RELEASED IN PART
12

Indonesia/East Timor: Call to Arms (U) B1, 1.4(D)

Pro-Jakarta militia members yesterday attacked pro-independence supporters, killing at least two people, according to press reports. Some of the wounded said police and local military had backed the attackers. Pro-independence leader **Xanana Gusmao** claimed 17 were killed and **called on his followers to take up arms in response to repeated attacks.** Timorese students in late March started returning to East Timor from universities throughout Indonesia, saying Xanana had "ordered" them to come home. (U)

[redacted] B1

MORI DocID: 1054664

Top Secret TIER

CIAPASS...SEIB 99-079CX...

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

The SEIB must be returned to CIA within 5 working days

Wednesday, 7 April 1999

National Security Information

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Reproduction of this Document Prohibited

Readership is limited to those on approved reader list on file with CIA SEIB Control Officer. The undersigned hereby acknowledge reading this document.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2004

MORI DocID: 1054664

Table of Contents

Leading Developments

[redacted] 1

3

5

Regional Notes

East Asia

[redacted] 6

8

Indonesia: Rebel Leader Taking Dangerous Gamble [redacted] 9

10

South Asia

[redacted] 11

12

Eurasia

[redacted] 13

13

Sense of the Community Memorandum

[redacted] 14

Top Secret

Indonesia: **Rebel Leader Taking Dangerous Gamble**

East Timorese leader Xanana's surprise public call for new attacks on Indonesian military units and prointegrationist civilian militias may be an attempt to hasten UN involvement in the province. Xanana's lawyer on Monday told a press conference that the jailed guerrilla will revoke his call to arms if the UN establishes a presence in East Timor to disarm the militias.

— A top Habibie aide warned that Xanana's declaration could undermine UN-sponsored tripartite talks with Portugal scheduled for next week.

Xanana has been under pressure from supporters to modify his longstanding call for his guerrilla fighters to exercise restraint in the face of provocations by the militia or the army, according to press reports. He admitted in a written statement that the new policy could prompt a "bloodbath" but noted he had no alternative. The policy reversal follows attacks on his supporters this week.

— it cannot confirm that Indonesian forces joined the attacks by prointegration militias but notes the militias control a main road leading to the provincial capital of Dili, presumably with the military's permission.

Extract from Atlantic Intelligence Command Executive Summary 071430Z Apr 90

INDONESIA: RIOTING CONTINUES [redacted]

[redacted] SIMULTANEOUS RIOTS IN OUTLYING AREAS IN INDONESIA ON 5 APRIL DEMONSTRATE THE ONGOING SECURITY PROBLEMS THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI) FACE IN MAINTAINING PEACE. THIS PROBLEM IS NOT LIKELY TO IMPROVE AS ABRI WILL UTILIZE MOST OF ITS RESOURCES TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER IN THE URBAN AREAS OF JAVA AS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS LOOM IN JUNE.

[redacted] RIOTING IN THE KAI ISLANDS, SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS OCCURRED ON 5 APRIL BETWEEN CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM FACTIONS INVOLVED IN A LAND DISPUTE. FIFTY-FOUR PEOPLE WERE KILLED BEFORE SECURITY FORCES COULD HALT THE CLASHES. IN LIQUICA, EAST TIMOR, CONTINUOUS CLASHES BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS LEFT AT LEAST TWO DEAD AND NINE INJURED. THESE RIOTS FOLLOWED THE CANCELLATION OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE LED CEASEFIRE ON 5 APRIL. IN STILL FURTHER RIOTING, SEVENTEEN HOUSES WERE BURNED IN ETHNIC CLASHES IN SAMBAS, WEST KALIMANTAN.

[redacted] THE ABRI HAS BEEN UNABLE TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO THE SCATTERED, YET INTENSE, VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT THE ARCHIPELAGO. LOCAL SECURITY FORCES ARE OFTEN UNTRUSTED AND TAKE LITTLE ACTION TO STOP THE VIOLENT ETHNIC AND RELIGION-BASED UNREST. THE OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION IN RURAL INDONESIA WILL WORSEN AS THE ABRI WILL FOCUS ITS FORCES ON INTERNAL SECURITY IN THE MAJOR URBAN AREAS OF JAVA IN THE FACE OF ELECTIONS THIS SUMMER. (PACOM, DIA, REUTERS, AIC POC: LTJG DEAN)

--

C34

DOCUMENT_ID: 183064779
DOCNO: 001745
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990407
TOR: 081032
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904071140
MHFNO: 99 4974787
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI5899
OO RUEHZS RUEHC
DE RUEHJA #1745 0971140
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071140Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7109
INFO RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 0866
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 4706
RHHMUNA/USCINCAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENQVA IMMEDIATE 1964
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001745

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/04

TEXT
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PREL, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: BELO AND XANANA PRESS CONFERENCES

REF: JAKARTA 1722

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (U) BISHOP BELO GAVE A LATE AFTERNOON PRESS CONFERENCE APRIL 7 FOLLOWING HIS RETURN TO DILI FROM A VISIT TO LIQUICA, SITE OF AN ABRI-BACKED MILITIA ATTACK ON CIVILIANS (REFTEL). BELO TOLD THE MEDIA THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM SENIOR SECURITY OFFICIAL COL. TONO REPORTING THAT THE TOTAL DEAD IN THE APRIL 6 LIQUICA INCIDENT WAS 25. BELO SPECULATED THAT THE COUNT WAS IN FACT HIGHER.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Gra..
X Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Dec..
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

3. (U) IN JAKARTA, AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME (APRIL 7), IMPRISONED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO AND CHIEF OF THE PORTUGUESE INTEREST SECTION ANNA GOMEZ ALSO GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE. GUSMAO CLARIFIED HIS APRIL 6 STATEMENT CALLING OF AN "INSURRECTION AGAINST THE ABRI-BACKED MILITIAS" BY STATING THAT HE ONLY CALLED OR THE ARMED RESISTANCE (FALINTIL) TO BE READQ TO DEFEND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND THAT HQ WAS NOT CALLING FOR AN UPRISING AGAINST THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY. HE INSISTED HAT HE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE UNSYG-SPOQSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR AND PLANS QOR A VOTE ON AUTONOMY.

4. (U) FOR HER PARQ, GOMEZ SAID THAT PORTUGAL WAS CALLING FOR AN NTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR, FOR AN INTERNATIONAL INQUIRY INTO THE APRIL 6 INCIDEN AND FOR PERMISSION FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TOBE SENT TO THOSE INJURED IN THAT INCIDENT. SE CLAIMED THE ATTACK IN LIQUICA BY ABRI-BACKEQ MILITIA WAS INTENDED TO DISRUPT THE NEW YORK TALKS -- SET TO BEGIN NEXT WEEK -- ON AN AUTONOMY PACKAGE AND MECHANISM FOR CONSULTATION IN EAST TIMOR.

5. (C) A WESTERN JOURNALIST WHO WAS IN LIQUICA TWICE ON APRIL 7 TOLD POLCOUNS THAT HE AND COLLEAGUES HAD FILM FOOTAGE OF "SCENES OF CARNAGE TOO STRONG FOR TELEVISION." HE ADDED THAT THE LIQUICA PRIEST WHOSE HOUSE HAD BEEN ASSAULTED, FATHER RAFAEL, TOLD HIM AND OTHER JOURNALISTS THAT WHEN ATTACKED BY THE MILITIA ON APRIL 6, LOCAL PEOPLE FLED TO HIS HOUSE AND TO THE ADJOINING CHURCH. AT THAT POINT, POLICE MOBIL BRIGADE TROOPS WHO HAD BEEN MOVING WITH BUT JUST BEHIND THE MILITIA ATTACKERS, MOVED FORWARD AND FIRED TEARGAS INTO HIS HOUSE. AS VILLAGERS FLED OUT OF THE HOUSE, THEY WERE SET UPON BY THE MILITIA WHO HACKED AT THEM WITH MACHETES. HE CITED WITNESSES AND THE PRIEST AS STATING THAT THE SECURITY FORCES TOOK NO ACTION TO STOP THE CARNAGE.
ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

(C36)

DOCUMENT_ID: 183069304
DOCNO: 064541
PRODUCER: WASHDC
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: OUT
DOR: 19990408
TOR: 001200
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904080404
MHFNO: 99 4988261
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #4541/01 0980409
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 080404Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0023
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4150
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0085
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE 8764
RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE 4668
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE 1862
RUEHJA/AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE 9711
RUEHKOF/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA IMMEDIATE 9269
RUEHKON/AMCONSUL NAGOYA IMMEDIATE 2593
RUHBBMA/AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE 2992
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE 6269
RUEHKOS/AMCONSUL SAPPORO IMMEDIATE 7635
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7672
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 5698
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4308
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2966
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5327
RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 6508
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2479
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 9609
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUAGAMS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS/ /PRIORITY
RUAGAMS/CHJUSMAG SEOUL NOR PRIORITY
RHHMHAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
RUCJACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 4961
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0172
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 3859
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 6162
BT

CONTROLS
UNCLAS STATE 064541

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: APRIL 7, 1999 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS - ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF - ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
UNVIE FOR FITZPATRICK
USEU FOR RUTH

1. INDEX:

--(CHINA) STILL NO PROTECTING POWER FOR FRY AND FOR U.S.
PARAS 2 - 3
-- CHINA - UPDATE: OFFICIAL VISIT OF PREMIER ZHU RONGJI
PARAS 4 - 5
-- CHINA'S POSSIBLE STRATEGIC GAINS FROM U.S. DUAL-USE
EXPORTS PARAS 4 AND 6
-- U.S.-CHINA CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT PARAS 4 AND 7
-- CHINA - WTO PARAS 4 AND 8
-- CHINA: JAILED DISSIDENT XU WENLI'S DAUGHTER ASKS
ADMINISTRATION TO RAISE FATHER'S CASE PARAS 4 AND 9
-- INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR VIOLENCE PARAS 4 AND 10
--INDONESIA: CONVICTIONS FOR KIDNAPPINGS PARAS 4 AND 11
-- CAMBODIA: REMAINS OF U.S. SERVICEMEN MISSING IN ACTION
PARAS 4 AND 12
-- DPRK: ROK PRESIDENT INDICATES NORTH SHIFT ON U.S.
FORCES? PARAS 4 AND 13

-- CANCELLATION OF PRESS CONFERENCE U.S. JAPAN COMMON
AGENDA PARAS 14 - 15

2. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED ON 04/0V/99
AND USED IN PART BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE DAILY
BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THIS GUIDANCE FOR USE ON AN
IF ASKED BASIS.

3. (CHINA) STILL NO PROTECTING POWER FOR FRY AND FOR U.S.

CONTEXT: DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE ON THE ISSUE OF PROTECTING
POWER FOR THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BELGRADE AND THE FRY EMBASSY
IN WASHINGTON.. SWEDEN STILL HAS THE KEYS TO THE U.S.
EMBASSY IN BELGRADE - I.E., THE SWEDES HAVE NOT FORMALLY
TERMINATED THEIR ROLE AS PROTECTING POWER, ALTHOUGH THEY
ARE NOT RECOGNIZED AS SUCH BY THE FRY. CHINA WAS NOT
FORMALLY REJECTED AS "UNACCEPTABLE" BY THE U.S. AS FRY
PROTECTING POWER, THOUGH WE HAVE INDICATED INFORMALLY IT
WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE, GIVEN OUR COMPLEX AND MULTI-
FACETED RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. THE CHINESE HAVE NOT/NOT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

RAISED THE ISSUE AGAIN FOLLOWING THE INITIAL DISCUSSION.

ON APRIL 4, THE FRY MFA INFORMED THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN BELGRADE THAT THE FRY HAD REJECTED SWEDEN'S OFFER TO BE THEIR PROTECTING POWER IN THE U.S. AND THAT CHINA WAS THE ONLY PROTECTING POWER ACCEPTABLE TO THEM IN THE U.S. THE FRY ALSO ASKED THE SWEDES TO TURN OVER THE KEYS TO THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BELGRADE. APRIL 6 WE REITERATED TO THE FRY OUR DESIRE TO SETTLE THE PROTECTING POWER ISSUE QUICKLY AND REASONABLY, URGING THEM TO CONSIDER ALTERNATES. WE ARE WAITING TO HEAR BACK.

ART. 45 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION STATES THAT A SENDING STATE MAY ENTRUST THE CUSTODY OF THE PREMISES OF THE MISSION, INCLUDING PROPERTY AND ARCHIVES, AND THE PROTECTION OF ITS INTERESTS AND THOSE OF ITS NATIONALS TO A THIRD STATE ACCEPTABLE TO THE RECEIVING STATE. THE RECEIVING STATE HAS BROAD DISCRETION TO DETERMINE WHICH PROTECTING POWER IS ACCEPTABLE TO IT. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE SENDING STATE HAS A RIGHT TO HAVE ITS INTERESTS AND PROPERTY PROTECTED BY A THIRD STATE, THERE COMES A POINT WHEN A RECEIVING STATE REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ANY THIRD STATE WOULD CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION. WE CLEARLY HAVE NOT REACHED THAT POINT BY INDICATING THE NON-SUITABILITY OF THE PRC TO BE PROTECTING POWER FOR THE FRY. GREECE WAS NEVER ACTUALLY PROPOSED BY THE FRY, FORMALLY OR OTHERWISE. END CONTEXT)

Q: HAS THE ISSUE OF A PROTECTING POWER FOR THE FRY EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON BEEN SETTLED YET?

A: AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE IN DISCUSSION WITH THE FRY TO ENSURE THAT EMBASSIES AND RELATED INTERESTS OF BOTH THE U.S. AND THE FRY ARE COVERED BY THE SERVICES OF AN APPROPRIATE PROTECTING POWER. THE ISSUE HAS NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED.

Q: DID THE FRY REFUSE TO ALLOW THE SWEDES TO CONTINUE AS PROTECTING POWER FOR THE U.S. IN BELGRADE?

A: FRY AUTHORITIES HAVE INFORMED SWEDEN THAT IT CAN NO LONGER BE THE U.S. PROTECTING POWER IN THE FRY. WE ARE DISCUSSING THE SITUATION AND EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES.

Q: DID THIS CAUSE DISCUSSIONS TO BREAK OFF ON RETURN OF THE THREE CAPTURED U.S. SERVICEMEN, AS ALLEGED BY THE WASHINGTON POST?

A: THE ISSUE HERE IS NOT WHETHER DIPLOMATIC NOTES ARE ANSWERED, BUT THAT THE CAPTURED U.S. SERVICEMEN SHOULD BE RELEASED.

--SO LONG AS THE SERVICEMEN ARE DETAINED, THEY HAVE PRISONER OF WAR STATUS.

--THE SERVICEMEN SHOULD BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY. WE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

INSIST ON THEIR HUMANE TREATMENT, AND THEIR IMMUNITY FROM ANY TRIAL.

Q: DID WE REFUSE TO ALLOW THE FRY TO BE REPRESENTED BY CHINA AS PROTECTING POWER?

A: NO FINAL DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE REGARDING A PROTECTING POWER FOR THE FRY.

(IF PRESSED)

--I HAVE NO COMMENT ON DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES.

4. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 04/0-/99 AND NOT USED BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE DAILY BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

5. CHINA - UPDATE: OFFICIAL VISIT OF PREMIER ZHU RONGJI

Q: CAN YOU PROVIDE DETAILS OF THE VISIT OF ZHU RONGJI?

A: ZHU RONGJI WILL VISIT WASHINGTON, D.C. FROM APRIL 7 TO APRIL 10. THIS WILL BE THE FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF A CHINESE PREMIER IN FIFTEEN YEARS. (PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN VISITED WASHINGTON OCTOBER 28-30 1997.) HE WILL ARRIVE AT ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE ON THE AFTERNOON OF WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7 AND WILL DEPART IN THE MORNING OF SATURDAY, APRIL 10. ON ARRIVAL AT BLAIR HOUSE, HE WILL RECEIVE A COURTESY CALL FROM SECRETARY ALBRIGHT.

-- AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON APRIL 8, THERE WILL BE A WELCOMING CEREMONY ON THE SOUTH LAWN IN THE MORNING, FOLLOWED BY A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON, A LUNCHEON HOSTED BY SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT, A LEADERS' JOINT PRESS AVAILABILITY, AND AN OFFICIAL DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

-- ON APRIL 9, THE PREMIER WILL MEET WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AND TAKE PART IN THE U.S. - CHINA FORUM ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, CO-CHAIRED BY VICE PRESIDENT GORE. A WORKING LUNCHEON AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WILL BE HOSTED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT. PRIVATE APPOINTMENTS IN THE AFTERNOON WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A DINNER HOSTED BY THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON U.S. - CHINA RELATIONS (NCUSCR), AMERICA-CHINA SOCIETY, ASIA SOCIETY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, COMMITTEE OF 100, U.S.-CHINA POLICY FOUNDATION, AND U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.

-- PREMIER ZHU WILL ARRIVE IN THE UNITED STATES ON TUESDAY, APRIL 6 IN LOS ANGELES AND WILL DEPART THE NEXT DAY, APRIL 7, FOR ANDREWS.

-- FOLLOWING HIS STAY IN WASHINGTON, PREMIER ZHU WILL TRAVEL TO DENVER ON APRIL 10, TO CHICAGO ON APRIL 11, TO NEW YORK CITY ON APRIL 12, AND TO BOSTON ON APRIL 14

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BEFORE DEPARTURE LATER ON APRIL 14 FOR CANADA.

DETAILS OF THE PREMIER'S SCHEDULE ARE STILL BEING WORKED OUT. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION, WHICH IS STILL PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE, MAY BE GIVEN OUT ONLY FOR PLANNING PURPOSES:

APRIL 6 - MORNING ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES
(PRESS POC: ROBERT ALANIZ, TEL. (323) 966-5727)
MEETINGS WITH L.A. MAYOR, GOVERNOR, LOCAL OFFICIALS AND BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES
LUNCHEON HOSTED BY L.A. MAYOR
DINNER HOSTED BY CHINESE-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY
(PRESS POC: KATRINA LEUNG, TEL. (626) 304-9389)
MEETING WITH STAFF OF PRC CONSULATE GENERAL

APRIL 7-- DEPART LOS ANGELES IN THE MORNING FOR ANDREWS AFB
ARRIVE ANDREWS IN THE LATE AFTERNOON
(PRESS POC: SGT. RICK CORRALL, ANDREWS AFB MEDIA CENTER, TEL. (301) 981-4511)
LATE AFTERNOON ARRIVAL AT BLAIR HOUSE - OPEN MEDIA
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT COURTESY CALL
(PRESS POC: MARY MASSERINI, TEL. 64V-1685)
MEETING WITH CHINESE EMBASSY STAFF AND REPRESENTATIVES OF CHINESE ORGANIZATIONS
(PRESS POC: LIU XIAOMING, CHINESE EMBASSY, TEL. 328-2511)

APRIL 8 - ARRIVAL CEREMONY ON THE WHITE HOUSE SOUTH LAWN
(APPROXIMATELY 9:30 A.M.)
RECEPTION FOR DELEGATIONS
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
LUNCHEON HOSTED BY SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT
LEADERS' JOINT PRESS AVAILABILITY
MEETING WITH WORLD BANK PRESIDENT WOLFENSOHN AT BLAIR HOUSE - PHOTO OP/OPEN MEDIA
(PRESS POC: MARY MASSERINI, TEL. 647-1685)
OFFICIAL DINNER AT WHITE HOUSE AT 7:15 P.M.

APRIL 9 -- MEETINGS WITH CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS
U.S. - CHINA FORUM ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT WITH VICE PRESIDENT GORE, INCLUDING A PLENARY AND A BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE
GORE-ZHU BILATERAL MEETING

WORKING LUNCH HOSTED BY VICE PRESIDENT GORE
(PRESS POC: VP GORE'S PRESS OFFICE, TEL. 456-7035)
MEETING WITH TREASURY SECRETARY RUB IN AND FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIRMAN GREENS PAN AT BLAIR HOUSE - PHOTO OP/OPEN MEDIA
(PRESS POC: MARY MASSERINI, TEL. 647-1685)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DINNER HOSTED BY NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS (NCUSCR), AMERICA-CHINA SOCIETY, ASIA SOCIETY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S.-CHINA POLICY FOUNDATION, COMMITTEE OF 100 AND U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
(PRESS POC: NICOLE GLUSHAKOW, TEL. 336-7412)

APRIL 10--DEPART FOR DENVER IN THE MORNING
RECEPTION AND LUNCH HOSTED BY MAYOR OF DENVER WITH BUSINESS AND ACADEMIC LEADERS
(PRESS POC: ANDREW HUDSON, TEL. (303) 640-2722)
PERFORMANCE AT RED ROCKS AMPHITHEATRE
VISIT TO DENVER BRONCOS TRAINING FACILITY
TOUR STORAGE TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION
RECEPTION AND DINNER HOSTED BY GOVERNOR OF COLORADO
(PRESS POC: AMY SAMPSON, TEL. (303) 866-6323)

APRIL 11--DEPART FOR CHICAGO IN THE MORNING
(PRESS POC: JACKIE HEARD/JOHN CAMPER, TEL. (312) 744-3334)
MEETING WITH CHINESE CONSULATE STAFF AND MEMBERS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITY
VISIT MARRELBAR FARM, LIBERTYVILLE, IL.
WELCOME BANQUET - CLOSED TO MEDIA COVERAGE

APRIL 12--VISIT CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE
(PRESS POC: ELLEN RESNICK, TEL. (312) 930-3435)
VISIT 911 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION CENTER
(PRESS POC: MR. RANJAN DANIELS, TEL. (312) 746-9425)
LUNCHEON WITH BUSINESS AND CIVIC LEADERSHIP
(PRESS POC: MS. RAESHMA RAZVI, TEL. (312) 236-8745)

VISIT MOTOROLA HQ AND MOTOROLA MUSEUM, SCHAUMBURG, IL.
(PRESS POC: DAVID RUDD, TEL. (847) 576-5304)
DEPART FOR NEW YORK IN THE EVENING

APRIL 13 --VISIT TO NASDAQ
(PRESS POC: ANDREW MACMILLAN, TEL. (202) 728-8340)
LUNCHEON, HOSTED BY THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, WITH MEMBERS OF BUSINESS COMMUNITY - CLOSED TO MEDIA COVERAGE
(PRESS POC: LARRY LAROCCO, TEL. (202) 663-5558)
MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF STAFF OF CHINESE MISSION TO THE UN AND CONSULATE GENERAL AND CHINESE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
DINNER HOSTED BY U.S.-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, NEW YORK ECONOMIC CLUB AND CHINESE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
(PRESS POC: CHERYL BELL/GINGER GILLIAN, TEL. (212) 891-0212)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

APRIL 14--DEPART FOR BOSTON IN THE MORNING
SPEECH AT MIT
(PRESS POC: MYLES CROWLEY, TEL. (617) 253-2700)
MEET WITH MEMBERS OF STAFF OF THE CHINESE CONSULATE AND CHINESE COMMUNITY
LUNCHEON HOSTED BY BUSINESS-ORIENTED "CHINA FORUM"- LIMITED PRESS ACCESS
(PRESS POC: PAMELA KRUH, TEL. (617) 572-0558)
DEPART FOR CANADA IN THE AFTERNOON

6. CHINA'S POSSIBLE STRATEGIC GAINS FROM U.S. DUAL-USE EXPORTS

CONTEXT: A BILL GERTZ ARTICLE IN TODAY'S WASHINGTON TIMES ALLEGES THAT CHINA HAS BEEN ABLE TO MAKE IMPORTANT ADVANCES IN ITS PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS THROUGH THE USE OF DUAL-USE GOODS MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES AND EXPORTED UNDER THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT'S EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS. THE ARTICLE IS BASED ON A REPORT BY THE WISCONSIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ENTITLED "U.S. EXPORTS TO CHINA, 1988-1998: FUELING PROLIFERATION." THE REPORT IS SCHEDULED TO BE RELEASED TODAY. WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN A COPY OF THE REPORT.

Q: HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO THE CHARGES THAT THE PRC MILITARY HAS BENEFITED FROM AMERICAN DUAL-USE EXPORTS AND THAT U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY HAS BEEN THREATENED BY THESE EXPORTS?

A: DUAL-USE EXPORTS ARE LICENSED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE UNDER THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS. REVIEW OF EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATIONS IS DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES WHILE ALSO PROTECTING ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

-- THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEWS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THE EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATIONS, AS DO THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE, ENERGY, AND, UNTIL APRIL FIRST, THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY.

-- EXPORTING ANY DUAL-USE GOODS HAS THE INHERENT POTENTIAL TO IMPROVE THE RECIPIENT'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES. THE LICENSE REVIEW PROCEDURES ARE DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE THAT POTENTIAL BY INCLUDING CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF AN EXPORT'S SPECIFIC END-USE AND END-USERS.

-- ITEMS SHIPPED UNDER GENERAL LICENSES (I.E. WITHOUT A SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL LICENSE FOR EACH COMMODITY) ARE ONLY REVIEWED BY THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT.

Q: CAN YOU COMMENT ON THE ALLEGATION THAT THE CHINESE OBTAINED TECHNOLOGY CRITICAL TO MODERNIZING THEIR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS?

A: THE ARTICLE MAKES ITS ASSERTION BASED ON ALLEGED INTELLIGENCE SOURCES. WE DO NOT COMMENT ON INTELLIGENCE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MATTERS OR ALLEGED INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

-- THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEWS DUAL-USE EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATIONS FROM THE FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY GROUND PRESPECTIVE.

IF PRESSED:

-- I WOULD REFER YOU TO AGENCIES WITH TECHNICAL EXPERTISE FOR AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAPABILITIES OF EXPORTED DUAL-USE ITEMS.

-. U.S.-CHINA CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT

Q: WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT REACHED WITH CHINA THIS WEEK?

A: THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA INITIALED A NEW AGREEMENT ON TUESDAY TO EXPAND CIVIL AVIATION TIES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE AGREEMENT WILL GREATLY EXPAND AIR SERVICE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, BRINGING BENEFITS TO CONSUMERS, LOCALITIES AND AIR CARRIERS.

--THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN PURSUING A NEW AVIATION RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA FOR MORE THAN 18 MONTHS. ONLY IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS, FOLLOWING HIGH-LEVEL INTERVENTIONS BY THE WHITE HOUSE, SECRETARIES ALBRIGHT AND SLATER, AND REPRESENTATIVE JAMES OBERSTAR, HAVE WE CLOSED THE GAPS WITH THE CHINESE.

--OVER THREE YEARS, THE AGREEMENT WILL DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF ROUND-TRIP FLIGHTS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES FROM 2V TO 54 FOR EACH SIDE PER WEEK. IT WILL ALLOW A FOURTH U.S. AIRLINE TO ENTER THE CHINA MARKET, AND WILL IMPROVE U.S.-CHINA AIR LINKS FOR DOZENS OF U.S. AND CHINESE CITIES. THE AGREEMENT WILL PERMIT EXPANDED COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S. AND CHINESE AIRLINES FOR JOINT MARKETING OF AIR SERVICES TO A LARGE NUMBER OF NEW CITIES IN BOTH COUNTRIES.

--THIS AGREEMENT SUPPORTS THE LIBERALIZATION OF OUR ECONOMIC TIES WITH CHINA, PROVIDES GROWTH FOR THE FUTURE, AND WILL BENEFIT THE TRAVELING PUBLIC, LOCAL COMMUNITIES, BUSINESSMEN AND AIRLINES IN BOTH COUNTRIES.

8. CHINA - WTO

CONTEXT: WE HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE WTO TALKS OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS, IN LARGE PART BECAUSE PREMIER ZHU RONGJI HAS REDOUBLED HIS EFFORTS TO TRY TO REACH A COMMERCIALLY VIABLE DEAL. WE EXPECT CONTINUED INTENSE TALKS UP TO AND POSSIBLY THROUGH ZHU'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON APRIL 7-L0. A COMMERCIALLY VIABLE DEAL MAY BE IN THE OFFING; THE CHINESE HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS, BUT MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AMB. BARSHEFSKY HAS BEEN PRIVATELY POSITIVE, BUT SUCCESS IS FAR FROM GUARANTEED. WE DO NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC DEADLINE, BUT WILL USE ZHU'S DESIRE FOR A DEAL TO TRY TO CLOSE THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BY THE TIME OF HIS VISIT. USTR CHARLENE BARSHEFSKY LEFT CHINA MARCH 30, AFTER MEETING WITH PREMIER ZHU RONGJI AND STATE COUNCILOR WU YI. SHE DID NOT GO TO OBTAIN A PACKAGE, AND SO THEREFORE DID

NOT "LEAVE EMPTY-HANDED." SHE WENT TO NARROW EXISTING GAPS AND TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM IN THE DISCUSSIONS. TALKS HAVE CONTINUED THIS WEEK IN WASHINGTON AT THE EXPERT LEVEL, BETWEEN BOB CASSIDY OF USTR AND CHINA'S CHIEF NEGOTIATOR, VICE MINISTER LONG YONGTU.

SOME MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ARE OPENLY WORRIED THAT THE NSC AND STATE ARE PUSHING USTR TO GET A DEAL AT ANY COST TO ENSURE A WTO DELIVERABLE FOR THE ZHU VISIT. SOME MEMBERS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL ACCEPT A ONE-SIDED DEAL THAT MAINLY SATISFIES BIG BUSINESS. WE HAVE FLATLY REFUTED THESE VIEWS AND EMPHASIZED THAT WE, LIKE USTR, SEEK A COMMERCIALLY MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT THAT WILL ACHIEVE BROAD SUPPORT ON THE HILL AND IN THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY TOGETHER WITH USTR AND USDA, WE HAVE MADE THESE POINTS CLEARLY AND FORCEFULLY IN PUBLIC TESTIMONY ON THE HILL. USTR HAS ALSO PROVIDED CLASSIFIED BRIEFINGS TO KEY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND BUSINESS LEADERS ON THE MORE SENSITIVE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE WTO NEGOTIATIONS.

CONGRESS IS CERTAIN TO SCRUTINIZE CLOSELY ANY WTO DEAL WE OBTAIN, IN TERMS OF BOTH ITS OWN MERITS AND OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES.

Q: HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE TALKS?

A: WE ARE MAKING SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS, BUT CRITICAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SPECULATE WHETHER OR NOT WE WILL ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT.

Q: SOME REPORTS SAY YOU HAVE A DEAL ON AGRICULTURE.
A: IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT WE HAVE NARROWED OUR DIFFERENCES ON AGRICULTURAL ISSUES SUBSTANTIALLY, AND THAT WE ARE CLOSER TO REACHING AGREEMENT IN THIS SECTOR THAN IN OTHER AREAS, BUT WE ARE NOT THERE YET. THERE ARE IMPORTANT ISSUES THAT MUST BE RESOLVED WITH RESPECT TO OUR BILATERAL CONCERNS ON CITRUS, WHEAT, AND MEAT. AND, CERTAINLY, THERE ARE OTHER AGRICULTURAL CONCERNS THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED.

Q: WHAT ARE THE REMAINING ISSUES?

A: THIS IS A VERY COMPLEX NEGOTIATION, INVOLVING VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF TRADE IN CHINA. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY INDICATED THAT WE WILL BE FLEXIBLE AND PRAGMATIC, BUT THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT WE MUST ACHIEVE MARKET ACCESS OBJECTIVES OF U.S. INDUSTRY IN CHINA. THE ISSUES IN MANY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CASES CUT ACROSS ENTIRE AREAS OF CHINA'S ECONOMY. UNTIL THESE ISSUES ARE RESOLVED, THERE CANNOT BE A DEAL. UNRESOLVED ISSUES HERE AFFECT OVERALL MARKET ACCESS, DISTRIBUTION RIGHTS, AND THE OPERATIONS OF FOREIGN COMPANIES IN CHINA. AGAIN, WE HAVE DIFFERENCES IN ALL AREAS THAT MUST BE RESOLVED.

Q: WILL AMBASSADOR BARSHEFSKY OR OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS BECOME INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?

A: THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE PROCEEDING AT THE "EXPERT" LEVEL WITH ASSISTANT USTR ROBERT CASSIDY LEADING TALKS ON THE U.S. SIDE. DISCUSSIONS ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE THROUGH TODAY.

Q: IS THE ADMINISTRATION SEEKING A TEN-YEAR PHASE-OUT OF TEXTILE QUOTAS?

A: WE HAVE REMAINING CONCERNS IN THIS AREA.

9. CHINA: JAILED DISSIDENT XU WENLI'S DAUGHTER ASKS ADMINISTRATION TO RAISE FATHER'S CASE

CONTEXT: XU JIN, DAUGHTER OF JAILED CHINESE DEMOCRACY PARTY ACTIVIST, XU WENLI, ARRIVES TODAY IN WASHINGTON TO URGE THE ADMINISTRATION TO PRESS FOR HER FATHER'S RELEASE DURING THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER ZHU RONGJI TO WASHINGTON. THE WASHINGTON POST RAN AN OP-ED PIECE BY XU JIN THIS MORNING IN WHICH SHE OUTLINED THE FACTS OF HER FATHER'S DECEMBER TRIAL AND SENTENCING TO 13 YEARS IN PRISON FOR "SUBVERTING THE POWER OF THE STATE." SHE STATES THE TRIAL WAS A "SHAM" AND ASSERTS THAT CHINA VIOLATED ITS OWN LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS BY PUTTING HER FATHER IN JAIL. SHE CALLS "FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S HELP IN PRESSING FOR MY FATHER'S RELEASE AND URGING THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TAKE STEPS IMMEDIATELY TO IMPROVE THE CONDITIONS OF HIS IMPRISONMENT." SHE ALSO ASKS FOR HELP IN SEEKING AN END TO THE HARASSMENT OF HER MOTHER. (TWO OTHER CHINESE DEMOCRACY PARTY ACTIVISTS, QIN YONGMIN AND WANG YOUCAI, ARE ALSO SERVING HARSH SENTENCES AFTER DECEMBER TRIALS THAT FLAGRANTLY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS.) XU JIN IS A GRADUATE STUDENT AT BOSTON UNIVERSITY.
Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON XU JIN'S OP-ED PIECE IN THE WASHINGTON POST.

A: ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE MET WITH XU JIN, XU WENLI'S DAUGHTER, AND TALKED WITH HER ABOUT HER FATHER'S CASE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. ASSISTANT SECRETARY KOH HAS SPOKEN TO HER THIS WEEK TO HEAR HER CONCERNS ABOUT HER FATHER'S CASE, INCLUDING HIS TREATMENT IN PRISON AND THE HARASSMENT OF HER MOTHER.

--AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE HARSH SENTENCES THAT XU WENLI, QIN YONGMIN, AND WANG YOUCAI

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED IN DECEMBER IN CLOSED TRIALS THAT FLAGRANTLY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS.

--WE HAVE RAISED THESE CONCERNS WITH CHINESE OFFICIALS ON MANY OCCASIONS, URGING THAT THE CRACKDOWN ON ORGANIZED POLITICAL DISSENT BE ROLLED BACK AND THAT ALL THOSE SERVING SENTENCES FOR THE PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS ARE RELEASED.

--WE WILL CONTINUE TO RAISE THESE CONCERNS WITH THE CHINESE, INCLUDING DURING MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER ZHU RONGJI. HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES ARE SQUARELY ON THE AGENDA OF THE MEETINGS SCHEDULED OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

10. INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR VIOLENCE

CONTEXT: EMBASSY JAKARTA REPORTS THAT THERE WAS A SECOND DAY OF VIOLENCE APRIL 6 IN THE SMALL TOWN OF LIQUICA, EAST TIMOR. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA KILLED AT LEAST FIVE CIVILIANS, WITH APPROXIMATELY 20 INJURED. SOURCES WHO VISITED THE SCENE SAW NO EVIDENCE THAT GRENADES WERE USED IN THE ATTACK. BISHOP BELO'S OFFICE IN DILL REPORTEDLY DENIED THAT HE HAD SAID GRENADES WERE USED AND THAT 45 PERSONS WERE KILLED IN THE APRIL 6 ATTACK. EMBASSY JAKARTA COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT INDONESIAN MILITARY PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK. AT A MINIMUM, HOWEVER, THEY DID NOT INTERCEDE TO PREVENT BLOODSHED.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR IN LIGHT OF A REPORT THAT GUNMEN FIRED SHOTS INTO A CHURCH IN EAST TIMOR WHERE 1500 TERRIFIED RESIDENTS HAD TAKEN REFUGE AND THAT AS MANY AS 45 PEOPLE MAY HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE SHOOTINGS THERE AND AT THE HOME OF THE PARISH PRIEST IN LIQUICA.

A: WE HAVE RECEIVED CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT CIVILIANS WERE ATTACKED IN A CHURCH IN LIQUICA, EAST TIMOR. AT LEAST FIVE ARE DEAD. THEIR KILLERS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ARMED CIVILIAN MILITIA.

-- ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT CONFIRM REPORTS OF INDONESIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND PROTECT THE PEOPLE. WE ARE DEEPLY TROUBLED BY THEIR FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD CIVILIANS IN LIQUICA. WE CALL FOR THE IMMEDIATE DISARMING OF CIVILIAN MILITIA GROUPS, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THIS WEEK'S KILLINGS, AND PUNISHMENT FOR THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE CRIMES, AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO PREVENT FURTHER CLASHES.

-- THE UNITED STATES IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING THE LATEST REPORTED CLASHES. WE REJECT VIOLENCE AS A MEANS OF RESOLVING THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR AND CALL FOR ALL PARTIES TO WORK FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. WE SUPPORT AN ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR AND THE ON-GOING UN-SPONSORED TALKS ON THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

STATUS OF EAST TIMOR; WE CALL ON INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THEIR UPCOMING ROUND.

-- WE ALSO CALL ON EAST TIMORESE LEADERS TO ACTIVELY CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO A CEASE-FIRE AND OTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. ALL SIDES SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE TENSIONS BOTH NOW, AND AS THE PROCESS OF EAST TIMOR'S TRANSITION TO A NEW STATUS PROCEEDS.

11. INDONESIA: CONVICTIONS FOR KIDNAPPINGS

CONTEXT: ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, 11 MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) HAVE BEEN CONVICTED IN AN INDONESIAN MILITARY COURT OF ABDUCTING DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS IN 199- AND 1998. THE CONVICTED SOLDIERS RECEIVED PRISON SENTENCES RANGING UP TO 22 MONTHS.

Q: WHAT IS OUR REACTION TO THE REPORTED SENTENCING BY AN INDONESIAN MILITARY COURT OF 11 SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIERS TO PRISON TERMS OF MUCH AS 22 MONTHS APIECE FOR THE KIDNAPPINGS OF ANTI-SUHARTO DISSIDENTS IN 1997 AND 1998?

A: TWELVE OF THE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS WHO WERE KIDNAPPED BY INDONESIAN SPECIAL FORCES TROOPS (KOPASSUS) WHEN IT WAS UNDER THE CONTROL OF LT. GENERAL PRABOWO, THE SON-IN-LAW OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, REMAIN MISSING. THEY ARE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN MURDERED. IN THAT CONTEXT, CONVICTION OF LOW-RANKING SOLDIERS WITH RELATIVELY LIGHT SENTENCES IS NOT A SATISFACTORY FINAL OUTCOME OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE DISAPPEARANCES THAT OCCURRED IN THE LATTER MONTHS OF THE SOEHARTO REGIME.

-- WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED OUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE DISAPPEARANCES TO THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. WE CONTINUE TO URGE THAT THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES CONDUCT THOROUGH AND CREDIBLE INVESTIGATIONS AND ENSURE THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE CRIMES - INCLUDING SENIOR FIGURES WHO ORDERED THEM -- ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE AND HELD ACCOUNTABLE.

12. CAMBODIA: REMAINS OF U.S. SERVICEMEN MISSING IN ACTION

CONTEXT: THE REMAINS BELIEVED TO BE THOSE OF U.S. SERVICEMEN MISSING IN ACTION WERE HANDED OVER TO AMBASSADOR QUINN ON APRIL 6. THIS CAME AT THE CONCLUSION OF A MONTH-LONG JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN U.S. JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING AND THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA POW/MIA COMMITTEE.

Q: WHY HAVE THE CAMBODIANS TURNED OVER THE REMAINS OF U.S. SERVICEMEN MISSING IN ACTION?

A: WE HAVE RECEIVED EXCELLENT COOPERATION FROM CAMBODIAN OFFICIALS IN OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF U.S. SERVICEMEN MISSING AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE HANDOVER OF THESE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

REMAINS ON APRIL 6 TO AMBASSADOR QUINN IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THIS COOPERATION.

-- PLEASE CONTACT THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT FOR FURTHER DETAILS.

13. DPRK: ROK PRESIDENT INDICATES NORTH SHIFT ON U.S. FORCES?

CONTEXT: SOUTH KOREAN NEWSPAPERS REPORT THAT PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG STATED TO ROK ARMY OFFICERS AT A PROMOTION CEREMONY THAT HE HAD INDICATIONS THAT NORTH KOREA WOULD NO LONGER DEMAND U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM THE KOREAN PENINSULA BUT WOULD REGARD THEM AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE AFTER UNIFICATION. IN OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON THE STORIES, THE ROK FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS SUBSEQUENTLY DENIED THAT SUCH SIGNALS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE NORTH.

Q: WHAT IS THE NORTH KOREAN POSITION ON THE PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA? HAVE THEY CHANGED THEIR POSITION? HOW WAS THIS CONVEYED? IS THIS A TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NORTH KOREA OR AT THE FOUR PARTY TALKS?

A: THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS A MATTER FOR THE U.S. AND ROK GOVERNMENTS AND, AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED, IS NOT A SUBJECT FOR BILATERAL NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND DPRK.

--THIS ITEM IS ALSO NOT ON THE "AGENDA" OF THE FOUR PARTY TALKS. THE U.S. GOALS IN THE FOUR PARTY TALKS -- AND INDEED THE RESPECTIVE FOCUS OF THE TWO SUBCOMMITTEES ESTABLISHED BY THE FOUR PARTIES -- ARE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE REGIME ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TENSION REDUCTION THERE.

-- THERE ARE NO PLANS TO CHANGE THE LEVELS OR NATURE OF U.S. TROOP DEPLOYMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

-- WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY CHANGE IN THE LONG-STANDING NORTH KOREAN POSITION ON THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IN KOREA.

Q: SO WHAT IS PRESIDENT KIRN TALKING ABOUT?

A: WE HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS THAT CLAIM PRESIDENT KIM HAS INDICATED HE HAS INFORMATION THAT NORTH KOREA HAS CHANGED ITS VIEWS. I UNDERSTAND THE ROK GOVERNMENT HAS COMMENTED PUBLICLY ON THESE REPORTS AND WOULD REFER YOU TO THE ROK GOVERNMENT FOR FURTHER COMMENT ON PRESIDENT KIM'S REMARKS.

--WE NOTE THAT PRESIDENT KIM INDICATED THAT THE ROK FAVORS THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS, A BEDROCK POLICY OF OUR MUTUAL DETERRENCE OF POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION.

14. THE FOLLOWING NOTICE TO THE PRESS WAS ISSUED BY THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ON 4/07/99.

15. CANCELLATION OF PRESS CONFERENCE U.S. JAPAN COMMON AGENDA

DUE TO SCHEDULING PROBLEMS, THE PRESS CONFERENCE ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR APRIL 8 FOR THE U.S.-JAPAN COMMON AGENDA WILL NOT BE HELD. THERE WILL BE A CAMERA SPRAY AT THE OPENING OF THE MEETING IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S LOY HENDERSON CONFERENCE ROOM AT 8:30 A.M. ON APRIL 8.

THE COMMON AGENDA COVERS BILATERAL COOPERATION ON GLOBAL ISSUES, INCLUDING CLIMATE CHANGE, DISEASE PREVENTION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH, AND NATURAL DISASTER MITIGATION. THE U.S. AND JAPAN HAVE COLLABORATED ON SOME

200 PROJECTS ON NEARLY EVERY CONTINENT UNDER THE COMMON AGENDA, WHICH WAS INAUGURATED BY PRESIDENT CLINTON AND THEN-PRIME MINISTER MIYAZAWA IN 1993.

FRANK LOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS, WILL CHAIR THE U.S. DELEGATION, WHICH WILL INCLUDE SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM SOME 15 USG AGENCIES INCLUDING THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, THE NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, AND THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS KOICHI HARAGUCHI WILL LEAD THE JAPANESE DELEGATION, WHICH INCLUDES SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM EIGHT JAPANESE AGENCIES.

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, PLEASE CONTACT JOHN BRINKLEY, STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS, AT 202-647 8093.
ALBRIGHT

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

C35

DOCUMENT_ID: 183068810
DOCNO: 064343
PRODUCER: WASHDC
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: OUT
DOR: 19990407
TOR: 203422
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904080032
MHFNO: 99 4986721
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNR UUUUU ZOC STATE ZZH
MPF4343
OO RUEHC RUEHBD RUEHBK RUEHBY RUEHJA RUEHKL RUEHLI
RUEHML RUCNDT RUEHBS RUEHGO RUEHGP RUEHKO RUEHVN
RHHMUNA RUEHPF RUEHHI
DE RUEHC #4343 0980033
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 080032Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 5061
INFO RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5268
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 6726
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 8880
BT

CONTROLS
UNCLAS STATE 064343

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, ID
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM A/S ROTH TO XANANA GUSMAO

1. (U) DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT EMBASSY JAKARTA DELIVER THE LETTER AT PAPA 2 BELOW FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY O. ROTH TO XANANA GUSMAO. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW:

2. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR XANANA:

IT HAS BEEN NEARLY A MONTH SINCE YOU, SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AND I MET IN JAKARTA. EVENTS IN MANY PARTS OF THE-WORLD HAVE EVOLVED RAPIDLY SINCE THAT MEETING, INCLUDING IN EAST TIMOR.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

MORI DocID: 1054630

UNCLASSIFIED

IT IS OVER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST TIMOR THAT I WRITE YOU. I HAVE BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED BY EVENTS, INCLUDING THE REPORTS OF KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS IN LIQUICA THIS WEEK.

WE HAVE REPEATEDLY URGED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO DISARM THE CIVILIAN MILITIA. THESE ATTACKS -- AND ALLEGATIONS OF MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE KILLERS -- ARE EXTREMELY TROUBLING. WE ARE REITERATING OUR CONCERNS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA AND WILL CONTINUE TO CALL UPON ABRI LEADERSHIP TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE AND PREVENT FURTHER OCCURRENCES.

I AM ALSO TROUBLED BY REPORTS THAT YOU HAVE RECENTLY RAISED THE PROSPECT OF ARMED STRUGGLE AND A BROADER CONFLICT IN EAST TIMOR. I UNDERSTAND THAT SOME OF THE MEDIA REPORTS MAY HAVE EXAGGERATED YOUR COMMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF VIOLENCE AT THIS SENSITIVE TIME ITSELF RISKS JEOPARDIZING PROSPECTS FOR A PEACEFUL AND LASTING SOLUTION TO THE FUTURE OF EAST TIMOR. IN ADDITION TO INCREASING TENSIONS, SUCH RHETORIC MAY COMPLICATE, RATHER THAN FACILITATE, MOBILIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR EAST TIMOR'S TRANSITION TO AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. IT RISKS HEIGHTENING INTERNATIONAL CONCERN THAT CURRENT CONDITIONS IN EAST TIMOR WILL NOT PERMIT CREDIBLE CONSULTATIONS OF THE EAST TIMORESE ABOUT THEIR FUTURE AND THUS CONTRIBUTE POSSIBLY TO POSTPONEMENT OF THIS CRUCIAL STEP.

AS WE HAVE STATED ON MANY PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE UN-SPONSORED INITIATIVE ON THE STATUS OF EAST TIMOR HOLDS THE BEST HOPE FOR PROGRESS IN CHARTING A NEW FUTURE FOR YOUR PEOPLE. WE REMAIN FIRMLY OF THAT VIEW TODAY. DESPITE A RECENT INCREASE VIOLENCE ON THE GROUND, PROSPECTS IN RECENT MONTHS FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE UN TALKS HAVE NEVERTHELESS IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY, THANKS TO YOUR PRAGMATIC LEADERSHIP AND TO THE NEW FLEXIBILITY OF PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON THE QUESTION OF AUTONOMY OR SEPARATION. THUS, WE MUST DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO PRESERVE THIS PROGRESS AND BUILD FURTHER MOMENTUM.

I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE CLARIFIED FOR YOUR SUPPORTERS AND FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT YOU DID NOT CALL FOR AN ARMED UPRISING, AS PREVIOUS REPORTS HAD SAID. I URGE YOU TO CONTINUE TO CALL PUBLICLY FOR RESTRAINT. YOUR LEADERSHIP IN THE CRUCIAL AREA OF RESTORING CALM IS ESSENTIAL IF THE UN PROCESS IS TO SUCCEED. FOR OUR PART, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO PERMIT IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR AS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN RESTORING CALM IN PREPARATION FOR THE UPCOMING CONSULTATIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO MAKE VERY CLEAR TO ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT

OF INDONESIA, THAT WE VIEW ALL ACTIONS WHICH INCREASE TENSIONS AND PROMOTE VIOLENQE AS DANGEROUS AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO FINDING A LASTING, PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

I PLAN TO VISIT JAKARTA NEXT WEEK AND HOPE TO SEE YOU AT THAT TIME.

SINCERELY,

STANLEY O. ROTH

END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(101)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183067794
PRODUCER: USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ2-J//
SOURCE: MILITARY
~~DOCTYPE:~~ OTHER
DOR: 19990407
TOR: 164838
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904072000
MHFNO: 99 4984471
DOCCLASS: ~~S~~
CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

R - Item pp 4-5

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUWSMXI #4102 0972030
ZNY ~~SSSSS~~
P 072000Z APR 99
FM USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ2-J//
TO AIG 8008
~~AIG 12303~~
AIG 328
AIG 621
AIG 10313
RUEASCO/CDR599THTRANSGPTML WHEELER AAF HI//MTWPA-OP-OS//
RUATNPT/CDR837THTRANSBN PUSAN KOR//MTWPA-PU-C//
RUWMNMN/926FW NEW ORLEANS LA//IN//
RUEOGEA/128ARW GEN MITCHELL IAP WI//IN//
RHCPMXA/908AW MAXWELL AFB AL//IN//
RHFJJAJ/COMHSWINGLANT JACKSONVILLE FL//N72//
RUQNAAA/48FW DEPLOYED INCIRLIK AB TU//DOI//
RUFTURA/ACS SPANGDAHLEM AB GE//DOI//
RUVRAAA/93OSS ROBINS AFB GA//IN//
RUEBBEA/MARITIME ADMIN WASHINGTON DC//613/620//
RUHUBDA/133ACS FT DODGE IA//IN//
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

~~QQQQ~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ: USTRANSCOM DISUM CY 99-066 (U)

1. (U) USTRANSCOM DISUM FOR 07 APR 99.

2. (U) THIS REPORT IS MADE UP OF USTRANSCOM ITEMS OF INTEREST. THIS PRODUCT, BASED ON ALL-SOURCE REPORTING, REPRESENTS THE ANALYSIS AND POSITION OF THE USTRANSCOM JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER TRANSPORTATION (JICTRANS).

3. (U) EUCOM AOR.

MORI DocID: 1054658

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION:

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

MORI DocID: 1054658

4. (U) CENTCOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

Non-responsive

MORI DocID: 1054658

Non-Responsive

5. (U) SOUTHCOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)
B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS: (NTR)

6. (U) PACOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

1. (U) INDONESIA: FOLLOWING THE DEATHS OF AT LEAST FIVE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS IN EAST TIMOR, JAILED RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO HAS CANCELLED AN EXISTING CEASE-FIRE AND CALLED FOR HIS SUPPORTERS TO ENGAGE PRO-INDONESIA FORCES. XANANA'S SURPRISE PUBLIC CALL FOR NEW ATTACKS ON INDONESIAN MILITARY UNITS AND PROINTEGRATIONIST CIVILIAN MILITIAS IS AN ATTEMPT TO HASTEN UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROVINCE. A SPOKESMAN FOR GUSMAO SAID THE CALL FOR A RETURN TO INSURRECTION WOULD BE REVOKED IF THE UN STEPPED IN TO HELP AND INDONESIA'S MILITARY ENDED ITS ATTACKS. XANANA'S DECLARATION COULD UNDERMINE UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS WITH PORTUGAL SCHEDULED FOR NEXT WEEK. XANANA HAS BEEN UNDER PRESSURE FROM SUPPORTERS TO MODIFY HIS LONG-STANDING CALL FOR HIS GUERRILLA FIGHTERS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF PROVOCATIONS BY THE MILITIA OR THE ARMY. HE ADMITTED IN A WRITTEN STATEMENT THAT THE NEW POLICY COULD PROMPT A "BLOODBATH" BUT NOTED HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE. THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SAYS IT CANNOT CONFIRM THAT INDONESIAN FORCES JOINED THE ATTACKS BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS BUT NOTES THE MILITIAS CONTROL A MAIN ROAD

R

RESPONSIVE

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

LEADING TO THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF DILI, PRESUMABLY WITH THE MILITARY'S PERMISSION. ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO COULD PLAY A PIVOTAL ROLE IN REDUCING TENSION BY ENFORCING HIS ORDERS FOR AN END TO MILITARY SUPPORT FOR VARIOUS PROINTEGRATIONIST GROUPS. FOR MONTHS THE MILITARY HAS PROVIDED AMMUNITION TO THE CIVILIAN MILITIAS. SOME UNITS MAY STILL BE PROVIDING TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ADVICE AND HAVE NOT ATTEMPTED TO DISARM THE MILITIAS. THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE, WHETHER SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR OR COMMUNAL VIOLENCE AS SEEN ELSEWHERE, IS LIKELY TO INCREASE AS JUNE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS APPROACH. WITH VIOLENT UNREST SO WIDESPREAD, THE INDONESIAN MILITARY WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO AVOID OVEREXTENDING ITSELF IN ITS EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE SECURITY SITUATION. DESPITE A STRONG, DEMONSTRATED RELUCTANCE, THE ARMED FORCES MAY BE FORCED TO DEPLOY CRITICAL FORCES AWAY FROM THE CAPITAL OF JAKARTA, AND OTHER IMPORTANT URBAN CENTERS LIKELY TO SEE INCREASED UNREST IN THE RUN UP TO ELECTIONS. THERE IS NO DIRECT THREAT TO AMERICAN CITIZENS IN INDONESIA AT THIS TIME. (POC: [redacted] CJCS INTELLIGENCE UPDATE 07 APR 99; [redacted] 07 APR 99)

RESPONSIVE

7. (U) RESPECTIVE AOR ASSESSMENTS OF TERRORIST THREAT LEVELS (AREAS WITH MEDIUM OR HIGHER THREAT ASSESSMENTS) ARE SHOWN EVERY MONDAY. CHANGES ARE REPORTED DAILY AS THEY OCCUR.

8. (U) ANY PLAIN LANGUAGE ADDRESS CHANGE REQUESTS TO THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE FORWARDED VIA MESSAGE TO ORIGINATOR OR VIA FAX TO CINC TRANS INTEL CEN, DSN 576 8005 SECURE FAX, DSN 576 1559 UNCLAS FAX. POC FOR PLA CHANGES IS SSGT K. MORRIS.

9. (U) POC IS JICTRANS; DSN STU III 576 4235; COMM STU III 618 256 4235; SECURE FAX 576 8005//

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

SOURCES: FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

USTRANSCOM DISUM CY 99-066,
Paragraph 6.B(1) is declassified
IAW TCJ2 Memo, 20 May 2004
And Department of State Memo,
30 Jun 2004.

30 Jun 06

DAVID M. COONEY, JR. (Date)
CAPT, USN
Director of Intelligence

I IA

RELEASED IN FULL

■ **Rhetoric heats up**

The "call to arms" statement released by East Timorese pro-independence leader Xanana Gusmao on April 5 reflected his dismay at reports of the violence. In an April 7 press conference, Xanana denied he had called for war, saying he had urged the people of East Timor to defend themselves, but his statements generated predictable reactions. Pro-Jakarta Timorese activists taunted that they too were ready to fight, and Indonesia's justice minister demanded a retraction and suggested that Xanana could be transferred back to prison from the current house arrest arrangement. In East Timor, the Dili military commander, who accompanied Bishop Belo to Likisia on April 7, argued publicly that the attack was "understandable" because guns found in the priest's house confirmed that Falintil the military wing of the pro-independence movement, had sought refuge there. (U)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 19 NOV 2004 200300644

MORI DocID: 1054606

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT ID: 183069792
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990408
TOR: 005510
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904081100
MHFNO: 99 4988514
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUHPSGG #0273 0980421
ZNY SSSSS
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR/THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUCORGP T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RUEBJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR/HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUFOADA T JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUERJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUHBABA T CG III MEF/HQBN THIRD MARDIV/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE/THREE ONE MEU/FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR/SECONDBN FOURTH MAR/SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR/III MEF TECG
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW/MWSG SEVENTEEN/TWELFTH MAR/THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO/HMH THREE SIX ONE/MAG THREE SIX
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN/HMH FOUR SIX SIX/HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE/COMPHIBGRU ONE DET

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Sep 02
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

ENCL 2

MORI DocID: 1054606

RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUHDYOK T NAVSECGRUACT YOKOSUKA JA
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU SOC/THIRTEENTH MEU
RUHPCRO T COMCARGRU ONE
RUHPPEL T COMPHIBRON ONE
RUHPTAR T USS TARAWA
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUWHITS T COMCMRON ONE DET
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE/FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE/MACS SEVEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE/FIRST MAR
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR/THIRDBN FIFTH MAR/FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR/FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR/THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWIKBD T VMFA AW TWO TWO FIVE/MAG ELEVEN
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO/HMH FOUR SIX FIVE/MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT/MTACS THREE EIGHT
RUWIKBK T MWSG THREE SEVEN
P 081100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN

MORI DocID: 1054606

~~SECRET~~

RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUFAPTJ/NMCB THREE DET SIERRA
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
4WG SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
USNS WATERS
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA098/08 APR//
RMKS/
(U) 1. ~~(S)~~ WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

[redacted]

(ESPIONAGE) NOFORN

~~SECRET~~

D. (C) INDONESIA - BODY COUNT RISES IN THREE PROVINCES

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELPOMENTS:

[redacted]

NOW responsive

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE

(U) D. (C) INDONESIA - BODY COUNT RISES IN THREE PROVINCES: RIOTS CONTINUED AND THE BODY COUNT ROSE IN THE KAI ISLANDS (0540S/13245E), SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS; SINGKAWANG (0054N/10900E), WEST KALIMANTAN; AND LIQUICA (0840S/12520E), EAST TIMOR 7 APR. IN THE KAI ISLANDS THE DEATH TOLL ROSE TO 63 DESPITE THE DEPLOYMENT OF ONE BATTALION OF THE ANTI-RIOT STRIKE FORCE. POLICE IN SINGKAWANG KILLED AT LEAST 12 MADURESE WHO ATTACKED A POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN AN EFFORT TO RELEASE 20 DETAINED FRIENDS. LOCAL MALAYS AND DAYAKS CONTINUE TO BURN HOUSES OF MADURESE SETTLERS. IN LIQUICA, VIOLENCE CONTINUED BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS. CONFLICTING REPORTS INDICATE PRO-JAKARTA MILITIA GROUPS, WITH ARMED FORCES SUPPORT, KILLED BETWEEN 5 AND 45 INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS IN THE LAST TWO DAYS. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE VIOLENCE IN THESE AREAS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE AS SECURITY FORCES ON THE SCENE ARE BEING ACCUSED OF TAKING INSUFFICIENT ACTION TO STOP UNREST. THE WIDELY VARYING REPORTS OUT OF EAST TIMOR ARE PROBABLY CAUSED BY THE PROPAGANDA EFFORTS OF BOTH PRO AND ANTI-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS. SEPARATIST ELEMENTS LIKELY WANT TO EXAGGERATE THE SCALE OF MILITIA GROUP KILLINGS TO FORCE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE COMMITMENT OF UN PEACE-KEEPING FORCES. SEPARATISTS SEE THE DEPLOYMENT OF UN FORCES TO EAST TIMOR ACCELERATING THE MOVE TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE. INTEGRATIONISTS LIKELY WANT TO LIMIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY OF MILITIA GROUPS EFFORTS TO INTIMIDATE LIKELY SEPARATIST VOTERS. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR	BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

08 APR	JAPAN	(U) HANA MATSURI (FLOWER FESTIVAL)

SECRET

10 APR	PAKISTAN	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY (1973)
13 APR	INDIA	(U) VAISAKHI (SIKH) GURU GOBIND SINGH FOUNDED SIKHISM AS A MILITARISTIC RELIGION (1699).
12-14 APR	THAILAND	(U) SONGKRAN (NATIONAL HOLIDAY; TRADITIONAL NEW YEAR)
15 APR	NORTH KOREA	(U) BIRTHDAY OF KIM IL-SUNG (1912) ANNIVERSARY OF EC-121 SHOOTDOWN (1969)
19 APR	SOUTH KOREA	(U) STUDENT REVOLUTION (1960)
25 APR	AUSTRALIA/ NEW ZEALAND/ COOK ISLANDS/ SAMOA/TONGA	(U) ANZAC DAY (1915)
25 APR	NORTH KOREA	(U) FOUNDING OF KOREAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (1932)/KIM IL-SUNG GUERRILLA UNIT ACTIVATION DAY (1915)
29 APR	JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS

C.
5. (U) [redacted]

b(2)

[redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183077403
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990409
TOR: 031940
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904091100
MHFNO: 99 5005059
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #0243 0990700
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0225 0990509
RUHPFTP T COMCARGRU FIVE
RUHPCRO T COMCARGRU ONE
RUHPCDT T COMCRUDESGRU THREE
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRMAAT T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUNGPDF T USS VANDEGRIFT
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUWHITS T COMCMRON ONE DET
RUHPZAE T COMCRUDESGRU ONE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUWDIBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUHPJCS T USS JOHN C STENNIS
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RHWIFUA T USCGC MIDGETT
RUHPTAR T USS TARAWA
RUHDYOK T NAVSECGRUACT YOKOSUKA JA
RUHPPEL T COMPHIBRON ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 2340 00
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

ENCL 32

MORI DocID: 1054607

RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUEOEGA T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUFOADA T JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN

RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUEBJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN

SECRET

RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHWISSF T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RUCORGP T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHWISSM T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 091100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUFAPTJ/NMCB THREE DET SIERRA
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
4WG SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
USNS WATERS
BT

CONTROLS
S E C R E T

MORI DocID: 1054607

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA099/09 APR//
RMKS/
(U) 1. ~~(S)~~ WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:
   A. [redacted]
   B. [redacted]
(U) C. ~~(S)~~ INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 1-8 APR 99
   D. [redacted]

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELPOMENTS:
   A. [redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE

[redacted]

NOT RESPONSIVE

C. (S) INDONESIA — WEEKLY UPDATE 1 – 8 APR 99:

(C) GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THE OVERALL LEVEL OF UNREST IN INDONESIA INCREASED OVER LAST WEEK DUE TO RENEWED VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, MOLUCCAS, AND WEST KALIMANTAN. SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR REMAINS TENSE AS PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBEL LEADER XANANA GUSMAO AND EAST TIMOR ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP CARLOS BELO ALLEGEDLY MADE STATEMENTS FOR CONTINUED RESISTANCE AND RENEWED FIGHTING. UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS SCHEDULED FOR 22-23 APR. (KEYS ID)

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE RUPIAH EXCHANGE RATE DECLINED TO RP 8,655/$1.00. THE ECONOMY REMAINS WEAK AND IS UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PERIOD. THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY IS STILL BURDENED WITH PROBLEMS RELATING TO INSOLVENT BANKS AND OFF-SHORE PRIVATE DEBTS. MEANWHILE, AMIDST THE CONTROVERSIAL FINANCIAL BRIBERY SCANDAL, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE (DPR) FINALLY ENDORSED THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL THAT

AN INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY OUTSIDE THE BANK OF INDONESIA BE SET UP TO MONITOR AND SUPERVISE BANKS IN 2002. THE INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY WILL EVENTUALLY SUPERVISE ALL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INCLUDING STOCK MARKETS, PENSION FUNDS, AND INSURANCE. INDONESIA'S PERSISTENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS WILL LIKELY COMPLICATE THE NATION'S CURRENT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY. (KEYS ID)

(c) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI) COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO PROPOSED TO PRESIDENT HABIBIE 1 APR THAT THE NAME OF ABRI BE CHANGED TO TNI ("TENTARA NASIONAL INDONESIA" OR INDONESIAN NATIONAL FORCES). TNI WAS THE ORIGINAL NAME OF ABRI, AND WAS UTILIZED DURING THE 1940'S. THIS NAME CHANGE IS INTENDED TO REFLECT THE SEPARATION OF THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE FORCE (POLRI) FROM ABRI, AND IS AN ATTEMPT BY WIRANTO TO DISTANCE THE MILITARY FORCES FROM THE NEGATIVE IMAGE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE FORCE AND THE SUHARTO-ERA ABUSES. THIS NAME-CHANGE PROPOSAL IS MERELY A PUBLIC RELATIONS MOVE, AND IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE ANYTHING WITHIN ABRI. ANY COSMETIC CHANGES TO ABRI WILL NOT BE WELL-RECEIVED BY CRITICS, WHO WILL DEMAND GREATER REFORM MEASURES. (KEYS ID)

(c) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) RECENTLY BANNED POLITICAL PARTIES FROM INVOLVING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT MINISTERS, IN THE UP-COMING ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THIS MOVE WAS AIMED AT BREAKING GOLKAR'S LONG-STANDING CONNECTION TO THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS ABILITY TO UTILIZE GOVERNMENT FACILITIES AND RESOURCES TO WIN THE ELECTION. FACTIONS WITHIN GOLKAR PUSHED BACK HARD, THREATENING TO WITHDRAW POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM PRESIDENT HABIBIE IF HE DID NOT PROTECT THEIR EQUITIES. LOOKING FOR COVER, HABIBIE TURNED TO THE SUPREME COURT, WHICH ISSUED A NON-COMMITTAL LEGAL OPINION. HABIBIE WILL NOW HAVE TO MAKE THE FINAL DECISION ON WHETHER MINISTERS SHOULD CAMPAIGN OR NOT. GOLKAR OFFICIALS ARE NOW SIGNALING THAT THEY EXPECT HABIBIE WILL ISSUE A GOVERNMENT REGULATION ALLOWING MINISTERS TO CAMPAIGN IF THEY TAKE A LEAVE OF ABSENCE DURING THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD. IN AN EFFORT TO KEEP GOLKAR ON HIS SIDE, HABIBIE WILL LIKELY ALLOW CERTAIN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND MINISTERS SOME FORM OF CAMPAIGNING DESPITE THE KPU BAN. (KEYS ID)

(c) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: THE OVERALL LEVEL OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE INCREASED OVER LAST WEEK. THE MAJORITY OF THIS WEEK'S VIOLENCE WERE NOTED IN THE AREAS OF TUAL (0540S/13245E), SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS, SINGKAWANG (0054N/10900E), WEST KALIMANTAN AND LIQUICA (0840S/12520E), EAST TIMOR. IN LIQUICA, PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVIST, XANANA GUSMAO, ALLEGEDLY TOLD FOLLOWERS TO TAKE UP ARMS AGAINST PRO-INDONESIAN MILITIA GROUPS AND THE INDONESIAN MILITARY UNTIL A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE ARRIVES. HE LATER DENIED MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT. ABRI COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO SAYS THERE IS NO NEED FOR A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE AND PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SOLVED INTERNALLY. IN SINGKAWANG, LOCAL MALAYS AND INDIGENOUS DAYAKS CONTINUE TO TERRORIZE MADURESE SETTLERS. IN TUAL, CLASHES BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS CONTINUE DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF MARINES AND ARMY PERSONNEL. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:

1 APR TUAL / AT LEAST 11 PEOPLE DIED IN CLASHES BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS.

1 APR ABEPURA (0238S/14035E) / 50 STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE AT POLICE HEADQUARTERS DEMANDING AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF A COLLEGE LECTURER.

2 APR TUAL / RIOTS CONTINUE LEAVING EIGHT DEAD AND 22 INJURED.

2 APR PURBALINGGA (0724S/10922E) / PEOPLE WEARING INDONESIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY-STRUGGLE COSTUMES ASSAULTED A CAR CARRYING AKBAR TANJUNG, GENERAL CHAIRMAN OF GOLKAR PARTY. NOBODY WAS HURT IN THE INCIDENT.

3 APR TUAL / CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS ARMED WITH SWORDS, SPEARS AND HOMEMADE BOMBS CONTINUED TO CLASH.

4 APR TUAL / FIGHTING BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS REPORTEDLY KILLED AT LEAST ONE PERSON, BRINGING THE DEATH TOLL TO 38 IN LESS THAN A WEEK.

5 APR LIQUICA / CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATIONIST MILITIA GROUPS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE PEOPLE LEAVES AT LEAST TWO PEOPLE DEAD AND NINE OTHERS INJURED.

5 APR SAMBAS (0120N/10915E)/ LOCAL MALAYS AND INDIGENOUS DAYAKS REPORTEDLY BURNED 17 MADURESE HOMES.

5 APR BELAWAN (0347N/09841E) / A RIOT BROKE OUT RESULTING IN A PERSON SERIOUSLY INJURED AND TWO HOUSES DESTROYED.

5 APR SINGKAWANG / 200 MADURESE ATTACKED A POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN AN EFFORT TO FREE 20 OF THEIR COLLEAGUES BEING DETAINED BY POLICE. AT LEAST 12 DIED FROM GUNSHOTS.

6 APR TUAL / COMMUNAL CLASHES CONTINUE TO ERUPT DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF A BATTALION OF TROOPS.

6 APR LIQUICA / THERE HAVE BEEN UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF AN INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED IN A CHURCH RESULTING IN 45 DEATHS.

7 APR TUAL / COMMUNAL CLASHES CONTINUED AS THE DEATH TOLL REACHES 63 DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF 100 MARINES AND ARMY STRATEGIC RESERVE COMMAND PERSONNEL.

7 APR LANGSA (0428N/09758E) / A DOZEN MEN BELIEVED TO BE MILITARY, MISTREATED RESIDENTS AND STUDENTS BY BEATING, KICKING AND THREATENING TO SHOOT THEM. (KEYS ID)

(U) (c) ABRI CONTINUES TO TAKE LITTLE OR NO ACTION TO SUPPRESS VIOLENCE IN AREAS OF UNREST. WITH THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE STILL NOT RESOLVED, CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM CLASHES CONTINUES IN THE MOLUCCAS, AND THE SITUATION REMAINS TENSE IN WEST KALIMANTAN. ABRI WILL HAVE ITS HANDS FULL COPING WITH UNREST AS THE JUN 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS GET CLOSER. UNREST WILL LIKELY CONTINUE IN AREAS ALREADY NOTED AND MAY SPREAD TO OTHER REGIONS AS THE ELECTION PERIOD APPROACHES. (KEYS ID)

(U) (c) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(U) (c) EAST TIMOR: VIOLENCE RESUMED BETWEEN EAST TIMOR'S PRO-INDEPENDENCE ARMED RESISTANCE GROUP FALINTIL AND THE PRO-INTEGRATION PARAMILITARY GROUP HALILINTAR 5 APR. REPORTING INDICATES THAT OVER 50 PEOPLE WERE KILLED DURING A THREE DAY PERIOD. THIS LATEST SERIES OF VIOLENCE COMES AFTER PEACE TALKS BROKE DOWN 19 MAR BETWEEN EX-FALINTIL LEADER XANANA GUSMAO AND HALILINTAR LEADER JOAO TAVARES. ON 5 APR, GUSMAO ALLEGEDLY ORDERED EAST TIMORESE TO RESIST AND WAGE WAR AGAINST ABRI, GOI, AND THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS. HE LATER DENIED MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT, BUT EAST TIMOR CATHOLIC BISHOP CARLOS BELO SUPPORTED GUSMAO'S ALLEGED CALL FOR RESISTANCE. BOTH STATEMENTS COULD FUEL FURTHER UNREST AND VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, AS WELL AS COMPLICATE OR DELAY THE UP-COMING UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS SCHEDULED FOR 22-23 APR. PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS HAVE ASKED FOR UN GROUND TROOPS PRESENCE. COUNTRIES OFFERING TO SEND GROUND TROOPS TO EAST TIMOR FOR POSSIBLE UN PEACE-KEEPING DUTIES INCLUDE AUSTRALIA, CANADA, IRELAND, NEW ZEALAND, AND NORWAY. (KEYS ID)

(U) (c) MOLUCCAS: AFTER SEVERAL WEEKS OF CALM, RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS ERUPTED AGAIN IN MOLUCCAS

31 MAR. LATEST REPORTS INDICATED THAT OVER 80 PEOPLE WERE KILLED, OVER 100 PEOPLE INJURED, AND OVER 400 HOMES DESTROYED WITHIN A ONE WEEK PERIOD. OVER 20,000 HAVE FLED THEIR HOMES AND ARE SEEKING REFUGE AT NEARBY MILITARY BASES. SINCE JAN 99, OVER 280 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED AND SEVERAL HUNDREDS INJURED FROM RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN THE MOLUCCAS. (KEYS ID)

(C) WEST KALIMANTAN: IN WEST KALIMANTAN, ETHNIC VIOLENCE BETWEEN THE LOCAL DAYAKS/MALAYS AND THE MIGRANT MADURESE ERUPTED AGAIN ON 5 APR AFTER A FEW DAYS OF PEACE. REPORTING INDICATED THAT OVER 20 PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN JUST THREE DAYS. SINCE 15 MAR, OVER 320 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED, SEVERAL HUNDREDS INJURED, AND OVER 3,000 HOMES DESTROYED. IN ADDITION, OVER 15,000 MADURESE REFUGEES HAVE FLED THEIR HOMES TO SEEK SAFETY IN THE CAPITAL CITY OF PONTIANAK. THE UNREST IN WEST KALIMANTAN HAS BEEN THE WORST CASE OF ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA SINCE FEBRUARY 1997.

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

13-14APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL)
17APR	MUSLIM NEW YEAR'S DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
22-23APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (MINISTERIAL LEVEL)
30APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS AGREEMENT SIGNING CEREMONY (ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE)
12MAY	TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING 1ST ANNIVERSARY
07JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
JUL	UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE ON EAST TIMOR
12JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
28AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
AUG-OCT	NEW MPR TO DECIDE ON EAST TIMOR STATUS
28OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12NOV	ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13NOV	ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING 1ST ANNIVERSARY
07DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT) (KEYS ID)

(S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10

11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5

(U) (S) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE UNREST AND VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, MOLUCCAS, AND WEST KALIMANTAN WILL LIKELY CALM DOWN IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS BEFORE RE-IGNITING AGAIN NEXT WEEK. AS THE PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PERIOD APPROACHES (JUN & OCT), IT IS LIKELY THAT THE UNREST AND VIOLENCE LEVEL WILL INCREASE AND SPREAD TO OTHER REGIONS OF INDONESIA. VIOLENCE BETWEEN EAST TIMOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS WILL LIKELY INCREASE DURING THE UP-COMING TRIPARTITE TALKS (APR) AND THE DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE PERIOD (JUL). STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA AND IN OTHER MAJOR CITIES HAVE BEEN LOW IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS, BUT WILL LIKELY INCREASE DURING THE EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE AND THE NATIONAL ELECTION PERIOD. (OSA MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

10 APR PAKISTAN	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY (1973)
13 APR INDIA	(U) VAISAKHI (SIKH) GURU GOBIND SINGH

~~SECRET~~

		FOUNDED SIKHISM AS A MILITARISTIC RELIGION (1699)
12-14 APR	THAILAND	(U) SONGKRAN (NATIONAL HOLIDAY; TRADITIONAL NEW YEAR)
15 APR	NORTH KOREA	(U) BIRTHDAY OF KIM IL-SUNG (1912) ANNIVERSARY OF EC-121 SHOOTDOWN (1969)
19 APR	SOUTH KOREA	(U) STUDENT REVOLUTION (1960)
25 APR	AUSTRALIA/ NEW ZEALAND/ COOK ISLANDS/ SAMOA/TONGA	(U) ANZAC DAY (1915)
25 APR	NORTH KOREA	(U) FOUNDING OF KOREAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (1932)/KIM IL-SUNG GUERRILLA UNIT ACTIVATION DAY (1915)
29 APR	JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS

C.
5. (U) [redacted]

b(2)

[redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

RELEASED IN FULL

1

Indonesia: Festering East Timor (U)



4718 3-99 STATE (INR/GG)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 19 NOV 2004 200300644

UNCLASSIFIED

E20

DOCUMENT_ID: 183102928
DOCNO: 068553
PRODUCER: WASHDC
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: OUT
DOR: 19990413
TOR: 211127
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904140106
MHFNO: 99 5059480
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #8553/01 1040109
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140106Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0191
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4344
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0292
RUEHJA/AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE 9738
RUEHKOF/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA IMMEDIATE 9307
RUEHKON/AMCONSUL NAGOYA IMMEDIATE 2627
RUHBBMA/AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE 3031
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE 6307
RUEHKOS/AMCONSUL SAPPORO IMMEDIATE 7671
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE IMMEDIATE 0824
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY IMMEDIATE 4582
RUEHPT/AMCONSUL PERTH IMMEDIATE 3772
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE 8814
RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE 4720
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE 1910
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7910
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 5939
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4553
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 3240
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5483
RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 6561
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2623
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0001
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUAGAMS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//PRIORITY
RUAGAMS/CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMHAH/CINCPACELT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
RUCJACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AEB EL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 5259
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0476
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 3967
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 6238
BT

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTROLS
UNCLAS STATE 068553

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: APRIL 13, 1999 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS - ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF - ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
UNVIE FOR FITZPATRICK
USEU FOR RUTH

1. INDEX:

-- KOREA: FOUR PARTY TALKS: FIFTH PLENARY TO CONVENE APRIL 24 PARAS 2 - 3
-- DPRK: FOUR PARTY TALKS: FIFTH PLENARY TO MEET APRIL 24 PARAS 4 - 5
-- JAPAN - ELECTION OF SHINTARO ISHIHARA AS TOKYO GOVERNOR PARAS 4 AND 6
-- AUSTRALIA: CARE AUSTRALIA PERSONNEL DETAINED BY YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT PARAS 4 AND -
-- INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR UPDATE PARAS 4 AND 8
-- PHILIPPINES: DEPORTATION OF U.S. CITIZEN PARAS 4 AND 9
-- BURMA: U.S. INVESTMENT VERSUS LABOR RIGHTS PARAS 4 AND 10
--JOINT U.S. - CHINA STATEMENT PARAS 11 - 12

2. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ON 4/13/99.

3. KOREA: FOUR PARTY TALKS: FIFTH PLENARY TO CONVENE APRIL 24

AS A RESULT OF FOUR PARTY WORKING GROUP CONSULTATIONS BEGUN IN NEW YORK APRIL 5, THE U.S., CHINA, THE ROK, AND THE DPRK HAVE AGREED TO CONVENE THE FIFTH PLENARY OF THE FOUR PARTY TALKS IN GENEVA BEGINNING APRIL 24, 1999. U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE KOREAN PEACE TALKS, AMBASSADOR CHARLES KARTMAN, WILL LEAD THE U.S. DELEGATION. THE UNITED STATES WILL CHAIR THE FIFTH PLENARY, PER THE AGREED ROTATION.

THE U.S. GOALS IN THE FOUR PARTY TALKS CONTINUE TO BE THE REDUCTION OF TENSION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND REPLACING THE ARMISTICE BY THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A PERMANENT PEACE ARRANGEMENT THERE. TWO SUBCOMMITTEES RESPECTIVELY ADDRESSED THESE GOALS DURING THE FOURTH PLENARY AND WILL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTINUE THEIR WORK AT THE FIFTH PLENARY.

AS IN THE PAST, THE SWISS GOVERNMENT IS PROVIDING FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE FOR THE TALKS, AND WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR ITS SUPPORT.

4. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 4/13/99 AND NOT USED BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE DAILY BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

5. DPRK: FOUR PARTY TALKS: FIFTH PLENARY TO MEET APRIL 24

CONTEXT: THE FOUR-PARTY WORKING GROUP MET IN NEW YORK APRIL 5 TO DISCUSS PREPARATIONS FOR THE FIFTH PLENARY OF FOUR PARTY TALKS AND AFTERWARDS CONTINUED INFORMAL CONTACTS TO SETTLE ON A DATE FOR THE FIFTH PLENARY. OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR EVANS REVERE REPRESENTED THE U.S. AT THE WORKING GROUP MEETING. THE FOURTH PLENARY WAS HELD IN GENEVA JANUARY 18-22, WHERE THE PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THE NEXT ROUND WOULD TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA IN MID-APRIL. HOWEVER, THE DPRK SIDE RECENTLY RAISED A PROBLEM WITH THE MID-APRIL TIMEFRAME, BUT INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO GO FORWARD WITH THE TALKS AS CLOSE TO THE ORIGINAL TIMEFRAME AS POSSIBLE. THE PARTIES SETTLED THE ISSUE AND AGREED ON AN ALTERNATIVE DATE, APRIL 24.

THE U.S. GOALS IN THE FOUR PARTY TALKS CONTINUE TO BE ESTABLISHING A MECHANISM FOR TENSION REDUCTION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND REPLACING THE ARMISTICE WITH A PERMANENT PEACE, AND THE TWO SUBCOMMITTEES-- ESTABLISHED TO DISCUSS RESPECTIVELY THE GOALS OF TENSION REDUCTION AND RE PLACING THE ARMISTICE AT THE THIRD PLENARY AND CONVENED FOR THE FIRST TIME AT THE FOURTH PLENARY-- WILL CONTINUE THEIR WORK DURING THE FIFTH PLENARY. THE U.S. WILL CHAIR THE FIFTH ROUND, PER THE AGREED ROTATION.

Q: WHY THE DELAY IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF THE FOUR PARTY TALKS?

A: PARTICIPANTS AGREED AT THE LAST PLENARY IN JANUARY THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF THE FOUR PARTY TALKS WOULD TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA IN MID-APRIL. THE FOUR PARTY WORKING GROUP MET IN NEW YORK APRIL 5 TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE DATES FOR THE TALKS. ALTHOUGH NO DECISIONS WERE MADE THEN, THE WORKING GROUP AGREED THROUGH SUBSEQUENT INFORMAL CONTACTS THAT THE NEXT ROUND WOULD BEGIN ON APRIL 24.

Q: WHAT IS THE SCHEDULE FOR THE FIFTH ROUND?

A: THE PLENARY WILL BEGIN APRIL 24 AND WILL BE PRECEDED BY A DEPUTY-HEAD-OF-DELEGATION PREPARATORY MEETING IN GENEVA ON APRIL 23.

--IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN ESTABLISHED ROTATION, THE U.S. WILL CHAIR THE FIFTH PLENARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

--AS AGREED AT THE THIRD PLENARY, TWO SUBCOMMITTEES CONVENED DURING THE FOURTH PLENARY TO DISCUSS RESPECTIVELY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE REGIME ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TENSION REDUCTION THERE. THEY WILL CONTINUE THEIR WORK AT THE FIFTH PLENARY.

--AS IN THE PAST, THE SWISS GOVERNMENT IS PROVIDING FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE FOR THE TALKS, AND WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR ITS SUPPORT.

Q: IS THERE ANY PROSPECT THAT DR. PERRY WILL BE INVOLVED IN THE FIFTH PLENARY?

A: U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE KOREAN PEACE TALKS, AMBASSADOR CHARLES KARTMAN, WILL LEAD THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE FIFTH PLENARY. DR. PERRY WILL NOT TAKE PART IN THE FOUR PARTY TALKS. DR. PERRY IS CONTINUING HIS WORK ON THE NORTH KOREA POLICY REVIEW.

Q: IS THE ISSUE OF U.S. FORCES IN THE ROK ON THE AGENDA?

A: THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS A MATTER FOR THE U.S. AND ROK GOVERNMENTS AND, AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED, IS NOT A SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION WITH ANY OTHER PARTY.

--THIS ITEM IS ALSO NOT ON THE WLAGENDAFW OF THE FOUR PARTY TALKS. THE U.S. GOALS IN THE FOUR PARTY TALKS -- AND INDEED THE RESPECTIVE FOCUS OF THE TWO SUBCOMMITTEES ESTABLISHED BY THE FOUR PARTIES -- ARE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE REGIME ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TENSION REDUCTION THERE.

(IF PRESSED)

Q: WHICH OF THE PARTIES HAD A SCHEDULE CONFLICT?

A: THE DPRK SIDE RECENTLY RAISED A PROBLEM WITH THE MID-APRIL TIMEFRAME, BUT INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO GO FORWARD WITH THE TALKS AS CLOSE TO THE ORIGINAL TIME FRAME AS POSSIBLE.

6. JAPAN - ELECTION OF SHINTARO ISHIHARA AS TOKYO GOVERNOR

CONTEXT: NATIONALIST SHINTARO ISHIHARA WAS ELECTED GOVERNOR OF TOKYO APRIL 11. MR. ISHIHARA CO-AUTHOR OF THE JAPAN THAT CAN SAY NO, HAS LONG BEEN A VOCAL CRITIC OF THE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP. DURING HIS CAMPAIGN, ISHIHARA DEMANDED THAT U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN GIVE UP YOKOTA AIR FORCE BASE IN WESTERN TOKYO. HE ALSO PROMISED THAT, IF ELECTED, HE WOULD PRESS FOR AN EXPLANATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SENKAKU ISLANDS, WHICH ARE UNDER JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION, BUT ALSO CLAIMED BY CHINA AND TAIWAN, AND OF THE APPLICABILITY OF

THE U.S.-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY TO THE SENKAKUS. (THE SENKAKUS ARE KNOWN IN CHINESE AS THE DIAOYUTAI.)

UNCLASSIFIED

Q: WHAT IS OUR REACTION TO THE ELECTION OF SHINTARO ISHIHARA AS GOVERNOR OF TOKYO?

A: THE ELECTION FOR GOVERNOR OF TOKYO IS AN INTERNAL JAPANESE MATTER, AND I HAVE NO COMMENT ON IT.

Q: CAN YOU COMMENT ON CALLS BY SHINTARO ISHIHARA, NEWLY-ELECTED GOVERNOR OF TOKYO, FOR AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES TO GIVE UP YOKOTA AIR BASE?

A: IN JAPAN, AS IN THE UNITED STATES, THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY RESIDES WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. UNDER THE 1960 TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITES STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN, THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN GRANTS U.S. FORCES THE USE OF FACILITIES AND AREAS IN JAPAN. YOKOTA AIR BASE, THE HEADQUARTERS OF U.S. FORCES JAPAN, 5TH AIR FORCE, AND THE 374TH AIRLIFT WING, IS CRUCIAL TO THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SECURITY TREATY TO DEFEND JAPAN AND MAINTAIN PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION.

--VIGILENCE AND READINESS ARE ESSENTIAL, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN FULLY SHARES OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF YOKOTA AIR BASE FOR THE SECURITY OF JAPAN.

Q: WHAT IS OUR POSITION ON THE SENKAKUS?

A: THE U.S. BELIEVES THE SENKAKUS (DIAOYUTAI) REMAIN DISPUTED TERRITORY. THE ULTIMATE RIGHTS MUST BE RESOLVED AMONG THE COMPETING CLAIMANTS THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS.

Q: WHAT IS THE APPLICABILITY OF THE U.S.-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY TO THIS SITUATION?

A: WE WILL NOT SPECULATE ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE TREATY IN A HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION.

--AS WE HAVE STATED BEFORE, WE HAVE URGED ALL CLAIMANTS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS.

7. AUSTRALIA: CARE AUSTRALIA PERSONNEL DETAINED BY YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT

CONTEXT: TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST QUOTES AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALEXANDER DOWNER AS STATING THAT TWO CARE AUSTRALIA AID WORKERS DETAINED APRIL 1 BY SERB AUTHORITIES AT YUGOSLAVIA'S BORDER WITH CROATIA WERE LIKELY TO BE CHARGED WITH SPYING. THE TWO, STEVE PRATT AND PETER WALLACE WERE REPORTEDLY ON THE WAY TO MONTENEGRO TO ASSIST REFUGEES FROM KOSOVO WHEN THEY WERE DETAINED. YUGOSLAV TV SHOWED FOOTAGE OF PRATT "CONFESSING" TO HAVING ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS UNDER COVER OF CARE. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN PRATT AND U.S. GOVERNMENT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AGENCIES. WE HAVE TOLD THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY WE WOULD ISSUE NO STATEMENT ON THE DETENTION OF PRATT AND WALLACE WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH THE GOA, BUT THAT WE WOULD PREPARE CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE FOR USE IF ASKED.

Q: ANY COMMENT ON YUGOSLAV AUTHORITIES CONTENTION THAT TWO CARE AUSTRALIA PERSONNEL DETAINED APRIL 1 WERE ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES?

A: WE FULLY SHARE THE SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED APRIL 12 BY AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER WHO INDICATED THAT THE CHARGES ARE "SIMPLY PREPOSTEROUS."

--THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE AUSTRALIAN AUTHORITIES IMMEDIATE CONSULAR ACCESS TO PRATT AND WALLACE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS.

8. INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR UPDATE

CONTEXT: TRIPARTITE (UN-PORTUGAL-INDONESIA) TALKS ON EAST TIMOR AT MINISTERIAL-LEVEL REMAIN SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 22, AT WHICH TIME IT IS HOPED AGREEMENT ON AN AUTONOMY PLAN CAN BE REACHED. THE UN IS MAKING PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS TO CONDUCT A DIRECT VOTE CONSULTATION WITH EAST TIMORESE ON THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL PROBABLY IN JULY. HOWEVER, CONTINUING VIOLENCE ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR COULD JEOPARDIZE THIS TIMETABLE. INDONESIA FM ALATAS, ACCORDING TO MEDIA REPORTS, HAS HINTED THAT RENEWED VIOLENCE COULD

LEAD TO A POSTPONEMENT. IN THE WAKE OF APRIL 5-6 KILLINGS AND VIOLENCE IN LIQUICA (LEE-KEE-SA) INITIATED BY PRO-INTEGRATIONIST MILITIAS, WITH THE APPARENT ACQUIESCENCE AT LEAST OF LOCAL SECURITY FORCES (TNI, FORMERLY ABRI), THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL OTHER INCIDENTS. REPORTEDLY, AT LEAST FOUR MORE PEOPLE DIED IN APRIL 12 CLASHES, TWO KILLED BY TNI TROOPS IN A FIREFIGHT NEAR ERMERA, A TOWN 15 MILES FROM DILI, THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON THE SITUATION/VIOLENCE ON EAST TIMOR.

A: THE U.S. IS DEEPLY TROUBLED BY THE DETERIORATION IN THE SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR, MARKED MOST RECENTLY BY FOUR MORE REPORTED DEATHS IN ERMERA AND ELSEWHERE APRIL 12. CONTINUED VIOLENCE CASTS DOUBT ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY'S ABILITY TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF INNOCENT PEOPLE IN EAST TIMOR.

--SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AND OTHER SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE UNDERSCORED U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT EAST TIMOR TO ALL PARTIES AND URGED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE SPECIFIC STEPS, INCLUDING DISARMING CIVILIAN MILITIAS AND AN IMMEDIATE ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE, AS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO REDUCE TENSIONS. SHE HAS ALSO CALLED ON ALL SIDES TO SHOW RESTRAINT AND RENOUNCE VIOLENCE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

--WE ALSO CALL FOR THOROUGH GOL INVESTIGATION OF RECENT INCIDENTS, TO INCLUDE EXAMINATION OF CHARGES THAT EAST TIMOR-BASED MILITARY UNITS ARE SUPPORTING THOSE ENGAGED IN THE VIOLENCE. WE SUPPORT DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION. WE HAVE CONVEYED THESE VIEWS TO BOTH THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND EAST TIMORESE LEADERS.

--THE UNITED STATES REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED TO THE ONGOING UN-SPONSORED INITIATIVE ON EAST TIMOR AS OFFERING THE BEST PROSPECTS TO HELP DEFINE EAST TIMOR'S FUTURE STATUS. DESPITE THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, THE U.S. BELIEVES THIS IMPORTANT INITIATIVE SHOULD CONTINUE.

9. PHILIPPINES: DEPORTATION OF U.S. CITIZEN

CONTEXT: THE U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE HAS CONFIRMED TODAY'S REUTERS REPORT THAT U.S. CITIZEN RICHARD DEAN PEDRIOLI WAS DEPORTED APRIL 10 TO THE U.S. FROM THE PHILIPPINES. WANTED IN THIS COUNTRY IN A FIREARMS SMUGGLING CASE, PEDRIOLI WAS ON THE U.S. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S MOST WANTED LIST. INQUIRIES REQUESTING FACTS ABOUT THE CASE SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT.

NOTE: A U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE PRESS RELEASE WILL LIKELY BE OBTAINED TODAY IN TIME FOR THE DAILY BRIEFING.

Q: WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE APRIL 10 TRANSFER TO THE U.S. OF AMERICAN CITIZEN RICHARD DEAN PEDRIOLI?

A: WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE THAT RICHARD DEAN PEDRIOLI WAS DEPORTED TO THE U.S. FROM THE PHILIPPINES ON APRIL 10. FOR ANY QUERIES REGARDING THIS MATTER, PLEASE CONTACT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

10. BURMA: U.S. INVESTMENT VERSUS LABOR RIGHTS

CONTEXT: THE WASHINGTON POSTS HAS REPORTED ON THE ONGOING LAWSUIT AGAINST UNOCAL AND THE CONSORTIUM OF OIL COMPANIES THAT CONSTRUCTED THE YADANA NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ACROSS THE ISTHMUS OF KRA FROM BURMA TO THAILAND.

THE LAWSUIT ALLEGES THE OIL COMPANIES WERE COMPLICIT WITH THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT WHEN IT EXACTED FORCED LABOR AND RELOCATED VILLAGES IN SERVICE OF THE PIPELINE PROJECT.

THE ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS THE ACTIVITIES OF NA HSAW WA (KAH SAH WAH), A BURMESE STUDENT ACTIVIST IN 1988 WHO COLLECTED STORIES OF ABUSES CONNECTED WITH THE PIPELINE FROM WITNESSES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF BURMA.

Q: DOES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAVE A POSITION ON EFFORTS BY U.S. ACTIVISTS TO DISCOURAGE PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTRIES THAT ALLEGEDLY VIOLATE LABOR AND CIVIL RIGHTS?

A: WE ARE AWARE OF THE CALIFORNIA LAWSUIT CONCERNING BURMA'S ALLEGED USE OF FORCED LABOR DURING THE

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONSTRUCTION OF THE YADANA (YAH DAH NAH) PIPELINE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR USUAL PRACTICE, WE HAVE NO COMMENT ABOUT THIS ONGOING LAWSUIT.

--THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT'S ABUSE OF ITS CITIZENS, IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND STANDARDS, HAS BEEN WELL DOCUMENTED IN STUDIES BY THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

--WE CALL UPON THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT TO IMMEDIATELY CEASE THE PRACTICE OF FORCED LABOR. WE ALSO CALL UPON THE GOVERNMENT TO ENTER INTO MEANINGFUL DISUSSIONS WITH THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION, INCULDING THE NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY AND AUNG SAN SUU KYL, AND THE ETHNIC MINORITIES.
11. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY ON 4/13/99.

12. JOINT U.S. - CHINA STATEMENT

PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PREMIER ZHU SPOKE THIS AFTERNOON ON THE TELEPHONE. DURING THE CONVERSATION, THEY AGREED THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD MOVE INTENSIVELY ON NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THE REMAINING ISSUES IN THEIR TALKS ON CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE WTO. THEY HAVE AGREED TO HAVE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE BY THE END OF THE MONTH IN BEIJING.
ALBRIGHT

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

C22

R

DOCUMENT_ID: 183109338
DOCNO: 069342
PRODUCER: WASHDC
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: OUT
DOR: 19990414
TOR: 204349
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904150042
MHFNO: 99 5074063
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNR UUUUU ZOC STATE ZZH
MPH9342
OO RUEHC RUEHGV RUEHJA RUCNDT
DE RUEHC #9342 1050043
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 150042Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 3349
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0345
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 5154
BT

CONTROLS
UNCLAS STATE 069342

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, AORC, UNHRC-L
SUBJECT: CHR-55: CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT ON EAST TIMOR

1. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM LISBON, PORTUGUESE EMBASSY CALLED ON 10/ESA APRIL 12 REGARDING THE PORTUGUESE DRAFT OF A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT ON EAST TIMOR, CURRENTLY BEING DISCUSSED WITHIN THE EU, FOR ADOPTION AT THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEETING NOW UNDERWAY IN GENEVA. ACCORDING TO THE PORTUGUESE EMBASSY, THE DRAFT WAS WRITTEN IN A "BALANCED" WAY TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE BY THE INDONESIANS, BUT THE LATTER ARE STONEWALLING AND REFUSE TO DISCUSS IT. PORTUGUESE HAVE ASKED FOR OUR HELP IN PERSUADING THE INDONESIANS TO ACCEPT THE TEXT.

2. TEXT OF PORTUGUESE DRAFT FOLLOWS (PLEASE TREAT WITH DISCRETION AT THIS TIME) . QUOTE:

THE COMMISSION HAS FOLLOWED WITH GRAVE CONCERN CONTINUED AND SUBSTANTIATED REPORTS ON VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR, NAMELY THE RECENTLY REPORTED KILLINGS OF UNARMED CIVILIANS IN LIQUICA, THE DISTURBANCES AND THREATS BY ARMED MILITIAS IN OTHER TOWNS AND VILLAGES, AND THE BEATINGS OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS. THE COMMISSION IS

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 9/18/2004 Exemption

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXTREMELY CONCERNED WITH THE CLIMATE OF INTIMIDATION THUS CREATED, AIMED AT JEOPARDIZING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IT URGES THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATION TO WORK FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR AND TO DISARM THE MILITIAS. IT TAKES NOTE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA HAS AGREED TO THE UNSG'S REQUEST FOR AN IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENTS OF LIQUICA AND CALLS ON THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO HOLD ACCOUNTABLE THOSE FOUND RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH KILLINGS.

THE COMMISSION IS ENCOURAGED BY THE PROGRESS REACHED SO FAR IN THE TALKS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNSG AIMED AT ACHIEVING A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE AND INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION AND STRESSES THE NEED FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIONS, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UN PERMANENT PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR AND THE SETTING UP OF THE ENVISAGED PEACE AND STABILITY COMMITTEE, IN ORDER TO PROMOTE AN ATMOSPHERE CONDUCIVE TO A PEACEFUL AND LASTING SOLUTION.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CURRENT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE COMMISSION WILL CONSIDER THE MATTER AT ITS FIFTY-SIXTH SESSION AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO KEEP IT INFORMED ON THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR. END QUOTE.

3. ACTION FOR GENEVA: PLEASE COORDINATE WITH THE PORTUGUESE MISSION AND WITH EU MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, AS APPROPRIATE, ON AN APPROACH TO THE INDONESIAN DELEGATION SUPPORTING THE PORTUGUESE DRAFT.
ALBRIGHT

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C23

DOCUMENT_ID: 183109482
DOCNO: 069385
PRODUCER: WASHDC
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: OUT
DOR: 19990414
TOR: 212434
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904150120
MHFNO: 99 5074301
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MPF9385
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHC #9385 1050123
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 150120Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 0000
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0000
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 069385

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/09

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, UN, ID
SUBJECT: U/S PICKERING'S APRIL 14 MEETING WITH INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN ON EAST TIMOR

CLASSIFIED BY U/S THOMAS R. PICKERING. REASON: 1.5(D).

1. (C) SUMMARY: U/S PICKERING MET APRIL 14 WITH INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN TO UNDERSCORE U.S. CONCERN ABOUT ESCALATING VIOLENCE AND OTHER ISSUES IN EAST TIMOR. HE REITERATED OUR CALL FOR THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT (GOI) TO TAKE UNAMBIGUOUS STEPS TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE TERRITORY, INCLUDING INVESTIGATING AND BRINGING TO JUSTICE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LIQUICA KILLINGS, AND DISARMING AND DEACTIVATING ALL MILITIAS INVOLVED IN VIOLENCE. AS A FRIEND OF INDONESIA, HE CAUTIONED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON INDONESIA'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION OF A PERCEPTION THAT THE MILITARY (TNI, FORMERLY ABRI) WAS BACKING THE MILITIA VIOLENCE. HE ALSO URGED THAT THE UN BE ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH AN IMMEDIATE PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR.

B7

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B1.4(b)+(d)

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

END SUMMARY.

2. (C) UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING MET APRIL 14 WITH INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN TO DELIVER A STRONG MESSAGE ON EAST TIMOR. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID HE HAD ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO COME TO THE DEPARTMENT TO DISCUSS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER, EAST TIMOR. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE U.S. IS INCREASINGLY TROUBLED BY DETERIORATION IN THE SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR. CONTINUED VIOLENCE, IF UNCHECKED, RISKS DERAILING PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S DETERMINED EFFORT TO CHART A NEW FUTURE FOR EAST TIMOR, AND CASTS DOUBT ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY'S (TNI) ABILITY AND COMMITMENT TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF INNOCENT PEOPLE IN EAST TIMOR.

-- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AND CINCPAC ADMIRAL BLAIR IN THEIR RECENT VISITS HAVE UNDERSCORED U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT EAST TIMOR AND URGED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO DISARM CIVILIAN MILITIAS AND TAKE OTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING STEPS THAT COULD REDUCE TENSIONS. WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS THAT ANY OF THESE STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN.

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING SECURITY AND ADEQUATE HEALTH CARE IN EAST TIMOR. IN THE FACE OF DEMONSTRATED HUMANITARIAN NEEDS, HOWEVER, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS OFFERED TO ASSIST. THIS IS NOT A SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE.

-- THE EVENTS IN LIQUICA ARE PARTICULARLY OMINOUS. NUMEROUS PRESS REPORTS NOTE THE SECURITY SITUATION HAS BEEN THREATENED BY BANDS OF MILITIAMEN REPORTEDLY SUPPORTED BY THE TNI (FORMERLY ABRI) WHO HAVE TERRORIZED THE POPULATION. SCORES OF PEOPLE MAY HAVE BEEN KILLED.

-- WE HAVE, AND ARE AWARE THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS, CONCRETE INFORMATION ABOUT THE MILITIA GROUPS

INVOLVED IN RECENT ABUSES AND THEIR LEADERS.

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

-- GIVEN THE MOUNTING EVIDENCE OF INVOLVEMENT OF THE LOCAL SECURITY FORCES, WE URGE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE UNAMBIGUOUS STEPS TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE SUCH AS IMMEDIATELY REPLACING THE UNITS IN LIQUICA WHILE AN IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATION IS CONDUCTED. WITHOUT SUCH RESOLUTE ACTION, INDONESIA'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION AND CREDIBILITY WILL BE SERIOUSLY TARNISHED.

-- GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS, REGARDLESS OF THEIR POLITICAL ORIENTATION, WHO HAVE COMMITTED ABUSES AND ARE VIOLATING THE LAW MUST BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE THROUGH CREDIBLE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF THOSE INVOLVED.

-- GIVEN THE INADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR, WE ALSO URGE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO RECONSIDER ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO PERMIT ACCESS THERE TO THOSE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS PREPARED TO RENDER HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE NEED TO RE-BUILD A SURGICAL CAPACITY WITHIN EAST TIMOR IN THE LONG TERM. MOST IMMEDIATELY, WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE TNI HAS REPORTEDLY REFUSED TO FACILITATE ADEQUATE SECURITY FOR HUMANITARIAN MEDICAL RELIEF EFFORTS IN LIQUICA.

-- THE TNI MUST ACT TO ENSURE A PEACEFUL ENVIRONMENT FOR A FREE AND FAIR CONSULTATION PROCESS. INDONESIA'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION IS AT STAKE. THIS WILL ENTAIL, AS A CRITICAL FIRST STEP, THE DISARMING AND DEACTIVATION OF ALL MILITIAS THAT HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN AN ESCALATING TIDE OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION. THE TNI SHOULD CEASE PROVIDING ARMS, TRANSPORT, LOGISTICAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE AS WELL AS PAY TO ANY MILITIA UNITS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN RECENT VIOLENCE.

-- DIPLOMATIC ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR SHOULD BE FACILITATED. DENYING ACCESS ON THE BASIS THAT LOCAL OFFICIALS ARE TOO BUSY TO ACCEPT VISITORS CAN ONLY INCREASE DOUBTS ABOUT THE REAL SITUATION THERE.

-- AS A FRIEND OF INDONESIA, WE ARE SURE THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT THE INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTION TO GROW THAT THE OFFICIAL SECURITY FORCES HAVE

PRIVATIZED VIOLENCE BY ARMING AND TOLERATING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS. WE KNOW FROM EXPERIENCE ELSEWHERE THAT THIS CAN HAVE A DEVASTATING IMPACT ON A COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION.

-- THE GOI MUST ENGAGE WITH THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES TO END THE VIOLENCE. WE HAVE, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, URGED XANANA GUSMAG TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO WORK FOR RESTRAINT AMONG PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE. HIS RECENT REPORTED OFFER TO COOPERATE IN DISARMING FALINTIL (I.E., PRO-INDEPENDENCE GUERRILLAS) TOGETHER WITH ALL EAST TIMORESE MILITIAS -- WITH THE WEAPONS BEING HANDED TO A UN FORCE -- DESERVES SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-- IN THIS REGARD, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE UN BE ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH AN IMMEDIATE PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR AS A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE.

[redacted] B1

SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE VERY SERIOUSLY ALL THE POINTS OF CONCERN HE HAD MADE. THE UNDER

6. (U) AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR PERWITORINI WIJONO. EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS HARTWICK, EAP/PIMBS BOB CLARKE (NOTETAKER), AND P SPECIAL ASSISTANT DAVID STRAUB SAT IN.

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

MORI DocID: 1054591

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C13

DOCUMENT_ID: 183135729
DOCNO: 001281
PRODUCER: CANBERRA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990419
TOR: 171546
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904192106
MHFNO: 99 5130989
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI9041
OO RUEHZS RUEHC
DE RUEHBY #1281/01 1092106
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 192106Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3490
INFO RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0166
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1704
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 8593
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE 2113
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH 0366
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 001281

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/19/04

Classified by Department of State
Lee R. Lohman, DAS, A/RPS
Classify Cont. Reason B-1.4(b)+(d) Date 6/11/2004
Declassify on 4/18/2024 Auth.

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, ID, AS
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AUSTRALIA'S PM CALLS ON HABIBIE TO REIN IN MILITIAS; WILL VISIT JAKARTA APRIL 26

REF: JAKARTA 1923

(U) CLASSIFIED BY STEPHEN ENGELKEN, POLITICAL COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.5 (B).

1. (C) SUMMARY. [redacted] BRIEFED AMBASSDOR ON PM HOWARD'S APRIL 19 CALL TO PRESIDENT HABIBIE. [redacted]

B-1

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, D.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B-1.4(b)+(d)

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

HABIBIE ACCEPTED HOWARD'S OFFER TO VISIT JAKARTA NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS WHAT SORT OF UN PRESENCE WOULD BE HELPFUL IN EAST TIMOR. THE OPPOSITION SPOKESMAN FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS WANTS IMMEDIATE AND STRONG INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE TO DISARM AND DISBAND THE MILITIAS AND ESTABISH A UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION. PUBLIC PRESSURE IS CLEARLY A FACTOR

END SUMMARY.

2. (C) BREIFED THE AMBASSADOR APRIL 19 ON THE HOWARD/HABIBIE TELEPHONE CALL OF THE SAME DAY.

HABIBIE ACCEPTED HOWARD'S OFFER TO TRAVEL TO JAKARTA NEXT MONDAY, APRIL 26. FM DOWNER AND DEFENSE MINISTER JOHN MOORE WILL ACCOMPANY THE PM TO JAKARTA. DISCUSSIONS WILL FOCUS ON WHAT SORT OF UN PRESENCE WOULD BE HELPFUL IN EAST TIMOR OVER THE SHORT AND LONG-TERM.

3. (U) THE CHIEF OF DFAT'S EAST TIMOR TASK FORCE CHRIS MORAITIS IS PRESENTLY IN NEW YORK WITH TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (ADOD) AND ONE FROM AUSAID. THE AUSTRALIAN TEAM WILL BE DISCUSSING WHAT TYPE OF UN PRESENCE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN EAST TIMOR AND THEIR REPORT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE A PART OF THE PM'S DISCUSSIONS IN JAKARTA.

4. (U) HOWARD'S CALL CAME AFTER A WEEKEND IN WHICH THE AUSTRALIAN PRESS AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION REACTED STRONGLY TO EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR. SHADOW FOREIGN MINISTER LAURIE BRERETON SAID THAT THE HORRIFIC EVENTS IN DILI CONFIRM THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR IMMEDIATE AND STRONG INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND AND DISARM THE PRO-INTEGRATIONIST MILITIAS AND ACCEPT AN EFFECTIVE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN EAST TIMOR.

b1

b1

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183118928
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990416
TOR: 092607
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904161100
MHFNO: 99 5096158
DOCCLASS: S
~~CAVEATS: NOFORN~~

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUCOMCC #0622 1061305
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0262 1060558
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Jan 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~NOFORN~~
SECRET

ENCL (4)

MORI DocID: 1054609

RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUEOEGA T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUFOADA T JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE

MORI DocID: 1054609

RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBHR T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHWISSF T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 161100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUFAPTJ/NMCB THREE DET SIERRA
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4EW SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
4WG SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
USNS WATERS
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~ NOFORN

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/JD-106/16 APR//
RMKS/
1. (U) (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B. [redacted]

C. (S) INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 8 - 15 APR 99

D. [redacted]

2 pgs responsive

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELPOMENTS: NOTHING TO REPORT.

A. [redacted]

2 pgs responsive

~~NOFORN~~
SECRET

MORI DocID: 1054609

[redacted]

202 responsive

C. (U) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 8 - 15 APR 99

(C) GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THE OVERALL LEVEL OF UNREST IN INDONESIA REMAINED THE SAME AS LAST WEEK. STUDENT GROUPS HELD DEMONSTRATIONS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES WITH SOME ENDING IN VIOLENCE. A MILITARY COURT SENTENCED 11 KOPASSUS MEMBERS TO PRISON FOR THEIR ROLE IN THE KIDNAPPING OF 23 PRO-DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS. (KEYS ID)

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR INCREASED SLIGHTLY TO RP 8,550/$1.00. THE OVERALL ECONOMIC SITUATION REMAINS WEAK. THE WORLD BANK ANNOUNCED THE POSTPONEMENT OF US$600 MILLION IN AID TO INDONESIA AFTER BOTH PARTIES FAILED TO REACH AN AGREEMENT OVER NEW GUIDELINES TO MONITOR THE ALLOCATION OF THE FUNDS. ORIGINALLY THE WORLD BANK WAS TO HAVE RELEASED THE FUNDS 31 MAR, BUT AN EARLIER REPORT SHOWED INDONESIA'S MISMANAGEMENT OF PREVIOUS FUNDS FOR POLITICAL MEANS. THE POSTPONEMENT OF FUNDS WILL LIKELY AFFECT THE GLOBAL MARKET'S CONFIDENCE AND WORSEN INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC SITUATION. (KEYS ID)

(C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: A MILITARY COURT SENTENCED 11 INDONESIAN SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (KOPASSUS) MEMBERS TO 12-22 MONTHS IN PRISON FOR THEIR ROLE IN THE KIDNAPPING OF 23 PRO-DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS DURING THE JAN-MAY 98 UNREST. THE LIGHT SENTENCES ARE DESIGNED TO KEEP THE LOWER RANKING OFFICERS FROM IMPLICATING THEIR SUPERIORS; HOWEVER, THE OUTCOME OF THIS TRIAL WILL BE VIEWED AS HAVING LITTLE IMPACT ON SATISFYING PUBLIC SENTIMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. FORMER PRESIDENT SUHARTO'S SON-IN-LAW AND THE FORMER COMMANDER OF KOPASSUS, LTG (RET) PRABOWO, WILL NOT BE PUT ON TRIAL FOR HIS ROLE IN THE KIDNAPPING AS HE WAS DISMISSED FROM THE MILITARY AUG 98 AND THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE INVESTIGATION COMPLETED. (KEYS ID)

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU), RESPONSIBLE FOR APPROVING REGULATIONS WILL GOVERN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS, HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR ITS SLOW START OF THE 33-DAY VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD. THE KPU'S PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN CONSIDERED POOR, AND LACKING A SENSE OF URGENCY AS THEY ARE MORE PREOCCUPIED WITH ISSUES SUCH AS THEIR SALARIES AND PARTY FUNDS. FAMILIARIZATION OF REGULATIONS HAS NOT REACHED ALL SECTORS OF THE COMMUNITY AND MANY OFFICIALS DO NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF THE RULES THEY ARE IMPLEMENTING. POLITICAL PARTIES WHO FAIL TO URGE PROSPECTIVE VOTERS TO REGISTER, RISK LOSING OUT TO ESTABLISHED PARTIES AS PEOPLE WILL TEND TO VOTE FOR FAMILIAR AND PROVEN PARTIES. ACCORDING TO THE KPU, THE VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD IS 5 APR - 4 MAY. (KEYS ID)

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS INCREASED SLIGHTLY FOR THE WEEK, BUT OVERALL UNREST REMAINED THE SAME AS THE

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

PREVIOUS WEEK. STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E), BANDUNG (0654S/10736E) AND SURABAYA (0715S/11245E), WITH VIOLENCE OCCURRING IN JAKARTA AND BANDUNG. IN LHOKSEUMAWE (0510N/09708E), STUDENTS STAGED PROTESTS WHEN MILITARY OFFICERS TORE DOWN STREET BANNERS DEMANDING A REFERENDUM. DAILY UNREST CONTINUED BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATIONIST GROUPS IN EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E). VIOLENCE IN WEST KALIMANTAN (0054N/10900E) AND SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS (0540S/13245E) IS SUBSIDING. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:
- 8 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / 600 DRIVERS AND WORKERS EMPLOYED BY COMPANIES PROVIDING TRANSPORT TO MOBIL OIL ARE ON STRIKE.
- 8 APR MALIANA (0900S/12515E), EAST TIMOR / SOME 2,000 PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS HELD A RALLY IN REACTION TO XANANA GUSMAO'S DECLARATION OF WAR.
- 8 APR SINGKAWANG (0054N/10900E), WEST KALIMANTAN / MALAYS AND DAYAKS TORCHED MADURESE HOMES.
- 9 APR TUAL (0540S/13245E), MALUKU / A COMMUNAL CLASH KILLS ONE, INJURES TWO.
- 10 APR ERMERA (0845S/12523E), EAST TIMOR / CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATIONIST GROUPS LEAVES ONE DEAD AND ONE SERIOUSLY INJURED.
- 11 APR LIQUICA (0840S/12520E), EAST TIMOR / MEMBERS OF AN ARMED CIVILIAN MILITIA ATTACKED A CONVOY OF CARS IN WHICH BISHOP OF DILI, CARLOS BELO, WAS TRAVELLING. NO CASUALTIES REPORTED.
- 11 APR ZULAMAI (0858S/12503E), EAST TIMOR / HUNDREDS OF PRO-INTEGRATIONIST BACKERS WERE ATTACKED BY PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBEL GROUP FALINTIL. NO CASUALTIES REPORTED.
- 11 APR ERMERA, EAST TIMOR / INDONESIAN TROOPS AND FALINTIL CLASHED RESULTING IN TWO REBELS WOUNDED.
- 12 APR DILI (0833S/12534E) / 200 AITARAK PRO-INTEGRATION MILITANTS PARADED IN A SHOW OF STRENGTH.
- 12 APR BATAM ISLAND (0105N/10403E)/ SECURITY OFFICIAL STOPPED AN ETHNIC CLASH THAT RESULTED IN SEVERAL INJURIES.
- 13 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / ACEH YOUTHS AND STUDENTS PROTESTED THE TEARING DOWN OF STREET BANNERS DEMANDING A REFERENDUM.
- 13 APR JAKARTA / VARIOUS STUDENT GROUPS HELD DEMONSTRATIONS DEMANDING A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT BE FORMED. THERE WERE INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SECURITY FORCES RESULTING IN SEVERAL INJURIES.
- 14 APR SUNGAIRAYA (0042N/10854E), WEST KALIMANTAN / MOBS OF MALAYS AND DAYAKS TORCHED MADURESE HOMES LEAVING ONE MAN DEAD.
(KEYS ID)

(S) DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST WILL MOST LIKELY INCREASE WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS LESS THAN TWO MONTHS AWAY. STUDENTS ARE TRYING TO REGAIN SOLIDARITY; HOWEVER, THEY REMAIN DIVIDED ON POLITICAL ISSUES AND GOALS. WITH INCREASING TURMOIL IN JAKARTA AND IN THE OUTERLYING AREAS OF INDONESIA, TNI (INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES) WILL BE STRETCHED VERY THIN AS THEY ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH SIMULTANEOUS CRISES.

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(C) EAST TIMOR: AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI), THE SENIOR LEVEL TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR, ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 13-14 APR, WAS POSTPONED UNTIL 20-21 APR. THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL TRIPARTITE TALKS WILL STILL GO ON AS SCHEDULED 22-23 APR, WITH THE AGREEMENT SIGNING CEREMONY PLANNED FOR 30 APR. A LARGE PRO-INTEGRATION DEMONSTRATION IS PLANNED 17 APR IN DILI, WHICH

MORI DocID: 1054609

MAY RESULT IN A VIOLENT CONFRONTATION WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS. IT IS LIKELY THAT PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA FORCES WILL RESORT TO VIOLENCE DURING THIS PERIOD IN AN ATTEMPT TO STALL OR SABOTAGE THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT. MEANWHILE, PRESIDENT HABIBIE AGREED TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR. HABIBIE VIEWS THIS AS A STEP TOWARDS CREATING A PEACEFUL AND CONDUCIVE ATMOSPHERE TO FAMILIARIZE THE EAST TIMORESE OF THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE.

(U) (C) WEST KALIMANTAN: VIOLENT ETHNIC CLASHES BETWEEN NATIVE DAYAKS/MALAYS AND MIGRANT MADURESE CONTINUED FOR THE FIFTH CONSECUTIVE DAY IN WEST KALIMANTAN. AS A RESULT, SOME 5,000 MADURESE REFUGEES WERE EVACUATED TO MADURA ISLAND, WITH ANOTHER 2,000 EN ROUTE. WHILE THEY WERE LIKELY NOT FORCED TO LEAVE, IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THEY WERE GIVEN LITTLE OPTION.

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

17APR	MUSLIM NEW YEAR'S DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
20-21APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL)
22-23APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (MINISTERIAL LEVEL)
30APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS AGREEMENT SIGNING CEREMONY (ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE)
12MAY	TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING 1ST ANNIVERSARY
07JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
JUL	UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE ON EAST TIMOR
12JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
28AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
AUG-OCT	NEW MPR TO DECIDE ON EAST TIMOR STATUS
28OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13NOV	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
07DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT)

(U) (S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10

11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
(OSA MULTIPLE SOURCES)	(KEYS ID)		

[redacted]

Non responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:
A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

29 APR	BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR	INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

19 APR	SOUTH KOREA	(U) STUDENT REVOLUTION (1960)
25 APR	AUSTRALIA/ NEW ZEALAND/ COOK ISLANDS/ SAMOA/TONGA	(U) ANZAC DAY (1915)
25 APR	NORTH KOREA	(U) FOUNDING OF KOREAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (1932)/KIM IL-SUNG GUERRILLA UNIT ACTIVATION DAY (1915)
29 APR	JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS

C.

5. (U) [redacted] NOD responsive

b(3)

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C25

DOCUMENT_ID: 183119235
DOCNO: 001891
PRODUCER: LISBON
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990416
TOR: 101456
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904161506
MHFNO: 99 5096999
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI7409
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHLI #1891 1061506
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161506Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2740
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0137
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0720
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0087
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
BT

Classified by Department of State
Lee R. Lohman, DAS, A/RPS
Classify Conf. Reason 1.4(b+d) Date 6/11/2004
Declassify on 4/15/2024 Auth. / /

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L LISBON 001891

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/04

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UNCHR, ID, PO
SUBJECT: MFA CONCERN ABOUT VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR; UNCHR LANGUAGE

REF: LISBON 1761

(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. GERALD MCGOWAN, REASON 1.5 (B AND D).

1. (C) [ ] TELEPHONED THE AMBASSADOR APRIL 16 TO CONVEY THE PORTUGUESE BELIEF THAT THERE IS A "VERY HIGH" THREAT OF VIOLENCE BREAKING OUT IN DILI THIS WEEKEND. IT IS "VERY GOOD" THAT, [ ] A U.S. EMBASSY OFFICER WOULD BE IN DILI AT THIS TIME. [ ]

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B-1,1.4(b+d)

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] ALSO PRESENTED A DRAFT OF LANGUAGE ON EAST TIMOR (SEE PARAGRAPH 3) THAT PORTUGAL IS INTRODUCING AT THE CURRENT SESSION OF THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

3. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT (COMMENT: WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS LANGUAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED OR HAS ANY STATUS IN GENEVA.)

-- THE COMMISSION HAS FOLLOWED WITH GRAVE CONCERN CONTINUED AND SUBSTANTIATED REPORTS ON VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR, NAMELY THE RECENTLY REPORTED KILLINGS OF UNARMED CIVILIANS IN LIQUICA, THE DISTURBANCES AND THREATS BY ARMED MILITIAS IN OTHER TOWNS AND VILLAGES AND THE BEATINGS OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS. THE COMMISSION IS EXTREMELY CONCERNED WITH THE CLIMATE OF INTIMIDATION THUS CREATED, AIMED AT JEOPARDIZING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IT URGES THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATION TO WORK FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR AND TO DISARM THE MILITIAS. IT TAKES NOTE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA HAS AGREED TO THE UNSG'S REQUEST FOR AN IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENTS OF LIQUICA AND CALLS ON THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO HOLD ACCOUNTABLE THOSE FOUND RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH KILLINGS.

-- THE COMMISSION IS ENCOURAGED BY THE PROGRESS REACHED SO FAR IN THE TALKS UNDER THE AUSPICES ON THE UNSG AIMED AT ACHIEVING A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE AND INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION AND STRESSES THE NEED FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIONS, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UN PERMANENT PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR AND THE SETTING UP OF THE ENVISAGED PEACE AND STABILITY COMMITTEE, IN ORDER TO PROMOTE AN ATMOSPHERE CONDUCIVE TO A PEACEFUL AND LASTING SOLUTION.

-- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CURRENT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE COMMISSION WILL CONSIDER THE MATTER AT ITS FIFTY-SIXTH SESSION AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO KEEP IT INFORMED ON THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR.

END TEXT.

MCGOWAN

ADMIN

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

(C26)

DOCUMENT ID: 183123937
DOCNO: 001920
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990417
TOR: 052944
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904170849
MHFNO: 99 5107532
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI0971
OO RUEHZS RUEHC
DE RUEHJA #1920/01 1070849
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170849Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7285
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 4785
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0088
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 3090
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2015
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 0893
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0267
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1046
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0228
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001920

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/04

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, PINR, ID
COMBINE: COMPLETE

Classified by Department of State
Lee R. Lohman, DAS, A/RPS
Classify Cont. Reason B4, 1.4(b)+(d) Date 6/11/2004
Declassify on 4/16/2024 Auth. ___

SUBJECT: A/S ROTH CALLS ON FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS TOLD A/S ROTH THAT HE EXPECTED TO HAVE A COMPLETED AUTONOMY PACKAGE TO CARRY TO NEW YORK NEXT WEEK. HE BELIEVED THAT THE CONSULTATION PROCESS FOR EAST TIMORESE CONSIDERATION OF

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B4, 1.4(b)+(d)

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

THE PACKAGE WAS ON TRACK FOR A VOTE IN JULY OR EARLY AUGUST. ALATAS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE "INSANE FIGHTING" IN EAST TIMOR BUT PORTRAYED IT AS GROWING OUT OF RIVALRY BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI-INTEGRATIOIN GROUPS WITH THE SECURITY FORCES NOT ABLE TO DO MUCH TO STOP IT.

[redacted]

b-1

3. (U) A/S ROTH, ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSAODOR, EAP ASSISTANT ARVIS AND POLCOUNS (NOTETAKER), MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS FOR 75 MINUTES APRIL 15. DIRECTOR OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS SAMODRA AND DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS WIDODO AND TWO OTHER STAFF ACCOMPANIED ALATAS.

EAST TIMOR

[redacted]

b-1

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

B-1

13. (C) THE FINAL PACKAGE WOULD HAVE THE SHAPE OF A TWO-

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE DOCUMENT IN WHICH PORTUGAL AND INDONESIA WOULD STATE THEIR POSTIONS, WITH A 69 ARTICLE ANNEX DETAILING THE AUTONOMY OFFER. THERE WOULD ALSO BE A STATEMENT REGARDING THE INTENTIONS OF PORTUGAL AND INDONESIA TO UNDERTAKE "FOLLOW-UP" ACTION IN THE WAKE OF THE CONSULTATION AMONG THE EAST TIMORESE.

14. (C) WITH REGARD TO THE SCHEDULE FOR THE CONSULTATION PROCESS, ALATAS SAID THAT HE HAD MOVED THE SENIOR OFFICIALS MEETING, SET FOR APRIL 13-14 TO APRIL 20 SO THAT THE FOLLOW-ON MINITERS' MEETING WOULD BE "BACK-TO-BACK." THERE WOULD BE ONE ADDITIONAL MEETING FOR SIGNING AND THEN THE "SOCIALIZATION PROCESS" WOULD BEGIN (MAY-JUNE) DURING WHICH THE EAST TIMORESE WOULD BE INFORMED OF THE CONTENTS OF THE AUTONOMY PLAN. THE CONSULTATION WOULD TAKE PLACE IN JULY OR POSSIBLY EARLY AUGUST. IT WAS UNAVOIDABLE THAT THE "SOCIALIZATION" WOULD BE TAKING PLACE CONCURRENTLY WITH THE JUNE 7 ELECTION. (NOTE: ALATAS EARLIER REPONDED TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION REGARDING THE JUNE 7 ELECTION IN EAST TIMOR BY SAYING THAT IT WAS AS YET UNDECIDED WHETHER THE ELECTION IN EAST TIMOR WOULD BE FOR THE NATIONAL OR FOR THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT OR BOTH. END NOTE)

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

MORI DocID: 1054621

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

B-1 withdrawn
page

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

ELECTIONS
---

24. (C) IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE ELECTIONS, ROTH SAID THAT EXCEPT FOR SOME TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES INCLUDING TIMELY WORK ON COMPLETING REGULATIONS AND QUESTION ABOUT WHAT LEVEL MONITORS WOULD WORK AT, THE ELECTION PREPARATIONS APPEARED TO BE PROCEEDING ACEPTABLY. MOREOVER, HE HAD HEARD NO SUPPORT FO A POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTIONS (WHICH WOULD BE POLITCALLY COSTLY). ROTH RAISED THE MATTER OF VISAS FOR FOREIGN TECHNICAL EXPERTS ASSISTING WITH ELECTION PREPARATION NOTING THAT THEY CURRENTLY MUST WORKON TOURIST VISAS BECAUSE THE APPROPRIATE VISAS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. ALATAS UNDERTOOK TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM WITH "IN DEPTH" DIRECTIVES ENSURING THE PROPER VISAS WITH APPROPRIATE DURATION WOULD BE ISSUED.

ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C11

DOCUMENT_ID: 183128091
DOCNO: 001926
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990418
TOR: 055150
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904180925
MHFNO: 99 5114724
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI2419
OO RUEHC RUEHZS
DE RUEHJA #1926/01 1080925
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180925Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7305
INFO RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 4805
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 0913
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2035
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001926

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/01

Classified by Department of State
Lee R. Lohman, DAS, A/RPS
Classify Conf. Reason B1, 1.4(b)(d) Date 6/11/2004
Declassify on 4/17/2024 Auth.

TEXT
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, PINS, CASC, PINR ID
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: DILI UPDATE

REF: A) JAKARTA 1908 (NOTAL), B) JAKARTA 1923

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

CORRECTED COPY CORRECTING PARA ENUMERATIOM

2. (U) SUMMARY: AS OF MID-DAY APRIL 18, MILITARY-BACKED MILITIA CONTINUE TO OPERATE WITHOUT CONSTRAINT IN DILI, THE CAPITAL OF EAST TIMOR. THE OFFICIAL DEATH COUNT FROM THE APRIL 17 MILITIA ASSAULTS ON CIVILIANS STANDS AT 20 WITH MANY CLAIMS THAT IT IS HIGHER. OVER ONE HUNDRED

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B1, 1.4(b)+(d), B-6

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

DISPLACED PERSONS AT THE SCENE OF THE MOST BRUTAL MILITIA ATTACK ARE MISSING. ONE REPORT CLAIMS THAT SOME ARE IN POLICE CUSTODY. THERE ARE REPORTS OF RENEWED MILITIA ATTACKS, APRIL 18, ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE CIVILIANS IN ONE DILI NEIGHBORHOOD IN WHICH INDONESIAN MILITARY FORCES MAY HAVE JOINED IN. A SENIOR INDONESIAN MILITARY FIGURE IS RUMORED TO HAVE BEEN IN DILI DURING THE MILITIA RAMPAGE AND THERE ARE REPORTS OF THAT SENIOR MILITARY FIGURES, INCLUDING GENERAL WIRANTO, MET IN JAKARTA REGARDING EAST TIMOR A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE MILITIA RALLY-RAMPAGE. WIRANTO REPORTEDLY WILL VISIT DILI APRIL 19. REPORTS FROM DILI CLAIM THE MILITIAS ARE PLANNING MORE ATTACKS IN TOWNS SOUTH OF DILI OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS OF KILLINGS AND KIDNAPPINGS BY THE MILITIA IN LIQUICA AND VIQUEQUE IN RECENT DAYS. THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA HAS MADE NO STATEMENT. HIS PEOPLE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS OF MILITIA ELEMENTS IN JAKARTA TARGETING THEM. THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER WILL CALL ON HABIBIE APRIL 19 TO DISCUSS THE VIOLENCE. THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY AND AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER MAY BE CONTACTING HABIBIE AS WELL. THE PORTUGUESE CLAIM TO BE DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE TRIPARTITE TALKS SET FOR THIS WEEK IN NEW YORK. FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS ALSO APPEARS SET TO KEEP THE TALKS ON SCHEDULE. WESTERN JOURNALISTS BELIEVE THAT A STRATEGY IS EMERGING TO PARTITION EAST TIMOR BY INTIMIDATING THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MAJORITY IN WESTERN DISTRICTS AND THE CAPITAL. END SUMMARY

DILI UPDATE
---

3. (U) WESTERN JOURNALISTS IN DILI HAVE TOLD US BY PHONE THAT THERE WAS ADDITIONAL SHOOTING IN DILI OVERNIGHT (APRIL 17-18). AS OF MID-DAY APRIL 18 THE MILITIAS, WHICH RAMPAGED THROUGH THE CAPITAL APRIL 17, REMAIN IN DILI AND APPEAR TO BE OPERATING FREELY ABSENT ANY CONSTRAINT/CONTROL IMPOSED BY THE POLICE OR MILITARY. THE OFFICIAL DEATH COUNT NOW STANDS AT 20, THOUGH MANY SOURCES, INCLUDING FORMER EAST TIMOR GOVERNOR MARIO CARRASCALAO, BELIEVE THAT THE COUNT IS CERTAINLY HIGHER.

4. (U) A JOURNALIST WHO WAS AT THE HOUSE OF MANUEL CARRASCALAO WHEN IT WAS ATTACKED APRIL 17 TOLD US THAT HE SAW OVER 100 PEOPLE WHEN HE INTERVIEWED THEM THERE APRIL 16 AND AGAIN WHEN HE WAS AT THE HOUSE ON APRIL 17. CHRISTINA CARRASCALAO, MANUEL CARRASCALAO'S DAUGHTER, TOLD OUR JOURNALIST SOURCE THAT 126 PEOPLE WERE AT THE HOUSE AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK. THE AUTHORITIES HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED 12 DEAD AT THE HOUSE. (FOUR FROM THE HOUSE EARLIER HAD SOUGHT REFUGE AT THE RESIDENCE OF BISHOP BELO.) THE REST, INCLUDING THE REMAINS OF THOSE KILLED (12 OR MORE) ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR THOUGH ONE REPORT CLAIMS THE REMAINS OF THE DEAD ARE AT THE MILITARY HOSPITAL. INDONESIAN RED CROSS OFFICIALS TOLD JOURNALISTS THAT THE DEAD AND WOUNDED WERE TAKEN AWAY IN MILITARY TRUCKS LATE

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

IN THE DAY APRIL 17. A CORDON OF MILITARY AND POLICE PREVENTED JOURNALISTS FROM APPROACHING THE SCENE AFTER THE ASSAULT, APRIL 17. SOME PEOPLE WOUNDED IN OTHER INCIDENTS IN DILI SOUGHT MEDICAL HELP AT A PRIVATE HOUSE SET UP TO AID VICTIMS ACCORDING TO A WESTERN JOURNALIST IN DILI. THE POLICE VISITED THE SITE OVERNIGHT LOOKING FOR WOUNDED. THE PEOPLE AT THE HOUSE CLAIMED THEY HAD NO WOUNDED THERE AND THE POLICE LEFT. ONE REPORT CLAIMS THAT APPROXIMATELY 60 DISPLACED PERSONS, POSSIBLY FROM THE CARRASCALAO HOUSE, ARE IN POLICE CUSTODY IN DILI.

5. (U) JOURNALISTS WHO VISITED THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF BEKORA ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF DILI ON APRIL 17 WERE SHOWN CARTRIDGES THAT LOCAL PEOPLE SAID WERE EXPENDED DURING THE MILITIA ATTACK ON BEKORA THAT DAY. THE CARTRIDGES, WHICH SMELLED FRESH, INCLUDED 9MM (HAND GUN OR BARRETTA), 5.66 CALIBER (M-16) AND 7.62 MM (KALISHNIKOV OR SKS). THE LOCAL PEOPLE HAD ARMED THEMSELVES WITH KNIVES AND STAVES FOR SELF-DEFENSE BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THEY WOULD BE NO MATCH FOR "ABRI-BACKED MILITIA," SHOULD THEY RETURN. AS OF MID-DAY APRIL 18, THERE WERE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT THE MILITIA HAD IN FACT RETURNED TO BEKORA. THESE REPORTS CLAIMED SHOOTING AND BURNING OF HOUSES HAD OCCURRED. A WESTERN JOURNALIST REPORTEDLY WITNESSED MOBIL POLICE AND ARMY TROOPS SHOOTING INTO A NEIGHBORHOOD WHILE THE MILITIAS WERE ASSAULTING IT. HE SAID FROM HIS VANTAGEPOINTS IT WAS NOT CONCEIVABLE THAT THE BRIMOB TROOPS WERE SHOOTING TO DEFEND THE NEIGHBORHOOD, ADDING, "AND THERE WAS NO SHOOTING COMING BACK." ISAAC, THE POLITICAL COORDINATOR OF THE CNRT (PRO-INDEPENDENCE UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION) TOLD ONE CORRESPONDENT THAT "NOW WE CAN ONLY COUNT ON OURSELVES FOR DEFENSE."

6. (U) FORMER EAST TIMOR GOVERNOR MARIO CARRASCALAO TOLD US APRIL 18 THAT GENERAL ZACKY ANWAR HAD BEEN IN DILI SINCE APRIL 16 OR 17 "TO BLESS THIS OPERATION." JOURNALISTS ON THE SCENE ALSO REPORTED CLAIMS THAT ZACKY WAS IN DILI ON APRIL 17. THE JOURNALISTS BELIEVE THAT THIS REFLECTS HIGH-LEVEL TNI (INDONESIAN MILITARY) INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENTS IN DILI. SPECULATION IS ALSO GROWING ABOUT THE PRESENCE IN JAKARTA OF THE KEY EAST TIMOR SECURITY FORCE LEADERS, INCLUDING THE DILI POLICE CHIEF, THE EAST TIMOR MILITARY COMMANDER AND GENERAL DAIMRI (REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER) LAST WEEK. THE GROUP REPORTEDLY MET WITH GENERAL WIRANTO ON OR ABOUT APRIL 13. LOCAL MEDIA, AT THE TIME, CARRIED REPORTS OF SENIOR SECURITY MEETING(S) ON EAST TIMOR. WIRANTO WILL REPORTEDLY VISIT DILI ON APRIL 19.

7. (U) MARIO CARRASCALAO SAID HE HAS HEARD ABOUT PLANS FOR MILITIA ATTACKS ON APRIL 19 OR 20 IN TOWNS SOUTH OF DILI, SPECIFICALLY MAUBISSE IN AINARO DISTRICT. JOURNALISTS IN DILI TOLD US OF EXPECTATION OF ATTACKS IN THE DISTRICT TOWN OF ALIEU (ALSO SOUTH OF DILI) APRIL 19 OR 20. MEANWHILE, THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF A MILITIA ATTACK IN LIQUICA, APRIL 17, WHICH LEFT MANY

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

DEAD. LIQUICA REMAINS SEALED OFF. THERE IS ALSO A REPORT THAT OVER THE WEEKEND, MILITIA HAVE SEIZED 18 PEOPLE IN VIQUEQUE (NFI).

8. (U) A SENIOR GENERAL TOLD THE DATT THAT THE MILITARY AND POLICE HAVE TAKEN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION IN DILI. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT MILITARY AND POLICE MEASURES IN DILI ON APRIL 17, PREVENTED AN EVEN HIGHER DEATH TOLL. JOURNALISTS ON THE SCENE MID-DAY APRIL 18 TELL US, HOWEVER, THAT THE MILITARY STILL HAVE TAKEN NO STEPS TO REASSERT CONTROL AND THAT, EXCEPT FOR AN OCCASIONAL VEHICLE CARRYING POLICE, SECURITY FORCES ARE OFF THE STREETS.

9. (U) XANANA'S STAFF REPORT THAT HE IS NOT ISSUING STATEMENTS FOR THE MOMENT. THEY HAVE REPORTS WHICH THEY TAKE SERIOUSLY OF 150 PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAMEN IN JAKARTA WHO ARE PREPARING TO ATTACK PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURES IN THE JAKARTA, INCLUDING XANANA. THEY IDENTIFIED THE LEADERS OF THE GROUP AS [ ] (NOT KNOWN TO US), AND SAID THEY WERE DISPERSED IN THREE LOCATIONS IN THE CITY (RAGUNAN, RAWASARI -- NEAR XANANA'S HOUSE OF DETENTION, AND KALAPA DUA). (NFI) B-6

DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS

10. (C) [ ] HAS TOLD US THAT THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER, NOW IN INDONESIA ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT AND WHO WAS IN DILI ON APRIL 17 (REF B), WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE TOMORROW, APRIL 19, ABOUT THE VIOLENCE. [ ] SAID, IS DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN NEW YORK. OTHERWISE, THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA WILL ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES OF PREVENTING THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE FROM DETERMINING THEIR FUTURE. B-1 B-1

[ ] TOLD US ON APRIL 18 THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS ALSO HOPES TO KEEP THE TRIPARTITE TALKS ON SCHEDULE AND PLANS TO LEAVE FOR NEW YORK TALKS WITH A NEW AUTONOMY PACKAGE ON APRIL 19. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TOLD US FOREIGN SECRETARY ROBIN COOK IS CONSIDERING TELEPHONING PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON APRIL 19. B-6

11. (C) [ ] HAS TOLD US THAT THE AUSTRALIAN SECURITY COUNCIL WILL MEET APRIL 19 REGARDING EAST TIMOR DEVELOPMENTS AND THAT A PHONE CALL OR MESSAGE FORM PRIME MINISTER HOWARD TO HABIBIE WILL LIKELY FOLLOW THAT SESSION. B-1

12. (C) JOURNALISTS IN DILI, NOTING APRIL 17 PUBLIC CALLS AT THE RALLY BY RALLY LEADERS FOR PARTITION OF EAST TIMOR WITH WESTERN DISTRICTS AND THE CAPITAL REMAINING WITH INDONESIA, BELIEVE THAT MILITIA INTIMIDATION AND ASSAULTS IN THOSE WESTERN DISTRICTS NOW ON-GOING IS IN SUPPORT OF SUCH AN OUTCOME. THE AIM WOULD BE TO DRIVE OUT OR SILENCE THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MAJORITY.

UNCLASSIFIED

MORI DocID: 1054588

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183131360
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990419
TOR: 023129
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904191100
MHFNO: 99 5120558
DOCCLASS: S

Review entire document

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCC #1736 1090616
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0415 1090616
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Feb 09
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

ENCL (5)

~~SECRET~~

RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUEOEGA T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUFOADA T JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
~~RHFJAGT T MAG FOUR ONE~~
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR

RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPBHR T FIRST MAR
RUHPPEL T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUHPBHR T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBHR T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHPESX T TACRON TWELVE
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHWISSK T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHWISSF T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW

~~SECRET~~

RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 191100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUBDPLA/NMCB THREE DET SIERRA
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
4WG SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
USNS WATERS
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA0109/19 APR//
RMKS/
1. (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

~~SECRET~~

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. (C) INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING DELAYED TO 12 SEP

B. (C) INDONESIA - UP-DATE ON EAST TIMOR UNREST

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELPOMENTS: NOTHING TO REPORT.

A. (C) INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING DELAYED TO 12 SEP: UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, JAMSHEED MARKER, INFORMED THE US MISSION ON 16 APR THAT THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING WILL BE DELAYED FROM JULY TO 12 SEP. MARKER STATED THAT THE 12 SEP DATE HAD BEEN SELECTED OUT OF SECURITY AND TRANSPARENCY CONCERNS, AND THE NEED FOR SUFFICIENT TIME TO GATHER ENOUGH RESOURCES, FUNDS, AND PERSONNEL. HE ESTIMATED THE TOTAL UN COST TO BE APPROXIMATELY $45 MILLION, WITH AN ON-SITE REQUIREMENT OF 4,500 PERSONNEL. (KEYS ID)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE DELAY WILL GIVE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) MORE TIME TO COME UP WITH A POST BALLOTING STRATEGY. IT WILL ALSO GIVE PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS MORE TIME TO CONDUCT THEIR INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT ACTIVITIES IN AN EFFORT TO INFLUENCE THE DIRECT BALLOTS OUTCOME. THIS WILL LIKELY INCREASE THE LEVEL OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR AS PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES CLASH WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS. THE DELAY WILL LIKELY BE SEEN AS A VICTORY FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES AS THE ANNOUNCEMENT WILL COME AFTER A WEEKEND OF VIOLENCE. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES/CONFIDENTIAL) (KEYS ID)

B. (C) INDONESIA - UP-DATE ON EAST TIMOR UNREST: VIOLENCE ERUPTED AGAIN IN DILI, EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E), AS OVER 1,500 ARMED PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAMEN PARADED INTO THE CAPITAL CITY, HELD A RALLY, AND WENT ON A RAMPAGE 17 APR. LATEST REPORTING INDICATES OVER 30 PEOPLE WERE KILLED WHEN PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES ATTACKED INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. DURING THE RAMPAGE, PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES WERE SEEN ATTACKING AND BURNING THE HOMES AND BUSINESSES OF KNOWN PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS. AMONG THE DEAD WAS 18-YEAR-OLD MANUELITO CARRASCALAO, THE SON OF PRO-INDEPEDENCE FIGURE MANUEL CARRASCALAO. THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) DID NOT INTERVENE DURING THE VIOLENCE. (KEYS ID)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES WILL CONTINUE

~~SECRET~~

TO USE INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE TO DELAY THE UP-COMING 22-23 APR UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS AND TO INFLUENCE THE 12 SEP DIRECT BALLOTING FOR AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. UNREST AND VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE DURING THE WEEK AS PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES MOVE THEIR CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES TO OTHER NEARBY CITIES, RESULTING IN SIMILAR VIOLENT ATTACKS AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS.
(OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES/CONFIDENTIAL) (KEYS ID)

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

13 APR INDIA	(U) VAISAKHI (SIKH) GURU GOBIND SINGH FOUNDED SIKHISM AS A MILITARISTIC RELIGION (1699)
12-14 APR THAILAND	(U) SONGKRAN (NATIONAL HOLIDAY; TRADITIONAL NEW YEAR)
15 APR NORTH KOREA	(U) BIRTHDAY OF KIM IL-SUNG (1912) ANNIVERSARY OF EC-121 SHOOTDOWN (1969)
19 APR SOUTH KOREA	(U) STUDENT REVOLUTION (1960)
25 APR AUSTRALIA/ NEW ZEALAND/ COOK ISLANDS/ SAMOA/TONGA	(U) ANZAC DAY (1915)
25 APR NORTH KOREA	(U) FOUNDING OF KOREAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (1932)/KIM IL-SUNG GUERRILLA UNIT ACTIVATION DAY (1915)
29 APR JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
1 MAY MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
1 MAY SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS

C. (U) FOREIGN VIP TRAVEL: NOTHING TO REPORT.

5. (U) [redacted]

b2

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

Extract from Atlantic Intelligence Command Executive Summary 201432Z Apr 99

INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR INCIDENTS CONTINUE [redacted]

[redacted] UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE JAMSHEED MARKER INFORMED THE U.S. MISSION ON 16 APRIL THAT UN-SPONSORED BALLOTING FOR EAST TIMOR WILL BE POSTPONED FROM JULY TO 12 SEPTEMBER. CONCERNS OVER SECURITY AND SUFFICIENT TIME TO GATHER AND DEPLOY RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTED TO THE DECISION. APPROXIMATELY THIRTY PEOPLE WERE KILLED AS ANTI-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE PEOPLE AND BUILDINGS IN DILI ON 17 APRIL. PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES WILL CONTINUE THEIR ATTACKS LEADING TO THE TRIPARTITE TALKS BETWEEN INDONESIA, PORTUGAL, AND THE UN ON 22-23 APRIL. THE EXTENDED DELAY IN THE REFERENDUM PROCESS WILL ALLOW ANTI-INDEPENDENCE TO CONTINUE THEIR VIOLENT ATTACKS AND SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT THE VOTING PROCESS.

[redacted] MARKER STATED THAT THE 12 SEPTEMBER DATE HAD BEEN SELECTED OUT OF SECURITY AND TRANSPARENCY CONCERNS, AND THE NEED FOR SUFFICIENT RESOURCES, FUNDS, AND PERSONNEL. HE ESTIMATED THE TOTAL UN COST TO BE APPROXIMATELY $45 MILLION, WITH AN ON-SITE REQUIREMENT OF 4,500 PERSONNEL. THE DELAY WILL GIVE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA MORE TIME TO DEVELOP A POST BALLOTING STRATEGY AND A HONORABLE, FACE SAVING EXIT FROM EAST TIMORESE POLITICS. IT WILL ALSO GIVE PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS MORE TIME TO CONDUCT THEIR INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT ACTIVITIES IN AN EFFORT TO INFLUENCE THE DIRECT BALLOTS OUTCOME. THE DELAY WILL LIKELY BE SEEN AS A VICTORY FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES AS THE ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE RELEASED AFTER A WEEKEND OF VIOLENCE.

[redacted] VIOLENCE ON 17 APRIL INVOLVED OVER 1,500 ARMED PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAMEN IN DILI. AT LEAST THIRTY PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND NUMEROUS HOUSES AND BUSINESSES OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE FACTIONS WERE BURNED. THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) DID NOT INTERVENE DURING THE VIOLENCE. THE TNI WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON SECURITY IN URBAN AREAS AS THE FIRST OPEN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS SINCE 1955 ARE SCHEDULED FOR JUNE.

[redacted] PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES WILL CONTINUE THEIR PATTERN OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION THROUGH THE TRIPARTITE TALKS IN NEW YORK ON 22-23 APRIL UNTIL THE REFERENDUM ON 12 SEPTEMBER. UNREST AND VIOLENCE WILL CONTINUE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE TNI CONTINUES TO BE INEFFECTIVE, UNWILLING, OR UNABLE, TO HALT THE ATTACKS. (JICPAC, PRESS, AIC POC: LTJG DEAN)

MORI DocID: 1054665

~~Top Secret~~ TEP

CIAPASS SEIB 99-090CX

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

The SEIB must be returned to CIA within 5 working days

Tuesday, 20 April 1999

National Security Information

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Reproduction of this Document Prohibited

Readership is limited to those on approved reader list on file with CIA SEIB Control Officer. The undersigned hereby acknowledge reading this document.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2004

****** EYES ONLY ******

~~Top Secret~~

Table of Contents

1

3

5

6

7

8

10

East Asia **East Timor:** Independence Not a Sure Bet 11
Analytic Perspective

13

14

MORI DocID: 1054665

EAST ASIA

East Timor:
Analytic Perspective

Independence Not a Sure Bet

A lack of broad support in Jakarta for President Habibie's commitment to independence for the province by yearend if its citizenry rejects autonomy will encourage prointegration militias to continue their violent campaign to cow proindependence advocates and delay the consultation process.

Support for Habibie's East Timor initiative also appears tenuous among senior military officers, including Armed Forces Commander Wiranto who has taken no action against the prointegration militias or complicit local military units. the military may be seeking to manipulate the polling process in favor of the autonomy option by allowing the militias to create disturbances.

Possible Outcomes

Continued violence could indefinitely delay a vote on the autonomy proposal. UN officials recently postponed the polling from July to 12 September,

— If the militia activities continue unchecked, the situation could degenerate into a protracted conflict. the various militias are poised to begin assaults in areas outside of their strongholds.

To restore stability, the Indonesian security forces must stop supporting the militias and adopt a neutral posture. This would increase the prospects for a resumption of the reconciliation talks between pro–Jakarta and proindependence leaders and for an eventual disarmament of both sides.

MORI DocID: 1054665

A close vote in the UN ballot, however, could spark renewed violence. Indonesia nationalists in the newly elected People's Consultative Assembly—which has ultimate authority to relinquish sovereignty over East Timor—also might be emboldened by such a vote to try to abort the process and retain the province.

— Proindependence leaders—who expect to win by a wide margin—would reject any result favoring autonomy as evidence of manipulation by prointegrationists.

— A strong rejection of autonomy would deflate the momentum of the militias, who, without military support, would be hard pressed to mount a serious armed challenge.

UNCLASSIFIED

MORI DocID: 1054572

UNCLASSIFIED

(C2)

DOCUMENT_ID: 183153055
DOCNO: 002119
PRODUCER: BONN
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990422
TOR: 073011
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904221114
MHFNO: 99 5172059
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
ZNR UUUUU ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI5842
PP RUEHZL RUEHC
DE RUEHOL #2119 1121114
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221114Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0861
INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0111
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
BT

CONTROLS
UNCLAS BONN 002119

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, PHUM, EUN, UN, ID, GM
SUBJECT: FRG/EU PRES - MORE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR

1. DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENCY ON 4/20/99 ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE CONTINUED VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR. THIS DOCUMENT AND ALL OTHER EU PRESIDENCY DECLARATIONS CAN BE FOUND AT THE GERMAN EU PRESIDENCY WEB SITE, HTTP://WWW.EU-PRESIDENCY.DE/, IN ENGLISH.

2. TEXT OF STATEMENT:

THE EUROPEAN UNION IS DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT SINCE ITS APRIL 12 DECLARATION VIOLENCE HAS ESCALATED SUBSTANTIALLY IN EAST TIMOR. IN DILI, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS HAVE CARRIED OUT NEW ATTACKS ON 17 AND 18 APRIL KILLING SOME THIRTY UNARMED CIVILIANS AND INJURING MANY MORE. THE TEENAGE SON OF MANUEL JOSE CARRASCALAO, SPEAKER OF CONSELHO NACIONAL DA RESISTENCIA TIMORENSE, IS REPORTED TO BE AMONGST THOSE KILLED. THE EU IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE OCCURRED WITHIN A SHORT DISTANCE OF

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/04 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE MILITARY COMMAND OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES STATIONED IN EAST TIMOR AND THAT THOSE FORCES DID NOT INTERVENE IN ORDER TO PREVENT OR STOP THE INCIDENT.

THE EU STRONGLY CONDEMNS THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND URGES ALL PARTIES IN THE TERRITORY OF EAST TIMOR TO SHOW THE UTMOST RESTRAINT IN ORDER TO AVOID FURTHER SUCH INCIDENTS. THE EU EXPRESSES ITS DEEP CONCERN THAT THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES WERE UNABLE TO PREVENT THE NEW ATTACKS RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF INNOCENT HUMAN LIVES. THE EU NOTES IN THIS CONTEXT THE FACT THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS LIKEWISE CONDEMNED THESE ATTACKS AND TAKEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENT. THE EU URGES THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY TO ASSUME ITS RESPONSIBILITY AND TO ENSURE THAT VIOLENCE WILL NOT RECUR. THE EU AGAIN REITERATES ITS POSITION THAT IT REMAINS THE OBLIGATION OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN AND PRESERVE SECURITY, STABILITY AND PUBLIC ORDER IN EAST TIMOR, TO DISARM MILITIAS AND HOLD ACCOUNTABLE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KILLINGS.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A UN PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR IS URGENTLY NEEDED TO HELP PREVENT FURTHER VIOLENT CLASHES IN EAST TIMOR. THE EU URGES THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO RECOGNISE THIS NEED AND TO ALLOW THE UN TO DEPLOY ITS PERSONNEL IN THE TERRITORY.

THE EU UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ONGOING TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH REMAINS THE ONLY WAY TO REACH A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE AND INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE EAST TIMORESE ISSUE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR AND THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

POLT

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C4

DOCUMENT_ID: 183158573
DOCNO: 001352
PRODUCER: CANBERRA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990423
TOR: 033422
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904230720
MHFNO: 99 5185889
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI0966
PP RUEHC
DE RUEHBY #1352/01 1130720
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 230720Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3529
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 3241
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1715
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0173
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 8629
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE 2143
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH 0395
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 001352

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/04

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PINS, KPKO, UN, ID, AS
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: GUSMAO MESSAGE TO FM DOWNER

REF: JAKARTA 2012

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL/C STEPHEN ENGELKEN. REASON 1.5 (B AND D).

2. (U) [ ] BOTH LONG-TIME AUSTRALIAN RESIDENTS OF EAST TIMORESE ORIGIN, CALLED ON POLCOUNS APRIL 23 TO PROVIDE A COPY OF THE MESSAGE WHICH EAST TIMORESE INDEPENDENCE LEADER GUSMAO SENT AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER (REFTEL). [ ] EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD LONG BEEN ACTIVE IN ORGANIZING ASYLUM IN AUSTRALIA FOR EAST TIMORESE REFUGEES [ ]

B-6

Classified by Department of State
Lee R. Lohman, DAS, A/RPS
Classify C.A.F. Reason B-1.4(b+d) Date 6/11/2024
Declassify on 04/22/2024 Auth.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2007 Exemption B-1.4(b+d); B-6

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] A FULL FLEDGED CNRT MEMBER. [redacted] REPORTED THAT HE HAD MET APRIL 19 WITH GUSMAO AT HIS PLACE OF DETENTION IN JAKARTA AND THAT GUSMAO HAD ASKED HIM TO PASS A MESSAGE TO DOWNER AND SHARE IT WITH OTHER EMBASSIES IN CANBERRA. THE MESSAGE TOOK THE FORM OF A SHORT LETTER FROM GUSMAO IDENTIFYING [redacted] AS HIS REPRESENTATIVE ACCOMPANIED BY A MEMORANDUM FROM [redacted] DESCRIBING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GUSMAO (TEXT AT PARA 5 BELOW).

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

5. (C) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF [ ] MEMORANDUM REPORTING GUSMAO'S VIEWS:

BEGIN TEXT.

CNRT EAST TIMOR REPORT

I VISITED JAKARTA RECENTLY AND HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET TWICE WITH XANANA GUSMAO, THE PRESIDENT OF THE CNRT.

THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT HIS DETENTION HOUSE NEAR THE CIPINANG PRISON IN JAKARTA [ ] AND AFTERWARDS [ ] AFTER THE MEETINGS XANANA ASKED ME TO PASS ON TO THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT THE FOLLOWING POINTS OF DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS:

1) CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS.

2) COMMENTS

XANANA AND THE CNRT ARE DESPERATELY TRYING TO SAVE THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS OF WHICH HE IS A FIRM BELIEVER AND SUPPORTER. DESPITE THE RECENT EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR, XANANA BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION PROCESS CAN STILL BE SAVED IF THE FOLLOWING STEPS CAN BE FOLLOWED AND IMPLEMENTED. BECAUSE OF AUSTRALIA'S CLOSE RELATIONS AND FRIENDSHIP WITH INDONESIA HE BELIEVES THAT THE ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT OF THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE VITAL IN ACHIEVING ANY PROGRESS WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO A FINAL AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION FOR EAST TIMOR.

B1

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

[ ] B-1

AS STATED, XANANA BELIEVES THAT THOSE INITIATIVES SHOULD COME FROM THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF ITS CLOSE RELATIONS AND FRIENDSHIP WITH INDONESIA. XANANA BELIEVES THAT OF MANY COUNTRIES IF ANY, AUSTRALIA WILL BE IN A BETTER AND STRONGER POSITION TO PERSUADE INDONESIA TO AGREE TO THESE STEPS WHICH HE BELIEVES WILL BE THE BEST WAY TO HELP ACHIEVE A FAIR AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION FOR EAST TIMOR.

FINALLY, XANANA BELIEVES THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK TOWARDS THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL ENVOY TO EAST TIMOR.

END TEXT.

HOLMES

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

C14

DOCUMENT_ID: 183136658
DOCNO: 072333
PRODUCER: WASHDC
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: OUT
DOR: 19990419
TOR: 210824
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904200104
MHFNO: 99 5132990
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #2333/01 1100106
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200104Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0382
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4560
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0526
RUEHKOF/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA IMMEDIATE 9324
RUEHKON/AMCONSUL NAGOYA IMMEDIATE 2641
RUHBBMA/AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE 3048
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE 6328
RUEHKOS/AMCONSUL SAPPORO IMMEDIATE 7689
RUEHJA/AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE 9749
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8118
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0063
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4850
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 3535
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5661
RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 6605
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2753
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0371
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUAGAMS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJCJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//PRIORITY
RUAGAMS/CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMHAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
RUCJACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 5512
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0748
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 4098
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 6309
BT

CONTROLS
UNCLAS STATE 072333

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: APRIL 19, 1999 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS - ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF - ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
UNVIE FOR FITZPATRICK
USEU FOR RUTR

1. INDEX:

-- U.S. - JAPAN SUECABINET MEETING PARAS 2 - 3
-- BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON U.S. - JAPAN SUBCABINET MEETINGS PARAS 2 - 4
-- ATTACK IN EAST TIMOR PARAS 5 - 6
-- INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR PARAS 7 - 8
-- INDONESIA: INDONESIA'S LARGEST MOSQUE BOMBED PARAS 7 AND 9
-- TAIWAN - POSSIBLE SHIP SALE PARAS 7 AND 10

2. THE FOLLOWING NOTICES WERE ISSUED BY THE OFFICE 0F THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ON 4/19/99.

3. U.S. - JAPAN SUBCABINET MEETING

U.S. AND JAPANESE DELEGATIONS WILL PARTICIPATE IN A BILATERAL SUBOABINET-LEVEL MEETING TO-PREPARE FOR THE MAY 3 CLINTON-OBUCHI SUMMIT. THE MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE AT THE NATIONAL EOREIGN AFFAIRS TRAINING CENTER, 4000 ARLINGTON BOULEVARD, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA, BEGINNING AT 2:00 P.M. ON APRIL 21.

THE U.S. DELEGATION WILL BE LED BY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL DEPUTY DIRECTOR LAEL BRAINARD, AND WILL INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE STATE, COMMERCE, TREASURY, AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENTS, AS WELL AS USTR AND THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS. UNDER SECRETARY EIZENSTAT WILL LEAD THE STATE DEPARTMENT CONTINGENT.

DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS KOICHI HARAGUCHI WILL HEAD A JAPANESE DELEGATION THAT INCLUDES REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, THE MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE ECONOMIC PLANNING AGENCY, AND THE JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION.

THERE WILL BE A CAMERA SPRAY (POOL COVERAGE) AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING. THOSE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING SHOULD CONTACT KENNETH BAILES, AT 647-2538.

4. BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON U.S. - JAPAN SUBCABINET MEETINGS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ON TUESDAY, APRIL 20, AT 2 P.M. REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE WILL BRIEF THE PRESS ON BACKGROUND IN ADVANCE OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SUBCABINET TALKS TAKING PLACE THIS WEEK.

MEDIA WITH DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS IDENTIFICATION SHOULD PROCEED DIRECTLY TO ROOM 1406. THOSE WITHOUT STATE DEPARTMENT IDS SHOULD ARRANGE FOR ADVANCE CLEARANCE WITH MS. SHARON ROGERS AT 647-5968.
5. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ON 4/17/99.

6. ATTACK IN EAST TIMOR

WE WERE DEEPLY DISTURBED BY REPORTS THAT ARMED MILITIAS FAVORING CONTINUED INTEGRATION WITH INDONESIA ATTACKED CIVILIANS IN DILI, THE CAPITAL OF EAST TIMOR, CAUSING THE DEATHS OF AT LEAST 8 PEOPLE AND PERHAPS MORE. WE URGENTLY CALL ON THE INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS TO BRING THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS UNDER CONTROL AND FULFIL THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO PROTECT ALL PERSONS IN EAST TIMOR. MOREOVER, WE LOOK TO THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO BRING THE PERPETRATORS OF THESE VIOLENT ATTACKS TO JUSTICE.

7. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 04/19/99 AND NOT USED BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE DAILY BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

8. INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR

CONTEXT: ARMED PRO-INTEGRATIONIST CIVILIAN MILITIAS WENT ON A RAMPAGE APRIL 17 AFTER A RALLY IN DILI, THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL. SOME ATTACKED THE HOUSE OF MANUEL CARRASCALAO, A PROMINENT PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADER, KILLING UP TO 20 PEOPLE WHO SOUGHT SHELTER AT HIS RESIDENCE. REPORTEDLY, OVER 100 OTHERS WHO WERE THERE ARE MISSING. MILITIAS ATTACKED OTHER NEIGHBORHOODS. THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (TNI, FORMERLY ABRI) AND POLICE DID NOT INTERVENE DURING THESE EVENTS (ALTHOUGH THE EMBASSY REPORTS THAT SOME WITNESSES CLAIM THAT POLICE AND ARMY TROOPS FIRED INTO ONE NEIGHBORHOOD WHEN MILITIAS WERE ASSAULTING IT). IRISH FM ANDREWS, WHO WAS IN DILI SAW SOME OF THE RAMPAGE AND WAS FORCED TO TAKE REFUGE IN THE HOME OF BISHOP BELO. EMBASSY JAKARTA REPORTS THAT MILITIAS CONTINUED AS OF MID-DAY APRIL 18 TO OPERATE IN DILI WITHOUT CONSTRAINTS. A KEY ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON EAST TIMOR HAS CONDEMNED THE VIOLENCE AND ACCEPTED GOI RESPONSIBILITY FOR NOT CONTROLLING THE SITUATION. DEFENSE MINISTER GENERAL WIRANTO IS ON HIS WAY TO EAST TIMOR AND HAS SAID HE IS OPEN TO AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OF EVENTS. THE U.S., WHICH AT SENIOR LEVELS (SECRETARY ALBRIGHT, SECDEF COHEN AND OTHERS) HAS BEEN URGING THE GOI TO DISARM THE CIVILIAN MILITIAS, ISSUED A TOUGH STATEMENT OVER THE WEEKEND AND

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

HAS APPROACHED THE GOL OVER THE LATEST EVENTS. CINCPAC ADMIRAL BLAIR REACHED GENERAL WIRANTO BY PHONE TO URGE HLM TO TAKE DECISIVE ACTION TO RESTORE CALM. MEANWHILE, THE GOL HAS FINISHED THE REVISION 0F THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE IT WILL DISCUSS IN THE UN-SPONSORED MARKER TALKS, AND FM ALATAS IS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN NEW YORK IN THE SESSION ON APRIL 22.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR AND UN PEACE TALKS.

A: ARMED PRO-INTEGRATIONIST CIVILIAN MILITIAS LAUNCHED A SERIES OF BLOODY ATTACKS APRIL 17 AFTER A RALLY IN DILI, THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF EAST TIMOR. SOME ATTACKED THE HOUSE OF MANUEL CARRASCALAO, A PROMINENT PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADER, KILLING UP TO 20 PEOPLE WHO SOUGHT SHELTER AT HIS RESIDENCE. REPORTEDLY, OVER 100 OTHERS WHO WERE ALSO THERE ARE MISSING. MILITIAS ATTACKED OTHER NEIGHBORHOODS. IT 15 CREDIBLY REPORTED THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (TNI, FORMERLY ABRI) AND POLICE STOOD BY AND DID NOT INTERVENE TO HALT THIS VIOLENCE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM EMBASSY REPORTING THAT MILITIAS CONTINUE ON APRIL 18 TO OPERATE NITHOUT CONSTRAINT IN DILI.

-- AS WE STATED THIS WEEKEND, THE UNITED STATES IS DEEPLY TROUBLED BY THIS MURDEROUS OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE BY CIVILIAN MILITIAS IN DILI. NE REPEAT IN THE STRONGEST TERMS OUR PREVIOUS CALLS FOR THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (TNI) TO TAKE BACK NEAPONS IT HAD PROVIDED THESE MILITIAS, AND TO DISBAND THEM. NE NOTE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT'S CONDEMNATION OF THE VIOLENCE, BUT CALL FOR EFFECTIVE GOI STEPS TO CONTROL THE MILITIAS, CHECK FURTHER DETERIORATION IN EAST TIMOR, AND FACILITATE THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS. DEFENSE MINISTER NIRANTO IS ON HIS WAY TO EAST TIMOR, AND NE URGE HLM TO ENSURE SECURITY FORCES FULFILL THE DUTIES THEY HAVE CLEARLY NEGLECTED BY PROTECTING VICTIMS OR VIGILANTE MILITIAS. THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS VIOLENCE MUST SNIFTLY BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE AND PUNISHED.

-- AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH HAS EMPHASIZED DURING HIS JUST CONCLUDED VISIT TO JAKARTA LAST NEEK, THE U.S. CONTINUES TO URGE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO ALLOW AS CONFIDENCE BUILDING STEPS IN EAST TIMOR, ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE THERE AND FACILITATION OR HUMANITARIAN, PARTICULARLY MEDICAL, ASSISTANCE. THE U.S. ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORTS IMMEDIATE ENGAGEMENT OF THE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION UNDER THE AUSPICES OR THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO ENCOURAGE PEACE AND CALM IN THE TERRITORY.

-- IN ADDITION, NE SUPPORT IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE ON THE GROUND TO PREPARE FOR AN ANTICIPATED VOTE ON AN AUTONOMY PACKAGE FOR EAST TIMOR. NE UNDERSTAND THAT THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE WILL BE DISCUSSED, AND POSSIBLY FINALIZED, IN NEN YORK ON APRIL 22 IN THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NEXT ROUND CE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER UN AUSPICES. THESE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR'S EUTURE STATUS NILL INVOLVE THE EOREIGN MINISTERS 0E INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL.

9. INDONESIA: INDONESIA'S LARGEST MOSQUE BOMBED

CONTEXT: ACCORDING TO PRESS AND EMBASSY REPORTS, A BOMB EXPLODED TODAY AT 3:15 PM LOCAL TIME IN JAKARTA'S AL-ISTIQLAL MOSQUE, INDONESIA'S LARGEST. 300 PEOPLE WERE PEREORMING AETERNOON PRAYERS AT THE TIME 0E THE BLAST, WHICH REPORTEDLY WOUNDED 6 PEOPLE. THUS EAR, NO ONE HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. EMBASSY JAKARTA HAS ISSUED A NARDEN NOTICE, ALERTING U.S. CITIZENS IN INDONESIA 0E THE INCIDENT AND URGING CAUTION.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE BLAST AT INDONESIA'S LARGEST MOSQUE?

A: NE UNDERSTAND THAT A BOMB EXPLODED IN INDONESIA'S NATIONAL MOSQUE IN JAKARTA ON THE AETERNOON OF APRIL 19. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT SIX PERSONS WERE WOUNDED. THUS EAR, NO ONE HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. NE HAVE NO REPORTS THAT AMERICANS WERE AEEECTED BY THIS OCCURRENCE.

-- NE CONDEMN VIOLENCE EROM ANY SOURCE. INDONESIA IS UNDERGOING A EUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSITION, WHICH IS CREATING OR EXACERBATING TENSIONS IN THE SOCIETY. VIOLENT EXPRESSIONS 0E ERUSTRATION OR GRIEVANCE THREATEN TO DESTABILIZE THE SOCIETY, TO THE DETRIMENT 0E ALL.

-- NE CALL ON ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND RENOUNCE VIOLENCE. NE URGE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO CONDUCT A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION AND ENSURE THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE EOR THIS CRIME ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE AND HELD ACCOUNTABLE.

10. TAINAN - POSSIBLE SHIP SALE

CONTEXT: TWO KNOX-CLASS FRIGATES WERE SOLD TO TAIWAN IN APRIL 1998. TAIWAN HAS BEEN LEASING 6 ADDITIONAL KNOX SHIPS FROM THE U.S. FOR SEVERAL YEARS. TAIWAN HAS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN CONVERTING THEIN FROM LEASE TO SALE. THE U.S. ALSO SOLD AN LSD-38 TO TAIWAN ON MARCH 16, 1999. CONGRESS PASSED ENABLING LEGISLATION PERMITTING THE SALE OF THIS LSD AS EXCESS EQUIPMENT. IN ADDITION, A SECOND LANDING SHIP AND A SALVAGE VESSEL MAY ALSO BE SOLD THIS YEAR. THE SALVAGE SHIP REQUIRES CONGRESSIONAL.

NOTIFICATION, BUT THE LANDING CRAFT WILL REQUIRE ENABLING LEGISIATION AS EXCESS EQUIPMENT. NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE PENDING CONIPLETION OF NOTIFICATION OR PASSAGE OF THE NECESSARY LEGISIATION.

Q: IS THE U.S. PROVIDING SOME USED NAVAL VESSELS TO TAIWAN?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

A: TWO KNOX-CLASS FRIGATES WERE SOLD TO TAIWAN IN 1998. TAIWAN PRESENTLY LEASES 6 ADDITIONAL KNOX-CLASS FRIGATES FROM THE U.S. IN ADDITION, THE U.S. SOLD AN LSD-38 ANCHORAGE-CLASS SUPPLY LANDING SHIP IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR.

-- THE U.S. SELLS ITEMS TO TAIWAN FOR ITS SELF-DEFENSE CONSISTENT WITH OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT AND THE 1982 U.S.-PRC COMMUNIQUE. WE DO NOT HAVE ANY ANNOUNCEMENTS OF ANY NEW OR CONTEMPLATED SALES AT THIS TIME.
ALBRIGHT

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

C17

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT ID: 183148273
DOCNO: 001955
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990421
TOR: 134916
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904211341
MHFNO: 99 5161912
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
VSC988
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHJA #1955/01 1111341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (TAO)
O 211341Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7337
INFO RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0100
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 4816
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2039
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 0920
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 0016
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0285
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001955
ROME FOR THE VATICAN
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/03

TEXT
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, PINR, PHUM, ID
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: AGREEMENT SETS TRUCE TERMS AND ESTABLISHES PEACE COMMISSION IN EAST TIMOR

REF: A) JAKARTA 1923, (NOTAL) B) JAKARTA 1928 (NOTAL)

1. (U) CLASSIFED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (U) SEE ACTIOM RECOMMENDATION PARA 7.

3. (U) FOLLOWING ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE CIVILIANS IN DILI OVER RKCENT DAYS, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS HAVE

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

SIGNED A "TRUCE" WITH THEIR RIVALS. THE SIGNING WAS WITTNESSED BY ARMEL) FORCES COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO, WHO ARRIVEE) LATE APRIL 20, AND BY BISUOP BELO. IMPRISONED RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO GAVE HIS APPROVAL FOR THE RESISTANCE TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT. SIGNERS WERE: FOR THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE "CNRT:" XANANA (NOT PHYSICALLY PRESENT) AND LIANDRO ISAC; FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS: JOAO TOVARES AND DOMINGO SOARES; FOR THE GOVERNMENT: GOVERNOR ABILIO SOARES AND DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE DPRD MARIANO LOPEZ DA CRUZ; FOR THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION: JOKO SUBIANTO; FOR THE MILITARY (TNI): COL. TONO SURATMAN; AND FOR THE POLICE: COL. TIMBUL SILAEN.

4. (U) THE AGREEMENT INCLUDED FIVE POINTS:

-- ALL SIDES SHALL END ALL FORMS OF HOSTILITY, INTIMIDATION, TERROR AND VIOLENCE;

-- ALL SIDES ARE OBLIGATED TO HELP CREATE PEACE AND TRANQUILITY;

-- ALL SIDES SHALL SUPPORT THK DESIRE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND EFFORTS OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH TO BRING ABOUT RECONCILIATION, RESPECT AND ENFORCE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENFORCE THE LAW;

-- ALL PARTIES SHALL TAKE STEPS TO GUARANTEE THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT BY THEIR SUPPORTERS WHETHER ARMED OR UNARMED;

-- TO OVERSKE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT A PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSTON IS FORMED WHOSE MEMBERSHIP WILL CONSIST OF TWO PERSONS FROM EACH OF THE AGREEING PARTIES. THE COMMISSION WILL BEGIN ITS WORK IN TWO DAYS (APRIL 23) .

5. (U) WHILE PRESS REPORTS CLAIM THAT PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS SAIL)THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD LEAD TO THEIR DISARMAMENT, A JOURNALIST ON THE SCENE WHO INTERVIEWED KURICO GUTEREZ, A PROMINENT MILITIA LEADER, TOLD US THAT GUTEREZ SAIE) SO LONG AS THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE RESISTANCE HAD ARMS, THE PRO-INTEGRATION SIDE WOULD RETAIN THEIRS. ON THE OTHER HAND, MILITIA SPOKESMAN ABILIO SOARES IS QUOTED) IN A REUTERS REPORT AS STATING THAT "WHILE THE PEACE DOCUMENT DID NOT INCLUDE DISARMAMENT, MILITIAS HAD TOLD WIRANTO THAT THEY WOULD LAY DOWN (NOTE: NOT "SURRENDER") THEIR ARMS." MANUEL CARRASCALAO, A SENIOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURE IN DILI, WUOSE HOUSE WAS THE TARGET OF THE BLOODIEST ASSAULT ON APRIL 17, TOLD THE SAME JOURNALIST THAT, THE AGREEMENT NOTWITHSTANDING, HE DID NOT INTEND TO ABANDON THE POLICE PROTECTION HE AND SOME OF HIS FAMILY ARE BEING ACCORDED.

6. (C) COMMENT: WIRANTO'S PERSONNEL INVOLVEMENT WITH

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS AGREEMENT AND THE PARTICIPATION OF THE MILITARY AND POLICK ON THE COMMISSION WOULD APPEAR TO OFFER SOME GUARANTEE THAT THE MIIJTIAS, EVEN TF NOT FULLY DISARMED, MIGHT AT LEAST PEFRAIN FROM THE HTGH LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN WHICH THEY HAVE RECENTLY ENGAGED. XANANA'S SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT AND HIS PERSONAL ASSURANCES TO A/S ROTH AND MOST RECENTLY TO AMBASSADOR ROY THAT HE WOULD DIRECT HIS FORCES TO STAND DOWN FROM ARMED ACTIVITIES SIMILARLY WARRANT SOME HOPE THAT A BASIS HAS BEEN LAID FOR A PEACEFUL CONSTULTATION PROCESS. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THAT BASIS IS EXCEEDINGLY FRAGILE. IN THE COMING DAYS, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR AIJ, INVOLVED TO UNDERTAKE

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES TO UNDERGIRD THIS AGREEMENT. THE GOI'S DECISION TO ALLOW ICRC TO RRING TN MEDICAI, PERSONNEL (SEPTEL) CLEARLY FALLS INTO THAT CATEGORY. AN ACCOUNTING OF PERSONS MISSING SINCE THE APRIL 17 ATTACK ON CARAASCALAO'S HOUSE AND SAID TO BE IN MILITIA DETENTION (SEE REFTELS AND SEPTEL) WOULD OBVIOUSLY REDUCE TENSIONS AS WELL.

7: (C) POST RECOMMENDS DEPARTMENT CONSIDER STATEMENT WELCOMING THIS AGREEMENT, NOTING THAT ITS SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION WILL REQUIRE GOOD FAITH AMONG ALL PARTIES. ROY.

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183158595
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990423
TOR: 033732
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904231100
MHFNO: 99 5185932
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #5045 1130711
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0263 1130710
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Jan 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

Encl (7)

MORI DocID: 1054613

RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE

RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPBHR T FIRST MAR
RUHPPEL T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUHPBHR T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBHR T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPESX T TACRON TWELVE
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHWISSK T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHWISSF T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN

SECRET

RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 231100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOU4WG 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
S E C R E T

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/JD 113/23 APR//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE

MORI DocID: 1054613

RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B.

C.

Non responsive

(3) D. (C) INDONESIA - PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN EAST TIMOR

(3) E. (C) INDONESIA - CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE IN SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS

(3) F. (S) INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 15 - 22 APR 99

G. [redacted]

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

Non responsive

~~SECRET~~

NON RESPONSIVE

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

NOR responsive

(U) D. (C) INDONESIA - PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN EAST TIMOR: PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATION REPRESENTATIVES SIGNED A TRUCE AGREEMENT 21 APR IN DILI AT THE HOME OF BISHOP BELO TO REDUCE THE RECENT SPAT OF VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW. DOMINGOS SOARES WHO HEADS THE FORUM FOR DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE AND JOAO TAVERES, COMMANDER OF THE MILITIA FORCE SIGNED FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS WHILE LEANDRO ISAAC, COORDINATOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF EAST TIMOR SIGNED FOR THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUP. EAST TIMOR MILITARY COMMANDER COLONEL TONO SURATMAN, EAST TIMOR POLICE CHIEF COLONEL TIMBUL SILEAN, AND JOKO SIGIANTO FROM THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ALSO SIGNED THE AGREEMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL WIRANTO. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS FRAGILE TRUCE AGREEMENT WILL LAST VERY LONG AS THE SITUATION STILL REMAINS VOLATILE. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT SEVEN WERE KILLED IN EAST TIMOR SINCE THE TRUCE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED. THE AGREEMENT DID NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE AND THE MILITIAS REPORTEDLY WILL NOT SURRENDER THEIR ARMS. IT ALSO IS APPARENT THAT MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR ARE INCAPABLE OR UNWILLING TO INTERVENE TO STOP MILITIA ATTACKS AND INTIMIDATION PRACTICES AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

(U) E. (C) INDONESIA - CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE IN SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS: CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE BROKE OUT IN TWO AREAS OF THE SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS 20 APR. IN THE FIRST AREA, VIOLENCE BEGAN IN TUAL (0540S/13245E), KAI ISLANDS, 250NM (500KM) SOUTHEAST OF AMBON (0343S/12812E) WHEN A CHRISTIAN GOT INTO A DRUNKEN BRAWL WITH A MUSLIM. THE UNREST SPREAD TO LARUT (0539S/13259E) ON THE NEARBY ISLAND OF BIG KAI AND THEN BACK TO TUAL. REPORTS INDICATE UP TO 50 DEAD, 100 INJURED, AND 200 HOUSES BURNED AND MORE THAN 10,000 PEOPLE HAVE FLED TO TUAL. THE ARMED FORCES (TNI) SENT 1,000 TROOPS FROM AMBON TO THE KAI ISLANDS TO DEAL WITH UNREST. ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS, SOME CASUALTIES WERE SHOT BY TNI. THE SECOND AREA OF UNREST CENTERED ON NEIRA (0432S/12954E), BANDA ISLANDS, 90NM (160KM) SOUTH OF AMBON. CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS CLASHED LEAVING 4 DEAD AND 30 HOUSES BURNED. THE MUSLIMS ARE THE MAJORITY GROUP IN THE BANDA ISLANDS. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) VIOLENCE WILL CONTINUE IN THE MOLUCCAS AS TENSIONS BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS REMAIN HIGH. THE SLIGHTEST PROVOCATION BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS WILL LEAD TO FURTHER UNREST IN THE AREA. THE MUSLIMS IN THE KAI ISLANDS ARE NEW MIGRANTS FROM SULAWESI (0300S/12100E) AND AMBON AND HAVE OFTEN BEEN CRITICIZED BY THE LOCAL CHRISTIANS FOR BEING AGGRESSIVE BUSINESSMEN, ARROGANT AND DISRESPECTFUL OF LOCAL TRADITIONS. THE CAUSES BEHIND THE VIOLENCE MIRROR THE PAST AMBON RIOTS AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE MILITARY REGAINS CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

(U) F. (C) INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 15 - 22 APR 99, GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THE OVERALL LEVEL OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED OVER LAST WEEK. THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT

BALLOTING WILL BE DELAYED FROM JULY TO 12 SEP. PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS SIGNED A TRUCE AGREEMENT TO END THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR.
(KEYS ID)

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: NINE PRIVATE INDONESIAN BANKS SIGNED INVESTMENT AND PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS WITH THE CENTRAL BANK AND THE GOVERNMENT 15 APR AS PART OF AN AMBITIOUS BANK RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM. THE CONTRACTS, HOWEVER, CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT GAPS REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF RECAPITALIZATION NEEDED AND THE TERMS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REPLACEMENT BONDS. THE RUSH TO SIGN THE CONTRACTS WAS LIKELY TO COUNTER PERCEPTIONS THAT THE RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM WAS NOT PROGRESSING AS PLANNED AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, WOULD INFLUENCE INVESTOR'S CONFIDENCE. THE RECAPITALIZATION COST FOR THE NINE BANKS IS ESTIMATED TO BE $ 3.4 BILLION. THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK PREDICTS THAT INDONESIA WILL NOT SHOW ECONOMIC GROWTH UNTIL 2000, AS ITS RECOVERY WILL DEPEND UPON BOTH MACROECONOMICS AND POLITICAL STABILITY. IF INDONESIA'S POLITICAL STABILITY COLLAPSES, REFORM WILL BE DELAYED AND ECONOMIC GROWTH WILL STALL. THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR REMAINED AT RP 8,550/$1. (KEYS ID)

(S) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (TNI) COMMANDER, GENERAL WIRANTO, VISITED DILI, EAST TIMOR 20-21 APR TO MEET WITH LOCAL COMMUNITY AND MILITARY LEADERS IN RESPONSE TO THE RECENT RISE IN VIOLENCE. WIRANTO HELD A MEETING WITH PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS 20 APR, THEN MET WITH DILI ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP CARLOS F.X. BELO 21 APR. ALTHOUGH WIRANTO'S VISIT TO EAST TIMOR WAS A GOOD PUBLIC RELATIONS GESTURE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HIS VISIT ALONE WILL END THE UNREST AND VIOLENCE.
(KEYS ID)

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING WILL BE DELAYED FROM JULY TO 12 SEP. UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, JAMSHEED MARKER, STATED THAT THE 12 SEP DATE HAD BEEN SELECTED OUT OF SECURITY AND TRANSPARENCY CONCERNS, AND THE NEED FOR SUFFICIENT TIME TO GATHER ENOUGH RESOURCES, FUNDS, AND PERSONNEL. THE TOTAL UN COST IS ESTIMATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY $45 MILLION, WITH AN ON-SITE REQUIREMENT OF 4,500 PERSONNEL. THE DELAY WILL GIVE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA MORE TIME TO COME UP WITH A POST BALLOTING STRATEGY.
(KEYS ID)

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY OVER LAST WEEK. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT UNREST OCCURRED AT DILI (0833S/12434E), EAST TIMOR, WHEN PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS 17 APR. IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E), A "HOME-MADE" BOMB EXPLODED AT NATIONAL ISTIQLAL MOSQUE 19 APR. DEMONSTRATIONS DEVELOPED IN LHOKSEUMAWE (0510N/09708E), ACEH, AS VIOLENCE CONTINUED IN WEST KALIMANTAN (0054N/10900E), AND SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS (0540S/13245E). SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:
15 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN THREE TOWNS IN ACEH PROVINCE TO DEMAND A REFERENDUM.
15 APR WEST KALIMANTAN / ETHNIC CLASHES ERUPTED BETWEEN MADURESE SETTLERS AND LOCAL MALAYS AND DAYAKS.
15 APR JAKARTA / HUNDREDS FROM SEVERAL STUDENT GROUPS DEMONSTRATED AT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.
15 APR LACLUBAR DISTRICT, EAST TIMOR / PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS

AMBUSHED MEMBERS FROM A MILITARY DISTRICT COMMAND RESULTING IN ONE SECURITY MEMBER KILLED AND FIVE OTHERS INJURED.

16 APR ERMERA / CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE FALINTIL GUERRILLAS AND AN INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES TEAM RESULTED IN TWO GUERRILLAS KILLED.

17 APR DILI / PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS, HOLDING A RALLY ON THE GOVERNOR'S LAWN RESULTING IN REPORTS OF UP TO 30 KILLED.

18 APR BECORA, EAST TIMOR / VIOLENCE CONTINUED BETWEEN PRO-INDONESIA GROUPS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS RESULTING IN TWO DEATHS REPORTED.

18 APR SAMBAS / ARMED CLASHES BETWEEN SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND LOCAL RESIDENTS RESULTED IN FOUR PEOPLE KILLED.

19 APR KARIMUNTING VILLAGE, WEST KALIMANTAN / SECURITY FORCES MISTAKENEDLY OPENED FIRE ON ETHNIC MADURESE MIGRANTS AND LOCAL MALAYS, KILLING FOUR PEOPLE AND INJURING THREE.

19 APR JAKARTA / A "HOME-MADE" BOMB EXPLODED IN AN OFFICE COMPLEX LOCATED ON THE GROUND FLOOR OF JAKARTA'S NATIONAL AL-ISTIQLAL MOSQUE RESULTING IN SIX INJURIES AND NO DEATHS.

19 APR UJUNGPANDANG / A MOB ATTACKED A PRIMARY SCHOOL AND THE OFFICES OF THE INDONESIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH FOUNDATION IN RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL AL-ISTIQLAL MOSQUE BOMBING.

19 APR YOHYAKARTA / TWO MEN ON A MOTORCYCLE THREW FIRECRACKERS INTO A CHURCH.

20 APR JAKARTA / A BOMB THREAT OCCURRED AT A JAKARTA CATHEDRAL, LOCATED EXACTLY OPPOSITE FROM NATIONAL ISTIQLAL MOSQUE.

20 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / POLICE OPENED FIRE TO DISPERSE THOUSANDS OF PRO-SEPARATIST STUDENTS.

20 APR RIAU / SECURITY FORCES FIRED WARNING SHOTS TO DISPERSE HUNDREDS OF STUDENTS WHO STORMED A CALTEX INDONESIA HOUSING COMPLEX DEMANDING A SHARE OF OIL EARNINGS.

20 APR SIGLI, ACEH / THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED TO SHOW SOLIDARITY FOR VICTIMS OF EARLIER CLASHES WITH AUTHORITIES.

20 APR BANDA ISLANDS / CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM FIGHTING BROKE OUT LEAVING FOUR DEAD AND 30 HOUSES BURNED.

21 APR KAI ISLANDS / MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN VIOLENCE OCCURRED IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS, RESULTING IN 50 DEAD, HUNDREDS INJURED, AND 200 HUNDRED HOUSES BURNED. (KEYS ID)

(S) (C) AS ETHNIC UNREST IN WEST KALIMANTAN SUBSIDES, AN OUTBREAK OF RELIGIOUS UNREST RESUMED IN THE MOLUCCAS. THE CAUSES BEHIND THE VIOLENCE MIRROR THE PAST AMBON RIOTS AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE MILITARY REGAINS CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. IN EAST TIMOR, UNREST AND VIOLENCE LIKELY WILL CONTINUE AS THE SITUATION STILL REMAINS VOLATILE.

(S) (C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS SIGNED A TRUCE AGREEMENT IN DILI 21 APR, TO END THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR. BOTH SIDES PLEDGED TO STOP MUTUAL ATTACKS, VIOLENCE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, DID NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE AND THE MILITIAS REPORTEDLY WILL NOT SURRENDER THE ARMS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS TRUCE AGREEMENT WILL LAST VERY LONG AS IT IS APPARENT THAT THE MILITARY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR ARE INCAPABLE OR UNWILLING TO STOP MILITIA ATTACKS AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. (KEYS ID)

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

22-23APR UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (MINISTERIAL LEVEL)

~~SECRET~~

30APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS AGREEMENT SIGNING CEREMONY (ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE)
12MAY	TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING 1ST ANNIVERSARY
07JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
JUL	UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE ON EAST TIMOR
12JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
28AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
AUG-OCT	NEW MPR TO DECIDE ON EAST TIMOR STATUS
12SEP	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING
28OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13NOV	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
07DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT)

(KEYS ID)

(U) (S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5

MORI DocID: 1054613

09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18

(KEYS ID)

(S) WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ONLY 45 DAYS AWAY, UNREST AND VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT INDONESIA LIKELY WILL CONTINUE AT THE SAME LEVEL DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. ATTENTION AND SECURITY WILL START TO FOCUS ON JAKARTA, WHICH WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES TO RESPOND TO UNREST IN THE OUTLYING AREAS. VIOLENCE AND UNREST LIKELY WILL CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR DESPITE THE SIGNING OF THE TRUCE AGREEMENT. UNLESS BOTH PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE VOLUNTARILY DISARM, THE TRUCE AGREEMENT HAS LITTLE CHANCE OF HOLDING. (OSA MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

~~SECRET~~

25 APR	AUSTRALIA/ NEW ZEALAND/ COOK ISLANDS/ SAMOA/TONGA	(U)	ANZAC DAY (1915)
25 APR	NORTH KOREA	(U)	FOUNDING OF KOREAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (1932)/KIM IL-SUNG GUERRILLA UNIT ACTIVATION DAY (1915)
29 APR	JAPAN	(U)	EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U)	CONSTITUTION DAY
01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U)	LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS
03 MAY	JAPAN	(U)	CONSTITUTION DAY (1947)
04 MAY	PRC	(U)	YOUTH DAY (1919)
04 MAY	TONGA	(U)	CROWN PRINCE'S BIRTHDAY (1948)
05 MAY	PALAU	(U)	SENIOR CITIZEN'S DAY
05 MAY	JAPAN/ROK	(U)	CHILDREN'S DAY
05 MAY	THAILAND	(U)	CORONATION DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U)	CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U)	CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U)	PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U)	LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U)	GOSPEL DAY

C. (C) FOREIGN VIP TRAVEL:

27-03 MAY	THAILAND	(U)	THAI PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT CHINA.
05-07 MAY	CHINA	(U)	SOUTH AFRICA PRESIDENT TO VISIT CHINA.

5. (U) [redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//

b(3)

DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183158595
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990423
TOR: 033732
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904231100
MHFNO: 99 5185932
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #5045 1130711
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0263 1130710
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Jan 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

Encl (7)

MORI DocID: 1054613

RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE

RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPBHR T FIRST MAR
RUHPPEL T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUHPBHR T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBHR T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPESX T TACRON TWELVE
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHWISSK T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHWISSF T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN

SECRET

RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 231100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOU4WG 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
S E C R E T

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/JD 113/23 APR//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE

MORI DocID: 1054613

RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B.

C.

Non responsive

(3) D. (C) INDONESIA - PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN EAST TIMOR

(3) E. (C) INDONESIA - CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE IN SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS

(3) F. (S) INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 15 - 22 APR 99

G. [redacted]

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

Non responsive

~~SECRET~~

NON RESPONSIVE

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

NOR responsive

(U) D. (C) INDONESIA - PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN EAST TIMOR: PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATION REPRESENTATIVES SIGNED A TRUCE AGREEMENT 21 APR IN DILI AT THE HOME OF BISHOP BELO TO REDUCE THE RECENT SPAT OF VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW. DOMINGOS SOARES WHO HEADS THE FORUM FOR DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE AND JOAO TAVERES, COMMANDER OF THE MILITIA FORCE SIGNED FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS WHILE LEANDRO ISAAC, COORDINATOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF EAST TIMOR SIGNED FOR THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUP. EAST TIMOR MILITARY COMMANDER COLONEL TONO SURATMAN, EAST TIMOR POLICE CHIEF COLONEL TIMBUL SILEAN, AND JOKO SIGIANTO FROM THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ALSO SIGNED THE AGREEMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL WIRANTO. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS FRAGILE TRUCE AGREEMENT WILL LAST VERY LONG AS THE SITUATION STILL REMAINS VOLATILE. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT SEVEN WERE KILLED IN EAST TIMOR SINCE THE TRUCE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED. THE AGREEMENT DID NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE AND THE MILITIAS REPORTEDLY WILL NOT SURRENDER THEIR ARMS. IT ALSO IS APPARENT THAT MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR ARE INCAPABLE OR UNWILLING TO INTERVENE TO STOP MILITIA ATTACKS AND INTIMIDATION PRACTICES AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

(U) E. (C) INDONESIA - CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE IN SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS: CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE BROKE OUT IN TWO AREAS OF THE SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS 20 APR. IN THE FIRST AREA, VIOLENCE BEGAN IN TUAL (0540S/13245E), KAI ISLANDS, 250NM (500KM) SOUTHEAST OF AMBON (0343S/12812E) WHEN A CHRISTIAN GOT INTO A DRUNKEN BRAWL WITH A MUSLIM. THE UNREST SPREAD TO LARUT (0539S/13259E) ON THE NEARBY ISLAND OF BIG KAI AND THEN BACK TO TUAL. REPORTS INDICATE UP TO 50 DEAD, 100 INJURED, AND 200 HOUSES BURNED AND MORE THAN 10,000 PEOPLE HAVE FLED TO TUAL. THE ARMED FORCES (TNI) SENT 1,000 TROOPS FROM AMBON TO THE KAI ISLANDS TO DEAL WITH UNREST. ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS, SOME CASUALTIES WERE SHOT BY TNI. THE SECOND AREA OF UNREST CENTERED ON NEIRA (0432S/12954E), BANDA ISLANDS, 90NM (160KM) SOUTH OF AMBON. CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS CLASHED LEAVING 4 DEAD AND 30 HOUSES BURNED. THE MUSLIMS ARE THE MAJORITY GROUP IN THE BANDA ISLANDS. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) VIOLENCE WILL CONTINUE IN THE MOLUCCAS AS TENSIONS BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS REMAIN HIGH. THE SLIGHTEST PROVOCATION BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS WILL LEAD TO FURTHER UNREST IN THE AREA. THE MUSLIMS IN THE KAI ISLANDS ARE NEW MIGRANTS FROM SULAWESI (0300S/12100E) AND AMBON AND HAVE OFTEN BEEN CRITICIZED BY THE LOCAL CHRISTIANS FOR BEING AGGRESSIVE BUSINESSMEN, ARROGANT AND DISRESPECTFUL OF LOCAL TRADITIONS. THE CAUSES BEHIND THE VIOLENCE MIRROR THE PAST AMBON RIOTS AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE MILITARY REGAINS CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

(U) F. (C) INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 15 - 22 APR 99, GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THE OVERALL LEVEL OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED OVER LAST WEEK. THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT

BALLOTING WILL BE DELAYED FROM JULY TO 12 SEP. PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS SIGNED A TRUCE AGREEMENT TO END THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR.
(KEYS ID)

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: NINE PRIVATE INDONESIAN BANKS SIGNED INVESTMENT AND PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS WITH THE CENTRAL BANK AND THE GOVERNMENT 15 APR AS PART OF AN AMBITIOUS BANK RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM. THE CONTRACTS, HOWEVER, CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT GAPS REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF RECAPITALIZATION NEEDED AND THE TERMS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REPLACEMENT BONDS. THE RUSH TO SIGN THE CONTRACTS WAS LIKELY TO COUNTER PERCEPTIONS THAT THE RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM WAS NOT PROGRESSING AS PLANNED AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, WOULD INFLUENCE INVESTOR'S CONFIDENCE. THE RECAPITALIZATION COST FOR THE NINE BANKS IS ESTIMATED TO BE $ 3.4 BILLION. THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK PREDICTS THAT INDONESIA WILL NOT SHOW ECONOMIC GROWTH UNTIL 2000, AS ITS RECOVERY WILL DEPEND UPON BOTH MACROECONOMICS AND POLITICAL STABILITY. IF INDONESIA'S POLITICAL STABILITY COLLAPSES, REFORM WILL BE DELAYED AND ECONOMIC GROWTH WILL STALL. THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR REMAINED AT RP 8,550/$1. (KEYS ID)

(S) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (TNI) COMMANDER, GENERAL WIRANTO, VISITED DILI, EAST TIMOR 20-21 APR TO MEET WITH LOCAL COMMUNITY AND MILITARY LEADERS IN RESPONSE TO THE RECENT RISE IN VIOLENCE. WIRANTO HELD A MEETING WITH PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS 20 APR, THEN MET WITH DILI ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP CARLOS F.X. BELO 21 APR. ALTHOUGH WIRANTO'S VISIT TO EAST TIMOR WAS A GOOD PUBLIC RELATIONS GESTURE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HIS VISIT ALONE WILL END THE UNREST AND VIOLENCE.
(KEYS ID)

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING WILL BE DELAYED FROM JULY TO 12 SEP. UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, JAMSHEED MARKER, STATED THAT THE 12 SEP DATE HAD BEEN SELECTED OUT OF SECURITY AND TRANSPARENCY CONCERNS, AND THE NEED FOR SUFFICIENT TIME TO GATHER ENOUGH RESOURCES, FUNDS, AND PERSONNEL. THE TOTAL UN COST IS ESTIMATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY $45 MILLION, WITH AN ON-SITE REQUIREMENT OF 4,500 PERSONNEL. THE DELAY WILL GIVE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA MORE TIME TO COME UP WITH A POST BALLOTING STRATEGY.
(KEYS ID)

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY OVER LAST WEEK. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT UNREST OCCURRED AT DILI (0833S/12434E), EAST TIMOR, WHEN PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS 17 APR. IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E), A "HOME-MADE" BOMB EXPLODED AT NATIONAL ISTIQLAL MOSQUE 19 APR. DEMONSTRATIONS DEVELOPED IN LHOKSEUMAWE (0510N/09708E), ACEH, AS VIOLENCE CONTINUED IN WEST KALIMANTAN (0054N/10900E), AND SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS (0540S/13245E). SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:
15 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN THREE TOWNS IN ACEH PROVINCE TO DEMAND A REFERENDUM.
15 APR WEST KALIMANTAN / ETHNIC CLASHES ERUPTED BETWEEN MADURESE SETTLERS AND LOCAL MALAYS AND DAYAKS.
15 APR JAKARTA / HUNDREDS FROM SEVERAL STUDENT GROUPS DEMONSTRATED AT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.
15 APR LACLUBAR DISTRICT, EAST TIMOR / PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS

AMBUSHED MEMBERS FROM A MILITARY DISTRICT COMMAND RESULTING IN ONE SECURITY MEMBER KILLED AND FIVE OTHERS INJURED.

16 APR ERMERA / CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE FALINTIL GUERRILLAS AND AN INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES TEAM RESULTED IN TWO GUERRILLAS KILLED.

17 APR DILI / PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS, HOLDING A RALLY ON THE GOVERNOR'S LAWN RESULTING IN REPORTS OF UP TO 30 KILLED.

18 APR BECORA, EAST TIMOR / VIOLENCE CONTINUED BETWEEN PRO-INDONESIA GROUPS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS RESULTING IN TWO DEATHS REPORTED.

18 APR SAMBAS / ARMED CLASHES BETWEEN SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND LOCAL RESIDENTS RESULTED IN FOUR PEOPLE KILLED.

19 APR KARIMUNTING VILLAGE, WEST KALIMANTAN / SECURITY FORCES MISTAKENEDLY OPENED FIRE ON ETHNIC MADURESE MIGRANTS AND LOCAL MALAYS, KILLING FOUR PEOPLE AND INJURING THREE.

19 APR JAKARTA / A "HOME-MADE" BOMB EXPLODED IN AN OFFICE COMPLEX LOCATED ON THE GROUND FLOOR OF JAKARTA'S NATIONAL AL-ISTIQLAL MOSQUE RESULTING IN SIX INJURIES AND NO DEATHS.

19 APR UJUNGPANDANG / A MOB ATTACKED A PRIMARY SCHOOL AND THE OFFICES OF THE INDONESIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH FOUNDATION IN RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL AL-ISTIQLAL MOSQUE BOMBING.

19 APR YOHYAKARTA / TWO MEN ON A MOTORCYCLE THREW FIRECRACKERS INTO A CHURCH.

20 APR JAKARTA / A BOMB THREAT OCCURRED AT A JAKARTA CATHEDRAL, LOCATED EXACTLY OPPOSITE FROM NATIONAL ISTIQLAL MOSQUE.

20 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / POLICE OPENED FIRE TO DISPERSE THOUSANDS OF PRO-SEPARATIST STUDENTS.

20 APR RIAU / SECURITY FORCES FIRED WARNING SHOTS TO DISPERSE HUNDREDS OF STUDENTS WHO STORMED A CALTEX INDONESIA HOUSING COMPLEX DEMANDING A SHARE OF OIL EARNINGS.

20 APR SIGLI, ACEH / THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED TO SHOW SOLIDARITY FOR VICTIMS OF EARLIER CLASHES WITH AUTHORITIES.

20 APR BANDA ISLANDS / CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM FIGHTING BROKE OUT LEAVING FOUR DEAD AND 30 HOUSES BURNED.

21 APR KAI ISLANDS / MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN VIOLENCE OCCURRED IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS, RESULTING IN 50 DEAD, HUNDREDS INJURED, AND 200 HUNDRED HOUSES BURNED. (KEYS ID)

(S) (C) AS ETHNIC UNREST IN WEST KALIMANTAN SUBSIDES, AN OUTBREAK OF RELIGIOUS UNREST RESUMED IN THE MOLUCCAS. THE CAUSES BEHIND THE VIOLENCE MIRROR THE PAST AMBON RIOTS AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE MILITARY REGAINS CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. IN EAST TIMOR, UNREST AND VIOLENCE LIKELY WILL CONTINUE AS THE SITUATION STILL REMAINS VOLATILE.

(S) (C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS SIGNED A TRUCE AGREEMENT IN DILI 21 APR, TO END THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR. BOTH SIDES PLEDGED TO STOP MUTUAL ATTACKS, VIOLENCE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, DID NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE AND THE MILITIAS REPORTEDLY WILL NOT SURRENDER THE ARMS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS TRUCE AGREEMENT WILL LAST VERY LONG AS IT IS APPARENT THAT THE MILITARY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR ARE INCAPABLE OR UNWILLING TO STOP MILITIA ATTACKS AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. (KEYS ID)

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

22-23APR UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (MINISTERIAL LEVEL)

~~SECRET~~

30APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS AGREEMENT SIGNING CEREMONY (ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE)
12MAY	TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING 1ST ANNIVERSARY
07JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
JUL	UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE ON EAST TIMOR
12JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
28AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
AUG-OCT	NEW MPR TO DECIDE ON EAST TIMOR STATUS
12SEP	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING
28OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13NOV	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
07DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT)

(KEYS ID)

(U) (S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5

MORI DocID: 1054613

09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18

(KEYS ID)

(S) WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ONLY 45 DAYS AWAY, UNREST AND VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT INDONESIA LIKELY WILL CONTINUE AT THE SAME LEVEL DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. ATTENTION AND SECURITY WILL START TO FOCUS ON JAKARTA, WHICH WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES TO RESPOND TO UNREST IN THE OUTLYING AREAS. VIOLENCE AND UNREST LIKELY WILL CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR DESPITE THE SIGNING OF THE TRUCE AGREEMENT. UNLESS BOTH PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE VOLUNTARILY DISARM, THE TRUCE AGREEMENT HAS LITTLE CHANCE OF HOLDING. (OSA MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

~~SECRET~~

25 APR	AUSTRALIA/ NEW ZEALAND/ COOK ISLANDS/ SAMOA/TONGA	(U)	ANZAC DAY (1915)
25 APR	NORTH KOREA	(U)	FOUNDING OF KOREAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (1932)/KIM IL-SUNG GUERRILLA UNIT ACTIVATION DAY (1915)
29 APR	JAPAN	(U)	EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U)	CONSTITUTION DAY
01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U)	LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS
03 MAY	JAPAN	(U)	CONSTITUTION DAY (1947)
04 MAY	PRC	(U)	YOUTH DAY (1919)
04 MAY	TONGA	(U)	CROWN PRINCE'S BIRTHDAY (1948)
05 MAY	PALAU	(U)	SENIOR CITIZEN'S DAY
05 MAY	JAPAN/ROK	(U)	CHILDREN'S DAY
05 MAY	THAILAND	(U)	CORONATION DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U)	CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U)	CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U)	PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U)	LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U)	GOSPEL DAY

C. (C) FOREIGN VIP TRAVEL:

27-03 MAY	THAILAND	(U)	THAI PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT CHINA.
05-07 MAY	CHINA	(U)	SOUTH AFRICA PRESIDENT TO VISIT CHINA.

5. (U) [redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//

b(3)

DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK~~

Review entire Document.

DOCUMENT_ID: 183158132
DOCNO: PA0808
PRODUCER: JICPAC
SOURCE: IMAGERY
DOCTYPE: TARGET
DOR: 19990423
TOR: 014011
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904230228
MHFNO: 99 5184876
DOCCLASS: S
CAVEATS: REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK

HEADER
PP RUEAIIC
DE RUEKJCS #2278 1130230
ZNY SSSSS
P 230230Z APR 99
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHHJMCY/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RHRMDAB/COMUSNAVCENT//N2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLFREN VA
RUEDAEA/NAIC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH
RUEADWD/HQ DA WASH DC
RUWSMXI/USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//J2-J//
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIC/DSCA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 230228Z APR 99 ZYS
FM JICPAC CATIS HONOLULU HI
TO AIG FOUR SIX THREE
PAC IMAGE
RAYMJA/ASTJIC
RUYLRCS/82RS KADENA AB JA//INZ//
RUHDKAF/324IS KUNIA HI
RAYMIK/ASTJIC OBU
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T REL AUS/CA/UK~~
QQQQ
CLASSIFIED BY: DCI

TEXT
MSGID/IIR/JICPAC/PAC071/APR//
RPTID/SUPIR/JICPAC/SER:PA0808/-/-/990422//
HILITES/(S-REL AS CA UK)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
1.5(c)

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Feb 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK~~
SECRET

End 6

~~SECRET~~
~~REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK~~

[redacted]

1.5(c)
1.7(c)

1.5(c)
1.7(c)

1.5(c)
1.7(c)

NOW responsive

ADMIN
DECL/E.O. 12951//
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

Extract from Atlantic Intelligence Command Executive Summary Z61430Z Apr 99

INDONESIA: WEEKLY SUMMARY FOR 15-22 APRIL [redacted]

[redacted] WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ONLY 45 DAYS AWAY, UNREST AND VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT INDONESIA LIKELY WILL CONTINUE DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS WILL PROBABLY INCREASE IN URBAN AREAS ON JAVA AND IN JAKARTA, FORCING THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL FORCES (TNI) TO FOCUS ON MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS. AS THE TNI CHANNELS ITS RESOURCES TO JAKARTA AND JAVA, SECURITY FORCES WILL BE LESS LIKELY TO RESPOND TO UNREST IN THE OUTLYING AREAS. VIOLENCE AND UNREST LIKELY WILL CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR DESPITE THE SIGNING OF A TRUCE AGREEMENT ON 21 APRIL AND THE ONGOING TRIPARTITE TALKS AT THE UNITED NATIONS. UNLESS BOTH PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE VOLUNTARILY DISARM, THE TRUCE AGREEMENT HAS LITTLE CHANCE OF HOLDING

[redacted] TNI COMMANDER, GENERAL WIRANTO, VISITED DILI, EAST TIMOR 20-21 APRIL TO MEET WITH LOCAL COMMUNITY AND MILITARY LEADERS IN RESPONSE TO THE RECENT RISE IN VIOLENCE. WIRANTO HELD A MEETING WITH PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS ON 20 APRIL, AND MET WITH DILI ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP CARLOS FILIPE XIMENES BELO ON 21 APRIL. ALTHOUGH WIRANTO'S VISIT TO EAST TIMOR WAS A GOOD PUBLIC RELATIONS GESTURE, LITTLE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES WERE MADE TO THE OVERALL SECURITY POSTURE IN EAST TIMOR. AS A RESULT, HIS TRIP WILL LIKELY HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE OVERALL LEVEL OF VIOLENCE.

[redacted] PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS SIGNED A TRUCE AGREEMENT IN DILI 21 APRIL, TO END THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR. BOTH SIDES PLEDGED TO STOP MUTUAL ATTACKS, VIOLENCE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; HOWEVER, THE AGREEMENT DID NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE AND THE MILITIAS REPORTEDLY WILL NOT SURRENDER THE ARMS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS TRUCE AGREEMENT WILL LAST VERY LONG, AS IT IS APPARENT THAT THE MILITARY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR ARE INCAPABLE OR UNWILLING TO STOP MILITIA ATTACKS AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. ADDITIONALLY, AUSTRALIAN PRESS REPORTING CONFIRMS THE INVOLVEMENT OF TNI FORCES IN THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS, INDICATING REGIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE TNI WERE LIKELY SUPPLYING THE MILITIAS WITH WEAPONS AND POSSIBLY MILITARY TRAINING. THE TRIPARTITE TALKS AT THE UNITED NATIONS BEGAN ON 22 APRIL WITH FEW SUBSTANTIAL GAINS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED IN THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF MEETINGS BETWEEN PORTUGUESE, INDONESIAN, AND UNITED NATIONS DIPLOMATS. A POLITICAL AGREEMENT IS EXPECTED TO BE SIGNED ON 30 APRIL.

[redacted] THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING WILL BE DELAYED FROM JULY TO 12 SEPTEMBER AS UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, JAMSHEED MARKER, STATED CONCERN OVER SECURITY AND THE NEED FOR SUFFICIENT TIME TO GATHER ENOUGH RESOURCES, FUNDS, AND PERSONNEL. THE TOTAL UN COST IS ESTIMATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY $45 MILLION, WITH AN ON-SITE REQUIREMENT OF 4,500 PERSONNEL. THE DELAY WILL GIVE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA ADDITIONAL TIME TO COME UP WITH

A POST BALLOTING STRATEGY.

[redacted] DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY OVER LAST WEEK. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT UNREST OCCURRED AT DILI, EAST TIMOR, WHEN PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS 17 APR. IN JAKARTA, A "HOME-MADE" BOMB EXPLODED AT NATIONAL ISTIQLAL MOSQUE 19 APR. DEMONSTRATIONS DEVELOPED IN LHOKSEUMAWE, ACEH, AS VIOLENCE CONTINUED IN WEST KALIMANTAN, AND SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE: LOCATION / INCIDENT:

15 APRIL: LHOKSEUMAWE / THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN THREE TOWNS IN ACEH PROVINCE TO DEMAND A REFERENDUM.

15 APRIL: WEST KALIMANTAN / ETHNIC CLASHES ERUPTED BETWEEN MADURESE SETTLERS AND LOCAL MALAYS AND DAYAKS.

15 APRIL: JAKARTA / HUNDREDS FROM SEVERAL STUDENT GROUPS DEMONSTRATED AT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.

15 APRIL: LACLUBAR DISTRICT, EAST TIMOR / PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS AMBUSHED MEMBERS FROM A MILITARY DISTRICT COMMAND RESULTING IN ONE SECURITY MEMBER KILLED AND FIVE OTHERS INJURED.

16 APRIL: ERMERA / CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE FALINTIL GUERRILLAS AND A TNI TEAM RESULTED IN TWO GUERRILLAS KILLED.

17 APRIL: DILI / PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS, HOLDING A RALLY ON THE GOVERNOR'S LAWN RESULTING IN REPORTS OF UP TO 30 KILLED. 18 APRIL: BECORA, EAST TIMOR / VIOLENCE CONTINUED BETWEEN PRO-INDONESIA GROUPS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS RESULTING IN TWO DEATHS REPORTED.

18 APRIL: SAMBAS / ARMED CLASHES BETWEEN SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND LOCAL RESIDENTS RESULTED IN FOUR PEOPLE KILLED.

19 APRIL: KARIMUNTING VILLAGE, WEST KALIMANTAN / SECURITY FORCES MISTAKENLY OPENED FIRE ON ETHNIC MADURESE MIGRANTS AND LOCAL MALAYS, KILLING FOUR PEOPLE AND INJURING THREE.

19 APRIL: JAKARTA / A "HOME-MADE" BOMB EXPLODED IN AN OFFICE COMPLEX LOCATED ON THE GROUND FLOOR OF JAKARTA'S NATIONAL AL-ISTIQLAL MOSQUE RESULTING IN SIX INJURIES AND NO DEATHS.

19 APRIL: UJUNGPANDANG / A MOB ATTACKED A PRIMARY SCHOOL AND THE OFFICES OF THE INDONESIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH FOUNDATION IN RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL AL-ISTIQLAL MOSQUE BOMBING.

19 APRIL: YOHYAKARTA / TWO MEN ON A MOTORCYCLE THREW FIRECRACKERS INTO A CHURCH.

20 APRIL: JAKARTA / A BOMB THREAT OCCURRED AT A JAKARTA CATHEDRAL, LOCATED EXACTLY OPPOSITE FROM NATIONAL ISTIQLAL MOSQUE.

20 APRIL: LHOKSEUMAWE / POLICE OPENED FIRE TO DISPERSE THOUSANDS OF PRO-SEPARATIST STUDENTS.

20 APRIL: RIAU / SECURITY FORCES FIRED WARNING SHOTS TO DISPERSE HUNDREDS OF STUDENTS WHO STORMED A CALTEX INDONESIA HOUSING COMPLEX DEMANDING A SHARE OF OIL EARNINGS.

20 APRIL: SIGLI, ACEH / THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED TO SHOW SOLIDARITY FOR VICTIMS OF EARLIER CLASHES WITH AUTHORITIES.

20 APRIL: BANDA ISLANDS / CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM FIGHTING BROKE OUT LEAVING 4 DEAD AND 30 HOUSES BURNED.

21 APRIL: KAI ISLANDS / MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN VIOLENCE OCCURRED IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS, RESULTING IN 50 DEAD, HUNDREDS INJURED, AND 200 HUNDRED HOUSES BURNED. (JICPAC, AIC POC: LTJG DEAN)

--

UNCLASSIFIED

C10

DOCUMENT_ID: 183173292
DOCNO: 002035
PRODUCER: LISBON
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990426
TOR: 115458
DOCPREC: R
ORIGDATE: 199904261342
MHFNO: 99 5218887
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER
RR RUEAIIA
ZNR UUUUU ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI3946
RR RUEHC
DE RUEHLI #2035 1161342
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261342Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2780
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0142
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0723
BT

CONTROLS
UNCLAS LISBON 002035

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, US, ID, PO
SUBJECT: PRO-EAST TIMOR GROUP ASKS U.S. TO ASSIST IN STOPPING VIOLENCE

1. ON APRIL 23 POST RECEIVED IDENTICAL LETTERS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE PRESIDENT ASKING THE USG TO USE ITS PRESTIGE TO PERSUADE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO END THE VIOLENCE AND COOPERATE WITH THE UN TO ARRIVE AT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN EAST TIMOR. THE LETTERS WERE SIGNED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE "FORUM TIMORENSE" AND DATED APRIL 22. POST HAS HAD NO PREVIOUS CONTACT WITH THIS GROUP.

2. TEXT OF THE LETTERS FOLLOWS:

-- THE LAST MASSACRES OCCURRED IN EAST TIMOR (IN LIQUICA AND DILI) ARE A THREAT FOR PEACE AND A CONTINUOUS VIOLATION OF THE ELEMENTARY HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TERRITORY. IN LIQUICA WERE KILLED 42 PERSONS, OF WHICH 15 WERE WOMEN AND 22 WERE CHILDREN, SOME OF THEM BABIES. IN DILI WERE MURDERED AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF UNDEFENDED CIVILIAN YOUTHS.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-- WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE MILITIAS IN EAST TIMOR ARE A CREATION OF THE INDONESIAN ARMY TO PROMOTE DISORDER, SOCIAL INSTABILITY AND CIVILIAN WAR, IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY NEW MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST THE EAST-TIMORESE PEOPLE AND TO PERPETUATE THE ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THE COUNTRY.

-- WE ARE AFRAID THAT MORE AND MORE PEOPLE MAY BE KILLED IN THE FUTURE IN EAST TIMOR IF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE WORLD, THE FREE AND CIVILIZED WORLD, DOES NOT DO ANYTHING TO STOP THEM.

-- IN THE NAME OF PEACE THAT YOU ARE A DEFENDER AROUND THE WORLD (E.G. KUWAIT, IRAQ AND KOSOVO), IN THE NAME OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES, WE APPEAL TO YOU TO USE YOUR PRESTIGE CLOSE TO THE JAKARTA GOVERNMENT TO:
-- 1. STOP IMMEDIATELY THE PERSECUTION OF CIVILIAN AND YOUTHS, DEFENDERS OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE IN EAST TIMOR;
-- 2. REQUEST THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL DEATHS IN EAST TIMOR, CLOSE TO THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY POWER IN EAST TIMOR;
-- 3. DISARM AND QUARTER ALL MEMBERS OF THE MILITIAS;
-- 4. WITHDRAW INDONESIAN MILITARY FORCES FROM EAST TIMOR;
-- 5. PROVIDE A UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN EAST TIMOR TO GUARANTEE PEACE AND THE FREEDOM OF CHOICE FOR ITS FUTURE;
-- 6. FORCE THE JAKARTA GOVERNMENT TO FIND AN AGREEMENT IN THE PRESENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH PORTUGAL, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
END TEXT.

MCGOWAN

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

C6

DOCUMENT_ID: 183171836
DOCNO: 002088
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990426
TOR: 070455
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904261019
MHFNO: 99 5214921
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNR UUUUU ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI2141
OO RUEHZS RUEHC
DE RUEHJA #2088/01 1161019
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261019Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7454
INFO RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0939
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1069
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4864
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0121
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2068
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0301
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3127
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1079
BT

CONTROLS
UNCLAS JAKARTA 002088

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, EAID, ID
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM IMPRISONED EAST TIMOR RESISTANCE LEADER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON

1. ON APRIL 25 POST RECEIVED A LETTER, DATE APRIL 23, FROM IMPRISONED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO TO PRESIDENT CLINTON. THE LETTER WAS TRANSMITTED VIA UNSECURE FAX FROM THE JAKARTA OFFICE OF EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE (CNRT). TEXT OF THAT MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/04 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BEGIN TEXT:

PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON DC
USA

23 APRIL 1999

DEAR PRESIDENT CLINTON,

ON 5 MARCH 1999, I HAD THE HONOUR AND THE PRIVILEGE TO MEET WITH SECRETARY OF STATE, MADAM MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM THE GOVERMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR. SINCE, THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND HAS CONSIDERABLY DETERIORATED AND I AM NOW TAKING THE LIBERTY OF DRAWING YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS FACT.

IT WAS ALREADY MY CONVICTION THAT THE `PEACE ACCORD' SIGNED ON 21 APRIL 1999 WOULD NOT GUARANTEE IN THE LEAST THE SECURITY OF THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR.

ABRI'S STRATEGY IN FOMENTING THE LIQUICA AND DILI MASSACRES WAS AIMED AT DERAILING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN NEW YORK, WHICH WAS TO BE THE LAST ROUND, AND THEREFORE A CRUCIAL ONE FOR THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE.

WITH THE INTENTION OF RESTORING A CLIMATE OF CALM TO THE POPULATION ON THE ONE HAND, NOT WISHING TO BE ACCUSED OF REJECTING ANY PEACE PROPOSAL ON THE OTHER, AND BEARING IN MIND THE IMMINENCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK, WE FELT THAT IT WAS OUR DUTY TO CONTRIBUTE TO A DIFFERENT ATMOSPHERE IN THE WHOLE PROCESS.

HOWEVER, IN THE AFTERNOON FOLLOWING THE SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT, FIVE YOUTHS WERE MURDERED IN BAZAR TET: ALBERTO DOS SANTOS, MIGUEL, ABILIO DE ARAUJO, DOMINGOS DOS SANTOS (ALL BROTHERS) AND THEIR COUSIN FLORINDO PAULO DA COSTA.

IN HERA, ANOTHER THREE YOUTHS WERE MURDERED THAT SAME AFTERNOON. THE FOLLOWING DAY, ON 22 APRIL 1999, THIRTY SUTDENTS WERE DETAINED NEAR BEKORA (DILI).

ON 22 APRIL 1999, IN SUAI (ZUMALAI), IN THE VILLAGE OF LABARAI - DUSUN HOLBELIS, VARIOUS SOURCES INCLUDING TWO EMBASSIES IN JAKARTA REPORTED THAT THE RATIH MILITIA GROUP HAD KILLED MANY DOZENS OF PEOPLE. AT THE MOMENT, SELECTIVE ASSASSINATIONS ARE BEING COMMITTED THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORY.

IN MAUBARA, THE MILITIAS TOGETHER WITH THE INDONESIAN MILITARY HAVE SET UP TEN CHECK POINTS ALONG THE ROAD TO RIBEIRA LOIS, WHERE THEY ASK ALL THE PASSERSBY FOR THEIR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS (INDONESIAN), AND THOSE WHO DO NOT HAVE ANY ARE SEVERELY BEATEN.

IN VIKEKE, BAUKAU AND SAME, THE POPULATION CONTINUES TO BE SUBJECTED TO THREATS AND IS BEING FORCED TO SIGN DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF INTEGRATION. SIMILAR THREATS AND COERCION ARE BEING EMPLOYED AGAINST THE PEOPLE IN AREAS OF DILI.

IN HOLARUA, SAME, THE HOMES OF THE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN BURNT DOWN BY THE MILITIAS.

PHONE CONNECTIONS IN THE INTERIOR OF THE TERRITORY HAVE BEEN CUT OFF, MAKING COMMUNICATION EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.

THE "PEACE ACCORD" WAS AN ACT DESIGNED TO RELIEVE WIRANTO OF THE GUILT OF HAVING GIVEN HIS CONSENT TO THE LIQUICA AND DILI MASSACRES. THE "PEACE ACCORD" DISREGARDS THE QUESTION OF THE IDENTITY OF THE PERPETRATORS OF THESE MURDERS AND ALSO THE ROLE OF ABRI.

IN SIGNING THE ACCORD, IT WAS OUR HOPE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PURSUE A JUST AND RAPID SOLUTION TO THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION.

IT IS WITH SADNESS THAT WE HAVE LEARNT THAT THE AGREEMENT CURRENTLY THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK WILL ONLY BE SIGNED ON 5 MAY. THE UN WILL REQUIRE BETWEEN 15 AND 30 DAYS TO PREPARE FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE FIRST GROUP OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS.

MR PRESIDENT,

ABRI IS WELL AWARE OF ITS FAILURE IN EAST TIMOR, AND IN REALITY IT HAS KNOWN THIS SINCE THE FIRST DAY OF ITS COWARDLY AND SHAMEFUL INVASION ON 7 DECEMBER 1975.

THE DECLARATIONS OF THE HARD-LINE GENERALS (VETERANS OF THE WAR IN EAST TIMOR AND MEMBERS OF KOPASSUS AND THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE) ALONG WITH EVERYTHING WHICH HAS HAPPENED SINCE JANUARY THIS YEAR, ARE MORE THAN SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT ABRI REFUSES TO ACCEPT THE SECOND OPTION OFFERED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT HABIBIE.

ABRI IS EXTERMINATING THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR, MR. PRESIDENT.

I WILL NOT DRAW ON COMPARISONS WITH THE REACTION OF NATO TO THE KOSOVO PROBLEM.

TODAY I APPREAL TO YOUR SPIRIT OF JUSTICE. FOR 23 YEARS AND COMPLETELY ALONE, WE HAVE SUFFERED A PHYSICAL GENOCIDE INVOLVING OVER 250,000 EAST TIMORESE, ALONG WITH A CULTURAL AND ETHNIC GENOCIDE.

NOW AS THE DAY OF BEING FINALLY GRANTED OUR RIGHT TO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECIDE OUR OWN FUTURE DRAWS CLOSER, THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR ARE AT THE MERCY OF THE MURDEROUS INDONESIAN MILITARY AND OF THE MONSTER IT HAS CREATED AND SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORY: THE MILITIAS.

THIS MESSAGE I WRITE TO YOU TODAY IS NOTHING BUT AN APPEAL, MR PRESIDENT, AS IT CAN BE NOTHING MORE THAN THAT.

SAVE THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE FROM SENSELESS SLAUGHTER! ONLY AN URGENT AND IMMEDIATE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CAN STOP THIS NEW CARNAGE AND RESTORE TO THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE THE PEACE AND TRANQUILITY THEY HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF FOR TWENTY THREE YEARS.

WITHOUT THE URGENT AND IMMEDIATE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NOTHING CAN GUARATEE THAT OUR PEOPLE WILL NOT BE EXTERMINATED.

THE LIFE OF THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE NOW DEPENDS ON YOUR DECISION, MR PRESIDENT.

WITH MY VERY BEST WISHES

KAY RALA XANANA GUSMAO
PRESIDENT OF THE CNRT

END TEXT.

ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MORI DocID: 1054663

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183200561
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990430
TOR: 124552
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904301100
MHFNO: 99 5280696
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #8441 1200654
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0334 1200654
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 23 Oct 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~SECRET~~

ENCL (8)

~~SECRET~~

RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE

~~SECRET~~

MORI DocID: 1054663

RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
~~RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU~~
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON

SECRET

RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 301100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOU4WG 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
S E C R E T

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA0120/30 APR//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE

MORI DocID: 1054663

NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B.

C.

D.

E.

NOT RESPONSIVE

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

NOT RESPONSIVE

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE

(S) C. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 22 - 29 APR: ETHNIC CHINESE-INDONESIANS PREPARE TO LEAVE PRIOR TO 7 JUN GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA PROPOSES TO DIVIDE THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA AND MALUKU. IN EAST TIMOR, TRIPARTITE REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AN AUTONOMY PLAN AGREEMENT 23 APR.

(S) (G) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: ETHNIC CHINESE-INDONESIANS ARE PREPARING TO LEAVE INDONESIA PRIOR TO THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS 7 JUN. CHINESE IN INODONESIA ARE PURCHASING AIRLINE TICKETS TO GET OUT OF INDONESIA BEFORE THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS, AND REPORTEDLY ALL FLIGHTS FROM INDONESIA TO THE US, SINGAPORE, AND AUSTRALIA ARE COMPLETELY BOOKED BETWEEN 15 - 31 MAY. THE CHINESE FEAR A BREAKDOWN IN SOCIAL ORDER MAY BE USED AS A PRETEXT FOR VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE BUSINESSES PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ELECTIONS AND, THEREFORE, ARE HESITANT TO INVEST AGAIN IN INDONESIA. THE STABILITY OF THE RUPIAH IS AN INDICATION OF A DEAD MARKET. INVESTOR'S CONFIDENCE, HOWEVER, WILL NOT BE RESTORED QUICKLY AS THERE WILL REMAIN HIGH LEVELS OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY UNTIL THE

NOVEMBER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR INCREASED SLIGHTLY TO RP 8,200/$1.00.

(C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (TNI) REITERATED 28 APR ITS COMMITMENT TO INTERNAL REFORM, SETTING SEVEN MAIN AGENDAS THAT WERE DESIGNED TO IMPROVE ITS TARNISHED IMAGE. THE SEVEN MAIN AGENDAS ARE INTENDED TO FOCUS ON IMPROVING DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, POSTURE, EDUCATION, TRAINING, ETHICS, AND LEADERSHIP. THE TNI ALSO STATED THAT IT WAS PRESENTLY CONDUCTING INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE REFORMS, WHICH ARE BEING DONE CONCEPTUALLY, SYSTEMATICALLY, AND GRADUALLY, WITH A CLEAR AGENDA, PRIORITIES, AND CONTROL. THESE REFORM MEASURES APPEAR TO BE "COSMETIC" IN NATURE AND ARE MERELY DESIGNED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION. IT WILL LIKELY HAVE NO AFFECT ON THEIR FUTURE PERFORMANCE OR REACTION DURING PERIODS OF CRISIS.

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA IS PROPOSING TO DIVIDE THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA INTO THREE NEW PROVINCES AND MALUKU INTO TWO NEW PROVINCES AFTER THE 7 JUN GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE PROPOSAL WILL GRANT MORE AUTONOMY TO THE NEW PROVINCES TO STIMULATE GREATER GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE REGIONS. IN IRIAN JAYA, THE PROPOSAL IS LIKELY THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO WEAKEN THE STRENGTH AND UNITY OF THE PRO-SEPARATIST REBEL GROUP, FREE PAPUA ORGANIZATION.

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: THE NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATIONS REMAINED THE SAME AS LAST WEEK, BUT OVERALL UNREST DECREASED. DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED IN ACEH (0510N/09708E) WHILE ETHNIC COMMUNAL VIOLENCE RESUMED IN TUAL (0540S/13245E), KAI ISLANDS. UNREST IN EAST TIMOR (0833S/12434E) CONTINUES DESPITE THE SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT. IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E), NUMEROUS BOMB THREATS WERE REPORTED. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:

22 APR JAKRTA / AN AIRPORT TERMINAL AND 2 AIRCRAFT WERE TARGETS OF A BOMB THREAT. NO BOMB WAS FOUND.

22 APR SINGKAWANG (0540N/10900E) / ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND ANOTHER 4 SUFFERED GUNSHOT WOUNDS AFTER SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED A CROWD FROM BURNING THE HOMES OF MADURESE PEOPLE.

22 APR TUAL / AN ETHNIC CLASH BETWEEN LOCAL RESIDENTS ERUPTED RESULTING IN 2 DEATHS AND 22 INJURIES.

23 APR SUAI (0921S/12517E) / A CLASH OCCURRED BETWEEN A PRO-INTEGRATION GROUP AND A PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUP RESULTING IN 1 PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS INJURED AND 3 HOUSES BURNED.

23 APR TUAL / CROWDS FROM RIVAL COMMUNITIES TOOK TO THE STREETS AND ATTACKED THE SECURITY FORCES TRYING TO DISPERSE THE CROWD.

25 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / A CROWD OF THOUSANDS HELD A FREE ACEH GATHERING AND BURNED 2 BUSES BELONGING TO MOBIL OIL.

25 APR YOGYAKARTA (0748S/11022E) / SUPPORTERS OF UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) ATTACKED MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY-STRUGGLE (PDIP) RESULTING IN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF INJURIES.

25 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / SEPARATIST SYMPATHIZERS HELD A RALLY NEAR MOBIL OIL'S OPERATIONS BASE.

26 APR ERMERA (0845S/12523E), EAST TIMOR / THOUSANDS OF EAST TIMORESE RALLIED TO PLEDGE THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO INDONESIA.

26 APR BALIBO (0858S/12503E) / HUNDREDS OF PRO-INDONESIA SUPPORTERS GATHERED TO DECLARE THEIR SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA RETAINING CONTROL OF THE DISPUTED TERRITORY OF EAST TIMOR.

28 APR MALANG (0759S/11237E) / UNIVERSITY STUDENTS STAGED A PROTEST AGAINST PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S VISIT.

28 APR CIREBON ()644S/10834E) / FIGHTING BROKE OUT BETWEEN RESIDENTS LEAVING 13 PEOPLE INJURED AND 12 HOUSES DAMAGED.
28 APR MEULABOH (0409N/09608E), ACEH / A CROWD DEMANDED COMPENSATION FOR COMMUNITY LAND AND BURNED DOWN 10 HOUSES BELONGING TO EMPLOYEES OF A RUBBER PLANTATION.

(C) VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR AS THE PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED 21 APR DOES NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE. UNREST IN TUAL, SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF SUBSIDING AS THE MILITARY IS SLOWLY GAINING CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. THE ACEHNESE WILL CONTINUE TO VOICE THEIR DEMANDS AND APPLY PRESSURE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN HOPES OF GETTING A REACTION FROM JAKARTA. DEMONSTRATIONS WILL START TO INCREASE IN JAKARTA WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ONLY 5 WEEKS AWAY.

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(C) EAST TIMOR: TRIPARTITE REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AN AGREEMENT 23 APR TO PRESENT AN AUTONOMY PLAN TO THE EAST TIMORESE. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SIGNED AND PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED MAY 5-6. THE UN WILL SEND A 40 PERSON ADVANCE TEAM SHORTLY AFTER THE MAY SIGNING. THE POLLING IS SET FOR 8 AUG AND WILL INVOLVE 200 POLLING CENTERS AND NUMEROUS SUPPORT ELEMENTS. DISARMING MILITIA GROUPS IS VIEWED CRITICAL IN ORDER FOR THE PROCESS TO SUCCEED. IF THE EAST TIMORESE ARE CONVINCED THE MILITIA GROUPS WILL BE UNABLE TO SEEK RETRIBUTION, THEY WILL LIKELY VOTE TO REJECT THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL.

(C) ACEH: INCREASED SEPARATIST UNREST AND DESTRUCTION OF MOBIL OIL PROPERTY NEAR LHOKSEUMAWE, ACEH LED MOBIL TO ORDER THE PRECAUTIONARY EVACUATION OF ITS EMPLOYEES' DEPENDENTS 27 APR. THE DEPARTURE OF MOBIL DEPENDENTS COINCIDES WITH REPORTS OF DEPLOYMENTS OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO THE PROVINCE AND THE LAUNCH OF AN OPERATION BY THE SECURITY FORCES TO CLEANSE THE AREA OF PRO-SEPARATIST FLAGS AND GRAFFITI. MOBIL INCREASINGLY FINDS ITSELF THE MOST VISIBLE TARGET IN A NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE DISPUTE BETWEEN ACTIVISTS AND GRAFFITI. MOBIL INCREASINGLY FINDS ITSELF THE MOST VISIBLE TARGET IN A NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE DISPUTE BETWEEN ACTIVISTS ACEHNESE AND JAKARTA. THIS DISPUTE IS EXPLOITED BY SEPARATISTS SEEKING TO PORTRAY MOBIL AS BEING COMPLICIT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN ACEH FOR THE LAST THREE DECADES. MOBIL EXECUTIVES NOTED THAT NO EVIDENCE EXITS THAT AMERICAN CITIZENS ARE BEING BLAMED OR TARGETED.

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

5-6 MAY*	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS AGREEMENT SIGNING CEREMONY (ON EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM)
12 MAY	TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING 1ST ANNIVERSARY
21 MAY*	INDONESIAN SCHOOLS DISMISSED FOR THE SUMMER
7 JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26 JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
12 JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17 JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17 AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
8 AUG*	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28 AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
29 AUG*	NEW MPR ANNOUNCES RESULTS OF EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28 OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
6 NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10 NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12 NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR)

~~SECRET~~

MASSACRE
13 NOV 1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
7 DEC 24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
1 JAN EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT)
* DENOTES ADDITION OR CHANGE

(S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24

(S) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION WILL REMAIN FRAGILE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS AND MAY DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER AFTER THE MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 28 OCT. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD OPENING 18 MAY AND THE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN WEST KALIMANTAN AND MALUKU, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAY, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR. ALTHOUGH AN EAST TIMOR AUTONOMY BALLOTING PLAN WAS REACHED FOR 8 AUG, THE UN'S ROLE WILL LIKELY BE IMPACTED BY ACTS OF INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS. (OSA MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

NON responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR	BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR	INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

29 APR	JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY

MORI DocID: 1054663

01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS.
03 MAY	JAPAN	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY (1947)
04 MAY	PRC	(U) YOUTH DAY (1919)
04 MAY	TONGA	(U) CROWN PRINCE'S BIRTHDAY (1948)
05 MAY	PALAU	(U) SENIOR CITIZEN'S DAY
05 MAY	JAPAN/ROK	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
05 MAY	THAILAND	(U) CORONATION DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U) GOSPEL DAY
14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)

[redacted]

NON Responsive

b(2)

5. (U) [redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED
TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE
POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Review entire document

DOCUMENT ID: 183207777
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990502
TOR: 094202
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904301105
MHFNO: 99 5295405
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #9822 1201547
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0694 1201543
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25/2022
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

ENCL 9

MORI DocID: 1054597

RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE

RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON

MORI DocID: 1054597

RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 301105Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOU4WG 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: PARTIAL

SEGMENT 1 OF 4 MISSING

C. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 22 - 29 APR: ETHNIC CHINESE INDONESIANS PREPARE TO LEAVE PRIOR TO 7 JUN GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA PROPOSES TO DIVIDE THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA AND MALUKU. IN EAST TIMOR, TRIPARTITE REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AN AUTONOMY PLAN AGREEMENT 23 APR.

8

SECRET

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: ETHNIC CHINESE-INDONESIANS ARE PREPARING TO LEAVE INDONESIA PRIOR TO THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS 7 JUN. CHINESE IN INODONESIA ARE PURCHASING AIRLINE TICKETS TO GET OUT OF INDONESIA BEFORE THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS, AND REPORTEDLY ALL FLIGHTS FROM INDONESIA TO THE US, SINGAPORE, AND AUSTRALIA ARE COMPLETELY BOOKED BETWEEN 15 - 31 MAY. THE CHINESE FEAR A BREAKDOWN IN SOCIAL ORDER MAY BE USED AS A PRETEXT FOR VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE BUSINESSES PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ELECTIONS AND, THEREFORE, ARE HESITANT TO INVEST AGAIN IN INDONESIA. THE STABILITY OF THE RUPIAH IS AN INDICATION OF A DEAD MARKET. INVESTOR'S CONFIDENCE, HOWEVER, WILL NOT BE RESTORED QUICKLY AS THERE WILL REMAIN HIGH LEVELS OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY UNTIL THE NOVEMBER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR INCREASED SLIGHTLY TO RP 8,200/$1.00.

(C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (TNI) REITERATED 28 APR ITS COMMITMENT TO INTERNAL REFORM, SETTING SEVEN MAIN AGENDAS THAT WERE DESIGNED TO IMPROVE ITS TARNISHED IMAGE. THE SEVEN MAIN AGENDAS ARE INTENDED TO FOCUS ON IMPROVING DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, POSTURE, EDUCATION, TRAINING, ETHICS, AND LEADERSHIP. THE TNI ALSO STATED THAT IT WAS PRESENTLY CONDUCTING INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE REFORMS, WHICH ARE BEING DONE CONCEPTUALLY, SYSTEMATICALLY, AND GRADUALLY, WITH A CLEAR AGENDA, PRIORITIES, AND CONTROL. THESE REFORM MEASURES APPEAR TO BE "COSMETIC" IN NATURE AND ARE MERELY DESIGNED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION. IT WILL LIKELY HAVE NO AFFECT ON THEIR FUTURE PERFORMANCE OR REACTION DURING PERIODS OF CRISIS.

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA IS PROPOSING TO DIVIDE THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA INTO THREE NEW PROVINCES AND MALUKU INTO TWO NEW PROVINCES AFTER THE 7 JUN GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE PROPOSAL WILL GRANT MORE AUTONOMY TO THE NEW PROVINCES TO STIMULATE GREATER GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE REGIONS. IN IRIAN JAYA, THE PROPOSAL IS LIKELY THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO WEAKEN THE STRENGTH AND UNITY OF THE PRO-SEPARATIST REBEL GROUP, FREE PAPUA ORGANIZATION.

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: THE NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATIONS REMAINED THE SAME AS LAST WEEK, BUT OVERALL UNREST DECREASED. DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED IN ACEH (0510N/09708E) WHILE ETHNIC COMMUNAL VIOLENCE RESUMED IN TUAL (0540S/13245E), KAI ISLANDS. UNREST IN EAST TIMOR (0833S/12434E) CONTINUES DESPITE THE SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT. IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E), NUMEROUS BOMB THREATS WERE REPORTED. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:

22 APR JAKRTA / AN AIRPORT TERMINAL AND 2 AIRCRAFT WERE TARGETS OF A BOMB THREAT. NO BOMB WAS FOUND.

22 APR SINGKAWANG (0540N/10900E) / ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND ANOTHER 4 SUFFERED GUNSHOT WOUNDS AFTER SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED A CROWD FROM BURNING THE HOMES OF MADURESE PEOPLE.

22 APR TUAL / AN ETHNIC CLASH BETWEEN LOCAL RESIDENTS ERUPTED RESULTING IN 2 DEATHS AND 22 INJURIES.

23 APR SUAI (0921S/12517E) / A CLASH OCCURRED BETWEEN A PRO-INTEGRATION GROUP AND A PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUP RESULTING IN 1 PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS INJURED AND 3 HOUSES BURNED.

23 APR TUAL / CROWDS FROM RIVAL COMMUNITIES TOOK TO THE STREETS AND ATTACKED THE SECURITY FORCES TRYING TO DISPERSE THE CROWD.

25 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / A CROWD OF THOUSANDS HELD A FREE ACEH GATHERING AND BURNED 2 BUSES BELONGING TO MOBIL OIL.

25 APR YOGYAKARTA (0748S/11022E) / SUPPORTERS OF UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) ATTACKED MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY-STRUGGLE (PDIP) RESULTING IN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF INJURIES.
25 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / SEPARATIST SYMPATHIZERS HELD A RALLY NEAR MOBIL OIL'S OPERATIONS BASE.
26 APR ERMERA (0845S/12523E), EAST TIMOR / THOUSANDS OF EAST TIMORESE RALLIED TO PLEDGE THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO INDONESIA.
26 APR BALIBO (0858S/12503E) / HUNDREDS OF PRO-INDONESIA SUPPORTERS GATHERED TO DECLARE THEIR SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA RETAINING CONTROL OF THE DISPUTED TERRITORY OF EAST TIMOR.
28 APR MALANG (0759S/11237E) / UNIVERSITY STUDENTS STAGED A PROTEST AGAINST PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S VISIT.
28 APR CIREBON ()644S/10834E) / FIGHTING BROKE OUT BETWEEN RESIDENTS LEAVING 13 PEOPLE INJURED AND 12 HOUSES DAMAGED.
28 APR MEULABOH (0409N/09608E), ACEH / A CROWD DEMANDED COMPENSATION FOR COMMUNITY LAND AND BURNED DOWN 10 HOUSES BELONGING TO EMPLOYEES OF A RUBBER PLANTATION.

(U) (c) VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR AS THE PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED 21 APR DOES NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE. UNREST IN TUAL, SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF SUBSIDING AS THE MILITARY IS SLOWLY GAINING CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. THE ACEHNESE WILL CONTINUE TO VOICE THEIR DEMANDS AND APPLY PRESSURE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN HOPES OF GETTING A REACTION FROM JAKARTA. DEMONSTRATIONS WILL START TO INCREASE IN JAKARTA WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ONLY 5 WEEKS AWAY.

(S) (c) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(S) (c) EAST TIMOR: TRIPARTITE REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AN AGREEMENT 23 APR TO PRESENT AN AUTONOMY PLAN TO THE EAST TIMORESE. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SIGNED AND PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED MAY 5-6. THE UN WILL SEND A 40 PERSON ADVANCE TEAM SHORTLY AFTER THE MAY SIGNING. THE POLLING IS SET FOR 8 AUG AND WILL INVOLVE 200 POLLING CENTERS AND NUMEROUS SUPPORT ELEMENTS. DISARMING MILITIA GROUPS IS VIEWED CRITICAL IN ORDER FOR THE PROCESS TO SUCCEED. IF THE EAST TIMORESE ARE CONVINCED THE MILITIA GROUPS WILL BE UNABLE TO SEEK RETRIBUTION, THEY WILL LIKELY VOTE TO REJECT THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL.

(U) (c) ACEH: INCREASED SEPARATIST UNREST AND DESTRUCTION OF MOBIL OIL PROPERTY NEAR LHOKSEUMAWE, ACEH LED MOBIL TO ORDER THE PRECAUTIONARY EVACUATION OF ITS EMPLOYEES' DEPENDENTS 27 APR. THE DEPARTURE OF MOBIL DEPENDENTS COINCIDES WITH REPORTS OF DEPLOYMENTS OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO THE PROVINCE AND THE LAUNCH OF AN OPERATION BY THE SECURITY FORCES TO CLEANSE THE AREA OF PRO-SEPARATIST FLAGS

SEGMENT 3 OF 4 MISSING

Not relevant to this case

~~SECRET~~

NON Responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR	BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR	INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

29 APR	JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS
03 MAY	JAPAN	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY (1947)
04 MAY	PRC	(U) YOUTH DAY (1919)
04 MAY	TONGA	(U) CROWN PRINCE'S BIRTHDAY (1948)
05 MAY	PALAU	(U) SENIOR CITIZEN'S DAY
05 MAY	JAPAN/ROK	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
05 MAY	THAILAND	(U) CORONATION DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U) GOSPEL DAY
14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)

C.
27-03
05-07
5. (U

NON Responsive

b(7)

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED
TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE
POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Review entire document

DOCUMENT ID: 183207777
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990502
TOR: 094202
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904301105
MHFNO: 99 5295405
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #9822 1201547
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0694 1201543
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25/2022
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

ENCL 9

MORI DocID: 1054597

RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE

RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON

MORI DocID: 1054597

RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 301105Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOU4WG 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: PARTIAL

SEGMENT 1 OF 4 MISSING

C. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 22 - 29 APR: ETHNIC CHINESE INDONESIANS PREPARE TO LEAVE PRIOR TO 7 JUN GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA PROPOSES TO DIVIDE THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA AND MALUKU. IN EAST TIMOR, TRIPARTITE REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AN AUTONOMY PLAN AGREEMENT 23 APR.

8

SECRET

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: ETHNIC CHINESE-INDONESIANS ARE PREPARING TO LEAVE INDONESIA PRIOR TO THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS 7 JUN. CHINESE IN INODONESIA ARE PURCHASING AIRLINE TICKETS TO GET OUT OF INDONESIA BEFORE THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS, AND REPORTEDLY ALL FLIGHTS FROM INDONESIA TO THE US, SINGAPORE, AND AUSTRALIA ARE COMPLETELY BOOKED BETWEEN 15 - 31 MAY. THE CHINESE FEAR A BREAKDOWN IN SOCIAL ORDER MAY BE USED AS A PRETEXT FOR VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE BUSINESSES PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ELECTIONS AND, THEREFORE, ARE HESITANT TO INVEST AGAIN IN INDONESIA. THE STABILITY OF THE RUPIAH IS AN INDICATION OF A DEAD MARKET. INVESTOR'S CONFIDENCE, HOWEVER, WILL NOT BE RESTORED QUICKLY AS THERE WILL REMAIN HIGH LEVELS OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY UNTIL THE NOVEMBER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR INCREASED SLIGHTLY TO RP 8,200/$1.00.

(C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (TNI) REITERATED 28 APR ITS COMMITMENT TO INTERNAL REFORM, SETTING SEVEN MAIN AGENDAS THAT WERE DESIGNED TO IMPROVE ITS TARNISHED IMAGE. THE SEVEN MAIN AGENDAS ARE INTENDED TO FOCUS ON IMPROVING DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, POSTURE, EDUCATION, TRAINING, ETHICS, AND LEADERSHIP. THE TNI ALSO STATED THAT IT WAS PRESENTLY CONDUCTING INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE REFORMS, WHICH ARE BEING DONE CONCEPTUALLY, SYSTEMATICALLY, AND GRADUALLY, WITH A CLEAR AGENDA, PRIORITIES, AND CONTROL. THESE REFORM MEASURES APPEAR TO BE "COSMETIC" IN NATURE AND ARE MERELY DESIGNED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION. IT WILL LIKELY HAVE NO AFFECT ON THEIR FUTURE PERFORMANCE OR REACTION DURING PERIODS OF CRISIS.

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA IS PROPOSING TO DIVIDE THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA INTO THREE NEW PROVINCES AND MALUKU INTO TWO NEW PROVINCES AFTER THE 7 JUN GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE PROPOSAL WILL GRANT MORE AUTONOMY TO THE NEW PROVINCES TO STIMULATE GREATER GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE REGIONS. IN IRIAN JAYA, THE PROPOSAL IS LIKELY THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO WEAKEN THE STRENGTH AND UNITY OF THE PRO-SEPARATIST REBEL GROUP, FREE PAPUA ORGANIZATION.

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: THE NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATIONS REMAINED THE SAME AS LAST WEEK, BUT OVERALL UNREST DECREASED. DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED IN ACEH (0510N/09708E) WHILE ETHNIC COMMUNAL VIOLENCE RESUMED IN TUAL (0540S/13245E), KAI ISLANDS. UNREST IN EAST TIMOR (0833S/12434E) CONTINUES DESPITE THE SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT. IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E), NUMEROUS BOMB THREATS WERE REPORTED. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:

22 APR JAKRTA / AN AIRPORT TERMINAL AND 2 AIRCRAFT WERE TARGETS OF A BOMB THREAT. NO BOMB WAS FOUND.

22 APR SINGKAWANG (0540N/10900E) / ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND ANOTHER 4 SUFFERED GUNSHOT WOUNDS AFTER SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED A CROWD FROM BURNING THE HOMES OF MADURESE PEOPLE.

22 APR TUAL / AN ETHNIC CLASH BETWEEN LOCAL RESIDENTS ERUPTED RESULTING IN 2 DEATHS AND 22 INJURIES.

23 APR SUAI (0921S/12517E) / A CLASH OCCURRED BETWEEN A PRO-INTEGRATION GROUP AND A PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUP RESULTING IN 1 PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS INJURED AND 3 HOUSES BURNED.

23 APR TUAL / CROWDS FROM RIVAL COMMUNITIES TOOK TO THE STREETS AND ATTACKED THE SECURITY FORCES TRYING TO DISPERSE THE CROWD.

25 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / A CROWD OF THOUSANDS HELD A FREE ACEH GATHERING AND BURNED 2 BUSES BELONGING TO MOBIL OIL.

25 APR YOGYAKARTA (0748S/11022E) / SUPPORTERS OF UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) ATTACKED MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY-STRUGGLE (PDIP) RESULTING IN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF INJURIES.
25 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / SEPARATIST SYMPATHIZERS HELD A RALLY NEAR MOBIL OIL'S OPERATIONS BASE.
26 APR ERMERA (0845S/12523E), EAST TIMOR / THOUSANDS OF EAST TIMORESE RALLIED TO PLEDGE THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO INDONESIA.
26 APR BALIBO (0858S/12503E) / HUNDREDS OF PRO-INDONESIA SUPPORTERS GATHERED TO DECLARE THEIR SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA RETAINING CONTROL OF THE DISPUTED TERRITORY OF EAST TIMOR.
28 APR MALANG (0759S/11237E) / UNIVERSITY STUDENTS STAGED A PROTEST AGAINST PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S VISIT.
28 APR CIREBON ()644S/10834E) / FIGHTING BROKE OUT BETWEEN RESIDENTS LEAVING 13 PEOPLE INJURED AND 12 HOUSES DAMAGED.
28 APR MEULABOH (0409N/09608E), ACEH / A CROWD DEMANDED COMPENSATION FOR COMMUNITY LAND AND BURNED DOWN 10 HOUSES BELONGING TO EMPLOYEES OF A RUBBER PLANTATION.

(U) (c) VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR AS THE PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED 21 APR DOES NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE. UNREST IN TUAL, SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF SUBSIDING AS THE MILITARY IS SLOWLY GAINING CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. THE ACEHNESE WILL CONTINUE TO VOICE THEIR DEMANDS AND APPLY PRESSURE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN HOPES OF GETTING A REACTION FROM JAKARTA. DEMONSTRATIONS WILL START TO INCREASE IN JAKARTA WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ONLY 5 WEEKS AWAY.

(S) (c) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(S) (c) EAST TIMOR: TRIPARTITE REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AN AGREEMENT 23 APR TO PRESENT AN AUTONOMY PLAN TO THE EAST TIMORESE. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SIGNED AND PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED MAY 5-6. THE UN WILL SEND A 40 PERSON ADVANCE TEAM SHORTLY AFTER THE MAY SIGNING. THE POLLING IS SET FOR 8 AUG AND WILL INVOLVE 200 POLLING CENTERS AND NUMEROUS SUPPORT ELEMENTS. DISARMING MILITIA GROUPS IS VIEWED CRITICAL IN ORDER FOR THE PROCESS TO SUCCEED. IF THE EAST TIMORESE ARE CONVINCED THE MILITIA GROUPS WILL BE UNABLE TO SEEK RETRIBUTION, THEY WILL LIKELY VOTE TO REJECT THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL.

(U) (c) ACEH: INCREASED SEPARATIST UNREST AND DESTRUCTION OF MOBIL OIL PROPERTY NEAR LHOKSEUMAWE, ACEH LED MOBIL TO ORDER THE PRECAUTIONARY EVACUATION OF ITS EMPLOYEES' DEPENDENTS 27 APR. THE DEPARTURE OF MOBIL DEPENDENTS COINCIDES WITH REPORTS OF DEPLOYMENTS OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO THE PROVINCE AND THE LAUNCH OF AN OPERATION BY THE SECURITY FORCES TO CLEANSE THE AREA OF PRO-SEPARATIST FLAGS

SEGMENT 3 OF 4 MISSING

Not relevant to this case

~~SECRET~~

NON Responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR	BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR	INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

29 APR	JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS
03 MAY	JAPAN	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY (1947)
04 MAY	PRC	(U) YOUTH DAY (1919)
04 MAY	TONGA	(U) CROWN PRINCE'S BIRTHDAY (1948)
05 MAY	PALAU	(U) SENIOR CITIZEN'S DAY
05 MAY	JAPAN/ROK	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
05 MAY	THAILAND	(U) CORONATION DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U) GOSPEL DAY
14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)

C.
27-03
05-07
5. (U

NON Responsive

b(7)

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED
TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE
POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT 1/2

Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive



Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive



Non-Responsive

[redacted]

1. (U) INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION UPDATE:
A. (U) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ON POTENTIAL THREATS:
(1) (C) INDONESIA: THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN EAST TIMOR CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE IN THE WAKE OF THE 7 APR ATTACK BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS IN LIQUICA IN WHICH BETWEEN 5 AND 45 WERE REPORTED KILLED. UNLESS INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES CAN CONTROL THE AGGRESSIVE MILITIAS, MOUNTING VIOLENCE COULD SCUTTLE THE UN PROCESS FOR EAST TIMOR AND INCREASE DEMANDS FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION. ELSEWHERE, PREVIOUSLY QUIET AREAS OF WEST JAVA, CENTRAL AND EASTERN KALIMANTAN (BORNEO), AND LAMPUNG, SUMATRA, FACE OUTBREAKS OF COMMUNAL VIOLENCE ACCORDING TO INDONESIAN ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS AND ECONOMIC FACTORS

[redacted]

Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive



RMKS/ITEM 1: (U) INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION UPDATE

A. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ON POTENTIAL THREATS

(1) (U) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH; NEW COMMUNAL VIOLENCE POSSIBLE ELSEWHERE IN INDONESIA


Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive



Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive

(2) DUE TO ETHNIC/SEPARATIST/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE, AVOID IRIAN JAYA, EAST TIMOR AND NORTHERN SUMATRA (ACEH), AND OTHER AREAS OF OCCASIONAL UNREST, SUCH AS THE WEST KALIMANTAN AREA, AREAS OF SULAWESI AND THE CENTRAL MALUKU ISLANDS. COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN VARIOUS AREAS COULD BE A COLLATERAL THREAT, PARTICULARLY IN OUTLYING AREAS. AN ON-GOING ELECTRICITY BLACKOUT IS CAUSING A RISE IN CRIME ON MADURA ISLAND AND PERSONNEL SHOULD EXERCISE GREATER PRECAUTIONS PARTICULARLY DURING DARKNESS. A MANDATORY TWO PERSON POLICY REMAINS FOR IRIAN JAYA.

(3) MAINTAIN HEIGHTENED AWARENESS AND PRECAUTIONS WHILE IN-COUNTRY. BE PARTICULARLY CAUTIOUS IN ETHNIC CHINESE AREAS, NEAR GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND COLLEGE CAMPUSES, AND OUTSIDE MAJOR CITIES. ETHNIC CHINESE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY CAREFUL GIVEN ANTI-ETHNIC CHINESE ATTITUDES OF MANY RIOTERS. ALL TRAVELERS TO INDONESIA SHOULD STAY IN LARGER TOWNS AND AVOID REMOTE VILLAGES.

Non-Responsive

Non-Response

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183235636
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990507
TOR: 031220
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905071100
MHFNO: 99 5361483
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCC #8772 1270653
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0222 1270653
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUWHIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 APR 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

ENCL (10)

MORI DocID: 1054600

RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE

RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RULYJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RULYGNA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW

SECRET

RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 071100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA127/7 MAY//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE

SECRET

MORI DocID: 1054600

NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B. [redacted]

C. [redacted]

D. (C) INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT SIGNED 5 MAY

E. [redacted]

F. [redacted]

G. [redacted]

(U) Non Responsive

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

Non Responsive

SECRET

[redacted]

NON Responsive

C. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 29 APR - 06 MAY 99: DESPITE THE SIGNING OF THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT 5 MAY, VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR, AND MAY EVEN ESCALATE LEADING UP TO THE 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOTING DATE. THE UP-COMING 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, THE 28 OCT PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION DATE, AS WELL AS CERTAIN KEY ANNIVERSARY DATES, WILL ALSO CREATE SEVERAL ENVIRONMENTS FOR FURTHER UNREST AND VIOLENCE. THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS WILL LIKELY BE A VERY TUMULTUOUS AND VIOLENT PERIOD FOR INDONESIA (KEYS ID)

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH INCREASED TO RP 8,000/$1.00. THE ECONOMY REMAINS WEAK AND IS UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PERIOD 28 AUG-28 OCT. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) RECENTLY CONCLUDED IN ITS ANNUAL REVIEW OF INDONESIA THAT THE MACROECONOMICS SITUATION WOULD REMAIN DIFFICULT UNTIL POLITICAL TRANSITION WAS FURTHER ADVANCED. THE WORLD BANK (WB) WAS REPORTED TO HAVE DELAYED DISBURSEMENT OF A $600 MILLION (USD) LOAN UNTIL AFTER THE JUNE ELECTIONS OUT OF CONCERN THAT THE FUNDS MIGHT BE SIPHONED OFF FOR POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS. INDONESIA'S PERSISTENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO COMPLICATE THE NATION'S CURRENT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY. (KEYS ID)

(C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: REPORTING INDICATES THAT IN MAR 99, INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO ASKED PRESIDENT HABIBIE TO FIRE INDONESIAN STATE INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (BAKIN) CHIEF LTG (RET) ZAINI MAULANI, EFFECTIVE 1 APR. UPON HEARING THIS, MAULANI IMMEDIATELY OFFERED HIS RETIREMENT TO THE PRESIDENT. HOWEVER, HABIBIE REFUSED TO ACCEPT MAULANI'S RETIREMENT AND ASKED HIM TO STAY ON FOR ONE MORE YEAR. HABIBIE REPORTEDLY INFORMED WIRANTO THAT MAULANI WOULD STAY ON AS BAKIN CHIEF FOR ANOTHER YEAR DESPITE HIS OBJECTION. MEANWHILE, OTHER REPORTING INDICATES THAT WIRANTO IS STILL PLANNING TO REPLACE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF (KASAD) GEN SUBAGYO, BUT WILL DELAY THE MOVE UNTIL AFTER THE JUNE ELECTIONS. GEN SUBAGYO WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED TO RETIRE 1 APR TO BECOME AMBASSADOR TO MALAYSIA. WIRANTO FURTHER STATED THAT LTG BAMBANG YUDHOYONO WILL LIKELY REPLACE SUBAGYO AS HEAD OF KASAD. THE DELAY IN REPLACING THESE TWO KEY POSITIONS MAY INDICATE THAT WIRANTO IS GRADUALLY LOSING HIS INFLUENCE WITHIN THE GOI AND TNI. IT MAY ALSO SIGNAL THAT WIRANTO IS BECOMING MORE INDECISIVE AND LESS CONFIDENCE IN HIS ACTIONS. HIS BACK-DOOR ATTEMPT TO FIRE MAULANI WILL LIKELY ADD FURTHER STRAIN TO AN ALREADY BAD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TNI AND BAKIN. WIRANTO WILL LIKELY REFRAIN FROM MAKING ANY SENIOR OFFICER CHANGES WITHIN THE TNI UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS OUT OF FEAR THAT IT COULD WEAKEN HIS GRIP ON TNI AND ANY POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS. (KEYS ID)

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: GENERAL

ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) CHAIRMAN RUDINI STATED THAT THE VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD FOR ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, AND MALUKU WOULD BE EXTENDED UNTIL THE THIRD WEEK OF MAY. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT 69 PERCENT OF INDONESIANS HAVE REGISTERED FOR THE 7 JUN ELECTION AND EXPECT THE NUMBER TO SURPASS 70 PERCENT BY 6 MAY, THE LAST DAY OF THE VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD. ACCORDING TO RUDINI, CLAIMS THAT INDONESIANS DID NOT WANT THE ELECTION TO GO ON WERE PROVEN UNTRUE BY THE MERE FACT THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE HAD REGISTERED TO VOTE. THE VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD EXTENSION FOR ACEH, MALUKU, AND IRIAN JAYA WERE LIKELY DUE TO THE RECENT OUTBREAK OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE. DESPITE THE HIGH VOTER REGISTRATION NUMBERS, THE KEY INDICATOR WILL BE THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF VOTER TURN-OUTS ON ELECTION DAY. GROWING UNREST AND VIOLENCE MAY DISCOURAGE OR PREVENT SOME INDONESIANS FROM VOTING IN THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) AND TNI WILL ATTEMPT TO ENSURE A SMOOTH AND PEACEFUL ELECTION. HOWEVER, THEIR RESOURCES WILL BE STRETCHED VERY THIN DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD WITH SEVERAL SIMULTANEOUS UNREST IN OUTER AREAS SUCH AS ACEH, EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, MALUKU, AND WEST KALIMANTAN. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS INCREASED THIS WEEK THROUGHOUT INDONESIA. UNREST INCREASED IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E) AND THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E) AS WELL AS DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS IN ACEH (0510N/09708E). SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING: DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT: 29 APR KUTA (0855S/11617E), BALI / A MOB TORCHED SOME STREET TRADERS' STALLS CAUSING A 500 MAN POLICE FORCE TO DEPLOYED TO THE AREA.
30 APR ATABAI (0848S/12512E), EAST TIMOR / AUSTRALIAN JOURNALISTS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS ATTENDED A PRO-INTEGRATION RALLY WITH THEIR TRANSLATOR. THEY LEFT THE RALLY AFTER THEIR TRANSLATOR WAS BEATEN AND RECEIVED DEATH THREATS. 30 APR ERMERA (0845S/12523E), EAST TIMOR / THE BODIES OF 11 MURDER VICTIMS WERE FOUND IN A DRAINAGE DITCH. REPORTS SAY THE VICTIMS WERE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS.
1 MAY JEPARA (0740S/10914E) / FIVE PEOPLE KILLED AND SIX INJURED IN A PHYSICAL ENCOUNTER BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP).
2 MAY JAKARTA / A THOUSAND NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) SUPPORTERS CONDUCTED A VEHICLE PROGRESSION. 3 MAY ERMERA / FIVE INDONESIA POLICE KILLED IN TWO SEPARATE INCIDENTS. 3 MAY LHOKSEUMAWE (0510N/09708E) / AT LEAST 39 PEOPLE KILLED AND SEVERAL INJURED WHEN TNI FORCES OPENED FIRE ON DEMONSTRATORS TRYING TO MARCH TO A BATTALION HEADQUARTERS IN PROTEST OF ``BRUTAL SWEEPS'' IN LOCAL VILLAGES OF TNI LOOKING FOR TWO SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY KIDNAPPED.
3 MAY CIREBON (0644S/10834E) / A CLASH BETWEEN VILLAGERS RESULTED IN 94 HOUSES DESTROYED INCLUDING A HEALTH CENTER, VILLAGE OFFICES AND A STATE PRIMARY SCHOOL. 3 MAY TUAL (0540S/13245E) / REFUGEES STAGE AN ATTACK AFTER THEIR VILLAGE WAS BURNED KILLING ONE AND INJURING THREE OTHERS. 4 MAY DILI (0833S/12534E) / STUDENTS AND YOUTHS DEMONSTRATED OUTSIDE OF UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR IN FAVOR OF INDEPENDENCE.
4 MAY JAKARTA / THOUSANDS HELD AN ANTI-COMMUNIST RALLY AT A GOVERNMENT BUILDING. 4 MAY JAKARTA / STUDENTS STAGED A DEMONSTRATION AT THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION DEMANDING AN INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL OF FORMER PRESIDENT SUHARTO. 5 MAY IRIAN JAYA (0232S/14042E) / A GROUP OF OPM (FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT) REBELS KILLED THREE MEN AND TOOK 11 HOSTAGES. THE REBELS ARE REPORTEDLY HEADING TOWARDS THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA BORDER AND ARE BEING PURSUED BY TNI HELICOPTERS.

(U)

(C) SOCIAL UNREST RELATED TO THE ELECTIONS IS BECOMING EVIDENT IN JAKARTA WITH POLITICAL PARTIES CLASHING. DEMONSTRATIONS

AND UNREST WILL INCREASE AS THE ELECTIONS GET CLOSER. WITH TNI FIRING ON SEPARATISTS IN ACEH, INDONESIA HAS GIVEN THE SEPARATISTS ANOTHER REASON TO CONTINUE THEIR FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE. (KEYS ID)

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(C) ACEH: VIOLENCE RE-IGNITED IN LHOKSEUMAWE, ACEH, 3 MAY, AS INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) PERSONNEL OPENED FIRE ON APPROXIMATELY 1,000 PRO-SEPARATIST DEMONSTRATORS PROTESTING AGAINST PAST TNI HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. AS MANY AS 30 DEMONSTRATORS WERE KILLED AND OVER 100 INJURED DURING THIS CLASH. TNI STATED THAT THEY ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE WHEN THEIR TROOPS WERE ATTACKED BY A LARGE VIOLENT CROWD.

(C) EAST TIMOR: THE VIOLENT UNREST MANY FEARED WOULD OCCUR IN EAST TIMOR DURING THE 1-2 MAY WEEKEND FAILED TO MATERIALIZE. DESPITE THEIR THREATS TO DO SO, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS DID NOT HOLD ANY MAJOR RALLIES, NOR DID THEY ENGAGE IN ANY MAJOR ATTACKS AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS OR SUPPORTERS. MANY HAD FEARED THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WOULD RESORT TO VIOLENCE IN A LAST-MINUTE ATTEMPT TO DERAIL THE 5 MAY UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT SIGNING. THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WAS FINALLY SIGNED 5 MAY IN NEW YORK BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN, INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALI ALATAS, AND PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER JAIME GAMA. THIS AGREEMENT WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR A 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOTING, WHICH WILL ALLOW EAST TIMORESE TO VOTE FOR EITHER AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. MEANWHILE, REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE TNI MAY HAVE CONDUCTED A JOINT MILITARY OPERATION WITH THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WHEN THEY ALLEGEDLY CONDUCTED A SEARCH MISSION TO LOCATE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. TO FURTHER LEGITIMATIZE THE DIRECT BALLOTING PROCESS AND AS A GESTURE OF GOOD FAITH, THE GOI MAY SOON RELEASE PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBEL LEADER XANANA GUSMAO FROM HOUSE ARREST IN JAKARTA. (KEYS ID)

(S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12

~~SECRET~~

26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24
30 APR-06 MAY 99	24	9	14

(KEYS ID)

(S) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL SITUATION WILL REMAIN FRAGILE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS AND MAY DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER AFTER THE MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 28 OCT. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD OFFICIALLY OPENING 18 MAY AND THE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN WEST KALIMANTAN AND MALUKU, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR. ALTHOUGH THE UN EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED 5 MAY, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL LIKELY STEP UP THEIR ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS IN AN EFFORT TO INFLUENCE THE 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOTING OUTCOME. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

D. (C) INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT SIGNED 5 MAY: UN SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN, INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALI ALATAS, AND PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER JAIME GAMA SIGNED THE UN EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT 5 MAY. THIS AGREEMENT OFFICIALLY PAVES THE WAY TO AN 8 AUG UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING WHICH WILL ALLOW EAST TIMORESE TO VOTE FOR AUTONOMY. IF THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE IS REJECTED BY THE MAJORITY OF EAST TIMORESE, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) MAY GRANT EAST TIMOR FULL INDEPENDENCE 1 JAN 2000. THIS TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT CONCLUDES MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS. (KEYS ID)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL LIKELY INCREASE THEIR INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT ACTIVITIES TO DELAY THE DIRECT BALLOTING DATE OR INFLUENCE ITS OUTCOME. THIS WILL LIKELY INCREASE UNREST AND VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR AS PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES CLASH WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS. THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) IS UNLIKELY TO INTERVENE TO STOP THE EXPECTED VIOLENCE. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)



NON responsive

~~SECRET~~



NOT Responsive

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

NSW responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

---

06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U) GOSPEL DAY
14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)
16 MAY	BANGLADESH	(U) FARAKKA RESISTANCE DAY
17 MAY	NAURU	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
17 MAY	PAKISTAN	(U) ASHURA/MOHARRAM, ISLAMIC HOLIDAY
21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY

4 C. ~~(C)~~ FOREIGN VIP TRAVEL:

27-03 MAY	THAILAND	(U) THAILAND PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT CHINA
05-07 MAY	CHINA	(U) SOUTH AFRICA PRESIDENT TO VISIT CHINA

5. (U) [redacted]

(b)(2)

SECRET

[redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183235636
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990507
TOR: 031220
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905071100
MHFNO: 99 5361483
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCC #8772 1270653
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0222 1270653
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUWHIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 APR 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

ENCL (10)

MORI DocID: 1054600

RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE

RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RULYJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RULYGNA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW

SECRET

RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 071100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA127/7 MAY//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE

SECRET

MORI DocID: 1054600

NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B. [redacted]

C. [redacted]

D. (C) INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT SIGNED 5 MAY

E. [redacted]

F. [redacted]

G. [redacted]

(U) Non Responsive

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

Non Responsive

SECRET

[redacted]

NON Responsive

C. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 29 APR - 06 MAY 99: DESPITE THE SIGNING OF THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT 5 MAY, VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR, AND MAY EVEN ESCALATE LEADING UP TO THE 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOTING DATE. THE UP-COMING 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, THE 28 OCT PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION DATE, AS WELL AS CERTAIN KEY ANNIVERSARY DATES, WILL ALSO CREATE SEVERAL ENVIRONMENTS FOR FURTHER UNREST AND VIOLENCE. THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS WILL LIKELY BE A VERY TUMULTUOUS AND VIOLENT PERIOD FOR INDONESIA (KEYS ID)

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH INCREASED TO RP 8,000/$1.00. THE ECONOMY REMAINS WEAK AND IS UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PERIOD 28 AUG-28 OCT. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) RECENTLY CONCLUDED IN ITS ANNUAL REVIEW OF INDONESIA THAT THE MACROECONOMICS SITUATION WOULD REMAIN DIFFICULT UNTIL POLITICAL TRANSITION WAS FURTHER ADVANCED. THE WORLD BANK (WB) WAS REPORTED TO HAVE DELAYED DISBURSEMENT OF A $600 MILLION (USD) LOAN UNTIL AFTER THE JUNE ELECTIONS OUT OF CONCERN THAT THE FUNDS MIGHT BE SIPHONED OFF FOR POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS. INDONESIA'S PERSISTENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO COMPLICATE THE NATION'S CURRENT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY. (KEYS ID)

(C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: REPORTING INDICATES THAT IN MAR 99, INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO ASKED PRESIDENT HABIBIE TO FIRE INDONESIAN STATE INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (BAKIN) CHIEF LTG (RET) ZAINI MAULANI, EFFECTIVE 1 APR. UPON HEARING THIS, MAULANI IMMEDIATELY OFFERED HIS RETIREMENT TO THE PRESIDENT. HOWEVER, HABIBIE REFUSED TO ACCEPT MAULANI'S RETIREMENT AND ASKED HIM TO STAY ON FOR ONE MORE YEAR. HABIBIE REPORTEDLY INFORMED WIRANTO THAT MAULANI WOULD STAY ON AS BAKIN CHIEF FOR ANOTHER YEAR DESPITE HIS OBJECTION. MEANWHILE, OTHER REPORTING INDICATES THAT WIRANTO IS STILL PLANNING TO REPLACE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF (KASAD) GEN SUBAGYO, BUT WILL DELAY THE MOVE UNTIL AFTER THE JUNE ELECTIONS. GEN SUBAGYO WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED TO RETIRE 1 APR TO BECOME AMBASSADOR TO MALAYSIA. WIRANTO FURTHER STATED THAT LTG BAMBANG YUDHOYONO WILL LIKELY REPLACE SUBAGYO AS HEAD OF KASAD. THE DELAY IN REPLACING THESE TWO KEY POSITIONS MAY INDICATE THAT WIRANTO IS GRADUALLY LOSING HIS INFLUENCE WITHIN THE GOI AND TNI. IT MAY ALSO SIGNAL THAT WIRANTO IS BECOMING MORE INDECISIVE AND LESS CONFIDENCE IN HIS ACTIONS. HIS BACK-DOOR ATTEMPT TO FIRE MAULANI WILL LIKELY ADD FURTHER STRAIN TO AN ALREADY BAD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TNI AND BAKIN. WIRANTO WILL LIKELY REFRAIN FROM MAKING ANY SENIOR OFFICER CHANGES WITHIN THE TNI UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS OUT OF FEAR THAT IT COULD WEAKEN HIS GRIP ON TNI AND ANY POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS. (KEYS ID)

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: GENERAL

ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) CHAIRMAN RUDINI STATED THAT THE VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD FOR ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, AND MALUKU WOULD BE EXTENDED UNTIL THE THIRD WEEK OF MAY. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT 69 PERCENT OF INDONESIANS HAVE REGISTERED FOR THE 7 JUN ELECTION AND EXPECT THE NUMBER TO SURPASS 70 PERCENT BY 6 MAY, THE LAST DAY OF THE VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD. ACCORDING TO RUDINI, CLAIMS THAT INDONESIANS DID NOT WANT THE ELECTION TO GO ON WERE PROVEN UNTRUE BY THE MERE FACT THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE HAD REGISTERED TO VOTE. THE VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD EXTENSION FOR ACEH, MALUKU, AND IRIAN JAYA WERE LIKELY DUE TO THE RECENT OUTBREAK OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE. DESPITE THE HIGH VOTER REGISTRATION NUMBERS, THE KEY INDICATOR WILL BE THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF VOTER TURN-OUTS ON ELECTION DAY. GROWING UNREST AND VIOLENCE MAY DISCOURAGE OR PREVENT SOME INDONESIANS FROM VOTING IN THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) AND TNI WILL ATTEMPT TO ENSURE A SMOOTH AND PEACEFUL ELECTION. HOWEVER, THEIR RESOURCES WILL BE STRETCHED VERY THIN DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD WITH SEVERAL SIMULTANEOUS UNREST IN OUTER AREAS SUCH AS ACEH, EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, MALUKU, AND WEST KALIMANTAN. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS INCREASED THIS WEEK THROUGHOUT INDONESIA. UNREST INCREASED IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E) AND THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E) AS WELL AS DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS IN ACEH (0510N/09708E). SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING: DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT: 29 APR KUTA (0855S/11617E), BALI / A MOB TORCHED SOME STREET TRADERS' STALLS CAUSING A 500 MAN POLICE FORCE TO DEPLOYED TO THE AREA.
30 APR ATABAI (0848S/12512E), EAST TIMOR / AUSTRALIAN JOURNALISTS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS ATTENDED A PRO-INTEGRATION RALLY WITH THEIR TRANSLATOR. THEY LEFT THE RALLY AFTER THEIR TRANSLATOR WAS BEATEN AND RECEIVED DEATH THREATS. 30 APR ERMERA (0845S/12523E), EAST TIMOR / THE BODIES OF 11 MURDER VICTIMS WERE FOUND IN A DRAINAGE DITCH. REPORTS SAY THE VICTIMS WERE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS.
1 MAY JEPARA (0740S/10914E) / FIVE PEOPLE KILLED AND SIX INJURED IN A PHYSICAL ENCOUNTER BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP).
2 MAY JAKARTA / A THOUSAND NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) SUPPORTERS CONDUCTED A VEHICLE PROGRESSION. 3 MAY ERMERA / FIVE INDONESIA POLICE KILLED IN TWO SEPARATE INCIDENTS. 3 MAY LHOKSEUMAWE (0510N/09708E) / AT LEAST 39 PEOPLE KILLED AND SEVERAL INJURED WHEN TNI FORCES OPENED FIRE ON DEMONSTRATORS TRYING TO MARCH TO A BATTALION HEADQUARTERS IN PROTEST OF ``BRUTAL SWEEPS'' IN LOCAL VILLAGES OF TNI LOOKING FOR TWO SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY KIDNAPPED.
3 MAY CIREBON (0644S/10834E) / A CLASH BETWEEN VILLAGERS RESULTED IN 94 HOUSES DESTROYED INCLUDING A HEALTH CENTER, VILLAGE OFFICES AND A STATE PRIMARY SCHOOL. 3 MAY TUAL (0540S/13245E) / REFUGEES STAGE AN ATTACK AFTER THEIR VILLAGE WAS BURNED KILLING ONE AND INJURING THREE OTHERS. 4 MAY DILI (0833S/12534E) / STUDENTS AND YOUTHS DEMONSTRATED OUTSIDE OF UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR IN FAVOR OF INDEPENDENCE.
4 MAY JAKARTA / THOUSANDS HELD AN ANTI-COMMUNIST RALLY AT A GOVERNMENT BUILDING. 4 MAY JAKARTA / STUDENTS STAGED A DEMONSTRATION AT THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION DEMANDING AN INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL OF FORMER PRESIDENT SUHARTO. 5 MAY IRIAN JAYA (0232S/14042E) / A GROUP OF OPM (FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT) REBELS KILLED THREE MEN AND TOOK 11 HOSTAGES. THE REBELS ARE REPORTEDLY HEADING TOWARDS THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA BORDER AND ARE BEING PURSUED BY TNI HELICOPTERS.

(U)

(C) SOCIAL UNREST RELATED TO THE ELECTIONS IS BECOMING EVIDENT IN JAKARTA WITH POLITICAL PARTIES CLASHING. DEMONSTRATIONS

AND UNREST WILL INCREASE AS THE ELECTIONS GET CLOSER. WITH TNI FIRING ON SEPARATISTS IN ACEH, INDONESIA HAS GIVEN THE SEPARATISTS ANOTHER REASON TO CONTINUE THEIR FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE. (KEYS ID)

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(C) ACEH: VIOLENCE RE-IGNITED IN LHOKSEUMAWE, ACEH, 3 MAY, AS INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) PERSONNEL OPENED FIRE ON APPROXIMATELY 1,000 PRO-SEPARATIST DEMONSTRATORS PROTESTING AGAINST PAST TNI HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. AS MANY AS 30 DEMONSTRATORS WERE KILLED AND OVER 100 INJURED DURING THIS CLASH. TNI STATED THAT THEY ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE WHEN THEIR TROOPS WERE ATTACKED BY A LARGE VIOLENT CROWD.

(C) EAST TIMOR: THE VIOLENT UNREST MANY FEARED WOULD OCCUR IN EAST TIMOR DURING THE 1-2 MAY WEEKEND FAILED TO MATERIALIZE. DESPITE THEIR THREATS TO DO SO, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS DID NOT HOLD ANY MAJOR RALLIES, NOR DID THEY ENGAGE IN ANY MAJOR ATTACKS AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS OR SUPPORTERS. MANY HAD FEARED THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WOULD RESORT TO VIOLENCE IN A LAST-MINUTE ATTEMPT TO DERAIL THE 5 MAY UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT SIGNING. THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WAS FINALLY SIGNED 5 MAY IN NEW YORK BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN, INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALI ALATAS, AND PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER JAIME GAMA. THIS AGREEMENT WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR A 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOTING, WHICH WILL ALLOW EAST TIMORESE TO VOTE FOR EITHER AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. MEANWHILE, REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE TNI MAY HAVE CONDUCTED A JOINT MILITARY OPERATION WITH THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WHEN THEY ALLEGEDLY CONDUCTED A SEARCH MISSION TO LOCATE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. TO FURTHER LEGITIMATIZE THE DIRECT BALLOTING PROCESS AND AS A GESTURE OF GOOD FAITH, THE GOI MAY SOON RELEASE PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBEL LEADER XANANA GUSMAO FROM HOUSE ARREST IN JAKARTA. (KEYS ID)

(S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12

~~SECRET~~

26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24
30 APR-06 MAY 99	24	9	14

(KEYS ID)

(S) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL SITUATION WILL REMAIN FRAGILE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS AND MAY DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER AFTER THE MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 28 OCT. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD OFFICIALLY OPENING 18 MAY AND THE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN WEST KALIMANTAN AND MALUKU, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR. ALTHOUGH THE UN EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED 5 MAY, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL LIKELY STEP UP THEIR ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS IN AN EFFORT TO INFLUENCE THE 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOTING OUTCOME. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

D. (C) INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT SIGNED 5 MAY: UN SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN, INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALI ALATAS, AND PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER JAIME GAMA SIGNED THE UN EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT 5 MAY. THIS AGREEMENT OFFICIALLY PAVES THE WAY TO AN 8 AUG UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING WHICH WILL ALLOW EAST TIMORESE TO VOTE FOR AUTONOMY. IF THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE IS REJECTED BY THE MAJORITY OF EAST TIMORESE, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) MAY GRANT EAST TIMOR FULL INDEPENDENCE 1 JAN 2000. THIS TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT CONCLUDES MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS. (KEYS ID)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL LIKELY INCREASE THEIR INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT ACTIVITIES TO DELAY THE DIRECT BALLOTING DATE OR INFLUENCE ITS OUTCOME. THIS WILL LIKELY INCREASE UNREST AND VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR AS PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES CLASH WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS. THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) IS UNLIKELY TO INTERVENE TO STOP THE EXPECTED VIOLENCE. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)



NON responsive

~~SECRET~~



NOT Responsive

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

NSW responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

---

06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U) GOSPEL DAY
14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)
16 MAY	BANGLADESH	(U) FARAKKA RESISTANCE DAY
17 MAY	NAURU	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
17 MAY	PAKISTAN	(U) ASHURA/MOHARRAM, ISLAMIC HOLIDAY
21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY

4 C. ~~(C)~~ FOREIGN VIP TRAVEL:

27-03 MAY	THAILAND	(U) THAILAND PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT CHINA
05-07 MAY	CHINA	(U) SOUTH AFRICA PRESIDENT TO VISIT CHINA

5. (U) [redacted]

(b)(2)

SECRET

[redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

MORI DocID: 1054667

Top Secret TIER

CIA APLA IR 99-40507

Intelligence Report

Office of Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis *10 May 1999*

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Indonesia: Challenges Facing East Timor

Summary

The government's commitment to President Habibie's sudden and uncoordinated pledge to offer East Timor a choice between greater autonomy and quick independence has become less certain since the announcement in late January. Reporting indicates a lack of consensus on the issue among key senior officials.

APPROVED FOR
DATE: MAR 200

Lack of firm leadership from Jakarta has encouraged civilian militias and their prointegration supporters to continue attacking independence advocates throughout the province.

- *Armed Forces Commander Wiranto's vow to enforce a recent cease-fire agreement has not stopped prointegration militias from continuing their campaign of violence and intimidation against independence supporters, many of whom remain in hiding.*
- *The disarming of all warring factions is crucial to ensuring a free and fair ballot, but, until genuine attempts at reconciliation commence and the military ends its tacit support of the militias, East Timor's security situation will remain volatile.*

Indonesian and Portuguese negotiators have agreed that the province will vote on its future on 8 August but, if violence continues, we cannot be confident that the polling process will take place or how orderly it will be.

- *Sustained unrest could lead UN officials to preempt the ballot in August.*
- *A free and fair ballot will still require approval from Indonesia's newly formed national legislature, which may not approve a close vote for independence.*

MORI DocID: 1054667

Jakarta Sending Mixed Signals . . .

The Indonesian Government lacks a consensus on how to proceed with President Habibie's public pledge in late January to allow East Timor to become independent by yearend if the troubled province rejects autonomy:

- Some government ministers who previously supported independence now privately argue in favor of the autonomy option because they fear granting independence would trigger separatist outbreaks in other provinces,
- opposition within the ruling Golkar party was complicating Habibie's handling of the issue.
- Foreign Minister Alatas has had several heated arguments with presidential foreign affairs adviser Dewi Fortuna Anwar—who helped formulate Habibie's autonomy proposal—over her involvement in East Timor policy. In early April, Alatas told her that she was damaging the Foreign Ministry's credibility because he and his Ministry repeatedly had to deal with repercussions from her unsanctioned statements to the media about the future of East Timor.

Support for Habibie's East Timor initiative also appears tenuous among senior military officers, including Armed Forces Commander Wiranto, who has taken no action against the prointegration civilian militias or discipline against local military units that, if not abetting, have at the least tolerated these groups:

- Wiranto has repeatedly promised that the military is a neutral force, but local commanders would have required at least tacit approval from headquarters in Jakarta to allow the militias the blatant free hand they have enjoyed. security authorities knew in advance about a planned militia rally on 17 April in the provincial capital of Dili, permitted it to occur, and were ineffective in curbing the violence that led to some 20 deaths.
- the military may be seeking to manipulate the polling process in favor of the autonomy option by allowing the militias to create disturbances. The military's

MORI DocID: 1054667

Speculating on Habibie's Ulterior Motives

Habibie's sudden and uncoordinated decision to offer independence to the East Timorese is, at a minimum, characteristic of his mercurial leadership style; his continued neglect at keeping key players within the Indonesian Government in the loop on East Timor is exacerbating differences. Habibie's initiative to allow the Timorese to determine their own future may have been designed only to improve his own short-term political prospects:

- Presidential foreign affairs adviser Dewi Fortuna Anwar advocated autonomy in early 1999. According to Anwar, independence was proposed to demonstrate Indonesia's democratic credentials and would be taken only if unspecified efforts to sway proindependence East Timorese failed.

- Habibie has repeatedly told US and foreign officials since his announcement in January that Indonesia has no strategic, economic, political, or cultural interest in retaining East Timor. The director of Indonesia's civilian intelligence agency—who has close ties to Habibie—stated in mid-March, however, that Jakarta's offer of independence was for "foreign consumption" only and did not reflect the government's true intentions, which were to ensure the province remained part of Indonesia.

- the President viewed his initiative on East Timor as a political ploy designed to improve his party's prospects in the legislative elections in June by stifling international criticism that might benefit opponents; however, Habibie would withdraw Jakarta's acquiescence to an independence option upon securing the presidency later in the fall.

strategy, [redacted] is to kill, drive out, or intimidate into silence independence activists and to cow the general population into acceptance of an East Timor under Jakarta's control.

- [redacted]

. . . That Cultivates Culture of Violence

Jakarta's mixed signals coupled with local military support have encouraged the prointegration civilian militias to carry on a violent campaign against the independence movement in the last few months:

- The armed forces has trained and provided logistic support to many of the militia units, [redacted] enabling these disparate forces to operate with some degree of coordination. As a result, prointegrationist forces have been able to easily target independence supporters, especially in the western districts of the province.

- The militias' leaders fear retribution by the majority proindependence population and are strongly motivated by desires to protect their wealth, [redacted] For their part, many local military units have vested interests with and emotional ties to the militias. [redacted]

The violence has not been entirely one sided, but proindependence guerrilla attacks against the military and prointegrationists have been relatively restrained, and rebels, for the most part, did not heed jailed rebel leader Xanana Gusmao's public call in early April for his supporters to take up arms in defense:

- [redacted] most of East Timor's proindependence leadership are in hiding—lacking any guarantee from the police for their protection—and the failure of rebel forces to respond to militia aggression is partly due to the fact that they are now disorganized and on the defensive.

- [redacted] despite his call to arms, Xanana remains committed to a path of peaceful dialogue. His Jakarta-based advisers have subsequently directed his followers in East Timor to make

Security Arrangements for Ballot Remain Vague

Indonesia and Portugal on 5 May signed an agreement setting 8 August as the date for the autonomy ballot and paving the way for the deployment of a small UN civilian monitoring force to oversee the polls. These latest efforts, however, have side-stepped security arrangements for the ballot at the behest of Indonesia. Portuguese officials allege that a miscommunication between their negotiating team and jailed rebel leader Xanana Gusmao led the Portuguese delegation to the UN talks to pay insufficient attention to the document on security:

- The two sides failed to agree on joint disarmament by the rival factions—a crucial precondition to stopping the cycle of violence in the runup to the ballot. Disarmament is only mentioned as something the recently established, but not yet operational peace and stability commission should "endeavor to achieve."

- It is unclear who has responsibility to maintain security. The draft initially required the Indonesian military to substantially reduce its presence in the province by July, and the local police to take sole responsibility for maintaining law and order during the ballot process. The arrangement now refers responsibility for security to the "appropriate Indonesian security authorities."

Habibie has agreed publicly to include an international police force as part of the UN presence, but insists they will act in an advisory role, not as peacekeepers, and be allowed only to carry handguns. President Habibie and Armed Forces Commander Wiranto initially told Australian Prime Minister Howard they could accept an international force of between 200 and 300 police, but retreated from this number and allowed only that they would permit "an adequate number."

whatever temporary accommodations necessary to stay alive until an international force establishes a more secure environment.

Radical elements within the insurgency, however, are likely to react if civilian militias continue their attacks, despite the cease-fire signed on 21 April between proindependence and prointegrationist leaders and witnessed by Wiranto. One Xanana adviser insists that rebel forces will not take action against the militias without the approval of the jailed guerrilla leader.

Independence Not a Sure Bet

most East Timorese would reject Indonesia's autonomy package in favor of independence if a free and fair ballot were held. Independence supporters make frequent public assertions that the vast majority of East Timorese want independence. most senior Indonesian officials in East Timor concede it is unlikely that a ballot will result in Jakarta's favor. Proindependence Timorese could try to stage a boycott locally of the legislative elections in June to signal the province's opposition to integration with Indonesia.

The uncertainty of Indonesia's commitment to allowing East Timor to determine its future and the province's volatile security situation are key determinants of whether a free and fair ballot under UN auspices can take place in the province later this summer. Several scenarios could develop that would derail the process toward independence.

Ballot is Postponed. Continued violence could indefinitely delay a vote on the autonomy proposal. current conditions in the province could prevent a poll, and, in our judgment, the ballot scheduled for 8 August could be pushed back even further if Jakarta cannot guarantee the security of UN personnel deployed to the province to oversee the polls:

- Continued attacks by prointegration militias threaten to degenerate into a protracted conflict. Dili has remained tense since the cease-fire, with militias making house-to-house searches for independence supporters under cover of night. The reports of prointegration violence outside of the provincial capital, but details remain vague as militia roadblocks prevent easy access to all parts of the province.
-

MORI DocID: 1054667

Indonesia: Critical Steps Toward an Independent East Timor

End to Serious Violence

- Indonesian military withdraws support from prointegration civilian militias to establish public faith in its neutrality.
- Reconciliation talks involving proindependence and prointegration leaders resume.
- Rebel forces and civilian militias maintain ceasefire and disarm.

UN-Led Ballot on Autonomy

- UN and Indonesia agree to terms on security arrangements.
- The ballot is widely perceived as free and fair.
- The ballot outcome is decisive in rejecting Jakarta's autonomy plan.

Legislative Decision

- The legislative election on 7 June results in new Peoples' Consultative Assembly that is willing to rescind the annexation of East Timor.

Confidential

368160PM 4-99

~~Top Secret~~

Ballot Not Viewed As Free and Fair. Expecting to win by a wide margin, proindependence leaders are likely to view an outcome favoring autonomy as evidence of manipulation by prointegrationists. Conversely, prointegrationists could escalate violent attacks as a last-ditch response if the vote rejects autonomy and East Timor appeared poised to be granted independence. The UN will insist on a completely secret ballot so that neither individuals nor villages can be targeted for retribution on the basis of their voting pattern.

Legislature Rejects Ballot Results. Even if East Timorese reject autonomy, the newly formed Peoples' Consultative Assembly (MPR) still needs to revoke the nation's 1975 decree that integrated East Timor into Indonesia—an action that will revert the province to a UN-administered, non-self-governing territory with Portugal as the administering power until which time it is declared independent. The assembly would find it difficult to reject a ballot that indicated an overwhelming majority of East Timorese opposed the autonomy proposal, but a close vote could provide enough cause for the assembly to abort the process and retain the province without risking international condemnation. Opposition leader Megawati—who has criticized Habibie's East Timor policy—could emerge from the legislative elections in June as the leader of a coalition government and not feel bound by a ballot initiated by Habibie.

Partition of East Timor. A less likely option for the MPR would be to partition the province with the western districts—where a majority of prointegrationist militias are located—remaining with Jakarta and the eastern portion becoming independent. Proindependence leaders, however, are unlikely to accept such a compromise, and UN officials refused to consider a similar proposal made by prointegrationists in February,

MORI DocID: 1054667



MORI DocID: 1054667

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Indonesia: Challenges Facing East Timor

Pub Num: 98-40507

Distribution:

TOP SECRET

MORI DocID: 1054667

SUBJECT: Indonesia: Challenges Facing East Timor

Pub Num: 98-40507

Distribution:

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Indonesia: Challenges Facing East Timor

Pub Num: 98-40507

Distribution:

~~SECRET~~
~~REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183269153
DOCNO: PA0976
PRODUCER: JICPAC
SOURCE: IMAGERY
DOCTYPE: TARGET
DOR: 19990512
TOR: 233249
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905122223
MHFNO: 99 5434027
DOCCLASS: S
CAVEATS: REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK

HEADER
PP RUEAIIC
DE RUEKJCS #2459 1330324
ZNY SSSSS
P 130324Z MAY 99
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHHJMCY/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RHRMDAB/COMUSNAVCENT//N2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUEDAEA/NAIC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH
RUEADWD/HQ DA WASH DC
RUWSMXI/USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//J2-J//
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIC/DSCA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 122223Z MAY 99 ZYS
FM JICPAC CATIS HONOLULU HI
TO AIG ONE ONE EIGHT FIVE SIX
PAC IMAGE
RAYMIK/ASTJIC OBU
RUYLRCS/82RS KADENA AB JA//INZ//
RUHDKAF/324IS KUNIA HI
RAYMJA/ASTJIC
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T REL AUS/CA/UK~~
QQQQ
CLASSIFIED BY: DCI

TEXT
MSGID/IIR/JICPAC/PAC097/MAY//
RPTID/SUPIR/JICPAC/SER:PA0976/-/-/990512//
COMBINE: COMPLETE

HILITES/(S-REL AS CA UK) [redacted]

1.5(c)

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 23 e 2023
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK~~
~~SECRET~~

Encl (11)

~~SECRET~~
~~REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK~~

[redacted]

SECRET
REL AUS, ~~REL CAN,~~ REL UK



NON responsive

~~SECRET~~
REL AUS, REL CAN, ~~REL UK~~



NON RESPONSIVE

SECRET
~~REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK~~

b(1)
1.4c

[redacted]

NOV responsive

b(1)
1.4(c)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~
~~REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK~~

b(1)
1.4(c)

b(1)
1.4(c)

b(1)
1.4(c)

b(1)
1.4(c)



~~SECRET~~
~~REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK~~

b(1)
1.4(d)

[redacted]

ADMIN
DECL/E.O. 12951//
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT ID: 183276036
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990514
TOR: 013246
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905141100
MHFNO: 99 5449040
DOCCLASS: S
CAVEATS: NOFORN

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCC #2702 1340507
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0169 1340450
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RHBCIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Sep 2023
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

ENCL 12

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN

RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPPEL T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUHPPEL T ELEVENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHWISSJ T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 141100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
RUYNANI/COMUSMARFORK SEOUL KOR//G2//
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA134/14 MAY//
RMKS/
1. (U) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

SECRET
NOFORN

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B. [redacted]

C. [redacted]

D. (S) INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 06-13 MAY 99

E. (C) INDONESIA - ELECTION SECURITY FORCE FOR JAKARTA

F. [redacted]

G. [redacted]

Non Responsive

(3)
(3)

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

Non Responsive

NOFORN
SECRET

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN



NOV Responsive

(S) D. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 6-13 MAY 99: THE OVERALL SITUATION IN INDONESIA REMAINS TENSE AND TUMULTUOUS AS THE NATION PREPARES FOR THREE FAST-APPROACHING WATERSHED EVENTS, NAMELY THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, THE 8 AUG EAST TIMOR AUTONOMY DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE, AND THE 28 OCT MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. THE LEVEL OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY INCREASE DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, AND CULMINATE AFTER THE RESULTS OF THESE MOMENTOUS EVENTS ARE ANNOUNCED. (KEYS ID)

(S) (C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR IMPROVED SLIGHTLY TO RP 7,800/$1.00. COORDINATING MINISTER FOR ECONOMY, FINANCE, AND INDUSTRY GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA ANNOUNCED THAT THE STATISTICAL FIGURE ON THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) FOR THE FIRST QUARTER SHOWED THAT THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY IS

``REAWAKENING''. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE INDICATION OF THE ``REAWAKENING'' ECONOMY COULD BE SEEN FROM THE STRENGTHENING OF THE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE RUPIAH, THE DROP IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND INFLATION WHICH ENABLED THE GOVERNMENT TO LOWER BANK INTEREST RATES. DESPITE MODEST SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT TO CERTAIN SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY, INDONESIA'S OVERALL ECONOMIC SITUATION STILL REMAINS WEAK, AND IS UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE PRIOR TO THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: IN RESPONSE TO RECENT VIOLENCE IN ACEH, A BATTALION OF SPECIAL RIOT TROOPS, CALLED THE PASUKAN PENINDAK RUSUH MASSA (PPRM) OR MASS DISTURBANCE REACTION FORCE, DEPLOYED TO LHOKSEUMAWE 7 MAY TO AUGMENT LOCAL SECURITY FORCES. APPROXIMATELY 450 PERSONNEL AND THEIR EQUIPMENT ARRIVED IN ACEH ABOARD FOUR C-130 AIRCRAFT. THE FORCES WILL DEPLOY TO KEY LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE CITY TO CONTROL VIOLENCE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS. THREE PPRM BATTALIONS WERE OFFICIALLY FORMED ON 1 MAR, COMPRISING 3,000 PERSONNEL FROM THE ARMY, AIR FORCE, NAVY, MARINES, POLICE, AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. THE PPRM IS UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE POLICE AND IS ONLY UTILIZED FOR SECURITY/LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS. THE PPRM IS EQUIPPED WITH SMALL ARMS AND RIOT-CONTROL EQUIPMENT. THIS LATEST DEPLOYMENT WILL LIKELY BE THE LAST DUE TO THE CONSTRAINTS ON TNI AND POLICE FORCES USED FOR SECURITY ROLES IN JAKARTA AND THROUGHOUT JAVA. THE SPECIALLY TRAINED RIOT TASK FORCE WILL LIKELY BE MORE AGGRESSIVE THAN THE LOCAL SECURITY FORCE IN DEALING WITH UNREST. THE USE OF NON-INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES TO CONTAIN REGIONAL UNREST COULD INCREASE TENSION BETWEEN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY AND TNI, AND MAY FUEL FURTHER UNREST. TNI FORCES WILL BE STRETCHED VERY THIN DURING THE NEXT 6 MONTHS AS THEY PREPARE FOR ELECTION SECURITY DUTIES IN MOST MAJOR CITIES, WHILE HANDLING SIMULTANEOUS REGIONAL UNREST IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, MALUKU, AND WEST KALIMANTAN. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIAN STATE MINISTER FOR STATE SECRETARY AKBAR TANDJUNG AND STATE MINISTER FOR INVESTMENT AFFAIRS HAMZAH HAZ, BOTH RESIGNED FROM THEIR CABINET POSITIONS EFFECTIVE 10 MAY TO CONCENTRATE ON CAMPAIGNING FULL-TIME FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UP-COMING 7 JUN ELECTIONS. TANDJUNG CONCURRENTLY SERVED AS THE CHAIRMAN OF INDONESIA'S LARGEST POLITICAL PARTY, THE FUNCTIONAL GROUP (GOLKAR), WHILE HAZ CONCURRENTLY SERVED AS THE CHAIRMAN OF INDONESIA'S SECOND LARGEST POLITICAL PARTY, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP). BOTH VOLUNTARILY RESIGNED FROM THEIR MINISTERIAL DUTIES AFTER CONTROVERSY ERUPTED OVER PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S DECISION TO ALLOW BOTH OF THEM TO RETAIN THEIR CABINET POSITIONS, WHILE CONCURRENTLY CAMPAIGNING FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES. IF ALLOWED TO DO SO, BOTH WOULD HAVE BEEN IN VIOLATION WITH THE NEW ELECTION CAMPAIGN LAW, WHICH FORBIDS CURRENT APPOINTED GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM ACTIVE POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING. TANDJUNG AND HAZ PUBLICLY RESIGNED TO COMPLY WITH THE NEW ELECTION LAW AND TO AVOID THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT AND PUBLIC OUT-CRY WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED IF BOTH HAD DECIDED TO STAY ON AS CABINET MINISTERS WHILE ACTIVELY CAMPAIGNING FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES. HOWEVER, THEY MAY HAVE ALSO RESIGNED TO CAMPAIGN FOR THEIR OWN POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS, SINCE BOTH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED AS POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. IF NO DOMINANT CANDIDATE EMERGES, A COMPROMISE OR COALITION TICKET COULD RESULT, ENCOMPASSING EITHER TANDJUNG OR HAZ AS A POSSIBLE RUNNING MATE WITH HABIBIE. (KEYS ID)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS ONLY 3 WEEKS AWAY, ACTIVITY IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E) IS INCREASING. DEMONSTRATIONS WERE ON THE RISE WITH RIOTS FOCUSING ON ELECTION ISSUES. EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E) CONTINUES TO HAVE CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE MILITIAS, EVEN WITH AN INITIAL UN PRESENCE ON GROUND. AMBON (0343S/12812E) IS STARTING TO STIR UP AGAIN; AND ACEH (0510N/09708E) IS IN A VERY TENSE STATE. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:
6 MAY DILI (0833S/12534E) / EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS AND YOUTHS DEMONSTRATED AT EAST TIMOR UNIVERSITY FOR A THIRD STRAIGHT DAY CARRYING EAST TIMOR FLAGS AND BANNERS REJECTING AUTONOMY.
6 MAY JAKARTA / THE STUDENT SOLIDARITY WITH ACEH GROUP (SOMAKA) DEMONSTRATED AT THE US EMBASSY DEMANDING THE US NOT BE ONE-SIDED IN REACTING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN ACEH.
7 MAY JAKARTA / EAST TIMORESE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS DEMONSTRATED AT THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION DEMANDING AN END TO THE `SLAUGHTER AND INTIMIDATION' IN EAST TIMOR AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF TNI `TEAMS' FROM THE PROVINCE BEFORE THE 8 AUG POLL.
8 MAY PEKALONGAN (0653S/10940E), CENTRAL JAVA / A PRE-CAMPAIGN PERIOD CLASH OCCURRED BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), LEAVING 5 PERSONS INJURED.
8 MAY LIQUICA (0840S/12520E)/ PRO-INDONESIA MILITIA GROUPS GATHERED FOR A RALLY TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR AUTONOMY.
9 MAY DILI / SHOTS WERE FIRED AT A CAR CARRYING FOREIGN JOURNALISTS MOST LIKELY BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS WHO WERE SEEN BRANDISHING HANDGUNS.
9 MAY DILI / A VIOLENT BATTLE BROKE OUT BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST GROUPS CAUSING POLICE TO OPEN FIRE IN THE AIR. AT LEAST 1 DEAD, 3 INJURED.
9 MAY JEMBER (0810S/11342E)/ INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI-P) SUPPORTERS BLOCKED THE GOLKAR PARTY GENERAL CHAIRMAN, AKBAR TANJUNG, FROM HOLDING A MEETING.
9 MAY SEMARANG (0658S/11025E)/ A GOLKAR OFFICE WAS SET ON FIRE BY SUPPORTERS OF PDI-P.
9 MAY AMBON / FRESH CLASHES, TRIGGERED BY A HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT BRAWL, SET 14 HOUSES ON FIRE. NO DEATHS REPORTED.
9 MAY DILI / PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA WERE INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT WHICH RESULTED IN A FOREIGN JOURNALIST BEATEN AND SEVERAL WOUNDED, ACCORDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST.
10 MAY DILI / PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS ATTACKED AN AITARAK MILITIA POST RESULTING IN 1 ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST KILLED AND 9 OTHERS INJURED.
10 MAY DILI / A HOTEL OCCUPYING FOREIGN JOURNALISTS RECEIVED SEVERAL BOMB THREATS.
10 MAY JAKARTA / UP TO 1,300 BANK EMPLOYEES CONDUCTED SPEECHES AND WAVED BANNERS OUTSIDE BANK OF INDONESIA.
10 MAY BAUCAU (0835S/12630E)/ PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA PERSONNEL, DRESSED UP AS PRO-INDEPENDENCE FALINTIL FIGHTERS, REPORTEDLY SHOT 27 PEOPLE, KILLING THREE. THIS WAS MOST LIKELY A PLOY BY PRO-INDONESIA ELEMENTS TO GIVE UN PERSONNEL THE PERCEPTION THAT PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS ARE INSTIGATING VIOLENCE.
11 MAY JAKARTA / UNIVERSITY STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN FRONT OF THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION (KPU) OFFICE COVERING THEIR BODIES WITH 50,000 RUPIAH BILLS, MOCKING KPU MEMBERS.
11 MAY AMBON / A BOMB WENT OFF INJURING 4 AND CAUSED MASS PANIC.

11 MAY LHOKSEUMAWE (0510N/09708E)/ FIVE GRENADES WENT OFF AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF AN AIR DEFENSE BATTALION. NO INJURIES REPORTED.
12 MAY JAKARTA / REPORTING INDICATES UP TO 5,000 STUDENTS GATHERED AT THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS FOR A MEMORIAL SERVICE AND DEMONSTRATION.
12 MAY CIANJUR (0649S/10708E)/ A GROUP OF YOUTHS IDENTIFIED AS NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN) MEMBERS OCCUPIED A DISTRICT ELECTORAL COMMITTEE OFFICE, HOLDING HOSTAGE SOME OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES ON DUTY. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(S) TNI AND POLICE ARE PREPARING FOR SECURITY IN JAVA BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAVA AS POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORTERS WILL BECOME EMOTIONAL. THE OUTLYING AREAS ARE STILL TURBULENT AND TENSE. SINCE MAJORITY OF FORCES ARE IN JAVA, TNI AND POLICE WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH UNREST THAT OCCURS IN OUTLYING AREAS OF INDONESIA. (KEYS ID)

(U)
(U)

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:
(C) EAST TIMOR: A SMALL ADVANCE TEAM OF APPROXIMATELY 40 UN OFFICIALS ARRIVED IN DILI, EAST TIMOR 7-8 MAY TO PREPARE FOR THE 8 AUG UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE. THE UN IS EXPECTED TO HAVE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 OFFICIALS IN EAST TIMOR BY MID-JUN, WITH HOPES THAT THEIR PRESENCE WILL ENSURE A FAIR, OPEN, AND SAFE BALLOTING PROCESS. APPROXIMATELY 200-300 WILL BE CIVILIAN POLICE ADVISERS WHO WILL ASSIST THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE FORCE (POLRI) IN MAINTAINING SECURITY AT APPROXIMATELY 200 POLLING CENTERS THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR. AUSTRALIA IS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE THE LARGEST SINGLE NATIONAL CONTINGENT OF POLICE ADVISORS, APPROXIMATELY 50-60. AUSTRALIA, GERMANY, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, PHILIPPINES, UK, AND THE US WILL SEND OFFICIALS TO MONITOR THE BALLOTING. THE DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE IS EXPECTED TO COST APPROXIMATELY $46 MILLION, WITH AUSTRALIA PLEDGING $20 MILLION AND PORTUGAL OFFERING $10 MILLION TO HELP DEFRAY THE COST. THE ARRIVAL OF UN OFFICIALS IN EAST TIMOR SHOULD BRING SOME RELIEF TO THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS AND THE MAIN ADVOCATE OF A UN PRESENCE. HOWEVER, ANY LARGE OR VISIBLE UN PRESENCE COULD FUEL RESENTMENT BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WHO OPPOSE ANY FOREIGN PRESENCE ON EAST TIMOR SOIL. DESPITE THEIR OBJECTION, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL DELIBERATELY ATTACK ANY UN PERSONNEL WITHOUT PROVOCATION. THEY MAY, HOWEVER, USE THE ARRIVAL OF UN PERSONNEL IN EAST TIMOR AS A PRETEXT TO INCREASE THEIR ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS AND SUPPORTERS. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(C) IRIAN JAYA: THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) WILL SOON RE-DECLARE THE BORDER ALONG PAPUA NEW GUINEA (PNG) A MILITARY OPERATION ZONE (DOM) FOLLOWING INCREASED REBEL ACTIVITY IN THE REGION OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS. THE AREA WAS A DOM PRIOR TO 1998, BUT THE DESIGNATION WAS LIFTED IN OCT 98 AS A GOOD-WILL GESTURE AND REFORM PROMISE BY TNI COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO. DESPITE THE LIFT, REPORTS OF GANGS HARASSING AND TERRORIZING PEOPLE LIVING ALONG THE BORDER AREA HAS INCREASED. IN THE LATEST INCIDENT, A 100-MAN GANG ATTACKED A VILLAGE IN THE ARSO DISTRICT, KILLING THREE LOCAL RESIDENTS, INJURING 3 OTHERS, AND TAKING 11 HOSTAGES. TNI IS PROBABLY REINSTATING THE DOM DESIGNATION IN AN EFFORT TO CURB THE GROWING SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN IRIAN JAYA, ESPECIALLY IN KNOWN REBEL TERRITORY ALONG THE PNG BORDER. REINSTATING THE DOM MAY UPSET LOCAL EMOTIONS AND HELP FUEL FURTHER UNREST IN THE REGION. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(C) JAKARTA: STUDENTS COMMEMORATED THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING WITH DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

12 MAY. REPORTING INDICATES UP TO 5,000 STUDENTS GATHERED AT THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS FOR A MEMORIAL SERVICE AND DEMONSTRATION. FROM THIS GROUP, APPROXIMATELY 1,500 STUDENTS MARCHED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE/PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (DPR/MPR) BUILDING LOCATED 2 MILES EAST OF THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED THEM FROM ENTERING THE DPR/MPR GROUNDS AND LOWERING THE INDONESIAN FLAG TO HALF MAST TO COMMEMORATE THE KILLINGS OF FOUR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. A SMALLER GROUP OF STUDENTS STAGED A SIMILAR PROTEST OUTSIDE THE DEFENSE MINISTRY BUILDING. NO DEATHS, INJURIES, OR ARRESTS WERE REPORTED FROM ALL THREE LOCATIONS. DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED DESPITE EARLIER REPORTING THAT THE 12 MAY TRISAKTI ANNIVERSARY DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD BE CANCELLED. THESE DEMONSTRATIONS WERE THE LARGEST SINCE THE 13 NOV 98 ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATIONS OF UP 50,000. THIS EVENT COULD BE THE PRELUDE TO FURTHER AND LARGER STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND POSSIBLE VIOLENCE, ESPECIALLY ON KEY ANNIVERSARY AND POLITICAL DATES. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS WILL LIKELY INCREASE AS THE NATIONAL ELECTION PERIOD APPROACHES, AND THEIR MAGNITUDE WILL BE INFLUENCED BY SECURITY FORCE REACTION AND THE OUTCOME OF THE DPR ELECTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. (KEYS ID)

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

*18MAY	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD COMMENCES
21MAY	INDONESIAN SCHOOLS DISMISSED FOR SUMMER RECESS
07JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
12JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
08AUG	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
29AUG	NEW MPR ANNOUNCES RESULTS OF EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13NOV	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
07DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT)

*DENOTES ADDITION (KEYS ID)

(U) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24
30 APR-06 MAY 99	24	9	14
07-13 MAY 99	28	8	16

(U)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA WILL REMAIN FRAGILE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, AND WILL LIKELY DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER AFTER THE 28 OCT MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD OPENING 18 MAY AND THE NATIONWIDE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES, ESPECIALLY ON KEY ANNIVERSARY AND POLITICAL DATES. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN MALUKU AND WEST KALIMANTAN, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR. ALTHOUGH THE EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE IS SET FOR 8 AUG AND UN OFFICIALS BEGAN ARRIVING IN DILI 7-8 MAY, PRO-INTEGRATION/PRO-INDEPENDENCE VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE AND MAY EVENTUALLY ESCALATE AFTER THE BALLOTING RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED 29 AUG. (OSA MULITIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

(U)

E. (C) INDONESIA - ELECTION SECURITY FOR FOR JAKARTA: AS OF 11 MAY, THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) SECURITY PLANS FOR THE 18 MAY - 4 JUNE ELECTION PERIOD IN JAKARTA CALLED FOR 62,000 TROOPS, CONSISTING OF:

- 12,000 TNI
- 8,000 POLICE
- 12,000 PEOPLE'S SECURITY FORCE (KNOWN AS KAMRA OR CIVILIAN MILITIA)
- 30,000 CIVIL DEFENSE FORCES (WANRA AND HANSIP) (KEYS ID)

(U)

(C) TNI TROOPS WILL INCLUDE PERSONNEL FROM THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE. THE KAMRA WERE RECRUITED FROM EXISITING CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS IN JAN-FEB 99 AND HAD A 3-WEEK TRAINING PROGRAM WHICH INCLUDED SHIELD AND BATON USE. WANRA ARE PART-TIME LOCAL MILITARY AUXILIARY PERSONNEL. HANSIP MAKE UP INDONESIA'S LARGE CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND ARE TYPICALLY USED IN ROUTINE CIVIL DEFENSE TASKS SUCH AS FIREFIGHTING, DISASTER DAMAGE CONTROL, AND NEIGHBORHOOD SECURITY. (KEYS ID)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

[redacted]

(U) APPROXIMATELY 30,000 ADDITIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL WERE SENT TO THE JAKARTA AREA FOR THE 10-13 NOV 98 PEOPLES' CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) SPECIAL SESSION. IN MAY 98, AN ESTIMATED 60,000 AUGMENTEES WERE CALLED IN TO RESTORE ORDER AFTER SUHARTO WAS REMOVED FROM POWER. (KEYS ID)

(S) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF SECURITY FORCES SLATED FOR JAKARTA IS FLEXIBLE AND WILL PROBABLY INCREASE. OF THE 62,000 CURRENTLY PLANNED, 60 PERCENT (37,000) ARE ORGANIC TO THE JAKARTA AREA; THE REMAINDER WILL BE BROUGHT IN FROM OTHER AREAS IN JAVA AND THE OUTER ISLANDS. OF THE 20,000 TNI AND POLICE PERSONNEL LISTED IN THE JAKARTA SECURITY PLAN, JICPAC ASSESSES 15,000 ARE ALREADY BASED IN THE JAKARTA AREA. (KEYS ID)

(S) TNI TROOPS ARE A MINORITY OF THE PLANNED SECURITY FORCE. THE CIVILIAN DEFENSE FORCES AND MILITIA, RELATIVELY UNTRAINED AND INDISCIPLINED, WILL PROBABLY EXACERBATE ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE. AT THE SAME TIME, THEIR LARGE AND VISIBLE PRESENCE WILL ALLOW THE TNI TO DEFLECT BLAME FOR ANY HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THE BULK OF UNREST WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE 20 JUN-12 JUL WHEN ELECTION RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

Non responsive

SECRET
NOFORN

[redacted]

NON Responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:
A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT
B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

---

14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)
16 MAY	BANGLADESH	(U) FARAKKA RESISTANCE DAY
17 MAY	NAURU	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
17 MAY	PAKISTAN	(U) ASHURA/MOHARRAM, ISLAMIC HOLIDAY
21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY

b(2)

[redacted]

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT ID: 183276036
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990514
TOR: 013246
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905141100
MHFNO: 99 5449040
DOCCLASS: S
CAVEATS: NOFORN

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCC #2702 1340507
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0169 1340450
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RHBCIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Sep 2023
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

ENCL 12

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN

RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPPEL T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUHPPEL T ELEVENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHWISSJ T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 141100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
RUYNANI/COMUSMARFORK SEOUL KOR//G2//
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA134/14 MAY//
RMKS/
1. (U) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

SECRET
NOFORN

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B. [redacted]

C. [redacted]

D. (S) INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 06-13 MAY 99

E. (C) INDONESIA - ELECTION SECURITY FORCE FOR JAKARTA

F. [redacted]

G. [redacted]

Non Responsive

(3)
(3)

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

Non Responsive

NOFORN
SECRET

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN



NOV Responsive

(S) D. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 6-13 MAY 99: THE OVERALL SITUATION IN INDONESIA REMAINS TENSE AND TUMULTUOUS AS THE NATION PREPARES FOR THREE FAST-APPROACHING WATERSHED EVENTS, NAMELY THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, THE 8 AUG EAST TIMOR AUTONOMY DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE, AND THE 28 OCT MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. THE LEVEL OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY INCREASE DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, AND CULMINATE AFTER THE RESULTS OF THESE MOMENTOUS EVENTS ARE ANNOUNCED. (KEYS ID)

(S) (C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR IMPROVED SLIGHTLY TO RP 7,800/$1.00. COORDINATING MINISTER FOR ECONOMY, FINANCE, AND INDUSTRY GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA ANNOUNCED THAT THE STATISTICAL FIGURE ON THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) FOR THE FIRST QUARTER SHOWED THAT THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY IS

``REAWAKENING''. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE INDICATION OF THE ``REAWAKENING'' ECONOMY COULD BE SEEN FROM THE STRENGTHENING OF THE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE RUPIAH, THE DROP IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND INFLATION WHICH ENABLED THE GOVERNMENT TO LOWER BANK INTEREST RATES. DESPITE MODEST SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT TO CERTAIN SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY, INDONESIA'S OVERALL ECONOMIC SITUATION STILL REMAINS WEAK, AND IS UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE PRIOR TO THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: IN RESPONSE TO RECENT VIOLENCE IN ACEH, A BATTALION OF SPECIAL RIOT TROOPS, CALLED THE PASUKAN PENINDAK RUSUH MASSA (PPRM) OR MASS DISTURBANCE REACTION FORCE, DEPLOYED TO LHOKSEUMAWE 7 MAY TO AUGMENT LOCAL SECURITY FORCES. APPROXIMATELY 450 PERSONNEL AND THEIR EQUIPMENT ARRIVED IN ACEH ABOARD FOUR C-130 AIRCRAFT. THE FORCES WILL DEPLOY TO KEY LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE CITY TO CONTROL VIOLENCE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS. THREE PPRM BATTALIONS WERE OFFICIALLY FORMED ON 1 MAR, COMPRISING 3,000 PERSONNEL FROM THE ARMY, AIR FORCE, NAVY, MARINES, POLICE, AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. THE PPRM IS UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE POLICE AND IS ONLY UTILIZED FOR SECURITY/LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS. THE PPRM IS EQUIPPED WITH SMALL ARMS AND RIOT-CONTROL EQUIPMENT. THIS LATEST DEPLOYMENT WILL LIKELY BE THE LAST DUE TO THE CONSTRAINTS ON TNI AND POLICE FORCES USED FOR SECURITY ROLES IN JAKARTA AND THROUGHOUT JAVA. THE SPECIALLY TRAINED RIOT TASK FORCE WILL LIKELY BE MORE AGGRESSIVE THAN THE LOCAL SECURITY FORCE IN DEALING WITH UNREST. THE USE OF NON-INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES TO CONTAIN REGIONAL UNREST COULD INCREASE TENSION BETWEEN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY AND TNI, AND MAY FUEL FURTHER UNREST. TNI FORCES WILL BE STRETCHED VERY THIN DURING THE NEXT 6 MONTHS AS THEY PREPARE FOR ELECTION SECURITY DUTIES IN MOST MAJOR CITIES, WHILE HANDLING SIMULTANEOUS REGIONAL UNREST IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, MALUKU, AND WEST KALIMANTAN. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIAN STATE MINISTER FOR STATE SECRETARY AKBAR TANDJUNG AND STATE MINISTER FOR INVESTMENT AFFAIRS HAMZAH HAZ, BOTH RESIGNED FROM THEIR CABINET POSITIONS EFFECTIVE 10 MAY TO CONCENTRATE ON CAMPAIGNING FULL-TIME FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UP-COMING 7 JUN ELECTIONS. TANDJUNG CONCURRENTLY SERVED AS THE CHAIRMAN OF INDONESIA'S LARGEST POLITICAL PARTY, THE FUNCTIONAL GROUP (GOLKAR), WHILE HAZ CONCURRENTLY SERVED AS THE CHAIRMAN OF INDONESIA'S SECOND LARGEST POLITICAL PARTY, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP). BOTH VOLUNTARILY RESIGNED FROM THEIR MINISTERIAL DUTIES AFTER CONTROVERSY ERUPTED OVER PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S DECISION TO ALLOW BOTH OF THEM TO RETAIN THEIR CABINET POSITIONS, WHILE CONCURRENTLY CAMPAIGNING FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES. IF ALLOWED TO DO SO, BOTH WOULD HAVE BEEN IN VIOLATION WITH THE NEW ELECTION CAMPAIGN LAW, WHICH FORBIDS CURRENT APPOINTED GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM ACTIVE POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING. TANDJUNG AND HAZ PUBLICLY RESIGNED TO COMPLY WITH THE NEW ELECTION LAW AND TO AVOID THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT AND PUBLIC OUT-CRY WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED IF BOTH HAD DECIDED TO STAY ON AS CABINET MINISTERS WHILE ACTIVELY CAMPAIGNING FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES. HOWEVER, THEY MAY HAVE ALSO RESIGNED TO CAMPAIGN FOR THEIR OWN POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS, SINCE BOTH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED AS POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. IF NO DOMINANT CANDIDATE EMERGES, A COMPROMISE OR COALITION TICKET COULD RESULT, ENCOMPASSING EITHER TANDJUNG OR HAZ AS A POSSIBLE RUNNING MATE WITH HABIBIE. (KEYS ID)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS ONLY 3 WEEKS AWAY, ACTIVITY IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E) IS INCREASING. DEMONSTRATIONS WERE ON THE RISE WITH RIOTS FOCUSING ON ELECTION ISSUES. EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E) CONTINUES TO HAVE CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE MILITIAS, EVEN WITH AN INITIAL UN PRESENCE ON GROUND. AMBON (0343S/12812E) IS STARTING TO STIR UP AGAIN; AND ACEH (0510N/09708E) IS IN A VERY TENSE STATE. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:
6 MAY DILI (0833S/12534E) / EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS AND YOUTHS DEMONSTRATED AT EAST TIMOR UNIVERSITY FOR A THIRD STRAIGHT DAY CARRYING EAST TIMOR FLAGS AND BANNERS REJECTING AUTONOMY.
6 MAY JAKARTA / THE STUDENT SOLIDARITY WITH ACEH GROUP (SOMAKA) DEMONSTRATED AT THE US EMBASSY DEMANDING THE US NOT BE ONE-SIDED IN REACTING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN ACEH.
7 MAY JAKARTA / EAST TIMORESE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS DEMONSTRATED AT THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION DEMANDING AN END TO THE `SLAUGHTER AND INTIMIDATION' IN EAST TIMOR AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF TNI `TEAMS' FROM THE PROVINCE BEFORE THE 8 AUG POLL.
8 MAY PEKALONGAN (0653S/10940E), CENTRAL JAVA / A PRE-CAMPAIGN PERIOD CLASH OCCURRED BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), LEAVING 5 PERSONS INJURED.
8 MAY LIQUICA (0840S/12520E)/ PRO-INDONESIA MILITIA GROUPS GATHERED FOR A RALLY TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR AUTONOMY.
9 MAY DILI / SHOTS WERE FIRED AT A CAR CARRYING FOREIGN JOURNALISTS MOST LIKELY BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS WHO WERE SEEN BRANDISHING HANDGUNS.
9 MAY DILI / A VIOLENT BATTLE BROKE OUT BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST GROUPS CAUSING POLICE TO OPEN FIRE IN THE AIR. AT LEAST 1 DEAD, 3 INJURED.
9 MAY JEMBER (0810S/11342E)/ INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI-P) SUPPORTERS BLOCKED THE GOLKAR PARTY GENERAL CHAIRMAN, AKBAR TANJUNG, FROM HOLDING A MEETING.
9 MAY SEMARANG (0658S/11025E)/ A GOLKAR OFFICE WAS SET ON FIRE BY SUPPORTERS OF PDI-P.
9 MAY AMBON / FRESH CLASHES, TRIGGERED BY A HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT BRAWL, SET 14 HOUSES ON FIRE. NO DEATHS REPORTED.
9 MAY DILI / PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA WERE INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT WHICH RESULTED IN A FOREIGN JOURNALIST BEATEN AND SEVERAL WOUNDED, ACCORDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST.
10 MAY DILI / PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS ATTACKED AN AITARAK MILITIA POST RESULTING IN 1 ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST KILLED AND 9 OTHERS INJURED.
10 MAY DILI / A HOTEL OCCUPYING FOREIGN JOURNALISTS RECEIVED SEVERAL BOMB THREATS.
10 MAY JAKARTA / UP TO 1,300 BANK EMPLOYEES CONDUCTED SPEECHES AND WAVED BANNERS OUTSIDE BANK OF INDONESIA.
10 MAY BAUCAU (0835S/12630E)/ PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA PERSONNEL, DRESSED UP AS PRO-INDEPENDENCE FALINTIL FIGHTERS, REPORTEDLY SHOT 27 PEOPLE, KILLING THREE. THIS WAS MOST LIKELY A PLOY BY PRO-INDONESIA ELEMENTS TO GIVE UN PERSONNEL THE PERCEPTION THAT PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS ARE INSTIGATING VIOLENCE.
11 MAY JAKARTA / UNIVERSITY STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN FRONT OF THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION (KPU) OFFICE COVERING THEIR BODIES WITH 50,000 RUPIAH BILLS, MOCKING KPU MEMBERS.
11 MAY AMBON / A BOMB WENT OFF INJURING 4 AND CAUSED MASS PANIC.

11 MAY LHOKSEUMAWE (0510N/09708E)/ FIVE GRENADES WENT OFF AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF AN AIR DEFENSE BATTALION. NO INJURIES REPORTED.
12 MAY JAKARTA / REPORTING INDICATES UP TO 5,000 STUDENTS GATHERED AT THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS FOR A MEMORIAL SERVICE AND DEMONSTRATION.
12 MAY CIANJUR (0649S/10708E)/ A GROUP OF YOUTHS IDENTIFIED AS NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN) MEMBERS OCCUPIED A DISTRICT ELECTORAL COMMITTEE OFFICE, HOLDING HOSTAGE SOME OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES ON DUTY. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(S) TNI AND POLICE ARE PREPARING FOR SECURITY IN JAVA BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAVA AS POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORTERS WILL BECOME EMOTIONAL. THE OUTLYING AREAS ARE STILL TURBULENT AND TENSE. SINCE MAJORITY OF FORCES ARE IN JAVA, TNI AND POLICE WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH UNREST THAT OCCURS IN OUTLYING AREAS OF INDONESIA. (KEYS ID)

(U)
(U)

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:
(C) EAST TIMOR: A SMALL ADVANCE TEAM OF APPROXIMATELY 40 UN OFFICIALS ARRIVED IN DILI, EAST TIMOR 7-8 MAY TO PREPARE FOR THE 8 AUG UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE. THE UN IS EXPECTED TO HAVE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 OFFICIALS IN EAST TIMOR BY MID-JUN, WITH HOPES THAT THEIR PRESENCE WILL ENSURE A FAIR, OPEN, AND SAFE BALLOTING PROCESS. APPROXIMATELY 200-300 WILL BE CIVILIAN POLICE ADVISERS WHO WILL ASSIST THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE FORCE (POLRI) IN MAINTAINING SECURITY AT APPROXIMATELY 200 POLLING CENTERS THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR. AUSTRALIA IS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE THE LARGEST SINGLE NATIONAL CONTINGENT OF POLICE ADVISORS, APPROXIMATELY 50-60. AUSTRALIA, GERMANY, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, PHILIPPINES, UK, AND THE US WILL SEND OFFICIALS TO MONITOR THE BALLOTING. THE DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE IS EXPECTED TO COST APPROXIMATELY $46 MILLION, WITH AUSTRALIA PLEDGING $20 MILLION AND PORTUGAL OFFERING $10 MILLION TO HELP DEFRAY THE COST. THE ARRIVAL OF UN OFFICIALS IN EAST TIMOR SHOULD BRING SOME RELIEF TO THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS AND THE MAIN ADVOCATE OF A UN PRESENCE. HOWEVER, ANY LARGE OR VISIBLE UN PRESENCE COULD FUEL RESENTMENT BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WHO OPPOSE ANY FOREIGN PRESENCE ON EAST TIMOR SOIL. DESPITE THEIR OBJECTION, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL DELIBERATELY ATTACK ANY UN PERSONNEL WITHOUT PROVOCATION. THEY MAY, HOWEVER, USE THE ARRIVAL OF UN PERSONNEL IN EAST TIMOR AS A PRETEXT TO INCREASE THEIR ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS AND SUPPORTERS. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(C) IRIAN JAYA: THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) WILL SOON RE-DECLARE THE BORDER ALONG PAPUA NEW GUINEA (PNG) A MILITARY OPERATION ZONE (DOM) FOLLOWING INCREASED REBEL ACTIVITY IN THE REGION OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS. THE AREA WAS A DOM PRIOR TO 1998, BUT THE DESIGNATION WAS LIFTED IN OCT 98 AS A GOOD-WILL GESTURE AND REFORM PROMISE BY TNI COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO. DESPITE THE LIFT, REPORTS OF GANGS HARASSING AND TERRORIZING PEOPLE LIVING ALONG THE BORDER AREA HAS INCREASED. IN THE LATEST INCIDENT, A 100-MAN GANG ATTACKED A VILLAGE IN THE ARSO DISTRICT, KILLING THREE LOCAL RESIDENTS, INJURING 3 OTHERS, AND TAKING 11 HOSTAGES. TNI IS PROBABLY REINSTATING THE DOM DESIGNATION IN AN EFFORT TO CURB THE GROWING SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN IRIAN JAYA, ESPECIALLY IN KNOWN REBEL TERRITORY ALONG THE PNG BORDER. REINSTATING THE DOM MAY UPSET LOCAL EMOTIONS AND HELP FUEL FURTHER UNREST IN THE REGION. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(C) JAKARTA: STUDENTS COMMEMORATED THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING WITH DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

12 MAY. REPORTING INDICATES UP TO 5,000 STUDENTS GATHERED AT THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS FOR A MEMORIAL SERVICE AND DEMONSTRATION. FROM THIS GROUP, APPROXIMATELY 1,500 STUDENTS MARCHED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE/PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (DPR/MPR) BUILDING LOCATED 2 MILES EAST OF THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED THEM FROM ENTERING THE DPR/MPR GROUNDS AND LOWERING THE INDONESIAN FLAG TO HALF MAST TO COMMEMORATE THE KILLINGS OF FOUR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. A SMALLER GROUP OF STUDENTS STAGED A SIMILAR PROTEST OUTSIDE THE DEFENSE MINISTRY BUILDING. NO DEATHS, INJURIES, OR ARRESTS WERE REPORTED FROM ALL THREE LOCATIONS. DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED DESPITE EARLIER REPORTING THAT THE 12 MAY TRISAKTI ANNIVERSARY DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD BE CANCELLED. THESE DEMONSTRATIONS WERE THE LARGEST SINCE THE 13 NOV 98 ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATIONS OF UP 50,000. THIS EVENT COULD BE THE PRELUDE TO FURTHER AND LARGER STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND POSSIBLE VIOLENCE, ESPECIALLY ON KEY ANNIVERSARY AND POLITICAL DATES. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS WILL LIKELY INCREASE AS THE NATIONAL ELECTION PERIOD APPROACHES, AND THEIR MAGNITUDE WILL BE INFLUENCED BY SECURITY FORCE REACTION AND THE OUTCOME OF THE DPR ELECTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. (KEYS ID)

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

*18MAY	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD COMMENCES
21MAY	INDONESIAN SCHOOLS DISMISSED FOR SUMMER RECESS
07JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
12JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
08AUG	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
29AUG	NEW MPR ANNOUNCES RESULTS OF EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13NOV	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
07DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT)

*DENOTES ADDITION (KEYS ID)

(U) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24
30 APR-06 MAY 99	24	9	14
07-13 MAY 99	28	8	16

(U)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA WILL REMAIN FRAGILE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, AND WILL LIKELY DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER AFTER THE 28 OCT MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD OPENING 18 MAY AND THE NATIONWIDE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES, ESPECIALLY ON KEY ANNIVERSARY AND POLITICAL DATES. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN MALUKU AND WEST KALIMANTAN, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR. ALTHOUGH THE EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE IS SET FOR 8 AUG AND UN OFFICIALS BEGAN ARRIVING IN DILI 7-8 MAY, PRO-INTEGRATION/PRO-INDEPENDENCE VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE AND MAY EVENTUALLY ESCALATE AFTER THE BALLOTING RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED 29 AUG. (OSA MULITIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

(U)

E. (C) INDONESIA - ELECTION SECURITY FOR FOR JAKARTA: AS OF 11 MAY, THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) SECURITY PLANS FOR THE 18 MAY - 4 JUNE ELECTION PERIOD IN JAKARTA CALLED FOR 62,000 TROOPS, CONSISTING OF:

- 12,000 TNI
- 8,000 POLICE
- 12,000 PEOPLE'S SECURITY FORCE (KNOWN AS KAMRA OR CIVILIAN MILITIA)
- 30,000 CIVIL DEFENSE FORCES (WANRA AND HANSIP) (KEYS ID)

(U)

(C) TNI TROOPS WILL INCLUDE PERSONNEL FROM THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE. THE KAMRA WERE RECRUITED FROM EXISITING CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS IN JAN-FEB 99 AND HAD A 3-WEEK TRAINING PROGRAM WHICH INCLUDED SHIELD AND BATON USE. WANRA ARE PART-TIME LOCAL MILITARY AUXILIARY PERSONNEL. HANSIP MAKE UP INDONESIA'S LARGE CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND ARE TYPICALLY USED IN ROUTINE CIVIL DEFENSE TASKS SUCH AS FIREFIGHTING, DISASTER DAMAGE CONTROL, AND NEIGHBORHOOD SECURITY. (KEYS ID)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

[redacted]

(U) APPROXIMATELY 30,000 ADDITIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL WERE SENT TO THE JAKARTA AREA FOR THE 10-13 NOV 98 PEOPLES' CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) SPECIAL SESSION. IN MAY 98, AN ESTIMATED 60,000 AUGMENTEES WERE CALLED IN TO RESTORE ORDER AFTER SUHARTO WAS REMOVED FROM POWER. (KEYS ID)

(S) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF SECURITY FORCES SLATED FOR JAKARTA IS FLEXIBLE AND WILL PROBABLY INCREASE. OF THE 62,000 CURRENTLY PLANNED, 60 PERCENT (37,000) ARE ORGANIC TO THE JAKARTA AREA; THE REMAINDER WILL BE BROUGHT IN FROM OTHER AREAS IN JAVA AND THE OUTER ISLANDS. OF THE 20,000 TNI AND POLICE PERSONNEL LISTED IN THE JAKARTA SECURITY PLAN, JICPAC ASSESSES 15,000 ARE ALREADY BASED IN THE JAKARTA AREA. (KEYS ID)

(S) TNI TROOPS ARE A MINORITY OF THE PLANNED SECURITY FORCE. THE CIVILIAN DEFENSE FORCES AND MILITIA, RELATIVELY UNTRAINED AND INDISCIPLINED, WILL PROBABLY EXACERBATE ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE. AT THE SAME TIME, THEIR LARGE AND VISIBLE PRESENCE WILL ALLOW THE TNI TO DEFLECT BLAME FOR ANY HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THE BULK OF UNREST WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE 20 JUN-12 JUL WHEN ELECTION RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

Non responsive

SECRET
NOFORN

[redacted]

NON Responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:
A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT
B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

---

14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)
16 MAY	BANGLADESH	(U) FARAKKA RESISTANCE DAY
17 MAY	NAURU	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
17 MAY	PAKISTAN	(U) ASHURA/MOHARRAM, ISLAMIC HOLIDAY
21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY

b(2)

[redacted]

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183299545
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990518
TOR: 144331
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905181100
MHFNO: 99 5499738
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCC #1722 1380520
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0287 1380523
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RHBCIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST ESSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Jan 2023
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

SECRET

ENCL 13

RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUHBANA T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RHMCUUU T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX

RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUHPPEL T ELEVENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW

SECRET

RHWISSJ T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 181100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
RUYNANI/COMUSMARFORK SEOUL KOR//G2//
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA138/18 MAY//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (U) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

~~SECRET~~

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

[redacted]

B. (C) INDONESIA - UNREST UPDATE

C. [redacted]

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

NOV responsive

(U)

B. (C) INDONESIA - UNREST UPDATE: GENERAL WIRANTO ARRIVED IN AMBON (0343S/12812E) 13 MAY TO SIGN A PEACE ACCORD TO END MONTHS OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN GROUPS. TWO DAYS LATER, INDONESIAN TROOPS FIRED ON BATTLING MOBS OF MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS KILLING AT LEAST SEVEN AND INJURING SIX. THE RIOT BEGAN AFTER AN ARGUMENT OVER WHO WOULD CARRY A TORCH DURING CELEBRATIONS IN HONOR OF A LOCAL HERO. IN DILI (0833S/12534E), HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE MARCHED THROUGH THE EAST TIMOR CAPITAL TO CALL AN END TO KILLINGS IN THE TROUBLED PROVINCE 15 MAY. ABOUT 40 PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAMEN ATTACKED A NEIGHBORHOOD 16 MAY KILLING FIVE AND SETTING FIRE TO 11 HOUSES. UN OFFICIALS AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL STAFF WERE NEARBY DINING WHEN THEY HEARD SHOTS. THEY WERE ESCORTED TO SAFETY BY INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES. (KEYS ID)

(S)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: DESPITE THE SIGNING OF A PEACE ACCORD AND MILITARY TROOP BUILD-UP SINCE MARCH, CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE LIKELY WILL CONTINUE IN AMBON. THE UNREST IN DILI WAS THE FIRST TIME UN OFFICIALS WITNESSED VIOLENCE SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL 2 WEEKS AGO. INTIMIDATION TACTICS BY MILITIA PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS WILL CONTINUE UP TO THE 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOT VOTE DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF UN OFFICIALS. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

NON responsive

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] Non Responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:
A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY
30 MAY	TAIWAN	(U) MEMORIAL DAY
01 JUN	PRC	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
01 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (FIRST OF 3 DAYS)
01 JUN	NEW ZEALAND	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (1ST MONDAY)
01 JUN	PALAU	(U) PRESIDENT'S DAY
02 JUN	BHUTAN	(U) CORONATION OF JIGME SINGHE WANGCHUK
02 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (SECOND OF 3 DAYS)
03 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION CONCLUDES
04 JUN	TONGA	(U) EMANCIPATION DAY
06 JUN	INDIA	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF OPERATION BLUE STAR (1984)
06 JUN	ROK	(U) MEMORIAL DAY/LOYALTY DAY
08 JUN	AUSTRALIA	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (2ND MONDAY)
09 JUN	CHINESE WORLD	(U) DRAGON BOAT FESTIVAL (S/S)

C. (U) FOREIGN VIP TRAVEL:

24-28 MAY	VIETNAM	(U) VIETNAMESE DEFENSE MINISTER TO VISIT RUSSIA
27-30 MAY	ROK	(U) PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG TO VISIT MOSCOW
30 MAY-01 JUN	ROK	(U) PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG TO VISIT ULAN BAATAR

5. (U) [redacted] b(3)

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN.
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183315319
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990521
TOR: 050959
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905211100
MHFNO: 99 5537504
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #0083 1410843
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0372 1410749
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RHBCIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 26 Feb 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~SECRET~~

ENCL (1)

MORI DocID: 1054604

RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUHBANA T FIRSTBN EIETH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX

RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHWISSK T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHLPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW

~~SECRET~~

RHWISSJ T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 211100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
RUYNANI/COMUSMARFORK SEOUL KOR//G2//
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA0141/21 MAY//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (U) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV) OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

[redacted]

(U) D. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 13-20 MAY 99

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE



NON Responsive

Non Responsive

SECRET

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE

(U) D. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 13-20 MAY 99: SEVERAL KEY POLITICAL EVENTSUNFOLDED THIS WEEK. FIRST, IN A COMPROMISE MOVE, GOLKAR NOMINATED CURRENTPRESIDENT HABIBIE AS ITS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. SECOND, THE ELECTIONCAMPAIGN PERIOD OFFICIALLY STARTED 18 MAY WITH ONLY MINOR VIOLENCEREPORTED. ON 19 MAY, THREE KEY OPPOSITION PARTIES, PDI-P, PAN, AND PKB, FORMED A COALITION TO CHALLENGE GOLKAR'S OLIGARCHY. REPORTING INDICATESTHAT HABIBIE IS CONSOLIDATING HIS POWER THROUGH ``MONEY'' POLITICS AND``BACK-ROOM DEALINGS'', WHILE OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE BEGINNING TO UNIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVENT A HABIBIE VICTORY. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIA'S ECONOMY IS SHOWING SOME MODEST SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT. THE JAKARTA STOCK EXCHANGE INDEX DISPLAYED SIGNS OF RENEWED VITALITY WITH INCREASED TRADING. DOMESTIC INTEREST RATES HAVE STEADILY DECLINED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, AS EVIDENCED BY THE RESULTS OF THE CENTRAL BANK'S WEEKLY AUCTION OF ONE-MONTH SBI'S TO BELOW 30 PERCENT. INFLATION IS SLOWLY DECREASING, ERASING FEARS OF POSSIBLE FOOD SHORTAGES AND PRICE RIOTS. NON-OIL EXPORT INCREASED BY 10% SINCE JAN 99. SEVERAL LARGE CORPORATE DEBTORS ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WERE MAKING PROGRESS IN THEIR DEBT RESTRUCTURING NEGOTIATIONS WITH FOREIGN CREDITORS. DESPITE THESE MODEST SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT, INDONESIA'S ECONOMY STILL REMAINS WEAK AND FRAGILE, AND COULD EASILY PLUNGE INTO CHAOS AGAIN. (SEE CHART). THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE U.S. DOLLAR IMPROVED SLIGHTLY TO RP 7,949/$1.00. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GEN SUBAGYO PRESIDED OVER THE REINAUGURATION OF THE OLD ``PATTIMURA'' REGIONAL COMMAND (KODAM XVI) IN THE MALUKUS 15 MAY. PATTIMURA IS THE FIRST OF 7 NEW MILITARY REGIONAL COMMANDS THAT WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY 2006, IN RESPONSE TO MOUNTING DEMANDS FOR TNI TO DEAL WITH SOCIAL UNREST AND THREATS TO NATIONAL STABILITY. THE ONLY OTHER NEW KODAM THAT SUBAGYO SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED WAS THE ``ISKANDAR MUDA'' KODAM IN BANDA ACEH. APPROXIMATELY 10,000 TROOPS REMAIN IN THE MALUKUS AND ARE EXPECTED TO STAY THROUGH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS TO HELP MAINTAIN ORDER. THE INAUGURATION OF NEW KODAMS SHOULD HELP THE TNI MANAGE THOSE REGIONS MORE EFFICIENTLY AND INDEPENDENTLY, WHILE ALLOWING THEM TO FOCUS THEIR ATTENTION ON VARIOUS SEPARATIST OR ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS ISSUES THAT ARE UNIQUE TO THAT PARTICULAR REGION. EXPECT SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR IRIAN JAYA, WEST KALIMANTAN, AND EAST TIMOR, IF THEIR INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT FAILS. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIA'S LEADING POLITICAL PARTY, GOLKAR, NOMINATED CURRENT PRESIDENT B.J. HABIBIE, AS ITS CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT DURING ITS 13-14 MAY CENTRAL BOARD NATIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING (RAPIM). GOLKAR MEMBERS ALSO CONSIDERED GENERAL WIRANTO, AKBAR TANDJUNG, SULTAN HAMENGKUBUWONO X,

AND GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA FOR PRESIDENT. IN A COMPROMISE PACKAGE DEAL, THE FOUR REMAINING CANDIDATES WERE NOMINATED FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT POSITION. REPORTING INDICATES THAT ``MONEY POLITICS'' AND ``BACK-ROOM DEALS'' WERE USED TO ASSURE HABIBIE'S NOMINATION FOR PRESIDENT. WHILE HABIBIE CONTROLS THE FLOW OF MONEY TO GOLKAR'S GRASS ROOTS LEVEL, HIS NOMINATION DOES NOT COME WITHOUT RISKS. HABIBIE IS VIEWED BY MANY AS A TRANSIENT PRESIDENT AND HIS CLOSE PERSONNEL TIES TO FORMER PRESIDENT SUHARTO WILL PORTRAY HIM AS REPRESENTING CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND NEPOTISM. GOLKAR, HOWEVER, BELIEVES HABIBIE IS THE BEST CANDIDATE TO FUNNEL MONEY TO THE PARTY'S PROVINCIAL LEADERS WHO ARE EXPECTED TO DELIVER A LARGE NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE UPCOMING 7 JUN ELECTIONS. MEANWHILE, ON 19 MAY, A PRO-REFORM COALITION WAS FORMED CONSISTING OF THREE OPPOSITION CANDIDATES AND PARTIES, NAMELY MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY-STRUGGLE (PDI-P), AMIEN RAIS OF THE NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN), AND ABDURRAHMAN WAHID OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB). THIS ALLIANCE WAS FORMED TO MAKE A COORDINATED CHALLENGE AGAINST THE STATUS-QUO FORCE OF GOLKAR. POLITICAL MANEUVERING, RHETORIC, AND VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY PICK-UP AS THE 18 MAY ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD BEGINS. (KEYS ID)

(C) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: ELECTION RELATED VIOLENCE CONTINUES IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E) WITH DEMONSTRATIONS AND STRIKES REMAINING ON THE LOW SIDE. HOWEVER, VIOLENCE CONTINUES TO BE REPORTED IN INDONESIA'S OUTLYING PROVINCES OF ACEH (0534N/09520E), EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E), AND AMBON (0343S/12812E). SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:

13 MAY DILI (0833S/12534E)/ A MARCH FOR PEACE LED BY BISHOP BELO OCCURRED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

13 MAY JAKARTA / CIVILIANS DEMONSTRATED COMMEMORATING THE 13 MAY 98 SEMANGGI INCIDENT.

14 MAY SURABAYA (0715S/11245E) / MEMBERS OF YOUTH ORGANIZATION TASK FORCE ATTENDED A RALLY AT GELORA STADIUM.

14 MAY BAUCAU (0835S/12630E)/ CLASHES BROKE OUT BETWEEN A LOCAL ARMY BATTALION AND A SPECIAL INDONESIAN FORCE (KOPASSUS) RESULTING IN TWO SERIOUSLY INJURED.

15 MAY AMBON / AT LEAST SEVEN KILLED IN A CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM CLASH WHEN SECURITY FORCES OPENED FIRE ON AN ANGRY MOB OF 200.

16 MAY JAKARTA / NAHDLATUL ULUMA PARTY (NU) MEMBERS CONDUCTED A PARADE THAT PASSED BY INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT (MPR/DPR).

17 MAY SIGLI, ACEH (0523N/09557E)/ RESIDENTS FROM THREE VILLAGES FLED THEIR HOMES FOLLOWING INTERROGATIONS BY THE MILITARY WHO WERE SEEKING A MISSING COLLEAGUE.

17 MAY DILI / PRO-INDONESIA MILITIA GROUPS LAUNCHED A NIGHT ATTACK IN A PRO-INDEPENDENCE NEIGHBORHOOD RESULTING IN SEVEN HOUSES TORCHED.

17 MAY ATARA (0858S/12524E)/ SEVEN PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND FOUR INJURED IN A CLASH BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATION SUPPORTERS.

17 MAY JAYAPURA (0232S/14042E)/ ENVIRONMENTALLY CONSCIOUS STUDENTS STAGED A DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF IRIAN JAYA PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL (DPRD).

18 MAY PEKALONGAN (0653S/10940E)/ A CLASH BETWEEN THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE IDENTIFIED AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) LEFT 14 HOMES BURNED DOWN AND AT LEAST 11 INJURED.

18 MAY SIGLI / RESIDENTS HELD A RALLY OUTSIDE A MOSQUE TO EXPRESS THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH A WRITTEN SECURITY GUARANTEE FROM THEIR DISTRICT.

19 MAY JAKARTA / THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE GATHERED IN THE INDONESIAN CAPITAL FOR THE FIRST OFFICIAL EVENT OF INDONESIA'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

19 MAY LHOKSEUMAWE / A MOLOTOV BOMB EXPLODED AT THE NORTH ACEH DISTRICT POLICE HEADQUARTERS INJURING THREE MEMBERS OF ANTI-RIOT STRIKE FORCE POLICE. (KEYS ID)

(S) THE DATE OF 18 MAY SIGNIFIES THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN ELECTION PERIOD FOR INDONESIA. THE COALITION OF POLITICAL PARTIES PDI-P, PKB, AND PAN WILL LIKELY REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF UNREST BETWEEN THE 3 POLITICAL PARTIES. CONTINUING VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR SUGGESTS TNI AND PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS ARE TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE 8 AUG BALLOT VOTE IN THEIR FAVOR. THE UNREST IN EAST TIMOR WILL CONTINUE. FINALLY, VIOLENCE IN AMBON AND ACEH WILL CONTINUE TO BE HARSHLY DEALT WITH BY INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI). (KEYS ID)

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(U) ACEH: OPPOSITION PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (AKA: GUS DUR) OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) ANNOUNCED 20 MAY THAT HE SUPPORTS AN AUTONOMY REFERENDUM FOR ACEH. HOWEVER, HE STATED IF GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REFERENDUM, ACEH WOULD CHOOSE TO REMAIN PART OF INDONESIA. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT COULD ADD FUEL TO THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN ACEH, WHILE GIVING HIM POLITICAL MILEAGE FOR SUPPORTING THE REFERENDUM. (KEYS ID)

(S) EAST TIMOR: PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES ARE CONTINUING OPERATIONS AIMED AT INTIMIDATION AROUND DILI. PRESS REPORTS INDICATED AN ATTACK BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS SOUTH OF DILI, FORCING RESIDENTS TO FLEE THE AREA. A GROUP CONSISTING OF UN AND NGO WORKERS HAD TO BE ESCORTED TO SAFETY BY POLICE AFTER BEING TRAPPED IN THE AREA. TNI AND PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS ARE DETERMINED TO INFLUENCE THE 8 AUG BALLOT IN THEIR FAVOR, WITH INDICATIONS EMERGING THEY MAY ATTEMPT TO DELAY OR STOP THE BALLOT IF AN AUTONOMY OUTCOME IS NOT LIKELY. THE MILITIAS REMAIN UNFETTERED BY SECURITY FORCES AND ARE FREE TO ACT AT WILL THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE, ESPECIALLY IN DILI. AS A RESULT, THE CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN EAST TIMOR IS NOT LIKELY TO IMPROVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. MEANWHILE, XANANA GUSMAO STATED THAT HE MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOUSE ARREST ONE DAY AFTER THE EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (8 AUG). (KEYS ID)

(C) JAKARTA: IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE UNREST RELATED TO THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD 18 MAY-4 JUN, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) WILL BE FOCUSING MOST OF ITS SECURITY EFFORTS IN JAKARTA. THEY NOW HAVE APPROXIMATELY 62,000 SECURITY PERSONNEL DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE CAPITAL. FROM THIS NUMBER, 12,000 COMES FROM TNI, 8,000 FROM POLRI, 12,000 FROM KAMRA (POLRI MILITIA), AND 30,000 FROM WANRA (TNI MILITIA) AND HANSIP (CIVIL DEFENSE FORCE). THEY WILL BE GUARDING THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, THE DPR/MPR BUILDING, THE DEFENSE MINISTRY BUILDING, MERDEKA SQUARE, MAJOR UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES, POLLING STATIONS, AND MAJOR ROADWAYS LEADING INTO JAKARTA. (KEYS ID)

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

18 MAY	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD COMMENCES
21 MAY	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF SUHARTO'S RESIGNATION
21 MAY	INDONESIAN SCHOOLS DISMISSED FOR SUMMER RECESS
07 JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26 JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)

~~SECRET~~

12 JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17 JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17 AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
08 AUG	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28 AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
29 AUG	NEW MPR ANNOUNCES RESULTS OF EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28 OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06 NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10 NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12 NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13 NOV	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
07 DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01 JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT) (KEYS ID)

(S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24
30 APR-06 MAY 99	24	9	14
07-13 MAY 99	28	8	16
14-20 MAY 99	22	8	11

(KEYS ID)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA WILL LIKELY REMAIN TENSE AND VOLATILE. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD NOW IN PROGRESS AND THE NATION-WIDE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, POLITICAL UNREST AND STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN MALUKU AND WEST KALIMANTAN, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR. IN EAST TIMOR, ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE ON A REGULAR BASIS, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF THE UN ADVANCE TEAM. THE CONTINUED ENVIRONMENT OF FEAR AND INTIMIDATION BY PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE MILITIAS WILL MAKE A FREE AND FAIR BALLOT ON 8 AUG INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. THE FREQUENCY AND LEVEL OF UNREST/VIOLENCE DURING THE NEXT SIX MONTHS WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, THE 8 AUG EAST TIMOR AUTONOMY REFERENDUM, AND THE 28 OCT MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. (OSA MULITIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

---

21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY
30 MAY	TAIWAN	(U) MEMORIAL DAY
01 JUN	PRC	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
01 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (FIRST OF 3 DAYS)
01 JUN	NEW ZEALAND	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (1ST MONDAY)
01 JUN	PALAU	(U) PRESIDENT'S DAY
02 JUN	BHUTAN	(U) CORONATION OF JIGME SINGHE WANGCHUK
02 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (SECOND OF 3 DAYS)
03 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION CONCLUDES
04 JUN	TONGA	(U) EMANCIPATION DAY
06 JUN	INDIA	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF OPERATION BLUE STAR (1984)
06 JUN	ROK	(U) MEMORIAL DAY/LOYALTY DAY
08 JUN	AUSTRALIA	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (2ND MONDAY)
09 JUN	CHINESE WORLD	(U) DRAGON BOAT FESTIVAL (5/5)
12 JUN	PHILIPPINES	(U) INDEPENDENCE DAY
12 JUN	SOLOMON ISLANDS	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (FRIDAY CLOSEST TO 14 JUN)
15 JUN	PAKISTAN	(U) ARREST OF MIR AMAL KANSI FOR MURDER OF CIA EMPLOYEES AT LANGLEY, VA (1997)
15 JUN	TUVALU	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY

[redacted]

Non responsive

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] NON responsive.

b(3)

[redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183315319
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990521
TOR: 050959
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905211100
MHFNO: 99 5537504
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #0083 1410843
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0372 1410749
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RHBCIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 26 Feb 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~SECRET~~

ENCL (1)

MORI DocID: 1054604

RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUHBANA T FIRSTBN EIETH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX

RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHWISSK T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHLPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW

~~SECRET~~

RHWISSJ T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 211100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
RUYNANI/COMUSMARFORK SEOUL KOR//G2//
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA0141/21 MAY//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (U) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV) OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

[redacted]

(U) D. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 13-20 MAY 99

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE



NON Responsive

Non Responsive

SECRET

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE

(U) D. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 13-20 MAY 99: SEVERAL KEY POLITICAL EVENTSUNFOLDED THIS WEEK. FIRST, IN A COMPROMISE MOVE, GOLKAR NOMINATED CURRENTPRESIDENT HABIBIE AS ITS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. SECOND, THE ELECTIONCAMPAIGN PERIOD OFFICIALLY STARTED 18 MAY WITH ONLY MINOR VIOLENCEREPORTED. ON 19 MAY, THREE KEY OPPOSITION PARTIES, PDI-P, PAN, AND PKB, FORMED A COALITION TO CHALLENGE GOLKAR'S OLIGARCHY. REPORTING INDICATESTHAT HABIBIE IS CONSOLIDATING HIS POWER THROUGH ``MONEY'' POLITICS AND``BACK-ROOM DEALINGS'', WHILE OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE BEGINNING TO UNIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVENT A HABIBIE VICTORY. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIA'S ECONOMY IS SHOWING SOME MODEST SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT. THE JAKARTA STOCK EXCHANGE INDEX DISPLAYED SIGNS OF RENEWED VITALITY WITH INCREASED TRADING. DOMESTIC INTEREST RATES HAVE STEADILY DECLINED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, AS EVIDENCED BY THE RESULTS OF THE CENTRAL BANK'S WEEKLY AUCTION OF ONE-MONTH SBI'S TO BELOW 30 PERCENT. INFLATION IS SLOWLY DECREASING, ERASING FEARS OF POSSIBLE FOOD SHORTAGES AND PRICE RIOTS. NON-OIL EXPORT INCREASED BY 10% SINCE JAN 99. SEVERAL LARGE CORPORATE DEBTORS ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WERE MAKING PROGRESS IN THEIR DEBT RESTRUCTURING NEGOTIATIONS WITH FOREIGN CREDITORS. DESPITE THESE MODEST SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT, INDONESIA'S ECONOMY STILL REMAINS WEAK AND FRAGILE, AND COULD EASILY PLUNGE INTO CHAOS AGAIN. (SEE CHART). THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE U.S. DOLLAR IMPROVED SLIGHTLY TO RP 7,949/$1.00. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GEN SUBAGYO PRESIDED OVER THE REINAUGURATION OF THE OLD ``PATTIMURA'' REGIONAL COMMAND (KODAM XVI) IN THE MALUKUS 15 MAY. PATTIMURA IS THE FIRST OF 7 NEW MILITARY REGIONAL COMMANDS THAT WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY 2006, IN RESPONSE TO MOUNTING DEMANDS FOR TNI TO DEAL WITH SOCIAL UNREST AND THREATS TO NATIONAL STABILITY. THE ONLY OTHER NEW KODAM THAT SUBAGYO SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED WAS THE ``ISKANDAR MUDA'' KODAM IN BANDA ACEH. APPROXIMATELY 10,000 TROOPS REMAIN IN THE MALUKUS AND ARE EXPECTED TO STAY THROUGH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS TO HELP MAINTAIN ORDER. THE INAUGURATION OF NEW KODAMS SHOULD HELP THE TNI MANAGE THOSE REGIONS MORE EFFICIENTLY AND INDEPENDENTLY, WHILE ALLOWING THEM TO FOCUS THEIR ATTENTION ON VARIOUS SEPARATIST OR ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS ISSUES THAT ARE UNIQUE TO THAT PARTICULAR REGION. EXPECT SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR IRIAN JAYA, WEST KALIMANTAN, AND EAST TIMOR, IF THEIR INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT FAILS. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIA'S LEADING POLITICAL PARTY, GOLKAR, NOMINATED CURRENT PRESIDENT B.J. HABIBIE, AS ITS CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT DURING ITS 13-14 MAY CENTRAL BOARD NATIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING (RAPIM). GOLKAR MEMBERS ALSO CONSIDERED GENERAL WIRANTO, AKBAR TANDJUNG, SULTAN HAMENGKUBUWONO X,

AND GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA FOR PRESIDENT. IN A COMPROMISE PACKAGE DEAL, THE FOUR REMAINING CANDIDATES WERE NOMINATED FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT POSITION. REPORTING INDICATES THAT ``MONEY POLITICS'' AND ``BACK-ROOM DEALS'' WERE USED TO ASSURE HABIBIE'S NOMINATION FOR PRESIDENT. WHILE HABIBIE CONTROLS THE FLOW OF MONEY TO GOLKAR'S GRASS ROOTS LEVEL, HIS NOMINATION DOES NOT COME WITHOUT RISKS. HABIBIE IS VIEWED BY MANY AS A TRANSIENT PRESIDENT AND HIS CLOSE PERSONNEL TIES TO FORMER PRESIDENT SUHARTO WILL PORTRAY HIM AS REPRESENTING CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND NEPOTISM. GOLKAR, HOWEVER, BELIEVES HABIBIE IS THE BEST CANDIDATE TO FUNNEL MONEY TO THE PARTY'S PROVINCIAL LEADERS WHO ARE EXPECTED TO DELIVER A LARGE NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE UPCOMING 7 JUN ELECTIONS. MEANWHILE, ON 19 MAY, A PRO-REFORM COALITION WAS FORMED CONSISTING OF THREE OPPOSITION CANDIDATES AND PARTIES, NAMELY MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY-STRUGGLE (PDI-P), AMIEN RAIS OF THE NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN), AND ABDURRAHMAN WAHID OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB). THIS ALLIANCE WAS FORMED TO MAKE A COORDINATED CHALLENGE AGAINST THE STATUS-QUO FORCE OF GOLKAR. POLITICAL MANEUVERING, RHETORIC, AND VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY PICK-UP AS THE 18 MAY ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD BEGINS. (KEYS ID)

(C) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: ELECTION RELATED VIOLENCE CONTINUES IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E) WITH DEMONSTRATIONS AND STRIKES REMAINING ON THE LOW SIDE. HOWEVER, VIOLENCE CONTINUES TO BE REPORTED IN INDONESIA'S OUTLYING PROVINCES OF ACEH (0534N/09520E), EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E), AND AMBON (0343S/12812E). SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:

13 MAY DILI (0833S/12534E)/ A MARCH FOR PEACE LED BY BISHOP BELO OCCURRED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

13 MAY JAKARTA / CIVILIANS DEMONSTRATED COMMEMORATING THE 13 MAY 98 SEMANGGI INCIDENT.

14 MAY SURABAYA (0715S/11245E) / MEMBERS OF YOUTH ORGANIZATION TASK FORCE ATTENDED A RALLY AT GELORA STADIUM.

14 MAY BAUCAU (0835S/12630E)/ CLASHES BROKE OUT BETWEEN A LOCAL ARMY BATTALION AND A SPECIAL INDONESIAN FORCE (KOPASSUS) RESULTING IN TWO SERIOUSLY INJURED.

15 MAY AMBON / AT LEAST SEVEN KILLED IN A CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM CLASH WHEN SECURITY FORCES OPENED FIRE ON AN ANGRY MOB OF 200.

16 MAY JAKARTA / NAHDLATUL ULUMA PARTY (NU) MEMBERS CONDUCTED A PARADE THAT PASSED BY INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT (MPR/DPR).

17 MAY SIGLI, ACEH (0523N/09557E)/ RESIDENTS FROM THREE VILLAGES FLED THEIR HOMES FOLLOWING INTERROGATIONS BY THE MILITARY WHO WERE SEEKING A MISSING COLLEAGUE.

17 MAY DILI / PRO-INDONESIA MILITIA GROUPS LAUNCHED A NIGHT ATTACK IN A PRO-INDEPENDENCE NEIGHBORHOOD RESULTING IN SEVEN HOUSES TORCHED.

17 MAY ATARA (0858S/12524E)/ SEVEN PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND FOUR INJURED IN A CLASH BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATION SUPPORTERS.

17 MAY JAYAPURA (0232S/14042E)/ ENVIRONMENTALLY CONSCIOUS STUDENTS STAGED A DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF IRIAN JAYA PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL (DPRD).

18 MAY PEKALONGAN (0653S/10940E)/ A CLASH BETWEEN THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE IDENTIFIED AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) LEFT 14 HOMES BURNED DOWN AND AT LEAST 11 INJURED.

18 MAY SIGLI / RESIDENTS HELD A RALLY OUTSIDE A MOSQUE TO EXPRESS THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH A WRITTEN SECURITY GUARANTEE FROM THEIR DISTRICT.

19 MAY JAKARTA / THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE GATHERED IN THE INDONESIAN CAPITAL FOR THE FIRST OFFICIAL EVENT OF INDONESIA'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

19 MAY LHOKSEUMAWE / A MOLOTOV BOMB EXPLODED AT THE NORTH ACEH DISTRICT POLICE HEADQUARTERS INJURING THREE MEMBERS OF ANTI-RIOT STRIKE FORCE POLICE. (KEYS ID)

(S) THE DATE OF 18 MAY SIGNIFIES THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN ELECTION PERIOD FOR INDONESIA. THE COALITION OF POLITICAL PARTIES PDI-P, PKB, AND PAN WILL LIKELY REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF UNREST BETWEEN THE 3 POLITICAL PARTIES. CONTINUING VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR SUGGESTS TNI AND PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS ARE TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE 8 AUG BALLOT VOTE IN THEIR FAVOR. THE UNREST IN EAST TIMOR WILL CONTINUE. FINALLY, VIOLENCE IN AMBON AND ACEH WILL CONTINUE TO BE HARSHLY DEALT WITH BY INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI). (KEYS ID)

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(U) ACEH: OPPOSITION PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (AKA: GUS DUR) OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) ANNOUNCED 20 MAY THAT HE SUPPORTS AN AUTONOMY REFERENDUM FOR ACEH. HOWEVER, HE STATED IF GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REFERENDUM, ACEH WOULD CHOOSE TO REMAIN PART OF INDONESIA. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT COULD ADD FUEL TO THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN ACEH, WHILE GIVING HIM POLITICAL MILEAGE FOR SUPPORTING THE REFERENDUM. (KEYS ID)

(S) EAST TIMOR: PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES ARE CONTINUING OPERATIONS AIMED AT INTIMIDATION AROUND DILI. PRESS REPORTS INDICATED AN ATTACK BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS SOUTH OF DILI, FORCING RESIDENTS TO FLEE THE AREA. A GROUP CONSISTING OF UN AND NGO WORKERS HAD TO BE ESCORTED TO SAFETY BY POLICE AFTER BEING TRAPPED IN THE AREA. TNI AND PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS ARE DETERMINED TO INFLUENCE THE 8 AUG BALLOT IN THEIR FAVOR, WITH INDICATIONS EMERGING THEY MAY ATTEMPT TO DELAY OR STOP THE BALLOT IF AN AUTONOMY OUTCOME IS NOT LIKELY. THE MILITIAS REMAIN UNFETTERED BY SECURITY FORCES AND ARE FREE TO ACT AT WILL THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE, ESPECIALLY IN DILI. AS A RESULT, THE CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN EAST TIMOR IS NOT LIKELY TO IMPROVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. MEANWHILE, XANANA GUSMAO STATED THAT HE MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOUSE ARREST ONE DAY AFTER THE EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (8 AUG). (KEYS ID)

(C) JAKARTA: IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE UNREST RELATED TO THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD 18 MAY-4 JUN, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) WILL BE FOCUSING MOST OF ITS SECURITY EFFORTS IN JAKARTA. THEY NOW HAVE APPROXIMATELY 62,000 SECURITY PERSONNEL DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE CAPITAL. FROM THIS NUMBER, 12,000 COMES FROM TNI, 8,000 FROM POLRI, 12,000 FROM KAMRA (POLRI MILITIA), AND 30,000 FROM WANRA (TNI MILITIA) AND HANSIP (CIVIL DEFENSE FORCE). THEY WILL BE GUARDING THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, THE DPR/MPR BUILDING, THE DEFENSE MINISTRY BUILDING, MERDEKA SQUARE, MAJOR UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES, POLLING STATIONS, AND MAJOR ROADWAYS LEADING INTO JAKARTA. (KEYS ID)

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

18 MAY	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD COMMENCES
21 MAY	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF SUHARTO'S RESIGNATION
21 MAY	INDONESIAN SCHOOLS DISMISSED FOR SUMMER RECESS
07 JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26 JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)

~~SECRET~~

12 JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17 JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17 AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
08 AUG	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28 AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
29 AUG	NEW MPR ANNOUNCES RESULTS OF EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28 OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06 NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10 NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12 NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13 NOV	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
07 DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01 JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT) (KEYS ID)

(S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24
30 APR-06 MAY 99	24	9	14
07-13 MAY 99	28	8	16
14-20 MAY 99	22	8	11

(KEYS ID)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA WILL LIKELY REMAIN TENSE AND VOLATILE. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD NOW IN PROGRESS AND THE NATION-WIDE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, POLITICAL UNREST AND STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN MALUKU AND WEST KALIMANTAN, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR. IN EAST TIMOR, ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE ON A REGULAR BASIS, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF THE UN ADVANCE TEAM. THE CONTINUED ENVIRONMENT OF FEAR AND INTIMIDATION BY PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE MILITIAS WILL MAKE A FREE AND FAIR BALLOT ON 8 AUG INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. THE FREQUENCY AND LEVEL OF UNREST/VIOLENCE DURING THE NEXT SIX MONTHS WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, THE 8 AUG EAST TIMOR AUTONOMY REFERENDUM, AND THE 28 OCT MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. (OSA MULITIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

---

21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY
30 MAY	TAIWAN	(U) MEMORIAL DAY
01 JUN	PRC	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
01 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (FIRST OF 3 DAYS)
01 JUN	NEW ZEALAND	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (1ST MONDAY)
01 JUN	PALAU	(U) PRESIDENT'S DAY
02 JUN	BHUTAN	(U) CORONATION OF JIGME SINGHE WANGCHUK
02 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (SECOND OF 3 DAYS)
03 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION CONCLUDES
04 JUN	TONGA	(U) EMANCIPATION DAY
06 JUN	INDIA	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF OPERATION BLUE STAR (1984)
06 JUN	ROK	(U) MEMORIAL DAY/LOYALTY DAY
08 JUN	AUSTRALIA	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (2ND MONDAY)
09 JUN	CHINESE WORLD	(U) DRAGON BOAT FESTIVAL (5/5)
12 JUN	PHILIPPINES	(U) INDEPENDENCE DAY
12 JUN	SOLOMON ISLANDS	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (FRIDAY CLOSEST TO 14 JUN)
15 JUN	PAKISTAN	(U) ARREST OF MIR AMAL KANSI FOR MURDER OF CIA EMPLOYEES AT LANGLEY, VA (1997)
15 JUN	TUVALU	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY

[redacted]

Non responsive

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] NON responsive.

b(3)

[redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

MORI DocID: 1054666

~~Top Secret~~ TIER

CIAPASS SEIB 99-118CX

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

The SEIB must be returned to CIA within 5 working days

Saturday, 22 May 1999

National Security Information

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Reproduction of this Document Prohibited

Readership is limited to those on approved reader list on file with CIA SEIB Control Officer. The undersigned hereby acknowledge reading this document.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2004

****** EYES ONLY ******

MORI DocID: 1054666

Table of Contents

Leading Development

Indonesia: Militia Terrorism Intensifying in East Timor 1

2

3

5

7

8

9

10

11

MORI DocID: 1054666

Top Secret

[redacted]

Leading Development

Indonesia: **Militia Terrorism Intensifying in East Timor (S NF)**

[redacted] that prointegration militias are holding more than 35,000 East Timorese in several camps with inadequate food, water, shelter, and medical care. [redacted] some camps are located at military installations, ***suggesting Army collusion.***

— Most of those in the camps are women and children fleeing violence in their villages, and a number are family members of independence supporters. Some women claim they have been sexually assaulted.

— [redacted] prointegrationists say these forced evacuations are a prelude to "cleansing" operations directed against independence supporters. [redacted]

The US defense attache says the armed forces appear to have only limited control over the more aggressive militias, ***whose violent attacks are undermining Jakarta's commitment to the safety of UN officials in the province.*** [redacted] that he saw one militia unit last week attack houses in Dili within sight of UN Mission members and journalists; the military arrived 50 minutes later and did not intervene.

— [redacted] Foreign Minister Alatas this month said he tried to dissuade the leader of one of the more violent militias from targeting UN personnel but admitted his attempt "guarantees nothing." [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Top Secret
22 May 1999

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183299545
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990518
TOR: 144331
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905181100
MHFNO: 99 5499738
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCC #1722 1380520
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0287 1380523
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RHBCIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST ESSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Jan 2023
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

SECRET

ENCL 13

RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUHBANA T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RHMCUUU T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX

RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUHPPEL T ELEVENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW

SECRET

RHWISSJ T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 181100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
RUYNANI/COMUSMARFORK SEOUL KOR//G2//
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA138/18 MAY//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (U) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

~~SECRET~~

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

[redacted]

B. (C) INDONESIA - UNREST UPDATE

C. [redacted]

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

NOV responsive

(U)

B. (C) INDONESIA - UNREST UPDATE: GENERAL WIRANTO ARRIVED IN AMBON (0343S/12812E) 13 MAY TO SIGN A PEACE ACCORD TO END MONTHS OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN GROUPS. TWO DAYS LATER, INDONESIAN TROOPS FIRED ON BATTLING MOBS OF MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS KILLING AT LEAST SEVEN AND INJURING SIX. THE RIOT BEGAN AFTER AN ARGUMENT OVER WHO WOULD CARRY A TORCH DURING CELEBRATIONS IN HONOR OF A LOCAL HERO. IN DILI (0833S/12534E), HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE MARCHED THROUGH THE EAST TIMOR CAPITAL TO CALL AN END TO KILLINGS IN THE TROUBLED PROVINCE 15 MAY. ABOUT 40 PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAMEN ATTACKED A NEIGHBORHOOD 16 MAY KILLING FIVE AND SETTING FIRE TO 11 HOUSES. UN OFFICIALS AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL STAFF WERE NEARBY DINING WHEN THEY HEARD SHOTS. THEY WERE ESCORTED TO SAFETY BY INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES. (KEYS ID)

(S)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: DESPITE THE SIGNING OF A PEACE ACCORD AND MILITARY TROOP BUILD-UP SINCE MARCH, CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE LIKELY WILL CONTINUE IN AMBON. THE UNREST IN DILI WAS THE FIRST TIME UN OFFICIALS WITNESSED VIOLENCE SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL 2 WEEKS AGO. INTIMIDATION TACTICS BY MILITIA PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS WILL CONTINUE UP TO THE 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOT VOTE DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF UN OFFICIALS. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

NON responsive

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] Non Responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:
A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY
30 MAY	TAIWAN	(U) MEMORIAL DAY
01 JUN	PRC	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
01 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (FIRST OF 3 DAYS)
01 JUN	NEW ZEALAND	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (1ST MONDAY)
01 JUN	PALAU	(U) PRESIDENT'S DAY
02 JUN	BHUTAN	(U) CORONATION OF JIGME SINGHE WANGCHUK
02 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (SECOND OF 3 DAYS)
03 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION CONCLUDES
04 JUN	TONGA	(U) EMANCIPATION DAY
06 JUN	INDIA	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF OPERATION BLUE STAR (1984)
06 JUN	ROK	(U) MEMORIAL DAY/LOYALTY DAY
08 JUN	AUSTRALIA	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (2ND MONDAY)
09 JUN	CHINESE WORLD	(U) DRAGON BOAT FESTIVAL (S/S)

C. (U) FOREIGN VIP TRAVEL:

24-28 MAY	VIETNAM	(U) VIETNAMESE DEFENSE MINISTER TO VISIT RUSSIA
27-30 MAY	ROK	(U) PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG TO VISIT MOSCOW
30 MAY-01 JUN	ROK	(U) PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG TO VISIT ULAN BAATAR

5. (U) [redacted] b(3)

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN.
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT 2/2



Responsive

Non-Responsive

[redacted]

RMKS/ITEM 1: (U) INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION UPDATE
A. (U) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ON POTENTIAL THREATS
(1) (U) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH; NEW COMMUNAL VIOLENCE POSSIBLE ELSEWHERE IN INDONESIA

Non-Responsive [redacted]



1. (U) INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION UPDATE:

A. (U) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ON POTENTIAL THREATS:

(1) (C) INDONESIA: THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN EAST TIMOR CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE IN THE WAKE OF THE 17 APR ATTACK BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS IN DILI, THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, IN WHICH AT LEAST 12 PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS WERE KILLED, AND OVER 50 ARE REPORTED MISSING. CALLS BY FOREIGN DIPLOMATS ON THE SCENE FOR THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (TNI) TO CONTROL THE AGGRESSIVE MILITIAS HAVE BEEN REBUFFED. FOREIGN CONDEMNATIONS TO THE MOUNTING VIOLENCE COULD HARDEN ANTI-WESTERN ATTITUDES IN TNI AGAINST ANY INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN EAST TIMOR.




Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive



(2) DUE TO ETHNIC/SEPARATIST/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE, AVOID

Non-Responsive

IRIAN JAYA, EAST TIMOR AND NORTHERN SUMATRA (ACEH), AND OTHER AREAS OF OCCASIONAL UNREST, SUCH AS THE WEST KALIMANTAN AREA, AREAS OF SULAWESI AND THE CENTRAL MALUKU ISLANDS. COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN VARIOUS AREAS COULD BE A COLLATERAL THREAT, PARTICULARLY IN OUTLYING AREAS. AN ON-GOING ELECTRICITY BLACKOUT IS CAUSING A RISE IN CRIME ON MADURA ISLAND AND PERSONNEL SHOULD EXERCISE GREATER PRECAUTIONS PARTICULARLY DURING DARKNESS. A MANDATORY TWO PERSON POLICY REMAINS FOR IRIAN JAYA.

(3) MAINTAIN HEIGHTENED AWARENESS AND PRECAUTIONS WHILE IN-COUNTRY. BE PARTICULARLY CAUTIOUS IN ETHNIC CHINESE AREAS, NEAR GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND COLLEGE CAMPUSES, AND OUTSIDE MAJOR CITIES. ETHNIC CHINESE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY CAREFUL GIVEN ANTI-ETHNIC CHINESE ATTITUDES OF MANY RIOTERS. ALL TRAVELERS TO INDONESIA SHOULD STAY IN LARGER TOWNS AND AVOID REMOTE VILLAGES.




Non-Responsive

CONFIDENTIAL

C48

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT_ID: 183340093
DOCNO: 002590
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990525
TOR: 230010
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199905260254
MHFNO: 99 5591222
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI7219
OO RUEHZS RUEHC
DE RUEHJA #2590/01 1460254
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 260254Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7962
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1156
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1037
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5093
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0220
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3276
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0060
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2240
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1165
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0298
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0445
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0066
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0378
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002590

ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/09

TEXT
TAGS: PHUM, PREF, PINS, PTER, PGOV, PREL, ID, PO, UN
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: XANANA DISCUSSES CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS.

REFS: (A) JAKARTA 2559, (B) JAKARTA 2506, (C) JAKARTA 2442

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION MICHAEL P. OWENS, REASON: 1.5(D)

UNCLASSIFIED

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

2. (C) SUMMARY: EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO REVIEWED PREPARATIONS FOR A "DARE II" RECONCILIATION MEETING WITH JAKARTA DIPLOMATS MAY 25, INDICATING INTER ALIA THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO A JAKARTA VENUE FOR THE GATHERING AND THAT PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS DID NOT OPPOSE PARTICIPATION BY RAMOS HORTA OR OTHER OVERSEAS EAST TIMORESE LEADERS. AS ONE OF ITS GOALS, DARE II SHOULD FOCUS ON PROMOTING A FULLY FUNCTIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY COMMISSION FOR EAST TIMOR. THE LATTER BODY HAS THUS FAR BEEN INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE, GIVEN THE ONGOING THREATS TO THEIR SECURITY. DISCUSSING HIS OWN SITUATION, XANANA INSISTED HE WOULD NOT GO OVERSEAS IF HE WERE RELEASED BEFORE THE AUGUST EAST TIMOR CONSULTATION. RATHER, HE WOULD RETURN TO THE PROVINCE TO ENCOURAGE RECONCILIATION. THERE IS STILL TIME, IN XANANA'S VIEW, TO CREATE CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO A FREE AND FAIR AUGUST CONSULTATION, BUT ALL EAST TIMORESE WILL HAVE TO AGREE TO DISARM IF THIS IS TO HAPPEN. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER REPORTS THAT CIVILIAN LEADERS OF THE MILITIAS WERE LOSING CONTGROL, WITH THE MILITIAS INCREASINGLY DIRECTED BY THE TNI. END SUMMARY.

3. (SBU) RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO MET ON MAY 25 WITH DIPLOMATS FROM THE SIX COUNTRIES PRESIDENT HABIBIE INVITED TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A UN-BROKERED SETTLEMENT IN EAST TIMOR (REF A). AUSTRALIAN, UK, AND PHILIPPINE AMBASSADORS WERE PRESENT, ALONG WITH GERMAN, JAPANESE, AND U.S. DCMS.

DARE II PREPARATIONS

4. (C) XANANA WELCOMED THE SIX DIPLOMATS, SAYING THAT THEIR JOINT CALL UNDERSCORED INTERNATIONAL CONCERN FOR EAST TIMOR'S PLIGHT AND THE DESIRE OF FRIENDLY NATIONS TO HELP RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS THERE. IN RESPONSE TO INITIAL QUESTIONS, HE MADE SEVERAL POINTS REGARDING PREPARATIONS FOR A "DARE II" MEETING OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE EAST TIMOR DISPUTE, AS RECENTLY PROPOSED BY THE PROVINCE'S TWO CATHOLIC BISHOPS (REF B):

-- LOCATION: ALTHOUGH HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED HOLDING THE MEETING IN AUSTRALIA, AS ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED BY THE BISHOPS, XANANA HAD NO PROBLEM WITH A JAKARTA VENUE. HE PLEDGED THE RESISTANCE WOULD DO EVERYTHING IT COULD TO ENSURE INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS DID NOT MOUNT DEMONSTRATIONS OR OTHER ACTIONS THAT COULD IMPEDE THE PROCEEDINGS.

-- PARTICIPANTS: THE BISHOPS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPILING THE PROPOSED PARTICIPANTS LIST (WHOSE INCLUSION OF RAMOS HORTA AND OTHER OVERSEAS TIMORESE FIGURES HAS DRAWN GOI OPPOSITION). THEY ARE NOW REVIEWING IT, ACCORDING TO XANANA, IN LIGHT OF THE GOI REACTION. ON THE OTHER HAND, XANANA SAID, PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS SUCH AS THE EAST TIMOR PEOPLE'S FRONT (BRTT) AND THE FORUM FOR UNITY AND JUSTICE (FPDK) ARE AMENABLE TO PARTICIPATION BY THE OVERSEAS LEADERS. HE ADDED THAT THE CNRT AND PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS WOULD ISSUE JOINT STATEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT FOLLOWING SEPARATE BILATERAL MEETINGS HE WOULD BE HOLDING WITH THEM LATER THIS WEEK AND EARLY NEXT WEEK. AS FOR THE GOI STANCE ON PARTICIPATION, XANANA RECALLED INFORMATION MINISTER YUNUS HAD

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

INDICATED DURING THEIR MAY 22 MEETING THAT THE GOI WOULD NOT OBJECT TO RAMOS HORTA'S COMING INTO THE COUNTRY AT THE TIME OF A DARI II MEETING, AND THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS HAD NOT SAID ANYTHING ABOUT IT DURING HIS MAY 24 PRESS REMARKS ON THE DARE II MEETING.

-- TIMING: XANANA BELIEVED DARE II SHOULD BE HELD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SCHEDULE IT BEFORE THE JUNE 7 INDONESIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. ALTHOUGH JUNE 14 WAS NOW RECEIVING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION IN THE MEDIA AS A LIKELY START-UP DATE, XANANA THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE MEETING COULD BEGIN ON JUNE 10.

-- FINANCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT: ALTHOUGH THE GOI WOULD HAVE TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN FINANCING THE MEETING, XANANA HOPED THE "GROUP OF SIX" COUNTRIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE AS WELL. HE ENVISAGED A PRINCIPAL ROLE FOR THE UN IN ORGANIZING THE MEETING AND PRESIDING OVER ITS DELIBERATIONS. THE BISHOPS, HE SAID, WOULD PLAY A "MEDIATING ROLE." LATER IN THE DISCUSSION, XANANA SEEMED TO TAKE ON BOARD COMMENTS BY THE UK AND AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADORS CAUTIONING AGAINST EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE BISHOPS' ROLE AT DARI II, WHICH THEY NOTED MIGHT DELAY AN EARLY CONVENING OF THE CONFERENCE. XANANA NOTED IN THIS REGARD THAT IN A RECENT LETTER TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL HE HAD STRESSED THE BISHOPS' CONTINUING IMPORTANCE IN THE DARE PROCESS, WHILE ASKING THAT THE UN LEND A HAND IN GETTING IT OFF THE GROUND.

-- AGENDA: FROM CNRT'S PERSPECTIVE, DARE II COULD MAKE A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION BY PROVIDING A BETTER IDEA OF PRECISELY WHAT IT IS THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS ARE AFTER. XANANA EXPECTED, HOWEVER, THAT AT LEAST SOME PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE FROM THE FPDK, WOULD USE THE OCCASION TO ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES TO ACCEPT AUTONOMY, WHILE FOREGOING THE UN CONSULTATION PROCESS. THIS SAID, XANANA THOUGHT THE AGENDA SHOULD FOCUS ON (1) THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION VIEWED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; (2) DEFINING THE ROLES OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES IN THE CONSULTATION PROCESS, INCLUDING THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ITS OUTCOME; AND (3) DISCUSSING GUARANTEES TO BE GIVEN TO BOTH SIDES REGARDING THEIR STATUS AND SAFETY, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS, PROVIDED THE UN CERTIFIES IT TO HAVE BEEN FREE AND FAIR. THE OVERALL OUTCOME OF THE DARE II DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN A FINAL DOCUMENT, SIGNED BY ALL OF THE PARTICIPANTS AND THE UN REPRESENTATIVES WHO TOOK PART IN THE PROCEEDINGS.

PEACE AND SECURITY COMMISSION
---

5. (C) XANANA READILY AGREED THAT DARE II SHOULD HAVE AS A FURTHER GOAL PROMOTING A FULLY FUNCTIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY COMMISSION (PSC). REFERRING TO HIS MEETING LATE LAST WEEK WITH NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (KOMNASHAM) MEMBERS, XANANA RECALLED HE HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF RESTORING SECURITY IN EAST TIMOR TO LEVELS AT LEAST APPROXIMATING THOSE PREVAILING BEFORE THE EARLY APRIL LIQUICA MASSACRE. IN THE WAKE OF RECENT

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

MILITIA ATTACKS, VIRTUALLY ALL PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS HAVE EITHER FLED THE PROVINCE OR ARE IN HIDING. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS CLEARLY NO WAY THAT THE CNRT COULD PARTICIPATE IN PSC DELIBERATIONS. NONETHELESS, XANANA PLEDGED CNRT WOULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THAT BODY WHEN IT COULD DO SO SAFELY.

6. (C) ADDRESSING THE COMPOSITION OF THE PSC, XANANA RECALLED KOMNASHAM HAD INSISTED THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (TNI) BE REPRESENTED ON THE PSC, ALONG WITH THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE. XANANA SAID HE HAD ARGUED THAT TNI SHOULD NOT HAVE A SEAT AT THIS TABLE BECAUSE THE POLICE WERE TO TAKE OVER THE MAJOR SECURITY ROLE IN EAST TIMOR. MOREOVER, HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE MAIN PLAYERS ON THE COMMISSION SHOULD BE THE EAST TIMORESE CONTENDING PARTIES, RATHER THAN OUTSIDE ELEMENTS. IN THE END, HOWEVER, HE HAD AGREED TO TNI REPRESENTATION, SO LONG AS FALINTIL WAS GIVEN A SEAT AS WELL, ALONG WITH REPRESENTATION FOR GOI OFFICIALS. OTHER REPRESENTATIVES WOULD INCLUDE CNRT AND PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS FPDK AND BRTT.

XANANA'S STATUS
---

7. (C) XANANA INSISTED HE HAD NO INTENTION OF GOING ABROAD IF HE WERE RELEASED FROM DETENTION PRIOR TO THE AUGUST UN-SUPERVISED CONSULTATION. THE GOI HAD OFFERED HIM THIS OPTION ON MANY PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, HE SAID, AND HE HAD ALWAYS TURNED THEM DOWN. INSTEAD, XANANA SAID HE INTENDED TO RETURN TO EAST TIMOR IF HE HAD THE CHANCE. RECALLING HIS MEETING WITH MUHAMMAD YUNUS, XANANA SAID THE MINISTER HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT XANANA WOULD EITHER HEAD INTO THE HILLS TO REVIVE THE ARMED REBELLION OR "EXCITE" THE LOCAL POPULATION BY STAGING MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS. XANANA SAID HE HAD TOLD YUNUS HE WOULD DO NEITHER. WHY WOULD HE PROMOTE ANOTHER REBELLION? TIMORESE HAD TAKEN UP ARMS TO PRESS THEIR DEMANDS THAT THEY BE ABLE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE. THEY HAD ALREADY WON THEIR FIGHT, ASSUMING A UN-FACILITATED CONSULTATION TAKES PLACE. SIMILARLY, XANANA SAID, THE CNRT HAD NO INTEREST IN HEIGHTENING TENSIONS IN EAST TIMOR BY HOLDING LARGE DEMONSTRATIONS. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A CALM ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH PEOPLE COULD MULL THEIR FUTURES AND DECIDE WHETHER THEY WANTED INDEPENDENCE OR AN ONGOING RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA. XANANA REITERATED THAT HIS OWN SITUATION SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO HOLDING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAID HE DID BELIEVE HE COULD PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IN ENSURING A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE EAST TIMORESE PROBLEM. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE CONSULTATIONS, XANANA INSISTED HE COULD ACCEPT THE RESULTS, SO LONG AS THE UN CERTIFIED THEY REFLECTED THE WILL OF THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE. THIS APPLIED WHETHER HE WAS UNDER DETENTION OR NOT, XANANA SAID. TOWARD THE END OF THE MEETING, XANANA CAUTIONED THAT HIS SUPPORTERS IN EAST TIMOR MIGHT BEGIN TO MOUNT DEMONSTRATIONS DEMANDING HIS RELEASE IF SECURITY CONDITIONS PERMITTED.

IMPACT OF INTIMIDATION; NEED FOR DISARMAMENT

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

8. (C) ASKED WHETHER ONGOING MILITIA ATTACKS ARE UNDERMINING HIS CONFIDENCE THAT THE TIMORESE WOULD INDEED SUPPORT INDEPENDENCE AT THE END OF THE DAY, XANANA TEMPORIZED. "NORMAL" LEVELS OF INTIMIDATION, SUCH AS THOSE EXPERIENCED OVER MUCH OF THE LAST TEN YEARS, WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE AVERAGE TIMORESE'S DESIRE TO BE ABLE TO DETERMINE HIS OWN FATE, HE SAID. THEY HAD BEEN FIGHTING FOR THIS RIGHT FOR OVER 23 YEARS, AND HAD OFTEN APPEARED TO BE BEATEN INTO SUBMISSION. YET THEY ALWAYS MANAGED TO RENEW THE STRUGGLE, NO MATTER THE ODDS. THE LAST FEW MONTHS, THOUGH, HAD BROKEN NEW GROUND ON THE INTIMIDATION FRONT. EAST TIMOR HAD NEVER EXPERIENCED SUCH FREQUENT ATTACKS ON HELPLESS CIVILIANS AND HARASSMENT AND EVEN MASSACRES OF ITS PRO-INDEPENDENCE PARTISANS. THAT IS WHY, HE SAID, THE RESISTANCE IS WILLING TO LAY DOWN ITS OWN ARMS, PROVIDED NO TIMORESE BE ALLOWED TO CARRY ARMS ANYWHERE IN THE PROVINCE. THIS WOULD INCLUDE TIMORESE SERVING IN THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES, SINCE THEY TOO CAN BE INCITED TO VIOLENCE, GIVEN CURRENT STRESS LEVELS IN THE PROVINCE. ASKED WHETHER TIMORESE SERVING WITH THE INDONESIAN POLICE NEEDED TO BE DISARMED, XANANA INDICATED POLICE OFFICERS COULD CONTINUE TO CARRY ARMS IN VIEW OF THEIR ROLE UNDER THE UN AGREEMENT TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER.

POWER SHARING
---

9. (C) XANANA HOPED PRO-AUTONOMY GROUPS WOULD BEGIN TO CONSIDER POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS PRIOR TO THE DARE II MEETING, SINCE SUCH CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE AN IMPORTANT PART OF THAT MEETING'S AGENDA. DARE II MUST ARRIVE AT GUARANTEES FOR ALL GROUPS, WHICH WOULD APPLY TO THE PERIOD AFTER THE CONSULTATION AS WELL AS TO THE MONTHS LEADING UP TO THE ACTUAL BALLOTING. RECALLING THAT HE HAD BEEN LOOKING AT POSSIBLE PRECEDENTS, SUCH AS THOSE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S EXPERIENCE, XANANA STRESSED THAT RECONCILIATION NEEDS TO TAKE PLACE AT THE GRASS-ROOTS LEVEL IF IT IS EVER TO BE EFFECTIVE. IDEALLY, DARE II SUCCESSES CAN BE SOCIALIZED SO THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE REALIZES THAT INTIMIDATION CAN NEVER SUCCEED IN FORMING A LASTING CONSENSUS.

10. (C) REAL POWER-SHARING WILL BE NECESSARY FOR AT LEAST FIVE YEARS AFTER THE UN CONSULTATION, XANANA SAID, ESPECIALLY IF THE OUTCOME IS FOR INDEPENDENCE. EAST TIMOR, SIMPLY PUT, IS NOT YET READY TO "PLAY THE DEMOCRATIC GAME." IN FACT, IT COULD BE 10 YEARS BEFORE PEOPLE ARE PREPARED FOR FULLY REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE VARIOUS POLITICAL FORCES NEED TO AGREE TO SHARE POWER. (THE BRTT, HE SAID, IS ALREADY THINKING ALONG THESE LINES, AND HAS TOLD THE CNRT IT INTENDS TO BECOME TIMOR'S SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AT SOME POINT.)

11. (C) ASSUMING THAT EAST TIMOR RECEIVES INDEPENDENCE, XANANA ENVISAGED HOLDING ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY, ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE WOULD FIRST WANT TO DISCUSS THE ACTUAL MODALITIES WITH THE UN. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS WOULD FOLLOW AT SOME POINT, BUT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

FOR RECONCILIATION TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE EAST TIMOR ACTUALLY MOVED INTO A "WINNER-TAKE-ALL" FORM OF DEMOCRACY.

12.(C) IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-CONSULTATION PHASE, XANANA THOUGHT IT WOULD BE VITAL TO CUSHION THE LETDOWN FOR THE LOSERS (AGAIN ASSUMING A PRO-INDEPENDENCE OUTCOME) SO THAT THEY WOULD NOT HARBOR HARD FEELINGS TOWARD THE WINNING SIDE. IT WAS THUS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT, HE SAID, THAT THE CURRENT LEVELS OF VIOLENCE BE REDUCED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. OTHERWISE, IT WOULD BE IMMEASURABLY MORE DIFFICULT TO REASSURE THE LOSERS THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AT RISK IN AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR. IN SHORT, WHAT WAS NEEDED NOW WAS DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, WHICH NEEDED TO START AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. RECENT REPORTS FROM VARIOUS PRO-AUTONOMY REPRESENTATIVES, ESPECIALLY FROM WITHIN THE FDPK, WERE THUS DOUBLY WORRISOME, SINCE THEY INDICATED THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP OF THESE GROUPS WAS LOSING CONTROL OVER THE MILITIAS, WHO NOW WERE INCREASINGLY DIRECTED BY ARMY ELEMENTS.

BOTTOM LINE
---

13. (C) XANANA THOUGHT THERE WAS STILL TIME BEFORE AUGUST 8 TO CREATE CONDITIONS THAT WOULD PERMIT A FREE AND FAIR CONSULTATION PROCESS. KEY TO THIS OUTCOME, HOWEVER, WOULD BE SUCCESS AT DARE II IN REACHING A WORKABLE DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT. ALL OF THE OTHER ISSUES CAN BE RESOLVED, HE SAID, IF ALL EAST TIMORESE AGREE TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS. ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C49

DOCUMENT_ID: 183342140
DOCNO: 002607
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990526
TOR: 062617
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199905261021
MHFNO: 99 5594976
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI9124
OO RUEHZS RUEHC
DE RUEHJA #2607/01 1461021
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261021Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7978
INFO RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1041
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1160
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5097
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2244
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0224
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3280
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0382
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0302
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002607

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/05

TEXT
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, PINS, PTER, MOPS, ID
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 26, 1999

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: A POLITICAL OFFICER IN DILI HAS NEW REPORTS OF MILITIA KILLINGS AND DISPLACEMENT OF PEOPLE IN LIQUICA, WEST OF DILI. LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN THE CAPITAL APPEAR TO BE TRYING TO CREATE A FALSE IMAGE OF POLITICAL PARTY CAMPAIGN FEVER IN THE RUN-UP TO THE JUNE 7 NATIONAL

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

ELECTIONS. CLAIMS OF MORE THAN 80 PERCENT VOTER REGISTRATION ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE GIVEN THE DEPLORABLE SECURITY SITUATION OBTAINING OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. IN A MESSAGE TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, IMPRISONED EAST TIMORESE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO HAS URGED THE UN TO ASSIST IN ADVANCING RECONCILIATION AMONG EAST TIMORESE. WITHOUT PROGRESS TOWARD RECONCILIATION, XANANA SAID, HE WAS "PROFOUNDLY SKEPTICAL REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MAY 5 AGREEMENT. HE EXPRESSED FEAR THAT WITHOUT UN INVOLVEMENT IN BRINGING ABOUT A RECONCILIATION PROCESS, "THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES WILL CONTINUE POSTPONING IT IN AN ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE AUTONOMY." END SUMMARY

NEWLY REPORTED INCIDENTS

3. (U) POLOFF, IN DILI, REPORTS THAT ON MAY 16, ACCORDING TO A RELIABLE NGO SOURCE, MILITIA ATTACKED THE VILLAGE OF ASSUMANO IN LIQUICA DISTRICT. THEY KILLED THREE FARMERS AND FORCED THE OTHER 170 INHABITANTS OF THE VILLAGE TO FLEE TO THE NEIGHBORING VILLAGE OF LEOREMA.

4. (U) POLOFF ALSO REPORTS THAT MILITIA KILLED ONE MAN IN LIQUICA TOWN ON MAY 25. (NFI)

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN DILI

5. (SBU) POLOFF REPORTS THAT THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES APPEAR TO BE ATTEMPTING TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION OF LIVELY PRE-NATIONAL ELECTION POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN DILI FOR EXPAT JOURNALISTS AND UN OFFICIALS. SMALL CONVOYS OF VEHICLES CARRYING MOSTLY CHILDREN DECKED OUT IN THE COLORS AND SYMBOLS OF VARIOUS MAJOR PARTIES HAVE BEEN TOURING IN THE CITY CENTER. (DAO COMMENT: THIS IS THE EXACT SAME THING THAT IS HAPPENING IN JAKARTA. IT APPEARS THAT ALMOST 30 PERCENT OF CAMPAIGN PARTICIPANTS ARE BELOW THE VOTING AGE, WHICH IS 17, FOR ALL THE POLITICAL PARTIES. END DAO COMMENT) EVEN PARTIES SUCH AS THE ISLAMIC PPP WHICH HAD MINIMAL SUPPORT IN THE 1997 ELECTIONS, ALONG WITH OTHER ISLAMIC PARTIES -- AN ODDITY IN HEAVILY CHRISTIAN EAST TIMOR -- ARE REPRESENTED. MOREOVER, CLAIMS BY THE AUTHORITIES 387,000 OUT OF 462,000 ELIGIBLE VOTERS HAVE REGISTERED FOR THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION APPEAR UNTRUE. THE MILITIA-TERROR WHICH HAS DISRUPTED LIFE IN EAST TIMOR FOR SEVERAL MONTHS ALMOST CERTAINLY PREVENTED ANY REGISTRATION PROCESS IN VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS.

XANANA MESSAGE TO UNSYG

6. (SBU) POST HAS RECEIVED A COPY OF A LETTER FROM IMPRISONED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO TO UNSYG KOFI ANNAN. EXCERPTS FOLLOW:

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

-- I BELIEVE THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS IS CRUCIAL AND THE SOLE BASIS UPON WHICH WE CAN CREATE THE NECESSARY ATMOSPHERE FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE UN ASSISTANCE MISSION TO EAST TIMOR (UNAMET).

-- IT IS NECESSARY TO RECONCILE AT TWO DISTINCT LEVELS, I.E., AT THE LEADERSHIP AND GRASS ROOTS LEVELS, TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE.

-- DESPITE THE LIQUICA AND DILI MASSACRES (APRIL 6 AND APRIL 17-18), I HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH MAJOR PLAYERS OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION SIDE. ... THEY MUST BE REASSURED ABOUT THEIR RIGHTS IN THE FUTURE BUT ALSO (WE) MUST REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THEM ABOUT POWER SHARING.

-- A CODE OF CONDUCT MUST BE SIGNED (IN WHICH) ALL SIGNATORIES WOULD STATE THEIR WILL AND COMMITMENT TO MUTUALLY RESPECT THE RIGHT TO LIFE, POLITICAL RIGHTS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND OTHER BASIC RIGHTS IRRESPECTIVE OF THE OUTCOME OF THE CONSULTATION PROCESS.

-- I BELIEVE THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS SHOULD BE LONG-LASTING (AND) IT MUST HAVE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE EAST TIMORESE LEADERS IN DIASPORA WHO WILL HAVE A LEADING ROLE TO PLAY IN THE FUTURE AND WITH WHOM POWER WILL BE SHARED.

-- THE REASONS UNDERLYING THE CHOICE OF A COUNTRY OTHER THAN INDONESIA OR EAST TIMOR (FOR THE DARE II CONFERENCE) ARE THE NEED FOR PARTICIPANTS TO BE FREE FORM ANY "THIRD PARTY" INFLUENCE OR LINKS THUS ENABLING A MUCH NEEDED FRANK AND SINCERE DIALOGUE.

-- (HE DESCRIBED A RECENT MEETING WITH MINISTER OF INFORMATION YUNUS YOSFIAH IN WHICH THE MINISTER SAID THAT THERE WAS NO GOI OBJECTION TO PARTICIPATION OF EAST TIMORESE DIASPORA MEMBERS IN A MEETING. THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS CONTRADICTED THIS POSITION, CLAIMING THAT A "GROUP OF MINISTERS HAD MET AND DECIDED AGAINST ISSUING AUTHORIZATION FOR THEM TO ENTER INDONESIA.)

-- I REMAIN PROFOUNDLY SKEPTICAL AS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW YORK AGREEMENT WITHOUT A GENUINE RECONCILIATION AMONG EAST TIMORESE. OTHER STEPS OR STAGES, SUCH AS DISARMAMENT AND THE SETTING UP OF AN OPERATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION WILL NOT BE ENDURING OR CONSOLIDATED.
-- I THEREFORE WISH TO PROPOSE TO YOU, EXCELLENCY, THAT THE UN RESUME ITS FACILITATOR ROLE AND GUIDE THIS RECONCILIATION PROCESS, IN PARTICULAR THE HOLDING OF THE DARE II MEETING. I FURTHER SUGGEST THAT THIS ROLE BE SIMILAR TO THAT THE UN PLAYED WITH THE AIETD (ALL INCLUSIVE EAST TIMORESE DIALOGUE) MEETINGS. WITHOUT UN INVOLVEMENT IN THIS MEETING, THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES WILL CONTINUE POSTPONING IT (DARE II AND THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

RECONCILIATION PROCESS) IN AN ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE AUTONOMY.

THE AUTONOMY-INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN

7. (U) POLOFF HAS HEARD IN DILI THAT THE DATE TO BEGIN CAMPAIGNING OVER THE QUESTION OF AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY SET BY THE UN AS JULY 22.
ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT 2/2



Responsive

Non-Responsive

[redacted]

RMKS/ITEM 1: (U) INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION UPDATE
A. (U) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ON POTENTIAL THREATS
(1) (U) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH; NEW COMMUNAL VIOLENCE POSSIBLE ELSEWHERE IN INDONESIA

Non-Responsive [redacted]



1. (U) INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION UPDATE:

A. (U) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ON POTENTIAL THREATS:

(1) (C) INDONESIA: THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN EAST TIMOR CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE IN THE WAKE OF THE 17 APR ATTACK BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS IN DILI, THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, IN WHICH AT LEAST 12 PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS WERE KILLED, AND OVER 50 ARE REPORTED MISSING. CALLS BY FOREIGN DIPLOMATS ON THE SCENE FOR THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (TNI) TO CONTROL THE AGGRESSIVE MILITIAS HAVE BEEN REBUFFED. FOREIGN CONDEMNATIONS TO THE MOUNTING VIOLENCE COULD HARDEN ANTI-WESTERN ATTITUDES IN TNI AGAINST ANY INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN EAST TIMOR.




Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive



(2) DUE TO ETHNIC/SEPARATIST/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE, AVOID

Non-Responsive

IRIAN JAYA, EAST TIMOR AND NORTHERN SUMATRA (ACEH), AND OTHER AREAS OF OCCASIONAL UNREST, SUCH AS THE WEST KALIMANTAN AREA, AREAS OF SULAWESI AND THE CENTRAL MALUKU ISLANDS. COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN VARIOUS AREAS COULD BE A COLLATERAL THREAT, PARTICULARLY IN OUTLYING AREAS. AN ON-GOING ELECTRICITY BLACKOUT IS CAUSING A RISE IN CRIME ON MADURA ISLAND AND PERSONNEL SHOULD EXERCISE GREATER PRECAUTIONS PARTICULARLY DURING DARKNESS. A MANDATORY TWO PERSON POLICY REMAINS FOR IRIAN JAYA.

(3) MAINTAIN HEIGHTENED AWARENESS AND PRECAUTIONS WHILE IN-COUNTRY. BE PARTICULARLY CAUTIOUS IN ETHNIC CHINESE AREAS, NEAR GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND COLLEGE CAMPUSES, AND OUTSIDE MAJOR CITIES. ETHNIC CHINESE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY CAREFUL GIVEN ANTI-ETHNIC CHINESE ATTITUDES OF MANY RIOTERS. ALL TRAVELERS TO INDONESIA SHOULD STAY IN LARGER TOWNS AND AVOID REMOTE VILLAGES.




Non-Responsive

UNCLASSIFIED

R11

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W		

----------A02076 080241Z /38

P 261025Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5702
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000379

C O R R E C T E D COPY//PARA MARKINGS//

USCINCPAC FOR HONOLULU HI

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: BUMPY RIDE FOR THE POLITICAL BILLS; THOUGH FOCUS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

JAKARTA 01 OF 02 379

PAGE 02 JAKART 00379 01 OF 02 080240Z
STILL ON JANUARY 28 PASSAGE

REF: A) JAKARTA 327; B) JAKARTA 6582

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (U) SUMMARY: THE ISLAMIC PARTY "PPP" REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN FORMAL DELIBERATIONS OF THE PARLIAMENT'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE (PANSUS) ON THE POLITICAL BILLS ON JANUARY 25, APPARENTLY FEARING THAT IT WOULD BE FORCED INTO A VOTE THAT IT COULD NOT WIN ON SEVERAL OUTSTANDING CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. CLOSED DOOR NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE MAJOR PLAYERS CONTINUED, HOWEVER. AMIEN RAIS ACCOMPANIED BY SEVERAL HUNDRED MEMBERS OF HIS NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN) HELD A "DIALOGUE" WITH MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT ON JANUARY 25 AT WHICH HE RAISED CONCERNS ABOUT THE THREE MAJOR OUTSTANDING CONTENTIOUS ISSUES -- THE NUMBER OF APPOINTED MILITARY SEATS IN THE DPR, THE TYPE OF ELECTION SYSTEM TO BE USED, AND THE POLITICAL ROLE OF CIVIL SERVANTS -- AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE ON THE FUTURE ELECTION COMMISSION AND "MONEY POLITICS." HE URGED THAT MILITARY MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT BE NON-VOTING AND THAT APPOINTED MILITARY MEMBERS OF PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS BE REMOVED. THE MANDATE OF AN ELEVEN-MEMBER TEAM OF MOSTLY INDEPENDENT FIGURES THAT REPORTEDLY WILL HELP OVERSEE THE PREPARATION OF THE NEW ELECTION COMMISSION IS UNCLEAR. THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER TOLD THE PRESS THAT THIS TEAM WOULD NOT DETERMINE WHICH PARTIES WERE ELIGIBLE TO

RELEASED IN FULL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 MAR 2007 200503302

02D 052,2

UNCLASSIFIED

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION, BUT WOULD SIMPLY "GIVE ADVICE," WITH THE GOVERNMENT MAKING THE DECISION ABOUT WHAT PARTIES MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION. END SUMMARY

PPP EXPRESSES ITS DISPLEASURE WITH POLITICAL BILLS

3. (U) THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) WAS SET TO RESUME ITS FORMAL DELIBERATION OF THE POLITICAL BILLS IN THE "SPECIAL COMMITTEE" (PANSUS) ON JANUARY 25, BUT WAS FORCED TO PUT OFF THE SESSION AFTER THE ISLAMIC "UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY" (PPP) MEMBERS REFUSED TO ENTER THE MEETING ROOM. ACCORDING TO ONE PPP MP QUOTED IN THE INDONESIAN LANGUAGE DAILY KOMPAS, PPP DID NOT WANT TO ENTER BECAUSE IT FEARED THAT A VOTE WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE PANSUS ON THE OUTSTANDING CONTENTIOUS ISSUES, AND IT DID NOT WANT TO BEAR ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OUTCOME OF THIS VOTE. WHILE PPP MEMBERS ASSERTED PUBLICLY THAT THIS MOVE HAD THE BLESSING OF PARTY LEADER HAMZAH HAZ, THEY ALSO WERE CAREFUL TO INSIST THAT PPP HAD NOT CARRIED OUT A "WALK OUT" BECAUSE THEY HAD NEVER ENTERED THE ROOM. THE PANSUS MEETING WAS QUICKLY ADJOURNED, BUT WAS FOLLOWED BY A CLOSED MEETING OF THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS LT. GENERAL SYARWAN HAMID, AND DPR FACTION LEADERS (INCLUDING PPP FACTION LEADERS).

AMIEN RAIS AND PARTY RAISE CONCERNS AT THE PARLIAMENT

4. (U) AS ANTICIPATED (REFTEL), AMIEN RAIS LED A DELEGATION OF SEVERAL HUNDRED NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN) MEMBERS TO PARLIAMENT ON JANUARY 25 TO RAISE CONCERNS ABOUT THE PENDING POLITICAL BILLS. SOURCES IN THE DPR HAVE DESCRIBED IT TO US AS A "DIALOGUE," RATHER THAN A DEMONSTRATION. THE GROUP WAS RECEIVED BY MEMBERS OF THE PANSUS, INCLUDING THE CHAIRMAN ABU HASAN SADZIL (GOLKAR) AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ABRI, INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI, GOVERNMENT FACTION) AND UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY.

5. (U) RAIS AND HIS GROUP FOCUSSED ON THE THREE OUTSTANDING CONTENTIOUS ISSUES (REFTEL) -- THE NUMBER OF APPOINTED SEATS IN THE DPR, THE BASIS OF THE ELECTION SYSTEM, AND THE POLITICAL ROLE OF CIVIL SERVANTS -- AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE ON THE ELECTION COMMISSION AND "MONEY POLITICS."

-- ABRI IN THE DPR: PAN CONTENDED THAT ABRI SHOULD RECEIVE NO MORE THAT 15 APPOINTED SEATS IN THE DPR, AND THAT THESE MEMBERS SHOULD NOT HAVE VOTING RIGHTS BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT ELECTED. THE PARTY ARGUED THAT ABRI SHOULD RECEIVE NO APPOINTED SEATS IN THE PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEVEL LEGISLATURES.

-- NEUTRALITY OF CIVIL SERVANTS: PAN URGED THAT A SEPARATE GOVERNMENT REGULATION MANDATING THE NEUTRALITY OF CIVIL SERVANTS BE ISSUED PRIOR TO PASSAGE OF THE POLITICAL LAWS. (NOTE: ACCORDING PRESS REPORTS, IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THIS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT AS EARLY AS SOON AS JANUARY 26)

-- ELECTION SYSTEM TO BE USED: PAN URGED THAT A PROPORTIONAL ELECTION SYSTEM BE BASED ON PROVINCES (PPP

JAKARTA 02 OF 02 379

STILL ON JANUARY 28 PASSAGE

POSITION) RATHER THAN THE REGENCIES (GOLKAR/ABRI POSITION) BE USED.

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

-- GOVERNMENT ROLE ON ELECTION COMMISSION: PAN INSISTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SERVE ONLY AS A FACILITATOR OF THE ELECTION AND THAT THE ELECTION PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE IN CHARGE. THIS IS IN CONTRAST TO THE CURRENT PLAN THAT ENVISAGES THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PARTIES SHARING AN EQUAL ROLE ON THE NEW ELECTION COMMISSION.

-- MONEY POLITICS: PAN URGED THAT TOUGH SANCTIONS BE PUT INTO EFFECT TO COMBAT THE USE OF MONEY TO INFLUENCE THE ELECTION.

5. (U) RAIS WAS QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS SAYING THAT "IF THE HOUSE REFUSES TO INSERT OUR RECOMMENDATION INTO THE POLITICAL BILLS, THAT MEANS WE ARE DEFEATED POLITICALLY, BUT PEOPLE WILL KNOW THAT WE WON A MORAL VICTORY."

FORMATION OF ELEVEN-MEMBER ELECTION TEAM
---

6. (U) AS REPORTED REFTEL A, THE GOVERNMENT IS FORMING AN ELEVEN-MEMBER TEAM WHOSE MANDATE WILL BE RELATED TO THE FORMATION OF THE NEW ELECTION COMMISSION TO BE ESTABLISHED BY THE POLITICAL LAWS. A MEMBER OF THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY'S GROUP THAT DRAFTED THE GOVERNMENT'S VERSION OF THE POLITICAL LAWS WAS REPORTED WIDELY IN THE PRESS ON JANUARY 25 AS SIGNALLING THAT THE TEAM'S MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY WOULD BE TO DETERMINE WHICH POLITICAL PARTIES MET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE UPCOMING ELECTION (ONLY SUCH PARTIES CAN BECOME MEMBERS OF THE PERMANENT NEW ELECTION COMMISSION.) NUMEROUS PROMINENT, INDEPENDENT FIGURES WERE FLOATED IN THE PRESS AS TEAM MEMBERS, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS MULYA LUBIS AND ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION, FORMER HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBER MIRIAM BUDIARDJO, MUSLIM INTELLECTUAL NURCHOLIS MADJID, FORMER SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANDI ANDOYO, INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE LEADER MULYANAH KUSUMAH, NGO LEADER KASTORIUS SINAGA, ACADEMIC AFFAN GAFAR (PART OF GOVERNMENT TEAM THAT DRAFTED LAWS), ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM STUDENTS LEADER ANA URBANINGRUM, AND UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA STUDENT LEADER RAMA PRATMA.

7. (U) SEVERAL OF THESE INDIVIDUALS HAVE CONFIRMED TO US THAT THEY WILL BE MEMBERS OF THE TEAM. THEIR MANDATE, HOWEVER, REMAINS UNCLEAR. HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER SYARWAN HAMID WAS QUOTED PUBLICLY BY THE JANUARY 26 INDONESIAN OBSERVER AS SAYING THAT "THE TEAM (OF ELEVEN) HAS NOT AUTHORITY TO DECIDE WHICH POLITICAL PARTIES WILL BE PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTION. IT WILL MERELY GIVE ADVICE ABOUT WHICH OF THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES FULFILL (ELECTION) REQUIREMENTS STATED IN THE POLITICAL LAWS NOW BEING DISCUSSED BY THE PARLIAMENT...THE GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE THE FINAL DECISIONS."
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001W
----------9E616A 081411Z /38
O 031033Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5878

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000544

OFFICIAL INFORMAL - FOR EAP/PIMBS D. HARTWICK FROM DCM M. OWENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/09
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL JAKARTA TO PIMBS NO. 20

JAKARTA 01 OF 02 544

1. CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL P. OWENS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) UN PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR

[redacted] HE SAYS THAT IN FACT B1
HIS "HOME OFFICE" HAS BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO EAST TIMOR RECENTLY. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT UNHCR INVOLVEMENT MAY BE TRIGGERED IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE BY AN OUTFLOW OF REFUGEES (I.E., FROM THE STATE OF EAST TIMOR TO THE STATE OF INDONESIA). MOREOVER, UNHCR DOES GIVE CONSIDERATION TO DISPLACED PERSONS WITHIN STATES AND UNHCR IS AWARE OF RELIABLE REPORTS OF SOME THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED AS A RESULT OF RECENT UNREST IN EAST TIMOR. SEPARATELY, WE HAVE ALSO TALKED WITH [redacted] WHO SHARES OUR CONCERN B1, B6
THAT FURTHER DETERIORATION OF THE SECURITY CONDITION AS WELL AS FOOD, WATER AND MEDICAL NEEDS COULD WARRANT CONSIDERATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION. [redacted] IS PARTICULARLY B1
CONCERNED ABOUT THE WEEK-LONG CLOSING OF THE DILI CIVILIAN HOSPITAL (SINCE JANUARY 27.) [redacted] BELIEVES THE CLOSING WAS FOR B1
POLITICAL AS WELL AS SECURITY REASONS. (THIS MATTER DID NOT B1, B6
ARISE IN POL'S DISCUSSION FEBRUARY 2 WITH [redacted])
OUR INTERLOCUTORS AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL (UN AND OTHER) PRESENCE COULD HAVE A CALMING/REASSURING EFFECT. MOREOVER, IN THE EVENT THAT THERE IS A TRANSITION IN EAST TIMOR'S POLITICAL STATUS, THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN LAYING SOME OF THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE INEVITABLE NEW HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS WHICH WILL FOLLOW.

3. (C) INFORMAL INTERAGENCY ON EAST TIMOR

WE WOULD SUGGEST DISCUSSION OF THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

-- WE ARE GETTING CONFLICTING SIGNALS ON HOW THE EAST TIMORESE WILL BE "CONSULTED" REGARDING THEIR ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION OF THE AUTONOMY OFFER. DEPLU SEEMS TO BE INDICATING THAT JUNE ELECTIONS FOR THE LOCAL ASSEMBLY IN EAST TIMOR COULD BE SEEN AS A SORT OF SELF-DETERMINATION EXERCISE (ALATAS STILL SEEMS DEAD SET AGAINST A REFERENDUM). OBVIOUSLY FOR THIS TO HAVE ANY VALIDITY XANANA AND THE VARIOUS EAST TIMORESE PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO PARTICIPATE IN A FREE AND FAIR PROCESS, A BIG ORDER GIVEN THE SHORT TIME FRAME. WE NEED TO PUSH THE GOI TO ESTABLISH, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, A CLEAR PROCESS WHICH CAN BE APPROVED BY ALL THE MAJOR PLAYERS. IF THE UN PROCESS IS TO REMAIN RELEVANT, THE REAL EAST TIMORESE LEADERS WILL HAVE TO BE BROUGHT IN MORE DIRECTLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AT THE END OF THE DAY, THE REALITY MAY SIMPLY BE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 2 FEB 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAR 2007 200503302

UNCLASSIFIED

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

THAT NEITHER JAKARTA NOR THE EAST TIMORESE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE THE KIND OF COMPROMISES THAT WOULD GIVE AUTONOMY A CHANCE. MINDSETS IN DILI AND JAKARTA ARE HARDENING FAST. MANY OBSERVERS BELIEVE INDEPENDENCE IS A DONE DEAL.

-- THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR IS MURKY BUT MOST AGREE (INCLUDING DEPLU, IT APPEARS, [redacted] REMARKS BEFORE THE HABIBIE MEETING TODAY) THAT ABRI'S ARMING OF CIVILIANS IS A MAJOR PROBLEM. AS YET WE HAVE NO REACTIONS FROM OUR DEMARCHES ON THIS ISSUE, ALTHOUGH WIRANTO'S DENIAL THAT ARMING OF RATIH ELEMENTS IS TAKING PLACE AT LEAST SHOWS THAT HE IS NOW AWARE OF THE CONCERN OVER THIS ISSUE. IT MAY ULTIMATELY BE HARDER TO CONVINCE ABRI TO STOP ARMING AND START DISARMING NOW THAT WIRANTO HAS TAKEN SO DISINGENUOUS A POSITION. XANANA HAS PROPOSED A CEASEFIRE ON THE PART OF THE GUERRILLAS ALONG WITH A MORATORIUM ON PRO-REFERENDUM DEMONSTRATIONS IN EXCHANGE FOR DISARMING THE CIVILIAN MILITIAS. THIS WOULD GIVE ABRI SOME FACE. B1

-- THE RECENT CONFLICTS HAVE CREATED A POTENTIAL HUMANITARIAN CRISIS. BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ICRC, THE PRESENCE OF UNHCR AND/OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES COULD PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IN REDUCING ABUSES. WE MAY NEED TO BEGIN THINKING ABOUT THE SHAPE OF AND PARTICIPANTS IN AN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION. QUIET CONSULTATIONS AND PLANNING SEEM TO BE IN ORDER AT THIS STAGE. GOI REACTION IS HARD TO ANTICIPATE: WHILE RESIDUAL RESISTANCE TO INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN EAST TIMOR MAY BE A FACTOR, THE DESIRE TO END THE FINANCIAL OUTLAYS AND DESIRE TO BE SEEN TO BE DOING THE RIGHT THING MIGHT OVERRIDE THIS.

4. (U) FREE, FAIR AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS

WE THINK THAT YOU HAVE MADE A VERY GOOD BEGINNING ON THE DIFFICULT QUESTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A FREE, FAIR AND CREDIBLE ELECTION. AT THIS EARLY STAGE, WE STILL HAVE NOT HAD A CHANCE TO COME UP WITH WHAT WE WOULD REGARD AS A COMPLETE ANSWER, BUT HERE ARE SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS THAT MOST INDONESIANS WILL REGARD AS KEY, SOME OF WHICH ELABORATE UPON WHAT YOU HAVE ALREADY LISTED.

PRE-ELECTION

-- DOES ABRI REFRAIN FROM INTERFERING IN THE ELECTION? (E.G. MOBILIZING VOTERS FOR A PARTICULAR PARTY

****
* Missing section 2 *
****

GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO HOLD EITHER NATIONAL OR PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS IN EAST TIMOR IS PROBLEMATIC.) THERE ARE OTHER IMPORTANT PROBLEMS: E.G., HOW TO PROVIDE FOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE PARTIES TO FORM, CAMPAIGN, AND PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS. THE INDONESIANS RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEM, BUT THEIR THINKING HAS NOT YET JELLED ON THE RIGHT SOLUTION.

-- PRESIDENT HABIBIE OUTLINED FOR A/S ROTH A TIME TABLE PROVIDING FOR SEPARATION OF EAST TIMOR FROM INDONESIA ON JANUARY 1, 2000 IF AUTONOMY IS REJECTED. FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS TOLD A/S ROTH THAT HE HAD CAUTIONED THE PRESIDENT THAT SUCH A COMPRESSED TIME TABLE WAS UNREALISTIC. ALATAS RECOGNIZES THAT A TRANSITION PROCESS IS NEEDED, BUT CLEARLY THERE IS STILL NO INTERNAL INDONESIAN CONSENSUS ON THIS MATTER.
-- UN ROLE. THE INDONESIANS HAVE OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS MUST PLAY A ROLE IN ANY TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE FOR EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING BY HAVING A PRESENCE ON THE GROUND (E.G. PRESS REPORTS QUOTE ALATAS AS SAYING THAT THE UN SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT PRO-INDONESIAN EAST TIMORESE ARE NOT ATTACKED IF THE TERRITORY SECEDES). THEY HAVE NOT AS YET DISPLAYED ANY WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO INTRODUCING A UN PRESENCE INTO EAST TIMOR TO HELP STABILIZE THE SITUATION THERE NOW, WHICH THEY REJECT AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR POSITION THAT EAST TIMOR IS STILL PART OF INDONESIA. THEY MAY DISPLAY MORE FLEXIBILITY ON THIS QUESTION OVER TIME, BUT FOR THE MOMENT THEY ARE STILL ADHERING TO THE POSITION THAT A UN PRESENCE CAN ONLY BE INTRODUCED AFTER AUTONOMY IS REJECTED.

7. (C) THESE ARE VITAL ISSUES. THE LACK OF CLARITY ON HOW TO APPROACH THEM ILLUSTRATES BOTH THE SUDDENNESS OF THE SHIFT IN INDONESIAN THINKING ON EAST TIMOR, AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM.

8. (C) STABILIZING THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND: THE RECENT ABRI ARMING OF UNDISCIPLINED PRO-JAKARTA CIVILIAN ELEMENTS IN EAST TIMOR HAS WORSENED AN ALREADY BAD SECURITY SITUATION THERE AND ALARMED MODERATE LEADERS SUCH AS [redacted] B1, B6

[redacted] B1

HE FAVORED FORMATION OF A COUNCIL REPRESENTING ALL SHADES OF OPINION AIMED AT REACHING AGREEMENT TO HALT FIGHTING, DISARM CONTENDING FACTIONS, AND FACILITATE PEACEFUL DISCUSSION. [redacted] B1, B6

[redacted] IS THINKING ALONG SIMILAR LINES BY CALLING FOR EVERYBODY TO SIT AND TALK RATHER THAN TAKING UP ARMS.

[redacted] B1

CLEARLY, A TOP PRIORITY MUST BE TO FIND A MECHANISM TO CALM THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR AND GET THE ARMS AWAY FROM IRRESPONSIBLE ELEMENTS. OTHERWISE, POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO EITHER AUTONOMY OR SEPARATION WILL BE DEGRADED OR DESTROYED.

9. (C) NEED FOR A CREDIBLE PROCESS: [redacted] B1
ALONG WITH MANY OTHERS, BELIEVES THAT NOW THAT INDEPENDENCE HAS BEEN HELD OUT AS AN OPTION, AUTONOMY WILL NOT BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AS AN OPTION. THIS DOES NOT ALTER THE NEED FOR A CREDIBLE PROCESS OF DETERMINING THE PREFERENCES OF THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR.

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

THUS FAR, EARLY INDONESIAN REACTIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT'S SHIFT IN POLICY HAVE BEEN BROADLY SUPPORTIVE. AN EXCEPTION HAS BEEN [redacted] THE PDI-P, THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY - PERJUANGAN, WHICH IS GIVEN STRONG CHANCES OF MAKING A GOOD SHOWING IN THE B1

JAKARTA 03 OF 03 598

ELECTIONS.

10. (C) MEGAWATI'S POSITION HAS BEEN THAT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT LACKS SUFFICIENT LEGITIMACY TO MAKE SUCH A FAR-REACHING POLICY SHIFT INVOLVING INDONESIA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. [redacted] B1

11. (C) GENERAL WIRANTO HAS STATED [redacted] PUBLICLY [redacted] THAT THE MILITARY WILL DUTIFULLY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION, BUT MANY SUSPECT THE MILITARY'S SUPPORT IS LUKEWARM AT BEST. GIVEN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHIFT IN INDONESIAN ATTITUDES CANNOT BE EXCLUDED, ESPECIALLY IF THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING EAST TIMORESE ATTITUDES IS PERFUNCTORY. FOR THAT REASON, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PROCESS HAVE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY. THIS REQUIRES THAT THERE BE A MEANINGFUL AUTONOMY OPTION ON THE TABLE. B1 B1

12. (C) THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS ISSUE CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED. BOTH ACEHNESE AND IRIANESE HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED TO US THAT INDEPENDENCE HOPES IN THOSE AREAS HAVE BEEN SPURRED BY DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO EAST TIMOR. A BROAD AUTONOMY OPTION FOR EAST TIMOR COULD ALSO BECOME THE STARTING POINT FOR AUTONOMY DEMANDS BY OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA. IF THE INDONESIANS FALTER IN THEIR EFFORTS TO HANDLE EAST TIMOR SEPARATELY FROM THE LARGER ISSUES INVOLVING THE INTEGRITY OF INDONESIA ITSELF, A COMPLEX SITUATION WILL BE RENDERED EVEN MORE DIFFICULT.

13. (C) INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL CLEARLY ARE STILL IN THE PROCESS OF RETHINKING THEIR APPROACHES IN THE WAKE OF THE SUDDEN GOI POLICY SHIFT. FOR THAT REASON, A CRITICAL GOAL OF THE MEETINGS BETWEEN ALATAS AND HIS PORTUGUESE COUNTERPART IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS SHOULD BE TO SMOOTH THE PROCESS OF READJUSTING THINKING ON BOTH SIDES SO THAT THE FOCUS CAN BE ON THE NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND NOT ON THE OLD DIFFERENCES. THERE IS NOW LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL, BUT THERE ARE NUMEROUS PITFALLS ALONG THE WAY. ROY

ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
INCOMING
R25
RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)
EAP/L CARDS CENTER

INFO: EAP (04) P (01)
---------- 25/0853Z A1 DDK (TOTAL COPIES: 008)
ACTION EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-00	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-00	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/020W						

----------A74F2D 250455Z /38
R 210316Z FEB 99 ZDK CTG RUEHCB 2321
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6208
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000844

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/04
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, MILI, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH MEETS WITH ACEH HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS. REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: A/S ROTH MET WITH TWO NGO OFFICIALS LONG ACTIVE IN ACEHNESE AFFAIRS ON FEBRUARY 4. THEY DESCRIBED VIEWS IN ACEH AS DIVIDED AMONG GROUPS FAVORING THE STATUS QUO, A FEDERATED STATUS, BROAD AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE. THE LATTER SENTIMENT WAS GAINING SUPPORT IN THE WAKE OF RECENT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE CASES PERPETRATED BY THE ARMY. ANGER OVER ABUSES, UNFAIR DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES AND REVENUES BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND INADEQUATE ACEHNESE REPRESENTATION AT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL HAS PERSISTED FOR MANY YEARS. ACEHNESE DO NOT TRUST THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND HAVE LITTLE FAITH IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WHOSE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE IGNORED BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. ACEHNESE LACK THE UNITY TO APPROACH THE GOVERNMENT FOR FORMAL DIALOGUE ABOUT GRIEVANCES AND ASPIRATIONS. THE NGO OFFICIALS CALLED FOR GREATER INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN ACEH AND PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO END ABUSES. THE ISLAMIC PARTIES WILL RUN WELL IN ACEH, AS WILL AMIEN RAIS'S NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN). SOME STUDENTS AND OTHERS FAVOR A BOYCOTT OF THE JUNE NATIONAL ELECTIONS. END SUMMARY

3. (C) [redacted]

---

4. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THE ACEH POPULATION CURRENTLY IS DIVIDED INTO FOUR GROUPINGS:

-- THOSE WHO ARE "LOYAL REPUBLICANS" (WHO SUPPORT CONTINUED INTEGRATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA);

-- FEDERATIONISTS SEEKING A FEDERATED RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA;

-- THOSE FAVORING AUTONOMY;

-- SEPARATISTS.

[redacted] SAID THAT IN RECENT MONTHS, SUPPORT FOR THE SEPARATIST POSITION HAS GROWN, THOUGH IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ASSESS ITS CURRENT STRENGTH. B1

5. (C) SUPPORT FOR THE SEPARATIST POSITION HAS DEVELOPED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DISAPPOINTMENT WITH JAKARTA, INCREASED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE AND CONFLICT BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS. HE NOTED THAT STUDENTS WHO GATHERED EARLIER IN THE WEEK IN BANDA ACEH SUPPORTED A REFERENDUM ON ACEH'S POLITICAL STATUS. [redacted] ADDED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, REGARDING THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A CHANGE. SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE GENERALLY WAS "MORE EMOTIONAL THAN RATIONAL." B1

BEHIND THE SUPPORT FOR SEPARATISM

6. (C) [redacted] HE HAD FOUND SYMPATHY FOR ONLY TWO OPTIONS: BROAD AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. PEOPLE GENERALLY WERE VERY ANGRY, WITH ESPECIALLY STRONG FEELING AGAINST CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM JAVA AND THOSE IN MEDAN (SEAT OF THE MILITARY REGION RESPONSIBLE FOR ACEH). RECENT KILLINGS OF ALLEGED COLLABORATORS (CUAK) AND SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL BY CIVILIANS WAS A MEASURE OF THIS NEW AND GROWING ANGER, AS WAS THE BURNING OF MILITAY INSTALLATIONS. B1

7. (C) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAD EXACERBATED ACEHNESE ANGER. THE "WIBAWA" SECURITY OPERATIONS, SAID BY THE GOVERNMENT TO BE A POLICE OPERATION, WAS IN FACT CONDUCTED BY THE MILITARY. DESPITE CLAIMS THAT SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) PERSONNEL HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN, 60 OF THEM REMAINED, MOST OF THEM IN LHOKSEUMAWE DISTRICT, WEARING CIVILIAN CLOTHES AND SPECIALIZING IN INTELLIGENCE FOR THE "WIBAWA" OPERATION, ACCORDING TO THE ACEHNESE INTERLOCUTORS.

8. (C) EXPLAINING THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE, [redacted] SAID THAT OLDER ACEHNESE ARGUED THAT THEY HAD STRONGLY SUPPORTED SOEKARNO WHEN HE DECLARED THE REPUBLIC BUT HAD RECEIVED LITTLE FOR THEIR LOYALTY. THEY ALSO SUPPORTED B1

THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT WHEN IT CAME TO POWER, BUT WERE REWARDED WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS WHICH, HASBALLAH CLAIMED, LEFT OVER 6,000 DEAD IN A DECADE (1989 TO PRESENT) AND EXPLOITATION OF ACEH'S NATURAL RESOURCES B1

WITH LITTLE RETURN FOR LOCAL PEOPLE. BASED ON THIS EXPERIENCE, PEOPLE WERE RELUCTANT TO OFFER SUPPORT TO A THIRD INDONESIAN PRESIDENT. MOREOVER, RECENT PROMISES BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF REFORMS, ACCOUNTABILITY BY ABRI AND GREATER AUTONOMY HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY AT THIS POINT.

9. (C) [redacted] ECHOED THESE VIEWS, SAYING THAT "BASICALLY, THE PROBLEM IS TRUST," WHICH IS LACKING AS A RESULT OF THE PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF MANY ACEHNESE WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OR ITS REPRESENTATIVES. OFFERS BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF A FAIRER SHARE OF REVENUES FOR B1 B1

02D0522

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 FEB 2024

ACEHNESE, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO CHANGE ATTITUDES BECAUSE THE OFFERS WOULD NOT BE BELIEVED. MOREOVER, PROMISES OF ABRI REFORM AND FUTURE ACCOUNTABILITY WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO DISSIPATE THE REAL HATRED FELT BY ACEHNESE TOWARD THE MILITARY. EVEN ACEHNESE OFFICIALS EXPRESS ANGER OVER WHAT THEY CLAIM IS "UNFAIR TREATMENT" BY JAKARTA, HE SAID.

10. (C) [redacted] AGREED THAT ACEHNESE GRIEVANCES OVER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES WERE MORE IMPORTANT IN SHAPING CURRENT ATTITUDES THAN THE RESOURCE SHARING ISSUE. THE GROWING POSSIBILITY THAT JAKARTA MAY ALLOW EAST TIMOR TO BECOME INDEPENDENT HAD GIVEN ACEHNESE CONFIDENCE BUT WAS NOT A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN SHAPING OPINIONS AMONG ACEHNESE. OVER THE YEARS, ACEHNESE ALSO RESENTED THE FACT THAT RELATIVELY FEW ACEHNESE HAD BEEN APPOINTED TO SENIOR POSITIONS; THERE IS NO NATIVE-BORN ACEHNESE IN THE CURRENT CABINET. HASBALLAH CLAIMED THAT THE SUPREME ADVISORY COUNCIL HAS NEVER HAD AN ACEHNESE

B1

AMONG ITS 45 MEMBERS. MOREOVER FOUR OF EIGHT DISTRICT PARLIAMENTS ARE CHAIRED BY NON-ACEHNESE.

11. (C) WHILE AGREEING THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES CONSTITUTED THE MOST IMPORTANT GRIEVANCE, [redacted] ADDED THAT THE ABUSES HAD GROWN OUT OF PROTESTS WHICH WERE LARGELY OVER ECONOMIC ISSUES. "WHEN WE COMPLAINED ABOUT ECONOMIC ISSUES, JAKARTA ACCUSED US OF BEING SEPARATISTS AND ANSWERED US WITH MILITARY FORCE," HE SAID.

B1

HOW TO DEAL WITH ACEH-CENTRAL GOVERNMENT PROBLEMS

12. (C) [redacted] BELIEVED IT WOULD BE PREMATURE FOR THE ACEHNESE TO HOLD A DIALOGUE WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BECAUSE ACEHNESE WERE NOT YET UNIFIED ON KEY QUESTIONS, SUCH AS THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE PROVINCE. ONLY WHEN THE FOUR PERSPECTIVES NOTED ABOVE HAD ACHIEVED A CONSENSUS COULD ACEHNESE APPROACH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FOR DIALOGUE. MOREOVER, ATTEMPTS AT DIALOGUE THUS FAR HAD ONLY TAKEN PLACE AMONG JAVANESE OF THE SAME GENERATION (ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, AMIEN RAIS, MEGAWATI, WIRANTO, AND SULTAN HAMENGKUBUWONO X). THESE PEOPLE DID NOT SPEAK FOR NON-JAVANESE, NOR FOR STUDENTS AND OTHER YOUTHS. HABIBIE, AS A NATIVE OF SULAWESI, APPEARED MORE SENSITIVE TO THE NON-JAVANESE, HOWEVER.

B1

13. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT SEVERAL NATIONAL FIGURES APPEARED TO UNDERSTAND AND BE SYMPATHETIC TO THE ACEHNESE PERSPECTIVE. [redacted] CLAIMED THAT

B1

RAIS HAD ATTRACTED A CROWD OF 300,000 RECENTLY WHEN HE SPOKE IN ACEH -- THE LARGEST CROWD HE HAS ATTRACTED ANYWHERE TO DATE. MINISTER OF COOPERATIVES AND SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES ADI SASONO HAS VISITED THE PROVINCE AND, MOREOVER, WORKED ON ACEH-RELATED PROBLEMS WHEN HE WAS AN NGO ACTIVIST IN THE 1980'S. FORMER CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF; LTG FACHRUL RAZI, THOUGH FROM ACEH, IS NOT SEEN SYMPATHETICALLY BY ACEHNESE.

14. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE, ESPECIALLY THOSE ASPECTS INVOLVING THE MILITARY, WARRANTED GREATER INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION, TO INCLUDE A GREATER INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE. [redacted] NOTED THAT IN THE EARLY JANUARY VIOLENCE INVOLVING MILITARY SWEEPS OF VILLAGES OUTSIDE LHOKSEUMAWE, SEVERAL HUNDRED PEOPLE FLED TO THE ICRC OFFICE FOR PROTECTION REFLECTING TRUST IN THAT INSTITUTION. (NOTE: THE ICRC TELLS US THAT ON FEBRUARY 5 IT SECURED A TWO-MONTH EXTENSION FOR ITS

B1

B1

PRESENCE IN ACEH. END NOTE) "WE NEED INTERNATIONAL EYES TO STOP THE ARMY AND TO SEE WHAT IS GOING ON," AND TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO STOP IT, [redacted] SAID.

B1

15. (C) [redacted] THE IMPACT OF

B1

THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (KOMNASHAM), CLAIMING THAT ITS GENERALLY GOOD REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS INVARIABLY SAW NO GOVERNMENT FOLLOW-UP. IN JANUARY, ON ITS FOURTH VISIT SINCE THE SUMMER OF 1998, THE COMMISSION WAS TOLD BY LOCAL ACEHNESE THAT UNLESS THE COMMISSION COULD PRODUCE TANGIBLE CHANGES IN THE

SITUATION, IT SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY MORE VISITS.

16. (C) [redacted] DISCOUNTED THE IMPORTANCE OF RECENT PROSECUTIONS AND SENTENCING OF ABRI MEMBERS WHO HAD COMMITTED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. HE DESCRIBED THE STRATEGY AS AIMED AT FOCUSSING ATTENTION ON INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF ABRI WHO WERE CHARGED WITH "DISOBEDIENCE." [redacted] INSISTED THAT ABRI AS AN INSTITUTION WAS TO BLAME, NOT SIMPLY INDIVIDUAL ABRI PERSONNEL. THE INSTITUTION NEEDED FUNDAMENTAL REFORM AND, MOREOVER, SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE.

B1

B1

THE ELECTIONS

17. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT MANY ACEHNESE STUDENTS WITH WHOM HE IS IN CONTACT BELIEVE THAT THE JUNE 7 ELECTIONS WOULD BE "USELESS." "THE ACEHNESE WENT THROUGH SEVEN ELECTIONS AND NOTHING CHANGED." MANY, THEREFORE, OPENLY ARGUE FOR BOYCOTTING THE ELECTION. [redacted] ACKNOWLEDGED THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THIS ELECTION COULD BE FAR MORE FREE AND FAIR THAN IN THE PAST AND THAT SUPPORT FOR PARTICIPATION IN IT WOULD DEPEND ON THE ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE IN ACEH IN THE MONTHS LEADING UP TO JUNE.

B1

B1

18. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THE ISLAMIC UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) WAS STRONG IN ACEH AND THAT NEW PARTIES LIKE THE JUSTICE PARTY (KEADILIAN) AND THE CRESCENT MOON AND STAR PARTY (BULAN BINTANG) WOULD DO WELL. ALTHOUGH NOT AN ISLAMIC PARTY, AMIEN RAIS'S PAN WOULD RUN STRONGLY, AS ACEHNESE SAW IT AS A PARTY THAT COULD "CHANGE THE SITUATION." PAN'S SUPPORT FOR A

B1

FEDERAL SYSTEM IN INDONESIA WAS POPULAR IN ACEH.

19. (U) A/S ROTH CLEARED THIS MESSAGE
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED/IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/022W				

----------A01F40 080143Z /38

O 072324Z FEB 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5931
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000599

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ID, UN
SUBJECT: ALATAS ON EAST TIMOR

REF: JAKARTA 583

JAKARTA 01 OF 02 -599

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR J. STAPLETON ROY. REASON: 1.5 (B).

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN A FEBRUARY 4 MEETING WITH A/S ROTH, FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS CALLED A JANUARY 1, 2000 DEADLINE FOR EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE UNREALISTIC, HINTED THAT A REFERENDUM STILL MAY BE POSSIBLE, AND REJECTED THE NOTION THAT THE JUNE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS COULD SERVE AS A SELF-DETERMINATION EXERCISE IN EAST TIMOR. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALI ALATAS ON FEBRUARY 4. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AMERICAS DIRECTOR SAMODRA SRIWIJAYA AND ASIA-PACIFIC DIRECTOR HADI WAYARABI ALSO SAT IN. A/S ROTH WAS JOINED BY AMBASSADOR ROY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT JASON HYLAND, AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER).

EAST TIMOR -- FINAL AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE

3. (C) THE DISCUSSION FOCUSSED PRIMARILY ON EAST TIMOR BUT OTHER ISSUES WERE ALSO COVERED AND ARE REPORTED SEPTEL. ALATAS OBSERVED THAT HE WOULD BE IN NEW YORK FEBRUARY 7-8 FOR MEETINGS WITH PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER DA GAMA. ALATAS SAID HIS PURPOSE WAS TO REPORT DIRECTLY ON THE MEANING OF THE GOI'S NEW APPROACH ON EAST TIMOR AND TO ASSESS THE PROGRESS MADE AT THE TRIPARTITE TALKS AT THE SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL.

[redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 6 FEB 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAR 2007 200503302

02D052,2

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

[redacted] B1

JANUARY 1, 2000 NOT FIRM

4. (C) [redacted] B1

5. (C) A/S ROTH SAID THE GOI DESERVED MUCH CREDIT FOR ITS TWO DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES ON EAST TIMOR (BROAD-BASED AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE), BUT THAT THE NEW OPPORTUNITY TO REACH A SOLUTION ALSO PRESENTED DANGERS. EVEN WITH THE BEST OF INTENTIONS, VIOLENCE COULD RESULT, PARTICULARLY IF INDONESIA WITHDREW PRECIPITOUSLY WITHOUT LEAVING ADEQUATE TIME TO PUT TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN PLACE. THE GOI WOULD THEN EMERGE WITH A BLACK EYE INTERNATIONALLY IF A CIVIL WAR ERUPTED. ROTH SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW EAST TIMORESE LEADERS COULD ACCEPT AUTONOMY NOW THAT INDEPENDENCE HAD BEEN PUT ON THE TABLE. WITH EAST TIMOR TOTALLY UNPREPARED FOR QUICK INDEPENDENCE, THE HOPE WAS THAT LOGIC WILL PREVAIL IF AN AGREEMENT WERE REACHED THAT PROVIDED FOR AN ADEQUATE TRANSITION PERIOD.

6. (C) ROTH STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING THE EAST TIMORESE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, EITHER CONCERNING AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. ROTH EMPHASIZED THAT ANY AGREEMENT NOT ACCEPTABLE TO EAST TIMOR WOULD NOT WORK AND IT WAS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO INVOLVE THE TIMORESE IN ANY NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

[redacted] B1

7. (C) ACKNOWLEDGING THE GOI'S DIFFICULTY AT A TIME OF FINANCIAL HARDSHIP TO COMMIT TO FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR EAST TIMOR DURING A

JAKARTA 02 OF 02 599

MULTI-YEAR TRANSITION, ROTH ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A "DEFERRED INDEPENDENCE" OPTION. UNDER SUCH AN OPTION, IT WOULD BE CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THE OUTCOME WOULD BE INDEPENDENCE, MAKING A REFERENDUM UNNECESSARY, BUT DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD ASSUME MUCH OF THE FINANCIAL AND SECURITY BURDEN FOR EAST TIMOR. ROTH SAID MUCH MORE ATTENTION MUST BE GIVEN TO CALMING THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, AND A PACKAGE OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES WAS URGENTLY NEEDED. THESE SHOULD INCLUDE DISARMING THE MILITIAS, TROOP REDUCTIONS WITH AN INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION MECHANISM, AND IN GENERAL A GREATER SENSE OF INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR. ROTH OBSERVED THAT THE UNHCR COULD PLAY A ROLE, AND THAT THERE WERE OTHER CREATIVE POSSIBILITIES, INCLUDING OPENING AN OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE,

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

AMBASSADOR MARKER, IN DILI.

JUNE ELECTIONS WON'T WORK

8. (C) A/S ROTH ASKED ABOUT THE RELEVANCE OF THE JUNE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS FOR EAST TIMOR. [redacted] B1

ALATAS, THE AMBASSADOR AND A/S ROTH BRIEFLY DISCUSSED PUERTO RICO, QUEBEC, AND OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD WITH AUTONOMY/INDEPENDENCE ISSUES AND THEIR POSSIBLE RELEVANCE TO EAST TIMOR. ALL AGREED THAT THE MOST URGENT TASK NOW WAS TO AVOID ANY EXPLOSION ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR WHICH COULD DISRUPT ALL THE OTHER PROCESSES.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C25

DOCUMENT_ID: 183119235
DOCNO: 001891
PRODUCER: LISBON
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990416
TOR: 101456
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904161506
MHFNO: 99 5096999
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI7409
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHLI #1891 1061506
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161506Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2740
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0137
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0720
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0087
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
BT

Classified by Department of State
Lee R. Lohman, DAS, A/RPS
Classify Conf. Reason 1.4(b+d) Date 6/11/2004
Declassify on 4/15/2024 Auth. / /

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L LISBON 001891

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/04

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UNCHR, ID, PO
SUBJECT: MFA CONCERN ABOUT VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR; UNCHR LANGUAGE

REF: LISBON 1761

(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. GERALD MCGOWAN, REASON 1.5 (B AND D).

1. (C) [ ] TELEPHONED THE AMBASSADOR APRIL 16 TO CONVEY THE PORTUGUESE BELIEF THAT THERE IS A "VERY HIGH" THREAT OF VIOLENCE BREAKING OUT IN DILI THIS WEEKEND. IT IS "VERY GOOD" THAT, [ ] A U.S. EMBASSY OFFICER WOULD BE IN DILI AT THIS TIME. [ ]

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B-1,1.4(b+d)

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] ALSO PRESENTED A DRAFT OF LANGUAGE ON EAST TIMOR (SEE PARAGRAPH 3) THAT PORTUGAL IS INTRODUCING AT THE CURRENT SESSION OF THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

3. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT (COMMENT: WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS LANGUAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED OR HAS ANY STATUS IN GENEVA.)

-- THE COMMISSION HAS FOLLOWED WITH GRAVE CONCERN CONTINUED AND SUBSTANTIATED REPORTS ON VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR, NAMELY THE RECENTLY REPORTED KILLINGS OF UNARMED CIVILIANS IN LIQUICA, THE DISTURBANCES AND THREATS BY ARMED MILITIAS IN OTHER TOWNS AND VILLAGES AND THE BEATINGS OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS. THE COMMISSION IS EXTREMELY CONCERNED WITH THE CLIMATE OF INTIMIDATION THUS CREATED, AIMED AT JEOPARDIZING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IT URGES THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATION TO WORK FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR AND TO DISARM THE MILITIAS. IT TAKES NOTE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA HAS AGREED TO THE UNSG'S REQUEST FOR AN IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENTS OF LIQUICA AND CALLS ON THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO HOLD ACCOUNTABLE THOSE FOUND RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH KILLINGS.

-- THE COMMISSION IS ENCOURAGED BY THE PROGRESS REACHED SO FAR IN THE TALKS UNDER THE AUSPICES ON THE UNSG AIMED AT ACHIEVING A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE AND INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION AND STRESSES THE NEED FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIONS, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UN PERMANENT PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR AND THE SETTING UP OF THE ENVISAGED PEACE AND STABILITY COMMITTEE, IN ORDER TO PROMOTE AN ATMOSPHERE CONDUCIVE TO A PEACEFUL AND LASTING SOLUTION.

-- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CURRENT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE COMMISSION WILL CONSIDER THE MATTER AT ITS FIFTY-SIXTH SESSION AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO KEEP IT INFORMED ON THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR.

END TEXT.

MCGOWAN

ADMIN

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

(101)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183067794
PRODUCER: USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ2-J//
SOURCE: MILITARY
~~DOCTYPE:~~ OTHER
DOR: 19990407
TOR: 164838
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904072000
MHFNO: 99 4984471
DOCCLASS: ~~S~~
CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

R - Item pp 4-5

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUWSMXI #4102 0972030
ZNY ~~SSSSS~~
P 072000Z APR 99
FM USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ2-J//
TO AIG 8008
~~AIG 12303~~
AIG 328
AIG 621
AIG 10313
RUEASCO/CDR599THTRANSGPTML WHEELER AAF HI//MTWPA-OP-OS//
RUATNPT/CDR837THTRANSBN PUSAN KOR//MTWPA-PU-C//
RUWMNMN/926FW NEW ORLEANS LA//IN//
RUEOGEA/128ARW GEN MITCHELL IAP WI//IN//
RHCPMXA/908AW MAXWELL AFB AL//IN//
RHFJJAJ/COMHSWINGLANT JACKSONVILLE FL//N72//
RUQNAAA/48FW DEPLOYED INCIRLIK AB TU//DOI//
RUFTURA/ACS SPANGDAHLEM AB GE//DOI//
RUVRAAA/93OSS ROBINS AFB GA//IN//
RUEBBEA/MARITIME ADMIN WASHINGTON DC//613/620//
RUHUBDA/133ACS FT DODGE IA//IN//
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

~~QQQQ~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ: USTRANSCOM DISUM CY 99-066 (U)

1. (U) USTRANSCOM DISUM FOR 07 APR 99.

2. (U) THIS REPORT IS MADE UP OF USTRANSCOM ITEMS OF INTEREST. THIS PRODUCT, BASED ON ALL-SOURCE REPORTING, REPRESENTS THE ANALYSIS AND POSITION OF THE USTRANSCOM JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER TRANSPORTATION (JICTRANS).

3. (U) EUCOM AOR.

MORI DocID: 1054658

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION:

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

MORI DocID: 1054658

4. (U) CENTCOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

Non-responsive

MORI DocID: 1054658

Non-Responsive

5. (U) SOUTHCOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)
B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS: (NTR)

6. (U) PACOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

1. (U) INDONESIA: FOLLOWING THE DEATHS OF AT LEAST FIVE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS IN EAST TIMOR, JAILED RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO HAS CANCELLED AN EXISTING CEASE-FIRE AND CALLED FOR HIS SUPPORTERS TO ENGAGE PRO-INDONESIA FORCES. XANANA'S SURPRISE PUBLIC CALL FOR NEW ATTACKS ON INDONESIAN MILITARY UNITS AND PROINTEGRATIONIST CIVILIAN MILITIAS IS AN ATTEMPT TO HASTEN UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROVINCE. A SPOKESMAN FOR GUSMAO SAID THE CALL FOR A RETURN TO INSURRECTION WOULD BE REVOKED IF THE UN STEPPED IN TO HELP AND INDONESIA'S MILITARY ENDED ITS ATTACKS. XANANA'S DECLARATION COULD UNDERMINE UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS WITH PORTUGAL SCHEDULED FOR NEXT WEEK. XANANA HAS BEEN UNDER PRESSURE FROM SUPPORTERS TO MODIFY HIS LONG-STANDING CALL FOR HIS GUERRILLA FIGHTERS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF PROVOCATIONS BY THE MILITIA OR THE ARMY. HE ADMITTED IN A WRITTEN STATEMENT THAT THE NEW POLICY COULD PROMPT A "BLOODBATH" BUT NOTED HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE. THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SAYS IT CANNOT CONFIRM THAT INDONESIAN FORCES JOINED THE ATTACKS BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS BUT NOTES THE MILITIAS CONTROL A MAIN ROAD

R

RESPONSIVE

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

LEADING TO THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF DILI, PRESUMABLY WITH THE MILITARY'S PERMISSION. ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO COULD PLAY A PIVOTAL ROLE IN REDUCING TENSION BY ENFORCING HIS ORDERS FOR AN END TO MILITARY SUPPORT FOR VARIOUS PROINTEGRATIONIST GROUPS. FOR MONTHS THE MILITARY HAS PROVIDED AMMUNITION TO THE CIVILIAN MILITIAS. SOME UNITS MAY STILL BE PROVIDING TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ADVICE AND HAVE NOT ATTEMPTED TO DISARM THE MILITIAS. THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE, WHETHER SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR OR COMMUNAL VIOLENCE AS SEEN ELSEWHERE, IS LIKELY TO INCREASE AS JUNE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS APPROACH. WITH VIOLENT UNREST SO WIDESPREAD, THE INDONESIAN MILITARY WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO AVOID OVEREXTENDING ITSELF IN ITS EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE SECURITY SITUATION. DESPITE A STRONG, DEMONSTRATED RELUCTANCE, THE ARMED FORCES MAY BE FORCED TO DEPLOY CRITICAL FORCES AWAY FROM THE CAPITAL OF JAKARTA, AND OTHER IMPORTANT URBAN CENTERS LIKELY TO SEE INCREASED UNREST IN THE RUN UP TO ELECTIONS. THERE IS NO DIRECT THREAT TO AMERICAN CITIZENS IN INDONESIA AT THIS TIME. (POC: [redacted] CJCS INTELLIGENCE UPDATE 07 APR 99; [redacted] 07 APR 99)

RESPONSIVE

7. (U) RESPECTIVE AOR ASSESSMENTS OF TERRORIST THREAT LEVELS (AREAS WITH MEDIUM OR HIGHER THREAT ASSESSMENTS) ARE SHOWN EVERY MONDAY. CHANGES ARE REPORTED DAILY AS THEY OCCUR.

8. (U) ANY PLAIN LANGUAGE ADDRESS CHANGE REQUESTS TO THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE FORWARDED VIA MESSAGE TO ORIGINATOR OR VIA FAX TO CINC TRANS INTEL CEN, DSN 576 8005 SECURE FAX, DSN 576 1559 UNCLAS FAX. POC FOR PLA CHANGES IS SSGT K. MORRIS.

9. (U) POC IS JICTRANS; DSN STU III 576 4235; COMM STU III 618 256 4235; SECURE FAX 576 8005//

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

SOURCES: FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

USTRANSCOM DISUM CY 99-066,
Paragraph 6.B(1) is declassified
IAW TCJ2 Memo, 20 May 2004
And Department of State Memo,
30 Jun 2004.

30 Jun 06

DAVID M. COONEY, JR. (Date)
CAPT, USN
Director of Intelligence

UNCLASSIFIED

RASA

Carter Center Weekly Report on East Timor, No.1 July 11 - 17, 1999:
Large Turnout for Registration despite Continuing Security Concerns

RELEASED IN FULL

*(**Background:** Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the public consultation process on autonomy in East Timor. The Center opened an office with two observers in Dili on July 4. They will be joined next week by eight long-term observers who will travel throughout East Timor to assess preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign, while remaining strictly neutral and nonpartisan. The following is the first of a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation).*

Dili, East Timor...The past week saw a significant decrease in the level of intimidation and violence directed at personnel of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) who are supervising the upcoming popular consultation. However, the security situation for the people of East Timor does not seem to have improved significantly.

Initial reports on voter registration, which began on July 16, indicate potential voters flooded registration centers all across East Timor during the first few days of voter registration. The Carter Center is greatly encouraged by the opening of registration and the high turnout so far. Clearly, the large majority of the people of East Timor are committed to participating in a peaceful, fair and democratic consultation.

However, this commitment is being severely tested by an atmosphere of violence, intimidation, and insecurity that continues to pervade most areas of East Timor. Information gathered in direct interviews during field visits by Carter Center observers and from other independent reports from all parts of East Timor, indicate that pro-integration militias in many areas are threatening to harm or kill those who do not vote for autonomy. Similar reports indicate that the militias also are largely responsible for creating tens of thousands of internally displaced persons and preventing them from returning to their homes to participate in the consultation.

This report is based on field visits to Liquica and Ermera districts during the past several days, including observation of the opening of registration, and on meetings in Jakarta and Dili with senior Indonesian Government, military, and police officials; members of the Indonesian Government Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular Consultation; the Commission for Peace and Stability; Timorese non-governmental organizations; UNAMET officials; representatives of international organizations; diplomats; and members of pro-autonomy groups (which favor integration into Indonesia) and pro-independence groups.

The Carter Center is particularly concerned about the following problems, which must be addressed to ensure that conditions established by the May 5 New York Agreements for the popular consultation are met:

- **Intimidation of Voters.** While all sides must accept some responsibility for the hostile climate that now prevails, our interviews and other independent reports indicate that responsibility for the large majority of incidents of intimidation and violence lies with pro-integration militias. These groups are subjecting potential voters to an intense and systematic campaign of intimidation in an attempt to influence the outcome of the consultation. Individuals interviewed by The Carter Center observers spoke uniformly about widespread harassment and intimidation by the militia, and described similar incidents of militia visiting people at their homes at night and threatening

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

violence after the poll if autonomy is rejected. Similar reports from other independent groups indicate such incidents are occurring throughout East Timor.

According to paragraph 1 of the Security Agreement, the appropriate Indonesian security forces are responsible for ensuring a secure environment devoid of violence and intimidation. In addition, paragraph 4 provides that the Indonesian police are solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order during the consultation process. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the Indonesian Police have been successful in improving the security situation. In order for the conditions of the New York Agreements to be fulfilled, the activities of violent militia groups must be curtailed.

- **Internally Displaced Persons.** The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has documented the existence of more than 32,000 internally displaced persons in East Timor, most of whom report having been driven from their homes in the past six months by pro-integration militias as a direct result of their presumed political beliefs. It appears little is being done to facilitate their safe return to their homes. Some militia leaders have openly stated that they will not permit internally displaced persons to return home until after the completion of the consultation.

  For internally displaced persons to be able to participate in the consultation as provided in the New York Agreements, it is essential that adequate security conditions exist for all of them to return to their homes immediately and to ensure that no others are driven from their home by violence and intimidation.

- **Active Campaign for Autonomy.** According to many credible observers, elements of the Indonesian Government and military continue to campaign for the autonomy option in violation of the New York Agreements. One senior army leader in Dili admitted that the military is actively promoting the autonomy package and distributing food and services to people to encourage votes for autonomy.

  Such practices are in violation of paragraph 1 of the Security Agreement, which establishes that the absolute neutrality of the Indonesian armed forces and the Indonesian police is essential. Similarly, the "Agreement on Modalities for the Popular Consultation" provides that officials of the Indonesian Government will not participate in the campaign in support for either option. It is imperative that all sides abide by these commitments.

- **Need for Redeployment.** Although senior military commanders indicated to Carter Center observers that all military forces in East Timor will be confined to their barracks in advance of the consultation, no timetable for this redeployment has been established and military units continue to operate throughout the territory. To improve the current climate of fear, a timetable for completion of the redeployment of the Indonesia military should be established and implemented.

END

RELEASED IN FULL
R37

Printed By: Shaana J Tolson 07/19/99 07:50:35 AM

JAKARTA 3449

From: AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
Subject: SECURITY CLIMATE IN EAST TIMOR DURING ROTH VISIT.

MRN: 3449
ICNbr: TED8077

Date/Time: 161105Z JUL 99
Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Cable Text:

TED8077
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-01	AGRE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W			

----------E1CF0C 161531Z /38

O 161105Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8838
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003449

ROME PASS VATICAN CITY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, PINS, MOPS, CASC, ID

SUBJECT: SECURITY CLIMATE IN EAST TIMOR DURING ROTH VISIT

CONFIDENTIAL

JAKARTA 01 OF 02 3449

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM MICHAEL P. OWENS, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: JULY 16, THE FIRST DAY OF REGISTRATION FOR THE UN-ADMINISTERED CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF EAST TIMOR, SET FOR LATE AUGUST, COINCIDED WITH EAP A/S ROTH'S TO EAST TIMOR. REGISTRATION FOR THE CONSULTATION APPEARS TO HAVE GONE RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY SO FAR. HOWEVER, BRIEFINGS PROVIDED TO A/S ROTH BY UNAMET OFFICIALS AND OTHER CONTACTS PAINT A GRIM PICTURE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH INTIMIDATION AND FEAR HAVE MADE AN IMPACT ON THE POPULACE, AND UN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 MAR 2007 200503302

02D032, 2

OFFICIALS ON THE GROUND HAVE EXPRESSEO RESERVATIONS AND UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. THERE ARE PARTICULAR FEARS THAT DISTURBANCES MAY EMERGE FROM COMMEMORATIONS OF "INTEGRASI (INTEGRATION) DAY" ON JULY 17. END SUMMARY.

FIRST OAY OF REGISTRATION

3. (C) EAP A/S ROTH, AMBASSADOR, EAP CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON, AND POLOFF ARE CONDUCTING A THREE OAY VISIT TO EAST TIMOR (JULY 15-17). CONVERSATIONS WITH A/S ROTH'S PARTY, CURRENTLY IN DILI, INDICATE THAT JULY 16, THE FIRST DAY OF REGISTRATION FOR UN-ADMINISTERED CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE TERRITORY, SET FOR LATE AUGUST, HAS GONE RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY. ON JULY 16, A/S ROTH AND PARTY TRAVELED BY UNAMET HEIJCOPTER TO SUAI IN SOUTHEAST EAST TIMOR AND MALIANA ON THE EASTERN FRINGE OF THE TERRITORY. A/S ROTH AND PARTY ALSO TRAVELED BY ROAD TO LIQUICIA, SITE OF SOME OF THE WORST VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR IN RECENT MONTHS. IN EACH PLACE, REGISTRATION OPERATIONS APPEARED TO BE GOING RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY, WITH 50-150 CITIZENS OBSERVED REGISTERING AT DESIGNATED SITES. WHILE IT IS TOO EARLY TO PROCLAIM A "GOOD TURNOUT" FOR REGISTRATION, EARLIER TALK OF A SIGNIFICANT BOYCOTT NOW APPEARS UNFOUNDED, POLOFF OPINED. A/S ROTH AND PARTY ORSERVED SOME SIGNS OF INTIMIDATION: A SKULL AND CROSS BONES WERE PAINTED ON THE DOOR OF ONE REGISTRATION STATION IN LIQUICIA, AND THERE WERE VARIOUS REPORTS OF MILITIA MEMBERS LOITERING IN THE VICINITY OF THE REGISTRATION SITES, AS WELL AS OTHER ACCOUNTS OF MINOR OBSTRUCTIONISM. POLOFF TRAVELLING WITH A/S ROTH OPINED THAT THE DOMINANT THEME WAS THE RELATIVE NORMALITY OF THE FIRST DAY OF REGISTRATION AND THE LACK OF ANY SERIOUS VIOLENT INCIDENTS, PARTICULARLY IN PROBLEMATIC SPOTS LIKE LIQUICIA, SUAI, AND MALIANA.

GRIM MOOD AMONG UNAMET STAFF

4. (C) A/S ROTH ANO PARTY WERE BRIEFED JULY 15 BY SENIOR UNAMET STAFF IN DILI. THE OVERALL MOOD OF THE UN OFFICIALS WAS GRIM. THE STAFF INDICATED THAT UN OFFICIALS ENJOY GOOD FORMAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH THEIR INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS BUT THAT ASSURANCES OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION THEY RECEIVE ARE STILL NOT BEING FULLY TRANSLATED INTO DEEDS. CONTRARY TO INDONESIAN CLAIMS, UN STAFFERS SAID, LOGISTICAL ISSUES ARE NOT IMPEDING PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONSULTATION. THE PROBLEM, ACCORDING TO UNAMET'S ANALYSIS, IS THE DEGREE TO WHICH GOI-SPONSORED MILITIAS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN INTIMIDATING THE GENERAL PUBLIC. PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS HAVE BEEN TOO AFRAID TO CAMPAIGN, OR EVEN TO COME OUT OF HIDING. UNAMET PERSONNEL MEETING WITH A/S ROTH AND PARTY PRIVATELY EXPRESSED UNCERTAINTY OVER WHETHER THE CONSULTATION COULD BE CARRIED OUT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. ALTHOUGH UNAMET STAFF STATED THEY WERE SOMEWHAT MORE CONFIDENT ABOUT THEIR OWN SECURITY THAN THEY HAD BEEN LAST WEEK, UNAMET CONTINUES TO RECEIVE THREATS FROM PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS VIA TELEPHONE, RADIO, AND IN

PERSON.

FEARS ABOUT "INTEGRASI DAY"
---

5. (SBU) FEARS ARE WIOESPREAD OF UNREST ASSOCIATED WITH COMMEMORATIONS OF "INTEGRASI (INTEGRATION) DAY" SET FOR JULY . UNAMET STAFF STATED THEY MAY NEED TO POSTPONE REGISTRATION IN BALIBO, AN INTEGRATIONIST STRONGHOLO, AND ELSEWHERE IN EAST TIMOR, IF THE MILITIA-ORGANIZED COMMEMORATIONS APPEAR TOO ROWDY OR AGGRESSIVE.

JAKARTA 02 OF 02 3449

MILITIA MEMBER KILLED
---

6. (SBU) A MEMBER OF THE "MAHIDI" PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA WAS KILLED JULY 15, APPARENTLY AS HE WAS PARTICIPATING IN A MAHIDI ATTACK ON THE VILLAGE OF ZUMALAI. POLOFF PREDICTED THAT THE DEATH WILI, RE DEPICTEO BY MAHIDI AS AN ATTACK BY ARMED PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS, ALTHOUGH OTHER REPORTS SUGGEST THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WAS KILLED BY OTHER PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS, AS PART OF AN INTRA-MILITIA DISPUTE.

7. (SBU) SINCE OUR CONVERSATION WITH A/S ROTH'S PARTY IN DILI, WE HAVE RECEIVEO MEDIA REPORTS OF SEVERAL ATTACKS AGAINST REGISTRATION STATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE "MAHIDI" PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA (NFI).

8. (SBU) A/S ROTH'S VISIT TO EAST TIMOR WILL BE REPORTED IN GREATER DETAIL SEPTEL. ROY
NNNN

End Cable Text

Printed By: Shaana J Tolson 07/19/99 07:50:35 AM

RELEASED IN FULL R49

Bailes, Kenneth

From: Vance, John C. [jcvance@exbridge.usia.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, July 14, 1999 7:54 PM
To: jslvrmn@exbridge.usia.gov; bailes@exbridge.usia.gov; bkbyers@exbridge.usia.gov; holdenr@exbridge.usia.gov; phu@exbridge.usia.gov
Cc: rdgjkt@exbridge.usia.gov
Subject: Roth Media Availability, Jakarta, 7/14

Press Conference by Stanley O. Roth
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Wednesday, July 14, 1999
U.S. Embassy, Jakarta, Indonesia

Good evening. Let me apologize in advance for my voice. I appear to be in the early stages of a cold, but we will do the best that we can. I am delighted to be back in Indonesia. I believe it's now the 13th trip, although I'm starting to lose count, since I was appointed Assistant Secretary almost two years ago. Not surprisingly, I had two primary topics on my mind when I came here. One was to update myself on the status of the elections, and the second was to get a better understanding of the situation in East Timor, and in fact to visit East Timor for the first time in 18 or 19 years. I haven't been there since the early 1980s and thought that this was a good moment to get updated on that situation.

In a sense, I'm doing this press conference at the halfway point, because I have not yet been to East Timor. I've only been here for about two days and completed my government meetings in Jakarta. And so, I will be less than definitive in my conclusions about East Timor since I have not yet seen the situation for myself. But while I've been here, I have been very fortunate to have had excellent access to senior officials within the Indonesian Government. I had a long session of more than two hours yesterday with President Habibie. I had a lengthy discussion today with Foreign Minister Alatas. I had a discussion with General Wiranto, the Defense Minister, spent some time with Coordinating Minister Ginandjar yesterday, and I have had several good conversations as well with leaders of the opposition including Megawati and Gus Dur. So, even though I've been here a brief time, I think I have had a pretty good start. In terms of my trip to East Timor, the schedule is still in some flux in terms of the precise meetings, but it is my intent to meet a range of individuals reflecting the many different viewpoints on the island itself and not just to see one element, and my hope is to get out of Dili as well and see at least one or two other points on the island, so that I can make the best possible assessment of the situation there.

Let me make a general observation and then comment on each of the two topics that I have highlighted. I think, first, that there is a relationship between the two issues in one sense -- elections and East Timor. I think the electoral situation is one which has brought great credit thus far to the government and to the people of Indonesia because the elections have been conducted peacefully and thus far have gone very well, although obviously they have not yet been brought to conclusion, which I will discuss. But I think that the fact that there was such a large turnout and such an expression for democracy, and the fact that it was achieved with so little violence, were very positive steps. And this has enhanced Indonesia's stature worldwide and has been a credit to everyone involved.

The issue of East Timor, I think, is related in this sense: If, after

(RD 052) UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

more than 20 years of conflict, it can be brought to a successful conclusion, and if the parties, including the Government of Indonesia, can implement the UN agreement successfully and in a credible fashion, then I think that, too, will reflect very well on Indonesia, and that Indonesia's international stature will be enhanced. So I think there is a major incentive for the government to try to make this agreement work. Now, let me comment a little bit more on the two issues that I have flagged.

With respect to the election, there has been significant change even since I left the United States last week. When I left the United States, I was concerned because the count appeared to be frozen somewhere in the 60% range where it had been for many weeks. And it was unclear to me what steps were necessary to get the count completed and to move on with the process. I am pleased that by the time that I actually arrived here, a fact that has absolutely nothing to do with me, that procedures have been worked out to proceed with the count. And I have been informed that in 24 of 27 provinces basically the count is completed. There is almost 90% of the vote in, and that the general breakdowns are basically the same as we've seen all along suggesting that the delay has not in fact been an opportunity for tampering with the vote or changing the outcome in any way, but rather due, as was suggested all along, to technical factors relating to the procedural difficulties rather than to malfeasance. I've been informed also by General Rudini, with whom I met with today, that he hopes the election results will be finalized next week, on the 21st, as has been previously stated. Although that was not an absolute commitment, he did express his strong desire, and so I think that is a positive development.

Obviously, it is a two-step process, and the election process is not over even though a significant milestone has been passed. One of the issues I wanted to discuss was the question of how do we proceed from here. And I had extensive discussions about some of the crucial procedural issues. Obviously, given the fact that no candidate or no party received a majority, or even close to a majority, there is going to have to be some type of coalition arrangement in order to form a government. And, under the circumstances, the 200 appointed seats -- the 65 functional seats and the 135 seats from the local legislatures -- will be very crucial in helping to put together a coalition.

I wanted to get a better understanding of that process and how it would take place. I received assurances from government officials that this would be an impartial process subject to criteria, that it would not be used simply to have 200 seats fall into the lap of one particular party so as to somehow change the outcome of the election, that the individual legislatures at the provincial level be allowed to select their own people, that the KPU will select functional groups but the groups will select their own representatives, and so the procedures seem designed to allow for impartiality and to ensure that the 200 seats will not be a bloc. But we have a saying in English, that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. So, obviously we have to see the actual arrangements and who these 200 people are before anything can be said authoritatively about the process. But I think there is widespread recognition within the government of the significance of these seats and how they are allocated. I believe that the government is aware that both the people of Indonesia and the international community are scrutinizing this closely, and the opposition figures are, of course, highly seized of the importance of this issue and watching the process, although they did not register complaints with me at this stage about the process.

With respect to East Timor, as I've indicated on many previous occasions in Indonesia, I think there is an historic process underway, which after

more than 20 years holds out the possibility of a resolution through the UN agreement and through the voting process or consultation that will hopefully take place in August. And this, of course, is a major change from where the situation has been in past years. At the same time, I must say that I also came to express my concerns about some of the difficulties that have emerged, some very serious difficulties, including the attacks which you are all familiar with on three different UNAMET facilities in East Timor, including the failure thus far to establish a secure environment for the people of East Timor and the fact that there have been numerous reports of support for militia groups by elements of the military, and that thus far it has not been possible to state that a secure environment exists. I obviously come here shortly after the decision was taken by the United Nations to temporarily delay by several weeks the holding of the election to try to obtain a more secure environment. Of course, there have been many developments just within the past week, including Ambassador Marker's trip here, Ian Martin, the head of UNAMET, meeting with General Wiranto, and the very important meeting in which, I think, 13 or 14 members of the Indonesian cabinet visited Dili this past Monday, which I think was an important demonstration of the government's concern about the situation.

While these developments are in themselves encouraging and suggest that the government wants to see the agreement work, which is all the officials assured me, obviously what matters is the situation on the ground itself. Is there an improvement in the security situation? We're going to have to wait and see, and, in fact, this is one of the reasons I am going there myself for the next two days, because I want to make my own assessment about the situation on the ground so that I can report to senior U.S. officials. So, I think we are at a moment where the United Nations is about to make an important decision. And that decision is whether or not the registration process can begin on Friday of this week. That is, I emphasize, the United Nations' decision and not an American decision. And so I cannot make any pronouncement on that point, although I do wish to state that I thought it quite significant that when I met with Xanana Gusmao today, he indicated his own hope that the registration process would begin on schedule this week, so that if possible a delay in the process could be avoided, although I should add, he made it very clear that this beginning of registration should not be interpreted as a final decision that all is well on East Timor, and that the process could continue to conclusion, but rather was an effort to keep the process moving while an effort was made to improve the situation on the ground. There would have to be a later determination in his view as to whether the conditions existed to finish the process and hold the referendum or vote as scheduled. This again is a UN decision, and I cannot speak for the United Nations as to what decision will be made later this week. I think the decision is relatively imminent.

Why don't I stop at this point and open it up to your questions.

Q: I just wanted to get your views about the sincerity of the Indonesian Government in relation to restoring the security situation and having a fair and free ballot, especially your view about the military's sincerity following your meeting with General Wiranto.

Roth: Well, I haven't come here to give a report card nor to point fingers. I have come here to look for results. And the question is quite clear, what is the situation on the ground? Are there any, you know, any additional attacks on UNAMET facilities or does the situation become more secure? Is UNAMET able to move out of the eight regional centers to open up the 200 registration centers across East Timor so that they can begin the process of registration, coming up with an accurate list? Is there a cessation of violent activity by the militia groups and

an end to the climate of intimidation? Are the IDPs, the internally displaced people, allowed to return home, allowed to register, allowed to participate without fear? I think one has to look at the question of results. One has to look at where the people are punished for some of the intimidation that has taken place, whether all parties are able to campaign equally so that there is a fair process. There are many concrete indicators and, as I said, since I haven't gone there yet, it is a little premature for me to share my impressions with you or pass judgment at this point. But those are the types of things I will be looking at.

Q: I have two questions. The first question is, is it right that you bring a letter from Madeleine Albright and Kofi Annan and what is it about? And is there any special message from Kofi Annan and Albright, especially on East Timor? Second question: Is there any plan, after the attacks on UNAMET, or any US Government plan or recommendation to send peacekeeping troops to East Timor? Thanks.

Roth: First, let me state categorically, I have brought no letters, not from the Secretary of State, not from the United Nations, or any official of the U.S. Government. I came here in my stature as Assistant Secretary of State as part of a regular process, as I mentioned. But I am not bearing special letters and I am not here as an emissary. In terms of the attacks on UNAMET, I think my government has spoken very clearly expressing our sharp disapproval of what happened. We have emphasized the point that the Government of Indonesia insisted in the negotiations in New York on having responsibility for the security of the consultation that was going to take place; therefore, it has to live up to the obligation it asked for. And that's what we are looking for. But it is an Indonesian job to provide for the security. The United Nations is there as advisors; that is their role. They are not conducting the peacekeeping. Indonesia is responsible for security, and there is no American plan to introduce peacekeepers.

Q: If Indonesia fails to guarantee security in East Timor, what kind of action can we expect from the U.S. and the international community against Indonesia if the vote has to be delayed again?

Roth: As always it's difficult for me to respond to a hypothetical question except in the most general of terms. What I tried to say in my opening remarks was that East Timor represents a potential opportunity for Indonesia to demonstrate just how much Indonesia has changed from the government of the past, and that, you know, if Indonesia can demonstrate that it is committed to a fair resolution of this issue, that that will redound to the government's credit and to the credit of the people of Indonesia and there will be positive consequences. If the opposite is the case, and the agreement falls apart, and it is viewed to be the failure of the Government of Indonesia, I think it will obviously have consequences too in terms of Indonesia's reputation and in terms of the closeness in the relationship between Indonesia and a number of countries around the world including my own. But without having the specifics and without wanting getting into different scenarios, I can't get into any greater detail.

Q: Was the issue of disbanding the militias been discussed in your talks with General Wiranto? What seems to be the problem there, in not disbanding the militias?

Roth: Yes, I did discuss that topic extensively both with General Wiranto, also with Xanana Gusmao. In one sense, the problem is, who goes first? You know, each side is concerned that if it surrenders its arms and the other side doesn't, that they will be placed at a comparative

disadvantage. There are also the complex details of surrender arms to whom. Is it surrendering arms, or laying down arms, which is something different. There is a question of, does either side have total control of forces, and can they speak for all people, and so, who would implement such an agreement? So, there are many details to be worked out. But each of them expressed an interest in seeing this take place, indicating that it was an important part of the process, and it's certainly something that the United States would support. It seems to me that this is something that needs to be worked on by the Commission for Peace and Stability, or by some other mechanism, maybe through the Dare process, but that there are lots of creative opportunities for carrying this out if the two parties want to see it happen.

Q: Did you discuss the situation in Aceh with General Wiranto?

Roth: No, not this time. The discussion today focused overwhelmingly on East Timor, although I must say that the situation in Aceh remains of significant concern to the United States. We are concerned about the increasing violence that has been witnessed there, increasing in tension, and I believe one of the challenges that will face the next government of Indonesia, regardless of who is at the top, will be to try to bring the situation in Aceh to a peaceful resolution without a major loss of life. That will be a significant effort, but I believe it is essential that it be undertaken.

Q: What is your response to Mr. Alatas' statement yesterday that UNAMET seems to be biased, and that it recruited some local staff from pro-independence (groups)? Any comments on this?

Roth: I have been very candid in all my conversations with officials here to indicate that it is simply not acceptable to blame the United Nations or UNAMET for the problems; that the United Nations has great experience in many places and many continents around the world in carrying out operations of this type; that the people involved are overwhelmingly professionals who have been in many difficult situations before; and that, leaving aside the question of whether or not UNAMET has behaved perfectly, it is clear that the primary problem does not relate to the activities of UNAMET, and that that should not be the focus of concern. The real focus of concern should be getting the violence under control. And that, primarily, at this stage means the militias. Although, again, I emphasize the United States has condemned violence by all parties.

Q: Can you give us any details of your meeting with Megawati, and particularly whether she feels entitled to the presidency, and what she makes of the campaign that suggests a woman cannot be president in Indonesia?

Roth: No, I think that she has spoken for herself and doesn't need me to speak for her. Obviously, our conversation focused primarily on the electoral process itself. She obviously believes that she received a very significant mandate by virtue of the plurality where she was far ahead of the next largest candidate. And, you know, she has made public statements to this effect and I would rather let her speak for herself.

Q: In your talks with Megawati did you get a sense that there was going to be a policy reversal on East Timor should she become president? Secondly, in all your talks, to what did you get a sense that there is a twin track being pursued in East Timor between the military on the one hand and what President Habibie is hoping to achieve in East Timor?

Roth: On the first point, my clear impression from my conversation was that if the UN process had played itself out prior to the point at which,

you know, if she were selected, chosen, through the MPR process as president, that she would abide by the results. And so, there is not an intent to reverse the process.

On the second, I would say definitely not: no sense that there was a two-track policy with a split between the military and other officials. And, in fact, there were very similar comments from all the people I spoke with: the president, the foreign minister, the defense minister, about Indonesian policy, identical commitments by all of them in terms of their commitment to the process working out, to wanting to see the agreement enforced. I did not pick up a sense of differences.

***

NEWS FROM THE CARTER CENTER
ONE COPENHILL, ATLANTA, GA 30307

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Tuesday, July 27, 1999

CONTACT: In Atlanta, Deanna Congileo
404 420-5108

In Dili, Brent Preston or
Gillian Flies
62 390 313 777

R45B

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

Carter Center Weekly Report on East Timor, No. 2 July 19 – 25, 1999: Registration Continues to Run Smoothly, Security Issues Remain Key Concern

(Background: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the public consultation process on autonomy in East Timor through neutral, nonpartisan observers assessing preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign. Following is the second in a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation).

Dili, East Timor... During the past week, registration for the public consultation in East Timor continued with strong turnout of potential voters, and few reported incidents of violence. UNAMET operations are in full swing, but no date has been set for the consultation vote. While registration and other UNAMET activities are now proceeding well, The Carter Center is concerned that an atmosphere of fear and intimidation continues to prevail in many parts of East Timor.

The Center is particularly concerned about persistent reports of Indonesian military involvement in the activities of pro-integration militia groups. In direct interviews with local residents, self-proclaimed members and commanders of armed pro-integration groups, Indonesian soldiers and senior military personnel in Baucau district, Carter Center observers were told that one Timorese pro-integration group known as Saka is being armed, trained, equipped, directed and paid by the Indonesian military.

This report is based on field visits to Baucau and Manatuto districts during the past several days, and on meetings in Dili with senior Indonesian Government, military, and police officials; members of the Indonesian Government Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular Consultation; the Commission for Peace and Stability; Timorese nongovernmental organizations; UNAMET officials; representatives of international organizations; diplomats; and members of groups which favor integration into Indonesia as well as pro-independence groups.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

The Carter Center is very encouraged by the following developments in East Timor and believes that the continuation of such conditions will further enhance the opportunity for the fair conduct of the consultation.

- **Voter Registration**: Large numbers of people are registering at centers across East Timor. Carter Center observers witnessed long lines at all registration centers visited. Numerous interviews with potential voters indicate that the majority are satisfied with the conduct of registration and remain committed to participating in a peaceful, fair, and democratic consultation. Carter Center observers received no complaints about the identification requirements for registration, but many people are unaware of the availability of a UNAMET Affidavit of Birth for those who do not have the required identification. With the notable exception of internally displaced persons, it appears that the large majority of eligible voters will have the opportunity to register for the upcoming consultation.

- **The Pre-Consultation Role of UNAMET**. UNAMET has nearly completed deployment of its personnel to East Timor. The mission was fully ready for registration to begin and registration is proceeding smoothly. The UN deployed rapidly for this mission. Indonesian police have provided good security for UNAMET personnel during the registration period.

The Center continues to have serious concern, however, about continuing intimidation of the East Timorese, violations of the New York agreements and the issue of redeployment of the Indonesian military. These concerns were noted in our weekly report released July 20, 1999. To date, these issues have not been adequately addressed.

The Carter Center remains particularly concerned about reports of Indonesian military support of armed pro-integration groups and the plight of internally displaced persons. Both of these issues must be addressed to ensure conditions established by the May 5 New York Agreements for the popular consultation are met.

- **Military Support of Pro-Integration Groups**. The Carter Center has received numerous reports of Indonesian military (TNI) involvement in the activities of militias over the past several weeks, but until now has been unable to independently confirm a direct link between armed pro-integration groups and the military. Carter Center observers recently visited a number of camps in several districts that local residents claim are militia posts, and in several cases observers found evidence of Indonesian military involvement in these camps. Carter Center observers have now identified at least one group in Baucau district known as Pusaka or Saka that is being armed, trained, equipped, directed, and its members paid by the military. The existence of this group and its ties to the Indonesian military have been confirmed through interviews with local residents, members of Saka, and local senior military personnel.

- **Harassment and Intimidation Continues**. Local residents in several different areas in Bacau complained of harassment and intimidation by pro-integration groups. Residents identified Saka and Rajawali as militia groups that work in cooperation with the TNI, and say armed members visit them at night, threatening violence and bloodshed after the vote if autonomy is rejected. Members of the militia groups who were interviewed described Saka and Rajawali as Timorese military groups that fight for autonomy and reported that they work with local TNI units to provide security and promote the autonomy option.

- **Internally Displaced Persons**. Poor security conditions continue to prevent tens of thousands of internally displaced persons in East Timor from returning to their homes. For internally displaced persons to be able to participate in the consultation as provided in the New York Agreements, adequate security conditions must exist for them to return to their homes immediately and to ensure that no others are driven from their homes by intimidation or violence.

  Note: Paragraph 4 of the Security Agreement states that the Indonesian police are solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order during the consultation process. Paragraph 1 of the same agreement states that the Indonesian police and military must be absolutely neutral throughout the consultation process. It is essential that all support for Timorese groups of any description by the military cease at once and that all security functions are handed over to the police.

- **Post-Consultation Security**. Many of those interviewed by Carter Center observers fear that UNAMET will leave East Timor immediately after the vote, and are concerned about their safety. It is important, therefore, that UNAMET clearly explains the role the UN will play in East Timor after the consultation.

-END-

UNCLASSIFIED

UNAMET
USG
US Emb
GOI

Evidence of Military Support for Armed Pro-Integration Groups in Baucau District

Carter Center observers recently visited Quelicai sub-district in Baucau to observe registration activities and the overall security climate in the area. Local residents in several different areas complained of harassment and intimidation by pro-integration groups known as Saka and Rajawali, as well as by TNI soldiers. Subsequent investigations over the following days, including extensive interviews with local residents, members, former members and leaders of Saka and Rajawali, military personnel and district military commanders, revealed the following:

- Residents of Quelicai sub-district report widespread and persistent harassment and intimidation by Saka, Rajawali and the TNI. Residents identify Saka and Rajawali as militia groups that work in cooperation with the TNI, and say armed members visit them at night, threatening violence and bloodshed after the vote if autonomy is rejected. They also say that militia members and TNI officers are actively explaining and promoting the autonomy option through public meetings.

- Saka and Rajawali operate out of a post in the area that is within sight of a UNAMET registration center. Carter Center observers witnessed large amounts of military equipment and personnel wearing military fatigues within the post. Members and former members of Saka and Rajawali both within the post and in surrounding villages claim that both groups are part of the TNI and are funded, equipped, trained, directed, armed and their members paid by the DANDIM (district military commander) in Baucau. Members describe Saka and Rajawali as Timorese military groups that fight for autonomy and say that they work with local TNI units to provide security and promote the autonomy option.

- TNI personnel in Quelicai sub-district report to Carter Center observers that Saka and Rajawali are part of the TNI and that they work together to provide security and promote the autonomy option. Local TNI personnel claim that Saka and Rajawali are funded, directed, equipped, trained, armed and their members paid by the DANDIM in Baucau.

- An individual who claimed to be the commander of the Saka group met with Carter Center observers in Baucau town and claimed that Saka, Rajawali and several other groups under his control in Baucau and neighboring districts are funded, directed, equipped, trained, and their members paid by the DANDIM in Baucau, and that Saka is armed by the TNI. The commander described all of these groups as Timorese military organizations that support autonomy. The commander claimed to be a KOPASSUS (Indonesian Army Special Forces) officer. The commander confirmed that Saka and other groups are providing security but denied that they are promoting the autonomy option.

- The DANDIM for Baucau stated that Saka is part of the TNI and is composed of two parts: one official and one militia. He stated that both components are funded, directed, equipped, trained, and their members paid by his office and the official component is armed. The DANDIM denied that the TNI or pro-integration groups are providing security or promoting autonomy.

UNCLASSIFIED

"non-attribution"
basis only for use with press

C2

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

VZCZCCCR474
PTTCZYUW RUEHBYA3262 2650734-CCCC--RHHMUNA.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220734Z SEP 99 PSN 847436H32
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4919
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 3445
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1982
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 6521
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0234
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 6302
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 8158
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 4148
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0958
RUEHWLB/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND PRIORITY 0169
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0319
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0418
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 9950
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0429
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1531
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0165
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0655
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1919
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY PRIORITY 9516
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE PRIORITY 2921
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH PRIORITY 1112
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA// PRIORITY
RUHPOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT PRIORITY
RUHGOAB/CG III MEF PRIORITY
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CLARKE N ELLIS
DATE/CASE ID: 03 SEP 2008 200804559

DEPARTMENT PASS AID/BHR/OFDA FOR RWILLIAMS, EKVITASHVILI, ESIMOES, PSMITH AND ANE GANDERSON, GGEORGE, TPIERCE

MANILA FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR JSHERMAN

GENEVA PLEASE PASS TO NKYLOH FOR UNOCHA AND IPRC

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING

ROME FOR FODAG AND VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/04
TAGS: PREF, EAID, PREL, MOPS, KPKO, KCRM, UN, ID, AS
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN AID SITREP FOR SEPTEMBER 22

REF: (A) JAKARTA 004644; (B) JAKARTA 004652; (C) ROME 006530

1. CLASSIFIED BY EMBASSY ECONOMIC COUNSELOR MICHAEL J. DELANEY. REASON: 1.5 B AND D.

2. (U) NOTE: THIS MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED BY AMEMBASSY CANBERRA WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM AMCONSULATE MELBOURNE POL/ECON OFFICER CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO DARWIN.

3. (C) SUMMARY: WITH EIGHT FOOD AIRDROPS (MOSTLY U.S. HDR'S) SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 22-23, THE TEMPO OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS IS PICKING UP. AUSAID OFFICIALS MOSTLY BLAME GOI RECALCITRANCE FOR THE MEAGER AIRDROP AMOUNTS (ONLY THREE FLIGHTS) DELIVERED SO FAR. ACCORDING TO FALANTIL, AIRDROPS HAVE BEEN ACCURATE AND

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCL (2)

EFFECTIVE IN MEETING THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF THE IDP'S. THE AIRDROPS SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL EARLY NEXT WEEK.

4. (C) ATTENTION INCREASINGLY IS SHIFTING TO WEST TIMOR. UNHCR COMMISSIONER OGATA REPORTEDLY WAS ASSURED ON SEPTEMBER 20 BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE THAT IDP'S IN WEST TIMOR WOULD BE PROTECTED AND GIVEN THE CHOICE OF RETURNING TO EAST TIMOR. BOTH OGATA AND AUSAID OFFICIALS ARE SKEPTICAL THAT SUCH ASSURANCES WILL BE FOLLOWED UP ON THE GROUND. GOA OFFICIALS HOPE THAT GOI/TNI CONCERNS OVER POTENTIAL DESTABILIZATION OF WEST TIMOR WILL PROMPT TNI TO CURB MILITIA ACTIVITIES THERE. END SUMMARY

AIRDROP TEMPO INCREASES

---

5. (U) ON SEPTEMBER 22 AUSAID DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL JENNIFER RAWSON BRIEFED EMBASSY ECONOMIC COUNSELOR ON THE STATUS OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS IN EAST AND WEST TIMOR. FOUR AIRDROP FLIGHTS FROM DARWIN ARE SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 22, UTILIZING C-130 AIRCRAFT FROM THE U.S., AUSTRALIA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE WFP. THE WFP C-130 WILL DROP THE "SNOWDROP" HIGH ENERGY BISCUITS, WHILE THE OTHER C-130'S WILL DROP THE U.S.-SUPPLIED HDR'S. PLANS CALL FOR A FURTHER FOUR AIRDROP FLIGHTS TOMORROW (SEPTEMBER 23). WITH THE ARRIVAL OF ALL 300,000 HDR'S IN DARWIN, THERE ARE NOW ADEQUATE FOOD SUPPLIES AVAILABLE IN DARWIN FOR SUSTAINED AIRDROP OPERATIONS.

MEAGER AIRDROP RESULTS BLAMED ON GOI RECALCITRANCE

---

6. (C) AUSAID OFFICIALS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE INCREASED TEMPO OF THE AIRLIFT OPERATION. WHILE THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY FOR FEAR OF FURTHER ANTAGONIZING THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES, THEY LAY THE

DEPARTMENT PASS AID/BHR/OFDA FOR RWILLIAMS, EKVITASHVILI, ESIMOES, PSMITH AND ANE GANDERSON, GGEORGE, TPIERCE

MANILA FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR JSHERMAN

GENEVA PLEASE PASS TO NKYLOH FOR UNOCHA AND IFRC

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING

ROME FOR FODAG AND VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/04
TAGS: PREF, EAID, PREL, MOPS, KPKO, KCRM, UN, ID, AS
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN AID SITREP FOR SEPTEMBER 22

LION'S SHARE OF THE BLAME FOR THE 7-DAY OLD AIRDROP OPERATION'S MEAGER RESULTS (PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 22, ONLY THREE AIRDROP FLIGHTS HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT) SQUARELY ON THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES. THE GOI HAS REQUIRED CASE BY CASE FLIGHT APPROVAL, WHICH NECESSARILY LIMITS THE NUMBER OF FLIGHTS POSSIBLE PER DAY. ALSO, DARWIN-BASED FLIGHTS HAVE HAD TO LAND IN DILI TO BE SEARCHED AND TAKE ON BOARD A TNI VERIFIER/OBSERVER BEFORE PERFORMING THE AIRDROP. AUSAID OFFICIALS ESTIMATE THAT SUCH "GRATUITOUSLY BURDENSOME" REQUIREMENTS HAVE REDUCED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIRDROP OPERATION BY 90 PERCENT (OTHER FACTORS, SUCH AS WEATHER, AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY,

AND LOGISTICAL BOTTLENECKS AT DILI HAVE PLAYED COMPARATIVELY MINOR ROLES IN SLOWING THE OPERATION, ACCORDING TO THESE OFFICIALS). AUSAID OFFICIALS HOPE THAT INTERFET CONTROL OF THE DILI AIRPORT AND THE (IT IS HOPED) IMMINENT AVAILABILITY OF THE BAUCAU AIRPORT (WHICH REPORTEDLY IS A BETTER FACILITY THAN DILI) WILL ALLOW MORE AIRDROP FLIGHTS.

COORDINATION WITH FALANTIL

---

7. (C) WFP OFFICIAL PETER ISKANDER TOLD DARWIN POL/ECON OFFICER THAT HE IS IN DAILY CONTACT WITH XANANA GUSMAO AND HIS AIDES TO COORDINATE FOOD DROPS. EVERYONE INVOLVED ESTIMATES THAT THE AIRDROPS ARE BEING ACCURATELY PLACED AND ARE HAVING A POSITIVE IMPACT ON IDP'S WELFARE.

AIRDROPS TO CONTINUE FOR ANOTHER WEEK

---

8. (U) RAWSON ESTIMATES THAT AIRDROPS WILL BE NECESSARY UNTIL "EARLY NEXT WEEK." AFTER THAT TIME, IT IS HOPED THAT DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS USING TRUCKS AND FOOD DEPOTS WILL BE ADEQUATE.

CIVILIAN/MILITARY COOPERATION IMPROVING

---

9. (U) DARWIN POL/ECON OFFICER REPORTS THAT, UNDER WFP LEADERSHIP, THE AID EFFORT GRADUALLY IS BECOMING BETTER COORDINATED. EARLIER, THE POLITICS BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS UNAMET, UNHCR, AND OCHA LED TO DUPLICATION OF EFFORTS, WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION, AND LACK OF LIAISON. WITH WFP AS A SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT, THINGS ARE IMPROVING ALTHOUGH SOME RIFTS AND PARALLEL OPERATIONS STILL EXIST.

10. (U) AUSAID'S RAWSON TOLD US THAT COORDINATION WITH THE MILITARY (INTERFET) ALSO IS IMPROVING. AUSAID'S REPS IN DARWIN CHARACTERIZED THEIR AGENCY'S EFFORTS TO DATE AS "BUILDING, AND REBUILDING, A HOUSE OF CARDS." THEY RECOUNTED WOES SUCH AS, THAT AUSAID'S

DEPARTMENT PASS AID/BHR/OFDA FOR RWILLIAMS, EKVITASHVILI, ESIMOES, PSMITH AND ANE GANDERSON, GGEORGE, TPIERCE

MANILA FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR JSHERMAN

GENEVA PLEASE PASS TO NKYLOH FOR UNOCHA AND IPRC

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING

ROME FOR FODAG AND VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/04
TAGS: PREF, EAID, PREL, MOPS, KPKO, KCRM, UN, ID, AS
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN AID SITREP FOR SEPTEMBER 22

CONTRACTOR PROVIDED AN AIRCRAFT THAT LACKED AIRDROP FACILITIES; THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY TOLD AUSAID THAT AN AIRCRAFT WAS AVAILABLE AND THEN REVERSED ITSELF; AND LACK OF AIRCRAFT PARKING SPACE WAS CAUSING DELAYS IN DELIVERIES OF RELIEF SUPPLIES. "BUT NOW WE HAVE IN PLACE A GOOD COOPERATION STRUCTURE WITH INTERFET," SAID RAWSON, "AND THINGS ARE GETTING BETTER."

ATTENTION SHIFTING TO WEST TIMOR

---

11. (C) RAWSON SAID THAT HER AGENCY NOW REGARDS WEST TIMOR AS THE MORE WORRISOME ISSUE. ACCESS REMAINS A PROBLEM, PARTICULARLY IN THE LARGER CAMPS WHERE THE MILITIA ARE IN CONTROL. THERE ALSO ARE PROBLEMS WITH ACCESS TO WATER, SANITATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL HYGIENE. RAWSON REPORTS THAT THE GOI HAS GIVEN UNHCR PERMISSION TO BEGIN INTERVIEWING DISPLACED PERSONS IN WEST TIMOR TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY WANT TO RETURN HOME. WFP HAS REPORTED THAT AT THIS STAGE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO DISTRIBUTE FOOD SUPPLIES TO IDP'S IN WEST TIMOR IS THROUGH POSKO, A NETWORK OF LOCAL NGO'S.

12. (C) COMMENTING ON UNHCR COMMISSIONER SADAKO OGATA'S MISSION TO INDONESIA, RAWSON SAID THAT OGATA TOLD GOA OFFICIALS THAT ON SEPTEMBER 20 PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAD ASSURED HER THAT IDP'S IN WEST TIMOR WOULD BE PROTECTED AND GIVEN THE CHOICE OF RETURNING TO EAST TIMOR. HOWEVER, OGATA EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT SUCH ASSURANCES WOULD BE FOLLOWED THROUGH ON THE GROUND. SUCH SKEPTICISM IS ALMOST UNIVERSAL HERE IN AUSTRALIA. HOWEVER, RAWSON SAID THAT THE GOA HOPES THAT GROWING REALIZATION WITHIN THE GOI AND TNI THAT MILITIA CONTROL OF WEST TIMOR COULD LEAD TO DESTABILIZATION OF THAT AREA OF INDONESIA, WILL COMPEL TNI TO REIN IN THE MILITIAS.
HOLMES
BT
#3262

NNNN

MORI DocID: 1054667

Top Secret TIER

CIA APLA IR 99-40507

Intelligence Report

Office of Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis *10 May 1999*

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Indonesia: Challenges Facing East Timor

Summary

The government's commitment to President Habibie's sudden and uncoordinated pledge to offer East Timor a choice between greater autonomy and quick independence has become less certain since the announcement in late January. Reporting indicates a lack of consensus on the issue among key senior officials.

APPROVED FOR
DATE: MAR 200

Lack of firm leadership from Jakarta has encouraged civilian militias and their prointegration supporters to continue attacking independence advocates throughout the province.

- *Armed Forces Commander Wiranto's vow to enforce a recent cease-fire agreement has not stopped prointegration militias from continuing their campaign of violence and intimidation against independence supporters, many of whom remain in hiding.*
- *The disarming of all warring factions is crucial to ensuring a free and fair ballot, but, until genuine attempts at reconciliation commence and the military ends its tacit support of the militias, East Timor's security situation will remain volatile.*

Indonesian and Portuguese negotiators have agreed that the province will vote on its future on 8 August but, if violence continues, we cannot be confident that the polling process will take place or how orderly it will be.

- *Sustained unrest could lead UN officials to preempt the ballot in August.*
- *A free and fair ballot will still require approval from Indonesia's newly formed national legislature, which may not approve a close vote for independence.*

MORI DocID: 1054667

Jakarta Sending Mixed Signals . . .

The Indonesian Government lacks a consensus on how to proceed with President Habibie's public pledge in late January to allow East Timor to become independent by yearend if the troubled province rejects autonomy:

- Some government ministers who previously supported independence now privately argue in favor of the autonomy option because they fear granting independence would trigger separatist outbreaks in other provinces,
- opposition within the ruling Golkar party was complicating Habibie's handling of the issue.
- Foreign Minister Alatas has had several heated arguments with presidential foreign affairs adviser Dewi Fortuna Anwar—who helped formulate Habibie's autonomy proposal—over her involvement in East Timor policy. In early April, Alatas told her that she was damaging the Foreign Ministry's credibility because he and his Ministry repeatedly had to deal with repercussions from her unsanctioned statements to the media about the future of East Timor.

Support for Habibie's East Timor initiative also appears tenuous among senior military officers, including Armed Forces Commander Wiranto, who has taken no action against the prointegration civilian militias or discipline against local military units that, if not abetting, have at the least tolerated these groups:

- Wiranto has repeatedly promised that the military is a neutral force, but local commanders would have required at least tacit approval from headquarters in Jakarta to allow the militias the blatant free hand they have enjoyed. security authorities knew in advance about a planned militia rally on 17 April in the provincial capital of Dili, permitted it to occur, and were ineffective in curbing the violence that led to some 20 deaths.
- the military may be seeking to manipulate the polling process in favor of the autonomy option by allowing the militias to create disturbances. The military's

MORI DocID: 1054667

Speculating on Habibie's Ulterior Motives

Habibie's sudden and uncoordinated decision to offer independence to the East Timorese is, at a minimum, characteristic of his mercurial leadership style; his continued neglect at keeping key players within the Indonesian Government in the loop on East Timor is exacerbating differences. Habibie's initiative to allow the Timorese to determine their own future may have been designed only to improve his own short-term political prospects:

- Presidential foreign affairs adviser Dewi Fortuna Anwar advocated autonomy in early 1999. According to Anwar, independence was proposed to demonstrate Indonesia's democratic credentials and would be taken only if unspecified efforts to sway proindependence East Timorese failed.

- Habibie has repeatedly told US and foreign officials since his announcement in January that Indonesia has no strategic, economic, political, or cultural interest in retaining East Timor. The director of Indonesia's civilian intelligence agency—who has close ties to Habibie—stated in mid-March, however, that Jakarta's offer of independence was for "foreign consumption" only and did not reflect the government's true intentions, which were to ensure the province remained part of Indonesia.

- the President viewed his initiative on East Timor as a political ploy designed to improve his party's prospects in the legislative elections in June by stifling international criticism that might benefit opponents; however, Habibie would withdraw Jakarta's acquiescence to an independence option upon securing the presidency later in the fall.

strategy, [redacted] is to kill, drive out, or intimidate into silence independence activists and to cow the general population into acceptance of an East Timor under Jakarta's control.

- [redacted]

. . . That Cultivates Culture of Violence

Jakarta's mixed signals coupled with local military support have encouraged the prointegration civilian militias to carry on a violent campaign against the independence movement in the last few months:

- The armed forces has trained and provided logistic support to many of the militia units, [redacted] enabling these disparate forces to operate with some degree of coordination. As a result, prointegrationist forces have been able to easily target independence supporters, especially in the western districts of the province.

- The militias' leaders fear retribution by the majority proindependence population and are strongly motivated by desires to protect their wealth, [redacted] For their part, many local military units have vested interests with and emotional ties to the militias. [redacted]

The violence has not been entirely one sided, but proindependence guerrilla attacks against the military and prointegrationists have been relatively restrained, and rebels, for the most part, did not heed jailed rebel leader Xanana Gusmao's public call in early April for his supporters to take up arms in defense:

- [redacted] most of East Timor's proindependence leadership are in hiding—lacking any guarantee from the police for their protection—and the failure of rebel forces to respond to militia aggression is partly due to the fact that they are now disorganized and on the defensive.

- [redacted] despite his call to arms, Xanana remains committed to a path of peaceful dialogue. His Jakarta-based advisers have subsequently directed his followers in East Timor to make

Security Arrangements for Ballot Remain Vague

Indonesia and Portugal on 5 May signed an agreement setting 8 August as the date for the autonomy ballot and paving the way for the deployment of a small UN civilian monitoring force to oversee the polls. These latest efforts, however, have side-stepped security arrangements for the ballot at the behest of Indonesia. Portuguese officials allege that a miscommunication between their negotiating team and jailed rebel leader Xanana Gusmao led the Portuguese delegation to the UN talks to pay insufficient attention to the document on security:

- The two sides failed to agree on joint disarmament by the rival factions—a crucial precondition to stopping the cycle of violence in the runup to the ballot. Disarmament is only mentioned as something the recently established, but not yet operational peace and stability commission should "endeavor to achieve."

- It is unclear who has responsibility to maintain security. The draft initially required the Indonesian military to substantially reduce its presence in the province by July, and the local police to take sole responsibility for maintaining law and order during the ballot process. The arrangement now refers responsibility for security to the "appropriate Indonesian security authorities."

Habibie has agreed publicly to include an international police force as part of the UN presence, but insists they will act in an advisory role, not as peacekeepers, and be allowed only to carry handguns. President Habibie and Armed Forces Commander Wiranto initially told Australian Prime Minister Howard they could accept an international force of between 200 and 300 police, but retreated from this number and allowed only that they would permit "an adequate number."

whatever temporary accommodations necessary to stay alive until an international force establishes a more secure environment.

Radical elements within the insurgency, however, are likely to react if civilian militias continue their attacks, despite the cease-fire signed on 21 April between proindependence and prointegrationist leaders and witnessed by Wiranto. One Xanana adviser insists that rebel forces will not take action against the militias without the approval of the jailed guerrilla leader.

Independence Not a Sure Bet

most East Timorese would reject Indonesia's autonomy package in favor of independence if a free and fair ballot were held. Independence supporters make frequent public assertions that the vast majority of East Timorese want independence. most senior Indonesian officials in East Timor concede it is unlikely that a ballot will result in Jakarta's favor. Proindependence Timorese could try to stage a boycott locally of the legislative elections in June to signal the province's opposition to integration with Indonesia.

The uncertainty of Indonesia's commitment to allowing East Timor to determine its future and the province's volatile security situation are key determinants of whether a free and fair ballot under UN auspices can take place in the province later this summer. Several scenarios could develop that would derail the process toward independence.

Ballot is Postponed. Continued violence could indefinitely delay a vote on the autonomy proposal. current conditions in the province could prevent a poll, and, in our judgment, the ballot scheduled for 8 August could be pushed back even further if Jakarta cannot guarantee the security of UN personnel deployed to the province to oversee the polls:

- Continued attacks by prointegration militias threaten to degenerate into a protracted conflict. Dili has remained tense since the cease-fire, with militias making house-to-house searches for independence supporters under cover of night. The reports of prointegration violence outside of the provincial capital, but details remain vague as militia roadblocks prevent easy access to all parts of the province.
-

MORI DocID: 1054667

Indonesia: Critical Steps Toward an Independent East Timor

End to Serious Violence

- Indonesian military withdraws support from prointegration civilian militias to establish public faith in its neutrality.
- Reconciliation talks involving proindependence and prointegration leaders resume.
- Rebel forces and civilian militias maintain ceasefire and disarm.

UN-Led Ballot on Autonomy

- UN and Indonesia agree to terms on security arrangements.
- The ballot is widely perceived as free and fair.
- The ballot outcome is decisive in rejecting Jakarta's autonomy plan.

Legislative Decision

- The legislative election on 7 June results in new Peoples' Consultative Assembly that is willing to rescind the annexation of East Timor.

Confidential

368160PM 4-99

~~Top Secret~~

Ballot Not Viewed As Free and Fair. Expecting to win by a wide margin, proindependence leaders are likely to view an outcome favoring autonomy as evidence of manipulation by prointegrationists. Conversely, prointegrationists could escalate violent attacks as a last-ditch response if the vote rejects autonomy and East Timor appeared poised to be granted independence. The UN will insist on a completely secret ballot so that neither individuals nor villages can be targeted for retribution on the basis of their voting pattern.

Legislature Rejects Ballot Results. Even if East Timorese reject autonomy, the newly formed Peoples' Consultative Assembly (MPR) still needs to revoke the nation's 1975 decree that integrated East Timor into Indonesia—an action that will revert the province to a UN-administered, non-self-governing territory with Portugal as the administering power until which time it is declared independent. The assembly would find it difficult to reject a ballot that indicated an overwhelming majority of East Timorese opposed the autonomy proposal, but a close vote could provide enough cause for the assembly to abort the process and retain the province without risking international condemnation. Opposition leader Megawati—who has criticized Habibie's East Timor policy—could emerge from the legislative elections in June as the leader of a coalition government and not feel bound by a ballot initiated by Habibie.

Partition of East Timor. A less likely option for the MPR would be to partition the province with the western districts—where a majority of prointegrationist militias are located—remaining with Jakarta and the eastern portion becoming independent. Proindependence leaders, however, are unlikely to accept such a compromise, and UN officials refused to consider a similar proposal made by prointegrationists in February,

MORI DocID: 1054667



MORI DocID: 1054667

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Indonesia: Challenges Facing East Timor

Pub Num: 98-40507

Distribution:

TOP SECRET

MORI DocID: 1054667

SUBJECT: Indonesia: Challenges Facing East Timor

Pub Num: 98-40507

Distribution:

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Indonesia: Challenges Facing East Timor

Pub Num: 98-40507

Distribution:

MORI DocID: 1054666

~~Top Secret~~ TIER

CIAPASS SEIB 99-118CX

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

The SEIB must be returned to CIA within 5 working days

Saturday, 22 May 1999

National Security Information

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Reproduction of this Document Prohibited

Readership is limited to those on approved reader list on file with CIA SEIB Control Officer. The undersigned hereby acknowledge reading this document.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2004

****** EYES ONLY ******

MORI DocID: 1054666

Table of Contents

Leading Development

Indonesia: Militia Terrorism Intensifying in East Timor 1

2

3

5

7

8

9

10

11

MORI DocID: 1054666

Top Secret

[redacted]

Leading Development

Indonesia: **Militia Terrorism Intensifying in East Timor (S NF)**

[redacted] that prointegration militias are holding more than 35,000 East Timorese in several camps with inadequate food, water, shelter, and medical care. [redacted] some camps are located at military installations, ***suggesting Army collusion.***

— Most of those in the camps are women and children fleeing violence in their villages, and a number are family members of independence supporters. Some women claim they have been sexually assaulted.

— [redacted] prointegrationists say these forced evacuations are a prelude to "cleansing" operations directed against independence supporters. [redacted]

The US defense attache says the armed forces appear to have only limited control over the more aggressive militias, ***whose violent attacks are undermining Jakarta's commitment to the safety of UN officials in the province.*** [redacted] that he saw one militia unit last week attack houses in Dili within sight of UN Mission members and journalists; the military arrived 50 minutes later and did not intervene.

— [redacted] Foreign Minister Alatas this month said he tried to dissuade the leader of one of the more violent militias from targeting UN personnel but admitted his attempt "guarantees nothing." [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Top Secret
22 May 1999

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

a. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions	UNCLASSIFIED Classification/Control Markings	This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: INDONESIA (ID)

2. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

3. TITLE: Indonesian Army Engineer Activity in East Timor

4. PROJECT NUMBER:

5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 781215

6. DATE OF REPORT: 781219

7. DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 781218 (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. REFERENCES: INITATIVE

(b)(3):10 USC 424

9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE C, INFO

10. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424

11. REQUEST EVALUATION ____, QPQ _____ (country)

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)

14. SOURCE: ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN

124

15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DIRC YES ☐ NO ☒

16. SUMMARY: This reports planned road construction in East Timor, to be accomplished by the Indonesian Corps of Engineers. The road is planned to connect Batugede,Maliana, Dili,Baukau and Los Palos (on the eastern tip of East Timor). The road would be approximately 300 Kilometers in length and may cost as much as ten million Rupiah ($16,129.00) per kilometer to construct. The project has an estimated two year duration. The heavy construction equipment is expected to be sent to East Timor during Dec 78 on board Indonesian Navy ships.

Rec'd (b)(3):10 USC 424 12 JAN 79

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

AREA CODES:

18. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
DIA *(original)*
IPAC I53
FICPAC

19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA:

20. ENCLOSURES:
NONE

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ENCL 00

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification/Control Markings

21. This IR contains 1 pages.

DD Form 1 SEP 76 1396

1 SEPT 62 EDITION MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 MAR 77

C

MORI DocID: 1081432

TOP SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

27 September 1983

Indonesia: Military Developments in East Timor

Summary

Jakarta has launched a major operation to eliminate all resistance by Fretilin guerrillas in East Timor following the breakdown of a three-month ceasefire. As many as 18,000 Indonesian troops may be involved against an estimated 600 armed guerrillas in the largest campaign since 1981. Despite the personal commitment of Indonesian Armed Forces Commander Murdani to the operation's success, in our judgment it is unlikely to enjoy better fortune than its predecessors before the onset of the rainy season in December. Moreover, as news of the operation becomes widespread in the foreign press, increased international criticism of Indonesia's East Timor policy is likely. A side effect of the renewed fighting is the prospect of a cooling in Australian-Indonesian relations should the Hawke government accede to the demands of the Labor Party's left-wing for a tougher stand over the East Timor issue.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2004

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] *Office of East Asian Analysis. Information as of 21 September 1983 was used in its preparation.*

MORI DocID: 1081432

Recent Developments

The current fighting follows the breakdown of a three-month old de facto ceasefire that began in May when talks were held between the Fretilin leadership and government representatives. The talks, however, quickly reached a stalemate when Fretilin presented the Indonesians with four unacceptable demands:

-- Removal of all Indonesian troops from the province.

-- Appointment of East Timorese to leading provincial administrative positions.

-- A popular referendum.

-- International supervision of the referendum.

Although lower level meetings were subsequently held between local authorities and guerrilla bands, discussions remained deadlocked.

Against this backdrop ABRI Commander Murdani in mid-July called for Fretilin to surrender or face military action.

Initially Jakarta believed the attack was made by about 100 renegade guerrillas and ordered the provincial commander to bring them to justice by the end of the month. Ensuing clashes, coupled with further defections of armed civilians, disclosed a more widespread insurgency. Small-scale engagements between guerrillas and government forces, usually in the form of attacks on military outposts, villages, or clashes between patrols, marked the level of fighting for the remainder of the month.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Murdani was said to be outraged by the surprise Fretilin attacks and ordered that they be answered with the strongest military force.

Fretilin Strength and Operations

Fretilin sympathizers in the villages not only provide information and supplies to the guerrillas but, enable the guerrillas to cover preparations for attack. The guerrillas also carry out propaganda activities among the villagers, reminding local officials of their Timorese heritage, and calling upon them to join in the struggle to liberate their country. Native civil defense personnel are also encouraged to defect.

Fretilin combat operations are conducted in typical guerrilla fashion. Forces operate in small groups to provide greater freedom of action, concentrating when the opportunity presents itself to attack Indonesian outposts, preferably at night or early morning. Ambushes are established along critical government supply routes. Civil defense posts are a particular target for raids and sabotage,

MORI DocID: 1081432

The Current Picture

Current military operations in East Timor involve over 18,000 Indonesian troops*, a threefold increase from the July figure of 6,000 personnel. (An additional 2,000 men are scheduled to be brought in soon.) Five Task Forces have been established under the Provincial Military Command to conduct this operation. Their primary tasks are: destroy the armed guerrillas, restore security and order, support local authorities, and continue development efforts in the area.

In addition to the participating ground forces, elements of the Indonesian Air Force were being readied for possible support operations as of 14 September.

International Implications

The outbreak of hostilities will deal a serious setback to Indonesian efforts to remove the issue of East Timor from international debate, coming as it does on the heels of an Australian parliamentary delegation's recent visit (28 July to 1 August) to the province, and shortly before the annual UN deliberations on the issue. Prior to the renewal of fighting, Jakarta had conducted a major lobbying campaign to gain sufficient support to defeat this year's resolution on East Timor in the UN General Assembly, and thereby eliminate it from future agendas. As recently as mid-September, prospects for success were promising. However, Jakarta now appears to have reversed its position and has joined Portugal in supporting a

*See Appendix

MORI DocID: 1081432

move in the General Assembly to postpone consideration of the resolution until the next session. We believe Jakarta is probably loath to take any chances on an assembly vote at the moment, and postponement will save Indonesia the embarrassment of a vote amidst accounts of increased fighting. Jakarta has suffered a series of setbacks for its East Timor policy since the beginning of September, including the adoption of a resolution critical of Indonesia in a subcommission of the UN Human Rights Commission.

Jakarta is keeping a lid on domestic coverage of the fighting and Foreign Minister Mochtar has denounced foreign wire service reports of a large military operation as unfounded allegations. Nonetheless, the international press continues to carry reports of the fighting with varying degrees of accuracy. As the scope of the present military operations in the province becomes more fully known, we expect increased debate in international arenas, more criticism, and further political reversals for the Indonesians

Reports of fighting on the island have already undermined the moderate conclusions reached by the Australian parliamentary delegation in its recently released report.

Foreign Minister Hayden has expressed the government's concern over reports of a military buildup on the island and said that any resumption of hostilities would represent a step backwards from a lasting peaceful settlement.

Domestic Implications

General Murdani has an important stake in the outcome of the campaign not only as ABRI Commander ultimately responsible for the military's performance, but also because he is the principal

authority for East Timor policy.

the fighting in East Timor may be providing additional ammunition to Murdani's critics in the government who have been privately criticizing his role in the "mysterious shooting" campaign against suspected criminals.

Short Term Prospects

Barring the unlikely possibility of large-scale Fretilin defections to the government or a major coup such as the capture of Fretilin leadership or the destruction of sizeable groups of guerrillas, we believe that the current operation, after an initial flurry of activity, will gradually wind down by the beginning of the rainy season in December. However, unlike past operations, Murdani's commitment to the destruction of Fretilin, leads us to expect a more vigorous effort than in the past, which could put considerable pressure on Fretilin to resume negotiations, if only to gain a respite. Nonetheless, both sides appear as uncompromising as ever. Although an embarrassment to Murdani, we do not believe the renewal of fighting, in itself, seriously threatens his position in the government.

MORI DocID: 1081432



MORI DocID: 1081432



MORI DocID: 1081432



700215 9-83

RELEASED IN FULL

ER3A

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to thank you for your recent letter expressing frank views on the human rights situation in East Timor. As you are well aware, human rights abuses in East Timor are a long-standing concern of the international community.

Like you, I was deeply concerned by the tragic shootings in East Timor in November 1991. We belive that Indonesia must still do more before we are convinced it has dealt with this tragedy in a full and complete manner. For example, many of those missing still remain to be accounted for. We have also pressed for a reduction in the severity of the sentences given to civilian demonstrators.

To underscore our concern, we co-sponsored with you and your European Community colleagues a resolution critical of Indonesian policy in East Timor during the recent session of the UN Human Rights Commission. This balanced resolution gave support for positive actions by Indonesia while emphasizing measures which must still be taken. U.S. support for this resolution does not, however, change our position, held since 1976, that we accept Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor without maintaining that a valid act of self-determination has taken place.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 13 MAY 2004 200300573

His Excellency

Mario Soares,

President of the Portuguese Republic,

Lisbon.

LOT 93D395 BOX 12371

We continue to support strongly efforts by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to advance the dialogue between Indonesia and Portugal on East Timor. I hope that when your Foreign Minister meets Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas in April they will both be able to adopt a flexible and constructive approach which can lead to some positive results.

Rest assured that the United States will continue to emphasize to Indonesia the importance we attach to improvements in the human rights situation in East Timor.

Sincerely,

William J. Clinton

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

R2

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 USUN N 03727 01 OF 03 022025Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SCT-03	SIL-00
	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	RPE-01	CORE-00	/069W			

----------DE0FD2 022040Z /38

R 022015Z AUG 93
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8565
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 003727

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: UN SPONSORED TALKS ON EAST TIMOR

REFTEL: STATE 193101

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. WE FIND NO CHANGE IN THE [redacted] B1
[redacted] NORMALLY PESSIMISTLC VIEW OF PROSPECTS IN THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 03727 01 OF 03 022025Z
SHORT TERM FOR SUCCESS IN THE UN-SPONSORED TALKS ON EAST TIMORQ ADVERSE PUBLICITY ASSOCIATED WITH THE XANANA TRIAL, ICRC DIFFICULTIES IN SCHEDULING PRISON VISITS, AND THE PRESENCE OF EAST TIMORESE ASYLUM SEEKERS LN NORDIC EMBASSIES IN JAKARTA HAVE MUDDIED THE WATERS, BUT THE SYG HAS NOT MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF POSTPONLNG THE NEXT ROUND OF MINISTERIAL TALKS IN SEPTEMBER.

3. C-24 CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR ON

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 13 MAY 2004 200300604

JULY 13-14 BROUGHT THE USUAL FIREWORKS, WITH INDONESIA, SUPPORTED FOR THE FIRST TIME BY TUNISIA AND INDIA, STOUTLY DEFENDING ITSELF AGAINST STRONG CENSURE FROM THE PORTUGUESE AND A LONG LIST OF PETITIONERS. NEITHER THE PORTUGUESE NOR INDONESIANS MISSIONS, HOWEVER, THOUGHT EVENTS IN THE C-24 WOULD PREVENT THE ROLLOVER OF THE EAST TIMOR LTEM DURING THE 48TH UNGA. END SUMMARY.

4. WE DISCUSSED THE STATUS OF THE UN-SPONSORED TALKS BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND INDONESIA ON EAST TIMOR WITH [redacted] ON B1
JULY 30 AND WITH [redacted] EARLIER IN THE B1
MONTH.

5. [redacted] WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR B1
PROGRESS IN THE SHORT TERM IN THE UN-SPONSORED TALKS. HE SAID THE CONDUCT AND OUTCOME OF THE XANANA TRIAL, THE DIFFICULTIES THE ICRC HAD HAD IN RESUMING ITS PRISON VISITS TO EAST TIMOR, AND THE PRESENCE OF EAST TIMORESE ASYLUM SEEKERS IN NORDIC EMBASSIES IN JAKARTA HAD "MUDDIED THE WATERS" AND DERAILED PLANS FOR MISSION-LEVEL MEETINGS IN PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT

CONFIDENTIAL

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN SEPTEMBER. PORTUGUESE [redacted] TOLD [redacted] THAT **B1**
HIS FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TOLD THE SYG IN VIENNA (AT THE WORLD CONFERENCE) THAT CONDITIONS IN EAST TIMOR MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR PORTUGAL TO CONSIDER "POSITIVE GESTURES" IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DIALOGUE WITH INDONESIA.

6. [redacted] CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO B1
MISSION-LEVEL MEETINGS SINCE BEFORE THE ROME TALKS IN APRIL. HE SAID A MEETING OF PERMREPS WAS SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 7-8, HOWEVER, IN PREPARATION FOR THE SCHEDULED MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 17. IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTION, HE SAID THE SYG HAD NOT RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF POSTPONING THE MINISTERIAL AND PLANS FOR THE TALKS IN THE SECRETARIAT (HOWEVER MINIMAL IN THE AUGUST LULL) WERE GOING AHEAD. THAT SAID, [redacted] DID NOT THINK A POSTPONEMENT WOULD SIGNAL B1
THE END OF THE UN EFFORT. THE SYG HAD GIVEN A COPY OF WAKO'S SECOND REPORT TO ALATAS IN VIENNA AND URGED HIM TO CONSIDER SOME OF THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

WAKO HAD RECOMMENDED (E.G. VISITS BY JOURNALISTS, NGO'S). WITH PROGRESS ON THIS DIFFICULT ISSUE MEASURED IN VERY SMALL STEPS, [redacted] THOUGHT INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL WOULD FIND SOME WAY OF KEEPING THE TALKS GOING. B1

7. [redacted] COMMENTED TO US IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE RELATIVE POWER OF THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN INDONESIA WOULD HAVE TO SHIFT DRAMATICALLY BEFORE ANY REAL IMPROVEMENT IN CONDITIONS IN EAST TIMOR WOULD BE POSSIBLE. THE SECRETARIAT UNDERSTOOD THIS DYNAMIC AND WAS, THEREFORE, RELUCTANT TO PRESS FOR MORE THAN WHAT B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USUN N 03727 01 OF 03 022025Z
THE TRAFFIC (I.E., THE INDONESIAN MILITARY) WOULD BEAR.

8. [redacted] OFFICER WHO FOLLOWS THIS ISSUE CLOSELY OPINED THAT, WHILE PORTUGAL'S COMPLAINTS SEEMED TO THREATEN THE VIABILITY OF THE TALKS, PORTUGAL HAD A VESTED INTEREST IN KEEPING THE TALKS GOING. THE COMPLAINTS WERE PART OF AN ANNUAL EFFORT TO WRING SOME VISIBLE CONCESSION OUT OF THE INDONESIANS, SO THAT THE (PORTUGUESE) GOVERNMENT COULD JUSTIFY THE ANNUAL ROLLOVER OF THE ITEM IN THE GA TO ITS DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCY. PORTUGAL UNDERSTOOD THAT IT MIGHT NOT PREVAIL IF THE ITEM DID COME UP AGAIN IN THE GA (RESOLUTIONS CRITICAL OF THE INDONESIAN INTERVENTION WERE ADOPTED WITH DWINDLING MAJORITIES BETWEEN 1975 AND 1982, WHEN THE RESOLUTION PASSED BY ONLY FOUR VOTES, WITH LESS THAN HALF THE UN MEMBERSHIP VOTING IN FAVOR). B1

C-24 CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR

9. THE C-24 UNDERTOOK ITS ANNUAL CONSIDERATION OF EAST TIMOR AUGUST 13-14. PORTUGAL AND INDONESIA MADE THEIR STANDARD HARDLINE STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. 20 PETITIONERS (INCLUDING

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 03727 02 OF 03 022026Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SCT-03	SIL-00
	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	RPE-01	CORE-00	/069W			

----------DE0FDD 022040Z /38

R 022015Z AUG 93
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8566
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 003727

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: UN SPONSORED TALKS ON EAST TIMOR

FRETILIN, ASIA WATCH, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENTARIANS, AMONG OTHERS) PRESENTED THE USUAL ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. FOR THE FIRST TIME, OTHER C-24 MEMBERS (TUNISIA AND INDIA) WERE DRAWN INTO THE DEBATE IN SUPPORT OF INDONESIAN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROCEEDINGS. THE SESSION CONCLUDED WITH THE USUAL DECISION BY THE COMMITTEE TO TAKE NO ACTION BUT TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 03727 02 OF 03 022026Z

10. THE PETITIONERS ATTACKED INDONESIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IN EAST TIMOR FROM A VARIETY OF ANGLES. AMNESTY

INTERNATIONAL SAID THE DENIAL OF THE RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION AND THE DEATHS OF LARGE NUMBERS OF EAST TIMORESE SINCE THE INDONESIAN INTERVENTION INDICATED AN "INSTITUTIONALIZED AND SYSTEMIC" ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. MANY INTERVENTIONS FOCUSED ON THE XANANA TRIAL, INCLUDING ON HIS SENTENCING AND ALLEGED ILL-TREATMENT AND ON THE FACT THAT INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS WERE DENIED ACCESS TO SOME OF THE TRIAL SESSIONS. A NEW ELEMENT THIS YEAR WAS THE CLAIM THAT INDONESIAN SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS IN EAST TIMOR RAPED EAST TIMORESE WOMEN WITH IMPUNITY (AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO CAPITALIZE ON INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF SERBIAN WAR CRIMES). THE PETITIONERS ALSO MENTIONED:

-- THE SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY, SIGNALLED BY ITS SUPPORT FOR THE MARCH 1993 COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION ON EAST TIMOR;

-- THE SUSPENSION OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA FOLLOWING THE SANTA CRUZ MASSACRE AND THE LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON FROM 43 SENATORS ON THE EVE OF HIS MEETING WITH SUHARTO AT THE TOKYO G-7 SUMMIT;

-- INCREASED UN INTEREST IN EAST TIMOR, INDICATED BY THE CHR RESOLUTION, THE WAKO MISSION AND THE ELEVATION OF THE UN-SPONSORED DIALOGUE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL;

-- ICRC SUSPENSION OF ITS VISITS PROGRAM IN EAST TIMOR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USUN N 03727 02 OF 03 022026Z

BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES;

-- THE EAST TIMORESE ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE SWEDISH AND FINNISH EMBASSIES IN JAKARTA;

-- THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE INCORPORATION OF EAST TIMOR INTO INDONESIA AND IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT;

-- THE INCONGRUITY OF INDONESIA SITTING ON THE C-24 AS BOTH "JUDGE AND DEFENDANT" WHEN THE COMMITTEE CONSIDERED EAST TIMOR;

-- THE FAILURE OF THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO ACCOUNT FULLY AND CREDIBLY FOR THE CASUALTIES AND MISSING OF THE

SANTA CRUZ MASSACRE;

-- THE "HYPOCRISY" OF INDONESIA HOLDING THE NAM CHAIR IN LIGHT OF THE "COLONIAL SITUATION" IN EAST TIMOR, FOR WHICH IT WAS RESPONSIBLE.

11. THE INDONESIAN AND PORTUGUESE STATEMENTS WERE HARDLINE REITERATIONS OF THEIR STANDARD POSITIONS QTEXTS POUCHED TO EAP/IMBS). BOTH DELEGATIONS EXERCISED THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE RULES OF PROCEDURE TO TWO RIGHTS OF REPLY:

-- PORTUGAL SAID IT SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL FOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, PROVIDED INDONESIA TOOK THE FIRST STEP BY IMPROVING THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR; INDONESIA RESPONDED THAT PORTUGAL SHOULD FIRST SHOW GOOD FAITH BY HALTING ITS CONFRONTATIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USUN N 03727 02 OF 03 022026Z
CAMPAIGN AGAINST INDONESIA;

-- PORTUGAL DID NOT SEEK TO DEFEND ITS PRE-1975 RECORD BUT POINTED OUT THE ABSURDITY OF INDONESIA'S ARGUMENT THAT COLONIZED PEOPLE COULD BE DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION BECAUSE OF THE SINS OF THEIR COLONIZERS; INDONESIA RESPONDED THAT THE ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IT HAD CONDUCTED IN EAST TIMOR WAS "NOT PERFECT," BUT THAT THIS WAS NOT INDONESIA'S FAULT.

INTERVENTION OF OTHER C-24 MEMBERS

12. TUNISIA, WITH SOME SUPPORT FROM INDIA, MADE INTERVENTIONS ON BEHALF OF INDONESIA ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE MEETINGS. THE TUNISIAN REPRESENTATIVE VOICED SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA'S STANDARD OBJECTION TO THE INCLUSION OF EAST TIMOR ON THE COMMITTEE'S AGENDA, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE ITEM HAD BEEN DEFERRED BY THE 47TH UNGA (THE CHAIR AGREED TO SEEK AN OPINION FROM THE UN LEGAL COUNSEL ON THIS POINT -- BUT "AT A LATER DATE" -- AND THE MEETING CONTINUED). WITH SUPPORT FROM INDIA, TUNISIA ALSO ARGUED THAT "FALLACIOUS ARGUMENTS" SHOULD NOT BE USED TO "AMPUTATE" THE TERRITORY OF NAM COUNTRIES

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 03727 03 OF 03 022026Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SCT-03	SIL-00
	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	RPE-01	CORE-00	/069W			

----------DE0FE2 022041Z /38

R 022015Z AUG 93
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8567
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 003727

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: UN SPONSORED TALKS ON EAST TIMOR

ON RELIGIOUS OR ETHNIC GROUNDS (AS WAS HAPPENING IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA). THE TUNISIAN CLAIMED THAT THE PETITIONERS WERE A LARGELY PRO-WESTERN, ONE-ISSUE GROUP INTENT ON SELECTIVELY PLAYING UP THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS OF A MUSLIM STATE (WHICH WERE, IN ANY CASE, NOT RELEVANT TO THE COMMITTEE ON DECOLONIZATION) WHILE IGNORING COMPARABLE PROBLEMS ELSEWHERE, SUCH AS THE PLIGHT OF THE MUSLIMS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 03727 03 OF 03 022026Z

13. [redacted] B1

14. DESPITE THE HEIGHTENED PROFILE OF EVENTS IN THE C-24, BOTH [redacted] SAID THEY THOUGHT B1
THE UN-SPONSORED TALKS WOULD CONTINUE AND THAT THE ITEM WOULD AGAIN BE DEFERRED DURING THE 48TH UNGA.

ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

DOCUMENT ID: 183233788
PRODUCER: USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ2-J//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990506
TOR: 174522
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905062000
MHFNO: 99 5357093
DOCCLASS: ~~S~~
CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUWSMXI #4060 1262051
ZNY ~~SSSSS~~
P 062000Z MAY 99
FM USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ2-J//
TO AIG 8008
AIG 12303
AIG 328
AIG 621
AIG 10313
RUEASCO/CDR599THTRANSGPTML WHEELER AAF HI//MTWPA-OP-OS//
RUATNPT/CDR837THTRANSBN PUSAN KOR//MTWPA-PU-C//
RUWMNMN/926FW NEW ORLEANS LA//IN//
RUEOGEA/128ARW GEN MITCHELL IAP WI//IN//
RHCPMXA/908AW MAXWELL AFB AL//IN//
RHFJJAJ/COMHSWINGLANT JACKSONVILLE FL//N72//
RUQNAAA/48FW DEPLOYED INCIRLIK AB TU//DOI//
RUEDBNA/43OG POPE AFB NC//IN//
RUFTURA/ACS SPANGDAHLEM AB GE//DOI//
RUVRAAA/93OSS ROBINS AFB GA//IN//
RUEBBEA/MARITIME ADMIN WASHINGTON DC//613/620//
RUHUBDA/133ACS FT DODGE IA//IN//
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

~~QQQQ~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ: USTRANSCOM DISUM CY 99-087 (U)

1. (U) USTRANSCOM DISUM FOR 06 MAY 99.

2. (U) THIS REPORT IS MADE UP OF USTRANSCOM ITEMS OF INTEREST. THIS PRODUCT, BASED ON ALL-SOURCE REPORTING, REPRESENTS THE ANALYSIS AND POSITION OF THE USTRANSCOM JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER TRANSPORTATION (JICTRANS).

MORI DocID: 1054657

3. (U) EUCOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION:

1. (C/NF)

Non-responsive

2. (C)

Non-responsive

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

1. (S/NF)

Non-responsive

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

Non-responsive

2. (S)

Non-responsive

3. (C)

Non-responsive

4. (U) CENTCOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

1. (C/NF)

Non-responsive

2. (C)

Non-responsive

3. (S/NF)

Non-responsive

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

Non-responsive

5. (U) SOUTHCOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

1. (U) CHILE: CHILEAN POLICE CLASHED WITH APPROXIMATELY 300 PORT WORKERS WHO PARALYZED PORT ACTIVITY FOR THE SECOND CONSECUTIVE DAY BY BUILDING BARRICADES IN THE STREETS AND PREVENTING THE NORMAL FLOW OF TRAFFIC INTO VALPARAISO (3302S/07137W). POLICE REPORTEDLY USED TEAR GAS TO CONTAIN THE UNREST AND ARRESTED 12 DEMONSTRATORS. PROTESTS HAVE ALSO TAKEN PLACE IN PORT TOWN OF SAN ANTONIO (3335S/07138W). (POC: SSGT STONE; SOUTHCOM DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 061200Z MAY 99)

2. (C/NF)

Non-responsive

6. (U) PACOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

1. (S)

Non-responsive

2. (S) INDONESIA: THE PATTERN OF VIOLENCE IS CHANGING IN EAST

RESPONSIVE

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

TIMOR. LARGE RALLIES AND MASS ATTACKS HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY PERSONAL INTIMIDATION. THE THREAT TO ATTACK DILI (0833S/12534E) LAST WEEKEND WAS ENOUGH TO SCARE MANY INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS OUT OF THE CAPITAL, AND TO DRAW ATTENTION AWAY FROM INDONESIAN NATIONAL GROUP (TNI) ACTIVITIES IN OTHER AREAS. PRO-INDEPENDENCE NATIONAL RESISTANCE COUNCIL (CNRT) MEMBERS HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY MILITIA UNITS, TAKEN TO MILITARY DISTRICT COMMAND CENTERS AND ALLEGEDLY TORTURED. THESE ACTIVITIES ARE PROVOKING THE REVOLUTIONARY FRONT FOR AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR (FALINTIL), WHOSE STRENGTH IS IN THE RURAL AREAS. IF THEY STRIKE BACK, TNI WILL USE IT AS JUSTIFICATION TO RESPOND AGGRESSIVELY. FALINTIL NUMBERS ACROSS THE PROVINCE HAVE BEEN BOOSTED BY PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS FLEEING FROM WIDESPREAD PRO-INTEGRATION MILITANT INTIMIDATION. THE MILITANT GROUPS AIM TO WIPE OUT AS MANY PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS AS POSSIBLE, TO PROVOKE MAJOR UNREST TO SCARE THE UN OFF AND PREVENT THE BALLOT FROM GOING AHEAD. AMC HAS A FLIGHT SCHEDULED INTO JAKARTA ON 21 MAY. (POC: [redacted] DIA WASHINGTON 060130Z MAY 99)

RESPONSIVE

7. (U) RESPECTIVE AOR ASSESSMENTS OF TERRORIST THREAT LEVELS (AREAS WITH MEDIUM OR HIGHER THREAT ASSESSMENTS) ARE SHOWN EVERY MONDAY. CHANGES ARE REPORTED DAILY AS THEY OCCUR.

8. (U) ANY PLAIN LANGUAGE ADDRESS CHANGE REQUESTS TO THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE FORWARDED VIA MESSAGE TO ORIGINATOR OR VIA FAX TO CINC TRANS INTEL CEN, DSN 576 8005 SECURE FAX, DSN 576 1559 UNCLAS FAX. POC FOR AIG 8008 IS SSGT K. MORRIS.

9. (U) POC IS JICTRANS; DSN STU III 576 4235; COMM STU III 618 256 4235; SECURE FAX 576 8005//

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

SOURCES: FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

USTRANSCOM DISUM 99-087,
Doc I.D. 183233788, Paragraph 6B(2),
is declassified IAW TCJ2 Memo,
20 May 04 and DIA Memo, 24 Oct 07.

Ernest B. Markham 12-4-2007

ERNEST B. MARKHAM (Date)
CAPT, U.S. Navy
Director of Intelligence

MORI DocID: 1054664

Top Secret TIER

CIAPASS...SEIB 99-079CX...

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

The SEIB must be returned to CIA within 5 working days

Wednesday, 7 April 1999

National Security Information

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Reproduction of this Document Prohibited

Readership is limited to those on approved reader list on file with CIA SEIB Control Officer. The undersigned hereby acknowledge reading this document.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2004

MORI DocID: 1054664

Table of Contents

Leading Developments

[redacted] 1

3

5

Regional Notes

East Asia

[redacted] 6

8

Indonesia: Rebel Leader Taking Dangerous Gamble [redacted] 9

10

South Asia

[redacted] 11

12

Eurasia

[redacted] 13

13

Sense of the Community Memorandum

[redacted] 14

Top Secret

Indonesia: **Rebel Leader Taking Dangerous Gamble**

East Timorese leader Xanana's surprise public call for new attacks on Indonesian military units and prointegrationist civilian militias may be an attempt to hasten UN involvement in the province. Xanana's lawyer on Monday told a press conference that the jailed guerrilla will revoke his call to arms if the UN establishes a presence in East Timor to disarm the militias.

— A top Habibie aide warned that Xanana's declaration could undermine UN-sponsored tripartite talks with Portugal scheduled for next week.

Xanana has been under pressure from supporters to modify his longstanding call for his guerrilla fighters to exercise restraint in the face of provocations by the militia or the army, according to press reports. He admitted in a written statement that the new policy could prompt a "bloodbath" but noted he had no alternative. The policy reversal follows attacks on his supporters this week.

— it cannot confirm that Indonesian forces joined the attacks by prointegration militias but notes the militias control a main road leading to the provincial capital of Dili, presumably with the military's permission.

MORI DocID: 1054666

~~Top Secret~~ TIER

CIAPASS SEIB 99-118CX

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

The SEIB must be returned to CIA within 5 working days

Saturday, 22 May 1999

National Security Information

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Reproduction of this Document Prohibited

Readership is limited to those on approved reader list on file with CIA SEIB Control Officer. The undersigned hereby acknowledge reading this document.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2004

****** EYES ONLY ******

MORI DocID: 1054666

Table of Contents

Leading Development

Indonesia: Militia Terrorism Intensifying in East Timor 1

2

3

5

7

8

9

10

11

MORI DocID: 1054666

Top Secret

[redacted]

Leading Development

Indonesia: **Militia Terrorism Intensifying in East Timor (S NF)**

[redacted] that prointegration militias are holding more than 35,000 East Timorese in several camps with inadequate food, water, shelter, and medical care. [redacted] some camps are located at military installations, ***suggesting Army collusion.***

— Most of those in the camps are women and children fleeing violence in their villages, and a number are family members of independence supporters. Some women claim they have been sexually assaulted.

— [redacted] prointegrationists say these forced evacuations are a prelude to "cleansing" operations directed against independence supporters. [redacted]

The US defense attache says the armed forces appear to have only limited control over the more aggressive militias, ***whose violent attacks are undermining Jakarta's commitment to the safety of UN officials in the province.*** [redacted] that he saw one militia unit last week attack houses in Dili within sight of UN Mission members and journalists; the military arrived 50 minutes later and did not intervene.

— [redacted] Foreign Minister Alatas this month said he tried to dissuade the leader of one of the more violent militias from targeting UN personnel but admitted his attempt "guarantees nothing." [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Top Secret
22 May 1999

MORI DocID: 1054667

Top Secret TIER

CIA APLA IR 99-40507

Intelligence Report

Office of Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis *10 May 1999*

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Indonesia: Challenges Facing East Timor

Summary

The government's commitment to President Habibie's sudden and uncoordinated pledge to offer East Timor a choice between greater autonomy and quick independence has become less certain since the announcement in late January. Reporting indicates a lack of consensus on the issue among key senior officials.

APPROVED FOR
DATE: MAR 200

Lack of firm leadership from Jakarta has encouraged civilian militias and their prointegration supporters to continue attacking independence advocates throughout the province.

- *Armed Forces Commander Wiranto's vow to enforce a recent cease-fire agreement has not stopped prointegration militias from continuing their campaign of violence and intimidation against independence supporters, many of whom remain in hiding.*
- *The disarming of all warring factions is crucial to ensuring a free and fair ballot, but, until genuine attempts at reconciliation commence and the military ends its tacit support of the militias, East Timor's security situation will remain volatile.*

Indonesian and Portuguese negotiators have agreed that the province will vote on its future on 8 August but, if violence continues, we cannot be confident that the polling process will take place or how orderly it will be.

- *Sustained unrest could lead UN officials to preempt the ballot in August.*
- *A free and fair ballot will still require approval from Indonesia's newly formed national legislature, which may not approve a close vote for independence.*

MORI DocID: 1054667

Jakarta Sending Mixed Signals . . .

The Indonesian Government lacks a consensus on how to proceed with President Habibie's public pledge in late January to allow East Timor to become independent by yearend if the troubled province rejects autonomy:

- Some government ministers who previously supported independence now privately argue in favor of the autonomy option because they fear granting independence would trigger separatist outbreaks in other provinces,
- opposition within the ruling Golkar party was complicating Habibie's handling of the issue.
- Foreign Minister Alatas has had several heated arguments with presidential foreign affairs adviser Dewi Fortuna Anwar—who helped formulate Habibie's autonomy proposal—over her involvement in East Timor policy. In early April, Alatas told her that she was damaging the Foreign Ministry's credibility because he and his Ministry repeatedly had to deal with repercussions from her unsanctioned statements to the media about the future of East Timor.

Support for Habibie's East Timor initiative also appears tenuous among senior military officers, including Armed Forces Commander Wiranto, who has taken no action against the prointegration civilian militias or discipline against local military units that, if not abetting, have at the least tolerated these groups:

- Wiranto has repeatedly promised that the military is a neutral force, but local commanders would have required at least tacit approval from headquarters in Jakarta to allow the militias the blatant free hand they have enjoyed. security authorities knew in advance about a planned militia rally on 17 April in the provincial capital of Dili, permitted it to occur, and were ineffective in curbing the violence that led to some 20 deaths.
- the military may be seeking to manipulate the polling process in favor of the autonomy option by allowing the militias to create disturbances. The military's

MORI DocID: 1054667

Speculating on Habibie's Ulterior Motives

Habibie's sudden and uncoordinated decision to offer independence to the East Timorese is, at a minimum, characteristic of his mercurial leadership style; his continued neglect at keeping key players within the Indonesian Government in the loop on East Timor is exacerbating differences. Habibie's initiative to allow the Timorese to determine their own future may have been designed only to improve his own short-term political prospects:

- Presidential foreign affairs adviser Dewi Fortuna Anwar advocated autonomy in early 1999. According to Anwar, independence was proposed to demonstrate Indonesia's democratic credentials and would be taken only if unspecified efforts to sway proindependence East Timorese failed.

- Habibie has repeatedly told US and foreign officials since his announcement in January that Indonesia has no strategic, economic, political, or cultural interest in retaining East Timor. The director of Indonesia's civilian intelligence agency—who has close ties to Habibie—stated in mid-March, however, that Jakarta's offer of independence was for "foreign consumption" only and did not reflect the government's true intentions, which were to ensure the province remained part of Indonesia.

- the President viewed his initiative on East Timor as a political ploy designed to improve his party's prospects in the legislative elections in June by stifling international criticism that might benefit opponents; however, Habibie would withdraw Jakarta's acquiescence to an independence option upon securing the presidency later in the fall.

strategy, [redacted] is to kill, drive out, or intimidate into silence independence activists and to cow the general population into acceptance of an East Timor under Jakarta's control.

- [redacted]

. . . That Cultivates Culture of Violence

Jakarta's mixed signals coupled with local military support have encouraged the prointegration civilian militias to carry on a violent campaign against the independence movement in the last few months:

- The armed forces has trained and provided logistic support to many of the militia units, [redacted] enabling these disparate forces to operate with some degree of coordination. As a result, prointegrationist forces have been able to easily target independence supporters, especially in the western districts of the province.

- The militias' leaders fear retribution by the majority proindependence population and are strongly motivated by desires to protect their wealth, [redacted] For their part, many local military units have vested interests with and emotional ties to the militias. [redacted]

The violence has not been entirely one sided, but proindependence guerrilla attacks against the military and prointegrationists have been relatively restrained, and rebels, for the most part, did not heed jailed rebel leader Xanana Gusmao's public call in early April for his supporters to take up arms in defense:

- [redacted] most of East Timor's proindependence leadership are in hiding—lacking any guarantee from the police for their protection—and the failure of rebel forces to respond to militia aggression is partly due to the fact that they are now disorganized and on the defensive.

- [redacted] despite his call to arms, Xanana remains committed to a path of peaceful dialogue. His Jakarta-based advisers have subsequently directed his followers in East Timor to make

Security Arrangements for Ballot Remain Vague

Indonesia and Portugal on 5 May signed an agreement setting 8 August as the date for the autonomy ballot and paving the way for the deployment of a small UN civilian monitoring force to oversee the polls. These latest efforts, however, have side-stepped security arrangements for the ballot at the behest of Indonesia. Portuguese officials allege that a miscommunication between their negotiating team and jailed rebel leader Xanana Gusmao led the Portuguese delegation to the UN talks to pay insufficient attention to the document on security:

- The two sides failed to agree on joint disarmament by the rival factions—a crucial precondition to stopping the cycle of violence in the runup to the ballot. Disarmament is only mentioned as something the recently established, but not yet operational peace and stability commission should "endeavor to achieve."

- It is unclear who has responsibility to maintain security. The draft initially required the Indonesian military to substantially reduce its presence in the province by July, and the local police to take sole responsibility for maintaining law and order during the ballot process. The arrangement now refers responsibility for security to the "appropriate Indonesian security authorities."

Habibie has agreed publicly to include an international police force as part of the UN presence, but insists they will act in an advisory role, not as peacekeepers, and be allowed only to carry handguns. President Habibie and Armed Forces Commander Wiranto initially told Australian Prime Minister Howard they could accept an international force of between 200 and 300 police, but retreated from this number and allowed only that they would permit "an adequate number."

whatever temporary accommodations necessary to stay alive until an international force establishes a more secure environment.

Radical elements within the insurgency, however, are likely to react if civilian militias continue their attacks, despite the cease-fire signed on 21 April between proindependence and prointegrationist leaders and witnessed by Wiranto. One Xanana adviser insists that rebel forces will not take action against the militias without the approval of the jailed guerrilla leader.

Independence Not a Sure Bet

most East Timorese would reject Indonesia's autonomy package in favor of independence if a free and fair ballot were held. Independence supporters make frequent public assertions that the vast majority of East Timorese want independence. most senior Indonesian officials in East Timor concede it is unlikely that a ballot will result in Jakarta's favor. Proindependence Timorese could try to stage a boycott locally of the legislative elections in June to signal the province's opposition to integration with Indonesia.

The uncertainty of Indonesia's commitment to allowing East Timor to determine its future and the province's volatile security situation are key determinants of whether a free and fair ballot under UN auspices can take place in the province later this summer. Several scenarios could develop that would derail the process toward independence.

Ballot is Postponed. Continued violence could indefinitely delay a vote on the autonomy proposal. current conditions in the province could prevent a poll, and, in our judgment, the ballot scheduled for 8 August could be pushed back even further if Jakarta cannot guarantee the security of UN personnel deployed to the province to oversee the polls:

- Continued attacks by prointegration militias threaten to degenerate into a protracted conflict. Dili has remained tense since the cease-fire, with militias making house-to-house searches for independence supporters under cover of night. The reports of prointegration violence outside of the provincial capital, but details remain vague as militia roadblocks prevent easy access to all parts of the province.
-

MORI DocID: 1054667

Indonesia: Critical Steps Toward an Independent East Timor

End to Serious Violence

- Indonesian military withdraws support from prointegration civilian militias to establish public faith in its neutrality.
- Reconciliation talks involving proindependence and prointegration leaders resume.
- Rebel forces and civilian militias maintain ceasefire and disarm.

UN-Led Ballot on Autonomy

- UN and Indonesia agree to terms on security arrangements.
- The ballot is widely perceived as free and fair.
- The ballot outcome is decisive in rejecting Jakarta's autonomy plan.

Legislative Decision

- The legislative election on 7 June results in new Peoples' Consultative Assembly that is willing to rescind the annexation of East Timor.

Confidential

368160PM 4-99

~~Top Secret~~

Ballot Not Viewed As Free and Fair. Expecting to win by a wide margin, proindependence leaders are likely to view an outcome favoring autonomy as evidence of manipulation by prointegrationists. Conversely, prointegrationists could escalate violent attacks as a last-ditch response if the vote rejects autonomy and East Timor appeared poised to be granted independence. The UN will insist on a completely secret ballot so that neither individuals nor villages can be targeted for retribution on the basis of their voting pattern.

Legislature Rejects Ballot Results. Even if East Timorese reject autonomy, the newly formed Peoples' Consultative Assembly (MPR) still needs to revoke the nation's 1975 decree that integrated East Timor into Indonesia—an action that will revert the province to a UN-administered, non-self-governing territory with Portugal as the administering power until which time it is declared independent. The assembly would find it difficult to reject a ballot that indicated an overwhelming majority of East Timorese opposed the autonomy proposal, but a close vote could provide enough cause for the assembly to abort the process and retain the province without risking international condemnation. Opposition leader Megawati—who has criticized Habibie's East Timor policy—could emerge from the legislative elections in June as the leader of a coalition government and not feel bound by a ballot initiated by Habibie.

Partition of East Timor. A less likely option for the MPR would be to partition the province with the western districts—where a majority of prointegrationist militias are located—remaining with Jakarta and the eastern portion becoming independent. Proindependence leaders, however, are unlikely to accept such a compromise, and UN officials refused to consider a similar proposal made by prointegrationists in February,

MORI DocID: 1054667



MORI DocID: 1054667

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Indonesia: Challenges Facing East Timor

Pub Num: 98-40507

Distribution:

TOP SECRET

MORI DocID: 1054667

SUBJECT: Indonesia: Challenges Facing East Timor

Pub Num: 98-40507

Distribution:

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Indonesia: Challenges Facing East Timor

Pub Num: 98-40507

Distribution:

MORI DocID: 1054665

~~Top Secret~~ TEP

CIAPASS SEIB 99-090CX

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

The SEIB must be returned to CIA within 5 working days

Tuesday, 20 April 1999

National Security Information

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Reproduction of this Document Prohibited

Readership is limited to those on approved reader list on file with CIA SEIB Control Officer. The undersigned hereby acknowledge reading this document.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2004

****** EYES ONLY ******

~~Top Secret~~

Table of Contents

1

3

5

6

7

8

10

East Asia **East Timor:** Independence Not a Sure Bet 11
Analytic Perspective

13

14

MORI DocID: 1054665

EAST ASIA

East Timor:
Analytic Perspective

Independence Not a Sure Bet

A lack of broad support in Jakarta for President Habibie's commitment to independence for the province by yearend if its citizenry rejects autonomy will encourage prointegration militias to continue their violent campaign to cow proindependence advocates and delay the consultation process.

Support for Habibie's East Timor initiative also appears tenuous among senior military officers, including Armed Forces Commander Wiranto who has taken no action against the prointegration militias or complicit local military units. the military may be seeking to manipulate the polling process in favor of the autonomy option by allowing the militias to create disturbances.

Possible Outcomes

Continued violence could indefinitely delay a vote on the autonomy proposal. UN officials recently postponed the polling from July to 12 September,

— If the militia activities continue unchecked, the situation could degenerate into a protracted conflict. the various militias are poised to begin assaults in areas outside of their strongholds.

To restore stability, the Indonesian security forces must stop supporting the militias and adopt a neutral posture. This would increase the prospects for a resumption of the reconciliation talks between pro–Jakarta and proindependence leaders and for an eventual disarmament of both sides.

MORI DocID: 1054665

A close vote in the UN ballot, however, could spark renewed violence. Indonesia nationalists in the newly elected People's Consultative Assembly—which has ultimate authority to relinquish sovereignty over East Timor—also might be emboldened by such a vote to try to abort the process and retain the province.

— Proindependence leaders—who expect to win by a wide margin—would reject any result favoring autonomy as evidence of manipulation by prointegrationists.

— A strong rejection of autonomy would deflate the momentum of the militias, who, without military support, would be hard pressed to mount a serious armed challenge.

Extract from Atlantic Intelligence Command Executive Summary 071430Z Apr 90

INDONESIA: RIOTING CONTINUES [redacted]

[redacted] SIMULTANEOUS RIOTS IN OUTLYING AREAS IN INDONESIA ON 5 APRIL DEMONSTRATE THE ONGOING SECURITY PROBLEMS THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI) FACE IN MAINTAINING PEACE. THIS PROBLEM IS NOT LIKELY TO IMPROVE AS ABRI WILL UTILIZE MOST OF ITS RESOURCES TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER IN THE URBAN AREAS OF JAVA AS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS LOOM IN JUNE.

[redacted] RIOTING IN THE KAI ISLANDS, SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS OCCURRED ON 5 APRIL BETWEEN CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM FACTIONS INVOLVED IN A LAND DISPUTE. FIFTY-FOUR PEOPLE WERE KILLED BEFORE SECURITY FORCES COULD HALT THE CLASHES. IN LIQUICA, EAST TIMOR, CONTINUOUS CLASHES BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS LEFT AT LEAST TWO DEAD AND NINE INJURED. THESE RIOTS FOLLOWED THE CANCELLATION OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE LED CEASEFIRE ON 5 APRIL. IN STILL FURTHER RIOTING, SEVENTEEN HOUSES WERE BURNED IN ETHNIC CLASHES IN SAMBAS, WEST KALIMANTAN.

[redacted] THE ABRI HAS BEEN UNABLE TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO THE SCATTERED, YET INTENSE, VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT THE ARCHIPELAGO. LOCAL SECURITY FORCES ARE OFTEN UNTRUSTED AND TAKE LITTLE ACTION TO STOP THE VIOLENT ETHNIC AND RELIGION-BASED UNREST. THE OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION IN RURAL INDONESIA WILL WORSEN AS THE ABRI WILL FOCUS ITS FORCES ON INTERNAL SECURITY IN THE MAJOR URBAN AREAS OF JAVA IN THE FACE OF ELECTIONS THIS SUMMER. (PACOM, DIA, REUTERS, AIC POC: LTJG DEAN)

--

Extract from Atlantic Intelligence Command Executive Summary 181430Z Ap

INDONESIA: TROOPS FAIL TO STOP THE KILLINGS

AN AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATIC REPORT ON THE ALLEGED MASSACRE IN LIQUISIA, A VILLAGE IN EAST TIMOR, FOUND THAT INDONESIAN TROOPS WERE PRESENT BUT FAILED TO STOP THE KILLINGS. DIPLOMATS IN AUSTRALIA'S JAKARTA EMBASSY FOUND THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY HAD COLLUDED WITH PRO-JAKARTA MILITIA FORCES IN EVENTS PRECEDING THE ATTACK AND WERE PRESENT IN SOME NUMBERS AT THE TIME OF THE KILLINGS. AN AUSTRALIAN NEWSPAPER REPORTED THAT THE EVIDENCE OF A DIRECT ROLE BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE ATTACK OF LIQUISA IS ONLY CIRCUMSTANTIAL, BUT THE EVIDENCE INCLUDES GUNSHOT WOUNDS FROM WEAPONS OF A TYPE ISSUED BY THE MILITARY.

THE ALLEDGED MASSACRE HAPPENED ON APRIL 6, 1999, AND AN AUATRALIAN NEWSPAPER REPORTED SOME OF THE FINDINGS ON 17 APRIL. THE REPORT FROM THE AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMAT GAVE ENOUGH EVIDENCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF KILLINGS TO WARRANT A DETAILED AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENT. AS MANY AS 25 HAVE BEEN REPORTED DEAD BY EAST TIMOR'S SPIRITUAL LEADER BISHOP CARLOS DELO, WHILE INDONESIA REJECTS REPORTS OF A "MASSACRE" SAYING ONLY FIVE PEOPLE WERE KILLED. A SPOKESMAN FOR AUSTRALIA'S FOREIGN MINISTER STATED THE REPORT DOES EXIST, BUT WOULD NOT BE RELEASED FOR FEAR OF ENDANGERING CONTACTS IN EAST TIMOR. THE AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD REPORTERS THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE EXACTLY HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE KILLED. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ACCUSED THE INDONESIAN MILITARY OF DESTABILISING EAST TIMOR BY ALLOWING PRO-JAKARTA MILITIAS TO MURDER AND RAPE EAST TIMORESE.

MEANWHILE, ON 17 APRIL IN DILI, SEVERAL PEOPLE DIED WHEN INDONESIAN TROOPS OPENED FIRE ON A HOUSE SHELTERING DOZENS OF EAST TIMORESE. THE VIOLENCE CAME AFTER PRO-JARKARTA MILITIAMEN STAGED A RALLY IN SUPPORT OF MAINTAINING TIMOR'S HOMELAND STATUS AS PART OF INDONESIA. MILITIAMEN WENT ON A RAMPAGE AFTER THE RALLY, BURNING CARS AND HOUSES. THE MILITIA COMMANDER, EURICO GUTTERESS, TOLD HIS FOLLOWERS TO CLEAR THE TERRITORY OF GROUPS WHO WERE IN FAVOR OF INDEPENDENCE, USING VIOLENCE IF NECESSARY. THESE TYPES OF ATROCITIES ARE NOT THE FIRST OF ITS KIND IN INDONESIA. IN 1991, A MASSACREIN DILI OF OVER 200 PEOPLE BY THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI) MADE EAST TIMOR AN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CAUSE. THE LATEST UPSURGE IN VIOLENCE IN THE REGION RESULTED FROM INDONESIA'S OFFER OF AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE FOR EAST TIMOR IN JANUARY.

THE EAST TIMORESE HAVE NO DESIRE TO REMAIN PART OF INDONESIA AND MOST WILL VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE WHEN UNITED NATIONS SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING IS HELD IN JULY. VIOLENCE IN THE REGION WILL CONTINUE BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA KNOWS IT WILL FAIL TO GET AN AUTONOMY OUTCOME AFTER THE VOTES ARE COUNTED. IT WILL ATTEMPT TO BUY VOTES AND MILITIA GROUPS WILL ATTEMPT TO INTIMIDATE VOTERS. HOWEVER, AFTER FIGHTING A 23-YEAR OLD GUERRILLA WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE, THE EAST TIMORESE WILL CHOOSE INDEPENDENCE DESPITE THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPTS TO MANIPULATE THEM. ULTIMATELY, THE GOVERNMENT CAN ONLY ACT TO SAVE FACE AND KEEP A SEPARATIST CONTAGION FROM SPREADING TO OTHER DISGRUNTLED PROVINCES. (AIC, USPACOM, REUTERS, AIC POC: IS2 REYES)

Extract from Atlantic Intelligence Command Executive Summary 201432Z Apr 99

INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR INCIDENTS CONTINUE [redacted]

[redacted] UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE JAMSHEED MARKER INFORMED THE U.S. MISSION ON 16 APRIL THAT UN-SPONSORED BALLOTING FOR EAST TIMOR WILL BE POSTPONED FROM JULY TO 12 SEPTEMBER. CONCERNS OVER SECURITY AND SUFFICIENT TIME TO GATHER AND DEPLOY RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTED TO THE DECISION. APPROXIMATELY THIRTY PEOPLE WERE KILLED AS ANTI-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE PEOPLE AND BUILDINGS IN DILI ON 17 APRIL. PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES WILL CONTINUE THEIR ATTACKS LEADING TO THE TRIPARTITE TALKS BETWEEN INDONESIA, PORTUGAL, AND THE UN ON 22-23 APRIL. THE EXTENDED DELAY IN THE REFERENDUM PROCESS WILL ALLOW ANTI-INDEPENDENCE TO CONTINUE THEIR VIOLENT ATTACKS AND SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT THE VOTING PROCESS.

[redacted] MARKER STATED THAT THE 12 SEPTEMBER DATE HAD BEEN SELECTED OUT OF SECURITY AND TRANSPARENCY CONCERNS, AND THE NEED FOR SUFFICIENT RESOURCES, FUNDS, AND PERSONNEL. HE ESTIMATED THE TOTAL UN COST TO BE APPROXIMATELY $45 MILLION, WITH AN ON-SITE REQUIREMENT OF 4,500 PERSONNEL. THE DELAY WILL GIVE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA MORE TIME TO DEVELOP A POST BALLOTING STRATEGY AND A HONORABLE, FACE SAVING EXIT FROM EAST TIMORESE POLITICS. IT WILL ALSO GIVE PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS MORE TIME TO CONDUCT THEIR INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT ACTIVITIES IN AN EFFORT TO INFLUENCE THE DIRECT BALLOTS OUTCOME. THE DELAY WILL LIKELY BE SEEN AS A VICTORY FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES AS THE ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE RELEASED AFTER A WEEKEND OF VIOLENCE.

[redacted] VIOLENCE ON 17 APRIL INVOLVED OVER 1,500 ARMED PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAMEN IN DILI. AT LEAST THIRTY PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND NUMEROUS HOUSES AND BUSINESSES OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE FACTIONS WERE BURNED. THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) DID NOT INTERVENE DURING THE VIOLENCE. THE TNI WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON SECURITY IN URBAN AREAS AS THE FIRST OPEN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS SINCE 1955 ARE SCHEDULED FOR JUNE.

[redacted] PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES WILL CONTINUE THEIR PATTERN OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION THROUGH THE TRIPARTITE TALKS IN NEW YORK ON 22-23 APRIL UNTIL THE REFERENDUM ON 12 SEPTEMBER. UNREST AND VIOLENCE WILL CONTINUE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE TNI CONTINUES TO BE INEFFECTIVE, UNWILLING, OR UNABLE, TO HALT THE ATTACKS. (JICPAC, PRESS, AIC POC: LTJG DEAN)

Extract from Atlantic Intelligence Command Executive Summary Z61430Z Apr 99

INDONESIA: WEEKLY SUMMARY FOR 15-22 APRIL [redacted]

[redacted] WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ONLY 45 DAYS AWAY, UNREST AND VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT INDONESIA LIKELY WILL CONTINUE DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS WILL PROBABLY INCREASE IN URBAN AREAS ON JAVA AND IN JAKARTA, FORCING THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL FORCES (TNI) TO FOCUS ON MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS. AS THE TNI CHANNELS ITS RESOURCES TO JAKARTA AND JAVA, SECURITY FORCES WILL BE LESS LIKELY TO RESPOND TO UNREST IN THE OUTLYING AREAS. VIOLENCE AND UNREST LIKELY WILL CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR DESPITE THE SIGNING OF A TRUCE AGREEMENT ON 21 APRIL AND THE ONGOING TRIPARTITE TALKS AT THE UNITED NATIONS. UNLESS BOTH PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE VOLUNTARILY DISARM, THE TRUCE AGREEMENT HAS LITTLE CHANCE OF HOLDING

[redacted] TNI COMMANDER, GENERAL WIRANTO, VISITED DILI, EAST TIMOR 20-21 APRIL TO MEET WITH LOCAL COMMUNITY AND MILITARY LEADERS IN RESPONSE TO THE RECENT RISE IN VIOLENCE. WIRANTO HELD A MEETING WITH PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS ON 20 APRIL, AND MET WITH DILI ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP CARLOS FILIPE XIMENES BELO ON 21 APRIL. ALTHOUGH WIRANTO'S VISIT TO EAST TIMOR WAS A GOOD PUBLIC RELATIONS GESTURE, LITTLE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES WERE MADE TO THE OVERALL SECURITY POSTURE IN EAST TIMOR. AS A RESULT, HIS TRIP WILL LIKELY HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE OVERALL LEVEL OF VIOLENCE.

[redacted] PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS SIGNED A TRUCE AGREEMENT IN DILI 21 APRIL, TO END THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR. BOTH SIDES PLEDGED TO STOP MUTUAL ATTACKS, VIOLENCE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; HOWEVER, THE AGREEMENT DID NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE AND THE MILITIAS REPORTEDLY WILL NOT SURRENDER THE ARMS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS TRUCE AGREEMENT WILL LAST VERY LONG, AS IT IS APPARENT THAT THE MILITARY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR ARE INCAPABLE OR UNWILLING TO STOP MILITIA ATTACKS AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. ADDITIONALLY, AUSTRALIAN PRESS REPORTING CONFIRMS THE INVOLVEMENT OF TNI FORCES IN THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS, INDICATING REGIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE TNI WERE LIKELY SUPPLYING THE MILITIAS WITH WEAPONS AND POSSIBLY MILITARY TRAINING. THE TRIPARTITE TALKS AT THE UNITED NATIONS BEGAN ON 22 APRIL WITH FEW SUBSTANTIAL GAINS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED IN THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF MEETINGS BETWEEN PORTUGUESE, INDONESIAN, AND UNITED NATIONS DIPLOMATS. A POLITICAL AGREEMENT IS EXPECTED TO BE SIGNED ON 30 APRIL.

[redacted] THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING WILL BE DELAYED FROM JULY TO 12 SEPTEMBER AS UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, JAMSHEED MARKER, STATED CONCERN OVER SECURITY AND THE NEED FOR SUFFICIENT TIME TO GATHER ENOUGH RESOURCES, FUNDS, AND PERSONNEL. THE TOTAL UN COST IS ESTIMATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY $45 MILLION, WITH AN ON-SITE REQUIREMENT OF 4,500 PERSONNEL. THE DELAY WILL GIVE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA ADDITIONAL TIME TO COME UP WITH

A POST BALLOTING STRATEGY.

[redacted] DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY OVER LAST WEEK. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT UNREST OCCURRED AT DILI, EAST TIMOR, WHEN PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS 17 APR. IN JAKARTA, A "HOME-MADE" BOMB EXPLODED AT NATIONAL ISTIQLAL MOSQUE 19 APR. DEMONSTRATIONS DEVELOPED IN LHOKSEUMAWE, ACEH, AS VIOLENCE CONTINUED IN WEST KALIMANTAN, AND SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE: LOCATION / INCIDENT:

15 APRIL: LHOKSEUMAWE / THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN THREE TOWNS IN ACEH PROVINCE TO DEMAND A REFERENDUM.

15 APRIL: WEST KALIMANTAN / ETHNIC CLASHES ERUPTED BETWEEN MADURESE SETTLERS AND LOCAL MALAYS AND DAYAKS.

15 APRIL: JAKARTA / HUNDREDS FROM SEVERAL STUDENT GROUPS DEMONSTRATED AT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.

15 APRIL: LACLUBAR DISTRICT, EAST TIMOR / PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS AMBUSHED MEMBERS FROM A MILITARY DISTRICT COMMAND RESULTING IN ONE SECURITY MEMBER KILLED AND FIVE OTHERS INJURED.

16 APRIL: ERMERA / CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE FALINTIL GUERRILLAS AND A TNI TEAM RESULTED IN TWO GUERRILLAS KILLED.

17 APRIL: DILI / PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS, HOLDING A RALLY ON THE GOVERNOR'S LAWN RESULTING IN REPORTS OF UP TO 30 KILLED. 18 APRIL: BECORA, EAST TIMOR / VIOLENCE CONTINUED BETWEEN PRO-INDONESIA GROUPS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS RESULTING IN TWO DEATHS REPORTED.

18 APRIL: SAMBAS / ARMED CLASHES BETWEEN SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND LOCAL RESIDENTS RESULTED IN FOUR PEOPLE KILLED.

19 APRIL: KARIMUNTING VILLAGE, WEST KALIMANTAN / SECURITY FORCES MISTAKENLY OPENED FIRE ON ETHNIC MADURESE MIGRANTS AND LOCAL MALAYS, KILLING FOUR PEOPLE AND INJURING THREE.

19 APRIL: JAKARTA / A "HOME-MADE" BOMB EXPLODED IN AN OFFICE COMPLEX LOCATED ON THE GROUND FLOOR OF JAKARTA'S NATIONAL AL-ISTIQLAL MOSQUE RESULTING IN SIX INJURIES AND NO DEATHS.

19 APRIL: UJUNGPANDANG / A MOB ATTACKED A PRIMARY SCHOOL AND THE OFFICES OF THE INDONESIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH FOUNDATION IN RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL AL-ISTIQLAL MOSQUE BOMBING.

19 APRIL: YOHYAKARTA / TWO MEN ON A MOTORCYCLE THREW FIRECRACKERS INTO A CHURCH.

20 APRIL: JAKARTA / A BOMB THREAT OCCURRED AT A JAKARTA CATHEDRAL, LOCATED EXACTLY OPPOSITE FROM NATIONAL ISTIQLAL MOSQUE.

20 APRIL: LHOKSEUMAWE / POLICE OPENED FIRE TO DISPERSE THOUSANDS OF PRO-SEPARATIST STUDENTS.

20 APRIL: RIAU / SECURITY FORCES FIRED WARNING SHOTS TO DISPERSE HUNDREDS OF STUDENTS WHO STORMED A CALTEX INDONESIA HOUSING COMPLEX DEMANDING A SHARE OF OIL EARNINGS.

20 APRIL: SIGLI, ACEH / THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED TO SHOW SOLIDARITY FOR VICTIMS OF EARLIER CLASHES WITH AUTHORITIES.

20 APRIL: BANDA ISLANDS / CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM FIGHTING BROKE OUT LEAVING 4 DEAD AND 30 HOUSES BURNED.

21 APRIL: KAI ISLANDS / MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN VIOLENCE OCCURRED IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS, RESULTING IN 50 DEAD, HUNDREDS INJURED, AND 200 HUNDRED HOUSES BURNED. (JICPAC, AIC POC: LTJG DEAN)

--

(101)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183067794
PRODUCER: USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ2-J//
SOURCE: MILITARY
~~DOCTYPE:~~ OTHER
DOR: 19990407
TOR: 164838
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904072000
MHFNO: 99 4984471
DOCCLASS: ~~S~~
CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

R - Item pp 4-5

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUWSMXI #4102 0972030
ZNY ~~SSSSS~~
P 072000Z APR 99
FM USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ2-J//
TO AIG 8008
~~AIG 12303~~
AIG 328
AIG 621
AIG 10313
RUEASCO/CDR599THTRANSGPTML WHEELER AAF HI//MTWPA-OP-OS//
RUATNPT/CDR837THTRANSBN PUSAN KOR//MTWPA-PU-C//
RUWMNMN/926FW NEW ORLEANS LA//IN//
RUEOGEA/128ARW GEN MITCHELL IAP WI//IN//
RHCPMXA/908AW MAXWELL AFB AL//IN//
RHFJJAJ/COMHSWINGLANT JACKSONVILLE FL//N72//
RUQNAAA/48FW DEPLOYED INCIRLIK AB TU//DOI//
RUFTURA/ACS SPANGDAHLEM AB GE//DOI//
RUVRAAA/93OSS ROBINS AFB GA//IN//
RUEBBEA/MARITIME ADMIN WASHINGTON DC//613/620//
RUHUBDA/133ACS FT DODGE IA//IN//
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

~~QQQQ~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ: USTRANSCOM DISUM CY 99-066 (U)

1. (U) USTRANSCOM DISUM FOR 07 APR 99.

2. (U) THIS REPORT IS MADE UP OF USTRANSCOM ITEMS OF INTEREST. THIS PRODUCT, BASED ON ALL-SOURCE REPORTING, REPRESENTS THE ANALYSIS AND POSITION OF THE USTRANSCOM JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER TRANSPORTATION (JICTRANS).

3. (U) EUCOM AOR.

MORI DocID: 1054658

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION:

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

MORI DocID: 1054658

4. (U) CENTCOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

Non-responsive

MORI DocID: 1054658

Non-Responsive

5. (U) SOUTHCOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)
B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS: (NTR)

6. (U) PACOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

1. (U) INDONESIA: FOLLOWING THE DEATHS OF AT LEAST FIVE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS IN EAST TIMOR, JAILED RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO HAS CANCELLED AN EXISTING CEASE-FIRE AND CALLED FOR HIS SUPPORTERS TO ENGAGE PRO-INDONESIA FORCES. XANANA'S SURPRISE PUBLIC CALL FOR NEW ATTACKS ON INDONESIAN MILITARY UNITS AND PROINTEGRATIONIST CIVILIAN MILITIAS IS AN ATTEMPT TO HASTEN UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROVINCE. A SPOKESMAN FOR GUSMAO SAID THE CALL FOR A RETURN TO INSURRECTION WOULD BE REVOKED IF THE UN STEPPED IN TO HELP AND INDONESIA'S MILITARY ENDED ITS ATTACKS. XANANA'S DECLARATION COULD UNDERMINE UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS WITH PORTUGAL SCHEDULED FOR NEXT WEEK. XANANA HAS BEEN UNDER PRESSURE FROM SUPPORTERS TO MODIFY HIS LONG-STANDING CALL FOR HIS GUERRILLA FIGHTERS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF PROVOCATIONS BY THE MILITIA OR THE ARMY. HE ADMITTED IN A WRITTEN STATEMENT THAT THE NEW POLICY COULD PROMPT A "BLOODBATH" BUT NOTED HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE. THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SAYS IT CANNOT CONFIRM THAT INDONESIAN FORCES JOINED THE ATTACKS BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS BUT NOTES THE MILITIAS CONTROL A MAIN ROAD

R

RESPONSIVE

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

LEADING TO THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF DILI, PRESUMABLY WITH THE MILITARY'S PERMISSION. ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO COULD PLAY A PIVOTAL ROLE IN REDUCING TENSION BY ENFORCING HIS ORDERS FOR AN END TO MILITARY SUPPORT FOR VARIOUS PROINTEGRATIONIST GROUPS. FOR MONTHS THE MILITARY HAS PROVIDED AMMUNITION TO THE CIVILIAN MILITIAS. SOME UNITS MAY STILL BE PROVIDING TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ADVICE AND HAVE NOT ATTEMPTED TO DISARM THE MILITIAS. THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE, WHETHER SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR OR COMMUNAL VIOLENCE AS SEEN ELSEWHERE, IS LIKELY TO INCREASE AS JUNE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS APPROACH. WITH VIOLENT UNREST SO WIDESPREAD, THE INDONESIAN MILITARY WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO AVOID OVEREXTENDING ITSELF IN ITS EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE SECURITY SITUATION. DESPITE A STRONG, DEMONSTRATED RELUCTANCE, THE ARMED FORCES MAY BE FORCED TO DEPLOY CRITICAL FORCES AWAY FROM THE CAPITAL OF JAKARTA, AND OTHER IMPORTANT URBAN CENTERS LIKELY TO SEE INCREASED UNREST IN THE RUN UP TO ELECTIONS. THERE IS NO DIRECT THREAT TO AMERICAN CITIZENS IN INDONESIA AT THIS TIME. (POC: [redacted] CJCS INTELLIGENCE UPDATE 07 APR 99; [redacted] 07 APR 99)

RESPONSIVE

7. (U) RESPECTIVE AOR ASSESSMENTS OF TERRORIST THREAT LEVELS (AREAS WITH MEDIUM OR HIGHER THREAT ASSESSMENTS) ARE SHOWN EVERY MONDAY. CHANGES ARE REPORTED DAILY AS THEY OCCUR.

8. (U) ANY PLAIN LANGUAGE ADDRESS CHANGE REQUESTS TO THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE FORWARDED VIA MESSAGE TO ORIGINATOR OR VIA FAX TO CINC TRANS INTEL CEN, DSN 576 8005 SECURE FAX, DSN 576 1559 UNCLAS FAX. POC FOR PLA CHANGES IS SSGT K. MORRIS.

9. (U) POC IS JICTRANS; DSN STU III 576 4235; COMM STU III 618 256 4235; SECURE FAX 576 8005//

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

SOURCES: FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

USTRANSCOM DISUM CY 99-066,
Paragraph 6.B(1) is declassified
IAW TCJ2 Memo, 20 May 2004
And Department of State Memo,
30 Jun 2004.

30 Jun 06

DAVID M. COONEY, JR. (Date)
CAPT, USN
Director of Intelligence

MORI DocID: 1054606

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT ID: 183069792
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990408
TOR: 005510
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904081100
MHFNO: 99 4988514
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUHPSGG #0273 0980421
ZNY SSSSS
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR/THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUCORGP T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RUEBJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR/HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUFOADA T JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUERJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUHBABA T CG III MEF/HQBN THIRD MARDIV/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE/THREE ONE MEU/FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR/SECONDBN FOURTH MAR/SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR/III MEF TECG
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW/MWSG SEVENTEEN/TWELFTH MAR/THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO/HMH THREE SIX ONE/MAG THREE SIX
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN/HMH FOUR SIX SIX/HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE/COMPHIBGRU ONE DET

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Sep 02
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

ENCL 2

MORI DocID: 1054606

RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUHDYOK T NAVSECGRUACT YOKOSUKA JA
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU SOC/THIRTEENTH MEU
RUHPCRO T COMCARGRU ONE
RUHPPEL T COMPHIBRON ONE
RUHPTAR T USS TARAWA
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUWHITS T COMCMRON ONE DET
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE/FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE/MACS SEVEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE/FIRST MAR
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR/THIRDBN FIFTH MAR/FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR/FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR/THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWIKBD T VMFA AW TWO TWO FIVE/MAG ELEVEN
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO/HMH FOUR SIX FIVE/MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT/MTACS THREE EIGHT
RUWIKBK T MWSG THREE SEVEN
P 081100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN

MORI DocID: 1054606

~~SECRET~~

RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUFAPTJ/NMCB THREE DET SIERRA
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
4WG SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
USNS WATERS
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA098/08 APR//
RMKS/
(U) 1. ~~(S)~~ WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

[redacted]

(ESPIONAGE) NOFORN

~~SECRET~~

D. (C) INDONESIA - BODY COUNT RISES IN THREE PROVINCES

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELPOMENTS:

[redacted]

NOW responsive

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE

(U) D. (C) INDONESIA - BODY COUNT RISES IN THREE PROVINCES: RIOTS CONTINUED AND THE BODY COUNT ROSE IN THE KAI ISLANDS (0540S/13245E), SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS; SINGKAWANG (0054N/10900E), WEST KALIMANTAN; AND LIQUICA (0840S/12520E), EAST TIMOR 7 APR. IN THE KAI ISLANDS THE DEATH TOLL ROSE TO 63 DESPITE THE DEPLOYMENT OF ONE BATTALION OF THE ANTI-RIOT STRIKE FORCE. POLICE IN SINGKAWANG KILLED AT LEAST 12 MADURESE WHO ATTACKED A POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN AN EFFORT TO RELEASE 20 DETAINED FRIENDS. LOCAL MALAYS AND DAYAKS CONTINUE TO BURN HOUSES OF MADURESE SETTLERS. IN LIQUICA, VIOLENCE CONTINUED BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS. CONFLICTING REPORTS INDICATE PRO-JAKARTA MILITIA GROUPS, WITH ARMED FORCES SUPPORT, KILLED BETWEEN 5 AND 45 INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS IN THE LAST TWO DAYS. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE VIOLENCE IN THESE AREAS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE AS SECURITY FORCES ON THE SCENE ARE BEING ACCUSED OF TAKING INSUFFICIENT ACTION TO STOP UNREST. THE WIDELY VARYING REPORTS OUT OF EAST TIMOR ARE PROBABLY CAUSED BY THE PROPAGANDA EFFORTS OF BOTH PRO AND ANTI-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS. SEPARATIST ELEMENTS LIKELY WANT TO EXAGGERATE THE SCALE OF MILITIA GROUP KILLINGS TO FORCE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE COMMITMENT OF UN PEACE-KEEPING FORCES. SEPARATISTS SEE THE DEPLOYMENT OF UN FORCES TO EAST TIMOR ACCELERATING THE MOVE TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE. INTEGRATIONISTS LIKELY WANT TO LIMIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY OF MILITIA GROUPS EFFORTS TO INTIMIDATE LIKELY SEPARATIST VOTERS. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR	BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

08 APR	JAPAN	(U) HANA MATSURI (FLOWER FESTIVAL)

SECRET

10 APR	PAKISTAN	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY (1973)
13 APR	INDIA	(U) VAISAKHI (SIKH) GURU GOBIND SINGH FOUNDED SIKHISM AS A MILITARISTIC RELIGION (1699).
12-14 APR	THAILAND	(U) SONGKRAN (NATIONAL HOLIDAY; TRADITIONAL NEW YEAR)
15 APR	NORTH KOREA	(U) BIRTHDAY OF KIM IL-SUNG (1912) ANNIVERSARY OF EC-121 SHOOTDOWN (1969)
19 APR	SOUTH KOREA	(U) STUDENT REVOLUTION (1960)
25 APR	AUSTRALIA/ NEW ZEALAND/ COOK ISLANDS/ SAMOA/TONGA	(U) ANZAC DAY (1915)
25 APR	NORTH KOREA	(U) FOUNDING OF KOREAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (1932)/KIM IL-SUNG GUERRILLA UNIT ACTIVATION DAY (1915)
29 APR	JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS

C.
5. (U) [redacted]

b(2)

[redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183077403
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990409
TOR: 031940
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904091100
MHFNO: 99 5005059
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #0243 0990700
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0225 0990509
RUHPFTP T COMCARGRU FIVE
RUHPCRO T COMCARGRU ONE
RUHPCDT T COMCRUDESGRU THREE
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRMAAT T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUNGPDF T USS VANDEGRIFT
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUWHITS T COMCMRON ONE DET
RUHPZAE T COMCRUDESGRU ONE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUWDIBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUHPJCS T USS JOHN C STENNIS
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RHWIFUA T USCGC MIDGETT
RUHPTAR T USS TARAWA
RUHDYOK T NAVSECGRUACT YOKOSUKA JA
RUHPPEL T COMPHIBRON ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 2340 00
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

ENCL 32

MORI DocID: 1054607

RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUEOEGA T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUFOADA T JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN

RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUEBJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN

SECRET

RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHWISSF T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RUCORGP T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHWISSM T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 091100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUFAPTJ/NMCB THREE DET SIERRA
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
4WG SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
USNS WATERS
BT

CONTROLS
S E C R E T

MORI DocID: 1054607

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA099/09 APR//
RMKS/
(U) 1. ~~(S)~~ WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:
   A. [redacted]
   B. [redacted]
(U) C. ~~(S)~~ INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 1-8 APR 99
   D. [redacted]

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELPOMENTS:
   A. [redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE

[redacted]

NOT RESPONSIVE

C. (S) INDONESIA — WEEKLY UPDATE 1 – 8 APR 99:

(C) GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THE OVERALL LEVEL OF UNREST IN INDONESIA INCREASED OVER LAST WEEK DUE TO RENEWED VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, MOLUCCAS, AND WEST KALIMANTAN. SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR REMAINS TENSE AS PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBEL LEADER XANANA GUSMAO AND EAST TIMOR ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP CARLOS BELO ALLEGEDLY MADE STATEMENTS FOR CONTINUED RESISTANCE AND RENEWED FIGHTING. UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS SCHEDULED FOR 22-23 APR. (KEYS ID)

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE RUPIAH EXCHANGE RATE DECLINED TO RP 8,655/$1.00. THE ECONOMY REMAINS WEAK AND IS UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PERIOD. THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY IS STILL BURDENED WITH PROBLEMS RELATING TO INSOLVENT BANKS AND OFF-SHORE PRIVATE DEBTS. MEANWHILE, AMIDST THE CONTROVERSIAL FINANCIAL BRIBERY SCANDAL, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE (DPR) FINALLY ENDORSED THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL THAT

AN INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY OUTSIDE THE BANK OF INDONESIA BE SET UP TO MONITOR AND SUPERVISE BANKS IN 2002. THE INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY WILL EVENTUALLY SUPERVISE ALL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INCLUDING STOCK MARKETS, PENSION FUNDS, AND INSURANCE. INDONESIA'S PERSISTENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS WILL LIKELY COMPLICATE THE NATION'S CURRENT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY. (KEYS ID)

(c) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI) COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO PROPOSED TO PRESIDENT HABIBIE 1 APR THAT THE NAME OF ABRI BE CHANGED TO TNI ("TENTARA NASIONAL INDONESIA" OR INDONESIAN NATIONAL FORCES). TNI WAS THE ORIGINAL NAME OF ABRI, AND WAS UTILIZED DURING THE 1940'S. THIS NAME CHANGE IS INTENDED TO REFLECT THE SEPARATION OF THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE FORCE (POLRI) FROM ABRI, AND IS AN ATTEMPT BY WIRANTO TO DISTANCE THE MILITARY FORCES FROM THE NEGATIVE IMAGE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE FORCE AND THE SUHARTO-ERA ABUSES. THIS NAME-CHANGE PROPOSAL IS MERELY A PUBLIC RELATIONS MOVE, AND IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE ANYTHING WITHIN ABRI. ANY COSMETIC CHANGES TO ABRI WILL NOT BE WELL-RECEIVED BY CRITICS, WHO WILL DEMAND GREATER REFORM MEASURES. (KEYS ID)

(c) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) RECENTLY BANNED POLITICAL PARTIES FROM INVOLVING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT MINISTERS, IN THE UP-COMING ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THIS MOVE WAS AIMED AT BREAKING GOLKAR'S LONG-STANDING CONNECTION TO THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS ABILITY TO UTILIZE GOVERNMENT FACILITIES AND RESOURCES TO WIN THE ELECTION. FACTIONS WITHIN GOLKAR PUSHED BACK HARD, THREATENING TO WITHDRAW POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM PRESIDENT HABIBIE IF HE DID NOT PROTECT THEIR EQUITIES. LOOKING FOR COVER, HABIBIE TURNED TO THE SUPREME COURT, WHICH ISSUED A NON-COMMITTAL LEGAL OPINION. HABIBIE WILL NOW HAVE TO MAKE THE FINAL DECISION ON WHETHER MINISTERS SHOULD CAMPAIGN OR NOT. GOLKAR OFFICIALS ARE NOW SIGNALING THAT THEY EXPECT HABIBIE WILL ISSUE A GOVERNMENT REGULATION ALLOWING MINISTERS TO CAMPAIGN IF THEY TAKE A LEAVE OF ABSENCE DURING THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD. IN AN EFFORT TO KEEP GOLKAR ON HIS SIDE, HABIBIE WILL LIKELY ALLOW CERTAIN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND MINISTERS SOME FORM OF CAMPAIGNING DESPITE THE KPU BAN. (KEYS ID)

(c) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: THE OVERALL LEVEL OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE INCREASED OVER LAST WEEK. THE MAJORITY OF THIS WEEK'S VIOLENCE WERE NOTED IN THE AREAS OF TUAL (0540S/13245E), SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS, SINGKAWANG (0054N/10900E), WEST KALIMANTAN AND LIQUICA (0840S/12520E), EAST TIMOR. IN LIQUICA, PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVIST, XANANA GUSMAO, ALLEGEDLY TOLD FOLLOWERS TO TAKE UP ARMS AGAINST PRO-INDONESIAN MILITIA GROUPS AND THE INDONESIAN MILITARY UNTIL A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE ARRIVES. HE LATER DENIED MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT. ABRI COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO SAYS THERE IS NO NEED FOR A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE AND PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SOLVED INTERNALLY. IN SINGKAWANG, LOCAL MALAYS AND INDIGENOUS DAYAKS CONTINUE TO TERRORIZE MADURESE SETTLERS. IN TUAL, CLASHES BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS CONTINUE DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF MARINES AND ARMY PERSONNEL. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:

1 APR TUAL / AT LEAST 11 PEOPLE DIED IN CLASHES BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS.

1 APR ABEPURA (0238S/14035E) / 50 STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE AT POLICE HEADQUARTERS DEMANDING AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF A COLLEGE LECTURER.

2 APR TUAL / RIOTS CONTINUE LEAVING EIGHT DEAD AND 22 INJURED.

2 APR PURBALINGGA (0724S/10922E) / PEOPLE WEARING INDONESIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY-STRUGGLE COSTUMES ASSAULTED A CAR CARRYING AKBAR TANJUNG, GENERAL CHAIRMAN OF GOLKAR PARTY. NOBODY WAS HURT IN THE INCIDENT.

3 APR TUAL / CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS ARMED WITH SWORDS, SPEARS AND HOMEMADE BOMBS CONTINUED TO CLASH.

4 APR TUAL / FIGHTING BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS REPORTEDLY KILLED AT LEAST ONE PERSON, BRINGING THE DEATH TOLL TO 38 IN LESS THAN A WEEK.

5 APR LIQUICA / CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATIONIST MILITIA GROUPS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE PEOPLE LEAVES AT LEAST TWO PEOPLE DEAD AND NINE OTHERS INJURED.

5 APR SAMBAS (0120N/10915E)/ LOCAL MALAYS AND INDIGENOUS DAYAKS REPORTEDLY BURNED 17 MADURESE HOMES.

5 APR BELAWAN (0347N/09841E) / A RIOT BROKE OUT RESULTING IN A PERSON SERIOUSLY INJURED AND TWO HOUSES DESTROYED.

5 APR SINGKAWANG / 200 MADURESE ATTACKED A POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN AN EFFORT TO FREE 20 OF THEIR COLLEAGUES BEING DETAINED BY POLICE. AT LEAST 12 DIED FROM GUNSHOTS.

6 APR TUAL / COMMUNAL CLASHES CONTINUE TO ERUPT DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF A BATTALION OF TROOPS.

6 APR LIQUICA / THERE HAVE BEEN UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF AN INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED IN A CHURCH RESULTING IN 45 DEATHS.

7 APR TUAL / COMMUNAL CLASHES CONTINUED AS THE DEATH TOLL REACHES 63 DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF 100 MARINES AND ARMY STRATEGIC RESERVE COMMAND PERSONNEL.

7 APR LANGSA (0428N/09758E) / A DOZEN MEN BELIEVED TO BE MILITARY, MISTREATED RESIDENTS AND STUDENTS BY BEATING, KICKING AND THREATENING TO SHOOT THEM. (KEYS ID)

(U) (c) ABRI CONTINUES TO TAKE LITTLE OR NO ACTION TO SUPPRESS VIOLENCE IN AREAS OF UNREST. WITH THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE STILL NOT RESOLVED, CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM CLASHES CONTINUES IN THE MOLUCCAS, AND THE SITUATION REMAINS TENSE IN WEST KALIMANTAN. ABRI WILL HAVE ITS HANDS FULL COPING WITH UNREST AS THE JUN 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS GET CLOSER. UNREST WILL LIKELY CONTINUE IN AREAS ALREADY NOTED AND MAY SPREAD TO OTHER REGIONS AS THE ELECTION PERIOD APPROACHES. (KEYS ID)

(U) (c) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(U) (c) EAST TIMOR: VIOLENCE RESUMED BETWEEN EAST TIMOR'S PRO-INDEPENDENCE ARMED RESISTANCE GROUP FALINTIL AND THE PRO-INTEGRATION PARAMILITARY GROUP HALILINTAR 5 APR. REPORTING INDICATES THAT OVER 50 PEOPLE WERE KILLED DURING A THREE DAY PERIOD. THIS LATEST SERIES OF VIOLENCE COMES AFTER PEACE TALKS BROKE DOWN 19 MAR BETWEEN EX-FALINTIL LEADER XANANA GUSMAO AND HALILINTAR LEADER JOAO TAVARES. ON 5 APR, GUSMAO ALLEGEDLY ORDERED EAST TIMORESE TO RESIST AND WAGE WAR AGAINST ABRI, GOI, AND THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS. HE LATER DENIED MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT, BUT EAST TIMOR CATHOLIC BISHOP CARLOS BELO SUPPORTED GUSMAO'S ALLEGED CALL FOR RESISTANCE. BOTH STATEMENTS COULD FUEL FURTHER UNREST AND VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, AS WELL AS COMPLICATE OR DELAY THE UP-COMING UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS SCHEDULED FOR 22-23 APR. PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS HAVE ASKED FOR UN GROUND TROOPS PRESENCE. COUNTRIES OFFERING TO SEND GROUND TROOPS TO EAST TIMOR FOR POSSIBLE UN PEACE-KEEPING DUTIES INCLUDE AUSTRALIA, CANADA, IRELAND, NEW ZEALAND, AND NORWAY. (KEYS ID)

(U) (c) MOLUCCAS: AFTER SEVERAL WEEKS OF CALM, RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS ERUPTED AGAIN IN MOLUCCAS

31 MAR. LATEST REPORTS INDICATED THAT OVER 80 PEOPLE WERE KILLED, OVER 100 PEOPLE INJURED, AND OVER 400 HOMES DESTROYED WITHIN A ONE WEEK PERIOD. OVER 20,000 HAVE FLED THEIR HOMES AND ARE SEEKING REFUGE AT NEARBY MILITARY BASES. SINCE JAN 99, OVER 280 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED AND SEVERAL HUNDREDS INJURED FROM RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN THE MOLUCCAS. (KEYS ID)

(C) WEST KALIMANTAN: IN WEST KALIMANTAN, ETHNIC VIOLENCE BETWEEN THE LOCAL DAYAKS/MALAYS AND THE MIGRANT MADURESE ERUPTED AGAIN ON 5 APR AFTER A FEW DAYS OF PEACE. REPORTING INDICATED THAT OVER 20 PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN JUST THREE DAYS. SINCE 15 MAR, OVER 320 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED, SEVERAL HUNDREDS INJURED, AND OVER 3,000 HOMES DESTROYED. IN ADDITION, OVER 15,000 MADURESE REFUGEES HAVE FLED THEIR HOMES TO SEEK SAFETY IN THE CAPITAL CITY OF PONTIANAK. THE UNREST IN WEST KALIMANTAN HAS BEEN THE WORST CASE OF ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA SINCE FEBRUARY 1997.

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

13-14APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL)
17APR	MUSLIM NEW YEAR'S DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
22-23APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (MINISTERIAL LEVEL)
30APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS AGREEMENT SIGNING CEREMONY (ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE)
12MAY	TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING 1ST ANNIVERSARY
07JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
JUL	UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE ON EAST TIMOR
12JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
28AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
AUG-OCT	NEW MPR TO DECIDE ON EAST TIMOR STATUS
28OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12NOV	ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13NOV	ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING 1ST ANNIVERSARY
07DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT) (KEYS ID)

(S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10

11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5

(U) (S) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE UNREST AND VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, MOLUCCAS, AND WEST KALIMANTAN WILL LIKELY CALM DOWN IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS BEFORE RE-IGNITING AGAIN NEXT WEEK. AS THE PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PERIOD APPROACHES (JUN & OCT), IT IS LIKELY THAT THE UNREST AND VIOLENCE LEVEL WILL INCREASE AND SPREAD TO OTHER REGIONS OF INDONESIA. VIOLENCE BETWEEN EAST TIMOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS WILL LIKELY INCREASE DURING THE UP-COMING TRIPARTITE TALKS (APR) AND THE DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE PERIOD (JUL). STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA AND IN OTHER MAJOR CITIES HAVE BEEN LOW IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS, BUT WILL LIKELY INCREASE DURING THE EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE AND THE NATIONAL ELECTION PERIOD. (OSA MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

10 APR PAKISTAN	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY (1973)
13 APR INDIA	(U) VAISAKHI (SIKH) GURU GOBIND SINGH

~~SECRET~~

		FOUNDED SIKHISM AS A MILITARISTIC RELIGION (1699)
12-14 APR	THAILAND	(U) SONGKRAN (NATIONAL HOLIDAY; TRADITIONAL NEW YEAR)
15 APR	NORTH KOREA	(U) BIRTHDAY OF KIM IL-SUNG (1912) ANNIVERSARY OF EC-121 SHOOTDOWN (1969)
19 APR	SOUTH KOREA	(U) STUDENT REVOLUTION (1960)
25 APR	AUSTRALIA/ NEW ZEALAND/ COOK ISLANDS/ SAMOA/TONGA	(U) ANZAC DAY (1915)
25 APR	NORTH KOREA	(U) FOUNDING OF KOREAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (1932)/KIM IL-SUNG GUERRILLA UNIT ACTIVATION DAY (1915)
29 APR	JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS

C.
5. (U) [redacted]

b(2)

[redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183118928
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990416
TOR: 092607
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904161100
MHFNO: 99 5096158
DOCCLASS: S
~~CAVEATS: NOFORN~~

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUCOMCC #0622 1061305
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0262 1060558
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Jan 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~NOFORN~~
SECRET

ENCL (4)

MORI DocID: 1054609

RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUEOEGA T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUFOADA T JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE

MORI DocID: 1054609

RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBHR T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHWISSF T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 161100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUFAPTJ/NMCB THREE DET SIERRA
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4EW SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
4WG SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
USNS WATERS
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~ NOFORN

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/JD-106/16 APR//
RMKS/
1. (U) (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B. [redacted]

C. (S) INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 8 - 15 APR 99

D. [redacted]

2 pgs responsive

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELPOMENTS: NOTHING TO REPORT.

A. [redacted]

2 pgs responsive

~~NOFORN~~
SECRET

MORI DocID: 1054609

[redacted]

202 responsive

C. (U) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 8 - 15 APR 99

(C) GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THE OVERALL LEVEL OF UNREST IN INDONESIA REMAINED THE SAME AS LAST WEEK. STUDENT GROUPS HELD DEMONSTRATIONS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES WITH SOME ENDING IN VIOLENCE. A MILITARY COURT SENTENCED 11 KOPASSUS MEMBERS TO PRISON FOR THEIR ROLE IN THE KIDNAPPING OF 23 PRO-DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS. (KEYS ID)

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR INCREASED SLIGHTLY TO RP 8,550/$1.00. THE OVERALL ECONOMIC SITUATION REMAINS WEAK. THE WORLD BANK ANNOUNCED THE POSTPONEMENT OF US$600 MILLION IN AID TO INDONESIA AFTER BOTH PARTIES FAILED TO REACH AN AGREEMENT OVER NEW GUIDELINES TO MONITOR THE ALLOCATION OF THE FUNDS. ORIGINALLY THE WORLD BANK WAS TO HAVE RELEASED THE FUNDS 31 MAR, BUT AN EARLIER REPORT SHOWED INDONESIA'S MISMANAGEMENT OF PREVIOUS FUNDS FOR POLITICAL MEANS. THE POSTPONEMENT OF FUNDS WILL LIKELY AFFECT THE GLOBAL MARKET'S CONFIDENCE AND WORSEN INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC SITUATION. (KEYS ID)

(C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: A MILITARY COURT SENTENCED 11 INDONESIAN SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (KOPASSUS) MEMBERS TO 12-22 MONTHS IN PRISON FOR THEIR ROLE IN THE KIDNAPPING OF 23 PRO-DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS DURING THE JAN-MAY 98 UNREST. THE LIGHT SENTENCES ARE DESIGNED TO KEEP THE LOWER RANKING OFFICERS FROM IMPLICATING THEIR SUPERIORS; HOWEVER, THE OUTCOME OF THIS TRIAL WILL BE VIEWED AS HAVING LITTLE IMPACT ON SATISFYING PUBLIC SENTIMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. FORMER PRESIDENT SUHARTO'S SON-IN-LAW AND THE FORMER COMMANDER OF KOPASSUS, LTG (RET) PRABOWO, WILL NOT BE PUT ON TRIAL FOR HIS ROLE IN THE KIDNAPPING AS HE WAS DISMISSED FROM THE MILITARY AUG 98 AND THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE INVESTIGATION COMPLETED. (KEYS ID)

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU), RESPONSIBLE FOR APPROVING REGULATIONS WILL GOVERN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS, HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR ITS SLOW START OF THE 33-DAY VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD. THE KPU'S PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN CONSIDERED POOR, AND LACKING A SENSE OF URGENCY AS THEY ARE MORE PREOCCUPIED WITH ISSUES SUCH AS THEIR SALARIES AND PARTY FUNDS. FAMILIARIZATION OF REGULATIONS HAS NOT REACHED ALL SECTORS OF THE COMMUNITY AND MANY OFFICIALS DO NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF THE RULES THEY ARE IMPLEMENTING. POLITICAL PARTIES WHO FAIL TO URGE PROSPECTIVE VOTERS TO REGISTER, RISK LOSING OUT TO ESTABLISHED PARTIES AS PEOPLE WILL TEND TO VOTE FOR FAMILIAR AND PROVEN PARTIES. ACCORDING TO THE KPU, THE VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD IS 5 APR - 4 MAY. (KEYS ID)

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS INCREASED SLIGHTLY FOR THE WEEK, BUT OVERALL UNREST REMAINED THE SAME AS THE

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

PREVIOUS WEEK. STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E), BANDUNG (0654S/10736E) AND SURABAYA (0715S/11245E), WITH VIOLENCE OCCURRING IN JAKARTA AND BANDUNG. IN LHOKSEUMAWE (0510N/09708E), STUDENTS STAGED PROTESTS WHEN MILITARY OFFICERS TORE DOWN STREET BANNERS DEMANDING A REFERENDUM. DAILY UNREST CONTINUED BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATIONIST GROUPS IN EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E). VIOLENCE IN WEST KALIMANTAN (0054N/10900E) AND SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS (0540S/13245E) IS SUBSIDING. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:
- 8 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / 600 DRIVERS AND WORKERS EMPLOYED BY COMPANIES PROVIDING TRANSPORT TO MOBIL OIL ARE ON STRIKE.
- 8 APR MALIANA (0900S/12515E), EAST TIMOR / SOME 2,000 PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS HELD A RALLY IN REACTION TO XANANA GUSMAO'S DECLARATION OF WAR.
- 8 APR SINGKAWANG (0054N/10900E), WEST KALIMANTAN / MALAYS AND DAYAKS TORCHED MADURESE HOMES.
- 9 APR TUAL (0540S/13245E), MALUKU / A COMMUNAL CLASH KILLS ONE, INJURES TWO.
- 10 APR ERMERA (0845S/12523E), EAST TIMOR / CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATIONIST GROUPS LEAVES ONE DEAD AND ONE SERIOUSLY INJURED.
- 11 APR LIQUICA (0840S/12520E), EAST TIMOR / MEMBERS OF AN ARMED CIVILIAN MILITIA ATTACKED A CONVOY OF CARS IN WHICH BISHOP OF DILI, CARLOS BELO, WAS TRAVELLING. NO CASUALTIES REPORTED.
- 11 APR ZULAMAI (0858S/12503E), EAST TIMOR / HUNDREDS OF PRO-INTEGRATIONIST BACKERS WERE ATTACKED BY PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBEL GROUP FALINTIL. NO CASUALTIES REPORTED.
- 11 APR ERMERA, EAST TIMOR / INDONESIAN TROOPS AND FALINTIL CLASHED RESULTING IN TWO REBELS WOUNDED.
- 12 APR DILI (0833S/12534E) / 200 AITARAK PRO-INTEGRATION MILITANTS PARADED IN A SHOW OF STRENGTH.
- 12 APR BATAM ISLAND (0105N/10403E)/ SECURITY OFFICIAL STOPPED AN ETHNIC CLASH THAT RESULTED IN SEVERAL INJURIES.
- 13 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / ACEH YOUTHS AND STUDENTS PROTESTED THE TEARING DOWN OF STREET BANNERS DEMANDING A REFERENDUM.
- 13 APR JAKARTA / VARIOUS STUDENT GROUPS HELD DEMONSTRATIONS DEMANDING A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT BE FORMED. THERE WERE INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SECURITY FORCES RESULTING IN SEVERAL INJURIES.
- 14 APR SUNGAIRAYA (0042N/10854E), WEST KALIMANTAN / MOBS OF MALAYS AND DAYAKS TORCHED MADURESE HOMES LEAVING ONE MAN DEAD.
(KEYS ID)

(S) DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST WILL MOST LIKELY INCREASE WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS LESS THAN TWO MONTHS AWAY. STUDENTS ARE TRYING TO REGAIN SOLIDARITY; HOWEVER, THEY REMAIN DIVIDED ON POLITICAL ISSUES AND GOALS. WITH INCREASING TURMOIL IN JAKARTA AND IN THE OUTERLYING AREAS OF INDONESIA, TNI (INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES) WILL BE STRETCHED VERY THIN AS THEY ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH SIMULTANEOUS CRISES.

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(C) EAST TIMOR: AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI), THE SENIOR LEVEL TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR, ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 13-14 APR, WAS POSTPONED UNTIL 20-21 APR. THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL TRIPARTITE TALKS WILL STILL GO ON AS SCHEDULED 22-23 APR, WITH THE AGREEMENT SIGNING CEREMONY PLANNED FOR 30 APR. A LARGE PRO-INTEGRATION DEMONSTRATION IS PLANNED 17 APR IN DILI, WHICH

MORI DocID: 1054609

MAY RESULT IN A VIOLENT CONFRONTATION WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS. IT IS LIKELY THAT PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA FORCES WILL RESORT TO VIOLENCE DURING THIS PERIOD IN AN ATTEMPT TO STALL OR SABOTAGE THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT. MEANWHILE, PRESIDENT HABIBIE AGREED TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR. HABIBIE VIEWS THIS AS A STEP TOWARDS CREATING A PEACEFUL AND CONDUCIVE ATMOSPHERE TO FAMILIARIZE THE EAST TIMORESE OF THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE.

(U) (C) WEST KALIMANTAN: VIOLENT ETHNIC CLASHES BETWEEN NATIVE DAYAKS/MALAYS AND MIGRANT MADURESE CONTINUED FOR THE FIFTH CONSECUTIVE DAY IN WEST KALIMANTAN. AS A RESULT, SOME 5,000 MADURESE REFUGEES WERE EVACUATED TO MADURA ISLAND, WITH ANOTHER 2,000 EN ROUTE. WHILE THEY WERE LIKELY NOT FORCED TO LEAVE, IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THEY WERE GIVEN LITTLE OPTION.

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

17APR	MUSLIM NEW YEAR'S DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
20-21APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL)
22-23APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (MINISTERIAL LEVEL)
30APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS AGREEMENT SIGNING CEREMONY (ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE)
12MAY	TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING 1ST ANNIVERSARY
07JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
JUL	UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE ON EAST TIMOR
12JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
28AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
AUG-OCT	NEW MPR TO DECIDE ON EAST TIMOR STATUS
28OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13NOV	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
07DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT)

(U) (S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10

11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
(OSA MULTIPLE SOURCES)	(KEYS ID)		

[redacted]

Non responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:
A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

29 APR	BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR	INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

19 APR	SOUTH KOREA	(U) STUDENT REVOLUTION (1960)
25 APR	AUSTRALIA/ NEW ZEALAND/ COOK ISLANDS/ SAMOA/TONGA	(U) ANZAC DAY (1915)
25 APR	NORTH KOREA	(U) FOUNDING OF KOREAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (1932)/KIM IL-SUNG GUERRILLA UNIT ACTIVATION DAY (1915)
29 APR	JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS

C.

5. (U) [redacted] NOD responsive

b(3)

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183131360
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990419
TOR: 023129
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904191100
MHFNO: 99 5120558
DOCCLASS: S

Review entire document

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCC #1736 1090616
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0415 1090616
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Feb 09
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

ENCL (5)

~~SECRET~~

RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUEOEGA T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUFOADA T JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
~~RHFJAGT T MAG FOUR ONE~~
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR

RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPBHR T FIRST MAR
RUHPPEL T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUHPBHR T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBHR T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHPESX T TACRON TWELVE
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHWISSK T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHWISSF T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW

~~SECRET~~

RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 191100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUBDPLA/NMCB THREE DET SIERRA
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
4WG SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
USNS WATERS
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA0109/19 APR//
RMKS/
1. (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

~~SECRET~~

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. (C) INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING DELAYED TO 12 SEP

B. (C) INDONESIA - UP-DATE ON EAST TIMOR UNREST

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELPOMENTS: NOTHING TO REPORT.

A. (C) INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING DELAYED TO 12 SEP: UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, JAMSHEED MARKER, INFORMED THE US MISSION ON 16 APR THAT THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING WILL BE DELAYED FROM JULY TO 12 SEP. MARKER STATED THAT THE 12 SEP DATE HAD BEEN SELECTED OUT OF SECURITY AND TRANSPARENCY CONCERNS, AND THE NEED FOR SUFFICIENT TIME TO GATHER ENOUGH RESOURCES, FUNDS, AND PERSONNEL. HE ESTIMATED THE TOTAL UN COST TO BE APPROXIMATELY $45 MILLION, WITH AN ON-SITE REQUIREMENT OF 4,500 PERSONNEL. (KEYS ID)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE DELAY WILL GIVE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) MORE TIME TO COME UP WITH A POST BALLOTING STRATEGY. IT WILL ALSO GIVE PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS MORE TIME TO CONDUCT THEIR INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT ACTIVITIES IN AN EFFORT TO INFLUENCE THE DIRECT BALLOTS OUTCOME. THIS WILL LIKELY INCREASE THE LEVEL OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR AS PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES CLASH WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS. THE DELAY WILL LIKELY BE SEEN AS A VICTORY FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES AS THE ANNOUNCEMENT WILL COME AFTER A WEEKEND OF VIOLENCE. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES/CONFIDENTIAL) (KEYS ID)

B. (C) INDONESIA - UP-DATE ON EAST TIMOR UNREST: VIOLENCE ERUPTED AGAIN IN DILI, EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E), AS OVER 1,500 ARMED PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAMEN PARADED INTO THE CAPITAL CITY, HELD A RALLY, AND WENT ON A RAMPAGE 17 APR. LATEST REPORTING INDICATES OVER 30 PEOPLE WERE KILLED WHEN PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES ATTACKED INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. DURING THE RAMPAGE, PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES WERE SEEN ATTACKING AND BURNING THE HOMES AND BUSINESSES OF KNOWN PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS. AMONG THE DEAD WAS 18-YEAR-OLD MANUELITO CARRASCALAO, THE SON OF PRO-INDEPEDENCE FIGURE MANUEL CARRASCALAO. THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) DID NOT INTERVENE DURING THE VIOLENCE. (KEYS ID)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES WILL CONTINUE

~~SECRET~~

TO USE INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE TO DELAY THE UP-COMING 22-23 APR UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS AND TO INFLUENCE THE 12 SEP DIRECT BALLOTING FOR AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. UNREST AND VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE DURING THE WEEK AS PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES MOVE THEIR CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES TO OTHER NEARBY CITIES, RESULTING IN SIMILAR VIOLENT ATTACKS AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS.
(OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES/CONFIDENTIAL) (KEYS ID)

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

13 APR INDIA	(U) VAISAKHI (SIKH) GURU GOBIND SINGH FOUNDED SIKHISM AS A MILITARISTIC RELIGION (1699)
12-14 APR THAILAND	(U) SONGKRAN (NATIONAL HOLIDAY; TRADITIONAL NEW YEAR)
15 APR NORTH KOREA	(U) BIRTHDAY OF KIM IL-SUNG (1912) ANNIVERSARY OF EC-121 SHOOTDOWN (1969)
19 APR SOUTH KOREA	(U) STUDENT REVOLUTION (1960)
25 APR AUSTRALIA/ NEW ZEALAND/ COOK ISLANDS/ SAMOA/TONGA	(U) ANZAC DAY (1915)
25 APR NORTH KOREA	(U) FOUNDING OF KOREAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (1932)/KIM IL-SUNG GUERRILLA UNIT ACTIVATION DAY (1915)
29 APR JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
1 MAY MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
1 MAY SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS

C. (U) FOREIGN VIP TRAVEL: NOTHING TO REPORT.

5. (U) [redacted]

b2

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK~~

Review entire Document.

DOCUMENT_ID: 183158132
DOCNO: PA0808
PRODUCER: JICPAC
SOURCE: IMAGERY
DOCTYPE: TARGET
DOR: 19990423
TOR: 014011
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904230228
MHFNO: 99 5184876
DOCCLASS: S
CAVEATS: REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK

HEADER
PP RUEAIIC
DE RUEKJCS #2278 1130230
ZNY SSSSS
P 230230Z APR 99
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHHJMCY/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RHRMDAB/COMUSNAVCENT//N2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLFREN VA
RUEDAEA/NAIC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH
RUEADWD/HQ DA WASH DC
RUWSMXI/USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//J2-J//
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIC/DSCA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 230228Z APR 99 ZYS
FM JICPAC CATIS HONOLULU HI
TO AIG FOUR SIX THREE
PAC IMAGE
RAYMJA/ASTJIC
RUYLRCS/82RS KADENA AB JA//INZ//
RUHDKAF/324IS KUNIA HI
RAYMIK/ASTJIC OBU
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T REL AUS/CA/UK~~
QQQQ
CLASSIFIED BY: DCI

TEXT
MSGID/IIR/JICPAC/PAC071/APR//
RPTID/SUPIR/JICPAC/SER:PA0808/-/-/990422//
HILITES/(S-REL AS CA UK)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
1.5(c)

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Feb 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK~~
SECRET

End 6

~~SECRET~~
~~REL AUS, REL CAN, REL UK~~

[redacted]

1.5(c)
1.7(c)

1.5(c)
1.7(c)

1.5(c)
1.7(c)

NOW responsive

ADMIN
DECL/E.O. 12951//
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183158595
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990423
TOR: 033732
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904231100
MHFNO: 99 5185932
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #5045 1130711
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0263 1130710
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Jan 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

Encl (7)

MORI DocID: 1054613

RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE

RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPBHR T FIRST MAR
RUHPPEL T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUHPBHR T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBHR T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPESX T TACRON TWELVE
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHWISSK T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHWISSF T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN

SECRET

RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 231100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOU4WG 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
S E C R E T

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/JD 113/23 APR//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE

MORI DocID: 1054613

RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B.

C.

Non responsive

(3) D. (C) INDONESIA - PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN EAST TIMOR

(3) E. (C) INDONESIA - CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE IN SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS

(3) F. (S) INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 15 - 22 APR 99

G. [redacted]

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

Non responsive

~~SECRET~~

NON RESPONSIVE

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

NOR responsive

(U) D. (C) INDONESIA - PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN EAST TIMOR: PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATION REPRESENTATIVES SIGNED A TRUCE AGREEMENT 21 APR IN DILI AT THE HOME OF BISHOP BELO TO REDUCE THE RECENT SPAT OF VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW. DOMINGOS SOARES WHO HEADS THE FORUM FOR DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE AND JOAO TAVERES, COMMANDER OF THE MILITIA FORCE SIGNED FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS WHILE LEANDRO ISAAC, COORDINATOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF EAST TIMOR SIGNED FOR THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUP. EAST TIMOR MILITARY COMMANDER COLONEL TONO SURATMAN, EAST TIMOR POLICE CHIEF COLONEL TIMBUL SILEAN, AND JOKO SIGIANTO FROM THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ALSO SIGNED THE AGREEMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL WIRANTO. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS FRAGILE TRUCE AGREEMENT WILL LAST VERY LONG AS THE SITUATION STILL REMAINS VOLATILE. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT SEVEN WERE KILLED IN EAST TIMOR SINCE THE TRUCE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED. THE AGREEMENT DID NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE AND THE MILITIAS REPORTEDLY WILL NOT SURRENDER THEIR ARMS. IT ALSO IS APPARENT THAT MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR ARE INCAPABLE OR UNWILLING TO INTERVENE TO STOP MILITIA ATTACKS AND INTIMIDATION PRACTICES AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

(U) E. (C) INDONESIA - CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE IN SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS: CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE BROKE OUT IN TWO AREAS OF THE SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS 20 APR. IN THE FIRST AREA, VIOLENCE BEGAN IN TUAL (0540S/13245E), KAI ISLANDS, 250NM (500KM) SOUTHEAST OF AMBON (0343S/12812E) WHEN A CHRISTIAN GOT INTO A DRUNKEN BRAWL WITH A MUSLIM. THE UNREST SPREAD TO LARUT (0539S/13259E) ON THE NEARBY ISLAND OF BIG KAI AND THEN BACK TO TUAL. REPORTS INDICATE UP TO 50 DEAD, 100 INJURED, AND 200 HOUSES BURNED AND MORE THAN 10,000 PEOPLE HAVE FLED TO TUAL. THE ARMED FORCES (TNI) SENT 1,000 TROOPS FROM AMBON TO THE KAI ISLANDS TO DEAL WITH UNREST. ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS, SOME CASUALTIES WERE SHOT BY TNI. THE SECOND AREA OF UNREST CENTERED ON NEIRA (0432S/12954E), BANDA ISLANDS, 90NM (160KM) SOUTH OF AMBON. CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS CLASHED LEAVING 4 DEAD AND 30 HOUSES BURNED. THE MUSLIMS ARE THE MAJORITY GROUP IN THE BANDA ISLANDS. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) VIOLENCE WILL CONTINUE IN THE MOLUCCAS AS TENSIONS BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS REMAIN HIGH. THE SLIGHTEST PROVOCATION BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS WILL LEAD TO FURTHER UNREST IN THE AREA. THE MUSLIMS IN THE KAI ISLANDS ARE NEW MIGRANTS FROM SULAWESI (0300S/12100E) AND AMBON AND HAVE OFTEN BEEN CRITICIZED BY THE LOCAL CHRISTIANS FOR BEING AGGRESSIVE BUSINESSMEN, ARROGANT AND DISRESPECTFUL OF LOCAL TRADITIONS. THE CAUSES BEHIND THE VIOLENCE MIRROR THE PAST AMBON RIOTS AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE MILITARY REGAINS CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

(U) F. (C) INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 15 - 22 APR 99, GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THE OVERALL LEVEL OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED OVER LAST WEEK. THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT

BALLOTING WILL BE DELAYED FROM JULY TO 12 SEP. PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS SIGNED A TRUCE AGREEMENT TO END THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR.
(KEYS ID)

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: NINE PRIVATE INDONESIAN BANKS SIGNED INVESTMENT AND PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS WITH THE CENTRAL BANK AND THE GOVERNMENT 15 APR AS PART OF AN AMBITIOUS BANK RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM. THE CONTRACTS, HOWEVER, CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT GAPS REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF RECAPITALIZATION NEEDED AND THE TERMS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REPLACEMENT BONDS. THE RUSH TO SIGN THE CONTRACTS WAS LIKELY TO COUNTER PERCEPTIONS THAT THE RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM WAS NOT PROGRESSING AS PLANNED AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, WOULD INFLUENCE INVESTOR'S CONFIDENCE. THE RECAPITALIZATION COST FOR THE NINE BANKS IS ESTIMATED TO BE $ 3.4 BILLION. THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK PREDICTS THAT INDONESIA WILL NOT SHOW ECONOMIC GROWTH UNTIL 2000, AS ITS RECOVERY WILL DEPEND UPON BOTH MACROECONOMICS AND POLITICAL STABILITY. IF INDONESIA'S POLITICAL STABILITY COLLAPSES, REFORM WILL BE DELAYED AND ECONOMIC GROWTH WILL STALL. THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR REMAINED AT RP 8,550/$1. (KEYS ID)

(S) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (TNI) COMMANDER, GENERAL WIRANTO, VISITED DILI, EAST TIMOR 20-21 APR TO MEET WITH LOCAL COMMUNITY AND MILITARY LEADERS IN RESPONSE TO THE RECENT RISE IN VIOLENCE. WIRANTO HELD A MEETING WITH PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS 20 APR, THEN MET WITH DILI ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP CARLOS F.X. BELO 21 APR. ALTHOUGH WIRANTO'S VISIT TO EAST TIMOR WAS A GOOD PUBLIC RELATIONS GESTURE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HIS VISIT ALONE WILL END THE UNREST AND VIOLENCE.
(KEYS ID)

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING WILL BE DELAYED FROM JULY TO 12 SEP. UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, JAMSHEED MARKER, STATED THAT THE 12 SEP DATE HAD BEEN SELECTED OUT OF SECURITY AND TRANSPARENCY CONCERNS, AND THE NEED FOR SUFFICIENT TIME TO GATHER ENOUGH RESOURCES, FUNDS, AND PERSONNEL. THE TOTAL UN COST IS ESTIMATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY $45 MILLION, WITH AN ON-SITE REQUIREMENT OF 4,500 PERSONNEL. THE DELAY WILL GIVE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA MORE TIME TO COME UP WITH A POST BALLOTING STRATEGY.
(KEYS ID)

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY OVER LAST WEEK. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT UNREST OCCURRED AT DILI (0833S/12434E), EAST TIMOR, WHEN PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS 17 APR. IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E), A "HOME-MADE" BOMB EXPLODED AT NATIONAL ISTIQLAL MOSQUE 19 APR. DEMONSTRATIONS DEVELOPED IN LHOKSEUMAWE (0510N/09708E), ACEH, AS VIOLENCE CONTINUED IN WEST KALIMANTAN (0054N/10900E), AND SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS (0540S/13245E). SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:
15 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN THREE TOWNS IN ACEH PROVINCE TO DEMAND A REFERENDUM.
15 APR WEST KALIMANTAN / ETHNIC CLASHES ERUPTED BETWEEN MADURESE SETTLERS AND LOCAL MALAYS AND DAYAKS.
15 APR JAKARTA / HUNDREDS FROM SEVERAL STUDENT GROUPS DEMONSTRATED AT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.
15 APR LACLUBAR DISTRICT, EAST TIMOR / PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS

AMBUSHED MEMBERS FROM A MILITARY DISTRICT COMMAND RESULTING IN ONE SECURITY MEMBER KILLED AND FIVE OTHERS INJURED.

16 APR ERMERA / CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE FALINTIL GUERRILLAS AND AN INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES TEAM RESULTED IN TWO GUERRILLAS KILLED.

17 APR DILI / PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS, HOLDING A RALLY ON THE GOVERNOR'S LAWN RESULTING IN REPORTS OF UP TO 30 KILLED.

18 APR BECORA, EAST TIMOR / VIOLENCE CONTINUED BETWEEN PRO-INDONESIA GROUPS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS RESULTING IN TWO DEATHS REPORTED.

18 APR SAMBAS / ARMED CLASHES BETWEEN SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND LOCAL RESIDENTS RESULTED IN FOUR PEOPLE KILLED.

19 APR KARIMUNTING VILLAGE, WEST KALIMANTAN / SECURITY FORCES MISTAKENEDLY OPENED FIRE ON ETHNIC MADURESE MIGRANTS AND LOCAL MALAYS, KILLING FOUR PEOPLE AND INJURING THREE.

19 APR JAKARTA / A "HOME-MADE" BOMB EXPLODED IN AN OFFICE COMPLEX LOCATED ON THE GROUND FLOOR OF JAKARTA'S NATIONAL AL-ISTIQLAL MOSQUE RESULTING IN SIX INJURIES AND NO DEATHS.

19 APR UJUNGPANDANG / A MOB ATTACKED A PRIMARY SCHOOL AND THE OFFICES OF THE INDONESIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH FOUNDATION IN RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL AL-ISTIQLAL MOSQUE BOMBING.

19 APR YOHYAKARTA / TWO MEN ON A MOTORCYCLE THREW FIRECRACKERS INTO A CHURCH.

20 APR JAKARTA / A BOMB THREAT OCCURRED AT A JAKARTA CATHEDRAL, LOCATED EXACTLY OPPOSITE FROM NATIONAL ISTIQLAL MOSQUE.

20 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / POLICE OPENED FIRE TO DISPERSE THOUSANDS OF PRO-SEPARATIST STUDENTS.

20 APR RIAU / SECURITY FORCES FIRED WARNING SHOTS TO DISPERSE HUNDREDS OF STUDENTS WHO STORMED A CALTEX INDONESIA HOUSING COMPLEX DEMANDING A SHARE OF OIL EARNINGS.

20 APR SIGLI, ACEH / THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED TO SHOW SOLIDARITY FOR VICTIMS OF EARLIER CLASHES WITH AUTHORITIES.

20 APR BANDA ISLANDS / CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM FIGHTING BROKE OUT LEAVING FOUR DEAD AND 30 HOUSES BURNED.

21 APR KAI ISLANDS / MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN VIOLENCE OCCURRED IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS, RESULTING IN 50 DEAD, HUNDREDS INJURED, AND 200 HUNDRED HOUSES BURNED. (KEYS ID)

(S) (C) AS ETHNIC UNREST IN WEST KALIMANTAN SUBSIDES, AN OUTBREAK OF RELIGIOUS UNREST RESUMED IN THE MOLUCCAS. THE CAUSES BEHIND THE VIOLENCE MIRROR THE PAST AMBON RIOTS AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE MILITARY REGAINS CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. IN EAST TIMOR, UNREST AND VIOLENCE LIKELY WILL CONTINUE AS THE SITUATION STILL REMAINS VOLATILE.

(S) (C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS SIGNED A TRUCE AGREEMENT IN DILI 21 APR, TO END THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR. BOTH SIDES PLEDGED TO STOP MUTUAL ATTACKS, VIOLENCE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, DID NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE AND THE MILITIAS REPORTEDLY WILL NOT SURRENDER THE ARMS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS TRUCE AGREEMENT WILL LAST VERY LONG AS IT IS APPARENT THAT THE MILITARY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR ARE INCAPABLE OR UNWILLING TO STOP MILITIA ATTACKS AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. (KEYS ID)

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

22-23APR UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (MINISTERIAL LEVEL)

~~SECRET~~

30APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS AGREEMENT SIGNING CEREMONY (ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE)
12MAY	TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING 1ST ANNIVERSARY
07JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
JUL	UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE ON EAST TIMOR
12JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
28AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
AUG-OCT	NEW MPR TO DECIDE ON EAST TIMOR STATUS
12SEP	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING
28OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13NOV	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
07DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT)

(KEYS ID)

(U) (S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5

MORI DocID: 1054613

09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18

(KEYS ID)

(S) WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ONLY 45 DAYS AWAY, UNREST AND VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT INDONESIA LIKELY WILL CONTINUE AT THE SAME LEVEL DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. ATTENTION AND SECURITY WILL START TO FOCUS ON JAKARTA, WHICH WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES TO RESPOND TO UNREST IN THE OUTLYING AREAS. VIOLENCE AND UNREST LIKELY WILL CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR DESPITE THE SIGNING OF THE TRUCE AGREEMENT. UNLESS BOTH PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE VOLUNTARILY DISARM, THE TRUCE AGREEMENT HAS LITTLE CHANCE OF HOLDING. (OSA MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

~~SECRET~~

25 APR	AUSTRALIA/ NEW ZEALAND/ COOK ISLANDS/ SAMOA/TONGA	(U)	ANZAC DAY (1915)
25 APR	NORTH KOREA	(U)	FOUNDING OF KOREAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (1932)/KIM IL-SUNG GUERRILLA UNIT ACTIVATION DAY (1915)
29 APR	JAPAN	(U)	EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U)	CONSTITUTION DAY
01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U)	LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS
03 MAY	JAPAN	(U)	CONSTITUTION DAY (1947)
04 MAY	PRC	(U)	YOUTH DAY (1919)
04 MAY	TONGA	(U)	CROWN PRINCE'S BIRTHDAY (1948)
05 MAY	PALAU	(U)	SENIOR CITIZEN'S DAY
05 MAY	JAPAN/ROK	(U)	CHILDREN'S DAY
05 MAY	THAILAND	(U)	CORONATION DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U)	CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U)	CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U)	PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U)	LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U)	GOSPEL DAY

C. (C) FOREIGN VIP TRAVEL:

27-03 MAY	THAILAND	(U)	THAI PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT CHINA.
05-07 MAY	CHINA	(U)	SOUTH AFRICA PRESIDENT TO VISIT CHINA.

5. (U) [redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//

b(3)

DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

MORI DocID: 1054663

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183200561
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990430
TOR: 124552
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904301100
MHFNO: 99 5280696
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #8441 1200654
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0334 1200654
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 23 Oct 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~SECRET~~

ENCL (8)

~~SECRET~~

RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE

~~SECRET~~

MORI DocID: 1054663

RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
~~RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU~~
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON

SECRET

RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 301100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOU4WG 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
S E C R E T

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA0120/30 APR//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE

MORI DocID: 1054663

NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B.

C.

D.

E.

NOT RESPONSIVE

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

NOT RESPONSIVE

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE

(S) C. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 22 - 29 APR: ETHNIC CHINESE-INDONESIANS PREPARE TO LEAVE PRIOR TO 7 JUN GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA PROPOSES TO DIVIDE THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA AND MALUKU. IN EAST TIMOR, TRIPARTITE REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AN AUTONOMY PLAN AGREEMENT 23 APR.

(S) (G) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: ETHNIC CHINESE-INDONESIANS ARE PREPARING TO LEAVE INDONESIA PRIOR TO THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS 7 JUN. CHINESE IN INODONESIA ARE PURCHASING AIRLINE TICKETS TO GET OUT OF INDONESIA BEFORE THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS, AND REPORTEDLY ALL FLIGHTS FROM INDONESIA TO THE US, SINGAPORE, AND AUSTRALIA ARE COMPLETELY BOOKED BETWEEN 15 - 31 MAY. THE CHINESE FEAR A BREAKDOWN IN SOCIAL ORDER MAY BE USED AS A PRETEXT FOR VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE BUSINESSES PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ELECTIONS AND, THEREFORE, ARE HESITANT TO INVEST AGAIN IN INDONESIA. THE STABILITY OF THE RUPIAH IS AN INDICATION OF A DEAD MARKET. INVESTOR'S CONFIDENCE, HOWEVER, WILL NOT BE RESTORED QUICKLY AS THERE WILL REMAIN HIGH LEVELS OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY UNTIL THE

NOVEMBER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR INCREASED SLIGHTLY TO RP 8,200/$1.00.

(C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (TNI) REITERATED 28 APR ITS COMMITMENT TO INTERNAL REFORM, SETTING SEVEN MAIN AGENDAS THAT WERE DESIGNED TO IMPROVE ITS TARNISHED IMAGE. THE SEVEN MAIN AGENDAS ARE INTENDED TO FOCUS ON IMPROVING DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, POSTURE, EDUCATION, TRAINING, ETHICS, AND LEADERSHIP. THE TNI ALSO STATED THAT IT WAS PRESENTLY CONDUCTING INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE REFORMS, WHICH ARE BEING DONE CONCEPTUALLY, SYSTEMATICALLY, AND GRADUALLY, WITH A CLEAR AGENDA, PRIORITIES, AND CONTROL. THESE REFORM MEASURES APPEAR TO BE "COSMETIC" IN NATURE AND ARE MERELY DESIGNED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION. IT WILL LIKELY HAVE NO AFFECT ON THEIR FUTURE PERFORMANCE OR REACTION DURING PERIODS OF CRISIS.

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA IS PROPOSING TO DIVIDE THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA INTO THREE NEW PROVINCES AND MALUKU INTO TWO NEW PROVINCES AFTER THE 7 JUN GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE PROPOSAL WILL GRANT MORE AUTONOMY TO THE NEW PROVINCES TO STIMULATE GREATER GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE REGIONS. IN IRIAN JAYA, THE PROPOSAL IS LIKELY THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO WEAKEN THE STRENGTH AND UNITY OF THE PRO-SEPARATIST REBEL GROUP, FREE PAPUA ORGANIZATION.

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: THE NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATIONS REMAINED THE SAME AS LAST WEEK, BUT OVERALL UNREST DECREASED. DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED IN ACEH (0510N/09708E) WHILE ETHNIC COMMUNAL VIOLENCE RESUMED IN TUAL (0540S/13245E), KAI ISLANDS. UNREST IN EAST TIMOR (0833S/12434E) CONTINUES DESPITE THE SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT. IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E), NUMEROUS BOMB THREATS WERE REPORTED. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:

22 APR JAKRTA / AN AIRPORT TERMINAL AND 2 AIRCRAFT WERE TARGETS OF A BOMB THREAT. NO BOMB WAS FOUND.

22 APR SINGKAWANG (0540N/10900E) / ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND ANOTHER 4 SUFFERED GUNSHOT WOUNDS AFTER SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED A CROWD FROM BURNING THE HOMES OF MADURESE PEOPLE.

22 APR TUAL / AN ETHNIC CLASH BETWEEN LOCAL RESIDENTS ERUPTED RESULTING IN 2 DEATHS AND 22 INJURIES.

23 APR SUAI (0921S/12517E) / A CLASH OCCURRED BETWEEN A PRO-INTEGRATION GROUP AND A PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUP RESULTING IN 1 PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS INJURED AND 3 HOUSES BURNED.

23 APR TUAL / CROWDS FROM RIVAL COMMUNITIES TOOK TO THE STREETS AND ATTACKED THE SECURITY FORCES TRYING TO DISPERSE THE CROWD.

25 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / A CROWD OF THOUSANDS HELD A FREE ACEH GATHERING AND BURNED 2 BUSES BELONGING TO MOBIL OIL.

25 APR YOGYAKARTA (0748S/11022E) / SUPPORTERS OF UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) ATTACKED MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY-STRUGGLE (PDIP) RESULTING IN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF INJURIES.

25 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / SEPARATIST SYMPATHIZERS HELD A RALLY NEAR MOBIL OIL'S OPERATIONS BASE.

26 APR ERMERA (0845S/12523E), EAST TIMOR / THOUSANDS OF EAST TIMORESE RALLIED TO PLEDGE THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO INDONESIA.

26 APR BALIBO (0858S/12503E) / HUNDREDS OF PRO-INDONESIA SUPPORTERS GATHERED TO DECLARE THEIR SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA RETAINING CONTROL OF THE DISPUTED TERRITORY OF EAST TIMOR.

28 APR MALANG (0759S/11237E) / UNIVERSITY STUDENTS STAGED A PROTEST AGAINST PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S VISIT.

28 APR CIREBON ()644S/10834E) / FIGHTING BROKE OUT BETWEEN RESIDENTS LEAVING 13 PEOPLE INJURED AND 12 HOUSES DAMAGED.
28 APR MEULABOH (0409N/09608E), ACEH / A CROWD DEMANDED COMPENSATION FOR COMMUNITY LAND AND BURNED DOWN 10 HOUSES BELONGING TO EMPLOYEES OF A RUBBER PLANTATION.

(C) VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR AS THE PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED 21 APR DOES NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE. UNREST IN TUAL, SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF SUBSIDING AS THE MILITARY IS SLOWLY GAINING CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. THE ACEHNESE WILL CONTINUE TO VOICE THEIR DEMANDS AND APPLY PRESSURE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN HOPES OF GETTING A REACTION FROM JAKARTA. DEMONSTRATIONS WILL START TO INCREASE IN JAKARTA WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ONLY 5 WEEKS AWAY.

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(C) EAST TIMOR: TRIPARTITE REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AN AGREEMENT 23 APR TO PRESENT AN AUTONOMY PLAN TO THE EAST TIMORESE. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SIGNED AND PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED MAY 5-6. THE UN WILL SEND A 40 PERSON ADVANCE TEAM SHORTLY AFTER THE MAY SIGNING. THE POLLING IS SET FOR 8 AUG AND WILL INVOLVE 200 POLLING CENTERS AND NUMEROUS SUPPORT ELEMENTS. DISARMING MILITIA GROUPS IS VIEWED CRITICAL IN ORDER FOR THE PROCESS TO SUCCEED. IF THE EAST TIMORESE ARE CONVINCED THE MILITIA GROUPS WILL BE UNABLE TO SEEK RETRIBUTION, THEY WILL LIKELY VOTE TO REJECT THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL.

(C) ACEH: INCREASED SEPARATIST UNREST AND DESTRUCTION OF MOBIL OIL PROPERTY NEAR LHOKSEUMAWE, ACEH LED MOBIL TO ORDER THE PRECAUTIONARY EVACUATION OF ITS EMPLOYEES' DEPENDENTS 27 APR. THE DEPARTURE OF MOBIL DEPENDENTS COINCIDES WITH REPORTS OF DEPLOYMENTS OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO THE PROVINCE AND THE LAUNCH OF AN OPERATION BY THE SECURITY FORCES TO CLEANSE THE AREA OF PRO-SEPARATIST FLAGS AND GRAFFITI. MOBIL INCREASINGLY FINDS ITSELF THE MOST VISIBLE TARGET IN A NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE DISPUTE BETWEEN ACTIVISTS AND GRAFFITI. MOBIL INCREASINGLY FINDS ITSELF THE MOST VISIBLE TARGET IN A NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE DISPUTE BETWEEN ACTIVISTS ACEHNESE AND JAKARTA. THIS DISPUTE IS EXPLOITED BY SEPARATISTS SEEKING TO PORTRAY MOBIL AS BEING COMPLICIT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN ACEH FOR THE LAST THREE DECADES. MOBIL EXECUTIVES NOTED THAT NO EVIDENCE EXITS THAT AMERICAN CITIZENS ARE BEING BLAMED OR TARGETED.

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

5-6 MAY*	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS AGREEMENT SIGNING CEREMONY (ON EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM)
12 MAY	TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING 1ST ANNIVERSARY
21 MAY*	INDONESIAN SCHOOLS DISMISSED FOR THE SUMMER
7 JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26 JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
12 JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17 JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17 AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
8 AUG*	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28 AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
29 AUG*	NEW MPR ANNOUNCES RESULTS OF EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28 OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
6 NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10 NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12 NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR)

~~SECRET~~

MASSACRE
13 NOV 1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
7 DEC 24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
1 JAN EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT)
* DENOTES ADDITION OR CHANGE

(S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24

(S) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION WILL REMAIN FRAGILE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS AND MAY DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER AFTER THE MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 28 OCT. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD OPENING 18 MAY AND THE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN WEST KALIMANTAN AND MALUKU, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAY, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR. ALTHOUGH AN EAST TIMOR AUTONOMY BALLOTING PLAN WAS REACHED FOR 8 AUG, THE UN'S ROLE WILL LIKELY BE IMPACTED BY ACTS OF INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS. (OSA MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

NON responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR	BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR	INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

29 APR	JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY

MORI DocID: 1054663

01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS.
03 MAY	JAPAN	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY (1947)
04 MAY	PRC	(U) YOUTH DAY (1919)
04 MAY	TONGA	(U) CROWN PRINCE'S BIRTHDAY (1948)
05 MAY	PALAU	(U) SENIOR CITIZEN'S DAY
05 MAY	JAPAN/ROK	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
05 MAY	THAILAND	(U) CORONATION DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U) GOSPEL DAY
14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)

[redacted]

NON Responsive

b(2)

5. (U) [redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED
TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE
POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Review entire document

DOCUMENT ID: 183207777
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990502
TOR: 094202
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904301105
MHFNO: 99 5295405
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #9822 1201547
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0694 1201543
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25/2022
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

ENCL 9

MORI DocID: 1054597

RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE

RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON

~~SECRET~~

RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 301105Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOU4WG 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: PARTIAL

SEGMENT 1 OF 4 MISSING

C. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 22 - 29 APR: ETHNIC CHINESE INDONESIANS PREPARE TO LEAVE PRIOR TO 7 JUN GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA PROPOSES TO DIVIDE THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA AND MALUKU. IN EAST TIMOR, TRIPARTITE REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AN AUTONOMY PLAN AGREEMENT 23 APR.

SECRET

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: ETHNIC CHINESE-INDONESIANS ARE PREPARING TO LEAVE INDONESIA PRIOR TO THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS 7 JUN. CHINESE IN INODONESIA ARE PURCHASING AIRLINE TICKETS TO GET OUT OF INDONESIA BEFORE THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS, AND REPORTEDLY ALL FLIGHTS FROM INDONESIA TO THE US, SINGAPORE, AND AUSTRALIA ARE COMPLETELY BOOKED BETWEEN 15 - 31 MAY. THE CHINESE FEAR A BREAKDOWN IN SOCIAL ORDER MAY BE USED AS A PRETEXT FOR VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE BUSINESSES PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ELECTIONS AND, THEREFORE, ARE HESITANT TO INVEST AGAIN IN INDONESIA. THE STABILITY OF THE RUPIAH IS AN INDICATION OF A DEAD MARKET. INVESTOR'S CONFIDENCE, HOWEVER, WILL NOT BE RESTORED QUICKLY AS THERE WILL REMAIN HIGH LEVELS OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY UNTIL THE NOVEMBER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR INCREASED SLIGHTLY TO RP 8,200/$1.00.

(C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (TNI) REITERATED 28 APR ITS COMMITMENT TO INTERNAL REFORM, SETTING SEVEN MAIN AGENDAS THAT WERE DESIGNED TO IMPROVE ITS TARNISHED IMAGE. THE SEVEN MAIN AGENDAS ARE INTENDED TO FOCUS ON IMPROVING DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, POSTURE, EDUCATION, TRAINING, ETHICS, AND LEADERSHIP. THE TNI ALSO STATED THAT IT WAS PRESENTLY CONDUCTING INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE REFORMS, WHICH ARE BEING DONE CONCEPTUALLY, SYSTEMATICALLY, AND GRADUALLY, WITH A CLEAR AGENDA, PRIORITIES, AND CONTROL. THESE REFORM MEASURES APPEAR TO BE "COSMETIC" IN NATURE AND ARE MERELY DESIGNED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION. IT WILL LIKELY HAVE NO AFFECT ON THEIR FUTURE PERFORMANCE OR REACTION DURING PERIODS OF CRISIS.

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA IS PROPOSING TO DIVIDE THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA INTO THREE NEW PROVINCES AND MALUKU INTO TWO NEW PROVINCES AFTER THE 7 JUN GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE PROPOSAL WILL GRANT MORE AUTONOMY TO THE NEW PROVINCES TO STIMULATE GREATER GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE REGIONS. IN IRIAN JAYA, THE PROPOSAL IS LIKELY THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO WEAKEN THE STRENGTH AND UNITY OF THE PRO-SEPARATIST REBEL GROUP, FREE PAPUA ORGANIZATION.

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: THE NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATIONS REMAINED THE SAME AS LAST WEEK, BUT OVERALL UNREST DECREASED. DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED IN ACEH (0510N/09708E) WHILE ETHNIC COMMUNAL VIOLENCE RESUMED IN TUAL (0540S/13245E), KAI ISLANDS. UNREST IN EAST TIMOR (0833S/12434E) CONTINUES DESPITE THE SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT. IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E), NUMEROUS BOMB THREATS WERE REPORTED. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:

22 APR JAKRTA / AN AIRPORT TERMINAL AND 2 AIRCRAFT WERE TARGETS OF A BOMB THREAT. NO BOMB WAS FOUND.

22 APR SINGKAWANG (0540N/10900E) / ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND ANOTHER 4 SUFFERED GUNSHOT WOUNDS AFTER SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED A CROWD FROM BURNING THE HOMES OF MADURESE PEOPLE.

22 APR TUAL / AN ETHNIC CLASH BETWEEN LOCAL RESIDENTS ERUPTED RESULTING IN 2 DEATHS AND 22 INJURIES.

23 APR SUAI (0921S/12517E) / A CLASH OCCURRED BETWEEN A PRO-INTEGRATION GROUP AND A PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUP RESULTING IN 1 PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS INJURED AND 3 HOUSES BURNED.

23 APR TUAL / CROWDS FROM RIVAL COMMUNITIES TOOK TO THE STREETS AND ATTACKED THE SECURITY FORCES TRYING TO DISPERSE THE CROWD.

25 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / A CROWD OF THOUSANDS HELD A FREE ACEH GATHERING AND BURNED 2 BUSES BELONGING TO MOBIL OIL.

25 APR YOGYAKARTA (0748S/11022E) / SUPPORTERS OF UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) ATTACKED MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY-STRUGGLE (PDIP) RESULTING IN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF INJURIES.
25 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / SEPARATIST SYMPATHIZERS HELD A RALLY NEAR MOBIL OIL'S OPERATIONS BASE.
26 APR ERMERA (0845S/12523E), EAST TIMOR / THOUSANDS OF EAST TIMORESE RALLIED TO PLEDGE THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO INDONESIA.
26 APR BALIBO (0858S/12503E) / HUNDREDS OF PRO-INDONESIA SUPPORTERS GATHERED TO DECLARE THEIR SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA RETAINING CONTROL OF THE DISPUTED TERRITORY OF EAST TIMOR.
28 APR MALANG (0759S/11237E) / UNIVERSITY STUDENTS STAGED A PROTEST AGAINST PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S VISIT.
28 APR CIREBON ()644S/10834E) / FIGHTING BROKE OUT BETWEEN RESIDENTS LEAVING 13 PEOPLE INJURED AND 12 HOUSES DAMAGED.
28 APR MEULABOH (0409N/09608E), ACEH / A CROWD DEMANDED COMPENSATION FOR COMMUNITY LAND AND BURNED DOWN 10 HOUSES BELONGING TO EMPLOYEES OF A RUBBER PLANTATION.

(U) (c) VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR AS THE PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED 21 APR DOES NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE. UNREST IN TUAL, SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF SUBSIDING AS THE MILITARY IS SLOWLY GAINING CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. THE ACEHNESE WILL CONTINUE TO VOICE THEIR DEMANDS AND APPLY PRESSURE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN HOPES OF GETTING A REACTION FROM JAKARTA. DEMONSTRATIONS WILL START TO INCREASE IN JAKARTA WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ONLY 5 WEEKS AWAY.

(S) (c) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(S) (c) EAST TIMOR: TRIPARTITE REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AN AGREEMENT 23 APR TO PRESENT AN AUTONOMY PLAN TO THE EAST TIMORESE. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SIGNED AND PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED MAY 5-6. THE UN WILL SEND A 40 PERSON ADVANCE TEAM SHORTLY AFTER THE MAY SIGNING. THE POLLING IS SET FOR 8 AUG AND WILL INVOLVE 200 POLLING CENTERS AND NUMEROUS SUPPORT ELEMENTS. DISARMING MILITIA GROUPS IS VIEWED CRITICAL IN ORDER FOR THE PROCESS TO SUCCEED. IF THE EAST TIMORESE ARE CONVINCED THE MILITIA GROUPS WILL BE UNABLE TO SEEK RETRIBUTION, THEY WILL LIKELY VOTE TO REJECT THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL.

(U) (c) ACEH: INCREASED SEPARATIST UNREST AND DESTRUCTION OF MOBIL OIL PROPERTY NEAR LHOKSEUMAWE, ACEH LED MOBIL TO ORDER THE PRECAUTIONARY EVACUATION OF ITS EMPLOYEES' DEPENDENTS 27 APR. THE DEPARTURE OF MOBIL DEPENDENTS COINCIDES WITH REPORTS OF DEPLOYMENTS OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO THE PROVINCE AND THE LAUNCH OF AN OPERATION BY THE SECURITY FORCES TO CLEANSE THE AREA OF PRO-SEPARATIST FLAGS

SEGMENT 3 OF 4 MISSING

Not relevant to this case

~~SECRET~~

NON Responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR	BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR	INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

29 APR	JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS
03 MAY	JAPAN	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY (1947)
04 MAY	PRC	(U) YOUTH DAY (1919)
04 MAY	TONGA	(U) CROWN PRINCE'S BIRTHDAY (1948)
05 MAY	PALAU	(U) SENIOR CITIZEN'S DAY
05 MAY	JAPAN/ROK	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
05 MAY	THAILAND	(U) CORONATION DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U) GOSPEL DAY
14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)

C.
27-03
05-07
5. (U

NON Responsive

b(7)

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED
TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE
POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183235636
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990507
TOR: 031220
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905071100
MHFNO: 99 5361483
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCC #8772 1270653
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0222 1270653
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUWHIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 APR 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

ENCL (10)

MORI DocID: 1054600

RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE

RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RULYJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RULYGNA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW

SECRET

RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 071100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA127/7 MAY//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE

SECRET

MORI DocID: 1054600

NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B. [redacted]

C. [redacted]

D. (C) INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT SIGNED 5 MAY

E. [redacted]

F. [redacted]

G. [redacted]

(U) Non Responsive

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

Non Responsive

SECRET

[redacted]

NON Responsive

C. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 29 APR - 06 MAY 99: DESPITE THE SIGNING OF THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT 5 MAY, VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR, AND MAY EVEN ESCALATE LEADING UP TO THE 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOTING DATE. THE UP-COMING 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, THE 28 OCT PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION DATE, AS WELL AS CERTAIN KEY ANNIVERSARY DATES, WILL ALSO CREATE SEVERAL ENVIRONMENTS FOR FURTHER UNREST AND VIOLENCE. THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS WILL LIKELY BE A VERY TUMULTUOUS AND VIOLENT PERIOD FOR INDONESIA (KEYS ID)

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH INCREASED TO RP 8,000/$1.00. THE ECONOMY REMAINS WEAK AND IS UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PERIOD 28 AUG-28 OCT. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) RECENTLY CONCLUDED IN ITS ANNUAL REVIEW OF INDONESIA THAT THE MACROECONOMICS SITUATION WOULD REMAIN DIFFICULT UNTIL POLITICAL TRANSITION WAS FURTHER ADVANCED. THE WORLD BANK (WB) WAS REPORTED TO HAVE DELAYED DISBURSEMENT OF A $600 MILLION (USD) LOAN UNTIL AFTER THE JUNE ELECTIONS OUT OF CONCERN THAT THE FUNDS MIGHT BE SIPHONED OFF FOR POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS. INDONESIA'S PERSISTENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO COMPLICATE THE NATION'S CURRENT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY. (KEYS ID)

(C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: REPORTING INDICATES THAT IN MAR 99, INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO ASKED PRESIDENT HABIBIE TO FIRE INDONESIAN STATE INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (BAKIN) CHIEF LTG (RET) ZAINI MAULANI, EFFECTIVE 1 APR. UPON HEARING THIS, MAULANI IMMEDIATELY OFFERED HIS RETIREMENT TO THE PRESIDENT. HOWEVER, HABIBIE REFUSED TO ACCEPT MAULANI'S RETIREMENT AND ASKED HIM TO STAY ON FOR ONE MORE YEAR. HABIBIE REPORTEDLY INFORMED WIRANTO THAT MAULANI WOULD STAY ON AS BAKIN CHIEF FOR ANOTHER YEAR DESPITE HIS OBJECTION. MEANWHILE, OTHER REPORTING INDICATES THAT WIRANTO IS STILL PLANNING TO REPLACE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF (KASAD) GEN SUBAGYO, BUT WILL DELAY THE MOVE UNTIL AFTER THE JUNE ELECTIONS. GEN SUBAGYO WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED TO RETIRE 1 APR TO BECOME AMBASSADOR TO MALAYSIA. WIRANTO FURTHER STATED THAT LTG BAMBANG YUDHOYONO WILL LIKELY REPLACE SUBAGYO AS HEAD OF KASAD. THE DELAY IN REPLACING THESE TWO KEY POSITIONS MAY INDICATE THAT WIRANTO IS GRADUALLY LOSING HIS INFLUENCE WITHIN THE GOI AND TNI. IT MAY ALSO SIGNAL THAT WIRANTO IS BECOMING MORE INDECISIVE AND LESS CONFIDENCE IN HIS ACTIONS. HIS BACK-DOOR ATTEMPT TO FIRE MAULANI WILL LIKELY ADD FURTHER STRAIN TO AN ALREADY BAD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TNI AND BAKIN. WIRANTO WILL LIKELY REFRAIN FROM MAKING ANY SENIOR OFFICER CHANGES WITHIN THE TNI UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS OUT OF FEAR THAT IT COULD WEAKEN HIS GRIP ON TNI AND ANY POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS. (KEYS ID)

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: GENERAL

ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) CHAIRMAN RUDINI STATED THAT THE VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD FOR ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, AND MALUKU WOULD BE EXTENDED UNTIL THE THIRD WEEK OF MAY. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT 69 PERCENT OF INDONESIANS HAVE REGISTERED FOR THE 7 JUN ELECTION AND EXPECT THE NUMBER TO SURPASS 70 PERCENT BY 6 MAY, THE LAST DAY OF THE VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD. ACCORDING TO RUDINI, CLAIMS THAT INDONESIANS DID NOT WANT THE ELECTION TO GO ON WERE PROVEN UNTRUE BY THE MERE FACT THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE HAD REGISTERED TO VOTE. THE VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD EXTENSION FOR ACEH, MALUKU, AND IRIAN JAYA WERE LIKELY DUE TO THE RECENT OUTBREAK OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE. DESPITE THE HIGH VOTER REGISTRATION NUMBERS, THE KEY INDICATOR WILL BE THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF VOTER TURN-OUTS ON ELECTION DAY. GROWING UNREST AND VIOLENCE MAY DISCOURAGE OR PREVENT SOME INDONESIANS FROM VOTING IN THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) AND TNI WILL ATTEMPT TO ENSURE A SMOOTH AND PEACEFUL ELECTION. HOWEVER, THEIR RESOURCES WILL BE STRETCHED VERY THIN DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD WITH SEVERAL SIMULTANEOUS UNREST IN OUTER AREAS SUCH AS ACEH, EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, MALUKU, AND WEST KALIMANTAN. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS INCREASED THIS WEEK THROUGHOUT INDONESIA. UNREST INCREASED IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E) AND THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E) AS WELL AS DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS IN ACEH (0510N/09708E). SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING: DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT: 29 APR KUTA (0855S/11617E), BALI / A MOB TORCHED SOME STREET TRADERS' STALLS CAUSING A 500 MAN POLICE FORCE TO DEPLOYED TO THE AREA.
30 APR ATABAI (0848S/12512E), EAST TIMOR / AUSTRALIAN JOURNALISTS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS ATTENDED A PRO-INTEGRATION RALLY WITH THEIR TRANSLATOR. THEY LEFT THE RALLY AFTER THEIR TRANSLATOR WAS BEATEN AND RECEIVED DEATH THREATS. 30 APR ERMERA (0845S/12523E), EAST TIMOR / THE BODIES OF 11 MURDER VICTIMS WERE FOUND IN A DRAINAGE DITCH. REPORTS SAY THE VICTIMS WERE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS.
1 MAY JEPARA (0740S/10914E) / FIVE PEOPLE KILLED AND SIX INJURED IN A PHYSICAL ENCOUNTER BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP).
2 MAY JAKARTA / A THOUSAND NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) SUPPORTERS CONDUCTED A VEHICLE PROGRESSION. 3 MAY ERMERA / FIVE INDONESIA POLICE KILLED IN TWO SEPARATE INCIDENTS. 3 MAY LHOKSEUMAWE (0510N/09708E) / AT LEAST 39 PEOPLE KILLED AND SEVERAL INJURED WHEN TNI FORCES OPENED FIRE ON DEMONSTRATORS TRYING TO MARCH TO A BATTALION HEADQUARTERS IN PROTEST OF ``BRUTAL SWEEPS'' IN LOCAL VILLAGES OF TNI LOOKING FOR TWO SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY KIDNAPPED.
3 MAY CIREBON (0644S/10834E) / A CLASH BETWEEN VILLAGERS RESULTED IN 94 HOUSES DESTROYED INCLUDING A HEALTH CENTER, VILLAGE OFFICES AND A STATE PRIMARY SCHOOL. 3 MAY TUAL (0540S/13245E) / REFUGEES STAGE AN ATTACK AFTER THEIR VILLAGE WAS BURNED KILLING ONE AND INJURING THREE OTHERS. 4 MAY DILI (0833S/12534E) / STUDENTS AND YOUTHS DEMONSTRATED OUTSIDE OF UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR IN FAVOR OF INDEPENDENCE.
4 MAY JAKARTA / THOUSANDS HELD AN ANTI-COMMUNIST RALLY AT A GOVERNMENT BUILDING. 4 MAY JAKARTA / STUDENTS STAGED A DEMONSTRATION AT THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION DEMANDING AN INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL OF FORMER PRESIDENT SUHARTO. 5 MAY IRIAN JAYA (0232S/14042E) / A GROUP OF OPM (FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT) REBELS KILLED THREE MEN AND TOOK 11 HOSTAGES. THE REBELS ARE REPORTEDLY HEADING TOWARDS THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA BORDER AND ARE BEING PURSUED BY TNI HELICOPTERS.

(U)

(C) SOCIAL UNREST RELATED TO THE ELECTIONS IS BECOMING EVIDENT IN JAKARTA WITH POLITICAL PARTIES CLASHING. DEMONSTRATIONS

AND UNREST WILL INCREASE AS THE ELECTIONS GET CLOSER. WITH TNI FIRING ON SEPARATISTS IN ACEH, INDONESIA HAS GIVEN THE SEPARATISTS ANOTHER REASON TO CONTINUE THEIR FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE. (KEYS ID)

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(C) ACEH: VIOLENCE RE-IGNITED IN LHOKSEUMAWE, ACEH, 3 MAY, AS INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) PERSONNEL OPENED FIRE ON APPROXIMATELY 1,000 PRO-SEPARATIST DEMONSTRATORS PROTESTING AGAINST PAST TNI HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. AS MANY AS 30 DEMONSTRATORS WERE KILLED AND OVER 100 INJURED DURING THIS CLASH. TNI STATED THAT THEY ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE WHEN THEIR TROOPS WERE ATTACKED BY A LARGE VIOLENT CROWD.

(C) EAST TIMOR: THE VIOLENT UNREST MANY FEARED WOULD OCCUR IN EAST TIMOR DURING THE 1-2 MAY WEEKEND FAILED TO MATERIALIZE. DESPITE THEIR THREATS TO DO SO, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS DID NOT HOLD ANY MAJOR RALLIES, NOR DID THEY ENGAGE IN ANY MAJOR ATTACKS AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS OR SUPPORTERS. MANY HAD FEARED THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WOULD RESORT TO VIOLENCE IN A LAST-MINUTE ATTEMPT TO DERAIL THE 5 MAY UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT SIGNING. THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WAS FINALLY SIGNED 5 MAY IN NEW YORK BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN, INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALI ALATAS, AND PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER JAIME GAMA. THIS AGREEMENT WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR A 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOTING, WHICH WILL ALLOW EAST TIMORESE TO VOTE FOR EITHER AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. MEANWHILE, REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE TNI MAY HAVE CONDUCTED A JOINT MILITARY OPERATION WITH THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WHEN THEY ALLEGEDLY CONDUCTED A SEARCH MISSION TO LOCATE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. TO FURTHER LEGITIMATIZE THE DIRECT BALLOTING PROCESS AND AS A GESTURE OF GOOD FAITH, THE GOI MAY SOON RELEASE PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBEL LEADER XANANA GUSMAO FROM HOUSE ARREST IN JAKARTA. (KEYS ID)

(S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12

~~SECRET~~

26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24
30 APR-06 MAY 99	24	9	14

(KEYS ID)

(S) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL SITUATION WILL REMAIN FRAGILE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS AND MAY DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER AFTER THE MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 28 OCT. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD OFFICIALLY OPENING 18 MAY AND THE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN WEST KALIMANTAN AND MALUKU, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR. ALTHOUGH THE UN EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED 5 MAY, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL LIKELY STEP UP THEIR ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS IN AN EFFORT TO INFLUENCE THE 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOTING OUTCOME. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

D. (C) INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT SIGNED 5 MAY: UN SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN, INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALI ALATAS, AND PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER JAIME GAMA SIGNED THE UN EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT 5 MAY. THIS AGREEMENT OFFICIALLY PAVES THE WAY TO AN 8 AUG UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING WHICH WILL ALLOW EAST TIMORESE TO VOTE FOR AUTONOMY. IF THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE IS REJECTED BY THE MAJORITY OF EAST TIMORESE, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) MAY GRANT EAST TIMOR FULL INDEPENDENCE 1 JAN 2000. THIS TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT CONCLUDES MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS. (KEYS ID)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL LIKELY INCREASE THEIR INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT ACTIVITIES TO DELAY THE DIRECT BALLOTING DATE OR INFLUENCE ITS OUTCOME. THIS WILL LIKELY INCREASE UNREST AND VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR AS PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES CLASH WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS. THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) IS UNLIKELY TO INTERVENE TO STOP THE EXPECTED VIOLENCE. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)



NON responsive

~~SECRET~~



NOT Responsive

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

NSW responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

---

06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U) GOSPEL DAY
14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)
16 MAY	BANGLADESH	(U) FARAKKA RESISTANCE DAY
17 MAY	NAURU	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
17 MAY	PAKISTAN	(U) ASHURA/MOHARRAM, ISLAMIC HOLIDAY
21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY

4 C. ~~(C)~~ FOREIGN VIP TRAVEL:

27-03 MAY	THAILAND	(U) THAILAND PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT CHINA
05-07 MAY	CHINA	(U) SOUTH AFRICA PRESIDENT TO VISIT CHINA

5. (U) [redacted]

(b)(2)

SECRET

[redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT ID: 183276036
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990514
TOR: 013246
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905141100
MHFNO: 99 5449040
DOCCLASS: S
CAVEATS: NOFORN

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCC #2702 1340507
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0169 1340450
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RHBCIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Sep 2023
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

ENCL 12

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN

RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPPEL T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUHPPEL T ELEVENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHWISSJ T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 141100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
RUYNANI/COMUSMARFORK SEOUL KOR//G2//
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA134/14 MAY//
RMKS/
1. (U) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

SECRET
NOFORN

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B. [redacted]

C. [redacted]

D. (S) INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 06-13 MAY 99

E. (C) INDONESIA - ELECTION SECURITY FORCE FOR JAKARTA

F. [redacted]

G. [redacted]

Non Responsive

(3)
(3)

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

Non Responsive

NOFORN
SECRET

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN



NOV Responsive

(S) D. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 6-13 MAY 99: THE OVERALL SITUATION IN INDONESIA REMAINS TENSE AND TUMULTUOUS AS THE NATION PREPARES FOR THREE FAST-APPROACHING WATERSHED EVENTS, NAMELY THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, THE 8 AUG EAST TIMOR AUTONOMY DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE, AND THE 28 OCT MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. THE LEVEL OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY INCREASE DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, AND CULMINATE AFTER THE RESULTS OF THESE MOMENTOUS EVENTS ARE ANNOUNCED. (KEYS ID)

(S) (C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR IMPROVED SLIGHTLY TO RP 7,800/$1.00. COORDINATING MINISTER FOR ECONOMY, FINANCE, AND INDUSTRY GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA ANNOUNCED THAT THE STATISTICAL FIGURE ON THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) FOR THE FIRST QUARTER SHOWED THAT THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY IS

``REAWAKENING''. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE INDICATION OF THE ``REAWAKENING'' ECONOMY COULD BE SEEN FROM THE STRENGTHENING OF THE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE RUPIAH, THE DROP IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND INFLATION WHICH ENABLED THE GOVERNMENT TO LOWER BANK INTEREST RATES. DESPITE MODEST SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT TO CERTAIN SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY, INDONESIA'S OVERALL ECONOMIC SITUATION STILL REMAINS WEAK, AND IS UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE PRIOR TO THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: IN RESPONSE TO RECENT VIOLENCE IN ACEH, A BATTALION OF SPECIAL RIOT TROOPS, CALLED THE PASUKAN PENINDAK RUSUH MASSA (PPRM) OR MASS DISTURBANCE REACTION FORCE, DEPLOYED TO LHOKSEUMAWE 7 MAY TO AUGMENT LOCAL SECURITY FORCES. APPROXIMATELY 450 PERSONNEL AND THEIR EQUIPMENT ARRIVED IN ACEH ABOARD FOUR C-130 AIRCRAFT. THE FORCES WILL DEPLOY TO KEY LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE CITY TO CONTROL VIOLENCE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS. THREE PPRM BATTALIONS WERE OFFICIALLY FORMED ON 1 MAR, COMPRISING 3,000 PERSONNEL FROM THE ARMY, AIR FORCE, NAVY, MARINES, POLICE, AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. THE PPRM IS UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE POLICE AND IS ONLY UTILIZED FOR SECURITY/LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS. THE PPRM IS EQUIPPED WITH SMALL ARMS AND RIOT-CONTROL EQUIPMENT. THIS LATEST DEPLOYMENT WILL LIKELY BE THE LAST DUE TO THE CONSTRAINTS ON TNI AND POLICE FORCES USED FOR SECURITY ROLES IN JAKARTA AND THROUGHOUT JAVA. THE SPECIALLY TRAINED RIOT TASK FORCE WILL LIKELY BE MORE AGGRESSIVE THAN THE LOCAL SECURITY FORCE IN DEALING WITH UNREST. THE USE OF NON-INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES TO CONTAIN REGIONAL UNREST COULD INCREASE TENSION BETWEEN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY AND TNI, AND MAY FUEL FURTHER UNREST. TNI FORCES WILL BE STRETCHED VERY THIN DURING THE NEXT 6 MONTHS AS THEY PREPARE FOR ELECTION SECURITY DUTIES IN MOST MAJOR CITIES, WHILE HANDLING SIMULTANEOUS REGIONAL UNREST IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, MALUKU, AND WEST KALIMANTAN. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIAN STATE MINISTER FOR STATE SECRETARY AKBAR TANDJUNG AND STATE MINISTER FOR INVESTMENT AFFAIRS HAMZAH HAZ, BOTH RESIGNED FROM THEIR CABINET POSITIONS EFFECTIVE 10 MAY TO CONCENTRATE ON CAMPAIGNING FULL-TIME FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UP-COMING 7 JUN ELECTIONS. TANDJUNG CONCURRENTLY SERVED AS THE CHAIRMAN OF INDONESIA'S LARGEST POLITICAL PARTY, THE FUNCTIONAL GROUP (GOLKAR), WHILE HAZ CONCURRENTLY SERVED AS THE CHAIRMAN OF INDONESIA'S SECOND LARGEST POLITICAL PARTY, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP). BOTH VOLUNTARILY RESIGNED FROM THEIR MINISTERIAL DUTIES AFTER CONTROVERSY ERUPTED OVER PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S DECISION TO ALLOW BOTH OF THEM TO RETAIN THEIR CABINET POSITIONS, WHILE CONCURRENTLY CAMPAIGNING FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES. IF ALLOWED TO DO SO, BOTH WOULD HAVE BEEN IN VIOLATION WITH THE NEW ELECTION CAMPAIGN LAW, WHICH FORBIDS CURRENT APPOINTED GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM ACTIVE POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING. TANDJUNG AND HAZ PUBLICLY RESIGNED TO COMPLY WITH THE NEW ELECTION LAW AND TO AVOID THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT AND PUBLIC OUT-CRY WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED IF BOTH HAD DECIDED TO STAY ON AS CABINET MINISTERS WHILE ACTIVELY CAMPAIGNING FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES. HOWEVER, THEY MAY HAVE ALSO RESIGNED TO CAMPAIGN FOR THEIR OWN POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS, SINCE BOTH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED AS POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. IF NO DOMINANT CANDIDATE EMERGES, A COMPROMISE OR COALITION TICKET COULD RESULT, ENCOMPASSING EITHER TANDJUNG OR HAZ AS A POSSIBLE RUNNING MATE WITH HABIBIE. (KEYS ID)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS ONLY 3 WEEKS AWAY, ACTIVITY IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E) IS INCREASING. DEMONSTRATIONS WERE ON THE RISE WITH RIOTS FOCUSING ON ELECTION ISSUES. EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E) CONTINUES TO HAVE CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE MILITIAS, EVEN WITH AN INITIAL UN PRESENCE ON GROUND. AMBON (0343S/12812E) IS STARTING TO STIR UP AGAIN; AND ACEH (0510N/09708E) IS IN A VERY TENSE STATE. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:
6 MAY DILI (0833S/12534E) / EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS AND YOUTHS DEMONSTRATED AT EAST TIMOR UNIVERSITY FOR A THIRD STRAIGHT DAY CARRYING EAST TIMOR FLAGS AND BANNERS REJECTING AUTONOMY.
6 MAY JAKARTA / THE STUDENT SOLIDARITY WITH ACEH GROUP (SOMAKA) DEMONSTRATED AT THE US EMBASSY DEMANDING THE US NOT BE ONE-SIDED IN REACTING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN ACEH.
7 MAY JAKARTA / EAST TIMORESE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS DEMONSTRATED AT THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION DEMANDING AN END TO THE `SLAUGHTER AND INTIMIDATION' IN EAST TIMOR AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF TNI `TEAMS' FROM THE PROVINCE BEFORE THE 8 AUG POLL.
8 MAY PEKALONGAN (0653S/10940E), CENTRAL JAVA / A PRE-CAMPAIGN PERIOD CLASH OCCURRED BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), LEAVING 5 PERSONS INJURED.
8 MAY LIQUICA (0840S/12520E)/ PRO-INDONESIA MILITIA GROUPS GATHERED FOR A RALLY TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR AUTONOMY.
9 MAY DILI / SHOTS WERE FIRED AT A CAR CARRYING FOREIGN JOURNALISTS MOST LIKELY BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS WHO WERE SEEN BRANDISHING HANDGUNS.
9 MAY DILI / A VIOLENT BATTLE BROKE OUT BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST GROUPS CAUSING POLICE TO OPEN FIRE IN THE AIR. AT LEAST 1 DEAD, 3 INJURED.
9 MAY JEMBER (0810S/11342E)/ INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI-P) SUPPORTERS BLOCKED THE GOLKAR PARTY GENERAL CHAIRMAN, AKBAR TANJUNG, FROM HOLDING A MEETING.
9 MAY SEMARANG (0658S/11025E)/ A GOLKAR OFFICE WAS SET ON FIRE BY SUPPORTERS OF PDI-P.
9 MAY AMBON / FRESH CLASHES, TRIGGERED BY A HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT BRAWL, SET 14 HOUSES ON FIRE. NO DEATHS REPORTED.
9 MAY DILI / PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA WERE INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT WHICH RESULTED IN A FOREIGN JOURNALIST BEATEN AND SEVERAL WOUNDED, ACCORDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST.
10 MAY DILI / PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS ATTACKED AN AITARAK MILITIA POST RESULTING IN 1 ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST KILLED AND 9 OTHERS INJURED.
10 MAY DILI / A HOTEL OCCUPYING FOREIGN JOURNALISTS RECEIVED SEVERAL BOMB THREATS.
10 MAY JAKARTA / UP TO 1,300 BANK EMPLOYEES CONDUCTED SPEECHES AND WAVED BANNERS OUTSIDE BANK OF INDONESIA.
10 MAY BAUCAU (0835S/12630E)/ PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA PERSONNEL, DRESSED UP AS PRO-INDEPENDENCE FALINTIL FIGHTERS, REPORTEDLY SHOT 27 PEOPLE, KILLING THREE. THIS WAS MOST LIKELY A PLOY BY PRO-INDONESIA ELEMENTS TO GIVE UN PERSONNEL THE PERCEPTION THAT PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS ARE INSTIGATING VIOLENCE.
11 MAY JAKARTA / UNIVERSITY STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN FRONT OF THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION (KPU) OFFICE COVERING THEIR BODIES WITH 50,000 RUPIAH BILLS, MOCKING KPU MEMBERS.
11 MAY AMBON / A BOMB WENT OFF INJURING 4 AND CAUSED MASS PANIC.

11 MAY LHOKSEUMAWE (0510N/09708E)/ FIVE GRENADES WENT OFF AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF AN AIR DEFENSE BATTALION. NO INJURIES REPORTED.
12 MAY JAKARTA / REPORTING INDICATES UP TO 5,000 STUDENTS GATHERED AT THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS FOR A MEMORIAL SERVICE AND DEMONSTRATION.
12 MAY CIANJUR (0649S/10708E)/ A GROUP OF YOUTHS IDENTIFIED AS NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN) MEMBERS OCCUPIED A DISTRICT ELECTORAL COMMITTEE OFFICE, HOLDING HOSTAGE SOME OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES ON DUTY. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(S) TNI AND POLICE ARE PREPARING FOR SECURITY IN JAVA BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAVA AS POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORTERS WILL BECOME EMOTIONAL. THE OUTLYING AREAS ARE STILL TURBULENT AND TENSE. SINCE MAJORITY OF FORCES ARE IN JAVA, TNI AND POLICE WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH UNREST THAT OCCURS IN OUTLYING AREAS OF INDONESIA. (KEYS ID)

(U)
(U)

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:
(C) EAST TIMOR: A SMALL ADVANCE TEAM OF APPROXIMATELY 40 UN OFFICIALS ARRIVED IN DILI, EAST TIMOR 7-8 MAY TO PREPARE FOR THE 8 AUG UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE. THE UN IS EXPECTED TO HAVE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 OFFICIALS IN EAST TIMOR BY MID-JUN, WITH HOPES THAT THEIR PRESENCE WILL ENSURE A FAIR, OPEN, AND SAFE BALLOTING PROCESS. APPROXIMATELY 200-300 WILL BE CIVILIAN POLICE ADVISERS WHO WILL ASSIST THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE FORCE (POLRI) IN MAINTAINING SECURITY AT APPROXIMATELY 200 POLLING CENTERS THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR. AUSTRALIA IS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE THE LARGEST SINGLE NATIONAL CONTINGENT OF POLICE ADVISORS, APPROXIMATELY 50-60. AUSTRALIA, GERMANY, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, PHILIPPINES, UK, AND THE US WILL SEND OFFICIALS TO MONITOR THE BALLOTING. THE DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE IS EXPECTED TO COST APPROXIMATELY $46 MILLION, WITH AUSTRALIA PLEDGING $20 MILLION AND PORTUGAL OFFERING $10 MILLION TO HELP DEFRAY THE COST. THE ARRIVAL OF UN OFFICIALS IN EAST TIMOR SHOULD BRING SOME RELIEF TO THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS AND THE MAIN ADVOCATE OF A UN PRESENCE. HOWEVER, ANY LARGE OR VISIBLE UN PRESENCE COULD FUEL RESENTMENT BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WHO OPPOSE ANY FOREIGN PRESENCE ON EAST TIMOR SOIL. DESPITE THEIR OBJECTION, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL DELIBERATELY ATTACK ANY UN PERSONNEL WITHOUT PROVOCATION. THEY MAY, HOWEVER, USE THE ARRIVAL OF UN PERSONNEL IN EAST TIMOR AS A PRETEXT TO INCREASE THEIR ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS AND SUPPORTERS. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(C) IRIAN JAYA: THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) WILL SOON RE-DECLARE THE BORDER ALONG PAPUA NEW GUINEA (PNG) A MILITARY OPERATION ZONE (DOM) FOLLOWING INCREASED REBEL ACTIVITY IN THE REGION OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS. THE AREA WAS A DOM PRIOR TO 1998, BUT THE DESIGNATION WAS LIFTED IN OCT 98 AS A GOOD-WILL GESTURE AND REFORM PROMISE BY TNI COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO. DESPITE THE LIFT, REPORTS OF GANGS HARASSING AND TERRORIZING PEOPLE LIVING ALONG THE BORDER AREA HAS INCREASED. IN THE LATEST INCIDENT, A 100-MAN GANG ATTACKED A VILLAGE IN THE ARSO DISTRICT, KILLING THREE LOCAL RESIDENTS, INJURING 3 OTHERS, AND TAKING 11 HOSTAGES. TNI IS PROBABLY REINSTATING THE DOM DESIGNATION IN AN EFFORT TO CURB THE GROWING SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN IRIAN JAYA, ESPECIALLY IN KNOWN REBEL TERRITORY ALONG THE PNG BORDER. REINSTATING THE DOM MAY UPSET LOCAL EMOTIONS AND HELP FUEL FURTHER UNREST IN THE REGION. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(C) JAKARTA: STUDENTS COMMEMORATED THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING WITH DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

12 MAY. REPORTING INDICATES UP TO 5,000 STUDENTS GATHERED AT THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS FOR A MEMORIAL SERVICE AND DEMONSTRATION. FROM THIS GROUP, APPROXIMATELY 1,500 STUDENTS MARCHED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE/PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (DPR/MPR) BUILDING LOCATED 2 MILES EAST OF THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED THEM FROM ENTERING THE DPR/MPR GROUNDS AND LOWERING THE INDONESIAN FLAG TO HALF MAST TO COMMEMORATE THE KILLINGS OF FOUR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. A SMALLER GROUP OF STUDENTS STAGED A SIMILAR PROTEST OUTSIDE THE DEFENSE MINISTRY BUILDING. NO DEATHS, INJURIES, OR ARRESTS WERE REPORTED FROM ALL THREE LOCATIONS. DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED DESPITE EARLIER REPORTING THAT THE 12 MAY TRISAKTI ANNIVERSARY DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD BE CANCELLED. THESE DEMONSTRATIONS WERE THE LARGEST SINCE THE 13 NOV 98 ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATIONS OF UP 50,000. THIS EVENT COULD BE THE PRELUDE TO FURTHER AND LARGER STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND POSSIBLE VIOLENCE, ESPECIALLY ON KEY ANNIVERSARY AND POLITICAL DATES. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS WILL LIKELY INCREASE AS THE NATIONAL ELECTION PERIOD APPROACHES, AND THEIR MAGNITUDE WILL BE INFLUENCED BY SECURITY FORCE REACTION AND THE OUTCOME OF THE DPR ELECTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. (KEYS ID)

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

*18MAY	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD COMMENCES
21MAY	INDONESIAN SCHOOLS DISMISSED FOR SUMMER RECESS
07JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
12JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
08AUG	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
29AUG	NEW MPR ANNOUNCES RESULTS OF EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13NOV	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
07DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT)

*DENOTES ADDITION (KEYS ID)

(U) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24
30 APR-06 MAY 99	24	9	14
07-13 MAY 99	28	8	16

(U)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA WILL REMAIN FRAGILE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, AND WILL LIKELY DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER AFTER THE 28 OCT MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD OPENING 18 MAY AND THE NATIONWIDE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES, ESPECIALLY ON KEY ANNIVERSARY AND POLITICAL DATES. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN MALUKU AND WEST KALIMANTAN, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR. ALTHOUGH THE EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE IS SET FOR 8 AUG AND UN OFFICIALS BEGAN ARRIVING IN DILI 7-8 MAY, PRO-INTEGRATION/PRO-INDEPENDENCE VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE AND MAY EVENTUALLY ESCALATE AFTER THE BALLOTING RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED 29 AUG. (OSA MULITIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

(U)

E. (C) INDONESIA - ELECTION SECURITY FOR FOR JAKARTA: AS OF 11 MAY, THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) SECURITY PLANS FOR THE 18 MAY - 4 JUNE ELECTION PERIOD IN JAKARTA CALLED FOR 62,000 TROOPS, CONSISTING OF:

- 12,000 TNI
- 8,000 POLICE
- 12,000 PEOPLE'S SECURITY FORCE (KNOWN AS KAMRA OR CIVILIAN MILITIA)
- 30,000 CIVIL DEFENSE FORCES (WANRA AND HANSIP) (KEYS ID)

(U)

(C) TNI TROOPS WILL INCLUDE PERSONNEL FROM THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE. THE KAMRA WERE RECRUITED FROM EXISITING CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS IN JAN-FEB 99 AND HAD A 3-WEEK TRAINING PROGRAM WHICH INCLUDED SHIELD AND BATON USE. WANRA ARE PART-TIME LOCAL MILITARY AUXILIARY PERSONNEL. HANSIP MAKE UP INDONESIA'S LARGE CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND ARE TYPICALLY USED IN ROUTINE CIVIL DEFENSE TASKS SUCH AS FIREFIGHTING, DISASTER DAMAGE CONTROL, AND NEIGHBORHOOD SECURITY. (KEYS ID)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

[redacted]

(U) APPROXIMATELY 30,000 ADDITIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL WERE SENT TO THE JAKARTA AREA FOR THE 10-13 NOV 98 PEOPLES' CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) SPECIAL SESSION. IN MAY 98, AN ESTIMATED 60,000 AUGMENTEES WERE CALLED IN TO RESTORE ORDER AFTER SUHARTO WAS REMOVED FROM POWER. (KEYS ID)

(S) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF SECURITY FORCES SLATED FOR JAKARTA IS FLEXIBLE AND WILL PROBABLY INCREASE. OF THE 62,000 CURRENTLY PLANNED, 60 PERCENT (37,000) ARE ORGANIC TO THE JAKARTA AREA; THE REMAINDER WILL BE BROUGHT IN FROM OTHER AREAS IN JAVA AND THE OUTER ISLANDS. OF THE 20,000 TNI AND POLICE PERSONNEL LISTED IN THE JAKARTA SECURITY PLAN, JICPAC ASSESSES 15,000 ARE ALREADY BASED IN THE JAKARTA AREA. (KEYS ID)

(S) TNI TROOPS ARE A MINORITY OF THE PLANNED SECURITY FORCE. THE CIVILIAN DEFENSE FORCES AND MILITIA, RELATIVELY UNTRAINED AND INDISCIPLINED, WILL PROBABLY EXACERBATE ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE. AT THE SAME TIME, THEIR LARGE AND VISIBLE PRESENCE WILL ALLOW THE TNI TO DEFLECT BLAME FOR ANY HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THE BULK OF UNREST WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE 20 JUN-12 JUL WHEN ELECTION RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

Non responsive

SECRET
NOFORN

[redacted]

NON Responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:
A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT
B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

---

14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)
16 MAY	BANGLADESH	(U) FARAKKA RESISTANCE DAY
17 MAY	NAURU	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
17 MAY	PAKISTAN	(U) ASHURA/MOHARRAM, ISLAMIC HOLIDAY
21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY

b(2)

[redacted]

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183299545
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990518
TOR: 144331
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905181100
MHFNO: 99 5499738
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCC #1722 1380520
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0287 1380523
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RHBCIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST ESSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Jan 2023
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

SECRET

ENCL 13

RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUHBANA T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RHMCUUU T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX

RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUHPPEL T ELEVENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW

SECRET

RHWISSJ T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 181100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
RUYNANI/COMUSMARFORK SEOUL KOR//G2//
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA138/18 MAY//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (U) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

~~SECRET~~

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

[redacted]

B. (C) INDONESIA - UNREST UPDATE

C. [redacted]

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

NOV responsive

(U)

B. (C) INDONESIA - UNREST UPDATE: GENERAL WIRANTO ARRIVED IN AMBON (0343S/12812E) 13 MAY TO SIGN A PEACE ACCORD TO END MONTHS OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN GROUPS. TWO DAYS LATER, INDONESIAN TROOPS FIRED ON BATTLING MOBS OF MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS KILLING AT LEAST SEVEN AND INJURING SIX. THE RIOT BEGAN AFTER AN ARGUMENT OVER WHO WOULD CARRY A TORCH DURING CELEBRATIONS IN HONOR OF A LOCAL HERO. IN DILI (0833S/12534E), HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE MARCHED THROUGH THE EAST TIMOR CAPITAL TO CALL AN END TO KILLINGS IN THE TROUBLED PROVINCE 15 MAY. ABOUT 40 PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAMEN ATTACKED A NEIGHBORHOOD 16 MAY KILLING FIVE AND SETTING FIRE TO 11 HOUSES. UN OFFICIALS AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL STAFF WERE NEARBY DINING WHEN THEY HEARD SHOTS. THEY WERE ESCORTED TO SAFETY BY INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES. (KEYS ID)

(S)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: DESPITE THE SIGNING OF A PEACE ACCORD AND MILITARY TROOP BUILD-UP SINCE MARCH, CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE LIKELY WILL CONTINUE IN AMBON. THE UNREST IN DILI WAS THE FIRST TIME UN OFFICIALS WITNESSED VIOLENCE SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL 2 WEEKS AGO. INTIMIDATION TACTICS BY MILITIA PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS WILL CONTINUE UP TO THE 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOT VOTE DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF UN OFFICIALS. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

NON responsive

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] Non Responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:
A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY
30 MAY	TAIWAN	(U) MEMORIAL DAY
01 JUN	PRC	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
01 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (FIRST OF 3 DAYS)
01 JUN	NEW ZEALAND	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (1ST MONDAY)
01 JUN	PALAU	(U) PRESIDENT'S DAY
02 JUN	BHUTAN	(U) CORONATION OF JIGME SINGHE WANGCHUK
02 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (SECOND OF 3 DAYS)
03 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION CONCLUDES
04 JUN	TONGA	(U) EMANCIPATION DAY
06 JUN	INDIA	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF OPERATION BLUE STAR (1984)
06 JUN	ROK	(U) MEMORIAL DAY/LOYALTY DAY
08 JUN	AUSTRALIA	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (2ND MONDAY)
09 JUN	CHINESE WORLD	(U) DRAGON BOAT FESTIVAL (S/S)

C. (U) FOREIGN VIP TRAVEL:

24-28 MAY	VIETNAM	(U) VIETNAMESE DEFENSE MINISTER TO VISIT RUSSIA
27-30 MAY	ROK	(U) PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG TO VISIT MOSCOW
30 MAY-01 JUN	ROK	(U) PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG TO VISIT ULAN BAATAR

5. (U) [redacted] b(3)

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN.
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183315319
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990521
TOR: 050959
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905211100
MHFNO: 99 5537504
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #0083 1410843
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0372 1410749
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RHBCIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 26 Feb 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~SECRET~~

ENCL (1)

MORI DocID: 1054604

RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUHBANA T FIRSTBN EIETH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX

RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHWISSK T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHLPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW

~~SECRET~~

RHWISSJ T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 211100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
RUYNANI/COMUSMARFORK SEOUL KOR//G2//
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA0141/21 MAY//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (U) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV) OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

[redacted]

(U) D. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 13-20 MAY 99

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE



NON Responsive

Non Responsive

SECRET

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE

(U) D. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 13-20 MAY 99: SEVERAL KEY POLITICAL EVENTSUNFOLDED THIS WEEK. FIRST, IN A COMPROMISE MOVE, GOLKAR NOMINATED CURRENTPRESIDENT HABIBIE AS ITS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. SECOND, THE ELECTIONCAMPAIGN PERIOD OFFICIALLY STARTED 18 MAY WITH ONLY MINOR VIOLENCEREPORTED. ON 19 MAY, THREE KEY OPPOSITION PARTIES, PDI-P, PAN, AND PKB, FORMED A COALITION TO CHALLENGE GOLKAR'S OLIGARCHY. REPORTING INDICATESTHAT HABIBIE IS CONSOLIDATING HIS POWER THROUGH ``MONEY'' POLITICS AND``BACK-ROOM DEALINGS'', WHILE OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE BEGINNING TO UNIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVENT A HABIBIE VICTORY. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIA'S ECONOMY IS SHOWING SOME MODEST SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT. THE JAKARTA STOCK EXCHANGE INDEX DISPLAYED SIGNS OF RENEWED VITALITY WITH INCREASED TRADING. DOMESTIC INTEREST RATES HAVE STEADILY DECLINED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, AS EVIDENCED BY THE RESULTS OF THE CENTRAL BANK'S WEEKLY AUCTION OF ONE-MONTH SBI'S TO BELOW 30 PERCENT. INFLATION IS SLOWLY DECREASING, ERASING FEARS OF POSSIBLE FOOD SHORTAGES AND PRICE RIOTS. NON-OIL EXPORT INCREASED BY 10% SINCE JAN 99. SEVERAL LARGE CORPORATE DEBTORS ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WERE MAKING PROGRESS IN THEIR DEBT RESTRUCTURING NEGOTIATIONS WITH FOREIGN CREDITORS. DESPITE THESE MODEST SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT, INDONESIA'S ECONOMY STILL REMAINS WEAK AND FRAGILE, AND COULD EASILY PLUNGE INTO CHAOS AGAIN. (SEE CHART). THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE U.S. DOLLAR IMPROVED SLIGHTLY TO RP 7,949/$1.00. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GEN SUBAGYO PRESIDED OVER THE REINAUGURATION OF THE OLD ``PATTIMURA'' REGIONAL COMMAND (KODAM XVI) IN THE MALUKUS 15 MAY. PATTIMURA IS THE FIRST OF 7 NEW MILITARY REGIONAL COMMANDS THAT WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY 2006, IN RESPONSE TO MOUNTING DEMANDS FOR TNI TO DEAL WITH SOCIAL UNREST AND THREATS TO NATIONAL STABILITY. THE ONLY OTHER NEW KODAM THAT SUBAGYO SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED WAS THE ``ISKANDAR MUDA'' KODAM IN BANDA ACEH. APPROXIMATELY 10,000 TROOPS REMAIN IN THE MALUKUS AND ARE EXPECTED TO STAY THROUGH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS TO HELP MAINTAIN ORDER. THE INAUGURATION OF NEW KODAMS SHOULD HELP THE TNI MANAGE THOSE REGIONS MORE EFFICIENTLY AND INDEPENDENTLY, WHILE ALLOWING THEM TO FOCUS THEIR ATTENTION ON VARIOUS SEPARATIST OR ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS ISSUES THAT ARE UNIQUE TO THAT PARTICULAR REGION. EXPECT SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR IRIAN JAYA, WEST KALIMANTAN, AND EAST TIMOR, IF THEIR INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT FAILS. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIA'S LEADING POLITICAL PARTY, GOLKAR, NOMINATED CURRENT PRESIDENT B.J. HABIBIE, AS ITS CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT DURING ITS 13-14 MAY CENTRAL BOARD NATIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING (RAPIM). GOLKAR MEMBERS ALSO CONSIDERED GENERAL WIRANTO, AKBAR TANDJUNG, SULTAN HAMENGKUBUWONO X,

AND GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA FOR PRESIDENT. IN A COMPROMISE PACKAGE DEAL, THE FOUR REMAINING CANDIDATES WERE NOMINATED FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT POSITION. REPORTING INDICATES THAT ``MONEY POLITICS'' AND ``BACK-ROOM DEALS'' WERE USED TO ASSURE HABIBIE'S NOMINATION FOR PRESIDENT. WHILE HABIBIE CONTROLS THE FLOW OF MONEY TO GOLKAR'S GRASS ROOTS LEVEL, HIS NOMINATION DOES NOT COME WITHOUT RISKS. HABIBIE IS VIEWED BY MANY AS A TRANSIENT PRESIDENT AND HIS CLOSE PERSONNEL TIES TO FORMER PRESIDENT SUHARTO WILL PORTRAY HIM AS REPRESENTING CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND NEPOTISM. GOLKAR, HOWEVER, BELIEVES HABIBIE IS THE BEST CANDIDATE TO FUNNEL MONEY TO THE PARTY'S PROVINCIAL LEADERS WHO ARE EXPECTED TO DELIVER A LARGE NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE UPCOMING 7 JUN ELECTIONS. MEANWHILE, ON 19 MAY, A PRO-REFORM COALITION WAS FORMED CONSISTING OF THREE OPPOSITION CANDIDATES AND PARTIES, NAMELY MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY-STRUGGLE (PDI-P), AMIEN RAIS OF THE NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN), AND ABDURRAHMAN WAHID OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB). THIS ALLIANCE WAS FORMED TO MAKE A COORDINATED CHALLENGE AGAINST THE STATUS-QUO FORCE OF GOLKAR. POLITICAL MANEUVERING, RHETORIC, AND VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY PICK-UP AS THE 18 MAY ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD BEGINS. (KEYS ID)

(C) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: ELECTION RELATED VIOLENCE CONTINUES IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E) WITH DEMONSTRATIONS AND STRIKES REMAINING ON THE LOW SIDE. HOWEVER, VIOLENCE CONTINUES TO BE REPORTED IN INDONESIA'S OUTLYING PROVINCES OF ACEH (0534N/09520E), EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E), AND AMBON (0343S/12812E). SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:

13 MAY DILI (0833S/12534E)/ A MARCH FOR PEACE LED BY BISHOP BELO OCCURRED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

13 MAY JAKARTA / CIVILIANS DEMONSTRATED COMMEMORATING THE 13 MAY 98 SEMANGGI INCIDENT.

14 MAY SURABAYA (0715S/11245E) / MEMBERS OF YOUTH ORGANIZATION TASK FORCE ATTENDED A RALLY AT GELORA STADIUM.

14 MAY BAUCAU (0835S/12630E)/ CLASHES BROKE OUT BETWEEN A LOCAL ARMY BATTALION AND A SPECIAL INDONESIAN FORCE (KOPASSUS) RESULTING IN TWO SERIOUSLY INJURED.

15 MAY AMBON / AT LEAST SEVEN KILLED IN A CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM CLASH WHEN SECURITY FORCES OPENED FIRE ON AN ANGRY MOB OF 200.

16 MAY JAKARTA / NAHDLATUL ULUMA PARTY (NU) MEMBERS CONDUCTED A PARADE THAT PASSED BY INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT (MPR/DPR).

17 MAY SIGLI, ACEH (0523N/09557E)/ RESIDENTS FROM THREE VILLAGES FLED THEIR HOMES FOLLOWING INTERROGATIONS BY THE MILITARY WHO WERE SEEKING A MISSING COLLEAGUE.

17 MAY DILI / PRO-INDONESIA MILITIA GROUPS LAUNCHED A NIGHT ATTACK IN A PRO-INDEPENDENCE NEIGHBORHOOD RESULTING IN SEVEN HOUSES TORCHED.

17 MAY ATARA (0858S/12524E)/ SEVEN PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND FOUR INJURED IN A CLASH BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATION SUPPORTERS.

17 MAY JAYAPURA (0232S/14042E)/ ENVIRONMENTALLY CONSCIOUS STUDENTS STAGED A DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF IRIAN JAYA PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL (DPRD).

18 MAY PEKALONGAN (0653S/10940E)/ A CLASH BETWEEN THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE IDENTIFIED AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) LEFT 14 HOMES BURNED DOWN AND AT LEAST 11 INJURED.

18 MAY SIGLI / RESIDENTS HELD A RALLY OUTSIDE A MOSQUE TO EXPRESS THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH A WRITTEN SECURITY GUARANTEE FROM THEIR DISTRICT.

19 MAY JAKARTA / THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE GATHERED IN THE INDONESIAN CAPITAL FOR THE FIRST OFFICIAL EVENT OF INDONESIA'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

19 MAY LHOKSEUMAWE / A MOLOTOV BOMB EXPLODED AT THE NORTH ACEH DISTRICT POLICE HEADQUARTERS INJURING THREE MEMBERS OF ANTI-RIOT STRIKE FORCE POLICE. (KEYS ID)

(S) THE DATE OF 18 MAY SIGNIFIES THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN ELECTION PERIOD FOR INDONESIA. THE COALITION OF POLITICAL PARTIES PDI-P, PKB, AND PAN WILL LIKELY REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF UNREST BETWEEN THE 3 POLITICAL PARTIES. CONTINUING VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR SUGGESTS TNI AND PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS ARE TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE 8 AUG BALLOT VOTE IN THEIR FAVOR. THE UNREST IN EAST TIMOR WILL CONTINUE. FINALLY, VIOLENCE IN AMBON AND ACEH WILL CONTINUE TO BE HARSHLY DEALT WITH BY INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI). (KEYS ID)

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(U) ACEH: OPPOSITION PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (AKA: GUS DUR) OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) ANNOUNCED 20 MAY THAT HE SUPPORTS AN AUTONOMY REFERENDUM FOR ACEH. HOWEVER, HE STATED IF GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REFERENDUM, ACEH WOULD CHOOSE TO REMAIN PART OF INDONESIA. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT COULD ADD FUEL TO THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN ACEH, WHILE GIVING HIM POLITICAL MILEAGE FOR SUPPORTING THE REFERENDUM. (KEYS ID)

(S) EAST TIMOR: PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES ARE CONTINUING OPERATIONS AIMED AT INTIMIDATION AROUND DILI. PRESS REPORTS INDICATED AN ATTACK BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS SOUTH OF DILI, FORCING RESIDENTS TO FLEE THE AREA. A GROUP CONSISTING OF UN AND NGO WORKERS HAD TO BE ESCORTED TO SAFETY BY POLICE AFTER BEING TRAPPED IN THE AREA. TNI AND PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS ARE DETERMINED TO INFLUENCE THE 8 AUG BALLOT IN THEIR FAVOR, WITH INDICATIONS EMERGING THEY MAY ATTEMPT TO DELAY OR STOP THE BALLOT IF AN AUTONOMY OUTCOME IS NOT LIKELY. THE MILITIAS REMAIN UNFETTERED BY SECURITY FORCES AND ARE FREE TO ACT AT WILL THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE, ESPECIALLY IN DILI. AS A RESULT, THE CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN EAST TIMOR IS NOT LIKELY TO IMPROVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. MEANWHILE, XANANA GUSMAO STATED THAT HE MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOUSE ARREST ONE DAY AFTER THE EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (8 AUG). (KEYS ID)

(C) JAKARTA: IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE UNREST RELATED TO THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD 18 MAY-4 JUN, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) WILL BE FOCUSING MOST OF ITS SECURITY EFFORTS IN JAKARTA. THEY NOW HAVE APPROXIMATELY 62,000 SECURITY PERSONNEL DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE CAPITAL. FROM THIS NUMBER, 12,000 COMES FROM TNI, 8,000 FROM POLRI, 12,000 FROM KAMRA (POLRI MILITIA), AND 30,000 FROM WANRA (TNI MILITIA) AND HANSIP (CIVIL DEFENSE FORCE). THEY WILL BE GUARDING THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, THE DPR/MPR BUILDING, THE DEFENSE MINISTRY BUILDING, MERDEKA SQUARE, MAJOR UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES, POLLING STATIONS, AND MAJOR ROADWAYS LEADING INTO JAKARTA. (KEYS ID)

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

18 MAY	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD COMMENCES
21 MAY	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF SUHARTO'S RESIGNATION
21 MAY	INDONESIAN SCHOOLS DISMISSED FOR SUMMER RECESS
07 JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26 JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)

~~SECRET~~

12 JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17 JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17 AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
08 AUG	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28 AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
29 AUG	NEW MPR ANNOUNCES RESULTS OF EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28 OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06 NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10 NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12 NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13 NOV	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
07 DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01 JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT) (KEYS ID)

(S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24
30 APR-06 MAY 99	24	9	14
07-13 MAY 99	28	8	16
14-20 MAY 99	22	8	11

(KEYS ID)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA WILL LIKELY REMAIN TENSE AND VOLATILE. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD NOW IN PROGRESS AND THE NATION-WIDE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, POLITICAL UNREST AND STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN MALUKU AND WEST KALIMANTAN, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR. IN EAST TIMOR, ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE ON A REGULAR BASIS, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF THE UN ADVANCE TEAM. THE CONTINUED ENVIRONMENT OF FEAR AND INTIMIDATION BY PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE MILITIAS WILL MAKE A FREE AND FAIR BALLOT ON 8 AUG INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. THE FREQUENCY AND LEVEL OF UNREST/VIOLENCE DURING THE NEXT SIX MONTHS WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, THE 8 AUG EAST TIMOR AUTONOMY REFERENDUM, AND THE 28 OCT MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. (OSA MULITIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

---

21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY
30 MAY	TAIWAN	(U) MEMORIAL DAY
01 JUN	PRC	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
01 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (FIRST OF 3 DAYS)
01 JUN	NEW ZEALAND	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (1ST MONDAY)
01 JUN	PALAU	(U) PRESIDENT'S DAY
02 JUN	BHUTAN	(U) CORONATION OF JIGME SINGHE WANGCHUK
02 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (SECOND OF 3 DAYS)
03 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION CONCLUDES
04 JUN	TONGA	(U) EMANCIPATION DAY
06 JUN	INDIA	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF OPERATION BLUE STAR (1984)
06 JUN	ROK	(U) MEMORIAL DAY/LOYALTY DAY
08 JUN	AUSTRALIA	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (2ND MONDAY)
09 JUN	CHINESE WORLD	(U) DRAGON BOAT FESTIVAL (5/5)
12 JUN	PHILIPPINES	(U) INDEPENDENCE DAY
12 JUN	SOLOMON ISLANDS	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (FRIDAY CLOSEST TO 14 JUN)
15 JUN	PAKISTAN	(U) ARREST OF MIR AMAL KANSI FOR MURDER OF CIA EMPLOYEES AT LANGLEY, VA (1997)
15 JUN	TUVALU	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY

[redacted]

Non responsive

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] NON responsive.

b(3)

[redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT 2/2



Responsive

Non-Responsive

[redacted]

RMKS/ITEM 1: (U) INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION UPDATE
A. (U) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ON POTENTIAL THREATS
(1) (U) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH; NEW COMMUNAL VIOLENCE POSSIBLE ELSEWHERE IN INDONESIA

Non-Responsive [redacted]



1. (U) INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION UPDATE:

A. (U) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ON POTENTIAL THREATS:

(1) (C) INDONESIA: THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN EAST TIMOR CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE IN THE WAKE OF THE 17 APR ATTACK BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS IN DILI, THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, IN WHICH AT LEAST 12 PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS WERE KILLED, AND OVER 50 ARE REPORTED MISSING. CALLS BY FOREIGN DIPLOMATS ON THE SCENE FOR THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (TNI) TO CONTROL THE AGGRESSIVE MILITIAS HAVE BEEN REBUFFED. FOREIGN CONDEMNATIONS TO THE MOUNTING VIOLENCE COULD HARDEN ANTI-WESTERN ATTITUDES IN TNI AGAINST ANY INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN EAST TIMOR.




Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive



(2) DUE TO ETHNIC/SEPARATIST/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE, AVOID

Non-Responsive

IRIAN JAYA, EAST TIMOR AND NORTHERN SUMATRA (ACEH), AND OTHER AREAS OF OCCASIONAL UNREST, SUCH AS THE WEST KALIMANTAN AREA, AREAS OF SULAWESI AND THE CENTRAL MALUKU ISLANDS. COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN VARIOUS AREAS COULD BE A COLLATERAL THREAT, PARTICULARLY IN OUTLYING AREAS. AN ON-GOING ELECTRICITY BLACKOUT IS CAUSING A RISE IN CRIME ON MADURA ISLAND AND PERSONNEL SHOULD EXERCISE GREATER PRECAUTIONS PARTICULARLY DURING DARKNESS. A MANDATORY TWO PERSON POLICY REMAINS FOR IRIAN JAYA.

(3) MAINTAIN HEIGHTENED AWARENESS AND PRECAUTIONS WHILE IN-COUNTRY. BE PARTICULARLY CAUTIOUS IN ETHNIC CHINESE AREAS, NEAR GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND COLLEGE CAMPUSES, AND OUTSIDE MAJOR CITIES. ETHNIC CHINESE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY CAREFUL GIVEN ANTI-ETHNIC CHINESE ATTITUDES OF MANY RIOTERS. ALL TRAVELERS TO INDONESIA SHOULD STAY IN LARGER TOWNS AND AVOID REMOTE VILLAGES.




Non-Responsive

DOCUMENT 1/2

Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive



Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive



Non-Responsive

[redacted]

1. (U) INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION UPDATE:
A. (U) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ON POTENTIAL THREATS:
(1) (C) INDONESIA: THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN EAST TIMOR CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE IN THE WAKE OF THE 7 APR ATTACK BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS IN LIQUICA IN WHICH BETWEEN 5 AND 45 WERE REPORTED KILLED. UNLESS INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES CAN CONTROL THE AGGRESSIVE MILITIAS, MOUNTING VIOLENCE COULD SCUTTLE THE UN PROCESS FOR EAST TIMOR AND INCREASE DEMANDS FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION. ELSEWHERE, PREVIOUSLY QUIET AREAS OF WEST JAVA, CENTRAL AND EASTERN KALIMANTAN (BORNEO), AND LAMPUNG, SUMATRA, FACE OUTBREAKS OF COMMUNAL VIOLENCE ACCORDING TO INDONESIAN ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS AND ECONOMIC FACTORS

[redacted]

Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive



RMKS/ITEM 1: (U) INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION UPDATE

A. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ON POTENTIAL THREATS

(1) (U) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH; NEW COMMUNAL VIOLENCE POSSIBLE ELSEWHERE IN INDONESIA


Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive



Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive

(2) DUE TO ETHNIC/SEPARATIST/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE, AVOID IRIAN JAYA, EAST TIMOR AND NORTHERN SUMATRA (ACEH), AND OTHER AREAS OF OCCASIONAL UNREST, SUCH AS THE WEST KALIMANTAN AREA, AREAS OF SULAWESI AND THE CENTRAL MALUKU ISLANDS. COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN VARIOUS AREAS COULD BE A COLLATERAL THREAT, PARTICULARLY IN OUTLYING AREAS. AN ON-GOING ELECTRICITY BLACKOUT IS CAUSING A RISE IN CRIME ON MADURA ISLAND AND PERSONNEL SHOULD EXERCISE GREATER PRECAUTIONS PARTICULARLY DURING DARKNESS. A MANDATORY TWO PERSON POLICY REMAINS FOR IRIAN JAYA.

(3) MAINTAIN HEIGHTENED AWARENESS AND PRECAUTIONS WHILE IN-COUNTRY. BE PARTICULARLY CAUTIOUS IN ETHNIC CHINESE AREAS, NEAR GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND COLLEGE CAMPUSES, AND OUTSIDE MAJOR CITIES. ETHNIC CHINESE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY CAREFUL GIVEN ANTI-ETHNIC CHINESE ATTITUDES OF MANY RIOTERS. ALL TRAVELERS TO INDONESIA SHOULD STAY IN LARGER TOWNS AND AVOID REMOTE VILLAGES.

Non-Responsive

Non-Response

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

FOIA Case: 43858
26 May 2004

Mr. Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Mr. Simpson:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of 27 February 2003 to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for all documents generated between April 1999 and May 1999 relating in whole or in part to: the 6 April 1999 killings of as many as 50 East Timorese civilians in the church compound at Liquica, outside of Dili, East Timor; the 12-13 April 1999 killings of East Timorese civilians and 2 Indonesian troops in the village of Cailaco in the Bobonaro district of East Timor; the 17 April 1999 attack on the home of independence leader Manuel Carrascalao in Dili, East Timor; the April 1999 militia killings of up to 100 persons in Suai, East Timor; and the May 1999 killing of 30 East Timorese in Atara, East Timor. A copy of your request is enclosed. The CIA referred one NSA-originated document (3 pages) to the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) on 29 March 2004 (CIA FOIA/PA No: F-2003-00337) for our review and direct response to you. This referral has been assigned case number 43858.

The document has been reviewed by this Agency as required by the FOIA and has been found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958, as amended. This document meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Subparagraphs (c) and (g) of Section 1.4 and remains classified TOP SECRET as provided in Section 1.2 of Executive Order 12958, as amended. The document is classified because its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Because the document is currently and properly classified, it is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the first exemption of the FOIA (5 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(1)).

20030162CIA017 NSA
RECNO: 28943 SEQCOR: 107335
DATER: 6/1/2004 Simpson, Brad
Indonesia/East Timor April-May 1999

In addition, this Agency is authorized by various statutes to protect certain information concerning its activities. We have determined that such information exists in this document. Accordingly, those portions are also exempt from disclosure pursuant to the third exemption of the FOIA which provides for the withholding of information specifically protected from disclosure by statute. The specific statutes applicable in this case are Title 18 U.S. Code 798; Title 50 U.S. Code 403-3(c)(7); and Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 402 note). No portion of the information is reasonably segregable.

Since your request has been denied, you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures. Any person denied access to information may file an appeal to the NSA/CSS Freedom of Information Act Appeal Authority. The appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days after the date of the initial denial letter. The appeal shall be in writing addressed to the NSA/CSS FOIA Appeal Authority (DC321), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road STE 6248, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6248. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which the requester believes release of the information is required. The NSA/CSS Appeal Authority will endeavor to respond to the appeal within 20 working days after receipt, absent unusual circumstances.

The CIA has asked that we protect information pursuant to 5 USC 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). Any appeal of the denial of CIA information should be directed to that agency.

Sincerely,

LOUIS F. GILES
Director of Policy

Encl:
a/s

F-2003-00337

The National Security Archive

The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000
Fax: 202/994-7005
nsarchive@gwu.edu
www.nsarchive.org

February 27, 2003

Kathryn I. Dyer
FOIA and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Request under the FOIA, in reply please refer to Archive # 20030162CIA017

Dear Ms. Dyer:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), I hereby request disclosure of the following for inspection and possible copying:

All documents generated between April 1999 and May 1999 relating in whole or in part to:

1. The April 6, 1999 killings of as many as 50 East Timorese civilians in the church compound at Liquica, outside of Dili, East Timor;

2. The April 12-13, 1999 killings of East Timorese civilians and 2 Indonesian troops in the village of Cailaco in the Bobonaro district of East Timor.

3. The April 17, 1999 attack on the home of independence leader Manuel Carrascalao in Dili, East Timor.

4. The April 1999 militia killings of up to 100 persons in Suai, East Timor.

5. The May 1999 killing of 30 East Timorese in Atara, East Timor.

Documents pertaining to this request include but are not limited to cables, reports, memoranda, and finished intelligence.

If you regard any of these documents as potentially exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements, I request that you nonetheless exercise your discretion to disclose them. As the FOIA requires, please release all reasonably segregable nonexempt portions of documents. To permit me to reach an intelligent and informed decision whether or not to file an administrative appeal of any denied material, please describe any withheld records (or portions thereof) and explain the basis for your exemption claims.

As you know, the National Security Archive qualifies for waiver of search and review fees as a representative of the news media. This request is made as part of a scholarly and news research project and not for commercial use. For details on the Archive's research and publication activities, please see our Web site at the address above. Please notify me before incurring photocopying costs over $100.

An Independent non-governmental research institute and library located at the George Washington University, the Archive collects and publishes declassified documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Publication royalties and tax deductible contributions through The National Security Archive Fund, Inc. underwrite the Archive's Budget.

To expedite the release of the requested documents, please disclose them on an interim basis as they become available to you, without waiting until all the documents have been processed. If you have any questions regarding the identity of the records, their location, the scope of the request or any other matters, please call Barbara Elias at (202) 994-7219 or e-mail belias@gwu.edu. I look forward to receiving your response within the twenty-day statutory time period.

Sincerely,

Barbara Elias

for Brad Simpson
National Security Archive Staff Fellow

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183158595
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990423
TOR: 033732
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904231100
MHFNO: 99 5185932
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #5045 1130711
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0263 1130710
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Jan 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

Encl (7)

MORI DocID: 1054613

RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE

RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPBHR T FIRST MAR
RUHPPEL T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUHPBHR T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBHR T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPESX T TACRON TWELVE
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHWISSK T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHWISSF T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN

SECRET

RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 231100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOU4WG 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
S E C R E T

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/JD 113/23 APR//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE

MORI DocID: 1054613

RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B.

C.

Non responsive

(3) D. (C) INDONESIA - PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN EAST TIMOR

(3) E. (C) INDONESIA - CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE IN SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS

(3) F. (S) INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 15 - 22 APR 99

G. [redacted]

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

Non responsive

~~SECRET~~

NON RESPONSIVE

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

NOR responsive

(U) D. (C) INDONESIA - PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN EAST TIMOR: PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATION REPRESENTATIVES SIGNED A TRUCE AGREEMENT 21 APR IN DILI AT THE HOME OF BISHOP BELO TO REDUCE THE RECENT SPAT OF VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW. DOMINGOS SOARES WHO HEADS THE FORUM FOR DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE AND JOAO TAVERES, COMMANDER OF THE MILITIA FORCE SIGNED FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS WHILE LEANDRO ISAAC, COORDINATOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF EAST TIMOR SIGNED FOR THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUP. EAST TIMOR MILITARY COMMANDER COLONEL TONO SURATMAN, EAST TIMOR POLICE CHIEF COLONEL TIMBUL SILEAN, AND JOKO SIGIANTO FROM THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ALSO SIGNED THE AGREEMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL WIRANTO. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS FRAGILE TRUCE AGREEMENT WILL LAST VERY LONG AS THE SITUATION STILL REMAINS VOLATILE. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT SEVEN WERE KILLED IN EAST TIMOR SINCE THE TRUCE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED. THE AGREEMENT DID NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE AND THE MILITIAS REPORTEDLY WILL NOT SURRENDER THEIR ARMS. IT ALSO IS APPARENT THAT MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR ARE INCAPABLE OR UNWILLING TO INTERVENE TO STOP MILITIA ATTACKS AND INTIMIDATION PRACTICES AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

(U) E. (C) INDONESIA - CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE IN SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS: CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE BROKE OUT IN TWO AREAS OF THE SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS 20 APR. IN THE FIRST AREA, VIOLENCE BEGAN IN TUAL (0540S/13245E), KAI ISLANDS, 250NM (500KM) SOUTHEAST OF AMBON (0343S/12812E) WHEN A CHRISTIAN GOT INTO A DRUNKEN BRAWL WITH A MUSLIM. THE UNREST SPREAD TO LARUT (0539S/13259E) ON THE NEARBY ISLAND OF BIG KAI AND THEN BACK TO TUAL. REPORTS INDICATE UP TO 50 DEAD, 100 INJURED, AND 200 HOUSES BURNED AND MORE THAN 10,000 PEOPLE HAVE FLED TO TUAL. THE ARMED FORCES (TNI) SENT 1,000 TROOPS FROM AMBON TO THE KAI ISLANDS TO DEAL WITH UNREST. ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS, SOME CASUALTIES WERE SHOT BY TNI. THE SECOND AREA OF UNREST CENTERED ON NEIRA (0432S/12954E), BANDA ISLANDS, 90NM (160KM) SOUTH OF AMBON. CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS CLASHED LEAVING 4 DEAD AND 30 HOUSES BURNED. THE MUSLIMS ARE THE MAJORITY GROUP IN THE BANDA ISLANDS. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) VIOLENCE WILL CONTINUE IN THE MOLUCCAS AS TENSIONS BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS REMAIN HIGH. THE SLIGHTEST PROVOCATION BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS WILL LEAD TO FURTHER UNREST IN THE AREA. THE MUSLIMS IN THE KAI ISLANDS ARE NEW MIGRANTS FROM SULAWESI (0300S/12100E) AND AMBON AND HAVE OFTEN BEEN CRITICIZED BY THE LOCAL CHRISTIANS FOR BEING AGGRESSIVE BUSINESSMEN, ARROGANT AND DISRESPECTFUL OF LOCAL TRADITIONS. THE CAUSES BEHIND THE VIOLENCE MIRROR THE PAST AMBON RIOTS AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE MILITARY REGAINS CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

(U) F. (C) INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 15 - 22 APR 99, GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THE OVERALL LEVEL OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED OVER LAST WEEK. THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT

BALLOTING WILL BE DELAYED FROM JULY TO 12 SEP. PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS SIGNED A TRUCE AGREEMENT TO END THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR.
(KEYS ID)

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: NINE PRIVATE INDONESIAN BANKS SIGNED INVESTMENT AND PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS WITH THE CENTRAL BANK AND THE GOVERNMENT 15 APR AS PART OF AN AMBITIOUS BANK RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM. THE CONTRACTS, HOWEVER, CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT GAPS REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF RECAPITALIZATION NEEDED AND THE TERMS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REPLACEMENT BONDS. THE RUSH TO SIGN THE CONTRACTS WAS LIKELY TO COUNTER PERCEPTIONS THAT THE RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM WAS NOT PROGRESSING AS PLANNED AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, WOULD INFLUENCE INVESTOR'S CONFIDENCE. THE RECAPITALIZATION COST FOR THE NINE BANKS IS ESTIMATED TO BE $ 3.4 BILLION. THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK PREDICTS THAT INDONESIA WILL NOT SHOW ECONOMIC GROWTH UNTIL 2000, AS ITS RECOVERY WILL DEPEND UPON BOTH MACROECONOMICS AND POLITICAL STABILITY. IF INDONESIA'S POLITICAL STABILITY COLLAPSES, REFORM WILL BE DELAYED AND ECONOMIC GROWTH WILL STALL. THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR REMAINED AT RP 8,550/$1. (KEYS ID)

(S) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (TNI) COMMANDER, GENERAL WIRANTO, VISITED DILI, EAST TIMOR 20-21 APR TO MEET WITH LOCAL COMMUNITY AND MILITARY LEADERS IN RESPONSE TO THE RECENT RISE IN VIOLENCE. WIRANTO HELD A MEETING WITH PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS 20 APR, THEN MET WITH DILI ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP CARLOS F.X. BELO 21 APR. ALTHOUGH WIRANTO'S VISIT TO EAST TIMOR WAS A GOOD PUBLIC RELATIONS GESTURE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HIS VISIT ALONE WILL END THE UNREST AND VIOLENCE.
(KEYS ID)

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING WILL BE DELAYED FROM JULY TO 12 SEP. UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, JAMSHEED MARKER, STATED THAT THE 12 SEP DATE HAD BEEN SELECTED OUT OF SECURITY AND TRANSPARENCY CONCERNS, AND THE NEED FOR SUFFICIENT TIME TO GATHER ENOUGH RESOURCES, FUNDS, AND PERSONNEL. THE TOTAL UN COST IS ESTIMATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY $45 MILLION, WITH AN ON-SITE REQUIREMENT OF 4,500 PERSONNEL. THE DELAY WILL GIVE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA MORE TIME TO COME UP WITH A POST BALLOTING STRATEGY.
(KEYS ID)

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY OVER LAST WEEK. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT UNREST OCCURRED AT DILI (0833S/12434E), EAST TIMOR, WHEN PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS 17 APR. IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E), A "HOME-MADE" BOMB EXPLODED AT NATIONAL ISTIQLAL MOSQUE 19 APR. DEMONSTRATIONS DEVELOPED IN LHOKSEUMAWE (0510N/09708E), ACEH, AS VIOLENCE CONTINUED IN WEST KALIMANTAN (0054N/10900E), AND SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS (0540S/13245E). SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:
15 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN THREE TOWNS IN ACEH PROVINCE TO DEMAND A REFERENDUM.
15 APR WEST KALIMANTAN / ETHNIC CLASHES ERUPTED BETWEEN MADURESE SETTLERS AND LOCAL MALAYS AND DAYAKS.
15 APR JAKARTA / HUNDREDS FROM SEVERAL STUDENT GROUPS DEMONSTRATED AT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.
15 APR LACLUBAR DISTRICT, EAST TIMOR / PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS

AMBUSHED MEMBERS FROM A MILITARY DISTRICT COMMAND RESULTING IN ONE SECURITY MEMBER KILLED AND FIVE OTHERS INJURED.

16 APR ERMERA / CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE FALINTIL GUERRILLAS AND AN INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES TEAM RESULTED IN TWO GUERRILLAS KILLED.

17 APR DILI / PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS, HOLDING A RALLY ON THE GOVERNOR'S LAWN RESULTING IN REPORTS OF UP TO 30 KILLED.

18 APR BECORA, EAST TIMOR / VIOLENCE CONTINUED BETWEEN PRO-INDONESIA GROUPS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS RESULTING IN TWO DEATHS REPORTED.

18 APR SAMBAS / ARMED CLASHES BETWEEN SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND LOCAL RESIDENTS RESULTED IN FOUR PEOPLE KILLED.

19 APR KARIMUNTING VILLAGE, WEST KALIMANTAN / SECURITY FORCES MISTAKENEDLY OPENED FIRE ON ETHNIC MADURESE MIGRANTS AND LOCAL MALAYS, KILLING FOUR PEOPLE AND INJURING THREE.

19 APR JAKARTA / A "HOME-MADE" BOMB EXPLODED IN AN OFFICE COMPLEX LOCATED ON THE GROUND FLOOR OF JAKARTA'S NATIONAL AL-ISTIQLAL MOSQUE RESULTING IN SIX INJURIES AND NO DEATHS.

19 APR UJUNGPANDANG / A MOB ATTACKED A PRIMARY SCHOOL AND THE OFFICES OF THE INDONESIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH FOUNDATION IN RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL AL-ISTIQLAL MOSQUE BOMBING.

19 APR YOHYAKARTA / TWO MEN ON A MOTORCYCLE THREW FIRECRACKERS INTO A CHURCH.

20 APR JAKARTA / A BOMB THREAT OCCURRED AT A JAKARTA CATHEDRAL, LOCATED EXACTLY OPPOSITE FROM NATIONAL ISTIQLAL MOSQUE.

20 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / POLICE OPENED FIRE TO DISPERSE THOUSANDS OF PRO-SEPARATIST STUDENTS.

20 APR RIAU / SECURITY FORCES FIRED WARNING SHOTS TO DISPERSE HUNDREDS OF STUDENTS WHO STORMED A CALTEX INDONESIA HOUSING COMPLEX DEMANDING A SHARE OF OIL EARNINGS.

20 APR SIGLI, ACEH / THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED TO SHOW SOLIDARITY FOR VICTIMS OF EARLIER CLASHES WITH AUTHORITIES.

20 APR BANDA ISLANDS / CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM FIGHTING BROKE OUT LEAVING FOUR DEAD AND 30 HOUSES BURNED.

21 APR KAI ISLANDS / MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN VIOLENCE OCCURRED IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS, RESULTING IN 50 DEAD, HUNDREDS INJURED, AND 200 HUNDRED HOUSES BURNED. (KEYS ID)

(S) (C) AS ETHNIC UNREST IN WEST KALIMANTAN SUBSIDES, AN OUTBREAK OF RELIGIOUS UNREST RESUMED IN THE MOLUCCAS. THE CAUSES BEHIND THE VIOLENCE MIRROR THE PAST AMBON RIOTS AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE MILITARY REGAINS CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. IN EAST TIMOR, UNREST AND VIOLENCE LIKELY WILL CONTINUE AS THE SITUATION STILL REMAINS VOLATILE.

(S) (C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS SIGNED A TRUCE AGREEMENT IN DILI 21 APR, TO END THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR. BOTH SIDES PLEDGED TO STOP MUTUAL ATTACKS, VIOLENCE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, DID NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE AND THE MILITIAS REPORTEDLY WILL NOT SURRENDER THE ARMS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS TRUCE AGREEMENT WILL LAST VERY LONG AS IT IS APPARENT THAT THE MILITARY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR ARE INCAPABLE OR UNWILLING TO STOP MILITIA ATTACKS AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. (KEYS ID)

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

22-23APR UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (MINISTERIAL LEVEL)

~~SECRET~~

30APR	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS AGREEMENT SIGNING CEREMONY (ON EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE)
12MAY	TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING 1ST ANNIVERSARY
07JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
JUL	UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE ON EAST TIMOR
12JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
28AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
AUG-OCT	NEW MPR TO DECIDE ON EAST TIMOR STATUS
12SEP	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING
28OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13NOV	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
07DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT)

(KEYS ID)

(U) (S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5

MORI DocID: 1054613

09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18

(KEYS ID)

(S) WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ONLY 45 DAYS AWAY, UNREST AND VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT INDONESIA LIKELY WILL CONTINUE AT THE SAME LEVEL DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. ATTENTION AND SECURITY WILL START TO FOCUS ON JAKARTA, WHICH WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES TO RESPOND TO UNREST IN THE OUTLYING AREAS. VIOLENCE AND UNREST LIKELY WILL CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR DESPITE THE SIGNING OF THE TRUCE AGREEMENT. UNLESS BOTH PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE VOLUNTARILY DISARM, THE TRUCE AGREEMENT HAS LITTLE CHANCE OF HOLDING. (OSA MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

~~SECRET~~

25 APR	AUSTRALIA/ NEW ZEALAND/ COOK ISLANDS/ SAMOA/TONGA	(U)	ANZAC DAY (1915)
25 APR	NORTH KOREA	(U)	FOUNDING OF KOREAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (1932)/KIM IL-SUNG GUERRILLA UNIT ACTIVATION DAY (1915)
29 APR	JAPAN	(U)	EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U)	CONSTITUTION DAY
01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U)	LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS
03 MAY	JAPAN	(U)	CONSTITUTION DAY (1947)
04 MAY	PRC	(U)	YOUTH DAY (1919)
04 MAY	TONGA	(U)	CROWN PRINCE'S BIRTHDAY (1948)
05 MAY	PALAU	(U)	SENIOR CITIZEN'S DAY
05 MAY	JAPAN/ROK	(U)	CHILDREN'S DAY
05 MAY	THAILAND	(U)	CORONATION DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U)	CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U)	CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U)	PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U)	LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U)	GOSPEL DAY

C. (C) FOREIGN VIP TRAVEL:

27-03 MAY	THAILAND	(U)	THAI PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT CHINA.
05-07 MAY	CHINA	(U)	SOUTH AFRICA PRESIDENT TO VISIT CHINA.

5. (U) [redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//

b(3)

DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

MORI DocID: 1054663

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183200561
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990430
TOR: 124552
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904301100
MHFNO: 99 5280696
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #8441 1200654
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0334 1200654
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 23 Oct 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~SECRET~~

ENCL (8)

~~SECRET~~

RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE

~~SECRET~~

MORI DocID: 1054663

RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
~~RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU~~
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON

SECRET

RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 301100Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOU4WG 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
S E C R E T

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA0120/30 APR//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE

MORI DocID: 1054663

NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B.

C.

D.

E.

NOT RESPONSIVE

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

NOT RESPONSIVE

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE

(S) C. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 22 - 29 APR: ETHNIC CHINESE-INDONESIANS PREPARE TO LEAVE PRIOR TO 7 JUN GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA PROPOSES TO DIVIDE THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA AND MALUKU. IN EAST TIMOR, TRIPARTITE REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AN AUTONOMY PLAN AGREEMENT 23 APR.

(S) (G) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: ETHNIC CHINESE-INDONESIANS ARE PREPARING TO LEAVE INDONESIA PRIOR TO THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS 7 JUN. CHINESE IN INODONESIA ARE PURCHASING AIRLINE TICKETS TO GET OUT OF INDONESIA BEFORE THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS, AND REPORTEDLY ALL FLIGHTS FROM INDONESIA TO THE US, SINGAPORE, AND AUSTRALIA ARE COMPLETELY BOOKED BETWEEN 15 - 31 MAY. THE CHINESE FEAR A BREAKDOWN IN SOCIAL ORDER MAY BE USED AS A PRETEXT FOR VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE BUSINESSES PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ELECTIONS AND, THEREFORE, ARE HESITANT TO INVEST AGAIN IN INDONESIA. THE STABILITY OF THE RUPIAH IS AN INDICATION OF A DEAD MARKET. INVESTOR'S CONFIDENCE, HOWEVER, WILL NOT BE RESTORED QUICKLY AS THERE WILL REMAIN HIGH LEVELS OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY UNTIL THE

NOVEMBER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR INCREASED SLIGHTLY TO RP 8,200/$1.00.

(C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (TNI) REITERATED 28 APR ITS COMMITMENT TO INTERNAL REFORM, SETTING SEVEN MAIN AGENDAS THAT WERE DESIGNED TO IMPROVE ITS TARNISHED IMAGE. THE SEVEN MAIN AGENDAS ARE INTENDED TO FOCUS ON IMPROVING DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, POSTURE, EDUCATION, TRAINING, ETHICS, AND LEADERSHIP. THE TNI ALSO STATED THAT IT WAS PRESENTLY CONDUCTING INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE REFORMS, WHICH ARE BEING DONE CONCEPTUALLY, SYSTEMATICALLY, AND GRADUALLY, WITH A CLEAR AGENDA, PRIORITIES, AND CONTROL. THESE REFORM MEASURES APPEAR TO BE "COSMETIC" IN NATURE AND ARE MERELY DESIGNED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION. IT WILL LIKELY HAVE NO AFFECT ON THEIR FUTURE PERFORMANCE OR REACTION DURING PERIODS OF CRISIS.

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA IS PROPOSING TO DIVIDE THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA INTO THREE NEW PROVINCES AND MALUKU INTO TWO NEW PROVINCES AFTER THE 7 JUN GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE PROPOSAL WILL GRANT MORE AUTONOMY TO THE NEW PROVINCES TO STIMULATE GREATER GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE REGIONS. IN IRIAN JAYA, THE PROPOSAL IS LIKELY THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO WEAKEN THE STRENGTH AND UNITY OF THE PRO-SEPARATIST REBEL GROUP, FREE PAPUA ORGANIZATION.

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: THE NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATIONS REMAINED THE SAME AS LAST WEEK, BUT OVERALL UNREST DECREASED. DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED IN ACEH (0510N/09708E) WHILE ETHNIC COMMUNAL VIOLENCE RESUMED IN TUAL (0540S/13245E), KAI ISLANDS. UNREST IN EAST TIMOR (0833S/12434E) CONTINUES DESPITE THE SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT. IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E), NUMEROUS BOMB THREATS WERE REPORTED. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:

22 APR JAKRTA / AN AIRPORT TERMINAL AND 2 AIRCRAFT WERE TARGETS OF A BOMB THREAT. NO BOMB WAS FOUND.

22 APR SINGKAWANG (0540N/10900E) / ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND ANOTHER 4 SUFFERED GUNSHOT WOUNDS AFTER SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED A CROWD FROM BURNING THE HOMES OF MADURESE PEOPLE.

22 APR TUAL / AN ETHNIC CLASH BETWEEN LOCAL RESIDENTS ERUPTED RESULTING IN 2 DEATHS AND 22 INJURIES.

23 APR SUAI (0921S/12517E) / A CLASH OCCURRED BETWEEN A PRO-INTEGRATION GROUP AND A PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUP RESULTING IN 1 PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS INJURED AND 3 HOUSES BURNED.

23 APR TUAL / CROWDS FROM RIVAL COMMUNITIES TOOK TO THE STREETS AND ATTACKED THE SECURITY FORCES TRYING TO DISPERSE THE CROWD.

25 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / A CROWD OF THOUSANDS HELD A FREE ACEH GATHERING AND BURNED 2 BUSES BELONGING TO MOBIL OIL.

25 APR YOGYAKARTA (0748S/11022E) / SUPPORTERS OF UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) ATTACKED MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY-STRUGGLE (PDIP) RESULTING IN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF INJURIES.

25 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / SEPARATIST SYMPATHIZERS HELD A RALLY NEAR MOBIL OIL'S OPERATIONS BASE.

26 APR ERMERA (0845S/12523E), EAST TIMOR / THOUSANDS OF EAST TIMORESE RALLIED TO PLEDGE THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO INDONESIA.

26 APR BALIBO (0858S/12503E) / HUNDREDS OF PRO-INDONESIA SUPPORTERS GATHERED TO DECLARE THEIR SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA RETAINING CONTROL OF THE DISPUTED TERRITORY OF EAST TIMOR.

28 APR MALANG (0759S/11237E) / UNIVERSITY STUDENTS STAGED A PROTEST AGAINST PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S VISIT.

28 APR CIREBON ()644S/10834E) / FIGHTING BROKE OUT BETWEEN RESIDENTS LEAVING 13 PEOPLE INJURED AND 12 HOUSES DAMAGED.
28 APR MEULABOH (0409N/09608E), ACEH / A CROWD DEMANDED COMPENSATION FOR COMMUNITY LAND AND BURNED DOWN 10 HOUSES BELONGING TO EMPLOYEES OF A RUBBER PLANTATION.

(C) VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR AS THE PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED 21 APR DOES NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE. UNREST IN TUAL, SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF SUBSIDING AS THE MILITARY IS SLOWLY GAINING CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. THE ACEHNESE WILL CONTINUE TO VOICE THEIR DEMANDS AND APPLY PRESSURE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN HOPES OF GETTING A REACTION FROM JAKARTA. DEMONSTRATIONS WILL START TO INCREASE IN JAKARTA WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ONLY 5 WEEKS AWAY.

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(C) EAST TIMOR: TRIPARTITE REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AN AGREEMENT 23 APR TO PRESENT AN AUTONOMY PLAN TO THE EAST TIMORESE. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SIGNED AND PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED MAY 5-6. THE UN WILL SEND A 40 PERSON ADVANCE TEAM SHORTLY AFTER THE MAY SIGNING. THE POLLING IS SET FOR 8 AUG AND WILL INVOLVE 200 POLLING CENTERS AND NUMEROUS SUPPORT ELEMENTS. DISARMING MILITIA GROUPS IS VIEWED CRITICAL IN ORDER FOR THE PROCESS TO SUCCEED. IF THE EAST TIMORESE ARE CONVINCED THE MILITIA GROUPS WILL BE UNABLE TO SEEK RETRIBUTION, THEY WILL LIKELY VOTE TO REJECT THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL.

(C) ACEH: INCREASED SEPARATIST UNREST AND DESTRUCTION OF MOBIL OIL PROPERTY NEAR LHOKSEUMAWE, ACEH LED MOBIL TO ORDER THE PRECAUTIONARY EVACUATION OF ITS EMPLOYEES' DEPENDENTS 27 APR. THE DEPARTURE OF MOBIL DEPENDENTS COINCIDES WITH REPORTS OF DEPLOYMENTS OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO THE PROVINCE AND THE LAUNCH OF AN OPERATION BY THE SECURITY FORCES TO CLEANSE THE AREA OF PRO-SEPARATIST FLAGS AND GRAFFITI. MOBIL INCREASINGLY FINDS ITSELF THE MOST VISIBLE TARGET IN A NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE DISPUTE BETWEEN ACTIVISTS AND GRAFFITI. MOBIL INCREASINGLY FINDS ITSELF THE MOST VISIBLE TARGET IN A NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE DISPUTE BETWEEN ACTIVISTS ACEHNESE AND JAKARTA. THIS DISPUTE IS EXPLOITED BY SEPARATISTS SEEKING TO PORTRAY MOBIL AS BEING COMPLICIT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN ACEH FOR THE LAST THREE DECADES. MOBIL EXECUTIVES NOTED THAT NO EVIDENCE EXITS THAT AMERICAN CITIZENS ARE BEING BLAMED OR TARGETED.

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

5-6 MAY*	UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE TALKS AGREEMENT SIGNING CEREMONY (ON EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM)
12 MAY	TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING 1ST ANNIVERSARY
21 MAY*	INDONESIAN SCHOOLS DISMISSED FOR THE SUMMER
7 JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26 JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
12 JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17 JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17 AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
8 AUG*	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28 AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
29 AUG*	NEW MPR ANNOUNCES RESULTS OF EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28 OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
6 NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10 NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12 NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR)

~~SECRET~~

MASSACRE
13 NOV 1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
7 DEC 24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
1 JAN EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT)
* DENOTES ADDITION OR CHANGE

(S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24

(S) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION WILL REMAIN FRAGILE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS AND MAY DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER AFTER THE MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 28 OCT. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD OPENING 18 MAY AND THE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN WEST KALIMANTAN AND MALUKU, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAY, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR. ALTHOUGH AN EAST TIMOR AUTONOMY BALLOTING PLAN WAS REACHED FOR 8 AUG, THE UN'S ROLE WILL LIKELY BE IMPACTED BY ACTS OF INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS. (OSA MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

NON responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR	BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR	INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

29 APR	JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY

MORI DocID: 1054663

01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS.
03 MAY	JAPAN	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY (1947)
04 MAY	PRC	(U) YOUTH DAY (1919)
04 MAY	TONGA	(U) CROWN PRINCE'S BIRTHDAY (1948)
05 MAY	PALAU	(U) SENIOR CITIZEN'S DAY
05 MAY	JAPAN/ROK	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
05 MAY	THAILAND	(U) CORONATION DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U) GOSPEL DAY
14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)

[redacted]

NON Responsive

b(2)

5. (U) [redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED
TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE
POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Review entire document

DOCUMENT ID: 183207777
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990502
TOR: 094202
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904301105
MHFNO: 99 5295405
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #9822 1201547
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0694 1201543
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RUFRPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25/2022
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

ENCL 9

MORI DocID: 1054597

RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE

RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUFRJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON

~~SECRET~~

RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 301105Z APR 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNJTF/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 4FW SEYMOU4WG 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: PARTIAL

SEGMENT 1 OF 4 MISSING

C. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 22 - 29 APR: ETHNIC CHINESE INDONESIANS PREPARE TO LEAVE PRIOR TO 7 JUN GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA PROPOSES TO DIVIDE THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA AND MALUKU. IN EAST TIMOR, TRIPARTITE REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AN AUTONOMY PLAN AGREEMENT 23 APR.

SECRET

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: ETHNIC CHINESE-INDONESIANS ARE PREPARING TO LEAVE INDONESIA PRIOR TO THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS 7 JUN. CHINESE IN INODONESIA ARE PURCHASING AIRLINE TICKETS TO GET OUT OF INDONESIA BEFORE THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS, AND REPORTEDLY ALL FLIGHTS FROM INDONESIA TO THE US, SINGAPORE, AND AUSTRALIA ARE COMPLETELY BOOKED BETWEEN 15 - 31 MAY. THE CHINESE FEAR A BREAKDOWN IN SOCIAL ORDER MAY BE USED AS A PRETEXT FOR VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE BUSINESSES PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ELECTIONS AND, THEREFORE, ARE HESITANT TO INVEST AGAIN IN INDONESIA. THE STABILITY OF THE RUPIAH IS AN INDICATION OF A DEAD MARKET. INVESTOR'S CONFIDENCE, HOWEVER, WILL NOT BE RESTORED QUICKLY AS THERE WILL REMAIN HIGH LEVELS OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY UNTIL THE NOVEMBER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR INCREASED SLIGHTLY TO RP 8,200/$1.00.

(C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (TNI) REITERATED 28 APR ITS COMMITMENT TO INTERNAL REFORM, SETTING SEVEN MAIN AGENDAS THAT WERE DESIGNED TO IMPROVE ITS TARNISHED IMAGE. THE SEVEN MAIN AGENDAS ARE INTENDED TO FOCUS ON IMPROVING DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, POSTURE, EDUCATION, TRAINING, ETHICS, AND LEADERSHIP. THE TNI ALSO STATED THAT IT WAS PRESENTLY CONDUCTING INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE REFORMS, WHICH ARE BEING DONE CONCEPTUALLY, SYSTEMATICALLY, AND GRADUALLY, WITH A CLEAR AGENDA, PRIORITIES, AND CONTROL. THESE REFORM MEASURES APPEAR TO BE "COSMETIC" IN NATURE AND ARE MERELY DESIGNED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION. IT WILL LIKELY HAVE NO AFFECT ON THEIR FUTURE PERFORMANCE OR REACTION DURING PERIODS OF CRISIS.

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA IS PROPOSING TO DIVIDE THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA INTO THREE NEW PROVINCES AND MALUKU INTO TWO NEW PROVINCES AFTER THE 7 JUN GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE PROPOSAL WILL GRANT MORE AUTONOMY TO THE NEW PROVINCES TO STIMULATE GREATER GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE REGIONS. IN IRIAN JAYA, THE PROPOSAL IS LIKELY THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO WEAKEN THE STRENGTH AND UNITY OF THE PRO-SEPARATIST REBEL GROUP, FREE PAPUA ORGANIZATION.

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: THE NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATIONS REMAINED THE SAME AS LAST WEEK, BUT OVERALL UNREST DECREASED. DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED IN ACEH (0510N/09708E) WHILE ETHNIC COMMUNAL VIOLENCE RESUMED IN TUAL (0540S/13245E), KAI ISLANDS. UNREST IN EAST TIMOR (0833S/12434E) CONTINUES DESPITE THE SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT. IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E), NUMEROUS BOMB THREATS WERE REPORTED. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:

22 APR JAKRTA / AN AIRPORT TERMINAL AND 2 AIRCRAFT WERE TARGETS OF A BOMB THREAT. NO BOMB WAS FOUND.

22 APR SINGKAWANG (0540N/10900E) / ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND ANOTHER 4 SUFFERED GUNSHOT WOUNDS AFTER SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED A CROWD FROM BURNING THE HOMES OF MADURESE PEOPLE.

22 APR TUAL / AN ETHNIC CLASH BETWEEN LOCAL RESIDENTS ERUPTED RESULTING IN 2 DEATHS AND 22 INJURIES.

23 APR SUAI (0921S/12517E) / A CLASH OCCURRED BETWEEN A PRO-INTEGRATION GROUP AND A PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUP RESULTING IN 1 PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS INJURED AND 3 HOUSES BURNED.

23 APR TUAL / CROWDS FROM RIVAL COMMUNITIES TOOK TO THE STREETS AND ATTACKED THE SECURITY FORCES TRYING TO DISPERSE THE CROWD.

25 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / A CROWD OF THOUSANDS HELD A FREE ACEH GATHERING AND BURNED 2 BUSES BELONGING TO MOBIL OIL.

25 APR YOGYAKARTA (0748S/11022E) / SUPPORTERS OF UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) ATTACKED MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY-STRUGGLE (PDIP) RESULTING IN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF INJURIES.
25 APR LHOKSEUMAWE / SEPARATIST SYMPATHIZERS HELD A RALLY NEAR MOBIL OIL'S OPERATIONS BASE.
26 APR ERMERA (0845S/12523E), EAST TIMOR / THOUSANDS OF EAST TIMORESE RALLIED TO PLEDGE THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO INDONESIA.
26 APR BALIBO (0858S/12503E) / HUNDREDS OF PRO-INDONESIA SUPPORTERS GATHERED TO DECLARE THEIR SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA RETAINING CONTROL OF THE DISPUTED TERRITORY OF EAST TIMOR.
28 APR MALANG (0759S/11237E) / UNIVERSITY STUDENTS STAGED A PROTEST AGAINST PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S VISIT.
28 APR CIREBON ()644S/10834E) / FIGHTING BROKE OUT BETWEEN RESIDENTS LEAVING 13 PEOPLE INJURED AND 12 HOUSES DAMAGED.
28 APR MEULABOH (0409N/09608E), ACEH / A CROWD DEMANDED COMPENSATION FOR COMMUNITY LAND AND BURNED DOWN 10 HOUSES BELONGING TO EMPLOYEES OF A RUBBER PLANTATION.

(U) (c) VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR AS THE PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED 21 APR DOES NOT CALL FOR DISARMAMENT ON EITHER SIDE. UNREST IN TUAL, SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF SUBSIDING AS THE MILITARY IS SLOWLY GAINING CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. THE ACEHNESE WILL CONTINUE TO VOICE THEIR DEMANDS AND APPLY PRESSURE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN HOPES OF GETTING A REACTION FROM JAKARTA. DEMONSTRATIONS WILL START TO INCREASE IN JAKARTA WITH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ONLY 5 WEEKS AWAY.

(S) (c) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(S) (c) EAST TIMOR: TRIPARTITE REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AN AGREEMENT 23 APR TO PRESENT AN AUTONOMY PLAN TO THE EAST TIMORESE. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SIGNED AND PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED MAY 5-6. THE UN WILL SEND A 40 PERSON ADVANCE TEAM SHORTLY AFTER THE MAY SIGNING. THE POLLING IS SET FOR 8 AUG AND WILL INVOLVE 200 POLLING CENTERS AND NUMEROUS SUPPORT ELEMENTS. DISARMING MILITIA GROUPS IS VIEWED CRITICAL IN ORDER FOR THE PROCESS TO SUCCEED. IF THE EAST TIMORESE ARE CONVINCED THE MILITIA GROUPS WILL BE UNABLE TO SEEK RETRIBUTION, THEY WILL LIKELY VOTE TO REJECT THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL.

(U) (c) ACEH: INCREASED SEPARATIST UNREST AND DESTRUCTION OF MOBIL OIL PROPERTY NEAR LHOKSEUMAWE, ACEH LED MOBIL TO ORDER THE PRECAUTIONARY EVACUATION OF ITS EMPLOYEES' DEPENDENTS 27 APR. THE DEPARTURE OF MOBIL DEPENDENTS COINCIDES WITH REPORTS OF DEPLOYMENTS OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO THE PROVINCE AND THE LAUNCH OF AN OPERATION BY THE SECURITY FORCES TO CLEANSE THE AREA OF PRO-SEPARATIST FLAGS

SEGMENT 3 OF 4 MISSING

Not relevant to this case

~~SECRET~~

NON Responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

29 APR	BURMA	(U) FULL MOON OF KASON (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
30 APR	INDIA	(U) VESAK (BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN THERAVADA TRADITION)

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

29 APR	JAPAN	(U) EMPEROR HIROHITO'S BIRTHDAY (1901)/ MIDORI-NO-HI (GREEN DAY)
01 MAY	MARSHALL ISLANDS	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
01 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) LTTE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PREMADAS
03 MAY	JAPAN	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY (1947)
04 MAY	PRC	(U) YOUTH DAY (1919)
04 MAY	TONGA	(U) CROWN PRINCE'S BIRTHDAY (1948)
05 MAY	PALAU	(U) SENIOR CITIZEN'S DAY
05 MAY	JAPAN/ROK	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
05 MAY	THAILAND	(U) CORONATION DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U) GOSPEL DAY
14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)

C.
27-03
05-07
5. (U

NON Responsive

b(7)

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED
TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE
POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183235636
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990507
TOR: 031220
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905071100
MHFNO: 99 5361483
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCC #8772 1270653
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0222 1270653
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RUWHIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 APR 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

ENCL (10)

MORI DocID: 1054600

RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX
RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE

RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RULYJPX T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RULYGNA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW

SECRET

RHHIPAA T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 071100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA127/7 MAY//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (S) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS
N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE

SECRET

MORI DocID: 1054600

NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B. [redacted]

C. [redacted]

D. (C) INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT SIGNED 5 MAY

E. [redacted]

F. [redacted]

G. [redacted]

(U) Non Responsive

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

Non Responsive

SECRET

[redacted]

NON Responsive

C. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 29 APR - 06 MAY 99: DESPITE THE SIGNING OF THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT 5 MAY, VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR, AND MAY EVEN ESCALATE LEADING UP TO THE 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOTING DATE. THE UP-COMING 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, THE 28 OCT PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION DATE, AS WELL AS CERTAIN KEY ANNIVERSARY DATES, WILL ALSO CREATE SEVERAL ENVIRONMENTS FOR FURTHER UNREST AND VIOLENCE. THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS WILL LIKELY BE A VERY TUMULTUOUS AND VIOLENT PERIOD FOR INDONESIA (KEYS ID)

(C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH INCREASED TO RP 8,000/$1.00. THE ECONOMY REMAINS WEAK AND IS UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PERIOD 28 AUG-28 OCT. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) RECENTLY CONCLUDED IN ITS ANNUAL REVIEW OF INDONESIA THAT THE MACROECONOMICS SITUATION WOULD REMAIN DIFFICULT UNTIL POLITICAL TRANSITION WAS FURTHER ADVANCED. THE WORLD BANK (WB) WAS REPORTED TO HAVE DELAYED DISBURSEMENT OF A $600 MILLION (USD) LOAN UNTIL AFTER THE JUNE ELECTIONS OUT OF CONCERN THAT THE FUNDS MIGHT BE SIPHONED OFF FOR POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS. INDONESIA'S PERSISTENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO COMPLICATE THE NATION'S CURRENT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY. (KEYS ID)

(C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: REPORTING INDICATES THAT IN MAR 99, INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO ASKED PRESIDENT HABIBIE TO FIRE INDONESIAN STATE INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (BAKIN) CHIEF LTG (RET) ZAINI MAULANI, EFFECTIVE 1 APR. UPON HEARING THIS, MAULANI IMMEDIATELY OFFERED HIS RETIREMENT TO THE PRESIDENT. HOWEVER, HABIBIE REFUSED TO ACCEPT MAULANI'S RETIREMENT AND ASKED HIM TO STAY ON FOR ONE MORE YEAR. HABIBIE REPORTEDLY INFORMED WIRANTO THAT MAULANI WOULD STAY ON AS BAKIN CHIEF FOR ANOTHER YEAR DESPITE HIS OBJECTION. MEANWHILE, OTHER REPORTING INDICATES THAT WIRANTO IS STILL PLANNING TO REPLACE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF (KASAD) GEN SUBAGYO, BUT WILL DELAY THE MOVE UNTIL AFTER THE JUNE ELECTIONS. GEN SUBAGYO WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED TO RETIRE 1 APR TO BECOME AMBASSADOR TO MALAYSIA. WIRANTO FURTHER STATED THAT LTG BAMBANG YUDHOYONO WILL LIKELY REPLACE SUBAGYO AS HEAD OF KASAD. THE DELAY IN REPLACING THESE TWO KEY POSITIONS MAY INDICATE THAT WIRANTO IS GRADUALLY LOSING HIS INFLUENCE WITHIN THE GOI AND TNI. IT MAY ALSO SIGNAL THAT WIRANTO IS BECOMING MORE INDECISIVE AND LESS CONFIDENCE IN HIS ACTIONS. HIS BACK-DOOR ATTEMPT TO FIRE MAULANI WILL LIKELY ADD FURTHER STRAIN TO AN ALREADY BAD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TNI AND BAKIN. WIRANTO WILL LIKELY REFRAIN FROM MAKING ANY SENIOR OFFICER CHANGES WITHIN THE TNI UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS OUT OF FEAR THAT IT COULD WEAKEN HIS GRIP ON TNI AND ANY POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS. (KEYS ID)

(C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: GENERAL

ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) CHAIRMAN RUDINI STATED THAT THE VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD FOR ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, AND MALUKU WOULD BE EXTENDED UNTIL THE THIRD WEEK OF MAY. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT 69 PERCENT OF INDONESIANS HAVE REGISTERED FOR THE 7 JUN ELECTION AND EXPECT THE NUMBER TO SURPASS 70 PERCENT BY 6 MAY, THE LAST DAY OF THE VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD. ACCORDING TO RUDINI, CLAIMS THAT INDONESIANS DID NOT WANT THE ELECTION TO GO ON WERE PROVEN UNTRUE BY THE MERE FACT THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE HAD REGISTERED TO VOTE. THE VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD EXTENSION FOR ACEH, MALUKU, AND IRIAN JAYA WERE LIKELY DUE TO THE RECENT OUTBREAK OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE. DESPITE THE HIGH VOTER REGISTRATION NUMBERS, THE KEY INDICATOR WILL BE THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF VOTER TURN-OUTS ON ELECTION DAY. GROWING UNREST AND VIOLENCE MAY DISCOURAGE OR PREVENT SOME INDONESIANS FROM VOTING IN THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) AND TNI WILL ATTEMPT TO ENSURE A SMOOTH AND PEACEFUL ELECTION. HOWEVER, THEIR RESOURCES WILL BE STRETCHED VERY THIN DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD WITH SEVERAL SIMULTANEOUS UNREST IN OUTER AREAS SUCH AS ACEH, EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, MALUKU, AND WEST KALIMANTAN. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS INCREASED THIS WEEK THROUGHOUT INDONESIA. UNREST INCREASED IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E) AND THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E) AS WELL AS DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS IN ACEH (0510N/09708E). SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING: DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT: 29 APR KUTA (0855S/11617E), BALI / A MOB TORCHED SOME STREET TRADERS' STALLS CAUSING A 500 MAN POLICE FORCE TO DEPLOYED TO THE AREA.
30 APR ATABAI (0848S/12512E), EAST TIMOR / AUSTRALIAN JOURNALISTS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS ATTENDED A PRO-INTEGRATION RALLY WITH THEIR TRANSLATOR. THEY LEFT THE RALLY AFTER THEIR TRANSLATOR WAS BEATEN AND RECEIVED DEATH THREATS. 30 APR ERMERA (0845S/12523E), EAST TIMOR / THE BODIES OF 11 MURDER VICTIMS WERE FOUND IN A DRAINAGE DITCH. REPORTS SAY THE VICTIMS WERE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS.
1 MAY JEPARA (0740S/10914E) / FIVE PEOPLE KILLED AND SIX INJURED IN A PHYSICAL ENCOUNTER BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP).
2 MAY JAKARTA / A THOUSAND NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) SUPPORTERS CONDUCTED A VEHICLE PROGRESSION. 3 MAY ERMERA / FIVE INDONESIA POLICE KILLED IN TWO SEPARATE INCIDENTS. 3 MAY LHOKSEUMAWE (0510N/09708E) / AT LEAST 39 PEOPLE KILLED AND SEVERAL INJURED WHEN TNI FORCES OPENED FIRE ON DEMONSTRATORS TRYING TO MARCH TO A BATTALION HEADQUARTERS IN PROTEST OF ``BRUTAL SWEEPS'' IN LOCAL VILLAGES OF TNI LOOKING FOR TWO SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY KIDNAPPED.
3 MAY CIREBON (0644S/10834E) / A CLASH BETWEEN VILLAGERS RESULTED IN 94 HOUSES DESTROYED INCLUDING A HEALTH CENTER, VILLAGE OFFICES AND A STATE PRIMARY SCHOOL. 3 MAY TUAL (0540S/13245E) / REFUGEES STAGE AN ATTACK AFTER THEIR VILLAGE WAS BURNED KILLING ONE AND INJURING THREE OTHERS. 4 MAY DILI (0833S/12534E) / STUDENTS AND YOUTHS DEMONSTRATED OUTSIDE OF UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR IN FAVOR OF INDEPENDENCE.
4 MAY JAKARTA / THOUSANDS HELD AN ANTI-COMMUNIST RALLY AT A GOVERNMENT BUILDING. 4 MAY JAKARTA / STUDENTS STAGED A DEMONSTRATION AT THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION DEMANDING AN INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL OF FORMER PRESIDENT SUHARTO. 5 MAY IRIAN JAYA (0232S/14042E) / A GROUP OF OPM (FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT) REBELS KILLED THREE MEN AND TOOK 11 HOSTAGES. THE REBELS ARE REPORTEDLY HEADING TOWARDS THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA BORDER AND ARE BEING PURSUED BY TNI HELICOPTERS.

(U)

(C) SOCIAL UNREST RELATED TO THE ELECTIONS IS BECOMING EVIDENT IN JAKARTA WITH POLITICAL PARTIES CLASHING. DEMONSTRATIONS

AND UNREST WILL INCREASE AS THE ELECTIONS GET CLOSER. WITH TNI FIRING ON SEPARATISTS IN ACEH, INDONESIA HAS GIVEN THE SEPARATISTS ANOTHER REASON TO CONTINUE THEIR FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE. (KEYS ID)

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(C) ACEH: VIOLENCE RE-IGNITED IN LHOKSEUMAWE, ACEH, 3 MAY, AS INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) PERSONNEL OPENED FIRE ON APPROXIMATELY 1,000 PRO-SEPARATIST DEMONSTRATORS PROTESTING AGAINST PAST TNI HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. AS MANY AS 30 DEMONSTRATORS WERE KILLED AND OVER 100 INJURED DURING THIS CLASH. TNI STATED THAT THEY ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE WHEN THEIR TROOPS WERE ATTACKED BY A LARGE VIOLENT CROWD.

(C) EAST TIMOR: THE VIOLENT UNREST MANY FEARED WOULD OCCUR IN EAST TIMOR DURING THE 1-2 MAY WEEKEND FAILED TO MATERIALIZE. DESPITE THEIR THREATS TO DO SO, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS DID NOT HOLD ANY MAJOR RALLIES, NOR DID THEY ENGAGE IN ANY MAJOR ATTACKS AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS OR SUPPORTERS. MANY HAD FEARED THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WOULD RESORT TO VIOLENCE IN A LAST-MINUTE ATTEMPT TO DERAIL THE 5 MAY UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT SIGNING. THE UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WAS FINALLY SIGNED 5 MAY IN NEW YORK BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN, INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALI ALATAS, AND PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER JAIME GAMA. THIS AGREEMENT WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR A 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOTING, WHICH WILL ALLOW EAST TIMORESE TO VOTE FOR EITHER AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. MEANWHILE, REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE TNI MAY HAVE CONDUCTED A JOINT MILITARY OPERATION WITH THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WHEN THEY ALLEGEDLY CONDUCTED A SEARCH MISSION TO LOCATE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. TO FURTHER LEGITIMATIZE THE DIRECT BALLOTING PROCESS AND AS A GESTURE OF GOOD FAITH, THE GOI MAY SOON RELEASE PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBEL LEADER XANANA GUSMAO FROM HOUSE ARREST IN JAKARTA. (KEYS ID)

(S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12

~~SECRET~~

26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24
30 APR-06 MAY 99	24	9	14

(KEYS ID)

(S) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL SITUATION WILL REMAIN FRAGILE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS AND MAY DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER AFTER THE MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 28 OCT. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD OFFICIALLY OPENING 18 MAY AND THE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN WEST KALIMANTAN AND MALUKU, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR. ALTHOUGH THE UN EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED 5 MAY, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL LIKELY STEP UP THEIR ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS IN AN EFFORT TO INFLUENCE THE 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOTING OUTCOME. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

D. (C) INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT SIGNED 5 MAY: UN SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN, INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALI ALATAS, AND PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER JAIME GAMA SIGNED THE UN EAST TIMOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT 5 MAY. THIS AGREEMENT OFFICIALLY PAVES THE WAY TO AN 8 AUG UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING WHICH WILL ALLOW EAST TIMORESE TO VOTE FOR AUTONOMY. IF THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE IS REJECTED BY THE MAJORITY OF EAST TIMORESE, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) MAY GRANT EAST TIMOR FULL INDEPENDENCE 1 JAN 2000. THIS TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT CONCLUDES MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS. (KEYS ID)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL LIKELY INCREASE THEIR INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT ACTIVITIES TO DELAY THE DIRECT BALLOTING DATE OR INFLUENCE ITS OUTCOME. THIS WILL LIKELY INCREASE UNREST AND VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR AS PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES CLASH WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS. THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) IS UNLIKELY TO INTERVENE TO STOP THE EXPECTED VIOLENCE. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)



NON responsive

~~SECRET~~



NOT Responsive

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

NSW responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

---

06 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) CORREGIDOR DAY
11 MAY	FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
11 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	PHILIPPINES	(U) LOCAL ELECTIONS
12 MAY	TUVALU	(U) GOSPEL DAY
14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)
16 MAY	BANGLADESH	(U) FARAKKA RESISTANCE DAY
17 MAY	NAURU	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
17 MAY	PAKISTAN	(U) ASHURA/MOHARRAM, ISLAMIC HOLIDAY
21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY

4 C. ~~(C)~~ FOREIGN VIP TRAVEL:

27-03 MAY	THAILAND	(U) THAILAND PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT CHINA
05-07 MAY	CHINA	(U) SOUTH AFRICA PRESIDENT TO VISIT CHINA

5. (U) [redacted]

(b)(2)

SECRET

[redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT ID: 183276036
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990514
TOR: 013246
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905141100
MHFNO: 99 5449040
DOCCLASS: S
CAVEATS: NOFORN

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCC #2702 1340507
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0169 1340450
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RHBCIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Sep 2023
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

ENCL 12

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN

RUHBABA T CG III MEF
RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUWICBJ T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPPEL T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUHPPEL T ELEVENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
RHWISSJ T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 141100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
RUYNANI/COMUSMARFORK SEOUL KOR//G2//
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA134/14 MAY//
RMKS/
1. (U) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

SECRET
NOFORN

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

A. [redacted]

B. [redacted]

C. [redacted]

D. (S) INDONESIA - WEEKLY UPDATE 06-13 MAY 99

E. (C) INDONESIA - ELECTION SECURITY FORCE FOR JAKARTA

F. [redacted]

G. [redacted]

Non Responsive

(3)
(3)

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

Non Responsive

NOFORN
SECRET

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN



NOV Responsive

(S) D. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 6-13 MAY 99: THE OVERALL SITUATION IN INDONESIA REMAINS TENSE AND TUMULTUOUS AS THE NATION PREPARES FOR THREE FAST-APPROACHING WATERSHED EVENTS, NAMELY THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, THE 8 AUG EAST TIMOR AUTONOMY DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE, AND THE 28 OCT MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. THE LEVEL OF UNREST AND VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY INCREASE DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, AND CULMINATE AFTER THE RESULTS OF THESE MOMENTOUS EVENTS ARE ANNOUNCED. (KEYS ID)

(S) (C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE DOLLAR IMPROVED SLIGHTLY TO RP 7,800/$1.00. COORDINATING MINISTER FOR ECONOMY, FINANCE, AND INDUSTRY GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA ANNOUNCED THAT THE STATISTICAL FIGURE ON THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) FOR THE FIRST QUARTER SHOWED THAT THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY IS

``REAWAKENING''. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE INDICATION OF THE ``REAWAKENING'' ECONOMY COULD BE SEEN FROM THE STRENGTHENING OF THE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE RUPIAH, THE DROP IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND INFLATION WHICH ENABLED THE GOVERNMENT TO LOWER BANK INTEREST RATES. DESPITE MODEST SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT TO CERTAIN SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY, INDONESIA'S OVERALL ECONOMIC SITUATION STILL REMAINS WEAK, AND IS UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE PRIOR TO THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: IN RESPONSE TO RECENT VIOLENCE IN ACEH, A BATTALION OF SPECIAL RIOT TROOPS, CALLED THE PASUKAN PENINDAK RUSUH MASSA (PPRM) OR MASS DISTURBANCE REACTION FORCE, DEPLOYED TO LHOKSEUMAWE 7 MAY TO AUGMENT LOCAL SECURITY FORCES. APPROXIMATELY 450 PERSONNEL AND THEIR EQUIPMENT ARRIVED IN ACEH ABOARD FOUR C-130 AIRCRAFT. THE FORCES WILL DEPLOY TO KEY LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE CITY TO CONTROL VIOLENCE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN ELECTIONS. THREE PPRM BATTALIONS WERE OFFICIALLY FORMED ON 1 MAR, COMPRISING 3,000 PERSONNEL FROM THE ARMY, AIR FORCE, NAVY, MARINES, POLICE, AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. THE PPRM IS UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE POLICE AND IS ONLY UTILIZED FOR SECURITY/LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS. THE PPRM IS EQUIPPED WITH SMALL ARMS AND RIOT-CONTROL EQUIPMENT. THIS LATEST DEPLOYMENT WILL LIKELY BE THE LAST DUE TO THE CONSTRAINTS ON TNI AND POLICE FORCES USED FOR SECURITY ROLES IN JAKARTA AND THROUGHOUT JAVA. THE SPECIALLY TRAINED RIOT TASK FORCE WILL LIKELY BE MORE AGGRESSIVE THAN THE LOCAL SECURITY FORCE IN DEALING WITH UNREST. THE USE OF NON-INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES TO CONTAIN REGIONAL UNREST COULD INCREASE TENSION BETWEEN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY AND TNI, AND MAY FUEL FURTHER UNREST. TNI FORCES WILL BE STRETCHED VERY THIN DURING THE NEXT 6 MONTHS AS THEY PREPARE FOR ELECTION SECURITY DUTIES IN MOST MAJOR CITIES, WHILE HANDLING SIMULTANEOUS REGIONAL UNREST IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, MALUKU, AND WEST KALIMANTAN. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIAN STATE MINISTER FOR STATE SECRETARY AKBAR TANDJUNG AND STATE MINISTER FOR INVESTMENT AFFAIRS HAMZAH HAZ, BOTH RESIGNED FROM THEIR CABINET POSITIONS EFFECTIVE 10 MAY TO CONCENTRATE ON CAMPAIGNING FULL-TIME FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UP-COMING 7 JUN ELECTIONS. TANDJUNG CONCURRENTLY SERVED AS THE CHAIRMAN OF INDONESIA'S LARGEST POLITICAL PARTY, THE FUNCTIONAL GROUP (GOLKAR), WHILE HAZ CONCURRENTLY SERVED AS THE CHAIRMAN OF INDONESIA'S SECOND LARGEST POLITICAL PARTY, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP). BOTH VOLUNTARILY RESIGNED FROM THEIR MINISTERIAL DUTIES AFTER CONTROVERSY ERUPTED OVER PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S DECISION TO ALLOW BOTH OF THEM TO RETAIN THEIR CABINET POSITIONS, WHILE CONCURRENTLY CAMPAIGNING FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES. IF ALLOWED TO DO SO, BOTH WOULD HAVE BEEN IN VIOLATION WITH THE NEW ELECTION CAMPAIGN LAW, WHICH FORBIDS CURRENT APPOINTED GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM ACTIVE POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING. TANDJUNG AND HAZ PUBLICLY RESIGNED TO COMPLY WITH THE NEW ELECTION LAW AND TO AVOID THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT AND PUBLIC OUT-CRY WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED IF BOTH HAD DECIDED TO STAY ON AS CABINET MINISTERS WHILE ACTIVELY CAMPAIGNING FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES. HOWEVER, THEY MAY HAVE ALSO RESIGNED TO CAMPAIGN FOR THEIR OWN POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS, SINCE BOTH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED AS POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. IF NO DOMINANT CANDIDATE EMERGES, A COMPROMISE OR COALITION TICKET COULD RESULT, ENCOMPASSING EITHER TANDJUNG OR HAZ AS A POSSIBLE RUNNING MATE WITH HABIBIE. (KEYS ID)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

(S) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS ONLY 3 WEEKS AWAY, ACTIVITY IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E) IS INCREASING. DEMONSTRATIONS WERE ON THE RISE WITH RIOTS FOCUSING ON ELECTION ISSUES. EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E) CONTINUES TO HAVE CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE MILITIAS, EVEN WITH AN INITIAL UN PRESENCE ON GROUND. AMBON (0343S/12812E) IS STARTING TO STIR UP AGAIN; AND ACEH (0510N/09708E) IS IN A VERY TENSE STATE. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:
6 MAY DILI (0833S/12534E) / EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS AND YOUTHS DEMONSTRATED AT EAST TIMOR UNIVERSITY FOR A THIRD STRAIGHT DAY CARRYING EAST TIMOR FLAGS AND BANNERS REJECTING AUTONOMY.
6 MAY JAKARTA / THE STUDENT SOLIDARITY WITH ACEH GROUP (SOMAKA) DEMONSTRATED AT THE US EMBASSY DEMANDING THE US NOT BE ONE-SIDED IN REACTING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN ACEH.
7 MAY JAKARTA / EAST TIMORESE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS DEMONSTRATED AT THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION DEMANDING AN END TO THE `SLAUGHTER AND INTIMIDATION' IN EAST TIMOR AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF TNI `TEAMS' FROM THE PROVINCE BEFORE THE 8 AUG POLL.
8 MAY PEKALONGAN (0653S/10940E), CENTRAL JAVA / A PRE-CAMPAIGN PERIOD CLASH OCCURRED BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), LEAVING 5 PERSONS INJURED.
8 MAY LIQUICA (0840S/12520E)/ PRO-INDONESIA MILITIA GROUPS GATHERED FOR A RALLY TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR AUTONOMY.
9 MAY DILI / SHOTS WERE FIRED AT A CAR CARRYING FOREIGN JOURNALISTS MOST LIKELY BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS WHO WERE SEEN BRANDISHING HANDGUNS.
9 MAY DILI / A VIOLENT BATTLE BROKE OUT BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST GROUPS CAUSING POLICE TO OPEN FIRE IN THE AIR. AT LEAST 1 DEAD, 3 INJURED.
9 MAY JEMBER (0810S/11342E)/ INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI-P) SUPPORTERS BLOCKED THE GOLKAR PARTY GENERAL CHAIRMAN, AKBAR TANJUNG, FROM HOLDING A MEETING.
9 MAY SEMARANG (0658S/11025E)/ A GOLKAR OFFICE WAS SET ON FIRE BY SUPPORTERS OF PDI-P.
9 MAY AMBON / FRESH CLASHES, TRIGGERED BY A HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT BRAWL, SET 14 HOUSES ON FIRE. NO DEATHS REPORTED.
9 MAY DILI / PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA WERE INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT WHICH RESULTED IN A FOREIGN JOURNALIST BEATEN AND SEVERAL WOUNDED, ACCORDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST.
10 MAY DILI / PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS ATTACKED AN AITARAK MILITIA POST RESULTING IN 1 ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST KILLED AND 9 OTHERS INJURED.
10 MAY DILI / A HOTEL OCCUPYING FOREIGN JOURNALISTS RECEIVED SEVERAL BOMB THREATS.
10 MAY JAKARTA / UP TO 1,300 BANK EMPLOYEES CONDUCTED SPEECHES AND WAVED BANNERS OUTSIDE BANK OF INDONESIA.
10 MAY BAUCAU (0835S/12630E)/ PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA PERSONNEL, DRESSED UP AS PRO-INDEPENDENCE FALINTIL FIGHTERS, REPORTEDLY SHOT 27 PEOPLE, KILLING THREE. THIS WAS MOST LIKELY A PLOY BY PRO-INDONESIA ELEMENTS TO GIVE UN PERSONNEL THE PERCEPTION THAT PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS ARE INSTIGATING VIOLENCE.
11 MAY JAKARTA / UNIVERSITY STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN FRONT OF THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION (KPU) OFFICE COVERING THEIR BODIES WITH 50,000 RUPIAH BILLS, MOCKING KPU MEMBERS.
11 MAY AMBON / A BOMB WENT OFF INJURING 4 AND CAUSED MASS PANIC.

11 MAY LHOKSEUMAWE (0510N/09708E)/ FIVE GRENADES WENT OFF AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF AN AIR DEFENSE BATTALION. NO INJURIES REPORTED.
12 MAY JAKARTA / REPORTING INDICATES UP TO 5,000 STUDENTS GATHERED AT THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS FOR A MEMORIAL SERVICE AND DEMONSTRATION.
12 MAY CIANJUR (0649S/10708E)/ A GROUP OF YOUTHS IDENTIFIED AS NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN) MEMBERS OCCUPIED A DISTRICT ELECTORAL COMMITTEE OFFICE, HOLDING HOSTAGE SOME OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES ON DUTY. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(S) TNI AND POLICE ARE PREPARING FOR SECURITY IN JAVA BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAVA AS POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORTERS WILL BECOME EMOTIONAL. THE OUTLYING AREAS ARE STILL TURBULENT AND TENSE. SINCE MAJORITY OF FORCES ARE IN JAVA, TNI AND POLICE WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH UNREST THAT OCCURS IN OUTLYING AREAS OF INDONESIA. (KEYS ID)

(U)
(U)

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:
(C) EAST TIMOR: A SMALL ADVANCE TEAM OF APPROXIMATELY 40 UN OFFICIALS ARRIVED IN DILI, EAST TIMOR 7-8 MAY TO PREPARE FOR THE 8 AUG UN-SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE. THE UN IS EXPECTED TO HAVE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 OFFICIALS IN EAST TIMOR BY MID-JUN, WITH HOPES THAT THEIR PRESENCE WILL ENSURE A FAIR, OPEN, AND SAFE BALLOTING PROCESS. APPROXIMATELY 200-300 WILL BE CIVILIAN POLICE ADVISERS WHO WILL ASSIST THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE FORCE (POLRI) IN MAINTAINING SECURITY AT APPROXIMATELY 200 POLLING CENTERS THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR. AUSTRALIA IS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE THE LARGEST SINGLE NATIONAL CONTINGENT OF POLICE ADVISORS, APPROXIMATELY 50-60. AUSTRALIA, GERMANY, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, PHILIPPINES, UK, AND THE US WILL SEND OFFICIALS TO MONITOR THE BALLOTING. THE DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE IS EXPECTED TO COST APPROXIMATELY $46 MILLION, WITH AUSTRALIA PLEDGING $20 MILLION AND PORTUGAL OFFERING $10 MILLION TO HELP DEFRAY THE COST. THE ARRIVAL OF UN OFFICIALS IN EAST TIMOR SHOULD BRING SOME RELIEF TO THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS AND THE MAIN ADVOCATE OF A UN PRESENCE. HOWEVER, ANY LARGE OR VISIBLE UN PRESENCE COULD FUEL RESENTMENT BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WHO OPPOSE ANY FOREIGN PRESENCE ON EAST TIMOR SOIL. DESPITE THEIR OBJECTION, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL DELIBERATELY ATTACK ANY UN PERSONNEL WITHOUT PROVOCATION. THEY MAY, HOWEVER, USE THE ARRIVAL OF UN PERSONNEL IN EAST TIMOR AS A PRETEXT TO INCREASE THEIR ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE REBELS AND SUPPORTERS. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(C) IRIAN JAYA: THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) WILL SOON RE-DECLARE THE BORDER ALONG PAPUA NEW GUINEA (PNG) A MILITARY OPERATION ZONE (DOM) FOLLOWING INCREASED REBEL ACTIVITY IN THE REGION OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS. THE AREA WAS A DOM PRIOR TO 1998, BUT THE DESIGNATION WAS LIFTED IN OCT 98 AS A GOOD-WILL GESTURE AND REFORM PROMISE BY TNI COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO. DESPITE THE LIFT, REPORTS OF GANGS HARASSING AND TERRORIZING PEOPLE LIVING ALONG THE BORDER AREA HAS INCREASED. IN THE LATEST INCIDENT, A 100-MAN GANG ATTACKED A VILLAGE IN THE ARSO DISTRICT, KILLING THREE LOCAL RESIDENTS, INJURING 3 OTHERS, AND TAKING 11 HOSTAGES. TNI IS PROBABLY REINSTATING THE DOM DESIGNATION IN AN EFFORT TO CURB THE GROWING SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN IRIAN JAYA, ESPECIALLY IN KNOWN REBEL TERRITORY ALONG THE PNG BORDER. REINSTATING THE DOM MAY UPSET LOCAL EMOTIONS AND HELP FUEL FURTHER UNREST IN THE REGION. (KEYS ID)

(U)

(C) JAKARTA: STUDENTS COMMEMORATED THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTING WITH DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

12 MAY. REPORTING INDICATES UP TO 5,000 STUDENTS GATHERED AT THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS FOR A MEMORIAL SERVICE AND DEMONSTRATION. FROM THIS GROUP, APPROXIMATELY 1,500 STUDENTS MARCHED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE/PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (DPR/MPR) BUILDING LOCATED 2 MILES EAST OF THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED THEM FROM ENTERING THE DPR/MPR GROUNDS AND LOWERING THE INDONESIAN FLAG TO HALF MAST TO COMMEMORATE THE KILLINGS OF FOUR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. A SMALLER GROUP OF STUDENTS STAGED A SIMILAR PROTEST OUTSIDE THE DEFENSE MINISTRY BUILDING. NO DEATHS, INJURIES, OR ARRESTS WERE REPORTED FROM ALL THREE LOCATIONS. DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED DESPITE EARLIER REPORTING THAT THE 12 MAY TRISAKTI ANNIVERSARY DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD BE CANCELLED. THESE DEMONSTRATIONS WERE THE LARGEST SINCE THE 13 NOV 98 ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATIONS OF UP 50,000. THIS EVENT COULD BE THE PRELUDE TO FURTHER AND LARGER STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND POSSIBLE VIOLENCE, ESPECIALLY ON KEY ANNIVERSARY AND POLITICAL DATES. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS WILL LIKELY INCREASE AS THE NATIONAL ELECTION PERIOD APPROACHES, AND THEIR MAGNITUDE WILL BE INFLUENCED BY SECURITY FORCE REACTION AND THE OUTCOME OF THE DPR ELECTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. (KEYS ID)

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

*18MAY	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD COMMENCES
21MAY	INDONESIAN SCHOOLS DISMISSED FOR SUMMER RECESS
07JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
12JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
08AUG	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
29AUG	NEW MPR ANNOUNCES RESULTS OF EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13NOV	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
07DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT)

*DENOTES ADDITION (KEYS ID)

(U) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24
30 APR-06 MAY 99	24	9	14
07-13 MAY 99	28	8	16

(U)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA WILL REMAIN FRAGILE LEADING UP TO THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, AND WILL LIKELY DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER AFTER THE 28 OCT MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD OPENING 18 MAY AND THE NATIONWIDE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES, ESPECIALLY ON KEY ANNIVERSARY AND POLITICAL DATES. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN MALUKU AND WEST KALIMANTAN, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR. ALTHOUGH THE EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE IS SET FOR 8 AUG AND UN OFFICIALS BEGAN ARRIVING IN DILI 7-8 MAY, PRO-INTEGRATION/PRO-INDEPENDENCE VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY CONTINUE AND MAY EVENTUALLY ESCALATE AFTER THE BALLOTING RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED 29 AUG. (OSA MULITIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

(U)

E. (C) INDONESIA - ELECTION SECURITY FOR FOR JAKARTA: AS OF 11 MAY, THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) SECURITY PLANS FOR THE 18 MAY - 4 JUNE ELECTION PERIOD IN JAKARTA CALLED FOR 62,000 TROOPS, CONSISTING OF:

- 12,000 TNI
- 8,000 POLICE
- 12,000 PEOPLE'S SECURITY FORCE (KNOWN AS KAMRA OR CIVILIAN MILITIA)
- 30,000 CIVIL DEFENSE FORCES (WANRA AND HANSIP) (KEYS ID)

(U)

(C) TNI TROOPS WILL INCLUDE PERSONNEL FROM THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE. THE KAMRA WERE RECRUITED FROM EXISITING CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS IN JAN-FEB 99 AND HAD A 3-WEEK TRAINING PROGRAM WHICH INCLUDED SHIELD AND BATON USE. WANRA ARE PART-TIME LOCAL MILITARY AUXILIARY PERSONNEL. HANSIP MAKE UP INDONESIA'S LARGE CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND ARE TYPICALLY USED IN ROUTINE CIVIL DEFENSE TASKS SUCH AS FIREFIGHTING, DISASTER DAMAGE CONTROL, AND NEIGHBORHOOD SECURITY. (KEYS ID)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

[redacted]

(U) APPROXIMATELY 30,000 ADDITIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL WERE SENT TO THE JAKARTA AREA FOR THE 10-13 NOV 98 PEOPLES' CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) SPECIAL SESSION. IN MAY 98, AN ESTIMATED 60,000 AUGMENTEES WERE CALLED IN TO RESTORE ORDER AFTER SUHARTO WAS REMOVED FROM POWER. (KEYS ID)

(S) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF SECURITY FORCES SLATED FOR JAKARTA IS FLEXIBLE AND WILL PROBABLY INCREASE. OF THE 62,000 CURRENTLY PLANNED, 60 PERCENT (37,000) ARE ORGANIC TO THE JAKARTA AREA; THE REMAINDER WILL BE BROUGHT IN FROM OTHER AREAS IN JAVA AND THE OUTER ISLANDS. OF THE 20,000 TNI AND POLICE PERSONNEL LISTED IN THE JAKARTA SECURITY PLAN, JICPAC ASSESSES 15,000 ARE ALREADY BASED IN THE JAKARTA AREA. (KEYS ID)

(S) TNI TROOPS ARE A MINORITY OF THE PLANNED SECURITY FORCE. THE CIVILIAN DEFENSE FORCES AND MILITIA, RELATIVELY UNTRAINED AND INDISCIPLINED, WILL PROBABLY EXACERBATE ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE. AT THE SAME TIME, THEIR LARGE AND VISIBLE PRESENCE WILL ALLOW THE TNI TO DEFLECT BLAME FOR ANY HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THE BULK OF UNREST WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE 20 JUN-12 JUL WHEN ELECTION RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

Non responsive

SECRET
NOFORN

[redacted]

NON Responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:
A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT
B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

---

14 MAY	FIJI	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF COUP AGAINST INDIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT (1987)
16 MAY	BANGLADESH	(U) FARAKKA RESISTANCE DAY
17 MAY	NAURU	(U) CONSTITUTION DAY
17 MAY	PAKISTAN	(U) ASHURA/MOHARRAM, ISLAMIC HOLIDAY
21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY

b(2)

[redacted]

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

DOCUMENT_ID: 183299545
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990518
TOR: 144331
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905181100
MHFNO: 99 5499738
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCC #1722 1380520
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0287 1380523
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RHBCIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST ESSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 25 Jan 2023
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

SECRET

ENCL 13

RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUHBANA T FIRSTBN FIFTH MAR
RHMCUUU T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX

RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUHPPEL T ELEVENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW

SECRET

RHWISSJ T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 181100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
RUYNANI/COMUSMARFORK SEOUL KOR//G2//
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA138/18 MAY//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (U) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV)	OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

~~SECRET~~

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

[redacted]

B. (C) INDONESIA - UNREST UPDATE

C. [redacted]

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

NOV responsive

(U)

B. (C) INDONESIA - UNREST UPDATE: GENERAL WIRANTO ARRIVED IN AMBON (0343S/12812E) 13 MAY TO SIGN A PEACE ACCORD TO END MONTHS OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN GROUPS. TWO DAYS LATER, INDONESIAN TROOPS FIRED ON BATTLING MOBS OF MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS KILLING AT LEAST SEVEN AND INJURING SIX. THE RIOT BEGAN AFTER AN ARGUMENT OVER WHO WOULD CARRY A TORCH DURING CELEBRATIONS IN HONOR OF A LOCAL HERO. IN DILI (0833S/12534E), HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE MARCHED THROUGH THE EAST TIMOR CAPITAL TO CALL AN END TO KILLINGS IN THE TROUBLED PROVINCE 15 MAY. ABOUT 40 PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAMEN ATTACKED A NEIGHBORHOOD 16 MAY KILLING FIVE AND SETTING FIRE TO 11 HOUSES. UN OFFICIALS AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL STAFF WERE NEARBY DINING WHEN THEY HEARD SHOTS. THEY WERE ESCORTED TO SAFETY BY INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES. (KEYS ID)

(S)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: DESPITE THE SIGNING OF A PEACE ACCORD AND MILITARY TROOP BUILD-UP SINCE MARCH, CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM VIOLENCE LIKELY WILL CONTINUE IN AMBON. THE UNREST IN DILI WAS THE FIRST TIME UN OFFICIALS WITNESSED VIOLENCE SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL 2 WEEKS AGO. INTIMIDATION TACTICS BY MILITIA PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS WILL CONTINUE UP TO THE 8 AUG DIRECT BALLOT VOTE DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF UN OFFICIALS. (OSA/MULTIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

[redacted]

NON responsive

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] Non Responsive

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:
A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY
30 MAY	TAIWAN	(U) MEMORIAL DAY
01 JUN	PRC	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
01 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (FIRST OF 3 DAYS)
01 JUN	NEW ZEALAND	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (1ST MONDAY)
01 JUN	PALAU	(U) PRESIDENT'S DAY
02 JUN	BHUTAN	(U) CORONATION OF JIGME SINGHE WANGCHUK
02 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (SECOND OF 3 DAYS)
03 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION CONCLUDES
04 JUN	TONGA	(U) EMANCIPATION DAY
06 JUN	INDIA	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF OPERATION BLUE STAR (1984)
06 JUN	ROK	(U) MEMORIAL DAY/LOYALTY DAY
08 JUN	AUSTRALIA	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (2ND MONDAY)
09 JUN	CHINESE WORLD	(U) DRAGON BOAT FESTIVAL (S/S)

C. (U) FOREIGN VIP TRAVEL:

24-28 MAY	VIETNAM	(U) VIETNAMESE DEFENSE MINISTER TO VISIT RUSSIA
27-30 MAY	ROK	(U) PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG TO VISIT MOSCOW
30 MAY-01 JUN	ROK	(U) PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG TO VISIT ULAN BAATAR

5. (U) [redacted] b(3)

INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN.
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183315319
PRODUCER: JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990521
TOR: 050959
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905211100
MHFNO: 99 5537504
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #0083 1410843
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHJOBU0372 1410749
RUHBVMA T COMPHIBGRU ONE
RUWDXBY T COMPHIBGRU THREE
RUHPOAA T COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAYIAA T COMSUBGRU SEVEN
RUHPQUA T COMTHIRDFLT
RUWFABY T FAIRECONRON FIVE
RHWIPYV T FAIRECONRON ONE
RUHGSNN T FAIRECONRON ONE DET DIEGO GARCIA
RHRMABD T FAIRECONRON ONE DET SWA
RUHPSPP T FMP MOCC WESTPAC
RUNGAAB T NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE
RUWFOAA T SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA
RUVNSAQ T PATRON FOUR
RUHEBPG T PATRON FOUR SEVEN
RUHPBPH T PATRON NINE
RHWIPYQ T PATRON ONE
RHRCPAC T PATWING ONE DET MASIRAH
RHBCIUS T USS ROBIN
RUARMAG T CTG 72.5
RUHPESX T COMPHIBGRU THREE FWD
RUWDHFY T AIRTEVRON NINE
RUWFPBI T AIRTEVRON NINE DET PT MUGU CA
RUHPPSA T COMCARGRU THREE
RUWFAFY T COMEODGRU ONE
RUWFAFS T COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
RUWDTBV T COMSPECBOATRON ONE
RHWIGNA T COMSUBGRU NINE
RUWNAWW T COMSUBRON ELEVEN
RUWFADD T HELANTISUBRON TEN
RUWDXGI T PATRON NINE ONE
RUWFAEE T SEACONRON FOUR ONE
RUVMBDA T AFFTC EDWARDS AFB CA
RUATDBA T CDR2DINFDIV UIJONGBU KOR
RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG
RUWICBC T CG FIRST MARDIV
RUHBANB T CG FIRST MAW
RUCCNOP T CG FOURTH MARDIV
RUCCNOQ T CG FOURTH MAW
RUWICBE T CG I MEF
RUHBABA T CG III MEF

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: 26 Feb 08
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~SECRET~~

ENCL (1)

MORI DocID: 1054604

RUCKMOB T CG SECOND FSSG
RUHBBEA T CG THIRD FSSG
RUHBABA T CG THIRD MARDIV
RUWIKBC T CG THIRD MAW
RUWDTBZ T CNSWTG PAC
RUSICWP T COMLOG WESTPAC
RUHEHMS T COMMARFORPAC
RUWDTBY T COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
RUWFAGC T COMTACGRU ONE
RUWIBSG T CSSG ONE
RUWICBG T ELEVENTH MAR
RHWIPYL T EODMU SEVENTEEN
RHFJSZA T FAIRECONRON SIX
RUWICAC T FIFTEENTH MEU
RUWICBJ T FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T FIRST MAR
RUHEKCD T FIRST MAW AVN SPT ELM KANEOHE BAY HI
RUHDFRB T FIRST RADBN
RUWIBHA T FIRST RPVCO DET ALFA
RUHBABA T FIRSTBN EIGHTH MAR
RUHBANA T FIRSTBN EIETH MAR
RUWICAA T FIRSTBN FIRST MAR
RUWICBK T FIRSTBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T FIRSTBN SECOND MAR
RUWIBSI T FIRSTBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T FIRSTBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN THIRD MAR
RUHEKCP T FIRSTBN TWELFTH MAR
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMH FOUR SIX SIX
RUWIKBH T HMH FOUR SIX TWO
RUHBBMA T HMH THREE SIX ONE
RUWICCA T HMLA ONE SIX NINE
RUWICBP T HMLA THREE SIX NINE
RUHBBMA T HMLA TWO SIX SEVEN
RUWICBP T HMMT ONE SIX FOUR
RUHBABA T HMM TWO SIX FIVE
RUHBBMA T HMM TWO SIX TWO
RUHBABA T HQBN THIRD MARDIV
RUHBABA T III MEF TECG
RUHBBMA T MACG EIGHTEEN
RUWIKBJ T MACG THREE EIGHT
RUCKFDM T MACG TWO EIGHT
RUWIBHJ T MACS ONE
RHFJAEA T MACS TWO FOUR
RUWIKBD T MAG ELEVEN
RHFJABM T MAG FOUR NINE
RHFJACT T MAG FOUR ONE
RHFJADR T MAG FOUR SIX
RHFJAAP T MAG FOUR SIX DET BRAVO
RHFJAGQ T MAG FOUR TWO
RUCKFCL T MAG FOURTEEN
RUWIKBH T MAG SIXTEEN
RUWIBHP T MAG THIRTEEN
RUWICAA T MAG THREE NINE
RUHBBMA T MAG THREE SIX

RUYNJRE T MAG TWELVE
RUWICBM T MASS THREE
RUHBANB T MWSG SEVENTEEN
RHHJDHA T PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RUCCAJO T PATRON NINE FOUR
RUWFPBG T PATRON SIX FIVE
RHWIPYO T PATRON SIX NINE
RHFJJCP T PATRON THREE ZERO
RUHEMCB T SDV TEAM ONE
RUWDTCM T SEAL TEAM FIVE
RUWDTCK T SEAL TEAM ONE
RUWDTCL T SEAL TEAM THREE
RUEOEGA T SECONDBN FIRST MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN FOURTH MAR
RUHBABA T SECONDBN THIRD MAR
RUWDTBW T SPECBOATU TWELVE
RUWFAGD T TACRON ELEVEN
RUWFAGE T TACRON TWELVE
RUWIBSS T THIRD LARBN
RUHEKCP T THIRD MAR
RUWIBSV T THIRDBN ELEVENTH MAR
RUWICBJ T THIRDBN FIFTH MAR
RUWICBK T THIRDBN FIRST MAR
RUWIBST T THIRDBN FOURTH MAR
RUCKDDB T THIRDBN SECOND MAR
RUHBABA T THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR
RUCKDDC T THIRDBN SIXTH MAR
RUHEKCP T THIRDBN THIRD MAR
RUHBANB T THIRDBN TWELFTH MAR
RUHBABA T THREE ONE MEU
RUHBANB T TWELFTH MAR
RHFJAFJ T TWO FOUR MAR
RUFTAKC T UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUWIBHR T VMA FIVE ONE THREE
RUHBANA T VMA THREE ONE ONE DET ALFA
RUWIBHA T VMA TWO ONE ONE
RUWIKBG T VMFA AW ONE TWO ONE
RUHHJKA T VMFA TWO ONE TWO
RUHBBMA T VMGR ONE FIVE TWO
RUWICBA T ELEVENTH MEU
RHHMHAW T CTF 12
RUAYJAA T CTF 72
RUHPBXR T HMM THREE SIX FOUR
RUHPBXR T THIRTEENTH MEU
RUEDBNA T 624AMSG POPE AFB NC
RHHJCSP T COMSUBPAC DET THREE
RHWIGNH T COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN
RHOOABA T FAIRECONRON THREE
RHWISSA T USS ALABAMA
RHWICAL T USS ALABAMA OFFCREW
RHWISSK T USS ALASKA
RHWICAK T USS ALASKA OFFCREW
RHHLPAA T USS FLORIDA
RHWICFL T USS FLORIDA OFFCREW
RHWISSG T USS GEORGIA
RHWICGA T USS GEORGIA OFFCREW

~~SECRET~~

RHWISSJ T USS HENRY M JACKSON
RHWICWA T USS HENRY M JACKSON OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS MICHIGAN
RHWICMI T USS MICHIGAN OFFCREW
RHHIPAA T USS NEVADA
RHHIPAA T USS OHIO
RHWICOH T USS OHIO OFFCREW
P 211100Z MAY 99 ZZZ8
FM JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI//OED//
TO INTEL ALL SEVENTHFLT
INTEL ALL THIRDFLT
RHMPISP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
AIG EIGHT SEVEN THREE THREE
AIG SIX TWO ONE
AIG ONE ZERO THREE ONE THREE
SSBNS PAC
RUWIBHQ/VMA THREE ONE ONE
RUYNANI/COMUSMARFORK SEOUL KOR//G2//
INFO RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J22/J3/J5//
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUYNABA/NAVPACMETOCCEN YOKOSUKA JA
RUSICWP/COMLOG WESTPAC//N61H//
RUWDVCP/FITRON COMP THIRTEEN
RUAGEIG/CDRUSAEIGHT SEOUL KOR//G2//
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW//G2//
RUEOGHS/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
RUHEYIY/COMDESRON THREE ONE
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RHWIPZW/USNS ASSERTIVE
RHWIPZU/USNS EFFECTIVE
RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//IN//
RUYLCSG/CSG JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J2//
RUEHLM/USDAO COLOMBO CE
XMT 607AIG OSAN AB KOR
607AOG OSAN AB KOR
607ACOMS OSAN AB KOR
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ/DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (DISP) (U)//
MSGID/DISUM/JICPAC/PA0141/21 MAY//
RMKS/
(U) 1. (U) WARNING PROBLEMS MONITORED BY PACOM:

NAME	(ABBREV) OWNER	PACOM WATCHCON	DATE	CURRENT STATUS

N. KOREA/S. KOREA	(KN/KS)	USFK	III	10MAY96	NO CHANGE
NORTH KOREA INTERNAL	(KNINT)	DIA	III	19MAR96	NO CHANGE
INDONESIA INTERNAL	(IDINT)	PACOM	III	26MAY98	NO CHANGE
CAMBODIA INTERNAL	(CBINT)	PACOM	IV	19NOV98	NO CHANGE
CHINA/TAIWAN	(CH/TW)	PACOM	IV	28MAR96	NO CHANGE
RS/NORTH AMERICA	(RS/NX)	SPACECOM	IV	31OCT93	NO CHANGE
INDIA/PAKISTAN	(IN/PK)	CENTCOM	IV(1)	30JAN96	NO CHANGE
SRI LANKA INTERNAL	(CEINT)	PACOM	IV	18FEB98	NO CHANGE
SPRATLY/SCS REGIONAL	(PGXXX)	PACOM	IV	26JUL94	NO CHANGE
BURMA INTERNAL	(BMINT)	PACOM	IV	11SEP98	NO CHANGE
BANGLADESH INTERNAL	(BGINT)	PACOM	IV	29DEC97	NO CHANGE
PHILIPPINES INTERNAL	(RPINT)	PACOM	IV	08JUL92	NO CHANGE
P. NEW GUINEA INTERNAL	(PPINT)	PACOM	IV	15MAY97	NO CHANGE
CHINA/NORTH AMERICA	(CH/NX)	SPACECOM	V(2)	-------	NO CHANGE
CHINA INTERNAL	(CHINT)	DIA	V(3)	-------	NO CHANGE

NOTES:
(1) CENTCOM IS AT WATCHCON III
(2) SPACECOM IS AT WATCHCON IV
(3) DIA IS AT WATCHCON IV

2. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

[redacted]

(U) D. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 13-20 MAY 99

3. (U) POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE



NON Responsive

Non Responsive

SECRET

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

NON RESPONSIVE

(U) D. (S) ID - WEEKLY UPDATE 13-20 MAY 99: SEVERAL KEY POLITICAL EVENTSUNFOLDED THIS WEEK. FIRST, IN A COMPROMISE MOVE, GOLKAR NOMINATED CURRENTPRESIDENT HABIBIE AS ITS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. SECOND, THE ELECTIONCAMPAIGN PERIOD OFFICIALLY STARTED 18 MAY WITH ONLY MINOR VIOLENCEREPORTED. ON 19 MAY, THREE KEY OPPOSITION PARTIES, PDI-P, PAN, AND PKB, FORMED A COALITION TO CHALLENGE GOLKAR'S OLIGARCHY. REPORTING INDICATESTHAT HABIBIE IS CONSOLIDATING HIS POWER THROUGH ``MONEY'' POLITICS AND``BACK-ROOM DEALINGS'', WHILE OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE BEGINNING TO UNIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVENT A HABIBIE VICTORY. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) ECONOMIC SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIA'S ECONOMY IS SHOWING SOME MODEST SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT. THE JAKARTA STOCK EXCHANGE INDEX DISPLAYED SIGNS OF RENEWED VITALITY WITH INCREASED TRADING. DOMESTIC INTEREST RATES HAVE STEADILY DECLINED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, AS EVIDENCED BY THE RESULTS OF THE CENTRAL BANK'S WEEKLY AUCTION OF ONE-MONTH SBI'S TO BELOW 30 PERCENT. INFLATION IS SLOWLY DECREASING, ERASING FEARS OF POSSIBLE FOOD SHORTAGES AND PRICE RIOTS. NON-OIL EXPORT INCREASED BY 10% SINCE JAN 99. SEVERAL LARGE CORPORATE DEBTORS ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WERE MAKING PROGRESS IN THEIR DEBT RESTRUCTURING NEGOTIATIONS WITH FOREIGN CREDITORS. DESPITE THESE MODEST SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT, INDONESIA'S ECONOMY STILL REMAINS WEAK AND FRAGILE, AND COULD EASILY PLUNGE INTO CHAOS AGAIN. (SEE CHART). THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH AGAINST THE U.S. DOLLAR IMPROVED SLIGHTLY TO RP 7,949/$1.00. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) MILITARY SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GEN SUBAGYO PRESIDED OVER THE REINAUGURATION OF THE OLD ``PATTIMURA'' REGIONAL COMMAND (KODAM XVI) IN THE MALUKUS 15 MAY. PATTIMURA IS THE FIRST OF 7 NEW MILITARY REGIONAL COMMANDS THAT WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY 2006, IN RESPONSE TO MOUNTING DEMANDS FOR TNI TO DEAL WITH SOCIAL UNREST AND THREATS TO NATIONAL STABILITY. THE ONLY OTHER NEW KODAM THAT SUBAGYO SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED WAS THE ``ISKANDAR MUDA'' KODAM IN BANDA ACEH. APPROXIMATELY 10,000 TROOPS REMAIN IN THE MALUKUS AND ARE EXPECTED TO STAY THROUGH THE GENERAL ELECTIONS TO HELP MAINTAIN ORDER. THE INAUGURATION OF NEW KODAMS SHOULD HELP THE TNI MANAGE THOSE REGIONS MORE EFFICIENTLY AND INDEPENDENTLY, WHILE ALLOWING THEM TO FOCUS THEIR ATTENTION ON VARIOUS SEPARATIST OR ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS ISSUES THAT ARE UNIQUE TO THAT PARTICULAR REGION. EXPECT SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR IRIAN JAYA, WEST KALIMANTAN, AND EAST TIMOR, IF THEIR INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT FAILS. (KEYS ID)

(U) (C) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP SITUATION/ASSESSMENT: INDONESIA'S LEADING POLITICAL PARTY, GOLKAR, NOMINATED CURRENT PRESIDENT B.J. HABIBIE, AS ITS CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT DURING ITS 13-14 MAY CENTRAL BOARD NATIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING (RAPIM). GOLKAR MEMBERS ALSO CONSIDERED GENERAL WIRANTO, AKBAR TANDJUNG, SULTAN HAMENGKUBUWONO X,

AND GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA FOR PRESIDENT. IN A COMPROMISE PACKAGE DEAL, THE FOUR REMAINING CANDIDATES WERE NOMINATED FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT POSITION. REPORTING INDICATES THAT ``MONEY POLITICS'' AND ``BACK-ROOM DEALS'' WERE USED TO ASSURE HABIBIE'S NOMINATION FOR PRESIDENT. WHILE HABIBIE CONTROLS THE FLOW OF MONEY TO GOLKAR'S GRASS ROOTS LEVEL, HIS NOMINATION DOES NOT COME WITHOUT RISKS. HABIBIE IS VIEWED BY MANY AS A TRANSIENT PRESIDENT AND HIS CLOSE PERSONNEL TIES TO FORMER PRESIDENT SUHARTO WILL PORTRAY HIM AS REPRESENTING CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND NEPOTISM. GOLKAR, HOWEVER, BELIEVES HABIBIE IS THE BEST CANDIDATE TO FUNNEL MONEY TO THE PARTY'S PROVINCIAL LEADERS WHO ARE EXPECTED TO DELIVER A LARGE NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE UPCOMING 7 JUN ELECTIONS. MEANWHILE, ON 19 MAY, A PRO-REFORM COALITION WAS FORMED CONSISTING OF THREE OPPOSITION CANDIDATES AND PARTIES, NAMELY MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY-STRUGGLE (PDI-P), AMIEN RAIS OF THE NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN), AND ABDURRAHMAN WAHID OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB). THIS ALLIANCE WAS FORMED TO MAKE A COORDINATED CHALLENGE AGAINST THE STATUS-QUO FORCE OF GOLKAR. POLITICAL MANEUVERING, RHETORIC, AND VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY PICK-UP AS THE 18 MAY ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD BEGINS. (KEYS ID)

(C) SOCIAL CLIMATE/ASSESSMENT: ELECTION RELATED VIOLENCE CONTINUES IN JAKARTA (0610S/10648E) WITH DEMONSTRATIONS AND STRIKES REMAINING ON THE LOW SIDE. HOWEVER, VIOLENCE CONTINUES TO BE REPORTED IN INDONESIA'S OUTLYING PROVINCES OF ACEH (0534N/09520E), EAST TIMOR (0833S/12534E), AND AMBON (0343S/12812E). SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

DATE LOCATION/INCIDENT:

13 MAY DILI (0833S/12534E)/ A MARCH FOR PEACE LED BY BISHOP BELO OCCURRED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

13 MAY JAKARTA / CIVILIANS DEMONSTRATED COMMEMORATING THE 13 MAY 98 SEMANGGI INCIDENT.

14 MAY SURABAYA (0715S/11245E) / MEMBERS OF YOUTH ORGANIZATION TASK FORCE ATTENDED A RALLY AT GELORA STADIUM.

14 MAY BAUCAU (0835S/12630E)/ CLASHES BROKE OUT BETWEEN A LOCAL ARMY BATTALION AND A SPECIAL INDONESIAN FORCE (KOPASSUS) RESULTING IN TWO SERIOUSLY INJURED.

15 MAY AMBON / AT LEAST SEVEN KILLED IN A CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM CLASH WHEN SECURITY FORCES OPENED FIRE ON AN ANGRY MOB OF 200.

16 MAY JAKARTA / NAHDLATUL ULUMA PARTY (NU) MEMBERS CONDUCTED A PARADE THAT PASSED BY INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT (MPR/DPR).

17 MAY SIGLI, ACEH (0523N/09557E)/ RESIDENTS FROM THREE VILLAGES FLED THEIR HOMES FOLLOWING INTERROGATIONS BY THE MILITARY WHO WERE SEEKING A MISSING COLLEAGUE.

17 MAY DILI / PRO-INDONESIA MILITIA GROUPS LAUNCHED A NIGHT ATTACK IN A PRO-INDEPENDENCE NEIGHBORHOOD RESULTING IN SEVEN HOUSES TORCHED.

17 MAY ATARA (0858S/12524E)/ SEVEN PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND FOUR INJURED IN A CLASH BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATION SUPPORTERS.

17 MAY JAYAPURA (0232S/14042E)/ ENVIRONMENTALLY CONSCIOUS STUDENTS STAGED A DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF IRIAN JAYA PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL (DPRD).

18 MAY PEKALONGAN (0653S/10940E)/ A CLASH BETWEEN THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE IDENTIFIED AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) LEFT 14 HOMES BURNED DOWN AND AT LEAST 11 INJURED.

18 MAY SIGLI / RESIDENTS HELD A RALLY OUTSIDE A MOSQUE TO EXPRESS THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH A WRITTEN SECURITY GUARANTEE FROM THEIR DISTRICT.

19 MAY JAKARTA / THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE GATHERED IN THE INDONESIAN CAPITAL FOR THE FIRST OFFICIAL EVENT OF INDONESIA'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

19 MAY LHOKSEUMAWE / A MOLOTOV BOMB EXPLODED AT THE NORTH ACEH DISTRICT POLICE HEADQUARTERS INJURING THREE MEMBERS OF ANTI-RIOT STRIKE FORCE POLICE. (KEYS ID)

(S) THE DATE OF 18 MAY SIGNIFIES THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN ELECTION PERIOD FOR INDONESIA. THE COALITION OF POLITICAL PARTIES PDI-P, PKB, AND PAN WILL LIKELY REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF UNREST BETWEEN THE 3 POLITICAL PARTIES. CONTINUING VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR SUGGESTS TNI AND PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS ARE TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE 8 AUG BALLOT VOTE IN THEIR FAVOR. THE UNREST IN EAST TIMOR WILL CONTINUE. FINALLY, VIOLENCE IN AMBON AND ACEH WILL CONTINUE TO BE HARSHLY DEALT WITH BY INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI). (KEYS ID)

(C) REGIONAL SITUATION/ASSESSMENT:

(U) ACEH: OPPOSITION PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (AKA: GUS DUR) OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) AND THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) ANNOUNCED 20 MAY THAT HE SUPPORTS AN AUTONOMY REFERENDUM FOR ACEH. HOWEVER, HE STATED IF GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REFERENDUM, ACEH WOULD CHOOSE TO REMAIN PART OF INDONESIA. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT COULD ADD FUEL TO THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN ACEH, WHILE GIVING HIM POLITICAL MILEAGE FOR SUPPORTING THE REFERENDUM. (KEYS ID)

(S) EAST TIMOR: PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES ARE CONTINUING OPERATIONS AIMED AT INTIMIDATION AROUND DILI. PRESS REPORTS INDICATED AN ATTACK BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS SOUTH OF DILI, FORCING RESIDENTS TO FLEE THE AREA. A GROUP CONSISTING OF UN AND NGO WORKERS HAD TO BE ESCORTED TO SAFETY BY POLICE AFTER BEING TRAPPED IN THE AREA. TNI AND PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS ARE DETERMINED TO INFLUENCE THE 8 AUG BALLOT IN THEIR FAVOR, WITH INDICATIONS EMERGING THEY MAY ATTEMPT TO DELAY OR STOP THE BALLOT IF AN AUTONOMY OUTCOME IS NOT LIKELY. THE MILITIAS REMAIN UNFETTERED BY SECURITY FORCES AND ARE FREE TO ACT AT WILL THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE, ESPECIALLY IN DILI. AS A RESULT, THE CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN EAST TIMOR IS NOT LIKELY TO IMPROVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. MEANWHILE, XANANA GUSMAO STATED THAT HE MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOUSE ARREST ONE DAY AFTER THE EAST TIMOR DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE (8 AUG). (KEYS ID)

(C) JAKARTA: IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE UNREST RELATED TO THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD 18 MAY-4 JUN, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) WILL BE FOCUSING MOST OF ITS SECURITY EFFORTS IN JAKARTA. THEY NOW HAVE APPROXIMATELY 62,000 SECURITY PERSONNEL DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE CAPITAL. FROM THIS NUMBER, 12,000 COMES FROM TNI, 8,000 FROM POLRI, 12,000 FROM KAMRA (POLRI MILITIA), AND 30,000 FROM WANRA (TNI MILITIA) AND HANSIP (CIVIL DEFENSE FORCE). THEY WILL BE GUARDING THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, THE DPR/MPR BUILDING, THE DEFENSE MINISTRY BUILDING, MERDEKA SQUARE, MAJOR UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES, POLLING STATIONS, AND MAJOR ROADWAYS LEADING INTO JAKARTA. (KEYS ID)

(U) KEY INDONESIAN DATES:

18 MAY	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD COMMENCES
21 MAY	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF SUHARTO'S RESIGNATION
21 MAY	INDONESIAN SCHOOLS DISMISSED FOR SUMMER RECESS
07 JUN	PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTIONS
26 JUN	PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)

~~SECRET~~

12 JUL	OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION RESULTS
17 JUL	23RD ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INTEGRATION
17 AUG	INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
08 AUG	UN-SPONSORED EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28 AUG	NEW MPR CONVENES
29 AUG	NEW MPR ANNOUNCES RESULTS OF EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM
28 OCT	NEW MPR SELECTS NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
06 NOV	PILGRIMAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (NATIONAL HOLIDAY)
10 NOV	NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT INSTALLED
12 NOV	8TH ANNIVERSARY OF DILI/SANTA CRUZ (EAST TIMOR) MASSACRE
13 NOV	1ST ANNIVERSARY OF ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY SHOOTING
07 DEC	24TH ANNIVERSARY OF EAST TIMOR INVASION
01 JAN	EAST TIMOR BECOMES INDEPENDENT (PENDING DIRECT BALLOTING VOTE OUTCOME, NEW MPR, & NEW PRESIDENT) (KEYS ID)

(S) CIVIL UNREST SUMMARY:

	DEMONSTRATIONS	RIOTS	OTHER
11-17 SEP 98	44	6	0
18-24 SEP 98	45	5	0
25 SEP-01 OCT 98	34	1	0
02-08 OCT 98	32	5	5
09-15 OCT 98	19	2	8
16-22 OCT 98	16	1	3
23-29 OCT 98	26	2	4
30 OCT-05 NOV 98	26	2	7
06-12 NOV 98	33	9	6
13-19 NOV 98	40	12	6
20-25 NOV 98	15	3	2
26 NOV-03 DEC 98	34	5	12
04-10 DEC 98	30	5	10
11-17 DEC 98	18	7	6
18-25 DEC 98	3	7	0
25-31 DEC 98	9	5	2
01-07 JAN 99	10	1	10
08-14 JAN 99	3	2	4
15-21 JAN 99	3	6	9
22-28 JAN 99	9	7	3
29 JAN-04 FEB 99	21	7	9
05-11 FEB 99	13	4	9
12-18 FEB 99	9	5	4
19-25 FEB 99	27	10	12
26 FEB-04 MAR 99	21	8	8
05-11 MAR 99	26	6	11
12-18 MAR 99	23	5	7
19-24 MAR 99	34	8	8
25 MAR-01 APR 99	16	9	7
02-08 APR 99	5	18	5
09-15 APR 99	15	9	18
16-22 APR 99	20	17	18
23-29 APR 99	19	7	24
30 APR-06 MAY 99	24	9	14
07-13 MAY 99	28	8	16
14-20 MAY 99	22	8	11

(KEYS ID)

(C) JICPAC ASSESSMENT: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA WILL LIKELY REMAIN TENSE AND VOLATILE. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD NOW IN PROGRESS AND THE NATION-WIDE UNIVERSITY SPRING SEMESTER ENDING 21 MAY, POLITICAL UNREST AND STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS WILL LIKELY INCREASE IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES. MEANWHILE, ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN MALUKU AND WEST KALIMANTAN, AS WELL AS SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA, WILL LIKELY CONTINUE FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR. IN EAST TIMOR, ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE ON A REGULAR BASIS, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF THE UN ADVANCE TEAM. THE CONTINUED ENVIRONMENT OF FEAR AND INTIMIDATION BY PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE MILITIAS WILL MAKE A FREE AND FAIR BALLOT ON 8 AUG INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. THE FREQUENCY AND LEVEL OF UNREST/VIOLENCE DURING THE NEXT SIX MONTHS WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE 7 JUN DPR ELECTIONS, THE 8 AUG EAST TIMOR AUTONOMY REFERENDUM, AND THE 28 OCT MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. (OSA MULITIPLE SOURCES) (KEYS ID)

4. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE PACOM AOR:

A. (U) SIGNIFICANT UPCOMING DATES:

NOTHING TO REPORT

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS:

---

21 MAY	INDIA/SRI LANKA	(U) ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1991)
21 MAY	ROK	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF THE KWANGJU RIOTS (1980), USUALLY MARKED BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS (WEEK LONG)
22 MAY	SRI LANKA	(U) REPUBLIC DAY (1972)/HEROES DAY
30 MAY	TAIWAN	(U) MEMORIAL DAY
01 JUN	PRC	(U) CHILDREN'S DAY
01 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (FIRST OF 3 DAYS)
01 JUN	NEW ZEALAND	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (1ST MONDAY)
01 JUN	PALAU	(U) PRESIDENT'S DAY
02 JUN	BHUTAN	(U) CORONATION OF JIGME SINGHE WANGCHUK
02 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (SECOND OF 3 DAYS)
03 JUN	SAMOA	(U) INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION CONCLUDES
04 JUN	TONGA	(U) EMANCIPATION DAY
06 JUN	INDIA	(U) ANNIVERSARY OF OPERATION BLUE STAR (1984)
06 JUN	ROK	(U) MEMORIAL DAY/LOYALTY DAY
08 JUN	AUSTRALIA	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (2ND MONDAY)
09 JUN	CHINESE WORLD	(U) DRAGON BOAT FESTIVAL (5/5)
12 JUN	PHILIPPINES	(U) INDEPENDENCE DAY
12 JUN	SOLOMON ISLANDS	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY (FRIDAY CLOSEST TO 14 JUN)
15 JUN	PAKISTAN	(U) ARREST OF MIR AMAL KANSI FOR MURDER OF CIA EMPLOYEES AT LANGLEY, VA (1997)
15 JUN	TUVALU	(U) QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY

[redacted]

Non responsive

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] NON responsive.

b(3)

[redacted] INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO OTHER US INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO JICPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.//
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL/X1
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

F-2003-00337

The National Security Archive

The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000
Fax: 202/994-7005
nsarchive@gwu.edu
www.nsarchive.org

February 27, 2003

Kathryn I. Dyer
FOIA and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Request under the FOIA, in reply please refer to Archive # 20030162CIA017

Dear Ms. Dyer:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), I hereby request disclosure of the following for inspection and possible copying:

All documents generated between April 1999 and May 1999 relating in whole or in part to:

1. The April 6, 1999 killings of as many as 50 East Timorese civilians in the church compound at Liquica, outside of Dili, East Timor;

2. The April 12-13, 1999 killings of East Timorese civilians and 2 Indonesian troops in the village of Cailaco in the Bobonaro district of East Timor.

3. The April 17, 1999 attack on the home of independence leader Manuel Carrascalao in Dili, East Timor.

4. The April 1999 militia killings of up to 100 persons in Suai, East Timor.

5. The May 1999 killing of 30 East Timorese in Atara, East Timor.

Documents pertaining to this request include but are not limited to cables, reports, memoranda, and finished intelligence.

If you regard any of these documents as potentially exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements, I request that you nonetheless exercise your discretion to disclose them. As the FOIA requires, please release all reasonably segregable nonexempt portions of documents. To permit me to reach an intelligent and informed decision whether or not to file an administrative appeal of any denied material, please describe any withheld records (or portions thereof) and explain the basis for your exemption claims.

As you know, the National Security Archive qualifies for waiver of search and review fees as a representative of the news media. This request is made as part of a scholarly and news research project and not for commercial use. For details on the Archive's research and publication activities, please see our Web site at the address above. Please notify me before incurring photocopying costs over $100.

An Independent non-governmental research institute and library located at the George Washington University, the Archive collects and publishes declassified documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Publication royalties and tax deductible contributions through The National Security Archive Fund, Inc. underwrite the Archive's Budget.

To expedite the release of the requested documents, please disclose them on an interim basis as they become available to you, without waiting until all the documents have been processed. If you have any questions regarding the identity of the records, their location, the scope of the request or any other matters, please call Barbara Elias at (202) 994-7219 or e-mail belias@gwu.edu. I look forward to receiving your response within the twenty-day statutory time period.

Sincerely,

Barbara Elias

for Brad Simpson
National Security Archive Staff Fellow

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 19 2004

Case Control No. 200401404
Archives #20030162CIA017

Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Mr. Simpson:

I refer to your letter dated February 27, 2003 to the Central Intelligence Agency, requesting the release of certain material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552). Sixty of the relevant documents retrieved in response to your request originated with the Department of State and were therefore referred to us for appropriate action. Twenty-eight of these documents are duplicates of documents either previously released to the National Security Archives or reviewed for possible release within the last two years. One document was not relevant to your request.

Of the remaining thirty-one documents, we have determined that twelve may be released, fifteen may be released with excisions, and four may not be released.

The material in the excised portions of thirteen of the documents released in part and in the four documents withheld in full is currently and properly classified under Executive Order 12958 in the interest of national defense or foreign relations. As such, it is exempt from release under subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act.

The material in the excised portions of six of the documents released in part is of such a nature that its release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. As such, it is exempt from release under subsection (b)(6) of the Freedom of Information Act.

20030162CIA017 DOS
RECNO:29481 SEQCOR:109052
8/24/2004 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Indonesia/East Timor April-May 1999

In some cases, two or more exemptions may apply to the same document. In the case of a document released in part, all non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released.

You have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. Appeals should be addressed to the Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/RPS/IPS/PP/LC, SA-2, Room 8100, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20522-8100. The letter of appeal should refer to the case number shown above. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

Sincerely,

Margaret P. Grafeld
Director
Office of Information Programs
and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

UNCLASSIFIED

MORI DocID: 1054572

UNCLASSIFIED

(C2)

DOCUMENT_ID: 183153055
DOCNO: 002119
PRODUCER: BONN
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990422
TOR: 073011
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904221114
MHFNO: 99 5172059
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
ZNR UUUUU ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI5842
PP RUEHZL RUEHC
DE RUEHOL #2119 1121114
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221114Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0861
INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0111
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
BT

CONTROLS
UNCLAS BONN 002119

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, PHUM, EUN, UN, ID, GM
SUBJECT: FRG/EU PRES - MORE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR

1. DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENCY ON 4/20/99 ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE CONTINUED VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR. THIS DOCUMENT AND ALL OTHER EU PRESIDENCY DECLARATIONS CAN BE FOUND AT THE GERMAN EU PRESIDENCY WEB SITE, HTTP://WWW.EU-PRESIDENCY.DE/, IN ENGLISH.

2. TEXT OF STATEMENT:

THE EUROPEAN UNION IS DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT SINCE ITS APRIL 12 DECLARATION VIOLENCE HAS ESCALATED SUBSTANTIALLY IN EAST TIMOR. IN DILI, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS HAVE CARRIED OUT NEW ATTACKS ON 17 AND 18 APRIL KILLING SOME THIRTY UNARMED CIVILIANS AND INJURING MANY MORE. THE TEENAGE SON OF MANUEL JOSE CARRASCALAO, SPEAKER OF CONSELHO NACIONAL DA RESISTENCIA TIMORENSE, IS REPORTED TO BE AMONGST THOSE KILLED. THE EU IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE OCCURRED WITHIN A SHORT DISTANCE OF

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/04 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE MILITARY COMMAND OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES STATIONED IN EAST TIMOR AND THAT THOSE FORCES DID NOT INTERVENE IN ORDER TO PREVENT OR STOP THE INCIDENT.

THE EU STRONGLY CONDEMNS THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND URGES ALL PARTIES IN THE TERRITORY OF EAST TIMOR TO SHOW THE UTMOST RESTRAINT IN ORDER TO AVOID FURTHER SUCH INCIDENTS. THE EU EXPRESSES ITS DEEP CONCERN THAT THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES WERE UNABLE TO PREVENT THE NEW ATTACKS RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF INNOCENT HUMAN LIVES. THE EU NOTES IN THIS CONTEXT THE FACT THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS LIKEWISE CONDEMNED THESE ATTACKS AND TAKEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENT. THE EU URGES THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY TO ASSUME ITS RESPONSIBILITY AND TO ENSURE THAT VIOLENCE WILL NOT RECUR. THE EU AGAIN REITERATES ITS POSITION THAT IT REMAINS THE OBLIGATION OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN AND PRESERVE SECURITY, STABILITY AND PUBLIC ORDER IN EAST TIMOR, TO DISARM MILITIAS AND HOLD ACCOUNTABLE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KILLINGS.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A UN PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR IS URGENTLY NEEDED TO HELP PREVENT FURTHER VIOLENT CLASHES IN EAST TIMOR. THE EU URGES THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO RECOGNISE THIS NEED AND TO ALLOW THE UN TO DEPLOY ITS PERSONNEL IN THE TERRITORY.

THE EU UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ONGOING TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH REMAINS THE ONLY WAY TO REACH A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE AND INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE EAST TIMORESE ISSUE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR AND THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

POLT

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

C6

DOCUMENT_ID: 183171836
DOCNO: 002088
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990426
TOR: 070455
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904261019
MHFNO: 99 5214921
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNR UUUUU ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI2141
OO RUEHZS RUEHC
DE RUEHJA #2088/01 1161019
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261019Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7454
INFO RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0939
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1069
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4864
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0121
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2068
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0301
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3127
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1079
BT

CONTROLS
UNCLAS JAKARTA 002088

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, EAID, ID
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM IMPRISONED EAST TIMOR RESISTANCE LEADER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON

1. ON APRIL 25 POST RECEIVED A LETTER, DATE APRIL 23, FROM IMPRISONED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO TO PRESIDENT CLINTON. THE LETTER WAS TRANSMITTED VIA UNSECURE FAX FROM THE JAKARTA OFFICE OF EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE (CNRT). TEXT OF THAT MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/04 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BEGIN TEXT:

PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON DC
USA

23 APRIL 1999

DEAR PRESIDENT CLINTON,

ON 5 MARCH 1999, I HAD THE HONOUR AND THE PRIVILEGE TO MEET WITH SECRETARY OF STATE, MADAM MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM THE GOVERMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR. SINCE, THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND HAS CONSIDERABLY DETERIORATED AND I AM NOW TAKING THE LIBERTY OF DRAWING YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS FACT.

IT WAS ALREADY MY CONVICTION THAT THE `PEACE ACCORD' SIGNED ON 21 APRIL 1999 WOULD NOT GUARANTEE IN THE LEAST THE SECURITY OF THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR.

ABRI'S STRATEGY IN FOMENTING THE LIQUICA AND DILI MASSACRES WAS AIMED AT DERAILING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN NEW YORK, WHICH WAS TO BE THE LAST ROUND, AND THEREFORE A CRUCIAL ONE FOR THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE.

WITH THE INTENTION OF RESTORING A CLIMATE OF CALM TO THE POPULATION ON THE ONE HAND, NOT WISHING TO BE ACCUSED OF REJECTING ANY PEACE PROPOSAL ON THE OTHER, AND BEARING IN MIND THE IMMINENCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK, WE FELT THAT IT WAS OUR DUTY TO CONTRIBUTE TO A DIFFERENT ATMOSPHERE IN THE WHOLE PROCESS.

HOWEVER, IN THE AFTERNOON FOLLOWING THE SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT, FIVE YOUTHS WERE MURDERED IN BAZAR TET: ALBERTO DOS SANTOS, MIGUEL, ABILIO DE ARAUJO, DOMINGOS DOS SANTOS (ALL BROTHERS) AND THEIR COUSIN FLORINDO PAULO DA COSTA.

IN HERA, ANOTHER THREE YOUTHS WERE MURDERED THAT SAME AFTERNOON. THE FOLLOWING DAY, ON 22 APRIL 1999, THIRTY SUTDENTS WERE DETAINED NEAR BEKORA (DILI).

ON 22 APRIL 1999, IN SUAI (ZUMALAI), IN THE VILLAGE OF LABARAI - DUSUN HOLBELIS, VARIOUS SOURCES INCLUDING TWO EMBASSIES IN JAKARTA REPORTED THAT THE RATIH MILITIA GROUP HAD KILLED MANY DOZENS OF PEOPLE. AT THE MOMENT, SELECTIVE ASSASSINATIONS ARE BEING COMMITTED THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORY.

IN MAUBARA, THE MILITIAS TOGETHER WITH THE INDONESIAN MILITARY HAVE SET UP TEN CHECK POINTS ALONG THE ROAD TO RIBEIRA LOIS, WHERE THEY ASK ALL THE PASSERSBY FOR THEIR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS (INDONESIAN), AND THOSE WHO DO NOT HAVE ANY ARE SEVERELY BEATEN.

IN VIKEKE, BAUKAU AND SAME, THE POPULATION CONTINUES TO BE SUBJECTED TO THREATS AND IS BEING FORCED TO SIGN DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF INTEGRATION. SIMILAR THREATS AND COERCION ARE BEING EMPLOYED AGAINST THE PEOPLE IN AREAS OF DILI.

IN HOLARUA, SAME, THE HOMES OF THE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN BURNT DOWN BY THE MILITIAS.

PHONE CONNECTIONS IN THE INTERIOR OF THE TERRITORY HAVE BEEN CUT OFF, MAKING COMMUNICATION EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.

THE "PEACE ACCORD" WAS AN ACT DESIGNED TO RELIEVE WIRANTO OF THE GUILT OF HAVING GIVEN HIS CONSENT TO THE LIQUICA AND DILI MASSACRES. THE "PEACE ACCORD" DISREGARDS THE QUESTION OF THE IDENTITY OF THE PERPETRATORS OF THESE MURDERS AND ALSO THE ROLE OF ABRI.

IN SIGNING THE ACCORD, IT WAS OUR HOPE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PURSUE A JUST AND RAPID SOLUTION TO THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION.

IT IS WITH SADNESS THAT WE HAVE LEARNT THAT THE AGREEMENT CURRENTLY THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK WILL ONLY BE SIGNED ON 5 MAY. THE UN WILL REQUIRE BETWEEN 15 AND 30 DAYS TO PREPARE FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE FIRST GROUP OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS.

MR PRESIDENT,

ABRI IS WELL AWARE OF ITS FAILURE IN EAST TIMOR, AND IN REALITY IT HAS KNOWN THIS SINCE THE FIRST DAY OF ITS COWARDLY AND SHAMEFUL INVASION ON 7 DECEMBER 1975.

THE DECLARATIONS OF THE HARD-LINE GENERALS (VETERANS OF THE WAR IN EAST TIMOR AND MEMBERS OF KOPASSUS AND THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE) ALONG WITH EVERYTHING WHICH HAS HAPPENED SINCE JANUARY THIS YEAR, ARE MORE THAN SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT ABRI REFUSES TO ACCEPT THE SECOND OPTION OFFERED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT HABIBIE.

ABRI IS EXTERMINATING THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR, MR. PRESIDENT.

I WILL NOT DRAW ON COMPARISONS WITH THE REACTION OF NATO TO THE KOSOVO PROBLEM.

TODAY I APPREAL TO YOUR SPIRIT OF JUSTICE. FOR 23 YEARS AND COMPLETELY ALONE, WE HAVE SUFFERED A PHYSICAL GENOCIDE INVOLVING OVER 250,000 EAST TIMORESE, ALONG WITH A CULTURAL AND ETHNIC GENOCIDE.

NOW AS THE DAY OF BEING FINALLY GRANTED OUR RIGHT TO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECIDE OUR OWN FUTURE DRAWS CLOSER, THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR ARE AT THE MERCY OF THE MURDEROUS INDONESIAN MILITARY AND OF THE MONSTER IT HAS CREATED AND SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORY: THE MILITIAS.

THIS MESSAGE I WRITE TO YOU TODAY IS NOTHING BUT AN APPEAL, MR PRESIDENT, AS IT CAN BE NOTHING MORE THAN THAT.

SAVE THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE FROM SENSELESS SLAUGHTER! ONLY AN URGENT AND IMMEDIATE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CAN STOP THIS NEW CARNAGE AND RESTORE TO THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE THE PEACE AND TRANQUILITY THEY HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF FOR TWENTY THREE YEARS.

WITHOUT THE URGENT AND IMMEDIATE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NOTHING CAN GUARATEE THAT OUR PEOPLE WILL NOT BE EXTERMINATED.

THE LIFE OF THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE NOW DEPENDS ON YOUR DECISION, MR PRESIDENT.

WITH MY VERY BEST WISHES

KAY RALA XANANA GUSMAO
PRESIDENT OF THE CNRT

END TEXT.

ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

C10

DOCUMENT_ID: 183173292
DOCNO: 002035
PRODUCER: LISBON
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990426
TOR: 115458
DOCPREC: R
ORIGDATE: 199904261342
MHFNO: 99 5218887
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER
RR RUEAIIA
ZNR UUUUU ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI3946
RR RUEHC
DE RUEHLI #2035 1161342
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261342Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2780
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0142
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0723
BT

CONTROLS
UNCLAS LISBON 002035

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, US, ID, PO
SUBJECT: PRO-EAST TIMOR GROUP ASKS U.S. TO ASSIST IN STOPPING VIOLENCE

1. ON APRIL 23 POST RECEIVED IDENTICAL LETTERS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE PRESIDENT ASKING THE USG TO USE ITS PRESTIGE TO PERSUADE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO END THE VIOLENCE AND COOPERATE WITH THE UN TO ARRIVE AT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN EAST TIMOR. THE LETTERS WERE SIGNED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE "FORUM TIMORENSE" AND DATED APRIL 22. POST HAS HAD NO PREVIOUS CONTACT WITH THIS GROUP.

2. TEXT OF THE LETTERS FOLLOWS:

-- THE LAST MASSACRES OCCURRED IN EAST TIMOR (IN LIQUICA AND DILI) ARE A THREAT FOR PEACE AND A CONTINUOUS VIOLATION OF THE ELEMENTARY HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TERRITORY. IN LIQUICA WERE KILLED 42 PERSONS, OF WHICH 15 WERE WOMEN AND 22 WERE CHILDREN, SOME OF THEM BABIES. IN DILI WERE MURDERED AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF UNDEFENDED CIVILIAN YOUTHS.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-- WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE MILITIAS IN EAST TIMOR ARE A CREATION OF THE INDONESIAN ARMY TO PROMOTE DISORDER, SOCIAL INSTABILITY AND CIVILIAN WAR, IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY NEW MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST THE EAST-TIMORESE PEOPLE AND TO PERPETUATE THE ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THE COUNTRY.

-- WE ARE AFRAID THAT MORE AND MORE PEOPLE MAY BE KILLED IN THE FUTURE IN EAST TIMOR IF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE WORLD, THE FREE AND CIVILIZED WORLD, DOES NOT DO ANYTHING TO STOP THEM.

-- IN THE NAME OF PEACE THAT YOU ARE A DEFENDER AROUND THE WORLD (E.G. KUWAIT, IRAQ AND KOSOVO), IN THE NAME OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES, WE APPEAL TO YOU TO USE YOUR PRESTIGE CLOSE TO THE JAKARTA GOVERNMENT TO:
-- 1. STOP IMMEDIATELY THE PERSECUTION OF CIVILIAN AND YOUTHS, DEFENDERS OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE IN EAST TIMOR;
-- 2. REQUEST THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL DEATHS IN EAST TIMOR, CLOSE TO THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY POWER IN EAST TIMOR;
-- 3. DISARM AND QUARTER ALL MEMBERS OF THE MILITIAS;
-- 4. WITHDRAW INDONESIAN MILITARY FORCES FROM EAST TIMOR;
-- 5. PROVIDE A UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN EAST TIMOR TO GUARANTEE PEACE AND THE FREEDOM OF CHOICE FOR ITS FUTURE;
-- 6. FORCE THE JAKARTA GOVERNMENT TO FIND AN AGREEMENT IN THE PRESENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH PORTUGAL, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
END TEXT.

MCGOWAN

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

C14

DOCUMENT_ID: 183136658
DOCNO: 072333
PRODUCER: WASHDC
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: OUT
DOR: 19990419
TOR: 210824
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904200104
MHFNO: 99 5132990
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #2333/01 1100106
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200104Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0382
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4560
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0526
RUEHKOF/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA IMMEDIATE 9324
RUEHKON/AMCONSUL NAGOYA IMMEDIATE 2641
RUHBBMA/AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE 3048
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE 6328
RUEHKOS/AMCONSUL SAPPORO IMMEDIATE 7689
RUEHJA/AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE 9749
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8118
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0063
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4850
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 3535
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5661
RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 6605
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2753
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0371
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUAGAMS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJCJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//PRIORITY
RUAGAMS/CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMHAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
RUCJACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 5512
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0748
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 4098
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 6309
BT

CONTROLS
UNCLAS STATE 072333

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: APRIL 19, 1999 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS - ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF - ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
UNVIE FOR FITZPATRICK
USEU FOR RUTR

1. INDEX:

-- U.S. - JAPAN SUECABINET MEETING PARAS 2 - 3
-- BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON U.S. - JAPAN SUBCABINET MEETINGS PARAS 2 - 4
-- ATTACK IN EAST TIMOR PARAS 5 - 6
-- INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR PARAS 7 - 8
-- INDONESIA: INDONESIA'S LARGEST MOSQUE BOMBED PARAS 7 AND 9
-- TAIWAN - POSSIBLE SHIP SALE PARAS 7 AND 10

2. THE FOLLOWING NOTICES WERE ISSUED BY THE OFFICE 0F THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ON 4/19/99.

3. U.S. - JAPAN SUBCABINET MEETING

U.S. AND JAPANESE DELEGATIONS WILL PARTICIPATE IN A BILATERAL SUBOABINET-LEVEL MEETING TO-PREPARE FOR THE MAY 3 CLINTON-OBUCHI SUMMIT. THE MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE AT THE NATIONAL EOREIGN AFFAIRS TRAINING CENTER, 4000 ARLINGTON BOULEVARD, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA, BEGINNING AT 2:00 P.M. ON APRIL 21.

THE U.S. DELEGATION WILL BE LED BY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL DEPUTY DIRECTOR LAEL BRAINARD, AND WILL INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE STATE, COMMERCE, TREASURY, AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENTS, AS WELL AS USTR AND THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS. UNDER SECRETARY EIZENSTAT WILL LEAD THE STATE DEPARTMENT CONTINGENT.

DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS KOICHI HARAGUCHI WILL HEAD A JAPANESE DELEGATION THAT INCLUDES REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, THE MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE ECONOMIC PLANNING AGENCY, AND THE JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION.

THERE WILL BE A CAMERA SPRAY (POOL COVERAGE) AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING. THOSE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING SHOULD CONTACT KENNETH BAILES, AT 647-2538.

4. BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON U.S. - JAPAN SUBCABINET MEETINGS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ON TUESDAY, APRIL 20, AT 2 P.M. REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE WILL BRIEF THE PRESS ON BACKGROUND IN ADVANCE OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SUBCABINET TALKS TAKING PLACE THIS WEEK.

MEDIA WITH DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS IDENTIFICATION SHOULD PROCEED DIRECTLY TO ROOM 1406. THOSE WITHOUT STATE DEPARTMENT IDS SHOULD ARRANGE FOR ADVANCE CLEARANCE WITH MS. SHARON ROGERS AT 647-5968.
5. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ON 4/17/99.

6. ATTACK IN EAST TIMOR

WE WERE DEEPLY DISTURBED BY REPORTS THAT ARMED MILITIAS FAVORING CONTINUED INTEGRATION WITH INDONESIA ATTACKED CIVILIANS IN DILI, THE CAPITAL OF EAST TIMOR, CAUSING THE DEATHS OF AT LEAST 8 PEOPLE AND PERHAPS MORE. WE URGENTLY CALL ON THE INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS TO BRING THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS UNDER CONTROL AND FULFIL THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO PROTECT ALL PERSONS IN EAST TIMOR. MOREOVER, WE LOOK TO THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO BRING THE PERPETRATORS OF THESE VIOLENT ATTACKS TO JUSTICE.

7. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 04/19/99 AND NOT USED BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE DAILY BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

8. INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR

CONTEXT: ARMED PRO-INTEGRATIONIST CIVILIAN MILITIAS WENT ON A RAMPAGE APRIL 17 AFTER A RALLY IN DILI, THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL. SOME ATTACKED THE HOUSE OF MANUEL CARRASCALAO, A PROMINENT PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADER, KILLING UP TO 20 PEOPLE WHO SOUGHT SHELTER AT HIS RESIDENCE. REPORTEDLY, OVER 100 OTHERS WHO WERE THERE ARE MISSING. MILITIAS ATTACKED OTHER NEIGHBORHOODS. THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (TNI, FORMERLY ABRI) AND POLICE DID NOT INTERVENE DURING THESE EVENTS (ALTHOUGH THE EMBASSY REPORTS THAT SOME WITNESSES CLAIM THAT POLICE AND ARMY TROOPS FIRED INTO ONE NEIGHBORHOOD WHEN MILITIAS WERE ASSAULTING IT). IRISH FM ANDREWS, WHO WAS IN DILI SAW SOME OF THE RAMPAGE AND WAS FORCED TO TAKE REFUGE IN THE HOME OF BISHOP BELO. EMBASSY JAKARTA REPORTS THAT MILITIAS CONTINUED AS OF MID-DAY APRIL 18 TO OPERATE IN DILI WITHOUT CONSTRAINTS. A KEY ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON EAST TIMOR HAS CONDEMNED THE VIOLENCE AND ACCEPTED GOI RESPONSIBILITY FOR NOT CONTROLLING THE SITUATION. DEFENSE MINISTER GENERAL WIRANTO IS ON HIS WAY TO EAST TIMOR AND HAS SAID HE IS OPEN TO AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OF EVENTS. THE U.S., WHICH AT SENIOR LEVELS (SECRETARY ALBRIGHT, SECDEF COHEN AND OTHERS) HAS BEEN URGING THE GOI TO DISARM THE CIVILIAN MILITIAS, ISSUED A TOUGH STATEMENT OVER THE WEEKEND AND

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

HAS APPROACHED THE GOL OVER THE LATEST EVENTS. CINCPAC ADMIRAL BLAIR REACHED GENERAL WIRANTO BY PHONE TO URGE HLM TO TAKE DECISIVE ACTION TO RESTORE CALM. MEANWHILE, THE GOL HAS FINISHED THE REVISION 0F THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE IT WILL DISCUSS IN THE UN-SPONSORED MARKER TALKS, AND FM ALATAS IS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN NEW YORK IN THE SESSION ON APRIL 22.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR AND UN PEACE TALKS.

A: ARMED PRO-INTEGRATIONIST CIVILIAN MILITIAS LAUNCHED A SERIES OF BLOODY ATTACKS APRIL 17 AFTER A RALLY IN DILI, THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF EAST TIMOR. SOME ATTACKED THE HOUSE OF MANUEL CARRASCALAO, A PROMINENT PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADER, KILLING UP TO 20 PEOPLE WHO SOUGHT SHELTER AT HIS RESIDENCE. REPORTEDLY, OVER 100 OTHERS WHO WERE ALSO THERE ARE MISSING. MILITIAS ATTACKED OTHER NEIGHBORHOODS. IT 15 CREDIBLY REPORTED THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (TNI, FORMERLY ABRI) AND POLICE STOOD BY AND DID NOT INTERVENE TO HALT THIS VIOLENCE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM EMBASSY REPORTING THAT MILITIAS CONTINUE ON APRIL 18 TO OPERATE NITHOUT CONSTRAINT IN DILI.

-- AS WE STATED THIS WEEKEND, THE UNITED STATES IS DEEPLY TROUBLED BY THIS MURDEROUS OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE BY CIVILIAN MILITIAS IN DILI. NE REPEAT IN THE STRONGEST TERMS OUR PREVIOUS CALLS FOR THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (TNI) TO TAKE BACK NEAPONS IT HAD PROVIDED THESE MILITIAS, AND TO DISBAND THEM. NE NOTE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT'S CONDEMNATION OF THE VIOLENCE, BUT CALL FOR EFFECTIVE GOI STEPS TO CONTROL THE MILITIAS, CHECK FURTHER DETERIORATION IN EAST TIMOR, AND FACILITATE THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS. DEFENSE MINISTER NIRANTO IS ON HIS WAY TO EAST TIMOR, AND NE URGE HLM TO ENSURE SECURITY FORCES FULFILL THE DUTIES THEY HAVE CLEARLY NEGLECTED BY PROTECTING VICTIMS OR VIGILANTE MILITIAS. THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS VIOLENCE MUST SNIFTLY BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE AND PUNISHED.

-- AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH HAS EMPHASIZED DURING HIS JUST CONCLUDED VISIT TO JAKARTA LAST NEEK, THE U.S. CONTINUES TO URGE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO ALLOW AS CONFIDENCE BUILDING STEPS IN EAST TIMOR, ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE THERE AND FACILITATION OR HUMANITARIAN, PARTICULARLY MEDICAL, ASSISTANCE. THE U.S. ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORTS IMMEDIATE ENGAGEMENT OF THE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION UNDER THE AUSPICES OR THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO ENCOURAGE PEACE AND CALM IN THE TERRITORY.

-- IN ADDITION, NE SUPPORT IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE ON THE GROUND TO PREPARE FOR AN ANTICIPATED VOTE ON AN AUTONOMY PACKAGE FOR EAST TIMOR. NE UNDERSTAND THAT THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE WILL BE DISCUSSED, AND POSSIBLY FINALIZED, IN NEN YORK ON APRIL 22 IN THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NEXT ROUND CE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER UN AUSPICES. THESE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR'S EUTURE STATUS NILL INVOLVE THE EOREIGN MINISTERS 0E INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL.

9. INDONESIA: INDONESIA'S LARGEST MOSQUE BOMBED

CONTEXT: ACCORDING TO PRESS AND EMBASSY REPORTS, A BOMB EXPLODED TODAY AT 3:15 PM LOCAL TIME IN JAKARTA'S AL-ISTIQLAL MOSQUE, INDONESIA'S LARGEST. 300 PEOPLE WERE PEREORMING AETERNOON PRAYERS AT THE TIME 0E THE BLAST, WHICH REPORTEDLY WOUNDED 6 PEOPLE. THUS EAR, NO ONE HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. EMBASSY JAKARTA HAS ISSUED A NARDEN NOTICE, ALERTING U.S. CITIZENS IN INDONESIA 0E THE INCIDENT AND URGING CAUTION.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE BLAST AT INDONESIA'S LARGEST MOSQUE?

A: NE UNDERSTAND THAT A BOMB EXPLODED IN INDONESIA'S NATIONAL MOSQUE IN JAKARTA ON THE AETERNOON OF APRIL 19. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT SIX PERSONS WERE WOUNDED. THUS EAR, NO ONE HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. NE HAVE NO REPORTS THAT AMERICANS WERE AEEECTED BY THIS OCCURRENCE.

-- NE CONDEMN VIOLENCE EROM ANY SOURCE. INDONESIA IS UNDERGOING A EUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSITION, WHICH IS CREATING OR EXACERBATING TENSIONS IN THE SOCIETY. VIOLENT EXPRESSIONS 0E ERUSTRATION OR GRIEVANCE THREATEN TO DESTABILIZE THE SOCIETY, TO THE DETRIMENT 0E ALL.

-- NE CALL ON ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND RENOUNCE VIOLENCE. NE URGE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO CONDUCT A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION AND ENSURE THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE EOR THIS CRIME ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE AND HELD ACCOUNTABLE.

10. TAINAN - POSSIBLE SHIP SALE

CONTEXT: TWO KNOX-CLASS FRIGATES WERE SOLD TO TAIWAN IN APRIL 1998. TAIWAN HAS BEEN LEASING 6 ADDITIONAL KNOX SHIPS FROM THE U.S. FOR SEVERAL YEARS. TAIWAN HAS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN CONVERTING THEIN FROM LEASE TO SALE. THE U.S. ALSO SOLD AN LSD-38 TO TAIWAN ON MARCH 16, 1999. CONGRESS PASSED ENABLING LEGISLATION PERMITTING THE SALE OF THIS LSD AS EXCESS EQUIPMENT. IN ADDITION, A SECOND LANDING SHIP AND A SALVAGE VESSEL MAY ALSO BE SOLD THIS YEAR. THE SALVAGE SHIP REQUIRES CONGRESSIONAL.

NOTIFICATION, BUT THE LANDING CRAFT WILL REQUIRE ENABLING LEGISIATION AS EXCESS EQUIPMENT. NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE PENDING CONIPLETION OF NOTIFICATION OR PASSAGE OF THE NECESSARY LEGISIATION.

Q: IS THE U.S. PROVIDING SOME USED NAVAL VESSELS TO TAIWAN?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

A: TWO KNOX-CLASS FRIGATES WERE SOLD TO TAIWAN IN 1998. TAIWAN PRESENTLY LEASES 6 ADDITIONAL KNOX-CLASS FRIGATES FROM THE U.S. IN ADDITION, THE U.S. SOLD AN LSD-38 ANCHORAGE-CLASS SUPPLY LANDING SHIP IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR.

-- THE U.S. SELLS ITEMS TO TAIWAN FOR ITS SELF-DEFENSE CONSISTENT WITH OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT AND THE 1982 U.S.-PRC COMMUNIQUE. WE DO NOT HAVE ANY ANNOUNCEMENTS OF ANY NEW OR CONTEMPLATED SALES AT THIS TIME.
ALBRIGHT

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

C17

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT ID: 183148273
DOCNO: 001955
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990421
TOR: 134916
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904211341
MHFNO: 99 5161912
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
VSC988
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHJA #1955/01 1111341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (TAO)
O 211341Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7337
INFO RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0100
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 4816
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2039
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 0920
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 0016
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0285
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001955
ROME FOR THE VATICAN
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/03

TEXT
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, PINR, PHUM, ID
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: AGREEMENT SETS TRUCE TERMS AND ESTABLISHES PEACE COMMISSION IN EAST TIMOR

REF: A) JAKARTA 1923, (NOTAL) B) JAKARTA 1928 (NOTAL)

1. (U) CLASSIFED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (U) SEE ACTIOM RECOMMENDATION PARA 7.

3. (U) FOLLOWING ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE CIVILIANS IN DILI OVER RKCENT DAYS, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS HAVE

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

SIGNED A "TRUCE" WITH THEIR RIVALS. THE SIGNING WAS WITTNESSED BY ARMEL) FORCES COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO, WHO ARRIVEE) LATE APRIL 20, AND BY BISUOP BELO. IMPRISONED RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO GAVE HIS APPROVAL FOR THE RESISTANCE TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT. SIGNERS WERE: FOR THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE "CNRT:" XANANA (NOT PHYSICALLY PRESENT) AND LIANDRO ISAC; FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS: JOAO TOVARES AND DOMINGO SOARES; FOR THE GOVERNMENT: GOVERNOR ABILIO SOARES AND DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE DPRD MARIANO LOPEZ DA CRUZ; FOR THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION: JOKO SUBIANTO; FOR THE MILITARY (TNI): COL. TONO SURATMAN; AND FOR THE POLICE: COL. TIMBUL SILAEN.

4. (U) THE AGREEMENT INCLUDED FIVE POINTS:

-- ALL SIDES SHALL END ALL FORMS OF HOSTILITY, INTIMIDATION, TERROR AND VIOLENCE;

-- ALL SIDES ARE OBLIGATED TO HELP CREATE PEACE AND TRANQUILITY;

-- ALL SIDES SHALL SUPPORT THK DESIRE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND EFFORTS OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH TO BRING ABOUT RECONCILIATION, RESPECT AND ENFORCE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENFORCE THE LAW;

-- ALL PARTIES SHALL TAKE STEPS TO GUARANTEE THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT BY THEIR SUPPORTERS WHETHER ARMED OR UNARMED;

-- TO OVERSKE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT A PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSTON IS FORMED WHOSE MEMBERSHIP WILL CONSIST OF TWO PERSONS FROM EACH OF THE AGREEING PARTIES. THE COMMISSION WILL BEGIN ITS WORK IN TWO DAYS (APRIL 23) .

5. (U) WHILE PRESS REPORTS CLAIM THAT PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS SAIL)THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD LEAD TO THEIR DISARMAMENT, A JOURNALIST ON THE SCENE WHO INTERVIEWED KURICO GUTEREZ, A PROMINENT MILITIA LEADER, TOLD US THAT GUTEREZ SAIE) SO LONG AS THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE RESISTANCE HAD ARMS, THE PRO-INTEGRATION SIDE WOULD RETAIN THEIRS. ON THE OTHER HAND, MILITIA SPOKESMAN ABILIO SOARES IS QUOTED) IN A REUTERS REPORT AS STATING THAT "WHILE THE PEACE DOCUMENT DID NOT INCLUDE DISARMAMENT, MILITIAS HAD TOLD WIRANTO THAT THEY WOULD LAY DOWN (NOTE: NOT "SURRENDER") THEIR ARMS." MANUEL CARRASCALAO, A SENIOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURE IN DILI, WUOSE HOUSE WAS THE TARGET OF THE BLOODIEST ASSAULT ON APRIL 17, TOLD THE SAME JOURNALIST THAT, THE AGREEMENT NOTWITHSTANDING, HE DID NOT INTEND TO ABANDON THE POLICE PROTECTION HE AND SOME OF HIS FAMILY ARE BEING ACCORDED.

6. (C) COMMENT: WIRANTO'S PERSONNEL INVOLVEMENT WITH

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS AGREEMENT AND THE PARTICIPATION OF THE MILITARY AND POLICK ON THE COMMISSION WOULD APPEAR TO OFFER SOME GUARANTEE THAT THE MIIJTIAS, EVEN TF NOT FULLY DISARMED, MIGHT AT LEAST PEFRAIN FROM THE HTGH LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN WHICH THEY HAVE RECENTLY ENGAGED. XANANA'S SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT AND HIS PERSONAL ASSURANCES TO A/S ROTH AND MOST RECENTLY TO AMBASSADOR ROY THAT HE WOULD DIRECT HIS FORCES TO STAND DOWN FROM ARMED ACTIVITIES SIMILARLY WARRANT SOME HOPE THAT A BASIS HAS BEEN LAID FOR A PEACEFUL CONSTULTATION PROCESS. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THAT BASIS IS EXCEEDINGLY FRAGILE. IN THE COMING DAYS, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR AIJ, INVOLVED TO UNDERTAKE

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES TO UNDERGIRD THIS AGREEMENT. THE GOI'S DECISION TO ALLOW ICRC TO RRING TN MEDICAI, PERSONNEL (SEPTEL) CLEARLY FALLS INTO THAT CATEGORY. AN ACCOUNTING OF PERSONS MISSING SINCE THE APRIL 17 ATTACK ON CARAASCALAO'S HOUSE AND SAID TO BE IN MILITIA DETENTION (SEE REFTELS AND SEPTEL) WOULD OBVIOUSLY REDUCE TENSIONS AS WELL.

7: (C) POST RECOMMENDS DEPARTMENT CONSIDER STATEMENT WELCOMING THIS AGREEMENT, NOTING THAT ITS SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION WILL REQUIRE GOOD FAITH AMONG ALL PARTIES. ROY.

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E20

DOCUMENT_ID: 183102928
DOCNO: 068553
PRODUCER: WASHDC
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: OUT
DOR: 19990413
TOR: 211127
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904140106
MHFNO: 99 5059480
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #8553/01 1040109
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140106Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0191
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4344
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0292
RUEHJA/AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE 9738
RUEHKOF/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA IMMEDIATE 9307
RUEHKON/AMCONSUL NAGOYA IMMEDIATE 2627
RUHBBMA/AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE 3031
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE 6307
RUEHKOS/AMCONSUL SAPPORO IMMEDIATE 7671
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE IMMEDIATE 0824
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY IMMEDIATE 4582
RUEHPT/AMCONSUL PERTH IMMEDIATE 3772
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE 8814
RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE 4720
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE 1910
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7910
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 5939
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4553
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 3240
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5483
RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 6561
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2623
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0001
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUAGAMS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//PRIORITY
RUAGAMS/CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMHAH/CINCPACELT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
RUCJACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AEB EL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 5259
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0476
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 3967
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 6238
BT

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTROLS
UNCLAS STATE 068553

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: APRIL 13, 1999 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS - ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF - ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
UNVIE FOR FITZPATRICK
USEU FOR RUTH

1. INDEX:

-- KOREA: FOUR PARTY TALKS: FIFTH PLENARY TO CONVENE APRIL 24 PARAS 2 - 3
-- DPRK: FOUR PARTY TALKS: FIFTH PLENARY TO MEET APRIL 24 PARAS 4 - 5
-- JAPAN - ELECTION OF SHINTARO ISHIHARA AS TOKYO GOVERNOR PARAS 4 AND 6
-- AUSTRALIA: CARE AUSTRALIA PERSONNEL DETAINED BY YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT PARAS 4 AND -
-- INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR UPDATE PARAS 4 AND 8
-- PHILIPPINES: DEPORTATION OF U.S. CITIZEN PARAS 4 AND 9
-- BURMA: U.S. INVESTMENT VERSUS LABOR RIGHTS PARAS 4 AND 10
--JOINT U.S. - CHINA STATEMENT PARAS 11 - 12

2. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ON 4/13/99.

3. KOREA: FOUR PARTY TALKS: FIFTH PLENARY TO CONVENE APRIL 24

AS A RESULT OF FOUR PARTY WORKING GROUP CONSULTATIONS BEGUN IN NEW YORK APRIL 5, THE U.S., CHINA, THE ROK, AND THE DPRK HAVE AGREED TO CONVENE THE FIFTH PLENARY OF THE FOUR PARTY TALKS IN GENEVA BEGINNING APRIL 24, 1999. U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE KOREAN PEACE TALKS, AMBASSADOR CHARLES KARTMAN, WILL LEAD THE U.S. DELEGATION. THE UNITED STATES WILL CHAIR THE FIFTH PLENARY, PER THE AGREED ROTATION.

THE U.S. GOALS IN THE FOUR PARTY TALKS CONTINUE TO BE THE REDUCTION OF TENSION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND REPLACING THE ARMISTICE BY THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A PERMANENT PEACE ARRANGEMENT THERE. TWO SUBCOMMITTEES RESPECTIVELY ADDRESSED THESE GOALS DURING THE FOURTH PLENARY AND WILL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTINUE THEIR WORK AT THE FIFTH PLENARY.

AS IN THE PAST, THE SWISS GOVERNMENT IS PROVIDING FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE FOR THE TALKS, AND WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR ITS SUPPORT.

4. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 4/13/99 AND NOT USED BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE DAILY BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

5. DPRK: FOUR PARTY TALKS: FIFTH PLENARY TO MEET APRIL 24

CONTEXT: THE FOUR-PARTY WORKING GROUP MET IN NEW YORK APRIL 5 TO DISCUSS PREPARATIONS FOR THE FIFTH PLENARY OF FOUR PARTY TALKS AND AFTERWARDS CONTINUED INFORMAL CONTACTS TO SETTLE ON A DATE FOR THE FIFTH PLENARY. OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR EVANS REVERE REPRESENTED THE U.S. AT THE WORKING GROUP MEETING. THE FOURTH PLENARY WAS HELD IN GENEVA JANUARY 18-22, WHERE THE PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THE NEXT ROUND WOULD TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA IN MID-APRIL. HOWEVER, THE DPRK SIDE RECENTLY RAISED A PROBLEM WITH THE MID-APRIL TIMEFRAME, BUT INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO GO FORWARD WITH THE TALKS AS CLOSE TO THE ORIGINAL TIMEFRAME AS POSSIBLE. THE PARTIES SETTLED THE ISSUE AND AGREED ON AN ALTERNATIVE DATE, APRIL 24.

THE U.S. GOALS IN THE FOUR PARTY TALKS CONTINUE TO BE ESTABLISHING A MECHANISM FOR TENSION REDUCTION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND REPLACING THE ARMISTICE WITH A PERMANENT PEACE, AND THE TWO SUBCOMMITTEES-- ESTABLISHED TO DISCUSS RESPECTIVELY THE GOALS OF TENSION REDUCTION AND RE PLACING THE ARMISTICE AT THE THIRD PLENARY AND CONVENED FOR THE FIRST TIME AT THE FOURTH PLENARY-- WILL CONTINUE THEIR WORK DURING THE FIFTH PLENARY. THE U.S. WILL CHAIR THE FIFTH ROUND, PER THE AGREED ROTATION.

Q: WHY THE DELAY IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF THE FOUR PARTY TALKS?

A: PARTICIPANTS AGREED AT THE LAST PLENARY IN JANUARY THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF THE FOUR PARTY TALKS WOULD TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA IN MID-APRIL. THE FOUR PARTY WORKING GROUP MET IN NEW YORK APRIL 5 TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE DATES FOR THE TALKS. ALTHOUGH NO DECISIONS WERE MADE THEN, THE WORKING GROUP AGREED THROUGH SUBSEQUENT INFORMAL CONTACTS THAT THE NEXT ROUND WOULD BEGIN ON APRIL 24.

Q: WHAT IS THE SCHEDULE FOR THE FIFTH ROUND?

A: THE PLENARY WILL BEGIN APRIL 24 AND WILL BE PRECEDED BY A DEPUTY-HEAD-OF-DELEGATION PREPARATORY MEETING IN GENEVA ON APRIL 23.

--IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN ESTABLISHED ROTATION, THE U.S. WILL CHAIR THE FIFTH PLENARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

--AS AGREED AT THE THIRD PLENARY, TWO SUBCOMMITTEES CONVENED DURING THE FOURTH PLENARY TO DISCUSS RESPECTIVELY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE REGIME ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TENSION REDUCTION THERE. THEY WILL CONTINUE THEIR WORK AT THE FIFTH PLENARY.

--AS IN THE PAST, THE SWISS GOVERNMENT IS PROVIDING FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE FOR THE TALKS, AND WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR ITS SUPPORT.

Q: IS THERE ANY PROSPECT THAT DR. PERRY WILL BE INVOLVED IN THE FIFTH PLENARY?

A: U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE KOREAN PEACE TALKS, AMBASSADOR CHARLES KARTMAN, WILL LEAD THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE FIFTH PLENARY. DR. PERRY WILL NOT TAKE PART IN THE FOUR PARTY TALKS. DR. PERRY IS CONTINUING HIS WORK ON THE NORTH KOREA POLICY REVIEW.

Q: IS THE ISSUE OF U.S. FORCES IN THE ROK ON THE AGENDA?

A: THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS A MATTER FOR THE U.S. AND ROK GOVERNMENTS AND, AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED, IS NOT A SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION WITH ANY OTHER PARTY.

--THIS ITEM IS ALSO NOT ON THE WLAGENDAFW OF THE FOUR PARTY TALKS. THE U.S. GOALS IN THE FOUR PARTY TALKS -- AND INDEED THE RESPECTIVE FOCUS OF THE TWO SUBCOMMITTEES ESTABLISHED BY THE FOUR PARTIES -- ARE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE REGIME ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TENSION REDUCTION THERE.

(IF PRESSED)

Q: WHICH OF THE PARTIES HAD A SCHEDULE CONFLICT?

A: THE DPRK SIDE RECENTLY RAISED A PROBLEM WITH THE MID-APRIL TIMEFRAME, BUT INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO GO FORWARD WITH THE TALKS AS CLOSE TO THE ORIGINAL TIME FRAME AS POSSIBLE.

6. JAPAN - ELECTION OF SHINTARO ISHIHARA AS TOKYO GOVERNOR

CONTEXT: NATIONALIST SHINTARO ISHIHARA WAS ELECTED GOVERNOR OF TOKYO APRIL 11. MR. ISHIHARA CO-AUTHOR OF THE JAPAN THAT CAN SAY NO, HAS LONG BEEN A VOCAL CRITIC OF THE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP. DURING HIS CAMPAIGN, ISHIHARA DEMANDED THAT U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN GIVE UP YOKOTA AIR FORCE BASE IN WESTERN TOKYO. HE ALSO PROMISED THAT, IF ELECTED, HE WOULD PRESS FOR AN EXPLANATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SENKAKU ISLANDS, WHICH ARE UNDER JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION, BUT ALSO CLAIMED BY CHINA AND TAIWAN, AND OF THE APPLICABILITY OF

THE U.S.-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY TO THE SENKAKUS. (THE SENKAKUS ARE KNOWN IN CHINESE AS THE DIAOYUTAI.)

UNCLASSIFIED

Q: WHAT IS OUR REACTION TO THE ELECTION OF SHINTARO ISHIHARA AS GOVERNOR OF TOKYO?

A: THE ELECTION FOR GOVERNOR OF TOKYO IS AN INTERNAL JAPANESE MATTER, AND I HAVE NO COMMENT ON IT.

Q: CAN YOU COMMENT ON CALLS BY SHINTARO ISHIHARA, NEWLY-ELECTED GOVERNOR OF TOKYO, FOR AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES TO GIVE UP YOKOTA AIR BASE?

A: IN JAPAN, AS IN THE UNITED STATES, THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY RESIDES WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. UNDER THE 1960 TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITES STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN, THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN GRANTS U.S. FORCES THE USE OF FACILITIES AND AREAS IN JAPAN. YOKOTA AIR BASE, THE HEADQUARTERS OF U.S. FORCES JAPAN, 5TH AIR FORCE, AND THE 374TH AIRLIFT WING, IS CRUCIAL TO THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SECURITY TREATY TO DEFEND JAPAN AND MAINTAIN PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION.

--VIGILENCE AND READINESS ARE ESSENTIAL, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN FULLY SHARES OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF YOKOTA AIR BASE FOR THE SECURITY OF JAPAN.

Q: WHAT IS OUR POSITION ON THE SENKAKUS?

A: THE U.S. BELIEVES THE SENKAKUS (DIAOYUTAI) REMAIN DISPUTED TERRITORY. THE ULTIMATE RIGHTS MUST BE RESOLVED AMONG THE COMPETING CLAIMANTS THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS.

Q: WHAT IS THE APPLICABILITY OF THE U.S.-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY TO THIS SITUATION?

A: WE WILL NOT SPECULATE ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE TREATY IN A HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION.

--AS WE HAVE STATED BEFORE, WE HAVE URGED ALL CLAIMANTS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS.

7. AUSTRALIA: CARE AUSTRALIA PERSONNEL DETAINED BY YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT

CONTEXT: TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST QUOTES AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALEXANDER DOWNER AS STATING THAT TWO CARE AUSTRALIA AID WORKERS DETAINED APRIL 1 BY SERB AUTHORITIES AT YUGOSLAVIA'S BORDER WITH CROATIA WERE LIKELY TO BE CHARGED WITH SPYING. THE TWO, STEVE PRATT AND PETER WALLACE WERE REPORTEDLY ON THE WAY TO MONTENEGRO TO ASSIST REFUGEES FROM KOSOVO WHEN THEY WERE DETAINED. YUGOSLAV TV SHOWED FOOTAGE OF PRATT "CONFESSING" TO HAVING ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS UNDER COVER OF CARE. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN PRATT AND U.S. GOVERNMENT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AGENCIES. WE HAVE TOLD THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY WE WOULD ISSUE NO STATEMENT ON THE DETENTION OF PRATT AND WALLACE WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH THE GOA, BUT THAT WE WOULD PREPARE CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE FOR USE IF ASKED.

Q: ANY COMMENT ON YUGOSLAV AUTHORITIES CONTENTION THAT TWO CARE AUSTRALIA PERSONNEL DETAINED APRIL 1 WERE ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES?

A: WE FULLY SHARE THE SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED APRIL 12 BY AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER WHO INDICATED THAT THE CHARGES ARE "SIMPLY PREPOSTEROUS."

--THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE AUSTRALIAN AUTHORITIES IMMEDIATE CONSULAR ACCESS TO PRATT AND WALLACE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS.

8. INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR UPDATE

CONTEXT: TRIPARTITE (UN-PORTUGAL-INDONESIA) TALKS ON EAST TIMOR AT MINISTERIAL-LEVEL REMAIN SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 22, AT WHICH TIME IT IS HOPED AGREEMENT ON AN AUTONOMY PLAN CAN BE REACHED. THE UN IS MAKING PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS TO CONDUCT A DIRECT VOTE CONSULTATION WITH EAST TIMORESE ON THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL PROBABLY IN JULY. HOWEVER, CONTINUING VIOLENCE ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR COULD JEOPARDIZE THIS TIMETABLE. INDONESIA FM ALATAS, ACCORDING TO MEDIA REPORTS, HAS HINTED THAT RENEWED VIOLENCE COULD

LEAD TO A POSTPONEMENT. IN THE WAKE OF APRIL 5-6 KILLINGS AND VIOLENCE IN LIQUICA (LEE-KEE-SA) INITIATED BY PRO-INTEGRATIONIST MILITIAS, WITH THE APPARENT ACQUIESCENCE AT LEAST OF LOCAL SECURITY FORCES (TNI, FORMERLY ABRI), THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL OTHER INCIDENTS. REPORTEDLY, AT LEAST FOUR MORE PEOPLE DIED IN APRIL 12 CLASHES, TWO KILLED BY TNI TROOPS IN A FIREFIGHT NEAR ERMERA, A TOWN 15 MILES FROM DILI, THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON THE SITUATION/VIOLENCE ON EAST TIMOR.

A: THE U.S. IS DEEPLY TROUBLED BY THE DETERIORATION IN THE SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR, MARKED MOST RECENTLY BY FOUR MORE REPORTED DEATHS IN ERMERA AND ELSEWHERE APRIL 12. CONTINUED VIOLENCE CASTS DOUBT ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY'S ABILITY TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF INNOCENT PEOPLE IN EAST TIMOR.

--SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AND OTHER SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE UNDERSCORED U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT EAST TIMOR TO ALL PARTIES AND URGED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE SPECIFIC STEPS, INCLUDING DISARMING CIVILIAN MILITIAS AND AN IMMEDIATE ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE, AS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO REDUCE TENSIONS. SHE HAS ALSO CALLED ON ALL SIDES TO SHOW RESTRAINT AND RENOUNCE VIOLENCE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

--WE ALSO CALL FOR THOROUGH GOL INVESTIGATION OF RECENT INCIDENTS, TO INCLUDE EXAMINATION OF CHARGES THAT EAST TIMOR-BASED MILITARY UNITS ARE SUPPORTING THOSE ENGAGED IN THE VIOLENCE. WE SUPPORT DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION. WE HAVE CONVEYED THESE VIEWS TO BOTH THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND EAST TIMORESE LEADERS.

--THE UNITED STATES REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED TO THE ONGOING UN-SPONSORED INITIATIVE ON EAST TIMOR AS OFFERING THE BEST PROSPECTS TO HELP DEFINE EAST TIMOR'S FUTURE STATUS. DESPITE THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, THE U.S. BELIEVES THIS IMPORTANT INITIATIVE SHOULD CONTINUE.

9. PHILIPPINES: DEPORTATION OF U.S. CITIZEN

CONTEXT: THE U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE HAS CONFIRMED TODAY'S REUTERS REPORT THAT U.S. CITIZEN RICHARD DEAN PEDRIOLI WAS DEPORTED APRIL 10 TO THE U.S. FROM THE PHILIPPINES. WANTED IN THIS COUNTRY IN A FIREARMS SMUGGLING CASE, PEDRIOLI WAS ON THE U.S. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S MOST WANTED LIST. INQUIRIES REQUESTING FACTS ABOUT THE CASE SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT.

NOTE: A U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE PRESS RELEASE WILL LIKELY BE OBTAINED TODAY IN TIME FOR THE DAILY BRIEFING.

Q: WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE APRIL 10 TRANSFER TO THE U.S. OF AMERICAN CITIZEN RICHARD DEAN PEDRIOLI?

A: WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE THAT RICHARD DEAN PEDRIOLI WAS DEPORTED TO THE U.S. FROM THE PHILIPPINES ON APRIL 10. FOR ANY QUERIES REGARDING THIS MATTER, PLEASE CONTACT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

10. BURMA: U.S. INVESTMENT VERSUS LABOR RIGHTS

CONTEXT: THE WASHINGTON POSTS HAS REPORTED ON THE ONGOING LAWSUIT AGAINST UNOCAL AND THE CONSORTIUM OF OIL COMPANIES THAT CONSTRUCTED THE YADANA NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ACROSS THE ISTHMUS OF KRA FROM BURMA TO THAILAND.

THE LAWSUIT ALLEGES THE OIL COMPANIES WERE COMPLICIT WITH THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT WHEN IT EXACTED FORCED LABOR AND RELOCATED VILLAGES IN SERVICE OF THE PIPELINE PROJECT.

THE ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS THE ACTIVITIES OF NA HSAW WA (KAH SAH WAH), A BURMESE STUDENT ACTIVIST IN 1988 WHO COLLECTED STORIES OF ABUSES CONNECTED WITH THE PIPELINE FROM WITNESSES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF BURMA.

Q: DOES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAVE A POSITION ON EFFORTS BY U.S. ACTIVISTS TO DISCOURAGE PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTRIES THAT ALLEGEDLY VIOLATE LABOR AND CIVIL RIGHTS?

A: WE ARE AWARE OF THE CALIFORNIA LAWSUIT CONCERNING BURMA'S ALLEGED USE OF FORCED LABOR DURING THE

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONSTRUCTION OF THE YADANA (YAH DAH NAH) PIPELINE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR USUAL PRACTICE, WE HAVE NO COMMENT ABOUT THIS ONGOING LAWSUIT.

--THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT'S ABUSE OF ITS CITIZENS, IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND STANDARDS, HAS BEEN WELL DOCUMENTED IN STUDIES BY THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

--WE CALL UPON THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT TO IMMEDIATELY CEASE THE PRACTICE OF FORCED LABOR. WE ALSO CALL UPON THE GOVERNMENT TO ENTER INTO MEANINGFUL DISUSSIONS WITH THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION, INCULDING THE NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY AND AUNG SAN SUU KYL, AND THE ETHNIC MINORITIES.
11. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY ON 4/13/99.

12. JOINT U.S. - CHINA STATEMENT

PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PREMIER ZHU SPOKE THIS AFTERNOON ON THE TELEPHONE. DURING THE CONVERSATION, THEY AGREED THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD MOVE INTENSIVELY ON NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THE REMAINING ISSUES IN THEIR TALKS ON CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE WTO. THEY HAVE AGREED TO HAVE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE BY THE END OF THE MONTH IN BEIJING.
ALBRIGHT

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(C36)

DOCUMENT_ID: 183069304
DOCNO: 064541
PRODUCER: WASHDC
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: OUT
DOR: 19990408
TOR: 001200
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904080404
MHFNO: 99 4988261
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #4541/01 0980409
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 080404Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0023
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4150
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0085
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE 8764
RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE 4668
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE 1862
RUEHJA/AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE 9711
RUEHKOF/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA IMMEDIATE 9269
RUEHKON/AMCONSUL NAGOYA IMMEDIATE 2593
RUHBBMA/AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE 2992
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE 6269
RUEHKOS/AMCONSUL SAPPORO IMMEDIATE 7635
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7672
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 5698
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4308
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2966
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5327
RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 6508
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2479
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 9609
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUAGAMS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS/ /PRIORITY
RUAGAMS/CHJUSMAG SEOUL NOR PRIORITY
RHHMHAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
RUCJACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 4961
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0172
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 3859
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 6162
BT

CONTROLS
UNCLAS STATE 064541

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: APRIL 7, 1999 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS - ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF - ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
UNVIE FOR FITZPATRICK
USEU FOR RUTH

1. INDEX:

--(CHINA) STILL NO PROTECTING POWER FOR FRY AND FOR U.S.
PARAS 2 - 3
-- CHINA - UPDATE: OFFICIAL VISIT OF PREMIER ZHU RONGJI
PARAS 4 - 5
-- CHINA'S POSSIBLE STRATEGIC GAINS FROM U.S. DUAL-USE
EXPORTS PARAS 4 AND 6
-- U.S.-CHINA CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT PARAS 4 AND 7
-- CHINA - WTO PARAS 4 AND 8
-- CHINA: JAILED DISSIDENT XU WENLI'S DAUGHTER ASKS
ADMINISTRATION TO RAISE FATHER'S CASE PARAS 4 AND 9
-- INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR VIOLENCE PARAS 4 AND 10
--INDONESIA: CONVICTIONS FOR KIDNAPPINGS PARAS 4 AND 11
-- CAMBODIA: REMAINS OF U.S. SERVICEMEN MISSING IN ACTION
PARAS 4 AND 12
-- DPRK: ROK PRESIDENT INDICATES NORTH SHIFT ON U.S.
FORCES? PARAS 4 AND 13

-- CANCELLATION OF PRESS CONFERENCE U.S. JAPAN COMMON
AGENDA PARAS 14 - 15

2. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED ON 04/0V/99
AND USED IN PART BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE DAILY
BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THIS GUIDANCE FOR USE ON AN
IF ASKED BASIS.

3. (CHINA) STILL NO PROTECTING POWER FOR FRY AND FOR U.S.

CONTEXT: DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE ON THE ISSUE OF PROTECTING
POWER FOR THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BELGRADE AND THE FRY EMBASSY
IN WASHINGTON.. SWEDEN STILL HAS THE KEYS TO THE U.S.
EMBASSY IN BELGRADE - I.E., THE SWEDES HAVE NOT FORMALLY
TERMINATED THEIR ROLE AS PROTECTING POWER, ALTHOUGH THEY
ARE NOT RECOGNIZED AS SUCH BY THE FRY. CHINA WAS NOT
FORMALLY REJECTED AS "UNACCEPTABLE" BY THE U.S. AS FRY
PROTECTING POWER, THOUGH WE HAVE INDICATED INFORMALLY IT
WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE, GIVEN OUR COMPLEX AND MULTI-
FACETED RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. THE CHINESE HAVE NOT/NOT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

RAISED THE ISSUE AGAIN FOLLOWING THE INITIAL DISCUSSION.

ON APRIL 4, THE FRY MFA INFORMED THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN BELGRADE THAT THE FRY HAD REJECTED SWEDEN'S OFFER TO BE THEIR PROTECTING POWER IN THE U.S. AND THAT CHINA WAS THE ONLY PROTECTING POWER ACCEPTABLE TO THEM IN THE U.S. THE FRY ALSO ASKED THE SWEDES TO TURN OVER THE KEYS TO THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BELGRADE. APRIL 6 WE REITERATED TO THE FRY OUR DESIRE TO SETTLE THE PROTECTING POWER ISSUE QUICKLY AND REASONABLY, URGING THEM TO CONSIDER ALTERNATES. WE ARE WAITING TO HEAR BACK.

ART. 45 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION STATES THAT A SENDING STATE MAY ENTRUST THE CUSTODY OF THE PREMISES OF THE MISSION, INCLUDING PROPERTY AND ARCHIVES, AND THE PROTECTION OF ITS INTERESTS AND THOSE OF ITS NATIONALS TO A THIRD STATE ACCEPTABLE TO THE RECEIVING STATE. THE RECEIVING STATE HAS BROAD DISCRETION TO DETERMINE WHICH PROTECTING POWER IS ACCEPTABLE TO IT. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE SENDING STATE HAS A RIGHT TO HAVE ITS INTERESTS AND PROPERTY PROTECTED BY A THIRD STATE, THERE COMES A POINT WHEN A RECEIVING STATE REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ANY THIRD STATE WOULD CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION. WE CLEARLY HAVE NOT REACHED THAT POINT BY INDICATING THE NON-SUITABILITY OF THE PRC TO BE PROTECTING POWER FOR THE FRY. GREECE WAS NEVER ACTUALLY PROPOSED BY THE FRY, FORMALLY OR OTHERWISE. END CONTEXT)

Q: HAS THE ISSUE OF A PROTECTING POWER FOR THE FRY EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON BEEN SETTLED YET?

A: AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE IN DISCUSSION WITH THE FRY TO ENSURE THAT EMBASSIES AND RELATED INTERESTS OF BOTH THE U.S. AND THE FRY ARE COVERED BY THE SERVICES OF AN APPROPRIATE PROTECTING POWER. THE ISSUE HAS NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED.

Q: DID THE FRY REFUSE TO ALLOW THE SWEDES TO CONTINUE AS PROTECTING POWER FOR THE U.S. IN BELGRADE?

A: FRY AUTHORITIES HAVE INFORMED SWEDEN THAT IT CAN NO LONGER BE THE U.S. PROTECTING POWER IN THE FRY. WE ARE DISCUSSING THE SITUATION AND EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES.

Q: DID THIS CAUSE DISCUSSIONS TO BREAK OFF ON RETURN OF THE THREE CAPTURED U.S. SERVICEMEN, AS ALLEGED BY THE WASHINGTON POST?

A: THE ISSUE HERE IS NOT WHETHER DIPLOMATIC NOTES ARE ANSWERED, BUT THAT THE CAPTURED U.S. SERVICEMEN SHOULD BE RELEASED.

--SO LONG AS THE SERVICEMEN ARE DETAINED, THEY HAVE PRISONER OF WAR STATUS.

--THE SERVICEMEN SHOULD BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY. WE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

INSIST ON THEIR HUMANE TREATMENT, AND THEIR IMMUNITY FROM ANY TRIAL.

Q: DID WE REFUSE TO ALLOW THE FRY TO BE REPRESENTED BY CHINA AS PROTECTING POWER?

A: NO FINAL DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE REGARDING A PROTECTING POWER FOR THE FRY.

(IF PRESSED)

--I HAVE NO COMMENT ON DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES.

4. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 04/0-/99 AND NOT USED BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE DAILY BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

5. CHINA - UPDATE: OFFICIAL VISIT OF PREMIER ZHU RONGJI

Q: CAN YOU PROVIDE DETAILS OF THE VISIT OF ZHU RONGJI?

A: ZHU RONGJI WILL VISIT WASHINGTON, D.C. FROM APRIL 7 TO APRIL 10. THIS WILL BE THE FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF A CHINESE PREMIER IN FIFTEEN YEARS. (PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN VISITED WASHINGTON OCTOBER 28-30 1997.) HE WILL ARRIVE AT ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE ON THE AFTERNOON OF WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7 AND WILL DEPART IN THE MORNING OF SATURDAY, APRIL 10. ON ARRIVAL AT BLAIR HOUSE, HE WILL RECEIVE A COURTESY CALL FROM SECRETARY ALBRIGHT.

-- AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON APRIL 8, THERE WILL BE A WELCOMING CEREMONY ON THE SOUTH LAWN IN THE MORNING, FOLLOWED BY A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON, A LUNCHEON HOSTED BY SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT, A LEADERS' JOINT PRESS AVAILABILITY, AND AN OFFICIAL DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

-- ON APRIL 9, THE PREMIER WILL MEET WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AND TAKE PART IN THE U.S. - CHINA FORUM ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, CO-CHAIRED BY VICE PRESIDENT GORE. A WORKING LUNCHEON AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WILL BE HOSTED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT. PRIVATE APPOINTMENTS IN THE AFTERNOON WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A DINNER HOSTED BY THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON U.S. - CHINA RELATIONS (NCUSCR), AMERICA-CHINA SOCIETY, ASIA SOCIETY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, COMMITTEE OF 100, U.S.-CHINA POLICY FOUNDATION, AND U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.

-- PREMIER ZHU WILL ARRIVE IN THE UNITED STATES ON TUESDAY, APRIL 6 IN LOS ANGELES AND WILL DEPART THE NEXT DAY, APRIL 7, FOR ANDREWS.

-- FOLLOWING HIS STAY IN WASHINGTON, PREMIER ZHU WILL TRAVEL TO DENVER ON APRIL 10, TO CHICAGO ON APRIL 11, TO NEW YORK CITY ON APRIL 12, AND TO BOSTON ON APRIL 14

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BEFORE DEPARTURE LATER ON APRIL 14 FOR CANADA.

DETAILS OF THE PREMIER'S SCHEDULE ARE STILL BEING WORKED OUT. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION, WHICH IS STILL PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE, MAY BE GIVEN OUT ONLY FOR PLANNING PURPOSES:

APRIL 6 - MORNING ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES
(PRESS POC: ROBERT ALANIZ, TEL. (323) 966-5727)
MEETINGS WITH L.A. MAYOR, GOVERNOR, LOCAL OFFICIALS AND BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES
LUNCHEON HOSTED BY L.A. MAYOR
DINNER HOSTED BY CHINESE-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY
(PRESS POC: KATRINA LEUNG, TEL. (626) 304-9389)
MEETING WITH STAFF OF PRC CONSULATE GENERAL

APRIL 7-- DEPART LOS ANGELES IN THE MORNING FOR ANDREWS AFB
ARRIVE ANDREWS IN THE LATE AFTERNOON
(PRESS POC: SGT. RICK CORRALL, ANDREWS AFB MEDIA CENTER, TEL. (301) 981-4511)
LATE AFTERNOON ARRIVAL AT BLAIR HOUSE - OPEN MEDIA
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT COURTESY CALL
(PRESS POC: MARY MASSERINI, TEL. 64V-1685)
MEETING WITH CHINESE EMBASSY STAFF AND REPRESENTATIVES OF CHINESE ORGANIZATIONS
(PRESS POC: LIU XIAOMING, CHINESE EMBASSY, TEL. 328-2511)

APRIL 8 - ARRIVAL CEREMONY ON THE WHITE HOUSE SOUTH LAWN
(APPROXIMATELY 9:30 A.M.)
RECEPTION FOR DELEGATIONS
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
LUNCHEON HOSTED BY SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT
LEADERS' JOINT PRESS AVAILABILITY
MEETING WITH WORLD BANK PRESIDENT WOLFENSOHN AT BLAIR HOUSE - PHOTO OP/OPEN MEDIA
(PRESS POC: MARY MASSERINI, TEL. 647-1685)
OFFICIAL DINNER AT WHITE HOUSE AT 7:15 P.M.

APRIL 9 -- MEETINGS WITH CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS
U.S. - CHINA FORUM ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT WITH VICE PRESIDENT GORE, INCLUDING A PLENARY AND A BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE
GORE-ZHU BILATERAL MEETING

WORKING LUNCH HOSTED BY VICE PRESIDENT GORE
(PRESS POC: VP GORE'S PRESS OFFICE, TEL. 456-7035)
MEETING WITH TREASURY SECRETARY RUB IN AND FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIRMAN GREENS PAN AT BLAIR HOUSE - PHOTO OP/OPEN MEDIA
(PRESS POC: MARY MASSERINI, TEL. 647-1685)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DINNER HOSTED BY NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS (NCUSCR), AMERICA-CHINA SOCIETY, ASIA SOCIETY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S.-CHINA POLICY FOUNDATION, COMMITTEE OF 100 AND U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
(PRESS POC: NICOLE GLUSHAKOW, TEL. 336-7412)

APRIL 10--DEPART FOR DENVER IN THE MORNING
RECEPTION AND LUNCH HOSTED BY MAYOR OF DENVER WITH BUSINESS AND ACADEMIC LEADERS
(PRESS POC: ANDREW HUDSON, TEL. (303) 640-2722)
PERFORMANCE AT RED ROCKS AMPHITHEATRE
VISIT TO DENVER BRONCOS TRAINING FACILITY
TOUR STORAGE TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION
RECEPTION AND DINNER HOSTED BY GOVERNOR OF COLORADO
(PRESS POC: AMY SAMPSON, TEL. (303) 866-6323)

APRIL 11--DEPART FOR CHICAGO IN THE MORNING
(PRESS POC: JACKIE HEARD/JOHN CAMPER, TEL. (312) 744-3334)
MEETING WITH CHINESE CONSULATE STAFF AND MEMBERS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITY
VISIT MARRELBAR FARM, LIBERTYVILLE, IL.
WELCOME BANQUET - CLOSED TO MEDIA COVERAGE

APRIL 12--VISIT CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE
(PRESS POC: ELLEN RESNICK, TEL. (312) 930-3435)
VISIT 911 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION CENTER
(PRESS POC: MR. RANJAN DANIELS, TEL. (312) 746-9425)
LUNCHEON WITH BUSINESS AND CIVIC LEADERSHIP
(PRESS POC: MS. RAESHMA RAZVI, TEL. (312) 236-8745)

VISIT MOTOROLA HQ AND MOTOROLA MUSEUM, SCHAUMBURG, IL.
(PRESS POC: DAVID RUDD, TEL. (847) 576-5304)
DEPART FOR NEW YORK IN THE EVENING

APRIL 13 --VISIT TO NASDAQ
(PRESS POC: ANDREW MACMILLAN, TEL. (202) 728-8340)
LUNCHEON, HOSTED BY THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, WITH MEMBERS OF BUSINESS COMMUNITY - CLOSED TO MEDIA COVERAGE
(PRESS POC: LARRY LAROCCO, TEL. (202) 663-5558)
MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF STAFF OF CHINESE MISSION TO THE UN AND CONSULATE GENERAL AND CHINESE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
DINNER HOSTED BY U.S.-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, NEW YORK ECONOMIC CLUB AND CHINESE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
(PRESS POC: CHERYL BELL/GINGER GILLIAN, TEL. (212) 891-0212)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

APRIL 14--DEPART FOR BOSTON IN THE MORNING
SPEECH AT MIT
(PRESS POC: MYLES CROWLEY, TEL. (617) 253-2700)
MEET WITH MEMBERS OF STAFF OF THE CHINESE CONSULATE AND CHINESE COMMUNITY
LUNCHEON HOSTED BY BUSINESS-ORIENTED "CHINA FORUM"- LIMITED PRESS ACCESS
(PRESS POC: PAMELA KRUH, TEL. (617) 572-0558)
DEPART FOR CANADA IN THE AFTERNOON

6. CHINA'S POSSIBLE STRATEGIC GAINS FROM U.S. DUAL-USE EXPORTS

CONTEXT: A BILL GERTZ ARTICLE IN TODAY'S WASHINGTON TIMES ALLEGES THAT CHINA HAS BEEN ABLE TO MAKE IMPORTANT ADVANCES IN ITS PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS THROUGH THE USE OF DUAL-USE GOODS MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES AND EXPORTED UNDER THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT'S EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS. THE ARTICLE IS BASED ON A REPORT BY THE WISCONSIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ENTITLED "U.S. EXPORTS TO CHINA, 1988-1998: FUELING PROLIFERATION." THE REPORT IS SCHEDULED TO BE RELEASED TODAY. WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN A COPY OF THE REPORT.

Q: HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO THE CHARGES THAT THE PRC MILITARY HAS BENEFITED FROM AMERICAN DUAL-USE EXPORTS AND THAT U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY HAS BEEN THREATENED BY THESE EXPORTS?

A: DUAL-USE EXPORTS ARE LICENSED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE UNDER THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS. REVIEW OF EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATIONS IS DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES WHILE ALSO PROTECTING ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

-- THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEWS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THE EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATIONS, AS DO THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE, ENERGY, AND, UNTIL APRIL FIRST, THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY.

-- EXPORTING ANY DUAL-USE GOODS HAS THE INHERENT POTENTIAL TO IMPROVE THE RECIPIENT'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES. THE LICENSE REVIEW PROCEDURES ARE DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE THAT POTENTIAL BY INCLUDING CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF AN EXPORT'S SPECIFIC END-USE AND END-USERS.

-- ITEMS SHIPPED UNDER GENERAL LICENSES (I.E. WITHOUT A SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL LICENSE FOR EACH COMMODITY) ARE ONLY REVIEWED BY THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT.

Q: CAN YOU COMMENT ON THE ALLEGATION THAT THE CHINESE OBTAINED TECHNOLOGY CRITICAL TO MODERNIZING THEIR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS?

A: THE ARTICLE MAKES ITS ASSERTION BASED ON ALLEGED INTELLIGENCE SOURCES. WE DO NOT COMMENT ON INTELLIGENCE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MATTERS OR ALLEGED INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

-- THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEWS DUAL-USE EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATIONS FROM THE FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY GROUND PRESPECTIVE.

IF PRESSED:

-- I WOULD REFER YOU TO AGENCIES WITH TECHNICAL EXPERTISE FOR AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAPABILITIES OF EXPORTED DUAL-USE ITEMS.

-. U.S.-CHINA CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT

Q: WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT REACHED WITH CHINA THIS WEEK?

A: THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA INITIALED A NEW AGREEMENT ON TUESDAY TO EXPAND CIVIL AVIATION TIES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE AGREEMENT WILL GREATLY EXPAND AIR SERVICE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, BRINGING BENEFITS TO CONSUMERS, LOCALITIES AND AIR CARRIERS.

--THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN PURSUING A NEW AVIATION RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA FOR MORE THAN 18 MONTHS. ONLY IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS, FOLLOWING HIGH-LEVEL INTERVENTIONS BY THE WHITE HOUSE, SECRETARIES ALBRIGHT AND SLATER, AND REPRESENTATIVE JAMES OBERSTAR, HAVE WE CLOSED THE GAPS WITH THE CHINESE.

--OVER THREE YEARS, THE AGREEMENT WILL DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF ROUND-TRIP FLIGHTS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES FROM 2V TO 54 FOR EACH SIDE PER WEEK. IT WILL ALLOW A FOURTH U.S. AIRLINE TO ENTER THE CHINA MARKET, AND WILL IMPROVE U.S.-CHINA AIR LINKS FOR DOZENS OF U.S. AND CHINESE CITIES. THE AGREEMENT WILL PERMIT EXPANDED COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S. AND CHINESE AIRLINES FOR JOINT MARKETING OF AIR SERVICES TO A LARGE NUMBER OF NEW CITIES IN BOTH COUNTRIES.

--THIS AGREEMENT SUPPORTS THE LIBERALIZATION OF OUR ECONOMIC TIES WITH CHINA, PROVIDES GROWTH FOR THE FUTURE, AND WILL BENEFIT THE TRAVELING PUBLIC, LOCAL COMMUNITIES, BUSINESSMEN AND AIRLINES IN BOTH COUNTRIES.

8. CHINA - WTO

CONTEXT: WE HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE WTO TALKS OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS, IN LARGE PART BECAUSE PREMIER ZHU RONGJI HAS REDOUBLED HIS EFFORTS TO TRY TO REACH A COMMERCIALLY VIABLE DEAL. WE EXPECT CONTINUED INTENSE TALKS UP TO AND POSSIBLY THROUGH ZHU'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON APRIL 7-L0. A COMMERCIALLY VIABLE DEAL MAY BE IN THE OFFING; THE CHINESE HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS, BUT MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AMB. BARSHEFSKY HAS BEEN PRIVATELY POSITIVE, BUT SUCCESS IS FAR FROM GUARANTEED. WE DO NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC DEADLINE, BUT WILL USE ZHU'S DESIRE FOR A DEAL TO TRY TO CLOSE THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BY THE TIME OF HIS VISIT. USTR CHARLENE BARSHEFSKY LEFT CHINA MARCH 30, AFTER MEETING WITH PREMIER ZHU RONGJI AND STATE COUNCILOR WU YI. SHE DID NOT GO TO OBTAIN A PACKAGE, AND SO THEREFORE DID

NOT "LEAVE EMPTY-HANDED." SHE WENT TO NARROW EXISTING GAPS AND TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM IN THE DISCUSSIONS. TALKS HAVE CONTINUED THIS WEEK IN WASHINGTON AT THE EXPERT LEVEL, BETWEEN BOB CASSIDY OF USTR AND CHINA'S CHIEF NEGOTIATOR, VICE MINISTER LONG YONGTU.

SOME MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ARE OPENLY WORRIED THAT THE NSC AND STATE ARE PUSHING USTR TO GET A DEAL AT ANY COST TO ENSURE A WTO DELIVERABLE FOR THE ZHU VISIT. SOME MEMBERS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL ACCEPT A ONE-SIDED DEAL THAT MAINLY SATISFIES BIG BUSINESS. WE HAVE FLATLY REFUTED THESE VIEWS AND EMPHASIZED THAT WE, LIKE USTR, SEEK A COMMERCIALLY MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT THAT WILL ACHIEVE BROAD SUPPORT ON THE HILL AND IN THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY TOGETHER WITH USTR AND USDA, WE HAVE MADE THESE POINTS CLEARLY AND FORCEFULLY IN PUBLIC TESTIMONY ON THE HILL. USTR HAS ALSO PROVIDED CLASSIFIED BRIEFINGS TO KEY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND BUSINESS LEADERS ON THE MORE SENSITIVE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE WTO NEGOTIATIONS.

CONGRESS IS CERTAIN TO SCRUTINIZE CLOSELY ANY WTO DEAL WE OBTAIN, IN TERMS OF BOTH ITS OWN MERITS AND OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES.

Q: HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE TALKS?

A: WE ARE MAKING SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS, BUT CRITICAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SPECULATE WHETHER OR NOT WE WILL ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT.

Q: SOME REPORTS SAY YOU HAVE A DEAL ON AGRICULTURE.
A: IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT WE HAVE NARROWED OUR DIFFERENCES ON AGRICULTURAL ISSUES SUBSTANTIALLY, AND THAT WE ARE CLOSER TO REACHING AGREEMENT IN THIS SECTOR THAN IN OTHER AREAS, BUT WE ARE NOT THERE YET. THERE ARE IMPORTANT ISSUES THAT MUST BE RESOLVED WITH RESPECT TO OUR BILATERAL CONCERNS ON CITRUS, WHEAT, AND MEAT. AND, CERTAINLY, THERE ARE OTHER AGRICULTURAL CONCERNS THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED.

Q: WHAT ARE THE REMAINING ISSUES?

A: THIS IS A VERY COMPLEX NEGOTIATION, INVOLVING VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF TRADE IN CHINA. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY INDICATED THAT WE WILL BE FLEXIBLE AND PRAGMATIC, BUT THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT WE MUST ACHIEVE MARKET ACCESS OBJECTIVES OF U.S. INDUSTRY IN CHINA. THE ISSUES IN MANY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CASES CUT ACROSS ENTIRE AREAS OF CHINA'S ECONOMY. UNTIL THESE ISSUES ARE RESOLVED, THERE CANNOT BE A DEAL. UNRESOLVED ISSUES HERE AFFECT OVERALL MARKET ACCESS, DISTRIBUTION RIGHTS, AND THE OPERATIONS OF FOREIGN COMPANIES IN CHINA. AGAIN, WE HAVE DIFFERENCES IN ALL AREAS THAT MUST BE RESOLVED.

Q: WILL AMBASSADOR BARSHEFSKY OR OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS BECOME INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?

A: THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE PROCEEDING AT THE "EXPERT" LEVEL WITH ASSISTANT USTR ROBERT CASSIDY LEADING TALKS ON THE U.S. SIDE. DISCUSSIONS ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE THROUGH TODAY.

Q: IS THE ADMINISTRATION SEEKING A TEN-YEAR PHASE-OUT OF TEXTILE QUOTAS?

A: WE HAVE REMAINING CONCERNS IN THIS AREA.

9. CHINA: JAILED DISSIDENT XU WENLI'S DAUGHTER ASKS ADMINISTRATION TO RAISE FATHER'S CASE

CONTEXT: XU JIN, DAUGHTER OF JAILED CHINESE DEMOCRACY PARTY ACTIVIST, XU WENLI, ARRIVES TODAY IN WASHINGTON TO URGE THE ADMINISTRATION TO PRESS FOR HER FATHER'S RELEASE DURING THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER ZHU RONGJI TO WASHINGTON. THE WASHINGTON POST RAN AN OP-ED PIECE BY XU JIN THIS MORNING IN WHICH SHE OUTLINED THE FACTS OF HER FATHER'S DECEMBER TRIAL AND SENTENCING TO 13 YEARS IN PRISON FOR "SUBVERTING THE POWER OF THE STATE." SHE STATES THE TRIAL WAS A "SHAM" AND ASSERTS THAT CHINA VIOLATED ITS OWN LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS BY PUTTING HER FATHER IN JAIL. SHE CALLS "FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S HELP IN PRESSING FOR MY FATHER'S RELEASE AND URGING THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TAKE STEPS IMMEDIATELY TO IMPROVE THE CONDITIONS OF HIS IMPRISONMENT." SHE ALSO ASKS FOR HELP IN SEEKING AN END TO THE HARASSMENT OF HER MOTHER. (TWO OTHER CHINESE DEMOCRACY PARTY ACTIVISTS, QIN YONGMIN AND WANG YOUCAI, ARE ALSO SERVING HARSH SENTENCES AFTER DECEMBER TRIALS THAT FLAGRANTLY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS.) XU JIN IS A GRADUATE STUDENT AT BOSTON UNIVERSITY.
Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON XU JIN'S OP-ED PIECE IN THE WASHINGTON POST.

A: ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE MET WITH XU JIN, XU WENLI'S DAUGHTER, AND TALKED WITH HER ABOUT HER FATHER'S CASE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. ASSISTANT SECRETARY KOH HAS SPOKEN TO HER THIS WEEK TO HEAR HER CONCERNS ABOUT HER FATHER'S CASE, INCLUDING HIS TREATMENT IN PRISON AND THE HARASSMENT OF HER MOTHER.

--AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE HARSH SENTENCES THAT XU WENLI, QIN YONGMIN, AND WANG YOUCAI

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED IN DECEMBER IN CLOSED TRIALS THAT FLAGRANTLY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS.

--WE HAVE RAISED THESE CONCERNS WITH CHINESE OFFICIALS ON MANY OCCASIONS, URGING THAT THE CRACKDOWN ON ORGANIZED POLITICAL DISSENT BE ROLLED BACK AND THAT ALL THOSE SERVING SENTENCES FOR THE PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS ARE RELEASED.

--WE WILL CONTINUE TO RAISE THESE CONCERNS WITH THE CHINESE, INCLUDING DURING MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER ZHU RONGJI. HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES ARE SQUARELY ON THE AGENDA OF THE MEETINGS SCHEDULED OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

10. INDONESIA - EAST TIMOR VIOLENCE

CONTEXT: EMBASSY JAKARTA REPORTS THAT THERE WAS A SECOND DAY OF VIOLENCE APRIL 6 IN THE SMALL TOWN OF LIQUICA, EAST TIMOR. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA KILLED AT LEAST FIVE CIVILIANS, WITH APPROXIMATELY 20 INJURED. SOURCES WHO VISITED THE SCENE SAW NO EVIDENCE THAT GRENADES WERE USED IN THE ATTACK. BISHOP BELO'S OFFICE IN DILL REPORTEDLY DENIED THAT HE HAD SAID GRENADES WERE USED AND THAT 45 PERSONS WERE KILLED IN THE APRIL 6 ATTACK. EMBASSY JAKARTA COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT INDONESIAN MILITARY PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK. AT A MINIMUM, HOWEVER, THEY DID NOT INTERCEDE TO PREVENT BLOODSHED.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR IN LIGHT OF A REPORT THAT GUNMEN FIRED SHOTS INTO A CHURCH IN EAST TIMOR WHERE 1500 TERRIFIED RESIDENTS HAD TAKEN REFUGE AND THAT AS MANY AS 45 PEOPLE MAY HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE SHOOTINGS THERE AND AT THE HOME OF THE PARISH PRIEST IN LIQUICA.

A: WE HAVE RECEIVED CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT CIVILIANS WERE ATTACKED IN A CHURCH IN LIQUICA, EAST TIMOR. AT LEAST FIVE ARE DEAD. THEIR KILLERS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ARMED CIVILIAN MILITIA.

-- ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT CONFIRM REPORTS OF INDONESIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND PROTECT THE PEOPLE. WE ARE DEEPLY TROUBLED BY THEIR FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD CIVILIANS IN LIQUICA. WE CALL FOR THE IMMEDIATE DISARMING OF CIVILIAN MILITIA GROUPS, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THIS WEEK'S KILLINGS, AND PUNISHMENT FOR THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE CRIMES, AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO PREVENT FURTHER CLASHES.

-- THE UNITED STATES IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING THE LATEST REPORTED CLASHES. WE REJECT VIOLENCE AS A MEANS OF RESOLVING THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR AND CALL FOR ALL PARTIES TO WORK FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. WE SUPPORT AN ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR AND THE ON-GOING UN-SPONSORED TALKS ON THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

STATUS OF EAST TIMOR; WE CALL ON INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THEIR UPCOMING ROUND.

-- WE ALSO CALL ON EAST TIMORESE LEADERS TO ACTIVELY CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO A CEASE-FIRE AND OTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. ALL SIDES SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE TENSIONS BOTH NOW, AND AS THE PROCESS OF EAST TIMOR'S TRANSITION TO A NEW STATUS PROCEEDS.

11. INDONESIA: CONVICTIONS FOR KIDNAPPINGS

CONTEXT: ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, 11 MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) HAVE BEEN CONVICTED IN AN INDONESIAN MILITARY COURT OF ABDUCTING DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS IN 199- AND 1998. THE CONVICTED SOLDIERS RECEIVED PRISON SENTENCES RANGING UP TO 22 MONTHS.

Q: WHAT IS OUR REACTION TO THE REPORTED SENTENCING BY AN INDONESIAN MILITARY COURT OF 11 SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIERS TO PRISON TERMS OF MUCH AS 22 MONTHS APIECE FOR THE KIDNAPPINGS OF ANTI-SUHARTO DISSIDENTS IN 1997 AND 1998?

A: TWELVE OF THE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS WHO WERE KIDNAPPED BY INDONESIAN SPECIAL FORCES TROOPS (KOPASSUS) WHEN IT WAS UNDER THE CONTROL OF LT. GENERAL PRABOWO, THE SON-IN-LAW OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, REMAIN MISSING. THEY ARE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN MURDERED. IN THAT CONTEXT, CONVICTION OF LOW-RANKING SOLDIERS WITH RELATIVELY LIGHT SENTENCES IS NOT A SATISFACTORY FINAL OUTCOME OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE DISAPPEARANCES THAT OCCURRED IN THE LATTER MONTHS OF THE SOEHARTO REGIME.

-- WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED OUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE DISAPPEARANCES TO THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. WE CONTINUE TO URGE THAT THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES CONDUCT THOROUGH AND CREDIBLE INVESTIGATIONS AND ENSURE THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE CRIMES - INCLUDING SENIOR FIGURES WHO ORDERED THEM -- ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE AND HELD ACCOUNTABLE.

12. CAMBODIA: REMAINS OF U.S. SERVICEMEN MISSING IN ACTION

CONTEXT: THE REMAINS BELIEVED TO BE THOSE OF U.S. SERVICEMEN MISSING IN ACTION WERE HANDED OVER TO AMBASSADOR QUINN ON APRIL 6. THIS CAME AT THE CONCLUSION OF A MONTH-LONG JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN U.S. JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING AND THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA POW/MIA COMMITTEE.

Q: WHY HAVE THE CAMBODIANS TURNED OVER THE REMAINS OF U.S. SERVICEMEN MISSING IN ACTION?

A: WE HAVE RECEIVED EXCELLENT COOPERATION FROM CAMBODIAN OFFICIALS IN OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF U.S. SERVICEMEN MISSING AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE HANDOVER OF THESE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

REMAINS ON APRIL 6 TO AMBASSADOR QUINN IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THIS COOPERATION.

-- PLEASE CONTACT THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT FOR FURTHER DETAILS.

13. DPRK: ROK PRESIDENT INDICATES NORTH SHIFT ON U.S. FORCES?

CONTEXT: SOUTH KOREAN NEWSPAPERS REPORT THAT PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG STATED TO ROK ARMY OFFICERS AT A PROMOTION CEREMONY THAT HE HAD INDICATIONS THAT NORTH KOREA WOULD NO LONGER DEMAND U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM THE KOREAN PENINSULA BUT WOULD REGARD THEM AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE AFTER UNIFICATION. IN OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON THE STORIES, THE ROK FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS SUBSEQUENTLY DENIED THAT SUCH SIGNALS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE NORTH.

Q: WHAT IS THE NORTH KOREAN POSITION ON THE PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA? HAVE THEY CHANGED THEIR POSITION? HOW WAS THIS CONVEYED? IS THIS A TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NORTH KOREA OR AT THE FOUR PARTY TALKS?

A: THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS A MATTER FOR THE U.S. AND ROK GOVERNMENTS AND, AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED, IS NOT A SUBJECT FOR BILATERAL NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND DPRK.

--THIS ITEM IS ALSO NOT ON THE "AGENDA" OF THE FOUR PARTY TALKS. THE U.S. GOALS IN THE FOUR PARTY TALKS -- AND INDEED THE RESPECTIVE FOCUS OF THE TWO SUBCOMMITTEES ESTABLISHED BY THE FOUR PARTIES -- ARE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE REGIME ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TENSION REDUCTION THERE.

-- THERE ARE NO PLANS TO CHANGE THE LEVELS OR NATURE OF U.S. TROOP DEPLOYMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

-- WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY CHANGE IN THE LONG-STANDING NORTH KOREAN POSITION ON THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IN KOREA.

Q: SO WHAT IS PRESIDENT KIRN TALKING ABOUT?

A: WE HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS THAT CLAIM PRESIDENT KIM HAS INDICATED HE HAS INFORMATION THAT NORTH KOREA HAS CHANGED ITS VIEWS. I UNDERSTAND THE ROK GOVERNMENT HAS COMMENTED PUBLICLY ON THESE REPORTS AND WOULD REFER YOU TO THE ROK GOVERNMENT FOR FURTHER COMMENT ON PRESIDENT KIM'S REMARKS.

--WE NOTE THAT PRESIDENT KIM INDICATED THAT THE ROK FAVORS THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS, A BEDROCK POLICY OF OUR MUTUAL DETERRENCE OF POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION.

14. THE FOLLOWING NOTICE TO THE PRESS WAS ISSUED BY THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ON 4/07/99.

15. CANCELLATION OF PRESS CONFERENCE U.S. JAPAN COMMON AGENDA

DUE TO SCHEDULING PROBLEMS, THE PRESS CONFERENCE ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR APRIL 8 FOR THE U.S.-JAPAN COMMON AGENDA WILL NOT BE HELD. THERE WILL BE A CAMERA SPRAY AT THE OPENING OF THE MEETING IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S LOY HENDERSON CONFERENCE ROOM AT 8:30 A.M. ON APRIL 8.

THE COMMON AGENDA COVERS BILATERAL COOPERATION ON GLOBAL ISSUES, INCLUDING CLIMATE CHANGE, DISEASE PREVENTION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH, AND NATURAL DISASTER MITIGATION. THE U.S. AND JAPAN HAVE COLLABORATED ON SOME

200 PROJECTS ON NEARLY EVERY CONTINENT UNDER THE COMMON AGENDA, WHICH WAS INAUGURATED BY PRESIDENT CLINTON AND THEN-PRIME MINISTER MIYAZAWA IN 1993.

FRANK LOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS, WILL CHAIR THE U.S. DELEGATION, WHICH WILL INCLUDE SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM SOME 15 USG AGENCIES INCLUDING THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, THE NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, AND THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS KOICHI HARAGUCHI WILL LEAD THE JAPANESE DELEGATION, WHICH INCLUDES SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM EIGHT JAPANESE AGENCIES.

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, PLEASE CONTACT JOHN BRINKLEY, STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS, AT 202-647 8093.
ALBRIGHT

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

C48

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT_ID: 183340093
DOCNO: 002590
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990525
TOR: 230010
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199905260254
MHFNO: 99 5591222
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI7219
OO RUEHZS RUEHC
DE RUEHJA #2590/01 1460254
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 260254Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7962
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1156
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1037
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5093
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0220
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3276
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0060
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2240
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1165
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0298
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0445
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0066
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0378
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002590

ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/09

TEXT
TAGS: PHUM, PREF, PINS, PTER, PGOV, PREL, ID, PO, UN
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: XANANA DISCUSSES CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS.

REFS: (A) JAKARTA 2559, (B) JAKARTA 2506, (C) JAKARTA 2442

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION MICHAEL P. OWENS, REASON: 1.5(D)

UNCLASSIFIED

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

2. (C) SUMMARY: EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO REVIEWED PREPARATIONS FOR A "DARE II" RECONCILIATION MEETING WITH JAKARTA DIPLOMATS MAY 25, INDICATING INTER ALIA THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO A JAKARTA VENUE FOR THE GATHERING AND THAT PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS DID NOT OPPOSE PARTICIPATION BY RAMOS HORTA OR OTHER OVERSEAS EAST TIMORESE LEADERS. AS ONE OF ITS GOALS, DARE II SHOULD FOCUS ON PROMOTING A FULLY FUNCTIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY COMMISSION FOR EAST TIMOR. THE LATTER BODY HAS THUS FAR BEEN INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE, GIVEN THE ONGOING THREATS TO THEIR SECURITY. DISCUSSING HIS OWN SITUATION, XANANA INSISTED HE WOULD NOT GO OVERSEAS IF HE WERE RELEASED BEFORE THE AUGUST EAST TIMOR CONSULTATION. RATHER, HE WOULD RETURN TO THE PROVINCE TO ENCOURAGE RECONCILIATION. THERE IS STILL TIME, IN XANANA'S VIEW, TO CREATE CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO A FREE AND FAIR AUGUST CONSULTATION, BUT ALL EAST TIMORESE WILL HAVE TO AGREE TO DISARM IF THIS IS TO HAPPEN. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER REPORTS THAT CIVILIAN LEADERS OF THE MILITIAS WERE LOSING CONTGROL, WITH THE MILITIAS INCREASINGLY DIRECTED BY THE TNI. END SUMMARY.

3. (SBU) RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO MET ON MAY 25 WITH DIPLOMATS FROM THE SIX COUNTRIES PRESIDENT HABIBIE INVITED TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A UN-BROKERED SETTLEMENT IN EAST TIMOR (REF A). AUSTRALIAN, UK, AND PHILIPPINE AMBASSADORS WERE PRESENT, ALONG WITH GERMAN, JAPANESE, AND U.S. DCMS.

DARE II PREPARATIONS

4. (C) XANANA WELCOMED THE SIX DIPLOMATS, SAYING THAT THEIR JOINT CALL UNDERSCORED INTERNATIONAL CONCERN FOR EAST TIMOR'S PLIGHT AND THE DESIRE OF FRIENDLY NATIONS TO HELP RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS THERE. IN RESPONSE TO INITIAL QUESTIONS, HE MADE SEVERAL POINTS REGARDING PREPARATIONS FOR A "DARE II" MEETING OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE EAST TIMOR DISPUTE, AS RECENTLY PROPOSED BY THE PROVINCE'S TWO CATHOLIC BISHOPS (REF B):

-- LOCATION: ALTHOUGH HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED HOLDING THE MEETING IN AUSTRALIA, AS ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED BY THE BISHOPS, XANANA HAD NO PROBLEM WITH A JAKARTA VENUE. HE PLEDGED THE RESISTANCE WOULD DO EVERYTHING IT COULD TO ENSURE INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS DID NOT MOUNT DEMONSTRATIONS OR OTHER ACTIONS THAT COULD IMPEDE THE PROCEEDINGS.

-- PARTICIPANTS: THE BISHOPS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPILING THE PROPOSED PARTICIPANTS LIST (WHOSE INCLUSION OF RAMOS HORTA AND OTHER OVERSEAS TIMORESE FIGURES HAS DRAWN GOI OPPOSITION). THEY ARE NOW REVIEWING IT, ACCORDING TO XANANA, IN LIGHT OF THE GOI REACTION. ON THE OTHER HAND, XANANA SAID, PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS SUCH AS THE EAST TIMOR PEOPLE'S FRONT (BRTT) AND THE FORUM FOR UNITY AND JUSTICE (FPDK) ARE AMENABLE TO PARTICIPATION BY THE OVERSEAS LEADERS. HE ADDED THAT THE CNRT AND PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS WOULD ISSUE JOINT STATEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT FOLLOWING SEPARATE BILATERAL MEETINGS HE WOULD BE HOLDING WITH THEM LATER THIS WEEK AND EARLY NEXT WEEK. AS FOR THE GOI STANCE ON PARTICIPATION, XANANA RECALLED INFORMATION MINISTER YUNUS HAD

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

INDICATED DURING THEIR MAY 22 MEETING THAT THE GOI WOULD NOT OBJECT TO RAMOS HORTA'S COMING INTO THE COUNTRY AT THE TIME OF A DARI II MEETING, AND THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS HAD NOT SAID ANYTHING ABOUT IT DURING HIS MAY 24 PRESS REMARKS ON THE DARE II MEETING.

-- TIMING: XANANA BELIEVED DARE II SHOULD BE HELD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SCHEDULE IT BEFORE THE JUNE 7 INDONESIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. ALTHOUGH JUNE 14 WAS NOW RECEIVING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION IN THE MEDIA AS A LIKELY START-UP DATE, XANANA THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE MEETING COULD BEGIN ON JUNE 10.

-- FINANCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT: ALTHOUGH THE GOI WOULD HAVE TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN FINANCING THE MEETING, XANANA HOPED THE "GROUP OF SIX" COUNTRIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE AS WELL. HE ENVISAGED A PRINCIPAL ROLE FOR THE UN IN ORGANIZING THE MEETING AND PRESIDING OVER ITS DELIBERATIONS. THE BISHOPS, HE SAID, WOULD PLAY A "MEDIATING ROLE." LATER IN THE DISCUSSION, XANANA SEEMED TO TAKE ON BOARD COMMENTS BY THE UK AND AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADORS CAUTIONING AGAINST EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE BISHOPS' ROLE AT DARI II, WHICH THEY NOTED MIGHT DELAY AN EARLY CONVENING OF THE CONFERENCE. XANANA NOTED IN THIS REGARD THAT IN A RECENT LETTER TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL HE HAD STRESSED THE BISHOPS' CONTINUING IMPORTANCE IN THE DARE PROCESS, WHILE ASKING THAT THE UN LEND A HAND IN GETTING IT OFF THE GROUND.

-- AGENDA: FROM CNRT'S PERSPECTIVE, DARE II COULD MAKE A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION BY PROVIDING A BETTER IDEA OF PRECISELY WHAT IT IS THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS ARE AFTER. XANANA EXPECTED, HOWEVER, THAT AT LEAST SOME PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE FROM THE FPDK, WOULD USE THE OCCASION TO ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES TO ACCEPT AUTONOMY, WHILE FOREGOING THE UN CONSULTATION PROCESS. THIS SAID, XANANA THOUGHT THE AGENDA SHOULD FOCUS ON (1) THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION VIEWED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; (2) DEFINING THE ROLES OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES IN THE CONSULTATION PROCESS, INCLUDING THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ITS OUTCOME; AND (3) DISCUSSING GUARANTEES TO BE GIVEN TO BOTH SIDES REGARDING THEIR STATUS AND SAFETY, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS, PROVIDED THE UN CERTIFIES IT TO HAVE BEEN FREE AND FAIR. THE OVERALL OUTCOME OF THE DARE II DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN A FINAL DOCUMENT, SIGNED BY ALL OF THE PARTICIPANTS AND THE UN REPRESENTATIVES WHO TOOK PART IN THE PROCEEDINGS.

PEACE AND SECURITY COMMISSION
---

5. (C) XANANA READILY AGREED THAT DARE II SHOULD HAVE AS A FURTHER GOAL PROMOTING A FULLY FUNCTIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY COMMISSION (PSC). REFERRING TO HIS MEETING LATE LAST WEEK WITH NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (KOMNASHAM) MEMBERS, XANANA RECALLED HE HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF RESTORING SECURITY IN EAST TIMOR TO LEVELS AT LEAST APPROXIMATING THOSE PREVAILING BEFORE THE EARLY APRIL LIQUICA MASSACRE. IN THE WAKE OF RECENT

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

MILITIA ATTACKS, VIRTUALLY ALL PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS HAVE EITHER FLED THE PROVINCE OR ARE IN HIDING. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS CLEARLY NO WAY THAT THE CNRT COULD PARTICIPATE IN PSC DELIBERATIONS. NONETHELESS, XANANA PLEDGED CNRT WOULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THAT BODY WHEN IT COULD DO SO SAFELY.

6. (C) ADDRESSING THE COMPOSITION OF THE PSC, XANANA RECALLED KOMNASHAM HAD INSISTED THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (TNI) BE REPRESENTED ON THE PSC, ALONG WITH THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE. XANANA SAID HE HAD ARGUED THAT TNI SHOULD NOT HAVE A SEAT AT THIS TABLE BECAUSE THE POLICE WERE TO TAKE OVER THE MAJOR SECURITY ROLE IN EAST TIMOR. MOREOVER, HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE MAIN PLAYERS ON THE COMMISSION SHOULD BE THE EAST TIMORESE CONTENDING PARTIES, RATHER THAN OUTSIDE ELEMENTS. IN THE END, HOWEVER, HE HAD AGREED TO TNI REPRESENTATION, SO LONG AS FALINTIL WAS GIVEN A SEAT AS WELL, ALONG WITH REPRESENTATION FOR GOI OFFICIALS. OTHER REPRESENTATIVES WOULD INCLUDE CNRT AND PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS FPDK AND BRTT.

XANANA'S STATUS
---

7. (C) XANANA INSISTED HE HAD NO INTENTION OF GOING ABROAD IF HE WERE RELEASED FROM DETENTION PRIOR TO THE AUGUST UN-SUPERVISED CONSULTATION. THE GOI HAD OFFERED HIM THIS OPTION ON MANY PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, HE SAID, AND HE HAD ALWAYS TURNED THEM DOWN. INSTEAD, XANANA SAID HE INTENDED TO RETURN TO EAST TIMOR IF HE HAD THE CHANCE. RECALLING HIS MEETING WITH MUHAMMAD YUNUS, XANANA SAID THE MINISTER HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT XANANA WOULD EITHER HEAD INTO THE HILLS TO REVIVE THE ARMED REBELLION OR "EXCITE" THE LOCAL POPULATION BY STAGING MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS. XANANA SAID HE HAD TOLD YUNUS HE WOULD DO NEITHER. WHY WOULD HE PROMOTE ANOTHER REBELLION? TIMORESE HAD TAKEN UP ARMS TO PRESS THEIR DEMANDS THAT THEY BE ABLE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE. THEY HAD ALREADY WON THEIR FIGHT, ASSUMING A UN-FACILITATED CONSULTATION TAKES PLACE. SIMILARLY, XANANA SAID, THE CNRT HAD NO INTEREST IN HEIGHTENING TENSIONS IN EAST TIMOR BY HOLDING LARGE DEMONSTRATIONS. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A CALM ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH PEOPLE COULD MULL THEIR FUTURES AND DECIDE WHETHER THEY WANTED INDEPENDENCE OR AN ONGOING RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA. XANANA REITERATED THAT HIS OWN SITUATION SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO HOLDING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAID HE DID BELIEVE HE COULD PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IN ENSURING A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE EAST TIMORESE PROBLEM. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE CONSULTATIONS, XANANA INSISTED HE COULD ACCEPT THE RESULTS, SO LONG AS THE UN CERTIFIED THEY REFLECTED THE WILL OF THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE. THIS APPLIED WHETHER HE WAS UNDER DETENTION OR NOT, XANANA SAID. TOWARD THE END OF THE MEETING, XANANA CAUTIONED THAT HIS SUPPORTERS IN EAST TIMOR MIGHT BEGIN TO MOUNT DEMONSTRATIONS DEMANDING HIS RELEASE IF SECURITY CONDITIONS PERMITTED.

IMPACT OF INTIMIDATION; NEED FOR DISARMAMENT

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

8. (C) ASKED WHETHER ONGOING MILITIA ATTACKS ARE UNDERMINING HIS CONFIDENCE THAT THE TIMORESE WOULD INDEED SUPPORT INDEPENDENCE AT THE END OF THE DAY, XANANA TEMPORIZED. "NORMAL" LEVELS OF INTIMIDATION, SUCH AS THOSE EXPERIENCED OVER MUCH OF THE LAST TEN YEARS, WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE AVERAGE TIMORESE'S DESIRE TO BE ABLE TO DETERMINE HIS OWN FATE, HE SAID. THEY HAD BEEN FIGHTING FOR THIS RIGHT FOR OVER 23 YEARS, AND HAD OFTEN APPEARED TO BE BEATEN INTO SUBMISSION. YET THEY ALWAYS MANAGED TO RENEW THE STRUGGLE, NO MATTER THE ODDS. THE LAST FEW MONTHS, THOUGH, HAD BROKEN NEW GROUND ON THE INTIMIDATION FRONT. EAST TIMOR HAD NEVER EXPERIENCED SUCH FREQUENT ATTACKS ON HELPLESS CIVILIANS AND HARASSMENT AND EVEN MASSACRES OF ITS PRO-INDEPENDENCE PARTISANS. THAT IS WHY, HE SAID, THE RESISTANCE IS WILLING TO LAY DOWN ITS OWN ARMS, PROVIDED NO TIMORESE BE ALLOWED TO CARRY ARMS ANYWHERE IN THE PROVINCE. THIS WOULD INCLUDE TIMORESE SERVING IN THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES, SINCE THEY TOO CAN BE INCITED TO VIOLENCE, GIVEN CURRENT STRESS LEVELS IN THE PROVINCE. ASKED WHETHER TIMORESE SERVING WITH THE INDONESIAN POLICE NEEDED TO BE DISARMED, XANANA INDICATED POLICE OFFICERS COULD CONTINUE TO CARRY ARMS IN VIEW OF THEIR ROLE UNDER THE UN AGREEMENT TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER.

POWER SHARING
---

9. (C) XANANA HOPED PRO-AUTONOMY GROUPS WOULD BEGIN TO CONSIDER POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS PRIOR TO THE DARE II MEETING, SINCE SUCH CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE AN IMPORTANT PART OF THAT MEETING'S AGENDA. DARE II MUST ARRIVE AT GUARANTEES FOR ALL GROUPS, WHICH WOULD APPLY TO THE PERIOD AFTER THE CONSULTATION AS WELL AS TO THE MONTHS LEADING UP TO THE ACTUAL BALLOTING. RECALLING THAT HE HAD BEEN LOOKING AT POSSIBLE PRECEDENTS, SUCH AS THOSE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S EXPERIENCE, XANANA STRESSED THAT RECONCILIATION NEEDS TO TAKE PLACE AT THE GRASS-ROOTS LEVEL IF IT IS EVER TO BE EFFECTIVE. IDEALLY, DARE II SUCCESSES CAN BE SOCIALIZED SO THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE REALIZES THAT INTIMIDATION CAN NEVER SUCCEED IN FORMING A LASTING CONSENSUS.

10. (C) REAL POWER-SHARING WILL BE NECESSARY FOR AT LEAST FIVE YEARS AFTER THE UN CONSULTATION, XANANA SAID, ESPECIALLY IF THE OUTCOME IS FOR INDEPENDENCE. EAST TIMOR, SIMPLY PUT, IS NOT YET READY TO "PLAY THE DEMOCRATIC GAME." IN FACT, IT COULD BE 10 YEARS BEFORE PEOPLE ARE PREPARED FOR FULLY REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE VARIOUS POLITICAL FORCES NEED TO AGREE TO SHARE POWER. (THE BRTT, HE SAID, IS ALREADY THINKING ALONG THESE LINES, AND HAS TOLD THE CNRT IT INTENDS TO BECOME TIMOR'S SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AT SOME POINT.)

11. (C) ASSUMING THAT EAST TIMOR RECEIVES INDEPENDENCE, XANANA ENVISAGED HOLDING ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY, ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE WOULD FIRST WANT TO DISCUSS THE ACTUAL MODALITIES WITH THE UN. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS WOULD FOLLOW AT SOME POINT, BUT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

FOR RECONCILIATION TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE EAST TIMOR ACTUALLY MOVED INTO A "WINNER-TAKE-ALL" FORM OF DEMOCRACY.

12.(C) IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-CONSULTATION PHASE, XANANA THOUGHT IT WOULD BE VITAL TO CUSHION THE LETDOWN FOR THE LOSERS (AGAIN ASSUMING A PRO-INDEPENDENCE OUTCOME) SO THAT THEY WOULD NOT HARBOR HARD FEELINGS TOWARD THE WINNING SIDE. IT WAS THUS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT, HE SAID, THAT THE CURRENT LEVELS OF VIOLENCE BE REDUCED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. OTHERWISE, IT WOULD BE IMMEASURABLY MORE DIFFICULT TO REASSURE THE LOSERS THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AT RISK IN AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR. IN SHORT, WHAT WAS NEEDED NOW WAS DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, WHICH NEEDED TO START AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. RECENT REPORTS FROM VARIOUS PRO-AUTONOMY REPRESENTATIVES, ESPECIALLY FROM WITHIN THE FDPK, WERE THUS DOUBLY WORRISOME, SINCE THEY INDICATED THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP OF THESE GROUPS WAS LOSING CONTROL OVER THE MILITIAS, WHO NOW WERE INCREASINGLY DIRECTED BY ARMY ELEMENTS.

BOTTOM LINE
---

13. (C) XANANA THOUGHT THERE WAS STILL TIME BEFORE AUGUST 8 TO CREATE CONDITIONS THAT WOULD PERMIT A FREE AND FAIR CONSULTATION PROCESS. KEY TO THIS OUTCOME, HOWEVER, WOULD BE SUCCESS AT DARE II IN REACHING A WORKABLE DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT. ALL OF THE OTHER ISSUES CAN BE RESOLVED, HE SAID, IF ALL EAST TIMORESE AGREE TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS. ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C4

DOCUMENT_ID: 183158573
DOCNO: 001352
PRODUCER: CANBERRA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990423
TOR: 033422
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904230720
MHFNO: 99 5185889
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI0966
PP RUEHC
DE RUEHBY #1352/01 1130720
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 230720Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3529
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 3241
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1715
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0173
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 8629
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE 2143
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH 0395
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 001352

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/04

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PINS, KPKO, UN, ID, AS
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: GUSMAO MESSAGE TO FM DOWNER

REF: JAKARTA 2012

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL/C STEPHEN ENGELKEN. REASON 1.5 (B AND D).

2. (U) [ ] BOTH LONG-TIME AUSTRALIAN RESIDENTS OF EAST TIMORESE ORIGIN, CALLED ON POLCOUNS APRIL 23 TO PROVIDE A COPY OF THE MESSAGE WHICH EAST TIMORESE INDEPENDENCE LEADER GUSMAO SENT AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER (REFTEL). [ ] EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD LONG BEEN ACTIVE IN ORGANIZING ASYLUM IN AUSTRALIA FOR EAST TIMORESE REFUGEES [ ]

B-6

Classified by Department of State
Lee R. Lohman, DAS, A/RPS
Classify C.A.F. Reason B-1.4(b+d) Date 6/11/2024
Declassify on 04/22/2024 Auth.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2007 Exemption B-1.4(b+d); B-6

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] A FULL FLEDGED CNRT MEMBER. [redacted] REPORTED THAT HE HAD MET APRIL 19 WITH GUSMAO AT HIS PLACE OF DETENTION IN JAKARTA AND THAT GUSMAO HAD ASKED HIM TO PASS A MESSAGE TO DOWNER AND SHARE IT WITH OTHER EMBASSIES IN CANBERRA. THE MESSAGE TOOK THE FORM OF A SHORT LETTER FROM GUSMAO IDENTIFYING [redacted] AS HIS REPRESENTATIVE ACCOMPANIED BY A MEMORANDUM FROM [redacted] DESCRIBING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GUSMAO (TEXT AT PARA 5 BELOW).

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

5. (C) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF [ ] MEMORANDUM REPORTING GUSMAO'S VIEWS:

BEGIN TEXT.

CNRT EAST TIMOR REPORT

I VISITED JAKARTA RECENTLY AND HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET TWICE WITH XANANA GUSMAO, THE PRESIDENT OF THE CNRT.

THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT HIS DETENTION HOUSE NEAR THE CIPINANG PRISON IN JAKARTA [ ] AND AFTERWARDS [ ] AFTER THE MEETINGS XANANA ASKED ME TO PASS ON TO THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT THE FOLLOWING POINTS OF DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS:

1) CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS.

2) COMMENTS

XANANA AND THE CNRT ARE DESPERATELY TRYING TO SAVE THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS OF WHICH HE IS A FIRM BELIEVER AND SUPPORTER. DESPITE THE RECENT EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR, XANANA BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION PROCESS CAN STILL BE SAVED IF THE FOLLOWING STEPS CAN BE FOLLOWED AND IMPLEMENTED. BECAUSE OF AUSTRALIA'S CLOSE RELATIONS AND FRIENDSHIP WITH INDONESIA HE BELIEVES THAT THE ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT OF THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE VITAL IN ACHIEVING ANY PROGRESS WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO A FINAL AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION FOR EAST TIMOR.

B1

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

[ ] B-1

AS STATED, XANANA BELIEVES THAT THOSE INITIATIVES SHOULD COME FROM THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF ITS CLOSE RELATIONS AND FRIENDSHIP WITH INDONESIA. XANANA BELIEVES THAT OF MANY COUNTRIES IF ANY, AUSTRALIA WILL BE IN A BETTER AND STRONGER POSITION TO PERSUADE INDONESIA TO AGREE TO THESE STEPS WHICH HE BELIEVES WILL BE THE BEST WAY TO HELP ACHIEVE A FAIR AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION FOR EAST TIMOR.

FINALLY, XANANA BELIEVES THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK TOWARDS THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL ENVOY TO EAST TIMOR.

END TEXT.

HOLMES

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C11

DOCUMENT_ID: 183128091
DOCNO: 001926
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990418
TOR: 055150
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904180925
MHFNO: 99 5114724
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI2419
OO RUEHC RUEHZS
DE RUEHJA #1926/01 1080925
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180925Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7305
INFO RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 4805
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 0913
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2035
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001926

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/01

Classified by Department of State
Lee R. Lohman, DAS, A/RPS
Classify Conf. Reason B1, 1.4(b)(d) Date 6/11/2004
Declassify on 4/17/2024 Auth.

TEXT
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, PINS, CASC, PINR ID
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: DILI UPDATE

REF: A) JAKARTA 1908 (NOTAL), B) JAKARTA 1923

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

CORRECTED COPY CORRECTING PARA ENUMERATIOM

2. (U) SUMMARY: AS OF MID-DAY APRIL 18, MILITARY-BACKED MILITIA CONTINUE TO OPERATE WITHOUT CONSTRAINT IN DILI, THE CAPITAL OF EAST TIMOR. THE OFFICIAL DEATH COUNT FROM THE APRIL 17 MILITIA ASSAULTS ON CIVILIANS STANDS AT 20 WITH MANY CLAIMS THAT IT IS HIGHER. OVER ONE HUNDRED

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B1, 1.4(b)+(d), B-6

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

DISPLACED PERSONS AT THE SCENE OF THE MOST BRUTAL MILITIA ATTACK ARE MISSING. ONE REPORT CLAIMS THAT SOME ARE IN POLICE CUSTODY. THERE ARE REPORTS OF RENEWED MILITIA ATTACKS, APRIL 18, ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE CIVILIANS IN ONE DILI NEIGHBORHOOD IN WHICH INDONESIAN MILITARY FORCES MAY HAVE JOINED IN. A SENIOR INDONESIAN MILITARY FIGURE IS RUMORED TO HAVE BEEN IN DILI DURING THE MILITIA RAMPAGE AND THERE ARE REPORTS OF THAT SENIOR MILITARY FIGURES, INCLUDING GENERAL WIRANTO, MET IN JAKARTA REGARDING EAST TIMOR A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE MILITIA RALLY-RAMPAGE. WIRANTO REPORTEDLY WILL VISIT DILI APRIL 19. REPORTS FROM DILI CLAIM THE MILITIAS ARE PLANNING MORE ATTACKS IN TOWNS SOUTH OF DILI OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS OF KILLINGS AND KIDNAPPINGS BY THE MILITIA IN LIQUICA AND VIQUEQUE IN RECENT DAYS. THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA HAS MADE NO STATEMENT. HIS PEOPLE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS OF MILITIA ELEMENTS IN JAKARTA TARGETING THEM. THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER WILL CALL ON HABIBIE APRIL 19 TO DISCUSS THE VIOLENCE. THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY AND AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER MAY BE CONTACTING HABIBIE AS WELL. THE PORTUGUESE CLAIM TO BE DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE TRIPARTITE TALKS SET FOR THIS WEEK IN NEW YORK. FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS ALSO APPEARS SET TO KEEP THE TALKS ON SCHEDULE. WESTERN JOURNALISTS BELIEVE THAT A STRATEGY IS EMERGING TO PARTITION EAST TIMOR BY INTIMIDATING THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MAJORITY IN WESTERN DISTRICTS AND THE CAPITAL. END SUMMARY

DILI UPDATE
---

3. (U) WESTERN JOURNALISTS IN DILI HAVE TOLD US BY PHONE THAT THERE WAS ADDITIONAL SHOOTING IN DILI OVERNIGHT (APRIL 17-18). AS OF MID-DAY APRIL 18 THE MILITIAS, WHICH RAMPAGED THROUGH THE CAPITAL APRIL 17, REMAIN IN DILI AND APPEAR TO BE OPERATING FREELY ABSENT ANY CONSTRAINT/CONTROL IMPOSED BY THE POLICE OR MILITARY. THE OFFICIAL DEATH COUNT NOW STANDS AT 20, THOUGH MANY SOURCES, INCLUDING FORMER EAST TIMOR GOVERNOR MARIO CARRASCALAO, BELIEVE THAT THE COUNT IS CERTAINLY HIGHER.

4. (U) A JOURNALIST WHO WAS AT THE HOUSE OF MANUEL CARRASCALAO WHEN IT WAS ATTACKED APRIL 17 TOLD US THAT HE SAW OVER 100 PEOPLE WHEN HE INTERVIEWED THEM THERE APRIL 16 AND AGAIN WHEN HE WAS AT THE HOUSE ON APRIL 17. CHRISTINA CARRASCALAO, MANUEL CARRASCALAO'S DAUGHTER, TOLD OUR JOURNALIST SOURCE THAT 126 PEOPLE WERE AT THE HOUSE AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK. THE AUTHORITIES HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED 12 DEAD AT THE HOUSE. (FOUR FROM THE HOUSE EARLIER HAD SOUGHT REFUGE AT THE RESIDENCE OF BISHOP BELO.) THE REST, INCLUDING THE REMAINS OF THOSE KILLED (12 OR MORE) ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR THOUGH ONE REPORT CLAIMS THE REMAINS OF THE DEAD ARE AT THE MILITARY HOSPITAL. INDONESIAN RED CROSS OFFICIALS TOLD JOURNALISTS THAT THE DEAD AND WOUNDED WERE TAKEN AWAY IN MILITARY TRUCKS LATE

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

IN THE DAY APRIL 17. A CORDON OF MILITARY AND POLICE PREVENTED JOURNALISTS FROM APPROACHING THE SCENE AFTER THE ASSAULT, APRIL 17. SOME PEOPLE WOUNDED IN OTHER INCIDENTS IN DILI SOUGHT MEDICAL HELP AT A PRIVATE HOUSE SET UP TO AID VICTIMS ACCORDING TO A WESTERN JOURNALIST IN DILI. THE POLICE VISITED THE SITE OVERNIGHT LOOKING FOR WOUNDED. THE PEOPLE AT THE HOUSE CLAIMED THEY HAD NO WOUNDED THERE AND THE POLICE LEFT. ONE REPORT CLAIMS THAT APPROXIMATELY 60 DISPLACED PERSONS, POSSIBLY FROM THE CARRASCALAO HOUSE, ARE IN POLICE CUSTODY IN DILI.

5. (U) JOURNALISTS WHO VISITED THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF BEKORA ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF DILI ON APRIL 17 WERE SHOWN CARTRIDGES THAT LOCAL PEOPLE SAID WERE EXPENDED DURING THE MILITIA ATTACK ON BEKORA THAT DAY. THE CARTRIDGES, WHICH SMELLED FRESH, INCLUDED 9MM (HAND GUN OR BARRETTA), 5.66 CALIBER (M-16) AND 7.62 MM (KALISHNIKOV OR SKS). THE LOCAL PEOPLE HAD ARMED THEMSELVES WITH KNIVES AND STAVES FOR SELF-DEFENSE BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THEY WOULD BE NO MATCH FOR "ABRI-BACKED MILITIA," SHOULD THEY RETURN. AS OF MID-DAY APRIL 18, THERE WERE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT THE MILITIA HAD IN FACT RETURNED TO BEKORA. THESE REPORTS CLAIMED SHOOTING AND BURNING OF HOUSES HAD OCCURRED. A WESTERN JOURNALIST REPORTEDLY WITNESSED MOBIL POLICE AND ARMY TROOPS SHOOTING INTO A NEIGHBORHOOD WHILE THE MILITIAS WERE ASSAULTING IT. HE SAID FROM HIS VANTAGEPOINTS IT WAS NOT CONCEIVABLE THAT THE BRIMOB TROOPS WERE SHOOTING TO DEFEND THE NEIGHBORHOOD, ADDING, "AND THERE WAS NO SHOOTING COMING BACK." ISAAC, THE POLITICAL COORDINATOR OF THE CNRT (PRO-INDEPENDENCE UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION) TOLD ONE CORRESPONDENT THAT "NOW WE CAN ONLY COUNT ON OURSELVES FOR DEFENSE."

6. (U) FORMER EAST TIMOR GOVERNOR MARIO CARRASCALAO TOLD US APRIL 18 THAT GENERAL ZACKY ANWAR HAD BEEN IN DILI SINCE APRIL 16 OR 17 "TO BLESS THIS OPERATION." JOURNALISTS ON THE SCENE ALSO REPORTED CLAIMS THAT ZACKY WAS IN DILI ON APRIL 17. THE JOURNALISTS BELIEVE THAT THIS REFLECTS HIGH-LEVEL TNI (INDONESIAN MILITARY) INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENTS IN DILI. SPECULATION IS ALSO GROWING ABOUT THE PRESENCE IN JAKARTA OF THE KEY EAST TIMOR SECURITY FORCE LEADERS, INCLUDING THE DILI POLICE CHIEF, THE EAST TIMOR MILITARY COMMANDER AND GENERAL DAIMRI (REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER) LAST WEEK. THE GROUP REPORTEDLY MET WITH GENERAL WIRANTO ON OR ABOUT APRIL 13. LOCAL MEDIA, AT THE TIME, CARRIED REPORTS OF SENIOR SECURITY MEETING(S) ON EAST TIMOR. WIRANTO WILL REPORTEDLY VISIT DILI ON APRIL 19.

7. (U) MARIO CARRASCALAO SAID HE HAS HEARD ABOUT PLANS FOR MILITIA ATTACKS ON APRIL 19 OR 20 IN TOWNS SOUTH OF DILI, SPECIFICALLY MAUBISSE IN AINARO DISTRICT. JOURNALISTS IN DILI TOLD US OF EXPECTATION OF ATTACKS IN THE DISTRICT TOWN OF ALIEU (ALSO SOUTH OF DILI) APRIL 19 OR 20. MEANWHILE, THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF A MILITIA ATTACK IN LIQUICA, APRIL 17, WHICH LEFT MANY

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

DEAD. LIQUICA REMAINS SEALED OFF. THERE IS ALSO A REPORT THAT OVER THE WEEKEND, MILITIA HAVE SEIZED 18 PEOPLE IN VIQUEQUE (NFI).

8. (U) A SENIOR GENERAL TOLD THE DATT THAT THE MILITARY AND POLICE HAVE TAKEN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION IN DILI. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT MILITARY AND POLICE MEASURES IN DILI ON APRIL 17, PREVENTED AN EVEN HIGHER DEATH TOLL. JOURNALISTS ON THE SCENE MID-DAY APRIL 18 TELL US, HOWEVER, THAT THE MILITARY STILL HAVE TAKEN NO STEPS TO REASSERT CONTROL AND THAT, EXCEPT FOR AN OCCASIONAL VEHICLE CARRYING POLICE, SECURITY FORCES ARE OFF THE STREETS.

9. (U) XANANA'S STAFF REPORT THAT HE IS NOT ISSUING STATEMENTS FOR THE MOMENT. THEY HAVE REPORTS WHICH THEY TAKE SERIOUSLY OF 150 PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAMEN IN JAKARTA WHO ARE PREPARING TO ATTACK PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURES IN THE JAKARTA, INCLUDING XANANA. THEY IDENTIFIED THE LEADERS OF THE GROUP AS [ ] (NOT KNOWN TO US), AND SAID THEY WERE DISPERSED IN THREE LOCATIONS IN THE CITY (RAGUNAN, RAWASARI -- NEAR XANANA'S HOUSE OF DETENTION, AND KALAPA DUA). (NFI) B-6

DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS

10. (C) [ ] HAS TOLD US THAT THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER, NOW IN INDONESIA ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT AND WHO WAS IN DILI ON APRIL 17 (REF B), WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE TOMORROW, APRIL 19, ABOUT THE VIOLENCE. [ ] SAID, IS DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN NEW YORK. OTHERWISE, THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA WILL ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES OF PREVENTING THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE FROM DETERMINING THEIR FUTURE. B-1 B-1

[ ] TOLD US ON APRIL 18 THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS ALSO HOPES TO KEEP THE TRIPARTITE TALKS ON SCHEDULE AND PLANS TO LEAVE FOR NEW YORK TALKS WITH A NEW AUTONOMY PACKAGE ON APRIL 19. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TOLD US FOREIGN SECRETARY ROBIN COOK IS CONSIDERING TELEPHONING PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON APRIL 19. B-6

11. (C) [ ] HAS TOLD US THAT THE AUSTRALIAN SECURITY COUNCIL WILL MEET APRIL 19 REGARDING EAST TIMOR DEVELOPMENTS AND THAT A PHONE CALL OR MESSAGE FORM PRIME MINISTER HOWARD TO HABIBIE WILL LIKELY FOLLOW THAT SESSION. B-1

12. (C) JOURNALISTS IN DILI, NOTING APRIL 17 PUBLIC CALLS AT THE RALLY BY RALLY LEADERS FOR PARTITION OF EAST TIMOR WITH WESTERN DISTRICTS AND THE CAPITAL REMAINING WITH INDONESIA, BELIEVE THAT MILITIA INTIMIDATION AND ASSAULTS IN THOSE WESTERN DISTRICTS NOW ON-GOING IS IN SUPPORT OF SUCH AN OUTCOME. THE AIM WOULD BE TO DRIVE OUT OR SILENCE THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MAJORITY.

UNCLASSIFIED

MORI DocID: 1054588

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

MORI DocID: 1054591

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C13

DOCUMENT_ID: 183135729
DOCNO: 001281
PRODUCER: CANBERRA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990419
TOR: 171546
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904192106
MHFNO: 99 5130989
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI9041
OO RUEHZS RUEHC
DE RUEHBY #1281/01 1092106
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 192106Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3490
INFO RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0166
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1704
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 8593
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE 2113
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH 0366
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 001281

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/19/04

Classified by Department of State
Lee R. Lohman, DAS, A/RPS
Classify Cont. Reason B-1.4(b)+(d) Date 6/11/2004
Declassify on 4/18/2024 Auth.

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, ID, AS
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AUSTRALIA'S PM CALLS ON HABIBIE TO REIN IN MILITIAS; WILL VISIT JAKARTA APRIL 26

REF: JAKARTA 1923

(U) CLASSIFIED BY STEPHEN ENGELKEN, POLITICAL COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.5 (B).

1. (C) SUMMARY. [redacted] BRIEFED AMBASSDOR ON PM HOWARD'S APRIL 19 CALL TO PRESIDENT HABIBIE. [redacted]

B-1

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, D.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B-1.4(b)+(d)

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

HABIBIE ACCEPTED HOWARD'S OFFER TO VISIT JAKARTA NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS WHAT SORT OF UN PRESENCE WOULD BE HELPFUL IN EAST TIMOR. THE OPPOSITION SPOKESMAN FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS WANTS IMMEDIATE AND STRONG INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE TO DISARM AND DISBAND THE MILITIAS AND ESTABISH A UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION. PUBLIC PRESSURE IS CLEARLY A FACTOR

END SUMMARY.

2. (C) BREIFED THE AMBASSADOR APRIL 19 ON THE HOWARD/HABIBIE TELEPHONE CALL OF THE SAME DAY.

HABIBIE ACCEPTED HOWARD'S OFFER TO TRAVEL TO JAKARTA NEXT MONDAY, APRIL 26. FM DOWNER AND DEFENSE MINISTER JOHN MOORE WILL ACCOMPANY THE PM TO JAKARTA. DISCUSSIONS WILL FOCUS ON WHAT SORT OF UN PRESENCE WOULD BE HELPFUL IN EAST TIMOR OVER THE SHORT AND LONG-TERM.

3. (U) THE CHIEF OF DFAT'S EAST TIMOR TASK FORCE CHRIS MORAITIS IS PRESENTLY IN NEW YORK WITH TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (ADOD) AND ONE FROM AUSAID. THE AUSTRALIAN TEAM WILL BE DISCUSSING WHAT TYPE OF UN PRESENCE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN EAST TIMOR AND THEIR REPORT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE A PART OF THE PM'S DISCUSSIONS IN JAKARTA.

4. (U) HOWARD'S CALL CAME AFTER A WEEKEND IN WHICH THE AUSTRALIAN PRESS AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION REACTED STRONGLY TO EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR. SHADOW FOREIGN MINISTER LAURIE BRERETON SAID THAT THE HORRIFIC EVENTS IN DILI CONFIRM THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR IMMEDIATE AND STRONG INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND AND DISARM THE PRO-INTEGRATIONIST MILITIAS AND ACCEPT AN EFFECTIVE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN EAST TIMOR.

b1

b1

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C23

DOCUMENT_ID: 183109482
DOCNO: 069385
PRODUCER: WASHDC
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: OUT
DOR: 19990414
TOR: 212434
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904150120
MHFNO: 99 5074301
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MPF9385
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHC #9385 1050123
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 150120Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 0000
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0000
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 069385

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/09

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, UN, ID
SUBJECT: U/S PICKERING'S APRIL 14 MEETING WITH INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN ON EAST TIMOR

CLASSIFIED BY U/S THOMAS R. PICKERING. REASON: 1.5(D).

1. (C) SUMMARY: U/S PICKERING MET APRIL 14 WITH INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN TO UNDERSCORE U.S. CONCERN ABOUT ESCALATING VIOLENCE AND OTHER ISSUES IN EAST TIMOR. HE REITERATED OUR CALL FOR THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT (GOI) TO TAKE UNAMBIGUOUS STEPS TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE TERRITORY, INCLUDING INVESTIGATING AND BRINGING TO JUSTICE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LIQUICA KILLINGS, AND DISARMING AND DEACTIVATING ALL MILITIAS INVOLVED IN VIOLENCE. AS A FRIEND OF INDONESIA, HE CAUTIONED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON INDONESIA'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION OF A PERCEPTION THAT THE MILITARY (TNI, FORMERLY ABRI) WAS BACKING THE MILITIA VIOLENCE. HE ALSO URGED THAT THE UN BE ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH AN IMMEDIATE PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR.

B7

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B1.4(b)+(d)

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

END SUMMARY.

2. (C) UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING MET APRIL 14 WITH INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN TO DELIVER A STRONG MESSAGE ON EAST TIMOR. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID HE HAD ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO COME TO THE DEPARTMENT TO DISCUSS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER, EAST TIMOR. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE U.S. IS INCREASINGLY TROUBLED BY DETERIORATION IN THE SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR. CONTINUED VIOLENCE, IF UNCHECKED, RISKS DERAILING PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S DETERMINED EFFORT TO CHART A NEW FUTURE FOR EAST TIMOR, AND CASTS DOUBT ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY'S (TNI) ABILITY AND COMMITMENT TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF INNOCENT PEOPLE IN EAST TIMOR.

-- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AND CINCPAC ADMIRAL BLAIR IN THEIR RECENT VISITS HAVE UNDERSCORED U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT EAST TIMOR AND URGED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO DISARM CIVILIAN MILITIAS AND TAKE OTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING STEPS THAT COULD REDUCE TENSIONS. WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS THAT ANY OF THESE STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN.

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING SECURITY AND ADEQUATE HEALTH CARE IN EAST TIMOR. IN THE FACE OF DEMONSTRATED HUMANITARIAN NEEDS, HOWEVER, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS OFFERED TO ASSIST. THIS IS NOT A SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE.

-- THE EVENTS IN LIQUICA ARE PARTICULARLY OMINOUS. NUMEROUS PRESS REPORTS NOTE THE SECURITY SITUATION HAS BEEN THREATENED BY BANDS OF MILITIAMEN REPORTEDLY SUPPORTED BY THE TNI (FORMERLY ABRI) WHO HAVE TERRORIZED THE POPULATION. SCORES OF PEOPLE MAY HAVE BEEN KILLED.

-- WE HAVE, AND ARE AWARE THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS, CONCRETE INFORMATION ABOUT THE MILITIA GROUPS

INVOLVED IN RECENT ABUSES AND THEIR LEADERS.

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

-- GIVEN THE MOUNTING EVIDENCE OF INVOLVEMENT OF THE LOCAL SECURITY FORCES, WE URGE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE UNAMBIGUOUS STEPS TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE SUCH AS IMMEDIATELY REPLACING THE UNITS IN LIQUICA WHILE AN IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATION IS CONDUCTED. WITHOUT SUCH RESOLUTE ACTION, INDONESIA'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION AND CREDIBILITY WILL BE SERIOUSLY TARNISHED.

-- GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS, REGARDLESS OF THEIR POLITICAL ORIENTATION, WHO HAVE COMMITTED ABUSES AND ARE VIOLATING THE LAW MUST BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE THROUGH CREDIBLE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF THOSE INVOLVED.

-- GIVEN THE INADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR, WE ALSO URGE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO RECONSIDER ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO PERMIT ACCESS THERE TO THOSE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS PREPARED TO RENDER HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE NEED TO RE-BUILD A SURGICAL CAPACITY WITHIN EAST TIMOR IN THE LONG TERM. MOST IMMEDIATELY, WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE TNI HAS REPORTEDLY REFUSED TO FACILITATE ADEQUATE SECURITY FOR HUMANITARIAN MEDICAL RELIEF EFFORTS IN LIQUICA.

-- THE TNI MUST ACT TO ENSURE A PEACEFUL ENVIRONMENT FOR A FREE AND FAIR CONSULTATION PROCESS. INDONESIA'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION IS AT STAKE. THIS WILL ENTAIL, AS A CRITICAL FIRST STEP, THE DISARMING AND DEACTIVATION OF ALL MILITIAS THAT HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN AN ESCALATING TIDE OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION. THE TNI SHOULD CEASE PROVIDING ARMS, TRANSPORT, LOGISTICAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE AS WELL AS PAY TO ANY MILITIA UNITS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN RECENT VIOLENCE.

-- DIPLOMATIC ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR SHOULD BE FACILITATED. DENYING ACCESS ON THE BASIS THAT LOCAL OFFICIALS ARE TOO BUSY TO ACCEPT VISITORS CAN ONLY INCREASE DOUBTS ABOUT THE REAL SITUATION THERE.

-- AS A FRIEND OF INDONESIA, WE ARE SURE THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT THE INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTION TO GROW THAT THE OFFICIAL SECURITY FORCES HAVE

PRIVATIZED VIOLENCE BY ARMING AND TOLERATING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS. WE KNOW FROM EXPERIENCE ELSEWHERE THAT THIS CAN HAVE A DEVASTATING IMPACT ON A COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION.

-- THE GOI MUST ENGAGE WITH THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES TO END THE VIOLENCE. WE HAVE, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, URGED XANANA GUSMAG TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO WORK FOR RESTRAINT AMONG PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE. HIS RECENT REPORTED OFFER TO COOPERATE IN DISARMING FALINTIL (I.E., PRO-INDEPENDENCE GUERRILLAS) TOGETHER WITH ALL EAST TIMORESE MILITIAS -- WITH THE WEAPONS BEING HANDED TO A UN FORCE -- DESERVES SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-- IN THIS REGARD, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE UN BE ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH AN IMMEDIATE PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR AS A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE.

[redacted] B1

SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE VERY SERIOUSLY ALL THE POINTS OF CONCERN HE HAD MADE. THE UNDER

6. (U) AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR PERWITORINI WIJONO. EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS HARTWICK, EAP/PIMBS BOB CLARKE (NOTETAKER), AND P SPECIAL ASSISTANT DAVID STRAUB SAT IN.

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C30

DOCUMENT_ID: 183349711
DOCNO: 002630
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990527
TOR: 085841
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199905271148
MHFNO: 99 5612350
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI6268
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHJA #2630/01 1471148
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271148Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8003
INFO RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1043
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1164
RUEHBY/AMEMBASY CANBERRA 5111
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3282
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0226
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0064
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0304
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1169
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0449
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0070
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0384
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
RUHBABA/CG III MEF//G2//
BT

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Classify as (X) Extend as (C) Downgrade to
Date 6/18/2004 Declassify on 5/27/2016 Reason B1.4(b)+(d)

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002630

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/06

TEXT
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PREF, PGOV, PTER, PINS, MOPS, EAID, ID
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 27, 1999

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO REPORTING GATHERED BY POLOFF IN DILI MAY 27, MILITARY-BACKED MILITIA ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS CONTINUE IN WESTERN DISTRICTS IN EAST TIMOR, WHILE IN THE EAST AND IN DILI, MILITIA ACTIVITY IS

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B1.4(b)+(d)

UNCLASSIFIED

RELATIVELY LIGHTER. THE CHURCH'S RESPECTED "PEACE AND JUSTICE COMMISSION" TOLD POLOFF THAT IT CAN CONFIRM 149 DEATHS AT MILITIA HANDS SINCE APRIL 1 BUT NOTES THAT THE ACTUAL TOTAL IS PRESUMABLY HIGHER. CHURCH SOURCES CLAIM THAT THE DARE II RECONCILIATION PROCESS HAS BEEN PUT BACK TO SQUARE ONE WITH NO DARE II GATHERING LIKELY BEFORE JULY. AN INTERNATIONAL NGO HAS PROVIDED UNCONFIRMED FIGURES FOR THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE DISPLACED BY MILITIA ACTIVITY. IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE MAY 5 AGREEMENT IT SIGNED WITH THE UN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF PORTUGAL, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE PROMOTING AUTONOMY IN EAST TIMOR BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE OFFICIAL CAMPAIGN PERIOD -- DRAWING AN UNAMET COMPLAINT.

[redacted] ALATAS HAS NOTED THE POSSIBILITY THE CONSULTATION BALLOT SET FOR AUGUST 8 COULD BE POSTPONED. UNAMET CHIEF MARTIN IS EXPECTED IN EAST TIMOR MAY 31. MEGAWATI WILL MAKE A CAMPAIGN STOP IN DILI JUNE 1. END COMMENT

B-1

CONTINUING MILITIA VIOLENCE IN WESTERN DISTRICTS

3. (C) POLOFF, REPORTING FROM DILI LATE MAY 27, SAID THERE IS BROAD CONSENSUS AMONG CHURCH AND NGO SOURCES THAT MILITIA VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR'S WESTERN MOST DISTRICTS IS CONTINUING. REPORTING FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN DISTRICTS SUGGESTS LOWER LEVELS OF MILITIA ACTIVITY. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS REPORTED BY RELIABLE SOURCES BUT IS UNCONFIRMED UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED:

-- DURING THE MAY 16-18 PERIOD, MILITIA KILLED AS MANY AS 16 VILLAGERS IN BOBANARO DISTRICT, DUMPING SOME OF THE BODIES INTO THE SEA NEAR BATUGADE. (CHURCH AND NGO SOURCES REPORT THREE KILLED.)

-- IN HATOLIA, ERMERA DISTRICT FROM MAY 5 TO MAY 17, MILITIA KILLED UP TO 50 PEOPLE (THREE CONFIRMED DEATHS).

-- RECENTLY, MILITIA TRANSFERED FIVE PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN TAKEN CAPTIVE IN THE APRIL 17 ASSAULT ON THE HOUSE OF MANUEL CARRASCALAO (IN DILI) TO MAUBARA, WHERE THEY WERE EXECUTED.

4. (C) THE CHURCH'S "PEACE AND JUSTICE COMMISSION" REPORTS THAT IT HAS CONFIRMED 99 PEOPLE KILLED BY MILITIAS IN EAST TIMOR IN THE MONTH OF APRIL. IT CLAIMS THAT CONFIRMED KILLINGS BY MILITIAS IN MAY STAND AT 50 FOR ALL EAST TIMOR. THE COMMISSION EMPHASIZES THAT THESE FIGURES ARE INCOMPLETE AND ARE EXPECTED TO RISE AS MORE DATA IS COLLECTED.

5. (SBU) THE SITUATION IN DILI REMAINS RELATIVELY QUIET,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DAILY REPORTS OF MILITIA BEATINGS AND OTHER ACTS OF INTIMIDATION DIRECTED AT THE LOCAL POPULATION.

MEGAWATI COMING TO DILI

6. (SBU) MEGAWATI, LEADER OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY FOR STRUGGLE (PDI-P) IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT DILI ON JUNE 1..

THE DARE II PROCESS

7. (C) CHURCH OFFICIALS IN DILI HAVE TOLD POLOFF THAT THE DARE II PROCESS HAS BEEN "POLITICIZED" TO THE EXTENT THAT IT CANNOT, FOR THE TIME BEING, PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR RECONCILIATION. THEY CITE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION TO PROPOSALS RELATED TO VENUE AND PARTICIPANTS IN THIS REGARD. THE CHURCH PLANS TO ATTEMPT TO REBUILD CONSENSUS BY CONTACTING INDIVIDUAL ACTORS SEPARATELY WITH THE HOPE OF ACHIEVING BROAD AGREEMENT FOR A DARE II MEETING IN EAST TIMOR IN JULY.

THE DISPLACED

8. (SBU) CARITAS IN DILI HAS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ESTIMATES OF DISPLACED POPULATION, NOTING THAT THE COMPILATION IS NOT COMPREHENSIVE:

-- IN BOBONARO (MALIANA AND CAILOCO) - 12,000;

-- IN HATOLIA (ERMERA) - 12,000 (A FIRMER ESTIMATE THAN RECORDED FOR OTHER SITES);

-- ATOMBUA (WEST TIMOR) - 3,200;

-- SOAI DISTRICT - 3,000;

-- SAME DISTRICT - 300;

-- DILI - 2,500.

CARITAS HAS DISTRIBUTED FOOD TO SOME OF THESE CAMPS THROUGH A CHURCH NETWORK BUT IS UNSURE HOW MUCH IS REACHING THE NEEDY. CARITAS NOTES THAT SOME DISPLACED HAVE FLED MILITIA VIOLENCE WHILE OTHERS HAVE BEEN FORCIBLY RESETTLED BY MILITIAS INTO CAMP AREAS WHERE THEY RECEIVE PRO-AUTONOMY INDOCTRINATION. SEPARATELY, REUTERS HAS REPORTED A TOTAL DISPLACED POPULATION IN EAST TIMOR OF 54,000 -- SOURCING LOCAL NGOS.

THE GOVERNMENT PROMOTES AUTONOMY

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

9. (SBU) "SURA TIM TIM," THE LOCAL DAILY IN EAST TIMOR WHICH SINCE ITS OFFICES WERE ATTACKED BY MILITIA IN APRIL, HAS ADOPTED A STRONG PRO-AUTONOMY SLANT, REPORTED MAY 27 THAT EAST TIMOR GOVERNOR ABILIO SOARES AND FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL AMBASSADOR LOPEZ DA CRUZ OFFICIATED AT A CEREMONY IN VIQUEQUE ON MAY 26, WHICH INAUGURATED THE LOCAL OFFICE OF DA CRUZ'S PRO-AUTONOMY "EAST TIMORESE PEOPLES FRONT" (BRTT). ON MAY 26 UNAMET PUBLICLY CRITICIZED PRO-AUTONOMY CAMPAIGNING WHICH IS NOT SUPPOSED TO BEGIN UNTIL JULY 20. (COMMENT: MOREOVER, AS EXPLAINED TO POLCOUNS BY UNAMET OFFICIALS, UNDER TERMS OF THE MAY 5 AGREEMENT, THE GOVERNMENT IS REQUIRED TO BE NEUTRAL IN DEALING WITH THE AUTONOMY-INDEPENDENCE QUESTION. THE MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT ARE BROADLY IGNORING THIS PROVISION OF THE AGREEMENT. END COMMENT)

B-1

ALATAS ON POSTPONING THE PROCESS

11. (U) ALATAS TOLD THE MEDIA MAY 26 THAT UNSYG KOFI ANNAN MIGHT DECIDE TO DELAY THE AUTONOMY-INDEPENDENCE VOTE NOW SET FOR AUGUST 8. "IF HE SAYS IT IS NOT CONDUCIVE THEN ALL OF OUR EFFORTS WILL BE USELESS AND THERE WILL BE A PROPOSAL TO DELAY IT." ALATAS ALSO DENIED A UNAMET STATEMENT THAT THE MILITARY WERE TRAINING MILITIAS. HE ADDED THAT "SECURITY PERSONNEL ARE EXPECTED TO TAKE FIRM ACTION AND, WHEN NEEDED, ARREST, INVESTIGATE AND BRING TO JUSTICE THOSE PEOPLE WHO PROVOKE AND VIOLATE THE LAW." SPEAKING OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS CHASED INTO HIDING BY MILITIA VIOLENCE OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS, ALATAS SAID "LET THEM COME OUT, LET THEM TAKE PARTICIPATE."

UNCLASSIFIED

MORI DocID: 1054625

UNCLASSIFIED

UNAMET CHIEF'S ARRIVAL

12. (U) UNAMET CHIEF IAN MARTIN IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN INDONESIA MARCH 27 AND GO TO DILI ON MARCH 31.
ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C46

DOCUMENT ID: 183329411
DOCNO: 002556
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990524
TOR: 063723
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199905241033
MHFNO: 99 5565487
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI7006
OO RUEHZS RUEHC
DE RUEHJA #2556/01 1441033
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241033Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7926
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1144
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1028
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5075
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0213
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3265
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0053
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2223
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1158
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0289
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0438
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0061
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0369
BT

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Classify as (X) Extend as (C) Downgrade to
Date 5/10/2001 Declassify on 5/24/2006 Reason 1.5(d)

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002556

Classified by Department of State
Lee R. Lohman, DAS, A/RPS
Classify ____ Reason ____ Date ____
Declassify on ____ Auth. ____

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/06

TEXT
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PREF, PINS, PTER, PGOV, PREL, ID
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR MAY 24 UPDATE:

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption 1.4(d)

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

2. (C) SUMMARY: MILITIAS ARE CONTINUING ASSAULTS ON CIVILIANS IN EAST TIMOR AMID ONGOING REPORTS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN MILITIA AND MILITARY UNITS. MILITIA PERSONNEL ALSO ACCOSTED USAID-SUPPORTED COFFEE HARVESTERS. MILITIA SPOKESMEN, FOR THEIR PART, HAVE CLAIMED "PRO-INDEPENDENCE PEOPLE" HAVE KILLED FOUR TNI SOLDIERS. THESE CLAIMS ARE DISPUTED ALTHOUGH A UNAMET STATEMENT GAVE CREDENCE TO ONE CLAIM. THE [ ] IS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT MILITIA ASSAULTS ARE OVER. PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE HAVE LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN THE "PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION." EVIDENCE OF PRO-AUTONOMY PETITIONS WHICH EAST TIMORESE REPORTEDLY ARE PRESSED BY MILITIAS TO SIGN HAS SURFACED. THERE REPORTEDLY IS MILITIA PRESSURE AGAINST A CHURCH CLINIC AND ITS STAFF IN DILI. A WESTERN JOURNALIST HAS RECEIVED A TELEPHONIC THREAT FROM A MAJOR MILITIA LEADER. END SUMMARY

delete B1

MILITIAS CONTINUE ASSAULTS AGAINST CIVILIANS

3. (C) REPORTING FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES INCLUDING SOME DERIVED FROM MAY 20-22 POLCOUNS VISIT TO EAST TIMOR INDICATED CONTINUING ATTACKS ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION BY THE MILITARY-BACKED MILITIAS. NOT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED INCIDENTS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

-- A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN REPORTS THAT ON MAY 21, 30 MILITIA ACCOSTED PERSONNEL OF THE NCBA COFFEE FIRM DEMANDING THAT THE GROUP SURRENDER ITS MOTORCYCLES WHICH THE MILITIA ALLEGED (INCORRECTLY) WERE BEING USED TO FERRY PRO-INDEPENDENCE YOUTHS INTO THE HILLS. SIX MOBIL POLICE MOBILE BRIGADE OFFICIALS (BRIMOB) WHO WERE ACCOMPANYING THE COFFEE PERSONNEL TOOK NO ACTION TO PROTECT THE COFFEE PERSONNEL.

B-4

-- ACCORDING TO [ ] STAFF IN EAST TIMOR, TWO PRO-INDEPENDENCE (CNRT) STAFF PERSONNEL, KAMA

B-1

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

MOTAN AND HERIKERA, WERE DETAINED BY POLICE IN ALIEU AND BROUGHT TO THE PROVINCIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN DILI ON OR ABOUT MAY 21. THE POLICE CLAIM NOT TO HAVE RECEIVED THE TWO NOR TO KNOW WHERE THEY ARE.

-- THE MILITIA-BASED "FORUM FOR UNITY, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE" CLAIMS "PRO-INDEPENDENCE PEOPLE" AMBUSHED AND KILLED THREE EAST TIMORESE MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN ARMY AT LOLOTOE ON MAY 17. A MAY 21 STATEMENT BY UNAMET CLAIMS THE THREE WERE KILLED BY THE EAST TIMORESE ARMED RESISTANCE. [ ] CLAIMS TO HAVE SPOKEN TO A BROTHER OF ONE OF THE VICTIMS, WHO REPORTEDLY BLAMED THE ATTACK ON MILITIA WHO WERE ANGERED THAT THE THREE HAD DEFENDED LOCAL EAST TIMORESE FROM A MILITIA ASSAULT. THE [ ] TOLD POLCOUNS THAT IT BELIEVES THAT SOME KILLINGS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL MAY BE BY OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL OR MILITIA. THE [ ] BELIEVES THAT JUST AS MANY CIVIL SERVANTS ARE PRO-INDEPENDENCE, SO TOO ARE MANY EAST TIMORESE IN THE MILITARY. THEY FACE THE SAME "WEEDING OUT" THAT CIVIL SERVANTS ARE UNDERGOING AT THE HANDS OF THE MILITIA AND THEIR MILITARY ALLIES. NEARLY ALL THE MILITARY PERSONNEL KILLED IN RECENT MONTHS HAVE BEEN EAST TIMORESE, THE [ ] STATES.

B-1
B-1
B1
B-1

-- THE MILITIA FORUM ALSO CLAIMED THAT "PRO-INDEPENDENCE PEOPLE" KILLED ANOTHER EAST TIMORESE SOLIDER IN TIRILOLO, BAUCAU ON MAY 19. THERE WAS NO GOVERNMENT OR NGO CONFIRMATION OF THIS CLAIM.

[ ] NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT MILITIA VIOLENCE WILL END SOON

B-1

4. (C) THE [ ] IN EAST TIMOR TOLD VISITING POLCOUNS MAY 21 THAT THE THREE AUSTRALIAN MEDICAL DOCTORS WHO HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO ENTER EAST TIMOR HAVE STILL NOT BEEN GIVEN PERMISSION TO PRACTICE. HE SAID THAT THE [ ] DECISION TO BRING IN THE THREE PHYSICIANS WAS NOT AIMED AT ADDRESSING THE "TRICKLE" OF CASES IN NORMAL TIMES BUT RATHER TO DEAL WITH THE "EMERGENCY SURGES" OF PATIENTS WHICH HAVE BECOME ALMOST WEEKLY CONCERNS DUE TO THE MILITIA ASSAULTS ON CIVILIANS. [ ] CONCLUDED "THERE WILL BE MORE."

PROBLEMS WITH THE PEACE AND JUSTICE COMMISSION

5. (C) [

B-1

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

CEASE-FIRE WITH THE TNI THAT WOULD ENABLE THEM TO MOVE ABOUT FREELY.

6. (C) [ ] ALSO QUESTIONED THE FAIRNESS OF THE COMMISSION STRUCTURE WHICH WAS, HE CLAIMED, HEAVILY WEIGHTED TO THE PRO-AUTONOMY SIDE. A COMBINATION OF TWO REPRESENTATIVES EACH FROM THE MILITARY, POLICE, GOVERNMENT AND MILITIAS WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO OVERRULE THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE REPRESENTATIVES.

PRESSURE ON LOCAL CITIZENS TO "SIGNUP" FOR AUTONOMY

7. (U) A FOREIGN JOURNALIST IN DILI MAY 21 SHOWED POLCOUNS A DOCUMENT SIGNED BY THE VILLAGE HEAD OF CAMENASA VILLAGE ON APRIL 20, WHICH ASSERTED THAT ALL 1,558 INHABITANTS OF THE VILLAGE (INCLUDING CHILDREN) ACCEPTED INTEGRATION WITH INDONESIA. THE SIGNATURE OF THE VILLAGE CHIEF, SILVINO TARAN, AND A SEAL ATTESTED TO THE VALIDITY OF A STACK OF DOCUMENTS FROM INDIVIDUAL VILLAGERS THAT BORE SIGNATURES AND THUMB PRINTS. (COMMENT: SIMILAR DOCUMENTS ARE REPORTEDLY BEING CIRCULATED BY THE MILITIA IN MANY PARTS OF EAST TIMOR. THIS WAS THE FIRST ONE WE HAVE SEEN. END COMMENT)

PRESSURES ON THE MOTAEL CHURCH CLINIC

8. (C) [ ]

CLINIC AND ITS STAFF WERE UNDER CONTINUING MILITIA PRESSURE. IN MID-MAY, MILITIA BURNED THE FOUR-ROOM HOUSE OF HIS CHIEF NURSE. AFTER RE-LOCATING HER TEN-MEMBER FAMILY SHE HAS RETURNED TO WORK AT THE HOSPITAL. [ ] BELIEVED THAT THE ASSAULT WAS A RESULT OF HER ASSOCIATION WITH THE CLINIC THAT PROVIDES FREE MEDICAL TREATMENT TO (AMONG OTHERS) VICTIMS OF MILITIA ASSAULTS.

MILITIA THREATS IN JAKARTA

9. (C) [ ] (PROTECT) TOLD POLCOUNS MAY 24 THAT ON MAY 21 HE RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM MILITIA LEADER CANCIO CARVALLO. [ ] WHO HAD INTERVIEWED CARVALLO IN DILI AFTER THE MILITIA ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS IN DILI APRIL 17, RECOGNIZED CARVALLO'S VOICE. ACCORDING TO [ ] CARVALLO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AND ASKED IF [ ] REMEMBERED HIM. ASSURED THAT [ ] KNEW WHO HE WAS, CARVALLO SAID: "I AM HERE IN JAKARTA AND I AM GOING TO GET YOU." CARVALLO THEN HUNG UP. [ ] MILITARY ATTACHE IS IN CONTACT WITH GOI COUNTERPARTS TO INSIST THAT CARVALLO'S THREAT NOT BE CARRIED OUT. (NOTE: CANCIO CARVALLO WAS ONE OF THE SIGNATORIES TO A THREAT NOTE AIMED AT AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATS, JOURNALISTS AND AID WORKERS, WHICH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

WAS HAND DELIVERED TO AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER.
END NOTE)
ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C51

DOCUMENT_ID: 183282524
DOCNO: 002378
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990515
TOR: 024651
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199905121021
MHFNO: 99 5421796
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI7561
OO RUEHZS RUEHC
DE RUEHJA #2378/01 1321021
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121021Z MAY 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7730
INFO RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0987
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4975
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1115
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3197
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1101
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2147
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002378

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/03

TEXT
TAGS: PHUM, CASC, PGOV, EAID, PREL, MOPS, PINR, ID
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: MAY 12 - EAST TIMOR UPDATE

REF: JAKARTA 2360

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: A CONSENSUS APPEARS TO BE EMERGING ON A VENUE FOR AN EAST TIMORESE GATHERING UNDER A CHURCH-SPONSORED FORMAT KNOWN AS "DARE II." PLANS NOW CALL FOR A MEETING IN AUSTRALIA ON MAY 22, ALTHOUGH BALI STILL REMAINS A FALLBACK IF THE GOI INSISTS ON A VENUE INSIDE

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption 6-6

UNCLASSIFIED

INDONESIA. IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS HAVE SEIZED THE PASSPORT OF AN AMCIT DOCTOR WHO HAS BEEN PROVIDING EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE AT A CHURCH CLINIC IN DILI. HE EXPECTS TO BE DEPORTED. DILI WAS QUIET MAY 12, BUT TENSE. THE PERMANENT HEAD OF THE UN SECURITY TEAM IS IN JAKARTA AND DUE TO GOT TO DILI MAY 13 WITH A LOGISTICS TEAM TO FOLLOW MAY 15. TWO AIDES TO MEGAWATI HAVE MADE PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUGGESTING OPPOSITION TO EAST TIMOR'S SEPARATION. A THIRD PDI-P INSIDER WHOM WE REGARD AS CLOSER TO MEGAWATI, CLAIMS THAT THIS IS NOT THE PDI-P LINE AND DOES NOT REFLECT MEGAWATI'S THINKING. END SUMMARY

DARE II GATHERING

3. (C) THE PROPOSAL BY BISHOP BELO AND OTHERS TO CONVENE AN ALL-FACTION EAST TIMORESE MEETING APPEARS ON THE BRINK OF WINNING AGREEMENT FROM ALL PLAYERS. ACCORDING TO THE CNRT (PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE), STRONG RESISTANCE HAD EMERGED TO AN EARLIER SUGGESTION TO HOLD THE MEETING IN BALI. A CNRT SPOKESPERSON SAID THAT CNRT WOULD ONLY SUPPORT A MEETING IN BALI IF "STRONG, CREDIBLE GUARANTEES" WERE AVAILABLE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO "OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE." THE SPOKESPERSON EXPLAINED THAT CNRT FEARED THE GOI/MILITARY WOULD ATTEMPT TO PRESSURE THE PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS. AS OF MID-DAY MAY 12, THE SPOKESPERSON SAID THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON A SITE "SOUTHEAST OF HERE." THE BREAKTHROUGH CAME, HE SAID, WHEN PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS RECEIVED WHAT THEY REGARDED AS SATISFACTORY GUARANTEES OF THEIR OWN SAFETY IN THAT LOCATION (PRESUMABLY AGAINST POTENTIAL THREATS FROM PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS THERE).

4. (C) THE AUSTRALIANS HAVE INFORMED US THAT THE GOA PLANS TO PRESENT A PROPOSAL TO THE GOI ON MAY 12 OFFERING AN AUSTRALIAN SITE FOR THE CONFERENCE. THE AUSTRALIANS ADDED THAT, WITH THE MEETING SET TO BEGIN MAY 22, A GOI REJECTION OF THE GOA OFFER WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY RESULT BALI BEING SELECTED SINCE THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO LINE UP ANOTHER "NEUTRAL" VENUE. THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY WILL HOST A MAY 13 MEETING FOR SEVERAL MISSIONS (INCLUDING THE U.S.) TO UPDATE US ON THESE DEVELOPMENTS.

AMCIT MEDICAL DOCTOR EXPECTS DEPORTATION FROM DILI

5. (C) WE HAVE RECEIVED A CALL FROM [ ] AN AMCIT LIVING IN DILI. HE AND THREE OTHER EXPAT DOCTORS, WHO HOLD TOURIST VISAS, HAVE BEEN PROVIDING FREE EMERGENCY CARE AT THE MOTAEL CHURCH CLINIC THERE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THEIR PRESENCE RECENTLY DREW PUBLIC PROTEST FROM THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WHO, IN A PRESS STATEMENT, CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE VIOLATING THE TERMS OF THEIR VISAS AND, [ ] PROTESTED HIS PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF THE MILITIAS IN VARIOUS INTERVIEWS

B-1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PUBLISHED IN THE FOREIGN PRESS.

6. (C) [ ] RECOUNTED THAT HE RECEIVED A VISIT FROM IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES ON THE MORNING OF MAY 12. THEY CONFISCATED HIS PASSPORT AND TOLD HIM TO REPORT TO THEIR DILI OFFICE ON MAY 15. HE EXPECTS AT THAT POINT TO BE DEPORTED. THE FATE OF THE OTHER EXPAT MEDICAL DOCTORS WORKING WITH HIM IS UNCLEAR ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ASKED TO SURRENDER THEIR PASSPORTS. [ ] TOLD POLCOUNS THAT A TEAM OF ICRC MEDICAL DOCTORS WILL BE ARRIVING IN DILI ON MAY 15 -- ALL OF WHOM, HE SAID, WILL BE TRAVELING ON TOURIST VISAS. (COMMENT: [ ] EXPULSION, IF IT HAPPENS, WILL DRAW SIGNIFICANT MEDIA ATTENTION. THE CONSULAR SECTION HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM SINCE MAY 10. END COMMENT)

B-6

DILI REPORTEDLY QUIET

7. (U) A WESTERN JOURNALIST CONTACT IN DILI TOLD US MID-DAY THAT DILI WAS QUIET. IT REMAINS TENSE, HOWEVER, WITH SEVERAL HUNDRED PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE WHO REPORTEDLY FEAR PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA ATTACKS NOW SEEKING REFUGE AT THE CENTRAL POLICE STATION.

MORE UN TEAM PERSONNEL ENROUTE TO DILI

8. (C) THE PERMANENT HEAD OF THE UN SECURITY TEAM HAS REACHED JAKARTA AND WILL GO TO DILI MAY 13. A LOGISTICS TEAM IS TO FOLLOW MAY 15.

PDI-P AND EAST TIMOR

9. (C) TWO PARTY OFFICIALS OF MEAGWATI'S PDI-P HAVE RECENTLY MADE STATEMENTS EXPRESSING OPPOSITION TO EAST TIMOR'S SEPARATION FROM INDONESIA. WE SOUGHT OUT THE VIEWS OF [ ] [ ] HE SAID THAT THAT PERSPECTIVE DOES NOT REFLECT MEGAWATI'S VIEWS NOR THAT OF THE PDI-P. [ ] WHO ALSO HAVE DONE SOME CHECKING, BELIEVE THAT MEGAWATI'S VIEWS REMAIN AS STATED TO [ ] THAT HABIBIE'S OFFER OF AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE WAS WRONG BUT THAT IF THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR CHOOSE INDEPENDENCE, SHE WILL ACCEPT THEIR DECISION. REFTEL NOTED THAT THIS POSITION IS PARALLEL TO THAT OF ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (GUS DUR) WHO HAS SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE WITH MEGAWATI.
ROY

B-6

ADMIN
BT
#2378

CORRECTED COPY RENUMBERING PARAS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

|BT
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

(52)

P
B1
1.4(B)+(D)

DOCUMENT_ID: 183278018
DOCNO: 002411
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990514
TOR: 085201
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199905141026
MHFNO: 99 5453242
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
WSC2464
OO RUEHC RUEHZS
DE RUEHJA #2411/01 1341026
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141026Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7765
INFO RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1119
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4992
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0991
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0332
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3205
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0173
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2153
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1105
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002411

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/04

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, EAID, AU, UN, ID
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 14

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

SUMMARY

2. (C) A MARCH FOR PEACE LED BY BISHOP BELO TOOK PLACE WITHOUT INCIDENT IN DILI ON MAY 13. THE CITY REMAINED CALM ON MAY 14 BUT REPORTS OF MILITIA ACTIVITY ELSEWHERE CONTINUE, AND THERE IS ONE REPORT OF A CLASH IN BAUCAU PITTING REGULAR TROOPS AGAINST

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B-1, 1.4(B)+(D)

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Classify as (X) Extend as ( ) Downgrade to Confidential
Date 5/14/2004 Declassify on 5/14/2009 Reason B-1, 1.4(B)+(D)

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL FORCES AND MILITIA PERSONNEL. THREATS AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST ANICETO GUTERRES HAVE SUBSIDED. THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF GOI OPPOSITION TO A "DARE II" RECONCILIATION MEETING IN AUSTRALIA. XANANA GUSMAO HAS STATED THAT THE TIMING OF HIS OWN RELEASE SHOULD NOT BE LINKED TO THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI HAS TOLD A JOURNALIST THAT SHE WANTS NO DECISION TO BE TAKEN ON EAST TIMOR UNTIL A NEW GOVERNMENT IS IN PLACE. END SUMMARY.

BISHOPS LEAD MARCH FOR PEACE

3. (C) ON MAY 13, A RELIGIOUS HOLIDAY IN EAST TIMOR, BISHOPS BELO AND BASILIO NASCIMENTO LED SOME ONE THOUSAND LOCAL RESIDENTS ON MARCH THROUGH DILI, CALLING FOR AN END TO VIOLENCE. CONTACTS IN DILI REPORT THAT THE CITY HAS BEEN CALM FOR THE PAST THREE DAYS. NEVERTHELESS, [ ] EMPHASIZES THAT HIS ORGANIZATION IS CONTINUING TO RECEIVE REPORTS OF "TERROR AND INTIMIDATION" BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS OUTSIDE DILI. [ ] DIPLOMAT NOW IN DILI REPORTED RUMORS CIRCULATING OF MORE MILITIA ATTACKS IN DILI DURING THE MAY 15-16 WEEKEND. ACCORDING TO THE [ ] EMBOFF, SKETCHY REPORTS ARE CIRCULATING OF A MAY 13 INCIDENT IN BAUCAU IN WHICH SOLDIERS FROM THE LOCAL BATTALION CLASHED WITH A GROUP OF PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA AND SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) PERSONNEL AT A ROADBLOCK. THE SOLDIERS (IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THEY WERE EAST TIMORESE) THEN REPORTEDLY ATTACKED THE LOCAL KOPASSUS BASE AND WOUNDED TWO KOPASSUS PERSONNEL.

B-1

THREATS AGAINST [ ] SUBSIDE

4. (C) [ ] REPORTS THAT HE AND HIS FAMILY HAVE RECEIVED NO FURTHER THREATS SINCE MAY 5. HE HAS EMERGED FROM HIDING AND RETURNED TO HIS HOUSE, AND BELIEVES THAT THE LOCAL MILITARY AND POLICE NOW ARE AFFORDING HIM SOME PROTECTION. HE SAID EAST TIMOR POLICE COMMANDER TIMBUL SILAEN, ALONG WITH THE LOCAL MILITARY DISTRICT COMMANDER, VISITED HIS HOME ON MAY 6 TO DISCUSS HIS SECURITY.

SIGNALS OF GOI OPPOSITION TO DARE II

5. (C) PLANS ARE PROCEEDING FOR A "DARE II" RECONCILIATION MEETING IN AUSTRALIA MAY 22-28 AMID NEGATIVE SIGNALS FROM THE GOI. ACCORDING TO A [ ] DIPLOMAT, IN A MAY 14 MEETING WITH [ ] FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS CHARACTERIZED THE DARE II PROPOSAL AS AN ATTEMPT BY THE CHURCH TO "RAM A PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORUM DOWN OUR THROATS." HABIBIE ADVISOR DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR REPORTEDLY HAS EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO HOLDING SUCH A MEETING OUTSIDE INDONESIA. BISHOP BELO REPORTEDLY HAS SPOKEN BY PHONE WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE IN AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN HABIBIE'S SUPPORT FOR AN AUSTRALIA-BASED FORUM.

B-1

BALI FORUM ONE-SIDED

6. (C) FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS WAS SCHEDULED TO BRIEF TIMORESE "FROM BOTH SIDES" ON THE AUTONOMY OFFER IN BALI MAY 14-15. IT APPEARS, HOWEVER, THAT FEW, IF ANY, PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURES ARE

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

ATTENDING, AND DFA SPOKESMEN NOW ARE PORTRAYING THE EVENT AS PRIMARILY A BRIEFING FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS.

XANANA NOT INSISTING ON HIS OWN RELEASE

7. (C) ACCORDING TO MAY 14 PRESS REPORTS, XANANA GUSMAO HAS STATED THAT HIS RELEASE SHOULD NOT BE A CONDITION FOR THE CONSULTATION PROCESS TO TAKE PLACE. HE STRESSED THAT THE PROCESS WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN HIS OWN STATUS. ADVISORS TO XANANA IMPLIED HIS STATEMENT WAS INTENDED TO CLARIFY RECENT PRONOUNCEMENTS OF RAMOS HORTA MAINTAINING THAT THE PROCESS WOULD NOT BE CREDIBLE IF XANANA AND FIGURES SUCH AS HORTA HIMSELF WERE UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PRE-CONSULTATION CAMPAIGN.

MEGAWATI ON EAST TIMOR

8. (C) A JOURNALIST FOR THE GUARDIAN WHO INTERVIEWED MEGAWATI ON MAY 14 TOLD US SHE SAID THAT SHE DID NOT WANT ANY DECISION TAKEN ON EAST TIMOR UNTIL A NEW GOVERNMENT WAS IN PLACE IN JAKARTA. SHE ADDED THAT IT WAS A VERY COMPLEX SITUATION AND THAT SHE FEARED MORE BLOODSHED COULD BE IN THE OFFING THERE. SHE ALSO REITERATED HER POSITION THAT THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION, AS A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, LACKED THE LEGITIMACY TO MAKE A DECISION ON A TERRITORIAL ISSUE. MEANWHILE, PAN (NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY) DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL SANTOSO, IN A MAY 14 EDITORIAL, CONFIRMS HIS PARTY'S SUPPORT FOR EAST TIMORESE SELF-DETERMINATION VIA A DIRECT VOTE.
ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

C55

DOCUMENT ID: 183250208
DOCNO: 002337
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990510
TOR: 071442
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199905101105
MHFNO: 99 5390881
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI4981
OO RUEHC RUEHZS
DE RUEHJA #2337/01 1301105
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101105Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7687
INFO RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1111
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4960
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0983
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0326
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3189
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1626
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0164
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2136
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1095
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002337

BEIJING FOR A/S ROTH
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/04

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, CASC, UN, ID
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: A BAD DAY IN DILI

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. TENSIONS ARE AGAIN HIGH IN DILI AS TRUCKLOADS OF PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS ENTERED THE CITY ON MAY 10 AND AT LEAST THREE PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN ENSUING FIGHTING. THERE IS A REPORT THAT, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN DILI, THE MILITIAS

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B1,1.4(b)(d) 3.3b6

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Classify as (X) Extend as ( ) Downgrade to Conf.
Date 5/14/04 Declassify on 5/10/09 Reason B7,1.4(d)

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCOUNTERED SOME ARMED RESISTANCE FROM INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS WHO SOUGHT TO PROTECT THEIR NEIGHBORHOODS. ARMED MILITIAS HAVE BLOCKADED THE EASTERN PART OF DILI, BRINGING NORMAL ACTIVITIES TO A STANDSTILL, AND HAVE THREATENED FOREIGN JOURNALISTS AND LOCAL EXPAT RESIDENTS. THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORUM FOR DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND JUSTICE (FPDK) HAS CALLED FOR THE EXPULSION OF A GROUP OF FOREIGN DOCTORS, INCLUDING ONE AMCIT, WHO HAVE SET UP AN INFORMAL PRACTICE AT A CHURCH CLINIC IN DILI. THE INDONESIAN MILITARY MAY ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE OPENING OF AN AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE IN DILI, NOW SLATED FOR JUNE 1. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) VARIOUS CONTACTS, [redacted] REPORTED THAT PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS RAMPAGED AROUND DILI THROUGH MUCH OF THE DAY MAY 10, FIRING THEIR WEAPONS AND CLASHING WITH INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS AND LOCAL RESIDENTS WHO HAD SET UP CHECKPOINTS IN THEIR EAST DILI NEIGHBORHOODS THE PREVIOUS DAY TO KEEP THE MILITIAS OUT. THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY ATTACHE REPORTED FROM DILI THAT NINE TRUCKLOADS OF RED AND WHITE MILITIA MEMBERS FROM LIQUICA AND MAUBARA HAD ENTERED THE CITY EARLY ON THE MORNING OF MAY 10. THE MILITIA FORCES REPORTEDLY SUCCEEDED IN BLOCKADING THE EASTERN HALF OF THE CITY AND PARTS NEAR THE CENTER, AND ONE SOURCE REPORTED A NUMBER OF FIRES BURNING. AN AMCIT EMPLOYEE OF THE COFFEE PROJECT ON HIS WAY TO THE OFFICE WAS THREATENED BY A GUN-WIELDING MILITIA MEMBER AND FORCED TO RETURN HOME. A WOMAN JOURNALIST WAS FORCED TO RETURN TO HER HOTEL AT GUN POINT. [redacted] TOLD US ITS PERSONNEL WERE NOT PERMITTED TO MOVE ABOUT IN THE CITY AND THAT MILITIAS PREVENTED THE INDONESIAN RED CROSS FROM SENDING AMBULANCES TO AREAS WHERE THE MILITIAS REPORTEDLY HAD INFLICTED CASUALTIES, NOTABLY IN THE OLD MARKET AREA.

3. (C) [redacted] AND OTHER SOURCES INFORMED US MID-AFTERNOON THAT THERE WERE THREE CONFIRMED DEAD AS A RESULT OF SHOOTINGS IN THE MARKET, NEAR THE UNIVERSITY, AND IN THE SANTA CRUZ NEIGHBORHOOD. [redacted] REPORTED THAT A SHOOTOUT BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE RESIDENTS AND THE MILITIAS WAS TAKING PLACE LATE IN THE AFTERNOON IN THE SANTA CRUZ NEIGHBORHOOD, AS THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE TRIED TO PREVENT THE MILITIAS FROM ENTERING THE AREA. INDONESIAN POLICE REPORTEDLY WERE ON THE SCENE BUT NOT INTERVENING. [redacted] COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE DEAD OTHER THAN TO SAY THEY WERE NOT FROM AMONG THE MILITIA. POLICE ARE CLAIMING THAT TWO OF THE DEAD ARE FROM THE PRO-INTEGRATION SIDE. (COMMENT. IF TRUE, THE SANTA CRUZ AREA SHOOTOUT WOULD REPRESENT THE FIRST TIME, AT LEAST IN DILI, THAT THE MILITIAS HAVE ENCOUNTERED ARMED RESISTANCE FROM THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE. END COMMENT.)

4. (C) SOME OF OUR CONTACTS REPORTED THAT RUMORS HAD CIRCULATED THAT A LARGE UN FORCE WAS TO ENTER DILI ON MAY 10, AND THAT THE MILITIA SHOW OF FORCE HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEMONSTRATING THEIR STRENGTH TO THIS UN CONTINGENT THEY MISTAKENLY THOUGHT WAS ABOUT TO ARRIVE. PRO-INDEPENDENCE STUDENTS ALSO REPORTEDLY CAME OUT INTO THE STREETS IN ANTICIPATION OF THE ARRIVAL OF A UN FORCE, AND THIS CONTRIBUTED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICTS WITH THE MILITIAS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

5.(C) JOURNALISTS ARE ENCOUNTERING INCREASING PROBLEMS IN DILI. ON MAY 10 A FOREIGN REPORTER REPORTEDLY WAS THREATENED BY MILITIA MEMBERS AND FORCED TO RETURN TO HER HOTEL AT GUNPOINT. ACCORDING TO [redacted], ON MAY 9 MILITIA MEMBERS AT THE MARKET HAD PUT A GUN TO THE HEAD OF AN AUSTRALIAN TELEVISION CAMERMAN AND A KNIFE-WIELDING MILITIA MEMBER HAD CHASED ANOTHER AUSTRALIAN JOURNALIST FROM THE SCENE. CONTACTS WITH THE COFFEE PROJECT INDICATE THAT THEY ARE STILL UNABLE TO ACCESS THE LIQUICA AREA AND REPORT THAT ARMED THUGS FROM THE SUAI AREA HAVE ENTERED MAUBISSE, 80 KMS SOUTH OF DILI, WHERE THEY ARE TERRORIZING THE POPULATION.

6. (C) THE PRO-INTEGRATION FPDK ISSUED A STATEMENT ON MAY 7 DEMANDING THE ARREST OR EXPULSION FROM EAST TIMOR OF [redacted] AND THREE OTHER FOREIGN DOCTORS, WHO HAVE BEEN WORKING AT THE MOTAEL CHURCH CLINIC IN DILI, TREATING VICTIMS OF THE RECENT VIOLENCE. THEY ACCUSED THESE DOCTORS OF WORKING ILLEGALLY AND OF CRITICIZING THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY.

b-6

7. (C) AUSTRALIA'S PLANS TO OPEN A CONSULATE IN DILI (AGREED UPON AT THE HABIBIE-HOWARD BALI SUMMIT) APPEAR TO BE ENCOUNTERING DIFFICULTIES. AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATS SAY THEY HAVE NEARLY WORKED OUT THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFFICIALS IN JAKARTA, BUT ARE HEARING A DIFFERENT STORY IN DILI, WHERE THE LOCAL MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE MILITIAS LEADERS HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR OPPOSITION TO A CONSULATE. IN A MAY 10 MEETING WITH DCM AND DATT, AN AIDE TO GENERAL WIRANTO QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR AN AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE IN DILI, ARGUING THAT THE AUSTRALIANS ALREADY HAVE A CONSULATE IN KUPANG, WEST TIMOR (IN REALITY THIS IS ONLY AN HONORARY CONSUL). NEVERTHELSS, THE AUSTRALIANS ARE PROCEEDING UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE FIRST PERMANENT STAFF MEMBERS OF THE CONSULATE WILL ARRIVE IN DILI ON JUNE 1.
ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C57

DOCUMENT ID: 183234255
DOCNO: 084123
PRODUCER: WASHDC
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: OUT
DOR: 19990506
TOR: 193110
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199905062321
MHFNO: 99 5358027
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MPE4123
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHC #4123 1262329
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 062321Z MAY 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0000
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 084123

PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 002291 DATED 06 MAY 1999 SENT ACTION SECSTATE WASHDC INFO SECDEF WASHDC ASEAN COLLECTIVE BONN CANBERRA LISBON ROME TOKYO WELLINGTON GENEVA USUN NEW YORK COMMARFORPAC USCINCJPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION.
QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002291

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/04

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, ASEC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 6

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS GREGORY FERGIN; REASON 1.5(D).

SUMMARY

2. (C) ON MAY 5 PRO-INTEGRATIONIST MILITIA FORCES SURROUNDED THE HOME OF PROMINENT EAST TIMORESE HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST ANICETO GUTERRES AND THREATENED TO KILL HIM. GUTERRES IS NOW IN HIDING. DETAILS OF A MILITIA/SECURITY FORCES OPERATION IN AILEU REMAIN SKETCHY. PRO-INDEPENDENCE SOURCES CLAIM THAT MILITIAS

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B-6

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTINUE TO INTIMIDATE RESIDENTS IN DILI. PRO-INTEGRATION SPOKESMEN HAVE SAID THEY WILL RESPECT THE TRI-PARTITE AGREEMENT AND UN PRESENCE BUT THREATEN TO WAGE GUERRILLA WAR IF AUTONOMY IS REJECTED. END SUMMARY.

YAYASAN HAK DIRECTOR THREATENED

3. (C) ACCORDING TO HIS STAFF AND OTHER SOURCES IN DILI, THE HOME OF YAYASAN HAK DIRECTOR ANICETO GUTERRES, LOCATED IN AN ISOLATED PART OF DILI, WAS SURROUNDED BY ARMED MILITIA MEMBERS, SOME WEARING MASKS, LATE IN THE DAY ON MAY 5. THEY THREATENED TO KILL GUTERRES, WHO WAS INSIDE THE HOUSE WITH HIS FAMILY. THIS FOLLOWED A PRESENTATION BY GUTERRES EARLIER THAT DAY AT A MEETING OF THE KOMNASHAM (NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION)-SPONSORED PEACE COMMISSION. GUTERRES REPORTEDLY SEVERELY CRITICIZED THE MILITIAS AT THAT MEETING. (GUTERRES ALSO AUTHORED A NEW YORK TIMES OP-ED PIECE, CRITICAL OF THE MILITARY AND THE MILITIAS, WHICH APPEARED IN THE MAY 5 EDITION.) ACCORDING TO MEMBERS OF THE YAYASAN HAK STAFF, CONTACTED ON MAY 6, GUTERRES AND HIS FAMILY EVENTUALLY MANAGED TO LEAVE THE HOUSE SOMETIME DURING THE NIGHT AND ARE NOW IN HIDING. DATT CONTACTED THE OFFICE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER IN DILI ON MAY 6 TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY HAS ALSO BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES. A DELEGATION OF JOURNALISTS VISITED GUTERRES' HOME LATE IN THE EVENING ON MAY 5. ACCORDING TO THESE JOURNALISTS, MEMBERS OF THE UN TEAM CURRENTLY IN DILI HAD DECLINED REQUESTS THAT THEY ALSO GO TO THE HOUSE.

DETAILS ON AILEU STILL SKETCHY

4. (C) HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS IN DILI HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM ANY DETAILS REGARDING THE REPORTED OPERATIONS OF MILITIA AND SECURITY FORCES IN THE AILEU AREA SOUTH OF DILI. PRO-INDEPENDENCE SOURCES MAINTAIN THAT EURICO GUTERRES' "AITARAK" MILITIA CONTINUES TO PRESSURE RESIDENTS OF DILI TO SIGN PLEDGES OF SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATION, THREATENING THAT ANY WHO REFUSE TO SIGN WILL BE TAKEN AWAY DURING THE NIGHT. THEY CLAIM THAT ON MAY 5 AITARAK ABDUCTED MATEUS DA SILVA, A LOCAL CNRT LEADER IN DILI.

PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS PLEDGE TO RESPECT UN PRESENCE

5. (C) MILITIA SPOKESMAN BASILIO ARAUJO, ALONG WITH NATALINO MONTEIRO AND JOSE TAVERES (AN OFFICIAL AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE SON OF MILITIA COMMANDER JOAO TAVERES) HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN JAKARTA ON MAY 6. THEY SAID THEY WOULD RESPECT THE TRI-PARTITE AGREEMENT IN NEW YORK AND THE UN PRESENCE ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR, AS LONG AS UN OFFICIALS ACTED IN A NEUTRAL MANNER, ADDING THAT EARLIER THREATS AGAINST UN PERSONNEL BY PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS WERE MADE "IN THE HEAT OF THE MOMENT." (COMMENT: IT IS UNCLEAR TO WHAT DEGREE ARAUJO AND TAVERES SPEAK FOR MILITIA LEADERS SUCH AS EURICO GUTERRES AND CANCIO CARVALHO, WHO HAVE USED THE MOST THREATENING LANGUAGE IN REGARD TO UN PERSONNEL. END COMMENT.)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

6. (C) IN REMARKS TO US LATER, [ ] WAS LESS CLEAR ON THE ISSUE, STRESSING THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS STILL OPPOSED A DIRECT BALLOT AND, WHILE FORCED TO ACCEPT THE UN PROCESS, WOULD "NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE CONSEQUENCES." HE SPECIFICALLY CRITICIZED AMBASSADOR MARKER, TAMRAT SAMUEL, AND FRANCESC VENDRELL AS UN OFFICIALS WHO FAVORED THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE. [ ] MAINTAINED THAT IF THE CONSULTATION PRODUCED A PRO-INDEPENDENCE VOTE, THE MILITIAS WOULD RETREAT TO THE HILLS IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS OF EAST TIMOR AND WAGE GUERRILLA WARFARE. ASKED ABOUT HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD OTHER FOREIGN PERSONNEL IN EAST TIMOR, [ ] WAS CRITICAL OF THE AUSTRALIANS, ARGUING THAT THE FORMER AUSTRALIAN AID DIRECTOR IN DILI HAD FAVORED THE INDEPENDENCE SIDE, AND POINTING OUT THAT "THE AUSTRALIANS HAVE ALREADY FLED FROM EAST TIMOR." HE SAID HE STILL VIEWED AMERICANS FAVORABLY, ESPECIALLY THOSE WORKING WITH THE USAID-SUPPORTED COFFEE PROJECT, BECAUSE THIS PROJECT "HAD MADE EAST TIMORESE PROUD." ROY
UNQUOTE TALBOTT

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C60

DOCUMENT ID: 183132752
DOCNO: 001946
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990419
TOR: 075000
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904191111
MHFNO: 99 5123578
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI6108
PP RUEHC RUEHZS
DE RUEHJA #1946/01 1091111
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191111Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-PIMBS// PRIORITY 7332
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//ISA-AP//
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J51//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC//DH-3//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001946

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/05/09

TEXT
TAGS: PINS, PHUM, PINR, MILI, ID

COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH [redacted]

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DATT/ARMA - COL JOSEPH H. DAVES, USA, REASON, 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) DCM AND DATT MET WITH [redacted] ON 19 APRIL TO DISCUSS SITUATION IN [redacted] EAST TIMOR. [redacted]

B-1

B-1

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B-1, 1.4(b)+(d)

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

MORI DocID: 1054655

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

3. (C) [redacted]

4. (C) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE NON-PAPER GIVEN TO [redacted]

THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA WHEREBY THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR WILL BE PERMITTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY WISH TO ACCEPT BROAD AUTONOMY AND REMAIN A PART OF INDONESIA OR PREFER TO SEPARATE FROM INDONESIA.

IN THIS REGARD, WE HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY RECENT ASSURANCES FROM GENERAL WIRANTO AND OTHER ARMED FORCES LEADERS THAT THE TNI RECOGNIZES ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER IN EAST TIMOR AND TO ENSURE THAT THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR CAN MAKE THEIR CHOICE BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND SEPARATION IN PEACEFUL CONDITIONS.

WE WERE THEREFORE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE EVENTS OF THIS PAST WEEKEND IN DILI, WHERE ARMED, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WERE ABLE TO RALLY AND ATTACK UNARMED INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE ARMED FORCES AND NATIONAL POLICE TO MAINTAIN ORDER.

ANY REPETITION OF THE EVENTS OF LAST WEEKEND WOULD INEVITABLY RISK DESTROYING THE EFFORTS NOW UNDERWAY BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA TO IMPLEMENT ITS DECLARED POLICY TOWARD EAST TIMOR. MOREOVER, IT WOULD RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ROLE OF TNI IN EAST TIMOR.

AS SECRETARY ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY COHEN, AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH HAVE INDICATED PREVIOUSLY, IN ORDER TO SECURE THE PEACE IN EAST TIMOR AND TO ENSURE THAT THE CONSULTATION WITH THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR CAN BE CARRIED OUT SUCCESSFULLY, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO:

-- DISARM THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS THAT HAVE BEEN FORMED OVER THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS.

-- ENSURE THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS IN THE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION NOW BEING ESTABLISHED BY THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.

-- PERMIT THE INTRODUCTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR.

IN ADDITION, WE STRONGLY ENCOURAGE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC STEPS:

-- STOP ANYMORE ARMED MILITIA RALLIES THAT HAVE BEEN PLANNED. THE DILI RALLY WAS ANNOUNCED DAYS IN ADVANCE, YET POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES DID NOT PREVENT THE PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS BY ARMED MILITIA MEMBERS.

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

-- HELP FACILITATE URGENT MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE.

-- SUPPORT FAIR AND OBJECTIVE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE VIOLENT INCIDENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED AND ENSURE FULL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR ABUSES. THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK ON THE HOUSE OF MANUEL CARRASCALAO, AND OTHER RECENT ARMED ASSAULTS AGAINST CIVILIANS IN DILI LIQUICA, SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED AND PROSECUTED.

-- ASSIST EFFORTS TO DETERMINE THE WHEREABOUTS OF ANY INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR IN THE WAKE OF THE DILI EVENTS.

-- ALLOW ADEQUATE ACCESS BY DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL SO THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS AN ACCURATE UNDERSTANDING OF EVENTS THERE.

THE UNITED STATES OPPOSES VIOLENT ACTIONS BY ANY OF THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE IN EAST TIMOR. WE DO NOT FAVOR ANY PARTICULAR OUTCOME TO THE CHOICE BEING OFFERED TO THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR, AS LONG AS THE PROCESS IS FAIR, COMPREHENSIVE AND PEACEFUL. WE BELIEVE THAT TNI'S PERFORMANCE IN CARRYING OUT ITS DIFFICULT RESPONSIBILITIES IN EAST TIMOR WILL BE AN IMPORTANT DETERMINANT OF THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF FUTURE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR RESPECTIVE SECURITY ESTABLISHMENTS.

ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C37

DOCUMENT ID: 183071257
DOCNO: 001755
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990408
TOR: 064840
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199904081028
MHFNO: 99 4991503
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI1928
OO RUEHZS RUEHC
DE RUEHJA #1755 0981028
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081028Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7114
INFO RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0867
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1965
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4707
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001755

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/04

Classified by Department of State
Lee R. Lohman, DAS, A/RPS
Classify Conf. Reason 1.4(d) Date 6/11/2004
Declassify on 4/07/2024 Auth.

TEXT
TAGS: PHUM, EAID, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: SURGICAL AND OTHER MEDICAL NEEDS IN EAST TIMOR

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: AUSTRALIANS AND OTHERS HAVE HAD NO SUCCESS IN EFFORTS TO RENDER MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO EAST TIMOR WHERE, INTER ALIA, THE ABSENCE OF SURGEONS HAS CREATED A CRITICAL MEDICAL SITUATION. END SUMMARY

3. (C) AN AUSTRALIAN AID OFFICIAL TOLD POLCOUNS THAT THE GOA HAD "HIT A BRICK WALL" IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO WIN APPROVAL FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO EAST TIMOR. AFTER HAVING BEEN DIRECTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO ADDRESS ITS REQUEST TO ASSIST IN EAST TIMOR TO THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH, THE MOH TOLD THE AUSTRALIANS THAT IT "HAD NO MANDATE TO RESPOND TO SUCH REQUESTS.". THE

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption 6-4,1.4(d)

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN OFFICIAL NOTED THAT AT THE MOH TECHNICAL LEVEL "THEY SAW THE NEED, THEY WERE BLOCKED POLITICALLY."

4. (C) THE AUSTRALIAN SAID THAT THE GOA HOPED TO HAVE A SECOND NEEDS ASSESSMENT MISSION INTO EAST TIMOR LATE NEXT WEEK AND THAT IT WOULD "TAKE A SECOND LOOK AT THE HEALTH SECTOR." AT THIS STAGE, THE GOA WAS ATTEMPTING TO LINE UP ASSISTANCE IN AUSTRALIA, INCLUDING BY COORDINATING WITH THE AUSTRALIAN RED CROSS, "IF AND WHEN" THERE WERE A GREEN LIGHT FROM JAKARTA.

5. (C) [ ] TOLD POLCOUNS APRIL 8 THAT THE [ ] HAD MADE NO PROGRESS IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO INSERT ADDITIONAL MEDICAL PERSONNEL INTO ITS STAFF IN DILI. (EARLIER, [ ] TOLD US THAT THE [ ] BELIEVED THAT IT HAD A COMMITTMENT FROM PRESIDENT HABIBIE TO STAFF EXPANSION IN JUNE.) IN AN APRIL 8 CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF, [ ] SAID SHE HAD BEEN TOLD BY DFA THAT THE GOI HAD APPROVED ONE ADDITIONAL POSITION FOR [ ] IN EAST TIMOR BUT THAT ON CHECKING, SHE HAD RECEIVED THE SAME [ ] RESPONSE WE RECEIVED (I.E., NO CHANGE).

delete

6. (C) THE NEED FOR PROFESSIONAL MEDIAL STAFF IN EAST TIMOR WAS NOTED BY [ ] WHICH APPROACHED THE EMBASSY APRIL 8 TO UNDERSCORE THE GRAVE SITUATION FACING THE SCORES OF CIVILIANS INJURED IN THE APRIL 5 AND APRIL 6 MILITIA ATTACKS IN LIQUICA. MOST SUFFERED SEVERE SLASH WOUNDS (REF B) AND NEEDED SURGICAL ASSISTANCE URGENTLY. THE NGO OFFICIAL WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM EAST TIMOR ECHOED A VIEW HEARD IN OUR OWN TRAVEL IN EAST TIMOR THAT EAST TIMORESE REJECT GOING TO THE MILITARY HOSPITAL OUT OF FEAR.

deleted

7. (C) THE AMBASSADOR RAISED THE PROBLEM OF UNMET MEDICAL NEEDS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER APRIL 8 WHO SAID THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE BROUGHT UP WITH THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH. WE WILL PURSUE THE MATTER, THOUGH NOT ONLY WITH THE MINISTER OF HEALTH, GIVEN THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE NOTED ABOVE.
ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C53

DOCUMENT_ID: 183270178
DOCNO: 002384
PRODUCER: JAKARTA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19990513
TOR: 034654
DOCPREC: O
ORIGDATE: 199905130745
MHFNO: 99 5435980
DOCCLASS: C

HEADER
OO RUEAIIA
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI3396
OO RUEHC RUEHZS
DE RUEHJA #2384/01 1330745
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 130745Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7741
INFO RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1117
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4983
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0402
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0989
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0253
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0033
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0330
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3203
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0171
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2151
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1103
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
BT

CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002384

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/04

TEXT
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EAID, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, UN, ID
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 13

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. AT A MAY 13 MEETING CONVENED BY [C] [17] [B-1]
JAKARTA EMBASSIES MOST INVOLVED IN THE EAST TIMOR
ISSUE AGREED ON A PLAN FOR JOINT APPROACHES TO THE GOI REGARDING

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 8/17/2004 Exemption B1.1.4(b)+(d)

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Classify as (X), Extend as ( ) Downgrade to Conf.
Date 5/10/2004 Declassify on 5/13/2009 Reason B1.1.4(b)+(d)

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE "DARE II" MEETING AND THE ISSUES OF XANANA GUSMAO'S RELEASE AND THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR. MAY 13 WAS A RELGIOUS HOLIDAY IN INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR AND THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF NEW VIOLENCE. PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA MEMBERS REPORTEDLY ATTACKED A SCHOOL OUTSIDE DILI ON MAY 12. XANANA HAS CALLED FOR A HALT TO PRO-INDEPENDENCE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN DILI. FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS REPORTEDLY IS PLANNING TO MEET WITH EAST TIMORESE FROM BOTH SIDES IN BALI THIS WEEKEND. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) ON MAY 13 CONVENED A MEETING OF JAKARTA DIPLOMATS MOST INVOLVED IN THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE. ATTENDING WERE AMBASSADORS AND OTHER DIPLOMATS FROM THE "GROUP OF SIX" (AUSTRALIA, UNITED STATES, U.K., JAPAN, THE PHILIPPINES AND GERMANY -- THE COUNTRIES PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE TO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE UN PROCESS), THE LOCAL UNDP REPRESENTATIVE, ALONG WITH CANADA AND SWEDEN, WHICH HAVE BEEN ASKED BY BISHOP BELO TO HELP FUND THE DARE II MEETING.

DARE II

4. (C) REVIEWED THE STATE OF PLAY REGARDING A PROPOSAL TO HOLD A MAY 22-28 "DARE II" RECONCILIATION MEETING IN AUSTRALIA.

SAID EAST TIMORESE GOVERNOR ABILIO SOARES HAD EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR HOLDING THE MEETING OUTSIDE INDONESIA, AND HAD SAID XANANA SHOULD PARTICIPATE. PRO-INTEGRATIONIST FPDK (FORUM FOR DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND JUSTICE) LEADER DOMINGOS SOARES HAD TOLD HE WAS NOT OPPOSED TO MEETING IN AUSTRALIA. WHO HAD MET WITH XANANA ON MAY 12, SAID THE RESISTANCE LEADER WAS PREPARED TO ATTEND A FORUM IN AUSTRALIA "AS A PRISONER," I.E., HE WAS NOT MAKING HIS RELEASE A CONDITION FOR HIS PARTICIPATION.

5. (C) GIVEN THE SHORT TIME REMAINING, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRIMARY REQUIREMENT NOW WAS TO SECURE QUICK GOI APPROVAL FOR THE AUSTRALIA FORUM.

IT WAS AGREED THAT THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY BISHOP BELO TO ASSIST (UNITED STATES, U.K., CANADA, SWEDEN) JOINTLY WOULD ATTEMPT TO MEET AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH ALATAS AND JUSTICE MINISTER/STATE SECRETARY MULADI TO PRESS FOR GOI APPROVAL, WITH THE CANADIANS TAKING THE LEAD.

SECURITY AND THE RELEASE OF XANANA

6. (C) EMPHASIZED THAT THE STORY NOW COMING OUT OF EAST TIMOR (HE NOTED THAT THERE WERE SOME 40 JOURNALISTS ON THE SCENE IN DILI) WAS THE BLATANT BEHAVIOR OF THE MILITIAS AND THE INDONESIAN MILITARY'S PERCEIVED INACTION OR EVEN SUPPORT OF THE MILITIA ACTIVITIES. SAID HIS MEETINGS WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS HAD CONVINCED HIM THAT THEY GENUINELY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

FEARED FOR THEIR LIVES AND THAT "THERE'S NO ACTING GOING ON." HE HAD STRESSED TO THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES THAT UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, EVEN IF THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE WERE APPROVED BY EAST TIMORESE VOTERS, NO ONE WOULD BELIEVE THE PROCESS HAD BEEN FAIR.

7. (C) [ ] HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO VISIT LIQUICA AND SUAI, WHERE HE FOUND LOCAL AUTHORITIES VERY DEFENSIVE. HE SAW SOME DISPLACED VILLAGERS IN LIQUICA BUT BASED ON HIS EXPERIENCE COULD NIETHER SUBSTANTIATE NOR REFUTE REPORTS OF MASSIVE ENCAMPMENTS OF DISPLACED. IN SUAI, HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE LOCAL PRIEST, WHO "SEEMED TO BE TELLING THE TRUTH" REGARDING THE KILLINGS TAKING PLACE THERE. [ ] WHILE THERE WERE PERIODS OF CALM IN DILI, KILLING ELSEWHERE IN EAST TIMOR APPEARED TO BE CONTINUING. IN DILI AT LEAST, THE POLICE APPEARED TO BE MAKING AT LEAST SOME EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE VIOLENCE. HE CITED ONE CASE DURING HIS VISIT IN WHICH PLAINCLOTHES POLICE STEPPED IN TO PREVENT A GROUP OF EUROPEAN JOURNALISTS FROM BEING ATTACKED. [ ] EMPHASIZED THAT DESPITE THE ONGOING VIOLENCE, HIS GOVERNMENT REMAINED OPPOSED TO ANY DELAY IN THE UN PROCESS.

8. (C) [ ] ARGUED THAT THE ISSUE OF XANANA'S RELEASE IS NOW LOOMING LARGER AND THAT IF THE GOI'S CURRENT STANCE THAT HE CAN BE RELEASED ONLY AFTER THE AUGUST VOTE IS TO BE ACCEPTED, A STATEMENT FROM XANANA AGREEING TO THIS WOULD BE NECESSARY. OTHERWISE THE INABILITY OF XANANA TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SOCIALIZATION CAMPAIGN WOULD BE SEEN AS UNDERMINING THE VOTE'S CREDIBILITY. [ ] EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT IF XANANA WERE RELEASED AND ABLE SECURELY TO RETURN TO EAST TIMOR, IT WOULD GIVE INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS A DRAMATIC LIFT AND SHIFT THE SITUATION IN THEIR FAVOR OVERNIGHT. THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING A RELEASE OF XANANA INTO INSECURE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE STRESSED THE FUTILITY OF SIMPLY PRESSURING THE GOI ON THESE ISSUES WHEN A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE GOVERNMENT, I.E., THE MILITARY, FUNDAMENTALLY WAS OPPOSED TO TERRITORIAL SEPARATION. HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO GIVE THE GOI AND TNI POSITIVE INCENTIVES TO COOPERATE WHILE KEEPING UP THE PRESSURE FOR RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR.

9. (C) PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THE BRITISH WOULD ATTEMPT TO COORDINATE, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, A JOINT MEETING OF THE "GROUP OF SIX" WITH THE RECENTLY-APPOINTED COMMITTEE OF FIVE GOI MINISTERS CHARGED WITH OVERSEEING THE UN PROCESS IN EAST TIMOR (COORDINATING MINISTER FOR SECURITY AFFAIRS FEISAL TANJUNG, HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER SYARWAN HAMID, ALATAS, MULADI, AND WIRANTO), TO DISCUSS THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR AND THE TIMING OF XANANA'S RELEASE.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

10. (C) MAY 13 WAS A RELIGIOUS HOLIDAY IN EAST TIMOR AND INDONESIA AND THERE WERE NO REPORTS FROM DILI OF NEW VIOLENCE. THE PRESS REPORTED A MILITIA ATTACK ON A SCHOOL OUTSIDE DILI ON MAY 12, BUT DETAILS ARE NOT YET AVAILABLE. LOCAL PRESS REPORTS ARE QUOTING XANANA AS CALLING FOR AN END TO PRO-INDEPENDENCE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN DILI, ARGUING THAT THEY ONLY PROVIDE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

THE MILITIAS WITH PRETEXTS TO ATTACK. ACCORDING TO CANADIAN DIPLOMATS, ALATAS IS SCHEDULED TO MEET IN BALI THIS WEEKEND (MAY 14-16) WITH EAST TIMORESE LEADERS FROM BOTH SIDES. WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN ANY PRESS REPORTS ON THIS.
ROY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
508 SCOTT DRIVE
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225-5357

17 December 2007

Mr. Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20037

USTRANSCOM FOIA No. 04-17
Archive File No. 20030162CIA017

Dear Mr. Simpson

This is a final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated 27 February 2003 for all documents generated between April-May 1999 relating in whole or in part to the April 1999 killings of East Timorese civilians and 2 Indonesian troops in the village of Cailaco; the April 17, 1999 attack on the home of independence leader Manuel Carrascalao; the April 1999 militia killings of up to 100 persons in Suai, East Timor; and the May 1999 killing of 30 East Timorese in Atara, East Timor. Your request was referred to this agency by the Department of Defense (DOD) FOIA office and received in this agency on 5 May 2004. It is being processed in accordance with DOD Regulation 5400.7, DOD FOIA Program.

USTRANSCOM DISUM CY 99-087, consisting of 6 pages, is a partial release. Information being withheld is exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1), national security and Executive Order 12958 and 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6), personal privacy.

If you are dissatisfied with our action on this request, you may appeal it to the Department of Defense, Office of Freedom of Information, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 203011-1155, within 60 days of your receipt of this letter. Both the letter and envelope should be marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

There are no fees associated with this request, and we are closing your file in this agency. If further assistance is required, please contact our FOIA Officer, Ms. JoLynn Bien, at 618-229-3828 or e-mail: USTCCS-IM@ustranscom.mil

Sincerely

WILLIAM H. JOHNSON
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

Attachment
Sanitized DISUM CY 99-087 (6 Pages)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

DOCUMENT ID: 183233788
PRODUCER: USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ2-J//
SOURCE: MILITARY
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990506
TOR: 174522
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199905062000
MHFNO: 99 5357093
DOCCLASS: ~~S~~
CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUWSMXI #4060 1262051
ZNY ~~SSSSS~~
P 062000Z MAY 99
FM USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ2-J//
TO AIG 8008
AIG 12303
AIG 328
AIG 621
AIG 10313
RUEASCO/CDR599THTRANSGPTML WHEELER AAF HI//MTWPA-OP-OS//
RUATNPT/CDR837THTRANSBN PUSAN KOR//MTWPA-PU-C//
RUWMNMN/926FW NEW ORLEANS LA//IN//
RUEOGEA/128ARW GEN MITCHELL IAP WI//IN//
RHCPMXA/908AW MAXWELL AFB AL//IN//
RHFJJAJ/COMHSWINGLANT JACKSONVILLE FL//N72//
RUQNAAA/48FW DEPLOYED INCIRLIK AB TU//DOI//
RUEDBNA/43OG POPE AFB NC//IN//
RUFTURA/ACS SPANGDAHLEM AB GE//DOI//
RUVRAAA/93OSS ROBINS AFB GA//IN//
RUEBBEA/MARITIME ADMIN WASHINGTON DC//613/620//
RUHUBDA/133ACS FT DODGE IA//IN//
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

~~QQQQ~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ: USTRANSCOM DISUM CY 99-087 (U)

1. (U) USTRANSCOM DISUM FOR 06 MAY 99.

2. (U) THIS REPORT IS MADE UP OF USTRANSCOM ITEMS OF INTEREST. THIS PRODUCT, BASED ON ALL-SOURCE REPORTING, REPRESENTS THE ANALYSIS AND POSITION OF THE USTRANSCOM JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER TRANSPORTATION (JICTRANS).

MORI DocID: 1054657

3. (U) EUCOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION:

1. (C/NF)

Non-responsive

2. (C)

Non-responsive

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

1. (S/NF)

Non-responsive

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

Non-responsive

2. (S)

Non-responsive

3. (C)

Non-responsive

4. (U) CENTCOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

1. (C/NF)

Non-responsive

2. (C)

Non-responsive

3. (S/NF)

Non-responsive

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

Non-responsive

5. (U) SOUTHCOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

1. (U) CHILE: CHILEAN POLICE CLASHED WITH APPROXIMATELY 300 PORT WORKERS WHO PARALYZED PORT ACTIVITY FOR THE SECOND CONSECUTIVE DAY BY BUILDING BARRICADES IN THE STREETS AND PREVENTING THE NORMAL FLOW OF TRAFFIC INTO VALPARAISO (3302S/07137W). POLICE REPORTEDLY USED TEAR GAS TO CONTAIN THE UNREST AND ARRESTED 12 DEMONSTRATORS. PROTESTS HAVE ALSO TAKEN PLACE IN PORT TOWN OF SAN ANTONIO (3335S/07138W). (POC: SSGT STONE; SOUTHCOM DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 061200Z MAY 99)

2. (C/NF)

Non-responsive

6. (U) PACOM AOR.

A. (U) ITEMS IMPACTING USTRANSCOM OPERATIONS/FORCE PROTECTION: (NTR)

B. (U) HIGHLIGHTS:

1. (S)

Non-responsive

2. (S) INDONESIA: THE PATTERN OF VIOLENCE IS CHANGING IN EAST

RESPONSIVE

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

TIMOR. LARGE RALLIES AND MASS ATTACKS HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY PERSONAL INTIMIDATION. THE THREAT TO ATTACK DILI (0833S/12534E) LAST WEEKEND WAS ENOUGH TO SCARE MANY INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS OUT OF THE CAPITAL, AND TO DRAW ATTENTION AWAY FROM INDONESIAN NATIONAL GROUP (TNI) ACTIVITIES IN OTHER AREAS. PRO-INDEPENDENCE NATIONAL RESISTANCE COUNCIL (CNRT) MEMBERS HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY MILITIA UNITS, TAKEN TO MILITARY DISTRICT COMMAND CENTERS AND ALLEGEDLY TORTURED. THESE ACTIVITIES ARE PROVOKING THE REVOLUTIONARY FRONT FOR AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR (FALINTIL), WHOSE STRENGTH IS IN THE RURAL AREAS. IF THEY STRIKE BACK, TNI WILL USE IT AS JUSTIFICATION TO RESPOND AGGRESSIVELY. FALINTIL NUMBERS ACROSS THE PROVINCE HAVE BEEN BOOSTED BY PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS FLEEING FROM WIDESPREAD PRO-INTEGRATION MILITANT INTIMIDATION. THE MILITANT GROUPS AIM TO WIPE OUT AS MANY PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS AS POSSIBLE, TO PROVOKE MAJOR UNREST TO SCARE THE UN OFF AND PREVENT THE BALLOT FROM GOING AHEAD. AMC HAS A FLIGHT SCHEDULED INTO JAKARTA ON 21 MAY. (POC: [redacted] DIA WASHINGTON 060130Z MAY 99)

RESPONSIVE

7. (U) RESPECTIVE AOR ASSESSMENTS OF TERRORIST THREAT LEVELS (AREAS WITH MEDIUM OR HIGHER THREAT ASSESSMENTS) ARE SHOWN EVERY MONDAY. CHANGES ARE REPORTED DAILY AS THEY OCCUR.

8. (U) ANY PLAIN LANGUAGE ADDRESS CHANGE REQUESTS TO THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE FORWARDED VIA MESSAGE TO ORIGINATOR OR VIA FAX TO CINC TRANS INTEL CEN, DSN 576 8005 SECURE FAX, DSN 576 1559 UNCLAS FAX. POC FOR AIG 8008 IS SSGT K. MORRIS.

9. (U) POC IS JICTRANS; DSN STU III 576 4235; COMM STU III 618 256 4235; SECURE FAX 576 8005//

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

SOURCES: FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

USTRANSCOM DISUM 99-087,
Doc I.D. 183233788, Paragraph 6B(2),
is declassified IAW TCJ2 Memo,
20 May 04 and DIA Memo, 24 Oct 07.

Ernest B. Markham 12-4-2007

ERNEST B. MARKHAM (Date)
CAPT, U.S. Navy
Director of Intelligence

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100

JUN 20 2012

U-12-5,786/DAN-1A (FOIA)

Mr. Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Mr. Simpson:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated February 27, 2003, your reference number 20030163DIA009, for information concerning the killings of East Timorese civilians between April- May 1999. I apologize for the delay in responding to your request. DIA continues its efforts to eliminate the large backlog of pending FOIA requests. In order to properly respond, it was necessary to consult with multiple offices within the agency.

A search of DIA's systems of records located 12 documents (68 pages) responsive to your request.

Upon review, I have determined that some portions of six documents (36 pages) must be withheld in part from disclosure pursuant to the FOIA. The withheld portions are exempt from release pursuant to Exemption 3 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3). Exemption 3 applies to information specifically exempted by a statute establishing particular criteria for withholding. The applicable statutes are 10 U.S.C. § 424 and 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i). Statute 10 U.S.C. § 424 protects the identity of DIA employees, the organizational structure of the agency, and any function of DIA. Statute 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i) protects intelligence sources and methods.

Further, I have determined that six of the responsive documents (32 pages) must be withheld in full pursuant to the FOIA. These withheld documents are exempt from release pursuant to Exemptions 1 and 3 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) and (b)(3). Exemption 1 applies to information properly classified under the criteria of Executive Order 13,526. DIA has not withheld any reasonably segregable non-exempt portions of the records.

20030163DIA009 DIA
RECNO:25227 SEQCOR:167518
6/26/2012 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Indonesia/East Timor April May 1999

If you are not satisfied with my response to your request, you may exercise your right to file an administrative appeal by writing to the address below and referring to case number 0278-2003. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 days after the date of this letter.

Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN: DAN-1A (FOIA)
200 MacDill Blvd
Washington, D.C. 20340-5100

Sincerely,

Alesia Y. Williams

6 Enclosures

Alesia Y. Williams AYW
Chief, Freedom of Information Act Staff

Pages 3 - 10 are not responsive and are not attached.

MORI DocID: 1054564

~~TOP SECRET~~
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT ID: 183116690
PRODUCER: JOINT STAFF (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
SOURCE: (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990416
TOR: 010555
DOCPREC: R
ORIGDATE: 199904160200
MHFNO: ~~TS~~ 5091159
DOCCLASS: ~~T~~
CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~
CODEWORD: (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

HEADER
RR YEKADLX
DE YEKDQH #0161 1060430
ZNY MMIDO
ZKZK RR AAZ DE
R 160200Z APR 99
FM JOINT STAFF (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

CONTROLS
~~T O P S E C R E T~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOFORN~~

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

SUBJ: DIA NMJIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 16 APR. (U)
SUMMARY OF FEATURES

This information is not responsive to this request.

~~NOFORN~~
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
~~NOFORN~~

This information is not responsive this request

~~(S)~~ INDONESIA: REPORTS THAT THE MILITARY IS SUPPORTING AND ARMING PROINTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS IN EAST TIMOR INDICATE THE MILITARY IS TRYING TO INFLUENCE OR PREVENT AN AUTONOMY VOTE.

This information is not responsive to this request.



~~NOFORN~~
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
~~TOP SECRET~~

Pages 2 - 3 and 5 - 10 are not responsive and are not attached.

MORI DocID: 1054565

~~TOP SECRET~~
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183138236
PRODUCER: JOINT STAFF (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
SOURCE: (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990420
TOR: 034956
DOCPREC: R
ORIGDATE: 199904200200
MHFNO: ~~IS~~ 5136215
DOCCLASS: ~~T~~
CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~
CODEWORD: ~~TK~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

HEADER
RR YEKADLX
DE YEKDQH #0452 1100527
ZNY MMIDO
ZKZK RR SOA DE
R 200200Z APR 99
FM JOINT STAFF (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

CONTROLS
~~T O P S E C R E T~~ ~~NOFORN~~
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

SUBJ: DIA NMJIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 20 APR. (U)
SUMMARY OF FEATURES

This information is not responsive to this request.

~~(C)~~ INDONESIA: ARMED MILITIA GROUPS, UNCHECKED BY SECURITY FORCES, ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS IN EAST TIMOR OVER THE WEEKEND IN RENEWED VIOLENCE THAT THREATENS TO DISRUPT THE AUTONOMY VOTE

This information is not responsive to this request.

~~NOFORN~~
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
~~NOFORN~~

This information is not responsive to this request.

INDONESIA:
1. ~~(C)~~ ARMED MILITIA GROUPS, UNCHECKED BY SECURITY FORCES, ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS IN EAST TIMOR OVER THE WEEKEND IN RENEWED

VIOLENCE THAT THREATENS TO DISRUPT THE AUTONOMY VOTE SCHEDULED TO BE HELD BY EARLY AUGUST.
2. ~~(C)~~ PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS RAMPAGED THROUGHOUT THE CAPITAL

OF DILI AND ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS ON 17 APRIL. AT LEAST 20 PEOPLE REPORTEDLY WERE KILLED IN THE VIOLENCE THAT CONTINUED

THROUGH THE 18TH. US EMBASSY REPORTS CLAIMED THAT ADDITIONAL ATTACKS ARE PLANNED SOUTH OF DILI IN THE COMING DAYS.
3. ~~(C)~~ PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS, WHICH FORCED PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS TO HIDE OR FLEE, MAINTAIN CONTROL OF DILI. SECURITY FORCES

APPARENTLY HAVE DONE LITTLE TO STOP THE VIOLENCE, AND SOME REPORTEDLY

WERE ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE MILITIAS' ACTIVITIES.
4. ~~(C)~~ THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS OFFERED EAST TIMOR EXPANDED AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. UN-SPONSORED TALKS REGARDING THE FUTURE OF

THE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONY ARE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN TOMORROW. THE PORTUGUESE AND INDONESIAN GOVERNMENTS VOW THAT THE TALKS WILL PROCEED

DESPITE THE RECENT VIOLENCE.
5. ~~(C)~~ THE MILITARY APPARENTLY IS UNWILLING TO INTERVENE IN TIMOR, PERHAPS INDICATING ITS RELUCTANCE TO BACK THE GOVERNMENT'S NEW POLICY. THIS RECENT OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE JEOPARDIZES THE AUTONOMY VOTE. THE GOVERNMENT LACKS THE CAPABILITY TO RAPIDLY RESPOND TO
SUBJ: DIA NMJIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 20 APR. (U)
SIMULTANEOUS CRISES THROUGHOUT THE NATION.
(b)(3):10 USC 424

This information is not responsvie to this request.

~~NOFORN~~
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183138458
PRODUCER: OTHER
SOURCE: DIA
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990420
TOR: 044431
DOCPREC: R
ORIGDATE: 199904200244
MHFNO: 99 5136679
DOCCLASS: ~~S~~
CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

HEADER
RR RUEAIIA
DE RHHMMCA #5434 1100830
ZNY ~~SSSSS~~ ZUI RUEKDIA4325 1100418
RUEHLB T (b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RHHMUNA T USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
R 200244Z APR 99
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

Pages 3 - 7 are not responsive to this request and are not attached.

MORI DocID: 1054587

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

TEXT
PASS: (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ: DIA NMJIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 20 APR (U)
SUMMARY OF FEATURES

Not responsive to this request.

~~(C)~~ INDONESIA: ARMED MILITIA GROUPS, UNCHECKED BY SECURITY FORCES, ATTACKED PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS IN EAST TIMOR OVER THE WEEKEND IN RENEWED VIOLENCE THAT THREATENS TO DISRUPT THE AUTONOMY VOTE SCHEDULED TO BE HELD BY EARLY AUGUST.

Not responsive to this request.

Pages 2 - 3 are not responsive to this request and are not attached.

MORI DocID: 1054582

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183137125
PRODUCER: OTHER
SOURCE: DIA
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990419
TOR: 223000
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904191714
MHFNO: 99 5133635
DOCCLASS: ~~S~~

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEKDIA #4273 1091725
ZNY ~~SSSSS~~ ZUI RFFABAA0450 1091937
P R 191714Z APR 99 (b)(3):10 USC 424
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T~~ [ ] ~~SECRET~~ FOR [ ] ADDRESSEES
QQQQ
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

SIC UAJ
)))

TEXT
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ: DIA NADA INTSUM 92-99/DIA WASH DC/19 APR 99. (U)

This information is not responsive to this request.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

This information is not responsive to this request.

INDONESIA: VIOLENCE OUT OF CONTROL IN EAST TIMOR (U)
AS OF 0700Z 19 APR 99

1. ~~(C)~~ FOLLOWING THEIR DEADLY RAMPAGE ON 17 APRIL, ANTI-INDEPENDENCE MILITIA MEMBERS CONTINUED THEIR VIOLENT ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS THIS WEEKEND. THE LATEST VIOLENCE IN THE SUBURBS OF THE EAST TIMOR CAPITAL OF DILI REPORTEDLY RESULTED IN TWO DEAD AND MANY MORE INJURED. UNCONFIRMED REPORTS INDICATE THAT OTHER VIOLENCE WAS OCCURRING IN MORE REMOTE AREAS OF EAST TIMOR. ADDITIONAL ATTACKS ALSO ARE PLANNED TO THE SOUTH OF DILI IN THE COMING DAYS.

2. ~~(C)~~ PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS MAINTAIN CONTROL OF DILI, FORCING PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS TO HIDE OR FLEE. INDONESIAN SECURITY WAS VIRTUALLY ABSENT DURING THE VIOLENCE THIS WEEKEND. WHEN PRESENT, THE SECURITY FORCES APPEARED TO DO LITTLE TO STOP THE VIOLENCE AND, IN FACT, REPORTEDLY WERE ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE MILITIA'S ACTIVITIES.

3. ~~(C)~~ UN TALKS REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONY ARE SCHEDULED FOR 21-23 APRIL IN NEW YORK. INDONESIA HAS OFFERED EAST TIMOR EXPANDED AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS VOWED THAT THE TALKS WILL PROCEED DESPITE THE MOST RECENT VIOLENCE.

4. ~~(C)~~ INDONESIAN MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES ARE EITHER UNWILLING OR SIMPLY UNABLE TO INTERVENE IN ORDER TO CONTROL THE SECURITY SITUATION. DESPITE EFFORTS MADE IN THE UN TALKS, THIS OUTBREAK IN VIOLENCE PLACES THE AUTONOMY VOTE SCHEDULED FOR JULY IN JEOPARDY. GIVEN THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN INDONESIA, THE GOVERNMENT LACKS THE CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES TO RAPIDLY RESPOND TO MULTIPLE SIMULTANEOUS CRISES.

~~(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES -- DECLASSIFY ON:X1)~~

~~)))~~

~~(OVERALL: DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES -- DECLASSIFY ON X1).~~

ADMIN.

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

Page 3 is not responsive to this request and is not attached.

MORI DocID: 1054579

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183066781
PRODUCER: OTHER
SOURCE: DIA
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990407
TOR: 151759
DOCPREC: P
ORIGDATE: 199904071800
MHFNO: 99 4983417
DOCCLASS: ~~S~~
CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

HEADER
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEKDIA #2339 0971904
ZNY ~~SSSSS~~
P 071800Z APR 99
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
DIA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~
QQQQ

TEXT
SUBJ:DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE TERRORISM SUMMARY (U)
DITSUM 067-99, 08 MARCH 1999(U)
1. (U) TABLE OF CONTENTS

Not responsive to this request.

-- C. (U) INDONESIA: PRO-INDONESIAN MILITANTS IN EAST TIMOR ATTACK CATHOLIC CHURCH

Not responsive to this request.

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

Not responsive to this request.

C. (U) INDONESIA: PRO-INDONESIAN MILITANTS IN EAST TIMOR ATTACK CATHOLIC CHURCH. VIOLENCE BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE AND PRO-INDONESIAN INTEGRATIONISTS HAS ESCALATED AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF HOUSE BURNINGS AND KIDNAPPINGS WITH AN ATTACK ON A CATHOLIC CHURCH BY THE INTEGRATIONISTS IN THE LIQUICA DISTRICT OF EAST TIMOR. SPECIFIC DETAILS REGARDING THE INCIDENT REMAIN UNCLEAR. ACCORDING TO PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS, THE PARAMILITARY BESI MERAH PUTIH (BMP) USED SMALL ARMS AND GRENADES TO KILL MORE THAN 17 INNOCENT PEOPLE WHO WERE MEETING WITH A CATHOLIC PRIEST. THE INDONESIAN MILITARY CLAIMS ONLY FIVE PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND 25 INJURED. THEY ALSO CLAIM TWO AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FOUND IN THE PRIEST'S RESIDENCE WERE PROOF OF HIS CONNECTIONS TO TIMORESE REBELS. NEITHER OF THESE GROUPS POSE A DIRECT THREAT TO OFFICIAL AMERICANS IN INDONESIA, ALTHOUGH SOME WESTERNERS INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGNING IN TIMOR COULD BE AT RISK.

Not responsive to this request.

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT_ID: 183281089
DOCNO: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (MID) 091-4A
PRODUCER: OTHER
SOURCE: DIA
DOCTYPE: OTHER
DOR: 19990514
TOR: 171954
DOCPREC: R
ORIGDATE: 199905141858
MHFNO: 99 5460723
DOCCLASS: ~~S~~
CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

HEADER
RR RUEAIIA
DE RUEKDIA #3450 1341904
ZNY ~~SSSSS~~
R 141858Z MAY 99 (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
BT

CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~
PASS:
(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (MID) 091-4A
SECTION 1 OF 3

TEXT
SUBJ: INDONESIAN MILITARY MOTIVES IN EAST TIMOR (U)
DOI: 10 MAY 99 (AS OF 1000 EST)
TEXT: 1. ~~(S)~~ THE ARMED FORCES' DETERMINATION TO RETAIN EAST TIMOR IN INDONESIA UNDERPINS A POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR MILITANT TIMORESE INTEGRATIONISTS, ALTHOUGH THE VIOLENT EXCESSES OF THESE GROUPS HAVE FORCED CHANGES IN THE MILITARY'S APPROACH. THE STRONG ANTI-INDONESIAN FEELINGS PREVALENT IN EAST TIMOR SUGGEST THE MILITARY WILL BE HARD PRESSED TO PREVENT A PRO-INDEPENDENCE VICTORY DURING THE PLANNED UN REFERENDUM IN AUGUST. SUCH AN OUTCOME WILL CREATE FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR DEFENSE LEADERS WHO STILL SUPPORT THEIR TIMORESE ALLIES BUT ACKNOWLEDGE THE COUNTRY'S NEED FOR A STABLE AND COOPERATIVE EAST TIMOR.
2. ~~(C)~~ CLINGING TO EAST TIMOR. PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S SURPRISE OFFER IN LATE JANUARY - TO RECOMMEND EAST TIMOR'S INDEPENDENCE IF THE TIMORESE REJECT JAKARTA'S AUTONOMY - HAS LEFT A CONFUSED PICTURE OF INDONESIAN INTENTIONS. DESPITE A PERSONAL INTEREST IN JETTISONING THE TROUBLESOME PROVINCE, PRESIDENT HABIBIE, FACING PRESSURE WITHIN HIS

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

POLITICAL BASE AND GROWING SEPARATIST DEMANDS ELSEWHERE, HAS BEEN FORCED TO ADOPT A TWO-TRACK APPROACH OF ACCOMMODATING FOREIGN DEMANDS FOR THE PROVINCE'S SELF-DETERMINATION WHILE BACKING MEASURES TO ACHIEVE A WINNING VOTE FOR AUTONOMY. LAST WEEK'S UN-MEDIATED AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAKARTA AND PORTUGAL, THE FORMER GOVERNING POWER, SET THE BASIC GUIDELINES FOR THIS PROCESS, INCLUDING THE UN-MANAGED "CONSULTATION" ON 8 AUGUST.

3. ~~(C)~~ THE MILITARY'S POLICY UNDERSCORES A STRONG DETERMINATION TO ENSURE A PRO-AUTONOMY VOTE, CONTINUING ITS 23-YEAR STRUGGLE TO RETAIN INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY. CRITICAL OF HABIBIE'S OFFER TO RELINQUISH EAST TIMOR, THE MILITARY HAS TURNED TO PROGOVERNMENT TIMORESE TO SPEARHEAD THE PRO-AUTONOMY CAMPAIGN. LOCAL COMMANDS HAVE BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN FOSTERING SUPPORT FOR NEWLY FORMED MILITANT TIMORESE MILITIAS, PROVIDING TRAINING AND SURPLUS ARMS FOLLOWING STEPPED-UP REBEL ATTACKS LAST YEAR. THE MILITARY STOOD ASIDE DURING THE MILITIA'S MONTHS-LONG CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE, INCLUDING A RAMPAGE THROUGH THE CAPITAL, DILI, ON 17 APRIL THAT LEFT MORE THAN 20 PEOPLE DEAD.

4. ~~(S)~~ NEW MILITARY APPROACH. MILITIA ATROCITIES HAVE HEIGHTENED THE PRESSURE ON ARMED FORCES COMMANDER GEN WIRANTO. SEEKING TO SILENCE CRITICS, WIRANTO ORCHESTRATED A TRUCE, AND LOCAL COMMANDERS HAVE SINCE ORDERED TROOPS NOT TO TOLERATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND TO ENSURE A PEACEFUL UN VOTE. THE MILITARY IS NOW SEEKING TO RALLY NONVIOLENT PRO-INTEGRATIONIST FORCES TO CAMPAIGN FOR AUTONOMY, BUT ITS TOLERATION OF MILITIA PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND BRUTAL BEHAVIOR PERSISTS. CLASHES IN DILI ON 9 AND 10 MAY BETWEEN MILITIA GROUPS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE YOUTH UNDERSCORE THE EXISTING TENSION, WHICH SECURITY FORCES HAVE YET TO DAMPEN.

5. ~~(S)~~ FUTURE UNCERTAINTIES. THE UN'S BROAD AUTHORITY TO MANAGE THE VOTE, COMBINED WITH INDONESIA'S COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN ORDER, WILL GIVE THE MILITARY STRONG INCENTIVES TO RESTRAIN MILITIA VIOLENCE. HABIBIE HAS ACQUIESCED TO A UN FORCE, INCLUDING CIVILIAN POLICE. THIS INTERNATIONAL FORCE SHOULD HEIGHTEN CONFIDENCE AND DISCOURAGE VIOLENCE BUT ALONE WILL NOT ELIMINATE FIGHTING OR POTENTIAL THREATS TO UN PERSONNEL. SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY WILL FALL TO THE INDONESIAN POLICE, WHICH WILL BE EXPANDED IN CONCERT WITH A TROOP DRAWDOWN. HOWEVER, CONSIDERING POLICE FEAR OF MILITIA RETALIATION, THE MILITARY'S CONTINUED INVOLVEMENT IN ENSURING SECURITY AND THE SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL WILL REMAIN CRITICAL.

6. ~~(C)~~ A MILESTONE IN THIS PROCESS WILL BE THE DISARMAMENT OF THE WARRING TIMORESE GROUPS. ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO MOVE QUICKLY ON THIS FRONT, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SEEKS A TRANSFER CEREMONY WITHIN THE NEXT 2 MONTHS. NONETHELESS, A COMPLETE WEAPONS HANDOVER IS UNLIKELY IN VIEW OF THE SUSPICIONS THAT ABOUND. RUMORS OF HIDDEN STOCKPILES AND THE PREVALENCE OF TRADITIONAL ARMS FURTHER COMPLICATE THE SITUATION.

7. ~~(C)~~ ANOTHER UN CHALLENGE WILL BE ENSURING A FAIR VOTE, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE SHORT RUNUP AND PREVAILING TENSION. BOTH SIDES INTEND TO STEP UP EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE VOTE, WITH PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS PLAYING ON DEEP-SEATED FEARS OF A CIVIL WAR IF AUTONOMY IS REJECTED. THE UN FORCE WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY HALTING MORE SUBTLE COERCIVE MEASURES. THE MILITIAS ALREADY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN DRIVING INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS UNDERGROUND IN SOME AREAS, BUT REBEL LEADER JOSE "XANANA" GUSMAO REMAINS CONFIDENT THE UN FORCE WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW AN OVERWHELMINGLY PRO-INDEPENDENCE VOTE.

8. ~~(C)~~ POSTELECTION SECURITY IS NOW MUCH LESS CERTAIN, CONSIDERING

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

THREATS BY MILITIA LEADERS TO WAGE A GUERRILLA STRUGGLE OR FORCE THE PARTITION OF THE PROVINCE IN THE CASE OF AN INDEPENDENCE VICTORY. THE MILITARY WILL BE UNDER STRONG PRESSURE TO DISCOURAGE THREATS AGAINST UN PERSONNEL OR A PRO-INTEGRATIONIST REVOLT HARMFUL TO JAKARTA'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE. AT THE SAME TIME, JAKARTA IS LIKELY TO INSIST ON ADEQUATE PROTECTIONS FOR THOSE REMAINING IN EAST TIMOR. FAILURE OF THE TIMORESE RECONCILIATION PROCESS COULD ENCOURAGE LOCAL COMMANDERS TO PRESS FOR FURTHER BACKING FOR THE MILITIAS, EVEN INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR PARTITIONING. STILL, JAKARTA PROBABLY WILL RETAIN INTEREST IN PROMOTING A STABLE TRANSITION, SECURING ITS BORDER, AND FOSTERING CORDIAL TIES TO WHATEVER POLITICAL ENTITY EMERGES IN EAST TIMOR.
}}}

COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
(USPACOM)
CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-4028

0925-03
2012-F-33
August 03, 2012

The National Security Archive
The George Washington University
Ms. Barbara Elias
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Ms. Elias,

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Number: 20030163DIA009 which you sent to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) seeking any information relating to:

- The April 6, 1999 killings of as many as 50 East Timorese civilians in the church compound at Liquica, outside of Dili, East Timor
- The April 12-13, 1999 killings of East Timorese civilians and 2 Indonesian troops in the village of Cailaco in the Bobonaro district of East Timor
- The April 17, 1999 attack on the home of independence leader Manuel Carrascalao in Dili, East Timor
- The April 1999 militia killings of up to 100 persons in Suai, East Timor
- The May 1999 killing of 30 East Timorese in Atara, East Timor

The DIA located one document, totaling 13-pages, and sent it to this Headquarters for declassification and release review. The document is a Combatant Command Executive Summary of significant events throughout the respective areas of responsibility. We could not make a release determination of the other Combatant Commands equities, and their information is not responsive to your request. Therefore, we marked those portions as appropriate. USPACOM equities are regarding April 1999 riots in Indonesia that left 54 people dead in East Timor.

Our subject matter experts reviewed the paragraphs containing our equities and determined the information could be declassified and released to you, except for a small amount of information regarding privacy. Therefore, this information is denied under Exemption (b)(6), personal privacy. Because that

20030163DIA009 DIA
RECNO:25227 SEQCOR:168417
8/14/2012 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Indonesia/East Timor April May 1999

constitutes a partial denial of information, you have the right to file an administrative appeal. Such an appeal should be sent to Mr. James Hogan, Chief, Defense Freedom of Information Policy Office, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155, within 60 days from the date of this letter. Both the letter of appeal and the envelope should bear the notation "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

If you have any questions concerning the administrative processing of your request, you may contact Mr. Perez at (808) 477-0995, or by writing: HQ USPACOM, Attn: J0211 BOX 64028, Camp Smith, HI 96861-4028, or email: Pacom.Foia.Fct@pacom.mil.

Sincerely,

EUGENE O'NALE
Assistant Chief of Staff

Enclosure
As stated

CDS
CDSN = CFS942 MCN = 99097/18175 TOR = 990971518
RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS2075 0971531-SSSS--RUEALGX.
ZNY SSSSS
DTG
071430Z APR 99
FROM
FM AIC NORFOLK VA//DI1//
CONTROLS
—~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~//N03860//
SECTION 01 OF 05
QQQQ
HMOSRLSD
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCACOM//
SUBJ/DISUM//
RMKS/
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive

--
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
SUBJ/DISUM//
EUCOM

Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive

UNCLASSIFIED

Non-Responsive

UNCLASSIFIED


Non-Responsive

Non-Responsive

--

INDONESIA: RIOTING CONTINUES (U)

(C) SIMULTANEOUS RIOTS IN OUTLYING AREAS IN INDONESIA ON 5 APRIL DEMONSTRATE THE ONGOING SECURITY PROBLEMS THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI) FACE IN MAINTAINING PEACE. THIS PROBLEM IS NOT LIKELY TO IMPROVE AS ABRI WILL UTILIZE MOST OF ITS RESOURCES TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER IN THE URBAN AREAS OF JAVA AS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS LOOM IN JUNE.

(C) RIOTING IN THE KAI ISLANDS, SOUTHEAST MOLUCCAS OCCURRED ON 5 APRIL BETWEEN CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM FACTIONS INVOLVED IN A LAND

UNCLASSIFIED

Non-Responsive

ADMIN
DECL ON: SOURCE MARKED "OADR"
DATE OF SOURCE: 07 APR 1999
BT
#2079
NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Ms. Kathleen N. Costar
The National Security Archive
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, North West
Washington, DC 20037

27 SEP 2012

Dear Ms. Costar:

This is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of June 23, 2003, (Archive # N-20030163DIA041) to the Defense Intelligence Agency and supplements our letter of May 16, 2012.

Coordination has been completed with an element of our command and another government agency. The record has been returned to this office for our review and direct response to you.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 13526. As a result of our review, information has been sanitized, as it is currently and properly classified CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.2 (a)(3) and 1.4(c) of EO 13526. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1). A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.2(a)(3) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 1.4(c) of EO 13526, provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

In addition, information has been deleted from these records that would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6).

20030163DIA009 ISC
RECNO:46858 SEQCOR:169278
10/2/2012 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Indonesia/East Timor April May 1999

The withholding of the information described above is a total denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Stephen G. Fogarty, Commanding, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the Freedom of Information Act and may be appealed to the Secretary of the Army. If you decide to appeal at this time, your appeal must be post marked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of our letter. After the 60-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts. You should state the basis for your disagreement with the response and you should provide justification for reconsideration of the denial. An appeal may not serve as a request for additional or new information. An appeal may only address information denied in this response. Your appeal is to be made to this office to the below listed address for forwarding, as appropriate, to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the General Counsel.

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office (APPEAL)
4552 Pike Road
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-5995

Additionally, we have been informed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that their information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code § 552 (b)(3) of the Freedom of Information Act. The statute invoked under Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(3) is 10 U.S.C. §424, which allows for the protection of organizational and personnel information for DIA.

The withholding of the information by the DIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision directly to the DIA. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be sent to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Attention: DAN-1A, FOIA, Washington, DC 20340-5100. Please cite DIA #0503-2003 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

There are no assessable FOIA fees.

If you have any questions regarding this action, feel free to contact this office at 1-866-548-5651, or email the INSCOM FOIA office at: usarmy.meade.902-mi-grp-mbx.inscom-foia-service-center@mail.mil and refer to case #2701F-12.

Sincerely,

Brad S. Dorris
Director
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
Classification/Control Markings

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on basis of this report

1 COUNTRY ARGENTINA (AR)

2 REPORT NUMBER 2 201 4009 80

3 TITLE Biographic Information Regarding COL Juan Carlos MORENO, AR Assistant Military Attache to the US

4 PROJECT NUMBER 202200

5 DATE OF INFORMATION 791228

6 DATE OF REPORT 800123

7 DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION 800118 WASHINGTON, DC

8 REFERENCES T-XXX-42015
Y-DIRM-9-002

9 ASSESSMENT SOURCE B INFO DOCU

10 ORIGINATOR DET O, OPERATIONAL GROUP, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY COMMAND, ALEX, VA

11 REQUEST EVALUATION OPO __ (country)

12 [illegible]ICER b6
CPT, MI
DESK OFFICER

13 APPROVING AUTHORITY b6
LTC, MI
COMMANDING

14 SOURCE b1

15 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS THIS IIR SHOULD NOT RECEIVE FOREIGN DISSEMINATION SINCE SUCH DISSEMINATION COULD LEAD TO THE COMPROMISE OF THE COLLECTION ACTIVITY INVOLVED.

DIRC YES ☐ NO ☒

16 SUMMARY

(U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ This IIR forwards biographic information (Encl) regarding COL Juan Carlos MORENO, AR Assistant Military Attache to the US, which was obtained through a search of the files at Headquarters, Department of the Army. All information contained in the enclosure was provided by MORENO. SUBJECT was accredited (officially assumed his position) to the Department of the Army on 17 Jan 80.

103

17 SUBJECT AND AREA CODES

18 DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR
DIA (original)
IAX-FS-C (w/o Encl)
IAX-TA-C (w/o Encl)
DAMI-ISH (w/o Encl)
DAMI-FII (w/o Encl)
[redacted] (w/o Encl)
IAFM-OPS-HUC-B

(b)(3) 10 USC 424 Per DIA

19 DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA
CLASSIFIED BY: DIAM 58-11
ENCLOSURE 3
REVIEW ON: 23 JANUARY 2000

20 ENCLOSURES
1 Enclosure:
DD Form 1396-1, 1 cy, 3pp (U).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
Classification/Control Markings

21 This IR contains 1 pages

DD Form 1396 SEP 75 * SEPT 62 EDITION MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 MAR 77

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BIOGRAPHIC REPORT

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. COUNTRY	1a. DATE OF INFORMATION (Yr, mo, day)	2. DATE OF REPORT (Yr, mo, day)
Argentina	1979-DEC-28	1979-DEC-28

4. NAME
a. FULL NAME (Give full name in Roman letters, in natural order, and with natural capitalization. Underline surname, or, if known by nickname rather than surname, underline name. Give phonetic pronunciation of name as appropriate.)
Juan Carlos Moreno

b. NAME OR NAMES BY WHICH INDIVIDUAL PREFERS TO BE ADDRESSED:
1) IN OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE: Colonel Juan C. Moreno
2) INFORMAL OR SOCIAL OCCASIONS: Colonel Moreno

c. FULL NAME IN NATIVE ALPHABET:
same as 4.a.

d. VARIANTS, ALIASES, MAIDEN NAME:
none

5. POSITION
a. PRESENT POSITION: Assistant Military Attache and Delegate to the IADB

b. DATE ASSUMED POSITION (Year, month, day):

c. NAME, TITLE (In English and Native language): Colonel / Coronel

d. DATE OF RANK (Yr, mo, day): 1978/12/31

e. SERVICE: Army

f. BRANCH OF SERVICE: Artillery

6. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (Day, month, year, city, province, country): b6

7. SEX: M

8. PRESENT ADDRESS (Including ZIP code or APO/FPO): b6

TELEPHONE NO.:

9. NATIONALITY: Argentine

10. RACE: C

11. PHOTO AVAILABLE: X Yes

12. COUNTRY(IES) FOR WHICH ACCREDITED: Argentine

13. RESIDENCE: X Quarters

14. FULL NAMES, RELATIONSHIP, AND PRESENT ADDRESSES OF FAMILY:

15. MARITAL STATUS: X Married; Single; Divorced; Widowed

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

16. AGE: b6

17. BEARD: X Yes

18. GLASSES: X Yes

19. IDENTIFYING MARKS OR PECULIARITIES (Moles, scars, birthmarks, etc.): none

20. HAIR	21. EYES	22. BALD	23. HEIGHT	24. WEIGHT
brown	black	X Yes	5'6"	145

25. BUILD (Stout, medium, slender): medium

26. POSTURE: erect

27. X RIGHT HANDED

28. PHYSICAL DEFECTS: none

29. GENERAL STATE OF HEALTH: excellent

30. WEARS GLASSES: X Yes

31. TEETH: X Yes

PERSONAL BACKGROUND

32. EDUCATION (Degrees, fields, institutions, majors, professional, honors and dates): High School

33. FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY (Indicate whether, degree of fluency, and ability to act as translator/interpreter):

Spanish excellent
English fair

34. TRAVEL (Visits, countries, dates, and purpose):

-Chile
-Bolivia
-Paraguay
-Uruguay
-EE.UU. (west coast) in commission.

DD FORM 1396-1 EDITION OF 1 NOV 68 IS OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED

(c) MILITARY SERVICE (Air, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Merchant Marine, Reserve, Militia, or Foreign Service. Include Military Academy graduation, commissions, ranks, dates, duty assignments, and specialties.)

(Also list awards and decorations together with circumstances surrounding the awarding of unusual awards or decorations.)

1952- Graduated from the Argentine Military Academy as 2nd Lieutenant.
1953/54-"San Luis" Antiaircraft Group.
1955 -Promoted to Lieutenant.First Mountain Antiaircraft Group.
1956 -"Sargento Cabral" NCO School.
1957/60-Second Antiaircraft Group.
1960 -Promoted to 1st Lieutenant.
1960/61-"General Lombardi" Artillery School.
1964 -Promoted to Captain.
1965/67-"Sargento Cabral" NCO School
1968/70-Higher War College
1969 -Promoted to Major.
1970 -Graduated from Higher War College as Staff Officer.
1971 -14th Air Defense Artillery Battalion.
1972 -2nd Armored Artillery Battalion.
1973 -Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.
1973/75-Higher War College Instructor.
1976/77-Commanding Officer, 14th Air Defense Artillery Battalion.
1978 -Argentine Congress (Legislative Advisory Committee).
1979 -Promoted to Colonel.
1979 -I Army Corps H..

(d) [illegible] (Name, address, and relationship of employer. If employed by self, so state. Include name and address of partnership or corporation. Describe nature of business. Indicate approximate gross income. Specify monthly, annual, or other period.)

(e) MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS (Professional, service, civic, fraternal, political, religious, and other organizations. Include offices held. Specify whether active or inactive.)

EDITION OF 1 NOV 68 IS OBSOLETE

16C U.S. ACQUAINTANCES AND RELATIVES (Name, position or occupation of relatives, exercise, nature and duration of relationship. Include U.S. military or other U.S. officials acquaintances referred under this item.)

-Sports
-Reading
-History

Military Articles: "Higher War Colleges Magazine ".

SPOUSE - FAMILY

b6

b6

b6

Argentine

C

X PRACTICING
NONPRACTICING

b6

b6

CDS
CDSN = CFS706 MCN = 99221/18448 TOR = 992211638
RATSZYUW RUEKDIA4693 2211610-~~SSSS~~-RUEALGX.
ZNY-~~SSSSS~~-
DTG
051905Z AUG 99
FROM
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424
CONTROLS
~~SECRET~~
PASS: (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

}}}
{U} THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDS, THE MILITARY SERVICES, NSA, AND DIA. EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT IS MADE TO ENSURE THAT INIVIDUAL ARTICLES REPRESENT THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY VIEW.
}}}
SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST {MID} 150-4A
SECTION 1 OF 3
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
SUBJ: (U) THE UNITED NATIONS' CHALLENGES IN INDONESIA'S EAST TIMOR
DOI: 3 AUG 99 {AS OF 1000 EST}
TEXT: 1. (U) BECAUSE DIA'S FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS USE A STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CLASSIFICATION MARKING SYSTEM THAT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH TODAY'S MESSAGE-HANDLING SYSTEM, THIS MESSAGE SHOWS THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION ABOVE IN A DIFFERENT FORM THAN THAT USED THROUGHOUT THE BODY OF THE MESSAGE. IN TERMS OF THE STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MARKING SYSTEM, THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS SECRET//X1.
2.-(S)-DESPITE PERSISTENT UNREST AND HOSTILITY BY PRO-INDONESIAN MILITIAS, THE UN MISSION IN EAST TIMOR STILL IS PREPARING FOR A UN-RUN REFERENDUM ON THE PROVINCE'S FUTURE. INDONESIA HAS STEPPED UP SECURITY MEASURES, ALTHOUGH SHORT OF NEUTRALIZING THE VIOLENCE-PRONE MILITIAS. JAKARTA'S DESIRE TO AVOID FURTHER HARM TO ITS INTERNATIONAL STANDING SUGGESTS IT WILL ACCOMMODATE UN DEMANDS, BUT INDONESIAN DIFFERENCES WITH THE UNITED NATIONS POINT TO LINGERING FRICTION.
3.-(S)-UN PREPARATIONS. DESPITE SEVERAL DELAYS, THE UN MISSION IS MAKING PROGRESS IN PREPARATIONS FOR A POPULAR VOTE ENABLING EAST TIMORESE TO CHOOSE BROAD AUTONOMY WITHIN THE INDONESIAN STATE OR

SEPARATION UNDER TRANSITIONAL UN OVERSIGHT. RECENT SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS HAVE PERMITTED THE MISSION TO REGISTER MOST OF THE OVER 400,000 ELIGIBLE VOTERS, ALTHOUGH NOT WITHOUT MORE VIOLENCE FROM BOTH SIDES, PARTICULARLY INTIMIDATING ACTIONS BY THE PRO-INDONESIAN MILITIAS. ALSO OF CONCERN ARE A STILL-LARGE NUMBER OF VOTERS DISPLACED BY EARLIER **MILITIA** VIOLENCE. BECAUSE OF THIS SITUATION, THE UNITED NATIONS LAST WEEK AGAIN DELAYED THE VOTE UNTIL 30 AUGUST.

4. ~~(S)~~ SINCE ITS ARRIVAL, THE UN MISSION HAS CONFRONTED PERSISTENT INDONESIAN BREACHES OF THE 5 MAY UN ACCORD GOVERNING THE VOTE, INCLUDING CAMPAIGN AND FUNDING VIOLATIONS. THE PROAUTONOMY CAMPAIGN BEGAN WELL BEFORE THE UN SIGNING, VARYING FROM VIOLENT INTIMIDATION BY THE MILITIAS AND LOCAL OFFICIALS TO MORE RECENT GOVERNMENT RICE HANDOUTS TO GARNER SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS, INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES RESENT UN COMPLAINTS AND BELIEVE THE MISSION IS SUPPORTING THE PROINDEPENDENCE CAUSE. HOPEFUL OF VICTORY AND FEARFUL OF LOSING MOMENTUM, JAKARTA OPPOSES FURTHER UN DELAYS AND HAS SOUGHT TO DEFLECT BLAME FROM THE MILITIAS TO PROVOCATIONS BY THE OTHER SIDE.

5. ~~(S)~~ CHANGED SECURITY DIRECTIVES. FACING RISING FOREIGN CRITICISM, ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO HAS TAKEN MORE CONCERTED ACTION IN RECENT WEEKS TO AVOID FURTHER EMBARRASSING INCIDENTS. FOLLOWING GEN WIRANTO'S VISIT IN MID-JULY, JAKARTA BEGAN TO REPLACE LOCAL COMMANDERS CLOSE TO THE MILITIAS AND REPORTEDLY DIRECTED OFFICERS TO RESPOND TO UN NEEDS. THE RECENTLY AUGMENTED POLICE FORCE IS NOW MOVING INTO TROUBLED AREAS, ALTHOUGH SHORTCOMINGS AND LACK OF WILLPOWER IN CONFRONTING MILITARY-BACKED MILITIAS STILL UNDERMINE POLICE EFFECTIVENESS.

6. ~~(S)~~ DESPITE THESE STEPPED-UP MEASURES, THE MILITIAS' IMPORTANCE TO THE PROAUTONOMY CAMPAIGN STILL MILITATES AGAINST MORE FORCEFUL MEASURES AGAINST THEM. ALTHOUGH NOW PRECLUDED FROM CAMPAIGNING, ARMY OFFICIALS REMAIN HEAVILY INVOLVED IN INFLUENCING THE VOTE BY TRYING TO UNIFY THE PROINTEGRATIONISTS AND MOBILIZING VOTER TURNOUT FOR AUTONOMY. NOTORIOUS **MILITIA** GROUPS CONTINUE TO OPERATE ABOVE THE LAW, DESPITE THE ARMED FORCES' ABILITY TO NEUTRALIZE THEM QUICKLY IF THEY CHOOSE.

7. ~~(S)~~ CHALLENGES AHEAD. THE UNITED NATIONS IS CALLING FOR FURTHER SPECIFIC MEASURES TO HALT **MILITIA** INTIMIDATION, SEVER MILITARY-TO-**MILITIA** TIES, AND OVERCOME THE REFUGEE PROBLEM BEFORE CERTIFYING THAT "FREE AND FAIR" CONDITIONS EXIST FOR BALLOTING. IT ALSO HAS URGED JAKARTA TO ESTABLISH SAFEGUARDS TO ALLOW INDEPENDENCE GROUPS TO CAMPAIGN AND TO AGREE ON CANTONMENT AREAS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, **MILITIA**, AND REBEL ELEMENTS BEFORE THE VOTE. **MILITIA** COERCION

PROBABLY WILL NARROW THE CONTEST, ALTHOUGH STRONG PROINDEPENDENCE SYMPATHIES PERSIST. A FAILURE TO MAKE ADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COULD AGAIN DELAY THE VOTE, BUT IN VIEW OF ITS MAJOR INVESTMENT, THE UNITED NATIONS APPEARS RECONCILED TO LESS THAN IDEAL CONDITIONS AS LONG AS A CREDIBLE OUTCOME REMAINS POSSIBLE.

8. ~~(S)~~ THREATS BY MILITANT **MILITIA** LEADERS TO VIOLENTLY REJECT A PROINDEPENDENCE VOTE ALSO HAVE PROMPTED A UN REVIEW OF POSTBALLOT SECURITY. THE UN POLICE AND ADVISORY PRESENCE WILL EXPAND, BUT THE INDONESIA MILITARY WILL RETAIN SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY UNTIL INDONESIA'S PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY VOTES TO ACCEPT THE BALLOT RESULTS IN OCTOBER. JAKARTA HAS PLEDGED NOT TO DEPART ABRUPTLY IF EAST TIMOR CHOOSES INDEPENDENCE AND EVEN HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE FURTHER TROOP AUGMENTATION UNTIL THE PROVINCE IS FORMALLY HANDED OVER TO THE UNITED NATIONS. NONETHELESS, THE GOVERNMENT NOW APPEARS DETERMINED TO SCALE BACK ITS COSTLY INVOLVEMENT AND REPORTEDLY IS PREPARING TO EVACUATE INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN NATIONALS AS A CONTINGENCY.

9. ~~(S)~~ OWING TO **MILITIA** DOMINANCE IN VARIOUS AREAS, AN UPRISING COULD WELL PROVE SERIOUS AND EVEN THREATENING TO UN PERSONNEL, ESPECIALLY IF SECURITY FORCES FAIL TO REACT QUICKLY. AT LEAST SOME **MILITIA** LEADERS WILL TRY TO KEEP THEIR WESTERN STRONGHOLDS PART OF INDONESIA, BUT THEIR ABILITY TO WAGE A FULL-SCALE CIVIL WAR REMAINS DOUBTFUL. PROINTEGRATIONIST WARNINGS TO SOME DEGREE REFLECT POSTURING TO DISCOURAGE A PROINDEPENDENCE VOTE. HARD-CORE MILITANTS PROBABLY NUMBER ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THE MORE THAN 12,000 CLAIMED PARAMILITARY MEMBERS, AND MANY KEY INTEGRATIONIST LEADERS PRIVATELY HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN A POWERSHARING ARRANGEMENT. STILL, PARTITIONING THE PROVINCE HAS SOME APPARENT SUPPORT IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH IS RELUCTANT TO ABANDON ITS TIMORESE ALLIES. THE ARMED FORCES' POSTURE THUS WILL REMAIN IMPORTANT, BUT ULTIMATELY A PEACEFUL SOLUTION RESTS ON RECONCILIATION AMONG THE TIMORESE THEMSELVES. CATHOLIC CHURCH-SPONSORED TALKS ARE TO RECONVENE AFTER THE VOTE, ALTHOUGH A BREAKTHROUGH DOES NOT APPEAR IMMINENT.

}}}

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
IMPROVEMENTS TO SHARPLY REDUCE THE PROFILE OF THE MILITIAS, SUSPEND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN PRO-AUTONOMY ACTIVITIES, AND ARREST OR OTHERWISE PREVENT **MILITIA** PERSONNEL FROM ENGAGING IN FURTHER INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE.

11. ~~(C)~~ THE UNITED NATIONS, CONCERNED ABOUT UNREST, IS PREPARING A DETAILED PLAN TO INCREASE ITS SECURITY PRESENCE. THE RECOMMENDATION CALLS FOR SOME 450 CIVILIAN POLICE, 350 MILITARY OBSERVERS, AND A CIVIL AFFAIRS STAFF DURING THE POSTBALLOT PHASE. THE UNITED NATIONS ALSO HAS SUGGESTED A GRADUAL BUILDUP OF 6,000 TO 10,000 TROOPS IF INDONESIA FORMALLY RELINQUISHES THE TERRITORY. HOWEVER, CARRYING OUT THIS CONTINGENCY PLAN WOULD TAKE SEVERAL WEEKS AND WOULD REQUIRE APPROVAL FROM THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. UNTIL THEN, THE UNITED NATIONS EXPECTS INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES TO RETAIN PRIMARY LAW AND ORDER RESPONSIBILITY AFTER THE BALLOT.

}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}} }}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}

WERE
REJECTED.
BESI MERAH PUTIH, COMMANDED BY MANUEL SOUSSA, HAS AT LEAST 350 MEMBERS. THE GROUP, WHICH OPERATES IN THE LIQUICA AREA, HAS LED THE FORCEFUL DISPLACEMENT OF LARGE NUMBERS OF PROINDEPENDENCE VILLAGERS.
MAHIDI CLAIMS OVER 6,000 MEMBERS BASED IN AINARO AND IS LED BY CANCIO DE CARVALHO. LIKE THE OTHER GROUPS ABOVE, **MAHIDI** WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR NUMEROUS VIOLENT DEATHS AND ACTS OF INTIMIDATION AGAINST PROINDEPENDENCE SYMPATHIZERS.
DAUDARUS MERAH PUTIH, WHICH LISTS 1,000 TO 3,000 MEMBERS, OPERATES IN THE MALIANA AND BOBONARO AREAS UNDER PAOLOS PEREIRA. DAUDARUS WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR AN ATTACK ON THE UN COMPOUND IN MALIANA.
}}}

RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING SECURITY IN EAST TIMOR, BUT THE ARMED FORCES RETAIN OVERALL POWER. UNTIL RECENTLY, MILITARY OFFICIALS SUPPORTED THE **MILITIA** BUILDUP AND ACCEPTED VIOLENT PARAMILITARY BEHAVIOR AS BEING NECESSARY TO CURB THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AND COMPEL POLITICALLY UNSOPHISTICATED TIMORESE TO BACK AUTONOMY. ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO PRESUMABLY EARLIER AGREED TO THIS APPROACH, ACCEPTING ONE-SIDED REPORTS FROM FIELD COMMANDERS THAT PLACED PRIMARY BLAME ON REBEL VIOLENCE.

18. ~~(S)~~ OVER THE PAST 3 MONTHS, HEIGHTENED FOREIGN CRITICISM INCREASINGLY HAS COMPELLED WIRANTO TO EMPHASIZE REDUCING OVERT **MILITIA** VIOLENCE. **MILITIA** INCIDENTS AGAINST UN PERSONNEL LAST MONTH IN PARTICULAR APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN A DEFINING MOMENT. ALTHOUGH THE ARMY STILL TOLERATES SMALL-SCALE INCIDENTS, IT NOW DIRECTS **MILITIA** LEADERS NOT TO ATTACK UN PERSONNEL AND TO REFRAIN FROM OTHER ACTIONS THAT MIGHT PROMPT FURTHER ELECTION DELAYS OR PRESSURE FOR FOREIGN PEACEKEEPING TROOPS. EVEN SO, SOME VIOLENCE-PRONE GROUPS RETAIN AN AUTHORIZED CIVIL DEFENSE ROLE, AND THE ARMED FORCES ARE RELUCTANT TO INCUR **MILITIA** ANGER, OFTEN EXCUSING THEIR VIOLENCE AS BEING INHERENT TO TIMORESE CULTURE.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/

19. ~~(S)~~ INDONESIAN MILITARY LEADERS PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE UN MISSION WITH SOME LIMITATIONS. THE LEADERS HAVE RESISTED WITHDRAWING GOVERNMENT FORCES TO CANTONMENT AREAS, FEARING THAT REBEL FORCES WOULD FILL THE RESULTING VACUUM. MILITARY OFFICIALS HAVE PLEDGED NOT TO DEPART ABRUPTLY AND REPORTEDLY INTEND TO BRING IN MORE TROOPS TO DEAL WITH POSTBALLOT VIOLENCE, POSSIBLY AS A WAY TO AVERT DEPLOYMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE. PLANS ALSO CALL FOR THE EVACUATION OF ANY FOREIGNERS AND OTHER CIVILIANS CONSIDERED ENDANGERED. NONETHELESS, CONCERN ABOUT DETERIORATING SECURITY IN ACEH, THE OTHER TROUBLED PROVINCE, IS SPURRING PLANS FOR A TROOP DRAWDOWN IN TIMOR REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE VOTE. LOCAL TROOPS WOULD BE MOVED TO ADJOINING AREAS AS A BUFFER WITH ANY NEW STATE, BUT SOME COVERT SUPPORT FOR THE MILITIAS APPARENTLY WOULD CONTINUE. A CLOSE VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE PRESUMABLY WOULD HEIGHTEN MILITARY INTEREST IN KEEPING PROINTEGRATION WESTERN DISTRICTS UNDER INDONESIAN CONTROL, AS PROPOSED BY INTEGRATIONISTS.

}}}

FRUSTRATED INDONESIAN OFFICIALS NOW COMPLAIN OF CANBERRA'S CONCERTED EFFORT TO GARNER A PROINDEPENDENCE VICTORY IN EAST TIMOR IN ORDER TO REPLACE INDONESIA AS THE PREEMINENT POWER IN THE TERRITORY. JAKARTA IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT AUSTRALIA'S READYING OF TWO ARMY BRIGADES, WHICH COULD WELL FORM THE INITIAL CONTINGENT OF ANY UNWANTED UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. SENIOR MILITARY SPOKESMEN ALSO RECENTLY CHARGED CANBERRA WITH FAILING TO STEM ALLEGED ARMS SMUGGLING AND HAVE INTENSIFIED AIR AND NAVAL PATROLLING IN THE AREA.

21. ~~(C)~~ MILITIA LEADERS OFFERED MORE STRIDENT CRITICISM, AS WELL AS THREATS. CANBERRA HAS TRIED TO EMPHASIZE ITS NEUTRALITY BUT LAST WEEK POINTEDLY WARNED OF "ENORMOUS CONSEQUENCES" IF ITS NATIONALS WERE HARMED. ANTI-AUSTRALIAN FEELINGS COULD INTENSIFY FOLLOWING A PROINDEPENDENCE VOTE, IF JAKARTA SEEKS A SCAPEGOAT FOR ITS LOSS OF THE PROVINCE. NONETHELESS, MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL TIES WILL REMAIN A STRONG FACTOR TEMPERING ANY SHARP DOWNTURN IN RELATIONS.

}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}} }}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}

22 ~~(S)~~ GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR

DEPLOYED FORCES	NON-TIMORESE	TIMORESE	TOTAL
COMBAT TASK FORCE	390	-	390
TERRITORIAL BATTALIONS			
143 INF BN (S SUMATRA)	985	-	985
301 INF BN (W JAVA)	985	-	985
406 INF BN (W JAVA)	985	-	985
521 INF BN (E JAVA)	985	-	985
621 INF BN (S KALIMANTAN)	980	-	980
SPECIAL FORCES	120	-	120
MISCELLANEOUS	590	-	590
TOTAL DEPLOYED	6,020	-	6,020
PERMANENT MILITARY PRESENCE			
KOREM HQ, DILI	300	125	425
13 KODIM HQ AND SMALL MISCELLANEOUS UNITS	1,160	3,540	4,700
744 INF BN	470	145	615
745 INF BN	510	150	660
TOTAL PERMANENT	2,440	3,960	6,390
PARAMILITARY ELEMENTS			
WANRA (TERRITORIAL)	-	930	930
WANRA (13 SPECIAL FORCES TEAMS)	-	1,200	1,200
CIVIL SERVICE PNS (TRAINED CIVILIANS)	-	1,590	1,590
KAMRA (UNARMED POLICE AUXILIARY)	-	1,000	1,000

TOTAL OFFICIAL PARAMILITARY - 4,720 4,720
POLICE 5,440 570 6,010
GRAND TOTAL 13,900 9,250 23,140
NOTE: DOES NOT INCLUDE THE NEW MILITIAS
}}}

CDS
CDSN = CFS783 MCN = 99071/34467 TOR = 990712328
RATSZYUW RUEKDIA3309 0712048-~~SSSS~~-RUEALGX.
ZNY-~~SSSSS~~-
DTG
122045Z MAR 99
FROM
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/(b)(3):10 USC 424
CONTROLS
~~SECRET~~
~~QQQQ~~
PASS: (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
}}}
{U} THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDS, THE MILITARY SERVICES, NSA, AND DIA. EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT IS MADE TO ENSURE THAT INIVIDUAL ARTICLES REPRESENT THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY VIEW.
}}}
SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST {MID} 048-6A
SECTION 1 OF 3
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
SUBJ: EAST TIMOR: TRANSITIONING TO INDEPENDENCE (U)
DOI: JAN 99 {AS OF 1000 EST}
TEXT: 1. ~~(C)~~ AFTER 23 TURBULENT YEARS OF INDONESIAN RULE, EAST TIMOR IS NOW SET ON A COURSE LIKELY TO RESULT IN SEPARATION FROM INDONESIA EARLY NEXT YEAR. ALTHOUGH JAKARTA'S FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS WILL BE CRITICAL, THE UNITED NATIONS WILL PLAY A PIVOTAL ROLE IN THE COMING MONTHS, ASSESSING TIMORESE WISHES AND OVERSEEING THE PEACE PROCESS AND INDONESIAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL. TO FILL THE VOID, A MODEST INTERNATIONAL POLICE CONTINGENT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT THE SCOPE OF FOREIGN SECURITY INVOLVEMENT WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON CONTINUED PROGRESS IN THE RECONCILIATION EFFORTS AMONG THE WARRING TIMORESE FACTIONS.
2. ~~(C)~~ SEPARATING FROM INDONESIA. PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S SURPRISE OFFER IN LATE JANUARY TO PERMIT EAST TIMOR WIDE-RANGING AUTONOMY OR QUICK SEPARATION FROM INDONESIA HAS SHARPLY ALTERED THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE. ALTHOUGH CABINET OPPOSITION TO CERTAIN AUTONOMY PROVISIONS HAS DELAYED FINAL GOVERNMENT APPROVAL, AGREEMENT STILL IS EXPECTED, WITH PORTUGAL AS THE UN-RECOGNIZED ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OF EAST

TIMOR. THE SIGNING, NOW EXPECTED BY APRIL, WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A PERIOD FOR THE TIMORESE TO DEBATE THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE. THE UN THEN HOPES TO CANVASS TIMORESE PREFERENCES THROUGH A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED TIMORESE COUNCIL IN JULY. ALTHOUGH SOME INDONESIAN OFFICIALS BELIEVE AUTONOMY MAY PREVAIL, MOST ANTICIPATE ITS REJECTION, OWING TO THE STRONG ANTI-INDONESIAN FEELINGS IN EAST TIMOR. WITH SUCH AN OUTCOME, HABIBIE WOULD ASK INDONESIA'S SUPREME LEGISLATIVE BODY, THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY, WHEN IT CONVENES IN AUGUST TO RESCIND THE 1976 INTEGRATION DECREE, RETURNING THE PROVINCE TO A "NONSELF-GOVERNING" TERRITORY UNDER PORTUGUESE AUTHORITY. AN OVERWHELMING PROINDEPENDENCE TIMORESE MANDATE WOULD COMPLICATE ANY EFFORT BY A NEW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND ASSEMBLY, TO BE FORMED LATER THIS YEAR, TO COUNTERMAND TIMOR'S DESIRES.

3. ~~(C)~~ JAKARTA INTENDS TO DELEGATE INCREASING OVERSIGHT TO THE UNITED NATIONS AS THE PROCESS PROCEEDS, INCLUDING ASSESSING TIMORESE WISHES. UN OFFICIALS ALSO ARE FORMING A "FRIENDS OF EAST TIMOR" GROUPING TO COORDINATE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND WEIGH OTHER ASPECTS OF THE TRANSITION. ALTHOUGH MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVE TIMOR WILL REMAIN UNDER SOME UN/PORTUGUESE OVERSIGHT FOR 2 OR 3 YEARS, UN OFFICIALS HOPE TO AVOID A CULTURE OF DEPENDENCY BY FORMING AN UMBRELLA AUTHORITY THAT WOULD DELEGATE EXTENSIVE POWER TO THE TIMORESE BASED ON THE AUTONOMY MODEL.

4. ~~(C)~~ MIXED SECURITY PICTURE. EAST TIMOR FACES LOOMING SECURITY PROBLEMS AND UNCERTAINTIES AS IT ENTERS THIS TRANSITION PERIOD. ALTHOUGH VIOLENCE HAS BEEN LOCALIZED AND HAS LED TO FAIRLY FEW DEATHS, THE SITUATION IS VOLATILE. MILITANTS ON BOTH SIDES HAVE INSTIGATED VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION, BUT PRO-INDONESIAN MILITIAS RECENTLY HAVE BEEN MOST DISRUPTIVE IN THE CENTRAL AND WESTERN DISTRICTS. THE POTENTIAL FOR UNREST IS LIKELY TO REMAIN HIGH AS BOTH SIDES COMPETE TO INFLUENCE THE INDEPENDENCE OUTCOME.

5. ~~(S)~~ THE VIOLENCE AND EXPECTATION OF INDONESIA'S DEPARTURE ALSO ARE CREATING NOTABLE DISLOCATIONS AND SOME REFUGEES. JAKARTA HAS GIVEN ASSURANCES IT WILL AVOID A HASTY DEPARTURE, BUT IT IS EAGER TO WITHDRAW ALL GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL AND BUDGETARY SUPPORT BY EARLY NEXT YEAR IF TIMOR CHOOSES INDEPENDENCE. CIVIL SERVANTS, SCHOOLTEACHERS, HEALTH WORKERS, RETAIL MERCHANTS, AND OTHER NONNATIVE TIMORESE ARE DEPARTING, LEADING TO CLOSURES OF SERVICES, PRICE INCREASES, AND TEMPORARY SHORTAGES OF BASIC COMMODITIES.

6. ~~(C)~~ DESPITE THE GROWING PROBLEMS, RECONCILIATION EFFORTS ARE UNDER WAY, WITH RECENT PROSPECT FOR EASING TENSION. SEPARATE PEACE INITIATIVES ARE BEING PURSUED BY RESISTANCE AND INTEGRATION GROUPS, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, AND INDONESIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.

IMPRISONED REBEL LEADER JOSE "XANANA" GUSMAO IS THE CENTRAL PLAYER IN THE PROCESS, UNDERTAKING A SERIES OF DIALOGUES WITH TIMORESE FROM ALL PERSPECTIVES. IN AN APPARENT BREAKTHROUGH, GUSMAO AND THE LEADER OF THE **MILITIA** GROUPS ANNOUNCED A CEASE-FIRE ON 11 MARCH. ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY GUSMAO, A "PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION" IS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION AS A CENTRAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM.

7. ~~(C)~~ GUSMAO AND THE MILITARY ALSO HAVE INITIATED DISCUSSIONS. ONE UN IDEA ACCEPTABLE TO GUSMAO WOULD ENTAIL CONFINING THE ARMED FORCES TO THEIR BARRACKS IN PREPARATION FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL WHILE REBEL FIGHTERS ASSEMBLE IN ISOLATED CANTONMENT AREAS. ALL PARTIES PUBLICLY FAVOR DISARMAMENT BUT DISAGREE ON TIMING. NONETHELESS, REMOVAL OF FIREARMS ALONE IS UNLIKELY TO LOWER VIOLENCE CONSIDERING THE PREVALENT USE OF TRADITIONAL WEAPONS, WHICH TIMORESE WILL NOT EASILY SURRENDER.

8. ~~(C)~~ PEACEKEEPING PROSPECTS. IN VIEW OF THE LONG-TERM SECURITY DIFFICULTIES, ALL SIDES ACCEPT THE NECESSITY OF INSTALLING A UN SECURITY PRESENCE WHEN THE MORE THAN 11,000 NON-TIMORESE MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL NOW ON THE ISLAND DEPART. CURRENTLY MAINTAINING A LOW PROFILE, THESE FORCES PLAN A PHASED PULLOUT LATER THIS YEAR, EVEN IF AUTONOMY IS ACCEPTED. ALTHOUGH THE TIMING MOST LIKELY WILL DEPEND ON MULTIPLE FACTORS, JAKARTA WILL REMAIN RELUCTANT TO PERMIT A SIZABLE FOREIGN PRESENCE BEFORE IT MAKES THE FINAL DETERMINATION ON EAST TIMOR'S FUTURE.

9. ~~(C)~~ INDONESIAN INTEREST IN MAINTAINING STABILITY ON ITS BORDERS IS LIKELY TO ENSURE FUTURE COOPERATION WITH ANY UN FORCE, BUT THE MILITARY'S ARMING OF THE MILITIAS POSES A DILEMMA, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE DESTABILIZING POTENTIAL OF THESE GROUPS. AUSTRALIA, WHICH ANTICIPATES CONTRIBUTING A MAJOR ELEMENT OF THE UN FORCE, MAY WELL PERSUADE JAKARTA OF THE NEED TO NEUTRALIZE ITS TIMORESE SUPPORTERS. ULTIMATELY, HOWEVER, STABILITY WILL DEPEND ON THE RECONCILIATION EFFORTS OF THE TIMORESE THEMSELVES. ALTHOUGH NOT EASY, AUSTRALIA AND OTHERS HOPE THIS PROCESS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL, NECESSITATING ONLY A FAIRLY MODEST UN POLICE CONTINGENT TO MONITOR THE PEACE AND TRAIN AN INDIGENOUS TIMORESE FORCE. NONETHELESS, CANBERRA IS PREPARING CONTINGENCIES FOR A MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IF A MAJOR DISORDER ERUPTS.

}}}

THE PROVINCE, WHILE LARGELY CHRISTIAN, CONTAINS ONLY 570 NATIVE
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
TIMORESE, MOST OCCUPYING LOW-RANKING POSITIONS. MANY TIMORESE POLICE OFFICERS INITIALLY ENTERED THE FORCE AS POLICE AUXILIARIES, A FORCE NOW BEING EXPANDED BY SOME 1,000 MEMBERS TO HELP SAFEGUARD COMING ELECTIONS.
11. ~~(C)~~ GUSMAO ENVISIONS A 2,600- TO 3,000-PERSON POLICE FORCE, BUILDING ON THE EXISTING INDIGENOUS CONTINGENT AND FILLED OUT WITH TIMORESE FROM THE INDONESIAN MILITARY, REBEL FORCES, AND EVEN **MILITIA** PERSONNEL. KEY ASPECTS OF THE NEW FORCE WOULD BE ITS NEUTRALITY AND ACCEPTANCE BY ALL SIDES. IN TRAINING THIS FORCE, INDONESIAN POLICE ASSISTANCE WOULD BE SOUGHT, ALONG WITH A NUCLEUS OF UN POLICE ADVISERS. IN ADDITION TO SELECTING, TRAINING, AND ADVISING A TIMORESE FORCE, UN PERSONNEL SEEMINGLY WOULD EXERCISE SOME DIRECT LAW-AND-ORDER RESPONSIBILITIES, AT LEAST INITIALLY.
12. ~~(C)~~ INDONESIAN OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED OPENNESS TO A UN POLICE TRAINING EFFORT WHETHER AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE IS ADOPTED, ALTHOUGH THEY APPARENTLY WOULD PREFER ANY INITIAL TRAINING BE CONDUCTED OUTSIDE THE PROVINCE, OWING TO SOVEREIGNTY CONSIDERATIONS. A RESIDUAL INDONESIAN POLICE CONTINGENT PRESUMABLY WOULD HAVE SOME POPULAR ACCEPTABILITY BECAUSE THE POLICE HAVE A SOMEWHAT BETTER HUMAN RIGHTS REPUTATION IN EAST TIMOR AND HAVE OPENLY CRITICIZED THE UNPOPULAR MILITIAS.
}}}

15. ~~(C)~~ INDONESIA. JAKARTA HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO CONSIDER A SIZABLE UN SECURITY PRESENCE AT THIS STAGE, VIEWING IT AS AN UNACCEPTABLE INFRINGEMENT ON INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY. STILL, THE GOVERNMENT WILL ACCEPT FOREIGN OBSERVERS DURING THE UN CONSULTATION STAGE. AT SOME POINT, JAKARTA INTENDS TO SURRENDER ALL RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND JAKARTA EVEN HAS SHOWN WILLINGNESS TO SUBORDINATE SECURITY PERSONNEL UNDER SUCH A UN MANDATE.

16. ~~(C)~~ AUSTRALIA. AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS HOPE TO AVOID THE NEED FOR AN ARMED PRESENCE IN THE TERRITORY, FAVORING INSTEAD AN UNARMED POLICE FORCE ON THE GROUND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. CANBERRA DISTRUSTS THE ABILITIES OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING DEPARTMENT AND SEES POTENTIAL PROBLEMS STEMMING FROM A POORLY MOTIVATED AND INEFFECTUAL THIRD-WORLD FORCE. AUSTRALIA HOPES ITS IDEAS WILL BE ACCEPTED QUICKLY, CONSIDERING THE TIME NECESSARY TO ORGANIZE A FORCE. CANBERRA CONTEMPLATES SENDING MEMBERS OF ITS FEDERAL POLICE, WHICH PRESUMABLY WOULD MAKE UP A LARGE COMPONENT OF THE UN FORCE. AS A CONTINGENCY, THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ALSO IS READYING TWO BRIGADES CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH MORE SERIOUS UNREST. NONETHELESS, CANBERRA REMAINS STRONGLY DISINCLINED TO SEND TROOPS INTO SERIOUS HOSTILITIES WITH PROSPECTS FOR SERIOUS CASUALTIES.

}}}

RELUCTANT TO ABANDON TIMORESE ALLIES THEY HAVE LONG RELIED ON TO HELP NEUTRALIZE THE RESISTANCE. WITH REBELS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS INCREASINGLY TARGETING PARAMILITARY PERSONNEL LAST YEAR, GEN WIRANTO APPROVED ARMING **MILITIA** ELEMENTS, DISTRIBUTING APPARENTLY HUNDREDS OF SURPLUS RIFLES. ALTHOUGH SUPPORT VARIES, DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS ALSO HAVE PROVIDED AMMUNITION, LOGISTICS, AND ADVICE TO THE MILITIAS.
SUCH BACKING HAS ENABLED THE MILITARY TO TAKE A MORE HANDS-OFF APPROACH, SUGGESTING TO THE TIMORESE THEY ARE NOW ON THEIR OWN. THE RESULT, HOWEVER, HAS ONLY BEEN HEIGHTENED UNREST AS MILITIAS HAVE SOUGHT TO BOLSTER THEIR POSITION BY ATTACKING THEIR ADVERSARIES.
19. ~~(S)~~ COL SURATMAN HAS SINCE ORDERED THE COLLECTION OF THE MILITIAS' WEAPONS, PROMISING TO DISARM THEM FOLLOWING GUSMAO'S PLEDGE TO REFRAIN FROM REBEL VENDETTAS AGAINST THOSE GROUPS. EVEN SO, THE COMMAND'S RELUCTANCE TO RESTORE ORDER OR PUNISH **MILITIA** TRANSGRESSIONS RAISES QUESTIONS OF THE MILITARY'S CONTROL OR INTENTIONS, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING SUPPORT TO THESE GROUPS BY LOCAL COMMANDS AND SPECIAL FORCES INTELLIGENCE. THE MILITARY NOW FACES A NEW DILEMMA POSED BY THE PUBLIC THREATS OF THESE GROUPS AGAINST AUSTRALIAN INTERESTS. THE OVERRIDING IMPERATIVE TO ENSURE A SMOOTH HANDOVER TO UN FORCES MOST LIKELY WILL COMPEL THE LOCAL COMMAND
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/
EVENTUALLY TO REIN IN THESE GROUPS IF STILL POSSIBLE.
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}} }}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
20. ~~(S)~~ TIMORESE MILITIAS. MILITANT TIMORESE **MILITIA** GROUPS HAVE THEIR ORIGINS IN MILITARY EFFORTS TO BUILD AN INDIGENOUS COUNTERWEIGHT AGAINST THE PROINDEPENDENCE REBELS AND THEIR CLANDESTINE SUPPORTERS. SOME OF THESE MILITANT MILITIAS ARE THREATENING WAR IF INDEPENDENCE IS GRANTED. THEY GENERALLY ARE LED BY CLAN-BASED CHIEFS WHO HAVE BENEFITED FROM THEIR LONG ASSOCIATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND FEAR THEIR LOSS OF AUTHORITY, AS WELL AS RETRIBUTION BY THE OTHER SIDE. SOME MILITIAS ARE NEWLY ORGANIZED, BUT OTHERS WERE FORMED IN EARLIER YEARS BY INDONESIA'S SPECIAL FORCES INTELLIGENCE TEAMS. THESE ORIGINAL GROUPS, WHICH TOTALED 1,200 TIMORESE LAST YEAR, HAVE SINCE BEEN RESUBORDINATED TO LOCAL DISTRICT COMMANDS, ALTHOUGH INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS STILL PROVIDE SUPPORT AND USE THEIR SERVICES.
21. ~~(S)~~ DESPITE EXAGGERATED CLAIMS OF UP TO 15,000 RECRUITS, MOST INDIVIDUAL MILITIAS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE FEWER THAN SEVERAL HUNDRED HARDCORE MEMBERS, ARMED PRIMARILY WITH TRADITIONAL WEAPONS. EARLIER THIS YEAR, THEY FORMED A POLITICAL WING - THE FORUM FOR UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND JUSTICE - TO PRESS THEIR INTEGRATION DEMANDS. EIGHT CORE MILITIAS ALSO MERGED UNDER A UNIFIED COMMAND UNDER JOAO TAVARES,

A PROMINENT LANDOWNER. SOME BELIEVE THE GROUP'S OBJECTIVE IS TO EVENTUALLY BREAK OFF THE WESTERN DISTRICTS OF EAST TIMOR. NONETHELESS, THEY HAVE PUBLICLY WELCOMED A UN PRESENCE AND RECENTLY BEGAN TALKS WITH GUSMAO. MORE IMPORTANT, TAVARES THIS WEEK ANNOUNCED PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT WITH GUSMAO TO HALT THE FIGHTING, ALTHOUGH IMPLEMENTATION MAY WELL PROVE DIFFICULT.

22. ~~(S)~~ THE FOUR MOST PROMINENT GROUPS NOW ACTIVE INCLUDE:

BESI MERAH PUTIH (RED AND WHITE IRON), LED BY ILIDIO DOS SANTOS. IT CLAIMS TO HAVE 2,890 MEMBERS BUT MOST LIKELY HAS FEW SUPPORTERS AND FEW IF ANY FIREARMS. THE GROUP RECENTLY ATTRACTED NEWS MEDIA ATTENTION BY SETTING UP ROADBLOCKS MANNED BY ELDERLY MEN AND CHILDREN.

MAHIDI (LIVE OR DIE INTEGRATED WITH INDONESIA), COMMANDED BY CANCIO DE CARVALHO. THIS GROUP IS ONE OF THE MOST MILITANT **MILITIA** GROUPS FORMED THIS YEAR, AND IT IS LINKED TO A SERIES OF VIOLENT CONFRONTATIONS WITH PROINDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. **MAHIDI** HAS ACQUIRED AT LEAST 20 FIREARMS FROM THE MILITARY AND RETAINS AT LEAST SOME TIES TO MILITARY OFFICIALS.

HALILINTAR (THUNDER), LED BY JOAO TAVARES. TAVARES IS A FORMER REGENT IN THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF BOBONARO, WITH LONGSTANDING TIES TO THE GOVERNMENT AND SPECIAL FORCES. HALILINTAR ORIGINATED AS A SPECIAL-FORCES-LED UNIT NUMBERING A LITTLE OVER A 100 MEMBERS. SOURCES BELIEVE TAVARES HAS AMASSED HIS OWN ARMS SUPPLY.

AITARAK (THORN), LED BY EURICO GUTERRES. GUTERRES IS A LEADER OF THE YOUTH GROUP GADAPAKSI, ORGANIZED SEVERAL YEARS AGO BY SOEHARTO SON-IN-LAW LT GEN PRABOWO. EARLY THIS YEAR, EURICO ASSEMBLED 200 TO 400 YOUTH, A FEW OF WHOM WERE ARMED, TO SURROUND THE PROINDEPENDENCE OFFICES IN DILI. **AITARAK** ALSO REPORTEDLY WAS INVOLVED IN THE RECENT FATAL WOUNDING OF TWO TIMORESE IN DILI.

}}}

The following five pages are not responsive to the request and are not included.

CDS
CDSN = CFS542 MCN = 99245/21369 TOR = 992451738
PATSZYUW RUEKDIA2649 2451707-~~SSSS~~-RUEALGX.
ZNY~~SSSSS~~
DTG
021714Z SEP 99
FROM
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/(b)(3):10 USC 424
CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NATO SECRET FOR NATO ADDRESSEES~~
SIC UAJ
)))
SECTION 1 OF 3
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
SUBJ: DIA NADA INTSUM 208-99/DIA WASH DC/2 SEP 99. (U)
)))
FEATURES

Not responsive to the request.

(U) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR UPDATE

NON-RESPONSIVE

Not responsive to the request.

)))
(U) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR UPDATE
AS OF 0700Z 2 SEP 99
1. ~~(S)~~ ELEMENTS OF TWO PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS CLASHED WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS NEAR THE UNAMET HEADQUARTERS IN DILI ON 1 SEPTEMBER.
2. ~~(S)~~ MEMBERS OF THE **AITARAK MILITIA**, ENGAGED IN A FUNERAL PROCESSION, CONFRONTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY CLASHED WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS. A CROWD NUMBERING AS HIGH AS 400, CONSISTING OF INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS, JOURNALISTS, AND OBSERVERS FLED INTO THE UN COMPOUND. **MILITIA** MEMBERS, WHO REPORTEDLY FIRED INTO THE CROWD AS IT ENTERED THE COMPOUND, CHASED THE MOB. SECURITY FORCES WERE SLOW TO ARRIVE.
3. (U) FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS AND DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO INDICATED THAT INDONESIA WILL NOT LEAVE EAST TIMOR IN HASTE. WIRANTO INDICATED THAT, UPON THE DATE OF IMPLEMENTATION AND PENDING THE RATIFICATION OF THE RESULTS BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES WOULD HAVE NO AUTHORITY IN A FREE EAST TIMOR AND WOULD THEREFORE REQUIRE GOVERNMENT APPROVAL TO REMAIN IN ORDER TO EFFECT A TRANSITION.
4. ~~(C)~~ THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE VOTE RESULTS COULD POSSIBLY BE RELEASED AS EARLY AS 4 OR 5 SEPTEMBER, BECAUSE THE PROCESS HAS GONE LARGELY UNHINDERED.
5. ~~(C)~~ UNREST IS LIKELY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE RELEASE OF THE

BALLOT RESULTS, WHICH COULD OCCUR SOMETIME PRIOR TO THE TARGET DATE OF 6 SEPTEMBER.
(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON X1)~~
)))

Not responsive to the request.

Not responsive to the request.

(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON X1~~)
)))
(OVERALL: DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON X1~~)
BT
ADMIN
#2651
NNNN

CDS
PAAMZYUW YEKDQA 1565 0851412-MRXA--YEKDXB.
ZNY MMRXA
ZKZK PP SOA DE
DTG
261807Z MAR 99
FROM
FM SSO DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424
CONTROLS
~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424
SECTION 1 OF 4
~~QQQQ~~
)))
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
SUBJ: DIA COMMONWEALTH ASSESSMENT 034-99/26 MAR 99
SPECIAL REPORT
)))
(U) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424
)))
EAST TIMOR: TRANSITIONING TO INDEPENDENCE (U)
AS OF 2100Z 11 MAR 99
1. ~~(C)~~ AFTER 23 TURBULENT YEARS OF INDONESIAN RULE, EAST TIMOR IS NOW SET ON A COURSE LIKELY TO RESULT IN SEPARATION FROM INDONESIA EARLY NEXT YEAR. ALTHOUGH JAKARTA'S FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS WILL BE CRITICAL, THE UNITED NATIONS WILL PLAY A PIVOTAL ROLE IN THE COMING MONTHS, ASSESSING TIMORESE WISHES AND OVERSEEING THE PEACE PROCESS AND INDONESIAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL. TO FILL THE VOID, A MODEST INTERNATIONAL POLICE CONTINGENT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT THE SCOPE OF FOREIGN SECURITY INVOLVEMENT WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON CONTINUED PROGRESS IN THE RECONCILIATION EFFORTS AMONG THE WARRING TIMORESE FACTIONS.
2. ~~(C)~~ SEPARATING FROM INDONESIA. PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S SURPRISE OFFER IN LATE JANUARY TO PERMIT EAST TIMOR WIDE-RANGING AUTONOMY OR QUICK SEPARATION FROM INDONESIA HAS SHARPLY ALTERED THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE. ALTHOUGH CABINET OPPOSITION TO CERTAIN AUTONOMY PROVISIONS HAS DELAYED FINAL GOVERNMENT APPROVAL, AGREEMENT STILL IS EXPECTED, WITH PORTUGAL AS THE UN-RECOGNIZED ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OF EAST TIMOR. THE SIGNING, NOW EXPECTED BY APRIL, WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A PERIOD FOR THE TIMORESE TO DEBATE THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE. THE UN THEN HOPES TO CANVASS TIMORESE PREFERENCES THROUGH A DEMOCRATICALLY

4

ELECTED TIMORESE COUNCIL IN JULY. ALTHOUGH SOME INDONESIAN OFFICIALS BELIEVE AUTONOMY MAY PREVAIL, MOST ANTICIPATE ITS REJECTION, OWING TO THE STRONG ANTI-INDONESIAN FEELINGS IN EAST TIMOR. WITH SUCH AN OUTCOME, HABIBIE WOULD ASK INDONESIA'S SUPREME LEGISLATIVE BODY, THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY, WHEN IT CONVENES IN AUGUST TO RESCIND THE 1976 INTEGRATION DECREE, RETURNING THE PROVINCE TO A "NONSELF-GOVERNING" TERRITORY UNDER PORTUGUESE AUTHORITY. AN OVERWHELMING PROINDEPENDENCE TIMORESE MANDATE WOULD COMPLICATE ANY EFFORT BY A NEW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND ASSEMBLY, TO BE FORMED LATER THIS YEAR, TO COUNTERMAND TIMOR'S DESIRES.

3. ~~(C)~~ JAKARTA INTENDS TO DELEGATE INCREASING OVERSIGHT TO THE UNITED NATIONS AS THE PROCESS PROCEEDS, INCLUDING ASSESSING TIMORESE WISHES. UN OFFICIALS ALSO ARE FORMING A "FRIENDS OF EAST TIMOR" GROUPING TO COORDINATE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND WEIGH OTHER ASPECTS OF THE TRANSITION. ALTHOUGH MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVE TIMOR WILL REMAIN UNDER SOME UN/PORTUGUESE OVERSIGHT FOR 2 OR 3 YEARS, UN OFFICIALS HOPE TO AVOID A CULTURE OF DEPENDENCY BY FORMING AN UMBRELLA AUTHORITY THAT WOULD DELEGATE EXTENSIVE POWER TO THE TIMORESE BASED ON THE AUTONOMY MODEL.

4. ~~(C)~~ MIXED SECURITY PICTURE. EAST TIMOR FACES LOOMING SECURITY PROBLEMS AND UNCERTAINTIES AS IT ENTERS THIS TRANSITION PERIOD. ALTHOUGH VIOLENCE HAS BEEN LOCALIZED AND HAS LED TO FAIRLY FEW DEATHS, THE SITUATION IS VOLATILE. MILITANTS ON BOTH SIDES HAVE INSTIGATED VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION, BUT PRO-INDONESIAN MILITIAS RECENTLY HAVE BEEN MOST DISRUPTIVE IN THE CENTRAL AND WESTERN DISTRICTS. THE POTENTIAL FOR UNREST IS LIKELY TO REMAIN HIGH AS BOTH SIDES COMPETE TO INFLUENCE THE INDEPENDENCE OUTCOME.

5. ~~(S)~~ THE VIOLENCE AND EXPECTATION OF INDONESIA'S DEPARTURE ALSO ARE CREATING NOTABLE DISLOCATIONS AND SOME REFUGEES. JAKARTA HAS GIVEN ASSURANCES IT WILL AVOID A HASTY DEPARTURE, BUT IT IS EAGER TO WITHDRAW ALL GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL AND BUDGETARY SUPPORT BY EARLY NEXT YEAR IF TIMOR CHOOSES INDEPENDENCE. CIVIL SERVANTS, SCHOOLTEACHERS, HEALTH WORKERS, RETAIL MERCHANTS, AND OTHER NONNATIVE TIMORESE ARE DEPARTING, LEADING TO CLOSURES OF SERVICES, PRICE INCREASES, AND TEMPORARY SHORTAGES OF BASIC COMMODITIES.

6. ~~(C)~~ DESPITE THE GROWING PROBLEMS, RECONCILIATION EFFORTS ARE UNDER WAY, WITH RECENT PROSPECT FOR EASING TENSION. SEPARATE PEACE INITIATIVES ARE BEING PURSUED BY RESISTANCE AND INTEGRATION GROUPS, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, AND INDONESIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. IMPRISONED REBEL LEADER JOSE "XANANA" GUSMAO IS THE CENTRAL PLAYER IN THE PROCESS, UNDERTAKING A SERIES OF DIALOGUES WITH TIMORESE FROM ALL PERSPECTIVES. IN AN APPARENT BREAKTHROUGH, GUSMAO AND THE LEADER OF

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
THE **MILITIA** GROUPS ANNOUNCED A CEASE-FIRE ON 11 MARCH. ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY GUSMAO, A "PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION" IS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION AS A CENTRAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM.
7. ~~(C)~~ GUSMAO AND THE MILITARY ALSO HAVE INITIATED DISCUSSIONS. ONE UN IDEA ACCEPTABLE TO GUSMAO WOULD ENTAIL CONFINING THE ARMED FORCES TO THEIR BARRACKS IN PREPARATION FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL WHILE REBEL FIGHTERS ASSEMBLE IN ISOLATED CANTONMENT AREAS. ALL PARTIES PUBLICLY FAVOR DISARMAMENT BUT DISAGREE ON TIMING. NONETHELESS, REMOVAL OF FIREARMS ALONE IS UNLIKELY TO LOWER VIOLENCE CONSIDERING THE PREVALENT USE OF TRADITIONAL WEAPONS, WHICH TIMORESE WILL NOT EASILY SURRENDER.
8. ~~(C)~~ PEACEKEEPING PROSPECTS. IN VIEW OF THE LONG-TERM SECURITY DIFFICULTIES, ALL SIDES ACCEPT THE NECESSITY OF INSTALLING A UN SECURITY PRESENCE WHEN THE MORE THAN 11,000 NON-TIMORESE MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL NOW ON THE ISLAND DEPART. CURRENTLY MAINTAINING A LOW PROFILE, THESE FORCES PLAN A PHASED PULLOUT LATER THIS YEAR, EVEN IF AUTONOMY IS ACCEPTED. ALTHOUGH THE TIMING MOST LIKELY WILL DEPEND ON MULTIPLE FACTORS, JAKARTA WILL REMAIN RELUCTANT TO PERMIT A SIZABLE FOREIGN PRESENCE BEFORE IT MAKES THE FINAL DETERMINATION ON EAST TIMOR'S FUTURE.
9. ~~(C)~~ INDONESIAN INTEREST IN MAINTAINING STABILITY ON ITS BORDERS IS LIKELY TO ENSURE FUTURE COOPERATION WITH ANY UN FORCE, BUT THE MILITARY'S ARMING OF THE MILITIAS POSES A DILEMMA, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE DESTABILIZING POTENTIAL OF THESE GROUPS. ULTIMATELY, HOWEVER, STABILITY WILL DEPEND ON THE RECONCILIATION EFFORTS OF THE TIMORESE THEMSELVES. ALTHOUGH NOT EASY, ALL REGIONAL ACTORS HOPE THIS PROCESS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL, NECESSITATING ONLY A FAIRLY MODEST UN POLICE CONTINGENT TO MONITOR THE PEACE AND TRAIN AN INDIGENOUS TIMORESE FORCE.
10. ~~(C)~~ BUILDING AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR POLICE. THE KEY PLAYERS, INCLUDING RESISTANCE LEADER JOSE GUSMAO, REJECT THE NEED FOR AN EAST TIMOR ARMED FORCES AND INSTEAD FOCUS ATTENTION ON AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR NATIONAL POLICE, ABLE TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER AMONG TIMOR'S DIVIDED POPULATION. THE 4,000-PERSON INDONESIAN POLICE CONTINGENT IN THE PROVINCE, WHILE LARGELY CHRISTIAN, CONTAINS ONLY 570 NATIVE TIMORESE, MOST OCCUPYING LOW-RANKING POSITIONS. MANY TIMORESE POLICE OFFICERS INITIALLY ENTERED THE FORCE AS POLICE AUXILIARIES, A FORCE NOW BEING EXPANDED BY SOME 1,000 MEMBERS TO HELP SAFEGUARD COMING ELECTIONS.
11. ~~(C)~~ GUSMAO ENVISIONS A 2,600- TO 3,000-PERSON POLICE FORCE, BUILDING ON THE EXISTING INDIGENOUS CONTINGENT AND FILLED OUT WITH

TIMORESE FROM THE INDONESIAN MILITARY, REBEL FORCES, AND EVEN **MILITIA** PERSONNEL. KEY ASPECTS OF THE NEW FORCE WOULD BE ITS NEUTRALITY AND ACCEPTANCE BY ALL SIDES. IN TRAINING THIS FORCE, INDONESIAN POLICE ASSISTANCE WOULD BE SOUGHT, ALONG WITH A NUCLEUS OF UN POLICE ADVISERS. IN ADDITION TO SELECTING, TRAINING, AND ADVISING A TIMORESE FORCE, UN PERSONNEL SEEMINGLY WOULD EXERCISE SOME DIRECT LAW-AND-ORDER RESPONSIBILITIES, AT LEAST INITIALLY.

12. ~~(C)~~ INDONESIAN OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED OPENNESS TO A UN POLICE TRAINING EFFORT WHETHER AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE IS ADOPTED, ALTHOUGH THEY APPARENTLY WOULD PREFER ANY INITIAL TRAINING BE CONDUCTED OUTSIDE THE PROVINCE, OWING TO SOVEREIGNTY CONSIDERATIONS. A RESIDUAL INDONESIAN POLICE CONTINGENT PRESUMABLY WOULD HAVE SOME POPULAR ACCEPTABILITY BECAUSE THE POLICE HAVE A SOMEWHAT BETTER HUMAN RIGHTS REPUTATION IN EAST TIMOR AND HAVE OPENLY CRITICIZED THE UNPOPULAR MILITIAS.

13. ~~(C)~~ IDEAS ON A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. UNITED NATIONS. UN OFFICIALS ANTICIPATE THE NEED FOR A FAIRLY SMALL UNARMED POLICE OBSERVER AND TRAINING PRESENCE, BACKED BY FRIENDLY INVOLVED STATES. ONE REPRESENTATIVE FORESEES THIS FORCE COMPRISING "REGIONAL NONPOWERS WITH EXPERIENCE," SUCH AS FIJI. THE ACTUAL SIZE AND MISSION WOULD BE DETERMINED BY A UN TEAM OF EXPERTS SENT TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AT AN EARLY DATE.

14. ~~(C)~~ TIMOR RESISTANCE. REBEL LEADER GUSMAO HAS CONTEMPLATED SOME 200-400 UN CIVILIAN POLICE PERSONNEL, BUT HE WOULD LIKE SUCH A CONTINGENT PRESENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND BEFORE THE CONSULTATIONS /****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/
TAKE PLACE. INFLUENCED BY THE CURRENT TENSION, HE HOPES THIS FORCE WOULD PROVIDE AN ADDED INCENTIVE FOR THE INDONESIAN MILITARY TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH ITS COMMITMENT TO DISARM THE MILITIAS. SUCH A UN FORCE ALSO WOULD SUPERVISE THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND HELP GUARANTEE A CEASE-FIRE. ALTHOUGH GUSMAO HAS SUGGESTED THE UN FORCE BE UNARMED, FELLOW REBEL SPOKESMAN RAMOS HORTA RECENTLY IMPLIED THAT ANY FOREIGN CONTINGENT BE LIGHTLY ARMED.

15. ~~(C)~~ INDONESIA. JAKARTA HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO CONSIDER A SIZABLE UN SECURITY PRESENCE AT THIS STAGE, VIEWING IT AS AN UNACCEPTABLE INFRINGEMENT ON INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY. STILL, THE GOVERNMENT WILL ACCEPT FOREIGN OBSERVERS DURING THE UN CONSULTATION STAGE. AT SOME POINT, JAKARTA INTENDS TO SURRENDER ALL RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND JAKARTA EVEN HAS SHOWN WILLINGNESS TO SUBORDINATE SECURITY PERSONNEL UNDER SUCH A UN MANDATE.

16. ~~(C)~~ THE MILITARY'S MIXED SIGNALS. INDONESIA'S MILITARY POLICIES TOWARD EAST TIMOR REFLECT CONFLICTING PRESSURES AND MOTIVATIONS, NOT

SURPRISING CONSIDERING JAKARTA'S LONG AND TROUBLED HISTORY IN THE PROVINCE. ALTHOUGH FAVORING AUTONOMY, ARMED FORCES COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO CHOSE NOT TO CHALLENGE THE CABINET'S JANUARY DECISION PROVIDING FOR POSSIBLE INDEPENDENCE. WIRANTO INSISTED ONLY THAT THE GOVERNMENT AVOID THE SUGGESTION THAT INTEGRATION HAD BEEN A MISTAKE SO AS TO PRESERVE THE HONOR OF THE MILITARY AND THE MORE THAN 1,900 TROOPS WHO HAD DIED THERE. SEEKING TO ASSIST A STABLE DEPARTURE, WIRANTO HAS SINCE GIVEN HIS APPROVAL FOR A PEACE COMMISSION AND MUTUAL DISARMAMENT OF THE TIMORESE PARTIES. CONSISTENT WITH THIS APPROACH, LOCAL MILITARY COMMANDER COL TONO SURATMAN ALSO RECENTLY SIGNED A PEACE PROCLAMATION WITH THE RESISTANCE AND PRO-INTEGRATIONIST ELEMENTS. HE ALSO GREATLY SCALED BACK ACTIVITIES, LARGELY REFRAINING FROM OPERATIONS AGAINST THE REBELS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS.

17. ~~(S)~~ NONETHELESS, MANY SENIOR OFFICERS STILL HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE, AND SOME REMAIN CONVINCED SEPARATION SOMEHOW CAN BE AVOIDED. STRONG EMOTIONAL BONDS EXIST, PARTICULARLY AT THE LOCAL COMMAND LEVEL IN TIMOR, WITH OFFICERS RELUCTANT TO ABANDON TIMORESE ALLIES THEY HAVE LONG RELIED ON TO HELP NEUTRALIZE THE RESISTANCE. WITH REBELS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS INCREASINGLY TARGETING PARAMILITARY PERSONNEL LAST YEAR, GEN WIRANTO APPROVED ARMING **MILITIA** ELEMENTS, DISTRIBUTING APPARENTLY HUNDREDS OF SURPLUS RIFLES. ALTHOUGH SUPPORT VARIES, DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS ALSO HAVE PROVIDED AMMUNITION, LOGISTICS, AND ADVICE TO THE MILITIAS. SUCH BACKING HAS ENABLED THE MILITARY TO TAKE A MORE HANDS-OFF APPROACH, SUGGESTING TO THE TIMORESE THEY ARE NOW ON THEIR OWN. THE RESULT, HOWEVER, HAS ONLY BEEN HEIGHTENED UNREST AS MILITIAS HAVE SOUGHT TO BOLSTER THEIR POSITION BY ATTACKING THEIR ADVERSARIES.

18. ~~(S)~~ COL SURATMAN HAS SINCE ORDERED THE COLLECTION OF THE MILITIAS' WEAPONS, PROMISING TO DISARM THEM FOLLOWING GUSMAO'S PLEDGE TO REFRAIN FROM REBEL VENDETTAS AGAINST THOSE GROUPS. EVEN SO, THE COMMAND'S RELUCTANCE TO RESTORE ORDER OR PUNISH **MILITIA** TRANSGRESSIONS RAISES QUESTIONS OF THE MILITARY'S CONTROL OR INTENTIONS, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING SUPPORT TO THESE GROUPS BY LOCAL COMMANDS AND SPECIAL FORCES INTELLIGENCE. THE MILITARY NOW FACES A NEW DILEMMA POSED BY THE PUBLIC THREATS OF THESE GROUPS AGAINST AUSTRALIAN INTERESTS. THE OVERRIDING IMPERATIVE TO ENSURE A SMOOTH HANDOVER TO UN FORCES MOST LIKELY WILL COMPEL THE LOCAL COMMAND EVENTUALLY TO REIN IN THESE GROUPS IF STILL POSSIBLE.

19. ~~(S)~~ TIMORESE MILITIAS. MILITANT TIMORESE **MILITIA** GROUPS HAVE THEIR ORIGINS IN MILITARY EFFORTS TO BUILD AN INDIGENOUS COUNTERWEIGHT AGAINST THE PROINDEPENDENCE REBELS AND THEIR

CLANDESTINE SUPPORTERS. SOME OF THESE MILITANT MILITIAS ARE THREATENING WAR IF INDEPENDENCE IS GRANTED. THEY GENERALLY ARE LED BY CLAN-BASED CHIEFS WHO HAVE BENEFITED FROM THEIR LONG ASSOCIATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND FEAR THEIR LOSS OF AUTHORITY, AS WELL AS RETRIBUTION BY THE OTHER SIDE. SOME MILITIAS ARE NEWLY ORGANIZED, BUT OTHERS WERE FORMED IN EARLIER YEARS BY INDONESIA'S SPECIAL FORCES
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/
INTELLIGENCE TEAMS. THESE ORIGINAL GROUPS, WHICH TOTALED 1,200 TIMORESE LAST YEAR, HAVE SINCE BEEN RESUBORDINATED TO LOCAL DISTRICT COMMANDS, ALTHOUGH INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS STILL PROVIDE SUPPORT AND USE THEIR SERVICES.

20. ~~(S)~~ DESPITE EXAGGERATED CLAIMS OF UP TO 15,000 RECRUITS, MOST INDIVIDUAL MILITIAS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE FEWER THAN SEVERAL HUNDRED HARDCORE MEMBERS, ARMED PRIMARILY WITH TRADITIONAL WEAPONS. EARLIER THIS YEAR, THEY FORMED A POLITICAL WING - THE FORUM FOR UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND JUSTICE - TO PRESS THEIR INTEGRATION DEMANDS. EIGHT CORE MILITIAS ALSO MERGED UNDER A UNIFIED COMMAND UNDER JOAO TAVARES, A PROMINENT LANDOWNER. SOME BELIEVE THE GROUP'S OBJECTIVE IS TO EVENTUALLY BREAK OFF THE WESTERN DISTRICTS OF EAST TIMOR. NONETHELESS, THEY HAVE PUBLICLY WELCOMED A UN PRESENCE AND RECENTLY BEGAN TALKS WITH GUSMAO. MORE IMPORTANT, TAVARES THIS WEEK ANNOUNCED PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT WITH GUSMAO TO HALT THE FIGHTING, ALTHOUGH IMPLEMENTATION MAY WELL PROVE DIFFICULT.

21. ~~(S)~~ THE FOUR MOST PROMINENT GROUPS NOW ACTIVE INCLUDE:

BESI MERAH PUTIH (RED AND WHITE IRON), LED BY ILIDIO DOS SANTOS. IT CLAIMS TO HAVE 2,890 MEMBERS BUT MOST LIKELY HAS FEW SUPPORTERS AND FEW IF ANY FIREARMS. THE GROUP RECENTLY ATTRACTED NEWS MEDIA ATTENTION BY SETTING UP ROADBLOCKS MANNED BY ELDERLY MEN AND CHILDREN.

MAHIDI (LIVE OR DIE INTEGRATED WITH INDONESIA), COMMANDED BY CANCIO DE CARVALHO. THIS GROUP IS ONE OF THE MOST MILITANT **MILITIA** GROUPS FORMED THIS YEAR, AND IT IS LINKED TO A SERIES OF VIOLENT CONFRONTATIONS WITH PROINDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. **MAHIDI** HAS ACQUIRED AT LEAST 20 FIREARMS FROM THE MILITARY AND RETAINS AT LEAST SOME TIES TO MILITARY OFFICIALS.

HALILINTAR (THUNDER), LED BY JOAO TAVARES. TAVARES IS A FORMER REGENT IN THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF BOBONARO, WITH LONGSTANDING TIES TO THE GOVERNMENT AND SPECIAL FORCES. HALILINTAR ORIGINATED AS A SPECIAL-FORCES-LED UNIT NUMBERING A LITTLE OVER A 100 MEMBERS. SOURCES BELIEVE TAVARES HAS AMASSED HIS OWN ARMS SUPPLY.

AITARAK (THORN), LED BY EURICO GUTERRES. GUTERRES IS A LEADER OF THE YOUTH GROUP GADAPAKSI, ORGANIZED SEVERAL YEARS AGO BY SOEHARTO

SON-IN-LAW LT GEN PRABOWO. EARLY THIS YEAR, EURICO ASSEMBLED 200 TO 400 YOUTH, A FEW OF WHOM WERE ARMED, TO SURROUND THE PROINDEPENDENCE OFFICES IN DILI. **AITARAK** ALSO REPORTEDLY WAS INVOLVED IN THE RECENT FATAL WOUNDING OF TWO TIMORESE IN DILI.

)))

DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~

)))

ADMIN

NNNN

#1568

AE8A

NNNN

The following page is not responsive to the request and is not included.

CDS
CDSN
PTASZYUW RUEKJCS4545 2712032-~~SSSS~~-RUEALGX.
ZNY~~SSSSS~~
HEADER
P 282032Z SEP 99
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
P 281953Z SEP 99
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/(b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1
(i)
DIA(b)(3):10 USC 424
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI/(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE WASH DC
BT
CONTROLS
~~SECRET NOFORN~~
SECTION 1 OF 3
QQQQ
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
SUBJ: DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE TERRORISM SUMMARY 188-99, 29 SEPT 99(U)
1. (U) TABLE OF CONTENTS
- 2. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Non Responsive
- 3. TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL CHANGE
-- A. (U) INDONESIA: LOW TO MEDIUM
Non Responsive

NON-RESPONSIVE

3. (U) TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL CHANGE
A. (U) INDONESIA: LOW TO MEDIUM.
1 ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY: NUMEROUS EAST TIMOR PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA ATTACKS ACROSS EAST TIMOR IN EARLY SEPTEMBER HAVE ALREADY RESULTED IN ONE US CIVIL POLICE OFFICER BEING WOUNDED. ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENT IS GROWING IN INDONESIA. THE WILL AND CAPABILITY OF THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AND POLICE TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IS DOUBTFUL. DIA IS RAISING THE TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL TO DOD PERSONNEL, FACILITIES AND INTERESTS IN INDONESIA FROM LOW TO MEDIUM, WITH EAST TIMOR CONSIDERED A HIGH THREAT AREA. THE DOD TERRORIST THREAT ASSESSMENT FACTORS OF EXISTENCE, HISTORY AND CAPABILITY ARE ASSESSED AS PRESENT. THE INTENTIONS FACTOR, AT PRESENT, EXISTS IN EAST TIMOR. THE TARGETING FACTOR IS ABSENT.
2 ~~(C)~~ EXISTENCE: THIS FACTOR IS PRESENT. FOLLOWING THE RELEASE OF VOTING RESULTS ON 4 SEPTEMBER 1999, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS SUPPLIED BY THE INDONESIAN MILITARY CONDUCTED VIOLENT ATTACKS ACROSS EAST TIMOR. THESE ATTACKS WERE DESIGNED TO EXPEL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ASSASSINATE PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS, TERRORIZE THE POPULATION OF EAST TIMOR, AND OVERTURN THE INDEPENDENCE VOTE. DOMESTIC INSURGENT/EXTREMIST GROUPS HAVE OCCASIONALLY CONDUCTED TERRORISM IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO GAIN INDEPENDENCE FROM INDONESIA. THE GROUPS INCLUDE THE FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT OPM IN IRIAN JAYA, THE ACEH MERDEKA MOVEMENT AMM IN NORTH SUMATRA, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY FRONT FOR AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR FRETILIN. THE EAST TIMORESE MILITIAS INCLUDE: AITARAK WITH APPROXIMATELY 1,000 MEMBERS; BESI MERAH PUTIH WITH AT LEAST 350 MEMBERS; MAHIDI CLAIMING OVER 6,000 MEMBERS; AND DAUDARUS MERAH PUTIH LISTING 1,000 TO 3,000 MEMBERS.

The following two pages are not responsive to the request and are not included.

3 ~~(C)~~ HISTORY: THIS FACTOR IS PRESENT. FOLLOWING THE RELEASE OF THE INDEPENDENCE VOTE, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR NUMEROUS TERRORIST ATTACKS IN EAST TIMOR, WHICH LEFT THOUSANDS DEAD, AND WIDESPREAD PROPERTY DAMAGE.
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
4 ~~(C)~~ CAPABILITY: THIS FACTOR IS PRESENT. MILITIA MEMBERS IN TIMOR HAVE HAD UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ARSENAL, ACQUIRING SMALL ARMS AND HAND GRENADES AS SUPPLEMENTS TO TRADITIONAL WEAPONS, SUCH AS MACHETES AND SPEARS. THEY DEMONSTRATED AN ABILITY TO CONDUCT ASSASSINATIONS AND FIREBOMBINGS DURING THEIR EARLY SEPTEMBER CAMPAIGN AGAINST EAST TIMORESE INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS.
5 (U) INTENTIONS: THIS FACTOR IS ABSENT THROUGHOUT MOST OF INDONESIA WITH THE EXCEPTION OF EAST TIMOR. THE MILITIAS HAVE PUBLICLY STATED THEIR OPPOSITION TO UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES IN EAST TIMOR AND THREATENED TO KILL ONE MEMBER FOR EACH DAY THE UN FORCE IS IN TIMOR. WHILE THESE THREATS ARE PRIMARILY FOCUSED ON THE AUSTRALIANS, OTHER UN ELEMENTS, INCLUDING US FORCES, CO-LOCATED WITH THE AUSTRALIANS WILL ALSO BE AT RISK.
6 ~~(C)~~ TARGETING: THERE CURRENTLY IS NO CREDIBLE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SPECIFIC TARGETING OF US PERSONNEL, US INTERESTS, OR UN-ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL IN INDONESIA. HOWEVER, ONE AMERICAN UN CIVILIAN POLICE OFFICER HAS BEEN SHOT AND WOUNDED, A GERMAN PRIEST WAS SHOT AND KILLED IN DILI, AND NUMEROUS WESTERN OBSERVERS AND JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN ASSAULTED AND THREATENED WITH DEATH.
7 ~~(C)~~ SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: COLLECTIVELY, THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY FACTORS COMBINED WITH THE LOOSELY CONNECTED CLAN-BASED MILITIAS PRESENT A PICTURE OF CHAOS WITHIN WHICH THE AUSTRALIAN-LED UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE MUST OPERATE. THE GENERAL INSTABILITY IN INDONESIA HAS ALSO GIVEN RISE TO INCREASED ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS, WHICH THE SECURITY FORCES HAVE KEPT UNDER CONTROL, SOMETIMES THROUGH THE USE OF REPRESSIVE FORCE. THE EAST TIMOR SITUATION IS VOLATILE FOR WESTERN INTERESTS; A MOOD OF ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENT PREVAILS. ON TIMOR, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS COVERTLY ASSISTED BY THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE THEIR VIOLENCE TO DENY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE. THIS VIOLENCE PLACES THE INTERNATIONAL UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE AT INCREASED RISK.

NON-RESPONSIVE

NON-RESPONSIVE

DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES
ADMIN
DECLASSIFY ON: ~~SOURCE MARKED "OADR"~~
DATE OF SOURCE: SEPTEMBER 1999
BT
#4547
NNNN

The next four pages are not responsive to the request and are not included.

CDS
CDSN
RAASZYUW RUEKJCS5649 2730426-~~SGGG~~-RUEALGX.
ZNY-~~SGGGG~~
DTG
300244Z SEP 99
FROM
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424
CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~
PASS: (b)(3):10 USC 424
SECTION 1 OF 3
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
SUBJ: (U) DIA NMJIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 30 SEP.
(U) BECAUSE DIA'S FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS USE A STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CLASSIFICATION MARKING SYSTEM THAT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH TODAY'S MESSAGE-HANDLING SYSTEM, THIS MESSAGE SHOWS THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION ABOVE IN A DIFFERENT FORM THAN THAT USED THROUGHOUT THE BODY OF THE MESSAGE. IN TERMS OF THE STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MARKING SYSTEM, THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS ~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1.~~
(U) SUMMARY OF FEATURES

NON-RESPONSIVE

PAGES 8 AND 9 ARE NON-RESPONSIVE

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN;~~

NON-RESPONSIVE

INDONESIA:
1. ~~(C)~~ INTERIM FORCE IN EAST TIMOR (INTERFET) CONTINUED SECURITY OPERATIONS WITHOUT OPPOSITION, ALTHOUGH PRO-JAKARTA **MILITIA** LEADERS' INTENTIONS ARE UNCLEAR.
2. ~~(C)~~ THE LEADER OF **AITARAK**, ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL **MILITIA** GROUPS, AT A 27 SEPTEMBER RALLY AT ATAMBUA IN WEST TIMOR REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCED THAT HE PLANNED TO LAUNCH A GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST INTERFET. OTHER **MILITIA** LEADERS FAVOR A PEACEFUL POLITICAL STRATEGY. ON THE 25TH, THE **MILITIA** COMMANDER IN CHIEF CALLED ON ALL **MILITIA** MEMBERS TO END VIOLENCE AND TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE EAST TIMOR PEOPLE IN A POLITICAL STRUGGLE TO WIN BACK EAST TIMOR FOR INDONESIA.
3. ~~(S)~~ THE USDAO, JAKARTA, REPORTED INDONESIAN MILITARY CONCERN ABOUT DESERTIONS BY EAST TIMORESE TROOPS FROM INDONESIAN TERRITORIAL BATTALIONS BEFORE THOSE UNITS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE DESERTERS HAD JOINED FALINTIL, THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCE.
4. ~~(C)~~ DESPITE THE LACK OF SERIOUS SECURITY INCIDENTS, INTERFET IS CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE CLASHES WITH THE MILITIAS AS IT ENTERS PRO-JAKARTA STRONGHOLDS WEST OF DILI. UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE **MILITIA**
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/

LEADERS' STRATEGY AND UNSETTLED CONDITIONS IN WEST TIMOR REINFORCE THESE CONCERNS.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

NON-RESPONSIVE

NON-RESPONSIVE

(b)(3):10 USC 424

DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES
ADMIN
DECLASSIFY ON: ~~X1,X5~~
BT
#5651
NNNN

CDS
OAAMZYUW [redacted] 1574 2490749-MORN-[redacted]
ZNY MMORN
ZKZK OO SOA DE
DTG
060623Z SEP 99
FROM
FM SSO DIA/ [redacted]
CONTROLS
~~TOPSECRET/~~ [redacted] ~~/NOFORN//X1~~
SECTION 1 OF 3
~~QQQQ~~
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
PASS: [redacted]

SUBJ: DIA NMJIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 6 SEP 99. (U)
SUMMARY OF FEATURES:
Not responsive to the request.

2) (~~TS~~ [redacted] INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR UPDATE
PRO-JAKARTA MILITIAS CONTINUE CAMPAIGN OF INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE.
NON-RESPONSIVE

Not responsive to the request.

2) ~~(TOP SECRET/~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR UPDATE

PRO-JAKARTA MILITIAS CONTINUE CAMPAIGN OF INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE.

- ONE ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADE HITS BUILDING NEXT TO UNAMET HQ IN DILI, 5 SEP.
- VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST CARTER CENTER AMCITS BY MILITIAS; AMCITS EVACUATED SAFELY TO UNAMET IN DILI.
- TEN KILLED AT DILI PORT BY **AITARAK MILITIA.**

FOREIGNERS CONTINUE DEPARTING EAST TIMOR.

- MANY FOREIGNERS, INCLUDING SOME UNAMET, LEFT EAST TIMOR 5 SEP.
- JAPAN CHARTERED AN AIRCRAFT TO EVACUATE THEIR 30 CITIZENS.
- AUSTRALIA BEGINS "ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTURE" OPS OF 300 AUSTRALIANS WITH THREE C-130S 6 SEP.

EVACUATION OF INDONESIANS FROM EAST TIMOR UNDERWAY.

- MILITARY DEPENDANTS DEPARTING BY AIR.
- TWO SHIPS OBSERVED LOADING REFUGEES IN DILI HARBOR.
- BAUCAU AIRPORT OPEN; AIRLINE SERVICES STILL AVAILABLE.

GEN WIRANTO, FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS AND DELEGATION VISITED EAST TIMOR 5 SEP.

- REMAINED AT COMORO AIRFIELD; DILI CONSIDERED UNSAFE.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/

- WIRANTO MET WITH MILITARY, POLICE, MILITIAS, AND UNAMET LEADERS.
- ORDERS, IF ISSUED, ARE UNKNOWN.

J2 COMMENT: UNREST LIKELY TO CONTINUE. SECURITY FORCES EITHER UNWILLING OR INCAPABLE OF MAINTAINING ORDER. EVACUATION OF

PRO-JAKARTA PERSONNEL ONGOING. AUSTRALIANS ASSESS DANGER TO UNAMET AND FOREIGNERS AS HIGH. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AND INTERNAL DISSENT CONTRIBUTE TO INABILITY OF INDONESIAN LEADERS TO MANAGE RAPIDLY DETERIORATING SITUATION.

PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

Not responsive to the request.

NON-RESPONSIVE

PREPARED BY (b)(3):10 USC 424
ADMIN
#1576
5BA3

NNNN

MORI DocID: 1078761

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~ TEP

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

This SEIB must be returned to C - within 5 working days

Friday, 17 September 1999

National Security Information
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Reproduction of this Document Prohibited

Readership is limited to those on approved reader list on file with CIA SEIB Control Officer. The undersigned hereby acknowledge reading this document.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2004

CIAPASS SEIB 99-216CX

MORI DocID: 1078761

Table of Contents

Leading Developments

Indonesia: Army on Both Sides of Fence in East Timor 1
Indonesia: Activists Will Keep Political Pot Boiling 2
Analytic Perspective

4
5
7
8
9
10
12
14

MORI DocID: 1078761

~~Top Secret~~

Looming Border Problems

The Indonesian military will retain links to prointegration militias despite reports that growing numbers of militia elements are retreating to West Timor, where they can regroup, rearm, and recruit. the Indonesian military representative to the militias has held open-ended talks with militia leaders about future military action, leaving them to believe support from the armed forces will continue indefinitely.

— Militia cross-border activity—launched from staging bases in rural frontier areas of West Timor—is a strong possibility.

— The Indonesian armed forces will maintain a substantial presence in West Timor—close enough to continue covert support to prointegration forces if they so choose.

MORI DocID: 1078761

Leading Developments

Indonesia: **Army on Both Sides of Fence in East Timor**

the military is dismantling its command structure in East Timor and is preparing to return the five battalions serving rotational duties in the province to their parent commands. Remnants of the two local East Timorese battalions already have withdrawn.

— the moves leave only core headquarters elements, Strategic Reserve units, police mobile brigade forces, and engineering and support units. The military intends to base its command structure around Strategic Reserve forces to be stationed in Dili and Baucau, ***but the size and mission of this contingent is unclear.***

— ***All remaining forces could be withdrawn rapidly when the battalions have left.***

Indonesian troops are trying to establish order and to improve conditions in the province before the arrival of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET)—***a task made easier by a growing exodus of prointegration militias to West Timor.*** Martial Law Commander Syahnakrie has ordered troops to repair buildings and to distribute rice and has shown cooperation with Red Cross officials,

—

— The status of Army Special Forces units, which were responsible for organizing, equipping, and training the prointegration militias, is unknown; ***their continued presence and covert activity could pose a major threat to INTERFET forces.***

MORI DocID: 1078761

~~Top Secret~~

Indonesia: Areas of Recent Unrest



DI Current Production Center 751145AI (R00522) 9-99

~~Top Secret~~

17 September 1999

~~Top Secret~~

Indonesia:
Analytic Perspective

Activists Will Keep Political Pot Boiling

Several events in the next month or so will test Jakarta's ability to cope with disaffected groups and hotspots other than East Timor. The government's response will affect the high-stakes political maneuvering in advance of the selection later this year of a new president by the People's Consultative Assembly.

— Selection of Assembly delegates is far behind schedule, and the major parties are embroiled in internal conflicts over strategy and presidential preferences.

The 34th anniversary of the 30 September abortive coup that ushered in the Soeharto era and holidays honoring the military, including Armed Forces Day on 5 October and the struggle for independence against the Dutch on 28 October, could fan nationalistic sentiment and stir debate about military-civilian relations.

Regional Actors Restive

Disenchanted groups around the archipelago may try to exploit Jakarta's distraction with East Timor and the Assembly. Religious leaders in Aceh this week publicly called on the government to hold a referendum similar to the one in East Timor to allow residents to choose whether to remain in Indonesia or to become independent.

— Habibie's preoccupation with the presidential selection process suggests Jakarta will do little to dampen the already high tension.

Press reports say police last week killed one person in Irian Jaya after some residents, encouraged by the Timor vote, raised a separatist flag.

MORI DocID: 1078761

Others Waiting in the Wings

Student and other groups are reemerging on the political stage demanding political reform and accountability. Several student protests this week occurred in Jakarta, according to press reports, and demonstrations in Jakarta and elsewhere will grow in size and frequency in the runup to the Assembly.

In contrast, Muslim constituencies are likely to use the Assembly, not the street, to flex their political muscle. They will not form a united front because of internal divisions, but each of the presidential candidates needs support from at least one of the large Muslim blocs, giving Muslim activists an incentive to raise the temperature of their political rhetoric and to press their parochial concerns.

MORI DocID: 1078762

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Top Secret TIER
[redacted]

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

Monday, 27 September 1999

National Security Information

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Reproduction of this Document Prohibited

Copy is limited to those on approved reader list on file with CIA SEIB Control Officer. The undersigned hereby acknowledge reading this document.

CIAPASS SEIB 99-224CX

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2004

[redacted]

MORI DocID: 1078762

Table of Contents

Leading Development

Indonesia: Struggling To Manage Provincial Tension 1
Analytic Perspective

3

4

6

8

9

11

12

MORI DocID: 1078762

~~Top Secret~~

Indonesia: More Unrest Anticipated in Jakarta

Contacts of US diplomats expect student activists who staged violent protests last week against Indonesia's new state security law to mount more demonstrations this week, the authorities are bracing for trouble. Members of several student organizations yesterday used a peaceful march commemorating students killed in the protests to reiterate their demand that the bill be rejected, not merely deferred, according to local press reports.

— Jakarta's police chief yesterday asserted that groups behind the demonstrations are planning to stage mass protests when the People's Consultative Assembly convenes on Friday.

~~Secret~~

MORI DocID: 1078762

Leading Development

Indonesia:
Analytic Perspective

Struggling To Manage Provincial Tension

Government mishandling of the East Timor issue is raising doubts in Indonesia about Jakarta's longstanding reliance on military intimidation to squelch provincial discontent. While most Indonesians feel little common cause with East Timorese, an increasingly politicized public and a more open media will challenge the central government's dominance and the military's hardnosed reaction to public protest.

— Large student protests—sparked by public suspicion that new national security legislation would embolden the military—have returned to Jakarta for the first time in more than a year.

Old Tactics Failing

The East Timor debacle, an inadequate response to demands for provincial autonomy, and the overreaction of security forces to the student protests that hastened former President Soeharto's ouster have discredited President Habibie and the military—twin pillars of the governing arrangement. Nevertheless, the central government is unable or unwilling to end its traditional dependence on military intimidation to preserve national cohesion.

— The military, which has used violence to suppress separatist movements, appears poised to use the same methods in areas such as Aceh and Irian Jaya, where activists now are pressing for self-determination.

— These tactics have become less effective since Soeharto's fall and may be fueling disintegration by reducing the room for civilians to work out solutions.

Old Problems Worsening

Even if the government stopped relying on the military to suppress separatism, Jakarta would continue to face tension because of ethnic and religious diversity. Moreover, the continuing economic crisis and the squabbling among political elites over the coming session of the People's Consultative Assembly is reinforcing perceptions around the archipelago that the capital is out of touch with outer provinces.

MORI DocID: 1078762

— The administration's failure to follow through quickly on earlier promises to decentralize government authority and to allow outer provinces to keep a greater proportion of the royalties from their natural resources has compounded its troubles.

— The presidential candidates have not specified how they would address these issues—a further indication that regional grievances will remain contentious.

The devolution of power from Jakarta to the periphery is inevitable, but Jakarta's ability to manage the change and avoid disintegration will hinge in large part on how well the new government can meet the difficult challenge of orchestrating economic recovery. Economic growth historically has dampened center-periphery tension and would enable Jakarta to direct more resources to the outer provinces.

MORI DocID: 1078762

Top Secret

Organization of the National Council for the Timorese Resistance



National Political Commission
President Jose "Xanana" Gusmao
Vice President Jose Ramos-Horta
(five additional Vice Presidents)

Executive Council
Vice President Jose Ramos-Horta
(Chairman)

- International Relations Department
- Agriculture Department
- Telecommunications Department
- Public Works Department
- Social Affairs Department
- Forestry Department
- Health Department
- Economy and Finance Department
- Information Department
- Administration Department
- Women's Affairs Department
- Education Department

The National Council for the Timorese Resistance (CNRT)–led by Jose "Xanana" Gusmao–is an umbrella organization formed last year to unite East Timor's fragmented resistance groups. Gusmao will rely on the CNRT's Executive Council and several departments to build a presence to fill the leadership vacuum in East Timor even before the UN formally takes over administration. Gusmao and the CNRT also will be crucial in lobbying educated Timorese exiles to return to help build an independent East Timor and in bridging the gap between returnees and those who stayed behind to fight Jakarta. The CNRT has adopted a flag, an anthem, and a charter that could become the basis of a constitution for an independent East Timor, to be called Timor Lorosae.

DI Current Production Center 370712PM 9-99

Top Secret

27 September 1999

MORI DocID: 1078762

Regional Notes

EAST ASIA

Indonesia: **Vacuum of Authority in East Timor**

The withdrawal of Indonesian troops leaves an administrative and security void in some areas outside the control of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) that the militias temporarily could exploit.

— INTERFET troops last week had to stop hungry refugees from sacking a relief warehouse in Dili, and the lack of security forces in most areas continues to hinder food deliveries by relief organizations, according to press reports

Jakarta's lifting of martial law last week could encourage the militias and proindependence forces to step up operations. proindependence Falantil fighters—until now largely dormant—have begun patrolling between Dili and the border with West Timor as pro-Jakarta militias reenter East Timor from the west.

"Xanana" Gusmao and other proindependence leaders will press peacekeeping forces and relief organizations to stabilize the situation. Gusmao last week ruled out a government-in-exile and promised to work with the UN to organize elections once the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly reverses Jakarta's annexation of the territory.

— Gusmao's office in Lisbon says he will lead a delegation to Washington this week to seek World Bank development aid, and that he plans to outline publicly an economic development plan and a proposed constitution for East Timor.

MORI DocID: 1078771

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2004

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

SECRET

TRR
10/26

EPTEMBER 1999

TERRORISM REVIEW

DCI Counterterrorist Center
CTC
Central Intelligence Agency

CIADI TR 99-008

SECRET
DI TR 99-008
September 1999
Copy 0380

MORI DocID: 1078771

Terrorism Review
September 1999

		Page
Articles	**Prointegrationists Pose Threat To Foreign Interests in East Timor**	1
	The insertion of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) into the Indonesian province raises the potential threat to foreigners, particularly from prointegration militias. The militias already have conducted attacks and issued threats against foreign journalists and international peacekeepers, including seriously wounding a US civilian police officer. Attacks may continue from attempts to disarm and possibly relocate the militias. Jakarta's efforts to contain the violence in East Timor failed largely because the military has supported or worked alongside the militias.	
	The more threatening the peacekeeping mission is to the militias' goal of keeping East Timor part of Indonesia, the higher the risk to foreigners, as the militias may conclude they have little to lose by attacking foreign targets. The greatest danger to foreigners is in East Timor, particularly in the western regions, although protests with the potential to turn ugly are taking place elsewhere in the country.	
		5

MORI DocID: 1078771

	9
Highlights	15
	17
	18
Key Dates and Events	19
Trends in Terrorism	21
	25

MORI DocID: 1078771

~~Secret~~

Prointegrationists Pose Threat To Foreign Interests in East Timor

The insertion of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) into the Indonesian province raises the potential threat to foreigners, particularly from prointegration militias, which already have conducted attacks and issued threats against foreign journalists and international peacekeepers. Attacks may continue from attempts to disarm and possibly relocate the militias. The militias—concluding that the UN manipulated the 30 August ballot results favoring independence for East Timor—attacked UN and other foreign targets, including seriously wounding a US civilian police officer. These attacks followed attempts by the prointegrationists to ensure a favorable vote by threatening foreigners before the balloting.

- **Jakarta's efforts to contain the violence in East Timor failed largely because the military has supported or worked alongside the militias.**

The more threatening the peacekeeping mission is to the militias' goal of keeping East Timor part of Indonesia, the higher the risk to foreigners, as the militias may conclude they have little to lose by attacking foreign targets. If prointegrationist proposals for a partition of East Timor ultimately are ignored, militias also may continue targeting UN interests.

- **The militias' capabilities to carry out attacks will depend in part on continued support from Indonesian military elements.**

- **The greatest danger to foreigners is in East Timor, particularly in the western regions, although protests with the potential to turn ugly are taking place elsewhere in the country.**

Prointegration militias—armed East Timorese favoring unity with Indonesia—intimidated foreigners and considered targeting them as a way to prevent the 30 August referendum on East Timor independence.

- Prointegrationists on 26 August threatened to kill Australian journalists, according to press reports.

- prointegrationist paramilitary leaders had planned to assassinate United Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) personnel, particularly Australians, before the referendum on 30 August

Prointegrationists Attack and Threaten Foreign Interests in East Timor

Prointegration militias followed through on threats against foreigners with attacks on United Nations and other foreign interests after the UN Secretary General's announcement on 3 September that the referendum vote favored independence for East Timor.

~~Secret~~



~~Secret~~

Indonesian Nationalists Pose Potential Threat Outside Timor

Indonesian nationalists have issued threats to foreigners and held protests in Jakarta and Surabaya in response to the ballot results and the deployment of INTERFET to East Timor.

- *Indonesian protesters sacked the West Australia Trade Office in Surabaya on 13 September.*
- *The Australian school in Jakarta received two separate telephonic threats on 13 September. The first caller made a bomb threat, and the second threatened to kill foreigners.*
- *the number of protests and anti-Western demonstrations outside the US and Australian Embassies and the UN building in Jakarta has increased since Indonesian President Habibie announced on 12 September that Indonesia would accept UN peacekeeping forces in East Timor.*
- *Foreigners could become targets or inadvertent casualties if violence erupts during these protests.*

Prointegrationists also conducted attacks against foreigners following the deployment of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) on 19 September.

- Militia members burned 30 UNAMET vehicles and opened fire on a UNAMET convoy in Likisia on 4 September, shooting and seriously injuring a US civilian police officer.
- Militiamen fired on the Australian Ambassador's vehicle and attacked the Australian Consulate in Dili on 6 September, according to press.
- Alleged militiamen killed a Dutch *Financial Times* reporter on 21 September in a Dili suburb after his motorcycle driver tried to flee from six armed men, according to press. In a separate incident the same day, prointegrationists ambushed a British journalist and a US photographer in Baukau, east of Dili. Australian troops later rescued the two.

The prointegrationists blame the referendum results in part on UNAMET, claiming it manipulated the ballot results, and plan to confront international peacekeepers to keep East Timor part of Indonesia.

- A militia leader told the press on 9 September that the UN is responsible for electoral fraud, accusing it of failing to count all the votes for autonomy.
- Eurico Guterres, leader of the prointegration Aitarak militia, told Indonesian Armed Forces Chief General Wiranto on 11 September that he would have no regrets about killing nongovernmental organization or UN employees who support the proindependence side, according to press.
- According to press, militia have gathered in several locations across East Timor and plan to attack INTERFET personnel. Approximately 500 members of the Besi Merah Putih (Red and White Iron)

~~Secret~~

Secret

militia—possessing old and homemade guns—gathered in Likisia on 23 September, claiming they would attack foreign peacekeepers.

Indonesian Military Elements Enhance Prointegrationist Capabilities

Jakarta's initiatives to control the security situation in East Timor have had little impact because Indonesian military elements have supported prointegration militias.

- Numerous reports indicate that Indonesian military elements have aided or worked with prointegration militias. The Indonesian military on 6 September worked openly with the militia to force people out of East Timor, according to press.

Outlook

Prointegrationists will focus most of their attention on proindependence Timorese, but the deployment of INTERFET raises the threat to foreigners. Clashes may occur as peacekeepers attempt to disarm and possibly to relocate the militias. An effective peacekeeping effort that enforces the referendum results probably will lead prointegrationists to conclude they have nothing to lose by attacking foreign targets. If prointegrationist proposals for a partition of East Timor ultimately are ignored, militias also may continue attacking foreign interests.

- The militias' capabilities to carry out attacks, however, will depend in part on continued support from Indonesian military elements.

- Foreigners face the greatest threat in East Timor, particularly in western regions, but prointegrationist sympathizers in other parts of the archipelago may attack foreigners for perceived interference in their country's internal affairs.

Secret

MORI DocID: 1078772

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Top Secret TIER
[redacted]

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

The SEIB must be returned to CIA within [illegible] working days

Wednesday, 15 September 1999

National Security Information
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Reproduction of this Document Prohibited

Readership is limited to those on approved reader list on file with CIA SEIB Control Officer. The undersigned hereby acknowledge reading this document.

CIAPASS SEIB 99-214CX

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2004

[redacted]

MORI DocID: 1078772

Table of Contents

Leading Developments

[redacted] 1

Indonesia: Poor Security Delaying Aid Deliveries to East Timor [redacted] 2
Analytic Perspective

Indonesia: Impact of East Timor's Volatile Ethnic Mix [redacted] 3
Analytic Perspective

Regional Notes

[redacted] 5

7

9

9

10

12

MORI DocID: 1078772

~~Top Secret~~

Indonesia:
Analytic Perspective

Poor Security Delaying Aid Deliveries to East Timor

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees is prepared to enter East Timor quickly with relief supplies, but not until security conditions improve. Prointegration militias have forced nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and all but a skeleton group of UNAMET to evacuate, and militias continue to threaten UN and relief personnel.

— Even if the UN and other relief workers this week gain access to some 100,000 people affected in Dili, Indonesian military or the militias may try to deny or limit foreign access to the 200,000 needy in the mountains between Dili and Suai.

Aid waiting to stabilize the humanitarian condition in East Timor includes a ship in coastal waters ready to offload 1,400 tons of rice in Dili and a UN World Food Program shipment of another 5,040 tons of rice in transit to Dili. Over the past few years, the UN and NGOs have provided food aid to children under age five and expectant and lactating women in East Timor.

Hundreds of people have been killed and as many as 300,000 have been displaced, of whom 200,000 are in immediate need of assistance, according to UNAMET and press reports. Prointegration militias, strongest in the mountainous area south and southwest of Dili, are still forcing proindependence East Timorese out of their villages, exacerbating the lean season when usual food supplies are low and people sustain themselves by eating roots, tubers, and coconuts.

— The lower level of violence on the eastern end of the island has resulted in less displacement and less destitution among its 300,000 residents.

Even if international peacekeepers deploy to East Timor, insecurity will continue to affect foreign relief operations in western Timor. Jakarta is helping meet the humanitarian food and shelter needs of many of the 100,000 displaced in western Timor and has announced plans to deliver 1,500 tons of rice. Most of the displaced from East Timor who were shipped or flown to Kupang and to other islands—some 40,000—are against independence, according to press reports and relief workers.

— Food and water are available for the 56,000 displaced in Atambua, according to US AID officials, but Red Cross workers are concerned about militia harassment of proindependence supporters in the camps.

MORI DocID: 1078772

Indonesia:
Analytic Perspective

Impact of East Timor's Volatile Ethnic Mix

East Timor's patchwork of mutually hostile ethnic groups makes it unlikely the UN presence can quickly end local conflicts. UN personnel will find a populace scarred by displacement and by heavy loss of life from attempts to gain independence that began in 1910 with a rebellion against the Portuguese.

— Known and suspected pro-Jakarta sympathizers will be the targets of revenge seekers.

Before the colonial era, East Timor was divided into many small kingdoms whose clan-based hamlets were led by hereditary rulers. Two ethnic groups predominate—the Atoni in the mountainous center of the island and West Timor—and the Belu, whose scattered subgroups share the lingua franca of Tetum.

None of the political structure that existed before the Indonesian invasion in 1975 is intact, and the Indonesian administrative structure is discredited in Timorese eyes. UN personnel may be faced with an administrative vacuum along with jockeying for power among remaining urban elites, including mixed-race families and descendants of Portuguese nationals deported to the island, who remain influential.

Indonesian Migrants Fuel Fire

East Timorese harbor a profound resentment of Indonesia's government-sponsored and spontaneous migration that substantially increased the island's population and changed its ethnic composition. According to academic studies, by 1996 as many as 20 percent of the population was non-Timorese.

— Ethnic clashes erupted in the past three years as Timorese accused Jakarta of deliberately using migrants to overwhelm them and take over the economy.

The number of Indonesian migrants who have fled is not known, but those who remain will continue to be a point of contention. East Timorese, including vocal overseas groups, may demand that the UN establish border controls or undertake more extreme measures such as population transfers to remove Indonesian migrants.

MORI DocID: 1078772

Top Secret

Indonesia: Timor's Major Ethnic Groups



Indigenous Ethnolinguistic Group	Locale	Estimated Speakers	Comments
Atoni	Western Timor, east-west border	650,000	Much dialect variation
Bunak	Central interior	50,000	One of the main languages
Fataluku	Northeast; around Los Palos	30,000	Northeastern end of Timor; around Los Palos
Galoli	North coast	50,000	One of the main languages
Kemak	North central	50,000	Closely related to Tetum
Makassi	West of Fataluku group	70,000	Several subdialects
Mambai	Mountains of central Timor	80,000	Second most widely spoken language
Tetum (includes Belu)	Central Timor corridor from northern to southern coast	300,000 to 600,000	Lingua franca of Timor except in Lautem and along border
Tukudede	North coast of Maubara and Liquisa	50,000	One of the main languages

Proindependence groups since the 1970s have pursued a Pan–East Timorese identity, called Maubere. Once a common personal name found among the Mambai, a highland ethnic group, it originated as a derogatory reference to a stereotypically illiterate hill people, who nevertheless are regarded as the guardians of traditional Timorese wisdom.

751113AI 9-99

Top Secret

15 September 1999

Catholicism as Pillar and Target

The Catholic Church is a pillar in the social structure of East Timor because of its role as sanctuary and symbol of a non-Indonesian cultural identity. As a result, pro-Jakarta militias will target Church personnel and property despite a UN presence.

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SSSS~~

~~SSSSS~~

DTG

081100Z SEP 99

FROM

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/(b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS

~~SECRETNOFORN~~

~~S~~-46,479/ (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),1.4 (c)

BODY

SUBJ: CJCS TOPICS OF INTEREST (U)

REF: A. CJCS TOPICS OF INTEREST FOR 07 SEPTEMBER 1999

(1) ~~(C)~~ **INDONESIA:**

(b)(1),1.4 (b),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

APPROXIMATELY 85 AMERICAN CITIZENS REMAIN IN EAST **TIMOR**, INCLUDING UNAMET STAFF MEMBERS.

(b)(1),1.4 (b),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

IN EAST **TIMOR, INDONESIAN** PRESIDENT HABIBIE IMPOSED MARTIAL LAW IN THE TERRITORY, EFFECTIVE 7 SEP. ACCORDING TO THE **INDONESIAN** CONSTITUTION, UNDER MARTIAL LAW THE **ARMED FORCES** HAVE INCREASED POWERS TO INCLUDE EXPANDED SEARCHES AND THE AUTHORITY TO ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, GEN WIRANTO HAS ORDERED THE DEPLOYMENT OF 6 MORE BATTALIONS TO EAST **TIMOR**. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT FOLLOWS WIRANTO'S WHIRLWIND VISIT TO DILI WHEN THE GENERAL WAS UNABLE TO DEPART THE AIRPORT BECAUSE OF THE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN THE CAPITAL.

(b)(1),1.4 (b),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

The second page of the report is withheld in full and not provided.

CDS

[redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SSSS~~

~~SSSSS~~

DTG

191100Z SEP 99

(b)(3):10 USC 424

FROM

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/[redacted]

CONTROLS

~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

~~S~~-46,484/[redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),1.4 (c)

BODY

SUBJ: CJCS TOPICS OF INTEREST (U)

REF: A. CJCS TOPICS OF INTEREST FOR 17 SEPTEMBER 1999

[redacted]

(1) ~~(C)~~ **INDONESIA**: JAKARTA CONTINUED TO WITHDRAW ITS **FORCES** FROM EAST **TIMOR** ON 16 SEPTEMBER IN ANTICIPATION OF THE ARRIVAL OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING **FORCE. ARMED FORCES** COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO CONFIRMED PUBLICLY THAT HE WOULD PULL OUT HIS TROOPS AS SOON AS THE INTERNATIONAL **FORCE** IS ESTABLISHED IN EAST **TIMOR**. [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (b),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

[redacted]

Non Responsive

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),Non Responsive

(1) ~~(S)~~ **INDONESIA**: POLITICAL, SECURITY, AND HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST **TIMOR**. DEPLOYMENT OF UN PEACEKEEPING **FORCE** AND **MILITIAS'** INTENT REGARDING IT. INTENTIONS OF KEY **INDONESIAN MILITARY**, POLITICAL ACTORS. UNSC AND REGIONAL VIEWS. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT. THREATS TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

Non Responsive

The last page does not contain responsive information and is not provided.

CDS

~~SSSS~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SSSSS~~

DTG
241115Z SEP 99
FROM
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):10 USC 424
CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~
~~S~~-46,487/ (b)(3):10 USC 424
SECTION 1 OF 2
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),1.4 (c)
SUBJ: CJCS TOPICS OF INTEREST (U)
REF: A. CJCS TOPICS OF INTEREST FOR 22 AND 23 SEPTEMBER 1999

1. ~~(C)~~ **INDONESIA:**

(b)(1),1.4 (b),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

REFUGEES WERE BEGINNING TO RETURN TO DILI AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF IMPROVED SECURITY CONDITIONS, HOWEVER, YESTERDAY THERE WERE SEVERAL NEW REPORTED INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE. A FOREIGN JOURNALIST WAS FOUND DEAD JUST OUTSIDE DILI AND TWO OTHER JOURNALISTS WERE ATTACKED BY MILITANTS. THERE WERE ALSO TWO REPORTED CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-JAKARTA AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS. IN JAKARTA, A CONTROVERSIAL NEW GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED DRAFT SECURITY BILL HAS SPARKED STUDENT PROTESTS. THE BILL WILL GIVE THE MILITARY SWEEPING NEW POWERS DURING NATIONAL EMERGENCIES. ALTHOUGH THE REVISED VERSION OF THE BILL UNDER DEBATE HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED, THE ORIGINAL DRAFT GAVE THE MILITARY THE POWER TO CONTROL MAIL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE NEWS MEDIA; RESTRICT THE MOVEMENT OF CITIZENS; DETAIN SUSPECTS WITHOUT TRIAL; AND BAN OR LIMIT STREET DEMONSTRATIONS.

(b)(1),1.4 (b),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

The remaining 3 pages are withheld in full.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN;~~

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 [redacted]

DTG

111019Z SEP 99

FROM

FM SSO DIA// (b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS

~~TOPSECRET~~/ (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) /~~NOFORN//X1~~

SECTION 1 OF 2

QQQQ

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

BODY

[redacted]

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: ~~DIA~~ [redacted] INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 11 SEP 99 (U).

SUMMARY OF FEATURES:

1. ~~(SECRET//NOFORN)~~ **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** SITUATION UPDATE.

Non Responsive [redacted]

FEATURES:

1. ~~(SECRET//NOFORN)~~ **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** SITUATION UPDATE.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d) [redacted]

- ACCEPTED DEMAND FOR MARTIAL LAW DECLARATION, REJECTED INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING **FORCE**.

MILITIAS CONTINUE OPERATING IN DILI WITH NO INTERFERENCE FROM **INDONESIAN** TROOPS.

- INCREASING ACTIVITY IN WEST **TIMOR**, HARASSING FOREIGNERS.

UNAMET PLANNING TO EVACUATE TO DARWIN 12 SEP.

REFUGEES IN WEST **TIMOR** NUMBER ABOUT 100,000; FLOW UNABATED.

AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND RESTRICTING MILITARY TIES WITH **INDONESIA**; UK CONSIDERING SIMILAR ACTION.

IMF, WORLD BANK THREATENING TO SUSPEND FINANCIAL AID.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

[redacted] ~~NOFORN;~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 additional pages withheld in full.

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SSSS~~
~~SSSSS~~

DTG
130244Z SEP 99
FROM
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC// (b)(3):10 USC 424
CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

SECTION 1 OF 4
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SUBJ: (U) DIA~~ INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 13 SEP.
(U) BECAUSE DIA'S FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS USE A STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CLASSIFICATION MARKING SYSTEM THAT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH TODAY'S MESSAGE-HANDLING SYSTEM, THIS MESSAGE SHOWS THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION ABOVE IN A DIFFERENT FORM THAN THAT USED THROUGHOUT THE BODY OF THE MESSAGE. IN TERMS OF THE STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MARKING SYSTEM, THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS ~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1~~.

(U) SUMMARY OF FEATURES

~~(C)~~ **INDONESIA**: DILI WAS REPORTED GENERALLY CALM ON 12 SEPTEMBER AS PRESIDENT HABIBIE AGREED TO ACCEPT A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

Non Responsive

Non Responsive

INDONESIA:

1. ~~(C)~~ DILI WAS REPORTED GENERALLY CALM ON 12 SEPTEMBER AS PRESIDENT HABIBIE AGREED TO ACCEPT A UN PEACEKEEPING **FORCE**.
2. ~~(C)~~ PRO-JAKARTA **MILITIA** ACTIVITY LESSENED FOLLOWING THE 11 SEPTEMBER VISIT TO DILI

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

UNAMET OFFICIALS, CONCERNED THAT THE RESPITE COULD BE ONLY TEMPORARY, WARNED AGAINST COMPLACENCY. DESPITE THE GENERALLY IMPROVED SECURITY CONDITIONS IN THE CITY, A GERMAN PRIEST WAS **KILLED** AT A JESUIT COMPLEX NOT FAR FROM UNAMET BY A GROUP OF TROOPS AND **MILITIA** MEMBERS SEARCHING FOR PROINDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS. THE **MURDER** WAS THE FIRST CONFIRMED EXPATRIATE DEATH DURING THE CRISIS.

3. ~~(C)~~ **MILITIA** ATTACKS CONTINUED IN OTHER PARTS OF EAST **TIMOR**. TROOPS AND MILITIA PERSONNEL WERE REPORTED TO BE MOVING TOWARD DARE, 9 KM SOUTH OF DILI, WHERE AN ESTIMATED 30,000 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS ARE CONCENTRATED. UNAMET AND THE MILITIAS INFORMALLY AGREED TO MAKE DARE A SAFEHAVEN. A JOURNALIST IN THE AREA DENIED REPORTS THAT THE TOWN WAS UNDER ATTACK BUT REPORTED SPORADIC GUNFIRE.
4. ~~(C)~~ IN WEST **TIMOR**, MILITIAS INCREASED THEIR ACTIVITY NEAR REFUGEE CAMPS. ACCORDING TO THE **INDONESIAN** GOVERNMENT, SOME 94,000 EAST **TIMORESE** REFUGEES ARE IN WEST **TIMOR**, 56,000 OF THEM AROUND ATAMBUA. THE REFUGEE FLOW IS CONTINUING. THE **MILITIAS** AND **INDONESIAN** SECURITY **FORCES** ARE HARASSING FOREIGN AID WORKERS AND JOURNALISTS. FOREIGN RELIEF WORKERS HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM ATAMBUA TO KUPANG.
5. ~~(C)~~ PRESIDENT HABIBIE ANNOUNCED ON 12 SEPTEMBER HIS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A UN PEACEKEEPING **FORCE**. THE DECISION FOLLOWED CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE, INCLUDING SUSPENSION OF **MILITARY** AID AND CONTACTS BY SEVERAL NATIONS AND THREATS TO CUT OFF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS WAS EXPECTED TO LEAVE FOR NEW YORK ON 13 SEPTEMBER TO DISCUSS THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE AND TIMING FOR ITS DEPLOYMENT. (b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

The next page is withheld in full. The 7 pages following that are not responsive to the request and are not provided.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

CDS

~~SSSS~~

~~SSSS~~

HEADER

R 160244Z SEP 99

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/(b)(3):10 USC 424

TO (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE WASH DC

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

BT

CONTROLS

~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

QQQQ

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

SECTION 1 OF 5

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SUBJ: (U) DIA~~ INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 16 SEP.

(U) BECAUSE DIA'S FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS USE A STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CLASSIFICATION MARKING SYSTEM THAT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH TODAY'S MESSAGE-HANDLING SYSTEM, THIS MESSAGE SHOWS THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION ABOVE IN A DIFFERENT FORM THAN THAT USED THROUGHOUT THE BODY OF THE MESSAGE. IN TERMS OF THE STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MARKING SYSTEM, THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS ~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1.~~

(U) SUMMARY OF FEATURES

(U) NATO: SEVERAL NATO NATIONS ARE OFFERING SUPPORT FOR THE UN'S

The next 7 pages are not responsive.

MULTINATIONAL DEPLOYMENT TO EAST TIMOR.

Non Responsive

1. (U) SEVERAL NATO NATIONS ARE OFFERING SUPPORT FOR THE UN'S MULTINATIONAL DEPLOYMENT TO EAST TIMOR.

Non Responsive

Non Responsive

INDONESIA:

1. ~~(C)~~ DILI REMAINED CALM ON 14 SEPTEMBER AS THE UN PLANNED FOR THE EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO EAST TIMOR.

2. ~~(C)~~ ALTHOUGH A LARGE NUMBER OF PRO-JAKARTA MILITIA PERSONNEL REMAIN IN DILI, NO NEW ATTACKS WERE REPORTED.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

WITH THE CITY LARGELY DEPOPULATED AND MOST OF ITS PROPERTY DESTROYED OR LOOTED, LITTLE FOCUS IS LEFT FOR MILITIA ACTIVITY. ALL BUT 10 MEMBERS OF THE UN ASSISTANCE MISSION IN EAST TIMOR WERE EVACUATED TO AUSTRALIA ON 14 SEPTEMBER, WITHOUT INCIDENT.

3. ~~(C)~~ IN NEW YORK, UN SECRETARY GENERAL ANNAN PRESSED FOR AN EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE WITHOUT ANY JAKARTA-IMPOSED CONDITIONS. ANNAN CLAIMED THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE AGREED TO A BROAD MANDATE TO RESTORE ORDER AND TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS DEMANDED NO CONDITIONS BUT ASKED THAT INDONESIAN SENSITIVITIES ABOUT THE LEADERSHIP AND COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE BE RESPECTED, AN ALLUSION TO THE CONTROVERSY OVER AUSTRALIA'S PROPOSED LEADERSHIP OF THE FORCE.

4. ~~(C)~~ ACCORDING TO US OFFICIALS IN JAKARTA, ACCEPTANCE OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE WAS MORE WIDESPREAD IN INDONESIA ON 14 SEPTEMBER, BUT THE DEBATE CONTINUED OVER ITS COMPOSITION. A SENIOR MEMBER OF

The final 3 pages are not responsive.

HABIBIE'S RULING GOLKAR PARTY WARNED THAT INCLUDING AUSTRALIANS WOULD TRIGGER MORE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR.

5. ~~(S//NF)~~ INDONESIA IS CONSOLIDATING ITS SECURITY FORCES IN TIMOR. AN ARMORED UNIT WITH 47 ARMORED VEHICLES DEPARTED JAKARTA BY LST ON 10 SEPTEMBER AND WAS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN THE TIMOR AREA OF OPERATIONS BY THE 17TH. MORE THAN 300 POLICE MOBILE BRIGADE PERSONNEL WERE SCHEDULED TO DEPLOY TO DILI AND KUPANG BY C-130 ON THE 13TH AND 14TH.

6. ~~(S//NF)~~ OTHER FORCES ARE BEING WITHDRAWN. TWO TERRITORIAL BATTALIONS MADE UP MOSTLY OF NATIVE TIMORESE WERE TO BE EVACUATED AND POSSIBLY DISBANDED OR REDESIGNATED. MILITARY LEADERS REGARDED THE BATTALIONS AS "COMPROMISED" BECAUSE OF THEIR TIMORESE PERSONNEL; THEIR WITHDRAWAL WAS EXPECTED. SOME UNSPECIFIED SUPPORT PERSONNEL ALSO WERE TO DEPART EAST TIMOR. DESPITE SPECULATION THAT THE INDONESIANS MAY BE PREPARING TO EVACUATE FORCES FROM EAST TIMOR, THESE LIMITED MOVEMENTS DO NOT NECESSARILY INDICATE AN INTENTION TO WITHDRAW.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

Non Responsive

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SSSS~~

~~SSSSS~~

DTG

220244Z SEP 99

FROM

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/(b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS

(b)(3):50 USC 3024 ~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

SECTION 1 OF 3

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY

(b)(3):10 USC 424 SUBJ: ~~(U) DIA~~ INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 22 SEP.

(U) BECAUSE DIA'S FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS USE A STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CLASSIFICATION MARKING SYSTEM THAT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH TODAY'S MESSAGE-HANDLING SYSTEM, THIS MESSAGE SHOWS THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION ABOVE IN A DIFFERENT FORM THAN THAT USED THROUGHOUT THE BODY OF THE MESSAGE. IN TERMS OF THE STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MARKING SYSTEM, THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS ~~SECRET~~/ ~~NOFORN//X1~~. (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(U) SUMMARY OF FEATURES

Non Responsive

Non Responsive

~~(C)~~ **INDONESIA**: THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF) TOOK PLACE WITHOUT SERIOUS INCIDENT ON 20 SEPTEMBER, BUT THE GROUND THREAT AS THE FORCE EXPANDS INTO THE INTERIOR WILL REMAIN HIGH.

Non Responsive

Next 4 pages contain no responsive data.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

Non Responsive

INDONESIA:

1. ~~(C)~~ THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF) TOOK PLACE WITHOUT SERIOUS INCIDENT ON 20 SEPTEMBER, BUT THE GROUND THREAT AS THE **FORCE** EXPANDS INTO THE INTERIOR WILL REMAIN HIGH.

2. ~~(C)~~ MNF TROOPS PATROLLED DILI WITH NO OPPOSITION FROM PRO-JAKARTA **MILITIAS**. THE ONLY REPORTED INCIDENT OCCURRED WHEN TWO **MILITIA** MEMBERS WERE STOPPED IN THE PORT AREA AND **FORCED** TO HAND OVER A WEAPON. **FORCE** COMMANDER MAJ GEN COSGROVE DESCRIBED THE **INDONESIAN MILITARY** AS CORDIAL AND COOPERATIVE, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. JUST OVER 1,000 MNF TROOPS DEPLOYED ON 20 SEPTEMBER. THE **FORCE** HAD NOT MOVED BEYOND DILI, EXCEPT FOR A SURVEY TEAM IN BAUCAU.

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ SOME CONFUSION REMAINED OVER THE TIMING AND EXTENT OF AN **INDONESIAN** MILITARY WITHDRAWAL. EAST **TIMOR** COMMANDER MAJ GEN SYAHNAKRIE ANNOUNCED THAT FIVE BATTALIONS WILL DEPART AND SIX BATTALIONS AND AN ENGINEER ELEMENT WILL REMAIN TO CONDUCT A TURNOVER TO THE MNF. THE STATEMENT APPEARS TO CONFLICT WITH **ARMED FORCES** COMMANDER GEN WIRANTO'S EARLIER STATED PLAN TO WITHDRAW ALL BUT LIAISON ELEMENTS.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

5. ~~(C)~~ **MILITARY** WITHDRAWAL PLANS ARE APPARENTLY STILL NOT RESOLVED. THE COMMITMENT TO A PULLOUT IS UNQUESTIONED; ONLY TIMING IS AN ISSUE. DESPITE THE SUCCESSFUL MNF DILI DEPLOYMENT, THE GROUND THREAT TO THE MNF AS IT EXPANDS INTO THE INTERIOR REMAINS HIGH, ESPECIALLY IN THE WESTERN AREAS OF WEST **TIMOR**, WHERE THE MILITIAS ARE STRONGEST.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

NOTES IN BRIEF

Non Responsive

The last 2 pages are not responsive.

CDS

[redacted] ~~SSSS~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SSSSS~~

DTG
221636Z SEP 99

FROM
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC// (b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS
~~SECRET NOFORN~~
SECTION 1 OF 6
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/ (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)

BODY
SUBJECT: **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** DEPLOYMENT INFORMATION (U)

[redacted]

----------TEAR-LINE ----------

~~(S)~~ **INDONESIAN** MILITARY INTENTIONS: THE **MILITARY**'S INTENTIONS TOWARD EAST **TIMOR** REMAIN SUBJECT TO DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS AND MAY WELL BE IN FLUX.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d) [redacted]

~~(S)~~ AT THE SAME TIME, THE LOCAL COMMAND SUFFERED A SERIOUS BREAKDOWN IN COMMAND AND CONTROL AND DISCIPLINE WITH ITS SECURITY PERSONNEL. EVEN BEFORE THE VOTE, THE COMMANDER HAD SOUGHT REINFORCEMENTS, FEARING HIS LOCAL **TIMORESE** TROOPS WOULD JOIN THE MILITIAS AND BECOME A POTENTIAL THREAT. HOPING THAT ANGER WOULD ABATE OVER TIME, TNI RESORTED TO OFTEN FUTILE EFFORTS AT PERSUASION, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A MORE CONCERTED EFFORT TO ENFORCE SECURITY JUST PRIOR TO INTERFET'S ARRIVAL.

~~(S)~~ TNI ACCELERATING THE EXIT STRATEGY: FACED WITH A NOW ANTAGONISTIC WORLD COMMUNITY AND INABILITY TO RESTORE ORDER, **ARMED**

FORCES CHIEF GEN. WIRANTO PUBLICLY WASHED HIS HANDS OF THE PROBLEM IN ACCEPTING THE MULTINATIONAL **FORCE**, DESPITE CLEAR DIMINUTION OF **INDONESIA**'S CHERISHED SOVEREIGNTY. THE MILITARY'S 23-YEAR MILITARY OCCUPATION IS NOW RAPIDLY DRAWING TO A CLOSE, BEGINNING WITH THE RECENT RELOCATION OF THE LOCAL TERRITORIAL APPARATUS TO AN ADJACENT ISLAND. TERRITORIAL BATTALIONS, WHICH HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED SINCE DECEMBER, ALSO ARE TO RETURN TO THEIR PARENT UNITS AS EARLY AS 22 SEPTEMBER. THE COMBAT UNITS WHICH DEPLOYED SINCE 01 SEPTEMBER WILL BE THE LAST TO WITHDRAW AND ARE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE SECURITY UNTIL THE APPROACHING HAND-OVER, LEAVING BEHIND ONLY A CONTINGENT OF ADVISORS AND LIAISON OFFICERS.

~~(C)~~ FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, GEN. WIRANTO HAD BEEN CONSISTENT IN HIS PUBLIC COMMENTS THAT THE MILITARY WILL RESPECT THE POLL OUTCOME AND WITHDRAW. JAKARTA'S FORMAL TRANSFER OF CONTROL, HOWEVER, IS STILL NOT EXPECTED UNTIL THE MPR CONVENES TO APPROVE SEPARATION AND SET A TRANSFER DATE. UP UNTIL THAT POINT, **INDONESIAN** AUTHORITIES CAN BE EXPECTED TO ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE SOME NOMINAL INFLUENCE AND SAY OVER PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS.

~~(S)~~ THE **MILITARY** AND INTERFET: QUESTIONS OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL, **FORCE** COMPOSITION AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WERE NOT SERIOUSLY CONTESTED AT THE UN, ALTHOUGH TNI REMAINS OPPOSED TO AUSTRALIA'S DOMINANT PRESENCE IN THE FORCE. JAKARTA IS CONTINUING TO PUSH FOR A COMMANDER FROM AN ASEAN STATE, ALONG WITH A SIZABLE ASEAN-MEMBER PRESENCE FOLLOWING THE FORMAL SEPARATION OF THE PROVINCE.

~~(S)~~ THE MILITARY TRANSFER CONTROL IS BEING CONDUCTED IN A PROFESSIONAL MANNER OUT OF SENSITIVITY TO INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND COOPERATION HAS SO FAR BEEN GOOD. TNI APPARENTLY IS INTENT ON REMAINING IN DISTRICT TOWNS LONG ENOUGH TO ENSURE A PROPER HAND-OVER. **INDONESIAN** FORCES HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED BY GEN. WIRANTO FROM CARRYING OUT SECURITY OPERATIONS WITH THE UN **FORCES**, BUT THEY ARE TO CONCENTRATE ON CIVIL AFFAIRS DUTIES UNTIL DEPARTURE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT **MILITARY** ELEMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO HELP RUN PUBLIC SERVICES, NOW DEPENDENT ON THE **MILITARY** FOLLOWING THE RAPID EXODUS OF MOST CIVIL SERVANTS. (b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)



~~(S)~~ AS ASEAN AND OTHER ASIAN **FORCES** DEPLOY AS PART OF THE UN

FORCE, JAKARTA WILL BE UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THESE TROOPS, AND AN ARMED CONFRONTATION BY **INDONESIAN FORCES** WITH INTERFET REMAINS VERY UNLIKELY. THE PLANNED PRESENCE OF TNI LIAISON OR OTHER SUPPORT PERSONNEL COULD EVEN TEMPER **MILITIA** VIOLENCE, BUT **INDONESIAN MILITARY** PERSONNEL ARE UNLIKELY TO TAKE STRONG ACTION AGAINST THE **MILITIAS** AND SOME MAY EVEN FOREWARN SUCH GROUPS OF UN

(b)(1),1.4
(c),1.4 (d) INTENTIONS.

(b)(1),1.4
(c),1.4 (d)



~~(S)~~ CERTAIN MILITARY OFFICIALS HOLD OUT HOPE THAT AN EVENTUAL

RE-INTEGRATION OF EAST **TIMOR** MAY BE POSSIBLE AFTER THE SEVERAL-YEAR UN TRANSITION PERIOD. AS SUCH, THERE IS A RECOGNIZED NEED TO BEGIN RETURNING PRO-INTEGRATION SUPPORTERS TO EAST **TIMOR** TO REBUILD A PRO-**INDONESIAN** CONSTITUENCY. AS AN INITIAL STEP, PRO-INTEGRATION REFUGEES NOW IN KUPANG PURPORTEDLY WOULD BE SHIPPED BACK TO THE WESTERN AREAS. MANY PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS, HOWEVER, LIKELY FEAR A QUICK RETURN BECAUSE OF ANTICIPATED RETRIBUTION BY THE MANY **TIMORESE** WHO SUFFERED AT THE HANDS OF THE MILITIAS.

~~(S)~~ THE MILITIA POSTURE: PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS LEADERS DIRECTING THE MILITIAS ARE NOW CONTEMPLATING THEIR NEXT STEPS, BUT DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ADOPTED A COMMON APPROACH AND CONTINUE TO SEND OUT MIXED MESSAGES. THEIR EFFORTS TO **FORCE** LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d) [redacted]

PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS HOPE THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY CONVENING IN OCTOBER WILL PERCEIVE THE VOTE AS FRAUDULENT AND TO AT LEAST AGREE TO RETAIN WESTERN DISTRICTS. THE MILITIA LEADERS ARE UNDOUBTEDLY BUOYED BY THE RISING **INDONESIAN** NATIONALISM, BUT THE MPR WILL BE UNDER STRONG PRESSURE TO ACCEPT THE BALLOT RESULTS, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE RISK OF FURTHER DAMAGING THE COUNTRY'S REPUTATION AND POTENTIAL CURTAILMENT OF ASSISTANCE FOR **INDONESIA**'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY.

~~(S)~~ IRRESPECTIVE OF THE MPR DECISION, AT LEAST SOME PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS LEADERS APPEAR INTENT ON PURSUING PARTITION OF THE PROVINCE THROUGH A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE. THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR FORCES AND WILL LIKELY TRY TO OPERATE FROM THEIR TRADITIONAL STRONGHOLDS IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS. ALTHOUGH CURRENT DISPOSITIONS REMAIN UNCLEAR, OVER 30 MILITIA GROUPS HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED OVER THE YEAR, SOME OF WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY STILL REMAIN IN THE PROVINCE. HARD-CORE MILITIA PERSONNEL NUMBER IN THE THOUSANDS, BUT LIKELY FAR LESS THAN THE 12,500 IDENTIFIED IN JUNE.

~~(S)~~ THREATS TO PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL: THE MILITIA THREAT IN DILI AND THE EASTERN DISTRICTS HAS SUBSIDED SOMEWHAT AS VARIOUS **MILITIA** GROUPS FLEE THE AREA. REPORTING SUGGESTS CERTAIN **MILITIAS** ARE TAKING ACTIVE MEASURES TO AVOID THE ARRIVING UN **FORCE**, AND KEY MILITIA OFFICIALS ARE NOW IN WEST **TIMOR**. NONETHELESS, THE SITUATION REMAINS VOLATILE, AND RUMORS SUGGEST A PLANNED **MILITIA** CONFRONTATION WITH UN **FORCES** WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS.

~~(S)~~ [redacted] **INDONESIAN** MILITARY OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

WARN OF ATTACKS, PARTICULARLY TARGETING AUSTRALIAN TROOPS.

[redacted] HE CLAIMS HIS **FORCES** HAVE WORKED OUT ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EAST WITH MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL SECURITY **FORCES** AND **MILITIA** ELEMENTS. ONE **INDONESIAN** OFFICER HEAVILY INVOLVED WITH THE **MILITIAS** THOUGHT THAT ONCE THE TNI LEFT, MANY **MILITIA** PERSONNEL WOULD CHANGE SIDES QUICKLY.

~~(S)~~ THE **TIMORESE** PARAMILITARIES ARRAYED AGAINST THE MNF VARY GREATLY IN TERMS OF DISCIPLINE, TRAINING, EQUIPMENT AND RESOLVE. AT ONE END OF THE SPECTRUM ARE HARD-LINE EX-TNI **TIMORESE** TROOPS WHO POSSESS EXTENSIVE COMBAT EXPERIENCE PURSUING REBEL **FORCES** IN THE HILLS. ALSO OF NOTE ARE THE OLDER **MILITIA** TEAMS, ORGANIZED, TRAINED AND PREVIOUSLY LED BY SPECIAL **FORCES** ELEMENTS. SUCH PARAMILITARY TROOPS ARE LIKELY WELL ARMED AND INCLUDE A SMALL NUMBER OF EX-PRO-INDEPENDENCE GUERRILLAS, WELL SUITED TO ROOT OUT THEIR FORMER COLLEAGUES. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF MILITIA EFFORTS TO PLANT BOOBY-TRAPS OR ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES IN DILI, BUT THIS CAPABILITY HAS YET TO BE PROVEN.

~~(S)~~ THE NEWER MILITIAS, FORMED SINCE LATE LAST YEAR, LACK THE TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT OF THE OLDER GROUPS, ALTHOUGH THEIR WEAPONS HOLDINGS APPARENTLY INCREASED IN RECENT WEEKS. THESE GROUPS ARE THE MOST VIOLENT AND RESPONSIBLE FOR MUCH OF THE DEATH AND DESTRUCTION THIS YEAR. YOUNGER MEMBERS APPEAR TO HAVE LITTLE DISCIPLINE, WITH DRUG AND ALCOHOL **ABUSE** ADDING TO THEIR VOLATILITY. OPERATING IN LOOSELY ORGANIZED GROUPS, MANY LACK RUDIMENTARY **MILITARY** SKILLS AND FAMILIARITY WITH MODERN WEAPONS. WHILE DANGEROUS AND UNPREDICTABLE, THEIR ABILITY TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY AGAINST THE UN **FORCE** REMAINS DOUBTFUL. THEY LACK MOBILITY, PROVEN COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND PROBABLY HAVE LIMITED AMMUNITION HOLDINGS. THESE GROUPS CAN NOT SUSTAIN OPERATIONS WITHOUT THE EXTENSIVE SUPPORT AND EXPERTISE FROM TNI PERSONNEL.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ PRO-INDEPENDENCE (FALINTIL) **FORCES** HAVE REFRAINED FROM MAJOR CONFRONTATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT AND **MILITIA FORCES**, REMAINING IN THE HILLS WITH A GROWING NUMBER OF SUPPORTERS FLEEING **MILITIA** VIOLENCE. STILL, REBEL GROUPS WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT SMALL-SCALE

ATTACKS, RAISING THE POTENTIAL THAT INTERFET FORCES COULD BE CAUGHT IN THE CROSS-FIRE.

~~(C)~~ ASSISTING INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) IN ADDITION TO THE SECURITY ISSUES, A CRITICAL UN PRIORITY WILL BE ALLEVIATING THE CURRENT REFUGEE CRISIS, PARTICULARLY IN THE INTERIOR. THE RESTORATION OF CONTROL IN DILI AND BAUCAU IS ALLOWING THE RETURN OF MANY DISPLACED PERSONS TO THESE AREAS. MEANWHILE, AIRDROPS TO ISOLATED REFUGEES HAVE RESUMED FOLLOWING A TEMPORARY SUSPENSION, AND INTERNATIONAL AID AGENCIES AND THE TNI IN RECENT DAYS HAVE BEGUN DISTRIBUTING NECESSITIES VIA LAND ROUTES.

~~(S)~~ ANOTHER PRESSING PROBLEM HAS BEEN THE WELFARE OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE **TIMORESE** WHO HAVE BEEN DISPLACED TO WEST **TIMOR** AND TARGETED FOR REVENGE BY MILITIAS OPERATING IN REFUGEE CAMPS. REPORTEDLY, THERE ARE OVER 150,000 EAST **TIMORESE** REFUGEES IN EAST

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/

LESSER SUNDAS. THOUSANDS MORE STILL AWAIT TRANSPORTATION. SOME MILITARY OFFICIALS HAVE BECOME ALARMED OVER THE NEGATIVE PUBLICITY AND SEE THE NEED TO CONTROL MILITIA INTIMIDATION IN THESE AREAS. IN RECENT DAYS, THE SITUATION IN WEST **TIMOR** HAS BEEN IMPROVING WITH LAW AND ORDER APPARENTLY BEING ENFORCED MORE EFFECTIVELY BY THE SECURITY APPARATUS. WEAPONS ARE NO LONGER CARRIED OPENLY BY PRO-JAKARTA MILITIAS.

~~(C)~~ REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS:

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

INDONESIAN MILITARY AND CIVIL LEADERS UPSET OVER THEIR LOSS OF THE PROVINCE, HAVE FOCUSED MUCH OF THEIR BLAME AND ANGER ON AUSTRALIA. ALTHOUGH JAKARTA HAS MADE SOME CONCILIATORY GESTURES IN RECENT DAYS, CONTINUED NATIONALIST SENTIMENT AMONG THE **INDONESIAN** POPULACE WILL CONSTRAIN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND AMPLIFY THE THREAT TO AUSTRALIAN PEACEKEEPERS.

~~(C)~~ WITHIN ASEAN, THE EAST **TIMOR** SITUATION ALSO HAS TOUCHED REGIONAL SENSITIVITIES, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPAL OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A MEMBER STATE. HOWEVER, JAKARTA HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN PUSHING FOR ASEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE UN FORCE, BASED ON THE VIEW THAT AN ASIAN SOLUTION IS MORE PALATABLE THAN WESTERN INTERFERENCE.

~~(C)~~ MOST REGIONAL LEADERS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ASEAN IS NOT GEARED TO HANDLE PROBLEMS SUCH AS THOSE PRESENTED BY EAST **TIMOR**, AND ACCEPT THAT UN PEACEKEEPING EFFORT WAS THE ONLY VIABLE MEANS OF RESTORING STABILITY. ASEAN COUNTRIES NONETHELESS ARE SEEKING ASSURANCES THAT TNI WILL DO ALL IN ITS POWER TO SAFEGUARD THEIR

RESPECTIVE TROOPS. CO-LOCATING "WHITE" PEACEKEEPERS WITH ASIAN CONTINGENTS CONCEIVABLY COULD LESSEN THE RISK TO WESTERN PERSONNEL, BUT CERTAIN ASEAN CONTINGENTS FAVOR SEPARATE OPERATING SECTORS TO REDUCE THREATS TO THEIR OWN FORCES.

~~(C)~~ LONGER-TERM QUESTIONS: PERCEIVING THEY HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE, THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS ARE NOT EXPECTED TO EASILY SURRENDER THEIR GOAL OF UNDOING EAST **TIMOR** INDEPENDENCE OR PARTITIONING THE PROVINCE. THEIR ABILITY TO CONDUCT SUSTAINED RESISTANCE, HOWEVER, (b)(1),1.4 WILL LARGELY DEPEND ON CONTINUING TNI SUPPORT AND WILLINGNESS TO (c),1.4 (d) PERMIT CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS FROM WEST **TIMOR**. ALTHOUGH **INDONESIAN** INTENTIONS COULD WELL CHANGE WITH A NEW GOVERNMENT,

~~(C)~~ STRONG EMOTIONAL PRESSURE TO EXACT REVENGE AGAINST PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS LEFT BEHIND PROMISES TO FURTHER COMPLICATE SECURITY MATTERS. GIVEN THE EXPECTED POLARIZATION, RECRUITING AND BUILDING A NEUTRAL EAST **TIMOR** POLICE FORCE MAY PROVE DIFFICULT, ONLY INCREASING PROSPECTS FOR A UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN THE TERRITORY FOR SOME TIME. HOPES FOR EVENTUAL RESOLUTION REST ON GUSMAO AND OTHERS STILL INTENT ON RESUMING THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS.

(U) HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE: THE HEALTH CARE INFRASTRUCTURE IN EAST **TIMOR**, SERIOUSLY CRIPPLED BY MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND SUPPLY SHORTAGES, IS COLLAPSING. EAST **TIMOR** COULD NOT SUSTAIN EVEN MINIMAL HEALTH CARE SHOULD A CIVIL WAR OR LARGE-SCALE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OCCUR. ERODING HEALTH CARE WILL FURTHER FUEL THE TREND TOWARD ANARCHY AND FOREIGN PRESSURES FOR OUTSIDE INTERVENTION.

~~(S)~~ MOST GOVERNMENT HEALTH FACILITIES IN EAST **TIMOR** ARE SEVERELY UNDERSTAFFED AND HAVE CRITICAL SUPPLY SHORTAGES. IN DILI, EAST **TIMOR**'S PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, THE MAIN PUBLIC HOSPITAL--DILI GENERAL HOSPITAL--CONTINUES TO EXPERIENCE EXTREME SHORTAGES OF MEDICAL STAFF, SUPPLIES, EQUIPMENT, AND MEDICATIONS; HEALTH CARE SERVICES ARE LIMITED TO BASIC FIRST AID. MANY GOVERNMENT MEDICAL FACILITIES HAVE CEASED FUNCTIONING BECAUSE OF THE SHORTAGES

(U) MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES SUCH AS ANALGESICS, ANTIBIOTICS, ANESTHETICS, FIRST AID ITEMS, IMMUNIZATIONS, AND SURGICAL EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO COPE WITH TRAUMATIC INJURIES, INFECTIOUS DISEASES, AND MALNUTRITION STILL ARE BEING BLOCKED FROM ENTRY INTO EAST **TIMOR** BY BOTH THE **INDONESIAN** GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL PRO-**INDONESIA** MILITIA LEADERS. RECENTLY, PRO-**INDONESIA** MILITIA LEADERS ORDERED ADDITIONAL BLOCKADES OF AIRPORTS, HELIPADS, ROADWAYS, AND SEAPORTS TO

PREVENT ANY CIVILIANS FROM LEAVING THE ISLAND AND, THUS, ALSO PREVENTING HUMANITARIAN AID FOR COMING INTO THE REGION.
(U) EAST **TIMOR** HAS HAD A SEVERE EXODUS OF PHYSICIANS. AN ESTIMATED 50 PHYSICIANS, FOUR OF WHOM ARE SURGEONS, REMAIN TO TREAT A POPULATION OF 800,000. MOST REMAINING PHYSICIANS ARE **INDONESIAN** MILITARY OFFICERS WHO WERE SENT TO ALLEVIATE STAFF SHORTAGES CAUSED BY THE INITIAL EXODUS OF MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS.
~~(S)~~ PERSONNEL FROM NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COOPERATIVE FOR AMERICAN RELIEF EVERYWHERE (CARE), AUSAID, CARITAS INTERNATIONALIS, AND UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN EAST **TIMOR** (UNAMET), HAVE BEEN THE TARGET OF VIOLENCE BY PRO-**INDONESIA** MILITIAS SINCE THE 30 AUGUST AUTONOMY VOTE. ONE UNAMET STAFF MEMBER RECENTLY WAS STABBED TO DEATH, AND ATTACKS BY ARMED MILITIAS INJURED TWO OTHERS.
(U) **TIMORESE** CITIZENS ARE RELUCTANT TO SEEK MEDICAL CARE IN GOVERNMENT FACILITIES FOR FEAR OF REPRISAL FROM **INDONESIAN** MILITARY MEDICAL OFFICERS WHO ARE AUGMENTING LOCAL HOSPITAL STAFF. THOSE SEEKING TREATMENT RELY ON CHURCH-RUN CLINICS, WHICH HAVE EVEN FEWER RESOURCES THAN LOCAL HOSPITALS.
~~(S)~~ THE BLOCKADE OF EAST **TIMOR** AIRPORTS, ROADWAYS, AND SEAPORTS BY PRO-**INDONESIA** MILITIA, WHILE INTENDED TO PREVENT PERSONS FROM LEAVING EAST **TIMOR**, ALSO SEVERELY DEGRADED THE ABILITY TO EVACUATE SICK OR WOUNDED PERSONNEL OR RECEIVE ADDITIONAL MEDICAL AID SHOULD LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE ERUPT.
~~(C)~~ CURRENT MEDICAL RESOURCES ARE INADEQUATE TO SUSTAIN THE EXISTING MEDICAL SUPPORT EFFORT AND WILL BE INSUFFICIENT IN THE INCREASED VIOLENCE. IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF DILI GENERAL HOSPITAL, OR IF **INDONESIAN** MILITARY PHYSICIANS LEAVE AND ARE NOT REPLACED, THE ALREADY SEVERELY DEGRADED HEALTH CARE SYSTEM WILL TOTALLY COLLAPSE. THE CURRENT LACK OF ADEQUATE HEALTH CARE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO ANARCHY AND FOREIGN PRESSURES FOR OUTSIDE INTERVENTION. ANY UN-SPONSORED INTERVENTION WILL REQUIRE A DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT.
(U) HEALTH RISKS: IF DEPLOYED TO EAST **TIMOR**, PERSONNEL WOULD FACE HEALTH RISKS FROM DISEASES ENDEMIC TO **INDONESIA** AND FROM
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/
INFECTIOUS FELLOW PEACEKEEPERS. HISTORICALLY, PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS HAVE RESULTED IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION, PLACING DEPLOYED PERSONNEL AT GREATER RISK OF DISEASES SUCH AS TUBERCULOSIS. ADDITIONALLY, MANY NON-WESTERN MILITARY PARTICIPANTS IN UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS HAVE DEPLOYED UNSCREENED PERSONNEL, EXPOSING PERSONNEL TO NONENDEMIC DISEASES.

(U) INFECTIOUS DISEASES POSING THE GREATEST RISK (IN DESCENDING ORDER) TO FORCES DEPLOYED TO EAST **TIMOR** INCLUDE DIARRHEAL DISEASES (HIGHLY ENDEMIC; CAUSED BY SEVERAL BACTERIAL, PROTOZOAL, AND VIRAL AGENTS); VECTOR-BORNE DISEASES, INCLUDING MALARIA (MODERATELY TO HIGHLY ENDEMIC; PLASMODIUM FALCIPARUM PREDOMINATES FOLLOWED BY P. VIVAX; PLASMODIUM OVALE AND P. MALARIAE HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTED; P. FALCIPARUM STRAINS RESISTANT TO CHLOROQUINE ARE WIDESPREAD AND RESISTANCE ALSO HAS BEEN REPORTED TO SULFADOXINE/PYRIMETHAMINE AND METHOQUINE), DENGUE FEVER (HIGHLY ENDEMIC; ALL FOUR VIRAL SEROTYPES CIRCULATE; INCIDENCE INCREASED DRAMATICALLY IN 1998; INCIDENCE IN 1995 WAS REPORTED AS 4 PERCENT IN **TIMOR**, WITH A 3 PERCENT CASE FATALITY RATE), JAPANESE ENCEPHALITIS (FOCALLY ENZOOTIC), AND CHIKUNGUNYA FEVER; OTHER FOOD- OR WATERBORNE DISEASES, INCLUDING HEPATITIS A (HIGHLY ENDEMIC), HEPATITIS E, AND TYPHOID/PARATYPHOID FEVERS (HIGHLY ENDEMIC); SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED AND/OR BLOODBORNE DISEASES, INCLUDING HEPATITIS B/D AND C (MODERATELY TO HIGHLY ENDEMIC), GONORRHEA (1995 PREVALENCE OF 25.6 CASES PER 100,000 POPULATION), CHLAMYDIAL CERVICITIS/URETHRITIS, SYPHILIS (1995 PREVALENCE OF 8.2 CASES PER 100,000 POPULATION) ("STD INFECTION" RATES OF 42 PERCENT REPORTED AMONG PROSTITUTES IN 1996 IN **INDONESIA**), AND HIV/AIDS (ESTIMATED 1996 PREVALENCE OF 49 PER 100,000 POPULATION IN **INDONESIA**); PERSON TO PERSON/CLOSE CONTACT DISEASES, INCLUDING TUBERCULOSIS (HIGHLY ENDEMIC; 1999 TB PREVALENCE OF 220 PER 100,000 POPULATION; DRUG RESISTANCE OCCURS); AND ANIMAL-ASSOCIATED DISEASES, INCLUDING RABIES, LEPTOSPIROSIS, Q FEVER, AND ANTHRAX (OUTBREAK BLAMED ON CONSUMPTION OF INFECTED BUFFALO MEAT IN 1999 IN **INDONESIA**).

(U) ENIVIRONMENTAL HEALTH THREATS: EAST **TIMOR** IS MAINLY A COFFEE-GROWING PROVINCE WITH LIMITED INDUSTRY. ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISKS INCLUDE WATER SOURCES CONTAMINATED WITH RAW SEWAGE, INDUSTRIAL POLLUTANTS, AND RESIDUAL PESTICIDES FROM AGRICULTURAL AREAS. ADDITIONALLY, THE THREAT OF DELIBERATE BURNING OF BUILDINGS, INDUSTRIES, AND THE MAIN PETROLEUM STORAGE FACILITIES LOCATED 1.5 KILOMETERS EAST OF THE MAIN PORT IN DILI POSE A POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL RISK DUE TO THE RELEASE OF AIRBORNE CHEMICALS.

(U) ALTHOUGH HAZARDOUS WASTE STANDARDS WERE ESTABLISHED IN 1994, THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ENFORCED, AND LARGE QUANTITIES OF HAZARDOUS WASTE HAVE DEPOSITED IN LANDFILLS AND RIVERS.

HAZE AND SMOKE FROM FOREST FIRES IN WEST KALIMANTAN AND PART OF SUMATRA ISLAND PRESENT A POTENTIAL HEALTH RISK. DURING FOREST FIRE BURNING, PARTICULATE MATTER, SMOKE, DUST, AND TRACE GASES--INCLUDING CARBON MONOXIDE AND CARBON DIOXIDE--ARE RELEASED. INCREASED EXPOSURE TO PARTICULATES (DUST, DIRT, SOOT AND SMOKE) IN AIR CAN RESULT IN

RESPIRATORY IRRITATION, INFLAMMATION, OR AN INCREASED OF SEVERITY OF EXISTING LUNG DISEASE, SUCH AS ASTHMA. ALTHOUGH RESPIRABLE PARTICULATE CONCENTRATIONS ARE UNLIKELY TO REACH LEVELS ASSOCIATED WITH SIGNIFICANT OR SEVERE HEALTH EFFECTS AFTER SHORT-TERM EXPOSURES IN NORMAL HEALTHY DEPLOYED INDIVIDUALS, INCREASED EXPOSURE OVER TIME MAY DECREASE PERFORMANCE AND DEGRADE EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL.

~~(S)~~ INFRASTRUCTURE DATA: PETROLEUM: EAST **TIMOR** HAS AN EXTREMELY LIMITED PETROLEUM INFRASTRUCTURE. THE ONLY MAJOR POL IMPORT, WITH AN ESTIMATED STORAGE CAPACITY OF 40,000 BARRELS, IS LOCATED IN THE WESTERN SECTION OF DILI. DIESEL AND MOTOR GASOLINE ARE THE MAIN REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS STORED AT THIS FACILITY. IT IS LIKELY THAT POL IS DELIVERED TO THIS FACILITY BY TANKER FROM OTHER PORTS IN **INDONESIA**. NO PETROLEUM REFINERIES ARE LOCATED ON THE ISLAND OF **TIMOR**. FUELS ARE DISTRIBUTED TO EAST **TIMOR** CONSUMERS BY TRANSPORTED BY TANKER TRUCKS.

~~(S)~~ THE DILI HELIPORT, LOCATED LESS THAN ONE KILOMETER FROM THE DILI POL IMPORT FACILITY, HAS SMALL ABOVEGROUND HORIZONTAL STORAGE TANKS (TOTAL OF LESS THAN 500 BARRELS CAPACITY) LOCATED ON-SITE. KOMORO AIRFIELD, LOCATED ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF DILI, REPORTEDLY HAS THREE UNDERGROUND POL STORAGE TANKS. IT ALSO RELIES ON TANKER TRUCK DELIVERIES FROM THE DILI IMPORT TERMINAL. THE AIRFIELD IS LESS THAN TWO KILOMETERS AWAY FROM THIS FACILITY. NO ABOVEGROUND FUEL STORAGE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AT KOMORO AIRFIELD. ALL OF EAST **TIMOR**'S DIESEL POWERPLANTS HAVE ON-SITE FUEL STORAGE. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE TWO POWERPLANTS IN DILI HAVE 10,000 BARRELS OF STORAGE. THE REMAINING 10 POWERPLANTS HAVE SMALLER DEDICATED STORAGE.

~~(S)~~ CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION IS LIMITED TO TWO MINOR OILFIELDS ON THE SOUTHERN SIDE OF EAST **TIMOR**, NEAR THE VILLAGES OF SUAI AND VIQUEQUE. THE CRUDE OIL FROM THESE FIELDS MAY BE CONSUMED LOCALLY OR POSSIBLY TRUCKED TO WEST **TIMOR** FOR EXPORT. THERE ARE NO PIPELINES OR CRUDE OIL TRANSSHIPMENT FACILITIES LOCATED ON EAST **TIMOR**.

~~(S)~~ ELECTRIC POWER: EAST **TIMOR** HAS A RUDIMENTARY POWER SYSTEM THAT IS FOCUSED ON PROVIDING POWER TO LOCAL SERVICE AREAS. MUCH OF THE POWER GENERATION IS PROVIDED BY SMALL DIESEL-FUELED POWER PLANTS THAT RANGE IN CAPACITIES ESTIMATED TO BE FROM ONE TO SIX MEGAWATTS. THE TWO LARGEST FACILITIES ARE LOCATED IN AND SERVE THE LARGEST CITY IN EAST **TIMOR**, DILI. TEN OTHER SMALLER FACILITIES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND ARE MOSTLY LOCATED AT TOWNS ALONG OR NEAR THE COAST. ADDITIONALLY, A NUMBER OF SMALLER PORTABLE GENERATOR UNITS ARE USED BY THE MILITARY AND OTHER CONSUMERS TO MEET THEIR NEEDS.

~~(S)~~ THERE IS NO HIGH-VOLTAGE TRANSMISSION POWERLINE NETWORK SERVING EAST **TIMOR**. ELECTRICITY FROM THE SMALL POWER PLANTS IS DISTRIBUTED TO LOCAL SERVICE AREAS VIA LOW-VOLTAGE (PROBABLY 20-KILOVOLT OR BELOW) POWERLINES. ACCORDING THE ELECTRIC CURRENT ABROAD, CONSUMERS RECEIVE POWER AT 127/220-VOLTS AND 50 HERTZ. THE PLUG (CONNECTOR) IS C, E, AND F TYPE.

(U) WATER SUPPLY: THE DRY SEASON IS VERY DISTINCT IN EAST **TIMOR** AND RESULTS IN FOOD AND WATER SHORTAGES. PRIMARY SOURCES OF WATER INCLUDE RIVERS, STREAMS, CANALS, GROUND WATER FROM WELLS, AND RAINWATER FROM ROOF CATCHMENTS. IN MANY AREAS, PUMPS HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED TO IMPROVE WATER ACCESS BUT 60-70% ARE IN POOR CONDITION OR DO NOT FUNCTION AT ALL. WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS ARE POORLY MAINTAINED, AND UNABLE TO KEEP PACE WITH DEMAND, CONTRIBUTING TO CONTAMINATED TAP WATER. URBAN DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS PROVIDE EITHER
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 ******/
IN-HOUSE HOOKUPS OR, MORE COMMONLY, PUBLIC STANDPIPES. THE MOST COMMON METHOD OF MUNICIPAL DISTRIBUTION IN RURAL AREAS IS THE PUBLIC STANDPIPE.

~~(S)~~ EAST **TIMOR**'S TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROVIDES ONLY A LIMITED CAPACITY TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE A PKO. ALL THE PORTS ON THE ISLAND ARE CONSIDERED MINOR; HOWEVER DILI PROVIDES A MODERATE LEVEL OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. THERE ARE ALSO ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF AIRFIELDS, MOST OF WHICH CAN ACCOMMODATE MILITARY CARGO AND TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT UP TO C-130 SIZE. OF THESE AIRFIELDS ONLY COMORO (ALSO SPELLED KOMORO) AND BAUCAU ARE CAPABLE OF HANDLING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS, AS WELL AS LARGER AIRCRAFT.

~~(C)~~ THE ROAD SYSTEM IN EAST **TIMOR** CONSISTS OF ABOUT 4900 KM OF ROADS, OF WHICH ABOUT 2550 KM ARE PAVED (ASPHALT). THE ROAD SYSTEM CAPACITY IS LIMITED AND NOT LIKELY TO SUPPORT HIGH-SPEED MILITARY ROAD MOVEMENTS, ESPECIALLY HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND MILITARY TRACKED VEHICLES. THE MAJOR PAVED ROADS EXTEND ALONG THE COAST, WHILE MOST OF THE INLAND ROADS ARE MAINLY DIRT OR MIXED SURFACE. ALTHOUGH THE INTERNAL NETWORK IS WELL USED AND HANDLES INDIGENOUS TRAFFIC, THE HEAVIER VEHICLES, NORMALLY ASSOCIATED WITH A PKO (TRACKED AND WHEELED ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APCS)) WILL HAVE GREATER DIFFICULTY TRAVERSING THESE AREAS. IN ADDITION, EROSION, HEAVY MONSOON RAINS AND HEAVIER THAN NORMAL TRAFFIC COULD COMBINE TO CREATE LARGE-SCALE MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS FOR ALL OF THE ROADS, INCLUDING THE COASTAL, PAVED ROADS.

(U) PORT/HARBOR DATA DILI PORT IS LOCATED ON THE CENTRAL NORTH COAST OF EAST **TIMOR, INDONESIA,** APPROXIMATELY 1.5 KM EAST OF DILI HELIPORT AND APPROXIMATELY 13 KM WEST OF HERA PORT FACS.

(U) DILI PORT COMPRISES TWO FACILITIES, DILI PORT FACS AND DILI NAVAL BASE. THE TWO FACILITIES ARE LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 900M AWAY FROM EACH OTHER AND BOTH CAN BE REACH BY TRAVELLING ALONG THE COAST ROAD, JALAN AVENIDA MARECHAL CARMONAM THROUGH TO JALAN ALVES ALDEIA. DILI NAVAL BASE IS LOCATED IN TWO AREAS. THE HEADQUARTERS AND ADMINISTRATION AREA IS LOCATED ON THE SOUTHERN SIDE OF JALAN AVENLDA MARACHAL CARMONA AND THE SLIPWAY AND MAINTENANCE BUILDING ARE LOCATED OPPOSITE ON THE NORTHERN SIDE OF THIS ROAD. DILI PORT FACS IS ONE OF TWO MAJOR PORTS SERVING THE ISLAND OF EAST **TIMOR** AND IS THE MAJOR PORT SERVING THE ENTIRE NORTHERN REGION OF THE ISLAND.

(U) DILI NAVAL BASE IS A CLASS B NAVAL BASE AND IS THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL BASE FOR EAST **TIMOR**. THIS FACILITY PROVIDES LIMITED ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT TO VISITING SHIPS. THE CIVILIAN PORT, DILI PORT FACS, SUPPLEMENTS THE BERTHING FACILITIES. MOST UNITS DEPLOYING TO EAST **TIMOR** ARE SHIPPED IN BY LANDING CRAFT, HAVING THEIR VESSELS DISEMBARK AT THE CIVILIAN PORT FACILITY.

(U) HARBOR AREA: THE HARBOR IS ASSESSED AS A SMALL, OPEN HARBOR. THE DEPTH VARIES DRAMATICALLY DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF NUMEROUS DETACHED REEFS ON A SANDY SEABED. THE TIDAL STREAMS THROUGHOUT THE **INDONESIAN** ARCHIPELAGO HAVE A STRONG DIURNAL INEQUALITY. THE MEAN TIDAL RANGE FOR THE DILI REGION IS ASSESSED AS BEING 1.2M (4FT).

(U) PORT APPROACHES: THERE IS ONLY A NARROW PASSAGE EITHER SIDE OF A DETACHED REEF. THE WESTERN PASSAGE IS GENERALLY USED. THE EASTERN PASSAGE SHOULD ONLY BE USED BY VESSELS WITH LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, AS A CORAL PATCH WITH A DEPTH OF 2.4M (8FT) LIES IN THE MIDDLE OF THE FAIRWAY. EXACT DEPTHS AND WIDTHS ARE UNKNOWN. THEY MAY BE OBTAINED IN THE INNER ROAD, CLEAR OF THE REEFS AND IN A DEPTH OF APPROXIMATELY 20M (65FT). AN OUTER ANCHORAGE FOR LARGE VESSELS IS AVAILABLE IN THE OUTER ROAD AT A DEPTH OF APPROXIMATELY 49M (160FT).

(U) DILI PORT FACS HAS A MARGINAL WHARF OF CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION 221M X 33M (750FT X 108FT) WITH ROAD ACCESS AND AN ASSESSED ALONGSIDE DEPTH OF APPROXIMATELY 9M (29FT) CAPABLE OF HANDLING MEDIUM TO LARGE VESSELS. DILI PORT FACS HAS NEITHER PERMANENT CRANES NOR A REFUELING CAPABILITY.

(U) THE SPECIAL PURPOSE FACILITIES AT DILI NAVAL BASE INCLUDE: ONE FERRY SLIPWAY WITH MARINE RAILWAY AND A MAINTENANCE BUILDING AND A WINCH HOUSE ARE LOCATED AT THE TOP OF THE SLIPWAY. THIS AREA HAS THE CAPACITY TO HANDLE MEDIUM SIZED LANDING CRAFT AND PATROL BOAT SIZE VESSELS. THERE ARE NO CRANES OR ANY OTHER MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT NOTED AROUND THIS FACILITY.

(U) PHYSICAL SECURITY: DILI PORT FACS HAS A FENCE SECURED AREA WITH FOUR CONTROLLED ACCESS POINTS. THE

HEADQUARTERS/ADMINISTRATION AREA AT DILI NAVAL BASE IS FENCE SECURED WITH AN ACCESS CONTROL BUILDING LOCATED AT THE ONLY VEHICLE ENTRANCE. THE SLIPWAY AND MAINTENANCE BUILDING FOR DILI NAVAL BASE, WHICH IS LOCATED ACROSS THE ROAD, IS NOT SECURED.
~~(C)~~ OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS: DILI PET PROD STOR IS
LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 2.8KM WNW OF DILI PORT FACS AND PROVIDES FUEL SUPPLIES FOR LOCAL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN REQUIREMENTS AND HAS A REPORTED CAPACITY OF APPROXIMATELY 35,000 US BARRELS. NUMEROUS COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE DILI TOWNSHIP. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NONE WITHIN THE CONFINES OF DILI NAVAL BASE.
(U) CURRENTS IN THE **INDONESIAN** ARCHIPELAGO ARE TO A VERY LARGE EXTENT CONTROLLED BY THE MONSOON SEASON. HENCE TWICE A YEAR THE CURRENT DIRECTIONS ARE REVERSED IN PHASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MONSOONS. HOWEVER THE CURRENT DIRECTION IN THE SAVU SEA REMAINS CONSTANT THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. THE DIRECTION OF THE CURRENT IN THE SAVU SEA IS SOUTHWEST ALONG THE WEST COAST OF **TIMOR**. THE **TIMOR** REGION HAS WELL MARKED WET AND DRY SEASON'S CORRESPONDING WITH THE MONSOON SEASONS. THE MONSOON SEASON RUNS FROM NOVEMBER UNTIL APPROXIMATELY MARCH. **TIMOR** IS THE DRIEST REGION WITHIN THE ARCHIPELAGO AND THE PROLONGED DRY SEASON, MAY RESULT IN SERIOUS SHORTAGES OF DRINKING WATER IN THE PERIOD FROM JUNE TO OCTOBER.
~~(S)~~ BEACHING AREAS ALONG NORTHERN SHORE OF EAST **TIMOR**: PONTA ACOILO BEACH IS LOCATED ON A SMALL PENINSULA ON THE NORTHERN COAST OF EAST **TIMOR**, APPROXIMATELY 5NM WEST OF DILI AND APPROXIMATELY 15.75NM SOUTH OF ILHA DE ATAURO. A PATCH OF VEGETATION IS LOCATED BETWEEN THE RIGHT FLANK AND THE BEACH CENTER, RENDERING 185M/608FT OF THE BEACH UNSUITABLE. TRAVEL INLAND MAY BE HAMPERED BY VEGETATION AND SLOPE. A TWO-LANE, ALL WEATHER ROAD RUNS ADJACENT TO BOTH BEACH FLANKS. THE COAST OF EAST **TIMOR** IS ENCOMPASSED BY REEFS WHICH MAY BE EXPOSED AT LOW TIDE AND PRESENT A SIGNIFICANT HAZARD TO NAVIGATION.
~~(S)~~ DILI BEACH (IS LOCATED 0.9 KM (0.5NM) WEST-NORTHWEST OF DILI HELIPORT, AND 1.1 KM (0.6NM) WEST-SOUTHWEST OF DILI NAVAL BASE. THERE ARE NO AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OBSTRUCTIONS ON THE BEACH OR ITS SEA APPROACH. EXITING THE BEACH IS CROSS-COUNTRY ALONG ITS ENTIRE
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 006 ******/
LENGTH. A TWO-LANE, HARD SURFACE ROAD RUNS PARALLEL TO THE BEACH, INTERSECTED BY TWO, ONE-LANE LOOSE SURFACED ROADS LEADING SOUTH TO ROUTE 1. THE HINTERLAND CONSISTS OF A MODERATE TO DENSELY VEGETATED AREA BACKED BY AN URBAN AREA. THE COAST OF EAST **TIMOR** IS ENCOMPASSED BY REEFS WHICH MAY BE EXPOSED AT LOW TIDE AND PRESENT A SIGNIFICANT HAZARD TO NAVIGATION.

~~(S)~~ COMORO SOUTH BEACH IS LOCATED ON THE NORTHERN COAST OF EAST **TIMOR**, 1NM (2KM) SOUTHWEST OF COMORO AIRFIELD AND 5NM (9KM) SOUTHWEST OF DILI PORT FACILITY. EXIT FROM THE BEACH IS CROSS-COUNTRY ALONG ITS ENTIRE LENGTH VIA A LOOSE SURFACE, ONE-LANE ROAD LOCATED 58M (190FT) SOUTH OF BEACH CENTER. THIS ROAD CONNECTS TO ROUTE 1 LOCATED 99M (324FT) SOUTH OF BEACH CENTER. THE HINTERLAND CONSISTS OF LOW-LYING VEGETATION. THE COAST OF EAST **TIMOR** IS ENCOMPASSED BY REEFS WHICH MAY BE EXPOSED AT LOW TIDE AND PRESENT A SIGNIFICANT HAZARD TO NAVIGATION.

~~(S)~~ COMORO BEACH IS LOCATED ON THE NORTHERN COAST OF EAST **TIMOR**, 1NM (2KM) SOUTHWEST OF COMORO AIRFIELD AND 5NM (9KM) WEST OF DILI PORT FACILITY. EXITING THE BEACH IS CROSS-COUNTRY ALONG ITS ENTIRE LENGTH VIA A LOOSE SURFACE ONE-LANE ROAD LOCATED 56M (183FT) SOUTH OF BEACH CENTER. THIS ROAD CONNECTS TO ROUTE 1 LOCATED 92M (302FT) SOUTH OF BEACH CENTER. THE HINTERLAND CONSISTS OF SPARSE VEGETATION. THE COAST OF EAST **TIMOR** IS ENCOMPASSED BY REEFS WHICH MAY BE EXPOSED AT LOW TIDE AND PRESENT A SIGNIFICANT HAZARD TO NAVIGATION.

~~(C)~~ PRINCIPAL WHARF: DILI PORT FACS HAS A MARGINAL WHARF OF CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION 221M X 33M (750FT X 108FT) WITH ROAD ACCESS AND AN ASSESSED ALONGSIDE DEPTH OF APPROXIMATELY 9M (29FT) CAPABLE OF HANDLING MEDIUM TO LARGE VESSELS. DILI PORT FACS HAS NEITHER PERMANENT CRANES NOR A REFUELING CAPABILITY.

~~(S)~~ THE SPECIAL PURPOSE FACILITIES AT DILI NAVAL BASE INCLUDE:ONE FERRY SLIPWAY WITH MARINE RAILWAY CENTERED ON GRID K2Y0, G6 GRAPHIC; AND MAINTENANCE BUILDING AND WINCH HOUSE ARE LOCATED AT THE TOP OF THE SLIPWAY. THIS AREA HAS THE CAPACITY TO HANDLE MEDIUM SIZED LANDING CRAFT AND PATROL BOAT SIZE VESSELS. THERE ARE NO CRANES OR ANY OTHER MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT OBSERVED AROUND THIS FACILITY.

(U) AIRFIELD DATA: OUTLINED BELOW IS AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ON AIRFIELDS IN EAST **TIMOR**.

~~(C)~~ COMORO (DILI) AIRFIELD HAS AN ASPHALT/CONCRETE COMPOSITE SURFACE AND IS C-17/B 707 CAPABLE. ITS RUNWAY LENGTH IS 6030FT X 98FT. ITS STRENGTH IS ITS LOCATION TO UN HEADQUARTERS, BUT IS WEAKNESSES INCLUDE ITS LACK OF SERVICES, SECURITY GAPS IN THE FENCE AND ITS ABILITY TO HANDLE DAYLIGHT OPERATIONS ONLY.

~~(C)~~ BAUCAU AIRFIELD IS AN ASPHALT/CONCRETE COMPOSITE SURFACE (8333FT X 197FT) AND IS C-5 CAPABLE. IT IS THE LARGEST AIRFIELD IN EAST **TIMOR**, BUT ITS WEAKNESSES INCLUDE NO POL STORAGE, LACK SECURITY FENCES, LIMITED PARKING, AND DAYLIGHT OPERATIONS ONLY.

~~(C)~~ OTHER AIRFIELDS IN EAST **TIMOR**: SUAI AIRFIELD IS A GRADED EARTH SURFACE FACILITY AND IS DHC4 CAPABLE. MALIANA AND

FUILORO AIRFIELDS ARE ALSO GRADED EARTH SURFACES WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE ENGINEERING WORK TO BE SERVICEABLE FOR FIXED WING OPERATIONS. DILI HELIPORT IS ROTARY WING CAPABLE ONLY. ELTARI AIRFIELD SERVICES KUPANG, AND HAS A N ASPHALT/CONCRETE COMPOSITE SURFACE. IT IS C130 CAPABLE. HALIWEN AIRFIELD IS LOCATED NEAR ATAMBUA, CLOSE TO EAST **TIMOR** BORDER.

~~DERIVED FROM: DIAR 60-28~~

ADMIN

~~DECLASSIFY ON: X6~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

BT

#4939

NNNN

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 [redacted] ~~SSSS~~ [redacted]

[redacted] ~~SSSSS~~

DTG

240244Z SEP 99

FROM

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SECTION 1 OF 5

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY

(b)(3):10 USC 424 SUBJ: ~~(U)~~ DIA [redacted] INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 24 SEP.

(U) BECAUSE DIA'S FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS USE A STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CLASSIFICATION MARKING SYSTEM THAT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH TODAY'S MESSAGE-HANDLING SYSTEM, THIS MESSAGE SHOWS THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION ABOVE IN A DIFFERENT FORM THAN THAT USED THROUGHOUT THE BODY OF THE MESSAGE. IN TERMS OF THE STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MARKING SYSTEM, THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS ~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1~~.

(U) SUMMARY OF FEATURES

~~(C)~~ **INDONESIA**: TENSION REMAINS HIGH IN DILI IN THE AFTERMATH OF 23 SEPTEMBER SHOOTING INCIDENTS BY PRO-JAKARTA MILITIA.

Non Responsive

(b)(1),1.4 (c),Non Responsive

FEATURES

INDONESIA:

1. (~~S~~) TENSION REMAINS HIGH IN DILI IN THE AFTERMATH OF 23 SEPTEMBER SHOOTING INCIDENTS BY PRO-JAKARTA **MILITIA.**

2. (~~C~~) THE SHOOTINGS OCCURRED SEEMINGLY AT RANDOM IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THE CITY. INTERIM **FORCES** IN EAST **TIMOR** (INTERFET) TROOPS CONVERGED ON THE SITES OF THE INCIDENTS, SEARCHED SUSPECTS, AND DETAINED THREE OFFENDERS. INTERFET DID NOT FIRE ITS WEAPONS AND DID NOT SUSTAIN CASUALTIES. (b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

3. (~~S~~) UNCONFIRMED PRESS REPORTS CLAIM THAT **MILITIA FORCES** WERE MASSING AT LIQUISA, 35 KM WEST OF DILI, ON 23 SEPTEMBER AND WERE THREATENING TO ATTACK INTERFET TROOPS. A **MILITIA** LEADER CLAIMED THAT HIS **FORCES** WERE REGROUPING AND PLANNED TO CONTINUE THEIR STRUGGLE, BUT HE SAID THEY HAD NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO ATTACK INTERFET. ALLEGATIONS BY PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS THAT THE MILITIAS ARE PLANTING MINES AND BOOBYTRAPS IN DILI AND BAUCAU ARE UNCONFIRMED BUT CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED.

4. (~~C~~) DESPITE THE WORSENING SECURITY SITUATION, PRESIDENT HABIBIE ANNOUNCED THE REVOCATION OF THE MARTIAL LAW IN EFFECT IN EAST **TIMOR** SINCE 7 SEPTEMBER.

5. (~~C~~) IN JAKARTA, UP TO 10,000 STUDENTS AND OTHER POLITICAL ACTIVISTS CONVERGED ON PARLIAMENT TO PROTEST THE 23 SEPTEMBER PASSAGE OF A STATE SECURITY LAW. THE LAW SETS GUIDELINES FOR THE MILITARY'S POWERS DURING A STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY. CRITICS BELIEVE THE LAW GIVES SWEEPING POWERS TO THE **MILITARY**. THE PROTEST WAS THE LARGEST

STUDENT DEMONSTRATION IN JAKARTA THIS YEAR. ACCORDING TO UNCONFIRMED REPORTS, 3 PEOPLE WERE **KILLED** AND 36 INJURED WHEN THE PROTESTS TURNED VIOLENT.

6. (C) SPORADIC OUTBREAKS OF MILITIA VIOLENCE AND CLASHES BETWEEN THE MILITIAS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE. THE GROUND THREAT TO INTERFET REMAINS HIGH, PARTICULARLY IN WESTERN AREAS OF EAST **TIMOR**, WHERE THE **MILITIAS** ARE STRONGEST AND WHERE **MILITIA FORCES** ARE SAID TO BE REGROUPING.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

Non Responsive

Most of the information in the remaining 9 pages is not responsive. Responsive portions on the 8th and 9th pages are withheld and not provided.

CDS
(b)(3):10 USC 424

DTG
280200Z SEP 99
FROM
FM SSO DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424
CONTROLS
~~TOPSECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
SECTION 1 OF 10
QQQQ
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/ (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
BODY

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SUBJ: (U) DIA~~ INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 28 SEP.
(U) BECAUSE DIA'S FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS USE A STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CLASSIFICATION MARKING SYSTEM THAT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH TODAY'S MESSAGE-HANDLING SYSTEM, THIS MESSAGE SHOWS THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION ABOVE IN A DIFFERENT FORM THAN THAT USED THROUGHOUT THE BODY OF THE MESSAGE. IN TERMS OF THE STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MARKING SYSTEM, THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~/NOFORN//X1.~~ (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(U) SUMMARY OF FEATURES

~~(C)~~ **INDONESIA**: THE INTERIM FORCE IN EAST **TIMOR** IS STRENGTHENING ITS CONTROL IN DILI WITHOUT SERIOUS INCIDENT AS MOST **INDONESIAN** FORCES WITHDRAW

Non Responsive

Non Responsive

(U)FEATURES

INDONESIA:

1. (~~C~~) THE INTERIM FORCE IN EAST **TIMOR** (INTERFET) IS STRENGTHENING ITS CONTROL IN DILI WITHOUT SERIOUS INCIDENT AS MOST **INDONESIAN** FORCES WITHDRAW.

2. (~~C~~) NO SHOOTINGS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN DILI SINCE 23 SEPTEMBER. INTERFET CONTROL OF THE CITY IS NOT COMPLETE, BUT NO INCIDENTS OF PRO-JAKARTA RESISTANCE TO INTERFET HAVE BEEN REPORTED.

3. (~~C~~) **INDONESIA** TURNED OVER SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES TO INTERFET IN A 27 SEPTEMBER CEREMONY IN DILI. JAKARTA AND INTERFET DISAGREE ABOUT THE EXTENT OF THE TRANSFER. INTERFET COMMANDER MAJ GEN COSGROVE /****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/ MAINTAINED THAT EAST **TIMOR** IS STILL **INDONESIAN** SOVEREIGN TERRITORY AND THAT JAKARTA WOULD STILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY THERE. AN **INDONESIAN MILITARY** SPOKESMAN RESPONDED THAT INTERFET HAD COMPLETE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY FOLLOWING THE HANDOVER; REMAINING **INDONESIAN FORCES** WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE ONLY FOR PROTECTING **INDONESIAN** GOVERNMENT ASSETS AND HELPING THE UN WITH SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

5. ~~(C)~~ INTERFET IS EXPANDING OUTSIDE DILI. ON 27 SEPTEMBER, A FORCE OF
150 AUSTRALIAN TROOPS WITH BLACK HAWK HELICOPTERS SUPPORT ENTERED AND SECURED THE TOWN OF LIQUICA, 25 KM WEST OF DILI. LIQUICA WAS A STRONGHOLD OF BESIH MERAH PUTIH, ONE OF THE MOST AGGRESSIVE AND VIOLENT OF THE PRO-JAKARTA MILITIAS, BUT MILITIA MEMBERS WITHDREW **FROM**
THE TOWN AND DID NOT RESIST THE INTERFET ADVANCE.
6. ~~(C)~~ IN JAKARTA, STUDENT ACTIVISTS POSTPONED A RENEWAL OF DEMONSTRATIONS PLANNED FOR 27 SEPTEMBER. PROTESTS ARE LIKELY TO RESUME
LATER THIS WEEK, COINCIDING WITH THE 1 OCTOBER OPENING OF THE PEOPLE'S
CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY. (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

Non Responsive

The remaining 12 pages do not contain responsive information and are not provided.

CDS
(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SSSS~~
ZNY ~~SSSSS~~
DTG
280244Z SEP 99
FROM
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424
CONTROLS
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~
(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
SECTION 1 OF 4
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
(b)(3):10 USC 424 SUBJ: (U) DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 28 SEP.
(U) BECAUSE DIA'S FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS USE A STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CLASSIFICATION MARKING SYSTEM THAT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH TODAY'S MESSAGE-HANDLING SYSTEM, THIS MESSAGE SHOWS THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION ABOVE IN A DIFFERENT FORM THAN THAT USED THROUGHOUT THE BODY OF THE MESSAGE. IN TERMS OF THE STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MARKING SYSTEM, THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS ~~SECRET//NOFORN//XT~~.
(U) SUMMARY OF FEATURES
Non Responsive
~~(C)~~ **INDONESIA:** THE SECURITY SITUATION IN DILI REMAINED UNSETTLED, BUT NO NEW FIRING INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED SINCE 23 SEPTEMBER.
Non Responsive

The next 4 pages are not responsive.

Non Responsive

INDONESIA:
1. ~~(C)~~ THE SECURITY SITUATION IN DILI REMAINED UNSETTLED, BUT NO NEW FIRING INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED SINCE 23 SEPTEMBER.
2. ~~(C)~~ TROOPS OF THE INTERIM **FORCE** IN EAST **TIMOR** (INTERFET) ARE CONDUCTING CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS TO FLUSH OUT MEMBERS OF THE PRO-JAKARTA **MILITIAS**. THE **MILITIAS** STILL HAVE NOT ENGAGED INTERFET **FORCES**. NO EVIDENCE CONFIRMS **MILITIA** INVOLVEMENT IN LAST WEEK'S RANDOM SHOOTING INCIDENTS. RUMORS THAT THE **MILITIAS** ARE PREPARING ATTACKS ON INTERFET AS **INDONESIAN FORCES** WITHDRAW REMAIN UNSUBSTANTIATED.
3. ~~(C)~~ DILI IS BECOMING CALMER. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS ARE RETURNING TO THE CITY FROM THE HILLS TO THE SOUTH WHERE THEY SOUGHT REFUGE EARLIER THIS MONTH. NONETHELESS, NOT ALL OF DILI IS SECURE, AND THE COUNTRYSIDE IS DANGEROUS. INTERFET HAS BEGUN TO PATROL OUTSIDE DILI AND TO ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN BAUCAU.
4. ~~(S)~~ THE **INDONESIAN** MILITARY PLANNED TO TURN OVER AUTHORITY IN EAST **TIMOR** TO INTERFET ON 27 SEPTEMBER. MAJ GEN SYAHNAKRIE, THE COMMANDER OF **INDONESIAN** FORCES IN EAST **TIMOR**, ANNOUNCED THAT 4,500 **INDONESIAN** TROOPS WOULD REMAIN FOR UP TO A MONTH TO MAINTAIN SECURITY DURING THE TRANSITION AS INTERFET CONTINUES TO DEPLOY. ACCORDING TO REPORTS, AN **INDONESIAN** TASK **FORCE** WILL ASSUME CONTROL OF ALL **MILITARY** AND POLICE **FORCES** AS WELL AS **INDONESIAN** AIR AND NAVAL BASES UNTIL 10 NOVEMBER.
5. ~~(S)~~ MEANWHILE, **INDONESIAN** TROOPS IN DILI HAVE BEEN BURNING THEIR BARRACKS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT FACILITIES BEFORE LEAVING.
6. ~~(C)~~ IN JAKARTA, NO FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEEN REPORTED. IN AN EFFORT TO DEFUSE UNREST, PRESIDENT HABIBIE DECIDED TO DELAY SIGNING THE NEW STATE SECURITY BILL UNTIL THE PUBLIC HAS TIME TO "UNDERSTAND" IT, BUT POLITICAL ACTIVISTS PLEDGED TO RENEW THEIR PROTESTS AGAINST THE BILL UNTIL IT IS SCRAPPED. THE OPENING OF THE PEOPLE'S
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/

CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY ON 1 OCTOBER IS LIKELY TO PROVIDE A FOCUS FOR RENEWED UNREST. ADDITIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL ARE DEPLOYING TO JAKARTA FOR THE SESSION.

7. ~~(C)~~ ALTHOUGH THE SECURITY SITUATION IN DILI APPEARS TO BE STABILIZING, THE GROUND THREAT TO INTERFET AS IT GRADUALLY EXPANDS INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE WILL BE HIGH, ESPECIALLY IN THE WESTERN AREAS OF EAST **TIMOR**, WHERE THE **MILITIAS** ARE STRONGEST AND WHERE **MILITIA FORCES** ARE REPORTED TO BE REGROUPING.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

Non Responsive

The final 3 pages are not responsive.

CDS
(b)(3):10 USC 424

DTG
281326Z SEP 99
FROM
FM SSO DIA// (b)(3):10 USC 424
CONTROLS
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECTION 1 OF 2
OOOO
(b)(3):10 USC 424
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE.**********/
BODY
SUBJ: DEFENSE TERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT CHANGE REPORT FOR **INDONESIA**(U)
1. (~~C~~) SUMMARY: NUMEROUS EAST **TIMOR** PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA ATTACKS ACROSS EAST **TIMOR** IN EARLY SEPTEMBER HAVE ALREADY RESULTED IN ONE U.S. CIVIL POLICE OFFICER BEING WOUNDED. ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENT IS GROWING IN **INDONESIA** (b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

DIA IS RAISING THE TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL TO DOD PERSONNEL, FACILITIES AND INTERESTS IN **INDONESIA** FROM LOW TO MEDIUM, WITH EAST **TIMOR** CONSIDERED A HIGH THREAT AREA. THE DOD TERRORIST THREAT ASSESSMENT FACTORS OF EXISTENCE, HISTORY AND CAPABILITY ARE ASSESSED AS PRESENT. THE INTENTIONS FACTOR, AT PRESENT, EXISTS IN EAST **TIMOR**. THE TARGETING FACTOR IS ABSENT.
2. (~~C~~) THREAT ASSESSMENT EVALUATION FACTORS:
A. (~~C~~) EXISTENCE: THIS FACTOR IS PRESENT. FOLLOWING THE RELEASE OF VOTING RESULTS ON 4 SEPTEMBER 1999, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS SUPPLIED BY THE **INDONESIAN** MILITARY CONDUCTED VIOLENT ATTACKS ACROSS EAST **TIMOR**. THESE ATTACKS WERE DESIGNED TO EXPEL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ASSASSINATE PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS, TERRORIZE THE POPULATION OF EAST **TIMOR**, AND OVERTURN THE INDEPENDENCE VOTE. DOMESTIC INSURGENT/EXTREMIST GROUPS HAVE OCCASIONALLY CONDUCTED TERRORISM IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO GAIN INDEPENDENCE FROM **INDONESIA**. THE GROUPS INCLUDE THE FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT OPM IN IRIAN JAYA, THE ACEH MERDEKA MOVEMENT AMM IN NORTH SUMATRA, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY FRONT FOR AN INDEPENDENT EAST **TIMOR** FRETILIN. THE EAST **TIMORESE** MILITIAS INCLUDE: AITARAK WITH APPROXIMATELY 1,000 MEMBERS; BESI MERAH PUTIH

WITH AT LEAST 350 MEMBERS; MAHIDI CLAIMING OVER 6,000 MEMBERS; AND DAUDARUS MERAH PUTIH LISTING 1,000 TO 3,000 MEMBERS.
B. ~~(C)~~ HISTORY: THIS FACTOR IS PRESENT. FOLLOWING THE RELEASE OF THE INDEPENDENCE VOTE, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR NUMEROUS TERRORIST ATTACKS IN EAST **TIMOR**, WHICH LEFT THOUSANDS DEAD, AND WIDESPREAD PROPERTY DAMAGE.
C. ~~(C)~~ CAPABILITY: THIS FACTOR IS PRESENT

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

THEY DEMONSTRATED AN ABILITY TO CONDUCT ASSASSINATIONS AND FIREBOMBINGS DURING THEIR EARLY SEPTEMBER CAMPAIGN AGAINST EAST **TIMORESE** INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS.
D. (U) INTENTIONS: THIS FACTOR IS ABSENT THROUGHOUT MOST OF **INDONESIA** WITH THE EXCEPTION OF EAST **TIMOR**. THE **MILITIAS** HAVE PUBLICLY STATED THEIR OPPOSITION TO UN PEACEKEEPING **FORCES** IN EAST **TIMOR** AND THREATENED TO **KILL** ONE MEMBER FOR EACH DAY THE UN FORCE IS IN **TIMOR**. WHILE THESE THREATS ARE PRIMARILY FOCUSED ON THE AUSTRALIANS, OTHER UN ELEMENTS, INCLUDING US FORCES, CO-LOCATED WITH THE AUSTRALIANS WILL ALSO BE AT RISK.
E. ~~(C)~~ TARGETING: THERE CURRENTLY IS NO CREDIBLE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TARGETING OF SPECIFIC US PERSONNEL, US INTERESTS, OR UN-ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL IN **INDONESIA**. HOWEVER, ONE AMERICAN UN CIVILIAN POLICE OFFICER HAS BEEN SHOT AND WOUNDED, A GERMAN PRIEST WAS SHOT AND KILLED IN DILI AND NUMEROUS WESTERN OBSERVERS AND JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN ASSAULTED AND THREATENED WITH DEATH.
F. ~~(C)~~ SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: COLLECTIVELY, THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY FACTORS COMBINED WITH THE LOOSELY CONNECTED CLAN-BASED **MILITIAS** PRESENT A PICTURE OF CHAOS WITHIN WHICH THE AUSTRALIAN-LED UN PEACEKEEPING **FORCE** MUST OPERATE. THE GENERAL INSTABILITY IN **INDONESIA** HAS ALSO GIVEN RISE TO INCREASED ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS, WHICH THE SECURITY FORCES HAVE KEPT UNDER CONTROL, SOMETIMES THROUGH THE USE OF REPRESSIVE FORCE. IN EAST **TIMOR** SITUATION IS VOLATILE FOR WESTERN INTERESTS AS A MOOD OF ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENT PREVAILS. ON **TIMOR**, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS COVERTLY ASSISTED BY THE **INDONESIAN** MILITARY ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE THEIR
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
VIOLENCE IN ORDER TO DENY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EAST **TIMOR** INDEPENDENCE. THIS VIOLENCE WOULD PLACE AN INTERNATIONAL UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE AT INCREASED RISK.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE

ADMIN
~~DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~
#0258
67E9

NNNN

CDS

[redacted] ~~SSSS~~ [redacted]

[redacted] ~~SSSSS~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

DTG

290244Z SEP 99

FROM

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC// (b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS

~~SECRET NOFORN~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

[redacted]

SECTION 1 OF 4

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: (U) DIA [redacted] INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 29 SEP.

(U) BECAUSE DIA'S FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS USE A STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CLASSIFICATION MARKING SYSTEM THAT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH TODAY'S MESSAGE-HANDLING SYSTEM, THIS MESSAGE SHOWS THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION ABOVE IN A DIFFERENT FORM THAN THAT USED THROUGHOUT THE BODY OF THE MESSAGE. IN TERMS OF THE STANDARDIZED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MARKING SYSTEM, THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS ~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1.~~

(U) SUMMARY OF FEATURES

Non Responsive

Non Responsive

~~(C)~~ **INDONESIA**: THE INTERIM FORCE IN EAST **TIMOR** IS STRENGTHENING ITS CONTROL IN DILI WITHOUT SERIOUS INCIDENT AS MOST **INDONESIAN** FORCES WITHDRAW.

Non Responsive

The 5 pages that follow are not responsive, and not provided.

Non Responsive

INDONESIA:

1. (~~C~~) THE INTERIM FORCE IN EAST **TIMOR** (INTERFET) IS STRENGTHENING ITS CONTROL IN DILI WITHOUT SERIOUS INCIDENT AS MOST **INDONESIAN** FORCES WITHDRAW.
2. (~~C~~) NO SHOOTINGS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN DILI SINCE 23 SEPTEMBER. INTERFET CONTROL OF THE CITY IS NOT COMPLETE, BUT NO INCIDENTS OF PRO-JAKARTA RESISTANCE TO INTERFET HAVE BEEN REPORTED.
3. (~~C~~) **INDONESIA** TURNED OVER SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES TO INTERFET IN A 27 SEPTEMBER CEREMONY IN DILI. JAKARTA AND INTERFET DISAGREE ABOUT THE EXTENT OF THE TRANSFER. INTERFET COMMANDER MAJ GEN COSGROVE MAINTAINED THAT EAST **TIMOR** IS STILL **INDONESIAN** SOVEREIGN TERRITORY AND THAT JAKARTA WOULD STILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY THERE. AN **INDONESIAN MILITARY** SPOKESMAN RESPONDED THAT INTERFET HAD COMPLETE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY FOLLOWING THE HANDOVER; REMAINING **INDONESIAN FORCES** WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE ONLY FOR PROTECTING **INDONESIAN** GOVERNMENT ASSETS AND HELPING THE UN WITH SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
4. (~~S~~) SIX **INDONESIAN** BATTALIONS AND A HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT LEFT EAST **TIMOR** FROM 24 THROUGH 26 SEPTEMBER. A MARINE BATTALION AND A STRATEGIC RESERVE INFANTRY BATTALION ARE EXPECTED TO DEPART. THE FORCE REMAINING WILL NUMBER 1,200 TO 1,500.
5. (~~C~~) INTERFET IS EXPANDING OUTSIDE DILI. ON 27 SEPTEMBER, A FORCE OF 150 AUSTRALIAN TROOPS WITH BLACK HAWK HELICOPTERS SUPPORT ENTERED AND SECURED THE TOWN OF LIQUICA, 25 KM WEST OF DILI. LIQUICA WAS A STRONGHOLD OF BESIH MERAH PUTIH, ONE OF THE MOST AGGRESSIVE AND VIOLENT OF THE PRO-JAKARTA MILITIAS, BUT MILITIA MEMBERS WITHDREW FROM THE TOWN AND DID NOT RESIST THE INTERFET ADVANCE.
6. (~~S~~) IN JAKARTA, STUDENT ACTIVISTS POSTPONED A RENEWAL OF DEMONSTRATIONS PLANNED FOR 27 SEPTEMBER. PROTESTS ARE LIKELY TO RESUME LATER THIS WEEK, COINCIDING WITH THE 1 OCTOBER OPENING OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

The final 3 pages are not responsive.

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424

DTG
311704Z AUG 99
FROM
FM SSO DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424
CONTROLS
~~TOPSECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
QQQQ
SECTION 1 OF 5
)))
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
SUBJ: DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424 INTSUM 213-99/31 AUG 99
)))
(b)(3):10 USC 424

)))
FEATURES
Non Responsive

(U) **INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR** UPDATE
Non Responsive

The next 4 pages are not responsive, and not provided.

Non Responsive

(U) **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** UPDATE
AS OF 0700Z 31 AUG 99

1. (U) MOST SIDES OF THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN **INDONESIA** ARE CELEBRATING THE 30 AUGUST AUTONOMY BALLOT IN EAST **TIMOR**. UN AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS, INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS, AND THE **INDONESIAN** MILITARY ALL HAVE HIGH PRAISE FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE VOTE THAT MOST EXPECTED TO BE INTERRUPTED BY VIOLENCE. **INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES** COMMANDER WIRANTO HAD HIGH PRAISE FOR THE BALLOT, URGING IMPERFECTIONS SHOULD NOT BE "BLOWN OUT OF PROPORTION."

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),1.4 (c)

3. (U) PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS ALIKE ARE IMPRESSED WITH THE RELATIVE CALM THAT PERVADED DURING THE BALLOTING PERIOD. PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA LEADERS ARE THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION, CLAIMING THAT UN TEAM MEMBERS WERE CLEARLY BIASED AND INTERFERED WITH THE PROCESS. THEY APPEAR TO BE SETTING THE STAGE TO CALL FOR THE REJECTION OF THE VOTE, APPARENTLY CONVINCED INDEPENDENCE WILL EMERGE AS THE POPULAR CHOICE.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

5. ~~(C)~~ FOLLOWING THE RELEASE OF THE BALLOT RESULTS, A MARKED INCREASE IN UNREST IS EXPECTED IN EAST **TIMOR**. THE **INDONESIAN** SECURITY FORCES, ANXIOUS TO IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL OPINIONS, WILL FOCUS THEIR EFFORTS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A STABLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. THEY WILL ALSO WORK TO MAINTAIN BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES AND PREPARE FOR ANY POSSIBLE EVACUATIONS -- WHETHER VOLUNTARY OR REQUIRED.

~~(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES, DECLASSIFY ON X1)~~

Non Responsive

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424

DTG
171704Z SEP 99
FROM
FM SSO DIA/(b)(3):10 USC 424
CONTROLS
~~TOPSECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424
SECTION 1 OF 7
QQQQ
)))
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
SUBJ: DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424 INTSUM 225-99/17 SEP 99

(b)(3):10 USC 424

)))
FEATURES

Non Responsive

(U) **INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR** UPDATE

Non Responsive

The next 6 pages contain no responsive data and are not provided.

Non Responsive

)))

(U) **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** UPDATE

AS OF 0700Z 17 SEP 99

1. (~~C~~) JAKARTA CONTINUED TO WITHDRAW ITS **FORCES** FROM EAST **TIMOR** ON 16 SEPTEMBER IN ANTICIPATION OF THE ARRIVAL OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING **FORCE**.

2. (~~C~~) **ARMED FORCES** COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO CONFIRMED PUBLICLY THAT HE WOULD PULL OUT HIS TROOPS AS SOON AS THE INTERNATIONAL **FORCE** IS ESTABLISHED IN EAST **TIMOR**. JAKARTA ANTICIPATES THE ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST PEACEKEEPING TROOPS ON 20 SEPTEMBER. THERE ARE GROWING SIGNS THAT MOST **INDONESIAN** MILITARY UNITS ARE PULLING OUT OF EAST **TIMOR**.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 ******/

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

4. (~~C~~) SOME **MILITIAS** ALSO PLAN TO WITHDRAW PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE PEACEKEEPING **FORCE**, BUT IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THEY ARE MOVING TO SAFE HAVENS IN WEST **TIMOR** OR MERELY REGROUPING TO THE WESTERN DISTRICTS OF EAST **TIMOR**, WHERE SUPPORT FOR JAKARTA IS STRONGEST.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

6. (~~C~~) IN DILI, SPORADIC FIRING AND **LOOTING** CONTINUED, BUT SOME OF THE PRO-JAKARTA **MILITIA FORCES** APPEARED TO BE PREPARING TO WITHDRAW. THE SLIGHT UPSURGE IN **MILITIA** LAWLESSNESS REPORTED ON 16 SEPTEMBER MIGHT HAVE REPRESENTED A FINAL SPREE OF LOOTING BEFORE LEAVING THE CITY. TROOPS FROM KOSTRAD, THE ARMY'S STRATEGIC RESERVE INFANTRY COMMAND, WERE PRESENT IN DILI AND ALONG THE MAIN ROUTE TO WEST **TIMOR**, IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO IMPOSE SOME ORDER AND TO CHECK FOR THE MOVEMENT OF WEAPONS AND STOLEN GOODS.

(b)(1),1.4
(c),1.4 (d)

8. (~~C~~) ASSESSMENT: THE PRESENCE OF HOSTILE **MILITIAS** WILL CREATE A DANGEROUS AND SOMEWHAT CHAOTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE FIRST ARRIVING PEACEKEEPERS. THE INTERNATIONAL **FORCES** COULD FACE THE THREAT OF STIFF **MILITIA** OPPOSITION IN SOME AREAS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE SNIPING AND **AMBUSHES**.

9. (~~C~~) THE COMPLETE DEPARTURE OF **INDONESIAN** SECURITY **FORCES** PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE PEACEKEEPING **FORCE** IS UNLIKELY. A PERIOD OF OVERLAP IS PROBABLE IN DILI.

10. (~~C~~) THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOME OF THE **MILITIAS**, THE REGROUPING OF **MILITIA FORCES** IN THE WEST OF EAST **TIMOR**, AND THE BUILDUP OF **INDONESIAN MILITARY FORCES** JUST INSIDE THE BORDER IN WEST **TIMOR** LENDS SUBSTANCE TO SUSPICIONS THAT THE **MILITARY** WILL CONTINUE COVERT ASSISTANCE TO THE **MILITIAS**.

(b)(1),1.4
(c),1.4 (d)

~~(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES, DECLASSIFY ON X1)~~

)))

Non Responsive

The final 3 pages contain no responsive information.

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424

DTG

181104Z SEP 99

FROM

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~FM SSO DIA/~~

CONTROLS

~~TOPSECRET~~

QQQQ

)))

BODY

SUBJ: DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424 INTSUM 226-99/18 SEP 99

)))

(b)(3):10 USC 424

)))

(U) **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** UPDATE

AS OF 0700Z 18 SEP 99

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

6. (~~C~~) ASSESSMENT: THE GROUND THREAT TO THE MULTINATIONAL **FORCE** REMAINS HIGH, PARTICULARLY IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS OF EAST **TIMOR** WHERE THE PRO-JAKARTA **MILITIAS** ARE STRONGEST. PEACEKEEPING TROOPS WILL FACE THE RISK OF SNIPER ATTACKS AND **AMBUSHES** FROM HOSTILE **MILITIA** ELEMENTS. THE **MILITIAS** HAVE MOSTLY SMALL ARMS, BUT SOME **MILITIA** TROOPS CARRY LIGHT MACHINEGUNS.

7. (~~C~~) SOME **MILITIA FORCES** ARE WITHDRAWING INTO THE WESTERN PART OF EAST **TIMOR** AND MAY TRY TO ESTABLISH A PRO-JAKARTA ENCLAVE THERE.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

~~(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES, DECLASSIFY ON X1)~~

ADMIN

#2616

4864

NNNN

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):10 USC 424 [redacted]

CDS

[redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424

HEADER

P R 201704Z SEP 99

(b)(3):10 USC 424 **FM SSO DIA** [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]

INFO SAFE

(b)(3):10 USC 424 [redacted]

CONTROLS

~~TOPSECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]

SECTION 1 OF 6

QQQQ

)))

/******** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/**

BODY

SUBJ: DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424 [redacted] **INTSUM 228-99/20 SEP 99**

)))

(b)(3):10 USC 424 [redacted]

)))

FEATURES

Non Responsive [redacted]

(U) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR UPDATE

Non Responsive [redacted]

)))

FEATURES

)))

Non Responsive [redacted]

(b)(3):10 USC 424 [redacted]

The next 7 pages are not responsive, and not provided.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 006 ******/

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

4. ~~(S)~~ THE SECURITY SITUATION IN DILI HAS IMPROVED, BUT MILITIA FORCES REMAINING IN THE CITY ARE STILL ARMED AND THREATENING.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),~~1.4~~ (d)

~~(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES; DECLASSIFY ON X1)~~

)))

Non Responsive

(b)(3):10 USC 424

The final page is not responsive.

CDS
(b)(3):10 USC 424

HEADER
P R **241704Z SEP 99**
FM SSO DIA/(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

INFO SAFE
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

CONTROLS
~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
SECTION 1 OF 4
QQQQ
)))
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
SUBJ: DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424 INTSUM 232-99/24 SEP 99
)))

(b)(3):10 USC 424
)))
FEATURES
Non Responsive

The next 4 pages are not responsive

Non Responsive

)))
(U) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR UPDATE
AS OF 0700Z 24 SEP 99
1. ~~(C)~~ TENSION REMAINS HIGH IN DILI IN THE AFTERMATH OF 23 SEPTEMBER SHOOTING INCIDENTS BY PRO-JAKARTA MILITIA. ALLEGATIONS BY PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS THAT THE MILITIAS ARE PLANTING MINES AND BOOBYTRAPS IN DILI AND BAUCAU ARE UNCONFIRMED BUT CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED.
2. ~~(C)~~ PRESIDENT HABIBIE ANNOUNCED THE REVOCATION OF THE MARTIAL LAW IN EFFECT IN EAST TIMOR SINCE 7 SEPTEMBER.
3. (S) MEANWHILE, UNCONFIRMED REPORTS CLAIM THAT MILITIA FORCES WERE MASSING AT LIQUISA, 35 KM WEST OF DILI, ON 23 SEPTEMBER AND WERE THREATENING TO ATTACK INTERFET TROOPS. A MILITIA LEADER CLAIMED THAT HIS FORCES WERE REGROUPING AND PLANNED TO CONTINUE THEIR STRUGGLE, BUT HE SAID THEY HAD NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO ATTACK INTERFET.
4. ~~(C)~~ IN JAKARTA, UP TO 15,000 STUDENTS AND OTHER POLITICAL ACTIVISTS CONVERGED ON PARLIAMENT TO PROTEST THE 23 SEPTEMBER PASSAGE OF A STATE SECURITY LAW. PROTESTS ALSO ARE TAKING PLACE ON THE 24TH AS WELL. THE LAW SETS GUIDELINES FOR THE MILITARY'S POWERS DURING A STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY. SOME CRITICS ALSO SUSPECT THAT PASSAGE OF THE NEW LAW WILL SET THE STAGE FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IF MASS UNREST BREAKS OUT DURING THE COMING PARLIAMENTARY SESSION.
5. ~~(C)~~ THE 23 SEPTEMBER DEMONSTRATIONS WERE THE LARGEST STUDENT PROTESTS IN JAKARTA SO FAR HIS YEAR. ACCORDING TO UNCONFIRMED REPORTS, THREE PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND THIRTY-SIX INJURED WHEN THE PROTESTS TURNED VIOLENT. IN ADDITION TO THE UNREST IN JAKARTA, PROTESTERS IN SURABAYA OVERWHELMED SECURITY FORCES AND OCCUPIED THE REGIONAL LEGISLATIVE COMPOUND OVERNIGHT.
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/
6. ~~(C)~~ ASSESSMENT: SPORADIC OUTBREAKS OF MILITIA VIOLENCE AND CLASHES BETWEEN THE MILITIAS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE. THE GROUND THREAT TO INTERFET REMAINS HIGH, PARTICULARLY IN WESTERN AREAS OF EAST TIMOR, WHERE THE MILITIAS ARE STRONGEST AND WHERE MILITIA FORCES ARE REPORTED TO BE REGROUPING.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

Final page withheld in full.

(b)(3):10 USC 424 [redacted]

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 [redacted]

HEADER

P R 271704Z SEP 99

(b)(3):10 USC 424 FM SSO DIA/ [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]

INFO SAFE

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]

CONTROLS

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]

SECTION 1 OF 5

QQQQ

)))

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY

SUBJ: DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424 [redacted] INTSUM 233-99/27 SEP 99

)))

(b)(3):10 USC 424 [redacted]

)))

[redacted] Non Responsive

(U) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR UPDATE

[redacted] Non Responsive

(b)(3):10 USC 424 [redacted]

The next two pages are not responsive and not provided.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

Non Responsive



)))

(U) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR UPDATE
AS OF 2200Z 26 SEP 99

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

2. (~~S~~) TWO MORE BATTALIONS, A MARINE BATTALION AND A STRATEGIC RESERVE BATTALION, ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART.

5. (~~C~~) THE SECURITY SITUATION IN DILI REMAINED UNSETTLED, BUT NO NEW FIRING INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED SINCE 23 SEPTEMBER. THE MILITIAS HAVE YET TO ENGAGE INTERFET FORCES.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

6. (~~C~~) DILI HAS STABILIZIED SUFFICIENTLY THAT MANY RESIDENTS WHO HAD FLED TO THE HILLS SOUTH OF THE CITY EARLIER THIS MONTH ARE NOW RETURNING. NOT ALL OF DILI IS SECURE, HOWEVER, AND THE COUNTRYSIDE REMAINS DANGEROUS.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/

7. (~~S~~) THIS SLIDE SHOWS THE BATTALIONS THAT WERE WITHDRAWN OVER THE WEEKEND AND THE TWO THAT ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART. THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS YET THAT THE REMAINING THREE WILL DEPART.

8. (~~S~~) IN JAKARTA, NO FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEEN REPORTED. THE OPENING OF THE NEW PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY ON 1 OCTOBER WILL PROVIDE A FOCUS FOR NEW UNREST.

9. (~~S~~) ADDITIONAL SECURITY FORCES ARE MOVING INTO JAKARTA IN ANTICIPATION. REPORTS HAVE NOTED TROOPS ARRIVING AT A BIVOUAC AREA AT JAKARTA'S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. THE ACTIVITY IS SIMILAR TO WHAT WAS NOTED DURING PREVIOUS PERIODS OF RIOTING IN THE CITY.

10. (~~C~~) OUR ASSESSMENT IS UNCHANGED. THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION IN EAST TIMOR, AS INDONESIAN TROOPS DEPART BEFORE INTERFET HAS COMPLETED THE EXPANSION OF ITS AREA OF OPERATIONS INTO THE INTERIOR, WILL BE PARTICULARLY TENSE. CLASHES BETWEEN THE MILITIAS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS ARE EXPECTED TO INCREASE. THE GROUND THREAT TO INTERFET AS IT MOVES DEEPER INTO THE INTERIOR WILL BE HIGH, ESPECIALLY IN THE WESTERN AREAS OF EAST TIMOR, WHERE THE MILITIAS ARE STRONGEST AND WHERE MILITIA FORCES ARE REPORTED TO BE REGROUPING

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

~~DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES; DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~

)))

Non Responsive

(b)(3):10 USC 424

The information in the remaining 5 pages is not responsive.

CDS
(b)(3):10 USC 424

DTG
281704Z SEP 99
FROM
FM SSO DIA/(b)(3):10 USC 424
CONTROLS
~~TOP SECRET~~(b)(3):10 USC 424
SECTION 1 OF 7
QQQQ
)))
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
SUBJ: DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424 INTSUM 234-99/28 SEP 99
)))
(b)(3):10 USC 424
)))
Non Responsive

(U) **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** UPDATE
Non Responsive

The next 3 pages are not responsive and not provided.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

Non Responsive

)))

(U) **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** UPDATE

AS OF 0500Z 28 SEP 99

1. (~~C~~) INTERFET IS STRENGTHENING ITS CONTROL IN DILI WITHOUT SERIOUS INCIDENT AS MOST OF THE **INDONESIAN** FORCES IN EAST **TIMOR** WITHDRAW. NO SHOOTING INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN DILI SINCE 23 SEPTEMBER. INTERFET CONTROL OF THE CITY IS NOT YET COMPLETE, BUT NO INCIDENTS OF PRO-JAKARTA RESISTANCE TO INTERFET HAVE BEEN REPORTED. (b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

2. (~~S~~) **INDONESIA** TURNED OVER SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES TO INTERFET IN A 27 SEPTEMBER CEREMONY IN DILI.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

4. ~~(C)~~ RECENT REPORTS SUGGEST THAT CONDITIONS IN THE AMBENO REGENCY, THE ISOLATED ENCLAVE OF EAST **TIMOR** SURROUNDED BY **INDONESIAN** WEST **TIMOR**, ARE AMONG THE WORST IN THE PROVINCE. REPORTS STATE THAT MANY SETTLEMENTS HAVE BEEN BURNED AND ARE EMPTY GHOST TOWNS. OBSERVERS VISITING WEST **TIMOR** REPORTED UNCONFIRMED STORIES OF HUNDREDS OF DEATHS, HOUSES BURNED, AND THE ABANDONMENT OF PANTE MAKASSAR, THE DISTRICT CAPITAL. A LARGE FLOW OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS FROM AMBENO HAS ENTERED THE CAMPS AT KEFAMENANU, WHERE CONDITIONS ARE REPORTED TO BE AMONG THE WORST IN WEST **TIMOR**. ARMED PRO-JAKARTA MILITIA MEMBERS ARE SAID TO BE OPERATING FREELY, PERSECUTING PRO-INDEPENDENCE REFUGEES.

5. ~~(C)~~ IN JAKARTA, STUDENT ACTIVISTS POSTPONED A RENEWAL OF DEMONSTRATIONS PLANNED FOR 27 SEPTEMBER. PROTESTS ARE EXPECTED TO RESUME LATER THIS WEEK, TO COINCIDE WITH THE 1 OCTOBER OPENING OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY.

6. ~~(C)~~ IN ACEH, IN NORTHERN SUMATRA, A BUS CARRYING MOBIL OIL EMPLOYEES WAS FIRED UPON, PROBABLY WITH AN AK-47, BY A LONE GUNMAN ON 25 SEPTEMBER. NO INJURIES WERE SUSTAINED, BUT THE INCIDENT WAS THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT SO FAR AGAINST MOBIL EMPLOYEES IN ACEH. NO PERPETRATOR HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED. AMONG THE SUSPECTS ARE MEMBERS OF THE ACEHNESE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL, AND DISGRUNTLED LOCAL VILLAGERS.

~~(b)(1),1.4~~ (c),1.4 (d)

8. ~~(C)~~ THE DEPARTURE OF **INDONESIAN** TROOPS AND THE EXPANDING PRESENCE OF INTERFET WILL LESSEN THE INTIMIDATION OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE POPULATION AND CAUSE PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS AND ARMED GUERRILLAS TO OPERATE MORE OPENLY. CLASHES BETWEEN REMAINING **MILITIA FORCES** AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE.

9. ~~(C)~~ DESPITE THE LACK OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS, INTERFET REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE CLASHES WITH THE **MILITIAS** AS ITS **FORCES** ENTER PRO-JAKARTA STRONGHOLDS WEST OF DILI.

10. ~~(C)~~ REPORTS FROM WEST **TIMOR** SUGGEST THAT **MILITIA** LEADERS RELOCATED FROM EAST **TIMOR** ARE AT LEAST CONSIDERING OPERATIONS ACROSS THE BORDER INTO EAST **TIMOR** WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF SECURING A PRO-JAKARTA ENCLAVE IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS OF THE PROVINCE.

~~DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES; DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~

)))

The remaining 7 pages are not responsive and not provided.

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SSSS~~

~~SSSSS~~

HEADER

P R **141724Z SEP 99**

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE WASH DC

(b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~

SECTION 1 OF 3

BODY

SUBJ: DIA FOREIGN SUPPORT INTSUM 215-99/14 SEP 99. (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424,Non Responsive

The next 5 pages are not responsive to the request, and not provided.

Non Responsive

ITEM 6 - (U) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR SITUATION UPDATE
AS OF 0700Z 14 SEP 99
1. ~~(S)~~ DILI WAS GENERALLY CALM FOR THE SECOND DAY ON 13 SEPTEMBER AS LEADERS IN JAKARTA DISAGREED OVER THE COMPOSITION OF A UN

PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
2. ~~(S)~~ PRO-JAKARTA MILITIA MEMBERS WERE STILL PRESENT IN DILI, BUT
BT
ADMIN
#3656
NNNN

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SSSS~~

~~SSSSS~~

DTG

141724Z SEP 99

FROM

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~

SECTION 3 OF 3

BODY

SUBJ: DIA FOREIGN SUPPORT INTSUM 215-99/14 SEP 99. (U)

THEY REPORTEDLY WERE LIMITING THEIR ACTIVITY MOSTLY TO LOOTING. GUNFIRE STILL COULD BE HEARD IN THE CITY'S OUTSKIRTS, AND **INDONESIAN** AUTHORITIES CONTINUED TO TRANSPORT **TIMORESE** REFUGEES OUT OF THE PROVINCE ON 13 SEPTEMBER USING DILI'S PORT.

3. (~~C~~) UNAMET CLOSED ITS COMPOUND ON 14 SEPTEMBER, AND ORDERED THE EVACUATION OF ALL BUT 12 OF THE 88 UNAMET PERSONNEL. THE MORE THAN 1,300 **TIMORESE** REFUGEES SHELTERED IN THE COMPOUND WERE ALSO EVACUATED.

4. (~~C~~) NO NEW ATTACKS ON REFUGEES WERE REPORTED IN EAST OR WEST **TIMOR** ON 13 SEPTEMBER. NONETHELESS, PRO-JAKARTA FORCES REPORTEDLY ARE SEARCHING REFUGEE CAMPS IN WEST **TIMOR** WITH HIT LISTS, LOOKING FOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE RESISTANCE LEADERS. A MAJOR SWEEP THROUGH WEST **TIMOR** BY **INDONESIAN** SECURITY **FORCES** AND **MILITIA** REPORTEDLY WILL OCCUR ON 15 SEPTEMBER. THE **MILITIAS** REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN SEPARATING YOUNG MEN FROM WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND TAKING THEM AWAY. THEIR FATE IS UNKNOWN. FOREIGN RELIEF WORKERS AND JOURNALISTS ALSO HAVE BEEN HARASSED BY THE **MILITIAS** AND SECURITY **FORCES** AND DENIED ACCESS TO THE CAMPS.

5. (~~C~~) AS REFUGEES ARRIVE IN SAFE HAVENS, REPORTS ARE INCREASING OF EARLIER ATROCITIES. THESE REPORTS ALLEGE SYSTEMATIC TARGETING OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS, **TIMORESE** WORKING FOR FOREIGNERS, AND CATHOLIC PRIESTS.

6. (~~C~~) MIXED GOVERNMENT REACTION TO PKO PARTICIPATION. IN JAKARTA, NO GOVERNMENT OR OPPOSITION LEADERS REJECTED THE IDEA OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE, BUT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS DIFFERED ON AN AUSTRALIAN PRESENCE. PRESIDENT HABIBIE SAID HE TRUSTED THE UN TO DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE AFTER CONSULTING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS IN NEW YORK.

7. (~~C~~) A HABIBIE AIDE EARLIER SAID THAT **INDONESIA** PREFERRED ASIAN

PEACEKEEPERS, AND HABIBIE'S CALL FOR FORCES FROM WHAT HE CALLED "FRIENDLY NATIONS" IMPLIED ASEAN MEMBERS AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. THE PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, HAS NOT INSISTED ON THIS.

8. ~~(C)~~ MOST OTHER LEADERS OPPOSE THE AUSTRALIANS. A **MILITARY** SPOKESMAN SAID THE **ARMED FORCES** SIMPLY COULD NOT ACCEPT THE AUSTRALIANS. THE CHAIRMAN OF HABIBIE'S OWN RULING PARTY, GOLKAR, SAID HE THOUGHT AUSTRALIA, THE US, NEW ZEALAND, CANADA, AND PORTUGAL SHOULD BE REJECTED. THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OPPOSED AUSTRALIANS. MEDIA COMMENTATORS MOSTLY WERE AGAINST THE AUSTRALIANS, ARGUING THAT THE **INDONESIAN** PUBLIC WOULD REJECT THEM. MEANWHILE, PRO-JAKARTA **TIMORESE** LEADERS REJECTED A PEACEKEEPING **FORCE** REGARDLESS OF ITS COMPOSITION.

9. ~~(C)~~ **MILITARY** OPPOSITION TO AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION PROBABLY REPRESENTS AN EFFORT TO DELAY THE INTRODUCTION OF PEACEKEEPERS AND TO LIMIT THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. THE **INDONESIAN FORCES** AND **MILITIAS** ARE LIKELY TO USE THE INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF PEACEKEEPERS TO INTENSIFY THEIR REPRESSION OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS. NONETHELESS, THE **MILITARY** MAY STILL BE AMENABLE TO COMPROMISE.

10. ~~(C)~~ HABIBIE'S AGREEMENT TO A PEACEKEEPING **FORCE** HAS NOT YET BEEN REFLECTED ON THE GROUND IN **TIMOR. MILITARY** AND **MILITIA** ACTIVITIES ARE LIKELY TO GO ON UNCHECKED, AT LEAST UNTIL A PEACEKEEPING **FORCE** ARRIVES ON THE SCENE.

(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON X1~~)

Non Responsive

The final page is not responsive, and not provided.

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SSSS~~

~~SSSS~~

HEADER

P R **171724Z SEP 99**

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC// (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE WASH DC

(b)(3):10 USC 424

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~

SECTION 1 OF 3

BODY

SUBJ: DIA FOREIGN SUPPORT INTSUM 218-99/17 SEP 99. (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424,Non Responsive

The next 5 pages are not responsive to your request.

Non Responsive

ITEM 5 - (U) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR UPDATE
AS OF 0700Z 17 SEP 99

1. (~~C~~) JAKARTA CONTINUED TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM EAST TIMOR ON 16 SEPTEMBER IN ANTICIPATION OF THE ARRIVAL OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

2. (~~C~~) ARMED FORCES COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO CONFIRMED PUBLICLY THAT HE WOULD PULL OUT HIS TROOPS AS SOON AS THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IS ESTABLISHED IN EAST TIMOR. JAKARTA ANTICIPATES THE ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST PEACEKEEPING TROOPS ON 20 SEPTEMBER. THERE ARE GROWING SIGNS THAT MOST INDONESIAN MILITARY UNITS ARE PULLING OUT OF EAST TIMOR.

3. (~~C~~) SOME MILITIAS ALSO PLAN TO WITHDRAW PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE, BUT IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THEY ARE MOVING TO SAFE HAVENS IN WEST TIMOR OR MERELY REGROUPING TO THE WESTERN DISTRICTS OF EAST TIMOR, WHERE SUPPORT FOR JAKARTA IS STRONGEST.

4. ~~(S)~~ ALTHOUGH THE INDONESIAN MILITARY APPEARS TO BE COOPERATING WITH THE UN AND SHOWS NO SIGN OF AN INTENTION TO RESIST OR IMPEDE THE BT

ADMIN

#4207

NNNN

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SSSS~~

~~SSSSS~~

DTG

171724Z SEP 99

FROM

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/(b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~

SECTION 3 OF 3

BODY

SUBJ: DIA FOREIGN SUPPORT INTSUM 218-99/17 SEP 99. (U)

DEPLOYMENT OF THE MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING **FORCE**, PRO-JAKARTA **MILITIA** GROUPS CONTINUE TO THREATEN THE **FORCE**. A **MILITIA** LEADER ANNOUNCED ON 16 SEPTEMBER THAT HE WOULD PUT 8 DISTRICTS IN THE WESTERN PART OF EAST **TIMOR** OFF LIMITS TO THE PEACEKEEPERS. THE

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d) /**MILITARY** AND **MILITIA FORCES** APPEAR TO BE ESTABLISHING A PRESENCE ALONG THE BORDER JUST INSIDE WEST **TIMOR** FROM WHICH TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS.

5. ~~(C)~~ IN DILI, SPORADIC FIRING AND **LOOTING** CONTINUED, BUT SOME OF THE PRO-JAKARTA **MILITIA FORCES** APPEARED TO BE PREPARING TO WITHDRAW. THE SLIGHT UPSURGE IN **MILITIA** LAWLESSNESS REPORTED ON 16 SEPTEMBER MIGHT HAVE REPRESENTED A FINAL SPREE OF LOOTING BEFORE LEAVING THE CITY. TROOPS FROM KOSTRAD, THE ARMY'S STRATEGIC RESERVE INFANTRY COMMAND, WERE PRESENT IN DILI AND ALONG THE MAIN ROUTE TO WEST **TIMOR**, IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO IMPOSE SOME ORDER AND TO CHECK FOR THE MOVEMENT OF WEAPONS AND STOLEN GOODS.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

7. ~~(C)~~ ASSESSMENT: THE PRESENCE OF HOSTILE **MILITIAS** WILL CREATE A DANGEROUS AND SOMEWHAT CHAOTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE FIRST ARRIVING PEACEKEEPERS. THE INTERNATIONAL **FORCES** COULD FACE THE THREAT OF STIFF **MILITIA** OPPOSITION IN SOME AREAS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE SNIPING AND **AMBUSHES**.

8. ~~(C)~~ THE COMPLETE DEPARTURE OF **INDONESIAN** SECURITY **FORCES** PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE PEACEKEEPING **FORCE** IS UNLIKELY. A PERIOD OF

OVERLAP IS PROBABLE IN DILI.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)



(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON X1)~~

)))

Non Responsive



The final page is non responsive, and not provided.

CDS



(b)(3):10 USC 424

DTG
221724Z SEP 99
FROM
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/(b)(3):10 USC 424
CONTROLS
~~SECRET~~
CORRECTED COPY
)))
SECTION 1 OF 3
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
SUBJ: DIA FOREIGN SUPPORT INTSUM 222-99/22 SEP 99. (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424,Non Responsive

The next 3 pages are not responsive, and not provided.

~~(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES, DECLASSIFY ON X1)~~
)))
ITEM 4 - (U) **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** UPDATE
AS OF 0700Z 22 SEP 99
1. ~~(S)~~ **INDONESIAN FORCES** ARE PREPARING FOR ADDITIONAL WITHDRAWALS FROM EAST **TIMOR**. VEHICLE CONVOYS WERE FORMING UP AT THE **MILITARY** HEADQUARTERS IN APPARENT DEPARTURE PREPARATIONS, AND LSTS ALSO WERE LOADING AT DILI PORT.
2. ~~(C)~~ EAST **TIMORESE** PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADER GUSMAO PLANS TO RETURN TO DILI AS SOON AS SECURITY CONDITIONS PERMIT TO ESTABLISH AN ADMINISTRATION IN COOPERATION WITH THE UN. GUSMAO, WHO WAS FREED FROM HOUSE ARREST BY JAKARTA TWO WEEKS AGO, ARRIVED IN DARWIN ON 19 SEPTEMBER. HE DENIED REPORTS THAT HE WAS PLANNING TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE.
3. ~~(C)~~ REFUGEES WERE BEGINNING TO RETURN TO DILI AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF IMPROVED SECURITY CONDITIONS; HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL NEW REPORTED INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE. A FOREIGN JOURNALIST WAS FOUND DEAD JUST OUTSIDE DILI, AND TWO OTHER JOURNALISTS WERE ATTACKED BY MILITANTS. THERE WERE ALSO TWO REPORTED CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-JAKARTA AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS.
4. ~~(C)~~ IN JAKARTA, A CONTROVERSIAL NEW GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED DRAFT SECURITY BILL UNDER DELIBERATION BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HAS SPARKED STUDENT PROTESTS. OPPONENTS OF THE BILL CLAIM THAT IT WILL GIVE THE MILITARY SWEEPING NEW POWERS DURING NATIONAL EMERGENCIES. ALTHOUGH THE REVISED VERSION OF THE BILL UNDER DEBATE HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED, THE ORIGINAL DRAFT GAVE THE MILITARY THE POWER TO CONTROL MAIL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE NEWS MEDIA; RESTRICT THE MOVEMENT OF CITIZENS; DETAIN SUSPECTS WITHOUT TRIAL; AND BAN OR LIMIT STREET DEMONSTRATIONS. THE MILITARY ALREADY HAS BROAD POWERS UNDER EXISTING STATE OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION, BUT OPPONENTS APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT THE NEW BILL WOULD RENEW AND PERPETUATE MARTIAL LAW PROVISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE REGIME OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND COUNTER THE TREND TOWARD A MORE OPEN AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. THESE DEMONSTRATIONS COULD TURN VIOLENT AS THE LEGISLATION COMES UP FOR A VOTE ON 23 SEPTEMBER.
5. ~~(C)~~ DESPITE CONTINUING DISCONTENT OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST **TIMOR**, PRESIDENT HABIBIE URGED PARLIAMENTARY VALIDATION OF THE 30 AUGUST EAST **TIMOR** INDEPENDENCE VOTE IN A 21 SEPTEMBER ADDRESS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. HABIBIE ARGUED THAT, DESPITE ALLEGATIONS OF UN BIAS, THE VOTE SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AS A VALID REFLECTION OF THE WILL OF THE EAST **TIMORESE** PEOPLE. HE DEFENDED THE MULTINATIONAL **FORCE** AS NECESSARY TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER.

6. ~~(C)~~ ASSESSMENT: **MILITARY** WITHDRAWAL PREPARATIONS FROM EAST **TIMOR** ARE PROCEEDING.
7. ~~(C)~~ ALTHOUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MNF TO DILI HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT SERIOUS INCIDENT, THE GROUND THREAT WILL REMAIN HIGH AS THE MNF EXPANDS INTO THE INTERIOR. THE MAIN THREAT CONSISTS OF POSSIBLE SPORADIC SNIPER ATTACKS AND **AMBUSHES** BY PRO-JAKARTA **MILITIAS**. THE ATTITUDE OF THE **INDONESIAN MILITARY** TOWARD THE MNF SO FAR HAS BEEN CORRECT AND COOPERATIVE.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

9. ~~(C)~~ IN JAKARTA, THE VOTE ON THE PROPOSED NEW NATIONAL SECURITY LAW /****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/
WILL PROVIDE A FLASH POINT FOR THE MANY OPPONENTS OF HABIBIE, THE MILITARY, AND THE SURVIVING VESTIGES OF SOEHARTO'S OLD AUTHORITARIAN REGIME. THE VOTE WILL INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY THAT DEMONSTRATIONS WILL TURN VIOLENT.
(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES~~; DECLASSIFY ON X1~~)
)))

Non Responsive

The final page is not responsive, and not provided.

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SSSS~~

~~SSSSS~~

HEADER

P R **071714Z SEP 99**

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC// (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE WASH DC

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

BT

CONTROLS (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~

SECTION 1 OF 4

OOOO

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

)))

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY

SUBJ: DIA NADA INTSUM 210-99/DIA WASH DC/7 SEP 99. (U)

Non Responsive

The next 6 pages are not responsive and not included.

Non Responsive

)))

(U) INDONESIA: SITUATION UPDATE

AS OF 0700Z 7 SEP 99

1. ~~(S)~~ THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE BY THE MINUTE.

2. ~~(S)~~ THE CAPITAL OF DILI IS REPORTEDLY UNDER THE COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

4. ~~(S)~~ UN PERSONNEL, FOREIGN OBSERVERS, JOURNALISTS AND PRO-JAKARTA TIMORESE HAVE ALL BEGUN TO LEAVE EAST TIMOR AS A RESULT OF THE VIOLENT ENVIRONMENT. CURRENT UN STRENGTH IS REPORTED TO BE ABOUT 400, DOWN FROM ITS ORIGINAL 1,000. THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION OF THE EVACUATION OF THE UN'S LOCAL STAFF MEMBERS WHO HAVE BEEN FREQUENT TARGETS OF MILITIA ATTACKS.

5. ~~(C)~~ IN AN EFFORT TO FINALLY GAIN CONTROL OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR, INDONESIAN PRESIDENT HABIBIE IMPOSED MARTIAL LAW IN THE TERRITORY, EFFECTIVE 7 SEPTEMBER. ACCORDING TO THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTION, UNDER MARTIAL LAW THE ARMED FORCES HAVE INCREASED POWERS TO INCLUDE EXPANDED SEARCHES AND THE AUTHORITY TO ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT. IF MARTIAL LAW FAILS, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO ALLOW AN ARMED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCE TO INTERVENE.

6. (U) INCREASING THE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA, THE UN HAS DISPATCHED A HIGH-LEVEL ASSESSMENT TEAM FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO JAKARTA ON 7 SEPTEMBER. THE TEAM'S GOAL IS TO IMPRESS UPON THE INDONESIAN LEADERSHIP THE NEED TO CONTROL THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR AND INDICATE THE GROWING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO EAST TIMOR.

7. (U) STATUS OF FORCES. GEN WIRANTO REPORTEDLY HAS ORDERED THE DEPLOYMENT OF 6 MORE BATTALIONS TO EAST TIMOR. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT FOLLOWS WIRANTO'S WHIRLWIND VISIT TO DILI WHEN THE GENERAL WAS UNABLE TO DEPART THE AIRPORT BECAUSE OF THE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN THE CAPITAL.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

9. ~~(S)~~ THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES HAVE REMAINED LARGELY ABSENT FROM THE VIOLENCE SINCE THE BALLOT ON 30 AUGUST. HOWEVER, THEY PROBABLY WILL SOON LEAVE THEIR CANTONMENTS IN THE HILLS AND BEGIN ENGAGING THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/

10. ~~(C)~~ ASSESSMENT. PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WILL CONTINUE TO WAGE THEIR WAR OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE, APPARENTLY HOPING TO FORCE A NULLIFICATION OF THE BALLOT RESULTS. UNAMET PERSONNEL, BOTH INTERNATIONAL STAFF AND LOCAL TIMORESE STAFF, AS WELL AS FOREIGN OBSERVERS AND JOURNALISTS, WILL CONTINUE TO BE TARGETS OF SOMETIMES-VIOLENT INTIMIDATION THAT COULD

POSSIBLY RESULT IN INJURIES OR FATALITIES. THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN EAST TIMOR WILL DO LITTLE TO BRING THE SECURITY SITUATION UNDER CONTROL. THE TOUGHER RESTRICTIONS ARE NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE THE RESOLVE OF THE SECURITY FORCES TO DEAL WITH THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS. (DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON XT~~)

Non Responsive

The final page is not responsive, and not provided.

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SSSS~~

~~SSSSS~~

HEADER

P R 081714Z SEP 99

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC// (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE WASH DC

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

BT

CONTROLS (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

)))

SECTION 1 OF 4

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY

SUBJ: DIA NADA INTSUM 211-99/DIA WASH DC/8 SEP 99. (U)

Non Responsive

The next 4 pages are not responsive, and not provided.

Non Responsive

)))

(U) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR UPDATE

AS OF 0700Z 8 SEP 99

1. ~~(S)~~ MARTIAL LAW AND SHOOT ON SIGHT ORDERS HAVE DONE LITTLE TO STOP MILITIA VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR. THE CAPITAL OF DILI APPEARS TO BE NEARLY UNDER THE COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE PRO-JAKARTA MILITIAS.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d) 2. ~~(S)~~ MILITIA MOBS CONTINUE TO ROAM DILI, LOOTING AND BURNING, AS WELL AS ACCUSING THE UN OF BIAS TOWARD PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS. THE MOBS REPORTEDLY ARE BURNING PUBLIC BUILDINGS, INCLUDING THE UNIVERSITY, THE HOSPITAL, AND THE COURT; THEY ALSO BURNED 30 UN

VEHICLES. WATER AND ELECTRICITY HAVE BEEN CUT OFF, AND THE PUBLIC TELEPHONE SYSTEM IS INOPERABLE DUE TO A FIRE AT THE TELECOM OFFICE. MEANWHILE, THE EXODUS OF FOREIGNERS AND TIMORESE CONTINUES.

3. ~~(C)~~ WITH THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW, THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES CREATED A NEW JOINT OPERATION COMMAND FOR EAST TIMOR. THE COMMAND IS TO BE HEADED BY MAJ GEN SYANAKRIE, THE CURRENT ARMY ASSISTANT FOR OPERATIONS. THE MILITARY IS ALSO INCREASING ITS FORCES ON THE GROUND WITH THREE TERRITORIAL BATTALIONS AND A MARINE BATTALION SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO SUPPLEMENT THE TWO STRATEGIC RESERVE BATTALIONS DEPLOYED LAST WEEKEND.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON X1~~)

Non Responsive

The final 5 pages are not responsive, and not provided.

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SSSS~~

~~SSSSS~~

HEADER

P 102007Z SEP 99

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE

P R **101714Z SEP 99** (b)(3):10 USC 424

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE WASH DC

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

BT

CONTROLS (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~S E C R E T~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

)))

SECTION 1 OF 2

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY

SUBJ: DIA NADA INTSUM 213-99/DIA WASH DC/10 SEP 99. (U)

Non Responsive

The next 3 pages are not responsive.

Non Responsive

(U) INDONESIA: SITUATION UPDATE
AS OF 0500Z 10 SEP 99

1. ~~(C)~~ AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF DESTRUCTION AND LOOTING BY PRO-JAKARTA MILITIAS, FEWER MILITIA PERSONNEL WERE ON THE STREETS ON 9 SEPTEMBER, AND INDONESIAN TROOPS PATROLLED PARTS OF THE CITY. THE LEVEL OF GUNFIRE WAS REDUCED. THESE IMPROVEMENTS MAY APPLY ONLY TO DILI; LITTLE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON AREAS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL.

2. ~~(C)~~ A UN SECURITY COUNCIL TEAM IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT DILI FOR A DAY ON 11 SEPTEMBER, ACCOMPANIED BY A SMALL MEDIA DELEGATION.

3. ~~(C)~~ AUSTRALIAN C-130S EVACUATED OVER HALF OF THE REMAINING UNAMET PERSONNEL.TO DARWIN THIS MORNING. A STAFF OF 89 WILL REMAIN TO MAINTAIN THE UN PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR. PRESSURE ON THE UNAMET COMPOUND HAS EASED. THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA HAS IMPROVED. ON THE 9TH, AN UNAMET CONVOY WAS ABLE TO GO WITHOUT INCIDENT TO DILI'S AIRPORT TO MEET A SUPPLY PLANE FROM DARWIN. UNAMET'S TELEPHONE LINKS AND ACCESS TO FOOD AND WATER SUPPLIES WERE RESTORED.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

4. ~~(C)~~

THE NUMBER OF DISPLACED PEOPLE IN WEST TIMOR COULD SOON REACH 100,000. MOST OF THE REFUGEES APPEAR TO BE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. REFUGEES HAVE STATED THAT, IN SOME CASES, SELECTED PEOPLE, MOSTLY YOUNG MEN, HAVE BEEN SEPARATED FROM THE REFUGEE CONCENTRATIONS AND

TAKEN AWAY. THEIR FATE IS UNKNOWN.

5. ~~(C)~~ THE MILITIAS REPORTEDLY ARE EXTENDING THEIR CAMPAIGN OF INTIMIDATION INTO WEST TIMOR, HARASSING NOT ONLY THE REFUGEES, BUT ALSO FOREIGN JOURNALISTS AND NGOS, IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO PREVENT OBSERVATION OF MILITARY AND MILITIA ACTIVITY.

6. ~~(C)~~ IN A POSSIBLE INDICATION OF THE STRATEGY BEHIND MILITIA ACTIONS, PRO-JAKARTA GROUPS ARE CALLING FOR A NEW REFERENDUM ON AUTONOMY TO REPLACE THE 30 AUGUST BALLOTING, WHICH THEY CLAIM WAS FLAWED BY UN PRO-INDEPENDENCE BIAS.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~

Non Responsive

The last page is not responsive.

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SSSS~~

~~SSSSS~~

DTG

171714Z SEP 99

FROM

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/(b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROL

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

)))

SECTION 1 OF 3

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY

SUBJ: DIA NADA INTSUM 218-99/DIA WASH DC/17 SEP 99. (U)

Non Responsive

The next 3 pages are not responsive and not provided.

Non Responsive

)))

(U) **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** UPDATE
AS OF 0700Z 17 SEP 99

1. ~~(C)~~ JAKARTA CONTINUED TO WITHDRAW ITS **FORCES** FROM EAST **TIMOR** ON 16 SEPTEMBER IN ANTICIPATION OF THE ARRIVAL OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING **FORCE**.

2. ~~(C)~~ **ARMED FORCES** COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO CONFIRMED PUBLICLY THAT HE WOULD PULL OUT HIS TROOPS AS SOON AS THE INTERNATIONAL **FORCE** IS ESTABLISHED IN EAST **TIMOR**. JAKARTA ANTICIPATES THE ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST PEACEKEEPING TROOPS ON 20 SEPTEMBER. THERE ARE GROWING SIGNS

THAT MOST **INDONESIAN** MILITARY UNITS ARE PULLING OUT OF EAST **TIMOR**.
3. ~~(C)~~ SOME **MILITIAS** ALSO PLAN TO WITHDRAW PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE PEACEKEEPING **FORCE**, BUT IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THEY ARE MOVING TO SAFE HAVENS IN WEST **TIMOR** OR MERELY REGROUPING TO THE WESTERN DISTRICTS OF EAST **TIMOR**, WHERE SUPPORT FOR JAKARTA IS STRONGEST.
4. ~~(S)~~ ALTHOUGH THE **INDONESIAN** MILITARY APPEARS TO BE COOPERATING WITH THE UN AND SHOWS NO SIGN OF AN INTENTION TO RESIST OR IMPEDE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING **FORCE**, PRO-JAKARTA **MILITIA** GROUPS CONTINUE TO THREATEN THE **FORCE**. A **MILITIA** LEADER ANNOUNCED ON 16 SEPTEMBER THAT HE WOULD PUT 8 DISTRICTS IN THE WESTERN PART OF EAST **TIMOR** OFF LIMITS TO THE PEACEKEEPERS.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

5. ~~(C)~~ IN DILI, SPORADIC FIRING AND **LOOTING** CONTINUED, BUT SOME OF THE PRO-JAKARTA **MILITIA FORCES** APPEARED TO BE PREPARING TO WITHDRAW. THE SLIGHT UPSURGE IN **MILITIA** LAWLESSNESS REPORTED ON 16 SEPTEMBER MIGHT HAVE REPRESENTED A FINAL SPREE OF LOOTING BEFORE LEAVING THE CITY. TROOPS FROM KOSTRAD, THE ARMY'S STRATEGIC RESERVE INFANTRY COMMAND, WERE PRESENT IN DILI AND ALONG THE MAIN ROUTE TO WEST **TIMOR**, IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO IMPOSE SOME ORDER AND TO CHECK FOR THE MOVEMENT OF WEAPONS AND STOLEN GOODS.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

7. ~~(C)~~ ASSESSMENT: THE PRESENCE OF HOSTILE **MILITIAS** WILL CREATE A DANGEROUS AND SOMEWHAT CHAOTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE FIRST ARRIVING PEACEKEEPERS. THE INTERNATIONAL **FORCES** COULD FACE THE THREAT OF STIFF **MILITIA** OPPOSITION IN SOME AREAS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE SNIPING AND **AMBUSHES**.
8. ~~(C)~~ THE COMPLETE DEPARTURE OF **INDONESIAN** SECURITY **FORCES** PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE PEACEKEEPING **FORCE** IS UNLIKELY. A PERIOD OF OVERLAP IS PROBABLE IN DILI.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

(b)(1),1.4
(c),1.4 (d)

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/

(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON X1~~)

Non Responsive

Final page is not responsive, and not provided.

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SSSS~~

~~SSSSS~~

DTG

191114Z SEP 99

FROM

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/(b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROL(b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SECTION 1 OF 3

QQQQ

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY

SUBJ: DIA NADA INTSUM 219-99/DIA WASH DC/19 SEP 99. (U)

)))

Non Responsive

)))

(U) **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** UPDATE

AS OF 0700Z 19 SEP 99

1. ~~(C)~~ **ARMED FORCES** COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO HAS BEEN TRYING TO CLEAR UP APPARENT CONFUSION ABOUT THE ROLE THE **MILITARY** WILL PLAY ONCE A MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE (MNF) ARRIVES.

2. ~~(C)~~ ON 17 SEPTEMBER, WIRANTO STRESSED THAT THE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE HANDED OVER TO THE UN AFTER THE MNF IS DEPLOYED. WIRANTO MADE CLEAR THAT THE **INDONESIAN** MILITARY WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN MNF OPERATIONS, BUT WOULD ACT ONLY IN A LIAISON OR ADVISORY CAPACITY IF REQUESTED.

3. ~~(C)~~ ASSESSMENT: THE THREAT TO THE MNF REMAINS HIGH, PARTICULARLY IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS OF EAST **TIMOR**, WHERE THE PRO-JAKARTA **MILITIAS** ARE STRONGEST. MNF **FORCES** FACE THE POSSIBILITY OF SNIPER ATTACKS AND AMBUSHES FROM HOSTILE **MILITIA** ELEMENTS.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

INTIMIDATION, HARASSMENT, AND PERSECUTION OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE POPULATION BY THE PRO-JAKARTA MILITIAS WILL CONTINUE WITH OR WITHOUT THE MILITARY. (DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON X1~~).

Non Responsive

The remaining 7 pages are not responsive, and not provided.

CDS

[redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SSSSS~~

HEADER

P R **221714Z SEP 99**

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):10 USC 424

[redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE WASH DC

[redacted] (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

BT

CONTROLS (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~S E C R E T~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424 [redacted]

)))

SECTION 1 OF 3

BODY

SUBJ: DIA NADA INTSUM 222-99/DIA WASH DC/22 SEP 99. (U)

Non Responsive

The next 4 pages are not responsive, and not provided.

Non Responsive

)))

(U) **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** UPDATE

AS OF 0700Z 22 SEP 99

1. ~~(S)~~ **INDONESIAN FORCES** ARE PREPARING FOR ADDITIONAL WITHDRAWALS FROM EAST **TIMOR**. VEHICLE CONVOYS WERE FORMING UP AT THE **MILITARY** HEADQUARTERS IN APPARENT DEPARTURE PREPARATIONS, AND LSTS ALSO WERE LOADING AT DILI PORT.

2. ~~(C)~~ EAST **TIMORESE** PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADER GUSMAO PLANS TO RETURN TO DILI AS SOON AS SECURITY CONDITIONS PERMIT TO ESTABLISH AN ADMINISTRATION IN COOPERATION WITH THE UN. GUSMAO, WHO WAS FREED FROM HOUSE ARREST BY JAKARTA TWO WEEKS AGO, ARRIVED IN DARWIN ON 19 SEPTEMBER. HE DENIED REPORTS THAT HE WAS PLANNING TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE.

3. ~~(C)~~ REFUGEES WERE BEGINNING TO RETURN TO DILI AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF IMPROVED SECURITY CONDITIONS; HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL NEW REPORTED INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE. A FOREIGN JOURNALIST WAS FOUND DEAD JUST OUTSIDE DILI, AND TWO OTHER JOURNALISTS WERE ATTACKED BY MILITANTS. THERE WERE ALSO TWO REPORTED CLASHES BETWEEN PRO-JAKARTA AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS.

4. ~~(C)~~ IN JAKARTA, A CONTROVERSIAL NEW GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED DRAFT SECURITY BILL UNDER DELIBERATION BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HAS SPARKED STUDENT PROTESTS. OPPONENTS OF THE BILL CLAIM THAT IT WILL GIVE THE MILITARY SWEEPING NEW POWERS DURING NATIONAL EMERGENCIES. ALTHOUGH THE REVISED VERSION OF THE BILL UNDER DEBATE HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED, THE ORIGINAL DRAFT GAVE THE MILITARY THE POWER TO CONTROL MAIL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE NEWS MEDIA; RESTRICT THE MOVEMENT OF CITIZENS; DETAIN SUSPECTS WITHOUT TRIAL; AND BAN OR LIMIT STREET DEMONSTRATIONS. THE MILITARY ALREADY HAS BROAD POWERS UNDER EXISTING

STATE OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION, BUT OPPONENTS APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT THE NEW BILL WOULD RENEW AND PERPETUATE MARTIAL LAW PROVISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE REGIME OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND COUNTER THE TREND TOWARD A MORE OPEN AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. THESE DEMONSTRATIONS COULD TURN VIOLENT AS THE LEGISLATION COMES UP FOR A VOTE ON 23 SEPTEMBER.

5. ~~(C)~~ DESPITE CONTINUING DISCONTENT OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST **TIMOR**, PRESIDENT HABIBIE URGED PARLIAMENTARY VALIDATION OF THE 30 AUGUST EAST **TIMOR** INDEPENDENCE VOTE IN A 21 SEPTEMBER ADDRESS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. HABIBIE ARGUED THAT, DESPITE ALLEGATIONS OF UN BIAS, THE VOTE SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AS A VALID REFLECTION OF THE WILL OF THE EAST **TIMORESE** PEOPLE. HE DEFENDED THE MULTINATIONAL **FORCE** AS NECESSARY TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER.

6. ~~(C)~~ ASSESSMENT: **MILITARY** WITHDRAWAL PREPARATIONS FROM EAST **TIMOR** ARE PROCEEDING.

7. ~~(C)~~ ALTHOUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MNF TO DILI HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT SERIOUS INCIDENT, THE GROUND THREAT WILL REMAIN HIGH AS THE MNF EXPANDS INTO THE INTERIOR. THE MAIN THREAT CONSISTS OF POSSIBLE SPORADIC SNIPER ATTACKS AND **AMBUSHES** BY PRO-JAKARTA **MILITIAS**. THE ATTITUDE OF THE **INDONESIAN MILITARY** TOWARD THE MNF SO FAR HAS BEEN CORRECT AND COOPERATIVE.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

9. ~~(C)~~ IN JAKARTA, THE VOTE ON THE PROPOSED NEW NATIONAL SECURITY LAW WILL PROVIDE A FLASH POINT FOR THE MANY OPPONENTS OF HABIBIE, THE MILITARY, AND THE SURVIVING VESTIGES OF SOEHARTO'S OLD AUTHORITARIAN REGIME. THE VOTE WILL INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY THAT DEMONSTRATIONS WILL TURN VIOLENT.

(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON X1~~)

Non Responsive

The last 3 pages are not responsive, and not provided.

CDS

[redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SSSS~~

~~SSSSS~~

DTG

231714Z SEP 99

FROM

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/[redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS

~~S E C R E T~~ [redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424 [redacted]

)))

SECTION 1 OF 4

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY

SUBJ: DIA NADA INTSUM 223-99/DIA WASH DC/23 SEP 99. (U)

Non Responsive [redacted]

The next 6 pages are not responsive, and not provided.

Non Responsive

)))

(U) **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** UPDATE

AS OF 0700Z 23 SEP 99

1. (~~C~~) THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST **TIMOR** REMAINS UNCERTAIN AS VIOLENT ACTIVITY BY PRO-JAKARTA MILITIAS AND ARMED INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS INCREASES.

2. (~~C~~) THE ARMED PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUP, FALINTIL, HAS BECOME MORE ACTIVE AND AGGRESSIVE. FALINTIL, FOLLOWING THE WISHES OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS, FOR THE MOST PART EXERCISED RESTRAINT DURING THE **MILITIA** VIOLENCE EARLIER THIS MONTH. NOW, WITH THE ARRIVAL OF INTERFET AND THE IMPENDING DEPARTURE OF **INDONESIAN FORCES**, FALINTIL IS RAISING ITS PROFILE. FALINTIL TROOPS ARE OPERATING ON THE MAIN ROAD ALONG THE COAST FROM DILI TO ATAMBUA IN WEST **TIMOR**, MANNING ROADBLOCKS. PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGHTERS HAVE CLASHED WITH THE MILITIAS NEAR THE WEST **TIMOR** BORDER. IN A 21 SEPTEMBER FIGHT AT A FALINTIL ROADBLOCK, THREE **MILITIA** TROOPS AND ONE FALINTIL MEMBER REPORTEDLY WERE **KILLED**. FALINTIL MEMBERS ALSO HAVE STOPPED THE TRUCKS OF RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS TO ASK FOR FOOD.

3. (~~C~~) PRO-JAKARTA MILITIA MEMBERS ARE FLEEING DILI FOR WEST **TIMOR**. THE MILITIA GROUPS ARE REESTABLISHING THEMSELVES JUST ACROSS THE

BORDER. IN ATAMBUA, TWO TOP MILITIA LEADERS ANNOUNCED A "NATIONAL FRONT FOR UNITY" IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT FOR INTEGRATION INTO **INDONESIA**. A MODERATE FACTION AMONG THE MILITIA LEADERS IS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN EAST **TIMOR**, BUT HARDLINERS SEEK PARTITION OF EAST **TIMOR** THROUGH ARMED STRUGGLE WITH INTERFET. SOME **MILITIA FORCES** REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN REENTERING THE WESTERN REGION OF EAST **TIMOR**.

4. ~~(C)~~ ASSESSMENT: CLASHES BETWEEN THE **MILITIAS** AND THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE **FORCES** ARE EXPECTED TO INCREASE. INTERFET HAS ONLY BEGUN TO DISARM THE **MILITIAS**, AND UNDER PREVAILING SECURITY CONDITIONS, FALINTIL IS NOT EAGER TO HAND OVER ITS WEAPONS TO INTERFET.

5. ~~(C)~~ **MILITARY** WITHDRAWAL PREPARATIONS ARE CONTINUING, BUT TIMING OF THE DEPARTURES REMAINS UNCERTAIN.

6. ~~(C)~~ WITH SECURITY STILL PRECARIOUS, THE GROUND THREAT TO INTERFET WILL REMAIN HIGH AS ITS FORCES EXPAND FROM DILI INTO THE INTERIOR. THE THREAT WILL BE PARTICULARLY HIGH IN THE WESTERN AREAS OF EAST **TIMOR**. PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS SUGGEST THAT **MILITIA FORCES** RELOCATED INTO WEST **TIMOR** MAY STAGE OPERATIONS BACK ACROSS THE BORDER.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d) [redacted] WITH OR WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF **INDONESIAN** TROOPS, THE MILITIAS WILL CONTINUE TO HARASS AND INTIMIDATE THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE POPULATION OF EAST **TIMOR**.

(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON X1~~)

Non Responsive [redacted]

The final 2 pages are not responsive, and not provided.

CDS

~~SSSS~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SSSSS~~

DTG

241714Z SEP 99

FROM

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

)))

SECTION 1 OF 2

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY

SUBJ: DIA NADA INTSUM 224-99/DIA WASH DC/24 SEP 99. (U)

Non Responsive

The next page is not responsive, and not provided.

Non Responsive

(U) **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** UPDATE
AS OF 0700Z 24 SEP 99
1. ~~(C)~~ TENSION REMAINS HIGH IN DILI IN THE AFTERMATH OF 23 SEPTEMBER SHOOTING INCIDENTS BY PRO-JAKARTA MILITIA. ALLEGATIONS BY PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS THAT THE MILITIAS ARE PLANTING MINES AND BOOBYTRAPS IN DILI AND BAUCAU ARE UNCONFIRMED BUT CANNOT BE

DISCOUNTED.
2. ~~(C)~~ PRESIDENT HABIBIE ANNOUNCED THE REVOCATION OF THE MARTIAL LAW IN EFFECT IN EAST **TIMOR** SINCE 7 SEPTEMBER.
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
3. ~~(S)~~ MEANWHILE, UNCONFIRMED REPORTS CLAIM THAT **MILITIA FORCES** WERE MASSING AT LIQUISA, 35 KM WEST OF DILI, ON 23 SEPTEMBER AND WERE THREATENING TO ATTACK INTERFET TROOPS. A **MILITIA** LEADER CLAIMED THAT HIS **FORCES** WERE REGROUPING AND PLANNED TO CONTINUE THEIR STRUGGLE, BUT HE SAID THEY HAD NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO ATTACK INTERFET.
4. ~~(C)~~ IN JAKARTA, UP TO 15,000 STUDENTS AND OTHER POLITICAL ACTIVISTS CONVERGED ON PARLIAMENT TO PROTEST THE 23 SEPTEMBER PASSAGE OF A STATE SECURITY LAW. PROTESTS ALSO ARE TAKING PLACE ON THE 24TH AS WELL. THE LAW SETS GUIDELINES FOR THE MILITARY'S POWERS DURING A STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY. SOME CRITICS ALSO SUSPECT THAT PASSAGE OF THE NEW LAW WILL SET THE STAGE FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IF MASS UNREST BREAKS OUT DURING THE COMING PARLIAMENTARY SESSION.
5. ~~(C)~~ THE 23 SEPTEMBER DEMONSTRATIONS WERE THE LARGEST STUDENT PROTESTS IN JAKARTA SO FAR HIS YEAR. ACCORDING TO UNCONFIRMED REPORTS, THREE PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND THIRTY-SIX INJURED WHEN THE PROTESTS TURNED VIOLENT. IN ADDITION TO THE UNREST IN JAKARTA, PROTESTERS IN SURABAYA OVERWHELMED SECURITY **FORCES** AND OCCUPIED THE REGIONAL LEGISLATIVE COMPOUND OVERNIGHT.
6. ~~(C)~~ ASSESSMENT: SPORADIC OUTBREAKS OF **MILITIA** VIOLENCE AND CLASHES BETWEEN THE **MILITIAS** AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE. THE GROUND THREAT TO INTERFET REMAINS HIGH, PARTICULARLY IN WESTERN AREAS OF EAST **TIMOR**, WHERE THE **MILITIAS** ARE STRONGEST AND WHERE **MILITIA FORCES** ARE REPORTED TO BE REGROUPING.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON X1~~)
)))

Non Responsive

Final page not responsive and not provided.

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SSSS~~

~~SSSSS~~

DTG

281714Z SEP 99

FROM

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/(b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROL(b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

)))

SECTION 1 OF 3

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY

SUBJ: DIA NADA INTSUM 226-99/DIA WASH DC/28 SEP 99. (U)

Non Responsive

The next 3 pages are not responsive, and not provided.

Non Responsive

///

(U) **INDONESIA**: EAST **TIMOR** UPDATE
AS OF 0500Z 28 SEP 99

1. ~~(C)~~ INTERFET IS STRENGTHENING ITS CONTROL IN DILI WITHOUT SERIOUS INCIDENT AS MOST OF THE **INDONESIAN** FORCES IN EAST **TIMOR** WITHDRAW. NO SHOOTING INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN DILI SINCE 23 SEPTEMBER. INTERFET CONTROL OF THE CITY IS NOT YET COMPLETE, BUT NO INCIDENTS OF PRO-JAKARTA RESISTANCE TO INTERFET HAVE BEEN REPORTED.

2. ~~(C)~~ RECENT REPORTS SUGGEST THAT CONDITIONS IN THE AMBENO REGENCY, THE ISOLATED ENCLAVE OF EAST **TIMOR** SURROUNDED BY **INDONESIAN** WEST **TIMOR**, ARE AMONG THE WORST IN THE PROVINCE. REPORTS STATE THAT MANY SETTLEMENTS HAVE BEEN BURNED AND ARE EMPTY GHOST TOWNS. OBSERVERS VISITING WEST **TIMOR** REPORTED UNCONFIRMED STORIES OF HUNDREDS OF DEATHS, HOUSES BURNED, AND THE ABANDONMENT OF PANTE MAKASSAR, THE DISTRICT CAPITAL. A LARGE FLOW OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS FROM AMBENO HAS ENTERED THE CAMPS AT KEFAMENANU, WHERE CONDITIONS ARE REPORTED TO BE AMONG THE WORST IN WEST **TIMOR**. ARMED PRO-JAKARTA MILITIA MEMBERS ARE SAID TO BE OPERATING FREELY, PERSECUTING PRO-INDEPENDENCE REFUGEES.

3. ~~(C)~~ IN JAKARTA, STUDENT ACTIVISTS POSTPONED A RENEWAL OF DEMONSTRATIONS PLANNED FOR 27 SEPTEMBER. PROTESTS ARE EXPECTED TO RESUME LATER THIS WEEK, TO COINCIDE WITH THE 1 OCTOBER OPENING OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY.

4. ~~(C)~~ IN ACEH, IN NORTHERN SUMATRA, A BUS CARRYING MOBIL OIL EMPLOYEES WAS FIRED UPON, PROBABLY WITH AN AK-47, BY A LONE GUNMAN ON 25 SEPTEMBER. NO INJURIES WERE SUSTAINED, BUT THE INCIDENT WAS THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT SO FAR AGAINST MOBIL EMPLOYEES IN ACEH. NO PERPETRATOR HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED. AMONG THE SUSPECTS ARE MEMBERS OF THE ACEHNESE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL, AND

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

DISGRUNTLED LOCAL VILLAGERS.

6. ~~(C)~~ THE DEPARTURE OF **INDONESIAN** TROOPS AND THE EXPANDING PRESENCE OF INTERFET WILL LESSEN THE INTIMIDATION OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE POPULATION AND CAUSE PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS AND ARMED GUERRILLAS TO OPERATE MORE OPENLY. CLASHES BETWEEN REMAINING **MILITIA FORCES** AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE.

7. ~~(C)~~ DESPITE THE LACK OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS, INTERFET REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE CLASHES WITH THE **MILITIAS** AS ITS **FORCES** ENTER PRO-JAKARTA STRONGHOLDS WEST OF DILI.

8. ~~(C)~~ REPORTS FROM WEST **TIMOR** SUGGEST THAT **MILITIA** LEADERS RELOCATED FROM EAST **TIMOR** ARE AT LEAST CONSIDERING OPERATIONS ACROSS THE BORDER INTO EAST **TIMOR** WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF SECURING A PRO-JAKARTA ENCLAVE IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS OF THE PROVINCE.

DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES; ~~DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~

Non Responsive

The last 2 pages are not responsive and not provided.

CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~SCSS~~

~~SSSSS~~

DTG

101851Z SEP 99

FROM

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

BODY

SUBJECT: CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR (U)

REFERENCE: DAWN MSG DATED 9 SEP 99

(b)(3):10 USC 424

2. (U) THE FOLLOWING PROVIDES A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF THE LATEST SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR AS OF 1200 HRS 10 SEPTEMBER.

A. ~~(S)~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424 THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR HAS IMPROVED MODESTLY IN DILI IN RECENT DAYS WITH THE INDONESIAN TROOP REINFORCEMENTS, ALTHOUGH NOT WITHOUT SOME SETBACKS AT THE UNAMET COMPOUND. SHOOTING STILL CONTINUES NEAR THE FACILITY, AND THERE WERE TWO BREAK-INS TODAY, INCLUDING ONE INVOLVING TNI OFFICERS LOOKING FOR PAPERS.

B. ~~(S)~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424 UNAMET CHIEF MARTIN MAY DECIDE TO PULL OUT THE WHOLE MISSION ON 11 SEPTEMBERWITH THE DEPARTURE OF VARIOUS DELEGATIONS DUE IN THAT DAY, BUT NO DECISION NOTED AS YET. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT GEN. WIRANTO WILL VISIT TOMORROW, POSSIBLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PLANNED UN DELEGATION VISIT. EXISTING PLANS CALL FOR A REDUCED STAFF OF ABOUT 50, WITH A REGULAR PERSONNEL ROTATION THROUGH DARWIN.

C. ~~(S)~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424 INDONESIAN MILITARY OFFICIALS IN DILI CONTINUE TO REMAIN CORDIAL AND REQUEST THE UNAMET MISSION REMAIN. GEN. WIRANTO WROTE A LETTER TO THIS EFFECT, AND THERE CONTINUES TO BE MILITARY INTEREST IN SAFEGUARDING THE UN MISSION. TROOPS HAVE BEEN DISPERSED THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE, PURPORTEDLY TO STEM THE VIOLENCE, BUT THEIR MISSION REMAINS UNCLEAR.

D. ~~(S)~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424 THE MILITARY CONTINUES TO HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH UNAUTHORIZED MILITIA ACTIVITIES AND A BREAKDOWN OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE. ORDERS TO HAVE THE PARAMILITARIES PROCEED TO THEIR CANTONMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN OBEYED OR ENFORCED. WIRANTO AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO CLAIM THAT MILITIAS SUPPORTED BY "ROGUE"

ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY-UNTRUSTWORTHY TIMORESE TROOP-ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CURRENT UNREST. AT THE SAME TIME, SOME MILITARY AND POLICE UNITS ARE STILL APPARENTLY WORKING IN AN INTEGRATED FASHION WITH THE MILITIAS.

E. ~~(S//REL)~~ JAKARTA CONTINUES TO REJECT AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE. WITH INCREASED PRESSURE HOWEVER, THEY MAY EVENTUALLY SEEK OUT REGIONAL STATES TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES TO OFFSET WESTERN INVOLVEMENT. MEGAWATI NOW APPEARS SUPPORTIVE OF THE IDEA OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO STEM THE VIOLENCE. MALAYSIA AND THAILAND ARE REPORTED IN THE PRESS TO BE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TROOPS.

F. ~~(S//REL)~~ PROINTEGRATIONIST LEADERS APPEAR IN GOOD SPIRITS. THERE WAS A MEETING TODAY IN KUPANG WEST TIMOR AMONG MILITIA LEADERS, APPARENTLY SEEKING TO FORGE A UNITED FRONT, ALTHOUGH THERE APPEARS TO BE NO EFFECTIVE HIGH COMMAND. MILITIA PERSONNEL ALSO ARE NOW ACTIVE IN KUPANG. REJECTING PREVIOUS TRUCE ACCORDS, THEY NOW WANT THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE TO AGREE THE AUTONOMY BALLOT WAS INVALID AND SHOULD BE CONDUCTED AGAIN, AS A CONDITION TO FORGING A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

G. ~~(S//REL)~~ THERE ARE INDICATIONS REBEL FORCES HAVE BECOME MORE ENGAGED IN COMBAT OPERATIONS, CONDUCTING RECENT AMBUSHES OF GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES IN WESTERN AREAS. IN ADDITION TO CAPTURING WEAPONS, THE REBEL RANKS HAVE BEEN ENLARGED TO AT LEAST SOME EXTENT BY TIMORESE DESERTERS FROM THE ARMY, POLICE AND MILITIAS.

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)

ADMIN

~~DECLASSIFY ON: X6~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

BT
#3393
NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

Questions and Answers on East Timor

UIA

1. Why has the violence become so bad, so quickly?

The situation deteriorated rapidly because the militias had firearms, and no one else did (except the guerrillas who haven't been willing to use them); because the police and the army made no move to stop militia attacks, and in some cases actively joined in; and because this was part of a military strategy, if the vote was against autonomy, to thwart independence by other means.

East Timor has been wracked by violence for the last twenty years, but it took a turn for the worse in late January 1999, after Indonesian President Habibie announced that he would give East Timor the option of choosing autonomy under Indonesian sovereignty or separating from Indonesia. Almost immediately, 13 district-level militias emerged, ostensibly to defend the population against depradations by pro-independence guerrillas and youth groups but in fact to try and intimidate East Timorese into supporting continued integration with Indonesia. These militias were openly supported by the Indonesian army; most were based at the local district military command. Their campaign of intimidation and terror seemed to reach a peak in April when one militia based in Liquica district, just west of Dili, the capital, carried out a massacre of refugees in a church compound in April, then sacked homes and offices of suspected supporters of independence in Dili. No one was arrested for these assaults, although the perpetrators were well-known. Militia violence continued through July, culminating in an attack on an NGO convoy carrying relief supplies to displaced people. (By this time, some 40,000 people had been displaced by militia violence.) International outrage led to the arrests of seven young suspects, none of them responsible for organizing the attack, and a visible lessening of militia terrorizing in the weeks that followed. A new wave of violence began after registration centers opened in late July, to register voters for the referendum on autonomy/independence. On August 30, the day of the referendum itself, however, 98.2 percent of the eligible voters defied intimidation and turned out to vote.

The results were announced on Saturday morning, Dili time, September 4. Militias immediately went on what appeared to be a planned and coordinated offensive across the territory, but particularly in Dili and the western districts (Bobonaro, Liquica, Suai, and Ermera). Any East Timorese associated with UNAMET in any way was targeted. So were foreign and Indoensian journalists, considered sympathetic to the independence movement, and offices and homes of pro-independence supporters. Thousands of displaced people were attacked in their places of refuge, and some of them appear to have been trucked to West Timor.

Every indication is that this was a planned, army-organized offensive. A senior State Department official has been quoted as saying it was an operation of the army's Special Forces (Kopassus) -- the force once led by Suharto's son-in-law, Prabowo. Police in Dili told a member of Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission that they couldn't do anything because this was a Kopassus zone. The fact that Kopassus has almost certainly been involved does not make this a "rogue" operation; the rogues are serving a Jakarta master, and all evidence points to Wiranto.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 13 MAY 2004 200300712

Officials from the US and Australia have both indicated they have evidence that the militias were being directed from Jakarta.

2. Why would the army do this?

There are several possible reasons:

a. The army has been concerned since Habibie's January 1999 announcement that East Timor's independence would lead to the break-up of Indonesia. There is no question that separatist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya have taken heart from developments in Timor and from the UN's role. The violence could be a warning to them that any move to independence will lead to bloodshed, and the Indonesian army is more powerful than any outside force, including the UN.

b. Wiranto is concerned about the unity of the armed forces. Many Indonesian soldiers died in attacks or ambushes by Falintil guerrillas, many more were wounded. Most senior officers got their promotions after combat duty in East Timor. The idea of letting East Timor go is seen by some officers as a betrayal of everything the army did over the last 24 years. To keep his forces together, the argument goes, Wiranto had to do everything in his power to thwart independence.

c. The army genuinely believed that it had stacked the deck and intimidated enough people to get a much higher percentage of the vote. It can't believe the 78.2 percent vote and is now doing everything in its power and through a media offensive to convince the Indonesian public that UNAMET perpetrated a giant fraud. The offensive, unfortunately, is working (see below).

d. The vote and the violence are playing into Indonesian politics. Habibie is totally discredited now by the debacle, by the few remaining groups who were still willing to grant him some legitimacy. Wiranto may be using the violence he controls, and the martial law pretext for ending it, as a launching pad to become the Golkar candidate for president in Habibie's place.

3. What can stop the violence in East Timor?

The Indonesian armed forces could easily stop the violence if ~~it~~ they had the political will to do so. All of the attacks over the last week, indeed most of the attacks over the last six months, with a very few exceptions, have been initiated by militias that were created, armed, and supported by the Indonesian army. There are over 8,000 Indonesian police now in East Timor and at least as many soldiers, none of whom have made any effort to stop militia violence or arrest those responsible. The attacks on Monday, September 6, on the home of Bishop Belo and the office of the International Committee of the Red Cross would not have been possible without army logistical support. Local human rights organizations, UN personnel, and other international agencies have identified Indonesian officers working directly with the militias in acts of violence. These names have been turned over to the appropriate Indonesian authorities, but no action of any kind whatsoever has been taken against them.

Since the Indonesian army has the ability but not the will to stop the violence, the only alternative is for donor countries to use their considerable economic leverage to make the army feel the consequences of continuing its current role or persuade Habibie to invite an international

peacekeeping force in.

4. After mounting international pressure, Habibie and General Wiranto, commander of the Indonesian armed forces, declared a state of emergency in East Timor on Tuesday. Will this help?

A state of emergency in East Timor will probably be a human rights disaster. The army has all the personnel it needs now to stop the violence and has done nothing. Martial law may only be a pretext to arrest and detain suspects without charge or trial and to hamper any international monitoring of the army's role. The last thing East Timor needs is for the army to take on additional powers. Martial law may also be used to disarm and detain the pro-independence leaders.

5. What is the evidence for army-militia cooperation and coordination?
We have extensive eyewitness accounts of army officers taking part in militia operations,of militias being backed by lines of soldiers in their attacks, of militias holding meetings in district military commands. There is no question of the linkage. Diplomatic sources have even better evidence.

6. Who are these militias?
All thirteen are led by East Timorese who have a record of cooperating with the Indonesian army. Not all are new; some were created in the 1970s, after the Indonesian invasion, but the three worst, Aitarak (Dili) and Besi Merah Putih (Liquica) and Mahidi (Suai) were created this year. Eurico Gutteres, the leader of Aitarak is a former pro-independence activist who switched sides after being detained as a result of the Santa Cruz massacre in Dili in 1991. He became leader of the youth civil guard called Gardapaksi,a paramilitary auxiliary created by Prabowo in 1995. The head of the militia in Baucau is an active duty Kopassus officer. The Halilintar militia in Bobonaro, one of older groups, is led by Joao Tavares, a former traditional chief who was a member of the pro-Indonesia Apodeti party just before the invasion in 1975.

There have been allegations that some of the militias are not East Timorese. In July, the Laksaur militia in the Suai area was said to be at least half West Timorese. In the attack on the ICRC, Bishop Belo's residence, and the Hotel Turismo on Monday, the attackers wore black shirts as Aitarak does but without the Aitarak logo. Some have alleged that these were regular soldiers and not militia; in any case, army trucks were used in the operation.

7. Is everyone who supported autonomy a militia member?
No; there are many civil servants who derived their authority from their links to the Indonesian power structure who probably voted for autonomy, as well as non-Timorese who were eligible to vote by virtue of having been born in East Timor or having a spouse born in East Timor. There are also some intellectuals who genuinely believed that there was no way East Timor could survive as an independent state. But by the time of the referendum, almost everybody had been recruited into either the militias, their political front (The Forum for Democracy and Justice) or the Golkar-like pro-autonomy organization called the BRTT (Popular Front for East Timor).

8. Why are refugees being forced out of East Timor?
It's not clear, but one theory is that as part of a plan to partition East Timor and effectively wreck the outcome of the referendum, the army wants to ensure that key areas, including Dili and the western districts, are under total control of the militias. That means getting the pro-independence people, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the displaced, out of the way. The militias may also be hoping that their demands will be granted for a re-vote to correct the unfairness and bias in the referendum; if it happens, the pro-independence ranks will have been seriously thinned. (The UN has no intention of allowing a re-vote but the pro-autonomy side has refused to accept the outcome and seems to be raising the stakes.)

The Indonesian press continues to portray the vast majority of the East Timorese streaming out of Dili as being pro-autonomy, fearful of the results of independence. That's true for most of the non-Timorese fleeing, but I don't have a breakdown of Timorese and non-Timorese. Some 25,000 people are believed to have fled already, with over 10,000 in West Timor alone.

9. How is this all playing out in Jakarta?
To read the Jakarta press, you would think that the case made against UNAMET for rigging the vote in favor of independence was overwhelming. Not only every Cabinet minister but every politician is jumping on the anti-UN, anti-West bandwagon, with particular venom being reserved for Australia. The argument is that Australia wanted East Timor independent for security reasons, the US wanted to monitor China from an independent East Timor, and the UN bent to their wishes.

This is very dangerous for three reasons. It may be laying the groundwork for the MPR's refusing to endorse the results of the referendum in November. It is serving to weaken any political divisions within the political elite, meaning the army and the pro-autonomy groups are getting increasing public support. And it may make it politically much more difficult for donor countries to get tough on Indonesia as officials will be wary of exacerbating the backlash in a country where they have extensive interests.

10. What is the likelihood of an international peacekeeping force at this stage?
Still highly unlikely. The declaration of martial law means that the army is determined to go it alone, and that Indonesia will not invite peacekeepers in. By the terms of the UN charter, an international force can't be sent to a member country without its permission unless there is a real danger of international instability (Chapter 7). If it came to that, China or Russia might veto a Security Council resolution, but it would never get that far. Without Indonesian approval, peacekeepers are out of the question.

On the other hand, if Indonesia did approve, a force could be quickly assembled around an Australian core of readily deployable troops. The Australians want some commitment of involvement from the US, which we believe would not be more than logistical support for someone else's operation.

npbell, Piper MSX

RELEASED IN FULL

U3

rom: Joyo@aol.com
Sent: Monday, September 27, 1999 3:05 AM
To: "undisclosed-recipients:;"@igc.org
Subject: NYTimes: Albright Addresses New Warning to Indonesia

The New York Times
September 27, 1999

Albright Addresses New Warning to Indonesia

By BARBARA CROSSETTE

NEW YORK -- Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met Sunday with the man expected to lead an independent East Timor and warned Indonesia that it risks losing America aid and investment unless it protects refugees in areas it controls.

Albright's warning was one of the strongest yet by Washington, which has been reluctant to threaten sanctions against the world's fourth most populous country and one vital to Asia's economy. It was also the first time that Washington had made clear that it would hold Jakarta accountable for behavior beyond the border of East Timor.

Albright, in New York for the opening last week of the U.N. General Assembly session, spoke about the threat facing 100,000 to 200,000 refugees who were forced into West Timor during a siege of violence by militias backed by the Indonesian military. The refugees are reportedly being threatened and attacked by militia members who fled there as peacekeepers arrived in East Timor.

Commenting on a report from her assistant secretary of state for refugees, who has just been in East and West Timor, Albright said that "what she has reported to me is terribly troubling."

The assistant secretary, Julia Taft, said that while civilian authorities in West Timor seemed genuinely concerned about the refugees, it was evident that pro-Indonesian militias, in collusion with the Indonesia army, had infiltrated refugee camps and were intimidating people.

"The government and armed forces of Indonesia should understand that what happens in West Timor and to East Timorese living elsewhere in Indonesia is as important to the United States as what happens in East Timor itself," Albright said at a news conference with the East Timorese leader, Jose Alexandre Gusmao.

Sunday a senior administration official said in an interview, "We believe that the key to getting Indonesia to accept" a peacekeeping force, "was the threat of severe consequences if they didn't -- primarily loss of economic aid."

"What the secretary is saying is, Look, you don't just check the box and get out of the East Timor situation simply by evacuating your troops and turning it over to the U.N. if terrible things are going on in West Timor," the official said.

Albright will deliver the same message to Indonesia's foreign minister, Ali Alatas, on Monday, aides said. She will tell him that the United States is also concerned about the government's response to protests in Jakarta, the

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 13 MAY 2004 200300712

Indonesian capital, and elsewhere in the country. Aides added that she will tell the government that it must continue to adhere to its promises of democratic change.

But the government of President B.J. Habibie is not the only player, and American officials also intended their strong message to be heard by Megawati Sukarnoputri. Her party will hold a plurality of seats in a new national parliament, and she hopes to be elected president in indirect elections later this year.

Ms. Megawati, the daughter of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, is thought to be a nationalist in her father's mold and may attract military nationalists to her cause.

Gusmao, who was imprisoned in Indonesia for seven years before being released in August, pressed in their meeting Sunday for American attention to the safety of East Timorese scattered not only in West Timor but also across other Indonesian islands, Albright's aides said.

Gusmao, known as Xanana, is in New York to meet with Secretary-General Kofi Annan and other U.N. officials who are preparing to take over the administration and defense of East Timor after a new Indonesian parliament assembles and ratifies the East Timorese vote for independence. After the East Timorese elect a government, the United Nations plans to withdraw.

Albright last met with Gusmao when she was visiting Indonesia in March. Indonesians and some foreign governments see him as the most likely leader of an independent East Timor. He has been more moderate than Jose Ramos-Horta, who has led an independence campaign from exile. Ramos-Horta was also at Sunday's meeting.

Gusmao, 53, was a military and political hero of the long guerrilla war against Indonesia, which began even before Indonesian troops seized the territory in 1975 after administrators from a collapsing Portuguese empire fled.

Gusmao was brought into three-way talks between Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations as Indonesia moved toward allowing the East Timorese to vote in the referendum on their future.

Campbell, Piper MSX

RELEASED IN FULL

(44)

From: Joyo@aol.com
Sent: Sunday, September 26, 1999 11:11 PM
To: "undisclosed-recipients:;"@igc.org
Subject: US urges Jakarta to end "collusion" between army and militias

US urges Jakarta to end "collusion" between army and militias

NEW YORK, Sept 26 (AFP) - The United States warned Indonesia's government Sunday to allow those displaced by the violence in East Timor to return home and to end the "collusion" between the army and armed militias.

"I call on the government of Indonesia to stop the collusion between the Indonesian military and the militias, and to disarm the militias," Albright said, after meeting here Sunday with Timorese opposition leader Xanana Gusmao.

"I further call on the Indonesian government to ensure that all displaced persons wishing to return to East Timor are able to do so," she said.

Albright also called for greater cooperation from Jakarta with the United Nations and Interfet, the Australian-led international peacekeeping force on the ground in East Timor, "in order to restore order in East Timor and prevent future violence there."

The secretary warned that Jakarta risked losing US economic aid if it failed to heed US appeals.

"The ongoing aid review that we initiated several weeks ago will take into account all relevant factors," she said.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 13 MAY 2004 200300712

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017-3505

RELEASED IN PART
B6

(41)

September 8, 1999

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: **POL – Piper Campbell**
Through: POL - Mark Minton
Subject: My 9/7 meeting with [redacted] B6

1. Following up on your suggestion, I had a very useful – and enjoyable -- lunch on September 7 with [redacted] B6 gave me the attached *questions and answers on East Timor.* [redacted] B6 also mentioned three interesting points:

- The Indonesian Military (TNI) two-star general placed in charge of martial law in East Timor has a very bad reputation among human-rights watchers, primarily because of his links to the militia. General "Kiki" is a Special Forces officer, who previously served as army Assistant for Operations.

- The propaganda campaign focussed in Jakarta, which argues that UNAMET was biased and the results of the Popular Consultation suspect, may fuel the belief in some quarters that if UNAMET is driven out the results can be invalidated. Statements from opinion leaders, especially those not in direct competition for the Presidency, accepting the ballot results would be helpful.

- The humanitarian situation in West Timor is deteriorating, and with pro- and anti- independence refugees clustered in the same camps, violence is rising. (Note: On September 8, three UNHCR staff visiting a camp were attacked.)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 13 MAY 2004 200300712

Memo: 9-7 Sidney Jones
N:\POL\Campbell\East Timor\[redacted]
Drafted: POL – Piper Campbell, 44358, 9/8/1999
Cleared: POL – HStoffer

B6

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017-3505

(42)

September 27, 1999

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

CONFIDENTIAL
Decl:09/27/04

From: **POL –Piper Campbell**
Through: POL - Mark Minton
Subject: Your meeting with East Timor leader Xanana Gusmao, 9/27/99, 10:15 a.m.

Gusmao, 53, was under house arrest for 7 years before being released mid-September. He is in New York to meet with FM Alatas, FM Gama, SYG Annan, and the UN officials planning the UN Transitional Administration (UNAMET Phase III).

- In 9/26 news conference with Gusmao, Albright said, "The Government and Armed Forces of Indonesia should understand that what happens in West Timor and to East Timorese living elsewhere in Indonesia is as important to United States policy as what happens in East Timor itself.... The U.S.-Indonesian relationship cannot return to what has been a normal basis until these various issues are resolved."

- The Geneva special session continues; the Asian block is pushing for a primarily domestic investigation. (Commissioner Mazurki's body is called KOMNAS Ham.)

- Has Xanana met with any Asian delegations in New York, to encourage unity within INTERFET, urge participation in the UN PKO, and push for Security Council consensus on the next resolution? Malaysia and Thailand are key.

- [redacted] What does Xanana see as the short- and medium-term priorities? B1

- General Kiki left East Timor today, September 27. INTERFET has not officially assumed security responsibility – there are still Indonesian forces, but doing nothing.

- UNAMET, INTERFET concerned ref. security if Gusmao returns to Dili, what are his plans?

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 27 SEP 2009
DATE/CASE ID: 13 MAY 2004 200300712

Memo: N:\POL\East Timor\Gusmao
Drafted: POL –PCampbell, x44358, 9/27/99
Cleared: POL – HStoffer

List of attachments: Two articles based on the Secretary's 9/26 press conference

I Ø3

[redacted]L

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brief
09/09/1999

RELEASED IN FULL

UN/East Timor: Empty Hand (U)

UN efforts to avert a humanitarian disaster in East Timor are collapsing, despite the imposition of martial law and the arrival on September 8 of a UN Security Council delegation in Jakarta. UN discussions in New York about the composition of a multinational peacekeeping force or in Jakarta with the crumbling Habibie government will probably have little bearing on the brutal reality being shaped in East Timor. (C)

The UN's decision to evacuate the bulk of its Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET) staff from the Dili compound on September 9 follows an unsuccessful attempt by UNAMET to obtain food and water from a nearby UN warehouse. Militias apparently forced them to flee back to their compound, where more than 2,000 Timorese who have sought refuge risk being attacked following the UNAMET withdrawal. UN and church compounds are no longer havens, with militias now explicitly targeting them; three priests were among the approximately 100 people feared killed in a massacre in the southern coastal town of Suai. (C)

Dili is now "looted, gutted, and gone," according to Embassy Jakarta. With UN personnel and foreign journalists expelled and telecommunications cut, East Timorese over the next few days can expect little mercy from rampaging militias and increasing numbers of Indonesian military (TNI). TNI generals will probably manipulate the crisis to suit their national political agenda and will not be swayed by the pleas of an "outraged" Security Council delegation or other emissaries (especially the Australians). In western Timor, newly arriving refugees are overwhelming local capacity to provide food, shelter, or protection; two UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff were slightly wounded and forced to curtail their review of border camps, where militias are assassinating selective pro-independence leaders. (C)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 05 OCT 2005 200300712

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

I ø1

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
09/02/1999

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)

Indonesia and East Timor--Struggle for Control (U)

East Timor remains volatile, with militia active in several locations attacking homes, offices, foreign and domestic journalists, and other individuals seen as associated with the independence movement. If there was political will, the security forces on the ground would be able to restrain the militias. Military forces to date have largely stayed out of the action, giving the police full responsibility for law and order. Additional police and armed forces arrived today. However, there continue to be mixed signals on how Jakarta intends to handle the militias and, given the expectation of an overwhelming vote for independence, the transition and withdrawal. (C)

Reining in the militias

It is unclear whether Jakarta is now committed to restraining the militias it created. Also unclear is whether the current rampages are part of a campaign to derail the process or reflect a last gasp by gangs who fear the military will abandon them. [redacted] the nature of the forces on the ground further complicate the picture. The police, who have the primary responsibility for crowd control and protecting The UN Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET), are afraid that the militias enjoy high-level military support from elements such as the special forces. Local battalions of East Timorese troops are suspected of being independence sympathizers. [redacted] (S)

B1

B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 05 OCT 2005 200300712

Moreover, Indonesia's military is suffering significant morale problems. Officers are questioning the current civilian leadership, and pressures are mounting to resolve the more significant threat than East Timor--the growing rebellion in Aceh. Even if the leadership issues clear orders, implementing them on the ground may still be problematic. In addition, the potential for former pro-independence guerrillas to take to the streets should be factored into plans for establishing security. (S)

Political steps ahead

[redacted] Jakarta is resigned to a clear vote for independence. But, B1
that does not guarantee smooth sailing through the political process. The new assembly (MPR), which is scheduled to open October 1 and is charged with accepting or rejecting the vote, may contain many who are highly more nationalistic, including the large Megawati bloc. Consideration of the Timor issue could be put off, because it has no clearly defined place on the MPR agenda. The delegates may decide they have higher priorities, including choosing the next president. (C)

[redacted] rgue that Indonesians will be eager to put East Timor behind B1
them and move smartly to bless the vote, even designating January 1 as the transition date. President Habibie could call a special MPR session for that purpose only, but INR sees no evidence of planning for that. Habibie is not very effective at swaying public opinion and no groundwork has been laid in Jakarta for losing Timor with honor. (C)

Pulling out

Some of the militias have threatened to trash East Timor if they are forced out and the military has developed extensive evacuation plans, including removal of infrastructure, according to [redacted] senior officers B1
are sufficiently concerned about Indonesia's international image to refrain from an abrupt departure that would leave a security vacuum. Although some Indonesian officials now talk about an eventual peacekeeping operation, they remain opposed to the deployment of armed peacekeepers as long as East Timor remains, in their view, a sovereign part of the nation. (S)

Once the political formalities are worked out, however, and a peacekeeping operation authorized, a rather rapid removal of Indonesian forces is likely. [redacted] B1
[redacted] reportedly favors an early and complete withdrawal, probably because he is wary of leaving troops unprotected in a potentially hostile environment. His more

pressing concerns are Aceh, Ambon, and security for the MPR session in Jakarta. Some of the ethnic East Timorese in the two native battalions may opt--or be allowed--to remain as part of a fledgling East Timorese defense force, but they would be suspected of being a fifth column working for Indonesia's return. (S)

SECRET

INR Home Page | Briefs | Intel Assessments | Viewpoints | Products by date | Products by country

---

C[redacted]TIAL

I Ø2

INR

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
09/08/1999

Indonesia/East Timor: Roads Not Taken (C)

The Indonesian Government had at least three operational plans under consideration for East Timor, although security forces now appear intent on the third option, using a show of force to retain the province. Common denominators underlay each approach. (C)

1. The original public plan

As enunciated by the Foreign Ministry and senior civilian and military leaders, Indonesia would evacuate non- East Timorese and those Timorese loyal to the Indonesian regime; reduce the military in a phased withdrawal; maintain security for the ever-growing foreign presence; continue aid until March 2000; and cooperate in a peaceful transition. (U)

2. Cut and run

Evacuate non-East Timorese and those loyal to the Indonesian regime; and expeditiously remove security forces and infrastructure "belonging" to Jakarta. Subplan A was a relatively orderly withdrawal that left a primitive, but operational infrastructure in the hands of the UN Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET). Subplan B had the Indonesians trashing East Timor as they left, but still with the intent of handing things over to the UN. (C)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 05 OCT 2005 200300712

3. Discredit the vote and retain the province

Engage in various measures to undermine the credibility of the vote and retain control, working from a pro-Jakarta beachhead in the western part of the province or in Timor Barat (western Timor) if necessary. Subsets of this plan may involve assassinations and forcing Catholic Timorese to flee, indoctrination and intimidation at refugee camps in Timor Barat, and sabotage against any regime established in Dili. (S)

Common denominators

All three approaches have common underlying traits:

- resentment of foreign, i.e., Western interference, and a feeling of victimization by the media;
- a belief that the UN and foreign observers were biased and that the election was not fair;
- hostility toward the "ungrateful" Timorese;
- a military that can operate outside of civilian leadership;

B1

- the absence of effective civilian leadership in Jakarta in the executive or legislative branches.
- the absence of a critical mass of civilians willing to defy the government and demand Timorese independence. (C)

What's viable?

Even if Option #2 were restored, elements in the security forces would remain committed to retaining East Timor and seek to sabotage the transition and eventual independent government. Security forces continue to see the danger of a slippery slope for other regions in Indonesia; demonstrating the "costs" of breaking with Jakarta is a consistent theme. Despite international opprobrium, Indonesia appears

unlikely to reinvite a UN presence until the authorities are comfortable that a "second vote" would support integration. It is unclear what level of economic and political pressure would bring about the sea change necessary for Jakarta to take Option 2 seriously. (C)

Leaders may understand the potential international ramifications of pursuing Option 3, but some are impoten[redacted] and others see the interests of national unity and their personal survivability as overriding. None of the current or would be leaders have solid backing, with suspicions, fractured institutions, and competing agendas complicating the political scene and making it difficult for outsiders to identify the power center, much less to change behavior. (C) B1

CONFIDENTIAL

INR Home Page | Briefs | Intel Assessments | Viewpoints | Products by date | Products by country

---

UNCLASSIFIED

T[redacted]ST

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brief
09/10/1999

Indonesia/East Timor: Nowhere To Hide (U)

[redacted] See also map showing refugee camps, evacuation routes in East Timor. (C)

Displaced East Timorese continue to clog roads leading into western Timor, bringing the total there to as many as 100,000, according to Embassy Jakarta. Many internally displaced persons (IDPs) taken to Kupang and elsewhere by boat appear to be under Indonesian military (TNI) care because they are pro-integration; those scattered in camps along the border may be targeted because they are pro-independence. (C)

[redacted]

The United Nations Assistance Mission for East Timor's (UNAMET's) revised evacuation plans now call for leaving 40-50 staff behind, according to press reports.

[redacted]

Militias allegedly have killed several prominent priests, as well as independence leader Xanana Gusmao's father, according to press reports. (U)

Comment: The humanitarian crisis over the next few days will not center on the

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 2/7/06 Exemption B1, 1.4(c),(d)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

lack of food or water but on the need for protection, especially for those in the border camps and the more than 700,000 within East Timor. Many IDPs are heading into the hills; the men are taking up arms, while their families try to survive in and around rural villages.

TOP SECRET UMBRA

INR Home Page | Briefs | Intel Assessments | Viewpoints | Products by date | Products by country

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
09/22/1999

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (✓) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 2/28/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

I 18

UN/East Timor: Human Rights Geopolitics (U)

Human rights groups are clamoring for investigations into war crimes committed by the Indonesian military (TNI) and its militia allies.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Robinson succeeded in scheduling a rare special session of the UNCHR for September 23 to address the East Timor human rights crisis, but the entire Asian group--including potential INTERFET participants India, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines--voted against it.

Canberra's concerns

Australian Foreign Minister Downer on September 20 announced that his government would consider releasing intelligence, "consistent with established principles," on East Timor to a UN war crimes investigation.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Nongovernmental groups are jumping on an unsteady war-crimes bandwagon. The Australian branch of the International Council of Jurists has begun interviewing refugees in Darwin about alleged atrocities. More problematic for Indonesia is an effort by a European human rights group to file a case before a Portuguese court naming 21 Indonesians as responsible for the massacres. Because the UN has never recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, Portugal could make a credible claim for war crimes jurisdiction. (U)

Starting slowly

With INTERFET preoccupied with security and assisting in a massive humanitarian mission, and the UN Assistance Mission's (UNAMET's) future mandate still undecided by the Security Council, not much on-the-ground support will be forthcoming in the next few weeks for collecting forensic evidence at atrocity sites or even interviewing potential witnesses on the island

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA/NOFORN~~

I 19

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brief
09/24/1999

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (✓) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 2/28/01 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

East Timor:

R1

The first day of the special East Timor session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva ended on September 23 with Asian member states rallying around Indonesia, according to press reports. The European Union favors the creation of an international commission of inquiry, but Asian, Arab, and some Latin American countries strongly oppose it, according to Mission Geneva. (C)

Comment: The recent spate of gunfire against INTERFET and the killings of a German priest and a Dutch journalist underscore the threat to westerners now and to future Asian peacekeepers in East Timor. The heated rhetoric at the UNCHR special session was divided on an East-West fault line, indicating a regional polarization that could undermine both INTERFET and a future UNAMET. (C)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
09/24/1999

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir
( ) Release (✓) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 2/28/06 Exemption B(1.4)(D)

I20

UN/East Timor: Security and Relief (U)

Increasing concerns about attacks on the Interim Force for East Timor (INTERFET) have resulted in faster deployment of peacekeepers and tighter security while restricting civilian agencies trying to reach vulnerable groups outside Dili. (C)

See also map of Timor.

Indonesian State Secretary Muladi on September 23 claimed that the security situation in East Timor was improving, martial law was over, and the military (TNI) would make the hand-off to INTERFET as soon as possible. Army Chief of Staff General Wiranto said that, despite "one or two" looters, "things are OK." But security remains tense, with several accounts of gunfire in Dili directed toward peacekeepers, a heated "misunderstanding" (with warning shots) between TNI and INTERFET troops, and roundups of dozens of suspected militia members. More alarming for INTERFET are reports of an alleged TNI-supported militia buildup in western Timor. (C)

Burn and go

UNCLASSIFIED

15/

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERFET expected to have 3,500 troops on the ground by the evening of September 23 but was having trouble deploying them beyond Dili and Bakau, which has an airport that will be critical for food deliveries to the easternmost region of Timor.

No peace, no food

Security problems are impeding urgent relief operations. Though World Food Program (WFP) airdrops have resumed despite technical and logistical problems, and will increase to two drops per day, they will not meet the requirements of the several hundred thousand needy or displaced. UNAMET on September 23 announced that 20 IDPs had died from malnutrition-linked causes and that thousands near the town of Dare were desperate for food and water. Food stockpiles in Dili have been looted, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has taken over the only functional hospital, fears that food distribution outside Dili will remain stalled until security improves; the ICRC also wants to begin reuniting families divided by the forced expulsions. The Acting UN Humanitarian Coordinator warns that the bulk of aid supplies must be delivered before the rainy season commences in November. (C)

For related analysis, see
"Indonesia: Cliffhanging in Jakarta (U)" and
"East Timor:
September 24, 1999.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

INR Home Page | Briefs | Intel Assessments | Viewpoints | Products by date | Products by country

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
09/14/1999

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 2/28/06 Exemption B1.4(D)
I14

UN/East Timor: Intervention Preparation (U)

The UN Security Council is poised to launch a long-term mission for East Timor, where UN intervention is viewed with suspicion, if not hostility. (C)

The East Timor crisis has three intertwined aspects that complicate ambitious UN plans. The basic relief task of getting food and clean water quickly to those who need it will be difficult, with or without airdrops. Neutralizing the militias that have been terrorizing Timorese at the behest of the Indonesian military (TNI) will prove dangerous. And presiding over the birth of an independent country despite the objections of TNI generals, Indonesian nationalists, and angry militias--who blame President Habibie, the UN, and the Australians for this calamity--will be exhausting for all involved. (C)

For many internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees scattered in western Timor, difficulties obtaining food reflect the militias' control over food distribution. Reports of people scavenging for food in the hills of East Timor will continue as long as IDPs there are threatened by militias. Jakarta's acceptance of airdrops does not resolve the operational problem of accurately targeting needy groups while avoiding militias. (C)

More massacres?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

The Australian defense minister's announcement that he could deploy 2,000 troops within a week may spur violence--the militias now know they are working under a deadline to eliminate those behind the successful independence vote. Despite Habibie's blessing of a peacekeeping force, pro-integration militias on the brink of losing all will vent their anger at UN interference and Jakarta's betrayal by hitting harder at "traitors." (C)

Beyond Chapter VII

Much of the discussion over the next few days in New York will be on the structure, mandate, and composition of a UN peacekeeping force. Though the search for a "non-western" head of mission may yet yield a suitable candidate, the heart and soul of the operation will be the Australians, who are eager and ready to launch both peacekeeping and relief efforts. (C)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]ET

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
09/24/1999

UN/East Timor: Security and Relief (U)

Increasing concerns about attacks on the Interim Force for East Timor (INTERFET) have resulted in faster deployment of peacekeepers and tighter security while restricting civilian agencies trying to reach vulnerable groups outside Dili. (C)

See also map of Timor.

Indonesian State Secretary Muladi on September 23 claimed that the security situation in East Timor was improving, martial law was over, and the military (TNI) would make the hand-off to INTERFET as soon as possible. Army Chief of Staff General Wiranto said that, despite "one or two" looters, "things are OK." But security remains tense, with several accounts of gunfire in Dili directed toward peacekeepers, a heated "misunderstanding" (with warning shots) between TNI and INTERFET troops, and roundups of dozens of suspected militia members. More alarming for INTERFET are reports of an alleged TNI-supported militia buildup in western Timor. (C)

Burn and go

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 2/7/06 Exemption B1.1.4(c),(d)

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERFET expected to have 3,500 troops on the ground by the evening of September 23 but was having trouble deploying them beyond Dili and Bakau, which has an airport that will be critical for food deliveries to the easternmost region of Timor.

No peace, no food

Security problems are impeding urgent relief operations. Though World Food Program (WFP) airdrops have resumed despite technical and logistical problems, and will increase to two drops per day, they will not meet the requirements of the several hundred thousand needy or displaced. UNAMET on September 23 announced that 20 IDPs had died from malnutrition-linked causes and that thousands near the town of Dare were desperate for food and water. Food stockpiles in Dili have been looted, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has taken over the only functional hospital, fears that food distribution outside Dili will remain stalled until security improves; the ICRC also wants to begin reuniting families divided by the forced expulsions. The Acting UN Humanitarian Coordinator warns that the bulk of aid supplies must be delivered before the rainy season commences in November. (C)

For related analysis, see
"Indonesia: Cliffhanging in Jakarta (U)" and
"East Timor:
September 24, 1999.

TOP SECRET UMBRA

INR Home Page | Briefs | Intel Assessments | Viewpoints | Products by date | Products by country

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
09/22/1999

I18 P

B1 1.4 (c,d)

UN/East Timor: Human Rights Geopolitics (U)

Human rights groups are clamoring for investigations into war crimes committed by the Indonesian military (TNI) and its militia allies.

B1

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Robinson succeeded in scheduling a rare special session of the UNCHR for September 23 to address the East Timor human rights crisis, but the entire Asian group--including potential INTERFET participants India, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines--voted against it.

B1

Canberra's concerns

Australian Foreign Minister Downer on September 20 announced that his government would consider releasing intelligence, "consistent with established principles," on East Timor to a UN war crimes investigation.

B1

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 2/7/06 Exemption B1, 1.4(c),(d)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

C

B1

J

Nongovernmental groups are jumping on an unsteady war-crimes bandwagon. The Australian branch of the International Council of Jurists has begun interviewing refugees in Darwin about alleged atrocities. More problematic for Indonesia is an effort by a European human rights group to file a case before a Portuguese court naming 21 Indonesians as responsible for the massacres. Because the UN has never recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, Portugal could make a credible claim for war crimes jurisdiction. (U)

Starting slowly

With INTERFET preoccupied with security and assisting in a massive humanitarian mission, and the UN Assistance Mission's (UNAMET's) future mandate still undecided by the Security Council, not much on-the-ground support will be forthcoming in the next few weeks for collecting forensic evidence at atrocity sites or even interviewing potential witnesses on the island

C

B1

J

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

INR Home Page | Briefs | Intel Assessments | Viewpoints | Products by date | Products by country

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]ET

UNCLASSIFIED

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
09/22/1999

UN/East Timor: Human Rights Geopolitics (U)

Human rights groups are clamoring for investigations into war crimes committed by the Indonesian military (TNI) and its militia allies.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Robinson succeeded in scheduling a rare special session of the UNCHR for September 23 to address the East Timor human rights crisis, but the entire Asian group--including potential INTERFET participants India, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines--voted against it.

Canberra's concerns

Australian Foreign Minister Downer on September 20 announced that his government would consider releasing intelligence, "consistent with established principles," on East Timor to a UN war crimes investigation.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 3/7/01 Exemption B1, 1.4(c),(d)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

B1

Nongovernmental groups are jumping on an unsteady war-crimes bandwagon. The Australian branch of the International Council of Jurists has begun interviewing refugees in Darwin about alleged atrocities. More problematic for Indonesia is an effort by a European human rights group to file a case before a Portuguese court naming 21 Indonesians as responsible for the massacres. Because the UN has never recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, Portugal could make a credible claim for war crimes jurisdiction. (U)

Starting slowly

With INTERFET preoccupied with security and assisting in a massive humanitarian mission, and the UN Assistance Mission's (UNAMET's) future mandate still undecided by the Security Council, not much on-the-ground support will be forthcoming in the next few weeks for collecting forensic evidence at atrocity sites or even interviewing potential witnesses on the island

B1

TOP SECRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]ET

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brief
09/24/1999

I-19
P

East Timor:

The first day of the special East Timor session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva ended on September 23 with Asian member states rallying around Indonesia, according to press reports. The European Union favors the creation of an international commission of inquiry, but Asian, Arab, and some Latin American countries strongly oppose it, according to Mission Geneva. (C)

Comment: The recent spate of gunfire against INTERFET and the killings of a German priest and a Dutch journalist underscore the threat to westerners now and to future Asian peacekeepers in East Timor. The heated rhetoric at the UNCHR special session was divided on an East-West fault line, indicating a regional polarization that could undermine both INTERFET and a future UNAMET. (C)

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 1/7/06 Exemption B1.1.4(c),(d)

UNCLASSIFIED

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100

U-8,500-09/DAN-1A(FOIA)

OCT 28 2008

Mr. Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Mr. Simpson

This responds to your request under the Freedom of Information Act, archive #20030195DIA016 dated 7 Mar 2003. Therein you requested records concerning all finished intelligence from August to November 1975, relating to outbreak of civil war in East Timor and Indonesian military and security operations in and around East Timor. DIA has completed a search of its systems of records and determined that this Agency has no records responsive to the subject of your request.

If you believe this Agency should have records responsive to your request, you are advised that a requester may appeal, within 60 days, DIA's attempt to locate records. You may exercise this right by referring to case number #0279-2003 and addressing your appeal to:

Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN: DAN-1A(FOIA)
Washington, DC 20340-5100

Sincerely,

Alesia Y. Williams
Chief, Freedom of Information Act Staff

20030195DIA016 DIA
RECNO:25269 SEQCOR:143950
11/4/2008 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Civil War in East Timor

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG - 3 2004

Case No. 200300722(ER1)
Archive File No. 20030196DOS045

Mr. Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Mr. Simpson:

Pursuant to your request of March 10, 2003, for the release of information under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552), we initiated a search of the following record systems under the control of the Department of State: the Central Foreign Policy Records, the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

The search of the Central Foreign Policy Records has been completed, resulting in the retrieval of 76 documents responsive to your request. After reviewing these documents, we have determined that 12 may be released in full, 56 may be released with excisions, and seven may not be released. All released documents are enclosed.

A decision on the remaining document requires further interagency coordination: it has been referred for review and direct reply to you.

The material in the excised portions of 54 of the documents released in part and in the seven documents withheld in full is currently and properly classified under Executive Order 12958 in the interest of national defense or foreign relations. As such, it is exempt from release under subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act.

20030196DOS045
RECNO: 25273
DATER: 8/10/2004
Militia Groups - East Timor

DOS
SEQCOR: 108745
Simpson, Brad

The information in the excised portions of one of the documents released in part is exempt from release under subsection (b)(5) of the Freedom of Information Act because it consists of pre-decisional deliberative process material.

The material in the excised portions of nine of the documents released in part is of such a nature that its release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. As such, it is exempt from release under subsection (b)(6) of the Freedom of Information Act.

In some cases, two or more exemptions may apply to the same document.

In the case of a document released in part, all non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released.

With respect to material we have withheld under the Freedom of Information Act, you have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. Appeals should be addressed to the Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/RPS/IPS/PP/LC, SA-2, Room 8113, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20522-8113. The letter of appeal should refer to the case number shown above. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

Still in progress are the searches of the records of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Additional information will be provided as soon as it becomes available.

If you have any questions with respect to the processing of your request, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, A/RPS/IPS/CR/EAP, Room 8113, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20522-8113. You may also reach us by telephone at (202) 261-8314. Please be sure to refer to the case control number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

Your continuing cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Margaret P. Grafeld
Director
Office of Information Programs
and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

February 26, 1999

RELEASED IN FULL

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

E2

Dear Madame Secretary,

We are writing to you today to express our great concern over escalating Indonesian military (ABRI) and ABRI-backed paramilitary violence in East Timor. We are very encouraged by the Indonesian government's recent, most hopeful announcement of a separate option for independence for East Timor if the East Timorese people reject an Indonesian proffered autonomy plan. However, we fear UN negotiations will be doomed to failure if the current humanitarian crisis is not addressed immediately.

We greatly appreciate the work that you and Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth have been doing to press for the release of political prisoners as well as the withdrawal of troops from East Timor. We highly encourage you to continue these efforts.

However, we can't emphasize enough the gravity of the human rights conditions throughout the countryside in East Timor at a time when a transition to self-determination is finally within sight. Bishop Belo has himself stated last week that things are getting worse on the ground. We follow his moral lead as we renew our call for active U.S. support for the steps necessary to allow this transition to be a peaceful one.

Daily reports from East Timor indicate a serious increase in violent actions by several armed militias, including those by the Makihit, Alfa, Saka and Mahidi. In the last two months these groups have reportedly attacked villagers in several areas, recently around Suai, killing civilians, including a pregnant woman and precipitating a refugee crisis with over 5,000 seeking refuge on the grounds of a local church and school. Just a few days ago, a young man of 25 was reportedly shot in the head by an Indonesian military unit backing up a paramilitary unit that attacked a neighborhood just outside of Dili. Indonesian Generals have admitted to arming these groups with small weapons. All of this has caused immense turmoil and unrest.

On the eve of your departure for southeast Asia, we take this opportunity to respectfully request your help in pressing the Indonesian government to cooperate with several crucial measures to alleviate this volatile situation and set the groundwork for just and peaceful settlement of the situation. These are: A) the speedy introduction of permanent UN and other international observers in East Timor, B) an immediate end to the arming of the paramilitary units in East Timor by ABRI C) the initiation of a process to disarm and disband these units, and a genuine, monitored withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor. In addition, we hope that you will take this opportunity to meet with Xanana Gusmao and press the Indonesian government for his unconditional release.

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2004 200300722

These last months, the State Department has clearly played a vital role in this process by more clearly expressing to Jakarta its support for the rights of the people of East Timor. We thank you very much for your efforts and look forward to hearing the results of your upcoming visit to Jakarta.

Sincerely,

LANE EVANS
Member of Congress

PATRICK J. KENNEDY
Member of Congress

JOSEPH PITTS
Member of Congress

NITA LOWEY
Member of Congress

JOHN OLVER
Member of Congress

BERNARD SANDERS
Member of Congress

JAMES P. MCGOVERN
Member of Congress

CAROLYN MALONEY
Member of Congress

JAMES L. OBERSTAR
Member of Congress

JOHN CONYERS
Member of Congress

ROBERT UNDERWOOD
Member of Congress

GEORGE MILLER
Member of Congress

BOB FILNER
Member of Congress

JOSE SERRANO
Member of Congress

LLOYD DOGGETT
Member of Congress

BILL LUTHER
Member of Congress

JOHN TIERNEY
Member of Congress

BARNEY FRANK
Member of Congress

FRANK WOLF
Member of Congress

BRUCE VENTO
Member of Congress

SHERROD BROWN
Member of Congress

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH
Member of Congress

TONY P. HALL
Member of Congress

DENNIS KUCINICH
Member of Congress

PETER DEFAZIO
Member of Congress

HOWARD BERMAN
Member of Congress

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG - 3 2004

Case No. 200300722(ER1)
Archive File No. 20030196DOS045

Mr. Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Mr. Simpson:

Pursuant to your request of March 10, 2003, for the release of information under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552), we initiated a search of the following record systems under the control of the Department of State: the Central Foreign Policy Records, the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

The search of the Central Foreign Policy Records has been completed, resulting in the retrieval of 76 documents responsive to your request. After reviewing these documents, we have determined that 12 may be released in full, 56 may be released with excisions, and seven may not be released. All released documents are enclosed.

A decision on the remaining document requires further interagency coordination: it has been referred for review and direct reply to you.

The material in the excised portions of 54 of the documents released in part and in the seven documents withheld in full is currently and properly classified under Executive Order 12958 in the interest of national defense or foreign relations. As such, it is exempt from release under subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act.

20030196DOS045
RECNO: 25273
DATER: 8/10/2004
Militia Groups - East Timor

DOS
SEQCOR: 108745
Simpson, Brad

The information in the excised portions of one of the documents released in part is exempt from release under subsection (b)(5) of the Freedom of Information Act because it consists of pre-decisional deliberative process material.

The material in the excised portions of nine of the documents released in part is of such a nature that its release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. As such, it is exempt from release under subsection (b)(6) of the Freedom of Information Act.

In some cases, two or more exemptions may apply to the same document.

In the case of a document released in part, all non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released.

With respect to material we have withheld under the Freedom of Information Act, you have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. Appeals should be addressed to the Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/RPS/IPS/PP/LC, SA-2, Room 8113, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20522-8113. The letter of appeal should refer to the case number shown above. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

Still in progress are the searches of the records of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Additional information will be provided as soon as it becomes available.

If you have any questions with respect to the processing of your request, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, A/RPS/IPS/CR/EAP, Room 8113, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20522-8113. You may also reach us by telephone at (202) 261-8314. Please be sure to refer to the case control number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

Your continuing cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Margaret P. Grafeld
Director
Office of Information Programs
and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

February 26, 1999

RELEASED IN FULL

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

E2

Dear Madame Secretary,

We are writing to you today to express our great concern over escalating Indonesian military (ABRI) and ABRI-backed paramilitary violence in East Timor. We are very encouraged by the Indonesian government's recent, most hopeful announcement of a separate option for independence for East Timor if the East Timorese people reject an Indonesian proffered autonomy plan. However, we fear UN negotiations will be doomed to failure if the current humanitarian crisis is not addressed immediately.

We greatly appreciate the work that you and Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth have been doing to press for the release of political prisoners as well as the withdrawal of troops from East Timor. We highly encourage you to continue these efforts.

However, we can't emphasize enough the gravity of the human rights conditions throughout the countryside in East Timor at a time when a transition to self-determination is finally within sight. Bishop Belo has himself stated last week that things are getting worse on the ground. We follow his moral lead as we renew our call for active U.S. support for the steps necessary to allow this transition to be a peaceful one.

Daily reports from East Timor indicate a serious increase in violent actions by several armed militias, including those by the Makihit, Alfa, Saka and Mahidi. In the last two months these groups have reportedly attacked villagers in several areas, recently around Suai, killing civilians, including a pregnant woman and precipitating a refugee crisis with over 5,000 seeking refuge on the grounds of a local church and school. Just a few days ago, a young man of 25 was reportedly shot in the head by an Indonesian military unit backing up a paramilitary unit that attacked a neighborhood just outside of Dili. Indonesian Generals have admitted to arming these groups with small weapons. All of this has caused immense turmoil and unrest.

On the eve of your departure for southeast Asia, we take this opportunity to respectfully request your help in pressing the Indonesian government to cooperate with several crucial measures to alleviate this volatile situation and set the groundwork for just and peaceful settlement of the situation. These are: A) the speedy introduction of permanent UN and other international observers in East Timor, B) an immediate end to the arming of the paramilitary units in East Timor by ABRI C) the initiation of a process to disarm and disband these units, and a genuine, monitored withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor. In addition, we hope that you will take this opportunity to meet with Xanana Gusmao and press the Indonesian government for his unconditional release.

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2004 200300722

These last months, the State Department has clearly played a vital role in this process by more clearly expressing to Jakarta its support for the rights of the people of East Timor. We thank you very much for your efforts and look forward to hearing the results of your upcoming visit to Jakarta.

Sincerely,

LANE EVANS
Member of Congress

PATRICK J. KENNEDY
Member of Congress

JOSEPH PITTS
Member of Congress

NITA LOWEY
Member of Congress

JOHN OLVER
Member of Congress

BERNARD SANDERS
Member of Congress

JAMES P. MCGOVERN
Member of Congress

CAROLYN MALONEY
Member of Congress

JAMES L. OBERSTAR
Member of Congress

JOHN CONYERS
Member of Congress

ROBERT UNDERWOOD
Member of Congress

GEORGE MILLER
Member of Congress

BOB FILNER
Member of Congress

JOSE SERRANO
Member of Congress

LLOYD DOGGETT
Member of Congress

BILL LUTHER
Member of Congress

JOHN TIERNEY
Member of Congress

BARNEY FRANK
Member of Congress

FRANK WOLF
Member of Congress

BRUCE VENTO
Member of Congress

SHERROD BROWN
Member of Congress

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH
Member of Congress

TONY P. HALL
Member of Congress

DENNIS KUCINICH
Member of Congress

PETER DEFAZIO
Member of Congress

HOWARD BERMAN
Member of Congress

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART03449

Channel: n/a

RELEASED IN FULL

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8062

ESS

PAGE 01 JAKART 03449 01 OF 02 161445Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-01	AGRE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W			

----------E1CF0C 161531Z /38

O 161105Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8838
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003449

ROME PASS VATICAN CITY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, PINS, MOPS, CASC, ID

SUBJECT: SECURITY CLIMATE IN EAST TIMOR DURING ROTH VISIT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03449 01 OF 02 161445Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM MICHAEL P. OWENS, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: JULY 16, THE FIRST DAY OF REGISTRATION FOR THE UN-ADMINISTERED CONSULTATLON ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF EAST TIMOR, SET FOR LATE AUGUST, COINCIDED WITH EAP A/S ROTH'S TO EAST TIMOR. REGISTRATION FOR THE CONSULTATION APPEARS TO HAVE GONE RELATIVELY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

SMOOTHLY SO FAR. HOWEVER, BRIEFLNGS PROVIDED TO A/S ROTH BY UNAMET OFFICIALS AND OTHER CONTACTS PAINT A GRIM PICTURE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH INTIMIDATION AND FEAR HAVE MADE AN IMPACT ON THE POPULACE, ANO UN OFFICIALS ON THE GROUND HAVE EXPRESSEO RESERVATIONS AND UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. THERE ARE PARTICULAR FEARS THAT DISTURBANCES MAY EMERGE FROM COMMEMORATIONS OF "INTEGRASI (INTEGRATION) DAY" ON JULY 17. END SUMMARY.

FIRST OAY OF REGISTRATION

3. (C) EAP A/S ROTH, AMBASSADOR, EAP CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON, AND POLOFF ARE CONDUCTING A THREE OAY VISIT TO EAST TIMOR (JULY 15-17). CONVERSATIONS WITH A/S ROTH'S PARTY, CURRENTLY IN DILI, INDICATE THAT JULY 16, THE FIRST DAY OF REGISTRATION FOR UN-ADMINISTERED CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE TERRITORY, SET FOR LATE AUGUST, HAS GONE RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY. ON JULY 16, A/S ROTH AND PARTY TRAVELED BY UNAMET HEIJCOPTER TO SUAI IN SOUTHEAST EAST TIMOR AND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03449 01 OF 02 161445Z

MALIANA ON THE EASTERN FRINGE OF THE TERRITORY. A/S ROTH AND PARTY ALSO TRAVELED BY ROAD TO LIQUICIA, SITE OF SOME OF THE WORST VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR IN RECENT MONTHS. IN EACH PLACE, REGISTRATION OPERATIONS APPEARED TO BE GOING RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY, WITH 50-150 CITIZENS OBSERVED REGISTERING AT DESIGNATED SITES. WHILE IT IS TOO EARLY TO PROCLAIM A "GOOD TURNOUT" FOR REGISTRATION, EARLIER TALK OF A SIGNIFICANT BOYCOTT NOW APPEARS UNFOUNDED, POLOFF OPINED. A/S ROTH AND PARTY ORSERVED SOME SIGNS OF INTIMIDATION: A SKULL AND CROSS BONES WERE PAINTED ON THE DOOR OF ONE REGISTRATION STATION IN LIQUICIA, AND THERE WERE VARIOUS REPORTS OF MILITIA MEMBERS LOITERING IN THE VICINITY OF THE REGISTRATION SITES, AS WELL AS OTHER ACCOUNTS OF MINOR OBSTRUCTIONISM. POLOFF TRAVELLING WITH A/S ROTH OPINED THAT THE DOMINANT THEME WAS THE RELATIVE NORMALITY OF THE FIRST DAY OF REGISTRATION AND THE LACK OF ANY SERIOUS VIOLENT INCIDENTS, PARTICULARLY IN PROBLEMATIC SPOTS LIKE LIQUICIA, SUAI, AND MALIANA.

GRIM MOOD AMONG UNAMET STAFF

4. (C) A/S ROTH AND PARTY WERE BRIEFED JULY 15 BY SENIOR UNAMET STAFF IN DILI. THE OVERALL MOOD OF THE UN OFFICIALS WAS GRIM. THE STAFF INDICATED THAT UN OFFICIALS ENJOY GOOD FORMAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH THEIR INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS BUT THAT ASSURANCES OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION THEY RECEIVE ARE STILL NOT BEING FULLY TRANSLATED INTO DEEDS. CONTRARY TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03449 01 OF 02 161445Z
INDONESIAN CLAIMS, UN STAFFERS SAID, LOGISTICAL ISSUES ARE NOT IMPEDING PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONSULTATION. THE PROBLEM, ACCORDING TO UNAMET'S ANALYSIS, IS THE DEGREE TO WHICH GOI-SPONSORED MILITIAS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN INTIMIDATING THE GENERAL PUBLIC. PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS HAVE BEEN TOO AFRAID TO CAMPAIGN, OR EVEN TO COME OUT OF HIDING. UNAMET PERSONNEL MEETING WITH A/S ROTH AND PARTY PRIVATELY EXPRESSED UNCERTAINTY OVER WHETHER THE CONSULTATION COULD BE CARRIED OUT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. ALTHOUGH UNAMET STAFF STATED THEY WERE SOMEWHAT MORE CONFIDENT ABOUT THEIR OWN SECURITY THAN THEY HAD BEEN LAST WEEK, UNAMET CONTINUES TO RECEIVE THREATS FROM PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS VIA TELEPHONE, RADIO, AND IN PERSON.

FEARS ABOUT "INTEGRASI DAY"
---

5. (SBU) FEARS ARE WIOESPREAD OF UNREST ASSOCIATED WITH COMMEMORATIONS OF "INTEGRASI (INTEGRATION) DAY" SET FOR JULY . UNAMET STAFF STATED THEY MAY NEED TO POSTPONE REGISTRATION IN BALIBO, AN INTEGRATIONIST STRONGHOLO, AND ELSEWHERE IN EAST TIMOR, IF THE MILITIA-ORGANIZED COMMEMORATIONS APPEAR TOO ROWDY OR AGGRESSIVE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7522

PAGE 01 JAKART 03449 02 OF 02 161349Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-01	AGRE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00

IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W				

----------E1C378 161353Z /38

O 161105Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8839
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003449

ROME PASS VATICAN CITY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, PINS, MOPS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: SECURITY CLIMATE IN EAST TIMOR DURING ROTH VISIT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03449 02 OF 02 161349Z

MILITIA MEMBER KILLED

6. (SBU) A MEMBER OF THE "MAHIDI" PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA WAS KILLED JULY 15, APPARENTLY AS HE WAS PARTICIPATING IN A MAHIDI ATTACK ON THE VILLAGE OF ZUMALAI. POLOFF PREDICTED THAT THE DEATH WILI, RE DEPICTEO BY MAHIDI AS AN ATTACK BY ARMED PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS, ALTHOUGH OTHER REPORTS SUGGEST THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WAS KILLED BY OTHER PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS, AS PART OF AN INTRA-MILITIA DISPUTE.

7. (SBU) SINCE OUR CONVERSATION WITH A/S ROTH'S PARTY IN DILI, WE HAVE RECEIVEO MEDIA REPORTS OF SEVERAL ATTACKS AGAINST REGISTRATION STATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE "MAHIDI" PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA (NFI).

8. (SBU) A/S ROTH'S VISIT TO EAST TIMOR WILL BE REPORTED IN GREATER DETAIL SEPTEL. ROY

RELEASED IN FULL

<<<>>>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4870

E66

PAGE 01 JAKART 04136 01 OF 02 281808Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/023W

----------F1AA67 281808Z /49

O 270936Z AUG 99 (CCY-SECTION INFO-ADXF138D5-MSI5776-045)
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHC IMMEDIATE 9509
INFO AMCONSUL SYDNEY IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004136

CORRECTED COPY -(SECTION INFORMATION)
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 04136 01 OF 02 281808Z
SENSTIVE
SYDNEY FO A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, CASC, ID, UN
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AUGUST 27 UPDATE

REF: JKARTA 4117 AND PREVIOUS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

1. (U) SENSITIVE BUT UNLASSIFIED. PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: THE SITUATION IN DILI REMAINED QUITE TENSE AS OF MID-AFTERNOON ON AUGUST 27, BUT TH CITY WAS MUCH LESS VIOLENT THAN THE PREVIOUS DAY. STREETS WERE MAINLY EMPTY, WITH MOST SHOPS CLOSED. A CNRT OFFICE WAS ATTACKED BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS EARLIER IN THE DAY, BUT NO INJURIS WERE REPORTED. JOURNALISTS, MANY OF WHOM WERE TARGETED BY MILITIAS ON AUGUST 26, REMAIN EDGY. PARTIES CONTINUE TO TAKE STOCK OF THE TUMULTUOUS AND VIOLENT EVENTS OF AUGUST 26. END SUMMARY.

DILI REMAINS TENSE
---

3. (SBU) AS OF MID-AFTERNOON AUGUST 27, THE SITUATION IN DILI REMAINED TENSE, ESPECIALLY IN THE EASTERN PART OF TOWN, WHERE LOCAL RESIDENTS MAINTAINED ROADBLOCKS IN AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT MILITIAS FROM ENTERING THEIR NEIGHBORHOODS. EARLY IN THE AFTERNOON, A MILITIA VEHICLE APPROACHED ONE OF THESE ROADBLOCKS IN THE BECORA AREA, AND

AN INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTER WAS SHOT IN THE ABDOMEN BY THE MILITIA. ICRC RUSHED TO THE SCENE AND EVACUATED THE INJURED MAN TO A CHURCH CLINIC. POLIE IN THIS AREA AND ELSEWHERE SEEMED TO BE UNDER A GREAT DEAL OF STRESS. THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE YOUTH IN THE BECORA AREA REMAIN IN A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL STATE, READY TO CONFRONT THE MILITIAS, WH, ACCORDNG TO SOME ACCOUNTS, HAVE SENT ARMED INFILTRATORS INTO THES NEIGHBORHOODS. ONE SOURCE REPORTED THAT MANY RESIDENTS HAVE FLED THE BECORA AREA. DILI IS OF COURSE RIFE WITH UNVERIFIED RUMORS-- SUCH AS THAT SNIPERS HAVE ARRIVED IN TOWN TO SHOOT ALL THE LOCAL PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS.

4. (SBU) CENTRAL DILI BECAME EERILY QUIET IN THE AFTERNOON, WITH VIRTUALLY NO ONE ON THE STREETS, EXCEPT FOR SCATTERED GROUPS OF POLICE, AND FE VEHICLES. AITARAK MILITIA, ACCOMPANIED BY POLICE, PATROLLED THE NEARLY DESERED STREETS AND THERE WERE OTHER VEHICLES CARRYING GROUPS OF MEN IN PRO-AUTONOMY SHIRBS AND HATS. POLOFF DID NO SEE ANY MILITIA MEMBERS OPENLY EXHIBITING ARMS BUT OTHER SOURCES REPORTED SEEING ONE TRUCK OF AIARAK MEMBERS BRANDISHING RIFLES. HE MILITIA MEMBERS EXCHANGED FRIENDLY WAVES WITH THE POLICE.

CNRT OFFICE RANSACKED

5. (SBU) THE CNRT OFFICE INDILI, WHICH CAME UNDER ATTACK FROM STONE-THROWING MILITIA ON AUGUST 26, WS AGAIN TARGETED BY MILITIA EARLY ON THE MORNING OF AUGUST 27. RELIABLE SOURCES REPORTED SEEING THE POLICE GUARDING THE

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 04136 01 OF 02 281808Z
COMPOUND MOVE ASIDE TO ALLOW THE MILITIA TO ENTER AND DESTROY ALL TH OFFICE AND COMPUTER EQUIPMENT, WHICH HAD SURVIVED THE PREVIOUS DAY'S ATTACK. THERE WERAPPARENTLY NO INJURIES RESULTIN FROM THE ARLY MORNING AGUST 27 ATTACK.

JOURNALISTS EDGY

6.(SBU) THE MANY INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE FLOODED INTO DILI ARE EDGY FOLLOWING AN AUGUST 26 ATTACK BY MILITIA ON THE DILI HOTEL, WHERE A NUMBER OF REPORTERS FROM NEW ZEALAND WERE HOLED UP. THE MILITIA RAKED THE HOTEL WITH GUNFIRE, SHOUTING THAT THEY INTENDED TO KILL THE JOURNALISTS.

MORE OBSERVATIONS FROM AUGUST 26

7. (SBU) THROUGHOUT THE MORNING OF AUGUST 26 THERE WAS RAMPANT THEFT OF ALL KINDS OF VEHICLES, BUT ESPECIALY MOTORCYCLES BY MILITIA PERSONL. POLOFF SPOKE WITH NUMEROUS INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD HAD THEIR OWN VEHICLES STOLEN, HAD WITNESSED SUCH THEFTS, OR KNEW SOMEONE WHO HAD BEEN VICTIMIZED. LATER IN THE EVENING VEHICLES COULD BE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8847

PAGE 01 JAKART 04136 02 OF 02 270951Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00

NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/023W

----------F13A3D 271008Z /38

O 270936Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9510
INFO AMCONSUL SYDNEY IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
RUEHBYAMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5700
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

CG III MEF

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 04136 02 OF 02 270951Z
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004136

SENSITIVE
SYDNEY FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, CASC, ID, UN
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AUGUST 27 UPDATE

SEEN ABANDONED, SOMETIMES LEFT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD. SOME CONTACTS CLAIMED THAT POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL HAD WITNESSED SOME OF THE THEFTS AND DONE NOTHING.

8. (SBU) THE ATTACKS BY THE MILITIA WERE UNPROVOKED. A JAPANESE DIPLOMAT WHO WAS IN THE CNRT OFFICE AT THE TIME SAID MILITIA SIMPY ROVE UP AND UNLEASHED A HAIL OF STONES AT THE BUILDING. IN BECORA, ACCORDING TO NUMEROUS EYEWITNESSES INTERVIEWED BY POLOFF, MILITIA STONED CNRT/XANANA POSTERS ANDSIGNS UNTIL LOCAL YOUTH RSPONDED BY THROWING STONES, AFTR WHICH MORE MILITA ARRIVED TO SPRAY THE ARA WITH GUNFIRE AND BURN AND RANSACK THREE HOUSES. POLOFF SAW THE BURNT HOUSES AND THE BULLET HOLES. BY THAT TIME THE LOCAL YOUTH WERE IN A HIGHY

AGITATED STATE, ARMING THEMSELVES WITH ROCKS AND DETERMINED TO PREVENT THE MILITIA FROM ENTERING THE AREA AGAIN, DESPITE FERVENT PLEAS FROM CATHOLIC SISTERS IN THE AREA THAT THEY NOT TRY TO ENGAGE THE ARMED MILITIA. WHEN THE MILITIA RETURNED TO RETAKE THE "BECORA BRIDGE" (NEAR WHERE THE HOUSES HAD BEEN BURNED) MANY MORE CASUALTIES RESULTED.

9. (SBU) POLICE SEEM TO HAVE BEEN UNDER ORDERS TO PROTECT

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JAKART 04136 02 OF 02 270951Z
FOREIGNERS WHEN POSSIBLE (THERE WERE REPORTS THAT POLICE HAD SHIELDED SOME JOURNALISTS FROM THREATENING MILITIA MEMBERS) BUT NOT TO INTERVENE IN THE MILITIA ATTACKS ON EAST TIMORESE. ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

<<<>>>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4559

E69

PAGE 01 JAKART 04186 01 OF 02 311049Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/023W

----------F262BE 311049Z /38

O 311033Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9573
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004186

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 04186 01 OF 02 311049Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PREF, KCRM, CASC, ID, UN
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AUGUST 31 UPDATE NO. 2

REF: JAKARTA 4179 AND PREVIOUS

1. (U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

2. (U) SUMMARY: DILI WAS QUIET AT 6:00 PM, AUGUST 31,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

WITH MOST RESIDENTS STAYING INDOORS AND MOST SHOPS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICES CLOSED. MILITIA MEMBERS WERE EVIDENT IN SOME AREAS, AS WERE POLICE PATROLS. GLENO, THE SITE OF THE AUGUST 30 ATTACK ON THE POLLING STATION WITNESSED BY THE AMBASSADOR, EXPERIENCED MORE TROUBLE EARLIER IN THE DAY, WHICH WAS REPORTEDLY RESOLVED BY THE AFTERNOON. OFFICIALS FROM THE INDONESIAN DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHO SERVED AS OFFICIAL OBSERVERS TO THE CONSULTATION, DELIVERED CONTRADICTORY ASSESSMENTS OF THE VOTE. "UNIF," A PRIVATE PRO-INTEGRATION GROUP, STRONGLY CONDEMNED UNAMET'S ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONSULTATION AND CRITICIZED "INTERFERENCE" FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY.

DILI QUIET BUT TENSE
---

3. (SBU) ON THE AFTERNOON OF AUGUST 31 MOST OF DILI'S STREETS WERE DESERTED AND SHOPS CLOSED AS RESIDENTS STAYED CLOSE TO HOME IN ANTICIPATION OF A FUNERAL FOR

AN AITARAK MILITIA MEMBER KILLED ON AUGUST 29. APPARENTLY THE FUNERAL WAS POSTPONED UNTIL THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 1, HOWEVER, AND AS OF LATE AFTERNOON DILI REMAINED QUIET. MILITIA MEMBERS HAD GATHERED EARLIER NEAR THE CNRT OFFICE (ALREADY ATTACKED AND RANSACKED TWICE BY AITARAK IN PREVIOUS DAYS). A COUPLE OF DOZEN POLICE HAD BLOCKED OFF THE STREET LEADING TO AITARAK HEADQUARTERS IN CENTRAL DILI.

4. (SBU) PRACTICALLY THE ONLY VEHICLES CIRCULATING IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN DILI WERE THOSE OF AITARAK, UNAMET, AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS, ALTHOUGH POLICE WERE EVIDENT IN THE STREETS AS WELL. AT THE AIRPORT, EURICO GUTERRES AND OTHER AITARAK MEMBERS REPORTEDLY WERE "MONITORING" EAST TIMORESE DEPARTING ON THE MID-DAY MERPATI FLIGHT. THERE WAS A REPORT THAT ONE FAMILY HAD BEEN PREVENTED FROM BOARDING BY AITARAK. THERE WERE RUMORS THAT AITARAK WOULD ATTACK PEOPLE TRYING TO DEPART ON A PASSENGER SHIP ARRIVING IN DILI ON AUGUST 31. A NUMBER OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS ARE TAKING REFUGE IN CHURCH FACILITIES AND OTHERS REPORTEDLY HAVE RETURNED TO THE HILLS.

TROUBLE IN GLENO AGAIN

---

5. (SBU) GLENO EXPERIENCED MORE PROBLEMS ON THE MORNING OF AUGUST 31, WHEN MILITIA MEMBERS, ALLEGING UNAMET BIAS, REFUSED TO ALLOW BALLOT BOXES TO BE TAKEN OUT OF THE VILLAGE. EAST TIMOR MILITARY COMMANDER COL MUIS TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE DIFFICULTY WAS RESOLVED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 04186 01 OF 02 311049Z
WHEN UNAMET HEAD IAN MARTIN AND THE EAST TIMOR POLICE COMMANDER TRAVELED THERE AND PERSUADED THE MILITIA TO ALLOW UNAMET PERSONNEL (AND THE BALLOT BOXES) TO DEPART FOR DILI. MARTIN IN TURN AGREED TO INVESTIGATE THE MILITIA CHARGES, AND INVITED THE MILITIA TO COME TO DILI TO DISCUSS THEM. ASKED ABOUT MEDIA REPORTS OF THE DEATHS OF THREE UNAMET WORKERS IN GLENO, MUIS SAID THESE CONSISTED OF THE UNAMET INDONESIAN EMPLOYEE THAT HAD BEEN STABBED TO DEATH AFTER POLLS CLOSED ON AUGUST 30, AN ADDITIONAL UNAMET INDONESIAN EMPLOYEE WHO WAS ALSO STABBED ON AUGUST 30 AND DIED ON AUGUST 31, AND A THIRD NON-UNAMET INDONESIAN, WHOSE IDENTITY WAS NOT KNOWN. THERE IS ALSO AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT MILITIA IN MALIANA HAVE AGAIN ATTACKED (ON AUGUST 31) PRO-INDEPENDENCE STUDENT ACTIVISTS TAKING REFUGE AT THE DON BOSCO SCHOOL, INJURING TWO, ONE OF WHOM, ACCORDING TO SOME REPORTS HAS DIED. (THE AMBASSADOR HOPES TO MEET WITH IAN MARTIN LATER ON AUGUST 31 TO OBTAIN A FULLER READ-OUT ON THESE AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS.)

GOI REPRESENTATIVES ISSUE CONCILIATORY STATEMENTS

---

6. (SBU) AT A LATE MORNING PRESS CONFERENCE ON AUGUST 31, A SPOKESMAN FOR THE GOI TASK FORCE READ A

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4560

PAGE 01 JAKART 04186 02 OF 02 311049Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00

PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00
STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 ASDS-01 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01
DRL-02 G-00 MR-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /023W
----------F262C2 311049Z /38

O 311033Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9574
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004186

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 04186 02 OF 02 311049Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PREF, KCRM, CASC, ID, UN
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AUGUST 31 UPDATE NO. 2

CONCILIATORY STATEMENT COMMENDING EAST TIMORESE FOR THEIR HIGH TURNOUT AND EXPRESSING APPRECIATION TO UNAMET. THE STATEMENT EXPRESSED SHOCK AT THE DEATH OF THE UNAMET LOCAL EMPLOYEE ON AUGUST 30, ADDING THAT A SPECIAL POLICE TEAM WAS INVESTIGATING AND WOULD APPREHEND ANY SUSPECTS. IT REITERATED INDONESIA'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING SECURITY DURING PHASE TWO AND URGED RECONCILIATION AND DISARMAMENT OF THE CONTENDING EAST TIMORESE PARTIES. IN AN AUGUST 31 MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR (WHO WAS JOINED BY THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR), GOI TASK FORCE CHIEF AMBASSADOR TARMIDZI ECHOED THESE SENTIMENTS BUT ALSO REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO IRREGULARITIES WHICH HAD TO BE INVESTIGATED.

7. (SBU) ACCOMPANYING TARMIDZI WAS AMBASSADOR SULEYMAN, WHO HEADED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL OBSERVER TEAM. HE WAS MORE UNRELENTING AND HARSH IN HIS CHARGES OF ALLEGED IRREGULARITIES STEMMING FROM "BIASED" LOCAL

UNAMET STAFF AND WHAT HE CLAIMED WAS THE FAILURE OF UNAMET INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL TO ADEQUATELY SUPERVISE THE WORK OF THE LOCAL EMPLOYEES ON VOTING DAY. HE ALSO COMPLAINED THAT PARTY (PRO AND ANTI-INTEGRATION) REPRESENTATIVES WERE NOT PRESENT. (COMMENT. AS THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT, THIS WAS DUE NOT TO UNAMET POLICY BUT TO THE FAILURE OF THE TWO SIDES THEMSELVES TO AGREE.) SULEYMAN GAVE THE IMPRESSION

THAT THE INDONESIAN OBSERVERS AND THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES WOULD MAKE AN ISSUE OF THESE ALLEGED IRREGULARITIES.

8. (SBU) THE U.S. AND BRITISH AMBASSADORS AGREED THAT ALL COMPLAINTS SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BUT SAID THAT BASED ON THEIR OWN DIRECT OBSERVATIONS THE PERFORMANCE OF THE UNAMET EMPLOYEES HAD BEEN EXEMPLARY AND NEUTRAL. THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT THE MOST CRITICAL THING NOW WAS TO ENSURE A STABLE SECURE PROCESS THROUGH PHASE TWO SO THAT THE POSITIVE IMAGE FOR THE GOI GENERATED BY THE SUCCESSFUL VOTE COULD BE MAINTAINED.

PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES TAKE HARD LINE
---

9. (SBU) IN A PRESS RELEASE DISTRIBUTED AT THE GOI TASK FORCE BRIEFING, THE UNIF (UNITED FRONT FOR EAST TIMOR AUTONOMY, AN UMBRELLA GROUP OF THE FPDK, BRTT, AND MILITIAS) HARSHLY ATTACKED UNAMET, AUSTRALIA, PORTUGAL, AND "THE BIG COUNTRIES" FOR AN ALLEGED "CONSPIRACY TO DEFEAT INTEGRATION." APPENDED WAS A LONG LIST OF ALLEGED VOTING DAY IRREGULARITIES AT VARIOUS POLLING SITES, MOST DESCRIBED IN VERY GENERAL TERMS BUT WITH THE COMMON THEME OF UNAMET INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL EMPLOYEES "FORCING" VOTERS TO CHOOSE THE INDEPENDENCE OPTION OR PRE-MARKING THE BALLOTS. PRO-INTEGRATION SPOKESMAN BASILIO ARAUJO SAID HIS ORGANIZATION WOULD DEMAND THAT THE VOTE BE HELD AGAIN.
ROY

RELEASED IN FULL

<<<>>>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4254

E70

PAGE 01 JAKART 04179 01 OF 02 310956Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/023W	

----------F25D96 310956Z /38

O 310940Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9567
INFO AMCONSUL SYDNEY IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004179

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 04179 01 OF 02 310956Z
SYDNEY FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, CASC, ID, UN
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AUGUST 31 UPDATE

REF: (A) JAKARTA 4161, (B) JAKARTA 4155 AND PREVIOUS

1. (U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: REACTING TO THE AUGUST 30 EAST TIMOR BALLOTING, ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO LAUDED UNAMET'S PERFORMANCE AND PLEDGED TO CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE SECURITY AND TO ABIDE BY THE RESULTS OF THE CONSULTATION. THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TASK FORCE IN DILI GAVE SIMILARLY HIGH MARKS TO UNAMET, WHILE CALLING FOR ALL PARTIES TO REMAIN CALM IN THE NEXT DAYS AND WEEKS. JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI, HOWEVER, LEFT THE DOOR OPEN TO CHARGES OF UNAMET BIAS, ACCORDING TO SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF HIS REMARKS TO THE PRESS. JAMSHEED MARKER TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT UNAMET WOULD PROBABLY LET THE CONSULTATION VOTES TRICKLE OUT, SO THAT THE FINAL ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD COME AS A SHOCK TO NO ONE. AS OF MID-DAY AUGUST 31, DILI WAS GENERALLY QUIET, BUT SOME AREAS WERE STILL TENSE. END SUMMARY.

GOI REACTION TO CONSULTATION
---

3. (SBU) DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO TOLD JOURNALISTS IN JAKARTA LATE ON AUGUST 30

THAT HE THOUGHT THE UN HAD DONE A GOOD JOB OF ADMINISTERING THE CONSULTATION ON BALANCE. HE MAINTAINED THAT ANY BIAS ON THE PART OF UNAMET COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO INDIVIDUALS, RATHER THAN THE INSTITUTION AS A WHOLE. WIRANTO PLEDGED THE GOI WOULD CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE SECURITY IN EAST TIMOR UNTIL AND AFTER THE RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED AND AFFIRMED THAT THE GOI WOULD ABIDE BY THE CONSULTATION'S RESULTS. ACCORDING TO THE AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHO WORKS CLOSELY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS ON EAST TIMOR ISSUES, WIRANTO'S STATEMENT REFLECTS THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW, E.G. THAT UNAMET DID A GOOD JOB AS AN INSTITUTION ALTHOUGH THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE BIASED.

4. (SBU) IN DILI, THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS' EAST TIMOR TASK FORCE HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE AND GAVE A VERY POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF UNAMET'S PERFORMANCE. THE TASK FORCE SPOKESMAN CALLED ON EVERYONE TO REMAIN CALM AND ACCEPT THE OUTCOME. (WE UNDERSTAND REUTERS IS ALSO QUOTING FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS AS VERY SATISFIED WITH THE BALLOTING PROCESS). IN CONTRAST, A PRESS SPOKESMAN FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATION GROUP UNIF, ATTACKED UNAMET FOR ALLEGED BIAS IN CARRYING OUT THE ELECTION.

5. (SBU) JUSTICE MINISTER AND ACTING STATE SECRETARY MULADI'S REACTION WAS SOMEWHAT MORE EQUIVOCAL: ASKED ABOUT CHARGES OF UNAMET BIAS, HE SAID ANY SUCH CHARGES SHOULD BE DOCUMENTED AND PRESENTED TO THE UN. IF PROVED ACCURATE, HE SAID, THEY WOULD INDICATE UNAMET CONSISTED OF "PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS." "BISNIS INDONESIA"

AND OTHER JAKARTA PAPERS PRINTED TESTIMONY FROM INDIVIDUAL VOTERS WHO ALLEGED INTIMIDATION TO VOTE PRO-INDEPENDENCE AT THE HANDS OF UNAMET AND CITED INDIVIDUAL UNAMET STAFF WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY BIASED. THESE SAME PAPERS ALSO PORTRAYED MULADI'S REMARKS AS SUGGESTING THAT UNAMET'S PERFORMANCE WAS BIASED AND THAT THE CONSULTATION SHOULD BE HELD AGAIN, AN INTERPRETATION NOT BORNE OUT BY A CAREFUL READING OF WHAT MULADI ACTUALLY SAID.

CURRENT CONDITIONS IN DILI

6. (SBU) AS OF MIDDAY, DILI WAS REPORTED CALM BUT WITH POCKETS OF TENSION. TRAFFIC AND COMMERCE APPEARED MUCH LIGHTER THAN NORMAL. EMBOFFS SPOTTED SOME MEMBERS OF THE VIOLENT PRO-INTEGRATION AITARAK MILITIA ROAMING ABOUT THE CITY. THERE WAS SOME CONCERN THAT A FUNERAL LATER IN THE DAY FOR AN AITARAK MEMBER KILLED IN RECENT CLASHES WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS MIGHT BECOME AN IGNITION POINT FOR MORE VIOLENCE.

AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH MARKER

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00

STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 ASDS-01 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01
DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /023W
----------F25D99 310956Z /38

O 310940Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9568
INFO AMCONSUL SYDNEY IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004179

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 04179 02 OF 02 310956Z
SYDNEY FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, CASC, ID, UN
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AUGUST 31 UPDATE

7. (SBU) AMB, DATT AND POLOFF MET WITH AMB MARKER IMMEDIATELY AFTER LAST NIGHT'S UNAMET PRESS CONFERENCE. MARKER STRESSED THAT "THIS IS NOT THE TIME TO RELAX AND LET UP." MARKER SEES THE RESULTS GRADUALLY SEEPING OUT OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS, GIVING PEOPLE TIME TO ADJUST, SO THAT WHEN THE OFFICIAL RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED THE IMPACT WILL NOT BE ALL THAT DRAMATIC, WHICH SHOULD HELP MITIGATE AGAINST ANY VIOLENT REACTIONS.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTO9291

E84

PAGE 01 STATE 169952 101726Z
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	AF-00	CA-02	CCO-00	CIAE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00
	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	E-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	AC-01	NEA-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01
	PMB-00	DRL-02	G-00	SAS-00	/016R		

169952
SOURCE: KODAKC.010159
DRAFTED BY: TFID01:J ALOISI -- 09/10/99 (202) 647-6530
APPROVED BY: TFID01:J ALOISI
S/S-O:THANDREWS
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
S, D, P, E, T, M, TFID01, SS0-2, S/S-3, S/S-IRM, S/S-O/CMS,
S/S-EX, EP-5

----------F677E1 101727Z /45

O 101553Z SEP 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8305
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1159
USCINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA IMMEDIATE
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
USCINCSO MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 169952 101726Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 169952

INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/10/2009
TAGS: PREL, PINS, AEMR, MARR, CASC, EAP
SUBJECT: TFID01 SITUATION REPORT NO. 004 AS OF 0530 EDT
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1999

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL Page: 1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

CLASSIFIED BY J ALOISI, COORDINATOR. REASONS 1.5 B AND D.

SIX FLIGHTS DEPART DILI, MORE TOMORROW

1. (C) AUSTRALIAN C-130S MADE SIX FLIGHTS OUT OF DILI FILLED WITH UNAMET EMPLOYEES AND FAMILY MEMBERS FRIDAY. MOST PASSENGERS WERE ETHNIC EAST TIMORESE. AT LEAST TWO ADDITIONAL FLIGHTS WILL DEPART TOMORROW, CARRYING MOSTLY FOREIGNERS. EMBASSY JAKARTA ESTIMATES THAT 20-25 AMERICANS REMAIN WITH UNAMET IN DILI, AND THAT APPROXIMATELY HALF WILL LEAVE TOMORROW. (SOURCE: DARWIN CONOFF, EMBASSY JAKARTA TELCONS)

SITUATION IN DILI

2. (C) FOREIGNERS ARRIVING IN DARWIN REPORT MILITIA ROAMING DILI, WITH NO HINDRANCE FROM THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (TNI). MILITIA UNITS WERE SHARING TNI POSITIONS AT THE AIRPORT, AND ONE CONVOY AND AT LEAST ONE DEPARTING

FLIGHT WERE FIRED UPON. THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES. ONE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 169952 101726Z
OBSERVER TOLD OUR CONSULAR OFFICER IN DARWIN THAT "MARTIAL LAW IS A JOKE." SEPARATELY, EIGHT AITARAK MILITIA MEMBERS VANDALIZED UN VEHICLES PARKED NEXT TO THE UUNAMET COMPOUND. UNAMET REPORTEDLY COMPLAINED TO LOCAL COMMANDERS, DEMANDING ARMED FOREIGN GUARDS FOR SECURITY. (SOURCE: EMBASSY JAKARTA AND CONGEN SYDNEY TELCONS)

GUSMAO'S FATHER

3. (C) ADVISORS TO XANANA GUSMAO STILL CANNOT CONFIRM THAT GUSMAO'S FATHER HAS COME TO HARM IN EAST TIMOR. (SOURCE: EMBASSY JAKARTA TELCON)

NO COUP IN JAKARTA

4. (C) JAKARTA PAPERS ARE REPORTING TNI HAS "LAID DOWN THE LAW" TO HABIBIE, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IS UNACCEPTABLE. THERE IS LESS SPECULATION THAT HABIBIE WILL STEP DOWN, BUT OBSERVERS AGREE THAT THE EAST TIMOR SITUATION HAS PROVED A FURTHER BLOW TO HIS POLITICAL FUTURE. (SOURCE: EMBASSY JAKARTA TELCON, PRESS REPORTS)
TALBOTT

RELEASED IN FULL

<<<>>>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8585

E 89

PAGE 01 MANILA 12873 01 OF 02 130418Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 NP-01 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 INR-00
DCP-01 NSAE-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SAS-00 /004W
----------F6F272 130419Z /38

O 130407Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2319
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 5123
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD/PA//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 012873

USIA

USIA FOR EA, I/FW, R/MR
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EAP/P

E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA SUMMARY EAST TIMOR APEC

"GLAD THAT CLINTON HAS TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS"

RENE ESPINA, A CONGRESSMAN DURING THE EARLY PART OF THE MARCOS GOVERNMENT, WROTE IN HIS COLUMN IN THE CONSERVATIVE AND TOP-CIRCULATION DAILY "MANILA BULLETIN" (09/12): "INITIALLY, THE NEWS FROM THE U.S. WAS NOT ENCOURAGING BECAUSE WASHINGTON, D.C.
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MANILA 12873 01 OF 02 130418Z
SPOKE OF THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF AMERICA VIS A VIS INDONESIA.... U.S. COMPANIES ARE IN THE FOREFRONT OF EXPLOITING INDONESIAN OIL, GAS, MINERAL AND OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES.... BUT...THE WORLD'S CIVILIZED SOCIETIES HAVE BECOME ANGRY BECAUSE OF THE SAVAGE ATROCITIES COMMITTED IN THAT ISLAND. NOT EVEN THE STRONGEST LOBBY OF VESTED AMERICAN INTERESTS IN WASHINGTON CAN SUPPRESS THE INDIGNATION OF THE WORLD'S NATIONS. I WOULD LIKE TO THINK THAT THE CONSCIENCE OF THE U.S. LEADERSHIP HAS ALSO BEEN JOLTED. I AM GLAD THAT LAST FRIDAY PRESIDENT CLINTON FINALLY TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS TO SEND U.N. FORCES IN EAST TIMOR. HE SAID IN A PRESS CONFERENCE IN EFFECT THAT THE INDO ARMY WAS LINKED IN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

THE ACTION OF THE AITARAK (MILITIAS). `IF INDONESIA DOES NOT END THE VIOLENCE, IT MUST INVITE...THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ASSIST IN RESTORING SECURITY.' THIS STATEMENT WAS NOT AN IDLE THREAT. IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE U.S. TOGETHER WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD ACT, PREFERABLY WITH, OR WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF INDONESIA, AS IT DID IN KOSOVO."

"ETHNIC CLEANSING IN EAST TIMOR"

LAWYER, TELEVISION TALK SHOW HOST AND TELEVISION NETWORK EXECUTIVE RICARDO PUNO WROTE IN HIS COLUMN IN THE CONSERVATIVE AND THIRD-HIGHEST CIRCULATION DAILY "PHILIPPINE STAR" (09/12): "UNAMET, THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR EAST TIMOR, DID A GOOD JOB OVERSEEING THE ELECTIONS BUT IT IS INCREDIBLE THAT NO PREPARATIONS WERE MADE TO REACT TO THE BREAKDOWN OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS OR TO THE ANTICIPATED VIOLENCE FROM ANTI-INDEPENDENCE FORCES.... A RECENT IFET-OP [INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR EAST TIMOR OBSERVER PROJECT] E-MAILED MESSAGE CONTENDS THAT THE UN MUST IMMEDIATELY TAKE RESPONSIBILITY BY REPLACING INDONESIAN POLICE AND MILITARY WITH A U.S. SECURITY

UNCLASSIFIED

FORCE."

PUNO WROTE FURTHER: "THE CHALLENGE TO THE U.N. IS CLEAR. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS MADE IT VERY CLEAR EAST TIMOR WILL BE HIGH ON THE AGENDA AT THE APEC MEETING IN AUCKLAND. THIS, IN THE FACE OF THE USUAL PUSSY-FOOTING BY SOME TIMID FOREIGN MINISTERS DURING THE PREPARATORY SESSIONS. THERE NEED NOT BE AN OUTRIGHT INVASION OF EAST TIMOR, BUT INDONESIA SHOULD NOW ALLOW, FIRST, THE AUSTRALIAN PEACEKEEPING FORCES IN AND EVENTUALLY THE CONTINGENTS OF OTHER UN NATIONS. INDONESIAN ASSURANCES ARE, AT THIS TIME, EMPTY. JAKARTA DOESN'T EVEN KNOW THE CASUALTY RATE IN DILI. IT IS STILL IN DENIAL WHEREAS ALL INDICATIONS POINT TO AN ONGOING MASSACRE."

PUNO CONCLUDED: "TO H--- WITH DIPLOMACY. I THOUGHT THE U.N. LEARNED IN CAMBODIA, RWANDA, BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, KOSOVO AND OTHER KILLING FIELDS THAT SLAUGHTER IS NOT NEGOTIABLE AND THAT DELAY IS PRECISELY WHAT KILLERS WANT. THERE WILL BE MORE THAN ENOUGH TIME FOR POSTURING BY DIPLOMATS, FOR REFLECTIONS BY INTELLECTUALS ON WHAT ALL THIS SAYS ABOUT THE HUMAN PSYCHE, EVEN FOR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS TO BEING PARTICIPANTS IN GENOCIDE TO JUSTICE. BUT NOW THE UTMOST PRIORITY IS TO STOP THE KILLING. AND, IF NECESSARY, TO KILL THE KILLERS IF THEY PERSIST IN THEIR INHUMAN ACTS."

"THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST MOVE"

THE EDITORIAL OF THE CONSERVATIVE AND THIRD-LARGEST DAILY CIRCULATION "PHILIPPINE STAR" (09/12) SAID: "WHAT CAN THE WORLD DO? THE UNITED STATES IS WARNING OF SANCTIONS AND INSISTING ON SENDING AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO EAST TIMOR. AUSTRALIA HAS MOBILIZED ITS TROOPS FOR SUCH A MOVE. THE

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 MANILA 12873 01 OF 02 130418Z
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND HAS SUSPENDED THE PAYMENT OF 460 MILLION DOLLARS FOR INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM. RATHER THAN SCARE JAKARTA, HOWEVER, THE THREATS AND CONDEMNATION ARE STIRRING NATIONALIST SENTIMENT -- THE SAME SENTIMENT THAT HAS MADE EAST TIMORESE VOTE UNPOPULAR IN INDONESIA."

THE EDITORIAL SAID FURTHER: "WHERE IS THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IN THIS CRISIS? [PHILIPPINE] PRESIDENT ESTRADA, WHO EARLIER DEPLORED THE BLOODSHED, SAID INDONESIA REMAINS A FRIEND OF THE PHILIPPINES. THE REST OF THE ASEAN LEADERS PROBABLY SHARE HIS SENTIMENT. CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, HOWEVER, CAN OCCASIONALLY BE SET ASIDE WHEN LIVES ARE AT STAKE. ASEAN MUST NOT PROPEL ITS SLIDE TOWARD IRRELEVANCE BY REMAINING SILENT IN THE FACE OF THIS EMERGENCY."

THE EDITORIAL CONCLUDED: "AN ADVISER OF HABIBIE HAS WARNED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MIGHT WIN BACK EAST TIMOR BUT LOSE INDONESIA.... BUT THIS IS NOT JUST A CHOICE BETWEEN EAST TIMOR AND INDONESIA. THIS IS A CHOICE BETWEEN FREEDOM AND OPPRESSION. THIS IS A CHOICE BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH IN EAST TIMOR. THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8586

PAGE 01 MANILA 12873 02 OF 02 130418Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 NSAE-00
SP-00 PRM-01 SAS-00 /003W
----------F6F274 130419Z /38

O 130407Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2320
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 5124
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD/PA//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 MANILA 012873

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Page: 3

USIA

USIA FOR EA, I/FW, R/MR
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EAP/P

E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA SUMMARY EAST TIMOR APEC

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST MOVE TO STOP THIS BLOODSHED."

"PHILIPPINES HAS TO SPEAK UP"

MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, WIDOW OF AQUINO ADMINISTRATION'S FINANCE SECRETARY JAIME ONGPIN, WROTE IN HER COLUMN IN THE LIBERAL "TODAY" (09/12): "WE CANNOT BE COMFORTABLE OR PRETEND TO BE

OBLIVIOUS TO THE EVENTS NOW UNFOLDING IN EAST TIMOR.... THE PHILIPPINES HAS TO SPEAK UP. IT HAS TO RAISE ABOVE ITS INHIBITIONS OF BEING `NEIGHBORLY'.... IT SHOULD TAKE A POSITION IN DEFENSE OF THE EAST TIMORESE... WE HAVE TO STAND ON THE SIDE OF HUMAN RIGHTS...."

ONGPIN WROTE FURTHER: "THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE LEADING COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD ARE EXPECTED TO DO MORE TO RIGHT THE WRONG NOW BEING PERPETRATED IN EAST TIMOR.... IN PRACTICAL TERMS, A INTERNATIONAL FORCE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS HAS A BETTER PROSPECT OF REVERSING THE CHAOS AND DESTRUCTION...THAT IS NOW GOING ON IN EAST TIMOR. BOTH THE U.N. AND THE U.S. HAVE ALREADY DECLARED THE INDONESIAN MILITARY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAYHEM IN EAST TIMOR THROUGH THEIR SUPPORT OF THE...RAMPAGING MILITIAS.... IF AND WHEN THE UNITED NATIONS NEEDS TO PUT AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE TOGETHER TO BRING LAW AND ORDER TO EAST TIMOR, THE PHILIPPINES SHOULD COOPERATE AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE."

APEC-U.S.-RP

FEL MARAGAY WROTE IN HIS COLUMN IN THE INDEPENDENT "MANILA STANDARD" (09/12): "WILL [PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT] MR. ESTRADA AGAIN GRAB THE LIMELIGHT IN HIS SECOND APPEARANCE AT THE ANNUAL APEC GAB...? ...MR. ESTRADA WILL HAVE HIS HANDS FULL, HOLDING ONE-ON-ONE TALKS WITH U.S. PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON AND OTHER APEC LEADERS.... WITH CLINTON, HE WILL FOLLOW UP HIS REQUEST FOR AMERICAN ASSISTANCE IN MODERNIZING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES. HE WILL ALSO PROD CLINTON TO USE HIS CLOUT FOR THE SPEEDY ENACTMENT BY THE U.S. CONGRESS OF THE LONG-OVERDUE BILL

INCREASING THE PENSION AND OTHER BENEFITS TO FILIPINO VETERANS WHO SERVED IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES DURING THE LAST GLOBAL WAR."
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 MANILA 12873 02 OF 02 130418Z

ANDERSON

UNCLASSIFIED

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN FULL

<<<>>>

UNCLASSIFIED PTO0112

E91

PAGE 01 STATE 173322 151511Z
ORIGIN P-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/000R

DRAFTED BY: S/S-O: MKDRAPER
APPROVED BY: S/S-O: CJMCMULLEN
----------F83370 151511Z /38
O 151456Z SEP 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 173322

TOPOL 10050 PLEASE PASS U/S PICKERING

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 04523 DATED 15 SEP 99, SENT ACTION SENT INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE, CANBERRA, LONDON, LISBON, OTTAWA, ROME, TOKYO, WELLINTGTON, USEU BRUSSELS, GENEVA CG III MEF, USCINCPAC HONOLULU AND SECDEF WASHDC BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION.
QUOTE

UNCLAS JAKARTA 004523

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
AUCKLAND/WELLINGTON FOR A/S ROTH
DOD FOR ISA/AP DAS CAMPBELL

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 173322 151511Z
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINS, MOPS, ID, UN
SUBJECT: PEACEKEEPERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY HOLD INDONESIAN PUBLIC ATTENTION ON EAST TIMOR

REF: JAKARTA 4491

1. SUMMARY: ON SEPTEMBER 15, MEDIA AND PUBLIC COMMENTATORS CONTINUED TO DEBATE THE COMPOSITION OF A MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN EAST TIMOR. FOREIGN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

MINISTER ALATAS' STATEMENT THAT INDONESIA WOULD NOT SET CONDITIONS ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE ALSO GOT PROMINENT COVERAGE. EMBASSY CONTACTS IN MEDAN, NORTH SUMATRA, SAID THAT NOBODY BELIEVED THAT THE KILLINGS IN EAST TIMOR WERE A "MESSAGE" FROM THE MILITARY TO ACEH ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THEM IF THEY PURSUED INDEPENDENCE. OF MORE CONCERN TO PEOPLE WAS WHETHER OR NOT POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR WOULD DERAIL THE NATIONAL REFORM PROCESS. THERE IS CONTINUING DISCUSSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN EAST TIMOR, SPURRED BY UNHCHR MARY ROBINSON'S JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN. HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS IN EAST AND WEST TIMOR AND DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST AUSTRALIAN AND U.S. POLICIES ALSO CONTINUE TO ATTRACT MEDIA ATTENTION. END SUMMARY.

COMMENTARY ON PEACKEEPING FORCE
---

2. SEVERAL INDONESIAN PAPERS GAVE FRONT-PAGE COVERAGE TO
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 173322 151511Z
FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS' SEPTEMBER 14 STATEMENT IN NEW YORK THAT INDONESIA SET NO CONDITIONS WHATSOEVER ON THE COMPOSITION OF INTERNATIONAL TROOPS FOR EAST TIMOR AND EXPECTED THEIR ARRIVAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MINISTER OF DEFENSE/INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) COMMANDER WIRANTO IS QUOTED AS SAYING INDONESIA IS NOT GOING TO INTERFERE WITH THE UN POLICIES IN OPERATING THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES. "JUST GO AHEAD AND REGULATE IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN MECHANISMS," HE SAID.

3. A NUMBER OF ANALYSTS AND POLITICAL FIGURES IN INDONESIA SUPPORTED THE PRESENCE OF UN TROOPS IN EAST TIMOR, BUT THEY HOPED THAT THE UN WILL AVOID SUBJECTIVITY THAT CAN HURT INDONESIA. FOR THIS REASON, THEY REJECT THE PARTICIPATION OF AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND PORTUGAL. THIS VIEW IS EXPRESSED BY, AMONG OTHERS, PAN CHAIRMAN AMIEN RAIS, KONTRAS COORDINATOR MUNIR, SPOKESMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TASK FORCE IN EAST TIMOR DINO PATI DJALAL, HOME MINISTER SYARWAN HAMID AND COOPERATIVES MINISTER ADI SASONO. HOWEVER, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN OBSERVED THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN TROOPS IN THE UN MISSION CAN BE EFFECTIVE BECAUSE THERE IS LARGE SUPPORT FROM THE AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY ITSELF. MOREOVER, AS

PART OF A U.N. FORCE, AUSTRALIAN TROOPS COULD NOT HAVE A SEPARATE AGENDA. SPEAKING SEPARATELY TO "KOMPAS" NEWSPAPER, OMAR HALIM, AN ANALYST OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, CAUTIONED THAT THE UN SHOULD BE CAREFUL WHEN DETERMINING THE COMPOSITION AND THE CHIEF OF THE PEACEKEEPING TROOPS TO BE DEPLOYED IN EAST TIMOR. EXPERIENCES GAINED SO FAR

SHOW THAT UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN SUCCESSFUL, AS HAPPENED IN SOMALIA (NOTE: IN THE PAST WEEK SEVERAL COMMENTATORS HAVE RAISED SOMALIA AS A WARNING OF WHAT COULD HAPPEN IN EAST TIMOR. END NOTE) THE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER THE EAST TIMORESE CAN ACCEPT THE INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE.

4. EDITORIALS GENERALLY ECHOED THE FOREGOING COMMENTS. LEADING INDEPENDENT DAILY "KOMPAS" COMMENTED THAT, "IN THE END, INDONESIA WAS UNABLE TO REJECT UN PEACEKEEPERS. NEVERTHELESS, WE HOPE THE UN AND OTHER COUNTRIES WILL HEED THE DIGNITY OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE. ONLY IN THIS WAY WILL THE UN BE ABLE TO QUICKLY RESTORE SECURITY AND ORDER TO EAST TIMOR AND EASE INDONESIANS' SUFFERING." THE MUSLIM-ORIENTED "REPUBLIKA" SAID, "THE UN WOULD BE FAIR AND WISE TO NOTE THE HOPES AND SOLIDARITY OF ASEAN COUNTRIES, AND THE REASONS FOR WHICH INDONESIANS DO NOT WANT TO ACCEPT AUSTRALIAN FORCES."

5. SOME EDITORIALS CONTAINED (GENERALLY UNFAVORABLE) COMMENTARY ON DISCUSSION OF EAST TIMOR DURING THE APEC LEADERS' MEETING IN AUCKLAND. THE RULING GOLKAR PARTY'S "SUARA KARYA" OBSERVED, "THE KUALA LUMPUR PHENOMENON (I.E., THE ATTENTION FOCUSED ON INDONESIA'S DOMESTIC TROUBLES AT THE 1998 APEC LEADERS' MEETING) WAS REPEATED IN AUCKLAND. DURING THE MINISTERIAL MEETING NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA AND THE U.S. TRIED TO FORM A COMMON STANCE TO PRESSURE INDONESIA WITH MILITARY THREATS AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS." THE INDEPENDENT "SUARA PEMBARUAN" COMMENTED, "THE APEC SUMMIT IN AUCKLAND IS OF THE VIEW THAT THIS

COOPERATION FORUM HAS BEEN TOO SLOW IN REALIZING THE PLAN FOR FREE TRADE. THAT IS WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION IS NOT ECONOMICS BUT POLITICS, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR!" INDEPENDENT "MEDIA INDONESIA" NOTED THAT THE

U.S. IS BEGINNING TO "DISPLAY ITS MUSCLE" IN RELATION TO THE ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING TROOPS FOR EAST TIMOR NOW UNDER DISCUSSION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THE WISHES OF THE U.S., THE EDITORIAL CONTINUED, AS THE SOLE SUPERPOWER ARE REFLECTED IN PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON'S STATEMENT IN AUCKLAND.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPACT OF EAST TIMOR SITUATION

6. JUSTICE AND UNITY PARTY (PKP) FIGURE GEN. (RET.) TRY SUTRISNO, (ALSO VICE PRESIDENT (1993-98) AND ARMED FORCES COMMANDER AT THE TIME OF THE 1991 SANTA CRUZ MASSACRE), SAID THE OFFER OF THE TWO OPTIONS TO EAST TIMOR (AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE) HAD BEEN HIGHLY RISKY AND NOT THE BEST SOLUTION, AND THAT IT GREATLY HURT THE HEARTS OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE WHO STRUGGLED TO BUILD THE 27TH PROVINCE FOR 23 YEARS. SEPARATELY, PRIVATE TELEVISION STATION SCTV BROADCAST AN APPEAL FROM RIZA TADJOEDDIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE INDONESIAN-GERMAN ALUMNI ASSOCIATION THAT PRESIDENT BJ HABIBIE SHOULD STEP DOWN.

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

7. SEVERAL PAPERS GAVE PROMINENT COVERAGE TO U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MARY ROBINSON'S STATEMENT (AT A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN) THAT SHE WAS AFRAID

THAT A SYSTEMATIC MASSACRE HAD HAPPENED IN EAST TIMOR FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE (OUTCOME OF) THE AUGUST 30 REFERENDUM VOTE. SEPARATELY, ALBERT HASIBUAN, ONE OF THE FOUNDERS OF THE PAN (NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY), AND HENDARDI, HEAD OF PBHI (HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL AID ASSOCIATION), SAID THAT THE PERPETRATORS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN EAST TIMOR MUST ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR ACTS IN COURT. OTHERWISE, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL TAKE THE MATTER TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT. THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE "INDONESIAN OBSERVER" SAID, "WE WARMLY WELCOME THE ARRIVAL OF MARY ROBINSON....A FULL INVESTIGATION INTO THIS BLACK PAGE OF INDONESIA'S HISTORY WILL BRING THIS WHOLE GHASTLY AFFAIR INTO THE FULL GLARE OF PUBLICITY, INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS LOCAL, AND WILL SHOW HOW THE ARMY COVERTLY USED MISGUIDED SENTIMENTS AMONG THE EAST TIMORESE TO PHYSICALLY LIQUIDATE THEIR OWN BROTHERS, JUST BECAUSE THEY OPTED FOR INDEPENDENCE."

PUBLIC DIALOGUE ON EAST TIMOR

8. POLOFFS ATTENDED A TWO-HOUR PUBLIC DIALOGUE ON SEPTEMBER 15 HOSTED BY THE CENTER OF INFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT (CIDES), AN ICMI OFFSHOOT THAT SUPPORTS HABIBIE. GUESTS WERE CNRT CHAIRMAN XANANA GUSMAO (WHO PARTICIPATED VIA VIDEO CONFERENCING FROM THE UK AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE), TNI INFORMATION CHIEF GEN. SUDRAJAT, DEPLU OFFICIAL DINO PATI DJALAL, XANANA'S LAWYER AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST HENDARTI, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBER CLEMENTINO AMARAL, AND CIDES "EXPERT" INDRIA SAMEGO. INTERESTINGLY, THE DIALOGUE WAS

BROADCAST LIVE ON THE INDEPENDENT TV STATION SCTV. TO ITS CREDIT, CIDES' OBJECTIVE WAS TO MOVE THE PUBLIC DEBATE BEYOND "NATIONALIST JINGOISM" TO A SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF EAST TIMOR'S FUTURE. THE PAMPHLET

DISTRIBUTED TO THE AUDIENCE CONTAINS ESSAYS ON "EAST TIMOR IS NOT A PART OF INDONESIAN NATIONALISM," AND THE REFERENDUM IS PROOF OF INDONESIA'S DEDICATION TO HUMAN RIGHTS, ETC.

9. UNFORTUNATELY, THE POSITIVE TONE WAS UNDERMINED BY SUDRAJAT'S CASTIGATION OF FRETILIN/FALINTIL AND ASSERTION THAT THE VIOLENCE AFTER THE REFERENDUM WAS PREDICTABLE GIVEN THE INTER-TRIBAL RIVALRIES AMONG EAST TIMORESE. HE ALSO PLAYED THE "PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER" ARGUMENT TO EXPLAIN WHY THE TNI WAS UNABLE TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER. DURING THE QUESTION/ANSWER PERIOD, THE AUDIENCE DISPLAYED THE DEPTH OF DIVISION AND DEEPLY HELD VIEWS ON BOTH SIDES. ONE EAST TIMORESE RECOUNTED HIS SUFFERING AT THE HANDS OF FRETILIN. HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST YENNY ROSA DAMAYANTI MADE AN IMPASSIONED PRESENTATION OF HER FIRST-HAND OBSERVATIONS OF AITARAK MILITIA BURNING AND ATTACKING UNARMED CIVILIANS, AND WAS BOOED BY OTHERS IN THE AUDIENCE WHO SAID THEY HAD BEEN THERE, TOO, AND HAD NOT SEEN THAT ACTIVITY. (NOTE: YENNY WAS REPORTED MISSING EARLIER THIS WEEK. SHE IS ALIVE AND KICKING.)

NORTH SUMATRA LOOKS AT EAST TIMOR

10. ECONOFF VISITED MEDAN FOR TWO DAYS EARLIER THIS WEEK. THE EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR WERE GETTING THE SAME PROMINENT

PAGE 08 STATE 173322 151511Z
PLAY IN BOTH PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA AS IN JAKARTA BUT IT WAS NOT A MAJOR TOPIC OF CONVERSATION. NOBODY BELIEVED THAT THE KILLINGS IN EAST TIMOR WERE A "MESSAGE" FROM TNI TO ACEH ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THEM IF THEY PURSUED INDEPENDENCE. THE ACEHNESE ARE FULLY AWARE OF HOW BRUTAL TNI CAN BE AND NO ONE FELT THIS WOULD REDUCE THEIR RESISTANCE TO JAKARTA. EVERYONE ECONOFF SPOKE WITH AGREED THAT EVENTS IN ACEH WOULD FOLLOW THEIR OWN COURSE AND WOULD BE AFFECTED MUCH MORE BY HOW A FUTURE GOVERNMENT IN JAKARTA RESPONDED TO ACEHNESE DEMANDS THAN BY EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR.

11. OF MORE CONCERN TO PEOPLE WAS WHETHER OR NOT POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR WOULD DERAIL THE NATIONAL REFORM PROCESS. ONE NGO MEMBER SAID, "THE REFORM PROCESS HAS NOT YET BEGUN," REFERRING TO THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO PROSECUTE CORRUPTION AND CRONYISM IN THE BANK BALI CASE AND OTHER RECENT SCANDALS. HE DID AGREE, HOWEVER, THE PREREQUISITES OF REFORM WERE IN PLACE, SUCH AS A FREE PRESS AND THE FACT THAT PEOPLE WERE NO LONGER AFRAID TO SPEAK FREELY. HE AND OTHERS FEARED THE MILITARY'S (TNI) ACTIONS IN EAST TIMOR COULD BE USED AS AN EXCUSE FOR A POLITICAL CRACKDOWN BY TNI NATIONWIDE IN ORDER TO PREVENT A PRO-REFORM GOVERNMENT FROM COMING TO POWER LATER THIS YEAR. MANY IN MEDAN ARE PLEASED WITH THE FLEDGLING INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY AND EXCITED ABOUT THE PROMISE OF INCREASED LOCAL AUTHORITY AND WOULD BE VERY DISAPPOINTED TO LOSE THESE GAINS AS A RESULT OF THE EAST TIMOR DEBACLE.

HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 09 STATE 173322 151511Z
---

12. MANY PAPERS GAVE COVERAGE TO UNAMET'S EVACUATION OF ITS STAFF FROM EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING SOME 1,000 REFUGEES SHELTERING AT UNAMET HQS IN DILI. THERE WAS ALSO REPORTING ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN WEST TIMOR. PAPERS NOTED THAT ATAMBUA, THE KABUPATEN (DISTRICT) CAPITAL IN NORTHERN WEST TIMOR, IS NOW THE SECOND MOST POPULOUS TOWN AFTER THE TOWN OF KUPANG. ITS POPULACE UNTIL SATURDAY (9/11) WAS OVER 100,000 PEOPLE IN NUMBER OR THREE TIMES MORE THAN ITS OWN PERMANENT POPULATION. THE TOWN IS REPORTED TO BE EXTREMELY HECTIC AND BUSY AND IS TENSE.

13. PAPERS ALSO REPORTED THAILAND'S EXPRESSED READINESS TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID FOR INDONESIA ON A BILATERAL BASIS, AND FINLAND'S EXPRESSION OF CONCERN ABOUT THE PROBLEMS FACED BY INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN TIMOR.

DEMONSTRATIONS

14. PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA REPORTED ON DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST AUSTRALIAN AND U.S. "INTERVENTION" IN EAST TIMOR IN THE TOWNS OF SURABAYA, YOGYAKARTA AND SEMARANG MONDAY (9/13). THE PRESS ALSO COVERED DEMONSTRATIONS BY STUDENTS FROM VARIOUS GROUPS AND UNIVERSITIES IN FRONT OF THE UN BUILDING AND U.S. EMBASSY SEPTEMBER 14, AS WELL AS THE DEMONSTRATION AT THE AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL IN SURABAYA.
ROY UNQOUTE ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 10 STATE 173322 151511Z

UNCLASSIFIED

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN FULL

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9712

E88

PAGE 01 STATE 170129 102126Z
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	AF-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00
	DODE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	SAS-00	/019R					

170129
SOURCE: KODAKA.010159
DRAFTED BY: TFID01:JLHUSKEY -- 09/10/99 (202) 647-6530
APPROVED BY: TFID01:JLHUSKEY
S/S-O:FLPALMIERI
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
S, D, P, E, T, M, TFID01, SS0-2, S/S-3, S/S-IRM, S/S-O/CMS,
S/S-EX, P-5

----------F688F9 102126Z /75

O 101949Z SEP 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8319
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1175
USCINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA IMMEDIATE
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
USCINCSO MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 170129 102126Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 170129

INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/10/2009
TAGS: PREL, PINS, AEMR, MARR, CASC, EAP
SUBJECT: TFID01 SITUATION REPORT NO. 5 AS OF 1230 EDT

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1999

1. CLASSIFIED BY JAMES HUSKEY, TASK FORCE COORDINATOR. REASONS 1.5 B AND D.

SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR/DILI

2. (C) THE SITUATION IN DILI REMAINS EXTREMELY MURKY, ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR ROY. REPORTS ARE CIRCULATING IN JAKARTA, HE CONTINUED, OF A VIRTUAL "SHADOW GOVERNMENT" TO WHICH PRESIDENT HABIBE HAS ACQUIESCED. EMBASSY CANBERRA REPORTS THAT EAST TIMOR RESISTANCE FORCES SAY THE FORESTS OUTSIDE OF DILI ARE INUNDATED WITH REFUGEES, AND THERE IS LITTLE FOOD OR WATER. EMBASSY JAKARTA REPORTS SOME 30,000 IDPS IN DARE, SOUTH OF DILI, AND 100,000 IDPS IN WEST TIMOR. (JAKARTA/ROY TELCON; CANBERRA/ENGELKEN TELCON; JAKARTA 4408)

UNAMET DRAWDOWN

3. (C) THE SIX AUSTRALIAN EVACUATION FLIGHTS ON SEPTEMBER

10 CARRIED 444 UNAMET EMPLOYEES AND FAMILY MEMBERS FROM DILI TO DARWIN, LEAVING 96 UNAMET STAFFERS IN DILI, INCLUDING 4 AMERICAN CIVILIAN POLICE OFFICERS, 3 AMERICAN MLOS, AND POSSIBLY 13-18 OTHER AMERICANS, ACCORDING TO THE SENIOR US MILITARY ADVISOR IN DILI. EMBASSY JAKARTA REPORTS THAT MORE AUSTRALIAN FLIGHTS ARE DUE TO LEAVE ON SEPTEMBER 11. THE UN IS CONSIDERING WHETHER TO FURTHER DRAW DOWN, OR EVEN CLOSE, THE UNAMET COMPOUND IN DILI. UNAMET CONFIRMED THAT INDONESIAN MILITARY AND POLICE ALLOWED AITARAK MILITIA FORCES TO ENTER THE OUTER PERIPHERY OF THE UNAMET COMPOUND. AITARAK FIRED SHOTS AND THREATENED THE IDPS WITH GRENADES, BUT THEY DID NOT BREACH UNAMET'S INNER COMPOUND. (USUN/BAGLEY TELCON; JAKARTA/TELCONS;

JAKARTA 4428)

UNSC TEAM IN JAKARTA

4. (C) THE UNSC TEAM PLANS TO VISIT DILI ON SEPTEMBER 11. IN MEETINGS ON SEPTEMBER 9 AND 10, PRESIDENT HABIBE, FM ALATAS, AND DM GENERAL WIRANTO TOLD THE VISITING FIVE-

MEMBER UNSC TEAM THAT THEY REJECTED THE OFFER OF AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCE, ACCORDING TO EMBASSY JAKARTA. THE GOI AGREED TO ACCEPT UN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING ICRC AND UNHCR, AND TO GUARANTEE THEIR SECURITY. (JAKARTA 4430)
TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART04523

RELEASED IN FULL

Channel: n/a

<<<>>>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4553

E92

PAGE 01 JAKART 04523 01 OF 04 151149Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/017W

----------F81560 151149Z /38

O 151045Z SEP 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9909
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
CG III MEF IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/AP IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 004523

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 04523 01 OF 04 151149Z
ROME FOR THE VATICAN
AUCKLAND/WELLINGTON FOR A/S ROTH
DOD FOR ISA/AP DAS CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINS, MOPS, ID, UN
SUBJECT: PEACEKEEPERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY
HOLD INDONESIAN PUBLIC ATTENTION ON EAST TIMOR

REF: JAKARTA 4491

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

1. SUMMARY: ON SEPTEMBER 15, MEDIA AND PUBLIC COMMENTATORS CONTINUED TO DEBATE THE COMPOSITION OF A MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN EAST TIMOR. FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS' STATEMENT THAT INDONESIA WOULD NOT SET CONDITIONS ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE ALSO GOT PROMINENT COVERAGE. EMBASSY CONTACTS IN MEDAN, NORTH SUMATRA, SAID THAT NOBODY BELIEVED THAT THE KILLINGS IN EAST TIMOR WERE A "MESSAGE" FROM THE MILITARY TO ACEH ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THEM IF THEY PURSUED INDEPENDENCE. OF MORE CONCERN TO PEOPLE WAS WHETHER OR NOT POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR WOULD DERAIL THE NATIONAL REFORM PROCESS. THERE IS CONTINUING DISCUSSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN EAST TIMOR, SPURRED BY UNHCHR MARY ROBINSON'S JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN. HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS IN EAST AND WEST TIMOR AND DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST AUSTRALIAN AND U.S. POLICIES ALSO CONTINUE TO ATTRACT MEDIA ATTENTION. END SUMMARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JAKART 04523 01 OF 04 151149Z
COMMENTARY ON PEACKEEPING FORCE
==========

2. SEVERAL INDONESIAN PAPERS GAVE FRONT-PAGE COVERAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS' SEPTEMBER 14 STATEMENT IN NEW YORK THAT INDONESIA SET NO CONDITIONS WHATSOEVER ON THE COMPOSITION OF INTERNATIONAL TROOPS FOR EAST TIMOR AND EXPECTED THEIR ARRIVAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MINISTER OF DEFENSE/INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) COMMANDER WIRANTO IS QUOTED AS SAYING INDONESIA IS NOT GOING TO INTERFERE WITH THE UN POLICIES IN OPERATING THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES. "JUST GO AHEAD AND REGULATE IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN MECHANISMS," HE SAID.

3. A NUMBER OF ANALYSTS AND POLITICAL FIGURES IN INDONESIA SUPPORTED THE PRESENCE OF UN TROOPS IN EAST TIMOR, BUT THEY HOPED THAT THE UN WILL AVOID SUBJECTIVITY THAT CAN HURT INDONESIA. FOR THIS REASON, THEY REJECT THE PARTICIPATION OF AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND PORTUGAL. THIS VIEW IS EXPRESSED BY, AMONG OTHERS, PAN CHAIRMAN AMIEN RAIS, KONTRAS COORDINATOR MUNIR, SPOKESMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TASK FORCE IN EAST TIMOR DINO PATI DJALAL, HOME MINISTER SYARWAN HAMID AND COOPERATIVES MINISTER ADI SASONO. HOWEVER, NATIONAL

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN OBSERVED THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN TROOPS IN THE UN MISSION CAN BE EFFECTIVE BECAUSE THERE IS LARGE SUPPORT FROM THE AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY ITSELF. MOREOVER, AS PART OF A U.N. FORCE, AUSTRALIAN TROOPS COULD NOT HAVE A SEPARATE AGENDA. SPEAKING SEPARATELY TO "KOMPAS" NEWSPAPER, OMAR HALIM, AN ANALYST OF INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS AND U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, CAUTIONED THAT THE UN SHOULD BE CAREFUL WHEN DETERMINING THE COMPOSITION AND THE CHIEF OF THE PEACEKEEPING TROOPS TO BE DEPLOYED IN EAST TIMOR. EXPERIENCES GAINED SO FAR SHOW THAT UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN SUCCESSFUL, AS HAPPENED IN SOMALIA (NOTE: IN THE PAST WEEK SEVERAL COMMENTATORS HAVE RAISED SOMALIA AS A WARNING OF WHAT COULD HAPPEN IN EAST TIMOR. END NOTE) THE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER THE EAST TIMORESE CAN ACCEPT THE INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE.

4. EDITORIALS GENERALLY ECHOED THE FOREGOING COMMENTS. LEADING INDEPENDENT DAILY "KOMPAS" COMMENTED THAT, "IN THE END, INDONESIA WAS UNABLE TO REJECT UN PEACEKEEPERS. NEVERTHELESS, WE HOPE THE UN AND OTHER COUNTRIES WILL HEED THE DIGNITY OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE. ONLY IN THIS WAY WILL THE UN BE ABLE TO QUICKLY RESTORE SECURITY AND ORDER TO EAST TIMOR AND EASE INDONESIANS' SUFFERING." THE MUSLIM-ORIENTED "REPUBLIKA" SAID, "THE UN WOULD BE FAIR AND WISE TO NOTE THE HOPES AND SOLIDARITY OF ASEAN COUNTRIES, AND THE REASONS FOR WHICH INDONESIANS DO NOT WANT TO ACCEPT AUSTRALIAN FORCES."

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4363

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00

/017W
----------F81196 151112Z /38

O 151045Z SEP 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9910
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
CG III MEF IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/AP IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 04523 02 OF 04 151112Z
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 004523

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
AUCKLAND/WELLINGTON FOR A/S ROTH
DOD FOR ISA/AP DAS CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINS, MOPS, ID, UN
SUBJECT: PEACEKEEPERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY HOLD INDONESIAN PUBLIC ATTENTION ON EAST TIMOR

5. SOME EDITORIALS CONTAINED (GENERALLY UNFAVORABLE) COMMENTARY ON DISCUSSION OF EAST TIMOR DURING THE APEC LEADERS' MEETING IN AUCKLAND. THE RULING GOLKAR PARTY'S "SUARA KARYA" OBSERVED, "THE KUALA LUMPUR PHENOMENON [I.E., THE ATTENTION FOCUSED ON INDONESIA'S DOMESTIC TROUBLES AT THE 1998 APEC LEADERS' MEETING] WAS REPEATED IN AUCKLAND. DURING THE MINISTERIAL MEETING NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA AND THE U.S. TRIED TO FORM A COMMON STANCE TO PRESSURE INDONESIA WITH MILITARY THREATS AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS." THE INDEPENDENT "SUARA PEMBARUAN" COMMENTED, "THE APEC SUMMIT IN AUCKLAND IS OF THE VIEW THAT THIS COOPERATION FORUM HAS BEEN TOO SLOW IN REALIZING THE PLAN FOR FREE TRADE. THAT IS WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION IS NOT ECONOMICS BUT POLITICS, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR!" INDEPENDENT "MEDIA INDONESIA" NOTED THAT THE

U.S. IS BEGINNING TO "DISPLAY ITS MUSCLE" IN RELATION TO THE ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING TROOPS FOR EAST TIMOR NOW UNDER DISCUSSION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THE WISHES OF THE U.S., THE EDITORIAL CONTINUED, AS THE SOLE SUPERPOWER ARE REFLECTED IN PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON'S STATEMENT IN AUCKLAND.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JAKART 04523 02 OF 04 151112Z

DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPACT OF EAST TIMOR SITUATION

6. JUSTICE AND UNITY PARTY (PKP) FIGURE GEN. (RET.) TRY SUTRISNO, (ALSO VICE PRESIDENT (1993-98) AND ARMED FORCES COMMANDER AT THE TIME OF THE 1991 SANTA CRUZ MASSACRE), SAID THE OFFER OF THE TWO OPTIONS TO EAST TIMOR (AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE) HAD BEEN HIGHLY RISKY AND NOT THE BEST SOLUTION, AND THAT IT GREATLY HURT THE HEARTS OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE WHO STRUGGLED TO BUILD THE 27TH PROVINCE FOR 23 YEARS. SEPARATELY, PRIVATE TELEVISION STATION SCTV BROADCAST AN APPEAL FROM RIZA TADJOEDDIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE INDONESIAN-GERMAN ALUMNI ASSOCIATION THAT PRESIDENT BJ HABIBIE SHOULD STEP DOWN.

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

7. SEVERAL PAPERS GAVE PROMINENT COVERAGE TO U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MARY ROBINSON'S STATEMENT (AT A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN) THAT SHE WAS AFRAID THAT A SYSTEMATIC MASSACRE HAD HAPPENED IN EAST TIMOR FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE [OUTCOME OF] THE AUGUST 30 REFERENDUM VOTE. SEPARATELY, ALBERT HASIBUAN, ONE OF THE FOUNDERS OF THE PAN (NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY), AND HENDARDI, HEAD OF PBHI (HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL AID ASSOCIATION), SAID THAT THE PERPETRATORS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN EAST TIMOR MUST ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR ACTS IN COURT. OTHERWISE, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL TAKE THE MATTER TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT. THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE "INDONESIAN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 04523 02 OF 04 151112Z

OBSERVER" SAID, "WE WARMLY WELCOME THE ARRIVAL OF MARY ROBINSON....A FULL INVESTIGATION INTO THIS BLACK PAGE OF INDONESIA'S HISTORY WILL BRING THIS WHOLE GHASTLY AFFAIR INTO THE FULL GLARE OF PUBLICITY, INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS LOCAL, AND WILL SHOW HOW THE ARMY COVERTLY USED

MISGUIDED SENTIMENTS AMONG THE EAST TIMORESE TO PHYSICALLY LIQUIDATE THEIR OWN BROTHERS, JUST BECAUSE THEY OPTED FOR INDEPENDENCE."

PUBLIC DIALOGUE ON EAST TIMOR

8. POLOFFS ATTENDED A TWO-HOUR PUBLIC DIALOGUE ON SEPTEMBER 15 HOSTED BY THE CENTER OF INFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT (CIDES), AN ICMI OFFSHOOT THAT SUPPORTS HABIBIE. GUESTS WERE CNRT CHAIRMAN XANANA GUSMAO (WHO PARTICIPATED VIA VIDEO CONFERENCING FROM THE UK AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE), TNI INFORMATION CHIEF GEN. SUDRAJAT, DEPLU OFFICIAL DINO PATI DJALAL, XANANA'S LAWYER AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST HENDARTI, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBER CLEMENTINO AMARAL, AND CIDES "EXPERT" INDRIA SAMEGO. INTERESTINGLY, THE DIALOGUE WAS BROADCAST LIVE ON THE INDEPENDENT TV STATION SCTV. TO ITS CREDIT, CIDES' OBJECTIVE WAS TO MOVE THE PUBLIC DEBATE BEYOND "NATIONALIST JINGOISM" TO A SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF EAST TIMOR'S FUTURE. THE PAMPHLET

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4356

PAGE 01 JAKART 04523 03 OF 04 151111Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	SWCI-00	/018W					

----------F81170 151112Z /38

O 151045Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9911
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE

USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
CG III MEF IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/AP IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 04523 03 OF 04 151111Z
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 004523

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
AUCKLAND/WELLINGTON FOR A/S ROTH
DOD FOR ISA/AP DAS CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINS, MOPS, ID, UN
SUBJECT: PEACEKEEPERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY HOLD INDONESIAN PUBLIC ATTENTION ON EAST TIMOR

DISTRIBUTED TO THE AUDIENCE CONTAINS ESSAYS ON "EAST TIMOR IS NOT A PART OF INDONESIAN NATIONALISM," AND THE REFERENDUM IS PROOF OF INDONESIA'S DEDICATION TO HUMAN RIGHTS, ETC.

9. UNFORTUNATELY, THE POSITIVE TONE WAS UNDERMINED BY SUDRAJAT'S CASTIGATION OF FRETILIN/FALINTIL AND ASSERTION THAT THE VIOLENCE AFTER THE REFERENDUM WAS PREDICTABLE GIVEN THE INTER-TRIBAL RIVALRIES AMONG EAST TIMORESE. HE ALSO PLAYED THE "PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER" ARGUMENT TO EXPLAIN WHY THE TNI WAS UNABLE TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER. DURING THE QUESTION/ANSWER PERIOD, THE AUDIENCE DISPLAYED THE DEPTH OF DIVISION AND DEEPLY HELD VIEWS ON BOTH SIDES. ONE EAST TIMORESE RECOUNTED HIS SUFFERING AT THE HANDS OF FRETILIN. HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST YENNY ROSA DAMAYANTI MADE AN IMPASSIONED PRESENTATION OF HER FIRST-HAND OBSERVATIONS OF AITARAK MILITIA BURNING AND ATTACKING UNARMED CIVILIANS, AND WAS BOOED BY OTHERS IN THE AUDIENCE WHO SAID THEY HAD BEEN THERE, TOO, AND HAD NOT SEEN THAT ACTIVITY. (NOTE: YENNY WAS REPORTED MISSING EARLIER THIS WEEK. SHE IS ALIVE AND KICKING.)

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JAKART 04523 03 OF 04 151111Z

NORTH SUMATRA LOOKS AT EAST TIMOR
==========
10. ECONOFF VISITED MEDAN FOR TWO DAYS EARLIER THIS WEEK.

THE EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR WERE GETTING THE SAME PROMINENT PLAY IN BOTH PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA AS IN JAKARTA BUT IT WAS NOT A MAJOR TOPIC OF CONVERSATION. NOBODY BELIEVED THAT THE KILLINGS IN EAST TIMOR WERE A "MESSAGE" FROM TNI TO ACEH ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THEM IF THEY PURSUED INDEPENDENCE. THE ACEHNESE ARE FULLY AWARE OF HOW BRUTAL TNI CAN BE AND NO ONE FELT THIS WOULD REDUCE THEIR RESISTANCE TO JAKARTA. EVERYONE ECONOFF SPOKE WITH AGREED THAT EVENTS IN ACEH WOULD FOLLOW THEIR OWN COURSE AND WOULD BE AFFECTED MUCH MORE BY HOW A FUTURE GOVERNMENT IN JAKARTA RESPONDED TO ACEHNESE DEMANDS THAN BY EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR.

11. OF MORE CONCERN TO PEOPLE WAS WHETHER OR NOT POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR WOULD DERAIL THE NATIONAL REFORM PROCESS. ONE NGO MEMBER SAID, "THE REFORM PROCESS HAS NOT YET BEGUN," REFERRING TO THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO PROSECUTE CORRUPTION AND CRONYISM IN THE BANK BALI CASE AND OTHER RECENT SCANDALS. HE DID AGREE, HOWEVER, THE PREREQUISITES OF REFORM WERE IN PLACE, SUCH AS A FREE PRESS AND THE FACT THAT PEOPLE WERE NO LONGER AFRAID TO SPEAK FREELY. HE AND OTHERS FEARED THE MILITARY'S (TNI) ACTIONS IN EAST TIMOR COULD BE USED AS AN EXCUSE FOR A POLITICAL CRACKDOWN BY TNI NATIONWIDE IN ORDER TO PREVENT A PRO-REFORM GOVERNMENT FROM COMING TO POWER LATER THIS YEAR. MANY IN MEDAN ARE PLEASED WITH THE FLEDGLING INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY AND

EXCITED ABOUT THE PROMISE OF INCREASED LOCAL AUTHORITY AND WOULD BE VERY DISAPPOINTED TO LOSE THESE GAINS AS A RESULT OF THE EAST TIMOR DEBACLE.

HUMANITARIAN ISSUES
==========

12. MANY PAPERS GAVE COVERAGE TO UNAMET'S EVACUATION OF ITS STAFF FROM EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING SOME 1,000 REFUGEES SHELTERING AT UNAMET HQS IN DILI. THERE WAS ALSO REPORTING ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN WEST TIMOR. PAPERS NOTED THAT ATAMBUA, THE KABUPATEN (DISTRICT) CAPITAL IN NORTHERN WEST TIMOR, IS NOW THE SECOND MOST POPULOUS TOWN AFTER THE TOWN OF KUPANG. ITS POPULACE UNTIL SATURDAY (9/11) WAS OVER 100,000 PEOPLE IN NUMBER OR THREE TIMES MORE THAN ITS OWN PERMANENT POPULATION. THE TOWN IS REPORTED TO BE EXTREMELY HECTIC AND BUSY AND IS TENSE.

13. PAPERS ALSO REPORTED THAILAND'S EXPRESSED READINESS TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID FOR INDONESIA ON A BILATERAL BASIS, AND FINLAND'S EXPRESSION OF CONCERN ABOUT THE PROBLEMS FACED BY INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN TIMOR.

DEMONSTRATIONS
==========

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4357

PAGE 01 JAKART 04523 04 OF 04 151111Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/017W

------------------F81172 151112Z /38

O 151045Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9912
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
CG III MEF IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/AP IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 004523

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 04523 04 OF 04 151111Z
ROME FOR THE VATICAN
AUCKLAND/WELLINGTON FOR A/S ROTH
DOD FOR ISA/AP DAS CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINS, MOPS, ID, UN
SUBJECT: PEACEKEEPERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY HOLD INDONESIAN PUBLIC ATTENTION ON EAST TIMOR

14. PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA REPORTED ON DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST AUSTRALIAN AND U.S. "INTERVENTION" IN EAST TIMOR IN THE TOWNS OF SURABAYA, YOGYAKARTA AND SEMARANG MONDAY (9/13). THE PRESS ALSO COVERED DEMONSTRATIONS BY STUDENTS FROM VARIOUS GROUPS AND UNIVERSITIES IN FRONT OF THE UN BUILDING AND U.S. EMBASSY SEPTEMBER 14, AS WELL AS THE DEMONSTRATION AT THE AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL IN SURABAYA.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999ROME06655

RELEASED IN FULL

<<<>>>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6644

E75

PAGE 01 ROME 06655 01 OF 04 241308Z
ACTION EUR-01

INFO LOG-00 NP-01 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 INR-00
NSAE-00 SP-00 IRM-00 T-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 SAS-00
/003W

----------FBD78D 241317Z /38

P 241138Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2872
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5022
ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
COMSIXTHFLT //019
AMCONSUL FLORENCE
AMEMBASSY TIRANA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
NAVSUPPACT LA MADDALENA IT
ENGFLDACT MED NAPLES IT//NI//
COMSUBGRU EIGHT
COMSUBRON TWO TWO
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
NAS SIGONELLA IT//PA//
USCINCEUR ALT SHAPE BE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 006655

USIA

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/USIA, EUR/RPM, INR, PA
USIA FOR R/MR, I/GEU, I/FW, I/FNY, B/VOA/X, D/P
NAVSUPPACT FOR LT. SMITH/01E
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 ROME 06655 01 OF 04 241308Z
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 LCDR. FC PANDOLFE

PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE

E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT:USIS ROME MEDIA REACTION REPORT - SEPTEMBER 24, 1999

THIS REPORT WILL FOCUS ON THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

1. UNGA
2. EAST TIMOR
3. RUSSIA
4. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

TREATMENT

1. UNGA

TODAY'S MEDIA DO NOT COVER THE UNGA.

"DINI: LIFT SANCTION AGAINST BAGHDAD" -- AS A SIDE-STORY FROM THE UNGA MEETING, MAURIZIO MOLINARI REPORTS IN CENTRIST, LA STAMPA (9/24) THAT ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DINI MET WITH HIS IRAQI COUNTERPART. DINI IS REPORTED AS SAYING THAT HE FAVORS "A NEW BALANCING OF THE SANCTION SYSTEM', MORE BASED ON 'INCENTIVES' IN ORDER TO ALLOW BAGHDAD TO SEE A RAY OF HOPE AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL OF INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION". THE STORY GOES ON BY QUOTING ITALIAN DIPLOMATIC SOURCES TALKING OF THEIR INTENTION "TO GET BACK BAGHDAD INTO THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY AS ALREADY HAPPENED WITH IRAN IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE STABILITY IN THE WHOLE GULF REGION.''

CENTRIST-TOP CIRCULATION CORRIERE DELLA SERA (9/24) CARRIES A FRONT-PAGE COMMENTARY BY THE FRENCH INTELLECTUAL BERNARD HENRY LEVY HEADLINED "THE UN IN TIMOR, THE LATEST SHAME", WHICH CONCLUDES: "THE UN IS OUTDATED. FOR THE FUTURE WE SHOULD IMAGINE AND BUILD ANOTHER ORGANIZATION OF UNITED NATIONS."

COMMENTS:

"WHAT THE UN IS FOR" ALDO RIZZO COMMENTS IN CENTRIST, INFLUENTIAL LA STAMPA (9/24): "THE DEBATE...ON THE FUTURE OF THE UN HAS STARTED AGAIN, IN THE LIGHT, OR PERHAPS IN THE SHADE, OF THE EVENTS IN KOSOVO AND EAST TIMOR. THIS DEBATE HAS TWO EXTREME POSITIONS. ONE IS THAT OF THOSE WHO WANT THE UN TO BE A WORLD GOVERNMENT....THE OTHER EXTREMIST POSITION IS THAT OF THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE UN ORGANIZATION IS USELESS AND THAT IT IS AN EXPENSIVE PRESENT TO INTERNATIONAL HYPOCRISY....FOR ONCE, THE 'THIRD WAY' POSITION IS THE RIGHT ONE. IT IS THAT OF THOSE WHO MAINTAIN THAT THE UN

ORGANIZATION IS NOT AND CANNOT BE A WORLD GOVERNMENT...BUT IT IS NOT EITHER A USELESS MONEY-EATING MACHINE. INDEED, THE UN ORGANIZATION IS A CLEARING HOUSE OF POLITICAL CONTRAST AMONG STATES, A NECESSARY FORUM OF MEETINGS AND MEDIATION EFFORTS, WITH ALL ITS LIMITATIONS....NOW THERE IS THE NEW FACT OF THE 'HUMANITARIAN INTERFERENCE'...WHICH SHOULD BE SEEN AS A HIGHER VISION OF NATIONAL INTERESTS WHICH, AS SECRETARY-

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 ROME 06655 01 OF 04 241308Z
GENERAL ANNA SAID, 'COINCIDES MORE AND MORE WITH COLLECTIVE INTERESTS'....THEN THERE IS TREND TO MAKE THE UNSC 'MORE DEMOCRATIC', AS ITALY HAS BEEN FIGHTING FOR IN PARTICULAR. IN BOTH CASES WE CANNOT BUT GO AHEAD WITH REALISM, AND IN THE MEANWHILE THE BIG STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONS AS NATO MUST REMAIN FIRM POINTS, IN THE INTEREST ALSO OF WHAT CAN BE THE NEW AND MORE EFFECTIVE UN IN THE 21ST CENTURY."

2. EAST TIMOR

ALL NEWSPAPERS LEAD THEIR REPORTS FROM INDONESIA WITH WHAT IS SEEN AS A DRAMATIC ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE IN THE ISLAND.
REPORTS MENTION THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONER'S REQUEST TO SET UP AN INTERNATIONAL COMMITTE TO INVESTIGATE ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION IN THE ISLAND.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6647

PAGE 01 ROME 06655 02 OF 04 241309Z
ACTION EUR-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 DCP-01
NSAE-00 SP-00 T-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 SAS-00 /003W
----------FBD7A3 241318Z /38

P 241138Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2873
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5023
ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
COMSIXTHFLT //019
AMCONSUL FLORENCE
AMEMBASSY TIRANA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

NAVSUPPACT LA MADDALENA IT
ENGFLDACT MED NAPLES IT//NI//
COMSUBGRU EIGHT
COMSUBRON TWO TWO
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
NAS SIGONELLA IT//PA//
USCINCEUR ALT SHAPE BE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 ROME 006655

USIA

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/USIA, EUR/RPM, INR, PA
USIA FOR R/MR, I/GEU, I/FW, I/FNY, B/VOA/X, D/P
NAVSUPPACT FOR LT. SMITH/01E
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 LCDR. FC PANDOLFE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 ROME 06655 02 OF 04 241309Z

PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE

E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT:USIS ROME MEDIA REACTION REPORT - SEPTEMBER 24, 1999

DAILIES ALSO REPORT THAT THE FIRST 50 ITALIAN PARACHUTER FROM THE FOLGORE BRIGADE ARE DUE TO ARRIVE IN AUSTRALIA TODAY.

HEADLINES:

"TERROR IN TIMOR: MILITIAS BESIEGE THE UN" (FRONT-PAGE," (LA REPUBBLICA)
"EAST TIMOR SIEGED BY HANGER" (CORRIERE DELLA SERA)
"EAST TIMOR: PEACE KEEPERS FIRE BACK" (LA NAZIONE)
"PEACEKEEPERS'S FIRST SHOTS" (LA STAMPA)
"EAST TIMOR: ASSAULT AGAINST PEACEKEEPERS" (IL MESSAGGERO)
"EAST TIMOR: UN TROOPS IN THE STORM AND THE FOLGORE LEAVES" (FRONT-PAGE, L'UNITA')
"EAST TIMOR: FIGHTING WITH PEACE KEEPERS" (IL TEMPO)

COMMENTS:

PIETRO VERONESE REPORTS FROM DILI IN LEFT-LEANING, INFLUENTIAL LA REPUBBLICA (9/24): "3,000 SOLDIERS ARE NOT ENOUGH TO BRING PEACE BACK IN EAST TIMOR. WE CANNOT

SAY THAT THE SITUATION IS SLIPPING OUT OF THE HANDS OF GENERAL COSGROVE'S MEN BECAUSE THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 ROME 06655 02 OF 04 241309Z
NEVER HAD IT UNDER GOOD CONTROL YET. IN DILI PATROLS OR CHECK POINTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE REMAIN AT THE MERCY OF A CITY WHICH IS OUT OF CONTROL....WE SAW THIS VERY WELL YESTERDAY MORNING IN THE BALIDE DISTRICT, WHERE THE BUILDINGS OF THE UNAMET HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED....YESTERDAY TOO THE LEADERSHIP OF JAKARTA'S MILITARY ANNOUNCED THE IMMEDIATE END OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCE IN EAST TIMOR. A WAY AS ANOTHER TO WASH THEIR HANDS OF IT AND LEAVE FREEWAY TO THE MILITIAS. INDEED, TENSION IN DILI REMAINS VERY HIGH."

GIUSEPPE ZACCARIA REPORTS FROM DILI IN CENTRIST, INFLUENTIAL LA STAMPA (9/24): "THERE IS SHOOTING AGAIN, FOUR, FIVE FIRE SHOOT-OUTS AND NOT ONLY AGAINST THE 'AITARAK' GUERRILLA MEN. A THAI PEACEKEEPING OFFICER MAINTAINS THAT 'WE RISK ANOTHER VIETNAM HERE IS THINGS CONTINUE LIKE THIS.'.... THERE ARE THOSE, LIKE HUNDREDS OF REPORTERS WHO HAVE THEIR FEET IN THE GUANO, WHO FEEL THAT GENERAL COSGROVE'S LINE IS TOO CONCILIATORY. YESTERDAY, AFTER THE SHOOT-OUTS WITH THE INDONESIAN, THE GENERAL SPENT SOME HOURS IN A MEETING WITH THEIR COMMANDERS WITHOUT GETTING VERY MUCH OUT OF IT. HE CONTINUES TO TALK OF 'COOPERATION' WHEN IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT THE JAKARTA SOLDIERS ARE NERVOUS AND FRUSTRATED. MOREOVER, SOME PROBLEMS ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE IN THE 'HUMANITARIAN' INTERVENTION THAT SOON MIGHT BECOME CAPITAL MISTAKES. IN EAST TIMOR ANY EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION OF ASSISTANCE CONTINUES TO BE LACKING."

MARCO TAVASINI REPORTS FROM DILI IN LEADING CONSERVATIVE SYNDICATE LA NAZIONE (9/24): "FOR THE FIRST TIME THE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 ROME 06655 02 OF 04 241309Z
PEACEKEEPING FORCE...RISKED BEING INVOLVED IN A SHOOT-OUT AGAINST A GROUP OF PRO-INDONESIAN MILITIAS...IN THE NEARBY OF THE DILI PORT....THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MARY ROBINSON, URGED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ON THE 'DELIBERATE AND CONTINUOUS SERIOUS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHT' CARRIED OUT IN EAST TIMOR. AUSTRALIA FAVORS THE INITIATIVE. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC SOURCES, MANY COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY FROM ASIA, MIGHT OPPOSE ITS

CREATION."

"WHAT IS NEXT IN EAST TIMOR" GIANDOMENICO PICCO COMMENTS ON THE FRONT-PAGE OF PRO-DS (LEADING GOVERNMENT PARTY) DAILY L'UNITA' (9/24): "THE UN PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR IS INCREASING AND IN THE NEXT DAYS IT SHOULD GO BEYOND DILI....THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONER HAS CLEARLY STATED THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLICES OF THE MILITIAS' VIOLENCE. AND IT IS NOT BY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6649

PAGE 01 ROME 06655 03 OF 04 241309Z
ACTION EUR-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 NSAE-00
SP-00 IRM-00 T-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00
/002W
----------FBD7B0 241318Z /38

P 241138Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2874
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5024
ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
COMSIXTHFLT //019
AMCONSUL FLORENCE
AMEMBASSY TIRANA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
NAVSUPPACT LA MADDALENA IT
ENGFLDACT MED NAPLES IT//NI//
COMSUBGRU EIGHT
COMSUBRON TWO TWO
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
NAS SIGONELLA IT//PA//
USCINCEUR ALT SHAPE BE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 ROME 006655

USIA

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/USIA, EUR/RPM, INR, PA
USIA FOR R/MR, I/GEU, I/FW, I/FNY, B/VOA/X, D/P
NAVSUPPACT FOR LT. SMITH/01E
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 ROME 06655 03 OF 04 241309Z

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Page: 6

JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 LCDR. FC PANDOLFE

PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE

E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT:USIS ROME MEDIA REACTION REPORT - SEPTEMBER 24, 1999

CHANCE THAT THE JAKARTA GOVERNMENT HAS ACCEPTED TO CARRY OUT AN INVESTIGATION AT NATIONAL LEVEL. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD BUT ONLY ITS RESULTS WILL TELL US IF IT IS ENOUGH....IT IS VERY URGENT THAT THE REMAINING 5,000 MEN WHO ARE DUE TO GO, GET TO EAST TIMOR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IT IS ALSO VERY IMPORTANT THAT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE...CONTINUES....INDEED, I FEAR THAT 8,000 MEN ARE NOT ENOUGH TO STOP MILITIAS' VIOLENCE AND IT IS THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH MUST DO SO.....THE IMF LOANS REMAIN THE MOST IMPORTANT TOOL IN THE HANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY."

3. RUSSIA

REPORTS ON RUSSIA COVER DIFFERENT ANGLES. BESIDE RAISSA GORBACHEV'S FUNERALS, STORIES FROM THE U.S. PICK UP THE USA TODAY STORY ACCORDING TO WHICH THE FBI STATED THAT 10 BANKS ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR RUSSIAGATE. REPORTS ALSO PICK UP IMF MANAGING DIRECTOR MICHEL CAMDESSUS' POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE.

REPORTS FROM RUSSIA FOCUS ON PROSECUTOR SKURATOV'S
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 ROME 06655 03 OF 04 241309Z
STATEMENTS THAT NO CORRUPTION CHARGES CAN BE MADE ON YELTSIN AND ON RUSSIAN AIR ATTACKS IN CHECHNYA.

HEADLINES:

"'THE CIA ARRIVED AT THE KREMLIN"" (CORRIERE DELLA SERA)
"COUP DE THEATER: PROSECUTOR SKURATOV EXONERATE YELTSIN -- MOSCOW BOMBARDS HOUSES IN GROZNY" (IL GIORNALE)
"MOSCOW: SKURATOV HAS A SECOND THOUGHT: 'THE PRESIDENT IS NOT INVOLVED'" (LA REPUBBLICA)
"RUSSIAN BOMBARDIERS ON CHECHNYA CAPITAL" (LA STAMPA)
"MOSCOW STRIKES AT GROZNY - CAMDESSUS: EVERYTHING IS ALL RIGHT WITH RUSSIA, 'WE WILL SELL GOLD'" (IL SOLE 24-ORE)

"WAR AGAINST CHECHNYA, THE KREMLIN IS GIVING ITS GREEN LIGHT" (IL MESSAGGERO)
"THE CIA HAS BEEN INVESTIGATION ON YELTSIN'S ACCOUNTS FOR FIVE YEARS" (LA NAZIONE)

COMMENTS:

ENNIO CARETTO REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON IN CENTRIST, TOP-CIRCULATION CORRIERE DELLA SERA (9/24): "ONLY THREE CONGRESS HEARINGS...HAVE BEEN ENOUGH TO PROVE THAT CORRUPTION INVOLVES, IF NOT DIRECTLY YELTSIN, AT LEAST HIS FAMILY AND HIS ADVISERS, AND THAT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE U.S. INSTITUTIONS WERE AWARE OF THIS SINCE SIX YEARS AND KEPT IT HIDDEN. YESTERDAY, THE LATEST COUP DE THEATER CONCERNED THE FBI ANNOUNCEMENT THAT 10 AMERICAN BANKS ARE BEING INVESTIGATED FOR THE SCANDAL....AS TO THE IMF, IT SEEMS THAT A TUG OF WAR IS

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 ROME 06655 03 OF 04 241309Z
UNDERWAY BETWEEN THE IMF AND THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION. CAMDESSUS INDICATED THAT THE IMF WILL GIVE THE KREMLIN THE NEXT INSTALMENTS OF LOANS...IN OTHER WORDS, ACCORDING TO THE FUND, MONEY LAUNDERING HAS NOT TOUCHED ITS PROGRAM AID. ON THE CONTRARY, TREASURY SECRETARY SUMMERS INSISTED THAT THE IMF CHANGES ITS PATH. HE WANTS THAT IT INVESTIGATES ABOUT ALL CENTRAL BANKS SUSPECTED OF 'TAMPERING' LOANS."

CESARE DE CARLO REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON IN LEADING OPPOSITION SYNDICATE LA NAZIONE (9/24):"THE CONGRESS IS TALKING ABOUT RUSSIA, THE LONDON CLUB IS TALKING ABOUT RUSSIA...THE UN IS TALKING ABOUT RUSSIA WHEN IT REACTS WITH DISCONCERT TO THE RUSSIAN BOMBS ON CHECHNYA. AND TOMORROW THE G7 FINANCE MINISTERS...WILL TALK ABOUT RUSSIA....ALSO THE PENTAGON YESTERDAY EXAMINED RUSSIA. THE REASON: THE BOMBARDMENTS ON THE AIRPORT IN GROZNY...ACCUSED OF BEING THE BASIS FOR DAGESTAN REBEL MILITIAS. THE NEXT STEP COULD BE A GROUND ATTACK. HOW

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6650

PAGE 01 ROME 06655 04 OF 04 241309Z
ACTION EUR-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 NSAE-00

SP-00 IRM-00 T-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00
/002W
----------FBD7B8 . 241318Z /38

P 241138Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2875
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5025
ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
COMSIXTHFLT //019
AMCONSUL FLORENCE
AMEMBASSY TIRANA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
NAVSUPPACT LA MADDALENA IT
ENGFLDACT MED NAPLES IT//NI//
COMSUBGRU EIGHT
COMSUBRON TWO TWO
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
NAS SIGONELLA IT//PA//
USCINCEUR ALT SHAPE BE

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 ROME 006655

USIA

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/USIA, EUR/RPM, INR, PA
USIA FOR R/MR, I/GEU, I/FW, I/FNY, B/VOA/X, D/P
NAVSUPPACT FOR LT. SMITH/01E
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 ROME 06655 04 OF 04 241309Z
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 LCDR. FC PANDOLFE

PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE

E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT:USIS ROME MEDIA REACTION REPORT - SEPTEMBER 24, 1999

WILL THE UN REACT?"

VLADIMIR SAPOZHNIKOV REPORTS FROM MOSCOW IN LEADING BUSINESS DAILY IL SOLE 24-ORE (9/24): "IN STEAD OF KOSOVO THERE IS CHECHNYA, IN STEAD OF PRISTINA THERE IS GROZNY. FOR THE REST, THE STRATEGY ADOPTED BY THE RUSSIAN MILITARY TOWARDS THE REBEL REPUBLIC IN CAUCASUS IS A CARBON COPY OF THE NATO OPERATION DURING THE WAR IN THE BALKANS. YESTERDAY, FOR THE WHOLE DAY, THE RUSSIAN JETS BOMBARDED THE STRATEGIC POINTS OF THE CHECHEN

CAPITAL....ACCORDING TO INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY CHECHNYA GOVERNMENT THE BOMBS KILLED EIGHT PEOPLE....THE CHECHEN PRESIDENT HAS CONVENED THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO DRAW A PLAN AIMED AT REJECTING ' RUSSIA'S POSSIBLE ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST CHECHNYA'. ESCALATION OF TENSION IN CAUCASUS FOLLOWED PRIME MINISTER PUTIN'S BELLICOSE STATEMENTS WHO PROMISED TO GET RID OF BASES OF THE CHECHNYA GUERRILLAS WHEREVER THEY ARE."

4. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

"SERBIA IS ISOLATED, LET'S HELP IT FIND DEMOCRACY" -- AN OP-ED BY ROBERTO CUILLO, FROM DS FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICE,
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 ROME 06655 04 OF 04 241309Z
IN PRO-DS (LEADING GOVERNMENT PARTY) DAILY L'UNITA' (9/24): "SERBIA IS ISOLATED. YOU CAN SEE IT WHEN YOU TAKE THE ROAD WHICH LEADS TO BELGRADE FROM HUNGARY. THERE ARE FEW CARS, FEW TRUCKS WHICH VIOLATE THE EMBARGO. THE POST-WAR SERBIA DOES NOT COMMUNICATE WITH ANYONE, DOES NOT TRADE WITH ANYONE, DOES NOT TRAVEL, DOES NOT HAVE EXCHANGES....THE FACT IS THAT THE MAJORITY OF PEOPLE IN BELGRADE HAVE THE DAILY PROBLEM OF PUTTING TOGETHER LUNCH AND DINNER....THE OPPOSITION HAS LAUNCHED A SERIES OF PROTESTS AGAINST MILOSEVIC...BUT THE OPPOSITION IS STILL DIVIDED. DRASKOVIC HAS CALLED HIMSELF OUT. IT WILL ALSO BE UP TO US, IN PART, TO HELP THESE FORCES REDISCOVER UNITY....THE DS PARTY HAS BEEN AMONG THE FIRST PARTIES OF THE EUROPEAN LEFT TO GO TO BELGRADE AFTER THE WAR IN KOSOVO....THROUGH US THE MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES IN SERBIA ASK THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NOT TO MAKE THE SAME MISTAKES AS IN THE PAST WERE MADE WITH MILOSEVIC....WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO OURSELVES THAT MILOSEVIC IS THE HEAD OF AN OLIGARCHY READY TO DO EVERYTHING, INCLUDING UNDERGO WAR, IN ORDER TO DEFEND ITS OWN PRIVILEGES. TODAY, OUR AIM MUST ALSO BE TO DEFEAT AND DISMANTLE IDEOLOGY: THE ETHNIC NATIONALISM WHICH POISONED THE SERBIAN SOCIETY AND WHICH CONTINUES TO BE A DANGEROUS DISEASE FOR EUROPE....OUR DEMOCRATIC INTERLOCUTORS FORCE US TO BE AWARE OF THE RISK OF SETTING UP A SORT OF 'IRAQI-LIKE' SITUATION IN THE HEART OF EUROPE....FOR EXAMPLE THEY APPRECIATE THE SPIRIT OF THE STABILITY PACT FOR THE BALKANS WHICH CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS ASSISTANCE IN EXCHANGE FOR DEMOCRACY. BUT WE ALSO HAVE A LOT OF WORK AHEAD... HELPING THE CREATION OF A NEW POLITICAL AND
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 ROME 06655 04 OF 04 241309Z
CULTURAL RULING CLASS." CALLAHAN

UNCLASSIFIED

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999ROME06717
RELEASED IN FULL

<<<>>>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4615

E96

PAGE 01 ROME 06717 01 OF 04 281340Z
ACTION EUR-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 NSAE-00
SP-00 T-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /002W
----------FD1FB9 281340Z /38

P 281209Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2888
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5080
ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
COMSIXTHFLT //019
AMCONSUL FLORENCE
AMEMBASSY TIRANA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
NAVSUPPACT LA MADDALENA IT
ENGFLDACT MED NAPLES IT//NI//
COMSUBGRU EIGHT
COMSUBRON TWO TWO
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
NAS SIGONELLA IT//PA//
USCINCEUR ALT SHAPE BE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 006717

USIA

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/USIA, EUR/RPM, INR, PA
USIA FOR R/MR, I/GEU, I/FW, I/FNY, B/VOA/X, D/P
NAVSUPPACT FOR LT. SMITH/01E
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 LCDR. FC PANDOLFE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 ROME 06717 01 OF 04 281340Z

PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE

E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT:USIS ROME MEDIA REACTION REPORT - SEPTEMBER 28, 1999

THIS REPORT WILL FOCUS ON THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

1. G-7/IMF/WORLD BANK MEETINGS
2. RUSSIA
3. EAST TIMOR
4. MIDDLE EAST

TREATMENT

1. G-7/IMF/WORLD BANK MEETINGS

LIMITED COVERAGE OF THE G-7 AND IMF/WORLD BANK MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON FOCUS ON DIFFERENT ASPECTS, SUCH AS THE AGREEMENT REACHED AMONG 14 EUROPEAN BANKS TO LIMIT GOLD SALES, THE NEED TO CURB THE EXAGGERATED STRENGTH OF THE JAPANESE CURRENCY AND THE G-7 DECISION ON LOANS TO RUSSIA.

HEADLINES:

"THE G-7 CONDITIONS IRRITATE RUSSIA" (CORRIERE DELLA SERA)
"GOLD: EUROPE BLOCKS SALES" (LA REPUBBLICA)
"GOLD PRICE SURGE AFTER THE IMF AGREEMENT" (IL

MESSAGGERO)
"THE IMF DICTATES RULES FOR POOR COUNTRIES' FINANCING" (L'UNITA')
"THE G-7 BRAKES THE YEN" (IL SOLE 24-ORE)

COMMENTS:

MARIO PLATERO REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON IN LEADING BUSINESS DAILY IL SOLE 24-ORE (9/27): "MARKETS REACTED CALMLY TO THE G-7 MESSAGE SENT LAST SATURDAY, AND THE YEN LOST SLIGHTLY AGAINST THE DOLLAR....THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE CLOSED IN POSITIVE....BUT INDEED, IT IS THE STOCK MARKET TRENDS WHICH SHOW THE FRAILTY OF THIS MARKET...THE UNCERTAINTY HAS NOT BEEN CLARIFIED...AND IT IS LIKELY THAT IT HAS TO DO WITH THE FLIGHT TO QUALITY....ACCORDING TO SOME SOURCES...BEHIND THE G-7 NEGOTIATION THERE WAS A TUG OF WAR ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUES."

"THE STRONG YEN IS FRIGHTENING, BUT IT IS CONVENIENT" -- A SHORT EDITORIAL IN PROVOCATIVE, CLASSICAL LIBERAL DAILY IL FOGLIO (9/28) SAYS: "THE G-7 CONCLUSIONS WILL INFLUENCE IMF AND WORLD BANK DECISIONS. THE G-7 INVITES

THEM TO LINK LOANS TO RUSSIA TO TRANSPARENCY CLAUSES AND BUDGET CONTROLS AS WELL AS CONTROLS ON THE CENTRAL BANK ACCOUNTS....THE RUSSIAN QUESTION HAS FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES: IT IS NOW COMMON PRACTICE TO ENLARGE THE MEETING TO MOSCOW REPRESENTATIVES, AND THIS WAS THE CASE IN WASHINGTON TOO. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE G-8 WOULD FAIL IF LOANS TO MOSCOW STOP. THE G-7 WAS MAINLY DOMINATED BY THE YEN QUESTION, SINCE ITS

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 ROME 06717 01 OF 04 281340Z
EXAGGERATED STRENGTH MIGHT 'CHOKE' A JAPANESE RECOVERY, WITH EFFECTS ON THE ASIAN ONE (RECOVERY).... BUT, INDEED, A STRONG YEN CONSOLIDATES TOKYO'S ROLE IN ASIA AND DISCOURAGE RAIDS ON ITS FIRMS BY FOREIGN INVESTORS LOOKING FOR EASY PURCHASES. THEREFORE, UNDER MANY RESPECTS, MOST OF THE GAME HAS TO BE PLAYED YET."

2. RUSSIA

THE ALARMING ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA IS THE MAIN SLANT OF REPORTS FROM RUSSIA.

CENTRIST, INFLUENTIAL LA STAMPA (9/28) CARRIES THE TEXT OF AN INTERVIEW PRIME MINISTER PUTIN GAVE TO THE RUSSIAN DAILY "VREMIA" UNDER THE HEADLINE: "'WE WILL EXTERMINATE THEM FROM THE SKY.'"

HEADLINES:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4617

PAGE 01 ROME 06717 02 OF 04 281340Z
ACTION EUR-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 DCP-01
NSAE-00 SP-00 IRM-00 T-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 SAS-00
SWCI-00 /003W
----------FD1FC2 281340Z /38

P 281209Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2889
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5081
ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
COMSIXTHFLT //019
AMCONSUL FLORENCE

AMEMBASSY TIRANA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
NAVSUPPACT LA MADDALENA IT
ENGFLDACT MED NAPLES IT//NI//
COMSUBGRU EIGHT
COMSUBRON TWO TWO
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
NAS SIGONELLA IT//PA//
USCINCEUR ALT SHAPE BE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 ROME 006717

USIA

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/USIA, EUR/RPM, INR, PA
USIA FOR R/MR, I/GEU, I/FW, I/FNY, B/VOA/X, D/P
NAVSUPPACT FOR LT. SMITH/01E
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 ROME 06717 02 OF 04 281340Z
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 LCDR. FC PANDOLFE

PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE

E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT:USIS ROME MEDIA REACTION REPORT - SEPTEMBER 28, 1999

"THE SMOKE OF HUNDREDS OF FIRES POISONS GROZNY" (LA STAMPA)
"RUSSIA: YELTSIN'S OFFENSIVE" (IL MESSAGGERO)
"CHECHNYA AS KOSOVO" (IL GIORNALE)
"RUSSIAN RAIDS ON GROZNY, THOUSANDS OF CIVILIANS ESCAPE" (L'UNITA')
"MOSCOW'S ANGER ON CHECHNYA" (LA REPUBBLICA)

COMMENTS:

ROBERTO LIVI REPORTS FROM MOSCOW IN ROME CENTRIST DAILY IL MESSAGGERO (9/28): "PRESIDENT YELTSIN IS NOT EVEN THINKING OF RESIGNING. ON THE CONTRARY, IN THESE DAYS, HIS MEN ARE WORKING ON A TOUGH POLITICAL COUNTERATTACK: THEY PUSHED ASIDE THE PROSECUTORS WHO MIGHT HAVE SERIOUSLY INVESTIGATED CORRUPTION CHARGES IN THE KREMLIN; THEY ARE STEPPING ON THE GAS FOR A NEW WAR AGAINST CHECHNYA; THEY ARE PREPARING A NEW POLITICAL 'PRESIDENTIAL' REGROUPING IN VIEW OF THE DECEMBER ELECTIONS AND THEY ARE TIGHTENING UP CONTROL ON STATE

COMPANIES IN THE ENERGY AND COMMUNICATION SECTORS IN ORDER TO GET MASSIVE FINANCING FOR THE ELECTORAL
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 ROME 06717 02 OF 04 281340Z
CAMPAIGN."

LUCIANO GULLI REPORTS FROM MOSCOW IN LEADING CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION DAILY IL GIORNALE (9/28): "SINCE IN GROZNY, BACK IN 1994-96, THEY ALREADY SUFFERED QUITE A BLOW, RUSSIAN STRATEGISTS SUGGEST THAT IT IS BETTER NOT TO RUN RISKS AND TO LET THQAIR FORCE 'TOP GUNS' DO THE WORK, FOLLOWING THE U.S. TEACHER. WITH TWO AIMS: TO PUSH THE ISLAMIC TERRORISTS INTO A CORNER AND TO PUSH THE POPULATION TO REVOLT AGAINST BASEV'S MEN. THOSE WHO REMEMBER THE VIOLENT REBUKES AND THE 'SCANDAL' PROVOKED WITHIN THE RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY BY NATO'S INTERVENTION IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA MIGHT HAVE MORE THAN ONE REASON TO LAUGH. INDEED, THE TACTICS AND THE STRATEGY ADOPTED BY THE FORMER RED ARMY IN CHECHNYA...ARE LIKE AS TWO PEAS IN THE POD WITH THOSE DEFINED IN THE WAR ROOM IN BRUSSELS....WITH ONE DIFFERENCE...: WHILE IN THE WAR IN KOSOVO RUSSIA CONDEMNED NATO INTERVENTION WITHIN A SOVEREIGN STATE, TODAY MOSCOW CLAIMS ITS RIGHT TO BRING BACK ORDER IN A PROVINCE WHICH FROM A LEGAL POINT OF VIEW IS STILL PART OF THE CONFEDERATION. PRECISELY, AS MILOSEVIC (SAID). AND THE KREMLIN DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THAT BEFORE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION THE LINES OF WOMEN, OLD PEOPLE AND CHILDREN ESCAPING TOWARD THE BORDERS...ARE UNBEARABLY SIMILAR TO THOSE KOSOVAR-ALBANIANS....FACED WITH THE INTENSIFICATION OF RUSSIAN AIR RAIDS, CHECHEN AUTHORITIES ARE RENEWING THEIR THREATS TO PROCLAIM A GENERAL MOBILIZATION. IT MIGHT BE A BLUFF...BUT THE GAMBLE BEGUN BY THE GENERALS IN MOSCOW, WHICH PUTIN HIMSELF HAS JOINED, IS VERY RISKY."

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 ROME 06717 02 OF 04 281340Z
3. EAST TIMOR

THE KILLING OF NINE CHURCH WORKERS, INCLUDING AN ITALIAN NUN, BY INDONESIAN TROOPS IN THE EASTERN PART OF EAST TIMOR IS THE FRONT-PAGE STORY IN ALL ITALIAN MEDIA. MOST DAILIES CARRY HEART-BREAKING STORIES OF THE NUN'S COURAGE TO DEFY TERRORISTS AND CONTINUE TO HELP THE POOR.

REPORTS NOTE THAT THE NEWS OF THIS MASSACRE ARRIVED ON

THE SAME DAY AS WHEN THE INDONESIAN MILITARY OFFICIALLY CEDED EAST TIMOR TO UN FORCES.

THE VATICAN'S STATEMENT, AS REPORTED IN THE OFFICIAL DAILY OSSERVATORE ROMANO, THAT "THE KILLING IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO CRIMINALITY AND DESPERATION RATHER THAN BEING AN EXPRESSION OF DIRECT HATE AGAINST THE CHURCH" IS WIDELY MENTIONED IN ALL REPORTS.

HEADLINES (FRONT-PAGES):

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4616

PAGE 01 ROME 06717 03 OF 04 281340Z
ACTION EUR-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 NSAE-00
SP-00 T-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /002W
----------FD1FD0 281340Z /38
P 281209Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2890
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5082
ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
COMSIXTHFLT //019
AMCONSUL FLORENCE
AMEMBASSY TIRANA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
NAVSUPPACT LA MADDALENA IT
ENGFLDACT MED NAPLES IT//NI//
COMSUBGRU EIGHT
COMSUBRON TWO TWO
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
NAS SIGONELLA IT//PA//
USCINCEUR ALT SHAPE BE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 ROME 006717

USIA

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/USIA, EUR/RPM, INR, PA
USIA FOR R/MR, I/GEU, I/FW, I/FNY, B/VOA/X, D/P
NAVSUPPACT FOR LT. SMITH/01E
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 LCDR. FC PANDOLFE

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 ROME 06717 03 OF 04 281340Z

PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE

E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT:USIS ROME MEDIA REACTION REPORT - SEPTEMBER 28, 1999

"EAST TIMOR: MASSACRE OF CHURCH WORKERS AND CHILDREN" (CORRIERE DELLA SERA)
"EAST TIMOR: MASSACRE OF CHURCH WORKERS" (LA REPUBBLICA)
"EAST TIMOR, NINE CHURCH WORKERS KILLED AND THROWN INTO THE RIVER" (IL MESSAGGERO)
"A NUN FROM LECCO MASSACRED IN EAST TIMOR" (IL GIORNALE)
"EAST TIMOR: MASSACRE OF CHURCH WORKERS" (L'UNITA')

COMMENTS:

GUIDO ZACCARIA REPORTS FROM JAKARTA IN CENTRIST, INFLUENTIAL LA STAMPA (9/28): "MASSACRES CONTINUE IN EAST TIMOR. THE DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY THE 'AITARAKA' GUERRILLA FIGHTERS...KILLED NINE PEOPLE ON-BOARD A MINI VAN. AMONG THEM, THERE WAS AN ITALIAN NUN. THE NEWS OF THE MASSACRE BEGUN TO CIRCULATE ONLY AFTER 24 HOURS, THROUGH RELIGIOUS CHANNELS AND PORTUGUESE RADIO, WHILE THE BIG TV NETWORKS REPORTED ON UN HELICOPTERS FLYING OVER LIQUICA....IN THE AREAS STILL OUTSIDE UN CONTROL, THAT IS, 98 PER CENT OF THE ISLAND, THE GUERRILLA FIGHTERS 'FALINTIL' SEEM TO HAVE TAKEN ON THE ROLE OF A SPONTANEOUS POLICE FORCE, NO LESS FEROCIOUS THAN THE GROUPS WHICH WERE THERE BEFORE THEM. YESTERDAY THE INDONESIAN MILITARY FORMALLY CEDED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 ROME 06717 03 OF 04 281340Z
CONTROL OF EAST TIMOR TO THE UN."

PIETRO VERONESE REPORTS FROM DARWIN IN LEFT-LEANING, INFLUENTIAL LA REPUBBLICA (9/28): "THE NUNS IN EAST TIMOR DO NOT WAIT FOR HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS...THEY JUST GET UP AND GO, AS THEY ALWAYS HAVE DONE IN TIMES OF DANGER AND DIFFICULTY...ON THE SAME DAY WHEN WE WERE INFORMED THAT THE INDONESIAN FORCE HAD FORMALLY CEDED CONTROL OF EAST TIMOR TO THE INTERFET, WE ALSO LEARNED ABOUT THIS FREE MASSACRE OF NUNS AND PRIESTS....BY NOW IN EAST TIMOR THERE ARE MORE PEACE KEEPING SOLDIERS THAN INDONESIAN PEOPLE....YESTERDAY THE INTERFET MADE ITS FIRST OFFENSIVE ACTION AND LAUNCHED AN OPERATION IN THE SMALL TOWN OF LIQUICA, WEST FROM DILI....THE WITHDRAWAL OF INDONESIAN

ARMY AND MILITIAS FROM EAST TIMOR HAS MADE WEST TIMOR BECOME AN OUTPOST OF THEIRS. AND IT IS THERE, IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE ISLAND, THAT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED THE HATE AND THE VIOLENCE ALONG WITH THE ARMED GANGS."

4. MIDDLE EAST

SOME NEWSPAPERS REPORT THAT EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK WON 93.79 PER CENT OF THE VOTE IN A REFERENDUM ON HIS PRESIDENCY.

COMMENTS:

"AND IN THE MEANTIME MUBARAK 'RECONQUERS' EGYPT" -- UGO TRAMBALLI WRITES IN LEADING BUSINESS DAILY IL SOLE 24-ORE (9/28): "MUBARAK AND EGYPT REPRESENT THE BASIC DILEMMA BETWEEN STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 ROME 06717 03 OF 04 281340Z
WORLD....INDEED, FEW LEADERS IN THE REGION HAVE BEEN MORE EFFECTIVE THAN MUBARAK IN THESE LAST TWO DECADES: THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ALWAYS GRANTED PEACE WITH ISRAEL, EVEN WHEN IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DO SO. HE COURAGEOUSLY FOUGHT A WAR AGAINST IRAQ, SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE WEST. HE FIRMLY FOUGHT AGAINST RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, HE DID NOT ACCEPT THE IMF'S STAGGERING PLAN IN 1991...AND NOW EGYPT HAS A 5 PER CENT YEARLY GROWTH RATE....HOWEVER, THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM IS A REALITY IN EGYPT TOO; BUT SOMETIMES IT IS AN EXCUSE TO REPRESS ANY KIND OF OPPOSITION. SLOWLY, SIGNS OF DEMOCRACY ARE BEING SEEN IN MOROCCO, TUNISIA, QATAR, OMAN, EVEN IN LIBYA....KUWAIT IS ALREADY A DEMOCRACY AND JORDAN IS ALMOST A DEMOCRACY. BUT IN THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD IT IS EGYPT WHICH CAN MAKE THE DIFFERENCE...AND THE TRUTH IS THAT THE DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY HOSNI MUBARAK DID NOT HAVE THE COURAGE TO FACE A REAL ELECTION, WHICH HE WOULD HAVE WON."

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4618

PAGE 01 ROME 06717 04 OF 04 281340Z
ACTION EUR-01

INFO	LOG-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	UTED-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	NSAE-00
	SP-00	T-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/002W

----------FD1FDA 281340Z /38
P 281209Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2891
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5083
ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
COMSIXTHFLT //019
AMCONSUL FLORENCE
AMEMBASSY TIRANA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
NAVSUPPACT LA MADDALENA IT
ENGFLDACT MED NAPLES IT//NI//
COMSUBGRU EIGHT
COMSUBRON TWO TWO
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
NAS SIGONELLA IT//PA//
USCINCEUR ALT SHAPE BE

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 ROME 006717

USIA

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/USIA, EUR/RPM, INR, PA
USIA FOR R/MR, I/GEU, I/FW, I/FNY, B/VOA/X, D/P
NAVSUPPACT FOR LT. SMITH/01E
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 LCDR. FC PANDOLFE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 ROME 06717 04 OF 04 281340Z

PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE

E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT:USIS ROME MEDIA REACTION REPORT - SEPTEMBER 28, 1999

"MIRAGE OF EGYPT" -- IGOR MAN COMMENTS IN CENTRIST, INFLUENTIAL LA STAMPA (9/28): "IT IS TRUE THAT MUBARAK HAS PUT ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS IN ORDER, IT IS TRUE THAT HE KEEPS FUNDAMENTALISTS UNDER CONTROL, IT IS TRUE THAT HE HAS RESTRAINED NOT A FEW WHEELER-DEALERS, BUT CORRUPTION GOES AHEAD. MUBARAK HAS BECOME A 'KEY MAN' IN THE ME AND AFRICA. THANKS TO OSAMA AL BAZ, HIS KEY ADVISER, HE IS NOW A KEY INTERNATIONAL MEDIATOR NOBODY CAN DO WITHOUT. HOWEVER, WE WOULD LIKE THAT, AFTER 18 YEARS IN POWER, HE WOULD DECIDE TO ABOLISH THE STATE OF EMERGENCY SO THAT HIS PATIENT PEOPLE CAN AT LAST BENEFIT FROM THOSE RIGHTS THAT ONLY 'REAL DEMOCRACY' GUARANTEES. BUT TODAY

DEMOCRACY IS A MIRAGE IN EGYPT." CALLAHAN

UNCLASSIFIED

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

E1

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0900

PAGE 01 JAKART 00836 01 OF 04 191110Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W				

----------A4F190 191110Z /38

P 191107Z FEB 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6191
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000836

ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MARR, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR ROUNDUP: DIFFERENCES IN GOI OVER HABIBIE EAST TIMOR POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00836 01 OF 04 191110Z

1. CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON, 1.5 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY
---

2. (C) RESISTANCE TO THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT'S NEW APPROACH TO EAST TIMOR IS ARISING IN JAKARTA, WHERE A WELL-FUNDED GROUP OF PRO-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 18 FEB 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2004 200300722

OFFICIALS IS MAKING THE ROUNDS AND ABRI VETERANS AND WIDOWS HAVE PROTESTED TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. ALTHOUGH SOME OPPOSITION ELEMENTS IN THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL SPECTRUM HARBOR REAL DOUBTS ABOUT IMMEDIATE MOVES TOWARD EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE (E.G., MEGAWATI AND GUS DUR), THESE LATEST EFFORTS APPEAR TO BE LARGELY ORCHESTRATED BY ELEMENTS WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND ABRI WHO OPPOSE LETTING THE PROVINCE BECOME INDEPENDENT. IN EAST TIMOR ITSELF, TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH AND HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS SEE A DISCONNECT BETWEEN JAKARTA'S NEW APPROACH AND THE ON-THE-GROUND DYNAMICS, WHERE OLD BEHAVIOR PATTERNS STILL HOLD SWAY.

3. (C) THERE IS TALK WITHIN SOME CIRCLES OF BREAKING OFF CERTAIN "PRO-INTEGRATION" EAST TIMOR DISTRICTS BORDERING ON WEST TIMOR, BUT IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE GOI ITSELF IS ACTUALLY CONSIDERING THIS. PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS DISMISS THIS THREAT, EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE THAT ANY POLL WOULD SHOW STRONG SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE IN ALL OF EAST TIMOR'S 13 DISTRICTS. DESPITE DIVERGENT VIEWS WITHIN THE GOI, HABIBIE HIMSELF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 00836 01 OF 04 191110Z
SHOWS NO SIGNS OF BACKING AWAY FROM A DETERMINATION TO BE RID OF THE EAST TIMOR PROBLEM BY THE END OF THE YEAR. HE REPORTEDLY INTIMATED TO [redacted] THAT B1
THE GOI WOULD BE READY TO WASH ITS HANDS WITH EAST TIMOR
IN AS LITTLE AS THREE MONTHS. A [redacted] B1
MEMO STATES THAT ALL MILITARY AND GOI CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ARE TO BE OUT OF THE PROVINCE BEFORE JANUARY 1, 2000. (SEPTEL REPORTS CONCERNS OVER THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF AN EXODUS OF GOI PERSONNEL). MEANWHILE, A HABIBIE ADVISOR ARGUES THAT IN REALITY WIDE-RANGING AUTONOMY FOR EAST TIMOR IS A MORE DANGEROUS "PRECEDENT" FOR OTHER PROVINCES THAN OUTRIGHT INDEPENDENCE. END SUMMARY.

WELL-FUNDED PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS DESCEND ON JAKARTA
---

4. (C) DOZENS OF PRO-INTEGRATIONIST EAST TIMORESE HAVE BEEN IN JAKARTA THIS PAST WEEK TO ARGUE AGAINST THE INDEPENDENCE OPTION. THIS CONTINGENT, WHICH CALLS ITSELF THE "FORUM FOR UNITY, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE," HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY THE REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER IN BALI, FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS, AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND HAS BEEN GIVEN AMPLE TIME TO AIR THEIR VIEWS ON THE GOVERNMENT TELEVISION CHANNEL. ALTHOUGH PORTRAYING

THEMSELVES AS "REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE," THIS GROUP CONSISTS ENTIRELY OF EAST TIMORESE LOCAL OFFICIALS, LOCAL ASSEMBLY MEMBERS, AND OTHERS WHO RECEIVE GOI PAYCHECKS (AND WHO UNDOUBTEDLY FEAR FOR THEIR PERSONAL FUTURES IN AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR).

5. (C) IN A RECENT INTERVIEW, BISHOP BELO COMPLAINED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00836 01 OF 04 191110Z
THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE IN JAKARTA WERE STAYING IN LUXURY HOTELS AND EATING AT THE BEST RESTAURANTS IN JAKARTA DURING A TIME OF SEVERE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN EAST TIMOR. VARIOUS SOURCES CLAIM THAT THIS EFFORT IS FUNDED BY ABRI AND THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHICH MAY INDICATE THAT AT LEAST SOME ELEMENTS OF THE GOI ARE NOT COMPLETELY ON BOARD WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S STATED PREFERENCE THAT EAST TIMORESE OPT FOR INDEPENDENCE. ON FEBRUARY 17, A GROUP OF ABRI WAR VETERANS AND WIDOWS APPEARED BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS TO URGE THAT THEIR SACRIFICES NOT BE FORGOTTEN AND THAT EAST TIMOR NOT BE GIVEN INDEPENDENCE. (COMMENT: WHETHER FUNDED BY VARIOUS GOI ELEMENTS OR NOT THESE PRO-INTEGRATIONIST INDIVIDUALS ARE NOT ALONE IN EXPRESSING QUALMS ABOUT IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE FOR EAST TIMOR, WHICH MANY (MEGAWATI, GUS DUR, EVEN BELO HIMSELF) REGARD AS A VERY CHANCY--IF NOT DANGEROUS-- PROPOSITION. END COMMENT.)

MEANWHILE, IN EAST TIMOR...
---

6. (C) MEANWHILE, IN EAST TIMOR ITSELF, MILITARY SOURCES HAVE TOLD A WESTERN JOURNALIST CONTACT THAT ABRI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4538

PAGE 01 JAKART 00836 02 OF 04 212357Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	SVC-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00

MR-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /021W
----------A5B1F7 212357Z /75
P 191107Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6192
INQO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 000836

ROME FOR THE VATICAN/19/09

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOVS, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR ROUNDUP. DIFFERENCES IN GOI OVER HABIBIE EAST TIMOR POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00836 02 OF 04 212357Z
HABIBIE HELP ORGANIZE PRO-INT EAST TIMOR FEBRUARY WILL BE HELDIN THE WQ TENSION DILI ITSELF.

7. DISTURBANCE IN DILI, A PRO-Q WAS SHOT AND KILLED, (##) POLICE MOBILE BRIGADE THE DIE FOR INTEQACCORDING TO HUMAN RIGHQOME ACTIVE IN DILI.
[redacted] IS BASED IN AIRDING TO [redacted] (IN QWAS B1
GIVEN 20 FIREARMS BY ABRI AF AND HIS ASSOCIATES WERE THREATENED B1
BY PRO-INDEENDENCE FORCES. TENS OF THOUSANDS ATTENDED THE FUNERAL OF THE SHOOTING VICTIM IN DILI, BUT THE SITUATION REMAINED CALM. SOME OBSERVERS, INCLUDING [redacted] B1
[redacted] ATTRIBUTED THIS TO A LETTER FROM XANANQ GUSMAO APPEALING FOR RESTRAINT WHICH APPEARED IN THE DILI NEWSPAPER.

8. (C) POLOFF MET ON FEBRUARY 17 WITH [redacted] B1
[redacted] AND OTHE PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURES
IMMEDIATELY AFTEQ THEY HAD MET WITH XANANA. [redacted] B1
SAID QHAT XANANA'S MAIN MESSAGES HAD BEEN THE NEED TO MAINTAIN PEACE, SEEK RECONCILIATION AMONG ALL AST TIMORESE, AND "NOT RESPOND TO PROVOCATIONQ." [redacted] TOLD B1
POLCOUNS FEBRUARY 18 THAT XANANA HAD DIRECTED THAT HARDER LINE PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS

SEND REPRESENTA MEET WITH HIM
DURING TO RECEIVE HIS MESSAGE (##)INTIMIDATING ACTIONS.
(##)FORCES TO TAKE RESPONSI--LEADERS URGED TAHIDI AFTER THE
GROUP(##) SUAI AREA IN LATE
JANUARY, BUT THE MILITAY RESPONDED THAT CONFL WERE INTERNAL
EAST TIMORF ABRI'S FEBRUARY 17, [redacted] POLICE B1
IN EAST TIMNG TO INVOLVE
THEMSECE OF LAW AND ORDER, ANDQDENTS ARE REPORTING PROBLEMS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 00836 02 OF 04 212357Z
TO THE CNRT (COUNIL FOR NATIONAL TIMORESE RESISTANCE) RATHER
TAN TO THE POLICE. [redacted] MAINTAINED THAT WHIQE B1
POLICIES MAY HAVE CHANGED IN JAKARTA, ELEMENTS OF THE
MILITARY ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR CONTINUE TO PLAY
THE SAME OLD GAMES," BY ENCOURAGING CONFLICT BETWEEN
EAST TIMORESE.
10. (C) ON FEBRUARY 17 THERE WERE FURTHER CLASES IN
THE MAUBARA AREA OF LIQUICA DISTRICT WHICH REPORTEDLY
RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF A PRO-INTEGRATION HIGH SCHOOL
STUDENT. JAKARTA PRSS REPORTS INDICATED THAT THESE
CLASHES OCCURRED IN AN AREA WHERE A NEW PRO-INTEGRATION
CIVILIAN MILITIA GROUP "BESI MERAH PUTIH" (RED AND WHITE
IRON) WAS RECENTLY SET UP, AND INVOLVED A CONFLICT
BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI-INTEGRATION VILLAGERS. ACCORDING
TO [redacted] BESI MERAH UTIH AND "NAGA MERAH PUTIH" B1
(RED AND WHITE DRAGON), ALONG WITH MAHIDI, ARE THE MOST
SIGIFICANT PRO-INTEGRATION CIVILIAN MILITIA GROUPS
OPERATING IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE PROVINCEQ

11. (C) ACCORDING TO A FEBRUARY 19 PRESS REPORT, CNRT
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN DAVID XIMENES MET WITH DEPUTY EAST TIMOR
POLICE CHIEF COL. MAHFI SAHUDJI ON FEBRUARY 18 TO
DEMAND THAT POLICE TAKE CONTROL OF THE SITUATION IN THE
MAUBARA AREA, WHERE HE SAID THE PRO-INTEGRATION "RED AND
WHITE IRON" GROUP, ARMED WITH SHARP WEAPONS, WAS
"SPREADING TERROR." IF THE POLICE FAILED TO TAKE CHARGE
OF THE SITUATION, XIMENES THREATENED TO HAVE THE CNRT
ITSELF TAKE ON THE LATTER AND "CALL FOR THE MASSES TO GO
TO MAUBARA." MAHUFI DENIED THAT THE SITUATION WAS OUT
OF CONTROL, BUT A [redacted] B1
TOLD POLOFF ON FEBRUARY 18 THAT CAR(##) HAS BEN TOP
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00836 02 OF 04 212357Z
FOOD DISTRIBUTIONS INTO THE UNSTABLE SECURITY (##)

NOTE: SVC GARBLED TEXT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4597

PAGE 01 JAKART 00836 02 OF 04 220050Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W				

----------A5B490 220104Z /38

P 191107Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6192
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 000836

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MARR, MOPS, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00836 02 OF 04 220050Z
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR ROUNDUP: DIFFERENCES IN GOI OVER HABIBIE EAST TIMOR POLICY

WILL HELP ORGANIZE PRO-INTEGRATION RALLIES THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR FEBRUARY 19. THE CENTRAL RALLY WILL BE HELD IN THE WESTERN TOWN OF BALIBO. TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH IN EAST TIMOR GENERALLY WITH MORE KILLINGS REPORTED AND ARMED PRO-JAKARTA CIVILIANS CONTINUING TO CLASH WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS AND IN DILI ITSELF.

7. (C) IN A FEBRUARY 14 DISTURBANCE IN DILI, A PRO-INDEPENDENCE CIVILIAN WAS SHOT AND KILLED, EITHER BY A MEMBER OF THE POLICE MOBILE BRIGADE (BRIMOB) OR A MEMBER OF THE ARMED CIVILIAN PRO-INTEGRATION "MAHIDI" (LIVE AND DIE FOR INTEGRATION) GROUP, WHICH, ACCORDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, HAS NOW BECOME ACTIVE IN DILI. "MAHIDI," LED BY CANSIO CARVALHO, IS BASED IN AINARO DISTRICT, AND, ACCORDING TO CARVALHO (IN AN INTERVIEW WITH BBC), WAS GIVEN 20 FIREARMS BY ABRI AFTER CARVALHO AND HIS ASSOCIATES WERE THREATENED BY PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES. TENS OF THOUSANDS ATTENDED THE FUNERAL OF THE SHOOTING VICTIM IN DILI, BUT THE SITUATION REMAINED CALM. SOME OBSERVERS, INCLUDING [redacted] B1
[redacted] ATTRIBUTED THIS TO A LETTER FROM XANANA GUSMAO APPEALING FOR RESTRAINT WHICH APPEARED IN THE DILI NEWSPAPER.

8. (C) POLOFF MET ON FEBRUARY 17 WITH [redacted] B1
[redacted] AND OTHER PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURES IMMEDIATELY AFTER THEY HAD MET WITH XANANA. [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 00836 02 OF 04 220050Z
SAID THAT XANANA'S MAIN MESSAGES HAD BEEN THE NEED TO MAINTAIN PEACE, SEEK RECONCILIATION AMONG ALL EAST TIMORESE, AND "NOT RESPOND TO PROVOCATIONS." [redacted] TOLD B1
POLCOUNS FEBRUARY 18 THAT XANANA HAD DIRECTED THAT HARDER LINE PRO-INDEPENDENCE YOUTH AND STUDENT GROUPS SEND REPRESENTATIVES FROM EAST TIMOR TO MEET WITH HIM DURING THE WEEK OF FEBRUARY 21 TO RECEIVE HIS MESSAGE TO AVOID PROVOCATIVE AND INTIMIDATING ACTIONS.

URGING THE SECURITY FORCES TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY
---

9. (C) MEANWHILE, ACCORDING TO [redacted] B1
[redacted] CHURCH LEADERS URGED THE MILITARY TO DISARM MAHIDI AFTER THE GROUP KILLED FOUR CIVILIANS IN THE SUAI AREA IN LATE JANUARY, BUT THE MILITARY RESPONDED THAT CONFLICTS INVOLVING MAHIDI WERE INTERNAL EAST TIMORESE AFFAIRS AND OUT OF ABRI'S CONTROL. IN A MEETING WITH POLOFF ON FEBRUARY 17, [redacted] SAID THAT THE MILITARY AND POLICE B1
IN EAST TIMOR ARE INCREASINGLY UNWILLING TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN BASIC MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER, AND THAT AS A RESULT RESIDENTS ARE REPORTING PROBLEMS TO THE CNRT (COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL TIMORESE RESISTANCE) RATHER

THAN TO THE POLICE. [redacted] MAINTAINED THAT WHILE B1
POLICIES MAY HAVE CHANGED IN JAKARTA, ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR CONTINUE TO "PLAY THE SAME OLD GAMES," BY ENCOURAGING CONFLICT BETWEEN EAST TIMORESE.

10. (C) ON FEBRUARY 17 THERE WERE FURTHER CLASHES IN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00836 02 OF 04 220050Z
THE MAUBARA AREA OF LIQUICA DISTRICT WHICH REPORTEDLY RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF A PRO-INTEGRATION HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT. JAKARTA PRESS REPORTS INDICATED THAT THESE CLASHES OCCURRED IN AN AREA WHERE A NEW PRO-INTEGRATION CIVILIAN MILITIA GROUP "BESI MERAH PUTIH" (RED AND WHITE IRON) WAS RECENTLY SET UP, AND INVOLVED A CONFLICT BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI-INTEGRATION VILLAGERS. ACCORDING TO [redacted] BESI MERAH PUTIH AND "NAGA MERAH PUTIH" B1
(RED AND WHITE DRAGON), ALONG WITH MAHIDI, ARE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PROINTEGRATION CIVILIAN MILITIA GROUPS OPERATING IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE PROVINCE.

11. (C) ACCORDING TO A FEBRUARY 19 PRESS REPORT, CNRT DEPUTY CHAIRMAN DAVID XIMENES MET WITH DEPUTY EAST TIMOR POLICE CHIEF COL. MAHUFI SAHUDJI ON FEBRUARY 18 TO DEMAND THAT POLICE TAKE CONTROL OF THE SITUATION IN THE MAUBARA AREA, WHERE HE SAID THE PRO-INTEGRATION "RED AND WHITE IRON" GROUP, ARMED WITH SHARP WEAPONS, WAS "SPREADING TERROR." IF THE POLICE FAILED TO TAKE CHARGE OF THE SITUATION, XIMENES THREATENED TO HAVE THE CNRT ITSELF TAKE ON THE MATTER AND "CALL FOR THE MASSES TO GO TO MAUBARA." MAHUFI DENIED THAT THE SITUATION WAS OUT OF CONTROL, BUT A [redacted] B1
TOLD POLOFF ON FEBRUARY 18 THAT CARE HAS BEEN FORCED TO STOP FOOD DISTRIBUTIONS IN THE MAUBARA AREA DUE TO THE UNSTABLE SECURITY SITUATION. IN A TELEPHONE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4600

PAGE 01 JAKART 00836 03 OF 04 220050Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00

PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 STR-00 TRSE-00
USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 MR-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 /021W
----------A5B4A9 220107Z /38

P 191107Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6193
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 000836

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MARR, MOPS, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00836 03 OF 04 220050Z
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR ROUNDUP: DIFFERENCES IN GOI OVER HABIBIE EAST TIMOR POLICY

CONVERSATION OF FEBRUARY 19, [redacted] B1
[redacted] IN DILI EXPRESSED ALARM OVER THREATS TO HIM AND HIS STAFF BY THE MAHIDI ELEMENTS NOW ACTIVE IN DILI. IN A JOINT PRESS APPEARANCE LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN AND XANANA ISSUED A CALL FEBRUARY 19 FOR THE POLICE IN EAST TIMOR TO "TAKE RESPONSIBILITY" FOR RESTORING ORDER.

SPLITTING OFF THE WESTERN DISTRICTS?
---

12. (C) RECENT CONFLICTS ARE CENTERED ALMOST ENTIRELY IN EAST TIMOR'S WESTERN DISTRICTS, WHICH BORDER WEST TIMOR. THE EASTERN HALF OF THE PROVINCE, HISTORICALLY MORE VOLATILE, HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET IN RECENT MONTHS. A NUMBER OF PRO-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE, APPARENTLY CONCEDING THAT EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE IS NOW INEVITABLE, ARE MAINTAINING THAT THERE IS A PREPONDERANCE OF PRO-INTEGRATION SENTIMENT IN THESE

WESTERN DISTRICTS. [redacted] B1
[redacted] RECENTLY TOLD US HE BELIEVES THERE MAY BE A CAMPAIGN UNDERWAY TO SPLIT OFF THESE WESTERN "PRO-INTEGRATION" DISTRICTS AND ALLOW AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR TO RETAIN ONLY A RUMP TERRITORY CONSISTING OF THE REMAINING EASTERN DISTRICTS. HE NOTED THAT THE EASTERN-MOST PROVINCE OF LAUTEM MIGHT ALSO BE RETAINED BY JAKARTA. IN A FEBRUARY 17 ARTICLE, FRANS SEDA, CITED BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE IN RECENT MEETINGS WITH U.S. VISITORS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 00836 03 OF 04 220050Z

AS ONE OF HIS PRIMARY ADVISORS ON EAST TIMOR, ASSERTED THAT PRO-INTEGRATION SENTIMENT DOMINATED AREAS WEST OF DILI AND THE WESTERN SECTION OF DILI ITSELF, WHILE THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE HELD SWAY OVER TERRITORY EAST OF DILI. A GOI-FUNDED PRO-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE STUDENT GROUP HAS MADE SIMILAR CLAIMS, ARGUING THAT ONLY 8 OF EAST TIMOR'S 13 DISTRICTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR.

13. (C) PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS DISMISS THE IDEA THAT EAST TIMOR COULD BE DIVIDED ALONG PRO AND ANTI-INTEGRATION LINES. IN A FEBRUARY 17 MEETING WITH POLOFF, [redacted] EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT ANY B1
POLL WOULD SHOW THAT PRO-INDEPENDENCE SENTIMENT IN EAST TIMOR DOMINATES IN ALL 13 DISTRICTS, AND ARGUED THAT IN ANY CASE A REFERENDUM WAS THE ONLY WAY TO SETTLE THESE ISSUES. [redacted] AGREED, AND ADDED THAT HE DID B1
NOT BELIEVE THE CURRENT VIOLENCE IN THE WESTERN AREAS OF EAST TIMOR WAS RELATED TO ANY CAMPAIGN TO SEPARATE THESE DISTRICTS. HE ATTRIBUTED THE DISTURBANCES IN THESE PREVIOUSLY DORMANT AREAS TO EMOTIONS RAISED BY THE LATE 1998 "DIALOGUE" CAMPAIGN WAGED BY PRO-REFERENDUM STUDENTS. (COMMENT. A GOI ATTEMPT TO SPLIT OFF THESE DISTRICTS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE A NON-STARTER FOR THE UN, PORTUGAL, AND THE EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE, AND AS POINTED OUT ABOVE, WE HAVE NEVER SEEN EVIDENCE THAT PRO-INDONESIAN SENTIMENTS ARE ESPECIALLY STRONG IN THESE AREAS. THERE IS NOT YET ANY REAL EVIDENCE THAT SERIOUSLY SUCH IDEAS ARE ENTERTAINED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOI, BUT THIS SITUATION NEVERTHELESS BEARS WATCHING. END COMMENT)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00836 03 OF 04 220050Z

HABIBIE POINTS TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

---

14. (C) POLOFF AND ECONOFF MET ON FEBRUARY 17 WITH [redacted] B1 MAINTAINED THAT GRANTING EAST TIMOR WIDE-RANGING AUTONOMY SET A MORE DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR OTHER PROVINCES THAN WOULD OUTRIGHT INDEPENDENCE. HE ARGUED THAT IT WAS RELATIVELY EASY TO MAKE THE CASE THAT EAST TIMOR DIFFERED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM OTHER INDONESIAN PROVINCES AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE INDEPENDENT, BUT IF IT BECAME A MODEL FOR REAL AUTONOMY OTHER PROVINCES WOULD QUICKLY DEMAND SIMILAR TREATMENT. IN THE COURSE OF ILLUSTRATING ONE OF HIS POINTS, [redacted] B1 HANDED POLOFF AND ECONOFF A SHEAF OF DOCUMENTS ON PORTUGUESE LAW. CLIPPED TO THE BACK OF THESE PAPERS (APPARENTLY INADVERTENTLY) WAS A [redacted] MEMO ON B1 EAST TIMOR, THE FINAL POINT OF WHICH STATED THAT ALL MILITARY AND GOI CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ARE TO BE OUT OF THE PROVINCE BEFORE JANUARY 1, 2000. (NOTE: AFTER THIS MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED [redacted] TOLD US THAT IN B1 HABIBIE'S FEBRUARY 19 MEETING WITH [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0906

PAGE 01 JAKART 00836 04 OF 04 191114Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W				

----------A4F1DB 191114Z /38

P 191107Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6194
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 000836

ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/1Q/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MARR, MOPS,ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR ROUNDUP: DIFFERENCES QN GOI OVER
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00836 04 OF 04 191114Z
HABIBIE EAST TIMOR POLICY

[redacted] SEPTEL), THE PRESIDENT TOLD [redacted] THAT "IN THREE MONTS YOU CAN DO WHAT YOU WANT WITH IT (EAST TIMOQ)." END NOTE) B1 B1

WILL ABRI GO ALONG?
---

15. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT WHILE THRE WERE INDIVIDUAL ABRI OFFICERS WHO HAD PERSQNAL INTERESTS IN OPPOSING EAST TIMOR INDEPQNDENCE, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT ABRI AS AN INSTITUTION WOULD ADHERE TO HABIBIE'S APPROACH. IN A FEBRUARY 18 DISCUSSION WITH POLOFF, [redacted] WHILE B1 B1
EXTREMELY CRITICAL OF HABIBIQ'S EAST TIMOR POLICY, DID NOT SEE ABRI ATTEMPTNG TO BLOCK AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR. HE ARQUED THAT FOR THE ABRI LEADERSHIP, WHICH WAS MUCH MORE FOCUSSED ON POLITICAL EVENTS IN JAKARTA, EAST TIMOR HAD BECOME A PERIPHERAL ISSUE.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] ROY B1

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>

CONFIDENTIAL PTO0038

PAGE 01 JAKART 00836 212358Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	SVC-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W			

----------A5B20B 212358Z /75

P 191107Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6193
INFO ASSOCIATIONOF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LQSBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0968Q
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 000836

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/09
TAGS: OREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MARR, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR ROUNDUP: DIFFERENCES IN GOI OVE
HABIBIE EAT TIMOR POLICY

(@@)FEBRUARY 19, [redacted] IN B1
DIL THREATS TO HIM AND HI(##) NOW ACTIVE IN DILI. IN A JOINT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00836 212358Z
PRESS APPEARANCE LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN AND XQNANA
ISSUED A CALL FEBRUARY 19 FOR THE POLICE IN EAST TIMOR TO "TAKE
RESPONSIBILITY" FOR RESORING ORDER.

SPLITTING OFF THE WESTERN DISTRQCTS?

Q2. (C) RECENT CONFLICTS ARE CENTERED ALMOST ENTIRELY IN EAST TIMOR'S WESTERN DISTRICTS, WHCH BORDER WEST TIMOR. THE EASTERN HALF OF THE PROVINCE, HISTORICALLY MORE VOLATILE, HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET IN RECENT MONTHS. A NUMBEQ OF PRO-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE, APPARENTLY CONCEDING THAT EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE IS NOW INEVITABLE, ARE MAINTAINING THAT THERE IS AQ PREPONDERANCE OF PRO-INTEGRATION SE WESTERN DISTRICTS. [redacted] B1
[redacted] RECENTLY TOLD US HE BELIVES THERE MAY BE A CAMPAIGN UNDERWAY TO SPLITOFF THESE WESTERN "PRO-INTEGRATION" DISTRICTS AND ALLOW AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR TO RETAI ONLY A RUMP TERRITORY CONSISTING OF THE REMAINING EASTERN DISTRICTS. HE NOTED THAT THE EASTERN-MOST PROVINCE OF LAUTEM MIGHT ALSO BE RQTAINED BY JAKARTA. IN A FEBRUARY 17 ARTICLE,FRANS SEDA, CITED BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE IN RECENT MEETINGS WITH U.S. VISITORS AS ONE OF HIS PIMARY ADVISORS ON EAST TIMOR, ASSERTED THAT PRO-INTEGRATION SENTIMENT DOMINATED AREAS WEST OF DILI AND THE WESTERN SECTION OF DILI ITSELF, WHILE THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE HELD SWAY OVR TERRITORY EAST OF DILI. A GOI-FUNDED PRO-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE STUDENT GROUP HAS MADE (##) THAT ONLY 8 OF EACH COULD BE (##)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 00836 212358Z
13. (C) PRO-INDEPES THE IDEA THAT EAST TIMOR PRO AND ANTI-INTEGRATION LINES. IN A FEBUARY 17 MEETING WITH POLOFF, [redacted] EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT ANY B1
POLL WOULD SHW THAT PRO-INDEPENDENCE SENTIMENT IN EAST TIMOR DOMINATES IN ALL 13 DISTRICTS, AND ARGUED THAT IN ANY CASE A REFERENDUM WAS THE ONLY WAY TO SETTLE THESE ISSUES. [redacted] AGREED, AND ADDED THAT HE DID B1
NOT BELIEVE THE CURRENT VIOLENCE IN THE WESTERN AREAS OF EAST TIMOR WAS RELATED TO ANY CAMPAIGN TO SEPARATE THESEQ DISTRICTS. HE ATTRIBUTED THE DISTURBANCES INTHESE PREVIOUSLY DORMANT AREAS TO EMOTIONS RAISED BY THE LATE 1998 "DIALOGUE" CAMPAIGN WAGEDBY PRO-REFERENDUM STUDENTS. (COMMENT. A GOIATTEMPT TO SPLIT OFF THESE DISTRICTS WOULDPRESUMABLY BE A NON-STARTER FOR THE UN, PORTUGAL, AND THE EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE, AND AS PINTED OUT ABOVE, WE HAVE NEVER SEEN EVIDENCE THAT PRO-INDONESIAN SENTIMENTS ARE ESPECIALLY STRONG IN THESE

AREAS. THERE IS NOT YET ANYREAL EVIDENCE THAT SERIOUSLY SUCH IDEAS ARE ENTERTAINED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOI, BUT THIS SITUATION NEVERTHELESS BEARS WATCHING. END COMMENT)

HABIBIE POINTS TOWARD INDEPENDECE

14. (C) POLOFF AND ECONOFF MET ON FEBRUARY 17 WITH [redacted] B1 MAINTAINED THAT GRANTING EAST TIMOR WIDE-RANGING AUTONOMY SETS A MORE DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR OTHER PROVINCQS THAN WOULD OUTRIGHT INDEPENDENCE. HE ARGUED THAT IT WAS RELATIVELY EASY TO MAKE THE CASE THAT EAST TIMOR DIFFERED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM OTHER INDONESIAN PROVINCES AND SHOULD THEREFOREBE INDEPENDENT, BUT IF IT BECAME A MODEL FOR REAL AUTONOMY OTHER PROVINCES WOULD QUICKLY DEMAND SIMILAR TREATMENT. IN THE COURSE OF ILLUSTATING ONE OF HIS POINTS, [redacted] B1 HANDED POLOFF AND ECONOFF A SHEAF OF DOCUMENTS ON PORTUGUESE LAW. CLIPPED TO THE BACK OF THESE PAPERS (APPARENTLY INADVERTENTLY) WAS A [redacted] MEMO ON B1 EAST TIMOR, THE FINAL POINT OF WHICH STATED THAT ALL MILITARY AND GOI CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ARE TO BE OUT OF THE PROVINCE BEFORE JANUARY 1, 2000. (NOTE: AFTR THIS MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED [redacted] TOLD US THAT IN B1 HABIBIE'S FEBRUARY 19 MEETING WITH [redacted] B1

NOTE: SVC FOR GARBLED TEXT.

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

E4

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2287

PAGE 01 JAKART 00959 01 OF 05 280752Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/022W			

----------A8B023 280752Z /38

O 280742Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6330
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SUVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 3 FEB 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 20 JUL 2004 200300722

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00959 01 OF 05 280752Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 000959

BEIJING PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/03
TAGS: PREL, EAID, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: [redacted]ON STRATEGY/TACTICS AND SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR

B

REF: JAKARTA 0908 (NOTAL)

1. CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON, 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: [redacted] B
[redacted] PROVIDED AN OUTBRIEF OF HIS WEEK-LONG VISIT TO INDONESIA WHICH INCLUDED THREE DAYS IN EAST TIMOR. HE SAID THAT BOTH THE UN AND THE GOI WERE UNHAPPY WITH THE AUSTRALIAN-PROPOSED CONTACT GROUP IDEA, IN PART BECAUSE IT COMPETED WITH A UN PLAN FOR A SIMILAR GROUP. A CONTACT GROUP, AS ENVISAGED BY THE UN, WOULD EXERT TIMELY PRESSURE ON ALL PARTIES TO KEEP NEGOTIATIONS MOVING, ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY IN EAST TIMOR AND COORDINATE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT. A FORTHCOMING GOI CABINET MEETING WILL PROVIDE FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MARCH 9-10 TRIPARTITE MEETING IN NEW YORK. IT IS NOT CLEAR IF IT WILL SET A DATE FOR THE "CONSULTATION AMONG EAST TIMORESE," THOUGH [redacted] NOTED THAT SOME IN THE B
GOI ARE PRESSING FOR AN EARLY CONSULTATION (PRE-JUNE 7),
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 00959 01 OF 05 280752Z
WHILE THE MILITARY WISHES TO DELAY IT. WHILE THE RESULTS OF THE CONSULTATION ARE WIDELY ANTICIPATED, IT IS A KEY STEP AND VULNERABLE TO THOSE SEEKING TO BLOCK THE PROCESS THROUGH VIOLENCE. IN THIS VEIN, [redacted] B
[redacted] WAS CRITICAL OF WHAT HE SAID WAS MILITARY ARMING OF CIVILIAN GROUPS. [redacted] SAW NEED FOR B
PRESSURE ON ABRI (NOT SIMPLY ON TH FOREIGN MINISTRY) TO BRING AN END TO THIS ARMING OF GROUPS WHICH COULD "RUN AMUCK." THERE ALSO NEEDS TO BE GENERAL DISARMING OF ALL SIDES BUT THE PROBLEM OF ARMED CIVILIAN GROUPS AND THE DISENGAGEMENT OF ABRI AND THE EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE SHOULD BE SEEN AS SEPARATE PROBLEMS.

3. (C) A NUMBER OF INITIATIVES HAVE EMERGED AIMED AT FORMING A "PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION." THE UN BELIEVES THAT ONE APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND ANOTHER GROWING OUT OF CHURCH RECONCILIATION EFFORTS COULD SOON MERGE. A THIRD, PUSHED BY THE EAST TIMOR GOVERNOR AND THE MILITARY, APPEARS NOT TO BE GENUINE AND IS NOT LIKELY TO SUCCEED. ULTIMATELY A PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION WOULD ACT AS A CONFLICT RESOLUTION GROUP WORKING FROM VILLAGE TO PROVINCIAL LEVEL. A UN PRESENCE WOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY INITIALLY FOR THE CONSULTATION PROCESS BUT WOULD COME TO EMBRACE SECURITY AND

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSIBILITIES AS WELL. END SUMMARY.

4. (C) [redacted] MET WITH POLCOUNS FEBRUARY 27 UPON RETURNING FROM THREE DAYS IN EAST TIMOR AND A DAY OF DISCUSSIONS (FEBRUARY 26) WITH SENIOR GOI LEADERS. [redacted] B B

CONFIDENTIAL

JOINED THE DISCUSSION.

STRATEGY

COORDINATING INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN EAST TIMOR
---

5. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THE UN HAD BEEN UNHAPPY WITH THE AUSTRALIAN PROPOSAL FOR A CONTACT GROUP ON EAST TIMOR, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE UN HAD ALREADY FORMULATED ITS OWN PROPOSAL ON THIS THEME WHICH WAS ONLY AWAITING THE UNSYG'S ENDORSEMENT. ONE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE AUSTRALIAN LIST OF MEMBERS DIFFERED FROM THAT DEVELOPED BY THE UN. "WE HAD SOME PRETTY TOUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AUSTRALIANS OVER THIS IN NEW YORK (AFTER THE AUSTRALIAN ANNOUNCEMENT)," [redacted] SAID. B
[redacted] ADDED THAT [redacted] B B B
TOLD HIM ON FEBRUARY 26 THAT THE GOI ALSO WAS "NOT HAPPY" WITH THE AUSTRALIAN PROPOSAL AND WOULD HAVE MUCH PREFERRED TO FOCUS ALL DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY "ALONG THE UN TRACK." THE GOI, [redacted] SAID, WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT B

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2288

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/021W			

----------A8B027 280752Z /38
O 280742Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6331
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SUVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00959 02 OF 05 280752Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 000959

BEIJING PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/03
TAGS: PRL, EAID, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: [redacted]ON STRATEGY/TACTICS AND SITUATION ON B
HE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR

THE UN PLAN WHICH WAS TO BE DUBBED "FRIENDS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON EAST TIMOR." THE GOI, ACCORDING TO [redacted] FEARED THAT THE UNSC MIGHT BECOME A VENUE FOR B
ACTION ON EAST TIMOR AND FELT THAT THE AUSTRALIAN INITIATIVE MIGHT LEAD TO THAT.

6. (C) ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE FRIENDS GROUP ENVISAGED B
BY THE UN WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING KEY TASKS: FIRST, "TO EXERT THE RIGHT PRESSURE AT THE RIGHT MOMENT." SECOND, THE GROUP WOULD NEED TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY. REFLECTING CURRENT UN THINKING, HE SAID THIS COULD ENTAIL COORDINATION OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR A SMALL FOREIGN POLICE PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR. THOSE FOREIGN POLICE WOULD PRINCIPALLY BE USED TO HELP ORGANIZE AND TRAIN A NATIVE EAST TIMORESE POLICE FORCE.

[redacted] QUOTED [redacted] B
[redacted] AS SAYING THAT EAST TIMORESE NOW SERVING WITH ABRI COULD CONSTITUTE THE CORE OF A POLICE UNIT, WHICH WOULD FORM UP AROUND A FOREIGN POLICE ADVISOR(S) NUCLEUS. THE FOREIGN POLICE ASSISTANCE MIGHT BE DRAWN, INTER ALIA, FROM "REGIONAL, NON-POWERS WITH EXPERIENCE"

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 00959 02 OF 05 280752Z
SUCH AS FIJI. THE POLICE COMMANDER IN DILI TOLD [redacted] B
THIS PAST WEEK THAT HE BELIEVED SUCH A POLICE FORCE WAS DO-ABLE AND THAT, FOR LEGAL PURPOSES, IT COULD BE SUBORDINATED TO POLICE AND ABRI MEMBERS OF A "PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION" (DESCRIBED BELOW).

7. (C) A THIRD TASK FOR A "FRIENDS OF THE UNSYG ON EAST TIMOR" WOULD BE TO COORDINATE SUPPORT FOR A TWO TO THREE YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD. THIS WOULD ENTAIL ENSURING THE AVAILABILITY OF ADEQUATE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL NECESSITIES FOR EAST TIMORESE DURING THE TRANSITION. [redacted] ESTIMATED THAT THERE WOULD BE B
SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT BASED ON "BROAD GOODWILL FOR EAST TIMOR" IN THE FIRST TWO TO THREE YEARS BUT THAT AFTER THAT, SUPPORT WOULD LIKELY TAPER OFF AND EAST TIMOR WOULD HAVE TO BE READY TO SHOULDER MORE AND MORE OF ITS OWN RESPONSIBILITIES.

8. (C) WITH REGARD TO TECHNICAL PERSONNEL, [redacted] SAID B
XANANA GUSMAO HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE CNRT IS ALREADY SURVEYING THE EAST TIMORESEDIASPORA TO IDENTIFY PEOPLE WHO HAD THE SKILL NEEDED IN EAST TIMOR AND WHO WERE WILLING TO VOLUNTEER THEIR SERVICES FOR A FINITE PERIOD. [redacted] SAID THAT A PROJECT ORGANIZED UNDER AMCIT DAVID B
PHILLIPS AT COLUMBIA WAS COMPILING A REPORT SURVEYING EAST TIMOR HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER NEEDS. THE REPORT, HOWEVER, WOULD ONLY BE READY AT THE END OF THE YEAR, ACCORDING TO CURRENT PLANNING. HE PROPOSED THAT A FOREIGN DONOR MIGHT BE WILLING TO EXPAND AND ACCELERATE THIS WORK.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00959 02 OF 05 280752Z
THE GOI PREPARES ITS POSITION
---

9. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THE GOI CABINET WAS DUE TO MEET B
ON MARCH 8 TO FORMULATE INSTRUCTIONS FOR FOREIGN

MINISTER ALATAS, WHO WOULD PARTICIPATE IN KEY TRI-PARTITE TALKS IN NEW YORK ON THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE MARCH 9-10. [redacted] SAID MOST ISSUES WERE RESOLVED BUT THAT A FEW STILL NEEDED FINE TUNING. THE GOI CABINET MEETING, FOR EXAMPLE, IS EXPECTED TO FINALIZE A POSITION ON THE ROLE OF INDONESIAN COURTS VIS-A-VIS EAST TIMOR. IT APPEARS THAT THE GOI WILL OFFER TO ESTABLISH A SPECIAL OFFICE WITHIN THE SUPREME COURT WHICH WOULD HAVE THE POWER TO INTERPRET THE AUTONOMY LAW AND WOULD HAVE JURISDICTION OVER LAWS IN EAST TIMOR. JUDGES IN THIS OFFICE WOULD BE EAST TIMORESE AND INDONESIAN. B

10. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND, HE UNDERSTOOD, PRESIDENT HABIBIE WERE LOOKING TO A "CONSULTATION" AMONG EAST TIMORESE REGARDING THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL BEFORE THE JUNE 7 INDONESIAN ELECTIONS. OTHER ELEMENTS WITHIN THE GOI, NOTABLY THE MILITARY, HOWEVER, APPEARED DETERMINED TO DELAY THIS B

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2289

PAGE 01 JAKART 00959 03 OF 05 280752Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/022W			

----------A8B02B 280752Z /38

O 280742Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6332
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SUVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00959 03 OF 05 280752Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 000959

BEIJING PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/7/03
TAGS: PREL, EAID, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: [redacted] ON STRATEGY/TACTICS AND SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR B

STEP ... "TO DRAG IT OUT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE." [redacted] B WAS NOT SURE WHETHER THE GOI WOULD TAKE UP THE QUESTION OF TIMING OF A CONSULTATION AT THIS CABINET SESSION.

PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION PROPOSALS
---

11. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT A PEACE AND STABILITY B COMMISSION, SUCH AS PROPOSED BY XANANA AND OTHERS, COULD BE A KEY COMPONENT OF A PEACEFUL TRANSITION. HE SAW A COMMISSION, OR SOMETHING LIKE IT, SERVING AS A CONFLICT RESOLUTION BODY OPERATING FROM THE NATIONAL TO THE VILLAGE LEVEL. IT MIGHT ALSO COORDINATE THE DEVELOPMENT AND MONITORING OF AN INDIGENOUS POLICE FORCE WHICH WOULD BE NEUTRAL AND HAVE CREDIBILITY WITH ALL SIDES. HE NOTED THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAD ENDORSED THE CONCEPT OF A PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION AND AGREED TO PROVIDE FUNDS FOR SUCH A BODY.

12. (C) HE ADDED THERE WERE ALREADY SEVERAL COMPETING CONCEPTS AND EFFORTS IN THIS AREA. THE HUMAN RIGHTS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 00959 03 OF 05 280752Z
COMMISSION, PRINCIPALLY IN THE PERSON OF ITS EAST TIMORESE SECRETARY GENERAL CLEMENTINO DOS AMARAL, HAD SECURED THE SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT HABIBIE FOR ONE SUCH EFFORT, WHICH ALSO INCLUDES THREE OTHER COMMISSION MEMBERS PLUS FORMER EAST TIMORESE GOVERNOR MARIO CARRASCALAO AND GOI ROVING AMBASSADOR LOPEZ DA CRUZ.

[redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS FEBRUARY 26 THAT THIS COMMISSION HAD BEEN BLOCKED FROM GOING TO EAST TIMOR ON FEBRUARY 28 BY THE "UNITY AND JUSTICE FORUM" (MADE UP OF PRO-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE OFFICIALS) BUT WAS PLANNING TO GO IN WITH BISHOP BELO ON HIS MARCH 4-5 RETURN FROM AUSTRALIA.) B

13. (C) ANOTHER PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION APPROACH MIGHT GROW OUT OF THE DARE DIALOGUE FORMED BY BISHO BELO IN 1998 BUT WHICH HAD BEEN INACTIVE SINCE A SEPTEMBER EFFORT TO ORGANIZE A DIALOGUE AMONG EAST TIMORESE EMBRACING A WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS. [redacted] SAID THAT HE FELT THAT IN THE END THE CHURCH MIGHT BEST TAKE THE LEAD IN FORMING A STABILITY COMMISSION, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CONCEPT AND THE DARE FORMULA FOR RECONCILIATION MIGHT ULTIMATELY MERGE. HE ADDED THAT WHILE THE VATICAN WOULD LIKELY OBJECT TO THE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF THE TWO BISHOPS IN SUCH A COMMISSION, THEIR VICAR GENERALS MIGHT REPRESENT THE CHURCH (HE NOTED THAT BISHOP BELO'S VICAR GENERAL IN DILI, IN PARTICULAR, COULD BE A STRONG FORCE IN SUCH A BODY). B

14. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT A THIRD EFFORT TO FORMULATE AN EAST TIMORESE PEACE AN STABILITY COMMISSION WAS NOW B

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00959 03 OF 05 280752Z

BEGINNING UNDER TH LEADERSHIP OF EAST TIMOR GOVERNOR ABILIO OARES. THAT UNDERTAKING WAS INAUGURATED IN A MEETING OF PEOPLE FROM BOTH PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPINGS AND FROM THE MILITARY IN DILI ON FEBRUARY 24. [redacted] SAID THAT THE CNRT HAD EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE WITH THIS GROUP, POSSIBLY REFLECTING XANANA'S PERSPECTIVE THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ALL OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIALOGUE. B

[redacted] NOTED THAT ABRI, CONSIDERED BY XANANA AND OTHERS TO BE A VITAL COMPONENT OF ANY STABILITY UNDERTAKNG, WAS ASSOCIATING ITSELF WITH THIS ABILIO SORES GROUP. B

[redacted] WAS NONETHELESS SOMEWHAT DIMISSIVE OF THIS GROUP, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF GOVERNOR SOARES WHO APPEARED TO OCCUPY AN EVER-WEAKENING POLITICAL POSITION. B

15. (C) (VISITING POLOFF WAS PRESENT AT THIS GROUP'S INAUGURAL MEETING IN DILI ON FEBRUARY 24. WHILE RELUCTANT TO BOYCOTT THIS MEETING AND RISK BEING SEEN AS "ANTI-RECONCILIATION," PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS AND NGO'S

SAW THIS EFFORT BASICALLY AS AN ATTEMPT BY THE GOVERNOR, THE PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS AND ABRI TO GAIN CONTROL OVER THE "RECONCILIATION PROCESS" BY ESTABLISHING THEIR OWN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2290

PAGE 01 JAKART 00959 04 OF 05 280752Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/022W			

-----------A8B030 280752Z /38

O 280742Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6333
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SUVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00959 04 OF 05 280752Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 000959

BEIJING PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/03
TAGS: PREL, EAID, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID, PO, UN

SUBJECT: [redacted] ON STRATEGY/TACTICS AND SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR

FORUM AND DISPROPORTIONALLY STACKING IT WITH PRO-INTEGRATION TYPES.)

16. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT IN A FEBRUARY 25 MEETING WITH [redacted] HAD ATTEMPTED TO WIN [redacted] SUPPORT FOR A CONCEPT WHICH WOULD DIVIDE EAST TIMOR IN HALF. UNDER THIS PLAN, FOUR WESTERN DISTRICTS PLUS HALF OF DILI AND POSSIBLY THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LAUTEM WOULD REMAIN PART OF INDONESIA WHILE THE OTHER DISTRICTS WOULD SEPARATE. [redacted] SAID HE "MADE CLEAR" TO [redacted] THAT THIS IDEA WAS A "NON-STARTER."

SITUATION ON THE GROUND

17. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT INSECURITY ON THE GROUND WAS THE GRAVEST THREAT TO ANY CONSULTATION REGARDING THE EAST TIMORESE ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION OF THE AUTONOMY FORMULA. HE SAID THAT DURING HIS VISIT THIS PAST WEEK, THE SITUATION WAS VERY TENSE. [redacted] REPORTEDLY TOLD [redacted] THAT ABRI ARMING OF MILITIAS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 00959 04 OF 05 280752Z

WAS "CRAZY." [redacted] REJECTED THE ABRI CONTENTION THAT THE ONLY ELEMENTS BEING ARMED BY ABRI IN EAST TIMOR WERE THE "WANRA AND KAMRA," (ADJUNCT MILITARY AND POLICE SUPPORT PERSONNEL WHO ARE NOT ARMED WITH LETHAL WEAPONS). [redacted] POINTED SPECIFICALLY TO THE "MAHIDI" GROUP AS ARMED WITH LETHAL WEAPONS AND AS DESTABILIZING THE SITUATION. [redacted] ADDED THAT "THERE IS NOT DOUBT THAT ABRI IS GIVING ARMS TO CANCIO (THE MAHIDI COMMANDER)." (NOTE: CONTACTS WHO MET WITH POLOFF WHO VISITED EAST TIMOR FEBRUARY 22-26 CONFIRMED THESE POINTS AND ECHOED [redacted] IN CLAIMING GROWING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE POLICE AND THE MILITARY, SEPTEL.)

18. (C) [redacted] COMPLAINED THAT THE MILITARY IS ALSO ACTIVELY SEEKING TO DISRUPT EFFORTS TO PROMOTE GENUINE DIALOGUE AMONG EAST TIMORESE. HE SAID THAT ONE MILITIA COMMANDER WHO HAD BEEN GIVEN ARMS BY ABRI RECENTLY WAS "SIDELINED" BECAUSE HE HAD BEGUN TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE.

19. (C) IN A CONVERSATION DURING THE PAST WEEK WITH THE ABRI REGIONAL COMMANDER IN DENPASAR, THE LATTER PROPOSED THAT ABRI WOULD DISARM BOTH THE CIVILIAN MILITIAS AND THE FALINTIL RESISTANCE. [redacted] REJECTED THIS, TELLING THE COMMANDER THAT THE PROBLEM OF THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ABRI AND THE ARMED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE MUST BE SEEN AS SEPARATE FROM "ARMED MILITIA GROUPS RUNNING AMUCK." TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF ABRI ARMING OF CIVILIAN MILITAS, [redacted] SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO "FIND WAYS TO PUT PRESSURE ON ABRI THAT B B

CONFIDENTIAL

ABRI ITSELF WILL FEEL." IT WOULD DO NO GOOD SIMPLY TO EXERT MORE PRESSURE ON THE INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY.

20. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT XANANA HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE AGREED WITH THE IDEA OF A CEASEFIRE (PERHAPS UNDER A DIFFERENT NAME, AS THAT IS OBJECTED TO BY ABRI). XANANA REPORTEDLY ACCEPTED A FORMULA SUGGESTED HYPOTHETICALLY BY [redacted] THAT ABRI BE CONFINED TO BARRACKS AND THAT A WITHDRAWAL WOULD BEGIN. FOR ITS PART, UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT, FALINTIL WOULD AGREE TO "CANTONMENT" AWAY FROM LARGE POPULATION CENTERS. B B

21. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT ON FEBRUARY 26 HE MET WITH THE PRO-INTEGRATION GROUP "THE UNITY AND JUSTICE FRONT," WHICH COMPRISES ARMINDO MARIANO, THE SPEAKER OF THE LOCAL PARLIAMENT, MILITIA LEADER ENRICO GUTEREZ, THE DILI DISTRICT CHIEF AND SEVERAL OTHER DISTRICT CHIEFS. THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED BY MAHIDI CHIEF CANCIO CARVALHO. THE GROUP, WHICH WAS JAKARTA BOUND, TOLD [redacted] THAT "WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN DIALOGUE, WE ARE INTERESTED IN GUNS. WE ARE GOING TO FIGHT." [redacted] DESCRIBED THE PRO-AUTONOMY (PRO-INTEGRATION) EFFORT NOW BEING CONDUCTED BY SOME EAST TIMORESE AS "WELL-OILED AND WELL- B B

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2291

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01

PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00
TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /022W
----------A8B033 280753Z /38

O 280742Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6334
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SUVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00959 05 OF 05 280752Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 000959

BEIJING PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/03
TAGS: PREL, EAID, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: [redacted]ON STRATEGY/TACTICS AND SITUATION ON B
THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR

FUNDED." (COMMENT: ELEMENTS OF THE GOI AND ABRI OBVIOUSLY ARE FUNDING THIS GROUP AND PROMOTING ITS SUPPOSED ABILITY TO WAGE "CIVIL WAR." THE GROUP RECENTLY THREATENED TO KILL AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATS AND JOURNALISTS IN EAST TIMOR, PROMPTING A WITHDRAWAL OF EIGHT PERSONNEL FROM EAST TIMOR. DURING A FEBRUARY 22-25 VISIT TO EAST TIMOR (REPORTED SEPTEL), HOWEVER, POLOFF'S MOST CREDIBLE SOURCES EXPRESSED DOUBTS THAT THIS RELATIVELY SMALL GROUP OF PRO-INTEGRATION GOI CIVIL SERVANTS COULD SURVIVE FOR LONG WITHOUT BACKING FROM THE MILITARY. END COMMENT.)

A UN PRESENCE

22. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT A UN PRESENCE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED SOON TO UNDERTAKE THE CONSULTATION AMONG THE EAST TIMORESE ABOUT AUTONOMY. HE ENVISAGED ULTIMATELY THAT A UN PRESENCE WOULD HAVE THREE COMPONENTS. THERE WOULD BE A POLITICAL COMPONENT WHICH WOULD CARRY OUT THE CONSULTATION, BUT ALSO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMANITARIAN B

AFFAIRS. THIS LATTER RESPONSIBILITY WOULD REQUIRE MONITORS, ALTHOUGH [redacted] WAS AWARE OF GOI SENSITIVITY ABOUT UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING EFFORTS. "THIS WILL HAVE TO BE PACKAGED RIGHT." B

23. (C) A SECOND FUNCTION OF A UN PRESENCE WOULD BE IN THE SECURITY AREA AND WOULD ENTAIL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING THE DEVELOPMENT AND WORK OF AN INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCE. FINALLY, THE UN PRESENCE WOULD ALSO EMBRACE A HUMANITARIAN RESPONSIBILITY, ESSENTIALLY, ENSURING THE AVAILABILITY OF CRITICAL SUPPLIES AND TECHNICAL SERVICES.

THE CONSULTATION MECHANISM

24. (C) [redacted] ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UN WAS STILL SEARCHING FOR A FORMULA THAT MET GOI INSISTENCE THAT THERE BE NO "ONE-MAN-ONE VOTE REFERENDUM" BUT WHICH WAS NONETHELESS SEEN AS BROADLY CREDIBLE. HE PORTRAYED THE EXERCISE AS "CREDIBLY RECORDING A RESULT THAT IS ALREADY KNOWN." ALTHOUGH A SIMPLE TASK, IT WAS NONETHELESS THE KEY STEP IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSITION AND WAS AT THE SAME TIME VULNERABLE TO DISRUPTION TO FORCES DETERMINED TO STOP THE PROCESS. B

25. (C) [redacted] NOTED (PER REFTEL) THE IDEA OF A COUNCIL'S FORMATION THROUGH AN ELECTIVE PROCESS BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THE DANGER THAT EVEN ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES COULD FALL UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM VARIOUS SIDES. [redacted] RECALLED THE B

CANADIAN EXPERIENCE IN QUEBEC IN WHICH COMPETING PANELS ADVOCATED FOR SEPARATION AND FOR UNITY DEBATE BEFORE

PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES. POLCOUNS NOTED THAT A UN TEAM COULD BE CHARGED WITH MONITORING THESE DISCUSSIONS AND PARTICULARLY THE REACTION OF THE PEOPLE -- AS A BASIS FOR ITS SURVEY OF POPULAR OPINION. HE ADDED THAT THE CHURCH MIGHT TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ORGANIZING SUCH GATHERINGS SO AS TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF STACKING OF PARTICIPANTS AND OF VIOLENCE. [redacted] B
[redacted] B

26. (C) [redacted] EMPHASIZED THAT THE REJECTION OF B
AUTONOMY WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE. IN HIS VIEW, IT WOULD MERELY SET IN MOTION A PROCESS OF MUCH GREATER INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT, THE LESSENING OF INDONESIAN INVOLVEMENT AND THE REVERSION OF EAST TIMOR TO ITS PRE-DECEMBER 7, 1975 STATUS. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART01058

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

Channel: n/a

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0996

E7

PAGE 01 JAKART 01058 01 OF 04 031201Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/023W		

----------AA03C0 031201Z /38

O 031140Z MAR 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6428
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SUVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 2 MAR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 20 JUL 2004 200300722

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01058 01 OF 04 031201Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 001058

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/03
TAGS: PREL, EAID, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: CONSULTATION, SECURITY AND RECONCILIATION IN EAST TIMOR

REF: JAKARTA 991

1. CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON, 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (SBU) THE FOLLOWING PROVIDES EMBASSY PERSPECTIVE ON THE STATE OF PLAY REGARDING A SERIES OF KEY ISSUES RELATED TO EAST TIMOR. WE WILL BE PURSUING THESE QUESTIONS IN COMING WEEKS AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF A RAPIDLY EVOLVING SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR (SEE SEPTEL).

TWO-TIERED, ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE PROCESS LOOKS LIKELY

3. (C) ON MARCH 10, UNSYG REP MARKER IS EXPECTED TO PROPOSE TO MINISTERS GAMA AND ALATAS A CONSULTATION MECHANISM FOR DETERMINING THE PREFERENCE OF THE EAST TIMORESE REGARDING THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE TO BE FINALIZED MARCH 11. [redacted] HERE TELLS US THAT THIS B
MECHANISM WILL INVOLVE ELECTING, ON A ONE PERSON, ONE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01058 01 OF 04 031201Z

VOTE BASIS, AN ASSEMBLY, WHICH WILL THEN TAKE UP THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL. WHILE PORTUGAL SEES SUCH A TWO-TIER PROCEDURE AS SUFFICIENTLY DEMOCRATIC, [redacted] B
STRESSED THAT ANYTHING LESS THAN A ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE EXERCISE (SUCH AS "EXPANDED CONSULTATIONS" ONLY) WOULD VIOLATE PORTUGAL'S OWN CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR TRUE SELF-DETERMINATION IN EAST TIMOR.

WILL THE GOI GO ALONG?

4. (C) WILL THE INDONESIANS ACCEPT THE UN PLAN? ALATAS HAS INDICATED TO US THAT HE IS AMENABLE TO ANY PROPOSAL SHORT OF A FULL-FLEDGED "REFERENDUM," EVEN IF IT INVOLVES BALLOTING. INFLUENTIAL HABIBIE ADVISOR DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR HAS ALREADY INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO GO ALONG WITH ANY VOTING PROCEDURE NOT LABELLED A "REFERENDUM." [redacted] B

[redacted] TOLD US MARCH 3 THAT ONLY A ONE MAN, ONE VOTE APPROACH COULD BE CREDIBLE. ANYTHING LESS COULD BE TOO EASILY ENGINEERED. HABIBIE IS CONSISTENTLY CONVEYING A DESIRE TO BE RID OF THE EAST TIMOR PROBLEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND MAKING CLEAR HIS DESIRE THAT THE SOLUTION

BE ONE WHICH DOES NOT ENTAIL ANY FURTHER GOI EXPENDITURES IN THE TERRITORY, I.E., A TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE FINANCED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. (IN A MARCH 2 MEETING WITH [redacted] B HABIBIE STRONGLY REITERATED HIS INSISTENCE THAT INDONESIA BE RELIEVED OF THE BURDEN OF EAST TIMOR BY JANUARY 1, 2000.) GIVEN HABIBIE'S RELATIVELY WEAK

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01058 01 OF 04 031201Z
POSITION, WE CAN NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT OTHER FORCES, I.E., WITHIN ABRI, COULD COMPEL HABIBIE TO RETURN TO A HARDLINE POSITION ON THIS ISSUE, BUT AT PRESENT WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS FROM THE MAJOR PLAYERS THAT THIS IS IN THE CARDS.

CAN UNRECONCILED ELEMENTS ACT AS SPOILERS?
---

5. (C) FOR THEIR PART, BASED ON A CANVASSING OF VIEWS DURING A RECENT VISIT TO EAST TIMOR, THE ANTI-AUTONOMY, PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE HAVE LITTLE INTEREST IN THE SHAPE OF A CONSULTATION PROCESS. THEY APPEAR CONCERNED ONLY THAT IT BE FAIR AND ASSUME THAT A FAIR RESULT WILL INDICATE THE SIGNIFICANT MAJORITY OPINION THEY BELIEVE THEY REPRESENT. IF ALL SIDES ACCEPT THE UN-PROPOSED TWO-TIER VOTE, WE WILL THEN FACE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER POTENTIAL SPOILERS IN THE PROCESS, SUCH AS THE PRO-INTEGRATION CIVILIAN MILITIAS, AND THEIR ALLIES AMONG THE MURKY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE FORCES, WILL HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DISRUPT THE VOTE.

MILITIA STRENGTH SHOULD NOT BE OVERESTIMATED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1339

PAGE 01 JAKART 01058 02 OF 04 031337Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/023W		

----------AA10D3 031337Z /38

O 311140Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6429
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
INFO ASSOCITION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBAQSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4420Q
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSIONGENEVA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SUVA
AMEMBASSY LONDN
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AQEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0064

AMEMBASSY BONN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01058 02 OF 04 031337Z
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 001058

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/03
TAGS: PREL, EAID, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: CONSULTATION, SECURITY AND RECONCILIATION IN EAST TIMOR

---

6. (C) WE WOULD CAUTION AGAINST OVERESTIMATING THE STRENGTH AND POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THESE GROUPS. POLOFF'S FEBRUARY 22-25 OBSERVATIONS ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR AND DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH EAST TIMORESE AND RESIDENT EXPAT OBSERVERS THERE UNDERSCORE THAT THE NUMBER OF ARMED ANTI-INDEPENDENCE PERSONNEL IS RELATIVELY SMALL, PROBABLY NUMBERING IN THE VERY LOW HUNDREDS. THEY ARE MAINLY CONCENTRATED IN A FEW SPECIFIC AREAS NEAR EAST TIMOR'S WESTERN BORDER. XANANA HIMSELF, IN A MARCH 2 MEETING WITH [redacted] EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM WHICH COULD BE SOLVED,

B

ESPECIALLY IF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (SGI) UNITS WERE REMOVED FROM EAST TIMOR. [redacted] B

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01058 02 OF 04 031337Z

7. (C) WHILE THESE GROUPS ARE NOT LARGE, THE RECENT EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR SHOW THAT RELATIVELY FEW ARMED ELEMENTS, WHEN SUPPORTED BY OR AT LEAST PERMITTED TO OPERATE BY ABRI, CAN CREATE SIGNIFICANT TENSION. THE PUBLIC THREATS AGAINST AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATS AND JOURNALISTS IN EAST TIMOR MADE BY TWO OF THESE GROUPS, WHICH HAVE CLEAR TIES TO ABRI, SUGGEST THAT UN WORKERS ATTEMPTING TO CONDUCT A BALLOTING OR EVEN A CONSULTATION COULD FACE A SECURITY PROBLEM. EVEN THE PROSPECT OF SUCH THREATS COULD DAMPEN INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN SUPPORTING THE UN EFFORT WITH PERSONNEL AND COULD GENERATE CALLS FOR AN ARMED UN DEFENSE PRESENCE OR PKO.

ABRI IS THE KEY

8. (C) AGAIN, ABRI'S ATTITUDE IS THE KEY FACTOR. THESE CIVILIAN MILITIAS ARE HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON ABRI UNITS FOR SHELTER, TRANSPORT AND PROBABLY AMMUNITION. IN MID-1998, UNDER U.S. AND OTHER PRESSURE, ABRI DISARMED MEMBERS OF THE NOTORIOUS GADA PAKSI MILITIA, WHICH NUMBERED NO FEWER THAN 100 AND PROBABLY NO MORE THAN SEVERAL HUNDRED. DISARMING THE CLAN-BASED CIVILIAN MILITIAS NOW ACTIVE IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS WOULD BE MORE COMPLICATED, GIVEN THAT THE LEADERS OF THESE GROUPS ARE STRONGLY MOTIVATED BY DESIRES TO PROTECT THEIR WEALTH AND FEARS OF RETRIBUTION BY THE MAJORITY PRO-INDEPENDENCE POPULATION. NEVERTHELESS, OUR MOST TRUSTED CONTACTS IN EAST TIMOR STRESS THAT IF ABRI REALLY WANTS TO REIGN IN THESE GROUPS THEY CERTAINLY HAVE THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01058 02 OF 04 031337Z

CAPABILITY TO DO IT, AND IDEALLY ABRI, RATHER THAN A PKO FORCE, SHOULD ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY. AT A MINIMUM, HOWEVER, XANANA AND OTHERS ARGUE THAT A SMALL UN SECURITY FORCE SHOULD BE INJECTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN TO KEEP ABRI (AND THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE) HONEST IN REGARD TO ANY COMMITMENTS TO DISARM. [redacted] WAS OF A SIMILAR VIEW B

IN OUR TALKS WITH HIM OVER THE WEEKEND. THUS FAR, HOWEVER, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO CONSIDER SUCH A STEP AT THIS STAGE, VIEWING IT AS AN UNACCEPTABLE INFRINGEMENT OF INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY.

9. (C) GIVEN THE VULNERABILITY OF THE PROCESS TO A SINGLE ASSAULT AGAINST AN UN OFFICER, IT WOULD SEEM NECESSARY TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK POSED BY THE ARMED ELEMENTS BEFORE THE PROCESS BEGAN -- BY PRESSING FOR DISARMAMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE GOAL OF PRECLUDING A RELATIVELY FEW HARDLINERS FROM EXERCISING A VETO OR PROTRACTED DELAY OF THE PROCESS SHOULD NOT BE MADE A SINE QUA NON FOR THE CONSULTATION PROCESS TO BEGIN. THE PROCESS SHOULD NOT BE HOSTAGE TO THE DISARMING OF THE MILITIAS.

10. (C) IN SHORT, IT MAY BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF HARDLINE PRO-INTEGRATION ELEMENTS TO GENERATE CONCERN ABOUT INSTABILITY (CLEARLY THE ABRI MESSAGE TO VISITING JOURNALISTS RECENTLY HAS BEEN AIMED AT CREATING THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0970

PAGE 01 JAKART 01058 03 OF 04 031152Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/022W		

----------AA02F5 031152Z /38

O 031140Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6430
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SUVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01058 03 OF 04 031152Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 001058

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/03
TAGS: PREL, EAID, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: CONSULTATION, SECURITY AND RECONCILIATION IN EAST TIMOR

IMPRESSION OF A PROTO-CIVIL WAR ENVIRONMENT) TO DELAY THE PROCESS. IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER. THAT THE THREAT BE PERCEIVED OBJECTIVELY AND THAT THE UN AND ITS SUPPORTERS NOT BE STAMPEDED INTO A COSTLY, TIME CONSUMING EFFORT TO DISARM THE CIVILIAN MILITIAS.

HOW COULD EXILES VOTE?
---

11. (C) IF THERE WERE AGREEMENT FOR A BALLOTING PROCEDURE, VOTING IN THE DIASPORA MIGHT BE CONDUCTED VIA UN OFFICES ABROAD, A PROCESS SIMILAR TO THAT EMPLOYED IN INDONESIAN GENERAL ELECTIONS WHEREIN INDONESIAN CITIZENS ABROAD VOTE AT INDONESIAN EMBASSIES. ACCORDING TO A PORTUGUESE DIPLOMAT HERE, THE EAST TIMORESE DIASPORA IS ACTUALLY RELATIVELY SMALL, NO MORE THAN 20,000 PEOPLE, 15,000 OF WHOM ARE IN AUSTRALIA AND MOST OF THE REST IN PORTUGAL. XANANA GUSMAO HAS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF TRANSMIGRANT VOTING BY SUGGESTING (TO THE UN) THAT THERE BE A REQUIREMENT THAT VOTERS EITHER MUST HAVE BEEN BORN IN EAST TIMOR, HAVE ONE EAST TIMORESE PARENT OR HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01058 03 OF 04 031152Z
LIVED IN EAST TIMOR FOR A GIVEN PERIOD OF TIME (GUSMAO MENTIONED NINE YEARS IN A RECENT DISCUSSION WITH [redacted] B1

COULD ALL THIS BE DONE IN THREE MONTHS?

12. (C) FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT, IT IS NOT EASY TO JUDGE WHETHER THE UN COULD HAVE ALL THE ARRANGEMENTS IN PLACE TO CONDUCT A VOTING PROCESS IN EAST TIMOR BEFORE THE INDONESIAN ELECTION ON JUNE 7. WE WOULD ONLY EMPHASIZE THAT HABIBIE'S CIRCLE AND ALATAS ARE EXTREMELY ANXIOUS TO GET THIS DECISION OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE JUNE, WHILE OTHERS, ESPECIALLY IN THE MILITARY, WOULD BE MORE PRONE TO DELAY THE PROCESS. THE LOGISTICS ON THE INDONESIAN SIDE OF COURSE WOULD BE DAUNTING BUT THE GOI IS PRESUMABLY PREPARING FOR A PROVINCE-WIDE VOQIMOR IN JUNE IN ANY CASE.

PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION

13. (C) IF IT WERE UP AND RUNNING, AND IF IT HAD AN ACTIVE ABRI COMPONENT, THE "PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION," NOW IN NEBULOUS STATUS, COULD PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE, POSSIBLY ACTING IN SOME MONITORING CAPACITY TO ENSURE THAT ARMED ELEMENTS WERE IN FACT DISARMED AND DISBANDED. LOGICALLY, UN OFFICE SECURITY PERSONNEL WOULD WISH TO MONITOR THIS PROCESS AS WELL.
14. (C) THE CONCEPT OF A "PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION" WON THE SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT HABIBIE WHO EVEN OFFERED FUNDING TO THE VENTURE PROPOSED BY HUMAN

CONFIDENTIAL

RIGHTS COMMISSION SECRETARY GENERAL CLEMENTINO DOS AMARAL. HOWEVER, THE ORGANIZATION HAS NOT BEEN FORMALLY CONSTITUTED. [redacted] B1
[redacted] MEMBERS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WILL GO TO DILI ON MARCH 7 TO BE "FACILITATORS" AT A 50-PERSON ROUNDTABLE TO BE CONVENED BY THE CHURCH. THE MEETING, WHICH WILL INCLUDE ALL EAST TIMORESE FACTIONS, ABRI, THE CHURCH, STUDENTS AND NGO REPRESENTATIVES, IS TO ADDRESS FOUR KEY ISSUES: ENDING CLASHES AMONG EAST TIMORESE; "AVOIDING" AN EXODUS OF SKILLED NON-EAST TIMORESE; ENDING ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY, AND ABRI'S DISARMING OF CIVILIAN MILITIAS.

15. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN, FORMER EAST TIMOR GOVERNOR MARIO CARRASCALAO AND FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL LOPEZ DA CRUZ ARE ALL TO JOIN IN THE ROUNDTABLE. [redacted] B1
BELIEVES THAT SUCH A BODY COULD MEET REPEATEDLY,

EMERGING POSSIBLY AS A VERSION OF A PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION. [redacted] ADMITTED CANDIDLY THAT ACHIEVING SUCH A GATHERING AND CATALYZING SUFFICIENT COOPERATION TO ADDRESS THE FOUR TASKS HE IDENTIFIED WOULD BE

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0971

PAGE 01 JAKART 01058 04 OF 04 031152Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/022W			

----------AA02F7 031152Z /38

O 031140Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6431
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SUVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01058 04 OF 04 031152Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 001058

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/03

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

TAGS: PREL, EAID, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: CONSULTATION, SECURITY AND RECONCILIATION IN EAST TIMOR

IMPOSSIBLE ABSENT GOOD WILL ON THE PART OF ALL PARTICIPANTS -- WHICH HE SAID IN THE CASE OF ABRI AND THE PRO-AUTONOMY GROUPS WAS NOT LIKELY.

16. (C) [redacted] EARLIER TOLD US THAT HARD LINE PRO-AUTONOMY CIVIL SERVANTS, GROUPED IN THE "FORUM FOR UNITY AND JUSTICE" HAVE, WITH ABRI BACKING, DELAYED THE COMMISSION'S FIRST MISSION TO EAST TIMOR. THE COMMISSION NOW PLANS TO AWAIT BISHOP BELO'S MARCH 8 RETURN TO EAST TIMOR. AFTER INTERRUPTING A DISCUSSION WITH US MARCH 3 TO TAKE A CALL FROM [redacted] TO DISCUSS THE AGENDA FOR THE DILI ROUNDTABLE, [redacted] RETURNED WITH A SIGH SAYING "I'M SURE HE IS AGAINST US TOO." B1 B1 B1
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

PAGE 01 JAKART 01682 051029Z
ACTION IO-00

E10

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/022W		

----------B7B264 051029Z /38

P 051011Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7027
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001682

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/05/09
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: VIOLENCE IN LIQICA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. A PRO-INTEGRATION CIVILIAN MILITIA CLASHED WITH LOCAL RESIDENTS OF LIQICA ON APRIL 5 WITH SEVERAL PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01682 051029Z
REPORTEDLY KILLED AND INJURED. ACCORDING TO [redacted] B1
[redacted] GAVE THE GREEN LIGHT TO HIS SUPPORTERS TO CONFRONT THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH COULD HERALD A LESS-RESTRAINED APPROACH ON THE PART OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE. [redacted] B1
[redacted] THREATENED TO RESUME GUERRILLA WARFARE AND CALL FOR POPULAR INSURRECTION IF THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) ON APRIL 5 EMBASSY SOURCES REPORTED FIGHTING IN THE LIQICA

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2004 200300722

AREA BETWEEN THE PRO-INTEGRATION "BESI MERAH PUTIH" (RED AND WHITE IRON) CIVILIAN MILITIA FORCE AND LOCAL PRO-INDEPENDENCE RESIDENTS. [redacted] B1
THAT HE WAS STOPPED ON THE ROAD BY THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (ABRI) BETWEEN THE WEST TIMOR BORDER AND MAUBARA AND COMPELLED TO WAIT FOR TWO HOURS. AFTER BEING ALLOWED TO PROCEED, HE DROVE THROUGH ABOUT 300 BESIH MERAH PUTIH PERSONNEL ARMED WITH SHARP WEAPONS. FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD, HE OBSERVED ANOTHER GROUP OF ROUGHLY EQUAL SIZE CONSISTING OF LOCAL PRO-INDEPENDENCE RESIDENTS. HE REPORTED THAT BOTH GROUPS WERE HIGHLY EXCITED AND THREW STONES AT HIS CAR, WHICH WAS SEVERELY DAMAGED. AFTER PASSING THE SECOND GROUP, HE OBSERVED A SECOND ABRI CHECKPOINT BETWEEN LIQICA AND DILI. ACCORDING TO [redacted] ABRI PERSONNEL TOLD HIM THEY WERE TAKING A HANDS-OFF APPROACH TO THIS CONFLICT. B1

4. (C) IN AN APRIL 5 MEETING WITH POLOFF, [redacted] B1
[redacted] MAINTAINED THAT LOCAL ABRI FORCES HAD SUPPORTED A BESI MARAH PUTIH ATTACK ON THE LIQICA AREA AND THAT THE LOCAL RESIDENTS HAD APPEALED TO XANANA TO SUSPEND HIS POLICY OF RESTRAINT AND PERMIT THEM TO RESPOND FORCEFULLY TO THE PRO-

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01682 051029Z

INTEGRATION FORCES. XANANA'S CNRT (EAST TIMOR NATIONAL RESISTANCE FRONT) IS REPORTING THAT THREE INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS WERE KILLED AND 8 WOUNDED IN THE CONFLICT. [redacted] SUGGESTED THAT [redacted] DECISION TO ALLOW THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS TO RESPOND TO THIS "PROVOCATION" COULD HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS, SINCE IT REPRESENTS THE FIRST INSTANCE IN WHICH [redacted] HAS AGREED TO AN EXCEPTION IN HIS POLICY OF RESTRAINING HIS FOLLOWERS FROM MOBILIZING TO CONFRONT THE PRO-INTEGRATION SIDE. B1 B1 B1

5. (C) THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORE AGGRESSIVE STANCE ON THE PART OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES WAS ALSO RAISED [redacted] SHARPLY CRITICIZED RECENT STATMENTS BY REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER ADAM DAMIRI (WHO, ACCORDING TO APRIL 5 PRESS REPORTS, CRITICIZED [redacted] FOR CALLING FOR A UN FORCE IN EAST TIMOR) AND THREATENED THAT "THE MORE UNCONTROLLABLE THE SITUATION BECOMES IN EAST TIMOR, THE FASTER I WILL TAKE THE DECISION TO ANNOUNCE THE RESUMPTION OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AND GENERAL POPULAR INSURRECTION AGAINST THE ARMED MILITIA GROUPS WHO HAVE BEEN KILLING THE POPULATION WITH IMPUNITY UNDER THE INDIFFERENT EYES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY." B1 B1

6. (C) COMMENT: THE HIGH TENSION IN THE MAUBARA/LIQICA AREA IS NOTHING NEW; THE PRO-INTEGRATION CIVILIAN MILITIAS HAVE BEEN

ACTIVE IN THE AREA FOR THE PAST THREE MONTHS. THIS IS THE FIRST INSTANCE, HOWEVER, IN WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN CONFRONTED WITH A SIGNIFICANT FORCE ON THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE VIOLENCE HAS SPREAD BEYOND THIS RELATIVELY LIMITED AREA. END COMMENT.
OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01682 051029Z

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

SECRET PTQ8562

E12

PAGE 01 JAKART 01740 01 OF 04 071011Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W	

----------B8A216 071019Z /38

P 070952Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7095
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 001740

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/07/09
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PINR, MARR, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW FROM A LISBON-BASED OPERATIVE

REF: JAKARTA 1558

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 01740 01 OF 04 071011Z
REASON:1.5 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY
---

2. (S) IN A RECENT MEETING WITH POLOFF, A LISBON-BASED CNRT OPERATIVE PRESENTED A MORE NUANCED ANALYSIS OF THE EAST TIMOR SITUATION THAN THAT PROJECTED IN THE RECENT STATEMENTS OF EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO AND OTHER CNRT SPOKESMEN. HE WAS LARGELY DISMISSIVE OF ANY LONG TERM THREAT POSED BY PRO-INTEGRATION CIVILIAN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 6 APR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2004 200300722

MILITIAS, AND MAINTAINED THAT THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE WAS IN THE PROCESS OF CO-OPTING THE MAJORITY OF EAST TIMORESE MEMBERS OF THE ARMY AND POLICE, AS WELL AS THOSE IN THE MORE ESTABLISHED MILITIA GROUPS. HE EXPRESSED SOME UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRESSURES ON THE PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS, AND STRESSED THE NECESSITY OF GUARANTEEING AMNESTY FOR BOTH THE GUERRILLAS AND THOSE WHO HAD COOPERATED WITH JAKARTA. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME ON THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE WERE COMMITTING ABUSES AND NEEDLESSLY PROVOKING THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS. THIS OPERATIVE STATED FLATLY THAT AS LONG AS ABRI REMAINED IN EAST TIMOR, EVEN IF CONFINED TO BARRACKS, THE GUERRILLAS AND THEIR FAMILIES WOULD NOT RISK COMING DOWN FROM THE HILLS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONSULTATION. IN CONTRAST TO XANANA'S RECENT STATEMENTS, HOWEVER, HE ARGUED THAT A UN POLICE FORCE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN ORDER. END SUMMARY.

SECRET

PAGE 03 JAKART 01740 01 OF 04 071011Z
A LOW PROFILE

[redacted] B1

"95 PER CENT FOR INDEPENDENCE"
---

4. (S) IN A MARCH 30 MEETING WITH POLOFF, [redacted] B1 SAID HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM HIS MOST RECENT TRIP TO DILI, AND RECALLED THAT HE HAD SPENT MOST OF DECEMBER THERE, TRAVELING TO ALL 13 DISTRICTS TO

EVALUATE THE SITUATION. HE ADAMANTLY MAINTAINED THAT A THOROUGH SURVEY BASED ON REPORTS FROM LOCAL PRIESTS HAD FOUND THAT "95 PERCENT" OF EAST TIMORESE BACKED INDEPENDENCE. HE ADDED THAT IF INDONESIAN INTELLIGENCE (BAKIN) ATTEMPTED TO BUY VOTES (HE

SECRET

PAGE 04 JAKART 01740 01 OF 04 071011Z
BELIEVED THAT SUCH AN EFFORT WAS ALREADY UNDERWAY) OR OTHERWISE SUBVERT THE CONSULTATION PROCESS TO OBTAIN A PRO-AUTONOMY OUTCOME, THE RESULT WOULD BE "DISASTER," I.E., THERE WOULD BE A VIOLENT REACTION FROM THE POPULATION. HE ALSO SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE NOT TAKE PLACE IN EAST TIMOR, BECAUSE HOLDING SUCH AN ELECTION SO CLOSE TO A VOTE ON THE AUTONOMY OFFER WOULD "CONFUSE" THE EAST TIMORESE ELECTORATE.
[redacted] STRESSED THAT UNTIL NOW THE CNRT HAD USED ONLY ONE OF ITS "FOUR FORCES" (I.E. THE GUERRILLAS) AND THAT IF THE CURRENT INDOESIAN GOVERNMENT OR ANY NEWLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTED TO REVERSE COURSE ON EAST TIMOR, THE OTHER THREE FORCES WOULD BE UNLEASHED. HE WOULD NOT SPECIFY WHAT THESE OTHER FORCES ENTAILED. B1

CO-OPTING EAST TIMORESE IN ABRI

5. (S) [redacted] MAINTAINED THAT THE CNRT HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT INROADS IN WINNING OVER EAST TIMORESE MEMBERS OF ABRI AND THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MORE ESTABLISHED EAST TIMORESE MILITIA GROUPS OPERATING UNDER ABRI AUSPICES. ACCORDING TO HIM, WHILE ABRI HAD OFFERED ITS EAST TIMORESE MEMBERS THE OPTION OF B1

SECRET

SECRET PTQ8563

PAGE 01 JAKART 01740 02 OF 04 071012Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W		

----------B8A21B 071019Z /38

P 070952Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7096
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 001740

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/07/09
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PINR, MARR, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW FROM A LISBON-BASED OPERATIVE

MOVING TO ANOTHER PROVINCE IN INDONESIA AFTER INDEPENDENCE, THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE EAST TIMORESE SOLDIERS HAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO STAY AT HOME, AND

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 01740 02 OF 04 071012Z

THEREFORE WISHED TO COME TO AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE. [redacted] B1

[redacted] MAINTAINED THAT CNRT EVEN HAD DEVELOPED GOOD RELATIONSHIPS WITH A NUMBER OF INDONESIAN OFFICERS OF ABRI, INCLUDING A MAJOR BASED IN DILI, WHO, DURING [redacted] MOST RECENT VISIT, HAD B1 PROVIDED TRANSPORT FOR HIM TO VISIT GUERRILLA LEADER MATAN RUAK.

OLDER MILITIAS COOPERATING

6. (S) [redacted] SAID CNRT HAD ESTABLISHED A GOOD B1 RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EAST TIMORESE MILITIAS OPERATING IN THE EASTERN PART OF THE PROVINCE, INCLUDING TEAM SAKA, TEAM SERA, AND TEAM ALFA. HE SPECIFICALLY OBSERVED THAT [redacted] HAD B1 PROVIDED VALUABLE ASSISTANCE TO THE CNRT IN IDENTIFYING THOSE EAST TIMORESE WHO WERE WORKING FOR INDONESIAN INTELLIGENCE. HE CONCEDED THAT THE CNRT WAS STILL ENCOUNTERING PROBLEMS IN LOS PALOS, WHERE [redacted] WAS A PRO-INTEGRATION HARDLINER B1 LINKED TO PRABOWO, BUT MAINTAINED THAT "WE CAN HANDLE THAT SITUATION."

7. (S) (COMMENT. DURING A RECENT VISIT TO EAST TIMOR, POLOFF HEARD SIMILAR REPORTS OF A "DEAL" BETWEEN CNRT AND THE EAST TIMORESE MILITIAS, TEAM SERA AND TEAM SAKA, BASED AROUND BAUCAU. [redacted] B1

[redacted]

END COMMENT.)

PRO-INDEPENDENCE YOUTH AROUSE ANGER

8. (S) [redacted] WAS NOT PARTICULARLY ALARMED BY THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RECENTLY FORMED PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA GROUPS NOW SUPPOSEDLY UNDER THE OVERALL COMMAND OF JOAO TAVERES (THIS DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE BEFORE THE APRIL 5-6 VIOLENCE IN LIQUISA). [redacted] SAID TAVERES' CLAIMS OF COMMANDING A FORCE OF 5000 MEN WERE COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED. HE MAINTAINED THAT MANY "FIGHTERS" ATTENDING TAVERES' "INSTALLATION" AS MILITIA COMMANDER IN BALIBO WERE ACTUALLY RESIDENTS OF ATAMBUA IN WEST TIMOR WHO HAD BEEN TRUCKED IN FOR THE OCCASION. HE SAID TAVERES, AS A FORMER MEMBER OF THE UDT (THE TIMORESE DEMOCRATIC UNION), WAS NOT NECESSARILY OPPOSED TO INDEPENDENCE, BUT HAD BEEN INSULTED WHEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE STUDENT ACTIVISTS ENTERED HIS BOBONARO FIEFDOM LATE LAST YEAR AND MADE VARIOUS PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS AGAINST HIM. [redacted] ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PROVOCATIVE ACTIVITIES OF SOME OF THE MORE YOUTHFUL AND EMOTIONAL INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO RISE OF THE CIVILIAN PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS IN THE WESTERN B1 B1 B1

DISTRICTS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT GUERRILLA COMMANDER MATAN RUAK HAD ORDERED THE "ARREST" OF ANY PRO-INDEPENDENCE GUERRILLAS OR ACTIVISTS WHO WERE INVOLVED IN KILLINGS OR "CONFISCATIONS" OF PROPERTY.

PERSONAL INTERESTS SEEN AS MAIN FACTOR

---

9. (S) ACCORDING TO [redacted] MOST OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS WERE MOTIVATED MORE BY THE PRESSURES THEY WERE UNDER PERSONALLY THAN BY ANY GENUINE DEDICATION TO INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PROVINCE. HE CITED THE CASE OF HERMINIO DA SILVA DA COSTA, WHO RECENTLY HAS ASSUMED A HIGH PROFILE IN JAKARTA AS THE "CHIEF OF STAFF" OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS. ACCORDING TO [redacted] (AND OTHER SOURCES HAVE CONFIRMED THIS), DA COSTA OWNS THE ONLY FLEET OF TAXIS IN DILI. [redacted] SAID THAT MANY OF DA COSTA'S DRIVERS HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE "MORE RELAXED" ATMOSPHERE TO STOP PAYING RENTAL FOR THEIR VEHICLES. DA COSTA THEREFORE NEEDED ABRI/POLICE ASSISTANCE TO ENFORCE COLLECTION OF HIS FEES, AND THE PRICE FOR THIS SERVICE WAS HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE MILITIA ENTERPRISE. BECAUSE DA COSTA AND MANY OTHER PRO-INTEGRATION FIGURES WERE ACTING OUT OF PERSONAL, OFTEN FINANCIAL, INTERESTS,

B1

B1

B1

SECRET

SECRET PTQ8564

PAGE 01 JAKART 01740 03 OF 04 071012Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W	

----------B8A223 071019Z /38

P 070952Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7097
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 001740

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/07/09
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PINR, MARR, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW FROM A

LISBON-BASED OPERATIVE

[redacted]BELIEVED THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE COULD EVENTUALLY ARRIVE AT AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THEM. B1

AMNESTY NEEDED

10. (S) [redacted]ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MANY OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE WHO HAD COOPERATED WITH JAKARTA ALSO HAD A GENUINE FEAR OF RETRIBUTION. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT THE CNRT AND THE BISHOPS PROVIDE SOLID GUARANTEES THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS, AS WELL AS THE GUERRILLAS, WOULD BE GRANTED "AMNESTY." [redacted]CONCEDED THAT THE MORE RADICAL PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS, MANY OF WHOSE RELATIVES HAD BEEN KILLED, DISAGREED WITH THIS APPROACH AND WANTED THOSE WHO HAD COMMITTED ABUSES TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE. HE INCLUDED MAHUNU AND MAHUDO IN THIS GROUP, BUT ARGUED THAT XANANA STILL COMMANDED THE AUTHORITY TO KEEP THESE MORE RADICAL ELEMENTS UNDER CONTROL. B1 B1

PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS HAVE RELATIVELY FEW ARMS

11. (S) [redacted]WAS NOT OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS THAT ABRI HAD PROVIDED FIREARMS TO THE NEWLY FORMED MILITIA GROUPS. HE SAID THE RESISTANCE WAS ABLE TO PENETRATE THE MILITIAS QUITE EASILY, AND HAD PRECISE KNOWLEDGE OF WHO HAD WHAT WEAPONS. AS EXAMPLES, HE CITED DA COSTA'S POSSESSION OF "ONE UZI-TYPE WEAPON" ([redacted]HIMSELF DID NOT APPEAR TO BE AN EXPERT ON IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS TYPES), TAVERES' OWNERSHIP OF "AN AK OF SOME SORT," AND "FIVE B1 B1

RIFLES AND A GRENADE" IN POSSESSION OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION LIURAI (TRADITIONAL CHIEF) OF METINARO (A VILLAGE IN THE DILI AREA).

BUT CONCERN OVER ABRI STOCKPILES

12. (S) [redacted] SAID A MORE SERIOUS DANGER THAN THE RELATIVELY LIMITED NUMBER OF FIREARMS NOW IN THE HANDS OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT ABRI WEAPONS STOCKPILED AT EACH KORAMIL (SUBDISTRICT POST) WOULD BE DISTRIBUTED TO PRO-INTEGRATION CIVILIANS AT SOME POINT. HERE TOO, HE CLAIMED THAT CNRT HAD PRECISE FIGURES ON HOW MANY WEAPONS WERE INVOLVED, I.E., A FEW DOZEN AT EACH POST. THE 36 WEAPONS CAPTURED BY THE GUERRILLAS WHEN THE KORAMIL IN ALAS WAS OVERRUN LAST NOVEMBER REPRESENTED THE TYPICAL QUANTITY OF FIREARMS WHICH WERE STOCKPILED IN THESE POSTS, HE ADDED. [redacted] SAID THE LOCAL ABRI COMMANDER IN BOBONARO DISTRICT AT ONE POINT HAD HANDED OUT A NUMBER OF SUCH WEAPONS TO PRO-INTEGRATION CIVILIANS, BUT HAS SINCE TAKEN THEM BACK. B1 B1

ABRI MUST WITHDRAW
---

13. (S) DESPITE [redacted] SUPREME CONFIDENCE REGARDING CNRT'S STRENGTH ON THE GROUND AND WHAT HE SAW AS THE OVERWHELMING PRO-INDEPENDENCE SENTIMENT IN EAST TIMOR, HE ARGUED THAT THE VOTE ON THE AUTONOMY B1

SECRET

PAGE 04 JAKART 01740 03 OF 04 071012Z

OFFER MUST BE PRECEDED BY A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ABRI AND BRIMOB (POLICE MOBILE BRIGADE) FORCES. OTHERWISE, HE CONTINUED, THE GUERRILLAS AND THE LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE ACCOMPANYING THEM IN THE MOUNTAINS WOULD NEVER COME DOWN TO THE TOWNS. WITH ABRI GONE, ANTONIO SAID A UN POLICE FORCE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO GUARANTEE ORDER.

HARDLINERS WITHIN ABRI
---

14. (S) ACCORDING TO [redacted] KOPASSUS JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SGI) PERSONNEL, WORKING CLOSELY WITH PRO-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE, CONTINUED TO ACT AS THE PRIMARY DESTABILIZING FORCE IN EAST TIMOR. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (BIA) ALSO PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE, HE ADDED, AND BRIMOB WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM. [redacted] MAINTAINED THAT OFFICERS GROUPED AROUND COORDINATING MINISTER FOR SECURITY AFFAIRS FEISAL TANJUNG, AND RETIRED GENERALS THEO SYAFEI AND BENNY MURDANI, WERE KEY JAKARTA ELEMENTS SUPPORTING THESE B1 B1

ACTIVITIES. HE ADDED THAT SYAFEI WAS EXERTING AN ESPECIALLY PERNICIOUS INFLUENCE ON MEGAWATI. [redacted] B1 ALLEGED THAT BRIG. GEN. SIMBOLON, THE FORMER COMMANDER IN DILI WHO IS NOW THE DEPUTY REGIONAL COMMANDER IN DENSPASAR, WAS THE KEY LINK BETWEEN

SECRET

SECRET PTQ8565

PAGE 01 JAKART 01740 04 OF 04 071012Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W	

----------B8A226 071019Z /38

P 070952Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7098
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 001740

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/07/09
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PINR, MARR, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW FROM A LISBON-BASED OPERATIVE

JAKARTA AND THE KOPASSUS/SGI ELEMENTS IN EAST TIMOR (A NUMBER OF OUR OTHER SOURCES HAVE MADE SIMILAR ALLEGATIONS). HE SPECIFICALLY STRESSED THAT WIRANTO

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 01740 04 OF 04 071012Z
AND TRY SUTRISNO WERE NOT PART OF THIS GROUP, AND WERE GENERALLY VIEWED IN A FAVORABLE LIGHT BY THE CNRT.

15. (S) POLOFF OBSERVED THAT XANANA HAD MET WITH THEO SYAFEI, AS WELL AS FORMER BIA CHIEF ZACKY ANWAR, AND ASKED WHY WHAT ONCE SEEMED A GOOD RELATIONSHIP

WITH THESE TWO NOW HAD APPARENTLY SOURED. [redacted] B1
ARGUED THAT HABIBIE'S JANUARY 27 "EITHER-OR" APPROACH TO EAST TIMOR HAD COMPLICATED THE CNRT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH FIGURES SUCH AS SYAFEI, WHO HAD BEEN READY TO SUPPORT AN INTERIM PERIOD OF AUTONOMY FOLLOWED BY A REFERENDUM (WHICH SYAFEI BELIEVED A DEMOCRATIC, MEGAWATI-LED, GOI COULD WIN), BUT DID NOT SHARE HABIBIE'S DESIRE TO SEPARATE THE PROVINCE FROM INDONESIA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
ROY

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0255

ES

PAGE 01 JAKART 01021 01 OF 04 030216Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	SWCI-00	/020W					

----------A9E91A 030714Z /38

P 021105Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6389
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 001021

CHANG MAI/BANGKOK FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/1/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MARR, MOPS, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: FROM DILI TO KUPANG -- FEBRUARY 22-27 VISIT TO EAST AND WEST TIMOR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01021 01 OF 04 030216Z

REFS: A) JAKARTA 959, B) JAKARTA 952, C) JAKARTA 927

1. CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON, 1.5 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 1 MAR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2004 200300722

2. (C) EMBFFS VISITED EAST AND WEST TIMOR FEBRUARY 22-2, A WEEK MARKED BY INCREASED THREATS BY PRO-NTEGRATION FORCES, MORE VIOLENCE AND HIGH TENSION IN DILI, AND A CONTINUING EXODUS OF INDONESIAN PERSONNEL. MANY GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS SEEMED ANXIOUS TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT EAST TIMOR WAS ON THE VERGE OF CIVIL WAR. OTHER CONTACTS POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THOSE EAST TIMORESE GROUPS THREATENING "WAR" IN REALITY CONSISTED OF A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF LOCALIZED, CLAN-BASED CHIEFTAINS MAKING A LAST DITCH EFFORT TO PROTECT WEALTH THEY ACCUMULATED AS A RESULT OF THEIR COOPERATION WITH JAKARTA. SOME OF THESE FIGURES REPORTEDLY ALREADY HAD FLED TO JAKARTA OR ABROAD. MOST OBSERVERS PREDICTED THAT WITHOUT ABRI BACKING, REMAINING PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES WOULD MELT QUICKLY. ABRI HAD DISTRIBUTED SOME WEAPONS TO SUCH GROUPS, BUT APPARENTLY IN THE DOZENS, NOT THE HUNDREDS OR THOUSANDS REPORTED IN SOME CIRCLES. BASED ON EMBOFFS' FIRST-HAND OBSERVATIONS AND OTHER ACCOUNTS, A MUCH PUBLICIZED "RED AND WHITE" MILITIA GROUP APPEARED MORE HYPE THAN REAL THREAT. THE ABRI-ARMED "MAHIDI" GROUP, WHOSE THREATS LED TO AN EVACUATION OF AUSTRALIANS FROM DILI, APPEARED MORE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01021 01 OF 04 030216Z

DANGEROUS, HOWEVER. THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM INVOLVING LARGE NUMBERS OF DISPLACED VILLAGERS CONTINUED, BUT THIS ISSUE WAS BEING EXAGGERATED AND POLITICALLY MANIPULATED AS WELL, IN THIS CASE BY THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE.

3. (C) HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS STRESSED THAT A REGIME OF IMPUNITY STILL EXISTS, WITH EVEN WELL-INTENTIONED MILITARY AND POLICE COMMANDERS UNABLE TO PUNISH ABUSES BY EAST TIMORESE MILITIA FORCES WHO ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH SGI (MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL) OUTSIDE THE REGULAR STRUCTURES. THESE NGOS APPEALED FOR THE SOONEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR. DURING AND AFTER THE VIOLENT INCIDENTS OF FEBRUARY 24, THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES IN DILI CLEARLY HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO STAY OFF THE STREETS AND NOT INTERVENE TO RESTORE ORDER. IN A MEETING WITH EMBOFFS, [redacted] PRESENTED A SEEMINGLY B FAR-FETCHED SCHEME TO DIVIDE EAST TIMOR INTO INDEPENDENT AND INDONESIAN HALVES AND SAID THIS INITIATIVE WAS COMING FROM THE EAST TIMORESE THEMSELVES, NOT JAKARTA. VIRTUALLY ALL CONTACTS STRESSED THE POWERFUL INFLUENCE WIELDED BY IMPRISONED RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO, AND HIS CALL FOR CALM FOLLOWING THE FEBRUARY 24-25 INCIDENTS WAS SEEN AS THE DECISIVE FACTOR PREVENTING

FURTHER BLOODSHED. END SUMMARY.
4. (C) POLOFF, ECONOFF, AN USAID PROGRAM OFFICER WERE IN DILI, EAST TIMOR FEBRUARY 22-25. THEY MET WITH [redacted] B
[redacted] POLOFF ALSO HELD CONSULTATIONS WITH [redacted] WHO B
WAS IN DILI AT THIS TIME (REFTELS). POLOFF AND ECONOFF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01021 01 OF 04 030216Z
DEPARTED FROM DILI BY CAR ON FEBRUARY 25, TRANSITING THE LIQUICA AND MAUBARA AREAS, AND TRAVERSED WEST TIMOR TO KUPANG, DETOURING TO THE EAST TIMOR ENCLAVE OF AMBENO (REPORTED SEPTEL). ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS, AND OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE CONTINUING EXODUS OF NON-EAST TIMORESE, ARE REPORTED SEPTEL.

HYPING "CIVIL WAR"
---

5. (C) DURING EMBOFFS' VISIT, DILI WAS GRIPPED BY AN ATMOSPHERE OF CRISIS AND TENSION, ESPECIALLY FOLLOWING THE VIOLENCE OF FEBRUARY 24 (REFTELS). VISITING FOREIGN JOURNALISTS HAD BEEN TRANSPORTED IN MILITARY HELICOPTERS TO PRO-INTEGRATION RALLIES IN ISOLATED LOCATIONS IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS BORDERING ON WEST TIMOR, WHERE LOCAL PRO-JAKARTA LEADERS GAVE SPEECHES AND DISTRIBUTED LEAFLETS THREATENING TO WAGE "WAR" IF EAST TIMOR BECAME INDEPENDENT. [redacted] B
DESCRIBED ONE SUCH RALLY IN WHICH, ACCORDING TO HIM, SEEMINGLY BEWILDERED VILLAGERS SURROUNDED BY ARMED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7068

PAGE 01 JAKART 01021 02 OF 04 021117Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/021W				

----------A975E4 021117Z /38

P 021105Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6390
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 001021

CHANG MAI/BANGKOK FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/1/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MARR, MOPS, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: FROM DILI TO KUPANG -- FEBRUARY 22-27 VISIT TO CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01021 02 OF 04 021117Z
EAST AND WEST TIMOR

SOLDIERS LISTENED TO CALLS TO "GO TO WAR." A [redacted] B
JOURNALIST EXHIBITED A PRO-INTEGRATION LEAFLET ENTITLED "IF YOU WANT PEACE, PREPARE FOR WAR." JOURNALISTS SAID THAT GOI OFFICIALS ON THE SCENE, INCLUDING A MINISTRY OF INFORMATION REPRESENTATIVE FROM JAKARTA, SEEMED DETERMINED TO CONVINCE THE FOREIGN REPORTERS THAT EAST TIMOR WAS INDEED ON THE VERGE OF A CIVIL WAR BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE MILITIAS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES.

A MILITIA SCORECARD
---

6. (C) [redacted] B
STRESSED THAT THE ONGOING CONFLICTS, WHILE CERTAINLY DISTURBING, WERE LOCALIZED, SPORADIC, AND CLAN-BASED, FREQUENTLY INVOLVING LAND DISPUTES. [redacted] AND OTHER B
CONTACTS POINTED OUT THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATION CIVILIAN MILITIAS REVOLVED AROUND A HANDFUL OF LOCAL DISTRICT OFFICIALS AND FORMER OFFICIALS, ALL OF WHOM HAD BEEN WELL-COMPENSATED FOR THEIR LOYALTY TO JAKARTA, AND WHO NOW (LIKE MANY DISTRICT CHIEFS THROUGHOUT INDONESIA) WERE FACING ACCUSATIONS OF CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE THEM. SOME OF THESE DISTRICT LEADERS

HAD ALREADY FLED. THE RECENTLY OUSTED BUPATI OF AINARO REPORTEDLY HAD MOVED TO JAKARTA AND THE BUPATI OF ERMERA HAD LEFT FOR AUSTRALIA. AS DESCRIBED BY [redacted] AND A B
NUMBER OF OTHER CONTACTS, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT MILITIA LEADERS INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01021 02 OF 04 021117Z

--"HALILINTAR" LEADER JOAO TAVERES, A FORMER BUPATI (DISTRICT CHIEF) OF THE BOBONARO DISTRICT BORDERING ON WEST TIMOR AND THE LEADER OF A TRADITIONALLY POWERFUL FAMILY IN THIS LOCALITY. TAVERES SIDED WITH THE INDONESIANS IN 1975-76 AND HE AND HIS CLAN WERE REWARDED WITH EXTENSIVE LANDHOLDINGS AND GOVERNMENT POSITIONS. AS A RESULT OF HIS EXTENSIVE PATRONAGE NETWORK, TAVERES COMMANDS THE ALLEGIANCE OF NUMEROUS VILLAGE CHIEFS IN BOBONARO. HE HAS BEEN HOLDING RALLIES IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS THREATENING "WAR." WHILE IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER ABRI HAS SUPPLIED ANY NEW ARMS TO TAVERES, HALILINTAR CERTAINLY RECEIVED ARMS IN THE PAST AND SOME CONTACTS BELIEVED THAT TAVERES HAD AMASSED HIS OWN ARMS SUPPLY INDEPENDENT OF ABRI.

--RUI LOPES, DESCRIBED BY [redacted] B
[redacted] AS A POWERFUL "LOCAL WARLORD" IN THE KOVA-LIMA DISTRICT (BORDERING ON WEST TIMOR ON THE SOUTH COAST) WHO MAY BE BEYOND THE CONTROL OF EVEN THE LOCAL ABRI ESTABLISHMENT. LOPES WAS CONSPICUOUSLY PRESENT AT A FEBRUARY 24 "RECONCILIATION" GATHERING IN DILI (REF A) AND THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE WAS SEEKING AN ACCOMMODATION WITH HIM.

--"MAHIDI"("LIVE AND DIE FOR INTEGRATION") IS LED BY CANCIO CARVALHO. HIS FAMILY HAS EXERCISED TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY IN THE AINARO AREA, AND WAS HANDSOMELY REWARDED FOR PAST COOPERATION WITH INDONESIA. ACCORDING TO [redacted] AFTER 1975 THE CARVALHOS WERE GIVEN B
EXTENSIVE LANDS CONFISCATED FROM LOCAL FRETILIN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01021 02 OF 04 021117Z
SUPPORTERS. THE LOCAL FRETILIN PEOPLE, EMBOLDENED BY THE NEW POLITICAL SITUATION, ARE NOW AGGRESSIVELY ATTEMPTING TO REGAIN THESE LANDS. THIS STRUGGLE IS BEHIND THE RECENT VIOLENCE IN AINARO. SGI PROVIDED CANCIO CARVALHO'S "MAHIDI" ("LIVE AND DIE FOR INTEGRATION") MILITIA WITH 20 FIREARMS (THIS IS OPENLY

ACKNOWLEDGED) WHICH APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN USED IN SEVERAL FATAL SHOOTINGS, MOST NOTABLY THE JANUARY 25 KILLINGS IN ZUMALAI OF THREE CIVILIANS, INCLUDING A PREGNANT WOMAN. ACCORDING TO [redacted] "MAHIDI" CAME INTO DILI IN EARLY FEBRUARY AND ATTEMPTED TO ESTABLISH A BASE AT THE HOUSE OF ONE OF CANCIO'S BROTHERS, PRECIPITATING A CONFRONTATION WITH LOCAL PRO-INDEPENDENCE RESIDENTS WHICH LED TO ANOTHER FATAL SHOOTING. CARVALHO RECENTLY THREATENED THE LIVES OF AUSTRALIAN PERSONNEL AND HE HAS REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE KOMNASHAM RECONCILIATION EFFORT, TELLING [redacted] THAT "KOMNASHAM SAID NOTHING WHEN PRO-REFERENDUM PEOPLE ATTACKED MY HOUSE." (CANCIO CLAIMS IT WAS SUCH ATTACKS AND THREATS WHICH LED HIM TO REQUEST WEAPONS FROM ABRI.) B B

--ENRICO GUTERRES, THE LEADER OF "GADAPAKSI" (A GROUP FOUNDED BY PRABOWO WHICH WAS ACTIVE IN 1997 AND EARLY 1998) AND A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF GOVERNOR ABILIO SOARES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7071

PAGE 01 JAKART 01021 03 OF 04 021117Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	SWCI-00	/020W					

----------A975ED 021118Z /38

P 021105Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6391
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 001021

CHANG MAI/BANGKOK FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/1/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MARR, MOPS, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: FROM DILI TO KUPANG -- FEBRUARY 22-27 VISIT TO CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01021 03 OF 04 021117Z
EAST AND WEST TIMOR

HE HAS FORMED A NEW MILITIA CALLED "AITARAK," WHICH IS ALLIED TO MAHIDI. GUTERRES PARTICIPATED IN THE "RECONCILIATION FORUM" (SEE BELOW) IN DILI ON FEBRUARY 24, WHICH SOME OBSERVERS SAW AS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN. HE WAS A CO-SIGNER, HOWEVER, OF THE THREATENING LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE AUSTRALIANS.

--THE "RED AND WHITE" MILITIA GROUPS, ORIGINATING FROM A LOCAL POLITICAL DISPUTE IN THE LIQUICA AREA, WHERE THE BUPATI HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF CORRUPTION. THEY HAVE ATTRACTED MUCH MEDIA ATTENTION BY SETTING UP ROADBLOCKS ON THE MAIN ROAD FROM DILI TO WEST TIMOR. EMBOFFS TRAVELED THIS COASTAL ROUTE ON FEBRUARY 25. SOME ELDERLY MEN AND CHILDREN WERE MANNING "RED AND WHITE" OUTPOSTS ALONG THE ROAD WEST OF MAUBARA, BUT NO ARMS WERE IN EVIDENCE. THERE WAS A CHECKPOINT AT THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE LIQUICA AND BOBONARO DISTRICTS, MANNED BY WHAT APPEARED TO BE A SINGLE ABRI SOLDIER WITH A RIFLE AND ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL OF INDETERMINATE STATUS, WHO HAD STOPPED TWO BUSES. EMBOFFS WERE WAVED THROUGH. IN DILI, EMBOFFS ENCOUNTERED AN INJURED "RED AND WHITE" PARTISAN TAKING REFUGE AT THE NGO ETADEP OFFICE. NGO PERSONNEL EXPLAINED THAT THIS SIMPLE FARMER HAD BEEN RECRUITED TO JOIN THE MILITIA GROUP AND SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN ATTACKED BY HIS FELLOW VILLAGERS. HE NOW FEARED RETURNING HOME. IN A MEETING WITH EMBOFFS, [redacted] B
[redacted] LARGELY DISMISSED THE "RED AND WHITE" GROUP, ASSERTING THAT IT REVOLVED AROUND A SINGLE PRO-INTEGRATION FAMILY AND WAS LIMITED TO THE MAUBARA AREA.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01021 03 OF 04 021117Z
ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE RED AND WHITE GROUP HAD B
BEEN THOROUGHLY THRASHED (AND AT LEAST ONE OF THEIR NUMBER KILLED) WHEN THEY TRIED TO ENTER THE MOUNTAIN VILLAGES OVERLOOKING THE COAST. [redacted] AND OTHER B
CONTACTS ARGUED THAT IT WAS ONLY THE SUPPORT OF ABRI WHICH ENABLED THE RED AND WHITE MILITIA TO OPERATE ALONG

THE ROAD. [redacted] WHO HAD TRAVELED TO MAUBAURA ON FEBRUARY 23 AND MET SOME OF THE RED AND WHITE MEMBERS, DESCRIBED THEM AS INTOXICATED, FRIGHTENED, AND ARMED WITH ONLY PRIMITIVE SLINGSHOTS. B

A POTENTIAL FOR MORE VIOLENCE
---

7. (C) [redacted] SAID ABRI HAD DISTRIBUTED WEAPONS TO THE VARIOUS MILITIA GROUPS, BUT THIS AMOUNTED TO "FIVE HERE, TEN THERE," NOT THE HUGE QUANTITIES REPORTED IN SOME CIRCLES. ON ONE HAND, ACCORDING TO [redacted] LOCAL ABRI COMMANDERS HAD PROVIDED THESE WEAPONS WITH A VIEW TO ENABLING ABRI ITSELF TO TAKE A MORE HANDS-OFF APPROACH, ESSENTIALLY TELLING THE MILITIA LEADERS THAT "NOW YOU ARE ON YOUR OWN, WE ARE NOT GOING TO PROTECT YOU ANYMORE." HOWEVER, THERE ALSO SEEMED TO BE ABRI ELEMENTS, PRIMARILY WITHIN SGI, ACTIVELY WORKING WITH THE CIVILIAN PARAMILITARIES, WITH WHOM THEY PROBABLY HAVE LONGSTANDING RELATIONSHIPS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, [redacted] ADDED, HE DID NOT EXPECT ABRI TO DISARM THESE GROUPS. B B B

8. (C) THE MAIN PROBLEM, [redacted] ARGUED, WAS THAT THE TOP MILITARY AND POLICE COMMANDERS "DO NOT CONTROL ALL B

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01021 03 OF 04 021117Z
THESE ELEMENTS, DO NOT KNOW WHAT THEY ARE DOING, AND DO NOT PUNISH ABUSES." [redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT B
LOCAL POLICE COMMANDERS HAD AGREED WITH THEM ON THE NEED TO BRING ABUSIVE MILITIAS TO JUSTICE, AND EVEN ENCOURAGED THEM TO BRING MORE PRESSURE IN THIS REGARD. THE POLICE COMMANDERS REPORTEDLY EXPRESSED FEARS, HOWEVER, THAT ANY AGGRESSIVE INVESTIGATIONS ON THEIR PART COULD LEAD TO "SHOOTOUTS" BETWEEN THE POLICE AND SGI, SUCH AS THOSE WHICH REPORTEDLY OCCURRED LATE LAST YEAR IN ALAS AND SAME. [redacted] AGREED THAT THE TOP B
POLICE COMMANDERS APPEARED WELL-INTENTIONED BUT UNABLE TO ACT. MOST CONTACTS ARGUED THAT THE CIVILIAN MILITIA GROUPS DID NOT AMOUNT TO MUCH ON THEIR OWN [redacted] B
[redacted] MAINTAINED THAT WITHOUT ABRI'S INVOLVEMENT ANY "CIVIL WAR" WOULD BE OVER IN LESS THAN THREE MONTHS) BUT AGREED THAT WITH ABRI BACKING SUCH FORCES, DESPITE BEING RELATIVELY FEW IN NUMBER, COULD CONTINUE TO DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION.

A DIVIDED EAST TIMOR?
---

9. (C) SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7072

PAGE 01 JAKART 01021 04 OF 04 021117Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	SWCI-00	/021W					

----------A975F0 021118Z /38

P 021105Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6392
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 001021

CHANG MAI/BANGKOK FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/1/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MARR, MOPS, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: FROM DILI TO KUPANG -- FEBRUARY 22-27 VISIT TO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01021 04 OF 04 021117Z
EAST AND WEST TIMOR

PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS AND THEIR ALLIES WITHIN GOI/ABRI CIRCLES IS TO EVENTUALLY BREAK OFF A SECTION OF EAST TIMOR WHICH WOULD REMAIN PART OF INDONESIA. IN A FEBRUARY 23 MEETING WITH POLOFF AND AIDOFF, [redacted] B1

[redacted] PROUDLY PRESENTED SUCH A PLAN AS HIS OWN. HE DISPLAYED A MAP OF EAST TIMOR WITH A LINE DRAWN SOUTH FROM DILI PASSING THROUGH AILEU AND SAME DOWN TO THE SOUTH COAST, ARGUING THAT AREAS WEST OF THIS LINE WERE PRO-INDONESIA, AND ASSERTING THAT THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS COULD HAVE THE EASTERN AREA. DILI, HE SAID, WOULD BE SPLIT DOWN THE MIDDLE. [redacted] CLAIMED THAT THE INITIATIVE FOR THIS PLAN WAS COMING FROM THE EAST TIMORESE THEMSELVES, NOT JAKARTA. [redacted] WHO ALSO RECEIVED THIS PITCH TOLD THE GOVERNOR THAT THE IDEA WAS A NON-STARTER.) B B B

THE FEBRUARY 24 VIOLENCE - KEEPING EMOTIONS IN CHECK

10. (C) THE FEBRUARY 24 KILLINGS IN DILI (REFTELS) AROUSED STRONG EMOTIONS ON THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE. EMBOFFS TRAVERSED NUMEROUS ROADBLOCKS ERECTED BY PRO-INDEPENDENCE RESIDENTS TO MEET WITH [redacted] WORKERS AT A HOUSE IN NORTH DILI THAT EVENING. INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES WERE NOWHERE TO BE SEEN. THE [redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT AFTER THE FIRST SHOOTING INCIDENT IN MID-AFTERNOON HE HAD GONE TO THE DEPUTY MILITARY COMMANDER'S HOME (THE COMMANDER WAS IN JAKARTA) AND ROUSED HIM FROM A NAP IN AN (APPARENTLY B B

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01021 04 OF 04 021117Z

UNSUCCESSFUL) ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THE ACTING COMMANDER TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. [redacted] SAID HE HAD RECEIVED A CALL FROM XANANA GUSMAO, WHO HAD REPORTEDLY SAID THAT HE WAS UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM BOTH ACTIVISTS INSIDE EAST TIMOR AND RAMOS HORTA TO RESPOND FORCEFULLY TO THE KILLINGS AND "CALL PEOPLE INTO THE STREETS." ACCORDING TO [redacted] HE HAD ADVISED XANANA TO CONTINUE CALLING FOR RESTRAINT. IN ANY CASE, A LETTER FROM XANANA URGING EAST TIMORESE TO REMAIN CALM APPEARED IN THE "SUARA TIMOR TIMUR" DAILY THE FOLLOWING MORNING. SEVERAL CONTACTS POINTED OUT THAT XANANA HAD PLAYED A CRITICAL ROLE EARLIER IN THE MONTH FOLLOWING ANOTHER SHOOTING DEATH IN DILI. PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS REPORTEDLY HAD PLANNED A MAJOR DEMONSTRATION DURING THE FUNERAL OF THE VICTIM, BUT XANANA HAD RULED AGAINST THIS. AFTER THE CALL FROM XANANA, "THEY ACTUALLY WENT OUT AND REMOVED THE BANNERS THEY HAD PUT UP," ONE EXPAT CONTACT RECALLED. B B

TACTICS OF INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS ALSO QUESTIONED

11. (C) WHILE NON-GOI CONTACTS PRIMARILY STRESSED THE DESTABILIZING ROLE OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS, THEY ALSO DIRECTED SOME CRITICISM TOWARD THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES. [redacted] CONFIRMED REPORTS THAT B
PRO-INDEPENDENCE YOUTH WERE INTIMIDATING VILLAGERS IN THE LIQUICA AREA, DEMANDING "CONTRIBUTIONS." CONTACTS IN THE EAST TIMORESE ENCLAVE OF AMBENO (WHICH IS SURROUNDED BY WEST TIMOR) ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT

CONFIDENTIAL

STRONGARM TACTICS USED BY CNRT ACTIVISTS (SEPTEL). SEVERAL CONTACTS BELIEVED THAT MANUEL CARRASCALAO'S MOVEMENT (GRPRTT) WAS POLITICALLY MANIPULATING THE DISPLACED PEOPLE WHO HAVE FLED TO DILI AND OTHER TOWNS. [redacted] SAID THE SEVERAL THOUSAND PEOPLE WHO HAD FLED B
TO SUAI FOUND A WELL-PREPARED CAMP AWAITING THEM, SUGGESTING THAT THE OPERATION HAD BEEN ORCHESTRATED. HE ADDED THAT [redacted] PRESSURE FROM CARRASCALAO B
TO START FEEDING PROGRAMS FOR THESE DISPLACED PEOPLE. [redacted] SAID THAT THE "REFUGEE" CRISIS IN B
THAT TOWN WAS LESS THAN MET THE EYE. IN RECENT YEARS, A NUMBER OF VILLAGERS FROM THE SURROUNDING MOUNTAINS HAD BEEN MOVED TO NEW HOMES ALONG THE COAST IN AN "INTERNAL TRANSMIGRATION" EXERCISE. MOST OF THEM, HOWEVER, SPENT THE MAJORITY OF THEIR TIME LIVING AND TENDING FIELDS BACK IN THEIR ORIGINAL VILLAGES. WHEN THE RECENT VIOLENCE HAD FLARED UP, THESE VILLAGERS SIMPLY RELOCATED TO THE NEW SETTLEMENT ON THE COAST, WHICH WAS NOT A "REFUGEE CAMP" AS REPORTED BY THE MEDIA.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1603

(E6)

PAGE 01 STATE 039304 031438Z
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /001R

DRAFTED BY S/S-O:SCOTT BOSWELL
APPROVED BY S/S-O:LUIS E ARREAGA
----------AA192D 031440Z /38
O 031432Z MAR 99 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 039304 TOSEC 050085

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 01058 DTG 031140Z MAR 99 SENT ACTION SECSTATE BAMGKOK INFO ASSOCIATION OF WOUTH EASTERN ASIAN NATIONS LISBON CANBERRA ROME GENEVA BONN SUVA LONDON TOKYO WELLINGTON BONN OTTAWA USUN NEW YORK USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI BEING RPTD FOR UR INFO:
QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001058

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 2 MAR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 20 JUL 2004 200300722

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/03
TAGS: PREL, EAID, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID, PO, UN
SUBJECT: CONSULTATION, SECURITY AND RECONCILIATION IN EAST TIMOR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 039304 031438Z

REF: JAKARTA 991

1. CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON, 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (SBU) THE FOLLOWING PROVIDES EMBASSY PERSPECTIVE ON THE STATE OF PLAY REGARDING A SERIES OF KEY ISSUES RELATED TO EAST TIMOR. WE WILL BE PURSUING THESE

QUESTIONS IN COMING WEEKS AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF A RAPIDLY EVOLVING SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR (SEE SEPTEL).

TWO-TIERED, ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE PROCESS LOOKS LIKELY

3. (C) ON MARCH 10, UNSYG REP MARKER IS EXPECTED TO PROPOSE TO MINISTERS GAMA AND ALATAS A CONSULTATION MECHANISM FOR DETERMINING THE PREFERENCE OF THE EAST TIMORESE REGARDING THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE TO BE FINALIZED MARCH 11. [redacted] TELLS US THAT THIS MECHANISM WILL INVOLVE ELECTING, ON A ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE BASIS, AN ASSEMBLY, WHICH WILL THEN TAKE UP THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL. WHILE PORTUGAL SEES SUCH A TWO-TIER PROCEDURE AS SUFFICIENTLY DEMOCRATIC, [redacted] STRESSED THAT ANYTHING LESS THAN A ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE EXERCISE (SUCH AS "EXPANDED CONSULTATIONS" ONLY) WOULD VIOLATE PORTUGAL'S OWN CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR TRUE SELF-DETERMINATION IN EAST TIMOR. B B

WILL THE GOI GO ALONG?

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 039304 031438Z

4. (C) WILL THE INDONESIANS ACCEPT THE UN PLAN? [redacted] HAS INDICATED TO US THAT HE IS AMENABLE TO ANY PROPOSAL SHORT OF A FULL-FLEDGED "REFERENDUM," EVEN IF IT INVOLVES BALLOTING. INFLUENTIAL HABIBIE ADVISOR [redacted] [redacted] HAS ALREADY INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO GO ALONG WITH ANY VOTING PROCEDURE NOT LABELLED A "REFERENDUM." [redacted] TOLD US MARCH 3 THAT ONLY A ONE MAN, ONE VOTE APPROACH COULD BE CREDIBLE. ANYTHING LESS COULD BE TOO EASILY ENGINEERED. [redacted] IS CONSISTENTLY CONVEYING A DESIRE TO BE RID OF THE EAST TIMOR PROBLEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND MAKING CLEAR HIS DESIRE THAT THE SOLUTION BE ONE WHICH DOES NOT ENTAIL ANY FURTHER GOI EXPENDITURES IN THE TERRITORY, I.E., A TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE FINANCED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. (IN A MARCH 2 MEETING WITH [redacted] [redacted] STRONGLY REITERATED HIS INSISTENCE THAT INDONESIA BE RELIEVED OF THE BURDEN OF EAST TIMOR BY JANUARY 1, 2000.) GIVEN HABIBIE'S RELATIVELY WEAK POSITION, WE CAN NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT B B B B B B B

OTHER FORCES, I.E., WITHIN ABRI, COULD COMPEL HABIBIE TO RETURN TO A HARDLINE POSITION ON THIS ISSUE, BUT AT PRESENT WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS FROM THE MAJOR PLAYERS THAT THIS IS IN THE CARDS.

CAN UNRECONCILED ELEMENTS ACT AS SPOILERS?

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 039304 031438Z

5. (C) FOR THEIR PART, BASED ON A CANVASSING OF VIEWS DURING A RECENT VISIT TO EAST TIMOR, THE ANTI-AUTONOMY, PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE HAVE LITTLE INTEREST IN THE SHAPE OF A CONSULTATION PROCESS. THEY APPEAR CONCERNED ONLY THAT IT BE FAIR AND ASSUME THAT A FAIR RESULT WILL INDICATE THE SIGNIFICANT MAJORITY OPINION THEY BELIEVE THEY REPRESENT. IF ALL SIDES ACCEPT THE UN-PROPOSED TWO-TIER VOTE, WE WILL THEN FACE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER POTENTIAL SPOILERS IN THE PROCESS, SUCH AS THE PRO-INTEGRATION CIVILIAN MILITIAS, AND THEIR ALLIES AMONG THE MURKY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE FORCES, WILL HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DISRUPT THE VOTE.

MILITIA STRENGTH SHOULD NOT BE OVERESTIMATED

---

6. (C) WE WOULD CAUTION AGAINST OVERESTIMATING THE STRENGTH AND POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THESE GROUPS. POLOFF'S FEBRUARY 22-25 OBSERVATIONS ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR AND DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH EAST TIMORESE AND RESIDENT EXPAT OBSERVERS THERE UNDERSCORE THAT THE NUMBER OF ARMED ANTI-INDEPENDENCE PERSONNEL IS RELATIVELY SMALL, PROBABLY NUMBERING IN THE VERY LOW HUNDREDS. THEY ARE MAINLY CONCENTRATED IN A FEW SPECIFIC AREAS NEAR EAST TIMOR'S WESTERN BORDER. [redacted] IN A MARCH 2 B
MEETING WITH [redacted] EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF B
THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM WHICH COULD BE SOLVED, ESPECIALLY IF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (SGI) UNITS WERE REMOVED FROM EAST TIMOR. [redacted] B

[redacted]

7. (C) WHILE THESE GROUPS ARE NOT LARGE, THE RECENT

EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR SHOW THAT RELATIVELY FEW ARMED ELEMENTS, WHEN SUPPORTED BY OR AT LEAST PERMITTED TO OPERATE BY ABRI, CAN CREATE SIGNIFICANT TENSION. THE PUBLIC THREATS AGAINST AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATS AND JOURNALISTS IN EAST TIMOR MADE BY TWO OF THESE GROUPS, WHICH HAVE CLEAR TIES TO ABRI, SUGGEST THAT UN WORKERS ATTEMPTING TO CONDUCT A BALLOTING OR EVEN A CONSULTATION COULD FACE A SECURITY PROBLEM. EVEN THE PROSPECT OF SUCH THREATS COULD DAMPEN INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN SUPPORTING THE UN EFFORT WITH PERSONNEL AND COULD GENERATE CALLS FOR AN ARMED UN DEFENSE PRESENCE OR PKO.

ABRI IS THE KEY

8. (C) AGAIN, ABRI'S ATTITUDE IS THE KEY FACTOR. THESE CIVILIAN MILITIAS ARE HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON ABRI UNITS FOR SHELTER, TRANSPORT AND PROBABLY AMMUNITION. IN MID-1998, UNDER U.S. AND OTHER PRESSURE, ABRI DISARMED MEMBERS OF THE NOTORIOUS GADA PAKSI MILITIA, WHICH NUMBERED NO FEWER THAN 100 AND PROBABLY NO MORE THAN SEVERAL HUNDRED. DISARMING THE CLAN-BASED CIVILIAN MILITIAS NOW ACTIVE IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS WOULD BE MORE COMPLICATED, GIVEN THAT THE LEADERS OF THESE GROUPS ARE STRONGLY MOTIVATED BY DESIRES TO PROTECT THEIR WEALTH AND FEARS OF RETRIBUTION BY THE MAJORITY PRO-INDEPENDENCE POPULATION. NEVERTHELESS, OUR MOST TRUSTED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 039304 031438Z

CONTACTS IN EAST TIMOR STRESS THAT IF ABRI REALLY WANTS TO REIGN IN THESE GROUPS THEY CERTAINLY HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DO IT, AND IDEALLY ABRI, RATHER THAN A PKO FORCE, SHOULD ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY. AT A MINIMUM, HOWEVER, XANANA AND OTHERS ARGUE THAT A SMALL UN SECURITY FORCE SHOULD BE INJECTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN TO KEEP ABRI (AND THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE) HONEST IN REGARD TO ANY COMMITMENTS TO DISARM. [redacted] WAS OF A SIMILAR VIEW IN OUR TALKS WITH HIM OVER THE WEEKEND. THUS FAR, HOWEVER, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO CONSIDER SUCH A STEP AT THIS STAGE, VIEWING IT AS AN UNACCEPTABLE INFRINGEMENT OF INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY.

9. (C) GIVEN THE VULNERABILITY OF THE PROCESS TO A SINGLE ASSAULT AGAINST AN UN OFFICER, IT WOULD SEEM NECESSARY TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK POSED BY THE ARMED ELEMENTS BEFORE THE PROCESS

BEGAN -- BY PRESSING FOR DISARMAMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE GOAL OF PRECLUDING A RELATIVELY FEW HARDLINERS FROM EXERCISING A VETO OR PROTRACTED DELAY OF THE PROCESS SHOULD NOT BE MADE A SINE QUA NON FOR THE CONSULTATION PROCESS TO BEGIN. THE PROCESS SHOULD NOT BE HOSTAGE TO THE DISARMING OF THE MILITIAS.

10. (C) IN SHORT, IT MAY BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF HARDLINE PRO-INTEGRATION ELEMENTS TO GENERATE CONCERN ABOUT INSTABILITY (CLEARLY THE ABRI MESSAGE TO VISITING JOURNALISTS RECENTLY HAS BEEN AIMED AT CREATING THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 039304 031438Z
IMPRESSION OF A PROTO-CIVIL WAR ENVIRONMENT) TO DELAY THE PROCESS. IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER. THAT THE THREAT BE PERCEIVED OBJECTIVELY AND THAT THE UN AND ITS SUPPORTERS NOT BE STAMPEDED INTO A COSTLY, TIME CONSUMING EFFORT TO DISARM THE CIVILIAN MILITIAS.

HOW COULD EXILES VOTE?
---

11. (C) IF THERE WERE AGREEMENT FOR A BALLOTING PROCEDURE, VOTING IN THE DIASPORA MIGHT BE CONDUCTED VIA UN OFFICES ABROAD, A PROCESS SIMILAR TO THAT EMPLOYED IN INDONESIAN GENERAL ELECTIONS WHEREIN INDONESIAN CITIZENS ABROAD VOTE AT INDONESIAN EMBASSIES. ACCORDING TO A PORTUGUESE DIPLOMAT HERE, THE EAST TIMORESE DIASPORA IS ACTUALLY RELATIVELY SMALL, NO MORE THAN 20,000 PEOPLE, 15,000 OF WHOM ARE IN AUSTRALIA AND MOST OF THE REST IN PORTUGAL. XANANA GUSMAO HAS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF TRANSMIGRANT VOTING BY SUGGESTING (TO THE UN) THAT THERE BE A REQUIREMENT THAT VOTERS EITHER MUST HAVE BEEN BORN IN EAST TIMOR, HAVE ONE EAST TIMORESE PARENT OR HAVE LIVED IN EAST TIMOR FOR A GIVEN PERIOD OF TIME (GUSMAO MENTIONED NINE YEARS IN A RECENT DISCUSSION WITH [redacted] B1

COULD ALL THIS BE DONE IN THREE MONTHS?
---

12. (C) FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT, IT IS NOT EASY TO JUDGE WHETHER THE UN COULD HAVE ALL THE ARRANGEMENTS IN PLACE TO CONDUCT A VOTING PROCESS IN EAST TIMOR BEFORE THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 039304 031438Z
INDONESIAN ELECTION ON JUNE 7. WE WOULD ONLY EMPHASIZE THAT HABIBIE'S CIRCLE AND [redacted] ARE EXTREMELY ANXIOUS TO GET THIS DECISION OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE JUNE, WHILE OTHERS, ESPECIALLY IN THE MILITARY, WOULD BE MORE PRONE TO DELAY THE PROCESS. THE LOGISTICS ON THE INDONESIAN SIDE OF COURSE WOULD BE DAUNTING BUT THE GOI IS PRESUMABLY PREPARING FOR A PROVINCE-WIDE VOQIMOR IN JUNE IN ANY CASE. B

PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION

13. (C) IF IT WERE UP AND RUNNING, AND IF IT HAD AN ACTIVE ABRI COMPONENT, THE "PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION," NOW IN NEBULOUS STATUS, COULD PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE, POSSIBLY ACTING IN SOME MONITORING CAPACITY TO ENSURE THAT ARMED ELEMENTS WERE IN FACT DISARMED AND DISBANDED. LOGICALLY, UN OFFICE SECURITY PERSONNEL WOULD WISH TO MONITOR THIS PROCESS AS WELL.
14. (C) THE CONCEPT OF A "PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION" WON THE SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT HABIBIE WHO EVEN OFFERED FUNDING TO THE VENTURE PROPOSED BY HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SECRETARY GENERAL CLEMENTINO DOS AMARAL. HOWEVER, THE ORGANIZATION HAS NOT BEEN FORMALLY CONSTITUTED. [redacted] MEMBERS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WILL GO TO DILI ON MARCH 7 TO BE "FACILITATORS" AT A 50-PERSON ROUNDTABLE TO BE CONVENED BY THE CHURCH. THE MEETING, WHICH WILL INCLUDE ALL EAST TIMORESE FACTIONS, ABRI, THE CHURCH, STUDENTS AND NGO REPRESENTATIVES, IS TO ADDRESS FOUR KEY ISSUES: ENDING CLASHES AMONG EAST TIMORESE; "AVOIDING" AN EXODUS OF SKILLED NON-EAST B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 039304 031438Z
TIMORESE; ENDING ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY, AND ABRI'S DISARMING OF CIVILIAN MILITIAS.

15. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN, FORMER EAST TIMOR GOVERNOR MARIO CARRASCALAO AND FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL LOPEZ DA CRUZ ARE ALL TO JOIN IN THE ROUNDTABLE. [redacted] BELIEVES THAT SUCH A BODY COULD MEET REPEATEDLY, EMERGING POSSIBLY AS A VERSION OF A PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION. [redacted] ADMITTED CANDIDLY THAT ACHIEVING SUCH A GATHERING AND CATALYZING SUFFICIENT COOPERATION TO ADDRESS THE FOUR TASKS HE IDENTIFIED WOULD BE B1 B1 B1

IMPOSSIBLE ABSENT GOOD WILL ON THE PART OF ALL PARTICIPANTS -- WHICH HE SAID IN THE CASE OF ABRI AND THE PRO-AUTONOMY GROUPS WAS NOT LIKELY.

16. (C) [redacted] EARLIER TOLD US THAT HARD LINE PRO-AUTONOMY CIVIL SERVANTS, GROUPED IN THE "FORUM FOR UNITY AND JUSTICE" HAVE, WITH ABRI BACKING, DELAYED THE COMMISSION'S FIRST MISSION TO EAST TIMOR. THE COMMISSION NOW PLANS TO AWAIT BISHOP BELO'S MARCH 8 RETURN TO EAST TIMOR. AFTER INTERRUPTING A DISCUSSION WITH US MARCH 3 TO TAKE A CALL FROM [redacted] TO DISCUSS THE AGENDA FOR THE DILI ROUNDTABLE, [redacted] RETURNED WITH A SIGH SAYING "I'M SURE HE IS AGAINST US TOO." ROY UNQUOTE TALBOTT

B1

B1

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 039304 031438Z

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7025

E17

PAGE 01 JAKART 01923 01 OF 02 170939Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/021W						

----------BD2FE1 170939Z /38

O 170913Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7297
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001923

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR THE VATICAN
SINGAPORE FOR A/S ROTH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01923 01 OF 02 170939Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/04
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, PINR, PINS, PREL, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: MILITIAS RAMPAGE IN DILI, EAST TIMOR

REF: JAKARTA 1908

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 17 APR 2014
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2004 200300722

2. (C) SUMMARY: PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS RALLIED IN DILI APRIL 17. FOLLOWING THE RALLY, THE HUNDREDS MILITIA WENT ON A RAMPAGE IN THE EAST TIMOR CAPITAL. AS OF MID-DAY, UNCONFIRMED REPORTS CLAIM 24 DEAD. THE HOUSE OF MANUEL CARRASCALAO, ONE OF THE MOST PROMINENT PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURES IN THE CAPITAL, WAS HEAVILY ATTACKED. THERE IS A WELL-SOURCED REPORT THAT HIS SON AND DISPLACED PEOPLE SHELTERING THERE WERE KILLED. A WESTERN JOURNALIST AT THE HOUSE WAS BEATEN AND THREATENED WITH MOCK EXECUTION. MILITIAMEN ARE FIRING ON OTHER HOUSES OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE. SOME HOUSES, CARS AND KIOSKS HAVE BEEN BURNED BY THE MILITIA. THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER WHO WAS IN DILI HAS SOUGHT REFUGE IN THE RESIDENCE OF BISHOP BELO. THE MILITARY AND THE POLICE HAVE TAKEN NO/NO STEPS TO STEM THE VIOLENCE AND SECURITY FORCE COMMANDER COL. TONO, REPORTEDLY HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE MILITARY IS "NEUTRAL." SPEAKERS AT THE MAIN MORNING RALLY CALLED FOR CLEANSING THE CIVIL SERVICE OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE PERSONNEL AND PROPOSED A DIVISION OF EAST TIMOR. THEY ALSO DECLARED WAR ON "ANY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR, ESPECIALLY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01923 01 OF 02 170939Z

JOURNALISTS." SEPARATELY, A MILITARY OFFICER WHO WAS A MEMBER OF A PROMINENT EAST TIMORESE FAMILY WAS KILLED IN AN INCIDENT WHICH THE RESISTANCE AND THE CHURCH DESCRIBE AS A RESISTANCE COUNTER-ATTACK. EMBASSY HAS REACHED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WHO HAS UNDERTAKEN TO REACH SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIALS IN AN ATTEMPT TO HALT THE VIOLENCE. END SUMMARY

THE SITUATION IN DILI

3. (C) FOLLOWING A RALLY OF PRO-INTEGRATION, MILITARY-BACKED MILITIAS IN DILI, EAST TIMOR, THE ARMED MILITIAMEN WENT ON A RAMPAGE SHOOTING INTO SOME HOUSES AND BURNING OTHERS. AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT FROM A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE CLAIMS 13 DEAD IN DILI AS OF MID-AFTERNOON. A REPORT FROM [redacted] SOURCED TO BISHOP BELO'S RESIDENCE REPORT AT LEAST 24 DEAD IN THE HOUSE AND GARDEN OF MANUEL CARRASCALAO, A PROMINENT PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURE WHO HAS BEEN SHELTERING EAST TIMORESE DISPLACED BY MILITIA ACTIVITIES IN AREAS OUTSIDE OF DILI. THE DEAD INCLUDE HIS 16 YEAR-OLD SON AND SOME OF THE DISPLACED STAYING AT HIS HOUSE. A WESTERN JOURNALIST WHO WAS AT THE HOUSE HAS TOLD US HE WAS BEATEN AND THREATENED WITH

B1

MOCK EXECUTION. THE POLICE AND MILITARY, ACCORDING TO EYEWITNESSES ON THE SCENE, ARE TAKING NO ACTION TO STOP THE MAYHEM. THE MILITARY COMMANDER, COL. TONO, REPORTEDLY TOLD CARRASCALALO THAT THE FIGHTING WAS NONE OF HIS CONCERN, AND THAT THE MILITARY AND POLICE WERE NEUTRAL. THEY HAVE BEEN SEEN HANDING OUT CIGARETTES AND WATER TO THE MILITIAS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01923 01 OF 02 170939Z

4. (U) THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO ARRIVED IN DILI ON APRIL 17, HAS SOUGHT REFUGE AT THE HOUSE OF BISHOP BELO. IT APPEARS THAT HE AND HIS PARTY HAVE NOT BEEN HARMED.

5. (C) A RELIABLE JOURNALIST NOW IN DILI TOLD POLCOUNS THAT APPROXIMATELY 1,500 MILITIAMEN FROM VARIOUS MILITIAS, ARMED FOR THE MOST PART WITH PRIMITIVE WEAPONS, RALLIED AND PARADED IN DILI DURING THE MORNING OF APRIL 17. THE CENTRAL RALLY TOOK PLACE ON THE FRONT LAWN OF THE GOVERNOR'S PALACE. THE GOVERNOR ATTENDED AS DID A FEW MILITARY OFFICIALS. THERE WERE NO CHURCH OFFICIALS IN ATTENDANCE AS CLAN LEADER JOAO TAVERES GAVE THE KEYNOTE SPEECH. HE CLAIMED THAT THE MILITIAS HAD MOBILIZED BECAUSE OF A "CALL TO ARMS" BY XANANA GUSMAO ON APRIL 5. (NOTE: THE MILITIAS IN FACT BEGAN MOBILIZING WITH MILITARY SUPPORT IN THE FALL OF 1998. END NOTE)

6. (U) IN HIS SPEECH AT THE RALLY, EURICO GUTEREZ, LEADER OF THE "AITARAK" MILITIA, PROPOSED THAT EAST TIMOR BE DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS, WITH THE WESTERN PART REMAINING INTEGRATED WITH INDONESIA WHILE THE EASTERN PART LEFT TO SEPARATE IF IT WISHED. HE ALSO REPEATED WARNINGS CONTAINED IN EARLIER STATEMENTS (REFTEL) THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7026

PAGE 01 JAKART 01923 02 OF 02 170939Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART01923

Channel: n/a

SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00
DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /021W
----------BD2FE5 170939Z /38

O 170913Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7298
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001923

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR THE VATICAN
SINGAPORE FOR A/S ROTH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01923 02 OF 02 170939Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/04
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, PINR, PINS, PREL, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: MILITIAS RAMPAGE IN DILI, EAST TIMOR

THE MILITIAS WOULD "CLEANSE" THE EAST TIMORESE CIVIL SERVICE OF ALL PEOPLE WHO SUPPORTED INDEPENDENCE. BASILIO ARAUJO, ANOTHER PRO-INTEGRATION ACTIVIST WORKING FOR THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ASSOCIATED WITH THE MILITIAS, TOLD OUR SOURCE THAT IT WOULD BE EASY TO IDENTIFY THOSE PUBLIC SERVANTS WHO WERE PRO-INDEPENDENCE BECAUSE DURING THE "REFORM" PERIOD, MANY CIVIL SERVANTS HAD EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE -- AND PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS HAD MADE LISTS. GUTEREZ, IN HIS RALLY SPEECH ALSO CALLED FOR "WAR AGAINST ANY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE" AND SPECIFICALLY SINGLED OUT FOREIGN JOURNALISTS.

7. (U) CHURCH OFFICIALS REPORTEDLY ARE CONCERNED OVER INTENTIONS OF THE AITARAK MILITIA TO ATTEND A LARGE MASS WHICH WILL BE CELEBRATED AT AN OUTDOOR SITE SEVEN KMS FROM DILI ON APRIL 18.

INCIDENT IN MANATUTO
---

8. (U) CHURCH AND CNRT OFFICIALS (PRO-INDEPENDENCE) HAVE REPORTED THAT BERNADINO LOPEZ DA CRUZ, BROTHER OF INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR AT LARGE LOPEZ DA CRUZ, WAS KILLED IN A FALINTIL COUNTER-ATTACK ON A CONVOY OF SIX MILITARY VEHICLES NEAR MANATUTO APRIL 16. ACCORDING TO THIS VERSION, THE VICTIM, A MILITARY OFFICER, WAS KILLED IN AN ATTACK WHICH FOLLOWED A TNI (INDONESIAN MILITARY) ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01923 02 OF 02 170939Z
ON A FALINTIL ELEMENT. LATE APRIL 16, WE WERE INFORMED
OF THE INCIDENT BY [redacted] B1
[redacted] HE EXPRESSED CONCERN
THAT THE KILLING OF A MEMBER OF A PROMINENT PRO-
INTEGRATION FAMILY COULD INCREASE TENSIONS SIGNIFICANTLY.

9. (C) THE DCM REACHED MARZUKI DARUSMAN, CHAIRPERSON OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO EXPRESS DEEP CONCERN AND URGE THAT STEPS BE TAKEN TO HALT THE VIOLENCE. MARZUKI UNDERTOOK TO CONTACT SENIOR MILITARY AND GOI CIVILIAN OFFICIALS. THE DATT CONVEYED A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO MAJOR GENERAL SIHOMBING, THE ONLY MILITARY OFFICER TRHUS FAR REACHABLE ON THIS SATURDAY AFTERNOON. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IS ATTEMPTING TO REACH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS AND THE CANADIAN AND AUSTRALIAN EMBASSIES ARE ALSO ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT OFFICIALS. THE PORTUGUESE INTEREST SECTION IS ALSO SEEKING TO CONTACT OFFICIALS.

10. (U) THERE ARE 5 TO 10 AMCIT RESIDENTS IN EAST TIMOR, MOST IN THE DILI AREA. AT LEAST SOME OF THE AMCITS, INCLUDING TWO EMPLOYED BY THE USAID-FUNDED COFFEE PROJECT, HAD EVACUATED DILI EARLIER. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART01947

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

Channels: n/a

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8700

E19

PAGE 01 JAKART 01947 01 OF 03 191231Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	VO-03
	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	SAS-00	/017W	

----------BDA601 191231Z /49

O 191129Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7334
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USCICPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 18 APR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 20 JUL 2004 200300722

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001947

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/02
TGAS: PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, PREF, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: APRIL 19, 1999

REF: A) JAKARTA 1908, B) JAKARTA 1923, C) JAKARTA 1928

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01947 01 OF 03 191231Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON, 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SHOOTING EARLY AND LATE IN THE DAY IN ONE LOCATION, DILI WAS REPORTEDLY QUIET ON APRIL 19. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED, BUT PERSISTENT REPORTS OF VIOLENCE IN TOWNS OUTSIDE OF DILI. AS MANY AS 50 PEOPLE WHO HAD TAKEN REFUGE IN MANUEL CARRASCALAO'S HOUSE ARE STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR AND MAY BE IN MILITIA

CUSTODY. CARRASCALAO HIMSELF IS IN A POLICE COMPOUND IN DILI, AND A SMALL CONTINGENT OF SOLDIERS BRIEFLY GUARDED BISHOP BELO'S HOUSE. PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS IN DILI CONTINUE TO RECEIVE THREATS. THE MILITIAS REPORTEDLY PLAN A RALLY IN BAUCAU ON APRIL 20 AND IN OTHER LOCATIONS LATER IN THE WEEK. ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT, FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE CABINET HAS AGREED ON AN AUTONOMY PACKAGE WHICH HE WILL CARRY TO NEW YORK THIS WEEK. ACCORDING TO A SENIOR HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OFFICIAL THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHING A PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION. THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER WHO WAS IN DILI AT THE TIME OF THE MILITIA VIOLENCE TOOK WIRANTO TO TASK AND SAID HE INTENDED TO BRIEF HIS EU COLLEAGUES ON WHAT HE WITNESSED. WIRANTO, IN PUBLIC REMARKS APRIL 19, SAID THAT THE VIOLATION OF RIGHTS BY ANY SIDE IN EAST TIMOR WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED. END SUMMARY

MILITIA/MILITARY ACTIVITY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01947 01 OF 03 191231Z

3. (U) DILI APPEARED TO BE QUIET FOR THE MOST PART ON APRIL 19 WITH ONLY TWO INCIDENTS OF PROTRACTED SHOOTING. WESTERN JOURNALISTS IN EAST TIMOR HEARD SHOOTING NEAR THE SATWAI ARTEA NEAR BEKORA, A SUBURB OF DILI IN THE MORNING AND THEN AGAIN LATER IN THE DAY. AN EYEWITNESS REPORTEDLY TOLD THIS JOURNALIST SOURCE THAT HE SAW THE MILITARY FIRING AT UNARMED PEOPLE IN THE MORNING. OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES OF THESE INCIDENTS ARE UNKNOWN. THERE WERE TWO PARADES IN THE MORNING AT THE GOVERNOR'S PALACE. A PROCESSION OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE LARGELY INDONESIAN (NON EAST TIMORESE) GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES WAS FOLLOWED BY A POLICE AUXILIARY MARCH (THE LATTER WAS "DECIDELY RAGTAG," ACCORDING TO JOURNALISTS ON THE SCENE.) BY MID-DAY, A CONTINGENT OF APPROXIMATELY 16 TROOPS HAD ASSUMED A DEFENSIVE POSITION AT THE RESIDENCE OF BISHOP BELO BUT DEPARTED LATER IN THE DAY.

4. (U) THE INDONESIAN MEDIA REPORTS THAT TWO PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN A MILITIA ASSAULT IN THE BECORA AREA OF DILI ON APRIL 18. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, "TROOPS FIRED AT A CROWD AFTER PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS MILITIA SAID THEY WERE OUTNUMBERED BY PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGHTERS." (NOTE: "PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGHTERS" PROBABLY REFERS TO GROUPS OF LOCAL RESIDENTS WHO HAVE ORGANIZED TO RESIST MILITIA ATTACKS ON

THEIR NEIGHBORHOODS. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT FALINTIL GUERRILLAS HAVE ENTERED DILI. END NOTE.)

5. (U) REPORTS PERSIST OF A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT APRIL 17 IN LIQUICA WHICH, ACCORDING TO AN AMCIT NGO IN DILI, REMAINS SEALED OFF. THE ICRC HAS YET TO REACH THE AREA (SINCE THE APRIL 6 MILITIA RAMPAGE THERE) DESPITE FOREIGN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01947 01 OF 03 191231Z
MINISTRY ASSURANCES IT WOULD BE ALLOWED TO DO SO. VARIOUS SOURCES REPORT THE KILLING OF TWO PRO-INDEPENDENCE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN SUAI WHICH LED TO MOST OF THE YOUTH OF THAT DISTRICT TOWN FLEEING TO THE HILLS. A WESTERN JOURNALIST IN DILI TOLD US LATE APRIL 19 THAT PLANS ARE SET FOR A MILITIA RALLY IN BAUCAU, EAST TIMOR'S SECOND CITY AND KNOWN AS STRONGLY PRO-INDEPENDENCE TERRITORY.

MISSING PEOPLE
---

6. (U) THE POLICE IN DILI HAVE TOLD WESTERN JOURNALISTS THAT THEY ARE SHELTERING 96 DISPLACED PERSONS, INCLUDING 46 FROM MANUEL CARRASCALAO'S HOUSE WHICH WAS ATTACKED ON APRIL 17 (REF B AND C). A JOURNALISTS WHO WAS IN THE HOUSE APRIL 16 AND AS IT WAS ATTACKED ON APRIL 17 TOLD US THAT THERE WERE WELL OVER 100 IN THE HOUSE AND THAT EVEN ACCOUNTING FOR THE OFFICIAL COUNT OF 12 DEAD AND FIVE WOUNDED (THERE ARE HIGHER ESTIMATES), THERE ARE MORE THAN 50 PEOPLE UNACCOUNTED FOR.

7. (U) BASILIO ARAUJO, A SPOKESMAN FOR THE MILITIAS,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8704

PAGE 01 JAKART 01947 02 OF 03 191232Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	VO-03
	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	SAS-00	/017W	

----------BDA61D 191232Z /49

O 191129Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7335
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 001947

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/02
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, PREF, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: APRIL 19, 1999

INDICATED TO THE CANADIAN EMBASSY THAT THE "AITARAK"
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01947 02 OF 03 191232Z
MILITIA WAS "PROTECTING" AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF DISPLACED PEOPLE WHICH HE IMPLIED WERE FROM THE CARRASCALAO HOUSE.

8. (U) MANUEL CARRASCALAO, HIS DAUGHTER CHRISTINA AND LEONARDO ISAAC (POLITICAL COORDINATOR FOR THE CNRT) ARE AT A POLICE FACILITY. INITIALLY POLICE TOLD JOURNALISTS THAT THE MANUEL CARRASCALAO HAD BEEN ILL, HAD RECEIVED AN INJECTION AND DID NOT WANT TO SEE JOURNALISTS. A JOURNALIST WAS ABLE TO REACH THE GROUP AND FOUND THEM ANXIOUS TO MEET. ALL APPEARED HEALTHY, BUT THE JOURNALIST WAS QUICKLY USHERED OUT BY THE POLICE WHEN SHE WAS DISCOVERED. THE GROUP ORIGINALLY HAD FLED FROM BISHOP BELO'S RESIDENCE APRIL 18 TO THE POLICE AFTER REPORTS THAT BELO'S RESIDENCE ITSELF WAS TO BE ATTACKED IN ORDER TO SEIZE CARRASCALAO. AT CARRASCALAO'S REQUEST, JOURNALISTS WERE MAINTAINING A ROTATING VIGIL AT THE BISHOP'S RESIDENCE, ENSURING THERE WAS ALWAYS AT LEAST ONE JOURNALIST WITH HIM. WHEN CONFRONTED BY PORTUGUESE INTERESTS SECTION CHIEF ANA GOMES ABOUT CARRASCALAO'S "DETENTION," A DFA OFFICIAL SAID THAT CARRASCALAO HAD BEEN "MAKING TOO MANY EMOTIONAL STATEMENTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY."

THREATS
---

9. (C) [redacted] INFORMS US THAT A NUMBER OF OFFICES IN DILI OVER THE WEEKEND RECEIVED THREATS THAT THEY WILL SUFFER THE SAME FATE AS THE OFFICE OF SUARA TIMOT TIMOR, AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER WHICH WAS RANSACKED APRIL 17. THE OFFICES BEING THREATENED (BY B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01947 02 OF 03 191232Z

MILITIA PERSONNEL) ARE "CARITAS," (AN INTERNATIONAL CHARITY), "YAYASAN HAK" (A LEGAL ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION) AND "KONTRAS" (A HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING ORGANIZATION SPECIALIZING IN MISSING PERSONS).

DIPLOMATIC FRONT

10. (U) FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS HAS ANNOUNCED IN A PRESS CONFERENCE THIS AFTERNOON (APRIL 19) THAT THE CABINET HAS ENDORSED AN AUTONOMY PACKAGE FOR EAST TIMOR WHICH HE WILL CARRY TO NEW YORK TO PRESENT TO UNSYG REP JAMSHED MARKER AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PORTUGAL. GENERAL WIRANTO IN PUBLISHED REMARKS, APRIL 19, SAID THAT VIOLATION OF RIGHT BY ANY FACTION IN EAST TIMOR WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY AND POLICE TO ENSURE A PEACEFUL ENVIRONMENT IN EAST TIMOR.

11. (C) ACCORDING TO EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS HERE, IN THE WAKE OF THE LIQUICA AND DILI EVENTS, THE PORTUGUESE NOW ARE INSISTING ON A STRONGER CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT AT THE UNHRC IN GENEVA THAN THE ONE WHICH IS CURRENTLY PROPOSED. THEY ARE NOT YET LOBBYING FOR A RESOLUTION, HOWEVER.

12. (C) FOLLOWING HIS EVENTFUL VISIT TO EAST TIMOR, IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER DAVID ANDREWS BRIEFED THE EU AMBASSADORS IN JAKARTA ON APRIL 19. ACCORDING TO [redacted] B1
WHO WAS PRESENT, ANDREWS DESCRIBED HIS FIRST-HAND EXPOSURE TO THE EVENTS OF APRIL 17 IN DILI. HE WAS MEETING WITH LOCAL COMMANDER TONO SURATMAN WHEN MANUEL CARRASCALAO ENTERED TO MAKE HIS FUTILE PLEA FOR THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01947 02 OF 03 191232Z

MILITARY TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR HIS HOUSE WHICH WAS BEING ATTACKED BY THE MILITIA. ANDREWS ALSO WAS PRESENT AT BISHOP BELO'S RESIDENCE WHEN VICTIMS OF THE VIOLENCE SOUGHT REFUGE THERE. ANDREWS TOLD THE AMBASSADOR'S THAT HE HAD BEEN "SHOCKED" BY [redacted] B1

"STUPIDITY" AND HIS THREATS OF VIOLENCE. ACCORDING TO A TNI OFFICER PRESENT AT THE MEETING ANDREWS TOOK WIRANTO TO TASK FOR HIS TROOPS BEHAVIOR IN DILI. ANDREWS ADDED THAT HE WILL TRAVEL TO BRUSSELS SHORTLY TO BRIEF THE EU ON WHAT HE WITNESSED.

PROGRESS ON A PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION

13. (C) [redacted] A THREE-MAN COMMISSION DELEGATION NOW IN DILI HAS MADE PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHING A "PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION" FOR EAST TIMOR. NOTWITHSTANDING THE VIOLENCE IN DILI OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS, [redacted] SAID THAT THE THREE-MAN TEAM HAD WON AGREEMENT OF PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE LEADERS (UNSPECIFIED) AS WELL AS THE CHURCH TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A COMMISSION. [redacted] B1 B1 B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8705

PAGE 01 JAKART 01947 03 OF 03 191232Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	VO-03
	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	SAS-00	/017W	

----------BDA62E 191232Z /49

O 191129Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7336
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 001947

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/02
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, PREF, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: APRIL 19, 1999

[redacted] ADDED THAT THE MILITARY HAD NOMINATED TWO COLONELS B1
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01947 03 OF 03 191232Z
TO REPRESENT TNI AND THAT THE POLICE HAD NOMINATED A BRIGADIER GENERAL AND A COLONEL. REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER DAMIRI, NOW IN DILI, HAS VOLUNTEERED TO MOVE PRO-INDEPENDENCE REPRESENTATIVES BY MILITARY HELICOPTER TO THE MEETING SITE IF THAT IS NECESSARY GIVEN THE INSECURITY OF OVERLAND TRAVEL. WHILE NO DATE HAS BEEN SET, [redacted] IS HOPEFUL THAT A FIRST MEETING MIGHT BE B1
HELD AS EARLY AS THIS WEEK. (COMMENT: THIS SEEMS VERY OPTIMISTIC. WE WILL BE CHECKING WITH XANANA AND OTHERS APRIL 20 TO DETERMINE IF THINGS ARE IN FACT MOVING ALONG SO NICELY. END COMMENT)
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8503

E21

PAGE 01 JAKART 02004 01 OF 02 220836Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W

----------BF2810 220840Z /38

O 220803Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7383
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 02004

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02004 01 OF 02 220836Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/06
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, PINS, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: CAUTIOUSLY POSITIVE REACTION TO DILI ACCORD

REF: A) JAKARTA 1956, B) JAKARTA 1955

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE APRIL 21 DILI TRUCE AGREEMENT REPORTEDLY ARE CAUTIOUS ON THE PART OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SQ AND GRUDGINGLY ACQUIESCENT ON

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 21 APR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2004 200300722

THE PRO-INTEGRATION SIDE. BISHOP BELO IS HOPEFUL, AS IS RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA, WHO SEES THE PACT AS A BRIDGE TO CARRY EAST TIMOR PEACEFULLY TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UN PRESENCE. THERE ARE SIGNS OF DISCORD IN THE MILITARY. A WELL-DOCUMENTED REPORT OF AN APRIL 21 MILITIA KILLING NEAR LIQUICA AND LESS WELL-SUBSTANTIATED CLAIMS OF KIDNAPPING BY THE RESISTANCE UNDERSCORE HOW FRAGILE THE PEACE IN EAST TIMOR IS. END SUMMARY

3. (C) [redacted] TOLD B1
POLCOUNS THAT REACTIONS TO THE APRIL 21 DILI "TRUCE" AGREEMENT (REFTEL) HAVE BEEN CAUTIOUSLY POSITIVE. SHE PROFESSED HERSELF TO BE OPTIMISTIC AS WELL. IMPRISONED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO WHO SIGNED THE AGREEMENT REPORTEDLY TOLD [redacted] THAT HE COULD NOT B1
REFUSE TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, HE REPORTEDLY SAID THAT IT MIGHT HELP BRING ABOUT PEACE DURING THE CRITICAL PERIOD BEFORE A UN PRESENCE IS ESTABLISHED, HOPEFULLY IN MAY.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02004 01 OF 02 220836Z

4. (C) BISHOP BELO WAS ALSO CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. [redacted] SAID THAT HE ASSESSED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD B1
"REALLY TWISTED THE ARMS" OF THE MILITIAS AND OF GOVERNOR ABILIO SOARES TO WIN THEIR ACQUIESCENCE. IN TURN, SHE SAID, IT WAS THE PRESSURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT FORCED THE INDONESIAN MILITARY TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THE AGREEMENT. SHE ADDED THAT ACCORDING TO [redacted] GENERAL B1
ZACKY ANWAR, A KEY PLAYER FOR THE MILITARY ON EAST TIMOR, WAS "FURIOUS." ZACKY, WHO ONCE HEADED THE MILITARY'S INTELLIGENCE UNIT, BIA, WAS IN DILI THROUGHOUT DILI'S BLOODY WEEKEND AND IS THOUGHT BY MANY TO HAVE PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN WHAT TRANSPIRED. ([redacted] WHO WAS B1
ALSO IN DILI AT THE TIME IS AMONG THOSE HOLDING THIS VIEW (REF A) AS IS [redacted] WHO B1
DISCUSSED HIS VIEWS IN THIS REGARD WITH DCM ON APRIL 21.).

5. (C) [redacted] B1
WAS HIGHLY SKEPTICAL OF THE AGREEMENT, QUESTIONING WHETHER IT WAS "WORTH THE PAPER IT WAS WRITTEN ON," ACCORDING TO [redacted] WHO SPOKE TO HIM APRIL 22 B1
-- ALTHOUGH HE SIGNED THE DOCUMENT. HE IS SENDING HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN OUT OF THE COUNTRY IN THE WAKE OF THE ATTACK, BUT HAS VOWED TO STAY PERSONALLY.

6. (C) A JOURNALIST IN DILI TOLD US APRIL 22 THAT [redacted] B1
[redacted] ANOTHER SENIOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURE IN DILI WAS VERY NEGATIVE REGARDING THE AGREEMENT, BELIEVING IT WILL NOT BE IMPLEMENTED. THE JOURNALIST BELIEVED THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02004 01 OF 02 220836Z
THE SKEPTICISM MAY BE WARRANTED BASED ON REPORTING (BY [redacted] THAT PRO- B1
INTEGRATION MILITIA, POSSIBLY ACCOMPANIED BY THE INDONESIAN MILITARY, KILLED FIVE PEOPLE AT 1430 HOURS APRIL 21 AT BAZAR TETE. BAZAR TETE IS NEAR LIQUICA, SITE OF THE APRIL 6 MILITIA ASSAULT THAT MAY HAVE LEFT OVER 50 DEAD. (COMMENT: WE WILL ATTEMPT TO FOLLOW UP WITH OTHER SOURCES REGARDING THE ALLEGED APRIL 21 MILITIA ATTACK. [redacted] TOLD US THAT AS OF APRIL 22 IT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO B1
VERIFY THE ATTACK TOOK PLACE AND THAT THE MILITARY HAD DENIED THE ALLEGATION. END COMMENT)

7. (C) [redacted] B1
[redacted] TOLD THE SAME JOURNALIST THAT THERE HAD BEEN TWO RECENT KIDNAPPINGS, ALLEGEDLY CARRIED OUT BY FALINTIL GUERILLAS. HE CLAIMED THAT FIVE MILITIAMEN OF THE BESI MERAH PUTI HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED WEST OF DILI ON APRIL 21. THREE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED. ALSO, HE CLAIMED, FOUR OTHER MILITIA PERSONNEL FROM THE "SAKUNAR" GROUP WERE KIDNAPPED BY FALINTIL ON APRIL 21 (HE DID NOT SPECIFY WHERE). THE JOURNALIST HAS BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION OF THESE CLAIMS. [redacted] B1
HAS IMMEDIATE PLANS TO GO TO AUSTRALIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8505

PAGE 01 JAKART 02004 02 OF 02 220837Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W

----------BF2838 220841Z /38

O 220803Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 3

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7384
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 02004

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/06
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02004 02 OF 02 220837Z
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, PINS, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: CAUTIOUSLY POSITIVE REACTION TO DILI ACCORD

8. (C) COMMENT: REACTIONS ARE ESSENTIALLY COMING IN ALONG EXPECTED LINES. IN THE WAKE OF THE RECENT MILITIA VIOLENCE, THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE IS VERY WARY BUT NOT DISMISSIVE. THE MILITIA SIDE, TO INCLUDE GENERAL ZACKY, APPEARS TO HAVE DUTIFULLY, IF UNHAPPILY SALUTED AND SIGNED. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0375

E14

PAGE 01 JAKART 01808 01 OF 03 121257Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/018W	

----------BA96B2 121258Z /38

O 121236Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7160
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001808

AMEMBASSY TOKYO FOR A/S ROTH
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/04
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PINR, PINS, PGOV, PREL, CACS, ID
SUBJECT: BISHOP BELO'S CONVOY ATTACKED AS PRO-JAKARTA MILITAS POSTURE MORE AGGRESSIVELY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01808 01 OF 03 121257Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: MILITARY-BACKED MILITA IN EAST TIMOR HAVE ADOPTED A MORE AGGRESSIVE POSTURE IN RECENT DAYS, PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING THE "LIQUICA INCIDENT" IN WHICH MILITA MEMBERS KILLED AN AS YET UNKNOWN NUMBER OF PEOPLE. VILOLENCE APPEARS CENTERED IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS AND AROUND DILI. ON APRIL 11, A MILITA GROUP ATTACKED A CONVOY WHICH INCLUDED BISHOP BELO, ICRC DELGATES AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 10 APR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2004 200300722

WESTERN JOURNALISTS AS IT RETURNED TO DILI FROM A SPECIAL MASS IN LIQUICA. BELO WAS UNHURT. ACCOMPANYING POLICE REMAINED WITH BELO BUT DID NOT ACT TO PROTECT THE CONVOY. ACCORDING TO [redacted] WHICH MADE AN B1
INSPECTION TRIP TO LIQUICA, AN EXPAT MEDICAL DOCTOR WHO TREATED VICTIMS FROM THE LIQUICA INCIDENT SAID THAT MANY WOUNDS WERE CAUSED BY HIGH-VELOCITY GUNSHOTS -- LENDING SUPPPORT TO CLAIMS THAT POLICE AND MILITARY MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK. [redacted] BELIEVE THAT THE B1
NUMBER KILLED IN LIQUICA MAY BE HIGHER THAN THE FIVE CLAIMED BY THE MILITARY ALTHOUGH AS YET UNSUBSTANTIATED. [redacted] HAS BEEN UNABLE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OR B1
RENDER ASSISTANCE IN LIQUICA DUE TO PHYSICAL THREATS. BISHOP BELO HAS CALLED FOR A SUSPENSION OF CHURCH EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE A RECONCILIATION MEETING IN DILI THIS WEEK -- IN LIGHT OF THE VIOLENCE WHICH HE SAYS CLAIMED OVER 25 LIVES IN LIQUICA ON APRIL 6. NEW ATTACKS, INVOLVING DEATHS OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE, HAVE BEEN REPORTED OVER THE WEEKEND BUT NOT CONFIRMED. WITH RUMORS OF IMMINENT MILITIA "SWEEPS" THROUGH DILI, MANY PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS HAVE GONE INTO HIDING AND SOME

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01808 01 OF 03 121257Z
EXPATRIATES, INCLUDING AMCITS WITH THE USAID-FUNDED COFFEE PROJECT, ARE EVACUATING. MEANWHILE, IMPRISONED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO REPORTEDLY HAS STATED HIS WILINGNESS TO DISARM THE FALINTIL RESISTANCE IF ALL MILITARY-BACKED EAST TIMORESE MILITIAS, BOTH OLD AND NEW, TURN THEIR WEAPONS OVER TO A UN FORCE. THE PORTUGUESE INTERESTS SECTION HAS GIVEN A STIFF DEMARCHE TO THE INDONESIA MILITARY. END SUMMARY.

[redacted] B1

---

3. (U) A CONVOY CARRYING BISHOP BELO BACK TO DILI FROM LIQUICA WHERE HE HAD SAID SUNDAY MORNING MASS APRIL 11 WAS ATTACKED BY MILITIA PERSONNEL LATE THAT MORNING. THE BISHOP WAS NOT INJURED BUT THE DRIVER OF A VEHICLE CARRYING JOURNALISTS WHICH WAS FOLLOWING BELO'S VEHICLE WAS INJURED BY THE ROCK-THROWING MOB. SEVERAL VEHICLES WERE TRASHED. THE GROUP INVOLVED WAS THE "MERAH PUTIH" (RED AND WHITE) BAND. POLICE TRAVELLING WITH THE CONVOY REMAINED WITH BISHOP BELO WHO WAS THE FIRST THROUGH THE GAUNTLET. THEY DID NOT INTERVENE TO DEFEND THE 12 FOLLOWING VEHICLES WHICH TOOK THE BRUNT OF THE ATTACK. THE ONTOURAGE HAD BEEN CONFRONTED INITIALLY OUTSIDE THE

LIQUICA POLICE STATION BY A MOB WHICH VERBALLY THREATENED THEM WITH DEATH AS POLICE LOOKED ON.

4. (C) A DELEGATION FROM THE ICRC WAS IN THE CONVOY ACCOMPANYING BELO WHEN IT WAS ATTACKED. [redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS APRIL 12 THAT ICRC STAFF HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY TURNED BACK BY ARMED MILITIAMEN AS THEY B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01808 01 OF 03 121257Z
ATTEMPTED TO GET TO LIQUICA TO RENDER MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE WAKE OF APRIL 5-6 ATTACKS ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION THERE. ICRC MISSIONS CARRYING MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND FOOD WERE TURNED BACK THREE TIMES DURING THE WEEK. BECAUSE OF THREATS MADE BY THE MILITIA WHILE THE ICRC DELEGATION WAS IN LIQUICA APRIL 11, THE DELEGATES ONLY ATTENDED THE BISHOP'S MASS AND THEN LEFT WITH THE CONVOY.

5. (U) JOURNALISTS WHO ACCOMPANIED BELO TO LIQUICA SAID THAT VILLAGERS WERE OBVIOUSLY TRAUMATIZED. ONE JOURNALIST TOLD POLCOUNS THAT HE HAD BEEN SHOWN DAMAGE DONE TO THE INTERIOR OF A LOCAL PRIEST'S HOME WHICH INCLUDED BULLET HOLES. EXTERIOR WALLS HAD BEEN CLEANED OF BLOOD, HE SAID, AND BULLET HOLE SCARS PATCHED OVER. LOCAL PEOPLE CLAIMED TO THE JOURNALISTS IN FURTIVE CONVERSATIONS THAT THE MILITARY HAD REMOVED BODIES AFTER THE MILITIA ASSAULT, TAKING THEM TO UNKNOWN DESTINATIONS.

INITIAL [redacted] ACCOUNT B1

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0376

PAGE 01 JAKART 01808 02 OF 03 121257Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00

SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01
DRL-02 G-00 MR-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /018W
----------BA96B8 121258Z /38

O 121236Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7161
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 001808

AMEMBASSY TOKYO FOR A/S ROTH
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/04
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PINR, PINS, PGOV, PREL, CACS, ID
SUBJECT: BISHOP BELO'S CONVOY ATTACKED AS PRO-JAKARTA MILITAS POSTURE MORE AGGRESSIVELY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01808 02 OF 03 121257Z

[redacted] B1

THEY CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ASCERTAIN THE NUMBER OF CIVILIANS KILLED BUT THAT "EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT THE MILITARY COULD NOT SUSTAIN THEIR CLAIM THAT ONLY FIVE DIED." WHILE [redacted] WERE NOT ABLE TO B1
PRODUCE HARD EVIDENCE THAT BODIES HAD BEEN TAKEN AWAY, THEY DID RECEIVE A CREDIBLE REPORT OF FRESH GRAVES AT A BEACH SITE(NFI)AS WELL AS SECOND-HAND ACCOUNTS OF TRUCKS IN THE NIGHT REMOVING BODIES.

7. (C) [redacted] FOUND ONLY A FEW BULLET HOLES B1
INSIDE THE LIQUICA PRIEST'S HOUSE WHICH HAD BEEN CLEANED AND FRESHLY PAINTED AFTER THE ATTACK. (A JOURNALIST WHO WAS IN THE HOUSE TOLD POLCOUNS HE HAD SEEN A WARDROBE RIDDLED WITH BULLET HOLES.) [redacted] B1
[redacted] THE MAJORITY OF 30
VICTIMS WHOM HE TREATED FROM LIQUICA WERE SUFFERING FROM WHAT HE SAID WERE HIGH VELOCITY BULLET WOUNDS. HE NOTED

MOST WERE TO THE EXTREMITIES, RAISING IN HIS MIND THE QUESTION OF WHAT HAD BEEN THE FATE OF THOSE PEOPLE PRESUMABLY SUFFERING MORE SERIOUS GUNSHOT WOUNDS. (NOTE: THIS WOULD APPEAR TO SUBSTANTIATE CLAIMS OF THE CLERGY AND LOCAL POPULATION THAT SOME OF THE POLICE AND MILITARY JOINED IN THE ATTACK OR THAT MEMBERS OF THE MILITIA WERE ARMED BY THE MILITARY WITH HIGH POWERED WEAPONS.
[redacted] LOCAL PEOPLE B1

CLAIMED THAT MILITARY/POLICE PERSONNEL IN CIVILIAN DRESS BUT BEARING MODERN ARMS WERE AMONG THE ATTACKERS. END NOTE)

8. (C) THE MILITARY TOLD [redacted] THAT THEY WERE B1
UNABLE TO CONTROL THE CROWD AND HAVE DENIED ACTUALLY JOINING IN THE ATTACK OR USING TEARGAS. THE POLICE AND MILITARY PUT THEIR OWN NUMBERS AT 50 TO 80. THE MERAH PUTIH ATTACKERS, WHOM THE POLICE AND MILITARY HAD ESCORTED INTO LIQUICA FROM THEIR VILLAGE, NUMBERED ABOUT 280 FIGHTERS ALTHOUGH THERE WERE THREE TIMES THAT NUMBER OF SUPPORTERS. [redacted] WERE NOT ABLE TO DETECT B1
EVIDENCE THAT TEAR GAS HAD BEEN USED TO DRIVE PEOPLE FROM THE PRIEST'S HOUSE AS CLAIMED BY FATHER RAFAEL WHO OWNS THE HOUSE AND WAS PRESENT. (EMBASSY NOTE: VILLAGERS ALSO HAVE DESCRIBED USE OF TEARGAS TO JOURNALISTS. THE FACT THE INVESTIGATION TOOK PLACE FIVE DAYS AFTER THE ATTACK AND THAT THE PRIEST'S HOUSE HAD BEEN WASHED AND FRESHLY PAINTED MAY HAVE ELIMINATED EVIDENCE OF A TEARGAS ATTACK. EMBASSY NOTE) [redacted] WERE NOT ABLE TO VERIFY B1
WITNESS ACCOUNTS THAT A SECOND ATTACK AFTER THE INITIAL ONE ON APRIL 6 HAD LED TO ADDITIONAL DEATHS.

9. (C) THE APRIL 6 FIGHTING FOLLOWED A CLASH APRIL 5 ON THE ROAD OUTSIDE OF LIQUICA WHEN ARMED RESIDENTS OF LIQUICA TRIED TO STOP THE ADVANCE OF A MERAH PUTIH GROUP INTO LIQUICA. IN THAT INCIDENT, POLICE AND MILITARY ACCOMPANYING THE MERA PUTIH GROUP JOINED IN THE ATTACK ON THE LIQUICA GROUP. [redacted] CONCLUDED THAT AT B1
LEAST TWO OF THE LIQUICA PEOPLE DIED AND SEVEN WERE WOUNDED, ALTHOUGH ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HIGHER COUNTS ARE

CIRCULATING.

BELO AND XANANA RESPOND

---

10. (U) ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 10 BISHOP BELO ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS SUSPENDING RECONCILIATION EFFORTS VIA THE "DARE II" CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE UNDER CHURCH SPONSORSHIP THIS WEEK. BELO'S STATEMENT INCLUDED FIVE POINTS WHICH DEMANDED, INTER ALIA, "AN END TO THE SHOOTING" AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE APRIL 6 LIQUICA MASSACRE. CLAIMING TO HAVE A LIST OF 24 NAMES OF PEOPLE KILLED IN THE ATTACK -- PROVIDED BY VICTIMS' FAMILY MEMBERS -- BELO CHALLENGED THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT CHIEF TO EXPLAIN HIS CONTENTION THAT ONLY FIVE PEOPLE DIED IN THE ATTACK.

11. (C) [redacted] B1
[redacted] HAS BEEN INFORMED BY XANANA GUSMAO THAT "SINCE THE NEW MILITIAS HAD NOW BEEN FULLY INTEGRATED INTO ABRI," THEY SHOULD BE VIEWED AS NO DIFFERENT FROM THE OLDER MILITIAS SUCH AS "TEAM SERA" AND "TEAM SAKA." GIVEN THIS, ACCORDING TO [redacted] XANANA WAS WILLING TO B1
ORDER FALINTIL TO GIVE UP ITS ARMS AS LONG AS ALL THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0377

PAGE 01 JAKART 01808 03 OF 03 121258Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/018W		

----------BA96BB 121258Z /38

O 121236Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7162
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 001808

AMEMBASSY TOKYO FOR A/S ROTH
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/04
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PINR, PINS, PGOV, PREL, CACS, ID
SUBJECT: BISHOP BELO'S CONVOY ATTACKED AS PRO-JAKARTA MILITAS POSTURE MORE AGGRESSIVELY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01808 03 OF 03 121258Z
EAST TIMORESE PRO-JAKARTA MILITAS, BOTH OLD AND NEW, ALSO SURRENDERED THEIR WEAPONS. XANANA INSISTED, AS WELL, THAT THE MILITIAS TURN THEIR WEAPONS IN TO A UN SECURITY FORCE, NOT TO ABRI. (COMMENT: SUCH AN OFFER WOULD REPRESENT A MAJOR SHIFT BY XANANA. PREVIOUSLY HE HAS INSISTED THAT FALINIL AND THE MILITIAS COULD NOT BE EQUATED. END COMMENT)

[redacted] B1

12. (C) IN AN APRIL 12 CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF, [redacted] HAD B1
DELIVERED A VERY TOUGH MESSAGE TO TNI CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. SUGIONO EARLIER THAT DAY. [redacted] HAD CHARGED THAT B1
RECENT EVENTS HAD PROVEN THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY WAS EITHER INCAPABLE OF OR UNWILLING TO EXERT CONTROL OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR. [redacted] HAD ADDED THAT IF B1
JAKARTA COULD NOT PROVIDE SECURITY ANDMEDICAL CARE IN EAST TIMOR, THE GOI SHOULD ALLOW OTHERS TO TAKE ON THESE TASKS. [redacted] HAD TOLD TNI CHIEF OF GENERAL B1
STAFF LTG SUGIONO THAT IT WAS "OUTRAGEOUS" THAT THE SECURITY FORCES COULD OR WOULD NOT EVEN PROTECT BISHOP BELO'S CONVOY FROM ATTACK. [redacted] HAD ALSO COMPLAINED B1
ABOUT THE MILITIA PREVENTING THE ICRC FROM RENDERING MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN LIQUICA ON APRIL 6 AND 7.
ACCORDING TO [redacted] SUGIONO, WHILE CLEARLY AGITATED BY B1
[redacted] STATEMENTS, PLEADED IGNORANCE AND SAID HE DID NOT B1
KNOW WHETHER THE CIVILIAN MILITIAS WERE PRO-INDEPENDENCE OR PRO-INTEGRATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01808 03 OF 03 121258Z
OTHER VIOLENCE
---

13. (U) IN OTHER VIOLENCE, A WESTERN JOURNALIST NOW IN EAST TIMOR TOLD POLCOUNS LATE APRIL 11 THAT HE HAD A CREDIBLE REPORT THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY HAD KILLED TEN PEOPLE ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 9 NEAR THE TOWN OF ERMERA. A SEPARATE REPORT SOURCED TO PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURE MANUEL CARRASCALAO ALSO CLAIMED TEN DEAD IN THE SAME AREA BUT CLAIMED THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE ON APRIL 10. THE WESTERN JOURNALIST WAS AWARE OF TWO OTHER KILINGS OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE ON APRIL 10 AND A SEPARATE INCIDENT IN WHICH TWO WERE KILLED ON APRIL 11. ALL OF THESE REPORTS ARE UNCONFIRMED.

14. (U) THE GOVERNMENT NEWS AGENCY ANTARA, QUOTING MILITARY SOURCES, CLAIMS THAT PRO-JAKARTA MILITIA AND OTHER SUPPORTERS OF INTEGRATION WITH INDONESIA WERE ATTACKED ON THEIR WAY TO A RALLY OVER THE WEEKEND. THE ALLEGED ATTACK CAUSED NO INJURIES, ACCORDING TO THE REPORT.

FEAR IN DILI

15. (C) WESTERN JOURNALISTS IN DILI APRIL 12 TOLD POLCOUNS THAT ONE MILITIA GROUP LED BY ENRICO GUTTEREZ (NOT INVOLVED IN THE APRIL 6 LIQUICA INCIDENT) WAS DRILLING ON THE LAWN IN FRONT OF THE GOVERNOR'S PALACE. [redacted] VISITING DILI TOLD POLOFF THAT RUMORS B1
WERE CIRCULATING THAT THE RED AND WHITE MILITIA WAS ABOUT

TO ENTER THE CITY AND WOULD TARGET FOREIGNERS AS WELL AS PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. SHE ADDED THAT TNI SOURCES REPORTEDLY HAD PUT OUT THE WORD THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY WAS TAKING A "HANDS OFF" APPROACH. [redacted] B1
[redacted] CONFIRMED THE HIGH LEVEL OF FEAR IN DILI AND REPORTED THAT TWO OF THEIR KEY EAST TIMORESE EMPLOYEES, WHO WERE KNOWN TO BE PRO-INDEPENDENCE, HAD SOUGHT REFUGE "IN THE HILLS." CNRT ACTIVISTS IN DILI REPORTEDLY ALSO ARE IN HIDING. THE [redacted] PLAN TO DEPART DILI ON APRIL B1
13 FOR KUPANG, IN WEST TIMOR, WHERE THEY WILL WAIT UNTIL THE SITUATION NORMALIZES. [redacted] WHO HAS B1
EXPERIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND BOSNIA HAD TOLD HIS CHIEF THAT HE IS LEAVING EAST TIMOR BECAUSE IT IS TOO DANGEROUS. HE SAID THAT THE TNI-BACKED MILITAS ARE TARGETING JOURNALISTS, ESPECIALLY PHOTOGRAPHERS.

16. (C) AFTER THIS MESSAGE WAS COMPLETED [redacted] B1

[redacted] TOLD US THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAD AGREED TO ALLOW AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL TO INVESTIGATE THE LIQUICA INCIDENT. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART01908

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

Channel: n/a

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3917

E16

PAGE 01 JAKART 01908 01 OF 02 161052Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PM-00	
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/018W					

----------BCB380 161053Z /38

O 161011Z APR 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7256
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY ROME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001908

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 15 APR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 20 JUL 2004 200300722

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/01
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PINR, PINS, CASC, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01908 01 OF 02 161052Z
SUBJECT: MILITARY-BACKED MILITIAS TAKE CONTROL OF DILI

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).
2. (C) SUMMARY: MILITARY-BACKED, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS HAVE TAKEN CONTROL OF THE EAST TIMOR CAPITAL, DILI. PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE HAVE BEEN PUBLICLY THREATENED AND MANY LEADING PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS HAVE GONE TO GROUND. SOME HAVE FLED WITH THE INTENTION OF SEEKING POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AUSTRALIA. THE INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES ARE LENDING SUPPORT TO THIS MASSIVE DISPLAY OF MILITA STRENGTH WHICH BEGAN APRIL 16 AND IS

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

EXPECTED TO CULMINATE APRIL 17. THOSE CITIZENS WHO DO NOT FLY THE INDONEISAN FLAG ON APRIL 17 HAVE BEEN WARNED THAT THEIR HOUSES WILL BE SEARCHED. DEATH THREATS HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTEDLY MADE TO ICRC PERSONNEL IN THE CITY. CIVIL SERVANTS WHO DO NOT SUPPORT INTEGRATION HAVE BEEN WARNED TO SURRENDER THEIR JOBS, HOMES AND VEHICLES TO THE "PRO-INTEGRATION ADMINISTRATION." A SENIOR PRO-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE HAS TOLD US THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL CEASE PAYING SALARIES OF CIVIL SERVANTS REGARDED AS PRO-INDEPENDENCE. END SUMMARY

3. (U) [redacted] NOW IN DILI, EAST TIMOR, TELPHONED POLCOUNS LATE APRIL 16 TO REPORT THAT THE MILITARY-BACKED PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS HAD "TAKEN CONTROL" OF THE CITY. HE HAS OBSERVED "FULL MILITARY AND POLICE SUPPORT FOR THE MILITIA ACTIVITY" TO INCLUDE JOINT DETATCHMENTS OF MILITIA AND SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL (POLICE AND MILITARY) TRANSPORTED IN THE SAME TRUCKS. B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01908 01 OF 02 161052Z

4. (U) A CONGREGATION OF WHAT WAS BILLED AS REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE MILITIAS HELD A JOINT MILITARY EXERCISE ON THE LAWN IN FRONT OF THE GOVERNOR'S PALACE, MORNING APRIL 16. CITIZENS OF DILI HAVE BEEN WARNED TO FLY THE NATIONAL (INDONESIAN) FLAG FROM THEIR HOUSES ON APRIL 17 OR ELSE FACE SEARCHES OF THEIR HOUSES FOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE LITERATURE. INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS NOT WEARING THE NATIONAL COLORS ON THEIR SHOULDER APRIL 17 WILL BE "TREATED ACCORDINGLY" ACCORDING TO FLYERS DISTRIBUTED IN THE CITY.

5. (C) THE CNRT (PRO-INDEPENDENCE) OFFICE IN DILI HAS CLOSED. CNRT PEOPLE ARE NOW STAYING IN SAFE HOUSES WITH MANY CHANGING HOUSES EACH NIGHT. ANOTHER FOREIGN JOURNALIST WHO RETURNED ON APRIL 15 FROM DILI TO JAKARTA, TOLD POLCOUNS THERE WERE "ABOUT A DOZEN" CNRT MEMBERS WHO FLEW OUT WITH HER AND ARE SEEKING POLITICAL ASYLUM FROM THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT. THEY CLAIM THAT THEIR NAMES ARE ON THE MILITIAS' DEATH LIST. [redacted] ALSO TOLD POLCOUNS ABOUT A DEATH LIST WHICH HAD CAUSED MANY CNRT MEMBERS AND OTHER PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS TO GO INTO HIDING. B

6. (C) THREATS ARE NOT ONLY TO LOCAL CITIZENS. THE JOURNALIST NOW IN DILI SAID THAT SEVERAL ICRC PERSONNEL

HAVE RECEIVED "PERSONAL" DEATH THREATS IN RECENT DAYS. A UNDP-LED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION MISSION SCHEDULED TO MAKE AN ASSESSMENT VISIT TO DILI THIS WEEK HAS BEEN POSTPONED.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01908 01 OF 02 161052Z

7. (U) TWO OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS MILITA GROUPS HAVE ISSUED STATEMENTS IN RECENT DAYS ELABORATING THEIR THREATENING POSTURE TOWARD THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE. ONE SUCH STATEMENT IS SIGNED BY ENRICO GUTERES, ONE OF THREE MILITIA LEADERS WHO SIGNED A DEATH THREAT AGAINST AUSTRALIAN AID WORKERS, JOURNALISTS AND DIPLOMATS WHICH WAS HANDED TO THE AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DURING A VISIT TO JAKARTA IN MARCH.

8. (U) GUTERES, REPRESENTING "COMMAND-SECTOR B OF THE AITARAK" WARNS "ALL CIVIL SERVANTS WHO DO NOT SUPPORT INTEGRATION IMMEDIATELY TO TENDER THEIR RESIGNATIONS." MOREOVER, "ALL CIVIL SERVANTS WHO DO NOT SUPPORT INTEGRATION BUT WHO CONTINUE TO AVAIL THEMSELVES OF PRO-INTEGRATION FACILITIES SUCH AS GOVERNMENT HOUSING, CARS AND MOTORBIKES, (MUST) IMMEDIATELY SURRENDER THEM TO THE PRO-INTEGRATION ADMINISTRATION..." THE STATEMENT ALSO CALLS FOR THE "EXTERMINATION OF ALL THOSE WHO REPRESENT A THREAT TO INTEGRATION (WITH INDONESIA)." [redacted] B1
[redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS LATE APRIL 16 THAT, AT THE REQUEST OF THE MILITIAS, THE GOVERNMENT WILL CEASE PAYING THE SALARIES OF THOSE CIVIL SERVANTS REGARDED AS PRO-INDEPENDENCE ON MAY 1.

9. (U) THE "EAST TIMOR CLEANSING FRONT RIGHT WING MILITA - RED BLOOD" ISSUED A SHORTER STATEMENT SIGNED BY ITS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3918

PAGE 01 JAKART 01908 02 OF 02 161052Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00

NFAT-00 SAS-00 /018W
----------BCB392 161053Z /38
O 161011Z APR 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7257
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY ROME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001908

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/01
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01908 02 OF 02 161052Z
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PINR, PINS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: MILITARY-BACKED MILITIAS TAKE CONTROL OF DILI

"COMMAND CHIEF" LAFAIK SABURAI. THIS STATEMENT CALLS FOR ALL PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS TO RAISE THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL FLAG AND FLY IT FROM APRIL 15 TO MAY 15. "ALL THOSE THAT FAIL TO DISPLAY THE FLAG WE WILL CONSIDER TO BE OUR ENEMIES." THE STATEMENT CONTINUES, "IT IS REQUESTED THAT ABRI REMAIN IN AND SECURE THEIR RESPECTIVE POSTS."

10. (C) COMMENT: [redacted] B1
DESCRIBED APRIL 17 AS, "PERHAPS A LITTLE KRISTALL NACHT" BY THESE "ASIAN NAZIS." ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART02087

Channel: n/a

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

E22

PAGE 01 JAKART 02087 01 OF 02 261042Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/020W					

----------C08C7C 261050Z /38

O 261002Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7452
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY ROME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002087

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02087 01 OF 02 261042Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/26/04
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, MOPS, PINR, PINS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: SITUATION REMAINS EXTREMELY FRAGILE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: AN ATMOSPHERE OF INTIMIDATION, REPORTEDLY REINFORCED BY CONTINUED MILITIA SEARCHES FOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURES AND NIGHT-TIME SHOOTING INTO SOME NEIGHBORHOODS, HAS KEPT DILI ON EDGE. ONE MILITIA LEADER HAS CALLED FOR EXPULSION OF MIXED-RACE PERSONS

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 26 APR 2014
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

FROM EAST TIMOR. OUTSIDE OF THE CAPITAL, REPORTS ARE SKETCHY, AS MOST HUMAN RIGHTS NGO'S WHO NORMALLY REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS ARE THEMSELVES REPORTEDLY MILITIA TARGETS AND THUS UNABLE TO TRAVEL. PHONE LINES ARE REPORTEDLY CUT TO SOME AREAS. AN APRIL 26 SIGNING CEREMONY IN DILI FOR FORMATION OF THE PEACE AND JUSTICE COMMISSION (OR A COMMISSION TO MONITOR THE APRIL 21 TRUCE -- ACCOUNTS VARIED) LACKED REPRESENTATION FROM THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE DUE TO SECURITY CONCERNS AND THE INABILITY OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURES TO CONSULT WITH COLLEAGUES NOW IN HIDING. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) AMBASSADOR-LED EMBASSY TEAM NOW IN DILI REPORTS THE CITY IS CALM BUT THAT INTIMIDATION AND THREATS BY MILITIA PERSONNEL AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE CONTINUE. IN A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR, ONE MILITIA LEADER [redacted] ASSERTED THAT PERSONS OF MIXED TIMORESE-PORTUGUESE BLOOD (WHICH INCLUDE PROMINENT PRO- B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02087 01 OF 02 261042Z

INDEPENDENCE LEADERS LIKE MARIO CARRASCALAO), SHOULD BE EXPELLED FROM EAST TIMOR. THOSE SENIOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURES STILL IN DILI ARE CONTINUING A WEEKS-OLD PRACTICE OF SLEEPING IN DIFFERENT HOUSES EACH NIGHT. CONTACTS IN DILI EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER REPORTS OF MORE MILITIA RALLIES IN DILI DURING THE PERIOD APRIL 28 - MAY 1. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS OF A MILITIA RALLY SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 28 IN BAUCAU (SEE BELOW). WHILE SENIOR MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICIALS, IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE U.S. TEAM, ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED TO DISARM MILITIA RALLIERS, THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO COMMIT TO ACTUALLY UNDERTAKE THIS. AN EMBOFF WHO HAS VISITED EAST TIMOR 12 TIMES OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS LIKENED THE ATTITUDE OF [redacted] SENIOR OFFICIALS TO "THE KIND OF TOUGH TALK WE HEARD 30 MONTHS AGO," ADDING THAT "THEY DESCRIBE THE (NOW LEGAL) CNRT AS ILLEGAL AND CRIMINAL." B1

4. (C) A CEREMONY INAUGURATING THE "PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION" (OR POSSIBLE SIMPLY A COMMISSION TO MONITOR THE APRIL 21 "TRUCE" -- ACCOUNTS DIFFERED) DREW NO PRO-INDEPENDENCE REPRESENTATIVES. THE TWO PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIGNERS OF THE APRIL 21 "TRUCE" TOLD THE U.S. TEAM THAT THEY HAD NO SAFETY GUARANTEES TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CEREMONY AND MOREOVER HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONSULT WITH OTHER CNRT OFFICIALS (WHO ARE NOW IN HIDING) REGARDING

THE AGREEMENT. FOR THE MOMENT, THERE IS NO EXPECTATION AMONG PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE THAT ANY PEACE COMMISSION WILL BE IN A POSITION TO ACHIEVE ANYTHING.

5. (C) THE TEAM REPORTS IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02087 01 OF 02 261042Z
ASCERTAIN WHAT IS TRANSPIRING OUT OF THE CITY BECAUSE NGO'S [redacted] BELIEVE THEY B1
THEMSELVES WILL BECOME "TARGETS" IF THEY LEAVE THE CAPITAL. THE ICRC, APRIL 26, SENT ITS FIRST TEAM OUTSIDE OF DILI IN OVER A WEEK. THAT TEAM WILL ASSESS DEVELOPMENTS IN SUAI, WHERE MILITIA KILLINGS HAVE BEEN WIDELY RUMORED. THE U.S TEAM HAS ALSO HEARD REPORTS THAT APPEAR TO CORROBORATE OTHER ACCOUNTS OF INTIMIDATION IN LOS PALOS AND VIQUEQUE. SOME TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN CUT. ON THE OTHER HAND SOME ROAD BLOCKS WERE REPORTEDLY REMOVED OVER THE WEEKEND -- IT IS UNCLEAR WHY OR TO WHAT EXTENT. LOCAL MEDIA REPORT SEARCHES OF BUS PASSENGERS TRAVELING OUTSIDE OF DILI.

OTHER ACCOUNTS
---

6. (C) [redacted] INFORMS US THAT THE B1
OUTSKIRTS OF DILI REMAIN INSECURE WITH MILITIA FIRING INTO NEIGHBORHOODS SUCH AS BECORA AND KAMORO AT NIGHT TO INTIMIDATE THE POPULATION. THE MILITIA GROUP BESI MERAH PUTIH, JOINED BY THE POLICE AUXILARY KAMRA AND HANSIP (LOCAL GUARDS), REPORTEDLY ARE CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE FIGURES IN DILI -- USUALLY AT NIGHT.

7. (C) SINCE THE APRIL 21 TRUCE, [redacted] B1
ACCOUNTS OF TWO PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE DETAINED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 02087 02 OF 02 040959Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00

SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00
PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 MR-00 NFAT-00
SAS-00 /020W
----------C3EC55 041000Z /38

O 261002Z APR 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7453
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY ROME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002087

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/26/04
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, MOPS, PINR, PINS, CASC, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02087 02 OF 02 040959Z
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: SITUATION REMAINS EXTREMELY FRAGILE

AND TORTURED IN VIQUEUQUE. IN BAUCAU, PUBLIC SERVANTS HAVE BEEN COMPELLED BY THE MILITARY AND MILITIAS TO SIGN STATEMENTS SUPPORTING INTEGRATION AND "THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN EAST TIMOR." ALSO IN BAUCAU, [redacted] THAT HE IS FEARFUL THAT A REPORTED AN APRIL 28 MILITIA RALLY IN THE CITY COULD PARALLEL THE BLOODY APRIL 17 EVENTS IN DILI. B1

8. (C) [redacted] ARE AWARE OF POSSIBLE MILITIA RALLY PLANS IN COMING DAYS IN MELAYANA, ERMERA, SAME, MAUBUISSE, BALIBO, AND MANUTUTO (THE LATTER ALSO SET FOR APRIL 28 AS IN BAUCAU). IN LOS PALOS, EAST TIMORESE ARE BEING FORCED TO SWEAR TO SUPPORT THE AUTONOMY PLAN AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE JUNE 7 NATIONAL ELECTIONS. IN VIQUEQUE AND MELAYANA, ACCORDING TO [redacted] INFORMATION, MILITIAS ARE CONDUCTING SEARCHES FOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE FIGURES. B B

9. (C) COMMENT: THE TEAM'S OVERALL IMPRESSION, BASED ON

A DAY AND A HALF OF DISCUSSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS IN DILI, IS THAT THE SITUATION REMAINS EXTREMELY FRAGILE. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THEY DID NOT SENSE THAT IT IS NECESSARILY ON THE VERGE OF BREAKING DOWN INTO MAJOR VIOLENCE. REPORTS OF POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL MILITIA RALLIES ARE PARTICULARLY WORRISOME, HOWEVER, GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY THESE COULD LEAD TO BLOODSHED. THE AMBASSADOR DEPARTS ON THE MORNING OF APRIL 27 FOR BALI, WHERE HE HOPES TO MEET WITH THE REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02087 02 OF 02 040959Z

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART02160

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5502

E25

PAGE 01 JAKART 02160 01 OF 05 291117Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01
	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/023W					

----------C22194 291117Z /38

O 291031Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7524
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02160 01 OF 05 291117Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 002160

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, CASC, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S APRIL 25-27 VISIT TO EAST TIMOR

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR EMCWILLIAMS: REASON

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 28 APR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

1.5(D)

SUMMARY

2. (C) AN APRIL 25-27 VISIT TO DILI REVEALED A STRIKING DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE SITUATION AND ATTITUDES ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR AND THE UN-SPONSORED DIPLOMATIC PROCESS. DILI ITSELF WAS CALM ON THE SURFACE, BUT PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS REMAIN IN HIDING AS RUMORS CIRCULATED OF MORE IMPENDING MILITIA ATTACKS. CHURCH, NGO AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE CONTACTS SAW THE APRIL 21 "PEACE ACCORD" AS A SHAM AND BELIEVED RECONCILIATION EFFORTS WERE GOING NOWHERE. THE MILITIA AND THE SECURITY FORCES APPEAR TO BE ATTEMPTING TO DECAPITATE THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT BY INTIMIDATING, DRIVING UNDERGROUND, OR IN SOME CASES KILLING THE KEY LEADERS AND ACTIVISTS DOWN TO THE VILLAGE LEVEL. THEY HAVE ALREADY LARGELY SUCCEEDED IN DILI AND IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS, WHERE THE GUERRILLAS HAVE PULLED BACK FROM THE TOWNS AND DONE LITTLE TO COUNTER THE MILITIA. PRO-INTEGRATION

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02160 01 OF 05 291117Z

CONTACTS SAID THAT THE ONGOING MILITIA THREATS AND ATTACKS ON THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS WERE PART OF A "PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE" AND "SHOCK THERAPY" STRATEGY DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THE POWER OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES BEFORE ANY NEGOTIATIONS OR "DIALOGUE" TOOK PLACE. MILITIA LEADER EURICO GUTERRES, INTRODUCING A DISTURBING NEW ETHNIC ELEMENT INTO THE CONFLICT, ASSERTED THAT PRO-INDEPENDENCE PORTUGUESE-SPEAKING, MIXED-RACE EAST TIMORESE MUST BE EXPELLED FROM EAST TIMOR. ONE OF OUR MOST SEASONED, CREDIBLE OBSERVERS ARGUED THAT THE CONFLICT REFLECTED A HIGH-STAKES STRUGGLE WITHIN THE MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT IN JAKARTA, AND DISCOUNTED THE INFLUENCE OF MORE LOCALIZED FACTORS.

3. (C) NEUTRAL OBSERVERS STILL SEE THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION FAVORING INDEPENDENCE, BUT BISHOP BELO AND OTHERS BELIEVE ITIMIDATION TACTICS COULD SUCCEED IN PRODUCING A MAJORITY VOTE FOR AUTONOMY IF THE MILITIAS ARE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE OPERATING OR AN INADEQUATE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IS INTRODUCED. THE MILITIA PHENOMENON STILL REVOLVES AROUND A RELATIVE HANDFUL OF EAST TIMORESE WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE MILITARY. PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS REMAIN OPPOSED TO A ONE-MAN, ONE-VOTE CONSULTATION, ARGUING THAT IT WOULD PRODUCE WINNERS AND

LOSERS AND SPARK FURTHER VIOLENCE. THE MILITARY COMMANDER INSISTED THAT ANY CONSULTATION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES, WITH THE UN PRESENT ONLY IN A MONITORING ROLE. HE ADDED THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY, NOT THE UN, WOULD PROVIDE SECURITY. THE MILITARY AND THE PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS ALSO SEE THE "SOCIALIZATION" OF THE JAKARTA TWO-OPTIONS PROPOSAL BEING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02160 01 OF 05 291117Z

CARRIED OUT BY THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES, NOT THE UN. NGO CONTACTS AND BELO MAINTAIN THAT NO CONSULTATION PROCESS CAN BE FAIR WITHOUT A PERVASIVE UN PRESENCE DOWN TO THE VILLAGE LEVEL BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE VOTE. THERE HAS BEEN NO SERIOUS EFFORT TO BRING THE PERPETRATORS OF THE LIQUICA AND DILI KILLINGS TO JUSTICE. HUMANITARIAN WORKERS ARE UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE. CARE HAS CURTAILED OPERATIONS IN SOME AREAS DUE TO THREATS AGAINST ITS PERSONNEL, AND AN ICRC EAST TIMORESE EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN ARRESTED AND TORTURED BY THE MILITARY. END SUMMARY.

4. (C) AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY DATT, USAID DIRECTOR, AND POLOFF, VISITED DILI APRIL 25-27. HE MET WITH [redacted] B1

[redacted] MOST PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS WERE EITHER IN HIDING OR HAD FLED, BUT THE AMBASSADOR DID MEET BRIEFLY WITH [redacted] B1

ATMOSPHERE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5504

PAGE 01 JAKART 02160 02 OF 05 291117Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART02160

Channel: n/a

IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01
NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
IRM-09	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00
ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
NFAT-00	SAS-00	/032W				

----------C22197 291117Z /38

O 291031Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7525
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02160 02 OF 05 291117Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 002160

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, CASC, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S APRIL 25-27 VISIT TO EAST TIMOR

5. (C) DILI WAS CALM ON THE SURFACE, BUT PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS REMAIN IN HIDING AND NGO/HUMAN RIGHTS WORKERS CONTINUE TO RECEIVE THREATS. ONE OF OUR USUAL CONTACTS, [redacted] REMAINED IN DILI BUT WAS REPORTEDLY "CHANGING CARS AND LOCATIONS" SEVERAL TIMES PER DAY, AND WE WERE UNABLE TO MEET WITH HIM. OTHER PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS WERE SAID TO HAVE FLED TO THE HILLS OR TO AUSTRALIA, BALI, OR JAKARTA. THE MOOD AMONG OUR NGO INTERLOCUTORS WAS EXTREMELY TENSE, EVEN BY EAST TIMOR STANDARDS, AND RUMORS CIRCULATED THAT MILITIAS WILL AGAIN SWEEP THROUGH DILI BEFORE THE PLANNED MAY 5 SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT IN NEW YORK. RUMORED TARGETS WERE THE ICRC, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH COMMISSION OF

B

PEACE AND JUSTICE, AND YAYASAN HAK. MORE MILITIA RALLIES WERE PLANNED THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE IN THE FOLLOWING DAYS, AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT SECURITY AUTHORITIES WERE TAKING ANY STEPS TO HEAD OFF THESE EVENTS. (COMMENT: IN FACT ANOTHER MILITIA RALLY TOOK PLACE IN BALIBO ON APRIL 26. END COMMENT.)

LIQUICA, DILI, AND NOW SUAI...

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02160 02 OF 05 291117Z

6. (C) ACCORDING TO LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, MILITIAS IN SUAI NOW ARE CARRYING OUT AN OPERATION SIMILAR TO THOSE WHICH TOOK PLACE IN LIQUICA AND DILI, WITH AN AS YET UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF CASUALTIES AND DISPLACED PEOPLE. [redacted] HAD REPORTS THAT "40 TO 300 PEOPLE WERE KILLED," ADDING THAT THE TRUTH WAS PROBABLY SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN. [redacted] TEAM HAD LEFT FOR SUAI ON APRIL 26. THE PEACE AND JUSTICE COMMISSION PRODUCED A DETAILED LIST CONTAINING THE NAMES OF 28 PEOPLE REPORTEDLY KILLED IN SUAI. MILITARY COMMANDER COL. TONO SURATMAN MAINTAINED THAT FIGHTING IN SUAI HAD RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF ONE PRO-INTEGRATION SUPPORTER AND POLICE CHIEF TIMBUL SILAEN CLAIMED THERE WERE NO FATALITIES. B1 B1

"PEACE ACCORD" INSIGNIFICANT

7. (C) [redacted] CITED CONTINUING REPORTS OF INCIDENTS THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE, SUGGESTING THAT THE SITUATION HAS NOT STABILIZED. THE APRIL 21 "PEACE ACCORD," WAS CHARACTERIZED BY [redacted] AS PRIMARILY A PUBLICITY STUNT POSSIBLY HAVING A POSITIVE IMPACT IN THE SHORT TERM, BUT HAVING AN INSIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON LONG TERM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT. [redacted] SAID HE IS STILL RELUCTANT TO SEND PEOPLE TO LIQUICA BECAUSE IT IS NOT SAFE AND HE FEARS THAT [redacted] THERE WILL BE IN DANGER OF RETALIATION ATTACKS. HE ESTIMATED BETWEEN 2,000 AND 4,000 RESIDENTS OF LIQUICA, SOME OF THEM B1 B1 B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02160 02 OF 05 291117Z

WOUNDED, ARE STILL HIDING IN THE FORESTS.

STRATEGIES
---

8. (C) [redacted] SAID THE MILITIA AND B1
THE SECURITY FORCES APPEAR TO BE ATTEMPTING TO DECAPITATE THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT BY INTIMIDATING, DRIVING UNDERGROUND, OR IN SOME CASES KILLING THE KEY LEADERS AND ACTIVISTS DOWN TO THE VILLAGE LEVEL. THE MILITIAS WERE SAID TO HAVE A "BLACK LIST" CONTAINING THE NAMES OF ABOUT 300 TARGETED PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS. [redacted] B1
[redacted] VIEW, THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT A RELATIVELY SMALL CORE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE MILITIAS, WHILE "ALL THE OTHERS SAT BACK AND WATCHED." HE SAID KOPASSUS WAS STILL IN CHARGE OF EAST TIMOR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, BUT WAS NO LONGER INTERROGATING AND TORTURING SUSPECTS, HAVING "OUTSOURCED" THESE FUNCTIONS TO THE MILITIA GROUPS. MANY INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WEAR CIVILIAN CLOTHES AND THESE PERSONNEL ARE STILL ACTIVELY PROVIDING MONEY, WEAPONS AND FOOD TO THE MILITIA GROUPS, HE SAID.

9. (C) BISHOP BELO AND OTHER CONTACTS SAID THE STRATEGY OF NEUTRALIZING OR ELIMINATING INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS HAD ALREADY LARGELY SUCCEEDED IN DILI AND IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS. IN OUR CONVERSATION AT THE POLICE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5503

PAGE 01 JAKART 02160 03 OF 05 291117Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01
	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/023W					

----------C2219D 291117Z /38

O 291031Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7526
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02160 03 OF 05 291117Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 002160

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, CASC, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S APRIL 25-27 VISIT TO EAST TIMOR

B1

HEADQUARTERS [redacted] THE MILITIAS APPEAR TO BE OPERATING NOT ONLY WITH A CARTE BLANCHE FROM THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES BUT ALSO WITH LITTLE OPPOSITION FROM FALINTIL. ALTHOUGH THE FALINTIL GUERRILLAS PROBABLY WERE INVOLVED IN TWO KILLINGS OF PRO-INTEGRATION FIGURES IN RECENT WEEKS, OUR CONTACTS REPORTED THAT THE GUERRILLAS HAD PULLED BACK FROM THE TOWNS AND THEY HAVE DONE LITTLE TO COUNTER THE MILITIA ACTIVITIES.

B

10. (C) THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH A DELEGATION FROM THE FPDK [redacted] THESE PRO-INTEGRATION CONTACTS SAID THAT THE ONGOING MILITIA THREATS AND ATTACKS ON THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS WERE PART OF A "PSY-WAR" AND "SHOCK THERAPY" STRATEGY DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THE POWER OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES BEFORE ANY NEGOTIATIONS OR "DIALOGUE" TOOK PLACE. (COMMENT: "PSY-WAR" WAS A FAVORITE THEME OF GENERAL PRABOWO. END COMMENT.)

CONFIDENTIAL

A NEW RACIST THEME

11. (C) WE MET WITH EURICO GUTTERES AT HIS COMPOUND AT THE FORMER "TROPICALA" HOTEL, ONE BLOCK FROM THE HOUSE OF MANUEL CARRASCALAO IN CENTRAL DILI. THE MEETING WAS ARRANGED BY OUR MILITARY CONTACTS. AS WE SPOKE WITH GUTTERES IN THE COURTYARD OF THE FACILITY, A GROWING GROUP OF HIS MILITIA FOLLOWERS SILENTLY, AND SLIGHTLY MENACINGLY, GATHERED AROUND US, EXUDING AN AROMA OF ALCOHOL. GUTTERES' MAIN THEME WAS THE PERFIDY OF THE CARRASCALAO FAMILY, AND HE REPEATEDLY ASSERTED THAT PRO-INDEPENDENCE PORTUGUESE SPEAKING MIXED-RACE EAST TIMORESE (OF WHICH HE SAID MANUEL CARRASCALAO IS A PRIME EXAMPLE) MUST ALL BE EXPELLED FROM EAST TIMOR. HE MAINTAINED THAT THE ATTACK ON MANUEL CARRASCALAO'S HOUSE WAS JUSTIFIED BECAUSE "IT WAS APPROPRIATE THAT CARRASCALAO BE TAUGHT A LESSON." WORKING HIMSELF INTO AN EMOTIONAL FERVOR, GUTTERES MADE CLEAR HIS DISTASTE FOR JOURNALISTS AND FOREIGNERS, AND SAID EAST TIMORESE EXILES WOULD BE KILLED IF THEY TRIED TO RETURN.

12. (C) GUTTERES ALSO IS THE LEADER OF GADA PAKSI, A POSITION HE WAS GIVEN BY PRABOWO. [redacted] DESCRIBED GUTTERES AS NOW HAVING MORE REAL POWER THAN THE GOVERNOR OF EAST TIMOR. HE HAS RECENTLY MADE PUBLIC STATEMENTS CALLING FOR THE MILITIAS TO PURGE AND KILL ALL PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE IN EAST TIMOR. ACCORDING TO [redacted] HIS FOLLOWERS HAVE BEEN CONFISCATING THE CARS AND OTHER PROPERTY OF CIVIL SERVANTS SUSPECTED OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE B1 B1

SYMPATHIES. [redacted] SAID CIVIL SERVANTS WERE BEING COMPELLED TO SIGN STATEMENTS OF LOYALTY TO "THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA, THE MILITARY, AND THE MILITIAS." B

THE DARK FORCES

13. (C) IN TERMS OF OVERALL GOI/TNI STRATEGY IN EAST TIMOR, [redacted] ARGUED THAT THE CURRENT CONFLICT IN EAST TIMOR REFLECTED A MUCH BIGGER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT IN JAKARTA. HE DISCOUNTED THE INFLUENCE OF MORE LOCALIZED FACTORS. HE B

SPECULATED THAT DARK FORCES WITHIN THE MILITARY, POSSIBLY LINKED TO SOEHARTO OR PRABOWO INTERESTS, WERE PROMOTING THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR AS PART OF THEIR STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN JAKARTA. WHO ARE THE "GOOD GUYS AND BAD GUYS" IN THIS SCENARIO? [redacted] DESCRIBED COL SURATMAN AS "A DECENT MAN IN A VERY BAD SITUATION." HE ALSO SAID IT APPEARED THAT POLICE CHIEF SILAEN IS TRYING TO CARRY OUT HIS DUTIES DESPITE LACK OF MILITARY SUPPORT. THE POLICE, HE SAID, ARE ASHAMED OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN EAST TIMOR AND ARE TRYING THEIR BEST TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER WHILE THE ARMY STANDS BACK AND WATCHES. HE SAID THE POLICE NOW SOMETIMES REFUSE TO ACCEPT DETAINEES WHO HAVE ALREADY BEEN TORTURED BY THE MILITARY, NOT WANTING TO BE BLAMED FOR THE PRISONER'S CONDITION.

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5505

PAGE 01 JAKART 02160 04 OF 05 291118Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01
	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/023W					

----------C221A9 291118Z /38

O 291031Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7527
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02160 04 OF 05 291118Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 002160

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, CASC, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S APRIL 25-27 VISIT TO EAST TIMOR

14. (C) [redacted] (AND NUMEROUS OTHER CONTACTS) SAW MAJ. GEN. ADAM DAMIRI, THE REGIONAL COMMANDER IN BALI, AND HIS CHIEF OF STAFF, BRIG. GEN. SIMBOLON (A KOPASSUS OFFICER AND FORMER EAST TIMOR MILITARY COMMANDER WITH A BAD REPUTATION) AS REPRESENTING THE MORE PERNICIOUS FORCES. ALSO MENTIONED WERE MAJ. GEN. ZACKY ANWAR, WHO HAS A LONG ASSOCIATION WITH EAST TIMOR, AND MAJ. GEN. SYAHRIR, THE CURRENT KOPASSUS COMMANDER AND FORMER EAST TIMOR MILITARY COMMANDER. B1

BALANCE OF FORCES
---

15 (C) THE MILITIA ONSLAUGHTS HAVE DEFINITELY WEAKENED THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES. NEUTRAL OBSERVERS STILL SEE THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION FAVORING INDEPENDENCE, BUT BISHOP BELO AND OTHERS BELIEVE ITIMIDATION TACTICS COULD SUCCEED IN PRODUCING A MAJORITY VOTE FOR AUTONOMY IF THE MILITIAS ARE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE OPERATING OR AN INADEQUATE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IS INTRODUCED. THE MILITIA PHENOMENON STILL REVOLVES AROUND A RELATIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02160 04 OF 05 291118Z
HANDFUL OF EAST TIMORESE WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE MILITARY. [redacted] SAID THAT IF 50 HARD CORE MILITIA LEADERS AND PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS WERE REMOVED FROM THE SCENE, AND ABRI SUPPORT CEASED, THE MILITIA PHENOMENON WOULD EVAPORATE QUICKLY. THE MILITIA CAUSE HAS PROBABLY BEEN BOLSTERED, ESPECIALLY IN THE WESTERN BORDER DISTRICTS, BY INTIMIDATION ON THE PART OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, TO SUPPORT MILITIA CLAIMS THAT THE LIQUICA AND DILI VIOLENCE RESULTED FROM A POPULAR OUTPOURING OF ANTI-INDEPENDENCE SENTIMENT. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER B

THEIR INJECTION OF THE RACE ISSUE WILL RESONATE IN A POPULATION WHICH TRADITIONALLY HAS BEEN RELATIVELY TOLERANT OF ETHNIC DIFFERENCES.

UN PROCESS

16. (C) THE FPDK REPRESENTATIVES OPPOSED TO A ONE-MAN, ONE-VOTE CONSULTATION, ARGUING THAT IT WOULD PRODUCE WINNERS AND LOSERS AND SPARK FURTHER VIOLENCE. THE MILITARY COMMANDER MADE QUITE CLEAR THAT ANY CONSULTATION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES, WITH THE UN PRESENT ONLY IN A MONITORING ROLE. HE ADDED THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY, NOT THE UN, WOULD PROVIDE SECURITY. THE MILITARY AND THE PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS ALSO SEE THE "SOCIALIZATION" OF THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND THE PRO-INTEGRATION ACTIVISTS (IN MOST CASES ONE AND THE SAME), NOT THE UN. [redacted] OBSERVED THAT THE FPDK ALREADY WAS FORMING TEAMS FOR THE SOCIALIZATION B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02160 04 OF 05 291118Z

PROCESS. NGO CONTACTS AND BELO MAINTAIN THAT NO CONSULTATION PROCESS CAN BE FAIR WITHOUT A PERVASIVE UN PRESENCE DOWN TO THE VILLAGE LEVEL BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE VOTE.

ACCOUNTABILITY

17. (C) THERE HAD NOT BEEN ANY SERIOUS EFFORTS TO BRING THE PERPETRATORS OF THE LIQUICA AND DILI KILLINGS TO JUSTICE. [redacted] THE ONLY ACTION TAKEN THUS FAR IS THE ARREST OF FIVE PEOPLE FOR "DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY." THE POLICE COMMANDER MAINTAINED THAT 15 PERSONS HAD BEEN ARRESTED, BUT HE CITED DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING TESTIMONY AND NOT EXPECT ANY FURTHER ARRESTS. B1

RECONCILIATION

18. (C) AS IS CLEAR FROM THE ABOVE, RECONCILIATION EFFORTS APPEAR TO BE GOING NOWHERE AT PRESENT. AN APRIL 26 MEETING OF THE COMMISSION TO MONITOR THE APRIL 21 "PEACE AGREEMENT" (WHICH OUR NGO, CHURCH AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE CONTACTS LARGELY DISMISSED) DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PRO-INDEPENDENCE REPRESENTATIVES. PRO-INTEGRATION

FORCES SEEM DETERMINED TO FURTHER BUILD UP THEIR STRENGTH
BEFORE ENGAGING IN ANY DIALOGUE. BISHOP BELO DOES NOT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5507

PAGE 01 JAKART 02160 05 OF 05 291118Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01
	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/023W					

----------C221AD 291118Z /38

O 291031Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7528
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02160 05 OF 05 291118Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 002160

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, CASC, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S APRIL 25-27 VISIT TO EAST TIMOR

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

BELIEVE ANY RECONCILIATION MEETINGS (SUCH AS THE ONE HE HAD PLANNED FOR MID-MAY) CAN PROCEED UNDER THE CURRENT CONDITIONS. [redacted] B1

[redacted] WERE DISMISSIVE OF KOMNASHAM'S INVOLVEMENT, MAINTAINING THAT THE COMMISSION'S EFFORTS WERE UNSUSTAINABLE BECAUSE THEY HAD NO STRUCTURE ON THE GROUND TO MANAGE THE PROCESS. [redacted] WAS SAID B1 TO BE UNABLE TO TRAVEL TO DILI DUE TO FEARS FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY.

19. (C) [redacted] WAS UNCONCERNED ABOUT THE LACK OF SECURITY FOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS TO PARTICIPATE IN RECONCILIATION EFFORTS. HE SAID XANANA COULD SPEAK FOR THAT SIDE IN JAKARTA. USING LANGUAGE REMINISCENT OF WHAT WE WERE HEARING TWO YEARS AGO, [redacted] HARSHLY CRITICIZED THE CNRT, LABELLING MANUEL CARRASCALAO AND DAVID XIMENES AS "EXTREMISTS," AND ARGUING THAT "HARSH ACTIONS" MUST BE TAKEN AGAINST THE CNRT AND FALINTIL SINCE THEY HAVE BEEN "BOLD ENOUGH" TO KIDNAP AND KILL MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY. HE CHARGED CNRT

B1

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02160 05 OF 05 291118Z

AND FALINTIL MEMBERS WERE INTIMIDATING, PRESSURING AND COLLECTING MONEY FROM PEOPLE IN VILLAGES. HE CALLED THE CNRT AN "ILLEGAL" ORGANIZATION WHOSE LEADERS ARE VIOLATING THE LAW. [redacted] SAID, "THE PEOPLE UNDERSTAND THAT CNRT LIES AND THAT'S WHY THEY HAVE RISEN UP AGAINST THEM."

B1

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

20. (C) HUMANITARIAN WORKERS, BOTH EXPATRIATE AND LOCAL, ARE UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE. CARE HAS CURTAILED OPERATIONS IN SOME AREAS DUE TO THREATS AGAINST ITS PERSONNEL, MOST NOTABLY AN ACCUSATION FROM THE GOVERNOR THAT CARE FAVORED THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE. DUE TO THREATS AGAINST ITS PERSONNEL, [redacted] HAS BEEN UNABLE TO INVESTIGATE THE LIQUICA SITUATION. [redacted] STATED THAT THE MILITARY HAD ARRESTED AND TORTURED AN ICRC EAST TIMORESE EMPLOYEE. THE GOI CONINTUES TO BLOCK THE ENTRY OF FOREIGN DOCTORS AND DELIVERY OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES. HUMANITARIAN WORKERS ARE MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THOUSANDS OF EAST TIMORESE WHO HAVE

B1
B1

FLED, SOME WITH WOUNDS, INTO THE HILLS AROUND LIQUICA.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART02203

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3278

E26

PAGE 01 JAKART 02203 02 OF 02 031329Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W			

----------C38A1E 031337Z /38

O 031005Z MAY 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7577
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BONN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 002203

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/03/04
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02203 02 OF 02 031329Z
TAGS: PREL, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 3

WITH LOCAL VILLAGERS IN THE HIGHLANDS SOUTH OF LIQUICA (NOT FAR FROM ERMERA): POLOFF MET ONE WOUNDED MEMBER OF THE MILITIA WHO WAS TAKING REFUGE AT AN NGO FACILITY AFTER HIS FELLOW VILLAGERS HAD THREATENED HIM WITH DEATH. GIVEN THIS CONTEXT, IT IS PLAUSIBLE THAT THE 11 BODIES COULD BE SLAIN MILITIA MEMBERS. WHETHER THEY WERE KILLED BY FALINTIL GUERRILLAS OR BY ORDINARY VILLAGERS REMAINS UNCLEAR. END COMMENT.)

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 2 MAY 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

CNRT MEMBERS RECANT

7. (C) AT A MAY 1 CEREMONY ATTENDED BY THE GOVERNOR, MILITARY COMMANDER TONO SURATMAN, AND POLICE COMMANDER TIMBUL SILAEN, THE CNRT OFFICE IN THE EAST TIMORESE ENCLAVE OF AMBENO WAS "DISBANDED" AND THE LOCAL CNRT LEADERSHIP RECANTED THEIR SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE AND SWORE ALLEGIANCE TO INDONESIA AND SUPPORT FOR AUTONOMY. ACCORDING TO CNRT SOURCES, ON APRIL 26 A NEW MILITIA, "SAKUNAR," WAS FORMED IN AMBENO AND ALL CIVIL SERVANTS WERE COMPELLED TO SWEAR ALLEGIANCE TO MILITIA LEADER SIMAO LOPES. THERE HAD BEEN EARLIER REPORTS, CONFIRMED BY THE AUTHORITIES, THAT HOUSES OF INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS IN AMBENO HAD BEEN DESTROYED. AT THE MAY 1 CEREMONY, THE CNRT COORDINATOR FOR AMBENO, MARTINHO DA CUNHA, ANNOUNCED THAT CNRT MEMBERS IN AMBENO, AS WELL AS THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR, WERE DISBANDING THEIR ORGANIZATIONS, PROMISING ETERNAL LOYALTY TO INDONESIA, AND EXPRESSING THEIR WILLINGNESS TO FACE THE STRICTEST

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 - JAKART 02203 02 OF 02 031329Z

PUNISHMENTS PROVIDED BY LAW IF THEY VIOLATED THIS OATH. HE ADDED THAT NO CONSULTATION SHOULD BE HELD IN EAST TIMOR.

8. (C) COMMANDER TONO TOLD JOURNALISTS THAT DESPITE THE SUDDENNESS OF THE AMBENO CNRT MEMBERS' CONVERSION TO THE PRO-INTEGRATION CAUSE, "ABSOLUTELY NO FORCE HAD BEEN USED FROM ANY SIDE." TONO ADDED THAT 80 PERCENT OF THE CNRT MEMBERS IN AMBENO HAD BEEN CIVIL SERVANTS. (COMMENT: WHEN POLOFF VISITED AMBENO IN LATE FEBRUARY, THE CNRT HAD BEGUN CAMPAIGNING THROUGHOUT THE VILLAGES OF THIS ISOLATED ENCLAVE. AT THAT TIME THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY PRO-INTEGRATION ACTIVISM OR MILITIA ACTIVITY. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, FALINTIL HAS NEVER BEEN ACTIVE IN AMBENO. AS REPORTED SEPTEL, XANANA GUSMAO'S ADVISORS SAY THAT HE HAS ORDERED ALL CNRT MEMBERS IN EAST TIMOR TO DO WHATEVER NECESSARY TO ENSURE THEIR SURVIVAL, INCLUDING, IF NECESSARY, SWEARING TO UPHOLD INTEGRATION. END COMMENT.) ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3270

PAGE 01 JAKART 02203 01 OF 02 031329Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W			

----------C389F9 031336Z /38

O 031005Z MAY 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7576
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BONN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002203

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/03/04
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02203 01 OF 02 031329Z
TAGS: PREL, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 3

1. CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON 1.5 (D).

SUMMARY

2. (C) WHILE THREATENED MILITIA ATTACKS IN DILI DID NOT MATERIALIZE OVER THE MAY 1-2 WEEKEND, INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS, NGO'S, AND CHURCH LEADERS CONTINUE TO RECEIVE THREATS. THERE WERE REPORTS OF MILITIA DETENTIONS AND KILLINGS IN VIQUEQUE. THE GOI IS PUBLICIZING THE DISCOVERY OF 11 BODIES IN ERMERA WHICH IT CLAIMS ARE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA MEMBERS KILLED BY PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES TWO MONTHS AGO. IN THE EAST TIMORESE ENCLAVE OF

AMBENO, A GROUP OF CNRT MEMBERS PUBLICALLY RECANTED THEIR SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF THE GOVERNOR AND MILITARY AND POLICE COMMANDERS. THIS FOLLOWED THE APRIL 26 FORMATION OF A NEW MILITIA IN THE THIS PREVIOUSLY RELATIVELY QUIET DISTRICT. END SUMMARY.

DILI QUIET BUT THREATS CONTINUE

3. (C) DESPITE HIGHLY PUBLICIZED THREATS BY PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES TO "CLEANSE" DILI OF INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS DURING THE WEEKEND OF MAY 1-2, NO VIOLENT INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED IN THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL. ACCORDING TO JOURNALISTS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE SOURCES, SEVERAL PRO-INTEGRATION ROADBLOCKS WERE OPERATING IN DILI ON MAY 2. SOME OF THE MILITIA PERSONNEL AT THESE ROADBLOCKS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02203 01 OF 02 031329Z

REPORTEDLY WERE ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND GRENADES. INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS AND NGO WORKERS REPORTEDLY CONTINUE TO RECEIVE THREATS TO THEIR LIVES.

[redacted] TOLD US TWO ARMED B1
MEN VISITED HIS HOME DURING THE NIGHT OF APRIL 30 - MAY 1 AND THREATENED TO KILL HIM. THE SAME MEN LATER SHOWED UP AT HIS OFFICE. [redacted] WHO HAS B1
BEEN IN HIDING IN DILI SINCE MID-APRIL, WAS HIGHLY AGITATED WHEN HE PHONED POLOFF ON MAY 1 TO REQUEST THAT WE PRESS THE GOI FOR AN END TO THE MILITIA ACTIVITY.

VIOLENCE IN VIQUEQUE, LIQUICA

4. (C) ACCORDING TO CNRT SOURCES, MILITIA AND SECURITY FORCES MOUNTED AN OPERATION AGAINST INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS IN THE VIQUEQUE AREA APRIL 30-MAY 1, PRIMARILY TARGETING CIVIL SERVANTS AND TRADITIONAL LEADERS. CNRT CLAIMS TWO PERSONS WERE ARRESTED AND TWO KILLED ON APRIL 30 AT DILOR, WEST OF VIQUEQUE. FOUR PERSONS, INCLUDING AN ASSISTANT TO THE DISTRICT CHIEF AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE LOCAL AGRICULTURAL OFFICE, REPORTEDLY WERE ARRESTED BY MILITIA ON MAY 1 AND TAKEN TO THE MILITARY POST IN VIQUEQUE. [redacted] ARE REPORTING THAT ALL B1
RESIDENTS OF VILLAGES IN THE LIQUICA DISTRICT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO MOVE INTO TOWN, CREATING A POTENTIAL HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM AS THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED ARE CAMPED IN AND AROUND LIQUICA WITHOUT ADEQUATE FACILITIES. MOREOVER, INDONESIAN AND INTERNATIONAL AID AGENCIES (E.G. ICRC) STILL ARE UNABLE TO ACCESS LIQUICA TO AID THE DISPLACED AND WOUNDED. MILITIA FORCES WERE REPORTEDLY COMBING THROUGH THE NOW-ABANDONED

VILLAGES SEARCHING FOR TEENAGE BOYS, AND [redacted] B1
CONFIDENTIAL

BELIEVED TWO SUCH BOYS HAD BEEN KILLED IN RECENT DAYS.
(COMMENT. [redacted] ALSO HAS TOLD US OF THIS ORDER TO B1
EVACUATE THE VILLAGES. END COMMENT.)

BODIES FOUND NEAR ERMERA

5. (C) ON APRIL 30 AUTHORITIES BROUGHT JOURNALISTS TO ERMERA TO VIEW BODIES OF WHAT THEY CLAIMED WERE 11 MEMBERS OF THE RED AND WHITE MILITIA GROUP WHO HAD BEEN KILLED ON FEBRUARY 22. POLICE SAID THEY WERE HOLDING FOUR MEN INVOLVED IN THE KILLINGS, WHO WERE DESCRIBED AS "MEMBERS OF A PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUP." IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE SUSPECTS WERE FALINTIL GUERRILLAS. BISHOP BELO CONDEMNED THESE KILLINGS BUT POINTED OUT THAT THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES HAVE YET TO DEMONSTRATE THE SAME KIND OF DEDICATION TO LOCATING THE BODIES AND PROSECUTING THOSE GUILTY IN THE LIQUICA, DILI, AND SUAI VIOLENCE IN WHICH INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS WERE KILLED BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS.

6. (C) (COMMENT: POLOFF VISITED LIQUICA IN LATE FEBRUARY SHORTLY AFTER THESE KILLINGS ALLEGEDLY OCCURRED. CONTACTS AT THAT TIME HAD REPORTED THAT THE RED AND WHITE MILITIA WAS AGRESSIVELY ATTEMPTING TO EXPAND ITS OPERATIONS BEYOND ITS COASTAL BASES AND HAD MET STRONG OPPOSITION AND SUFFERED SIGNIFICANT CASUALTIES IN CLASHES

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTO7598

E-27

PAGE 01 STATE 084123 062329Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DS-00
	FBIE-00	FBO-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	OIC-02	PM-00	IRM-05	ASDS-01	SGHD-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	SAS-00	/016R				

DRAFTED BY: EAP/FO: IPCAMPBELL
APPROVED BY: EAP/FO:JHYLAND
----------C545B5 062329Z /38

O 062321Z MAY 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 084123

PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 002291 DATED 06 MAY 1999 SENT ACTION SECSTATE WASHDC INFO SECDEF WASHDC ASEAN COLLECTIVE BONN CANBERRA LISBON ROME TOKYO WELLINGTON GENEVA USUN NEW YORK COMMARFORPAC USCINCJPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION.
QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002291

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/04
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 084123 062329Z
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, ASEC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 6

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS GREGORY FERGIN; REASON 1.5(D).

SUMMARY

2. (C) ON MAY 5 PRO-INTEGRATIONIST MILITIA FORCES SURROUNDED THE HOME OF PROMINENT EAST TIMORESE HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 5 MAY 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2004 200300722

ANICETO GUTERRES AND THREATENED TO KILL HIM. GUTERRES IS NOW IN HIDING. DETAILS OF A MILITIA/SECURITY FORCES OPERATION IN AILEU REMAIN SKETCHY. PRO-INDEPENDENCE SOURCES CLAIM THAT MILITIAS CONTINUE TO INTIMIDATE RESIDENTS IN DILI. PRO-INTEGRATION SPOKESMEN HAVE SAID THEY WILL RESPECT THE TRI-PARTITE AGREEMENT AND UN PRESENCE BUT THREATEN TO WAGE GUERRILLA WAR IF AUTONOMY IS REJECTED. END SUMMARY.

YAYASAN HAK DIRECTOR THREATENED

3. (C) ACCORDING TO [redacted] IN DILI, THE B1
HOME OF YAYASAN HAK DIRECTOR ANICETO GUTERRES, LOCATED IN AN ISOLATED PART OF DILI, WAS SURROUNDED BY ARMED MILITIA MEMBERS, SOME WEARING MASKS, LATE IN THE DAY ON MAY 5. THEY THREATENED TO KILL GUTERRES, WHO WAS INSIDE THE HOUSE WITH HIS FAMILY. THIS FOLLOWED A PRESENTATION BY GUTERRES EARLIER THAT DAY AT A MEETING OF THE KOMNASHAM (NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION)-SPONSORED PEACE COMMISSION. GUTERRES REPORTEDLY SEVERELY CRITICIZED THE MILITIAS AT THAT MEETING. (GUTERRES ALSO AUTHORED A NEW YORK TIMES OP-ED PIECE, CRITICAL OF THE MILITARY AND THE MILITIAS, WHICH APPEARED IN THE MAY 5 EDITION.)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 084123 062329Z

ACCORDING TO [redacted] CONTACTED ON MAY B1
6, GUTERRES AND HIS FAMILY EVENTUALLY MANAGED TO LEAVE THE HOUSE SOMETIME DURING THE NIGHT AND ARE NOW IN HIDING. DATT CONTACTED THE OFFICE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER IN DILI ON MAY 6 TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY HAS ALSO BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES. A DELEGATION OF JOURNALISTS VISITED GUTERRES' HOME LATE IN THE EVENING ON MAY 5. ACCORDING TO THESE JOURNALISTS, MEMBERS OF THE UN TEAM CURRENTLY IN DILI HAD DECLINED REQUESTS THAT THEY ALSO GO TO THE HOUSE.

DETAILS ON AILEU STILL SKETCHY

4. (C) HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS IN DILI HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM ANY DETAILS REGARDING THE REPORTED OPERATIONS OF MILITIA AND SECURITY FORCES IN THE AILEU AREA SOUTH OF DILI. PRO-INDEPENDENCE SOURCES MAINTAIN THAT EURICO GUTERRES' "AITARAK" MILITIA CONTINUES TO PRESSURE RESIDENTS OF DILI TO SIGN PLEDGES OF SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATION, THREATENING THAT ANY WHO REFUSE TO SIGN WILL BE TAKEN AWAY DURING THE NIGHT. THEY CLAIM THAT ON MAY 5 AITARAK ABDUCTED MATEUS DA SILVA, A LOCAL CNRT LEADER IN DILI.

PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS PLEDGE TO RESPECT UN PRESENCE

5. (C) MILITIA SPOKESMAN BASILIO ARAUJO, ALONG WITH NATALINO MONTEIRO AND JOSE TAVERES (AN OFFICIAL AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE SON OF MILITIA COMMANDER JOAO TAVERES) HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN JAKARTA ON MAY 6. THEY SAID THEY WOULD RESPECT THE TRI-PARTITE AGREEMENT IN NEW YORK AND THE UN PRESENCE ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR, AS LONG AS UN OFFICIALS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 084123 062329Z
ACTED IN A NEUTRAL MANNER, ADDING THAT EARLIER THREATS AGAINST UN PERSONNEL BY PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS WERE MADE "IN THE HEAT OF THE MOMENT." (COMMENT: IT IS UNCLEAR TO WHAT DEGREE ARAUJO AND TAVERES SPEAK FOR MILITIA LEADERS SUCH AS EURICO GUTERRES AND CANCIO CARVALHO, WHO HAVE USED THE MOST THREATENING LANGUAGE IN REGARD TO UN PERSONNEL. END COMMENT.)

6. (C) [redacted] WAS LESS CLEAR ON THE B1
ISSUE, STRESSING THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS STILL OPPOSED A DIRECT BALLOT AND, WHILE FORCED TO ACCEPT THE UN PROCESS, WOULD "NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE CONSEQUENCES." HE SPECIFICALLY CRITICIZED AMBASSADOR MARKER, TAMRAT SAMUEL, AND FRANCESC VENDRELL AS UN OFFICIALS WHO FAVORED THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE. [redacted] MAINTAINED THAT IF THE CONSULTATION PRODUCED A PRO- B1
INDEPENDENCE VOTE, THE MILITIAS WOULD RETREAT TO THE HILLS IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS OF EAST TIMOR AND WAGE GUERRILLA WARFARE. ASKED ABOUT HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD OTHER FOREIGN PERSONNEL IN EAST TIMOR, [redacted] WAS CRITICAL OF THE AUSTRALIANS, ARGUING THAT THE B1
FORMER AUSTRALIAN AID DIRECTOR IN DILI HAD FAVORED THE INDEPENDENCE SIDE, AND POINTING OUT THAT "THE AUSTRALIANS HAVE ALREADY FLED FROM EAST TIMOR." HE SAID HE STILL VIEWED AMERICANS FAVORABLY, ESPECIALLY THOSE WORKING WITH THE USAID-SUPPORTED COFFEE PROJECT, BECAUSE THIS PROJECT "HAD MADE EAST TIMORESE PROUD." ROY
UNQUOTE TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1951

E28

PAGE 01 JAKART 02291 01 OF 02 061057Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FBO-01	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-05	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	SGHD-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/021W						

----------C4F224 061057Z /38

O 061052Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7631
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
COMMARFORPAC
CG III MEF//G-2//

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02291 01 OF 02 061057Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002291

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, ASEC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 6

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS GREGORY FERGIN; REASON 1.5(D).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 5 MAY 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2004 200300722

SUMMARY

2. (C) ON MAY 5 PRO-INTEGRATIONIST MILITIA FORCES SURROUNDED THE HOME OF PROMINENT EAST TIMORESE HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST ANICETO GUTERRES AND THREATENED TO KILL HIM. GUTERRES IS NOW IN HIDING. DETAILS OF A MILITIA/SECURITY FORCES OPERATION IN AILEU REMAIN SKETCHY. PRO-INDEPENDENCE SOURCES CLAIM THAT MILITIAS CONTINUE TO INTIMIDATE RESIDENTS IN DILI. PRO-INTEGRATION SPOKESMEN HAVE SAID THEY WILL RESPECT THE TRI-PARTITE AGREEMENT AND UN PRESENCE BUT THREATEN TO WAGE GUERRILLA WAR IF AUTONOMY IS REJECTED. END SUMMARY.

YAYASAN HAK DIRECTOR THREATENED

3. (C) ACCORDING TO [redacted] IN DILI, THE HOME OF YAYASAN HAK DIRECTOR ANICETO GUTERRES, LOCATED IN AN ISOLATED PART OF DILI, WAS SURROUNDED BY ARMED MILITIA MEMBERS, SOME WEARING MASKS, LATE IN THE DAY ON MAY 5. THEY THREATENED TO KILL GUTERRES, WHO WAS INSIDE THE HOUSE WITH HIS FAMILY. THIS FOLLOWED A PRESENTATION BY GUTERRES EARLIER THAT DAY AT A MEETING OF THE KOMNASHAM (NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION)- B1

SPONSORED PEACE COMMISSION. GUTERRES REPORTEDLY SEVERELY CRITICIZED THE MILITIAS AT THAT MEETING. (GUTERRES ALSO AUTHORED A NEW YORK TIMES OP-ED PIECE, CRITICAL OF THE MILITARY AND THE MILITIAS, WHICH APPEARED IN THE MAY 5 EDITION.) ACCORDING TO [redacted] CONTACTED ON MAY 6, GUTERRES AND HIS FAMILY EVENTUALLY MANAGED TO LEAVE THE HOUSE SOMETIME DURING THE NIGHT AND ARE NOW IN HIDING. DATT CONTACTED THE OFFICE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER IN DILI ON MAY 6 TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY HAS ALSO BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES. A DELEGATION OF JOURNALISTS VISITED GUTERRES' HOME LATE IN THE EVENING ON MAY 5. ACCORDING TO THESE JOURNALISTS, MEMBERS OF THE UN TEAM CURRENTLY IN DILI HAD DECLINED REQUESTS THAT THEY ALSO GO TO THE HOUSE. B1

DETAILS ON AILEU STILL SKETCHY

4. (C) HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS IN DILI HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM ANY DETAILS REGARDING THE REPORTED OPERATIONS OF MILITIA AND SECURITY FORCES IN THE AILEU AREA SOUTH OF DILI. PRO-INDEPENDENCE SOURCES MAINTAIN THAT EURICO GUTERRES' "AITARAK" MILITIA CONTINUES TO PRESSURE RESIDENTS OF DILI TO SIGN PLEDGES OF SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATION, THREATENING THAT ANY WHO REFUSE TO SIGN WILL BE TAKEN AWAY DURING THE NIGHT.

THEY CLAIM THAT ON MAY 5 AITARAK ABDUCTED MATEUS DA SILVA, A LOCAL CNRT LEADER IN DILI.

PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS PLEDGE TO RESPECT UN PRESENCE

5. (C) MILITIA SPOKESMAN BASILIO ARAUJO, ALONG WITH NATALINO MONTEIRO AND JOSE TAVERES (AN OFFICIAL AT THE DEPARTMENT OF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02291 01 OF 02 061057Z
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE SON OF MILITIA COMMANDER JOAO TAVERES) HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN JAKARTA ON MAY 6. THEY SAID THEY WOULD RESPECT THE TRI-PARTITE AGREEMENT IN NEW YORK AND THE UN PRESENCE ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR, AS LONG AS UN OFFICIALS ACTED IN A NEUTRAL MANNER, ADDING THAT EARLIER THREATS AGAINST UN PERSONNEL BY PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS WERE MADE "IN THE HEAT OF THE MOMENT." (COMMENT: IT IS UNCLEAR TO WHAT DEGREE ARAUJO AND TAVERES SPEAK FOR MILITIA LEADERS SUCH AS EURICO GUTERRES AND CANCIO CARVALHO, WHO HAVE USED THE MOST THREATENING LANGUAGE IN REGARD TO UN PERSONNEL. END COMMENT.)

6. (C) [redacted] WAS LESS CLEAR ON THE ISSUE, STRESSING THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS STILL OPPOSED A DIRECT BALLOT AND, WHILE FORCED TO ACCEPT THE UN PROCESS, WOULD "NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE CONSEQUENCES." HE SPECIFICALLY CRITICIZED AMBASSADOR MARKER, TAMRAT SAMUEL, AND FRANCESC VENDRELL AS UN OFFICIALS WHO FAVORED THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE. [redacted] MAINTAINED THAT IF THE CONSULTATION PRODUCED A PRO-INDEPENDENCE VOTE, THE MILITIAS WOULD RETREAT TO THE HILLS IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS OF EAST TIMOR AND WAGE GUERRILLA WARFARE. ASKED ABOUT HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD OTHER FOREIGN PERSONNEL IN EAST TIMOR, [redacted] WAS CRITICAL OF THE AUSTRALIANS, ARGUING THAT THE FORMER AUSTRALIAN AID DIRECTOR IN DILI HAD FAVORED THE INDEPENDENCE SIDE, AND POINTING OUT THAT "THE AUSTRALIANS HAVE ALREADY FLED FROM EAST TIMOR." HE SAID HE STILL VIEWED

B1

B1

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1952

PAGE 01 JAKART 02291 02 OF 02 061057Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FBO-01	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-05	SSO-00

STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 ASDS-01 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01
DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /021W
----------C4F226 061057Z /38

O 061052Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7632
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
COMMARFORPAC
CG III MEF//G-2//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002291

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02291 02 OF 02 061057Z
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, ASEC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 6

AMERICANS FAVORABLY, ESPECIALLY THOSE WORKING WITH THE USAID-SUPPORTED COFFEE PROJECT, BECAUSE THIS PROJECT "HAD MADE EAST TIMORESE PROUD." ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART02306

Channel: n/a

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8468

E29

PAGE 01 JAKART 02306 01 OF 02 070941Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	
	USIE-00	SGHD-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/014W			

----------C5730B 070941Z /38

P 070935Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7654
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002306

ROME FOR VATICAN
SEOUL FOR A/S ROTH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02306 01 OF 02 070941Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 7

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

SUMMARY

2. (C) MOST OF THE ADVANCE UN TEAM HAS ARRIVED IN DILI, WHICH

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 6 MAY 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2004 200300722

REMAINS QUIET. RECENT STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN DILI FAVORING INDEPENDENCE ARE NOT SANCTIONED BY THE CNRT, AND APPEAR TO INVOLVE A MORE RADICAL "SOCIALIST" GROUP. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS IN EAST TIMOR CONTINUE TO REPORT ARRESTS, TORTURE, AND KILLINGS BY MILITIAS AND REGULAR SECURITY FORCES OUTSIDE DILI. JOURNALISTS REPORT THAT AS MANY AS 20 THOUSAND VILLAGERS HAVE BEEN MOVED INTO THE LIQUICA AREA AS A RESULT OF A "CLEANSING" OPERATION BY MILITIAS WORKING CLOSELY WITH SECURITY FORCES, AND THREE THOUSAND MORE DISPLACED ARE TAKING REFUGE AT FATOBESSE, SOUTH OF LIQUICA. A KEY ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT HABIBIE SEES THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS AND UN PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR AS HELPING TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE MILITARY TO ACT CONTRARY TO GOVERNMENT POLICY. PREPARATIONS ARE GOING FORWARD FOR A POSSIBLE "DARE II" RECONCILIATION MEETING IN BALI, WITH XANANA GUSMAO POSSIBLY PARTICIPATING. THE GOI IS SENDING MIXED SIGNALS ON THE ISSUE OF XANANA'S RELEASE. THERE IS AS YET NO CLARITY ON THE SPECIFIC ROLES OF THE GROUP OF SIX COUNTRIES PROPOSED BY HABIBIE TO ASSIST IN THE UN PROCESS. END SUMMARY.

UN TEAM IN DILI

3. (C) MOST MEMBERS OF A UN TEAM CONSISTING OF PERSONNEL FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, AND THE OFFICES OF PEACEKEEPING AFFAIRS, LOGISTICS, AND SECURITY HAS ARRIVED IN DILI. THE REMAINDER ARE SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE ON MAY 8.

UNSANCTIONED DEMONSTRATIONS

4. (C) CONTACTS IN DILI REPORTED ON MAY 7 THAT THE CITY WAS CALM. PRO-INDEPENDENCE STUDENTS HAD HELD SMALL DEMONSTRATIONS DURING THE PREVIOUS THREE DAYS. THESE DEMONSTRATIONS WERE REPORTEDLY CARRIED OUT IN CONTRAVENTION OF ORDERS BY XANANA GUSMAO, AND THE STUDENTS RESPONSIBLE WERE BELIEVED TO BE AFFILIATED WITH THE TIMORESE SOCIALIST PARTY, WHICH REMAINS OUTSIDE THE CNRT UMBRELLA. SOME ON THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE, SUSPICIOUS OF THE BONA FIDES OF THE SOCIALISTS, ARE MAINTAINING THAT THE AUTHORITIES PERMITTED OR EVEN ENCOURAGED THESE DEMONSTRATIONS TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION TO THE UN PERSONNEL AND THE FOREIGN PRESS THAT CONDITIONS IN DILI HAD NORMALIZED.

CONTINUING VIOLENCE OUTSIDE DILI

5. (C) WHILE DILI REMAINS RELATIVELY CALM, HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS CONTINUE TO REPORT ARRESTS, TORTURE, AND KILLINGS BY

MILITIA AND REGULAR SECURITY FORCES IN OTHER AREAS OF THE PROVINCE. ACCORDING TO A DETAILED MAY 6 REPORT ISSUED BY THE BAUCAU BRANCH OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH PEACE AND JUSTICE COMMISSION, KOPASSUS PERSONNEL AND THE "59-75" MILITIA KILLED TWO CIVILIANS ON MAY 3-4 IN VIQUEQUE, WITH SEVERAL OTHERS ARRESTED AND BEATEN. THE REPORT INDICATES THAT SOME 20 YOUTH WERE ARRESTED IN VIQUEQUE IN MID-APRIL, SOME OF WHOM REMAIN IN

CUSTODY. ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSION REPORT, TWO CIVIL SERVANTS ARRESTED IN BAUCAU ON APRIL 12 IN CONNECTION WITH A BOMB EXPLOSION AT A POLICE POST HAVE BEEN RELEASED ON THE CONDITION THAT THEY WEAR RED AND WHITE KERCHIEFS AND ACTIVELY CAMPAIGN IN FAVOR OF AUTONOMY. THE REPORT ADDS THAT IN RECENT WEEKS THERE HAVE BEEN DOZENS OF ARRESTS AND DISAPPEARANCES INVOLVING CNRT ACTIVISTS DOWN TO THE VILLAGE LEVEL IN THE BAUCAU REGION. THE MAIN PEACE AND JUSTICE COMMISSION OFFICE IN DILI CLAIMS THAT IT HAS CONFIRMED THE KILLINGS OF AT LEAST 68 CIVILIANS IN THE PAST THREE WEEKS THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR.

THOUSANDS DISPLACED

6. (C) HUMANITARIAN WORKERS REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT DISPLACED VILLAGERS IN THE LIQUICA AREA, WHERE MILITIAS AND SECURITY FORCES HAVE FORCED VILLAGERS TO EVACUATE IN PREPARATION FOR "CLEANSING" OPERATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. [redacted] WHO TRAVELED TO LIQUICA ON MAY 6 REPORTED B1
THAT SOME 20 THOUSAND PEOPLE WERE CAMPED OUT IN AND AROUND THE TOWN WITH INADEQUATE FOOD AND HEALTH CARE, WITH SOME CHILDREN HAVING DISTENDED BELLIES. [redacted] B1
[redacted] REPORT THAT ANOTHER GROUP OF SOME THREE THOUSAND DISPLACED ARE LOCATED AT FATOBESSE, IN THE HILLS SOUTH OF LIQUICA. THIS REPORTER SAID IT WAS EVIDENT THAT MILITIAS AND

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	SGHD-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00

MR-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /014W
----------C573E2 070949Z /38

P 070935Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7655
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002306

ROME FOR VATICAN
SEOUL FOR A/S ROTH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02306 02 OF 02 070948Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 7

REGULAR POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES WERE WORKING TOGETHER CLOSELY IN LIQUICA.

HABIBIE ADVISOR CANDID ON ROLE OF MILITARY

7. (C) IN MAY 6 REMARKS TO THE AMBASSADOR, [redacted] B1
[redacted] CHARACTERIZED THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD IN PUBLICLY COMMITTING THE GOI TO SUPPORT THE UN PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR. [redacted] THE OBJECTIVE WAS B1
TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE MILITARY TO ACT CONTRARY TO THE GOVERNMENT'S UNDERTAKINGS.
[redacted] STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF INSERTING THE UN PRESENCE AS B1
SOON AS POSSIBLE AND MAKING THE PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION FUNCTIONAL. [redacted] EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE MOST RECENT B1
PROVOCATIONS BY THE MILITIAS REPRESENTED "LAST DITCH EFFORTS," WHICH WOULD CEASE WHEN THE UN PRESENCE WAS FULLY ESTABLISHED.

"DARE II" PREPARATIONS

8. (C) BISHOP BELO IS CONTINUING PREPARATIONS FOR A "DARE II" RECONCILIATION MEETING, PROBABLY TO BE HELD IN BALI. HE HAS MET WITH PRO-INTEGRATION AND CNRT LEADERS (IT IS NOT CLEAR WHICH CNRT LEADERS EMERGED FROM HIDING TO MEET BELO) AND ESTABLISHED AN ORGANIZING COMMITTEE. XANANA GUSMAO, AS HE HAS TOLD US, STRONGLY FAVORS HOLDING SUCH A MEETING OUTSIDE INDONESIA, BUT INTERNATIONAL NGO'S WORKING WITH THE CHURCH ON THIS FORUM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02306 02 OF 02 070948Z
BELIEVE XANANA WOULD ACCEPT BALI AS A VENUE IF SECURITY GUARANTEES WERE ADEQUATE.

MIXED SIGNALS ON XANANA RELEASE

9. (C) THE GOI CONTINUES TO SEND MIXED SIGNALS REGARDING XANANA'S RELEASE. [redacted] INDICATED THAT XANANA COULD BE FREED IN TIME TO ATTEND THE RECONCILIATION FORUM, AND ADDED THAT BISHOP BELO HAD CALLED JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI TO PROPOSE THIS. [redacted] BELIEVED THERE WAS MERIT IN HAVING XANANA PARTICIPATE IN THE CAMPAIGN LEADING UP TO THE AUGUST 8 VOTE. OTHER GOI OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO INDICATE THAT XANANA WILL ONLY BE RELEASED AFTER THE AUGUST 8 POLL. SOME, AT LEAST, EXPRESS PRIVATE CONCERNS OVER HIS SAFETY IF HE WERE RELEASED. [redacted] SAID THAT IN ANY CASE NO DECISION IS LIKELY UNTIL AFTER ALATAS RETURNS FROM NEW YORK.

B1
B1
B1

ROLE OF GROUP OF SIX STILL UNSPECIFIED

10. (C) [redacted] COULD PROVIDE NO SPECIFICS ON THE ROLE OF THE SIX COUNTRIES PROPOSED BY HABIBIE TO ASSIST IN THE UN OPERATION. [redacted] THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO INVOLVE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD SIGNIFICANT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDONESIA, THEREBY PROVIDING ADDITIONAL INCENTIVE FOR ALL CONCERNED TO AVOID ANY DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WOULD DAMAGE THESE RELATIONSHIPS.
ROY

B1
B1

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5341

E30

PAGE 01 JAKART 02360 01 OF 02 110923Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/014W		

----------C6C0F8 110923Z /38

O 110925Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7713
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002360

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/04
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02360 01 OF 02 110923Z
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 11

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

SUMMARY

2. (C) IN COMMENTS UNDOUBTEDLY DIRECTED AT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (AND INDICATIVE OF A STRUGGLE WITHIN THE GOI) FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS WARNED THAT INDONESIA'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 10 MAY 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2004 200300722

WILL BE DAMAGED IF SECURITY FORCES FAIL TO BRING THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR UNDER CONTROL. A TOP PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR HAS CAUTIONED THAT IF THE PEOPLES CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY REFUSES TO GO ALONG WITH AN EAST TIMORESE VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE, INDONESIA COULD BECOME AN INTERNATIONAL PARIAH. RELATIVE CALM RETURNED TO DILI ON MAY 11. [redacted] JUST BACK FROM FIVE DAYS IN EAST TIMOR, REPORTS THAT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND REMAINS ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED, WITH MILITIAS OPERATING AT WILL, RAIDING HOUSES AND SEEKING OUT INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS. LOPES DA CRUZ'S NEWLY FOUNDED PRO-INTEGRATION ORGANIZATION REPORTEDLY IS RECEIVING SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING. DESPITE THE TENSE ATMOSPHERE, DILI CONTINUES TO RECEIVE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL VISITORS. SOME PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE ARE TAKING TEMPORARY REFUGE IN BALI. END SUMMARY. B1

ALATAS WARNING

3. (C) IN MAY 10 COMMENTS TO THE PRESS, FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS WARNED THAT A FAILURE TO STOP VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR COULD FORCE DELAY OF THE CONSULTATION AND INCREASE INTERNATIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02360 01 OF 02 110923Z
PRESSURE FOR A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. HE SAID THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR WAS A TEST FOR INDONESIAN SECURITY PERSONNEL REGARDING "WHETHER THE TRUST GIVEN TO US TO KEEP PEACE AND ORDER IS WELL-FOUNDED." IF THE CONSULTATION PROCESS FAILED, INDONESIA'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION WOULD BE DAMAGED, THE FOREIGN MINISTER ADDED. (COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST TIME ALATAS HAS SO DIRECTLY CHALLENGED THE MILITARY ON EAST TIMOR, APPARENTLY INDICATING A GROWING STRUGGLE WITHIN THE GOI ON THIS ISSUE. END COMMENT.) PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR, QUOTED IN THE LATEST EDITION OF THE WEEKLY "TEMPO" NEWS MAGAZINE, ALSO CAUTIONS THAT IF THE PEOPLES CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY WERE TO REJECT A PRO-INDEPENDENCE CONSULTATION VOTE, INDONESIA COULD BECOME ANOTHER MYANMAR IN THE EYES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

CALM RETURNS TO DILI

4. (C) RELATIVE CALM RETURNED TO DILI ON MAY 11 FOLLOWING THE REPORTED DEPARTURE OF TEN TRUCKLOADS OF RED AND WHITE MILITIA, WHO RETURNED TO THEIR BASES IN LIQUICA AND MAUBARA LATE ON MAY 10. EVEN LOCAL MILITARY COMMANDER TONO SURATMAN, QUOTED IN "KOMPAS," ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WAS THE ARRIVAL OF THE RED AND WHITE MILITIA FORCES WHICH LED TO THE VIOLENCE ON MAY 11. A POLICE SPOKESMAN IN DILI MAINTAINED THAT POLICE HAD ATTEMPTED TO

HALT THE CONVOY OF MILITIA AS THEY ENTERED THE WESTERN OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY BUT THE MILITIA HAD BROKEN THROUGH THE POLICE BARRICADE. IN DILI, THE RED AND WHITE MILITIA JOINED WITH EURICO GUTERRES' "AITARAK" GROUP AND, WITH NO FURTHER RESISTANCE FROM SECURITY FORCES, ENTERED THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR AND SEVERAL NEIGHBORHOODS IN EAST DILI, ON MAY 10, LOOKING FOR INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS..

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02360 01 OF 02 110923Z

[redacted] NO CHANGE B1

5. (C) [redacted] B1

[redacted] CONCLUDED THAT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND REMAINS ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED, I.E., THE MILITIAS ARE STILL OPERATING AT WILL, BUT NOW REORIENTING THEIR STRATEGY AWAY FROM LARGER SCALE KILLINGS, SUCH AS THOSE IN LIQUICA AND DILI, TOWARD MORE SELECTIVE SEEKING OUT OF KEY PRO-INDEPENDENCE OPERATIVES. [redacted] B1

[redacted] ABLE TO OBSERVE TWO CAMPS HOUSING A TOTAL OF 800-1200 DISPLACED PEOPLE. (JOURNALISTS WHO RECENTLY VISITED LIQUICA HAVE REPORTED MUCH HIGHER TOTALS.)

PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS WELL FUNDED

6. (C) "TEMPO" REPORTS THAT GOVERNOR ABILIO SOARES HAS BEEN DIRECTED BY JAKARTA TO ALLOCATE 100 BILLION RUPIAH OF HIS 700 BILLION RUPIAH STATE BUDGET TO SUPPORT A NEWLY FOUNDED PRO-INTEGRATION ORGANIZATION, THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT (BRT). THIS FUNDING REPORTEDLY WOULD ENABLE BRT TO SET UP

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5342

PAGE 01 JAKART 02360 02 OF 02 110923Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00

NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /014W
----------C6C0FC 110923Z /38
O 110925Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7714
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002360

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/04
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02360 02 OF 02 110923Z
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 11

BRANCHES DOWN TO THE VILLAGE LEVEL. THE BRT IS LED BY AMBASSADOR AT LARGE LOPES DA CRUZ, WHO PRESIDED OVER ITS APRIL 29 ESTABLISHMENT IN DILI. GOI FUNDING OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES IS AN OPEN SECRET IN JAKARTA. A POLOFF CONTACT WHO WORKS FOR A MAJOR CONSULTING FIRM HERE REPORTS THAT HER COMPANY HAS BEEN AWARDED A GOI CONTRACT TO TRAIN THE PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING TECHNIQUES IN PREPARATION FOR THE "SOCIALIZATION" PROCESS PRECEDING THE AUGUST 8 CONSULTATION.

FLOW OF VISITORS CONTINUES

7. (C) DESPITE THE HIGH TENSIONS AND VIOLENCE IN DILI, THE FLOW OF FOREIGN VISITORS CONTINUES. ON MAY 11 THE SWEDISH AND BRAZILIAN AMBASSADORS WERE SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE, AS WELL AS THE NORWEGIAN CHARGE, AND THE FRENCH AND GERMAN MILITARY ATTACHES. A TEAM FROM CANBERRA AND THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN JAKARTA WILL TRAVEL TO DILI ON MAY 13 TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE OPENING OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE. A THREE-PERSON AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION, SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (KOMNASHAM) IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE THE SAME DAY.

INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS TAKE REFUGE IN BALI

8. (C) A NUMBER OF CNRT AND STUDENT ACTIVISTS, INCLUDING "SOLIDARITAS" LEADER ANTERO BENEDITO DA SILVA, ARE STAYING TEMPORARILY IN BALI, WAITING FOR THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR TO IMPROVE. [redacted] WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM BALI REPORTS THAT THESE EAST TIMORESE HAVE ESSENTIALLY TAKEN B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02360 02 OF 02 110923Z
OVER TWO HOTELS IN DENPASAR. THE STUDENT LEADERS ARE PLANNING TO SET UP GROUPS TO MONITOR THE CONSULTATION VOTE, AND HOPE TO RETURN TO EAST TIMOR BY THE END OF MAY.

MPR AND EAST TIMOR

9. (C) GUS DUR HAS TOLD THE MEDIA HE WILL ACCEPT A VOTE BY THE EAST TIMORESE FOR INDEPENDENCE. [redacted] B1
[redacted] HAS TOLD US THAT HER POSITION ON EAST TIMOR HAS NOT CHANGED AND REMAINS ESSENTIALLY THAT OF GUS DUR.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART02514

Channel: n/a

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

E34

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4926

PAGE 01 JAKART 02514 01 OF 02 210820Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/015W		

----------CB47CE 210820Z /38

O 210819Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7891
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002514

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02514 01 OF 02 210820Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 21

REF: JAKARTA 2506

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS GREGORY FERGIN; REASON 1.5(D).

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 MAY 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2004 200300722

2. (C) SUMMARY. IN A MAY 18 LETTER TO THE EAST TIMOR BISHOPS, FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS REJECTED AUSTRALIA AS A VENUE FOR A DARE II MEETING AND REACTED NEGATIVELY TO PARTICIPATION BY THE EXILED EAST TIMORESE POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS. FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH XANANA GUSMAO ON MAY 20, MINISTER OF INFORMATION YUNUS YOSFIAH SAID XANANA COULD NOT ATTEND MEETINGS OUTSIDE JAKARTA BUT ADDED THAT THE EXILED LEADERS, INCLUDING RAMOS HORTA, WERE FREE TO TRAVEL TO INDONESIA. IN A MAY 20 MEETING WITH [redacted] B1
[redacted] GEN. BAMBANG YUDHOYONO SAID THE MILITARY WOULD ADVISE ANY NEW GOVERNMENT TO CARRY THROUGH THE UN PROCESS ON EAST TIMOR. THE NEW EQUATION ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR RESULTING FROM THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA OFFENSIVES MAY BE ENHANCING THE PROFILE OF MORE RADICAL ELEMENTS ON THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE WHICH ARE NOT UNDER CNRT CONTROL. IN A MAY 21 TRIP FROM DILI TO MAUBARA, VISITING POLCOUNS FOUND NUMEROUS DESTROYED HOUSES AND BEDRAGGLED GROUPS OF DISPLACED PEOPLE, MANY OF WHOM WERE SUFFERING FROM HUNGER AND MALARIA. END SUMMARY.

MIXED SIGNALS ON EXILES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02514 01 OF 02 210820Z

3. (C) EMBASSY HAS OBTAINED A COPY OF ALATAS'S MAY 18 LETTER TO BISHOPS BELO AND BASILIO RESPONDING TO THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A DARE II MEETING IN AUSTRALIA. IN ADDITION TO REJECTING ANY FORUM IN AUSTRALIA, THE LETTER STATES THAT EXILED FIGURES SUCH AS MARI ALKATIRI, JOAO CARRASCALAO AND ESPECIALLY RAMOS HORTA SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN ANY SUCH MEETING BECAUSE THEIR PRESENCE WOULD ONLY UNDERMINE THE PROCESS AND CREATE CONTROVERSY. IT ADDS THAT THE FORUM SHOULD BE HELD IN EAST TIMOR ITSELF OR "IN ORDER TO OPEN THE POSSIBLITY THAT XANANA GUSMAO COULD ATTEND" IN JAKARTA. IN MAY 20 COMMENTS TO THE PRESS FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH XANANA, INFORMATION MINISTER YUNUS CONFIRMED THAT THE GOI WOULD NOT PERMIT XANANA TO LEAVE JAKARTA, BUT, CONTRARY TO THE POSITION TAKEN IN THE ALATAS LETTER, SAID RAMOS HORTA AND OTHER EXILES WERE FREE TO COME TO INDONESIA. XANANA'S STAFF TOLD US THAT THE MEETING WITH YUNUS WAS AT XANANA'S REQUEST, WHICH WAS SUBMITTED SOME TIME AGO. CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS, XANANA DID NOT MEET WITH JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI ON MAY 20. HIS SCHEDULED MAY 20 MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (REFTEL), WAS ALSO POSTPONED.

MEETING WITH BAMBANG YUDHOYONO

4. (C) [redacted] MET WITH TNI CHIEF B1
OF STAFF FOR TERRITORIAL AFFAIRS GENERAL BAMBANG YUDHOYONO ON
MAY 20. BAMBANG TOLD [redacted] THAT IT WAS TOO LATE FOR THE GOI B1
TO CHANGE COURSE ON EAST TIMOR AND THAT TNI WOULD ADVISE ANY NEW
GOVERNMENT TO SEE THE PROCESS THROUGH WHETHER THE RESULT WAS
AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. [redacted] SAID HE RAISED THE LATEST B1
KILLINGS IN ATARA, EMPHASIZING THAT THE CURRENT REPORTING COMING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02514 01 OF 02 210820Z
OUT OF EAST TIMOR WAS DISASTROUS FOR INDONESIA'S INTERNATIONAL
IMAGE. BAMBANG SAID THE ATARA INCIDENT WOULD BE INVESTIGATED.
HE CHARGED UN OFFICIALS IN EAST TIMOR OF BIAS, HOWEVER, AND
REPEATED ACCUSATIONS MADE BY MILITIA LEADERS THAT THE UN WAS
USING PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE AS TRANSLATORS.

PRO-INDEPENDENCE RADICALS EMERGING?
---

5. (C) EVIDENCE IS EMERGING THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA
OFFENSIVES, WHICH HAVE DRIVEN MORE MODERATE PRO-INDEPENDENCE
LEADERS OUT OF EAST TIMOR OR INTO HIDING, HAVE ENHANCED THE
PROFILE OF RADICAL PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS THAT ARE NOT UNDER
THE AUTHORITY OF CNRT AND XANANA. OUR CONTACTS REPORT THAT
THREE SUCH GROUPS ARE NOW ACTIVE: "AKTIVIST KEMERDEKAAN"
(POSSIBLY ALSO KNOWN BY THE ACRONYM APKT); RDTL ("REPUBLICA
DEMOCRATICA TIMOR LESTE"); AND PST (TIMORESE SOCIALIST PARTY).
THESE GROUPS WERE REPORTEDLY BEHIND RECENT STUDENT
DEMONSTRATIONS IN DILI WHICH WERE NOT SANCTIONED BY XANANA, WHO
COMPLAINED THAT THESE RALLIES PROVIDED A PRETEXT FOR MILITIA
ATTACKS.

6. (C) MODERATE PRO-INDEPENDENCE CONTACTS SUSPECT THAT THESE
MORE RADICAL GROUPS MAY BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO MANIPULATION BY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4927

PAGE 01 JAKART 02514 02 OF 02 210820Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02

G-00 MR-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /015W
----------CB47D1 210820Z /38

O 210819Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7892
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002514

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02514 02 OF 02 210820Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 21

INDONESIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. WHILE THIS IS A COMMON ACCUSATION MADE BY EAST TIMORESE AGAINST THEIR POLITICAL ENEMIES, THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT PST LEADER AVELINO MARIA COELHO DA SILVA IN PARTICULAR HAS LINKS WITH PROMINENT PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS SUCH AS LOPES DA CRUZ AND ABILIO ARAUJO. AVELINO RECENTLY EMERGED FROM 18 MONTHS IN THE AUSTRIAN EMBASSY IN JAKARTA, WHERE HE TOOK REFUGE AFTER BEING SOUGHT BY THE POLICE FOR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN A BOMB-MAKING PLOT. HE HAS EXPERIENCED NO PROBLEMS WITH THE AUTHORITIES SINCE HE LEFT THE EMBASSY.

7. (C) IN A RECENT MEETING WITH POLOFF, [redacted] SAID THEY BELIEVED THAT SOME OF THE RECENT ATTACKS ON PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS AND SECURITY PERSONNEL WERE CARRIED OUT NOT BY FALINTIL BUT BY PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MORE RADICAL GROUPS MENTIONED ABOVE. IN THE LATEST SUCH ATTACK, ACCORDING TO A PRESS REPORT, A GROUP OF UNKNOWN PERSONS ENTERED A HOUSE IN THE BAUCAU MILITARY

B

RESIDENTIAL COMPLEX ON MAY 19 AND SHOT TWO EAST TIMORESE SOLDIERS, KILLING ONE. (COMMENT: BAUCAU ALSO REPORTEDLY WAS THE SCENE OF A RECENT INTERNECINE CLASH BETWEEN SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) PERSONNEL AND REGULAR SOLDIERS. END COMMENT.)

OBSERVATIONS ON THE ROAD FROM DILI TO MAUBARA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02514 02 OF 02 210820Z

8. (C) VISITING POLCOUNS TRAVELED FROM DILI TO MAUBARA ON MAY 21. SOME 20 TO 30 PERCENT OF THE HOUSES ALONG THE ROAD HAD BEEN BURNED OR DISMANTLED AND MANY OF THE OTHERS WERE ABANDONED. "AITARAK" MILITIA ROADSIDE POSTS ON THE HIGHWAY OUTSIDE DILI WERE FLYING INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY-STRUGGLE (PDI-P) FLAGS, WHILE POSTS OF THE "BESI MERAH PUTIH" MILITIA, WHICH DOMINATED THE STRETCH OF ROAD AROUND LIQUICA AND MAUBARA, EXHIBITED GOLKAR BANNERS. THESE POSTS WERE MANNED BY LOUNGING MILITIA MEMBERS WITH HOMEMADE WEAPONS, BUT THERE WAS ONLY ONE ACTUAL ROADBLOCK, WHICH POLCOUNS WAS WAVED THROUGH.

9. (C) LOCAL RESIDENTS ALONG THE ROAD SAID THERE WERE MANY DISPLACED CAMPS IN THE AREA, BUT THESE WERE DIFFICULT TO ACCESS. THE BEDRAGGLED DISPLACED ALONG THE MAIN ROAD WERE COMPRISED MOSTLY OF MOSTLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN, WITH VERY FEW MEN PRESENT. CONTACTS SAID THAT MALARIA HAD BECOME PREVALENT AND FOOD WAS IN SHORT SUPPLY. THE MARKET IN LIQUICA WAS CLOSED AND AT THE MARKET IN MAUBARA THE CHEAPEST RICE WAS SELLING FOR 3,700 RUPIAH PER KILO, EXPENSIVE BY EAST TIMOR STANDARDS.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

<<<>>>

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5028

E35

PAGE 01 JAKART 02529 01 OF 04 240423Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FAAE-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01	NRCE-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W	

----------CC111A 240423Z /38

O 240422Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7906
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02529 01 OF 04 240423Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002529

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/06
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PREF, PTER, PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: MILITIA TERROR USED FOR "POLITICAL CLEANSING"

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 23 MAY 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2004 200300722

(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: MAY 21 TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF DILI REVEALED LARGE NUMBERS OF EAST TIMORESE DISPLACED BY MILITARY-BACKED MILITIAS' ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS TO THE WEST OF THE CAPITAL. THE ICRC AND OTHER OBSERVERS HAVE DESCRIBED THE PROCESS AS "POLITICAL CLEANSING" THAT TARGETS PRO-INDEPENDENCE POPULATIONS IN ADVANCE OF THE AUGUST 8 AUTONOMY-OR-INDEPENDENCE BALLOT. WHILE MANY ARE SHELTERING WITH THOSE WHO WERE NOT DISPLACED, MANY MORE ARE REPORTEDLY LIVING IN MILITIA AND MILITARY-CONTROLLED CAMPS UNDER CONDITIONS SAID TO BE UNHEALTHFUL AND ABUSIVE. INTERNATIONAL AGENCY AND NGO ACCESS TO THOSE IN AND OUTSIDE CAMPS IS BLOCKED BY HOSTILE MILITIA CHECKPOINTS AND ROAD BLOCKS. MEANWHILE, MILITIA ATTACKS ARE CONTINUING, GENERATING MORE DISPLACED PERSONS. MEETING URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF THESE DISPLACED PERSONS AND ASSURING THEIR RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE AUGUST 8 AUTONOMY-OR-INDEPENDENCE BALLOT WILL BE A MAJOR CHALLENGE FOR THE UN, INTERNATIONAL AID AGENCIES AND NGOS. THERE ARE SMALLER NUMBERS OF DISPLACED IN DILI

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02529 01 OF 04 240423Z

ITSELF, IN WEST TIMOR AND AN UNKNOWN NUMBER IN OTHER AREAS WHICH REMAIN BEYOND THE REACH OF AID AGENCIES AND THIS MAY 21 SURVEY. END SUMMARY

3. (U) DURING MAY 20-22 VISIT TO EAST TIMOR, POLCOUNS TRAVELED EAST FROM THE CAPITAL DILI, TO LIQUISA AND MAUBARRA, WEST TO HERA AND SOUTH TO DARE.

DISPLACED IN DILI

4. (SBU) FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, MILITARY-BACKED MILITIA HAVE BEEN FORCING EAST TIMORESE WHO SUPPORT AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR OR ARE SUSPECTED OF DOING SO FROM THEIR HOMES. IN DILI, MANY SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE "CNRT" HAVE FLED ABROAD OR TO SAFER INDONESIAN SITES. A GROUP OF 68 ARE HOLED-UP AT THE POLICE COMMAND COMPLEX IN CAMORO WEST OF DILI. EMBOFF VISITED THAT GROUP ON MAY 20 AND 21 AND DISCUSSED THEIR PLIGHT WITH [redacted] AND WITH THE EAST TIMORESE POLICE COMMANDER, COL. SILAEN. [redacted] TOLD EMBOFF THAT THE GROUP HAD SUFFICIENT FOOD BUT WAS STILL RECEIVING THREATS FROM MILITIAS IN DILI.

B
B

5. (SBU) HE COMPLAINED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST ANCETO GUTERRES FROM THE RESPECTED NGO YAYASAN HAK HAD BEEN DENIED PERMISSION TO MEET WITH HIM, EVEN WHEN HE APPEALED AS [redacted] ALSO COMPLAINED THAT SOME MEMBERS WERE PERIODICALLY PULLED OUT OF THE GROUP AT NIGHT FOR POLICE INTERROGATION. HE NOTED THAT THE GROUP HAD FLED TO THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS TO ESCAPE THE APRIL B6

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02529 01 OF 04 240423Z

17 VIOLENCE IN WHICH MORE THAN 12 OF THEIR ASSOCIATES HAD BEEN KILLED. INTERROGATIONS, HE SAID, SHOULD BE CONDUCTED AMONG THE MILITIAS WHO HAD BEEN THE ATTACKERS, NOT THEIR VICTIMS.

6. (SBU) AT THE REQUEST OF SEVERAL NGOS, EMBOFF RAISED "UNOFFICIALLY" IN A DISCUSSION WITH POLICE COMMANDER SILAEN WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE ESCORT FOR [redacted] TO THE HARBOR WHERE NGOS HAVE CLAIMED THEY COULD ARRANGE TRANSPORT TO FLORES ISLAND. REPORTEDLY, THE NGOS HAVE ARRANGED TEMPORARY DOMICILE THERE FOR THE GROUP UNTIL THE AUGUST 8 VOTE ON AUTONOMY-OR-INDEPENDENCE. EMBOFF EMPHASIZED TO SILAEN THIS WAS AN NGO PROPOSAL THAT HE HAD RAISED FOR DISCUSSION AND NOT A USG INITIATIVE. B6

7. (SBU) SILAEN SAID THAT SUCH A MOVE WAS UNNECESSARY AND THAT IN FACT, IT WAS TIME FOR THE GROUP TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IN DILI -- HE WOULD "GUARANTEE" THEIR SAFETY. RECALLING POLICE AND MILITARY INACTION DURING MILITIA ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE CIVILIANS IN DILI JUST ONE MONTH EARLIER, EMBOFF SUGGESTED THAT [redacted] AND NEUTRAL OBSERVERS MIGHT FIND THESE GUARANTEES LESS THAN COMPLETELY ASSURING. SILAEN SAID THAT, IN ANY EVENT, THE GROUP'S PRESENCE WAS DRAWING ON UNIT RESOURCES AND THAT THEY COULD NOT "STAY FOREVER." HE OFFERED NO SPECIFIC B6

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5030

PAGE 01 JAKART 02529 02 OF 04 240423Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FAAE-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-00	LAB-01

L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01	NRCE-00	NRRC-00
NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W	

----------CC111F 240424Z /38

O 240422Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7907
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02529 02 OF 04 240423Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 002529

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/06
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PREF, PTER, PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: MILITIA TERROR USED FOR "POLITICAL CLEANSING"

RESPONSE TO THE NGO OFFER BUT IN EMBOFF'S PRESENCE CONVEYED THE IDEA TO HIS "COMMANDER" (IT WAS UNCLEAR TO WHOM HE WAS REFERRING), WHO INTERRUPTED THE INTERVIEW WITH A PHONE CALL.

THE DISPLACED OUTSIDE DILI
---

8. (SBU) UNAMET, ICRC, CARE AND LOCAL NGO OFFICIALS TOLD EMBOFF THAT BECAUSE OF MILITIA ROAD BLOCKS AND CHECK POINTS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL THEY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH WHAT THEY KNEW TO BE LARGE NUMBERS OF DISPLACED PERSONS OUTSIDE DILI. OFFICIALS OF THE UN

ASSISTANCE TEAM IN EAST TIMOR (UNAMET) SAID THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED SUFFICIENT "ANECDOTAL" INFORMATION TO RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEM AS SERIOUS. THE ASSISTANCE TEAM'S PLAN OF ACTION INVOLVED RELYING ON LOCAL NGOS TO FOLLOW UP ON THE INFORMATION IT WAS COMPILING. UNAMET COULD ONLY BEGIN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF GUARANTEES OF "UNFETTERED ACCESS" TO ALL PARTS OF EAST TIMOR ONCE UNAMET PERSONEL HAD ARRIVED IN GRATER NUMBERS. [redacted] TOLD EMBOFF THAT HE WAS VERY WARY OF SENDING HIS PERSONNEL OUT, CLAIMING THEY B6

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02529 02 OF 04 240423Z

WOULD FACE SERIOUS RISKS OF DETENTION OR WORSE BY BOTH THE MILITIAS AND THE MILITARY.

9. (SBU) AT MID-DAY ON MAY 21, EMBOFF HEADED WEST IN A TAXI AND WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL THROUGH LIQUICA AND REACH MAUBARA, 90 MINUTES WEST OF DILI. HE WAS WAVED THROUGH APPROXIMATELY 15 CHECKPOINTS MANNED BY "AITARAK" MILITIA (TO A POINT MIDWAY BETWEEN DILI AND LIQUISA) AND "BESI MERAH PUTIH" (FROM THAT POINT ON TO MAUBARA). PERSONNEL AT THE CHECKPOINTS, MOST OF WHOM WERE RELAXING IN THE MID-DAY HEAT, WERE ARMED WITH MACHETES AND HOME-MADE FIREARMS.

10. (SBU) DISPLACED PEOPLE IN GROUPS OF TEN TO 100 WERE IN EVIDENCE ALONG THE ROUTE, IN MOST CASES SHELTERING WITH FAMILIES WHOSE HOUSES HAD ESCAPED ATTACK BY MILITIAS. IN ALL, APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF HOUSES HAD BEEN BURNED OR DISMANTLED, ALTHOUGH IN SOME AREAS THAT RATE WAS WELL OVER 50 PERCENT. IN LIQUICA TOWN, DISPLACED WERE SCATTERED IN SMALL GROUPS THROUGH THE MOSTLY SHUTTERED TOWN, RECOGNIZABLE BY THEIR DISHEVELED APPEARANCE. SOME CHILDREN HAD DISTENDED BELLIES AND ALL APPEARED DIRTY WITH RAGGED CLOTHING.

11. (SBU) IN MAUBARA, A SHOPKEEPER SAID THAT FOOD WAS THE PRINCIPAL CONCERN FOR THE DISPLACED AND THAT, IN FACT, IT WAS A CONCERN FOR LOCAL RESIDENTS AS WELL. TRADE HAD STOPPED, MARKETS WERE CLOSED (INCLUDING THE LARGE MARKET IN LIQUISA) AND RICE, WHEN IT COULD BE FOUND FOR SALE, HAD RISEN TO 3700 RUPIAH PER KG, MORE EXPENSIVE THAN IN JAKARTA. MANY OF THE DISPLACED HAD CONTRACTED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02529 02 OF 04 240423Z

MALARIA AND RESIDENTS WERE EXPERIENCING HIGHER INCIDENCE OF THE DISEASE AS WELL. AS BAD AS THINGS WERE, SHE SAID,

THE DIPLACED LIVING IN MILITIA AND MILITARY-CONTROLLED CAMPS WERE IN WORSE SHAPE. SOME OF THE DISPLACED IN MAUBARA, SHE SAID, HAD FLED FROM THESE CAMPS WITH GRIM STORIES. SHE CORROBORATED EMBOFF'S OBSERVATIONS THAT MOST OF THE DISPLACED WERE WOMEN AND CHILDREN, ADDING THAT MOST OF THE MALES HAD FLED TO THE HILLS. SHE ESTIMATED THAT HUNDREDS OF DISPLACED HAD FOUND SHELTER IN MAUBARA BUT THAT THOUSANDS WERE IN CAMPS OUTSIDE THE TOWN. (EMBOFF'S DRIVER REFUSED TO LEAVE THE MAIN ROAD TO SEARCH FOR THE CAMPS, FEARING HE WOULD BE DETAINED BY THE MILITIA OR MILITARY.)

12. (C) [redacted] B1

[redacted] TOLD EMBOFF THAT HE ESTIMATED THE DISPLACED POPULATION IN THE LIQUISA AREA TO BE IN EXCESS OF 20,000 (OF THE ROUGHLY 40,000 AREA POPULATION). SOME OF THE DISPLACED, HE SAID, HAD MADE THEIR WAY TO DILI (AND TO HIS CLINIC). HE DESCRIBED MILITIA, BACKED BY THE INDONESIAN MILITARY, AS CONDUCTING "POLITICAL CLEANSING SWEEPS" IN THE SEVEN VILLAGES SURROUNDING LIQUISA, FORCING ALMOST ALL INHABITANTS TO ABANDON THEIR HOMES -- MANY OF WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY BURNED. THE [redacted] ALSO B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5031

PAGE 01 JAKART 02529 03 OF 04 240423Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FAAE-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01	NRCE-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W

----------CC1122 240424Z /38

O 240422Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7908
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02529 03 OF 04 240423Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 002529

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/06
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PREF, PTER, PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: MILITIA TERROR USED FOR "POLITICAL CLEANSING"

DESCRIBED THE MILITIAS' ACTIONS AS "POLITICAL CLEANSING."

13. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE LARGEST POPULATION DISPLACEMENT HAD OCCURRED IN THREE VALLEYS WHICH JOIN AT THE POINT WHERE LIQUICA, BOBONARO AND ERMERA DISTRICTS MEET. THE POINT IS NEAR ATSABAE, ALSO THE SITE OF THE MAY 16 MILITIA KILLING OF APPROXIMATELY 20 CIVILIANS. THIS AREA HAS NOT BEEN SURVEYED BY OUTSIDE OBSERVERS SINCE THE ATTACKS BEGAN EARLIER THIS YEAR. WHILE NOT ABLE TO ESTIMATE NUMBERS, [redacted] RECALLED THAT MILITIA LEADER JOAO TAVARES HAD STATED PUBLICLY THAT HE HAD MOVED 1,000 FAMILIES FROM MALIANA (CAPITAL OF BOBONARO DISTRICT) TO CAILOCO, PURPORTEDLY TO PROTECT THEM FROM FALINITL (PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES) ATTACKS.

B1

B1

14. (C) [redacted] TOLD EMBOFF THAT THE DISPLACEMENT HAD TAKEN PLACE JUST AS THE COFFEE AND CORN HARVESTS WERE GETTING UNDERWAY. THERE WERE TWO PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THIS TIMING: MUCH OF THE CORN AND SOME OF THE COFFEE HARVEST WOULD LIKELY BE LOST (EMBOFF HEARD CONSISTENT REPORTS THAT MILITIA AND MILITARY

B

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02529 03 OF 04 240423Z

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL WERE ACCEPTING BRIBES TO ALLOW THE LUCRATIVE COFFEE HARVEST TO GO FORWARD). THE OTHER IMPACT WAS MORE WORRYING: THE PERIOD JUST BEFORE THE HARVEST IS WHEN THIS SUBSISTENCE POPULATION IS AT ITS MOST VULNERABLE AS SUPPLIES FROM THE PREVIOUS HARVEST DWINDLE OR ARE EXHAUSTED. [redacted] FOOD ASSISTANCE TO SOME COMMUNITIES, WHICH HAD CONTINUED UP UNTIL THE MILITIA ATTACKS HAD BEGUN, HAD IMPROVED PROSPECTS FOR THOSE FAMILIES ABLE TO TAKE THIS FOOD WITH THEM AS THEY FLED. OTHERS WOULD HAVE BEEN FORCED TO FLEE WITH LITTLE FOOD TO TAKE WITH THEM. B1

MILITIA ATTACKS STILL GENERATING DISPLACED

15. (C) A WESTERN JOURNALIST TOLD EMBOFF THAT ON MAY 18 HE HAD WITNESSED MILITIA (HE BELIEVED THEM TO BE BESI MERAH PUTIH) BURNING HOUSES IN THE AREA WEST OF MAUBARA ON THE ROAD TO ATSABAE. HE SAW 12-15 HOUSES TORCHED. IN FRONT OF A NUMBER OF THE HOUSES HE SAW THE FAMILIES DISPLACED BY THE BURNING, EACH CLUTCHING A FEW ARTICLES THEY HAD GATHERED UP BEFORE THEY WERE FORCED FROM THEIR HOMES. HE DESCRIBED THEM AS "SITTING BY THE ROADSIDE CLUTCHING THEIR PLASTIC POTS WAITING FOR THE MILITIA TO TAKE THEM SOMEWHERE." [redacted] CORROBORATED THE JOURNALIST'S ACCOUNT, BASED ON REPORTS HE HAD RECEIVED FROM NON-EXPAT SOURCES OF RECENT MILITIA ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS WEST OF MAUBARA. B1

16. (C) [redacted] B1

[redacted] CORROBORATED REPORTING BY A JAKARTA-BASED

WOMEN'S RIGHTS ADVOCATE (REFTEL) REGARDING CONDITIONS IN THE CAMPS FOR THE DISPLACED WHERE, THEY SAID, HEALTH-THREATENING AND POSSIBLY LIFE-THREATENING CONDITIONS OBTAIN. FOOD QUALITY AND QUANTITY, THEY CLAIMED, WAS INADEQUATE, AVAILABLE WATER WAS UNCLEAN, THERE WAS NO ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE AND THE DISPLACED SUFFERED ABUSIVE TREATMENT BY THE MILITIAS WHO, WITH MILITARY ASSISTANCE, RUN THE CAMPS. [redacted] CLAIMED THAT THE MILITIAS WERE "INDOCTRINATING" THE DISPLACED WITH A PRO-AUTONOMY MESSAGE. B

DISPLACED OUTSIDE OF EAST TIMOR

17. (U) A KUPANG-BASED LOCAL JOURNALIST TOLD EMBOFF THAT

APPROXIMATELY 1,500 PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE HAD FLED JUST OVER THE BORDER INTO WEST TIMOR, ESCAPING THE MILITIA ATTACKS IN WESTERN BOBONARO BY HEADING WEST. THESE DISPLACED WERE RELATIVELY WELL CARED FOR BY A LOCAL MILITARY COMMANDER WHO WAS A CHRISTIAN AND SEEMINGLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE DISPLACED. SEPARATELY, AN EXPAT JOURNALIST WHO VISITED THE AREA DESCRIBED THE DISPLACED IN THIS AREA AS LIVING IN SMALL (100-150) GROUPS UNDER THATCHED-ROOF EXTENSIONS TO SCHOOLS AND OTHER LOCAL FACILITIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5029

PAGE 01 JAKART 02529 04 OF 04 240423Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FAAE-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01	NRCE-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W	

----------CC1129 240424Z /38

O 240422Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7909
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02529 04 OF 04 240423Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 002529

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/06
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PREF, PTER, PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: MILITIA TERROR USED FOR "POLITICAL CLEANSING"

18. (C) COMMENT: FOR THOSE WHOSE HOMES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED AND WHOSE CROPS HAVE EITHER ROTTED IN THE FIELDS OR BEEN DESTROYED OR STOLEN BY THE MILITIAS, A NEAR-TERM RETURN HOME, PARTICULARLY BEFORE THE AUGUST 8 BALLOT, MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE. MEETING URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS WILL BE A PRIORITY ONCE INTERNATIONAL AGENCY/NGO ACCESS TO THESE GROUPS IS POSSIBLE. AS A SECONDARY CONCERN, ASSURING THEIR FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSULTATION PROCESS AND THE BALLOT, PARTICULARLY UNDER CAMP CONDITIONS, WILL BE PROBLEMATIC.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5183

E36

PAGE 01 JAKART 02532 01 OF 02 240537Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01	NRCE-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W	

----------CC14FC 240537Z /38

O 240536Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7913
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02532 01 OF 02 240537Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002532

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/06
TAGS: PHUM, PREF, MOPS, PTER, PINR, PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: MILITIA FACTIONALISM; REPORTED CLANDESTINE MILITARY ACTIVITY; FALINTIL CONTROL PROBLEMS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 23 MAY 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2004 200300722

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THERE IS ADDITIONAL ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE OF DIVISIONS AMONG MAJOR MILITARY-BACKED MILITIA GROUPS OPERATING IN EAST TIMOR. MEANWHILE, MILITARY SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS), ACCORDING TO TWO REPORTS, ARE DONNING POLICE UNIFORMS. THE FLIGHT OF YOUNG MALES TO THE HILLS TO ESCAPE MILITIA ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS REPORTEDLY IS POSING SUPPLY AND DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS FOR THE ARMED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE. END SUMMARY

3. (U) OBSERVERS IN DILI, EAST TIMOR SEE SIGNS OF GROWING CONTENTION AMONG THE VARIOUS MILITIAS WHO HAVE BEEN ATTACKING PRO-INDEPENDENCE CIVILIANS IN RECENT MONTHS. THE MILITARY-BACKED GROUPS APPEAR TO HAVE ESTABLISHED CONTROL OVER SPECIFIC TERRITORIES AND, AS REPORTED REFTEL, HAVE VARYING PERSPECTIVES ON THE SUBJECT OF COOPERATION WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS.

4. (U) ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE SUGGESTS SIGNIFICANT STRAINS

CONFIDENTIAL

BETWEEN THE "AITARAK" GROUP, WHICH LARGELY CONTROLS DILI AND ITS ENVIRONS, AND THE "TEAM SAKA" WHICH IS BASED IN THE BAUCAU AREA AND CONTROLS TERRITORY TO THE EAST OF A POINT ON THE DILI-MANATUTO ROAD. ACCORDING TO ACCOUNTS BY NGOS, WESTERN JOURNALISTS AND THE ICRC, TEAM SAKA, UNDER THE COMMAND OF "JOHNIQUO," EARLIER THIS MONTH MOVED TO DEFEND "LAHANAI" (PHONETIC) EAST OF DILI AFTER RESIDENTS SOUGHT PROTECTION FROM AN EXPECTED AITARAK ATTACK. AITARAK ARRIVED AND WAS CONFRONTED BY SAKA. AFTER A FACE-TO-FACE MEETING WITH JOHNIQUO, AITARAK LEADER EURICO GUTEREZ RETURNED TO DILI. SINCE THAT TIME, A CHECK POINT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY SAKA TO PREVENT ANY AITARAK ATTACKS EAST OF A POINT BETWEEN HERA AND MANATUTO.

5. (SBU) IN A SEPARATE, WIDELY RECOUNTED INCIDENT, AITARAK MILITIA REPORTEDLY THREATENED STUDENTS NATIVE TO BAUCAU IN MAY 10 VIOLENCE IN DILI. THE STUDENTS SOUGHT AND RECEIVED POLICE PROTECTION. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE POLICE TURNED THE STUDENTS OVER TO A COLUMN OF SAKA MILITIA WHICH ENTERED DILI FROM BAUCAU. THE SAKA COLUMN CARRIED THE STUDENTS SAFELY BACK TO BAUCAU. AITARAK REPORTEDLY STRONGLY PROTESTED TO THE POLICE OVER THE TURNOVER.

6. (SBU) THERE ALSO ARE LESS-DETAILED REPORTS OF THE KILLING OF A SAKA MILITIA COMMANDER'S BROTHER BY COMBINED AITARAK AND BESI MERAH PUTI FORCES IN SUAI DISTRICT IN LATE APRIL OR EARLY MAY. A SAKA UNIT REPORTEDLY WENT TO SUAI TO CAPTURE THOSE RESPONSIBLE BUT LEFT EMPTY-HANDED.

7. (SBU) TO THE SOUTH OF THE CAPITAL, THE LAST AITARAK

CHECK POINT IS AT THE PROVINCIAL GUEST HOUSE AT THE SOUTHERN FRINGE OF THE CITY. IT APPEARS THAT BOTH AITARAK AND BESI MERAH PUTIH OPERATE FURTHER SOUTH AS THEY HAVE PERIODICALLY INSIDE DILI (E.G., DURING THE APRIL 17-18 VIOLENCE IN THE CAPITAL BOTH UNITS WERE OPERATING). LOCAL PEOPLE ON THE MOUNTAINOUS ROAD TO ALIEU OUTSIDE DARE TOLD EMBOFF THAT BOTH BESI MERAH PUTIH AND AITARAK HAD TRIED (UNSUCCESSFULLY) TO INTIMIDATE YOUNG MEN AMONG DISPLACED STAYING WITH A LOCAL PRIEST TO JOIN THEIR UNITS RECENTLY.

8. (SBU) WEST OF DILI, BESI MERAH PUTIH MILITIA CONTROL AN AREA BEGINNING APPROXIMATELY FIVE KMS WEST OF THE CAPITAL, JUST INSIDE THE LIQUISA PROVINCE LINE. THERE WAS NO APPARENT HOSTILITY DETECTED BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS DURING A DRIVE ACROSS THE AITARAK/BESI MERAH PUTH BOUNDARY ON MAY 21, WITH THE ONLY DIFFERENCE OBSERVED BEING THE NATIONAL PARTY FLAGS DISPLAYED: MEGAWATI'S PDI-P FLAGS PREDOMINATED IN THE AITARAK AREA, AND AT AITARAK CHECKPOINTS. IN BESI MERAH PUTIH AREAS, GOLKAR AND PDI FLAGS WERE MOST COMMON.

9. (SBU) OBSERVERS, INCLUDING A WEST TIMOR JOURNALIST AND AN EXPAT JOURNALIST, BOTH OF WHOM TRAVELED IN WEST TIMOR NEAR THE WEST TIMOR-EAST TIMOR BORDER, TOLD EMBOFF SEPARATELY THAT MANY OF THE BESI MERAH PUTIH MILITIA (THE

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-00

LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01	NRCE-00
NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W	

--------------------CC3AF8 241314Z /68

O 240536Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7914
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02532 02 OF 02 241314Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002532

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/06
TAGS: PHUM, PREF, MOPS, PTER, PINR, PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: MILITIA FACTIONALISM; REPORTED CLANDESTINE MILITARY ACTIVITY; FALINTIL CONTROL PROBLEMS

KUPANG-BASED JOURNALIST SAID 60 PERCENT) WERE RECRUITED FROM AMONG WEST TIMORESE LIVING IN THE ATAMBUA AREA. SOME OF THESE INCLUDED YOUTHS BORN TO AN EARLIER GENERATION OF EAST TIMORESE WHO, IN 1975, FLED FROM CONFLICT IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS OF EAST TIMOR IN WHICH JAKARTA TROOPS FOUGHT WITH EAST TIMORESE FRETILIN. THE KUPANG-BASED JOURNALIST SAID THAT IN RECENT MONTHS THE MILITARY (HE SPECIFIED THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE "BIA") HAD GONE "DOOR-TO-DOOR" RECRUITING YOUNG MALES FOR THE BESI MERAH PUTIH AND THAT TRAINING OF THESE RECRUITS HAD TAKEN PLACE OUTSIDE ATAMBUA (BUT INSIDE WEST TIMOR).

ALLEGED CLANDESTINE INDONESIAN MILITARY ACTIVITY

10. (C) [redacted] B1
SAID THEY HAD RECEIVED SIMILAR REPORTS OF INDONESIAN
MILITARY CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITY. [redacted] CLAIMED B1
INDONESIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL DRESSED IN BLACK AND
WITHOUT IDENTIFYING INSIGNIA WERE "WALKING IN" TO EAST

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02532 02 OF 02 241314Z
TIMOR FROM THE WEST, POSSIBLY IN ACTIONS WHICH PARALLELED
ABRI ACTIONS IN 1975 WHEN "OPERATION KOMODO" UNITS
INFILTRATED INTO EAST TIMOR PRIOR TO THE INDONESIAN
INVASION. [redacted] AS WELL AS LOCAL AND EXPAT B1
JOURNALISTS, CLAIMED TO HAVE SIMILAR ACCOUNTS.

11. (C) A SENIOR NGO FIGURE AND A LOCAL JOURNALIST SAID
THAT THEY HAD HEARD REPORTS CLAIMING THAT SPECIAL FORCES
(KOPASSUS) PERSONNEL WERE DONNING POLICE UNIFORMS AND
THAT POLICE IN TURN WERE CHANGING TO THE UNIFORMS OF THE
POLICE AUXILARY (KAMRA). (NOTE: WE SHARED THIS
UNCONFIRMED REPORT WITH UNAMET WHICH PLANS TO EMPLOY
INTERNATIONAL POLICE AS ADVISORS TO THE EAST TIMORESE
POLICE.)
ROY

PROBLEMS OF FALINTIL CONTROL

12. (C) OBSERVERS COMMENTING ON THE IMPACT OF RECENT
MILITIA-GENERATED POPULATION DISPLACEMENT SAID THAT THE
FLIGHT OF MANY MALES TO THE HILLS (TO AVOID CAPTURE BY
THE MILITIAS) HAD PLACED A MULTIPLE BURDEN ON THE
FALINTIL. THE ARMED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE HAD RELIED
ON NETWORKS IN THE TOWNS AND VILLAGES FOR SUPPLY WHICH
WERE NOW DISRUPTED. MOREOVER, THE ARRIVAL OF THE FLEEING
CIVILIANS PUT PRESSURE ON EXISTING SUPPLIES. FINALLY,
THE NEWLY ARRIVED, UNTRAINED PERSONNEL, OFTEN SEEKING
REVENGE FOR ATTACKS ON THEIR FAMILIES, WOULD BE DIFFICULT
TO CONTROL AND DISCIPLINE -- CHAFING AT CURRENT CNRT
PRESIDENT XANANA GUSMAO'S STANDDOWN POSTURE FOR THE ARMED
RESISTANCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02532 02 OF 02 241314Z
ROY

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART02531

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3248

E37

PAGE 01 JAKART 02531 01 OF 03 251036Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CCO-00	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	INSE-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00
	AC-01	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00
	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W				

----------CCB53E 251230Z /38

O 240519Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7910
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 23 MAY 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 20 JUL 2004 200300722

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02531 01 OF 03 251036Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002531

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 6)
ROME FOR THE VATICAN
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/07
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREF, MOPS, PTER, PINS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: UNAMET IN EAST TIMOR: FACING A DANGEROUS,

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UPHILL BATTLE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: FOLLOWING INSINUATED THREATS AGAINST IT AND DIRECT THREATS AGAINST ITS LOCAL STAFF, THE UN ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR EAST TIMOR (UNAMET) HAS PUBLICLY CALLED ON THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO COMPLY WITH COMMITMENTS IT UNDERTOOK IN THE MAY 5 UN-BROKERED EAST TIMOR CONSULTATION ACCORD. UNAMET HAS ALSO SET DOWN SPECIFIC MARKERS WITH THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT REGARDING CONDITIONS WHICH MUST BE IN PLACE IF THE AUGUST 8 AUTONOMY-OR-INDEPENDENCE BALLOT IN EAST TIMOR IS TO GO FORWARD. THESE INCLUDE DISARMING THE MILITARY-BACKED MILITIAS, DISMANTLING MILITIA ROADBLOCKS, ENSURING GOI NEUTRALITY AND ALLOWING PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE TO CAMPAIGN. UNAMET PLANS TO COUNT ALL VOTES TOGETHER RATHER THAN ON A DISTRICT-BY-DISTRICT BASIS SO AS TO PRECLUDE CALLS FOR PARTITIONING EAST TIMOR. THIS APPROACH REFLECTS UNAMET CONCERN THAT

MILITIA INTIMIDATION COULD SUCCEED IN SWINGING THE VOTE IN SOME, PARTICULARLY WESTERN, DISTRICTS. THE CHURCH AS WELL AS PRO-AUTONOMY AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDES WILL BE INVOLVED IN THE VOTER REGISTRATION PROCESS TO PREVENT REGISTRATION FRAUD. UNAMET ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE "TERROR" UNLEASHED BY THE MILITIAS (WHICH CONTINUES) HAS SO TRAUMATIZED MUCH OF THE SOCIETY THAT A FREE AND FAIR VOTE MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE ON AUGUST 8. IN THAT EVENT, THE UN PLANS TO CALL FOR A POSTPONEMENT, BUT, IN ANY EVENT, TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENCE. END SUMMARY

PHYSICAL THREATS TO THE UNAMET ARE A GROWING CONCERN

4. (U) POLCOUNS, IN EAST TIMOR MAY 20-22, MET WITH MEMBERS OF THE UN ASSISTANCE MISSION TO EAST TIMOR (UNAMET) AT VARIOUS POINTS. DISCUSSIONS WITH UNAMET PERSONNEL INDICATED THE FLEDGLING ORGANIZATION IS PURSING ITS MISSION ASSERTIVELY AND IMAGINATIVELY, THOUGH IT CLEARLY REMAINS UNDERSTAFFED FOR THE TASK AT HAND.

5. (U) TWO OFFICIAL STATEMENTS BY UNAMET CHIEF DAVID WIMHURST DURING THE PAST WEEK PROMPTED SHARP RETORTS BY LOCAL MILITARY, JAKARTA POLITICAL AND MILITIA OFFICIALS.

UNAMET'S MAY 18 STATEMENT CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO CURTAIL THE MILITIAS, WHICH IT NOTED WERE ORGANIZED AND ARE SUSTAINED BY THE INDONESIAN MILITARY. IT SPECIFICALLY CONDEMNED THE MILITIA KILLING OF CIVILIANS IN ATSABAE AREA ON MAY 16. UNAMET CALLED FOR DEEDS AND NOT WORDS FROM THE GOI TO CREATE AN ACCEPTABLE SECURITY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02531 01 OF 03 251036Z

ENVIRONMENT FOR THE ELECTIONS, REMINDING THE GOI OF ITS MAY 5 AGREEMENT COMMITMENTS.

6. (U) THIS PRODUCED A SHARP PUBLIC RETORT BY EAST TIMOR MILITARY COMMANDER COLONEL TONO SURATMAN, WHO TOLD THE LOCAL PRESS THAT UNAMET SHOULD NOT ISSUE FURTHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS WITHOUT CHECKING ITS FACTS FIRST WITH HIS OFFICE. UNAMET ISSUED A SECOND PUBLIC STATEMENT MAY 20 IN WHICH IT SAID ITS PERSONNEL HAD WITNESSED INDONESIAN MILITARY TRAINING MILITIAS AT A MILITARY FACILITY IN THE ATSABAE AREA. JOURNALISTS, INCLUDING A REUTERS FILM TEAM AND AN NYT REPORTER, ALSO WITNESSED (AND RECORDED) THE TRAINING. THE STATEMENT ALSO CLAIMED THAT PRO-INDEPENDENCE GUERILLAS HAD KILLED THREE SOLDIERS IN ONE INCIDENT, A CLAIM DOUBTED BY [redacted] B1
(SEE SEPTEL).

7. (U) GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA REACTION TO THIS SECOND STATEMENT WAS MUCH SHARPER AND IN THE WORDS OF ONE UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICER WHO SPOKE TO EMBOFF, "MENACING." SURATMAN PUBLICLY QUESTIONED THE "RIGHT" OF UNAMET TO ISSUE STATEMENTS AND RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT UNAMET TEAM LEADER WIMHURST'S STATUS AND FUNCTION IN EAST TIMOR. PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR WARNED IN A TELEVISION COMMENT SEEN IN EAST TIMOR SAID THAT IF UNAMET CONTINUED TO ISSUE STATEMENTS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT, MILITARY AND MILITIAS, THE GOI WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ENSURE UNAMET PERSONNEL'S SECURITY. MILITIA SPOKESMAN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5128

PAGE 01 JAKART 02531 01 OF 03 240520Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01

OIGO-01	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00
IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01
NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01
PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
SAS-00	/023W					

----------CC13CE 240520Z /38

O 240519Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7910
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02531 01 OF 03 240520Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002531

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/07
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREF, MOPS, PTER, PINS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: UNAMET IN EAST TIMOR: FACING A DANGEROUS, UPHILL BATTLE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: FOLLOWING INSINUATED THREATS AGAINST IT AND DIRECT THREATS AGAINST ITS LOCAL STAFF, THE UN ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR EAST TIMOR (UNAMET) HAS PUBLICLY CALLED ON THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO COMPLY WITH COMMITMENTS IT UNDERTOOK IN THE MAY 5 UN-BROKERED EAST TIMOR CONSULTATION ACCORD. UNAMET HAS ALSO SET DOWN SPECIFIC MARKERS WITH THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AND

GOVERNMENT REGARDING CONDITIONS WHICH MUST BE IN PLACE IF THE AUGUST 8 AUTONOMY-OR-INDEPENDENCE BALLOT IN EAST TIMOR IS TO GO FORWARD. THESE INCLUDE DISARMING THE MILITARY-BACKED MILITIAS, DISMANTLING MILITIA ROADBLOCKS, ENSURING GOI NEUTRALITY AND ALLOWING PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE TO CAMPAIGN. UNAMET PLANS TO COUNT ALL VOTES TOGETHER RATHER THAN ON A DISTRICT-BY-DISTRICT BASIS SO AS TO PRECLUDE CALLS FOR PARTITIONING EAST TIMOR. THIS APPROACH REFLECTS UNAMET CONCERN THAT MILITIA INTIMIDATION COULD SUCCEED IN SWINGING THE VOTE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02531 01 OF 03 240520Z

IN SOME, PARTICULARLY WESTERN, DISTRICTS. THE CHURCH AS WELL AS PRO-AUTONOMY AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDES WILL BE INVOLVED IN THE VOTER REGISTRATION PROCESS TO PREVENT REGISTRATION FRAUD. UNAMET ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE "TERROR" UNLEASHED BY THE MILITIAS (WHICH CONTINUES) HAS SO TRAUMATIZED MUCH OF THE SOCIETY THAT A FREE AND FAIR VOTE MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE ON AUGUST 8. IN THAT EVENT, THE UN PLANS TO CALL FOR A POSTPONEMENT, BUT, IN ANY EVENT, TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENCE. END SUMMARY

PHYSICAL THREATS TO THE UNAMET ARE A GROWING CONCERN

4. (U) POLCOUNS, IN EAST TIMOR MAY 20-22, MET WITH MEMBERS OF THE UN ASSISTANCE MISSION TO EAST TIMOR (UNAMET) AT VARIOUS POINTS. DISCUSSIONS WITH UNAMET PERSONNEL INDICATED THE FLEDGLING ORGANIZATION IS PURSING ITS MISSION ASSERTIVELY AND IMAGINATIVELY, THOUGH IT CLEARLY REMAINS UNDERSTAFFED FOR THE TASK AT HAND.

5. (U) TWO OFFICIAL STATEMENTS BY UNAMET CHIEF DAVID WIMHURST DURING THE PAST WEEK PROMPTED SHARP RETORTS BY LOCAL MILITARY, JAKARTA POLITICAL AND MILITIA OFFICIALS. UNAMET'S MAY 18 STATEMENT CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO CURTAIL THE MILITIAS, WHICH IT NOTED WERE ORGANIZED AND ARE SUSTAINED BY THE INDONESIAN MILITARY. IT SPECIFICALLY CONDEMNED THE MILITIA KILLING OF CIVILIANS IN ATSABAE AREA ON MAY 16. UNAMET CALLED FOR DEEDS AND NOT WORDS FROM THE GOI TO CREATE AN ACCEPTABLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE ELECTIONS, REMINDING THE GOI OF ITS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02531 01 OF 03 240520Z

MAY 5 AGREEMENT COMMITMENTS.

6. (U) THIS PRODUCED A SHARP PUBLIC RETORT BY EAST TIMOR MILITARY COMMANDER COLONEL TONO SURATMAN, WHO TOLD THE LOCAL PRESS THAT UNAMET SHOULD NOT ISSUE FURTHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS WITHOUT CHECKING ITS FACTS FIRST WITH HIS OFFICE. UNAMET ISSUED A SECOND PUBLIC STATEMENT MAY 20 IN WHICH IT SAID ITS PERSONNEL HAD WITNESSED INDONESIAN MILITARY TRAINING MILITIAS AT A MILITARY FACILITY IN THE ATSABAE AREA. JOURNALISTS, INCLUDING A REUTERS FILM TEAM AND AN NYT REPORTER, ALSO WITNESSED (AND RECORDED) THE TRAINING. THE STATEMENT ALSO CLAIMED THAT PRO-
#]QQQGSP7ZXE?INDEPENDENCE GUERILLAS HAD KILLED THREE SOLDIERS IN ONE INCIDENT, A CLAIM DOUBTED BY [redacted] B1
(SEE SEPTEL).

7. (U) GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA REACTION TO THIS SECOND STATEMENT WAS MUCH SHARPER AND IN THE WORDS OF ONE UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICER WHO SPOKE TO EMBOFF, "MENACING." SURATMAN PUBLICLY QUESTIONED THE "RIGHT" OF UNAMET TO ISSUE STATEMENTS AND RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT UNAMET TEAM LEADER WIMHURST'S STATUS AND FUNCTION IN EAST TIMOR. PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR WARNED IN A TELEVISION COMMENT SEEN IN EAST TIMOR SAID THAT IF UNAMET CONTINUED TO ISSUE STATEMENTS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT, MILITARY AND MILITIAS, THE GOI WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ENSURE UNAMET PERSONNEL'S SECURITY. MILITIA SPOKESMAN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5130

PAGE 01 JAKART 02531 02 OF 03 240520Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01	NRCE-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	SGHD-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/022W					

----------CC13D3 240520Z /38

O 240519Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7911
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02531 02 OF 03 240520Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002531

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/07
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREF, MOPS, PTER, PINS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: UNAMET IN EAST TIMOR: FACING A DANGEROUS, UPHILL BATTLE

BASILIO ARAUJO, ON MAY 21, DISTRIBUTED MILITIA STATEMENTS ALLEGING "BIAS AND BLACKMAIL" BY UNAMET AND ASSERTING THAT "BLACKMAILERS SHOULD BE STOPPED."

8. (C) SEPARATELY, AN UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICER TOLD EMBOFF LATE MAY 21 THAT A "RELIABLE SOURCE" HAD REPORTED THAT INDONESIAN MILITARY SPECIAL FORCES ("KOPASSUS") HAD DIRECTED "MILITIA AGENTS" TO KIDNAP AND/OR HARM AN UNAMET MEMBER. UNAMET LEADER WIMHURST REQUESTED AND RECEIVED EXTRA POLICE PROTECTION FOR THE TEAM OFFICES (AT THEIR MAKOTA HOTEL HEADQUARTERS) AND CONVENED A MEETING OF ALL PERSONNEL, INCLUDING A VISITING UNHRC TEAM. [redacted] TOLD EMBOFF HE FOUND THE REPORT CREDIBLE AND DESCRIBED IT AS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR THE MILITARY TO "OUTSOURCE ITS DIRTY WORK TO THE MILITIAS." HE SAID THAT THREATS TO [redacted] IN THE PAST FOLLOWED A SIMILAR PATTERN WITH WHAT [redacted] PERCEIVED TO BE MILITARY ("USUALLY KOPASSUS") THREATS CHANNELED THROUGH SUCH GROUPS AS THE "GADA PAKSI," PREDECESSOR OF SOME OF THE CURRENT MILITIA GROUPS. IN ONE SUCH INSTANCE,

B
B
B

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02531 02 OF 03 240520Z
HE RECALLED, [redacted] TOOK A WEEK'S B1
"VACATION" IN BALI IN THE FACE OF A THREAT.

9. (C) A UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICER TOLD EMBOFF THAT UNAMET REALIZED CRITICAL STATEMENTS WOULD PRODUCE A SHARP REACTION BUT SAID IT HAD BECOME CLEAR THAT REMONSTRATIONS WITH THE MILITARY BEHIND CLOSED DOORS YIELDED NOTHING. MOREOVER, HE SAID, THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR WAS "UNACCEPTABLE AND WORSENING." UNAMET, HE CONTINUED, COULD NOT BE SEEN TO BE YIELDING TO INTIMIDATION OR THREATS. IT NEEDED TO AND WOULD CONTINUE TO SPEAK OUT ABOUT GOI NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE MAY 5 AGREEMENT.

10. (U) A MORE INDIRECT THREAT APPEARS TO HAVE SURFACED WITH MILITIA INTIMIDATION OF UNAMET LOCAL PERSONNEL, NOTABLY UNAMET INTERPRETERS, WHO HAVE BEEN PUBLICLY DESCRIBED IN MILITIA STATEMENTS AS "PRO-INDEPENDENCE." IN ADDITION, TWO WITNESSES OF THE MAY 16 MILITIA MURDERS IN ATSABAE HAVE BEEN THREATENED WITH DEATH BY THE MILITIAS, ACCORDING TO UNAMET AND [redacted] B1
[redacted] WHO SPOKE TO EMBOFF IN EAST TIMOR. SUMMING UP THE SITUATION, [redacted] TOLD JOURNALISTS AND THE AMNESTY B1
INTERNATIONAL TEAM THAT "WE HAVE TO BE REALISTIC, ONE OF US COULD BE KILLED."

11. (C) [redacted] B1
[redacted] TOLD EMBOFF MAY 21 THAT IT WAS COMMON BELIEF THAT THE MILITIAS PLANNED TO "WELCOME" THE FIRST CONTINGENT OF UNAMET POLICE ADVISORS "WITH THEIR GUNS." [redacted] ASSESSED THAT THE MILITIAS "WILL PROBABLY SHOOT B1
IN THE AIR OR AT US BUT NOT AT THEM (UNAMET)." HE NOTED,

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02531 02 OF 03 240520Z
AS DID OTHER OBSERVERS IN DILI, THAT THE MAY 10 VIOLENCE IN DILI IN WHICH SEVEN EAST TIMORESE DIED (REFTEL) WAS SPARKED IN PART BY A FALSE REPORT THAT UNAMET POLICE WOULD BE ARRIVING THAT DAY.

12. (C) [redacted] TOLD EMBOFF THAT B
HE WAS AWARE OF THESE REPORTS OF A "SPECIAL WELCOME" AND CONSIDERED SUCH A RESPONSE LIKELY. HE SAID THAT SHOULD IT COME, IT WOULD BE "CLEARED FROM ABOVE BUT IMPLEMENTED BY THE MILITIA." "PEOPLE WHO MAKE THE DECISIONS," HE CONTINUED, "ARE INVISIBLE SO THEY DON'T FEEL THE HEAT." HE DESCRIBED THE OVERALL MILITARY/MILITIA APPROACH AS HAVING A "PSY-WAR FEEL," WITH INTIMIDATION DIRECTED AT

BOTH THE LOCAL POPULATION AND THE UNAMET PERSONNEL.

THE UN APPROACH TO SECURING CONDITIONS FOR THE CONSULTATION BALLOT

---

13. (C) UNAMET OFFICIALS DESCRIBED BRIEFLY THEIR GAME PLAN FOR CREATING AN ACCEPTABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE AUGUST 8 BALLOT (SEE SEPTEL ON THE DATE DEBATE) AND THE CONSULTATION PERIOD PRECEDING IT. [redacted] UNAMET [redacted] TOLD EMBOFF THAT UNAMET HAD ALREADY SET DOWN "MARKERS" WITH COL. SURATMAN REGARDING WHAT WAS NECESSARY FOR A FREE AND FAIR BALLOT: B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5129

PAGE 01 JAKART 02531 03 OF 03 240520Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	OIGO-01	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01
	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/023W					

----------CC13D9 240520Z /38

O 240519Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7912
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02531 03 OF 03 240520Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002531

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/07
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREF, MOPS, PTER, PINS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: UNAMET IN EAST TIMOR: FACING A DANGEROUS, UPHILL BATTLE

-- MILITIAS MUST BE DISARMED AND ALL ACTS OF INTIMIDATION STOPPED. INDONESIAN LAWS WHICH PROHIBIT CIVILIANS FROM CARRYING FIREARMS SHOULD BE ENFORCED.

-- MILITIA ROADBLOCKS AND CHECKPOINTS MUST BE DISMANTLED.

-- THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE NEUTRAL ON THE QUESTION OF AUTONOMY/INDEPENDENCE, AS CALLED FOR IN THE MAY 5TH AGREEMENT. (ON THE MORNING OF MAY 22, MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE HANGING PRO-AUTONOMY BANNERS ON THE STREET DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF THE MAKOTA HOTEL, WHICH SERVES AS THE TEMPORARY UNAMET HEADQUARTERS.)

-- PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE MUST BE ALLOWED TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS IN THE COURSE OF THE CONSULTATION. (MOST SENIOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE ADVOCATES HAVE FLED EAST TIMOR OR ARE IN HIDING. EMBOFF SPOKE WITH ONE OF THE FEW REMAINING SENIOR CNRT LEADERS, [redacted] B1
[redacted] THE EAST TIMORESE POLICE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02531 03 OF 03 240520Z
COMMANDER, COL. SILAEN TOLD EMBOFF THAT GROUP MEMBERS COULD SAFELY RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND THAT HE GUARANTEED THEIR SAFETY. [redacted] SCOFFED AT B1
THIS ASSURANCE.)

14. (C) [redacted] TOLD EMBOFF THAT THEY B1
ANTICIPATED THAT THERE MIGHT BE PLANS BY PRO-AUTONOMY FORCES TO DEMAND PARTITION OF THE FOUR OR FIVE WESTERN DISTRICTS AND THE CAPITAL, DILI, WHERE MILITIA INTIMIDATION HAS BEEN MOST EXTENSIVE AND WHICH MIGHT THEREFORE YIELD A PRO-AUTONOMY VOTE. IN THOSE DISTRICTS

THE CHOICE MIGHT BE BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND CONTINUED TERROR. TO COUNTER THIS POSSIBILITY, UNAMET, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MAY 5 AGREEMENT, INTENDS TO COMPILE ALL VOTES AND NOT COUNT OR REPORT VOTES DISTRICT BY DISTRICT.

15. (C) UNAMET WAS AWARE OF REPORTS THAT FALSE ID'S WERE BEING PREPARED FOR WEST TIMORESE WHO WOULD BE MOVED ACROSS THE BORDER TO JOIN IN THE VOTING AS WELL AS FOR SOME INDONESIANS LIVING IN EAST TIMOR WHO WERE NOT ELIGIBLE TO VOTE. THERE WAS ALSO CONCERN THAT THE GOI MIGHT PROVIDE FALSE IDENTIFICATION TO INDONESIANS OUTSIDE OF EAST TIMOR WHO WOULD SEEK TO VOTE AS EAST TIMORESE NATIVES AT POLLING PLACES OUTSIDE EAST TIMOR. UNAMET PLANS TO HAVE REPRESENTATIVES FROM BOTH SIDES AT REGISTRATION POINTS AS WELL AS A LOCAL CHURCH REPRESENTATIVE WHO WILL BE ABLE TO POSE CHALLENGES WHERE REGISTRANT ID'S ARE SUSPECT. IN THE CASE OF CHALLENGES, THE CHURCH WILL BE ASKED TO AUTHENTICATE THE WOULD-BE REGISTRANT'S IDENTITY THROUGH CHURCH RECORDS. TO THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02531 03 OF 03 240520Z

EXTENT POSSIBLE, REGISTRATION WILL BE CONDUCTED AT LOCAL (SUB-DISTRICT OR VILLAGE) LEVEL, TO INCLUDE, WHERE NECESSARY, SEPARATE SUB-DISTRICT OR VILLAGE REGISTRATION TABLES AT DISTRICT LEVEL REGISTRATION CENTERS. WHILE THIS SYSTEM MIGHT NOT BE EFFECTIVE IN DEALING WITH FRAUD OUTSIDE EAST TIMOR, THE NUMBER OF THESE REGISTRANTS IS NOT EXPECTED TO BE LARGE AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME. FINALLY, REGISTRATION LISTS WILL BE PUBLISHED PRIOR TO THE BALLOT, ALLOWING FOR PUBLIC CHALLENGES.

16. (C) AN UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICER, WHO HAD BEEN IN EAST TIMOR FOR ALMOST ONE MONTH, CONCEDED THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR A FREE AND FAIR BALLOT BY AUGUST 8. HE SAID THAT THE GREATEST CHALLENGE WAS THE FACT THAT MANY EAST TIMORESE HAD BEEN SEVERELY TRAUMATIZED BY THE "TERROR" CREATED BY MILITIAS AND MILITARY OVER THE PAST FOUR MONTHS. (EMBOFF'S TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF DILI MAY 21 AND 22 CONFIRMED THIS ASSESSMENT, SEE SEPTEL.) HE SAID THAT THE UN WOULD NOT ALLOW THE BALLOTING TO GO FORWARD ON AUGUST 8 UNLESS APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS WERE IN PLACE. IF THEY WERE NOT, HE SAID, THE BALLOT WOULD BE POSTPONED -- "BUT WE WILL STAY."
ROY

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART02440

Channel: n/a

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7345

E31

PAGE 01 JAKART 02440 01 OF 02 171049Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SGHD-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/020W					

----------C93AB2 171049Z /38

O 171050Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7797
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002440

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02440 01 OF 02 171049Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: MAY 17 EAST TIMOR UPDATE: UN STRONGLY PROTESTS MILITAS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

SUMMARY

2. (C) THE UNITED NATIONS TEAM IN DILI HAS ISSUED A STRONG

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 17 MAY 2014
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2004 200300722

PROTEST OVER MILITARY-BACKED MILITIA ATTACKS IN DILI AND IN ATSABAE DISTRICT. THE MAY 17 STATEMENT CALLED FOR "DETERMINED ACTION ... NOT WORDS TO CURTAIL THE MILITIAS."
A WESTERN DIPLOMAT HAS PROVIDED AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF MILITIA ASSAULTS ON CIVILIANS IN DILI MAY 16. AN EAST TIMORESE MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION INSISTS THAT ANY CREDIBLE RECONCILIATION FORUM MUST BE HELD OUTSIDE INDONESIA AND INCLUDE XANANA. AN AMCIT PHYSICIAN HAS BEEN EXPELLED FROM DILI. END SUMMARY.

MORE REPORTS OF MILITIA OPERATIONS

3. (U) THE UNITED NATIONS TEAM IN DILI HAS ISSUED A STRONG PROTEST ADDRESSED TO THE GOI OVER ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY-BACKED, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS OPERATING IN EAST TIMOR. THE MAY 17 STATEMENT REPORTS THE KILLING OF AT LEAST FIVE AND POSSIBLY OVER 20 CIVILIANS BY THE "TIM PANCASILA" MILITIA IN ANTARA VILLAGE, ATSABAE DISTRICT. THE PROTEST READ IN PART: "WORDS BY THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ARE NOT ENOUGH. DETERMINED ACTION MUST BE TAKEN BY THE APPROPRIATE INDONESIAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES TO CURTAIL THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMED MILITIAS,

WHOSE MEMBERS ROAM THE STREETS OF DILI AND OTHER TOWNS IN EAST TIMOR AT WILL, SHOOTING CITIZENS AND BURNING HOMES." IN A SEPARATE STATEMENT TO THE MEDIA, UN MISSION SPOKESMAN DAVID WIMHURST SAID "THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE TAKING THIS MATTER UP WITH THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES BECAUSE IT IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE LACK OF SECURITY WHICH IS DESTABILIZING THE PEACE PROCESS." THE UN STATEMENT DESCRIBES THE "BRUTAL ATTACK" ON ATARA VILLAGE IN DETAILED TERMS: "THE GUNMEN PURSUED YOUNG PEOPLE FLEEING THE OWN NUMBER OF THEM." WE HAVE SIMILAR ACCOUNTS FROM THE CATHOLIC CHURCH'S "PEACE AND JUSTICE COMMISSION" AND FROM PRO-INDEPENDENCE SOURCES.

4. (C) [redacted] NOW IN DILI, TOLD US LATE MAY 17 BY TELEPHONE THAT SHE HAD WITNESSED "AITARAK" MILITIA ATTACKING HOUSES IN THE METIAUT DISTRICT OF DILI LATE MAY 16. THE ATTACK TOOK PLACE APPROXIMATELY 60 METERS FROM A RESTAURANT WHERE SHE, UN MISSION MEMBERS, ICRC STAFF AND JOURNALISTS WERE HAVING DINNER. THE MILITIA BEGAN BY SHOOTING AT THE HOUSES AND THEN SET THEM ON FIRE. A TELEPHONE CALL TO THE POLICE TO INTERVENE DREW NO RESPONSE. WHEN A SECOND ASSAULT BEGAN AGAINST HOUSES LOCATED ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RESTAURANT, THE EXPATS TELEPHONED THE MILITARY FOR ASSISTANCE IN GETTING OUT OF THE WORSENING SITUATION. THE MILITARY RESPONDED 50 MINUTES AFTER THE CALL AND ESCORTED THE GROUP TO ITS HOTEL. IT DID NOT ACT TO B1

CONTROL THE MILITIAS. ON THE MORNING OF MAY 17, AN INSPECTION OF THE SITE INDICATED THAT TEN HOUSES BELONGING TO MEMBERS OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE ORGANIZATION "CNRT" HAD BEEN BURNED AND OTHERS RANSACKED. SEPARATE FROM THE ABOVE MAY 16 ATTACKS IN DILI, PRO-INDEPENDENCE SOURCES CLAIM THAT THE AITARAK MILITIA ATTACKED AND BURNED THE
HOUSE OF A CNRT ACTIVIST, JOAO ALMEIDA, ON MAY 16 IN THE BIDAU SECTION

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02440 01 OF 02 171049Z
OF
DILI.

5. (C) YAYASAN HAK HAS RELEASED AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAY 9-10 VIOLENCE IN DILI WHICH REPORTED THREE DEATHS ON MAY 9 AND EIGHT FATALITIES ON MAY 10. THE REPORT, CITING SOURCES WITHIN THE MILITIAS, ALLEGES THAT AITARAK MILITIA OPERATIONS ON MAY 10 WERE SUPPORTED CLOSELY BY REGULAR MILITARY AND POLICE SPECIAL FORCES (BRIMOB) PERSONNEL, WHICH ESCORTED THE MILITIA PERSONNEL AS THEY DEPARTED THEIR HOTEL TROPIKAL BASE IN CENTRAL DILI. (COMMENT: OTHER REPORTS HAVE INDICATED THAT, LATER IN THE DAY, AT LEAST SOME POLICE PERSONNEL WERE ATTEMPTING TO DISCOURAGE THE MILITIA OPERATIONS. END COMMENT.)

AMCIT DOCTOR EXPELLED

6. (C) [redacted] B1
SPOKE WITH [redacted]ON SATURDAY AFTER HIS B1
INTERVIEW WITH IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES. THEY HAD DIRECTED HIM TO LEAVE DILI VIA A MAY 16 FLIGHT. JING
INFORMALLY AT A CHURCH CLINIC IN DILI TREATING VICTIMS OF RECENT VIOLENCE, HAS BEEN EXPELLED FROM EAST TIMOR BY LOCAL IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES THERE FOLLOWING A COMPLAINT BY LOCAL PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS THAT HE WAS WORKING ON A TOURIST VISA. THREE OTHER FOREIGN DOCTORS REMAIN AT THE CLINIC, WHICH NOW IS PROVIDING A

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7541

PAGE 01 JAKART 02440 02 OF 02 171121Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00

SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 SGHD-00
PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 MR-00 NFAT-00
SAS-00 /020W

----------C93DB9 171121Z /38

O 171050Z MAY 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7798
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002440

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02440 02 OF 02 171121Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: MAY 17 EAST TIMOR UPDATE: UN STRONGLY PROTESTS MILITAS

HIGH PERCENTAGE OF THE MEDICAL SERVICES NOW AVAILABLE IN DILI.
EMBASSY HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH HIM.

B1, B6

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

PAGE 01 JAKART 02459 01 OF 02 181000Z
ACTION EAP-01

E32

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/016W	

----------C9B651 181001Z /38

O 181001Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7822
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002459

SINGAPORE FOR A/S ROTH
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02459 01 OF 02 181000Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/06
TAGS: PHUM, PREF, PGOV, MOPS, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 18 -- THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED SAID TO BE IN DANGER

REF: JAKARTA 2440

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 17 MAY 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2004 200300722

2. (C) SUMMARY: DILI REMAINS RELATIVELY QUIET BUT HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS ARE STILL ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN ATSABE, WHERE THE DEATH TOLL REPORTEDLY HAS RISEN TO 12. THREE SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY WERE SHOT DEAD IN A MAY 16 AMBUSH NEAR THE WEST TIMOR BORDER. RESPECTED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS HAVE COMPLETED A NINE-DAY SURVEY OF CONDITIONS IN DISPLACED PERSON CAMPS IN EAST TIMOR. THEY REPORT THE POPULATION OF OVER 35,000, MOSTLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN, LACK CLEAN WATER, FOOD AND MEDICAL CARE. ANYONE SEEKING TO LEAVE THE CAMPS FACES ASSAULTS BY MILITARY-BACKED MILITIAS WHO GUARD THE CAMPS AND OPERATE ROAD BLOCKS. IN SOME CAMPS, MALES REPORTEDLY ARE STILL BEING TAKEN AWAY AT NIGHT BY THE MILITIAS. REPORTEDLY, WOMEN HAVE SUFFERED SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RAPE AT THE HANDS OF THE MILITIAS. THE ACTIVISTS SAY WOMEN ARE HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL AT A MILITIA HEADQUARTERS IN DILI. THE ACTIVISTS BELIEVE THAT THERE IS AN INFORMAL CHAIN OF COMMAND IN DILI WITH SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL (KOPASSUS) WHO HAVE PREVIOUS SERVICE IN DILI IN CHARGE OF THE MILITIAS. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02459 01 OF 02 181000Z

MORE DEATHS REPORTED IN ATSABE

3. (C) CONTACTS IN DILI REPORTED THAT THE CITY WAS CALM ON MAY 18. CONVOYS OF PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS REPORTEDLY CIRCULATED AROUND DILI ON THE EVENING OF MAY 17, BUT DID NOT CARRY OUT ANY ATTACKS. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS ARE FOCUSING ON THE ONGOING VIOLENCE IN THE ATSABE AREA, REFTEL. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH COMMISSION FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE CLAIMS TO HAVE CONFIRMED 12 DEATHS IN ATSABE, AND REPORTS THAT PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE YOUTH WHO HAVE FLED TO THE FOREST.

SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY AMBUSHED

4. (U) ACCORDING TO EAST TIMOR DEPUTY POLICE CHIEF MUAFI SAHUDJI, QUOTED IN MAY 18 PRESS ACCOUNTS, THREE SOLDIERS WERE AMBUSHED AND KILLED IN THE LOLOTOE AREA OF BOBONARO DISTRICT, NEAR THE BORDER WITH WEST TIMOR, ON MAY 16. THE MILITIA-BASED GROUPING, "FORUM FOR DEMOCRACY, PEACE AND JUSTICE," TOLD THE MEDIA THAT THE

THREE WERE KILLED BY THE RESISTANCE. THE MEDIA, QUOTING LOCAL SOURCES, CLAIM THE THREE WERE KILLED BY IRATE LOCAL CITIZENS.

PLIGHT OF THE DISPLACED IN EAST TIMOR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02459 01 OF 02 181000Z

5. (C) [redacted] B1

[redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS MAY 18 THAT DURING A MAY 1-9 INVESTIGATION IN EAST TIMOR, SHE AND A TEAM FROM SEVERAL JAKARTA-BASED HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS VISITED SIX DISPLACED PERSONS SETTLEMENTS AT HERA, KALIAKU, MAUTURU (NEAR BECORA), MATINARAU (NEAR HERA) AND LAKURA (NEAR MANUTUTO) AS WELL AS CAMP SITES IN LIQUISA.

6. (U) THEY CLAIMED THAT POOR CONDITIONS, INCLUDING INADEQUATE ACCESS TO CLEAN WATER, VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT MEDICAL CARE, INSUFFICIENT SUPPLY OF FOOD AND POOR SHELTER WERE COMMON TO ALL SITES. DISEASES AFFLICTING THE POPULATION INCLUDE MALARIA, ASSORTED FEVERS, SCABIES AND GASTROINTESTINAL PROBLEMS LEADING TO MALNUTRITION. THE TEAM MEMBERS ESTIMATED THE TOTAL NUMBER OF DISPLACED AT 35,000 WITH 5,000 IN THE LIQUISA AREA. THE GREAT MAJORITY OF CAMP INHABITANTS ARE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. THEY SAID THEY ENCOUNTERED WOMEN WHO CLAIMED THEY WERE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RAPE BY THE MILITIAS. THEY ALSO REPORTED THAT THERE ARE WOMEN WHO ARE HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL FOR SEXUAL FAVORS AT THE TROPICAL HOTEL IN DILI, HEADQUARTERS FOR THE AITARAK MILITIA. IN SEVERAL CAMPS, MILITIA CONDUCT SWEEPS AT NIGHT AND TAKE AWAY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 02459 02 OF 02 181000Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 3

DRL-02 G-00 MR-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /016W
----------C9B653 181001Z /38

O 181001Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7823
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002459

SINGAPORE FOR A/S ROTH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02459 02 OF 02 181000Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/06
TAGS: PHUM, PREF, PGOV, MOPS, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 18 -- THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED SAID TO BE IN DANGER

YOUNG MALES. THEIR FATE (SOME OF WHOM HAVE BEEN GONE FOR MORE THAN ONE MONTH) IS UNKNOWN BUT FAMILY MEMBERS TOLD THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS THEY FEARED THEY HAD BEEN KILLED. THE DISPLACED ARE NOT ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE CAMP AREAS AND THOSE THAT TRY ARE IN GRAVE JEOPARDY OF BEING KILLED. IN CAMP, THEY FACE MILITARY-LIKE REGIMENTATION.

7. (U) THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS REPORTED THERE WERE THREE CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE IN THE CAMPS: THOSE WHO FLED MILITIA AND MILITARY VIOLENCE IN THEIR VILLAGES (BY FAR THE MAJORITY); FAMILY OF LOW-LEVEL (PRO-INDEPENDENCE) CIVIL SERVANTS; AND FAMILY MEMBERS OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS. ACCESS TO THE SITES IS VERY DIFFICULT. MILITIAS USUALLY STAND GUARD AT THE CAMPS EVEN THOUGH SOME SETTLEMENTS ARE LOCATED AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. MOREOVER, MILITIA CHECKPOINTS ARE PARTICULARLY NUMEROUS AND AGGRESSIVE IN THE VICINITY OF THE CAMPS. FOREIGNERS

ARE GENERALLY NOT ALLOWED TO APPROACH THE CAMPS AND AMONG EAST TIMORESE, EVEN RELIGIOUS PERSONNEL HAVE ONLY LIMITED ACCESS.

8. (U) THOSE EAST TIMORESE WHO FLED THE APRIL 17 ATTACK ON THE HOUSE OF MANUEL CARRASCALAO REPORTEDLY FACE THE MOST SERIOUS DANGER. MOST ARE FAMILY MEMBERS OF MORE SENIOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS AND CONTINUE TO BE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02459 02 OF 02 181000Z
THREATENED BY MILITIA EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE FOUND TEMPORARY REFUGE IN THE DILI POLICE HEADQUARTERS. SEVERAL NGOS HAVE COMBINED RESOURCES TO ARRANGE FOR THE 68 PEOPLE INVOLVED TO TRAVEL BY SHIP FROM DILI HARBOR TO FLORES (A LARGELY CHRISTIAN ISLAND) WHERE THEY WOULD REMAIN UNTIL THE CONSULTATION BALLOT AUGUST 8. THE NGOS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE SECURE TRANSPORT FROM THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS TO THE HARBOR, HOWEVER. (WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO EXAMINE THIS SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN A FEW DAYS.)

COMMAND AND CONTROL
---

9. (C) ACCORDING TO [redacted] THERE APPEARS TO BE AN INFORMAL CHAIN OF COMMAND IN DILI WITH SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL WHO HAVE SERVED IN EAST TIMOR IN PREVIOUS YEARS OPERATING UNDER GENERAL ZACKY ANWAR AND HIS SUBORDINATE KIKI SYAHNAKRI. THESE SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL APPEAR TO DIRECT ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITIAS AND SOMETIMES MINGLE WITH THEM. B1
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8367

E 33

PAGE 01 JAKART 02507 01 OF 02 201106Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/021W				

----------CACDB3 201107Z /38

O 201106Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7882
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002507

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02507 01 OF 02 201106Z
ROME FOR VATICAN
SINGAPORE ALSO FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, CASC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 20

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS GREGORY FERGIN; REASON 1.5(D).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 MAY 2014
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2004 200300722

SUMMARY
---

2. (C) THE UN HAS CHARGED THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY IS CONTINUING TO TRAIN MILITIAS IN AN AREA WHERE MILITIA MEMBERS KILLED AT LEAST SIX CIVILIANS ON MAY 16. AN AMCIT DOCTOR HAS RETURNED TO HIS WORK IN DILI. NGO CONTACTS IN DILI MAINTAIN THAT WEST TIMORESE ARE BEING PROVIDED WITH FALSE IDENTITY CARDS IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONSULTATION. THERE ARE INCREASING INDICATIONS OF SERIOUS DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PRO-INTEGRATION CAMP WHICH COULD LEAD TO MORE VIOLENCE. END SUMMARY.

UN DISCOVERS MILITARY TRAINING MILITIAS
---

3. (C) THE UN SPOKESMAN IN DILI ISSUED A STATEMENT ON MAY 20 CHARGING THAT THE TNI CONTINUED TO TRAIN MILITIA FORCES IN ATSABE, NEAR WHERE MILITIA ATTACKS CLAIMED AT LEAST SIX LIVES ON MAY 16. UN SPOKESMAN DAVID WIMHURST SAID UN STAFF HAD VISITED ATSABE TO INVESTIGATE THE KILLINGS AND DISCOVERED MILITIA PERSONNEL UNDERGOING TRAINING ON A TNI BASE. ACCORDING TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02507 01 OF 02 201106Z

WIMHURST, THE TRAINING WAS "VERY DISCIPLINED AND SIGNIFIED THAT THE MILITIA ARE ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN PREPARATION FOR CONTINUED VIOLENCE." (COMMENT: THERE ALSO ARE REPORTS OF TNI TRAINING OF MILITIAS OUTSIDE EAST TIMOR. A RELIABLE POLOFF CONTACT RECENTLY REPORTED SEEING SOME 200 EAST TIMORESE BEING TRAINED AT A TNI BASE NEAR PAMUTERAN IN AN ISOLATED PART OF FAR WESTERN BALI. END COMMENT.)

4. (C) IN A MAY 20 MEETING IN DILI WITH VISITING POLCOUNS, [redacted] B1
[redacted] SAID THE UN TEAM WAS DETERMINED TO PRESS ON AND NOT BE INTIMIDATED. IN A MAY 20 INTERVIEW CARRIED IN THE JAKARTA PRESS, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA "CHIEF OF STAFF" HERMINIO DA COSTA ACCUSED THE UN TEAM OF FAVORING THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE, AND SPECIFICALLY COMPLAINED THAT THE UN HAD EMPLOYED A "PRO-INDEPENDENCE" TRANSLATOR.

AMCIT DOCTOR BACK IN DILI
---

5. (C) [redacted] OBTAINED A NEW VISA IN B6
SINGAPORE AND NOW IS BACK AT WORK AT THE MOTAEL CHURCH CLINIC IN DILI. IN A MAY 20 MEETING WITH VISITING POLCOUNS, [redacted] ASKED B6
IF THE USG COULD EXPRESS CONCERN TO THE GOI REGARDING CONTINUING THREATS TO HIM PERSONALLY AND THE CLINIC AS A WHOLE BY PRO-

INTEGRATION MILITIAS.

FALSE IDENTITY CARDS
---

6. (C) [redacted] TOLD VISITING POLCOUNS ON MAY 20 B1
THAT RESIDENTS OF WEST TIMOR WERE BEING PROVIDED WITH FALSE EAST

TIMOR IDENTITY CARDS SO THEY COULD PARTICIPATE IN THE AUGUST CONSULTATION. PRO-INDEPENDENCE SOURCES ARE CLAIMING THAT MANY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA MEMBERS ARE BEING RECRUITED FROM WEST TIMOR.

DIVISIONS AMONG THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS
---

7. (C) CONTACTS FROM VARIOUS PARTS OF THE EAST TIMOR POLITICAL SPECTRUM ARE REPORTING INCREASING EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PRO-INTEGRATION CAMP. THE PRIMARY FAULT LINE IS BETWEEN THE FPDK (FORUM FOR PEACE, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE) WHICH HAS CLOSE LINKS TO THE TNI, AND THE NEWLY FORMED BRT (BARISAN RAKYAT TIMOR) LED BY LOPES DA CRUZ, WHICH IS REGARDED AS MORE MODERATE. THIS DIVISION HAS ALSO SPLIT THE MILITIAS. EURICO GUTERRES' AITARAK, THE VARIOUS "RED AND WHITE" GROUPS, AND "HALILINTAR," LED BY JOAO TAVERES, ARE IN THE FPDK CAMP. THESE GROUPS, ALL FROM THE WESTERN DISTRICTS, ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MOST OF THE VIOLENT INCIDENTS OF THE PAST TWO MONTHS. "MAHIDI," LED BY CANCIO CARVALHO, AND THE MILITIA FORCES OF RUI LOPES, A LOCAL WARLORD IN KOVA-LIMA DISTRICT, NOW APPEAR TO HAVE ALIGNED WITH THE BRT. THE BRT ALSO IS SUPPORTED BY THE MAJORITY OF MILITIAS AND PARAMILITARY GROUPS IN THE EASTERN PART OF EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING TEAM SAKA AND TEAM ALFA. ACCORDING TO PRO-INDEPENDENCE CONTACTS, THESE EASTERN-BASED GROUPS ARE MORE

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00

SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00
DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00
/020W

----------CACDB6 201107Z /38

O 201106Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7883
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002507

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02507 02 OF 02 201107Z
ROME FOR VATICAN
SINGAPORE ALSO FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, CASC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 20

AMENABLE TO REACHING AN ACCOMMODATION WITH FALINTIL.

8. (C) IN THE LAWLESS ATMOSPHERE OF EAST TIMOR, THERE NOW APPEARS TO BE INCREASING POTENTIAL FOR ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES. SEVERAL CONTACTS HAVE REPORTED BAD BLOOD BETWEEN BAUCAU-BASED "TEAM SAKA" AND DILI-BASED "AITARAK." IN THE RECENT VIOLENCE IN DILI, AITARAK REPORTEDLY KILLED THE BROTHER OF A TEAM SAKA MEMBER, AND A TEAM SAKA CONTINGENT SUBSEQUENTLY ENTERED DILI AND FORCIBLY RETRIEVED THE CORPSE FROM AITARAK. VIQUEQUE DISTRICT CHIEF MARTINHO FERNANDES, WHO ALSO HEADS THE "MAKIKIT" MILITIA, REPORTEDLY HAS THREATENED TO BRING HIS FORCES TO DILI TO "DISARM AITARAK." FERNANDES IS SAID TO HAVE ESTABLISHED CLOSE TIES WITH FALINTIL GUERRILLAS IN THE VIQUEQUE AREA, ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN EAST TIMOR. ON MAY 20, THERE WAS A REPORT THAT A MILITIA LOYAL TO THE BRT HAD SET UP A ROADBLOCK ON

THE MAIN ROAD EAST OUT OF DILI TO PREVENT AITARAK MILITIA FORCES FROM MOVING EAST.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART02652
Channel: n/a

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4986

E38

PAGE 01 JAKART 02652 01 OF 02 281144Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W			

----------CE50DE 281145Z /38

P 281141Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8030
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002652

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/05
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, PHUM, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 28, 1999

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: A POLOFF TRAVELED SOUTH FROM DILI INTO AINARO DISTRICT ON MAY 28. IT IS THE FIRST VISIT BY A FOREIGN NATIONAL TO THE AREA SINCE THE MILITIA OFFENSIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02652 01 OF 02 281144Z
BEGAN. HE DESCRIBED AN ONGOING "REIGN OF TERROR" UNDER THE WELL-ARMED MAHIDI MILITIA. MEANWHILE, IN THE DISTRICT CAPITAL, THE GOVERNOR AND MILITARY COMMANDER WERE FEATURED AT A PRO-PEACE/PRO-AUTONOMY RALLY WHICH HAD A STAGED ATMOSPHERE. IN CONTRAST, THE MOOD IN DILI, WHICH HAS REMAINED RELATIVELY CALM OVER THE PAST WEEK, APPEARED TO BE BUOYED BY THE CONTINUING ARRIVAL OF UN EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING A UN HELICOPTER WHICH BUZZED THE CITY. SOME SENIOR MILITIA FIGURES REPORTEDLY ARE "GETTING NERVOUS" AND ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH LINKS TO

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 28 MAY 2015
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2004 200300722

PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS. A SENIOR INTERNATIONAL NGO CHIEF, HOWEVER, IS MAKING PLANS TO LEAVE AFTER BEING INFORMED BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE THAT HIS SAFETY CANNOT BE GUARANTEED. END SUMMARY

AINARO DISTRICT
---

3. (SBU) POLOFF WAS ABLE TO DRIVE SOUTH FROM DILI INTO TO MAUBISSE IN AINARO DISTRICT MAY 28. HE DESCRIBED A "REIGN OF TERROR" CONDUCTED BY "MAHIDI" MILITIA, WHO WERE SEEN AT CHECKPOINTS AND PATROLLING CARRYING MODERN FIREARMS. LOCAL PEOPLE TOLD POLOFF OF MAHIDI DEATH LISTS, COMMANDEERING OF HOUSES, KILLINGS AND BEATINGS. POLOFF REPORTED CLAIMS THAT EVEN COMMON PEOPLE FROM AREA VILLAGES WERE BEING "TERRORIZED," SUBJECTED TO BEATINGS FOR SIMPLY ATTEMPTING TO VENTURE OUT OF THEIR VILLAGES. HE SUMMED UP THAT WHILE IN DILI, THE SITUATION WAS IMPROVING, "IT IS NOT GETTING ANY BETTER IN AINARO."

4. (SBU) DESPITE THE GRIM SITUATION IN THE DISTRICT,

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02652 01 OF 02 281144Z
EAST TIMOR GOVERNOR ABILIO SOARES AND MILITARY COMMANDER COL. TONO SURATMAN JOINED IN A PEACE/PRO-AUTONOMY CEREMONY IN AINARO DISTRICT TOWN -- "ANOTHER STAGED AFFAIR WITH PEOPLE PULLED IN AS ONLOOKERS," ACCORDING TO POLOFF. (NOTE: UNAMET CHIEF WIMHURST HAS PUBLICLY COMPLAINED ABOUT PRO-AUTONOMY ELEMENTS LAUNCHING THEIR CAMPAIGN BEFORE THE JULY 20 DATE ESTABLISHED FOR CAMPAIGNING IN THE MAY 5 UN-INDONESIA-PORTUGAL AGREEMENT. END NOTE)

MOOD SWING IN DILI
---

5. (SBU) A WESTERN DIPLOMAT IN DILI TOLD US MAY 28 THAT THE ARRIVAL OF UN EQUIPMENT AND SOME PERSONNEL, AND ESPECIALLY THE ARRIVAL OF A UN HELICOPTER WHICH HAS BEEN SEEN FREQUENTLY OVER DILI, HAS SIGNIFICANTLY BUOYED SPIRITS. UN OFFICIALS TOLD THE DIPLOMAT THAT "PEOPLE ARE SAYING WE HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR THIS FOR 25 YEARS." RE-ENFORCING THE IMPROVED MOOD AMONG LOCAL RESIDENTS IS THE RELATIVE QUIET THAT HAS SETTLED ON DILI OVER THE PAST WEEK. ON THE OTHER HAND, HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS HAVE COMMENTED THAT THE REASON THE MILITIAS, WHILE STILL PRESENT, ARE NO LONGER ACTIVE IN DILI, IS "BECAUSE THERE

IS NOBODY (AMONG PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS) LEFT." THE WESTERN DIPLOMAT OBSERVED THAT OF THE TWO PROMINENT PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS IN DILI, ONE IS IN PROTECTIVE POLICE CUSTODY (LEONARDO ISAAC) AND THE OTHER, DAVID JIMENES, REMAINS IN HIDING BUT OCCASIONALLY SPEAKS TO DIPLOMATS AND JOURNALISTS BY TELEPHONE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02652 01 OF 02 281144Z

6. (C) THE DIPLOMAT, EXPLAINING THAT HE WAS RELUCTANT TO GO INTO DETAIL ON THE PHONE, SAID THAT SOME SENIOR MILITIA FIGURES, INCLUDING MILITIA SPOKESMAN BASILIO ARAUJO, APPEARED TO BE "GETTING NERVOUS." HE SAID THAT ARAUJO HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE MILITIA LEADERS WERE SEEKING TO TALK WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE (CNRT) LEADERS.

UN ACTIVITY
---

7. (SBU) FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL, SMALL UN TEAMS LEFT DILI HEADING EAST ON THE ROAD TO BAUCAU AND WEST TOWARDS LIQUICA. JOURNALISTS JOINED THE UN CONVOYS, WHICH WERE TO RETURN TO DILI BY NIGHTFALL. THE WESTERN DIPLOMAT REPORTED THAT THE UN INTENT WAS TO "RECONNOITER" AND "TEST THE (MILITIA) CHECKPOINTS." (NOTE: EMBOFF WAS ABLE TO NEGOTIATE APPROXIMATELY 15 CHECKPOINTS WEST OF THE CAPITAL ON MAY 21 TRAVELING ALONE. CHECKPOINT REACTION TO A LARGE CARAVAN MIGHT BE DIFFERENT. END NOTE)

CAMPS FOR THE DISPLACED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4987

PAGE 01 JAKART 02652 02 OF 02 281144Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/018W				

----------CE50E0 281145Z /38

P 281141Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8031
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002652

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/05
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, PHUM, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: MAY 28, 1999

8. (SBU) A CARITAS OFFICIAL TOLD THE DIPLOMAT THAT HIS ORGANIZATION WAS CONTINUING TO COLLECT DATA REGARDING DISPLACED PEOPLE BUT THAT IT WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY IN DEVELOPING A COMPLETE PICTURE OF THE SITUATION. SOME SOURCES TELL USAID IN JAKARTA THAT IT IS UNCLEAR HOW MANY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02652 02 OF 02 281144Z
DISPLACED PEOPLE ACTUALLY REQUIRE ASSISTANCE IN THE PROVINCE.

EXPAT LEAVES FOR SECURITY REASONS
---

9. (C) [redacted] IN DILI, WHO RETURNED TO EAST TIMOR MAY 20, IS LEAVING DILI FOR KUPANG IN WEST TIMOR FOR ONE WEEK IN THE WAKE OF A MESSAGE FROM THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY "BIA" THAT IT COULD NOT ASSURE HIS SECURITY IN DILI. B1
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6758

E39

PAGE 01 JAKART 02672 01 OF 02 011003Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/017W

----------CF39CD 011003Z /38

P 010959Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8042
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002672

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02672 01 OF 02 011003Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/04
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, EAID, MARR, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: A FORAY INTO MAHIDI COUNTRY

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS GREGORY FERGIN; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. IN A MAY 28 VISIT TO THE AINARO AND AILEU DISTRICTS SOUTH OF DILI, POLOFF FOUND MUCH EVIDENCE OF A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 1 JUN 2014
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2004 200300722

CONTINUING REIGN OF TERROR CARRIED OUT BY TNI-BACKED PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WHO ARE A LAW UNTO THEMSELVES. THEIR ACTIVITIES HAVE SEVERELY DISRUPTED ECONOMIC LIFE, MEDICAL CARE, AND THE EVERYDAY LIVES OF ORDINARY PEOPLE, MOST OF WHOM ARE TOO TERRIFIED TO SPEAK TO OUTSIDERS OR TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE THEIR VILLAGES. THAT THE MILITIAS AND THE LOCAL MILITARY WERE WORKING HAND IN HAND WAS TAKEN AS A GIVEN BY LOCAL OBSERVERS, AND THERE WAS LITTLE EFFORT TO DISGUISE THIS COOPERATION. THE CAMPAIGN FOR INTEGRATION/AUTONOMY ALREADY WAS IN FULL SWING, AND, GIVEN THE STRONG INFLUENCE OF TRADITIONAL BELIEFS, COMPELLING LOCAL VILLAGERS TO SWEAR BLOOD OATHS TO VOTE FOR AUTONOMY WAS SEEN AS A PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE TACTIC. THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES ALSO WERE THREATENING THAT REJECTION OF AUTONOMY WOULD RESULT IN A BLOODBATH REMINISCENT OF 1975-76. THE NON-EAST TIMORESE LOCAL DISTRICT CHIEF/MILITIA LEADER IN AILEU HAD MADE HIMSELF THE AREA'S TRADITIONAL CHIEF AS WELL, ENRAGING SOME LOCAL RESIDENTS. AS BAD AS CONDITIONS WERE IN AILEU AND AINARO, CONTACTS SPOKE OF A MUCH WORSE SITUATION IN DISTRICTS TO THE WEST. END SUMMARY

3. (C) POLOFF ACCOMPANIED AN AMCIT EMPLOYEE OF THE USAID-SUPPORTED NCBA COFFEE PROJECT AND AN AUSTRALIAN DOCTOR ON A MAY

CONFIDENTIAL

28 VISIT TO MAUBISSE, IN AINARO DISTRICT, SOUTH OF DILI ABOUT HALFWAY TO THE SOUTHERN COAST. NCBA NORMALLY UTILIZES AN ARMED TNI ESCORT FOR TRIPS INTO THIS AREA, BUT IN THIS CASE THE ESCORT DID NOT MATERIALIZE. NCBA IS CONSTRUCTING A HEALTH CLINIC IN THE SUB-DISTRICT SEAT OF MAUBISSE, AND ALSO MAINTAINS A COFFEE PROCESSING FACILITY IN THE AREA. WE ALSO VISITED THE MARYKNOLL SISTERS IN AILEU, THE MOUNTAINOUS DISTRICT SOUTH OF DILI.

IN MAUBISSE, MAHIDI REIGNS SUPREME

4. (C) MAUBISSE EFFECTIVELY IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE "MAHIDI" ("LIVE AND DIE FOR INTEGRATION") MILITIA BASED IN AINARO. A NUMBER OF WHAT WERE SAID TO BE NEW MAHIDI CHECKPOINTS HAD SPROUTED ALONG THE MAIN ROAD. GROUPS OF MAHIDI PATROLLED THE ROAD, SOME CARRYING GOVERNMENT-ISSUE FIREARMS (IDENTIFIED BY WHITE SERIAL NUMBERS PAINTED ON THE RIFLE BUTTS), AND OTHERS WITH TRADITIONAL WEAPONS. CONTACTS POINTED OUT THAT FEWER THAN NORMAL MILITIA AND LOCAL RESIDENTS WERE PRESENT BECAUSE EARLIER THAT MORNING LOCAL LEADERS HAD ROUNDED UP MOST PEOPLE AND TRUCKED THEM TO AINARO, WHERE A MAJOR CEREMONY WAS BEING HELD TO MARK THE AREA'S "ACCEPTANCE OF AUTONOMY." THE MILITARY REPORTEDLY HAD PUT UP PRO-AUTONOMY BANNERS AT EVERY VILLAGE BETWEEN DILI AND MAUBISSE. REGULAR TROOPS WERE LESS IN EVIDENCE

THAN THE MAHIDI. WE DID OBSERVE ONE TRUCKLOAD OF SOLDIERS ESCORTING A VIP CAR BACK TO DILI FROM THE AINARO CEREMONY.

5. (C) MAUBISSE RESIDENTS WERE FEARFUL WHEN APPROACHED BY POLOFF AND RELUCTANT TO SPEAK. IN THE GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO GATHERED AROUND AT THE CLINIC, ONE MAN NERVOUSLY TOLD POLOFF THAT "EVERYONE HERE SUPPORTS AUTONOMY." WHEN ASKED IF ANYONE AT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02672 01 OF 02 011003Z
ALL BACKED INDEPENDENCE, HE LOOKED AROUND QUICKLY AND WHISPERED "YES, THERE ARE SOME." THE CONTRACTOR FOR THE CLINIC, A SINO-EAST TIMORESE FROM DILI, HAD BEEN ACCOSTED BY MILITIA WHO HACKED OFF HIS LONG HAIR. PART OF THE HOUSING COMPLEX THAT HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR THE TWO AUSTRALIAN DOCTORS AND OTHER PERSONNEL WHO WILL BE OPERATING THE CLINIC WAS LOCKED UP AND UNACCESSIBLE. THE LOCAL CARETAKER SAID THE MAHIDI HAD "TAKEN OVER" THESE UNITS AND WAS IN POSSESSION OF THE KEYS.

TERROR IN AILEU
---

6. (C) IN AILEU, [redacted] B1
DESCRIBED A CONTINUING REIGN OF TERROR IN THE AREA. [redacted] B1
[redacted]
HAD RECEIVED DEATH THREATS AND BEEN DRIVEN INTO HIDING AFTER HE
ATTEMPTED TO [redacted] B1
[redacted] THE MILITIA WERE "ARRESTING"
PEOPLE FROM LONG LISTS OF SUPPOSED INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS AND ANYONE WHO HAD ATTENDED THE STUDENT-SPONSORED "DIALOGUES" OF LATE LAST YEAR. [redacted] EMPHASIZED THAT AN ATMOSPHERE OF B1
TERROR EXISTED IN WHICH LOCAL RESIDENTS WERE DENOUNCING AND BETRAYING EACH OTHER. THOSE WHO WERE DETAINED WERE TAKEN TO A "CLUBHOUSE" ON THE EDGE OF TOWN WHERE THEY WERE SEVERELY BEATEN,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6759

PAGE 01 JAKART 02672 02 OF 02 011003Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01

DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /017W
----------CF39D5 011003Z /38

P 010959Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8043
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002672

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02672 02 OF 02 011003Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/04
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, EAID, MARR, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: A FORAY INTO MAHIDI COUNTRY

AND ACCCORDING TO [redacted] TORTURED WITH ELECTRIC SHOCKS. B1
THE MARYKNOLL CLINIC RECENTLY HAD TREATED FIVE SEVERELY INJURED
YOUNG MEN WHO HAD BEEN VICTIMIZED. [redacted] MAINTAINED THAT B1
THE GROUP CARRYING OUT THESE ABUSES INCLUDED REGULAR SOLDIERS
FROM "RAJAWALI" UNITS AS WELL AS MILITIA. THE BUPATI (DISTRICT
CHIEF) WAS THE NOMINAL HEAD OF THE LOCAL "AHI" (I LIVE FOR
INTEGRATION) MILITIA BUT THE ACTUAL OPERATIONAL LEADER WAS
DESCRIBED AS A WELL-KNOWN LOCAL THUG WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN AN
ABORTIVE SCHEME TO ATTACK BISHOP BELO DURING ONE OF HIS VISITS
TO ALIEU LAST YEAR.

DOCTORS AND PATIENTS THREATENED
---

7. (C) OUR CONTACTS SAID SOME GOVERNMENT DOCTORS WERE
INCREASINGLY UNWILLING TO TREAT VICTIMS OF MILITIA VIOLENCE
BECAUSE THE DOCTORS THEMSELVES WERE COMING UNDER THREAT IF THEY
DID SO. ANOTHER MAJOR CONCERN OF HEALTH PRACTIONERS WAS THE
RELUCTANCE OF PEOPLE TO LEAVE THEIR VILLAGES, EVEN FOR URGENTLY

NEEDED MEDICAL CARE. AT THE MILITIA CHECKPOINTS, ANYONE FOUND AWAY FROM THEIR HOME VILLAGE COULD BE ACCUSED OF WORKING WITH THE GUERRILLAS OR "RUNNING AWAY." ACCORDING TO VARIOUS CONTACTS, MANY YOUNG MEN WERE FLEEING THE VILLAGES TO AVOID BEING FORCIBLY CONSCRIPTED INTO THE MILITIAS.

BLOOD OATHS COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR

8. (C) THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES ARE PUTTING GREAT EMPHASIS ON CEREMONIES IN WHICH VILLAGERS TAKE A BLOOD OATH (DRINKING THE BLOOD OF GOATS OR OTHER ANIMALS) TO VOTE FOR AUTONOMY. [redacted] B1 [redacted] SAID SUCH CEREMONIES WERE TAKING PLACE IN VIRTUALLY EVERY VILLAGE IN THE AREA. TO REFUSE PARTICIPATION WAS TO BE BRANDED PRO-INDEPENDENCE. ACCORDING TO TRADITIONAL BELIEFS, ANYONE VIOLATING SUCH AN OATH COULD BECOME SICK AND DIE. IN WHAT SEEMED PART OF THE AGE-OLD STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND ANIMISM IN EAST TIMOR, PRIESTS WERE ATTEMPTING TO CONVINCE RESIDENTS THAT THESE OATHS WERE NOT BINDING. [redacted] B1 EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE PARISHIONERS IN THE RELATIVELY SOPHISTICATED DISTRICT SEAT OF AILEU WOULD RESIST THE VARIOUS FORMS OF INTIMIDATION AND VOTE AS THEY WISH (I.E., OVERWHELMINGLY FOR INDEPENDENCE IN THEIR VIEW.) GIVEN THE LOW EDUCATION LEVELS AND CONTINUING STRENGTH OF TRADITIONAL BELIEFS IN THE RURAL AREAS OF EAST TIMOR WHERE MOST PEOPLE LIVE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THESE OATH TAKING CEREMONIES COULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE VOTE. CONTACTS SAID ANOTHER EFFECTIVE TACTIC OF THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS WAS TO WARN LOCAL RESIDENTS THAT REJECTION OF AUTONOMY WOULD GUARANTEE A BLOODBATH REMINISCENT OF 1975-76. THE PRIMARY MESSAGE OF THE PRO-AUTONOMY BANNERS WAS THAT AUTONOMY EQUALLED PEACE.

JAVANESE BUPATI BECOMES TRADITIONAL CHIEF

9. (C) IN WHAT [redacted] DESCRIBED AS AN "OBSCENE" B1 VIOLATION OF LOCAL TRADIONAL CUSTOMS, BUPATI (AND AHI LEADER) SUPRAPTO TARMON, A TNI OFFICER FROM JAVA, HAD HIMSELF CORONATED

AS THE LOCAL TRADITIONAL CHIEF OF ALIEU, ON MAY 20. THIS EVENT RECEIVED FRONT-PAGE COVERAGE IN THE DILI NEWSPAPER. [redacted] B1 THEORIZED THAT THIS MOVE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE RESIDENTS THAT TNI AND THE MILITIAS WERE COMPLETELY IN CHARGE AND THAT

OPPOSITION TO AUTONOMY WAS FRUITLESS.

WORSE IN THE WEST

10. (C) CONTACTS IN AILEU AND MAUBISSE, AS WELL AS IN DILI, STRESSED THAT AS BAD AS THE SITUATION WAS IN AILEU AND AINARO DISTRICTS, CONDITIONS WERE FAR WORSE IN THE DISTRICTS TO THE WEST, INCLUDING ERMERA, LIQUICA, AND BOBONARO. THESE COFFEE-GROWING DISTRICTS REMAINED A NO-GO AREA FOR NCBA AND IT WAS STILL IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE CURRENT COFFEE CROP TO BE HARVESTED AND PROCESSED, A DEVELOPMENT WITH RUINOUS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE. KILLINGS BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS ALSO WERE SAID TO BE MORE WIDESPREAD IN THE WESTERN AREAS. [redacted] [redacted] SAID THAT WHILE THE LOCAL MILITIAS WERE CARRYING OUT INTIMIDATION, BEATINGS AND TORTURE, THERE HAD BEEN NO RECENT KILLINGS IN AILEU. B1
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTO1552

E40

PAGE 01 JAKART 02743 040902Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/015W	

----------D0BF60 040904Z /38

O 040856Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8141
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002743

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02743 040902Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: JUNE 4

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

SUMMARY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 4 JUN 2014
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2004 200300722

2. (C) IN WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO PRESERVE AND LEGITIMIZE THE EAST TIMORESE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS, THE GOI IS OFFICIALLY DESIGNATING THESE GROUPS AS "PAMSWAKARSA" (CIVILIAN SELF-DEFENSE) UNITS. THE OFFICIAL OPENING OF THE UNAMET OFFICE IN DILI ON JUNE 4 WAS MARKED BY A BOISTEROUS PRO-INDEPENDENCE DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH CARS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS WERE ATTACKED. THE CNRT ANNOUNCED PLANS TO RE-OPEN OFFICES THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR. SOME 55 UN PERSONNEL, MOSTLY ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL SIDE, NOW HAVE ARRIVED IN EAST TIMOR. END SUMMARY.

MILITIAS BECOME "PAMSWAKARSA"
---

3. (C) ACCORDING TO [redacted] IN DILI, THE B1
AUTHORITIES THERE HAVE ISSUED A DOCUMENT PROCLAIMING THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE "AITARAK" PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA NOW WILL CONSTITUTE AN OFFICIAL "PAMSWAKARSA" FORCE. AITARAK LEADER EURICO GUTERRES HAS BEEN DESIGNATED THE PAMSWAKARSA LEADER, AND, ACCORDING TO THE DOCUMENT, THE FORCE IS CHARGED WITH "RESTORING" SECURITY IN DILI. THE ORDER IS SIGNED BY DILI DISTRICT CHIEF

DOMINGOS SOARES, WHO IS ALSO CHAIRMAN OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORUM FOR DEMOCRACY, PEACE AND JUSTICE (FPDK). [redacted] B1
[redacted] REPORTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT REPORTEDLY IS TAKING SIMILAR MEASURES TO LEGITIMIZE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS IN OTHER AREAS OF EAST TIMOR.

PRO-INDEPENDENCE DEMONSTRATION MARKS OPENING OF UNAMET OFFICE
---

4. (C) THE UNAMET OFFICE IN DILI WAS OFFICIALLY OPENED ON JUNE 3. SEVERAL THOUSAND EAST TIMORESE STAGED THE LARGEST PRO-INDEPENDENCE DEMONSTRATION SEEN IN MANY MONTHS. THE CARS OF GOVERNOR ABILIO SOARES, AMBASSADOR LOPEZ DA CRUZ, AND DILI MAYOR MATEUS MAIA WERE ATTACKED AND DAMAGED BY THE CROWD AS THEY LEFT THE CEREMONY. THE GOI IS DEMANDED THAT UNAMET "DEAL FIRMLY" WITH THE INCIDENT AND THE FPDK, IN A MUCH MORE HARSHLY-WORDED STATEMENT, ACCUSED UNAMET OF ATTEMPTING TO ENCOURAGE CONFLICT BETWEEN EAST TIMORESE IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY AN EXTENSION OF ITS PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR.

CNRT TO REOPEN OFFICES
---

5. (C) DAVID XIMENES OF THE CNRT, WHO WAS PRESENT AT THE UNAMET

INAUGURATION, ANNOUNCED THAT THE CNRT WILL SOON REOPEN ITS OFFICES IN DILI AND THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR. CNRT ACTIVITY HAS BEEN STYMIED FOR THE PAST TWO MONTHS DUE TO THE THREATS FROM THE MILITIAS BUT XIMENES SAID HE HAD BEEN ASSURED BY UNAMET THAT CNRT COULD RESUME OPERATIONS SAFELY. (COMMENT: XIMENES' OPTIMISM COULD BE AT LEAST SLIGHTLY PREMATURE. UNAMET CURRENTLY HAS ONLY 55 PERSONNEL ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR, MOSTLY ON THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02743 040902Z
ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL SIDE, AND HAS NOT YET ESTABLISHED ITSELF OUTSIDE DILI, WHERE, ACCORDING TO OUR CONTACTS, PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA ACTIVITY HAS NOT ABATED. END COMMENT.)
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9892

E41

PAGE 01 JAKART 02856 01 OF 02 101038Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/020W						

----------D33E4B 101039Z /38

O 101039Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8242
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 9 JUN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 20 JUL 2004 200300722

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002856

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/03
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02856 01 OF 02 101038Z
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, PINS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: JUNE 10, 1999

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: REPORTS FROM WEST AND SOUTH OF DILI INDICATE SECURITY CONDITIONS REMAIN POOR WITH AS MANY AS 20,000 PEOPLE DISPLACED BY MILITIA ACTIVITY IN THE DISTRICT OF LIQUISA. THE CONTINUING ARRIVAL OF UNAMET

PERSONNEL IN DILI HAS HAD A CALMING EFFECT IN THE CAPITAL. UNAMET IS TRAVELING, WITH THE EXPECTATION THAT SHOWING THE (UN) FLAG CAN BEGIN TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL AS WELL. A SENIOR SECURITY OFFICIAL HAS CONFIRMED TO THE MEDIA PLANS TO MOVE MILITIA CHIEFS INTO THE GOVERNMENT'S FORMAL SECURITY APPARATUS. THE UN CONTINUES TO VOICE PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR. THE INDONESIAN MILITARY CONTINUES TO ALLEGE THAT UNKNOWN HELICOPTERS HAVE BEEN TRACKED INSIDE EAST TIMOR. SKEPTICS BELIEVE THE CLAIMS ARE INTENDED TO CREATE JUSTIFICATION FOR LIMITING UNAMET ACTIVITY IN EAST TIMOR. B1

END

SUMMARY

CONTINUING INSECURITY
---

3. (C) POLOFF, IN EAST TIMOR, REPORTED JUNE 10 THAT AN AMCIT WHO KNOWS THE LIQUISA AREA WELL AND WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM THAT DISTRICT, SAID THAT APPROXIMATELY

20,000 LOCAL RESIDENTS HAVE BEEN DISPLACED BY MARAUDING MILITIAS AND THAT 60-70 PERCENT OF HOMES IN THE AREA HAVE BEEN BURNED. MOST OF THE REST ARE VACANT. (NOTE: THIS FIGURE FOR DISPLACED IN THE LIQUISA AREA IS HIGHER THAN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ALTHOUGH IT TRACKS WITH SEPARATE CHURCH DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SITUATION BELOW. END NOTE). HE ADDED THAT MILITIAS ARE CONTINUING OPERATIONS IN THE AREA FORCING THE CURTAILING OF THE COFFEE HARVEST IN THE DISTRICT. HE DESCRIBED VILLAGES AS DESERTED WITH "GRASS IN THE STREETS."

4. (C) CHURCH OFFICIALS CORROBORATED THIS ACCOUNT, ADDING THAT THE SITUATION IN THE AREAS WEST AND SOUTH OF DILI WERE "AS BAD AS OR WORSE THAN BEFORE." ON THE OTHER HAND, UNAMET TEAMS ARE PRESENT IN SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO BEGIN MOVING OUT OVERLAND, VISITING AREAS SOUTH OF DILI JUNE 10 AND SCHEDULED TO HEAD WEST ON JUNE 11 (WITH EMBOFF AND VISITING EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR ACCOMPANYING). MOREOVER, IN DILI, THANKS IN PART TO THE CONTINUING ARRIVAL OF UN PERSONNEL, THE SITUATION APPEARS MUCH LESS TENSE. THE UN TOLD THE MEDIA THAT "THERE'S A LONG WAY TO GO IF PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS, MANY OF WHOM HAVE LEFT THEIR HOMES IN RECENT MONTHS, ARE GOING TO FEEL THAT THEY CAN RETURN IN SECURITY, AS THAT'S WHAT THEY HAVE TO DO

FOR REGISTRATION, LET ALONE BALLOT CAMPAIGNING."

MILITIAS TRANSFORMED INTO GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES

5. (U) COL. TIMBUL SILAEN, THE EAST TIMOR POLICE CHIEF, TOLD THE MEDIA JUNE 9 THAT MILITIA LEADER EURICO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02856 01 OF 02 101038Z
GUTERERES WOULD BE GIVEN A SECURITY POSITION BY THE GOVERNMENT AS WOULD OTHER MILITIA LEADERS, INCLUDING MANUEL SOUSA. GUTERRES IS LEADER OF THE AITARAK MILITIA AND SOUSA IS LEADER OF THE BESI MERA PUTIH. BOTH WERE IDENTIFIED BY EXPAT JOURNALISTS ON THE SCENE AS PLAYING LEADING ROLES IN THE APRIL 17 ASSAULT ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE CIVILIANS IN DILI. SOUSA WAS INVOLVED IN THE KILLINGS IN LIQUISA IN EARLY APRIL. GUTERRES AND SOUSA WERE INVOLVED ALSO IN A SIGNED THREAT LETTER TRANSMITTED TO AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER DURING THE LATTER'S MARCH VISIT TO JAKARTA. BOTH ARE ALSO GOLKAR CANDIDATES FOR THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT.

"MYSTERIOUS" HELICOPTER MOVEMENT

6. (C) COL TONO SURATMAN, EAST TIMOR MILITARY COMMANDER, HAS TOLD THE MEDIA THAT FIVE "ILLEGAL" FLIGHTS WERE DETECTED IN EAST TIMOR IN MAY. HE ADDED THAT THE AUTHORITIES WERE STILL INVESTIGATING WHAT THE "WHITE CHOPPERS REALLY DID." HE EXPLAINED THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY HAD DEPLOYED THREE SHIPS TO HELP MAINTAIN SECURITY ON THE WATERS SOUTH OF EAST TIMOR OVER THE LAST TWO WEEKS. TONO ADDED THAT AIRCRAFT HAVE ALSO BEEN STATIONED IN EAST TIMOR IN ADVANCE OF THE BALLOT NOW SET

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8024

PAGE 01 JAKART 02856 02 OF 02 111243Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00

SCT-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00
PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00
/021W.

----------D3D6D1 111243Z /45

O 101039Z JUN 99(CCY-SECT INFO-ADXD33E4D-MSI0702-045)
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8243
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
USCINCPAC HONOLULUHI//FPA//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002856

CORRECTED COPY - (SECTION INFORMATION)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/03
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02856 02 OF 02 111243Z
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, PINS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: JUNE 10, 1999

FOR AUGUST 8.

7. (C) COMMENT: SEPARATELY, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE MILITARY HAS CAUTIONED UNAMET AGAINST ATTEMPTING TO FLY ITS (WHITE) HELICOPTERS AT NIGHT. THERE IS SOME SPECULATION THAT THE CLAIMS OF MYSTERIOUS AIR TRAFFIC IS AIMED AT CREATING A JUSTIFICATION TO LIMIT UNAMET AIR ACTIVITY. END COMMENT.



B1

B1



ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8017

E44

PAGE 01 JAKART 02914 01 OF 04 141040Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/015W		

----------D49C87 141041Z /38

O 141040Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8302
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY ROME
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002914

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/04
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02914 01 OF 04 141040Z
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, EAID, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: JUNE 14

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR AND POLOFF'S JUNE 10-12 TRAVEL AND DISCUSSIONS IN EAST TIMOR YIELDED A DECIDEDLY PESSIMISTIC PICTURE OF SECURITY CONDITIONS.

B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 13 JUN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2004 200300722

[redacted] B1

[redacted] BELIEVE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO EVEN ASSESS THE SECURITY SITUATION, MUCH LESS RECOMMEND POSITIVELY THAT THE AUGUST 8 BALLOT ON AUTONOMY-OR-INDEPENDENCE SHOULD GO FORWARD. PEOPLE ARE TOO FRIGHTENED TO REPORT ABUSES. [redacted] B1

[redacted] HAVE BEGUN DIALOGUES AIMED AT PROMOTING RECONCILIATION WITH LIMITED SUCCESS. THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED ARE FACING DISEASE, FOOD SHORTAGES AND ABUSE AT THE HANDS OF THE [redacted] B1 MILITAS. MEANWHILE, UNAMET WILL SHORTLY BEGIN TO DEPLOY PEOPLE OUTSIDE OF DILI. PRO-AUTONOMY EAST TIMORESE HAVE SPOKEN POSITIVELY OF THEIR CONTACT WITH IMPRISONED RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO AND OF PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION. [redacted] BELIEVES THAT MILITARY B1 INFLUENCE OVER THE PRO-AUTONOMY EAST TIMORESE IS THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02914 01 OF 04 141040Z
MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS TOWARDS RECONCILIATION. A DOCUMENT HAS SURFACED INDICATING THAT THE EAST TIMORESE GOVERNOR HAS ORDERED WITHDRAWAL OF "SOCIAL SAFETY NET" FUNDS TO SUPPORT PRO-AUTONOMY ACTIVITIES, TO INCLUDE FUNDING OF MILITIAS. THE IDENTITY OF A MAN KILLED OVER THE WEEKEND IN DILI IS UNCLEAR THOUGH THE MILITIAS HAVE CLAIMED HIM TO BE ONE OF THEIR OWN AND DEMANDED AN INVESTIGATION. END SUMMARY

3. (U) EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR HARTWICK AND POLOFF GRAY TRAVELED IN EAST TIMOR JUNE 10-12, HOLDING EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH UNAMET AND ICRC PERSONNEL, NGO CONTACTS AND [redacted] THEY ALSO MET WITH B6 CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS AS WELL AS PRO-AUTONOMY EAST TIMORESE (THOUGH NOT WITH MILITIA LEADERS CREDIBLY ACCUSED OF TORTURE AND MURDER). POLOFF REMAINS IN EAST TIMOR.

SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR BELIES TNI/GOI PUBLIC LINE:

---

4. (C) WHILE GOI OFFICIALS PUBLICLY HAVE STRUCK A MORE COOPERATIVE POSTURE, VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION AND A CLIMATE

OF FEAR CONTINUE TO BE THE NORM IN MOST OF EAST TIMOR. IN SOME AREAS, THE SITUATION IS WORSENING AS A RESULT OF MILITIA OPERATIONS WHICH, B1

PEOPLE OUTSIDE OF THE CAPITAL SIMPLY WERE NOT PREPARED TO SPEAK TO B1

FOREIGN PERSONNEL. B1

A NURSE TOLD B1

TEAM THAT "EVERYTHING WAS OK." LATER SHE MET THEM CLANDESTINELY WITH A SEPARATE MESSAGE: "PLEASE DON'T COME AGAIN." B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2234

PAGE 01 JAKART 02914 02 OF 04 150036Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/015W		

----------D4EBD1 150041Z /38

O 141040Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8303
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY ROME
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 002914

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02914 02 OF 04 150036Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/04
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, EAID, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: JUNE 14

OFFICIALS EXPLAIN THAT [redacted] IS "MORE DISCREET" IN B1
DEALING WITH SUCH MATTERS. [redacted] THAT THE B1
GOI'S PLOY IS TO USE [redacted] TO COUNTER CRITICISM -- B1
KEEPING UNAMET AWAY FROM SUCH MATTERS. B1

[redacted] TOLD THE U.S. OFFICIALS
THAT [redacted] B1
[redacted] HAD SECURED
PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S AGREEMENT FOR THE UN TO FIELD HUMAN
RIGHTS OBSERVERS IN EAST TIMOR. THE LOCAL UNHRC LOCAL
REP, HOWEVER, TOLD POLCOUNS THAT IN A SUBSEQUENT
ENCOUNTER WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS, THAT AGREEMENT
WAS ANGRILY WITHDRAWN.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] AT THAT TIME, MOREOVER, B1
[redacted] HAD ACCESS TO [redacted] NOW, [redacted] B1
[redacted] B1
[redacted] THIS REFLECTS THE FACT THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02914 02 OF 04 150036Z
PEOPLE ARE AFRAID TO REPORT. MOREOVER, [redacted] B1
[redacted] NOTED, "NOW WE HAVE BODY PARTS INSTEAD OF BODIES." "IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO GET SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS BECAUSE OF THE CLIMATE OF FEAR, (WE LEARN) ONLY THAT PEOPLE HAVE DIED." [redacted] B1
[redacted]

PLIGHT OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED
---

8. (C) [redacted] TOLD B1
THE U.S. OFFICIALS THAT MANY YOUNG MALES HAD FLED TO THE HILLS TO ESCAPE THE MILITIAS. THERE THEY HAVE ENCOUNTERED FOOD SHORTAGES AND GROWING PROBLEMS WITH DISEASE. [redacted] ASSESSED THAT TB HAD REACHED EPIDEMIC B1
PROPORTIONS IN SOME AREAS. [redacted] B1
AMONG THE TENS OF THOUSANDS DISPLACED, SOME WERE SAFER THAN OTHERS. BUT FOR MOST, MILITIA DEMANDS FOR MONEY, PORTIONS OF THE COFFEE CROP OR FOOD AND KILLINGS AND ABUSE OF WOMEN WAS CONTINUING. [redacted] B1
[redacted] THAT THERE
WERE NO DISPLACED IN HIS DISTRICT. (EARLIER REPORTING SUGGESTS THE NUMBER OF DISPLACED IN LIQUISA ALONE COULD
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02914 02 OF 04 150036Z
BE 40,000.) LOCAL PEOPLE HAVE REJECTED OFFERS OF DEFENSE BY THE FALINTIL RESISTANCE, EXPLAINING THAT ONCE THE ARMED PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES HAD LEFT THE AREA, THEY WOULD ALL BE REVISITED BY THE MILITIA AND "PUNISHED."

UNAMET PLANS
---

9. (C) [redacted] TOLD THE U.S. OFFICIALS B1
THAT THERE WERE ABOUT [redacted] IN EAST TIMOR B1
BUT THAT NONE OF THESE WERE YET BASED OUTSIDE OF DILI --
THAT WOULD BEGIN NEXT WEEK WITH UNAMET OFFICERS BEING
DEPLOYED TO EIGHT REGIONAL CENTERS ALONG WITH ELECTORAL
STAFF. AS MORE STAFF ARRIVE THEY WILL BE DEPLOYED TO
SUB-DISTRICT AND EVENTUALLY TO VILLAGE LEVEL. THE FIRST
CONTINGENT OF CIVPOL (60 IN ALL) WILL ARRIVE BY JUNE 20,
VIA FOUR DAYS OF TRAINING IN DARWIN.

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8020

PAGE 01 JAKART 02914 03 OF 04 141041Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/015W		

----------D49C96 141041Z /38

O 141040Z JUN 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8304
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY ROME
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 002914

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/04
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02914 03 OF 04 141041Z
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, EAID, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: JUNE 14

[redacted] B1

RECONCILIATION
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02914 03 OF 04 141041Z

13. (C) SEEKING TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF DIALOGUE AND EVENTUAL RECONCILIATION, [redacted] IS ORGANIZING DIRECT B1

DIALOGUES WITH THE KEY PLAYERS (MILITIAS, FALINTIL RESISTANCE AND THE CNRT). [redacted] TOLD THE U.S. OFFICIALS THAT HE BELIEVES THAT EAST TIMORESE COULD REACH AN UNDERSTANDING TO RESTORE PEACE AND COOPERATION IF LEFT ALONE AND NOT ENCOURAGED TO REJECT COMPROMISE. UP TO NOW, TNI ENCOURAGEMENT OF SUCH REJECTION HAS BEEN THE STRONGEST FACTOR INFLUENCING EVENTS, [redacted] CLAIMED. [redacted] SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT PRO-INDEPENDENCE SENTIMENT REMAINED VERY STRONG IN EASTERN EAST TIMOR, NOTING THAT IN RECENT DAYS HARD-LINE PRO-AUTONOMY MAYORS OF DILI AND LOS PALOS HAD SIGNALED THEIR INTENTION TO ABIDE BY THE RESULTS OF A VOTE REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME. MORE NEGATIVELY, [redacted] REPORTED THAT THE PRO-AUTONOMY MILITIA FAILED TO APPEAR AS SCHEDULED FOR THEIR DAY OF DIALOGUE WITH THE CHURCH (JUNE 13). B1 B1 B1 B1

14. (C) [redacted] PRONOUNCED HIMSELF "PESSIMISTIC" ABOUT THE FUTURE, NOTING THAT THE INTIMIDATION IN THE WEST WAS CONTINUING. HE BELIEVES THAT THE MILITIAS AND FALINTIL AS WELL HAD TO SURRENDER THEIR ARMS. HE STRESSED THAT UNAMET HAD TO BEGIN TO OPERATE OUTSIDE OF DILI. [redacted] B1 B1

MEETING WITH PRO-AUTONOMY EAST TIMORESE

15. (C) [redacted] THESE PRO-AUTONOMY EAST TIMORESE GENERALLY WERE POSITIVE REGARDING CONTACTS THEY HAD HAD WITH IMPRISONED RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO. THEY WERE ALSO POSITIVE REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING OUT AN AGREEMENT ON A CEASE-FIRE, DISARMAMENT AND ON POWER SHARING. THEY ADDED HOWEVER, THAT MILITIA LEADER EURICO GUTERRES HAD THUS FAR BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN PERSUADING FALINTIL RESISTANCE COMMANDER MATAN RUAK TO COME "DOWN FROM THE HILLS." IN CONVERSATION, THESE THREE B1

PRO-AUTONOMY EAST TIMORESE SOUGHT TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM THE MILITIAS EXPLAINING, "WE ARE NOT ONE BUT OUR OBJECTIVES ARE THE SAME." EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR HARTWICK STRESSED TO THEM THAT UNAMET WAS NOT GOING AWAY AND THAT THERE WAS NEED FOR EAST TIMORESE TO RECONCILE AMONG

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8018

PAGE 01 JAKART 02914 04 OF 04 141041Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/015W		

----------D49C8F 141041Z /38

O 141040Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8305
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY ROME
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 002914

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/04
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02914 04 OF 04 141041Z
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, EAID, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: JUNE 14

THEMSELVES. HE SAID THAT THE PERCEPTION OF THE OUTSIDE WORLD WAS THAT MILITIA BEHAVIOR WAS THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN EAST TIMOR. HE URGED THAT THEY COOPERATE FULLY WITH UNAMET.

16. (C) FOR THEIR PART, THEY EMPHASIZED THEIR OPPOSITION TO ANY OBSERVERS OUTSIDE THE UNAMET TEAM. THEY ALSO REITERATED EARLIER CRITICISM OF [redacted] B1
[redacted] THEY APPEARED COOL TO THE NOTION OF JOINING THEIR EFFORTS WITH THOSE OF ANOTHER [redacted] B1
[redacted] THEY CLAIMED THAT UNAMET WAS BIASED ON BEHALF OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE AND CLAIMED THAT [redacted] ([redacted] NOTED THAT B1
THESE [redacted] HAD TWICE CANCELLED DINNER B1
MEETINGS AT THE LAST MINUTE AND THAT HIS PHONE CALLS TO THEM HAD GONE UNRETURNED.)

17. (C) IN A CALL ON THE [redacted] B1
[redacted] CLAIMED THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION WAS NORMAL AND THAT THE TNI WAS PLAYING A STRICTLY NEUTRAL ROLE IN RELATION TO THE UPCOMING BALLOT. HARTWICK AND GRAY NOTED EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY AND TOOK THE OCCASION TO INFORM THE OFFICIAL THAT THERE WOULD BE USG SUPPORT FOR WHATEVER DECISION UNAMET TOOK REGARDING THE DATE FOR THE BALLOTING.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02914 04 OF 04 141041Z
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN DILI
---

18. (C) POLOFF REPORTED BY TELEPHONE JUNE 14 THAT THE PURPORTED KILLING OF A MEMBER OF THE AITARAK MILITIA IN DILI OVER THE WEEKEND APPEARED SUSPICIOUS. WHILE NO-ONE DISPUTED THAT THE VICTIM, STABBED 11 TIMES, WAS INDEED DEAD, THERE WAS DOUBT ABOUT AITARAK'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS ONE OF THEIR MEMBERS. NONETHELESS, THE PRO-AUTONOMY MILITIA, THE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY WERE DEMANDING AN UNAMET INVESTIGATION.

19. (C) REPORTS ARE CIRCULATING IN DILI (AND ABROAD) OF A LEAKED DOCUMENT WHICH INDICATES THAT EAST TIMORESE GOVERNOR ABILIO SOARES HAS AUTHORIZED THE DIVERSION OF THREE BILLION RUPIAH MEANT FOR SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAMS TO "ACTIVITIES TO PUBLICIZE THE SPECIAL AUTONOMY PACKAGE." THE ACTIVITIES TO BE FINANCED INCLUDED FINANCING "SECURITY GUARDS" RUN BY ONE OF EAST TIMOR'S MOST INFAMOUS MILITIA LEADERS, EURICO GUTERRES. POLOFF

WHO SAW A COPY OF THE DOCUMENT SAID THAT THE SIGNATURE APPEARED TO BE THAT OF GOVERNOR SOARES.

THOUGHTS ON ADDRESSING THE GOI



B1

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART02892

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2368

E42

PAGE 01 JAKART 02892 01 OF 07 160713Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/021W					

----------D5B057 161256Z /38

P 132356Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8286
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 12 JUN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 20 JUL 2004 200300722

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 JAKARTA 002892

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02892 01 OF 07 160713Z
C O R R E C T E D COPY//PARA RE-NUMBERED//

ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/03
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREF, CASC, PREL, PINS, EAID, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: FRIENDLY EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF EAST TIMOR

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE CHIEF OF MISSION OF A FRIENDLY EMBASSY RECENTLY LED A TEAM TO EAST TIMOR. HE HAS SHARED HIS OBSERVATIONS FROM THIS TRAVEL WHICH CONCLUDED IN EARLY JUNE. WHILE UNAMET'S ARRIVAL IN DILI APPEARED TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN THE CAPITAL, ELSEWHERE THE SITUATION IS MUCH WORSE. THERE IS A "FULL-SCALE, SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION BEING WAGED BY PRO-INTERGATIONISTS SUPPORTED BY THE MILITARY" WEST OF DILI. CHURCH AND NGO SOURCES REPORTED UP TO 45,000 INTERNALLY DISPLACED IN THE WEST WHO FACE SERIOUS FOOD AND MEDICAL SHORTAGES. HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS FACE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN REACHING THE DISPLACED (AS OF EARLY JUNE). BISHOP BELO DOES NOT BELIEVE CONDITIONS FOR A FREE AND FAIR BALLOT EXIST AND THAT MORE UNARMED CIVILIAN POLICE WILL BE REQUIRED THAN HAVE BEEN PROJECTED. UNAMET HOPES THAT ITS GROWING PRESENCE WILL HAVE A CALMING EFFECT OUTSIDE DILI IN TIME. IT WILL ESTABLISH EIGHT REGIONAL BALLOTING CENTERS TO SUPPORT 200 BALLOT STATIONS. POLICE SECURITY SUPPORT OF UNAMET HAS BEEN GOOD, THUS FAR. THERE APPEARS TO BE A SIGNIFICANT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02892 01 OF 07 160713Z

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNAMET AND THE GOI OVER THE SCOPE OF CIVPOL RESPONSIBILITY WITH UNAMET BELIEVING THAT EFFECTIVE POLICING OF THE BALLOTING CAN NOT BE SEPARATED FROM EFFECTIVE POLICING. THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE PUBLIC TRUST IN THE INDONESIAN POLICE. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS MET IN EAST TIMOR WERE UNIFORMLY PREJUDICED IN FAVOR OF THE PRO-AUTONOMY SIDE. THEY APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY SURPRISE BY THE TOUGH STANCE OF UNAMET WHICH IS INSISTING ON STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE TERMS OF THE MAY 5 AGREEMENT. THIS HAS PROMPTED GOI CLAIMS OF A PRO-INDEPENDENCE BIAS ON THE PART OF UNAMET. THERE IS LITTLE PROGRESS TOWARD RECONCILIATION WITH A KEY PROBLEM BEING HINDRANCE FROM THE MILITARY "BEHIND THE SCENES (AND) FROM THE TOP DOWN." PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS ARE TOO FRIGHTENED TO EMERGE FROM HIDING AND PARTICIPATE IN ANY DIALOGUE/RECONCILIATION PROCESS. MOREOVER, BELO AND UNAMET BELIEVED THAT MILITARY OR MILITARY-BACKED INTERFERENCE WOULD ATTEMPT TO DEFEAT EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION. THE GOI-INITIATED "PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION" HAS BEEN INEFFECTIVE. IT IS LED BY AN OFFICIAL WHO IS STRONGLY PRO-AUTONOMY. THERE ARE CONCERNS OVER VARIOUS METHODS BY WHICH THE GOVERNMENT MAY ATTEMPT TO CHEAT IN THE BALLOTING BUT THE CHURCH AND UNAMET ARE RELATIVELY CONFIDENT THAT MOST CHEATING EFFORTS WOULD FAIL. UNAMET WELCOMES INTERNATIONAL

MONITORS BUT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE FOR THEM AS IT ALREADY FACES DAUNTING LOGISTICS CHALLENGES MEETING NEEDS OF ITS OWN PERSONNEL. END SUMMARY.

B1

SECURITY IN DILI

4. (C) THE ARRIVAL OF UNAMET PERSONNEL IN EAST TIMOR HAS CLEARLY HAD A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN DILI, AT LEAST INITIALLY. THERE IS STILL A GOOD DEAL OF TENSION NOT FAR BELOW THE SURFACE. MANY SHOPS REMAIN CLOSED/BOARDED UP, AND FEW PEOPLE VENTURE ONTO THE STREETS AFTER EARLY EVENING. ONLY ONE CNRT LEADER, [redacted] WAS CONTACTABLE AND HE WAS UNDER 24-HOUR POLICE PROTECTION AT HIS HOME, AFTER MORE THAN 40 DAYS SHELTERING AT POLICE HQ. MANY OF THE NON-OFFICIAL INTERLOCUTORS -- CHURCH PEOPLE AND NGO REPRESENTATIVES -- MADE CLEAR THAT THE SENSE OF THREAT REMAINS STRONG FOR MANY PEOPLE.

B1

B1

5. (C) [redacted] DESCRIBED THE ARRIVAL OF THE UN AS "ENCOURAGING" BUT SAID THAT THE MILITIAS ARE STILL ACTIVE IN DILI, AND ARE STILL CHECKING PEOPLE, ALTHOUGH NOT AS OPENLY AS THEY WERE. HE SAID PEOPLE KNOW WHO THE PERPETRATORS OF VARIOUS INCIDENTS WERE (E.G., THE APRIL 6 MASSACRE IN LIQUISA) AND THEY ARE STILL WANDERING AROUND

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2363

PAGE 01 JAKART 02892 02 OF 07 160714Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01

ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00
SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
/020W						

----------D5B049 161256Z /38

P 132356Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8287
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 07 JAKARTA 002892

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02892 02 OF 07 160714Z
C O R R E C T E D COPY//PARA RE-NUMBERED//

ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/03
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREF, CASC, PREL, PINS, EAID, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: FRIENDLY EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF EAST TIMOR

FREELY ON THE STREETS.

SECURITY OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL
---

6. (C) THE SECURITY SITUATION IS MUCH WORSE OUTSIDE DILI, ESPECIALLY IN THE WEST. ACCORDING TO MANY SOURCES, A FULL SCALE SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION IS BEING WAGED THERE BY THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS, SUPPORTED BY THE MILITARY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT. UNAMET AND BISHOP BELO COMMENTED ON THE MASS INDUCTION CEREMONIES ORGANIZED BY PRO-INTEGRATIONIST GROUPS AND OFTEN INVOLVING THE GOVERNOR, WHICH PEOPLE ARE ALLEGEDLY FORCE TO ATTEND. (ONE WAS WITNESSED BY A

UNAMET OFFICER AND [redacted] TO WHOM WE SPOKE.) B1

7. (C) CHURCH AND OTHER NGO GROUPS REPORT THAT THERE ARE UP TO 45,000 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE WEST. THEY ALSO SAY THAT THE FOOD AND MEDICAL SITUATION IS SERIOUS AMONG THE IDPS. [redacted] B1
[redacted] TOLD US THAT THE PLIGHT OF THE IDPS HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE MILITIAS WHO ARE ATTEMPTING TO LAY THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02892 02 OF 07 160714Z
GROUND FOR MANIPULATING THE OUTCOME OF THE AUGUST 8 BALLOT.

8. (C) DESPITE ATTEMPTS (E.G., BY THE CATHOLIC CHURCH'S PEACE AND JUSTICE COMMISSION AND YAYASAN HAK) TO DOCUMENT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, VERIFICATION OF NUMBERS OF IDPS, THEIR CONDITION, OR OTHER INCIDENTS IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE. ACCESS TO THE WEST IS SEVERELY RESTRICTED BY THE MILITIAS AND POLICE/TNI -- OSTENSIBLY FOR SECURITY REASONS -- AND PEOPLE ARE TOO SCARED TO TALK. YAYASAN HAK'S CONTACTS IN THE FIELD HAD BEEN TARGETED BY THE MILITIAS AND ITS STAFF HAD BEEN THREATENED. WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY, CHURCH GROUPS AND NGOS HAVE BEEN DELIVERING LIMITED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SOME AFFECTED AREAS BUT OPERATING CONDITIONS ARE TOUGH AND DIRECT CONTACT WITH IDPS IS VERY LIMITED. ACCORDING TO [redacted] WE SPOKE TO, WITH B1
TRAVEL SO DIFFICULT AND ANY MEETINGS IN THE VILLAGES DANGEROUS, DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS HAVE COME TO A STANDSTILL.

9. (C) WE VISITED LIQUISA, ABOUT 40 MINUTES DRIVE WEST OF DILI AND THE SITE OF A SERIOUS INCIDENT IN APRIL IN WHICH A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WERE KILLED AROUND THE CATHOLIC CHAPEL. [redacted] TOLD US THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN BACK TO B1
LIQUISA SINCE A FEW DAYS AFTER THE INCIDENT WHEN THE REGIONAL HEAD DELEGATE AND THE FORMER HEAD OF THE DILI OFFICE HAD BEEN THREATENED AT GUNPOINT BY THE MILITIAS. ON OUR VISIT THERE WAS NO SIGN OF MILITIA ACTIVITY ALONG THE WAY OR IN LIQUISA. THE TOWNSHIP WAS VERY QUIET WITH ONLY A FEW PEOPLE VISIBLE ON THE STREETS. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION WITH PARISHIONERS AT A PROTESTANT CHURCH,

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02892 02 OF 07 160714Z
LOCAL PEOPLE EXPRESSED CONCERNS WHICH SUGGESTED LIMITED UNDERSTANDING OF THE UN PROCESS, DOUBTS -- WHICH WE

ENCOUNTERED EVERYWHERE -- THAT THEY WOULD BE SAFE AFTER THE BALLOT; WOULD THEY HAVE A FUTURE IN EAST TIMOR AFTERWARDS? (COMMENT: WE ARE CAUTIOUS ABOUT DRAWING ANY CONCLUSIONS FROM OUR LIMITED EXPOSURE TO LIQUISA, NOT LEAST BECAUSE AMBASSADORIAL VISITORS ARE ESCORTED BY A TRUCK WITH SIX WELL-ARMED POLICE AND ANOTHER VEHICLE BEHIND CONTAINING THREE HEAVILY ARMED MEN NOT IN UNIFORM (WE SUSPECT THEY WERE KOPASSUS SOLDIERS).

10. (C) UNAMET POLITICAL STAFF AND BISHOP BELO BOTH HELD THE VIEW THAT CONDITIONS DID NOT CURRENTLY EXIST FOR A FREE AND FAIR BALLOT TO PROCEED. BELO SAID THAT THE UN PRESENCE WOULD NEED TO BE STRONGER THAN 200-ODD UNARMED CIVILIAN POLICE TO ENSURE A SAFE ENVIRONMENT. HE HOPED THAT THE UN WOULD BE PRESENT IN EVERY VILLAGE/TOWN/SUBDISTRICT. HE ALSO SAID THE POPULATION NEEDED TO HAVE A SENSE OF FREEDOM TO VOTE; OTHERWISE THEY WOULD VOTE FOR AUTONOMY OUT OF FEAR. NGO GROUPS HELD SIMILAR VIEWS THAT, WITHOUT WEAPONS, THE UN WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DO MUCH AGAINST THE TNI-BACKED MILITIAS. AT THIS STAGE, THE UNAMET VIEW IS THAT THE UN WILL SOON HAVE EYES AND EARS THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE AND THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT WILL NO LONGER BE ABLE TO DENY THE INCIDENTS. HOPEFULLY THE CALMING EFFECT OF THE UN WOULD SPREAD FROM DILI TO THE REGIONS AS MORE STAFF WERE DEPLOYED.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2428

PAGE 01 JAKART 02892 03 OF 07 160714Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/021W					

----------D5B12E 161305Z /38

P 132356Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8288
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 07 JAKARTA 002892

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02892 03 OF 07 160714Z
C O R R E C T E D COPY //PARA RE-NUMBERED//
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/03
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREF, CASC, PREL, PINS, EAID, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: FRIENDLY EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF EAST TIMOR

UNAMET STATUS AND PLANS
---

11. (C) UNAMET WILL ESTABLISH EIGHT REGIONAL CENTERS OUTSIDE DILI TO SUPPORT THE 200 BALLOT STATIONS (10 TO 12 STATIONS AROUND EACH REGIONAL CENTER). THIS WILL PRESENT ENORMOUS LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS RANGING FROM SUPPLIES OF FOOD, FUEL AND WATER TO MEDEVAC ARRANGEMENTS FOR UN STAFF. DAILY FOOD AND DUEL RUNS MAY BE NECESSARY. ACCOMMODATION IS VERY DIFFICULT AND USE OF TENTS IS UNDER CONSIDERATION. THERE HAVE BEEN PROBLEMS WITH THE HIRING OF LOCAL STAFF AS THE MINISTRY OF LABOR HAS ARGUED THAT IT SHOULD MANAGE ALL HIRING. [redacted] B1

12. (C) UNAMET COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE HAS BEEN QUITE GOOD SO FAR. THE POLICE HAVE BEEN QUICK TO RESPOND TO ANY THREATS DIRECTED AT UNAMET. THE RETURN OF [redacted] B1
TO HIS HOME (WITH 24-HOUR POLICE PROTECTION) FROM POLICE HEADQUARTERS WHERE HE HAD BEEN SHELTERING WAS THE RESULT OF UNAMET NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE POLICE. WHILE [redacted] IS B1
PHYSICALLY SECURE, HE IS NOT ABLE TO OPERATE FREELY AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF CNRT, NOR HAS HIS SITUATION ENCOURAGED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02892 03 OF 07 160714Z

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

ANY OTHER RESISTANCE FIGURES TO RETURN FROM HIDING. THIS IS ONE CLEAR SIGN THAT CURRENT CONDITIONS FALL FAR SHORT OF WHAT IS NEEDED IF THE BALLOT IS TO TAKE PLACE. [redacted] B1 ARGUED THAT, FOR A FAIR PROCESS, XANANA GUSMAO HAD TO BE ALLOWED TO COME TO EAST TIMOR TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CAMPAIGNING. XANANA HAD PROMOTED PEACE AND APPEALED AGAINST VIOLENCE AND SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETURN.

CIVPOL
---

13. (C) THE UN VIEW OF THE CIVPOL FUNCTION DIFFERED FROM THAT OF THE INDONESIANS. BOTH THE ARMY AND POLICE COMMANDERS WERE CLEAR THAT THE CIVPOLS WOULD HAVE AN ADVISORY ROLE ONLY AND THAT THIS WOLD BE CONFINED TO ISSUES ARISING FROM THE CONSULTATION: THE POLICE CHIEF GAVE THE EXAMPLE OF SAFEGUARDING THE DISTRIBUTION OF VOTING CARDS TO POLLING STATIONS. THE UN TOOK A MORE EXPANSIVE VIEW ALTHOUGH THE CIVPOL ROLE HAD NOT YET BEEN DEFINED PRECISELY. THE MANDATE WAS TO CREATE CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE FOR A FREE AND FAIR BALLOT. THAT MEANT SEEING THAT ALL LAWS WERE ENFORCED FAIRLY AND PROMPTLY IN ORDER TO BUILD CONFIDENCE IN THE POLICE AS GUARDIANS OF THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. EFFECTIVE POLICING OF THE CONSULTATION, IN OTHER WORDS, CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM EFFECTIVE POLICING. THERE IS CLEARLY SCOPE FOR DISPUTES ABOUT THIS.

14. (C) CONSISTENT WITH ITS VIEW OF THEIR GENERAL ROLE, UNAMET PLANS TO DEPLOY CIVPOLS IN POLICE POSTS IN ALL PARTS OF THE PROVINCE TO WORK ALONGSIDE INDONESIAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02892 03 OF 07 160714Z

POLICE, THE PATTERN OF DEPLOYMENT WILL BE IN LINE WITH THE LOCATION OF THE 200 BALLOT STATIONS AROUND THE REGIONAL CENTERS.

15. (C) A MORE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE IS WHETHER, EVEN SUPPORTED BY CIVPOLS, INDONESIAN POLICE WILL BE TRUSTED BY THE POPULATION TO ACT FAIRLY AND NEUTRALLY. WE ASKED THE POLICE CHIEF DIRECTLY ABOUT THIS. HE REPLIED THAT HE "COULD NOT ANSWER AS A POLICEMAN" AND THAT "IT WOULD BE BETTER TO ASK THE PEOPLE." WHILE HE ACKNOWLEDGED COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE POLICE IN THE PAST (E.G., THEIR SLOWNESS TO RESPOND TO THE APRIL 17 INCIDENT AT THE CARRASCALAO RESIDENCE) THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO "DO THEIR BEST" AND WOULD BE NEUTRAL. HE RATHER SPOILED THE IMPACT

OF THIS MESSAGE BY ADDING THAT "PEOPLE ALWAYS COMPLAIN WHEN SOMETHING HAPPENS TO PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS." HE ALSO REMARKED UPON THE DIFFICULTIES OF REFORMING THE POLICE, EVEN AFTER THEIR FORMAL SEPARATION FROM ABRI: "SOEHARTO WAS PRESIDENT FOR SO LONG HE CAN'T BE ARRESTED. THE POLICE HAVE BEEN PART OF ABRI FOR SO LONG IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO CHANGE."

16. (C) FROM THE LIMITED SAMPLE OF TIMORESE WE ASKED ABOUT THIS, WE JUDGE THAT THE POLICE WILL NOT BE TRUSTED, GIVEN THEIR PAST COMPLICITY IN ABRI REPRESSION. THE ADDITIONAL POLICE BEING BROUGHT INTO THE PROVINCE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE ALSO ALL BRIMOB, NOT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5152

PAGE 01 JAKART 02892 04 OF 07 162049Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/021W					

----------D5E748 162100Z /38

P 132356Z JUN 99 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8289
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 07 JAKARTA 002892

C O R R E C T E D COPY//PARA RE-NUMBERED//

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02892 04 OF 07 162049Z

ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/03
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREF, CASC, PREL, PINS, EAID, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: FRIENDLY EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF EAST TIMOR

REGULARS. THERE MAY BE SOME NEGATIVE FALLOUT FOR THE CIVPOLS FROM THEIR CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS LIKE THESE.

17. (C) IN FAIRNESS, WE SHOULD REPORT THAT MANY OF THE POLICE REINFORCEMENTS ARE SAID TO HAVE PRIOR UN EXPERIENCE. ACCORDING TO THE POLICE CHIEF, THE PLANNED REDUCTION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THEIR REPLACEMENT BY POLICE WILL PROCEED IN STAGES. SOME 500 ADDITIONAL POLICE ARE PRESENTLY ON THE WAY TO EAST TIMOR (AS OF EARLY JUNE). THEY WILL COMPLEMENT THE EXISTING NUMBER OF 3,900. FURTHER TRANSFERS OF 800 TO 3,000 PERSONNEL WILL OCCUR BEFORE THE BALLOT, BRINGING STAFFING LEVELS TO AROUND 8,000. THE NORMAL BRIEFING PROCEDURE WILL BE FOLLOWED, WITH OFFICERS RECEIVING A ONE WEEK PRE-POSTING BRIEFING, INCLUDING SECTIONS FROM DEPLU (THE FOREIGN MINISTRY) AND OFFICERS WITH PREVIOUS UN EXPERIENCE, FOLLOWED BY FURTHER LOCAL CULTURAL BRIEFINGS ON ARRIVAL.

OFFICIAL RESPONSES
---

18. (C) ALL OFFICIALS WERE, TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE, OPEN IN THEIR DISLIKE OF THE UN PRESENCE; THERE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02892 04 OF 07 162049Z
WERE ALSO BARBED COMMENTS DIRECTED AT AUSTRALIA. IN SOME CASES THEY EXPRESSED THEIR PREFERENCE FOR AN AUTONOMY OUTCOME QUITE EXPLICITLY.

19. (C) THEIR COMMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF RECENT VIOLENCE AND ON THE PROSPECTS FOR DISARMAMENT WERE PARTISAN (PARTICULARLY MILITARY COMMANDER TONO SURATMAN) TO THE POINT OF INCREDIBILITY -- IN ALL CASES THE BLAME WAS ATTRIBUTED TO FALINTIL, WHILE THE MILITIAS WERE EXONERATED AND EVEN PRAISED. COLONEL TONO SURATMAN CLAIMED THAT FALINTIL HAD BEEN INTIMIDATING THE PEOPLE

OVER MUCH OF THE LAST YEAR. HE SAID THEIR ACTIONS HAD BROUGHT ABOUT THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE MILITIAS. FALINTIL HAD FORCED FARMERS TO BUY COUPONS AS A WAY OF RAISING FUNDS. HE REJECTED ALLEGATIONS THAT THE MILITARY HAD JUST STOOD BY ON OCCASIONS AND LET MILITIAS BREAK THE LAW. HE SAID THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR WAS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT IN OTHER PROVINCES, THE TWO GROUPS HAD BEEN FIGHTING FOR 23 YEARS. IT WAS NOT EASY FOR THE TNI TO INTERVENE, ESPECIALLY WHEN ITS NUMBERS WERE LIMITED. HE REPEATED OTHER FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE 10,000 WEAPONS LEFT OVER WHEN THE PORTUGUESE LEFT EAST TIMOR. HE SAID THAT THESE WERE THE MAIN SOURCE OF ARMS FOR FALINTIL. [redacted] TOLD US THAT FALINTIL HAD STOPPED USING PORTUGUESE FIREARMS SOME TIME AGO AS THEY WERE TOO OLD AND FALLING APART. HE ALSO SAID HE HAD BEEN IN THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY BEFORE 1975 AND WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE TYPES OF FIREARMS USED THEN. HE SAID THAT THE FIVE TYPES OF FIREARMS BEING USED NOW BY THE MILITIAS ARE NOT FROM THE PORTUGUESE PERIOD. (ON OUR VISIT IN MARCH, WE WERE TOLD BY THE MILITARY COMMANDER THAT THE MILITIAS WERE B1

USING WEAPONS LEFT BY THE PORTUGUESE.)

20. (C) GOVERNOR ABILIO SOARES SAID THAT ATTEMPTS TO FORCE DEMOCRACY ON EAST TIMOR IN SUCH A SHORT TIME WOULD FAIL. WITH LOW LEVELS OF EDUCATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, LITERACY AND POLITICAL MATURITY, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS ACTING IRRESPONSIBLY BY PUSHING FOR A BALLOT IN TWO MONTHS -- OR, INDEED, AT ALL; DEMOCRACY WAS NOT THE TIMORESE WAY. HE LIKENED THE SITUATION TO A BABY BEING FED MILK THAT WAS NOT SUITABLE FOR IT, ADDING THAT: "YOU WOULD NOT FEED A BABY POISON, WOULD YOU?" (WE RECALL HIM USING THIS EXACT ANALOGY WHEN WE MET HIM IN MARCH!) WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF RECONCILIATION AND DIALOGUE, HE SAID THAT DIALOGUE WAS IMPORTANT BUT POLITICAL COMPROMISE IS THE KEY. FOR THAT REASON, HE DID NOT FEEL OPTIMISTIC BECAUSE NEITHER SIDE WAS WILLING TO GIVE IN. SOARES TOLD US THAT HE HAD NEVER BEEN CONSULTED ON THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE. HE ALSO SAID THAT EAST TIMORESE DO NOT HAVE THE POLITICAL MATURITY TO ACCEPT LOSING AND CLOSED BY WARNING THAT 1975 COULD BE REPEATED. THE POLICE CHIEF TOOK UP THIS THEME, SAYING THAT THE FINAL BALLOT RESULT MAY BE REJECTED BY SOME WHO ARE ALREADY REJECTING THE PROCESS. HE CONTINUED" "WHAT SORT OF MESSAGE IS BEING SENT WHEN POLITICAL LEADERS LIKE XANANA GUSMAO WHO HAVE COMMITTED VIOLENT ACTIONS CAN WEAR

A TIE AND APPEAR ON TELEVISION - SO IT IS OKAY TO KILL?"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5040

PAGE 01 JAKART 02892 05 OF 07 162033Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/021W					

----------D5E548 162040Z /38

P 132356Z JUN 99 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8290
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 07 JAKARTA 002892

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02892 05 OF 07 162033Z
C O R R E C T E D COPY//PARA RE-NUMBERED//

ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/03
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREF, CASC, PREL, PINS, EAID, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: FRIENDLY EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF EAST TIMOR

21. (C) IT SEEMED TO US THAT THE AUTHORITIES -- PERHAPS SURPRISED AT THE TOUGH STANCE ADOPTED BY THE UN IN THE

EARLY STAGES -- ARE NOW CAREFULLY TAKING THE MEASURE OF THE UN TEAM, WITH A VIEW TO ADJUSTING THEIR TACTICS. WE DETECTED THE BEGINNINGS OF AN EFFORT TO PAINT THE UN AS PRO-INDEPENDENCE, AND TO DISCREDIT IT AS A NEUTRAL MANAGER OF THE PROCESS: ACCUSATIONS OF THIS KIND BY FEISAL TANJUNG (COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY) ARE REPORTED IN THE JAKARTA MEDIA. (THIS TAKES SOME GALL, GIVEN PRETTY FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF NEUTRALITY BY THE AUTHORITIES.)

22. (C) IT ALSO LOOKED AS IF THE POLICE ARE BEING POSITIONED BY TNI TO TAKE THE BLAME IF THINGS GO WRONG FOR THE INDONESIANS. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE OF OBSTRUCTIONISM BY THE INDONESIANS INCLUDING DELAYS IN CLEARING EQUIPMENT, LEVELING OF FEES AND CHARGES FROM WHICH THE UN SHOULD BE EXEMPT. AUSTRALIAN UN STAFF MAY ALSO HAVE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES IN GETTING ENTRY VISAS -- INDEED VISAS MAY BE A WIDER SOURCE OF PROBLEMS AS MANY UN STAFF APPARENTLY HAVE INAPPROPRIATE VISAS. (THE TREATMENT OF SOME FOREIGNERS HERE TO ASSIST WITH GENERAL ELECTION PREPARATIONS IS A POINTER TO THE POTENTIAL FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02892 05 OF 07 162033Z

INDONESIANS TO USE IMMIGRATION TECHNICALITIES AS AN HARASSMENT TOOL.) BUT [redacted] WERE TAKING THE CHARITABLE VIEW THAT THIS MAY SIMPLY BE INDONESIAN INEFFICIENCY. IN MOST AREAS THEY HAVE EXPERIENCED GOOD COOPERATION SO FAR. B1

[redacted] B1

RECONCILIATION

24. (C) NOT MUCH HAS BEEN HAPPENING IN EAST TIMOR ON THE RECONCILIATION FRONT; IN FACT MANY DO NOT FEEL OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES OF RECONCILIATION TALKS GOING AHEAD,

LET ALONE BEING ABLE TO RESOLVE ANY DIFFERENCE. PERHAPS FRUSTRATED BY THE UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO GET DARE II GOING UNTIL NOW, BISHOP BELO TOLD US THAT HE DID NOT THINK RECONCILIATION WOULD BE POSSIBLE UNTIL THE SECURITY SITUATION IMPROVED. HE SAID PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS WERE SIMPLY TOO SCARED TO COME OUT OF HIDING TO BE INVOLVED. HE STILL THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT THE CHURCH WAS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02892 05 OF 07 162033Z
THE KEY TO BRINGING PEOPLE TOGETHER, ALTHOUGH MILITARY OR MILITARY-BACKED INTERFERENCE WOULD ATTEMPT TO DEFEAT SUCH EFFORTS. HE SPOKE OF SMALLER GROUP EFFORTS BEING NEEDED, RATHER THAN HIGH PROFILE INITIATIVES.

25. (C) [redacted] B1
[redacted] AMPLIFIED THIS "SMALLER GROUP" REMARK, SAYING IT WAS TRYING TO PUSH FORWARD WITH THE DARE II PROPOSAL. WE WERE TOLD THAT THE COMMISSION DID NOT WISH TO PUSH A PARTICULAR SOLUTION, BUT RATHER WANTED TO PROMOTE A CODE OF CONDUCT. THE PROPOSED SMALLER DARE II INITIALLY WOULD ONLY INVOLVE FIVE LEADERS FROM EACH SIDE, THE TWO BISHOPS AND SOME CONFLICT RESOLUTION EXPERTS (INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN). THE VENUE MIGHT BE DILI OR BAUCAU. XANANA'S ROLE WOULD DEPEND ON THE VIEWS OF THE JUSTICE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS, MULADI AND ALATAS. THE CHURCH WOULD NOT PUSH THE XANANA ISSUE TOO HARD, GIVEN PAST SENSITIVITIES.

26. (C) THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT-INITIATED "PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION" HAS BEEN INEFFECTIVE UNTIL NOW. UNAMET COMMENTED THAT IT MIGHT STILL BE HELPFUL BECAUSE IT INVOLVES TNI, THE POLICE, PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS, THE CHURCH, ETC. [redacted] B1

[redacted]

OUR MEETING WITH [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2470

PAGE 01 JAKART 02892 06 OF 07 160715Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Page: 14

EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
SAS-00	/021W					

----------D5B1F3 161311Z /38

P 132356Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8291
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 07 JAKARTA 002892

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02892 06 OF 07 160715Z
C O R R E C T E D COPY//PARA RE-NUMBERRED//

ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/03
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREF, CASC, PREL, PINS, EAID, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: FRIENDLY EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF EAST TIMOR

[redacted] B1

WAS A DEPRESSING EXPERIENCE. HIS WHOLE FRAME OF REFERENCE WAS THAT OF A PROPONENT OF AUTONOMY OR INTEGRATION. HE SEEMED UNABLE TO COMPREHEND THE POSSIBILITY THAT TNI AND THE POLICE MIGHT BE PART OF THE PROBLEM OR THAT TIMORESE MIGHT GENUINELY WANT TO SPLIT OFF FROM INDONESIA. IN LIGHT OF THIS WE HAVE TO WONDER ABOUT THE EXPECTATIONS PLACES ON THE "PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION" BY THE REFERENCE TO IT IN THE UNSC RESOLUTION.

27. (C) UNAMET IS AWARE OF SOME OVERTURES MADE BY SOME KEY PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS TO XANANA GUSMAO AND LEANDRO

ISSAC. MOREOVER, ACCOMMODATING NOISES HAVE BEEN MADE BY XANANA. THE PROBLEM IS THE PRESSURE THE MILITARY IS APPLYING BEHIND THE SCENES. A STRIKING EXAMPLE OF MILITARY ATTITUDES WAS SURATMAN'S SUGGESTION THAT A COMPROMISE SOLUTION MIGHT BE ARRIVED AT BEFORE THE BALLOT, MAKING THE BALLOT UNNECESSARY: "THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS HAVE ALREADY COMPROMISED BY ACCEPTING AUTONOMY; IT IS ONLY FAIR FOR THE PRO-INDEPENDENISTS TO COMPROMISE" (I.E., BY ACCEPTING AUTONOMY BEFORE THE BALLOT). LIKE OTHERS, HE SEEMED TO THINK THAT COMPROMISE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02892 06 OF 07 160715Z

REQUIRED THE INDEPENDENTISTS TO FORGO THAT BASIC GOAL IN RETURN FOR CLAYTON'S CONCESSIONS FROM THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS. THIS INSTINCTIVE SYMPATHY FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS CAME THROUGH AGAIN IN SURATMAN'S RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT HIS MOST DIFFICULT CHALLENGE IN THE PERIOD AHEAD: THIS WOULD ARISE "IF XANANA GUSMAO DOES NOT ACCEPT AUTONOMY."

QUESTIONS ABOUT BALLOTING:

28. (C) WE HEARD CLAIMS THAT INDONESIA WILL TRY TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF VOTERS ILLEGALLY. STRATEGIES MENTIONED INCLUDED: BRING WEST TIMORESE IN TO VOTE ([redacted] CLAIMED THAT MANY WEST TIMORESE ARE ALREADY INVOLVED IN THE AITARAK AND BESI MERAH PUTI MILITIAS); FALSIFICATION OF ID CARDS; EAST TIMORESE WOMEN BEING ENCOURAGED/FORCED TO MARRY NON-EAST TIMORESE, WHO WOULD THEN BE ENTITLED TO VOTE. UNAMET AND BISHOP BELO DID NOT THINK THAT THESE TRICKS WOULD WORK BECAUSE, FORTUNATELY, THERE ARE GOOD CHURCH RECORDS, THE POPULATION OF EAST TIMOR IS SMALL, AND "EVERYBODY KNOWS EVERYBODY ELSE." UNAMET CONFIRMED THAT IT IS LOOKING CLOSELY AT USING CHURCH RECORDS FOR VERIFICATION OF VOTER BONA FIDES. B1

29. (C) ANOTHER ISSUE RELATES TO THE COUNTING OF VOTES. ACCORDING TO UNAMET THIS IS LIKELY TO BE DONE AT THE REGIONAL CENTERS, WHICH WILL INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF LOCAL POLL-COUNT OBSERVERS REVEALING THE OUTCOME IN CERTAIN REGIONS, DESPTE UN PLANS TO ANNOUNCE A SINGLE RESULT. THI MAY PROMPT CALLS FOR A SPLITTING OF THE PROVNCE OR BE THE TRIGGER FOR NEW VIOLENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02892 06 OF 07 160715Z

30. (C) MANY EAST TIMORESE ARE VERY CONCERNED ABUT THE SITUATION AFTER THE BALLOT, SEEING A LIKELIHOOD THAT NEITHER SIDE WILL ACCEPT A LOSS, WITH A CIVIL WAR BEING THE CONSEQUENCE. THIS IS ONE OF THE KEY THEMES OF THE PRO-INTEGRATIONIST ARGUMENT. THERE IS ALSO A FEAR OF REPRISALS BY THE LOSING SIDE. [redacted] NOTED RUMORS THAT A CLEANSING OPERATION WILL BE LAUNCHED IF THE BALLOT RESULT IS FOR INDEPENDENCE. B1

31. (C) ALL THAT SAID, LOCAL EXPECTATIONS OF THE UN ARE VERY HIGH, PERHAPS UNREALISTICALLY SO. ONE UNAMET CONTACT COMMENTED ON THE ENTHUSIASTIC PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE INITIAL TEAM MEMBERS - PEOPLE CLAPPING AND CHEERING IN THE STREETS. IN BOTH THE CONTACT'S PREVIOUS UN ASSIGNMENTS, THE UN WAS "HATED" BY THE LOCALS.

INTERNATIONAL MONITORS
---

32. (C) UNAMET REITERATED THE UN'S POSITION THAT INTERNATIONAL MONITORS ARE WELCOME BUT THAT IT CANNOT LOOK AFTER THEM. INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER MISSIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN FOOD, ACCOMMODATION, TRANSPORT, ETC. UNAMET WAS ALREADY AT THE LIMITS OF ITS LOGISTICAL CAPACITY. THE IMPACT OF THE INFLUX OF PEOPLE ON EAST TIMOR'S LIMITED INFRASTRUCTURE WILL BE HUGE AND

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4927

PAGE 01 JAKART 02892 07 OF 07 161954Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/021W					

----------D5E350 162012Z /38

P 132356Z JUN 99 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8292
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02892 07 OF 07 161954Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 07 JAKARTA 002892

C O R R E C T E D COPY (TEXT)
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/03
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREF, CASC, PREL, PINS, EAID, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: FRIENDLY EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF EAST TIMOR

IS CERTAIN TO CAUSE PROBLEMS. THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN GREAT PROBLEMS RAISING THE POWER SUPPLY TO AN ADEQUATE LEVEL. WATER AND OTHER SERVICES MAY ALSO STRUGGLE TO COPE.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART02937

Channel: n/a

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4146

E45

PAGE 01 JAKART 02937 01 OF 02 151017Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/021W					

----------D513C4 151021Z /38

O 151006Z JUN 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8328
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
AMEMBASSY ROME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002937

ROME FOR THE VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02937 01 OF 02 151017Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/04
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, MOPS, PINS, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: JUNE 15, 1999

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: REPORTS CONTINUE TO ARRIVE CONCERNING CLAIMS OF PREPARATION OF MILITIA AND MILITARY SUPPORT PLATFORMS IN WEST TIMOR AND IN THE WEST TIMOR-EAST TIMOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 13 JUN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2004 200300722

BORDER AREA. AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE KILLED THREE CHILDREN IN DILI UNDER UNCLEAR CIRCUMSTANCES. A SENIOR TNI OFFICIAL DENIED AUSTRALIAN ACCUSATIONS THAT IT WAS AIDING AND ARMING PRO-INTEGRATION/AUTONOMY MILITIAS. END SUMMARY

MILITARY AND OTHER ACTIVITY IN WEST TIMOR

3. (C) [redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS JUNE 14 THAT THERE IS INCREASING MILITARY RE-SUPPLY AND TRAINING OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF MILITIAS IN THE AREA WEST OF THE EAST TIMOR-WEST TIMOR BORDER. HE SOURCED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO [redacted] PROTESTANT CHURCHES IN THE WEST TIMOR CAPITAL OF KUPANG REPORTEDLY ARE COLLECTING MONEY FOR EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS STRANDED THERE AND FEARFUL OF

B1

B1

GOING HOME.

4. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT IN THE VILLAGE OF BETON ON THE BORDER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST TIMOR THE MILITARY HAS ESTABLISHED A BASE AREA FOR THE BESI MERAH PUTI AND HALIANTAR MILITIAS. THE BASE COMPRISES SHELTER, A TRAINING AREA AND A LOGISTICS POINT. [redacted] AND EAST TIMORESE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) WHO FLED TO THE AREA TO ESCAPE MILITIA ATTACKS IN EAST TIMOR CLAIM THAT MILITIA PERSONNEL IN THE AREA CONTINUE TO PREY ON THESE IDPS.

B1

B1

5. (C) THE MALIANA MILITIA, UNDER COMMANDER CANCIO LOPES, HAS A BASE AT MOTA AIN (IN THE BORDER ZONE). THERE IT HAS RECEIVED GROUND TRANSPORT (TRUCKS) AND ARMS AS WELL AS COMMUNICATIONS GEAR, LANDMINES, PISTOLS, BAZOOKAS AND GRENADES FROM THE TNI.

6. (C) TNI IS ESTABLISHING A POSITION AT CURITA HARBOR, A HARBOR USED BY THE JAPANESE DURING WORLD WAR II. IT IS LOCATED 45 KMS WEST OF ATAPUPU. ACCORDING TO [redacted] TNI PERSONNEL ARE HELD THERE IN CASE OF NEED FOR SUPPORT OF PRO-INTEGRATION OPERATIONS IN THE MOTA AIN AREA AND OTHER AREAS. TNI HAS DESIGNATED KUPANG AIR FIELD AS THE AIR

B1

BASE TO SUPPORT THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA.

DILI DEVELOPMENTS

7. (U) AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE OF SOME TYPE KILLED THREE CHILDREN PLAYING IN A FIELD NEAR BECORA, JUST OUTSIDE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02937 01 OF 02 151017Z
CENTRAL DILI. JAKARTA MEDIA REPORTS CLAIM THE FIELD HAD BEEN A STAGING AREA FOR MILITIA ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE CIVILIANS IN DILI IN THE INCIDENTS OF APRIL 17 AND 18. MEANWHILE, CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MAN KILLED ON THE BEACH EARLIER IN THE WEEK, WHOM THE AITARAK MILITIA CLAIMED TO BE ONE OF THEIR MEMBERS, REMAIN UNCLEAR. POLOFF NOTES REPORTS CIRCULATING IN DILI THAT HE WAS A MENTALLY DERANGED VAGRANT, KNOWN IN THE AREA, WHO WAS KILLED BY AITARAK SO THAT HE COULD BE IDENTIFIED AS A VICTIM FROM AIATRAK RANKS.

8. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA, WITH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT, PLAN TO ENROLL A LARGE NUMBER OF PRO-INTEGRATION YOUTH AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR IN DILI BEGINNING IN AUGUST TO ACT AS A CONSTRAINT ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE STUDENTS WHO HAVE IN THE PAST DOMINATED POLITICS AT THE SCHOOL. B1

9. (C) [redacted] HAS SHARED WITH US A REPORT THAT A DOCUMENT HAS SURFACED WHICH COULD POINT TO GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR ARMING OF MILITIA GROUPS. THE DOCUMENT, WHOSE AUTHENTICITY IS STILL BEING CHECKED, PURPORTS TO BE A REQUEST FROM THE MILITIA FORUM "FPDK" TO AUTHORITIES IN DILI REQUESTING 533,000,000 RUPIAH FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARMS DIRECTLY FROM TNI. THE DOCUMENT IS B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4494

PAGE 01 JAKART 02937 02 OF 02 151108Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00

SCT-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00
PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 MR-00 NFAT-00
SAS-00 /021W
----------D51949 151108Z /38

O 151006Z JUN 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8329
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
AMEMBASSY ROME

C O N F I D.E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002937

ROME FOR THE VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02937 02 OF 02 151108Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/04
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, MOPS, PINS, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: JUNE 15, 1999

DATED MAY 15.

10. (U) POLOFF IN DILI REPORTED BY PHONE THAT THE MEETING OF THE PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 15 FAILED TO TAKE PLACE. IT STILL LACKS EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION FROM PRO-INDEPENDENCE PERSONNEL WHO HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR THEIR SAFETY SHOULD THEY RETURN.

11. (C) [redacted] HAS SHARED WITH US A DEATH LIST OF 66 PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE. THE DEATH LIST IS PURPORTED TO CONTAIN THE NAMES OF VICTIMS TO BE KILLED AFTER THE NATIONAL ELECTION. B1

OUTSIDE OF DILI

12. (C) POLOFF IN DILI, REPORTS WORD OF MILITIA ATTACKS IN THE LAST 24 HOURS WHICH LEFT A NUMBER OF HOMES ABLAZE

IN MABUARA, WEST OF LIQUISA.

MILITARY DISPUTES CLAIMS IT AIDS MILITIAS
---

13. (U) A SENIOR TNI OFFICER HAS DENIED AUSTRALIAN ACCUSATIONS THAT THE TNI IS AIDING THE MILITIAS. "THE ACCUSATION IS UNTRUE AND IS A FABRICATION," SAID MAJOR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02937 02 OF 02 151108Z
GENERAL ADAM DAMIRI, CHIEF OF THE UDAYANA REGIONAL MILITARY COMMAND OVERSEEING EAST TIMOR.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART02960

Channel: n/a

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1794

E46

PAGE 01 JAKART 02960 01 OF 04 161114Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W			

----------D5A59C 161114Z /22

O 161040Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8347
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002960

SECDEF FOR ISA/SHER
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02960 01 OF 04 161114Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/06
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, MOPS, PREL, EAID, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH [redacted] AND BELO

B

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN A JUNE 12 MEETING WITH VISITING EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR AND POLOFF, BISHOP BELO WAS VERY

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 15 JUN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2004 200300722

PESSIMISTIC REGARDING THE PROSPECTS FOR A FREE AND FAIR CONSULTATION VOTE AS SOON AS AUGUST 8. HE SAID HE WAS STILL RECEIVING REPORTS OF INTIMIDATION AND INTENSE PRESSURE AGAINST THE POPULATION, ESPECIALLY IN THE WESTERN DISTRICTS, AND ADDED THAT MANY PEOPLE WERE TELLING HIM THEY WOULD "VOTE FOR AUTONOMY IN ORDER TO SURVIVE." [redacted] B1

HE SAID DISARMAMENT OF THE MILITIAS REMAINED TOP PRIORITY. IN A MEETING [redacted] B1 [redacted] WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC, ARGUING THAT THE INTIMIDATION TACTICS OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES WOULD ULTIMATELY FAIL. HE MAINTAINED THAT THE ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR OF THE MILITIA, A CLUMSY DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN, AND THE SELECTION OF THE HIGHLY UNPOPULAR LOPES DA CRUZ TO LEAD A PRO-INTEGRATION UMBRELLA GROUP WOULD BACKFIRE ON THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES. [redacted] DESCRIBED PLANS TO B1 HOLD A SERIES OF SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES, THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE, FALINTIL, AND THE MILITIAS, IN PREPARATION FOR A LARGER "DARE II" FORUM LATER THIS MONTH. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER,

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02960 01 OF 04 161114Z

THAT THE "HIDDEN HAND" BEHIND THE MILITIAS AND THE PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS DID NOT REALLY WANT TO CALM THE SITUATION, [redacted] B1 HE ARGUED THAT, IF LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES, THE VARIOUS EAST TIMORESE FACTIONS COULD PROBABLY REACH AGREEMENT. IN ADDITION TO WELL-KNOWN MILITIA ACTIVITY WEST AND SOUTH OF THE CAPITAL, MILITIA ACTIVITY WAS ALSO OBSERVED EAST OF THE CAPITAL. END SUMMARY.

"VERY, VERY PESSIMISTIC"
---

3. (C) BISHOP BELO SAID A UN PRESENCE WAS URGENTLY NEEDED IN THE DISTRICTS AND SUB-DISTRICTS BECAUSE THE MILITARY, THE MILITIAS, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE CONTINUING TO THREATEN THE POPULATION AND DISSEMINATE FALSE PROPAGANDA. HE STRESSED THAT HE WAS "VERY, VERY PESSIMISTIC" REGARDING THE PROSPECTS FOR HOLDING A FREE AND FAIR VOTE AS SOON AS AUGUST 8. HE SAID MANY PEOPLE WERE TELLING HIM THAT "WE WILL VOTE FOR AUTONOMY IN ORDER TO SURVIVE." BELO DID NOT BELIEVE THE UN WAS CAPABLE OF COUNTERING THIS, ESPECIALLY IN THE SIX WESTERN DISTRICTS WHERE PRESSURE WAS MOST INTENSE. HE

B1

[redacted]

ARGUED THAT NO FREE AND FAIR CONSULTATION COULD BE HELD WITHOUT DISARMING THE MILITIAS AND PERMITTING THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT TO RE-APPEAR.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02960 01 OF 04 161114Z
RECONCILIATION STYMIED

4. (C) BELO SAID RECONCILIATION EFFORTS WERE STILL HAMPERED BY THE INABILITY OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE TO MOVE FREELY. HE ADDED THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATION FPDK WAS NOW INTERESTED IN POWER-SHARING, BUT NOT IN GENUINE RECONCILIATION AND DIALOGUE. B1

[redacted]

INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE CONTINUE

5. (C) BELO SAID THE DISPLACED PERSON SITUATION REMAINED UNCHANGED. B1

[redacted] BELO SAID THAT WHILE DILI WAS NOW GENERALLY CALMER, THE AITARAK MILITIAS CONTINUED TO THREATEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS IN THE CITY. HE STRESSED VIOLENCE CONTINUED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, RECALLING THAT 25 PEOPLE HAD COME TO HIM THE PREVIOUS EVENING AFTER THEY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1518

PAGE 01 JAKART 02960 02 OF 04 170110Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02

G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /019W
----------D65FB4 171657Z /22
O 161040Z JUN 99 ZDK ALL CTG NUM SVCS ----------
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8348
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 002960

SECDEF FOR ISA/SHER
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02960 02 OF 04 170110Z
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/06
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, MOPS, PREL, EAID, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH [redacted] AND BELO B1

WERE THREATENED AND BEATEN BY MILITIA MEMBERS OPERATING
IN THE LETEFOHO AREA SOUTH OF ERMERA. [redacted] B1

[redacted]

"THE MILITIA IS ALREADY DOING IT FOR US"
---

6. (C) VISITING EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR AND POLOFF MET [redacted] B1
[redacted] SAID

THAT WHILE THERE RECENTLY HAD BEEN SOME SERIOUS ABUSES CARRIED OUT BY THE MILITARY IN VIQUEQUE, THE SITUATION IN THE EASTERN DISTRICTS WAS GENERALLY MORE CALM THAN THAT IN THE WESTERN PART OF EAST TIMOR. [redacted] SAID THERE B1
WAS WIDESPREAD INTIMIDATION BY PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES IN THE EASTERN DISTRICTS, BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THEIR
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02960 02 OF 04 170110Z
TACTICS WOULD SUCCEED IN PRODUCING A PRO-AUTONOMY VOTE, ESPECIALLY IF UNAMET COULD CREATE A MORE SECURE
ENVIRONMENT. [redacted] SAID THE GREAT MAJORITY OF B1
RESIDENTS IN HIS AREA FAVORED INDEPENDENCE. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD ASKED A PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVIST THE DAY BEFORE WHEN HIS SIDE WOULD BEGIN CAMPAIGNING AND THE ACTIVIST HAD JOKED THAT A PRO-INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN MAY NOT BE NECESSARY SINCE "THE MILITIAS ARE ALREADY DOING IT FOR US."

PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS SHIFT STANCE ON VOTE
---

7. (C) WHILE THERE WAS A WELL ORGANIZED INTIMIDATION CAMPAIGN IN THE EASTERN DISTRICTS, [redacted] BELIEVED MOST B1
PEOPLE WERE RESISTANT, AND AT TIMES EVEN GOOD-HUMORED ABOUT IT. HE JOKED THAT ONE PARISHIONER, WHO HAD BEEN PRESSURED TO DISPLAY INDONESIAN FLAGS, HAD PUT UP A VERY SMALL FLAG OVER THE DOOR OF HIS HOUSE BUT HUNG A LARGE RED AND WHITE BANNER OVER HIS PIG STY. HE SAID THE HIGHLY UNPOPULAR LOPEZ DA CRUZ WAS THE "WORST POSSIBLE CHOICE" FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS TO LEAD THEIR
CAMPAIGN. [redacted] SAID THAT THE HARD-LINE PRO- B1
INTEGRATION DISTRICT CHIEF OF LOS PALOS (EAST OF BAUCAU) HAD CARRIED OUT HIS OWN SURVEY WHICH FOUND THAT ONLY 180 PEOPLE IN HIS DISTRICT OF 19,000 COULD BE IDENTIFIED AS PRO-INTEGRATION. POSSIBLY AS A RESULT OF THEIR INCREASING AWARENESS OF THE POLITICAL REALITIES, HE SAID THE LOS PALOS DISTRICT CHIEF AND DILI DISTRICT CHIEF DOMINGOS SOARES, WHOM HE CALLED "TWO IMPORTANT REFERENCE POINTS," HAD RECENTLY CHANGED THEIR STANCE. INSTEAD OF
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02960 02 OF 04 170110Z
REJECTING THE CONSULTATION OUTRIGHT, THEY WERE NOW SAYING THEY WOULD "RESPECT THE DECISION OF THE PEOPLE."

A CRUDE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN

8. (C) [redacted] COMPLAINED THAT THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES WERE CARRYING OUT A CRUDE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN BUT HE BELIEVED THIS WOULD ULTIMATELY BACKFIRE. "FIRST THEY TOLD PEOPLE THE UN WOULD NEVER COME, THEN THEY SAID THAT WHEN THE UN DID ARRIVE IT WOULD PUSH EVERYONE INTO THE CHURCHES AND KILL THEM, AND NOW THEY ARE SAYING THE UN WILL REVEAL THE SECRET VOTES." [redacted] SAID A MAJOR CAMPAIGN WOULD BE NEEDED TO CONVINCE PEOPLE THAT THEIR VOTES WOULD NOT BE REVEALED, AND THAT THE TOTAL RESULTS WOULD BE ANNOUNCED, NOT THE TOTALS FOR DISTRICTS OR LOCALITIES. B1 B1

RECONCILIATION PROCESS
---

9. (C) [redacted] SAID HE PLANNED TO HOLD SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATION SIDES, ALONG WITH FALINTIL AND MILITIA LEADERS, IN PREPARATION FOR A LARGER "DARE II" MEETING LATER THIS MONTH. THE FIRST OF THESE, WITH THE PRO- B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1683

PAGE 01 JAKART 02960 03 OF 04 161053Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W		

----------D5A391 161053Z /38

O 161040Z JUN 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8349
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY BONN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 002960

SECDEF FOR ISA/SHER
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02960 03 OF 04 161053Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/06
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, MOPS, PREL, EAID, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH [redacted] AND BELO B1

INTEGRATION MILITIA LEADERS, WAS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 12 (IN FACT THE MILITIA LEADERS DID NOT SHOW UP FOR THIS MEETING). MEETINGS WITH FALINTIL AND THE PRO-INTEGRATION POLITICAL LEADERS WERE TO FOLLOW ON JUNE 14 AND 15. [redacted] B1
[redacted] ARGUED THAT IF LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES, THE VARIOUS TIMORESE FACTIMS COULD PROBABLY COME TO AN AGREEMENT. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT THE "HIDDEN HAND" BEHIND THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES (I.E., THE MILITARY) DID NOT REALLY WANT TO CALM THE SITUATION. [redacted] B1
STRESSED THAT THE MILITIAS MUST BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL. HE SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE MILITARY WAS DOING NOTHING TO RESTRAIN THEM, ARGUING THAT IT HAD BEEN QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE VERY NEXT DAY AFTER THE APRIL 21 "PEACE ACCORD," GENERAL ZACKY ANWAR HAD GIVEN THE MILITIAS THE O.K. TO CONTINUE THEIR ACTIVITIES. [redacted] HAD NO DOUBT THAT B1
MILITIA LEADERS SUCH AS EURICO GUTERRES COULD ONLY ACT WITH THE MILITARY'S SUPPORT. [redacted] B1

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02960 03 OF 04 161053Z
END NOTE)

OTHER TIDBITS

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

10. (U) THE FPDK IS PUBLISHING A NEW NEWSPAPER, "ROMANSA," TO CONVEY THE PRO-INTEGRATION VIEWPOINT. BY EAST TIMOR STANDARDS IT IS AN IMPRESSIVE PRODUCTION, WITH COLOR PHOTOS. IN THE MEANTIME A NEW PRO-INDEPENDENCE NEWSLETTER "LIGERTA," (FAR MORE MODEST THAN "ROMANSA") WAS BEING SOLD OPENLY ON THE STREETS IN CENTRAL DILI (CLEARLY AT A HIGHER VOLUME OF SALES THAN ROMANSA).

11. (U) THE LOCAL ELECTION COMMITTEE CHIEF HAS CONCEDED THAT THERE WAS A SEROUS DEGREE OF FRAUD IN COVALIMA DISTRICT WHERE WRITTEN COMPLAINTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED ALLEGING THAT MANY BALLOTS WERE PUNCHED (DITUSUK) BY THE MILITIAS (FRAUDULENTLY). THERE ARE REPORTS OF NUMEROUS OTHER VIOLATIONS THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR (PERHAPS WHAT IS INTERESTING HERE IS NOT THAT THE VIOLATIONS OCCURRED, WHICH WAS EXPECTED HERE, BUT THAT THEY ARE BEING OPENLY REPORTED AND EVEN ADMITTED TO BY LOCAL OFFICIALS.).

12. (U) SEASONED OBSERVERS HERE ARE WONDERING HOW THE BIG INFLUX OF POLICE FORCES WILL AFFECT THE BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN LOCAL DISTRICT CHIEFS AND LOCAL MILITARY COMMANDERS. THEY PREDICT POTENTIAL CONFLICT IF POLICE ATTEMPT TO CLAIM A SHARE OF THE SPOILS.

13. (C) LOCAL MILITARY OFFICERS IN THE LIQUICA/ERMERA COFFEE GROWING AREA EVIDENTLY DO NOT EXPECT THE SITUATION

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02960 03 OF 04 161053Z
THERE TO CALM DOWN ANYTIME SOON. THEY TOLD NCBA PERSONNEL NOT TO PLAN ANY ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE HARVEST SEASON.

14. (C) THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE IMPETTU/RENETIL YOUTH GROUPS ARE BEGINNING TO MOVE MORE INTO THE OPEN, AT LEAST IN DILI. THEY HELD A JUNE 12 RALLY TO MARK THE ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF THEIR DEMONSTRATION AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN JAKARTA. [redacted] THE ARE PLANNING A B1
CAMPAIGN IN THE RURAL AREAS FOR THE "PSYCHOLOGICAL RELIABILITATION" OF THOSE INTIMIDATED BY THE MILITIAS AS SOON AS SECURITY CONDITIONS PERMIT. MEANWHILE, SOME 300 EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE "SOLIDARITES MOVEMENT REMAIN IN BALI. [redacted] B1
[redacted] SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THESE STUDENTS HAD NOT YET RETURNED (THERE SEEMS TO BE AT LEAST SOME RIVALRY BETWEEN THE IMPETTU/RENETIL AND SOLIDARITAS GROUPS).

15. (C) IN A MEETING WITH [redacted] B1
[redacted] WHO IS PLAYING A KEY ROLE B1
IN THE COMMISSION FOR PEACE AND STABILITY (KPS), SEEMED
TO BE ECHOING THE GOI/TNI LINE ON VARIOUS ISSUES, E.G.,
HE BLAMED THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE FOR THE LIQUICA
KILLINGS, SAID BOTH SIDES WERE COMMITTING AN EQUAL NUMBER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1623

PAGE 01 JAKART 02960 04 OF 04 161042Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W		

----------D5A27C 161042Z /38

O 161040Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8350
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 002960

SECDEF FOR ISA/SHER
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02960 04 OF 04 161042Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/06
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, MOPS, PREL, EAID, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH [redacted] AND BELO B1

OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND CHARGED THAT THE FAILURE OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE REPRESENTATIVES TO ATTEND KPS MEETINGS WAS A MERE POLITICAL MANEUVER.

16. (C) IN A JUNE 12 MEETING WITH [redacted] B1
[redacted] ZACKY ANWAR SAID:
--THE GOLKAR VICTORY IN EAST TIMOR PROVED THE MAJORITY OF PEOPLE WERE PRO-INTEGRATION.
--CIVIL WAR WILL BREAK OUT AFTER THE AUGUST VOTE.
--THE POLICE ARE INCAPABLE OF HANDLING INSURGENCIES.
--UNAMET RELIED ON QUESTIONABLE SOURCES.
--FALINTIL HAD RECEIVED NEW MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS.
--EAST TIMOR WAS A "PSYCHOLOGICAL BURDEN -- FOR TNI."

DISTURBINGLY, ZACKY IMPLIED THAT TNI FELT BETRAYED BY HABIBIE'S EAST TIMOR POLICY, SUGGESTING TNI WAS NOT ON BOARD. HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE BELIEVED ANY DIPLOMATS AT THE FIRST/SECOND SECRETARY LEVEL WHO MET WITH NGO'S AND OPPOSITION ELEMENTS WERE IN REALITY INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS.

17. (C) [redacted] B1
[redacted] EXPRESSED STRONG PESSIMISM REGARDING THE PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATION SIDES. THERE ARE NOW

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02960 04 OF 04 161042Z
JUST TOO MANY WEAPONS AROUND AND THE RIVALRIES ARE JUST TOO DEEP, HE ARGUED. HE SAID HOTHEADED YOUTH, WHO "HAVE LOST ALL RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY IN THE PAST 23 YEARS," ALSO PROMISED TO BE A CONTINUING PROBLEM. [redacted] B1
BELIEVED THAT IF A TRULY FREE VOTE WERE HELD, 80 PER CENT OR MORE OF EAST TIMORESE WOULD FAVOR INDEPENDENCE. HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE UN TO COMMUNICATE WITH EAST TIMORESE NOT ONLY IN TETUM BUT IN THREE OTHER DIALECTS-MAKASEI, FATZLUKU AND MAMBEI. HE SAID RADIO WAS THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEDIUM.

18. (C) THE MILITIA PHENOMENOM HAS SPREAD EAST OF DILI. VISITING EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR AND POLOFF SAW MILITIA ACTIVITY IN HERA, WHERE THERE WERE TWO ROADBLOCKS IN THE MIDDLE OF TOWN AND MILITIA CONTINUED TO OCCUPY THE NOW ABANDONED HERA POLYTECHNICAL SCHOOL. FURTHER WEST IN METINARO THERE WERE MORE MILITIA PRESENT, MEMBERS OF THE "AITARAK ASSISTANCE BRIGADE FOR METINARO," LED BY MATEUS

CARVALHO. IN BOTH HERA AND METINARO A NUMBER OF HOUSES FLEW RED AND WHITE FLAGS. IN MANATUTO, HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF MILITIA ACTIVITY AND NO ONE WAS DISPLAYING THE INDONESIAN FLAG, AS WAS THE CASE IN LALEIA, XANANA'S HOME TOWN EAST OF MANCTUTO (THERE IS SAID TO BE A HIGH CONCENTRATION OF FALINTIL IN THIS AREA). AS WE APPROACHED BAUCAU, HOWEVER RED AND WHITE FLAGS BEGAN TO APPEAR. AT A VILLAGE SOME 20 KM WEST OF BAUCAU, LOCAL RESIDENTS TOLD POLOFF THAT "EVERYONE IS AFRAID HERE." BAUCAU ITSELF WAS AWASH IN INDONESIAN FLAGS BUT THE PRESSURE ON RESIDENTS WAS NOT COMING FROM MILITIAS BUT FROM THE MILITARY, THE LONG-ESTABLISHED PARA-MILITARY GROUPS, AND LOCAL OFFICIALS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02960 04 OF 04 161042Z
GONG

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0018

E47

PAGE 01 STATE 111991 160502Z
ORIGIN P-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/000R

DRAFTED BY:S/S-O:DAVE SOHIER
APPROVED BY:S/S-O:CJSANDROLINI
----------D58471 160502Z /38

O 160455Z JUN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 111991

PLS PASS TO U/S PICKERING'S PARTY TOPOL 70077

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 02937 DATED 15 JUN 99 SENT ACTION SECSTATE, INFO LISBON, ASEAN, GENEVA, CANBERRA, TOKYO, WELLINGTON, LONDON, BONN, ROME, USCINCPAC, BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION. QTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002937
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/04
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, MOPS, PINS, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: JUNE 15, 1999

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 111991 160502Z

2. (C) SUMMARY: REPORTS CONTINUE TO ARRIVE CONCERNING CLAIMS OF PREPARATION OF MILITIA AND MILITARY SUPPORT PLATFORMS IN WEST TIMOR AND IN THE WEST TIMOR-EAST TIMOR BORDER AREA. AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE KILLED THREE CHILDREN IN DILI UNDER UNCLEAR CIRCUMSTANCES. A SENIOR TNI OFFICIAL DENIED AUSTRALIAN ACCUSATIONS THAT IT WAS AIDING AND ARMING PRO-INTEGRATION/AUTONOMY MILITIAS. END SUMMARY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 14 JUN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2004 200300722

MILITARY AND OTHER ACTIVITY IN WEST TIMOR

3. (C) [redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS JUNE 14 THAT THERE IS INCREASING MILITARY RE-SUPPLY AND TRAINING OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF MILITIAS IN THE AREA WEST OF THE EAST TIMOR-WEST TIMOR BORDER. HE SOURCED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO [redacted] PROTESTANT CHURCHES IN THE WEST TIMOR CAPITAL OF KUPANG REPORTEDLY ARE COLLECTING MONEY FOR EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS STRANDED THERE AND FEARFUL OF GOING HOME. B1 B1

4. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT IN THE VILLAGE OF BETON ON THE BORDER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST TIMOR THE MILITARY HAS ESTABLISHED A BASE AREA FOR THE BESI MERAH PUTI AND HALIANTAR MILITIAS. THE BASE COMPRISES SHELTER, A TRAINING AREA AND A LOGISTICS POINT. [redacted] B1

[redacted] AND EAST TIMORESE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) WHO FLED TO THE AREA TO ESCAPE MILITIA ATTACKS IN EAST TIMOR CLAIM THAT MILITIA PERSONNEL IN THE AREA CONTINUE TO PREY ON THESE IDPS. B1

5. (C) THE MALIANA MILITIA, UNDER COMMANDER CANCIO LOPES, HAS A BASE AT MOTA AIN (IN THE BORDER ZONE). THERE IT HAS RECEIVED GROUND TRANSPORT (TRUCKS) AND ARMS AS WELL AS COMMUNICATIONS GEAR, LANDMINES, PISTOLS, BAZOOKAS AND GRENADES FROM THE TNI.

6. (C) TNI IS ESTABLISHING A POSITION AT CURITA HARBOR, A HARBOR USED BY THE JAPANESE DURING WORLD WAR II. IT IS LOCATED 45 KMS WEST OF ATAPUPU. ACCORDING TO [redacted] TNI PERSONNEL ARE HELD THERE IN CASE OF NEED FOR SUPPORT OF PRO-INTEGRATION OPERATIONS IN THE MOTA AIN AREA AND OTHER AREAS. TNI HAS DESIGNATED KUPANG AIR FIELD AS THE AIR BASE TO SUPPORT THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA. B1

DILI DEVELOPMENTS

7. (U) AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE OF SOME TYPE KILLED THREE

CHILDREN PLAYING IN A FIELD NEAR BECORA, JUST OUTSIDE CENTRAL DILI. JAKARTA MEDIA REPORTS CLAIM THE FIELD HAD BEEN A STAGING AREA FOR MILITIA ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE CIVILIANS IN DILI IN THE INCIDENTS OF APRIL 17 AND 18. MEANWHILE, CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MAN KILLED ON THE BEACH EARLIER IN THE WEEK, WHOM THE AITARAK MILITIA CLAIMED TO BE ONE OF THEIR MEMBERS, REMAIN UNCLEAR. POLOFF NOTES REPORTS CIRCULATING IN DILI THAT

HE WAS A MENTALLY DERANGED VAGRANT, KNOWN IN THE AREA, WHO WAS KILLED BY AITARAK SO THAT HE COULD BE IDENTIFIED AS A VICTIM FROM AIATRAK RANKS.

8. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA, WITH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT, PLAN TO ENROLL A LARGE NUMBER OF PRO-INTEGRATION YOUTH AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR IN DILI BEGINNING IN AUGUST TO ACT AS A CONSTRAINT ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE STUDENTS WHO HAVE IN THE PAST DOMINATED POLITICS AT THE SCHOOL. B1

9. (C) [redacted] HAS SHARED WITH US A REPORT THAT A DOCUMENT HAS SURFACED WHICH COULD POINT TO GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR ARMING OF MILITIA GROUPS. THE DOCUMENT, WHOSE AUTHENTICITY IS STILL BEING CHECKED, PURPORTS TO BE A REQUEST FROM THE MILITIA FORUM "FPDK" TO AUTHORITIES IN DILI REQUESTING 533,000,000 RUPIAH FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARMS DIRECTLY FROM TNI. THE DOCUMENT IS B1

DATED MAY 15.

10. (U) POLOFF IN DILI REPORTED BY PHONE THAT THE MEETING OF THE PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 15 FAILED TO TAKE PLACE. IT STILL LACKS EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION FROM PRO-INDEPENDENCE PERSONNEL WHO HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR THEIR SAFETY SHOULD THEY RETURN.

11. (C) [redacted] HAS SHARED WITH US A DEATH LIST OF 66 PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE. THE DEATH LIST IS PURPORTED TO CONTAIN THE NAMES OF VICTIMS TO BE KILLED B1

AFTER THE NATIONAL ELECTION.

OUTSIDE OF DILI

---

12. (C) POLOFF IN DILI, REPORTS WORD OF MILITIA ATTACKS IN THE LAST 24 HOURS WHICH LEFT A NUMBER OF HOMES ABLAZE IN MABUARA, WEST OF LIQUISA.

MILITARY DISPUTES CLAIMS IT AIDS MILITIAS

13. (U) A SENIOR TNI OFFICER HAS DENIED AUSTRALIAN ACCUSATIONS THAT THE TNI IS AIDING THE MILITIAS. "THE ACCUSATION IS UNTRUE AND IS A FABRICATION," SAID MAJOR GENERAL ADAM DAMIRI, CHIEF OF THE UDAYANA REGIONAL MILITARY COMMAND OVERSEEING EAST TIMOR.
ROY UNQUOTE TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B5

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTO0790

E48

PAGE 01 STATE 112794 170107Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-01	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	MR-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/017R		

DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:RCLARKE/DRL:SSUTTON:RC
APPROVED BY: RAP:SOROTH
P:OMARKS IO/UNP:KLARSON RAP:SBOYCE EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
IO/UNP:WIMBRIE S/P:KBROOKS NSC:ERICE S/S:GLBERRY
S/S-O:SDREW
----------D5FBDD 170109Z /38

O 170104Z JUN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 112794

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/09
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UN, IO
SUBJECT: APPROACH TO GOI OFFICIALS ON EAST TIMOR

REP: (A) JAKARTA 2918 (B) JAKARTA 2884, (C) JAKARTA 2160,
(D) JAKARTA 2744, (E) JAKARTA 2529
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 112794 170107Z

CLASSIFIED BY RAP A/S STANLEY BOTH. REASON 1.5 (D)

1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: DESPITE IMPROVEMENTS IN AREAS IN WHICH UNAMET HAS OEPLOYEO, THERE REMAIN SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR, ESPECIALLY THE ROLE OF THE MILITIAS AND LOCAL OFFICIALS. THE AMBASSADOR AODRESSEO MANY OF OUR CONCERNS IN HIS JUNE 14 MEETING WITH GENERAL WIRANTO (REP A). WE REQUEST THAT POST FOLLOW UP WITH APPROACHES TO APPROPRIATE GOI OFFICIALS TO UNDERSCORE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE "REAL SITUATIONS IN EAST TIMOR; THE BALLOTING IN AUGUST WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED FAIR UNLESS INDONESIA COOPERATES IN CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE FREE OF INTIMIDATION IN WHICH PROPONENTS OF BOTH SIOES CAN CAMPAIGN. SEE SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS, PARAS 4-7. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) AS UNAMET ESTABLISHES AND EXPANDS ITS PRESENCE, WE ANTICIPATE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION WILL BEGIN TO FOLLOW.

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 112794 170107Z

3. (C) WE HAVE REPEATEDLY PRESSED THE GOI TO DISARM MILITIAS, END INTIMIDATION, AND ADDRESS HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS. GIVEN THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT PROGRESS ON THESE QUESTIONS, WE PROPOSE MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC AREAS IN WHICH IMPROVEMENTS COULD BUILD CONFIDENCE IN THE CONSULTATION PROCESS, BOTH IN EAST TIMOR AND WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE POST SHOULD INITIATE FRANK DISCUSSIONS WITH ADVISORS TO PRESIDENT HABIBIE,

B1

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT ACCEPT ANY OUTCOME OF THE AUGUST 8 CONSULTATION AS THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR UNLESS THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT AND RAPID IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR.

B1

4. (SBU) POST MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

B5

B5





B5

[redacted] B5

7. (SBU) HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS/INTIMIDATION

-- WE HAVE REPEATEDLY RAISED OUR CONCERNS WITH INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES ABOUT HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS AND THE SITUATION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE. OUR AMBASSADOR HAS RAISED THE ISSUE WITH FONMIN ALATAS; A/S BOTH RAISED IT WITH GEN. WIRANTO AND OTHERS. YET WE HAVE NOT SEEN CONCRETE STEPS TAKEN TO ADDRESS THIS URGENT PROBLEM.

-- DUE TO THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF MILITIA ROADBLOCKS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 112794 170107Z

WHICH ARE BLOCKING ACCESS TO THESE TROUBLED AREAS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ASSESS THE NEEDS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (LOP'S) IN EAST TIMOR. ACCORDING TO INOONESIAN GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS, THE NUMBER OF IOP'S IS OVER 10 THOUSAND. OTHER REPORTS SUGGEST THE LEVELS ARE OVER 40 THOUSAND.

-- REPORTS THAT IOP'S ARE BEING HELO AGAINST THEIR WILL IN CAMPS IN AN EFFORT TO COERCE THEM TO VOTE FOR AUTONOMY [redacted] B5

[redacted]

-- INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AGENCIES NEED TO HAVE UNFETTERED ACCESS TO THIS REGION TO ADDRESS THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM; UN PERSONNEL NEED ACCESS TO CONFIRM THAT ALL PARTIES ARE LIVING UP TO THEIR COMMITMENTS. [redacted] B5

[redacted] CLEARING AWAY MILITIA CHECKPOINTS AND OTHER MEANS SO THAT THESE AREAS ARE ACCESSABLE.

TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTO5063

PAGE 01 STATE 114159 181231Z
ORIGIN P-00

E49

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/000R

DRAFTED BY: S/S-O: JENNIFER MCINTYRE
APPROVED BY: S/S-O: CJSANDROLINI
----------D6C3B6 181232Z /38
O 181227Z JUN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 114159

PLS PASS TO U/S PICKERING'S PARTY TOPOL NO. 70167

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 3005 DATED 18 JUNE 99, SENT ACTION SECSTATE, INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE, BONN, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, LISBON, ROME, TOKYO, SECDEF, WELLINGTON, GENEVA, USCINCPAC, BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.
QUOTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003005

ROME FOR VATICAN
SECDEF FOR ISA/SHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: A SCORCHED EARTH POLICY
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 114159 181231Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

SUMMARY
---

2. (C) SUMMARY. BASED ON REPORTS FROM UNAMET, [redacted] B1
[redacted] AND VISITING POLOFF'S DIRECT
OBSERVATIONS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AND PRO-

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 17 JUN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

INTEGRATION MILITIAS, WORKING TOGETHER CLOSELY, ARE CARRYING OUT A SCORCHED EARTH POLICY IN THE DISTRICT OF LIQUICA AND ITS ENVIRONS. AMONG THE THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES DISPLACED AS A RESULT, THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM IS DISEASE. RESIDENTS OF THIS AREA REMAIN TOO FRIGHTENED TO SPEAK WITH FOREIGNERS. BASED ON HIS OWN DIRECT OBSERVATIONS, THE UNAMET CHIEF HAS MADE HIS MOST DIRECT ALLEGATIONS TO DATE OF TNI LINKS TO MILITIA ACTIVITIES, EVEN SPECIFYING DESIGNATIONS OF THE UNITS INVOLVED. END SUMMARY.

CLIMATE OF FEAR PERSISTS IN LIQUICA

3. (C) POLOFF VISITED LIQUICA AND MAUBARA ON JUNE 16. AT THE TOWN'S WESTERN APPROACH, SOME 40 TO 50 BESI MERAH-PUTIH MILITIA WERE IN FORMATION, SALUTING THE INDONESIAN FLAG. AT THE CHURCH COMPOUND IN LIQUICA, SITE OF THE KILLINGS IN APRIL, THE HOUSE OF THE PASTOR WAS ABANDONED (HE REMAINS IN DILI DUE TO FEARS FOR HIS SECURITY). ANOTHER PRIEST WHO WAS STILL IN THE HOUSE IN EARLY JUNE, PROTECTED BY AN ARMY OF CHILDREN, IS NO LONGER PRESENT. [redacted] EXPLAINED THAT THE GROUP OF MOSTLY WOMEN, CHILDREN AND OLD MEN GATHERED IN THE CHURCHYARD INCLUDED MANY DISPLACED. SHE QUICKLY MOVED AWAY, HOWEVER, OBVIOUSLY B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 114159 181231Z
UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT SPEAKING TO POLOFF. AT A NEARBY CHURCH FACILITY [redacted] WAS SUPERVISING SOME 50 YOUNG CHILDREN. HE SAID CHURCH WORKERS HAD SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING THESE CHILDREN IN FROM "THE MILITIA PLACE," (A REFERENCE TO AN EXTENSIVE MILITIA-CONTROLLED AREA SOUTH OF LIQUICA CONTAINING THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED) FOR THE DAY TO BE PROVIDED FOOD AND MEDICAL CARE. HE IMPLORED POLOFF NOT TO SPEAK WITH ANYONE IN THE LIQUICA-MAUBARA AREA. "IF YOU WANT TO FIND OUT WHAT IS GOING ON HERE PLEASE TALK TO PEOPLE IN DILI," HE URGED. B1

DEVASTATION BETWEEN LIQUICA AND MAUBARA

4. (C) POLOFF CONTINUED A FURTHER 15 KILOMETERS TO MAUBARA THROUGH A SCENE OF UTTER DEVASTATION. ALMOST EVERY HOUSE HAD BEEN BURNED OR DISMANTLED, AND JUDGING BY THE APPEARANCE OF THE ASHES, SOME OF THE BURNINGS WERE QUITE RECENT. (POLCOUNS HAD TRAVERSED THIS AREA A FEW WEEKS BEFORE AND FOUND ABOUT 30 PERCENT OF THE HOUSES DESTROYED. NOW IT WAS MORE LIKE 90 PERCENT). GROUPS OF FORLORN PEOPLE, INCLUDING ENTIRE FAMILIES, WALKED ALONG THE SIDE OF THE ROAD. HOUSES STILL STANDING ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF LIQUICA, SOME PARTIALLY DESTROYED, WERE OVERCROWDED

WITH DOZENS OF PEOPLE TAKING SHELTER IN A SINGLE DWELLING.

SCORCHED EARTH IN THE MOUNTAIN VILLAGES

5. (C) REPORTS ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE FROM THE MOUNTAINOUS AREA SOUTH OF LIQUICA, WHICH HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY CLOSED OFF FROM THE OUTSIDE WORLD SINCE APRIL. JUDGING BY THE ACCOUNTS OF
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 114159 181231Z
UNAMET, [redacted] WHO HAVE ENTERED B1
THIS AREA IN THE PAST WEEK, THE MILITIAS, ACCOMPANIED BY REGULAR TNI FORCES, HAVE ENGAGED IN A SCORCHED EARTH CAMPAIGN WHICH HAS COMPLETELY EMPTIED MOST VILLAGES IN THE AREA. [redacted] B1
[redacted] REPORT VILLAGES ABANDONED OVER A WIDE AREA WITH MOST OF THE HOUSES BURNED. THEY REPORT THAT MOST OF THE YOUNG MEN HAVE FLED "UP THE MOUNTAIN" INTO FALINTIL CONTROLLED AREAS, WHILE THE WOMEN, ELDERLY AND CHILDREN HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LOWLANDS AROUND LIQUICA AND MAUBARA. THE USAID-SUPPORTEDED COFFEE PROJECT HAS BEEN COMPELLED TO CEASE OPERATIONS IN THESE HIGHLANDS DUE TO THE OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION AND THE DIFFICULTY IN PERSUADING THEIR WORKERS TO ENTER THESE AREAS. ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS REPORTS, SEVERAL TRUCKS CONTRACTED BY THE PROJECT WERE COMMANDEERED ON JUNE 11 AND THEIR DRIVERS WERE ABDUCTED AND BEATEN.

GRATUITOUS VIOLENCE

6. (C) IN A JUNE 17 DISCUSSION WITH POLOFF, [redacted] B1
[redacted] WHO WAS IN EAST TIMOR JUNE 15-
17, SAID [redacted] FOUND THAT GROUPS COMPOSED OF B1
"THREE OR FOUR MILITIA COMBINED WITH THREE OR FOUR REGULAR MILITARY" HAD CARRIED OUT BURNINGS OF HOUSES AND BEATINGS OF VILLAGERS IN THIS AREA. [redacted] HAD ACCOMPANIED A UNAMET TEAM B1
INTO THE AREA THE PREVIOUS DAY. HE STRESSED THAT EVIDENCE GATHERED FROM THIS TRIP SUGGESTED THAT MUCH OF THIS VIOLENCE IS GRATUITOUS. HE CITED THE EXAMPLE OF A 75-YEAR OLD MAN HE ENCOUNTERED, "WHO COULD NOT POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN FALINTIL ACTIVITY," BUT WHO NEVERTHELESS HAD BEEN SHOT THROUGH
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 114159 181231Z
THE ARM. HE HAD ALSO SEEN PILES OF CLOTHING AND VILLAGERS' POSSESSIONS WHICH HAD BEEN BURNED BY THE MILITIA/MILITARY PERSONNEL.

7. (C) ACCORDING TO [redacted] SOME 7-9,000 PEOPLE DISPLACED FROM THE HIGH COUNTRY SOUTH OF LIQUICA NOW WERE SEEKING REFUGE "ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN," I.E., NORTH OF ERMERA (THIS IS IN ADDITION TO THE REPORTED 15,000 DISPLACED IN THE LOW COUNTRY AROUND LIQUICA AND MAUBARA. [redacted] SAID THAT AMONG THESE DISPLACED, MANY OF WHOM WERE SLEEPING IN THE FOREST, THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS DISEASE (MALARIA, TUBERCULOSIS, AND RESPIRATORY AILMENTS), NOT HUNGER. HE SAID PEOPLE GENERALLY WERE ABLE TO OBTAIN FOOD IN THIS RELATIVELY FERTILE AREA, BUT THERE WAS NO MEDICINE AVAILABLE TO TREAT THEIR AILMENTS. B1 B1

UNAMET VERSION
---

8. (C) ACCORDING TO A WESTERN JOURNALIST, UNAMET CHIEF IAN MARTIN TOLD THE PRESS ON JUNE 18 THAT A JOINT UNAMET-ICRC TEAM "ENCOUNTERED THREE SEPARATE GROUPS OF BESI MERAH PUTIH MILITIA ACCOMPANIED BY AND INDEED DIRECTED BY TNI SOLDIERS CARRYING OUT OPERATIONS IN THE AREA." HE DESCRIBED MILITIA AS "BURNING PERSONAL PROPERTY, ASSAULTING AN OLD MAN AND SEEKING TO DRIVE VILLAGERS OUT OF LEOTELA VILLAGE." A JOURNALIST AT THE BRIEFING TOLD US THAT MARTIN IDENTIFIED THE TNI UNIT WORKING WITH THE MILITIA UNIT AS BEING FROM "ARMY POST NO. 5 OF THE 143 BN AT EBENO (PHONETIC)." MARTIN TOLD THE JOURNALISTS: "THIS IS EXACTLY THE KIND OF INCIDENT OF WHICH WE HAVE RECEIVED EXTENSIVE REPORTS." HE ADDED THAT THIS INCIDENT HELPED TO EXPLAIN "EXTENSIVE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT" OF PEOPLE WHO WERE "NOT IN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 114159 181231Z
CONCENTRATIONS, BUT ARE BEING DRIVEN FROM ONE VILLAGE TO ANOTHER." "BUT IT IS CLEAR," HE CONTINUED, "THAT THERE ARE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE AT THE MOMENT GIVING RISE TO VERY SERIOUS HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS AND ALSO OF COURSE A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO THE REGISTRATION EXERCISE WHICH IS THE FIRST MAJOR PRACTICAL PART OF THE CONSULTATION."
GONG UNQUOTE COHEN

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5981

E50

PAGE 01 JAKART 03005 01 OF 02 181010Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/015W		

----------D6B4BC 181011Z /38

O 181007Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8387
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003005

ROME FOR VATICAN
SECDEF FOR ISA/SHER

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03005 01 OF 02 181010Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: A SCORCHED EARTH POLICY

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

SUMMARY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 17 JUN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

2. (C) SUMMARY. BASED ON REPORTS FROM UNAMET, [redacted] AND VISITING POLOFF'S DIRECT OBSERVATIONS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AND PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS, WORKING TOGETHER CLOSELY, ARE CARRYING OUT A SCORCHED EARTH POLICY IN THE DISTRICT OF LIQUICA AND ITS ENVIRONS. AMONG THE THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES DISPLACED AS A RESULT, THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM IS DISEASE. RESIDENTS OF THIS AREA REMAIN TOO FRIGHTENED TO SPEAK WITH FOREIGNERS. BASED ON HIS OWN DIRECT OBSERVATIONS, THE UNAMET CHIEF HAS MADE HIS MOST DIRECT ALLEGATIONS TO DATE OF TNI LINKS TO MILITIA ACTIVITIES, EVEN SPECIFYING DESIGNATIONS OF THE UNITS INVOLVED. END SUMMARY. B1

CLIMATE OF FEAR PERSISTS IN LIQUICA

3. (C) POLOFF VISITED LIQUICA AND MAUBARA ON JUNE 16. AT THE TOWN'S WESTERN APPROACH, SOME 40 TO 50 BESI MERAH-PUTIH MILITIA WERE IN FORMATION, SALUTING THE INDONESIAN FLAG. AT THE CHURCH COMPOUND IN LIQUICA, SITE OF THE KILLINGS IN APRIL, THE HOUSE OF THE PASTOR WAS ABANDONED (HE REMAINS IN DILI DUE TO FEARS FOR HIS SECURITY). ANOTHER PRIEST WHO WAS STILL IN THE HOUSE IN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03005 01 OF 02 181010Z

EARLY JUNE, PROTECTED BY AN ARMY OF CHILDREN, IS NO LONGER PRESENT. [redacted] EXPLAINED THAT THE GROUP OF MOSTLY WOMEN, CHILDREN AND OLD MEN GATHERED IN THE CHURCHYARD INCLUDED MANY DISPLACED. SHE QUICKLY MOVED AWAY, HOWEVER, OBVIOUSLY UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT SPEAKING TO POLOFF. AT A NEARBY CHURCH FACILITY [redacted] WAS SUPERVISING SOME 50 YOUNG CHILDREN. HE SAID CHURCH WORKERS HAD SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING THESE CHILDREN IN FROM "THE MILITIA PLACE," (A REFERENCE TO AN EXTENSIVE MILITIA-CONTROLLED AREA SOUTH OF LIQUICA CONTAINING THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED) FOR THE DAY TO BE PROVIDED FOOD AND MEDICAL CARE. HE IMPLORED POLOFF NOT TO SPEAK WITH ANYONE IN THE LIQUICA-MAUBARA AREA. "IF YOU WANT TO FIND OUT WHAT IS GOING ON HERE PLEASE TALK TO PEOPLE IN DILI," HE URGED. B1 B1

DEVASTATION BETWEEN LIQUICA AND MAUBARA

4. (C) POLOFF CONTINUED A FURTHER 15 KILOMETERS TO MAUBARA THROUGH A SCENE OF UTTER DEVASTATION. ALMOST EVERY HOUSE HAD BEEN BURNED OR DISMANTLED, AND JUDGING BY THE APPEARANCE OF THE ASHES, SOME OF THE BURNINGS WERE QUITE RECENT. (POLCOUNS HAD TRAVERSED THIS AREA A FEW WEEKS BEFORE AND FOUND ABOUT 30 PERCENT OF THE HOUSES DESTROYED. NOW IT WAS MORE LIKE 90

PERCENT). GROUPS OF FORLORN PEOPLE, INCLUDING ENTIRE FAMILIES, WALKED ALONG THE SIDE OF THE ROAD. HOUSES STILL STANDING ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF LIQUICA, SOME PARTIALLY DESTROYED, WERE OVERCROWDED WITH DOZENS OF PEOPLE TAKING SHELTER IN A SINGLE DWELLING.

SCORCHED EARTH IN THE MOUNTAIN VILLAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03005 01 OF 02 181010Z

5. (C) REPORTS ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE FROM THE MOUNTAINOUS AREA SOUTH OF LIQUICA, WHICH HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY CLOSED OFF FROM THE OUTSIDE WORLD SINCE APRIL. JUDGING BY THE ACCOUNTS OF UNAMET, [redacted] WHO HAVE ENTERED THIS AREA IN THE PAST WEEK, THE MILITIAS, ACCOMPANIED BY REGULAR TNI FORCES, HAVE ENGAGED IN A SCORCHED EARTH CAMPAIGN WHICH HAS COMPLETELY EMPTIED MOST VILLAGES IN THE AREA. [redacted] REPORT VILLAGES ABANDONED OVER A WIDE AREA WITH MOST OF THE HOUSES BURNED. THEY REPORT THAT MOST OF THE YOUNG MEN HAVE FLED "UP THE MOUNTAIN" INTO FALINTIL CONTROLLED AREAS, WHILE THE WOMEN, ELDERLY AND CHILDREN HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LOWLANDS AROUND LIQUICA AND MAUBARA. THE USAID-SUPPORTEDED COFFEE PROJECT HAS BEEN COMPELLED TO CEASE OPERATIONS IN THESE HIGHLANDS DUE TO THE OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION AND THE DIFFICULTY IN PERSUADING THEIR WORKERS TO ENTER THESE AREAS. ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS REPORTS, SEVERAL TRUCKS CONTRACTED BY THE PROJECT WERE COMMANDEERED ON JUNE 11 AND THEIR DRIVERS WERE ABDUCTED AND BEATEN. B1 B1

GRATUITOUS VIOLENCE

6. (C) IN A JUNE 17 DISCUSSION WITH POLOFF, [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5982

PAGE 01 JAKART 03005 02 OF 02 181011Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02

G-00 MR-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /016W
----------D6B4C0 181011Z /38
O 181007Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8388
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003005

ROME FOR VATICAN
SECDEF FOR ISA/SHER
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03005 02 OF 02 181011Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: A SCORCHED EARTH POLICY

[redacted] WHO WAS IN EAST TIMOR JUNE 15-17, SAID [redacted] FOUND THAT GROUPS COMPOSED OF "THREE OR FOUR MILITIA COMBINED WITH THREE OR FOUR REGULAR MILITARY" HAD CARRIED OUT BURNINGS OF HOUSES AND BEATINGS OF VILLAGERS IN THIS AREA. [redacted] HAD ACCOMPANIED A UNAMET TEAM INTO THE AREA THE PREVIOUS DAY. HE STRESSED THAT EVIDENCE GATHERED FROM THIS TRIP SUGGESTED THAT MUCH OF THIS VIOLENCE IS GRATUITOUS. HE CITED THE EXAMPLE OF A 75-YEAR OLD MAN HE ENCOUNTERED, "WHO COULD NOT POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN FALINTIL ACTIVITY," BUT WHO NEVERTHELESS HAD BEEN SHOT THROUGH THE ARM. HE HAD ALSO SEEN PILES OF CLOTHING AND VILLAGERS' POSSESSIONS WHICH HAD BEEN BURNED BY THE MILITIA/MILITARY PERSONNEL. B1 B1 B1

7. (C) ACCORDING TO [redacted] SOME 7-9,000 PEOPLE DISPLACED FROM THE HIGH COUNTRY SOUTH OF LIQUICA NOW WERE SEEKING REFUGE "ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN," I.E., NORTH OF ERMERA (THIS IS IN ADDITION TO THE REPORTED 15,000 DISPLACED IN THE LOW COUNTRY AROUND LIQUICA AND MAUBARA. [redacted] SAID THAT AMONG THESE B1 B1

DISPLACED, MANY OF WHOM WERE SLEEPING IN THE FOREST, THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS DISEASE (MALARIA, TUBERCULOSIS, AND RESPIRATORY AILMENTS), NOT HUNGER. HE SAID PEOPLE GENERALLY WERE ABLE TO OBTAIN FOOD IN THIS RELATIVELY FERTILE AREA, BUT THERE WAS NO MEDICINE AVAILABLE TO TREAT THEIR AILMENTS.

UNAMET VERSION

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03005 02 OF 02 181011Z

8. (C) ACCORDING TO A WESTERN JOURNALIST, UNAMET CHIEF IAN MARTIN TOLD THE PRESS ON JUNE 18 THAT A JOINT UNAMET-ICRC TEAM "ENCOUNTERED THREE SEPARATE GROUPS OF BESI MERAH PUTIH MILITIA ACCOMPANIED BY AND INDEED DIRECTED BY TNI SOLDIERS CARRYING OUT OPERATIONS IN THE AREA." HE DESCRIBED MILITIA AS "BURNING PERSONAL PROPERTY, ASSAULTING AN OLD MAN AND SEEKING TO DRIVE VILLAGERS OUT OF LEOTELA VILLAGE." A JOURNALIST AT THE BRIEFING TOLD US THAT MARTIN IDENTIFIED THE TNI UNIT WORKING WITH THE MILITIA UNIT AS BEING FROM "ARMY POST NO. 5 OF THE 143 BN AT EBENO (PHONETIC)." MARTIN TOLD THE JOURNALISTS: "THIS IS EXACTLY THE KIND OF INCIDENT OF WHICH WE HAVE RECEIVED EXTENSIVE REPORTS." HE ADDED THAT THIS INCIDENT HELPED TO EXPLAIN "EXTENSIVE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT" OF PEOPLE WHO WERE "NOT IN CONCENTRATIONS, BUT ARE BEING DRIVEN FROM ONE VILLAGE TO ANOTHER." "BUT IT IS CLEAR," HE CONTINUED, "THAT THERE ARE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE AT THE MOMENT GIVING RISE TO VERY SERIOUS HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS AND ALSO OF COURSE A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO THE REGISTRATION EXERCISE WHICH IS THE FIRST MAJOR PRACTICAL PART OF THE CONSULTATION."
GONG

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6410

PAGE 01 JAKART 03032 01 OF 02 210931Z
ACTION EAP-01

E51

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/016W			

----------D78787 210932Z /38

P 210927Z JUN 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8412
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003032

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03032 01 OF 02 210931Z
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: JUNE 21

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

SUMMARY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 JUN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

2. (C) THE LATEST "PEACE AGREEMENT" BETWEEN THE PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDES SHOULD BE VIEWED WITH SKEPTICISM. GENERAL WIRANTO HAS DENIED UNAMET'S ASSERTIONS THAT INDONESIAN SOLDIERS WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN MILITIA ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS. A UNAMET OFFICIAL SEES NO CHANGE IN GOI POLICY AND CITES EVIDENCE THAT THE INDONESIAN POLICE IN EAST TIMOR HAVE COME UNDER PRESSURE FROM GENERAL ZACKY ANWAR NOT TO COOPERATE TOO CLOSELY WITH UNAMET. BISHOP BASILIO NASCIMENTO IS PLAYING AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE EFFORTS TO RECONCILE THE DISPUTING PARTIES IN EAST TIMOR. END SUMMARY.

MOST REMAIN SKEPTICAL ABOUT "PEACE PACT"
---

3. (C) REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATION SIDES SIGNED A DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT AT THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE IN JAKARTA ON JUNE 18. PRESENT WERE XANANA GUSMAO AND LEANDRO ISAAC OF THE CNRT, FPDK LEADER DOMINGOS SOARES, AND MILITIA LEADER JOAO TAVERES. AFTER THE SIGNING, THE GROUP MET WITH ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO, WHO DESCRIBED THE PACT AS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03032 01 OF 02 210931Z

MERELY "A MORAL GUARANTEE." BOTH SIDES CALL FOR AN END TO VIOLENCE AND FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE REGISTRATION AND VOTE SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 8. GIVEN THE FAILURE OF A SIMILARLY-WORDED APRIL 21 AGREEMENT TO END THE VIOLENCE, MOST OBSERVERS HERE ARE UNDERSTANDABLY SKEPTICAL ABOUT THIS LATEST PACT. [redacted] B1
ARE DOWNPLAYING ITS SIGNIFICANCE, BUT THEY STRESS THAT XANANA IS STILL ATTEMPTING TO WORK OUT A MORE SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT IN HIS MEETINGS WITH INDIVIDUAL PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS. IN A JUNE 19 STATEMENT, XANANA STRESSED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON WHO WOULD COLLECT ARMS FROM THE TWO SIDES AND HE AGAIN INSISTED THAT NO DISARMAMENT COULD TAKE PLACE UNTIL TNI TROOPS WERE CONFINED TO BARRACKS. [redacted] B1
[redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS ON JUNE 21 THAT, WHILE HE HAD AGREED TO ATTEND THE SIGNING CEREMONY, HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO KEEP SOME DISTANCE FROM THIS EXERCISE, WHICH IS SUSPECTED OF BEING ANOTHER GOI PUBLIC RELATIONS PLOY.

NO SHIFT IN POLICY
---

4. (C) IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH POLCOUNS, [redacted] SAID UNAMET B1
OFFICIALS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GOI HAS SHIFTED ITS POLICY ON EAST TIMOR, BUT MERELY HAS ADOPTED NEW METHODS OF IMPLEMENTING THIS POLICY. [redacted] B1

[redacted] SAID THAT GENERAL ZACKY ANWAR, WHO HEADS THE MILITARY'S TASK FORCE IN EAST TIMOR, HAS PUT PRESSURE ON THE INDONESIAN POLICE CONTINGENTS, WHICH IN ZACKY'S VIEW HAVE BEEN COOPERATING TOO CLOSELY WITH UNAMET. GENERAL WIRANTO HAS DENIED THAT INDONESIAN SOLDIERS WERE INVOLVED IN MILITIA ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS, AS DESCRIBED BY MARTIN IN HIS JUNE 18 PRESS CONFERENCE. IN WHAT COULD BE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, [redacted] B1

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03032 01 OF 02 210931Z
TOLD POLCOUNS THAT THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE GOI PLANNED TO SEND AITARAK MILITIA LEADER EURICO GUTERRES OUT OF EAST TIMOR.

BISHOP BASILIO EMERGES
---

5. (C) BISHOP BASILIO NASCIMENTO IS PLAYING AN INCREASINGLY PROMINENT ROLE IN RECONCILIATION EFFORTS. HE, RATHER THAN BISHOP BELO, PRESIDED OVER THE LAST ROUND OF PRELIMINARY "DARE II" TALKS, WHICH TOOK PLACE IN BAUCAU. [redacted] B1, B6

[redacted] BASILIO, [redacted] APPEARS TO HAVE A TALENT FOR DIPLOMACY AND NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT HESITATED TO CRITICIZE THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AND THE GOI, BASILIO MAY ALSO BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES, BECAUSE HE IS VIEWED AS HAVING A LOWER POLITICAL PROFILE THAN BELO. BASILIO HAS CONTENDED THAT THE CHURCH IS THE ONLY INSTITUTION WHICH HAS ANY HOPE OF BRINGING THE DISPUTING SIDES TOGETHER. IN HIS RECENT MEETING WITH EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR AND POLOFF, HOWEVER, HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE WAS UNDER NO ILLUSIONS REGARDING THE DIFFICULTY OF THIS TASK, ESPECIALLY AS LONG AS THE B1, B6

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6407

PAGE 01 JAKART 03032 02 OF 02 210931Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00

SAS-00 SWCI-00 /015W
----------D7877D 210931Z /38
P 210927Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8413
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003032

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03032 02 OF 02 210931Z
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: JUNE 21

INDONESIAN MILITARY CONTINUED TO PLAY THE ROLE OF THE HIDDEN HAND BEHIND THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES.
GONG

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

<<<>>>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3274

PAGE 01 JAKART 03117 01 OF 05 280734Z
ACTION EAP-01

E52

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/022W					

----------DA488B 280735Z /38

O 280726Z JUN 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8493
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION GENEVA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY ROME
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 003117

NOFORN

STATE DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR INL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03117 01 OF 05 280734Z
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/06
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, EAID, PREL, PREF, CASC, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF POLITICAL CLEANSING OBSERVED IN AREAS OF EAST TIMOR NOT PREVIOUSLY VISITED

REF: A) JAKARTA 2529, B) JAKARTA 3005, C) JAKARTA 2937

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 27 JUN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

UNCLASSIFIED

1.5 (D).

2. (C/NOFORN) SUMMARY: TRAVEL BY POLCOUNS THROUGH EAST AND WEST TIMOR JUNE 24-26 INDICATED CONTINUED TENSION IN EAST TIMOR, WITH MANY HOUSES ABANDONED OR BURNED BY MILITARY-BACKED MILITIAS IN AREAS NOT PREVIOUSLY VISITED BY EMBOFFS. EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL CLEANSING WAS APPARENT IN BURNED OR ABANDONED HOMES IN NORTHWESTERN BOBONARO AND SOUTHWESTERN KOVALIMA. SOME OF THOSE FLEEING THE MILITIA ATTACKS HAVE CROSSED INTO WEST TIMOR WHERE CHURCH OFFICIALS ESTIMATE THERE ARE OVER 8,000 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS). THE CHURCH OFFICIALS TOLD POLCOUNS THEY HAVE HEARD OF GOVERNMENT PLANS TO "ORGANIZE" DEPARTURE OF 600 FAMILIES OUT OF SUAI TO WEST TIMOR. [redacted] IN SUAI TOLD POLCOUNS THERE WERE REPORTS OF SOME IDP RETURN FOLLOWING THE UNAMET TEAM'S ARRIVAL. B1

3. (C/NOFORN) SUMMARY CONT: A NEWLY ESTABLISHED UNAMET CONTINGENT IN KOVALIMA HAS FACED A THREAT FROM MILITIAS WHOM POLCOUNS OBSERVED OPERATING OPENLY IN THE AREA.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03117 01 OF 05 280734Z
UNAMET PERSONNEL SAID THAT FEARFUL LOCAL PEOPLE WERE PRESSING THEM NOT TO LEAVE. [redacted] HAS RECEIVED REPORTS OF ALLEGED INDONESIAN MILITARY PREPARATIONS FOR A POST BALLOT OFFENSIVE IN EAST TIMOR -- A "PLAN B" IF THE VOTE WERE FOR INDEPENDENCE. [redacted] REPORTED SEEING WHAT HE BELIEVED TO BE SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL DISGUISED AS ARMED CIVILIANS NEAR THE WEST TIMOR-EAST TIMOR BORDER EARLIER IN JUNE. POLCOUNS OBSERVED A HIGH-LEVEL, UNPUBLICIZED MEETING OF MILITARY OFFICIALS AND CIVILIANS FROM DILI WITH WEST TIMOR COUNTERPARTS IN ATAMBUA, WEST TIMOR. THE FIRST OF A CONTINGENT OF EXPATS, INCLUDING MANY AMCITS, WHO ARE PLANNING TO MONITOR THE BALLOT IN EAST TIMOR, HAS ARRIVED IN DILI. INDONESIAN OBSERVERS ARE ALSO GEARING UP AS ARE INDONESIAN NGO'S SEEKING TO ASSIST IDP'S. END SUMMARY. B1 B1

4. (C) ON JUNE 24, POLCOUNS FLEW TO DILI AND, AFTER BRIEF AIRPORT MEETINGS WITH PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-AUTONOMY EAST TIMORESE AS WELL AS NGO'S, TRAVELED WEST BY TAXI THROUGH LIQUISA AND BOBONARO DISTRICTS. CROSSING THE BORDER WITH WEST TIMOR AT BATUAGADE, HE CONTINUED TO ATAMBUA, SEAT OF WEST TIMOR'S EASTERN-MOST DISTRICT. AFTER OVER-NIGHTING THERE, ON JUNE 25 HE TRAVELED BY BUS TO SUAI IN EAST TIMOR'S KOVALIMA DISTRICT ON THE SOUTHERN

COAST. PARAGRAPHS 5-12 REPORT OBSERVATIONS FROM THIS TRAVEL. SUBSEQUENT PARAS FOCUS ON MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS, DISPLACED PEOPLE AND OTHER ASPECTS.

DILI TO THE WEST TIMOR BORDER

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03117 01 OF 05 280734Z
5. (U) TRAVEL FROM DILI TO BATUGADE ON THE EAST TIMOR-WEST TIMOR BORDER REQUIRED TWO HOURS WITH BRIEF STOPS ENROUTE. ROAD CONDITIONS RANGED FROM FAIR TO POOR WITH ROAD CAVE-INS AT A HALF-DOZEN POINTS ENGULFING UP TO HALF THE TWO-LANE ROAD ALONG COASTAL CLIFF PORTIONS OF THE ROUTE. CONDITIONS BETWEEN DILI AND MAUBARA WERE MUCH THE SAME AS NOTED IN LATE MAY AND MID-JUNE TRAVEL BY EMBOFFS (REFS A AND B). MANY HOUSES REMAIN ABANDONED BUT POLCOUNS SAW NO NEWLY BURNED HOUSES -- IN ADDITION TO THOSE ALREADY OBSERVED IN PREVIOUS VISITS. MOST OF THOSE STILL OCCUPIED FLEW THE INDONESIAN FLAG, A SIGN OF PRO-INDONESIAN SENTIMENT INSISTED ON BY THE MILITIAS. THE NUMBER OF IDP'S LOCATED IN GROUPS ALONG THE ROUTE APPEARED TO HAVE DIMINISHED FROM LATE MAY. A 30-PERSON UNAMET TEAM WAS IN LIQUISA WHEN POLCOUNS PASSED THROUGH. UNAMET PERSONNEL SAID THAT THEY WERE HEARING FROM LOCALS THAT MANY PEOPLE HAD FLED TO ATAPUPU AND NIKI NIKI IN WEST TIMOR, IN ADDITION TO THOSE WHO WERE ON THE MOVE OR IN CAMPS IN EAST TIMOR.

6. (U) THE FIRST EMBASSY TRAVEL WEST OF MAUBARA SINCE THE EMERGENCE OF THE MILITIAS AND THEIR POLITICAL CLEANSING CAMPAIGNS REVEALED FEWER BURNED HOUSES THAN IN THE FIRST LEG OF THE JOURNEY (DILI TO MAUBARA) BUT MORE ABANDONED HOUSES. THOSE STILL OCCUPIED (LESS THAN 50

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3326

PAGE 01 JAKART 03117 02 OF 05 280743Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00

P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00
PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 MR-00 NFAT-00
SAS-00 /022W

----------DA4972 280743Z /38

O 280726Z JUN 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSQ JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8494
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
RUEHOLAMEMBASSY BONN 1232
USMISSION GENEVA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY ROME
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 003117

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03117 02 OF 05 280743Z

NOFORN

STATE DEPARTMENT ALS FOR INL
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/06
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, EAID, REL, PREF, CASC, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: RESULTS OQ POLITICAL CLEANSING OBSERVED IN AREAS OF EAST TIMOR NOT PREVIOUSLY VISITED

PERCENT IN QOME AREAS) USUALLY FLEW THE INDONESIAN FLAG. MILITIA CHECKPOINTS, STILL IN PLACE ON THE DILI-T-MAUBARA LEG, WERE MUCH LESS IN EVIDENCE WES OF MAUBARA, ALTHOUGH POLCOUNS ENCOUNTERED SEQERAL EAST-BOUND TRUCKS CARRYING ARMED CIVILIANS (PROBABLY MILITIA), INCLUDING ONE MILITAR TRUCK.

7. (U) POLCOUNS SAW NO SIGNIFICANT MARKET ACTIVITY ALONG THE ROUTE AND ALTHOUGH DILI-ATAMBUA BUSES ARE OPERATING, THEY DO NOT PICK UP PASSENGERS IN EAST TIMOR ONCE HAVING LEFT DILI. A NUN OUTSIDE ATTABAE, WEST OF MAUBARA, TOLD POLCOUNS SHE HAD BEEN WAITING FOR HOURS AT THE SIDE OF THE ROAD AND HAD BEEN UNABLE TO FLAG DOWN EITHER OF THE TWO BUSES SHE SAW OR ANY OTHER VEHICLE. (COMMENT: POLCOUNS LATER CONFIRMED THIS ON A SOUTHERN TRIP INTO

KOVALIMA DISTRICT OF EAST TIMOR WHERE THE BUS DRIVER SAID THAT HE AND OTHER DRIVERS WERE UNDER STRICT ORDERS NOT TO STOP TO PICK UP PASSENGERS OR PRODUCE ENROUTE IN EAST

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03117 02 OF 05 280743Z
TIMOR. THIS IMPOSES A HARDSHIP FOR LOCAL POPLE BY PRECLUDING THE MOST COMMON FORM OF TRQNSPORT AND TRADE -- MUCH LOCAL TRADE USUALLY QOVES BY INTER-PROVINCIAL BUS. END COMMENT)

BORDER TO ATAMBUA, WEST TIMOR

8. (U) TRAVEL BETWEEN THE BRDER AND ATAMBUA WAS UNEVENTFUL EXCEPT FOR GR UPS OF IDP'S LOCATED AT THE BORDER CROSSING (
ILITARY PERSONNEL SAID THERE WERE
HUNDREDS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY). A LOCAL ALSO REPOTED IDPS IN ATAPUPU AND ATAMBUA, SEE BELOW.

QTAMBUA TO SUAI (KOVALIMA DISTRICT CAPITAL IN EAQT TIMOR)

9. (U) UNABLE TO LOCTE A PRIVATE VEHICLE WILLING TO DRIVE INTO KOQALIMA, EAST TIMOR FOR ANY PRICE, POLCOUNS TRAQELED BY EARLY-AM BUS (ONE OF TWO MAKING DAILY ROUND-TRIPS. THEY RESUMED THIS ROUTE ONE WEEK GO). THE FOUR-HOUR RIDE VIA BETUM INCLUDED 25 EAST TIMORESE (A FULL LOAD) COMPRISED MOSQLY OF WOMEN, CHILDREN AND ELDERLY MEN, MOST OQ WHOM BOARDED IN THE LAST MAJOR TOWN (BETUM) QEFORE THE BORDER. (THE UNAMET TEAM CHIEF IN SUAI SAID THAT UNAMET HAD HEARD THAT SOME IDP'S WERE RETURNING TO SUAI FOLLOWING THE ARRIVAL OF THE UNAMET TEAM THERE.)

10. (U) THE 45 MINUTE DRIVE FROM THE BORDER TO SUAI REVEALED SOME BURNED HOUSES AND SOME ABANDONED, THOUGH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03117 02 OF 05 280743Z
NOT AS MANY AS SEEN IN LIQUICA AND BOBONARO DISTRICTS. PRIOR TO ENTERING SUAI TOWN, PASSENGERS WERE REQUIRED TO DISEMBARK FOR DOCUMENT CHECKS AT A POLICE CHECKPOINT. AT ANOTHER POINT CLOSER TO THE TOWN, THE BUS WAS STOPPED BY AN ARMED GRASS CUTTING CREW OF MALES IN CIVILIAN ATTIRE WHO PEERED INTO THE BUS BEFORE ALLOWING IT TO CONTINUE. (UNAMET PERSONNEL SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD POLCOUNS THAT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT WAS "EMPLOYING" MILITIAS IN JOBS SUCH AS

ROAD WORK AS COVER FOR PAYING THEM.) INSIDE SUAI POLCOUNS OBSERVED A GROUP OF 15-20 ARMED CIVILIAN-CLAD MALES MOVING TOGETHER THROUGH THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE TOWN ON MOTORCYCLES. THE RETURN TRIP FRM SUAI TO ATAMBUA REVEALED NO NEW INSIGHTS --NO MILITIA GROUPS WERE OBSERVED.

11. (U) Q SIX-HOUR ROAD JOURNEY JUNE 26 FROM ATAMBUA TO THE AIRPORT AT KUPANG, THE PROVINCE CAPITAL N THE WESTERN END OF THE ISLAND, REVEALED NOTING OF NOTE OTHER THAN REPORTS FROM LOCALS ALNG THE WAY THAT EAST TIMORESE IDP'S HAD SETTLED AS FAR WEST AS NIKI NIKI, THREE HOURS WEST OF ATAMBUA.

UNAMET COMMENTS
---

12. (U) APPROXIMATELY 30 MEMBERS OF AN UNAMET CONTINGENT, WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY REACH 40 OFFICIALS ARE IN SUAI, THE FIRST ELEMENTS HAVING MOVED IN BY HELICOPTER. OTHER MEMBERS AND EQUIPMENT REACHED SUAI VIA A SEVEN-HOUR DRIVE FROM DILI VIA ATAMBUA. A SHORTER DILI-SUAI ROUTE EXISTS THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS BUT THE ROAD

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 JAKART 03117 02 OF 05 280743Z
QIS BARELY PASSABLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3271

PAGE 01 JAKART 03117 03 OF 05 280734Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/021W						

----------DA4880 280734Z /38
O 280726Z JUN 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8495
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION GENEVA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY ROME
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 003117

NOFORN

STATE DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR INL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03117 03 OF 05 280734Z
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/06
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, EAID, PREL, PREF,CASC, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF POLITICAL CLEANSING OBSERVED IN AREAS OF EAST TIMOR OT PREVIOUSLY VISITED

13. (C/NOFORN) WHEN VISITED MID-DAY JUNE 25, [redacted] WAS BRIEFING UNAMET HEADQUARTERS IN DILI BY RADIO PHONE REGARDING A THREAT UNAMET HAD RECEIVED THAT MORNING FROM THE MILITIAS. TEAM MEMBERS QUIETLY BRIEFED POLCOUNS THAT THE "THREAT," THE FIRST RECEIVED BY THE MISSION, HAD DELAYED OR POSSIBLY PREVENTED THE HELICOPTER ARRIVAL OF THE UNAMET MISSION CHIEF THAT AFTERNOON (NFI). THE TEAM HAD FACED NO PREVIOUS THREATS BUT HAD ENCOUNTERED BUREAUCRATIC OBSTACLES. [redacted] B1

B1

[redacted]

14. (C/NOFORN) [redacted] B1
THE TEAM IS FACED WITH CONTINUOUS EFFORTS BY ENGLISH-SPEAKING MILITARY TNI PERSONNEL AND PLAIN CLOTHES PERSONNEL ASSUMED TO BE TNI TO ELICIT INFORMATION ON TEAM ACTIVITIES AND TO "SHARE THEIR VIEWS WITH US." THIS

[redacted] B1
SAID THAT THE MOST COMMON MESSAGE HEARD FROM LOCAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03117 03 OF 05 280734Z
PEOPLE WAS A PLEA FOR UNAMET NOT TO LEAVE. "THEY SAY THEY WILL BE PUNISHED WHEN WE GO AND THEY BELIEVE IT BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT (THEY SAY) THE MILITIAS ARE TELLING THEM," [redacted] SAID. B1

15. (C/NOFORN) [redacted] SAID THAT THE TEAM HAD B1
FOUND HOUSES BURNED IN VILLAGES VISITED, ESPECIALLY IN THE HILLS AWAY FORM THE MAIN ROAD. THOSE THAT SURVIVED THE MILITIA ATTACKS WERE ALL FLYING THE INDONESIAN FLAG. THE UNAMET PERSONNEL DESCRIBED THE MOOD AS TENSE, POINTING ESPECIALLY AS CAUSE FOR THIS TO THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF MAHIDI AND LAKSAUR MILITIA PERSONNEL (AMONG OTHER MILITIA GROUPS) IN THE AREA.

16. (C/NOFORN) [redacted] TOLD B1
POLCOUNS THAT THE MOST DISTURBING INFORMATION THUS FAR DEVELOPED BY THE TEAM WAS BASED ON MULTIPLE REPORTS THAT CLAIMED THE TNI, PRINCIPALLY THE SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS), WERE DEVELOPING A "COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE" AT ZUMALAI IN BOBONARO DISTRICT. THE AREA WAS TO BE USED AS A FORWARD BASE FOR "PLAN B" -- MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR'S WESTERN DISTRICTS BY MILITIA AND KOPASSUS PERSONNEL DISGUISED AS MILITIA WHICH WOULD BE PORTRAYED AS A POPULAR REBELLION SHOULD EAST TIMORESE CHOOSE INDEPENDENCE IN THE UPCOMING CONSULTATION BALLOT. HE SAID THAT [redacted] WAS STILL B1
CHECKING THE REPORTING BUT ADDED "WE TAKE THIS VERY SERIOUSLY." (COMMENT: POLCOUNS SAW NO UNUSUAL MILITARY MOVEMENT IN HIS BRIEF TRAVEL IN WEST TIMOR, BUT DID OBSERVE AN UNUSUAL, UNPUBLICIZED SENIOR MILITARY MEETING INVOLVING MILITARY AND CIVILIANS (POSSIBLY MILITIA) FROM
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03117 03 OF 05 280734Z
DILI AND WEST TIMOR IN ATAMBUA JUNE 25 AND JUNE 26, SEE BELOW. END COMMENT.)

17. (C/NOFORN) [redacted] SAID THAT [redacted] B1
[redacted] HAD PROVIDED B1
REPORTS OF BODIES, VICTIMS OF MILITIA ATTACKS, BEING DISPOSED OF IN THREE OF FOUR LAKES (IN THE SILAHI AREA - PHONETIC) AND IN A MASS GRAVE BEHIND A TNI COMPOUND. [redacted] HAS WHAT IS CLAIMED TO BE A SPECIFIC LOCATION FOR THE MASS GRAVE.) [redacted] SAID THE INFORMATION B1
WOULD BE CHECKED BUT THAT [redacted] REGARDED THE SOURCE AS B1
CREDIBLE AND WELL-INFORMED ON HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS.

REPORTING ON MILITIA/MILITARY ACTIVITY IN WEST TIMOR

18. (C) [redacted] B1 TOLD POLCOUNS THAT IN EARLY JUNE IN THE ATAPUPU AREA OF WEST TIMOR, HE HAD OBSERVED MEN IN PLAINCLOTHES, ALL ARMED, DISEMBARKING FROM THREE TRUCKS. HE SAID THE ORGANIZED MANNER IN WHICH THEY GOT OUT OF THE TRUCKS AND THE FACT THAT THEY IMMEDIATELY STACKED THEIR ARMS PROFESSIONALLY, CONVINCED HIM THAT THESE MEN WERE NOT CIVILIANS BUT RATHER, MILITARY PERSONNEL DISGUISED AS CIVILIANS. HOLDING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3321

PAGE 01 JAKART 03117 04 OF 05 280742Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/022W					

----------DA495E 280742Z /38
O 280726Z JUN 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8496
INFO AEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0297
AMEMBASSY CANBQRRA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AME
BASSY LISBON 1117
AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION GENEVA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY ROME
QSCINCPAC HONOLULU HÍ//FPA

C O N F I D E Q T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 003117

NOFRN

-CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03117 04 OF 05 280742Z
STATE DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR INL
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/06
TAGS PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, EAID, PREL, PREF, CASC, INS, ID
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF POLITICAL CLEANSQNG OBSERVED IN AREAS OF EAST TIMOR NOT PREVIOQSLY VISITED

STRONGLY TO THE VIEW THAT THE TNI IN BELU DISTRICT (WHICH COMPRISES THE WHOLE WST TIMOR BORDER AREA WITH EAST TIMOR) ARE PREPARING FOR MILITARY SUPPORT OF MILITIAS IN QAST TIMOR. HE CLAIMED FURTHER THAT EARLIER THIS YEAR, MOST TNI PERSONNEL IN THE DISTRICT WERE RANSFERRED TO KUPANG AND WERE REPLACED BY MILQTARY PERSONNEL TRANSFERRED FROM EAST TIMOR. [redacted] B1

[redacted] REPEATED REPORTS HEARD FROM [redacted] WEST B1
TIMOR SOURCES THAT THE TNI IS TRAINING MILITIA QN A "CLOSED AREA" NEAR BETUM (REF C).

19. (C) [redacted] TOLD B1
POLCOUNS THAT IN EARLY JUNE HE AND OTHE STAFF AT THE SEMINARY HAD REPELLED AN EFFORTBY EAST TIMORESE MILITIA TO IDENTIFY AND TAKE AWAY SEMINARIANS WHO WERE FROM EAST TIMOR. SOURCE AND THE STAFF TOLD THE MILITIAS THAT THERE WERE NO EAST TIMORESE AMONG THE SEMINARIANS. "IT WAS A GOOD LIE," HE CONCLUDED, NOTING THERE WERE OVER 30 EAST TIMORESE AT THE SEMINARY.

20. (C) WHILE POLCOUNS SAW LITTLE UNTOWARD MILITARY ACTIVITY IN 15 HOURS OF ROAD TRAVEL IN WEST TIMOR, HE DID

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03117 04 OF 05 280742Z
WITNESS AN UNUSUAL, UNPUBLICIZED MEETING AT HIS HOTEL, (THE HOTEL INTAN, THE ONLY REAL HOTEL IN ATAMBUA) ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE 25 AND THEMORNING OF JUNE 26. A LARGE DELEGATION OF MIQITARY OFFICIALS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES ARRIVED WITH A 22-MAN ARMED MILITARY ESCORT AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL (THE LATTER APPARENTLY UNARMED) IN THQ EARLY EVENING. THEY DINED PRIVATELY AT TQE HOTEL THAT NIGHT. ALSO PRESENT WERE CIVILIAS FROM DILI (THEIR ORIGIN INDICATED BY THE LICNSE TAG ON THEIR VEHICLE), THE DISTRICT CIVILQAN AND MILITARY CHIEF (BUPATI AND DANREM) ANDMILITARY OFFICIALS IN FROM KUPANG. HOTEL STQFF

REPORTED 13 MILITARY OFFICIALS FROM DILI, INCLUDING ONE GENERAL, ATTENDED. SOME OF THE CVILIAN PERSONNEL (TWO OF WHOM APPEARED TO BE IMORESE -- POSSIBLY MILITIA, AND WHO CARRIED ALKY-TALKIES) OVER-NIGHTED AT THE HOTEL. A SEPARATE, SMALLER MEETING INVOLVING THE DILI MILITARY OFFICIALS AND CIVILIANS, PLUS THE DANREM AND BUPATI IN TOOK PLACE AT THE HOTEL IN THEEARLY MORNING OF JUNE 26.

THE INTERNALLY DISQLACED
---

21. (SBU) [redacted] B6
[redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS THA THEY WERE IN THE PROCESS OF SURVEYING THE SIQE AND NEEDS OF THE IDP POPULATION FROM EAST TQMOR IN WEST TIMOR. THEY ESTIMATED THE POPULATION AS OVER 8,000, NOTING THAT HARD DATA FOR LATE-APRIL (SHARED WITH POLCOUNS AND PASSED TO AID) INDICATED THAT THE NUMBER THEN WAS IN THE RANGE OF 4,000 -- WITH HIGHER NUMBERS IN THE WAKE OF INTENSIFIED MILITIA ATTACKS ON PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE IN APRIL AND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03117 04 OF 05 280742Z
MAY.

22. (SBU) [redacted] SAID THAT ABOUT 300 B6
PRO-JAKARTA EAST TIMORESE ADMINISTRATION PERSONNEL FROM DILI HAD COME TO ATAMBUA EARLIER IN THE YEAR BUT THAT AS THESE PEOPLE RECEIVED GOVERNMENT HELP AND WERE STILL DRAWING THEIR SALARIES, THEY WERE NOT IN NEED OF CHURCH ASSISTANCE. MOST OF THOSE WHO FLED MILITIA ATTACKS HAD SETTLED WITH FRIENDS AND RELATIVES IN TOWNS NEAR THE BORDER, ESPECIALLY IN AND AR UND ATAPUPU (FOR LIQUISA AND BOBONARO IDPS) AND BETUM (FOR IDPS FROM KOVALIMA AND OTHER SOUTHERN EAST TIMOR AREAS). THESE IDPS WERE IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE. THE CHURCH IS SEEKING FUNDS TO PROVIDE FOOD, SHELTER, CLOTHING AND MEDIAL ASSISTANCE (ESPECIALLY TO DEAL WITH MALARIAL PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTH).

23. (C) A NUN MET ON THE BUS TO SUAI AND THE ST.MARY'S OFFICIALS SAID THAT THEY WERE NOT AWARE OF IDP CAMPS RUN BY MILITIAS. [redacted] ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IN A B1
JUNE 25 SURVEY OF THE IDP SITUATION IN THE BETUM AREA, HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARING AN "ORGANIZED" MOVEMENT OF 600 EAST TIMORESE FAMILIES FRM KOVALIMA DISTRICT TO THE BETUM AREA. THE MQVEMENT WOULD BE TO "PROTEST" THE POSSIBILITY QHAT EAST TIMOR MIGHT VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4787

PAGE 01 JAKART 03117 05 OF 05 281241Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	SVC-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W				

----------DA6712 281241Z /49

O 280726Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WQSHDC IMMEDIATE 8497
INFO AMEMBASSY QELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISON
AMEMBASSY BONN
UQMISSION GENEVA 2442
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY ROME
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 003117

NOFORN

STAE DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR INL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03117 05 OF 05 281241Z
ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/06
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, EAID, PREL, PREF, CASC, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF POLITICAL CLEANSING OBSERVED IN AREAS OF EAST TIMOR NOT PREVIOUSLY VISITED

INDEPENDENT MONITORS FOR THE CONSULTATION BALLOT
---

24. (SBU) AN AMCIT INVOLVED WITH PRO-DEMOCRACY ACTIVITY IN INDONESIA TOLD POLCOUNS AT DILI AIRPORT THAT HE HAD RECENTLY ARRIVED TO AKE LOGISTIC PREPARATIONS FOR A CONTINGENT OF (#) TO SERVE AS "INFORMAL MONITORS" FOR (#) CONSULTATION BALLOT. HE ADDED THAT WHILE (#) PREPARED TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL OR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, UNAMET HAD PLEDGED QO GIVE THEM SOME FORM OF OFFICIAL ACCREDITATION. HE SAID THAT APPROXIMATELY 200 EXPATS, MOSTLYD. (NOTE: WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO LEARN MORE ABOUT THE ARRIVAL TIMING, IDENTITY AND STATUS OF THSE INFORMAL MONITORS. END NOTE) [redacted] ALSO (#) WITH POLCOUNS IN DILI AND DESCRIBED EFFORTS BY HIS ORGANIZATION TO JOIN WITH OTHER GROUP TO CREATE AN INDONESIAN MONITORING FORCE. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HIS ORGANIZATION WAS HISTORICALLY SUPPORTIVE OF EAST TIMOR'S RIGHT TO A REFERENDUM, THE MONITORING EFFORT WOULD INVOLVE OTHES NGO'S AS WELL. ANOTHER INDONESIAN NGO RE TOLD POLCOUNS THAT SHE WAS SEEKING FUNDS TO (#) NGO SUPPORTED EFFORTS TO ASSIST IDPS, ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN. (COMMENT: INVOLVMENT OF SERIOUS INDONESIAN NGOS WITH SYMPATHY FOR

B6

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03117 05 OF 05 281241Z
THE EAST TIMORESE RIGHT TO VOTE ON THEIR FUTURE IS A RELATIVELY NEW PHENOMENON AND IS (#) A CONSTITUENCY IN INDONESIA FOR THIS PERSPECTIVE. END COMMENT.)
ROY

(##) GARBLED TEXT CORRECTIONS WILL FOLLOW

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART03172

Channel: n/a

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8478

E53

PAGE 01 JAKART 03172 01 OF 02 301125Z
ACTION INL-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01
	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/020W				

----------DB5A7F 301125Z /38

O 301130Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8568
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003172

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03172 01 OF 02 301125Z
DEPT FOR INL
SECDEF FOR ISA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID, BX
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: JUNE 30

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. WHILE GOI OFFICIALS AND LOCAL MEDIA PRESENT

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 29 JUN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

CONFLICTING VERSIONS OF THE JUNE 29 ATTACK ON THE UNAMET OFFICE IN MALIANA, ONE JAKARTA DAILY CITES A CLAIM THAT THE MILITIA ASSAILANTS WERE LED BY A MEMBER OF THE MILITARY. [redacted] B1 [redacted] RECENTLY TRAVELING IN EAST TIMOR REPORTS SEEING MIXED PATROLS OF MILITIA AND REGULAR MILITARY PERSONNEL. THE DARE II MEETINGS CONCLUDED ON JUNE 29 WITH NO SIGNS OF CONCRETE PROGRESS. MEETINGS BETWEEN PRO-INDEPENDENCE FACTION LEADERS AND SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS WHICH HAD BEEN IN PROSPECT NOW APPEAR OFF. VAGUE COMMITMENTS ON THE PART OF THE INTERLOCUTORS WILL LIKELY BE ANNOUNCED. BRUNEI IS CONSIDERING ASSISTANCE TO EAST TIMOR. THE CHINESE ALSO APPEAR TO BE SHOWING INTEREST IN EAST TIMOR. END SUMMARY

GOI ATTEMPTS TO DOWNPLAY ATTACK ON UNAMET

3. (C) GOI OFFICIALS ARE ATTEMPTING TO DOWNPLAY THE JUNE 29 ATTACK ON THE UNAMET OFFICE IN MALIANA. IN VARIOUS, AT TIMES CONFLICTING VERSIONS OF THE EVENT, OFFICIALS ARE CALLING IT A "CLASH BETWEEN COMPETING FACTIONS," AND "A PURELY CRIMINAL INCIDENT," OR CLAIMING THAT PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES INSTIGATED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03172 01 OF 02 301125Z

THE INCIDENT. IN ITS JUNE 30 EDITION, THE JAKARTA POST, USUALLY CAUTIOUS IN ITS HANDLING OF EAST TIMOR ISSUES, CITES AN EYEWINESS WHO CLAIMED THAT THE MILITIA ATTACK WAS LED BY A MEMBER OF THE INDONESIAN MILITARY. A PRO-INDEPENDENCE YOUTH ACTIVIST IN DILI CONTACTED POLOFF ON JUNE 30 CLAIMING THAT PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS WERE PLANNING MORE ATTACKS ON UN FACILITIES IN MALIANA AND VIQUEQUE.

BRITISH OBSERVATIONS

4. (C) [redacted] WHO TRAVELED THROUGH AINARO DISTRICT B1 IN LATE JUNE REPORTS SEEING MIXED PATROLS CONSISTING OF MAHIDI MILITIA MEMBERS AND REGULAR MILITARY PERSONNEL. WHEN HE STOPPED TO SPEAK WITH ONE OF THE GROUPS, THE MILITARY PERSONNEL QUICKLY FLED FROM THE SCENE. THE REMAINING MILITIA MEMBERS FREELY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY OPERATED JOINTLY WITH THE REGULAR SOLDIERS. THE DIPLOMAT WAS SURPRISED TO FIND THAT A NUMBER OF THE MILITIA MEMBERS SAID THEY SUPPORTED INDEPENDENCE. FROM HIS ENCOUNTERS IN THE AREA HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE POPULATION WAS BECOMING RESISTANT TO INTIMIDATION FROM THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES.

DARE II MEETING WINDS UP

---

5. (C) THE DARE II MEETING IN JAKARTA, WHICH BROUGHT TOGETHER REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL EAST TIMORESE FACTIONS, INCLUDING EXILED PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS, CONCLUDED ON JUNE 30. [redacted] B1
[redacted] TOLD POLOFF AT THE SITE THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FINAL DAY AND THE RESULT APPEARED TO BE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03172 01 OF 02 301125Z
ALONG THE LINES OF PREVIOUS ENCOUNTERS WITH ONLY VAGUE COMMITMENTS TO PEACE AND RECONCILIATION LIKELY TO BE ANNOUNCED.
[redacted] B1
[redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT THERE WAS "NO PROGRESS WHATSOEVER." [redacted] TOOK A SIMILAR VIEW WITH B1
POLOFF CITING A LACK OF ANY FIRM COMMITMENTS EMERGING FROM THE TALKS. ONE OTHER EAST TIMORESE EXPATRIATE COMMENTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PERSONAL CONTACTS ESTABLISHED WERE USEFUL. [redacted] B1
EARLIER JUNE 30 TOLD POLCOUNS, THAT HE ALSO WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FINAL RESULT. HE ADDED HOWEVER, THAT IT HAD BEEN IMPORTANT THAT HORTA AND OTHER PRO-INDEPENDENCE EXPATRIATES HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO ENTER INDONESIA AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS -- SOMETHING THAT HAD NOT OCCURRED IN THE ALL-INCLUSIVE INTER-EAST TIMORESE DIALOGUE (AIETD) MEETINGS OF PREVIOUS YEARS.

6. (C) [redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT PROSPECTS FOR SENIOR LEVEL B1
MEETINGS BETWEEN THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERSHIP AND SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS APPEAR NOW TO BE OFF. THERE HAD BEEN TALK OF MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE AND FEISAL TANJUNG, COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY. (NOTE: WE WILL DRAW MORE DETAILED ASSESSMENTS FROM INTERLOCUTORS IN MEETINGS SET FOR JULY 1. END NOTE)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8479

PAGE 01 JAKART 03172 02 OF 02 301125Z
ACTION INL-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01
	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01

PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00
SWCI-00 /020W
----------DB5A81 301125Z /38

O 301130Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8569
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003172

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03172 02 OF 02 301125Z
DEPT FOR INL
SECDEF FOR ISA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID, BX.
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: JUNE 30

BRUNEI CONSIDERS ASSISTANCE
---

7. (C) A DIPLOMAT AT BRUNEI'S JAKARTA EMBASSY CONTACTED POLOFF ON JUNE 29 TO INQUIRE ABOUT U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN EAST TIMOR. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WAS EXPLORING POSSIBLE AVENUES TO PROVIDE AID TO EAST TIMOR.

AND THE CHINESE ...
---

8. (C) [redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS JUNE 29 THAT HE HAD RECENTLY MET WITH CNRT STAFF IN JAKARTA TO GIVE A "QUIET BUT OFFICIAL" ORAL RESPONSE FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TO AN EARLIER LETTER FROM XANANA GUSMAO TO THE CHINESE PRESIDENT. HE ADDED THAT HIS AMBASSADOR WOULD LIKELY MAKE A FIRST-EVER VISIT TO EAST TIMOR LATER THIS SUMMER, BEFORE THE SCHEDULED

B1

CONSULTATION BALLOT.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3194

E54

PAGE 01 JAKART 03297 01 OF 02 071223Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/021W			

----------DDDB2A 071223Z /38

P 071226Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8700
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USOFFICE BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003297

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03297 01 OF 02 071223Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: [redacted] DESCRIBES LATEST INCIDENTS

B1

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS WILLIAM PIERCE; REASON 1.5(D).

SUMMARY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 6 JUL 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

---

2. (C) IN A JULY 7 MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR, [redacted] PRESENTED DAMNING EVIDENCE THAT THE MILITIA ATTACK AGAINST UNAMET IN MALIANA WAS ORCHESTRATED BY LOCAL TNI PERSONNEL. HE SAID THE PROBLEM IN LIQUICA ACTUALLY CONSISTED OF FIVE SEPARATE INCIDENTS OVER THE JULY 3-4 PERIOD AND STRESSED THAT THE MOST SERIOUS MILITIA ATTACK TOOK PLACE ONLY 100 METERS FROM A POLICE STATION. HE EXPRESSED IRRITATION WITH A GOI "DIRTY TRICKS" CAMPAIGN TO PIN THE BLAME ON UNAMET. [redacted] HAD RAISED THE TNI-MILITIA COLLABORATION IN JULY 7 MEETINGS WITH [redacted] BUT THEIR RESPONSES WERE INCONCLUSIVE. [redacted] SAID THAT WHILE UNAMET'S LOGISTICAL ARRANGMENTS WOULD BE IN PLACE, HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO RECOMMEND A POSITIVE SECURITY ASSESSMENT IN TIME FOR REGISTRATION TO START AS SCHEDULED ON JULY 13. END SUMMARY. B1 B1 B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03297 01 OF 02 071223Z

3. (SBU) AMBASSADOR, JOINED BY POLOFF, MET WITH [redacted] ON JULY 7. B6 B6

MALIANA ATTACK ORCHESTRATED BY TNI

4. (C) [redacted] DISPUTED THE GOI'S CONTENTION THAT THE JUNE 29 ATTACK ON THE UNAMET OFFICE IN MALIANA RESULTED FROM A BRAWL BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS. HE SAID THE LOCAL MILITARY DISTRICT COMMANDER (KODIM) HIMSELF HAD ASSEMBLED THE DADURUS MERAH PUTIH MILITIA ON JUNE 28 AND ORDERED THEM TO "PULL DOWN THE UNAMET FLAG." [redacted] SAID THERE WAS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE DADURUS MILITIA WAS SUPPORTED AND CONTROLLED BY THE DISTRICT MILITARY COMMAND. HE NOTED THAT SOME OF THE DADURUS MEMBERS, THEMSELVES HAVING BEEN FORCED TO JOIN THE MILITIA, HAD REBELLED AGAINST THE ORDERS TO ATTACK UNAMET. THIS HAD SET OFF VIOLENT CLASHES BETWEEN MEMBERS OF DADURUS ON JUNE 28, AND SOME OF THE "DISSIDENT" MILITIA MEMBERS HAD WARNED UNAMET OF THE IMPENDING B1 B1

ATTACK. DESPITE UNAMET'S OWN WARNINGS TO THE LOCAL POLICE, THE POLICE TOOK NO ACTION TO PREVENT THE ATTACK OR TO BRING THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL ON JUNE 29. [redacted] B1

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03297 01 OF 02 071223Z
LIQUICA ATTACKS
---

5. (C) [redacted] SAID THE ATTACKS ON THE UNAMET-ESCORTED HUMANITARIAN AID CONVOY IN LIQUICA ACTUALLY CONSISTED OF FIVE SEPARATE INCIDENTS OVER THE JULY 3-4 PERIOD. HE STRESSED THAT THE MAIN ATTACK ON JULY 4 OCCURRED ONLY 100 METERS FROM THE MAIN POLICE STATION IN LIQUICA. IN OTHER INCIDENTS, A CIVPOL VEHICLE WAS STONED AND WEAPONS WERE POINTED AT UNAMET PERSONNEL. B1
[redacted] EXPRESSED IRRITATION THAT THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES WERE CONTINUING THEIR "DIRTY TRICKS" BY CLAIMING THAT SHOTS WERE FIRED FROM WITHIN ONE OF THE UNAMET VEHICLES. [redacted] SAID THAT DURING THE LIQUICA ATTACK SOMEONE HAD DROPPED A HOMEMADE PISTOL INTO A UNAMET CAR IN WHICH UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICER PATRICK BURGESS AND AMCITS DANIEL MURPHY AND MAX WHITE WERE TRAVELING. HE SAID THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO OTHER EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE GOI CHARGES. [redacted] B1 B1 B1

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5739

PAGE 01 JAKART 03297 02 OF 02 071812Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00

ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00
ASDS-01 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 MR-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /021W
----------DE0835 071812Z /55

P 071226Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8701
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USOFFICE BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003297

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03297 02 OF 02 071812Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: [redacted] DESCRIBES LATEST INCIDENTS B1

PROTESTS TO GOI OFFICIALS
---

6. (C) [redacted] HAD MET EARLIER ON JULY B1
7 WITH [redacted] AND PRESENTED A FRANK B1
ASSESSMENT OF THE RECENT INCIDENTS AND THE EVIDENCE
OF TNI LINKS WITH THE MILITIA. [redacted] HAD ASKED THAT B1
THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACKS ON UNAMET BE
ARRESTED AND ALSO SUGGESTED TNI PERSONNEL CHANGES IN
EAST TIMOR WHICH COULD BE HELPFUL. ACCORDING TO
[redacted] HAD SAID THERE WOULD BE NO MORE B1
INCIDENTS AND HAD DIVERTED THE CONVERSATION ONTO THE
DISARMAMENT ISSUE, MAINTAINING THAT TNI COULD DISARM
THE MILITIAS "IN TWO DAYS" IF FALINTIL WERE TO
DISARM. [redacted] HAD RESPONDED INCONCLUSIVELY ON THE B1
QUESTION OF TNI'S WITHDRAWAL TO BASES, ARGUING THAT
FALINTIL COULD STEP INTO THE VACUUM IF TNI STOOD DOWN

TOO SOON. [redacted] POINTED OUT THAT IN ANY CASE B1
FALINTIL DISARMAMENT WOULD COINCIDE WITH TNI'S
WITHDRAWAL. [redacted] ARGUED THAT THE KEY REQUIREMENT B1
AT PRESENT WAS NOT DISARMAMENT, BUT THE NEED TO
CONTAIN AND CONTROL ALL ARMED FORCES AND MOVE THEM
INTO CANTONMENT AREAS. [redacted] HAD ALSO MET B1
WITH [redacted] AND WERE B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03297 02 OF 02 071812Z
SEEKING A MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS.

POSITIVE SECURITY ASSESSMENT NOT POSSIBLE
---

7. (C) [redacted] SAID THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY THAT HE B1
WOULD BE ABLE TO RECOMMEND A POSITIVE SECURITY
ASSESSMENT BY THE END OF THE WEEK (JULY 9) IN TIME
FOR THE REGISTRATION TO BEGIN AS NOW SCHEDULED ON
JULY 13. THE PROBLEM WAS BOTH THE CONTINUING THREAT
TO UNAMET PERSONNEL AND THE BROADER SECURITY
SITUATION. [redacted] SAID TENS OF THOUSANDS OF EAST B1
TIMORESE REMAINED DISPLACED, RECALLING THAT SIX TO
EIGHT THOUSAND DISPLACED HAD BEEN OBSERVED IN THE
MILITIA-CONTROLLED AREA AROUND SARE ALONE, WHERE THE
HUMANITARIAN CONVOY HAD DELIVERED FOOD ON JULY 2-3.
ACCORDING TO [redacted] IN THESE AREAS THE MEN WERE B1
BEING COMPELLED TO JOIN THE MILITIAS WHILE SOME OF
THE DISPLACED WOMEN WERE BEING TAKEN AWAY TO BE USED
SEXUALLY BY MILITIA MEMBERS. [redacted] STRESSED THAT B1
THESE DISPLACED HAD BEEN DRIVEN OUT OF THEIR VILLAGES
BY THE MILITIA AND THE MILITARY TO PREVENT THEM FROM
VOTING OR TO FACILITATE EFFORTS TO INTIMIDATE THEM
INTO VOTING FOR AUTONOMY. [redacted] SAID IT WAS B1
BECOMING MORE AND MORE CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE
DIFFICULT TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE OF THE PAST FEW
MONTHS, EVEN IF JAKARTA SUDDENLY FOUND THE STRONG
POLITICAL WILL TO REVERSE COURSE. HE PREDICTED THAT,
AS THE TRUE EXTENT OF THE ABUSES COMES TO LIGHT,
EMBARASSMENT TO THE GOI WILL FURTHER COMPLICATE
MATTERS. HE ADDED THAT TENSIONS REMAIN EVEN IN AREAS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03297 02 OF 02 071812Z
SUCH AS SUAI, WHERE MANY OF THE DISPLACED HAVE
RETURNED HOME BUT CONTINUE TO HARBOR ILL FEELINGS
AGAINST THE LOCAL PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES.

8. (C) THE AMBASSADOR TOLD [redacted] HE HAD A SIMILAR VIEW OF THE OVERALL SITUATION AND HAD EMPHASIZED THE EVIDENCE OF TNI COMPLICITY WITH THE MILITIAS IN OUR JULY 5 MEETING WITH COORDINATING MINISTER FEISAL TANJUNG. AT THE SAME TIME, THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO DEMONSTRATE THAT [redacted] WAS NEUTRAL AND IMPARTIAL IN ORDER TO BLUNT THIS EFFORT TO DISCREDIT THE UNAMET OPERATION. ROY B1 B1

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART03610

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8494

E57

PAGE 01 JAKART 03610 01 OF 05 270223Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/021W			

----------E58A94 270223Z /38

P 270218Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8983
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSYROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUEHWLAMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0331
USMISSION GEEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 003610

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03610 01 OF 05 270223Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: A/S ROTH'S MEETINGS WITH UNAMET

REF: USUN NEW YORK 1877

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS WILLIAM PIERCE; REASON 1.5(D).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 26 JUL 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

SUMMARY
---

2. (C) IN A JUNE 15-17 VISIT TO EAST TIMOR, A/S ROTH AND THE AMBASSADOR HEARD UNAMET OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS PRESENT A GRIM ASSESSMENT OF THE OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION. THEY SAID INTIMIDATION BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS HAD NOT ABATED AND NO POLITICAL SPACE HAD OPENED FOR THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE. UNAMET OFFICIALS WERE GREATLY CONCERNED BY BOTH THE HUMANITARIAN AND LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS POSED BY 40 TO 60 THOUSAND DISPLACED PERSONS, WHOM THEY CHARACTERIZED AS "POLITICAL HOSTAGES." WHILE UNAMET CIVPOL AND MILITARY LIAISON OFFICERS DESCRIBED THEIR COOPERATION WITH THEIR INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS AS GOOD, THE ASSURANCES GIVEN BY INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES HAD NOT TRANSLATED INTO IMPROVEMENS ON THE GROUND. UNAMET INTERLOCUTERS STRESED THAT THE MILITIAS WERE MERELY SYMPTOMS OF HE LARGER PROBLEM OF THE TNI'S OVERALL STRATEY. UNAMET OFFICIALS REFUTED GOI ACCUSATIONS THAT THEIR INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL AND LOCAL STAFF WERE PRO-INDEPENDENCE, AND THEY PRESENTED VIDEO TAPE EVIDENCE TO COUNTER GOI CLAIMS THAT CIVPOL HAD "RANSACKED" A HOUSE. A/S ROTH CONVEYED STRONG USG SUPPORT FOR THE UNAMET MISSION. END CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03610 01 OF 05 270223Z
SUMMARY.

3. (C) A/S ROTH, ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSADOR, EAP CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS OFFICER, AND POLOFF, VISITED EAST TIMOR JUNE 15-17. AT UNAMET'S HEADQUARTERS IN DILI, ROTH MET ON JUNE 15 WITH UNAMET [redacted] B1
[redacted] MILITARY LIAISON OFFICERS, AND SEVERAL UNAET POLITICAL OFFICERS. HE ALSO MET [redacted] B1
[redacted] ON JULY 16, THE FIRST DAY OF VOTER REGISTRATION, ROTH AND PARTY ACCOMPANIED [redacted] B1
UNAMET OFFICIALS ON HELICOPTER TRIPS TO MALIANA AND SUAI, WHERE THEY MET WITH UNAMET PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THOSE SITES AND VISITED VOTER REGISTRATION CENTERS. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A MEETING WITH DILI-BASED AMCIT UNAMET PERSONNEL AND AN OVERLAND TRIP TO LIQUICA. ROTH'S MEETINGS IN DILI WITH INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES AND EAST TIMORESE POLITICAL FIGURES ARE REPORTED SEPTEL.

SECURITY ISSUES
---

4. (C) UNAMET WAS FOCUSING ON THREE SECURITY CONCERNS: THE SAFETY OF UNAMET'S OWN PERSONNEL AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUFFICIENTLY SECURE CONDITIONS TO CARRY OUT THE REGISTRATION

PROCESS; THE WIDESPREAD INTIMIDATION WHICH WAS CORRUPTING THE PROCESS; AND THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS PROBLEM. [redacted] B1 [redacted] DESCRIBED THE SITUATION AS "ABYSMAL ALL OVER," ADDING THAT IT WAS BEYOND DISPUTE THAT TNI WAS ORCHESTRATING THE MILITIA ACTIVITY. HE CHARACTERIZED THE MILITIA AS "NOTHING MORE THAN THUGS" AND SAID THERE WAS EVIDENCE MANY HAD BEEN CONSCRIPTED AGAINST THEIR WILL. HE AND OTHER UNAMET OFFICIALS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03610 01 OF 05 270223Z

REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT THEIR CONCLUSIONS WERE NOT BASED SOLELY ON RUMORS OR PRO-INDEPENDENCE SOURCES BUT ON FIRSTHAND OBSERVATIONS AND A LARGE VOLUME OF HARD EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD. [redacted] RECALLED THAT UNAMET B1 PERSONNEL HAD STUMBLED ACROSS "SOCIALIZATION" GATHERINGS IN WHICH LOCAL OFFICIALS, MILITIAS, AND TNI PERSONNEL WERE JOINTLY INVOLVED IN THREATENING THE LOCAL RESIDENTS. UNAMET OFFICIALS ALSO HAD DIRECTLY OBSERVED JOINT TNI-MILITIA OPERATIONS AND SAID THEY HAD ASSEMBLED EXTENSIVE DOSSIERS OF EVIDENCE REGARDING PUBLIC FUNDING FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATION EFFORT AND ON THE NEXUS OF PUBLIC OFFICALS, TNI, AND THE MILITIAS.

5. (C) [redacted] SAID CIVPOL'S STRATEGY WAS TO DO EVERYTHING B1 POSSIBLE TO ENHANCE THE ROLE OF THE INDONESIAN POLICE VIS-A-VIS TNI AND TO FOCUS QUICKLY ON "HOTSPOTS" WHEN THEY DEVELOP. CIVPOL'S RELATIONS WITH ITS INDONESIAN POLICE (POLRI) COUNTERPARTS WERE DESCRIBED AS GOOD, [redacted] WAS PLEASED THAT B1 POLRI RECENTLY HAD AGREED TO JOINT NIGHT PATROLS WITH CIVPOL. IN RESPONSE TO THE MOST SERIOUS INCIDENTS, [redacted] WAS FLYING TO B1 THE AREAS INVOLVED WITH INDONESIAN POLICE COMMANDER TIMBUL SILAEN. IN MANUTUTO, THE LOCAL DISTRICT CHIEF HAD PUBLICLY THREATENED THE LIVES OF UNAMET PERSONNEL, BUT HAD SHOWN A MORE COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE WHEN CONFRONTED BY SILAEN [redacted] ON JULY B1 14. IN ISOLATED DELORI, WEST OF VIQUEQUE, THE LOCAL MILITARY CHIEF, A SERGEANT, HAD ORGANIZED A MILITIA AND INSTITUTED A

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8496

PAGE 01 JAKART 03610 02 OF 05 270223Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00

ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00
ASDS-01 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 MR-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /021W
----------E58A99 270223Z /38

P 270218Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8984
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
RUEHLIAMEMBASSY LISBON 1153
AMEMBASSY ROME 081
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 003610

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03610 02 OF 05 270223Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: A/S ROTH'S MEETINGS WITH UNAMET

REIGN OF TERROR. WHEN [redacted] SILAEN ARRIVED TO INVESTIGATE B1
ON JULY 14, THE SERGEANT HAD DISAPPEARED, BUT IT WAS FEARED THAT
HE WOULD RETURN TO EXACT RETRIBUTION AGAINST THE LOCAL
POPULATION. [redacted] BELIEVED THAT THE EXTENSION OF UNAMET B1
ACTIVITY TO 200 REGISTRATION CENTERS WAS CERTAIN TO REVEAL MANY
MORE PROBLEM LOCALITIES.

IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING
---

6. (C) TNI HAD FORMED ITS OWN LIAISON OFFICE CONSISTING OF 60 OFFICERS. UNAMET OFFICALS COMPLAINED THAT THESE PERSONNEL WERE ATTEMPTING TO DRESS LIKE UNAMET CIVPOL PERSONNEL IN ORDER TO CONFUSE THE POPULATION. WHILE THE UNAMET MLO'S DESCRIBED THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE TNI LIAISON OFFICERS AS COOPERATIVE AND FRIENDLY, THEY SAID THESE OFFICERS WERE ATTEMPTING TO ACT AS A BUFFER BETWEEN THEM AND THE LOCAL MILITARY. ONE MLO NOTED THAT "WE HAVE TO KEEP TRYING TO SHOVE THEM ASIDE TO GET TO THE

RELEVANT OFFICERS." [redacted] SAID THAT BECAUSE THE INDONESIAN B1
MILITARY HAD LITTLE RESPECT FOR THEIR OWN POLICE FORCES AND
PERHAPS FOR POLICE IN GENERAL, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT UNAMET'S
CIVPOL BE AUGMENTED BY SOME MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO COULD MORE
EFFECTIVELY INTERACT WITH THEIR TNI COUNTERPARTS.

DISPLACED PERSONS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PROCESS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03610 02 OF 05 270223Z
7. (C) UNAMET OFFICIALS ESTIMATED INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS
TOTALED 40 TO 60 THOUSAND. [redacted] SAID THE IDP SITUATION IN B1
EAST TIMOR DIFFERED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD
BECAUSE THE EAST TIMORESE WERE BEING DISPLACED FOR THE PURPOSE
OF THE BALLOT AND WERE ESSENTIALLY "POLITICAL HOSTAGES." [redacted] B1
[redacted] ARGUED THAT THE
DISPLACED WERE NOT A PURELY HUMANITARIAN ISSUE BUT PART OF A
WELL-FUNDED AND WELL-COORDINATED PROCESS TO COMPEL THE
POPULATION TO VOTE FOR AUTONOMY. HE STRESSED THAT THE MODE OF
OPERATIONS DID NOT DIFFER FROM AREA TO AREA, ESSENTIALLY
INVOLVING CLOSE MILITARY-MILITIA COOPERATION IN "KILLING A FEW
PEOPLE AND BURNING SOME HOUSES" TO INSTILL A CLIMATE OF FEAR AND
DRIVE PEOPLE FROM THEIR HOMES. [redacted] ARGUED THAT BECAUSE THE B1
THREATS (SUCH AS THAT A PRO-INDEPENDENCE VOTE WOULD LEAD TO A
BLOODBATH WORSE THAN 1975) WERE THE SAME IN EVERY LOCALE, IT
SEEMED LIKELY THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE EMANATING FROM A
CENTRAL SOURCE.

8. (C) IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING, [redacted] B1
LARGELY ECHOED THE POINTS MADE BY THE UNAMET OFFICIALS. HE SAID
GOOD COOPERATION WITH GOI OFFICIALS AND MILITARY OFFICERS AT THE
TOP LEVELS HAD NOT TRANSLATED INTO DEEDS IN THE FIELD. [redacted] SAW B1
THE POPULATION AS DISTRESSED AND LACKING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.
[redacted] CURRENT EFFORTS TO AID THE DISPLACED WERE DESCRIBED AS AN B1
ULTIMATELY HOPELESS AND UNSUSTAINABLE ENDEAVOR BECAUSE ONLY AN
ADEQUATE SECURITY SITUATION WOULD RESOLVE THE ISSUE. [redacted] B1
SAID THE SITUATION HAD ENTERED THE STAGE OF A LESS DRAMATIC WAR
OF ATTRITION.

LOSING THE HEARTS AND MINDS BATTLE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03610 02 OF 05 270223Z

9. [redacted] B1

POLOFF AND VISITING IO/PHO OFFICER IN EARLIER MEETINGS) UNAMET WORKING-LEVEL PERSONNEL GENERALLY GAVE A MORE NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONSULTATION THAN THAT PRESENTED BY [redacted] IN NEW YORK (REFTEL). THEY SAID B1
UNAMET SECTION CHIEFS HAD UNANIMOUSLY JUDGED THAT CURRENT CONDITIONS WOULD NOT PERMIT A FREE AND FAIR BALLOT. [redacted] B1
SAID "WE ARE LOSING THE HEARTS AND MINDS BATTLE" TO CONVINCE THE POPULATION THAT THEY COULD SAFELY VOTE THEIR CONSCIENCE.
[redacted] STRESSED THAT THE INTIMIDATION MECHANISMS ALREADY WERE B1
IN PLACE, THAT "THE PLAY IS SET, THEY DO NOT REALLY NEED TO MAKE MORE ATTACKS." UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICERS POINTED OUT THAT THE MILITIAS ARE INCREASINGLY INSTITUTIONALIZED AND EXERCISING REAL AUTHORITY AS A LAW UNTO THEMSELVES. (COMMENT: THIS PARALLELS OUR REPORTS FROM OTHER CONTACTS. IN MAUBISSE, FOR EXAMPLE, [redacted] B1
[redacted] REPORT THAT THE "MAHIDI" MILITIA HAS OPENED A NEW HEADQUARTERS IN THE MIDDLE OF TOWN, AND THE LOCAL MAHIDI LEADER HAS INFORMED [redacted] PERSONNEL THAT ALL THE B1
CUTOMARY PAYOFFS MUST BE DIRECTED THROUGH HIM RATHER THAN THROUGH TNI OR POLICE AUTHORITIES AS PREVIOUSLY. END COMMENT.)

PRESSURE NOT WORKING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8495

PAGE 01 JAKART 03610 03 OF 05 270223Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/021W			

----------E58AA2 270223Z /38

P 270218Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8985
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 003610

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03610 03 OF 05 270223Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: A/S ROTH'S MEETINGS WITH UNAMET

10. (C) UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICERS STRESSED AS THE UNAMET OPERATION EXTENDED ITS REACH IT WAS DISCOVERING THAT THE LEVEL OF INTIMIDATION HAD NOT DECLINED, I.E., THE FUNDAMENTALS DID NOT APPEAR TO BE CHANGING DESPITE UNAMET'S MORE PERVASIVE PRESENCE. SOME UNAMET OFFICIALS EXPRESSED EXASPERATION THAT EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO INFLUENCE THE GOI WERE INEFFECTIVE. "WHATEVER PRESSURE YOU ARE PUTTING ON THESE GUYS, IT IS NOT WORKING," [redacted] COMPLAINED. THESE UNAMET OFFICIALS WERE NOT ENTIRELY REASSURED BY THE ABSENCE OF ATTACKS ON UNAMET SINCE THE JULY 4 LIQUICA INCIDENT, ASSERTING THAT TNI'S APPROACH HAD NOT CHANGED AND "AT ANY MOMENT THE PUPPET MASTERS CAN RILE THINGS UP AGAIN." DESPITE THESE UNIFORMLY NEGATIVE ASSESSMENTS OF CURRENT CONDITIONS, UNAMET OFFICIALS WERE NOT READY TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SITUATION COULD BE TURNED AROUND IN TIME FOR THE CONSULTATION TO TAKE PLACE BY LATE AUGUST. THEY SAID THAT, FOR THIS TO OCCUR, "WINDOW DRESSING" ADJUSTMENTS SUCH AS ARRESTING A FEW MILITIA MEMBERS WOULD NOT SUFFICE. THEY STRESSED THAT IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT "THIS SHOW IS VERY MUCH BEING RUN BY TNI" AND THAT NO FREE AND FAIR PROCESS WOULD BE POSSIBLE UNLESS SUFFICENT PRESSURE WERE BROUGHT ON TNI TO CHANGE ITS OVERALL STRATEGY, WITHDRAW ITS FORCES TO AT LEAST THE DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS LEVEL, STOP MOBILIZING THE MILITIAS, AND STOP TAKING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE CAMPAIGNING. B1

GOI ACCUSATIONS OF "BIAS"

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03610 03 OF 05 270223Z

11. (C) A/S ROTH TOLD [redacted] OF [redacted] B1 B1

CONTENTIONS (SEPTEL) THAT SOME UNAMET PERSONNEL WERE BIASED AND THAT UNAMET FAVORED PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE IN ITS LOCAL HIRING. [redacted] SAW GOI/TNI CONCERN ABOUT UNAMET'S GROWING BODY OF EVIDENCE ON GOI/TNI SUPPORT OF THE MILITIAS AS BEHIND THESE GOI COUNTERATTACKS ON UNAMET'S CREDIBILITY. [redacted] TOOK EXCEPTION TO PROPOSALS THAT UNAMET REPLACE PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF "BIAS." HE DENIED THAT ANY OF THOSE ACCUSED HAD DONE ANYTHING OUT OF LINE. MARTIN SAID [redacted] HAD RECEIVED SERIOUS DEATH THREATS AND BEEN GIVEN SECURITY PROTECTION, BUT EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THIS SITUATION NOW WAS UNDER CONTROL, AS THE GOI HAD NOT SAID ANYTHING PUBLICLY ABOUT SPECIFIC UNAMET PERSONNEL FOR SOME TIME. (COMMENT: NEVERTHELESS, TNI OFFICERS AND PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS CONTINUED TO LEVEL THESE ACCUSATIONS IN THEIR MEETINGS WITH ROTH. END COMMENT.)

B1

B1

B1

12. (C) [redacted] STRONGLY ASSERTED THAT UNAMET'S PERSONNEL WERE EXPERIENCED PROFESSIONALS FROM 90 COUNTRIES, NOT POLITICIZED PEOPLE WHO WERE ENEMIES OF INDONESIA. HE ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE A BAD PRECEDENT TO BOW TO GOI PRESSURE TO REMOVE SPECIFIC UNAMET PERSONNEL.

B1

13. (C) ROTH ALSO ASKED ABOUT GOI/TNI CHARGES, WHICH HAD BEEN

REPEATED BY ALATAS, THAT UNAMET PERSONNEL HAD EXCEEDED THEIR MANDATE BY ALLEGEDLY RANSACKING A HOUSE IN MAUBARA ON JUNE 19 WHILE SEARCHING FOR WEAPONS. [redacted] SAID THAT, IN REALITY, CIVPOL HAS ACCOMPANIED INDONESIAN POLICE IN A ROUTINE SEARCH OF A HOUSE. NO WEAPONS HAD BEEN FOUND, AND THE POLICE/CIVPOL TEAM HAD DEPARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. ACCORDING TO UNAMET'S INVESTIGATION, TNI SOLDIERS HAD RANSACKED THE SAME HOUSE TWO DAYS LATER, AND CALLED IN AN INDONESIAN TELEVISION CREW TO FILM THE SCENE AND INDUCED ONE OF THE INHABITANTS TO CLAIM THAT UNAMET WAS RESPONSIBLE. UNAMET OFFICIALS PRESENTED A VIDEO TAPE OF THE CIVPOL VISIT TO THE HOUSE ON JUNE 19 THAT CLEARLY INDICATED NOTHING UNUSUAL HAD OCCURRED AND THAT THE SEARCH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN A FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE.

B1

LOCAL STAFF RECRUITMENT
---

14. (C) [redacted] SAID RECRUITMENT OF LOCAL STAFF HAD BEEN A "NIGHTMARE," SINCE FINDING PEOPLE WITH EVEN MINIMAL SKILLS WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. RECENT UNIVERSITY GRADUATES WERE ONE OF THE FEW POSSIBILITIES, AND THEY TENDED TO BE MORE PRO-INDEPENDENCE THAN THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE. MOST QUALIFIED PRO-INTEGRATION PEOPLE ALREADY HAD GOOD JOBS WITH THE GOVERNMENT, [redacted] POINTED OUT. [redacted] SAID APPLICANTS WERE NOT ASKED ABOUT THEIR POLITICAL VIEWPOINTS BUT UNAMET SHIED AWAY B1 B1 B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8497

PAGE 01 JAKART 03610 04 OF 05 270223Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/021W			

----------E58AA8 270223Z /38

P 270218Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8986
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 003610

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03610 04 OF 05 270223Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/04

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 9

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: A/S ROTH'S MEETINGS WITH UNAMET

FROM HIRING ANY KNOWN ACTIVISTS FROM EITHER SIDE. ALL LOCAL EMPLOYEES WERE REQUIRED TO SIGN A DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY. HE SAID UNAMET HAD ENCOURAGED THE PRO-INTEGRATION FPDK EARLY ON TO RECOMMEND POTENTIAL APPLICANTS, BUT FPDK HAD NOT RESPONDED FOR A MONTH, WHILE MOST SLOTS WERE BEING FILLED. UNAMET FINALLY HAD RECEIVED A LIST OF NAMES FROM FPDK THE PREVIOUS WEEK (PRE-DATED JUNE 19) AND WAS NOW EXAMINING IT.

THE VIEW FROM MALIANA
---

15. (C) IN MALIANA, SITE OF THE JUNE 29 ATTACK ON UNAMET'S OFFICE, [redacted] SAID CONDITIONS IN THE AREA WERE NOT CONDUCIVE FOR A FREE AND FAIR VOTE. WHILE UNAMET'S OWN SECURITY POSITION HAD IMPROVED FOLLOWING ASSURANCES FROM THE LOCAL MILITIA LEADER, TNI AND THE POLICE, [redacted] SAID SECURITY FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION WAS CURRENTLY "MINIMAL" AND VERY DIFFICULT TO UPGRADE, GIVEN THE INABILITY OF THE POLICE TO EXERT JURISDICTION OVER THE MILITIA GROUPS AND THE RESULTANT CLIMATE OF IMPUNITY. AS A RESULT, THERE WAS "ZERO POLITICAL SPACE FOR THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE." THE THREE OVERTLY PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS IN MALIANA HAD BEEN UNDER POLICE PROTECTION SINCE APRIL AND MILITIA LEADER JOAO TAVERES HAD SAID OPENLY THAT HE WOULD NOT TOLERATE A CNRT PRESENCE. [redacted] ADDED THAT "THERE IS A LARGE GAP BETWEEN THE AUTHORITIES' PERCEPTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTED MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A FREE AND FAIR B1 B1 B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03610 04 OF 05 270223Z
PROCESS AND OUR OWN, AND WE ARE UNABLE TO BRIDGE THAT GAP IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS AND TNI OFFICERS." HE SAID LOCAL AUTHORITIES CLEARLY COULD NOT MOVE ON THESE ISSUES WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM DILI OR HIGHER. IN MALIANA, ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE MILITIAS CONTINUED TO TRAIN DAILY WITH MOCK WEAPONS FOR "POST-CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES," SENDING A CLEAR SIGNAL TO THE POPULATION. B1

16. (C) [redacted] SAID HE HAD MET FALINTIL COMMANDERS IN THE REGION ON JULY 12. THEY HAD SAID THEIR FIGHT WAS WITH TNI AND THE POLICE AND THEY WOULD NOT SURRENDER WEAPONS UNLESS THESE TWO GROUPS LEFT EAST TIMOR, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE MILITIAS DISARMED OR NOT. [redacted] SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE FALINTIL MEMBERS WOULD NOT OPENLY PARTICIPATE IN ANY ASPECT OF THE PROCESS UNLESS THE ENVIRONMENT IMPROVED. NEVERTHELESS, FALINTIL WAS CARRYING OUT ITS OWN "CAMPAIGN" BY TALKING TO VILLAGE B1 B1

CHIEFS, AND THIS WAS PROVOKING TNI/MILITIA RESPONSES. [redacted] B1
PREDICTED THAT THIS WOULD INCREASE TENSION AS THE PROCESS UNFOLDED AND CREATE "GREAT DIFFICULTIES" SINCE THERE WERE AT BEST AMBIGUOUS SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE MORE URBANIZED AREAS WHILE IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO REGULATE ARMED GROUPS IN THE MORE RURAL REGIONS. MALIANA-BASED CIVPOL PERSONNEL SAID THAT HALF THE TNI PERSONEL IN BOBONARO DISTRICT WORE PLAIN CLOTHES. THEY CITED NUMEROUS REPORTS THAT REGULAR TNI PERSONNEL FORMED THE CORE OF THE MILITIA GROUPS. UNAMET OFFICIALS IN MALIANA EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE DISPLACED POPULATIONS TO THE NORTH AROUND CAILACO WHERE "PEOPLE ARE DYING ON A DAILY BASIS." THEY HAD COUNTED 366 MALES ABOVE THE AGE OF 17 WHO WERE TAKING REFUGE IN THE FORESTS IN THE BOBONARO/CAILACO SUBDISTRICT BORDER AREA.

SUAI

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03610 04 OF 05 270223Z
---

17. (C) IN SUAI, LOCAL OFFICIALS WERE DEALING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA MAHIDI'S EFFORTS TO EXTEND ITS INFLUENCE OVER THE LOCAL POPULATION. ACCORDING TO [redacted] MAHIDI AND LOCAL B1
OFFICIALS WERE ATTEMPTING TO BLOCK UNAMET REGISTRATION SITES IN THE HILLS NEAR ZUMELAI, INSISTING THAT THE STATIONS SHOULD BE LOCATED ONLY ALONG THE MAIN ROAD, WHICH MAHIDI CONTROLLED. IN THE PREVIOUS DAYS, MAHIDI'S ATTEMPT TO MOVE INTO VILLAGES NORTH OF ZUMELAI HAD PROVOKED THE LOCAL POPULATION AND RESULTED IN CLASHES WHICH LEFT ONE MAHIDI MEMBER DEAD. AS A RESULT, ZUMELAI WAS TENSE ON JULY 16 AND UNAMET OFFICIALS WERE UNABLE TO OPEN REGISTRATION IN THE AREA. IN LATE JUNE/EARLY JULY UNAMET OFFICIALS IN SUAI HAD PERSUADED TWO GROUPS OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE RESIDENTS WHO HAD FLED TO THE FOREST TO RETURN TO SUAI, WHERE SEVERAL HUNDRED NOW WERE TAKING REFUGE IN THE CHURCH AND BEING PROVIDED FOOD BY CARITAS. A THIRD GROUP REMAINED IN THE HILLS NEAR THE AREA WHERE MAHIDI HAD CARRIED OUT RECENT ATTACKS.

A/S ROTH EXPRESSES SUPPORT FOR UNAMET
---

18. (C) IN HIS MEETINGS WITH UNAMET PERSONNEL, A/S ROTH ASSURED THEM OF STRONG U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE MISSION AND APPRECIATION FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8499

PAGE 01 JAKART 03610 05 OF 05 270223Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/021W			

----------E58AAA 270223Z /38

P 270218Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8987
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 003610

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03610 05 OF 05 270223Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: A/S ROTH'S MEETINGS WITH UNAMET

THEIR INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS. HE STRESSED THAT THE EAST TIMOR PROCESS WAS RECEIVING ATTENTION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN WASHINGTON AND ASSURED UNAMET OFFICIALS OF CONTINUING U.S. PRESSURE ON THE GOI TO ACHIEVE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR A FREE AND FAIR VOTE. IN REGARD TO [redacted] CHARGES OF UNAMET BIAS, B1
ROTH PLEDGED TO CONVEY TO [redacted] HIS OWN FINDINGS B1
THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5054

E58

PAGE 01 JAKART 03697 01 OF 02 310636Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/017W						

----------E7703D 310643Z /38

P 301101Z JUL 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9086
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003697

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/30/04
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, ID, AS, UN
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: JULY 30 UPDATE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03697 01 OF 02 310636Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLOFF WILLIAM G. GRAY, REASON:1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. GOI/TNI OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO CHARGE UNAMET WITH BIAS, AND ALSO CRITICIZE THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT. THE CARTER CENTER AND AN INDONESIAN OBSERVER GROUP ISSUE REPORTS EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT CONTINUING INTIMIDATION BY THE PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES. XANANA GUSMAO'S AIDES WORRY THAT THIS INTIMIDATION COULD SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE VOTE IF CONDITIONS ON THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 29 JUL 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

GROUND DO NOT CHANGE. XANANA REPORTEDLY HOPES FALINTIL'S UNILATERAL DECISION TO MOVE INTO CANTONMENT AREAS WILL BRING PRESSURE ON THE TNI TO PULL BACK ITS FORCES AND THE MILITIAS. ACCORDING TO XANANA'S AIDES, HE SOON MAY BE MOVED TO HOUSE ARREST IN DILI. IN HIS MEETINGS IN JAKARTA AND DILI, AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER FOCUSES ON THE POST-VOTE SECURITY SITUATION. THE USAID NCBA COFFEE PROJECT IS COMPELLED TO EVACUATE PERSONNEL FROM A MAJOR COFFEE PROCESSSING FACILITY AFTER THREATS FROM THE MILITIA. END SUMMARY.

ANTI-UNAMET CAMPAIGN CONTINUES
---

3. (C) IN RECENT DAYS, TOP GOI/TNI OFFICIALS HAVE CONTINUED A BARRAGE OF PUBLIC CRITICISM AGAINST UNAMET. FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS REITERATED CHARGES THAT UNAMET HIRED ONLY PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE AND COMPILED INACCURATE REPORTS UNFAIR TO THE GOI. GENERAL WIRANTO STRONGLY CRITICIZED UNAMET FOR "FAVORING THE PRO-

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03697 01 OF 02 310636Z
INDEPENDENCE SIDE." TNI CHIEF FOR TERRITORIAL AFFAIRS BAMBANG YUDHOYONO MADE HEADLINES WITH HIS CHARGE THAT AN AUSTRALIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WAS WORKING IN UNAMET. UNAMET OFFICIALS RESPONDED THAT THE OFFICER IN QUESTION HAD RETIRED FROM THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY AND NOW WAS SOLELY EMPLOYED BY THE UN.

4. (C) THE AUSTRALIANS CAME IN FOR MORE CRITICISM FROM PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR, WHO COMPLAINED THAT CANBERRA WAS "ACTING LIKE A GODFATHER," AND INTERFERING IN INDONESIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. MAJ. GEN. ENDRIARTONO SUTARTO, ASSISTANT TO THE TNI CHIEF OF GENERAL AFFAIRS, MAINTAINED THAT FALINTIL WAS RECEIVING ARMS VIA UNIDENTIFIED BLACK FLIGHTS" FROM AUSTRALIA, AND CHARGED THAT CANBERRA FAILED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE ALLEGED DELIVERIES. HE ALSO SPOKE OF AN AUSTRALIAN CITIZEN SERVING WITH FALINTIL. GOI OFFICIALS ALSO HAVE CRITICIZED THE CHURCH'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS NEEDED FOR REGISTRATION. WIRANTO CHARGED THAT CHURCH AUTHORITIES WERE DISCRIMINATING AGAINST PRO-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE IN THIS REGARD, CHARGING THEM EXORBITANT FEES. CHURCH LEADERS STRENUOUSLY DENIED THIS, MAINTAINING THAT PEOPLE WERE CHARGED VERY MODEST FEES STRICTLY ON THE BASIS OF THEIR ABILITY TO PAY.

OBSERVER GROUPS ASSESS SITUATION

5. (C) THE CARTER CENTER AND AN INDONESIAN OBSERVER GROUP, THE INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE FOR DIRECT BALLOT MONITORING (KIPER) HAVE ISSUED THEIR FIRST REPORTS. THE CARTER CENTER

PRAISED UNAMET'S EFFORTS AND POSITIVELY ASSESSED THE REGISTRATION PROCESS, BUT EXPRESSED CONTINUING CONCERN OVER INTIMIDATION BY THE MILITIAS AND THE OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION. IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH POLOFF, CARTER CENTER OBSERVERS IN DILI WERE WORRIED THAT THEIR REPORTS WOULD ANGER THE GOI, BUT JAKARTA HAS NOT REACTED. KIPER HAS CITED "RAMPANT INTIMIDATION," WHICH IN ITS VIEW ENDANGERS PROSPECTS FOR A FREE AND FAIR VOTE, AND ADDS THAT ITS OBSERVERS FOUND VIOLATIONS BY GOI OFFICIALS, TNI, AND THE MILITIAS. KIPER CLAIMS TO HAVE 758 VOLUNTEERS COVERING 137 REGISTRATION STATIONS IN EAST TIMOR.

XANANA AIDES WORRIED

6. (C) ON JULY 29 POLOFF AND VISITING EAP/PIMBS DEPUTY DIRECTOR VISITED XANANA AIDES [redacted] B1
[redacted] SHORTLY AFTER XANANA'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER. IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS THESE AIDES HAD EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT EAST TIMORESE WOULD VOTE OVERWHELMINGLY FOR INDEPENDENCE EVEN IN THE FACE OF MASSIVE INTIMIDATION. NOW THEY SEEMED LESS SURE, VOICING WORRIES THAT EAST TIMORESE NOW HAD GOOD REASON TO FEAR RETRIBUTION FROM THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS, HAVING SEEN WHAT THESE GROUPS WERE CAPABLE OF DOING. THEY SAID XANANA'S HOPE WAS THAT FALINTIL'S UNILATERAL DECISION TO MOVE INTO CANTONMENT AREAS WOULD COMPEL TNI TO PULL BACK ITS OWN FORCES AND REIN IN THE MILITIAS. THEY SAID XANANA ALSO MAINTAINED HIS OPTIMISM THAT HE COULD BRING ABOUT RECONCILIATION WITH THE PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS BEFORE THE VOTE. ACCORDING TO

PAGE 01 JAKART 03697 02 OF 02 311141Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/017W						

----------E779DF 311141Z /22

P 301101Z JUL 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9087
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003697

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/04
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, ID, AS, UN
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: JULY 30 UPDATE

THESE AIDES, THERE IS A POSSIBILITY XANANA SOON MAY BE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03697 02 OF 02 311141Z
MOVED TO DILI, BUT REMAIN UNDER HOUSE ARREST. THEY SAID GENERAL ZACKY ANWAR WAS ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE THIS.

DOWNER FOCUSES ON POST-VOTE SITUATION
---

7. (C) BY ALL ACCOUNTS, IN HIS MEETINGS IN JAKARTA AND DILI, FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER IS FOCUSSING ON CONCERNS ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION AFTER THE VOTE. DOWNER IS IN DILI JULY 30-31. [redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD MET REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOI TASK FORCE, TNI (GENERALS GLENNY AND DAMIRI), POLICE COMMANDER TIMBUL SILAEN, THE PRO-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE LEADERS, AND THE CNRT. HE STRESSED TO ALL SIDES THAT THEY MUST ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF THE VOTE AND NOT CARRY OUT RETRIBUTION. HE ALSO UNDERLINED AUSTRALIAN NEUTRALITY AND IN HIS MEETING WITH THE PRO- B1

INTEGRATIONISTS RAISED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE SECURITY OF AUSTRALIAN PERSONNEL IN EAST TIMOR. [redacted] SAID THE MEETINGS HAD GONE SMOOTHLY ON JULY 30 WITH GOOD ATMOSPHERICS. THERE WERE NO DEMONSTRATIONS BUT A LARGE CROWD OF INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS GATHERED OUTSIDE THE SITE OF THE MEETING WITH CNRT, INCLUDING A CHOIR AND TRADITIONAL DANCERS. THIS CROWD RESPONDED WITH LOUD CHEERING WHEN DOWNER STATED AUSTRALIA'S STRONG COMMITMENT TO A JUST SOLUTION IN EAST TIMOR AND RECALLED THE SUPPORT EAST TIMORESE GAVE TO AUSTRALIA IN WORLD WAR II. B1

NCBA THREATENED AGAIN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03697 02 OF 02 311141Z
8. (C) THE USAID-SUPPORTED NCBA COFFEE PROJECT CONTINUES TO FACE THREATS FROM THE MILITIAS. ON JULY 28 PROJECT MANAGERS WERE FORCED TO WITHDRAW PERSONNEL FROM A MAJOR COFFEE PROCESSING FACILITY NEAR MAUBISSE AFTER MAHIDI MILITIA MEMBERS DEMANDED THAT NCBA WORKERS PURCHASE TWO TRUCKLOADS OF SUBSTANDARD COFFEE BEANS FROM THEM. WHEN THE NCBA PERSONNEL REFUSED, THE MILITIA MEMBERS THREATENED THEM WITH A GRENADE.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B); 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1785

E61

PAGE 01 JAKART 03873 01 OF 02 101247Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/021W			

----------EAD6B2 101322Z /38

O 101233Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE9244
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

AMCONSUL SURABAYA

PAGES MISSING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03873 01 OF 02 101247Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003873

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/09
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PINR, PGOV, KCRM,SOCI, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: CABINET ANQ MEGAWATI VISIT; MIXED ACCOUNTS OF OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION

REF: JAKARTA 3826

1. (U) CASSIFIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS GREGORY FERGIN; REAQON 1.5(D).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

2. (C) SUMMARY: A SIZEABLE QNDONESIAN CABINET DELEGATION VISITED EAST TIMR AUGUST 7 AND APPEALED FOR RESTRAINT BY BOTH SIDES DURING THE AUGUST 11-27 PRE-BALLOT CAMPAIG. MEGAWATI SPENT THE LAST THREE DAYS IN THE ROVINCE STUMPING FOR A FAVORABLE VOTE FOR QUTONOMY. SOME INTERNATIONAL AND EAST TIMORESE SOURCES IN DILI REPORT AN INCREASE IN INTIMIDATON BY PRO-INDEPENDENCE MILITIAS. THE UK AMBAQSADOR RECENTLY RETURNED WITH A DECIDEDLY UP-BQAT ASSESSMENT, HOWEVER. [redacted] B1

MINISTERIAL BLITZ

3. (U) A DELEGATION OF 50 INDONESIANCABINET MINISTERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS VISITEQ EAST TIMOR ON AUGUST 7, THE SECOND VISIT IN A MONTH TO CHECK ON ELECTION PREPARATIONS. IN A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE VISIT, MINISTERS FEISAL TANJUNG, GENERAL WIRANTO, AND ALI ALATAS CALLED ON BOTH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03873 01 OF 02 101247Z

PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES TO RESTRAIN THEMSELVES DURING THE AUGUST 11-27 CAMPAIGN BEFORE THE AUGUST 30 DIRECT BALLOT.

4. (C) SOURCES IN DILI TOLD POLOFF AUGUST 10 THAT THE MINISTERIAL GROUP SENT MIXED SIGNALS IN ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE GROUND. SOURCES VIEWED WIRANTO TAKING A HARD-LINE STANCE IN FAVOR OF AUTONOMY, WHILE ALATAS WAS MORE CONCILIATORY (ALTHOUGH HE CHARACTERIZED ASSESSMENTS THAT EAST TIMORESE WERE PREDOMINANTLY PRO-INDEPENDENCE AS A "MYTH.") MEANWHILE, IN ITS AUGUST 9 PRES BRIEFING, THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS Q(DEPLU) RELEASED AN ESTIMATE INDICATING A SLIGHQ MAJORITY FOR PRO-AUTONOMY SUPPORTERS(193,000 VERSUS 187,000). DEPLU PROVIDED NO BACKGROUD ON HOW IT CAME UP WITH THESE FIGURES, WHICH LQKELY REFLECT A BEST-CASE OUTCOME FROM THE GOI S PERSPECTIVE.

MEGAWATI STUMPS FOR AUTONOMY

5. (C) INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE PARTY (PDI-P) LEADER QEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI VISITED EAST TIMOR AUGUST -10 TO APPEAL FOR A PRO-AUTONOMY OUTCOME IN TQE UPCOMING CONSULTATION. ALTHOUGH MEGAWATI WAS QUOTED IN THE JAKARTA PRESS AS URGING EAST TIORESE TO AVOID VIOLENCE, [redacted] B1

B1

MIXED ACCOUNTS OF OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION

6. (C) POLOFF WHO ARRIVED IN DILI ON AUGUST 9 REPORTED THAT A VARIETY OF INTERNATIONAL AND EAST TIMORESE SOURCES BELIEVE INTIMIDATION BY PRO-INDEPENDENCE MILITIAS HAS WORSENED IN THE LAST TEN DAYS AND THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CAPITAL IS DETERIORATING. REPRESENTATIVES OF AN INTERNATIONAL NGO REPORTED THAT DURING SEVEN OUT OF THE LAST EIGHT NIGHTS THEY HEARD GUNFIRE, WHICH THEY SUSPECTED ORIGINATED FROM MILITIA GROUPS. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, UNKNOWN PERSONS ON MOTORCYCLES HAD STOPPED IN FRONT OF THE NGO'S OFFICE AT NIGHT AND FIRED SHOTS INTO THE AIR. SEVERAL STAFF MEMBERS OF THE NGO HAVE BEEN TARGETS OF THREATS FROM THE AITARAK MILITIA GROUP.

8. (C) EAST TIMORESE SOURCES HAVE ALSO TOLD POLOFF OF CONTINUING THREATS OF BLOODSHED SHOULD THE POPULACE OPT FOR INDEPENDENCE. THEY EXPRESSED INCREASING CONCERN ABOUT A VACUUM OF P WER AFTER

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1701

PAGE 01 JAKART 03873 02 OF 02 101248Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 NP-01 AID-00 AMAD-01 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

E62

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9570

PAGE 01 JAKART 03939 01 OF 02 131125Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/021W		

----------EC17F3 131125Z /22

P 131100Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9309
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003939

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03939 01 OF 02 131125Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: OBSERVATIONS FROM DILI

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS GREGORY FERGIN; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) IN AN AUGUST 9-12 VISIT TO EAST TIMOR, POLOFF FOUND

[redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 12 AUG 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

[redacted]FOR AN AUGUST 30 VOTE. THEY ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT NO ONE WANTS TO SEE FURTHER DELAYS. DETAILED EVIDENCE COMPILED BY UNAMET PERSONNEL, CARTER CENTER OBSERVERS, AND EAST TIMORESE NGO'S MADE VERY CLEAR THAT MILITIAS CONTINUE TO OPERATE UNFETTERED, WITH TNI PERSONNEL PLAYING INTEGRAL ROLES IN THEIR ACTIVITIES, WHILE THE RECENTLY AUGMENTED INDONESIAN POLICE FORCES REMAIN LARGELY INEFFECTIVE. ACCORDING TO THESE OBSERVERS, IN DILI AND ELSEWHERE THE OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION ACTUALLY HAS DETERIORATED SINCE LATE JULY. RANDOM SAMPLING OF ORDINARY CITIZENS' VIEWS IN DILI REVEAL INCREASINGLY VOCIFEROUS SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE AND EQUATIONS OF INDONESIAN RULE WITH LAWLESSNESS. MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVED THAT THE INDEPENDENCE SIDE EASILY WOULD PREVAIL EVEN IN A VOTE HELD UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS. A SUDDEN OFFER BY MILITIA LEADERS TO DISARM IS SEEN AS JAKARTA'S ATTEMPT TO FEND OFF GROWING PRESSURE RESULTING FROM FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER'S CRITICISM, THE TRIPARTITE MEETINGS IN JAKARTA, AND FALINTIL'S UNILATERAL CANTONMENT OF FORCES. RECENT CHANGES IN LOCAL MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN EAST TIMOR ARE NOT EXPECTED TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT. END SUMMARY. B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03939 01 OF 02 131125Z
UNAMET "SKEPTICS"
---

3. (C) UNAMET [redacted] DESPITE THE GREAT SUCCESS OF THE REGISTRATION, [redacted] STRESSED THAT THERE WERE THREE AREAS OF CONTINUING CONCERN: B1 B1

-- PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA ARE STILL INTIMIDATING THE POPULATION AND OPERATING AT WILL. THERE HAS BEN NO EFFORT TO REIN THEM IN. [redacted] SAID THE KILLING OF TWO STUDENTS BY MILITIA IN VIQUEQUE ON AUGUST 11, "WHILE SHOCKING, WAS NOT SURPRISING." HE SAID THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT WAS STILL FAR TOO DANGEROUS FOR THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE TO OPERATE. B1

-- THE RESPONSES OF THE INDONESIAN POLICE TO INCIDENTS SUCH AS THAT IN VIQUEQUE REMAIN "FEEBLE AND INADEQUATE." POLICE ARE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ARREST ANY MILITIA MEMBERS OR EVEN TO OBSTRUCT THEIR ACTIVITIES. THE POLICE AUTHORITIES CONTINUED TO VIEW THE MILITIAS AS THEIR PARTNERS, NOT AS LAW BREAKERS.

-- THERE IS OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE THAT TNI CONTINUES TO DIRECT AND PARTICIPATE IN MILITIA OPERATIONS. [redacted] REMARKED THAT, IN CONTACTS WITH UNAMET, LESS SOPHISTICATED TNI PERSONNEL BELOW THE DISTRICT COMMANDER LEVEL FREELY ADMIT THEIR ROLE IN THE MILITIAS. [redacted] ADDED THAT UNAMET HAD SEEN NUMEROUS DOCUMENTS CO-SIGNED BY LOCAL MILITARY AND MILITIA COMMANDERS. CARTER CENTER OBSERVERS ALSO HAVE COMPILED EXTENSIVE EVIDENCE OF B1 B1

CONTINUING TNI-MILITIA LINKS.

MILITIA ACTIVITY PICKING UP AGAIN
---

4. (C) [redacted] AND OTHER OBSERVERS ARGUED THAT THE OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION ACTUALLY HAD DETERIORATED SINCE LATE JULY, ESPECIALLY IN COVALIMA, BOBONARO AND LIQUICA DISTRICTS. B1

[redacted] CONFIRMED THAT B1
INTIMIDATION, HOUSE BURNINGS AND ROADBLOCKS RECENTLY HAD INCREASED AGAIN, WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS AND MILITIAS PRESSING PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN PRO-INTEGRATION CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES. IN DILI ITSELF, THE AITARAK MILITIA HAD BECOME MORE ACTIVE, ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT, AND CONTACTS IN THE COMORO AREA REPORTED HEARING FREQUENT GUNFIRE. POLOFF OBSERVED A LARGE, NOISY AITARAK GATHERING IN CENTRAL DILI ON AUGUST 10 AS NERVOUS LOCAL RESIDENTS, SHOPKEEPERS AND MOTORISTS STAYED WELL CLEAR OF THE AREA. EARLIER ON AUGUST 10, WHILE TRAVELING ON PUBLIC TRANSPORT, POLOFF ENCOUNTERED A DILI RESIDENT WHO HAD JUST BEEN ROBBED BY AN ARMED AITARAK MEMBER.

BUT NO ONE WANTS ANOTHER DELAY

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00

USIE-00 ASDS-01 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00
MR-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /021W
----------EC1810 131126Z /22

P 131100Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9310
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLIQTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003939

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03939 02 OF 02 131126Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: OBSERVATIONS FROM DILI

5. (C) WHILE STRESSING THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION WAS NOT YET CONDUCIVE FOR A FREE AND FAIR VOTE ON AUGUST 30, [redacted] SAID UNAMET WAS FACING A DILEMMA, BECAUSE THE ONLY WEAPON IT HAD TO PRESS JAKARTA TO FULFILL ITS COMMITMENTS WAS THE THREAT TO DELAY THE CONSULTATION, AND NO ONE, INCLUDING UNAMET, WANTED ANOTHER POSTPONEMENT. FOR UNAMET AND THE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, AS WELL AS LOCAL PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS, THE WILLINGNESS TO GO AHEAD WITH A VOTE UNDER ADVERSE SECURITY CONDITIONS SEEMS AT LEAST PARTIALLY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT, EVEN WITH THE CURRENT LEVELS OF INTIMIDATION, THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE VOTE IS LIKELY TO BE A CONVINCING 70 PERCENT OR HIGHER. ORDINARY DILI RESIDENTS RANDOMLY ENCOUNTERED BY POLOFF WERE, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, VOCIFEROUS IN THEIR SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE, MORE SO THAN IN PREVIOUS VISITS. SEVERAL COMPLAINED ABOUT MILITIA INTIMIDATION AND EQUATED INDONESIAN RULE WITH A CLIMATE OF LAWLESSNESS. B1

A SUDDEN OFFER TO DISARM
---

6. (C) ACCORDING TO UNAMET OFFICIALS, MILITIA LEADERS JOAO TAVERES, EURICO GUTERRES AND JOANICO CESARIO SUDDENLY APPEARED AT THE DILI OFFICE THE COMMISSION FOR PEACE AND STABILITY (KPS) LATE IN THE EVENING ON AUGUST 11 AND EXPRESSED AN URGENT DESIRE TO SIGN A DISARMAMENT ACCORD WITH FALINTIL. THE MILITIA LEADERS REPEATEDLY MAINTAINED THAT THEY WERE ACTING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03939 02 OF 02 131126Z

INDEPENDENTLY OF TNI. CNRT REPRESENTATIVE MAHUDU WAS SUMMONED TO THE MEETING AND HE AGREED TO SUBMIT THE DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL TO XANANA GUSMAO AND FALINTIL COMMANDER MATAN RUAK. UNAMET OFFICIALS SUSPECTED THAT THE OFFER WAS ANOTHER TNI-DIRECTED PUBLIC RELATIONS GAMBIT AND AN ATTEMPT TO DEFUSE GROWING PRESSURE GENERATED BY THE TRIPARTITE MEETINGS IN JAKARTA, THE STRONG STATEMENT FROM FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER, AND FALINTIL'S UNILATERAL CANTONMENT OF ITS FORCES. DESPITE THIS, UNAMET WILL FOLLOW UP ON THE PROPOSAL. IT WAS EXPECTED THAT FALINTIL WOULD RESPOND WITH A COUNTER PROPOSAL THAT THE MILITIAS FIRST MOVE THEIR PERSONNEL INTO CANTONMENT AREAS (GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE MILITIA GROUPS, UNAMET DID NOT CONSIDER THIS TO BE A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY).

SHAKEUP IN LOCAL TNI COMMAND

7. (C) LOCAL COMMANDER COL. TONO SURATMAN WAS REPLACED ON AUGUST 12 BY COL. MOHAMED NOER MUIS. TONO'S DEPARTURE HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED, BUT WAS NOT EXPECTED UNTIL AFTER THE CONSULTATION VOTE. IN ANY CASE, THE INFLUENCE OF THE LOCAL COMMANDER IN DILI HAS DECREASED SIGNIFICANTLY WITH THE ARRIVAL OF GENERALS ZACKY ANWAR AND GLENNY KAIRUPAN, WIDELY SEEN AS EXERCISING THE REAL POWER. IN ADDITION TO TONO, DISTRICT COMMANDERS IN DILI, MANATUTO, AND AINARO WERE RECENTLY REPLACED, BUT LOCAL OBSERVERS EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT SOME OF THE MORE PROBLEMATIC DISTRICT COMMANDERS REMAINED IN PLACE.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B6

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTO8617

E64

PAGE 01 JAKART 04054 241114Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001W

----------EFC6B5 241115Z /38

O 241101Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9419

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 004054

OFFICIAL INFORMAL - FOR EAP/PIMBS J. ALOISI FROM DCM MIKE OWENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/09
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL JAKARTA TO PIMBS NO. 144

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION MICHAEL P. OWENS, REASON 1.5(D).

2. (U) GINANDJAR TOPICS

AN OPEN CHANNEL IS HEADING YOUR WAY PROVIDING OUR THOUGHTS ON TOPICS FOR GINANDJAR'S WASHINGTON MEETINGS. THANK YOU FOR ALL YOUR HELP ORGANIZING HIS SCHEDULE.

3. (U) ALLISON TRANSMISSION

ECON RECEIVED THE MATERIALS FROM JIM, WILL DISCUSS WITH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04054 241114Z
FCS WHO IS PROBABLY FAMILIAR WITH THE CASE.

4. (C) THREATS AGAINST BELO

GARY MET WITH RELIABLE CHURCH CONTACTS IN DILI TO DISCUSS REPORTS OF THREATS AGAINST BISHOP BELO. NOTHING NEW OR DRAMATIC HERE. THERE WAS AN AUGUST 19 DOCUMENT (SOURCES PROVIDED A COPY), APPARENTLY FROM SOME ELEMENT OF FPDK, WHICH SAID BELO WAS BETRAYING GOD FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

INTERESTS, AMONG WHICH WAS GETTING MONEY FROM OVERSEAS. IT DID NOT DIRECTLY THREATEN HIS LIFE, HOWEVER. ALSO OF CONCERN WAS A "DEATH LIST" OF 100 PEOPLE SAID TO BE CONCOCTED BY THE BESI MERAH PUTIH MILITIA, WHICH REPORTEDLY INCLUDED "THREE UNAMET PERSONNEL" AND POSSIBLY SOME PRIESTS AS WELL, BUT AGAIN THIS INFORMATION WAS SKETCHY AND DID NOT INVOLVE DIRECT THREATS AGAINST BELO. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE SEE LITTLE TO BE DONE OTHER THAN TO CONTINUE TO KEEP A CLOSE EYE ON THE OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION.

5. (SBU) ET HUMANITARIAN UPDATE

ALTHOUGH THIS HAS NOW REACHED DEAD-HORSE STATUS, HERBIE SMITH WAS ON LEAVE WHEN THE MYSTERIOUS MESSAGE WAS APPARENTLY PENNED. WHATEVER IT'S ORIGINS, WE DID HAVE A CHANCE TO TALK TO [redacted] THIS AFTERNOON. HE READILY AGREED THAT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COORDINATION WAS NOT ALL THAT IT SHOULD BE. THE INDONESIANS HAVE NOT MADE LIFE EASY FOR ANYONE IN EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING THE RELIEF AGENCIES. [redacted] DID SAY THAT AID CONVOYS WERE SLATED TO LEAVE TOMORROW FOR B6 B6

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04054 241114Z

MALIANA AND SUAI. LOOKING AHEAD, [redacted] THOUGHT THE NEW YORK POWERS-THAT-BE NEEDED TO GET TOGETHER TO IRON OUT COORDINATION FOR THE PHASE II PERIOD, ESPECIALLY IF THE VOTE IS FOR SEPARATION. B6

6. (SBU) POTENTIAL CODEL

NO CHANCE OF MAKING IT TO DILI ON AUGUST 30, GIVEN THAT THE CONGRESSMAN'S FLIGHT WOULD ARRIVE IN JAKARTA AFTER THE PLANE FOR DENPASAR, WHICH CONNECTS ONWARD TO ET, WOULD HAVE LEFT. MEANWHILE, COMMERCIAL SEATS IN GENERAL ARE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ACQUIRE, ALTHOUGH WE'RE CHECKING TO SEE IF WE CAN SNAG ONE FOR THE 31ST. (BY THE WAY, WOULD FALEOMAVEAGA COME ALONE, OR WITH A STAFFER?) ALATAS AND WIRANTO ARE LIKELY TO BE PRETTY BUSY ON THE 30TH, BUT WE CAN CHECK TO SEE IF THEY MIGHT BE AVAILABLE -- IF WE HAVE A FIRMER FEEL ON WHETHER THE CONGRESSMAN INDEED PLANS TO TRY TO COME. OUR ADVICE WOULD BE TO FOCUS ON EAST TIMOR OR NON-IRIAN JAYA SUBJECTS IN ANY MEETINGS WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED. AS FOR OTHER BACKGROUND RELATING TO RECENT HAPPENINGS, THE CANADIANS TELL US THAT UNAMET APPEARS TO BE REACHING VISITOR OVERLOAD. THEY'VE ASKED TO BE SPARED ANY FURTHER

REQUESTS FOR MEETINGS WITH SHORT-TERM INTERLOPERS, SAYING THAT THEY NEED TO FOCUS ON WHAT THEY'RE THERE TO DO. WE UNDERSTAND THAT ONE OF THE TWO BISHOPS (NOT CLEAR WHICH ONE) IS ALSO PLEADING PRESS OF BUSINESS IN RESPONSE TO MEETING REQUESTS.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04054 241114Z

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B6

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9613

E65

PAGE 01 JAKART 04055 01 OF 03 241128Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	MR-00	SSAS-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/020W

----------EFC827 241129Z /38

O 241115Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9420
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004055

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/24/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN,
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04055 01 OF 03 241128Z
ID,

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AUGUST 24 UPDATE

REF: JAKARTA 3999 AND PREVIOUS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS PAMELA SLUTZ, REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

2. (C) SUMMARY: CAMPAIGNS CONTINUE IN DILI, WITH THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE APPARENTLY PICKING UP STEAM. A PARKED UNAMET VEHICLE WAS BURNED EARLY ON AUGUST 21 IN LOS PALOS. ALSO ON AUGUST 21, A CNRT OFFICE IN AINADO WAS STONED BY A MILITIA-LED MOB, ALSO DAMAGING THE ADJACENT HOME OF A UNAMET OBSERVER. INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATION OBSERVERS HAVE BEGUN TO POUR IN TO DILI. UNAMET HAS DENIED ACCREDITATION TO 450 GOI-SPONSORED OBSERVERS, TO THE GOVERNMENT'S DISMAY. GOLKAR LEADER AKBAR TANDJUNG VISITED DILI ON AUGUST 23 AND VOWED THE PARTY WOULD ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF THE CONSULTATION, "IF FAIR" BUT REPEATED GOI CHARGES OF UNAMET BIAS. WATER HAS BEEN RESTORED TO A CAMP HOUSING IDP'S IN SUAI, BUT FOOD SHIPMENTS STILL HAVE NOT BEEN ALLOWED IN. END SUMMARY.

THE CAMPAIGN IN DILI
---

3. (C) BASED ON THE PUBLIC CAMPAIGNING OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS, THE PRO-AUTONOMY FORCES MAY BE LOSING SOME STEAM WHILE THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE BEGINS TO EMERGE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04055 01 OF 03 241128Z
MORE OPENLY. ON AUGUST 24, THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS HELD A RALLY AND DROVE AROUND DILI IN CONVOYS OF HALF A DOZEN TRUCKS AND BUSES WITH A FEW OTHER VEHICLES. THEIR POLICE ESCORT, SEVERAL TRUCKS OF POLICE AND POLICE CARS WITH SIRENS BLARING, WAS ALMOST AS LARGE. THE PARTICIPANTS WERE ALMOST ALL YOUNG MEN, LOOKING MUCH LIKE THE CROWD WHICH MAKES UP THE AITARAK MILITIA (OR THE RENT-A-CROWDS SEEN IN JAKARTA), AND MOST DID NOT SEEM ENTHUSIASTIC. THE STAGING POINT FOR THE CONVOY WAS IN FRONT OF AITARAK'S CENTRAL DILI HEADQUARTERS. SOME CNRT SUPPORTERS CIRCULATED IN A CONVOY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON AUGUST 24, ALSO ESCORTED BY POLICE. THEIR SUPPORTERS CONTINUE TO PUT UP CNRT/XANANA POSTERS AROUND TOWN. IN A NEW TWIST, DILI WAS BLANKETED ON AUGUST 24 WITH POSTERS SHOWING MEGAWATI BENEATH A MAP EXHIBITING THE INDONESIAN FLAG STUCK INTO EAST TIMOR WITH THE CAPTION "REMEMBER OUR STRUGGLE HAS ALREADY BEEN WON.". MOST OF THE POSTERS SEEN BY POLOFF HAD BEEN RIPPED APART.

RECENT VIOLENCE
---

4. (SBU) INTIMIDATION IN VARIOUS AREAS, ESPECIALLY OUTSIDE OF DILI, REMAINS A SERIOUS PROBLEM. AN (UNOCCUPIED) UNAMET VEHICLE WAS BURNED EARLY ON SUNDAY, AUGUST 22 IN LOS PALOS. ON AUGUST 21, A PRO-AUTONOMY MILITIA MOB LOBBED STONES AT A CNRT OFFICE IN AINADO, CAUSING SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE OFFICE, AND ALSO DAMAGING THE ADJACENT HOME OF A UNAMET ELECTORAL OFFICIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04055 01 OF 03 241128Z

OBSERVERS COMING IN

5. (C) THE THRONGS OF FOREIGN OBSERVERS EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE AUGUST 30 CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF EAST TIMOR HAVE BEGUN TO POUR INTO DILI. POLOFF MET WITH IFET OBSERVERS IN DILI ON AUGUST 23. THERE WILL BE ABOUT 100 IN ALL, ORGANIZED INTO 13 TEAMS BASED THROUGHOUT EAST TIMOR, WITH FIVE TO SEVEN PEOPLE PER TEAM. EACH TEAM HAS ONE VEHICLE AND WILL HAVE ONE SATELLITE PHONE (ABOUT HALF THE TEAMS HAVE PHONES NOW.) MOST OF THE OBSERVERS WILL STAY ONE TO TWO WEEKS AFTER THE VOTE, SOME LONGER. THEY ARE BASED IN DILI, AILEU, AINARO, MAUBISSE, SAME, SUAI, MALIAN, LOS PALOS, MANATUTO, VIQUEQUE, ERMERA, BAUCAU, AND AMBENO. EACH TEAM HAS ITS OWN EVACUATION PLAN. SOME HAVE EVACUATION AGREEMENTS WITH LOCAL UNAMET OFFICES (SUCH AS IN MALIANA AND SAME.) IN OTHER LOCALES, UNAMET HAS SAID IT CANNOT HELP IN THIS REGARD. AT THIS POINT THERE ARE 31 AMCITS IN THE GROUP, SCATTERED THROUGH THE TEAMS. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE FOUR U.S. RESIDENTS AND U.S/U.K. DUAL NATIONAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9614

PAGE 01 JAKART 04055 02 OF 03 241129Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00

PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00
USIE-00 ASDS-01 SNIS-00 NISC-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01
DRL-02 G-00 SSAS-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /021W
----------EFC82F 241129Z /38

O 241115Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9421
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 004055

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/24/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN,
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04055 02 OF 03 241129Z
ID,

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AUGUST 24 UPDATE

AKBAR TANDJUNG
---

6. (SBU) TANDJUNG, CHAIRMAN OF THE GOLKAR PARTY, WAS IN DILI ON AUGUST 23. HE SAID HIS PARTY WOULD ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF THE AUGUST 30 CONSULTATION AS LONG AS IT WAS FAIR. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE REPEATED ALL THE FAMILIAR CHARGES ABOUT UNAMET BIAS. INTERESTINGLY, PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS USED THE OCCASION OF THIS VISIT TO SHARPLY CRITICIZE THE GOI FOR CORRUPTION AND INEFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN EAST TIMOR OVER THE YEARS. THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS, PERHAPS SENSING DEFEAT, HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY CRITICAL OF THE GOI AND EVEN THE TNI. (ONE PRO-INTEGRATION REPRESENTATIVE TOLD CODEL HARKIN "WE DON'T WANT THE TNI HERE EITHER.)

SUAI IDP STATUS
---

7. (C) POLOFF CONFIRMS THAT WATER WAS RESTORED TO SUAI IDP'S LATE ON AUGUST 23. SENATOR HARKIN, WHO HAD WEIGHED IN WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS ON THE WELFARE OF THE IDP'S DURING HIS RECENT VISIT, CALLED THE EMBASSY ON AUGUST 23 FOR AN UPDATE ON THEIR STATUS. WHILE GRATIFIED TO HEAR WATER HAD BEEN RESTORED, HARKIN EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT FOOD DELIVERIES STILL HAD

NOT BEEN ALLOWED INTO THE CAMP AT SUAI. OUR LATEST INFORMATION IS THAT FOOD DELIVERIES ARE STILL BEING BLOCKED BY LOCAL MILITIAS, WITH TACIT APPROVAL FROM LOCAL AUTHORITIES.

MEANWHILE, BACK ON THE TENNIS COURTS...

8. (SBU) POLOFF MET EAST TIMOR POLICE COMMANDER TIMBUL SILAEN AND BRIG. GEN. GLENNY (DEPUTY TO ZACKY ANWAR) AT THE DILI PUBLIC TENNIS COURTS ON THE EVENING OF AUGUST 23. WHILE LACKING IN POWER AND MOBILITY, TIMBUL AND GLENNY PRESENTED A DIZZYING ASSORTMENT OF DECEPTIVE SPINS AND PLACEMENTS. DESPITE THIS, AND THE BIZARRE DILI TENNIS RULES, POLOFF'S TEAMS TRIUMPHED (12-9, 12-6). IN APRES-TENNIS DISCUSSIONS, POLOFF EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF CODEL HARKIN'S VISIT (GLENNY WAS IMPRESSED BY THE MILITARY BACKGROUND OF BOTH SENATORS) AND REITERATED THAT EVERYONE IN WASHINGTON IS WATCHING CLOSELY, ETC. [redacted] SAID THAT B6
DEALING WITH THE PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT NOW, CLAIMING THAT "WE ARE TALKING TO THEM EVERYDAY" (TRYING TO ENCOURAGE RESTRAINT). DESPITE THEIR WEIGHTY RESPONSIBILITIES, THESE GOI SECURITY AUTHORITIES APPARENTLY HAVE TIME FOR AT LEAST A COUPLE OF HOURS OF TENNIS EVERY DAY. (POLOFF ONLY TAKES ON SUCH BURDENS WHEN THEY OFFER THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE U.S. INTERESTS.)

COORDINATING MEETING OF FOREIGN AMBASSADORS IN JAKARTA

9. (SBU) THE FINNISH AMBASSADOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE EU PRESIDENCY, CHAIRED ANOTHER COORDINATING

MEETING ON 8/24 TO REVIEW THE SECURITY SITUATION AND EXCHANGE VIEWS. OF NOTE, UNAMET ESTIMATES SOME 2200 FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OBSERVERS WILL BE PRESENT FOR THE CONSULTATION AND IS GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO HOW TO IDENTIFY THESE PEOPLE AS WELL AS HOW TO ENSURE THAT THEY ALL OBSERVE THE CODE OF CONDUCT WHICH, FOR EXAMPLE, COMMITS OBSERVERS NOT TO TALK TO THE PRESS. THE EU IS CHARTERING A 92-SEAT PLANE TO TAKE ITS DELEGATION OF THE IRISH FM, EU PARLIAMENTARIANS, FINNISH AND OTHER EU MEMBER OFFICIALS AND LOCAL EMBASSY OFFICERS, ARRIVING IN DILI ON 8/28 AND RETURNING ON 9/1.

11. (SBU) [redacted] B6
CLARIFIED THAT TNI HAS COMMITTED TO WITHDRAW (REDEPLOY) TO POSTS AT THE VILLAGE -- NOT DISTRICT -- LEVEL, ON THE GROUNDS THAT TNI NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND QUICKLY IF NECESSARY. [redacted] B6
HAS PROTESTED THAT THIS IS CONTRARY TO THE MAY 5 AGREEMENT WHICH PUTS THE POLICE -- NOT TNI -- IN CHARGE OF SECURITY. [redacted] (DURING HIS B6

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9615

PAGE 01 JAKART 04055 03 OF 03 241129Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	ASDS-01	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	SSAS-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/021W

----------EFC832 241129Z /38

O 241115Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9422
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 004055

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/24/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN,
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04055 03 OF 03 241129Z
ID,

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: AUGUST 24 UPDATE

RECENT VISIT) HAD RAISED THIS WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR WHO PROFESSED SURPRISE THAT THERE WERE (BY UNAMET ESTIMATES) 12-15,000 TNI IN EAST TIMOR.

12. (SBU) THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE BALLOT COUNTING PROCEDURE THAT UNAMET IS STILL FINALIZING. AS UNAMET DESCRIBED THE PROCEDURE TO VISITORS TO DILI LAST WEEK, POLLING BOOTHS WILL CLOSE AT 1530, BALLOT BOXES WILL BE SEALED AT THE 700 POLLING BOOTHS AND TRANSPORTED TO DILI ON HELICOPTERS, ACCOMPANIED BY THREE OBSERVERS (ONE FROM EACH SIDE AND AN INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER). GIVEN SPACE CONSTRAINTS, EACH FLIGHT CAN CARRY ONLY 24 BOXES. HENCE, THE TRANSPORTATION PORTION OF THE PROCEDURE COULD MEAN THAT THE COUNT WOULD NOT BE COMPLETED UNTIL THE AFTERNOON OF 8/31. UNAMET IS STILL TRYING TO CONFIGURE THE COUNTING SITE SO THAT OBSERVERS CAN WATCH BUT NOT SEE THE TALLY.

13. (SBU) FLEXIBILITY HAS ALSO BEEN WORKED INTO THE SCHEDULE -- WHICH UNAMET WILL NOT SHARE -- TO PERMIT TIME FOR THE THREE-PERSON INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION TO ADDRESS ANY COMPLAINTS AND IRREGULARITIES AND TO CERTIFY THE RESULTS. (NOTE: THE THREE "JUDGES" (FROM SOUTH KOREA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND IRELAND) ARE APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04055 03 OF 03 241129Z
AND INDEPENDENT FROM UNAMET. END NOTE)

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4173

E68

PAGE 01 JAKART 04145 01 OF 04 281037Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/023W	

----------F19D84 281053Z /38

O 281022Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9522
INFO AMCONSUL SYDNEY IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 27 AUG 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 20 JUL 2004 200300722

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 004145

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04145 01 OF 04 281037Z
SYDNEY FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.5
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, CASC, ID, UN
SUBJECT: AUGUST 28 EAST TIMOR UPDATE: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH HABIBIE AND SITUATION ON THE GROUND

REF: 99 JAKARTA 4117 AND PREVIOUS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR PAMELA J.

SLUTZ. REASON: 1.5 (B,D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE SITUATION IN, AND FUTURE OF, EAST TIMOR WAS ONE OF THE MAIN TOPICS DURING THE COURSE OF A THREE-HOUR "FAREWELL" LUNCH HOSTED BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE FOR AMBASSADOR ROY. AMBASSADOR ROY EXPRESSED U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION AND OUR COMMON INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT THE AUGUST 30 BALLOTING PROCEEDS SMOOTHLY AND RESULTS IN A LEGITIMATE CONSULTATION. OVERALL THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR APPEARS TO BE SOMEWHAT CALMER, ALTHOUGH THERE CONTINUE TO BE VIOLENT INCIDENTS, INCLUDING IN DILI. ACCORDING TO DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO, VOLUNTARY DISARMAMENT BY FALINTIL AND PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS HAS BEGUN IN BAUCAU AND IS EXPECTED TO PROCEED SOON IN OTHER AREAS. TNI AND FALINTIL HELD AN UNPRECEDENTED MEETING IN WHICH, WE UNDERSTAND, TNI PROMISED TO PUT AN END TO MILITIA VIOLENCE. UNAMET AND INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES BELIEVE THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE AUGUST 30 BALLOTING WILL BE SATISFACTORY AND UNAMET REPORTS IT IS DETERMINED TO PRESS ON WITH THE CONSULTATION. ATTENTION IS NOW INCREASINGLY FOCUSED ON

MAINTAINING SECURITY IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE BALLOTING AND BEFORE THE RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED, ANYWHERE FROM THREE TO SEVEN DAYS LATER. PRESIDENT HABIBIE INVITED U.S. CONSULTATION WITH HIS STAFF TO SHARE THOUGHTS ON HOW TO PREVENT FURTHER VIOLENCE.

3. (U) POLOFF IN DILI REPORTED THAT AS OF MIDDAY AUGUST 28, TENSION HAD RETURNED TO CENTRAL DILI AFTER A BRIEF RESPITE, DUE TO A FUNERAL FOR AT LEAST ONE VICTIM OF MILITIA VIOLENCE ON AUGUST 26. POLICE HAVE ARRESTED SIX DEMONSTRATORS -- FOUR PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS AND TWO PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS -- FOR ACTIVITIES CONNECTED TO THE VIOLENCE IN DILI ON AUGUST 26. THERE ARE SIGNS OF AN EXODUS OF NON-TIMORESE FROM DILI. A MILITIA ATTACK ON A CNRT OFFICE IN LOS PALOS LATE ON AUGUST 27 LEFT AT LEAST THREE DEAD. VIOLENCE WAS ALSO REPORTED LATE AUGUST 27 IN DILI, IN THE ENCLAVE OF OECUSSI, AND IN MALIANA, WHERE THREE WERE CONFIRMED DEAD. PRO-INTEGRATION SPOKESMEN HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE TO DEFEND MILITIA ACTIONS ON AUGUST 26. END SUMMARY.

HABIBIE AND WIRANTO PLEDGE STEPS TO CURB VIOLENCE

---

4. (C) OVER LUNCH ON AUGUST 28, PRESIDENT HABIBIE AND GENERAL WIRANTO ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT WHILE THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR WAS NOT "ONE HUNDRED PERCENT" PEACEFUL, THE GOI WAS TAKING NECESSARY STEPS TO CURB FURTHER VIOLENCE, ESPECIALLY DISARMING THE OPPOSING GROUPS. GENERAL WIRANTO SAID THAT ADM. YOSMENGKO HAD MET WITH FALINTIL TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION. (SEE PARA 12

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04145 01 OF 04 281037Z
BELOW FOR MORE DETAIL.) WIRANTO ALSO CLAIMED THAT DISARMAMENT BY BOTH SIDES (FALINTIL AND MILITIAS) WAS PROCEEDING IN BAUCAU AND WOULD SOON PROCEED IN OTHER AREAS. POLICE HAD ARRESTED SIX DEMONSTRATORS -- TWO PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS AND FOUR PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS -- FOR QUESTIONING ABOUT THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE AUGUST 26 RIOTS IN DILI. WIRANTO ALSO SAID THAT POLICE INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF A REPORTER IN DILI HAD PROVED THE STORY TO BE FALSE.

5. (C) PRESIDENT HABIBIE SAID THAT IN A SPEECH EARLIER TODAY (AUGUST 26), HE HAD ADVISED THE EAST TIMORESE TO VOTE FROM THEIR HEARTS NOT OUT OF FEAR. THE MOST CRITICAL PERIOD, HE SAID, WILL BE THE WEEK BETWEEN AUGUST 31 AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE RESULTS, WHICH HE SEEMED TO INDICATE WOULD BE NO EARLIER THAN SEPTEMBER 7. SAYING THAT HE VALUED AND TRUSTED U.S. VIEWS AND OUR COMMON GOAL OF AVERTING VIOLENCE, HABIBIE INVITED THE AMBASSADOR TO WORK CLOSELY WITH HIS STAFF (INDICATING POLDAM GEN. FEISAL TANJUNG AND GEN. WIRANTO) ON HOW TO MANAGE THE TRANSITION. HE SAID GENERAL WIRANTO AND OTHER MINISTERS WILL GO TO DILI ON AUGUST 31 AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS PREPARING TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON AUGUST 31 (AFTER THE BALLOTING) IN WHICH IT WOULD OUTLINE THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME, TO REASSURE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA'S COMMITMENT TO RESPECT THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4175

PAGE 01 JAKART 04145 02 OF 04 281037Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00

ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00
STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 ASDS-01 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01
DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /023W
----------F19D90 281053Z /38

O 281022Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9523
INFO AMCONSUL SYDNEY IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 004145

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04145 02 OF 04 281037Z
SYDNEY FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.5
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, CASC, ID, UN
SUBJECT: AUGUST 28 EAST TIMOR UPDATE: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH HABIBIE AND SITUATION ON THE GROUND

OUTCOME AND TO ABIDE BY ITS AGREEMENTS TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT (THROUGH MARCH 31, 2000) AND SECURITY DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. HABIBIE SUGGESTED THE GOI NEEDED TO "SOCIALIZE" THE PROSPECT THAT JAKARTA WILL INVITE THE UN TO SEND PEACEKEEPERS IN THE EVENT THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) RATIFIES A BALLOT OUTCOME SUPPORTING INDEPENDENCE. INDONESIANS, INCLUDING TEACHERS AND DOCTORS, WOULD CONTRIBUTE AS MUCH AS THEY COULD, BUT ONLY AS UN EMPLOYEES.
LATE REPORT: TENSION IN CENTRAL DILI
---

6. (SBU) POLOFF IN DILI REPORTED THAT AS OF MIDDAY AUGUST 28, TENSION HAD INCREASED IN CENTRAL DILI: A FUNERAL FOR ONE (OR MORE) VICTIMS OF PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA VIOLENCE WAS UNDERWAY IN THE SANTA CRUZ NEIGHBORHOOD, AND EMOTIONS

WERE RUNNING HIGH. GROUPS OF AITARAK MILITIA MEMBERS HAD CLUSTERED AROUND THE FRINGES OF THE FUNERAL, CREATING THE OBVIOUS POTENTIAL FOR CLASHES. MILITIA ACTIVITY CONTINUES TO BE CONSPICUOUS IN SOME PARTS OF DILI, POLOFF REPORTED.

EXODUS?

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04145 02 OF 04 281037Z
7. (SBU) POLOFF ALSO REPORTED SEEING SIGNS OF AN EXODUS OF NON-TIMORESE FROM DILI. HE SPOTTED NUMEROUS TRUCKS CARRYING APPARENTLY NON-TIMORESE FAMILIES AND HOUSEHOLD GOODS ON THE HIGHWAY TOWARD WEST TIMOR. INTERNATIONAL MEDIA HAVE ALSO COVERED SCENES OF MASSES OF NON-TIMORESE SCRAMBLING TO BOARD SEA VESSELS AND AIRPLANES DEPARTING DILI.

VIOLENCE IN LOS PALOS
---

8. (SBU) PRO-INTEGRATION FORCES ATTACKED THE CNRT HOUSE/OFFICE IN LOS PALOS ON AUGUST 27, DESTROYED THE STRUCTURE, AND KILLED THE LOCAL CNRT LEADER (WHO IS ALSO THE LIURAI, OR TRADITIONAL CHIEF OF LOS PALOS) HIS WIFE AND SON. IN ADDITION, TWO PRO-INDEPENDENCE STUDENTS AND A DRIVER WERE KILLED. A CANADIAN IFET (INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR EAST TIMOR) OBSERVER WHO HAD DISAPPEARED DURING THE ATTACK LATER TURNED UP UNHARMED. ACCORDING TO UNAMET, AS OF EARLY MORNING AUGUST 28 THE SITUATION IN LOS PALOS, WHILE VERY TENSE "HAS NOT YET ESCALATED AS WE HAD FEARED."

TROUBLE IN OECUSSI
---

9. (SBU) THE EAST TIMOR ENCLAVE OF OECUSSI (OR AMBENO), WHICH HAS BEEN RELATIVELY CALM IN RECENT WEEKS, WITNESSED VIOLENCE LATE ON AUGUST 27. ACCORDING TO UNAMET, CLASHES BETWEEN PRO- AND ANTI-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS RESULTED IN THE BURNING OF THE CNRT OFFICE. THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04145 02 OF 04 281037Z
DEATHS.

AT LEAST THREE KILLED IN MALIANA

---

10. (SBU) VARIOUS SOURCES ARE REPORTING VIOLENCE IN MALIANA ON AUGUST 27. IN A CLASH BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA AND RESIDENTS OF A VILLAGE JUST OUTSIDE MALIANA, THREE WERE KILLED AND ABOUT TWO DOZEN HOUSES BURNED. UNAMET REPORTS THAT IN MALIANA ITSELF DISTURBANCES CONTINUED UNTIL THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF AUGUST 28, WITH MILITIAS ATTACKING STUDENTS. NO ADDITIONAL DEATHS HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED, HOWEVER.

MOST OF DILI LESS TENSE BUT MILITIA ACTIVITY CONTINUES

---

11. (SBU) IN CENTRAL AND WEST DILI EARLY ON AUGUST 28, TRAFFIC AND SATURDAY MORNING COMMERCE APPEARED CLOSER TO NORMAL LEVELS THAN DURING THE PREVIOUS TWO DAYS. HOWEVER, THERE WERE REPORTS FROM UNAMET AND OTHER SOURCES THAT LOCALIZED AITARAK MILITIA ACTIVITY CONTINUED IN THE SANTA CRUZ, LAHANE AND TAIBESSE NEIGHBORHOODS IN SOUTH CENTRAL DILI DURING THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 27-28, WITH MANY CALLS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4188

PAGE 01 JAKART 04145 03 OF 04 281037Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/023W	

----------F19DBB 281056Z /38

O 281022Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9524
INFO AMCONSUL SYDNEY IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 004145

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04145 03 OF 04 281037Z
SYDNEY FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.5
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, CASC, ID, UN
SUBJECT: AUGUST 28 EAST TIMOR UPDATE: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH HABIBIE AND SITUATION ON THE GROUND

COMING INTO UNAMET REPORTING RANSACKING AND RAIDING OF HOUSES. NO NEW KILLINGS WERE CONFIRMED, HOWEVER. THE HOUSE OF YAYASAN HAK DIRECTOR ANICETO GUTERRES WAS REPORTEDLY SURROUNDED AND/OR ATTACKED DURING THE NIGHT, BUT THIS SITUATION APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY THE MORNING OF AUGUST 28. A UNAMET OFFICIAL SAID LARGE NUMBERS OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE RESIDENTS OF DILI HAD FLED THEIR HOMES.

TOP TNI AND FALINTIL COMMANDERS MEET
---

12. (SBU) ACCORDING TO [redacted] (AND CONFIRMED BY UNAMET), A HIGH LEVEL TNI DELEGATION LED BY ADMIRAL YOSMENKO AND INCLUDING TWO OTHER TWO-STAR GENERALS AND THE LOCAL EAST TIMOR COMMANDER MET WITH THE TOP FALINTIL COMMANDERS AT FALINTIL'S MAIN BASE NEAR WAIMORI IN EASTERN EAST TIMOR ON AUGUST 27. THE TNI DELEGATION PROMISED TO PUT AN END TO MILITIA VIOLENCE AND TO ENSURE PEACE AND SECURITY IN GENERAL. A UNAMET OFFICIAL CAUTIONED THAT THIS TNI DELEGATION INCLUDED ONLY OFFICERS THOUGHT TO BE ON BOARD WITH WHAT UNAMET SEES AS HABIBIE AND WIRANTO'S DESIRE FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONSULTATION. NONE OF THE OFFICERS CONSIDERED MORE PROBLEMATICAL, OR KOPASSUS B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04145 03 OF 04 281037Z
PERSONNEL, WERE PRESENT. "IT MAY BE THAT THIS WAS JUST THE GUYS IN THE WHITE HATS MAKING PROMISES THEY CANNOT CARRY OUT," COMMENTED ONE UNAMET OFFICIAL. NEVERTHELESS,

THE UNAMET LEADERSHIP WAS VERY PLEASED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THIS UNPRECEDENTED AUGUST 27 MEETING, AND IS OPTIMISTICALLY HOPING THAT THE MILITIA VIOLENCE OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS MAY REPRESENT ONLY THE "LAST GASP" OF RESISTANCE BY THE HARD-LINERS.

UNAMET DETERMINED TO PUSH AHEAD WITH VOTE

13. (SBU) DESPITE THE VIOLENCE OF THE PAST FEW DAYS, UNAMET OFFICIALS EXPRESS FIRM DETERMINATION TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE AUGUST 30 VOTE. UNAMET [redacted] BELIEVES B1
ANY DELAY WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE THE THUGGISH ELEMENTS HOPING TO BLOCK THE EXERCISE. UNAMET HOPES THAT BY CONCENTRATING FOREIGN OBSERVERS AT KEY TROUBLE- SPOTS SUCH AS MALIANA AND SUAI, THE GOI CAN BE COMPELLED TO ENSURE SECURITY FOR THE VOTERS. IN CASES WHERE VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION MAKES VOTING IMPOSSIBLE, POLLING STATIONS WILL BE CLOSED ON A VERY SELECTIVE, LOCALIZED BASIS, MUCH AS WAS DONE WHEN PROBLEMS OCCURRED DURING THE REGISTRATION PROCESS. IN [redacted] VIEW, IF AS MANY AS 70 PERCENT OF B1
THE POLLING STATIONS CAN OPERATE, THAT MAY MEET THE CRITERIA FOR A LEGITIMATE CONSULTATION. IT WOULD THEN BE DECIDED WHETHER IT WAS WORTH THE RISK TO TRY AND OPEN MORE STATIONS ON A SECOND DAY OF VOTING.

FOREIGNERS FLOOD IN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04145 03 OF 04 281037Z

14. (SBU) DILI AND ALL MAJOR DISTRICT TOWNS ARE FULL OF FOREIGN OBSERVER DELEGATIONS, DIPLOMATS, AND JOURNALISTS. ASIDE FROM THE HIGHLY PUBLICIZED ATTACKS ON JOURNALISTS ON AUGUST 26, AND THE TEMPORARY DISAPPEARANCE OF A CANADIAN OBSERVER IN LOS PALOS ON AUGUST 27, SECURITY INCIDENTS INVOLVING FOREIGNERS HAVE BEEN MINIMAL. IT IS CLEAR THAT POLICE ARE UNDER ORDERS TO PROTECT FOREIGNERS. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH POLOFF, RANK AND FILE POLICE PERSONNEL PATROLLING THE STREETS IN DILI HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT THEIR PRIMARY MISSION WAS TO PROTECT FOREIGNERS. MILITIA HOSTILITY APPEARS DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT JOURNALISTS. UNAMET OFFICIALS EMPHASIZE THAT FOREIGNERS WHO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES AS "OBSERVERS" SEEM TO BE REGARDED BY THE MILITIAS AS BEING IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS UNAMET, AND THEY SELDOM ENCOUNTER ANY PROBLEMS.

8/26 VIOLENCE: PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS MOUNT PR COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

---

13. (SBU) PRO-INTEGRATIONIST LEADERS LOPES DA CRUZ AND BASILIO ARAUJO HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN DILI ON THE MORNING OF AUGUST 27 TO MAINTAIN THAT FIVE OF THEIR SUPPORTERS HAD BEEN KILLED BY INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4177

PAGE 01 JAKART 04145 04 OF 04 281037Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/023W	

----------F19D97 281054Z /38

O 281022Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9525
INFO AMCONSUL SYDNEY IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 004145

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04145 04 OF 04 281037Z
SYDNEY FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.5
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, CASC, ID, UN
SUBJECT: AUGUST 28 EAST TIMOR UPDATE: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH HABIBIE AND SITUATION ON THE GROUND

ON AUGUST 26 AND TO CHARGE THAT ALL THE VIOLENCE IN DILI ON THAT DAY HAD RESULTED FROM PROVOCATIONS FROM THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE. (NOTE: EMBASSY RECEIVED COPIES OF SIMILAR PRESS RELEASES FROM TWO PRO-AUTONOMY GROUPS, THE KOMANDO PASUKAN PEJUANG PRO INTEGRASI AND THE FORUM PERSATUAN DEMOKRASI DAN KEADILAN. COPIES HAVE BEEN FAXED TO EAP/PIMBS.) THEIR DESCRIPTIONS OF THE ALLEGED KILLINGS OF THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS WERE NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR -- THEY BACKED AWAY FROM SOME OF THEIR ASSERTIONS WHEN QUESTIONED AGGRESSIVELY BY JOURNALISTS AND CONCLUDED THAT THE KILLINGS NEEDED FURTHER INVESTIGATION. THEY CLAIMED THAT TWO OF THEIR SUPPORTERS HAD BEEN TORTURED, KILLED, AND MUTILATED AFTER BEING PULLED OFF A BUS CARRYING PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS FROM VIQUEQUE THE AUGUST 26 RALLY IN DILI. WHEN ASKED IF HIS ORGANIZATION WOULD ACCEPT THE RESULT OF THE VOTE NO MATTER HOW IT TURNED OUT, ARAUJO RESPONDED THAT FOR HIS GROUP AUTONOMY WAS THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE OPTION, AND SINCE THE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS HAD BEEN THE VICTIMS OF ATTACKS EVEN BEFORE THE VOTE, THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT A PRO-INDEPENDENCE RESULT IN WHICH THEY WOULD BE EVEN MORE VULNERABLE.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04145 04 OF 04 281037Z

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0672

E73

PAGE 01 JAKART 04266 01 OF 03 040617Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/023W	

----------F4396B 040617Z /38

O 040556Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9651
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004266

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04266 01 OF 03 040617Z
HANOI FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PREF, KCRM, CASC, ID, UN
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR CHOOSES INDEPENDENCE: INITIAL OBSERVATIONS

REF: JAKARTA 4263 AND PREVIOUS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM MICHAEL OWENS, REASONS 1.5

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 3 SEP 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722
UNCLASSIFIED

(B) AND (D).

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: THE STREETS OF DILI ARE REPORTEDLY DESERTED IN THE FIRST HOURS AFTER UNSYG ANAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT 78.5 PERCENT OF EAST TIMORESE REJECTED INDONESIA'S AUTONOMY PROPOSAL IN THE AUGUST 30 REFERENDUM. OVER 1000 STRATEGIC FORCES TROOPS WHO ARRIVED OVERNIGHT ARE SETTING UP CORDONS AND CHECK POINTS IN SOME PARTS OF THE CITY. MORE UNREST AFFLICTED SECTIONS OF DILI AND OTHER PARTS OF THE TERRITORY OVERNIGHT. IN A SEPTEMBER 3 STATEMENT, DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMED FORCES CHIEF WIRANTO ASSERTED THAT THE CONSULTATION RESULT MUST BE RESPECTED. BY CONTRAST, JOSE SOARES, THE GOVERNOR OF EAST TIMOR, ALSO ON SEPTEMBER 3, REITERATED ALLEGATIONS OF BALLOT FRAUD AND STATED THAT HE AND OTHER PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS WOULD REJECT THE RESULTS OF THE REFERENDUM, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME. A PROMINENT PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA LEADER HAS VOWED TO PRESS FOR PARTITION.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04266 01 OF 03 040617Z
3. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: INDONESIAN FORMIN ALATAS RULED OUT THE ENTRY OF PEACEKEEPERS BEFORE THE CONSULTATION RESULTS CAN BE RATIFIED BY THE PARLIAMENT IN JAKARTA. U.N. PERSONNEL HAVE EVACUATED MALIANA FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 2 MILITIA ATTACKS THAT LEFT AT LEAST THREE LOCAL UNAMET STAFF DEAD. INDONESIAN MEDIA ARE INTERPRETING AUSTRALIAN PM HOWARD'S SEPTEMBER 3 STATEMENT ON EAST TIMOR AS HARSHLY CRITICAL. 300 PRO-INTEGRATION SUPPORTERS DEMONSTRATED IN FRONT OF THE U.N. OFFICE BUILDING IN JAKARTA ON SEPTEMBER 3. [redacted] B1

[redacted] END SUMMARY.

DILI IN THE FIRST HOURS
---

4. (SBU) EMBOFFS IN DILI REPORT THE STREETS ARE DESERTED IN THE FIRST HOURS AFTER UNSYG KOFI ANAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT 78.5 PERCENT TIMORESE REJECTED INDONESIA'S AUTONOMY PROPOSAL IN THE AUGUST 30 REFERENDUM. ANAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT WAS READ SIMULTANEOUSLY BY UNAMET CHIEF IAN MARTIN IN DILI AT APPROXIMATELY 0905 LOCAL TIME, SEPTEMBER 4. EMBOFFS ON

THE GROUND REPORT THAT AT LEAST 1000 STRATEGIC FORCES (KOSTRAD) TROOPS WHO ARRIVED IN DILI OVERNIGHT ARE ALREADY OUT IN THE CITY, SETTING UP BARBED WIRE CORDONS AND CHECKPOINTS, AROUND THE MAHKOTA HOTEL, HOME TO MANY FOREIGNERS, IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY. MANY OTHER PARTS OF DILI ARE REPORTEDLY EMPTY OF BOTH SECURITY PERSONNEL AND MILITIAS. EMBOFFS UNDERSTAND THAT MORE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04266 01 OF 03 040617Z
UNREST HIT SECTIONS OF DILI AND OTHER PARTS OF THE TERRITORY OVERNIGHT BUT WERE UNABLE TO PROVIDE DETAILS AS OF MID-MORNING SEPTEMBER 4.

WIRANTO TO SUPPORT, GOVERNOR VOWS OPPOSITION

5. (SBU) IN A SEPTEMBER 3 STATEMENT TO JOURNALISTS, DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO RESPECT THE RESULTS OF THE AUGUST 30 BALLOT, STATING "THE RESULTS MUST BE ACCEPTED AS THE BEST OPTION." BY CONTRAST, EAST TIMOR GOVERNOR JOSE ABILIO SOARES, HIMSELF APPOINTED BY JAKARTA, REITERATED ALLEGATIONS THAT THE BALLOT HAD BEEN TAINTED BY FRAUD ON THE PART OF UNAMET STAFF AND VOWED THAT HE AND OTHER PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS WOULD REJECT THE OUTCOME OF THE BALLOT "WHATEVER THE RESULT IS."

MILITIA LEADER DEPARTS EAST TIMOR

6. (SBU) PRO-INTEGRATION FIGURE EURICO GUTERRES, COMMANDER OF THE VIOLENT AITARAK MILITIA WAS SPOTTED AT DILI AIRPORT EARLY ON SEPTEMBER 4 DEPARTING FOR JAKARTA OR POSSIBLY BALI, STATING HIS INTENTION TO RETURN. HE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0673

PAGE 01 JAKART 04266 02 OF 03 040617Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00

PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00
STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 ASDS-01 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01
DRL-02 G-00 MR-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /024W
----------F4396F 040617Z /38

O 040556Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9652
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 004266

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04266 02 OF 03 040617Z
HANOI FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PREF, KCRM, CASC, ID, UN
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR CHOOSES INDEPENDENCE: INITIAL OBSERVATIONS

TOLD CNN THAT HE WOULD PRESS FOR PARTITION OF THE TERRITORY INTO INDEPENDENT AND AUTONOMOUS INDONESIAN SECTIONS.

ALATAS STATEMENT ON PEACEKEEPERS
---

7. (SBU) AT A PRESS CONFERENCE LATE ON SEPTEMBER 3, INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS STATED THAT INDONESIAN POLICE AND MILITARY WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN PRIMARY SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES AND THAT HE DID NOT ENVISION U.N. PEACEKEEPERS TAKING OVER THIS ROLE, PRIOR TO "PHASE III" FOLLOWING THE MPR'S RATIFICATION OF THE CONSULTATION RESULT. HE FURTHER REJECTED THE IDEA OF UNILATERAL DEPLOYMENT TO EAST TIMOR OF AMERICAN PEACEKEEPING TROOPS AND STATED THAT

IF THE U.S. "DARES" TO INTRODUCE PEACEKEEPERS THE SECURITY SITUATION WOULD DETERIORATE.

VIOLENCE IN MALIANA

8. INDONESIAN MEDIA REPORTS STATE THAT UNAMET EVACUATED ALL 40 INTERNATIONAL AND 14 LOCAL UNAMET STAFF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04266 02 OF 03 040617Z
PERSONNEL FROM MALIANA IN A POLICE-ESCORTED CONVOY ON SEPTEMBER 3 FOLLOWING MILITIA ATTACKS ON THE U.N. OFFICE IN THE TOWN ON THE NIGHT OF SEPTEMBER 2-3 IN WHICH AT LEAST THREE LOCAL UNAMET STAFF WERE KILLED AND FIVE REMAIN MISSING. ACCORDING TO JAKARTA PRESS, AFP IS REPORTING THAT THE THREE KILLINGS OF LOCAL UNAMET PERSONNEL WERE CARRIED OUT BY THE "DADALUS MERAH PUTIH" PRO-JAKARTA MILITIA. WE UNDERSTAND THAT A LARGE CONTINGENT OF THE POLICE'S MOBILE BRIGADE (BRIMOB) DEPARTED THE CITY AT THE SAME TIME AS THE UNAMET CONVOY, LEAVING BEHIND A SMALLER GROUP OF POLICE WHO REMAINED IN GARRISON. MORE BURNING OF HOMES AND OTHER VIOLENCE REPORTEDLY CONTINUED IN MALIANA ON THE NIGHT OF SEPTEMBER 3.

HOWARD STATEMENT

9. (SBU) INDONESIAN MEDIA TOOK NOTE OF AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER HOWARD'S SEPTEMBER 3 STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT IN CANBERRA, IN WHICH HOWARD, AMONG OTHER POINTS, CALLED THE FAILURE OF INDONESIAN POLICE TO MAINTAIN ORDER "UNACCEPTABLE," AND REPORTEDLY STATED "THEY HAVE CLOSED THEIR EYES TO ACTS OF TERRORISM." INDONESIAN PAPERS ARE INTERPRETING THE STATEMENT AS HARSHLY CRITICAL. HEADLINES SUMMARIZE HOWARD'S COMMENT AS A "WARNING" OR A "THREAT."

ANTI-U.N. DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04266 02 OF 03 040617Z
10. (SBU) FOUR PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS STAGED A JOINT DEMONSTRATION AT THE U.N. OFFICE BUILDING IN JAKARTA ON SEPTEMBER 3 IN WHICH 300 DEMONSTRATORS DECLARED UNAMET

PERSONNEL TO BE "WAR CRIMINALS" AND CARRIED PLACARDS ALONG THE LINES OF "UNAMET GO TO HELL." THE DEMONSTRATIONS BACKED UP TRAFFIC IN CENTRAL JAKARTA AND CAUSED THE U.N. TO CLOSE ITS OFFICE TEMPORARILY.

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0674

PAGE 01 JAKART 04266 03 OF 03 040617Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/024W	

----------F43971 040617Z /38

O 040556Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9653
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 004266

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04266 03 OF 03 040617Z
HANOI FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PREF, KCRM, CASC, ID, UN
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR CHOOSES INDEPENDENCE: INITIAL OBSERVATIONS

B1

END TEXT.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04266 03 OF 03 040617Z

CONFIDENTIAL

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL Page: 1
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1999JAKART04318 Channel: n/a

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1148

E80

PAGE 01 JAKART 04318 01 OF 03 101411Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/023W

----------F66047 101411Z /45

O 071043Z SEP 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9704
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004318

HANOI FOR A/S ROTH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04318 01 OF 03 101411Z
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, EAID, MOPS, CASC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: SITUATION REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 7

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS PAMELA SLUTZ; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. UNAMET REPORTS CONTINUING SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS IN DILI IN GENERAL AND GREAT CONCERN ABOUT ITS OWN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 6 SEP 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

SECURITY, BUT NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO EVACUATE. UNAMET HAS EVACUATED ITS STAFF FROM BAUCAU AFTER ITS COMPOUND THERE CAME UNDER AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE. VARIOUS EMBASSY SOURCES AND MEDIA REPORTS INDICATE THAT EAST TIMORESE WHO HAD TAKEN REFUGE IN CHURCH AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FACILITIES ARE BEING FORCED OUT OF THESE SAFE HAVENS BY TNI AND MILITIA. SOME HAVE FLED INTO THE HILLS WHILE OTHERS HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY TO UNKNOWN DESTINATIONS. LATEST REPORTS FROM DILI INDICATE THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IS NO LESS TENSE, WITH MUCH SHOOTING STILL BEING HEARD. THERE ARE REPORTS OF HOUSE BURNINGS IN BAUCAU AS WELL.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] WFP, CARE, CRS, AND ICRC WORKERS, AS WELL AS USAID PERSONNEL, PLAN TO TRAVEL TO WEST TIMOR THIS WEEK TO ASSESS THE REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE SITUATION. FOOD IS AVAILABLE BUT DISTRIBUTION AND SECURITY ARE PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.

UNAMET'S PERSPECTIVE
---

3. (C) IN A SEPTEMBER 7 CONVERSATION WITH THE AMBASSADOR, UNAMET
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04318 01 OF 03 101411Z
[redacted] REPORTED THE FOLLOWING: B1

-- THE SITUATION IN DILI HAS NOT IMPROVED. SHOPS ARE BEING LOOTED AND MILITIA HAVE BROKEN INTO THE UNAMET VEHICLE COMPOUND. "AITARAK (MILITIA) ARE RIDING AROUND DILI IN UNAMET VEHICLES." (COMMENT: ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED SEEING REGULAR MILITARY TROOPS LOOTING HOUSES ALONG THE ROAD TO THE AIRPORT. END COMMENT.)

-- UNAMET'S OWN PERSONNEL (200 REMAINING AT THE HEADQUARTERS) ARE STAYING OFF THE STREETS AND ARE ALL STAYING OVERNIGHT IN THE MAIN COMPOUND.

-- UNAMET HAS EVACUATED STAFF FROM BAUCAU AFTER MILITIA ATTACKED THE UNAMET OFFICE WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE.

-- THE PREVIOUS NIGHT WAS ONE OF HEAVY GUNFIRE AROUND THE UNAMET HEADQUARTERS IN DILI WITH A NUMBER OF AITARAK MOVEMENTS TOWARD THE COMPOUND. [redacted] REMAINED "VERY CONCERNED" ABOUT UNAMET'S SECURITY. B1

-- A TNI MAJOR HAD ARRIVED AT THE UNAMET COMPOUND WITH 200-300 WHICH HE SAID WERE FROM KOSTRAD FROM SURABAYA. ACCORDING TO THIS OFFICER, HIS TROOPS WERE NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR UNAMET'S SECURITY. AS THE KOSTRAD TROOPS ENTERED, BRIMOB POLICE FORCES

WHO HAD BEEN AT THE COMPOUND EXITED, FIRING THEIR WEAPONS IN THE AIR.

-- HIGH-RANKING INDONESIAN POLICE AND MILITARY OFFICERS IN DILI ARE TELLING UNAMET THAT THERE IS NOW A 9 P.M. CURFEW IN EFFECT AND THAT "HEAVY ORDERS" HAVE COME DOWN REGARDING THE "STATE OF EMERGENCY" DECLARED ON SEPTEMBER 7. [redacted] SAID TNI HAD B1
CONFIDENTIAL

EXPRESSED A DESIRE THAT UNAMET NOT PULL OUT..

-- UNAMET CAN CONFIRM THAT, DESPITE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY, CNRT LEADER LEANDRO ISAAC IS ALIVE, BUT THEY HAVE CREDIBLE INFORMATION THAT ANOTHER WELL-KNOWN CNRT FIGURE, MAHUDU, HAS BEEN KILLED.

4. (C) ACCORDING TO AN UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICER IN DILI, THE UNAMET COMPOUND REMAINS JAMMED WITH EAST TIMORESE SEEKING REFUGE BUT THE NEW KOSTRAD OFFICER HAS AGREED TO ALLOW 500 OF THEM TO MOVE TO A SCHOOL NEXT DOOR AND PROMISED THEY WOULD BE PROTECTED. THERE WAS SOME HOPE AMONG THE UNAMET STAFF THAT THE INSERTION OF THE KOSTRAD FORCES WOULD IMPROVE THEIR SECURITY SITUATION, AND SHE ADDED THAT UNAMET'S CORE STAFF IN DILI HAD NO PLANS TO EVACUATE. WATER AND ELECTRICITY SERVICES ON THE COMPOUND, HOWEVER, WERE SAID TO BE DETERIORATING.

5. (C) ACCORDING TO THIS UNAMET SOURCE, UNAMET LOCAL EAST TIMORESE STAFF IN DILI HAD BEEN TAKEN TO BAUCAU TO BOARD AN EVACUATION FLIGHT TO AUSTRALIA. INDONESIAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES REFUSED THEM PERMISSION TO BOARD, HOWEVER, AND THESE PERSONNEL WERE FORCED TO RETURN TO DILI.

THREAT TO REFUGEES IN CONVENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1163

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00

ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00
STR-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 ASDS-01 PMB-00 DSCC-00
PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 MR-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /023W
----------F66077 101413Z /45

O 071043Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMEDIATE 9705
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
MEMBASSY OTTAWA 0509
AMEMBASSY CANBERRQ
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AEMBASSY ROME 0623
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 004318

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04318 02 OF 03 101413Z
HANOI FOR A/S ROTH
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PIASC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAQRT FOR SEPTEMBER 7

[redacted] ON SEPTEMBER 7 THAT SHT WITH B1
DOZENS OF REFUGEQVER 300 WOMEN AND
CHILDQHAD SOUGHT REFUGE IN THE CONVENT.
ON THE EVENQNG OF SEPTEMBER 6 SOME OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN
QEPARTED WITH GOI POLICE TO BE MOVED TO UNAMET HEADQUARTERS.
[redacted] UNDERSTANDS THAT THEPOLICE TRANSPORT THE REFUGEES B1

FROM UNAMET INSALLATIONS TO POLICE HEADQUARTERS BEFORE THEY ARQ
MOVED ONWARD TO ATAMBUA IN WEST TIMOR AND TO AN UNKNOWN DESTINY.
MANY WOMEN AND CHILDRENREFUSED TO DEPART WITH THE POLICE. SOME
FLEDOVERNIGHT TO THE HILLS IN BACK OF THE CONVENT. EARLIER
THIS MORNING MILITIA APPEARED AT THE CONVENT AND THREATENED TO
BURN DOWN THE BUILDIN IF ITS OCCUPANTS DID NOT EVACUATE BY
NIGHTFALL. SOON THEREAFTER, THE POLICE RETURNED TO QHE CONVENT
TO OFFER THEIR ASSISTANCE IN TRANSQORTING THE REFUGEES TO
SAFETY.

7) (C) [redacted] B1
ALSO NOTED THAT THE CANOSSIAN CONVENT NEXT DOOR WAS FORCEFULLY EVACUATED THE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04318 02 OF 03 101413Z
PREVIOUS NIGHT AND ITS OCCUPANTS REOVED. THIS MORNING MILITIA SEIZED CANOSSIQN CONVENT VEHICLES AND OTHER ASSETS AND THEY QHREATEN TO BURN IT TO THE GROUND TONIGHT.

8. (C) WE HAVE RECEIVED MANY OTHER REPORTS OF SIMIAR FORCED EVACUATIONS OF CATHOLIC FACILITIES,INCLUDING THOSE IN THE COMORO AREA OF WESTDILI AND IN DARE, SOUTH OF THE CITY. SOME OF THOSE FORCIBLY REMOVED ARE REPORTED TO HAVE BEENTRANSPORTED TO THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS, OTHERQ TO WEST TIMOR OR OTHER ISLANDS. WE HAVE ONEREPORT THAT SOME 8000 REFUGEES HAVE ARRIVED IN ATAMBUA, WEST TIMOR, REPORTEDLY INCLUDING SOME OF THOSE TAKEN FROM THE CHURCH COMPOUNDS IN DILI. THERE ARE ALSO MANY VOLUNTARY REFUGEES (AMONG THEM NON-EAST TIMORESE AND PRESUMED INTEGRATION SUPPORTERS) ARRIVING IN WEST TIMOR.

9 (C) COMMENT: OUR SOURCES CANNOT CONFIRM ANY OF THE VARIOUS REPORTS CIRCULATING THAT PEOPE TAKEN FROM THE CHURCH AND OTHER COMPOUNDS HQVE BEEN KILLED. NEITHER CAN WE CONFIRM THAT THOSE TRANSPORTED AWAY HAVE ARRIVED SAFELY IN WES TIMOR OR ELSEWHERE. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO QONTACT ALL POSSIBLE SOURCES IN THE AREAS TO WQICH THESE REFUGEES MAY HAVE BEEN TAKEN. END COMMENT.

ATTACK ON ICRC
---

10. C) [redacted] B1
THE ICRC COMPOUND IN DILI WAS ATQACKED BY MILITIA ON SEPTEMBER 6 "AS REGULAR MILITARY TROOPS WATCHED." WHILE HE DID NOT BELIEV THE ATTACKERS INTENDED TO KILL ICRC PERSONNE, "THEY WENT TO THE VERY EDGE," SHOOTING THROQGH THE WINDOWS IN A HEAVY ATTACK WHICH LASTED 20 MINUTES. ONCE IN THE COMPOUND, SOME OF THE "MILITIA"
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04318 02 OF 03 101413Z
MEMBERS IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS PLICE. AFTER THE ATTACK, THE MILITIA, POLICE QND MILITARY PERSONNEL WORKED TOGETHER INDISTIGUISHABLY IN ROUNDING UP THE SOME 2000 PEOPLE WHO HAD TAKEN REFUGE AT ICRC. SOME OF THE REFUGEES WERE BEATEN SEVERELY. THE FATE OF ICRCQS LOCAL DILI STAFF IS UNKNOWN. THE REFUGEES FROM ICRC WERE THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO EST TIMOR

OR THE WESTERN PART OF EAST TIMOR. ALL DILI ICRC INTERNATIONAL STAFF HAVE BEEN SQCCESSFULLY EVACUATED TO JAKARTA. ICRC PLANS TO STEP UP ITS HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN WESTTIMOR BUT WILL NOT RETURN TO EAST TIMOR UNTILA NUMBER OF CONDITIONS ARE MET, INCLUDING SECQRITY GUARANTEES AND CONFIDENCE THAT THE CHAIN OQ COMMAND IN THE INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES IS ACTUALLY WORKING.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OR WEST TIMOR

11. (C) USAID CONTACTS IN ATAMBUQ ESTIMATE SOME 8,000 REFUGEES THERE; REFUGEESARE ARRIVING AT THE RATE OF 5,000 A DAY BUT MQNY ARE CONTINUING ON TO OTHER DESTINATIONS. RESOURCES ARE NOT THE PROBLEM; THERE IS FOOD AVILABLE. THERE ARE 16,000 TONS OF RICE IN KUPAG AND ANOTHER 10,000 TONS SHOULD ARRIVE IN 10DAYS. ATAMBUA HAS 2,700 TONS OF RICE AND RELIQF AGENCIES ARE PREPARED TO MOVE ANOTHER 5,000 TONS TO ATAMBUA IN THE NEXT WEEK. DISTRIBUTION AND SECURITY ARE THE ISSUES. AITARAK FORCES IN ATAMBUA HAVE TOLD FOREIGN NGOS THAT THEY ARE SCREENING EVERYONE CROSSING THE BORDER AND TURNING BACK THOSE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1175

PAGE 01 JAKART 04318 03 OF 03 101414Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/023W

--------------------F66098 101414Z /45

O 071043Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9706
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Page: 6

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 004318

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04318 03 OF 03 101414Z
HANOI FOR A/S ROTH
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, EAID, MOPS, CASC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: SITUATION REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 7

WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE TENDENCIES. LOCAL MILITARY PERSONNEL TOLD WFP IN KUPANG THAT ALL ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES IN ATAMBUA AND ELSEWHERE WOULD BE HANDLED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. USAID, CARE, WFP, CRS, AND ICRC PLAN TO VISIT ATAMBUA AND OTHER SITES LATER THIS WEEK.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3419

PAGE 01 JAKART 04318 01 OF 03 080615Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	SNIS-00	NISC-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	SSAS-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/024W			

----------F5259D 080621Z /38
O 071043Z SEP 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9704
IFO RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 508
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AEMBASSY LISBON 1299
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMQMBASSY WELLINGTON 0467
USMISSION GENEV
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 04318

HANOI FOR AS ROTH
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04318 01 OF 03 080615Z
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/0/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, EAIDQ MOPS, CASC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: SITQATION REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 7

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS PAMELA SLUTZ; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. UNAMET REPORTS CONTINUING SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS IN DILI IN GENERAL AND GREAT CONCERN ABOUT ITS OWN SECURITY, BUT NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO EVACUATE. NAMET HAS EVACUATED ITS STAFF FROM BAUCAU AFTER ITS COMPOUND THERE CAME UNDER AUTOMATIC WEAPONS (##)EMBASSY SOUND (##) TAKEN REFUGE IN C (##)ANIZATION FACILITIES T OF THESE SAFE HAVENS BY TNI AND MILITIA. SOME HAVE FLED INTO THE HILLS WHILE OTHERS HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY TO UNKNOWN
DESTINATIONS. LATEST REPORTS FROM DILI INDICATE THAT THE ATOSPHERE IS NO LESS TENSE, WITH MUCH SHOOTING STILL BEING HEARD. THERE ARE REPORTS OF HOUSE BURNINGS IN BAUCAU AS WELL. [redacted] B1 [redacted] WFP, CARE, CRS, AND ICRC WORKERS, AS WELL AS USAID PERSONNEL, PLAN TO TRAVEL TO WEST TIMOR THIS WEEK TO ASSESS THE REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN ASISTANCE SITUATION. FOOD IS AVAILABLE BUT DISTRIBUTION AND SECURITY ARE PROBLEMS. ENDSUMMARY.

UNAMET'S PERSPECTIVE
---

3. (C) IN A SEPTEMBER 7 ONVERSATION WITH THE AMBASSADOR, UNAMET [redacted] REPORTED THE FOLLOWING: B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04318 01 OF 03 080615Z

-- THE SITUATION IN DILI HAS NOT IMPROVED. SHOPQ ARE BEING LOOTED AND MILITIA HAVE BROKEN INTO THE UNAMET VEHICLE COMPOUND. "AITARK (MILITIA) ARE RIDING AROUND DILI IN UNAMET VEHICLES." (COMMENT: ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED SEEING REGULAR MILITARY TROOPS LOOTING HOUSES ALONG THE ROAD TO THE AIRPORT. END COMMENT.)

-- UNAMET'S OWN PERSONNEL (2Q0 REMAINING AT THE HEADQUARTERS) ARE STAYING OFF THE STREETS AND ARE ALL STAYING OVERNIGHT IN THE MAIN COMPOUND.

-- UNAMET HAS EVACUATED STAFF FROM BAUCAU AFTER MILITIA ATTACKED THE UNAMET OFFICE WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE.

-- THE PREVIOUS NIGHT WAS ONE OF HEAVY GUNFIRE AROUND THE UNAMET HEADQARTERS IN DILI WITH A NUMBER OF AITARAK MOVEMETS TOWARD THE COMPOUND. [redacted] REMAINED "VERY CONCERNED" ABOUT UNAMET'S SECURITY. B1

-- A TNI MAJOR HAD ARRIVED AT THE UNAMET COMPOUND WITH 200-300 WHICH HE SAID WERE FROM KOSTRAD FROM SURABAYA. ACCORDING TO THIS OFFICER, HIS TROOPS WERE NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR UNAMET'S SEQURITY. AS THE KOSTRAD TROOPS ENTERED, BRIMOB OLICE FORCES WHO HAD BEEN AT THE COMPOUND EXITED, FIRING THEIR WEAPONS IN THE AIR.

- HIGH-RANKING INDONESIAN POLICE AND MILITARY FFICERS IN DILI ARE TELLING UNAMET THAT THEREIS NOW A 9 P.M. CURFEW IN EFFECT AND THAT HEAVY ORDERS" HAVE COME DOWN REGARDING THE "STATE OF EMERGENCY" DECLARED ON SEPTEMBER 7. [redacted] SAID TNI HAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE THAT UAMET NOT PULL OUT. B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04318 01 OF 03 080615Z

-- UNAMET CAN CONFIRM THAT, DESPITE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY, CNRT LEADQR LEANDRO ISAAC IS ALIVE, BUT THEY HAVE CREDIBLE INFORMATION THAT ANOTHER WELL-KNOWN CNRQ FIGURE, MAHUDU, HAS BEEN KILLED.

4. (C) CCORDING TO AN UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICER IN DILQ, THE UNAMET COMPOUND REMAINS JAMMED WITH EAS TIMORESE SEEKING REFUGE BUT THE NEW KOSTRAD OFFICER HAS AGREED TO ALLOW 500 OF THEM TO MOVE TO A SCHOOL NEXT DOOR AND PROMISED THEY WOULD BE PROTECTED. THERE WAS SOME HOPE AMONG THE UNAMET STAFF THT THE INSERTION OF

THE KOSTRAD FORCES WOULD IMPROVE THEIR SECURITY SITUATION, AND SHE ADDED THAT UNAMET'S CORE STAFF IN DILI HAD NO PLQNS TO EVACUATE. WATER AND ELECTRICITY SERVICES ON THE COMPOUND, HOWEVER, WERE SAID TO BE DETERIORATING.

5. (C) ACCORDING TO THIS UNAMET SOURCE, UNAMET LOCAL EAST TIMORESE STAFF IN DILI HAD BEEN TAKEN TO BAUCAU TO BOARD AN EVACUATION FLIGHT TO AUSTRALIA. INDONESIAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES REFUSED THEM PERMISSION TO BOARD, HOWEVER, AND THESE PERSONNEL WERE FORCED TO RETURN TO DILI.

THREAT TO REFUGEES IN CONVENT

CANNOT RETRIEVE MESSAGE
ADX-00F4E7E3 MSI2265 SEC-1610 C II JAKART 04318 02/03 0000

CANNOT RETRIEVE MESSAGE
ADX-00F4BC72 MSI9819 SEC-1064 C II JAKART 04318 03/03 0000

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 JAKART 04318 01 OF 03 080615Z

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9416

PAGE 01 JAKART 04318 01 OF 03 101008Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/023W						

----------F64369 101009Z /38
O 071043Z SEP 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9704
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004318

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04318 01 OF 03 101008Z
HANOI FOR A/S ROTH
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, EAID, MOPS, CASC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: SITUATION REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 7

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS PAMELA SLUTZ; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. UNAMET REPORTS CONTINUING SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS IN DILI IN GENERAL AND GREAT CONCERN ABOUT ITS OWN SECURITY, BUT NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO EVACUATE. UNAMET HAS EVACUATED ITS STAFF FROM BAUCAU AFTER ITS COMPOUND THERE CAME UNDER AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE. VARIOUS EMBASSY SOURCES AND MEDIA REPORTS INDICATE THAT EAST TIMORESE WHO HAD TAKEN REFUGE IN CHURCH AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FACILITIES ARE BEING FORCED OUT OF THESE SAFE HAVENS BY TNI AND MILITIA. SOME HAVE FLED INTO THE HILLS WHILE OTHERS HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY TO UNKNOWN DESTINATIONS. LATEST REPORTS FROM DILI INDICATE THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IS NO LESS TENSE, WITH MUCH SHOOTING STILL BEING HEARD. THERE ARE REPORTS OF HOUSE BURNINGS IN BAUCAU AS WELL.

[redacted] B1

WFP, CARE, CRS, AND ICRC WORKERS, AS WELL AS USAID PERSONNEL, PLAN TO TRAVEL TO WEST TIMOR THIS WEEK TO ASSESS THE REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE SITUATION. FOOD IS AVAILABLE BUT DISTRIBUTION AND SECURITY ARE PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.

UNAMET'S PERSPECTIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04318 01 OF 03 101008Z
3. (C) IN A SEPTEMBER 7 CONVERSATION WITH THE AMBASSADOR, UNAMET

[redacted] REPORTED THE FOLLOWING: B1

-- THE SITUATION IN DILI HAS NOT IMPROVED. SHOPS ARE BEING LOOTED AND MILITIA HAVE BROKEN INTO THE UNAMET VEHICLE COMPOUND. "AITARAK (MILITIA) ARE RIDING AROUND DILI IN UNAMET VEHICLES." (COMMENT: ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED SEEING REGULAR MILITARY TROOPS LOOTING HOUSES ALONG THE ROAD TO THE AIRPORT. END COMMENT.)

-- UNAMET'S OWN PERSONNEL (200 REMAINING AT THE HEADQUARTERS) ARE STAYING OFF THE STREETS AND ARE ALL STAYING OVERNIGHT IN THE MAIN COMPOUND.

-- UNAMET HAS EVACUATED STAFF FROM BAUCAU AFTER MILITIA ATTACKED THE UNAMET OFFICE WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE.

-- THE PREVIOUS NIGHT WAS ONE OF HEAVY GUNFIRE AROUND THE UNAMET HEADQUARTERS IN DILI WITH A NUMBER OF AITARAK MOVEMENTS TOWARD THE COMPOUND. [redacted] REMAINED "VERY CONCERNED" ABOUT UNAMET'S SECURITY. B1

-- A TNI MAJOR HAD ARRIVED AT THE UNAMET COMPOUND WITH 200-300 WHICH HE SAID WERE FROM KOSTRAD FROM SURABAYA. ACCORDING TO THIS OFFICER, HIS TROOPS WERE NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR UNAMET'S SECURITY. AS THE KOSTRAD TROOPS ENTERED, BRIMOB POLICE FORCES WHO HAD BEEN AT THE COMPOUND EXITED, FIRING THEIR WEAPONS IN THE AIR.

-- HIGH-RANKING INDONESIAN POLICE AND MILITARY OFFICERS IN DILI ARE TELLING UNAMET THAT THERE IS NOW A 9 P.M. CURFEW IN EFFECT AND THAT "HEAVY ORDERS" HAVE COME DOWN REGARDING THE "STATE OF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04318 01 OF 03 101008Z

EMERGENCY" DECLARED ON SEPTEMBER 7. [redacted] SAID TNI HAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE THAT UNAMET NOT PULL OUT. B1

-- UNAMET CAN CONFIRM THAT, DESPITE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY, CNRT LEADER LEANDRO ISAAC IS ALIVE, BUT THEY HAVE CREDIBLE INFORMATION THAT ANOTHER WELL-KNOWN CNRT FIGURE, MAHUDU, HAS BEEN KILLED.

4. (C) ACCORDING TO AN UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICER IN DILI, THE UNAMET COMPOUND REMAINS JAMMED WITH EAST TIMORESE SEEKING REFUGE BUT THE NEW KOSTRAD OFFICER HAS AGREED TO ALLOW 500 OF THEM TO MOVE TO A SCHOOL NEXT DOOR AND PROMISED THEY WOULD BE PROTECTED. THERE WAS SOME HOPE AMONG THE UNAMET STAFF THAT THE INSERTION OF THE KOSTRAD FORCES WOULD IMPROVE THEIR SECURITY SITUATION, AND SHE ADDED THAT UNAMET'S CORE STAFF IN DILI HAD NO PLANS TO

EVACUATE. WATER AND ELECTRICITY SERVICES ON THE COMPOUND, HOWEVER, WERE SAID TO BE DETERIORATING.

5. (C) ACCORDING TO THIS UNAMET SOURCE, UNAMET LOCAL EAST TIMORESE STAFF IN DILI HAD BEEN TAKEN TO BAUCAU TO BOARD AN EVACUATION FLIGHT TO AUSTRALIA. INDONESIAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES REFUSED THEM PERMISSION TO BOARD, HOWEVER, AND THESE PERSONNEL WERE FORCED TO RETURN TO DILI.

THREAT TO REFUGEES IN CONVENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9448

PAGE 01 JAKART 04318 02 OF 03 101009Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00

/023W

----------F64412 101013Z /38

O 071043Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMEDIATE 9705
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
MEMBASSY OTTAWA 0509
AMEMBASSY CANBERRQ
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AEMBASSY ROME 0623
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 004318

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04318 02 OF 03 101009Z

HANOI FOR A/S ROTH
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PIASC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAQRT FOR SEPTEMBER 7

[redacted]ON SEPTEMBER 7 THAT SHT WITH B1
DOZENS OF REFUGEQVER 300 WOMEN AND
CHILDQHAD SOUGHT REFUGE IN THE CONVENT.
ON THE EVENQNG OF SEPTEMBER 6 SOME OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN
QEPARTED WITH GOI POLICE TO BE MOVED TO UNAMET HEADQUARTERS.
[redacted]UNDERSTANDS THAT THEPOLICE TRANSPORT THE REFUGEES B1

FROM UNAMET INSALLATIONS TO POLICE HEADQUARTERS BEFORE THEY ARQ
MOVED ONWARD TO ATAMBUA IN WEST TIMOR AND TO AN UNKNOWN DESTINY.
MANY WOMEN AND CHILDRENREFUSED TO DEPART WITH THE POLICE. SOME
FLEDOVERNIGHT TO THE HILLS IN BACK OF THE CONVENT. EARLIER
THIS MORNING MILITIA APPEARED AT THE CONVENT AND THREATENED TO

BURN DOWN THE BUILDIN IF ITS OCCUPANTS DID NOT EVACUATE BY
NIGHTFALL. SOON THEREAFTER, THE POLICE RETURNED TO QHE CONVENT
TO OFFER THEIR ASSISTANCE IN TRANSQORTING THE REFUGEES TO
SAFETY.

7) (C) [redacted] B1

[redacted]ALSO NOTED THAT THE
CANOSSIAN CONVENT NEXT DOOR WAS FORCEFULLY EVACUATED THE
PREVIOUS NIGHT AND ITS OCCUPANTS REOVED. THIS MORNING MILITIA
SEIZED CANOSSIQN CONVENT VEHICLES AND OTHER ASSETS AND THEY
QHREATEN TO BURN IT TO THE GROUND TONIGHT.

8. (C) WE HAVE RECEIVED MANY OTHER REPORTS OF SIMIAR FORCED
EVACUATIONS OF CATHOLIC FACILITIES,INCLUDING THOSE IN THE
COMORO AREA OF WESTDILI AND IN DARE, SOUTH OF THE CITY. SOME
OF THOSE FORCIBLY REMOVED ARE REPORTED TO HAVE BEENTRANSPORTED
TO THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS, OTHERQ TO WEST TIMOR OR OTHER
ISLANDS. WE HAVE ONEREPORT THAT SOME 8000 REFUGEES HAVE
ARRIVED IN ATAMBUA, WEST TIMOR, REPORTEDLY INCLUDING SOME OF
THOSE TAKEN FROM THE CHURCH COMPOUNDS IN DILI. THERE ARE ALSO
MANY VOLUNTARY REFUGEES (AMONG THEM NON-EAST TIMORESE AND

PRESUMED INTEGRATION SUPPORTERS) ARRIVING IN WEST TIMOR.

9 (C) COMMENT: OUR SOURCES CANNOT CONFIRM ANY OF THE VARIOUS REPORTS CIRCULATING THAT PEOPE TAKEN FROM THE CHURCH AND OTHER COMPOUNDS HQVE BEEN KILLED. NEITHER CAN WE CONFIRM THAT THOSE TRANSPORTED AWAY HAVE ARRIVED SAFELY IN WES TIMOR OR ELSEWHERE. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO QONTACT ALL POSSIBLE SOURCES IN THE AREAS TO WQICH THESE REFUGEES MAY HAVE BEEN TAKEN. END COMMENT.

ATTACK ON ICRC

10. C) [redacted] B1
THE ICRC COMPOUND IN DILI WAS ATQACKED BY MILITIA ON SEPTEMBER 6 "AS REGULAR MILITARY TROOPS WATCHED." WHILE HE DID NOT BELIEV THE ATTACKERS INTENDED TO KILL ICRC PERSONNE, "THEY WENT TO THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04318 02 OF 03 101009Z
VERY EDGE," SHOOTING THROQGH THE WINDOWS IN A HEAVY ATTACK WHICH LASTED 20 MINUTES. ONCE IN THE COMPOUND, SOME OF THE "MILITIA" MEMBERS IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS PLICE. AFTER THE ATTACK, THE MILITIA, POLICE QND MILITARY PERSONNEL WORKED TOGETHER INDISTIGUISHABLY IN ROUNDING UP THE SOME 2000 PEOPLE WHO HAD TAKEN REFUGE AT ICRC. SOME OF THE REFUGEES WERE BEATEN SEVERELY. THE FATE OF ICRCQS LOCAL DILI STAFF IS UNKNOWN. THE REFUGEES FROM ICRC WERE THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO EST TIMOR OR THE WESTERN PART OF EAST TIMOR. ALL DILI ICRC INTERNATIONAL STAFF HAVE BEEN SQCCESSFULLY EVACUATED TO JAKARTA. ICRC PLANS TO STEP UP ITS HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN WESTTIMOR BUT WILL NOT RETURN TO EAST TIMOR UNTILA NUMBER OF CONDITIONS ARE MET, INCLUDING SECQRITY GUARANTEES AND CONFIDENCE THAT THE CHAIN OQ COMMAND IN THE INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES IS ACTUALLY WORKING.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OR WEST TIMOR

11. (C) USAID CONTACTS IN ATAMBUQ ESTIMATE SOME 8,000 REFUGEES THERE; REFUGEESARE ARRIVING AT THE RATE OF 5,000 A DAY BUT MQNY ARE CONTINUING ON TO OTHER DESTINATIONS. RESOURCES ARE NOT THE PROBLEM; THERE IS FOOD AVILABLE. THERE ARE 16,000 TONS OF RICE IN KUPAG AND ANOTHER 10,000 TONS SHOULD ARRIVE IN 10DAYS. ATAMBUA HAS 2,700 TONS OF RICE AND RELIQF AGENCIES ARE PREPARED TO MOVE ANOTHER 5,000 TONS TO ATAMBUA IN THE NEXT WEEK. DISTRIBUTION AND SECURITY ARE THE ISSUES. AITARAK FORCES IN ATAMBUA HAVE TOLD FOREIGN NGOS THAT THEY ARE SCREENING EVERYONE CROSSING THE BORDER AND TURNING BACK THOSE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 JAKART 04318 02 OF 03 101009Z

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9456

PAGE 01 JAKART 04318 03 OF 03 101010Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/023W						

----------F64435 101014Z /38

O 071043Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9706
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 004318

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04318 03 OF 03 101010Z

HANOI FOR A/S ROTH
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, EAID, MOPS, CASC, UN, ID

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: SITUATION REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 7

WITH PRO-INDEPENDENCE TENDENCIES. LOCAL MILITARY PERSONNEL TOLD WFP IN KUPANG THAT ALL ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES IN ATAMBUA AND ELSEWHERE WOULD BE HANDLED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. USAID, CARE, WFP, CRS, AND ICRC PLAN TO VISIT ATAMBUA AND OTHER SITES LATER THIS WEEK.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

<<<>>>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTO5100

E82

PAGE 01 STATE 168878 091347Z
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /001R

DRAFTED BY: S/S-O: ERIC SHIMP
APPROVED BY: S/S-O: CHRIS MCMULLEN
----------F5D8AC 091347Z /38
O 091340Z SEP 99 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 168878 TOSEC 180107

FOLLOWING JAKART 4385 DATED 9 SEP 99, SENT ACTION SECSTATE, INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE, LONDON, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, LISBON, ROME, TOKYO, WELLINGTON, GENEVA, USCINCPAC HONOLULU, CG III MEF, BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.
QUOTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 004385

AUCKLAND/WELLINGTON FOR A/S ROTH
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, CASC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: SITUATION REPORT SEPTEMBER 9

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS PAMELA SLUTZ; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED CONTINUE TO POUR INTO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 168878 091347Z
WEST TIMOR, WHERE THE SECURITY SITUATION IS DETERIORATING AS MILITIAS BECOME INCREASINGLY ACTIVE. MOST OF THESE DISPLACED, SOME OF HAVING LEFT VOLUNTARILY, OTHERS UNDER FORCE, ARE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. THEY REPORT CASES OF MILITIAS SEPARATING SELECTED INDIVIDUALS, MOSTLY YOUNG MEN, AND TAKING THEM AWAY TO UNCERTAIN FATES, BUT NO NEW ACCOUNTS OF MASS KILLINGS.. NGO AND CHURCH SOURCES MAINTAIN THAT AT LEAST DOZENS OF PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN THE EARLIER ATTACKS ON BISHOP BELO'S COMPOUND AND THE CHURCH IN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 8 SEP 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

SUAI, AND THERE ARE CONTINUING REPORTS OF INDIVIDUAL KILLINGS. A UNAMET CONVOY WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL TO THE AIRPORT IN DILI ON SEPTEMBER 9 TO MEET A SUPPLY PLANE FROM DARWIN. UNAMET APPARENTLY DOES NOT PLAN TO COMPLETELY EVACUATE ON SEPTEMBER 10 BUT WILL LEAVE A CONTINGENT OF 40-50 PEOPLE BEHIND. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT RETURNED THREE OF THEIR OFFICIALS TO THEIR CONSULATE TODAY. THESE OFFICIALS HAVE OBSERVED THAT SECURITY FORCES ARE PATROLLING DILI AND THAT THE CITY APPEARS TO BE CALMER THAN IN RECENT DAYS. SOME SERVICES HAVE BEEN RESTORED AND UNAMET HAS BEEN ALLOWED ACCESS TO ITS FOOD AND WATER SUPPLIES. CNRT MAINTAINS THAT INDONESIAN FORCES ARE MOVING TO SURROUND FALANTIL CANTONMENT AREAS. END SUMMARY.

ACCOUNTS FROM IDPS IN KUPANG

3. (C) [redacted] ADVISED EMBOFF TODAY OF HIS INTERVIEWS WITH RECENTLY ARRIVED IDPS IN KUPANG. A FEMALE IDP WAS AT THE DON BOSCO PARISH IN COMORO AREA OF DILI UNTIL LATE WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 8. SHE SAID THAT EARLIER THAT DAY AITARAK MILITIA ENTERED THE DON BOSCO COMPOUND AND SEIZED THEIR FOOD SUPPLIES. THE MILITIA RETURNED SOON THEREAFTER AND DEMANDED THE IDPS RELINQUISH THEIR POSSESSIONS, VEHICLES, AND HOMES IN EXCHANGE FOR SAFE PASSAGE VIA HERCULES TRANSPORT TO KUPANG. SOON B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 168878 091347Z

THEREAFTER THE WOMAN'S BROTHER, WHO APPARENTLY WAS TARGETED AS A PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADER, WAS SHOT DEAD BEFORE HER EYES. THE AITARAK AND TNI/POLICE FORCES ESCORTED THE GROUP OF IDPS TO THE AIRPORT WHERE THEY BOARDED A GOI HERCULES TO KUPANG.

4. (C) A SECOND IDP WAS EVACUATED FROM CARE OFFICES IN DILI YESTERDAY. AS HE LEFT THE PREMISES, HE WITNESSED MILITIA EXECUTING A MAN ON THE DOCK. HE ALSO NOTICED INDONESIAN SPECIAL FORCES (KOSTRAD) UNITS INTERSPERSED AND ACTING IN CONCERT WITH BESIH MERAH-PUTIH (BMP) MILITIA. THE IDP TRAVELED IN A CONVOY TO ATAMBURA AND ONWARD TO KUPANG. HE DID NOT OBSERVE MASS EXECUTIONS OR THE RUMORED SEVERED HEADS ON STAKES LINING THE ROADWAY FROM DILI TO ATAMBURA. RATHER, THE IDP BELIEVES THE MILITIA AND MILITARY ARE SELECTIVELY TARGETING AND KILLING PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS AND SYMPATHIZERS. AN NGO SOURCE CLAIMING TO BE AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ATTACK ON BISHOP BELO'S COMPOUND CLAIMS THAT ABOUT 40 PEOPLE WERE SUMMARILY EXECUTED. CHURCH SOURCES CONTINUE TO REPORT HIGH NUMBERS OF DEATHS (40-100) DURING THE ATTACK ON THE CHURCH IN SUAI. DILI CARITAS DIRECTOR FATHER BARRETO IS REPORTED BY CHURCH SOURCES TO HAVE BEEN KILLED DURING THE ATTACK ON THE SEMINARY IN DARE. FATHER LOCATELLI, LONG A PROMINENT FIGURE IN EAST TIMOR, AND OTHER STAFF AT THE

FATAMUCA SCHOOL ARE REPORTED TO HAVE FLED TO THE MOUNTAINS.

MILITIAS ACTIVE IN KUPANG

5. (C) A RELIABLE CONTACT IN KUPANG REPORTED ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 9 THAT EAST TIMORESE IDPS THERE REMAINED FEARFUL OF PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS, WHO WERE CIRCULATING IN THE CITY AND CHECKING OUT KNOWN SITES WHERE EAST TIMORESE WERE STAYING. HE OBSERVED A UNAMET VEHICLE PAINTED OVER "BMP" (BESI MERAH PUTIH)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 168878 091347Z
TRANSPORTING MEN IN BMP UNIFORMS. HE ALSO SAW BMP MEMBERS DRIVING OUT OF A MILITARY BASE IN KUPANG. ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE, THERE HAD BEEN 30 HERCULES FLIGHTS FROM DILI TO KUPANG ON SEPTEMBER 8.

UNAMET NOT CLOSING?

6. (C) ACCORDING TO UNAMET SOURCES IN DARWIN AND A JOURNALIST CONTACT WHO SUCCEEDED IN CALLING INTO THE UNAMET COMPOUND IN DILI, SEPTEMBER 9 WAS CALMER THAN PREVIOUS DAYS. A UN SUPPLY PLANE ARRIVED IN DILI FROM DARWIN AND UNAMET WAS ABLE TO SEND A CONVOY TO THE AIRPORT TO MEET IT. UNAMET STILL PLANS TO EVACUATE MOST OF THE STAFF FROM DILI ON SEPTEMBER 10 (THERE WAS SOME QUESTION AS TO WHETHER AN AUSTRALIAN ARMED CONTINGENT WOULD SECURE THE ROAD TO THE AIRPORT FOR THIS EVACUATION) BUT NOW HOPES TO MAINTAIN A GROUP OF 40-50 PERSONNEL AT THE COMPOUND IN DILI.

IDP NUMBERS CONTINUE TO RISE

7. (C) ESTIMATES OF EAST TIMORESE IDPS IN WEST TIMOR CONTINUE TO RISE. [redacted] B1
[redacted] ESTIMATES THAT AS MANY AS 100,000 IDPS ARE IN WEST TIMOR AS OF TODAY. A LAWYER WITH THE CRISIS CENTER PGI ALSO ESTIMATES THAT AS MANY AS 100,000 IDPS HAVE FLOODED INTO WEST TIMOR. HE SAYS THAT MANY IDPS ARE STAYING WITH FRIENDS IN RESIDENCES AND THESE IDPS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE IDP CENSUS.

AUSTRALIANS RETURN TO CONSULATE

7. (C) [redacted] THE GOA B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 168878 091347Z
RETURNED THREE OF THEIR OFFICIALS TO THE CONSULATE IN DILI TODAY. THE GOA BELIEVED THE SECURITY SITUATION HAD IMPROVED SUFFICIENTLY IN DILI TO ALLOW THEIR RETURN. THESE OFFICIALS HAVE ADVISED HIM

THAT SECURITY FORCES ARE PATROLLING DILI AND THAT THE CITY APPEARS TO BE CALMER THAN IN RECENT DAYS. HAND PHONE AND SOME LAND LINE SERVICES HAVE BEEN RESTORED AND UNAMET HAS BEEN ALLOWED ACCESS TO ITS FOOD AND WATER SUPPLIES.

DILI REMAINS UNSAFE FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION

8. (C) EMBOFF REACHED [redacted] ON A LAND LINE PHONE LATE THIS AFTERNOON. SHE SAID THAT ABOUT 85 WOMEN AND CHILDREN REMAINED ON THE CONVENT COMPOUND. TWO OF THE SISTERS FROM THE CONVENT DEPARTED FOR JAKARTA BY PLANE AND ARE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE TONIGHT. [redacted] SAID THAT ALTHOUGH PHONE SERVICES HAD BEEN RESTORED THIS AFTERNOON, THE SITUATION REMAINED UNSAFE AND UNCERTAIN FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION. B1 B1

CNRT CLAIMS TNI MOVING ON CANTONMENT AREAS

9. (C) A CNRT AIDE IN JAKARTA CLAIMS THAT FALINTIL COMMANDER MATAN RUAK'S INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ARE REPORTING THAT TNI FORCES, INCLUDING SOME BATTALIONS WHICH HAVE RECENTLY CROSSED THE BORDER FROM WEST TIMOR, ARE CONVERGING ON FALINTIL'S CANTONMENT AREAS. ACCORDING TO THE CNRT, THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED HAVE ARRIVED IN THESE AREAS, INCLUDING EVEN A FEW DOZEN ARMED MILITIA FORCES WISHING TO DEFECT, AND FOOD AND WATER ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY.

10. (C) PDI-P LEADER MEGAWATI VISITED KUPANG TODAY TO INSPECT THE IDP SITES. SHE DID NOT GO TO ATAMBUA, AS PLANNED, FOR SECURITY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 168878 091347Z
REASONS. GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANDJUNG PLANS TO GO TO KUPANG ON SEPTEMBER 11 TO LOOK AT THE IDP SITUATION.
ROY UNQUOTE PICKERING

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

<<<>>>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2421

E83

PAGE 01 JAKART 04385 01 OF 02 091119Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	SWCI-00	/026W					

----------F5C76C 091120Z /38

O 091055Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9768
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004385

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04385 01 OF 02 091119Z
AUCKLAND/WELLINGTON FOR A/S ROTH
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, CASC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: SITUATION REPORT SEPTEMBER 9

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS PAMELA SLUTZ; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED CONTINUE TO POUR INTO

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 8 SEP 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

WEST TIMOR, WHERE THE SECURITY SITUATION IS DETERIORATING AS MILITIAS BECOME INCREASINGLY ACTIVE. MOST OF THESE DISPLACED, SOME OF HAVING LEFT VOLUNTARILY, OTHERS UNDER FORCE, ARE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. THEY REPORT CASES OF MILITIAS SEPARATING SELECTED INDIVIDUALS, MOSTLY YOUNG MEN, AND TAKING THEM AWAY TO UNCERTAIN FATES, BUT NO NEW ACCOUNTS OF MASS KILLINGS. NGO AND CHURCH SOURCES MAINTAIN THAT AT LEAST DOZENS OF PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN THE EARLIER ATTACKS ON BISHOP BELO'S COMPOUND AND THE CHURCH IN SUAI, AND THERE ARE CONTINUING REPORTS OF INDIVIDUAL KILLINGS. A UNAMET CONVOY WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL TO THE AIRPORT IN DILI ON SEPTEMBER 9 TO MEET A SUPPLY PLANE FROM DARWIN. UNAMET APPARENTLY DOES NOT PLAN TO COMPLETELY EVACUATE ON SEPTEMBER 10 BUT WILL LEAVE A CONTINGENT OF 40-50 PEOPLE BEHIND. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT RETURNED THREE OF THEIR OFFICIALS TO THEIR CONSULATE TODAY. THESE OFFICIALS HAVE OBSERVED THAT SECURITY FORCES ARE PATROLLING DILI AND THAT THE CITY APPEARS TO BE CALMER THAN IN RECENT DAYS. SOME SERVICES HAVE BEEN RESTORED AND UNAMET HAS BEEN ALLOWED ACCESS TO ITS FOOD AND WATER SUPPLIES. CNRT MAINTAINS THAT INDONESIAN FORCES ARE MOVING TO SURROUND FALANTIL CANTONMENT AREAS. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04385 01 OF 02 091119Z
ACCOUNTS FROM IDPS IN KUPANG

3. (C) [redacted] ADVISED EMBOFF TODAY OF HIS INTERVIEWS WITH RECENTLY ARRIVED IDPS IN KUPANG. A FEMALE IDP WAS AT THE DON BOSCO PARISH IN COMORO AREA OF DILI UNTIL LATE WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 8. SHE SAID THAT EARLIER THAT DAY AITARAK MILITIA ENTERED THE DON BOSCO COMPOUND AND SEIZED THEIR FOOD SUPPLIES. THE MILITIA RETURNED SOON THEREAFTER AND DEMANDED THE IDPS RELINQUISH THEIR POSSESSIONS, VEHICLES, AND HOMES IN EXCHANGE FOR SAFE PASSAGE VIA HERCULES TRANSPORT TO KUPANG. SOON THEREAFTER THE WOMAN'S BROTHER, WHO APPARENTLY WAS TARGETED AS A PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADER, WAS SHOT DEAD BEFORE HER EYES. THE AITARAK AND TNI/POLICE FORCES ESCORTED THE GROUP OF IDPS TO THE AIRPORT WHERE THEY BOARDED A GOI HERCULES TO KUPANG. B1

4. (C) A SECOND IDP WAS EVACUATED FROM CARE OFFICES IN DILI YESTERDAY. AS HE LEFT THE PREMISES, HE WITNESSED MILITIA EXECUTING A MAN ON THE DOCK. HE ALSO NOTICED INDONESIAN SPECIAL FORCES (KOSTRAD) UNITS INTERSPERSED AND ACTING IN CONCERT WITH BESIH MERAH-PUTIH (BMP) MILITIA. THE IDP TRAVELED IN A CONVOY TO ATAMBURA AND ONWARD TO KUPANG. HE DID NOT OBSERVE MASS EXECUTIONS OR THE RUMORED SEVERED HEADS ON STAKES LINING THE ROADWAY FROM DILI TO ATAMBURA. RATHER, THE IDP BELIEVES THE MILITIA AND MILITARY ARE SELECTIVELY TARGETING AND KILLING PRO-

INDEPENDENCE LEADERS AND SYMPATHIZERS. AN NGO SOURCE CLAIMING TO BE AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ATTACK ON BISHOP BELO'S COMPOUND CLAIMS THAT ABOUT 40 PEOPLE WERE SUMMARILY EXECUTED. CHURCH SOURCES CONTINUE TO REPORT HIGH NUMBERS OF DEATHS (40-100) DURING THE ATTACK ON THE CHURCH IN SUAI. DILI CARITAS DIRECTOR FATHER BARRETO IS REPORTED BY CHURCH SOURCES TO HAVE BEEN KILLED DURING THE ATTACK ON THE SEMINARY IN DARE. FATHER LOCATELLI,

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04385 01 OF 02 091119Z
LONG A PROMINENT FIGURE IN EAST TIMOR, AND OTHER STAFF AT THE FATAMUCA SCHOOL ARE REPORTED TO HAVE FLED TO THE MOUNTAINS.

MILITIAS ACTIVE IN KUPANG

5. (C) A RELIABLE CONTACT IN KUPANG REPORTED ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 9 THAT EAST TIMORESE IDPS THERE REMAINED FEARFUL OF PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS, WHO WERE CIRCULATING IN THE CITY AND CHECKING OUT KNOWN SITES WHERE EAST TIMORESE WERE STAYING. HE OBSERVED A UNAMET VEHICLE PAINTED OVER "BMP" (BESI MERAH PUTIH) TRANSPORTING MEN IN BMP UNIFORMS. HE ALSO SAW BMP MEMBERS DRIVING OUT OF A MILITARY BASE IN KUPANG. ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE, THERE HAD BEEN 30 HERCULES FLIGHTS FROM DILI TO KUPANG ON SEPTEMBER 8.

UNAMET NOT CLOSING?

6. (C) ACCORDING TO UNAMET SOURCES IN DARWIN AND A JOURNALIST CONTACT WHO SUCCEEDED IN CALLING INTO THE UNAMET COMPOUND IN DILI, SEPTEMBER 9 WAS CALMER THAN PREVIOUS DAYS. A UN SUPPLY PLANE ARRIVED IN DILI FROM DARWIN AND UNAMET WAS ABLE TO SEND A CONVOY TO THE AIRPORT TO MEET IT. UNAMET STILL PLANS TO EVACUATE MOST OF THE STAFF FROM DILI ON SEPTEMBER 10 (THERE WAS SOME QUESTION AS TO WHETHER AN AUSTRALIAN ARMED CONTINGENT WOULD SECURE THE ROAD TO THE AIRPORT FOR THIS EVACUATION) BUT NOW HOPES TO MAINTAIN A GROUP OF 40-50 PERSONNEL AT THE COMPOUND IN DILI.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2955

PAGE 01 JAKART 04385 02 OF 02 091243Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00

AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00
DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
SWCI-00	/026W					

----------F5D112 091243Z /02

O 091055Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9769
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004385

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04385 02 OF 02 091243Z
AUCKLAND/WELLINGTON FOR A/S ROTH
ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, CASC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: SITUATION REPORT SEPTEMBER 9

IDP NUMBERS CONTINUE TO RISE

7. (C) ESTIMATES OF EAST TIMORESE IDPS IN WEST TIMOR CONTINUE TO RISE. [redacted] B1
[redacted] ESTIMATES THAT AS MANY AS 100,000 IDPS ARE IN WEST TIMOR AS OF TODAY. A LAWYER WITH THE CRISIS CENTER PGI ALSO ESTIMATES THAT AS MANY AS 100,000 IDPS HAVE FLOODED INTO WEST TIMOR. HE SAYS THAT MANY IDPS ARE STAYING WITH FRIENDS IN RESIDENCES AND THESE IDPS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE IDP CENSUS.

AUSTRALIANS RETURN TO CONSULATE

7. (C) [redacted] THE GOA B1
RETURNED THREE OF THEIR OFFICIALS TO THE CONSULATE IN DILI TODAY. THE GOA BELIEVED THE SECURITY SITUATION HAD IMPROVED SUFFICIENTLY

IN DILI TO ALLOW THEIR RETURN. THESE OFFICIALS HAVE ADVISED HIM THAT SECURITY FORCES ARE PATROLLING DILI AND THAT THE CITY APPEARS TO BE CALMER THAN IN RECENT DAYS. HAND PHONE AND SOME LAND LINE SERVICES HAVE BEEN RESTORED AND UNAMET HAS BEEN ALLOWED ACCESS TO ITS FOOD AND WATER SUPPLIES.

DILI REMAINS UNSAFE FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04385 02 OF 02 091243Z

8. (C) EMBOFF REACHED [redacted] ON A LAND LINE PHONE LATE THIS AFTERNOON. SHE SAID THAT ABOUT 85 WOMEN AND CHILDREN REMAINED ON THE CONVENT COMPOUND. TWO OF THE SISTERS FROM THE CONVENT DEPARTED FOR JAKARTA BY PLANE AND ARE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE TONIGHT. [redacted] SAID THAT ALTHOUGH PHONE SERVICES HAD BEEN RESTORED THIS AFTERNOON, THE SITUATION REMAINED UNSAFE AND UNCERTAIN FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION. B1 B1

CNRT CLAIMS TNI MOVING ON CANTONMENT AREAS

9. (C) A CNRT AIDE IN JAKARTA CLAIMS THAT FALINTIL COMMANDER MATAN RUAK'S INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ARE REPORTING THAT TNI FORCES, INCLUDING SOME BATTALIONS WHICH HAVE RECENTLY CROSSED THE BORDER FROM WEST TIMOR, ARE CONVERGING ON FALINTIL'S CANTONMENT AREAS. ACCORDING TO THE CNRT, THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED HAVE ARRIVED IN THESE AREAS, INCLUDING EVEN A FEW DOZEN ARMED MILITIA FORCES WISHING TO DEFECT, AND FOOD AND WATER ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY.

10. (C) PDI-P LEADER MEGAWATI VISITED KUPANG TODAY TO INSPECT THE IDP SITES. SHE DID NOT GO TO ATAMBUA, AS PLANNED, FOR SECURITY REASONS. GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANDJUNG PLANS TO GO TO KUPANG ON SEPTEMBER 11 TO LOOK AT THE IDP SITUATION.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

<<<>>>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

SECRET PTQ8952

E87

PAGE 01 JAKART 04414 01 OF 02 100859Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/021W				

----------F63AE2 100900Z /38

O 100829Z SEP 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9789
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

PAGES MISSING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004414

ROME FOR VATICAN

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 04414 01 OF 02 100859Z
WELLINGTON/AUCKLAND FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, CASC, UN, ID
SUBJECT: TFID01: EAST TIMOR SITUATION REPORT -- AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 10

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS PAMELA SLUTZ; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE INDONESIAN CABINET IS REPORTEDLY SPLIT ON

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 9 SEP 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722
UNCLASSIFIED

THE ISSUE OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE FOR EAST TIMOR. GOI-IMPOSED MARTIAL LAW HAS NOT RESTORED ORDER IN EAST TIMOR, WHILE THE SITUATION IN WEST TIMOR GROWS MORE CRITICAL. EVIDENCE MOUNTS THAT SECURITY IN DILI IS AGAIN DETERIORATING AS THE FIFTH UNAMET PLANE TO DEPART TODAY WAS FIRED ON WHILE IT WAS TAXIING BEFORE DEPARTURE, AND AITARAK MILITIA WERE ALLOWED BY TNI TROOPS TO ENTER AN ADJACENT ANNEX OF THE UNAMET COMPOUND IN MID-DAY TO STEAL VEHICLES. POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES ALONG THE ROAD TO THE AIRPORT APPEAR TO BE WITHDRAWING WHILE MILITIA FORCES REPLACE THEM. MEANWHILE, SECURITY PROBLEMS IN WEST TIMOR ESCALATE AND IDP CAMP CONDITIONS DETERIORATE. IN BOTH EAST AND WEST TIMOR, THE TNI, POLICE, AND MILITIA FORCES APPEAR TO BE SYSTEMATICALLY WORKING IN CONCERT TO DESTROY AND DISMANTLE EAST TIMOR'S INFRASTRUCTURE, SHRED ITS SOCIAL FIBER, AND PURGE ITS LEADERSHIP. END SUMMARY.

CABINET SPLIT

[redacted] B1

4. (C) [redacted] WHO HAD JUST ARRIVED IN DARWIN ADVISED THAT SECURITY IN DILI WAS AGAIN DETERIORATING. HE HAD JUST B1

RECEIVED WORD THAT THE FIFTH PLANE TO DEPART DILI TODAY WAS FIRED ON WHILE IT WAS TAXIING BEFORE DEPARTURE. POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES ALONG THE ROAD TO THE AIRPORT APPEARED TO BE WITHDRAWING WHILE MILITIA FORCES REPLACED THEM. AT ABOUT 1:00 PM JAKARTA TIME, [redacted] TOLD [redacted] THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES HAD HALTED B1

SECRET

PAGE 04 JAKART 04414 01 OF 02 100859Z

OR EVEN REDUCED MILITIA ACTIVITY SINCE MARTIAL LAW WAS IMPOSED ON MIDNIGHT SEPTEMBER 7. HE SAID THE ONLY REASON THERE WERE FEWER SHOTS AND FIRES WAS BECAUSE THERE ARE FEWER PEOPLE TO SHOOT AND NOT MANY BUILDINGS STANDING TO BURN. APPARENTLY SHORTLY AFTER 1:00 P.M. TNI TROOPS GUARDING UNAMET ALLOWED ABOUT 8 ARMED AITARAK MEMBERS TO ENTER THE SCHOOL ADJACENT TO THE UNAMET COMPOUND WHICH RECENTLY HAS BECOME A DE FACTO PART OF THE UNAMET AREA (INSIDE THE DEFENSE PERIMETER PROVIDED BY THE KOSTRAD TROOPS). IDP'S SHELTERING IN THIS AREA WERE HASTILY MOVED TO THE MAIN PART OF THE COMPOUND WHILE THE MILITIA MEMBERS, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE TROOPS (ACCORDING TO A UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICER ON THE SCENE) DAMAGED SOME UNAMET VEHICLES AND DROVE AWAY IN OTHERS.

5. (C) [redacted] ADDED THAT THE FEW TIMES UNAMET OFFICERS HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO LEAVE THEIR COMPOUND, THEY OBSERVED MILITARY AND POLICE WORKING HAND-IN-GLOVE WITH MILITIA FORCES. [redacted] ADDED THAT THE CENTER OF TOWN HAD BEEN LOOTED AND DESTROYED IN A SYSTEMATIC, CONVEYOR-BELT MANNER: TNI AND MILITIA EVACUATE IDPS FROM BUILDINGS AND RESIDENCES, LOAD AND HAUL AWAY IDP BELONGINGS, AND FINALLY, TORCH AND SACK THE BUILDINGS. B1 B1

6. (C) MEANWHILE, SECURITY PROBLEMS IN WEST TIMOR ESCALATE AND IDP CAMP CONDITIONS DETERIORATE. [redacted] TOLD EMBOFF THAT HIS STAFF MEMBER IN ATAMBUA WAS NOT B1

SECRET

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

<<<>>>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4343

E93

PAGE 01 JAKART 04521 01 OF 02 151107Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	OIGO-02	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/019W				

----------F81141 151107Z /22

O 151019Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9907
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
CG III MEF IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004521

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04521 01 OF 02 151107Z
WELLINGTON/AUCKLAND FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, EAID, MOPS, PREF, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: SEPTEMBER 15 SITUATION REPORT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS PAMELA SLUTZ; REASON 1.5(D).

DARE ATTACK RUMORS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 14 SEP 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

2. (C) ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 15 [redacted] B1
[redacted] TOLD POLOFF THERE WERE CONTINUING RUMORS OF ATTACKS ON DARE BUT NO CONCRETE INFORMATION TO REPORT. [redacted] WHO WAS B1
IN DARE, HAD SPOKEN WITH UNAMET ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 15. [redacted] REPORTED CONTINUING ANXIETIES BASED ON "INSIDE B1
INFORMATION" COMING FROM TNI AND MILITIA IN THE AREA THAT AN ATTACK WAS IMMINENT. [redacted] SAID THERE WAS NO TANGIBLE EVIDENCE B1
OF THIS, HOWEVER, AND [redacted] EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THESE WERE B1
SIMPLY "PSY WAR" THREATS. UNAMET'S RELOCATION TO THE AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE COMPLICATES THEIR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM DARE. PREVIOUSLY THERE HAD BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF FOOT TRAFFIC BETWEEN DARE AND UNAMET HEADQUARTERS, LOCATED AT THE BASE OF THE HILL BELOW DARE. NEVERTHELESS, UNAMET OFFICERS MAINTAIN TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH A NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN DARE AND BELIEVE THEY WOULD BE MADE AWARE OF ANY MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS THERE.

3. (C) ON THE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 14 TNI HAD REITERATED TO UNAMET THAT THERE WERE NO PLANS TO MOVE ON DARE AND THAT THEIR INTENTION WAS TO KEEP WHAT THEY SAW AS THE "PRO-INDEPENDENCE PEOPLE" IN DARE SEPARATED FROM THE "PRO-AUTONOMY PEOPLE" IN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04521 01 OF 02 151107Z
DILI. TNI SAID THEY WERE PLANNING TO "EVACUATE" THE PRO-AUTONOMY ELEMENTS FROM DILI. ACCORDING TO [redacted] SINCE EVERY B1
MALE SEEN ON THE STREETS IN DILI WAS NOW WEARING RED AND WHITE HEADBANDS OR MILITIA TEE SHIRTS (MANY POSSIBLY FOR THEIR OWN PROTECTION), IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE HOW MANY BONA FIDE MILITIA MEMBERS REMAINED IN DILI. SOME OF THESE APPARENT CIVILIANS WERE ARMED, BUT TO A LESSER EXTENT THAN PREVIOUSLY. HE SAID MILITIA MEMBERS CONTINUED TO BE SEEN ENTERING AND EXITING FROM THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS (KOREM). [redacted] B1
REPORTED ON THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 15 THAT THE OVERALL IMPRESSION WAS THAT MILITIA MEMBERS WERE PACKING UP AND MOVING WEST OUT OF DILI.

UNAMET COMPOUND LITTLE DAMAGED

4. (C) CONTRARY TO SOME PRESS REPORTS, THE MAIN UNAMET COMPOUND IN DILI HAS NOT BEEN BURNED. [redacted] B1
[redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT A UNAMET TEAM HAD RETURNED TO INSPECT THE COMPOUND AND FOUND THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOME PETTY LOOTING AND DAMAGE TO VEHICLES, MOST FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT REMAINED INTACT. [redacted] ESTIMATED THAT ABOUT 60 UNAMET B1
VEHICLES REMAINED IN DILI, WHICH THE MISSION HOPED TO PRESERVE. UNAMET PERSONNEL, NOW OPERATING FROM THE AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE, ARE STILL UNABLE TO TRAVEL IN THE CITY WITHOUT A MILITARY

ESCORT. OTHER SOURCES ARE REPORTING THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CITY HAS IMPROVED SLIGHTLY, WITH CHURCH WORKERS AND OTHERS BEGINNING TO MOVE AROUND CAUTIOUSLY. AN NGO SOURCE WHO TRAVELED FROM THE WEST TIMOR BORDER TO DILI ON SEPTEMBER 14 REPORTED "THOUSANDS" OF PEOPLE STANDING ALONGSIDE THE ROAD, EVIDENTLY LOOKING FOR TRANSPORT, AND A LARGE NUMBER OF TRUCKS CARRYING GOODS TO WEST TIMOR.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04521 01 OF 02 151107Z

BUT CARTER CENTER HOUSES REPORTED DESTROYED

5. (C) [redacted] B1
[redacted] THEIR MAIN HOUSE/OFFICE IN THE COMORO SECTION OF DILI WAS ENTERED BY KOPASSUS PERSONNEL AND MILITIA ON SEPTEMBER 6, THE DAY AFTER THE LAST CARTER CENTER EXPATS DEPARTED. ALL EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS REPORTEDLY WERE REMOVED FROM THE HOUSE BEFORE IT WAS BURNED, ALONG WITH TWO OTHER NEARBY HOUSES RENTED BY THE CARTER CENTER. OTHER SOURCES HAVE REPORTED WIDESPREAD DESTRUCTION AND BURNED OUT HOUSES IN THE COMORO AREA, WHERE THE U.S. EMBASSY ALSO RENTED A HOUSE.

MINISTERS AND AMBASSADORS IN WEST TIMOR

6. (C) DIPLOMATS FROM CANADA, NORWAY, EU, AND UN OFFICIALS ACCOMPANIED A GROUP OF GOI MINISTERS TO WEST TIMOR ON SEPTEMBER 14. [redacted] THE INDONESIAN B1
MINISTERS (OF TRANSMIGRATION, AGRICULTURE, PEOPLE'S WELFARE, PUBLIC WORKRS, AND INFORMATION) APPEARED TO BE ASSUMING THAT TNI WOULD NOT OPERATE ALONGSIDE THE MNF, BUT WOULD WITHDRAW TO BARRACKS WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE ARRIVED. THE DIPLOMATS WERE STRUCK BY THE HEAVY SECURITY PRECAUTIONS FOR THE VISIT TO THE DISPLACED CAMPS IN WEST TIMOR. THREE ARMED BODY GUARDS ACCOMPANIED EACH VIP.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO9225

PAGE 01 JAKART 04521 02 OF 02 151107Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	OIGO-02	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00

SCT-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 ASDS-01
PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 MR-00 NFAT-00
SAS-00 SWCI-00 /019W
----------F8114B 151107Z /22

O 151019Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9908
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
CG III MEF IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004521

ROME FOR VATICAN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04521 02 OF 02 151107Z
WELLINGTON/AUCKLAND FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, EAID, MOPS, PREF, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: SEPTEMBER 15 SITUATION REPORT

WEST TIMOR WOES

7. (C) VARIOUS EMBASSY SOURCES CONTINUE TO REPORT A DETERIORATING SITUATION IN WEST TIMOR. [redacted] IN KUPANG ARE INCREASINGLY ANXIOUS, ESPECIALLY AFTER A SURPRISE VISIT TO [redacted] KUPANG BY AITARAK MILITIA LEADER EURICO GUTERRES. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WARN [redacted] THAT THE IDP CAMPS REMAIN TOO DANGEROUS FOR EXPATS OR ANY LOCAL EMPLOYEES WHO COULD BE SUSPECTED OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE VIEWS. THERE ARE ACCOUNTS OF SHOOTINGS, E.G., A TRUCK DRIVER IN ATAMBUA SHOT FOR NOT HANDING OVER HIS VEHICLE TO THE BESIH MERAH PUTIH MILITIA, AND SHOOTING OUTSIDE A MAJOR KUPANG HOTEL ON THE EVENING OF SEPTEMER 14. [redacted] REPORTS THAT THERE ARE ROADBLOCKS THROUGHOUT WEST TIMOR, OSTENSIBLY TO SEARCH FOR WEAPONS BUT IN REALITY TO SEARCH FOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS. B1 B1 B1 B1

CNRT CLAIMS TNI WITHDRAWALS, PARA-MILITARY DEFECTIONS IN EAST

8. (C) CNRT SOURCES CLAIM THAT TNI IS CONTINUING TO CONCENTRATE ITS FORCES AT MAIN BASES ON THE NORTH COAST IN THE EASTERN DISTRICTS, ABANDONING SUCH SUB-DISTRICT CENTERS AS QUELICAI, WITH FALINTIL FORCES AND DEFECTING EAST TIMORESE PARA-MILITARY ELEMENTS MOVING IN TO FILL THE SECURITY VACUUM. THEY CLAIM LOS PALOS DISTRICT CHIEF AND TEAM "ALFA" MILITIA LEADER EDMUNDO DA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04521 02 OF 02 151107Z
SILVA HAS FLED TO KISAR ISLAND OFF THE EASTERN TIP OF EAST TIMOR. CNRT ALLEGES THAT LOCAL RESIDENTS IN THE EASTERN AREAS CONTINUE TO BE ROUNDED UP AND TAKEN TO THE PORT OF COM FOR FORCED EVACUATION BY SHIP TO WEST TIMOR.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1328

E94

PAGE 01 JAKART 04626 01 OF 03 201834Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W		

----------FA0C0E 201835Z /38

P 201324Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0017
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004626

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 00137

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/09
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ID
SUBECT: MILITIA STRATEGY TO UNDERMINE LEGITIMACY
ENDUM

REF: A:JAKARTA 4443; B: JAKARTA 4525

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PRINCIPAL OFFICER, ROBERT POLLARD.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04626 01 OF 03 201834Z
REASO 1.5 (D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO VARQOUS CONTACTS IN KUPANG, WEST TIMOR, THE INDONQSIAN MILITARY AND PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA HAVE SYSTEMATICALLY FORCED THE RELOCATION OF EAST TIORESE REFUGEES INTO WEST TIMOR. IN PART, THEQE CONTACTS CLAIM, THE MOTIVE WAS PURE REVENGE BUT ANOTHER PART OF THE STRATEGY WAS TO UNDERMINE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE UN REFERENDUM. PRO AUTONOMY FORCES ARGUE THAT NOT ONLY WAS THE EFERENDUM "FIXED," BUT THE FACT THAT SO MANY QAST TIMORESE HAVE FLED THEIR HOMELAND SHOWS THAT MANY DO NOT ACCEPT THE RESULT. AS A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 19 SEP 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200300722

CONSEQUENCE, PRO-AUTONOMY FORCES HOPE THE MPR WILL EJECT INDEPENDENCE FOR EAST TIMOR. IF NOT, TEY WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT FOR PARTITION OF EAQT TIMOR. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) ON SEPTEMBER 18AND 19, CONOFF VISITED KUPANG, WEST TIMOR, TO MEET WITH [redacted] (SETEL). B1
CONOFF ALSO MET WITH CONTACTS (PLEASE PQOTECT) TO SOLICIT REACTIONS TO RECENT EVENTS QN EAST TIMOR.

CONTACTS INCLUDED:

[redacted] B1

--WESTERN JOURNALISTS, INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND MISCELLANEOUS AIRPORT PASSENGERS ALSO OFFERED OBSERVATIONS.

"WE ALL KNOW THAT UNAMET CHEATED"
==========

4. (C) MANY OF THE INTERLOCUTORS TOOK FOR GRANTED THAT UNAMET HAD STUFFED BALLOT BOXES. THAT WAS THE STARTING POINT FOR QEVERAL CONVERSATIONS. THEY CITED THE MOST CONVINCING EVIDENCE: THE VOTE TOTALS THEMSELVES. I WAS INCONCEIVABLE THAT 78.5 PERCENT OF THE PQPULATION WOULD REJECT AUTONOMY. CONTACTS WHO QAVE CONNECTIONS TO PRO-INTEGRATION GROUPS SAID THAT THOSE GROUPS SINCERELY BELIEVED THEY WOLD WIN. THE MILITIA REPORTEDLY THOUGHT THEY CONTROLLED" NINE OF THE THIRTEEN DISTRICTS. NOTE: CNRT STAFF IN JAKARTA CONFIRMED THAT TQEY HAD SEEN THE PRE-BALLOT CALCULATIONS OF PRO-AUTONOMY FORCES W HICH
INDICATED THE PRO-ATONOMY FORCES HAD VASTLY MISCALCULATED THEIR STQENG TH AND WERE STUNNED BY THE OUTCOME. END NTE.)

5. (C) ACCORDING TO INTERLOCUTORS, WHEN THE VOTE COUNT WAS ANNOUNCED, PRO-AUTONOMY FORCES "KNEW THAT UNAMET HAD FIXED THE

ELECTIQN." VILLAGES THAT THEY WERE CERTAIN WOULD VOTE100 PERCENT PRO-INTEGRATION WENT FOR INDEPEND%NCE INSTEAD. STORIES ABOUT THE ANTI-INDONESIAN BIAS OF UNAMET VOLUNTEERS AND ABOUT BALLOTS GOING MISSING WERE WIDESPREAD. THEY QUESTINED WHY THE VOTES WERE NOT COUNTED IN A "TRANSPARENT MANNER" AT LOCAL POLLING STATIONS, JUST A THEY HAD BEEN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04626 01 OF 03 201834Z
DURING THE GENERAL ELECTION. NOTE: THE GOI AGREED TO HAVE ALL THE BALLOTS COUNTED CENTRALLY, IN DILI, RATHER THAN BY DISTRICT, TO THWART ANY ATTEMPT TO "IDENTIFY" WHO VOTED HOW. END NOTE.) PRO-AUTONOMY PEOPLE ALSO FEEL THAT UNAMET'S "ARROGANT" DISMISSAL OF CHARGES OF FRAUD SMACKS OF A COVER-UP. INTERLOCUTORS ALSO ROUTINELY VOICED CONSPIRACY THEORIES INVOLVING THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA, E.G., THE U.S. DESIRE FOR A NAVAL BASE IN EAST TIMOR (A CHARGE WE HAVE REPEATEDLY HEARD IN EAST JAVA, REF A) AND AUSTRALIAN QUET FOR GREATER CONTROL OVER TIMOR GAP OIL.
Q

REFUGEES -- HELPING TO SELL THE STORY
---

6. (C) ACCORDING TO THIS LOGIC, SYSTEMATIC RELOCATION OF REFUGEES ALSO SERVES TO UNDERMINE THE REFERENDUM'S LEGITIMACY BECAUSE ONLY PRO-INTEGRATION PEOPLE WOULD FLEE TO WEST TIMOR. AS PROOF, THE INTERLOCUTORS POINTED TO THE OVERWHELMING NUMBER OF PEOPLE FLOODING IN TO WEST TIMOR, CLAIMING THAT THIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE UNAMET TALLIES MUST HAVE UNDERSTATED THE SUPPORT FOR AUTONOMY. (NOTE: THE REFUGEES COMING OUT OF EAST TIMOR ARE MIXED, BUT LARGELY PRO-INDEPENDENCE. MANY OF THESE PEOPLE HAVE UNDERSTANDABLY CHOSEN NOT TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES AS PRO-INDEPENDENCE OUT OF FEAR OF RETRIBUTION FROM MILITIAS. HENCE, THE UNCHALLENGED PERCEPTION THAT THE BULK OF THE REFUGEES ARE PRO-AUTONOMY SUPPORTERS. END COMMENT.) THE FORCED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9747

PAGE 01 JAKART 04626 02 OF 03 201352Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01

DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /012W
----------F9EF0D 201352Z /38
P 201324Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0018
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
.USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 004626

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 00137

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/09
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: MILITIA STRATEGY TO UNDERMINE LEGITIMACY
- OF EAST TIMORESE REFERENDUM

RELOCATION ALSO SERVED OTHER PURPOSES, WE WERE TOLD. IT MADE IT EASIER TO FIND AND KILL PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS, AND LOOTING DILI WAS MUCH EASIER WITHOUT INTERFERENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04626 02 OF 03 201352Z
7. (C) BY THE SAME TOKEN, SEVERAL CONTACTS THOUGHT THAT TNI AND THE MILITIAS WOULD NOT ALLOW REFUGEES TO RETURN HOME WHEN THEY WANTED TO. A MASS RETURN OF PEOPLE TO EAST TIMOR WOULD UNDERMINE THE CLAIM THAT THEY WERE PRO-INTEGRATION. ALSO, REFUGEES MIGHT BE AFRAID TO RISK A RETURN, AS THE MILITIAS MIGHT INTERPRET TEIR GOING BACK AS AN ADMISSION THAT THEY ARE PRO-INDEPENDENCE.

8. (C) CONTACTS GENERALLY REJECTED THE IDEA THAT THE FORCED REMOVAL OF EOPLE FROM EAST TIMOR WAS A MILITIA ATTEMPT TO
Q
CHANGE THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE NEW NATION. TO THE MILITIA, POWER AND LEGITIMACY HAVE LITTLE TO DO WITH MAJORITY RULE, SO THE SPECIFIC DEMOGRAPHIC MAKE UP OF TIMOR WAS IRRELEVANT TO THEIR THINKING.

9. (C) ONE PRO-AUTONOMY CONTACT SAID THAT THE SPECIFIC INTENDED AUDIENCE, AT LEAST IN THE NEAR TERM, IS THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE UPCOMING MPR SESSION. IF ENOUGH MPR DELEGATES WERE CONVINCED THAT THE RESULT OF THE REFERENDUM WAS ILLEGITIMATE, THEY WOULD HAVE GROUNDS TO REJECT INDEPENDENCE. DELEGATES OPPOSED TO "LOSING" EAST TIMOR WILL ARGUE THAT THE REFERENDUM WAS ILL-CONCEIVED AND PUT FORWARD BY AN

ILLEGITIMATE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, ONE CONTACT SAID. HABIBIE FORCED THE REFERENDUM ON INDONESIA TO BOLSTER HIS INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION AT THE EXPENSE OF NATIONAL INTEREST, IS A COMMON VIEW. WHEN CONOFF POINTED OUT THAT PDI-P LEADER, MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, THE LIKELY NEXT PRESIDENT, HAD SAID THAT SHE WOULD ABIDE BY THE RESULTS OF THE REFERENDUM, THE RESPONSE WAS, "BUT IT'S NOT MEGAWATI'S DECISION - IT IS THE MPR'S."

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04626 02 OF 03 201352Z

LAND FOR PEACE

10. (C) IF EFFORTS TO STEER THE MPR TOWARD REJECTING THE REFERENDUM FAIL, THE MILITIAS, WITH TNI SUPPORT, WOULD FIGHT FOR THE PARTITION OF EAST TIMOR, CONTACTS SAID. EVEN THOSE WHO DECLARED THEMSELVES NEUTRAL ON THE ISSUE SAID THAT PARTITION WOULD BE THE ONLY LASTING SOLUTION, GIVEN THE INDONESIAN CULTURE OF "COMPROMISE." ONE INTERLOCUTOR SAID THAT THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SYSTEM THAT HE EQUATED WITH DEMOCRACY DID NOT YET SIT WELL WITH LOCAL CULTURE. RATHER, HE THOUGHT IT REASONABLE THAT SINCE THE PRO-AUTONOMY FORCES GOT 20 PERCENT OF THE VOTE (OR PERHAPS 40 PERCENT, AFTER UNAMET "CHEATING" IS FACTORED IN), THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN THE SAME PROPORTION OF EAST TIMOR. [redacted] DID NOT GO SO FAR, SAYING THAT EAST TIMOR DID NOT HAVE TO BE DIVIDED, BUT CONCESSIONS NEEDED TO BE MADE TO THE PRO-AUTONOMY FORCES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR. B1

11. (C) PEOPLE WERE CERTAIN THAT THE MILITIAS WOULD FIGHT A GUERILLA WAR AGAINST UN TROOPS IN ORDER TO FORCE A LAND-FOR-PEACE DEAL. MILITIA LEADERSHIP REPORTEDLY TOLD ONE CONTACT THAT AITARAK MILITIAMEN WERE MOVING OUT OF WEST TIMOR "TO MEET THE AUSTRALIAN TROOPS." ANOTHER CONTACT REPORTED THAT SIX FLIGHTS OF HERCULES AIRCRAFT WERE DEPARTING EACH NIGHT FROM KUPANG, FROM 12:00 A.M. ON, FILLED WITH SOLDIERS DRESSED IN MILITIA CLOTHING. HE ALSO SAID THAT TRUCKLOADS OF TROOPS WERE DEPARTING ATAMBUA EACH NIGHT FOR DILI. (NOTE: WE HAVE NO OTHER CONFIRMATION OF THIS INFORMATION.)

12. (C) SEVERAL CONTACTS WERE CONCERNED THAT WESTERN NATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04626 02 OF 03 201352Z

WOULD UNDERESTIMATE THE DETERMINATION OF THE MILITIAS AND THEIR TNI BACKERS. "FOR TNI, IT IS A MATTER OF PRIDE. THEY WILL NOT LET EAST TIMOR GO," WE WERE TOLD. THE MILITIA

LEADERS WOULD FIGHT TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS AS "BIG MEN" IN AN INDONESIAN EAST TIMOR. MILITIA TROOPS WOULD FIGHT OUT OF BLIND NATIONALISM OR AS MERCENARIES. (ACCORDING TO AN NGO CONTACT, MILITIA MEN RECENTLY TOLD HIM THEY FOUGHT FOR RP. 150,000 TO 300,000 PER MONTH (OR USD 18 TO 37) AND 50 KILOS OF RICE.) THE MILITIAS EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO FORCE A PARTITION IN THREE YEARS, A MILITIA LEADER HAS REPORTEDLY SAID.

AND NEVER THE TWAIN SHALL MEET
---

13. (C) OUR CONTACTS IN KUPANG WERE MORE FAVORABLE TOWARD THE NEED FOR UN PEACEKEEPERS THAN WERE MANY OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS IN JAVA (REFS). GENERALLY, (CHRISTIAN) CONTACTS IN KUPANG APPRECIATED THE NEED FOR OUTSIDE FORCES TO HELP CONTROL THE SITUATION. BUT THEY REMAINED HARSHLY CRITICAL OF WHAT THEY DESCRIBED AS THE "ARROGANCE" OF UNAMET AND AUSTRALIA, NOTABLY THE INFLAMMATORY REMARKS OF PRIME MINISTER HOWARD.

REFUGEES KEEP COMING
---

14. (C) ACCORDING TO CONTACTS IN KUPANG, THERE WERE 180,000

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9748

PAGE 01 JAKART 04626 03 OF 03 201352Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W		

----------F9EF13 201352Z /38

P 201324Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0019
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 004626

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 00137

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/09
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: MILITIA STRATEGY TO UNDERMINE LEGITIMACY
- OF EAST TIMORESE REFERENDUM

TO 200,000 REFUGEES FROM EAST TIMOR, WITH MORE COMING OUT EVERY DAY. THE VAST MAJORITY REMAIN IN WEST TIMOR, WITH SMALL NUMBERS SCATTERED THROUGH OTHER ISLANDS IN EAST NUSA TENGGARA, AS WELL AS BALI AND JAVA. CONDITIONS WERE

DESCRIBED AS DIFFICULT, WITH SOME INFANTS DYING FROM MALNUTRITION OR DISEASE. MILITIA WERE STILL PRESENT, BUT LESS VISIBLE, IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS.

COMMENT
---

15. (C) COMMENT: WHILE THE PRO-INTEGRATION LOGIC MAY RING HOLLOW TO WESTERN EARS WITH ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL MEDIA REPORTING AND CNN FOOTAGE, IT HAS A CERTAIN PERVERSE APPEAL TO AN INDONESIAN AUDIENCE THAT IS PRONE TO XENOPHOBIA AND DEPENDENT ON GOSSIP AND INDONESIAN, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT, MEDIA FOR ITS NEWS. WHAT IS TROUBLING IS THE DEGREE OF CREDENCE AND SYMPATHY BEING GIVEN BY THE LOCAL POPULATION TO THE PRO-AUTONOMY VERSION OF EVENTS. WHILE IT IS CLEAR THAT FOR THE MOMENT THE MILITIAS ARE DETERMINED TO RESIST, THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND ABILITY TO MOUNT A SERIOUS, PROLONGED RESISTANCE IS UNKNOWN. MEANWHILE, EFFORTS AT EAST TIMORESE RECONCILIATION WILL HAVE TO AWAIT A MORE SECURE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. END COMMENT. POLLARD/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No. 200300722 (INR001)
Archive File No. 20030196DOS045

Mr. Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

APR 5 2006

Dear Mr. Simpson:

I refer to our letter dated August 3, 2004, regarding the release of certain Department of State material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552).

The first search of the records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research has been completed, resulting in the retrieval of 16 documents that appear responsive to your request. After reviewing these documents, we have determined that seven may be released in full, seven may be released with excisions, and 2 may not be released. All released documents are enclosed.

The material in the excised portions of seven of the documents released in part and the two documents withheld in full is currently and properly classified under Executive Order 12958 in the interest of national defense or foreign relations. As such, it is exempt from release under subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act.

In the case of a document released in part, all non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released.

With respect to material withheld by the Department of State, you have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. Appeals should be addressed to the Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/RPS/IPS/PP/LC, SA-2, Room 8100, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20522-8100. The letter of appeal should refer to the case

20030196DOS045 DOS
RECNO:25273 SEQCOR:120235
4/12/2006 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Militia Groups - East Timor

number shown above. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

Still in progress is the second search of records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Additional information will be provided as soon as it becomes available.

If you have any questions with respect to the processing of your request, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20522-8100. You may also reach us by telephone at (202) 261-8314. Please be sure to refer to the case number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

Your continuing cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Margaret P. Grafeld
Director
Office of Information Programs
and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

I 16

CONFIDENTIAL

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brief
09/09/1999

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

UN/East Timor: Empty Hand (U)

UN efforts to avert a humanitarian disaster in East Timor are collapsing, despite the imposition of martial law and the arrival on September 8 of a UN Security Council delegation in Jakarta. UN discussions in New York about the composition of a multinational peacekeeping force or in Jakarta with the crumbling Habibie government will probably have little bearing on the brutal reality being shaped in East Timor. (C)

The UN's decision to evacuate the bulk of its Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET) staff from the Dili compound on September 9 follows an unsuccessful attempt by UNAMET to obtain food and water from a nearby UN warehouse. Militias apparently forced them to flee back to their compound, where more than 2,000 Timorese who have sought refuge risk being attacked following the UNAMET withdrawal. UN and church compounds are no longer havens, with militias now explicitly targeting them; three priests were among the approximately 100 people feared killed in a massacre in the southern coastal town of Suai. (C)

Dili is now "looted, gutted, and gone," according to Embassy Jakarta. With UN personnel and foreign journalists expelled and telecommunications cut, East Timorese over the next few days can expect little mercy from rampaging militias and increasing numbers of Indonesian military (TNI). [redacted] B1

[redacted] In western Timor, newly arriving refugees are overwhelming local capacity to provide food, shelter, or protection; two UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff were slightly wounded and forced to curtail their review of border camps, where militias are assassinating selective pro-independence leaders. (C)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200300722

I15

CONFIDENTIAL

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
09/08/1999

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

Indonesia/East Timor: Roads Not Taken (C)

The Indonesian Government had at least three operational plans under consideration for East Timor, although security forces now appear intent on the third option, using a show of force to retain the province. Common denominators underlay each approach. (C)

1. The original public plan

As enunciated by the Foreign Ministry and senior civilian and military leaders, Indonesia would evacuate non- East Timorese and those Timorese loyal to the Indonesian regime; reduce the military in a phased withdrawal; maintain security for the ever-growing foreign presence; continue aid until March 2000; and cooperate in a peaceful transition. (U)

2. Cut and run

Evacuate non-East Timorese and those loyal to the Indonesian regime; and expeditiously remove security forces and infrastructure "belonging" to Jakarta. Subplan A was a relatively orderly withdrawal that left a primitive, but operational infrastructure in the hands of the UN Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET). Subplan B had the Indonesians trashing East Timor as they left, but still with the intent of handing things over to the UN. (C)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200300722

3. Discredit the vote and retain the province

Engage in various measures to undermine the credibility of the vote and retain control, working from a pro-Jakarta beachhead in the western part of the province or in Timor Barat (western Timor) if necessary.

B1

Common denominators

All three approaches have common underlying traits:

- resentment of foreign, i.e., Western interference, and a feeling of victimization by the media;
- a belief that the UN and foreign observers were biased and that the election was not fair;
- hostility toward the "ungrateful" Timorese;
- a military that can operate outside of civilian leadership;

B1

- the absence of effective civilian leadership in Jakarta in the executive or legislative branches.
- the absence of a critical mass of civilians willing to defy the government and demand Timorese independence. (C)

What's viable?

Even if Option #2 were restored, elements in the security forces would remain committed to retaining East Timor and seek to sabotage the transition and eventual independent government. Security forces continue to see the danger of a slippery slope for other regions in Indonesia; demonstrating the "costs" of breaking with Jakarta is a consistent theme. Despite international opprobrium, Indonesia appears

unlikely to reinvite a UN presence until the authorities are comfortable that a "second vote" would support integration. It is unclear what level of economic and political pressure would bring about the sea change necessary for Jakarta to take Option 2 seriously. (C)

Leaders may understand the potential international ramifications of pursuing Option 3, but some are impotent [redacted] and others see the interests of national unity and their personal survivability as overriding. None of the current or would be leaders have solid backing, with suspicions, fractured institutions, and competing agendas complicating the political scene and making it difficult for outsiders to identify the power center, much less to change behavior. (C) B1

CONFIDENTIAL

INR Home Page | Briefs | Intel Assessments | Viewpoints | Products by date | Products by country

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

SECRET

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
09/02/1999

Indonesia and East Timor--Struggle for Control (U)

East Timor remains volatile, with militia active in several locations attacking homes, offices, foreign and domestic journalists, and other individuals seen as associated with the independence movement. If there was political will, the security forces on the ground would be able to restrain the militias. Military forces to date have largely stayed out of the action, giving the police full responsibility for law and order. Additional police and armed forces arrived today. However, there continue to be mixed signals on how Jakarta intends to handle the militias and, given the expectation of an overwhelming vote for independence, the transition and withdrawal. (C)

Reining in the militias

It is unclear whether Jakarta is now committed to restraining the militias it created. Also unclear is whether the current rampages are part of a campaign to derail the process or reflect a last gasp by gangs who fear the military will abandon them. [redacted] and the nature of the forces on the ground further complicate the picture. The police, who have the primary responsibility for crowd control and protecting The UN Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET), are afraid that the militias enjoy high-level military support from elements such as the special forces. Local battalions of East Timorese troops are suspected of being independence sympathizers. [redacted] trying to undermine the independence movement are working throughout the province. (S) B1 B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200300722

Moreover, Indonesia's military is suffering significant morale problems. Officers are questioning the current civilian leadership, and pressures are mounting to resolve the more significant threat than East Timor--the growing rebellion in Aceh. Even if the leadership issues clear orders, implementing them on the ground may still be problematic. In addition, the potential for former pro-independence guerrillas to take to the streets should be factored into plans for establishing security. (S)

Political steps ahead

Reporting suggests that Jakarta is resigned to a clear vote for independence. But, that does not guarantee smooth sailing through the political process. The new assembly (MPR), which is scheduled to open October 1 and is charged with accepting or rejecting the vote, may contain many who are highly more nationalistic, including the large Megawati bloc. Consideration of the Timor issue could be put off, because it has no clearly defined place on the MPR agenda. The delegates may decide they have higher priorities, including choosing the next president. (C)

[redacted] argue that Indonesians will be eager to put East Timor behind them and move smartly to bless the vote, even designating January 1 as the transition date. President Habibie could call a special MPR session for that purpose only, but [redacted] no evidence of planning for that. Habibie is not very effective at swaying public opinion and no groundwork has been laid in Jakarta for losing Timor with honor. (C) B1 B1

Pulling out

[redacted] senior officers are sufficiently concerned about Indonesia's international image to refrain from an abrupt departure that would leave a security vacuum. Although some Indonesian officials now talk about an eventual peacekeeping operation, they remain opposed to the deployment of armed peacekeepers as long as East Timor remains, in their view, a sovereign part of the nation. (S) B1

Once the political formalities are worked out, however, and a peacekeeping operation authorized, a rather rapid removal of Indonesian forces is likely. [redacted] favors an early and complete withdrawal, probably because he is wary of leaving troops unprotected in a potentially hostile environment. His more B1

pressing concerns are Aceh, Ambon, and security for the MPR session in Jakarta. Some of the ethnic East Timorese in the two native battalions may opt--or be allowed--to remain as part of a fledgling East Timorese defense force, but they would be suspected of being a fifth column working for Indonesia's return. (S)

SECRET

INR Home Page | Briefs | Intel Assessments | Viewpoints | Products by date | Products by country

---

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

Indonesia: Ratcheting Up the Violence (C)

[redacted] reports of increasing examples of "gratuitous violence" in the Likisia area suggest the atrocities being committed by army-backed militias could evolve from a means to intimidate people to vote for autonomy in the UN-sponsored ballot scheduled for August 8 into escalating incidents of random human rights abuses. Depending in part on the success of UNAMET's deployment, **postponement of the ballot could aggravate the situation, rather than allow for stabilization.** (C) B1

Gratuitous violence. [redacted] indicated there were no signs of letup in the well-organized, pro-autonomy intimidation; on the contrary, **the violence appears to be "ratcheting up."** [redacted] stated that fewer cases of mistreatment by militias are being reported but believe this decline reflects peoples' unwillingness to speak to them, UNAMET, or other foreign personnel for fear of reprisal. An embassy official reported on a recent trip to the Likisia area that about 90% of the homes along a 15-kilometer stretch of road had been destroyed, whereas just a few weeks earlier only 30% had been burned. (C) B1 B1

Ballot postponement problematic. UN officials will resist postponing the vote for autonomy because of security concerns, particularly now that UNAMET has begun to deploy, though they may be forced to do so for "technical" reasons. **Because an unarmed civilian police force will have difficulty challenging militia activity in remote areas, a ballot postponement would not only encourage the pro-autonomy militias to continue their violence, but also would allow them more time to continue their campaign.** (C)
(CONFIDENTIAL)

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

SECRET/NOFORN

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brief
07/12/1999

Indonesia/East Timor: Police Woes (S)

Jakarta promised on July 7 to deploy 1,200 extra police to provide security for all parties, including the UN Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET), according to press reports. The provincial commander on July 6 in a meeting with a visiting ambassador softened accusations made the previous day by lower level police that the July 4 attack on a humanitarian aid convoy was largely UNAMET's fault and that shots had been fired from a UNAMET vehicle. (C)

Comment: The police commander's softer tone may be better public relations or could reflect new guidance from Jakarta to be more cooperative with UNAMET. Enforcing this on the ground is difficult, however. Police have been involved in intimidation, and security elements [redacted] remain committed to ensuring a vote for autonomy. Police fear of the violent pro-Jakarta militias, frictions with elements in the military, a lack of equipment and discipline, and a perception that UNAMET is pro- independence will continue to hamper cooperation with UNAMET. (S/NF)

B1

SECRET/NOFORN

INR Home Page | Briefs | Intel Assessments | Viewpoints | Products by date | Products by country

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200300722

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

Indonesia: Timor Positioning (U)

Imprisoned independence activist Xanana Gusmao and other moderate East Timorese leaders, both pro- and anti-integrationist, are finally beginning to reach out to each other to promote stability on the ground so that an agreement can be worked out. UN Special Envoy Tamrat Samuel on February 24 in Dili witnessed key representatives from both factions sign a declaration calling for peace. Xanana on February 23 met with the two military (ABRI) commanders responsible for East Timor; the three agreed to work together to create a climate of tolerance and tranquility. [redacted] (C) B1

ABRI is nonetheless arming small, roving bands of East Timorese paramilitary groups to create unrest and portray the security situation as "incipient civil war," according to Embassy Jakarta. In the latest development, two East Timorese youths were killed on February 24 in Dili after a pro-integrationist paramilitary group opened fire. Some reports allege those paramilitary members were ABRI personnel in plain clothes; the local commander yesterday confirmed ABRI plainclothesmen are involved with the paramilitary group in an anti-crime effort, according to press reports. (C)
(CONFIDENTIAL)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200300722

Indonesia: Timor Surprise (U)

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

I ϕ1

Jakarta's announcement that it may consider independence for East Timor follows increasing international pressure and escalating violence on the ground. The intent may be to stimulate support for a special autonomy status, but the statement is likely to fuel sentiment for a separate state. (C)

The information minister yesterday announced that if the East Timorese "masses" reject Jakarta's offer for widespread autonomy, the government will suggest that the next People's Consultative Assembly, to convene after the June 7 election, consider allowing East Timor to separate from Indonesia. Foreign Minister Alatas clarified that Jakarta would not accept any formula that called for an interim period of years before the East Timorese make a decision, arguing such a delay would lead to civil conflict. Jakarta also announced that imprisoned East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao would be moved to a house designated a "prison branch," to get around a legal constraint on formal house arrest. (U)

■ Trumping the Timorese

The statement marks the first time Jakarta has publicly acknowledged that East Timor could be expendable. East Timorese activists are expressing skepticism but are hailing the statement as evidence Jakarta knows it has lost. Increasing international pressure, including Canberra's recent decision to alter its stance to support an act of self-determination, no doubt helped tip the balance in favor of those in Jakarta who hope to get rid of the Timor albatross. **Some may calculate that the threat of abruptly cutting ties, including vital social services, will prompt more moderate leaders like Xanana,** who have advocated a transitional period before independence, **to opt for some special form of autonomy.** Ultimately, **leaders in Jakarta may have decided it is less risky to cut East Timor loose than to lose face through rejection in a referendum that could set an unacceptable model for other provinces.** (C)

■ Escalating violence in East Timor

The military's decision to arm pro-integration (pro-Jakarta) civil militias after two months of attacks on troops and pro-Indonesia civilians **has fueled clashes with anti-integration civilians and resistance guerrillas.** These newly established militia groups have little or no training and operate independently, frequently seeking to settle old scores. B1

B1 told US officials in mid-January that he saw emerging **a disturbing pattern of violence, in which paramilitary groups armed by the military provoke conflict that leads to a military response. Tension between the military and the local governor has paralyzed the local bureaucracy and is feeding fears of a vacuum of authority.** (C/NF)

B1 estimates that at least 50 people have been killed over the past six months, though critics say the number is much higher. An estimated 1,000 people fled in mid-January to the provincial capital in Dili to escape clashes and feared reprisals, seriously straining relief resources. In the latest round of violence, which began on January 24 in the southern town of Suai, at least four people have died and more than 2,000 have reportedly fled. (C)
(CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)

Australia: Going Public on East Timor (C)

RELEASED IN FULL

Canberra's public allegations of Indonesian military support for the violent pro-integration militias in East Timor will complicate Australian efforts to maintain influence in Jakarta and increase domestic pressure on the government to "do something" to counter or punish Indonesian actions. Canberra's hand was forced by mounting evidence of blatant abuses by Indonesia's military (TNI) and its surrogates, and by rising domestic criticism of Australian policy. (C)

Australian officials, testifying before a parliamentary committee on June 8-9, for the first time publicly asserted Australia had evidence of TNI involvement in arming and supporting pro-integration militias in East Timor, according to Embassy Canberra. Australia is frustrated with Jakarta's intransigence and fearful of the safety of Australian police being sent to help keep peace ahead of the vote. **The Labor party-led opposition is demanding a review of Australian defense ties to Jakarta**, according to press reports. The media and opposition leaders for several weeks had accused the government of suppressing evidence of TNI support for the militias. (C)
(CONFIDENTIAL)

(For related information, see Analysis no. 2.)

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

I Ø9

April 30, 1999

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 1.6X1

RELEASED IN FULL

TO: S/WCI - Ambassador Scheffer

FROM: INR - Phyllis E. Oakley

SUBJECT: East Timor—The Worst Case

You asked for a worst case scenario on East Timor and comments on a UN or "Friends group" response. A worse case is for the Indonesian military to decide, with or without Jakarta's political acquiescence, to keep the province at all costs and undertake a massive sweep against pro-independence activists and sympathizers. This could result in significant deaths or disappearances. Another bloody scenario is for pro-independence forces to expand guerrilla activity to include hit-and-run attacks or bombings directed at pro-Indonesian sympathizers and institutions. (C)

We cannot rule out either development, but a more likely pattern is continuation of Indonesian intimidation and isolated attacks that cause pro-independence activists to go into hiding or appear to capitulate, at least for the near term. A key determinant will be the size and credibility of "neutral" monitors or security forces on the ground. Diplomatic actions against a weak central government more concerned with the national/provincial parliamentary election in June and selection of a president in November will be of questionable value. Even more problematic would be trying to get the government in Jakarta to stop the actions of an uncooperative military. (C)

The current tense atmosphere and uncertainty surrounding the autonomy vote will continue to breed violence between pro-integration and pro-independence forces. Those who have been displaced in the latest round of fighting number in the thousands. The ICRC fears a recurrence of the tragedy experienced during military operations in 1975-79 when many deaths resulted from the absence of shelter, food, and medicine, according to Embassy Jakarta. Possible triggers that could set

CLASSIFIED BY: Phyllis E. Oakley, INR A/S
REASON: 1.5(c)(d)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200300722

off even more widespread fighting include, but are not limited to:

- Failure to finalize the autonomy plan at the upcoming May 5 UN-sponsored tripartite talks;

- A breakdown of the tripartite process over implementation of the direct ballot and modalities of a UN security presence which produces a further delay, if not cancellation of the autonomy vote;

- A sudden announcement by President Habibie to withdraw military forces, whether or not a UN security presence is on the ground;

- A UN security presence becomes the target of pro-integration militia attacks, particularly if UN personnel suffer casualties and are forced to withdraw;

- The assassination of pro-independence activist Xanana Gusmao, or one (or both) of the bishops in East Timor. (C)

The country most able to intervene is Australia because it is proximate and has the military capacity to mobilize quickly. However, pro-East Timor independence domestic sentiment in Australia could constrain Canberra's ability to be perceived as a "neutral" peacemaker. Moreover, although the UN is recognized by Indonesia as having a political role, Jakarta's view on a security presence prior to the autonomy vote is still evolving. The worst case scenario posits the Indonesian military resisting such a presence or seeking to restrict its activities on the ground. In such a scenario, the broadest possible grouping of UN members and "Friends" would be desirable. (C)

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

April 16, 1999

I Ø8

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 1.6X1

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

RELEASED IN FULL

TO: The Secretary

FROM: INR - Phyllis E. Oakley

SUBJECT: East Timor-Momentum Shift

The momentum in East Timor appears to have shifted to the pro-Indonesia forces after an early rush of pro-independence sentiment. Prospects are high that a cycle of intimidation and terror will intensify, requiring a neutral UN or other presence to maintain security and facilitate assistance. (C)

* * *

Intimidation by local militias with the support of Indonesia's regular forces is the driving force behind public demonstrations of pro-Jakarta sentiment this week in Dili and elsewhere, but other factors contribute to the new dynamics. (C)

- There is a ripe environment for militias. Like much of Indonesia, a significant portion of East Timor's population is young and without prospects for good jobs. Even without intimidation, youths see monetary and psychological advantage in joining a militia unit. Once involved in a violent incident, the incentive is even stronger to remain, a "revenge" momentum builds, and a snow-ball effect begins attracting more participants. (C)

- After President Habibie's announcement that independence for East Timor could be an option, it appeared that the civilian government in Jakarta was preparing for a Timorese rejection of an autonomy plan and that the military would accept independence for East Timor with proper provisions for a face-saving withdrawal. Recently, however, there are signals that the leadership thinks a "win" on the issue of autonomy is possible. There is no evidence that this sentiment has translated into orders for the military to suppress the pro-independence movement, but Jakarta has certainly given incentive to the pro-autonomy activists. Some local military

CLASSIFIED BY: Phyllis E. Oakley, INR A/S
REASON: 1.5(c)(d)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200300722

commanders are aiding the effort, but the extent or exact nature of their orders is unclear. (C)

- Pro-Jakarta Timorese have few options other than to fight for the status quo. Those Timorese who threw in their lot with Jakarta cannot easily leave the province like the non-Timorese teachers, doctors, and bureaucrats who have been reassigned by the central government. Some of these Timorese have been targeted by radical independence forces and many believe they are on "hit lists" that would be a priority of a new independent government. (C)

- On the other side of the equation, pro-independence rebels were ill-equipped to become political players and strains emerged between leaders on the ground and Xanana Gusmao. Their early parades and demands for independence frightened Timorese with vested interests in the status quo. As Indonesian authorities moved to defend pro-Jakarta sympathizers, including arming local gangs, violence increased, and the rebels stepped up attacks on Indonesian troops and civilian officials. A vicious cycle of gang warfare has erupted in many towns with pro-Jakarta militias clearly having the edge. (C)

- Pro-independence political activists were similarly ill-prepared. They had difficulty forming coalitions as new political organizations and NGOs bloomed in the heady days after President Habibie raised the independence option. Competing parochial interests of Timorese abroad and in-country undermined their effectiveness. (C)

Prospects. Without strong civilian leadership, the radical activists have filled the vacuum. Putting the armed militias back in the bottle may be extremely difficult unless their leaders (regional war lords, in some cases) are assured that their interests will be maintained and that there is no retribution. No one in authority can provide those assurances at present. It is very likely that the cycle of violence and intimidation will intensify and spread, making it extremely difficult for the UN to proceed. A "neutral" presence on the ground appears essential to the restoration of stability and to facilitate aid, but Jakarta may be increasingly resistant to such an outside presence if it interprets the current momentum as part of its "winning" strategy. (C)

RELEASED IN FULL

Indonesia/East Timor: Call to Arms (U)

Pro-Jakarta militia members yesterday attacked pro-independence supporters, killing at least two people, according to press reports. Some of the wounded said police and local military had backed the attackers. Pro-independence leader **Xanana Gusmao** claimed 17 were killed and **called on his followers to take up arms in response to repeated attacks.** Timorese students in late March started returning to East Timor from universities throughout Indonesia, saying Xanana had "ordered" them to come home. (U)

■ **COMMENT:** If these reports are accurate, **both sides appear to be moving toward increasingly violent rhetoric and action.** Escalating hostilities may jeopardize efforts by Bishops Belo and Nacimento to restart reconciliation talks this month; the talks still carry the ostensible blessing of the military. Habibie's senior foreign policy adviser today claimed the call to arms "does threaten the process." Violence could also delay Jakarta's agreement on the draft autonomy proposal for the next round of UN-sponsored tripartite talks in New York with the Portuguese. (C)

(CONFIDENTIAL)

RELEASED IN FULL (E05)

Analyst's Viewpoint

INR
United States Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

East Timor: A Work in Progress (U)

Summary. The prospect of independence for East Timor has unleashed a host of individuals and organizations with varying views and competing interests. The dynamics are extremely fluid. Some players on the ground in East Timor have resorted to intimidation and violence. This viewpoint attempts to capture the current state of play and provide a list of players as a basic reference tool. It will be periodically updated as the process evolves: INR/EAP welcomes corrections and additions. (U)

* * *

As of mid March, a working scenario calls for Indonesia and Portugal to reach agreement on terms for an autonomy package that would be presented to the East Timorese for their consideration. On March 8, Foreign Minister Alatas announced that presentation of the text to the Timorese would be delayed until late April at least, and that a special commission headed by Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs Faisal Tanjung would be working to "correct the flaws" in the draft. On March 11, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan reported that agreement had been reached at the tripartite talks (UN - Portugal - Indonesia) in New York on "a very democratic and direct method to know the wish of the East Timorese." The proposed schedule includes an April 13-14 senior officials meeting under UN auspices and a Portugal-Indonesia ministerial April 22-23. A UN official has suggested that if the Indonesians present their revised autonomy plan by the end of April, an optimistic scenario would have UN personnel arriving in early May to organize electoral activity. Others have indicated the balloting might take place in August. (C)

A working assumption is that the East Timorese will reject the autonomy proposal. There is speculation that Timorese living west of Dili and closer to the border with West Timor might vote in favor of autonomy, as may officials or others with strong links to Jakarta, but these are

---

Drafted by INR's Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific. For further information, contact Katherine Kerr at 202-647-3977.

March 18, 1999

Classified by: Paula Causey, INR/EAP
Reason: 1.5(c)(d): DECL: 3/18/09

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200300722

assumed to be a minority. President Habibie recently reiterated that if the East Timorese do not want autonomy, ties should be severed by January 1, 2000, and that Jakarta's financial responsibility should end by April 1, 2000. (C)

Much as President Habibie's independence alternative caught many by surprise, the extent of the proposed autonomy package apparently caught many of the cabinet by surprise. It is unclear whether the current review will significantly derail the process. Indonesian officials appear increasingly concerned about setting precedents with a wide-ranging autonomy offer, particularly in the face of demands from activists in the provinces of Aceh and Irian Jaya. If they succeed in scaling back the current package, they undermine the effort by Foreign Minister Alatas to give the East Timorese an attractive autonomy alternative to independence and could force a renegotiation session with the Portuguese. Foreign Minister Alatas is a key player, but he is not a close confident of Habibie. Presidential foreign affairs advisor Dewi Fortuna Anwar is increasingly active and other "domestic" ministers are now engaged as they address aspects of education, health care, and the safety of civil service personnel in East Timor. Although Indonesians differ on whether autonomy or independence is best for East Timor, there appears to be significant unanimity that East Timor is a "burden" that must be reduced. Military leaders caution, however, that the process must respect the sacrifice of the many Indonesians who died or were wounded in East Timor since 1975 and not "de-legitimize" Indonesia's invasion and occupation. (C)

East Timorese voices

Most observers see Xanana Gusmao as the only East Timorese leader with enough cachet to bring the East Timorese together. Since mid-February when he was moved to house arrest from prison, he has moved quickly to initiate discussions on reconciliation and sought to establish a council for stability that would include pro-integrationists and armed forces (ABRI) representatives. Xanana met Col. Suratman, the local ABRI commander in charge of East Timor, and proposed that ABRI dismantle armed paramilitary groups. On March 11, he met with pro-integration vigilante Joao Tavares and agreed to consider a 3-4 month cease-fire during which a dialogue would take place. Observers note Xanana's clout with anti-integrationists on the ground was strong enough to prevent large protests in Dili after two independence supporters were killed on February 24 by paramilitaries, debunking suggestions that his influence had eroded. (C)

Xanana has voiced expectations that 70% of the East Timorese would vote for independence and had hoped for a determination before the June 7 Indonesian national elections. He privately acknowledges backing away from earlier statements supporting a period of autonomy, and feels that appearing to support anything short of independence is politically impossible for him. At the same time, Xanana recognizes that a quick pullout by Indonesia—as some of Jakarta's early pronouncements suggested—will spark fear of chaos on the ground that will be exacerbated by the actions of armed paramilitaries. He expects Portugal to assume the responsibilities of sovereignty, but feels the bulk of responsibility for transition will be placed on

the international community. He favors a UN security presence, ideally through UN police training of neutral East Timorese (starting with a nucleus of 800 East Timorese) with a small transition role for ABRI. (C)

Xanana is not the sole voice for independence. There are others on the ground in East Timor who have engaged in violence directed at Indonesian soldiers and civil servants. East Timorese abroad are championing the cause, some with aspirations of leadership and property claims they are eager to pursue. On the other end of the spectrum, numerous bands of pro-Jakarta activists have formed, some with arms provided by Indonesian military units. They have engaged in acts of intimidation and violence against the independence activists. Violence has spawned violence to settle scores. Reaching agreement on a cease-fire is the first step, but forging a genuine reconciliation will be a lengthy and difficult process. East Timor also has significant numbers of non-Timorese (some estimates are as many as 175,000 out of total population of 800,000) who were moved there under Indonesia's transmigration program from over-populated Bali or Java, or who have settled as traders and shop owners. Some violence has already been directed against them and is likely to reoccur periodically. (C)

Outside players

Because of East Timor's unique status with the UN, the international body is already a party to the deliberations. UN special envoy Jamsheed Marker played a key role in hammering out the comprehensive autonomy proposal with input from both Indonesia and Portugal now under review in Jakarta. Marker has consulted with East Timorese leaders despite Jakarta's earlier prohibition against East Timorese involvement in meaningful political discussion. The UN also accepted the burden of devising the mechanism, short of a referendum, to determine East Timorese sentiments. But Marker and his top aides have told US officials that independence appears inevitable, and the key now is to get the autonomy exercise over quickly. UN officials are concerned about violence and the lack of flexibility from pro-integrationists, particularly those involved with paramilitary groups. Discussions are underway on the type of security assistance that may be necessary, in addition to material and economic aid. (C)

Australia and Portugal have unique roles due to history and proximity and both governments have offered various forms of assistance. Indonesia and Portugal have now exchanged liaison offices. Other neighbors in the region are likely to contribute aid to some degree, particularly if the process is under UN-administration with Indonesian concurrence, thus avoiding the problem of seeming to "interfere" in an internal Indonesian matter. (C)

Economic viability

An important question is East Timor's economic viability and the kinds of assistance that would be needed for an independent state to prosper. Some East Timorese have touted oil, tourism, marble, or potential casinos as sufficient resources, but Indonesians have expressed

concern that East Timor could become a magnet for crime, money laundering, or Chinese-run gambling offensive to Indonesia's Muslims. Jakarta has long claimed that without Indonesian support, East Timor would be destitute. In January, the Indonesian government announced that Jakarta spends $50 million annually on East Timor, primarily to finance the development of roads, schools, and social safety net programs. The editor of TEMPO privately estimated that the budget for East Timor has been running about $20-30 million per year just for civil administration. But East Timor remains very poor; independence activists blame the continued poverty on Indonesian corruption. The economy remains largely based on agriculture, and East Timor's livestock still has not recovered from the 1975 Indonesian invasion and years of conflict. There is little infrastructure to attract investment, and what little development exists is focused on extractive industries, like marble. The most significant export products are coffee (Starbucks among others) and wood. Unemployment levels are likely to be high, exacerbated by likely dismissals as the civil service contracts. Outside aid will be an important component of East Timor's future. (C)

The Timor Gap Treaty, negotiated between Indonesia and Australia in 1989, established a three part Zone of Cooperation (ZOC) to regulate development and exploitation of undersea petroleum resources, dividing tax and production sharing revenues under a complex calculation system depending on the zone of origin. Zone A is controlled jointly by Australia and Indonesia, Zone B by Australia alone, and Zone C by Indonesia. Australian pro-Timor activists argue that Zone C should devolve entirely to an independence East Timor and that Timor should be represented with Indonesia on the Zone A joint authority. There is mixed reporting on the potential production from the entire field. So far, the only area where oil exploration and production have started is Zone A with an estimated yield of 30,000 bpd over four years. But gas reserves are high, and a proposed project in the Bayu-Udan field could generate annual revenues of between approximately $38 and $230 million for ten years beginning in 2003. (C)

Pro-independence supporters have high, probably unrealistic, expectations that revenue from the Timor Gap will be enough to support an independent East Timor. Jakarta has helped fuel sentiments by suggesting that an independent East Timor would be free to renegotiate the Timor Gap Treaty with Australia. One estimate places the total oil and gas revenue from the Timor Gap to reach as high as $11 billion. How extensively the Timor Gap arrangement would have to be renegotiated to accommodate an independent East Timor is unclear, complicated by the fact that some of the ZOC straddles underwater territory still in dispute. World oil and gas prices will also play a role. Lack of refining or pipeline facilities in East Timor is likely to reduce the total earnings. But even more sophisticated thinkers among the pro-independence groups argue that an independent East Timor could, in the short term, borrow against future earnings from the Timor Gap. (C)

Much to do

The rapid developments of the past few months have sent Timorese, Indonesians, and outsiders reeling, but much remains uncertain and undone. A sampling of unresolved questions include:

Who will be responsible for monitoring a cease-fire or disarming paramilitary forces?

When will the vote on autonomy be taken and who will manage it?

How will the timing relate to Indonesia's June 7 national elections?

What sort of UN presence will be needed, and who will participate?

How and when does ABRI withdraw from East Timor?

Will there be a transitional, administering authority under the UN and Portugal? If so, how will responsibilities be divided?

When and how would full authority be transferred to a new East Timorese government?

What sort of continuing role is Indonesia likely to play before independence is formalized?

What sort of government will East Timor have, and how will that choice be determined?

How will prisoners, particularly Xanana Gusmao, be dealt with? When will he be freed?

How will East Timorese exiles be treated?

How will non-East Timorese migrants be treated?

How will relations between East Timor and Indonesia be handled?

Will Indonesia cooperate in facilitating the expanded presence of ICRC or other international and NGO bodies in East Timor?

Attachment: East Timor: Overview of Key Players and Organizations

G:\EAP: Timor reference tool viewpoint.doc

Indonesia: Timor Ray of Hope (U)

President Habibie yesterday called on East Timorese to decide by November whether to reject Jakarta's wide-ranging proposal for autonomy, paving the way for independence, according to press reports. **Earlier he** had said East Timor could be independent as soon as **January 1,** 2000, and **agreed to support and fund a commission on peace and stability** proposed by rebel leader Xanana Gusmao to calm tensions on the ground. (U)

Xanana, who on February 10 was moved from prison to guarded housing, told Portugal's newly arrived interest section chief that **he will soon meet the military commander stationed in East Timor to clarify Jakarta's support for the commission**, according to Embassy Jakarta. Meanwhile, **Xanana will urge radical elements on East Timor to halt violence and is confident he will be able to gain cooperation from most of the rebels.** (C)

■ **COMMENT: Habibie has pushed** Jakarta further **toward** a speedy Timor **independence**, even as preparations continue for presentation of a detailed autonomy plan by April. He has done so **with little consultation among his advisers, least of all the military, and left pro-integration East Timorese groups out on a limb.** (C)

Xanana maintains his pro-independence stance but **is working quickly to bring together pro- and anti-integration leaders who support an orderly transition period to ensure Jakarta does not abandon East Timor.** (C)

(CONFIDENTIAL)

EAP - Kerr

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520
February 9, 1999

I 02

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 1.6X1

RELEASED IN FULL

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

TO: The Secretary

FROM: INR - Phyllis E. Oakley

SUBJECT: East Timor - More Questions than Answers

Indonesia's January 27 announcement that independence for East Timor could be considered by the new parliament after the June 7 election if the Timorese reject an autonomy proposal initiated a political process with little coordination. Indonesian officials and the Australian prime minister have reiterated that autonomy is the preferred outcome, but the momentum is toward full independence. Key questions involve who to engage on the Timorese side and the timing and precise nature of the process. By default, the UN may be best suited to orchestrate the transition, but only if Jakarta has a face-saving way to protect its interests and supporters.(C)

* * *

On the diplomatic front. Who speaks for the East Timorese will need to be worked out among the Timorese themselves and with Jakarta, Lisbon, and the UN. Canberra will take a prime interest because Timorese, such as Ramos Horta, reside in Australia. East Timorese who have found unity in confronting a common enemy in Jakarta can be expected to voice differences over process, timing, and personalities. For example, some Timorese were critical of Xanana Gusmao's call for a lengthy transition. (C)

Under UN auspices, delegations from Portugal and Indonesia have discussed the basic framework for autonomy, but have not agreed on a mechanism to poll the Timorese. Even though this autonomy proposal is likely to be rejected, engaging the Timorese as soon as possible in this process could help establish guidelines for a transition to independence. (C)

On the ground. Jakarta maintains some 20,000 troops in East Timor and has organized armed civilian cadre, ostensibly to protect the people who are opposed to independence. Disarming both sides will be difficult unless there is a genuine ceasefire and guarantee of protection for residents opposed to

CLASSIFIED BY: Phyllis E. Oakley, , INR A/S
REASON: 1.5(c)(d)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200300722

independence. Arranging an exit strategy for Jakarta's forces also will be delicate. The armed forces want to avoid reopening the invasion issue and may balk at a scenario that appears to return East Timor to Portugal, thus calling into question the sacrifice of several thousand Indonesian soldiers. Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao's suggestion of a joint Indonesian-Timorese force for an interim period may sound naive, but could provide security for the transition if supported by all the key players. (C)

The exodus of non-Timorese has already begun; more are likely to depart. Managing resettlement will fall largely on the Indonesians, who already have said the UN must accept some responsibility. East Timor will lose a significant number of Indonesian-supplied teachers, healthcare workers, and civil servants, making Catholic Church and NGO support an essential part of the mix. (C)

Timing. President Habibie speaks of independence by the end of the year; other Indonesians and some Timorese refer to a transition ranging from months to years. There are no arbitrary deadlines, but Indonesian assembly elections on June 7 present an awkward obstacle. Whether to seek a Timorese determination on autonomy before, as part of, or after June 7 has not been decided; each timetable presents unique challenges, particularly for consideration of an acceptable UN role. Jakarta argues that only the full parliament, scheduled to meet in the fall, can terminate East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia. (C)

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No. 200300722 (INR002)
Archive # 20030196DOS045

APR 27 2006

Mr. Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Mr. Simpson:

I refer to our letter dated April 5, 2006, regarding the release of certain Department of State material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552).

The second search of the records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research has been completed, resulting in the retrieval of 43 documents that appear responsive to your request. After reviewing these documents, we have determined that 12 may be released with excisions and 31 may not be released. All released documents are enclosed.

The material in the excised portions of the 12 documents released in part and in the 31 documents withheld in full is currently and properly classified under Executive Order 12958 in the interest of national defense or foreign relations. As such, it is exempt from release under subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act.

In the case of a document released in part, all non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released.

With respect to material withheld by the Department of State, you have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. Appeals should be addressed to the Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/RPS/IPS/PP/, SA-2, Room 8100, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20522-8100. The letter of appeal should refer to the case number shown above. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

20030196DOS045 DOS
RECNO:25273 SEQCOR:120690
5/4/2006 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Militia Groups - East Timor

The Freedom of Information Act provides for the recovery of the direct cost of duplicating records requested for non-commercial use by a representative of the news media. No charge is made for the first one hundred pages of duplication. Total fees due in this case are $100.00, representing an additional 400 pages duplicated @ $0.25 per page. Please make your check or money order payable to the Treasurer of the United States, and mail it to the Office of Information Programs and Services, Room 8100, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20522-8100. Please be sure to write the case number on your check or money order.

We have now completed the processing of your case.

If you have any questions with respect to the processing of your request, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20522-8100. You may also reach us by telephone at (202) 261-8314. Please be sure to refer to the case number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

We hope that the Department has been of service to you in this matter.

Sincerely,

Margaret P. Grafeld
Director
Office of Information Programs
and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

Indonesia: Festering East Timor (U)

The fighting between pro- and anti-independence militia groups in East Timor this week reflects the lack of a credible political process and the need for the military, the Habibie government, and the UN to act more forcefully and expeditiously to control armed activists. (C)



4718 3-99 STATE (INR/CG)
Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 1/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4(B,D)

Rhetoric heats up

The "call to arms" statement released by East Timorese pro-independence leader Xanana Gusmao on April 5 reflected his dismay at reports of the violence. In an April 7 press conference, Xanana denied he had called for war, saying he had urged the people of East Timor to defend themselves, but his statements generated predictable reactions. Pro-Jakarta Timorese activists taunted that they too were ready to fight, and Indonesia's justice minister demanded a retraction and suggested that Xanana could be transferred back to prison from the current house arrest arrangement. In East Timor, the Dili military commander, who accompanied Bishop Belo to Likisia on April 7, argued publicly that the attack was "understandable" because guns found in the priest's house confirmed that Falintil, the military wing of the pro-independence movement, had sought refuge there. (U)

Delay in negotiations

Indonesian officials on April 8 said their work on the autonomy plan was not completed and asked for a week's delay in the next round of talks at the UN. **Though not directly related to the violence, the delay confirms an ongoing debate in Jakarta on how to proceed. Observers speculate that pro-independence forces, including Xanana, fear gains by those supporting autonomy and want to force the UN to take a stronger hand in East Timor.** (C)

Indonesia/East Timor: Give Peace a Chance (U)

Nobel laureate Jose Ramos Horta and another Timorese activist living abroad yesterday expressed skepticism about the truce agreed to by representatives of the warring pro-independence and pro-integration groups and officials from the government, military, police, and human rights commission, according to press reports. Military commander General Wiranto, the governor, and two Catholic bishops witnessed the signing. The pact does not include disarmament, but militia groups reportedly told Wiranto they will lay down their arms. By evening, the police displayed a small number of confiscated weapons. (U)

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

Indonesia: Timor Vote Set (U)

IN-6

President Habibie yesterday announced the UN-sponsored ballot on autonomy for East Timor will be held on August 8 and the results presented to Indonesia's newly elected parliament on August 29, according to press reports. He reportedly accepted "without change" a set of draft accords negotiated at the last round of UN-led tripartite talks with Jakarta and Portugal, including modalities for conducting the vote and ensuring security, according to Embassy Jakarta. (U)

1.4(D)

■ **COMMENT: Habibie's commitment to a timetable comes despite pressure from various quarters in Jakarta and East Timor to delay the vote because of security concerns.** Even if the vote yields clear support for independence, other domestic political pressures associated with instability and the outcome of the June parliamentary election could test Habibie's ability to follow through. **Pro-Jakarta militias** and their Indonesian backers will be looking to check the swing toward independence and **could give foreign advisers a less than friendly reception.** (C)

(TOP SECRET UMBRA)

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

Indonesia: Getting Nasty in Timor (C)

IN-8 P
B1
1.4(D)

Two special forces (KOPASSUS) soldiers on May 13 may have been injured in clashes with a TNI territorial battalion, according to press reports. Battalion members reportedly intervened when some militia-backed KOPASSUS troops roughed up bus passengers at a roadblock; battalion elements later attacked the local KOPASSUS headquarters. (U)

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4 (D)

Indonesia/East Timor: Waving the UN Flag (U)

The formal arrival of a UN contingent has helped bring calm to East Timor's capital, but intimidation persists in the countryside. Visiting presidential candidate Megawati's call for East Timor to remain part of Indonesia reflects the continuing debate over Timor's future. (C)

Several pro-independence activists yesterday came out of hiding to attend the UN flag raising ceremony in Dili marking the formal arrival of UNAMET. About 280 international police advisors are due to arrive, and Jakarta has now agreed to allow 45 unarmed UN military liaison officers to participate in UNAMET. Several observers note that Dili is much calmer, in part owing to UNAMET's arrival, but also because militia attacks have forced many pro-independence supporters to flee the city. (C)

Megawati's campaign stop

Megawati visited East Timor briefly on June 1, calling for an end to violence and telling supporters the province should remain part of Indonesia.

The province is strongly pro-Megawati, with support from both the pro-integration and the pro-independence camps. **Her visit thus made good campaign sense and, despite her role as opposition leader, was probably welcomed by a military eager to promote integration and demonstrate open politics in the province.** (C)

(TOP SECRET UMBRA)

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4 (D)

TOP SECRET UMBRA

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
08/12/1999

IN-18
P
B1 1.4 (B,D)

Indonesia/East Timor: Post-Ballot Planning (U)

Jakarta appears increasingly resigned to losing the August 30 East Timor autonomy ballot and is planning for the transition, including evacuations. (C)

Indonesian officials complain that foreign media inaccurately assume the overwhelming majority of East Timorese support independence, but signs are increasing that Jakarta recognizes it may lose the vote. The high registration turnout has buoyed the sp

The foreign ministry on August 9 issued estimates showing a slight majority favors independence (193,000 vs. 187,000). (C)

Expecting trouble

Two students reportedly were killed on August 11 when military and pro-Jakarta militia personnel fired on an office belonging to the leading pro-independence group, but observers judge that the security situation has improved overall. The military has reduced its overt support of militia activities and the pro-independence forces have remained largely in voluntary cantonments. The UN is adamant that the vote take place as scheduled. (C)

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4(B,D)

SECRET SPOKE

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brief
08/27/1999

IN-22
P
B1
1.4(D)

Indonesia/East Timor: Militia Blockade? (U)

Pro-Jakarta "Aitarak" militia leader Eurico Guterres on August 26 called for all exit points from East Timor to be closed following the August 30 UN-sponsored autonomy vote to "prevent East Timor's political elite from leaving" the region, "as they did in 1975," according to press reports. Guterres said the blockade of airports and overland routes would apply to non-East Timorese as well, noting "they must give political accountability." He repeated suggestions the territory should be divided. (U)

SECRET SPOKE

INR Home Page | Briefs | Intel Assessments | Viewpoints | Products by date | Products by country

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

Many observers, including UNAMET officials, predict renewed violence after the ballot as old scores are settled. Armed forces commander Wiranto has assured interlocutors that the military will take its security responsibilities seriously no matter what the outcome. Local commanders have rejected a UNAMET proposal to confine troops to barracks, arguing that independence movement guerrillas cannot be trusted to remain in their cantonments. There is little hope of disarming either the pro-independence forces or the pro-Jakarta militia, despite the recent signing by both sides of a code of conduct for the campaign. (C)

Unconfirmed reports continue to surface of a military buildup along the border with West Timor.

Pro-Jakarta activists are rumored to be considering a boycott with the intention of undermining UNAMET's ability to declare a successful ballot. They may be hoping that a strong military presence after the vote could help engineer a partition, with the western part of East Timor remaining part of Indonesia. (C)

Evacuation

Reason to hope

disagree with claims from some in the military that Timor will descend into civil war or that there will be a mass exodus of refugees. Without military support, there is little unity among the various militia groups; only a fraction of militia leaders are truly hard core. Past associations and family ties blur the lines between groups, offering the basis for post-ballot reconciliation. (C)

TOP SECRET UMBRA

TOP SECRET UMBRA

IN-30

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brief
09/10/1999

P
B1
1.9(D)

Indonesia/East Timor: Nowhere To Hide (U)

See also map showing refugee camps, evacuation routes in East Timor. (C)

Displaced East Timorese continue to clog roads leading into western Timor, bringing the total there to as many as 100,000. Many internally displaced persons (IDPs) taken to Kupang and elsewhere by boat appear to be under Indonesian military (TNI) care because they are pro-integration; those scattered in camps along the border may be targeted because they are pro-independence. (C)

B1

Militias allegedly have killed several prominent priests, as well as independence leader Xanana Gusmao's father, according to press reports. (U)

Comment: The humanitarian crisis over the next few days will not center on the

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 7/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

lack of food or water but on the need for protection, especially for those in the border camps and the more than 700,000 within East Timor. Many IDPs are heading into the hills; the men are taking up arms, while their families try to survive in and around rural villages. The TNI-organized evacuations may be part of an anti-guerrilla strategy to eliminate civilian bases of support. (C)

TOP SECRET UMBRA

INR Home Page | Briefs | Intel Assessments | Viewpoints | Products by date | Products by country

TOP SECRET UMBRA

JN-34

INR

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

(P)
B1 1.4(D)

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
09/14/1999

UN/East Timor: Intervention Preparation (U)

The UN Security Council is poised to launch a long-term mission for East Timor, where UN intervention is viewed with suspicion, if not hostility. (C)

The East Timor crisis has three intertwined aspects that complicate ambitious UN plans. The basic relief task of getting food and clean water quickly to those who need it will be difficult, with or without airdrops. Neutralizing the militias that have been terrorizing Timorese at the behest of the Indonesian military (TNI) will prove dangerous. And presiding over the birth of an independent country despite the objections of TNI generals, Indonesian nationalists, and angry militias--who blame President Habibie, the UN, and the Australians for this calamity--will be exhausting for all involved. (C)

For many internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees scattered in western Timor, difficulties obtaining food reflect the militias' control over food distribution. Reports of people scavenging for food in the hills of East Timor will continue as long as IDPs there are threatened by militias. Jakarta's acceptance of airdrops does not resolve the operational problem of accurately targeting needy groups while avoiding militias. (C)

More massacres?

The Australian defense minister's announcement that he could deploy 2,000 troops within a week may spur violence--the militias now know they are working under a deadline to eliminate those behind the successful independence vote. Despite Habibie's blessing of a peacekeeping force, pro-integration militias on the brink of losing all will vent their anger at UN interference and Jakarta's betrayal by hitting harder at "traitors." (C)

Beyond Chapter VII

Much of the discussion over the next few days in New York will be on the structure, mandate, and composition of a UN peacekeeping force. Though the search for a "non-western" head of mission may yet yield a suitable candidate, the heart and soul of the operation will be the Australians.

For related analysis, see
"China/East Timor: Keeping Out Taiwan (S)," September 14, 1999.

TOP SECRET UMBRA

MN-38

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

B1
1.4(D)

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
09/22/1999

UN/East Timor: Human Rights Geopolitics (U)

Human rights groups are clamoring for investigations into war crimes committed by the Indonesian military (TNI) and its militia allies.

Canberra's concerns

Australian Foreign Minister Downer on September 20 announced that his government would consider releasing intelligence, "consistent with established principles," on East Timor to a UN war crimes investigation. But political leaders

are acutely aware of anti-Australian sentiment in Indonesia and worry that a public campaign to identify TNI war criminals would increase security problems for INTERFET while aggravating already tense relations between Sydney and Jakarta.

Nongovernmental groups are jumping on an unsteady war-crimes bandwagon. The Australian branch of the International Council of Jurists has begun interviewing refugees in Darwin about alleged atrocities. More problematic for Indonesia is an effort by a European human rights group to file a case before a Portuguese court naming 21 Indonesians as responsible for the massacres. Because the UN has never recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, Portugal could make a credible claim for war crimes jurisdiction. (U)

Starting slowly

With INTERFET preoccupied with security and assisting in a massive humanitarian mission, and the UN Assistance Mission's (UNAMET's) future mandate still undecided by the Security Council, not much on-the-ground support will be forthcoming in the next few weeks for collecting forensic evidence at atrocity sites or even interviewing potential witnesses on the island. A low-key human rights approach at the onset may be the price of island-wide stability. (C)

With the ongoing departure of the TNI and militias, the imminent return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their villages, and the likely establishment of a reborn UNAMET, conditions should slowly improve for well-documented criminal investigations.

DA

TOP SECRET UMBRA

TOP SECRET UMBRA/NOFORN

IN-39

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

B1 1.4(D)

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brief
09/24/1999

East Timor:

The first day of the special East Timor session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva ended on September 23 with Asian member states rallying around Indonesia, according to press reports. The European Union favors the creation of an international commission of inquiry, but Asian, Arab, and some Latin American countries strongly oppose it, according to Mission Geneva. (C)

Comment: The recent spate of gunfire against INTERFET and the killings of a German priest and a Dutch journalist underscore the threat to westerners now and to future Asian peacekeepers in East Timor. The heated rhetoric at the UNCHR special session was divided on an East-West fault line, indicating a regional polarization that could undermine both INTERFET and a future UNAMET. (C)

TOP SECRET UMBRA

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4 (D)

IN-40

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
09/24/1999

UN/East Timor: Security and Relief (U)

Increasing concerns about attacks on the Interim Force for East Timor (INTERFET) have resulted in faster deployment of peacekeepers and tighter security while restricting civilian agencies trying to reach vulnerable groups outside Dili. (C)

See also map of Timor.

Indonesian State Secretary Muladi on September 23 claimed that the security situation in East Timor was improving, martial law was over, and the military (TNI) would make the hand-off to INTERFET as soon as possible. Army Chief of Staff General Wiranto said that, despite "one or two" looters, "things are OK." But security remains tense, with several accounts of gunfire in Dili directed toward peacekeepers, a heated "misunderstanding" (with warning shots) between TNI and INTERFET troops, and roundups of dozens of suspected militia members. More alarming for INTERFET are reports of an alleged TNI-supported militia buildup in western Timor. (C)

Burn and go

No peace, no food

Security problems are impeding urgent relief operations. Though World Food Program (WFP) airdrops have resumed despite technical and logistical problems, and will increase to two drops per day, they will not meet the requirements of the several hundred thousand needy or displaced. UNAMET on September 23 announced that 20 IDPs had died from malnutrition-linked causes and that thousands near the town of Dare were desperate for food and water. Food stockpiles in Dili have been looted, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has taken over the only functional hospital, fears that food distribution outside Dili will remain stalled until security improves; the ICRC also wants to begin reuniting families divided by the forced expulsions. The Acting UN Humanitarian Coordinator warns that the bulk of aid supplies must be delivered before the rainy season commences in November. (C)

For related analysis, see
"Indonesia: Cliffhanging in Jakarta (U)" and
"East Timor: Threat Warnings... (title TSU/NF)."
September 24, 1999.

TOP SECRET UMBRA

INR Home Page | Briefs | Intel Assessments | Viewpoints | Products by date | Products by country

20050141DOS066 DOS
RECNO: 30327 SEQCOR: [redacted]121376
DATER: [redacted] Battle, Joyce
Scott Ritter - Analysis of Iraq's weapons programs

20040978DOS361 DOS
RECNO: 29503 SEQCOR: 121375
DATER: Wampler, Robert
North Korea nuclear weapons program

20050817DOS245 DOS
RECNO: 31283 SEQCOR: 121374
DATER: Simpson, Brad
Popular uprisings following Megawati's removal, 1996

20051588DOS567 DOS
RECNO: 32287 SEQCOR: 121373
DATER: Curry, Mary
Weinberger's visit to Indonesia - 1982

20030196DOS045 DOS
RECNO: 25273 SEQCOR: 121372
DATER: Simpson, Brad
Militia Groups - East Timor

Accounts Receivable/FOIA Fees
IRM Programs & Services Office
U.S. Department of State
Building SA-2 - Room 6001
Washington, DC 20522-6001

Security enhanced document. See back for details.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
GELMAN LIBRARY - SUITE 701
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, DC 20037-2521

Bank of America
ACH R/T 054001204

5757
15-120/640 DC
0400

DATE 5.31.2006

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Two hundred fifty-seven & 35/100 DOLLARS $ 257.35

FOIA request duplicating charges - US DOS cases
200300722 (INR002) 200504735 (ER001)
2005 02742 (ER001) 200403956
200500836 T1

Treasurer of the United States

William Burns

NF

⑈005757⑈ ⑆054001204⑆ 00191422592 5⑈

GUARDIAN® SAFETY... Change protection

The National Security Archive

The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000
Fax: 202/994-7005
nsarchiv@gwu.edu
http://www.nsarchive.org

FAX COVER SHEET

Date: June 26, 2006

To: Chairman, Appeals Review Panel

Organization: U.S. Department of State

From: Mary Curry on behalf of Dr. Brad Simpson

Number of pages (including cover sheet) 6

If there is a problem with this transmission, please call us at 202-994-7000 as soon as possible.

Message: **FOIA Appeal Letter**
Case #: 200300722 (INR002)
Archive File No.: 20030196DOS045

An independent non-governmental research institute and library locate
the Archive collects and publishes declassified documents obtained t
Publication royalties and tax-deductible contributions through The National Securit

20030196DOS045 DOS
RECNO:25273 SEQCOR:122439
FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Militia Groups - East Timor

The National Security Archive

The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000
Fax: 202/994-7005
nsarchiv@gwu.edu
www.nsarchive.org

IN ALL CORRESPONDENCE PLEASE REFER
TO ARCHIVE FILE NO. 20030196DOS045

June 26, 2006

YOUR FILE NO. 200300722 (INR002)

Chairman, Appeals Review Panel
c/o Appeals Officer A/RPS/IPS/PP/LC
SA-2, Room 8100
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20522

RE: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT APPEAL

Dear Chairman:

I am writing on behalf of Dr. Brad Simpson to appeal the response to his FOIA request (DOS Case Control Number: 200300722 (INR002); National Security Archive Reference Number 20030196DOS045), which was submitted on March 10, 2003. Enclosed with this appeal are copies of the original request and your response of April 27, 2006. In your response you located 43 documents, of which 12 were released with excisions, and 31 were not released. The decision to release in part the 12 documents and to withhold the 31 documents was based on Exemption subsection b (1) of the Freedom of Information Act.

I am appealing the decision to withhold in their entirety the 31 documents. I request a new review of the 31 documents withheld in full to determine if there is any information that may be released without causing harm to U.S. national security interests or relations with foreign governments. If the 12 released documents had material that could be released in part, then certainly portions of the material in the 31 documents on the same subject matter must be releasable.

U.S. national security and foreign relations concerns have changed since September 11, 2001 and the start of the War on Terror. Understanding the current volatile political situation in East Timor, which became independent from Indonesia in May 2002, requires having access to more INR documents about the militia fighting in East Timor during 1999. America's mission to promote democracy around the world and transparency in government should be considered by the Appeal Panel in reviewing the 31 documents for releasable materials from 1999.

Please review the 31 documents carefully to consider releasing all non-sensitive information. At a minimum, it is likely that some segments of it are releasable, at least its date, title, origin, and all factual information. Thank you for your consideration of this appeal. I look forward to a prompt response. Please contact me with any questions or comments at (202) 994-7000.

Sincerely,

Mary E Curry

Mary Curry, Ph.D.
Research Associate
For Dr. Brad Simpson, Archive Fellow

An Independent non-governmental research institute and library located at the George Washington University, the Archive collects and publishes declassified documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Publication royalties and tax deductible contributions through The National Security Archive Fund, Inc. underwrite the Archive's Budget.

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No. 200300722 (INR002)
Archive # 20030196DOS045

APR 27 2006

Mr. Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Mr. Simpson:

I refer to our letter dated April 5, 2006, regarding the release of certain Department of State material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552).

The second search of the records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research has been completed, resulting in the retrieval of 43 documents that appear responsive to your request. After reviewing these documents, we have determined that 12 may be released with excisions and 31 may not be released. All released documents are enclosed.

The material in the excised portions of the 12 documents released in part and in the 31 documents withheld in full is currently and properly classified under Executive Order 12958 in the interest of national defense or foreign relations. As such, it is exempt from release under subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act.

In the case of a document released in part, all non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released.

With respect to material withheld by the Department of State, you have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. Appeals should be addressed to the Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/RPS/IPS/PP/, SA-2, Room 8100, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20522-8100. The letter of appeal should refer to the case number shown above. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

20030196DOS045 DOS
RECNO:25273 SEQCOR:120690
5/4/2006 FOISG: Simpson, Brad

The Freedom of Information Act provides for the recovery of the direct cost of duplicating records requested for non-commercial use by a representative of the news media. No charge is made for the first one hundred pages of duplication. Total fees due in this case are $100.00, representing an additional 400 pages duplicated @ $0.25 per page. Please make your check or money order payable to the Treasurer of the United States, and mail it to the Office of Information Programs and Services, Room 8100, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20522-8100. Please be sure to write the case number on your check or money order.

We have now completed the processing of your case.

If you have any questions with respect to the processing of your request, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20522-8100. You may also reach us by telephone at (202) 261-8314. Please be sure to refer to the case number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

We hope that the Department has been of service to you in this matter.

Sincerely,

Margaret P. Grafeld
Director
Office of Information Programs
and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

The National Security Archive

The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000
Fax: 202/994-7005
nsarchive@gwu.edu
www.nsarchive.org

March 10, 2003

Margaret P. Grafeld
Director, Office of IRM Programs and Services, SA-2
Department of State
5th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20522-6001

Re: Request under the FOIA, in reply please refer to Archive # 20030196DOS045

Dear Ms. Grafeld:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), I hereby request disclosure of the following for inspection and possible copying:

All documents generated by the State Department between January 1, 1999 and September 1999 relating in whole or in part to the following militia groups in East Timor. Documents should include, but not be limited to cables, reports, memoranda, and finished intelligence addressing the militia's formation, training, structure, operations and relationship to the Indonesian armed forces, police, intelligence and other security forces.

1. The Laksuar militia group, operating in the town of Covalima.

2. The Mahidi militia group, operating in Ainaro district.

3. The Besi Merah Putih militia group, operating in Liquica district.

4. The Halilinatar militia group, operating in Bobonaro district.

5. The Aitarak militia group, operating in Dili district.

6. The Tim Alfa militia group, operating in the area of Lautem.

7. The Gada Paksi militia group.

8. The Saka/Sera militia group, operating in Baucau district.

9. The 59-75 Fighters/Makikit militia group, operating in Viqueque district.

10. The Ablai militia group, operating in the area of Manufahi.

11. The AHI militia group, operating in Aileu district.

12. The Sakunar militia group, operating in the Oecussi enclave.

An Independent non-governmental research institute and library located at the George Washington University, the Archive collects and publishes declassified documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Publication royalties and tax deductible contributions through The National Security Archive Fund, Inc. underwrite the Archive's Budget.

At a minimum please search the record systems of the U.S. Embassy in Indonesia, the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

If you regard any of these documents as potentially exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements, I request that you nonetheless exercise your discretion to disclose them. As the FOIA requires, please release all reasonably segregable nonexempt portions of documents. To permit me to reach an intelligent and informed decision whether or not to file an administrative appeal of any denied material, please describe any withheld records (or portions thereof) and explain the basis for your exemption claims.

As you know, the National Security Archive qualifies for waiver of search and review fees as a representative of the news media. This request is made as part of a scholarly and news research project and not for commercial use. For details on the Archive's research and publication activities, please see our Web site at the address above. Please notify me before incurring photocopying costs over $100.

To expedite the release of the requested documents, please disclose them on an interim basis as they become available to you, without waiting until all the documents have been processed. If you have any questions regarding the identity of the records, their location, the scope of the request or any other matters, please call Barbara Elias at (202) 994-7219 or e-mail belias@gwu.edu. I look forward to receiving your response within the twenty-day statutory time period.

Sincerely,

Barbara Elias

Brad Simpson
National Security Archive Staff Fellow

****
*** TX REPORT ***
****

TRANSMISSION OK

TX/RX NO	1678
CONNECTION TEL	92618571
SUBADDRESS	
CONNECTION ID	
ST. TIME	06/26 17:01
USAGE T	01'55
PGS. SENT	6
RESULT	OK

The National Security Archive

The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000
Fax: 202/994-7005
nsarchiv@gwu.edu
http://www.nsarchive.org

FAX COVER SHEET

Date: June 26, 2006

To: Chairman, Appeals Review Panel

Organization: U.S. Department of State

From: Mary Curry on behalf of Dr. Brad Simpson

Number of pages (including cover sheet) 6

If there is a problem with this transmission, please call us at 202-994-7000 as soon as possible.

Message: FOIA Appeal Letter
Case #: 200300722 (INR002)
Archive File No.: 20030196DOS045

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520
June 27, 2006

Dr. Mary Curry
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20037

Re: Freedom of Information Request No. 200300722 (INR002)
NSA File No. 20030196DOS045

Dear Dr. Curry:

This is to inform you that the Chairman of the Department's Appeals Review Panel has received your letter of June 26, 2006, appealing Freedom of Information Case No. 200300722.

Should you have any questions concerning the status of your appeal, please write to:

The Appeals Officer
A/ISS/IPS/PP/LC
SA-2, Room 8100
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20522-8100

Sincerely,

Lori Hartmann

Lori Hartmann
Appeals Officer
Office of Information Programs
and Services

20030196DOS045 DOS
RECNO:25273 SEQCOR:122530
7/5/2006 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Militia Groups - East Timor

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SEP 26 2008

Case No. 200300722
INR2A1 segment

Mary E. Curry
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20037

Dear Ms. Curry:

A Department of State Appeals Review Panel, whose members are listed in an enclosure to this letter, has considered your appeal of June 26, 2006, for the release of 31 documents withheld in full by the Department in the course of responding to your request under the Freedom of Information Act.

The Panel has determined that 11 documents initially withheld in full may be released with excisions. A List of Documents Withheld in Part is enclosed, along with the released material.

The Panel has determined that 20 documents must continue to be withheld in their entirety. A separate List of Documents Withheld in Full is enclosed.

The information in all documents withheld in full and in the deleted portions of the other documents is properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958 (National Security Information) despite the passage of time. Its release reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security of the United States. It is therefore exempt from disclosure under subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC Section 552(b)(1).

No further non-exempt, meaningful information can be segregated from the exempt material and released.

20030196DOS045
RECNO: 25273
DATER: 10/8/2008
Militia Groups - East Timor

DOS
SEQCOR: 143732
Simpson, Brad

The Panel's decision represents the final decision of the Department of State. If you wish to seek judicial review of this determination, you may do so under 5 USC Section 552(a)(4).

Sincerely,

Francis Terry McNamara

Enclosures:
List of Panel Members
Document lists (two)
Eleven documents

FRANCIS TERRY MCNAMARA
CO-CHAIRMAN, APPEALS REVIEW PANEL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APPEALS REVIEW PANEL MEMBERS

Case Control No.: 200300722

Chairman:

Ambassador Francis Terry McNamara, Co-Chairman

Members:

Ambassador William Ryerson

Ambassador Harry Thayer

Exemption Category

9/29/2008
10:26:51AM

Case No. 200300722

LIST OF DOCUMENTS WITHHELD IN FULL

Segment	Doc No.	
INR002A01	000009	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000010	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000011	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000013	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000015	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000017	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000019	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000023	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000024	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000025	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000026	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000028	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000029	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000031	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000032	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000033	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000035	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000036	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000037	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000043	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)

Total Number of Documents 20

Case No. 200300722

LIST OF DOCUMENTS WITHHELD IN PART

Segment	Doc No.	
INR002A01	000001	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000002	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000004	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000007	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000014	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000016	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000020	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000021	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000027	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000041	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
INR002A01	000042	B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)

Total Number of Documents 11

Indonesia: Timor Tribulations (S)

1N-1
D
B1
1.4(D)
P
B1
1.4(c)(d)

East Timorese independence leader **Xanana Gusmao yesterday blamed a military (ABRI) intelligence unit in East Timor for inciting violence and hampering attempts at reconciliation**, according to press reports.

B1

[redacted]

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release ( ) Excise (X) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4.(D)

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)

( ) RELEASE IN FULL
(X) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
( ) ORIGINAL DECISION UPHELD

Exemptions B1 1.4(c) | 1.4(D)
ARP Action Cert 14 Date 9-26-08

UNCLASSIFIED

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release ( ) Excise (X) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 10/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

March 31, 1999 IN-2

P
B1
1.4(c)(d)

~~SECRET/~~SPOKE

DECL: 1.6X1

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: P - Under Secretary Pickering

FROM: INR - Phyllis E. Oakley

SUBJECT: East Timor's Ramos Horta

Nobel laureate Jose Ramos Horta is an important figure in the pro-independence community, but his penchant for strong statements lead some to question his credibility.

* * *

B1

Ramos Horta is vice president of the National Political Commission of the National Council of the Timorese Resistance (CNRT) and obviously sees a role for himself in an independent East Timor. He stresses his willingness to reconcile with other activists and speaks warmly of Xanana Gusmao.

B1

His ability to act as a peacemaker—between East Timorese factions and with the Indonesian government—may depend on his ability to couch his frequent public statements in less confrontational and more diplomatic terms.

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)
( ) RELEASE IN FULL
(X) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
( ) ORIGINAL DECISION UPHELD
Exemptions B1 1.4(c) 1.4(d)
ARP Action Cert LH Date 9-26-08

~~SECRET/~~SPOKE

CLASSIFIED BY: Phyllis E. Oakley, INR A/S
REASON: 1.5(c) (d)

INR# 03-22-99

UNCLASSIFIED

Indonesia: Violence and Protests (U)

IN - 4

Indonesian troops on April 10 killed thirteen suspected pro-independence civilians near Ermera in East Timor, according to press reports. Pro-Jakarta militia forces threw stones and beat on cars carrying journalists to a mass led by Bishop Belo at Liquisa, the site of the attack April 6 that may have left as many as 25 dead.

D
B1 1.4(D)
NC
P
B1
1.4 D
ES
B1

(TOP SECRET UMBRA)

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release ( ) Excise (X) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 7/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4 (D)

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)
( ) RELEASE IN FULL
(✓) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
( ) ORIGINAL DECISION UPHELD
Exemptions B1 1.4(c), 1.4(d)
ARP Action Cert LH Date 9-26-08

Indonesia:

The justice minister yesterday announced plans to establish an interagency team under the direction of Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs Feisal Tandjung to ensure the August balloting process in East Timor is "just and fair," according to press reports.

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)

( ) RELEASE IN FULL
(✓) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
( ) ORIGINAL DECISION UPHELD

Exemptions B1 1.4(c); 1.4(d)
ARP Action Cert 4 Date 9-26-08

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release ( ) Excise (X) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 9/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

Indonesia: Toning Down on Timor ~~(C)~~

IN-14

D

~~B1~~

~~1.4(D)~~

P

B1

1.4(c)(d)

[redacted]

■ **COMMENT: Jakarta is eager to show that it can maintain control of the security environment in East Timor now that UNAMET's arrival and the upcoming ballot have put events on the ground under even greater international scrutiny.** Until now, the more moderate pro-integrationists in East Timor have been eclipsed by hard-liners. ~~(C)~~

~~SECRET/SPOKE~~

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release ( ) Exempt (X) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)

( ) RELEASE IN FULL
(X) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
( ) ORIGINAL DECISION UPHELD

Exemptions B1 1.4(c) 1.4(d)
ARP Action Cert UH Date 9-26-08

Indonesia: Pro-autonomy Pep Talk (Ø)

IN-16

Leaders of two competing pro-integration groups—the Forum for Unity and Democracy (FPDK) and the East Timor People's Front (BRTT)—**and a senior militia leader yesterday announced a joint front to promote autonomy in the upcoming UN-sponsored ballot,** according to press reports.

D

B1

1.4(D)

P
B1
1.4(c)(d)

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release ( ) Excise (X) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)
( ) RELEASE IN FULL
(X) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
( ) ORIGINAL DECISION UPHELD
Exemptions B1 1.4(c) | 1.4(D)
ARP Action Cert 4 Date 9-26-08

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SPOKE~~

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)
( ) RELEASE IN FULL
(X) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
( ) ORIGINAL DECISION UPHELD
Exemptions B1 1.4(c) | 1.4(D)
ARP Action Cert UH Date 9-26-08

P
B1
1.4(c)(d)

D/N-20

~~B1~~
~~1.4(D)~~

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brief
08/21/1999

Indonesia: Threats, Suspicions, and Complaints (~~C~~)

Ian Martin, chief of the UN Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET), on August 20 urged Jakarta to take tougher measures to improve security, including arresting anyone holding weapons, according to press reports. His remarks followed two high-profile incidents sparked by pro-Jakarta militias.

[ ] B1

Comment: UNAMET officials want to hold the autonomy ballot on August 30 as scheduled and will do little more than complain as long as violence remains at a low level. Pro-independence student activists are the most immediate target for the militias, sparking brawls not necessarily directed at UNAMET. Indonesian authorities have showcased several disarmament ceremonies. [ ] B1

Genuine compliance by either side in the near term is unlikely. (~~C~~)

~~SECRET/SPOKE~~

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date _____ Exemption _____

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release ( ) Excise (X) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption _____

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

IN-27

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brief
09/06/1999

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release ( ) Excise (X) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1, 1.4(D)

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)
( ) RELEASE IN FULL
(X) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
( ) ORIGINAL DECISION UPHELD
Exemptions B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
ARP Action Cert UH Date 9-26-08

Indonesia/East Timor: Crashing Down (U)

Indonesian armed forces commander Wiranto, Foreign Minister Alatas, and other officials on September 5 visited East Timor to "calm down the situation" but never left the airport;

[redacted] B1

The militias control several regencies in the western part of East Timor, as well as several sections of Dili, and are seen colluding openly with police and military personnel. Governor Soares on September 5 reiterated his plan to divide East Timor into two parts, pro-integration and pro-independence, rather than "keep fighting," according to Indonesian press reports.

[redacted] B1

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA/NOFORN~~

IN-41 NC

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brief
09/28/1999

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release ( ) Excise (X) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/6/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)
( ) RELEASE IN FULL
(X) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
( ) ORIGINAL DECISION UPHELD
Exemptions B1 1.4(c) 1.4(D)
ARP Action Cert LH Date 9-26-08

Indonesia/East Timor: Militias Plotting (U)

Pro-Jakarta East Timorese militia leader Joao Tavares on September 27 said his forces will continue to fight to keep East Timor part of Indonesia, according to press reports.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA/NOFORN~~

UNCLASSIFIED 7/25/2006 3:17 PM

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA/NOFORN~~

IN-42

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release ( ) Excise (X) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/5/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brief
09/28/1999

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)
( ) RELEASE IN FULL
(X) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
( ) ORIGINAL DECISION UPHELD
Exemptions B1 1.4(c) , 1.4(D)
ARP Action Cert UH Date 9-26-08

East Timor: Kiki Leaves, Killings Continue (C)

See also map of Timor showing locations of refugee encampments, INTERFET control, etc. (S)

Indonesian military (TNI) General Kiki Syanakri on September 27 said "farewell" to Interim Force for East Timor (INTERFET) Commander Cosgrove behind closed doors and then departed Dili; Cosgrove emphasized this was not an official "handover," according to Embassy Jakarta and press reports. Over the weekend, INTERFET swiftly expelled militias from the town of Likisia.

[ ] B1

The exodus of refugees into western Timor continues; there are also growing concerns about those trapped in militia-controlled and crime-plagued camps, according to Embassy Jakarta and press reports. Relief activities remain largely limited to a narrow INTERFET-controlled strip. Though few Timorese are starving, many towns and villages continue to burn. Departing TNI soldiers on September 25 massacred 14 church members on the road between Baukau and Los Palos. (C)

Comment: With growing operational confidence, and remaining TNI troops sticking closer to their barracks, INTERFET will be extending methodically the parameters of relief activity. Beyond this thin zone, and especially in western Timor, militias will terrorize and loot at will.

[ ] B1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(S) B1

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA/NOFORN~~

UNCLASSIFIED
7/26/2005 3:18 PM

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)
( ) RELEASE IN FULL
(X) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
( ) ORIGINAL DECISION UPHELD
Exemptions B1 1.4(c) | 1.4(D)
ARP Action Cert CH Date 9-26-08
Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Release (X) Excise (X) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 4/25/06 Exemption B1 1.4(D)

UNCLASSIFIED
~~TOP SECRET/UMBRA~~

INR

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
08/25/1999

Indonesia: Timor Homestretch (U)

Responding to international pressure, Indonesia appears intent on demonstrating it can address security concerns before the UN-sponsored East Timor autonomy ballot scheduled for August 30, but there is a disconnect between Jakarta and elements on the ground. Many see increasing signs of a pro-independence victory. (C)

Foreign Minister Alatas, responding to a critical August 20 letter from the UN's Independent Electoral Commission, is anxious to ensure that Indonesian military and police units fully comply with the May 5 tripartite agreement, according to Embassy Jakarta.

B1

Out of touch

Key Jakarta players say they do not get the full story from subordinates in Timor.

B1

UNCLASSIFIED

B1 UNCLASSIFIED

Getting pessimistic

The pro-autonomy campaign may have lost some steam over the past few days as pro-independence supporters have emerged to campaign more openly, according to Embassy Jakarta. Pro-autonomy leaders are publicly criticizing Jakarta, some noting that even the pro-autonomy side does not want the military in East Timor.

B1

B1

An immediate post-ballot lull in violence is possible as both sides await the results, to be made public several days later. Pro-autonomy leaders continue to threaten civil war if autonomy is rejected. Military planning continues for the evacuation of East Timorese with militia ties; no matter what the outcome, some Timorese will be eager to relocate. (C)

~~TOP SECRET/UMBRA~~

INR Home Page | Briefs | Intel Assessments | Viewpoints | Products by date | Products by country

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 303047
ORIGIN EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 /013 R

DRAFTED BY EA/TIMBS:DPSULLIVAN:CCH
APPROVED BY EA/TIMBS:REFRITTS
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
EA ONLY

----------109832 202248Z /62

R 202204Z DEC 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 303047

STADIS//////////////////////////////////

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, PINS, ID

SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR

1. CONGRESSMAN FRASER HAS SENT FURTHER LETTER TO SECRETARY CONCERNING EAST TIMOR. LETTER STATES SUBCOMMITTEE HAS RECENTLY RECEIVED "RELIABLE REPORT" THAT GOI HAS BEEN USING CHEMICAL SPRAYS ON CROPS IN AREAS UNDER FRETELIN CONTROL AND THAT OV-10'S BEING USED TO SPREAD THESE CHEMICALS. CONGRESSMAN REQUESTS DEPT'S INFORMATION, ASKS "WHAT ASSURANCES HAVE WE RECEIVED FROM GOI THAT OV-10'S ARE NOT BEING USED FOR THIS PURPOSE" AND WHETHER OV-10'S BEING USED IN EAST TIMOR AND, IF SO, FOR WHAT PURPOSE. LETTER FURTHER STATES THAT SUBCOMMITTEE HAS RECEIVED "RELIABLE REPORTS" THAT INDONESIAN TROOPS ARE ENGAGED IN "INDISCRIMINATE KILLINGS" IN AREAS UNDER FRETELIN CONTROL AND REQUESTS DEPARTMENT'S ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 22 JUN 2004 200302005

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 303047

LEVEL OF CONFLICT AND FRETELIN'S STRENGTH IN EAST TIMOR.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE INFORMATION AVAILABLE AND EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT OF POINTS RAISED BY CONGRESSMAN. VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 304997
ORIGIN EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-05 PA-01 PRS-01 INR-07 HA-05
/032 R

DRAFTED BY EA/TIMBS:STAFF
APPROVED BY EA/TIMBS - ROBERT E. FRITTS
----------127071 221917Z /44
R 221706Z DEC 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
INFO CINCPAC
XMT AMEMBASSY SUVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 304997

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SHUM, PINT, ID, PT, MY

SUBJECT: EA/TIMBS WEEKLY STATUS REPORT

INDONESIA

PRISONER RELEASE - CONFIDENTIAL

THE DEC 20 RELEASE OF 10,000 PRISONERS APPEARS TO HAVE GONE WELL. AMB. MASTERS, ALONG WITH 11 OTHER CHIEFS OF MISSION AND SIX OTHER EMB REPS ATTENDED THE MAJOR CEREMONY NEAR MEDAN. AMB. MASTERS REPORTS THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES, ALL OF WHOM HAD OPPORTUNITIES TO TALK WITH THOSE BEING RELEASED, WERE UNANIMOUSLY OF THE VIEW THAT THE EVENT NEAR MEDAN WAS EXACTLY WHAT IT PURPORTED TO BE, THE ACTUAL RELEASE OF 886 DETAINEES WHO WERE GIVEN A FREE CHOICE OF RETURNING TO THEIR FORMER HOMES OR JOINING A RESETTLEMENT
CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 22 JUN 2004 200302005

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 304997

PROJECT (ONLY 20 OF THOSE RELEASED IN THE MEDAN CEREMONY SO CHOSE.) A MUCH SMALLER GROUP AT BANDUNG, ALL OF WHOM

WERE PROCEEDING HOME, SEEMED TO REGARD THEMSELVES AS FULLY FREE AND GAVE NO INDICATION OF INTIMIDATION IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS. THAT BEING SAID, IT SHOULD NONETHELESS BE KEPT IN MIND THAT IN A COUNTRY NOT NOTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY A MASS RELEASE PROGRAM WILL INEVITABLY BE IMPLEMENTED UNEVENLY.

US PRESS REPORTAGE TO DATE HAS TENDED TO BE NEUTRAL TO SNIPING, WITH THAT FROM BURU (POST AND TIMES) THE MOST DEPRECATORY. WE HAVE SEEN NO EDITORIAL COMMENT YET. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL RELEASED A STATEMENT WELCOMING THE GOI ANNOUNCEMENT, BUT STATING THAT PENDING RELEASES OF NAMES, DATES AND PLACES "THERE IS NO BASIS FOR BELIEVING AT FACE VALUE" THE GOI'S STATEMENTS ON NUMBERS RELEASED. AI ALSO ASSERTED THE NUMBER STILL HELD "IS PROBABLY AS HIGH AS 100,000" AND CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF ALL REMAINING DETAINEES, ASSERTING THAT THE GOI DELAY ON GROUNDS OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT IS "UNJUSTIFIABLE". AI'S WASHINGTON REP, ON THE OTHER HAND, EXPRESSED PLEASED AMAZEMENT TO TIMBS THAT 10,000 HAD APPARENTLY ACTUALLY BEEN RELEASED. THE RELEASES DID NOT COME UP AT NOON BRIEFINGS ON DEC. 20 OR 21 AND OUR GUIDANCE REMAINS UNUSED EXCEPT FOR SEVERAL SPECIFIC TELEPHONE INQUIRIES.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENGS - CONFIDENTIAL

THE POLITICAL TEMPERATURE IN INDONESIA APPEARS TO BE MOUNTING SIGNIFICANTLY AS THE MARCH MPR ELECTION OF A PRESIDENT APPROACHES. ARMED FORCES COMMANDERS, MEETING IN JAKARTA DEC 13-15, ISSUED A FIRM STATEMENT OF UNITY AND DETERMINATION TO PRESERVE PUBLIC ORDER AND OPPOSE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 304997

ILLEGAL DISSIDENCE. WHILE THE IMMEDIATE TARGET OF THE COMMANDERS' WARNING WAS UNDOUBTEDLY THE INCREASINGLY BOLD STUDENT DISSIDENT COMMUNITY, THE EMBASSY'S PRESS AND OTHER SOURCES QUICKLY SPECULATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS EQUALLY ALARMED BY ALLEGED BEHIND THE SCENES ACTIVITIES OF PROMINENT OPPOSITIONISTS SUCH AS RETIRED GEN. NASUTION AND FORMER JAKARTA GOVERNOR ALI SADIKIN. EAST JAVA MILITARY COMMANDER WITARMIN REPORTEDLY SUBSEQUENTLY STATED THAT THERE ARE SENIOR MILITARY WHO SUPPORT THE "OVERTHROW OF SUHARTO". THE EMBASSY COMMENTS THAT WITARMIN'S STATEMENT, EVEN IF ACCURATELY QUOTED, DOES NOT PROVE

THE EXISTENCE OF AN ANTI-SUHARTO CABAL. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A GROUP IS BELIEVED BY AT LEAST SOME TOP MILITARY OFFICERS. SUHARTO HIMSELF IS REPORTED TO HAVE CAUTIONED THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP THAT, WHILE HE ENDORSES THEIR DEC 15 STATEMENT AGAINST DISSENT, THE MILITARY SHOULD NOT "GENERALIZE" ITS RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC ACTS OF DISSIDENCE INTO A GENERAL CRACKDOWN. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS REMAIN UNCLEAR AT THIS POINT, BUT THE PROSPECT WOULD APPEAR TO BE FOR HEIGHTENED TENSION IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

EAST TIMOR - CONFIDENTIAL

CONGRESSMAN FRASER CONTINUES TO WRITE THE SECRETARY ABOUT EAST TIMOR DEVELOPMENTS. HIS LATEST LETTER SEEKS INFORMATION ON THE USE OF OV-10S IN THE AREA, SPECIFICALLY WHETHER THEY ARE BEING USED TO SPRAY CROPS IN FRETELIN AREAS. HE ALSO ASKS THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON FRETELIN STRENGTH AND ALLEGED RECENT ATROCITIES. WE ARE SENDING A PROVISIONAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WHILE PREPARING A MORE SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE.

REGARDING POSSIBLE ICRC VISITS TO EAST TIMOR, BOTH ACTING FONMIN MOCHTAR AND ADMIRAL SUDOMO HAVE SPECIFICALLY TOLD AMB. MASTERS THAT PRESS REPORTS THAT THE GOI HAS REFUSED CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 304997

SUCH AN ICRC REQUEST ARE INCORRECT SINCE THE RECENT ICRC DELEGATION TO JAKARTA TO FINALIZE PRISON VISIT PLANS HAD NOT RAISED THE SUBJECT. THE FOREIGN DEPT DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS TOLD AMB. MASTERS EARLIER THIS MONTH THAT THE GOI IS OPPOSED TO SUCH VISITS, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT ACCEPT VISITS BY RELIGIOUS GROUPS. AMB. MASTERS PLANS TO FOLLOW UP THIS POSSIBILITY AT AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY.

MALAYSIA

AFP REPORTS THAT SRV FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN DUY TRINH IS SCHEDULED TO MAKE A THREE DAY OFFICIAL VISIT TO MALAYSIA STARTING JANUARY 3 IN RETURN FOR THE VISIT BY MALAYSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER RITHAUDDEEN TO HANOI LAST MAY. FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH WILL BE IN JAKARTA FROM DEC 28 TO 31 FOLLOWING A VISIT TO BANGKOK.

THAILAND

AMBASSADOR WHITEHOUSE HAS COMPLETED HIS WORK ON THE SELECTION BOARDS AND WILL DEPART WASHINGTON DECEMBER 22 TO SPEND THE HOLIDAYS IN FLORIDA. HE WILL BE BACK IN BANGKOK ON DECEMBER 30.

REGIONAL

ASST SEC DERIAN TO VISIT AREA - LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PATT DERIAN'S VISIT PLANS ARE BECOMING SOMEWHAT MORE FIRM WITH PLANNED VISITS FOLLOWING THE CM CONFERENCE TO THAILAND, SINGAPORE, INDONESIA, SOUTH KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES. THE SUBJECTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEES. IN ADDITION TO OFFICIAL CONTACTS A DRAFT ITINERARY CABLE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 304997

NOTES HER WISH TO HAVE INFORMAL HUMAN RIGHTS SESSIONS WITH EMBASSY STAFFS PLUS MEET WITH PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD AND, IN INDONESIA, RELEASED DETAINEES. VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 17202 231544Z
ACTION EA-12

R

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 /013 W
----------003738 231554Z /45R

R 230905Z DEC 77
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5761

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 17202

STADIS//////////////////////////

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR

REF: STATE 303047

1. OV-10S ARE USED IN INDONESIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST FRETILIN. ARMAMENT EMPLOYED HAS THUS FAR BEEN LIMITED TO MACHINE GUNS, ROCKETS AND PERHAPS BOMBS.

2. WE HAVE NO REPEAT NO REPORTS THAT INDONESIANS HAVE USED CHEMICAL SPRAYS ON CROPS IN AREAS UNDER FRETILIN CONTROL. IN ANY EVENT, IT APPEARS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT OV-10 WOULD BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE. ACCORDING TO MISSION PERSONNEL WITH EXPERIENCE IN AERIAL SPRAYING, OV-10 WOULD, FOR THIS MISSION, REQUIRE EXTENSIVE MODIFICATION, WHICH COULD NOT ESCAPE NOTICE OF U.S. TECHREPS HERE. EVEN AFTER SUCH MODIFICATION, IT WOULD REMAIN BASICALLY UNSUITABLE FOR SPRAYING. (DEPARTMENT MAY WISH CONFIRM THESE TECHNICAL ASPECTS FURTHER WITH WWASHINGTON EXPERTS.) U.S. TECHREPS AND AIR FORCE OFFICER ASSIGNED TO OV-10 HOME BASE IN CENTRAL JAVA, WHO SEE AIRCRAFT DURING PERIODIC INSPECTIONS,HAVE NOTED NO EVIDENCE OF THEIR BEING USED FOR SPRAYING. AMBASSADOR IS SEEKING APPOINTMENT WITH DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ASSISTANT FOR INTELLIGENCE MAJOR GENERAL MURDANI TO DISCUSS TIMOR SITUATION AND WILL RE-

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 22 JUN 2004 200302005

PORT ANY COMMENTS BEARING ON THIS SUBJECT.
MASTERS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Military Leadership Profile

INDONESIA
Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang YUDHOYONO
June 1998

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Photo date: Unknown

(U) *NAME:* Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang *Yudhoyono*, Indonesian Army.

(U) *POSITION:* Chief of Social-Political Affairs, Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), since February 1998.

~~(C)~~ *SIGNIFICANCE:* Most senior members of ABRI consider Lt Gen Yudhoyono as a future leader of the armed forces and possibly the country. In his present position, Yudhoyono steers the military's development role in Indonesian society under ABRI's "dual function" system of civil and military guardianship. Yudhoyono is widely respected by civilian and military leaders and has an exceptional career record.

~~(C)~~ Yudhoyono is a member of a small group of intellectuals gathered together by General Wiranto, Minister of Defense and Security and Commander in Chief, ABRI, to study how Indonesia's political and governmental structure should change in the post-Soeharto era. The group will examine such issues as press freedom, corruption, nepotism, and enhancing the power of the legislature.

~~(C)~~ *PERSONAL DATA:* Lt Gen Yudhoyono was born on 9 September 1949 in East Java, Indonesia. He follows Islamic precepts and does not consume alcoholic beverages. He speaks, reads, and writes English well. Lt Gen Yudhoyono is married and has two sons: [redacted] born 1979, and [redacted] born 1983. An extremely competent and professional officer, he has great poise, is an excellent public speaker, is very intelligent, and is assured without arrogance or pomposity. Early in his career, Yudhoyono was reportedly given to very brief fits of temper when things did not appear to be going as he would like. His father-in-law is the late Sarwo Edhie Wibowo. Wibowo, a national hero, was Soeharto's most trusted commander and served in several prestigious government positions. Yudhoyono holds a master's degree in management from Webster University, St. Louis, MO. He is one of a very small number of Indonesian officers with foreign graduate degrees. (b)(6)

~~(C)~~ *CAREER:*

1970-73 - Attended the Military Academy, Magelan, Central Java. Graduated in 1973 at the top of his class.

1974-75 - Platoon leader at the 330th Airborne Battalion.

1975-76 - Attended a 6-month airborne training course at Fort Benning, Georgia.

1979-81 - Company commander, 330th Airborne Battalion. Student at an infantry captaincy course, 1979.

1981-82 - Training Staff Officer at Army Headquarters, Jakarta.

1982-83 - Student at the Infantry Officers Advanced Course, Fort Benning, Georgia.

1983 - Instructor at the Infantry Center, Bandung.

1983-86 - Commander, NCO School, Infantry Center.

1986-87 - Commander, 744 Infantry Battalion, Dili, East Timor.

1988-89 - Student, Indonesian Army Command and Staff College.

1989 - Instructor at the Indonesian Army Staff College, May-December.

1990-91 - Attended the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

?-1995 - Assistant for Operations, Jakarta Military Area Command. Commander of a military sub-area, April-November 1995.

1995-96 - Commander of the United Nations Military Contingent, Bosnia, November 1995-March 1996.

1996 - Chief of Staff, Jakarta Military Area Command, March-August. Commander, 2d Military Area Command, August.

1997 - Assistant for Social-Political Affairs, ABRI, September.

1998 - Chief of Social-Political Affairs, ABRI, February.

(b)(2) (b)(3) PREPARED BY: [redacted]

Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: Source marked "OADR"
Date of Source: February 1998

(U) This product responds to the Office of Secretary of Defense's production requirement A001-96-0004.

(U) COPYRIGHT WARNING: Further dissemination of the photograph in this publication is not authorized.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EAST TIMOR PRIMER



This is provided as a service of the USCINCPAC Virtual Information Center (VIC), Pacific Disaster Center and The Center of Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance

Prepared by: Allen Price, USCINCPAC VIC, 3 June 1999
Last Updated: Allen Price, USCINCPAC VIC, 28 July 1999

This combined HQ VIC/Center of Excellence document is a product of the Virtual Information Center Process

EAST TIMOR PRIMER

Table of Contents

1. Overview 1
A. Introduction
B. Referendum
C. History
D. Summary of Climate, Topography and Population

2. East Timorese 4
A. Biographies of Leaders
   (1) Pro-Independence Leaders
   (2) Pro-Jakarta Leaders
B. Political Parties/Movements
C. Economy
D. Infrastructure (Roads, Rail and Rivers)
E. NGO's, PVO's and IO's active in East Timor
F. United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)

3. Indonesians 8
A. Biographies of Leaders
   (1) Political Leaders
   (2) Military Leaders
B. Government Policy
   (1) Towards Provinces
   (2) In East Timor
   (3) Government Views on Infrastructure
C. Military Forces

1. Overview

A. Introduction

The people of East Timor have been under foreign occupation for almost 500 years, starting with the Portuguese and followed in this century by the Japanese, and Indonesians. East Timor has been actively seeking independence since 1910, and each attempt has been suppressed brutally. In an UN-organized vote to be held on 7 August 1999, East Timor will decide between wide-ranging autonomy under Indonesian rule or independence.

B. Referendum

On January 27, 1999, the Indonesian government in a surprise announcement said that it was ready to grant independence to East Timor if the population rejected autonomy. Many feel that severe economic difficulties and political dissent has forced Jakarta to conclude that it can no longer absorb the political and financial costs of holding on to the territory. But both the Indonesian Army and many Indonesian politicians fear that East Timorese independence could fuel separatist movements elsewhere in the archipelago.

On May 7, 1999, the UN Security Council unanimously endorsed agreements that led to the scheduling of the 8 August referendum to determine East Timor's fate. On May 26, 1999, the UN security Council circulated a resolution to set up an operation called the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to enable the people of the territory to decide their own future. Although Indonesia reportedly has changed the date to 7 August, the referendum's basic purpose remains unaltered – to determine if the people of East Timor want independence or remain a part of Indonesia. The UN is expected to send 600 civilians and an unspecified number of police advisors to East Timor.

C. History

East Timor was a Portuguese colony from 1509 to 1975. The Portuguese invested very little into developing the colony, providing only a limited infrastructure. For example, after WWII, the Portuguese built only a few health centers in the districts, a hospital, some schools, governmental offices and a new harbor in the city of Dili. The Portuguese had little impact on Timorese daily life although Portugal did suppress several East Timor rebellions. The first major rebellion was in 1910 and took 18 months to quell. Japan occupied East Timor as well as the rest of Indonesia from 1942 through 1945. Another rebellion occurred after the Japanese withdrawal in 1945. The Portuguese brutally suppressed that one as well but withdrew precipitously after granting the country independence in October 1974. A brief civil war ensued as the two dominant independence groups, Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), and Democratic Union of Timor (UDT) fought for control of the country.

Indonesia intervened in 1975, overrunning the province in a matter of weeks and annexing it as Indonesia's 27th province. Then, from 1975 through 1989, the Indonesian military ran East Timor like a closed colony. No media access was allowed and the only information provided about East Timor was through the Indonesian military or government. On 1 January 1989, the

military opened East Timor to tourists and Indonesians. In effect, Indonesia has colonized the province. Indonesians now comprise 20% of the population of East Timor.

East Timor's independence groups continued their resistance under Indonesian rule. Moreover, they have received extensive international support. For example, the UN has never recognized Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. The UN still views Portugal as the territory's official administrator. The fighting has been severe and costly for both sides. Human rights groups estimate that up to a quarter of the population (200,000) has died in fighting and famine during Indonesian rule.

D. Summary of Climate, Topography and Population

Situated in the equatorial regions, the climate in East Timor is tropical, humid, and has two annual seasons determined by the monsoon. The average temperature is 70^0 Fahrenheit, with humidity ranging from 70% to 80 %. The greatest variance in the weather is due to the monsoons. The rainy season runs from November to May and the dry season from June through October.

East Timor is a small territory of 19,000 sq. km, located on the island of Timor in Indonesia just 400 miles northwest of Darwin, Australia. East Timor is comprised of coastal lowlands with interior mountains. The higher elevations occur in the center of the island which is dominated by a massive central backbone. The mountainous terrain is cut by deep valleys and the rivers flow north or south in very steep, rough and unnavigable streams.



Figure 1. Location of East Timor

East Timor's population numbers 800,000 – 78% Timorese, 20% Indonesian and 2% Chinese. In contrast, East Timor's population when the Portuguese left in 1975, was 680,000 - 97% Timorese (including mestizos), 2% Chinese, and less than 1% Portuguese. The change reflects the extent of Indonesian migration into East Timor since it was opened in 1989.

There are 12 Timorese ethnic groups, each of which has its own language: nine Austronesian language groups and three Papuan language groups.

For centuries the East Timorese had been farmers, living in isolated mountainous, scattered hamlets and eating what they grew. Only a few coastal East Timorese were fisherman. Trading and shop keeping had for generations been in the hands of the Chinese.

Religion has played a major role in the East Timor conflict. Led by consecutive Timorese Bishops of Dili, Martinho da Costa Lopes (1977-1983) and Carlos Ximenes Belo (1983 till today), East Timor's Catholic clergy, have played a key role in defending people's rights and publicizing the flight of East Timor internationally. Timorese Bishop Carlos Belo has been tireless in exposing the horrors of living in East Timor and has become the foremost advocate and mouthpiece for the East Timorese. Annexation has revived the church's strength. In 1975, 28% of the population claimed to be Catholic. Today, nearly 85% of the population claims to be Catholic.

2. East Timorese

A. Biographies of Leading Personalities

(1) Pro-Independence Leaders

	Xanana Gusmao is the President of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (NCTR). To the people of East Timor, Gusmao has come to represent the symbol of their struggle for freedom, the key-person in the political, peaceful and negotiated solution-seeking process for the two decade long conflict. He has been imprisoned in Jakarta since 1992 for leading pro-independence guerillas. Recently, he was released from prison but is under house arrest in Jakarta.
	Jose Ramos-Horta is the Vice President of the NCTR and continues to be the Personal Representative of Xanana Gusmao, President of the NCTR, imprisoned in Jakarta since 1992. Jose Ramos-Horta was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize along with Bishop Belo in December 1996. He has been in exile from East Timor for the past fifteen years.
	Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo is the Bishop of East Timor. Bishop Belo's courageous labors on behalf of the East Timorese and in pursuit of peace and reconciliation were internationally recognized when he was awarded, along with Jose Ramos-Horta, the prestigious Nobel Peace Prize in December 1996.
	Taur Matan Ruak is the Military commander of FALINTIL, the East Timor armed forces since March 1998. The FALINTIL has been resisting the Indonesian occupation since December 1975.

(3) Pro-Jarkarta Leaders

Photo not available	**Eurico Guterres** is the leader of the Pro-Indonesia Aitarak militia. The Aitarak militia has been accused of involvement in numerous attacks against independence supporters, including the killing of 13 civilians in Dili on 17 April 1999.
Photo not available	**Basilio Araujo** is an important Pro-Integration leader in Indonesia.

B. Political Parties/Movements

In 1974 three Timorese political parties were established: **UDT** (Democratic Union of Timor) advocating a progressive process of autonomy, under Portugal, **ASDT** (Timorese Social Democratic Association) which later became **FRETILIN** (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) advocating the total independence of East Timor, and **APODETI** (Timorese Democratic People's Union) advocating that East Timor be integrated into the Indonesian government. Local elections were held in February and March 1975 in which FRETILIN won 55% of the vote, UDT with over 35% of the vote, and APOLETI with less than 10% of the vote.

In August 1975, the UDT staged "coup" which led to a three week running battle with FRETILIN, which resulted in 2000 deaths. FRETILIN won the resulting civil war and retook the capital Dili in October. However, the fighting drove thousands of refugees across the frontier into Indonesian West Timor. FRETILIN pursued retreating UDT troops into Indonesia. FRETILIN declared East Timor's independence on 25 November 1975 but the fighting continued. Indonesia invaded East Timor on 7 December, ostensibly to end the fighting and stabilize East Timor. Indonesia has ruled East Timor as its 27th province since 1976; however, FRETILIN has never stopped fighting.

Indonesia's 1998 financial crisis led to a re-evaluation of East Timor's importance to Indonesia. Facing a difficult financial crisis and growing unrest in the rest of Indonesia, President Habibie issued a statement on 27 January 1999, indicating that he was willing to discuss independence for East Timor. That statement led to Indonesian negotiations with Portugal to organize a referendum to determine East Timor's fate. The United Nations Security Council unanimously endorsed the Indonesian-Portuguese agreements on 7 May 1999. The referendum will determine whether the East Timorese want autonomy under Indonesian rule or total independence. The referendum was scheduled originally for Sunday, 8 August 1999. Since that time, Indonesia has announced it will be held on Saturday 7 August.

On 20 May 1999, the Indonesian government announced that Nobel Peace laureate Jose Ramos-Horta would be allowed to join jailed Timorese guerrilla leader Xanana Gusmao for talks with the Indonesian government. The visit to Indonesia would be Horta's first in more than two decades since he has been living in exile in Australia and Portugal. No date has been set for the talks.

C. Economy

If their homeland gets independence, East Timorese will face a daunting economic task. Most are subsistence farmers and there is very little industry. Moreover, independence will cost East Timor the $100 million a year Jakarta reportedly pumps into the province, an estimated two-thirds of the province's budget. East Timor, which generates only a few million dollars a year in tax revenue, will then be reliant on international support to keep government administration and public functioning. The province does have economic potential, but it will require significant investment to realize that potential.

East Timorese leaders claim there are many natural resources such as magnesium, marble, oil, sandalwood, fisheries, and tourism to draw upon. In addition to possible revenue from a renegotiated Timor Gap Treaty on oil exploration, coffee production is being touted as one of the best bets. Coffee exports are worth 15 million dollars annually, a figure local leaders believe could double in five to ten years. Independence leaders also hope to learn from Fiji's experience in economic development because of its similar size and type economy. East Timor plans to use the European EURO as their currency during their transition until they establish their own currency. Finally, independence leaders want to join the Asia Pacific Forum as they believe East Timor shares common perspectives on religion and trade issues with Australia and New Zealand.

Initially, independence leaders use tourism, especially from Australia, to generate revenues quickly, while investing heavily in becoming self-sufficient in agriculture, and enhancing the fishing industry. They expect revenues from the oil and gas industry to kick in 5-10 years after independence.

Education will be one of the new government's major challenges. The majority of adults have only rudimentary reading skills and most of the school teachers are Indonesian. So, the new government will have to build its national education system from the ground up. A National University will be built but they intend to send students abroad for education until the National University is established.

D. Infrastructure (Roads, Rail and Rivers)

East Timor's transportation infrastructure is limited. There are only a few roads and those link the major cities and towns. Most of the older roads were built by the Japanese to support their occupation from 1942-1945. The bulk of the new road system was built by the Indonesian military to support its operations in the province. The roads are lightly traveled as few East Timorese own vehicles (see figure 2 below). There is no major rail or river system in East Timor. In fact none of East Timor's rivers and streams are navigable. Small coasters and fishing craft conduct minor offshore trade among the small towns and villages along the coast.

In the event of torrential rains or a monsoon, the majority of the road system would be flooded and impassable by the fast moving rivers and streams.

E. NGO's, PVO's and IO's active in East Timor

Several NGOs are active in East Timor such as the International Committee of the Red Cross which provided training in humanitarian law and looking after victims of violence in Dili from 1996 through 1998. The ICRC is also busy monitoring the living conditions of the political prisoners in Indonesian jails. NGOs such as the World Food Program provided assistance in 1998 during the food shortages and famine caused by the weather and civil war. Most NGOs have departed since the food situation is under control. At this time International Organizations are focusing on the upcoming referendum vote on 7/8 August 1999, and the United Nations' advance party was in East Timor 14-25 May 1999. NGOs may assist the UN once the plan is in place to support the referendum vote.



Figure 2 Road system in East Timor http://www.freedom.tp/ireland/etisc/map2.html

F. United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)

The UNAMET was established by Security Council resolution 1246 (1999) of 11 Jun 99 to organize and conduct a popular consultation on the future status of the territory. The mission incorporates political, electoral and information components. The UNAMET will receive approximately $52.5 million for the period 5 May to 31 Aug 99.

Voter registration began 16 Jul 99 in East Timor and at registration sites around the world. As of 26 Jul 99, all 200 registration centers are open. More than 200 observers have been accredited as of 20 Jul 99. Jeff Fisher is the Chief Electoral Officer of UNAMET and international electoral experts Patrick Bradley, Johan Krirgler and Sohn Bong-scuk comprise the independent Electoral Commission. All these personnel are in East Timor and assumed their responsibilities of assessing the consultation process and hearing complaints, challenges and disputes thereon.

UNAMET is fully operational, and the deployment of international personnel is complete but for a final few. The number of United nations Volunteers (UNVs) is close to the full complement of 425; most of them have been assigned as electoral officers in the field (the balance being medical and support staff). The civilian police component, headed by Alan James Mills (Australia), is fully operational and has established good working relations with the local police. As of 19 Jul 99, there were 243 civilian police personnel. The remaining police are expected by early Aug 99. The Chief Military Liaison Officer, Brigadier Haider (Bangladesh), assumed his functions on 8 Jul 99. As of 19 Jul 99, 47 of the 50 expected military liaison officers had arrived.

3.Indonesians

A. Biographies of Leading Personalities

(1) Political Leaders

	Bucharuddin Jusuf Habibie is the new president of Indonesia and is in the head of the ruling political party, Golkar. He was vice-president when Suharto resigned and became president in line with the constitution in 1998. Many believe his rise to power is based entirely to his close friendship with former President Suharto. Indonesia's ruling Golkar party chose President Habibie as its candidate for the presidential elections 7 June 1999.
	Megawati Sukarnopotri is the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) leader. As the daughter of Indonesian's revered first President Sukarno and a persistent opponent of the Suharto regime, Megawati appeals to Indonesians from different ethnic and religious groups in a fashion that no other leader can match. She is a leading presidential candidate for the 7 June 1999 national elections.
	Amien Rais is another Indonesian candidate and could be characterized as a Muslim democrat. He has the support of most if not all of the Muhammidiya, a Muslim social organization. Rais is the energetic leader of the opposition National Mandate Party (PAN) and is a strong candidate for President in the upcoming 7 June 1999 elections.
	Abdurrahman Wahid commonly called **Gus Dur** is Indonesia's charismatic Muslim Leader. In the Indonesian elections, Gus Dur may be the political glue which holds together the disparate views of Megawati's PDIP, and Rais's PAN. He also has his own political grouping the National Awaking Party (PKB) which is part of the new coalition to oust Habibie and the Golkar party. He wields tremendous influence as the leader of Indonesia's largest Moslem group, the Nahdlatl Ulama (NU), which claims 40 million followers.

(2) Military Leaders

	General Wiranto is the Indonesian Defense Minister and Army Chief of staff. He also has had close ties to former President Suharto. General Wiranto has stated that he now supports Habibie on behalf of the Army and that he would protect Suharto and his family.
Photo not available	**Colonel Tono Suratman** is the Indonesia Military Commander for East Timor.

B. Government Policy

(1) Towards Provinces

Indonesia has 27 provinces (24 provinces, 2 special regions, and 1 special city district). The Indonesian government is a Republic with an executive, legislative and judicial branch. Theoretically, the government is centralized with the provinces following the direction of the central government. However, the Army, and provincial governments enjoy extensive authority.

(2) In East Timor

East Timor is Indonesia's 27th province. The East Timor capital is Dili, where most of the government offices are located In East Timor, the Army enjoys extensive authority. In fact, many East Timorese believe the Army has more authority than the provincial government.

(3) Government Views on Infrastructure

Unlike Portugal, Indonesia invested heavily in building up East Timor's infrastructure. The Indonesia's built roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, community health centers and government offices in Dili and other smaller towns. These infrastructure upgrades have been costly but Indonesian officials believed the investment essential to the integration of the Timorese into Indonesian society. In fact, on a per capita basis, East Timor has received a greater share of Indonesia's national developmental funds than any other province. Indonesia officials aware of that resource allocation interpret Timorese resentment of Indonesian rule as ingratitude.

C. Military Forces

East Timor was essentially a closed colony of the Indonesian military for 13 years. Although the province has been "open" since 1989, the Indonesian military remains an important political factor in East Timor and it is viewed by many of the East Timorese as an occupation army. Civil power resides with the deputy Governor who is usually a military man from Java, whilst all sensitive and security matters are subject to ratification by the Indonesian military commander, who, through his territorial commander in Bali, is subject to military headquarters in Jakarta. Ultimate authority lies in the military. There are about 10,500 troops in East Timor.

The Army has also established and armed pro-Jakarta militia units. Those units have proven undisciplined and often commit atrocities. For example, early in April 1999, about 500 anti-independence militiamen backed by the Indonesian army killed at least 25 people in East Timor. This incident was similar to the event when troops fired on a funeral march in the city of Dili, East Timor in 1991 killing 200 people in a massacre that tarnished Indonesia's reputation abroad and put East Timor back in the world spotlight. The pro-Jakarta militias oppose the referendum and a UN presence in East Timor.

Date: 24-Aug-1999 11:20 AM
Sender: Rezaqul Haider
To: William Moog
Priority: Normal
Subject: Fwd[2]:info

Forward Header

Subject: Fwd:info
Author: Ingrid Hayden(UNAMET)
Date: 8/23/99 10:02 PM

FYI

Tuesday, August 24, 1999

Freedom flight to Darwin

By LINDSAY MURDOCH, Herald Correspondent in Dili

East Timorese who want to leave after next week's independence ballot
will be escorted by
Indonesian forces to neighbouring countries, including Australia, the
territory's military commander
said yesterday.

Asked how this could happen, the newly installed Colonel Muhammad Noer
Muis said: "If the
pro-integration side wins and the independence supporters want to leave
we are prepared to
accommodate them."

Signalling an abrupt reversal of Indonesia's tight restrictions on East
Timorese wanting to leave
Indonesia, he added: "It will depend on the people themselves."

Speaking in Dili, Colonel Muis said United Nations staff, aid workers
and foreign journalists would
also be evacuated if violence broke out after Monday's ballot, in which
450,000 East Timorese will
choose between broad autonomy within Indonesia or independence.

"Our evacuation plans cover air, sea and ship," he said. "It is very
detailed and includes taking
transmigrants to other Indonesian islands."

Colonel Muis, a former Special Forces commander trained by the Australian Army, said that
high-level talks still had to be held between Jakarta and Canberra.

Most pro-independence refugees would have to enter through

Darwin, where
the Australian Defence
Force is already assembling its most powerful array of firepower
and
soldiers for decades.

The Army has deployed Leopard tanks, reconnaissance vehicles and
troop
carriers, while the Navy
has brought in the high-speed catamaran HMAS Jervis Bay, which
can carry
600 troops and dozens
of vehicles.

Diplomats and analysts have warned of widespread violence across
East
Timor, predicting that the
losing side will not accept the result in the UN-sponsored ballot.

Although UN officials, diplomats and independent observers
forecast a
landslide for independence,
senior Indonesian Government officials insist that the result
will be
too close to allow the former
Portuguese territory to separate from Indonesia.

Pro-integrationists would argue that a narrow win for
independence would
not be sufficient for
Jakarta to let the territory go.

Amid worsening violence outside Dili on the last days of
campaigning,
armed militia groups
opposed to independence are forcing thousands of villagers from
their
homes, the UN spokesman in
Dili, Mr David Wimhurst, said.

There was growing concern about a pattern of intimidation and
violence
in an apparent attempt to
silence registered voters, he said. An entire village in the
district of
Viqueque was deserted. But Mr
Wimhurst said the UN Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan, could foil
this
tactic by including an
assessment of the intimidation when announcing the result of the
ballot.

Colonel Muis said his forces were also willing to escort
integration
supporters "to wherever they
want to go" in the event of a vote for independence. He also said
the
forces were ready to quit East
Timor if the vote was for independence and the Indonesian
Government
ordered them to withdraw.
But a way had to be found so that they did not appear to be
leaving in

defeat.

Colonel Muis also denied accusations that his forces were backing pro-integration militia. "We are neutral," he said.

The appointment 10 days ago of Colonel Muis, 47, to head Indonesia's forces in East Timor is widely seen as an attempt by the Government to signal a break with past military-sanctioned atrocities. Last night, Australia's Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Downer, telephoned his Indonesian counterpart, Mr Ali Alatas, to repeat Australia's concern over recent security breakdowns in East Timor, and emphasised the importance of next week's ballot being free and fair.

This material is subject to copyright and any unauthorised use, copying or mirroring is prohibited.

EAST TIMOR

UN Assistance Mission, East Timor -- Jul - Sep 99

- 3 Military Liaison Officers OPCON to UN
  - Part of 50 MLNOs
- Deployed to East Timor 8 Jul-31 Aug 99
  - Extended until 30 Sep 99
- 10 Aug - UN asks to deploy additional 250 military observers (country donors TBD)
  - Estimated deployment date: Oct-Nov 99

East Timor Key Dates

- **30 Aug 99** -- East Timor Autonomy Ballot
  - PACOM anticipates violence will increase
- **6-7 Sep 99** -- Estimate Ballot Results
  - Ballot Will Be Flown To Australia For Tabulation
  - UN Will Announce Ballot Results
- **9-11 Sep 99** -- CINC Visit to Indonesia

USPACOM Perspective

- GOI must abide by agreements to resolve East Timor problem
- East Timor solution will be a long-term process
- Real story with Indonesia is in Jakarta
  - Presidential selection
  - Reform efforts
  - Additional unrest (Aceh, Ambon, Irian Jaya)

Australia and East Timor

- East Timor an important Australian domestic policy issue
  - WW II
  - 5 Australian journalists killed during invasion
  - East Timorese exiles in Australia
  - Australian - Indonesian relationship
- Australia is the "lead" country

Case Number: 200402548

<<<>>>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8812

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 CANBER 02533 01 OF 02 020736Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/015W				

----------E7BC8A 020736Z /38

O 020734Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4344
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA// IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
AMCONSUL PERTH

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 002533

SENSITIVE

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA/AP SCHER

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CANBER 02533 01 OF 02 020736Z

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, KPKO, KCRM, UN, ID, AS, US
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN PRESS TRIES TO MANUFACTURE A U.S.-AUSTRALIAN DISPUTE OVER EAST TIMOR

REF: FBIS RESTON DTG 010810Z AUG 99

1. (U) THIS MESSAGE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 19 AUG 2004 200402548

Case Number: 200402548

2. (U) OVER THE LAST THREE DAYS ARTICLES HAVE APPEARED IN THE MELBOURNE "AGE" AND PERTH'S "WEST AUSTRALIAN" WHICH ALLEGE THAT AUSTRALIA REBUFFED U.S. EFFORTS TO COOPERATE IN PLANNING FOR A PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN EAST TIMOR (TEXTS FAXED TO EAP/ANP ANTWEILER). THE MOST DETAILED OF THESE ARTICLES WHICH APPEARS IN THE AUGUST 1 ISSUE OF THE "AGE" CLAIMS THE GOA ORDERED AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE OFFICIALS TO REJECT AN INVITATION TO DISCUSS STRATEGY AND INTELLIGENCE PLANNING FOR EAST TIMOR AT CINCPAC HEADQUARTERS IN HONOLULU. AUSTRALIA, THE ARTICLE CONTINUES, TOLD U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIALS THAT ANY DISCUSSION OF PEACEKEEPING INVOLVING THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. MARINES WAS "PREMATURE" AND COULD DAMAGE AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA. THE "AGE" ARTICLE ASSERTS THAT DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE (DFAT) NUMBER TWO ASHTON CALVERT CONVEYED THIS POSITION TO EAP A/S STANLEY ROTH. ROTH, ACCORDING TO THE "AGE" ARGUED WITH CALVERT THAT PEACEKEEPING SHOULD BEGIN SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.

3. (SBU) DFAT MARITIME SOUTHEAST ASIA A/S NEILL MULES TOLD POLCOUNS AUGUST 2 THAT THESE STORIES INFURIATED FM DOWNER,

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CANBER 02533 01 OF 02 020736Z
COMING AS THEY DID AT THE END OF WHAT HE CONSIDERED TO BE HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL VISITS TO EAST TIMOR AND JAKARTA. DOWNER STRONGLY DENIED THEIR VERACITY IN AN AUGUST 1 TELEVISION INTERVIEW (REFTEL) AND ORDERED DFAT TO SEND TO THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE DEPARTMENT PRESS POINTS HE IS USING TO REBUT THE ARTICLES (TEXT OF THESE AT PARA 5 BELOW). MULES URGED THAT, IN RESPONDING TO PRESS QUERIES ABOUT THESE STORIES, USG SPOKESMEN MAKE SIMILAR POINTS.

4. (SBU) POLCOUNS TOLD MULES THAT THE STORIES WERE LUDICROUS, AND HE AND MULES AGREED THAT THE U.S.-AUSTRALIAN COORDINATION ON EAST TIMOR HAS BEEN GOOD. MULES SAID DFAT BELIEVES THE ROTH-CALVERT CONVERSATION REFERRED TO IN THE ARTICLE MAY HAVE BEEN ONE WHICH TOOK PLACE AS LONG AGO AS FEBRUARY AND IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH BEAR NO RESEMBLANCE TO THOSE WHICH PERTAIN TODAY. NOTING THAT THE IMPLICATION OF THESE ARTICLES -- THAT AUSTRALIA IS SOMEHOW HOLDING UP AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING EFFORT IN EAST TIMOR OUT OF DEFERENCE TO INDONESIAN SENSIBILITIES -- IS VERY CLOSE TO THE LINE OF THE OPPOSITION LABOR PARTY, MULES SUSPECTED THAT SOMEONE WITHIN THE GOA SYMPATHETIC TO LABOR WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS MISCHIEVOUS BACKGROUNDING OF THE AUSTRALIAN PRESS. MULES ADDED THAT THE JOURNALISTS WRITING THESE ARTICLES SEEM

Case Number: 200402548

TO FAVOR A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION (PKO) IN EAST TIMOR AND MAY HAVE WRITTEN THEIR STORIES TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE GOA TO SUPPORT A PKO. (COMMENT: ONE OF THE JOURNALISTS WRITING THESE STORIES IS A LONG-TIME EAST TIMOR ACTIVIST WHO HAS FOR MANY YEARS SOUGHT TO EMBARRASS AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS OVER THEIR ALLEGEDLY "CRAVEN" HANDLING OF THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE. IT IS ENTIRELY PLAUSIBLE THAT HE MIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 CANBER 02533 01 OF 02 020736Z
TRY TO DISTORT AN OUT OF CONTEXT LEAK INTO SOMETHING WHICH HE COULD USE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS DO NOT PERCEIVE A U.S.-AUSTRALIAN DISAGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE. END COMMENT.)

5. (U) FOLLOWING ARE THE POINTS WHICH FM DOWNER IS USING WHEN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ON THESE ARTICLES:

BEGIN TEXT.

EAST TIMOR - DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US

REPORTS WHICH HAVE APPEARED IN THE WEEKEND PRESS ABOUT SO-CALLED AUSTRALIAN 'SNUBBING' OF US 'ADVANCES' AND 'OFFERS' ON EAST TIMOR ARE INACCURATE.

I ONLY LAST WEEK DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR WITH THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE AND THIS MEETING REINFORCED THE CLOSE COOPERATION AND AGREEMENT THAT EXIST BETWEEN THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

THERE HAVE OF COURSE ALSO BEEN WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSIONS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR, BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS, AND BOTH THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERESTED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8813

PAGE 01 CANBER 02533 02 OF 02 020736Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00

Case Number: 200402548

T-00 USIE-00 ASDS-01 PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /016W
----------E7BC8D 020736Z /38

O 020734Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4345
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA// IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
AMCONSUL PERTH

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 CANBERRA 002533

SENSITIVE

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA/AP SCHER
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CANBER 02533 02 OF 02 020736Z

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, KPKO, KCRM, UN, ID, AS, US
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN PRESS TRIES TO MANUFACTURE A U.S.-AUSTRALIAN DISPUTE OVER EAST TIMOR

COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE US, ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EAST TIMOR SITUATION. THIS DIALOGUE HAS ALSO, QUITE NATURALLY, INCLUDED SOME PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING, AND HAS DEMONSTRATED THERE IS WIDE-RANGING AND BROAD AGREEMENT AMONGST ALL OF US ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, AND POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS THERE.

SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM MY DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING THE SECRETARY, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAVE FOR SOME MONTHS NOW BEEN DISCUSSING WITH A WIDE RANGE OF US OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS, ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE EAST TIMOR SITUATION. WHILE I HAVE NO INTENTION OF GETTING INTO THE DETAILS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, I CAN CONFIRM THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN US ON THE ISSUES CONFRONTING US - AND CERTAINLY NOTHING REMOTELY RESEMBLING A 'TENSE POLICY DISPUTE', 'DIPLOMATIC SNUBS' OR 'TENSE EXCHANGES' BETWEEN US.

Case Number: 200402548

I WOULD ALSO UNDERLINE THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE POST-BALLOT PERIOD IN EAST TIMOR RESTS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS. INTERESTED COUNTRIES, INCLUDING AUSTRALIA AND THE US, ARE NATURALLY INVOLVED IN DISCUSSIONS ON POST-BALLOT SCENARIOS WITH THE UN. ANY POSSIBLE PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AND UNDER UN AUSPICES.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CANBER 02533 02 OF 02 020736Z
WE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE UNITED NATIONS TO ASSIST IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSITION IN EAST TIMOR, WHATEVER ITS FUTURE STATUS MAY BE.

END TEXT.

BELLAMY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

E3

Case Number: 200402548

<<<>>>

UNCLASSIFIED PTO4231

PAGE 01 JAKART 03738 031046Z

RELEASED IN FULL

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01
	FBIE-00	UTED-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/021W						

----------E83D31 031046Z /38

P 031037Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9117
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

UNCLAS JAKARTA 003738

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSISIVE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 03738 031046Z

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: ALLEGED PLAN TO DISPATCH U.S. MARINES SURFACES IN JAKARTA

REF: CANBERRA 2533

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 19 AUG 2004 200402548

Case Number: 200402548

1. (SBU) AUSTRALIAN PRESS STORIES ALLEGING A U.S. PLAN TO SEND MARINES TO EAST TIMOR HAVE BEEN PICKED UP BY THE INDONESIAN MEDIA. AN AUGUST 2 "JAWA POS" ARTICLE CONVEYED THE AUSTRALIAN PRESS ACCOUNT UNCRITICALLY, WHILE THE AUGUST 2 EDITION ON "SUARA PEMBARUAN" INCLUDED FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER'S DENIAL THAT THE ISSUE HAD EVER BEEN RAISED. THE LATTER ARTICLE WAS HEADLINED "MINISTRY OF DEFENSE QUESTIONS U.S. INTENTION TO SEND MARINES TO EAST TIMOR." THE ARTICLE QUOTED INDONESIAN MILITARY (TNI) INFORMATION CHIEF MAJ. GEN. SYAMSUL MA'ARIF, WHO SAID TNI HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH A PLAN. SYAMSUL ADDED THAT, IN ANY CASE, A U.S. FORCE WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY BECAUSE INDONESIA HAD FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE UN PROCESS.

2. (SBU) AMBASSADOR WILL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF HIS AUGUST 4 FAREWELL CALL ON SECURITY COORDINATING MINSTER FEISAL TANJUNG TO CORRECT THE RECORD. WE PRESUME THE DEPARTMENT IS PREPARING CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

E6.

Case Number: 200402548

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9731

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 CANBER 02647 01 OF 02 100700Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EAP-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	SSR-00	SAS-00
	SWCI-00	/014W					

----------EAB2FE 100700Z /38

P 100701Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4429
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 002647

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMBASSADOR TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/09
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, OPRC, UN, ID, AS
SUBJ: U.S. MARINES TO EAST TIMOR

REF: CANBERRA 2533

CLASSIFIED BY DCM WILLIAM M. BELLAMY. REASON: 1.5(D)
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 CANBER 02647 01 OF 02 100700Z

1. (U) SUMMARY. AUSTRALIAN MEDIA ARE AGAIN REPORTING U.S. CONTINGENCY PLANS TO SEND LARGE NUMBERS OF U.S. FORCES TO EAST TIMOR TO PREVENT BLOODSHED AND MAINTAIN ORDER. THESE PRESS REPORTS ALSO ALLEGE SERIOUS DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA OVER EAST TIMOR.

2. (U) THE OPPOSITION LABOR PARTY IS USING THESE REPORTS, WHICH APPEAR TO BE BASED PARTLY ON LEAKED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 19 AUG 2004 200402548

CONFIDENTIAL CABLES, TO EMBARRASS THE GOA. EMBASSY HAS ISSUED A PRESS STATEMENT (AT PARA EIGHT) THAT DENIES THE U.S. IS PLANNING TO SEND PEACEKEEPING FORCES TO E. TIMOR WITHOUT A U.N. MANDATE. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) BOTH THE "AGE" AND THE "AUSTRALIAN" RAN STORIES AUGUST 10 (FAXED TO EAP/ANP) CLAIMING THE U.S. HAS DRAWN UP CONTINGENCY PLANS TO SEND LARGE NUMBERS OF U.S. TROOPS TO EAST TIMOR TO MAINTAIN ORDER. ACCORDING TO THE "AGE" EXCLUSIVE REPORT, THESE PLANS WERE DISCUSSED IN JUNE WITH AUSTRALIAN MILITARY COUNTERPARTS WHO WERE RELUCTANT TO COMMIT TO A PEACEMAKING OPERATION.

4. (C) IT NOW APPEARS THESE STORIES (AND PREVIOUS ONES -- REFTEL) ORIGINATE WITH A LEAKED CLASSIFIED CABLE FROM THE AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE IN HONOLULU WHICH REPORTS INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND AUSTRALIAN MILITARY PLANNERS. ACCORDING TO DOWNER'S STAFF, THESE MIL-MIL CONVERSATIONS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN PURELY HYPOTHETICAL, WITHOUT ANY OFFICIAL STANDING. HOWEVER,

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 CANBER 02647 01 OF 02 100700Z
THEY HAVE BEEN SEIZED ON AND INFLATED BY THE LABOR OPPOSITION AND PARTS OF THE MEDIA TO ILLUSTRATE AN ALLEGED MAJOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIAN APPROACHES TO EAST TIMOR.

5. (C) SIMILARLY, A LEAKED CABLE FROM THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON FROM LAST FEBRUARY, WHICH REPORTS ON US-GOA BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON INDONESIA, IS ALSO BEING SELECTIVELY CITED BY LABOR IN PARLIAMENT AND BY THE PRESS. IT ALLEGEDLY DESCRIBES HOW THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION RESISTED EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH'S RECOMMENDATION THAT THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA VIGOROUSLY PURSUE PEACEKEEPING OPTIONS IN EAST TIMOR.

6. (U) IN HIS PARLIAMENTARY REPLIES, DOWNER HAS INSISTED THAT U.S./AUSTRALIAN COOPERATION ON EAST TIMOR IS EXEMPLARY. HE HAS ALSO DENIED THAT THE U.S. HAS REQUESTED AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION IN A PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION IN EAST TIMOR.

7. (U) AT MIDDAY AUGUST 10, EMBASSY ISSUED THE PRESS STATEMENT AT PARAGRAPH 8 BELOW. DOWNER QUOTED FROM IT IN PARLIAMENT LATER THAT AFTERNOON AND ASKED THAT IT BE

Case Number: 200402548

ENTERED INTO THE PARLIAMENTARY RECORD.

8.(U) TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE FOLLOWS:

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

UNITED STATES EMBASSY STATEMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 CANBER 02647 01 OF 02 100700Z
MEDIA REPORTS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS PLANS TO SEND U.S. TROOPS TO EAST TIMOR TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THAT TERRITORY ARE INCORRECT. THE UNITED STATES HAS NO PLANS TO SEND U.S. FORCES TO EAST TIMOR, INDEPENDENTLY OF THE U.N., TO ACT AS PEACEKEEPERS OR PEACE ENFORCERS.

THE UNITED STATES IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE U.N. AND WITH OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA, TO ALLOW FOR A FREE AND FAIR POLL IN EAST TIMOR ON AUGUST 30. IT IS NOT YET KNOWN WHAT U.N. PRESENCE MAY BE NEEDED AFTER THE AUGUST 30 VOTE. ANY DECISION TO SEND ADDITIONAL U.N. PERSONNEL TO EAST TIMOR WILL BE MADE BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL IN CONSULTATION WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA. THE UNITED STATES IS NOT CONSIDERING ACTING INDEPENDENTLY OF THESE PROCESSES, NOR HAS IT INVITED AUSTRALIA TO TAKE ACTION IN EAST TIMOR OUTSIDE THE U.N. CONTEXT.

REPORTS OF SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA OVER EAST TIMOR ARE GROSSLY INACCURATE. OUR RESPECTIVE VIEWS ON EAST TIMOR ARE IN FACT COMPLETELY CONGRUENT. PRIME MINISTER HOWARD AND PRESIDENT CLINTON NOTED THIS CLOSE CONVERGENCE WHEN THEY MET IN WASHINGTON LAST MONTH. SECRETARY OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9732

PAGE 01 CANBER 02647 02 OF 02 100700Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EAP-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01

Case Number: 200402548

OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00
SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00
PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 SSR-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /013W
----------EAB300 100700Z /38

P 100701Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4430
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 CANBERRA 002647

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMBASSADOR TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/09
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, OPRC, UN, ID, AS
SUBJ: U.S. MARINES TO EAST TIMOR

ALBRIGHT AND FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER AGAIN CONFIRMED OUR VERY CLOSE COOPERATION ON EAST TIMOR AT THEIR RECENT MEETING IN SINGAPORE. END TEXT.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 CANBER 02647 02 OF 02 100700Z
HOLMES

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Case Number: 200402548

<<<>>>

UNCLASSIFIED PTO9031

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 03867 101035Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 SRPP-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 MR-00
SAS-00 /002W
----------EAC5EA 101035Z /38

O 101027Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9238
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2024
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
CLEAR

UNCLAS JAKARTA 003867

USIA

SECSTATE FOR EAP/PA, EAP/PIMBS
USIA FOR BBYERS, CSTROMME
CANBERRA FOR PAO
USCINCPAC FOR USIA ADVISOR

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE -- FALSE STORY ABOUT U.S. MARINES DEPLOYING IN EAST TIMOR

REF: JAKARTA 3738

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 03867 101035Z
1. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.

2. GUIDANCE IS URGENTLY REQUESTED TO RESPOND TO STORIES CIRCULATING IN INDONESIAN AND AUSTRALIAN PRESS THAT THE U.S. IS CONSIDERING SENDING UP TO 15,000 MARINES TO EAST TIMOR IF VIOLENCE FLARES UP IN THE PROVINCE. THE SOURCE OF THE STORY, ACCORDING TO LOCAL ACCOUNTS, IS THE "MELBOURNE AGE" NEWSPAPER IN AUSTRALIA, WHOSE AUGUST 10 STORY HAS NOW BEEN PICKED UP BY ONE OF INDONESIA'S LEADING EVENING DAILIES, "SUARA PEMBARUAN," AND IS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 19 AUG 2004 200402548

Case Number: 200402548

LIKELY TO BE PICKED UP BY EVEN MORE INDONESIAN PUBLICATIONS TOMORROW MORNING.

3. THE "MELBOURNE AGE" ARTICLE ALLEGEDLY QUOTES SENIOR OFFICIALS IN AUSTRALIA WHO CLAIM THAT A PLAN WAS DISCUSSED AT THE U.S.-AUSTRALIA DEFENSE BILATERALS IN JUNE 1999 TO SEND UP TO 15,000 U.S. MARINES TO EAST TIMOR IF NEEDED.

4. PLEASE PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO RESPOND TO LOCAL MEDIA INQUIRIES ABOUT THIS TOPIC. THE FOLLOWING DRAFT GUIDANCE IS BASED ON OUR AUGUST 10 EXCHANGES WITH EMBASSY CANBERRA:

(BEGIN DRAFT GUIDANCE)

MEDIA REPORTS THAT THE UNITED STATES PLANS TO SEND U.S. TROOPS TO EAST TIMOR TO PREVENT FURTHER BLOODSHED IN THAT TERRITORY ARE INCORRECT. THE UNITED STATES HAS NO PLANS TO SEND U.S. FORCES TO EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENTLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION THERE (UNAMET).

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JAKART 03867 101035Z

THE UNITED STATES IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH UNAMET AND WITH OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA, TO SUPPORT A FREE AND FAIR CONSULTATION IN EAST TIMOR ON AUGUST 30. ANY DECISION TO SEND ADDITIONAL U.N. PERSONNEL TO INDONESIA, EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER AUGUST 30, WILL BE MADE BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA. THE UNITED STATES IS NOT CONSIDERING ACTING INDEPENDENTLY OF THESE PROCESSES.

(END DRAFT GUIDANCE)

THANKS AND REGARDS.

STOLTZ

UNCLASSIFIED

<< ***END OF DOCUMENT*** >>

E8

Case Number: 200402548

<<<>>>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6032

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 CANBER 02660 01 OF 02 110804Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 SRPP-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00
INR-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 SP-00 MR-00 SAS-00 /003W
----------EB25DC 110809Z /38

R 110805Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO USIA WASHDC 5185
INFO AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
AMCONSUL PERTH
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
NSC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC 4441
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 002660

USIA FOR EA, M/R; SECSTATE FOR EAP/ANP, EAP/P, PA; SECDEF FOR PA; USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING AND PAA

E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: AUSTRALIAN PRESS REPORTS ON AUSTRALIAN AND U.S. POLICY ON EAST TIMOR

1. SUMMARY: AUSTRALIAN MEDIA HAVE DEVOTED A GREAT DEAL OF

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CANBER 02660 01 OF 02 110804Z
ATTENTION IN RECENT DAYS TO ALLEGATIONS THAT A POLICY DIFFERENCE EXISTS BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE U.S. ON THE POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OR PEACE ENFORCEMENT TROOPS TO EAST TIMOR. THE SAME REPORTS ALSO HAVE SUGGESTED THAT AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER HAS BEEN ILL-INFORMED OR HAS DELIBERATELY MISLED THE PARLIAMENT ON THE STATUS OF POLICY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. EMBASSY ISSUED A STATEMENT AUGUST 10 CONFIRMING THAT THE REPORTS WERE INCORRECT. END SUMMARY.

2. MAJOR AUSTRALIAN NEWSPAPERS ON AUGUST 10 PROMINENTLY FEATURED ARTICLES ALLEGING THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 19 AUG 2004 200402548

CONSIDERING SENDING UP TO 15,000 TROOPS INTO EAST TIMOR IF SECURITY BROKE DOWN FOLLOWING THE INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 30. THE ARTICLES BUILT ON DISCUSSIONS IN PARLIAMENT AUGUST 9 WHERE FOREIGN MINISTER ALEXANDER DOWNER WAS ASKED ABOUT REPORTS OF A POLICY SPLIT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA OVER HOW TO ADDRESS THE POTENTIAL FOR SECURITY PROBLEMS IN EAST TIMOR AFTER THE AUGUST 30 REFERENDUM ON INDEPENDENCE. DOWNER'S INITIAL DENIAL OF ANY MILITARY PLANNING DISCUSSIONS WAS FEATURED ALONGSIDE TEXTS FROM LEAKED DOCUMENTS RELATED TO MEETINGS BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN AND U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS AT CINCPAC.

3. THE MELBOURNE "AGE" NEWSPAPER (8/11:CIRC.202,573) RAN FRONT-PAGE REPORTS BOTH AUGUST 10 AND 11. THE LATTER, HEADED "DOWNER TRIPS OVER SECRET TIMOR CABLE," FOCUSED ON MINISTER DOWNER'S ADMISSION THAT HE HAD NOT READ AN AUSTRALIAN

DIPLOMATIC CABLE OUTLINING A U.S. CONTINGENCY PLAN THAT COULD INVOLVE 15,000 U.S. TROOPS IN EAST TIMOR. THE STORY CONCENTRATES ON DOWNER'S "EMBARRASSED" RETRACTION OF HIS AUGUST 9 DENIAL THAT ANY DISCUSSIONS ON SUCH PROPOSALS HAD TAKEN PLACE. EMPHASIS THROUGHOUT THE ARTICLE IS PLACED ON THE CONTENTS OF THE LEAKED DOCUMENT DETAILING THESE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN AND U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIALS IN JUNE.

4. AN EDITORIAL IN THE SAME ISSUE OF THE "AGE" LOOKED AT WHAT IT ASSERTED AS AUSTRALIA'S NEED TO "[TAKE] A LEAD ROLE IN EAST TIMOR," STATING THAT "WHATEVER THE TRUTH BEHIND THE SUGGESTION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS CONSIDERED SENDING. TROOPS TO EAST TIMOR, IT SHOULD BE AUSTRALIA RATHER THAN THE U.S. THAT TAKES THE LEAD.."

5. THE NATIONAL BUSINESS DAILY "AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW" (8/11:CIRC.91,000) CARRIED A CRITICAL COMMENTARY WHICH ASSERTED, "SAVING ALEXANDER DOWNER'S NECK IS NOW TAKING PRECEDENCE OVER GOOD POLICY MAKING ON EAST TIMOR." (COMMENT: MINISTER DOWNER QUOTED SUPPORTIVE COMMENTS BY EAP AS ROTH IN A STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT AUGUST 10; DOWNER ALSO CITED IN PARLIAMENT AN EMBASSY STATEMENT DENYING ANY U.S. PLANS TO SEND TROOPS INDEPENDENTLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO EAST TIMOR. END COMMENT).

6. THE "SYDNEY MORNING HERALD" (8/11:CIRC.231,508) ALSO ACCORDED THE STORY FRONT PAGE PROMINENCE AND CONCENTRATED ON PRINTING EXTRACTS FROM THE "SECRET CABLE FROM A SENIOR

Case Number: 200402548

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY OFFICIAL" DETAILING CONTINGENCY OPTIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR. MINISTER DOWNER'S RESPONSES TO INTENSE QUESTIONING IN PARLIAMENT YESTERDAY WERE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 CANBER 02660 01 OF 02 110804Z
ALSO EMPHASIZED. THE PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE EMBASSY CONFIRMING THAT AUSTRALIAN AND U.S. "VIEWS ON EAST TIMOR ARE IN FACT COMPLETELY CONGRUENT" WAS NOTED IN THE REPORTING, AS WAS THE STATEMENT FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH AFFIRMING "THERE ARE NO POLICY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US."

7. AN EDITORIAL IN THE "SYDNEY MORNING HERALD"(8/11) EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE POLITICAL "SCRAPPING" BETWEEN MINISTER DOWNER AND HIS OPPOSITION COUNTERPART LAURIE BRERETON YET ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ARGUMENT HAS THROWN "SOME WELCOME LIGHT" ONTO THE ISSUE. MINISTER DOWNER'S CONCESSION THAT AUSTRALIA AND THE U.S. HAD DISCUSSED "A RANGE OF CONTINGENCY PLANS" WAS NOTED AND THE PIECE CALLED FOR CLOSE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE CHANGING SITUATION IN INDONESIA.

8. BROADCAST MEDIA, ABC RADIO NATIONAL IN PARTICULAR, ON AUGUST 11 PROMINENTLY FEATURED STATE DEPARTMENT AND PENTAGON SPOKESMEN DENYING THESE REPORTS.

9. COMMENT: THE ISSUE OF PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY NEEDS IN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6036

PAGE 01 CANBER 02660 02 OF 02 110804Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 SRPP-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00
INR-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 SP-00 MR-00 SAS-00 /003W
----------EB25F4 110809Z /38
R 110805Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO USIA WASHDC 5186
INFO AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
AMCONSUL PERTH
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
NSC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC

Case Number: 200402548

SECSTATE WASHDC 4442
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 CANBERRA 002660

USIA FOR EA, M/R; SECSTATE FOR EAP/ANP, EAP/P, PA; SECDEF FOR PA; USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING AND PAA

E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: AUSTRALIAN PRESS REPORTS ON AUSTRALIAN AND U.S. POLICY ON EAST TIMOR

EAST TIMOR WILL DRAW INCREASED POLITICAL AND MEDIA ATTENTION
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CANBER 02660 02 OF 02 110804Z
AS THE AUGUST 30 BALLOT DRAWS NEAR. THE REPORTING OF THIS LATEST ISSUE HAS A STRONG DOMESTIC POLITICAL FOCUS WITH ACCUSATIONS OF EITHER IGNORANCE OR DECEPTION BEING LEVELED AT FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER OVER HIS ANSWERING OF QUESTIONS IN PARLIAMENT. POLITICAL POINT SCORING HAS STIMULATED MUCH OF THE REPORTING ALTHOUGH IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT EDITORIAL COMMENT HAS TENDED TO MOVE AWAY FROM THIS AND FOCUS BACK ON HOW BEST TO SECURE PEACE IN THE REGION. FITZGERALD, ACTING

UNCLASSIFIED

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

Case Number: 200402548

<<<>>>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1414

PAGE 01 CANBER 02230 01 OF 03 070746Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-01	SSO-00	SS-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	SWCI-00	/018W					

----------DDBC5E 070746Z /38

O 070746Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4165
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY MANILA
USOFFICE BONN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
AMCONSUL PERTH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 CANBER 02230 01 OF 03 070746Z
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 002230

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
ROME FOR EMBASSY VATICAN

NOFORN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 6 JUL 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 19 AUG 2004 200402548

Case Number: 200402548

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/06
TAGS: PREL, KPKO, KCRM, MOPS, UN, ID, AS
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: UP-DATE ON AUSTRALIAN VIEWS AND MARKER VISIT

REF: (A) JAKARTA 3264
(B) CANBERRA 2197
(C) JAKARTA 3156
(D) STATE 116913

(U) CLASSIFIED BY POL/C STEPHEN ENGELKEN. REASON 1.5 (B AND D).

1. (C) SUMMARY: ATTACKS BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS ON UN AND FOREIGN AID PERSONNEL HAVE GRABBED HEADLINES HERE. PRIME MINISTER HOWARD AND FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER HAVE PUBLICLY WARNED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT THAT ITS INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY IS ON THE LINE. AUSTRALIAN JOURNALISTS HAVE SEIZED ON REMARKS MADE BY FM DOWNER ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING AUSTRALIAN FORCES TO AN EVENTUAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN EAST TIMOR TO SPECULATE THAT

AUSTRALIAN ARMY UNITS ARE BEING READIED FOR MOVEMENT TO EAST TIMOR SOON. THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE (DFAT) ASSURES US THESE PRESS REPORTS ARE GREATLY EXAGGERATED. DFAT BELIEVES A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION MAY BE NEEDED IF THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT VOTES TO REVERSE INDONESIA'S ANNEXATION OF THE TERRITORY BUT NO AUSTRALIAN MILITARY OPERATION IN EAST TIMOR IS IMMINENT. DFAT IS WORRIED, HOWEVER, ABOUT HOW TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR CALM IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE BALLOT, WHEN THE LOSING SIDE MAY BE TEMPTED TO RESORT TO VIOLENCE.

2. (C) IN DISCUSSIONS IN CANBERRA JULY 5-6, UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE JAMSHEED MARKER SEEMED DEEPLY SHOCKED BY THE EFFORT TO INTIMIDATE UN PERSONNEL AND WAS UNCHARACTERISTICALLY DIRECT IN HOLDING THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) REPONSIBLE. HE WAS ON THE OTHER HAND ENCOURAGED BY PROGRESS IN THE DARE II PROCESS. HE LEFT HIS AUSTRALIAN HOSTS WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WILL RECOMMEND TO SECRETARY-GENERAL ANNAN THAT THE UN PROCEED WITH THE REGISTRATION PROCESS. HE WAS MORE AMBIGUOUS AS TO WHETHER HE WOULD INSIST THAT THE BALLOT TAKE PLACE ON AUGUST 21 OR BE FURTHER DELAYED. THE AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS WITH WHOM HE SPOKE URGED HIM TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THE LATTER POINT. END

Case Number: 200402548

SUMMARY.

3. (U) VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST UN PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN AID WORKERS BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS IN EAST TIMOR HAS AGAIN GRABBED HEADLINES HERE. THE AUSTRALIAN MEDIA HAVE REPORTED EXTENSIVELY ON THE THREATENING BEHAVIOR DIRECTED AT AUSTRALIAN JOURNALISTS AND AUSTRALIAN UN PERSONNEL IN MALIANA, VIQUEQUE, AND LIQUICA OVER THE PAST WEEKEND.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 CANBER 02230 01 OF 03 070746Z

4. (U) PRIME MINISTER HOWARD AND FM DOWNER HAVE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED CONCERN. IN TOKYO ON A VISIT, HOWARD WARNED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT THAT "ITS CREDIBILITY IN RELATION TO THE HANDLING OF THIS ISSUE IS VERY MUCH IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPOTLIGHT." "THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE PUTTING SOME VERY STRONG VIEWS TO INDONESIA" ABOUT WHAT HAS HAPPENED, HE CONTINUED. FOR HIS PART, DOWNER DECLARED THAT "THE UN AND AUSTRALIA WILL NOT BE INTIMIDATED BY ACTIVITY OF THUGS IN EAST TIMOR."

5. (U) IN THIS ATMOSPHERE, AUSTRALIAN JOURNALISTS HAVE PUT A CEREMONY IN DARWIN OVER THE WEEKEND MARKING THE READYING OF A SECOND AUSTRALIAN ARMY BRIGADE TOGETHER WITH REMARKS BY FM DOWNER THAT THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY MIGHT PARTICIPATE IN AN EVENTUAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN EAST TIMOR, IF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) EVENTUALLY VOTES TO REVERSE ITS ANNEXATION OF THE TERRITORY, TO RUN STORIES WHICH IMPLY THAT SOME SORT OF AUSTRALIAN MILITARY OPERATION IN EAST TIMOR IS IMMINENT. CONSERVATIVE DAILY, "THE AUSTRALIAN," FOR EXAMPLE, RUNS JULY 7 A LARGE PHOTOGRAPH OF A TROOP TRANSPORT VESSEL ON ITS FRONT PAGE UNDER THE HEADLINE "TROOPS ON TIMOR ALERT."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1416

PAGE 01 CANBER 02230 02 OF 03 070746Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-01	SSO-00	SS-00

Case Number: 200402548

TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 ASDS-01 SNIS-00 NISC-00 PMB-00
DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 MR-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00
SWCI-00 /018W
----------DDBC6C 070746Z /38

O 070746Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4166
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY MANILA
USOFFICE BONN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
AMCONSUL PERTH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 CANBER 02230 02 OF 03 070746Z
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 CANBERRA 002230

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
ROME FOR EMBASSY VATICAN

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/06
TAGS: PREL, KPKO, KCRM, MOPS, UN, ID, AS
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: UP-DATE ON AUSTRALIAN VIEWS AND MARKER VISIT

6. (C) DFAT [redacted] B1
ASSURED US JULY 7 THAT SUCH STORIES ARE GREATLY OVERBLOWN. NO AUSTRALIAN MILITARY OPERATION IS IMMINENT. DFAT DOES INDEED BELIEVE THAT A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION MAY BE NEEDED IF INDONESIA AGREES AT THE END OF THE DAY TO PERMIT EAST TIMOR TO SEPARATE, BUT THE PROBLEM WORRYING DFAT PLANNERS NOW IS THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE BALLOT AND MPR ACTION, IF THE

EAST TIMORESE CLEARLY OPT FOR INDEPENDENCE. INDONESIA WILL STILL BE NOMINALLY IN CONTROL, BUT PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS COULD ENGAGE IN TERRIBLE VIOLENCE IN AN EFFORT TO BLOCK INDEPENDENCE. DFAT BELIEVES THE UN AND CORE GROUP COUNTRIES SHOULD BEGIN DEVELOPING A STRATEGY FOR HOW TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THIS PERIOD. [redacted] THAT DFAT WAS DISAPPOINTED B1
THAT UN ENVOY MARKER SEEMED TO HAVE GIVEN LITTLE THOUGHT TO THIS PROBLEM WHEN HE STOPPED IN CANBERRA JULY 5-6 FOR TALKS WITH AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. (C) PROVIDING A BRIEF READ-OUT ON MARKER'S TALKS [redacted] B1
[redacted] THE UN ENVOY SEEMED VISIBLY SHAKEN BY THE MILITIAS' B1
BLATANT EFFORTS TO INTIMIDATE UN STAFF. ALWAYS THE GENTLEMAN, HE HAD SEEMED IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS TO BELIEVE THAT THE INDONESIANS WOULD NOT DARE SUBJECT UN STAFF TO SUCH TREATMENT. AS A RESULT, MARKER WAS UNCHARACTERISTICALLY DIRECT THIS TIME IN PLACING RESPONSIBILITY ON TNI'S SHOULDERS. THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES MUST MAKE ARRESTS IF THEY WANT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO BELIEVE THEY ARE SERIOUS ABOUT MAINTAINING ORDER, HE SUGGESTED. GENERAL WIRANTO MUST BE THE FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THIS POINT, MARKER CONTINUED. (NOTE: [redacted] THAT IT B1
WAS NO BAD THING THAT MARKER WAS SO SHOCKED. UP TO NOW, THE AUSTRALIANS HAVE HAD THE FEELING THAT THE UN WAS ENTIRELY TOO DIPLOMATIC IN DISCUSSING THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR WITH THE GOI, PREFERRING TO RELY ON OTHERS, LIKE THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA, TO PLAY THE "BAD COP." HOPEFULLY, THE UN WILL BE MORE FORCEFUL NOW. [redacted] THAT THE B1
AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE IN DILI IS REPORTING THAT THE VIOLENT INCIDENTS HAVE BADLY DAMAGED THE MORALE OF UN VOLUNTEERS WORKING WITH UNAMET. END NOTE.)

8. (C) [redacted] THAT, AS AN ANTIDOTE TO HIS CONCERNS B1
ABOUT SECURITY, MARKER WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE DARE II PROCESS. HE FELT THE MEETINGS BETWEEN INDEPENDENCE LEADERS AND SENIOR TNI BRASS WERE A GOOD SIGN. [redacted] B1
HOWEVER, THAT MARKER HAD SURPRISED HIS AUSTRALIAN INTERLOCUTORS BY SEEMING ALMOST UNAWARE OF EFFORTS TO GET THE PEACE AND STABILITY COMMISSION, PROVIDED FOR IN THE MAY 5 AGREEMENT, UP AND RUNNING. THE AUSTRALIANS CONCLUDED THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

HE COULD NOT HAVE DEVOTED MUCH TIME TO THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

Case Number: 200402548

9. (C) ASKED WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS MARKER IS LIKELY TO MAKE TO UNSYG ANNAN, [redacted] UN ENVOY LEFT THE IMPRESSION B1
HE WILL RECOMMEND THAT UNAMET PROCEED WITH VOTER REGISTRATION, ALTHOUGH HE WILL NOT TELL THE SYG THAT THE NECESSARY SECURITY CONDITIONS ARE YET IN PLACE TO PERMIT VOTING TO PROCEED. MARKER SUGGESTED TO THE AUSTRALIANS THAT HE WILL SUGGEST UN VOTER REGISTRATION PLANS BE MODIFIED. INSTEAD OF REGISTERING ALL VOTERS IN THE TERRITORY ON ONE DAY, HE WILL RECOMMEND THAT THE REGISTRATION PROCESS BEGIN IN PEACEFUL DISTRICTS FIRST AND PROCEED TO THE MORE DIFFICULT ONES AS THAT BECOMES FEASIBLE.

10. (C/NF) WE ASKED WHETHER MARKER SEEMED INTENT ON PROCEEDING WITH A VOTE AUGUST 21 OR WAS OPEN TO FURTHER DELAY. [redacted] AND SAID FIRST THAT MARKER SEEMED B1
INTENT ON ADHERING TO THE SCHEDULE BUT LATER CORRECTED [redacted] SAYING THAT MARKER SHOWED FLEXIBILITY ON TIMING. B1
ASKED WHAT ADVICE THE GOA HAD GIVEN MARKER ON THIS POINT, [redacted] THAT SENIOR AUSTRALIAN BUREAUCRATS HAD B1
COUNSELED FLEXIBILITY RATHER THAN FIRMNESS ON THE DATE.
[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1417

PAGE 01 CANBER 02230 03 OF 03 070746Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-01	SSO-00	SS-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	SWCI-00	/018W					

----------DDBC70 070746Z /38

O 070746Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4167
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

Case Number: 200402548

AMEMBASSY MANILA
USOFFICE BONN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
AMCONSUL PERTH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 CANBER 02230 03 OF 03 070746Z
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 CANBERRA 002230

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
ROME FOR EMBASSY VATICAN

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/06
TAGS: PREL, KPKO, KCRM, MOPS, UN, ID, AS
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: UP-DATE ON AUSTRALIAN VIEWS AND MARKER VISIT

[redacted] B1

BELLAMY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

UNCLASSIFIED

AS-PREL-13

R3

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Moonah Place
Yarralumla, ACT 2600
Australia

PHONE: 61-2-6214-5904
FAX: 61-2-6214-5816

RELEASED IN FULL

FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

TO: Phil Gantweiler

FAX:

FROM: Steve Engelken

DATE: 8/11/99 NO. OF PAGES (including cover): ____

SUBJECT: Downer-Brereton Exchange on East Timor

NOTE:

see my e-mail

(Signature)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 31 AUG 2004 200402548

UNCLASSIFIED

R3A

East Timor: Peacekeeping

Mr BRERETON—My question is directed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and concerns his denials yesterday of any knowledge of the request from the US military command in the Pacific for agreement to the attachment of Australian military officers to a possible peace enforcement operation in East Timor. Is it not a fact that these discussions took place in June and that the request was put directly at a very senior level, specifically to the Commander Australian Theatre, Air Vice Marshal Treloar? Didn't the Air Vice Marshal undertake to refer the request to top levels in the Australian government, and weren't you a specific recipient of the detailed report of these discussions six weeks ago? Minister, how do you explain your denials in question time and your subsequent statement claiming that you were completely unaware of these exchanges until you were told of them by your department last night? Don't you read important reports? Haven't you once again been caught out telling whoppers?

Mr DOWNER—First of all, this matter was not raised as you put it with the Australian government; it certainly was not raised with me. Secondly, it is true, as the Labor Party claim, that the cable, which you have apparently got hold of and which reports this conversation, was one of a number of cables that were directed to me. Honourable members might like to know that my department receives something like 186,000 cables every year, which is quite a lot, and 100,000 of them are directed to me. It will come as no surprise that no minister could read 100,000 cables—although I note that you can always tell when the member for Kingsford-Smith is reading, because his mouth is moving.

Mr Beazley interjecting--

Mr SPEAKER—The chair always exercises a good deal of tolerance to interjections from leaders of the opposition, and always has in my time in this House, but I would remind the Leader of the Opposition of his obligation to allow the minister to be heard without interruption.

Mr Lee—Mr Speaker, I raise a point of order. When you were first elected Speaker, you said that you would try to minimise the scorn and derision expressed in this House at question time. Having given an instruction to the Leader of the Opposition, will you issue an instruction to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as well?

Mr SPEAKER—I am very happy to comment on the member for Dobell's observation, which has some relevance. But I would point out to him that, particularly in the instance of this question, the sins have been vested on both sides of the House. The latter part of the question was asked and framed in a way that it could well have been ruled out of order on the grounds of irony, as the member for Kingsford-Smith would be aware. I turned a deaf ear to that. I can see that the standard could be raised on both sides. With that admonition, I call the Minister for Foreign Affairs and ask the member for Kingsford-Smith to bear in mind what I have said about the question.

Mr DOWNER—On the question of whether I misled the House, I draw the attention of the House to a press release which was issued today by the Embassy of the United States of America. The first sentence of this press release, which I will table, reads:

> Media reports that the United States has plans to send U.S. troops to East Timor to maintain order in that territory are incorrect. The United States has no plans to send U.S. forces to East Timor, independently of the U.N., to act as peacekeepers or peace enforcers.

What is more, as it happened and by coincidence, the Australian Ambassador to the United States, the redoubtable Andrew Peacock, met yesterday with Stanley Roth, the Assistant Secretary of State, who is responsible for Asia-Pacific affairs. This is what Stanley Roth said of the allegations—and all this blather we get from the opposition—that Australia and the United States have fallen out on the issue of East Timor:

> These allegations are utterly irritating, because there are no policy differences between us. The United States and Australia could not be working closer on the issue.

The point is this: the Labor Party has a guilty conscience on East Timor. You know you did East Timor wrong for 13 years. What really gets in your craw is the fact that this government is working hard to resolve this issue in concert with the United Nations and in concert with our friends such as the United States. The member for Kingsford-Smith, with his puerile behaviour, has of course completely alienated Jakarta. They will not have too much to do with the member for Kingsford-Smith anymore, and apparently he is beginning to irritate Washington as well. And that is not a bad effort for an opposition spokesman for foreign affairs. I think it is about time the Leader of the Opposition found somebody intelligent to do the job.

Taxation: Interest Withholding Tax

Mr ROSS CAMERON—My question is to the Minister for Financial Services and Regulation.

Opposition members interjecting—

Mr SPEAKER—Everybody in the House knows that that sort of behaviour is quite unacceptable. The member for Parramatta has the call and is entitled to be heard without interruption under the standing orders. I call him.

Mr ROSS CAMERON—Can the minister explain to the House the significance of the government's changes to interest withholding tax on corporate bonds? In particular, what impact will the changes have on home mortgage borrowers and small businesses in the regional financial capital of Parramatta?

Mr HOCKEY—I thank the regional member for Parramatta, who is such a strong advocate of the interests of regional and rural Australia. On 29 June this year, the Senate at last passed TLAB2, a bill that included in it a provision to abolish interest withholding tax on corporate bonds. This has been an enormous success in Australian financial markets. I would like to quote from a report by Salomon Smith Barney, one of the largest investment banks in the world. It has a headline 'Interest withholding tax gone—a new global era dawns!' It says:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 31 AUG 2004 200402548

AS- PREL 13 R3B

Antweiler, Philip L

From: AFSATEX@aol.com
Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 1999 9:11 AM
To: AFSATEX@aol.com
Subject: *stan roth supports Downer .. Indonesian Policy debated...*

RELEASED IN FULL

Good policy loses out to saving a neck

Comment,
By Brian Toohey

Saving Alexander Downer's neck is now taking precedence over good policy making on East Timor. After he was again embarrassed in Parliament yesterday, the Foreign Minister brandished supportive comments from the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Stanley Roth.

Unfortunately, Roth's support comes at the price of abandoning "at Australia's urging" his initial enthusiasm for sending a peace-keeping force to East Timor.

For the second day in a row, Labor's shadow Foreign Minister, Laurie Brereton, demonstrated in Parliament yesterday that Downer had wrongly denied that a senior Australian military officer had been approached by his US counterparts about a possible military deploy-ment in East Timor.

On Monday, Brereton also used a leaked document to rebut Downer's earlier denials of policy differences between Roth and his department head, Dr Ashton Calvert.

Although having to admit in Parliament yesterday that he had not read a crucial cable, Downer was able to quote a comforting statement which he said Roth made on Monday to the Australian Ambassador in Washington, Andrew Peacock.

Roth's timely assistance is little more than can be expected from a senior US diplomat in the circum-stances. Unhappily, it also under-lines how Roth has abandoned his earlier view that the safety of the people of East Timor would be best served by a peacekeeping force.

Roth is now locked into support-ing Australia's position that no peacekeepers are needed imm-ediately after the August 30 ballot on independence.

Despite predictions by senior Indonesian military officials that a bloodbath could occur at this stage, Australia has successfully opposed dispatching peacekeepers until after the Indonesian parliament considers the outcome of the ballot, probably in November. Until then, East Timorese independence supporters will remain under the dubious protection of Indonesian security forces.

Downer's parliament problems stem from his eagerness to endorse a statement from his department on August 2 which "categorically denied" a report in this newspaper on July 31 about policy differences between Roth and Calvert over East Timor. Contrary to the sweeping denial, the record of conversation of a February meeting says there was a significant difference over "our approaches concerning the security dimension of East Timor's trans-ition". Unlike Calvert, Roth re-garded the early implementation of a full-scale peacekeeping operation as unavoidable and described the Australian position as "defeatist".

Downer says Roth was only expressing a personal view, rather than US policy as it now stands. This may be true, but could easily turn out to be a tragedy for the East Timorese.

But Downer looks like escaping from his parliamentary predicament with his job intact.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 31 AUG 2004 200402548

A S UNRELEASSIFIED

R4

ANZ

national news

BACK

Downer admits US cable on E Timor

RELEASED IN FULL

From STEPHEN SPENCER of AAP

10aug99

FOREIGN Minister Alexander Downer today admitted receiving a diplomatic cable on US proposals for a peacekeeping force in East Timor, but said he had not read it because his office received too many cables.

"It is true, as the Labor Party claims, that this cable that you have apparently got hold of which reports this conversation was one of a number of cables directed to me," he told parliament.

He said his office department received 187,000 cables every year, 100,000 of which were directed to the minister.

"It won't come as any surprise that no minister could read 100,000 cables," he said.

Mr Downer's admission is the latest in a series of backdowns since his blanket denial of reports the US had floated the idea of a military force on East Timor with Australia.

Just yesterday he told parliament he was aware of all available information on the issue and there had been no US request for Australia to participate in a Timor military force.

However, late last night he told parliament he had just been informed US military officials had asked Australian defence officers in June whether Australia would contribute to any peacekeeping force on Timor.

He told parliament he was completely unaware of the proposal until then, prompting opposition foreign affairs spokesman Laurie Brereton to question whether Mr Downer had been incompetent, or was deliberately misleading parliament.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 31 AUG 2004 200402548

"Don't you read important reports or haven't you once again been caught out telling whoppers?" he asked Mr Downer.

Mr Brereton linked the affair to the 1996 DIFF loans scandal which almost forced Mr Downer's dismissal in his first months as foreign minister when he denied receiving any complaints over the axing of

UNCLASSIFIED

the DIFF foreign loans scheme.

When his denial was contradicted by a flood of leaked letters, Mr Downer admitted he had misled parliament and received a public reprimand from the Prime Minister.

However, Mr Downer insists the military plan was only raised hypothetically by US officials, and was never put to him as official policy, a stand backed up by a statement from the US Information Service.

"The United States has no plans to send US forces to East Timor independently of the UN to act as peacekeepers or peace enforcers," the statement said.

"Reports of significant differences between the United States and Australia over East Timor are grossly inaccurate."

Mr Downer said US Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth, who first raised the peacekeeping plan with Australia in February, had told Ambassador Andrew Peacock accusations Australia and the US were at odds over East Timor were "utterly irritating".

BACK

UNCLASSIFIED

A S UNRELEASSIFIED

R4

ANZ

national news

BACK

Downer admits US cable on E Timor

RELEASED IN FULL

From STEPHEN SPENCER of AAP

10aug99

FOREIGN Minister Alexander Downer today admitted receiving a diplomatic cable on US proposals for a peacekeeping force in East Timor, but said he had not read it because his office received too many cables.

"It is true, as the Labor Party claims, that this cable that you have apparently got hold of which reports this conversation was one of a number of cables directed to me," he told parliament.

He said his office department received 187,000 cables every year, 100,000 of which were directed to the minister.

"It won't come as any surprise that no minister could read 100,000 cables," he said.

Mr Downer's admission is the latest in a series of backdowns since his blanket denial of reports the US had floated the idea of a military force on East Timor with Australia.

Just yesterday he told parliament he was aware of all available information on the issue and there had been no US request for Australia to participate in a Timor military force.

However, late last night he told parliament he had just been informed US military officials had asked Australian defence officers in June whether Australia would contribute to any peacekeeping force on Timor.

He told parliament he was completely unaware of the proposal until then, prompting opposition foreign affairs spokesman Laurie Brereton to question whether Mr Downer had been incompetent, or was deliberately misleading parliament.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 31 AUG 2004 200402548

"Don't you read important reports or haven't you once again been caught out telling whoppers?" he asked Mr Downer.

Mr Brereton linked the affair to the 1996 DIFF loans scandal which almost forced Mr Downer's dismissal in his first months as foreign minister when he denied receiving any complaints over the axing of

UNCLASSIFIED

the DIFF foreign loans scheme.

When his denial was contradicted by a flood of leaked letters, Mr Downer admitted he had misled parliament and received a public reprimand from the Prime Minister.

However, Mr Downer insists the military plan was only raised hypothetically by US officials, and was never put to him as official policy, a stand backed up by a statement from the US Information Service.

"The United States has no plans to send US forces to East Timor independently of the UN to act as peacekeepers or peace enforcers," the statement said.

"Reports of significant differences between the United States and Australia over East Timor are grossly inaccurate."

Mr Downer said US Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth, who first raised the peacekeeping plan with Australia in February, had told Ambassador Andrew Peacock accusations Australia and the US were at odds over East Timor were "utterly irritating".

BACK

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
AS-PREL-13
R5

[redacted]

Thursday, August 12, 1999

RELEASED IN FULL

EAST TIMOR

US backs Downer's view on contingency

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 31 AUG 2004 200402548

By MARK RILEY in New York, JENNIFER HEWETT in Washington and PETER COLE-ADAMS

Washington's guns fired in defence of Australia's Foreign Minister, Mr Downer, again yesterday in the row over contingency plans for a breakdown of order in East Timor - by suggesting senior Australian military and diplomatic officials had got things wrong.

The Pentagon rejected as "complete bunkum" an Australian diplomatic cable that outlines US plans to send 15,000 marines into the territory - using Darwin as a staging base - if East Timor erupts in civil war after the August 30 vote on whether it should stay within Indonesia.

The Pentagon spokesman, Mr Ken Bacon, said there was "no truth" to the details of the cable sent by Australia's consul-general in Hawaii, Mr Peter Woolcott.

"We do not have plans to send 15,000 Marines to East Timor," he said. "To the best of my knowledge - and I've checked into this - no such plan was discussed."

Mr Woolcott listed the senior US officers who met Australia's Air Vice-Marshall Bob Treloar on June 21 - a meeting that the US military in Hawaii confirms - and recorded the discussions in detail.

Mr Downer faced further Opposition pressure in Parliament yesterday. Senator Robert Ray, a former defence minister, said the message from Hawaii was a "Category B" cable, "an important matter requiring urgent attention and action". Referring to Mr Downer's comment that no minister could be expected to read 100,000 cables a year, he said only 20 or 30 cables of this sort came to the minister's office in a day. "Is the minister expecting us to believe that no-one in the [Foreign Affairs] department ever though to draw the minister's attention to this high priority cable ... [or] provide him with a written brief on [its] implications?" Senator Ray asked. The US State Department spokesman, Mr James Rubin, also dismissed the Australian version of the meeting. "It is simply wrong," he said. "Some- one got their facts mixed up." A US official later told the *Herald* that the US was acutely aware of the risk of violence in East

Timor after the ballot. "Of course people are concerned and are considering 'what if' questions all the time," he said.

"We all see the potential for problems, which is why we have been working so hard in Jakarta about the need to ensure this all goes well."

The official denied that the US was dissatisfied with Australia's attitude towards a military presence in East Timor. "The thought of the US lecturing Australia on Indonesia is like Australia lecturing the US on Mexico," he said.

The Hawaii meeting took place just weeks before the Prime Minister's visit to Washington last month, when Mr Howard said he and President Clinton had "discussed Indonesia and Timor at very great lengths".

US officials said yesterday that any discussion of contingency options for East Timor would have been contained to informal military meetings.

PREVIOUS ◄ | ► NEXT
HOME | ARCHIVE | TEXT INDEX | FEEDBACK | HELP | FAIRFAX

This material is subject to copyright and any unauthorised use, copying or mirroring is prohibited.

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 7/30/19

AS-PREL-13 R1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 30 JUL 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 31 AUG 2004 200402548

Daily Activities Report
Friday, July 30, 1999

RELEASED, NON-RESPONSIVE DELETED
NR

1. EAP/J -- Robin White

[redacted] NR

[redacted] NR

2. EAP/CM - A/Robert Goldberg

[redacted] NR

CONFIDENTIAL

Lot# 02D083, box #4, file PREL-13, folder "Sept. 1 cont."

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted] NR

3. EAP/PIMBS - Douglas A. Hartwick

(U) Singapore [redacted] NR

(U) Singapore [redacted]

(U) Indonesia - East Timor: PIMBS received two calls about East Timor this morning from U.S. citizens, the kind of well-informed activists who frequently telephone to criticize U.S. policy for being too passive in response to militia violence. Both callers had nothing but praise for positions on East Timor you, Stanley, outlined in public statements during your July 13-17 Indonesia visit.

(C) Indonesia - East Timor: PCG outcome: A 1.5 hour meeting concluded the obvious, namely, that we needed to 1) stay close to the Australians, 2) engage the DPKO more directly to help them start planning along with Australia (but mindful of Indonesian sensitivities), 3) keep pressure on Indonesia to deliver on their responsibilities to provide adequate post ballot security, and 4) consider pro-active Hill consultations in the days ahead so that the Hill doesn't feel surprised if fast breaking events on the ground require us to adjust the Security council Mandate

rapidly. (Dave Keegan and I had already begun to lay on Hill briefings next week, anyway.) The meeting all but endorsed simply extending current congressional notification which the Security council may seek to do as early as next week.

(SBU) Indonesia - Australian Newspaper Features U.S.-Australia Policy Dispute on East Timor: The Saturday July 31 edition of the Australian Financial Review features a piece about the "tense policy dispute" between the U.S. and Australia over proposals to curb the potential post-ballot violence in East Timor. It cites recent meetings between you and Calvert, noting both the U.S. desire to have Australia take a leading role in a UN peace-keeping force in East Timor and the Australian reluctance to do so for fear of jeopardizing its relationship with the Indonesian military. It adds that the U.S. is considering committing a relatively large contingent of marines to a UN force(!). Pretty bizarre, all in all. Ambassador Peacock may try to call you about it; they are as puzzled by it as we are.

4. EAP/K - Evans Revere



NR



NR

[redacted]

NR

[redacted]

NR

RELEASED IN PART
NR, B1, 1.4(A), 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

AS-PREL-13 R7
8/27/96

[redacted] NR

5. EAP/APEC - Richard Boucher

[redacted] NR

6. EAP/PIMBS - Douglas A. Hartwick

(C) Indonesia/East Timor - Washington Liaison Group Meeting: Following the Secretary's East Timor meeting, the Operations Center Crisis Management Staff held a WLG meeting on East Timor. Over 40 persons from State, DOD, JCS and AID convened to discuss preliminary preparations for a possible NEO in the event the situation dictates. The assumption is [redacted] B1
evacuating Americans in a permissive environment, but [redacted] The Joint Staff representative (J-3) told the group that three ships would be in port in Bali 8/29-9/1, including an amphibious landing ship [redacted] The ships [redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(A), 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 30 JUL 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 31 AUG 2004 200402548

[redacted] and will be two steaming days from the coast off Dili. Forces in Okinawa can transport [redacted] We briefed the group on Embassy Jakarta's preparations and plans to have personnel on the ground. DS and others raised concerns about the safety of Ambassador Roy. B1 B1

We would make a decision to evacuate in conjunction with the Embassy, and almost certainly the Australians and the UN. Other governments, [redacted] are looking to us for support in evacuating their citizens. B1

(C) Indonesia/East Timor - Humanitarian Relief Plans: [redacted] NR

(C) Indonesia/East Timor - HRWA Calls for Presidential Action: [redacted] NR

(C) Indonesia/East Timor - Pro-Autonomy PR: [redacted] NR

(C) Indonesia - Atrocities Meeting: [redacted] NR

(SBU) Indonesia/East Timor - Ramos Horta: [redacted] NR

(C) Indonesia - Blair Trip: CINCPAC Admiral Blair will visit Indonesia September 9-11, and POLAD Ambassador Twinning is asking for our input into his talking points for his calls on Indonesian leaders. Clearly there is not much we can usefully provide at this time, but we will stay in close touch with Twinning as we get closer to the trip.

Case Number: 200402548

RELEASED IN FULL

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTO3545

PAGE 01 STATE 150749 120109Z
ORIGIN P-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/000R

DRAFTED BY: S/S-O: DAVE SOHIER
APPROVED BY: S/S-O: CJMCMULLEN
----------EB7DBE 120109Z /38
O 120107Z AUG 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 150749

TOPOL 90076 PLEASE PASS U/S PICKERING'S PARTY

FOLLOWING CANBERRA 02647 DATED 100701Z AUG 99 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO JAKARTA USCINCPAC SECDEF JCS BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 002647

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMBASSADOR TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/09
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, OPRC, UN, ID, AS
SUBJ: U.S. MARINES TO EAST TIMOR
REF: CANBERRA 2533

CLASSIFIED BY DCM WILLIAM M. BELLAMY. REASON: 1.5(D)
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 150749 120109Z

1. (U) SUMMARY. AUSTRALIAN MEDIA ARE AGAIN REPORTING U.S. CONTINGENCY PLANS TO SEND LARGE NUMBERS OF U.S. FORCES TO EAST TIMOR TO PREVENT BLOODSHED AND MAINTAIN ORDER. THESE PRESS REPORTS ALSO ALLEGE SERIOUS DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA OVER EAST TIMOR.

2. (U) THE OPPOSITION LABOR PARTY IS USING THESE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 19 AUG 2004 200402548

Case Number: 200402548

REPORTS, WHICH APPEAR TO BE BASED PARTLY ON LEAKED CONFIDENTIAL CABLES, TO EMBARRASS THE GOA. EMBASSY HAS ISSUED A PRESS STATEMENT (AT PARA EIGHT) THAT DENIES THE U.S. IS PLANNING TO SEND PEACEKEEPING FORCES TO E. TIMOR WITHOUT A U.N. MANDATE. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) BOTH THE "AGE" AND THE "AUSTRALIAN" RAN STORIES AUGUST 10 (FAXED TO EAP/ANP) CLAIMING THE U.S. HAS DRAWN UP CONTINGENCY PLANS TO SEND LARGE NUMBERS OF U.S. TROOPS TO EAST TIMOR TO MAINTAIN ORDER. ACCORDING TO THE "AGE" EXCLUSIVE REPORT, THESE PLANS WERE DISCUSSED IN JUNE WITH AUSTRALIAN MILITARY COUNTERPARTS WHO WERE RELUCTANT TO COMMIT TO A PEACEMAKING OPERATION.

4. (C) IT NOW APPEARS THESE STORIES (AND PREVIOUS ONES -- REFTEL) ORIGINATE WITH A LEAKED CLASSIFIED CABLE FROM THE AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE IN HONOLULU WHICH REPORTS INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND AUSTRALIAN MILITARY PLANNERS. ACCORDING TO DOWNER'S STAFF, THESE MIL-MIL CONVERSATIONS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN PURELY HYPOTHETICAL, WITHOUT ANY OFFICIAL STANDING. HOWEVER,

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 150749 120109Z
THEY HAVE BEEN SEIZED ON AND INFLATED BY THE LABOR OPPOSITION AND PARTS OF THE MEDIA TO ILLUSTRATE AN ALLEGED MAJOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIAN APPROACHES TO EAST TIMOR.

5. (C) SIMILARLY, A LEAKED CABLE FROM THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON FROM LAST FEBRUARY, WHICH REPORTS ON US-GOA BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON INDONESIA, IS ALSO BEING SELECTIVELY CITED BY LABOR IN PARLIAMENT AND BY THE PRESS. IT ALLEGEDLY DESCRIBES HOW THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION RESISTED EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH'S RECOMMENDATION THAT THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA VIGOROUSLY PURSUE PEACEKEEPING OPTIONS IN EAST TIMOR.

6. (U) IN HIS PARLIAMENTARY REPLIES, DOWNER HAS INSISTED THAT U.S./AUSTRALIAN COOPERATION ON EAST TIMOR IS EXEMPLARY. HE HAS ALSO DENIED THAT THE U.S. HAS REQUESTED AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION IN A PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION IN EAST TIMOR.

7. (U) AT MIDDAY AUGUST 10, EMBASSY ISSUED THE PRESS STATEMENT AT PARAGRAPH 8 BELOW. DOWNER QUOTED FROM IT

Case Number: 200402548

IN PARLIAMENT LATER THAT AFTERNOON AND ASKED THAT IT BE ENTERED INTO THE PARLIAMENTARY RECORD.

8.(U) TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE FOLLOWS:

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

UNITED STATES EMBASSY STATEMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 150749 120109Z
MEDIA REPORTS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS PLANS TO SEND U.S. TROOPS TO EAST TIMOR TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THAT TERRITORY ARE INCORRECT. THE UNITED STATES HAS NO PLANS TO SEND U.S. FORCES TO EAST TIMOR, INDEPENDENTLY OF THE U.N., TO ACT AS PEACEKEEPERS OR PEACE ENFORCERS.

THE UNITED STATES IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE U.N. AND WITH OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA, TO ALLOW FOR A FREE AND FAIR POLL IN EAST TIMOR ON AUGUST 30. IT IS NOT YET KNOWN WHAT U.N. PRESENCE MAY BE NEEDED AFTER THE AUGUST 30 VOTE. ANY DECISION TO SEND ADDITIONAL U.N. PERSONNEL TO EAST TIMOR WILL BE MADE BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL IN CONSULTATION WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES, .INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA. THE UNITED STATES IS NOT CONSIDERING ACTING INDEPENDENTLY OF THESE PROCESSES, NOR HAS IT INVITED AUSTRALIA TO TAKE ACTION IN EAST TIMOR OUTSIDE THE U.N. CONTEXT.

REPORTS OF SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA OVER EAST TIMOR ARE GROSSLY INACCURATE. OUR RESPECTIVE VIEWS ON EAST TIMOR ARE IN FACT COMPLETELY CONGRUENT. PRIME MINISTER HOWARD AND PRESIDENT CLINTON NOTED THIS CLOSE CONVERGENCE WHEN THEY MET IN WASHINGTON LAST MONTH. SECRETARY OF STATE ALBRIGHT AND FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER AGAIN CONFIRMED OUR VERY CLOSE COOPERATION ON EAST TIMOR AT THEIR RECENT MEETING IN SINGAPORE. END TEXT.

HOLMES UNQUOTE ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 150749 120109Z

The George Bush Library

1000 George Bush Drive West College Station, Texas 77845

June 30, 2004

Brad Simpson
Archive Research Fellow
The National Security Archive
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Mr. Simpson:

This letter is in response to your request dated June 30, 2004 for release of information from the George Bush Presidential Library under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)(5 U.S.C., as amended) and the Presidential Records Act (PRA)(44 U.S.C. 22). Your request was received by the Bush Library on June 28, 2004.

We have performed an initial search of our collection for material related to your request for nine file folders from the Dan Quayle Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs Files. Approximately 900 pages of records must be processed in order to respond to your request. Please keep in mind that the page total is an estimate and that all pages processed might not be applicable to your specific topic.

The staff of the Bush Library is currently processing and reviewing FOIA requests that precede your request. To treat everyone equitably, we have placed your request in our processing queue by the date it was received in our office. There are currently 104 cases before this one. FOIA requests received by the Bush Library are processed and reviewed for access under provisions of the PRA and FOIA and are subject to Executive Order 13233 which requires that we notify the representatives of the former President and the incumbent President prior to the release of any documents. Also, it should be noted that many of the documents processed in response to your request may be closed in whole or part in compliance with FOIA and PRA restrictions. When processing is completed and the notification period has passed, we will inform you of the availability of the requested records. At that point, you can request that we copy these records at a reproduction fee of $.50 per page, or you can choose to view these documents in the research room of the Bush Library where a self-service copier is available for the price of $.15 a page.

If you have any questions regarding your FOIA request, please contact our staff at (979) 691-4041. Your case log number is 2004-1701-F. Please have this number accessible for reference during any future contact concerning this FOIA request.

Sincerely,

ROBERT HOLZWEISS
Supervisory Archivist
George Bush Presidential Library

RFH:bah

20040748NLB012
RECNO: 29132
DATER: 7/7/2004
Quayle Meetings

NLB
SEQCOR: 108170
Simpson, Brad

The George Bush Library

1000 George Bush Drive West, College Station, Texas 77845

May 20, 2014

Brad Simpson
Archive Research Fellow
The National Security Archive
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Mr. Simpson:

This letter is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act request dated June 30, 2004 for release of information from the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum. FOIA requests for Presidential and Vice Presidential records are processed and reviewed for access under provisions of the 1978 Presidential Records Act (PRA) (44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207), which incorporates the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) in substantial part.

We have completed processing approximately 1635 pages of Quayle Vice Presidential records related to this request. Of this total, 671 pages have been exempted from release in whole or part in compliance with applicable FOIA exemptions, which specify what material may be released to the public. A list of the applicable FOIA exemption categories is attached. Further, the number of pages restricted from access, in whole or in part, is listed along with the exemption categories below. Some pages may be restricted under more than one category.

(b)(1) – 618 pages; (b)(2) – 2 pages; (b)(4) – 14 pages; (b)(6) – 47 pages; (b)(7)(c) – 40 pages; (b)(7)(e) – 45 pages

At this time, you have the right to file an administrative appeal of any Quayle Vice Presidential records responsive to your FOIA request that have been withheld under an exemption category of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. §552(b). To appeal a FOIA exemption, the appeal must be submitted in writing to the attention of the Deputy Archivist of the United States, c/o the George Bush Presidential Library, 1000 George Bush Drive West, College Station, TX 77845, by email to bush.library@nara.gov, or by facsimile to (979) 691-4030. You should also include a copy of your original request and our denial. Both your appeal letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "FOIA Appeal." You have 35 calendar days from the date of this letter to file your appeal. The Library will coordinate your appeal with the appropriate authority. Since these are Presidential records administered in accordance with 44 U.S.C. §§2201-2207, Executive Order 13489 and NARA regulations at 36 C.F.R. § 1270.46, NARA must notify the former and incumbent Presidents prior to the release of any information in response to an appeal. If an

20040748NLB012 NLB
RECNO:29132 SEQCOR:178169
5/27/2014 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Quayle Meetings

appeal is filed and a determination is made to release more information, once the provisions of E.O. 13489 have been met, we will contact you.

Please note that 618 pages of material responsive to your request have been withheld pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1), (national security classified information). In order to facilitate our ability to more quickly seek a declassification review for those specific documents that are of interest to you, we are no longer referring all classified documents processed in response to your FOIA request to the originating and/or equity agencies for a current classification review. Based on the information provided on our withdrawal sheets, you can request under your existing FOIA or through the mandatory declassification review provisions of Executive Order 13526 a declassification review of those specific documents of interest to you.

The remaining pages are open for research. As you may be aware, historical records at NARA are not governed by the FOIA fee and fee waiver provisions in section 552(a)(4)(A)(vi). Accordingly, the George Bush Library does not provide fee waivers for copying. NARA charges standard reproduction fees for copying of historical records in accordance with our statutorily based fee schedule, codified at 44 U.S.C. § 2116(c). We will be happy to provide you with copies of the open and partially open records upon receipt of the reproduction fee of $.80 per page. You may also view the documents in our research room at the George Bush Library where a self-service copier is available for the price of $.25 a page. The Library accepts checks or money orders made out to the National Archives Trust Fund. When you provide a check as payment to the National Archives and Records Administration, please be advised that you authorize them to use the information from your check to make a one-time electronic funds transfer from your account or to process the payment as a check transaction. When NARA uses information from your check to make an electronic funds transfer, funds may be withdrawn from your account as early as they day we receive your payment, and you will not receive your check back from your financial institution. The Library also accepts Visa, Master Card, American Express, or Discover/Novus orders.

If you wish to order copies or need any further assistance, please call our staff at (979) 691-4041. Your FOIA case log number is 2004-1701-F. Please have this number accessible for reference during any future contact concerning this case.

Sincerely,

Robert Holzweiss Ph. D.
Supervisory Archivist
George Bush Presidential Library

RFH:bah

Enclosures

PRA Restrictions and FOIA Exemptions Code

Presidential Records Act – [44 U.S.C. §2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

Freedom of Information Act – [5 U.S.C. §552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(7a) Release would disclose information concerning pending or prospective law enforcement proceedings
(b)(7)(b) Release of information would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication
(b)(7)(c) Release of information could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7)(d) Release of information could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source
(b)(7)(e) Release of information would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law
(b)(7)(f) Release of information could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

PRM – Personal Records Misfile

George Bush Presidential Library

1000 George Bush Drive West
College Station, TX 77845
phone: (979) 691-4041
fax: (979) 691-4030
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu
library.bush@nara.gov

Inventory for FOIA Request 2004-1701-F

Selected Quayle Vice Presidential Records on Indonesia

Extent
21 folders

Access
Collection is open to all researchers. Access to Bush Presidential Records, Bush Vice Presidential Records, and Quayle Vice Presidential Records is governed by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)(5 USC 552 as amended) and the Presidential Records Act (PRA)(44 USC 22) and therefore records may be restricted in whole or in part in accordance with legal exemptions.

Copyright
Documents in this collection that were prepared by officials of the United States government as part of their official duties are in the public domain. Researchers are advised to consult the copyright law of the United States (Title 17, USC) which governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material.

Provenance
Official records of George Bush's presidency and vice presidency are housed at the George Bush Presidential Library and administered by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) under the provisions of the Presidential Records Act (PRA).

Processed By
Staff Archivists, February 2009. Previously restricted materials are added as they are released.

System of Arrangement
Records that are responsive to this FOIA request were found in one collection area—Quayle Vice Presidential Records: Staff and Office Files. Staff and Office Files are processed at the folder level, that is, individual documents are not selected and removed from a folder for processing. While this method maintains folder integrity, it frequently results in the incidental processing of documents that are not wholly responsive to the subject area.

Scope and Content

The materials in FOIA 2004-1701-F are a selective, not necessarily all inclusive, body of documents responsive to the topic of the FOIA. Researchers should consult the archivist about related materials.

FOIA 2004-1701-F contains records from the Office of the Vice President's National Security Affairs Office relating to Vice President Quayle's 1991 trip to Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines; the Vice President and Mrs. Quayle's visit to India to attend Rajiv Gandhi's funeral; and meetings with Indonesian officials.

The Staff and Office Files consist of correspondence, press statements and guidance, memoranda, photographs, and administrative forms. Correspondence includes messages expressing congratulations and/or condolences between Indonesian officials and Vice President Quayle, as well as letters from constituents expressing views on such matters as doing business in Indonesia, Japanese trade barriers, and human rights in Indonesia, specifically the situation in East Timor. In addition, the Vice President sent letters thanking Indonesian officials for gifts. Also, there is correspondence regarding the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in Singapore.

The Japanese segment of the trip is highlighted by photographs of Vice President Quayle and Prime Minister Kaifu. Moreover, various memoranda and fact sheets concern issues involved with business opportunities in Japan.

Additionally, there are cables containing administrative details of the trip, local press reaction to the visit, and transcripts of the Vice President's public statements. Furthermore, there is prepared text of public statements to be given by Vice President Quayle, and questions-and-answers prepared for the Vice President's press availabilities. The collection is rounded out by routine transmittal memoranda, cover sheets, and "Vice President's Register" forms acknowledging gifts from Indonesian officials.

The following is a list of documents and folders processed in response to FOIA 2004-1701-F.

Quayle Vice Presidential Records: Staff and Office Files

National Security Affairs Office
- Country Files
  - Indonesia [OA/ID 27033]

- Foreign Travel Files
  - 5/18-24/91 - VP Trip to Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and Philippines [1] [1] [OA/ID 27014]
  - 5/18-24/91 - VP Trip to Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and Philippines [1] [2] [OA/ID 27014]
  - 5/18-24/91 - VP Trip to Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and Philippines [1] [3] [OA/ID 27014]
  - 5/18-24/91 - VP Trip to Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and Philippines [1] [4] [OA/ID 27014]
  - 5/18-24/91 - VP Trip to Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and Philippines [2] [1] [OA/ID 27014]
  - 5/18-24/91 - VP Trip to Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and Philippines [2] [2] [OA/ID 27014]
  - 5/18-24/91 - VP Trip to Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and Philippines [2] [3] [OA/ID 27014]
  - 5/18-24/91 - VP Trip to Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and Philippines [2] [4] [OA/ID 27014]
  - 5/18-24/91 - VP Trip to Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and Philippines [3] [1] [OA/ID 27014]
  - 5/18-24/91 - VP Trip to Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and Philippines [3] [2] [OA/ID 27014]
  - 5/18-24/91 - VP Trip to Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and Philippines [3] [3] [OA/ID 27014]
  - 5/18-24/91 - VP Trip to Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and Philippines [3] [4] [OA/ID 27014]
  - 4/25/89-5/5/89 - VP Trip to Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand [1] [OA/ID 27016]
  - 4/25/89-5/5/89 - VP Trip to Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand [2]: Australia [1] [OA/ID 27016]

4/25/89-5/5/89 - VP Trip to Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand [2]: Australia [2] [OA/ID 27016]
4/25/89-5/5/89 - VP Trip to Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand [2]: Australia [3] [OA/ID 27016]
4/25/89-5/5/89 - VP Trip to Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand [2]: Indonesia [1] [OA/ID 27016]
4/25/89-5/5/89 - VP Trip to Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand [2]: Indonesia [2] [OA/ID 27016]

Meetings Files
2/20/92 VP Meetings - Indonesia Foreign Minister Alatas [OA/ID 27008]
6/9/89 VP Meeting/Event - Indonesia President Suharto [OA/ID 27026]

Last modified: 05/20/2014

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9075

PAGE 01 JAKART 02672 01 OF 02 131258Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01
	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------3D5895 131258Z /38

P 131258Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1510
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0681
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002672

DEPARTMENT FOR MGIDOI
S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02672 01 OF 02 131258Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200502473

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MGIDOI: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/13)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: NEW VIOLENCE ERUPTED IN JAKARTA DURING THE DAY MAY 13, IN THE WAKE OF VIOLENCE WHICH TOOK THE LIVES OF AT LEAST SIX STUDENTS, SHOT BY SECURITY FORCES ON THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. THE NEW VIOLENCE BEGAN IN THE SAME LOCATION, WHERE ONE MORE DEATH HAS BEEN REPORTED. PROTESTERS, NOT NECESSARILY STUDENTS, BURNED A GASOLINE STATION AND VEHICLES. VIOLENT CLASHES WERE REPORTED ELSEWHERE IN THE CITY AS OF COB AS STUDENTS SOUGHT TO BLOCK ROADS. NEW VIOLENCE WAS ALSO REPORTED IN JOGJAKARTA. MEDAN IS QUIET BUT TENSE WHILE IN PADANG THERE WAS A PEACEFUL STUDENT DEMONSTRATION. SURABAYA SAW A PEACEFUL STUDENT MARCH TO THE LOCAL PARLIAMENT. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAS CUT SHORT HIS VISIT TO CAIRO, AND WILL RETURN TO JAKARTA MAY 14. END SUMMARY

JAKARTA SEES NEW VIOLENCE

TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY (JAKARTA):

3. (U) VIOLENT CONFRONTATIONS DEVELOPED ON THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 13 BETWEEN SECURITY FORCES AND A MIXTURE OF LOCAL PEOPLE AND STUDENTS AT JAKARTA'S TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. EARLIER IN THE DAY, POLOFF HAD WITNESSED A PEACEFUL RALLY OF THOUSANDS AT THE TRISAKTI CAMPUS IN HONOR OF THE SIX STUDENTS KILLED THE NIGHT

BEFORE. OPPOSITION LEADERS MEGAWATI AND AMIEN RAIS WERE AMONG THE SPEAKERS.

4. (U) FIGHTING DEVELOPED HOURS LATER AS LOCAL PEOPLE AND STUDENTS FROM OTHER UNIVERSITIES BEGAN TO CONGREGATE IN THE TRISAKTI CAMPUS AREA. SECURITY FORCES FIRED TEAR GAS AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AT THE CROWD OUTSIDE THE CAMPUS WHICH COUNTERED WITH STONES. THE CROWD ALSO SET FIRE TO A NUMBER OF VEHICLES IN THE AREA AND AT LEAST ONE GAS STATION. A SMALL POLICE OFFICE WAS

BESIEGED FOR A TIME.

5. (U) AS OF COB, THREE HELICOPTERS HAD DELIVERED SPECIAL FIGHTER TEAMS WHICH DESCENDED INTO THE AREA BY ROPE. A REPUTABLE WIRE SERVICE REPORTER HAS TOLD US THAT ONE DEAD YOUTH HAD BEEN DISCOVERED ON THE SCENE, THOUGH CAUSE OF DEATH WAS UNCERTAIN. TWO EXPAT JOURNALISTS WERE ALSO HIT BY RUBBER BULLETS AND A THIRD NARROWLY ESCAPED A LIVE ROUND HE SAID STRUCK A WALL BEHIND HIM. CASUALTY FIGURES ARE NOT AVAILABLE.

6. (U) STUDENTS AND ORDINARY PEOPLE ARE INVOLVED IN STREET DEMONSTRATIONS, SOME INVOLVING CLASHES WITH POLICE, THROUGHOUT THE CITY.

ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY (JAKARTA):

7. (U) AS OF LATE AFTERNOON THE CENTER OF JAKARTA'S JALAN SUDIRMAN BUSINESS DISTRICT WAS PARALYZED BY CLASHES BETWEEN POLICE AND MASSES OF PEOPLE WHO HAD EMERGED FROM OFFICE BUILDINGS AND ADJOINING NEIGHBORHOODS. POLICE WERE SPRAYING TEARGAS AND AN EMBASSY SPOUSE ON THE SCENE REPORTED SHOOTING BEGINNING AROUND 5 P.M. EARLIER IN THE DAY A LARGE DEMONSTRATION/REQUIEM WAS HELD

AT ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY WHICH IS LOCATED NEARBY ON THIS MAIN JAKARTA THOROUGHFARE. AT ONE POINT, STUDENTS WERE BLOCKING THE SLOW LANE OF SUDIRMAN, LINKED ARM IN ARM. AS OF 3:00 PM, THE DEMONSTRATION (WITNESSED BY POLOFF) WAS PEACEFUL, THOUGH TRAFFIC WAS SIGNIFICANTLY SLOWED. A SIGN DISPLAYED OVER THE UNIVERSITY SIGN SAID "PLEASE, DON'T SHOOT US." THERE WAS MINIMAL POLICE PRESENCE. A SOURCE ON THE SCENE REPORTED AT 3:15 PM THAT TRAFFIC HAD COME TO A HALT AND MANY PEOPLE WERE COMING OUT OF OFFICE BUILDINGS TO WATCH/JOIN THE DEMONSTRATION, SOME MOTIONING WITH A THUMBS UP SIGN IN SUPPORT OF THE STUDENTS.

8. (U) AT 4:00 P.M., AN EMBASSY SPOUSE REPORTED THAT HER CONTACT IN THE DANAMON BANK BUILDING, ADJACENT TO ATMA JAYA, WAS REPORTING CLASHES IN THE STREET AND IN THE NEARBY BENHIL MARKET. TEAR GAS WAS BEING SPRAYED BY THE SECURITY FORCES. THE CONTACT EMPHASIZED THAT THOSE BATTLING POLICE WERE NOT STUDENTS, WHO HAD LEFT THE SCENE, BUT LOCAL RESIDENTS. TRAFFIC ON SUDIRMAN HAD COME TO A COMPLETE STANDSTILL.

9. (U) A SEPARATE SOURCE REPORTED THAT DEMONSTRATORS WERE BURNING VEHICLES IN THE PONDOK INDAH AREA OF SOUTHERN JAKARTA. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHO THESE DEMONSTRATORS ARE BUT AN EARLIER REPORT CLAIMED THAT STUDENTS FROM MUHAMMADIYAH UNIVERSITY WERE ATTEMPTING TO MARCH TO TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS, AND THEIR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9078

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9078

PAGE 01 JAKART 02672 02 OF 02 131258Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01
	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------3D5899 131259Z /38

P 131258Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1511
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AIT TAIPEI 0682
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002672

DEPARTMENT FOR MGIDOI
S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MGIDOI: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/13)

MARCH WOULD HAVE LED THROUGH THIS AREA.

JOGJAKARTA:
---

9. (U) ACCORDING TO A RESPECTED WESTERN JOURNALIST, CLASHES ERUPTED BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SECURITY FORCES IN JOGJAKARTA MAY 13 AND WERE CONTINUING AS OF COB.

WEST SUMATRA:
---

10. (C) STUDENTS IN PADANG, WEST SUMATRA HELD A LARGE DEMONSTRATION ON MAY 13, ACCORDING TO TWO NGO SOURCES THERE WHO ARE WELL CONNECTED TO STUDENTS. ONE SAID THAT ABOUT 2000 STUDENTS MARCHED TO THE LOCAL PARLIAMENT WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE DEMONSTRATION HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY FOCUSED ON THE DEATHS OF STUDENTS IN JAKARTA. PLANS IN PADANG WERE FOR A MAJOR DEMONSTRATION ON MAY 20. HE SAID THAT AFTER THE MAY 7 DEMONSTRATION IN PADANG, SEVEN STUDENTS WERE DETAINED, AND SIX HAD BEEN RELEASED. ONE WAS STILL BEING HELD IN POLICE CUSTODY AS OF MAY 13. A STUDENT DEMONSTRATION ALSO WAS HELD IN BUKITTINGGI ON MAY 13.

MEDAN:

CONFIDENTIAL

11. (U) EMBASSY FSN IN MEDAN REPORTS THAT THE CITY IS QUIET BUT STILL TENSE. THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IS ON THE SCENE AND INVESTIGATING LAST WEEK'S VIOLENCE. LOCAL REPORTS, AS YET UNCONFIRMED, NOW CLAIM 13 KILLED, FOUR OF WHOM WERE SHOT.

SURABAYA:
---

12. (U) AMCONSUL SURABAYA REPORTS THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL DEMONSTRATIONS BY STUDENTS IN THE CITY ON MAY 13. IN ONE, STUDENTS PEACEFULLY MARCHED FROM AIRLANGGA UNIVERSITY TO THE LOCAL PARLIAMENT WITHOUT INCIDENT. AMCONSOFF WAS ON THE SCENE TO MONITOR PART OF THE MARCH.

INVESTIGATORY TEAM SET UP:
---

13. (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND DEFENSE MINISTER GENERAL WIRANTO HAS APPOINTED A FACT-FINDING TEAM WHICH WILL INVESTIGATE THE RECENT DISAPPEARANCE AND TORTURE OF ACTIVISTS. THE TEAM IS LED BY MILITARY POLICE CHIEF MAJOR GENERAL SYAMSU.

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TO RETURN MAY 14

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAS CUT SHORT HIS VISIT TO CAIRO, AND WILL RETURN TO JAKARTA MAY 14. ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9079

PAGE 01 JAKART 02673 01 OF 02 131258Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01
	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W			

----------3D58A1 131259Z /38

P 131258Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1512
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0683
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002673

DEPARTMENT FOR MGIDOI
S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02673 01 OF 02 131258Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200502473

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT:MGID0I: TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY AFTER THE STUDENT DEATHS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: MEGAWATI AND AMIEN RAIS SPOKE AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS ON MAY 13. AMIEN RAIS CALLED THE STUDENT DEATHS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY. MEGAWATI URGED STUDENTS TO REMAIN UNITED AND CALLED ON THE ARMY TO STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST STUDENTS. A LARGE CROWD GATHERED OUTSIDE TRISAKTI CAMPUS WHILE A LARGE STUDENT DEMONSTRATION WAS HELD INSIDE CAMPUS. VIOLENT CONFRONTATIONS DEVELOPED BY THE AFTERNOON BETWEEN SECURITY FORCES AND A MIXTURE OF STUDENTS AND LOCAL PEOPLE OUTSIDE THE CAMPUS. SECURITY FORCES FIRED TEAR GAS, AND SHOOTING WAS HEARD BY A NUMBER OF SOURCES. ONE YOUTH WAS FOUND DEAD NEAR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ON MAY 13, THOUGH THE CAUSE OF DEATH WAS UNKNOWN. THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS GATHERED PEACEFULLY AT THE CEMETERY WHERE THE VICTIMS OF THE MAY 12 SHOOTINGS WERE BEING BURIED. END SUMMARY

3. (U) FOLLOWING IS A CHRONOLOGY OF MAY 13 AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY.

4. (C) POLOFF WAS ON THE CAMPUS OF TRISAKTI FROM 0930 TO 1130 ON MAY 13, AND WITNESSED A PEACEFUL ON CAMPUS GATHERING OF SEVERAL THOUSAND STUDENTS FROM A NUMBER OF LOCAL UNIVERSITIES COMMEMORATING THE DEATH OF SIX OF THEIR FELLOW STUDENTS ON MAY 12. OPPOSITION FIGURES ALI SADIKIN, MEGAWATI, AND AMIEN RAIS SPOKE. FORMER MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT SARWONO SPOKE, CALLING ON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02673 01 OF 02 131258Z
ALL CAMPUSES TO LOWER THEIR FLAGS TO HALF MAST. PROMINENT ECONOMIST KWIK KIAN GIE ALSO SPOKE, AND ASKED THE STUDENTS NOT TO LOSE THEIR INTELLECT AND NOT TO BE PROVOKED BY "OKNUM" (BAD ELEMENTS).

5. (U) AMIEN RAIS SAID HE CAME FROM JOGJAKARTA AFTER HEARING THE NEWS OF SIX DEATHS. THE CROWD SHOUTED OUT THAT THERE WERE "MORE" DEATHS THAN SIX. HE CALLED THE DEATHS A "CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY," AND SAID IT WAS AGAINST ALL MORAL, RELIGIOUS AND

PANCASILA PRINCIPLES. THE MILITARY USED WEAPONS "THAT WERE BOUGHT WITH THE PEOPLE'S MONEY." BY KILLING STUDENTS, YOU KILL THE NATION, HE SAID. ABRI HAS TWO CHOICES: TO PROTECT ONE PERSON AND THE FAMILY, OR TO PROTECT THE NATION. HE SPOKE OF AN ALLIANCE BEING FORMED TO "CHANGE THE POWER," MAYBE AFTER SOMEONE RETURNS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST (SOEHARTO). HE MENTIONED KWIK KIAN GIE AND MEGAWATI AS PART OF THIS ALLIANCE, WHICH HE SAID WOULD EMERGE IN THE COMING DAYS, AND CALLED ON THE STUDENTS TO CONTINUE WITH PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS. PRESS REPORTS NOTE THAT MEGAWATI URGED THE STUDENTS TO REMAIN UNITED AND CALLED ON THE MILITARY NOT TO USE VIOLENCE AGAINST STUDENTS. AN AMERICAN CITIZEN SPOKE TO THE CROWD IN ENGLISH. HE SAID THAT THE POLICY OF THE IMF WAS TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA AND THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE CHAOS AND THOUSANDS WOULD DIE. HE SAID, "THE IMF IS DUTCH, IT'S COLONIALISM. THE U.S. IS CONTROLLED BY THE IMF, GANDI WAS KILLED BY THE IMF..." THE CROWD WAS UNIMPRESSED. THE INDONESIAN WHO SPOKE AFTER HIM CAUTIONED THE CROWD THAT IT WAS OK TO LISTEN BUT NOT TOO CLOSELY.

6. (C) AS OF 1:00 PM ON MAY 13, A JOURNALIST AT TRISAKTI AND A PROFESSOR AT TRISAKTI TOLD POLOFF THAT THE STUDENTS WERE BARRICADED ON CAMPUS AND THAT TEAR GAS WAS BEING FIRED INTO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CAMPUS BY SECURITY FORCES. HE SAID HE ALSO HEARD SHOTS FIRED. THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY REPORTED THAT SPORADIC SHOOTING WAS GOING ON THROUGH THE AFTERNOON. THE JOURNALIST REPORTED THAT THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE OUTSIDE THE CAMPUS BEGAN TAUNTING THE STUDENTS TO COME OUT OF CAMPUS, AND HAD STARTED TO BURN THINGS, INCLUDING ONE GAS STATION. A SMALL POLICE POST WAS BESIEGED FOR A TIME. WHEN POLOFF OBSERVED THIS CROWD FORMING OFF CAMPUS EARLIER, IT APPEARED TO BE COMPOSED OF MOSTLY YOUNG MEN, MANY OF WHOM DID NOT LOOK LIKE STUDENTS, INCLUDING OVER 50 ON MOTORCYCLES. AT THAT TIME, THEY WERE STANDING BY WATCHING THE CAMPUS ACTIVITY AND NOT MOVING.

7. (C) ECONOFF PASSED BY THE AREA BY CAR IN MIDAFTERNOON AND REPORTED SEEING HUGE PLUMES OF BLACK SMOKE RISING OVER A GASOLINE STATION ON FIRE NEAR THE CAMPUS AND A BURNING GARBAGE TRUCK SITTING ON THE MAIN HIGHWAY. THE HIGHWAY, WHICH LEADS TO THE AIRPORT, WAS CLOSED IN ONE DIRECTION. AN AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY SOURCE REPORTED THAT AS OF LATE AFTERNOON, THE BARRICADES ON

CAMPUS WERE DOWN AND THE STUDENTS AND THE SECURITY FORCES WERE PUSHING EACH OTHER BACK AND FORTH AS STUDENTS TRIED TO MOVE OFF CAMPUS. 22 CIVILIAN VEHICLES WERE SEEN BURNING; THE OWNERS HAD TAKEN REFUGE IN A NEARBY HOTEL. A THREE-STORY BUILDING WAS SEEN BURNING. ARMORED VEHICLES, PROBABLY WATER CANNON, WERE NEAR THE UNIVERSITY. 20 MILITARY TRUCKS AND 6 SMALLER VEHICLES WERE SEEN.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9080

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9080

PAGE 01 JAKART 02673 02 OF 02 131258Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01
	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W			

----------3D58A2 131259Z /38

P 131258Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1513
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AIT TAIPEI 0684
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002673

DEPARTMENT FOR MGID0I
S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02673 02 OF 02 131258Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT:MGID0I: TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY AFTER THE STUDENT DEATHS

THREE SUPERPUMA HELICOPTERS CIRCLED ABOVE. AN AMCIT CALLED THE EMBASSY TO REPORT THAT COMMANDOS WERE DESCENDING ON ROPES FROM THE HELICOPTERS ONTO THE CAMPUS.

8. (C) ONE YOUTH WAS FOUND DEAD NEAR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ON MAY 13, ACCORDING TO A WESTERN JOURNALIST. TWO EXPAT JOURNALISTS WERE HIT WITH RUBBER BULLETS.

THE CEMETERY
---

9. (U) THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS AND NON-STUDENTS GATHERED AT THE TANAH KUSIR CEMETERY IN SOUTHWEST JAKARTA FOR THE BURIAL OF THE STUDENTS WHO DIED DURING THE TRISAKTI INCIDENT MAY 12. AN EMBASSY SPOUSE WHO PASSED BY THE AREA IN LATE MORNING SAID SECURITY FORCES WERE MASSED BEHIND A NEARBY BUILDING, BUT MAINTAINING THEIR DISTANCE FROM THE HUGE CROWD OF MOURNERS. SHE RETURNED TO THE AREA AT 2:00 PM TO FIND LARGE GROUPS OF STUDENTS EMERGING FROM THE CEMETERY SHOUTING "HANG SOEHARTO," BUT THE SITUATION WAS STILL PEACEFUL.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9778

PAGE 01 JAKART 02751 01 OF 02 180559Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------3EFBBE 180943Z /38

O 171153Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1579
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0701
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002751

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02751 01 OF 02 180559Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 19 JUN 2006 200502473

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/17)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE DEATH TOLL IN JAKARTA RIOTING HAS CLIMBED TO OVER 500 WITH THE DISCOVERY OF MORE REMAINS IN BURNED OUT BUILDINGS. OVER THE WEEKEND, COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT WERE LEAVING JAKARTA WITH SOME OPEN SEATS. WHILE JAKARTA REMAINED CALM AS OF MID-AFTERNOON MAY 17, MAY 15-16 SAW RIOTING IN CENTRAL JAVA TOWNS. TENSIONS ARE HIGH AGAIN IN MEDAN AFTER THREE STUDENTS REPORTEDLY WERE WOUNDED BY GUNFIRE. MINISTER OF DEFENSE WIRANTO HAS GIVEN PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE POLICE'S INVESTIGATION OF THE KILLING OF STUDENTS AT JAKARTA'S TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. THE PRELIMINARY REPORT ACKNOWLEDGES ERRORS WERE MADE BY SECURITY FORCES. AN NGO HAS DEMANDED INVESTIGATION OF OTHER ALLEGED SHOOTING OF STUDENTS IN OTHER CITIES. BANKS WILL REOPEN MAY 18. END SUMMARY

THE DEATH TOLL IN JAKARTA FROM LAST WEEK'S RIOTING RISES
---

3. (C) THE ICRC CHIEF IN JAKARTA CONFIRMED PRESS ACCOUNTS THAT

OVER 500 REMAINS HAVE BEEN FOUND IN BUILDINGS BURNED OUT IN LAST WEEK'S RIOTING. POLICE REPORT THAT OVER 1,000 PERSONS HAVE BEEN DETAINED IN CONNECTION WITH THE RIOTING.

JAKARTA REMAINED CALM MAY 17
---

4. (U) CHECKING SOEHARTO-HATTA AIRPORT, EMBOFFS FOUND THAT OVER THE WEEKEND, SOME COMMERICAL AIRCRAFT WERE LEAVING JAKARTA WITH OPEN SEATS. JAKARTA REMAINED CALM ON MAY 17. POLOFFS WALKED AROUND CHINA TOWN (GLODOK), ONE OF THE AREAS HARDEST HIT DURING

THE RIOTING AND LOOTING ON MAY 15. OUTDOOR MARKETS WERE OPEN, THE STREETS WERE FILLED WITH PEOPLE, AND SOME OF THE LOCAL ETHNIC CHINESE HAD RETURNED. THE MAJOR COMMERCIAL THOROUGHFARE OUTSIDE OF CHINA TOWN (GADJA MADAH STREET), THAT HAD SEEN MAJOR RIOTING ON MAY 15, WAS CHOKED WITH TRAFFIC. ONE EMPLOYEE IN A LOCAL MARKET WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT IT COULD BE DIFFICULT AGAIN IN CHINA TOWN ON MAY 20, WHEN NATION-WIDE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ARE PLANNED.

NEW RIOTING OUTSIDE OF JAKARTA REPORTED

5. (U) ACCORDING TO MEDIA REPORTING, ON MAY 16, TENSIONS ROSE IN MEDAN, SCENE OF EXTENSIVE RIOTING EARLIER IN THE MONTH, AFTER POLICE SHOT AND WOUNDED THREE STUDENTS WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY ATTACKING A POLICE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHOM THEY ACCUSED OF SPYING ON THEIR MEETING WITH LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL MEMBERS.

6. (U) MAY 17 MEDIA REPORT THAT NEW RIOTING BROKE OUT IN THE CENTRAL JAVA TOWNS OF BOYOLAI, KARNAGANYAR AND SUKOHARDJO LATE MAY 15. RIOTERS TARGETED DOZENS OF SHOPS SELLING BASIC

COMMODITIES IN BOYOLAI. THERE WAS ALSO DESTRUCTION OF COMMERCIAL GOODS AND VEHICLES. AN OVERNIGHT CURFEW WAS PUT IN PLACE. AMCONSUL SURABAYA REPORTED THAT SOURCES FROM THE AREA SAID THAT TENSIONS WERE HIGH IN BOYOLAI THROUGH MAY 16.

7. (U) IN KARANGANYAR, RIOTERS DESTROYED THREE SUPERMARKETS, A BANK AND A NUMBER OF VEHICLES. MANY STORES WERE LOOTED.

8. (U) IN KARTASURA SUBDISTRICT, RIOTERS BURNED THREE SUPER MARKETS, THREE BANKS AND A NUMBER OF VEHICLES, INCLUDING THE CAR BELONGING TO THE CHIEF OF POLICE. POLICE REPORTS CLAIM THAT 50 PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED.

9. (U) IN SRAGEN REGENCY RIOTERS DESTROYED AN OFFICE COMPLEX AND STORES SELLING BASIC COMMODITIES.

HINTS THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT IMPOSE NEW CONTROLS

10. (U) AFTER A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, MAY 16, SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT HARMOKO TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD TAKE STEPS TO PROTECT CITIZEN'S RIGHTS AND PROPERTY, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TO MAINTAIN NATIONAL UNITY. HARMOKO ADDED THAT "THE PRESIDENT WILL SOON TAKE THESE MEASURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS AUTHORITY FOR THE SAFETY OF THE NATIONAL AND STATE." HE ADDED HOWEVER, THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9780

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9780

PAGE 01 JAKART 02751 02 OF 02 180600Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------3EFBD4 180944Z /38

O 171153Z MAY 98 ZDK ALL STATIONS
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1580
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0702

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002751

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1
CONFIDENTIAL

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/17)

"THE REFORMS WILL CONTINUE TO RUN IN ALL SECTORS." GIVING SUBSTANCE TO THESE HINTS ARE REPORTS THAT SOEHARTO WILL RECREATE THE POWERFUL SECURITY AGENCY KNOWN AS KOPKAMTIB UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF GENERAL PRABOWO.

ARMED FORCES CHIEF ISSUES STATEMENT ON KILLING OF STUDENTS

11. (U) MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND CARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO TOLD A PARLIAMENT COMMISSION ON MAY 15 THAT AFTER A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE KILLING OF STUDENTS IT APPEARED THE STUDENTS HAD BEEN FIRED ON BY SECURITY FORCES WHO WERE USING LIVE AMMUNITION FROM ATOP A PEDESTRIAN OVERPASS. ACCORDING TO WIRANTO, "THE SHOOTINGS WERE CLEARLY PROCEDURAL ERRORS AND A VIOLATION OF DISCIPLINE." HE ADDED, "WITHIN A SHORT TIME, I WILL BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE TRANSPARENTLY ALL RESULTS OF THE TEAM'S INVESTIGATION, INCLUDING THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS TRAGEDY." (NOTE: POLCOUNS, ON THE NIGHT OF THE SHOOTING, EXAMINED POSSIBLE FIRING POSITIONS ATOP THE OVERPASS. HE FOUND NO EXPENDED

CARTRIDGES. GIVEN THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE STUDENTS FELL ON
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CAMPUS, THE OVERPASS APPEARED TO BE AN UNLIKELY FIRING POINT. STUDENTS ON CAMPUS WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT DURING THE FIRING SAID THAT THEY THOUGHT SHOTS WERE ALSO FIRED FROM ATOP SEVERAL BUILDINGS IN THE AREA WITH HIGHER (BETTER) VANTAGE POINTS THAN AFFORDED BY THE OVERPASS. MEGAWATI TOLD POLCOUNS MAY 17 THAT WHEN SHE APPEARED ON CAMPUS TO SPEAK AT CEREMONIES FOR THE DEAD STUDENTS MAY 13, SHE WAS TOLD THAT MARKSMEN WERE POSITIONED ON BUILDINGS OVERLOOKING THE CAMPUS AS SHE SPOKE. END NOTE)

HUMAN RIGHTS NGO ACCUSES ABRI OF ADDITIONAL SHOOTINGS
---

12. (U) WHILE WELCOMING GENERAL WIRANTO'S CANDID COMMENTS (PARA 11) REGARDING THE MAY 12 KILLING OF STUDENTS, THE INDONESIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION (YLBHI) ON MAY 16 ACCUSED THE ARMED FORCES OF FAILING TO SUPERVISE SECURITY MEASURES USED BY TROOPS TO QUELL PROTESTS. "THE ABRI IS NO LONGER ABLE TO CONTROL TROOPS IN REGARD TO SECURITY MEASURES USED IN THE FIELD," CLAIMED YLBHI. THE NGO URGED THAT ABRI ALSO INVESTIGATE WHAT THE NGO CLAIMED WERE SHOOTINGS OF STUDENTS IN SOLO, JOGJAKARTA AND MALANG.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
---

13. (U) BANK INDONESIA HAS ORDERED BANKS TO OPEN ON MONDAY, MAY 18, ACCORDING TO THE CENTRAL BANK AND CONFIRMED BY A U.S. BANKER. THE BI REP STATED THAT THE CENTRAL BANK IS PREPARED TO SUPPLY BANKS CASH AS NEEDED. BANKS WILL BE ASKED TO DESIGNATE BRANCHES TO SERVE CUSTOMERS WHOSE OWN BRANCHES HAVE BEEN BURNED. ISSUES TO WATCH ON MONDAY INCLUDE: CASH DEMAND; EXCHANGE RATE PRESSURES; AND POSSIBLE SECURITY PROBLEMS CAUSED INTER ALIA BY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

PANICKY OR DISGRUNTLED CUSTOMERS.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>
PTQ9175

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JAKART 02751 01 OF 02 180150Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------3EE942 180500Z /38

O 171153Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1579
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0701
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002751

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02751 01 OF 02 180150Z

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/17)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE DEATH TOLL IN JAKARTA RIOTING HAS CLIMBED TO OVER 500 WITH THE DISCOVERY OF MORE REMAINS IN BURNED OUT BUILDINGS. OVER THE WEEKEND, COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT WERE LEAVING JAKARTA WITH SOME OPEN SEATS. WHILE JAKARTA REMAINED CALM AS OF MID-AFTERNOON MAY 17, MAY 15-16 SAW RIOTING IN CENTRAL JAVA TOWNS. TENSIONS ARE HIGH AGAIN IN MEDAN AFTER THREE STUDENTS REPORTEDLY WERE WOUNDED BY GUNFIRE. MINISTER OF DEFENSE WIRANTO HAS GIVEN PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE POLICE'S INVESTIGATION OF THE KILLING OF STUDENTS AT JAKARTA'S TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. THE PRELIMINARY REPORT ACKNOWLEDGES ERRORS WERE MADE BY SECURITY FORCES. AN NGO HAS DEMANDED INVESTIGATION OF OTHER ALLEGED SHOOTING OF STUDENTS IN OTHER CITIES. BANKS WILL REOPEN MAY 18. END SUMMARY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02751 01 OF 02 180150Z
THE DEATH TOLL IN JAKARTA FROM LAST WEEK'S RIOTING RISES

3. (C) THE ICRC CHIEF IN JAKARTA CONFIRMED PRESS ACCOUNTS THAT OVER 500 REMAINS HAVE BEEN FOUND IN BUILDINGS BURNED OUT IN LAST WEEK'S RIOTING. POLICE REPORT THAT OVER 1,000 PERSONS HAVE BEEN DETAINED IN CONNECTION WITH THE RIOTING.
JAKARTA REMAINED CALM MAY 17

4. (U) CHECKING SOEHARTO-HATTA AIRPORT, EMBOFFS FOUND THAT OVER THE WEEKEND, SOME COMMERICAL AIRCRAFT WERE LEAVING JAKARTA WITH OPEN SEATS. JAKARTA REMAINED CALM ON MAY 17. POLOFFS WALKED AROUND CHINA TOWN (GLODOK), ONE OF THE AREAS HARDEST HIT DURING THE RIOTING AND LOOTING ON MAY 15. OUTDOOR MARKETS WERE OPEN, THE STREETS WERE FILLED WITH PEOPLE, AND SOME OF THE LOCAL ETHNIC

CHINESE HAD RETURNED. THE MAJOR COMMERCIAL THOROUGHFARE OUTSIDE OF CHINA TOWN (GADJA MADAH STREET), THAT HAD SEEN MAJOR RIOTING ON MAY 15, WAS CHOKED WITH TRAFFIC. ONE EMPLOYEE IN A LOCAL MARKET WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT IT COULD BE DIFFICULT AGAIN IN CHINA TOWN ON MAY 20, WHEN NATION-WIDE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ARE PLANNED.

NEW RIOTING OUTSIDE OF JAKARTA REPORTED

5. (U) ACCORDING TO MEDIA REPORTING, ON MAY 16, TENSIONS ROSE IN MEDAN, SCENE OF EXTENSIVE RIOTING EARLIER IN THE MONTH, AFTER POLICE SHOT AND WOUNDED THREE STUDENTS WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY ATTACKING A POLICE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHOM THEY ACCUSED OF SPYING ON THEIR MEETING WITH LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL MEMBERS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

6. (U) MAY 17 MEDIA REPORT THAT NEW RIOTING BROKE OUT IN THE CENTRAL JAVA TOWNS OF BOYOLAI, KARNAGANYAR AND SUKOHARDJO LATE MAY 15. RIOTERS TARGETED DOZENS OF SHOPS SELLING BASIC COMMODITIES IN BOYOLAI. THERE WAS ALSO DESTRUCTION OF COMMERCIAL GOODS AND VEHICLES. AN OVERNIGHT CURFEW WAS PUT IN PLACE. AMCONSUL SURABAYA REPORTED THAT SOURCES FROM THE AREA SAID THAT TENSIONS WERE HIGH IN BOYOLAI THROUGH MAY 16.

7. (U) IN KARANGANYAR, RIOTERS DESTROYED THREE SUPERMARKETS, A BANK AND A NUMBER OF VEHICLES. MANY STORES WERE LOOTED.

8. (U) IN KARTASURA SUBDISTRICT, RIOTERS BURNED THREE SUPER MARKETS, THREE BANKS AND A NUMBER OF VEHICLES, INCLUDING THE CAR BELONGING TO THE CHIEF OF POLICE. POLICE REPORTS CLAIM THAT 50 PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED.

9. (U) IN SRAGEN REGENCY RIOTERS DESTROYED AN OFFICE COMPLEX AND STORES SELLING BASIC COMMODITIES.

HINTS THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT IMPOSE NEW CONTROLS

10. (U) AFTER A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, MAY 16, SPEAKER OF

PARLIAMENT HARMOKO TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD TAKE STEPS TO PROTECT CITIZEN'S RIGHTS AND PROPERTY, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TO MAINTAIN NATIONAL UNITY. HARMOKO ADDED THAT "THE PRESIDENT WILL SOON TAKE THESE MEASURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS AUTHORITY FOR THE SAFETY OF THE NATIONAL AND STATE." HE ADDED HOWEVER, THAT

NNNNPTQ8856

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8856

PAGE 01 JAKART 02751 02 OF 02 171231Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W		

----------3ED19F 171231Z /38

O 171153Z MAY 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1580
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0702
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002751

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CONFIDENTIAL

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/17)

"THE REFORMS WILL CONTINUE TO RUN IN ALL SECTORS." GIVING SUBSTANCE TO THESE HINTS ARE REPORTS THAT SOEHARTO WILL RECREATE THE POWERFUL SECURITY AGENCY KNOWN AS KOPKAMTIB UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF GENERAL PRABOWO.

ARMED FORCES CHIEF ISSUES STATEMENT ON KILLING OF STUDENTS

11. (U) MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND CARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO TOLD A PARLIAMENT COMMISSION ON MAY 15 THAT AFTER A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE KILLING OF STUDENTS IT APPEARED THE STUDENTS HAD BEEN FIRED ON BY SECURITY FORCES WHO WERE USING LIVE AMMUNITION FROM ATOP A PEDESTRIAN OVERPASS. ACCORDING TO WIRANTO, "THE SHOOTINGS WERE CLEARLY PROCEDURAL ERRORS AND A VIOLATION OF DISCIPLINE." HE ADDED, "WITHIN A SHORT TIME, I WILL BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE TRANSPARENTLY ALL RESULTS OF THE TEAM'S INVESTIGATION, INCLUDING THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS TRAGEDY." (NOTE: POLCOUNS, ON THE NIGHT OF THE SHOOTING, EXAMINED POSSIBLE FIRING POSITIONS ATOP THE OVERPASS. HE FOUND NO EXPENDED CARTRIDGES. GIVEN THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE STUDENTS FELL ON CAMPUS, THE OVERPASS APPEARED TO BE AN UNLIKELY FIRING POINT. STUDENTS ON CAMPUS WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT DURING THE FIRING SAID

THAT THEY THOUGHT SHOTS WERE ALSO FIRED FROM ATOP SEVERAL BUILDINGS IN THE AREA WITH HIGHER (BETTER) VANTAGE POINTS THAN AFFORDED BY THE OVERPASS. MEGAWATI TOLD POLCOUNS MAY 17 THAT WHEN SHE APPEARED ON CAMPUS TO SPEAK AT CEREMONIES FOR THE DEAD

STUDENTS MAY 13, SHE WAS TOLD THAT MARKSMEN WERE POSITIONED ON BUILDINGS OVERLOOKING THE CAMPUS AS SHE SPOKE. END NOTE)

HUMAN RIGHTS NGO ACCUSES ABRI OF ADDITIONAL SHOOTINGS

12. (U) WHILE WELCOMING GENERAL WIRANTO'S CANDID COMMENTS (PARA 11) REGARDING THE MAY 12 KILLING OF STUDENTS, THE INDONESIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION (YLBHI) ON MAY 16 ACCUSED THE ARMED FORCES OF FAILING TO SUPERVISE SECURITY MEASURES USED BY TROOPS TO QUELL PROTESTS. "THE ABRI IS NO LONGER ABLE TO CONTROL TROOPS IN REGARD TO SECURITY MEASURES USED IN THE FIELD," CLAIMED YLBHI. THE NGO URGED THAT ABRI ALSO INVESTIGATE WHAT THE NGO CLAIMED WERE SHOOTINGS OF STUDENTS IN SOLO, JOGJAKARTA AND MALANG.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

13. (U) BANK INDONESIA HAS ORDERED BANKS TO OPEN ON MONDAY, MAY 18, ACCORDING TO THE CENTRAL BANK AND CONFIRMED BY A U.S. BANKER. THE BI REP STATED THAT THE CENTRAL BANK IS PREPARED TO SUPPLY BANKS CASH AS NEEDED. BANKS WILL BE ASKED TO DESIGNATE BRANCHES TO SERVE CUSTOMERS WHOSE OWN BRANCHES HAVE BEEN BURNED. ISSUES TO WATCH ON MONDAY INCLUDE: CASH DEMAND; EXCHANGE RATE PRESSURES; AND POSSIBLE SECURITY PROBLEMS CAUSED INTER ALIA BY PANICKY OR DISGRUNTLED CUSTOMERS.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8870

PAGE 01 JAKART 02753 01 OF 03 171252Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W			

----------3ED239 171252Z /38

O 171249Z MAY 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1583
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0705
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002753

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02753 01 OF 03 171252Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 19 JUN 2006 200502473

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/17/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: STUDENT PLANS FOR MAY 18-20

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: STUDENTS WERE SOBERED BY MAJOR RIOTING IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE IN RECENT DAYS, BUT THEIR RESOLVE TO PUSH FOR SOEHARTO TO STEP DOWN APPEARS TO HAVE INCREASED. STUDENTS ARE STILL PLANNING TO HOLD MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 20, ALTHOUGH LOCAL CONDITIONS WILL DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THEY MOVE OFF CAMPUS. DEMONSTRATIONS ARE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN AGAIN ON MAY 18, WITH A DELEGATION OF STUDENTS IN JAKARTA PLANNING TO GO TO THE DPR (POSSIBLY WITH COOPERATION FROM MINISTER OF DEFENSE WIRANTO) TO CALL FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR AND SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION. THE STUDENTS MIGHT BE JOINED BY A GROUP OF 15 RETIRED GENERALS. STUDENT LEADERS APPEAR DETERMINED TO AVOID VIOLENCE THAT COULD TURN INTO RIOTING. IT IS FAR FROM CERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT LOCAL PEOPLE WHO MAY GATHER ON THE MARGINS OF DEMONSTRATIONS WILL REMAIN PEACEFUL. END SUMMARY

3. (C) CAMPUSES AROUND JAKARTA HAVE BEEN EMPTY FOR THE PAST THREE DAYS, FOLLOWING THURSDAY'S RIOTS IN JAKARTA. STUDENT LEADERS IN JAKARTA, PADANG (WEST SUMATRA), BOGOR, AND SURAKARTA (CENTRAL JAVA) TELL US, HOWEVER, THAT PLANS FOR NATIONWIDE STUDENT

DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 20 ARE STILL FIRM. STUDENTS ARE MEANWHILE HOLDING INTENSIVE INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED. STUDENTS IN EACH CITY ACROSS THE COUNTRY WILL DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO GO OFF CAMPUS BASED ON LOCAL CONDITIONS, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING RELATIONS WITH THE LOCAL MILITARY. AMCONSUL SURABAYA ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK HAVE NOT ALTERED PLANS FOR MASSIVE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 20. STUDENTS HAVE BEEN UPSET BY RIOTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN RECENT DAYS, AND SOME LEADERS ARE PUSHING FOR THE MAY 20 DEMONSTRATIONS

(WHICH MAY BEGIN ON MAY 19) TO REMAIN ON CAMPUS.

JAKARTA

4. (C) STUDENTS IN JAKARTA ARE STILL PLANNING MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS FOR MAY 20, AND ON MAY 16 WERE HOLDING MEETINGS TO DISCUSS THEIR STRATEGY. SOME STUDENT LEADERS WERE PROPOSING TO KEEP DEMONSTRATIONS ON CAMPUSES DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF RIOTS ERUPTING IF MASSES TAKE ADVANTAGE OF DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE STREETS. A STUDENT CONTACT SAID THAT STUDENT ACTION ON THE 20TH WAS NOW PARTLY DEPENDENT ON THE MILITARY. IF STUDENTS WERE SUPPORTED BY THE MILITARY, THEY WOULD GO TO THE DPR, AND IF NOT, THEY WOULD CONSIDER REMAINING ON CAMPUS.

5. (C) DEMONSTRATIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BEGIN AGAIN ON MAY 18. STUDENTS ARE PLANNING TO GO TO THE DPR ON MAY 18, POSSIBLY WITH COOPERATION AND EVEN ASSISTANCE FROM MINISTER OF DEFENSE WIRANTO. STUDENTS WILL PROBABLY BE JOINED BY 15 RETIRED GENERALS FROM THE GENERATION OF 1945. (NOTE SEPARATE REPORTING THAT INDICATES THAT WIRANTO WAS REPLACED AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF.) A STUDENT CONTACT AND A UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA PROFESSOR SAID THAT THE COMMUNICATION FORUM OF JAKARTA STUDENT SENATES PLANNED TO GO TO

THE DPR THE MORNING OF MAY 18 TO DEMAND A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR DURING WHICH SOEHARTO WOULD STEP DOWN. THEY THOUGHT THAT A DELEGATION, RATHER THAN A MASS OF STUDENTS, WOULD GO TO THE DPR AND THAT STUDENTS SUPPORTING THE DELEGATION WOULD HOLD ON-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATIONS. HOWEVER, INDICATIONS LATE IN THE DAY MAY 18 WERE THAT BUSLOADS OF STUDENTS AND PERHAPS NON-STUDNETS MIGHT TRY TO JOIN THE DELEGATION.

6. (C) THE PEOPLE WERE COOLING OFF, BUT THE ELITE MANEUVERINGS WERE GETTING HOTTER, ACCORDING TO A JAKARTA STUDENT CONTACT. HE HOPED THAT WIRANTO WOULD TAKE A STRONG POSITION IN FAVOR OF CHANGE WITHIN SEVERAL DAYS, AND WORRIED THAT IF HE DID NOT, THERE COULD BE MORE SERIOUS DESTRUCTION. ANOTHER STUDENT SOURCE SAID THAT IF SOEHARTO DOES NOT STEP DOWN AND A POLITICAL LEADER EMERGE QUICKLY, THERE WILL BE MORE RIOTING.

7. (C) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CATHOLIC STUDENT ASSOCIATION (PMKRI), WHO HAS STUDENT CONTACTS THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, SAID THAT THE

ORIGINAL PLAN FOR MAY 20 WAS FOR ALL STUDENTS TO GO TO THE STREETS, BUT THAT BECAUSE OF THE RECENT RIOTS, THEY WERE NOW TAKING A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH. HE POINTED OUT THAT MANY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS THAT HAD GONE OFF CAMPUS WERE PEACEFUL, INCLUDING RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN BANDUNG AND SEMARANG, AND THOUGHT IF THERE WERE NO PROVOCATIONS, OFF-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8868

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8868

PAGE 01 JAKART 02753 02 OF 03 171252Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W			

----------3ED234 171252Z /38

O 171249Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1584
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AIT TAIPEI 0706
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002753

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/17/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: STUDENT PLANS FOR MAY 18-20

COULD BE CONTROLLED. "WE MUST CONTINUE OUR STRUGGLE," HE SAID, "BUT WE NEED TO KEEP IT PEACEFUL." STUDENT SOURCES SAY DEMONSTRATIONS IN SURABAYA, SEMARANG, AND BANDUNG HAVE BEEN LARGELY PEACEFUL BECAUSE OF GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN STUDENTS AND THE MILITARY COMMANDERS. THIS WAS ALSO SAID TO BE THE CASE IN UJUNGPANDANG WITH GUMALAR, WHO HAS SINCE BEEN REPLACED, AND WHERE A CLASH BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SECURITY FORCES HAS SINCE OCCURRED.

8. (C) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE YOUNG DEMOCRATS SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO VIOLENCE ON THE 20TH. HE CALLED THE ACTIVITIES PLANNED FOR MAY 20TH "INTELLECTUAL ACTIONS," WHICH IN JAKARTA WOULD CONSIST OF MAJOR GATHERINGS OF STUDENT SENATE MEMBERS, LECTURERS AND OTHER UNIVERSITY OFFICIALS AND POPULAR LEADERS. EVENTS WOULD BE HELD THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, ALL WITH THE SAME REFORM THEMES AND ALL CALLING FOR THE PRESIDENT TO STEP DOWN. A PROFESSOR WHO IS WELL CONNECTED TO STUDENT ACTIVISTS IN JAKARTA SAYS THAT THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS WILL PROBABLY GO AHEAD WITH PLANS TO GO TO THE DPR ON MAY 20 TO CALL FOR SOEHARTO TO STEP DOWN. HE SAYS

THAT FOLLOWING THE RIOTS THE ARMED FORCES (ESPECIALLY WIRANTO) HAVE EXPRESSED MORE TOLERANCE TOWARDS STUDENTS, GIVING THEM HOPE THAT A MASS MARCH ON THE DPR MIGHT BE CONTROLLABLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PADANG, WEST SUMATRA

9. (C) A STUDENT LEADER IN PADANG TOLD POLOFF THAT ALTHOUGH THE SITUATION HAD SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED BECAUSE OF SERIOUS RIOTING, STUDENTS HAD NOT TAKEN PART IN RIOTING AND PLANNED TO CONTINUE PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS. HE SAID THEY HAD EVIDENCE THAT RIOTS ON MAY 15 HAD BEEN PROVOKED BY GOVERNMENT AFFILIATED MASS YOUTH ORGANIZATION PEMUDA PANCASILA, AN ORGANIZATION KNOWN FOR THUGGISH ACTIVITIES. STUDENTS WERE CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN INTENSE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED. THEY MIGHT LEAVE CAMPUS ON MAY 20, BUT WOULD TRY TO ENSURE A CONTROLLED MARCH AND PLANNED TO SEEK ASSISTANCE FROM LOCAL ACADEMIC AND OTHER LEADERS IN SOCIETY.

SOLO, CENTRAL JAVA

10. (C) POLOFF SPOKE SEPARATELY WITH TWO SOLO (SURAKARTA) STUDENT LEADERS, WHO SAID THAT MAY 20 WOULD SEE MAJOR STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN SOLO. STUDENTS WERE STILL DISCUSSING WHETHER TO GO OFF CAMPUS. AN AMERICAN LIVING IN SOLO WAS ADVISED BY FRIENDS TO LEAVE SOLO BY THE 20TH, BECAUSE RIOTERS MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS. ONE OF THE SOLO STUDENT LEADERS DESCRIBED A MAY 14 DEMONSTRATION AT MUHAMMADIYAH UNIVERSITY, WHICH ENDED WITH A CLASH BETWEEN POLICE AND STUDENTS. STUDENTS WERE BEATEN, STUDENTS THREW STONES, AND THE SECURITY FORCES USED TEAR GAS. THE RIOT BEGAN, ACCORDING TO ONE STUDENT SOURCE, WHEN TEAR GAS AIMED AT STUDENTS ALSO WENT INTO LOCAL NEIGHBORHOODS AND ANGERED LOCAL RESIDENTS, WHOSE RESPONSE LED TO RIOTING. HE SAID RIOTING LED TO THE BURNING OF 287 CARS AND TRUCKS, 56 SINO-INDONESIAN OWNED SHOPS, ONE MOVIE THEATER, 570 MOTORCYCLES, 24 CAR AND MOTORCYCLE DEALERSHIPS, ONE SCHOOL, AND 12 RESTAURANTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

HE CLAIMED THAT STUDENTS DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN RIOTING. ONE OF THE SOLO STUDENT LEADERS SAID THAT ON MAY 15, 10,000 STUDENTS HAD HELD A FIVE KILOMETER TOTALLY PEACEFUL MARCH TO THE MAYOR'S OFFICE. HE SAID THE SECURITY FORCES WERE ACCOMMODATING, AND THERE WERE NO CLASHES. SOME LOCAL RESIDENTS AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS HAD JOINED THE MARCH.

BOGOR, WEST JAVA

11. (C) A STUDENT LEADER IN BOGOR TOLD POLOFF THAT NATIONAL DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD BE HELD MAY 20, AND THAT THE WORD HAD BEEN SPREADING THROUGH CAMPUSES FOR WEEKS. PLANS HAD NOT BEEN CANCELED BECAUSE OF RIOTING IN RECENT DAYS. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THAT STUDENTS IN BOGOR WOULD TRY TO STAY ON CAMPUS TO AVOID VIOLENCE. HE COMPLAINED THAT ON MAY 13, STUDENTS HOLDING A DEMONSTRATION ON CAMPUS WERE PROVOKED BY A MASS OF PEOPLE GATHERED OUTSIDE TO JOIN THEM. HE SAID STUDENTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT OUTSIDERS TRYING TO LURE THEM INTO DESTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR THAT WILL RUIN THE STUDENT MOVEMENT. (NOTE: STUDENTS IN JAKARTA AT ATMA JAYA, THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA, AND TRISAKTI HAVE ALSO TOLD US THAT NON-STUDENTS OUTSIDE THEIR CAMPUSES HAD TRIED TO PROVOKE THEM TO COME OUTSIDE. END NOTE)

MEETING WITH SYARWAN HAMID

NNNNPTQ8869

PAGE 01 JAKART 02753 03 OF 03 171252Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W			

----------3ED235 171252Z /38

O 171249Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1585
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0707
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002753

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02753 03 OF 03 171252Z
S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/17/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFID01: STUDENT PLANS FOR MAY 18-20

---

12. (C) THE CATHOLIC STUDENT LEADER SAID THAT HE, ALONG WITH LEADERS OF OTHER MASS YOUTH AND STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS, HAD MET WITH DPR DEPUTY SPEAKER SYARWAN HAMID ON MAY 15. THE STUDENT LEADERS TOLD THEM THAT THE STUDENTS INTEND TO CONTINUE THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD A CHOICE: REFORM THROUGH A BLOODY OR A PEACEFUL PROCESS. STUDENTS HAD TO BE ALLOWED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION. THEY DEMANDED A SPECIAL SESSION OF PARLIAMENT TO WITHDRAW SOEHARTO'S MANDATE. A NEW LEADER WITHOUT ABSOLUTE POWER AND WITH A LIMITED TERM HAD TO BE INSTALLED TO BEGIN THE REFORM PROCESS. POSSIBLE CANDIDATES MENTIONED TO POLOFF WERE SARWONO, SISWONO, AND EMIL SALIM. WIRANTO WAS STILL TRUSTED BY MANY STUDENTS, HE THOUGHT, AND IF WIRANTO COULD BE BRAVE ENOUGH TO CHALLENGE SOEHARTO, HE COULD GAIN WIDE SUPPORT. HE THOUGHT THAT IF AMIEN RAIS, IN COOPERATION WITH ADI SASONO AND PRABOWO, TOOK POWER, INDONESIA WOULD BREAK APART. (NOTE: HE IS CATHOLIC, AND CHRISTIANS ARE ALWAYS SUSPICIOUS OF AMIEN RAIS, THOUGH THEY HAVE AT TIMES SUPPORTED HIS CHALLENGES TO SOEHARTO. END NOTE).

COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

---

13. (C) RIOTING IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE HAS HAD A SOBERING EFFECT ON STUDENTS, WHO SEEM TO HAVE BECOME MORE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR PLANNING, BUT NO LESS RESOLVED TO PUSH FOR POLITICAL CHANGE. THEY WANT TO MAINTAIN THE IMAGE OF A PEACEFUL MOVEMENT, AND ALMOST ALL STUDENT CONTACTS TALK OF PROVOCATEURS TRYING TO DESTROY THAT IMAGE. THEY APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT SUPPORT FROM ABRI COULD ENSURE THAT RIOTS ARE NOT SPARKED BY DEMONSTRATIONS. STUDENT LEADERS SAY THEY ARE DETERMINED TO AVOID VIOLENCE THAT COULD TURN INTO RIOTING. HOWEVER, IT IS FAR FROM CERTAIN THAT LOCAL PEOPLE WHO MAY GATHER ON THE MARGINS OF DEMONSTRATIONS WILL REMAIN PEACEFUL. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5548

PAGE 01 JAKART 02875 01 OF 02 230303Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W

----------413A21 230303Z /38

O 230301Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1707
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0748
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002875

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1
S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP
CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02875 01 OF 02 230303Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 19 JUN 2006 200502473

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/22/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/22)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE NEW HABIBIE CABINET WERE MIXED, WITH PRO AND ANTI-HABIBIE CONTACTS TAKING PREDICTABLE POSITIONS. THE NEW CABINET REMOVED THE MOST OBJECTIONABLE CRONIES AND FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE SOEHARTO CABINET BUT INCLUDES AT LEAST FOUR REGARDED AS SIGNIFICANTLY CORRUPT. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OVER A DECADE, MINORITY PARTY REPRESENTATIVES APPEAR IN THE CABINET, ONE A GENUINE REFORMER. THERE WAS SOME VIOLENCE AT THE PARLIAMENT AS PRO-HABIBIE ELEMENTS WERE BUSSED INTO THE PARLIAMENT GROUNDS WHERE THEY CONTENDED WITH STUDENTS DEMONSTRATING AGAINST HABIBIE. THE ARRIVAL OF LOCAL PEOPLE WHO SUPPORTED THE STUDENTS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL HELPED END THE CONFRONTATIONS. THE COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE GROWTH OF SECTARIAN ISLAM UNDER A HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION. THERE IS A REPORT THAT ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, AMIEN RAIS AND MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI MET FOR TWO HOURS MAY 22 AND WILL ISSUE A COMMON STATEMENT ON MAY 23. END SUMMARY

REACTIONS TO THE NEW CABINET
---

3. (SBU) INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE HABIBIE CABINET NAMED ON MAY 22 WERE MIXED, WITH MOST REACTIONS LINING UP ALONG THE MORE FUNDAMENTAL DIVIDE NOW EMERGING BEFORE PRO AND ANTI-HABIBIE SIDES. THERE HAS BEEN REACTION TO THE WIDELY RUMORED CORRUPTION

OF FOUR NEW CABINET MINISTERS (COORDINATING MINISTER GINANJAR, MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY RAMELAN, MINISTER OF HOUSING SASONO AND STATE MINISTER FOR POPULATION IDA BAGUS OKA). MORE POSITIVELY, THE PARLIAMENTARY FACTION LEADER FROM THE MINORITY PEOPLE'S DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), HAMZA HAZ, IS A RESPECTED REFORM VOICE IN PARLIAMENT. THE FACT THAT TWO NEW MINISTERS ARE DRAWN FROM MINORITY PARTIES ALSO SUGGESTS SOME EFFORT TO REACH OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL GOLKAR-MILITARY RANKS. (SEPTEL REPORTS THE NEW CABINET LIST AND PROVIDES INITIAL POST ANALYSIS.)

PARLIAMENT MAY 21

STUDENTS KEPT UP THEIR PROTESTS IN A FESTIVAL ATMOSPHERE AT THE PARLIAMENT COMPLEX ON THURSDAY EVENING, WITH 10,000 TO 20,000 STUDENTS CELEBRATING THE FALL OF SOEHARTO. AT THE SAME TIME, MANY SPOKE OUT AGAINST HABIBIE. A NUMBER OF STUDENTS SEPARATELY TOLD POLOFF THAT THEY WERE WORRIED ABOUT SPLITS AMONG THEM ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED, WITH SOME WILLING TO GIVE HABIBIE A CHANCE AND MOST STILL WANTING A SPECIAL SESSION. STUDENTS FROM THE PODIUM CALLED FOR NO VIOLENCE, NO RIOTS, NO ANARCHY, AND HONORED THE STUDENTS WHO DIED AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY MAY 12 AS "MARTYRS." POLOFF OBSERVED SEVERAL HUNDRED STUDENTS WATCH HABIBIE'S ADDRESS ON TV, AND THERE WAS ENTHUSIASTIC BOOING FROM THE CROWD. A NOOSE WAS PUT ON THE TV SCREEN, AND THEN A SIGN "HABIBIE IS ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE." STUDENTS ALSO BOOED GUS DUR. NONE OF THE STUDENTS AT THE DPR DEMONSTRATIVELY INDICATED SUPPORT FOR HABIBIE.

SCUFFLES AT PARLIAMENT

4. (U) DURING THE DAY (MAY 22) GROUPS OF PRO-HABIBIE ISLAMIC

DEMONSTRATORS ENTERED THE PARLIAMENT GROUNDS IN LARGE NUMBERS AND TRIED TO PUSH THEIR WAY INTO THE STUDENT ANTI-HABIBIE DEMONSTRATION, LEADING TO FIGHTING BETWEEN THE GROUPS. ACCORDING TO A STUDENT SOURCE, NON-STUDENTS WATCHING FROM OUTSIDE ENTERED THE COMPLEX TO SUPPORT THE STUDENTS, AND WITH THE HELP OF MILITARY ELEMENTS WHICH ARRIVED AFTER FIGHTING BEGAN, PUSHED THE PRO-HABIBIE GROUP BACK TO THE MOSQUE IN THE BACK OF THE COMPLEX. AS OF COB, THE SITUATION AT THE PARLIAMENT APPEARS CALM, WITH 15,000 TO 20,000 PEOPLE, MOSTLY STUDENTS REJECTING HABIBIE, STILL ON THE GROUNDS AND INSIDE THE PARLIAMENT. POLOFF ON THE SCENE NOTED THAT AMONG THE BANNERS WHICH PRO-HABIBIE DEMONSTRATORS CARRIED WAS A LARGE ONE WHICH READ "CIA INTERVENTION - NO, HABIBIE REFORMATION - YES." HOWEVER, THIS WAS THE ONLY SIGN SEEN WHICH EXPRESSED ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENTS. (SEPTEL REPORTS GREATER DETAIL ON THE CONFLICTS AT PARLIAMENT.)

STUDENTS BREAK WITH PARENT ORGANIZATIONS BACKING HABIBIE

5. (U) STUDENT AND YOUTH LEADERS OF THE NATIONAL FORUM FOR INDONESIAN YOUTH, FKPI, WHICH INCLUDES THE STUDENTS AND YOUTH OF NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) WHO HAVE NOW BROKEN RANKS WITH NU CHAIRMAN ABDURRAHMAN WAHID OVER HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT, TOLD POLOFF THEY MET MAY 22 WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOLKAR FACTION (11 MEMBERS) AND THE ABRI FACTION (7 MEMBERS) OF THE DPR.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ5549

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5549

PAGE 01 JAKART 02875 02 OF 02 230303Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W		

----------413A24 230303Z /38

O 230301Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1708
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0749

USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002875

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1
S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP
CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/22/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/22)

THEY TOLD BOTH THAT THEY REJECT HABIBIE AS PRESIDENT AND DEMAND A SPECIAL SESSION OF PARLIAMENT WHICH COULD REPLACE THE PRESIDENT. THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE NATIONALIST STUDENTS TOLD POLOFF FROM THE DPR THAT BOTH GOLKAR AND ABRI FRACTIONS HAD "IMPLICITLY" AGREED WITH THE STUDENTS AND HAD SAID THEY WERE AWAITING NEW DEVELOPMENTS. THE FACTIONS INDICATED THEY WOULD BE PREPARING FOR A SPECIAL SESSION.

CHRISTIAN CONCERN THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT
---

6. (U) THE COUNCIL OF CHURCHES HAS FORMED A CRISIS CENTER FOR STUDENTS AT ITS OFFICE. COUNCIL OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD POLOFF THEY ARE WORRIED ABOUT CONFLICTS BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND PEOPLE THEY DESCRIBE AS ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS. THEY FEAR AN INCREASE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM UNDER A HABIBIE PRESIDENCY. ONE COUNCIL MEMBER TOLD POLOFF THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO INFORM OVERSEAS FRIENDS OF THEIR CONCERNS THAT HABIBIE WILL DESTROY THE NATION WITH SECTARIANISM. (COMMENT: HABIBIE DOES ATTRACT SOME MUSLIM SUPPORT BUT IS ROUNDLY DISLIKED BY THE ARMY AND MOST OTHER ELEMENTS IN SOCIETY. HIS ROOM FOR MANEUVER IS THEREFORE EXTREMELY RESTRICTED. WHILE HE MIGHT TRY TO "PLAY THE ISLAMIC CARD," WHICH COULD LEAD TO PROBLEMS FOR CHRISTIANS, ESPECIALLY SINO-INDONESIAN CHRISTIANS, WE BELIEVE THE MILITARY WOULD ACT SWIFTLY TO TRY TO HEAD OFF SUCH A COURSE BY HABIBIE OR HIS

SUPPORTERS. END COMMENT)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THE "BIG THREE" REPORTEDLY MEET

7. (C) A MEMBER OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TOLD POLCOUNS THAT ISLAMIC LEADERS ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, AMIEN RAIS AND OPPOSITION LEADER MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI MET FOR TWO HOURS ON MAY 22. HE SAID THAT THE THREE WERE PLANNING TO ISSUE A JOINT DECLARATION OVER THE NEXT 24 HOURS WHICH, INTER ALIA, WOULD REVIEW THE POINTS AND PERSPECTIVES THEY HAVE IN COMMON. (COMMENT: EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SUCH A MEETING HAVE FALLEN APART A NUMBER OF TIMES IN RECENT MONTHS. END COMMENT)

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7888

PAGE 01 JAKART 02913 01 OF 02 261335Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	IM-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W		

----------41CA1C 261336Z /38

O 261332Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1762
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0765
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002913

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02913 01 OF 02 261335Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/26/2008

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 19 JUN 2006 200502473

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFID01: MAY 26 SITUATION REPORT

REF: JAKARTA 2807

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: PRESIDENT HABIBIE SAID HE WOULD PURSUE NEW ELECTION LAWS AND A NEW ELECTION "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." HE MADE NO REFERENCE TO A NEW SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY, WHICH SOME ARE CALLING FOR AND WHICH COULD, WERE IT TO CONVENE, REPLACE HIM. FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL WIRANTO HAVE RESIGNED GOVERNMENT POSITIONS, APPARENTLY IN A BOW TO ANTI-NEPOTISM DEMANDS BY STUDENTS AND OTHERS. MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, A WELL KNOWN LABOR LEADER RELEASED FROM PRISON ALONG WITH ANOTHER PROMINENT POLITICAL DISSIDENT VOWED TO STAGE DEMONSTRATIONS IF THE GOVERNMENT'S PLEDGE TO RELEASE OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE NOT KEPT. A NEW LABOR PARTY HAS FORMED. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS HEARD NEW CLAIMS OF TORTURE OF STUDENTS. END SUMMARY

THE PRESIDENT ON REFORM

3. (U) PRESIDENT HABIBIE OUTLINED PARTS OF HIS REFORM PROGRAM IN HIS MAY 25 CABINET MEETING CALLING FOR REVISING (NOT ABOLISHING) THE WIDELY CRITICIZED ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW. HE CALLED ON MINISTERS TO DRAW UP A NATIONAL REFORM AGENDA AND PROPOSED SEEKING A "NATIONAL CONSENSUS" (NOT OTHERWISE DEFINED) TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF FIVE-YEAR TERMS A PRESIDENT MIGHT SERVE TO TWO. HE SAID HE WOULD ESTABLISH A "REFORM WORKING GROUP" CONSISTING OF

PROMINENT FIGURES AND ASSIGNED THREE SENIOR MINISTERS TO ASSIST THE GROUP.

4. (U) THE PRESIDENT ALSO PLEDGED TO UPDATE THE COUNTRY'S SOEHARTO-ERA ELECTION LAWS AND HOLD ELECTIONS. "THE PRINCIPLE," HE SAID, "IS TO HOLD ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE NECESSARY LAWS ARE PASSED.

INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO IN THE NEWS
---

5. (U) ABRI COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO CALLED ON THE ARMED FORCES TO "ENTER THE CAMPUS AND APOLOGIZE TO ALL OF THE STUDENTS FOR ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED TO THEIR FRIENDS. LET THEM KNOW THAT WE SHARE THEIR VIEWS ABOUT REFORM." IN AN ANTI-NEPOTISM GESTURE, WIRANTO'S WIFE AND 21-YEAR OLD DAUGHTER RESIGNED THEIR POSITIONS AS MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY. THE ACTION CAME AS MANY OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS OF PROMINENT GOVERNMENT FIGURES RESIGNED FROM GOVERNMENT POSITIONS INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT'S BROTHER AND SON WHO SIMILARLY RESIGNED FROM STATE POSITIONS.

6. (U) ON POLITICAL REFORMS, WIRANTO, URGED CAUTION IN RESPONDING TO DEMANDS FOR A REVIEW OF THE FIVE POLITICAL LAWS OR PLACING LIMITATIONS ON PRESIDENTIAL TERMS -- ABSENT A "NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON THE MATTERS." RECENTLY GENERAL WIRANTO HAS ALSO CALLED ON STUDENTS TO END THEIR PRO-REFORM DEMONSTRATIONS AND RETURN TO THEIR STUDIES.

RELEASED LABOR LEADER CALLS FOR EARLY MPR AND ELECTIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

7. (C) MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, THE LABOR LEADER IMPRISONED FOR HIS CRITICISM OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND THE MILITARY TOLD CONGRESSMAN SMITH MAY 26 THAT HE WOULD WAGE A CAMPAIGN IN THE STREETS IF THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT LIVE UP TO ITS COMMITMENT, GIVEN TO HIM ON HIS OWN RELEASE SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT MAY 26, TO RELEASE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. PAKPAHAN ALSO CALLED FOR AN EARLY MPR SESSION AND ELECTIONS BY JUNE 1999. (SEE SEPTEL REPORT ON HIS MEETING WITH SMITH.) HE CLAIMED THAT THERE WERE PROBABLY IN EXCESS OF 200 POLITICAL PRISONERS IN INDONESIA, A FIGURE ALSO OFFERED BY THE LEGAL AID FOUNDATION TO CONGRESSMAN SMITH IN A SEPARATE MEETING. THESE FIGURES INCLUDE PEOPLE WHO WERE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI), NOW IN THEIR 70'S AND 80'S, AS WELL AS SEPARATISTS FROM ACEH, EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA.

FIRST REPORT ON MURDER OF TRISAKTI STUDENTS
---

8. (U) ABRI COMMANDER WIRANTO TOLD THE MEDIA THAT 14 MEMBERS OF

THE ARMED FORCES HAD BEEN IMPLICATED IN THE MAY 19 SHOOTING OF FOUR STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN JAKARTA WHICH LED TO WIDESPREAD RIOTING. DETAILS HAVE NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE.

A LABOR PARTY FORMING?

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7889

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7889

PAGE 01 JAKART 02913 02 OF 02 261335Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W			

----------41CA1E 261336Z /38

O 261332Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1763
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0766
USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002913

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02913 02 OF 02 261335Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/26/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: MAY 26 SITUATION REPORT

REF: JAKARTA 2807

9. (U) A GROUP OF LABOR ACTIVISTS, MOSTLY HAILING FROM THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED SPSI LABOR FEDERATION, ON MAY 25 FORMED THE "INDONESIAN WORKERS PARTY" (PPI). AN AMCIT OFFICIAL ACTIVE IN LABOR ACTIVITIES NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE ACTIVISTS INVOLVED WERE FROM THE GOVERNMNET-BACKED LABOR UNION, THERE WAS BROAD SENTIMENT IN LABOR RANKS AND AMONG PRO-LABOR ACTIVISTS FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF LABOR INTERESTS.

NEW TORTURE REPORTS
---

10. (U) NOTWITHSTANDING GROWING PUBLIC DEMANDS FOR REFORM IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, A NEW, SEEMINGLY WELL-FOUNDED CLAIM OF TORTURE OF STUDENTS EMERGED IN BOGOR WHERE FAMILIES OF STUDENTS AND THEIR FACULTY TOLD THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION THAT 12 STUDENTS QUESTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEATH OF A POLICE OFFICIAL IN MAY, WERE TORTURED DURING THEIR INTERROGATION.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5094

PAGE 01 JAKART 02964 01 OF 02 281652Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	SVC-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W	

----------42C27E 281652Z /22

O 281213Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1818
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0768
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002964

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02964 01 OF 02 281652Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/28/2008

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 19 JUN 2006 200502473

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MAY 28 SITUATION REPORT

REF: JAKARTA 2961

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: PARLIAMENT SPEAKER HARMOKO ANNOUNCED MAY 28, AFTER MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE, THAT A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) WOULD BE HELD, BUT NOT UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR (OR POSSIBLY THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT), TO BE FOLLOWED BY A GENERAL ELECTION. HE GAVE NO TIMETABLE, HOWEVER, AS TO WHEN THE GENERAL ELECTION WOULD BE HELD. THIS WILL LIKELY DRAW A NEGATIVE REACTION FROM STUDENTS AND SOME PARTS OF THE REFORM COMMUNITY WHO HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR A QUICK MPR SESSION TO HOLD SOEHARTO ACCOUNTABLE AND ESTABLISH A NEW LEADERSHIP. SIGNS THAT RULING PARTY GOLKAR'S HEGEMONY IS SLIPPING CONTINUED TO EMERGE AS A LARGE MASS ORGANIZATION ASSOCIATED WITH GOLKAR ANNOUNCED MAY 26 THAT IT WOULD FORM ITS OWN POLITICAL PARTY. LARGE GROUPS OF STUDENTS "OCCUPIED" LOCAL LEGISLATURES IN SURABAYA ON MAY 26-27 AND AS WELL AS SMALLER GROUPS IN PADANG ON MAY 26. SEVERAL HUNDRED STUDENTS ALSO SHOWED UP AT THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT. A VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SEES A NEW STRATEGY DEVELOPING IN THE PROTEST MOVEMENT TO TAKE THE ISSUES TO THE PROVINCES AND TO LOCAL PARLIAMENTS. END SUMMARY

HARMOKO ANNOUNCES NEW SPECIAL SESSION OF MPR TO BE HELD AT END OF THIS YEAR OR BEGINNING OF NEXT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. (C) ACCORDING TO A STAFFER AT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (DPR), HOUSE SPEAKER HARMOKO ANNOUNCED AFTER A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON MAY 28 THAT A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) WOULD BE HELD DURING THE END OF 1998 OR THE BEGINNING OF 1999, FOLLOWED BY A GENERAL ELECTION. HARMOKO PROVIDED NO TIME FRAME, HOWEVER, FOR WHEN THE ELECTION WOULD TAKE PLACE. THE DPR STAFFER COMMENTED THAT THIS WOULD "BE A BIG PROBLEM FOR THE STUDENTS BECAUSE IT SEEMED LIKE HARMOKO WAS DELAYING." MOREOVER, THE STUDENTS' GOAL OF FORCING SOEHARTO IN THE NEAR TERM TO GIVE AN ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH TO THE MPR WOULD

BE THWARTED.

SIGNS THAT RULING PARTY GOLKAR'S HEGEMONY SLIPPING

4. (C) MKGR (MUSYAWARAH KEKELUARGAAN DAN GOTONG ROYONG), ONE OF THE MASS ORGANIZATIONS THAT HELPED FORM RULING PARTY GOLKAR IN THE 1960'S, ANNOUNCED MAY 27 THAT IT WAS ESTABLISHING ITSELF AS A PARTY SEPARATE FROM GOLKAR. KOSGORO, ANOTHER LARGE MASS ORGANIZATION ASSOCIATED WITH GOLKAR, ANNOUNCED MAY 25 THAT IT WAS MOVING IN A SIMILAR DIRECTION. WHILE BOTH OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS CLAIM LARGE MEMBERSHIPS AND BOAST SUB-DISTRICT LEVEL INFRASTRUCTURE, NEITHER REPRESENTS A NATURAL CONSTITUENCY WITHIN SOCIETY. THE ANNOUNCEMENTS BY MKGR AND KOSGORO ARE SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE THEY REPRESENT TANGIBLE SIGNS RULING PARTY GOLKAR'S HEGEMONY IS SLIPPING.

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION'S PARTIAL FIOTINGS (###)
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ISSUED A STATEMENT ON MAY 26 WITH INCONCLUSIVE RESULTS OF ITS INVESTIGATION INTO THE MAY 12 SHOOTING OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. IT SAID THAT "THE COMMISSION HAS OBTAINED STRONG INDICATIONS THAT THE POLICE...DID

NOT USE LIVE AMMUNITION," A SIGNAL THAT THE COMMISSION WAS COMING TO THE CONCLUSIONRY INSTEAD WHICH USED (##)FORCES COMMANDER (###) AMMUNITION HAD BEEN USED SAID THAT IT SUSPECTED WERE MISSING AFTER THEECCORDING TO THE COMMISSION'S STATEMENT, SEVERAL POTENTIAL STUDENT WITNESSES TO THE INCIDENT "WERE THREATENED BY UNIDENTIFIED PEOPLE FORBIDDING THEM TO GIVE TESTIMONY TO ANYONE," INCLUDING THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. THE COMMISSION URGED THE ARMED FORCES TEAM INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT TO "PROVIDE PHYSICAL SECURITY AND AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE STUDENTS TO TESTIFY TO THE COMMISSION OF ABRI WITHOUT FEAR." ON MAY 25, ARMED FORCES COMMANDER SAID THAT 14 ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL WERE IMPLICATED IN THE SHOOTING, WITHOUT PROVIDING MORE DETAILS.

STUDENTS

6. (C) LEADERS OF THE NATIONAL FORUM FOR INDONESIAN YOUTH (FKPI, INCLUDING STUDENTS AND YOUTH FROM 11 MASS ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING ALL FIVE SANCTIONED RELIGIONS) TOLD POLOFF THAT

THEIR BRANCHES IN EAST JAVA WERE PLANNING TO OCCUPY LOCAL PARLIAMENT OFFICES IN PROTEST OF THE HABIBIE PRESIDENT AND TO CALL FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) STUDENTS SAID THAT FKPI HAD PEACEFULLY

NOTE: (##)OMISSION IN TEXT AND PARA 5 NOT NUMBERED. CORRECTION WILL FOLLOW.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0529

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0529

PAGE 01 JAKART 02964 01 OF 02 300518Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------4390DA 301349Z /38
O 281213Z MAY 98 CITE STATE SVC 0634W H/W VOL ZDK TO ALL
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1818
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0768

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002964

C O R R E C T E D COPY - TEXT
CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02964 01 OF 02 300518Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/28/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MAY 28 SITUATION REPORT

REF: JAKARTA 2961

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: PARLIAMENT SPEAKER HARMOKO ANNOUNCED MAY 28, AFTER MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE, THAT A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) WOULD BE HELD, BUT NOT UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR (OR POSSIBLY THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT), TO BE FOLLOWED BY A GENERAL ELECTION. HE GAVE NO TIMETABLE, HOWEVER, AS TO WHEN THE GENERAL ELECTION WOULD BE HELD. THIS WILL LIKELY DRAW A NEGATIVE REACTION FROM STUDENTS AND SOME PARTS OF THE REFORM COMMUNITY WHO HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR A QUICK MPR SESSION TO HOLD SOEHARTO ACCOUNTABLE AND ESTABLISH A NEW LEADERSHIP. SIGNS THAT RULING PARTY GOLKAR'S HEGEMONY IS SLIPPING CONTINUED TO EMERGE AS A LARGE MASS ORGANIZATION ASSOCIATED WITH GOLKAR ANNOUNCED MAY 26 THAT IT WOULD FORM ITS OWN POLITICAL PARTY. LARGE GROUPS OF STUDENTS "OCCUPIED" LOCAL LEGISLATURES IN SURABAYA ON MAY 26-27 AND AS WELL AS SMALLER GROUPS IN PADANG ON MAY 26. SEVERAL HUNDRED STUDENTS ALSO SHOWED UP AT THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT. A VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SEES A NEW STRATEGY DEVELOPING IN THE PROTEST MOVEMENT TO TAKE THE ISSUES TO THE PROVINCES AND TO LOCAL PARLIAMENTS. END SUMMARY

HARMOKO ANNOUNCES NEW SPECIAL SESSION OF MPR TO BE HELD AT END OF THIS YEAR OR BEGINNING OF NEXT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. (C) ACCORDING TO A STAFFER AT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (DPR), HOUSE SPEAKER HARMOKO ANNOUNCED AFTER A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON MAY 28 THAT A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) WOULD BE HELD DURING THE END OF 1998 OR THE BEGINNING OF 1999, FOLLOWED BY A GENERAL ELECTION. HARMOKO PROVIDED NO TIME FRAME, HOWEVER, FOR WHEN THE ELECTION WOULD TAKE PLACE. THE DPR STAFFER COMMENTED THAT THIS WOULD "BE A BIG PROBLEM FOR THE STUDENTS BECAUSE IT SEEMED LIKE HARMOKO WAS DELAYING." MOREOVER, THE STUDENTS' GOAL OF FORCING SOEHARTO IN THE NEAR TERM TO GIVE AN ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH TO THE MPR WOULD BE THWARTED.

SIGNS THAT RULING PARTY GOLKAR'S HEGEMONY SLIPPING

4. (C) MKGR (MUSYAWARAH KEKELUARGAAN DAN GOTONG ROYONG), ONE OF THE MASS ORGANIZATIONS THAT HELPED FORM RULING PARTY GOLKAR IN THE 1960'S, ANNOUNCED MAY 27 THAT IT WAS ESTABLISHING ITSELF AS A PARTY SEPARATE FROM GOLKAR. KOSGORO, ANOTHER LARGE MASS ORGANIZATION ASSOCIATED WITH GOLKAR, ANNOUNCED MAY 25 THAT IT WAS MOVING IN A SIMILAR DIRECTION. WHILE BOTH OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS CLAIM LARGE MEMBERSHIPS AND BOAST SUB-DISTRICT LEVEL INFRASTRUCTURE, NEITHER REPRESENTS A NATURAL CONSTITUENCY WITHIN SOCIETY. THE ANNOUNCEMENTS BY MKGR AND KOSGORO ARE SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE THEY REPRESENT TANGIBLE SIGNS RULING PARTY GOLKAR'S HEGEMONY IS SLIPPING.

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION'S PARTIAL FINDINGS ON TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS

5. (U) THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ISSUED A STATEMENT ON MAY 26 WITH INCONCLUSIVE RESULTS OF ITS INVESTIGATION INTO THE MAY 12
CONFIDENTIAL

SHOOTING OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. IT SAID THAT "THE COMMISSION HAS OBTAINED STRONG INDICATIONS THAT THE POLICE...DID NOT USE LIVE AMMUNITION," A SIGNAL THAT THE COMMISSION WAS COMING TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WAS THE MILITARY INSTEAD WHICH USED LIVE AMMUNITION (ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO SAID MAY 15 THAT LIVE AMMUNITION HAD BEEN USED). THE COMMISSION ALSO SAID THAT IT SUSPECTED THAT A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WERE MISSING AFTER THE TRISAKTI INCIDENT. ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSION'S STATEMENT, SEVERAL POTENTIAL STUDENT WITNESSES TO THE INCIDENT "WERE THREATENED BY UNIDENTIFIED PEOPLE FORBIDDING THEM TO GIVE TESTIMONY TO ANYONE," INCLUDING THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. THE COMMISSION URGED THE ARMED FORCES TEAM INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT TO "PROVIDE PHYSICAL SECURITY AND AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE STUDENTS TO TESTIFY TO THE COMMISSION OF ABRI WITHOUT FEAR." ON MAY 25, ARMED FORCES COMMANDER SAID THAT 14 ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL WERE IMPLICATED IN THE SHOOTING, WITHOUT PROVIDING MORE DETAILS.

STUDENTS
---

6. (C) LEADERS OF THE NATIONAL FORUM FOR INDONESIAN YOUTH (FKPI, INCLUDING STUDENTS AND YOUTH FROM 11 MASS ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING ALL FIVE SANCTIONED RELIGIONS) TOLD POLOFF THAT THEIR BRANCHES IN EAST JAVA WERE PLANNING TO OCCUPY LOCAL PARLIAMENT OFFICES IN PROTEST OF THE HABIBIE PRESIDENT AND TO CALL FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) STUDENTS SAID THAT FKPI HAD PEACEFULLY

NNNNPTQ0530

PAGE 01 JAKART 02964 02 OF 02 300519Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------4390EC 301350Z /38
O 281213Z MAY 98 CITE STATE SVC 0634W H/W VOL ZDK TO ALL
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1819
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0769
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002964

C O R R E C T E D COPY - TEXT
CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02964 02 OF 02 300519Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/28/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MAY 28 SITUATION REPORT

REF: JAKARTA 2961

OCCUPIED THE DPRD IN SURABAYA BEGINNING THE EVENING OF MAY 26. NU

GENERAL CHAIRMAN ABDURRAHMAN WAHID ALSO TOLD THIS TO A VISITING CODEL ON MAY 27, AND CONGEN SURABAYA CONFIRMED THESE REPORTS AND ADDED THAT BOTH THE PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEGISLATURES WERE OCCUPIED BY LARGE GROUPS OF STUDENTS (REFTEL). IN YOGYAKARTA, FKPI MEMBERS VISITED THE DPRD ON MAY 26, DELIVERED THEIR MESSAGE, AND LEFT. IN PADANG, WEST SUMATRA FKPI MEMBERS TOOK OVER THE DPRD MAY 26. NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN TOLD THE CANADIAN POLCOUNS THAT HE SEES A NEW STRATEGY DEVELOPING IN THE PROTEST MOVEMENT TO TAKE THE ISSUES TO THE PROVINCESAND TO LOCAL PARLIAMENTS.

7. (C) FKPI MEMBER IN JAKARTA TRIED TO ENTER THE DPR COMPLEX ON MAY 26. A SMALL DELEGATION WAS ALLOWED INSIDE TO MEET WITH PARLIAMENT MEMBERS. SEVERAL FKPI LEADERS TOLD POLOFF ON MAY 26 THAT THEY INTEND TO LAUNCH A NEW POLITICAL PARTY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ON MAY 28, APPROXIMATELY 500 STUDENTS WENT TO THE DPR TO DEMAND A SPECIAL MPR SESSION AND THE RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT HABIBIE. A SMALL DELEGATION WAS ALLOWED TO ENTER PARLIAMENT WHILE THE REST MILLED AROUND PEACEFULLY OUTSIDE THE MAIN PARLIAMENT GROUNDS GATE. STUDENTS DEMANDING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR ALSO DEMONSTRATED ON CAMPUS AT JAKARTA'S ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

---

8. (U) INDEPENDENT LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, WHO RECENTLY WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON, ENTERED THE FRAY AGAIN ON MAY 26 WHEN HE TESTIFIED AT THE TRIAL OF FOUR UNION MEMBERS CHARGED WITH ILLEGALLY HOLDING A RALLY IN DOWNTOWN JAKARTA ON MARCH 9. HE SAID THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE MEMBERS TO HOLD THE DEMONSTRATION. THOUGH THE DEFENDANTS HAVE BEEN RELEASED FROM DETENTION, THE TRIAL CONTINUES. THEIR LAWYER TOLD THE PRESS THAT "THE JUDGES ARE BEHAVING THE SAME WAY AS IF THIS WAS STILL THE OLD REGIME. UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT, ALL POLITICAL TRIALS SHOULD BE ENDED."

9. (U) THE NEW MINISTER OF MANPOWER (LABOR), FAHMI IDRIS, WAS QUOTED IN THE PRESS, MAY 28 AS SAYING THAT "WORKERS ARE NOW FREE TO SET UP THEIR OWN UNIONS PROVIDED THEIR ESTABLISHMENT IS IN LINE WITH THE LEGAL AND OFFICIAL PRE-REQUIREMENTS." HE ALSO

PROMISED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD IMMEDIATELY RATIFY THE ILO'S CONVENTION NO. 87 ON WORKER RIGHTS.

10. (U) THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A DISTRICT OUTSIDE JAKARTA, TANGERANG, REPORTEDLY CANCELED AN AGREEMENT WITH A COMPANY OWNED BY THE SOEHARTO'S ELDEST DAUGHTER SITI RUKMANA HARDIYANTI (TUTUT) TO PROVIDE DRINKING WATER. THE REASON GIVEN FOR THE CANCELLATION WAS THE COMPANY'S FAILURE TO BEGIN WORK ON THE PROJECT.

11. (U) SEPTEL REPORTS RIOTING OVERNIGHT IN A NORTH SUMATRAN TOWN. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7115

PAGE 01 JAKART 02977 01 OF 02 290710Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EB-00 EUR-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
IO-00 ADS-00 OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------4308B8 290710Z /38

R 290706Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1829
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002977

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/29/2008
TAGS: PHUM, SCUL, PGOV, SOCI, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: CODEL SMITH MEETS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VICE
- CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02977 01 OF 02 290710Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

2. (U) SUMMARY: HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VICE CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN TOLD CODEL SMITH ON MAY 25 THAT THE ARMED FORCES HAD SO FAR ISSUED ONLY PARTIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS OF IT FINDINGS REGARDING THE MAY 12 SHOOTINGS OF TRISAKTI STUDENTS, AND THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A SPLIT BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND POLICE OVER WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SHOOTINGS. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE ISSUE OF DISAPPEARANCES HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED, AS FIVE OF THE GROUP OF TWELVE THAT HAD DISAPPEARED AT AROUND THE SAME TIME REMAINED UNACCOUNTED FOR. BOTH THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND THE ARMED FORCES INVESTIGATING TEAM HAD FOUND THAT LASER EQUIPPED RIFLES WERE USED IN THE SHOOTINGS, SAID MARZUKI, AND HE NOTED THAT THE SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) HAD THIS TYPE OF EQUIPMENT, WHILE THE POLICE DID NOT. MARZUKI BELIEVED THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS MOVING TOO SLOWLY ON THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND DID NOT SEEM TO BE PREPARED TO CARRY OUT AN ALL OUT RELEASE. HE CALLED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO, REGARDED AS A COMMON CRIMINAL BY THE GOI, "A POLITICAL PRISONER, FULL STOP" WHO SHOULD BE RELEASED ALONG WITH OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND ARGUED THAT THE THOSE STILL IMPRISONED FROM THE 1965 ATTEMPTED COUP SHOULD BE RELEASED ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. MARZUKI SAID THAT THE "LANGUAGE AND DISCOURSE" ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDONESIA WAS PICKING UP, BUT THAT THERE WAS A "MISMATCH BETWEEN WHAT WAS BEING PROFESSED AND WHAT WAS BEING DONE" BY THE GOVERNMENT TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS. END SUMMARY

INVESTIGATION INTO TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS AND DISAPPEARANCES

---

3. (C) HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VICE CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN, DURING A MEETING WITH CODEL SMITH (CONGRESSMAN SMITH AND SENIOR STAFFER GROVER JOSEPH REES) ON MAY 25, QUESTIONED WHY THE MILITARY WAS MAKING PARTIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS OF ITS FINDINGS ON THE

TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS. HE REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO HAD SAID THAT MORNING THAT THE INVESTIGATION HAD REACHED A STAGE WHERE HE COULD ANNOUNCE THAT MILITARY ELEMENTS WERE INVOLVED, BUT DID NOT PROVIDE MUCH ELABORATION. (NOTE: ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS REPORTING, WIRANTO SAID THAT 14 ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL WERE IMPLICATED IN THE TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS, AND EIGHT WERE PRIMARY SUSPECTS. HE ALSO SAID THAT "A FEW MEMBERS FROM ANOTHER UNIT" WERE FOUND TO HAVE BEEN TAKING NONPROCEDURAL AND UNDISCIPLINED ACTION DURING THE INCIDENT. END

NOTE.) MARZUKI COMMENTED THAT THE INVESTIGATING TEAM FORMED BY THE ARMED FORCES "SEEMED TO KNOW WHAT IT WAS DOING" AND TO BE "DETERMINED TO GET TO THE BOTTOM OF THE SHOOTINGS," AND THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES TEAM HAD GOOD REPUTATIONS.

4. (C) MARZUKI WAS ALSO CONCERNED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND MILITARY AS TO WHO WAS INVOLVED IN THE SHOOTINGS. THE POLICE HAD TOLD THE COMMISSION THEY WERE NOT IMPLICATED, WHEREAS OTHER AUTHORITIES (HE DID NOT SPECIFY WHOM) WERE SAYING IT WAS THE POLICE. HE SAID THAT BOTH THE ARMED FORCES AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION INVESTIGATORS FOUND THAT LASER EQUIPPED RIFLES HAD BEEN USED IN THE TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS. HE CONTENDED THAT THE SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) HAD THIS TYPE OF EQUIPMENT, AND THE POLICE DID NOT. HE SAID THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WOULD RELEASE THE RESULTS OF ITS INVESTIGATION INTO THE TRISAKTI SHOOTING BY THE END OF THE WEEK. (NOTE: ON MAY 27 THE COMMISSION ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD RECEIVED STRONG INDICATIONS THAT THE POLICE DID NOT USE LIVE AMMUNITION. END NOTE.)

5. (C) MARZUKI WORRIED THAT GIVEN THE RECENT ATTENTION FOCUSSED ON THE TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS, THE ARMED FORCES COMMISSION

INVESTIGATING THE SHOOTINGS AND THE DISAPPEARANCES WAS NOW FOCUSSING MOSTLY ON THE FORMER. HE EMPHASIZED THAT OF THE 12 MISSING, FIVE REMAINED UNACCOUNTED FOR. HE EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT THE DISAPPEARANCES AND THE SHOOTINGS HAD THE COMMON ELEMENT OF "BEING ORGANIZED" AND WERE LIKELY RELATED.

POLITICAL PRISONERS: "XANANA IS A POLITICAL PRISONER, FULL STOP"

6. (C) MARZUKI SAID THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS MOVING TOO SLOWLY ON THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DID NOT SEEM PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN AN ALL OUT RELEASE. IT WAS GETTING OFF TO A WEAK START BY RELEASING ONLY TWO, MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN AND SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS, AND THEN ANNOUNCING THAT THE REST WOULD BE CONSIDERED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS NO COMPLETE AND ACCURATE LIST OF POLITICAL PRISONERS IN INDONESIA. THE COMMISSION WAS WORKING WITH A LIST OF ABOUT 70 PRISONERS SENTENCED IN "POLITICALLY RELATED" CASES. HE DIVIDED POLITICAL PRISONERS INTO THREE CATEGORIES: REFORMISTS (LIKE BINTANG AND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7116

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7116

PAGE 01 JAKART 02977 02 OF 02 290710Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EB-00 EUR-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
IO-00 ADS-00 OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------4308BA 290710Z /38
R 290706Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1830
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002977

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/29/2008
TAGS: PHUM, SCUL, PGOV, SOCI, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: CODEL SMITH MEETS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VICE
- CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN

PAKPAHAN), REGIONAL (EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, ACEH), AND
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02977 02 OF 02 290710Z
COMMUNISTS (PKI).

7. (C) MARZUKI BELIEVED THAT EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO, WHO THE GOVERNMENT CALLED A COMMON CRIMINAL, WAS "A POLITICAL PRISONER, FULL STOP." HE EXPLAINED THAT XANANA WAS FIGHTING IN THE FIRST PLACE BECAUSE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAD "MISUSED THE ARMED FORCES" IN EAST TIMOR. WHILE THE COMMISSION WOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN THE POLITICAL ISSUES SURROUNDING EAST TIMOR'S FUTURE, AS THAT WAS A MATTER FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO HANDLE, MARZUKI STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT XANANA'S RELEASE WAS A PREREQUISITE FOR ANY OVERALL SOLUTION. OTHERWISE, THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF OBTAINING THE GOOD WILL OF THE TIMORESE. MARZUKI SAID THAT THOSE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS (PKI) STILL IN JAIL CONVICTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1965 ATTEMPTED COUP SHOULD BE RELEASED ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS.

NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON HUMAN RIGHTS
---

8. (C) MARZUKI SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE LAUNCHING A "NATIONAL ACTION PLAN" ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HOPEFULLY IN JUNE. THIS PLAN HAD BEEN PREPARED BY THE GOVERNMENT WITH THE COMMISSION'S ASSISTANCE. IT WOULD INVOLVE STEPS SUCH AS THE RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, WITHIN FIVE YEARS. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT'S INTERNAL "BROAD GUIDELINES ON STATE POLICY," APPROVED IN MARCH, CONTAINED LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

9. (C) MARZUKI WAS ENCOURAGED THAT ALL OF THIS MEANT THAT THE "LANGUAGE AND DISCOURSE" ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDONESIA WAS "PICKING UP."

10. (C) HE WAS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS A "MISMATCH BETWEEN WHAT WAS BEING PROFESSED AND WHAT WAS BEING DONE" BY THE GOVERNMENT TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS. HE POINTED SPECIFICALLY TO THE FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN A BOLDER PROGRAM OF RELEASING POLITICAL PRISONERS (PARA. 6).

PAST CASES
---

11. (C) WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE JULY 27, 1996 VIOLENT TAKEOVER OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY HEADQUARTERS, MARZUKI SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD NEVER FULLY RESPONDED TO THE COMMISSION'S REPORT ON THIS EVENT. THOSE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS TRIED FOR DEFENDING THE HEADQUARTERS HAD BEEN SENTENCED TO TIME SERVED AND THEN RELEASED. THE ISSUE OF THOSE MISSING AFTER THE TAKEOVER HAD NEVER BEEN RESOLVED. THE NUMBER OF UNACCOUNTED FOR HAD DROPPED TO SIXTEEN, AND THAT LIST WAS INTEGRATED INTO THE NORMAL MISSING PERSONS LIST KEPT BY THE POLICE.

12. (C) WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE 1991 DILI MASSACRE, HE SAID THAT THE OFFICIAL NUMBER OF 56 UNACCOUNTED FOR HAD NOT CHANGED, AS FAR AS HE WAS AWARE. ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9117

PAGE 01 JAKART 03079 01 OF 02 031310Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	IM-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/033W

----------44DB42 031311Z /38

P 031306Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1936
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003079

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, ELAB, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: SKEPTICISM ABOUT INVESTIGATION OF STUDENT KILLINGS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03079 01 OF 02 031310Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JUN 2006 200502473

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE MILITARY WILL SHORTLY OPEN A TRIAL OF 18 POLICE OFFICIALS IT CLAIMS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SHOOTING DEATHS OF FOUR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY MAY 12. THERE IS SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE MILITARY CLAIM THAT ONLY POLICE WERE INVOLVED IN THE SHOOTING. A WELL-RESPECTED U.S. JOURNALIST HAS RESEARCHED THE INCIDENT AND SHARED FINDINGS WITH US WHICH LEND SUPPORT TO SKEPTICS. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT ON THE SUBJECT, DUE TO BE RELEASED SHORTLY, WILL BE READ CAREFULLY FOR ANY DIFFERENCES FROM THE MILITARY'S CONCLUSIONS. END SUMMARY

3. (U) NATIONAL MILITARY POLICE CORPS COMMANDER MAJOR GENERAL SYAMSU DJALAL TOLD MEDIA JUNE 2 THAT WEST JAKARTA POLICE CHIEF LTC TIMUR PRADOPO AND 17 OTHER POLICE MAY FACE PRISON TERMS OF BETWEEN SEVEN AND 12 YEARS IF THEY ARE CONVICTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEATH OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS SHOT DEAD ON CAMPUS ON MARCH 12. THE 18 WILL BE TRIED UNDER ARTICLE 170 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE FOR ASSAULTING PEOPLE WITH VIOLENCE. THE MILITARY COURT TRIAL, WHICH BEGINS, JUNE 6, HAS ALREADY DRAWN CRITICISM. CRITICS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE ALLEGED PERPETRATORS MIGHT BE SCAPEGOATS AND THAT ARMY PERSONNEL MAY IN FACT HAVE BEEN INVOLVED.

4. (U) LENDING CREDENCE TO THE SKEPTICS ARE THE RESULTS OF A DETAILED REVIEW OF THE INCIDENT UNDERTAKEN BY A WASHINGTON POST JOURNALIST WHO SHARED SOME OF HIS FINDINGS WITH POLCOUNS JUNE 2. INTERVIEWS WITH THREE OF THE FOUR FAMILIES OF THE DECEASED AND WITH MEDICAL PERSONNEL WHO RECEIVED THE BODIES AFTER THE SHOOTING

INDICATED THAT ALL FOUR HAD BEEN KILLED BY SHOTS WHICH WERE FIRED AT THE UPPER TORSO. ALL OF THE WOUNDS SHOWED THAT THE SHOTS WERE FIRED FROM A POINT MUCH HIGHER THAN THE VICTIM WITH A DOWNWARD TRAJECTORY FROM ENTRY TO EXIT WOUNDS. THREE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED STUDENTS, STILL IN HOSPITAL, ALSO WERE HIT BY BULLETS WHICH SHOWED A DISTINCT DOWNWARD TRAJECTORY FROM ENTRY TO EXIT. THE MOST SERIOUSLY WOUNDED STUDENT, WHO WAS STRUCK IN THE UPPER BACK, FOR EXAMPLE, SUFFERED SEVER KIDNEY DAMAGE FROM THAT ROUND.

5. (C) BASED ON DISCUSSIONS WITH STUDENTS ON THE SCENE AT THE

TIME OF THE SHOOTING, THE VICTIMS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY TARGETED. ONE WAS SHOT IN THE CHEST AS HE STOOD ON STEPS DIRECTING STUDENTS TO TAKE SHELTER IN THE BUILDING BEHIND HIM. ANOTHER STUDENT WAS SHOT AND KILLED WHEN HE STOPPED TO WASH TEAR GAS OUT OF HIS EYES. OVER AN OPEN PHONE LINE TO AN OFFICE AT THE UNIVERSITY, AN EMBASSY OFFICER HEARD SLOW DELIBERATE SINGLE SHOT GUN FIRE WHICH CONTINUED FOR OVER AN HOUR.

6. (C) THE JOURNALIST, WHO VISITED THE PURPORTED SITE OF THOSE FIRING THE LETHAL ROUNDS, AN OVERPASS IN FRONT OF THE CAMPUS, SPECULATED THAT SITE DID NOT PROVIDE THE ELEVATION NECESSARY TO PRODUCE SUCH A DISTINCT DOWNWARD TRAJECTORY. HE SAID THAT HE WAS THEREFORE INCLINED TO GIVE SOME WEIGHT TO STUDENT ACCOUNTS THAT A HELICOPTER HAD DROPPED ARMED PERSONNEL UNTO AN UNFINISHED BUILDING AT THE EDGE OF THE CAMPUS BY ROPES AND THAT THE FIRING WHICH KILLED FOUR STUDENTS AND INJURED OTHERS HAD COME FROM THIS MUCH HIGHER POINT. THE REPORTER ADDED THAT THE FIELD OF FIRE WAS MUCH LESS OBSTRUCTED THAN OFFERED BY THE OVERPASS SITE.

7. (C) THE REPORTER ECHOED CLAIMS BY MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION THAT EFFORTS TO INTERVIEW STUDENTS WHO

WERE SAID TO HAVE WITNESSED FIRING FROM ATOP THE BUILDING WERE PRECLUDED BECAUSE THE STUDENTS HAD LEFT THE UNIVERSITY AFTER UNEXPLAINED THREATS. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ALSO COMPLAINED PUBLICLY ABOUT THREATS AND PRESSURE ON THE STUDENTS AND CALLED ON THE MILITARY TO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF ALL POTENTIAL WITNESSES.

8. (C) THE REPORTER SAID HE INTERVIEWED ONE FAMILY WHICH RECOUNTED A STRANGE VISIT FROM LT. GEN. PRABOWO. HE CAME TO EXPRESS HIS CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILY OVER THE LOSS OF THEIR SON AND, THEN, ASKED THAT A KORAN BE BROUGHT TO HIM. HE THEN RAISED IT ABOVE HIS HEAD AND SWORE THAT HE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE KILLINGS. THE TWO OTHER BEREAVED FAMILIES WHICH THE REPORTER VISITED SAID THAT PRABOWO ADJUTANTS HAD VISITED THEM TO SAY THAT THEY WOULD RECEIVE A VISIT FROM THE PRABOWO, BUT HE NEVER APPEARED.

9. (C) COMMENT: THE REPORTED HELICOPTER INSERTION OF A FIRING TEAM ONTO A BUILDING ADJACENT TO THE TRISAKTI CAMPUS IS ONLY ONE

OF A NUMBER OF PIECES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE LEADING SOME TO SUSPECT THAT THE SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) PLAYED A ROLE IN THE KILLINGS. KOPASSUS, KOSTRAD, KODAM JAYA AND POLICE HAVE BEEN OBSERVED PRACTICING SUCH INSERTIONS AT VARIOUS POINTS IN THE CITY RECENTLY, MOST FREQUENTLY JUST PRIOR TO THE MARCH 1-11 SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR). ON THE OTHER HAND, OTHER SECURITY UNITS ALSO HAVE THIS CAPABILITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9118

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9118

PAGE 01 JAKART 03079 02 OF 02 031310Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/032W	

----------44DB43 031311Z /38

P 031306Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1937
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003079

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, ELAB, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: SKEPTICISM ABOUT INVESTIGATION OF STUDENT KILLINGS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03079 02 OF 02 031310Z

10. (C) THE CREDIBILITY OF THE MILITARY INVESTIGATION WILL DEPEND ON HOW CLOSELY IT TRACKS WITH THE REPORT OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO RELEASE CONCLUSIONS OF ITS OWN INVESTIGATION SOON. ANY MAJOR DAYLIGHT BETWEEN THE TWO REPORTS, PARTICULARLY ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER ARMY PERSONNEL WERE INVOLVED, WILL REDOUND AGAINST THE MILITARY AND ITS CREDIBILITY. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO9079

PAGE 01 JAKART 03214 01 OF 02 101104Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/036W	

----------477729 101104Z /38

O 101056Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2057
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0809
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003214

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
BEIJING FOR A/S ROTH PARTY
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03214 01 OF 02 101104Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JUN 2006 200502473

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2008
TAGS:. PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 10 SITUATION REPORT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: ANOTHER IN THE NEAR DAILY SMALL DEMONSTRATIONS TOOK PLACE AT THE EMBASSY BLOCKING ACCESS/EGRESS WELL PAST COB. EMPLOYEES WERE ONLY ABLE TO LEAVE ON FOOT THROUGH AN EMERGENCY EXIT. PRESIDENT HABIBIE TOLD REUTERS THAT HE HAD NO CURRENT PLANS TO CONTEST FOR THE PRESIDENCY. HE ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS TIME TO REDUCE THE MILITARY'S DUAL FUNCTION ROLE BY MOVING ABRI OUT OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ACTIVITY. DEMANDS ARE RISING FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF MULTIPLE CLAIMS THAT THE MAY 13-15 RIOTS IN JAKARTA WERE TO SOME DEGREE ORGANIZED. REPORTS OF SEVERE ABUSE OF SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN DURING THE RIOTS ALSO ARE EMERGING. THE PROSECUTION IN THE TRISAKTI STUDENT KILLINGS' TRIAL HAS LEVELED CHARGES WHICH CARRY A MAXIMUM SENTENCE OF 28 MONTHS IN JAIL AGAINST THE FIRST TWO POLICE DEFENDANTS. POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND REFORMERS ARE REBUTTING CLAIMS THEY RECEIVED U.S. GOVERNMENT MONEY TO CARRY OUT POLITICAL ACTIVITY. ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAS SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER SPECIAL STATUS FOR EAST TIMOR, OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS HAVE PUT THAT STATUS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT WITH PORTUGAL. BISHOP BELO WELCOMES SPECIAL STATUS BUT SEES IT AS TRANSITIONAL TO AN ACT OF FREE CHOICE BY THE EAST TIMORESE. THERE ARE REPORTS THAT EAST TIMORESE WILL DEMONSTRATE WITH INDONESIAN STUDENT BACKING IN JAKARTA LATER THIS WEEK. END SUMMARY

PART I: SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
CONFIDENTIAL

3. (U) A SMALL DEMONSTRATION (APPROXIMATELY 30 PROTESTERS) GATHERED AT THE U.S. EMBASSY JUNE 10, BLOCKING THE EMBASSY'S VEHICLE AND PEDESTRIAN GATES UNTIL WELL AFTER COB. EMBASSY FSN AND U.S. EMPLOYEES WERE ABLE TO LEAVE THROUGH AN EMERGENCY PEDESTRIAN GATE. FSNS HAVE REPORTED ON TWO OCCASIONS THAT THEY SAW DEMONSTRATORS BEING PAID FOR THEIR EFFORTS AT A LOCATION A SHORT DISTANCE FROM THE EMBASSY. ANOTHER FSN REPORTED THAT ONE YOUNG DEMONSTRATOR TOLD HER HE WAS PAID RP. 15,000 (USD 1.50) TO DEMONSTRATE. THE THEMES FOR THE DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEEN

CONSISTENT: NO INTERFERENCE IN INDONESIAN POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND DISBURSE THE NEXT IMF TRANCHE. MEANWHILE, THE GROUP THAT HAS DEMONSTRATED FOR THE PAST THREE DAYS HAS INCLUDED MANY YOUNG PEOPLE (UNDER AGE 14) WHO APPEARED TO HAVE NO CLEAR IDEA WHY THEY WERE DEMONSTRATING.

PART II: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

HABIBIE NOT TO CONTEST NEXT ELECTION

4. (U) PRESIDENT HABIBIE TOLD A REUTERS INTERVIEWER JUNE 9 THAT HE HAD NO CURRENT PLANS TO CONTINUE AS HEAD OF STATE AFTER THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL POLL. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD NOT PLANNED TO BECOME PRESIDENT NOW EITHER.

HABIBIE CALLS FOR LIMITS ON DUAL FUNCTION

5. (U) PRESIDENT HABIBIE, IN THE SAME REUTERS INTERVIEW SAID

THAT WHILE THE MILITARY (ABRI) SHOULD RETAIN ITS SOCIO-POLITICAL ROLE IN THE NATION'S AFFAIRS, THE MILITARY SHOULD NO LONGER INVOLVE ITSELF IN THE BUSINESS WORLD. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE MILITARY SHOULD BE GIVEN 50 SEATS IN THE PARLIAMENT (THEY NOW HOLD 75, OSTENSIBLY BECAUSE THEY CANNOT VOTE IN ELECTIONS).

HABIBIE ISSUES A DECREE RATIFYING ILO CONVENTION NO. 87

6. (U) LOCAL MEDIA ON JUNE 10 REPORTED THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE ISSUED A DECREE RATIFYING ILO CONVENTION NO. 87 ON "FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE." THE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE IS DATED JUNE 5. THE ANNOUNCEMENT PLEDGED THAT INDONESIA WOULD SOON RATIFY SEPARATE CONVENTIONS AGAINST FORCED LABOR AND DISCRIMINATION, AS WELL AS THE CONVENTION ON CHILD LABOR.

MORE ABUSE REPORTS FROM MAY 13-15 RIOTS

7. (U) WOMEN'S GROUPS AND OTHERS ARE BEGINNING TO REPORT CASES OF RAPE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN DURING THE MAY 13-15 RIOTS IN JAKARTA. UP TO 100 CASES HAVE BEEN REPORTED, ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS. VICTIMS WERE PRIMARILY SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN. REPORTS PRESENT SPECIFIC CASES, MANY OF WHICH INCLUDE PARTICULARLY SAVAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8391

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8391

PAGE 01 JAKART 03214 02 OF 02 101515Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/036W	

------------------47959A 101517Z /38

O 101056Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2058
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0810

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003214

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
BEIJING FOR A/S ROTH PARTY
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03214 02 OF 02 101515Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 10 SITUATION REPORT

BEHAVIOR.

DEMANDS FOR INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED INSTIGATORS OF RIOTING

8. (U) THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS CALLED FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF CLAIMS BY SEVERAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS THAT THE MAY 13-14 RIOTING IN JAKARTA APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED WITH MULTIPLE, ALLEGEDLY EYE WITNESS REPORTS OF GROUPS OF MEN ARRIVING IN AREAS WHERE THERE WAS NO RIOTING IN ORDER TO INSTIGATE RIOTS. A ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIEST, ACTIVE IN SOCIAL AFFAIRS, HAS LED EFFORTS TO GATHER FACTS ABOUT THE RIOTING. HE PRESENTED HIS INITIAL FINDINGS, ALONG THE ABOVE LINES, TO CONGRESSMAN CHRIS SMITH.

TRISAKTI TRIAL CONTINUES

9. (U) THE SECOND SESSION OF THE CASE INVOLVING THE MAY 12 TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS' KILLING CONVENED JUNE 9. IT WAS REVEALED THAT THE FIRST TWO DEFENDANTS ARE BEING CHARGED UNDER ARTICLE 103 OF THE MILITARY PENAL CODE, WHICH CARRIES A MAXIMUM SENTENCE OF 28 MONTHS IN PRISON. IN A RELATED DEVELOPMENT, JAKARTA MILITARY POLICE COMMANDER COL. HENDARDJI TOLD THE MEDIA JUNE 9 THAT THE SUSPECTS' SUPERIOR OFFICERS HAD REFUSED TO SUBMIT

THE 21 WEAPONS ALLEGEDLY USED IN THE SHOOTING TO HENDARDJI'S
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE.

ACTIVISTS REBUT CHARGES OF TAKING U.S. POLITICAL FUNDS

10. (U) OPPOSITION FIGURE AMIEN RAIS DEMANDED THE MAJOR DAILY EAST JAVA NEWSPAPER "SURYA" PUBLISH APOLOGIES FOR HAVING ACCUSED HIM OF ACCEPTING U.S. "POLITICAL FUNDS." RAIS HAS TAKEN LEGAL STEPS TO ENSURE THE PAPER APOLOGIZES. RAIS'S LAWYER TOPECTIVE, (##)
INTERVIEW, WELCOMED THE CONCEPT OF SPECIAL STATUS BUT ADDED THAT IT SHOULD BE SEEN AS A TRANSITIONAL STEP AND MUST BE FOLLOWED BY AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN FUTURE. WE AND THE CANADIANS ARE RECEIVING REPORTS OF PLANS FOR EAST TIMORESE DEMONSTRATIONS, SUPPORTED BY INDONESIAN STUDENTS, IN JAKARTA ON JUNE 11 AND/OR 12. THEIR THEME WILL BE TO DEMAND A REFERENDUM ON EAST TIMOR'S FUTURE.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4340

PAGE 01 JAKART 03430 01 OF 02 250038Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W			

----------4CED9E 250038Z /38

O 241029Z JUN 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2279
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0846
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003430

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03430 01 OF 02 250038Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JUN 2006 200502473

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 24 SITUATION REPORT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (U) SUMMARY:

-- WORKERS MOBILIZED AT SBSI HEADQUARTERS FOR A RALLY AT PARLIAMENT BUT WERE PREVENTED FROM TRAVELING FROM THEIR ASSEMBLY POINT TO THE PARLIAMENT BY MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES. THE SBSI LEADERSHIP ISSUED A STATEMENT PROTESTING SECURITY FORCE BLOCKAGE OF THE DEMONSTRATION, IN WHICH WORKERS DEMANDED HIGHER WAGES, LOWER PRICES, AND FREE ELECTIONS, INTER ALIA. A SMALL GROUP OF STUDENTS WERE ALLOWED TO DEMONSTRATE AT THE PARLIAMENT, HOWEVER.

-- PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAS APPEALED TO THE PUBLIC TO GIVE ABRI MORE TIME TO INVESTIGATE THE MAY 12 KILLING OF FOUR TRISAKTI STUDENTS, DISAPPEARANCE CASES AND CLAIMS THAT ORGANIZED GROUPS HELPED PRECIPITATE THE MAY 13-15 JAKARTA AREA RIOTS. THE PRESIDENT RELATED THE SLOWNESS WITH WHICH THE INVESTIGATIONS WERE PROCEEDING TO "ABRI'S INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION."

-- DEFENSE MINISTER/ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCED ON TELEVISION JUNE 24 THAT THE CHIEFS OF POLICE, NAVY AND AIR FORCE WOULD BE REPLACED. THE CHANGEOVER WOULD TAKE PLACE ON MONDAY JUNE 29.

-- FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS HAS SPOKEN PUBLICLY OF A GOI SPECIAL STATUS PROPOSAL FOR EAST TIMOR WHICH WOULD GIVE THE ISLAND

AUTONOMY IN AREAS OTHER THAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FINANCE AND DEFENSE. HE REITERATED THE GOI'S REJECTION OF A REFERENDUM AMONG EAST TIMORESE. A KEY GOI CONTACT ON EAST TIMOR HAS SAID THE PROPOSAL IS A CENTERPIECE FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT. AMENDMENTS ARE WELCOME, BUT NONE THAT WOULD ALLOW EAST TIMORESE AN ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

-- INFORMAL PRICE SURVEYS JUNE 24 SUGGEST RISING RICE PRICES. AT COB THE RUPIAH WAS AT 14,700 PER 1USD. THE JAKARTA SOTCK EXCHANGE ROSE SEVEN POINTS TO 430.86

END SUMMARY

LABOR NOT ALLOWED TO MARCH ON PARLIAMENT, BUT STUDENTS DO

2. (U) MILITARY AND POLICE PREVENTED MEMBERS OF THE SBSI LABOR UNION AND SUPPORTERS FROM CONVOYING FROM INDONESIAN PROSPERITY TRADE UNION (SBSI) HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER POINTS AROUND JAKARTA TO THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) IN JAKARTA JUNE 24. SBSI HAD ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO MOBILIZE 8,000-10,000 WORKERS FROM THE JAKARTA AREA TO BRING WORKERS' CONCERNS TO THE ATTENTION OF DPR MEMBERS, AND TO CALL FOR FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL CHANGE STARTING WITH AN IMMEDIATE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) TO ELECT A TRANSITIONAL PRESIDENT. SBSI LEADERS SAID SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED 20 BUSLOADS OF THE UNION'S SUPPORTERS FROM GATHERING AT SBSI HEADQUARTERS. ABOUT 70 ARMY TROOPS AND POLICE BLOCKED THE ROAD WHEN A GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY 500 SBSI ADHERENTS MOBILIZED TO MARCH ON FOOT IN THE DIRECTION OF PARLIAMENT. INSIDE SBSI HEADQUARTERS, LEADERS NEGOTIATED WITH THE LOCAL DISTRICT MILITARY COMMANDER TO GET A GREEN LIGHT FOR THE DEMONSTRATION. ULTIMATELY, AUTHORITIES OFFERED TO ALLOW A GROUP

OF 20 SBSI REPRESENTATIVES TO GO TO THE PARLIAMENT, BUT SBSI LEADERS REJECTED THIS AS "MANIPULATION". AFTER THE STANDOFF WENT ON FOR SEVERAL HOURS, UNION LEADERS ENDED EFFORTS TO GET TO THE DPR AND HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE. SBSI DEPUTY GENERAL CHAIRMAN TOHAP SIMANUNGKALIT EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AT THE AUTHORITIES' ATTITUDE, SAYING "THEIR JOB IS TO SECURE, NOT OBSTRUCT." HE PLEDGED THAT SBSI WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR WORKER RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL REFORMS.

3. (U) MEANWHILE, APPROXIMATELY 100-125 STUDENTS REPRESENTING THE STUDENT SENATE COMMITTEES OF JAKARTA GATHERED PEACEFULLY AT THE DPR TO CALL FOR LOWER PRICES AND A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR TO ELECT A NEW PRESIDENT. THEY WERE UNABLE TO MEET WITH LEGISLATORS AS THEY REQUESTED.

HABIBIE ASKS FOR PUBLIC PATIENCE WITH ABRI ON INVESTIGATIONS

4. (U) PRESIDENT HABIBIE CALLED PUBLICLY FOR PATIENCE WITH ABRI

OVER WHAT SOME CRITICS HAVE CHARGED IS THE SLOW PACE OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE KILLING OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS (SOME OF WHOM REMAIN MISSING) AND CLAIMS THAT ORGANIZED GROUPS, POSSIBLY WITH CONNECTIONS TO SECURITY FORCES, HELPED INSTIGATE THE MAY 13-15 JAKARTA-AREA RIOTING. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HIS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4341

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4341

PAGE 01 JAKART 03430 02 OF 02 250038Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W				

----------4CEDA5 250039Z /38

O 241029Z JUN 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2280
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0847

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003430

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 24 SITUATION REPORT

ADMINISTRATION'S CREDIBILITY DEPENDED HEAVILY ON THE RESOLUTION OF THOSE CASES, HABIBIE ADDED THAT THE INVESTIGATIONS WERE LINKED TO ABRI'S EFFORTS TO "CONDUCT INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION." MARZUKI DARUSMAN, THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, OFFERED THE VIEW THAT "WE ARE BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE MISSING PEOPLE, THE TRISAKTI INCIDENT AND THE RIOTS ARE STRONGLY RELATED TO ABRI'S INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION."

5. (U) MEANWHILE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS CALLED FOR THE OPENING OF AN INVESTIGATION OF THE 1984 TANJUNG PRIOK RIOTS IN WHICH, SOME CLAIM, OVER 400 DEMONSTRATORS DISAPPEARED IN A CONFRONTATION WITH THE MILITARY. THE GOI CLAIMS THAT ONLY 19 PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN THAT RIOTING. ALSO ON JUNE 24, A SMALL GROUP OF PRO-MEGAWATI DEMONSTRATORS GATHERED IN FRONT OF THE JAKARTA POLICE STATION TO DEMAND INVESTIGATION OF THE JULY 27, 1996 GOVERNMENT-BACKED ASSAULT ON THE PARTY HEADQUARTERS OF MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI.

CHANGEOVER IN ABRI
---

6. (U) DEFENSE MINISTER/ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCED ON TELEVISION JUNE 24 THAT THE CHIEFS OF POLICE, NAVY AND AIR FORCE WOULD BE REPLACED. THE CHANGEOVER WOULD TAKE PLACE ON MONDAY JUNE 29.

FOREIGN MINISTER ANNOUNCES NEW GOI PROPOSAL ON EAST TIMOR

7. (U) FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS, SPEAKING TO PRESS JUNE 23, SAID THAT HE HAD PRESENTED A NEW GOI PROPOSAL TO UNSYG KOFI ANNAN REGARDING EAST TIMOR. THE PROPOSAL, DESCRIBED BY ALATAS TO THE PRESS, AMOUNTS TO SUBSTANTIAL AUTONOMY FOR EAST TIMOR, WITH GOI RETAINING POWER IN THE AREAS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FINANCE AND DEFENSE. ALATAS CLAIMED THAT ANNAN WOULD SEND HIS REPRESENTATIVE AMBASSADOR MARKER TO LISBON (JUNE 24) TO RAISE THE PROPOSAL WITH THE PORTUGUESE. ALATAS SAID THAT HE TOLD THE UNSYG THAT THE GOI WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH THE PORTUGUESE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL (WITH UN COORDINATION) TO DISCUSS THE GOI PROPOSAL.

8. (C) SEPARATELY, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S ROVING AMBASSADOR FOR EAST TIMOR CONFIRMED TO US THAT THE AUTONOMY OFFER WAS MEANT TO BE THE "CENTERPIECE OF A FINAL SOLUTION." HE SAID THAT AMENDMENTS WOULD BE WELCOME, INCLUDING CALLS FOR RELEASE OF XANANA GUSMAO AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE GOI WILL REJECT ANY FORMULATION, HOWEVER, THAT AFFORDS EAST TIMORESE A CHANCE TO VOTE ON THEIR FUTURE. A FORMER TWO-TERM GOVERNOR OF EAST TIMOR TOLD US THE PROPOSAL IS AS MUCH AS THE GOI CAN LEGALLY OFFER BUT THAT HE DOUBTS IT WILL SATISFY RISING EXPECTATIONS AMONG EAST TIMORESE. (SEE SEPTEL)

RICE PRICES RISING

9. (U) AN INFORMAL JUNE 24-CHECK OF RICE PRICES IN JAKARTA APPEARS TO CONFIRM WORD-OF-MOUTH CONCERN THAT RICE PRICES ARE

RISING AND THAT, RICE GENERALLY, BUT PARTICULARLY LOWER QUALITY (LOWER PRICE) RICE, IS INCREASINGLY HARD TO FIND. EMBASSY'S WEEKLY MARKET SURVEY, WHICH REFLECTS MIDDLE-RANGE PRICE FOR RICE, HAS SHOWN A STEADY INCREASE IN PRICE THROUGH JUNE. OTHER PRICES FOR STAPLES APPEAR TO BE HOLDING STEADY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOME VEGETABLE PRICES WHICH CONTINUE TO CLIMB.

RUPIAH AND STOCK MARKET

10. (U) THE RUPIAH HELD RELATIVELY STEADY AGAINST THE USD AT 14,700 PER USD AT CLOSE. IT HAD SLIPPED BELOW 15,000 DURING TRADING BUT STRENGTHENED LATE IN THE DAY. THE STOCK MARKET ROSE SEVEN POINTS TO 430 AT END OF DAY TRADING.
OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ2134

PAGE 01 JAKART 03470 01 OF 04 271620Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	DS-00	UTED-00	FBO-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	MFLO-03	MMP-00	M-00	DCP-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIS-01	OPR-01	PC-05	PER-01
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	ASDS-01	FMP-00	IMCC-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	SAS-00
	/023W						

----------4E039D 271620Z /49

R 260615Z JUN 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2313
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 003470

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT, ASEC, CASC
SUBJECT: LESSONS LEARNED: MAY 1998 EVACUATION OF AMERICANS FROM INDONESIA

REF: STATE 105309

1. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS SUMMARIZE JAKARTA'S LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE MAY 1998 EVACUATION OF ALMOST 1600 DEPENDENTS, NON-EMERGENCY PERSONNEL, AND OTHER AMERICAN CITIZENS FROM INDONESIA. WIDESPREAD DISCONTENT WITH RISING PRICES, INCREASING UNEMPLOYMENT AND DISAFFECTION WITH THE SOEHARTO REGIME PROVOKED A SERIES OF LARGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 JUN 2006 200502473

DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA DURING THE MONTH OF MAY. THE MURDER OF AT LEAST FOUR STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY, ALLEGEDLY BY POLICE OR MILITARY TROOPS, PROVIDED THE FUSE THAT LED TO WIDESPREAD, ESSENTIALLY UNCONTROLLED RIOTING, LOOTING AND BURNING IN THE CITY BETWEEN MAY 13 AND MAY 15. OVER 600 INDONESIANS WERE KILLED AS A RESULT OF THE RIOTS, AND ESTIMATES OF RIOT DAMAGE RUN INTO THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS. THE EMBASSY ORGANIZED EVACUATION FROM JAKARTA WAS CARRIED OUT DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE RIOTS (TWO FLIGHTS EARLY ON MAY 15 AND TWO FLIGHTS EARLY ON MAY 16.) FINDINGS INCORPORATE INPUT FROM FRONT OFFICE, ADMIN, CONSULAR AND ECONOMIC SECTIONS -- ALL INVOLVED IN POST'S EVACUATION EFFORTS.

SOME ADVANCE PREPARATIONS THAT PAID OFF
---

2. THE FOLLOWING ADVANCE PREPARATIONS JUSTIFIED MANY TIMES OVER THE TIME AND EXPENSE IN SETTING THEM UP:

-- KEY EMBASSY STAFF HELD A SERIES OF TOWN MEETINGS WITH CONCERNED AMERICANS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IN THE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE EVACUATION. ON THOSE OCCASIONS, THE EMBASSY WAS ABLE TO PROVIDE A READING ON THE SITUATION IN INDNESIA, HIGHLIGHT THE "NO DOUBLE STANDARD" RULE, ENCOURAGE REGISTRATION WITH THE CONSULATE AND WITH LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE EMBASSY WARDEN SYSTEM, AND ANSWER QUESTIONS FROM A CONCERNED AMERICAN POPULATION IN INDONESIA.

-- A 24-HOUR CRISIS CENTER IN THE EMBASSY CONFERENCE

ROOM, STAFFED BY JAKARTA AND TDY PERSONNEL, WAS ESTABLISHED; DIRECT DIAL PHONE LINES AND EMBASSY EXTENSIONS WERE PREPOSITIONED AT THE SITE FOR THIS CONTINGENCY. CENTER STAFF WERE ABLE TO FIELD AN AVALANCHE OF PHONE CALLS RELATING TO THE CRISIS, AND TO PROVIDE UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION TO EVERYONE WHO CALLED IN;

-- SWITCHBOARD AND MOTOR POOL STAFFS WERE ASKED TO WORK ROUND THE CLOCK, IN SHIFTS, AND TO SLEEP AT THE EMBASSY

TO ENSURE THEIR AVAILABILITY. THEIR SERVICES WERE INVALUABLE, AND THEY PERFORMED SUPERBLY. MOTOR POOL DRIVERS WERE OFTEN THE BEST SOURCE OF INFORMATION REGARDING OPEN/SAFE ROUTES WITHIN THE CITY AT THE HEIGHT OF THE CRISIS;

-- HAD OUR OUTDATED PBX HAD THE CAPABILITY OF ADDING MORE OPERATOR CONSOLES, EMBASSY STAFF COULD HAVE HANDLED EVEN MORE PHONE CALLS. MANY CALLS WERE NOT ANSWERED (THEIR SHEER NUMBER OUTSTRIPPED OUR EQUIPMENT'S ABILITY TO HANDLE THEM), BUT AMERICANS AND OTHERS REQUIRING THE LATEST INFORMATION HAD ONLY TO GO TO THE EMBASSY WEB PAGE, WHICH WAS WIDELY ADVERTISED AND FREQUENTLY UPDATED.

WHAT CAUGHT US BY SURPRISE
---

3. THE CRISIS ESCALATED SO QUICKLY THAT THE EMBASSY WAS STILL FINALIZING PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING REQUESTS FOR AUTHORIZED EVACUATIONS WHEN THE CRISIS ESCALATED TO THE POINT WHERE AN ORDERED DEPARTURE WAS THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE OPTION -- A PERIOD OF ABOUT ONE DAY. THE LESSON: HAVE

UNCLASSIFIED

YOUR PLANS READY BEFORE THE ONSET OF THE CRISIS. ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT ARE YOUR CHOICE OF ASSEMBLY POINTS, STAFFING FOR ASSEMBLY POINTS AND AIRPORT (AND ALSO FOR PAPERWORK PROCESSING), AND ADVANCE ACQUISITION OF REQUIRED INFORMATION (EG. SAFEHAVEN LOCATION FOR NON-EMERGENCY EMPLOYEES AND FAMILY MEMBERS).

4. AS THE CRISIS EVOLVED, POST WAS CONSTANTLY IN TOUCH WITH THE DEPARTMENT REGARDING AIRCRAFT NEEDED TO FLY AMERICANS TO SAFETY. UP TO THE DAY THE CHARTER AVAILABILITY WAS ANNOUNCED, THE EMBASSY UNDERSTOOD FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DEPARTMENT THAT JAKARTA WOULD RECEIVE A TOTAL OF FOUR FLIGHTS (APPROXIMATELY 1600 PASSENGER CAPACITY) ON THE DAY OF THE EVACUATION. ONLY AFTER THE AVAILABILITY OF EVACUATION FLIGHTS HAD BEEN PUBLISHED ON THE EMBASSY'S HOME PAGE, AND AFTER MANY AMERICANS WERE ALREADY ON THEIR WAY TO THE ASSEMBLY POINTS, WAS THE POST INFORMED BY THE DEPARTMENT THAT ONLY

HALF THAT CAPACITY WOULD BE AVAILABLE THE FIRST DAY. THE OTHER TWO FLIGHTS WOULD NOT BE PROVIDED UNTIL THE FOLLOWING DAY. AS A RESULT, OVER HALF OF THE AMERICANS WHO SHOWED UP AT THE ASSEMBLY POINTS THE FIRST DAY WERE UNABLE TO DEPART ON THE CHARTERS UNTIL THE SECOND DAY -- THEY RETURNED HOME (OR TO HOTELS, WHICH WE HAD TO BOOK IN

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ2136

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ2136

PAGE 01 JAKART 03470 02 OF 04 271621Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	DS-00	UTED-00	FBO-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	MFLO-03	MMP-00	M-00	DCP-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIS-01	OPR-01	PC-05	PER-01
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00 /023W	ASDS-01	FMP-00	IMCC-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	SAS-00

----------4E03A2 271621Z /49

R 260615Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2314
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 003470

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: AMGT, ASEC, CASC
SUBJECT: LESSONS LEARNED: MAY 1998 EVACUATION OF AMERICANS FROM INDONESIA

REF: STATE 105309

SOME CASES) DISAPPOINTED AND UNDERSTANDABLY UPSET. THE LESSON: VERIFY EARLY ON WITH THE DEPARTMENT THE NUMBER OF SEATS YOU WILL HAVE AND THE DATES YOU WILL HAVE THEM.

5. POST PERSONNEL EXPENDED CONSIDERABLE EFFORT IN DEVELOPING AND TESTING AN EMBASSY-WIDE WARDEN SYSTEM,

PRIOR TO THE ONSET OF THE CRISIS. WHAT WAS NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WAS THAT MANY OF THE WARDENS WERE NOT ON POST'S EMERGENCY STAFFING LIST FOR DRAWDOWN PURPOSES. AS A RESULT THEY WERE EVACUATED, WITH PREDICTABLE RESULTS FOR OUR INTERNAL WARDEN LIST. THE LESSON: MAKE SURE EMBASSY WARDEN POSITIONS ARE FILLED WITH EMPLOYEES WHO WILL NOT BE EVACUATED IF POST GOES TO ESSENTIAL (EMERGENCY) STAFFING.

6. THE EMBASSY WAS COUNTING ON FSN STAFFING TO ASSIST WITH THE EVACUATION EFFORT. BECAUSE OF WIDESPREAD RIOTING IN THE CITY, MANY FSNS WERE UNABLE TO REPORT FOR WORK, AND WERE THEREFORE UNAVAILABLE FOR THE EVACUATION EFFORT. THE LESSON: IF THERE IS ANY CONCERN THAT KEY FSN STAFF WILL BE UNABLE TO MAKE IT TO WORK AND BE AVAILABLE FOR ASSISTANCE IN EVACUATION EFFORTS, MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEM TO STAY AT THE EMBASSY OR AT A NEARBY HOTEL. WE ASKED OUR DRIVERS TO SLEEP AT THE EMBASSY IN IMPROVISED SLEEPING QUARTERS (ESTABLISHED IN EMPTY OFFICES) DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE CRISIS. ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE MADE FOR MEALS: THE SAME CONDITIONS THAT KEPT OUR FSNS FROM REPORTING FOR WORK ALSO CLOSED DOWN MOST RESTAURANTS.

7. BECAUSE THE MAIN HIGHWAY TO THE COMMERCIAL AIRPORT WAS CLOSED PRIOR TO AND DURING MUCH OF THE RIOTING, THE EMBASSY DECIDED TO USE A MILITARY AIRPORT ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CITY FOR THE EVACUATION FLIGHTS. FROM A

SECURITY STANDPOINT, THE CHOICE WAS A WISE ONE; FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SPACE, NOT SO WISE. WE EXPECTED (AND RECEIVED) 2000 POTENTIAL EVACUEES. THE HANGAR AT THE

MILITARY AIRPORT WE USED WAS BARELY ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE 800. THE LESSON: DON'T UNDERESTIMATE THE SPACE YOU WILL NEED AT YOUR AIRPORT SITE. EIGHT HUNDRED PEOPLE -- AND THEIR ACCOMPANYING LUGGAGE -- TAKE UP A LOT OF SPACE. COMMERCIAL AIRPPORTS -- WHEN THEY CAN BE USED -- GENERALLY OFFER MORE COMFORTABLE FACILITIES.

WHAT ELSE WE LEARNED
---

8. JAKARTA USED THREE ASSEMBLY POINTS FOR ITS EVACUEES. THE GREATER THE NUMBER OF ASSEMBLY POINTS, THE MORE COMPLICATED THE ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE GREATER THE NUMBER OF STAFF REQUIRED. IF FEASIBLE, USE ONLY ONE ASSEMBLY POINT LARGE ENOUGH FOR THE ANTICIPATED NUMBER OF EVACUEES. A LARGE HOTEL BALLROOM IS ALMOST IDEAL. EQUIP THE ROOM WITH A GOOD P.A. SYSTEM; YOU WILL NEED IT TO ADVISE THE CROWD TO QUEUE, ANNOUNCE BUS BOARDING, CONDUCT A SEAT LOTTERY (IF NEEDED), ETC. ARRANGE FOR ROPES AND STANCHIONS AND SET ASIDE ROOM IN THE BALLROOM FOR QUEUES AND PAPERWORK PROCESSING. HAVE SEVERAL TABLES SET UP FOR INDIVIDUALS TO USE WHEN FILLING IN REQUIRED PAPERWORK AND FOR YOUR STAFF'S USE WHEN PREPARIG AIRLINE MANIFESTS. THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE ETREMELY USEFUL EVEN IF YOU USE MORE THN ONE ASSEMBLY AREA. IF MORE THAN ONE ASSEMBLY AREA MUST BE USED, SPECIFY IN ADVANCE WHO WILL BE IN CHARGE AT EACH ONE AND WHO WILL BE IN CHARGE AT THE AIRPORT. THE AIRPORT OIC SHOULD DETERMINE WHEN BUSES DEPART FROM ASSEMBLY POINTS (WHEN THEIR PASSENGERS CAN BE ACCOMMODATED AT THE AIRPORT). TO FACILITATE COMMUNICATIONS, OFFICERS IN CHARGE AT EACH ASSEMBLY SITE

AND AT THE AIRPORT SHOULD CARRY CELLPHONES, WHICH ARE TO BE KEPT ON, AND SPARE BATTERIES.

9. KEEP IN MIND THAT REQUESTS FOR MANY OF THE ITEMS REQUIRED IN PARA. 7 ABOVE TEND TO GET LOST IN THE CONFUSION OF PREPARING RAPIDLY FOR A MASS EVACUATION. MAKE SURE GSO STAFF RECEIVE AND ACT EXPEDITIOUSLY ON REQUESTS FOR THIS EQUIPMENT. WAREHOUSE STAFF SHOULD BE KEPT ON STANDBY AT THE AIRPORT TO ASSIST ALL PASSENGERS WITH LUGGAGE, IF NECESSARY (AS IT WAS IN OUR CASE; THE MILITARY TERMINAL WE USED HAD NO BAGGAGE HANDLERS).

10. THE FIRST NIGHT OF THE EVACUATION, EVACUEES FILLED OUT ALL FORMS AT THE AIRPORT. BECAUSE OF SPACE AND STAFF CONSTRAINTS, AND ALSO BECAUSE OF OUR INITIAL IGNORANCE OF SOME REQUIRED PROCEDURES (EG. THE NEED FOR AIRLINE MANIFESTS), THE PROCESS SLOWED TO A GLACIAL PACE, CAUSING EVERYONE'S NERVES TO FRAY AS THE NIGHT WORE ON. THE LESSON: HAVE EVACUEES FILL IN ALL REQUIRED PAPERWORK (PROMISSORY NOTES, DEPARTMENT-REQUIRED INFORMATION IN THE CASE OF USG EMPLOYEES/DEPENDENTS) AT THE ASSEMBLY POINT(S). THE ONLY THING STAFF SHOULD HAVE TO FILL IN AT THE AIRPORT IS THE PASSENGER MANIFEST. EVACUEES SHOULD HAVE FILLED OUT ALL OF THEIR REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION AT

PAGE 01 JAKART 03470 03 OF 04 271620Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	DS-00	UTED-00	FBO-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	MFLO-03	MMP-00	M-00	DCP-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIS-01	OPR-01	PC-05	PER-01
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	ASDS-01	FMP-00	IMCC-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	SAS-00
	/023W						

----------4E03A0 271621Z /49

R 260615Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2315
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 003470

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT, ASEC, CASC
SUBJECT: LESSONS LEARNED: MAY 1998 EVACUATION OF AMERICANS FROM INDONESIA

REF: STATE 105309

THE ASSEMBLY AREA(S).

11. AS MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY, WE HAD MANY MORE POTENTIAL EVACUEES THE FIRST NIGHT THAN AVAILABLE SEATS. OUR INTENT WAS TO CONDUCT A LOTTERY TO ENSURE THAT EVERYONE WHO WANTED TO LEAVE (INCLUDING USG PERSONNEL AND FAMILY

PAGE 02 JAKART 03470 03 OF 04 271620Z
MEMBERS) HAD EQUAL RIGHTS TO THE AVAILABLE SEATS. IF YOU ARE FACED WITH A SIMILAR SITUATION, CONSIDER SIMPLIFYING THE LOTTERY BY AUTOMATICALLY GIVING FIRST PREFERENCE FOR SEATS TO FAMILIES WITH SMALL CHILDREN, ELDERLY AND HANDICAPPED EVACUEES, AND UNACCOMPANIED MINORS. ANY REMAINING SEATS CAN THEN BE ASSIGNED BY A LOTTERY WITH

FEWER PARTICIPANTS. WHETHER OR NOT YOU CONDUCT A SEAT LOTTERY, GIVE EVERYONE WHO WILL HAVE A SEAT ON THE PLANE A NUMBERED BOARDING PASS, EITHER AT THE ASEMBLY AREA, OR AT THE AIRPORT. NOT ONLY DO THE PASSES PROVIDE THE PASSENGERS WITH A SENSE OF SECURITY THAT THEY WILL INDEED BE ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT, THEY PROVIDE STAFF WITH AN ACCURATE MEANS OF COUNTING PASSENGERS, CROSSCHECKING PLANE MANIFESTS, AND ESTABLISHING AN ORDERLY BOARDING PROCEDURE.

12. DON'T UNDERESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES YOU NEED TO CARRY OUT AN OPERATION OF THIS MAGNITUDE. JAKARTA UTILIZED (AS LONG AS IT COULD) THE SERVICES OF EMPLOYEES WHO THEMSELVES WERE BEING EVACUATED. MANY FOREIGN SERVICE NATIONALS WHO NORMALLY WOULD HAVE HELPED COULD NOT REPORT FOR WORK; HAD WE BEEN ABLE TO FORESEE THIS, WE WOULD HAVE ASKED ESSENTIAL FSNS (IN ADDITION TO MOTORPOOL AND SWITCHBOARD STAFF) TO STAY AT THE EMBASSY (IN MAKESHIFT SLEEPING QUARTERS) FROM THE BEGINNING. COUNT ON A MINIMUM OF 3-4 EMPLOYEES AT EACH ASSEMBLY AREA -- MORE IF YOU ARE USING ONLY ONE ASSEMBLY POINT -- AND AROUND 10 EMPLOYEES (PLUS LUGGAGE/SUPPORT PERSONNEL) AT THE AIRPORT. JAKARTA'S OPERATION WAS STAFFED PRIMARILY WITH PERSONNEL FROM THE CONSULAR, ADMIN, AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE OFFICES IN THE EMBASSY -- OTHER AGENCIES

ASSISTED WITH THEIR REMAINING PERSONNEL. ALSO CRUCIAL TO THE OPERATION WAS THE ASSISTANCE OF CONSULAR TDY PERSONNEL; THEY WERE INDISPENSABLE ADDITIONS, NOT ONLY IN THE EVACUATION OPERATION, BUT ALSO IN STAFFING THE EMBASSY'S CRISIS CENTER. POSTS SHOULD CONSIDER REQUESTING EARLY ON A CONSULAR "FLY-AWAY TEAM" FOR ASSISTANCE.

13. DON'T UNDERESTIMATE THE AMOUNT OF MONEY YOUR CASHIER WILL NEED FOR ADVANCE SEA PAYMENTS. MANY POSTS DO NOT HAVE A DOLLAR ADVANCE LARGE ENOUGH TO FUND 15 DAYS OF ADVANCE SEA PAYMENTS FOR EACH EMPLOYEE AND DEPENDENT EVACUATED. THIS REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE ANTICIPATED WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE CRISIS, AND INCREASES TO THE CASHIER'S DOLLAR ADVANCE REQUESTED AS APPROPRIATE. DON'T BE MISLED

BY THE STANDARDIZED REGULATIONS, WHICH CALL FOR SALARY ADVANCES TO BE MADE TO EMPLOYEES; THE GUIDANCE YOU WILL RECEIVE FROM THE DEPARTMENT CALLS FOR ADVANCES OF SEA PAYMENTS.

14. DON'T UNDERESTIMATE THE AMOUNT OF TIME AND LABOR REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S PAPERWORK REQUIREMENTS. MOST OF THEM ARE SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL IN THE EVACUATION CABLE SENT OUT BY THE DEPARTMENT, USUALLY IN ANTICIPATION OF A POSSIBLE EVACUATION, AND INCLUDE DETAILS SUCH AS SAFEHAVEN POINT SELECTED BY EACH EVACUEE, BANK NAME AND ACCOUNT NUMBER, ETC. POSTS FACING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EVACUATION SHOULD, IF POSSIBLE, OBTAIN THIS INFORMATION WELL BEFORE THE ONSET OF A CRISIS, AND TRANSFER THE DATA INTO A SPREADSHEET. IF NOT POSSIBLE, CONSIDER REQUESTING ASSISTANCE IN COMPLETING THIS

REQUIREMENT FROM EMBASSY STAFF AT THE FIRST TRANSIT POINT; GENERALLY THEY ARE NOT DEALING IN A CRISIS MODE, AND DO NOT HAVE THE STAFFING SHORTAGES FACED BY THE EVACUATING POST. IN ORDER TO FEED THE DEPARTMENT'S INSATIABLE APPETITE FOR EVACUEE INFORMATION, CONSIDER ASSIGNING TWO TO THREE INDIVIDUALS (CAPABLE FSNS ARE IDEAL) TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR OBTAINING THE DATA (IF NOT OBTAINED BEFOREHAND) AND CONVERTING IT TO SPREADSHEET AND TELEGRAPHIC FORM.

15. ESTABLISH CLEAR GUIDELINES WITH THE DEPARTMENT ON CRITERIA THEY WILL USE FOR APPROVING POST'S TRAVEL ADVISORIES. WE PREPARED SEVERAL OVER THE COURSE OF THE EXTENDED CRISIS, WHICH WERE DISAPPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY CRITERIA (INCLUDING THE "TRIPWIRES" WE HAD ESTABLISHED SOME TIME PREVIOUSLY), EXCEPT THAT THEY FELT MORE UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT THE SITUATION THAN DID THE EMBASSY.

16. THE DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS RE SAFEHAVEN LOCATIONS AND DRAWDOWN LISTS ARE RELATIVELY INFLEXIBLE GIVEN THE REPORTING DEMANDS PLACED ON POSTS AFTER AN EVACUATION. THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD CONSIDER ALLOWING SINGLE EMPLOYEES (OR EMPLOYEES WITHOUT CHILDREN) TO DEPART FOR A NEARBY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ2137

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ2137

PAGE 01 JAKART 03470 04 OF 04 271622Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	DS-00	UTED-00	FBO-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	MFLO-03	MMP-00	M-00	DCP-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIS-01	OPR-01	PC-05	PER-01
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00 /023W	ASDS-01	FMP-00	IMCC-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	SAS-00

----------4E03A5 271622Z /49

R 260615Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2316
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 003470

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT, ASEC, CASC
SUBJECT: LESSONS LEARNED: MAY 1998 EVACUATION OF AMERICANS FROM INDONESIA

REF: STATE 105309

POST FOR SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO DEPARTING FOR US SAFEHAVEN. IN JAKARTA'S CASE, THE LIFE-THREATENING CRISIS PASSED RELATIVELY QUICKLY, BUT THE SUBSTANTIVE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS PICKED UP IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. EMPLOYEES WAITING AT NEARBY POSTS COULD THEN HAVE RETURNED EASILY TO ASSIST WITH THESE UNDIMINISHED

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

17. SCRUB YOUR DRAWDOWN LISTS, AND REVERIFY THEM WITH ALL AGENCIES. MANY AGENCIES (INCLUDING STATE) DETERMINED THAT PERSONNEL NOT ON THE LIST AS ESSENTIAL REALLY WERE; THEY DID NOT LEAVE POST DURING THE EVACUATION, AND THE NUMBERS VARIANCE DREW NUMEROUS CONCERNED INQUIRIES FROM THE DEPARTMENT.

18. IF THE ABOVE LIST APPEARS TO BE HEAVY ON MINUTIAE, IT IS DELIBERATELY SO. WHILE THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF AN EVACUATION PLAN MAY SEEM CLEAR, THE DEVIL REALLY IS IN THE DETAILS, AND JAKARTA'S EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH OVER 1500 EVACUEES DEMONSTRATED UNEQUIVOCALLY THE NEED TO PLAN AHEAD AND TO CONSIDER -- AND TAKE CARE OF -- ALL THE DETAILS.

ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6724

PAGE 01 JAKART 03869 01 OF 02 201022Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------55FD8D 201023Z /38
O 201013Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2637

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003869

OFFICIAL INFORMAL - FOR EAP/PIMBS D. HARTWICK FROM DCM M. OWENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/08
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL JAKARTA TO PIMBS NO. 111

1. CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL P. OWENS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION.
REASON: 1.5(D).

SHATTUCK TESTIMONY
---

2. (C) WE WOULD APPRECIATE A CHANCE TO SEE THE DRAFT SHATTUCK TESTIMONY SHATTUCK WILL GIVE ON JULY 23 BEFORE SMITH'S SUBCOMMITTEE. WE CAN ASSURE 24-HOUR TURN-AROUND FOR OUR COMMENTS. WITH REGARD TO ISSUES TO BE FLAGGED, WE PRESUME HE WILL EITHER INCLUDE IN HIS REMARKS OR BE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING CURRENT HIGH-PROFILE ISSUES:

INVESTIGATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03869 01 OF 02 201022Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JUN 2006 200502473

-- THE GOVERNMENT IS INVESTIGATING THE DISAPPEARANCE CASES, WITH KOPASSUS PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED AS LIKELY CULPRITS. THERE IS PUBLIC SUSPICION THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE INVESTIGATION FROM REACHING TOO HIGH, FED INTER ALIA BY WIRANTO'S ASSESSMENT THAT SENIOR LEVEL COMMANDERS' ORDERS WERE MISUNDERSTOOD AT LOWER LEVELS AND SUGGESTIONS THAT PRABOWO MIGHT HAVE TO FACE ONLY AN HONOR BOARD AND NOT A COURT MARTIAL. MOREOVER, NOTWITHSTANDING APPARENT GOI PROGRESS IN THE INVESTIGATION, INCLUDING IDENTIFICATION OF SUSPECTS, AT LEAST 12 ACTIVISTS REMAIN MISSING.

-- THE GOVERNMENT IS PROCEEDING WITH INVESTIGATION OF THE TRISAKTI KILLINGS, WITH INDICATIONS THAT THE PROSECUTION MAY BE CHANGING FOCUS AWAY FROM POLICE AND TOWARDS THE ARMY. THERE WERE PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS THAT THE GOI MAY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO MAKE THE POLICE THE SCAPEGOAT FOR THE ARMY.

-- THE GOI HAS PLEDGED THAT AN INTER-AGENCY INVESTIGATION WILL BE LAUNCHED INTO THE MAY 13-15 RIOTS TO DETERMINE, INTER ALIA, IF THEY WERE "ENGINEERED." THERE IS TO BE A STRONG FOCUS ON THE ALLEGEDLY ORGANIZED RAPES OF SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND CHILDREN. THE GOVERNMENT HAS SET UP A COMMISSION TO ASSIST RAPE VICTIMS AND THEIR FAMILIES, CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS. THE PRESIDENT'S WIFE IS A PATRON.

UNREST IN IRIAN JAYA

-- FLAG RAISINGS AND RELATED PRO-INDEPENDENCE DEMONSTRATIONS IN IRIAN JAYA, JULY 1-6, LEFT AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF PEOPLE DEAD,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INCLUDING AT LEAST ONE SECURITY OFFICIAL. THE GREATEST VIOLENCE WAS IN BIAK WHERE MANY DEMONSTRATORS ARE MISSING AND PRESUMED EITHER DEAD OR IN DETENTION. THERE ARE DEMANDS FOR A VOTE ON SELF-DETERMINATION AND GROWING CALLS FOR INDEPENDENCE.

UNREST IN EAST TIMOR

-- THE FIRST FIVE MONTHS OF 1998 WITNESSED OVER 20 ALLEGED

EXTRA-JUDICIAL EXECUTIONS BY SECURITY FORCES OR ALLIED PARA-MILITARY UNITS. NONE HAVE OCCURED SINCE SOEHARTO STEPPED DOWN. ANTI-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE HAVE ASSUMED AN ASSERTIVE POSTURE, RAISING THE ANTE WITH LARGE DEMONSTRATIONS AND PURPORTED INTIMIDATION OF PRO-INTEGRATION MIGRANTS TO EAST TIMOR FROM OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA.

LABOR

-- WE WELCOME THE RELEASE AND DROPPING OF CHARGES AGAINST MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN AND OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS UNION, SBSI. MOREOVER, THE GOI TOOK AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION BY RATIFYING ILO CONVENTION 87 AND CANCELING A RESTRICTIVE 1993 REGULATION ON TRADE UNION REGISTRATION. THE GOI HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO SUBMIT A NEW LAW ON TRADE UNION REGISTRATION TO PARLIAMENT BEFORE THE END OF 1998, AND TO RATIFY THREE OTHER ILO CORE CONVENTIONS WITHIN A YEAR. WE HOPE THAT THE GOI WILL IMPLEMENT THESE NEW INITIATIVES FULLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND THE VIEWS OF INDONESIAN WORKERS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HUMAN RIGHTS GENERALLY

-- THE GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED THAT IT WILL MOVE FORWARD TOWARD RATIFICATION OF A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA, NOTABLY TO INCLUDE THE CONVENTION AGAINST THE USE OF TORTURE.

SECURITY FORCES SHOW RESTRAINT

-- JAKARTA IS NOW THE SCENE OF MULTIPLE DAILY DEMONSTRATIONS. THE GREAT MAJORITY HAVE BEEN HANDLED BY SECURITY FORCES WITH GREAT RESTRAINT. HOWEVER, RECENT INCIDENTS IN BIAK, IRIAN JAYA AND IN EAST TIMOR HAVE INVOLVED GOVERNMENT FORCES FIRING ON CIVILIANS WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION. THESE APPEAR TO BE ANOMALIES. IN THE CASE OF TWO SHOOTING DEATHS IN EAST TIMOR AND IN JAYAPURA, MILITARY OFFICIALS EXPRESSED REGRET AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6725

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6725

PAGE 01 JAKART 03869 02 OF 02 201022Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------55FD90 201023Z /38

O 201013Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2638

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003869

OFFICIAL INFORMAL - FOR EAP/PIMBS D. HARTWICK FROM DCM M. OWENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/08
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL JAKARTA TO PIMBS NO. 111

INCIDENTS.

A FREE PRESS

-- BOTH PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA HAVE BEEN TRANSFORMED. THERE IS STRONG AND SPECIFIC CRITICISM AND COMMENTARY IN ALL AREAS. IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO CLASSIFY THE MEDIA IN INDONESIA NOW AS "FREE."
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3840

PAGE 01 JAKART 03983 01 OF 02 270911Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------587098 270911Z /38

R 270756Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2738
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003983

BRUSSELS FOR USEU
USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03983 01 OF 02 270911Z
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT'S RELEASE OF 50 POLITICAL PRISONERS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 28 JUN 2006 200502473

- DRAWS MIXED REVIEWS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON, 1.5 (D).

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: THE GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED IT WILL RELEASE ANOTHER 50 POLITICAL PRISONERS, BRINGING OUR COUNT OF PRISONERS RELEASED BY THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION TO 69. THERE HAS BEEN CRITICISM, EVEN FROM SOME OF THOSE RELEASED, OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO RELEASE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. FOUR ON THE RELEASEE LIST HAVE RESISTED RELEASE IN SOLIDARITY WITH THOSE LEFT BEHIND. SOME CRITICS ARGUE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS TREATING THE POLITICAL PRISONERS LIKE HOSTAGES TO BE RELEASED WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IS IN NEED OF GOOD PUBLICITY. THERE IS ALSO CRITICISM THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS SHOWING ITSELF TO BE INDECISIVE AND DIVIDED OVER THE ISSUE OF WHICH PRISONERS SHOULD BE RELEASED. END SUMMARY

MORE POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASED

3. (U) AFTER AN EARLY JULY PLEDGE THAT THE GOI WOULD RELEASE 90 POLITICAL PRISONERS, JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI ANNOUNCED ON JULY 25 THE RELEASE OF 50 POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION BRINGS TO 69 THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASED AND IS THE FIRST RELEASE IN SIX WEEKS. (NOTE: THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS TO HAVE RELEASED 73, ALTHOUGH FOUR WERE DUE FOR RELEASE IN ANY EVENT, LEAVING THE COUNT AT 69. END NOTE) THE

CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNMENT UNOFFICIALLY HAS SAID THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 200 POLITICAL PRISONERS WHEN IT ASSUMED OFFICE ALTHOUGH THE ICRC AND SOME IN THE OPPOSITION BELIEVE THE FIGURE TO BE HIGHER.

4. (U) AMONG THOSE RELEASED WERE FOUR PRISONERS WHO WERE MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED TO THE BANNED PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD). MULADI TOLD CONGRESSMAN CHRISTOPHER SMITH IN EARLY JUNE THAT PRD MEMBERS WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE RELEASE PROGRAM BECAUSE

THE ORGANIZATION WAS OPPOSED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF "PANCASILA," THE STATE IDEOLOGY. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO HAS STATED THAT THOSE CONVICTED OF CRIMINAL ACTS, DISTORTING THE STATE IDEOLOGY OR WHO WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY WOULD NOT BE RELEASED.

5. (U) INCLUDED WERE PRISONERS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION, DEFAMATION OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1996 RIOT IN TASIKMALAYA. MEMBERS OF A STRANGE PARA-MILITARY CULT IN EASTQALSO RELEASED. THE TO-BE-RELEASEQ INCLUDE PRD CHAIRMAN BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO OR EAST TIMORESE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO. THE LIST ALSO EXCLUDED ACTIVISTS INVOLVED IN SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN IRIAN JAYA AND EAST TIMOR.

6. (SBU) A STATEMENT SIGNED BY 16 POLITICAL PRISONERS, INCLUDING XANANA GUSMAO, BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO AND FOUR OTHER PRISONERS WHO WERE ON THE RELEASEE LIST, CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT FOR NOT RELEASING ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE FOUR PRISONERS WHO SIGNED THE

STATEMENT ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD NOT LEAVE PRISON VOLUNTARILY, REJECTING RELEASE UNLESS ALL OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE ALSO FREED. AT 0200 JULY 26, TWO OF THOSE REJECTING RELEASE REPORTEDLY WERE FORCIBLY EVICTED FROM PRISON IN SURABAYA.

REACTION TO THE RELEASE

7. (U) THE JAKARTA POST IN A JULY 27 EDITORIAL WAS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR A PIECEMEAL APPROACH TO THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. IT ASSESSED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS REFLECTING INDECISIVENESS AND DIVISION IN ITS HESITANT APPROACH TO FREEING POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE POST CALLED FOR A RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS OUTRIGHT.

8. (C) ON THE EVENING OF JULY 26, THE EVE OF THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE SACKING OF MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI'S HEADQUARTERS IN JAKARTA BY THUGS AND GOVERNMENT SECURITY

FORCES, PRO-REFORM ACTIVISTS MET IN A COMMEMORATION. THE GATHERING INCLUDED REFORM ACTIVISTS INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATING DISAPPEARANCES, THE JAKARTA MAY RIOTS AND THE KILLING OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE PRISONER RELEASE. THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3843

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3843

PAGE 01 JAKART 03983 02 OF 02 270911Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/024W					

----------5870A0 270911Z /38

R 270756Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2739
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003983

BRUSSELS FOR USEU
USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT'S RELEASE OF 50 POLITICAL PRISONERS - DRAWS MIXED REVIEWS

MOTHER OF ONE PRISONER WHO WAS RESISTING RELEASE IN SOLIDARITY WITH OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS STRONGLY SUPPORTED HER SON'S DECISION. SHE TOLD POLCOUNS THAT SHE AND OTHER FAMILIES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE RECEIVED JULY 26 BY MEGAWATI, WHO SAID SHE WOULD LEND HER SUPPORT TO THE CAUSE OF IMMEDIATE FREEDOM FOR ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS.

9. (C) A POLITICAL PRISONER WITH TIES TO THE PRD WHO SERVED A BRIEF SENTENCE AND RECENTLY RELEASED POLITICAL PRISONER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN BOTH DESCRIBED THE RELEASE TO POLCOUNS AS "NOT ENOUGH." THE PRD SYMPATHIZER SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS HOLDING POLITICAL PRISONERS AS IF THEY WERE HOSTAGES TO BE RELEASED PERIODICALLY WHEN THE GOVERNMENT WANTED TO APPEAR GENEROUS IN THE EYES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA. RAHARIA WALUYA JATI, A RECENTLY FREED KIDNAPPING VICTIM, ECHOED THIS POINT, CLAIMING THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS SIMPLY "TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE IMF AND THE MEETING IN PARIS (THE CGI)."

10. (C) COMMENT: NOTWITHSTANDING THE CRITICISM, THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS IS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN THAT THERE IS STILL A REFORM IMPETUS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. RELUCTANCE TO RELEASE SOME PRISONERS, AS THE JAKARTA POST EDITORIAL POINTS OUT, DOES REFLECT A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT OVER WHO SHOULD BE

RELEASED AND POSSIBLY OVER THE PACE OF THOSE RELEASES.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03983 02 OF 02 270911Z
WE EXPECT PRO-REFORM FORCES AND THE MEDIA TO CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT FOR RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3840

PAGE 01 JAKART 03983 01 OF 02 270911Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------587098 270911Z /38

R 270756Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2738
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003983

BRUSSELS FOR USEU
USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03983 01 OF 02 270911Z
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT'S RELEASE OF 50 POLITICAL PRISONERS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 28 JUN 2006 200502473

- DRAWS MIXED REVIEWS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON, 1.5 (D).

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: THE GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED IT WILL RELEASE ANOTHER 50 POLITICAL PRISONERS, BRINGING OUR COUNT OF PRISONERS RELEASED BY THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION TO 69. THERE HAS BEEN CRITICISM, EVEN FROM SOME OF THOSE RELEASED, OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO RELEASE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. FOUR ON THE RELEASEE LIST HAVE RESISTED RELEASE IN SOLIDARITY WITH THOSE LEFT BEHIND. SOME CRITICS ARGUE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS TREATING THE POLITICAL PRISONERS LIKE HOSTAGES TO BE RELEASED WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IS IN NEED OF GOOD PUBLICITY. THERE IS ALSO CRITICISM THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS SHOWING ITSELF TO BE INDECISIVE AND DIVIDED OVER THE ISSUE OF WHICH PRISONERS SHOULD BE RELEASED. END SUMMARY

MORE POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASED

3. (U) AFTER AN EARLY JULY PLEDGE THAT THE GOI WOULD RELEASE 90 POLITICAL PRISONERS, JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI ANNOUNCED ON JULY 25 THE RELEASE OF 50 POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION BRINGS TO 69 THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASED AND IS THE FIRST RELEASE IN SIX WEEKS. (NOTE: THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS TO HAVE RELEASED 73, ALTHOUGH FOUR WERE DUE FOR RELEASE IN ANY EVENT, LEAVING THE COUNT AT 69. END NOTE) THE

CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNMENT UNOFFICIALLY HAS SAID THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 200 POLITICAL PRISONERS WHEN IT ASSUMED OFFICE ALTHOUGH THE ICRC AND SOME IN THE OPPOSITION BELIEVE THE FIGURE TO BE HIGHER.

4. (U) AMONG THOSE RELEASED WERE FOUR PRISONERS WHO WERE MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED TO THE BANNED PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD). MULADI TOLD CONGRESSMAN CHRISTOPHER SMITH IN EARLY JUNE THAT PRD MEMBERS WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE RELEASE PROGRAM BECAUSE

THE ORGANIZATION WAS OPPOSED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF "PANCASILA," THE STATE IDEOLOGY. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO HAS STATED THAT THOSE CONVICTED OF CRIMINAL ACTS, DISTORTING THE STATE IDEOLOGY OR WHO WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY WOULD NOT BE RELEASED.

5. (U) INCLUDED WERE PRISONERS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION, DEFAMATION OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1996 RIOT IN TASIKMALAYA. MEMBERS OF A STRANGE PARA-MILITARY CULT IN EASTQALSO RELEASED. THE TO-BE-RELEASEQ INCLUDE PRD CHAIRMAN BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO OR EAST TIMORESE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO. THE LIST ALSO EXCLUDED ACTIVISTS INVOLVED IN SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN IRIAN JAYA AND EAST TIMOR.

6. (SBU) A STATEMENT SIGNED BY 16 POLITICAL PRISONERS, INCLUDING XANANA GUSMAO, BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO AND FOUR OTHER PRISONERS WHO WERE ON THE RELEASEE LIST, CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT FOR NOT RELEASING ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE FOUR PRISONERS WHO SIGNED THE

STATEMENT ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD NOT LEAVE PRISON VOLUNTARILY, REJECTING RELEASE UNLESS ALL OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE ALSO FREED. AT 0200 JULY 26, TWO OF THOSE REJECTING RELEASE REPORTEDLY WERE FORCIBLY EVICTED FROM PRISON IN SURABAYA.

REACTION TO THE RELEASE

7. (U) THE JAKARTA POST IN A JULY 27 EDITORIAL WAS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR A PIECEMEAL APPROACH TO THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. IT ASSESSED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS REFLECTING INDECISIVENESS AND DIVISION IN ITS HESITANT APPROACH TO FREEING POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE POST CALLED FOR A RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS OUTRIGHT.

8. (C) ON THE EVENING OF JULY 26, THE EVE OF THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE SACKING OF MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI'S HEADQUARTERS IN JAKARTA BY THUGS AND GOVERNMENT SECURITY

FORCES, PRO-REFORM ACTIVISTS MET IN A COMMEMORATION. THE GATHERING INCLUDED REFORM ACTIVISTS INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATING DISAPPEARANCES, THE JAKARTA MAY RIOTS AND THE KILLING OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE PRISONER RELEASE. THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3843

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3843

PAGE 01 JAKART 03983 02 OF 02 270911Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/024W					

----------5870A0 270911Z /38

R 270756Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2739
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003983

BRUSSELS FOR USEU
USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT'S RELEASE OF 50 POLITICAL PRISONERS - DRAWS MIXED REVIEWS

MOTHER OF ONE PRISONER WHO WAS RESISTING RELEASE IN SOLIDARITY WITH OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS STRONGLY SUPPORTED HER SON'S DECISION. SHE TOLD POLCOUNS THAT SHE AND OTHER FAMILIES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE RECEIVED JULY 26 BY MEGAWATI, WHO SAID SHE WOULD LEND HER SUPPORT TO THE CAUSE OF IMMEDIATE FREEDOM FOR ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS.

9. (C) A POLITICAL PRISONER WITH TIES TO THE PRD WHO SERVED A BRIEF SENTENCE AND RECENTLY RELEASED POLITICAL PRISONER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN BOTH DESCRIBED THE RELEASE TO POLCOUNS AS "NOT ENOUGH." THE PRD SYMPATHIZER SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS HOLDING POLITICAL PRISONERS AS IF THEY WERE HOSTAGES TO BE RELEASED PERIODICALLY WHEN THE GOVERNMENT WANTED TO APPEAR GENEROUS IN THE EYES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA. RAHARIA WALUYA JATI, A RECENTLY FREED KIDNAPPING VICTIM, ECHOED THIS POINT, CLAIMING THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS SIMPLY "TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE IMF AND THE MEETING IN PARIS (THE CGI)."

10. (C) COMMENT: NOTWITHSTANDING THE CRITICISM, THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS IS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN THAT THERE IS STILL A REFORM IMPETUS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. RELUCTANCE TO RELEASE SOME PRISONERS, AS THE JAKARTA POST EDITORIAL POINTS OUT, DOES REFLECT A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT OVER WHO SHOULD BE

RELEASED AND POSSIBLY OVER THE PACE OF THOSE RELEASES.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03983 02 OF 02 270911Z
WE EXPECT PRO-REFORM FORCES AND THE MEDIA TO CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT FOR RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ7331

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7331

PAGE 01 JAKART 04012 01 OF 05 281101Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------58ED33 281102Z /38

R 281048Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2768
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 004012

BRUSSELS FOR USEU

USCINCPAC FR AMB SALMON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04012 01 OF 05 281101Z
CANBERRA AND MANILA FOR A/S ROTH

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 28 JUN 2006 200502473

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL REFORM IN INDONESIA

REF: A) JAKARTA 3759, B) JAKARTA 3596

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON, 1.5 (D).

SUMMARY
---

2. (C) NOTWITHSTANDING DAUNTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES, THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION HAS ESTABLISHED THE MOST OPEN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT THE COUNTRY HAS KNOWN IN MORE THAN THREE DECADES. THE SCOPE OF FREEDOMS IN SOME AREAS, NOTABLY FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, IS UNPRECEDENTED. IN OTHERS, REFORM HAS BEEN EVIDENT BUT HALTING. UNDER MOUNTING PUBLIC PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT BELATEDLY NAMED A HIGHLY CREDIBLE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE MAY RIOTS. PROGRESS IN INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION OF THE TRISAKTI KILLING CASES HAS BEEN SLOW AND THUS FAR NOT BROADLY CREDIBLE, WHILE THE ARMY'S EFFORTS TO UNCOVER THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SPATE OF KIDNAPPINGS AND DISAPPEARANCES EARLIER THIS YEAR APPEAR TO BE MAKING SOME PROGRESS. THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, AFTER A HIATUS OF OVER A MONTH, HAS RESUMED WITH A LIST OF 50 TO BE FREED. A NEW GOVERNMENT DECREE ON DEMONSTRATIONS LIMITS RIGHTS OF FREE ASSEMBLY BEYOND CURRENT PRACTICES. REGULATIONS ALSO HAVE BEEN PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT

WHICH SEEM TO TARGET STUDENT ACTIVISM. SECURITY FORCES HAVE GENERALLY SHOWN RESTRAINT IN DEALING WITH FAR MORE FREQUENT DEMONSTRATIONS, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS, ESPECIALLY OUTSIDE JAKARTA. A HABIBIE IDEA TO LICENSE JOURNALISTS HAS RAISED CONCERNS.

3. (SBU) WHILE REGIME CRITICS HAVE CONTINUED (RIGHTLY) TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT ON A RANGE OF REFORM ISSUES, THE GOVERNMENT IS PROCEEDING WITH PLANS FOR EARLY ELECTIONS, SEEN BY MANY AS A LITMUS TEST OF ITS

COMMITMENT TO REFORM. MOREOVER, IT HAS PRESENTED AN AUTONOMY PLAN FOR EAST TIMOR THAT EVEN CRITICS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED IS SUBSTANTIVE, THOUGH IT REJECTS ANY POSSIBILITY FOR EAST TIMORESE TO VOTE ON THE PLAN OR THEIR FUTURE.

4. (C) THE USG SHOULD CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN ITS EARLY REFORM PACE. WORTHY OF PARTICULAR ATTENTION ARE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE CONDITIONS FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS TO SAFEGUARD PRESS FREEDOM, AND TO ENSURE CREDIBLE INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED SECURITY FORCE WRONGS. RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND KIDNAPPED POLITICAL ACTIVISTS IS ALSO A HIGH PRIORITY. END SUMMARY

OFF TO A QUICK START
---

5. (SBU) PRESIDENT HABIBIE IMPRESSED DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS IN THE FIRST FEW WEEKS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION BY MOVING BOLDLY ON SEVERAL REFORM FRONTS, NOTWITHSTANDING DAUNTING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SOME HABIBIE CRITICS FELL SILENT AS THE NEW PRESIDENT INITIALLY APPEARED TO EXCEED THE VERY LOW EXPECTATIONS SET FOR HIM BY MOST OBSERVERS AS HE PLEDGED TO USHER IN A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF UNPRECEDENTED BREADTH.

6. (SBU) THE SETTING OF A RELATIVELY RAPID ELECTION/TRANSITION SCHEDULE, THE RELEASE OF HIGH PROFILE POLITICAL PRISONERS, ASSURANCES TO THE PRESS THAT IT COULD AND SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS NEWLY WON INDEPENDENCE AND HABIBIE'S PLEDGE TO INITIATE SERIOUS INVESTIGATIONS OF DISAPPEARANCES AND TRISAKTI KILLINGS WERE WELL-RECEIVED.

BUT DOUBTS REMAIN
---

7. (SBU) IN RECENT WEEKS, HOWEVER, CRITICS HAVE BEGUN TO RE-EMERGE, CLAIMING THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SLOWING OF THE PACE OF REFORM. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THEIR

STRONG CRITICISM, PLAYED PROMINENTLY IN THE MEDIA, IS PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE, IN ITSELF, OF A DECIDEDLY FREER PRESS ENVIRONMENT.

8. (SBU) DOUBT AMONG DOMESTIC CRITICS ABOUT THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7334

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7334

PAGE 01 JAKART 04012 02 OF 05 281102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------58ED39 281102Z /38

R 281048Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2769
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA

USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 004012

BRUSSELS FOR USEU

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CANBERRA AND MANILA FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL REFORM IN INDONESIA

REF: A) JAKARTA 3759, B) JAKARTA 3596

HABIBIE'S COMMITMENT TO POLITICAL REFORM FALLS INTO SEVERAL AREAS:

DOES HABIBIE STILL SEE HIMSELF AS A TRANSITIONAL LEADER?
---

9. (C) HABIBIE HAS STEPPED BACK FROM HIS EARLIER POSITION THAT HE WAS A TRANSITIONAL LEADER WHO WOULD NOT SEEK REELECTION IN HIS OWN RIGHT AS PRESIDENT. INSTEAD, HE HAS INDICATED THAT HIS POLITICAL FUTURE WILL "DEPEND ON THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE." WE HAVE HEARD FROM HIS CAMP THAT HABIBIE INTENDS TO SEEK THE PRESIDENCY. HABIBIE'S OPPONENTS HAVE PRESSED FOR ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE THEY FEAR HE WILL ATTEMPT TO BUY TIME IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POSITION. THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF A MAY/JUNE 1999 TIME FRAME FOR PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, HOWEVER. WERE THAT TO SLIP, WITHOUT CREDIBLE JUSTIFICATION, MANY WOULD LIKELY CRY "FOUL."

SEEKING JUSTICE FOR PAST WRONGS
---

10. (SBU) THE GOVERNMENT HAS LOST SOME DOMESTIC AND

FOREIGN CREDIBILITY DUE TO THE MANNER IN WHICH IT HAS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04012 02 OF 05 281102Z
PURSUED TWO MATTERS IN WHICH ELEMENTS OF THE SOEHARTO REGIME ARE GENERALLY ASSUMED TO HAVE BEEN IMPLICATED: THE KILLING OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND CLAIMS THAT THE MAY 13-15 JAKARTA AREA RIOTS WERE TO SOME EXTENT "ENGINEERED," TO INCLUDE WHAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS DESCRIBED AS THE "SYSTEMATIC" RAPE OF SINO-INDONESIANS.

11. (SBU) THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTING TO SCAPEGOAT THE POLICE, AND PROTECT THE ARMED FORCES, IN THE MATTER OF THE TRISAKTI KILLINGS. THE WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION CASE AGAINST TWO POLICE NOW ON TRIAL HAS BEEN EXPOSED BY A WELL-RESPECTED DEFENSE TEAM OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS WHO HAVE POINTED OUT, INTER ALIA, THAT THE POLICE APPEAR TO HAVE USED ONLY RUBBER BULLETS. THE FOUR STUDENTS WERE KILLED BY LIVE AMMUNITION.

12. (SBU) THE GOVERNMENT WAS ALSO SLOW TO INITIATE A FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE MAY 13-15 RIOTS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDINGS OF A NUMBER OF NGOS AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION THAT ORGANIZED ELEMENTS, POSSIBLY WITH CONNECTIONS TO THE SECURITY FORCES, WERE INVOLVED IN THE LOOTING, ARSON AND RAPES THAT TARGETED THE SINO-INDONESIAN COMMUNITIES IN JAKARTA, TANGERANG AND BEKASI. ON JULY 15, PRESIDENT HABIBIE MADE HIS FIRST EXPLICIT STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE VIOLENCE AGAINST SINO-INDONESIANS. ON JULY 23, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF A SENIOR-LEVEL, INTER-AGENCY COMMISSION WHICH, IMPRESSIVELY, INCLUDES KEY NGO HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS ALREADY INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATING THE RIOTS. THE WILLINGNESS OF THESE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FIGURES TO JOIN THE COMMISSION IS A COUP FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN THAT IT AUTOMATICALLY GIVES THE BODY CREDIBILITY. OBSERVERS WILL LOOK CLOSELY AT THE POWERS GIVEN THE COMMISSION AND ITS MANDATE. THE PRESIDENT EARLIER SET UP A SEPARATE COMMISSION TO ASSIST VICTIMS, WITH HABIBIE'S WIFE AS PATRON.

13. (SBU) IN OTHER AREAS, THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT MEMBERS OF KOPASSUS, THE ELITE ARMY SPECIAL FORCES CONTINGENT, ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION IN THE DISAPPEARANCE CASES HAS REDUCED CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ABRI ON THIS SCORE, ALTHOUGH THE FACT THAT 12 ACTIVISTS REMAIN MISSING IS A CONTINUING, SERIOUS CONCERN. THERE IS ALSO PUBLIC DOUBT THAT SENIOR OFFICERS WILL RECEIVE APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT, FUELED IN PART BY WIRANTO'S PUBLIC CONCLUSION THAT LOWER RANKING OFFICERS IN KOPASSUS MAY HAVE MISINTERPRETED THEIR ORDERS.

14. (SBU) THE TRISAKTI KILLINGS AND DISAPPEARANCE CASES HAVE HIGH RESONANCE AMONG REFORM FORCES, THE NATIONAL MEDIA, THE OPPOSITION AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS. THESE MATTERS HAVE A LESSER IMMEDIACY AMONG THE GROWING NUMBER OF INDONESIANS WHO ARE AT OR BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL AND WHO MUST FOCUS ON MORE IMMEDIATE CONCERNS.

NNNNPTQ7333

PAGE 01 JAKART 04012 03 OF 05 281102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------58ED41 281102Z /38

R 281048Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2770
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 004012

BRUSSELS FOR USEU

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CANBERRA AND MANILA FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL REFORM IN INDONESIA

REF: A) JAKARTA 3759, B) JAKARTA 3596

RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

15. (SBU) THE GOVERNMENT RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS SAW A HIATUS FOLLOWING THE EARLY JUNE FREEING OF PROMINENT POLITICAL DISSIDENTS MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN AND SRI BINTANG PAMUNGAS AND THE RELEASE OF A NUMBER OF EAST TIMORESE PRISONERS. ON JULY 24, HOWEVER, JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI ANNOUNCED THAT A FURTHER GROUP OF 50 PRISONERS WOULD BE RELEASED. THE GROUP INCLUDED FOUR MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH LINKS TO THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD), THOUGH NO SENIOR PRD MEMBERS WERE TO BE RELEASED. MEMBERS OF THE PRD AND ITS SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN RULED OUT AS POTENTIAL RELEASEES. THE INCLUSION OF FOUR WITH LINKS TO THE PRD WOULD APPEAR TO VALIDATE MULADI'S EARLIER ASSERTION TO US THAT HE WAS SEEKING TO EXPAND THE CATEGORIES OF PRISONERS ELIGIBLE FOR RELEASE. THE NEW LIST DOES NOT, HOWEVER, INCLUDE ELDERLY AND ILL PRISONERS ALLEGED TO BE MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI). IN JUNE MULADI TOLD CONGRESSMAN CHRISTOPHER SMITH THAT HE WOULD TRY TO INCLUDE SOME OF THEM IN FUTURE RELEASES.

CONFIDENTIAL

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

16. (SBU) THE GOVERNMENT HAS SIGNED A REGULATION IN LIEU OF A LAW ON "FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION" WHICH REGULATES PEACEFUL POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS, ORAL AND WRITTEN DISSENT AND LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS (APPARENTLY NOT TO INCLUDE STRIKES). THE REGULATION WILL REMAIN VALID UNTIL THE PARLIAMENT RATIFIES THE DOCUMENT, WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAS PLEDGED TO SUBMIT SOON. WHILE THE REGULATION (REPORTED IN DETAIL REF A) IS LIKELY TO BE STRONGLY OPPOSED BY NGOS AND SUBJECTED TO MAJOR REVISION IN PARLIAMENT, ITS PROMULGATION SUGGESTS A LOWER LEVEL OF HABIBIE GOVERNMENT TOLERANCE TOWARD POLITICAL DISSENT THAN WAS INITIALLY APPARENT. INTER ALIA, IT REQUIRES A POLICE PERMIT FOR DEMONSTRATIONS OF MORE THAN 50 INDIVIDUALS AND BANS DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, AMONG OTHER POINTS.

PREVIOUSLY, ANYONE PLANNING A DEMONSTRATION HAD ONLY TO INFORM THE POLICE IN ADVANCE. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, THE POLICE HAVE ASSUMED THE POWER TO PERMIT OR BAN SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS UPON BEING NOTIFIED. SINCE THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION TOOK OFFICE, THERE HAVE BEEN DAILY DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE, OFTEN INVOLVING MORE THAN 50 PEOPLE, AND OFTEN ABSENT ANY NOTIFICATION TO THE POLICE.

17. (SBU) PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S RECENT IDEA THAT INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS BE REQUIRED ANNUALLY TO OBTAIN RENEWABLE LICENSES FROM "AUTHORIZED BODIES" IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A "HIGH STANDARD OF PROFESSIONALISM" SMACKS OF

THE KIND OF CONTROL THAT HIS OWN MINISTER OF INFORMATION HAS STRENUOUSLY DISAVOWED. THE PROPOSAL HAS THE FULL BACKING OF THE GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED BOARD OF INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (PWI).

18. (SBU) WHILE THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT SOUGHT TO CRACK DOWN ON CRITICS, THERE HAS BEEN A GROWING CALL, NOTABLY FROM THE MILITARY BUT ALSO FROM PRESIDENT HABIBIE, FOR REGIME CRITICS TO QUIET DOWN. JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED TO BE "PATRIOTIC" AND NOT TO EXCITE THEIR READERS, WHOM THE GOVERNMENT DESCRIBES AS "UNSOPHISTICATED." (THUS FAR, THE MEDIA HAS APPEARED TO IGNORE SUCH CALLS.) THERE ARE ECHOES OF THE SOEHARTO-ERA IN THIS CHASTISING OF THOSE WHO WOULD CRITICIZE THEIR COUNTRY AND THUS DISCOURAGE FOREIGN INVESTMENT OR GIVE GRIST TO ANTI-INDONESIA FOREIGN CRITICS.

19. (SBU) STUDENTS ARE PROTESTING NEW REGULATIONS, STILL IN DRAFT FORM, WHICH WOULD GIVE UNIVERSITY RECTORS SIGNIFICANT NEW POWERS OVER STUDENT ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. THE REGULATIONS MAY REFLECT A PENDULUM SWING BACK TO THE MORE STRINGENT CONTROLS ON STUDENT ACTIVITY COMMON IN THE 1980'S AND MUCH OF THE 1990'S. ON THE OTHER HAND, RECTORS, WHO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7338

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7338

PAGE 01 JAKART 04012 04 OF 05 281102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------58ED49 281102Z /38

R 281048Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2771
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 004012

BRUSSELS FOR USEU

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CANBERRA AND MANILA FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL REFORM IN INDONESIA

REF: A) JAKARTA 3759, B) JAKARTA 3596

THEORETICALLY WOULD BE EMPOWERED TO DEAL WITH STUDENTS, SHOWED THEMSELVES TO BE GENERALLY SYMPATHETIC TO REFORM IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE SOEHARTO RESIGNATION. STUDENTS ARE PRESSING FOR ELIMINATION OF ALL REGULATIONS GOVERNING THEIR POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

USE OF FORCE AGAINST PEACEFUL PROTEST

20. (SBU) SECURITY FORCES GENERALLY HAVE MAINTAINED A RESPONSIBLE POSTURE VIS-A-VIS PROTESTS, ALLOWING NEARLY DAILY DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE CAPITAL AND USING MINIMAL FORCE TO CONTROL SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS. THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT EXCEPTIONS, HOWEVER, ESPECIALLY OUTSIDE OF JAKARTA. THE SHOOTINGS OF MORE THAN 20 PRO-INDEPENDENCE DEMONSTRATORS IN BIAK AND IN JAYAPURA (IRIAN JAYA) AND AT LEAST SEVEN IN EAST TIMOR (WITH DEATHS RESULTING IN BOTH LOCATIONS) SUGGEST THAT A TOUGHER POSTURE STILL OBTAINS IN SOME AREAS. ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO'S JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF FORCE IN IRIAN JAYA, IN PARTICULAR, ARGUING THAT FORCES WERE DEALING WITH "TREASONOUS" ACTS, WAS A REMINDER OF ABRI'S STRONG AVERSION TO SEPARATIST AGITATION. THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN IRIAN JAYA, NOTABLY IN BIAK WHERE THERE APPEARS TO HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

BEEN A NUMBER OF KILLINGS, WERE BY AND LARGE, PEACEFUL, ALBEIT OVERTLY PRO-INDEPENDENCE POLITICAL PROTESTS. ABRI'S REACTION IN IRIAN JAYA CONTRASTED WITH AN APOLOGY BY THE ARMED FORCES COMMANDER IN EAST TIMOR OVER AN UNPROVOKED KILLING RECENTLY. SECURITY FORCE RESPONSE TO LATE JUNE DEMONSTRATIONS BY EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS IN JAKARTA ALSO WAS SEEN BY OBSERVERS AS EXCESSIVE, WITH A NUMBER OF STUDENTS SUFFERING INJURIES.

21. (SBU) SECURITY FORCES HAVE GENERALLY NOT INTERVENED IN THE GROWING NUMBER OF LABOR STRIKES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED RECENTLY. HOWEVER, MILITARY FORCES AND POLICE BLOCKED LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN FROM STAGING DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA IN LATE JUNE. ALSO IN LATE JUNE, MILITARY TROOPS USED RUBBER BULLETS AGAINST DEMONSTRATING WORKERS OUTSIDE JAKARTA, WOUNDING 23.

GOVERNMENT STILL PRO-ACTIVE IN SOME REFORM AREAS
---

22. (SBU) ANY ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN INDONESIA TODAY MUST ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE RIGHTS ENVIRONMENT UNDER THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION REPRESENTS A SEA CHANGE FROM THE SOEHARTO ERA. THE PRESS, FOR EXAMPLE, IS NOW AS FREE AS ANY IN THE REGION, AND FREER THAN MOST. WHILE SOME IMPROVEMENT WAS EVIDENT BEFORE SOEHARTO'S FALL, THE PRESS HAS BECOME MUCH MORE OPEN SINCE THEN.

23. (SBU) SECURITY FORCES APPEAR TO HAVE QUIETLY SOUGHT TO RIGHT OLD WRONGS IN ACQUIESCING IN THE RETURN OF INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY FACILITIES COUNTRY-WIDE TO

THE MEGAWATI FACTION OF THE PARTY. SIMILARLY, SECURITY FORCES HAVE ALLOWED THE NON-GOVERNMENT BACKED FACTION OF THE BATAK CHRISTIAN CHURCH TO RE-CLAIM FACILITIES FROM THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED FACTION. FIVE YEARS AGO THOSE SAME SECURITY FORCES EITHER ASSISTED THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED FACTION OR STOOD BY AND ALLOWED THE GOVERNMENT-

BACKED FACTION TO ATTACK ITS RIVALS.

24. (SBU) THE ADMINISTRATION IS PREPARING IN A TIMELY MANNER TO SUBMIT ITS PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF THE FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL AND ELECTION LAWS, IN KEEPING WITH PLEDGES TO MOVE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TOWARD EARLY ELECTIONS. IT IS CERTAIN THAT THESE DRAFT LAWS WILL SPARK ENERGETIC DEBATE. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THAT DEBATE IS GIVEN FREE REIN IN THE MEDIA AND THE WILLINGNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT TO DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH PUBLIC INPUT WILL HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REFORM CREDENTIALS AND ON THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION.

25. (SBU) DESPITE PRESSURE ON MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, POSSIBLY ORGANIZED WITH GOVERNMENT CONNIVANCE, NEW LABOR UNIONS ARE BEING ESTABLISHED AND PAKPAHAN'S SBSI HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO OPERATE OPENLY WITHOUT INTERFERENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7339

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7339

PAGE 01 JAKART 04012 05 OF 05 281102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00

T-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-04 G-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 /025W
----------58ED4B 281102Z /38

R 281048Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2772
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 004012

BRUSSELS FOR USEU

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CANBERRA AND MANILA FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL REFORM IN INDONESIA

REF: A) JAKARTA 3759, B) JAKARTA 3596

(OTHER THAN THE SUPPRESSION OF ITS JUNE 25 DEMONSTRATION NOTED ABOVE). THE GOI HAS MOVED TO RATIFY KEY INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS, OR PLEDGED TO DO SO. IT ALSO HAS PLEDGED TO RATIFY KEY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS, ALTHOUGH WITH REGARD TO THE ANTI-TORTURE CONVENTION, THE PARLIAMENT ACTUALLY HAS SEIZED THE INITIATIVE AND HAS PRODUCED ITS OWN RATIFICATION LANGUAGE, A HIGHLY UNUSUAL PARLIAMENTARY INITIATIVE.

EAST TIMOR POLICY

26. (SBU) IN A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT FROM SOEHARTO-ERA POLICY, THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION HAS PRODUCED AN AUTONOMY PROPOSAL FOR EAST TIMOR THAT FAR EXCEEDS THE "SPECAL STATUS" ACCORDED ACEH AND JOGJAKARTA AND ONLY RESERVES THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EXTENERAL DEFENSE, AND FINANCE. THE PROPOSAL ALSO LEAVES OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF BROAD POLITICAL PRISONER RELEASE (INCLUDING THAT OF XANANA GUSMAO), AS WELL AS REDUCTIONS IN THE MILITARY PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SHOWN INFLEXIBILITY REGARDING A KEY DEMAND OF EAST TIMORESE, SUPPORTED BY UNGA RESOLUTIONS, THAT THE EAST TIMORESE SHOULD

EVENTUALLY BE ACCORDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON THE MATTER OF THEIR OWN FUTURE THROUGH A REFERENDUM. ABSENT FLEXIBILITY ON THIS KEY QUESTION, THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL MAY HAVE DIFFICULTY GAINING ACCEPTANCE AMONG EAST TIMORESE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ANNOUNCED REMOVAL OF 1,000 TROOPS FROM EAST TIMOR SET FOR JULY 29 (IT REMAINS UNCLEAR IF THEY WILL BE REPLACED) SHOULD BE SEEN AS A GOI EFFORT TO CREATE A GOOD ATMOSPHERE FOR THE EARLY AUGUST UN-SPONSORED MINISTERIAL TALKS.

CONCLUSION

27. (C) IN SHORT, AFTER A GOOD START THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION IS STILL MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION ON REFORM. EVEN IN AREAS WHERE THE REGIME HAS APPEARED TARDY, SUCH AS IN ACKNOWLEDGING AND INVESTIGATING THE SYSTEMATIC RAPES WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE MAY RIOTS, BY RESPONDING TO PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THE MATTER THE GOI HAS DEMONSTRATED SENSITIVITY TO PUBLIC OPINION. THIS CONTINUING, IF OCCASIONALLY HALTING, PROGRESS IS IMPRESSIVE, GIVEN THE INEVITABLE DIVERTING OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FOCUS BY THE MASSIVE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS THE NATION FACES.

28. (C) AMONG ALL OF THE REFORM AREAS NOTED ABOVE, THE MOST CRITICAL ARE THOSE RELATED TO THE FREEDOM AND

FAIRNESS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. REFORM ADVOCATES WILL BE LOOKING CAREFULLY TO SEE WHETHER PRESIDENT HABIBIE ATTEMPTS TO RETAIN POWER FOR HIMSELF AND GOLKAR THROUGH NEW POLITICAL AND ELECTION LAWS WHICH, AS IN THE PAST, STACK THE DECK IN THE

GOVERNMENT'S FAVOR. THIS WILL BE A LITMUS TEST OF THE REFORM CREDENTIALS OF THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION.

29. (C) THIS REVIEW UNDERSCORES THE NEED FOR CONTINUING USG ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE GOI TO REMAIN ON THE REFORM PATH, EMPHASIZING RESPECT FOR KEY RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL POLITICAL DISSENT. THE USG SHOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE REGARDING THE TRISAKTI KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCES AND THE RIOTS, STRESSING THAT THE GOI'S CREDIBILITY AMONG FOREIGN OBSERVERS AND ITS OWN CITIZENS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE OUTCOME OF THESE INVESTIGATIONS. THE USG SHOULD EMPHASIZE TO THE GOI ITS ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE 12 KIDNAP VICTIMS STILL MISSING AND CONTINUE TO URGE THE RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. FINALLY, THE U.S. IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE ELECTION PROCESS WHICH EMERGES SHOULD LAY THE BASIS FOR A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION CONDUCTED UNDER THE SPOTLIGHT OF A FREE MEDIA.

ROY

NNNN

E45

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4215

PAGE 01 JAKART 04303 121007Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/031W

----------5E3A2A 121007Z /38

P 121004Z AUG 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3062
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AIT TAIPEI 0935
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 004303

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/12/08
TAGS: PINS, CASC, PINR, ASEC, PHUM, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: FEARS OF TROUBLE ON AUGUST 17: RUMORS GALORE BUT LITTLE CONCRETE EVIDENCE

1. CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON, 1.5 (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04303 121007Z

SUMMARY
---

2. (C) SUMMARY. JAKARTA IS AWASH WITH RUMORS OF TROUBLE ON OR ABOUT AUGUST 17, INDONESIA'S INDEPENDENCE DAY. THE SINO-INDONESIAN COMMUNITY IS ESPECIALLY FEARFUL. WE HAVE FOUND LITTLE CONCRETE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THESE RUMORS. MOREOVER, THE SECURITY FORCES APPEAR WELL POSITIONED TO DEAL WITH ANY DISTURBANCES. END SUMMARY.

RUMORS ABOUND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 30 JUN 2006 200502473

3. (C) RUMORS HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING FOR WEEKS, ESPECIALLY IN JAKARTA'S SINO-INDONESIAN COMMUNITY, OF MORE RIOTING ON OR AROUND AUGUST 17. IT IS SAID THAT THE SAME "DARK FORCES" BELIEVED TO BE BEHIND THE MAY 13-15 ANTI-CHINESE VIOLENCE ARE DETERMINED TO "FINISH WHAT THEY STARTED IN MAY." THERE ARE RUMORS THAT "PREMAN" (GANGSTER) ELEMENTS AND POSSIBLY EVEN KOPASSUS (SPECIAL FORCES) PERSONNEL LOYAL TO GENERAL PRABOWO (NOW UNDER INVESTIGATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE KIDNAPPING AND DISAPPEARANCES OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS) WILL CREATE DISTURBANCES IN RESPONSE TO THE INVESTIGATIONS OF KOPASSUS. LOCAL MILITARY OFFICIALS HAVE CONFIRMED THAT IN SOME NEIGHBORHOODS RED MARKS HAVE BEEN PAINTED ON THE HOMES OF SOME SINO-INDONESIANS, SUPPOSEDLY SINGLING THEM OUT FOR ATTACKS (WE ALSO HAVE A CREDIBLE REPORT FROM THE PHILIPPINES EMBASSY THAT THE HOUSE OF ONE THEIR

NATIONAL'S WAS SO TARGETED). ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, SUCH MARKING OF HOUSES HAS ALSO OCCURRED IN SAMARANG, CENTRAL JAVA.

BUT HARD EVIDENCE LACKING

4. (C) WHILE THERE REMAINS CONTINUING CAUSE FOR CONCERN ABOUT STABILITY HERE IN CONNECTION WITH INCREASING SOCIO-ECONOMIC PAIN GENERATED BY THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, WE HAVE FOUND NO HARD EVIDENCE THAT ANYONE IS PREPARING TO CREATE LARGE SCALE PROBLEMS ON AUGUST 17. THE SITUATION DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT OF MID-MAY. LACKING ARE THE LARGE, ALMOST DAILY DEMONSTRATIONS, THE PROVOCATIVE ACT OF THE TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS AND THE HIGH LEVEL OF TENSION AMONG THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE WHICH CHARACTERIZED THAT PERIOD.

OFFICIALS URGE CALM, DEPLOY TROOPS

5. (C) GOI OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT HABIBIE AND JAKARTA POLICE AND MILITARY COMMANDERS, HAVE REPEATEDLY DISMISSED THE RUMORS AND PROMISED THAT SECURITY FORCES WILL BE IN PLACE TO DEAL WITH ANY TROUBLE. THE CHIEF OF THE JAKARTA MILITARY DISTRICT HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THOUSANDS OF TROOPS WILL BE DEPLOYED IN THE CAPITAL AND THAT THEY WILL NOT HESITATE TO STOP RIOTS OR LOOTING. IF TROUBLE DOES DEVELOP, SINO-INDONESIANS WILL BE MUCH BETTER PREPARED THIS TIME. A NUMBER OF NEIGHBORHOOD

SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS HAVE SPRUNG UP AND THERE ARE REPORTS
CONFIDENTIAL

THAT SINO-INDONESIANS HAVE ACQUIRED FIREARMS TO DEFEND
THEIR HOMES AND BUSINESSES.
OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E46

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7681

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 04329 01 OF 02 131028Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	SGHD-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W			

----------5EB1C1 131029Z /38

R 131027Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3092
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
USMISSION GENEVA
SECDEF WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004329

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/13/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CALLS FOR REVIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE TO DEAL WITH SYSTEMIC ABUSES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04329 01 OF 02 131028Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS. REASON: 1.5 (D)

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS ISSUED A STATEMENT CALLING ON THE GOVERNMENT TO ADDRESS THE RECENT CASES OF ABRI ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A SYSTEMATIC, RATHER THAN A CASE-BY-CASE MANNER. A MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION ELABORATED TO US THE COMMISSION VIEW THAT ABRI ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS WAS CONTINUING, NOTWITHSTANDING PUBLIC CONDEMNATION AND ON-GOING INVESTIGATIONS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT ABRI CREDIBILITY WAS ERODING AS CASE AFTER CASE CAME TO LIGHT. THEREFORE THE ABUSE HAD TO BE ADDRESSED AS A SYSTEMIC PROBLEM. THE COMMISSION IS CONTINUING WITH ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF ABUSES IN ACEH, IRIAN JAYA AND EAST

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

TIMOR. IT HAS INSISTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT PURSUE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE MAY RIOTS AND RAPES AND OPPOSES THE GOVERNMENT'S NEW DECREE LIMITING PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS. THE COMMISSION HAS ALSO REITERATED ITS INSISTENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT DEAL JUSTLY WITH THE MEGAWATI FACTION OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY -- BY WITHDRAWING ITS SUPPORT OF THE RIVAL SURJADI FACTION. THE COMMISSION MEMBER LAMENTED THE MILITARY COURT DECISION WHICH FOUND TWO JUNIOR POLICE OFFICERS GUILTY IN THE KILLING OF FOUR STUDENTS. HE ARGUED THAT, TO MANY, THE TWO APPEARED TO BE SCAPE-GOATS FOR THE MILITARY. END SUMMARY

3. (U) THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ISSUED A STATEMENT AUGUST 12 WHICH CALLED UPON THE GOVERNMENT TO DEVELOP A "PRINCIPLED SOLUTION" TO THE GROWING LIST OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE BY ABRI NOW BEING REVEALED IN THE MEDIA. SPECIFICALLY, THE COMMISSION URGED A FORMAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES RELATED TO ABRI'S NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL TACTICS. IT SAID THAT REPEATED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04329 01 OF 02 131028Z

VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRIAN JAYA, EAST TIMOR AND ACEH, AS WELL AS THE UNRESOLVED TANJUNG PRIOK AND LAMPUNG CASES DEMONSTRATED THAT RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WERE SYSTEMATIC. THE COMMISSION EXPRESSED CONCERN, MOREOVER, THAT A CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH TO RESOLVING THESE MATTERS WOULD NOT PRECLUDE NEW CASES OF ABUSE ARISING.

4. (U) THE COMMISSION STATEMENT, READ BY COMMISSION CHAIRPERSON BERHANUDDIN LOPA, SINGLED OUT IRIAN JAYA, ACEH AND EAST TIMOR AS AREAS OF THE MOST SEVERE ABRI VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS. THE STATEMENT CONCLUDED: "THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A REVIEW OR COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THESE SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS." WHILE WELCOMING RECENT TROOP PULLBACKS AND MISSION REVISION FOR TROOPS IN ACEH, IRIAN JAYA AND EAST TIMOR, THE COMMISSION STATED THAT LEGAL ACTION AGAINST PERPETRATORS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS WAS REQUIRED AS WELL.

5. (U) THE COMMISSION ALSO RE-RAISED THE MATTER OF THE JULY 27, 1996 GOVERNMENT ASSAULT ON THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) WHICH WAS DEFENDED BY PDI CADRE LOYAL TO MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI. THE STATEMENT NOTED THAT THE COMMISSION'S OCTOBER 1996 RECOMMENDATIONS HAD NOT RECEIVED A GOI RESPONSE. THE COMMISSION CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW ITS SUPPORT FOR THE UP-TO-NOW GOVERNMENT-BACKED PDI FACTION LED BY SURJADI. THE COMMISSION ALSO WAS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S NEW LIMITATION ON DEMONSTRATIONS CLAIMING THAT IT SAW NO "CRITICAL CONDITION" WARRANTING SUCH A REGULATION.

6. (C) POLCOUNS MET WITH COMMISSION MEMBER CHARLES HIMAWAN TO DISCUSS THE AUGUST 12 STATEMENT AND RECENT COMMISSION ACTIVITY.

HIMAWAN SAID THAT THE COMMISSION HAD NO SPECIFIC PLAN BY WHICH
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04329 01 OF 02 131028Z
THE GOVERNMENT COULD ADDRESS SYSTEMATIC ABUSE OF RIGHTS BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY, BUT HAD SOUGHT ONLY TO MAKE THE POINT THAT A CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH TO ABRI ABUSES WOULD LEAD TO A CONTINUING LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN ABRI AMONG THE PEOPLE. MOREOVER, AS RECENT ABRI HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRIAN JAYA DEMONSTRATED, SIMPLY ACCEPTING ACCOUNTABILITY IN CERTAIN CASES WOULD NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO A BROAD IMPROVEMENT IN "HOW ABRI DEALS WITH THE PEOPLE." HIMAWAN ALSO SPECULATED THAT IF WIRANTO WERE COMPELLED TO PRESS FORWARD WITH AN ENDLESS LIST OF INVESTIGATIONS, HE WOULD ENCOUNTER GROWING OPPOSITION TO THAT PROCESS AND TO HIS OWN LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE MILITARY. (AS AN ASIDE, HE REPEATED A WIDELY HEARD RUMOR THAT WIRANTO MIGHT BE TAPPED BY HABIBIE TO BE HIS VICE PRESIDENT AT THE NOVEMBER SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY.)

7. (C) HIMAWAN ALSO QUESTIONED GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT TO PROCEED WITH INVESTIGATIONS. "THEY (THE GOVERNMENT) TRIED TO SAY THAT THE KIDNAPPING CASE WOULD BE ENOUGH BECAUSE IT WOULD GET RID OF PRABOWO." "WE REMINDED THEM," ADDED HIMAWAN, "THAT THEY HAD TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE RIOTING AND RAPING TOO." HIMAWAN ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE INVESTIGATIONS COULD NOT BE COMPLETED UNLESS FORMER JAKARTA GARRISON CHIEF (AND PRABOWO ALLY) GENERAL SYAFRI SAMSUDDIN WERE ALSO INVESTIGATED -- ESPECIALLY FOR THE JAKARTA RIOTS WHICH TOOK PLACE ON HIS WATCH AS JAKARTA AREA COMMANDER.

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7684

PAGE 01 JAKART 04329 02 OF 02 131029Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	SGHD-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W			

----------5EB1CA 131029Z /38
R 131027Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3093
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
USMISSION GENEVA
SECDEF WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004329

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/13/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CALLS FOR REVIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE TO DEAL WITH SYSTEMIC ABUSES

HIMAWAN SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD ADVISED SINO-INDONESIANS AND OVERSEAS CHINESE COMMUNITIES, THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID AN ISLAMIC BACKLASH, THE RIOT-RAPE MATTER SHOULD BE PRESENTED AS A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND NOT AS AN ANTI-CHINESE ATTACK. HE ASSESSED THAT THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON-CHINESE, SUCH AS FATHER ROMO SANDYAWAN, IN THE INVESTIGATION WAS OF PARTICULAR VALUE IN STAVING OFF SUCH A BACKLASH.

8. (C) HIMAWAN SAID THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION NOW HAS A COMMITTEE COMPRISING FIVE COMMISSION MEMBERS WHICH HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPING INTERNAL COMMISSION REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR AND IN IRIAN JAYA. THE COMMISSION IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE RECENT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE LIMITING THE RIGHT TO ASSEMBLY (THE NEW DECREE LIMITING DEMONSTRATIONS). HIMAWAN NOTED THAT THE COMMISSION WOULD BE MEETING WITH THE SUPREME ADVISORY COUNCIL AND A NUMBER OF MINISTERS LATER AUGUST 13 TO PROTEST THE DECREE AND THE FACT THAT IT WAS ISSUED AS A DECREE RATHER THAN SENT TO PARLIAMENT FOR CONSIDERATION AS A LAW.
(SEPARATELY, A MEMBER OF THE SUPREME ADVISORY COUNCIL ON AUGUST 13 CONFIRMED THAT THERE WOULD BE DISCUSSION OF THE DECREE AS WELL AS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN ACEH AND IRIAN JAYA INVOLVING THE COUNCIL, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND A NUMBER OF MINISTERS. THE COUNCIL MEMBER SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW THE REASON THE DECREE WAS ISSUED WAS THAT "THE PARLIAMENT WOULD NOT HAVE AGREED TO PASS IT AS A LAW.")

9. (C) HIMAWAN LAMENTED THE MILITARY COURT DECISION, ANNOUNCED AUGUST 12, FINDING TWO JUNIOR POLICE OFFICERS GUILTY IN THE TRISAKTI STUDENT MURDER TRIAL. ALTHOUGH THE SENTENCES WERE LIGHT

(TEN MONTHS AND FOUR MONTHS IMPRISONMENT), HIMAWAN SAID, BOTH WERE VICTIMS OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS. THERE IS WIDESPREAD BELIEF, HE SAID, THAT THE MILITARY, "PROBABLY KOPASSUS," WAS INVOLVED IN THE KILLINGS. (NOTE: EIGHT MORE DEFENDANTS, ALL POLICE, ARE SCHEDULED TO BE TRIED FOR THE TRISAKTI KILLINGS. END NOTE) OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E48

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4382

PAGE 01 JAKART 04356 01 OF 04 170927Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W			

----------5FCD4D 170928Z /38

P 170924Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3122
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 004356

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/16
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, PINR, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE'S STATE ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE MIKE OWENS; REASON 1.5(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04356 01 OF 04 170927Z
SUMMARY
---

2. (C) PRESIDENT HABIBIE DELIVERED THE ANNUAL PRE-INDEPENDENCE DAY "ADDRESS OF STATE" TO THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) ON AUGUST 15. THE SPEECH WAS LONG, ALMOST TWO HOURS, AND WIDE-RANGING. IT COVERED POLITICAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT'S ALMOST THREE MONTHS IN OFFICE, AS WELL AS SOME OF HIS FUTURE PLANS. ON POLITICS, HABIBIE REITERATED HIS 16-MONTH ELECTION TIMETABLE AND FOCUSSED ON THE NEED TO DEVELOP CIVIL SOCIETY. HE CALLED FOR A NEW PARADIGM BASED ON TRANSPARENCY AND A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH, AND A SHIFT AWAY FROM THE OLD SECURITY FOCUS. HABIBIE SUGGESTED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 30 JUN 2006 200502473

THAT THE DUAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE GIVING THE ARMED FORCES A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE "ADJUSTED," BUT HE WAS VAGUE ON THE DETAILS. HE ALSO CAUTIONED THAT MASS MOBILIZATION AND THE DEMAND FOR DEMOCRACY HAD TO BE BALANCED AGAINST THE NEED TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER.

3. (C) ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HABIBIE APOLOGIZED TO INDONESIAN SOCIETY FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE PAST THAT HAD OCCURRED IN CERTAIN AREAS, AND ALSO CONDEMNED THE VIOLENCE AGAINST SINO-INDONESIANS CARRIED OUT IN MAY. HE REVIEWED STEPS HE HAS TAKEN SINCE ASSUMING OFFICE, INCLUDING INSTRUCTING THE ARMED FORCES TO INVESTIGATE THE KIDNAPPING OF ACTIVISTS AND THE SHOOTINGS OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. HE SOUNDED A HOPEFUL NOTE ON THE PROSPECTS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE EAST TIMOR SITUATION, AND SAID THAT 30 MORE POLITICAL PRISONERS WOULD BE RELEASED SOON.

4. (C) ON THE ECONOMY, HABIBIE SAID THAT RECOVERY DEPENDED ON THE RESTORATION OF CONFIDENCE, WHICH REQUIRED POLITICAL STABILITY AND ON OVERCOMING THE TRAUMA OF THE MID-MAY RIOTS, IN WHICH MANY SINO-INDONESIANS HAD SUFFERED. HE STATED THAT INDONESIANS HAD TO BE REALISTIC ABOUT THEIR EXPECTATIONS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY. MOST IMPORTANT NOW WAS RESTORING THE CONFIDENCE OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC PRIVATE INVESTORS. INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM WOULD BE A COMBINATION OF STRONG MONETARY POLICY, WHICH HABIBIE DESCRIBED IN IMF-PROGRAM TERMS, AND A MORE EXPANSIVE FISCAL STANCE TO PROVIDE A SOCIAL SAFETY NET. THE ECONOMIC PROGRAM HAD FOUR ELEMENTS, ADDRESSING: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, CORPORATE REFORM, INCREASED EFFICIENCY AND COMPETITION, AND GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE MANAGEMENT. END SUMMARY

ON POLITICS
---

5. (C) REGARDING THE POLITICAL SITUATION, PRESIDENT HABIBIE FOCUSSED ON THE NEXT 16 MONTHS. HE REAFFIRMED HIS PLANS FOR A PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN MAY 1999, PRECEDED BY A NOVEMBER 1998 SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) TO SET THE ELECTION DATE. FOLLOWING THE GENERAL ELECTION, THE MPR WOULD MEET IN DECEMBER 1999 TO CHOOSE A NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT.

6. (C) HABIBIE REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING "CIVIL SOCIETY," WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS THE FOUNDATION OF A "JUST, OPEN AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY." HE

INVITED ALL COMPONENTS OF THE NATION TO JOIN TOGETHER IN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04356 01 OF 04 170927Z
WORKING TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE.

7. (U) TO CREATE THIS CIVIL SOCIETY, HE BELIEVED THAT A "NEW PARADIGM" WAS NEEDED, BASED ON TRANSPARENCY AND A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE. THE "OLD PARADIGM" EMPHASIZED STABILITY, A "SECURITY APPROACH," AND A "TOP DOWN MECHANISM" CONTROLLED BY A STRONG GOVERNMENT. EVENTS LEADING UP TO MAY 21 DEMONSTRATED THAT THE OLD SECURITY APPROACH HAD BECOME INADEQUATE.

8. (U) ELABORATING ON THIS NEW PARADIGM, HABIBIE ARGUED THAT AN "ADJUSTMENT" OF THE ARMED FORCES' ROLE IN SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN COMING YEARS. WHILE NOTING THAT THERE WERE HISTORICAL REASONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES' UNIQUE ROLE IN INDONESIA, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE MILITARY NEEDED TO "CONDUCT INTERNAL REFORM" IN LINE WITH THE DEMANDS OF THE REFORM ERA TO BECOME INCREASINGLY PROFESSIONAL. THIS INCLUDED ADJUSTING THE STATUS OF THE POLICE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES.

9. (U) HABIBIE NOTED THAT POLITICAL REFORM ACTIVITIES WERE BEING CARRIED OUT THROUGH BOTH THE FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THROUGH MASS DEMONSTRATIONS. HE CALLED ON COMMUNITY LEADERS TO BE WARY OF MASS MOBILIZATION WHICH, HE SAID, COULD CREATE INSTABILITY, THEREBY HURTING ECONOMIC RECOVERY. HE DESCRIBED A BALANCE BETWEEN THE

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4386

PAGE 01 JAKART 04356 02 OF 04 170928Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	MR-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W		

----------5FCD53 170928Z /38

P 170924Z AUG 98

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3123
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 004356

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/16
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, PINR, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE'S STATE ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT

NEED FOR DEMOCRACY (WHICH HE SAID GUARANTEED FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION) ON THE ONE HAND AND

THE NEED TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER ON THE OTHER.

10. (U) HABIBIE SAID THAT ONE OF HIS PRIORITIES WAS CREATING "CLEAN AND AUTHORITATIVE GOVERNANCE," FREE FROM CORRUPT, COLLUSIVE, AND NEPOTISTIC PRACTICES, WHICH IS ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE, AND WHICH IS ABLE TO RENDER SERVICES TO THE COMMUNITY IN A JUST AND EQUITABLE MANNER.

11. (U) HABIBIE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT REFORM DID NOT MEAN THE CREATION OF A NEW STATE. EVERYTHING DID NOT HAVE TO BE BUILT FROM SCRATCH, AND THERE WERE ASPECTS OF THE PRE-REFORM ERA THAT WERE STILL USEFUL. HE URGED THAT THE SPIRIT OF INDONESIAN NATIONALISM BE MAINTAINED IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE UNITY OF INDONESIA. HE STATED THAT ALL INDONESIANS WERE "LEGITIMATE CITIZENS ON A PAR WITH ANYONE ELSE" WITHIN INDONESIA."

12. (U) HABIBIE CONTENDED THAT HIS ASCENSION TO THE PRESIDENCY WAS AN ANSWER TO THE DEMANDS IN SOCIETY FOR CHANGE AND NATIONAL REFORM. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BY MAY THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL CRISIS HAD COMBINED TO CREATE A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE. FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, HABIBIE SAID, HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO RESIGN "IN ORDER TO SAVE THE NATION." REVIEWING INDONESIAN HISTORY, HABIBIE NAMED SIX HISTORIC MILESTONES. THE FIRST FOUR WERE MAY 20, 1908 (NATIONAL AWAKENING DAY), OCTOBER 28, 1928 (YOUTH PLEDGE OF ONE HOMELAND, ONE NATION, ONE LANGUAGE), AUGUST 17, 1945 (PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE), AND JANUARY 10, 1966 (BEGINNING OF NEW ORDER). THE FIFTH WAS AUGUST 10, 1995, THE FIRST FLIGHT OF ONE OF THE AIRCRAFT BUILT BY

HABIBIE. THE SIXTH WAS MAY 21 WHEN SOEHARTO STEPPED DOWN

AND HABIBIE BECAME PRESIDENT.

ON HUMAN RIGHTS
---

13. (U) PRESIDENT HABIBIE, ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT, EXPRESSED HIS "DEEPEST REGRETS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SEVERAL REGIONS COMMITTED BY INDIVIDUALS FROM THE STATE APPARATUS IN THE PAST," AND APOLOGIZED TO THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE, IN PARTICULAR TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS." (NOTE: HABIBIE DID NOT CLARIFY WHICH REGIONS HE HAD IN MIND. THE PRESS HAS REPORTED THAT HE MEANT THE AREAS FACING SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ACEH, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA. THE HEAVILY ISLAMIC PROVINCE OF ACEH HAS RECEIVED A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION IN RECENT WEEKS AND THE ARMED FORCES COMMANDER VISITED ACEH AND ALSO APOLOGIZED FOR PAST ABUSES THERE. END NOTE.) HABIBIE CONTINUED THAT THE ARMED FORCES LEADERSHIP WAS CARRYING OUT INVESTIGATIONS AND HE CALLED ON SOCIETY TO BE PATIENT.

14. (SBU) IN A SEPARATE PART OF THE SPEECH, HABIBIE ACKNOWLEDGED AND CONDEMNED THE MAY RIOTS AND RAPES. IN REFERRING TO THE MAY RIOTS, HE REFERRED TO "VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT AGAINST WOMEN, MOSTLY ETHNIC CHINESE." HE SAID THAT THESE IRRESPONSIBLE ACTS WERE DISGRACEFUL AND HAD SHAMED THE NATION, AND HE SAID THAT "WE CURSE THESE BARBARIC ACTS."

15. (SBU) HABIBIE WARNED THAT LOOTING WAS STILL CONTINUING AND THAT IT WAS SLOWING DOWN ECONOMIC RECOVERY. HE SAID

THAT LOOTING HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH REFORM AND WAS A CRIMINAL ACT THAT MUST BE TACKLED BY THE LAW. HE PLEDGED THAT "FIRMER MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN BY LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL AGAINST LOOTING."

16. (SBU) HABIBIE REITERATED THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE ARMED FORCES COMMANDER TO "INVESTIGATE THOROUGHLY" THE ABDUCTIONS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND THE SHOOTINGS OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. IT WAS NECESSARY TO CLARITY THESE ISSUES TO "RESTORE THE DIGNITY AND HONOR OF THE ARMED FORCES."

17. (SBU) LEGAL REFORM WAS A HIGH PRIORITY ISSUE FOR HABIBIE. IN THE PAST, THE LAW WAS OFTEN USED AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POWER, HE SAID. NOW, IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF "SUPREMACY OF THE LAW" WAS A MAIN PILLAR.

18. (SBU) HABIBIE STRESSED THAT A "SOLUTION" TO THE EAST TIMOR SITUATION WAS PART OF POLITICAL REFORM. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD INVITED BISHOP BELO TO EXCHANGE IDEAS, AND THAT BELO HAD GIVEN HIM CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS WHICH WERE A STARTING POINT FOR A SOLUTION. HE REITERATED THAT AN OFFER HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO PORTUGAL AND THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO GIVE EAST TIMOR SPECIAL STATUS BASED ON EXTENSIVE AUTONOMY, AND THAT THE OFFER WAS BEING

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4387

PAGE 01 JAKART 04356 03 OF 04 170928Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------5FCD57 170928Z /38

P 170924Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3124
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 004356

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/16
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, PINR, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE'S STATE ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT

SERIOUSLY STUDIED BY ALL PARTIES.

19. (U) HABIBIE REVIEWED OTHER STEPS HE HAD TAKEN SINCE ASSUMING OFFICE. 78 POLITICAL DETAINEES AND PRISONERS HAD BEEN RELEASED, AND 30 MORE WOULD SOON FOLLOW (25 REPORTEDLY WERE RELEASED AUGUST 17, SEE SEPTEL). THE GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE LOOKING INTO THE CASES OF OTHERS. THE PRESS "HAS BEEN ABLE TO COMMUNICATE NEWS AND OPINIONS FREELY WITHOUT ANY WORRIES," AND THE GOVERNMENT HAD ABOLISHED THE THREAT OF REVOKING PRINTING PERMITS. A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT CONFIRMED INDONESIA'S COMMITMENT TO RATIFY UN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS.

ON THE ECONOMY
---

20. (U) PRESIDENT HABIBIE NOTED THAT ECONOMIC RECOVERY DEPENDED ON THE RESTORATION OF CONFIDENCE WHICH REQUIRED POLITICAL STABILITY AND OVERCOMING THE TRAUMA, INFLICTED ESPECIALLY SEVERELY ON SINO-INDONESIANS, OF MAY. INDONESIANS HAD TO BE REALISTIC ABOUT THEIR EXPECTATIONS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY. DESPITE THE DIFFICULTY OF THE TASKS AHEAD, INDONESIA'S NATURAL RESOURCES, INFRASTRUCTURE, HUMAN RESOURCES, RAINFALL SINCE THE DROUGHT, AND EXISTING INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY GAVE HOPE. HABIBIE CLAIMED THAT THE FOREIGN DONOR COMMUNITY'S CONFIDENCE HAD ALREADY BEEN RESTORED, AS EVIDENCED BY THEIR SPONTANEOUS SUPPORT GIVEN IN SYMPATHY AND SOLIDARITY THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO NO LESS THAN USD 14 BILLION THIS INDONESIAN FISCAL YEAR. MOST IMPORTANT NOW WAS RESTORING THE CONFIDENCE OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC PRIVATE INVESTORS.

21. (U) INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM WOULD BE A COMBINATION OF STRONG MONETARY POLICY, WHICH HABIBIE DESCRIBED IN IMF-PROGRAM TERMS, AND A MORE EXPANSIVE FISCAL STANCE TO PROVIDE A SOCIAL SAFETY NET. THE ECONOMIC PROGRAM HAD FOUR ELEMENTS:

-- FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING RECAPITALIZATION OF RELATIVELY HEALTHY BANKS AND AN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK;

-- CORPORATE REFORM, INCLUDING MANAGING CORPORATE DEBT, IMPLEMENTING THE NEW BANKRUPTCY LAW, AND ENCOURAGING RESTRUCTURING;

-- INCREASED EFFICIENCY AND COMPETITION, INCLUDING ABOLISHING OPPORTUNITIES TO GAIN ECONOMIC RENTS, CORRUPTION, COLLUSION, CRONYISM, AND NEPOTISM, CREATING A COMPETITIVE CLIMATE IN WHICH A LIMITED NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS ACCUMULATED WEALTH, AND CLEANING UP GOVERNMENT AND STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE PROCUREMENT; AND

-- GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE MANAGEMENT.

22. (U) ONE OUTCOME OF ECONOMIC POLICY WOULD BE AN ECONOMY "WHOSE CENTER OF GRAVITY LIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE WHICH WILL...SATISFY THE NEEDS OF PEOPLE THROUGH DOMESTIC MARKETS AND WILL BE ORIENTED TO EXPORT AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTES THAT RELY ON NATURAL RESOURCES, THE EMPHASIS BEING ON A STRONG AND INDEPENDENT AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY." HABIBIE ALSO MENTIONED THE IMPORTANCE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO INDONESIA'S

DEVELOPMENT.

COMMENT
---

23. (C) HABIBIE'S SPEECH WAS FULL OF ENCOURAGING STATEMENTS. THE KEY, OF COURSE, WILL BE THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE CAN FOLLOW-UP AND MAKE IT MORE THAN RHETORIC. HABIBIE DID BREAK NEW GROUND WITH HIS APOLOGY TO INDONESIA FOR PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY THE STATE IN CERTAIN AREAS OF INDONESIA, ESPECIALLY THOSE AFFECTED BY SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS. HIS REMARKS ON THE MAY RIOTS ALSO WENT A LONG WAY TOWARD ACKNOWLEDGING THE NATION'S FAILURE TO PROTECT SINO-INDONESIAN CITIZENS.

24. (C) HABIBIE DID NOT REFER TO HIMSELF AS A TEMPORARY OR TRANSITIONAL LEADER IN THIS SPEECH. HIS TONE WAS THAT OF A POLITICIAN WHO HAD NO INTENTION OF VOLUNTARILY RETIRING FROM THE POLITICAL SCENE. THOUGH HE REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO HOLDING A FREE AND FAIR GENERAL ELECTION, HE SAID VERY LITTLE ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THE POLITICAL LAW REFORM PROPOSALS THAT ARE SAID TO BE ABOUT TO BE SENT TO PARLIAMENT.

25. (U) HABIBIE'S ECONOMIC REMARKS COVERED WELL-KNOWN GROUND (THE SOLE STARTLING MOMENT OF THE SPEECH CAME WHEN

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5064

PAGE 01 JAKART 04356 04 OF 04 171309Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W			

----------5FE264 171309Z /38

P 170924Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3125
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 004356

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/16
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, PINR, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE'S STATE ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT

HE LABELED THE AUGUST 1995 MAIDEN FLIGHT OF AN IPTN-
DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED AIRCRAFT AS THE FIFTH HISTORIC
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04356 04 OF 04 171309Z
MILESTONE OF 20TH CENTURY INDONESIA.) THE SPEECH
REFLECTED WHAT VARIOUS GROUPS IN GOVERNMENT ESPOUSE, NOT
NECESSARILY HARMONIOUSLY -- PRO-MARKET ECONOMICS, A PRO-
SMALL ANDMEDIUM ENTERPRISE BIAS, AND SCIENCE AND
TEHNOLOGY AS TOOLS OF DEVELOPMENT. IF THERE WAS NY
POINT IN HABIBIE'S SPEECH THAT DREW UNIVERAL APPROVAL, IT
WAS HIS PLEDGE TO ROOT OUT CORRUPTION, WHICH DREW REPEATED
APPLAUSE THROUGHOUT HIS REMARKS. OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ5871

PAGE 01 JAKART 04869 01 OF 02 160119Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	A-00	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CCO-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00
	DOEE-00	ITCE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXME-00	E-00
	FBIE-00	UTED-00	FBO-01	FRB-00	H-01	IMMC-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	OPR-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00
	ASDS-01	IMCC-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/036W				

----------6ADF67 160119Z /38

P 160117Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3609
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004869

S E N S I T I V E BUT UNCLASSIFIED PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SCUL ECON ELAB CASC PINS ASEC ID
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 04869 01 OF 02 160119Z
SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA, MEDAN UPDATE

REF: A) JAKARTA 4838, B) JAKARTA 4836

1. (U) SUMMARY: STUDENTS AND OTHER ACTIVISTS HELD SEVERAL DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA ON SEPTEMBER 15. STUDENTS DEMANDING LOWER PRICES FOR STAPLE GOODS MARCHED ON THE PARLIAMENT AND BULOG, THE GOI AGENCY WHICH REGULATES DISTRIBUTION OF RICE AND OTHER STAPLES. STUDENTS ALSO HELD DEMONSTRATIONS AT GAMBIR, NEAR THE NATIONAL MONUMENT, AND AT THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA WHERE THEY DEMANDED LOWER FOOD PRICES ND THE RESIGNATION OF HABIBIE. AT ONE DEMONSRATION STUDENTS ALSO DEMANDED THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 03 JUL 2006 200502473

DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT. ACROSS TOWN AT THE STATE SECRETARIAT IN JAKARTA ABOUT 300 MUSLIM ACTIVIST DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND SCUFFLED WITH POLICE. MEANWHILE IN SUMATRA, STRIKING BUS DRIVERS IN MEDAN, INDONESIA'S THIRD LARGEST CITY RETURNED TO WORK, AS THEIR DEMANDS WERE PARTIALLY MET. END SUMMARY

STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS
---

2. (SBU) UNIVERSITY STUDENTS STAGED SEVERAL SMALL DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA ON SEPTEMBER 15. ABOUT FIVE BUSLOADS OF STUDENTS FROM TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY, A FOCAL POINT OF STUDENT POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN MAY, MARCHED ON THE PARLIAMENT DEMANDING THAT PRICES OF STAPLE GOODS BE LOWERED AND THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE RESIGN. THE TRISAKTI STUDENTS DISPERSED AROUND MIDDAY, BUT REGROUPED WITH UP TO 1000 OTHER ACTIVISTS AT THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY (LBH)

HEADQUARTERS, WHERE OPPOSITION LEADER AMIEN RAIS PARTICIPATED IN A VIGIL FOR ACTIVISTS WHO WERE KIDNAPPED PRIOR TO THE FALL OF THE SOEHARTO REGIME IN MAY. AN FSN REPORTED THAT SECURITY FORCES WERE DEPLOYED IN HEAVY CONCENTRATIONS AROUND LBH WHILE RAIS SPOKE. THE TRISAKTI STUENTS MOVED ON IN MID-AFTERNOON FROM LBH TO BULOG THE GOI AGENCY WHICH REGULATES DISTRIBUTION F STAPLE FOODS LIKE RICE, TO PRESS THEIR PINT THAT FOOD HAS BECOME TOO COSTLY.

3. (SU) STUDENTS ALSO STAGED A SMALL DEMONSTRATION AT THE INSTITUTE FOR ADMINISTRATION IN CENTRAL JAKARTA, WHERE THEY UNFURLED LARGE BANNERS DEMANDING A REDUCTION IN PRICES AND THE PROSECUTION OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FOR CORRUPTION. (NOTE: AFTER COB, A SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL QUOTED PRESIDENT HABIBIE AS STATING THAT SOEHARTO HAD AGREED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM BY A TEAM INVESTIGATING HIS WEALTH THIS WEEK. END NOTE)

4. (SBU) ALSO ON SEPTEMBER 15, A GROUP OF ABOUT 200 STUDENTS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA GATHERED IN THE VICINITY OF THE NATIONAL MONUMENT, NOT FAR FROM THE GAMBIR TRAIN STATION AND MILITARY POLICE HEADQUARTERS, TO PRESS THE FAMILIAR DEMANDS: LOWER PRICES AND HABIBIE'S RESIGNATION. A RELIABLE STUDENT CONTACT CALLED POLOFF AROUND COB SEPTEMBER 15 TO REPORT THAT "A VERY LARGE GROUP" OF STUDENTS WERE GATHERING ON THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA CAMPUS AT DEPOK SOUTH OF JAKARTA TO DEMAND "LOWER PRICES, HABIBIE'S RESIGNATION, AND THE DISSOLUTION

OF PARLIAMENT."

MUSLIM ACTIVISTS: "LET OUR PEOPLE GO"

5. (SBU) ACROSS THE PARK FROM THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATION NEAR THE GAMIR STATION, ABOUT 200 MUSLIM ACTIVISTS GATHERD IN FRONT OF THE STATE SECRETARIAT, PART OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE COMPLEX. THEY DEMANDED THAT MUSLIM ACTIVISTS JAILED BY THE GOI BE RELEASED, AND REPORTEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT SOME ALLEGED COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO HAD BEEN JAILED SINCE THE ATTEMPTED COUP OF 1966 HAD BEEN RECENTLY RELEASED, WHILE "MUSLIM BELIEVERS" LANGUISHED IN PRISON. THE DEMONSTRATORS BRIEFLY SCUFFLED WITH POLICE BEFORE RETREATING TO THE NEARBY NATIONAL MOSQUE. (NOTE: ISLAMIC-HUE DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEEN MORE NUMEROUS LATELY, PARTICULARLY AS THEY COMMEMORATED ON SEPTEMBER 12 THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE TANJUNG PRIOK INCIDENT. SEE REF B. END NOTE.)

BANK EMPLOYEES IN JAKARTA, DRIVERS IN MEDAN

6. (SBU) ALSO ON SEPTEMBER 15, DISGRUNTLED BANK WORKERS STAGED TWO SMALL PROTESTS IN JAKARTA AFTER BEING LAID OFF. ONE GROUP GATHERED AT THE HOME OF BOB HASAN, ONE OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS OF SOEHARTO'S CRONIES. THE OTHER GROUP PROTESTED IN FRONT OF THE NATIONAL BANK OF

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	A-00	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CCO-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00
	DOEE-00	ITCE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXME-00	E-00
	FBIE-00	UTED-00	FBO-01	FRB-00	H-01	IMMC-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	OPR-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00

ASDS-01 IMCC-01 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-04 G-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 /036W
----------6ADF6A 160119Z /38

P 160117Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3610
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004869

S E N S I T I V E BUT UNCLASSIFIED PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SCUL ECON ELAB CASC PINS ASEC ID
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 04869 02 OF 02 160119Z
SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA, MEDAN UPDATE

REF: A) JAKARTA 4838, B) JAKARTA 4836

INDONESIA. MEANWHILE STRIKING BUS DRIVERS, ANGERED BY HIGH PRICES FOR SPARE PARTS, RETURNED TO WORK IN MEDAN. THEIR STRIKE ON SEPTEMBER 14 HAD PARALYZED INDONESIA'S THIRD LARGEST CITY AND CAUSED FEARS OF WIDESPREAD LOOTING AND UNREST (REF A.) IN AN AGREEMENT BROKERED BY THE GOVERNOR OF NORTH SUMATRA, DEALERS FOR SPARE PARTS REPORTEDLY PLEDGED TO FREEZE PRICES FOR TWO MONTHS.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO2273

PAGE 01 JAKART 04972 210956Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CCO-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FBO-01
	FRB-00	H-01	IMMC-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	OPR-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	IMCC-01	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/036W

------------------6CBE05 210956Z /38

P 210953Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3705
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 004972

CINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/21/03
TAGS: PGOV, CASC, PINS, ASEC, PHUM, ECON, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT ORGANIZES "SPONTANEOUS" DEMONSTRATION

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04972 210956Z
REF: JAKARTA 4836

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (U) THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE BEHIND A "SPONTANEOUS" (SPONTAN) DEMONSTRATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT AT THE PARLIAMENT SEPTEMBER 21. APPROXIMATELY 1,500 DEMONSTRATORS GATHERED AT THE GATES OF PARLIAMENT, WITH MORE ARRIVING AS OF COB. THE DEMONSTRATORS ARRIVED BY BUS, INCLUDING NINE BUSES OWNED BY THE "SAFEWAY" LINE OWNED BY "TUTUT," DAUGHTER OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO.

3. (U) DEMONSTRATORS WORE WHITE HEADBANDS WHICH IDENTIFIED THEM

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 03 JUL 2006 200502473

AS MEMBERS OF A RANGE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NONE OF WHICH WE HAVE HEARD OF. MOST PEOPLE, WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY THE ORGANIZATION THEY REPRESENTED IMMEDIATELY ANSWERED THAT THEY WERE "FROM THE PEOPLE." WHEN PRESSED, SEVERAL CHECKED THEIR HEADBANDS TO SEE WHAT ORGANIZATION THEY WERE PURPORTING TO REPRESENT. THE ONLY LARGE BANNER SEEN READ: "LONG LIVE ABRI WHICH DEFENDS THE HAPPINESS OF THE PEOPLE." A JOURNALIST WHO ENGAGED ONE MIDDLE-AGED MAN ABOUT THE GROUP'S ASPIRATIONS WAS TOLD THAT FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SHOULD SIT DOWN WITH OPPOSITION LEADERS MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI AND AMIEN RAIS TO CONFESS MUTUALLY THEIR FAULTS. BEYOND THAT, PRESIDENT HABIBIE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE HIS REFORMS.

4. (U) DEMONSTRATORS, MOST OF WHOM LOUNGED IN WHAT SHADE COULD BE FOUND, TOLD POLCOUNS THEY WERE FROM DEPOK, BEKASI AND VARIOUS PARTS OF JAKARTA. THEY CLAIMED THEIR DEMONSTRATION WAS "SPONTANEOUS." MANY IN THE OBVIOUSLY POOR, ALMOST RAGGED CROWD BEGGED MONEY FROM POLCOUNS AND THE FEW WESTERN JOURNALISTS ON THE

SCENE.

5. (U) AT ONE POINT, SEVEN BUSES OF STUDENTS FROM TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ATTEMPTED TO DRIVE TO THE DEMONSTRATION SITE BUT WERE BLOCKED FROM DOING SO BY POLICE. EVENTUALLY, THEY DEPARTED THE SCENE. AS OF COB WE HAVE A REPORT FROM A MILITARY OFFICIAL WHO SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO THE PRO-GOVERNMENT "SAVE THE NATION" DEMONSTRATION, THE STUDENT ORGANIZATION "FORUM KOTA" WAS ON THE SCENE IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON AND THERE WAS SECURITY FORCE CONCERN ABOUT A POSSIBLE CLASH. AS OF COB, DAO OFFICER SAW ONLY THE PRO-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION, AND A HEAVY POLICE/MILITARY PRESENCE AT THE SITE. HOWEVER, AT COB, POLCOUNS SAW 11 BUSES CARRYING STUDENT ACTIVISTS HALTED BY ABOUT 200 INDONESIAN MARINES NEAR THE NATIONAL MONUMENT. ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT, THE STUDENTS WERE TRYING TO REACH THE U.S. EMBASSY SO THEY COULD DEMONSTRATE THERE.

6. (C) COMMENT: AFTER WEEKS OF GROWING CALLS BY THE GOI FOR AN END TO DEMONSTRATIONS IT APPEARS THE GOI HAS CHOSEN TO ORGANIZE ITS OWN DEMONSTRATION. REFTEL NOTES A SIMILAR, SMALLER EFFORT ON SEPTEMBER 14. STUDENT CONTACTS FROM "FORUM KOTA" ALERTED US OVER THE WEEKEND TO THEIR PLANS TO STAGE DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE DPR ON SEPTEMBER 21, 22 AND 23. AS OF COB, IT APPEARS STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS FOR SEPTEMBER 21 HAVE BEEN FOILED. ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4628

PAGE 01 JAKART 05029 01 OF 02 231028Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CCO-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00
	FBO-01	FRB-00	H-01	IMMC-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	OPR-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	IMCC-01
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00

/037W

----------6DAC76 231028Z /38

P 231023Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3775
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 005029

CINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/23/03
TAGS: PGOV, CASC, PINS, ASEC, PHUM, ECON, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE AT PARLIAMENT, FARMERS AND OTHERS JOIN IN PROTESTS IN MEDAN SEPTEMBER 23, OTHER NOTES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05029 01 OF 02 231028Z

REF: JAKARTA 4972

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (U) SUMMARY: APPROXIMATELY 1000 STUDENTS HELD A DEMONSTRATION AT THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING (DPR) IN JAKARTA ON SEPTEMBER 23. THEY DEMANDED LOWER PRICES, AN END TO MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS, THAT FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE AND PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S RESIGNATION. AT THE DPR, SECURITY FORCES SLIGHTLY OUTNUMBERED THE DEMONSTRATORS. IN MEDAN, TWO GROUPS OF FARMERS AND STUDENTS, EACH NUMBERING 500-700, DEMONSTRATED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 03 JUL 2006 200502473

OUTSIDE THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE AND ALSO AT THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE, DEMANDING LOWER PRICES, AND AN END TO THE MILITARY'S INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS. END SUMMARY.

STUDENTS RETURN TO PARLIAMENT

3. (C) ON SEPTEMBER 23, ABOUT 1000 STUDENTS DEMANDED LOWER PRICES, AN END TO MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS, AND PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S RESIGNATION AT THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT (DPR) IN JAKARTA. THE DEMONSTRATION WAS ORGANIZED BY "FORUM KOTA," A CONSORTIUM OF STUDENT ACTIVISTS FROM VARIOUS UNIVERSITIES IN JAKARTA. AS OF COB, THE GROUP REMAINED AT THE SITE. POLCOUNS, ON THE SCENE, ESTIMATED AT LEAST 1000 POLICE AND MILITARY ARMED AND IN RIOT GEAR.

4. (U) A DECISION BY SECURITY FORCES TO COMPEL THE DEMONSTRATORS TO REMAIN ON THE MAJOR TOLL ROAD WHICH RUNS IN FRONT OF THE

PARLIAMENT (AND NOT APPROACH THE FENCE SURROUNDING THE COMPLEX) LED TO MASSIVE TRAFFIC JAMS WHICH PUT MUCH OF CENTRAL JAKARTA INTO GRIDLOCK -- AT RUSH HOUR. SIGNS AND BANNERS CALLED FOR SOEHARTO TO BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE, FOR HABIBIE TO STEP DOWN, FOR PRICES TO BE LOWERED AND FOR THE MILITARY TO CEASE ITS INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS. ONE LARGE SIGN READ, "HABIBIE PLUS WIRANTO EQUALS SOEHARTO," ANOTHER PROCLAIMED THAT HABIBIE WAS SOEHARTO'S PUPPET. SEVERAL BANNERS ALSO DECLARED, "FORUM KOTA IS NOT COMMUNIST," A RESPONSE TO CHARGES CROPPING UP IN SOME ISLAMIC PRO-GOVERNMENT TABLOIDS. AS OF 1700, THE NON-VIOLENT DEMONSTRATION WAS CONTINUING. RUMORS AMONG THE MEDIA COVERING THE DEMONSTRATION CLAIMED THAT THE STUDENTS INTENDED TO ENTER THE COMPLEX AND OVERNIGHT THERE TO AWAIT A LARGE GROUP OF FARMERS PURPORTEDLY SET TO DEMONSTRATE AT THE DPR SEPTEMBER 24.

MEANWHILE IN MEDAN...

5. (SBU) MEANWHILE IN MEDAN, NORTH SUMATRA, INDONESIA'S THIRD LARGEST CITY, SIMILAR SIZED DEMONSTRATIONS (500-700 PARTICIPANTS) TOOK PLACE AT THE GOVERNOR'S PALACE AND ALSO AT THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT SEPTEMBER 23. THE DEMONSTRATORS VOICED COMMON THEMES, CALLING FOR THE END OF THE MILITARY'S INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS ("THE DWI FUNGSI" OR DUAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE); A REDUCTION IN PRICES FOR STAPLES; AND AN END TO UNJUST SEIZURE OF LAND BY THE GOVERNMENT, MILITARY AND CONGLOMERATES. THE EMBASSY'S MEDAN FSN WAS ON THE SCENE AND SAW BANNERS READING "LET THE GOVERNOR UNDERSTAND THE PEOPLE ARE POOR NOW," AND "END MILITARY VIOLENCE,". ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT, THE GOVERNOR AND

THE MILITARY COMMANDER OF NORTH SUMATRA CAME OUT OF THE BUILDING TO SPEAK WITH THE PROTESTORS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05029 01 OF 02 231028Z

MARCH ON SOEHARTO'S HOUSE

6. (U) WE HAVE ALSO HEARD REPORTS OF TWO OTHER MINOR DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA SEPTEMBER 23. ONE GROUP REPORTEDLY TRIED TO APPROACH THE RESIDENCE OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ON CENDANA STREET IN CENTRAL JAKARTA. (NOTE: PUBLIC CLAMOR FOR A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OF SOEHARTO'S CORRUPTION HAS BEEN GROWING LATELY. END NOTE.) ANOTHER GROUP REPORTEDLY HELD A SMALL GATHERING AT THE NATIONAL MONUMENT IN CENTRAL JAKARTA.

SEPTEMBER 21 DEMONSTRATION TURNED UGLY

7. (U) THE GOVERNMENT-ORGANIZED DEMONSTRATION REPORTED REFTEL, TURNED UGLY AT THE END WITH DEMONSTRATORS DEMANDING MONEY FROM PASSING MOTORISTS. SOME CAR WINDSHIELDS WERE BROKEN AND ROOFS CAVED IN AS DEMONSTRATORS CLIMBED ONTO THE CARS WHICH WERE TRAPPED IN A MASSIVE TRAFFIC JAM. EARLIER IN THE DAY SEVERAL HUNDRED STUDENTS HAD PROTESTED AT THE PARLIAMENT BUT HAD BEEN FORCED TO MOVE ON BY THE AUTHORITIES, APPARENTLY TO MAKE WAY FOR THE GOVERNMENT-ORGANIZED DEMONSTRATION. LATER IN THE DAY, POLCOUNS SAW A SEVEN-BUS CONVOY OF TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS BLOCKED FROM DEMONSTRATING AT THE DPR WHILE THE GOVERNMENT-ORGANIZED DEMONSTRATION WAS UNDERWAY. THE GOVERNMENT-ORGANIZED DEMONSTRATORS TOLD A WESTERN JOURNALIST THAT THEY RECEIVED 20,000

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4629

PAGE 01 JAKART 05029 02 OF 02 231028Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CCO-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00
	FBO-01	FRB-00	H-01	IMMC-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	OPR-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	IMCC-01

PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-04 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00
/037W

----------6DAC77 231028Z /38

P 231023Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3776
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 005029

CINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/23/03
TAGS: PGOV, CASC, PINS, ASEC, PHUM, ECON, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE AT PARLIAMENT, FARMERS AND OTHERS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05029 02 OF 02 231028Z
JOIN IN PROTESTS IN MEDAN SEPTEMBER 23, OTHER NOTES

REF: JAKARTA 4972

RUPIAH PER PERSON TO PARTICIPATE (APPROXIMATELY USD 1.90).

CENTRAL JAVA DEMONSTRATIONS
---

8. (U) IN NOT-PREVIOUSLY REPORTED DEMONSTRATIONS, PRESS REPORTS CLAIM THAT 1,500 STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN SEMARANG, CENTRAL JAVA SEPTEMBER 21. THE STUDENTS CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO REDUCE PRICES ON STAPLES AND TO INVESTIGATE FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND HIS "CRONIES."
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO7019

PAGE 01 JAKART 05241 061047Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	DINT-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/027W					

----------728AB0 061047Z /38

R 061037Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3965
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
DIA WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 005241

CINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/03
TAGS: PGOV, CASC, PINS, PHUM, MILI, ID
SUBJECT: ON ARMED FORCES DAY, AS ANTI-MILITARY PROTESTERS - DEMONSTRATE, HABIBIE WARNS OF "RADICALS;"

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05241 061047Z

REF: JAKARTA 5213

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (U) SUMMARY: PRESIDENT HABIBIE, IN HIS OCTOBER 5 ARMED FORCES DAY SPEECH, WARNED OF RADICALS AND REVOLUTIONARIES AND URGED ABRI TO SAFEGUARD THE REFORM PROCESS HE CLAIMS IS UNDERWAY. HIS COMMENTS WERE SET AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF SMALL- TO MEDIUM-SIZE DEMONSTRATIONS IN FIVE INDONESIAN CITIES WHICH CALLED FOR AN END TO ABRI'S INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS. ABRI COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO, IN COMMENTS TO THE PRESS, WAS CRITICAL OF FORMER ABRI LEADERS WHO ARE NOW ANTI-REGIME. MEGAWATI APPEARED AT THE 53RD

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 03 JUL 2006 200502473

ANNIVERSARY CEREMONIES AND SEEMED TO LEND SUPPORT TO ARGUMENTS URGING RETENTION, IN SOME MANNER, OF ABRI'S SOCIO-POLITICAL ROLE. END SUMMARY

3. (U) OCTOBER 5 CEREMONIES MARKING THE FOUNDING OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI), FOR THE FIRST TIME, WERE MARKED BY DEMONSTRATIONS IN A NUMBER OF CITIES WHICH HAD AN ANTI-MILITARY CHARACTER. IN ADDITION TO DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA (REFTEL), DEMONSTRATIONS DEMANDING AN END TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS (ANTI-DUAL FUNCTION, AKA "DWIFUNGSI") TOOK PLACE IN JOGJAKARTA, SURABAYA, SEMARANG AND BOGOR. ALL TRANSPIRED PEACEFULLY.

4. (U) MEANWHILE, IN JAKARTA, PRESIDENT HABIBIE WARNED ABRI ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF "SMALL RADICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS." "SLOWLY THERE IS A TREND AMONG SOME SMALL GROUPS IN SOCIETY THAT SHOWS THE EMERGENCE OF SEEDS OF RADICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS WHICH CLAIM TO SPEAK AND ACT FOR THE

CONFIDENTIAL

REFORM MOVEMENT." HE CALLED ON ABRI TO "SAFEGUARD THE PURITY OF THE NATION'S CURRENT REFORM CAMPAIGN SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE TARNISHED BY MANEUVERS OF RADICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS." HE ALSO WARNED OF GROUPS WHICH WERE "OPENLY WORKING TO CREATE AN UNCONTROLLABLE, UNSAFE AND UNSTABLE SITUATION." "THE NATION'S EFFORTS TO OVERCOME THE CRISIS AND CONTINUE WITH REFORM MUST SUCCEED WITHOUT THEIR BEING EXPLOITED BY ANY THIRD PARTIES," HE ADDED.

5. (U) ABRI COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO, FOR HIS PART, TOLD THE PRESS THAT "ABRI MUST TAKE FIRM ACTION AGAINST ANY RIOTERS TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF MOST OF INDONESIA'S 200 MILLION PEOPLE WHO DO NOT KNOW ABOUT OR EXPECT ANY SECURITY DISTURBANCES." REGARDING THE "NATIONAL FRONT," A GROUP OF RETIRED ABRI OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF THE REGIME, WIRANTO SPOKE OF "MEMBERS OF ABRI'S FAMILY WHO RAN FROM ABRI'S COMMITMENT."

6. (U) ABRI APPEARED TO DRAW A MODICUM OF SUPPORT FROM PROMINENT OPPOSITION POLITICIAN MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI WHO ATTENDED THE ARMED FORCES DAY CEREMONIES. MEGAWATI TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE "CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS COULD HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON ABRI'S RECOGNITION OF ITS SECURITY AND SOCIOPOLITICAL ROLES." THE STATEMENT APPEARED TO SUGGEST MEGAWATI'S SUPPORT FOR CONTINUATION OF ABRI'S SOCIOPOLITICAL ROLE, OR "DUAL FUNCTION".

7. (C) EARLIER, MEGAWATI SIGNALED HER SUPPORT FOR RETENTION OF ABRI'S DUAL FUNCTION TO SOME DEGREE WHEN IN A SEPTEMBER 28 LUNCH WITH POLCOUNS SHE SAID THAT SHE WAS PREPARED TO SEE RETENTION OF BETWEEN 50 AND 75 ABRI MEMBERS IN THE PARLIAMENT (DPR). THE

GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL IS FOR 55 ABRI MEMBERS AND MANY IN THE REFORM/OPPOSITION CAMP, INCLUDING MANY SENIOR MEMBERS OF
CONFIDENTIAL

MEGAWATI'S PDI, HAVE SAID THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO UNELECTED ABRI REPRESENTATION IN THE DPR. IN THAT CONVERSATION, MEGAWATI SAID SHE FAVORED "STEP BY STEP" CHANGES IN ABRI'S DUAL FUNCTION.

8. (C) COMMENT: SEPARATE INVESTIGATIONS INTO ABRI INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPING, TORTURE AND POSSIBLE KILLING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND THE SHOOTING DEATH OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS HAVE SHOWN LITTLE PROGRESS IN RECENT MONTHS. MEANWHILE, CHARGES OF ABRI ATROCITIES IN ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, LAMPUNG, TANJUNG PRIOK AND EAST TIMOR CONTINUE TO REVERBERATE. IRONICALLY, A KEY PART OF THE REFORM PROCESS THAT HABIBIE HAS CALLED UPON ABRI TO SAFEGUARD ENTAILS ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE IN THESE CASES. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4811

PAGE 01 JAKART 05340 01 OF 02 140803Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	CIAE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00	FBO-01	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W		

----------7567F8 140803Z /38

R 140752Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4064
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
DIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AIT TAIPEI 1027
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 005340

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

CINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05340 01 OF 02 140803Z
SINGAPORE FOR DEA MICHAEL FEGURSON
BANGKOK FOR FBI RALPH HORTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC, PGOV,
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETING WITH LT. GENERAL ROESMANHADI, CHIEF OF THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE

1.(SBU) SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR ROY PAID A COURTESY CALL ON LT GENERAL ROESMANHADI, CHIEF OF THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE (INP), ON OCTOBER 7. THE AMBASSADOR THANKED ROESMANHADI FOR PROVIDING EXTRA SECURITY AT USG FACILITIES IN LIGHT OF THE BOMBINGS IN AFRICA.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 03 JUL 2006 200502473

AMBASSADOR ASKED ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION DURING THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY FROM NOVEMBER 10-14 IN JAKARTA AND DURING THE PARTAI DEMOKRASI INDONESIA (PDI) CONGRESS FROM OCTOBER 8-10 IN BALI. GENERAL ROESMANHADI TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE POLICE HAVE FORMED A SPECIAL TEAM TO INVESTIGATE THE REPORTS OF MASS RAPES DURING THE MAY UNREST. HE STATED THAT IT WAS CLEAR RAPES HAD TAKEN PLACE. REGARDING THE FOUR STUDENTS FROM TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY WHO WERE KILLED ON MAY 12, GENERAL ROESMANHADI SAID THAT THE POLICE ARE CONTINUING TO INVESTIGATE BUT DID NOT HAVE ANY SUSPECTS AT THIS TIME. GENERAL ROESMANHADI EXPLAINED THE PROCEDURES FOR THE POLICE TO SEPARATE FROM THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES. END SUMMARY.

2. (SBU) AMBASSADOR ROY, ACCOMPANIED BY THE RSO AND ARSO, PAID A COURTESY CALL ON LT GENERAL ROESMANHADI, CHIEF OF THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE (INP), ON OCTOBER 7.

AMBASSADOR ROY CONGRATULATED THE GENERAL ON HIS RECENT PROMOTION TO CHIEF OF THE INP. HE EXPRESSED HIS CONFIDENCE THAT, UNDER THE GENERAL'S LEADERSHIP, THE INP WILL BE ABLE TO ADDRESS THE CURRENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS EFFECTIVELY. AMBASSADOR ROY THANKED GENERAL ROESMANHADI FOR PROVIDING EXTRA SECURITY AT USG FACILITIES FOLLOWING THE BOMBINGS IN AFRICA. HE ALSO EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE SUPPORT THE INP HAS PROVIDED DURING DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE EMBASSY.

3. (SBU) AMBASSADOR ROY ASKED FOR THE GENERAL'S OPINION REGARDING THE SECURITY SITUATION LEADING UP TO AND DURING THE SPECIAL CONSULATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) THAT WILL BE HELD IN JAKARTA FROM NOVEMBER 10-14. GENERAL ROESMANHADI STATED THAT THE NUMBER OF POLICE WOULD BE INCREASED AND THAT THEY WOULD BE PROVIDED SPECIAL EQUIPMENT IN ANTICIPATION OF POTENTIAL PROBLEMS SURROUNDING THE SPECIAL ASSEMBLY.

4. (SBU) IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUERY ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE UPCOMING PARTAI DEMOKRASI INDONESIA PERJUANGAN (PDI) CONFERENCE, FROM OCTOBER 8-10 IN BALI, GENERAL ROESMANHADI SAID HE IS CONFIDENT THAT LAW AND ORDER WILL BE MAINTAINED. HE EXPLAINED THAT SINCE BALI IS INDONESIA'S MAJOR TOURIST CENTER, THERE HAVE BEEN CONCERNS ABOUT SECURITY THERE DURING THE PDI CONGRESS. HE ADDED THAT THE POLICE HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE SECURITY ARM OF THE PDI TO COORDINATE SECURITY FOR THE EVENT. GENERAL

ROESMANHADI NOTED THAT TOURISM IN BALI HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 05340 01 OF 02 140803Z

5. (SBU) GENERAL ROESMANHADI TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE POLICE HAVE FORMED A SPECIAL TEAM TO INVESTIGATE THE REPORTS OF MASS RAPES DURING THE MAY UNREST. HE STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THERE WERE INCIDENTS OF RAPES DURING THE MAY UNREST BUT NOT TO THE EXTENT REPORTED BY THE MEDIA. REGARDING THE FOUR STUDENTS FROM TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY WHO WERE KILLED ON MAY 12, GENERAL ROESMANHADI SAID THAT THE POLICE ARE CONTINUING TO INVESTIGATE BUT DID NOT HAVE ANY FURTHER SUSPECTS AT THIS TIME. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE POLICE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE WEAPONS USED TO SHOOT THE STUDENTS.

6. (SBU) AMBASSADOR ROY ASKED ABOUT THE RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE POLICE WOULD SEPARATE FROM NDONESIAN ARMED FORCES. GENERAL ROESMANHADI EXPLAINED THAT IN APRIL OF 1999, THE POLICE WOULD COME UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY UNTIL THE YEAR 2000. AT THAT TIME A DECISION WILL BE MADE TO DETERMINE IF THE POLICE SHOULD BE UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HOME AFFAIRS OR DIRECTLY UNDER THE PRESIDENT. GENERAL ROESMANHADI REQUESTED THE AMBASSADOR'S SUPPORT FOR

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4814

PAGE 01 JAKART 05340 02 OF 02 140803Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	CIAE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00	FBO-01	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W		

----------7567FD 140803Z /38

R 140752Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4065
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE

DIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AIT TAIPEI 1028
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 005340

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

CINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05340 02 OF 02 140803Z
SINGAPORE FOR DEA MICHAEL FEGURSON
BANGKOK FOR FBI RALPH HORTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC, PGOV,
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETING WITH LT. GENERAL ROESMANHADI, CHIEF OF THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE

TRAINING FOR THE INP. THE AMBASSADOR STATED THAT HE HOPES TO SEE MORE OPPORTUNITIES AND COOPERATION IN THIS AREA, BUT THAT CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL REVIEW OF ANY PROPOSED COOPERATION. THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED APRECIATION FOR GOOD COOPERATION WITH FBI AND DEA PERSONNEL ON VARIOUS MATTERS.

7. THE AMBASSADOR RAISED THE RECENT CLAIMS BY MEMBERS OF AN NGO TEAM RESEARCHING THE MAY 13-15 RIOTS THAT THEY HAD SUFFERED QUOTE INTIMIDATION AND TERROR UNQUOTE AS A RESULT OF THEIR WORK. GENERAL ROESMANHADI SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER. ALSO IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, THE GENERAL SAID THE POLICE WERE LOOKING INTO THE STONING OF THE HOUSE OF OPPOSITION FIGURE ARIFIN PONIGORO.

8. THE GENERAL RAISED THE RECENT KILLINGS AT BANYUWANGI IN EAST JAUA, NOTING THAT IT APPEARED THAT THE KILLINGS MIGHT HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT BY PERSONS SEEKING REVENGE FOR THE 1965-66 KILLINGS OF ALLEGED PKI CADRE AND THEIR FAMILIES. ONE SUSPECT APPEARED TO BE OF PKI BACKGROUND.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO2919

PAGE 01 JAKART 05491 221028Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CCO-00	CIAE-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00	FBO-01	H-01
	IMMC-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	OPR-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00
	ASDS-01	IMCC-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/032W				

----------7897E4 221028Z /38

R 221013Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4231
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS JAKARTA 005491

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ASEC, PREL, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: SMALL DEMONSTRATIONS AT EMBASSY, PARLIAMENT, PALACE 10/22

REF: A) JAKARTA 5443, B) JAKARTA 5471

1. (U) FOUR SMALL AND ONE MEDIUM-SIZED DEMONSTRATIONS WERE STAGED IN JAKARTA OCTOBER 22. ONE WAS IN FRONT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY,

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05491 221028Z
THREE WERE AT THE PARLIAMENT AND ONE VERY SMALL DEMONSTRATION WAS AT THE PALACE. AT THE EMBASSY, APPROXIMATELY 40 YOUTHS CHANTED LOUDLY FOR OVER AN HOUR BEFORE DISPERSING. THE SMALL BUT BOISTEROUS GROUP WAS WELL DISCIPLINED, REMAINING BEHIND BARRIERS. THE GROUP'S PROTEST TARGETED U.S. ACADEMIC JEFFERY WINTERS, WHOSE COMMENTS ABOUT ECONOMIC COORDINATING MINISTER GINANJAR'S ALLEGED CORRUPT DEALINGS WITH U.S. MINING FIRM "FREEPORT" HAS RECEIVED EXTENSIVE PRESS COVERAGE (REF A). DEMONSTRATORS REFERRED TO WINTERS AND ECONIT (A LOCAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION WHICH DEVELOPED INFORMATION USED BY WINTERS) AS "SCANDAL MONGERS AND TROUBLEMAKERS" AND DEMANDED THAT THEY BE INVESTIGATED. A SENIOR POLICE OFFICIAL ON THE SCENE TOLD RSO AND POLCOUNS THAT THE DEMONSTRATORS WERE "FROM THE GOVERNMENT" ("DARI GOVERNMENT").

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 03 JUL 2006 200502473

2. (U) AFTER COB, THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR FOR THE AMERICAS CALLED POLCOUNS REGARDING THE DEMONSTRATION, FIRST ASKING WHO ORGANIZED IT AND THEN REITERATING WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS "MINISTER ALATAS'S POINT TO THE AMBASSADOR (REF A) THAT WINTERS IS FREE TO COME BACK." WE DON'T RECALL RECEIVING SUCH CALLS FROM DFA ON ANY OF OUR PREVIOUS DEMONSTRATIONS.

3. (U) AT THE PARLIAMENT, MID-MORNING, 30 PROTESTORS OF UNKNOWN AFFILIATION DEMONSTRATED AT THE FRONT GATE OF PARLIAMENT FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS THIS MORNING. FIFTEEN OF THE GROUP WERE ALLOWED IN TO MEET PARLIAMENT REPRESENTATIVES. AMONG THEIR DEMANDS: PARLIAMENT MEMBERS SHOULD "DO THEIR JOB WELL OR RESIGN". THEY ALSO CALLED FOR REMOVAL OF PARLIAMENT SPEAKER HARMOKO AND DEMANDED FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO BE BROUGHT TO COURT. THEY URGED THAT IF THEIR DEMANDS WERE NOT MET, THEN THE SPECIAL PARLIAMENT (MPR) SESSION SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER SHOULD NOT BE HELD.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JAKART 05491 221028Z

4. (U) SHORTLY THEREAFTER, A SECOND GROUP OF ABOUT 50 STUDENTS FROM THE "JAKARTA MUSLIM STUDENT ORGANIZATION" DEMANDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT STOP THE EAST JAVA MURDERS (SEPTELS), INVESTIGATE THOROUGHLY THE MAY RIOTS AND ACCOMPANYING VIOLENCE (NOTE: THE FACT-FINDING TEAM INVESTIGATION THE MAY VIOLENCE MAY RELEASE ITS REPORT ON OCTOBER 23. END NOTE), AND ALSO THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATE THE SHOOTING OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN MAY. THE HMI STUDENTS FURTHER CALLED FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) TO BE CONVENED "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE" AND DEMANDED AN END TO "CORRUPTION, COLLUSION, AND NEPOTISM (KKN)." THE DEMONSTRATION BROKE UP PEACEFULLY.

5. (U) AT MID-DAY A VERY SMALL GROUP OF PROTESTERS APPEARED OUTSIDE THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE BUT WERE DISBANDED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY BY SECURITY FORCES.

6. (U) LATER IN THE AFTERNOON, APPROXIMATELY 200-300 MEMBERS OF A GROUP CALLING ITSELF "REFORM WITHOUT ANARCHY," DESCRIBED AS PRO-GOVERNMENT BY JOURNALIST CONTACTS ON THE SCENE, ALSO DEMONSTRATED AT PARLIAMENT.

COMMENT
---

7. (U) THE HMI IS ONE OF THE LARGEST, WELL-ESTABLISHED, AND MOST MAINSTREAM MUSLIM STUDENT GROUPS. IRONICALLY, THEIR OWN DEMONSTRATION TODAY WAS MUCH SMALLER THAN THE DEMONSTRATION HELD OCTOBER 21 BY THE PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN ISLAMIC STUDENTS' FORUM (FORMASI) (REFTEL). ALL THREE GROUPS WHICH APPEARED AT THE

PARLIAMENT OCTOBER 22 WERE ALLOWED TO APPROACH THE MAIN GATE, THUS DID NOT BLOCK THE MAJOR HIGHWAY THAT RUNS IN FRONT OF THE

PARLIAMENT COMPLEX. POLICE BLOCKING OF DEMONSTRATOR ACCESS TO THE ELIPSE IN FRONT OF THE PARLIAMENT COMPLEX OCTOBER 21 AND PREVIOUSLY HAS LED TO MASSIVE TRAFFIC JAMS ON THE AIRPORT TOLL ROAD AS STUDENTS THEN SPILL INTO THE ROADWAY.
ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1349 RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 05585 01 OF 02 281117Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CCO-00	CIAE-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	FBO-01	H-01	IMMC-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	OPR-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	IMCC-01	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/030W

----------7AE6F0 281118Z /38

R 281059Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4311
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 005585

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/03
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, PHUM, MILI, ID
SUBJECT: LARGE ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA 10/28

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05585 01 OF 02 281117Z
2. (C) SUMMARY: THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS AND OTHERS TOOK TO THE STREETS IN PEACEFUL ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA ON OCTOBER 28, MARKING "YOUTH PLEDGE DAY." FOUR TO FIVE THOUSAND STUDENTS RALLIED AT THE PARLIAMENT (DPR), IN THE LARGEST STUDENT DEMONSTRATION JAKARTA HAS SEEN SINCE MAY. DEMONSTRATORS WERE HELD IN CHECK BY A LARGE SECURITY FORCE COMPOSED OF POLICE, MARINES, AND REGULAR ARMY TROOPS. SECURITY FORCES ALSO DEPLOYED ARMORED VEHICLES EQUIPPED WITH WATER CANNONS. DEMONSTRATORS TORE DOWN SEVERAL SECTIONS OF FENCING DIVIDING HIGHWAY LANES IN FRONT OF THE PARLIAMENT, GENERATING THE ONLY TENSION BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SECURITY FORCES NOTED DURING THE DAY. THE DPR DEMONSTRATORS DISPERSED PEACEFULLY AROUND 1700. AT A BRANCH CAMPUS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA IN CENTRAL JAKARTA, AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 03 JUL 2006 200502473

CROWD OF ABOUT 1000 STUDENTS AND MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS GATHERED TO HEAR SPEECHES BY VARIOUS OPPOSITION FIGURES. ALSO, AT LEAST 500 STUDENTS REPORTEDLY STAGED AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY, JUST WEST OF THE PARLIAMENT. REPORTEDLY STUDENTS ALSO HELD PROTESTS AT OTHER CAMPUSES. END SUMMARY.

THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS AT PARLIAMENT

3. (C) THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS, AND OTHERS, STAGED SEVERAL MEDIUM TO LARGE DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA ON OCTOBER 28. THE DEMONSTRATIONS, WHICH HAVE BEEN RUMORED FOR AT LEAST A WEEK, WERE STAGED TO COINCIDE WITH "YOUTH PLEDGE DAY", WHICH COMMEMORATES A SEMINAL 1928 MEETING OF YOUNG INDONESIAN NATIONALISTS. THE LARGEST DEMONSTRATION WAS HELD AT THE PARLIAMENT (DPR), WHERE UP TO 5,000 WERE ON HAND BY LATE AFTERNOON DESPITE SECURITY FORCE ATTEMPTS TO IMPEDE MOVEMENT TOWARD THE COMPLEX. DEMONSTRATORS DISPERSED PEACEFULLY AROUND 1700. THE CROWD WAS MOSTLY COMPOSED OF

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. FORUM KOTA (FORKOT), A CONSORTIUM GROUP FROM VARIOUS UNIVERSITIES, WAS ONE OF THE CHIEF ORGANIZERS OF THE EVENT. (NOTE: FORKOT WAS THE QITICAL ORGANIZATION IN SEPTEMBER, BUT LATER APPEARED DEFLATED BY ALLEGATIONS THAT THEY WERE COVERT COMMUNISTS. END NOTE.)

ANTI-GOVERNMENT THEMES

4. (C) THE DEMONSTRATORS AT THE DPR REJECTED THE UPCOMING SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH WILL MEET NOVEMBER 10 TO DEBATE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE COURSE OF INDONESIA'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS. THE CRUX OF THE DEMONSTRATORS' COMPLAINT WAS THAT THE MPR, COMPOSED OF SOEHARTO-ERA APPOINTEES, IS ILLEGITIMATE AND INCAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT THE PUBLIC'S WILL. OTHER DEMONSTRATORS CARRIED BANNERS DEMANDING PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S RESIGNATION, THE PROSECUTION OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, AND THE MILITARY (ABRI'S) WITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS.

BEEFED UP SECURITY FORCES AT PARLIAMENT

5. (C) IN RESPONSE TO THIS, THE LARGEST STUDENT DEMONSTRATION AT PARLIAMENT SINCE MAY, SECURITY AUTHORITIES FIELDED A LARGER-THAN-USUAL FORCE COMPOSED OF HUNDREDS OF RIOT POLICE, MARINES, AND REGULAR ARMY. POLCOUNS, ON THE SCENE, COUNTED AT LEAST SIX ARMORED VEHICLES, SOME EQUIPPED WITH WATER CANON, GUARDING THE FRONT GATE. MILITARY HELICOPTERS KEPT WATCH OVERHEAD. MOUNTED POLICE WERE ALSO

ON HAND. RELATIONS BETWEEN SECURITY AND DEMONSTRATORS WERE GENERALLY RELAXED, ALTHOUGH TENSION REPORTEDLY ROSE AT ONE POINT AS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05585 01 OF 02 281117Z
STUDENTS PULLED DOWN AN FENCE SEPARATING LANES OF THE MAJOR HIGHWAY WHICH RUNS IN FRONT OF THE PARLIAMENT COMPLEX.

OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS
---

6. (C) A CROWD OF ABOUT 1000 GATHERED AT THE SALEMBA CAMPUS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA IN CENTRAL JAKARTA ON THE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 28, WERE PROTESTERS ALSO VOICED ANTI-GOVERNMENT THEMES. SUPPORTERS OF MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI WHO CARAVANED THROUGH THE CENTER OF THE CITY DURING MIDDAY JOINED THE STUDENTS AT SALEMBA, APPARENTLY EXPECTING HER TO APPEAR. SHE DID NOT. HOWEVER, STUDENT LEADERS WHO ORGANIZED THE RALLY DISTRIBUTED FLYERS CALLING FOR POLITICAL PARTIES TO STAY OUT OF STUDENT POLITICS. SEVERAL WELL-KNOWN OPPOSITION FIGURES, INCLUDING KEMAL IDRIS AND ALI SADIKIN OF THE NATIONAL FRONT, AND SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS OF THE (SMALL) INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION PARTY (PUDI) ADDRESSED THE CROWD, MILDLY CRITICIZING THE GOVERNMENT WHILE AFFIRMING THEIR COMMITMENT TO INDONESIAN UNITY. MANY IN ATTENDANCE AT THE RALLY WERE MORE STRIDENT IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT: ONE BANNER POSTED IN MULTIPLE LOCATIONS DEPICTED AN AIRPLANE CRASHING INTO THE GROUND WITH THE CAPTION "HABIBIE IS INCAPABLE". BANNERS ALSO REJECTED THE UPCOMING MPR SESSION AND DEMANDED ABRI'S WITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS.

7. (C) A LARGE STUDENT POLITICAL GATHERING WAS ALSO REPORTEDLY HELD

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1350

PAGE 01 JAKART 05585 02 OF 02 281117Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CCO-00	CIAE-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	FBO-01	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	OPR-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	IMCC-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/029W	

----------7AE6FF 281118Z /38
R 281059Z OCT 98

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4312
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 005585

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/03
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, PHUM, MILI, ID
SUBJECT: LARGE ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA 10/28

ON THE MAIN CAMPUS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA AT DEPOK, AS A WARM-UP FOR THE DEMONSTRATION AT PARLIAMENT. AT LEAST 500 STUDENTS ALSO DEMONSTRATED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT ON THE CAMPUS OF TRISAKTI

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05585 02 OF 02 281117Z
UNIVERSITY, JUST WEST OF THE PARLIAMENT. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7384 RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 05696 01 OF 02 032330Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-01	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W			

----------7D6D6D 032331Z /38

O 032310Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4383
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AIT TAIPEI 1062
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 005696

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/03
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL FACT-FINDING TEAM FINDS ARMY ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN MAY RIOTS, CALLS FOR FURTHER GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05696 01 OF 02 032330Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND F. MCWILLIAMS, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: A GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED FACT FINDING TEAM, SET UP TO LOOK INTO THE CAUSES OF THE MAY RIOTS IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES, HAS CONCLUDED THAT ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY WERE INVOLVED. IT HAS CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO BRING FORMER GENERAL PRABOWO TO COURT AND TO INVESTIGATE MORE THOROUGHLY THE ROLE OF THEN-JAKARTA AREA COMMANDER GENERAL SYAFRIE. IT HAS IDENTIFIED 52 CASES OF RAPES AND SEXUAL ASSAULT DURING THE RIOTS. A MEMBER OF THE TEAM NOTED THAT THE NUMBER WAS UNDOUBTEDLY HIGHER BUT THAT THE TEAM'S INVESTIGATION HAD BEGUN WELL AFTER THE RIOTS AND THAT THREATS AGAINST VICTIMS AND WITNESSES HAD RESTRICTED THE NUMBER OF SEXUAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

ASSAULT CASES THAT IT COULD DOCUMENT. THE TEAM CHIEF SAID THAT THE TEAM REACHED A CONCLUSION THAT THE RIOTS WERE CREATED TO JUSTIFY THE IMPOSITION OF EMERGENCY POWERS. THE TEAM'S RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDE CALLS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF LEADS DEVELOPED BY THE FACT-FINDING TEAM AND, INTER ALIA, BETTER CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY'S INTELIGENCE BRANCH. MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE TEAM OFFERED SEVEN RESERVATIONS TO FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. THE MILITARY MEMBERS REPORTEDLY HAD JOINED IN A CONSENSUS ON OCTOBER 31 BUT UNEXPECTEDLY RAISED OLD OBJECTIONS AT THE NOVEMBER 3 MEETING WHICH WAS TO HAVE BEEN A PRESENTATION CEREMONY OF THE REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT. ONLY THE THREAT OF RESIGNATIONS BY NGO TEAM MEMBERS ENABLED A COMPROMISE FORMULA ("RESERVATIONS") TO EMERGE. MINISTERS TO WHOM THE TEAM WAS TO PRESENT ITS FINDINGS UNEXPECTEDLY WERE NOT PRESENT AT A NOVEMBER 3 MEETING WITH THE TEAM, PROMPTING THE TEAM TO ISSUE THE REPORT TO WAITING PRESS. SEPTEL REPORTS THE FULL TEAM REPORT INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESERVATIONS (ALSO CARRIED IN WIRE SERVICE REPORTS). THE FOLLOWING REPORTS COMMENTS TO POLCOUNS

CONFIDENTIAL

BY SEVERAL TEAM MEMBERS. END SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

---

3. (C) THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED FACT FINDING TEAM, LOOKING INTO THE MAY RIOTS IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES IN THE EARLY EVENING OF NOVEMBER 3 ISSUED A LENGTHY REPORT. THE TWO ABRI MEMBERS OF THE TEAM (ARMY AND POLICE) MADE SEVEN "RESERVATIONS." THE MAJORITY OF THE TEAM MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE DISSENTING MILITARY MEMBERS, PRESENTED THE REPORT PUBLICLY TO SEVERAL HUNDRED MEMBERS OF THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PRESS IN THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AT 1830. THE FOLLOWING DRAWS ON COMMENTS MADE TO POLCOUNS BY TEAM CHIEF MARZUKI DARUSMAN AND TEAM MEMBERS ASMARA NABABAN, BAMBANG SOEHARTO AND FATHER SANDYAWAN. SEPTEL WILL PROVIDE A MORE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESERVATIONS.

4. (C) NABABAN NOTED THAT THE TEAM WAS UNABLE TO PRESENT THE REPORT FORMALLY TO THE SIX MINISTERS (PLUS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL) WHO CONSTITUTED THE TEAM BECAUSE OF AN UNUSUAL (AND UNEXPLAINED) CABINET MEETING AT THE PALACE WHICH TOOK PLACE AT THE HOUR APPOINTED FOR THE TEAM TO MEET WITH THE MINISTERS. NABABAN SAID THAT THE TEAM CONSIDERED POSTPONING FOR A SECOND TIME THE ISSUANCE OF THE REPORT (IT WAS TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED ON OCTOBER 23) BUT AFTER DISCUSSION, DECIDED TO SUBMIT THE REPORT TO THE ASSEMBLED PRESS AND "MAIL THE MINISTERS THEIR COPY."

5. (C) NABABAN SAID THAT HE AND MOST OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE TEAM HAD EXPECTED THE NOVEMBER 3 MEETING TO BE A PRO-FORMA PRESENTATION OF THE REPORT TO THE MINISTERS, BUT HAD BEEN "TAKEN BY

PAGE 04 JAKART 05696 01 OF 02 032330Z
SURPRISE" WHEN THE POLICE AND ARMY MEMBERS OF THE TEAM ANNOUNCED THAT THEY HAD HAD SECOND THOUGHTS REGARDING THE TEAM CONSENSUS WHICH HAD BEEN REACHED ON OCTOBER 31. CITING THEIR "SECOND THOUGHTS," THE POLICE AND ARMY MEMBERS SAID THAT THEY WANTED SEVEN REVISIONS IN THE REPORT. AFTER THREATS BY SEVERAL NGO MEMBERS OF THE TEAM TO RESIGN, THE MILITARY TEAM MEMBERS AGREED TO "MAINTAIN THE CONSENSUS BUT EXPRESS RESERVATIONS."

KEY FINDINGS
---

6. (C) TEAM CHIEF MARZUKI DARUSMAN (VICE CHAIRPERSON OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION) SAID THAT THE TEAM HAD FOUND, AS A KEY FACT, THAT THERE HAD BEEN "AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE A SITUATION AND THEREBY JUSTIFY THE IMPOSITION OF EMERGENCY POWERS." HE SAID THAT THE TEAM'S INVESTIGATION HAD STOPPED SHORT OF IDENTIFYING WHO HAD ORGANIZED THE PLAN. ASKED IF THE POINT OF THE PLAN HAD BEEN TO KEEP SOEHARTO IN POWER OR TO REMOVE HIM, MARZUKI SAID THAT "WE DO NOT RULE OUT EITHER CONCLUSION." MARZUKI SAID THAT ELEMENTS OF ABRI WERE INVOLVED IN THE RIOT "BUT NOT THE INSTITUTION AS A WHOLE." HE DESCRIBED THE INVOLVEMENT AS BEING BOTH "BY OMISSION AND COMMISSION," AND CITED THE FACT THAT SOME POLICE AND MILITARY UNITS HAD BEEN ORDERED NOT TO TAKE ACTION TO STOP THE RIOTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7385

PAGE 01 JAKART 05696 02 OF 02 032331Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-01	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W			

----------7D6D6F 032331Z /38
O 032310Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4384
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AIT TAIPEI 1063
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 005696

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/03
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL FACT-FINDING TEAM FINDS ARMY ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN MAY RIOTS, CALLS FOR FURTHER GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05696 02 OF 02 032331Z

7. (C) NABABAN SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE KEY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT HAD BEEN THE TEAM'S CALL FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION TO INCLUDE BRINGING FORMER GENERAL PRABOWO TO COURT AND TO INVESTIGATE FORMER JAKARTA MILITARY COMMANDER SYAFRIE. THE GOVERNMENT, SAID NABABAN, MUST INVESTIGATE WHY SYAFRIE DID NOT PERFORM HIS FUNCTION TO PROTECT THE CITY." HE SAID THAT ANOTHER KEY RECOMMENDATION WAS FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO "REGULATE MORE CLOSELY" THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY INTELIGENCE ORGANIZATION (BIA) WHICH, HE SAID, HAD BEEN "OUT OF CONTROL." MARZUKI STRESSED THAT THE REPORT HAD FOCUSSED HEAVILY ON THE NEED TO INVESTIGATE A MAY 14 MEETING IN WHICH SENIOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS HAD PARTICIPATED. THE MEETING, HE SAID WITHOUT ELABORATION, "HAD BROUGHT TOGETHER THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROCESSES BEHIND THE RIOTS."

8. (C) NABABAN SAID THAT BECAUSE THE TEAM WAS NOT MANDATED TO INVESTIGATE, BUT MERELY ASSEMBLE FACTS, IT WAS NOT ABLE TO FOLLOW-UP MANY INDICATIONS: HE CITED AS AN EXAMPLE THE ARREST OF A SPECIAL FORCES OFFICER BY THE POLICE IN MEDAN DURING THE RIOTS. THE SPECIAL FORCES OFFICER HAD FLASHED HIS IDENTIFICATION AND HAD BEEN RELEASED. "WHY WAS HE ARRESTED? WHAT WAS HE DOING? WHO SENT HIM? WE COULD NOT CHECK. THE GOVERNMENT MUST FOLLOW-UP OUR LEADS." HE SAID THAT AS A MEMBER OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HE WAS CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD FAILED TO FOLLOW-UP MANY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THAT BODY. CONSEQUENTLY, HE SAID, HE WAS "ONLY 50-50 PERCENT HOPEFUL THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL DO ANYTHING WITH THESE RECOMMENDATIONS." "IT IS UP TO THE GOVERNMENT NOW, IF IT WANTS TO REGAIN ITS CREDIBILITY," HE CONCLUDED.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 05696 02 OF 02 032331Z

THE RAPES

9. (C) THE COMMISSION FOUND THERE HAD BEEN 52 CASES OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, INCLUDING RAPE, MOSTLY DIRECTED AGAINST SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND GIRLS. NABABAN EXPLAINED THAT THIS NUMBER REPRESENTED ONLY SOME OF THOSE VICTIMIZED. HE SAID THAT RAPE IS IN ANY EVENT, ALWAYS AN UNDER-REPORTED CRIME. MOREOVER, HE OBSERVED THAT THE TEAM HAD BEGUN ITS INVESTIGATION IN JULY. THE "VOLUNTEERS FOR HUMANITY" TEAM HAD BEGUN ITS RESEARCH IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RIOTS. "BY THE TIME WE BEGAN, MANY PEOPLE HAD FLED TO OTHER PLACES." HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS ALSO CONTINUING THREATS MADE AGAINST VICTIMS, WITNESSES, MEMBERS OF VICTIM'S FAMILIES AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO PREVENT THEM FROM TESTIFYING. HE ADDED THAT EVEN MEMBERS OF THE TEAM HAD RECEIVED DEATH THREATS, MENTIONING FATHER SANDYAWAN. (SANDYAWAN CORROBORATED TO POLCOUNS REPORTS WE RECEIVED ABOUT A NOVEMBER 1 DEATH THREAT MADE AGAINST HIM, IF THE TEAM REPORT WERE ISSUED.)

ABRI RESERVATIONS

10. (C) MARZUKI SAID THAT SOME OF THE RESERVATIONS BY ABRI MEMBERS WERE TECHNICAL AND HAD BEEN AGREED TO FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPROMISE. HE SAID THAT ABRI MEMBERS HAD AGREED TO THE REPORT'S CONCLUSION THAT INDIVIDUALS WEARING ARBI UNIFORMS HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN INSTIGATING THE RIOTS IN SOLO, BUT HAD INSISTED THAT THE TEAM NOT INCLUDE THE FACT (AS DEVELOPED BY THE TEAM) THAT THE UNIFORMS HAD BEEN THOSE OF THE SPECIAL FORCES.
ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8804

PAGE 01 JAKART 05719 01 OF 03 041112Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W	

----------7DA2A5 041113Z /38

O 041050Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4404
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AIT TAIPEI 1064
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005719

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/03
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: REPORT ON MAY RIOTS BY FACT-FINDING TEAM FINDS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05719 01 OF 03 041112Z
REF: JAKARTA 5696

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND F. MCWILLIAMS, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: A GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED FACT FINDING TEAM, SET UP TO LOOK INTO THE CAUSES OF THE MAY RIOTS IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES, PRODUCED A 28-PAGE REPORT, INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS AND "RESERVATIONS" BY WHICH MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE TEAM EXPRESSED DISAGREEMENTS WITH ASPECTS OF THE TEAM REPORT. THE REPORT CLAIMED THAT THE RIOTING WAS LINKED TO A CONSPIRACY AIMED AT CREATING A SITUATION WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE IMPOSITION OF EMERGENCY POWERS. THE RIOTING, ACCORDING TO THE TEAM, WAS RELATED TO A STRUGGLE WITHIN THE POLITICAL ELITE AND TO THE DETERIORATING ECONOMIC

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 03 JUL 2006 200502473

SITUATION. THE RIOTING WAS ALSO SEEN AS LINKED TO AND A CULMINATION OF A SERIES OF VIOLENT DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDING KIDNAPPING OF ACTIVISTS AND THE FATAL SHOOTING OF STUDENTS. THE TEAM REPORT DIFFERENTIATED AMONG THREE TYPES OF RIOTING, INCLUDING SEEMINGLY SPONTANEOUS EVENTS AND THOSE WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED. ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES WERE INVOLVED IN INSTIGATING THE RIOTING IN WHICH RAPES OCCURRED, ACCORDING TO THE TEAM'S FINDINGS. THE TEAM ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE MAJORITY OF VICTIMS OF 52 IDENTIFIED RAPES WERE SINO-INDONESIANS ALTHOUGH IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE SEXUAL VIOLENCE WAS PREMEDITATED OR MERELY A CONSEQUENCE OF THE RIOTING. IN SEPARATE COMMENT, TEAM MEMBERS EMPHASIZED THAT THE TEAM REALIZED THAT THE NUMBER OF RAPES WAS HIGHER THAN 52 WHICH IT WAS ABLE TO DOCUMENT. THE TEAM RECOMMENDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE RIOTING AND SPEED UP RELATED INVESTIGATIONS INTO KIDNAPPING OF ACTIVISTS AND THE FATAL SHOOTING OF STUDENTS. IT CALLED FOR SECURITY FOR WITNESSES AND VICTIMS, GOVERNMENT COMPENSATION TO RIOT VICTIMS,
CONFIDENTIAL

RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AGAINST RACISM AND BETTER CONTROL OF THE MILITARY INTELIGENCE AGENCY. RESERVATIONS PRESENTED BY THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE TEAM DEALT WITH SOME OF THE BROAD CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE ORIGINS OF THE RIOTING, PARTICULARLY THOSE SUGGESTING THAT THERE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH EMERGENCY POWERS COULD BE IMPOSED OR THAT THE RIOTS REFLECTED COMPETITION WITHIN THE POLITICAL ELITE. ONE TEAM MEMBER OPPOSED COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS, WHILE TWO OPPOSED THE TEAM CONCLUSION THAT A MAJORITY OF THOSE RAPED WERE SINO-INDONESIANS. THERE WAS ALSO AN OBJECTION BY A SINGLE MEMBER OF THE TEAM TO A PORTION OF THE REPORT WHICH IDENTIFIED THE SPECIAL FORCES AS INVOLVED IN RIOTING IN SOLO. ONE MEMBER URGED THAT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE RIOTING BE DESCRIBED AS HAVING TAKEN "OUTSIDE THE INSTITUTION (OF THE ARMED FORCES). END SUMMARY

BACKGROUND
---

3. (U) THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED FACT-FINDING TEAM ASSIGNED TO LOOK INTO THE BACKGROUND OF THE MAY RIOTS IN JAKARTA, SOLO, PALEMBANG, LAMPUNG, SURABAYA AND MEDAN PRESENTED ITS FINDINGS (IN THE FORM OF AN "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY") TO THE PRESS IN AN EARLY EVENING PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE JUSTICE MINISTRY NOVEMBER 3. THE TEAM WAS TO HAVE PRESENTED THE REPORT FIRST TO THE FIVE GOVERNMENT MINISTERS (PLUS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL) WHO COMMISSIONED THE TEAM, BUT THESE OFFICIALS UNEXPECTEDLY WERE NOT PRESENT TO MEET WITH THE TEAM. TEAM MEMBERS WERE TOLD THAT THEY WERE AT THE PALACE FOR A SPECIAL CABINET MEETING (REFTEL).

4. (C) LAST MINUTE RESERVATIONS BY THE POLICE AND MILITARY MEMBERS

OF THE TEAM LED TO THREATS OF RESIGNATIONS BY NGO MEMBERS OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05719 01 OF 03 041112Z
TEAM, AND TWO NGO MEMBERS ACTUALLY DID WALK OUT OF THE NOVEMBER 3 MEETING. ABDUL HAKIM GARUDA NUSANTARA TOLD WAITING JOURNALISTS AND DIPLOMATS THAT IF THE REPORT WERE NOT ISSUED THAT EVENING, HE WOULD RELEASE IT THE FOLLOWING MORNING. IN THE END, FACED WITH WHAT TEAM MEMBER ASMARA NABABAN TOLD POLCOUNS WAS A "POSSIBLE COLLAPSE OF THE TEAM," THE DISSENTERS AGREED TO RECORD THEIR OBJECTIONS IN "RESERVATIONS" WITHOUT DISASSOCIATING THEMSELVES FROM THE ENTIRE REPORT. (SEE BELOW FOR TEXT OF THESE RESERVATIONS.)

MAIN CONCLUSIONS
---

5. (U) THE 28-PAGE REPORT DREW THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS:

-- THE REPORT LINKED THE RIOTS TO A CONSPIRACY OF VARIOUS PARTIES INCLUDING ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY WHICH, THE REPORT CLAIMED, WAS AIMED AT CREATING AN EMERGENCY SITUATION THAT WOULD JUSTIFY THE IMPOSITION OF "EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS." (ASKED BY REPORTERS IF THIS MEANT THAT THE EMERGENCY WAS INTENDED TO KEEP FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IN POWER OR PUSH HIM OUT, TEAM CHIEF MARZUKI RESPONDED THAT NEITHER CONCLUSION WAS RULED OUT.)

-- THE REPORT SAID THAT THE RIOTING HAD BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE INTERACTION OF A STRUGGLE BY THE POLITICAL ELITE TO MAINTAIN THE POWER OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND THE PROCESS OF RAPID ECONOMIC

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8806

PAGE 01 JAKART 05719 02 OF 03 041112Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W	

----------7DA2A8 041113Z /38

O 041050Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4405
INFO USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AIT TAIPEI 1065
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 005719

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/03
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: REPORT ON MAY RIOTS BY FACT-FINDING TEAM FINDS

REF: JAKARTA 5696

AND MONETARY DETERIORATION AFFLICTING THE NATION.

-- THE RIOTS WERE A CULMINATION OF VIOLENT EVENTS INCLUDING THE KIDNAPPING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND THE KILLING OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY, WHICH THE TEAM IDENTIFIED AS THE "TRIGGER OF THE RIOTS." THE RIOTS ALSO COULD NOT, IN THE TEAM'S VIEW, BE SEPARATED FROM WIDESPREAD FEAR OF AND AN ERODING CONFIDENCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

-- THREE TYPES OF RIOTS APPEARED TO HAVE OCCURRED:

LOCAL, LIMITED, SPORADIC, SPONTANEOUS RIOTS;

RIOTS IN WHICH OUTSIDE PROVOCATEURS WERE INVOLVED. THESE RIOTS WERE LARGER AND "SYSTEMATIC" BUT THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF PREMEDITATION.

RIOTING WHICH APPEARED TO REPRESENT A POLITICAL STRUGGLE WITHIN THE ELITE. THERE WAS ALSO MORE EVIDENCE (THAN IN THE ABOVE TWO TYPES) THAT THE RIOTS WERE DELIBERATELY INSTIGATED.

-- "CREATION OF THIS EMERGENCY SITUATION, INCLUDING THE FATAL SHOOTING OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, WAS UNDERTAKEN BY THOSE AT THE "HIGHEST DECISION-MAKING LEVEL. ... THE WHOLE PROCESS PRECEDING THE RIOTS HAD A VERY CLEAR POLITICAL DIMENSION ... INCLUDING EFFORTS TO SECURE EXTRAORDINARY POWERS BASED ON (THE EMERGENCY POWERS DECREE)."

-- "THE RAPID SPREAD OF THE VIOLENCE GREW OUT OF THE INADEQUATE

SAFEGUARD MEASURES TO PREVENT, RESTRICT AND OVERCOME THE VIOLENCE WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED WOULD ESCALATE. THE VULNERABILITY AND WEAKNESSES IN SECURITY OPERATIONS IN JAKARTA PARTICULARLY WERE CLOSELY LINKED TO THE ENTIRE PROCESS OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY STRUGGLE, WHICH THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER OF GREATER JAKARTA (GENERAL SJAFRIE SJAMSUDDIN) MUST ACCOUNT FOR. INDICATIONS OF SECURITY VULNERABILITY AND WEAKNESSES IN DIFFERENT DEGREES IN OTHER CITIES WHERE RIOTS BROKE OUT WERE ALSO LINKED TO THE POLITICAL-MILITARY STRUGGLE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL."

-- THE REPORT CONCLUDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF CASES OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, INCLUDING 52 CASES OF RAPE. THE MAJORITY OF VICTIMS WERE SINO-INDONESIANS, ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, WHICH ALSO CONCLUDED THAT MOST OF THE RAPES WERE GANG RAPES. THE TEAM PROVIDED SEPARATE FIGURES FOR VICTIMS OF RAPE ACCOMPANIED BY VIOLENCE. THE TEAM ALSO NOTED VICTIMS WHO EXPERIENCED SEXUAL VIOLENCE BEFORE AND AFTER THE RIOTS, BUT WHO, IN ITS EVALUATION, WERE NONETHELESS LINKED TO THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE RIOTS. THE REPORT SAID THAT IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE SEXUAL VIOLENCE WAS PREMEDITATED OR WAS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE RIOTING. THE REPORT FOUND THAT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS WERE INADEQUATE IN THE AREA OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE.

-- THE TEAM SAID THAT IT FOUND A COMMON PATTERN DURING THE RIOTING IN VARIOUS PLACES INVOLVING THE PRESENCE OF PEOPLE WITH WELL-BUILT PHYSIQUES AND CREW CUTS WHO INCITED OTHERS TO VIOLENCE. THESE INSTIGATORS WERE USUALLY STRANGERS IN THE AREA IN WHICH THEY OPERATED, WERE HIGHLY MOBILE AND WERE EQUIPPED WITH DESTRUCTIVE MEANS TO INCLUDE FUEL, MOLOTOV COCKTAILS AND IN SOME INSTANCES FLAME THROWERS. THE TEAM SAID THAT "THERE WAS INVOLVEMENT OF MANY PARTIES FROM LOCAL THUGS, POLITICAL AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS TO

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMBERS AND ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES." ALSO AMONG THOSE INVOLVED IN THE RIOTS WERE "LOCAL HOODLUMS, MASS ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES WHO BENEFITTED FORM THEIR DELIBERATE EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT THE RIOTS AND FROM THEIR (OWN) INACTION."

-- THE TEAM SUGGESTED THE UNREST MAY HAVE BEEN LINKED TO A MEETING AT THE ARMY STRATEGIC RESERVE'S HEADQUARTERS ON MAY 14 AND CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE THIS MEETING FURTHER IN ORDER TO "REVEAL AND ASCERTAIN THE ROLE OF LT. GEN (RET) PRABOWO AND OTHER PARTIES IN THE WHOLE PROCESS WHICH PRECIPITATED THE RIOTS." (NOTE: THE "JAKARTA POST" AND THE "OBSERVER," CITING UNNAMED SOURCES, CLAIMED THAT THOSE AT THE MEETING INCLUDED THEN STRATEGIC FORCES COMMANDER PRABOWO AND HIS STAFF, THEN JAKARTA MILITARY COMMANDER GENERAL SJAFRIE SJAMSUDDIN, CURRENT MANPOWER MINISTER FAHMI IDRIS

AND BUSINESSMAN SETIAWAN DJODY. CURIOUSLY, HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS BUYUNG NASUTION AND BAMBANG WIJOJANTO FROM THE LEGAL AID FOUNDATION ALSO WERE SAID TO HAVE BEEN AT THE MEETING. A MAY 14 MEETING WOULD HAVE TRANSPIRED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE MAY 13-15 RIOT PERIOD. IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR WHAT THE TEAM SUSPECTS TRANSPIRED AT THIS MEETING. END NOTE)

RECOMMENDATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8805

PAGE 01 JAKART 05719 03 OF 03 041113Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W	

----------7DA2AF 041113Z /38

O 041050Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4406
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AIT TAIPEI 1066
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 005719

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/03
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: REPORT ON MAY RIOTS BY FACT-FINDING TEAM FINDS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05719 03 OF 03 041113Z
REF: JAKARTA 5696

6. (U) THE TEAM PRESENTED SEVEN RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT:

-- THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONDUCT FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE RIOTS (NOTING THAT THE TEAM ITSELF WAS NOT EMPOWERED TO INVESTIGATE AND HAD NO SUBPOENA POWER). SPECIFICALLY, THE TEAM CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE THE MAY 14 MEETING AND "THE ROLE OF LT. GEN (RET) PRABOWO AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS."

-- THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEED UP INVESTIGATION OF THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY KILLINGS AND THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. IN THAT CONNECTION, PRABOWO AND OTHERS DETERMINED TO BE INVOLVED IN THE ABDUCTIONS SHOULD BE BROUGHT BEFORE A MILITARY TRIBUNAL.

-- THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE SECURITY GUARANTEES TO WITNESSES AND VICTIMS AND SET UP A WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM.

-- THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE COMPENSATION TO RIOT VICTIMS AND HELP WITH RECONSTRUCTION OF DAMAGED PROPERTY.

-- THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD RATIFY THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AGAINST RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION AND SHOULD IMPLEMENT THE ANTI-TORTURE CONVENTION.

-- THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ACT TO END ALL FORMS OF HOODLUMISM.

-- THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD FORMULATE A LAW REGULATING STATE INTELIGENCE AGENCIES TO ENSURE THAT THEY WILL CARRY OUT NECESSARY FUNCTIONS WITHOUT VIOLATING HUMAN RIGHTS AND ALSO NOT BECOME

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 05719 03 OF 03 041113Z
INSTRUMENTS OF POLITICAL PARTIES OR VARIOUS OTHERS.

RESERVATIONS
---

7. (U) RESERVATIONS WERE REGISTERED ON SEVEN POINTS IN THE FINAL REPORT BY FOUR ABRI AND POLICE MEMBERS OF THE TEAM. THERE WAS NOT CONSENSUS AMONG THEM: NO RESERVATION WAS SUPPORTED BY ALL FOUR ABRI MEMBERS AND THREE OF THE SEVEN RESERVATIONS WERE SUPPORTED BY ONLY ONE OF THE ABRI MEMBERS:

-- THREE MEMBERS CALLED FOR REMOVAL OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE RIOTS THAT CONCLUDED THAT IT REFLECTED A COMPETITION AMONG POLITICAL ELITES;

-- TWO MEMBERS CALLED FOR REMOVAL OF THE ASSESSMENT THAT THE RIOTING WAS PRECIPITATED TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH EXTRA-

CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS COULD BE IMPOSED.

-- ONE MEMBER OBJECTED TO THE RECOMMENDATION THAT THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDE COMPENSATION TO THE VICTIMS OF THE RIOTING.

-- THREE MEMBERS, CLAIMING INCOMPLETE "VERIFICATION," OBJECTED TO IDENTIFICATION OF FOUR INDIVIDUALS AS KIDNAP VICTIMS, URGING THEY BE LISTED SIMPLY AMONG THE DEAD AND WOUNDED FROM THE RIOTING.

-- TWO MEMBERS OBJECTED TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE MAJORITY OF VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT WERE SINO-INDONESIANS, ON THE GROUNDS, THEY CLAIMED, THAT THIS WAS "NOT PROVEN."

-- ONE MEMBER OBJECTED TO A DESCRIPTION OF UNIFORMS WORN BY THOSE

INVOLVED IN THE RIOTING IN SOLO AS SIMILAR TO THOSE WORN BY THE SPECIAL FORCES, PROPOSING INSTEAD THAT THE DESCRIPTION SIMPLY STATE THE UNIFORMS WERE SIMILAR TO THOSE WORN BY THE MILITARY.

-- ONE MEMBER URGED THAT IN DISCUSSING INVOLVEMENT IN THE RIOTING BY MILITARY PERSONNEL THAT THE DESCRIPTION STATE THAT SUCH ACTIONS WERE CONDUCTED "OUTSIDE THE INSTITUTION (OF THE ARMED FORCES)."
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E70

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5734

PAGE 01 JAKART 05768 01 OF 02 061028Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/024W					

----------7EB3EF 061056Z /38

R 061004Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4445
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AIT TAIPEI 1067
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 005768

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/16
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: INITIAL REACTION TO FACT FINDING TEAM REPORT ON MAY RIOTS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05768 01 OF 02 061028Z

REF: A) JAKARTA 5719; B) JAKARTA 5696

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY:

-- THE GOVERNMENT HAS SO FAR HAD LITTLE TO SAY IN RESPONSE TO THE FACT FINDING TEAM'S REPORT ON THE MAY RIOTS. WHAT STATEMENTS IT HAS MADE HAVE SENT A MIXED MESSAGE. GENERAL WIRANTO REPORTEDLY SAID ON NOVEMBER 4 THAT THE ARMED FORCES WOULD FOLLOW UP ON THE REPORT'S RECOMMENDATIONS.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 03 JUL 2006 200502473

HOWEVER, LATER THE SAME DAY AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, HE CRITICIZED THE TEAM FOR GOING BEYOND ITS MANDATE BECAUSE IT PROVIDED ANALYSIS (INCLUDING FINDINGS CRITICAL OF THE MILITARY) AND DID NOT STICK TO FACT-FINDING.

-- THE REPORT HAS RECEIVED GENERALLY POSITIVE PUBLIC REACTION, INCLUDING FROM MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, FORMER GOVERNMENT MINISTER SARWONO, OPPOSITON LEADER AMIEN RAIS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS. MOST COMMENTS HAVE FOCUSSED ON THE NEED FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO FOLLOW UP ON THE TEAM'S RECOMMENDATIONS. A POLITICAL SCIENTIST, HOWEVER, ARGUED THAT THE REPORT WAS TAINTED BY THE TEAM'S "POLITICAL BAGGAGE." END SUMMARY

REACTION FROM GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY
---

3. (C) GENERAL WIRANTO, THE DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMED FORCES COMMANDER, GAVE TWO DIFFERENT PUBLIC REACTIONS TO

THE FACT FINDING TEAM'S REPORT. ACCORDING TO THE INDONESIAN LANGUAGE DAILY KOMPAS (NOV 5), HE WAS DISPLEASED BY THE EXTENSIVE ANALYSIS PROVIDED IN THE REPORT. HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE (BEFORE A CABINET MEETING) THAT THE MANDATE OF THE TEAM WAS NOT TO INVESTIGATE AND PROVIDE ANALYSIS, BUT TO SEARCH FOR FACTS AND THEN SEND THESE FACTS TO THE DEPARTMENTS THAT HAD ESTABLISHED THE TEAM.

4. (U) EARLIER THAT SAME DAY (NOV 4), WIRANTO ALSO SAID, ACCORDING TO KOMPAS, THAT THE ARMED FORCES WOULD PAY ATTENTION TO AND FOLLOW-UP ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE TEAM. HE REPORTEDLY ADDED THE CAVEAT THAT THE TEAM'S ANALYSIS WAS NOT FINAL, AND IT WOULD BE RELATED TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.

5. (U) ASIDE FROM WIRANTO'S STATEMENTS, WE HAVE SEEN NO OFFICIAL REACTION FROM THE GOVERNMENT TO THE FACT FINDING TEAM'S REPORT.

CALLS FOR GOVERNMENT FOLLOW-UP
---

6. (U) MOST OF THE PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE FACT FINDING TEAM'S REPORT HAVE FOCUSSED ON THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE REPORT'S RECOMMENDATIONS:

-- FORMER MINISTER OF TRANSMIGRATION SARWONO URGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOW UP ON THE FINDINGS OF THE TEAM. IF NOT, THE CRISIS OF TRUST IN THE

GOVERNMENT WOULD BECOME MORE SERIOUS, HE SAID.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05768 01 OF 02 061028Z
-- OPPOSITION LEADER AMIEN RAIS SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD TWO CHOICES IN RESPONDING TO THE TEAM'S FINDINGS. IT COULD CHOOSE TO SIDE WITH EITHER THE PEOPLE OR WITH THE "NEW ORDER REGIME."

-- GOLKAR MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT ABU HASAN SAZILI SAID THAT "THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ACT IMMEDIATELY TO FOLLOW-UP ON THE FINDING OF THE TEAM."

-- UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT AND FACTION HEAD ZARKASIH NUR SAID THAT "THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SHOW POLITICAL WILL TO ACT FIRMLY ON THE FINDINGS OF THE TEAM."

-- ITA NADIA, A HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST, SAID "THE IMPORTANT THING IS HOW THE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS." SHE EMPHASIZED THAT WITNESSES AND VICTIMS MUST RECEIVE ADEQUATE PROTECTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE TEAM.

-- THE HEAD OF THE COMMISSION FOR MISSING PERSONS AND VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE (KONTRAS), MUNIR, CHARGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT DID "NOT SEEM TO BE RESPONDING SERIOUSLY TO THE

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5735

PAGE 01 JAKART 05768 02 OF 02 061028Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/024W					

----------7EB3F5 061056Z /38

R 061004Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4446
INFO USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AIT TAIPEI 1068
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 005768

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/16
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: INITIAL REACTION TO FACT FINDING TEAM REPORT ON MAY RIOTS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05768 02 OF 02 061028Z

REF: A) JAKARTA 5719; B) JAKARTA 5696

REPORT.

-- THE INTERNATIONAL NGO FORUM ON INDONESIAN DEVELOPMENT (INFID) URGED PRESIDENT HABIBIE TO FOLLOW-UP IMMEDIATELY ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE REPORT.

7. (U) THE REACTIONS WERE NOT ALL SO SUPPORTIVE, HOWEVER. ALI YAFIE, A VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED INDONESIAN ULAMAS COUNCIL (MUI), AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION FOR MUSLIM GROUPS, WAS QUOTED IN KOMPAS AS SAYING THAT THE TEAM'S FINDINGS WERE NOT YET SATISFACTORY BECAUSE THEY INCLUDED ANALYSIS WHICH NEEDED TO BE PROVEN IN COURT, INCLUDING THE INVOLVEMENT OF PRABOWO IN THE RIOTS. A RESEARCHER FROM THE GOVERNMENT SPONSORED INDONESIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCES (LIPI), HERMAN SULISTIYO, WROTE IN THE JAKARTA POST THAT THE "TEAM MEMBERS HAD APPARENTLY TRIED TO INTERPRET THE FINDINGS BASED ON THEIR OWN POLITICAL BAGGAGE OR INTERESTS." HE CONTENDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT MEMBERS OF THE TEAM WERE INTERESTED IN DAMAGE CONTROL, WHILE THE NGO MEMBERS "MERELY WANTED TO HEAP THE BLAME ON THE GOVERNMENT."

MYSTERIOUS MAY 14 MEETING SPARKS CONTROVERSY
---

8. (SBU) THE TEAM'S RECOMMENDATION THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD FURTHER INVESTIGATE A MAY 14 MEETING AT STRATEGIC RESERVE COMMAND (KOSTRAD) HEADQUARTERS, IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN THE ROLE OF LT. GENERAL PRABOWO (THEN KOSTRAD

COMMANDER) IN THE PROCESS WHICH PRECIPITATED THE RIOTS, (REFTELS) HAS SPARKED CONTROVERSY. THREE MEETING PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING PRABOWO'S BROTHER HASHIM DJOJOHADIKUSUMO, HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 4, PROTESTING THAT THE MEETING WAS NOT SECRET AND HAD INCLUDED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS SUCH AS ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION AND BAMBANG WIDJOJANTO. BUYUNG WAS QUOTED IN KOMPAS NOVEMBER 4 AS ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HE WAS AT THE MEETING, AND THAT ITS PURPOSE WAS TO QUESTION PRABOWO ABOUT THE MAY 13-14 VIOLENCE, AS WELL AS THE DISAPPEARANCES AND TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS. BUYUNG SAID THAT WHAT NEEDED TO BE INVESTIGATED WERE MEETINGS THAT TOOK PLACE BEFORE THE RIOTING BEGAN. IT HAS NOT YET BEEN CLARIFIED AS TO WHETHER THIS IS THE MEETING TO WHICH THE TEAM WAS REFERRING, OR WHETHER THERE WAS ANOTHER MEETING AT KOSTRAD ON MAY 14.
ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2538

PAGE 01 JAKART 05929 01 OF 03 181312Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------832976 181312Z /38

R 181245Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4615
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005929

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/16
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, MILI, PINR, CASC, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: THE NOVEMBER 13 BLOODSHED AT ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05929 01 OF 03 181312Z
1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION: THE BLOODSHED AT ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY ON NOVEMBER 13 IS LIKELY TO BECOME A KEY REFERENCE POINT IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL HISTORY OF INDONESIA, AS DID THE KILLING OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ON MAY 12. ALREADY, CALLS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY ARE ECHOING AMONG STUDENTS AND BEYOND WITH SPECIFIC CALLS FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE ARMED FORCES COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO. PROMINENT MAIN-STREAM FIGURES IN SOCIETY HAVE JOINED IN THIS CALL. GENERAL WIRANTO HAS ANNOUNCED THAT ABRI WOULD CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION ALTHOUGH AN ABRI INVESTIGATION IS LIKELY NOT TO SATISFY STUDENTS AND OTHERS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200502473

WHO HAVE SEEN SUCH ABRI SELF-INVESTIGATIONS OF THE KILLING OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY AND THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE OF ACTIVISTS STALL IN RECENT MONTHS.

3. (U) THE BLOODY BOTTOM LINE IS CLEAR: NINE DEMONSTRATORS, MOSTLY STUDENTS, DIED OF GUNSHOT WOUNDS AND SEVERE BEATINGS. ONE POLICEMAN DIED AS A RESULT OF A BEATING BY DEMONSTRATORS. ACCORDING TO A SURVEY OF HOSPITALS CONDUCTED BY A REPUTABLE NGO, OF THE 339 CASUALTIES, THREE WERE SECURITY PERSONNEL (ONE OF WHOM WAS KILLED). THE REST WERE EITHER STUDENTS OR PEOPLE WHO JOINED THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS. OF THE 336 STUDENT/DEMONSTRATOR CASUALTIES, 108 SUFFERED GUNSHOT WOUNDS, VIRTUALLY ALL CAUSED BY "RUBBER BULLETS." (SEPTEL REPORTS ON CLAIMS OF EVIDENCE THAT A FEW OF THE INJURED WERE SHOT WITH LIVE AMMUNITION.) FOUR JOURNALISTS WERE ALSO INJURED INCLUDING ONE WHO WAS SHOT.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 05929 01 OF 03 181312Z

4. (U) VARIOUS EMBOFFS WERE ON THE SCENE AT VARIOUS POINTS: ONE OBSERVED ATMA JAYA CAMPUS FOR TEN HOURS, FROM APPROXIMATELY 1430, BEFORE THE STUDENTS LEFT THEIR CAMPUS TO BEGIN THEIR ILL-FATED MARCH TO PARLIAMENT, UNTIL AFTER MIDNIGHT, AS NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SECURITY FORCES ABOUT PERMISSION, ULTIMATELY DENIED, TO MARCH TO PARLIAMENT. THE FOLLOWING RECORDS THIS EMBOFF'S OBSERVATIONS AT ATMA JAYA CAMPUS WHERE THE MAJORITY OF THE CASUALTIES WERE RECORDED. (NOTE: FIGHTING ALSO TOOK PLACE NORTH OF THE CAMPUS AND WEST OF THE CAMPUS WHICH WAS NOT OBSERVED BY THIS EMBOFF.) END SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION.

5. (U) APPROXIMATELY 5,000 STUDENTS HAD GATHERED AT ATMA JAYA CAMPUS ON SUDIRMAN AVENUE BY 1400. ENTHUSIASM WAS HIGH AS STUDENTS MARCHED OUT OF THEIR CAMPUS GATES AT APPROXIMATELY 1435. THEY WERE IMMEDIATELY CONFRONTED BY A 18-MAN DEEP PHALANX OF POLICE AND JAKARTA MILITARY COMMAND IN THE SOUTHBOUND LANES OF SUDIRMAN. (AT THAT POINT, TRAFFIC WAS FLOWING IN SUDIRMAN'S NORTHBOUND LANES.) STUDENTS AND PASSERSBY CONTINUED TO FILL IN THE LINE OF MARCH FROM BEHIND WITH THE NUMBERS SWELLING TO APPROXIMATELY 10,000 BY 1530.

6. (U) A MAKESHIFT PODIUM WAS SET UP AT THE POLICE LINES FOR STUDENT SPEAKERS AND AN "OPEN FORUM" COMMENCED. DEMONSTRATORS INCLUDING LOCAL PEOPLE AND CONTINGENTS FROM OTHER UNIVERSITIES ARRIVED AN JOINED THE THRONG THROUGH THE AFTERNOON ULTIMATELY RAISING THE NUMBERS TO SEVERAL TENS OF THOUSANDS. BY 1530 THE NORTH-BOUND LANES HAD ALSO

BEEN CLOSED AS OVER-FLOW FROM THE RAPIDLY GROWING CROWD SPILLED INTO THOSE LANES.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05929 01 OF 03 181312Z

7. (U) SHORTLY AFTER 1530, YOUTHS, NOT STUDENTS, CAME RUNNING DOWN THE NORTH BOUND LANE BEARING SMALL TREE BRANCHES AND CLODS OF MUD WHICH THEY HURLED AT THE TROOPS BLOCKING THE NORTHBOUND LANE. THIS CHALLENGE PROMPTED THE FIRST RESPONSE BY SECURITY PERSONNEL WHICH WAS NOT DIRECTED AT THE STUDENTS, MOST OF WHOM WERE SITTING IN ON THE ROAD IN FRONT OF THE CAMPUS. BY 1600, HOWEVER, THE FIGHTING HAD ALSO ENGULFED THE STUDENTS. THE SECURITY FORCES EMPLOYED GUNFIRE, HIGH-POWER WATER GUNS AND TEAR GAS. SOME STUDENTS RESPONDED WITH ROCKS BUT MOST RETREATED INTO THE CAMPUS OR NORTH ON SUDIRMAN. TROOPS CHASED THE BULK OF THE DEMONSTRATORS DOWN THE STREET WHILE MOST STUDENTS RETREATED BACK INTO THE ATMA JAYA CAMPUS. SHOOTING INTO THE CAMPUS, AND FIRING OF TEAR GAS CANISTERS INTO THE CAMPUS CONTINUED FOR APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES. AS THE FIRING BEGAN TO LESSEN, AMBULANCES BEGAN TO APPEAR TO REMOVE THE WOUNDED AND DEAD.

8. (U) EMBOFF VISITED THE ADJACENT "JAKARTA HOSPITAL" AT 1700 AND OBSERVED THE REMAINS OF ONE VICTIM WHO DIED OF A GUN SHOT WOUND, AND APPROXIMATELY 20 INJURED DEMONSTRATORS, MOSTLY STUDENTS. SOME WERE SUFFERING FROM GUNSHOT WOUNDS INCLUDING WOUNDS TO THE UPPER BODY. OTHERS

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2540

PAGE 01 JAKART 05929 02 OF 03 181313Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------832985 181313Z /38

R 181245Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4616

INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 005929

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/16
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, MILI, PINR, CASC, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: THE NOVEMBER 13 BLOODSHED AT ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY

HAD HEAD WOUNDS FROM CLUBBINGS. MEDICAL PERSONNEL TOLD
CONFIDENTIAL

EMBOFF THAT ONE OTHER FATALITY HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN FROM THE MORGUE. A RELIABLE JOURNALIST REPORTED THAT A THIRD FATALITY HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THE MORGUE EARLIER. (NOTE: WHILE INITIAL CASUALTIES WERE BROUGHT TO THE NEARBY "JAKARTA HOSPITAL," LATER CASUALTIES WERE BROUGHT TO FOUR OTHER HOSPITALS AS THIS FACILITY BECAME INUNDATED. END NOTE)

9. (U) A UNIVERSITY LECTURER WHO HAD HELPED EMBOFF TO ACCESS THE WOUNDED AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL IN THE HOSPITAL PLEADED WITH EMBOFF TO GO ON TO THE CAMPUS AS A MEANS OF DISSUADING SECURITY FORCES FROM RESUMING FIRE INTO THE CAMPUS. EMBOFF AGREED AND USED THE OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVIEW MEDICAL PERSONNEL ON THE CAMPUS AND TO INSPECT WALLS FOR SIGNS OF LIVE AMMUNITION FIRE IMPACT (FINDING NONE, ALTHOUGH THE INSPECTION WAS LIMITED BY THE INTENSITY OF THE TEAR GAS LINGERING ON CAMPUS).

10. (U) EMBOFF LEFT THE CAMPUS AROUND NIGHTFALL AND RETURNED TO THE STREET IN FRONT OF THE CAMPUS AS STUDENTS AND OTHERS BEGAN TO FILTER BACK FROM INTO THE STREET IN FRONT OF THE SECURITY FORCE LINES. AS THE CROWD BUILT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF BRIEF RESUMPTIONS OF SUSTAINED SHOOTING AND FIRING OF TEAR GAS. AT ONE POINT SIX OPEN TRUCKS OF POLICE ARRIVED IN FRONT OF THE CAMPUS GATES FIRING INTO THE AIR AS THEY ARRIVED. ALMOST AS SOON AS THEY HAD DISEMBARKED, THEY BEGAN SHOOTING HORIZONTALLY INTO THE CAMPUS. AMONG JOURNALISTS WHO WERE DRAWN TO THE ACTION, ONE, A LOCAL INDONESIAN, WAS SHOT IN THE RIGHT KIDNEY AREA AT POINT BLANK RANGE. EMBOFF AND OTHERS

ASSISTED IN LIFTING AND CARRYING THE WOUNDED MAN TO
CONFIDENTIAL

SAFETY. DURING THE EARLY EVENING EPISODES OF FIGHTING, SECURITY PERSONNEL FIRED A FLARE AND SEVERAL ROUNDS OF TEAR GAS DIRECTLY INTO THE CROWD. IT IS NOT KNOWN IF ANYONE WERE INJURED BY THESE PROJECTILES.

11. (U) BY 2035, THE SITUATION HAD STABILIZED. THE THOUSANDS OF DEMONSTRATORS WHO HAD BEEN CHASED NORTH ON SUDIRMAN HAD REGROUPED, MARCHING BACK TO THE STREET IN FRONT OF THE CAMPUS AND HAD BEGUN A RALLY. MOST OF THOSE NEAREST THE LINE OF TROOPS, ABOUT 20 PERSONS DEEP, WERE SEATED ON THE GROUND AND THERE WAS MASS SINGING OF PATRIOTIC AND RELIGIOUS SONGS.

12. (U) AT THIS TIME, AFTER A MORE THAN AN HOUR OF RELATIVE TRANQUILITY, THE SECURITY FORCES SUDDENLY ATTACKED THE CROWD. EMBOFF AND A CANADIAN EMBOFF, AS WELL AS MORE THAN A SCORE OF WESTERN JOURNALISTS ON THE SCENE, SAW NO PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE CROWD. THE FOLLOWING 75 MINUTES COMPRISED A RELENTLESS ASSAULT ON DEMONSTRATORS. FIRING INCLUDED FLARES AND TEAR GAS CANISTERS, SOME FIRED HORIZONTAL TO THE GROUND INTO THE CROWD. AS SOME TROOPS PURSUED DEMONSTRATORS NORTH ON SUDIRMAN, THE BULK REMAINED BEHIND TO POUR FIRE INTO THE CAMPUS. POLICE AND SOLDIERS TOOK UP KNEELING FIRING POSITIONS AT THE CAMPUS'S FOUR FOOT FENCE. INTERIOR CAMPUS LIGHTING CAST RUNNING STUDENTS IN SILHOUETTE ENABLING THE SECURITY FORCES TO PICK THEM OFF WITH EASE. EMBOFF AND JOURNALISTS SAW SOME STUDENTS FALL AS THEY WERE HIT.

13. (U) EVENTUALLY, STUDENTS REGROUPED WITHIN THE CAMPUS
CONFIDENTIAL

AND BEGAN STONING SECURITY PERSONNEL NEAREST THE FENCE INCLUDING THOSE IN FIRING POSITIONS. AT APPROXIMATELY 2100 THE STUDENTS BEGAN TO THROW MOLOTOV COCKTAILS, MOST OF WHICH BARELY CLEARED THE FENCE BUT WERE SUFFICIENT TO DRIVE OFF SECURITY PERSONNEL CLOSEST TO THE FENCE. THIS ALLOWED SOME STUDENTS TO BEGIN TO RETURN TO THE ROAD IN FRONT OF THE UNIVERSITY, ONLY TO BE DRIVEN BACK BY INCREASED RIFLE FIRE. AT ABOUT 2145, A HUGE THRONG OF DEMONSTRATORS INCLUDING THOSE WHO HAD EARLIER FLED NORTH AND MANY THOUSANDS MORE WHO HAD SINCE JOINED THEM, MARCHED BACK TO THE AREA IN FRONT OF THE CAMPUS. AFTER BRIEFLY HOLDING FIRE, STONE THROWING BY SOME IN THE CROWN

PRECIPITATED A NEW ROUND OF FIRING.

14. (U) TROOPS FANNED OUT ATTACKING ONLOOKERS AT THIS POINT, CHASING JOURNALISTS AND OTHERS INTO BUILDINGS ON THE WEST SIDE OF SUDIRMAN. EARLIER, SOME DEMONSTRATORS IN PANIC BROKE THROUGH PLATE GLASS INTO A BANK BUILDING WHERE THEY WERE PURSUED AND BEATEN BY SECURITY FORCES. SUBSEQUENTLY, SECURITY FORCES BEAT THE SECURITY PERSONNEL AT ONE BUILDING FOR NOT HAVING PREVENTED RETREATING STUDENTS FROM TAKING REFUGE IN THE BUILDING.

15. (U) UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 2230, STUDENTS REPEATEDLY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2541

PAGE 01 JAKART 05929 03 OF 03 181313Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------83298A 181313Z /38

R 181245Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4617
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 005929

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/16
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, MILI, PINR, CASC, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: THE NOVEMBER 13 BLOODSHED AT ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY

TRIED TO PUSH OUT OF THE CAMPUS, THROWING ROCKS AND

MOLOTOV COCKTAILS, FOR THE MOST PART WITH LITTLE EFFECT. (EMBOFF SAW ONE SOLIDER HIT BY A ROCK AND CARRIED AWAY.) PRESS ACCOUNTS THAT ANOTHER TWO INJURIES WERE RECORDED AMONG SECURITY PERSONNEL. NGO DATA ALSO NOTES THESE TWO INJURIES. ATTEMPTS TO BREAK OUT OF THE CAMPUS WERE REPEATEDLY DEFEATED BY HORIZONTAL GUNFIRE INTO THE RANKS OF THE STUDENTS.

16. (U) AT APPROXIMATELY 2230, STUDENTS MADE A MASS PUSH OUT OF THE CAMPUS AND WERE JOINED BY SOME DEMONSTRATORS WHO HAD FILTERED BACK TO THE AREA IN FRONT OF THE CAMPUS. THEY LOCKED ARMS AT THE OUTER EDGES OF THE DENSELY PACKED GROUP AND APPEALED FOR THE SECURITY FORCES TO CEASE THEIR FIRE. THIS LAUNCHED THE FINAL TRUCE WHICH GRADUALLY TOOK HOLD SO THAT EVEN WHEN PROVOCATEURS TRIED TO DISRUPT THE "PEACE" BY THROWING ROCKS AT THE SECURITY FORCE, THE CULPRITS WERE QUICKLY CONTROLLED BY THE STUDENTS. POLICE, SOLDIERS AND STUDENTS SAT ON THE STREET SINGING PATRIOTIC SONGS.

17. (U) AT 0015, WHEN THE FINAL PHALANX OF POLICE MARCHED AWAY FROM THE CAMPUS, A LONE STUDENT CAME RACING UP AND HEAVED A MOLOTOV COCKTAIL WHICH EXPLODED NEAR THE DEPARTING POLICE COLUMN. STUDENTS RACED TO THE SPOT IN THE ROAD WHERE THE FLAMES ERUPTED STOMPING TO PUT OUT THE FIRE AND PLEADING WITH THE POLICE TO EXCUSE THE BREACH. THE POLICE DID SO AND DEPARTED TO LINES FURTHER SOUTH ON SUDIRMAN WHICH ULTIMATELY PROVED TO BE PERMANENT AS NEW SECURITY FORCE TROOPS ARRIVED, ROTATING FOR THOSE ON DUTY.
ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 06075 01 OF 02 272152Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	SAS-00	/022W					

----------86B9CD 272153Z /75

P 270931Z NOV 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4768
INFO ASSOCIQTION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBAQSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F ID E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 006075

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/06
TAGS: PHUM, PINR, PGOV, MILI, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: DEALING WITH THE NOVEMBER 13VIOLENCE AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS

REF: JAKARA 5940

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06075 01 OF 02 272152Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: ABRI HAS ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAS ARRAIGNED 44 PERSONNEL FOR UNDUE VIOLENCE IN DEALING WITHSTUDENTS AND OTHER DEMONSTRATORS IN THE NOVEMQER 13 "SEMANGGI TRAGEDY." IN ADDITION, 12 OFFICERS REPORTEDLY WERE DISCIPLINED FOR FAILIG TO CONTROL THEIR SUBORDINATES. AN ADDITIONQL 19 WERE DISCIPLINED FOR BEATING PROTESTERS. THE BRALED LITTLE ABOUT THE INVURE OF THE "DISCIPLINE" T GOVERNMENT, MEANWHI TREASON
AGAINST GOVQCLAIMS INCITED THE
PROTESTS. THE CHARGES QARRY A MAXIMUM SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT. THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS LAUNCHED ITS OWN INVESTIGATION INTO THE NOVEMBER 1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200502473

VIOLENCE. IT HAS ALSO URGED THE GOVERNMENT QO BE CAUTIOUS IN THE PURSUIT OF TREASON CHQRGES. A SENIOR COMMISSION MEMBER IN PRIVATE HS DESCRIBED THOSE CHARGES AS "SILLY." GIVEN TE LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND STALLED STATUS OF ABQI SELF-INVESTIGATIONS RELATED TO THE KILLINGS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN MAY AND THE MATTER OF ABRI KIDNAPPING/TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIISTS, STUDENTS AND OTHERS ARE NOT LIKELY TO BQ IMPRESSED WITH THE ABRI INVESTIGATION OF ITSOWN PERSONNEL. END SUMMARY

ABRI LAUNCHES INQESTIGATION:

3. (U) ABRI HAS ANNOUNCED THAT 144 PERSONNEL FQOM VARIOUS MILITARY UNITS ARE BEING ARRAIGNEDFOR UNDUE VIOLENCE

AGAINST STUDENT AND OTHER DEMONSTRATORS ON NOVEMBER 13 (REFTEL). ABRI SPKESMAN MAJ. GENERAL SYAMSUL MA'ARIF ALSO ANNOQNCED THAT TWELVE OFFICERS HAD BEEN DISCIPLINQD FOR FAILING TO CONTROL SUBORDINATES DURING QHE UNREST. AN ADDITIONAL 19 SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN DISCIPLINED FOR BEATING PROTESTERS. HE SAIDWITHOUT FURTHER CLARIFICATION THAT THE SANCTINS IMPOSED RANGED FROM "HEAVY MEASURES" TO "LIGHT REPRIMANDS." ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO SAID THAT "WE HAVE ADMITTED THAT (OFFICERSWERE DISCIPLINED) AND WE WILL INVESTIGATE ANDPUNISH THOSE WHO ARE GUILTY." IN A DEVELOPMENQ RELATED TO A SEPARATE INCIDENT ON NOVEMBER 12, THE ABRI SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT FOUR MEMBERS OF THE ARMY WOULD BE COURT-MARTIALED FOR BATING THREE JOURNALISTS.

4. (U) IN A SEPAQATE BUT RELATED DEVELOPMENT, GENERAL WIRANTO QAS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT POLICE OFFICERS STANDING AT THE FRONT LINES IN DEMONSTRATION SITUATIONS SHOULD ONLY CARRY BATONS. ABRI SPOKESMAN MA'ARIF ELABORATED THAT "OFFICERS STANDING ON THE FRONT LINES WHO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE DEMONSTRATORS, MQST NOT CARRY AMMUNITION AT ALL. THEY ARE TO EQUIP THEMSELVES WITH BATONS, BODY PROTECTORS AND SHIELDS ONLY." HE MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THATTHOSE IN THE BACK ROWS WOULD STILL HAVE WEQPONS WITH BLANK AND RUBBER BULLETS.

AN INDEPQNDENT TEAM TO PROBE THE NOVEMBER 13 VIOLENCE:

5. (U) MEANWHILE, THE INDONESIAN NATIQNAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, NOVEMBER 24, QET UP ITS OWN INVESTIGATION TEAM

PAGE 04 JAKART 06075 01 OF 02 272152Z
TO PROBE THE NOVEMBER 13 VIOLENCE. COMMISSION SECRETARY GEERAL SAID THAT THE TEAM "IS TO COMPLEMENT THE DQTA GIVEN BY THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THERE ARE QTILL FACTS WHICH NEED TO BE REVEALED AND SO THAT THE ASPECT OF ACCOUNTABILITY BECOMES CLEARER." MARZUKI DARUSMAN, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THECOMMISSION SAID THAT ONE OF THE TEAM'S TASKS COULD BE TO IDENTIFY THE "RADICAL GROUPS" WHICH GENERAL WIRANTO AND OTHER GOVERNMENT FIGURES HAVE ALLEGED INITIQTED THE VIOLENCE. HE ADDED THAT "THERE ARE A NUMBER OF THINGS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY EXPLAINED THAT WE FEEL ARE IMPORTANT." COMMISSIN MEMBER BAMBANG SOEHARTO (NO RELATION TO THEFORMER PRESIDENT) HAS BEEN NAMED TO HEAD THE TEAM.

6. (U) THE NGO "KONTRAS" WHICH INTER ALA INVESTIGATED CASES OF MISSING PERSONS HAS CLAIMED THAT TEN INDIVIDUALS, SEVEN OF THEM QTUDENTS, REMAIN MISSING FROM THE VIOLENCE OF NOVEMBER 13 AND 14. EIGHT OF THE MISSING ARE DESRIBED AS HAVING LAST BEEN SEEN IN LOCATIONS OQHER THAN SEMANGGI ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO INFORMQTION RELATED TO WHERE THE REMAINING TWO WER LAST SEEN.

SENIOR RETIRED MILITARY AND OTHER HABIBIE REGIME CRITICS INVESTIGATED:

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 06075 02 OF 02 271036Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	SAS-00	/022W					

----------867A3D 271036Z /38
P 270931Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTAQ
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4769
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 006075

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/06
TAGS: PHUM, PINR, PGOV, MILI, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: DEALING WITH THE NOVEMBER 13 VIOLENCE AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS

REF: JAKARTA 5940

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06075 02 OF 02 271036Z

7. (U) THE GOVERNMENT IS PURSUING "SEDITION" CHARGES AGAINST A GROUP WHICH INCLUDES SENIOR GOVERNMENT CRITICS AMONG THE RETIRED MILITARY AND IN PUBLIC LIFE. THEY HAVE BEEN FORBIDDEN FROM LEAVING THE COUNTRY. IN FORMAL TESTIMONY IN THE PARLIAMENT (DPR), ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO SAID THATTHE MEETING OF 18 OPPOSITION FIGURES AT A MAJQR DOWNTOWN JAKARTA HOTEL NOVEMBER 12 MET THE QRITERIA OF TREASON AS STIPULATED IN ARTICLES 110 AND 107 OF THE PENAL CODE. SPECIFICALLY, IRANTO SAID, "THEY AGREED TO FORM A REFORM PEQPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY AND A PRESIDIUM T REPLACE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT THROUGH AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL WAY." (NOTE: ARTICLE 110 DALS WITH "TREASON WITH A PURPOSE TO TOPPLE THQ GOVERNMENT. THE MOST SEVERE PUNISHMENT ALLOED UNDER THE ARTICLE IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT. AQTICLE 110 DEALS WITH CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT, FACILITATE, OR INCITE A CRIME UNDER ARTICLE 107 (OR OTHER STATUTES) OR IMPEDING GOVERNMENT ACTQON TO PREVENT A CRIME UNDER ARTICLE 107 (TREAQON). END NOTE)

8. (U) ACCORDING TO PRESS COVERAGE OF HIS REMARKS, WIRANTO UNDERSCORED THENEED TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBLE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE MEETING AND THE "SEMANGGI TRAGEDY," THE SHOOTING, CLUBBING AND TEAR GASSING OVER 400STUDENTS AND ORDINARY CITIZENS BY SECURITY FORCES. IT APPEARS EIGHT DEMONSTRATORS WERE KILLED. TWO SECURITY FORCE MEMBERS WERE INJURED AND ONE KILLED.

9. (U) NATIONAL POLICE SPOKESMAN BRIG. GENERAL SIANIPAR SAID ON NOVEMBER 23 THAT DOSSIERS OF 19 INDIVIDUALS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 06075 02 OF 02 271036Z

SUSPECTED OF TREASON WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE COURTS IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS. OF THE 19 SUSPECTS, 17 WERE SIGNATORIES OF THE NOVEMBER 12 COMMUNIQUE. POLICE SPOKESMAN BRIG. GENERAL TOGAR SIANIPAR TOLD REPORTERS THAT "FOLLOWING OUR INVESTIGATIONS WE HAVE FOUND VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW COVERING CONSPIRACY, ACTS OF TREASON AND AN ATTEMPT TO TOPPLE A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT." AN EIGHTEENTH SUSPECT, ALREADY QUESTIONED, IS POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND EDUCATOR SRI BINTANG PAMUNGAS HAS TOLD CANADIAN COLLEAGUES THAT HE WAS AT THE MEETING AT WHICH THE NOVEMBER 12 STATEMENT WAS SIGNED, BUT DID NOT HIMSELF SIGN IT AS HE ARRIVED LATE. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WERE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT CHARGES AGAINST SOME WILL BE EITHER REDUCED OR DROPPED. THE IDENTITY OF THE 19TH SUSPECT HAS BEEN THE SOURCE OF SOME SPECULATION SINCE THERE WERE ONLY 18 PEOPLE AT THE NOVEMBER 12 METING.

10. (U) THE GOVERNMENT'S PURSUIT OF PQSSIBLE PROSECUTION AGAINST THE SENIOR GOVERNMQNT CRITICS HAS DRAWN CRITICISM FROM MANY QUARTERS. IN A TWO-PAGE STATEMENT, THE GOVERNMET'S OWN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SAID THAT THE QGOVERNMENT SHOULD EXERCISE CAUTION TO AVOID GIVQNG THE IMPRESSION THAT POLITICAL MOTIVES LIE QEHIND THE ACCUSATIONS. IN A PRIVATE CONVERATION WITH VISITING A/S KOH, MARZUKI DARUSMANDESCRIBED THE CHARGES AS "SILLY."

11. (C) CMMENT: ABRI'S REVELATION THAT IT IS INVESTIGQTING AND METING OUT DISCIPLINE WITHIN ITS RANKS FOR THE NOVEMBER 13 VIOLENCE IS NOT LIKELY TO CARRY MUCH WEIGHT WITH STUDENTS. THE STUDENTS AND OTHERS REMAIN HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE FAILURE OF THE MILITARY TO PURSUE

CONFIDENTIAL

ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE KILLING OF FOUR TRISAKTI STUDENTS IN MAY OR THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. WHILE AN INVESTIGATION BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WOULD HAVE FAR MORE CREDIBILITY, THE COMMISSION LACKS THE POWER TO SUBPOENA AND CAN ONLY MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT ON THE BASIS OF ITS FINDINGS. ITS RECOMMENDATIONS OFTEN ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PROMPT GOVERNMENT ACTION. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E84

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9281

PAGE 01 JAKART 06120 01 OF 03 010952Z
ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	FAAE-00	FBIE-00
	IMMC-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	JUSE-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	DCP-01	NRCE-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	SNIS-00
	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/024W					

----------879A49 010953Z /38

R 010919Z DEC 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4802

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 006120

DEPARTMENT; S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/16
TAGS: PTER, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 1998 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: A) STATE 202128, B) 1997 JAKARTA 6773

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS;
REASON 1.5(D)

2. (U) FORMAT FOR THIS MESSAGE WAS DERIVED FROM REF A.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06120 01 OF 03 010952Z

A. RESPONSE OF THE INDONESIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 1998:
---

3. (U) THE GOI JUDICIAL SYSTEM WAS NOT CONFRONTED WITH ANY ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM DURING 1998. IT WAS, HOWEVER, CONFRONTED WITH INCIDENTS WHICH FALL INTO REF A'S DESCRIPTION OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM: "PREMEDITATED, POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE PERPETRATED AGAINST NONCOMBATANT TARGETS BY SUBNATIONAL GROUPS OR CLANDESTINE STATE AGENTS."

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

4. (U) THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BROUGHT TO TRIAL ANY OF THE MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO STAND ACCUSED OF CLANDESTINELY KIDNAPPING AND TORTURING POLITICAL ACTIVISTS IN 1997 AND 1998. A SENIOR MILITARY OFFICER, GENERAL PRABOWO, WAS SUBJECTED TO A MILITARY HONORS BOARD (NOT A COURT MARTIAL) AT WHICH HE ADMITTED INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPING OF NINE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. HE WAS HONORABLY RETIRED FROM MILITARY SERVICE. FOURTEEN ACTIVISTS REMAIN MISSING. A GROUP OF 11 MILITARY PERSONNEL HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS PENDING FORMAL CHARGES BUT ACTION IN MOVING THESE CASES TO TRIAL HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY DELAYED.

5. (U) THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BROUGHT TO TRIAL OR CHARGED ANY PARTY IN THE MAY FATAL SHOOTING OF PEACEFULLY DEMONSTRATING STUDENTS ON THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. IT HAS TRIED AND CONVICTED TWO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 06120 01 OF 03 010952Z

POLICE OFFICIALS FOR MISCONDUCT IN THE INCIDENT, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THEY WERE NOT GUILTY OF FIRING THE FATAL SHOTS. THE GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION INTO THESE KILLINGS AND THE WOUNDING OF A NUMBER OF OTHER INDIVIDUALS WITH LIVE AMMUNITION AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ON MAY 12 IS STALLED.

6. (U) THE GOVERNMENT HAS BROUGHT TO TRIAL A NUMBER OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF THE MURDER OF OVER 150 INDIVIDUALS INCLUDING ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS FIGURES AND SHAMANS, IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA. SOME OF THOSE CHARGED HAVE BEEN CONVICTED. THERE ARE REPORTS, CONSIDERED CREDIBLE BY THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THAT CLANDESTINE STATE AGENTS MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN SOME OF THESE KILLINGS. INVESTIGATIONS ARE PROCEEDING SLOWLY BUT ARE ACTIVE. THE MILITARY INTELIGENCE AGENCY, BIA, REPORTS THAT POLICE HAVE ARRESTED 157 SUSPECTS THUS FAR.

7. (U) THE GOVERNMENT APPOINTED A FACT-FINDING TEAM TO LOOK INTO MAY RIOTS IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES WHICH LED TO THE DEATH OF OVER 1,200 PEOPLE AND THE RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT OF MOSTLY SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND GIRLS. THE TEAM SUBMITTED ITS REPORT ON NOVEMBER 3, AND CALLED INTER ALIA ON THE GOVERNMENT TO CONDUCT A FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF THE RIOTS AND SPECIFICALLY TO BRING FORMER GENERAL PRABOWO BEFORE A COURT MARTIAL. IT NAMED ANOTHER SENIOR GENERAL, FORMER JAKARTA MILITARY COMMANDER SYAFRIE, AS SOMEONE WHOSE ROLE IN THE RIOTS SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED. THE REPORT ALSO URGED CLOSER

SUPERVISION OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (BIA)
WHICH A MEMBER OF THE FACT-FINDING TEAM DESCRIBED AS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 06120 01 OF 03 010952Z
"OUT OF CONTROL." PRESIDENT HABIBIE ANNOUNCED THAT KEY MINISTERS HAD ONE MONTH TO RESPOND TO THE TEAM'S REPORT. THE REPORT WAS ISSUED NOVEMBER 3. PRESIDENT HABIBIE TOLD AN AMERICAN VISITOR DECEMBER 1 THAT FOLLOW-UP ON THE REPORT WOULD BE DELAYED BECAUSE OF JUSTICE MULADI'S EMERGENCY HEART BY-PASS SURGERY IN NOVEMBER.

8. (U) IN EAST TIMOR, NON-COMBATANTS WERE TARGETS OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE CARRIED OUT BY SUBNATIONAL GROUPS OF ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST EAST TIMORESE AND BY MILITARY-BACKED PRO-INTEGRATIONIST GROUPS. IN 1998, THE OPPOSITION IN EAST TIMOR IS BELIEVED TO HAVE KILLED AT LEAST SIX CIVILIANS WHOM THEY ACCUSED OF BEING COLLABORATORS. ALSO IN 1998, GOI FORCES OR THEIR EAST TIMORESE PARAMILITARY AGENTS KILLED MORE THAN 30 NON-COMBATANTS WHOM THEY ACCUSED OF BEING CLANDESTINE SUPPORTERS OF THE REBELS, OR WHO WERE RELATIVES OF REBEL PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION TO THE NON-COMBATANTS, NINE ABRI PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN KILLED IN EAST TIMOR OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS.

9. (U) THE GOI POLICE/MILITARY AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS HAVE SOUGHT TO APPREHEND AND PROSECUTE ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST ELEMENTS ACCUSED OF ATTACKS ON NON-COMBATANTS (AND COMBATANTS). THE GOI IS ALSO SEEKING THE SURRENDER FROM REFUGE IN THE AUSTRIAN EMBASSY OF TWO

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9282

PAGE 01 JAKART 06120 02 OF 03 010952Z
ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	FAAE-00	FBIE-00
	IMMC-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	JUSE-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	DCP-01	NRCE-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	SNIS-00
	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/024W					

----------879A51 010953Z /38

R 010919Z DEC 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4803

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 006120

DEPARTMENT; S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/16
TAGS: PTER, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 1998 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: A) STATE 202128, B) 1997 JAKARTA 6773

PEOPLE IT ALLEGES ARE INVOLVED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF MUNITIONS AND EXPLOSIVES WHICH IT CLAIMS WERE TO BE USED BY ARMED ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST FORCES IN EAST TIMOR AND WHOM VARIOUS GOVERNMENT FIGURES HAVE DESCRIBED AS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06120 02 OF 03 010952Z
"TERRORISTS." ALLEGED ACCOMPLICES OF THESE INDIVIDUALS HAVE ALREADY BEEN FOUND NOT GUILTY BY AN INDONESIAN COURT, HOWEVER.

10. (U) THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT KNOWN TO HAVE BROUGHT TO TRIAL ANY OF THE MILITARY-BACKED STATE AGENTS WHO ARE CLAIMED BY VARIOUS DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVER ORGANIZATIONS TO HAVE TARGETED NON-COMBATANT EAST TIMORESE WHO OPPOSE EAST TIMOR'S INTEGRATION INTO INDONESIA.

11. (U) MOST REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES CONDUCTED BY STATE AGENTS (THE MILITARY) AGAINST NON-COMBATANTS IN ACEH AND IRIAN JAYA DURING 1998 AND IN EARLIER YEARS, INCLUDING REPORTS BY THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, HAVE GONE UNINVESTIGATED AND UNPROSECUTED BY THE SECURITY FORCES AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM. IN MOST BUT NOT ALL OF THESE CASES, THE ALLEGED PERPETRATORS WERE MILITARY NOT OPERATING CLANDESTINELY, AND THUS WOULD NOT FALL UNDER THE TECHNICAL DEFINITON OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM, REF A. THE GOVERNMNT HAS BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN APPREHENDING ARMED GROUPS ACCUSED OF BEING MEMBERS OF THE FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT (OPM) WHICH ATTACKED, TOOK HOSTAGE AND KILLED NON-COMBATANTS PRIOR TO 1998.

B. GOI EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION DURING 1998 OR ASSISTANCE IN RESPONSE TO U.S. REQUESTS IN TERRORIST CASES:

12. (U) THE GOI DID NOT EXTRADITE ANY SUSPECTED

TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION IN 1998 OR ASSIST IN RESPONSE TO U.S. REQUESTS IN OTHER WAYS INASMUCH AS THERE WERE NO U.S. REQUESTS IN THIS AREA.

C. IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS:

13. (U) THE GOVERNMENT WAS FACED WITH NO EXTRADITION REQUESTS IN 1998. DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A FORMAL EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND INDONESIA, AND SOME CONSTRAINTS RELATED TO EXTRADITION CONTAINED IN INDONESIAN LAW, THE GOI HAS COOPERATED WITH THE UNITED STATES IN SUPPORT OF PROSECUTION OF ACCUSED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS IN THE RECENT PAST (1997).

14. (U) THE GOVERNMENT'S DELAYED INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM CASES INVOLVING LIKELY "CLANDESTINE STATE AGENTS MPLOYING POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE AGAINST NON-COMBATANTS," SUCH AS THE MAY 12 TRISAKTI KILLINGS, THE MAY RIOTING AND THE KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS APPEAR TO MOST OBSERVERS TO REFLECT AN ABSENCE OF POLITICAL WILL TO PURSUE THESE CASES. MOREOVER, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IS WIDELY REGARDED AS CORRUPT, INEFFICIENT AND SUBJECT TO POLITICAL PRESSURE ON IMPORTANT CASES.

15. (SBU) ALTHOUGH THE NEW GOVERNMENT THAT CAME TO POWER IN MAY HAS MOVED SLOWLY IN PURSUING INVESTIGATIONS INTO PAST MISDEEDS, INSTANCES OF KIDNAPPINGS, TORTURE OR KILLINGS BY CLANDESTINE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT-DIRECTED AGENTS APPEAR TO HAVE LARGELY CEASED SINCE IT TOOK

OFFICE. INVESTIGATIONS ARE JUST BEING LAUNCHED, HOWEVER, INTO THE POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF CLANDESTINE ELEMENTS IN THE KILLING OF STUDENTS AND OTHERS ON NOVEMBER 13 AT ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY AND IN RELIGIOUS RIOTING NOVEMBER 22.

D. INDONESIAN RESPONSE OTHER THAN PROSECUTION OF TERRORIST CASES:

16. (U) INDONESIA, WHICH HAS SIGNED FOUR OF THE 10 KEY INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORISM CONVENTIONS, HAS A CONSISTENT RECORD OF COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN IGHTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. FOLLOWING THE U.S. STRIKES AGAINST TERRORISM TARGETS IN SUDAN AND AFGHANISTAN IN AUGUST, PRESIDENT HABIBIE TOLD THE PRESS THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO PERCEIVE THE ACTION AS BEING ANTI-ISLAMIC. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT REGARDING THOSE U.S. ACTIONS INCLUDED CRITICISM OF THE U.S. ACTION. WHILE CONDEMNING "TERRORISM IN ANY FORM," THE STATEMENT WENT ON TO SAY: "HOWEVER, INDONESIA CANNOT CONDONE ACTS OF INTERVENTION IN AND AGGRESSION AGAINST THE TERRITORY OF OTHER SOVEREIGN STATES."

E. MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN BY THE GOI

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9286

PAGE 01 JAKART 06120 03 OF 03 010953Z
ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	FAAE-00	FBIE-00
	IMMC-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	JUSE-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	DCP-01	NRCE-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	SNIS-00
	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/024W					

----------879A56 010953Z /38

R 010919Z DEC 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4804

C O N F I D E N T I A SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 006120

DEPARTMENT;S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/16
TAGS: PTER, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 1998 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: A) STATE 202128, B) 1997 JAKARTA 6773

IN 1998:

---

17. (U) NONE

CONFIDENTIAL

F. HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORISTS OR TERRORIST GROUPS, INCLUDING POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION:

---

18. (U) INDONESIA HAD DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, INCLUDING RECIPROCAL RESIDENT DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE, WITH ALL SEVEN OF THOSE COUNTRIES CURRENTLY ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S TERRORISM LIST. GENERALLY, THE GOI HAS OPPOSED SANCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA WHICH TARGET THESE SEVEN GOVERNMENTS FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

G. GOI PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE:

---

19. THE GOI OCCASIONALLY IS CRITICAL OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON OTHER STATES FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, THE GOI IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH ANTI-TERRORISM SANCTIONS.

H. SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1997 IN THE GOI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC:

---

20. (U) THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FREE PRESS AND THE INCREASING STRENGTH OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY GROUPS HAS LED THE GOVERNMENT TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING THAN IN THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAST IN ACKNOWLEDGING MATTER OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM INVOLVING CLANDESTINE STATE AGENTS. THIS PROGRESS IN PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET EXTENDED TO PROMPT INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF SUCH CASES. TWO POLICE JUNIOR OFFICERS WERE CONVICTED FOR ACTIONS RELATED TO THE TRISAKTI INCIDENT BUT NOT CONNECTED DIRECTLY TO THE KILLING OF THE FOUR STUDENTS.

I. U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH

RESPECT TO THE GOI:
---

21. (C) THE UNITED STATES, BOTH PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY, HAS CALLED ON THE GOI TO PURSUE THOROUGH AND PROMPT INVESTIGATIONS OF INSTANCES OF VIOLNCE AGAINST INDONESIAN CITIZENS, INCLUDING THOSE WHICH DERIVED FROM CLANDESTINE AGENT VIOLENCE AGAINST NON-COMBATANTS. THE GOI GAVE EXTENSIVE AND VITAL COOPERATION TO THE USG IN THE CASE OF A JAPANESE NATIONAL TERRORIST IN 1997 WHO WAS CONVICTED IN 1998.

J. GOI COOPERATION IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS IN THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF AN ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS OR INTERESTS:
---

22. (U) AS NOTED IN PARA 12, THE GOI HAS COOPERATED WITH THE UNITED STATES IN CASES RELATED TO TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS OR INTERESTS.

K. GOI COOPERATION IN THE PREVENTION OF AN CT OF

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS IN INDONESIA:
---

23. (C) THE GOI PROVIDED SWIFT AND EFFECTIVE POLICE PROTECTION TO THE EMBASSY IN THE WAKE OF THE ATTACKS ON U.S. EMBASSIES IN AFRICA IN AUGUST. THE GOI REGULARLY SHARES POTENTIAL INFORMATION RELATED TO TERRORIST CONCERNS AND HAS RESPONDED EFFECTIVELY IN MOST INSTANCES.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9380

PAGE 01 JAKART 06170 01 OF 02 090100Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------8AAD9D 090100Z /38

R 022319Z DEC 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4862
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 006170

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENTS: UPDATE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: INDONESIAN STUDENTS REMAIN POLITICALLY ACTIVE, ALTHOUGH THE ENORMOUS DEMONSTRATIONS OF MID-NOVEMBER HAVE GIVEN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06170 01 OF 02 090100Z
WAY TO SMALLER DEMONSTRATIONS AT MULTIPLE SITES, FOCUSING IN JAKARTA ON THE HOME OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. WE COUNT SEVEN UNDERWAY AT DIFFERENT SITES IN JAKARTA AS OF COB DECEMBER 2. STUDENTS CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE IN OTHER CITIES AS WELL, THOUGH AGAIN IN SMALLER NUMBERS. THE STUDENTS ARE UNITED ON TWO KEY POINTS: THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MILITARY FROM POLITICS, AND THE PROSECUTION OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. DEMANDS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE KILLING OF STUDENTS ON MAY 12 AND NOVEMBER 13 ALSO ARE COMMON TO MOST DEMONSTRATIONS. STUDENTS DO NOT HAVE A CONSENSUS OVER WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD STEP DOWN NOW, OR TO WHAT EXTENT THEIR FOCUS SHOULD BE ON FAIR ELECTIONS FOR MID-1999. PRACTICAL CONCERNS MAY BE A CONSTRAINT ON STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS OVER THE NEXT MONTH OR SO. END NOTE.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS GIVE WAY TO PIN PRICKS
---

3. (U) THE MASSIVE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS HELD IN JAKARTA AND OTHER INDONESIAN CITIES IN MID-NOVEMBER HAVE GIVEN WAY TO SMALLER, MULTIPLE PROTESTS. IN JAKARTA, THE RESIDENCE OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAS BEEN THE FAVORITE, NEARLY DAILY TARGET. SECURITY FORCES ARE PERMANENTLY DEPLOYED AT INTERSECTIONS LEADING TO SOEHARTO'S RESIDENCE IN THE CENDANA AREA OF CENTRAL JAKARTA TO PREVENT ANY PROTESTERS FROM GETTING TOO CLOSE. AT LEAST 100 MILITARY AND RIOT POLICE HAVE BEEN CAMPING AT THE SMALL SUROPATI PARK FOR THE PAST WEEK TO BLOCK DEMONSTRATORS ON ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ROUTES TO CENDANA. (NOTE: BOTH THE AMBASSADOR AND DCM LIVE ADJACENT TO THE PARK. END NOTE.) DIPONOGORO STREET, TO THE SOUTH OF SUROPATI PARK, HAS BECOME THE MAIN VENUE FOR ANTI-SOEHARTO DEMONSTRATIONS. DURING DEMONSTRATIONS NOVEMBER 30 AND DECEMBER 1, SECURITY FORCES HAVE OUTNUMBERED STUDENT PROTESTERS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 06170 01 OF 02 090100Z

4. (U) ON DECEMBER 2, 800 STUDENT PROTESTERS (20 BUSLOADS) WERE OBSERVED ENROUTE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE. THE CONVOY WAS NOT BRANDISHING BANNERS AND FLAGS, A FACT WHICH ENABLED EIGHT BUSLOADS OR ABOUT 400 STUDENTS TO REACH THE VICINITY OF THE PALACE ON DECEMBER 1 WITHOUT BEING NOTICED (OR STOPPED) BY SECURITY. THE DECEMBER 1 GROUP, FROM BOROBUDUR UNIVERSITY, DEMONSTRATED PEACEFULLY CALLING FOR SOEHARTO TO BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL.

5. (U) ALSO ON DECEMBER 2, POLOFF ON THE SCENE OBSERVED 500 TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ASSEMBLED NEAR THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE WHERE THEY DEMANDED THAT SOEHARTO BE RIED AND THAT THERE BE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE KILLING OF STUDENTSAND OTHERS AT THE SEMANGGI SHOOTING NOVEMBER 13 AND AT TRISAKTI ON MAY 12. THEY ALSO CALLED FOR THE DISMISAL OF ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO. A DELEGATION OF 17 FROM THE GROUP WAS ALLOWED INTO THE PALACE, ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL UNCLEAR WHO RECEIVED THEM. ALSO ON DECEMBER 2, HUNDREDS OF STUDENTS CONDUCTED A PROTEST NEAR THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S RESIDENCE (SUROPATI PARK) AND ABOUT 200 WERE LOCATED IN FRONT OF THE ELECTION COMMISSION OFFICE, THE FIRST TIME THE LATTER SITE HAS SEEN DEMONSTRATIONS. A GROUP OF ABOUT 400 STUDENTS FROM FORUM KOTA WERE ON THE AIRPORT TOLL ROAD NEAR THE PARLIAMENT AT COB WHILE A SMALLER GROUP WAS REPORTED ON THE TOLL ROAD NEAR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. A GROUP OF SEVERAL HUNDRED DEMONSTRATORS FROM "KOMRAD" MARCHED PAST THE U.S. EMBASSY, AT 1715, TRYING TO REACH THE DEFENSE MINISTRY. MEANWHILE, A SEVENTH DEMONSTRATION WAS REPORTED UNDERWAY AT THE HOTEL INDONESIA SQUARE. A SOURCE CLOSE TO STUDENTS HAD ALERTED US DECEMBER 1 THAT DECEMBER 2 WOULD BE A DAY OF "SAFARI" DEMONSTRATIONS.

6. (U) A DECEMBER 2 NEWS REPORT CLAIMS, WITHOUT OFFERING A DATE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 06170 01 OF 02 090100Z
THAT "THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS" STAGED A DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE DIPONOGORO MILITARY COMMAND HEADQUARTERS IN SEMARANG, CENTRAL JAVA. THE NEWSPAPER REPORT, WHICH DOES NOT IDENTIFY A SOURCE FOR ITS INFORMATION, ALLEGED THAT THE STUDENTS THREW "MISSILES" AT THE TROOPS BLOCKING ACCESS TO THE COMPOUND. THE REPORT ALSO CLAIMS, WITHOUT CITING A SOURCE, THAT "SECURITY FORCES SUCCEEDED IN CONFISCATING SOME TENNIS BALLS, WHICH HAD BEEN FITTED WITH RUBBER PIPES AND GASOLINE, MAKING THEM FUNCTION AS MOLOTOV COCKTAILS." (NOTE: MOLOTOV COCKTAILS ARE USUALLY MADE FROM GLASS BOTTLES. INASMUCH AS THE PROJECTILE HAS TO BURST TO RELEASE THE FLAMMABLE LIQUID, THE TENNIS BALL CLAIM SEEMS IMPROBABLE. THS IS THE FIRST WE HAVE HEARD OF SUCH A DEVICE. END NOTE)

STUDENTS UNITED AGAINST SOEHARTO AND POLITICAL ROLE FOR ABRI

6. (U) MAJOR STUDENT POLITICAL GROUPS REMAIN UNITED IN THEIR CALLS FOR FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TO BE PROSECUTED, AND FOR THE NEAR TERM ABOLISHMENT OF THE "DWIFUNGSI DOCTRINE" WHICH PROVIDES FOR A MAJOR ROLE FOR THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (ABRI) IN POLITICS. THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS HOLD SOEHARTO RESPONSIBLE FOR MASSIVE CORRUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. STUDENTS COMPLAIN THAT DWIFUNGSI BOTH AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIC CHANGE AND AN OBSOLETE

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9381

PAGE 01 JAKART 06170 02 OF 02 090100Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------8AADA3 090100Z /38
R 022319Z DEC 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4863
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 006170

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENTS: UPDATE

AND CORRUPT VESTIGE OF THE SOEHARTO REGIME. (A BROADER ANALYSIS OF THE DWIFUNGSI DEBATE IN INDONESIAN POLITICS FOLLOWS SEPTEL.)

STUDENTS DIVIDED OVER TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

7. (U) THE SHARPEST DIVIDE WITHIN THE STUDENT MOVEMENT IS THE QUESTION OF A "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT". SEVERAL OF THE LOUDEST, BEST ORGANIZED AND MOST ACTIVE STUDENT MOVEMENTS, INCLUDING FORUM KOTA (CITY FORUM) AND FAMRED (STUDENT - PEOPLE'S ACTION FRONT FOR DEMOCRACY), AND FKSMJ (THE JAKARTA STUDENT SENATES COMMUNICATION FORUM) HAVE CONSISTENTLY DEMANDED THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE STEP DOWN, AND THAT THE PARLIAMENT BE DISSOLVED. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE REPLACED, ACCORDING TO SOME VERSIONS - BY A "PRESIDIUM" - A RULING COALITION OF OPPOSITION FIGURES. THEIR IS NO CONSENSUS ON THE COMPOSITION OF A PRESIDIUM - PRIOR TO THE NOVEMBER 13 SEMANGGI INCIDENT, SOME GROUPS ARGUED THAT WIRANTO SHOULD BE INCLUDED - WHILE OTHERS SUPPORT MEGAWATI BUT NOT AMIEN RAIS FOR THE PRESIDIUM - OR VICE VERSA. ACCORDING TO FORUM KOTA'S VERSION OF TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, INDONESIA SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY A SYSEM OF "INDONESIAN PEOPLES' COMMITTEES" (KR) THAT WOULD GOVERN ON A NATIONAL LEVEL ON TH BASIS OF A MANDATE FROM LOCAL KRI'S THAT WOULD BE CLOSE TO THE PEOPLE AND UNDERSTAND THEIR NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS.

8. (U) THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT CONCEPT IS REJECTED BY OTHER, MORE MAINSTREAM POLITICAL GROUPS INCLUDING HMI (THE MUSLIM STUDENTS UNION) (HMI HAS LINKS TO GOLKAR), THE MUHAMADIYAH AND N.U. STUDENTS ORGANIZATIONS, AND OTHERS. THE CONCEPT IS CRITICIZED VARIOUSLY AS UNREALISTIC, UNCONSTITUTIONAL, UNSTABLE, AND UNDEMOCRATIC. SOME MAINSTREAM STUDENT GROUPS ARGUE THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON THE FAIR IMPLEMENTATION OF ELECTIONS SET FOR MAY, 1999, RATHER THAN DEMANDS THAT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT BE REPLACED BY AN AMORPHOUS TRANSITIONAL REGIME OF SOME KIND.

STUDENTS FACE PRACTICAL CONCERNS:

UNCLASSIFIED

9. (SBU) STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS MAY BE FACING SOME PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS. SEMESTER EXAMS BEGIN DECEMBER 7, POSSIBLY LEADING TO SOME FALL IN THE LEVEL OF STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN DEMONSTRATIONS. WE NOTE THAT THE RAINY SEASON IS EXPECTED SOON TO PRODUCE HEAVY DOWNPOURS WHICH ALSO MAY DAMPEN STUDENT ENTHUSIASM. RAMADAN, THE FASTING MONTH FOR MUSLIMS AND CHRISTMAS, MAY ALSO DRAIN STUDENT ENTHUSIASM OVER THE COMING MONTH. THAT SAID, STUDENT DETERMINATION TO PERSEVERE CONTINUES TO SURPRISE THEIR SUPPORTERS AND CRITICS.
ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7261

PAGE 01 JAKART 06520 02 OF 03 280228Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W		

----------911D2A 280229Z /38

R 230911Z DEC 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5210
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 006520

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARAS 7 AND 9)

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/98
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: STUDENT ACTIVISTS DISCUSS VIOLENCE, PLANS, IDEOLOGY

REF: (A) JAKARTA 6466, (B) JAKARTA 6262, (C) JAKARTA 5899
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06520 02 OF 03 280228Z

GROUP CONCEDED TO POLOFF THAT SOME STUDENTS HAVE STARTED TO BRING STICKS/CLUBS TO DEMONSTRATIONS, BUT CLAIMED THEY WERE ONLY FOR SELF-DEFENSE.

ALLEGED INTIMIDATION/POLICE VIOLENCE
---

7. (C) ACCORDING TO VARIOUS ACCOUNTS, STUDENTS RIDING A BUS FROM THE DECEMBER 17 DEMONSTRATION AT PARLIAMENT WERE BEATEN BY SECURITY PERSONNEL AFTER THEIR BUS WAS HALTED NEAR THE CAMPUS OF THE CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA (UKI) (WHERE FORKOT IS HEADQUARTERED). ACCORDING TO STUDENT ACCOUNTS, SECURITY FORCES

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

SHOT OUT THE TIRES OF THE BUS. SECURITY FORCES CLAIMED THAT THE BUS'S TIRE BLEW OUT ON ITS OWN AND STATED THAT THE SHOTS FIRED WERE WARNING SHOTS IN THE AIR. FORKOT REPRESENTATIVES TOLD POLOFF THAT THEY HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO THREATS AND INTIMIDATION FROM SECURITY FORCES. THEY CLAIMED THAT ARMY UNITS HAVE POSITIONED THEMSELVES IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE THE UKI CAMPUS SEVERAL NIGHTS IN THE PAST WEEK AND HAVE SHOUTED ABUSE AND THREATS INSIDE. A RECENT MEDIA ACCOUNT DESCRIBED A "SECURITY OPERATION" UNDERTAKEN BY THE MILITARY IN WHICH TROOPS WERE DEPLOYED OUTSIDE THE UKI CAMPUS AND SHINED SPOTLIGHTS INTO THE CAMPUS OVERNIGHT. (SEE REF B FOR AN ACCOUNT OF ANTI-STUDENT MOB VIOLENCE THAT OCCURRED JUST OUTSIDE THE UKI CAMPUS ON DECEMBER 9.)

MODERATE STUDENTS FOCUS ON ELECTIONS

8. (U) OUR CONTACTS WITH STUDENTS AND OBSERVATION OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS SUGGEST THAT A SUBSTANTIAL MAJORITY OF INDONESIAN

STUDENTS OPPOSE THE HABIBIE REGIME. AS A WHOLE, STUDENTS ARE UNITED IN THEIR CALLS FOR FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TO BE PROSECUTED AND FOR THE MILITARY TO WITHDRAW FROM POLITICS. HOWEVER, A DEEP SPLIT EXISTS WITHIN THE STUDENT MOVEMENT BETWEEN THOSE THAT WANT TO FOCUS ON THE ISSUE OF IMPLEMENTING FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, AND HARDLINERS THAT DENY THE LEGITIMACY OF THE HABIBIE REGIME AND ARE DEMANDING THE GOVERNMENT'S IMMEDIATE RESIGNATION. MODERATE STUDENTS CRITICIZE THE HARDLINERS' DEMAND FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S RESIGNATION AS UNREALISTIC AND STRESS THE NEED TO FOCUS ON THE ELECTIONS.

9. (U) MANY STUDENTS FROM THE MODERATE CAMP ARE PLANNING TO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES INTO ELECTION MONITORING TEAMS THAT WILL ASSUME A WATCHDOG STANCE BEFORE AND DURING THE ELECTIONS. SOME HOPE TO GET OFFICIAL RECOGNITION AS ELECTION MONITORS. (NOTE: A CABINET MINISTER RECENTLY TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT, AS FAR AS THE GOI IS CONCERNED, "ALL ARE WELCOME" TO MONITOR THE ELECTIONS. END NOTE.) MODERATE STUDENTS HAVE ALSO TRIED TO DIRECTLY INFLUENCE THE DEBATE ON POLITICAL LAWS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES (DPR). A MEMBER OF THE STUDENT SENATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA (U.I.) TOLD POLOFF THAT VARIOUS STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN BOMBARDING THE DPR COMMITTEE WITH STUDENT "DELEGATIONS" SHOWING UP WITH PETITIONS DEMANDING THAT THE NEW LAWS SET FORTH ELECTION SYSTEMS THAT WILL BE FAIR AND OPEN. THE COMMITTEE HAS APPARENTLY ACCEPTED A NUMBER OF THESE PETITIONS, ALTHOUGH IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT, IF ANY, INFLUENCE IT HAS HAD ON THE DEBATE.

10. (U) AMONG THE STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS THAT COULD BE CLASSIFIED

IN THE "MODERATE" CAMP ARE: HMI (THE MUSLIM STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION) KAMMI (ACTION COMMITTEE OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM

CONFIDENTIAL

STUDENTS), PMII (THE N.U. STUDENT ORGANIZATION), GMKI (THE INDONESIAN CHRISTIAN STUDENTS' MOVEMENT), IMM (MUHAMADIYAH STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION) AND STUDENT SENATES FROM VARIOUS UNIVERSITIES, IN JAKARTA, PARTICULARLY FROM U.I. AND TRISAKTI.

THE HARD LINE: FORUM KOTA

11. (C) IN THE SECOND MAJOR CAMP ARE THE HARD-LINE STUDENT GROUPS. THEY REJECT THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT AS AN ILLEGITIMATE REMNANT OF THE SOEHARTO REGIME. THEY DEMAND THE GOVERNMENT'S RESIGNATION, AND SEEK THE INSTALLATION OF A "TRANSITIONAL" GOVERNMENT. FORUM KOTA IS PERHAPS THE LARGEST AND MOST POWERFUL OF THESE GROUPS. FORUM KOTA AND LIKE-MINDED STUDENTS SHUN TRADITIONAL FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND LEADERSHIP. THREE MEMBERS OF FORUM KOTA'S CENTRAL BOARD (WHICH THEY ARE PROUD TO NOTE HAS NO CHAIRPERSON) OUTLINED THEIR POLITICAL VISION TO POLOFF IN A DECEMBER 22 MEETING: THEY DEMAND THAT THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL PARLIAMENTS BE DISMANTLED AND REPLACED BY A SYSTEM OF "INDONESIAN PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES" (KRI). ACCORDING TO FORKOT'S RATHER SKETCHY BLUEPRINT, LOCAL KRI'S WOULD ELECT DISTRICT KRI'S WHICH WOULD ELECT PROVINCIAL KRI'S, WHICH IN TURN WOULD CHOOSE THE NATIONAL KRI: A BOTTOM-UP, GRASSROOTS SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.

12. (C) FORKOT MEMBERS FEEL DEEP ALIENATION FROM THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM. ONE PREDICTED TO POLOFF THAT ELECTIONS

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0926

PAGE 01 STATE 086477 132237Z
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	ARA-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CIAE-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	E-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026R						

086477
SOURCE: KODAKA.013144
DRAFTED BY: MGIDOL:DAHARTWICK -- 05/13/98 (202) 647-6614
APPROVED BY: MGIDCL:DAROCHMAN
S/S-O:ELMILLARD
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
S, D, P, E, T, M, MGIDOL, SSO-2, S/S-3, S/S-IRM, S/S-O/CMS, S/S-EX, EAP-5

----------3D94DC 132237Z /45

O 132209Z MAY 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9167
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1531
USCINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA IMMEDIATE
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
USCINCSO MIAMI FL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 086477 132237Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

USCINCSOC MACDILL AEB FL IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 086477

INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/13/2008
TAGS: PREL, PINS, AEMR, MARK, CASC
SUBJECT: MGIDOL SITUATION REPORT NO. OL AS OF 1530 EDT WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 1998.

CLASSIFIED BY DAHARTWICK, `MOIDOL DIRECTOR.

UNREST CONTINUES
---

1. (C) NEW VIOLENCE ERUPTED IN JAKARTA ON MAY 13, IN THE WAKE OF VIOLENCE WHICH TOOK THE LIVES OF AT LEAST SIX STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN JAKARTA ON MAY 12. PROTESTERS, NOT NECESSARILY STUDENTS, BURNED A GASOLINE STATION AND VEHICLES. VIOLENT CLASHES WERE REPORTED ELSEWHERE IN JAKARTA, INCLUDING ON JALAN SUDIRMAN IN THE HEART OF THE CITY. CLASHES BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SECURITY FORCES WERE REPORTED IN JOGJAKARTA, AND THERE WERE PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE CITIES OF PADANG AND SURABAYA. MEDAN WAS QUIET BUT TENSE. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ANNOUNCED AN EARLY (MAY 14) RETURN FROM CAIRO. DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO APPEALED FOR RESTRAINT ON ALL SIDES AND PROMISED A FULL INVESTIGATION INTO THE MAY 12 STUDENT DEATHS. ACCORDING TO UNCONFIRMED PRESS REPORTS, AT LEAST TEN PEOPLE DIED IN JAKARTA RIOTING ON MAY 13. NINE OF

THOSE WERE REPORTEDLY ETHNIC CHINESE. (JAKARTA 1510, REUTERS)

MARKETS FALL
---

2. (U) INDONESIAN FINANCIAL MARKETS SUFFERED SHARP

SETBACKS. THE RUPIAH FELL TO 10,400 TO THE U.S. DOLLAR ON MAY 13, A ONE-DAY DROP OF MORE THAN 11 THE RUPIAH IS DOWN 20OVER THE PAST WEEK AND MORE THAN ~5FROM ITS PRE-CRISIS VALUE. THE STOCK MARKET FELL 8IN RUPIAH TERMS ON MAY 13. (BLOOMBERG)

AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE AND TRAVEL WARNING

3. (C) EMBASSY JAKARTA HAS REQUESTED AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE FOR ELIGIBLE FAMILY MEMBERS AND FOR EMPLOYEES ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. WE ANTICIPATE DEPARTMENTAL APPROVAL TODAY FOR AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE AND THE ATTENDANT TRAVEL WARNING. (S/S-O, EAP)

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

4. (C) EAP A/S ROTH IS SCHEDULED TO CHAIR AN INTERAGENCY SECURE VIDEO CONFERENCE ON INDONESIA TODAY AT 1800 EDT. DOD, TREASURY, NSC, NEC, AND CIA ARE SET TO PARTICIPATE. BEYOND THE ITEMS ABOVE, ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED INCLUDE CINCPAC PRUEHER'S SCHEDULED MAY 15-16 VISIT TO JAKARTA,

CONFIDENTIAL

OTHER MILITARY ISSUES, PRESS STRATEGY, AND G-8/THIRD COUNTRY COORDINATION. (EAP)
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO7361

PAGE 01 STATE 088678 171457Z
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /001R

DRAFTED BY S/S-O:KIMBERLY MURPHY
APPROVED BY S/S-O:JAMES M. ROBERTS
----------3ED641 171457Z /38
O 171448Z MAY 98 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 088678 TOSEC 140008

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 02753 SENT ACTION SECSTATE DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO BEIJING ASEAN COLLECTIVE TOKYO CABERRA AIT TAIPEI
GENEVA SURABAYA MAY 17 BEING RPTD FOR UR INFO:
QUOTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002753

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/17/2008
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

TAGS: , PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: STUDENT PLANS FOR MAY 18-20

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: STUDENTS WERE SOBERED BY MAJOR RIOTING IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE IN RECENT DAYS, BUT THEIR RESOLVE TO PUSH FOR SOEHARTO TO STEP DOWN APPEARS TO HAVE INCREASED. STUDENTS ARE STILL PLANNING TO HOLD MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 20, ALTHOUGH LOCAL CONDITIONS WILL DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THEY MOVE OFF CAMPUS. DEMONSTRATIONS ARE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN AGAIN ON MAY 18, WITH A DELEGATION OF STUDENTS IN JAKARTA PLANNING TO GO TO THE DPR (POSSIBLY WITH COOPERATION FROM MINISTER OF DEFENSE WIRANTO) TO CALL FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR AND SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION. THE STUDENTS MIGHT BE JOINED BY A GROUP OF 15 RETIRED GENERALS. STUDENT LEADERS APPEAR DETERMINED TO AVOID VIOLENCE THAT COULD TURN INTO RIOTING. IT IS FAR FROM CERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT LOCAL PEOPLE WHO MAY GATHER ON THE MARGINS OF DEMONSTRATIONS WILL REMAIN PEACEFUL. END SUMMARY

3. (C) CAMPUSES AROUND JAKARTA HAVE BEEN EMPTY FOR THE PAST THREE DAYS, FOLLOWING THURSDAY'S RIOTS IN JAKARTA. STUDENT LEADERS IN JAKARTA, PADANG (WEST SUMATRA), BOGOR, AND SURAKARTA (CENTRAL JAVA) TELL US, HOWEVER, THAT PLANS FOR NATIONWIDE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 20 ARE STILL FIRM. STUDENTS ARE MEANWHILE HOLDING INTENSIVE INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED. STUDENTS IN EACH CITY ACROSS THE COUNTRY WILL DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO GO OFF CAMPUS BASED ON LOCAL CONDITIONS, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING RELATIONS WITH THE LOCAL MILITARY. AMCONSUL SURABAYA ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK HAVE NOT ALTERED PLANS FOR MASSIVE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 20.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

STUDENTS HAVE BEEN UPSET BY RIOTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN RECENT DAYS, AND SOME LEADERS ARE PUSHING FOR THE MAY 20 DEMONSTRATIONS (WHICH MAY BEGIN ON MAY 19) TO REMAIN ON CAMPUS.

JAKARTA
---

4. (C) STUDENTS IN JAKARTA ARE STILL PLANNING MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS FOR MAY 20, AND ON MAY 16 WERE HOLDING MEETINGS TO

DISCUSS THEIR STRATEGY. SOME STUDENT LEADERS WERE PROPOSING TO KEEP DEMONSTRATIONS ON CAMPUSES DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF RIOTS ERUPTING IF MASSES TAKE ADVANTAGE OF DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE STREETS. A STUDENT CONTACT SAID THAT STUDENT ACTION ON THE 20TH WAS NOW PARTLY DEPENDENT ON THE MILITARY. IF STUDENTS WERE SUPPORTED BY THE MILITARY, THEY WOULD GO TO THE DPR, AND IF NOT, THEY WOULD CONSIDER REMAINING ON CAMPUS.

5. (C) DEMONSTRATIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BEGIN AGAIN ON MAY 18. STUDENTS ARE PLANNING TO GO TO THE DPR ON MAY 18, POSSIBLY WITH COOPERATION AND EVEN ASSISTANCE FROM MINISTER OF DEFENSE WIRANTO. STUDENTS WILL PROBABLY BE JOINED BY 15 RETIRED GENERALS FROM THE GENERATION OF 1945. (NOTE SEPARATE REPORTING THAT INDICATES THAT WIRANTO WAS REPLACED AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF.) A STUDENT CONTACT AND A UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA PROFESSOR SAID THAT THE COMMUNICATION FORUM OF JAKARTA STUDENT SENATES PLANNED TO GO TO THE DPR THE MORNING OF MAY 18 TO DEMAND A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR DURING WHICH SOEHARTO WOULD STEP DOWN. THEY THOUGHT THAT A DELEGATION, RATHER THAN A MASS OF STUDENTS, WOULD GO TO THE DPR AND THAT STUDENTS SUPPORTING THE DELEGATION WOULD HOLD ON-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATIONS. HOWEVER, INDICATIONS LATE IN THE DAY MAY 18 WERE THAT BUSLOADS OF STUDENTS AND PERHAPS NON-STUDNETS MIGHT TRY TO JOIN THE DELEGATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. (C) THE PEOPLE WERE COOLING OFF, BUT THE ELITE MANEUVERINGS WERE GETTING HOTTER, ACCORDING TO A JAKARTA STUDENT CONTACT. HE HOPED THAT WIRANTO WOULD TAKE A STRONG POSITION IN FAVOR OF CHANGE WITHIN SEVERAL DAYS, AND WORRIED THAT IF HE DID NOT, THERE COULD BE MORE SERIOUS DESTRUCTION. ANOTHER STUDENT SOURCE SAID THAT IF SOEHARTO DOES NOT STEP DOWN AND A POLITICAL LEADER EMERGE QUICKLY, THERE WILL BE MORE RIOTING.

7. (C) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CATHOLIC STUDENT ASSOCIATION (PMKRI), WHO HAS STUDENT CONTACTS THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, SAID THAT THE ORIGINAL PLAN FOR MAY 20 WAS FOR ALL STUDENTS TO GO TO THE STREETS, BUT THAT BECAUSE OF THE RECENT RIOTS, THEY WERE NOW TAKING A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH. HE POINTED OUT THAT MANY STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS THAT HAD GONE OFF CAMPUS WERE PEACEFUL, INCLUDING RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN BANDUNG AND SEMARANG, AND THOUGHT IF THERE WERE NO PROVOCATIONS, OFF-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATIONS

COULD BE CONTROLLED. "WE MUST CONTINUE OUR STRUGGLE," HE SAID, "BUT WE NEED TO KEEP IT PEACEFUL." STUDENT SOURCES SAY DEMONSTRATIONS IN SURABAYA, SEMARANG, AND BANDUNG HAVE BEEN LARGELY PEACEFUL BECAUSE OF GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN STUDENTS AND THE MILITARY COMMANDERS. THIS WAS ALSO SAID TO BE THE CASE IN UJUNGPANDANG WITH GUMALAR, WHO HAS SINCE BEEN REPLACED, AND WHERE A CLASH BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SECURITY FORCES HAS SINCE OCCURRED.

8. (C) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE YOUNG DEMOCRATS SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO VIOLENCE ON THE 20TH. HE CALLED THE ACTIVITIES PLANNED FOR MAY 20TH "INTELLECTUAL ACTIONS," WHICH IN JAKARTA WOULD CONSIST OF MAJOR GATHERINGS OF STUDENT SENATE MEMBERS, LECTURERS AND

CONFIDENTIAL

OTHER UNIVERSITY OFFICIALS AND POPULAR LEADERS. EVENTS WOULD BE HELD THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, ALL WITH THE SAME REFORM THEMES AND ALL CALLING FOR THE PRESIDENT TO STEP DOWN. A PROFESSOR WHO IS WELL CONNECTED TO STUDENT ACTIVISTS IN JAKARTA SAYS THAT THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS WILL PROBABLY GO AHEAD WITH PLANS TO GO TO THE DPR ON MAY 20 TO CALL FOR SOEHARTO TO STEP DOWN. HE SAYS THAT FOLLOWING THE RIOTS THE ARMED FORCES (ESPECIALLY WIRANTO) HAVE EXPRESSED MORE TOLERANCE TOWARDS STUDENTS, GIVING THEM HOPE THAT A MASS MARCH ON THE DPR MIGHT BE CONTROLLABLE.

PADANG, WEST SUMATRA

9. (C) A STUDENT LEADER IN PADANG TOLD POLOFF THAT ALTHOUGH THE SITUATION HAD SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED BECAUSE OF SERIOUS RIOTING, STUDENTS HAD NOT TAKEN PART IN RIOTING AND PLANNED TO CONTINUE PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS. HE SAID THEY HAD EVIDENCE THAT RIOTS ON MAY 15 HAD BEEN PROVOKED BY GOVERNMENT AFFILIATED MASS YOUTH ORGANIZATION PEMUDA PANCASILA, AN ORGANIZATION KNOWN FOR THUGGISH ACTIVITIES. STUDENTS WERE CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN INTENSE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED. THEY MIGHT LEAVE CAMPUS ON MAY 20, BUT WOULD TRY TO ENSURE A CONTROLLED MARCH AND PLANNED TO SEEK ASSISTANCE FROM LOCAL ACADEMIC AND OTHER LEADERS IN SOCIETY.

SOLO, CENTRAL JAVA

10. (C) POLOFF SPOKE SEPARATELY WITH TWO SOLO (SURAKARTA) STUDENT

LEADERS, WHO SAID THAT MAY 20 WOULD SEE MAJOR STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN SOLO. STUDENTS WERE STILL DISCUSSING WHETHER TO GO OFF CAMPUS. AN AMERICAN LIVING IN SOLO WAS ADVISED BY FRIENDS TO LEAVE SOLO BY THE 20TH, BECAUSE RIOTERS MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS. ONE OF THE SOLO STUDENT LEADERS

DESCRIBED A MAY 14 DEMONSTRATION AT MUHAMMADIYAH UNIVERSITY, WHICH ENDED WITH A CLASH BETWEEN POLICE AND STUDENTS. STUDENTS WERE BEATEN, STUDENTS THREW STONES, AND THE SECURITY FORCES USED TEAR GAS. THE RIOT BEGAN, ACCORDING TO ONE STUDENT SOURCE, WHEN TEAR GAS AIMED AT STUDENTS ALSO WENT INTO LOCAL NEIGHBORHOODS AND ANGERED LOCAL RESIDENTS, WHOSE RESPONSE LED TO RIOTING. HE SAID RIOTING LED TO THE BURNING OF 287 CARS AND TRUCKS, 56 SINO-INDONESIAN OWNED SHOPS, ONE MOVIE THEATER, 570 MOTORCYCLES, 24 CAR AND MOTORCYCLE DEALERSHIPS, ONE SCHOOL, AND 12 RESTAURANTS. HE CLAIMED THAT STUDENTS DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN RIOTING. ONE OF THE SOLO STUDENT LEADERS SAID THAT ON MAY 15, 10,000 STUDENTS HAD HELD A FIVE KILOMETER TOTALLY PEACEFUL MARCH TO THE MAYOR'S OFFICE. HE SAID THE SECURITY FORCES WERE ACCOMMODATING, AND THERE WERE NO CLASHES. SOME LOCAL RESIDENTS AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS HAD JOINED THE MARCH.

BOGOR, WEST JAVA

11. (C) A STUDENT LEADER IN BOGOR TOLD POLOFF THAT NATIONAL DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD BE HELD MAY 20, AND THAT THE WORD HAD BEEN SPREADING THROUGH CAMPUSES FOR WEEKS. PLANS HAD NOT BEEN CANCELED BECAUSE OF RIOTING IN RECENT DAYS. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THAT STUDENTS IN BOGOR WOULD TRY TO STAY ON CAMPUS TO AVOID VIOLENCE. HE COMPLAINED THAT ON MAY 13, STUDENTS HOLDING A DEMONSTRATION ON CAMPUS WERE PROVOKED BY A MASS OF PEOPLE GATHERED OUTSIDE TO JOIN THEM. HE SAID STUDENTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT OUTSIDERS TRYING TO LURE THEM INTO DESTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR THAT WILL RUIN THE STUDENT MOVEMENT. (NOTE: STUDENTS IN JAKARTA AT ATMA JAYA, THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA, AND TRISAKTI HAVE ALSO TOLD US THAT NON-STUDENTS OUTSIDE THEIR CAMPUSES HAD TRIED TO PROVOKE THEM TO COME OUTSIDE. END NOTE)

MEETING WITH SYARWAN HAMID

---

12. (C) THE CATHOLIC STUDENT LEADER SAID THAT HE, ALONG WITH LEADERS OF OTHER MASS YOUTH AND STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS, HAD MET WITH DPR DEPUTY SPEAKER SYARWAN HAMID ON MAY 15. THE STUDENT LEADERS TOLD THEM THAT THE STUDENTS INTEND TO CONTINUE THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD A CHOICE: REFORM THROUGH A BLOODY OR A PEACEFUL PROCESS. STUDENTS HAD TO BE ALLOWED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION. THEY DEMANDED A SPECIAL SESSION OF PARLIAMENT TO WITHDRAW SOEHARTO'S MANDATE. A NEW LEADER WITHOUT ABSOLUTE POWER AND WITH A LIMITED TERM HAD TO BE INSTALLED TO BEGIN THE REFORM PROCESS. POSSIBLE CANDIDATES MENTIONED TO POLOFF WERE SARWONO, SISWONO, AND EMIL SALIM. WIRANTO WAS STILL TRUSTED BY MANY STUDENTS, HE THOUGHT, AND IF WIRANTO COULD BE BRAVE ENOUGH TO CHALLENGE SOEHARTO, HE COULD GAIN WIDE SUPPORT. HE THOUGHT THAT IF AMIEN RAIS, IN COOPERATION WITH ADI SASONO AND PRABOWO, TOOK POWER, INDONESIA WOULD BREAK APART. (NOTE: HE IS CATHOLIC, AND CHRISTIANS ARE ALWAYS SUSPICIOUS OF AMIEN RAIS, THOUGH THEY HAVE AT TIMES SUPPORTED HIS CHALLENGES TO SOEHARTO. END NOTE).

COMMENT

---

13. (C) RIOTING IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE HAS HAD A SOBERING EFFECT ON STUDENTS, WHO SEEM TO HAVE BECOME MORE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR PLANNING, BUT NO LESS RESOLVED TO PUSH FOR POLITICAL CHANGE. THEY WANT TO MAINTAIN THE IMAGE OF A PEACEFUL MOVEMENT, AND ALMOST ALL STUDENT CONTACTS TALK OF PROVOCATEURS TRYING TO

DESTROY THAT IMAGE. THEY APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT SUPPORT FROM ABRI COULD ENSURE THAT RIOTS ARE NOT SPARKED BY DEMONSTRATIONS. STUDENT LEADERS SAY THEY ARE DETERMINED TO AVOID VIOLENCE THAT

COULD TURN INTO RIOTING. HOWEVER, IT IS FAR FROM CERTAIN THAT LOCAL PEOPLE WHO MAY GATHER ON THE MARGINS OF DEMONSTRATIONS WILL REMAIN PEACEFUL. ROY
UNQUOTE PICKERING

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO6272

PAGE 01 STATE 147690 130216Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	A-00	DOTE-00	EUR-01	UTED-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	IO-00	ADS-00	NEA-01	DCP-01
	OIC-02	OIG-04	PA-00	SA-01	DRL-04	SAS-00	/021R

147690
SOURCE: KODAKB.013032
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:EMMCDEVITT -- 08/12/98 71029
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KNEALLES
----------5E91B7 130222Z /38
O 130216Z AUG 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 147690 130216Z
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
NSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 147690

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: AUGUST 12, 1998 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS -- ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USOINOPAC FOR FPA TEARE
USVIENNA FOR UNVIE
ROME FOR STORELLA
BEIJING PASS CHENGDU

1. INDEX

-- PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT: EGYPT, MALAYSIA AND YEMEN (PARAS 2 AND 3)
-- PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT: BURMA (PARAS 4 AND 5)
-- CHINA: RELEASE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS VOLUME (PARAS 6-8)

-- FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION LAUNCHES INQUIRY INTO CHINESE SHIPPING POLICIES (PARAS 9 AND 10)
-- EMBASSY BOMBINGS (PARAS 11 AND 12)
-- CAMBODIA: ELECTIONS (PARAS 11 AND 13)
-- BURMA: AUNG SAN SUU KYL ON THE ROAD AGAIN (PARAS 11 AND 14)

-- BURMA: NO 2ND VISIT YET TO DETAINED AMERICANS(PARAS 11 AND 15)
-- INDONESIA: VIOLENCE AGAINST SINO-INDONESIANS (PARAS 11 AND 16)

2. THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON EGYPT, MALAYSIA AND YEMEN WAS RELEASED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 8/11/98.

3. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THERE MAY BE A THREAT TO UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN EGYPT, MALAYSIA AND YEMEN. THIS COULD INCLUDE ATTACKS ON BUILDINGS.

ALL AMERICANS IN THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD EXERCISE CAUTION AND REVIEW THEIR SECURITY PRACTICES.

THIS PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT EXPIRES ON NOVEMBER 10, 1998.

4. THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON BURMA WAS RELEASED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 8/12/98.

5. WITH THE RECENT 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BURMA'S VIOLENT SUPPRESSION OF DEMOCRACY DEMONSTRATIONS ON

AUGUST 8, 1998 AND DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS' DEMAND FOR CONVENING OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BY AUGUST 21, THE POSSIBILITY OF DISTURBANCES OR UNREST CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED. U.S. CITIZENS SHOULD STAY ALERT AND TAKE PRECAUTIONS TO AVOID BEING CAUGHT UP IN ANY CONFRONTATIONS, SHOULD THEY OCCUR.

ON AUGUST 9, THE GOVERNMENT DETAINED 18 FOREIGNERS, INCLUDING SIX AMERICANS, FOR ALLEGEDLY DISTRIBUTING POLITICAL LITERATURE. POSSIBLY IN CONNECTION WITH THIS INCIDENT, OTHER AMERICAN TOURISTS HAVE REPORTED BEING STOPPED, SEARCHED AND QUESTIONED ABOUT THEIR ACTIVITIES IN BURMA.

TRAVELERS ARE URGED TO TAKE THESE FACTORS INTO CONSIDERATION IN CONNECTION WITH ANY PLANS TO VISIT BURMA IN THE COINING WEEKS. THE U.S. EMBASSY ADVISES AMERICAN CITIZENS TO EXERCISE CAUTION DURING THIS PERIOD AND TO AVOID LARGE CROWDS OF DEMONSTRATIONS. ALL AMERICANS TRAVELING TO OR RESIDING IN BURMA ARE STRONGLY ADVISED TO STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE EMBASSY CONSULAR SECTION AT (95-1) 282-055 OR (95-1) 282-056 EXTENSION 320.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ON TRAVEL TO BURMA, CONSULT THE DEPARTMENT'S LATEST CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEET ON BURMA.

THIS PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT UPDATES THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ISSUED ON AUGUST 4, 1998 AND EXPIRES SEPTEMBER 22, 1998.

6. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964-1968, VOLUME XXX,

CHINA WERE ISSUED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 8/12/98.

7. FOREIGN RELATIONS VOLUME: CHINA

THE DEPARTMENT RELEASED TODAY FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964-1968, VOLUME XXX, CHINA. THE VOLUME, PART OF THE ONGOING OFFICIAL PUBLISHED RECORD OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, PRESENTS THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON. THE FIRST CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION WERE AMONG THE DEVELOPMENTS

THAT CONCERNED U.S. POLICYMAKERS. THE VOLUME DOCUMENTS U.S. REACTIONS TO THESE EVENTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON U.S. POLICY. U.S. SUPPORT FOR CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S GOVERNMENT ON TAIWAN AND BANS ON TRADE AND TRAVEL TO THE CHINA MAINLAND CONTINUED, AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK, PREOCCUPIED WITH VIETNAM, RESISTED CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY, BUT THE CONSENSUS THAT HAD ONCE SUPPORTED U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA WAS ERODING. EVEN JOHNSON ACKNOWLEDGED PRIVATELY THAT THE UNITED STATES EVENTUALLY WOULD HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

JOHNSON AND HIS ADVISERS ANTICIPATED PRC DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH SOME APPREHENSION, BUT U.S. ANALYSTS CONCLUDED THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE FIRST PRC NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WOULD BE GREATER THAN ITS IMMEDIATE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. ADMINISTRATION POLICYMAKERS REJECTED THE IDEA OF PREEMPTIVE ACTION AGAINST CHINESE NUCLEAR FACILITIES. RUSK AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS MCGEORGE BUNDY TRIED TO SOUND OUT SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINA'S

BECOMING A NUCLEAR POWER, BUT DOBRYNIN REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION. AFTER CHINA'S FIRST NUCLEAR EXPLOSION IN OCTOBER 1964, JOHNSON AND HIS ADVISERS CONCLUDED THAT EVEN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT WOULD BE LIMITED.

THE OUTBREAK OF CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION FASCINATED AND PERPLEXED U.S. POLICYMAKERS. WITH LIMITED INFORMATION AVAILABLE, U.S. ANALYSTS WERE UNCERTAIN OF THE MEANING OF EVENTS THEY COULD OBSERVE ONLY DIMLY. WAS IT AN

IDEOLOGICAL PURGE, A POLICY DISPUTE, A POWER STRUGGLE? OR WAS IT ALL THREE? THE REPORTS ON THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION THAT JOHNSON 5 AIDES SENT HIM INDICATE THE PRESIDENT'S INTEREST IN CHINESE DEVELOPMENTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE THAT MIGHT HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE WAR IN VIETNAM. AS DISORDER ON THE MAINLAND INCREASED, PRESSURE FOR CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY DIMINISHED, SINCE ADVOCATES OF CHANGE WERE INCLINED TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE POWER STRUGGLE IN CHINA.

THE BULK OF THE VOLUME IS ALLOTTED TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INCLUDING THE WARSAW AMBASSADORIAL TALKS, AND U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS ON TAIWAN. A SMALL, SEPARATE COMPILATION ON QUESTIONS CONCERNING TIBET DOCUMENTS THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONTINUATION OF ITS PREDECESSORS' POLICIES OF ASSISTANCE TO TIBETAN REFUGEES IN INDIA AND LIMITED SUPPORT FOR THE TIBETAN RESISTANCE. A SMALL COMPILATION CONTAINS

DOCUMENTATION ON THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION OF MONGOLIA, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERED BUT DID NOT PURSUE.

8. THE FIRST CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND THE CHINESE

CULTURAL REVOLUTION WERE AMONG THE DEVELOPMENTS THAT CONCERNED U.S. POLICY-MAKERS DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964-1968, VOLUME XXX, CHINA, RELEASED TODAY BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DOCUMENTS U.S. REACTIONS TO THESE EVENTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON U.S. POLICY. THE UNITED STATES CONTINUED ITS POLICY OF NON-RECOGNITION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC), SUPPORT FOR CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S GOVERNMENT ON TAIWAN, AND BANS ON TRADE AND TRAVEL TO THE CHINA MAINLAND DURING THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION, BUT THE CONSENSUS THAT HAD ONCE SUPPORTED U, S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA WAS ERODING. PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK, PREOCCUPIED WITH VIETNAM, RESISTED CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY, ALTHOUGH EVEN JOHNSON PRIVATELY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THE PRC.

JOHNSON AND HIS ADVISERS ANTICIPATED PRC DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH SOME APPREHENSION, BUT U.S. ANALYSTS CONCLUDED THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE FIRST PRC NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WOULD BE GREATER THAN ITS IMMEDIATE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. ADMINISTRATION POLICYRNAKERS REJECTED THE IDEA OF PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION AGAINST CHINESE NUCLEAR FACILITIES. RUSK AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS MCGEORGE BUNDY TRIED TO SOUND OUT SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINA'S BECOMING A NUCLEAR POWER, BUT

DOBRYNIN REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION. AFTER CHINA'S FIRST NUCLEAR EXPLOSION IN OCTOBER 1964, JOHNSON AND HIS ADVISERS CONCLUDED THAT EVEN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL

IMPACT WOULD BE LIMITED.

THE OUTBREAK OF CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION FASCINATED AND PERPLEXED U.S. POLICY-MAKERS. WITH LIMITED INFORMATION AVAILABLE, U. S . ANALYSTS WERE UNCERTAIN OF THE MEANING OF EVENTS THEY COULD OBSERVE ONLY DIMLY. WAS IT AN IDEOLOGICAL PURGE, A POLICY DISPUTE, A POWER STRUGGLE? OR WAS IT ALL THREE? AS THE TURMOIL GREW IN EARLY L967, JOHNSON'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT WALT ROSTOW TOLD THE PRESIDENT

THAT CIVIL WAR HAD BECOME A "DISTINCT POSSIBILITY" AND SENT HIM AN ANALYSIS COMPARING THE SITUATION TO EARLIER PERIODS OF CHINESE DISUNITY WHICH HAD PRECEDED DYNASTIC CHANGE. THE REPORTS ON THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION THAT JOHNSON'S AIDES SENT HIM INDICATE THE PRESIDENT'S INTEREST IN CHINESE DEVELOPMENTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE THAT MIGHT HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

IN 1966, WHEN IT SEEMED EVIDENT THAT U. S. SUPPORT COULD NO LONGER PREVENT NATIONALIST LOSS OF CHINA'S SEAT IN THE UNITED NATIONS, THE ADMINISTRATION DECIDED THAT AS A FALLBACK POSITION, THEY WOULD ACCEPT A PROPOSAL FOR A U.N. STUDY COMMITTEE, WHICH THEY EXPECTED WOULD PUT FORWARD A TWO-CHINA SOLUTION THAT THE PRC WOULD NOT ACCEPT. CHIANG ALSO SAW IT AS UNACCEPTABLE, HOWEVER; ONLY AFTER JOHNSON AND RUSK INTERVENED PERSONALLY DID HE WITHDRAW HIS THREAT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE UNITED NATIONS IF IT WAS ADOPTED. BEFORE THE ISSUE CAME TO A VOTE, HOWEVER, THE OUTBREAK OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION REDUCED THE PRESSURE FOR PRC MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE ADMINISTRATION NEVER WAS FORCED TO ADOPT ITS FALLBACK POSITION. AS DISORDER ON THE MAINLAND INCREASED, PRESSURE FOR CHANGES IN

U.S. POLICY DIMINISHED, AS ADVOCATES OF CHANGE WERE INCLINED TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE POWER STRUGGLE IN CHINA.

CHIANG WAS ALSO FRUSTRATED BY CONTINUING U.S. UNWILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT HIS AMBITION TO RETURN TO THE MAINLAND. THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION, LIKE THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION BEFORE IT, REACTED TO NATIONALIST PROPOSALS FOR ACTION AGAINST THE MAINLAND BY TEMPORIZING, PUTTING OFF THE PROPOSALS WITHOUT COMPLETELY REJECTING THEM. FINALLY, IN 1967, JOHNSON FLATLY TURNED DOWN A PLEA FROM CHIANG FOR ACTION TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE TURMOIL ON THE MAINLAND, TELLING HIM IT WOULD EXPAND THE VIETNAM WAR AND WOULD BE OPPOSED BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

THE BULK OF THE VOLUME IS ALLOTTED TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INCLUDING THE WARSAW AMBASSADORIAL TALKS, AND U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS ON TAIWAN. A SMALL, SEPARATE COMPILATION ON QUESTIONS CONCERNING TIBET DOCUMENTS THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONTINUATION OF ITS PREDECESSORS' POLICIES OF ASSISTANCE TO TIBETAN REFUGEES IN INDIA AND LIMITED SUPPORT FOR THE TIBETAN RESISTANCE. ANOTHER SMALL COMPILATION CONTAINS DOCUMENTATION ON THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION OF MONGOLIA, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERED BUT DID NOT PURSUE

THE OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN HAS PREPARED A SUMMARY OF THE VOLUME. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT DAVID S. PATTERSON, GENERAL EDITOR OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SERIES, AT (202) 663- LL27 (FAX: (202) 663-1289, E-MAIL: PAHISTOFF(OPANET.US-STATE.GOV) . THE TEXTS OF THE VOLUME,

THE SUMMARY, AND THIS PRESS RELEASE ARE AVAILABLE ON THE OFFICE'S WEB SITE: WWW.STATE.GOVTWW/ABOUT STATE/HISTORY/INDEXEHTML. COPIES OF VOLUME XXX CAN BE PURCHASED FROM THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.

9. THE FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE ON AN INQUIRY INTO THE MARITIME POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WAS ISSUED BY THE FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION ON 8/12/98.

10. THE FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION TODAY LAUNCHED A BROAD INQUIRY INTO THE MARITIME POLICIES AND PRICES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. THE COMMISSION RECENTLY HAS RECEIVED REPORTS REGARDING POTENTIALLY UNFAIR OR RESTRICTIVE CHINESE MARITIME POLICIES FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES, INCLUDING THE U.S. DEPARTMENTS OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE, AND COMMERCE, U.S. SENATOR ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, AND U.S. SHIPPING LINES AND NON-VESSEL-OPERATING COMMON CARRIERS. . IN LIGHT OF THESE REPORTS AND OTHER CONCERNS, THE COMMISSION HAS INITIATED A FORMAL PROCEEDING TO GATHER MORE INFORMATION ON THE RESTRICTIONS FACING THE U.S. MARITIME INDUSTRY AND U.S. OCEANBORNE TRADE IN CHINA, AND TO DETERMINE THE FULL SCOPE OF CHINESE MARITIME COMPANIES OPERATING IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE COMMISSION IS COLLECTING INFORMATION FROM U.S. AND CHINESE SHIPPING LINES THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF MANDATORY INFORMATION DEMAND ORDERS, BUT ALSO IS ISSUING A NOTICE OF INQUIRY REQUESTING COMMENTS FROM SHIPPERS, TRANSPORTATION INTERMEDIARIES, AND OTHER PARTIES, ON SEVERAL ISSUES. THE FIRST IS THE LIMITS ON U.S. CARRIERS' ABILITY TO OPERATE

BRANCH OFFICES IN CHINA AND OFFER INTERMODAL. TRANSPORTATION SERVICES WITH THE SAME FREEDOM THAT CHINESE CARRIERS ENJOY IN THE UNITED STATES. ANOTHER AREA OF INQUIRY IS THE ADMINISTRATION OF A CHINESE SYSTEM REQUIRING FOREIGN SHIPPING LINES TO OBTAIN GOVERNMENTAL LICENSES OR PERMISSIONS FOR NEW LINER SHIPPING ROUTES. ALSO, THE

COMMISSION IS INVESTIGATING REPORTED CHINESE PROHIBITIONS ON U.S. CARRIERS PERFORMING VESSEL AGENCY SERVICES (I.E., PROVIDING SERVICES AND PROVISIONS TO VESSELS WHEN IN PORT) IN CHINA. THE COMMISSION IS GATHERING MORE INFORMATION ON AN APPARENTLY STALLED EFFORT BY A U.S. SHIPPING LINE, SEA-LAND SERVICE, INC., TO ENTER INTO A JOINT VENTURE WITH THE PORT OF TIANJIN TO OPERATE A MARINE TERMINAL. .LASTLY, THE COMMISSION IS ASKING FOR COMMENTS FROM ALL INTERESTED PARTIES REGARDING THE BARRIERS OR RESTRICTIONS FACED BY U.S.. FREIGHT FORWARDING COMPANIES, NON-VESSEL-OPERATING COMMON CARRIERS, AND OTHER TRANSPORTATION INTERMEDIARIES SEEKING TO DO BUSINESS IN CHINA

FMC CHAIRMAN HAROLD J CREEL, JR. STATED: "I HAVE NOT BEEN ENCOUR,AGED BY GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY SOURCES REGARDING CHINA'S WILLINGNESS TO OPEN UP ITS SHIPPING SECTOR. IT IS NOW TIME FOR THE COMMISSION TO GET A FULLER REPORT ON THE RECORD FROM CARRIERS, SHIPPERS, NVOS AND OTHERS AFFECTED BY THESE RESTRICTIONS IN THE U.S. CHINA TRADE, SO THAT WE CAN DETERMINE WHETHER FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED."

RESPONSES TO THE COMMISSION ORDERS ARE DUE OCTOBER 2, 1998. COPIES OF THE ORDERS IN DOCKET NO. 98-14, SHIPPING RESTRICTIONS, REQUIREMENTS, AND PRACTICES OF THE PEOPLE1S

REPUBLIC OF CHINA. WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE PUBLIC DOCUMENT SECTION OF THE COMMISSION'S WEB SITE, AT WWW. FMC. GOV.

UNDER SECTION 19 OF THE MERCHANT MARINE ACT, 1920, THE COMMISSION IS EMPOWERED TO TAKE COUNTERVAILING ACTION IF IT FINDS THAT FOREIGN LAWS, RULES, OR REGULATIONS CREATE "CONDITIONS UNFAVORABLE TO SHIPPING IN THE FOREIGN TRADE." UNDER THE EOREIGN SHIPPING PRACTICES ACT OF 1988, THE COMMISSION MAY INVESTIGATE WHETHER ANY LAWS, RULES, REGULATIONS, POLICIES, OR PRACTICES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OR CARRIERS LEAD TO CONDITIONS THAT (1) ADVERSELY AFFECT THE OPERATIONS OF UNITED STATES CARRIERS IN THE UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE TRADE; AND 2) DO NOT EXIST FOR FOREIGN CARRIERS OF THAT COUNTRY IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER THESE LAWS, IF THE COMMISSION DETERMINES THAT SUCH ADVERSE CONDITIONS -EXIST, IT MAY TAKE ACTIONS INCLUDING LIMITATIONS ON SAILINGS, SUSPENSION OF TARIFFS, SUSPENSION OF REGULATED

AGREEMENTS, OR FEES NOT TO EXCEED $1,000,000 PER VOYAGE. NO SUCH SANCTIONS WERE LEVIED OR PROPOSED TODAY; RATHER, TODAY'S ACTION IS AN EFFORT TO COLLECT INFORMATION TO HELP DETERMINE WHETHER ANY FUTURE ACTION MIGHT BE WARRANTED

11. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 8/12/98. THERE WAS NO REGULAR PRESS BRIEFING ON THAT DAY. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

12. EMBASSY BOMBINGS

Q: HAS THIS HAPPENED BEFORE THAT STATE HAS SUSPENDED OPERATIONS, SEVERAL EMBASSIES SIMULTANEOUSLY DUE TO SECURITY THREATS?

A: NOT WITH SEVERAL MISSIONS AT THE SAME TIME. OCCASIONALLY, DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE PAST TO TEMPORARILY SUSPEND OPERATIONS AT AN EMBASSY BASED ON A THREAT OR DEMONSTRATION.

Q: WHEN DID THE PROCESS OF CATEGORIZING US POSTS INTO CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW BEGIN?

A: THE DEPARTMENT RANKS ITS POSTS ON AN INTERAGENCY ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL THREAT LEVELS. WE USE FOUR LEVELS OF RANKINGS--LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, AND CRITICAL. THIS PROCESS BEGAN IN 1985

Q: IS THERE A WORKING HYPOTHESIS?

A: WE ARE NOT GOING TO SPECULATE ON ANY ASPECT OF THIS INVESTIGATION

Q: PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON EGYPT, MALAYSIA, AND YEMEN. WHAT ARE WARNINGS BASED ON? SPECIFIC THREATS TO POST?

A: WE HAVE RECEIVED INFORMATION REGARDING THREATS IN EGYPT, MALAYSIA, AND YEMEN. WE TAKE THESE THREATS SERIOUSLY AND THEREFORE ISSUED A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. THE ANNOUNCEMENT CONTAINS ALL OF THE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION REGARDING THESE THREATS THAT CAN BE RELEASED. IF MORE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE THAT

CAN BE RELEASED, WE WILL DO SO.

Q: VIDEO CAMERA?

A: THE VIDEO CAMERA AT THE US EMBASSY IN DAR ES SALAAM WAS

NOT SET UP TO RECORD. IT IS MONITORED BY MARINE SECURITY GUARDS AT POST.

WE GENERALLY DO NOT COMMENT ON THE CAPABILITIES OF OUR SECURITY MEASURES AT OUR MISSIONS OVERSEAS OR WHAT SPECIFICALLY IS BEING DONE TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY AT OUR MISSIONS ABROAD

(NOTE: ON BACKGROUND ONLY. SOME OF OUR MISSIONS ABROAD DO HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO RECORD VIDEOTAPE FROM THE SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS. DAR ES SALAAM AND NAIROBI DID NOT. STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO INSTALL RECORDING CAPABILITY AT OUR MISSIONS ABROAD THAT DON'T CURRENTLY HAVE IT. WE ARE NOT GOING TO RELEASE A LIST OF THOSE POSTS THAT DO/DON'T HAVE THIS CAPABILITY.)

Q: WHAT DID THE MARINES AT POSTS SEE?

A: THIS IS PART OF THE INVESTIGATION, AND I CANNOT COMMENT ON THE ONGOING INVESTIGATION.

A: DID THE ISRAELIS PASS A WARNING TO US REGARDING THE BOMBINGS JUST BEFORE THEY HAPPENED?

A: WE GET 30,000 THREATS A YEAR -- WE TAKE EACH ONE SERIOUSLY. CREDIBLE THREATS RESULT IN SECURITY CHANGES OR

UPGRADES. WE HAD NO ADVANCE WARNING OF THESE ATTACKS..

Q: REWARD OFFER/FASTEST EVER?

A: THE COUNTERTERRORISM REWARDS PROGRAM APPLIES TO ALL ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS WORLDWIDE. REWARDS APPLY THE MOMENT A TERRORIST ATTACK TAKES PLACE.

THIS REWARD ANNOUNCEMENT IS THE FASTEST MADE FOLLOWING A TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS.

13. CAMBODIA: ELECTIONS

CONTEXT: CAMBODIAN LEADER HUN SEN HAS AGAIN OFFERED TO GIVE PRINCE RANARIDDH'S FUNCINPEC PARTY A ROLE IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT, BUT SAID THE OPPOSITION SAM RAINSY PARTY SHOULD STAY OUT OF GOVERNMENT, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. HUN SEN'S CAMBODIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (CPP) WON LAST MONTH'S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, BUT LACKS THE TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY NEEDED TO FROM A GOVERNMENT. RAINSY, WHOSE PARTY CAME IN

THIRD IN THE JULY 26 ELECTION, MET WITH KING SIHANOUK AT HIS PALACE IN SIEM REAP ON AUGUST 12. RAINSY SAID AFTER THE MEETING THAT THE KING OFFERED TO PLAY A CONCILIATORY ROLE IF ASKED TO DO SO. RAINSY AND RANARIDDH HAVE REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE ELECTION RESULTS AND HAVE ALLEGED FRAUD BY THE CPP, BUT THE NATIONAL ELECTION COMMISSION SAID ON AUGUST 11 THAT THEY WERE DISMISSING ALL ELECTION COMPLAINTS BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

Q: WHAT IS OUR REACTION TO REPORTS THAT HUN SEN HAS OFFERED A ROLE TO RANARIDDH'S FUNCINPEC IN A NEW GOVERNMENT BUT SAID THAT SAM RAINSY'S PARTY SHOULD STAY OUT OF GOVERNMENT?

A: THE NATIONAL ELECTION COMMISSION'S INVESTIGATION OF REPORTED ELECTORAL ABUSES AND ITS RECOUNTS ARE NOW COMPLETED WITHOUT ALTERING THE ALLOCATION OF SEATS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ANNOUNCED EARLIER. THOSE RESULTS INDICATED THAT NO SINGLE PARTY WILL HOLD THE TWO-THIRDS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SEATS REQUIRED TO FORM A GOVERNMENT.

OPPOSITION PARTIES MAY NOW RAISE THEIR REMAINING CONCERNS ABOUT IRREGULARITIES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL, WHICH WILL DETERMINE THE FINAL ELECTION RESULTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CAMBODIAN CONSTITUTION.

WE LOOK TO CAMBODIAN LEADERS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES CONCERNING THE ELECTION AND TO PEACEFULLY ESTABLISH A NEW GOVERNMENT IN ACCORD WITH THE ELECTION RESULTS.

Q: WHAT ABOUT SAM RAINSY'S STATEMENT THAT THE KING IS READY TO PLAY A MEDIATING ROLE?

A: WE RECOGNIZE KING SIHANOUK'S IMPORTANT ROLE AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO RECONCILIATION IN HIS COUNTRY. PEACEFUL DIALOGUE BETWEEN ALL THE PARTIES IS CRITICAL TO CAMBODIA'S POLITICAL PROCESS.

14. BURMA: AUNG SAN SUU KYL ON THE ROAD AGAIN

CONTEXT: ON AUGUST 12 AUNG SAN SUU KYI (ASSK) AND NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD) CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER U HIA PE ATTEMPTED ONCE AGAIN TO TRAVEL BY CAR FROM

RANGOON TO THE CITY OF PATHEIN TO VISIT LOCAL MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT-ELECT WHO HAVE BEEN PLACED UNDER TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS BY THE RULING STATE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL (SPDC). THIS IS ASSK'S FOURTH TRIP TO VISIT MPS-ELECT AND HER SECOND TO VISIT PATHEIN. SPDC MISTREATMENT

OF THE NLD LEADERS DURING THE LAST STANDOFF RECEIVED HARSH INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM. EMBASSY RANGOON REPORTS THAT THE NLD CAR HAS BEEN STOPPED BY POLICE ABOUT 30 KILOMETERS OUTSIDE RANGOON, NEAR THE LOCATION OF THE JULY STANDOFF.

THE NLD LEADERS ARE TRAVELING IN A SOMEWHAT LARGER CAR THIS TIME AND ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE A SEVERAL DAY SUPPLY OF FOOD AND WATER.

Q: CAN YOU CONFIRM REPORTS THAT AUNG SAN SUU KYI HAS BEEN PREVENTED BY POLICE FROM TRAVELING TO THE CITY OF PATHEIN (ALTERNATE SPELLING BASSEIN)?

A: AUNG SAN SUU KYI (AWNG SAHN SQO CHEE) AND NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD) CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER U HLA PE (OOH -HLA PAY) ARE CURRENTLY DETAINED IN THEIR CAR WEST OF RANGOON. THIS IS AUNG SAN SUU KYL'S SECOND ATTEMPT TO VISIT MPS-ELECT IN PATHEIN. HER LAST ATTEMPT TO VISIT PATHEIN RESULTED IN A SIX DAY STANDOFF WITH THE AUTHORITIES WHICH CULMINATED IN HER BEING RETURNED TO RANGOON BY FORCE.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 18 STATE 147690 130216Z

THE UNITED STATES CONDEMNED IN THE STRONGEST OF POSSIBLE TERMS THE MANHANDLING OF DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI IN BURMA ON JULY 30 AND THE SIX DAYS OF DETENTION AND DEPRIVATION TO WHICH SHE WAS SUBJECTED AT THE HANDS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THIS REMAINS OUR POSITION. THIS CALLOUS DISREGARD FOR HER SAFETY, THE RULE OF LAW, AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF MOVEMENT AND ASSOCIATION ARE UNACCEPTABLE VIOLATIONS OF HER HUMAN RIGHTS.

IN LIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ABYSMAL TREATMENT OF THE NLD LEADERS TWO WEEKS AGO, WE ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI AND U HLA PE AND HOLD THE BURMESE AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THEIR HEALTH AND WELFARE.

OUR CHARGE HAS EXPRESSED OUR GRAVE CONCERN TO GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES AND HAS REQUESTED PERMISSION TO TRAVEL TO THE CHECKPOINT TO OBSERVE THE SITUATION FOR HIMSELF. THAT REQUEST, HOWEVER, HAS NOT BEEN GRANTED. HE REAFFIRMED THE

STRONG U.S. POSITION THAT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT SHOULD BE ACCORDED TO MEMBERS OF THE NLD, INCLUDING AUNG SAN SUU KYI WHO IS NOW BEING DENIED THE EXERCISE OF THIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT.

15. BURMA: NO 2ND VISIT YET TO DETAINED AMERICANS

CONTEXT: NO SECOND CONSULAR VISIT HAS OCCURRED FOR THE SIX AMERICANS WHO REMAIN IN DETENTION IN BURMA. WHILE FORMAL CHARGES HAVE NOT BEEN FILED, BURMESE OFFICIALS CLAIM THE ACTIVISTS, ARRESTED AUGUST 9, VIOLATED A PRINTING ACT AND AN EMERGENCY LAW THAT CAN CARRY A 10-YEAR SENTENCE. THIS

SENTENCE IS OFTEN USED AGAINST POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. THEY ARE BEING HELD AT POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN DOWNTOWN RANGOON.

A FIRST CONSULAR VISIT OCCURRED AUGUST 11 AND THE DETAINED HAD NO COMPLAINTS OF INHUMANE TREATMENT AND ALL APPEARED IN GOOD HEALTH. CONSULAR ACCESS HAS BEEN REQUESTED AGAIN BUT THIS MUST BE DONE VIA DIPLOMATIC NOTE PER THE REQUEST OF THE BURMESE REGIME. WE SENT A DIPLOMATIC NOTE ON AUGUST 12 TO THIS EFFECT, BUT ACCESS WAS NOT GRANTED ON THAT DAY BECAUSE THE BURMESE HAVE TOLD US THEY REQUIRE 24 HOURS TO PROCESS SUCH A REQUEST. WE AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS.

WE HAVE RECEIVED ARREST CABLES FROM OUR EMBASSY IN RANGOON. ALL SIX HAVE SIGNED PRIVACY ACT WAIVERS FOR THE PRESS. THE DETAINEES' NAMES ARE NISHA MARIE ANAND, ANJANETTE MARIE HAMILTON, SAPNA CHANDRAMOHAN CHHATPAR, JOEL EDWARDS GREER, TYLER RICHARD GIANNINI AND MICHELE LYNN KEEGAN.

Q: CAN YOU GIVE US AN UPDATE ON THE AMERICANS DETAINED IN BURMA?

A: OUR EMBASSY IN RANGOON HAS REQUESTED PERMISSION VIA DIPLOMATIC NOTE FOR A SECOND CONSULAR VISIT TO THE SIX DETAINED AMERICANS. WE HAVE NO REASON AT THIS TIME TO BELIEVE THAT CONSULAR ACCESS WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING.

NO FORMAL CHARGES HAVE BEEN FILED AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THE SIX ARE BEING HELD FOR ALLEGEDLY VIOLATING A PRINTING ACT AND AN EMERGENCY LAW. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS PUSHING THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT FOR A QUICK RESOLUTION AND A SPEEDY RELEASE.

THE DETAINEES REMAIN IN GOOD CONDITION AND THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BURMA WAS GRANTED CONSULAR ACCESS TO THEM ON AUGUST 11.

Q: CAN YOU CONFIRM THE NAMES OF THE AMERICANS DETAINED:

A: THE NAMES OF THE DETAINED ARE NISHA MARIE ANAND, ANJANETTE MARIE HAMILTON, SAPNA CHANDRAMOHAN CHHATPAR, JOEL EDWARDS GREER, TYLER RICHARD GIANNINI AND MICHELE LYNN KEEGAN.

THIS CASE REMAINS THE TOP PRIORITY OF OUR EMBASSY IN RANGOON.

16. INDONESIA: VIOLENCE AGAINST SINO-INDONESIANS

CONTEXT: DURING THE MAY RIOTS THERE WAS WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE AND ABUSES DIRECTED AGAINST SINO-INDONESIANS, INCLUDING NUMEROUS RAPES OF SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND DAMAGE TO SINO-INDONESIAN OWNED BUSINESSES. REPORTS OF VIOLENCE HAVE SPARKED CONCERN IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, HONG KONG, AND TAIWAN, AS WELL AS AMONG CHINESE-AMERICAN GROUPS.

Q: WHAT IS THE U.S. REACTION TO REPORTS OF WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE AND CRIMES SUCH AS RAPE DIRECTED AGAINST SINO-INDONESIANS DURING RIOTING IN MAY IN INDONESIA? WHAT HAS THE U.S. DONE ABOUT IT?

A: FOR MANY MONTHS AND WELL BEFORE THE RIOTING IN MAY, THE U.S. EXPRESSED STRONG CONCERN THAT SINO-INDONESIANS OR

OTHER GROUPS NOT BE TARGETED AS SCAPEGOATS IN REACTION TO INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. WE HAVE ALSO CALLED FOR POLITICAL REFORM IN INDONESIA THAT INVOLVES DIALOGUE WITH ALL SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY AND THAT ENJOYS BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT.

AS THE EVENTS TN INDONESIA UNFOLDED, THE U.S. MET WITH INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN JAKARTA, INDONESIAN EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVES, AND NGO REPRESENTATIVES. WE REPEATEDLY URGED RESTRAINT BY GOVERNMENT AND OTHER FORCES, DEPLORED THE VIOLENCE, AND CONDEMNED IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THE SHOCKING REPORTS OF WIDESPREAD RAPES OF SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN.

WE HAVE URGED INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO INVESTIGATE THESE REPORTED CRIMES, INCLUDING THE RAPES, THE DEATHS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY, AND OTHER WRONGDOINGS, AND TO ARREST

AND PROSECUTE THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN AND PLANNED THEM.

WE HAVE REPEATEDLY RAISED OUR CONCERNS ON THESE ISSUES BOTH PUBLICLY AND AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

IN THIS CONTEXT, WE NOTE THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAS CONDEMNED THE MAY RIOTS AND THE ATTACKS AGAINST SINO-INDONESIANS AND PLEDGED THAT THEY WOULD BE THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATED. HE HAS ALSO PLEDGED MEASURES TO RECAPITALIZE

STORES ATTACKED IN THE MAY LOOTING AND ANNOUNCED SPECIAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR CHINESE NEIGHBORHOODS.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 22 STATE 147690 130216Z
THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ESTABLISHED A COMMISSION WITH GOVERNMENT AND NGO MEMBERS TO INVESTIGATE THESE CRIMES. IN ADDITION, INDONESIAN AND INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE INDEPENDENTLY COLLECTING INFORMATION REGARDING THE REPORTED RAPES, AND OTHER NGOS ARE ESTABLISHING HOT LINES AND OUTREACH SERVICES TO ASSIST VICTIMS. WE WELCOME THESE EFFORTS. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS EXPLORING WAYS IN WHICH WE MAY ASSIST THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND NGOS IN THIS MATTER.
PICKERING

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO8904

PAGE 01 STATE 148277 140100Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	A-00	CTME-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01	DCP-01	OIC-02	OIG-04
	PC-05	STR-00	SA-01	DSCC-00	SAS-00	/023R	

148277
SOURCE: KODAKC.014004
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:KHFRITZ -- 08/13/98 7LO28
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES
----------5EFB8C 140104Z /38
O 140059Z AUG 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL FUKUOKA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL NAGOYA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 148277 140100Z
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC//BJ//CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS/ PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
CINCPACELT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
NSA PT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 148277

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: AUGUST 13, 1998 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS -- ALSO FOR USIS
SEODEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
USVIENNA FOR UNVIE
ROME FOR STORELLA
BEIJING PASS CHENGDU

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 148277 140100Z
1. INDEX

-- JAPAN -- FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT PAPAS 2 - 3
-- JAPAN -- ECONOMY PAPAS 2 AND 4
-- BILATEPAL MEETING WITH NORTH KOREA PAPAS 2 AND 5
-- NORTH KOREA/BANGLADESH MISSILE TPADE PAPAS 2 AND 6
-- KOREA -- AGREED FPAMEWORK PAPAS 2 AND 7
-- INDONESIA --SENTENCING IN TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY KILLINGS PAPAS 2 AND 8

-- PHILIPPINES: PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER MURDERED PAPAS 2 AND 9
-- TAIWAN/PRC - WTO APPLICATION PARAS 2 AND 10
-- STATUS OF EMBASSIES PAPAS 2 AND 11
-- BURMA: ASSK STANDOFF WITH POLICE PAPAS 2 AND 12
-- BURMA: 2ND VISIT TO DETAINED AMERICANS GRANTED PAPAS 2 AND 13

2. THERE WAS NO REGULAR PRESS BRIEFING BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN TODAY. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 8/13/98 AND POSTS MAY DPAW ON THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

3. JAPAN -- FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT

CONTEXT: NEW JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MASAHIKO KOUMURA ARRIVES TOMORROW (FRIDAY) . HE IS SCHEDULED FOR A PRESS AVAILABILITY HERE AT 12:00, AND A LUNCHEON/MEETING WITH

THE SECRETARY. AFTER THAT HE WILL MEET WITH SECRETARY COHEN. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY OTHER PLANS -- HE WILL NOT HAVE A MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE. WE UNDERSTAND HE

RETURNS TO JAPAN ON SATURDAY.

Q: WHAT ARE THE PLANS FOR THE VISIT OF JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER KOUMURA?

A: MINISTER KOUMURA WILL VISIT TO WASHINGTON AUGUST 14-15. HE WILL HAVE A BILATEPAL MEETING AND WORKING LUNCH WITH SECRETARY ALBRIGHT TOMORROW.

--THIS WILL BE MR. KOUMUPA'S FIRST MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY SINCE HE BECAME FOREIGN MINISTER LAST MONTH. THE SECRETARY LOOKS FORWARD TO ESTABLISHING A CLOSE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM, AS SHE DID WITH HIS PREDECESSOR, NOW PRIME MINISTER OBUCHI.

--WE EXPECT THEY WILL DISCUSS A FULL RANGE OF TOPICS, INCLUDING THE BILATERAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, THE JAPANESE ECONOMY, AND OUR EXTENSIVE COOPEPATION ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES.

--FOR FURTHER DETAILS OF MINISTER KOUMUPA'S SCHEDULE, I REFER YOU TO THE JAPANESE EMBASSY.

4. JAPAN -- ECONOMY

CONTEXT: THE YEN HAS REBOUNDED SLIGHTLY, AND STOCK MARKETS LEVELED OFF AFTER DROPPING SHARPLY ON MONDAY AND TUESDAY. AMBASSADOR FOLEY MADE SOME UPBEAT REMARKS TO THE PRESS ON WEDNESDAY, CARRIED IN TODAY'S WASHINGTON TIMES, EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT NECESSARY REFORMS. OUR

BASIC POSITION ON JAPANESE ECONOMIC POLICY REMAINS AS STATED BELOW.

Q: WHAT IS OUR REACTION TO THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN JAPAN/AMBASSADOR FOLEY'S REMARKS IN TOKYO?

A: THE EARLY RESTORATION OF GROWTH IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY IS CRITICAL NOT ONLY FOR JAPAN, BUT FOR ASIA, OTHER EMERGING MARKETS, AND THE WORLD ECONOMY AS A WHOLE.

--ON AUGUST 7, PRIME MINISTER OBUCHI OUTLINED SOME CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS TO STIMULATE JAPAN'S ECONOMY. WE URGE THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO MOVE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO PUT THEM INTO PLACE.

--JAPAN ALSO NEEDS TO MOVE AGGRESSIVELY TO TAKE ACTION TO STRENGTHEN AND RESTRUCTURE BANKS, TO DISPOSE OF THE BURDEN OF BAD ASSETS, AND TO IMPROVE BANK SUPERVISION AND DISCLOSURE.

5. BILATERAL MEETING WITH NORTH KOREA

CONTEXT: MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING THE DIRECTOR, EVANS REVERE, MEET FROM TIME TO TIME WITH STAFF OF THE DPRK'S DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN, AMBASSADOR LI GUN, IN NEW YORK. LESS FREQUENTLY, WE HAVE MET WITH NORTH KOREANS AT THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. THE LAST SUCH MEETING WAS HELD IN BERLIN IN MARCH. ANOTHER SUCH BILATERAL, LED BY U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY AMBASSADOR CHARLES

KARTMAN, IS SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 21 AT THE U.S. MISSION TO THE U.N. IN NEW YORK. THE NORTH KOREAN SIDE WILL BE LED BY VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KIM GYE GWAN. WE HAVE REMAINED IN REGULAR TELEPHONE AND FAX COMMUNICATION WITH THE DPRK MISSION TO THE U.N., OUR USUAL CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT. IN KEEPING WITH PAST PRACTICE, WE DO NOT PLAN ANY MEDIA

COVERAGE OF THE AUG. 21 MEETING AND DO NOT PLAN TO ANNOUNCE THE VENUE FOR THE MEETING.

Q: ARE TALKS BETWEEN STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND SENIOR NORTH KOREAN OFFICIALS SCHEDULED FOR NEXT WEEK?

A: U.S.-DPRK BILATERAL TALKS ARE SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 21 IN NEW YORK.

--SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE KOREAN PEACE TALKS AMB. CHARLES KARTMAN WILL HEAD THE U.S. SIDE; THE HEAD OF THE DPRK DELEGATION WILL BE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KIM GYE GWAN.

--THIS ROUND WILL BE THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF SIMILAR MEETINGS THAT HAVE BEEN HELD OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. THE LAST SUCH MEETING WAS HELD IN MARCH IN BERLIN.

--IN THIS BILATERAL, AS IN PREVIOUS SUCH MEETINGS, THE FULL RANGE OF BILATERAL ISSUES WILL BE DISCUSSED, INCLUDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1994 U.S.-DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK.

Q: CAN YOU TELL US WHAT SPECIFICALLY WILL BE DISCUSSED?

A: I CANNOT COMMENT IN DETAIL ON THE AGENDA OF THE MEETING.

6. NORTH KOREA/BANGLADESH MISSILE TRADE

CONTEXT: AT AN AUGUST 13 PRESS CONFERENCE IN SEOUL, U.S. CONGRESSMAN JAY KIM ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS TOLD BY U.S. FORCES-KOREA THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD EVIDENCE THAT NORTH KOREA HAS EXPORTED SCUD MISSILES TO BANGLADESH. ANY SUCH INFORMATION, WOULD BE CLASSIFIED AND BASED ON INTELLIGENCE. NORTH KOREA'S MISSILE PROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES ARE OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES AND HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF TWO ROUNDS OF U.S.-NORTH KOREA MISSILE TALKS. NORTH KOREA HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO HOLD ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS.

Q: DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE EVIDENCE OF MISSILE TRADE BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND BANGLADESH?

A: IF WE HAD SUCH INFORMATION, IT WOULD BE BASED ON INTELLIGENCE.

--WE DO NOT COMMENT ON INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

Q: WILL THE UNITED STATES DISCUSS THESE ALLEGATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA AND BANGLADESH?

A: AS I SAID PREVIOUSLY, IF WE HAD INFORMATION ON THIS

SUBJECT, IT WOULD BE BASED ON INTELLIGENCE.

--WE DO NOT COMMENT ON INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

--THEREFORE, WE ALSO CANNOT COMMENT ON ACTION WE MIGHT TAKE BASED ON ANY SUCH INFORMATION.

(IF ASKED)

Q: HAS THE UNITED STATES SCHEDULED ANOTHER ROUND OF MISSILE TALKS WITH NORTH KOREA?

A: THE UNITED STATES HAS HELD TWO ROUNDS OF MISSILE TALKS WITH THE DPRK SINCE 1996, AND REMAINS READY TO MEET WITH THE DPRK AGAIN. HOWEVER, TO DATE, NORTH KOREA HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO SCHEDULE A THIRD ROUND OF MISSILE TALKS.

7. KOREA -- AGREED FRAMEWORK

CONTEXT: CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER'S OFFICE HAS INQUIRED ABOUT THE AGREED FRAMEWORK, ASKING SPECIFICALLY ABOUT CHARGES BY REP. CALLAHAN THAT NORTH KOREA IS CARRYING ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE YONGBYON COMPLEX AND WHETHER SUCH ACTIVITIES WOULD BE COVERED BY THE AGREED FRAMEWORK?

Q: IS NORTH KOREA CARRYING ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE YONGBYON COMPLEX THAT VIOLATE THE TERMS OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK?

A: WE MONITOR THE DPRK'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED

FRAMEWORK VERY CLOSELY.

--WE EXPECT THE DPRK TO LIVE UP TO ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AGREED FRAMEWORK, AND WE HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE THAT CLEAR TO THEM.

--AT THIS TIME, WE HAVE NO BASIS TO CONCLUDE THAT THE DPRK IS IN VIOLATION OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

Q: WOULD SUCH ACTIVITIES BE COVERED BY THE AGREED FRAMEWORK?

A: THE AGREED FRAMEWORK REQUIRES, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT NORTH KOREA FREEZE ACTIVITIES AT ITS REACTOR, REPROCESSING, AND RELATED FACILITIES AT YONGBYON, CEASE CONSTRUCTION OF TWO ADDITIONAL REACTORS, NOT CONSTRUCT ANY SIMILAR REACTORS, AND FOREGO ANY FURTHER REPROCESSING.

8. INDONESIA --SENTENCING IN TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY KILLINGS

CONTEXT: DURING A LARGE STUDENT DEMONSTRATION AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY LAST MAY, SOLDIERS FIRED ON STUDENTS WITH RUBBER BULLETS AND LIVE AMMUNITION AFTER THEY TRIED

TO MARCH FROM CAMPUS TO THE PARLIAMENT. FOUR STUDENTS WERE KILLED. TWO JUNIOR OFFICERS FROM THE UNIT ASSIGNED TO THE DEMONSTRATION (OF EIGHTEEN SUSPECTS FACING COURT MARTIAL) WERE COURT MARTIALED AND GIVEN SENTENCES OF LESS THAN A YEAR. OTHER SENTENCES ARE PENDING. MILITARY AUTHORITIES ARE INVESTIGATING WHETHER OTHER MILITARY UNITS WERE INVOLVED AND FURTHER COURT-MARTIAL

PROCEEDINGS MAY RESULT.

Q: WHAT IS OUR REACTION TO THE LIGHT SENTENCES GIVEN TWO MILITARY OFFICERS WHOSE TROOPS KILLED FOUR STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY, AN EVENT THAT SET OFF "A CATACLYSM OF VIOLENCE AND THE RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO"?

A: WE HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED OUR DEEP CONCERN OVER THE TRISAKTI KILLINGS TO THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. WE CONTINUE TO URGE THE GOVERNMENT TO CONDUCT THOROUGH INVESTIGATIONS, AND TO ENSURE THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE ARE HELD FULLY ACCOUNTABLE. A PROCESS THAT ENSURES THE CONFIDENCE OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF THE REFORM PROCESS NOW UNDER WAY.

--WE HAVE RAISED OUR CONCERNS REPEATEDLY BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

--WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE COURT MARTIAL AND SENTENCES GIVEN TWO JUNIOR OFFICERS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING MILITARY ORDERS AND NOT CONTROLLING THEIR TROOPS WILL NOT BE THE ONLY ONES IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEATHS OF FOUR STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN MAY. AT LEAST 16 OTHER PERSONS ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION. THESE INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUE AND MORE COURTS MARTIAL AND SENTENCES ARE EXPECTED TO RESULT.

9. PHILIPPINES: PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER MURDERED

CONTEXT: PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER ROBERT BOCK, 33, OF NEW YORK STATE, WAS MURDERED ALONG WITH NINE OTHER CIVILIANS DURING A HIGHWAY ROBBERY IN THE PHILIPPINES ON AUGUST 12. THE INCIDENT OCCURRED WHEN ARMED GUNMEN ATTACKED THREE OR FOUR VEHICLES IN SARA, ILOILO PROVINCE, PANAY ISLAND. LOCAL POLICE HAVE ARRESTED ONE SUSPECT AND

NAMED THREE OTHER LOCAL MEN WHO REPORTEDLY BELONG TO A GANG WANTED FOR PREVIOUS MURDERS AND ROBBERIES. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT BOCK WAS THE TARGET OF THE ATTACK.

WE ARE WORKING WITH LOCAL AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND THE PEACE CORPS ON THE CASE. ALL ARE COOPERATING. PEACE CORPS/PHILIPPINES DIRECT SCOTT DUNCAN IS ACCOMPANYING BOCK'S REMAINS BACK TO VIRGINIA.

Q: CAN YOU GIVE US THE DETAILS ON THE MURDER OF PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER ROBERT BOCK?

A: IT WAS WITH GREAT REGRET THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEARNED THAT THE PEACE CORPS HAS CONFIRMED THE DEATH OF PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER ROBERT BOCK, 33, OF NEW YORK STATE. MR. BOCK WAS MURDERED AUGUST 12 IN THE PHILIPPINES ALONG WITH NINE OTHER CIVILIANS DURING A HIGHWAY ROBBERY OF THREE OR FOUR VEHICLES.

--LOCAL POLICE HAVE ARRESTED ONE SUSPECT AND THREE OTHER PEOPLE HAVE BEEN NAMED. THEY REPORTEDLY BELONG TO A GANG WANTED FOR PREVIOUS MURDERS AND ROBBERIES. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT MR. BOCK WAS THE TARGET OF THE ATTACK.

--WE ARE WORKING WITH LOCAL AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND THE PEACE CORPS ON THE CASE AND ALL ARE COOPERATING.

--PEACE CORPS/PHILIPPINES DIRECTOR SCOTT DUNCAN IS ACCOMPANYING MR. BOCK'S REMAINS BACK TO VIRGINIA.

--FOR FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT MR. BOCK'S WORK AS A PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER IN THE PHILIPPINES, WE WOULD REFER YOU TO THE PEACE CORPS.

Q: DO YOU WARN AMERICANS OF THE RISK OF CRIME IN THE PHILIPPINES?

A: YES. IN OUR CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEET FOR THE PHILIPPINES, DATED MAY 13, 1998, WE WARN AMERICANS OF THE SERIOUS CRIME AND SECURITY RISKS IN THE COUNTRY.

10. TAIWAN/PRC - WTO APPLICATION

CONTEXT: THE WASHINGTON TIMES REPORTS FROM GENEVA THAT OFFICIALS ARE REASSESSING THE POSSIBILITY OF TAIWAN'S JOINING THE WTO AHEAD OF THE PRC, GIVEN THAT TAIPEI HAS

ALMOST COMPLETED THE STEPS REQUIRED FOR ENTRY WHEREAS BEIJING STILL HAS FAR TO GO. BEIJING STRONGLY OPPOSES PRIOR ACCESSION BY TAIWAN. THE ARTICLE ASSERTS ERRONEOUSLY THAT A 1992 "UNDERSTANDING" STIPULATES TAIWAN SHOULD NOT ENTER BEFORE THE PRC.

TAIWAN, KNOWN AS THE "SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU" OR "CHINESE TAIPEI" IN THE WTO CONTEXT, HAS CONCLUDED BILATERAL MARKET ACCESS

NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALL MEMBERS OF ITS WORKING GROUP, INCLUDING THE U.S. ON AUGUST 7, USTR AMBASSADOR BARSHEFSKY ANNOUNCED THE FORMAL CONCLUSION OF THE BILATERAL U.S.-TAIWAN MARKET ACCESS PORTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR TAIWAN'S ACCESSION TO WTO.

NORK IS CONTINUING ON THE MULTILATERAL SIDE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS TAIWAN ATTEMPTS TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH WTO MEMBERS ON THE PROTOCOL SETTING OUT TAIWAN'S COMMITMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF WTO RULES. RECENT DISCUSSIONS HAVE FOCUSED ON TAIWAN'S SUBSIDIES AND AGRICULTURAL IMPORT PROCEDURES. IN RECENT MONTHS, WTO MEMBERS HAVE MET TWICE WITH TAIWAN IN GENEVA TO DISCUSS THE MULTILATERAL ASPECTS OF THE ACCESSION. FURTHER MEETINGS ARE ANTICIPATED IN THE FALL.

THE PRC HAS INDICATED IT WOULD OBJECT TO TAIWAN JOINING THE WTO BEFORE ITS OWN ACCESSION, AND BEIJING WILL CERTAINLY MAKE AN EFFORT TO MUSTER SUPPORT TO BLOCK TAIPEI'S PRIOR ACCESSION. THERE IS STILL SUBSTANTIAL WORK TO BE DONE BEFORE WE WILL ACHIEVE A COMMERCIALLY VIABLE WTO ACCESSION PACKAGE FOR THE PRC.

Q: WHAT IS THE U.S. POSITION REGARDING TAIWAN'S ENTRY INTO THE WTO IN ADVANCE OF THE PRC?

A: -- THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES EACH APPLICATION TO THE WTO SHOULD BE JUDGED ON ITS OWN MERITS.

-- ON AUGUST 7, WE COMPLETED THE VERIFICATION WORK ON OUR FEBRUARY 20 BILATERAL MARKET ACCESS AGREEMENT WITH

TAIWAN. THIS WILL ENABLE THE AGREEMENT TO BE FORWARDED TO THE WTO SECRETARIAT.

--IN THE MULTILATERAL CONTEXT, THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF

FURTHER WORK THAT NEEDS TO BE DONE ON TAIWAN'S ACCESSION APPLICATION.

--UNDER THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE WTO, MEMBERSHIP IS OPEN TO SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORIES, SO WE DO NOT SEE A LEGAL OBSTACLE TO TAIWAN'S ACCESSION.

--WTO WORKING PARTIES MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS.

--WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING TO MAKE PROGRESS ON OUR WTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PRC AND TO COMPLETION OF A COMMERCIALLY MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT WITH BEIJING.

11. STATUS OF EMBASSIES

(CONTEXT: THERE IS NO WAY THAT DS WILL ALLOW YOU TO GO ON THE RECORD WITH THE SPECIFIC OPERATING STATUS OF KAMPALA AND ABIDJAN. AS THE OTHERS REQUESTED ARE OPERATING AT FULL STATUS, YOU CAN COMMENT SPECIFICALLY ON THOSE MISSIONS.)

(IF ASKED ONLY)

Q: STATUS OF OPERATIONS AT EMBASSIES KAMPALA, ABIDJAN, CAIRO, KUALA LUMPUR AND SANAA?

A: ALL OF OUR EMBASSIES ARE OPERATING IN SOME FASHION.

AT THIS TIME, TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, TWO MISSIONS ARE OPERATING WITH ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL ONLY. ONE OF THOSE MISSIONS IS PROVIDING LIMITED SERVICES. THESE MEASURES ARE TAKEN AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF OF MISSION FOR SECURITY PURPOSES.

--FOR SECURITY REASONS, I CANNOT PROVIDE A LIST OF THESE POSTS.

(IF PRESSED)

--EMBASSIES CAIRO, KUALA LUMPUR, AND SANAA ARE OPERATING AT FULL STATUS

(NOTE TO BRIEFER: BACKGROUND, IF ASKED ONLY. HERE IS THE OPERATING STATUS OF THE REQUESTED POSTS:

KAMPALA - OPEN FOR BUSINESS WITH WASHINGTON, DLOSED TO PUBLIC. STOPPED OPERATIONS AT CHANCERY EXCEPT FOR RSO AND MSGS, AND PERSONNEL OPERATING OUT OF OTHER LOCATIONS AND

WITH REDUCED STAFF.

ABIDJAN - EMBASSY OPERATING ON A REDUCED STAFF, THE STREETS AROUND THE EMBASSY ARE BLOCKED OFF, OPEN REGULAR HOURS, PROVIDING REGULAR SERVICES.

CAIRO - OPEN AND OPERATIONAL, REGULAR WORK HOURS, NO REDUCED STAFF, ALL SERVICES AVAILABLE. AID PERSONNEL WERE MOVED TO EMBASSY COMPOUND.

KUALA LUMPUR - OPEN AND OPERATIONAL, ALL SERVICES BEING

PROVIDED, REGULAR HOURS.

SANAA - OPEN AND OPERATIONAL, ALL SERVICES BEING PROVIDED, REGULAR WORK HOURS, ALL PERSONNEL PRESENT.)

Q: HAVE THERE BEEN THREATS TO EMBASSIES AMMAN, BAMAKO, KINSHASA, AND SANAA?

A: SINCE THE TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST OUR EMBASSIES IN NAIROBI AND DAR ES SALAAM LAST FRIDAY, WE HAVE RECEIVED NUMEROUS THREATS EACH DAY AGAINST OUR MISSIONS AROUND THE WORLD. WE TAKE ALL THREATS SERIOUSLY. IF

DEEMED APPROPRIATE, WE TAKE ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES.

--I AM NOT GOING TO COMMENT ON SPECIFIC THREAT INFORMATION WE RECEIVE. HOWEVER, IF INFORMATION IS RECEIVED THAT IS DEEMED CREDIBLE, WE WILL ISSUE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO ADVISE THE PUBLIC OF THIS UNCLASSIFIED THREAT INFORMATION.

12. BURMA: ASSK STANDOFF WITH POLICE

CONTEXT: AUNG SAN SUU KYI (ASSK) AND HER PARTY REMAIN AT THE SIDE OF THE MAIN RANGOON-PATHEIN ROAD. THEY ARE DETAINED ON THE BRIDGE WHICH WAS THE SITE OF THE SIX DAY STANDOFF IN JULY. NO WESTERN OBSERVERS HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO TRAVEL TO THE SITE.

PLEASE SEE AUGUST 11 PRESS GUIDANCE FOR BACKGROUND.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON AUNG SAN SUU KYI'S

SITUATION?

A: AUNG SAN SUU KYI AND HER PARTY REMAIN BLOCKED ON THE ROAD TO PATHEIN AT THE SAME LOCATION WHERE SHE SPENT SIX DAYS LAST MONTH IN A SIMILAR STAND OFF WITH THE SECURITY FORCES.

--EMBASSY RANGOON HAS ASKED TO VISIT THE SITE TO OBSERVE THE SITUATION AND SPEAK TO AUNG SAN SUU KYL. THIS REQUEST IS STILL PENDING WITH THE BURMESE AUTHORITIES.

--IN LIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ABYSMAL TREATMENT OF THE NLD LEADERS TWO WEEKS AGO, WE ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI AND U HLA PE AND HOLD THE BURMESE AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THEIR HEALTH AND WELFARE.

--WE SUPPORT AUNG SAN SUU KYL'S RIGHT TO TRAVEL FREELY IN BURMA AND URGE THE GOVERNMENT TO ADDRESS THIS SITUATION THROUGH DIALOGUE.

13. BURMA: 2ND VISIT TO DETAINED AMERICANS GRANTED

CONTEXT: CHARGE WIEDEMANN AND A CONSULAR OFFICER MET WITH THE SIX DETAINED AMERICANS AT A GUEST HOUSE OUTSIDE

RANGOON AT 3:00 P.M. LOCAL TIME AUGUST 13. THE AMERICAN DETAINEES WERE ALL IN GOOD SPIRITS DURING THIS SECOND CONSULAR VISIT. ALL EIGHTEEN DETAINEES ARE NOW BEING

UNCLASSIFIED

HELD IN THE SAME GUEST HOUSE WHICH HAS MUCH BETTER FACILITIES THAN THE PREVIOUS DETENTION CENTER.

THERE IS NO FURTHER WORD ON WHETHER CHARGES WILL BE FILED. EMBASSY RANGOON CONTINUES TO URGE THE BURMESE REGIME TO RELEASE THE DETAINEES.

WE ISSUED A NEW PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT FOR BURMA ON AUGUST 12, REITERATING THE POSSIBILITY OF DISTURBANCES OR UNREST AND DETAILING THE AUGUST 9 ARREST OF THE SIX AMERICANS.

Q: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE SIX AMERICANS DETAINED IN BURMA?

A: OUR EMBASSY IN RANGOON WAS GRANTED PERMISSION TO VISIT THE SIX DETAINED IN RANGOON AUGUST 13. CHARGE WIEDEMANN AND A CONSULAR OFFICER MET WITH THEM AT A

LOCATION NEAR THE AIRPORT AND REPORTED THEM TO BE IN GOOD SPIRITS. WE INTEND TO CONTINUE REGULAR VISITS UNTIL THIS MATTER IS RESOLVED.

--NO FORMAL CHARGES HAVE BEEN FILED AT THIS TIME. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO PUSH THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT FOR A QUICK RESOLUTION AND A SPEEDY RELEASE.

--THE STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUED A NEW PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AUGUST 12, REITERATING THE POSSIBILITY OF DISTURBANCES OR UNREST IN BURMA AND DETAILING THE SITUATION OF THE SIX DETAINED AMERICANS.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 19 STATE 148277 140100Z
ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9588

PAGE 01 STATE 151224 190127Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AIT-03 AMAD-01 A-00 SRPP-00 EUR-01
UTED-00 IM-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 JUSE-00 L-01 ADS-00
NEA-01 DCP-01 OIC-02 OIG-04 PA-00 SA-01 SAS-00
/017R

151224
SOURCE: KODAKB.019005
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:EMMCDEVITT -- 08/18/98 71029
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES
----------608EB5 190130Z /38
O 190127Z AUG 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 151224 190127Z
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
CINCPACELT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
NSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 151224

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: AUGUST 18, 1998 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS -- ALSO FOR USIS
SEODEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
USVIENNA FOR UNVIE
ROME FOR STORELLA
BEIJING PASS CHENGDU

1. INDEX

-- BURMA: AUNG SAN SUU KYT STANDOFF WITH POLICE/UPDATE (PARAS 2 AND 3)
-- CHINA/INDONESIA: VIOLENCE AGAINST SINO-INDONESIANS

(PARAS 2 AND 4)
-- CONSULAR INFORMATION: DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM (PARAS 2 AND 5)
-- U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY (PARAS 6 AND 7)

2. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 8/18/98. THERE WAS NO REGULAR PRESS BRIEFING ON THAT DAY. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

3. BURMA: AUNG SAN SUU KYL STANDOFF WITH POLICE/UPDATE

CONTEXT: AUNG SAN SUU KYL AND OTHER MEMBERS OF HER PARTY REMAIN AT THE SIDE OF THE MAIN RANGOON TO PATHEIN ROAD. OUR RANGOON CHARGE, KENT WIEDEMANN, WHO HAD BEEN SEEKING ACCESS TO AUNG SAN SUU KYI SINCE THE STAND-OFF BEGAN, WAS TAKEN BY BURMESE GOVERNMENT CAR TO THE STANDOFF SITE TODAY, BUT WAS NOT PERMITTED TO STOP OR TO COMMUNICATE WITH AUNG SAN SUU KYI AND HER PARTY.

PLEASE SEE EARLIER PRESS GUIDANCE FOR ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND AND Q&AS.

Q: HAS ANYONE FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY BEEN PERMITTED TO VISIT THE SITE OF THE AUNG SAN SUU KYI STANDOFF WITH THE SECURITY FORCES?

A: AFTER REPEATED REQUESTS FOR ACCESS TO AUNG SAN SUU KYL, THE BURMESE AUTHORITIES ALLOWED THE U.S. CHARGE' TO VIEW THE

SITE TODAY FROM A BURMESE GOVERNMENT CAR. HOWEVER, HE WAS NOT PERMITTED TO STOP OR TO COMMUNICATE WITH AUNG SAN SUU KYI OR HER COMPANIONS.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS ERECTED THATCHED STRUCTURES FOR SHADE AND ENCLOSED TOILET/SHOWER FACILITIES.

WE CONTINUE TO OPPOSE THIS ABRIDGMENT OF AUNG SAN SUU KYL'S RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ASSEMBLY AND CALL ON THE GOVERNMENT OF BURMA TO RESOLVE THIS SITUATION QUICKLY AND PEACEFULLY.

Q: MEANWHILE, WHAT ABOUT REPORTS OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE RULING STATE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL AND OTHER NLD MEMBERS?

A: WE HAVE SEEN REPORTS OF SUCH A MEETING BUT DO NOT HAVE DETAILS AT THIS TIME. THE U.S. HAS LONG CALLED FOR DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE BURMESE AUTHORITIES AND THE OPPOSITION, INCLUDING AUNG SAN SUU KYL.

4. CHINA/INDONESIA: VIOLENCE AGAINST SINO-INDONESIANS

CONTEXT: DURING THE MAY RIOTS THERE WAS WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE AND ABUSES DIRECTED AGAINST SINO-INDONESIANS,

INCLUDING NUMEROUS RAPES OF SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND DAMAGE TO SINO-INDONESIAN OWNED BUSINESSES. REPORTS OF VIOLENCE HAVE SPARKED CONCERN AND PROTESTS IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, HONG KONG, AND TAIWAN, AS WELL AS AMONG CHINESE-AMERICAN GROUPS. NEWSPAPERS TODAY CARRIED REPORTS THAT OVER 100 DEMONSTRATORS GATHERED OUTSIDE THE INDONESIAN EMBASSY COMPOUND TO PROTEST AGAINST THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT FOR

FAILING TO PROTECT INDONESIANS OF CHINESE DESCENT.

Q: ANY COMMENT ON STUDENT PROTESTS IN CHINA OVER INDONESIA'S TREATMENT OF ETHNIC CHINESE?

A: WE ARE AWARE OF CONCERN ABOUT THIS ISSUE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND IN OTHER CHINESE COMMUNITIES AROUND THE WORLD.

WELL BEFORE THE RIOTING, THE U.S. HAD EXPRESSED STRONG

CONCERN THAT SINO-INDONESIANS OR OTHER GROUPS NOT BE TARGETED AS SCAPEGOATS IN REACTION TO INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

AS THE EVENTS IN INDONESIA UNFOLDED, THE U.S. MET WITH INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN JAKARTA, INDONESIAN EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVES, AND NGO REPRESENTATIVES. WE REPEATEDLY URGED RESTRAINT BY GOVERNMENT AND OTHER FORCES, DEPLORED THE VIOLENCE, AND CONDEMNED IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THE SHOCKING REPORTS OF WIDESPREAD RAPES OF SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN.

WE HAVE URGED INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO INVESTIGATE THESE REPORTED CRIMES, INCLUDING THE RAPES, THE DEATHS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY, AND OTHER WRONGDOINGS, AND TO ARREST AND PROSECUTE THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN AND PLANNED THEM.

WE HAVE REPEATEDLY RAISED OUR CONCERNS ON THESE ISSUES BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

IN THIS CONTEXT, WE NOTE THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAS CONDEMNED THE MAY RIOTS AND THE ATTACKS AGAINST SINO-INDONESIANS AND PLEDGED THAT THEY WOULD BE THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATED. HE HAS ALSO PLEDGED MEASURES TO RECAPITALIZE STORES ATTACKED IN THE MAY LOOTING AND ANNOUNCED SPECIAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR CHINESE NEIGHBORHOODS.

THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ESTABLISHED A COMMISSION WITH GOVERNMENT AND NGO MEMBERS TO INVESTIGATE THESE CRIMES. IN

ADDITION, INDONESIAN AND INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE INDEPENDENTLY COLLECTING INFORMATION REGARDING THE REPORTED RAPES, AND OTHER NGOS ARE ESTABLISHING HOT LINES AND OUTREACH SERVICES TO ASSIST VICTIMS. WE WELCOME THESE EFFORTS. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS EXPLORING WAYS IN WHICH WE MAY ASSIST THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND NGOS IN THIS MATTER.

5. CONSULAR INFORMATION: DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM

Q: HOW DOES YOUR CONSULAR INFORMATION PROGRAM WORK? HOW DO YOU DECIDE WHEN TO ISSUE A WARNING?

A: A CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEET, USUALLY UPDATED ANNUALLY, IS ISSUED FOR EACH COUNTRY OF THE WORLD. IT APPRISES AMERICANS OF GENERAL CONDITIONS THAT MAY AFFECT SAFETY AND

TRAVEL. FOR INSTANCE, IT MAY DESCRIBE UNUSUAL ENTRY AND EXIT REQUIREMENTS, CRIME INFORMATION, AREAS OF INSTABILITY OR ROAD SAFETY, AMONG OTHER THINGS.

-- A TRAVEL WARNING (CURRENTLY WE HAVE 28) 15 GENERALLY
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 07 STATE 151224 190127Z
ISSUED FOR A COUNTRY TO WHICH THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDERS IT UNSAFE TO TRAVEL. FOR THE MOST PART, THEY WOULD BE COUNTRIES YOU MIGHT SUSPECT: IRAQ, BURUNDI, SOMALIA AND LIBYA. FOR OTHERS, SUCH AS MONTSERRAT, A NATURAL DISASTER -- AN ACTIVE VOLCANO THAT THREATENS LIVES -- HAS PROMPTED ISSUANCE OF A WARNING.

-- WE EVALUATE INFORMATION FROM ALL SOURCES WHEN ISSUING OUR PUBLICATIONS. FIRST-HAND REPORTING BY OUR DIPLOMATS ABROAD IS, OF COURSE, THE KEY INPUT, BUT WE ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL OTHER CREDIBLE INFORMATION. THE DEPARTMENT IN WASHINGTON DECIDES TO ISSUE A TRAVEL WARNING, WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CHIEF OF MISSION AT THE AFFECTED POST.

-- WHEN THE DEPARTMENT BECOMES AWARE OF A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS OVERSEAS THAT IS CREDIBLE, IMMINENT, AND NON-COUNTERABLE (MEANING THAT, FOR INSTANCE, STATIONING MORE SECURITY GUARDS AROUND A PARTICULAR U.S. INSTALLATION WILL NOT SUFFICE), WE ISSUE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. BOMB THREATS TO AIRLINES, TERRORIST ATTACKS, COUPS OR ANNIVERSARY DATES OF TERRORIST EVENTS HAVE RESULTED IN ANNOUNCEMENTS. WE HAVE 19 IN EFFECT.

-- PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS ARE OFTEN TRIGGERED BY QUICK ALERTS, KNOWN AS WARDEN MESSAGES, ISSUED BY OUR EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES OVERSEAS TO THE LOCAL AMERICAN COMMUNITY.

THE MESSAGE'S CONTENT IS REPEATED WORLDWIDE THROUGH OUR CONSULAR INFORMATION PROGRAM.

-- IF THE THREAT BECOMES MORE PERMANENT, SUCH AS THE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 08 STATE 151224 190127Z
CONTINUING PROBLEM WITH TAXI ROBBERIES IN MEXICO CITY, IT IS FOLDED INTO THE CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEET, OR IF APPROPRIATE, MADE INTO A TRAVEL WARNING. IF A THREAT AFFECTS AMERICANS IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES, WE GO TO A REGIONAL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, SUCH AS THE AUG. 16 "WORLDWIDE CAUTION, " INSTEAD OF OR IN ADDITION TO A COUNTRY-SPECIFIC ANNOUNCEMENT OR WARNING.

-- ALL THE PUBLICATIONS ARE DISTRIBUTED TO THE MEDIA AND THE TRAVEL INDUSTRY, AND ARE AVAILABLE ON THE OUR WEBSITES AND VIA AUTOMATED TELEPHONE AND FAX SYSTEMS.

Q: WAS YOUR TRAVEL WARNING ON PAKISTAN AN OVERREACTION?

A: NO. WE HAVE HAD A TRAVEL WARNING IN EFFECT ON PAKISTAN SINCE NOVEMBER L997, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MURDERS OF U.S. OIL WORKERS IN KARACHI. TRAVEL WARNINGS AND PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS ON PAKISTAN HAVE BEEN IN PLACE INTERMITTENTLY THROUGHOUT THE 1990S.

Q: IS THIS IN FACT AN EVACUATION OF AMERICANS FROM PAKISTAN?

A: NO, NOT IN THE SENSE THAT U.S. MARINES ARE ARRIVING IN HELICOPTERS TO WHISK AMERICANS OUT OF HARM'S WAY. BUT WE DO BELIEVE IT PRUDENT FOR U.S. CITIZENS TO LEAVE PAKISTAN, AND WE ARE FACILITATING THEIR DEPARTURE. WE HAVE ARRANGED FOR ONE CHARTER FLIGHT, WHICH IS CARRYING U.S. PERSONNEL IN NON-EMERGENCY POSITIONS, FAMILY DEPENDENTS AND PRIVATE U.S. CITIZENS. COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS REMAIN AVAILABLE AND SOME PRIVATE AMERICANS HAVE CHOSEN TO DEPART WITHOUT OUR ASSISTANCE.

-- AS IN EVERY SUCH CASE, WE MAKE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IN KEEPING WITH OUR "NO DOUBLE STANDARD" RULE. ALL INFORMATION -- AFFECTING OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE AMERICANS -- DISSEMINATED TO OFFICIAL AMERICANS ALSO GOES TO THE GENERAL AMERICAN PUBLIC. BUT WE CANNOT FORCE U.S. CITIZENS TO LEAVE A COUNTRY OR MAKE ANY OTHER TRAVEL DECISION.

Q: HOW MANY AMERICANS ARE IN PAKISTAN?

A: SOME 3,000 U.S. CITIZENS ARE REGISTERED IN THE COUNTRY, BUT THE ACTUAL NUMBER FLUCTUATES. THE 3,000 FIGURE DOES NOT REFLECT THOSE WHO HAVE CHOSEN NOT TO REGISTER, OR THOSE WHO ARE IN THE COUNTRY TEMPORARILY ON BUSINESS OR FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

-- WE WISH ALL U.S. CITIZENS WOULD REGISTER. IT MAKES IT MUCH EASIER TO CONTACT THEM IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION SUCH AS THIS.

6. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED ON 8/17/98. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM IT FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

7. U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY

Q: WHAT IS U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY?

A: OUR THREE-PART POLICY, IN FORCE FOR MORE THAN A DECADE, IS SOUND: MAKE NO CONCESSIONS TO TERRORISTS; PRESSURE

STATES THAT SPONSOR TERRORISM; AND BRING TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE.

THIS IS WHY WE ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES TO FIND THE PERPETRATORS OF THESE BOMBINGS AND SEE THAT JUSTICE IS DONE.

Q: WHAT ARE YOU ASKING THESE GOVERNMENTS TO DO?

A: WE ARE ASKING THESE GOVERNMENTS TO UNDERTAKE SEVERAL STEPS TO PREVENT TERRORIST ACTS AND BRING THOSE RESPONSIBLE TO JUSTICE. TREAT TERRORISM AS A CRIME, AND TERRORISTS AS CRIMINALS;

RESOLVE TO PROSECUTE TERRORIST THREATS FULLY WITH THE U.S. AND OTHER COOPERATING GOVERNMENTS;

DO NOT PERMIT YOUR NATION'S TERRITORY TO BE USED TO SUPPORT TERRORISTS, OR TO PROVIDE THEM SAFEHAVEN;

WORK RELENTLESSLY TO CHANGE THE ATTITUDES OF THOSE STATES WHICH, CONTRARY TO THE WILL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, GIVE TERRORIST SUPPORT OR SAFEHAVEN;

BECOME A PARTY TO ALL ELEVEN INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CONVENTIONS, AND IMPLEMENT THEM FULLY.
TALBOTT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTO2943 RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 155457 250153Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	A-00	DS-00	EUR-01	UTED-00
	IM-01	TEDE-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01	DCP-01
	OIC-02	OIG-04	SA-01	DSCC-00	DRL-04	SAS-00	/021R

155457
SOURCE: KODAKA.025009
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:KHFRITZ -- 08/24/98 71028
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES
----------62D67A 250157Z /38
O 250153Z AUG 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 155457 250153Z
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
NSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 155457

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: AUGUST 24, 1998 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS -- ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINOPAC FOR FPA TEARE
ROME FOR STORELLA
USEU FOR RUTH

1. INDEX

-- KOREA: U.S.-DPRK BILATERAL TALKS PARAS 2 - 3
-- CAMBODIA: OPPOSITION PROTESTS ELECTION CONDUCT PARAS 4 - 5
-- BURMA: ASSK RETURNS TO RANGOON PARAS 4 AND 6
-- SECURITY: STATUS OF U.S. MISSIONS IN EAP REGION PARAS 4 AND 7
-- INDONESIA: TROOP INVOLVEMENT IN MAY RIOTS PARAS 4 AND 8

-- INDONESIA: REPORTED BOMB NEAR AMERICAN CLUB PARAS 4 AND 9
-- INDONESIA: MASS GRAVES IN ACEH PARAS 4 AND 10

-- IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT: ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR BALAL QILFIELD PROJECT PARAS 4 AND 11
-- DS ASSISTANCE TO U.S. BUSINESSES PARAS 4 AND 12
-- DEPARTMENT: SECURITY PARAS 4 AND 13

2. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED ON 8/24/98 AND USED IN PART BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE DAILY BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THIS GUIDANCE FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

3. KOREA: U.S.-DPRK BILATERAL TALKS

CONTEXT: U.S. AND DPRK BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BEGAN IN NEW YORK ON FRIDAY, AUGUST 21 AND ARE EXPECTED TO RESUME THIS AFTERNOON. IT IS POSSIBLE THE TALKS COULD CONTINUE INTO TOMORROW. THESE TALKS ARE PART OF A SERIES OF MEETINGS AT THIS LEVEL, WITH THE LAST SUCH SESSION HAVING TAKEN PLACE IN MARCH IN BERLIN.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON THE U.S.-DPRK BILATERAL TALKS IN NEW YORK?

A: A U.S. DELEGATION, LED BY AMB. CHARLES KARTMAN, MET WITH A DPRK DELEGATION LED BY VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KIM GYE

GWAN IN NEW YORK ON AUG. 21. THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO MEET AGAIN AUG. 24.

-- THIS MEETING IS PART OF A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS ON BILATERAL ISSUES. THE LAST SUCH SESSION WAS HELD IN BERLIN IN MARCH.

Q: WHAT WAS DISCUSSED AT THE TALKS?

A: THE TALKS FOCUSED ON THE BROAD RANGE OF BILATERAL ISSUES, INCLUDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

-- THE TALKS ARE ONGOING, AND WE DO NOT WISH TO DISCUSS FURTHER DETAILS AT THIS TIME.

4. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 8/24/98 AND NOT USED BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE DAILY BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THIS GUIDANCE FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

5. CAMBODIA: OPPOSITION PROTESTS ELECTION CONDUCT

CONTEXT: CAMBODIA'S OPPOSITION RALLIED IN PHNOM PENH TO PRESS THEIR DEMANDS THAT ALLEGED FRAUD IN THE JULY 26 ELECTIONS BE PROPERLY INVESTIGATED. PRINCE RANARIDDH'S FUNCINPEC PARTY, THE SAM RAINSY PARTY AND EIGHT SMALL ALLIED PARTIES DREW A CROWD OF NEARLY 10,000 PEOPLE TO A RALLY DESPITE A GOVERNMENT BAN ON THE SUNDAY, AUGUST 23, DEMONSTRATION. ON MONDAY, AUGUST 24, ABOUT ONE THOUSAND PROTESTERS RALLIED AT A SPORTS STADIUM IN THE MORNING BEFORE MARCHING TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE GIVEN HUN SEN, WHOSE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY OFFICIALLY WON THE ELECTIONS, UNTIL AUGUST 29 TO RESOLVE THEIR GRIEVANCES OR FACE MASS PROTESTS. THE NATIONAL

ELECTION COMMISSION DISMISSED ALL ELECTION COMPLAINTS BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. THE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE NOW SUBMITTED THEIR COMPLAINTS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL, THE COUNTRY'S TOP LEGAL BODY, BUT THE COUNCIL HAS SAID IT WILL NOT CONSIDER MANY OF THE GRIEVANCES FOR VARIOUS TECHNICAL REASONS.

Q: WHAT IS THE LATEST ON ELECTIONS?

A: CAMBODIA'S OPPOSITION HELD PEACEFUL RALLIES ON

SUNDAY, AUGUST 23, AND MONDAY, AUGUST 24, TO PRESS DEMANDS THAT ALLEGED VOTE FRAUD BE PROPERLY INVESTIGATED AND THAT THE FORMULA FOR ALLOCATING SEATS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BE CHANGED. UNDER THE CURRENT FORMULA, HUN SEN'S CPP, WHICH WON 41 PERCENT OF THE POPULAR VOTE, WOULD CONTROL OVER HALF THE SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY.

-- THE NATIONAL ELECTION COMMISSION INVESTIGATED SOME OPPOSITION COMPLAINTS AND CONDUCTED RECOUNTS OF VOTES FROM SEVERAL PROVINCES BEFORE REJECTING THE REMAINING COMPLAINTS AND CONCLUDING ITS INVESTIGATIONS ON AUGUST 12. OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE TAKEN THEIR REMAINING CONCERNS ABOUT IRREGULARITIES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL, WHICH WILL DETERMINE THE FINAL ELECTION RESULTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CAMBODIAN CONSTITUTION.

-- WE LOOK TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL TO IMPARTIALLY AND THOROUGHLY ADDRESS THE COMPLAINTS OF IRREGULARITIES BROUGHT BY THE OPPOSITION. FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE CONCERNS RAISED BY THE OPPOSITION WOULD CALL

INTO QUESTION THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ENTIRE ELECTION PROCESS.

6. BURMA: ASSK RETURNS TO RANGOON

CONTEXT: AUNG SAN SUU KYI AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF HER PARTY RETURNED TO RANGOON AT APPROXIMATELY 4:00 P.M. RANGOON TIME ON MONDAY, AUGUST 24. THE RETURN APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN VOLUNTARY; HOWEVER, EMBASSY RANGOON HAS BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM THIS DIRECTLY. NLD LEADERS HAVE DESCRIBED HER HEALTH AS FINE, CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES; HOWEVER WE EXPECT SHE WILL REQUIRE A FEW DAYS OF REST AND RECUPERATION BEFORE SHE RECEIVES VISITORS. EMBASSY RANGOON WILL TRY TO VISIT HER AS SOON AS HER HEALTH PERMITS.

YESTERDAY AND THIS MORNING SECRETARY AIBRIGHT CALLED THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THAILAND (SURIN), JAPAN (KOMURA), INDONESIA (ALATAS), AND THE PHILIPPINES (SIAZON) TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN BURMA.

PLEASE SEE EARLIER PRESS GUIDANCE FOR ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND.

Q: HAS AUNG SAN SUU KYI VOLUNTARILY RETURNED TO RANGOON?

A: AUNG SAN SUU KYL AND HER PARTY RETURNED TO RANGOON AT APPROXIMATELY 4:00 P.M. ON MONDAY, AUGUST 24. SHE RETURNED IN HER OWN VEHICLE, ACCOMPANIED BY A GOVERNMENT AMBULANCE. HER RETURN APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN VOLUNTARY.

AUNG SAN SUU KYL'S HEALTH BEGAN TO DECLINE LATE LAST WEEK AND OVER THE WEEKEND THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT DENIED HER ACCESS TO HER PHYSICIAN. EMBASSY RANGOON HAS NOT SPOKEN TO HER DIRECTLY SINCE HER RETURN AND EXPECTS THAT SHE WILL NEED A FEW DAYS TO RECOVER. EMBASSY RANGOON WILL SEEK TO VISIT HER AS SOON AS HER HEALTH PERMITS.

-- THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY OPPOSES THE ABRIDGMENT OF AUNG SAN SUU KYL'S RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ASSE~BLY WHICH LED TO THIS STANDOFF AND CALLS ON THE GOVERNMENT OF BURMA TO LIFT THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON AUNG SAN SUU KYL'S ABILITY TO TRAVEL FREELY WITHIN HER OWN COUNTRY.

-- THE UNITED STATES FURTHER CALLS ON THE GOVERNMENT OF BURMA TO STOP ITS HARASSMENT OF THE NON-VIOLENT POLITICAL OPPOSITION, TO RELEASE THE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT WHO ARE DETAINED, AND TO ENTER INTO SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY, INCLUDING AUNG SAN SUU KYL, AND THE LEADERS OF THE ETHNIC MINORITIES AS A MEANS OF SOLVING THE DECADE-LONG POLITICAL CONFLICT IN BURMA.

7. SECURITY: STATUS OF U.S. MISSIONS IN EAP REGION

NOTE TO BRIEFER: EMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR EXPECTS TO RETURN TO REGULAR OPERATION ON AUGUST 25. ALL OTHER EAP POSTS ARE CONDUCTING BUSINESS AS USUAL.

Q: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF OPERATIONS AT EMBASSY KUALA

LUMPUR?

A: ALL SERVICES AND FUNCTIONS ARE BEING PROVIDED ALTHOUGH EMBASSY PERSONNEL ARE HANDLING U.S. PASSPORT RENEWALS OFF-SITE AND NIV APPLICATIONS MUST BE SUBMITTED THROUGH A COURIER SERVICE OR FROM TRAVEL AGENTS.

-- ALL OTHER EAP POSTS ARE CONDUCTING BUSINESS AS USUAL.

8. INDONESIA: TROOP INVOLVEMENT IN MAY RIOTS

CONTEXT: ON AUGUST 22, INDONESIAN ARMY (ABRI) CHIEF GENERAL WIRANTO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ARMY TROOPS WERE INVOLVED IN KIDNAPPING POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY KILLINGS, AND JAKARTA RIOTING LAST MAY. HE DID NOT SPECIFY WHAT ROLE THEY HAD PLAYED. THE MILDEST CRITICISM LEVELED AT ABRI HAS BEEN THAT IT KEPT TOO LOW A PROFILE AND DID NOT PREVENT THE MAY RIOTS. THE WORST ALLEGATIONS ARE THAT ABRI UNITS KIDNAPPED, TORTURED, AND KILLED POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, FIRED THE SHOTS THAT KILLED FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ON MAY 12, AND WAS INVOLVED IN TARGETING ETHNIC CHINESE DURING THE MAY RIOTING, AND IN RAPES OF CHINESE INDONESIAN WOMEN AND GIRLS.

Q: WHAT IS OUR REACTION TO INDONESIA'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT TROOPS WERE INVOLVED IN MAY RIOTS AND IN THE KIDNAPPING AND SHOOTING OF DEMONSTRATORS?

A: INDONESIAN ARMY CHIEF GENERAL WIRANTO ACKNOWLEDGED ON AUGUST 22 THAT ARMY TROOPS WERE INVOLVED IN THE RIOTING AND LOOTING IN JAKARTA LAST MAY, THE SHOOTING OF THE FOUR

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 09 STATE 155457 250153Z

TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS MAY 12 THAT PRECEDED THEM, AND THE KIDNAPPING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. GENERAL WIRANTO DID NOT PROVIDE DETAILS ON ARMY INVOLVEMENT IN THESE MATTERS, BUT SAID THE ARMY WAS THOROUGHLY COMMITTED TO INVESTIGATING THEM AND TO TAKING ACTION TO ENSURE THAT THEY DID NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. WE WELCOME GEN. WIRANTO'S STATEMENT AND WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION.

-- THE UNITED STATES HAS REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN TO THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT OVER THE KIDNAPPING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, THE TRISAKTI KILLINGS, AND THE JAKARTA RIOTING. WE HAVE URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO CONDUCT THOROUGH INVESTIGATIONS, AND TO ENSURE THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING AND CARRYING OUT THESE CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ARE HELD FULLY ACCOUNTABLE.

WE HAVE RAISED OUR CONCERNS REPEATEDLY BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

9. INDONESIA: REPORTED BOMB NEAR AMERICAN CLUB

CONTEXT: REUTERS REPORTED THAT A SMALL EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WITH A TIMER ATTACHED WAS FOUND AUGUST 21 IN A BOX ON THE

GROUND FLOOR OF A SKYSCRAPER IN JAKARTA. ON AUGUST 24, REUTERS SUBSEQUENTLY REPORTED INDONESIA POLICE SPOKESMAN'S EXPLANATION THAT THE BOX HAD BEEN EMPTY, HAD CONTAINED NO EXPLOSIVES, AND DID NOT HAVE A TIMER ATTACHED.

Q: WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE DISCOVERY OF A BOMB NEAR A JAKARTA OFFICE BUILDING HOUSING THE LOCAL BRANCH OF THE

AMERICAN CLUB?

A: FOLLOWING AUGUST 22 REPORTS ABOUT THE DISCOVERY OF A BOX CONTAINING EXPLOSIVES AND A TIMER ON THE GROUND FLOOR OF THE BANK NEGARA INDONESIA SKYSCRAPER IN JAKARTA. INDONESIAN POLICE AUTHORITIES NOW REPORT THAT A SUSPICIOUS BOX FOUND BY A SECURITY GUARD WAS EMPTY.

-- WE APPRECIATE THE ALERTNESS OF THE SECURITY GUARD TO THE PRESENCE OF A SUSPICIOUS BOX AND THE WILLINGNESS OF THE INDONESIAN POLICE TO INVESTIGATE FULLY. -

10. INDONESIA: MASS GRAVES IN ACEH

CONTEXT: ACEH IS ONE OF SEVERAL REGIONS IN INDONESIA IN WHICH SEPARATISTS ARE SEEKING GREATER RIGHTS AND INDEPENDENCE. THE REGION HAS BEEN UNDER "MILITARY OPERATIONS STATUS" SINCE SERIOUS UNREST IN 1989-91. A LARGE MILITARY PRESENCE HAS REMAINED THERE ALTHOUGH SEPARATIST ACTIVITY HAS BEEN LOW IN RECENT YEARS. IN EARLY AUGUST, RESPECTED NGO GROUPS (AND A VISITING INDONESIAN PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION) PUBLICIZED DISCOVERY OF SITES BELIEVED TO BE MASS GRAVES. ON AUGUST 7, IN THE WAKE OF INITIAL REPORTS, ARMED FORCES CHIEF GEN. WIRANTO, TRAVELED TO ACEH. HE ANNOUNCED THAT THE ARMY WILL END MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ACEH, AND REMOVE ITS COMBAT TROOPS FROM THE PROVINCE. HE APOLOGIZED TO THE PEOPLE OF ACEH "IF DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS THE ARMED FORCES HAVE MADE YOU SUFFER." 250 TROOPS LEFT AUGUST 20 AND THE REMAINING COMBAT TROOPS, REPORTEDLY 729, ARE SCHEDULED TO LEAVE AUGUST 31. ON AUGUST 22, A TEAM FROM INDONESIA'S OFFICIAL NATIONAL

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EXCAVATED ONE REPORTED MASS GRAVE SITE AND FOUND THE REMAINS OF AT LEAST 12 BODIES.

Q: WHAT IS U.S. REACTION TO THE LATEST REPORT OF THE DISCOVERY OF MASS GRAVES IN ACEH?

A: WE'RE AWARE OF THESE REPORTS AND OTHER REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE ACEH REGION OF INDONESIA. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SINCE EARLY AUGUST BOTH INDONESIAN GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WERE INVESTIGATING REPORTS OF EVIDENCE OF MASS GRAVES AND OTHER ABUSES. ON AUGUST 22, A TEAN FROM THE INDONESIA NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EXCAVATED A SITE AND REPORTEDLY FOUND THE REMAINS OF AT LEAST 12 BODIES. WE DO NOT HAVE INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE OF THE EXISTENCE OF MASS GRAVES, BUT ARE CLOSELY MONITORING HOW THE REPORTS ARE FOLLOWED UP.

-- WE NOTE THAT GEN. WIRANTO, CHIEF OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES, VISITED ACEH AFTER INITIAL REPORTS OF DISCOVERIES OF SITES OF POSSIBLE MASS GRAVES THERE. ON AUGUST 7, HE ANNOUNCED THAT THE INDONESIAN ARMY WOULD SHORTLY REMOVE ITS COMBAT TROOPS FROM THE PROVINCE. THAT PLEDGE REPORTEDLY HAS BEGUN TO BE IMPLEMENTED WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF 250 COMBAT TROOPS ON AUGUST 20. REMAINING COMBAT TROOPS, REPORTEDLY OVER 700, ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART ACEH BY AUGUST

31. DURING HIS EARLY AUGUST VISIT TO ACEH, GENERAL WIRANTO ALSO APOLOGIZED "IF DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS THE ARMED FORCES HAVE MADE YOU SUFFER."

-- THE ADMINISTRATION VIEWS SERIOUSLY CREDIBLE ACCOUNTS OF

UNCLASSIFIED

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY URGED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO FULLY INVESTIGATE ALL ALLEGATIONS, TO PURSUE THE EVIDENCE, AND TO PUNISH THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR ABUSES. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAS TAKEN THE FIRST STEP TOWARD DOING SO. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE OUR POSITION CLEAR TO HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT.

11. IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT: ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR BALAL OILFIELD PROJECT.

BACKGROUND: ACCORDING TO WIRE SERVICE REPORTS AUGUST 20, THE CANADIAN FIRM BOW VALLEY ENERGY HAS ANNOUNCED A PARTNERSHIP WITH PREMIER OIL PLC, HEADQUARTERED IN LONDON, TO DEVELOP IRAN'S BALAL OFFSHORE OILFIELD. BOW VALLEY HAD EARLIER LINKED UP WITH AN INDONESIAN FIRM, BAKRIE, TO UNDERTAKE THIS PROJECT. BAKRIE LATER WITHDREW FROM THE DEAL; BOW VALLEY HAD BEEN SEEKING, AND HAS NOW APPARENTLY FOUND, A NEW PARTNER.

Q: WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT BOW VALLEY ENERGY OF CANADA AND PREMIER OIL OF THE UK WILL FORM

A PARTNERSHIP TO DEVELOP IRAN'S BALAL OILFIELD?

A: WE CONTINUE TO OPPOSE INVESTMENT IN IRAN'S PETROLEUM SECTOR AND THUS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT MOVEMENT TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BALAL PROJECT. WE ARE MAKING OUR VIEWS KNOWN TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED, AS WE DID WHEN THE PROJECT WAS FIRST ANNOUNCED WITH A DIFFERENT PARTNERSHIP, LAST YEAR.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 13 STATE 155457 250153Z

Q: ISN'T THIS PROJECT ONE OF THOSE THE DEPARTMENT LISTED IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER? DOESN'T THAT MEAN THIS IS A SANCTIONABLE DEAL?

A: THE BALAL PROJECT WAS AMONG THOSE WE LISTED IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER IN 1996 AS HAVING BEEN PUBLICLY TENDERED IN THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR IN IRAN. AS THE NOTICE INDICATED, CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE DRAWN FROM A PROJECT'S INCLUSION ON OR ABSENCE FROM THE LIST. WE

ARE SEEKING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE CURRENT DEAL, AND ARE ASSESSING THE ILSA IMPLICATIONS.

Q: SINCE YOU WAIVED THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS IN THE SOUTH PARS CASE, WON'T YOU HAVE TO DO SO IN THIS ONE TOO?

A: NO. IN EVERY CASE, WE MUST EVALUATE THE FACTS IN LIGHT OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW; DETERMINE WHETHER SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITY HAS OCCURRED; AND IF IT HAS, DECIDE, IN VIEW OF OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS, WHETHER TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS, WAIVE THEM, OR DELAY A DECISION TO CONSULT WITH GOVERNMENTS.

(IF ASKED ABOUT THE "EXPECTATION" FOR EU FIRMS, REFERRED TO DURING THE U.S.-EU SUMMIT IN MAY.)

-- THE UNDERSTANDING WITH RESPECT TO EU FIRMS ANNOUNCED AT THE U.S.-EU SUMMIT IN MAY DOES NOT MEAN THAT WAIVERS WILL AUTOMATICALLY BE GRANTED TO SUCH FIRMS IN FUTURE ILSA CASES INVOLVING IRAN.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 14 STATE 155457 250153Z

-- IT MEANS, AS THE SECRETARY INDICATED IN HER STATEMENT AT THE SUMMIT, THAT SO LONG AS THE HEIGHTENED LEVEL OF EU COOPERATION ON NONPROLIFERATION AND COUNTERTERRORISM IS MAINTAINED, WE WOULD EXPECT THAT A REVIEW OF OUR NATIONAL

INTERESTS IN FUTURE ILSA CASES INVOLVING IRAN SIMILAR TO SOUTH PARS WOULD RESULT IN LIKE DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO WAIVERS FOR EU COMPANIES.

-- AN EXPECTATION IS NOT A GUARANTEE. IN ANY ILSA CASE, WHATEVER THE NATIONALITY OF THE FIRM INVOLVED, WE WOULD GO THROUGH THE PROCESS I INDICATED EARLIER: EVALUATE THE FACTS; DETERMINE WHETHER SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITY HAD OCCURRED; AND IF IT HAD, DECIDE IN LIGHT OF OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS WHAT ACTION TO TAKE.

12. - DS ASSISTANCE TO U.S. BUSINESSES

Q: WHAT IS THE DEPARTMENT, THROUGH THE OVERSEAS SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, DOING TO ASSIST U.S. BUSINESSES IN LIGHT OF THE AIR STRIKES?

A: THE BUREAU OF DLPLOMATIC SECURITY, THROUGH THE OVERSEAS SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, OR OSAC, HAS DEVELOPED

A STRONG WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY.

-- OSAC IS MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACTS WITH U.S. BUSINESSES WITH OVERSEAS INTERESTS. OSAC IS PROVIDING CORPORATE SECURITY DIRECTORS FROM OVER 1,600 U.S. COMPANIES WITH UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION REGARDING THIS

CRISIS AS WELL AS THE SECURITY SITUATIONS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS.

-- OSAC ALSO IS RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS FROM OTHER U.S. COMPANIES.

-- IN ADDITION, OUR REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO OUR EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES OVERSEAS ARE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS. THESE RSOS ARE PROVIDING SECURITY GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE TO THESE BUSINESSES IN LIGHT OF THIS CRISIS.

Q: ARE YOU GIVING ANY SPECIFIC ADVICE TO U.S. BUSINESSES OVERSEAS?

A: WE CERTAINLY ADVISE ALL U.S. BUSINESSES WITH OVERSEAS INTERESTS TO REVIEW THEIR SECURITY PROGRAMS AND TAKE ADDITIONAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS IF NECESSARY.

-- U.S. BUSINESSES WITH OVERSEAS INTERESTS ARE ALSO URGED

TO CONTINUE TO EXERCISE PRUDENT SECURITY AWARENESS IN LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS.

-- U.S. BUSINESSES SHOULD STAY IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS AND CONSULAR OFFICIALS AT U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD.

(NOTE TO BRIEFER: THE OSAC COUNCIL CONSISTS OF 21 PRIVATE SECTOR AND 4 PUBLIC SECTOR INEMBERS ORGANIZATIONS THAT REPRESENT SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES OR AGENCIES THAT OPERATE ABROAD. THESE REPRESENTATIVES PROVIDE DIRECTION AND

GUIDANCE TO DEVELOP PROGRAMS THAT BENEFIT THE U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR OVERSEAS. REPRESENTATIVES MEET QUARTERLY AND STAFF COMMITTEES THAT ARE TASKED WITH SPECIFIC SECURITY-RELATED PROJECTS. ONE OF THE PRIMARY GOALS OF OSAC IS TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY COMMUNICATION NETWORK THROUGH MUTUAL COOPERATION. OSAC CONTINUALLY PROMOTES THE EXCHANGE OF

INFORMATION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN ALL ASPECTS OF SECURITY PROGRAMS ABROAD.)

13. DEPARTMENT: SECURITY

Q: WHAT SECURITY MEASURES ARE BEING TAKEN TO PROTECT THE DEPARTMENT AND EMPLOYEES?

A: WE HAVE INCREASED SECURITY AT OUR DOMESTIC FACILITIES. FOR SECURITY REASONS, I'M NOT GOING TO COMMENT ON SPECIFIC MEASURES.

Q: HAS THE DEPARTMENT RECEIVED THREATS IN RESPONSE TO THE AIR STRIKES?

A: WE HAVE RECEIVED NUMEROUS THREATS AGAINST OUR MISSIONS AROUND THE WORLD IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS. WE TAKE ALL THREATS SERIOUSLY, AND TAKE ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES IF APPROPRIATE.

-- WHILE WE DO NOT COMMENT ON SPECIFIC THREAT INFORMATION THAT WE RECEIVE, WE WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS WHEN NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF OUR PERSONNEL, THEIR DEPENDENTS, AND U.S. CITIZENS.

(IF ASKED ONLY)

-- WE HAVE RECEIVED NO SPECIFIC THREAT INFORMATION AT THIS TIME DIRECTED AT THE DEPARTMENT OR ITS DOMESTIC FACILITIES.
ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0253

PAGE 01 STATE 174235 220130Z
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /001R

DRAFTED BY:S/S-O:KENNETH WETZEL
APPROVED BY:S/S-O:GRETA C. HOLTZ
----------6D0DA3 220130Z /38
O 220125Z SEP 98 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 174235 TOSEC 310029

PLEASE PASS TO A/S ROTH

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 04972 DATED 21 SEP 98, SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO SECDEF USCINCPAC ASEAN COLLECTIVE TOKYO CANBERRA SURABAYA BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO
QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 004972

CINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/21/03
TAGS: PGOV, CASC, PINS, ASEC, PHUM, ECON, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT ORGANIZES "SPONTANEOUS" DEMONSTRATION

REF: JAKARTA 4836

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 174235 220130Z

2. (U) THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE BEHIND A "SPONTANEOUS" (SPONTAN) DEMONSTRATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT AT THE PARLIAMENT SEPTEMBER 21. APPROXIMATELY 1,500 DEMONSTRATORS GATHERED AT THE GATES OF PARLIAMENT, WITH MORE ARRIVING AS OF COB. THE DEMONSTRATORS ARRIVED BY BUS, INCLUDING NINE BUSES OWNED BY THE "SAFEWAY" LINE OWNED BY "TUTUT," DAUGHTER OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO.

3. (U) DEMONSTRATORS WORE WHITE HEADBANDS WHICH IDENTIFIED THEM AS MEMBERS OF A RANGE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NONE OF WHICH WE HAVE HEARD OF. MOST PEOPLE, WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY THE ORGANIZATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

THEY REPRESENTED IMMEDIATELY ANSWERED THAT THEY WERE "FROM THE PEOPLE." WHEN PRESSED, SEVERAL CHECKED THEIR HEADBANDS TO SEE WHAT ORGANIZATION THEY WERE PURPORTING TO REPRESENT. THE ONLY LARGE BANNER SEEN READ: "LONG LIVE ABRI WHICH DEFENDS THE HAPPINESS OF THE PEOPLE." A JOURNALIST WHO ENGAGED ONE MIDDLE-AGED MAN ABOUT THE GROUP'S ASPIRATIONS WAS TOLD THAT FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SHOULD SIT DOWN WITH OPPOSITION LEADERS MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI AND AMIEN RAIS TO CONFESS MUTUALLY THEIR FAULTS. BEYOND THAT, PRESIDENT HABIBIE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE HIS REFORMS.

4. (U) DEMONSTRATORS, MOST OF WHOM LOUNGED IN WHAT SHADE COULD BE FOUND, TOLD POLCOUNS THEY WERE FROM DEPOK, BEKASI AND VARIOUS PARTS OF JAKARTA. THEY CLAIMED THEIR DEMONSTRATION WAS "SPONTANEOUS." MANY IN THE OBVIOUSLY POOR, ALMOST RAGGED CROWD BEGGED MONEY FROM POLCOUNS AND THE FEW WESTERN JOURNALISTS ON THE SCENE.

5. (U) AT ONE POINT, SEVEN BUSES OF STUDENTS FROM TRISAKTI

UNIVERSITY ATTEMPTED TO DRIVE TO THE DEMONSTRATION SITE BUT WERE BLOCKED FROM DOING SO BY POLICE. EVENTUALLY, THEY DEPARTED THE SCENE. AS OF COB WE HAVE A REPORT FROM A MILITARY OFFICIAL WHO SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO THE PRO-GOVERNMENT "SAVE THE NATION" DEMONSTRATION, THE STUDENT ORGANIZATION "FORUM KOTA" WAS ON THE SCENE IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON AND THERE WAS SECURITY FORCE CONCERN ABOUT A POSSIBLE CLASH. AS OF COB, DAO OFFICER SAW ONLY THE PRO-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION, AND A HEAVY POLICE/MILITARY PRESENCE AT THE SITE. HOWEVER, AT COB, POLCOUNS SAW 11 BUSES CARRYING STUDENT ACTIVISTS HALTED BY ABOUT 200 INDONESIAN MARINES NEAR THE NATIONAL MONUMENT. ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT, THE STUDENTS WERE TRYING TO REACH THE U.S. EMBASSY SO THEY COULD DEMONSTRATE THERE.

6. (C) COMMENT: AFTER WEEKS OF GROWING CALLS BY THE GOI FOR AN END TO DEMONSTRATIONS IT APPEARS THE GOI HAS CHOSEN TO ORGANIZE ITS OWN DEMONSTRATION. REFTEL NOTES A SIMILAR, SMALLER EFFORT ON SEPTEMBER 14. STUDENT CONTACTS FROM "FORUM KOTA" ALERTED US OVER THE WEEKEND TO THEIR PLANS TO STAGE DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE DPR ON SEPTEMBER 21, 22 AND 23. AS OF COB, IT APPEARS STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS FOR SEPTEMBER 21 HAVE BEEN FOILED. ROY UNQUOTE COHEN

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E120

EAP, Room 6205

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 18 XXX

Dear Senator Feinstein:

Thank you for your letter of August 6, 1998, to Secretary Albright. She has asked me to convey her appreciation for your views on the situation of the ethnic Chinese community in Indonesia and the rapes of Chinese Indonesian women and girls last May, issues about which she shares your deep concern.

Secretary Albright and other senior officials have condemned in the strongest possible terms the disappearances, kidnappings and torture of activists, the murders of students at Trisakti Univesity, and the violence, looting, property destruction, and shocking rapes directed against the Chinese Indonesian community. We have urged Indonesian authorities to investigate these crimes and to arrest and prosecute those who participated in and planned them. Secretary Albright most recently raised targeting of Chinese Indonesians, including the rapes, with Foreign Minister Alatas during their meeting in Manila on July 29, 1998.

We note that President Habibie has condemned the May riots and attacks against Chinese Indonesians, and pledged that they will be thoroughly investigated. He has announced additional measures, special protective patrols for ethnic Chinese neighborhoods and plans to recapitalize looted stores, to begin to restore confidence in the Chinese Indonesian community. As you noted, President Habibie has also set up a national committee to investigate the rapes and other crimes. Non-governmental organizations are

The Honorable
Dianne Feinstein,
United States Senate.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

4701

engaged in independent fact-gathering, and will submit their reports to the national committee. The Indonesian military has also recently begun its own investigation into allegations of military involvement in criminal activities last May.

We are encouraged by these decisions, but will closely monitor the conduct of the investigations. We will continue to raise our concerns with the Indonesian government, particularly when there are allegations of government involvement in human rights abuses or ethnically based crimes.

Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Reply by H A/S Larkin to Senator Feinstein on Indonesia and Ethnic Chinese-Indonesians

Draft:EAP/PIMBS:RClarke x7-2543 8/11/98
O:\Indonesia\Human Rights\HCorFein.doc

Clear:EAP:SRoth
:EAP/PIMBS:JAloisi (ok)
:EAP/CM:SKim (ok)
:EAP/RSP:JStrotz (ok)
:D:DStraub (ok)
:E:DNorland (info)
EAP:JWolf, Acting

E121

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 27 [illegible]

Dear Senator Feinstein:

Thank you for your letter of July 30, 1998, enclosing the inquiry of your constituent Stephanus Wirabudi, who wrote you about treatment of the ethnic Chinese community in Indonesia and the shocking rapes of Indonesian Chinese women and girls last May.

Your constituent's letter and similar accounts have been important in calling the attention of the media and the international community to the situation of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. We are very concerned, and Secretary Albright and other senior officials have condemned in the strongest possible terms the violence, looting, property destruction, and rapes directed against Chinese Indonesians as well as disappearances, kidnappings and torture of activists, and the murders of students at Trisakti University in Indonesia. We have urged the Indonesian authorities to investigate these crimes and prosecute those who participated in and planned them. We have also emphasized to the Indonesian authorities that their failure to address these matters will badly tarnish Indonesia's image as a tolerant, multi-racial, multi-cultural nation.

We note that, in the period since your constituent's letter was written, President Habibie has condemned the May riots and attacks against Chinese Indonesians, and pledged that they will be thoroughly investigated. He has announced additional measures, special protective patrols for ethnic Chinese neighborhoods and plans to recapitalize looted stores, to begin to restore confidence in the Indonesian Chinese community.

President Habibie has also established a national committee to investigate the rapes and other crimes. Non-governmental organizations (NGO) are engaged in independent fact-gathering, and will submit their reports to the national committee. Indonesian NGOs are also assisting the

The Honorable
Dianne Feinstein,
United States Senate.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

4772

victims of the May riots and this may be a relief effort that your constituent can support. We note also that the Indonesian military is also conducting its own investigation into allegations of military involvement in criminal activities last May.

We are closely monitoring the conduct and outcome of these investigations and the situation of the ethnic Chinese Indonesian community. We will continue to raise our concerns with the Indonesian government.

Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

Correspondence returned. AUG 21 1998

Reply by H A/S Larkin to Senator Feinstein (2nd Letter) on Indonesia and Ethnic Chinese-Indonesians

Draft:EAP/PIMBS:RClarke x7-2543 8/21/98
O:\Indonesia\Human Rights\HCFein02.doc

Clear:EAP:JWolf, Acting
:EAP/PIMBS:JAloisi (ok)
:EAP/CM:SKim (ok)
:EAP/RSP:JStrotz (ok)
:H:DPittman (ok)



RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9849

PAGE 01 JAKART 00262 01 OF 02 170647Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W	

----------97E879 170650Z /38

R 170634Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5568
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000262

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, MILI, PINR, PINS, ID

SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORTS ON 1998

1. SUMMARY: THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ANNUAL

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 00262 01 OF 02 170647Z
REPORT APPLAUDS HUMAN RIGHTS/DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRESS IN SOME AREAS IN 1998 IN INDONESIA, THOUGH MOST OF THE PROGRESS NOTED IS IN REFORM PROMISES NOT YET FULFILLED. THE REPORT IS STRONGLY CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR HAVING FAILED TO SEEK ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE FOR A SERIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN 1998. CONTINUED FAILURE TO DO SO, IT WARNS, WILL INVITE POPULAR FRUSTRATION AND ANGER. THE COMMISSION DESCRIBED THE MILITARY AS HAVING FALLEN TO ITS "LOWEST EBB" IN PUBLIC ESTEEM. ABRI, IT SAYS, FAILED TO OVERCOME VIOLENCE AND WAS ITSELF IMPLICATED IN SOME OF THE WORST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF 1998. THE REPORT IS INTERESTING IN THIS REGARD AS IT EMPHASIZES THAT ABRI FACES PUBLIC CRITICISM NOT ONLY FOR ITS ACTIONS REACHING WELL BACK INTO SOEHARTO'S 32-YEAR RULE BUT FOR VERY RECENT ACTIONS AS WELL. THE REPORT ALSO FAULTS THE MILITARY FOR SEEKING TO "JUSTIFY INACTION" IN RIOT AND OTHER SITUATIONS BY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

CLAIMING IT (ABRI) WANTED TO AVOID CHARGES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THE REPORT CLAIMS THAT ABRI HAS SUFFERED FROM "POLITIZATION WHICH HAS WEAKENED ITS INTEGRITY." THE COMMISSION CALLS FOR GOI RATIFICATION OF KEY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COVENANTS AND FOR SWIFT GOVERNMENT ACTION TO BRING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATERS TO TRIAL. THE COMMISSION WARNS THAT UNLESS INDONESIA MOVES IN THE DIRECTION OF RULE OF LAW, IT COULD DESCEND INTO "DESPOTISM AND ANARCHY." END SUMMARY

THE GLASS HALF-FULL
---

2. THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS ISSUED A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDONESIA IN 1998. THE ANNUAL REPORT, ISSUED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE COMMISSION'S JANUARY PLENARY MEETING, RECEIVED BROAD LOCAL MEDIA COVERAGE. THE COMMISSION COMMENDED

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARLIAMENT FOR A NUMBER OF ACTIONS AND SPECIFICALLY WELCOMED THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY'S (MPR) CALL FOR RATIFICATION OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM CONVENTION AS WELL AS THAT BODY'S CALL FOR STRENGTHENING THE POWERS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. THE COMMISSION ALSO WELCOMED THE MPR'S CALL FOR REMOVAL OF THE "ANTI-SUBVERSION" LAW AND HAILED THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) DISCUSSIONS AIMED AT CHANGING THE FIVE POLITICAL LAWS ALONG WITH OTHER STEPS TAKEN TO ADVANCE THE TRANSITION TO A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. MORE GENERALLY, THE COMMISSION NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN STEPS TO CREATE A FREER POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. THE REPORT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION THE FREEING OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, 43 MORE OF WHOM WERE RELEASED IN LATE DECEMBER, OR THE EMERGENCE OF A LARGELY FREE PRESS.

THE GLASS HALF-EMPTY
---

3. WHILE NOTING SOME PROGRESS, MOST OF IT IN THE CATEGORY OF PROMISED REFORM RATHER THAN REFORM ACTUALLY IN HAND, THE REPORT WAS LARGELY CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ESPECIALLY THE MILITARY (ABRI). MUCH OF THE REPORT FOCUSSED ON A BACKLOG OF MILITARY/POLICE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH THERE HAS BEEN NO ACCOUNTABILITY. THESE INCLUDED THE SHOOTING DEATH OF FOUR STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN MAY, THE MID-MAY RIOTS IN WHICH IT SAID MILITARY UNITS WERE INVOLVED, THE SHOOTING DEATH OF EIGHT STUDENTS AT ATMAJAYA UNIVERSITY, THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE MURDER OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, THE KILLING OF ISLAMIC LEADERS AND SHAMANS IN EAST JAVA, THE BURNING OF CHURCHES AND MOSQUES IN JAKARTA, WEST TIMOR AND ELSEWHERE AND THE VIOLENCE IN ALAS, EAST TIMOR. THE COMMISSION ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THE RISE IN CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 00262 01 OF 02 170647Z

A FOCUS ON THE MILITARY (ABRI)

4. THE COMMISSION DESCRIBED THE MILITARY (ABRI) AS "AT ITS LOWEST EBB" IN TERMS OF PUBLIC ESTEEM. ABRI, IT SAID, "FAILED TO OVERCOME VIOLENCE AND FAILED TO END UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE CAUSES AND BACKGROUND TO THE VIOLENCE." THE COMMISSION STATED THAT IN VARIOUS RIOT SITUATIONS MILITARY UNITS WERE INVOLVED AND ADDED, "(IT) IS NECESSARY TO APPEASE PUBLIC SUSPICION THAT THERE IS A CAMPAIGN TO COVER UP THE POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF ABRI PERSONNEL AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY."

5. THE COMMISSION ALSO SAID THAT ON OCCASION, SOME OF THE MILITARY HAD USED WHAT THE MILITARY CLAIMED WERE FEARS OF BEING ACCUSED OF VIOLATING HUMAN RIGHTS TO "JUSTIFY INACTION." FAILURE TO ACT, HOWEVER, LED TO THE LOSS OF PUBLIC TRUST, THE COMMISSION YEAR-END REVIEW CLAIMED. MOREOVER, THIS INACTION LED MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC TO THINK THEY COULD COMMIT CRIMES WITH IMPUNITY. RECENTLY, INCREASING CRIME HAS INCLUDED CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

6. THE REPORT SAID THAT "ABRI, AS AN INSTITUTION, (WAS) FACING INTERNAL OBSTACLES THAT WERE CREATED BY A POLITIZATION PROCESS WHICH WEAKEN(ED) ITS INTEGRITY." MOREOVER, THESE "OBSTACLES WITHIN ABRI DEMONSTRATE THAT IT IS STILL VULNERABLE TO VESTED INTERESTS." THE COMMISSION EXPRESSED FEAR THAT ABRI'S INTERNAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9850

PAGE 01 JAKART 00262 02 OF 02 170647Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W	

----------97E88D 170652Z /38

R 170634Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5569
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 000262

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, MILI, PINR, PINS, ID

SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORTS ON 1998

PROBLEMS COULD LEAD TO ITS "DISINTEGRATION" DURING INDONESIA'S
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 00262 02 OF 02 170647Z
"PERIOD OF TRANSITION." THE COMMISSION ALSO ACCUSED ABRI OF "COVERING UP VIOLATIONS WHICH COULD TARNISH ITS IMAGE." IN THIS CONTEXT IT CALLED FOR AN END TO THE TRIAL OF 11 SPECIAL FORCES TROOPS CHARGED WITH KIDNAPPING POLITICAL ACTIVISTS CONTENDING THAT THE TRIAL WAS FAIR NEITHER TO THE DEFENDANTS (SEEN BY MANY AS SCAPEGOATS FOR MORE SENIOR OFFICIALS) NOR TO THE VICTIMS, 13 OF WHOM ,IT NOTED, REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR. (NGOS AND STUDENTS HAVE ALSO CALLED FOR THE TRIAL TO BE STOPPED UNTIL STILL MISSING ACTIVISTS ARE ACCOUNTED FOR AND UNTIL THE MORE SENIOR-RANKING OFFICERS INVOLVED ARE CHARGED.)

7. THE COMMISSION CALLED FOR A "SYSTEMATIC DEPOLITIZATION" OF ABRI. IN THIS DIRECTION, IT SUGGESTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDER SEPARATING THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY MINISTRIES FROM THE ABRI COMMANDER (AS THE GOVERNMENT SAID IT WILL DO WITH FIRST STEPS REPORTEDLY SET FOR APRIL 1.)

OTHER COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS:
---

8. THE COMMISSION'S PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATION, MADE AT SEVERAL POINTS IN THE SEVEN-PAGE REPORT, WAS ITS ASSERTION THAT UNLESS VIOLENT INCIDENTS WERE FOLLOWED UP WITH A JUST AND SPEEDY LEGAL PROCESS, PUBLIC FRUSTRATION COULD LEAD TO MORE VIOLENCE. IT ADDED THAT UNLESS THE COUNTRY MOVED IN THE DIRECTION OF RULE OF LAW, IT COULD DESCEND INTO DESPOTISM AND ANARCHY.

9. THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT RATIFY THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, ON SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AS WELL AS THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

DISCRIMINATION.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9212

PAGE 01 JAKART 00884 01 OF 03 231205Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------A66274 231451Z /38

R 231133Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6252
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000884

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/16
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: ACCOUNTABILITY AND ABRI

REF: (A) JAKARTA 0248, (B) JAKARTA 0557

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00884 01 OF 03 231205Z

2. (C) SUMMARY: CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITY FORCES APPEARS TO HAVE REACHED A NADIR IN THE WAKE OF REVELATIONS ABOUT PAST ABRI HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AS REPORTED IN A NEWLY FREE MEDIA. THE MEDIA HAS ALSO GIVEN BROAD COVERAGE TO RECENT INCIDENTS INVOLVING CIVILIAN DEATHS IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH ABRI. THE LATTER IN PARTICULAR HAVE PROMPTED GROWING CALLS FOR CREDIBLE, TRANSPARENT INVESTIGATIONS AND JUDICIAL ACTION. THESE DEMANDS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY HAVE GONE LARGELY UNMET WITH INVESTIGATIONS LANGUISHING OR TRIALS, WHEN THEY DO TAKE PLACE, GENERATING RESULTS WHICH ARE SEEN EITHER AS NOT CREDIBLE OR AS NOT HAVING AFFORDED PENALTIES COMMENSURATE WITH THE CRIMES INVOLVED. THIS ABSENCE OF

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

ACCOUNTABILITY IS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE DEARTH OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITY FORCES. IT ALSO APPEARS TO BE A FACTOR IN DELAYING REAL REFORM IN THE RANKS OF THE MILITARY AND POLICE. END SUMMARY

3. (U) CRITICISM OF THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (ABRI) FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE HAS BEEN A KEY THEME OF STUDENT PROTEST AND IN THE FREE NATIONAL MEDIA. THIS CRITICISM HAS FOCUSSED ON PAST ABRI ABUSES, ESPECIALLY IN EAST TIMOR, ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, LAMPUNG, TANJUNG PRIOK AND ON RECENT INCIDENTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WITH A JAKARTA FOCUS. WHILE DEMANDS FOR INVESTIGATION OF PAST ABUSES HAVE GONE LARGELY UNADDRESSED, ABRI AND THE GOVERNMENT APPEARED INITIALLY TO BE RESPONDING TO DEMANDS FOR ACTION REGARDING MORE RECENT INCIDENTS. IN RECENT MONTHS, HOWEVER, PLEDGES THAT CREDIBLE, TRANSPARENT INVESTIGATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE HAVE NOT BEEN FULFILLED.

NGO'S AND OTHERS HAVE UNDERTAKEN UNOFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS IN SOME CASES, BUT INVARIABLY CONCLUDING WITH CALLS FOR OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS.

RECENT INCIDENTS

4. (U) THE PRINCIPAL RECENT INCIDENTS WHICH HAVE DRAWN STUDENT, MEDIA AND POPULAR INTEREST HAVE BEEN:

-- THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE AND KILLING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS;

-- THE MAY 12, 1998 SHOOTING DEATH OF FOUR STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY;

-- THE MAY 13-15 RIOTS IN JAKARTA AND OTHER URBAN AREAS; AND THE SHOOTING DEATHS OF STUDENT AND OTHER PROTESTERS NOVEMBER 13, 1998 (THE "SEMANGGI" INCIDENT).

IN ALL OF THESE INCIDENTS THERE HAVE BEEN STRONG PUBLIC SUSPICION OF INAPPROPRIATE OR CRIMINAL ABRI INVOLVEMENT. RECENT UNREST IN ACEH HAS ADDED SEVERAL NON-JAKARTA INCIDENTS TO THE LIST. THESE INCLUDE THE TORTURE/ KILLING OF DETAINEES IN LHOKSEUMAWE ON JANUARY 14 (REF A) AND THE SHOOTING DEATH OF A STILL UNKNOWN NUMBER OF CIVILIANS BY THE MILITARY AT IDI CUT ON FEBRUARY 2-3 UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH REMAIN OBSCURE (REF B). THE BODIES OF VICTIMS WERE LATER DUMPED IN WEIGHTED BAGS IN A RIVER IN AN APPARENT COVER-UP ATTEMPT. SOME OF THE

BODIES HAVE BEEN RECOVERED.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00884 01 OF 03 231205Z

5. (U) IN ADDITION TO THESE INCIDENTS, THERE HAVE BEEN A SERIES OF RIOTS IN WHICH ABRI AS AN INSTITUTION IS NOT WIDELY HELD TO BE CULPABLE, ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR NOT INVESTIGATING WITH SUFFICIENT RIGOR. THESE INCIDENTS OF UNREST INCLUDE: THE KILLINGS OF SHAMAN AND MUSLIM CLERGY IN EAST JAVA; THE NOVEMBER 22 CHURCH BURNINGS IN THE KETAPANG SECTION OF JAKARTA AND SUBSEQUENT RELIGIOUS RIOTS IN KUPANG, WEST NUSA TENGGARA AS WELL AS ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE MOLUCCAS (AMBON) AND IN KARAWANG, WEST JAVA.

6. (U) WHILE SECURITY FORCE INVESTIGATIONS HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED INTO SOME OF THESE RECENT INCIDENTS, GREATEST PRESSURE FOR CREDIBLE RESULTS HAS BEEN WITH REGARD TO THOSE IN WHICH ABRI ELEMENTS ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN DIRECTLY CULPABLE: THE 4/97-5/98 KIDNAPPING/TORTURE/KILLING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, THE MAY 12 TRISAKTI KILLINGS, THE MAY RIOTS, THE NOVEMBER 13 SEMANGGI KILLINGS AND THE RECENT DEATHS IN ACEH. THE DEMAND HAS BEEN FOR ACCOUNTABILITY ENTAILING A CREDIBLE INVESTIGATION, A TRANSPARENT AND FAIR JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SENTENCING OF THOSE FOUND GUILTY, WITH PENALTIES THAT ARE PROPORTIONAL TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CRIME.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9316

PAGE 01 JAKART 00884 02 OF 03 231205Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------A66277 231451Z /38

R 231133Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6253
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 000884

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/16
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: ACCOUNTABILITY AND ABRI

7. (SBU) IN ALL BUT ONE OF THE RECENT INCIDENTS IN WHICH DIRECT ABRI CULPABILITY IS ALLEGED, ABRI/GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION HAS BEEN

INADEQUATE OR NON-EXISTENT.

THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE/KILLING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS

8. (U) A TOTAL OF 23 POLITICAL ACTIVISTS DISAPPEARED BETWEEN APRIL 1997 AND MAY 1998. ALL OF THEM WERE INVOLVED WITH ORGANIZATIONS AND PARTIES CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT WITH A LARGE PROPORTION HAVING TIES TO THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD). OF THE 23 WHO DISAPPEARED, NINE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED. A NUMBER OF THESE TOLD OF TORTURE AND BRUTAL TREATMENT IN THE COURSE OF INTERROGATIONS AND SEVERAL TESTIFIED THAT SOME OF THOSE 14 ACTIVISTS STILL MISSING WERE DETAINED WITH THEM.

9. (U) A MILITARY COURT OF HONOR INVESTIGATED LT. GENERAL PRABOWO AND TWO OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS (GENERALS MUCHDI AND SYAFRIE) FOR THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPINGS. BASED ON ITS FINDINGS WHICH REPORTEDLY TOUCHED ON THE MAY RIOTS AS WELL AS THE KIDNAPPINGS, MOST OF WHICH HAVE NOT BECOME PUBLIC, THE MILITARY COURT RECOMMENDED THAT PRABOWO BE HONORABLY DISCHARGED. THIS RECOMMENDATION WAS ACCEPTED BY GENERAL WIRANTO AND PRABOWO RETIRED LATER IN 1998. GENERAL MUCHDI AND SYAFRIE, WHOSE CONDUCT ALSO WAS REVIEWED BY THE HONOR BOARD, WERE REASSIGNED WITH NO SPECIFIC DUTIES.

10. (U) LATE IN 1998 A MILITARY COURT TRIAL BEGAN FOR 11 OFFICERS AND SENIOR NCO'S FOR THEIR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPINGS. THEY CONFESSED TO

"PICKING UP" THE NINE ACTIVISTS WHO WERE SUBSEQUENTLY

RELEASED. THEY DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF THE 14 STILL MISSING. THE CHARGES AGAINST THE 11 DID NOT INCLUDE TORTURE OR KILLING EVEN THOUGH SOME OF THE VICTIMS CLAIM TO HAVE BEEN TORTURED AND ONE VICTIM WAS KILLED (HIS BODY WAS RECOVERED). NOR WAS THERE MENTION MADE IN THE CHARGES OF THE 14 ACTIVISTS STILL MISSING. THE INCOMPLETENESS OF THE CHARGES, THE ABSENCE OF REFERENCE TO THOSE STILL MISSING AND LACK OF PROGRESS OF A PURPORTED MILITARY INVESTIGATION INTO THE WHEREABOUTS OF THOSE STILL MISSING, THE FAILURE TO PURSUE CHARGES OF MORE SENIOR-LEVEL INVOLVEMENT (THE MOST SENIOR MAN AMONG THE 11 NOW FACING TRIAL HOLDS THE RANK OF MAJOR), AND THE FAILURE TO PURSUE CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST PRABOWO AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS HAVE LED TO BROAD REJECTION OF THE TRIAL AS A WHITEWASH.

THE MAY RIOTS
---

11. (U) UNDER PRESSURE FROM HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND OTHERS, THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT, IN JULY 1998, APPOINTED A BLUE-RIBBON FACT FINDING TEAM TO INVESTIGATE THE MAY RIOTS. WHILE CRITICS CHARGED THAT THE TWO-MONTH DELAY HAD ALLOWED THE EVIDENCE TRAIL TO GROW COLD, THE STATURE AND RESPECTABILITY THOSE APPOINTED TO THE TEAM LED TO EXPECTATIONS A CREDIBLE INVESTIGATION WOULD TAKE PLACE. THE PANEL REPORTED ITS FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN OCTOBER. AMONG THE RECOMMENDATIONS WERE CALLS FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND SPECIFICALLY THE ROLE OF LT. GENERAL PRABOWO (RET) IN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00884 02 OF 03 231205Z

THE RIOTS. THE TEAM REPORTED ITS CONCLUSION THAT MILITARY UNITS HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN INSTIGATING THE DISORDER. TO DATE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT MOVED ON THOSE RECOMMENDATIONS.

THE TRISAKTI KILLINGS
---

12. (U) ON THE EVENING OF MAY 12, FOUR STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY WERE SHOT TO DEATH. THE FOUR WERE ON CAMPUS, FOLLOWING A CONFRONTATIONAL DEMONSTRATION WITH SECURITY AUTHORITIES WITHIN SEVERAL HUNDRED METERS OF THE JAKARTA DOWNTOWN CAMPUS. IN THE WAKE OF MASSIVE RIOTING WHICH FOLLOWED THE INCIDENT (SEE PARA 11), 22 POLICE WERE CHARGED WITH THE KILLINGS. A TRIAL WHICH ENSUED FOCUSSED ON TWO OF THE POLICE WHO WERE ACCUSED ONLY OF DISOBEYING INSTRUCTIONS. NEITHER WAS CHARGED

WITH THE KILLINGS. WELL-KNOWN HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION DEFENDED THE TWO POLICEMEN CLAIMING THEY WERE SCAPEGOATS. A MILITARY COURT FOUND THE TWO GUILTY OF CONDUCT UNRELATED TO THE ACTUAL KILLINGS. THE TRIAL HAS NOT RESUMED.

THE SEMANGGI INCIDENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9317

PAGE 01 JAKART 00884 03 OF 03 231205Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W

----------A6627A 231452Z /38

R 231133Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6254
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 000884

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/16
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: ACCOUNTABILITY AND ABRI

---

13. (U) ON NOVEMBER 13, A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SCORES OF THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS AND NON-STUDENT PROTESTERS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00884 03 OF 03 231205Z
ERUPTED IN VIOLENCE IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS, BUT MOST SERIOUSLY IN FRONT OF THE ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY CAMPUS NEAR THE SEMANGGI INTERCHANGE IN CENTRAL JAKARTA. SHOTS FIRED INTO PROTESTER RANKS KILLED AT LEAST SEVEN STUDENTS. SOME OF THE LETHAL SHOTS INVOLVED LIVE

AMMUNITION WHICH ACCORDING TO THE AUTHORITIES WAS NOT TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO EITHER POLICE OR ARMY TROOPS ON THE SCENE. OBSERVERS ON THE SCENE, INCLUDING EMBOFFS, SAW PROTRACTED FIRE INTO THE CAMPUS, FIRING OF FLARES HORIZONTALLY INTO CROWDS AND INTERFERENCE WITH THOSE ATTEMPTING TO REMOVE THE INJURED TO SAFETY. ONE SUCH WORKER WAS AMONG THOSE SHOT DEAD. HIS REMAINS WERE VIEWED BY EMBOFF.

14. (U) DEMANDS FOR A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION (ALONG WITH CALLS FOR THE REMOVAL OF ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO) WERE BROAD AND INTENSE. THE INVESTIGATION WHICH TRANSPIRED LED TO ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE FOR SOME OF THE POLICE AND MILITARY INVOLVED ALTHOUGH IN NO CASE DID THE ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS EXCEED THREE WEEKS. AT LEAST AS FAR AS THE PUBLIC AND WE ARE AWARE, THERE IS NO CONTINUING INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT.

RECENT ACEH VIOLENCE
---

15. (U) IN RECENT MONTHS THERE HAVE BEEN LETHAL ATTACKS BY CITIZENS ON TROOPS IN ACEH, INCLUDING THE KILLING OF SEVEN MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO WERE TAKEN OFF A BUS AND THE KIDNAPPING OF TWO OTHERS. THESE KILLINGS CAME IN THE CONTEXT OF A GENERAL DETERIORATION OF THE SECURITY

SITUATION WHICH INCLUDED CLASHES BETWEEN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS IN WHICH CIVILIANS WERE KILLED. A "POLICE" OPERATION CONDUCTED BY MILITARY TROOPS ON JANUARY 14 NETTED OVER 40 "SUSPECTS" FROM A VILLAGE WHERE A PURPORTED REBEL LEADER WAS BELIEVED HOLED UP. ON THE DAY OF THEIR DETENTION, THE 40 SUSPECTS WERE ASSAULTED, REPORTEDLY BY 100 MILITARY PERSONNEL. THAT ASSAULT CAUSED SERIOUS INJURY TO MANY AND THE DEATH OF FIVE. THE LOCAL COMMANDER IMMEDIATELY EXPRESSED HIS OUTRAGE AND PLEDGED THAT THE PERPETRATORS WOULD BE TRIED IN MILITARY COURTS BEFORE THE MONTH WAS OUT. A MILITARY COURT WHICH CONVENED IN LATE JANUARY, TRIED AND CONVICTED A MAJOR AND FOUR OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL, SENTENCING THE MAJOR TO SIX YEARS IMPRISONMENT. THE OTHER FOUR LOWER RANKING INDIVIDUALS RECEIVED SIMILAR OR LIGHTER SENTENCES (RANGING FROM 24 TO 30 MONTHS AND DISMISSAL FROM THE ARMY). SOME ACEHNESE HAVE CLAIMED THAT MANY MORE THAN FIVE INDIVIDUALS WERE INVOLVED IN THE BEATING AND TORTURING OF THE 40 DETAINEES. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE MILITARY WILL PROCEED WITH INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION OF 23 OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL

INITIALLY DETAINED IN THE BEATINGS.

16. (U) A SECOND MAJOR INCIDENT TOOK PLACE ON FEBRUARY 2 NEAR IDI CUT WHEN A LARGE CROWD WHICH HAD LISTENED TO A SPEECH THAT ALLEGEDLY INCLUDED SEPARATIST DEMANDS, WAS FIRED ON BY MILITARY PERSONNEL AFTER THE MEETING HAD BROKEN UP. CIRCUMSTANCES OF WHAT PROMPTED THE SHOOTING ARE UNCLEAR BUT THE GOVERNMNET HAS ACKNOWLEDGED AT LEAST 14 CIVILIANS WERE KILLED. THE INCIDENT WAS COMPLICATED BY AN APPARENT COVER-UP IN WHICH SOME OF THE DEAD WERE

DUMPED INTO A RIVER IN WEIGHTED BAGS. THUS FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO INVESTIGATION OF THIS INCIDENT.

COMMENT
---

17. (C) PROMINENT HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS ARGUE THAT UNLESS AND UNTIL MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARE SEEN TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR CRIMES, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND COVER-UP OF THOSE CRIMES, PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITY FORCES WILL REMAIN AT THE NADIR IT HAS REACHED IN THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA. MOREOVER, UNLESS AND UNTIL SECURITY FORCES IN THE RANKS BECOME CONVINCED THAT VIOLATING THE LAW AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE WILL MEET WITH FAIR JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND PENALTIES COMMENSURATE WITH THESE BREACHES, REAL REFORM WITHIN THE SECURITY FORCES WILL BE INCOMPLETE AND POSSIBLY UNOBTAINABLE. IN SHORT, ACCOUNTABILITY APPEARS KEY BOTH TO PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITY FORCES AND TO GENUINE REFORM.
ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2119

PAGE 01 JAKART 01613 01 OF 02 311221Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CCO-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	FBO-01	H-01
	IMMC-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	OPR-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	IMCC-01
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/031W						

----------B5D8C7 311228Z /38

O 311108Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6928
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001613

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/31/04

TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: VIOLENCE AT 3/31 STUDENT DEMONSTRATION
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01613 01 OF 02 311221Z

REF: JAKARTA 1511 AND PREVIOUS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: ELEVEN STUDENTS WERE HOSPITALIZED FOR INJURIES THEY SUSTAINED DURING A MARCH 31 ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION AT THE DEFENSE MINISTRY IN JAKARTA. AT THE SCENE, POLOFF WITNESSED A CHARGE BY SECURITY FORCES TO DISPERSE THE STUDENTS FOLLOWED BY SEVERAL VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN WHICH STUDENTS AND THEIR VEHICLES WERE BEATEN WITH TRUNCHEONS. POLOFF SAW ONE STUDENT WITH AN APPARENTLY SERIOUS HEAD WOUND BEING CARRIED AWAY BY HIS COLLEAGUES. ALTHOUGH STUDENTS WHO

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

SPOKE WITH POLOFF INSISTED THE VIOLENCE HAD BEEN UNPROVOKED, AN EMBOFF WHO EARLIER PASSED BY THE SCENE SAW STUDENTS AGGRESSIVELY JOSTLING WITH SECURITY FORCE LINES, AND SOME STONE THROWING ON THE PART OF THE STUDENTS. STUDENTS ALSO CLAIMED TO POLOFF THAT THEY HAD GIVEN THREE DAYS NOTICE OF THE DEMONSTRATION, IN COMPLIANCE WITH GOI REGULATIONS. WE ARE UNABLE TO VERIFY THIS CLAIM. END SUMMARY.

VIOLENCE AT ANTI-MILITARY DEMONSTRATION

3. (SBU) ABOUT 300 STUDENTS FROM TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY, A PRIVATE UNIVERSITY IN JAKARTA WHOSE STUDENTS HAVE BEEN AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENT, GATHERED AT THE DEFENSE MINISTRY IN JAKARTA AT MIDDAY ON MARCH 31. THE DEMONSTRATION WAS INTENDED TO PROTEST THE LACK OF APPARENT LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE KILLINGS OF FOUR TRISAKTI STUDENTS IN

MAY, 1998, TO DEMAND "HUMAN RIGHTS FOR STUDENTS" AND TO URGE THE END OF THE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS. AN EMBOFF PASSING BY THE SITE ABOUT 1140 LOCAL, SAW STUDENTS AGGRESSIVELY PUSHING SECURITY FORCE LINES AND SAW SOME STONES THROWN BY STUDENTS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE DEMONSTRATORS WERE PUSHED BACK BY SECURITY FORCES, MAINLY TROOPS FROM THE ARMY'S STRATEGIC RESERVE COMMAND (KOSTRAD) WHO WERE DEPLOYED IN FRONT OF THE MINISTRY. AS POLOFF ARRIVED ON THE SCENE AT ABOUT 1205 LOCAL, AT LEAST 100 KOSTRAD TROOPS WEARING RIOT GEAR AND IN FORMATION, ALONG WITH SOME POLICE, WERE CHASING THE STUDENTS SOUTH, AWAY FROM THE MINISTRY.

4. (SBU) POLOFF OBSERVED A NUMBER OF STUDENTS HIT WITH BATONS AS THEY SCRAMBLED ON BUSES TRYING TO FLEE. TROOPS ALSO STRUCK THE BUSES WITH THEIR BATONS, IN SEVERAL CASES SMASHING WINDSHIELDS AND SIDE WINDOWS. POLOFF SAW ONE YOUNG MAN BEATEN WITH A BATON AND KARATE KICKED AS HE ATTEMPTED TO GET INTO HIS CAR. IN ANOTHER CASE, A YOUNG MAN ATTEMPTING TO DRIVE HIS CAR AWAY WAS SURROUNDED BY TROOPS WHO SMASHED THE CAR REPEATEDLY WITH BATONS. POLOFF HAD TO KEEP MOVING FOR SAFETY REASONS AND DID NOT SEE WHAT HAPPENED TO THE MAN IN THE CAR, BUT THE CAR WAS ON THE STREET LATER WITH ALL WINDOWS SMASHED AND BEARING OTHER DENTS FROM BATON BLOWS. THE SITUATION CALMED SOMEWHAT BY ABOUT 1230 LOCAL, AND THE APPROXIMATELY 200 STUDENTS STAYING BEHIND GATHERED AT AN INTERSECTION ABOUT 200 METERS SOUTH OF THE MINISTRY. AT 1250 LOCAL POLOFF SAW STUDENTS CARRYING A YOUNG MAN, APPARENTLY UNCONSCIOUS, WITH HIS HEAD WRAPPED IN A BLOODY CLOTH. THE INJURED STUDENT WAS SURROUNDED BY AN EMOTIONAL CROWD, SOME OF WHOM WERE WEEPING.

5. (SBU) THE STUDENTS REMAINING AT THE INTERSECTION CHANTED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01613 01 OF 02 311221Z
SLOGANS AND SANG SONGS AS SEVERAL APPARENTLY NEGOTIATED WITH A GROUP OF MILITARY POLICE. AT ABOUT 1300 LOCAL, THE STUDENTS, APPARENTLY WITH MILITARY POLICE APPROVAL, MARCHED BACK UP THE STREET AND HALTED IN THE PARK ACROSS THE STREET FROM THE DEFENSE MINISTRY. STUDENTS AT THE MINISTRY SITE STATED THEY WANTED TO SEND A DELEGATION TO SPEAK WITH ARMED FORCES COMMANDER AND DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO, WHO THEY WERE TOLD WAS NOT IN THE BUILDING. POLOFF OBSERVED A PASSING BUS CARRYING HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS EXCHANGE CHEERS WITH THE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AS THEY WENT BY. THE STUDENTS REMAINED UNTIL ABOUT 1500 AND THEN REBOARDED THEIR BUSES AND RETURNED TO CAMPUS. NO FURTHER INSTANCES OF VIOLENCE WERE REPORTED.

6. (SBU) STUDENTS AT THE SCENE WHO SPOKE WITH POLOFF CLAIMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO PROVOCATIVE BEHAVIOR ON THEIR PART AND FURTHER CLAIMED THAT THERE THEY HAD GIVEN ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE DEMONSTRATION, IN COMPLIANCE WITH LAW NO. 9/1998 WHICH GOVERNS DEMONSTRATIONS. (NOTE: THE FIRST CLAIM IS UNDERMINED BY THE OBSERVATIONS OF AN EMBOFF PASSING THE SCENE ABOUT 1140 LOCAL. WE ARE UNABLE TO VERIFY THE SECOND CLAIM AT THIS POINT. END NOTE.) "THIS WAS A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION," ONE STUDENT SAID TO POLOFF, "WE OBEYED THE RULES, WHY DID THEY HIT US?" HE ADDED.

INJURIES
---

7. (C) THE BUREAU CHIEF OF A WESTERN WIRE SERVICE TOLD POLOFF THAT AS OF 1700 LOCAL HE HAD COUNTED 11 STUDENTS HOSPITALIZED, FOUR OF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2120

PAGE 01 JAKART 01613 02 OF 02 311221Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CCO-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	FBO-01	H-01
	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	OPR-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	IMCC-01	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/030W

----------B5D8D3 311229Z /38
O 311108Z MAR 99

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6929
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001613

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/31/04

TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: VIOLENCE AT 3/31 STUDENT DEMONSTRATION

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01613 02 OF 02 311221Z
THEM WITH "SERIOUS INJURIES."

COMMENT
---

8. (C) THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE EMBOFF AT 1140 WERE CONTRARY TO THE STUDENTS' CLAIM THAT THERE WAS NO PROVOCATIVE BEHAVIOR ON THEIR SIDE. HOWEVER, THE STUDENTS BOARDING BUSES AND ATTEMPTING TO LEAVE THE SCENE CERTAINLY POSED NO THREAT TO THE TROOPS WHO GAVE CHASE AND BEAT THEM. THE FACT THAT MILITARY POLICE APPARENTLY AGREED TO ALLOW THE STUDENTS TO RETURN TO A DEMONSTRATION SITE FACING THE DEFENSE MINISTRY COULD LEND CREDENCE TO THE STUDENTS' CLAIM THAT THEY HAD FOLLOWED LEGAL PROCEDURES TO STAGE THE DEMONSTRATION. THIS VENUE, CONSIDERED OFF-LIMITS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS DURING THE SOEHARTO ERA, HAS BECOME THE SITE OF FAIRLY REGULAR, ALTHOUGH GENERALLY BRIEF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS. MANY OTHER STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS RECENTLY STAGED AT THE DEFENSE MINISTRY HAVE ENDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED E129

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0144 RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 01805 01 OF 02 121120Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/016W			

----------BA8B3C 121120Z /38

P 121058Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7155
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001805

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

TOKYO PASS A/S ROTH
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: ANTI-ELECTION STUDENTS TO HIT THE STREETS (?)
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 01805 01 OF 02 121120Z

REF: (A) JAKARTA 1613, (B) JAKARTA 1511

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: VARIOUS CONTACTS REPORT THAT HARD-LINE STUDENT GROUPS WILL STAGE A DEMONSTRATION IN CENTRAL JAKARTA, AND POSSIBLY OTHER CITIES ACROSS INDONESIA, ON APRIL 13. ACCORDING TO CONTACTS, THE DEMONSTRATIONS WILL BE PRINCIPALLY DIRECTED AGAINST THE "ILLEGITIMATE" NATIONAL ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE. THE STUDENTS HAVE NOT GIVEN OFFICIAL NOTICE OF THEIR PLANS TO THE POLICE, AS REQUIRED BY A 1998 LAW GOVERNING DEMONSTRATIONS. PERHAPS SETTING THE STAGE, LEADERS OF HARD-LINE GROUPS WERE QUOTED IN A NATIONAL DAILY ON APRIL 11 PREDICTING FRAUD AND FAILURE OF THE ELECTIONS. THE STUDENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
GROUPS REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN PLANNING FOR THE APRIL 13 RALLY DO NOT REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE MAINSTREAM STUDENT MOVEMENT, BUT HAVE A PROVEN TRACK RECORD OF DELIVERING LARGE NUMBERS TO THE STREETS. WHILE WE HAVE MULTIPLE REPORTS OF PLANNING FOR THIS DEMONSTRATION, SUCH PLANS OFTEN DO NOT EVENTUATE. END SUMMARY.

RAMPANT RUMORS/CLAIMS OF APRIL 13 DEMONSTRATION
---

2. (SBU) VARIOUS CONTACTS REPORT THAT SEVERAL ANTI-ELECTION STUDENT GROUPS ARE PLANNING WHAT THEY HOPE WILL BE A LARGE ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION IN JAKARTA ON APRIL 13. ACCORDING TO SOME SOURCES, STUDENTS WILL STAGE SIMULTANEOUS RALLIES IN A TOTAL OF 16 PROVINCES ACROSS INDONESIA, AS PART OF A PLAN DEVISED AT A CONGRESS OF HARD-LINE STUDENTS HELD IN BALI AT THE END OF MARCH (REF B). STUDENTS PLANNING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE JAKARTA ACTION TOLD POLOFF THEY WILL MARCH TO SIGNAL THEIR

OPPOSITION TO THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 7, WHICH THEY BELIEVE WILL NOT BE FREE AND FAIR. THE STUDENTS ARE ALSO DEMANDING THE DISMANTLING OF THE "DWIFUNGSI" SYSTEM, WHICH DEFINES AN ACTIVE ROLE FOR THE MILITARY IN NATIONAL POLITICS.

3. (SBU) OUR CONTACTS CLAIM THAT STUDENTS WILL GATHER AROUND MIDDAY AT THE MEDICAL CAMPUS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA IN SALEMBA, CENTRAL JAKARTA, AND ATTEMPT TO MARCH TO THE PARLIAMENT (DPR), THE SCENE OF THE TUMULTUOUS AND SOMETIMES VIOLENT STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN MAY AND NOVEMBER, 1998. THE STUDENT GROUPS PLANNING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE APRIL 13 ACTION REPORTEDLY INCLUDE FORUM KOTA (CITY FORUM), FAMRED (STUDENT-PEOPLES' ACTION FRONT FOR DEMOCRACY), KBUI (THE "BIG FAMILY" OF THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA) AND KMB (THE UNITED STUDENTS' COMMITEE.)

SETTING THE STAGE
---

4. (SBU) PERHAPS SETTING THE STAGE FOR A NEW STUDENT ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION CAMPAIGN, TWO LEADERS OF RADICAL STUDENT GROUPS, FORUM KOTA (CITY FORUM) AND FKSMJ (JAKARTA STUDENT SENATES COMMUNICATION FORUM), WERE QUOTED IN THE MASS CIRCULATION DAILY "MERDEKA" ON APRIL 11, PREDICTING FRAUD AND FAILURE IN THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 7. LABELLING THE ELECTIONS INHERENTLY "ILLEGITIMATE" BECAUSE THEY WILL BE STAGED BY AN "ILLEGITIMATE" REGIME, THE STUDENT LEADERS OPINED THAT "STATUS QUO FORCES" WILL CONTINUE TO MANIPULATE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
AND CONTROL THE POLITICAL SCENE WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE
JUNE ELECTIONS. THE STUDENTS PREDICTED THAT THE ELECTIONS WILL
UNCLASSIFIED

BE MARRED NOT ONLY BY FRAUD, BUT BY WIDESPREAD AND
ORCHESTRATED VIOLENCE. IN PARTICULAR, THEY IDENTIFIED FORMER
PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AS CONTINUING TO PLAY A SINISTER ROLE, IN
COORDINATION WITH ELEMENTS WITHIN THE HABIBIE REGIME. FORUM
KOTA, FKSMJ, AND LIKE-MINDED STUDENT GROUPS BELIEVE THAT A
NEUTRAL "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT" UNTAINTED BY CONNECTIONS
TO THE SOEHARTO REGIME, MUST BE FORMED BEFORE LEGIMITATE
ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD.

POTENTIAL CONFRONTATION
---

5. (SBU) IF THE APRIL 13 DEMONSTRATION GOES AHEAD, THERE IS A
POTENTIAL FOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE STUDENTS AND THE
SECURITY FORCES. THERE IS NO LOVE LOST BETWEEN THE
PARTICIPATING STUDENT GROUPS, BY NOW VETERANS OF STREET
ACTIVISM, AND THE POLICE AND MILITARY TROOPS WHO ARE DEPLOYED
TO CONTAIN THEM. GOI OFFICIALS HAVE PREVIOUSLY LABELED FORUM
KOTA AND LIKE-MINDED STUDENT GROUPS AS TROUBLE MAKERS,
RABBLE-ROUSERS, AND EVEN COMMUNISTS. FOR THEIR PART, MEMBERS
OF THESE STUDENT GROUPS TEND TO SEE SECURITY FORCES AS BRUTAL
OPPONENTS OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. FURTHERMORE,
THERE HAVE BEEN VIOLENT CLASHES BETWEEN STUDENT GROUPS AND
SECURITY FORCES AS RECENTLY AS MARCH 31. (SEE REF A FOR DETAILS.)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0145

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/016W			

----------BA8B42 121121Z /38
P 121058Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7156
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001805

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

TOKYO PASS A/S ROTH
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: ANTI-ELECTION STUDENTS TO HIT THE STREETS (?)
UNCLASSIFIED

6. (SBU) STUDENT CONTACTS WHO CLAIM THEY WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE APRIL 13 DEMONSTRATIONS TOLD POLOFF THEY HAVE NOT GIVEN FORMAL ADVANCE NOTICE OF THEIR PLANS, AS REQUIRED BY LAW NO. 9/1998, WHICH GOVERNS DEMONSTRATIONS. (NOTE: IN THE MARCH 31 DEMONSTRATION WHICH ENDED IN VIOLENCE (REF A), THE STUDENTS DEMONSTRATING - FROM THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENT GOVERNMENT - WERE CONSIDERABLY MORE MODERATE THAN THE GROUPS REPORTEDLY PLANNING TO MARCH ON APRIL 13 AND HAD FURTHERMORE GIVEN ADVANCE NOTICE, AND SECURED POLICE PERMISSION, FOR THEIR RALLY. END NOTE.) A MEMBER OF FORUM KOTA TOLD POLOFF ON APRIL 12 THAT HIS GROUP DID NOT GIVE NOTICE OF THE DEMONSTRATION ON PRINCIPAL, BECAUSE THEY CONSIDER LAW NO. 9 ILLEGITIMATE.

OUTLOOK
---

7. (SBU) IN ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS FOR AN APRIL 13 DEMONSTRATION TWO FACTORS MUST BE KEPT IN MIND: FIRST, THE STUDENT GROUPS REPORTEDLY ORGANIZING THIS DEMONSTRATION REPRESENT A MINORITY WING, NOT THE MAINSTREAM, OF THE INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT. WHILE VIRTUALLY ALL POLITICALLY ACTIVE INDONESIAN STUDENTS SHARE THESE GROUPS' OPPOSITION TO A MILITARY ROLE IN NATIONAL POLITICS, MANY DO NOT SHARE THIS COALITION'S OPPOSITION TO THE ELECTIONS. IN THE TWO PERIODS OF MASSIVE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS WITNESSED IN 1998, THERE WAS A MUCH BROADER CONCENSUS AMONG STUDENTS THAT SOEHARTO MUST RESIGN IN MAY, AND THAT PRESSURE MUST BE BROUGHT TO BEAR UPON THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) IN NOVEMBER. THAT WIDE CONCENSUS
UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

AMONG STUDENTS IS CURRENTLY LACKING.

8. (SBU) THE SECOND FACTOR, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE GROUPS REPORTEDLY PLANNING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE APRIL 13 ACTION HAVE A PROVEN TRACK RECORD OF DELIVERING THOUSANDS OF DISCIPLINED AND MOTIVATED STUDENTS TO THE STREETS AND THEIR POTENTIAL STRENGTH SHOULD NOT BE DISCOUNTED. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT APPARENT DISARRAY AMONG GROUPS ORGANIZING STUDENTS TO MONITOR THE ELECTIONS, AND PUBLIC BEWILDERMENT ABOUT THE MECHANICS OF THE ELECTIONS, COULD BE DRIVING MORE STUDENTS INTO THE ANTI-ELECTIONS CAMP. ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO9625

PAGE 01 JAKART 02376 120953Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FBO-01	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	JUSE-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	OPR-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	IRM-05	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	USSS-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/027W					

----------C74BDC 120953Z /38

O 120955Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7728
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002376

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, CASC, PINR, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: MAY 12 TRISAKTI STUDENTS MURDER COMMEMORATED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02376 120953Z
REF: 1998 JAKARTA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: MARKING AN EMOTIONAL DAY, THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS GATHERED MAY 12 AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN JAKARTA, SITE OF THE FATAL SHOOTING OF FOUR STUDENTS, TO COMMEMORATE THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THAT EVENT. STUDENTS FROM OTHER UNIVERSITIES ARE ATTEMPTING TO JOIN THE COMMEMORATION BUT HAVE HAD TO MANEUVER AROUND SECURITY FORCE ROADBLOCKS APPARENTLY AIMED AT KEEPING THEM FROM APPROACHING THE UNIVERSITY ALONG A MAJOR TOLL ROAD WHICH RUNS IN FRONT OF THE PARLIAMENT. ONE SMALL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

GROUP OF PROTESTERS MADE IT THROUGH TO THE PARLIAMENT FOR A BRIEF PROTEST. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE LARGER GROUP OF STUDENTS, NUMBERING AT LEAST 5,000, WILL ATTEMPT TO MARCH ON THE PARLIAMENT FROM TRISKATI UNIVERSITY BEFORE DISBANDING. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) ON MAY 12, 1998, FOUR STUDENTS WERE SHOT DEAD WITHIN THE CAMPUS OF TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. AN INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT STALLED AFTER TWO POLICE OFFICIALS WERE CONVICTED OF DISOBEYING ORDERS AND SENTENCED TO TEN AND FOUR MONTHS EACH. DEMANDS FOR A FULL INVESTIGATION OF THIS CRIME (AND OF A SIMILAR TRAGEDY ON NOVEMBER 13, 1998 WHEN EIGHT STUDENTS AND SIX OTHERS WERE SHOT DOWN DURING A STUDENT DEMONSTRATION) HAVE CONTINUED. THE DEMONSTRATIONS THROUGHOUT JAKARTA MAY 12, 1999, ECHOED THESE DEMANDS.

4. (U) AS OF COB, APPROXIMATELY 5,000 STUDENTS WERE AT JAKARTA'S TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY WITH ANOTHER 500-800 OUTSIDE THE CAMPUS UNABLE TO ENTER BECAUSE OF TIGHT SECURITY MAINTAINED BY THE TRISAKTI STUDENTS. A CONVOY OF OVER 1,000 STUDENTS UNDER THE "FORUM KOTA" BANNER IS CIRCUMNAVIGATING THE CITY HEADING TOWARD TRISAKTI. THEY WERE PREVENTED FROM MOVING DIRECTLY TO TRISAKTI BY POLICE AND MILITARY WHO APPEARED TO WANT TO PREVENT THEM FROM PASSING THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT ENROUTE.

5. (C) STUDENTS AND INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS CLOSE TO STUDENT LEADERS REPEATED INFORMATION WE RECEIVED EARLIER FROM POLITICAL ACTIVISTS CLOSE TO THE STUDENTS THAT THE STUDENTS WOULD ATTEMPT TO REACH THE PARLIAMENT (TWO MILES EAST OF TRISAKTI VIA THE TOLL ROAD) AT SOME POINT DURING THE DAY. THAT EFFORT WOULD RE-ENACT THE MAY 12, 1998 INCIDENT IN WHICH STUDENTS, HAVING BEEN FORCED TO TURN BACK FROM THE PARLIAMENT AND RE-ENTER THEIR CAMPUS WERE THEN FIRED UPON BY SECURITY FORCES.

6. (C) AT A 0900 CEREMONY MARKING THE OPENING OF DAY-LONG ACTIVITIES AT TRISAKTI, DEAN OF THE LAW FACULTY AND FORMER SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ADI ANDOJO SUCIPTO TOLD POLCOUNS HE FEARED THAT THE DAY COULD END IN VIOLENCE. HE NOTED THE EMOTION OF STUDENTS WHO WERE RELIVING THE MAY 12, 1998 EVENT THROUGHOUT THE DAY WITH POETRY AND SPEECHES. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO A LIFE SIZE SCULPTURE WHICH WAS DEDICATED IN THE MORNING CEREMONY, WHICH GRAPHICALLY DEPICTS TWO SOLDIERS BEATING THREE COWERING STUDENTS. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD STOOD FOR TEN MINUTES

WATCHING STUDENTS REACTIONS TO THE SCULPTURE. "EVERY

FACE CHANGED," HE SAID.

6. (U) DESPITE VERY HEAVY LAYERED POLICE AND MILITARY SECURITY DEPLOYED BETWEEN THE PARLIAMENT AND TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY, THREE BUSLOADS OF STUDENTS WERE ABLE TO MAKE IT THROUGH AND BRIEFLY DEMONSTRATED IN FRONT OF THE PARLIAMENT. THEY LEFT BY 1600.

7. (U) AS OF COB, IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THERE WILL BE FURTHER STUDENT EFFORTS TO GET TO THE PARLIAMENT -- OR WHETHER STUDENTS WILL REMAIN AT TRISAKTI UNTIL THE SCHEDULED 2100 CONCLUSION TO THE DAY'S ACTIVITIES.
ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6795 RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 03034 01 OF 03 211028Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W				

----------D78E93 211028Z /38

O 211023Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8415
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
CG III MEF//G2//
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003034

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/04
TAGS: PREF, PINS, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT MULLS THE FUTURE

1. (C) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03034 01 OF 03 211028Z
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: DESPITE MAJOR POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE PAST 18 MONTHS, INDONESIAN STUDENT LEADERS REMAIN FEARFUL THAT THE CORE DEMANDS OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENT WILL BE THWARTED. STUDENT LEADERS HAVE TOLD US THAT THE MOVEMENT WILL CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE GOI, BOTH THROUGH LOBBYING AND DEMONSTRATIONS, TO ADDRESS ISSUES IMPORTANT TO STUDENTS, PARTICULARLY THE DE-POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY AND THE PROSECUTION OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND HIS ASSOCIATES. LEADERS OF MAJOR MUSLIM STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS HAVE DOWNPLAYED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE EMERGENCE OF A MUSLIM RIGHT WING COALITION COULD (FURTHER) DIVIDE THE STUDENT MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, BARRING UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS, NO

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

MAJOR STUDENT DEMONSTRATION CAMPAIGNS ARE LIKELY THIS SUMMER, AT LEAST UNTIL THE NEW PARLIAMENT IS FORMED LATER THIS SUMMER. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) SOURCE NOTES: IN THE PAST WEEK, WE MET WITH A RANGE OF INDONESIAN STUDENT AND YOUTH LEADERS TO ASSESS THE MOVEMENT'S OUTLOOK AND POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. OUR INTERLOCUTORS INCLUDED LEADERS OF THE TWO LARGEST MUSLIM STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS, PMII (THE STUDENT WING OF THE NAHDATUL ULAMA) AND HMI (THE MUSLIM STUDENTS ASSOCIATION.) WE ALSO MET WITH LEADERS OF THE NATIONALIST STUDENTS MOVEMENT (GMNI), THE CHRISTIAN STUDENTS ORGANIZATION (GMKI), PRESIDENTS OF THE STUDENT BODIES AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN JAKARTA AND THE BANDUNG INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (ITB), AND LEADERS OF UNFREL, THE STUDENT ORGANIZATION FORMED TO MONITOR THE ELECTIONS. WE HAVE ALSO SPOKEN WITH ACTIVISTS WHO ARE CLOSE TO THE

LEADERSHIP OF THE "RADICAL" STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS FORUM KOTA AND FAMRED. DESPITE THE DIVERSITY OF THIS BODY OF CONTACTS, CORE THEMES AND COMMON DENOMINATORS GENERALLY OVERSHADOWED THEIR DIFFERENCES.

A GNAWING FEELING

4. (SBU) THE INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT IS WIDELY CREDITED WITH DRIVING THE REFORM MOVEMENT THAT BROUGHT DOWN THE SOEHARTO REGIME IN MAY, 1998. IN THE FALL OF 1998, THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AGAIN FLEXED ITS MUSCLES: MASSIVE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER PUT PRESSURE ON THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY TO INSTITUTE A SERIOUS POLITICAL REFORM PROGRAM, INCLUDING THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS STAGED IN EARLY JUNE, 1999 AND A RE-WRITING OF THE POLITICAL LAWS. IN SPITE OF THE KEY ROLE THE STUDENT MOVEMENT HAS PLAYED IN SHAPING THE COURSE OF INDONESIA'S RECENT POLITICAL HISTORY, A RANGE OF STUDENT LEADERS WE HAVE SPOKEN WITH RECENTLY FEAR THAT LONG-TERM, STRUCTURAL REFORMS THE STUDENTS HAVE FOUGHT FOR COULD STILL BE LOST.

5. (SBU) STUDENT LEADERS FROM MAINSTREAM, AS WELL AS MORE STRIDENT WINGS OF THE MOVEMENT HAVE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS STAGED ON JUNE 7 AND FEARS THAT THE "WILL OF THE PEOPLE" WOULD SOMEHOW BE THWARTED. ONE OF OUR CONTACTS BITTERLY CRITICIZED FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER FOR "PREMATURELY"

GIVING HIS BLESSING TO THE ELECTIONS. THE CONTACT CLAIMED THAT HE AND MANY OTHER STUDENTS WERE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03034 01 OF 03 211028Z
DISAPPOINTED THAT CARTER AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS WERE "HASTY" IN PROCLAIMING THE ELECTIONS A SUCCESS. (NOTE: IN POINT OF FACT, CARTER'S STATEMENT NOTED VARIOUS AREAS OF CONCERN AND EMPHASIZED THAT NO CONCRETE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE PROCESS COULD BE MADE UNTIL THE FINAL RESULTS WERE IN. END NOTE.)

6. (SBU) STUDENT LEADERS' FEARS ABOUT THE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL FUTURE FALL INTO TWO CATEGORIES: FIRST, FEARS THAT GOLKAR WOULD SOMEHOW GARNER ENOUGH POWER TO BUILD A COALITION AND FORM THE NEXT GOVERNMENT. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW GOLKAR-BASED GOVERNING COALITION WOULD REPRESENT, FOR MOST INDONESIAN STUDENTS, THE FAILURE OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT THEY CREATED 18 MONTH EARLIER. THE SECOND FEAR IS THAT A "REFORM" COALITION, PRESUMABLY LED BY MEGAWATI'S PDI-P, WOULD FAIL TO IMPLEMENT REFORMS DEMANDED BY THE STUDENTS. TWO STUDENT LEADERS ALLEGED TO POLOFF THAT SEVERAL SENIOR LEADERS IN THE PDI-P WERE CORRUPT AND WOULD BRING TO GOVERNMENT A CROOKED "BUSINESS AS USUAL" ATTITUDE. MOREOVER, STUDENT LEADERS ARE BEGINNING TO QUESTION WHETHER MEGAWATI AND HER PARTY WOULD CHALLENGE THE ARMED FORCE BY DISSOLVING THE "DWI-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6796

PAGE 01 JAKART 03034 02 OF 03 211028Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/018W					

----------D78E97 211028Z /38
O 211023Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8416
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
CG III MEF//G2//
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 003034

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/04
TAGS: PREF, PINS, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT MULLS THE FUTURE

FUNGSI" SYSTEM WHICH GIVES THE MILITARY A CENTRAL POLITICAL ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT. ABANDONING "DWIFUNGSI" IS A CORE DEMAND OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03034 02 OF 03 211028Z
(NOTE: IN THE NOVEMBER 1998 "CIGANJUR" STATEMENT, MEGAWATI JOINED AMIEN RAIS, ABDURRAHMAN WAHID AND THE SULTAN OF JOGJAKARTA IN CALLING FOR AN END TO DWI-FUNGSI OVER A SIX YEAR PERIOD. AT THE TIME, AN SINCE, MANY STUDENTS FELT BETRAYED BY THIS GRADUALIST APPROACH. END NOTE)

STUDENTS' CORE DEMANDS
---

7. (SBU) THERE ARE THREE CORE DEMANDS SHARED BY THE VAST MAJORITY OF INDONESIAN STUDENT ACTIVISTS. THE FIRST IS THAT THE MILITARY "RETURN TO THE BARRACKS" AND THE "DWIFUNGSI" SYSTEM BE ABANDONED. SECOND IS THE PROSECUTION OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND HIS ASSOCIATES FOR CORRUPTION, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND VARIOUS OTHER MISDEEDS COMMITTED DURING HIS 30-YEAR REIGN. THE THIRD, AND MOST AMORPHOUS DEMAND, IS AN END TO "KKN" - COLLUSION, CORRUPTION, AND NEPOTISM IN INDONESIAN POLITICS. OTHER POINTS WHICH ENJOY WIDESPREAD SUPPORT WITHIN THE STUDENT MOVEMENT INCLUDE AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION TO WEAKEN THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT, AND OFFERING SUBSTANTIAL AUTONOMY TO OUTLYING DISTRICTS. ALTHOUGH MOST STUDENTS SEE THE FALL OF SOEHARTO AS A VICTORY FOR THEIR MOVEMENT, AND MANY SEE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ELECTIONS AS ANOTHER ACHIEVEMENT, (NOTE: A SIGNIFICANT MINORITY OF STUDENTS OPPOSED THE ELECTIONS AS ILLEGITIMATE. END NOTE.) STUDENT ACTIVISTS ARE ACUTELY AWARE THAT THE CORE DEMANDS OF THEIR MOVEMENT ARE UNMET. STUDENT LEADERS ASSERT THAT ANY GOVERNMENT THAT COMES TO POWER WILL

CONFIDENTIAL

FACE SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE TO ADDRESS THEIR REFORM AGENDA.

FAULT LINES PERSIST

8. (SBU) THERE ARE STILL SIGNIFICANT DIVISIONS WITHIN THE STUDENT MOVEMENT THAT PRECLUDE MASS, JOINT ACTION AT THE CURRENT TIME. THROUGHOUT THE SPRING, STUDENT ACTIVISTS WERE DIVIDED BETWEEN A MAJORITY, WHICH SEIZED ON THE ELECTIONS AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE, AND A SUBSTANTIAL MINORITY WHOSE DISTRUST OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS SO DEEP THAT THEY DEEMED IMPOSSIBLE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. THIS REJECTIONIST GROUP STEADFASTLY ADHERED TO THE DEMAND FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT" OR RULE BY "INDONESIAN PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES" WHICH COULD IMPLEMENT FAIR ELECTIONS. THESE DEMANDS WERE SHARPLY CRITICIZED AS UNREALISTIC BY STUDENTS IN THE FORMER CAMP.

9. (SBU) IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN TO WHAT EXTENT THIS FAULT LINE WILL DEEPEN OR BE SMOOTHED OVER IN THE POST-ELECTION PERIOD. IF THE "STATUS QUO FORCES" MANAGE TO FORM THE NEXT GOVERNMENT, THIS WILL LIKELY BECOME THE TYPE OF ISSUE WHICH CAN MOBILIZE THE STUDENT MOVEMENT INTO THE KIND OF MASS, JOINT ACTION WITNESSED IN MAY AND NOVEMBER OF 1998. IF A "REFORM COALITION" FORMS THE NEXT GOVERNMENT, STUDENTS WILL WATCH CLOSELY, MANY SKEPTICALLY, TO SEE IF THEIR CORE DEMANDS ARE BEING ADDRESSED. SEVERAL OF OUR CONTACTS,

FORMERLY LEADERS OF MAJOR STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS RAN AS PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) CANDIDATES FOR PDI-P, AND IN ONE CASE FOR PKB. SEVERAL OF THESE LEADERS APPEAR LIKELY TO TAKE SEATS IN THE COMING DPR. THESE INDIVIDUALS STILL NOMINALLY HOLD POSITIONS OF POWER IN THEIR STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS AND COULD PLAY A ROLE IN DEFLECTING SOME STUDENT OPPOSITION TO A PDI-P LED COALITION, IF DEEMED INSUFFICIENTLY REFORMIST BY STUDENT LEADERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PRESENCE OF RECENTLY RETIRED STUDENT LEADERS IN A PDI-P LED COALITION WOULD ALSO LIKELY SERVE TO PUSH THE COALITION IN A REFORMIST DIRECTION.

10. (SBU) LEADERS OF TWO MAJOR ISLAMIC STUDENTS ORGANIZATIONS - HMI AND PMII - DOWNPLAYED TO POLOFF

THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN GOLKAR AND MUSLIM PARTIES SUCH AS THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), COULD CAUSE MUSLIM STUDENTS TO SPLIT FROM THE MAINSTREAM STUDENT MOVEMENT, WHICH WOULD DEFINITELY OPPOSE A GOLKAR-LED GOVERNMENT. PMII IS THE STUDENT ORGANIZATION OF THE NAHDATUL ULAMA (N.U.), INDONESIA'S LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION. MOST OF PMII'S MEMBERS HAVE GRAVITATED TOWARD THE NATIONAL REAWAKENING PARTY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6797

PAGE 01 JAKART 03034 03 OF 03 211028Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-01	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W				

----------D78E9A 211028Z /38

O 211023Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8417
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
CG III MEF//G2//
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 003034

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/04
TAGS: PREF, PINS, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT MULLS THE FUTURE

(PKB) LED BY N.U. CHAIRMAN GUS DUR, WHICH IS FIRMLY IN THE REFORMIST CAMP. HMI'S POSITION, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS MORE OBSCURE. WHILE HMI MEMBERS WERE ACTIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03034 03 OF 03 211028Z
PARTICIPANTS IN THE STUDENT MOVEMENT IN MAY AND NOVEMBER, ITS LEADERSHIP HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN IDENTIFIED WITH RULING, GOLKAR CIRCLES. HMI WOULD

SEEM A LIKELY CANDIDATE TO DEFECT FROM THE MAINSTREAM STUDENT REFORM MOVEMENT SHOULD STUDENTS HIT THE STREETS IN OPPOSITION TO A NEW GOLKAR-LED GOVERNMENT. INDEED, HMI'S PATRON WITHIN THE GOI IS GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANDJUNG. NONETHELESS, HMI'S CHAIRMAN AND SECRETARY GENERAL INSISTED TO POLOFF THAT THE GROUP WAS IN STEP WITH THE STUDENT REFORM MOVEMENT AND THAT A SCHISM BETWEEN MUSLIM STUDENTS AND REFORMIST STUDENTS WAS NOT IN THE CARDS.

SUMMER OUTLOOK
---

11. (SBU) GIVEN THE SUMMER RECESS, THE PERSISTENT IDEOLOGICAL FAULT LINES OUTLINED ABOVE, AND POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY THAT WILL CONTINUE DURING THE SUMMER'S COALITION BUILDING DANCE, MAJOR STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ARE UNLIKELY IN THE NEAR TERM. OUR STUDENT CONTACTS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS WERE POSSIBLE DURING THE NEXT SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR). THE NEW MPR IS EXPECTED TO BE SWORN IN LATE AUGUST, AND IS SCHEDULED TO CONVENE TO SELECT THE NEXT PRESIDENT IN NOVEMBER. (NOTE: THIS SCHEDULE IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE. END NOTE) STUDENT MASS ACTION IS POSSIBLE DURING EITHER OF THESE EVENTS, ESPECIALLY IF IT APPEARS THAT "STATUS-QUO FORCES" HAVE THE UPPER HAND.
GONG

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED E135

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ7188 RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 05423 01 OF 02 010935Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-00	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	IRM-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ECA-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W

----------09FF19 010937Z /38

O 010851Z NOV 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1041
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 005423

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENTS REACT TO NEW GOVERNMENT

REF: JAKARTA 5401

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05423 01 OF 02 010935Z

1. (U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION.

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: THE INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT IS REACTING WITH MIXED EMOTIONS TO THE ADVENT OF THE WAHID GOVERNMENT. THE CORE OBJECTIVES OF THE MOVEMENT GETTING THE MILITARY OUT OF POLITICS AND BRINGING SOEHARTO AND HIS CRONIES TO JUSTICE, REMAIN UNFULFILLED. HOWEVER, OUR STUDENT INTERLOCUTORS RECOGNIZE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEFEAT OF HABIBIE, THE RISE OF ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, AND THE APPOINTMENT OF REAL REFORMERS IN KEY CABINET POSTS. EVEN THE MOST STRIDENT GROUPS HAVE TONED DOWN THEIR RHETORIC AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. END SUMMARY.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

BREATHING SPACE
---

3. (SBU) CONVERSATIONS WITH A RANGE OF INDONESIAN STUDENT GROUPS FOLLOWING THE SELECTION OF ABDURRAHMAN WAHID AS PRESIDENT SUGGEST THAT THE MOVEMENT WILL GIVE THE NEW GOVERNMENT SOME BREATHING SPACE. STUDENT ACTIVISTS, SO ACCUSTOMED TO RAILING AGAINST AN "ELITE, STATUS QUO" GOVERNMENT," SEEM DAZED, AND ARE CLEARLY STILL DIGESTING THE ADVENT OF INDONESIA'S FIRST POST-NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT. DURING A RECENT FAST FOOD SUPPER WITH LEADERS OF FAMRED (THE STUDENT ACTION FRONT FOR REFORM AND DEMOCRACY-ONE OF THE TWO LARGEST AND MOST POWERFUL PROTEST GROUPS IN JAKARTA) STUDENTS CONCEDED, APPARENTLY WITH SOME RELUCTANCE, THAT THE DEFEAT OF HABIBIE WAS ALSO A MAJOR DEFEAT FOR THE OLD GUARD THAT DOMINATED THE COUNTRY DURING THE SOEHARTO ERA. THE GROUP PARTICULARLY WELCOMED THE APPOINTMENT OF MARZUKI DARUSMAN AS ATTORNEY GENERAL, WHOM THEY HOPE WILL AGGRESSIVELY PURSUE

INVESTIGATIONS OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, AS WELL AS THE BANK BANK BALI SCANDAL. THE STUDENTS ALSO AGREED THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STATE MINISTRY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ACEHNESE FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER (HASBALLAH SAAD) TO HEAD IT, WERE IMPORTANT, PROGRESSIVE STEPS. (COMMENT: SEE REFTEL FOR ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW JUSTICE/HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM.)

4. (SBU) FAMRED, A GROUP INVOLVED IN ORGANIZING MAJOR STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 23-24, AND DURING THE WEEK LEADING UP TO THE OCTOBER 20 PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION, TOLD POLOFF THEY WERE TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NEW GOVERNMENT, AND WERE PLANNING NO MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. STUDENTS FROM MAINSTREAM GROUPS SUCH AS THE CATHOLIC STUDENTS ASSOCIATION (PMKRI), AND STUDENT LEADERS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA, ECHOED SIMILAR SENTIMENTS. OTHER MAINSTREAM STUDENT GROUPS, SUCH AS THE PMII (THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA'S STUDENT WING), THE GMNI (THE NATIONALIST STUDENTS ORGANIZATION, WITH TIES TO PDI-P), AND THE IMM (MUHAMADIYAH'S STUDENT WING), WHICH WERE ALL MOBILIZED IN OPPOSITION TO SOEHARTO IN EARLY 1998, ARE NOW TIED TO MAJOR CONSTITUENCIES IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT, AND WILL NOT BE PART OF ANY ANTI-GOVERNMENT STUDENT OPPOSITION IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS
---

5. (SBU) NONETHELESS, MOST OF THE INDONESIAN STUDENTS WE HAVE SPOKEN WITH STILL HAVE STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE NEW GOVERNMENT, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE FIVE KEY CABINET POSITIONS WENT TO ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY OFFICERS. THE APPOINTMENT OF WIRANTO AS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICS AND SECURITY IS PARTICULARLY
UNCLASSIFIED

ONEROUS TO LEADERS OF THE INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT. (IN ADDITION TO WIRANTO'S POSITION, TNI OFFICERS HAVE SECURED POSTS AT THE HEAD OF THE MINISTRIES OF HOME AFFAIRS, MINING AND ENERGY, COMMUNICATIONS (TRANSPORTATION), AND STATE REFORM.) OPPOSITION TO THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN NATIONAL POLITICS HAS BEEN ONE OF THE CORE PRINCIPALS OF STUDENT ACTIVISM IN THE PAST TWO YEARS. WIRANTO IS ESPECIALLY DISLIKED BECAUSE, AS THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES AT THE TIME, HE ULTIMATELY BEARS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEATHS AT THE HANDS OF SECURITY FORCES OF UNARMED STUDENT PROTESTERS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN MAY, 1998 AND AT THE SEMANGGI INTERCHANGE IN NOVEMBER 1998 AND AGAIN IN SEPTEMBER 1999. FAMRED LEADERS TOLD POLOFF THEY WERE "VERY, VERY DISAPPOINTED WITH MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW CABINET." (COMMENT: HOME MINISTER SURJADI AND STATE MINISTER FOR REFORM OF STATE APPARATUS NUMBERI HAVE BEEN RETIRED AND SERVING IN CIVILIAN POSITIONS FOR SEVERAL YEARS. UNDER NEW REGULATIONS, WIRANTO, AGUM GUMELAR AND BAMBANG YUDHOYONO WILL HAVE TO RETIRE FROM THE MILITARY IN ORDER TO TAKE UP THEIR CIVILIAN POSITIONS; WE EXPECT THIS TO HAPPEN SHORTLY IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY.)

6. (SBU) FORUM KOTA (FORKOT-CITY FORUM), ANOTHER MAJOR STUDENT PROTEST GROUP IN JAKARTA WITH TIES TO THE ULTRA-LEFT PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) RECENTLY DISTRIBUTED A PAMPHLET DECRYING THE MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT, STATING THAT "DARK FORCES WILL CONTINUE TO HAUNT THE LIVES OF THE PEOPLE."

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ7189

ACTION EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-00	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	IRM-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ECA-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/012W						

----------09FF1E 010937Z /38
O 010851Z NOV 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1042

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 005423

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENTS REACT TO NEW GOVERNMENT

FORKOT'S MANIFESTO OUTLINES THE GROUP'S (REVISED) CORE DEMANDS:

(A) "ARREST AND TRY SOEHARTO, HABIBIE, AND WIRANTO";
(B) "RESTORE THE PEOPLE'S RIGHTS" (NO ELABORATION);
(C) "DISMANTLE THE SOCIAL-POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY";
(D) "CLEANSE THE (POLITICAL) AUTHORITIES OF NEW ORDER FIGURES AND THE MILITARY."

COMMENT
---

7. (SBU) FORKOT'S FOUR DEMANDS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE GROUP'S PAST RHETORIC AND ARE GENERALLY IN LINE WITH THE SENTIMENTS OF MOST STUDENT ACTIVISTS WE HAVE SPOKEN WITH. A SIGNIFICANT BREAK WITH PAST IDEOLOGY, HOWEVER IS THAT FORKOT, FAMRED, AND OTHER STRIDENT STUDENT GROUPS HAVE DROPPED THEIR DEMAND THAT THE GOVERNMENT STEP DOWN AND BE REPLACED BY A "TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY" THAT WOULD IMPLEMENT "CREDIBLE" ELECTIONS. STUDENT LEADERS HAD PREVIOUSLY ARGUED THAT THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT WAS ILLEGITIMATE AND THUS COULD NOT PRESIDE OVER LEGITIMATE ELECTIONS. THE FACT THAT THESE GROUPS HAVE DROPPED THE DEMAND FOR NEW, "LEGITIMATE" ELECTIONS SHOWS THAT EVEN RELATIVELY RADICAL WINGS OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENT NOW CONCEDE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE WAHID-MEGAWATI GOVERNMENT AND WILL FOCUS MORE ON INFLUENCING, RATHER THAN TOPPLING, THE GOVERNMENT. WE EXPECT FAMRED, FORKOT, AND OTHER GROUPS TO CONTINUE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN INDONESIA'S POLITICAL LIFE, TO INCLUDE STAGING DEMONSTRATIONS. HOWEVER, THE COMMON RALLYING POINT THAT UNITED STUDENTS IN MAY AND NOVEMBER 1998 AND SEPTEMBER 1999 NO LONGER EXISTS.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

GELBARD

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5181

PAGE 01 JAKART 02656 121211Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OIG-04	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/032W				

----------3CD03A 121212Z /38

O 121210Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1500
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002656

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/08
TAGS: PINS, CASC, PHUM, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: STUDENTS CLASH WITH SECURITY FORCES IN JAKARTA:
- SOME DEATHS ARE REPORTED

1. CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02656 121211Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 11 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200502473

2. (U) THERE WAS A LARGE DEMONSTRATION (5,000 PLUS) IN WEST JAKARTA TODAY AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN THE GROGOL AREA IN WEST JAKARTA. AT COB WE RECEIVED A REPORT FROM A USUALLY RELIABLE WIRE SERVICE CHIEF WHO TOLD US THAT ONE OF HIS REPORTERS ON THE SCENE HAD REPORTED TO HIM THAT IN A CLASH WITH STUDENTS, SECURITY FORCES FIRED RUBBER BULLETS, AND THEN LIVE AMMUNITION. THE CAMERAMAN CLAIMS HE HAS PHOTOGRAPHS OF FOUR STUDENTS WHO HAVE BEEN KILLED.

3. (C) EMBASSY HAS SPOKEN TO [redacted] B1
[redacted] CLAIMED THAT STUDENTS HAD TRIED TO MARCH TO THE PARLIAMENT BUT HAD BEEN BLOCKED. AT THAT POINT THEY SAT DOWN ON THE ROAD BLOCKING IT AND SOME TRIED TO HAND FLOWERS TO THE SECURITY FORCES. [redacted] CLAIMED AT ABOUT 1700 THAT B1
[redacted] HEARD DISTANT GUN FIRE, AND THEN THE PERSONNEL SURROUNDING B1
THE STUDENTS "IN BROWN UNIFORMS AND GREEN UNIFORMS," BEGAN FIRING ON THE STUDENTS. THE SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO FIRE ON THE STUDENTS AFTER THEY RETREATED TO THE CAMPUS. SOME STUDENTS REPORTEDLY HAVE BARRICADED THEMSELVES INTO UNIVERSITY BUILDINGS. AS OF 1900, ACCORDING TO [redacted], THE FIGHTING B1
APPEARED TO BE SPREADING TO THE NEIGHBORING UNTAR UNIVERSITY AND TO A SHOPPING COMPLEX CALLED "CHITRALAND," TO WHICH STUDENTS FLED UNDER FIRE.

4. (U) A JAKARTA POST REPORTER TOLD POLOFF THAT THE CASUALTY COUNT WAS 20 WOUNDED AND ONE KILLED (CNN HAS CARRIED A REPORT OF ONE KILLED). A STUDENT SOURCE HAS CLAIMED 25 WOUNDED. WE WILL BE REPORTING THIS INCIDENT IN GREATER DETAIL 5/13. SUBSEQUENT TO THIS, RSO HAS FORWARDED POLICE INFORMATION WHICH INDICATES SOME PROPERTY DAMAGE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SAME DEMONSTRATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ6441

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTO3420

PAGE 01 JAKART 02668 252343Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W		

----------41951B 252343Z /38

O 130943Z MAY 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1505
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002668

DEPARTMENT FOR MGIDOI
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/08
TAGS: PINS, CASC, PHUM, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: MGIDOI: MASS JAKARTA GATHERING FOR SIX DEAD STUDENTS

REF: JAKARTA 2656

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02668 252343Z
1. CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 12 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200502473

2. (U) SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING ADDS DETAIL AND CONTEXT TO REFTEL'S REPORT OF SECURITY FORCE ATTACKS ON STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS MAY 12, WHICH LEFT AT LEAST SIX DEAD. MULTIPLE REPORTS INDICATE FIRING BEGAN AS STUDENTS WERE RETURNING TO CAMPUS IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN AGREEMENT REACHED WHICH ALLOWED THEM TO DEMONSTRATE OFF CAMPUS UNTIL 1800. THE SHOOTING, WITH USE OF LIVE AMMUNITION, RUBBER BULLETS AND BLANKS, CONTINUED FOR OVER ONE HOUR. END SUMMARY

3. (U) THE FOLLOWING PROVIDES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO THAT CONVEYED REFTEL REGARDING THE SECURITY FORCE ATTACK ON STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY, MAY 12 (REFTEL).

4. (U) ACCORDING TO STUDENTS INVOLVED IN THE DEMONSTRATIONS AT TRISAKTI, MAY 12, THEIR RECTOR HAD NEGOTIATED AN AGREEMENT WITH THE POLICE WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE STUDENTS, NUMBERING APPROXIMATELY 5,000, TO REMAIN OFF CAMPUS ON THE SMALL SIDE STREET IN FRONT OF THE TRISAKTI CAMPUS UNTIL 1800. STUDENTS HAD MOVED INTO THE STREET EARLIER IN THE DAY BUT HAD BEEN PREVENTED FROM MARCHING ON THE PARLIAMENT. AS PER THE AGREEMENT, THE STUDENTS HAD BEGUN TO MOVE BACK TO THE CAMPUS AT 1800 HOURS WHEN FIRING AT THE STUDENTS COMMENCED. STUDENTS SAID THAT WHEN THEY WERE RETREATING BACK TO CAMPUS, THE SECURITY FORCES SUDDENLY BEGAN TO FIRE AT THEM AND CHASE THEM. THEY STRESSED THAT THERE WAS NO CLASH GOING ON WHEN THEY WERE ATTACKED. MANY REPORTS, IN PART CORROBORATED BY FILM FOOTAGE, INDICATE THE FIRING BEGAN FROM POINTS ABOVE AND BEHIND THE POLICE LINES, POSSIBLY FROM NEARBY BUILDINGS. THE DEAN OF THE LAW FACULTY, ADI ANDOJO SOEJIPTO, A FORMER SUPREME COURT JUSTICE NOTED FOR HIS INTEGRITY, TOLD POLOFF

CONFIDENTIAL

AND THE PRESS THAT FIRING COMMENCED FROM A PEDESTRIAN OVERPASS ACROSS THE EIGHT LANE TOLL ROAD-HIGHWAY IN FRONT OF THE CAMPUS.

5. (U) THE LAW DEAN AND STUDENTS NOTED THAT AT LEAST FOUR OF WHAT NOW APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SIX DEAD, WERE KILLED BY GUN SHOTS WHILE THEY WERE ON THE CAMPUS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH REPORTING WE HAVE THAT SECURITY FORCES TOOK UP FIRING POSITIONS ALONG THE CAMPUS FENCE AND NEAR THE MAIN GATE. POLOFF COLLECTED SPENT AMMUNITION CARTRIDGES FROM THIS LOCATION 30 MINUTES AFTER THE SHOOTING STOPPED. PHONE CONTACT WITH THE CAMPUS DURING THE

SHOOTING INDICATED THAT THE SHOOTING, AUDIBLE ON THE PHONE LINES, CONTINUED UNTIL AFTER 1900 HOURS, I.E., FOR OVER ONE HOUR. WOUNDS OF THE VICTIMS POINT TO USE OF BOTH RUBBER BULLETS AND LIVE AMMUNITION. POLOFF NOTED STRONG TEAR GAS NEAR HANGING IN THE AIR AT THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE CAMPUS AND IN POCKETS ON CAMPUS AS OF 1945. TEAR GAS WAS STILL IN THE AIR ON MAY 13 AT 1130.

6. (U) VICTIMS WERE TAKEN TO SUMBER WARAS HOSPITAL, ONE KM FROM THE CAMPUS, AND TO AT LEAST ONE OTHER HOSPITAL. THE SUMBER WARAS HOSPITAL GROUNDS, AT 2100, WERE FILLED WITH STUDENTS AND SOME PARENTS. MOURNERS AND AT THE HOSPITAL FORMED A CONTINUOUS LINE PAST THE REMAINS OF THE DECEASED. A HOSPITAL OFFICIAL CONTROLLING THE ROOM WHERE THE REMAINS OF THE FOUR STUDENTS LAY TOLD POLOFF THAT THE FOUR HAD BEEN KILLED BY BULLETS BUT BROKE OFF DISCUSSION WHISPERING "POLICE, POLICE." PLAINCLOTHES POLICE, "INTEL," WERE OMNIPRESENT AMONG THE MOURNERS.

7. (C) [redacted] B1

[redacted] COMMENTS AT A PRESS CONFERENCE LATER IN THE

CONFIDENTIAL

EVENING, WIDELY QUOTED IN THE MEDIA, WERE SHARPLY CRITICAL OF THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES. "IT'S VERY CRUEL, IT'S VERY SAD AND IT MAKES ME VERY ANGRY." [redacted] B1

8. (U) THE MEDIA, MAY 13 CARRIED THE VIOLENCE IN BANNER HEADLINES. POLICE SPOKESPERSON COMMENTS, INITIALLY DENYING THERE HAD BEEN ANY DEATHS AND THEN CLAIMING THAT THE DEAD STUDENTS HAD BEEN TRAMPLED, NOT SHOT, HAVE PROVOKED MORE ANGER AMONG STUDENTS. FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS, WHO IS ACCOMPANYING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ON A STATE VISIT TO EGYPT, COULD NOT CONFIRM THE STUDENT DEATHS, CLAIMED THAT SECURITY FORCES HAD NOT BEEN ISSUED LIVE AMMUNITION AND CRITICIZED THE STUDENTS FOR CONTINUING THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS AFTER THE GOVERNMENT HAD INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER REFORM. VICE PRESIDENT HABIBIE ADDRESSED THE NATION, MID-DAY MAY 13, IN AN HOUR LONG SPEECH REGARDING, INTER ALIA, THE MARCH 12 KILLINGS IN JAKARTA (SEPTEL).
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9225

PAGE 01 JAKART 02675 01 OF 03 131326Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------3D5BBD 131351Z /38

P 131325Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1516
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002675

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/06
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL REFORM - LOTS OF GOVERNMENT TALK, WILL THERE BE ACTION?

REF: A) JAKARTA 2632; B) JAKARTA 2564

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02675 01 OF 03 131326Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 12 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 19 JUN 2006 200502473

1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: AS STUDENT PROTESTERS AND OPPOSITION FIGURES BECOME BOLDER AND INCREASINGLY FOCUS ON THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSITION, DISCUSSION OF THE MORE LIMITED, YET CRITICAL, AGENDA OF POLITICAL REFORM HAS PERSISTED, EVEN IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES. IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS, THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE (DPR) AND THE DEFENSE MINISTER/CINC, HAS EMITTED A STEADY STREAM OF STATEMENTS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL REFORM. ON MAY 12, A PROMINENT GOVERNMENT CRITIC, EMIL SALIM, AND A GROUP OF ACADEMICS ISSUED A PETITION CALLING ON THE PARLIAMENT TO CARRY OUT QUICKLY THE REFORMS IT IS PROMISING. [redacted] TOLD THE AMBASSADOR B1
MAY 13, HOWEVER, THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE MAY 12 KILLING OF STUDENT PROTESTERS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY MEANT THAT MODERATE REFORM PROPOSALS WOULD NO LONGER BE FOUND CREDIBLE BY STUDENTS. IN OUR PRIVATE CONTACTS WITH SEVERAL OF THE HANDFUL OF RELATIVELY INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENT, WE SENSE A HOPE THAT THE REFORM PROPOSALS ARE GENUINE. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE HEARD THAT WORK ON REFORM IS BEGINNING IN VARIOUS DPR COMMISSIONS OR IN SPECIAL TEAMS, WE HAVE NOT YET DETECTED ANY GREAT SENSE OF URGENCY IN MOVING FORWARD ON FLESHING OUT REFORM PROPOSALS. IN FACT, PUBLIC STATEMENTS FROM GOVERNMENT LEADERS HAVE TENDED TO REFLECT THEIR BELIEF THAT ANY REFORM PERMITTED WILL NOT COME QUICKLY, WHICH WILL NOT SATISFY THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS, ESPECIALLY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TRISAKTI KILLINGS. END SUMMARY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MIDDLE OF THE ROAD PRESSURE FOR SWIFT REFORM CONTINUES

3. (U) AS STUDENT PROTESTERS AND OPPOSITION FIGURES BECOME BOLDER AND FOCUS MORE ON THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSITION, THERE IS STILL DISCUSSION OF THE MORE LIMITED, YET CRITICAL, AGENDA OF POLITICAL REFORM. FOR EXAMPLE, FORMER GOVERNMENT MINISTER AND RECENT VICE PRESIDENTIAL PROTEST CANDIDATE EMIL SALIM ON MAY 12 LED A GROUP OF 50 UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA PROFESSORS TO THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES (DPR) TO PRESENT A PETITION TO THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI) FACTION. THE PETITION DEMANDED URGENT AND THOROUGH REFORM OF THE ELECTION SYSTEM, AND IMPROVEMENTS TO THE DPR, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND SUPREME COURT. ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, HE SAID THAT "THE HOUSE IS NOW RACING WITH TIME TO DECIDE NECESSARY MEASURES FOR REFORM....THE LONGER THE HOUSE TAKES TO DECIDE, THE WORSE THE ECONOMIC CRISIS WILL BECOME."

4. (C) [redacted] TOLD THE AMBASSADOR MAY 13, HOWEVER, THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE MAY 12 KILLING OF STUDENT PROTESTERS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY MEANT THAT MODERATE REFORM PROPOSALS WOULD NO LONGER BE FOUND CREDIBLE BY STUDENTS. B1

GOVERNMENT TALK ABOUT POLITICAL REFORM

5. (U) IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS, THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE (DPR) AND THE DEFENSE MINISTER/CINC, HAS EMITTED A STEADY STREAM OF STATEMENTS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL REFORM. AS HE WAS LEAVING JAKARTA FOR CAIRO ON MAY 9, SOEHARTO AGAIN SIGNALLED THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER SOME KIND OF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REFORM, SAYING THAT HE ENDORSED THE DPR'S REFORM INITIATIVES. (REFTEL B. SOEHARTO EARLIER HAD SIGNALLED THAT PREPARATION FOR REFORMS, TO BE CARRIED OUT POST 2003, COULD BEGIN NOW. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE (DPR) HARMOKO ANNOUNCED ON MAY 4 THAT THE HOUSE WOULD REVISE OR INITIATE TEN LAWS COVERING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND LEGAL MATTERS.) DEFENSE MINISTER AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF WIRANTO ON MAY 7 CALLED ON STUDENTS TO STOP THEIR PROTESTS AS THE ARMED FORCES UNDERSTOOD THEIR DEMANDS FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AND HAD INCORPORATED THEM INTO THE NATIONAL AGENDA. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT REFORM WOULD TAKE TIME.

ARMED FORCES FACTION: DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS ON REFORM

6. (U) THE MILITARY'S VICE SPEAKER OF THE DPR, LT. GEN (RET.) SYARWAN HAMID, TOLD A MEETING OF EDITORS ON MAY 8 THAT THE NATION COULD COLLAPSE WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL REFORM. (COMMENT: POLITICAL REFORM IS A NEW

SUBJECT FOR HAMID. END COMMENT). HE ECHOED WIRANTO'S CALL FOR THE STUDENTS TO STOP THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS BECAUSE THEIR CONCERNS HAD BEEN HEARD. HE ALSO STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE DPR COULD NOT BE RUSHED IN CARRYING OUT ITS EFFORTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9228

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9228

PAGE 01 JAKART 02675 02 OF 03 131326Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01
	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/022W						

----------3D5BC2 131351Z /38

P 131325Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1517
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002675

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/06
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL REFORM - LOTS OF GOVERNMENT TALK, WILL THERE BE ACTION?

REF: A) JAKARTA 2632; B) JAKARTA 2564

CONFIDENTIAL

7. (C) [redacted] B1 TOLD POLOFF MAY 6 THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE DPR'S ANNOUNCED REFORM EFFORT WAS SIGNIFICANT. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO RESPOND TO THE DEMANDS THAT THE PEOPLE, SPECIFICALLY THE STUDENTS, WERE MAKING. HARMOKO'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE DPR WOULD REVIEW OR INITIATE TEN PIECES OF MAJOR LEGISLATION, INCLUDING THE LAWS ON ELECTIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND GOLKAR, AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE DPR AND PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), HAD BEEN AGREED UPON BY ALL FACTIONS IN THE PARLIAMENT (ABRI, GOLKAR, UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY, INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY).

8. (C) DISCUSSION WITH [redacted] B1 ABOUT THE DETAILS OF REFORMS UNDER DISCUSSION RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW SIGNIFICANT HE ENVISAGED THE CHANGES WOULD BE. ONE OF THE PROPOSALS HAS BEEN TO ESTABLISH A NEW ELECTORAL SYSTEM THAT WOULD GIVE MORE DIRECT REPRESENTATION IN THE DPR TO EACH AREA OF THE COUNTRY. [redacted] B1 TOLD POLOFF THAT THIS MIGHT WORK IN BETTER-EDUCATED JAKARTA, BUT WOULD NOT BE WORKABLE IN OUTLYING AREAS SUCH AS IRIAN JAYA. [redacted] B1 WAS UNCERTAIN AS TO WHETHER THE PROPOSAL TO STOP ALLOCATING SEATS IN THE DPR TO THE MILITARY WOULD BE WORKABLE. HE WAS ALSO DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PARLIAMENT COULD EXERCISE ITS RIGHT TO INITIATE LEGISLATION IN CARRYING OUT THESE REFORMS. HE SAID THAT

THE HOUSE WAS AT WORK ON AT LEAST TWO BILLS, COVERING CORRUPTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION. AS FOR THE OTHER LAWS THAT HARMOKO ANNOUNCED WOULD BE REVIEWED OR INITIATED, HE

THOUGHT THAT THE DPR WOULD HAVE TO WORK WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN DRAFTING THESE AS IT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT INSTITUTIONAL EXPERTISE TO DO THE WORK ITSELF.

RULING PARTY GOLKAR FACTION: MIXED VIEWS ON SERIOUSNESS OF REFORM EFFORT

---

9. (C) [redacted] B1 [redacted] TOLD POLOFF ON MAY 7 THAT SOEHARTO WAS NOT SERIOUS ABOUT REFORM AND WAS JUST ATTEMPTING TO BUY TIME AS HE FACED STUDENT PROTESTS. MOREOVER, [redacted] DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE DPR WOULD BE ABLE B1 TO CARRY OUT REFORM AS IT WAS "FULL OF SOEHARTO CRONIES." HE DID OFFER, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT SOEHARTO HAD PUT THE ISSUE OF REFORM ON THE TABLE.

10. (C) [redacted] B1 [redacted] POINTED OUT TO POLOFF ON MAY 8 THAT THE EXISTING POLITICAL SYSTEM "BELONGED TO SOEHARTO." FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOLKAR DPR FACTION ANSWERED TO THE GOLKAR CENTRAL BOARD, WHICH IN TURN ANSWERED TO SOEHARTO. IT WAS THE SAME FOR THE ABRI FACTION, [redacted] SAID. [redacted] CONTENDED, B1 B1 HOWEVER, THAT PRESSURE FROM STUDENT PROTESTS AND SOCIETY HAD FORCED SOEHARTO TO GIVE THE DPR SOME NEW "SPACE" IN WHICH TO WORK.

11. (C) [redacted] EXPLAINED THAT SPEAKER HARMOKO "WOULD NOT B1 HAVE DARED" TO ANNOUNCE A REFORM AGENDA WITHOUT A GO AHEAD FROM SOEHARTO. GOLKAR MEMBERS WOULD NOT EVEN UTTER THE WORD REFORM ("REFORMASI") UNTIL SOEHARTO SAID IT. WHEN

THE INITIAL PRESS REPORTS EMERGED ON SOEHARTO'S REFORM POSITION, EMPHASIZING THAT THEY COULD NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL AFTER 2003, [redacted] WAS SO FRUSTRATED THAT [redacted] WAS READY TO GO TO THE STREET. HOWEVER, IT HAD THEN BEEN CLARIFIED THAT THE PARLIAMENT COULD PREPARE THESE PROPOSALS NOW, WHICH [redacted] INTERPRETED TO MEAN WITHIN THE NEXT ONE OR TWO YEARS. B1 B1 B1

[redacted] B1

13. (C) [redacted] B1

[redacted] EMPHASIZED TO POLOFF ON MAY 12 THAT THE STUDENT PROTESTS WERE LEADING TO NEW DISCUSSIONS IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES ABOUT REFORM. [redacted] B1

PAGE 01 JAKART 02675 03 OF 03 131326Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------3D5BC5 131351Z /38

P 131325Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1518
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002675

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/06
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL REFORM - LOTS OF GOVERNMENT TALK, WILL THERE BE ACTION?

REF: A) JAKARTA 2632; B) JAKARTA 2564

[redacted] B1

14. (C) [redacted] B1 EMPHASIZED TO POLOFF ON MAY 7 THAT, GIVEN SOEHARTO'S HISTORIC CONTROL OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, ONLY THE GOVERNMENT COULD DRIVE REFORM, NOT POLITICAL PARTIES SUCH AS PPP. NEVERTHELESS, PPP WAS TAKING THE REFORM EFFORT SERIOUSLY IN PARLIAMENT AND HAD FORMED ITS OWN TEAMS TO WORK ON EACH OF THE TEN IMPORTANT PIECES OF LEGISLATION THAT WOULD BE UNDER REVIEW OR INITIATED.

15. (C) [redacted] B1 (PROTECT), EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF TO POLOFF ON APRIL 27 THAT THE DPR HAD TO RESPOND TO THE STUDENTS DEMANDS OR ELSE THEY WOULD FIND ANOTHER CHANNEL. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME PEOPLE THOUGHT THAT POLITICAL REFORM WAS ONLY POSSIBLE IF SOEHARTO WAS REMOVED, BUT SAID THAT OTHERS BELIEVED THAT HE COULD BEGIN THE PROCESS IF HE SHOWED SUFFICIENT POLITICAL WILL.

COMMENT
---

16. (C) THE GOVERNMENT'S TALK ABOUT POLITICAL REFORM IS UNPRECEDENTED IN RECENT MEMORY. IT IS CLEARLY MEANT TO BE A RESPONSE TO THE MASSIVE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS. WHETHER THIS OFFICIAL DISCUSSION OF REFORM IS GENUINE, HOWEVER, IS THE BIG QUESTION, AND THE EFFORT SO FAR HAS NOT BEEN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INFUSED WITH ANY GREAT SENSE OF URGENCY. NEVERTHELESS, IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES THAT INDONESIA MUST GRAPPLE WITH HAVE OFFICIALLY BEEN BROACHED, AND FIGURES SUCH AS EMIL SALIM APPEAR TO BE TRYING TO HOLD THE GOVERNMENT TO ITS PROMISES.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ1888

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1888

PAGE 01 JAKART 02689 01 OF 02 140827Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/028W

----------3DBDB8 140828Z /38

O 140826Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1529
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002689

DEPARTMENT FOR MONITORING WORKING GROUP, S/S-0 (CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER), EAP/PIMBS

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/08
TAGS: PINS, CASC, PHUM, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: MGID01: KEY FORMER MINISTER SPEAKS OF SOEHARTO'S OUSTER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02689 01 OF 02 140827Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 13 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 19 JUN 2006 200502473

1. CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (U) FORMER MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS RUDINI, AN INFLUENTIAL RETIRED MILITARY LEADER AND REGIME CRITIC, INVITED POLCOUNS TO CALL ON HIM MAY 14 AND PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING READOUT ON CURRENT RAPIDLY CHANGING DEVELOPMENTS.

3. (C) RUDINI SAID THAT HE MET WITH [redacted] B1
MAY 13 AND TOLD HIM BLUNTLY THAT IT WAS NOW TIME FOR ABRI TO CHOOSE. EITHER ABRI WOULD SIDE WITH THE PEOPLE, OR SIDE WITH THE PRESIDENT AND, ALONG WITH THE PRESIDENT, "GO DOWN TO DEFEAT." RUDINI, NOTING THAT HE HAS HAD A CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH

[redacted] B1

[redacted] ACCORDING TO RUDINI, THE FIRST QUESTION B1
ON THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING OF [redacted] GENERALS WAS, B1
WHETHER TO INFORM PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, NOW ENROUTE BACK TO INDONESIA FROM EGYPT, THAT ABRI COULD NOT ASSURE HIS SAFETY IF HE RETURNED.

4. (C) RUDINI SAID HE HAS ALSO TOLD GENERAL [redacted] B1
[redacted] THAT ABRI SHOULD B1
STAND ASIDE AS "TENS OF THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS" MARCH TO THE PARLIAMENT ON THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 14. HE EXPLAINED THAT THIS WOULD ENTAIL EITHER GUARDING THEIR LINE OF MARCH OR SIMPLY NOT INTERFERING WITH THE MARCH. RUDINI SAID THAT WERE THERE TO BE SUCH A LARGE GATHERING, IT WOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A [redacted] B1
MESSAGE TO SOEHARTO THAT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE HIS SECURITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02689 01 OF 02 140827Z

5. (C) RUDINI CLAIMED THAT MOST OF ABRI, "RIGHT DOWN TO THE BOTTOM RANKS," WANTED THE PRESIDENT TO STEP DOWN IMMEDIATELY. HE

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

7. (C) RUDINI SAID THAT STUDENTS AND ACADEMICS HAD APPROACHED HIM ABOUT SERVING AS A REPLACEMENT FOR SOEHARTO. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD ABRI'S TRUST, AND SPECIFICALLY THAT OF [redacted] B1 RUDINI TOLD POLCOUNS HE WAS READY TO ASSUME THIS ROLE. HE SAID THAT HE ANTICIPATED THAT IN A TRANSITION SCENARIO, VICE PRESIDENT HABIBIE WOULD REPLACE SOEHARTO "FOR ONE DAY," AND THAT A SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY WOULD REPLACE HABIBIE WITH HIMSELF (RUDINI). RUDINI SAID HE BELIEVED HE WOULD HAVE STUDENT SUPPORT AND WOULD ENSURE THAT BY OFFERING STUDENTS SIX MONTHS OF STIPENDSFOR TUITION AND LIVING EXPENSES. RUDINI BELIEVED HE WOULD ALSO HAVE SUPPORT OF MAJOR OPPOSITION FIGURES, ESPECIALLY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02689 01 OF 02 140827Z
IF HE AGREED TO SUPPORT A REFORM AGENDA, INCLUDING REFORM OF THE FIVE POLITICAL LAWS, SO THAT THERE COULD BE A "REALLY DEMOCRATIC ELECTION" IN 2002. RUDINI ENVISAGED HIMSELF SERVING AS PRESIDENT UNTIL 2002.

8. (C) RUDINI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME MIGHT OPPOSE HIM AS A TRANSITION PRESIDENT, NOTABLY ISLAMIC ELEMENTS SUCH AS AMIEN RAIS, ADI SASONO AND POSSIBLY HABIBIE HIMSELF. HE NOTED THE POSSIBILITY THAT SUCH AN ISLAMIC FORCE MIGHT DRAW SUPPORT FROM PRABOWO, BUT IN THE END, CONSIDERED THE FORCES DRAWN UP IN HIS SUPPORT TO ENSURE THAT "ANY OBJECTION COULD BE OVERCOME."

9. (C) POLCOUNS REITERATED U.S. POLICY OF NO INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF INDONESIA BUT SUPPORT FOR THE HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF THOSE WHO SOUGHT TO BRING ABOUT REFORM THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS. RUDINI SAID HE WAS WELL AWARE OF THIS AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE EMBASSY'S ROLE IN RECENT MONTHS.

10. (C) COMMENT: RUDINI'S ACCOUNT OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH

[redacted] IS PLAUSIBLE ON ITS FACE, ALTHOUGH WE B1
CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF ITS PARTICULARS. IT IS WORTH NOTING THOUGH
THAT A LARGE STUDENT DEMONSTRATION INDEED MATERIALIZED ON MAY 14
AND THAT THE SECURITY FORCES HAVE THUS FAR (AS OF 2:00 P.M.) DONE
NOTHING TO IMPEDE ITS MOVEMENTS TOWARD THE MPR. AS FOR RUDINI'S
SUPPOSED PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS, WE WOULD RATE HIM ONLY AS A VERY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1889

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1889

PAGE 01 JAKART 02689 02 OF 02 140827Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/027W	

----------3DBDBB 140828Z /38

O 140826Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1530
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002689

DEPARTMENT FOR MONITORING WORKING GROUP, S/S-0 (CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER), EAP/PIMBS

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/08
TAGS: PINS, CASC, PHUM, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: MGIDO1: KEY FORMER MINISTER SPEAKS OF SOEHARTO'S OUSTER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

LONG SHORT FOR THE TOP JOB. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ2327

RELEASED IN PART
B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2327

PAGE 01 JAKART 02693 01 OF 03 141118Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01
	H-01	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/036W						

----------3DCE73 141118Z /38

O 141115Z MAY 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1532
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0686
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002693

DEPARTMENT FOR MGIDOI
S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02693 01 OF 03 141118Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MGIDOI: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/14)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: WIDESPREAD LOOTING AND BURNING OF SHOPS AND MAJOR MARKETS SWEPT OVER JAKARTA ON MAY 14, WITH SINO-INDONESIAN AREAS SUFFERING THE WORST DAMAGE. PLACES WHERE EMBASSY PERSONNEL LIVE WERE NOT DIRECTLY AFFECTED, BUT NEARBY AREAS WERE. SECURITY FORCES DID LITTLE TO INTERVENE. THERE WERE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF SINO-INDONESIANS BEING BEATEN AND KILLED. OFFICES AND SHOPS CLOSED AS LOOTING AND BURNING SPREAD TO VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE CITY, INCLUDING THE VICINITY OF THE EMBASSY. ARMY CHIEF WIRANTO TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY BUT WOULD NOT IMPOSE A CURFEW OR ISSUE SHOOT ON SIGHT ORDERS. EARLY REPORTS CLAIMED THAT STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS, NOW JOINED BY THOUSANDS OF OTHER CITIZENS, WERE MASSING AT VARIOUS POINTS, DETERMINED TO PREVENT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FROM RETURNING FROM ABROAD TO RESUME HIS DUTIES. HOWEVER, AS THE RIOTING INCREASED IN LATE AFTERNOON, UNIVERSITY STUDENTS REPORTEDLY HAVE DECIDED TO REMAIN IN THEIR CAMPUSES BEHIND LOCKED GATES. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH EMBOFFS, PEOPLE ON THE STREETS MADE CLEAR THEIR DESIRE THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO STEP DOWN. THERE WERE RUMORS OF PREPARATIONS UNDERWAY TO REMOVE THE PRESIDENT, BUT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHIEF HARMOKO SAID SOEHARTO'S PLANS WOULD ONLY BE CLARIFIED ONCE THE PRESIDENT RETURNED FROM EGYPT. THUS FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO ANTI-FOREIGN ELEMENT TO THE DISTURBANCES. THE AIRPORT HAS REMAINED OPEN BUT THE MAIN TOLL

ROAD LEADING TO IT HAS BEEN CLOSED. END SUMMARY.

WIDESPREAD LOOTING AND BURNING

---

3. (C) IN MID-MORNING ABOUT A DOZEN LARGE PLUMES OF SMOKE WERE VISIBLE FROM BURNING COMMERCIAL AREAS, MOSTLY EMANATING FROM PREDOMINANTLY SINO-INDONESIAN AREAS IN NORTH JAKARTA BUT SOON SPREADING TO VIRTUALLY ALL OTHER SECTIONS OF THE CITY. PLACES WHERE EMBASSY PERSONNEL AND OTHER EXPATRIATES LIVE WERE NOT

DIRECTLY AFFECTED, BUT NEARBY COMMERCIAL AREAS EXPERIENCED DAMAGE AND LOOTING. THERE ARE MANY UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF SINO-INDONESIANS BEING KILLED AND RIOTERS ATTACKING HOMES AS WELL AS SHOPS. SUPERMARKETS AND SHOPPING CENTERS IN SOME UPSCALE AREAS, AS WELL AS TRADITIONAL MARKETS AND SHOPS HAVE BEEN ATTACKED BY RAMPAGING LOOTERS, MOSTLY YOUNG MEN. IN MANY AREAS SECURITY FORCES WERE NOWHERE TO BE SEEN OR WERE STANDING BY DOING NOTHING.

4. (C) BY LATE AFTERNOON, NUMEROUS AREAS OF JAKARTA WHERE EMBASSY HAD CONTACTS WAS EXPERIENCING LOOTING. LOOTERS WERE CLEANING OUT STORES WITHIN A FEW BLOCKS OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. LOOTING AND BURNING ALONG GADJAH MADA STREET REACHED TO WITHIN SEVERAL HUNDRED METERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. AN AMERICAN CITIZEN REPORTED FROM THE HILTON HOTEL THAT THE MAIN POLICE STATION OF JAKARTA IMMEDIATELY ACROSS JALAN SUDIRMAN WAS UNDER ATTACK BY MOBS AND POLICE WERE RESPONDING WITH GUNSHOTS. NO AREA OF JAKARTA APPEARED TO BE IMMUNE FROM THE VIOLENCE. CALLERS FROM SINO-INDONESIAN AREAS OF TOWN APPEALED DESPERATELY FOR ASSISTANCE AND SAID LOOTERS WERE ENTERING PRIVATE HOMES. WHILE STREETS IN THE CENTER OF JAKARTA WERE ALMOST DEVOID OF TRAFFIC, TRAFFIC WAS REPORTED AT A STANDSTILL ON ROADS LEADING OUT OF THE CITY TO THE SOUTH.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. (C) AT A LATE AFTERNOON PRESS CONFERENCE, MILITARY CHIEF WIRANTO SAID HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO KEEP ORDER IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY, "THE BAROMETER OF SECURITY FOR THE NATION," BUT WOULD NOT ISSUE ANY SHOOT ON SIGHT ORDERS OR ESTABLISH ANY CURFEWS. AT AROUND 5 P.M., THREE TRACKED ARMORED VEHICLES ROLLED PAST THE EMBASSY AND TURNED INTO A NEARBY STREET WHERE STORES WERE BEING LOOTED. POLOFF, WHO WITNESSED THE TANKS PASSING, REPORTED THAT THEY EFFECTIVELY DISPERSED LOOTERS AND BYSTANDERS. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHIEF HARMOKO ATTEMPTED TO DOWNPLAY SOEHARTO'S STATEMENT IN EGYPT THAT HE WOULD STEP DOWN, ASSERTING THAT THE SITUATION WOULD ONLY BE CLARIFIED ONCE THE PRESIDENT RETURNED.

6. (C) WHILE NO AREAS OF JAKARTA APPEARED IMMUNE FROM LOOTING, INFORMATION REACHING THE EMBASSY INDICATED THE FOLLOWING AREAS SEEMED HARDEST HIT:

NORTH JAKARTA

--JALAN GAJAH MADA, GLODOK, KOTA
--TANJUNG PRIOK (PORT OF JAKARTA)

CENTRAL JAKARTA
--TANAH ABANG
--PASAR BARU
--PENCONONGAN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ2325

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2325

PAGE 01 JAKART 02693 02 OF 03 141117Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01
	H-01	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/036W

----------3DCE64 141117Z /38

O 141115Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1533
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AIT TAIPEI 0687
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002693

DEPARTMENT FOR MGIDOI
S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02693 02 OF 03 141117Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MGIDOI: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/14)

--SALEMBA (NEAR DOWNTOWN CAMPUS OF UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA)

WEST JAKARTA
--GROGOL, TOMANG (NEAR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY)
--MANGGARAI

SOUTH JAKARTA
--MAMPANG PRAPATAN
--BINTARO/KEBAYORAN LAMA

SUBURBS
--TANGERANG (WEST OF JAKARTA)
--BEKASI (EAST OF JAKARTA)
STUDENTS
---

7. (C) STUDENTS GATHERED IN THE SAME AREAS AS THE PREVIOUS DAY AND THIS TIME WERE JOINED BY THOUSANDS OF OFFICE WORKERS, HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS, AND OTHER RESIDENTS. POLOFF VISITED THE SALEMBA AREA FROM 1100 TO 1300, WHERE MASSES WERE GATHERING AROUND THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA CAMPUS AND SURROUNDING AREAS. A STUDENT INSIDE REPORTED THE CROWD TO BE ABOUT 5000. OUTSIDE CAMPUS, MASSES OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND LOCAL PEOPLE WERE GATHERING.

STORES IN THE AREA WERE CLOSED. NEAR THE UI CAMPUS, A POLICE VEHICLE HAD BEEN OVERTURNED AND SET ON FIRE. APPROACHING UI FROM THE SOUTHWEST, CROWDS WERE GATHERED AND SOME LOOTING WAS

TAKING PLACE. BYSTANDERS WERE GENERALLY PLEASED ABOUT THE SITUATION, AND MAKING COMMENTS SUCH AS "IT'S GOOD, SOEHARTO HAS TO GO," AND ONE SAID "IF WE CAN'T HAVE CHANGE A GOOD WAY, WE'LL HAVE IT ANOTHER WAY."

8. (C) STUDENTS WHO PLANNED TO MARCH TO THE PARLIAMENT ON MAY 14 HAVE CANCELED PLANS BECAUSE OF THE SITUATION AND ARE REMAINING ON CAMPUS, ACCORDING TO ONE STUDENT LEADER. STUDENTS ARE GATHERED AT A NUMBER OF JAKARTA CAMPUSES, AND PRESUMABLY ON CAMPUSES AROUND INDONESIA. THE STUDENT LEADER EMPHASIZED THAT THE RIOTING MASSES ARE NOT UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. ACCORDING TO ONE RELIABLE NATIONALIST SOURCE, THREE STUDENTS WERE KILLED BY SECURITY FORCES IN PONTIANAK, WEST KALIMANTAN ON MAY 13. A STUDENT CALLED FROM INSIDE THE UI CAMPUS TO URGE THE U.S. TO CALL THE MILITARY TO TELL THEM NOT TO SHOOT STUDENTS. HE WAS IN A PANICKED STATE AND BELIEVED THAT IF THEY TRIED TO LEAVE CAMPUS THEY WOULD BE ARRESTED AND SHOT BY SECURITY FORCES. HE SAID THAT 145 STUDENTS HAD DISAPPEARED TEN DAYS AGO.

9. (C) MID-MORNING, POLOFF WATCHED TWO GROUPS OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS FROM MANY CAMPUSES, ROPED TOGETHER, MARCH TOWARDS THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA SALEMBA CAMPUS AT ABOUT 11:30 AM. THE FIRST GROUP HELD BANNERS READING "NEPOTISM, CORRUPTION" AND "REFORMATION, REVOLUTION," AND SHOUTED FOR SOEHARTO STEP DOWN. THE SECOND GROUP WAS LED WITH A BANNER PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT FOR REFORM, AND SOME WERE SHOUTING "HANG SOEHARTO." A DEMONSTRATION WAS IN PROGRESS AT THE CAMPUS OF "YAI" ON THAT ROAD, AND STUDENTS BROUGHT A MOCK COFFIN AND EFFIGY OF SOEHARTO TO THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD TO BURN.

JOGJAKARTA

10. (C) SURABAYA CONSUL GENERAL, NOW IN JOGJAKARTA, REPORTS THAT THERE WERE TWO MINOR DEMONSTRATIONS IN JOGJA MAY 13. AT ABOUT 1800 LOCAL TIME MAY 13, POLICE ENTERED THE CAMPUS, BEAT SEVERAL STUDENTS AND TOOK SOME AWAY. CONGEN ALSO RECEIVED AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT POLICE FORCED TWO STUDENTS TO THE GROUND AND SHOT THEM.

SURABAYA

11. (C) CONGENOFF REPORTS THAT AS OF 1200 LOCAL TIME ABOUT 6000 STUDENTS FROM THE TEACHERS' TRANING COLLEGE (IKIP), STATE ISLMIC INSTITUTE (IAIN), JOINED BY HIGH SCHOOL STUENTS, WERE MARCHING FROM THEIR CAMPUSES TO THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE, A SIX-MILE DISTANCE, CARRYING ANTI-SOEHARTO BANNERS. THE MARCH WAS PEACEFUL; 100 POLICE ACCOMPANIED THE MARCHERS. THERE WAS ALSO A SMALL DEMONSTRATION AT SURABAYA'S LARGEST UNIVERSITY, AIRLANGGA, IN WHICH STUDENTS CARRIED OUT A MOCK BURIAL IN HONOR OF THE STUDENTS SHOT AT JAKARTA'S TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY MAY 12.
H:\ECON\SITREP.WP5

USITC VISITORS

NNNNPTQ2326

PAGE 01 JAKART 02693 03 OF 03 141117Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01
	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------3DCE65 141117Z /38

O 141115Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1534
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0688
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002693

DEPARTMENT FOR MGIDOI
S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02693 03 OF 03 141117Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MGIDOI: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/14)

---

12. (U) USITC VISITORS [redacted] ARE AT THE HOTEL BOROBUDUR (TEL 62-21 380-5555), NOT/NOT AT THE MANDARIN ORIENTAL FOR THE NIGHT OF MAY 14. THEY HAVE CANCELED THEIR MAY 15 TRIP TO BANDUNG. THEY HAVE PLANE TICKETS TO DEPART INDONESIA APPROXIMATELY 2330 ON MAY 15. PLEASE INFORM THEIR OFFICES. B6

SPENT FUEL RODS VISITORS

13. [redacted] IS SAFE AT THE MANDARIN ORIENTAL (ROOM 805, TEL. 325 666). [redacted] (ROOM 967) ARE AT THE HORIZON HOTEL IN ANCOL (THIS IS ON THE WATERFRONT, TEL. 640-6000 OR 640-7000) TO WHICH THEIR TAXI DRIVER WAS ABLE TO DELIVER THEM AFTER A HAIR-RAISING RIDE. PLEASE INFORM THEIR OFFICES. B6 B6

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

E8

PTQ2837

RELEASED IN PART
B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2837

PAGE 01 JAKART 02700 01 OF 03 141345Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01
	H-01	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/036W						

----------3DE01D 141346Z /38

O 141344Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1542
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
COMSEVENTHFLT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0693
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002700

DEPARTMENT FOR MGIDOI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02700 01 OF 03 141345Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 19 JUN 2006 200502473

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MGID0I: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/14)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: WIDESPREAD LOOTING AND BURNING OF SHOPS AND MAJOR MARKETS SWEPT OVER JAKARTA ON MAY 14, WITH SINO-INDONESIAN AREAS SUFFERING THE WORST DAMAGE. PLACES WHERE EMBASSY PERSONNEL LIVE WERE NOT DIRECTLY AFFECTED, BUT NEARBY AREAS WERE. SECURITY FORCES DID LITTLE TO INTERVENE. THERE WERE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF SINO-INDONESIANS BEING BEATEN AND KILLED. OFFICES AND SHOPS CLOSED AS LOOTING AND BURNING SPREAD TO VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE CITY, INCLUDING THE VICINITY OF THE EMBASSY. ARMY CHIEF WIRANTO TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY BUT WOULD NOT IMPOSE A CURFEW OR ISSUE 'SHOOT ON SIGHT ORDERS. EARLY REPORTS CLAIMED THAT STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS, NOW JOINED BY THOUSANDS OF OTHER CITIZENS, WERE MASSING AT VARIOUS POINTS, DETERMINED TO PREVENT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FROM RETURNING FROM ABROAD TO RESUME HIS DUTIES. HOWEVER, AS THE RIOTING INCREASED IN LATE AFTERNOON, UNIVERSITY STUDENTS REPORTEDLY HAVE DECIDED TO REMAIN IN THEIR CAMPUSES BEHIND LOCKED GATES. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH EMBOFFS, PEOPLE ON THE STREETS MADE CLEAR THEIR DESIRE THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO STEP

DOWN. THERE WERE RUMORS OF PREPARATIONS UNDERWAY TO REMOVE THE PRESIDENT, BUT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHIEF HARMOKO SAID SOEHARTO'S PLANS WOULD ONLY BE CLARIFIED ONCE THE PRESIDENT RETURNED FROM EGYPT. THUS FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO ANTI-FOREIGN ELEMENT TO THE DISTURBANCES. THE AIRPORT HAS REMAINED OPEN BUT THE MAIN TOLL ROAD LEADING TO IT HAS BEEN CLOSED. END SUMMARY.

WIDESPREAD LOOTING AND BURNING
---

3. (C) IN MID-MORNING ABOUT A DOZEN LARGE PLUMES OF SMOKE WERE VISIBLE FROM BURNING COMMERCIAL AREAS, MOSTLY EMANATING FROM PREDOMINANTLY SINO-INDONESIAN AREAS IN NORTH JAKARTA BUT SOON SPREADING TO VIRTUALLY ALL OTHER SECTIONS OF THE CITY. PLACES WHERE EMBASSY PERSONNEL AND OTHER EXPATRIATES LIVE WERE NOT DIRECTLY AFFECTED, BUT NEARBY COMMERCIAL AREAS EXPERIENCED DAMAGE AND LOOTING. THERE ARE MANY UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF SINO-INDONESIANS BEING KILLED AND RIOTERS ATTACKING HOMES AS WELL AS SHOPS. SUPERMARKETS AND SHOPPING CENTERS IN SOME UPSCALE AREAS, AS WELL AS TRADITIONAL MARKETS AND SHOPS HAVE BEEN ATTACKED BY RAMPAGING LOOTERS, MOSTLY YOUNG MEN. IN MANY AREAS SECURITY FORCES WERE NOWHERE TO BE SEEN OR WERE STANDING BY DOING NOTHING.

4. (C) BY LATE AFTERNOON, NUMEROUS AREAS OF JAKARTA WHERE EMBASSY HAD CONTACTS WAS EXPERIENCING LOOTING. LOOTERS WERE CLEANING OUT STORES WITHIN A FEW BLOCKS OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. LOOTING AND BURNING ALONG GADJAH MADA STREET REACHED TO WITHIN SEVERAL HUNDRED METERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. AN AMERICAN CITIZEN REPORTED FROM THE HILTON HOTEL THAT THE MAIN POLICE STATION OF JAKARTA IMMEDIATELY ACROSS JALAN SUDIRMAN WAS UNDER ATTACK BY MOBS AND POLICE WERE RESPONDING WITH GUNSHOTS. NO AREA

OF JAKARTA APPEARED TO BE IMMUNE FROM THE VIOLENCE. CALLERS FROM SINO-INDONESIAN AREAS OF TOWN APPEALED DESPERATELY FOR ASSISTANCE AND SAID LOOTERS WERE ENTERING PRIVATE HOMES. WHILE STREETS IN THE CENTER OF JAKARTA WERE ALMOST DEVOID OF TRAFFIC, TRAFFIC WAS REPORTED AT A STANDSTILL ON ROADS LEADING OUT OF THE CITY TO THE SOUTH.

5. (C) AT A LATE AFTERNOON PRESS CONFERENCE, MILITARY CHIEF WIRANTO SAID HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO KEEP ORDER IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY, "THE BAROMETER OF SECURITY FOR THE NATION," BUT WOULD NOT ISSUE ANY SHOOT ON SIGHT ORDERS OR ESTABLISH ANY CURFEWS. AT AROUND 5 P.M., THREE TRACKED ARMORED VEHICLES ROLLED PAST THE EMBASSY AND TURNED INTO A NEARBY STREET WHERE STORES WERE BEING LOOTED. POLOFF, WHO WITNESSED THE TANKS PASSING, REPORTED THAT THEY EFFECTIVELY DISPERSED LOOTERS AND BYSTANDERS. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHIEF HARMOKO ATTEMPTED TO DOWNPLAY SOEHARTO'S STATEMENT IN EGYPT THAT HE WOULD STEP DOWN, ASSERTING THAT THE SITUATION WOULD ONLY BE CLARIFIED ONCE THE PRESIDENT RETURNED.

6. (C) WHILE NO AREAS OF JAKARTA APPEARED IMMUNE FROM LOOTING, INFORMATION REACHING THE EMBASSY INDICATED THE FOLLOWING AREAS SEEMED HARDEST HIT:

NORTH JAKARTA
--JALAN GAJAH MADA, GLODOK, KOTA

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ2838

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2838

PAGE 01 JAKART 02700 02 OF 03 141346Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01
	H-01	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/036W

----------3DE01E 141347Z /38

O 141344Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1543
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
COMSEVENTHFLT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE

AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0694
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002700

DEPARTMENT FOR MGIDOI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MGIDOI: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/14)

--TANJUNG PRIOK (PORT OF JAKARTA)

CENTRAL JAKARTA
--TANAH ABANG
--PASAR BARU
--PENCONONGAN
--SALEMBA (NEAR DOWNTOWN CAMPUS OF UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA)

WEST JAKARTA
--GROGOL, TOMANG (NEAR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY)
--MANGGARAI

SOUTH JAKARTA
--MAMPANG PRAPATAN
--BINTARO/KEBAYORAN LAMA

SUBURBS
--TANGERANG (WEST OF JAKARTA)

--BEKASI (EAST OF JAKARTA)
STUDENTS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

7. (C) STUDENTS GATHERED IN THE SAME AREAS AS THE PREVIOUS DAY AND THIS TIME WERE JOINED BY THOUSANDS OF OFFICE WORKERS, HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS, AND OTHER RESIDENTS. POLOFF VISITED THE SALEMBA AREA FROM 1100 TO 1300, WHERE MASSES WERE GATHERING AROUND THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA CAMPUS AND SURROUNDING AREAS. A STUDENT INSIDE REPORTED THE CROWD TO BE ABOUT 5000. OUTSIDE CAMPUS, MASSES OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND LOCAL PEOPLE WERE GATHERING. STORES IN THE AREA WERE CLOSED. NEAR THE UI CAMPUS, A POLICE VEHICLE HAD BEEN OVERTURNED AND SET ON FIRE. APPROACHING UI FROM THE SOUTHWEST, CROWDS WERE GATHERED AND SOME LOOTING WAS TAKING PLACE. BYSTANDERS WERE GENERALLY PLEASED ABOUT THE SITUATION, AND MAKING COMMENTS SUCH AS "IT'S GOOD, SOEHARTO HAS TO GO," AND ONE SAID "IF WE CAN'T HAVE CHANGE A GOOD WAY, WE'LL HAVE IT ANOTHER WAY."

8. (C) STUDENTS WHO PLANNED TO MARCH TO THE PARLIAMENT ON MAY 14 HAVE CANCELED PLANS BECAUSE OF THE SITUATION AND ARE REMAINING ON CAMPUS, ACCORDING TO ONE STUDENT LEADER. STUDENTS ARE GATHERED AT A NUMBER OF JAKARTA CAMPUSES, AND PRESUMABLY ON CAMPUSES AROUND INDONESIA. THE STUDENT LEADER EMPHASIZED THAT THE RIOTING MASSES ARE NOT UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. ACCORDING TO ONE RELIABLE NATIONALIST SOURCE, THREE STUDENTS WERE KILLED BY SECURITY FORCES IN PONTIANAK, WEST KALIMANTAN ON MAY 13. A STUDENT CALLED FROM INSIDE THE UI CAMPUS TO URGE THE U.S. TO CALL THE MILITARY TO TELL THEM NOT TO SHOOT STUDENTS. HE WAS IN A PANICKED STATE AND BELIEVED THAT IF THEY TRIED TO LEAVE CAMPUS THEY WOULD BE ARRESTED AND SHOT BY SECURITY FORCES. HE SAID THAT 145 STUDENTS HAD DISAPPEARED TEN DAYS AGO.

9. (C) MID-MORNING, POLOFF WATCHED TWO GROUPS OF UNIVERSITY

STUDENTS FROM MANY CAMPUSES, ROPED TOGETHER, MARCH TOWARDS THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA SALEMBA CAMPUS AT ABOUT 11:30 AM. THE FIRST GROUP HELD BANNERS READING "NEPOTISM, CORRUPTION" AND "REFORMATION, REVOLUTION," AND SHOUTED FOR SOEHARTO STEP DOWN. THE SECOND GROUP WAS LED WITH A BANNER PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT FOR REFORM, AND SOME WERE SHOUTING "HANG SOEHARTO." A DEMONSTRATION WAS IN PROGRESS AT THE CAMPUS OF "YAI" ON THAT ROAD, AND STUDENTS BROUGHT A MOCK COFFIN AND EFFIGY OF SOEHARTO TO THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD TO BURN.

JOGJAKARTA
---

10. (C) SURABAYA CONSUL GENERAL, NOW IN JOGJAKARTA, REPORTS THAT THERE WERE TWO MINOR DEMONSTRATIONS IN JOGJA MAY 13. AT ABOUT 1800 LOCAL TIME MAY 13, POLICE ENTERED THE CAMPUS, BEAT SEVERAL STUDENTS AND TOOK SOME AWAY. CONGEN ALSO RECEIVED AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT POLICE FORCED TWO STUDENTS TO THE GROUND AND SHOT THEM.

SURABAYA
---

11. (C) CONGENOFF REPORTS THAT AS OF 1200 LOCAL TIME ABOUT 6000

NNNNPTQ2839

PAGE 01 JAKART 02700 03 OF 03 141346Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01
	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------3DE01F 141347Z /38

O 141344Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1544
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
COMSEVENTHFLT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0695
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002700

DEPARTMENT FOR MGID0I

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MGIDOI: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/14)

STUDENTS FROM THE TEACHERS' TRAINING COLLEGE (IKIP), STATE ISLAMIC INSTITUTE (IAIN), JOINED BY HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS, WERE MARCHING FROM THEIR CAMPUSES TO THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE, A SIX-MILE DISTANCE, CARRYING ANTI-SOEHARTO BANNERS. THE MARCH WAS PEACEFUL; 100 POLICE ACCOMPANIED THE MARCHERS. THERE WAS ALSO A SMALL DEMONSTRATION AT SURABAYA'S LARGEST UNIVERSITY, AIRLANGGA, IN WHICH STUDENTS CARRIED OUT A MOCK BURIAL IN HONOR OF THE STUDENTS SHOT AT JAKARTA'S TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY MAY 12.
H:\ECON\SITREP.WP5

USITC VISITORS

12. (U) USITC VISITORS [redacted] ARE AT THE HOTEL BOROBUDUR (TEL 62-21 380-5555), NOT/NOT AT THE MANDARIN ORIENTAL FOR THE NIGHT OF MAY 14. THEY HAVE CANCELED THEIR MAY 15 TRIP TO BANDUNG. THEY HAVE PLANE TICKETS TO DEPART INDONESIA APPROXIMATELY 2330 ON MAY 15. PLEASE INFORM THEIR OFFICES. B6

SPENT FUEL RODS VISITORS

13. [redacted] IS SAFE AT THE MANDARIN ORIENTAL (ROOM 805, TEL. B6

325 666). [redacted] B6
ARE AT THE HORIZON HOTEL IN ANCOL (THIS IS ON THE WATERFRONT, TEL. 640-6000 OR 640-7000) TO WHICH THEIR TAXI DRIVER WAS ABLE TO DELIVER THEM AFTER A HAIR-RAISING RIDE. PLEASE INFORM THEIR OFFICES.

14. (U) NOTE: RESENT BECAUSE ADDRESSEES USCINCPAC AND COMSEVENTHFLT INADVERTENTLY LEFT OFF ON TELEGRAM.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5414

PAGE 01 JAKART 02724 01 OF 03 150959Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W

----------3E4131 151000Z /38

O 150957Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1564
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0696
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002724

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT FOR MGIDOI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02724 01 OF 03 150959Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 14 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 19 JUN 2006 200502473

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MGID0I: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/15)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE SECURITY SITUATION WAS MUCH IMPROVED IN JAKARTA DURING THE DAY OF MAY 15, THOUGH OVERNIGHT THERE WAS LOOTING IN SOME PARTS OF THE CITY AS WELL AS DAYTIME LOOTING IN WESTERN SUBURBS. MILITARY FORCES TOOK UP POSITIONS IN SOME PARTS OF THE CITY THOUGH MUCH OF THE WORST HIT AREAS STILL HAD NO VISIBLE SECURITY PRESENCE. OVER 100 PEOPLE DIED IN A PLAZA FIRE IN EAST JAKARTA, MANY OF THEM MAY HAVE BEEN LOOTERS. SURABAYA SAW VIOLENCE AND LOOTING OVERNIGHT AND LARGE CROWDS GATHERED IN THE STREETS DURING THE DAY. THERE WAS NO MAJOR VIOLENCE REPORTED ELSEWHERE THOUGH MAY 14 SAW VERY LARGE PEACEFUL STUDENT GATHERINGS. THE OPPOSITION APPEARS TO HAVE FAILED TO PRODUCE A UNIFIED FRONT DESPITE INTENSE NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH RUMORS ABOUND, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO SERIOUS EFFORT TO PERSUADE SOEHARTO, WHO RETURNED EARLY MAY 15, TO STEP DOWN. END SUMMARY

SECURITY SITUATION
---

3. (SBU) THE PARTS OF JAKARTA HARD HIT BY RIOTING AND LOOTING ON

MAY 14 WERE RELATIVELY CALM MAY 15. TRAFFIC WAS LIGHT AND ALMOST EVERYTHING APPEARED TO BE CLOSED IN CENTRAL JAKARTA AS WORKERS STAYED AT HOME. TRAINS, TAXIS, AND SMALL BUSES WERE RUNNING, BUT THE LARGER BUSES THAT TRANSPORT MANY JAKARTA WORKERS TO THEIR HOMES IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY WERE NOT RUNNING. POLOFFS TRAVELLED THROUGH SEVERAL OF THE AREAS IN NORTH, CENTRAL, WESTERN AND SOUTH JAKARTA THAT ON MAY 14 HAD SEEN LARGE MOBS SMASH WINDOWS, LOOT THE STORES WHERE THEY WERE ABLE TO BREAK THROUGH PROTECTIVE GATES AND GAIN ENTRANCE, AND -- IN SOME CASES -- STOP

AND BURN NUMEROUS CARS AND MOTORCYCLES. ON THE MORNING OF MAY 15, THERE WERE MANY PEOPLE IN THE STREETS THAT POLOFFS PASSED THROUGH CURIOUSLY SURVEYING THE DAMAGE, BUT NO MOBS HAD FORMED.

4. (U) A FIRE IN AN EAST JAKARTA PLAZA WHICH WAS BEING LOOTED APPEARS TO HAVE TRAPPED AND KILLED OVER 100 INDIVIDUALS. DETAILS ABOUT THE TRAGEDY ARE ONLY BEGINNING TO EMERGE.

5. (SBU) COMMANDER IN CHIEF WIRANTO EXPRESSED "SYMPATHY FOR STUDENTS INVOLVED IN THE REFORM MOVEMENT AND EXPRESSED REGRET FOR THE KILLINGS OF STUDENTS ON MARCH 12. SECURITY FORCES WERE MORE IN EVIDENCE ON MAY 15 THAN THEY HAD BEEN THE PREVIOUS DAY, BUT IN MODERATE NUMBERS AND USUALLY AT CHECK POINTS. IN HARDEST HIT AREAS, SUCH AS THE WEST JAKARTA NEIGHBORHOODS OF GROGOL AND TANNAH ABANG, SECURITY FORCE PRESENCE WAS MINIMAL. ARMORED VEHICLE AND SMALL GROUPS OF MARINES AND POLICE WERE STATIONED NEAR SOME COMMERCIAL AREAS THAT HAD SUFFERED THE WORST DAMAGE ON MAY 14. ARMORED VEHICLES ALSO WERE STATIONED AT POINTS ALONG JAKARTA'S MAIN THAMRIN/SUDIRMAN AVENUE. THE COMMERCIAL AREAS BLOK M AND PONDOK INDAH, IN THE SOUTH OF THE CITY WHERE EMBASSY PERSONNEL LIVE WERE CALM ON MAY 15 (THEY HAD NOT BEEN AFFECTED ON MAY 14). MAJOR DAMAGE FROM EVENING MAY 14 IN A COMMERCIAL AREA

NEAR PONDOK INDAH WAS VISIBLE.

6. (SBU) THE FIRES THAT CAST A SMOKY HAZE OVER JAKARTA ON MAY 14 GREATLY DISSIPATED BY THE MORNING OF MAY 15. THERE WAS ONE PLUME OF BLACK SMOKE POURING OUT OF A LOCATION IN NORTH JAKARTA, HOWEVER. THROUGH MAY 15, THE AIRPORT AND THE TOLL ROAD LEADING TO IT WERE OPEN, WITH NO MILITARY PRESENCE APPARENT. THE AREAS AROUND TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN WEST JAKARTA, WHERE STUDENTS WERE KILLED, WAS CALM, WITH SOME ARMORED VEHICLES AND SMALL NUMBERS OF TROOPS VISIBLE TAKING STATIONARY POSITIONS.

7. (SBU) AS OF MIDDAY, A SOURCE AT THE SINGAPORE EMBASSY REPORTED PROBLEMS IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS FOR SOME OF ITS CITIZENS. THE SINGAPORE EMBASSY WAS GETTING CALLS FROM PEOPLE WHOSE HOUSE WERE BEING ATTACKED AND LOOTED, INCLUDING IN A WEALTHY AREA NEAR PLAZA SENYAN IN THE HEART OF THE CITY.

8. (U) THERE WERE ALSO MULTIPLE REPORTS OF LOOTING OF HOUSES IN

THE NEIGHBORING CITY OF TANGGERANG AND A LUXURY HOUSING ESTATE WEST OF THE CITY CALLED LIPPO KIRAWACI.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS

9. (C) POLITICAL CIRCLES IN JAKARTA CONTINUE TO BE IN FERMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ5415

CONFIDENTIAL PTO3986

PAGE 01 JAKART 02724 02 OF 03 151000Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W

----------3E4133 151000Z /38

O 150957Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1565
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AIT TAIPEI 0697
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002724

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT FOR MGIDOI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02724 02 OF 03 151000Z

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MGIDOI: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/15)

WITH EFFORTS TO WELD TOGETHER AN ALLIANCE OF MAJOR OPPOSITION FIGURES MEGAWATI, AMIEN RAIS AND GUS DUR FALLING SHORT.

[redacted] B1

10. (U) LT. GENERAL PRABOWO, THE HEAD OF THE STRATEGIC RESERVE COMMAND AND SOEHARTO'S SON-IN-LAW, DELIVERED A SHORT STATEMENT CARRIED ON TELEVISION AT 0900 MAY 15 IN WHICH HE ANNOUNCED THAT SOEHARTO HAD RETURNED TO INDONESIA AN WOULD BE TAKING CHARGE OF THE SITUATIONS. HE SAID THAT DEFENSE MINISTER/COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES WIRANTO WAS MEETING WITH SOEHARTO, AND THAT HE, PRABOWO, WAS ALSO WORKING CLOSELY WITH WIRANTO. PRABOWO CONTENDED THAT THE RIOTING AND LOOTING WAS NOT HELPFUL TO THE CAUSE OF REFORM. HE DENIED THAT THERE WAS ANY DIVISION WITHIN THE MILITARY. RUMORS THAT PRABOWO WOULD BE NAMED TO LEAD A NEW MILITARY INTELIGENCE ORGANIZATION AIMED AT IMPROVING SECURITY IN

THE NATION APPEAR TO BE GROUNDLESS.



B1

13. (U) KOSGORO, A MASS BASED ORGANIZATION WITH CONNECTIONS TO RULING PARTY GOLKAR, ISSUED A STATEMENT MAY 14 CALLING ON THE MPR TO HOLD AN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE MPR FOR THE PURPOSE OF RETURNING THE MANDATE GIVEN SOEHARTO AND HABIBIE TO THE PEOPLE. THE STATEMENT SAID THAT "THIS IS IN LINE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS IN CAIRO THAT HE WAS READY TO STAND DOWN.

CONFIDENTIAL

STUDENT ACTIVITY

14. (U) STUDENTS IN SURABAYA, JEMBER, SEMARANG, JOGJAKARTA, AND BANDUNG HELD MASSIVE PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 14. IN MOST CASES, THE SECURITY FORCES WERE PERMISSIVE AND DID NOT BLOCK DEMONSTRATORS FROM LEAVING CAMPUSES.

15. (U) IN BANDUNG, A DEMONSTRATION OF BETWEEN 80,000 AND 100,000 PEOPLE WAS HELD ON THE FIELD IN FRONT OF THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING. THERE WERE SOME REPORTS OF RIOTING AND SHOOTING IN BANDUNG BUT NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE STUDENT ACTIVITY.

16. (U) IN SEMARANG, STUDENTS TOOK OVER A STATE-OWNED RADIO STATION AND STARTED BROADCASTING THEMSELVES. THEY DEMANDED TOTAL REFORM, LOWER PRICES, A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR, AND AN END TO ALL VIOLENCE. SECURITY PERSONNEL WERE PRESENT BUT DID NOT MOVE AGAINST THE STUDENTS, WHO WERE JOINED BY SEVERAL HUNDRED LOCAL RESIDENTS. STUDENTS IN MEDAN WERE BLOCKED BY SECURITY FORCES WHEN THEY TRIED TO MARCH OFF CAMPUS. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, A FRIENDLY NEGOTIATION TOOK PLACE BETWEEN STUDENTS AND THE MILITARY, AND THE STUDENTS HELD A FREE SPEECH FORUM ON THE STREET OUTSIDE CAMPUS.

PAGE 01 JAKART 02724 03 OF 03 151000Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W

----------3E4139 151000Z /38

O 150957Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1566
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0698
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002724

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT FOR MGIDOI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02724 03 OF 03 151000Z

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MGID0I: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/15)

17. (U) DEMONSTRATORS IN PURWOKERTO WERE DISPERSED BY TEAR GAS WHEN THEY TRIED TO MOVE OFF CAMPUS.

18. (U) SECURITY FORCES FIRED RUBBER BULLETS AT STUDENTS IN SOLO (SURAKARTA) AT MUHAMMADIYAH UNIVERSITY WHEN THEY TRIED TO BREAK THROUGH A POLICE BARRICADE. THE VIOLENCE LED TO A RIOT IN THE AREA.

19. (U) AN EMBASSY FSN IN MEDAN REPORTS THE CITY WAS CALM ON MAY 15 WITH MILITARY PERSONNEL STILL PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE CITY.

20. (U) AMCONSUL SURABAYA, WHO IS IN JOGJAKARTA, REPORTS THAT SECURITY FORCES AGAIN MOVED INTO A MAJOR UNIVESITY CAMPUS UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS AND CHASED AND BEAT STUDENTS. AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT CLAIMED THAT TWO STUDENTS WERE SHOT WHILE LAYING ON THE GROUND.

21. (U) ON MARCH 14, STUDENTS HELD DEMONSTRATIONS ON A NUMBER OF JAKARTA CAMPUSES, INCLUDING UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA (UI) SALEMBA, THE CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA (UKI), JAYABAYA UNIVERSITY,

AND ATMA JAYA. MASSES OF NON-STUDENTS GATHERED OUTSIDE THE UI AND ATMA JAYA WERE TAUNTING STUDENTS TO COME OUTSIDE THE CAMPUS AND JOIN THE MASS. STUDENTS STAYED BARRICADED ON CAMPUSES. STUDENT LEADERS ARE REPORTEDLY APPEALING TO STUDENTS TO REMAIN ON CAMPUSES.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3361

PAGE 01 JAKART 02950 01 OF 03 280452Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------428AE2 280453Z /38
O 280448Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1801
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002950

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, MOPS, PINR, OREP, ID
SUBJECT: CODEL SMITH CALLS ON JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI

REF: JAKARTA 2903

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02950 01 OF 03 280452Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 27 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 21 JUN 2006 200502473

REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: CONGRESSMAN SMITH AND STAFFER REES, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR, CALLED ON JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI MAY 27. SMITH, WHO HAD JUST VISITED POLITICAL PRISONERS IN JAKARTA'S CIPINANG PRISON, WELCOMED THE RELEASE OF SEVERAL PRISONERS AND THE PLAN TO RELEASE MORE. HE URGED THAT THE RELEASES BE BASED ON PRINCIPLES AND NOT CATEGORIES. MULADI EXPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD FORMED A COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER ALL RELEASES, BUT THAT CERTAIN CATEGORIES HAD TO BE EXCLUDED. MULADI ALSO SAID THAT THE MILITARY HAD VETO POWER FOR ANY PRISONER PROPOSED FOR RELEASE. RELEASES WOULD PROCEED, "STEP BY STEP," BUT "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." SMITH ALSO RAISED OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS INCLUDING TORTURE, USE OF THE ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW, REPORTS OF MILITARY REPRESSION IN IRIAN JAYA, RELEASE OF EAST TIMORESE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO, MILITARY ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISAPPEARANCE CASES. THE MINISTER RAISED INDONESIA'S DIRE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND SOUGHT US SUPPORT. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED POSSIBLE US TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN PREPARING REFORM LEGISLATION IN A VARIETY OF FIELDS. END SUMMARY

3. (U) CODEL SMITH (CONGRESSMAN CHRISTOPHER SMITH AND SENIOR STAFFER JOSEPH REES), ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSADOR AND POLCOUNS (NOTETAKER), CALLED ON JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI MAY 27. THE MINISTER WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ERMAN RAJAGUGUK, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR LAW AND LEGISLATION AND ROMLI ATMASASMITA, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS IN THE MINISTRY.

POLITICAL PRISONERS

CONFIDENTIAL

4. (C) CONGRESSMAN SMITH BEGAN BY EXPRESSING APPRECIATION TO THE MINISTER FOR FACILITATING HIS VISIT TO CIPINANG PRISON EARLIER IN THE DAY (SEPTEL) WHERE HE MET MANY POLITICAL PRISONERS. MINISTER MULADI SAID THAT HE HAD JUST MET WITH FAMILIES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS ACTIVELY CONSIDERING RELEASE FOR MANY SUCH PRISONERS. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS NOT ABLE TO MAKE RELEASE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY. DECISIONS WERE REVIEWED BY THE MILITARY AND BY OTHER CABINET MINISTERS. IN RESPONSE TO SMITH'S QUESTION, THE MINISTER CLARIFIED THAT WHILE DECISIONS DID NOT REQUIRE UNANIMITY, IF THE MILITARY OBJECTED, THEN A PRISONER

COULD NOT BE RELEASED.

5. (C) MULADI EXPLAINED THAT THERE WAS A PROCESS OF CATEGORIZATION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, WITH SOME PRISONERS, SUCH AS THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) AND THE 1965 COUP, NOT TO BE INCLUDED AMONG RELEASEES. MULADI SAID THAT INDONESIA WAS STILL TRAUMATIZED BY ITS EXPERIENCE WITH COMMUNISM AND THAT THEREFORE THERE COULD NOT BE RELEASES FROM THIS CATEGORY. SMITH POINTED OUT THAT THESE PRISONERS WERE IN THEIR SEVENTIES AND EIGHTIES AND ASKED IF IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER THEIR RELEASE ON A HUMANITARIAN BASIS. MULADI RESPONDED THAT THE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY (FEISAL TANJUNG) HAD ALREADY SENT A LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS (WHO ALSO IS ON THE DECISION-MAKING COMMITTEE ON RELEASES) TO PROPOSE A CATEGORY BE ADDED THAT WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AGE AND ILL HEALTH. MULADI SAID THAT THE RELEASE-DECISION COMMITTEE WOULD MEET NEXT WEEK TO CONSIDER RELEASE OF OLD OR INFIRM PRISONERS, "INCLUDING COMMUNISTS." HE SPECULATED THAT THERE MIGHT BE FIVE INDIVIDUALS IN THIS CATEGORY.

6. (C) MULADI SAID THE GOI WOULD RELEASE PRISONERS "STEP-BY-STEP."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02950 01 OF 03 280452Z

IN ADDITION TO MEMBERS OF THE FORMER COMMUNIST PARTY, RELEASEES COULD NOT BE DRAWN FROM THE RANKS OF ANYONE SEEKING TO CHANGE THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA AND OR ANYONE WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN GENERAL CRIMINAL OFFENSES. ON THE BASIS OF THESE CRITERIA, MULADI SAID HE HAD ASKED HIS STAFF TO IDENTIFY ELIGIBLE POLITICAL PRISONERS FROM ALL OVER INDONESIA. HE SAID THAT AN ADDITIONAL FIVE WOULD BE RELEASED "IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS." THERE WOULD ALSO BE BETWEEN FIVE AND TEN EAST TIMORESE PRISONERS RELEASED. THESE HAD ONLY BEEN INVOLVED IN DEMONSTRATIONS. RELEASE OF EAST TIMORESE INVOLVED IN RESISTANCE WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED WITH THE ARMED FORCES.

7. (C) SMITH PROPOSED TO MULADI THAT, RATHER THAN DEAL WITH CATEGORIES, THE GOI TREAT THE ISSUE AS ONE OF RECONCILIATION. BY HOLDING SOME BACK, CERTAIN PRISONERS COULD DRAW THE INTEREST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (AS MARTYRS). ON THE OTHER HAND, FOR THE MOMENT, SMITH NOTED, MANY INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, WERE "VERY OPTIMISTIC." HE ADDED THAT HE HAD SEEN FOR HIMSELF THAT THE DOOR IS NOW OPEN TO CHANGE AND THAT THIS CONSTITUTED A VERY POSITIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3363

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3363

PAGE 01 JAKART 02950 02 OF 03 280452Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------428AE6 280453Z /38
O 280448Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1802
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002950

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, MOPS, PINR, OREP, ID
SUBJECT: CODEL SMITH CALLS ON JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI

REF: JAKARTA 2903

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -- AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, FOR INDONESIAN CITIZENS.

OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS
---

8. (C) TOUCHING ON THE ISSUE OF EAST TIMOR, MULADI SAID THAT CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO A "SPECIAL STATUS" FOR EAST TIMOR WHICH WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THAT ACCORDED THE CITIES OF JOGJAKARTA AND JAKARTA. HE ADDED THAT THE CONCEPT WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT SENIOR LEVELS NEXT WEEK.

9. (C) SMITH INFORMED MULADI THAT IN HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE EARLIER IN THE DAY, THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID THAT THE GOI WOULD SIGN AND RATIFY THE ANTI-TORTURE CONVENTION. IN RESPONSE TO SMITH'S QUESTION OF HOW THE RATIFICATION WOULD BE TRANSLATED INTO INSTRUCTIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL ARMY TROOPS AND POLICE, MULADI SAID THIS WOULD BE PART OF A NATIONAL PLAN TO DEFEND HUMAN RIGHTS AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF THIS ACTION PLAN WOULD INVOLVE CHANGES IN KEY POLITICAL LAWS TO INCLUDE (IN ADDITION TO OUTLAWING TORTURE) PROTECTION OF CIVIL POLITICAL RIGHTS AND PROHIBITIONS ON DISAPPEARANCES.

10. (C) RESPONDING TO SMITH'S QUESTION ABOUT THE ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW, MULADI SAID THAT REVISION OF THIS LAW WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF A NUMBER OF POLITICAL AREAS, SUCH AS THE POLITICAL PARTIES LAW AND THE STRUCTURING OF THE MPR AND PARLIAMENT. IN THE MEANTIME, MULADI SAID HE HAD ASKED ALL JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS TO CEASE USING THIS LAW. THIS AMOUNTED TO A "DE-FACTO" END OF THE WIDELY UNPOPULAR LAW WHOSE VAGUE PROVISIONS

HAVE MADE IT A LEGAL TOOL OF CHOICE FOR PROSECUTION OF MANY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PROMINENT POLITICAL DISSENTERS. NOTE: MULADI'S REMARKS TO THIS EFFECT WERE CARRIED IN THE PRESS.)

11. (C) IN RESPONSE TO THE CONGRESSMAN'S QUESTION ABOUT THE LEGAL PROCESS FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES ACCUSED OF VIOLATING THE RIGHTS OF CIVILIANS, MULADI EXPLAINED THAT SUCH CASES ARE HANDLED IN MILITARY COURTS. WITH REGARD TO THE MILITARY'S REPORT ON THE SHOOTING DEATHS OF FOUR STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY MAY 19, MULADI SAID THAT THE ABRI REPORT IS EXPECTED SHORTLY. IN RESPONSE TO SMITH'S OBSERVATION THAT THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAD EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE REPORT APPARENTLY TARGETED ONLY POLICE (NOT ARMY) PERSONNEL, MULADI EXPRESSED THE PERSONAL VIEW THAT THE REPORT WOULD BE ACCURATE.

12. (C) SMITH THEN TURNED TO IRIAN JAYA, RECALLING THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD IN ONE MEETING THAT PORTIONS OF THAT PROVINCE HAD BEEN CLOSED OFF BY THE MILITARY AND THAT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE AREA WERE CAUSING SUBSTANTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE. IT APPEARED THE MILITARY WAS ACTING WITH IMPUNITY -- WHAT COULD BE DONE? MULADI RESPONDED GENERALLY THAT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE NOW A MATTER OF NATIONAL PRIORITY IN ALL OF INDONESIA, INCLUDING IRIAN JAYA. THE MILITARY WAS ATTEMPTING TO INSTILL RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN ITS PERSONNEL. SUCH MATTERS (AS THE IRIAN JAYA SITUATION) WERE ALSO A SUBJECT FOR THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO DEAL WITH (THE COMMISSION, ON MAY 25, RECEIVED THE SAME REPORT THE CONGRESSMAN WAS GIVEN MAY 26.)

13. (C) STAFFER REES ENQUIRED ABOUT THE STATUS OF A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO WERE STILL MISSING, SOME OF WHOM HAD BEEN REPORTEDLY SEEN BY RECENTLY RELEASED DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS DURING THEIR INCARCERATION. MULADI AGAIN REFERRED TO THE ON-GOING ABRI
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INVESTIGATION AND CALLED FOR PATIENCE UNTIL THE REPORT WAS ISSUED.

[redacted] B1

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

14. (C) MULADI ADDED THAT IN ADDITION TO THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, THE GOI WAS ALSO DEALING WITH THE MAJOR ECONOMIC PROBLEM. [redacted] B1 HE EMPHASIZED THAT THERE WAS ALREADY STRONG POLITICAL WILL "TO DO THE RIGHT THING." SMITH RESPONDED THAT THE GOI HAD SENT A CLEAR AND STRONG MESSAGE BY PLEDGING TO RELEASE PRISONERS.

15. (C) MULADI CONTINUED THAT HIS MINISTRY WAS ALSO DEEPLY INVOLVED IN DEVELOPING NEW ECONOMIC LAWS, ALL TO BE READY BY THE END OF THE YEAR. THESE INCLUDED NEW LAWS DEALING WITH BANKRUPTCY, COMPETITION, INVESTMENT, ANTI-MONOPOLY LEGISLATION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION MEASURES. THIS WAS IN ADDITION TO MINISTRY WORK TO

NNNNPTQ3362

PAGE 01 JAKART 02950 03 OF 03 280453Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------428AE9 280453Z /38

O 280448Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1803
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002950

ROME FOR THE VATICAN
CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, MOPS, PINR, OREP, ID
SUBJECT: CODEL SMITH CALLS ON JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI

REF: JAKARTA 2903

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PREPARE NEW POLITICAL LAWS, INCLUDING A NEW GENERAL ELECTION LAW. THIS AMOUNTED TO A "REVOLUTION, NOT SIMPLY REFORM." THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE US WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ASSISTING THE MINISTRY IF THERE WERE NEEDS FOR EXPERTISE IN ANY OF THESE FIELDS. HE ADDED THAT AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD WOULD BE COMING TO JAKARTA IN THE FIRST WEEK OF JUNE, AFFORDING AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS HOW THE USG COULD ASSIST IN PROVISION OF TECHNICAL EXPERTISE. MULADI SAID THAT HIS MINISTRY WAS ALREADY FAMILIAR WITH THE USEFUL ELIPSE PROGRAM FUNDED BY AID.

A NEW DAY DAWNING
---

16. (C) SMITH CONCLUDED THAT BASED ON HIS MANY MEETINGS IN JAKARTA, HE HAD TOLD THE PRESS THAT HE WAS OPTIMISTIC AND THAT HE BELIEVED A "NEW DAY WAS DAWNING." HE EMPHASIZED THE VALUE TO INDONESIA OF ACTIONS WHICH WOULD BE PERCEIVED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS "GENEROUS," AND THAT THE GOI SHOULD ERR ON THE SIDE OF INCLUSIVENESS IN CONSIDERING WHETHER TO RELEASE CERTAIN PRISONERS. HE ADDED THAT MANY INDONESIANS SEE EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO AS A POLITICAL PRISONER.

17. (C) MULADI SAID THAT HE ESSENTIALLY AGREED, BUT THAT AS A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY, INDONESIA HAD TO PROGRESS SLOWLY, STEP BY STEP. NONETHELESS, JUST AS INDONESIA NEEDED ECONOMIC HELP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, SO WAS IT ALSO PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE KEY POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS REFORMS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3930

PAGE 01 JAKART 02959 01 OF 02 280928Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------429E5C 280928Z /38

P 280922Z MAY 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1811
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002959

USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS

GENEVA FOR JOHN LONG

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/08
TAGS: ELAB, PHUM, PGOV, OREP, ID
SUBJECT: CODEL SMITH MEETS WITH [redacted] B1

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02959 01 OF 02 280928Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 27 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200502473

REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN A MEETING WITH CODEL SMITH, [redacted] B1
CLAIMED THAT OVER 1000 PEOPLE DIED DURING THE MAY 14 RIOTS (AS OPPOSED TO THE OFFICIAL FIGURE OF 500), AND 29 WERE STILL MISSING FOLLOWING THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTINGS. HE SAID THAT EVIDENCE [redacted] B1
[redacted] SHOWED THAT THE RIOTS WERE A "POLITICAL PLOT." END SUMMARY

3. (U) CODEL SMITH (CONGRESSMAN CHRISTOPHER SMITH AND SENIOR STAFF JOSEPH REES) MET WITH [redacted] B6
POLOFF (NOTETAKER) ACCOMPANIED.

4. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT 29 PEOPLE WERE STILL MISSING AFTER THE B1
SHOOTING INCIDENT AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY DURING WHICH SIX STUDENTS WERE KILLED. HE SAID THAT [redacted] B1
HAD DETERMINED THAT OVER 1000 PEOPLE HAD DIED DURING THE RIOTS, NOT 500 AS REPORTED. ALLEGATIONS THAT TEN OF THE VICTIMS HAD BEEN SHOT WERE MADE IN A REPORT [redacted] SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESSMAN. B1
[redacted] DESCRIBED THE RIOTS AS "A PLOT" AND "A MASSACRE." HE B1
ALLEGED THAT THE RIOTS WERE ORGANIZED BY THEN-KOSTRAD COMMANDER PRABOWO. HE SAID PROVOCATEURS HAD BEEN TRAINED IN ADVANCE AND HAD BEEN WORKING IN COOPERATION WITH KOPASSUS. HE CLAIMED THAT HE HEARD REPORTS FROM POLICE AND OTHER SOURCES INDICATING THAT THE INSTIGATORS HAD MAPS AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO SAY THEY WERE SENT BY ABRI COMMANDER WIRANTO (PRESUMABLY TO DISCREDIT WIRANTO). HE ALLEGED THAT SNIPERS USING LIVE AMMUNITION AT CERTAIN RIOT LOCATIONS WERE FROM KOPASSUS, WHILE POLICE WERE EQUIPPED WITH

RUBBER BULLETS.

5. (C) [redacted] SAID [redacted] HAD MANY EYE WITNESS B1 B1
REPORTS FROM JETI NEGARA PLAZA, WHICH WAS BURNED DURING THE RIOT. HE SAID PEOPLE/LOOTERS HAD BEEN INVITED INTO THE BUILDING TO LOOT, AND THEN LOCKED IN WHILE THE BUILDING WAS BURNED. HE SAID TEAR GAS WAS USED, WHICH CAUSED PANIC ON THE SCENE. HE ALSO ALLEGED THAT SNIPERS SHOT SOME LOOTERS IN THE STREET NEARBY, WHO WERE LATER MOVED INTO THE BURNING BUILDING.

6. (C) HE ALLEGED THAT IN VARIOUS LOCATIONS AROUND JAKARTA, RIOTS WERE SPARKED FIRST BY TIRES SET ON FIRE BY PROVOCATEURS TO ATTRACT CROWDS. THE CROWDS WERE THEN PROVOKED WITH ANTI-CHINESE SENTIMENT. WHEN THE CONGRESSMAN ASKED WHY THE MILITARY WOULD ORCHESTRATE SUCH DESTRUCTION, [redacted] SAID IT WAS BECAUSE THEY WANTED TO USE "SHOCK" TACTICS, TO RUIN THE STUDENT MOVEMENT BY SHOWING THAT DEMONSTRATIONS CAUSE RIOTS, AND TO SHOW THE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY ARE NECESSARY. B1

7. (C) CONGRESSMAN SMITH ASKED IF CHINESE WERE TARGETED DURING RIOTING BECAUSE THEY ARE CHRISTIAN. [redacted] SAID IT HAD LESS TO DO WITH RELIGION AND MORE TO DO WITH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC GAPS AND ETHNICITY. CHINESE MADE THE EASIEST SCAPEGOATS. HE THOUGHT THE MAIN REASON CHINESE BECAME TARGETS WAS BECAUSE OF POLITICAL PLOTS. B1

8. (C) [redacted] SAID RIOT VICTIMS WERE PUTTING TOGETHER A CLASS ACTION SUIT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE RIOT PLOT. IT WAS A POLITICAL ACTION, NOT A CASE THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD WIN. B1

9. (C) [redacted] THOUGHT THAT THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT WOULD TRY TO B1
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BREAK THE STUDENT MOVEMENT BY USING RELIGION TO DIVIDE PEOPLE. HE SAID HE HAD ATTENDED A MEETING WITH [redacted] IN EAST JAVA TO DISCUSS HOW TO PREVENT RELIGIOUS PROVOCATIONS. B1

10. (C) CONGRESSMAN SMITH ASKED IF THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S RELEASE OF PRISONERS WAS SIGNIFICANT OR JUST BUYING TIME, [redacted] SAID IT WAS PART OF THE EFFORTS TO LEGITIMIZE THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT ALTHOUGH HABIBIE HIMSELF WAS CORRUPT AND NEPOTISTIC. [redacted] BELIEVED THAT SOEHARTO WAS STILL IN CHARGE. WHEN ASKED IF HABIBIE WAS PLAYING THE ISLAM CARD, SANDYAWAN SAID THAT HE WAS, BUT THAT HE WOULD TRY TO CLOAK IT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. B1 B1

11. (C) WHEN ASKED HIS OPINION OF AMIEN RAIS, [redacted] SAID THAT AMIEN RAIS TOO EASILY MADE COMPROMISES. HE WORKED WITH PRO-EMOCRACY GROUPS, MADE STRONG STATEMENTS, BUT CHQNGED HIS POSITION FREQUENTLY. ON MEGAWATIQ [redacted] SAID THAT MANY AROUND HER DID NOT HAVE A CLEAR CONCEPT AND TENDED TOWARD B1 B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4004

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4004

PAGE 01 JAKART 02959 02 OF 02 280959Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------42A0FD 280959Z /38

P 280922Z MAY 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1812
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002959

USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS

GENEVA FOR JOHN LONG

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/08
TAGS: ELAB, PHUM, PGOV, OREP, ID
SUBJECT: CODEL SMITH MEETS WITH FATHER SANDYAWAN

LEGALISTIC REACTIONS THAT WERE TOO FORMAL AND TOO SLOW FOR
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02959 02 OF 02 280959Z
POLITICS. WHEN ASKED WHICH LEADERS HAD POTENTIAL, HE NAMED FORMER FINANCE MINISTER MAR'IE MUHAMMAD AS SOMEONE TRUSTED, SIMPLE AND CLEAN. SRI BINTANG DID NOT HAVE MANY SUPPORTERS. HE THOUGHT A NEW LEADER COULD EMERGE FROM NAHDLATUL ULAMA.

12. (C) [redacted] B1

13. (U) CODEL SMITH DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR THIS PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8567

PAGE 01 JAKART 02992 01 OF 03 291429Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	CA-02	CIAE-00
	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00	/028W			

----------433919 291430Z /15

O 291119Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1846
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0770
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002992

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/28/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: MAY 29 SITUATION REPORT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 28 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JUN 2006 200502473

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] B1

IMF REPRESENTATIVE MEETS THE OPPOSITION

6. (U) IMF DIRECTOR FOR ASIAN AND THE PACIFIC HUBERT NEISS HELD SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH AMIEN RAIS, MEGAWATI AND HER ADVISORS, AND REFORM COUNCIL MEMBERS NURCHOLISH MADJID AND EMIL SALIM. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, AMIEN RAIS SAID THAT NEISS HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THE IMF WAS VERY INTERESTED IN POLITICAL STABILITY IN INDONESIA.

HABIBIE CONTINUES TO REACH OUT FOR SUPPORT

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7828

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7828

PAGE 01 JAKART 02992 02 OF 03 291123Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W			

----------43216E 291123Z /38

O 291119Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1847
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0771
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002992

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02992 02 OF 03 291123Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/28/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MAY 29 SITUATION REPORT

[redacted] B1



B1

PRABOWO APPEARS

9. (U) LT. GENERAL PRABOWO APPEARED IN PUBLIC MAY 28 IN JAKARTA TO BE OFFICIALLY APPOINTED HEAD OF THE ARMED FORCES STAFF AND COMMAND SCHOOL, A DECIDEDLY LOW-PRESTIGE POSITION THAT COMMANDS NO MILITARY UNITS. ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO PRESIDED OVER THE SESSION AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE TWO RIVALS TOGETHER APPEARED ON THE FRONT PAGES OF MANY LOCAL NEWSPAPERS. PRABOWO WAS REPORTED TO HAVE DENIED RUMORS THAT HE HAD REJECTED THIS APPOINTMENT AND THAT SEVERAL HUNDRED SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) TROOPS HAD DESERTED TO FOLLOW HIM.

NEW HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER UNDER FIRE

10. (U) NEW HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER LT. GENERAL SYARWAN HAMID HAD COME UNDER FIRE FROM MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI'S LEGAL DEFENSE TEAM, WHICH HAS PUBLICLY REQUESTED THAT HE RESIGN. ACCORDING TO MEGAWATI'S LAWYERS, THE OUSTER OF THE FORMER LEADER OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) IN 1996 HAD BEEN ORCHESTRATED BY HAMID (THEN HEAD OF ARMED FORCES SOCIAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS), GENERAL FEISAL TANJUNG (THEN COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES), AND THEN-HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER YOGIE MEMET.

TWO MORE POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASED

11. (U) TWO MORE POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE RELEASED FROM CIPINANG PRISON ON MAY 28. THE TWO WERE NUKU SULEIMAN, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE INFORMATION CENTER AND REFORM ACTION NETWORK (PIJAR), AND

ANDI SYAHPUTRA, FROM THE ALLIANCE OF INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS
CONFIDENTIAL

(AJI).

STUDENTS
---

12. (C) ACCORDING TO STUDENT SOURCES, DEMONSTRATIONS TOOK PLACE AT UP TO 19 JAKARTA CAMPUSES TODAY (MAY 29), THE LARGEST OF WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN HELD AT THE CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA CAWANG (UKI). 1000 STUDENTS FROM PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES AROUND JAKARTA WERE GATHERED ON CAMPUS AT 3:00 PM. MORE WERE EXPECTED. UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA DEPOK IS HOSTING A "NIGHT OF REFORM CONTEMPLATION" ON CAMPUS, WHICH PROMISES MANY PROMINENT INTELLECTUALS AND ACADEMICS, AS WELL AS PERFORMERS AND MUSICIANS. STUDENT LEADERS CLAIM STUDENTS INTEND TO RETURN TO THE DPR COMPLEX WHEN IT BECOMES POSSIBLE. TODAY'S DEMONSTRATIONS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN PEACEFUL.

TRISAKTI SHOOTING
---

13. (U) ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, 19 MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FACE A COURT-MARTIAL NEXT WEEK FOR THEIR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN THE MAY 12 SHOOTING DEATHS OF FOUR STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY.

NEW LABOR PARTY FORMING UP

NNNNPTQ7829

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7829

PAGE 01 JAKART 02992 03 OF 03 291123Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W			

----------43216F 291123Z /38

O 291119Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1848
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0772
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002992

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02992 03 OF 03 291123Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/28/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MAY 29 SITUATION REPORT

14. (U) THE INDONESIAN WORKERS PARTY (PPI), A NEW LABOR PARTY ESTABLISHED BY LABOR ACTIVISTS, WILL ASSEMBLE NEXT WEEK TO ELECT AN EXECUTIVE BOARD. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1244

PAGE 01 JAKART 03011 01 OF 03 010621Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------43CC01 010622Z /38

O 010615Z JUN 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1866
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003011

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/08
TAGS: PGOV, ELAB, PHUM, EFIN, OREP, ID
SUBJECT: CODEL SMITH MEETS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: CONGRESSMAN SMITH AND SENIOR STAFFER REES MET WITH PROMINENT HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRO-DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS AT A MAY 27

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03011 01 OF 03 010621Z
LUNCH HOSTED BY THE AMBASSADOR. [redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 31 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JUN 2006 200502473

[redacted]

B1

4. (U) CONGRESSMAN CHRISTOPHER SMITH, CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND SENIOR SUBCOMMITTEE STAFFER JOSEPH REES MET WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRO-DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS AT A MAY 27 LUNCH HOSTED BY THE AMBASSADOR. IN ATTENDANCE WERE: EMMY HAFILD, DIRECTOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP WALHI; GOENAWAN MOHAMMAD, FORMER EDITOR OF THE BANNED "TEMPO" MAGAZINE; ASMARA NABABAN, MEMBER OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS

COMMISSION AND DIRECTOR OF THE NGO FEDERATION "INFID;" ABDUL HAKIM NUSANTARA, DIRECTOR OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION PBHI AND BAMBANG WIDJOJANTO, PRESIDENT OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY JAKARTA BRANCH.

[redacted]

B1



B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1242

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1242

PAGE 01 JAKART 03011 02 OF 03 010621Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------43CBF7 010621Z /38
O 010615Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1867
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 003011

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/08
TAGS: PGOV, ELAB, PHUM, EFIN, OREP, ID
SUBJECT: CODEL SMITH MEETS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS



B1

[redacted]

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03011 02 OF 03 010621Z

[redacted]

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] B1

14. (U) RESPONDING TO SMITH'S QUESTION ABOUT WHAT CONDITIONS IMF SHOULD IMPOSE ON THE GOVERNMENT FOR ANY NEW DISBURSEMENT, HAKIM SAID THAT IN THE PAST, TERMS WERE NOT DISCUSSED PUBLICLY, NOT EVEN IN THE PARLIAMENT, AND THAT, MOREOVER, SOME OF THE TERMS WERE NEVER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1243

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1243

PAGE 01 JAKART 03011 03 OF 03 010621Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------43CBF9 010621Z /38

O 010615Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1868
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 003011

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/08
TAGS: PGOV, ELAB, PHUM, EFIN, OREP, ID
SUBJECT: CODEL SMITH MEETS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS

REVEALED FULLY. NABABAN ADDED THAT WHILE THE "LETTER OF INTENT" WAS KNOWN, OTHER IMPORTANT ASPECTS, INCLUDING TERMS OF INTEREST, GRACE PERIODS, ETC. WERE NEVER MADE PUBLIC THOUGH NGO'S HAD ASKED PUBLICLY FOR THEM.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03011 03 OF 03 010621Z

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

E22

PTQ4939

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4939

PAGE 01 JAKART 03054 01 OF 03 021041Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/033W				

------------------444E4D 021042Z /38

O 021037Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1901
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0782
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003054

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
BEIJING FOR A/S ROTH PARTY
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03054 01 OF 03 021041Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 1 JUN 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JUL 2006 200502473

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: JUNE 2 SITUATION REPORT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: FOR THE SECOND CONSECUTIVE DAY, A SMALL GROUP OF DEMONSTRATORS BLOCKED THE EMBASSY'S SOLE VEHICLE EXIT. THE GROUP DISPERSED AFTER ITS LEADERS DISCUSSED VARIOUS ISSUES IN A MEETING WITH EMBOFFS. GOLKAR WILL SHORTLY DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF A PARTY CONGRESS IN JULY AT WHICH NEW PARTY LEADERSHIP WOULD LIKELY EMERGE. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE HAS ANNOUNCED IT IS BEGINNING AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE WEALTH OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. IN AN UNUSUALLY FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT GESTURE TO HER, OPPOSITION LEADER MEGAWATI WAS ALLOWED USE OF A MAJOR GOVERNMENT HALL TO GIVE AN ADDRESS WHICH RECEIVED BROAD MEDIA COVERAGE. THE OCCASION WAS THE UNOFFICIAL DAY SET ASIDE TO COMMEMORATE THE NATIONAL IDEOLOGY "PANCASILA." WHILE ADHERENCE TO THE DOCTRINE REMAINS A LITMUS TEST FOR LOYALTY TO THE SYSTEM, ONE MAJOR UNIVERSITY HAS ENDED ITS PANCASILA INDOCTRINATION COURSES. PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAS NAMED THREE RESPECTED ECONOMISTS AS SENIOR ADVISORS. A MILITARY SPOKESMAN STATED THAT THE CHIEF OF POLICE FOR WEST JAVA IS AMONG 18 OTHERS (ALL POLICE) WHO WILL FACE TRIAL OVER THE SHOOTING DEATHS OF FOUR STUDENTS IN JAKARTA MAY 12. A COURT IN SEMARANG HAS FREED FOUR EAST TIMORESE CHARGED WITH BOMB MANUFACTURING, CITING LACK OF EVIDENCE. THE JUSTICE MINISTER HAS PLEDGED PUBLICLY TO RELEASE EAST TIMORESE POLITICAL PRISONERS. IN LABOR DEVELOPMENTS, RECENTLY FREED POLITICAL PRISONER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN HAS FINALLY BEEN ALLOWED TO REGISTER HIS LABOR FEDERATION, GIVING THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED FEDERATION ITS FIRST

COMPETITION. END SUMMARY
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

JUNE 2 DEMONSTRATION AT EMBASSY
---

3. (U) APPROXIMATELY 100 DEMONSTRATORS GATHERED AT THE U.S. EMBASSY MAIN GATE LATE MORNING, BLOCKING ACCESS-EGRESS FROM THE EMBASSY FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS. LEADERS OF THE GROUP AGREED TO DISPERSE THE GATHERING AFTER A 40 MINUTE DISCUSSION WITH

POLCOUNS AND POLOFF IN WHICH THEY ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF AND EXPRESSED CRITICISM OF SOME U.S. POLICIES AND ACTIONS. THE GROUP SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF PRESS REPORTS THAT A U.S. NAVAL VESSEL MIGHT BE HEADING TO INDONESIA; COMPLAINED ABOUT U.S. ASSISTANCE TO NGOS WHOM THEY CLAIMED WERE ENGAGED IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY (A FLYER LABELED THEM AS "HENCHMAN OF THE U.S."); URGED THAT THE U.S. SUPPORT DISBURSEMENT OF THE IMF JUNE TRAUNCH TO INDONESIA AND CRITICIZED U.S. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO WERE CRITICAL OF DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA. BANNERS AND SIGNS INCLUDED: "BE A GOOD MUSLIM; DIE A MARTYR;" "PAKPAHAN, GUNAWAN, ADNAN (NASUTION) IS YOUR PUPPET;" "AMERICA REMEMBER THE VIENNA CONVENTION - DON'T INTERFERE IN MY COUNTRY;" "AMERICA STOP YOUR PROVOCATION IN OUR COUNTRY;" "TRY AMERICA AS WAR CRIMINAL;" "USA IS THE REAL EVIL;" "THE HANDS OF AMERICA/CIA ARE TRAITORS OF THE NATION;" "JEWS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS OF THE WORLD;" "AMERICA IS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSER IN INDONESIA;" A LARGE MEDIA CONTINGENT WAS ON HAND TO COVER THE DEMONSTRATION. THE GROUP THAT MET WITH EMBOFFS SUBSEQUENTLY MISREPRESENTED EMBOFFS' COMMENTS, CLAIMING TO THE PRESS THAT THE EMBOFFS HAD CONFIRMED U.S. FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION GROUPS. POLICE AND MILITARY WERE ALSO ON HAND AND COOPERATED WELL WITH U.S. EMBASSY SECURITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4940

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4940

PAGE 01 JAKART 03054 02 OF 03 021042Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/032W					

----------444E56 021042Z /38

O 021037Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1902
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0783

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 003054

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
BEIJING FOR A/S ROTH PARTY
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: JUNE 2 SITUATION REPORT

ATTORNEY GENERAL BEGINS INVESTIGATION OF SOEHARTO WEALTH

5. (C) UNDERSCORING THE PACE OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN INDONESIA, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE ANNOUNCED JUNE 1 THAT IT HAD BEGUN AN INVESTIGATION OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, ALONG WITH SEVERAL OTHER OUSTED GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, IN ASSIGNING A DEPUTY IN CHARGE OF CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS TO THE CASE, SAID THAT BECAUSE THE CASES INVOLVED "PERSONAL OWNERSHIPS," IT WOULD REQUIRE "SOME TIME FOR ME TO PROVIDE ANY RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS." IN A RELATED DEVELOPMENT, JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO ISSUE A TRAVEL BAN ON SOEHARTO FAMILY MEMBERS IF HE RECEIVED A REQUEST FOR SUCH A BAN FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OR THE POLICE.

[redacted] B1

PRESIDENT APPOINTS RESPECTED ECONOMIC ADVISORS

6. (U) IN A MOVE LIKELY TO BE WELCOMED BY INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, PRESIDENT HABIBIE, ON JUNE 1, APPOINTED SEVERAL SENIOR, WELL-RESPECTED ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL EXPERTS AS "SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISORS." THOSE NAMED WERE, WIDJOJO NITISASTRO, ALI

WARDHANA AND FRANS SEDA. ALL PLAYED SENIOR ECONOMIC ROLES IN THE
CONFIDENTIAL

SOEHARTO ERA.

MEGAWATI AND THE OPPOSITION CELEBRATE PANCASILA DAY

7. (U) MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI WAS THE PRINCIPAL SPEAKER AT LARGE GATHERING HELD AT THE GOVERNMENT'S ORNATE PANCASILA HALL COMMEMORATING THE DAY MARKED AS "PANCASILA DAY" IN THE PRE-SOEHARTO ERA. MEGAWATI'S SPEECH WAS GIVEN UNPRECEDENTEDLY BROAD TELEVISION AND PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE. IN THE SOEHARTO ERA, MEGAWATI'S ACTIVITIES GENERALLY WENT UNREPORTED. THE GOVERNMENT APPEARED TO OFFER MEGAWATI A MAJOR CONCESSION BY ALLOWING HER USE OF A KEY GOVERNMENT BUILDING TO COMMEMORATE "PANCASILA DAY" ON A DATE THE SOEHARTO REGIME DID NOT RECOGNIZE.

8. (U) IN HER SPEECH, MEGAWATI, IN A MOVE WHICH SURPRISED SOME OF HER SUPPORTERS, CALLED FOR AN END TO ATTACKS ON PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. "DO WE HAVE TO HEAP ABUSE ON THE OUTGOING PRESIDENT EVERY TIME THERE IS A PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION?" "DO WE HAVE TO TREAT FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S FAMILY THE WAY THE NATION TREATED US, SUKARNO'S FAMILY, IN 1965," SHE ASKED? "LET IT BE THAT ONLY I AND THE REST OF SUKARNO'S FAMILY EXPERIENCED SUCH TREATMENT." MEGAWATI, IN FEBRUARY, WAS AMONG THE FIRST TO CALL PUBLICLY FOR SOEHARTO TO BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF HIS WEALTH. SHE REITERATED THE NEED FOR SUCH AN INVESTIGATION IN A MAY 25 DINNER WITH CODEL SMITH. HER CALL FOR AN END TO ATTACKS ON SOEHARTO APPEARED NOT TO MEAN THAT HE SHOULD NOT BE INVESTIGATED FOR CORRUPTION.

9. (U) PANCASILA, THE INDONESIAN IDEOLOGY WHICH STRESSES HARMONY AND CONSENSUS (AND SOME WOULD SAY DISCOURAGES INDEPENDENT OR DISSIDENT VIEWS) WAS FIRST PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT SOEKARNO IN A JUNE 1, 1945 SPEECH. THE SACROSANCT DOCTRINE WAS USED BY THE

SOEHARTO REGIME AS A LITMUS TEST OF LOYALTY TO THE SYSTEM. IT STILL APPEARS TO HAVE SPECIAL STATUS. UNDER THE HABIBIE REGIME'S PROGRAM TO RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS, THOSE PRISONERS WHO STAND ACCUSED OF OPPOSING PANCASILA, ACCORDING TO CURRENT HABIBIE POLICY, WILL NOT BE RELEASED. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE JOGJAKARTA-BASED "ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA" HAS ANNOUNCED THAT HAS ENDED ITS SOEHARTO REGIME-MANDATED PANCASILA INDOCTRINATION COURSES AS "NOT USEFUL AND NOT IN KEEPING WITH REFORMATION."

SENIOR POLICE OFFICIAL DESCRIBED AS "MAIN SUSPECT" IN TRISAKTI MURDERS

---

10. (U) ACCORDING TO A REPORT SOURCED TO THE MILITARY POLICE, CARRIED IN THE JUNE 2 MEDIA THE WEST JAKARTA POLICE CHIEF, A LT. COLONEL, WILL APPEAR IN MILITARY COURT JUNE 5 AS THE "MAIN SUSPECT" IN THE SHOOTING DEATH OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS MAY 12. THE MILITARY POLICE CHIEF TOLD THE MEDIA THAT A TOTAL OF 18 OFFICERS WOULD BROUGHT TO TRIAL IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCIDENT, ALL OF THEM APPARENTLY POLICE (I.E., NOT FROM THE ARMY).

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4941

PAGE 01 JAKART 03054 03 OF 03 021042Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/032W					

----------444E59 021042Z /38

O 021037Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1903
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0784
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 003054

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
BEIJING FOR A/S ROTH PARTY
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03054 03 OF 03 021042Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: JUNE 2 SITUATION REPORT

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

LABOR DEVELOPMENTS

MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN FINALLY IS ALLOWED TO REGISTER HIS LABOR UNION

13. (U) AFTER YEARS OF STRUGGLE FOR OFFICIAL RECOGNITION, THE SBSI LABOR FEDERATION WAS FORMALLY RECOGNIZED ON JUNE 1. MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, RELEASED FROM PRISON ONLY LAST WEEK, FORMALLY PRESENTED HIS UNION FOR REGISTRATION. THE SBSI JOINS THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED

SPSI AS THE SECOND OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED INDONESIAN LABOR FEDERATION.

PROTESTS IN MEDAN

14. (U) EMBASSY FSN IN MEDAN AND THE PRESS REPORTED THAT SEVERAL HUNDRED FISHERMEN, FARMERS AND STUDENTS HELD A DEMONSTRATION AT LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICES ON JUNE 1 TO PROTEST CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND NEPOTISM. ONE DEMAND WAS THAT THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTORS OFFICE INVESTIGATE "IRREGULARITIES IN THE SELLING OF LAND BELONGING TO A STATE-OWNED PLANTATION TO SOEHARTO DAUGHTER TUTUT. THE FISHERMEN ALSO PROTESTED THREATS TO THEIR LIVELIHOOD POSED BY LARGE TRAWLERS OWNED BY FOREIGNERS AND LOCAL SINO-INDONESIANS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6359

PAGE 01 JAKART 03145 01 OF 03 051319Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------45D48D 051319Z /38
O 051313Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1985

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003145

OFFICIAL INFORMAL FOR EAP A/S ROTH AND SA JIM FOSTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL: A/S ROTH MEETS PRESIDENT
- HABIBIE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D)

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PROVIDED TO A/S ROTH FOR
CLEARANCE.

2. (C) SUMMARY: DURING A JUNE 4 MEETING WITH A/S ROTH,
PRESIDENT HABIBIE

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03145 01 OF 03 051319Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 4 JUN 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

[redacted] B1

[redacted] ROTH EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD NOT COME TO JAKARTA WITH AN "AMERICAN PLAN." WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING HIS CLOSENESS TO SOEHARTO, HABIBIE STRESSED THAT HE WAS "NOT A PUPPET" AND WOULD RULE INDEPENDENTLY, THOUGH HE SAID THAT SOEHARTO DESERVED RESPECT. HE PORTRAYED HIMSELF AS ACTING DECISIVELY IN THE OPENING WEEKS OF HIS PRESIDENCY TO MOVE FORWARD ON REFORM, REMOVE GENERAL PRABOWO, SET A TIMETABLE FOR ELECTIONS (NEXT YEAR), AND ENGAGE THE OPPOSITION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT POLITICAL OPPONENTS SAW HIM AS A CONTINUATION OF SOEHARTO AND WERE SEEKING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) TO REMOVE HIM FROM OFFICE. HE CHARACTERIZED SUCH A MOVE AS "CRAZY" AND "UNCONSTITUTIONAL." HABIBIE DOWNPLAYED THE ALLEGATIONS THAT HE HAD ENGAGED IN NEPOTISM [redacted] B1
AND CLAIMED FULL SUPPORT FROM RECTORS OF INDONESIA'S TOP UNIVERSITIES WITH WHOM HE HAD JUST MET, SAYING THAT HE HOPED THAT STUDENTS COULD RETURN TO STUDYING, RATHER THAN CONTINUING TO PURSUE POLITICS. HE ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF U.S. FUNDING SUPPORT TO HELP INDONESIAN STUDENTS COMPLETE THEIR UNIVERSITY STUDIES. END SUMMARY

3. (U) A/S ROTH, ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSADOR, STAFF ASSISTANT HALL, AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER), MET WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE FOR OVER AN HOUR ON JUNE 4. FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS PARTICIPATED AS WELL.

[redacted] B1

[redacted]

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03145 01 OF 03 051319Z

[redacted]

B1

6. (C) A/S ROTH EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD NOT COME WITH ANY "AMERICAN PLAN" FOR INDONESIA'S POLITICAL FUTURE.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6362

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6362

PAGE 01 JAKART 03145 02 OF 03 051319Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------45D49C 051320Z /38
O 051313Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1986

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 003145

OFFICIAL INFORMAL FOR EAP A/S ROTH AND SA JIM FOSTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL: A/S ROTH MEETS PRESIDENT
- HABIBIE

INSTEAD, HE WAS SEEKING TO UNDERSTAND HOW INDONESIA

PLANNED TO APPROACH THE PROCESS OF SORTING OUT ITS POLITICAL FUTURE. FOR EXAMPLE, WAS THE POLITICAL CRISIS OVER? ROTH SAID THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SOUGHT TO HELP INDONESIA WITH ITS ECONOMIC CRISIS, RECOGNIZING THAT IF THE ECONOMY DID NOT IMPROVE PEOPLE WOULD RETURN TO THE STREETS. HE TOLD PRESIDENT HABIBIE THAT "WE NEED YOU TO HELP US TO HELP YOU."

CURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH SOEHARTO

7. (C) INSISTING THAT HE WAS NOT A PUPPET, HABIBIE PORTRAYED HIMSELF AS INDEPENDENT FROM SOEHARTO, HIS LONG

TIME POLITICAL MENTOR. HE REVEALED THAT HE WOULD MEET SOEHARTO ON SATURDAY JUNE 6 FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE BECOMING PRESIDENT WHEN HE WILL ATTEND A PRAYER CEREMONY FOR THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S LATE WIFE. HABIBIE EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD KNOWN SOEHARTO FOR 49 YEARS AND WAS STILL HIS FRIEND, AND THAT SOEHARTO DESERVED RESPECT. WHILE HE HAD NOT SEEN SOEHARTO SINCE ASSUMING OFFICE, HE SAID THAT THE FORMER PRESIDENT HAD PASSED HIM A MESSAGE THROUGH A THIRD PARTY REAFFIRMING THAT HABIBIE WAS THE PRESIDENT BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION, THAT HE (SOEHARTO) WAS HEALTHY, AND THAT HABIBIE SHOULD THINK NOT OF SOEHARTO BUT ABOUT THE PEOPLE AND INDONESIA. REGARDING SOEHARTO'S FUTURE, HABIBIE SAID THAT THE FORMER PRESIDENT WOULD ENJOY THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND THAT IT WAS UP TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO DETERMINE HIS ULTIMATE FATE.

HABIBIE DESCRIBES FAST START OF HIS PRESIDENCY

8. (C) HABIBIE EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD MOVED QUICKLY AS HE OPENED HIS PRESIDENCY, INCLUDING ON REFORM, IN AN ATTEMPT TO STAY ON THE OFFENSIVE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD JUST MADE A DECISION TO LEGALIZE INDEPENDENT LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, SO LONG AS THEY WERE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION. HE SAID THAT INDONESIA WOULD RATIFY THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE. HE DESCRIBED HOW HE HAD ESTABLISHED HIS CABINET LITTLE MORE THAN A DAY AFTER BEING SWORN IN AS PRESIDENT, AND WITHIN HOURS AFTER THAT HE HAD RAISED WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE RELEASE OF MUCHTAR

PAKPAHAN.

9. (C) HABIBIE SAID THAT HIS POLITICAL TIMETABLE, WHICH HE
CONFIDENTIAL

HAD DISCUSSED OPENLY WITH CNN, ENVISAGED HOLDING A NEW ELECTION IN 1999.

10. (C) HABIBIE ALSO CLAIMED THAT AFTER HE BECAME PRESIDENT HE HAD MOVED DECISIVELY TO REMOVE LT. GENERAL PRABOWO.

B1

B1

B1

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

B1

NNNNPTQ6361

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JAKART 03145 03 OF 03 051319Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------45D4A0 051320Z /38
O 051313Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1987

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 003145

OFFICIAL INFORMAL FOR EAP A/S ROTH AND SA JIM FOSTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL: A/S ROTH MEETS PRESIDENT - HABIBIE

COLLUSION, CORRUPTION, AND NEPOTISM

15. (C) HABIBIE SAID THAT THE ISSUE OF "COLLUSION, CORRUPTION, AND NEPOTISM" (ACRONYM "KKN" IN INDONESIAN) WAS BEING DISTORTED. [redacted] HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO GET A HANDLE ON THE KKN ISSUE BY ESTABLISHING CRITERIA TO DEFINE KKN AND THEN ASKING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS. B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03145 03 OF 03 051319Z
MEETING WITH UNIVERSITY RECTORS

16. (C) HABIBIE SAID THAT IMMEDIATELY BEFORE SEEING A/S ROTH HE HAD MET WITH THE RECTORS OF INDONESIA'S 55 TOP UNIVERSITIES. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD ALL OFFERED THEIR "FULL SUPPORT" TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT HE

PLANNED TO MAKE A VISIT NEXT WEEK TO TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY, WHERE STUDENTS WERE SHOT BY SECURITY FORCES ON MAY 12. HE HAD ASKED THE RECTORS TO MAKE THE CAMPUSES CENTERS FOR LEARNING RATHER THAN POLITICS.

17. (C) DESCRIBING THE DIFFICULTIES OF MANY STUDENTS IN CONTINUING THEIR STUDIES BECAUSE THEIR PARENTS WERE NOW UNEMPLOYED BECAUSE OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, HABIBIE ASKED A/S ROTH IF THE UNITED STATES COULD PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN INDONESIA TO ENABLE THEM TO COMPLETE THEIR STUDIES. ROTH SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THIS REQUEST. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTO2464

PAGE 01 JAKART 03147 072335Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/028W	

----------46626D 080012Z /38

P 060933Z JUN 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1991
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003147

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/16
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PINS, CASC, MOPS, ID

SUBJECT: MILITARY COURT OPENS TRISAKTI KILLINGS TRIAL

//////////ZFR IMI ZFR THIS MSG--SENT IN ERROR////////
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03147 072335Z
//////////////////ZFR ZFR ZFR//////////////////////

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 5 JUN 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JUN 2006 200502473

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>
PTQ8779

CONFIDENTIAL PTO1454

PAGE 01 JAKART 03147 060939Z

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00 /029W	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00

----------462B37 060940Z /38

P 060933Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1991
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003147

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/16
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PINS, CASC, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: MILITARY COURT OPENS TRISAKTI KILLINGS TRIAL

REF: A) JAKARTA 2977, B) JAKARTA 3079

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03147 060939Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (U) HUNDREDS OF STUDENTS APPEARED AT THE JUNE 6 OPENING SESSION OF THE MILITARY COURT TRIAL OF 18 POLICE WHO ARE CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE KILLING OF FOUR STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN JAKARTA MAY 12. THOSE KILLINGS HELPED PRECEDED RIOTING WHICH LEFT WELL OVER 1,000 DEAD IN THE CAPITAL (ACCORDING TO THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND NGO COUNTS).

3. (U) ONLY TWO OF THE ACCUSED POLICEMEN APPEARED AT THE JUNE 6 SESSION. THE REST ARE SCHEDULED TO APPEAR SEPARATELY IN TRIAL SESSIONS LIKELY TO BEGIN NEXT WEEK. THE INITIAL SESSION WENT POORLY FOR THE PROSECUTION. THE DEFENSE POINTED OUT THAT IN ITS WRITTEN PRESENTATION TO THE COURT, THE PROSECUTION INDICATED THAT THE ACCUSED HAD FIRED RUBBER BULLETS. INASMUCH AS THE FOUR STUDENTS WERE KILLED BY LIVE AMMUNITION, ARGUED THE DEFENSE, THE PROSECUTION CASE AGAINST THE TWO POLICE DEFENDANTS WAS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED. THE DEFENSE ALSO CLAIMED VARIOUS PROCEDURAL ERRORS IN THE PROSECUTION'S JUNE 6 PRESENTATION. THE COURT, APPEARING TO AGREE WITH THE DEFENSE, QUICKLY ADJOURNED THE PROCEEDINGS AND SCHEDULED THE NEXT SESSION FOR JUNE 10. IT ALSO SAID IT WOULD CONSIDER SYMPATHETICALLY A REQUEST THAT ONE OF THE TWO POLICE BE DETAINED UNDER ONLY HOUSE ARREST BECAUSE HIS WIFE WAS EXPECTING A BABY IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

4. (U) UNIFORMED POLICE, WHO REPRESENTED MORE THAN HALF OF THOSE PRESENT IN THE COURTROOM, WERE VISIBLY PLEASED

WITH THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST SESSION. STUDENTS WERE NOT. WHILE CLEARLY NOT HAPPY WITH THE WAY THE FIRST SESSION HAD GONE, THEY LEFT QUIETLY AND BOARDED BUSES AND OTHER TRANSPORT BACK TO TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. WE VISITED THE TRISAKTI CAMPUS SEVERAL HOURS AFTER THE FIRST TRIAL SESSION AND SAW NO PROTEST ACTIVITY. NEARBY UNIVERSITIES AND ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY WERE ALSO QUIET.

5. (C) COMMENT: THERE IS ALREADY SUSPICION, EVEN WITHIN THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (REF A), THAT THE POLICE DEFENDANTS MAY BE SCAPEGOATS FOR ARMY PERSONNEL WHO ARE SEEN BY SOME AS THE MORE LIKELY PERPETRATORS OF THE TRISAKTI KILLINGS. SEPTEL NOTES THAT CLAIMS OF SCAPEGOATING HAVE ALSO BEEN HEARD AMONG SENIOR POLICE OFFICIALS WHO HAVE EXPRESSED SOME BITTERNESS OVER IT. STUDENTS AT THE JUNE 6 TRIAL SESSION ALSO VOICED SKEPTICISM THAT THE POLICE WERE MERELY SCAPEGOATS BUT WERE ANGRY AS WELL OVER THE PROSECUTION'S POOR HANDLING OF THE CASE IN THE COURTROOM JUNE 6. THESE DOUBTS DO

NOT REFLECT WELL ON EITHER ABRI [redacted] B1
[redacted] B1
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTO1470

PAGE 01 JAKART 03148 061014Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/029W						

----------462C7F 061015Z /38
P 061008Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1992
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003148

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/16
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PINS, CASC, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: MILITARY COURT OPENS TRISAKTI KILLINGS TRIAL

REF: A) JAKARTA 2977, B) JAKARTA 3079

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03148 061014Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS;

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 5 JUN 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JUN 2006 200502473

REASON 1.5(D)

2. (U) HUNDREDS OF STUDENTS APPEARED AT THE JUNE 6 OPENING SESSION OF THE MILITARY COURT TRIAL OF 18 POLICE WHO ARE CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE KILLING OF FOUR STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN JAKARTA MAY 12. THOSE KILLINGS PRECEDED RIOTING WHICH LEFT WELL OVER 1,000 DEAD IN THE CAPITAL (ACCORDING TO THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND NGO COUNTS).

3. (U) ONLY TWO OF THE ACCUSED POLICEMEN APPEARED AT THE JUNE 6 SESSION. THE REST ARE SCHEDULED TO APPEAR SEPARATELY IN TRIAL SESSIONS LIKELY TO BEGIN NEXT WEEK. THE INITIAL SESSION WENT POORLY FOR THE PROSECUTION. THE DEFENSE POINTED OUT THAT IN ITS WRITTEN PRESENTATION TO THE COURT, THE PROSECUTION INDICATED THAT THE ACCUSED HAD FIRED RUBBER BULLETS. INASMUCH AS THE FOUR STUDENTS WERE KILLED BY LIVE AMMUNITION, ARGUED THE DEFENSE, THE PROSECUTION CASE AGAINST THE TWO POLICE DEFENDANTS WAS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED. THE DEFENSE ALSO CLAIMED VARIOUS PROCEDURAL ERRORS IN THE PROSECUTION'S JUNE 6 PRESENTATION. THE COURT, APPEARING TO AGREE WITH THE DEFENSE, QUICKLY ADJOURNED THE PROCEEDINGS AND SCHEDULED THE NEXT SESSION FOR JUNE 10. IT ALSO SAID IT WOULD CONSIDER SYMPATHETICALLY A REQUEST THAT ONE OF THE TWO POLICE BE DETAINED UNDER ONLY HOUSE ARREST BECAUSE HIS WIFE WAS EXPECTING A BABY IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

4. (U) UNIFORMED POLICE, WHO REPRESENTED MORE THAN HALF OF THOSE PRESENT IN THE COURTROOM, WERE VISIBLY PLEASED

WITH THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST SESSION. STUDENTS WERE NOT. WHILE CLEARLY NOT HAPPY WITH THE WAY THE FIRST SESSION HAD GONE, THEY LEFT QUIETLY AND BOARDED BUSES AND OTHER TRANSPORT BACK TO TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. WE VISITED THE TRISAKTI CAMPUS SEVERAL HOURS AFTER THE FIRST TRIAL SESSION AND SAW NO PROTEST ACTIVITY. NEARBY UNIVERSITIES AND ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY WERE ALSO QUIET.

5. (C) COMMENT: THERE IS ALREADY SUSPICION, EVEN WITHIN THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (REF A), THAT THE

POLICE DEFENDANTS MAY BE SCAPEGOATS FOR ARMY PERSONNEL WHO ARE SEEN BY SOME AS THE MORE LIKELY PERPETRATORS OF THE TRISAKTI KILLINGS. SEPTEL NOTES THAT CLAIMS OF SCAPEGOATING HAVE ALSO BEEN HEARD AMONG SENIOR POLICE OFFICIALS WHO HAVE EXPRESSED SOME BITTERNESS OVER IT. STUDENTS AT THE JUNE 6 TRIAL SESSION ALSO VOICED SKEPTICISM THAT THE POLICE WERE MERELY SCAPEGOATS BUT WERE ANGRY AS WELL OVER THE PROSECUTION'S POOR HANDLING OF THE CASE IN THE COURTROOM JUNE 6. THESE DOUBTS DO NOT REFLECT WELL ON EITHER ABRI [redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0502

PAGE 01 JAKART 03167 01 OF 03 081039Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------46825A 081039Z /38

O 081033Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2012
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0804
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003167

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
BEIJING FOR A/S ROTH PARTY
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03167 01 OF 03 081039Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 7 JUN 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JUN 2006 200502473

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 8 SITUATION REPORT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: A SMALL DEMONSTRATION AGAIN BLOCKED EMBASSY VEHICLE AND PEDESTRIAN GATES JUNE 8. THERE WERE ALSO UNRELATED DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE AND THE MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT. ALL WERE PEACEFUL. STRATEGIC FORCES WITHDREW FROM MEDAN WHERE THEY HAD BEEN DEPLOYED FOR A MONTH FOLLOWING EXTENSIVE RIOTING IN INDONESIA'S THIRD LARGEST CITY. ALSO IN MEDAN, SECTARIAN VIOLENCE FLARED BETWEEN RIVAL PROTESTANT FACTIONS. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR ONE FACTION WHICH LED TO THE PRO-SOEHARTO FACTION GAINING THE UPPER HAND IN 1992, APPEARS TO HAVE COLLAPSED LEADING THE OTHER FACTION TO TRY TO REGAIN CHURCH AND OTHER PROPERTIES IT FEELS WERE TAKEN FROM IT BY THE GOVERNMENT (SEPTEL).

3. (C) IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAS ANNOUNCED NATIONAL ELECTIONS COULD TAKE PLACE AS EARLY AS MAY 1999 AS OPPOSED TO LATE 1999 AS HE SUGGESTED LAST WEEK. HE ALSO SPOKE OUT ON BEHALF OF SINO-INDONESIANS AS FULL CITIZENS OF INDONESIA. THE TRIAL OF POLICE PURPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN THE KILLING OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS BEGAN ON SATURDAY. STUDENTS WERE ANGERED BY THE POOR PRESENTATION BY THE PROSECUTION. A MAJOR, MODERATE ISLAMIC GROUP IS EDGING CLOSER TO DECLARING A POLITICAL PARTY. A YOUNG REFORM ACTIVIST HAS BEEN DISCOVERED DEAD UNDER MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. EAST TIMORESE AND IRIANESE (FROM IRIAN JAYA) MET OVER THE WEEKEND TO CONSIDER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

POSSIBLE NEW OPTIONS ARISING FROM THE POLITICAL CHANGES IN JAKARTA. END SUMMARY

PART I: SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

DEMONSTRATION

4. (U) A SMALL (30-PERSON) DEMONSTRATION BLOCKED THE ONLY U.S. EMBASSY VEHICLE AND MAIN PEDESTRIAN GATES FOR SEVERAL HOURS DURING THE AFTERNOON JUNE 8. THE GROUP, WHICH INITIALLY CLAIMED

UNCLASSIFIED

TO HAVE NO SPOKESPERSON, CARRIED SIGNS CALLING FOR THE U.S. NOT TO INTERFERE IN INDONESIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND FOR THE U.S. TO SUPPORT THE PROMPT DISBURSEMENT OF THE LATEST TRAUNCH OF THE IMF PACKAGE TO INDONESIA. SECURITY FORCES WERE SLOW TO ARRIVE AND WERE NOT HELPFUL IN REQUIRING THE DEMONSTRATORS TO MOVE TO AN APPROPRIATE DISTANCE FROM THE EMBASSY GATE SO AS TO ALLOW EMBASSY ACCESS/EGRESS. EVENTUALLY, WELL AFTER COB, THREE "SPOKESPERSONS" EMERGED FROM THE GROUP WHO THEN MET BRIEFLY WITH POLOFFS ON THE CONDITION THAT THEY STOP BLOCKING THE EMBASSY GATES. AFTER THE MEETING, THE CROWD DISPERSED. WE HAVE BEEN ALERTED TO THE PLANNED VISIT OF ANOTHER GROUP MORNING JUNE 9.

5. (U) THERE WERE THREE PEACEFUL PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS TARGETING VARIOUS MINISTRIES IN JAKARTA JUNE 8. THE GROUPS DID NOT INTERFERE WITH THE BUSINESS OF THOSE OFFICES. TWO GROUPS, WHO FILLED FOUR BUSES, DEMONSTRATED AT THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE DURING THE DAY. THEY DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS AND INVESTIGATION INTO ABRI CLASHES WITH CIVILIANS IN TANJUNG PRIOK, ACEH, IRIAN JAYA AND LAMPUNG. A PRO-MEGAWATI DEMONSTRATION TOOK PLACE AT THE MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT WHOSE MINISTER IS DRAWN FROM THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED, ANTI-MEGAWATI

CONFIDENTIAL

FACTION OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY. ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION WAS ORGANIZED AT THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

MILITARY FORCES WITHDRAW FROM MEDAN

---

6. (U) STRATEGIC FORCES (KOSTRAD) WITHDREW OVER THE WEEKEND FROM MEDAN, INDONESIA'S THIRD LARGEST CITY. THEY HAD BEEN DEPLOYED THERE SINCE EARLY MAY AFTER WIDE-SPREAD RIOTING. THE NORTH SUMATRA MILITARY POLICE CHIEF (COLONEL SUPRAPTO) TOLD THE MEDIA THAT 18 SECURITY PERSONNEL WERE BEING DETAINED AND QUESTIONED OVER ALLEGATIONS CONNECTED WITH VIOLATIONS OF MILITARY PROCEDURES. AMONG THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS ARE CHARGES STEMMING FROM THE HOSPITALIZATION OF FIVE STUDENT WHO WERE HIT BY RUBBER BULLETS FIRED BY THE SECURITY PERSONNEL. SIX OF THE DETAINED SECURITY PERSONNEL ALSO WERE ALLEGED TO HAVE SEXUALLY HARASSED FEMALE STUDENTS. THE OFFICIAL'S STATEMENTS APPEAR TO LEND CREDENCE TO STUDENT CLAIMS IN EARLY MAY THAT STUDENT-SECURITY FORCE CLASHES WHICH PRECEDED THE RIOTING, WERE CAUSED BY ABUSIVE

ACTION BY THE SECURITY FORCES.

SECTARIAN STRIFE IN MEDAN

7. (U) A PROTESTANT CHURCH FACTION IN NORTH SUMATRA HAS BEGUN FORCING ITS GOVERNMENT-BACKED RIVALS OUT OF CHURCH PROPERTY WHICH

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0505

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0505

PAGE 01 JAKART 03167 02 OF 03 081039Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

--------------------46826C 081040Z /38

O 081033Z JUN 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2013
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0805

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 003167

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
BEIJING FOR A/S ROTH PARTY
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 8 SITUATION REPORT

THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED FACTION HAD TAKEN OVER WITH MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN 1992-93. ON JUNE 7, THE NON-GOVERNMENT FACTION USED FORCE TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE MAIN BATAK PROTESTANT CHURCH IN MEDAN, LEAVING AS MANY AS TEN AMONG THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED FACTION INJURED. (SEE SEPTEL)

PART II: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

HABIBIE SHORTENS ELECTION TIME FRAME, DEFENDS SINO-INDONESIANS

8. (U) PRESIDENT HABIBIE, SPEAKING TO SENIOR EDITORS JUNE 6, STATED THAT HIS NEW TRANSITION SCENARIO WOULD HAVE ELECTIONS HELD NO LATER THAN MAY 1999. THIS IS A SIX-MONTH REDUCTION FROM THE "END OF 1999" PROJECTION WHICH HE PROPOSED IN A CNN INTERVIEW ONLY A WEEK AGO. HABIBIE DID NOT EXPLAIN WHAT LED HIM TO SUGGEST A SHORTENED TIME FRAME ALTHOUGH PRESSURES FROM MANY POINTS IN THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL SPECTRUM, NOTABLY FROM HIS FORMER ALLY AMIEN RAIS, HAVE BEEN FOR ELECTIONS IN NO MORE THAN ONE YEAR'S TIME. THIS NEW HABIBIE CONCESSION/PROPOSAL COULD DIMINISH CALLS FOR AN EARLY CONVENING OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY -- WIDELY SEEN AS A MECHANISM INTENDED TO REMOVE HABIBIE.

9. (U) HABIBIE, IN FURTHER COMMENTS TO SENIOR EDITORS,

REITERATED A PUBLIC POSITION HE HAS TAKEN ELSEWHERE RECENTLY,
CONFIDENTIAL

INSISTING THAT DEMONIZING SINO-INDONESIANS HAS NO PLACE IN INDONESIA. HE TOLD THE SENIOR EDITORS: "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS THE INDIGENOUS-NON-INDIGENOUS INDONESIA ISSUE. EVERY CITIZEN CONCERNED ABOUT AND COMMITTED TO IMPROVING THE NATION IS INDIGENOUS, REGARDLESS OF THEIR ETHNIC GROUP. I REGARD ALL CITIZENS WHO SERVE THE PEOPLE, INCLUDING THOSE OF ETHNIC CHINESE ORIGIN AS PRIBUMIS (THE WORD USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH INDIGENOUS MUSLIM INDONESIANS)."

TRIAL OF ALLEGED KILLERS OF TRISAKTI STUDENTS BEGINS

10. (U) HUNDREDS OF STUDENTS WHO ATTENDED THE JUNE 6 OPENING TRIAL SESSION OF POLICE WHO STAND ACCUSED OF KILLING FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS MARCH 12 WERE ANGERED BY THE FIRST TRIAL SESSION AT WHICH THE DEFENSE APPEARED TO POKE HOLES IN THE PROSECUTION'S CASE. THE APPEARANCE OF A PROMINENT PRO-REFORM HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST AS LEADER OF THE DEFENSE TEAM FURTHER CONFUSED THE STUDENTS. THE LAWYER, ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION, TOLD THE STUDENTS THAT HE BELIEVED THE POLICE WERE MERELY SCAPEGOATS FOR THOSE REALLY RESPONSIBLE, I.E., SENIOR FIGURES IN THE ARMY. THE TRIAL RESUMES JUNE 9. (SEE JAKARTA 3148).

11. (U) IN COMMENTS TO THE PRESS, NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF GENERAL DIBYO WIDODO REITERATED THAT NONE OF THE POLICE OFFICERS ON DUTY DURING THE DEMONSTRATION AT TRISAKTI HAD BEEN ARMED WITH LIVE AMMUNITION. "WE HAVE CHECKED WITH EVERY OFFICER ASSIGNED THERE AND FOUND THAT NONE OF OUR MEN USED LIVE AMMUNITION."

12. (C) IN A RELATED DEVELOPMENT, THE BODY OF ONE OF THE TRISAKTI VICTIMS WAS RE-EXHUMED OVER THE WEEKEND FOR A MORE THOROUGH AUTOPSY. EXAMINERS DISCOVERED A BULLET LODGED IN THE VICTIM'S HEART. THE BULLET, ALLEGEDLY A 5.56 MM CALIBER FROM A
CONFIDENTIAL

STEYR AUG RIFLE, MAY HELP ESTABLISH WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SHOOTING ACCORDING TO A SENIOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER INVOLVED IN THE CASE. BRIMOB PERSONNEL ARE EQUIPPED WITH THAT WEAPON. IRREGULAR ARMY UNITS MAY ALSO BE EQUIPPED WITH THE STEYR AUG.

MAJOR MODERATE ISLAMIC GROUP MOVES TOWARD FORMING POLITICAL PARTY

13. (C) HUNDREDS OF LEADERS OF THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) AGREED TO SET UP A POLITICAL PARTY AT A GATHERING IN THE CENTRAL JAVA TOWN OF REMBANG ON JUNE 6. [redacted] B1 HAS TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT IT WAS LIKELY THAT NU WOULD ESTABLISH A PARTY, BUT SO FAR HE HAS TAKEN THE PUBLIC POSITION THAT NU MEMBERS MUST AWAIT THE NU EXECUTIVE BOARD'S DECISION ON SUCH A STEP. MEANWHILE, THE INDONESIAN WOMEN'S PARTY (PP), THE INDONESIAN WORKERS PARTY (PPI), THE MKGR (A BREAKAWAY GROUP FROM THE RULING GOLKAR MASS ORGANIZATION), THE SINO-INDONESIAN REFORM PARTI (PARTI) AND SEVERAL OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES EITHER HAVE BEEN OR SOON WILL BE ESTABLISHED.

REFORM ACTIVIST DEAD IN UNEXPLAINED HOMICIDE

14. (U) IN THE CENTRAL JAVA TOWN OF SURAKARTA OVER THE WEEKEND, THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE, MOSTLY STUDENTS, THRONGED A BURIAL CEREMONY FOR REFORM ACTIVIST LEONARDUS "GILANG" NUGROHO ISKANDAR, WHO WAS FOUND DEAD IN EAST JAVA ON MAY 23. AN AUTOPSY REVEALED HE HAD

PAGE 01 JAKART 03167 03 OF 03 081039Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W		

----------46825D 081039Z /38

O 081033Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2014
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0806
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 003167

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
BEIJING FOR A/S ROTH PARTY
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03167 03 OF 03 081039Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 8 SITUATION REPORT

BEEN STABBED IN THE LUNG AND HEART. THE VICTIM'S FAMILY SAID THAT THE ACTIVIST LEFT SURAKARTA IN THE COMPANY OF SOMEONE WHO HAD OFFERED HIM A JOB IN EAST JAVA.

SENIOR IRIAN FIGURES MEET TO MAP OUT FUTURE FOR IRIAN JAYA

15. (C) SENIOR FIGURES FROM IRIAN JAYA, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, CHURCH LEADERS AND ACTIVISTS, MET ON JUNE 6 IN JAKARTA TO DISCUSS "NEW OPTIONS" FOR IRIAN JAYA. DISCUSSIONS WITH SEVERAL INVITEES INDICATED AN AGENDA WHICH WOULD INCLUDE DISCUSSION OF CHANGE-OF-STATUS FOR THE PROVINCE RANGING FROM GREATER AUTONOMY TO INDEPENDENCE. ALSO ON THE AGENDA WERE INITIATIVES TO ENSURE GREATER LOCAL CONTROL OVER AND BENEFIT FROM BOTH FOREIGN AND INDONESIAN DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES. (SEE JUNE 9 SEPTEL FOR A READOUT ON THAT MEETING.)

SENIOR EAST TIMORESE MEET TO CONSIDER SPECIAL STATUS OPTION

16. (C) SENIOR EAST TIMORESE MET UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF FORMER EAST TIMORESE GOVERNOR MARIO CARASCALAO IN DILI ON JUNE 6. THE DILI VENUE FOLLOWED TWO SIMILAR MEETINGS IN JAKARTA ALSO CHAIRED BY CARASCALAO. SENIOR EAST TIMORESE SOURCES DESCRIBED THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING AS AIMING AT ACHIEVING A CONSENSUS REGARDING A SPECIAL STATUS FOR EAST TIMOR WHICH WOULD THEN BE PRESENTED TO THE GOVERNMENT AS AN EAST TIMORESE PROPOSAL. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6020

PAGE 01 JAKART 03514 01 OF 05 300200Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/027W					

----------4EAC7F 300206Z /38

R 300156Z JUN 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2348
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 003514

DOL FOR ILAB

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03514 01 OF 05 300200Z
USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JUN 2006 200502473

GENEVA FOR JOHN LONG

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

FROM AMCONGEN SURABAYA 0144

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/29/03
TAGS: ELAB, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: LABOR IN EAST JAVA: NON-PLAYERS IN REFORM EFFORTS

REFS: A) 97 JAKARTA 6559 B) 97 JAKARTA 6782 C) 97 JAKARTA 6683
D) JAKARTA 634 E) JAKARTA 3149 F) JAKARTA 3170
G) JAKARTA 3228 H) JAKARTA 3367

1. CLASSIFIED BY PRINCIPAL OFFICER. REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS IN EAST JAVA HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY COMMON SINCE THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH BEGAN TO FALL IN JULY 1997. WORKERS TYPICALLY DEMAND WAGE AND ALLOWANCE INCREASES BUT STRIKES ARE MOST OFTEN SPARKED BY PERSONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEES. STRIKING WORKERS GENERALLY DEMAND TO NEGOTIATE ONLY WITH THE OWNER, WHO IS USUALLY ABLE TO QUICKLY FORGE AN AGREEMENT. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS ARE WEAK AND UNLIKELY TO GET STRONGER DUE TO WORKER DISTRUST AND RELUCTANCE TO CEDE CONTROL OVER INDIVIDUAL AGENDAS. LABOR GROUPS IN EAST JAVA HAVE NOT PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN SUPPORTING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. SUCH GROUPS ARE UNABLE AND UNWILLING TO MOBILIZE WORKERS ABSENT COMPELLING IMMEDIATE BENEFITS. THERE IS NO CONCEPT OF LABOR SOLIDARITY HERE, NOR IS

ONE IN THE OFFING. END SUMMARY

THE SHAPE OF LABOR IN EAST JAVA
---

3. (U) ALTHOUGH MOST EAST JAVA RESIDENTS CONTINUE TO WORK IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, THE AREA AROUND SURABAYA HAS SEEN SIGNIFICANT INDUSTRIAL GROWTH SINCE THE MID-1980S AND A STEADY EXPANSION OF A LABOR SEGMENT IN THE POPULATION. LONG A BUSY PORT AND IMPORTANT TRADING CENTER, SURABAYA OFFERS INEXPENSIVE LAND AND LABOR, AS WELL AS EASY ACCESS TO A LARGE LOCAL MARKET.

SURABAYA ITSELF IS HOME TO OVER 3 MILLION PEOPLE AND IS THE TRANS-SHIPMENT POINT FOR MOST CARGO TO AND FROM EASTERN INDONESIA. THE POPULATION OF EAST JAVA IS CLOSE TO 35 MILLION. AS MANY AS 3 MILLION WORK AS LABORERS IN INDUSTRY. OF THESE, ALMOST 2 MILLION WORK IN SMALL SCALE MANUFACTURING COMPANIES EMPLOYING FEWER THAN 10 WORKERS. THE REMAINDER WORK IN LARGE AND MEDIUM SCALE INDUSTRIES; PRIMARILY AGRICULTURAL PROCESSING, TEXTILES, PAPER, MACHINING AND WOOD PROCESSING. OF THE THREE MILLION INDUSTRIAL LABORERS, 1.4 MILLION ARE MEN AND 1.6 MILLION ARE WOMEN.

4. (U) ALTHOUGH THE MAJORITY OF LARGE AND MEDIUM SCALE INDUSTRIES ARE LOCATED CLOSE TO SURABAYA, MOST OF THE WORKERS COME FROM OUTSIDE THE SURABAYA METROPOLITAN AREA. MANY OF THE LABORERS IN EAST JAVA ARE UNSKILLED AND HAVE LIMITED EDUCATIONS. MOST COME FROM RURAL BACKGROUNDS, WORKING TEMPORARILY IN FACTORIES IN THE CITY IN THE HOPE OF SAVING ENOUGH TO PUT A SIBLING OR CHILD THROUGH SCHOOL OR BUILD A HOUSE IN THE VILLAGE. LONG-TERM WAGE LABOR IS NOT A GOAL FOR MOST, AND EVEN THOSE WHO REMAIN FOR YEARS RETAIN CLOSE TIES TO THE VILLAGE. WAGES ARE NOT HIGH; THE MINIMUM MONTHLY WAGE FOR SURABAYA IS ONLY RP132,000

(LESS THAN USD 10 AT CURRENT EXCHANGE RATES). THE MINIMUM WAGE HAS NOT BEEN INCREASED SINCE APRIL 1997 (AT THAT TIME RP132,000 = USD 55). MANY COMPANIES PAY HIGHER THAN THE MINIMUM WAGE AS A MEANS OF CULTIVATING WORKFORCE STABILITY AND MOST FACTORIES ALSO PROVIDE ALLOWANCES FOR FOOD, TRANSPORTATION, UNIFORMS, AND OTHER NECESSITIES.

LABOR ACTIVITY
---

5. (U) SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1998, THE SURABAYA CHAPTER OF THE INDONESIAN LEGAL AID SOCIETY HAS RECORDED 105 WORKER DEMONSTRATIONS IN EAST JAVA. BUT FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE INDONESIAN CURRENCY DEPRECIATION IN JULY 1997, LABOR PROTESTS IN EAST JAVA HAVE BEEN INCREASING IN NUMBER. IN NOVEMBER 1997, 6000 DEMONSTRATORS AT PT PAL, THE STATE OWNED SHIPYARD IN SURABAYA, DEMANDED A 200PAY INCREASE AND AN END TO THE EXTRAVAGANT LIFESTYLES OF COMPANY DIRECTORS. IN KEDIRI, 42,000 EMPLOYEES OF CIGARETTE GIANT GUDANG GARAM DEMANDED A 50PAY INCREASE, NEW UNIFORMS, AND MORE LENIENT MENSTRUAL LEAVE. IN SMALLER ACTIONS

THROUGH THE NEW YEAR EMPLOYEES AT SHRIMP CRACKER PROCESSOR SEKAR LAUT PROTESTED RUMORS OF MASS LAYOFFS, AS DID WORKERS AT BANKRUPT SHOE MANUFACTURER CINDERELLA, STEEL MANUFACTURER GUNAWAN JAYA STEEL, COOKIE MAKER UNITED BISCUIT MANUFACTORY (UBM), AND ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLER PANGGUNG ELECTRIC.

6. (U) MORE RECENTLY, 30,000 EMPLOYEES OF MASPION GROUP DEMONSTRATED FOR HIGHER WAGES AND ALLOWANCES, 3000 WORKERS IN A

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ5999

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5999

PAGE 01 JAKART 03514 02 OF 05 300159Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------4EAC2D 300201Z /38

R 300156Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2349
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA

USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 003514

DOL FOR ILAB

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS

GENEVA FOR JOHN LONG

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

FROM AMCONGEN SURABAYA 0144

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/29/03
TAGS: ELAB, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: LABOR IN EAST JAVA: NON-PLAYERS IN REFORM EFFORTS

LOCAL BRANDED SHOE FACTORY (KASOGI) STRUCK FOR HIGHER WAGES AND ALLOWANCES, AND 6000 LONGSHOREMEN DEMANDED THE RESIGNATION OF ALLEGEDLY CORRUPT ASSOCIATION LEADERS AS WELL AS A 100 PAY INCREASE. SMALLER LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN COMMON SINCE THE RUPIAH BEGAN ITS PLUNGE IN JULY 1997. (REFTELS)

LABOR ORGANIZATION IN EAST JAVA
---

7. (C) ALTHOUGH OCCURRING AT DIFFERENT POINTS IN INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC SLIDE AND AT VASTLY DIFFERENT COMPANIES, THE ACTIONS LISTED ABOVE SHARE COMMON CHARACTERISTICS THAT ILLUSTRATE THE UNFORMED NATURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN EAST JAVA. FIRST, IN NONE OF THESE ACTIONS DID A LABOR UNION PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE, EITHER IN INITIATING THE ACTIVITY OR RESOLVING THE ISSUES AT HAND. IN FACT, LABOR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED SPSI ARE DECIDEDLY, ALTHOUGH NOT UNIFORMLY, NEGATIVE. MASPION WORKERS MADE THE DISBANDING OF SPSI OPERATIONS IN THE FACTORY ONE OF THEIR DEMANDS. TO MANY, SPSI DOES A BETTER JOB OF STIFLING

WORKER DEMANDS THAN PRESSING THEM. SOME ACCUSE SPSI OF BEING
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03514 02 OF 05 300159Z
NOTHING MORE THAN A MANAGEMENT TOOL AND RESENT THE AUTOMATIC DEDUCTION OF UNION DUES FROM THEIR PAY PACKETS.

8. (C) NOR HAS MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN'S SBSI HAD MUCH SUCCESS ORGANIZING IN EAST JAVA. PAKPAHAN'S PERCEIVED NEGLECT OF EAST JAVA, [redacted], AND A GENERAL RELUCTANCE BY LOCAL LABORERS TO PARTICIPATE IN AN ORGANIZATION THEY SEE AS DOMINATED BY A JAKARTA-CENTRIC ELITE MAKE THE SBSI A NON-PLAYER IN EAST JAVA'S LABOR MOVEMENT. EVEN THE HEAD OF THE SMALL SURABAYA OFFICE NOMINALLY AFFILIATED WITH THE SBSI PRIVATELY RENOUNCES HIS TIES TO THE ORGANIZATION. HE TOLD US HE WELCOMES THE RECOGNITION OF SBSI AS A LEGAL LABOR UNION, BUT HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE A BRANCH OFFICE OF THE LARGER GROUP. HE FINDS IT EASIER TO ORGANIZE WORKERS UNDER HIS OWN FLAG. LABORERS IN EAST JAVA GENERALLY WANT TO HAVE THE FREEDOM TO ORGANIZE THEIR OWN WORKER ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDERS UNFAMILIAR WITH LOCAL CONDITIONS AND SENSIBILITIES. B6

9. (C) LOCAL UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE EAST JAVA LABORERS GROUP, THE REFORM LABOR GROUP, AND THE MIGRANT WORKERS GROUP, CAN CLAIM MEMBERS IN MULTIPLE COMPANIES BUT HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO ORGANIZE TO PRESS FOR LABOR RIGHTS OR GENERAL DEMANDS. SUCH GROUPS ARE RARELY ABLE TO MOBILIZE MEMBERS TO ADDRESS MORE THAN IMMEDIATE CONCERNS. IN THIS WAY, THEY ARE MUCH LIKE THE UNIT LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE DEVELOPED IN MANY COMPANIES. THESE GROUPS HAVE SHOWN THEY CAN MOTIVATE AND ORGANIZE WORKERS TO PRESS FOR BETTER WAGES, JOB SECURITY, AND IMPROVED WORKING CONDITIONS IN INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES. BUT THEY ARE UNWILLING AND UNABLE TO COOPERATE WITH SIMILAR GROUPS IN OTHER COMPANIES BECAUSE OF A LACK OF TRUST AND THE PERCEPTION
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THAT THEY SHARE NO SIGNIFICANT COMMON INTEREST. WHILE WORKERS MAY SYMPATHIZE WITH DEMONSTRATORS FROM OTHER COMPANIES, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO RISK THEIR OWN POSITIONS ABSENT IMMEDIATE CAUSE OR POTENTIAL FOR BENEFIT.

CAUSES OF PROTESTS AND DEMANDS

10. (C) LIKE MOST WORKERS, LABORERS AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS IN EAST JAVA GENERALLY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT WAGES, JOB SECURITY, AND RESPECT. SINCE THE ONSET OF THE INDONESIAN MONETARY CRISIS IN JULY 1997 WORKER DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON THESE ISSUES. WAGE INCREASES ARE TYPICALLY, ALTHOUGH NOT ALWAYS, THE PRIMARY DEMAND IN LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS BUT WAGES ARE RARELY THE SOLE SPARK THAT INITIATES A STRIKE. MORE OFTEN, IT IS A COMBINATION OF DEMANDS FOR HIGHER WAGES AND/OR LIVING ALLOWANCES, GUARANTEES OF JOB SECURITY, AND DEMANDS FOR ELIMINATING CORRUPTION OR IMPROVING LABOR/MANAGEMENT RELATIONS.

11. (C) LABOR ACTIONS ARE OFTEN DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO PERSONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND LABOR. IN STATE OWNED COMPANIES OR INSTITUTIONS WITH STATE CONNECTIONS EMPLOYEES HAVE DEMANDED THE RESIGNATIONS OF OFFICIALS DEEMED OVERLY CORRUPT. WORKERS AT STATE-OWNED SHIPBUILDER PT PAL WERE INSPIRED TO STRIKE NOT ONLY BY THE SUCCESS OF THEIR COLLEAGUES AT STATE-OWNED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER IPTN, BUT ALSO BY THE PERCEPTION OF VAST PROFITS BEING RAKED OFF BY COMPANY DIRECTORS IN JAKARTA. PORT WORKERS WERE UPSET WITH THE BEHAVIOR OF THE COOPERATIVE

NNNNPTQ6000

PAGE 01 JAKART 03514 03 OF 05 300159Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/027W					

----------4EAC38 300201Z /38

R 300156Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2350
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 003514

DOL FOR ILAB

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03514 03 OF 05 300159Z
USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS

GENEVA FOR JOHN LONG

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

FROM AMCONGEN SURABAYA 0144

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/29/03

TAGS: ELAB, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: LABOR IN EAST JAVA: NON-PLAYERS IN REFORM EFFORTS

MANAGEMENT, WHO WERE ACCUSED OF NEPOTISM AND CORRUPTION. WORKER DEMANDS IN BOTH CASES INCLUDED THE SACKING OF THESE CORRUPT OFFICIALS.

12. (C) PERSONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND LABOR CAN ALSO SPARK A CRISIS AT PRIVATE COMPANIES. LABORERS AT GUDANG GARAM RALLIED IN SUPPORT OF CO-WORKERS WHO WERE PROTESTING THE CURSORY DISMISSAL OF THEIR DEMANDS BY THE SHOP SUPERVISOR. WORKERS AT SEKAR LAUT, UGM, JAYA STEEL, AND CINDERELLA STRUCK BECAUSE THEY DISTRUSTED MANAGEMENT'S ANNOUNCEMENTS DENYING POTENTIAL LAYOFFS AND WERE UPSET AT THE MANNER IN WHICH THE COMPANIES LET EMPLOYEES GO WHEN LAYOFFS DID OCCUR. MANAGERS AT MASPION HAVE OFTEN BEEN ACCUSED BY LABORERS OF ARROGANCE AND HARSH TREATMENT. ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE NO DEMANDS RELATING DIRECTLY TO THIS ISSUE, A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND LABOR WOULD ALLOW THE TWO SIDES TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES WITHOUT THE MOBILIZATION OF THE ENTIRE WORKFORCE. WHEN WORKER COMPLAINTS ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE EARLY STAGES, LARGER NUMBERS MAY JOIN THE ACTION WITH A NEW SERIES OF DEMANDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NEGOTIATING STRATEGIES

13. (C) BECAUSE THERE ARE NO LEADERS ABLE TO UNIFY THE DISPARATE DEMANDS OF WORKERS, ESPECIALLY IN LARGE COMPANIES, WHEN LABORERS ARE MOTIVATED ENOUGH TO PROTEST THERE MAY BE MULTIPLE LEADERS AND CONFLICTING DEMANDS. THIS IS ILLUSTRATED IN THE MASPION, PORT, AND GUDANG GARAM PROTESTS. AT GUDANG GARAM, A SMALL GROUP OF WORKERS INITIALLY DEMANDED A SMALL RAISE, A MILK ALLOWANCE, AND NEW UNIFORMS. THESE DEMANDS QUICKLY SHIFTED TO LARGE PAY INCREASES, LIBERAL MENSTRUAL LEAVE, AND INCREASED OVERTIME BONUSES. AT MASPION, AN INITIAL AGREEMENT HAMMERED OUT WITH A SMALL GROUP OF WORKER REPRESENTATIVES WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY OTHERS, WHO DEMANDED SEATS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. EVENTUALLY, FORTY WORKER REPRESENTATIVES TOOK PART IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH MANAGEMENT AND THE LABOR MINISTRY. GOALS MAY BE INDETERMINATE. AT THE PORT, LABORERS REPRESENTATIVES FIRST REJECTED, THEN ACCEPTED FOR NO OBVIOUS REASON A PROPOSED SOLUTION.

14. (C) WORKER REPRESENTATIVES TYPICALLY REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE WITH MID OR EVEN UPPER-LEVEL MANAGEMENT. THEY WANT TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE OWNER OF THE COMPANY. LOWER LEVEL OFFICERS ARE GENERALLY REJECTED AS UNABLE TO MAKE COMMITMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE COMPANY. AN OWNER'S RELUCTANCE TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH WORKERS IS SEEN BY MANY AS A SIGN OF ARROGANCE AND LACK OF RESPECT. SUCH A RESPONSE IS LIKELY TO INFLAME WORKER PASSIONS EVEN HIGHER. MASPION MANAGERS TOLD US THEY ATTRIBUTED THE MASS PROTESTS AT THAT COMPANY IN PART TO THE RELUCTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT DIRECTOR TO ADDRESS WORKER CONCERNS AFTER A SMALLER DEMONSTRATION EARLIER IN THE WEEK. GUDANG GARAM WORKERS REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE BROTHER OF THE COMPANY PRESIDENT, THEY

DEMANDED THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF ADDRESS THE ASSEMBLED WORKERS BEFORE THEY WOULD DISPERSE. PT PAL WORKERS SPECIFICALLY DEMANDED NEGOTIATIONS BE HANDLED BY NO ONE OTHER THAN THEN RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY MINISTER HABIBIE. EMPLOYEES OF KASOGI REFUSED TO EVEN BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMPANY ARRIVED FROM JAKARTA.

15. (C) ONCE THE LEADER OF THE COMPANY ADDRESSES THE ASSEMBLED WORKERS A COMPROMISE SOLUTION IS USUALLY QUICKLY WORKED OUT. AT GUDANG GARAM, THE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED WITHIN HOURS OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE COMPANY PRESIDENT BEFORE HIS WORKERS. HABIBIE WAS SIMILARLY ABLE TO FASHION AN ACCEPTABLE ACCORD WITHIN A FEW HOURS. MASPION WORKERS AGREED TO SETTLE THEIR STRIKE SHORTLY AFTER A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT DIRECTOR.

16. (C) THE DEMANDS OF THE WORKERS RARELY VARY FROM AN ESTABLISHED NORM. STRIKERS GENERALLY DEMAND WAGE INCREASES OF ANYWHERE FROM 50-200; INCREASES IN ALLOWANCES FOR MEALS, TRANSPORTATION, AND OTHER EXPENSES; AND OVERTIME PAY INCREASES. OCCASIONALLY WORKERS WILL HAVE SITUATION SPECIFIC DEMANDS SUCH AS NEW UNIFORMS OR UNRESTRICTED MENSTRUAL LEAVE. A RECENT TREND HAS BEEN THE DEMAND FOR GUARANTEED HOURS. WHILE THE DECISION TO STRIKE MAY NOT BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF OTHER RECENT LABOR ACTIONS, THE DEMANDS WILL OFTEN MIRROR WHAT OTHERS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED, EVEN IN WIDELY VARYING INDUSTRIES. TO DATE, STRIKERS HAVE SHOWN AN APPRECIATION FOR WHAT THE MARKET WILL STILL BEAR. CRIES OF IMPENDING BANKRUPTCY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6007

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6007

PAGE 01 JAKART 03514 04 OF 05 300159Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------4EAC6D 300205Z /38
R 300156Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2351
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 003514

USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS

GENEVA FOR JOHN LONG

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

FROM AMCONGEN SURABAYA 0144

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/29/03
TAGS: ELAB, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: LABOR IN EAST JAVA: NON-PLAYERS IN REFORM EFFORTS

BY COMPANY PRESIDENTS HAVE BECOME PART OF THE NEGOTIATING RITUAL. THESE CRIES USUALLY BECOME MOST VOCIFEROUS JUST BEFORE THE COMPANY AGREES TO FULFILL MOST WORKER DEMANDS, AT LEAST IN PART.

NO POLITICS PLEASE, WE'RE LABOR
---

17. (C) LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN INSPIRED BY POLITICAL AGENDAS. DURING THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS DEMANDING THE RESIGNATION OF FORMER PRESIDENT SUHARTO, LABORERS WERE CONSPICUOUS BY THEIR ABSENCE. ONLY AFTER THE TRAGIC INCIDENT AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY DID LABORERS HOLD A HANDFUL OF SMALL DEMONSTRATIONS IN SUPPORT OF REFORM. EVEN THEN, WORKERS DECLINED TO JOIN THE LARGE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS MARCHING THROUGH SURABAYA OR AT THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY, INSTEAD RALLYING AT NEARBY INDUSTRIAL ESTATES. LABOR ACTIVISTS TOLD US AT THE TIME THAT WHILE WORKERS SUPPORTED CALLS FOR REFORM, THEY DID NOT WANT TO THROW THEIR SUPPORT BEHIND THE STUDENT GROUPS AND WOULD ACT INDEPENDENTLY. LABORERS FEARED LOSING CONTROL OF THEIR AGENDA AND PREFERRED TO ORGANIZE THEIR OWN MOVEMENT.

18. (C) THIS FEAR OF RELINQUISHING CONTROL HAS MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR LABOR ACTIVISTS TO ORGANIZE WORKERS EFFECTIVELY OUTSIDE THE PLANT OR COMPANY LEVEL. PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH THE SPSI HAS LEFT MANY WITH NEGATIVE VIEWS OF LABOR UNIONS. MOREOVER, WORKERS HARBOR A GENERAL DISTRUST OF OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS AND ARE RELUCTANT TO SUBMIT TO DIRECTION FROM WHAT ARE PERCEIVED AS FOREIGN (AS OPPOSED TO LOCAL, EAST JAVA) INTERESTS. WORKERS IN EAST JAVA ARE WARY OF WHAT THEY SEE AS OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN LOCAL ISSUES AND DO NOT WANT TO BE USED BY JAKARTA BASED ORGANIZATIONS TO FURTHER THE GOALS OR AMBITIONS OF NON-LOCAL LEADERS.

19. (C) WORKER RELUCTANCE TO ORGANIZE BEYOND THE PLANT EXTENDS TO THE INDUSTRY LEVEL AS WELL. A STRIKE BY WORKERS AT ONE COMPANY WILL GENERALLY NOT LEAD TO STRIKES AT OTHER COMPANIES IN THE SAME INDUSTRY. EAST JAVA LABORERS HAVE NOT FORMED INDUSTRY WIDE ASSOCIATIONS NOR DO THEY APPEAR TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT CONTACT WITH OTHER LABORERS, EVEN WITHIN THE SAME INDUSTRY. WHILE WORKERS MAY SUPPORT THEIR COLLEAGUES IN PRINCIPLE THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO DO SO IN ACTION. LABOR CONCERNS AND DEMANDS ARE COMPANY ORIENTED, NOT INDUSTRY ORIENTED.

THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN EAST JAVA

20. (C) THE COLLAPSE OF THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY IS EXPECTED BY MANY TO RESULT IN MASSIVE LAY-OFFS AND HUGE LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS. BUT IN EAST JAVA, THE PROSPECTS FOR THE LATTER AT LEAST ARE SLIM. MANY COMPANIES IN THE SURABAYA AREA HAVE ALREADY SLOWED OR STOPPED OPERATIONS. SOME WORKERS HAVE BEEN LAID OFF, MANY MORE SIMPLY WERE SENT HOME AT A FRACTION OF THEIR REGULAR PAY. YET

THESE EVENTS HAVE SPARKED FEW LABOR ACTIONS. ONLY WHEN MANAGEMENT IS PERCEIVED AS BEING UNFAIR OR DUPLICITOUS HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED. LABORERS ARE STILL TOO UNORGANIZED AND TOO DISTRUSTFUL OF OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS TO UNIFY IN MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS. LABOR SOLIDARITY IS AN ALIEN TERM. LARGE STRIKES AND DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT THE MANAGEMENT

OF INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES OR CONGLOMERATES BY EMPLOYEES OF THOSE COMPANIES AND HAVE NOT BEEN PRECURSORS OF STRIKES BY LABORERS IN OTHER COMPANIES OR INDUSTRIES.

21. (C) DESPITE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT'S RATIFICATION OF ILO CONVENTION 87 ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE NEW OPENNESS SHOWN BY GOVERNMENT TOWARDS LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVISTS, EAST JAVA LABORERS ARE UNLIKELY TO JOIN NATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATIONS ABSENT A CONCERTED EFFORT BY SUCH GROUPS AT LABOR EDUCATION. SHOP-LEVEL OR COMPANY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS WILL BE THE NORM WITH LEADERSHIP COMING FROM WITHIN THE INDIVIDUAL COMPANY. WHILE LABOR ACTIVISTS REPRESENTING A VARIETY OF GROUPS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE INSPIRED BY THE NEW LEVELS OF OPENNESS THEY WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO OVERCOME LABORERS' DISTRUST AND FEAR OF DOMINATION AND MANIPULATION.

22. (C) LABOR IN EAST JAVA IS UNLIKELY TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC REFORM, ON THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL LEVEL. THEIR LACK OF ORGANIZATION AND RELUCTANCE TO ORGANIZE WILL PREVENT LABORERS FROM BEING MOBILIZED TO PRESS FOR POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CHANGE. THEIR GENERALLY LOW LEVEL OF POLITICAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6019

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6019

PAGE 01 JAKART 03514 05 OF 05 300159Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00

PRS-00 P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 T-00
USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /025W
----------4EAC75 300206Z /38

R 300156Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2352
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 003514

DOL FOR ILAB

USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS
CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA FOR JOHN LONG

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

FROM AMCONGEN SURABAYA 0144

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/29/03
TAGS: ELAB, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: LABOR IN EAST JAVA: NON-PLAYERS IN REFORM EFFORTS

SOPHISTICATION WILL PRECLUDE THEM FROM PRESSING FOR BROAD REFORMS ON THEIR OWN. LABOR DISPUTES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE FOCUSED ON INDIVIDUAL WAGE CONCERNS, LAYOFFS, AND LABOR/MANAGEMENT RELATIONS. CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT HAVE ALREADY BECOME HOT-BUTTON ISSUES, ESPECIALLY IN STATE-OWNED COMPANIES, COMPANIES WITH TIES TO THE SUHARTO GOVERNMENT OR FAMILY, AND COMPANIES WITH

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS. IN THESE CASES, CALLS FOR RESIGNATIONS OF KEY OFFICIALS ARE POSSIBLE. COMPANIES WILL RESPOND TO LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS BY GRANTING, AT LEAST IN PART, AS MANY OF THE LABORERS DEMANDS FOR AS LONG AS IT REMAINS POSSIBLE TO DO SO.

23. (C) "LABOR" IS NOT A PLAYER IN EAST JAVA'S REFORM GAME. INABILITY TO UNIFY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO PUSH FOR ANY KIND OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE. THE RURAL BACKGROUND AND LACK OF POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION OF MOST LABORERS MAKE IT QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THEY WOULD SUPPORT BROAD STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN ANY CASE. INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES WILL CONTINUE TO FACE LABOR PROTESTS BUT THESE ACTIONS WILL BE SPECIFIC AND LOCALIZED. EVEN AS ECONOMIC CONDITIONS CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE, "LABOR" WILL NOT BECOME A POLITICAL FORCE HERE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ6072

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6072

PAGE 01 JAKART 03641 01 OF 03 080822Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W			

---------- 51B341 080823Z /38

R 080817Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2439
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003641

USCINCPAC FOR AMB. SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/08
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PREL, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: AMIEN RAIS CHARTS HIS POLITICAL COURSE

REF: JAKARTA 3494

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS;
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03641 01 OF 03 080822Z
REASON 1.5(D)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 7 JUL 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JUN 2006 200502473

2. (C) SUMMARY: AMIEN RAISE, OPPOSITION FIGURE AND LEADER OF THE 28-MILLION "MUHAMMADIYAH," HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY A MUHAMMADYAH LEADERSHIP CONGRESS PROCEED WITH FORMATION OF A POLITICAL PARTY.

[redacted] B1

END SUMMARY

3. (U) AMIEN RAIS, LEADER OF THE 28-MILLION MEMBER MUHAMMADIYAH, CONVENED A MUHAMMADIYAH LEADERSHIP CONGRESS JULY 5-7 IN SEMARANG, CENTRAL JAVA. RAIS MET WITH POLCOUNS IN SEMARANG JULY 7 TO DISCUSS THE CONGRESS AND HIS EVOLVING POLITICAL VIEWS.

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] B1



B1

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6074

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6074

PAGE 01 JAKART 03641 02 OF 03 080823Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01
	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W

----------51B34A 080823Z /38

R 080817Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2440
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 003641

USCINCPAC FOR AMB. SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/08
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PREL, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: AMIEN RAIS CHARTS HIS POLITICAL COURSE

REF: JAKARTA 3494

[redacted] B1

AGAINST CHALLENGES FROM DEMOCRATIC FIGURES, SUCH AS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6075

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6075

PAGE 01 JAKART 03641 03 OF 03 080823Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W			

----------51B34C 080823Z /38

R 080817Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2441
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 003641

USCINCPAC FOR AMB. SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/08
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PREL, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: AMIEN RAIS CHARTS HIS POLITICAL COURSE

REF: JAKARTA 3494



B1

[redacted] B1

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6644

PAGE 01 JAKART 03654 081113Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/023W						

----------51C2F8 081113Z /38

R 081107Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2450
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003654

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/08
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JULY 8 MEETING WITH COORDINATING MINISTER FEISAL TANJUNG

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03654 081113Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 7 JUL 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN A JULY 8 MEETING WITH COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS FEISAL TANJUNG, THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF GUARANTEEING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE SINO-INDONESIAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY, AND OF THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATING THE TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS AND THE RIOTS OF MAY 14. HE ALSO URGED GOI RESTRAINT IN HANDLING THE SITUATION IN IRIAN JAYA. FEISAL ATTRIBUTED THE ATTACKS ON CHINESE TO THE "INJUSTICES" CREATED BY THE SOEHARTO REGIME'S FAVORING OF CHINESE INTERESTS AND NEGLECT OF THE NEEDS OF POORER ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY. (ANOTHER MINISTER TOLD US THE CABINET DECIDED LATER JULY 8 TO FORM A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE RIOTS.) ARGUING THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAD "DONE MORE TO FURTHER POLITICAL REFORM IN 42 DAYS THAN SOEHARTO HAD IN 30 YEARS," FEISAL SUGGESTED THAT HABIBIE "MAY BE NEEDED" TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE FOR FIVE MORE YEARS AFTER 1999. HE REFUSED TO COMMENT SUBSTANTIVELY ON INTRA-GOLKAR CONFLICTS, BUT [redacted] B1 FEISAL MAINTAINED THAT THE SECURITY FORCES HAD MATTERS UNDER CONTROL IN IRIAN JAYA. HE BLAMED A DISGRUNTLED FORMER LOCAL OFFICIAL FOR "MASTERMINDING" RECENT DISTURBANCES. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED HOPE THAT INDONESIA'S ECONOMY COULD RECOVER QUICKLY AND ALLUDED TO THE USG'S POSITIVE REACTION TO THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT'S RELEASE OF SOME POLITICAL PRISONERS AND OPENINGS ON THE LABOR FRONT. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS MUCH CONCERN IN THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE NEED TO RESTORE THE SINO-INDONESIAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY'S CONFIDENCE THAT THEY CAN OPERATE IN A SECURE ENVIRONMENT. ONE PROPOSAL WAS THAT A COMMITTEE OF DISTINGUISHED INDONESIANS BE ESTABLISHED TO INVESTIGATE THE

CONFIDENTIAL

EVENTS OF MAY 14 AND BEFORE.

4. (C) DENYING ANY REAL ETHNIC PROBLEMS IN INDONESIA, FEISAL BLAMED THE RIOTS ON THE GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR AND THE INJUSTICE CREATED BY THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT'S FAVORING OF THE CHINESE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND ITS NEGLECT OF THE POOR. FEISAL CHARGED THAT THE REFUSAL OF SOME SINO-INDONESIAN BUSINESSMEN TO RETURN TO THE COUNTRY IS NOT BASED ON LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS BUT UNSPECIFIED OTHER FACTORS. DEFENDING CONTINUING GOI SUBSIDIES IN

THE AREAS OF EDUCATION, HEALTH CARE, AND THE 9 ESSENTIAL GOODS, FEISAL SAID THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT WAS FOCUSSING ITS ECONOMIC PROGRAM ON IMPROVING THE LIVES OF THE POOREST ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY.

5. (C) THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THIS PERIOD OF TRANSITION PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE GOI TO CREATE A NEW IMAGE FOR INDONESIA. IT WAS NECESSARY, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOVERNMENT PURSUE A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF THE TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS AND THE EVENTS OF MAY 14. THE GOI'S PROMPT INVESTIGATION AND PUNISHMENT OF THOSE INVOLVED IN RECENT KILLINGS IN EAST TIMOR IS SEEN AS A POSITIVE STEP, THE AMBASSADOR ADDED. FEISAL SAID MILITARY COMMANDER WIRANTO HAD ORDERED A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF THE MAY EVENTS AND THAT THE RESULTS COULD NOT BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL THE ENQUIRY WAS COMPLETED. (COMMENT: HOUSING MINISTER THEO SAMBUAGA TOLD US SEPARATELY THAT THE JULY 8 CABINET MEETING HAD DECIDED TO FORM A SPECIAL MINISTERIAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE RIOTS AND ASSOCIATED RAPES. END COMMENT.)

6. (C) THE AMBASSADOR ASKED FEISAL FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF PRESIDENT HABIBIE AND THE CURRENT CONFLICTS WITHIN GOLKAR. FEISAL REPLIED THAT IT WAS OF COURSE UP TO THE PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR LEADERS, BUT ADDED THAT HABIBIE MAY WELL BE NEEDED TO STAY ON FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANOTHER FIVE YEARS AFTER 1999. HE SAID HABIBIE HAD "DONE MORE IN 42 DAYS THAN SOEHARTO DID IN 30 YEARS" TO FURTHER POLITICAL REFORM. FEISAL AVOIDED SUBSTANTIVELY ADDRESSING THE SITUATION WITHIN GOLKAR, ONLY ASSERTING THAT ABRI WOULD NOT INTERFERE IN GOLKAR AFFAIRS. [redacted] B1

7. (C) THE AMBASSADOR REQUESTED FEISAL'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN IRIAN JAYA AND URGED THAT THE GOI SHOW RESTRAINT. FEISAL BLAMED THE PROBLEM IN IRIAN ON "EXCESSES OF DEMOCRACY," A SMALL NUMBER OF YOUTH AND "JEALOUSY" OF EAST TIMOR'S PROSPECTS FOR OBTAINING A SPECIAL STATUS. HE SAID A DISGRUNTLED FORMER LOCAL OFFICIAL HAD BEEN ARRESTED AS THE "MASTERMIND" OF THE DISTURBANCES IN BIAK. FEISAL MAINTAINED THAT THE SECURITY FORCES HAD HANDLED THE SITUATION WELL, USING RUBBER BULLETS ONLY WHEN DEMONSTRATORS BECAME "DESTRUCTIVE." HE SAID THE SITUATION IN IRIAN WAS NOW UNDER

CONTROL. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

E42

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0801

PAGE 01 JAKART 04098 01 OF 10 030724Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01
	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00
	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/033W		

----------5AE56B 030724Z /38

R 030708Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2879
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AIT TAIPEI 0917
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 JAKARTA 004098

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04098 01 OF 10 030724Z
BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PLEASE PASS EAP A/S ROTH

HONG KONG FOR TREASURY ATTACHE QUINN

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA, INR/IL

STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE FOR LANDRY

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

DEPARTMENT PASS FOR EXIMBANK FOR IMAM

PASS USDA FOR FAS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 2 AUG 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 30 JUN 2006 200502473

AID/W FOR ANE

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/08
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EIND, PINR, KPRP, PHUM, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INDONESIAN CHINESE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: TDY POLOFF CONDUCTED 22 INTERVIEWS IN JAKARTA'S SINO-INDONESIAN COMMUNITY TO GAUGE CURRENT SENTIMENT TOWARDS INDONESIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION. SINO-INDONESIANS CANVASSED INCLUDED ACADEMICS, PROFESSIONALS, SMALL AND MEDIUM SCALE BUSINESSPEOPLE AND CONGLOMERATE OWNERS. THIS CABLE, A FOLLOW UP TO

JAKARTA 4031, ENDEAVORS TO CORRECT SOME OF THE MOST COMMONLY HELD MISPERCEPTIONS OF THE CHINESE (SINO-INDONESIANS) IN INDONESIA, FIRST AND FOREMOST BY SHOWING THAT THERE IS NOT ONE MONOLITHIC COMMUNITY WHICH IS REACTING TO INDONESIA'S CURRENT CRISIS IN A FORMULAIC WAY. THE FIRST SECTION EXAMINES IMPORTANT BUT LITTLE UNDERSTOOD STATISTICS ABOUT THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN INDONESIA. THE SECOND ADDRESSES THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF CAPITAL FLOWS, IDENTIFYING THREE DISTINCT PERIODS OF OUTFLOW DRIVEN BY DIFFERENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS. CONTRARY TO POPULAR PERCEPTION, CAPITAL OUTFLOWS BEGAN IN EARNEST IN THE MID-1990'S, AND THE AMOUNT OF FLIGHT CAPITAL AVAILABLE FOR REPATRIATION MAY BE LESS THAN OBSERVERS BELIEVE.

3. (C) THE THIRD SECTION EXPLAINS WHY THE CHINESE SEE THIS CRISIS AS PROFOUNDLY DIFFERENT THAN PREVIOUS ANTI-CHINESE UNREST, PRESENTING A PICTURE OF PERVASIVE PESSIMISM WHICH SPANS DIFFERENT GROUPS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY. THE FOURTH SECTION EXAMINES DIFFERENT RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS, SHOWING HOW AGE, CLASS, EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND CULTURAL ORIENTATION ALL INFORM THE CHOICES BEING MADE BY DIFFERENT KINDS OF CHINESE. CERTAIN GROUPS ARE LEAVING OR TRYING TO LEAVE, WHILE OTHERS ARE FIGHTING FOR THEIR RIGHTS AND ATTACKING THE CORRUPT PRACTICES OF THE CRONY CHINESE. MANY BUSINESSPEOPLE ARE WAITING TO SEE HOW EVENTS UNFOLD, WHILE THE VAST MAJORITY OF CHINESE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO STAY PUT AND START OVER.

4. (C) THE INDONESIAN CHINESE ARE A HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITY, AND BEING ANTI-CONGLOMERATE DOES NOT MEAN BEING ANTI-CHINESE. THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR A RETURN OF CONFIDENCE AND CAPITAL TO INDONESIA ARE POLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY; A CREDIBLE

GUARANTEE FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY; INVESTIGATION OF THE MAY RIOTS AND RAPES; AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THOSE FOUND GUILTY. IN THE SHORT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04098 01 OF 10 030724Z

TERM, THEN, THE PICTURE IS BLEAK, FOR THESE CRITERIA WILL NOT BE EASILY OR IMMEDIATELY MET. MOREOVER, SHOULD ATTACKS ON CHINESE RESUME, THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN ARMING THEMSELVES AND ARE PREPARED TO FIGHT. IN THE MEDIUM TO LONG TERM, HOWEVER, IF ELECTIONS AND CREDIBLE GOVERNMENT FOSTER A MORE STABLE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT, THERE IS REASON FOR SOBER OPTIMISM. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, WHILE CAPITAL IS INDEED MOBILE AND CHINESE, LIKE CERTAIN KINDS OF OTHER INVESTORS, CAN KEEP THEIR MONEY ABROAD, VIRTUALLY ALL CHINESE BUSINESSMEN ACKNOWLEDGE THAT A STABLE INDONESIA WOULD PRESENT ENORMOUS INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, PERANAKAN CHINESE ("INDONESIANIZED CHINESE") ARE PRO-ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN "REFORMASI" AND ARE PROMOTING THE KIND OF DISCOURSE NECESSARY TO FIND LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS TO INDONESIA'S LONGSTANDING CHINESE PROBLEM. END SUMMARY.

SINO-INDONESIANS: MISPERCEPTIONS AND STEREOTYPES

5. (U) MANY OF THE MISPERCEPTIONS AND STEREOTYPES ABOUT THE CHINESE (AKA SINO-INDONESIANS) IN INDONESIA STEM FROM THE LACK OF ACCURATE DATA. THE LAST CENSUS THAT EMPLOYED RACE AS A DISTINGUISHING VARIABLE WAS TAKEN BY THE DUTCH IN 1930. SINCE INDEPENDENCE, INDONESIA HAS INSISTED THAT RACE/ETHNICITY NOT BE USED AS DISTINGUISHING CRITERIA; HENCE THE ABSENCE OF CONCRETE DATA

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2837

PAGE 01 JAKART 04098 02 OF 10 031857Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01
	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00
	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/033W		

----------5B2707 031857Z /49

R 030708Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2880
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AIT TAIPEI 0918
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 10 JAKARTA 004098

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04098 02 OF 10 031857Z
BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PLEASE PASS EAP A/S ROTH

HONG KONG FOR TREASURY ATTACHE QUINN

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA, INR/IL

STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE FOR LANDRY

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

DEPARTMENT PASS FOR EXIMBANK FOR IMAM

PASS USDA FOR FAS

AID/W FOR ANE

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/08
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EIND, PINR, KPRP, PHUM, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INDONESIAN CHINESE

ABOUT THE SIZE, DEMOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWN AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION AMONG CHINESE INDONESIANS. (IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES HAVE THIS DATA, SINCE IDENTITY CARDS FOR CHINESE HAVE UNTIL RECENTLY BEEN DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF NATIVE INDONESIANS. STILL, THIS INFORMATION HAS NEVER BEEN RELEASED.) AS A RESULT, ECONOMISTS USE THE FIGURES FROM THE 1930 CENSUS IN

CONJUNCTION WITH THE OVERALL GROWTH RATE OF THE POPULATION AND
CONFIDENTIAL

IMMIGRATION STATISTICS TO EXTRAPOLATE A FIGURE OF ROUGHLY SIX MILLION CHINESE, OR SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 3-4 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL POPULATION. THESE CHINESE ARE OVERWHELMINGLY CONCENTRATED IN URBAN CENTERS, NOTABLY JAKARTA, MEDAN, SURABAYA, SEMARANG, AND PONTIANAK, BUT CAN BE FOUND THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRYSIDE AS WELL.

6. (U) OF THE SIX MILLION OR SO CHINESE, ONLY 200 FAMILIES BELONG TO THE TYCOON CLASS. FACTORING A WIFE, CHILDREN, GRANDCHILDREN, SURVIVING PARENTS AND OTHER EXTENDED FAMILY MEMBERS, ECONOMISTS ESTIMATE AT MOST 10,000 INDIVIDUALS OR ABOUT .2 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL COMMUNITY BELONG TO THIS GROUP. A MILLION OR SO CHINESE ARE THOUGHT TO BE MIDDLE, UPPER-MIDDLE AND LOWER-UPPER CLASS, RANGING FROM SMALL AND MEDIUM SCALE BUSINESSMEN TO SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED CONGLOMERATE OWNERS. CONTRARY TO POPULAR PERCEPTIONS, THEN, A SUBSTANTIAL MAJORITY OF THE CHINESE IN INDONESIA ARE LOWER MIDDLE TO LOWER CLASS SHOP OWNERS AND TRADERS. SOME CHINESE, IN FACT, ARE QUITE POOR BY ANY STANDARD, LIVING BENEATH THE POVERTY LINE AND WORKING AS PEASANTS AND FOOD SELLERS IN PLACES LIKE WEST KALIMANTAN AND THE NORTH COAST OF JAVA. A POIGNANT REMINDER OF THIS FORGOTTEN CLASS OF CHINESE HIT THE INDONESIAN PAPERS ON JULY 20, WHEN IT WAS REPORTED THAT A POOR CHINESE FARMER IN SINGKAWANG, WEST KALIMANTAN POISONED HIMSELF AND HIS FOUR CHILDREN BECAUSE HE COULD NOT COPE WITH THE ECONOMIC CRISIS.

7. (U) ONE OF THE KEYS TO UNDERSTANDING CHINESE IS THE "PERANAKAN-TOTOK" DISTINCTION. THE SO-CALLED PERANAKAN CHINESE HAVE LIVED IN INDONESIA FOR MANY GENERATIONS AND CONSIDER THEMSELVES WHOLLY INDONESIAN. THIS GROUP IS GENERALLY WELL EDUCATED, WITH THE OLDER GENERATIONS TRAINED BY THE DUTCH AND THE YOUNGER ONES IN INDONESIAN AND WESTERN SCHOOLS. THE MAJORITY OF PERANAKAN ARE PROFESSIONALS, THOUGH SOME MEDIUM TO LARGE SIZED
CONFIDENTIAL

BUSINESSMEN AND A FEW TYCOONS (THE SURYAJAYAS, THE WANANDIS, THE HARTONOS, THE SAMPOERNAS) BELONG TO THIS GROUP.

8. (U) THE MORE RECENT IMMIGRANT GROUP ARE CALLED TOTOK CHINESE. TOTOKS ARE GENERALLY FIRST, SECOND OR THIRD GENERATION IN INDONESIA, SPEAK MANDARIN AND/OR A CHINESE DIALECT IN THE HOME, AND HAVE RELATIVES OR FAMILY TIES IN CHINA, SINGAPORE, OR HONG KONG. THEY WERE TRAINED IN CHINESE SCHOOLS BEFORE SOEHARTO SHUT THEM DOWN IN 1967, WHILE THEIR CHILDREN (OR AT LEAST THE CHILDREN OF THOSE WITH MONEY) ARE SENT ABROAD TO RECEIVE A CHINESE EDUCATION. EIGHTY TO NINETY PERCENT OF THE CHINESE TYCOONS ARE TOTOK CHINESE, AS ARE THE VAST MAJORITY OF SMALL SHOP OWNERS AND TRADERS THROUGHOUT JAVA.

9. (U) WHILE THESE DISTINCTIONS ARE NO LONGER AS CLEAR CUT AS THEY WERE SEVERAL DECADES AGO (MORE AND MORE TOTOK CHILDREN, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE EDUCATED ENTIRELY IN THE STATES, SPEAK LIMITED MANDARIN, AND THUS ARE NEITHER TOTOK NOR PERANAKAN IN THEIR PERCEPTION OF THEMSELVES), THE PERANAKAN/TOTOK DISTINCTION STILL HELPS TO EXPLAIN SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THE SINO-INDONESIAN RESPONSE TO INDONESIA'S CURRENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS.

10. (C) WHILE THE CHINESE ON AVERAGE ARE CONSIDERABLY MORE PROSPEROUS THAN THEIR PRIBUMI COUNTRYMEN, THE WIDELY USED STATISTIC OF 70-80 PERCENT OF INDONESIAN WEALTH BEING IN THE HANDS OF SINO-

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0803

PAGE 01 JAKART 04098 03 OF 10 030724Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01
	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00
	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/033W		

----------5AE577 030724Z /38

R 030708Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2881
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AIT TAIPEI 0919
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 10 JAKARTA 004098

BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PLEASE PASS EAP A/S ROTH

HONG KONG FOR TREASURY ATTACHE QUINN

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA, INR/IL

STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE FOR LANDRY

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

DEPARTMENT PASS FOR EXIMBANK FOR IMAM

PASS USDA FOR FAS

AID/W FOR ANE

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/08
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EIND, PINR, KPRP, PHUM, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INDONESIAN CHINESE

INDONESIANS SHOULD BE USED WITH EXTREME CAUTION. "EVERYONE IS JUST QUOTING EACH OTHER, AND THIS FIGURE IS ACTUALLY ABSOLUTE NONSENSE." SAID WELL-RESPECTED ECONOMIST KWIK KIAN GIE. THE 70-80 PERCENT FIGURE IS BASED ON THE PERCENTAGE OF PUBLICLY LISTED SHARES CONTROLLED BY CHINESE GROUPS. THIS IS, AS SEVERAL THOUGHTFUL ECONOMISTS FORCEFULLY ARGUE, AN ENTIRELY SUPERFICIAL AND UNREPRESENTATIVE PORTION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. TO BEGIN WITH,
CONFIDENTIAL

ONLY 225 OR SO COMPANIES ARE PUBLICLY LISTED, AND IN SOME CASES ONLY ONE COMPANY OF A CONGLOMERATE HAS GONE PUBLIC. MOREOVER, THE FIRST FAMILY, THE MILITARY, AND OTHER INDONESIAN CRONIES ARE DEEPLY EMBEDDED IN THESE GROUPS AND NO ONE REALLY KNOWS WHO ACTUALLY CONTROLS WHAT. THIS IS AS TRUE FOR PUBLIC COMPANIES AS WELL AS NON-PUBLIC ONES. SECOND, THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL CLASS OF PRIBUMI CRONY BUSINESSMEN AS WELL AS A VAST NUMBER OF BUREAUCRATS AND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS WHO HAVE ACCUMULATED ENORMOUS WEALTH DUE TO THEIR PROXIMITY TO THE STATE. THIRD AND MOST IMPORTANT, THERE ARE MAJOR SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY IN WHICH CHINESE HARDLY PARTICIPATE AT ALL, INCLUDING AGRICULTURE (ALTHOUGH THE CHINESE ARE REPRESENTED IN AGRIBUSINESS), MINING, OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION, NATURAL RESOURCE PROCESSING, GOVERNMENT SERVICES, AND THE STATE

SECTOR.

11. (C) SAID AN [redacted] B1
"ANYONE WHO SERIOUSLY UNDERTOOK TO INVESTIGATE THIS ISSUE WOULD FIND THAT CHINESE DO NOT CONTROL MORE THAN 40 PERCENT OF THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY." SUCH A STUDY, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT FIT THE IMAGE OF CHINESE CONSCIOUSLY PORTRAYED BY THE GOVERNMENT. "OFFICIALS, POLITICIANS, AND PRIBUMI CRONY BUSINESSMEN HAVE LONG USED STATISTICS LIKE THE 70 PERCENT CONTROL OF INDONESIAN WEALTH TO FOCUS POPULAR RESENTMENT ON -- AND EXCUSE OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST -- THE CHINESE COMMUNITY."

MAKING SENSE OF CAPITAL FLOWS
---

12. (C) WE KNOW FROM THE RUNS ON INDONESIAN BANKS, THE HIGH DEMAND FOR DOLLARS WHICH FED THE DRAMATIC DEPRECIATION OF THE RUPIAH, ANECDOTAL REPORTING OF THE BALLOONING OF ASSETS IN

SINGAPOREAN BANKS TOWARDS THE END OF 1997, AND ACCOUNTS BY INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE TRANSFERRED FUNDS ABROAD OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST YEAR THAT A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF CAPITAL FLED INDONESIA AFTER THE ONSET OF FINANCIAL CRISIS LATE LAST SUMMER. ACCOUNTS OF HOW LARGE THESE FLOWS HAVE BEEN, HOWEVER, VARY WIDELY RANGING FROM A FEW BILLION TO 200 BILLION DOLLARS (JAKARTA 4031). WITH NO SYSTEMATIC WAY TO TRACE THESE FUNDS AS A RESULT OF OPEN CAPITAL ACCOUNTS, THIS FIGURE WILL REMAIN CONTENTIOUS.

13. (C) ONE THING THAT IS BECOMING CLEAR, HOWEVER, IS THAT THERE WERE THREE DISTINCT PERIODS OF CAPITAL OUTFLOWS, EACH DRIVEN BY DIFFERENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS.

14. (C) THE FIRST FLOW BEGAN LONG BEFORE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS HIT ASIA, AS SOME OF THE BIGGER CHINESE CONGLOMERATES BEGAN DIVERSIFYING IN THE 1990'S. WITH THE LIBERALIZATION OF THE JAKARTA STOCK EXCHANGE UNDER MARZUKI USMAN (NOW MINISTER OF TOURISM) IN 1989, MANY CONGLOMERATES RAISED SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF CASH THROUGH INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS (IPOS). A NUMBER OF THE BIG GROUPS, INCLUDING LIPPO, GAJAH TUNGGAL, GAJAH GARUDA MAS, SALIM, AND SINAR MAS THEN RESTRUCTURED THEIR HOLDING COMPANIES IN THE MID-1990'S AND INVESTED HEAVILY ABROAD, LARGELY IN ASIA.

15. (C) ACCORDING TO SEVERAL TYCOON CLASS BUSINESSPEOPLE, THESE

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

PAGE 01 JAKART 04098 04 OF 10 030724Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01
	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00
	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/033W		

----------5AE57C 030724Z /38

R 030708Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2882
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AIT TAIPEI 0920
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 10 JAKARTA 004098

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04098 04 OF 10 030724Z
BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PLEASE PASS EAP A/S ROTH

HONG KONG FOR TREASURY ATTACHE QUINN

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA, INR/IL

STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE FOR LANDRY

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

DEPARTMENT PASS FOR EXIMBANK FOR IMAM

PASS USDA FOR FAS

AID/W FOR ANE

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/08
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EIND, PINR, KPRP, PHUM, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INDONESIAN CHINESE

GROUPS DIVERSIFIED FOR BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REASONS. AFTER SOEHARTO WAS ELECTED TO HIS SIXTH TERM AND A LESS TECHNOCRATIC/MORE ISLAM-FRIENDLY CABINET WAS INSTALLED IN 1993, MANY OF THESE CONGLOMERATES BEGAN TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT THEIR LONG-TERM PROSPECTS IN A POST-SOEHARTO INDONESIA. "WE DID NOT WANT ALL OUR EGGS IN SOEHARTO'S BASKET," ONE TYCOON NOTED. WITH THE REGION BOOMING, THEIR COMPANIES BIG ENOUGH TO GO ABROAD, AND STOCK MARKETS

HAVING PROVIDED A VEHICLE TO GENERATE CASH, THESE FAMILIES RESTRUCTURED THEIR HOLDINGS, "CASHED OUT" OF INDONESIA, AND INVESTED THIS MONEY ABROAD. THOUGH SOME GROUPS EXPANDED INTO EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, THE MAJORITY OF THESE INVESTMENTS WERE IN SINGAPORE, HONG KONG, CHINA AND AUSTRALIA. THUS SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF MONEY WERE LEAVING INDONESIA FROM THE MID-1990S ON, THOUGH TO DATE NO SYSTEMATIC RESEARCH HAS BEEN DONE TO SHOW HOW MUCH.

16. (C) THE SECOND FLOW STARTED WITH THE ONSET OF REGIONAL MONETARY INSTABILITY IN MID-JULY 1997. ONE TYCOON CLAIMED THAT WE MUST UNDERSTAND THE FIRST PROCESS OF CAPITAL OUTFLOW IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND THE SECOND FLOW IN POST-FINANCIAL CRISIS INDONESIA. HE ARGUES THAT THE MONEY INVESTED IN ASIA BY MANY OF THE BIG GROUPS IN THE MID-1990S WAS LEVERAGED TWO TO THREE TIMES OVER THROUGH FOREIGN BANKS EAGER TO LEND. WHEN THE CRISIS HIT AND INVESTMENTS WENT SOUR, THESE GROUPS WERE FORCED TO SUCK CASH FROM THEIR VIABLE COMPANIES IN INDONESIA TO PAY DEBT AND KEEP REGIONAL INVESTMENTS AFLOAT. HIS POINT WAS THAT MUCH OF THE MONEY THAT FLED INDONESIA IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1997 IS NOT SITTING IN BANK ACCOUNTS OFFSHORE BUT IS, RATHER, "GONE."

17. (C) THIS INTERPRETATION PROVIDES INTERESTING INSIGHT INTO THE QUESTION OF WHERE MONEY WENT AND WHY IN THE FALL OF 1997, THOUGH FURTHER RESEARCH IS REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE HOW MUCH OF THE TOTAL POST-CRISIS FLOW THIS MONEY ACCOUNTED FOR. NOT ALL GROUPS DIVERSIFIED UNSUCCESSFULLY IN ASIA; SOME GROUPS HAVE DONE VERY WELL WITH INVESTMENTS IN THE U.S., CANADA AND EUROPE. MOREOVER, EVEN IF, AS THIS SOURCE ASSERTS, MUCH OF THE CORPORATE CAPITAL THAT LEFT FOLLOWING THE ONSET OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INSTABILITY WAS USED TO

PAY DEBT AND DEAL WITH TROUBLED OFFSHORE INVESTMENTS, THIS DOES NOT
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04098 04 OF 10 030724Z
ACCOUNT FOR THE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF PRIVATE CAPITAL BELIEVED TO HAVE LEFT INDONESIA IN LATE 1997 AND EARLY 1998. SEVERAL BANKERS IN SINGAPORE POINT TO DECEMBER 1997 AS THE HIGH POINT OF THESE FLOWS, WHEN WORRIES OVER SOEHARTO'S HEALTH FUELED FEARS OF IMPENDING DOMESTIC INSTABILITY AND FURTHER EROSION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE. THIS MONEY CAME FROM A WIDE SPECTRUM OF INDONESIAN SOCIETY, INCLUDING PROFESSIONALS, MEDIUM AND LARGE CHINESE AND INDONESIAN BUSINESSMEN, AS WELL AS STATE ACTORS CONCERNED TO PROTECT DIRTY MONEY.

18. (C) A THIRD FLOW BEGAN IN THE WAKE OF THE MAY RIOTS. SEVERAL SMALL AND MEDIUM SCALE ENTREPRENEURS CLAIMED THEY SENT MONEY OUT ONLY AFTER THE UPHEAVAL OF MAY 13-14. BEFORE MAY, THESE CHINESE SAID THEY WERE CONTENT TO PLACE MONEY IN INDONESIAN BANKS DUE TO EXTRAORDINARILY HIGH INTEREST RATES. AFTER THE RIOTS AND NEWS OF THE RAPES, HOWEVER, THESE PEOPLE GOT SCARED AND SENT WHATEVER THEY COULD ABROAD. SEVERAL SAID THEY BELIEVED THE RUPIAH WOULD CRASH TO 20,000 OR MORE. ANALYSTS BELIEVE THAT THE POST MAY FLOW HAS BEEN QUITE SMALL, AS RATES WERE ALREADY AROUND 15,000 AND MOST OF THE BIG MONEY HAD ALREADY MOVED OUT. THE FOUR PEOPLE INTERVIEWED IN THIS CATEGORY ACKNOWLEDGED SENDING SMALL AMOUNTS OF BETWEEN $15-20,000 US DOLLARS TO SINGAPORE IN THE THIRD WEEK OF MAY. THEY INDICATED THAT FRIENDS AND FAMILY HAD DONE THE SAME.

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0869

PAGE 01 JAKART 04098 05 OF 10 030750Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01
	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00
	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/033W		

----------5AE74F 030750Z /38

R 030708Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2883
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AIT TAIPEI 0921
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 10 JAKARTA 004098

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04098 05 OF 10 030750Z
BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PLEASE PASS EAP A/S ROTH

HONG KONG FOR TREASURY ATTACHE QUINN

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA, INR/IL

STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE FOR LANDRY

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

DEPARTMENT PASS FOR EXIMBANK FOR IMAM

PASS USDA FOR FAS

AID/W FOR ANE

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/08
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EIND, PINR, KPRP, PHUM, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INDONESIAN CHINESE

19. (C) WHILE NOT ALL CONTACTS ACKNOWLEDGED SENDING MONEY ABROAD, THOSE INTERVIEWED STATED ACROSS THE BOARD THAT PROFITS AND/OR SPARE CASH ARE BEING PLACED INTO BANKS RATHER THAN PRODUCTIVELY REINVESTED. DATA ON THE CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE, MOREOVER, INDICATE THAT EXPORTERS BENEFITTING FROM THE RUPIAH'S DRAMATIC DEVALUATION ARE NOT REPATRIATING PROFITS TO INDONESIA. SEVERAL EXPORTERS CONFIDED THAT THEIR PURCHASERS ARE DEPOSITING PAYMENT FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

GOODS DIRECTLY IN SINGAPOREAN BANKS.

THIS CRISIS IS DIFFERENT

20. (C) INDONESIAN CHINESE ARE NOT UNACCUSTOMED TO RIOTS AND UPRISINGS. SINCE DUTCH TIMES, ANTI-CHINESE PROPAGANDA AND ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN A REGULAR FEATURE OF THE INDONESIAN LANDSCAPE. IN THE PAST FIFTY YEARS, MAJOR ANTI-CHINESE UNREST FLARED UP IN 1959-60, 1963, 1965-66, 1970, 1980, AND THROUGHOUT THE MID-1990'S. WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, HOWEVER, JAKARTAN CHINESE FEEL THAT THIS CRISIS IS DIFFERENT THAN THOSE THAT HAVE COME BEFORE.

21. (C) FIRST, THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RIOTS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED AND THE UNPRECEDENTED BRUTALITY OF THE VIOLENCE, ESPECIALLY THE GANG RAPES, HAVE TRAUMATIZED THE COMMUNITY TO A MUCH GREATER DEGREE. MANY CONTACTS CITED ACCESS TO WESTERN MEDIA AND MODERN COMMUNICATIONS AS PLAYING A ROLE IN THIS. WEALTHY CHINESE LIVING IN AREAS UNAFFECTED BY THE VIOLENCE WATCHED EVENTS UNFOLD ON CNN; STUDENTS AND COMPUTER-LITERATE PROFESSIONALS TRACKED BREAKING DEVELOPMENTS ON THE INTERNET; FRIENDS AND FAMILY ALERTED ONE ANOTHER THROUGH CELLULAR PHONES AS TO WHICH AREAS WERE ON FIRE AND WHERE NOT TO GO. ONE SMALL BUSINESSMAN FROM CHINATOWN SAID THAT AS HE TRIED TO MAKE HIS WAY HOME ON MAY 13, HE CALLED HIS DAUGHTERS FROM HIS CELL PHONE ONLY TO HEAR THEM SCREAMING AS MOBS WERE BANGING ON THEIR FRONT DOOR. THE RESULT WAS THAT AS OPPOSED TO PREVIOUS OUTBREAKS OF ANTI-CHINESE VIOLENCE, WHERE MANY CHINESE WERE AWARE OF WHAT HAPPENED ONLY AFTER THE FACT, IN MAY THE COMMUNITY AT LARGE EXPERIENCED THE TRAUMA IN REAL TIME.

22. (C) SECOND, THE GOVERNMENT'S TARDINESS IN CONDEMNING THE

CONFIDENTIAL

RIOTS, ACKNOWLEDGING THE RAPE PROBLEM AND LAUNCHING AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MAY HAS REINFORCED CHINESE OUTRAGE. RECENT STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT QUESTIONING THE VERACITY OF THE RAPE ALLEGATIONS ARE FURTHER EXACERBATING TENSIONS. AS A RESULT, WHEREAS FOLLOWING PREVIOUS RIOTS ONLY A FEW INTELLECTUALS PUBLICLY VOICED CONCERN OVER ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION, THIS TIME LARGE NUMBERS OF PERANAKAN PROFESSIONALS ARE RAISING THE ISSUE TO THE TOP OF THE NATIONAL POLITICAL AGENDA. THE INDONESIAN PRESS IS FILLED WITH ARTICLES AND EDITORIALS EXPLORING THE ROOTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF INDONESIA'S RACE PROBLEM; SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES ARE BEING ORGANIZED TO RAISE AWARENESS AND PROBE SOLUTIONS; AND POLITICAL PARTIES ARE BEING FORMED TO DEMAND EQUAL TREATMENT AND PROTECTION FOR THE CHINESE MINORITY.

23. (C) THIS IS IN PART BECAUSE THE TRAUMA LEVEL IS HIGHER, AND IN PART BECAUSE INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION TO THE EVENTS OF MAY AND THE FLURRY OF REPORTING IN THE WESTERN PRESS HAVE GALVANIZED CERTAIN SECTORS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITY TO TAKE A STRONGER STAND. THIS DISCOURSE ABOUT RACE MUST BE SEEN WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF "REFORMASI," WHERE ALL KINDS OF GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE STATE ARE BEING AIRED OPENLY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN DECADES.

24. (C) FINALLY, THE DEGREE OF PESSIMISM ABOUT THE FUTURE FOR CHINESE INDONESIANS IS GREATER BECAUSE THE CURRENT POLITICAL AND

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0871

PAGE 01 JAKART 04098 06 OF 10 030750Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01
	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00
	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/033W		

----------5AE753 030750Z /38

R 030708Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2884
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AIT TAIPEI 0922
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 10 JAKARTA 004098

CONFIDENTIAL

BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PLEASE PASS EAP A/S ROTH

HONG KONG FOR TREASURY ATTACHE QUINN

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA, INR/IL

STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE FOR LANDRY

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

DEPARTMENT PASS FOR EXIMBANK FOR IMAM

PASS USDA FOR FAS

AID/W FOR ANE

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/08
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EIND, PINR, KPRP, PHUM, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INDONESIAN CHINESE

ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT ARE SEEN AS FERTILE BREEDING GROUND FOR CONTINUED ANTI-CHINESE ACTIVITIES. CHINESE ACROSS THE BOARD SEE THE VIOLENCE OF MAY AS HAVING BEEN CAUSED BY THREE FACTORS: POLITICAL INSTABILITY, ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, AND A WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF CERTAIN ACTORS TO SCAPEGOAT THE CHINESE FOR POLITICAL/TACTICAL PURPOSES. THESE CONDITIONS, THE CHINESE FEEL, ARE ALL STILL IN PLACE. FIRST, THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT IS SEEN AS
CONFIDENTIAL

WEAK AND WITH NO MANDATE, AND THE CHINESE QUESTION THE MILITARY'S COHESION AND ABILITY TO MAINTAIN ORDER. ALL INTERVIEWEES POINTED TO THE PERSISTENCE OF LOOTING OUTSIDE JAKARTA AND A RISE IN LAWLESSNESS NATIONWIDE (JAKARTA 3867) AS EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE THINGS UNDER CONTROL.

25. (C) SECOND, WITH SOCIO-ECONOMIC PRESSURES OF UNEMPLOYMENT, POVERTY, AND HUNGER ON THE RISE, THE CHINESE FEAR THAT THIS LAWLESSNESS WILL INCREASE AND THUS SO WILL ATTACKS ON THE CHINESE. HABIBIE'S JULY 22 GUARANTEE OF EQUAL PROTECTION FOR THE CHINESE AND THE MILITARY'S TOUGH TALK ABOUT CRACKING DOWN ON LOOTING HAVE YET TO INSPIRE CONFIDENCE, AS REPORTS OF LOOTING (NOTABLY IN MEDAN AND EAST JAVA) PERSIST. THIRD, THE PRESENCE OF SEVERAL CABINET MEMBERS CONSIDERED BLATANTLY ANTI-CHINESE LEAVES THE CHINESE SUSPICIOUS THAT THEY WILL AGAIN FALL VICTIMS TO POLITICAL EXPEDIENCE. MORE

THAN THREE QUARTERS OF THE CHINESE INTERVIEWED POINTED TO MINISTER OF COOPERATIVES ADI SASONO, MINISTER OF FORESTRY AND PLANTATIONS MUSLIMIN NASUTION, COORDINATING MINISTER FOR THE ECONOMY GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA, AND PRESIDENT HABIBIE HIMSELF AS THE MOST OFFENSIVE IN THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT.



B1, B6

27. (C) B6 SAID THAT AKBAR TANDJUNG HAD ORCHESTRATED THE GATHERING IN AN EFFORT TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE DONE BY HABIBIE'S REMARKS TO THE WASHINGTON POST.



B6

HE NOTED THAT MOST THE OTHER TYCOONS, IN DIRE FINANCIAL STRAITS, WANTED TO KISS UP TO THE GOVERNMENT BEFORE THE NEW BANKRUPTCY LAW IS RELEASED. END COMMENT.

MASS EXODUS OR MASS CONFUSION?

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

PAGE 01 JAKART 04098 07 OF 10 030724Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01
	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00
	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/033W		

----------5AE582 030725Z /38

R 030708Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2885
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AIT TAIPEI 0923
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 10 JAKARTA 004098

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04098 07 OF 10 030724Z
BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PLEASE PASS EAP A/S ROTH

HONG KONG FOR TREASURY ATTACHE QUINN

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA, INR/IL

STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE FOR LANDRY

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

DEPARTMENT PASS FOR EXIMBANK FOR IMAM

PASS USDA FOR FAS

AID/W FOR ANE

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/08
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EIND, PINR, KPRP, PHUM, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INDONESIAN CHINESE

---

28. (C) WHILE PESSIMISM IS INDEED PERVASIVE, THERE HAS NOT BEEN A MASS EXODUS OF CHINESE AS IS POPULARLY REPORTED IN THE PRESS. ACCORDING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION 120,000 PEOPLE LEFT INDONESIA FROM MID-MAY TO MID-JUNE. IT IS ASSUMED, THOUGH THERE IS NO ETHNIC BREAKDOWN IN THE DATA, THAT THOSE WHO LEFT WERE MOSTLY

ETHNIC CHINESE. STILL, EVEN IF ALL 120,000 WERE SINO-INDONESIANS LEAVING AS A RESULT OF THE CRISIS, THIS REPRESENTS ONLY 2OF THE ENTIRE CHINESE COMMUNITY. NO FIGURES AS TO HOW MANY OF THOSE THAT LEFT HAVE RETURNED HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED, THOUGH ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER WHO LEFT JAKARTA ARE BACK IN INDONESIA. SEVERAL CHURCH GROUPS CANVASSED INDICATED THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF MEMBERS WHO HAD GONE ABROAD HAVE COME BACK, AND INTERVIEWEES STATED THAT WIVES AND KIDS WERE SENT TO SINGAPORE, HONG KONG OR AUSTRALIA FOR JUST A FEW WEEKS. COMPLICATING THIS PICTURE, HOWEVER, IS INTER-ISLAND MIGRATION. SOME CHINESE TRADERS WHOSE SHOPS WERE LOOTED AND/OR BURNED HAVE MOVED FROM JAKARTA, SOLO, AND SURABAYA TO OTHER, MORE TRADITIONALLY "TOLERANT" PARTS OF INDONESIA LIKE BALI, BATAM (SINGAPORE'S SISTER ISLAND), AND PONTIANAK (WEST KALIMANTAN).

29. (C) WHAT, THEN, ARE THE CHINESE THINKING FOR THE SHORT, MEDIUM AND LONG TERM? AS REPORTED IN JAKARTA 4031, THE ETHNIC CHINESE ARE NOT A MONOLITHIC GROUP WHICH CAN BE PERSUADED UNDER SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES TO STAY IN INDONESIA AND BRING THEIR MONEY BACK EN MASSE. THE INDONESIAN-CHINESE COMMUNITY IS DIVIDED BY AGE, CLASS, EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND, AND CULTURAL ORIENTATION, AND RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS HAVE BEEN HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY EACH OF THESE FACTORS.

30. (C) THE COMMUNITY IN JAKARTA (WHICH IS BELIEVED TO ACCOUNT FOR OVER TWO MILLION OF JAKARTA'S TEN MILLION CITIZENS) CAN BE ROUGHLY DIVIDED INTO FOUR GROUPS:

THOSE WHO WANT TO LEAVE

PAGE 04 JAKART 04098 07 OF 10 030724Z
31. (C) UPPER-MIDDLE AND UPPER-CLASS CHINESE IN THEIR EARLY 20'S TO EARLY 30'S EDUCATED IN THE WEST HAVE BEEN AMONG THE FIRST GROUP TO LEAVE, WHILE THOSE CURRENTLY WORKING OR STUDYING ABROAD ARE BEING TOLD BY THEIR PARENTS TO STAY PUT. THESE CHINESE ARE COSMOPOLITAN, BILINGUAL, AND HAVE THE SKILLS AND CONNECTIONS TO WORK OVERSEAS. STILL, PREDICTIONS THAT INDONESIA IS LOSING THE GENERATION OF HIGHLY EDUCATED CHINESE THAT WAS MEANT TO TRANSFORM INDONESIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY MAY BE PREMATURE. WHILE THIS GROUP HAS BEEN AMONG THE FIRST TO GO, THEY WILL LIKELY RETURN IF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT STABILIZES. "WE WERE BORN IN INDONESIA; WE ARE ATTACHED TO INDONESIA, AND AT THE END OF THE DAY, WE WILL HAVE GREATER OPPORTUNITIES IN INDONESIA," SAID ONE CONTACT

[redacted] B6

"MOST OF US ARE ONLY LEAVING UNTIL THINGS SETTLE DOWN HERE. THE COMPETITION IS TOO EXTREME IN THE STATES. WE ARE MUCH BIGGER FISH IN JAKARTA'S POND."

[redacted] B6

32. (C) ANOTHER, VERY DIFFERENT GROUP, THOSE WHO TOOK THE PHYSICAL BRUNT OF THE VIOLENCE THAT EXPLODED WITH THE RIOTS IN MAY, IS TRYING TO LEAVE. THE AREAS HARDEST HIT IN MAY, SUCH AS KOTA,

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0807

PAGE 01 JAKART 04098 08 OF 10 030725Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01
	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00
	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/033W		

----------5AE587 030725Z /38

R 030708Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2886
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

DEPTTREAS WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AIT TAIPEI 0924
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 08 OF 10 JAKARTA 004098

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04098 08 OF 10 030725Z
BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PLEASE PASS EAP A/S ROTH

HONG KONG FOR TREASURY ATTACHE QUINN

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA, INR/IL

STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE FOR LANDRY

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

DEPARTMENT PASS FOR EXIMBANK FOR IMAM

PASS USDA FOR FAS

AID/W FOR ANE

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/08
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EIND, PINR, KPRP, PHUM, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INDONESIAN CHINESE

GLODOK, PLUIT, ANGKE, AND KLENDER, ARE THE REAL CHINA TOWNS OF JAKARTA IN THE NORTH, WEST, AND EAST OF THE CITY. MIDDLE TO LOWER-CLASS CHINESE ENTREPRENEURS ARE CONCENTRATED IN THESE AREAS. THEIR STORES AND/OR HOMES WERE LOOTED AND BURNED, AND IN SEVERAL HUNDRED CASES THEIR DAUGHTERS, WIVES AND EVEN MOTHERS WERE RAPED. (MOST UPPER-CLASS CHINESE DO NOT LIVE IN PREDOMINANTLY CHINESE AREAS BUT IN MIXED COMMUNITIES WITH WEALTHY INDONESIANS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

CONFIDENTIAL

AND FOREIGNERS IN THE CENTER AND SOUTH OF THE CITY. THESE AREAS WERE LARGELY UNTOUCHED BY THE VIOLENCE.)

33. (C) THESE SMALL AND MEDIUM SCALE CHINESE BUSINESSPEOPLE HAVE BEEN THE MOST TRAUMATIZED BY THE MAY CRISIS, AND THEY ARE AFRAID FOR THEIR PHYSICAL SAFETY AND THAT OF THEIR FAMILIES. MANY ARE NOT WILLING TO START OVER AND REINVEST, PARTICULARLY THOSE WITH YOUNG DAUGHTERS. STILL, WITH LIMITED SAVINGS AND LIMITED SKILLS (THIS CLASS OF CHINESE IS LARGELY UNEDUCATED), CHINESE TRADERS AND SMALL BUSINESSMEN CAN NOT EASILY LEAVE AND LIVE ABROAD. SOME OF THESE TOTOK CHINESE HAVE FAMILY ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION, AND SO THEY ARE SENDING THEIR CHILDREN OUT FIRST WHILE THEY WAIT TO SEE HOW EVENTS UNFOLD IN INDONESIA. ONE MAN, DESPERATE TO GET HIS THREE DAUGHTERS OUT, SAID THAT HE AND SOME OF HIS FRIENDS WERE CONSIDERING MAIL-ORDER BRIDE SCHEMES.

THOSE THAT WANT TO FIGHT

34. (C) PERANAKAN CHINESE PROFESSIONALS WHOSE FAMILIES CAME TO INDONESIA MANY GENERATIONS AGO AND WHO THINK OF THEMSELVES AS WHOLLY INDONESIAN ARE STANDING UP TO DEMAND THEIR RIGHTS AND ASSERT THEIR PLACE IN THE INDONESIAN NATION. THESE PERANAKAN ACADEMICS, INTELLECTUALS, LAWYERS, AND DOCTORS HAVE BECOME VERY ACTIVE OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST TWO MONTHS, WRITING NEWSPAPER ARTICLES, ORGANIZING SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES, AND FORMING A VARIETY OF NGOS TO TACKLE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PRESSURE THE STATE. SIGNIFICANTLY, THESE GROUPS ARE ENGAGING A NUMBER OF HIGH-PROFILE PRIBUMI INTELLECTUALS AND ACADEMICS, INCLUDING [redacted] B6
[redacted] AND OTHERS. SUCH ACTIVITY IS ALSO REPORTEDLY TAKING PLACE IN SOLO, JOGJAKARTA AND SURABAYA. CHINESE

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE EVEN FORMED, THOUGH SUPPORT WITHIN THE BROADER CHINESE COMMUNITY FOR EXCLUSIVELY CHINESE PARTIES IS WEAK.

35. (C) ONE COMPONENT OF THIS PERANAKAN POLITICAL AWAKENING HAS BEEN AN OUTPOURING OF ANGER TOWARDS THE CHINESE TYCOONS, WHO ARE SEEN AS HAVING ABUSED THEIR PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO STATE LICENSES AND FACILITIES AND ENRICHED THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SECURITY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITY. THIS HAS BEEN A CONSTANT THEME OF THE RECENT SEMINARS, CONFERENCES AND NEWSPAPER ARTICLES ON THE CHINESE ISSUE. WHILE RESENTMENT OF THIS CLASS IS PARTICULARLY ACUTE AMONG PERANAKAN CHINESE (80-90OF THE TYCOONS ARE TOTOKS), AND PERANAKAN PROFESSIONALS ARE LEADING THE PUBLIC CHARGE, PERANAKAN AND TOTOK CONTACTS ALIKE CURSED THE CORRUPT CONGLOMERATE FAMILIES AS HAVING "RUINED IT FOR THE REST OF THE CHINESE." NOT ONLY, THEY ARGUE, HAD THE VAST MAJORITY OF CHINESE NEVER BENEFITTED ONE RUPIAH FROM STATE

PATRONAGE, BUT THE CHINESE COMMUNITY ALSO WAS LEFT VULNERABLE TO PUBLIC IRE AS A RESULT OF THE HIGHLY VISIBLE WEALTH OF THE CORRUPT TYCOONS. WHILE THESE CHINESE ALSO BLAME SOEHARTO FOR THE CORROSIVE CONGLOMERATE-STATE RELATIONSHIP, ANGER AT THE TYCOONS RUNS DEEP. SAID ONE MAJOR PERANAKAN BUSINESSMAN, "I WOULDN'T BEAT ALL SAD TO SEE A FEW OF THOSE GUYS HANGED FOR WHAT THEY'VE DONE. THEY'RE WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS, EVERY ONE OF THEM. AND THEY SHOULD PAY FOR RAPING THE STATE AND RUINING THE REPUTATIONS OF THE REST OF US."

36. (C) PERANAKAN PROFESSIONALS ARE RAISING A NUMBER OF CONCRETE

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0809

PAGE 01 JAKART 04098 09 OF 10 030725Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01
	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00
	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/033W		

----------5AE5B8 030728Z /38

R 030708Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2887
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG 075
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIOS
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AIT TAIPEI 0925
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04098 09 OF 10 030725Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 09 OF 10 JAKARTA 004098

BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PLEASE PASS EAP A/S ROTH

HONG KONG FOR TREASURY ATTACHE QUINN

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA, INR/IL

STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE FOR LANDRY

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

DEPARTMENT PASS FOR EXIMBANK FOR IMAM

PASS USDA FOR FAS

AID/W FOR ANE

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/08
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EIND, PINR, KPRP, PHUM, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INDONESIAN CHINESE

DEMANDS, INCLUDING SIMPLIFICATION OF THE CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR INDONESIANS OF CHINESE DESCENT, ABOLITION OF MARKS THAT DISTINGUISH CHINESE FROM PRIBUMIS ON IDENTITY CARDS, REPLACEMENT OF THE DEROGATORY TERM "CINA" WITH THE NEUTRAL TERM "TIONGHOA" IN REFERENCE TO SINO-INDONESIANS, AND ELIMINATION OF INFORMAL BARRIERS TO CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE MILITARY.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04098 09 OF 10 030725Z
(COMMENT: THE GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO ABOLISH THE IDENTITY CARD MARKINGS NATIONWIDE, AND JAKARTA HAS REPORTEDLY ALREADY IMPLEMENTED THE CHANGES. AFTER ASSUMING POWER IN 1967, SUHARTO ISSUED A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE CHANGING THE TERM "TIONGHOA" TO "CINA,' WHICH TO INDONESIAN CHINESE IS ROUGHLY ANALOGOUS TO "CHINK," OR WORSE YET, "NIGGER." END COMMENT.) SOME GROUPS ARE ALSO CALLING FOR NEW LAWS THAT EXPLICITLY GUARANTEE THE RIGHTS OF THE CHINESE MINORITY.

37. (C) INTERESTINGLY, MANY CHINESE ARE ALSO PROPOSING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS TO HELP POOR PRIBUMIS. A SOLID MAJORITY OF CHINESE INTERVIEWED REFERRED TO A MALAYSIAN-STYLE NEP (NEW ECONOMIC POLICY) AS ONE MEANS OF REDUCING ETHNIC TENSIONS IN INDONESIA. THIS WOULDN'T HAVE TO BE EXPLICITLY RACE-BASED, THEY ARGUE, FOR ANY PROGRAMS TO HELP THE POOR WOULD INEVITABLY FOCUS ON PRIBUMI. "THE LONG-TERM SECURITY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IS DEPENDENT ON THE

ELIMINATION OF INDONESIA'S ENORMOUS SEETHING UNDER-CLASS," EXPLAINED ONE PERANAKAN ECONOMIST. "THE REAL GRIEVANCES OF THE POOR MUST BE ADDRESSED. THERE IS SIMPLY NO OTHER WAY FOR THE CHINESE TO BE SAFE." THOUGH PERANAKAN PROFESSIONALS ARE OUT IN FRONT WITH THIS AGENDA, MOST PERANAKAN (AND SOME TOTOK) BUSINESSMEN INTERVIEWED EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR THESE IDEAS.

THOSE WHO WANT TO WAIT AND SEE
---

38. (C) THE VAST MAJORITY OF TOTOK BUSINESSMEN FALL IN THIS CATEGORY. TOTOK ARE TRADITIONALLY NOT INTERESTED IN POLITICS, DEMURE FROM DISCUSSING THE POLITICAL, AND WANT ONLY A STABLE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH TO DO BUSINESS. THESE CHINESE EXPRESSED THEIR CONTINUING SUSPICION OF THE GOVERNMENT,

CONCERNED THAT IT HAS NEITHER THE LEGITIMACY NOR THE POWER TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER AND STABILIZE THE ECONOMY. EVERY BUSINESSMAN INTERVIEWED BELIEVED THAT THE ECONOMY WOULD NOT RECOVER IN THE ABSENCE OF POLITICAL STABILITY, AND HABIBIE WAS SEEN AS STILL BEING WEAK. CREDIBLE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE KIDNAPPINGS, TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS AND THE MAY RIOTS AND RAPES ARE SEEN AS KEY TO POPULAR CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT, AND MOST DOUBTED THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO CARRY OUT SUCH INVESTIGATIONS. THE BIGGER BUSINESSMEN SAW THE IMF AND CGI MONEY AS NECESSARY BUT IRRELEVANT IN THE LARGER SCHEME OF THINGS. SINCE MOST OF THE MONEY WILL BE USED TO UNDERWRITE SUBSIDIES AND COVER GOVERNMENT SHORTFALLS, THEY ARGUE, THE MONEY WILL NOT JUMP-START INDONESIA'S MORIBUND ECONOMY BUT JUST KEEP THE PLACE AFLOAT. IF THE ECONOMY CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE, MOREOVER, THEY EXPECT THE CHINESE COMMUNITY WILL AGAIN BE THE TARGETS OF SOCIAL UNREST.

39. (C) IN THE SHORT TERM, THEN, THERE IS LITTLE OPTIMISM AND NO PLANS TO REINVEST. EVEN PERNAKANS DETERMINED TO STAY AND WILLING TO FIGHT FOR GREATER SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ARE WAITING TO SEE WHAT UNFOLDS BEFORE RECOMMITTING RESOURCES. "INVESTMENT," SAID ONE PERANAKAN BUSINESSMAN, "REQUIRES LONG-TERM CONFIDENCE, AND RIGHT NOW, EVERY DAY WHEN I WAKE UP, I DON'T KNOW WHAT I WILL FIND." JAKARTA IS RIFE WITH RUMORS OF COMING RIOTS AND UNREST, LEAFLETS ARE CIRCULATING WARNING OF IMPENDING ATTACKS ON CHINESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN, AND CHINESE, IN GENERAL, DO NOT FEEL PHYSICALLY SAFE.

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

PAGE 01 JAKART 04098 10 OF 10 030725Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01
	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00
	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/033W		

----------5AE58A 030725Z /38

R 030708Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2888
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AIT TAIPEI 0926
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 10 OF 10 JAKARTA 004098

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04098 10 OF 10 030725Z
BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PLEASE PASS EAP A/S ROTH

HONG KONG FOR TREASURY ATTACHE QUINN

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA, INR/IL

STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE FOR LANDRY

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

DEPARTMENT PASS FOR EXIMBANK FOR IMAM

PASS USDA FOR FAS

AID/W FOR ANE

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/08
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EIND, PINR, KPRP, PHUM, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INDONESIAN CHINESE

MOST CONTACTS HOPE THAT NEXT YEAR'S ELECTION WILL LEAD TO A GREATER DEGREE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY, THOUGH THEY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THINGS WILL LIKELY BE MESSY IN THE RUN UP TO THE VOTE. IF THE ELECTION IS RUN FAIRLY, A CREDIBLE GOVERNMENT IS INSTALLED, AND THE MACRO-ECONOMY SHOWS SIGNS OF STABILIZATION, THE CHINESE WILL REINVEST. "BUT FIRST WE WANT TO UNDERSTAND THE NEW RULES OF THE GAME," SAID ONE TOTOK CERAMICS EXPORTER. "WE DON'T WANT SPECIAL

TREATMENT LIKE THE CRONIES GOT IN THE PAST. A FREE, FAIR AND STABLE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IS ALL THAT WE NEED TO PROSPER."

40. (C) WHEN PRESSED ON WHO THEY WOULD VOTE FOR IN THE COMING ELECTION, 18 OF 22 CONTACTS SAID MEGAWATI'S PDI. PDI INSIDERS AND OTHER SOURCES TELL US THAT CHINESE MONEY IS FLOWING INTO PARTY COFFERS, THOUGH NO CHINESE INTERVIEWED ACKNOWLEDGED MAKING DONATIONS.

THOSE WHO HAVE NO CHOICE
---

41. (C) THE VAST MAJORITY OF INDONESIAN CHINESE ARE SMALL ENTREPRENEURS AND TRADERS WITH LIMITED CAPITAL AND LOW EDUCATION AND THUS LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO STAY PUT. WHILE SOME OF THE MORE TRAUMATIZED ARE TRYING TO GET OUT OR HAVE MOVED TO OTHER ISLANDS, MOST ARE TRYING TO REBUILD THEIR HOMES, STORES, AND LIVES. SEVERAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED TO HELP THE CHINESE GET BACK ON THEIR FEET, AND THE GOVERNMENT IS APPARENTLY CONTEMPLATING A SCHEME TO RECAPITALIZE SHOPS THAT WERE LOOTED AND BURNED. THE PLAN IS SAID TO PROVIDE RP 300-500 MILLION PER SHOP. CHINESE IN AREAS HIT BY THE RIOTS ARE DOING WHAT THEY CAN TO PROTECT AGAINST FUTURE ATTACKS, BARRICADING THEIR COMMUNITIES AND ARMING THEMSELVES WITH SWORDS, KNIVES GUNS AND MACE. THEE ARE ALSO REPORTS, THOUGH UNCONFIRMED, OF AN INCREASE IN THE TRADE OF ILLICIT ARMS. SHOULD ANTI-CHINESE UNREST AGAIN FLARE UP, THE CHINESE SAY THEY ARE PREPARED TO FIGHT BACK.

CONCLUSION
---

42. (C) THE INDONESIAN CHINESE ARE A HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITY, AND LARGELY REALIZE THAT BEING ANTI-CONGLOMERATE DOES NOT MEAN BEING ANTI-CHINESE. THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR A RETURN OF CONFIDENCE AND CAPITAL TO INDONESIA ARE POLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY; A CREDIBLE GUARANTEE FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY; INVESTIGATION OF THE MAY RIOTS AND RAPES; AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THOSE FOUND GUILTY. IN THE SHORT TERM, THEN, THE PICTURE IS BLEAK, FOR THESE CRITERIA WILL NOT BE EASILY OR IMMEDIATELY MET. IN THE MEDIUM TO LONG TERM, HOWEVER, IF ELECTIONS AND CREDIBLE GOVERNMENT FOSTER A MORE STABLE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT, THERE IS REASON FOR MEASURED OPTIMISM. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, WHILE CAPITAL IS INDEED MOBILE AND CHINESE, LIKE OTHER INVESTORS, CAN KEEP THEIR MONEY ABROAD, VIRTUALLY ALL CHINESE BUSINESSMEN ACKNOWLEDGE THAT A STABLE INDONESIA WOULD PRESENT ENORMOUS INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, PERANAKAN CHINESE ARE PRO-ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN "REFORMASI" AND ARE PROMOTING THE KIND OF DISCOURSE NECESSARY TO FIND LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS TO INDONESIA'S LONGSTANDING CHINESE PROBLEM. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E44

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5724

PAGE 01 JAKART 04135 01 OF 02 041618Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	SVC-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/023W			

----------5B8329 041618Z /02

P 041021Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2930
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA// PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004135

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/08
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PHUM, PREL ID
SUBJECT: PRABOWO AMONG THOSE TO BE QUESTIONED BY
MILITARY HONOR BOARD IN KIDNAPPING/TORTURE INVESTIGATION

REF: JAKARTA 2579

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04135 01 OF 02 041618Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY S: REASON
1.5(D)

2. MANDER WIRANTO HAS NAMEHARD TO QUESTION PRESIDENTIAL SON-IN-LAW PRABOWO AND TWO OTHER SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS REGARDING THEIR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. TEN OTHER LOWER RANKING PERSONNEL WILL FACE A MILITARY TRIBUNAL.

[redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 3 AUG 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 30 JUN 2006 200502473

[redacted] B1

THE HONOR COUNCIL
---

3. (U) ARMED FORCES COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO ANNOUNCED AUGUST 3 THAT A MILITARY "OFFICERS' HONOR COUNCIL" HAD BEEN FORMED TO QUESTION SENIOR ABRI OFFICERS REGARDING THE MATTER OF THE KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. NAMED TO HEAD THE COUNCIL (DEWAN KEHORMATAN PERWIRA) WAS GENERAL SUBAGIO HADISISWOYO. OTHER MEMBERS ARE: GENERAL FACHRULI RAZI (SUBAGYO'S DEPUTY ON THE PANEL), LT.GEN. YUSUF KATANEGARA, LT.GEN. BAMBANG

YUDHOYONO, LT. GEN. AGUM GUMELAR, LT. GEN. DJAMARI CHANIAGO, AND VICE ADMIRAL ACHMAD SUTJIPTO.

4. (U) THOSE TO BE SUMMONED BY THE COUNCIL ARE LT. GEN. PRABOWO SUBIANTO, MAJ. GEN. MUCHDI PURWOPRANJONO AND COL. CHAIRAWAN. COL. CHAIRAWAN, UNTIL RECENTLY, WAS THE COMMANDER OF "GROUP 4," WITHIN THE SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS). MUCHDI WAS RECENTLY RELIEVED OF COMMAND OF KOPASSUS AND PRABOWO, SON-IN-LAW OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, (##) MUCHDI'S (##) AS KOPASSUS COMMANDER. TEN LOWER RANKING TROOPS WHO WILL FACE ITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THEIR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE OF ACTIVISTS ARE ALL MEMBERS OF KOPASSUS. CHAIRAWAN, PRABOWO AND GROUP 4 WERE IDENTIFIED IN AN EARLY MAY REFTEL AS POSSIBLY INVOLVED IN THE KIDNAPPING.

5. (C) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL, GENERAL SUBAGYO, TOLD THE MEDIA AUGUST 3 THAT ALL THREE OFFICERS (PRABOWO, MUCHDI AND CHAIRAWAN) HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THEIR COMMANDS.

[redacted] B1



B1

CRITICISM OVER CHARGES OF SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR PRABOWO

8. (U) "KONTRAS," THE ORGANIZATION SET UP TO ASSIST

(##) GARBLED TEXT CORRECTIONS WILL FOLLOW

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4563

PAGE 01 JAKART 04135 02 OF 02 041038Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/023W					

----------5B5D3F 041039Z /38
P 041021Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2931

INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA// PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004135

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/08
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PHUM, PREL ID
SUBJECT: PRABOWO AMONG THOSE TO BE QUESTIONED BY MILITARY HONOR BOARD IN KIDNAPPING/TORTURE INVESTIGATION

REF: JAKARTA 2579

CONFIDENTIAL

FAMILIES OF KIDNAPPING VICTIMS, HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF THE DECISION TO BRING THE THREE SENIOR OFFICERS BEFORE AN HONOR BOARD, ARGUING THAT BY NOT COURT MARTIALING THEM ABRI WAS FAILING TO UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW. MUNIR, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION, HAS CLAIMED TO US AND THE PRESS THAT THE COUNCIL ROUTE COULD ALLOW THE THREE OFFICERS TO ESCAPE PRISON TERMS AND MOREOVER, COULD LIMIT PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE FACTS. THE JAKARTA POST HAS EDITORIALIZED IN THE SAME VEIN URGING THAT A COURT MARTIAL FOLLOW, ONCE THE COUNCIL DEVELOPS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION. GENERAL WIRANTO (AND GENERAL SUBAGYO) TOLD THE MEDIA THAT IF THE COUNCIL FINDS EVIDENCE OF CRIMES AGAINST THE SENIOR OFFICERS A COURT MARTIAL WILL FOLLOW.

9. (U) INTER ALIA, WIRANTO ALSO EXPRESSED HIS PUBLIC APOLOGY FOR THE MILITARY'S FAILURE TO STOP THE RIOTING OF MAY 13-15.



B1



B1

ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E49

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8088

PAGE 01 JAKART 04532 02 OF 02 310548Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/024W						

----------650DA1 310549Z /38

R 261101Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3320
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004532

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/16
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, INR, ID
SUBJECT: CRITICS DOUBT HABIBIE'S COMMITMENT TO REFORM AND ABILITY TO LEAD INDONESIA OUT OF CRISIS

RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBERS, AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HE PRAISED THE COMMITTEE'S CHAIRMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

MEMBER MARZUKI DARUSMAN. HE WAS FRUSTRATED, HOWEVER, WITH THE COMMITTEE'S FOCUS ON THE ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL PERPETRATORS RATHER THAN THE BROADER SYSTEM, WHICH HE BELIEVED WAS AT FAULT. HE SAID THAT SECURITY OFFICIALS ON THE COMMITTEE, IN PARTICULAR, RESISTED CONCLUSIONS THAT THE RAPES WERE A SYSTEMIC PROBLEM.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] THE "VOICE OF CONCERNED MOTHERS," DESCRIBED THE B1
DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE RAPE VICTIMS AND THEIR FAMILIES IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE VIOLENCE. THE VICTIMS DID NOT TRUST THE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES, GIVEN THEIR SUSPICIONS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 25 AUG 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 03 JUL 2006 200502473

ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION OF THE VIOLENCE. THEIR CONFIDENCE WAS FURTHER DIMINISHED BY THE ATTITUDE OF THE AUTHORITIES, WHO WANTED TO TREAT THEM LIKE THE VICTIMS OF REGULAR CRIMES AND WHO WERE PUBLICLY QUESTIONING THE VERACITY OF THE RAPE ACCOUNTS. IN ADDITION, SHE RECOUNTED THAT SOME RAPE VICTIMS AND THE NGOS TRYING TO HELP THEM HAD BEEN RECEIVING ANONYMOUS THREATS.

9. (C) [redacted] B1
[redacted] CONTENDED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL B1
COMMUNITY SHOULD LINK AID WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, IT SHOULD PUT PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE FULLY AND FIND THE TRUTH ABOUT THE SHOOTING OF STUDENTS AND TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ON MAY 12.

10. (C) [redacted] WAS DISMAYED BY THE B1
GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO PLACE RESTRICTIONS ON DEMONSTRATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE PROVISION REQUIRING

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTIFICATION IF THE GATHERING EXCEEDED 50 PEOPLE (WHICH HAS BEEN SUBMITTED AS A BILL BUT NOT YET PASSED BY PARLIAMENT). HE CALLED A DEMONSTRATION OF ONLY FIFTY PEOPLE A "PARTY," NOT A REAL DEMONSTRATION. HE WAS ALSO UPSET ABOUT THE MILITARY'S INTERVENTION IN SOME LABOR ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING IN A STRIKE ON JUNE 29 IN WHICH DEMONSTRATORS WERE SHOT WITH RUBBER BULLETS, INJURING 22.

[redacted] B1

TIME IS RUNNING OUT

11. (C) [redacted] B1
CONTENDED THAT THE NEGATIVE DIRECTION OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS MADE IT HARD TO IMAGINE THAT HABIBIE COULD SURVIVE IN OFFICE. IN HIS VIEW, ONE OF INDONESIA'S MOST FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WAS THE LACK OF A CREDIBLE LEADER. USUALLY, AFTER RECEIVING AN IMF STAMP OF APPROVAL, THE BASIC INDICATORS BEGAN TO IMPROVE AS FOREIGN CAPITAL BEGAN TO RETURN. THIS WAS NOT HAPPENING IN INDONESIA, HOWEVER, AS EVIDENCED BY THE VOLATILITY OF THE EXCHANGE RATE AND THE ABSENCE OF CAPITAL INFLOW. IN CONTRAST, OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION FACING SEVERE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP, SUCH AS KOREA AND THAILAND, WERE SEEING SOME POSITIVE ECONOMIC INDICATORS. BOTH OF THOSE COUNTRIES HAD DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED CREDIBLE LEADERS, HE POINTEDLY MENTIONED. POPULAR LEADERS SUCH AS AMIEN RAIS OR MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, [redacted] WOULD BE B1
AN IMPROVEMENT BECAUSE IF ELECTED THEY WOULD HAVE MORE

CREDIBILITY.
OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04532 02 OF 02 310548Z

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8148

PAGE 01 JAKART 04532 02 OF 02 310619Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/024W						

----------650FA1 310621Z /38

R 261101Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3320
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004532

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARA 11)

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/16
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, INR, ID
SUBJECT: CRITICS DOUBT HABIBIE'S COMMITMENT TO REFORM AND ABILITY TO LEAD INDONESIA OUT OF CRISIS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04532 02 OF 02 310619Z
RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBERS, AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HE PRAISED THE COMMITTEE'S CHAIRMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBER MARZUKI DARUSMAN. HE WAS FRUSTRATED, HOWEVER, WITH THE COMMITTEE'S FOCUS ON THE ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL

PERPETRATORS RATHER THAN THE BROADER SYSTEM, WHICH HE BELIEVED WAS AT FAULT. HE SAID THAT SECURITY OFFICIALS ON THE COMMITTEE, IN PARTICULAR, RESISTED CONCLUSIONS THAT THE RAPES WERE A SYSTEMIC PROBLEM.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] THE "VOICE OF CONCERNED MOTHERS," DESCRIBED THE B1
DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE RAPE VICTIMS AND THEIR FAMILIES IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE VIOLENCE. THE VICTIMS DID NOT TRUST THE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES, GIVEN THEIR SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION OF THE VIOLENCE. THEIR CONFIDENCE WAS FURTHER DIMINISHED BY THE ATTITUDE OF THE AUTHORITIES, WHO WANTED TO TREAT THEM LIKE THE VICTIMS OF REGULAR CRIMES AND WHO WERE PUBLICLY QUESTIONING THE VERACITY OF THE RAPE ACCOUNTS. IN ADDITION, SHE RECOUNTED THAT SOME RAPE VICTIMS AND THE NGOS TRYING TO HELP THEM HAD BEEN RECEIVING ANONYMOUS THREATS.

9. (C) [redacted] B1
[redacted], CONTENDED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL B1
COMMUNITY SHOULD LINK AID WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, IT SHOULD PUT PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE FULLY AND FIND THE TRUTH ABOUT THE SHOOTING OF STUDENTS AND TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ON MAY 12.

10. (C) [redacted] WAS DISMAYED BY THE B1
CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO PLACE RESTRICTIONS ON DEMONSTRATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE PROVISION REQUIRING NOTIFICATION IF THE GATHERING EXCEEDED 50 PEOPLE (WHICH HAS BEEN SUBMITTED AS A BILL BUT NOT YET PASSED BY PARLIAMENT). HE CALLED A DEMONSTRATION OF ONLY FIFTY PEOPLE A "PARTY," NOT A REAL DEMONSTRATION. HE WAS ALSO UPSET ABOUT THE MILITARY'S INTERVENTION IN SOME LABOR ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING IN A STRIKE ON JUNE 29 IN WHICH DEMONSTRATORS WERE SHOT WITH RUBBER BULLETS, INJURING 22.

[redacted] B1

TIME IS RUNNING OUT
---

11. (C) [redacted] B1
CONTENDED THAT THE NEGATIVE DIRECTION OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS MADE IT HARD TO IMAGINE THAT HABIBIE COULD SURVIVE IN OFFICE. IN HIS VIEW, ONE OF INDONESIA'S MOST FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WAS THE LACK OF A CREDIBLE LEADER. USUALLY, AFTER RECEIVING AN IMF STAMP OF

APPROVAL, THE BASIC INDICATORS BEGAN TO IMPROVE AS FOREIGN CAPITAL BEGAN TO RETURN. THIS WAS NOT HAPPENING IN INDONESIA, HOWEVER, AS EVIDENCED BY THE VOLATILITY OF THE EXCHANGE RATE AND THE ABSENCE OF CAPITAL INFLOW. IN CONTRAST, OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION FACING SEVERE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP, SUCH AS KOREA AND THAILAND, WERE SEEING SOME POSITIVE ECONOMIC INDICATORS. BOTH OF THOSE COUNTRIES HAD DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED CREDIBLE LEADERS, HE POINTEDLY MENTIONED. POPULAR LEADERS SUCH AS AMIEN RAIS OR MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI [redacted] WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT BECAUSE IF ELECTED THEY WOULD HAVE MORE B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CREDIBILITY.
OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E53

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5457

PAGE 01 JAKART 04943 01 OF 02 181811Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CA-02	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	CTME-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01
	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	SVC-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/029W						

----------6C3053 181811Z /45

P 181013Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3668
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004943

CINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/18/03

TAGS: PGOV, CASC, PINS, ASEC, PHUM, ECON, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: THE GOVERNMENT REACTS TO GROWING DISSENT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04943 01 OF 02 181811Z
REF: JAKARTA 4376

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (U) SUMMARY: CONTINUING DEMONSTRATIONS AND INDICATIONS THAT SOME POLITICAL ACTIVISTS ARE DETERMINED TO CONFRONT THE PRESIDENT AND THE MILITARY DIRECTLY APPEAR TO BE MOVING THE GOVERNMENT TOWARD A HARDER LINE IN DEALING WITH PROTEST. THE GOVERNMENT IS SEEKING MORE RESTRICTIVE REGULATIONS ON DEMONSTRATIONS AND HAS TAKEN ACTIONS WHICH MAY BE AIMED AT CHILLING DISSENT. END SUMMARY

THE GOVERNMENT REACTS TO DEMONSTRATIONS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 17 SEP 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 03 JUL 2006 200502473

3. (U) THE GOI, THROUGH VARIOUS MEANS, IS ATTEMPTING TO LIMIT DAILY DEMONSTRATIONS BY STUDENTS AND OTHERS IN THE CAPITAL AND ELSEWHERE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS SUBMITTED TO THE PARLIAMENT LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD LIMIT DEMONSTRATIONS BY REQUIRING(##)THE AUTHORITIES FOR DEMONSTRATIONS OF UP TO 50 PEOPLE AND POLICE PERMISSION FOR DEMONSTRATIONS BY GROUPS LARGER THAN 50. OTHER RESTRICTIONS WOULD PREVENT DEMONSTRATIONS NEAR CERTAIN PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND DEMONSTRATIONS AT NIGHT. ONE PROVISION OF THE DRAFT SUBMITTED TO PARLIAMENT WOULD REQUIRE THAT BROADCAST AND PRINT MEDIA OBTAIN POLICE PERMISPTRATIONS. THE PROPOSAL GOVERNMENT IN AUGUST REQUIRING PARLIAMENTARY HASTILY WITHDRAWN IN THE(##)INSISTED THAT REGUESTED BE PUT THROUGH PARLU) MEANWHILE, IN SEPTEMBER 17 REMARKS TO THE MEDIA, HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER SYARWAN HAMID CALLED FOR AN END TO DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH HE SAID "LACK(ED) LEGAL GROUNDS AND SUBSTANCE." HE ALSO SUPPORTED EARLIER CLAIMS BY THE POLICE THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04943 01 OF 02 181811Z

THERE WERE "PARTIES SUPPORTING STUDENTS WITH THE AIM OF CHANGING PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S ADMINISTRATION." THE MINISTER'S VIEWS ALSO REFLECTED THOSE OF ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO WHO HAS URGED THAT STUDENTS END DEMONSTRATIONS.

THE GOVERNMENT PRESSURES DISSENTERS

5. (U) IN ANOTHER SIGNAL THAT THE GOI IS SEEKING TO LIMIT SOME OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES, THE POLICE HAVE SUMMONED THE ACTRESS AND REFORM ADVOCATE RATNA SARUMPAET FOR QUESTIONING AS A "WITNESS" REGARDING A "NATIONAL DIALOGUE" WHICH SHE ORGANIZED AUGUST 15-16 IN JAKARTA. THE GATHERING, AT JAKARTA'S HOTEL INDONESIA, ATTRACTED SEVERAL HUNDRED NGO MEMBERS AND POLITICAL ACTIVISTS WHO DISCUSSED INDONESIA'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY OVER THE(##)CITES "INSULTING THE PRESIDENT" AND "ORGANIZING A MEETING WITHOUT PERMISSION" AS CHARGES UNDER WHICH THE INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN LAUNCHED. THE SUMMONS FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY SUSPECTS IN THE CASE, A TECHNICAL FLAW WHICH RATNA AND HER LAWYERS CITED AS REASON TO REFUSE THE SUMMONS.

[redacted] B1



B1

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3734

PAGE 01 JAKART 04943 02 OF 02 181033Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FBO-01	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/033W	

----------6BF930 181042Z /38

P 181012Z SEP 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3669
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004943

CINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/18/03
TAGS: PGOV, CASC, PINS, ASEC, PHUM, ECON, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: THE GOVERNMENT REACTS TO GROWING DISSENT

REF: JAKARTA 4376

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04943 02 OF 02 181033Z

REPORTS, ATTEMPTED TO MARCH FROM TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY BUT WERE PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY SECURITY FORCES. THE SCENARIO WAS REMINISCENT OF THE MAY 12 FOILED STUDENT MARCH TO THE PARLIAMENT FROM THE SAME UNIVERSITY WHICH LED TO THE DEATHS OF FOUR STUDENTS AND THREE DAYS OF RIOTING IN JAKARTA.

9. (U) AS OF COB SEPTEMBER 18, POST WAS AWARE OF ONLY ONE DEMONSTRATION IN JAKARTA INVOLVING APPROXIMATELY 200 ANTI-CORRUPTION DEMONSTRATORS AT PARLIAMENT WHICH TRANSPIRED PEACEFULLY.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0998

PAGE 01 JAKART 04985 01 OF 02 220845Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6D29B9 220846Z /38

R 220842Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3718
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI 1005
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004985

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/22/03
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: TEAM INVESTIGATING MASS RAPES OF SINO-INDONESIANS TO CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04985 01 OF 02 220845Z
ISSUE INTERIM REPORT "CONFIRMING" RAPES TOOK PLACE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: A MEMBER OF THE FACT-FINDING TEAM INVESTIGATING RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND GIRLS DURING THE MAY 13-15 RIOTS IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT THERE IS STILL NO FIRST-HAND TESTIMONY REGARDING THE RAPES. NEVERTHELESS, THE TEAM (TPGF) WILL ISSUE AN INTERIM REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 24 FINDING THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND GIRLS WERE RAPED IN AN ORGANIZED AND SYSTEMATIC MANNER. THE TGPF REPORTEDLY HAS DEVELOPED EVIDENCE BASED ON AFFIDAVITS OF

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

FAMILY MEMBERS AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL, AS WELL AS OTHER EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THESE CHARGES. IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH THE ARMED FORCES COMMANDER AND OTHER KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, THE TEAM'S CHAIRPERSON TOOK A STRONGER POSITION, STATING THAT CONTACT WITH VICTIMS HAD BEEN MADE AND THAT THE TEAM HAD "CONFIRMED" THAT RAPES AND SEXUAL ASSAULT HAD TAKEN PLACE. THE TEAM SOUGHT PROTECTION FROM INTIMIDATION FOR THOSE WILLING TO TESTIFY WHO HAD BEEN THREATENED. THE TEAM ALSO CRITICIZED SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO HAD EXPRESSED DOUBT ABOUT THE RAPES AND WHO HAD THREATENED TO PROSECUTE FABRICATORS. END SUMMARY.

TGPF MEMBER ON EVIDENCE

3. (C) REPORTS THAT AT LEAST 168 SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND GIRLS HAD BEEN RAPED IN A SYSTEMATIC AND ORGANIZED ASSAULT AMID THE RIOTING THAT STRUCK INDONESIA IN MAY SENT SHOCKWAVES ACROSS INDONESIA AND BEYOND. HOWEVER, IN THE MONTHS THAT FOLLOWED, VICTIMS AND WITNESSES WILLING TO GO ON RECORD FAILED TO MATERIALIZE

AND SENIOR INDONESIAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS ALLEGED THAT THE REPORTS WERE EXAGGERATED OR EVEN FABRICATED. [redacted] B6
[redacted] B6
[redacted] RECENTLY BRIEFED POLOFF ON THE STATUS OF B6
THE INVESTIGATION.

4. (C [redacted] SAID THAT [redacted] WAS CONVINCED THAT A LARGE NUMBER B6
OF SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN WERE INDEED RAPED IN MAY. HOWEVER, [redacted] B6
SAID THERE WERE NO VICTIMS WILLING TO TESTIFY, DUE IN PART TO THE
FACT THAT VICTIMS REMAINED TRAUMATIZED. [redacted] ADDED THAT RELUCTANCE B6
TO TESTIFY ALSO DERIVED FROM INTIMIDATION TARGETED AGAINST VICTIMS
AND THEIR FAMILIES BY GOI OFFICIALS. IN PARTICULAR, [redacted] CRITICIZED B6
OFFICIAL STATEMENTS BY NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF LT. GENERAL
ROESMANHANDI, MINISTER OF DEFENSE/ARMED FORCES COMMANDER GENERAL
WIRANTO AND ATTORNEY GENERAL MOHAMMAD GHALIB, TO THE EFFECT THAT
THE REPORTS WERE FABRICATED AND THAT THOSE "SPREADING LIES" WOULD
BE PROSECUTED. [redacted] CLAIMED THAT PRIOR TO THESE STATEMENTS, THREE B6
WITNESSES WERE PREPARED TO COME FORWARD AND GIVE TESTIMONY, BUT
THAT THE OFFICIALS' STATEMENTS CAUSED THEM TO WITHDRAW IN FEAR.

5. (C) [redacted] STATED THAT DESPITE THE LACK OF FIRST-HAND B6
TESTIMONY FROM VICTIMS, THE TGPF HAD COMPILED A SUBSTANTIAL BODY OF
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE MASS RAPE ALLEGATIONS. [redacted] SAID THAT THE B6
TEAM HAS NUMEROUS AFFIDAVITS FROM DOCTORS AND PSYCHOLOGISTS WHO
EXAMINED VICTIMS. THE TEAM ALSO HAD AFFIDAVITS FROM FAMILY MEMBERS
OF VICTIMS, AS WELL AS "CIRCUMSTANTIAL" EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
ALLEGATIONS. [redacted] CONFIDED THAT IN A COMPROMISE, INSISTED ON BY THE B6
MILITARY/POLICE MEMBERS OF TEAM, THE CRIMES PERPETRATED AGAINST

SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND GIRLS WILL BE DESCRIBED AS "SEXUAL ASSAULT" RATHER THAN RAPE [redacted] EXPLAINED THAT THE CLAIMS OF B6

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04985 01 OF 02 220845Z
ASSAULT, RATHER THAN RAPE, ENTAILED A DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF THE CRIME WITH DIFFERENT EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS, MAKING THE CASES EASIER TO PROVE.

6. (U) SEPARATELY AND SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTING [redacted] B6
COMMENTS, THE MEDIA, SEPTEMBER 22, CARRIED STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS BY TEAM CHAIRPERSON MARZUKI DARUSMAN INDICATING A FIRMER EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR THE RAPE ALLEGATIONS. HE TOLD THE PRESS THAT IN A MEETING WITH WIRANTO, JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI AND STATE MINISTER OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS TUTTY ALAWIYAH, "WE CONFIRMED TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT SEXUAL ASSAULTS INCLUDING RAPE OCCURRED DURING THE MAY RIOTS." DARUSMAN ALSO CLAIMED THAT "SEVERAL TEAM MEMBERS HAD MET WITH "A NUMBER OF VICTIMS." NOTING THAT THE TEAM WOULD COMPLETE THE REPORT IN OCTOBER, DARUSMAN ADDED "THE IMPORTANT THING IS WE WANT TO ASSURE THAT THESE THINGS HAVE HAPPENED AND THAT THIS (FACT) IS ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT." THE TEAM WILL GIVE AN INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PARLIAMENT ON SEPTEMBER 24.

7. (U) AFTER THE MEETING JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI INFORMED THE PRESS THAT GENERAL WIRANTO HAD TOLD THE FACT-FINDING TEAM THAT "THOSE WHO HAVE RECEIVED THREATS REGARDING WHAT THEY KNOW ABOUT THE RAPES WILL BE PROTECTED." THE PROMISE CAME IN THE WAKE OF REPORTING BY THE TEAM TO THE SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AS

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0999

PAGE 01 JAKART 04985 02 OF 02 220846Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W

----------6D29BE 220846Z /38

R 220842Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3719
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI 1006
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004985

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/22/03
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: TEAM INVESTIGATING MASS RAPES OF SINO-INDONESIANS TO ISSUE INTERIM REPORT "CONFIRMING" RAPES TOOK PLACE
CONFIDENTIAL

CARRIED IN THE MEDIA, THAT "RAPE VICTIMS, EYEWITNESSES AND MEMBERS OF THE INVESTIGATING ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE INVESTIGATING TEAM (TGPF), HAD RECEIVED PHONE CALLS THREATENING THEM WITH VIOLENCE." ACCORDING TO MULADI, WIRANTO "OFFERED THE SERVICES OF THE MILITARY TO ANYONE WHO FEELS THREATENED," INCLUDING AN OFFER TO TAP THE PHONES OF THOSE RECEIVING THREATENING PHONE CALLS SO AS TO CAPTURE THE PERPETRATORS.

8. (U) MULADI ALSO TOLD THE PRESS THAT TEAM MEMBERS HAD COMPLAINED TO WIRANTO ABOUT STATEMENTS MADE BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS EXPRESSING DOUBT THAT THE SEXUAL ASSAULTS HAD TAKEN PLACE. THE TEAM MEMBERS REPORTEDLY SAID THAT SUCH STATEMENTS DISCREDITED THEIR WORK. MULADI ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE TEAM HAD NOT PRESENTED THE GOVERNMENT WITH ANY CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF RAPE. MULADI SAID THAT ONCE SUCH EVIDENCE WAS IN HAND, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE ACTION, TO INCLUDE PROPOSING RATIFICATION OF UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST RACE DISCRIMINATION.

9. (C) COMMENT: THE TEAM INVESTIGATING THE MAY RIOTS IS THE ONLY ONE AMONG FOUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS NOW UNDERWAY, WHICH INCLUDES RESPECTED FIGURES FROM THE NGO COMMUNITY AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. (INVESTIGATIONS OF THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND THE KILLING OF TRISAKTI STUDENTS IS IN THE HANDS OF THE MILITARY WHILE AN INVESTIGATION OF SOEHARTO'S WEALTH IS BEING RUN BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.) THE IMPRESSIVE CREDENTIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NON-GOVERNMENT MEMBERS OF THE RIOT INVESTIGATION TEAM WILL GIVE ITS CONCLUSIONS SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT. IF, AS PREDICTED, THE TEAM CONFIRMS THAT ORGANIZED, SYSTEMATIC RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT TOOK PLACE, DOUBTERS WILL BE UNDERMINED BUT PROBABLY NOT SILENCED.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN PART B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1356

PAGE 01 JAKART 05076 01 OF 02 251038Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/027W				

----------6E9E4D 251043Z /38

R 251032Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3802
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI 1007
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 005076

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/25/03
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: RIOT/RAPE INVESTIGATION TEAM LEADER SUSPECTS LINKS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONNECTING RECENT RIOTS, KIDNAPPINGS AND STUDENT KILLINGS

REF: A) JAKARTA 4985, B) JAKARTA 4680

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE LEADER OF THE FACT-FINDING TEAM INVESTIGATING THE RIOTS AND SEXUAL ASSAULTS/RAPES WHICH, ACCORDING TO WELL-FOUNDED REPORTING, TRANSPIRED IN A NUMBER OF INDONESIAN CITIES IN MAY, HAS TESTIFIED BEFORE A PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ABOUT THE TEAM'S PRELIMINARY FINDINGS. HE SAID THAT THE TEAM HAD A "VERY STRONG BASIS OF EVIDENCE THAT SEXUAL ASSAULTS AND RAPES OCCURRED." HE ALSO STATED THAT THE TEAM BELIEVED THE RIOTS MAY HAVE BEEN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 03 JUL 2006 200502473

CONNECTED TO THE KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND TO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. HE CLAIMED HE HAD ABRI COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO'S ASSURANCE THAT THE TEAM COULD INTERVIEW MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY HONOR BOARD WHICH INVESTIGATED THE INVOLVEMENT OF SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS, INCLUDING LT. GENERAL PRABOWO (RET), ABOUT THE KIDNAPPINGS SO AS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF LINKS. SEPARATELY, A SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL HAS STATED THAT PRABOWO WILL SOON FACE A COURT MARTIAL. UNCONFIRMED REPORTING CLAIMS THAT SOME OF THE STILL-MISSING ACTIVISTS MAY BE ALIVE BUT IN VERY POOR CONDITION. WE NOTE THAT [redacted] ALSO BELIEVES THE THREE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES WERE LINKED. END SUMMARY B6

INTERIM TEAM REPORT ON SUBJECT OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RAPES:

3. (U) THE LEADER OF THE GOVERNMENT-ORGANIZED FACT FINDING TEAM

CONFIDENTIAL

INVESTIGATING THE MAY RIOTING (AND RAPES) TESTIFIED BEFORE A PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON SEPTEMBER 24. HIS TESTIMONY, AS ANTICIPATED REF A, INCLUDED AN AFFIRMATION THAT THE TEAM HAD SOLID EVIDENCE THAT SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RAPES HAD OCCURRED. HE STATED THAT THE TEAM "HAD FOUND THAT THERE (WAS) A VERY STRONG BASIS OF EVIDENCE THAT SEXUAL ASSAULTS AND ALSO RAPES OCCURRED DURING THE RIOTS." HE ADDED THAT THE TEAM WAS SEEKING ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE REGARDING SEXUAL ASSAULTS (INCLUDING RAPE) IN SOLO, SURABAYA, MEDAN, PALEMBANG AND LAMPUNG, AS WELL AS JAKARTA. (COMMENT: WE ARE AWARE OF INVESTIGATIONS ALSO REGARDING SEXUAL ASSAULT/RAPE IN BEKASI AND TANGERANG. END COMMENT)

4. (C) CHARLES HIMAWAN, A MEMBER OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WHO HAS BEEN ASSISTING THE FACT FINDING TEAM AS LIAISON WITH THE COMMISSION, TOLD POLOFF SEPTEMBER 24 THAT THE TEAM HAD BEEN ABLE TO GATHER EVIDENCE FROM MEDICAL WORKERS AND OTHERS WITH DIRECT ACCESS TO VICTIMS. MARZUKI DID NOT ELABORATE ON THE TEAM'S SOURCES IN HIS PUBLIC TESTIMONY.

TEAM LEADER SUSPECTS LINKS BETWEEN RIOTS AND OTHER INVESTIGATIONS:

5. (U) MARZUKI, WHO IS ALSO VICE CHAIRPERSON OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, TOLD THE PARLIAMENTARIANS THAT THE TEAM BELIEVED THERE WERE LINKS BETWEEN THE RIOTS, THE ABDUCTIONS/TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND THE SHOOTING DEATH OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. "THESE CONDITIONS (THE RIOTING) WERE SHAPED BY THE SHOOTING AT TRISAKTI, BUT WERE ALSO AFFECTED BY A SERIES OF VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST ACTIVISTS AND STUDENTS AND ABDUCTIONS OF THEM," MARZUKI TOLD THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05076 01 OF 02 251038Z
6. (U) MARZUKI ADDED THAT THE TEAM WAS LOOKING INTO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE MILITARY MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN THE RIOTS. "WE ARE LOOKING VERY CLOSELY INTO THAT POSSIBILITY AND INTO A VARIETY OF POSSIBILITIES OF LINKS BUT WE CANNOT MAKE ANY FIRM CONCLUSION AT THIS MOMENT."

7. (U) MARZUKI SAID THAT THE TEAM WAS SEEKING ACCESS TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE RECENT MILITARY HONOR BOARD WHICH TOOK TESTIMONY FROM FORMER LT. GENERAL PRABOWO AND OTHER SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIALS IN CONNECTION WITH THE KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. MARZUKI TOLD THE PARLIAMENTARIANS THAT "THE ABRI COMMANDER (WIRANTO) HAS ASSURED US THAT WE CAN HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE (HONOR BOARD) AND THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE TEAM."

PRABOWO YET TO FACE COURT MARTIAL?
---

8. (U) SEPARATELY, MILITARY POLICE COMMANDER MAJOR GENERAL SYAMSU DJALAL TOLD THE PRESS, SEPTEMBER 24, THAT FORMER LT. GENERAL PRABOWO WOULD BE BROUGHT BEFORE A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AFTER 11 MEMBERS OF THE ARMY'S SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) WERE TRIED FOR THEIR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPING OF DISSIDENTS. HE CLAIMED THAT THE COURT MARTIAL WOULD BEGIN SOON.

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1357

PAGE 01 JAKART 05076 02 OF 02 251038Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/027W					

----------6E9E50 251043Z /38

R 251032Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3803
INFO SECDEF WASHDC

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI 1008
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 005076

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/25/03
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: RIOT/RAPE INVESTIGATION TEAM LEADER SUSPECTS LINKS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONNECTING RECENT RIOTS, KIDNAPPINGS AND STUDENT KILLINGS

REF: A) JAKARTA 4985, B) JAKARTA 4680

9. (C) [redacted] TOLD B6
LABATT, SEPTEMBER 24, THAT THERE IS REPORTING THAT THREE OF THE 14 MISSING ACTIVISTS ARE STILL ALIVE BUT THAT THEY WERE "PHYSICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY RUINED AND PARALYZED." ACCORDING TO THIS REPORTING, ABRI IS UNWILLING TO ADMIT THEY ARE STILL ALIVE AND RELEASE THEM BECAUSE OF THEIR OBVIOUS SEVERE MISTREATMENT/TORTURE. EARLIER, [redacted] B6
[redacted] B6
TOLD POLCOUNS THAT THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT TWO OF THE VICTIMS WERE STILL ALIVE, BUT WERE IN VERY BAD CONDITION.

10. (C) COMMENT: REF B REPORTED THAT THE [redacted] B6
[redacted] B6
[redacted] BELIEVED THAT THERE WERE LINKS AMONG THE MAY RIOTS, THE B6
TRISAKTI KILLINGS AND THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE OF ACTIVISTS. SPECIFICALLY, HE TOLD POLCOUNS HE BELIEVED THAT A JOINT SECURITY FORCE UNIT, OPERATING CLANDESTINELY WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF SENIOR OFFICIALS, MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN ALL THREE CRIMINAL ACTIONS. HE ASSESSED THAT SUCH AN OPERATION HAD A PRECEDENT IN THE NOTORIOUS MULTI-FORCE OPERATION CODE-NAMED "PETRUS" WHICH WAS CONDUCTED IN 1984-85 AND WHICH TARGETED ALLEGED CRIMINAL ELEMENTS IN JAKARTA FOR KIDNAPPING AND KILLING. MARZUKI AND THE RIOT FACT-FINDING TEAM APPEAR TO BE MOVING IN THE SAME DIRECTION WITH THEIR ANALYSIS.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E66

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5378

PAGE 01 JAKART 05695 01 OF 02 031101Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/029W			

----------7D1FC1 031102Z /38

R 031041Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4381
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 005695

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

DEPT FOR EAP/PIMBS AND L

PASS USTR FOR RUZICKA

TREASURY FOR OASIA/INA - SAEGER, REDIFER, CRAWFORD
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05695 01 OF 02 031101Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/16
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, EINV, ETRD, PINR, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: SOEHARTO'S WEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS, CORRUPTION, AND TREATMENT OF AMCITS COVERED DURING AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: ATTORNEY GENERAL GHALIB ANTICIPATED THAT THE FINAL REPORT OF THE FACT FINDING TEAM ON THE MAY RIOTS WOULD BE RELEASED NOVEMBER 3. AMBASSADOR ROY EMPHASIZED THE EXTENT OF U.S. INTEREST IN THIS REPORT AND OTHER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 2 NOV 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 03 JUL 2006 200502473

ONGOING HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS, URGING THAT THEY BE CREDIBLE. [redacted] B1

[redacted] THE AMBASSADOR URGED FAIR TREATMENT FOR U.S. CITIZENS IN INDONESIA, INCLUDING [redacted] B6

[redacted] THE U.S. COMPANY FREEPORT, AND THE U.S. LAW FIRM B6 MORGAN, LEWIS AND BOCKIUS. END SUMMARY

3. (U) AMBASSADOR ROY MET WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL LT. GENERAL ANDI MUHAMMAD GHALIB ON NOVEMBER 3. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SEVERAL STAFF MEMBERS AND POLOFF ATTENDED AS NOTETAKER.

JOINT FACT FINDING TEAM ON MAY RIOTS ABOUT TO ISSUE REPORT

4. (C) AMBASSADOR ROY ASKED ABOUT THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

JOINT FACT FINDING TEAM ON THE MAY RIOTS, WHICH COULD BE RELEASED AS EARLY AS TODAY (SEPTEL). (GHALIB IS ONE OF THE MINISTERS WHO ESTABLISHED THE COMMISSION.) HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE CREATION OF THIS TEAM, AND HOPED THAT ITS FINAL PRODUCT WOULD BE A "GOOD, CREDIBLE REPORT." ASKED IF THE REPORT WOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR FOLLOW-UP PROSECUTIONS, GHALIB REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE WITHOUT PROVIDING ANY DETAIL. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S OTHER ONGOING HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS (I.E. DISAPPEARANCE, TRISAKTI) WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A CREDIBLE MANNER.

GOING AFTER SOEHARTO'S WEALTH?

5. (C) GHALIB MADE A POINT TO DISCUSS HIS EFFORTS TO SEARCH FOR SOEHARTO'S WEALTH. HE HAD RECEIVED THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY FROM THE FINANCE MINISTER TO COLLECT EVIDENCE [redacted] B1

[redacted] HE SAID, AND THE INVESTIGATION WAS CONTINUING.

6. (C) GHALIB SAID THAT SOEHARTO HAD AGREED THAT ANY MONEY FOUND IN HIS NAME WOULD BE HANDED OVER TO THE GOVERNMENT.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] GHALIB SAID THAT

THE [redacted] HAD PROMISED TO HELP HIM AND HE VAGUELY ASKED FOR SIMILAR ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED B1

CONFIDENTIAL

STATES.

FAIR TREATMENT FOR U.S. CITIZENS IN INDONESIA

7. (C) AMBASSADOR ROY URGED THAT U.S. CITIZENS BE TREATED FAIRLY IN INDONESIA, MENTIONING [redacted], THE U.S. COMPANY FREEPORT, AND THE U.S. LAW FIRM MORGAN, LEWIS, & BOCKIUS. B6

8. (C) REGARDING THE ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION MADE BY [redacted] [redacted] INVOLVING COORDINATING MINISTER GINANDJAR AND FREEPORT, GHALIB SAID THAT THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO CLARIFY THE FACTS, AS REQUESTED BY GINANDJAR. AMBASSADOR ROY SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY ENFORCED THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, BUT THAT HE HAD SEEN NO EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH FREEPORT IN THIS REGARD. GHALIB SAID THAT HIS OFFICE HAD ALREADY HEARD FROM BUSINESSMAN [redacted] ECONOMIST [redacted] [redacted], AND STAFF FROM FREEPORT. THEY WERE STILL WAITING TO HEAR FROM FREEPORT HEAD "JIM BOB" MOFFET. THE AMBASSADOR MENTIONED THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT MOFFET WAS NOW ON HIS WAY TO INDONESIA FOR THIS PURPOSE. B6 B6

9. (C) REGARDING [redacted] AMBASSADOR ROY EMPHASIZED THE U.S. BELIEF IN THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH B6

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5381

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/028W				

----------7D1FC4 031102Z /38

R 031041Z NOV 98

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4382
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 005695

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

DEPT FOR EAP/PIMBS AND L

PASS USTR FOR RUZICKA

TREASURY FOR OASIA/INA - SAEGER, REDIFER, CRAWFORD
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05695 02 OF 02 031102Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/16
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, EINV, ETRD, PINR, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: SOEHARTO'S WEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS, CORRUPTION, AND TREATMENT OF AMCITS COVERED DURING AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL

(THOUGH NOT TO LIBEL, OF COURSE), AND HIS CONCERN ABOUT A REPORT IN THE INDONESIAN PRESS NOVEMBER 2 THAT [redacted] B6
COULD BECOME A SUSPECT. GHALIB RESPONDED THAT [redacted] WAS B6
NOT THE TARGET IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION, AND THE POLICE HAD BEEN TALKING TO THE PRESS ABOUT A POSSIBLE LIBEL CASE. HE DREW A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO CASES, HOWEVER, POINTING OUT THAT IF GINANDJAR WAS CLEARED OF THE CORRUPTION ALLEGATIONS, THEN A SEPARATE LIBEL CASE COULD RESULT. IF GINANDJAR WERE GUILTY, THEN THERE COULD BE NO LIBEL.

10. (C) THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN UPSET WHEN HE LEARNED THAT [redacted] HAD BEEN BANNED FROM INDONESIA, AND B6
RELIEVED WHEN HE LEARNED THAT THE BAN WAS LIFTED. HE SAID THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE INDONESIAN PARTIES CONCERNED DID NOT INTEND TO PRESS CHARGES AGAINST [redacted] B6
HE HOPED THAT THIS WAS TRUE AS CRIMINALIZING THIS DISPUTE COULD HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON BILATERAL RELATIONS.

11. (C) IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, GHALIB AND HIS STAFF SAID THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THE U.S. LAW FIRM MORGAN, LEWIS AND BOCKIUS, AND WERE NOT

AWARE OF ANY INVESTIGATION WITHIN THEIR BUREAUCRACY. AMBASSADOR ROY HAD EXPLAINED THAT THERE HAD BEEN CLAIMS

WITHIN INDONESIA THAT THE FIRM WAS ACTING IMPROPERLY AND THAT THE POLICE HAD LAUNCHED AN INVESTIGATION. THE POLICE CASE WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN CLOSED, BUT WE UNDERSTOOD THAT INSTEAD IT HAD BEEN SHIFTED FROM THE POLICE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT AT A TIME WHEN INDONESIA WAS TRYING TO SHOW THAT IT WAS CARRYING OUT IMPORTANT REFORMS, ITS IMAGE IN THE EYES OF THE U.S. LEGAL COMMUNITY WOULD BE DAMAGED IF THERE WAS THE PERCEPTION THAT A U.S. LAW FIRM WAS BEING MISTREATED.

CORRUPTION AND POSSIBLE U.S. ASSISTANCE

12. (C) GHALIB AND HIS STAFF SAID THAT FIGHTING CORRUPTION WAS A HIGH PRIORITY, AND CLAIMED TO HAVE UNDERTAKEN NEW EFFORTS IN ALL 27 PROVINCES. ONE STAFF MEMBER SAID THAT IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS THEY HAD HANDLED TWICE AS MANY CORRUPTION CASES AS IN ALL OF THE PREVIOUS YEAR.

13. (C) AMBASSADOR ROY SAID THAT THE U.S. COULD POTENTIALLY BE SUPPORTIVE TO THIS EFFORT THROUGH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND OTHER FORMS OF COOPERATION. HE MENTIONED POSSIBLE COOPERATION ON FIGHTING MONEY LAUNDERING.
ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E69

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B5

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4436

PAGE 01 JAKART 05740 01 OF 02 052352Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001W

----------7E8292 060018Z /38
O 052312Z NOV 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4428

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 005740

OFFICIAL INFORMAL - FOR EAP/PIMBS D. HARTWICK FROM DCM M. OWENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/08
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL JAKARTA TO PIMBS NO. 180

1. CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL P. OWENS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

[redacted]

B1, B5

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 4 NOV 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

B1, B5

[redacted] B5, B1

[redacted] B1, B5

4. (U) STATUS OF SOMA SURYABRATA

SURYABRATA WAS ARRESTED IN 1967, IN CONNECTION WITH THE EVENTS OF 1965-66 AND THE ATTEMPTED COUP, PURPORTEDLY BY THE PKI. HE WAS GIVEN A LIFE SENTENCE WHICH HE IS SERVING IN MADURA. WE CHECKED WITH AN ACTIVIST WHO WORKS ON BEHALF OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, WHO CONFIRMED THAT SURYABRATA IS STILL IN JAIL.

[redacted] B1



B1

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3299

PAGE 01 JAKART 05825 01 OF 02 101128Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/027W						

----------800A42 101128Z /38

P 101103Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4512
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 005825

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/08
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, CASC, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: STUDENTS AND COUNTER-DEMONSTRATORS SQUARE OFF IN JAKARTA

REF: JAKARTA 5798

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05825 01 OF 02 101128Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS TOOK TO THE STREETS OF CENTRAL JAKARTA TO PROTEST THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) WHICH CONVENED TODAY. THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS WERE MET BY HUNDREDS OF COUNTER DEMONSTRATORS, AND A LONG SHOW DOWN ENSUED IN ONE LOCATION IN THE CENTER OF JAKARTA. AS OF COB, THE TWO SIDES WERE STILL IN A TENSE STALEMATE, SOME MINOR SCUFFLES HAD TAKEN PLACE. SECURITY FORCES WHO WERE CONSPICUOUS BY THEIR ABSENCE FOR SEVERAL HOURS, FINALLY ARRIVED TO SEPARATE THE SIDES. END SUMMARY.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 9 NOV 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200502473

THOUSANDS JOIN ANTI-MPR DEMONSTRATION...

3. (C) THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS TURNED OUT IN CENTRAL JAKARTA TO VOICE THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR WHICH CONVENED NOVEMBER 10. POLOFF OBSERVED THREE TO FOUR THOUSAND ANTI-MPR DEMONSTRATORS AS THEY MARCHED FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA'S MEDICAL CAMPUS IN SALEMBA, CENTRAL JAKARTA. THE CROWD MARCHED DOWN DIPONEGORO STREET BOUND FOR PROKLAMASI (PROCLAMATION SQUARE) BUT HALTED IN FRONT OF THE OFFICES OF THE LEGAL AID FOUNDATION (LBH) A FOCAL POINT OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTEST, LOCATED ABOUT 1 KILOMETER NORTHEAST OF THE SQUARE. THE HALT APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN CALLED SO AS TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION WITH 50-100 PRO-GOVERNMENT COUNTER-DEMONSTRATORS WHO WAITED NERVOUSLY AT THE GATES OF THE SQUARE. AS THE ANTI-MPR GROUP HALTED, THEY RESTED, LISTENED TO AND CHEERED SPEECHES FROM THEIR COLLEAGUES AND CHANTED ANTI-GOVERNMENT SLOGANS.

...AS PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES GATHER NEARBY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 05825 01 OF 02 101128Z

4. (C) MEANWHILE AT PROKLAMASI SQUARE, 800 METERS AWAY, A GROUP OF 50-100 PRO-GOVERNMENT COUNTER-DEMONSTRATORS WAITED NERVOUSLY. THE GROUP WORE GREEN HEADBANDS AND DISPLAYED BANNERS WITH ISLAMIC SLOGANS, IN ARABIC. THE GROUP BRANDISHED BAMBOO POLES WHICH HAD BEEN WHITTLED TO A SHARP POINT AT THE END. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE GROUP TOLD A CANADIAN DIPLOMAT THEY WERE FROM VILLAGES OUTSIDE OF JAKARTA AND THAT THEY WERE IN THE PARK TO PRAY. MEMBERS SHRUGGED WHEN ASKED WHY THEY NEEDED BAMBOO WEAPONS TO PRAY.



B1

OUTSIDE THE PROKLAMASI PARK WAS A SMALL GROUP OF 20 POLICEMEN (BROUGHT IN FROM KALIMANTAN TO AUGMENT SECURITY FOR THE MPR). SEVERAL SOURCES TOLD POLOFF THAT THE PRO-GOVERNMENT GROUP IN THE PARK WAS "FURKON" A CONSERVATIVE ISLAMIC GROUP (NOTE: FURKON STAGED A SMALL DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN AUGUST TO PROTEST THE U.S. ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SUDAN. END NOTE.) ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE CROWD TOLD POLOFF THAT THE GROUP IN THE PARK WAS KISDI, THE COMMITTEE FOR WORLD MUSLIM SOLIDARITY, ANOTHER CONSERVATIVE ISLAMIC GROUP WITH AN ANTI-WESTERN

ORIENTATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05825 01 OF 02 101128Z
CLASH
---

5. (C) SEVERAL WAVES OF ANTI-MPR DEMONSTRATORS ROUNDED A CORNER AND PROCEEDED TOWARD THE PROKLAMASI PARK, BUT HALTED ABOUT 200 YARDS BEFORE THE PARK ENTRANCE, APPARENTLY RELUCTANT TO START A VIOLENT CLASH. THE BULK OF THE ANTI-MPR DEMONSTRATORS REMAINED BEHIND, WORKING THEMSELVES INTO SOMETIMES FRENZIED CHANTS, BUT REMAINING LARGELY STATIONARY. HOWEVER, AT ABOUT 1600, POLOFF WITNESSED THOUSANDS OF DEMONSTRATORS SURGE ALONG A PATH UNDER A RAILROAD BRIDGE IN THE DIRECTION OF PROKLAMASI SQUARE. [redacted] B1 THE GROUP WAS REPELLED BY THE SMALL GROUP OF POLICE AT THE SITE, BUT A TENSE STANDOFF CONTINUED, WITH THE POLICE FORCE CLEARLY MUCH TOO SMALL TO DIFFUSE THE SITUATION. WE UNDERSTAND THE STANDOFF, AND POSSIBLY MORE STONE THROWING, CONTINUES AT THE SITE AS OF COB. A LATE REPORT INDICATES THAT 300 INDONESIAN MARINES HAVE ARRIVED AT THE SITE AND HAVE BEGUN TO SEPARATE THE TWO GROUPS.

ANTI-MPR DEMONSTRATORS: DEMANDS
---

6. (C) THE STUDENTS PARTICIPATING IN THE ANTI-MPR DEMONSTRATION

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3300

PAGE 01 JAKART 05825 02 OF 02 101128Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/027W					

----------800A45 101128Z /38

P 101103Z NOV 98

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4513
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 005825

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/08
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, CASC, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: STUDENTS AND COUNTER-DEMONSTRATORS SQUARE OFF IN JAKARTA

REF: JAKARTA 5798

CONFIDENTIAL

VOICED A NUMBER OF RECURRING THEMES: THE MPR IS ILLEGITIMATE, PROSECUTE SOEHARTO, ELIMINATE DWIFUNGSI (MAKE THE MILITARY WITHDRAW FROM POLITICS), AND ESTABLISH A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT (FREE OF SOEHARTO ERA POLITICIANS.) AMONG THE BANNERS POLOFF NOTED: "THIS IS THE PEOPLE'S SESSION"; "HABIBIE PLUS WIRANTO EQUALS SOEHARTO"; AND "LIE: WHAT'S GOOD FOR ABRI IS GOOD FOR THE PEOPLE."

ANTI-MPR DEMONSTRATORS: COMPOSITION
---

7. (C) THE ANTI-MPR DEMONSTRATORS WERE COMPOSED MAINLY OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS FROM ALL OVER JAKARTA, AS WELL AS BANDUNG AND OTHER OUTLYING AREAS. MANY STUDENTS WORE BRIGHTLY COLORED JACKETS IDENTIFYING THEMSELVES BY UNIVERSITY, BUT MANY ALSO ORGANIZED THEMSELVES BY THE STUDENT POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS CO-SPONSORING THE ANTI-MPR DEMONSTRATION. THE LARGEST CONTINGENTS OF ANTI-MPR STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS CAME FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA, TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY, ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY, AND MUHAMADIYAH UNIVERSITY. THE MOST CONSPICUOUS STUDENT POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ATTENDANCE WERE AKRAB (AKSI RAKYAT BERSAMA/PEOPLE'S JOINT ACTION, A RELATIVELY NEW, AND APPARENTLY POTENT UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION); FAMRUD (FORUM MAHASISWA-RAKYAT UNTUK DEMOKRASI/PEOPLE'S-STUDENT'S FORUM FOR DEMOCRACY, A SPINOFF OF FORKOT); KOBAR (KOMITEE PEOPLE'S LABOR ACTION COMMITTEE), AND KBUI (KELUARGA BESAR UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA/THE BIG FAMILY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA). POLOFF ALSO NOTED A NUMBER OF SMALLER, PREVIOUSLY OBSCURE OR UNKNOWN STUDENT GROUPS TAKING PART INCLUDING "THE INDONESIAN STUDENTS' PARLIAMENT" AND KOMRAD: "THE STUDENT-PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRACY," AND OTHERS. FORKOT (FORUM

KOTA/CITY FORUM), ONE OF THE MAJOR ANTI-GOVERNMENT STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS, WAS CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT FROM THE DEMONSTRATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

ONE DEMONSTRATOR TOLD POLOFF THAT FORKOT WAS ACROSS TOWN, TRYING TO STAGE A DEMONSTRATION AT THE SITE OF THE MPR ITSELF. (NOTE: WE HAVE REPORTING OF MAJOR TRAFFIC PROBLEMS IN THE VICINITY OF THE DPR CAUSED BY DEMONSTRATIONS AND ALSO HAVE ACCOUNTS OF A SMALL DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF THE DPR WHICH BLOCKED THE AIRPORT TOLL ROAD IN BOTH DIRECTIONS. END NOTE)

COMMENT:
---

8. (C) THESE DEMONSTRATIONS SUGGEST THAT THE STUDENT MOVEMENT IS STILL ABLE TO REACH CONSENSUS ON BROAD POLITICAL THEMES AND TO MOBILIZE LARGE NUMBERS IN SPITE OF THE ENORMOUS SECURITY FORCE DEPLOYED IN THE CAPITAL WHICH HAVE IMPEDED DEMONSTRATOR MOVEMENT. THE DEMONSTRATIONS ALSO HAVE NOT BEEN INTIMIDATED BY HE THREAT POSED BY COUNTER DEMONSTRATORS. ALTHOUGH AS MANY AS 30,000 SECURITY PERSONNEL ARE REPORTEDLY IN JAKARTA AND ASSIGNED TO PROTECT THE MPR SESSION, THE BULK APPEARS TO BE DEPLOYED IN AND AROUND THE PARLIAMENTARY COMPLEX, AND SPREAD VERY THINLY IN OTHER PARTS OF THE CITY. IRONICALLY, THE ABSENCE OF SECURITY AT THIS DEMONSTRATION IN CENTRAL JAKARTA RAISED THE RISK OF AN OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4046

PAGE 01 JAKART 05876 01 OF 03 151107Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W

----------81E49C 151108Z /38

O 151042Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4569
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005876

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, CASC, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: AN UNCERTAIN CALM RETURNS TO JAKARTA, 11/15

REF: A) JAKARTA 5780, B) JAKARTA 5858; C) JAKARTA 5860

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05876 01 OF 03 151107Z
1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: RIOTING SUBSIDED IN JAKARTA OVERNIGHT NOVEMBER 14-15. SECURITY FORCES ARE DEPLOYED IN MOST AREAS AND LARGE CROWDS HAVE NOT APPEARED ON THE STREETS BY COB NOVEMBER 15 LEADING TO HOPES THAT THIS PERIOD OF UNREST IS OVER. THIS RIOTING WAS NOT ON A PAR WITH THAT OF MAY. SURABAYA AND OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY APPEAR TO BE QUIET AS WELL. STUDENT LEADERS INDICATE THAT MORE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, PERHAPS AS EARLY AS NOVEMBER 16, ARE POSSIBLE. THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT RIOTS WILL RESUME, INASMUCH AS STUDENTS HAVE TRIED TO FORESTALL UNREST. FOLLOWING THE MILITARY/POLICE FIRING ON STUDENTS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 14 NOV 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200502473

AT ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY NOVEMBER 13, MANY STUDENTS HAVE DEMANDED ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO'S RESIGNATION. PRESIDENT HABIBIE APPEARS TO BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT EARLY-SELECTION OF A NEW PRESIDENT AFTER MAY-JUNE ELECTIONS, THUS POSSIBLY OFFERING A GESTURE OF COMPROMISE TO MAJOR OPPOSITION LEADERS WHO HAVE CALLED FOR AN EARLY TRANSITION AFTER THE ELECTIONS. THE OPPOSITION LEADERS, REPORTEDLY WORKING IN CONCERT, ARE SEEKING A "RECONCILIATION DIALOGUE" INVOLVING THE GOVERNMENT AND STUDENTS. THEY REPORTEDLY ARE ENCOUNTERING SOME RESISTANCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT TO SUCH A DIALOGUE. HABIBIE'S NOVEMBER 14 SPEECH AND SUMMONS/WARRANTS SUPPOSEDLY ISSUED FOR SOME OPPOSITION FIGURES ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN BEHIND RECENT UNREST SUGGEST THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE BENT ON PURSUING CULPRITS/SCAPEGOATS. THE SITUATION HAS POLARIZED TO AN AS YET UNKNOWN DEGREE. END SUMMARY

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN JAKARTA

---

3. (U) AN UNCERTAIN CALM RETURNED TO JAKARTA NOVEMBER 15 AFTER A DAY OF EXTENSIVE LOOTING, VANDALISM AND SOME ARSON. THE RIOTING WAS NOT ON A SCALE OF THAT SEEN IN MAY. WHILE SINO-INDONESIAN COMMERCIAL CENTERS AND SHOPS WERE A COMMON TARGET OF RIOTING MOBS, AS THEY TRADITIONALLY ARE, THERE WAS MUCH LESS ARSON THAN IN MAY AND THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN NO DELIBERATE PHYSICAL VIOLENCE METED OUT TO SINO-INDONESIANS. PRESUMABLY, HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN INJURIES AMONG THOSE SINO-INDONESIANS AND OTHERS WHO WERE CAUGHT UP IN VIOLENCE AGAINST THEIR PROPERTY.

4. (U) THE SECURITY PRESENCE, MADE UP OF ARMY, POLICE, MARINE, NAVY AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WAS NOTABLY MORE IN EVIDENCE IN THE CITY, NOVEMBER 15, INCLUDING IN THE SINO-INDONESIAN AREAS ("CHINA TOWN") IN NORTH JAKARTA (GOLODOK, MANKA DUA, ANCOL, TANJUNG PRIOK). MOST SECURITY FORCES, INCLUDING STATIC DEPLOYMENTS AND ROVING PATROLS, ON NOVEMBER 14, WERE CONFINED TO THE NORTH-SOUTH GADJA MADA STREET WHICH RUNS THROUGH THE HEART OF THE SINO-INDONESIAN AREA. ON MAJOR BISECTING STREETS, SINO-INDONESIANS SET UP DEFENSIVE GROUPS ARMED WITH POLES AND CLUBS. ON NOVEMBER 15, SECURITY PERSONNEL HAD EXTENDED THEIR PRESENCE IN A LIMITED WAY INTO THESE MAJOR BISECTING STREETS WITH SMALL KNOTS OF SECURITY PERSONNEL AT INTERSECTIONS AND IN FRONT OS SOME LARGE COMMERCAL ESTABLISHMENTS. THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF INONESIAN CITIZEN SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS.

5. (U) NOVEMBER 15 OBSERVATION OF OTHER AREAS WHICH WERE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05876 01 OF 03 151107Z
HIT BY RIOTING NOVEMBER 14 INDICATED CALM HAD RETURNED. THERE WERE NO LARGE CROWDS AND A LIGHT SECURITY PRESENCE WAS IN PLACE IN MOST AREAS. THROUGHOUT JAKARTA MANY PRIVATE HOMES AND BUSINESSES WERE FLYING THE NATIONAL FLAG AT HALF MAST IN HONOR OF THOSE KILLED, MOSTLY STUDENTS, ON NOVEMBER 13. A FEW GOVERNMENT BUT NO MILITARY BUILDINGS/FACILITIES HAD THEIR FLAGS AT HALF MAST.
THE SECURITY SITUATION OUTSIDE JAKARTA
---

6. (U) AMCONSUL SURABAYA REPORTS THAT THE SITUATION REMAINS CALM IN INDONESIA'S SECOND LARGEST CITY THOUGH DEMONSTRATING STUDENTS WHO WERE ALLOWED TO ENTER THE GOVERNOR'S PALACE, REMAINED EFFECTIVELY IN OCCUPATION OF THE FACILITY AS OF MID-DAY NOVEMBER 15. IT WAS UNCLEAR HOW THAT SITUATION WOULD BE RESOLVED. REPORTS FROM OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY THUS FAR INDICATE NO MAJOR RIOTING ALTHOUGH STUDENTS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN PROTESTS, WITH MUCH OF THIS ACTIVITY FOCUSSED ON THE KILLINGS AT ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY NOVEMBER 13.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4048

PAGE 01 JAKART 05876 02 OF 03 151107Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W

----------81E4A1 151108Z /38
O 151042Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4570
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 005876

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, CASC, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: AN UNCERTAIN CALM RETURNS TO JAKARTA, 11/15

REF: A) JAKARTA 5780, B) JAKARTA 5858; C) JAKARTA 5860

7. (U) PRESIDENT HABIBIE, IN A BRIEF NOVEMBER 15
CONFIDENTIAL

INTERVIEW BROADCAST BY CNN, STATED THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO HAVE A PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE SESSION CONVENE "ONE WEEK OR TWO DAYS AFTER THE MAY-JUNE ELECTION" TO SELECT THE NEXT PRESIDENT. ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT SCHEDULE THE MPR SESSION WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL DECEMBER 1999. (COMMENT: WHILE IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO EXPLORE WHETHER HABIBIE WAS SPEAKING LITERALLY, HIS REMARK AT LEAST APPEARS TO BE A CONCESSION IN THE DIRECTION OF A CALL MADE BY THE FOUR MAJOR OPPOSITION LEADERS FOR A TRANSITION WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE ELECTION. END COMMENT. HABIBIE ALSO APPEARED TO INDICATE THAT IN HIS VIEW STUDENTS WERE SUFFERING FROM POOR INFORMATION AND THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO INCREASE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO GET ITS POINTS ACROSS. GENERAL WIRANTO HAS ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT THE MILITARY WILL CONDUCT ITS OWN INVESTIGATION INTO WHAT WENT WRONG AT ATMA JAYA. (COMMENT: GIVEN THE STALLED NATURE OF OTHER ABRI INVESTIGATIONS OF ITS OWN PERSONNEL'S CONDUCT, SUCH AS THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE OF ACTIVISTS AND THE TRISAKTI KILLINGS, STUDENTS AND OTHERS MIGHT NOT SEE THIS AS LIKELY TO AFFORD A CREDIBLE RESULT AND MAY PRESS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY VIA A BROADER, MORE TRANSPARENT INVESTIGATION. END COMMENT)

8. (C) MEANWHILE, [redacted] B1
TOLD POLOFF NOVEMBER 15 THAT STUDENTS GENERALLY WERE "CONSOLIDATING" DURING THE DAY AND THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF DEMONSTRATIONS ON NOVEMBER 16. HE DESCRIBED STUDENTS GENERALLY AS "ANGRY," IN THE WAKE OF THE KILLING AND WOUNDING OF SCORES OF STUDENTS NOVEMBER 13, ADDING THAT KEY STUDENT DEMANDS NOW INCLUDED THE RESIGNATION OF ABRI COMMANDER WIRANTO. MUSLIM LEADER

ABDURRAHMAN WAHID TOOK A MORE CONCILIATORY LINE. ACCORDING TO A NOVEMBER 15 MEDIA REPORT, WAHID SAID, "WE ARE TRYING TO FIND A WAY TO COMPROMISE WITH THE MILITARY BECAUSE THE MILITARY ALSO BELONGS TO US AS A NATION, WE SHOULD NOT LET ANY EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT THEM SUCCEED."

9. (C) ACCORDING TO A CLOSE AIDE TO OPPOSITION LEADER MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S NOVEMBER 14 SPEECH (REF A) IS BEING PERCEIVED AS HAVING COMPLICATED EFFORTS TO INAUGURATE A RECONCILIATION DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND DISAFFECTED STUDENTS, OPPOSITION LEADERS AND OTHER SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING AND ENDORSING THE PRESIDENT'S CALL FOR FIRMNESS IN DEALING WITH RIOTING, MEGAWATI AIDE [redacted] B1
[redacted] SAID THAT HABIBIE'S "SEARCH FOR A SCAPEGOAT" HAD B1
POLARIZED THE SITUATION FURTHER. HE CONTENDED THAT HABIBIE'S ALLEGATIONS THAT "CERTAIN GROUPS" WERE ENGAGED IN UNLAWFUL, ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITIES WHICH "MUST BE CATEGORIZED AS REBELLION," MIGHT BE A PRELUDE TO INVESTIGATIONS THAT "IGNORED THE REAL ISSUES." HE CITED THE LATTER AS INCLUDING, THE ROLE OF ABRI IN SOCIETY, PURSUING SOEHARTO-ERA CORRUPTION AND SETTING FAIR GROUND RULES FOR THE 1999 ELECTIONS.

10. [redacted] SAID THAT THE "GROUP OF FOUR (MEGAWATI, B1
ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, AMIEN RAIS AND THE SULTAN OF JOGJAKARTA), WHICH A WEEK AGO HAD ISSUED A CAUTIOUS ENDORSEMENT OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY, WERE ATTEMPTING TO OPEN A "RECONCILIATION DIALOGUE" INVOLVING THEMSELVES, THE GOVERNMENT AND STUDENTS. THAT DIALOGUE, HE SAID, SHOULD

INCLUDE THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF AND A "SENIOR MILITARY FIGURE." THAT MILITARY FIGURE, HE ADDED MIGHT NOT BE WIRANTO, INASMUCH AS RAIS, STUDENT GROUPS AND OTHERS HAD ALREADY CALLED FOR WIRANTO'S RESIGNATION. [redacted] SAID B1
THAT, THUS FAR, THE GROUP OF FOUR WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY "GETTING THROUGH TO HABIBIE," BECAUSE, [redacted] CLAIMED, B1
THE MILITARY CLOSE TO HIM ARE NOT SEEKING DIALOGUE.

[redacted] B1

B1

SEARCH FOR CULPRITS OR SCAPEGOATS?
---

12. (U) THERE CONTINUES TO BE CONFUSION OVER WHAT ACTIONS THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACTUALLY TAKEN AGAINST THOSE WHOM IT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4047

PAGE 01 JAKART 05876 03 OF 03 151108Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W

----------81E4A3 151108Z /38

O 151042Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4571
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 005876

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, CASC, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: AN UNCERTAIN CALM RETURNS TO JAKARTA, 11/15

REF: A) JAKARTA 5780, B) JAKARTA 5858; C) JAKARTA 5860

SUSPECTS OF HAVING ENGAGED IN "REBELLION," AS ALLEGED BY

CONFIDENTIAL

HABIBIE. TWO MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT, A GROUP OF RETIRED MEMBERS OF ABRI, HAVE BEEN DETAINED AS REPORTED REF A. IN ADDITION, THE LAWYER FOR THE HEAD OF THE NATIONAL FRONT, KEMIL IDRIS, HAS TOLD A RELIABLE JOURNALIST THAT HE HAS SEEN "WARRANTS" (NOT MERELY INVESTIGATORY SUMMONSES) FOR THE ARREST OF IDRIS AND POPULAR EX-JAKARTA GOVERNOR AND MARINE COMMANDER ALI SADIKIN.

B1

PRESS ACCOUNTS CLAIM THAT POLITICAL ACTIVISTS SRI BINTANG PAMUNGAS AND HIS BROTHER SRI EDDY MIGHT ALSO BE SUMMONED. OTHER RUMORS SUGGEST THAT FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER EDI SUDRAJAT AND OTHERS MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED IN MACHINATIONS WHICH LED TO UNREST.

13. (C) COMMENT: THERE ARE CONFLICTING THEORIES AND ANALYSES ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION. MOST PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE SITUATION IS MORE POLARIZED NOW THAN BEFORE THE MPR. THE ASSAULT ON ATMA JAYA HAS CLEARLY BEEN A FACTOR. ANOTHER FACTOR MAY BE THE REALITY THAT THE MPR SPECIAL SESSION HAS NOW PRODUCED A CONCRETE (HABIBIE/GOLKAR) VISION OF THE POLITICAL FUTURE WHICH STUDENTS AND SOME OTHERS DO NOT SHARE. OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMPROMISE WITH STUDENT AND OTHERS' DEMANDS FOR FASTER-PACED REFORM VIA THE MPR SESSION APPEAR MORE LIMITED AS

CONFIDENTIAL

MANY KEY DECISIONS ARE EFFECTIVELY NOW SET.

14. (C) IT IS A HOPEFUL SIGN THAT SENIOR OPPOSITION FIGURES ARE SEEKING TO PROMOTE A RECONCILIATION DIALOGUE INVOLVING BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND STUDENT PERSPECTIVES. THE EXTENT TO WHICH SENTIMENT FOR SUCH A DIALOGUE EXISTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND AMONG STUDENTS IS A KEY UNKNOWN.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E76

RELEASED IN PART
B6

PAGE 01 JAKART 05899 01 OF 03 161303Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W				

----------822A5A 161304Z /38

O 161237Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4594
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005899

KUALA LUMPUR FOR A/S ROTH AND A/S KOH

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/03
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINS, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENTS: WHERE FROM HERE?

REF: (A) JAKARTA 5876, (B) JAKARTA 5870, (C) JAKARTA 5844,
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05899 01 OF 03 161303Z
(D) JAKARTA 5825, (E) JAKARTA 5798

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (U) SUMMARY: MOST INDONESIAN STUDENTS HAVE RETURNED TO CAMPUS FOLLOWING A TUMULTUOUS WEEK OF DEMONSTRATIONS (REFTELS) THAT CLIMAXED IN THE BLOODY INCIDENT AT JAKARTA'S ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY NOVEMBER 13, THE ENORMOUS GATHERING AT PARLIAMENT NOVEMBER 14, AND LOOTING AND VIOLENCE THAT OCCURRED ACROSS JAKARTA ON THE SAME DAY (REFTELS). STUDENTS STAGED SEVERAL SMALL TO MEDIUM-SIZED DEMONSTRATIONS ON NOVEMBER 16. NO MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS ARE ANTICIPATED FOR NOVEMBER 17. THE STUDENT MOVEMENT, WHICH IS OVERWHELMINGLY OPPOSED TO THE HABIBIE REGIME, IS DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS, THOSE THAT WANT TO FORCE THE REGIME FROM POWER AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200502473

ESTABLISH A "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT," AND THOSE THAT WANT TO KEEP PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO PURSUE REFORMS AND CONDUCT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. STUDENTS ALSO DISAGREE ON TACTICS - SOME WANT TO CONTINUE LARGE DEMONSTRATIONS UNTIL THEIR DEMANDS ARE MET, WHILE OTHERS ARE STRESSING THE NEED TO AVOID ANARCHY. DESPITE THESE DIFFERENCES, THE STUDENT MOVEMENT IS UNITED IN ITS CALL FOR DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO TO RESIGN, FOR THE MILITARY (ABRI) TO WITHDRAW FROM POLITICS, AND FOR FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TO BE PROSECUTED. END SUMMARY.

DEMONSTRATIONS 11/16 ATTACK WIRANTO, COMMEMORATE THE DEAD
---

3. (U) SEVERAL HUNDRED STUDENTS GATHERED AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY TO COMMEMORATE THOSE WHO DIED IN LAST WEEK'S DEMONSTRATIONS (REFTELS) AND THOSE GUNNED DOWN AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ITSELF ON MAY 12. ON

A STAGE DECORATED WITH DOZENS OF FLOWER ARRANGEMENTS, SPEAKERS LAMENTED THE DEATHS OF THEIR COLLEAGUES, CALLED ON WIRANTO TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CONDUCT OF SECURITY FORCES DURING THE DEMONSTRATIONS, AND REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO POLITICAL REFORM. THE CROWD WAS COMPOSED OF STUDENTS FROM TRISAKTI, THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA, AND A NUMBER OF OTHER LOCAL COLLEGES. AT LEAST A THOUSAND STUDENTS GATHERED AT ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY, THE EPICENTER OF LAST WEEK'S DEMONSTRATIONS, TO COMMEMORATE THE DEAD FROM LAST WEEK.

4. (C) ONE KILOMETER TO THE WEST, 50-100 STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN FRONT OF THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING, THE SITE OF LAST WEEK'S SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY UNDER CLOSE SURVEILLANCE BY MILITARY FORCES AND POLICE. CONTACTS REPORT THAT FOUR BUSLOADS OF STUDENTS TRYING TO REACH THE SITE WERE HALTED BY SECURITY FORCES. ACROSS TOWN, ABOUT TWO HUNDRED STUDENTS FROM THE MUSLIM STUDENTS UNION (HMI) STAGED A RALLY CALLING FOR DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO TO RESIGN AND FOR THE MILITARY TO WITHDRAW FROM POLITICS. NO STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE SCALE OF LAST WEEK WERE EXPECTED NOVEMBER 16, OR NOVEMBER 17 - AN ISLAMIC HOLIDAY. SOME STUDENT CONTACTS ASSERTED TO POLOFF THAT THEY WOULD RESUME DEMONSTRATIONS ON NOVEMBER 18, BUT PROVIDED FEW DETAILS.

PRO-GOVERNMENT STUDENTS
---

5. (C) IN THE BROADEST TERMS, THE INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT CAN BE DIVIDED INTO THREE MAIN CAMPS: THOSE THAT SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS VISION OF REFORM, THOSE THAT OPPOSE THE GOVERNMENT BUT WANT IT REPLACED FOLLOWING FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS,

AND THOSE THAT ARE PRESSING FOR THE IMMEDIATE REPLACEMENT OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05899 01 OF 03 161303Z
EXISTING GOVERNMENT WITH A TRANSITIONAL REGIME. IN RELATIVE TERMS, PRO-GOVERNMENT STUDENTS ARE FEW AND FAR BETWEEN. AMONG THE GROUPS MOST COMMONLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRO-GOVERNMENT CAMP ARE THE PANCASILA YOUTH (PEMUDA PANCASILA), AND VARIOUS YOUTH AND STUDENT GROUPS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RULING GOLKAR PARTY. PANCASILA AND GOLKAR YOUTH GROUPS SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT, ABRI'S DUAL FUNCTIONS (DWIFUNGSI) IN DEFENSE AND POLITICS, AND REFORMS DEFINED AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE RULING ELITE. NEITHER PANCASILA NOR GOLKAR YOUTH PLAYED MAJOR ROLE IN THE EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 9-14.

6. (C) A SECOND GROUPING OF "PRO-GOVERNMENT" ISLAMIST YOUTH GROUPS UNDER THE BANNER OF KISDI (THE COMMITTEE FOR WORLD ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY), INCLUDING FURKON, ACTED AS "SECURITY VOLUNTEERS" (PAM SWARSKA) AUGMENTING GOI SECURITY FOR THE MPR. THE VOLUNTEERS WERE INVOLVED IN SOME SCUFFLES WITH ANTI-GOVERNMENT STUDENTS, PARTICULARLY ON NOVEMBER 10 (REF D). (NOTE: MOST OF THE ISLAMIST SECURITY VOLUNTEERS DEPLOYED IN JAKARTA NOVEMBER 10-13 CAME FROM POOR, RURAL BACKGROUNDS AND APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN RECRUITED ESPECIALLY TO COUNTER BALANCE ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATORS. MANY DID NOT APPEAR TO BE STRONGLY IDENTIFIED WITH A PARTICULAR POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. END NOTE.) WHILE THE KISDI-ORIENTED YOUTH GROUPS SHARE THE PANCASILA/GOLKAR YOUTHS' OPPOSITION TO THE STUDENT MOVEMENTS' LIBERAL/DEMOCRATIC ASPIRATIONS, OTHER ASPECTS OF THEIR AGENDA, PARTICULARLY THEIR FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMIC VISION FOR INDONESIAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS, IS SHARPLY AT ODDS WITH GOLKAR AND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 05899 02 OF 03 161304Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W				

----------822A65 161304Z /38
O 161237Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4595
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 005899

KUALA LUMPUR FOR A/S ROTH AND A/S KOH

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/03
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINS, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENTS: WHERE FROM HERE?

REF: (A) JAKARTA 5876, (B) JAKARTA 5870, (C) JAKARTA 5844,

PANCASILA YOUTH GROUPS. PRO-GOVERNMENT STUDENTS CAN NOT BE RULED OUT OF THE EQUATION. HOWEVER, THEY ARE ECLIPSED IN NUMERICAL TERMS BY ANTI-GOVERNMENT STUDENT GROUPS, WHO FORM THE IDEOLOGICAL BACKBONE OF THE INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT.

STUDENT OPPOSITION: COMMON GROUND
---

6. (C) MOST POLITICALLY ACTIVE INDONESIAN STUDENTS, WHO COLLECTIVELY COMPOSE THE "STUDENT MOVEMENT" OPPOSE THE HABIBIE REGIME. THEY PERCEIVE THE HABIBIE REGIME AS ILLEGITIMATE AND COMPOSED OF CORRUPT AND AUTHORITARIAN CRONIES OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. THE STUDENT MOVEMENT IS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO THE "DWIFUNGSI DOCTRINE" WHICH GRANTS ABRI A MAJOR ROLE IN POLITICS. STUDENTS ARE ALSO UNITED IN THEIR VOCIFEROUS CALLS FOR FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TO BE PROSECUTED FOR CORRUPTION AND HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED DURING HIS TENURE. A NEW PLANK IN THE STUDENTS' PLATFORM, WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BROAD APPEAL, IS THE REMOVAL OF DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO. STUDENTS HOLD WIRANTO RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATHS OF AT LEAST 12 OF THEIR COLLEAGUES WHEN SECURITY FORCES OPENED FIRE ON DEMONSTRATORS AT THE ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY NOVEMBER 13. (NOTE: NOT ALL OF THE 12 DIED FROM GUNSHOT WOUNDS - SOME DIED FROM HEAD INJURIES CAUSED BY BATON BLOWS. END NOTE.)

STUDENT OPPOSITION: FAULT LINES
---

7. (C) THE STUDENT MOVEMENT IS DIVIDED OVER NEAR-TERM GOALS AND TACTICS. TWO MAIN CAMPS HAVE EMERGED: THOSE WANT TO TOPPLE THE HABIBIE REGIME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, TO BE REPLACED BY AN AMORPHOUS

"TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT", AND THOSE THAT WANT TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT DEMOCRATICREFORMS IN A QUICK BUT ORDERLY FASHION. STUDNT ACTIVISTS ALSO DIFFER SHARPLY ON TACTICS. DURING THE NOVEMBER 13 DEMONSTRATIONS, THE HARDER-LINE CAMP WAS DETERMINED TO OCCUPY THE PARLIAMENTARY BUILDINGS, AS STUDENTS DID IN MAY. THE MORE MODERATE STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS DID NOT ASPIRE TO OCCUPY THE PARLIAMENTARY COMPLEX AND TOPPLE THE GOVERNMENT. THEY WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE CLOSE TO THE PARLIAMENT IN ORDER TO BE AS VISIBLE AS POSSIBLE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE MPR'S AGENDA.

THE HARD LINERS: FORKOT, FAMRUD, AND AKRAB
---

8. (C) STUDENT ACTIVISTS WHO TAKE A HARDER LINE ON THE HABIBIE AND GOVERNMENT AND THE PACE OF REFORM HAVE BEEN ONE OF THE MAJOR FORCES GUIDING THE STUDENT MOVEMENT SINCE SEPTEMBER. THE HARDER-LINE GROUPS WANT PRESIDENT HABIBIE REMOVED FROM OFFICE AND THE PARLIAMENT DISSOLVED. THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT, CONSIDERED ILLEGITIMATE BECAUSE OF ITS LINKS WITH THE SOEHARTO REGIME, WOULD BE REPLACED BY A "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT." THE NATURE OF THE "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT" HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DEBATE AMONG DIFFERENT ACTIVISTS.

9. (C) SOME SUPPORT THE IDEA OF A "PRESIDIUM" - A COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURES SUCH AS MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, AMIEN RAIS, AND ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (GUS DUR) - THAT WOULD GOVERN THE COUNTRY PRIOR TO ELECTIONS. NOTE: EVEN AMONG THOSE WHO PUT FORWARD THE IDA OF A PRESIDIUM, THERE IS NO CONSENSUS ON WH WOULD BE GOOD CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE PRESIDIUM. END NOTE.) ANOTHER PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY THOSE IN THE HARDER-LINE CAMP IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT BE DISMANTLED AND REPLACED

CONFIDENTIAL

BY INDONESIAN PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES (KRI/KOMITE RAKYAT INDONESIA). AS ADVOCATES HAVE DESCRIBED THE IDEA TO POLOFF, KRI'S WOULD BE ELECTED AT THE LOCAL LEVEL WHO WOULD IN TURN ELECT NATIONAL KRI'S - CREATING A "GRASS ROOTS/BOTTOM UP" DEMOCRACY.

10. (C) THE MOST PROMINENT OF THE HARDLINE STUDENT GROUPS IS FORKOT (FORUM KOTA/CITY FORUM), A CONSORTIUM OF ACTIVISTS DRAWN FROM VARIOUS UNIVERSITIES IN JAKARTA. (NOTE: FORKOT HAS ALSO EMERGED IN SURABAYA. END NOTE.) FORKOT GAINED ATTENTION IN SEPTEMBER WHEN IT STAGED AN ALL-NIGHT ANTI-GOVERNMENT VIGIL AT THE PARLIAMENT DURING WHICH TWO DEMONSTRATORS WERE ALLEGEDLY STABBED BY POLICE. THE GROUP APPEARED TO HAVE LOST MOMENTUM IN OCTOBER WHEN SECURITY

OFFICIALS PUBLICLY ACCUSED THEM OF HAVING LINKS WITH THE OUTLAWED AND EXTINCT INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI). ALTHOUGH FORKOT ISSUED PRESS RELEASES VIGOROUSLY DENYING THE ALLEGATION, OTHER STUDENT LEADERS DISTANCED THEMSELVES FROM FORKOT AND THE GROUP WENT INTO A PERIOD OF DORMANCY.

11. (C) FORKOT REEMERGED IN LATE OCTOBER WHEN IT CO-ORGANIZED A DEMONSTRATION OF MORE THAN 5,000 STUDENTS AT THE PARLIAMENT IN LATE OCTOBER. FORKOT HAS PROVEN ITS ABILITY TO DELIVER LARGE NUMBERS TO DEMONSTRATIONS ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS. (NOTE: WHILE FORKOT MEMBERS ARE DISINCLINED TO SUPPORT ANY OF THE MOST PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURES, THEY HAVE EXPRESSED TO POLOFF THEIR PARTICULAR DISDAIN FOR AMIEN RAIS, WHO WAS AMONG THOSE WHO ACCUSED FORKOT OF BEING A COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. END NOTE.) (NOTE: FORKOT MAY HAVE LINKS TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 05899 03 OF 03 161304Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W				

----------822A68 161304Z /38

O 161237Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4596
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 005899

KUALA LUMPUR FOR A/S ROTH AND A/S KOH

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/03
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINS, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENTS: WHERE FROM HERE?

REF: (A) JAKARTA 5876, (B) JAKARTA 5870, (C) JAKARTA 5844,

CONFIDENTIAL

THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD). THEY SHARE THE SAME BASIC POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL TACTICS. END NOTE.) TWO OTHER HARDLINE STUDENT GROUPS THAT HAVE PROVEN THEIR ABILITY TO DELIVER NUMEROUS DISCIPLINED AND MOBILIZED DEMONSTRATORS ARE FAMRUD (FORUM MAHASISWA RAKYAT UNTUK DEMOKRASI\STUDENT-PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC FORUM) (FAMRUD IS A FACTION WHICH SPLIT WITH FORKOT OVER APPARENTLY PETTY IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES) AND AKRAB (AKSI RAKYAT BERSAMA\JOINT PEOPLE'S ACTION.)

"THE MIDDLE PATH"
---

12. (C) SOMEWHAT LOST IN THE GLARE OF THE HARDER-LINE STUDENTS ARE THE MANY STUDENT ACTIVISTS WHO CONSIDER THE "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT" AND THE "PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE" TO BE UNREALISTIC AND IMPRACTICAL DEMANDS. THEY WANT DEMOCRATIC REFORMS TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN A MORE MEASURED, ORDERLY PACE. WHILE FORKOT MEMBERS AND OTHER HARD-LINE ACTIVISTS OFTEN MADE THE HEADLINES DURING THE NOVEMBER 10-14 DEMONSTRATIONS, MANY IN THE CROWD WERE NOT THERE TO PUSH HABIBIE AND THE MPR OUT OF THE BUILDING, BUT TO INFLUENCE THE MPR'S AGENDA AND REMIND THE GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WANT REAL DEMOCRATIC REFORM. DURING A NOVEMBER 16 CONVERSATION, [redacted] B6
[redacted] B6
TOLD POLOFF THAT FOR MOST STUDENTS, FREE, FAIR, AND TIMELY ELECTIONS WERE THE TOP PRIORITY. HE SHARPLY CRITICIZED THE DEMAND FOR A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, CALLING IT BOTH UNREALISTIC AND ILL-PLOTTED.

13. [redacted] CLAIMED THAT MEDIA COVERAGE HAD GIVEN TOO MUCH PLAY TO THE HARDER-LINE STUDENTS AND THEIR OVER-AMBITIOUS OR MISGUIDED DEMANDS, AND HAD UNDERPLAYED THE DEMANDS OF THE MORE B6

CONFIDENTIAL

MODERATE, AND HE CLAIMED, MORE NUMEROUS GROUP ADVOCATING "A MIDDLE PATH. [redacted] STRESSED THE NEED TO PURSUE GOALS STRIDENTLY BUT B6
WITH DISCIPLINE, AVOIDING THE UNREST THAT BROKE OUT NOVEMBER 14. WHILE DRAWING A SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN HIS GROUP AND THE MORE MAXIMALIST ELEMENTS, [redacted] MADE A POINT OF EMPHASIZING THE POINTS B6
THAT UNITE STUDENT ACTIVISTS - OPPOSITION TO DWIFUNGSI (AND NOW TO WIRANTO), THE PURSUIT OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, AND THE NEED FOR RAPID POLITICAL REFORM. A GROUP OF STUDENTS WHO CHATTED WITH POLOFF AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ON NOVEMBER 16 ECHOED THESE SENTIMENTS TO THE LETTER.

COMMENT
---

14. (C) LAST WEEK'S MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS FIRMLY PUT INDONESIA'S STUDENTS BACK ON THE POLITICAL MAP. MANY OPPOSITION POLITICIANS NOW CONCUR THAT STUDENTS "HAVE EARNED A PLACE AT THE TABLE", AND WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY DIALOGUE THAT MIGHT TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION. DEVELOPING A FORMULA FOR SELECTING LEADERS WHO CAN REPRESENT THE ENTIRE STUDENT MOVEMENT WOULD BE A FORMIDABLE CHALLENGE. MOREOVER, THERE ARE FEW ACTIVISTS WHO HAVE SUFFICIENT CREDIBILITY WITH ALL STUDENTS TO FUNCTION AS THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B6

PAGE 01 JAKART 05907 01 OF 03 172354Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/021W					

----------82F061 180022Z /38

O 172326Z NOV 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4602
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005907

KUALA LUMPUR FOR A/S ROTH AND A/S KOH
USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/03
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINS, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENTS: WHERE FROM HERE?

REF: (A) JAKARTA 5876 (B) JAKARTA 5870 (C) JAKARTA 5844
(D) JAKARTA 5825 (E) JAKARTA 5798

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05907 01 OF 03 172354Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (U) SUMMARY: MOST INDONESIAN STUDENTS HAVE RETURNED TO CAMPUS FOLLOWING A TUMULTUOUS WEEK OF DEMONSTRATIONS (REFTELS) THAT CLIMAXED IN THE BLOODY INCIDENT AT JAKARTA'S ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY NOVEMBER 13, THE ENORMOUS GATHERING AT PARLIAMENT NOVEMBER 14, AND LOOTING AND VIOLENCE THAT OCCURRED ACROSS JAKARTA ON THE SAME DAY (REFTELS). STUDENTS STAGED SEVERAL SMALL TO MEDIUM-SIZED DEMONSTRATIONS ON NOVEMBER 16. NO MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS ARE ANTICIPATED FOR NOVEMBER 17. THE STUDENT MOVEMENT, WHICH IS OVERWHELMINGLY OPPOSED TO THE HABIBIE REGIME, IS DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS, THOSE THAT WANT TO FORCE THE REGIME FROM POWER AND ESTABLISH A "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT," AND THOSE THAT WANT TO KEEP

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200502473

PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO PURSUE REFORMS AND CONDUCT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. STUDENTS ALSO DISAGREE ON TACTICS - SOME WANT TO CONTINUE LARGE DEMONSTRATIONS UNTIL THEIR DEMANDS ARE MET, WHILE OTHERS ARE STRESSING THE NEED TO AVOID ANARCHY. DESPITE THESE DIFFERENCES, THE STUDENT MOVEMENT IS UNITED IN ITS CALL FOR DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO TO RESIGN, FOR THE MILITARY (ABRI) TO WITHDRAW FROM POLITICS, AND FOR FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TO BE PROSECUTED. END SUMMARY.

DEMONSTRATIONS 11/16 ATTACK WIRANTO, COMMEMORATE THE DEAD
---

3. (U) SEVERAL HUNDRED STUDENTS GATHERED AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY TO COMMEMORATE THOSE WHO DIED IN LAST WEEK'S DEMONSTRATIONS (REFTELS) AND THOSE GUNNED DOWN AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ITSELF ON MAY 12. ON A STAGE DECORATED WITH DOZENS OF FLOWER ARRANGEMENTS, SPEAKERS LAMENTED THE DEATHS OF THEIR COLLEAGUES, CALLED ON WIRANTO TO BE

HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CONDUCT OF SECURITY FORCES DURING THE DEMONSTRATIONS, AND REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO POLITICAL REFORM. THE CROWD WAS COMPOSED OF STUDENTS FROM TRISAKTI, THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA, AND A NUMBER OF OTHER LOCAL COLLEGES. AT LEAST A THOUSAND STUDENTS GATHERED AT ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY, THE EPICENTER OF LAST WEEK'S DEMONSTRATIONS, TO COMMEMORATE THE DEAD FROM LAST WEEK. ONE KILOMETER TO THE WEST, 50-100 STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN FRONT OF THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING, THE SITE OF LAST WEEK'S SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY UNDER CLOSE SURVEILLANCE BY MILITARY FORCES AND POLICE. CONTACTS REPORT THAT FOUR BUSLOADS OF STUDENTS TRYING TO REACH THE SITE WERE HALTED BY SECURITY FORCES. ACROSS TOWN, ABOUT TWO HUNDRED STUDENTS FROM THE MUSLIM STUDENTS UNION (HMI) STAGED A RALLY CALLING FOR DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO TO RESIGN AND FOR THE MILITARY TO WITHDRAW FROM POLITICS. NO STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE SCALE OF LAST WEEK WERE EXPECTED NOVEMBER 16, OR NOVEMBER 17 - AN ISLAMIC HOLIDAY. SOME STUDENT CONTACTS ASSERTED TO POLOFF THAT THEY WOULD RESUME DEMONSTRATIONS ON NOVEMBER 18, BUT PROVIDED FEW DETAILS.

PRO-GOVERNMENT STUDENTS
---

4. (C) IN THE BROADEST TERMS, THE INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT CAN BE DIVIDED INTO THREE MAIN CAMPS: THOSE THAT SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS VISION OF REFORM, THOSE THAT OPPOSE THE GOVERNMENT BUT WANT IT REPLACED FOLLOWING FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, AND THOSE THAT ARE PRESSING FOR THE IMMEDIATE REPLACEMENT OF THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT WITH A TRANSITIONAL REGIME. IN RELATIVE TERMS, PRO-GOVERNMENT STUDENTS ARE FEW AND FAR BETWEEN. AMONG THE GROUPS

MOST COMMONLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRO-GOVERNMENT CAMP ARE THE PANCASILA YOUTH (PEMUDA PANCASILA), AND VARIOUS YOUTH AND STUDENT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05907 01 OF 03 172354Z

GROUPS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RULING GOLKAR PARTY. PANCASILA AND GOLKAR YOUTH GROUPS SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT, ABRI'S DUAL FUNCTIONS (DWIFUNGSI) IN DEFENSE AND POLITICS, AND REFORMS DEFINED AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE RULING ELITE. NEITHER PANCASILA NOR GOLKAR YOUTH PLAYED MAJOR ROLE IN THE EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 9-14.

5. (C) A SECOND GROUPING OF "PRO-GOVERNMENT" ISLAMIST YOUTH GROUPS UNDER THE BANNER OF KISDI (THE COMMITTEE FOR WORLD ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY), INCLUDING FURKON, ACTED AS "SECURITY VOLUNTEERS" (PAM SWARSKA) AUGMENTING GOI SECURITY FOR THE MPR. THE VOLUNTEERS WERE INVOLVED IN SOME SCUFFLES WITH ANTI-GOVERNMENT STUDENTS, PARTICULARLY ON NOVEMBER 10 (REF D). (NOTE: MOST OF THE ISLAMIST SECURITY VOLUNTEERS DEPLOYED IN JAKARTA NOVEMBER 10-13 CAME FROM POOR, RURAL BACKGROUNDS AND APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN RECRUITED ESPECIALLY TO COUNTER BALANCE ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATORS. MANY DID NOT APPEAR TO BE STRONGLY IDENTIFIED WITH A PARTICULAR POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. END NOTE.) WHILE THE KISDI-ORIENTED YOUTH GROUPS SHARE THE PANCASILA/GOLKAR YOUTHS' OPPOSITION TO THE STUDENT MOVEMENTS' LIBERAL/DEMOCRATIC ASPIRATIONS, OTHER ASPECTS OF THEIR AGENDA, PARTICULARLY THEIR FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMIC VISION FOR INDONESIAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS, IS SHARPLY AT ODDS WITH GOLKAR AND PANCASILA YOUTH GROUPS. PRO-GOVERNMENT STUDENTS CAN NOT BE RULED OUT OF THE EQUATION. HOWEVER, THEY ARE ECLIPSED IN NUMERICAL TERMS BY ANTI-GOVERNMENT STUDENT GROUPS, WHO FORM THE IDEOLOGICAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 05907 02 OF 03 172353Z

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/020W						

----------82F054 180021Z /38

O 172326Z NOV 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4603
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 005907

KUALA LUMPUR FOR A/S ROTH AND A/S KOH
USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/03
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINS, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENTS: WHERE FROM HERE?

REF: (A) JAKARTA 5876 (B) JAKARTA 5870 (C) JAKARTA 5844
BACKBONE OF THE INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05907 02 OF 03 172353Z

STUDENT OPPOSITION: COMMON GROUND

5. (C) MOST POLITICALLY ACTIVE INDONESIAN STUDENTS, WHO COLLECTIVELY COMPOSE THE "STUDENT MOVEMENT" OPPOSE THE HABIBIE REGIME. THEY PERCEIVE THE HABIBIE REGIME AS ILLEGITIMATE AND COMPOSED OF CORRUPT AND AUTHORITARIAN CRONIES OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. THE STUDENT MOVEMENT IS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO THE "DWIFUNGSI DOCTRINE" WHICH GRANTS ABRI A MAJOR ROLE IN POLITICS. STUDENTS ARE ALSO UNITED IN THEIR VOCIFEROUS CALLS FOR FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TO BE PROSECUTED FOR CORRUPTION AND HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED DURING HIS TENURE. A NEW PLANK IN THE STUDENTS' PLATFORM, WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BROAD APPEAL, IS THE REMOVAL OF DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO. STUDENTS HOLD WIRANTO RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATHS OF AT LEAST 12 OF THEIR COLLEAGUES WHEN SECURITY FORCES OPENED FIRE ON DEMONSTRATORS AT THE ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY NOVEMBER 13. (NOTE: NOT ALL OF THE 12 DIED FROM GUNSHOT WOUNDS - SOME DIED FROM HEAD INJURIES CAUSED BY BATON BLOWS. END NOTE.)

STUDENT OPPOSITION: FAULT LINES

6. (C) THE STUDENT MOVEMENT IS DIVIDED OVER NEAR-TERM GOALS AND TACTICS. TWO MAIN CAMPS HAVE EMERGED: THOSE WANT TO TOPPLE THE HABIBIE REGIME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, TO BE REPLACED BY AN AMORPHOUS "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT", AND THOSE THAT WANT TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT DEMOCRATIC REFORMS IN A QUICK BUT ORDERLY FASHION. STUDENT ACTIVISTS ALSO DIFFER SHARPLY ON TACTICS. DURING THE NOVEMBER 13 DEMONSTRATIONS, THE HARDLINE CAMP WAS DETERMINED TO OCCUPY THE PARLIAMENTARY BUILDINGS, AS STUDENTS DID IN MAY. THE

MORE MODERATE STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS DID NOT ASPIRE TO OCCUPY THE PARLIAMENTARY COMPLEX AND TOPPLE THE GOVERNMENT. THEY WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE CLOSE TO THE PARLIAMENT IN ORDER TO BE AS VISIBLE AS POSSIBLE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE MPR'S AGENDA.

THE HARD LINERS: FORKOT, FAMRUD, AND AKRAB
---

7. (C) STUDENT ACTIVISTS WHO TAKE A HARD LINE ON THE HABIBIE AND GOVERNMENT AND THE PACE OF REFORM HAVE BEEN ONE OF THE MAJOR FORCES GUIDING THE STUDENT MOVEMENT SINCE SEPTEMBER. THE HARDLINE GROUPS WANT PRESIDENT HABIBIE REMOVED FROM OFFICE AND THE PARLIAMENT DISSOLVED. THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT, CONSIDERED ILLEGITIMATE BECAUSE OF ITS LINKS WITH THE SOEHARTO REGIME, WOULD BE REPLACED BY A "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT." THE NATURE OF THE "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT" HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DEBATE AMONG DIFFERENT ACTIVISTS. SOME SUPPORT THE IDEA OF A "PRESIDIUM" - A COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURES SUCH AS MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, AMIEN RAIS, AND ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (GUS DUR) - THAT WOULD GOVERN THE COUNTRY PRIOR TO ELECTIONS. (NOTE: EVEN AMONG THOSE WHO PUT FORWARD THE IDEA OF A PRESIDIUM, THERE IS NO CONSENSUS ON WHO WOULD BE GOOD CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE PRESIDIUM. END NOTE.) ANOTHER PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY THOSE IN THE HARD LINE CAMP IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT BE DISMANTLED AND REPLACED BY INDONESIAN PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES (KRI/KOMITE RAKYAT INDONESIA). AS ADVOCATES HAVE DESCRIBED THE IDEA TO POLOFF, KRI'S WOULD BE ELECTED AT THE LOCAL LEVEL WHO WOULD IN TURN ELECT NATIONAL KRI'S - CREATING A "GRASS ROOTS/BOTTOM UP" DEMOCRACY.

8. (C) THE MOST PROMINENT OF THE HARDLINE STUDENT GROUPS IS FORKOT (FORUM KOTA/CITY FORUM), A CONSORTIUM OF ACTIVISTS DRAWN FROM
CONFIDENTIAL

VARIOUS UNIVERSITIES IN JAKARTA. (NOTE: FORKOT HAS ALSO EMERGED IN SURABAYA. END NOTE.) FORKOT GAINED ATTENTION IN SEPTEMBER WHEN IT STAGED AN ALL-NIGHT ANTI-GOVERNMENT VIGIL AT THE PARLIAMENT DURING WHICH TWO DEMONSTRATORS WERE ALLEGEDLY STABBED BY POLICE. THE GROUP APPEARED TO HAVE LOST MOMENTUM IN OCTOBER WHEN SECURITY OFFICIALS PUBLICLY ACCUSED THEM OF HAVING LINKS WITH THE OUTLAWED AND EXTINCT INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI). ALTHOUGH FORKOT ISSUED PRESS RELEASES VIGOROUSLY DENYING THE ALLEGATION, OTHER STUDENT LEADERS DISTANCED THEMSELVES FROM FORKOT AND THE GROUP WENT INTO A PERIOD OF DORMANCY. FORKOT REEMERGED IN LATE OCTOBER WHEN IT CO-ORGANIZED A DEMONSTRATION OF MORE THAN 5,000 STUDENTS AT THE

PARLIAMENT IN LATE OCTOBER. FORKOT HAS PROVEN ITS ABILITY TO DELIVER LARGE NUMBERS TO DEMONSTRATIONS ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS. (NOTE: WHILE FORKOT MEMBERS ARE DISINCLINED TO SUPPORT ANY OF THE MOST PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURES, THEY HAVE EXPRESSED TO POLOFF THEIR PARTICULAR DISDAIN FOR AMIEN RAIS, WHO WAS AMONG THOSE WHO ACCUSED FORKOT OF BEING A COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. END NOTE.) (NOTE: FORKOT MAY HAVE LINKS TO THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD). THEY SHARE THE SAME BASIC POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL TACTICS. END NOTE.) TWO OTHER HARDLINE STUDENT GROUPS THAT HAVE PROVEN THEIR ABILITY TO DELIVER NUMEROUS DISCIPLINED AND MOBILIZED DEMONSTRATORS ARE FAMRUD (FORUM MAHASISWA RAKYAT UNTUK DEMOKRASI\STUDENT-PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC FORUM) (FAMRUD IS A FACTION WHICH SPLIT WITH FORKOT OVER APPARENTLY PETTY IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES) AND AKRAB (AKSI RAKYAT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 05907 03 OF 03 172354Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00 /020W	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00

----------82F066 180022Z /38

O 172326Z NOV 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4604
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 005907

KUALA LUMPUR FOR A/S ROTH AND A/S KOH
USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/03
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINS, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENTS: WHERE FROM HERE?

REF: (A) JAKARTA 5876 (B) JAKARTA 5870 (C) JAKARTA 5844
BERSAMA\JOINT PEOPLE'S ACTION.)

CONFIDENTIAL

"THE MIDDLE PATH"
---

9. (C) SOMEWHAT LOST IN THE GLARE OF THE HARDER-LINE STUDENTS ARE THE MANY STUDENT ACTIVISTS WHO CONSIDER THE "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT" AND THE "PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE" TO BE UNREALISTIC AND IMPRACTICAL DEMANDS. THEY WANT DEMOCRATIC REFORMS TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN A MORE MEASURED, ORDERLY PACE. WHILE FORKOT MEMBERS AND OTHER HARD-LINE ACTIVISTS OFTEN MADE THE HEADLINES DURING THE NOVEMBER 10-14 DEMONSTRATIONS, MANY IN THE CROWD WERE NOT THERE TO PUSH HABIBIE AND THE MPR OUT OF THE BUILDING, BUT TO INFLUENCE THE MPR'S AGENDA AND REMIND THE GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WANT REAL DEMOCRATIC REFORM. DURING A NOVEMBER 16 CONVERSATION, [redacted] B6
[redacted] B6
TOLD POLOFF THAT FOR MOST STUDENTS, FREE, FAIR, AND TIMELY ELECTIONS WERE THE TOP PRIORITY. HE SHARPLY CRITICIZED THE DEMAND FOR A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, CALLING IT BOTH UNREALISTIC AND ILL-PLOTTED. [redacted] CLAIMED THAT MEDIA COVERAGE HAD GIVEN TOO MUCH B6
PLAY TO THE HARDER-LINE STUDENTS AND THEIR OVER-AMBITIOUS OR MISGUIDED DEMANDS, AND HAD UNDERPLAYED THE DEMANDS OF THE MORE MODERATE, AND HE CLAIMED, MORE NUMEROUS GROUP ADVOCATING "A MIDDLE PATH." [redacted] STRESSED THE NEED TO PURSUE GOALS STRIDENTLY BUT B6
WITH DISCIPLINE, AVOIDING THE UNREST THAT BROKE OUT NOVEMBER 14. WHILE DRAWING A SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN HIS GROUP AND THE MORE MAXIMALIST ELEMENTS, [redacted] MADE A POINT OF EMPHASIZING THE POINTS B6
THAT UNITE STUDENT ACTIVISTS - OPPOSITION TO DWIFUNGSI (AND NOW TO WIRANTO), THE PURSUIT OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, AND THE NEED FOR RAPID POLITICAL REFORM. A GROUP OF STUDENTS WHO CHATTED WITH POLOFF AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ON NOVEMBER 16 ECHOED THESE SENTIMENTS TO THE LETTER.

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENT
---

10. (C) LAST WEEK'S MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS FIRMLY PUT INDONESIA'S STUDENTS BACK ON THE POLITICAL MAP. MANY OPPOSITION POLITICIANS NOW CONCUR THAT STUDENTS "HAVE EARNED A PLACE AT THE TABLE", AND WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY DIALOGUE THAT MIGHT TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION. DEVELOPING A FORMULA FOR SELECTING LEADERS WHO CAN REPRESENT THE ENTIRE STUDENT MOVEMENT WOULD BE A FORMIDABLE CHALLENGE. MOREOVER, THERE ARE FEW ACTIVISTS WHO HAVE SUFFICIENT CREDIBILITY WITH ALL STUDENTS TO FUNCTION AS THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4935

PAGE 01 STATE 087545 150720Z
ORIGIN P-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/000R

DRAFTED BY:S/S-O:RAYMOND MAXWELL
APPROVED BY:S/S-O:JAMES A MCVERRY
----------3E32E2 150720Z /38
O 150719Z MAY 98 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 087545

TOPOL 8004

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 02700 DATED 14 MAY 98, SENT ACTION SECSTATE TREASURY INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU BEIJING COMSEVENTHFLT ASEAN COLLECTIVE BONN SEOUL BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION.
QUOTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002700

DEPARTMENT FOR MGIDOI

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 087545 150720Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MGIDOI: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/14)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: WIDESPREAD LOOTING AND BURNING OF SHOPS AND MAJOR MARKETS SWEPT OVER JAKARTA ON MAY 14, WITH SINO-INDONESIAN AREAS SUFFERING THE WORST DAMAGE. PLACES WHERE EMBASSY PERSONNEL LIVE WERE NOT DIRECTLY AFFECTED, BUT NEARBY AREAS WERE. SECURITY FORCES DID LITTLE TO INTERVENE. THERE WERE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF SINO-INDONESIANS BEING BEATEN AND KILLED. OFFICES AND SHOPS CLOSED AS LOOTING AND BURNING SPREAD TO VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE CITY, INCLUDING THE VICINITY OF THE EMBASSY. ARMY CHIEF WIRANTO TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY BUT WOULD NOT IMPOSE A CURFEW OR ISSUE SHOOT ON SIGHT ORDERS. EARLY REPORTS CLAIMED THAT STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS, NOW JOINED BY THOUSANDS OF OTHER CITIZENS, WERE MASSING AT VARIOUS POINTS, DETERMINED TO PREVENT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FROM RETURNING FROM ABROAD TO RESUME HIS DUTIES. HOWEVER, AS THE RIOTING INCREASED IN LATE AFTERNOON, UNIVERSITY STUDENTS REPORTEDLY HAVE DECIDED TO REMAIN IN THEIR CAMPUSES BEHIND LOCKED GATES. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH EMBOFFS, PEOPLE ON THE STREETS MADE CLEAR THEIR DESIRE THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO STEP DOWN. THERE WERE RUMORS OF PREPARATIONS UNDERWAY TO REMOVE THE PRESIDENT, BUT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHIEF HARMOKO SAID SOEHARTO'S PLANS WOULD ONLY BE CLARIFIED ONCE THE PRESIDENT RETURNED FROM EGYPT. THUS FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO ANTI-FOREIGN ELEMENT TO THE DISTURBANCES. THE AIRPORT HAS REMAINED OPEN BUT THE MAIN TOLL

ROAD LEADING TO IT HAS BEEN CLOSED. END SUMMARY.

WIDESPREAD LOOTING AND BURNING

3. (C) IN MID-MORNING ABOUT A DOZEN LARGE PLUMES OF SMOKE WERE VISIBLE FROM BURNING COMMERCIAL AREAS, MOSTLY EMANATING FROM PREDOMINANTLY SINO-INDONESIAN AREAS IN NORTH JAKARTA BUT SOON SPREADING TO VIRTUALLY ALL OTHER SECTIONS OF THE CITY. PLACES

WHERE EMBASSY PERSONNEL AND OTHER EXPATRIATES LIVE WERE NOT DIRECTLY AFFECTED, BUT NEARBY COMMERCIAL AREAS EXPERIENCED DAMAGE AND LOOTING. THERE ARE MANY UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF SINO-INDONESIANS BEING KILLED AND RIOTERS ATTACKING HOMES AS WELL AS SHOPS. SUPERMARKETS AND SHOPPING CENTERS IN SOME UPSCALE AREAS, AS WELL AS TRADITIONAL MARKETS AND SHOPS HAVE BEEN ATTACKED BY RAMPAGING LOOTERS, MOSTLY YOUNG MEN. IN MANY AREAS SECURITY FORCES WERE NOWHERE TO BE SEEN OR WERE STANDING BY DOING NOTHING.

4. (C) BY LATE AFTERNOON, NUMEROUS AREAS OF JAKARTA WHERE EMBASSY HAD CONTACTS WAS EXPERIENCING LOOTING. LOOTERS WERE CLEANING OUT STORES WITHIN A FEW BLOCKS OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. LOOTING AND BURNING ALONG GADJAH MADA STREET REACHED TO WITHIN SEVERAL HUNDRED METERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. AN AMERICAN CITIZEN REPORTED FROM THE HILTON HOTEL THAT THE MAIN POLICE STATION OF JAKARTA IMMEDIATELY ACROSS JALAN SUDIRMAN WAS UNDER ATTACK BY MOBS AND POLICE WERE RESPONDING WITH GUNSHOTS. NO AREA OF JAKARTA APPEARED TO BE IMMUNE FROM THE VIOLENCE. CALLERS FROM SINO-INDONESIAN AREAS OF TOWN APPEALED DESPERATELY FOR ASSISTANCE AND SAID LOOTERS WERE ENTERING PRIVATE HOMES. WHILE STREETS IN THE CENTER OF JAKARTA WERE ALMOST DEVOID OF TRAFFIC, TRAFFIC WAS REPORTED AT A STANDSTILL ON ROADS LEADING OUT OF THE CITY TO THE

SOUTH.

5. (C) AT A LATE AFTERNOON PRESS CONFERENCE, MILITARY CHIEF WIRANTO SAID HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO KEEP ORDER IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY, "THE BAROMETER OF SECURITY FOR THE NATION," BUT WOULD NOT ISSUE ANY SHOOT ON SIGHT ORDERS OR ESTABLISH ANY CURFEWS. AT AROUND 5 P.M., THREE TRACKED ARMORED VEHICLES ROLLED PAST THE EMBASSY AND TURNED INTO A NEARBY STREET WHERE STORES WERE BEING LOOTED. POLOFF, WHO WITNESSED THE TANKS PASSING, REPORTED THAT THEY EFFECTIVELY DISPERSED LOOTERS AND BYSTANDERS. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHIEF HARMOKO ATTEMPTED TO DOWNPLAY SOEHARTO'S STATEMENT IN EGYPT THAT HE WOULD STEP DOWN, ASSERTING THAT THE SITUATION WOULD ONLY BE CLARIFIED ONCE THE PRESIDENT RETURNED.

6. (C) WHILE NO AREAS OF JAKARTA APPEARED IMMUNE FROM LOOTING, INFORMATION REACHING THE EMBASSY INDICATED THE FOLLOWING AREAS SEEMED HARDEST HIT:

NORTH JAKARTA
--JALAN GAJAH MADA, GLODOK, KOTA

--TANJUNG PRIOK (PORT OF JAKARTA)

CENTRAL JAKARTA
--TANAH ABANG
--PASAR BARU
--PENCONONGAN
--SALEMBA (NEAR DOWNTOWN CAMPUS OF UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA)

WEST JAKARTA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

--GROGOL, TOMANG (NEAR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY)
--MANGGARAI

SOUTH JAKARTA
--MAMPANG PRAPATAN
--BINTARO/KEBAYORAN LAMA

SUBURBS
--TANGERANG (WEST OF JAKARTA)
--BEKASI (EAST OF JAKARTA)
STUDENTS
---

7. (C) STUDENTS GATHERED IN THE SAME AREAS AS THE PREVIOUS DAY AND THIS TIME WERE JOINED BY THOUSANDS OF OFFICE WORKERS, HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS, AND OTHER RESIDENTS. POLOFF VISITED THE SALEMBA AREA FROM 1100 TO 1300, WHERE MASSES WERE GATHERING AROUND THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA CAMPUS AND SURROUNDING AREAS. A STUDENT INSIDE REPORTED THE CROWD TO BE ABOUT 5000. OUTSIDE CAMPUS, MASSES OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND LOCAL PEOPLE WERE GATHERING. STORES IN THE AREA WERE CLOSED. NEAR THE UI CAMPUS, A POLICE VEHICLE HAD BEEN OVERTURNED AND SET ON FIRE. APPROACHING UI FROM THE SOUTHWEST, CROWDS WERE GATHERED AND SOME LOOTING WAS TAKING PLACE. BYSTANDERS WERE GENERALLY PLEASED ABOUT THE SITUATION, AND MAKING COMMENTS SUCH AS "IT'S GOOD, SOEHARTO HAS TO GO," AND ONE SAID "IF WE CAN'T HAVE CHANGE A GOOD WAY, WE'LL HAVE IT ANOTHER WAY."

8. (C) STUDENTS WHO PLANNED TO MARCH TO THE PARLIAMENT ON MAY 14 HAVE CANCELED PLANS BECAUSE OF THE SITUATION AND ARE REMAINING ON CAMPUS, ACCORDING TO ONE STUDENT LEADER. STUDENTS ARE GATHERED

AT A NUMBER OF JAKARTA CAMPUSES, AND PRESUMABLY ON CAMPUSES AROUND INDONESIA. THE STUDENT LEADER EMPHASIZED THAT THE RIOTING MASSES ARE NOT UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. ACCORDING TO ONE RELIABLE NATIONALIST SOURCE, THREE STUDENTS WERE KILLED BY SECURITY FORCES IN PONTIANAK, WEST KALIMANTAN ON MAY 13. A STUDENT CALLED FROM INSIDE THE UI CAMPUS TO URGE THE U.S. TO CALL THE MILITARY TO TELL THEM NOT TO SHOOT STUDENTS. HE WAS IN A PANICKED STATE AND BELIEVED THAT IF THEY TRIED TO LEAVE CAMPUS THEY WOULD BE ARRESTED AND SHOT BY SECURITY FORCES. HE SAID THAT 145 STUDENTS HAD DISAPPEARED TEN DAYS AGO.

9. (C) MID-MORNING, POLOFF WATCHED TWO GROUPS OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS FROM MANY CAMPUSES, ROPED TOGETHER, MARCH TOWARDS THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA SALEMBA CAMPUS AT ABOUT 11:30 AM. THE FIRST GROUP HELD BANNERS READING "NEPOTISM, CORRUPTION" AND "REFORMATION, REVOLUTION," AND SHOUTED FOR SOEHARTO STEP DOWN. THE SECOND GROUP WAS LED WITH A BANNER PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT FOR REFORM, AND SOME WERE SHOUTING "HANG SOEHARTO." A DEMONSTRATION WAS IN PROGRESS AT THE CAMPUS OF "YAI" ON THAT ROAD, AND STUDENTS BROUGHT A MOCK COFFIN AND EFFIGY OF SOEHARTO TO THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD TO BURN.

JOGJAKARTA
---

10. (C) SURABAYA CONSUL GENERAL, NOW IN JOGJAKARTA, REPORTS THAT THERE WERE TWO MINOR DEMONSTRATIONS IN JOGJA MAY 13. AT ABOUT 1800 LOCAL TIME MAY 13, POLICE ENTERED THE CAMPUS, BEAT SEVERAL STUDENTS AND TOOK SOME AWAY. CONGEN ALSO RECEIVED AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT POLICE FORCED TWO STUDENTS TO THE GROUND AND SHOT THEM.

SURABAYA
---

11. (C) CONGENOFF REPORTS THAT AS OF 1200 LOCAL TIME ABOUT 6000 STUDENTS FROM THE TEACHERS' TRAINING COLLEGE (IKIP), STATE ISLAMIC INSTITUTE (IAIN), JOINED BY HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS, WERE MARCHING FROM THEIR CAMPUSES TO THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE, A SIX-MILE DISTANCE, CARRYING ANTI-SOEHARTO BANNERS. THE MARCH WAS PEACEFUL; 100 POLICE ACCOMPANIED THE MARCHERS. THERE WAS ALSO A SMALL DEMONSTRATION AT SURABAYA'S LARGEST UNIVERSITY, AIRLANGGA, IN WHICH STUDENTS CARRIED OUT A MOCK BURIAL IN HONOR OF THE STUDENTS SHOT AT JAKARTA'S TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY MAY 12.
H:/ECON/SITREP.WP5

USITC VISITORS
---

12. (U) USITC VISITORS [redacted] ARE AT THE HOTEL B6
BOROBUDUR (TEL 62-21 380-5555), NOT/NOT AT THE MANDARIN ORIENTAL FOR THE NIGHT OF MAY 14. THEY HAVE CANCELED THEIR MAY 15 TRIP TO BANDUNG. THEY HAVE PLANE TICKETS TO DEPART INDONESIA APPROXIMATELY 2330 ON MAY 15. PLEASE INFORM THEIR OFFICES.

SPENT FUEL RODS VISITORS
---

13. [redacted] IS SAFE AT THE MANDARIN ORIENTAL (ROOM 805, TEL. B6
325 666). [redacted] B6
ARE AT THE HORIZON HOTEL IN ANCOL (THIS IS ON THE WATERFRONT, TEL. 640-6000 OR 640-7000) TO WHICH THEIR TAXI DRIVER WAS ABLE TO

DELIVER THEM AFTER A HAIR-RAISING RIDE. PLEASE INFORM THEIR OFFICES.

14. (U) NOTE: RESENT BECAUSE ADDRESSEES USCINCPAC AND

COMSEVENTHFLT INADVERTENTLY LEFT OFF ON TELEGRAM.
ROY UNQUOTE ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ9286

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTO0480

PAGE 01 STATE 124316 090146Z
ORIGIN P-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/000R

DRAFTED BY:S/S-O:SPATT
APPROVED BY:S/S-O:CSANDOLINI
----------5217A0 090147Z /38
O 090144Z JUL 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMCONSUL TORONTO IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 124316

TOPOL 10063 PASS U/S PICKERING

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 3641 DTD 08 JUL SENT ACTION
STATE INFO ASEAN COLL CANBERRA TOKYO USCINCPAC
GENEVA RPTD FOR UR INFO.
QTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003641

USCINCPAC FOR AMB. SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/08
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PREL, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: AMIEN RAIS CHARTS HIS POLITICAL COURSE

REF: JAKARTA 3494
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 124316 090146Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 7 JUL 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: AMIEN RAISE, OPPOSITION FIGURE AND LEADER OF THE 28-MILLION "MUHAMMADIYAH," HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY A MUHAMMADYAH LEADERSHIP CONGRESS PROCEED WITH FORMATION OF A POLITICAL PARTY. [redacted] B1

END SUMMARY

3. (U) AMIEN RAIS, LEADER OF THE 28-MILLION MEMBER MUHAMMADIYAH, CONVENED A MUHAMMADIYAH LEADERSHIP CONGRESS JULY 5-7 IN SEMARANG, CENTRAL JAVA. RAIS MET

WITH POLCOUNS IN SEMARANG JULY 7 TO DISCUSS THE CONGRESS AND HIS EVOLVING POLITICAL VIEWS.

[redacted] B1

B1

B1



B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

B1

[redacted] B1

ROY
UNQTE ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ9292

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9292

PAGE 01 STATE 124317 090149Z
ORIGIN P-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/000R

DRAFTED BY:S/S-O:SPATT
APPROVED BY:S/S-O:CSANDROLINI
----------5217C7 090150Z /38
O 090147Z JUL 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMCONSUL TORONTO IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 124317

TOPOL 10064 PASS TO U/S PICKERING

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 03654 DTD 08 JUL SENT ACTION
STATE INFO CANBERRA ASEAN COLL USUN USCINCPAC GENEVA
SURRABAYA RPTD FOR UR INFO.
QTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003654

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/08
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JULY 8 MEETING WITH COORDINATING MINISTER
FEISAL TANJUNG

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 124317 090149Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 8 JUL 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS. REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN A JULY 8 MEETING WITH COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS FEISAL TANJUNG, THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF GUARANTEEING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE SINO-INDONESIAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY, AND OF THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATING THE TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS AND THE RIOTS OF MAY 14. HE ALSO URGED GOI RESTRAINT IN HANDLING THE SITUATION IN IRIAN JAYA. FEISAL ATTRIBUTED THE ATTACKS ON CHINESE TO THE "INJUSTICES" CREATED BY THE SOEHARTO REGIME'S FAVORING OF CHINESE INTERESTS AND NEGLECT OF THE NEEDS OF POORER ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY. (ANOTHER MINISTER TOLD US THE CABINET DECIDED LATER JULY 8 TO FORM A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE RIOTS.) ARGUING THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAD "DONE MORE TO FURTHER POLITICAL REFORM IN 42 DAYS THAN SOEHARTO HAD IN 30 YEARS," FEISAL SUGGESTED THAT HABIBIE "MAY BE NEEDED" TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE FOR FIVE MORE YEARS AFTER 1999. HE REFUSED TO COMMENT SUBSTANTIVELY ON INTRA-GOLKAR CONFLICTS, BUT [redacted] FEISAL MAINTAINED THAT THE SECURITY FORCES HAD MATTERS UNDER CONTROL IN IRIAN JAYA. HE BLAMED A DISGRUNTLED FORMER LOCAL OFFICIAL FOR "MASTERMINDING" RECENT DISTURBANCES. END SUMMARY. B1

3. (C) THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED HOPE THAT INDONESIA'S ECONOMY COULD RECOVER QUICKLY AND ALLUDED TO THE USG'S POSITIVE REACTION TO THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT'S RELEASE OF SOME POLITICAL PRISONERS AND OPENINGS ON THE LABOR FRONT. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS MUCH CONCERN IN THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE NEED TO RESTORE THE SINO-INDONESIAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY'S CONFIDENCE THAT THEY CAN OPERATE IN A SECURE ENVIRONMENT. ONE PROPOSAL WAS THAT A COMMITTEE

OF DISTINGUISHED INDONESIANS BE ESTABLISHED TO INVESTIGATE THE EVENTS OF MAY 14 AND BEFORE.

4. (C) DENYING ANY REAL ETHNIC PROBLEMS IN INDONESIA, FEISAL BLAMED THE RIOTS ON THE GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR AND THE INJUSTICE CREATED BY THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT'S FAVORING OF THE CHINESE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND ITS NEGLECT OF THE POOR. FEISAL CHARGED THAT THE REFUSAL OF SOME SINO-INDONESIAN BUSINESSMEN TO RETURN TO THE COUNTRY IS NOT BASED ON LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS BUT

UNSPECIFIED OTHER FACTORS. DEFENDING CONTINUING GOI SUBSIDIES IN THE AREAS OF EDUCATION, HEALTH CARE, AND THE 9 ESSENTIAL GOODS, FEISAL SAID THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT WAS FOCUSSING ITS ECONOMIC PROGRAM ON IMPROVING THE LIVES OF THE POOREST ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY.

5. (C) THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THIS PERIOD OF TRANSITION PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE GOI TO CREATE A NEW IMAGE FOR INDONESIA. IT WAS NECESSARY, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOVERNMENT PURSUE A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF THE TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS AND THE EVENTS OF MAY 14. THE GOI'S PROMPT INVESTIGATION AND PUNISHMENT OF THOSE INVOLVED IN RECENT KILLINGS IN EAST TIMOR IS SEEN AS A POSITIVE STEP, THE AMBASSADOR ADDED. FEISAL SAID MILITARY COMMANDER WIRANTO HAD ORDERED A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF THE MAY EVENTS AND THAT THE RESULTS COULD NOT BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL THE ENQUIRY WAS COMPLETED. (COMMENT: HOUSING MINISTER THEO SAMBUAGA TOLD US SEPARATELY THAT THE JULY 8 CABINET MEETING HAD DECIDED TO FORM A SPECIAL MINISTERIAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE RIOTS AND ASSOCIATED RAPES. END COMMENT.)

6. (C) THE AMBASSADOR ASKED FEISAL FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF PRESIDENT HABIBIE AND THE CURRENT CONFLICTS WITHIN GOLKAR. FEISAL REPLIED THAT IT WAS OF COURSE UP TO THE PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR

CONFIDENTIAL

LEADERS, BUT ADDED THAT HABIBIE MAY WELL BE NEEDED TO STAY ON FOR ANOTHER FIVE YEARS AFTER 1999. HE SAID HABIBIE HAD "DONE MORE IN 42 DAYS THAN SOEHARTO DID IN 30 YEARS" TO FURTHER POLITICAL REFORM. FEISAL AVOIDED SUBSTANTIVELY ADDRESSING THE SITUATION WITHIN GOLKAR, ONLY ASSERTING THAT ABRI WOULD NOT INTERFERE IN GOLKAR AFFAIRS.

B1

7. (C) THE AMBASSADOR REQUESTED FEISAL'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN IRIAN JAYA AND URGED THAT THE GOI SHOW RESTRAINT. FEISAL BLAMED THE PROBLEM IN IRIAN ON "EXCESSES OF DEMOCRACY," A SMALL NUMBER OF YOUTH AND "JEALOUSY" OF EAST TIMOR'S PROSPECTS FOR OBTAINING A SPECIAL STATUS. HE SAID A DISGRUNTLED FORMER LOCAL OFFICIAL HAD BEEN ARRESTED AS THE "MASTERMIND" OF THE DISTURBANCES IN BIAK. FEISAL MAINTAINED THAT THE SECURITY FORCES HAD HANDLED THE SITUATION WELL, USING RUBBER BULLETS ONLY WHEN DEMONSTRATORS

BECAME "DESTRUCTIVE." HE SAID THE SITUATION IN IRIAN WAS NOW UNDER CONTROL. ROY
UNQTE ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0505

PAGE 01 STATE 174337 220503Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001R

174337
SOURCE: KODAKB.022016
DRAFTED BY: EAP:NBOSHOVEN:GRB -- 08/28/98 647-6600
APPROVED BY: EAP:RDEMING
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------6D1956 220506Z /38
O 220503Z SEP 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 174337

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/06
TAGS: AMGT
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL/INFORMAL - DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 21, 1998

PLEASE PASS TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT HYLAND

(U) CLASSIFIED BY EAP ACTING SPECIAL ASSISTANT NANCY BOSHOVEN. REASONS: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 174337 220503Z
1. EAP/J - ROBIN WHITE

(U) JDA MINISTER NUKAGA INJURED IN PENTAGON ACCIDENT: UPON ARRIVING AT THE PENTAGON ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 21 FOR A MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COHEN, JAPANESE MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENSE FUKUSHIRO NUKAGA AND SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY WERE INJURED WHEN THE VEHICLE-CONTROL BARRIER ACCIDENTALLY POPPED UP AS HIS CAR WAS PASSING OVER IT. MR. NUKAGA WAS TREATED AT A LOCAL HOSPITAL FOR A TWISTED ANKLE AND BRUISES AND WAS RELEASED. HIS MEETING WITH SECRETARY COHEN WAS RESCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 21 AT 5:00 P.M. ALSO RECEIVING MINOR INJURIES IN THE ACCIDENT WERE NOBUYOSHI AOKI, MR. NUKAGA'S SECRETARY; RADM FUMLO

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 21 SEP 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 12 JUL 2006 200502473

OTA, DEFENSE ATTACHE OF THE EMBASSY OF JAPAN; CAPTAIN JEFFREY CREWS, EMBASSY TOKYO DEFENSE ATTACHE; JAMES CRANDALL, A DOD SPECIAL AGENT; AND SOLAMAN ABUELHAWA, THE DRIVER. ALL WERE TREATED IN A LOCAL HOSPITAL AND RELEASED.

SECRETARY COHEN VISITED MR. NUKAGA IN THE HOSPITAL TO EXPRESS HIS REGRETS OVER THE ACCIDENT. THE PRESIDENT CALLED MR. NUKAGA TO EXPRESS HIS REGRETS OVER THE INCIDENT. WE HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT SECRETARY ALBRIGHT ALSO CALL NUKAGA TO WISH HIM A SPEEDY RECOVERY.

(U) USTR LETTER ON DEREGULATION: DEPUTY USTR FISHER SENT A LETTER SEPTEMBER 18 TO THE CHAIR OF JAPAN'S DEREGULATION COMMITTEE EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF JAPAN'S DEREG EFFORTS-- TO BOTH STIMULATE DOMESTIC GROWTH AND ALLOW MARKET ACCESS FOR FOREIGN GOODS -- AND FORESHADOWING THIS YEAR'S U.S. SUBMISSION ON FURTHER DEREGULATORY STEPS THAT

WE BELIEVE JAPAN SHOULD TAKE. THE DEREGULATION COMMITTEE MEETS SEPTEMBER 22 AND AGAIN IN LATE OCTOBER; IT EXPECTS TO PRESENT ITS REPORT TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BY THE END OF THE YEAR. MEANWHILE, WE ARE WORKING WITH THE GOJ TO SCHEDULE WORKING-LEVEL DEREG GROUP MEETINGS IN OCTOBER, WITH A VIEW TO HOLDING A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING, CHAIRED BY AMB. FISHER IN HIS HOME STATE OF TEXAS, IN EARLY NOVEMBER.

(U) MIYAZAWA TO RUBIN ON INSURANCE: ON OUR TERMS ONLY: IN A FROSTY LETTER TO SECRETARY RUB IN DATED TODAY, FINMIN MIYAZAWA EXPLAINED THAT THE GOJ WOULD MEET WITH US TO DISCUSS OUR INSURANCE DISPUTE ONLY IF THE USG WOULD CONCEDE IN ADVANCE, IN WRITING, THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DISCUSSION OF JAPANESE COMPLIANCE WITH THE "CLOCK-STARTING" CRITERIA OF THE 1996 SUPPLEMENTAL MEASURES. MIYAZAWA ALSO CLAIMED HE HAD HAD NO TIME TO MEET WITH USTR BARSHEFSKY WHEN SHE WAS IN TOKYO LAST WEEK. SHE TOLD FOMIN KOUMURA THAT MOF'S POSITION ON INSURANCE IS "UNPRECEDENTED? AND "UNWELCOME". THE HARD-LINE STANCE OF THE LETTER MAKES THE LIKELIHOOD OF USTR'S HIGHLIGHTING THE ISSUE IN TARRYTOWN TOMORROW ALL THE GREATER.

(U) BRITISH RATING AGENCY DOWNGRADES JAPAN: LONDON-BASED FITCH-IBCA TODAY CUT JAPAN'S SOVEREIGN DEBT RATING TO BELOW TOP GRADE, CITING THE "WEAK AND DETERIORATING BANKING SYSTEM, HESITANT POLICY RESPONSES, ... AND MOUNTING PUBLIC DEBT." MOODY'S PUT JAPAN'S TRIPLE-A RATING UNDER REVIEW SOME WEEKS AGO, BUT HAS NOT ANNOUNCED THE RESULTS. S&P MEANWHILE HAS REAFFIRMED JAPAN'S TRIPLE-A STANDING.

2. EAP/RSP - PAM SLUTZ

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 174337 220503Z

(U) UPCOMING HEARINGS UPDATED: WE NOW HAVE SIX HEARINGS TENTATIVE OR CONFIRMED BETWEEN NOW AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 2.

CHUCK WILL BE TESTIFYING ON NORTH KOREA BEFORE THE HIRC ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 24.
TWO AMBASSADORIAL NOMINEES, LYNN PASCOE AND DIANA WATSON, ARE TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED TO HAVE THEIR CONFIRMATION HEARING BEFORE THE SFRC ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 25.
SKIP BOYCE HAS AGREED TO TESTIFY WITH DRL DAS GARE SMITH ON BURMA BEFORE A JOINT HEARING OF THE HIRC SUBCOMMITTEES ON ASIA & PACIFIC AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, MONDAY MORNING, SEPTEMBER 28. (DRL IS DRAFTING A SINGLE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT; WE WILL CLEAR. BOTH SMITH AND BOYCE WILL MAKE INDIVIDUAL ORAL STATEMENTS.)
SKIP BOYCE WILL RETURN TO THE HIRC ASIA & PACIFIC SUBCOMMITTEE MONDAY AFTERNOON TO TESTIFY ON CAMBODIA. (WE PLAN A MURDER BOARD FRIDAY AFTERNOON FOR BOTH BOYCE'S HEARINGS.)
YOU TESTIFY BEFORE THE HOUSE RESOURCES COMMITTEE AND THE HIRC ASIA & PACIFIC SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE COMPACTS THURSDAY AFTERNOON, OCTOBER 1. (WE HAVE SCHEDULED A MURDER BOARD FOR THAT MORNING AT 10:00.)
ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 2, YOU TESTIFY ON CAMBODIA BEFORE THE SFRC EAP SUBCOMMITTEE. (WE HAVE SET ASIDE 4:30 PM THE DAY BEFORE FOR A MURDER BOARD, ASSUMING YOU WANT ONE.)

(U) SFRC VOTE ON AMBASSADORIAL NOMINEES: WE STILL ANTICIPATE THAT THE SFRC WILL VOTE ON THE NOMINATIONS OF WATSON, PASCOE, HECKLINGER AND WIEDEMANN AT ITS FINAL BUSINESS MEETING OF THE SESSION, TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 174337 220503Z

SEPTEMBER 29. CURRENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT ALL FOUR ARE LIKELY TO BE REPORTED FAVORABLY TO THE FLOOR

(U) FIRST WORD OF RECESS CODELS: JIM BEIRNE TOLD EMIL SKODEN AND DAVE THAT HE IS HOPING THAT SEN. MURKOWSKI WILL TRAVEL TO TAIWAN AND ONE OR TWO LOCATIONS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS IN NOVEMBER. HE HOPES THAT OTHER SENATORS, SUCH AS CRAIG THOMAS, MIGHT ACCOMPANY MURKOWEKI. JIM ALSO EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN HAVING MURKOWSKI GO TO AUSTRALIA, BUT HE SAID THAT WOULD BE IN JANUARY IF IT HAPPENS DURING THE UPCOMING RECESS.

JANNUZI HAS SAID IT IS LIKELY THAT SEN. BIDEN WILL TRAVEL TO NORTHEAST ASIA (JAPAN, CHINA, THE ROK) IN MID NOVEMBER.

3. EAP/ANP - EMIL SKODON

(U) NEW ZEALAND: FM MOKINNON WILL ATTEND CAMBODIA AND BURMA MEETINGS: WE GOT WORD THIS MORNING THAT MCKINNON HAS MOVED UP HIS NEW YORK ARRIVAL TO BE ABLE TO ATTEND THE MEETINGS ON CAMBODIA AND BURMA SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW EVENING.

(U) SOLOMON ISLAND'S PM SURVIVES NO CONFIDENCE VOTE: PRIME MINISTER ULUFA'ALU MANAGED A TIE VOTE IN A SPECIAL SETTING OF PARLIAMENT, AND WILL REMAIN IN GOVERNMENT. NOW THAT HE HAS RETAINED POWER, THE PM WILL REPORTEDLY TRAVEL TO THE IME AND IBRD MEETINGS TO SEEK ASSISTANCE FOR HIS ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM. THOSE SEEKING TO TOPPLE HIM WOULD LIKELY HAVE SCUTTLED ULUFA'ALU'S EEEORTS TO PLACE THE SOLOMON'S ECONOMY ON A MORE SUSTAINABLE FOOTING.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 174337 220503Z

(SBU) AUSTRALIA - FISCHER/DOWNER LETTER TO SECRETARY ON WHEAT: DEPUTY PM FISCHER AND FONMIN DOWNER HAVE WRITTEN THE SECRETARY EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR OUR EARLY SEPTEMBER CONSULTATIONS ON WHEAT, BUT REITERATING CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME OF THE U.S. WHEAT DONATIONS TO INDONESIA MIGHT BE MONETIZED, WITH THE PROCEEDS USED FOR A TRADE FINANCE FUND.

(U) PAPUAN POLICE COMMISSIONER: WE HAVE LEARNED THAT PAPUAN POLICE COMMISSIONER IAN PETER AIGILO, WHOM PRIME MINISTER SKATE RAISED DURING YOUR SEPTEMBER 17 MEETING, WILL BE IN WASHINGTON SEPTEMBER 27-DECEMBER 11 FOR FBI-SPONSORED TRAINING IN QUANTICO. AMBASSADOR KARAER RECOMMENDS DS AND EAP CONTACT WITH AIGILO WHILE HE IS IN THE STATE. WE WILL TOUCH BASES NEXT WEEK WITH THE PAPUAN EMBASSY TO EXPLORE HOW BEST TO LINK UP WITH HIM.

4. EAP/PIMBS - JON ALOISI, ACTING

(C) MALAYSIA - 40 ARRESTS, DEMONSTRATORS DISPERSED WITH WATER CANNON: POLICE DISPERSED SEVERAL THOUSAND ANWAR SUPPORTERS TODAY USING TEAR GAS AND WATER CANNONS. THE MALAYSIAN HUMAN RIGHTS NGO SUARAM SAID THAT AT LEAST 34 DEMONSTRATORS HAD BEEN ARRESTED, IN ADDITION TO THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT ARRESTS OF ANWAR AND FIVE OF HIS ASSOCIATES. ANWAR'S WIFE HAS VOWED TO KEEP THE REFORM MOVEMENT GOING, BUT IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THESE PROTESTS

WILL CONTINUE WITHOUT ANWAR AND THE OTHER LEADERS. IN OUR PRESS GUIDANCE WE EMPHASIZED OUR CONCERN THAT ANWAR WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO ANSWER THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM IN AN OPEN COURT. THE AUSTRALIANS REPORTEDLY WENT FARTHER, WITH PM

HOWARD "DEEPLY CONCERNED'1 OVER GROWING AUTHORITARIANISM.



B1



B1

(U) INDONESIA - PORTUGAL/EAST TIMOR: PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR EAST TIMOR FERNANDO NEVES, WHO WILL PARTICIPATE IN NEXT UN-MEDIATED ROUND OF THE MARKER TALKS WITH INDONESIA BEGINNING OCTOBER 6 IN NEW YORK, IS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 174337 220503Z
INTERESTED IN PROVIDING YOU A READOUT IN WASHINGTON OCTOBER 9. WE UNDERSTAND THAT A MEETING ON THIS DATE PROBABLY WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE AS YOU ARE TRAVELING THAT MORNING. WE ARE CHECKING WHETHER AMBASSADOR NEVES MIGHT BE AVAILABLE ON OCTOBER 8. YOU MAY RUN INTO NEVES WHILE YOU ARE AT UNGA AS HE ARRIVES IN NEW YORK THIS AFTERNOON.



B1

[redacted] B1

5. EAP/P - KENNETH BAILES

(U) TED CLARK OF NPR HAS ASKED FOR AN ON-THE-RECORD INTERVIEW WITH YOU TO DISCUSS U.S.-INDONESIAN RELATIONS

SOMETIME THIS WEEK (HIS PREFERENCE) OR NEXT, IF NECESSARY. HE NOTED THAT HABIBIE HAS TAKEN SEVERAL POSITIVE STEPS, INCLUDING ON EAST TIMOR, AND SAID HE WANTS TO DISCUSS HOW THINGS ARE PROGRESSING IN INDONESIA UNDER HIS GOVERNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, HE OBSERVED THAT THERE IS ALSO CRITICISM

THAT THE U.S. HAS BEEN TOO EASY ON HIM AND THAT HE WAS LOOKING FOR OUR RESPONSE TO THAT IDEA. THIS COULD BE DONE BY PHONE, ALTHOUGH I'M SURE CLARK WOULD RATHER SEE YOU (AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE SOUND QUALITY IS MUCH BETTER). I SPOKE WITH JIM FOLEY ABOUT THIS AND HE RECOMMENDS THAT YOU ACCEPT.

MEANWHILE, DOUG WALLER OF TIME MAGAZINE HAS ASKED TO SPEAK WITH YOU ON BACKGROUND REGARDING THE OBUCHI VISIT, PREFERABLY AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING. HE IS IN THE WALDORF (212-355-3000, ROOM 1307) . IN ADDITION, CNN'S FINANCIAL NETWORK HAS ASKED FOR A 5-MINUTE ON-CAMERA INTERVIEW TO DISCUSS THE SAME TOPIC. CNNI WOULD ALSO USE THE SAME MATERIAL ON ITS DAILY ASIA NEWS PROGRAM. I HAVE SPOKEN WITH DAVID LEAVY OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE, WHO IS IN NEW YORK. HE SUGGESTED THAT CNN CONTACT HIM DIRECTLY, AS THE WHITE HOUSE WILL DECIDE TOMORROW HOW AND WITH WHOM TO RESPOND TO SEVERAL SUCH REQUESTS. HE POSED NO OBJECTION TO YOUR SPEAKING WITH WALLER, IF WISH TO DO SO.

6. EAP/K - EVANS REVERE

(U) FOOD AID TO THE DPRK ANNOUNCED: WE MADE PUBLIC TODAY OUR PLAN TO PROVIDE THE DPRK WITH 300,000 MT OF ADDITIONAL FOOD AID IN RESPONSE TO THE 1998 WFP APPEAL. BECAUSE THERE

WAS NO PRESS BRIEFING TODAY, THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION OF WHEAT WAS POSTED IN THE PRESS OFFICE. WE NOTIFIED THE ROK AND JAPAN IN ADVANCE OF THE POSTING.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

(U) TRILATERAL STATUS: THE JAPANESE AGREED TO DO AWAY WITH OPENING STATEMENTS AT THIS WEEK'S TRILATERAL; MEANWHILE, WE ARE FAXING SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THEIR PROPOSED JOINT

ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE GOD EMBASSY TONIGHT (WE ARE FAXING A COPY TO YOU AS WELL). WE HAVE TRIED TO RESCHEDULE THE TIME AND DAY OF THE MEETING -- THE KOREANS HAVE BEEN AMENABLE, BUT TOKYO STATES IT CANNOT CHANGE THE AGREED-UPON SCHEDULE.

[redacted] B1

COHEN

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E122

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9888

PAGE 01 JAKART 00200 01 OF 04 131105Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------965BC5 131105Z /38

P 131056Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5490
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000200

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/09
TAGS: OREP, PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: CODEL KOLBE/BEREUTER'S JANUARY 13 MEETING WITH INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS. REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN A JANUARY 13 MEETING WITH CODEL KOLBE/BEREUTER, INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00200 01 OF 04 131105Z

[redacted] SAID THAT THE COMMISSION WAS EXPERIENCING GROWING CREDIBILITY AS EVIDENCED BY THE INCREASING NUMBER OF APPEALS FROM CITIZENS FOR HELP. THE PARLIAMENT WILL SOON CONSIDER A BILL EXPANDING THE POWERS AND IMPROVING THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE COMMISSION. [redacted] CLAIMED THE COMMISSION WAS LARGELY FREE OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION. ON EAST TIMOR, [redacted] SAID THAT THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO VOTE ON THEIR STATUS VIA A REFERENDUM "AT SOME STAGE." ACCORDING [redacted] THE COMMISSION ALSO SUPPORTED THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF JAILED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO [redacted] DESCRIBED AS A "POLITICAL PRISONER," ADDING THAT XANANA SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A

B1
B1
B1
B1
B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

"BARGAINING CARD." WITH REGARD TO THE RECENT KILLING OF FOUR DETAINEES BY ABRI TROOPS IN ACEH, [redacted] SAID THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE, TRANSPARENT TRIAL. TO DEAL WITH THE ACEH PROBLEM COMPREHENSIVELY, [redacted] PROPOSED A "TRUTH COMMISSION." A DELEGATION OF SENIOR ACEHNESE VISITED THE COMMISSION JANUARY 12 TO WARN THEY WOULD PRESS FOR A REFERENDUM ON INDEPENDENCE UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT "SOLVED THE ACEH PROBLEM (TO INCLUDE TRYING THOSE MILITARY INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE OVER THE PAST DECADE)." [redacted] SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED FACT-FINDING TEAM ON THE MAY RIOTS HAD FOUND "DEFINITE INVOLVEMENT OF MILITARY UNITS IN THE RIOTS" TO INCLUDE SOME OF THE BURNING AND RAPING. THE RIOTS WERE TIED TO THE KILLING OF STUDENTS AND KIDNAPPING OF ACTIVISTS, AS PART OF A LARGER PLAN TO PROTECT THE "STATUS QUO." [redacted] CLAIM THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS FOLLOWING UP ON COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS DREW SOME DISCREET OBJECTION FROM OTHER COMMISSION MEMBERS. [redacted] THE

B1 B1 B1 B1 B1

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMISSION WOULD WELCOME CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE BILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE PARLIAMENT WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE POWERS OF THE COMMISSION. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) CODEL KOLBE, ACCOMPANIED BY AID DIRECTOR, USIS OFFICER AND POLCOUNS (NOTETAKER) MET WITH THE LEADERSHIP AND SELECT MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION JANUARY 13. REPRESENTING THE COMMISSION WERE [redacted] SECRETARY GENERAL CLEMENTINO DOS AMARAL AND FIVE OTHER COMMISSION MEMBERS.

B6

[redacted] OFFERS A TOUR D'HORIZON

B1

---

4. (C) AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF INTRODUCTIONS AND GREETINGS, [redacted] OFFERED A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ENVIRONMENT IN INDONESIA. [redacted] NOTED THAT THE COMMISSION, WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE, WAS IN ITS SIXTH YEAR AND THAT THOSE SIX YEARS HAD SEEN GROWING PUBLIC CREDIBILITY FOR THE BODY. AMONG POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRONT IN 1998, [redacted] NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD LAUNCHED A FIVE-YEAR NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION PLAN. AS PART OF THAT PLAN, IN NOVEMBER, THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) APPROVED A HUMAN RIGHTS CHARTER WHICH, INTER ALIA, CALLED UPON THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) TO LEGISLATE NEW POWERS TO THE COMMISSION.

B1 B1 B1

5. (C) THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION BILL IS INTENDED TO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00200 01 OF 04 131105Z
ELEVATE THE STATUS OF THE COMMISSION BY REINFORCING ITS POWERS AND ESTABLISHING THE COMMISSION IN LAW, RATHER THAN SIMPLY BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE. [redacted] SAID HE HOPED THE BILL WOULD BE PASSED IN TWO TO THREE MONTHS. WITH PASSAGE, THE COMMISSION WOULD BE ABLE TO ACT AS A "HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL ON AN AD HOC BASIS." THE BILL WOULD ALSO EMPOWER THE COMMISSION TO ACT AS A MEDIATOR IN DISPUTES. (NOTE: SEPARATELY, [redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS THAT HE AND OTHER MEMBERS DID NOT WANT TO SEE THE COMMISSION GIVEN THE POWER TO FUNCTION AS A TRIBUNAL BECAUSE COMMISSION MEMBERS LACKED THE JUDICIAL BACKGROUND TO FUNCTION IN THIS MANNER. END NOTE)

B1

B1

6. (C) [redacted] EXPLAINED THAT, IN ADDITION TO HIS DECEMBER-1998 SELECTION AS [redacted] SIX NEW MEMBERS WERE ELECTED TO THE COMMISSION FOR FIVE YEAR TERMS. THEIR SELECTION WAS BY COMMISSION MEMBER ELECTION WITHOUT

B1

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2661

PAGE 01 JAKART 00200 02 OF 04 140014Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------96BF2C 140350Z /38
P 131056Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5491
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 000200

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/09
TAGS: OREP, PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ELAB, ID

SUBJECT: CODEL KOLBE/BEREUTER'S JANUARY 13 MEETING WITH INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE SELECTION PROCESS. IN ADDITION TO 25 COMMISSION MEMBERS, THE COMMISSION HAS ESTABLISHED AN OFFICE IN EAST TIMOR (IN JULY 1996) AND HAS A "CORRESPONDENT" IN IRIAN JAYA AND TWO "CORRESPONDENTS" IN ACEH. THE COMMISSION HAS A STAFF OF

30 ASSISTANTS. [redacted] CLAIMED THAT ALTHOUGH THE B1
COMMISSION RELIES ON STATE BUDGET FUNDING (1.5 BILLION RUPIAH PER YEAR OR ROUGHLY USD TWO MILLION) FOR MOST OF ITS EXPENSES, THE COMMISSION OPERATES FREE OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION. HE ALSO NOTED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE SOURCES, NOTABLY COOPERATION WITH THE UN, WITH THE CANADIAN AND AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND, HE EMPHASIZED AT SEVERAL POINTS, WITH THE ASIA FOUNDATION (USAID FUNDING).

EAST TIMOR

7. (C) REGARDING EAST TIMOR, [redacted] SAID THAT IN 1998 B1
A SPECIAL UN RAPPORTEUR ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE SECGEN'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE (JAMSHED MARKER) HAD VISITED EAST TIMOR. THIS WAS PART OF AN EFFORT TO GAUGE THE ATTITUDE OF THE EAST TIMORESE ABOUT AUTONOMY OR OTHER OPTIONS. "FRANKLY," [redacted] "THE PUBLIC IS LOOKING B1
AT THE POSSIBILITY OF A REFERENDUM AT ONE STAGE. ... THIS IS ONE OF THE ASPIRATIONS THAT HAS DEVELOPED."

8. (C) [redacted] ADDED THAT "WE (THE COMMISSION) ASK FOR B1
THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF XANANA GUSMAO (THE JAILED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER) AND ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. THERE WAS A RELEASE OF SOME POLITICAL PRISONERS TWO WEEKS AGO BUT WE NEED A RELEASE OF XANANA AND ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. WE REGARD XANANA AS A POLITICAL PRISONER AND HE SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A BARGAINING CARD."

9. (C) [redacted] SAID HE SAW A "STAGED" PROCESS FOR EAST B1
TIMOR WHICH WOULD BEGIN WITH WIDE-RANGING AUTONOMY WITH

"THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EVENTUAL REFERENDUM AFTER A PERIOD IF THAT SEEMS NECESSARY." NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOW PROCEEDING ON POINTS WHICH COULD BE AGREED UPON AND NOT ON POINTS WHICH WERE CONSIDERED AS NON-NEGOTIABLE BY EITHER SIDE. WITHOUT ELABORATING, [redacted] SAID THAT B1

NEGOTIATIONS WERE "ADVANCING ON SEVERAL FRONTS."

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
---

10. (U) FOLLOWING [redacted] THE CODEL MEMBERS PRESENTED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS WHICH [redacted] RESPONDED TO IN A SECOND PRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION. [redacted] B1 B1 B1

11. (C) [redacted] SAID THE COMMISSION HAD A BACKLOG OF APPROXIMATELY 4,500 CASES. THERE WAS A 25 PERCENT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CASES BROUGHT TO THE COMMISSION EACH YEAR. WHILE THE FLOW OF CASES WAS WELCOME INASMUCH AS IT SHOWED STRONG AND GROWING FAITH IN THE COMMISSION, THE VOLUME WAS A PROBLEM WHICH THE COMMISSION WAS ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THROUGH COMPUTERIZATION. CASES INCLUDED BOTH INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ONES, MOST OF WHICH (60 PERCENT) DID NOT FALL INTO THE REALM OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BUT RATHER REFLECTED "POOR ACCESS TO THE APPROPRIATE DECISION MAKING BODIES IN GOVERNMENT." THE PRINCIPAL CATEGORIES OF COMPLAINTS WERE LAND PROBLEMS, LABOR ISSUES AND ABRI ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. IN SOME INSTANCES THE COMMISSION SOUGHT ONLY TO SHEPHERD THE CASES TO THE APPROPRIATE OFFICE. OFTEN CITIZENS SOUGHT COMMISSION HELP BECAUSE THEY ANTICIPATED THAT THIS WOULD B1

BRING PRESS ATTENTION TO THEIR CASES, PARTICULARLY WHERE THERE WERE COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OVER ABUSES. THE COMMISSION WAS AWARE THAT IT WAS BEING "UTILIZED" IN THIS WAY, BUT ACCEPTED ITS ROLE IN THIS PROCESS.

12. (C) THE COMMISSION PRODUCES AN ANNUAL REPORT WHICH THIS YEAR NOTED THAT GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS INCLUDING THE MILITARY (ABRI) HAD REACHED A "LOW POINT IN PUBLIC CREDIBILITY." (SEPTEL REPORTS ON THIS YEAR'S REPORT WHICH [redacted] SAID WAS STILL AT THE PUBLISHERS.) B1

13. (C) THE COMMISSION DEALS WITH MATTERS OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE, ESPECIALLY LABOR QUESTIONS. GENERALLY, THE COMMISSION SEEKS TO MEDIATE DISPUTES BETWEEN LABOR AND MANAGEMENT, A ROLE, [redacted] ADDED, WHICH SHOULD BE HANDLED BY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. B1

ACEH

PAGE 01 JAKART 00200 03 OF 04 131147Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------965FE8 131147Z /38

P 131056Z JAN 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5492
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 000200

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/09
TAGS: OREP, PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: CODEL KOLBE/BEREUTER'S JANUARY 13 MEETING WITH INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

---

14. (C) TURNING TO ACEH, [redacted] SAID THE SITUATION WAS VERY COMPLEX. ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSION CHAIRPERSON, "THE KEY TO RESTORATION OF CONFIDENCE WOULD BE THE TRIAL B1

OF THOSE INVOLVED" IN THE JANUARY 9 TORTURE-KILLING OF FOUR ACEHNESE DETAINED NEAR LHOKSEUMAWE. THE TRIAL SHOULD BE IN A "TRANSPARENT AND ACCEPTABLE MANNER." "THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST STEP," [redacted] EXPLAINED, BUT B1
ADDED THAT "COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTIONS" WERE NEEDED. IN ORDER TO GET TO THE TRUTH REGARDING A "DECADE OF ARBITRARY KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCES AND RAPES," IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A "TRUTH COMMISSION," AS IN SOUTH AFRICA. (NOTE: SEPARATELY, [redacted] TOLD B1
POLCOUNS THAT A DELEGATION OF SENIOR ACEH COMMUNITY LEADERS MET WITH THE COMMISSION JANUARY 12 AND HAD SAID THAT THEY WOULD JOIN CALLS FOR A REFERENDUM ON ACEHNESE INDEPENDENCE UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT "SOLVED THE PROBLEM OF ACEH" TO INCLUDE REMOVAL OF COMBAT TROOPS AND TRIALS FOR

THOSE INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE OVER THE PAST DECADE. END NOTE)

15. (C) RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS REGARDING THE CHINESE (SINO-INDONESIAN) POPULATION, [redacted] RECALLED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD ESTABLISHED A "FACT FINDING TEAM" [redacted] THE GOVERNMENT HAS "BEGUN TO REACT TO OUR RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE LAST THREE WEEKS," HE CLAIMED. HE NOTED THEY HAD ACCEPTED THE FINDINGS FOR THE MOST PART, AND HAD SPECIFICALLY ADMITTED THAT "RAPES OCCURRED ON A MULTIPLE BASIS." "THE TARGET WAS THE CHINESE," HE ADDED. [redacted] SAID THAT JUDICIAL PROCESSES HAD BEGUN BUT THE RAPE CASES, BY THEIR NATURE, COULD TAKE A LONG TIME TO RESOLVE. B1 B1 B1

16. (C) THE TEAM FOUND THAT THREE HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS HAD BEEN INVOLVED. THE RAPES ASSOCIATED WITH THE RIOTS

WERE "SYSTEMATIC" ALTHOUGH THE TEAM WAS NOT ABLE TO CONCLUDE WHETHER THEY WERE "ORGANIZED." THE TEAM FOUND "DEFINITE INVOLVEMENT OF ARMED FORCES UNITS IN THE RIOTS." [redacted] ADDED THAT THE ARMED FORCES UNITS' INVOLVEMENT "WAS NOT ACCIDENTAL." THE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WAS, [redacted] "CONNECTED TO A PATTERN OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY, ESSENTIALLY AN EFFORT TO KEEP THE STATUS QUO AGAINST THOSE PRESSING FOR CHANGE, LED BY THE STUDENTS." [redacted] ADDED THAT "IT WAS ALL CONNECTED TO TRISAKTI (THE INCIDENT IN WHICH FOUR STUDENTS WERE SHOT TO DEATH AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ON THE EVE OF THE RIOTS) AND TO THE KIDNAPPING (OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS)." B1 B1 B1

17. (C) [redacted] CLAIMED THAT "MILITARY GROUPS" STARTED SOME OF THE FIRES WHICH ACCOUNTED FOR MOST OF THE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 PEOPLE KILLED (WHO WERE TRAPPED IN BURNING SHOPPING MALLS WHICH HAD DRAWN LOOTERS). "SOME MILITARY WERE ALSO INVOLVED IN THE VIOLATIONS AGAINST WOMEN," [redacted] B1 B1

18. (C) [redacted] CLARIFIED THAT THE COMMISSION DID NOT HAVE SUBPOENA POWER BUT THAT POWER IS INCLUDED IN THE NEW COMMISSION-EMPOWERING BILL TO BE CONSIDERED IN PARLIAMENT. CURRENTLY, THE COMMISSION MAKES RECOMMENDATION FOR JUDICIAL AND OTHER FOLLOW-UP TO THE GOVERNMENT. ASKED IF THE GOVERNMENT DID INDEED FOLLOW-UP ON SUCH RECOMMENDATIONS, [redacted] ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY. (NOTE: SEVERAL CODEL MEMBERS OBSERVED "BODY LANGUAGE" AMONG OTHER COMMISSION MEMBERS SUGGESTING THAT THEY WERE NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH [redacted] CLAIM THAT THE GOVERNMENT B1 B1 B1

FOLLOWED UP ON COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS. PRIOR TO THE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00200 03 OF 04 131147Z
MEETING, POLCOUNS WAS TOLD BY [redacted] THAT FOLLOW- B1
UP REMAINED A PROBLEM, A COMPLAINT EMBOFFS HAVE
FREQUENTLY HEARD FROM OTHER COMMISSION MEMBERS OVER THE
YEARS. END NOTE)

19. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD BROUGHT B1
SOME OF THE ABRI PERPETRATORS OF THE MORE EGREGIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO TRIAL RECENTLY. WHEN PRESSED BY
SEVERAL CONGRESSMAN HE ADDED THAT THE MOST SERIOUS
PENALTY HANDED DOWN RECENTLY (FOR AN "ARBITRARY KILLING
IN EAST TIMOR") WAS 30 MONTHS IN PRISON. HE ACKNOWLEDGED
ALSO THAT ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL TRIED FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSE CRIMES WERE TRIED IN MILITARY COURTS.

20. (C) ASKED WHAT SUPPORT [redacted] WOULD WELCOME FROM B1
THE UNITED STATES, [redacted] AGREED WITH CONGRESSMAN B1
BEREUTER'S SUGGESTION OF A CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION
EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE COMMISSION AND FOR THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9889

PAGE 01 JAKART 00200 04 OF 04 131106Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------965BD0 131106Z /38
P 131056Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5493
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 000200

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/09
TAGS: OREP, PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ELAB, ID

SUBJECT: CODEL KOLBE/BEREUTER'S JANUARY 13 MEETING WITH INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

COMMISSION EMPOWERING BILL IN THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT. [redacted] ALSO NOTED THAT THE CODEL'S INTEREST IN AND SUPPORT FOR THE COMMISSION, AS WELL AS THAT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND U.S. GOVERNMENT GENERALLY OVER THE YEARS, WAS VERY USEFUL. (NOTE: B1

CONFIDENTIAL

EARLIER, [redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS THAT HE THOUGHT THAT QUIET U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE COMMISSION BILL EXPRESSED TO SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WOULD BE USEFUL. END NOTE.) B1

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E133

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0554

PAGE 01 JAKART 04820 01 OF 03 291116Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-01	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	FBO-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W			

----------FD89B8 291116Z /38

O 291042Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0248
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004820

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2009
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ASEC, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: INDEPENDENT FACT-FINDING TEAM
CHALLENGES POLICE VERSION OF SEPTEMBER 24
SHOOTINGS; MORE STUDENTS DIE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04820 01 OF 03 291116Z
REF: JAKARTA 4753

1. (C) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR
PAMELA SLUTZ - REASON 1.5 (C) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS
ACTIVISTS HAVE FORMED AN AD HOC GROUP TO
INVESTIGATE THE SHOOTING DEATHS THAT OCCURRED
NEAR THE JAKARTA SEMANGGI INTERCHANGE ON
SEPTEMBER 24. ARMED WITH DETAILS COMPILED FROM
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, THE TEAM ON SEPTEMBER 27
REFUTED A CLAIM BY THE JAKARTA POLICE CHIEF
THAT THE VICTIMS WERE SHOT BY UNKNOWN
ASSAILANTS DRIVING A CIVILIAN VEHICLE AND NOT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 28 SEP 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2006 200502473

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY FORCES. ON THAT SAME DAY, THE MILITARY'S SPOKESMAN ATTEMPTED TO WALK BACK THE CLAIM, SAYING THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE A "STRESSED OFFICER" COULD HAVE FIRED THE ROUNDS. ACTIVISTS ARE LOOKING FOR MORE THAN A LONE GUNMAN, HOWEVER, AND ARE CALLING FOR SENIOR OFFICIALS IN THE MILITARY, POLICE, AND CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE. MEANWHILE, STUDENTS CLASHED WITH SECURITY FORCES IN LAMPUNG, SOUTH SUMATRA ON SEPTEMBER 28, RESULTING IN AT LEAST ONE -- POSSIBLY TWO -- DEAD, 10 IN CRITICAL CONDITION, AND 30 OTHERS WOUNDED. ALTHOUGH OFFICIAL COVER-UPS ARE NOT A NEW ELEMENT IN RECENT STUDENT-POLICE CLASHES, THE BLATANT LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY CAN ONLY STOKE STUDENT AND POPULAR DISCONTENT AS THE NEW MPR PREPARES TO MEET ON OCTOBER 1. END

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY.

3. (SBU) AN "INDEPENDENT FACT-FINDING TEAM" (TPFI) HAS SHOT DOWN THE CLAIMS MADE BY JAKARTA POLICE CHIEF NOEGROHO DJAJOESMAN THAT UNKNOWN GUNMEN IN A CIVILIAN VEHICLE (TOYOTA KIJANG) USING RUBBER BULLETS HAD KILLED THE VICTIMS OF THE SEPTEMBER 24 LATE-EVENING DRIVE-BY SHOOTING (REFTEL). THE TPFI WAS FORMED LATE ON SEPTEMBER 24 BY KEY FIGURES FROM THE INDONESIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION (LBH), THE COMMISSION FOR DISAPPEARANCES AND VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE (KONTRAS), THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA (UI), AND THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SCIENCES (LIPI). MANY OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE IN THE SEMANGGI AREA DURING THE SHOOTING.

4. (SBU) TPFI CHAIRMAN HERMAWAN SULISTYO, A LIPI MEMBER, ANNOUNCED DURING A SEPTEMBER 27 PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THE TEAM'S INITIAL FINDINGS DISCOVERED NO EVIDENCE, INCLUDING THE PRESENCE OF A CIVILIAN VEHICLE, THAT WOULD SUGGEST THE SHOOTING WAS COMMITTED BY ANYONE OTHER THAN SECURITY PERSONNEL. INSTEAD, THE TPFI CONCLUDED THAT, DURING THE 0830-0900 PM PERIOD, TWO RANDOM SHOOTINGS HAD OCCURRED AS A CONVOY OF BETWEEN SEVEN AND EIGHT MILITARY VEHICLES DROVE DOWN JALAN SUDIRMAN UNDER THE SEMANGGI BRIDGE. THE FIRST SHOOTING RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF YAP YUN HAP, AN ENGINEERING

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

STUDENT FROM UI. THE SECOND CLAIMED AT LEAST
CONFIDENTIAL

THREE LIVES, NOTED IN PRESS REPORTS AS SALIM, FADLY, AND DENNY YULIAN. THE TPFI DISCOUNTED THAT A CIVILIAN VEHICLE COULD HAVE BEEN LOCATED IN THE SAME LANES WITH MILITARY VEHICLES ON JALAN SUDIRMAN, SINCE THE ENTRYWAYS TO THE STREET WERE CLOSED OFF BY SECURITY FORCES AND SINCE THE CONVOY WAS TRAVELLING THE WRONG WAY DOWN ONE-WAY LANES. THE POLICE ACCOUNT ALSO WAS CONTRADICTED BY DOCTORS FROM CIPTO MANGUNKUSUMO HOSPITAL, WHO SAID THAT MR. YAP WAS SHOT WITH A .22 CALIBER ROUND AND NOT A RUBBER BULLET. THE HOSPITAL SAID IT WOULD STORE THE BULLET FOR SAFE KEEPING.

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0555

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-01	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	OIGO-02	FBIE-00	FBO-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W			

----------FD89BE 291116Z /38

O 291042Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0249
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 004820

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2009
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ASEC, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: INDEPENDENT FACT-FINDING TEAM
CHALLENGES POLICE VERSION OF SEPTEMBER 24
SHOOTINGS; MORE STUDENTS DIE

CONFIDENTIAL



B1

WHAT ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION?
---

7. (SBU) THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (KOMNAS HAM) IS NOT TAKING A LEADING ROLE IN INVESTIGATING THE SEPTEMBER 24 INCIDENT. ASKED BY JOURNALISTS ON SEPTEMBER 27 IF THE GROUP WOULD SUPPORT THE TPFI, KOMNAS HAM CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN SAID THAT THE BODY WAS LOOKING AT WHAT STEPS TO TAKE TO REVEAL WHAT HAD HAPPENED. HE ADDED THAT KOMNAS HAM

CONFIDENTIAL

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

HAD URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO QUICKLY INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT AND BRING RESPONSIBLE PARTIES TO JUSTICE.

DEMONSTRATION IN LAMPUNG TURNS BLOODY

8. (SBU) LOW-LEVEL STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE CONTINUED THROUGHOUT INDONESIA SINCE SEPTEMBER 27, MOSTLY ORGANIZED IN OPPOSITION TO THE DRAFT SECURITY BILL (REFTELS) AND THE DEATH OF YAP YUN HAP. ONE DEMONSTRATION HELD ALONG THESE LINES ON SEPTEMBER 28 IN LAMPUNG, SOUTH SUMATRA ENDED IN A CLASH BETWEEN SECURITY FORCES AND STUDENTS, WHO WERE SUPPORTED BY A LARGE GROUP OF LOCAL RESIDENTS. AT LEAST ONE 23-YEAR OLD LAMPUNG UNIVERSITY STUDENT, YUSUF RIZAL, IS DEAD. ONE LOCAL PRESS REPORT, HOWEVER, SAYS 11 OTHERS -- ALL STUDENTS -- ARE IN CRITICAL CONDITION IN TWO HOSPITALS (ABDOEL MOELOEK AND ADVENT BANDARLAMPUNG). A CONTACT AT LBH TOLD US LATE SEPTEMBER 29 THAT ONE OF THESE STUDENTS DIED DURING THE DAY. AT LEAST 30 OTHERS, INCLUDING AROUND NINE SECURITY FORCES, ALSO WERE WOUNDED AND BETWEEN 13-14 WERE ARRESTED. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT TROOPS USED LIVE AMMUNITION DURING THE MELEE. DETAILS VARY, BUT THE INCIDENT APPARENTLY ERUPTED AFTER A GROUP OF BETWEEN 500-3000 STUDENTS WERE PREVENTED FROM MARCHING TO THE LOCAL MILITARY RESORT HEADQUARTERS. THE

CONFIDENTIAL

STUDENTS REPORTEDLY ASKED IF THEY COULD LOWER THE NATIONAL FLAG FLYING AT A GOVERNMENT BUILDING NEAR THE STANDOFF IN RESPECT FOR THE DEATH OF MR. YAP. THEY WERE ALLOWED TO DO SO, BUT APPARENTLY BECAME "EMOTIONAL" AND BEGAN DEFACING THE BUILDING. THE CLASH ENSUED, GROWING TO APPROXIMATELY 5000 PEOPLE AS LOCAL RESIDENTS TOOK THE SIDE OF THE STUDENTS.

COMMENT

9. (C) ACTIVIST GROUPS APPEARED ALMOST PRE-POSITIONED TO COLLECT AND PACKAGE DETAILS ON THE SEPTEMBER 24 INCIDENT. OUR CONTACTS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THE CONTINUED LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY OVER LAST YEAR'S TRAGEDIES AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY AND THE SEMANGGI INTERCHANGE AS THE MOTIVATION FOR LAUNCHING THE TPFI.



B1

[redacted] B1

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

MORI DocID: 1244947

[redacted]

Top Secret [redacted]

[redacted]

4/9

[redacted]

DCI NIC WL 99-007C

The Warning Committee's
Watchlist

9 April 1999

[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: SEP 2005

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

243 - 243 7

MORI DocID: 1244947

~~Top Secret~~

DCI Warning Committee's Watchlist Summary[a]

9 April 1999



→ **Collapse of government authority in Indonesia:** Calls for insurgency in East Timor and light sentences handed out for killings of student demonstrators in 1998 may fuel new round of protests.



[a]For an electronic version of the DCI *Warning Committee's Watchlist* and related products, see the National Intelligence Council (NIC) home page or the Warning Watch Lists Web site on

MORI DocID: 1244947

Special Warning Notice (U)



MORI DocID: 1244947

Watch Note (U)



MORI DocID: 1244947



MORI DocID: 1244947

Watchlist (U)

[1] The Warning Committee is chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and is composed of representatives of the Directors of the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency; the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. Comments and inquiries may be directed to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning on

[2] The odds of a crisis within each time frame (<1 month, 1-3 months, and 3-6 months) are independently derived and are based upon events, which are judged likely to happen within each time frame. (U)

~~Top Secret~~



~~Top Secret~~

Asia

Indonesia ⇔

Threat: Political, economic, or social turmoil leading to the collapse of government authority

Jailed East Timorese leader Gusmao's call for an insurrection threatens an intensification of violence in the troubled province leading up to July's vote on autonomy. Meanwhile, the light sentences handed out last week to four Indonesian National Police officers for their part in the killing of four students during the Trisakti University demonstrations in May 1998 will probably be viewed as a government whitewash by opposition and student groups, who may use the verdicts to fuel an anti-Habibie campaign as the November presidential election approaches. Demonstrations and unrest may occur in Jakarta on 12 May to mark the first anniversary of the Trisakti killings, which helped bring down former President Suharto. (C)

~~Top Secret~~

[redacted]



[redacted]



MORI DocID: 1244947

Longer Term Warning Concerns (U)



~~Top Secret~~



RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9967

PAGE 01 JAKART 05788 01 OF 03 090843Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/021W					

----------7F84C7 090843Z /38

R 090819Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4465
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005788

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/16
TAGS: PGOV, SCUL, PINR, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: MUSLIM CONGRESS SUPPORTS MPR SPECIAL SESSION BUT DEMANDS GOI PURSUE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS

REF: A) JAKARTA 4710, B) JAKARTA 5775
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05788 01 OF 03 090843Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (U) SUMMARY: A CONGRESS OF ISLAMIC CLERGY (ULAMA) CONVENED IN JAKARTA FOR FIVE DAYS IN THE FIRST SUCH GATHERING SINCE 1945. THE 1,400 DELEGATES OF THE "INDONESIAN ULEMAS COUNCIL" (MUI) ISSUED A DECLARATION SUPPORTING THE UPCOMING SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR-SI) AND THE GOVERNMENT'S SCHEDULE FOR ELECTIONS IN 1999. HOWEVER, IT ALSO URGED THAT THE MPR SESSION REVOKE REQUIREMENTS THAT GROUPS ACKNOWLEDGE THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF "PANCASILA." THE MUI CONGRESS, WHICH WAS EXPECTED TO BE PRO-REGIME, NONETHELESS ALSO DEMANDED INVESTIGATION OF NUMEROUS INCIDENTS IN WHICH MUSLIMS WERE ALLEGEDLY VICTIMS OF MILITARY (ABRI) ABUSE. HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION MINISTERS WERE KEY COMMANDERS IN TWO OF THE HISTORICAL INCIDENTS MENTIONED BY THE CONGRESS. THE CONGRESS ALSO DEMANDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT EXPEDITE INVESTIGATION OF OTHER ALLEGED ABRI ABUSE OF CITIZENS' RIGHTS INCLUDING THOSE INVOLVING NON-MUSLIM VICTIMS. IN REMARKS TO THE CONGRESS, PRESIDENT HABIBIE APPEARED SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR CONCERNS BUT MADE NO SPECIFIC PROMISES. THE CONGRESS PRESSED FOR RESOLUTION OF CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIONS AND URGED THE APPOINTMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION. PRESSURE FROM THE ADMINISTRATION'S IMPORTANT MUSLIM CONSTITUENCY FOR INVESTIGATION OF ABRI ABUSES INDICATES A FAULT LINE WITHIN THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION WHICH ALSO RELIES ON ABRI BACKING. END SUMMARY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONGRESS SUPPORTS MPR AND PRESSES FOR ONE AGENDA ITEM

---

3. (U) AN INDONESIAN MUSLIM CONGRESS (COMPRISING 1,400 MEMBERS OF THE "INDONESIAN ULAMAS COUNCIL" OR "MUI"), WHICH MET IN JAKARTA NOVEMBER 2-7, CONCLUDED WITH A DECLARATION WHICH SUPPORTED THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR-SI) WHICH CONVENES NOVEMBER 10. IT ALSO CALLED FOR BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT OF

THE ADMINISTRATION'S SCHEDULE FOR MAY 1999 ELECTIONS AND SELECTION OF A PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT BY THE NEW MPR IN DECEMBER 1999. THE DECLARATION CALLED ON THE ARMED FORCES TO "SAFEGUARD" THIS "NATIONAL AGENDA."

4. (U) IN THEIR FIVE-PAGE DECLARATION, THE ISLAMIC LEADERS FOCUSED ON ONE OF THE KEY ITEMS ON THE MPR SPECIAL SESSION'S AGENDA RELATED TO A LONG-STANDING OBJECTION BY SOME MUSLIMS REGARDING THE STATE IDEOLOGY, "PANCASILA." (SEE SEPTEL FOR FULL ACCOUNT OF THE AGENDA). THE MUI CONGRESS DECLARATION URGED THAT THE SESSION REVOKE THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE STATE IDEOLOGY, "PANCASILA," BE THE "SOLE ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE" FOR POLITICAL PARTIES AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS. THE CONGRESS WELCOMED THE PROFUSION OF POLITICAL PARTIES BASED ON ISLAMIC TEACHINGS (NOT SIMPLY PANCASILA), CONTENDING THAT THE MANY DIFFERENT PARTIES WERE NOT A HARBINGER FOR DISUNITY AMONG MUSLIMS. (NOTE: THE NEW ISLAMIC PARTIES ARE WRESTLING WITH THE PANCASILA REQUIREMENT, WHICH IN THE EYES OF MANY MUSLIMS REQUIRES THEM TO ABJURE PRIMARY ALLEGIANCE TO ISLAMIC PRINCIPLES. MUSLIM STUDENT

DEMONSTRATIONS SIMILARLY HAVE DEMANDED THE ELIMINATION OF ALLEGIANCE TO PANCASILA AS A LEGAL LITMUS TEST AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES AND OTHER GROUPINGS, REF B. END NOTE)

5. (U) THE MUI CONGRESS DEFEATED A PROPOSAL THAT THE CONGRESS CALL FOR LEGAL RESTRICTIONS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THAT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF INDONESIA BE ONLY MALE MUSLIMS. THE MOVE APPEARED TO BE AIMED AT OPPOSITION LEADER MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI.

CONGRESS MAKES DEMANDS

6. (U) THE MUI CONGRESS, MEETING IN ONLY ITS SECOND NATIONAL CONGRESS IN MORE THAN FIFTY YEARS (THE FIRST SINCE 1945), ALSO MADE CALLS WHICH ECHOED THOSE OF OTHER CONSTITUENCIES IN INDONESIA WHICH ARE PERCEIVED TO BE MORE CRITICAL OF THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION. THE MUSLIM

LEADERS DEMANDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT "RESOLVE OUTSTANDING CASES OF KILLING AND TORTURE," MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY THE 1984 TANJUNG PRIOK ABRI-MUSLIM CLASH; THE RECENT KILLING OF ISLAMIC LEADERS IN EAST JAVA; ALLEGED ABRI KILLING OF CIVILIANS IN ACEH OVER THE PAST DECADE; KILLINGS AT HAUR KONENG IN WEST JAVA; ABRI

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9968

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9968

PAGE 01 JAKART 05788 02 OF 03 090843Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W				

----------7F84CF 090843Z /38

R 090819Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4466
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 005788

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/16
TAGS: PGOV, SCUL, PINR, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: MUSLIM CONGRESS SUPPORTS MPR SPECIAL SESSION BUT DEMANDS GOI PURSUE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS

REF: A) JAKARTA 4710, B) JAKARTA 5775
CONFIDENTIAL

KILLING OF MUSLIMS IN CLASHES AT TALANG SARI IN LAMPUNG (1989); THE MAY RIOTS, THE KILLING OF TRISAKTI STUDENTS AND THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. THE FIVE-PAGE DECLARATION WHICH INCLUDED THESE DEMANDS ALSO CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO SPEED UP INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES (AGAINST NON-MUSLIMS) IN IRIAN JAYA AND EAST TIMOR.

7. (U) HABIBIE, WHO ADDRESSED THE CONCLUDING SESSION OF THE CONGRESS NOVEMBER 7 IN THE STATE PALACE, APPEARED AMENABLE TO THESE APPEALS. HE SAID, "THE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN WAITING TO HEAR ABOUT THESE CASES FOR A LONG TIME. NOT ONLY CASES THAT TOOK THE LIVES OF MUSLIMS LIKE THOSE IN ACEH, LAMPUNG AND TANJUNG PRIOK AND MOST RECENTLY IN BANYUWANGI." SPECIFICALLY REGARDING THE RECENT EAST JAVA KILLINGS, HE SAID THAT HE HAD "ASKED SECURITY OFFICIALS TO INCREASE THEIR VIGILANCE IN FACING ANY THREATS THAT DISTURB PUBLIC LIFE." HABIBIE ALSO NOTED THAT THE EAST JAVA KILLINGS HAD DRAWN INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION.

8. (C) COMMENT: HABIBIE'S COMMENTS MARK HIS FIRST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF GROWING DEMANDS AMONG MUSLIMS (REF A) FOR INVESTIGATION OF WHAT IS SEEN AS ABRI ABUSES METED OUT AGAINST MUSLIMS. HIS PAST RETICENCE HAD DRAWN CRITICISM WITH CLAIMS THAT IF HE WERE NOT PREPARED TO INVESTIGATE THESE INCIDENTS, THEN HIS ADMINISTRATION WAS NO DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S (REF A). THE LAMPUNG CASE POSES PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY FOR HABIBIE

INSOFAR AS HIS MINISTER OF TRANSMIGRATION, LT. GENERAL
CONFIDENTIAL

HENDROPRIYONO, WAS LOCAL COMMANDER DURING THE 1989 LAMPUNG CLASHES. CRITICS CLAIM THE DEATH TOLL AMONG CIVILIANS WAS AT LEAST 246, OR EIGHT TIMES THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT COUNT. SIMILARLY, HABIBIE'S CURRENT MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS, SYARWAN HAMID, WAS A SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL WITH COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES IN ACEH DURING THE 1989-1992 ANTI-SEPARATIST OPERATIONS WHICH LED TO THE DEATH OF SEVERAL THOUSAND CIVILIANS (AS REPORTED IN THE 1993 ANNUAL STATE DEPARTMENT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT TO CONGRESS). HAMID WAS "DANREM" OR AREA COMMANDER IN LHOKSUMAWE. END COMMENT

SPEED UP CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIONS
---

9. (U) THE MUI CONGRESS ALSO CRITICIZED THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION'S INVESTIGATION OF CORRUPTION. SPECIFICALLY, THE CONGRESS EXPRESSED REGRET OVER THE SLOWNESS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION OF CORRUPTION "AT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL DOWN TO THE LEVEL OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS." THE CONGRESS PROPOSED THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION TO SPEED UP THE INVESTIGATIONS. HABIBIE, REACTING TO THIS CONCERN IN HIS OWN ADDRESS TO THE CONGRESS, CONTENDED THAT IT WAS NOT EASY TO UNCOVER AND RESOLVE SUCH CASES QUICKLY. "OUR COMMITMENT TO ENFORCE THE LAW SHOULD NOT FADE ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOW IN THE MIDST OF AN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CRISIS," HE SAID. (COMMENT: MUSLIM STUDENTS AND YOUTH GROUPS HAVE EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO BRING FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND HIS FAMILY TO ACCOUNT FOR ALLEGED CORRUPTION.

MOREOVER, MUSLIM RALLIES WHICH HAVE FOCUSSED ON INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED ABRI HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE SUCH AS IN THE TANJUNG PRIOK CLASHES, HAVE ALSO CONDEMNED SOEHARTO FOR HAVING DIS-EMPOWERED MUSLIMS POLITICALLY (REF A AND B).)

10. (C) COMMENT: THE CONGRESS WAS INITIALLY DESCRIBED BY CRITICS OF THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION AS A GOVERNMENT-INSPIRED EVENT AIMED AT SHORING UP SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION. A 70,000 PERSON MUI RALLY NOVEMBER 4, INDEED, GENERALLY SUPPORTED THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE MPR-SI (REF B). NEVERTHELESS, THE CONGRESS PARTICIPANTS WERE QUITE VOCAL WITH CRITICISM AND ADVICE UNDERSCORING THE POINT THAT EVEN MUSLIMS SEEN AS CLOSE TO THE ADMINISTRATION ARE PREPARED TO PRESS THEIR PARTICULAR CONCERNS. PRESSURE FOR AN ACCOUNTING BY ABRI FOR ITS ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST MUSLIMS IN ACHE, TANJUNG PRIOK, LAMPUNG AND ELSEWHERE, CONSTITUTES A SIGNIFICANT FAULT LINE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION WITH THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION'S MUSLIM CONSTITUENCY ON ONE SIDE AND ABRI ON THE OTHER. THE STRENGTH OF MUSLIM DEMANDS FOR INVESTIGATIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY ON THE ONE HAND AND ABRI WILLINGNESS TO ACCOMMODATE THOSE DEMANDS ON THE OTHER WILL DETERMINE HOW ACTIVE AND POSSIBLY DIVISIVE THIS FAULT LINE WILL

NNNNPTQ9970

PAGE 01 JAKART 05788 03 OF 03 090843Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/021W					

----------7F84D4 090844Z /38

R 090819Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4467
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 005788

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/16
TAGS: PGOV, SCUL, PINR, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: MUSLIM CONGRESS SUPPORTS MPR SPECIAL SESSION BUT DEMANDS GOI PURSUE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS

REF: A) JAKARTA 4710, B) JAKARTA 5775
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05788 03 OF 03 090843Z

BECOME. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ2091

PAGE 01 JAKART 03759 01 OF 02 140951Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	UTED-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	MR-00	SSAS-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W		

----------53E5CD 140951Z /38

P 140943Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2538
ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003759

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCES; MAY RIOTS: FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

REF: JAKARTA 3533

1. SUMMARY: THERE WERE NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON JULY 14

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 03759 01 OF 02 140951Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

IN GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED EFFORTS TO INVESTIGATE BOTH THE DISAPPEARANCES OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS EARLY THIS YEAR (REFTEL) AS WELL AS THE MAY 13-14 RIOTS IN JAKARTA. THE ARMED FORCES SPOKESPERSON TOLD THE PRESS THE INTERNAL ABRI INVESTIGATION HAD CONCLUDED THAT SEVERAL SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) PERSONNEL WERE INVOLVED IN THE DISAPPEARANCES AND THAT THIS INFORMATION HAD BEEN TURNED OVER TO THE MILITARY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL FOR FOLLOW-UP. IN ADDITION, PRESIDENT HABIBIE AUTHORIZED THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE MAY RIOTS, COMPOSED OF FIVE MINISTRIES. A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WELCOMED THE STEP, BUT ALSO CRITICIZED ITS COMPOSITION FOR EXCLUDING NON-GOVERNMENT PARTICIPANTS. NOTED HUMAN RIGHTS FIGURE ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION MET WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE TO URGE A MORE FORWARD-LEANING INDONESIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS IN AN UPCOMING MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS. END SUMMARY.

KOPASSUS PERSONNEL CONNECTED TO DISAPPEARANCES

2. ARMED FORCES SPOKESPERSON MAJ. GEN. SYAMSUL MAARIF TOLD THE PRESS JULY 3 THAT ABRI'S INTERNAL INVESTIGATION OF THE DISAPPEARANCE CASES OF POLITICAL ACTIVISITS EARLIER THIS YEAR HAD CONCLUDED THAT PERSONNEL FROM THE SPECIAL FORCES WERE INVOLVED (REFTEL). MAARIF INDICATED THAT THE INVESTIGATORS HAD VISITED SEVERAL MILITARY INSTALLATIONS WHERE THE DISAPPEARED WERE SUSPECTED TO HAVE BEEN HELD, AND

QUESTIONED SEVERAL "OFFICERS" BEFORE CONCLUDING THAT THE INCIDENTS RESULTED FROM "PROCEDURAL ERRORS" AND "EXCESSES AGAINST THE LAW." WITHOUT DIRECTLY QUOTING MAARIF, KOMPAS REPORTED THAT THE ACTIONS RESULTED FROM MISINTERPRETATION OF AND/OR EXCEEDING ORDERS FROM THE "LEADERSHIP" OF KOPASSUS TO GET TO THE BOTTOM OF RADICAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN INDONESIA. CHIEF OF MILITARY POLICE MAJOR GENERAL DJALAL SAID THAT TWENTY SOLDIERS HAD BEEN QUESTIONED

IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISAPPEARANCES.

3. MAARIF ADDED THAT ARMED FORCES COMMANDER IN CHIEF GENERAL WIRANTO HAD ORDERED THAT THE EVIDENCE BE TURNED OVER TO MILITARY POLICE AND THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, THAT A FULL INVESTIGATION BE CARRIED OUT, AND THAT THE CASES BE PROCESSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MILITARY LAW AS QUICKLY AS FEASIBLE. HE ADDED THAT ABRI WAS RESOLVED TO ACKNOWLEDGE ITS "ERRORS" SO THAT THE ARMED FORCES ATTENTION CAN TURN TOWARD MEETING THE OTHER PRESSING CHALLENGES NOW FACING INDONESIA.

GOVERNMENT COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE MAY RIOTS FORMED

---

4. ON THE SAME DAY, JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO PARTICIPATE IN A MULTI-MINISTRY INVESTIGATORY TEAM TO INVESTIGATE THE MAY 13-14 RIOTS IN JAKARTA. THE TEAM WILL BE COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE

MINISTRIES OF JUSTICE, INTERIOR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, AND THE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICS AND SECURITY. MULADI SAID THE DECISION TO INVOLVE SEVERAL MINISTRIES CAME ABOUT BECAUSE THERE WAS "COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY" FOR THE RIOTS, BUT THAT UP TO NOW, ONLY THE ARMED FORCES HAD BEEN "PUT IN THE CORNER" TO TAKE RESPONSBILTY FOR THE RIOTS. MULADI DENIED THE FORMATION OF THE COMMISION WAS DESIGNED TO COUNTER SEPARATE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE RIOTS UNDERWAY BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WOMEN'S GROUPS, AND OTHERS. MULADI ALSO SAID THE GOVERNMENT INTENDED TO FORM
ANOTHER COMMISSION TO LOOK INTO THE RAPES, IN LINE WITH RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, BUT DID NOT PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS.

5. SEPARATELY, ARMED FORCES SPOKESMAN MAARIF TOLD

THE PRESS THAT ABRI'S OWN INVESTIGATION HAD
IDENTIFIED SEVERAL KEY ACTORS IN THE RIOTS, WHICH
WERE COMPLEXT PHENOMENA THAT RESULTED FROM MANY
DIFFERENT FACTORS. THE ABRI SPOKESMAN ADDED THAT
THE ARMED FORCES SUPPORTED CONTINUING INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ2092

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ2092

PAGE 01 JAKART 03759 02 OF 02 140951Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	UTED-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	SSAS-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W			

----------53E5CF 140952Z /38

P 140943Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2539
ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003759

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCES; MAY RIOTS: FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

REF: JAKARTA 3533

OF THE RIOTS, AND CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH NATIONAL
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 03759 02 OF 02 140951Z
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN FULL AND ACCURATE INFORMATION ON

WHAT HAPPENED.
6. ASKED HIS REACTION TO FORMATION OF THE TEAM TO INVESTIGATE THE RIOTS, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBER ASMARA NABABAN WELCOMED IT AS A CONTRIBUTION TO GETTING AT THE TRUTH, BUT ADDED THAT THE FALLURE TO INCLUDE NON-GOVERNMENT MEMBERS IN THE TEAM WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HUMMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS. THIS LAPSE, NABABAN OPINED, COULD WEAKEN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE TEAM'S EVENTUAL FINDINGS AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS.

BUYUNG NASUTION MEETS WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE.
---

7. PROMINENT HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION TOLD THE PRESS JULY 14 THAT HE HAD MET RECENTLY WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE AND JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI TO SEEK THEIR INPUT BEFORE DEPARTING FOR AN UPCOMING MEETING IN SOUTH AFRICA OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS (ICJ). NASUTION SAID HE BELIEVED THE EVENTS IN INDONESIA WOULD BE RAISED AT THE ICJ MEETING, EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE NOT FORMALLY ON THE AGENDA. HE CHARACTERIZED THE PREVIOUS RESPONSES OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO INTERNATIONAL QUERIES CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS IN

INDONESIA AS "CLOSED" AND UNRESPONSIVE, ADDING THAT THE AIM OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE WAS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE ATTITUDE OF THE INDONESIAN

GOVERNMENT HAD NOW CHANGED. NASUTION DID NOT COMMENT ON HABIBIE'S RESPONSE.

8. COMMENT: THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN A LOT OF FLACK OF LATE FOR ITS SLOW RESPONSE TO THE DISAPPEARANCES AND TO INVESTIGATING THE MAY RIOTS. THESE TWO INITIATIVES, ALTHOUGH NOT SUFFICIENT IN THEMSELVES, AT LEAST PARTIALLY RESPOND TO DEMANDS FOR ADDITIONAL ACTION. END COMMENT. ROY

NNNN

E91

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6864

PAGE 01 JAKART 04441 01 OF 02 120310Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	DCP-01	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	IRM-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/016W		

----------F6CF90 120317Z /38

O 120245Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9819
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL AUCKLAND IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

CG III MEF IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04441 01 OF 02 120310Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004441

WELLINGTON/AUCKLAND FOR A/S ROTH
ROME FOR THE VATICAN
DOD FOR ISA/AP DAS CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/09
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ID, UN
SUBJECT: TFID01: PUBLIC AND POLITICAL OPINION QUESTIONS
MILITARY MOTIVES AND ACTIONS

REF: A) 99 JAKARTA 4354 B) 99 JAKARTA 4350
C) 99 JAKARTA 4317

1. (U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE HANDLE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

ACCORDINGLY.

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: PUBLIC AND POLITICAL OPINION IS QUESTIONING THE VERACITY OF THE MILITARY'S VERSION OF EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR AND BLAMING THE MILITARY FOR PUTTING INDONESIA ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT WILL DAMAGE INDONESIA'S REPUTATION AND SET BACK ECONOMIC RECOVERY. FURTHER, SUSPICION THAT THE MILITARY MAY BE TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE GOVERNMENT AND THE JUNE 7 ELECTIONS APPEARS TO BE GROWING. IT WOULD BE PREMATURE, HOWEVER, TO PREDICT VICTORY IN THIS BATTLE FOR PUBLIC OPINION. THE MILITARY HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT IS NOT LOATH TO STIR THE POT OF XENOPHOBIC NATIONALISM AND THE APPEAL OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. MOREOVER, MANY INDONESIANS, EVEN OUR OWN FSNS AND THOSE FROM PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC BACKGROUNDS, REMAIN

CONFIDENTIAL

PREDISPOSED TO ACCEPT ALLEGATIONS OF UNAMET BIAS AND ARMY INNOCENCE. OUR OWN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS WILL CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON KEY OPINION MAKERS AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR INDONESIA OF A COLLISION COURSE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER EAST TIMOR. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) WITH THE RECENT PRONOUNCEMENT BY PAN CHAIRMAN AMIEN RAIS, ALL MAJOR POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS HAVE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED ACCEPTANCE OF THE OUTCOME OF THE REFERENDUM AND OF THE EVENTUAL SEPARATION OF EAST TIMOR FROM INDONESIA. PAN CHAIRMAN AMIEN RAIS, WHO HAS BEEN ON A HAJ TO MECCA, IS QUOTED IN THE SEPTEMBER 11 INDONESIAN PRESS AS SAYING HE MET RECENTLY WITH UN OFFICIALS IN NEW YORK AND UNDERSTANDS THE VIEWS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. RAIS SAID HE DISAGREED IN PRINCIPLE WITH THE DECLARATION OF MILITARY EMERGENCY AND CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO END IT PROMPTLY. HE URGED THE MILITARY TO WITHDRAW FROM EAST TIMOR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND PERMIT INTERNATIONAL FORCES TO ENTER, EVEN BEFORE THE MPR DECISION. HE ALSO APPEALED TO VETERANS OF EAST TIMOR CAMPAIGNS WITH EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENTS TO EAST TIMOR TO "LET GO."

4. (U) PKB CHAIRMAN GUS DUR, WHO IS IN EUROPE, IS REPORTED TO HAVE EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO "THE NEW EAST TIMOR LEADER," CNRT CHAIRMAN XANANA GUSMAO, TO STAY AT HIS HOME. ON THE ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES FOR EAST TIMOR, GUS DUR SAID HE SUPPORTED THE IDEA, AS LONG AS THE FORCES WERE FROM ASEAN COUNTRIES "BECAUSE THEY WOULD BE MORE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOCIAL-CULTURAL SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR." HE REPEATED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE AUGUST 30 REFERENDUM OUTCOME AND HIS THREE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE

PAGE 04 JAKART 04441 01 OF 02 120310Z
CONDUCT OF FUTURE INDONESIAN-EAST TIMORESE RELATIONS: AT THE LEVEL OF CHARGE AND NOT FULL AMBASSADOR; NO AUSTRALIAN TROOPS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCE; AND THE UN SHOULD INVESTIGATE UNAMET'S "POLITICAL BIAS."

5. (U) MEANWHILE, REPORTS THAT TWO PROMINENT INDONESIAN WOMEN HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS WERE CAPTURED AND PERHAPS MURDERED BY MILITIA IN EAST TIMOR HAS LED TO CALLS FROM NATIONAL HUMAN AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS GROUPS FOR AN IMMEDIATE END OF MARTIAL LAW, INTRODUCTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES, AND OPEN ACCESS FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AGENCIES. YENNY ROSA DAMAYANTI AND MARIA OLANDIA ALVES ARE FEARED MISSING IN EAST TIMOR, ACCORDING TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN. NATIONAL WOMEN'S ACTIVIST HERAWATI DIAH SAID THE MILITARY IS "NOT COMPETENT OR CREDIBLE" BECAUSE OF ITS CLOSE EMOTIONAL TIES TO THE MILITIAS. THE ONLY WAY TO PROTECT THE EAST TIMORESE FROM ATTACK BY MARAUDING MILITIA IS TO PERMIT A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO PROTECT THE AREA AND THE REFUGEES. SHE SAID THERE WERE REPORTS OF RAPE OF REFUGEES IN THE CAMPS AND ON BOARD SHIPS. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN HAS CALLED FOR MEMBERS OF THE MILITIA AND TNI THAT SUPPORTED THEM TO BE TRIED FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.

6. (U) FM ALATAS HAS VOICED CONCERNS ABOUT THE MILITARY'S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6865

PAGE 01 JAKART 04441 02 OF 02 120310Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	DCP-01	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	IRM-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/016W		

----------F6CF98 120317Z /38

O 120245Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9820
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL AUCKLAND IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

CG III MEF IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04441 02 OF 02 120310Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004441

WELLINGTON/AUCKLAND FOR A/S ROTH
ROME FOR THE VATICAN
DOD FOR ISA/AP DAS CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/09
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ID, UN
SUBJECT: TFID01: PUBLIC AND POLITICAL OPINION QUESTIONS MILITARY MOTIVES AND ACTIONS

CONDUCT IN TIMOR FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE AUGUST 30 VOTE. ACCORDING TO A SIDEBAR IN THE SEPTEMBER 11 INDONESIAN OBSERVER, ALATAS IS QUOTED TO CLAIM THAT "ROGUE ELEMENTS" IN THE MILITARY MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN CREATING DIFFICULTIES IN THE GOVERNMENT.

7. (SBU) GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANJUNG IS REPORTED TO HAVE REQUESTED A MEETING SEPTEMBER 11 WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE TO CONVEY HIS CONCERNS ABOUT CONTINUING WORLD CONDEMNATION OF INDONESIA OVER THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR. IN AN EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF ON SEPTEMBER 9, AKBAR RAISED HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE MILITARY'S INABILITY TO DATE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR AND ABOUT THE NUMBERS OF IDPS FLEEING INTO WEST TIMOR. HE PLANNED TO TRAVEL TO KUPANG OVER THE WEEKEND. (NOTE: IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT HE DID TRAVEL.) HE SAID GOLKAR HAD AGREED, RELUCTANTLY, TO THE DECLARATION OF MILITARY EMERGENCY IN THE EXPECTATION THAT IT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE AND SHORT-LIVED. WITH REGARD TO THE UN OFFER OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AKBAR TOLD POLOFF THAT THE MILITARY NEEDED TIME TO GET CONTROL AND THAT INTERNATIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04441 02 OF 02 120310Z

SECURITY FORCES WERE UNNECESSARY AND COULD NOT BE INTRODUCED UNTIL THE MPR HAD ACTED. ASKED IF GOLKAR WOULD CONSIDER EXPEDITING MPR ACTION TO FORMALLY SEPARATE EAST TIMOR FROM INDONESIA, HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. THE MPR WOULD FIRST HAVE TO AGREE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE, SET UP WORKING COMMITTEES, ETC. BEFORE IT COULD TURN TO REAL BUSINESS. HE ANTICIPATED THAT EAST TIMOR WOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE SECOND SESSION OF THE MPR, IN LATE NOVEMBER OR EARLY DECEMBER.

8. (SBU) COMMENT: PREVIOUS REPORTING HAS DESCRIBED THE DEGREE TO WHICH MAJOR SEGMENTS OF THE INDONESIAN ELITE AND PRESS ARE GIVEN TO ASCRIBING EVENTS TO CONSPIRACIES BY FOREIGN FORCES AND NATIONALISTIC EMOTIONS ARE EASILY AROUSED. SEPTEL FROM CONGEN SURABAYA UNDERSCORES FURTHER THE EXTENT TO WHICH EVEN WELL-EDUCATED INDONESIANS ARE PRONE TO DOWNPLAY TNI EXCESSES IN EAST TIMOR AND TO REACT DEFENSIVELY TO FOREIGN CRITICISM. THE MILITARY MOREOVER HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT IS CAPABLE OF FEEDING AND STIRRING THESE CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND EMOTIONAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE. THERE DOES, HOWEVER, SEEM TO BE CLEAR AWARENESS AMONG THE INTELLIGENTSIA THAT THE MILITARY IS ALSO CAPABLE OF LYING TO THEM AND OF ACTING CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF INDONESIA. ALTHOUGH RECENT STATEMENTS FROM GUS DUR, MEGAWATI, AND AMIEN RAIS ARE ENCOURAGING, IT IS UNCLEAR AT THIS POINT WHETHER PUBLIC AND POLITICAL CRITICISM OF MILITARY ACTIONS WILL PROVE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO PRODUCE MEANINGFUL CHANGES IN TNI'S APPROACH TO EAST TIMOR.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7281

PAGE 01 JAKART 01782 01 OF 02 091810Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	SVC-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/013W					

----------B9E8BB 091810Z /49

R 091104Z APR 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7137
INFO USISSION GENEVA 1972
ASEAN COLLECTIVEQ
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBAQSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001782

USCINCPAC FORFPR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/04Q
TAGS: PHUM, PINR, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: COVICTED MILITARY ABDUCTORS GET LIGHT SENTENCES

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01782 01 OF 02 091810Z
1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: A MLITARY COURT HAS HANDED DOWN LIGHT SENTENCES O ELEVEN SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL CONVICTED OF ABDUCTING NINE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. FIVE OF THE DEFENDANTS WERE DMISSED FROM THE SERVICE. THE PROSECUTION DID NOT PRESS CHARGES OF MQITE THE DEATH OF ONE (#) OF THOSE RELEASED THAT (#) CASE ALSO IGNORED OF THE 23 ABDUCTED AQ. ONE OF THE KIDNAP VQLIEVES THAT ALL OF THOSE D. HE BELIEVES THAT THE ABRI WILL NOT PERMIT ANY FURTHER (#) OR PROSECUTION OF THE CASE. END SUMMARY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

3. (U) A MILITARY COURT ON APRIL 7 SENTENCED 11 ARMY SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) PERSONNEL TO BETWEEN 12 AND 22 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT FOR ABDUTING NINE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS IN 1997 AND Q998. THE CHARGE, "DEPRIVATION OF FREEDOM" (AQTICLE 333 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE) COULD HAVE DRAWN A MAXIMUM SENTENCE OF EIGHT YEARS. THE HIGH-Q PROFILE CASE, IN MID-1998, LED TO THE HONORABQE DISCHARGE OF FORMER KOPASSUS COMMANDER GENERAL PRABOWO. TWO OTHER SENIOR KOPASSUS (#) AND COLONEL (#) ACTIVE DUTY FOR (#) THE ABDUCTIONS. THE (#) THE DEFENDANTS,IN THE (#) TWO TO SIX MONTHS SH PROSE

4. (U) TERIZED THE OFFENSE
(#) (A MAJOR, SEVEN (#) "DISGRACEFUL" (#) THEIR AUTHORITY.
(#) A HAVING "RUINED THE RELAND THE PUBLIC.
(#) RESULTS HAVE MET WITH BROAD

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01782 01 OF 02 091810Z
CRITICISM. VICTIMQ COMPLAINED THAT THE CS
THE MURDER OF ONE OF (#)
THE TORTURE WHICH MOSMS CLAIMED TO
HAVE E@LO REFERENCE TO 13 OTHEILL MISSING.
A NUMBER OQ WERE DETAINED WITH
THE (#) HAVE OFFERED PUBLIC SHE FACT THAT
THESE VLIKE THEMSELVES IN THEORY ABDUCTORS.
NONE OFUESTIONED ABOUT THE WHE
RQNG VICTIMS DURING THE TRICONTENDED THAT IT HAS
(#) LEADS AS TO THE(#) POLITICAL
ACTIVISTS JUDGE AT THE TRIAL MAINTNTS AFTER THE TRIAL
THAT) ACTIVITES WERE NOT (#)." THIS CLAIM IS HOTS
AND FAMILIES OF (#) HE HAD SPOKEN TO TWO
OF (#) AND HERMAN HENDRAWAN@

SE TWO (SONNY) HAD TOLD (#) WITH THREE
OTG(ISMAIL, NOVAL ALKAQ

9. (C) PIUS WAS (#) IT WAS A "SCAPEGOAT
TO IS TOO LOYAL TO ABRI

(##) GARBLED TEXT CORRECTIONS WILL FOLLOW

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5754

PAGE 01 JAKART 01782 02 OF 02 091124Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00

FBIE-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-01 ADS-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 P-00 SP-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00
DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /013W
----------B9B597 091127Z /38

R 091104Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7138
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001782

USCINCPAC FOR FPR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/04
TAGS: PHUM, PINR, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: CONVICTED MILITARY ABDUCTORS GET LIGHT SENTENCES

PUT A GENERAL ON TRIAL, EVEN PRABOWO." HE SAID THAT HE DOUBTED THAT ABRI WOULD PERMIT ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION RELATED TO THE CASE. PIUS HELD OUT HOPE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01782 02 OF 02 091124Z
THAT IF A NEW GOVERNMENT WERE TO EMERGE IN NOVEMBER, THAT A "TRUTH AND JUSTICE" PROCESS COULD BE ORGANIZED WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY REVEAL THE TRUTH OF THIS AND OTHER SOEHARTO ERA CRIMES. PIUS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE RECOGNIZED TWO OF THE 11 DEFENDANTS INCLUDING ONE WHO ABDUCTED HIM OFF THE STREET AND ONE AMONG THOSE WHO INTEROGATED HIM.

10. (SBU) BIO NOTE: PIUS ORIGINALLY JOINED AMIEN RAIS'S NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN) BUT SAID HIS OUTSPOKEN CHRISTIAN BELIEF BECAME A PROBLEM IN THE PARTY. (HE ALSO WAS TOO OPENLY SYMPATHETIC TO MEGAWATI.) HE IS NOW AN ACTIVIST FOR MEGAWATI'S PDI-P HAS BEEN ASKED BY THE PDI-P TO BE ONE OF ITS PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES FOR WEST JAVA.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5670

PAGE 01 JAKART 01411 01 OF 02 290751Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/021W						

----------B4C27D 290953Z /38

R 221006Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6744
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY BONN
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001411

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01411 01 OF 02 290751Z
SUBJECT: ONCE BANNED PARTY IS RE-LAUNCHED

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY, UNTIL RECENTLY BANNED, HAD WHAT PRD OFFICIALS DESCRIBED AS A "RE-LAUNCH" MARCH 21. AT THE GATHERING, A SPEECH BY IMPRISONED GENERAL CHAIRMAN BUDIMAN WAS READ ANNOUNCING THAT THE PRD WOULD CONTEST THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. IT ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT THE PRD WOULD CONTINUE ITS "EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE." WITH EIGHT OF ITS SENIOR CADRE STILL HELD AS POLITICAL PRISONERS, THREE STILL MISSING AFTER HAVING BEEN KIDNAPPED IN A MILITARY OPERATION, AND ONE KIDNAP VICTIM KILLED, THE PARTY NONETHELESS RALLIED SOME 400 SUPPORTERS, MANY OF THEM

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

YOUNG. SOME ELDERLY SUPPORTERS WITH TIES TO THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) WERE AMONG THOSE ATTENDING. THE PRD WILL LIKELY NOT GATHER A SIGNIFICANT PROPORTION OF THE VOTES, BUT WILL ATTRACT DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PRESS ATTENTION WITH ITS UNCOMPROMISING LINE CALLING FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE STATUS QUO. END SUMMARY

3. (U) THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (PARTAI RAKYAT DEMOCRAT OR PRD) CONVENED A MEETING OF PARTY FAITHFUL AND SYMPATHIZERS TO ANNOUNCE FORMALLY IT WOULD BE CONTESTING THE JUNE 7 ELECTIONS. THE PARTY WAS BANNED BY THE SOEHARTO REGIME, WHICH ALSO IMPRISONED MUCH OF THE PARTY LEADERSHIP UNDER THE WIDELY CRITICIZED ANTI SUBVERSION LAW (SEE PARA 10). IN ADDITION, MANY OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01411 01 OF 02 290751Z

POLITICAL ACTIVISTS KIDNAPPED, TORTURED AND KILLED BY MILITARY SPECIAL FORCES FROM MID 1997 TO MAY 1998 WERE PRD ACTIVISTS (SEE PARA 11). THE BAN ON THE PARTY WAS LIFTED BY THE COURTS UNDER THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION, WHICH HAS ALSO RELEASED FOUR PRD POLITICAL PRISONERS. PRD GENERAL CHAIRMAN BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO REMAINS IN PRISON. HIS SPEECH, SMUGGLED FROM PRISON, WAS READ AT THE GATHERING.

4. (U) THE MEETING ENDORSED THE SELECTION OF BUDIMAN AS THE PRD'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND DITA INDRAH SARI AS THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. DITA IS ALSO IMPRISONED FOLLOWING HER 1997 CONVICTION UNDER THE ANTI-SUBVERSION ACT. SHE SERVES AS THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE "INDONESIAN WORKERS STRUGGLE CENTER" (PPBI).

5. (U) APPROXIMATELY 400 ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORTERS WERE ON HAND IN CENTRAL JAKARTA FOR THE FOUR-HOUR MEETING. WHILE MOST OF THE CROWD WERE YOUNG, THERE WAS A SMATTERING OF OLDER, EVEN ELDERLY SUPPORTERS WHO APPEARED TO HAVE ROOTS IN INDONESIA'S LEFTIST PAST. FAMED NOVELIST PRAMOEDYA ANANTA TOER ATTENDED AS DID AT LEAST ONE OFFICIAL OF THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI), NOW AN ECONOMICS PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA. PRAMOEDYA HAD BEEN CHAIRPERSON OF THE "PEOPLE'S ART INSTITUTION," AN AFFILIATE OF THE PKI AND IS NOW A MEMBER OF THE PRD. PRAMOEDIA WAS ALSO PRESENT AT THE PRD'S FORMAL FOUNDING IN JULY 1996, ONLY WEEKS BEFORE IT WAD DECLARED BANNED. GREETINGS FROM VARIOUS FOREIGN POLITICAL PARTIES WERE READ, MOST OF THEM SOCIALIST PARTIES. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01411 01 OF 02 290751Z
SOCIALIST PARTY OF AUSTRALIA WAS PRESENT TO READ GREETINGS.

6. (U) THE MEETING BEGAN WITH DEMANDS FOR THE RELEASE OF PARTY CADRE, NOTABLY BUDIMAN, AND FOR FULL INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION OF THOSE WHO KIDNAPPED, CAPTURED AND KILLED PRD CADRE AND SYMPATHIZERS. IN A ROUSING OPENING ADDRESS, PARTY CHAIRMAN FAISOL REZA ANNOUNCED THAT THE PRD WOULD PURSUE A TWO-PRONGED STRATEGY OF "PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE" AND "EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE." THE PARTY WOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE ITS "RADICAL" POLITICAL PROGRAM CALLING FOR FORMATION OF A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, BRINGING TO JUSTICE FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND HIS CRONIES, ENDING OF THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN CIVIL AFFAIRS AND A REFERENDUM FOR EAST TIMOR.

7. (C) SUGGESTING SOME RESISTANCE TO THE DECISION TO ENGAGE IN THE ELECTIONS, BOTH RIZA AND BUDIMAN (IN HIS SPEECH READ BY PARTY SECRETARY IDA NASIM MUHAMMAD) PRESENTED LENGTHY DEFENSES FOR THE DECISION. RIZA EMPHASIZED THAT THE PARTY WOULD UTILIZE THE CAMPAIGN TO "EDUCATE" VOTERS AND WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN LARGE CAMPAIGN RALLIES. AT THE SAME TIME, RIZA STRESSED THAT THE PARTY FULLY EXPECTS THE ELECTION TO BE UNFAIR. ONLY IF THE ELECTION WERE CONDUCTED BY A "PROVISIONAL, CARETAKER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5088

PAGE 01 JAKART 01411 02 OF 02 290120Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/021W						

----------B4A81C 290120Z /38

R 221006Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6745
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY BONN
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001411

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ONCE BANNED PARTY IS RE-LAUNCHED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01411 02 OF 02 290120Z
GOVERNMENT," RIZA ARGUED, WOULD THERE BE A POSSIBILITY IT WOULD BE FREE AND FAIR. PRIVATELY, RIZA TOLD POLCOUNS MARCH 18 THAT THE DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS WAS VERY DIFFICULT WITH MANY STUDENTS IN PARTICULAR OPPOSED TO THIS "COMPROMISE."

8. (SBU) THE MEETING DREW SOME EXTRA SECURITY PRESENCE TO THE AREA OF THE DOWNTOWN MEETING SITE, THOUGH MOST OF THE MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL REMAINED OUT OF SIGHT. A POLICE CAPTAIN ROAMED THE BUILDING PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PROGRAM, WRITING DOWN SLOGANS FROM PARTY BANNERS.

9. (C) COMMENT: THE PRD WILL LIKELY DRAW MORE ATTENTION THAN ITS NUMBERS OR ITS VOTE-GETTER POTENTIAL WOULD OTHERWISE SUGGEST. THIS IS PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE IT IS RELATIVELY MEDIA SAVVY AND CLEARLY HAS THE SUPPORT OF MANY FOREIGN NGOS AND ORGANIZATIONS WHO PERCEIVE IT AS A CUTTING-EDGE ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS SHOWN CONSISTENCY IN SEEKING TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO, PARTICULARLY IN ENDING THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN CIVIL SOCIETY. DOMESTICALLY, SINCE THE ARREST OF ITS LEADERS IN 1996, IT HAS PURSUED A STRATEGY OF INSERTING ITS MEMBERS INTO VARIOUS NGOS AND STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS WHERE THEY HAVE BUILT ALLIANCES AND INFLUENCED AGENDAS. (CONTACTS WITHIN THE STUDENT ORGANIZATION FORUM KOTA HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY IN FACT HAVE RESISTED ATTEMPTS BY PRD TO JOIN THEIR ORGANIZATION LEST IT BECOME POLITICIZED. THEY PERCEIVE THEMSELVES TO BE A "MORAL" FORCE AND ESCHEW POLITICS.) THE PRD STRATEGY OF JOINING OTHER GROUPS, ACCORDING TO PARTY CADRE SPEAKING TO US IN CONFIDENCE, WAS DICTATED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01411 02 OF 02 290120Z

BY THE HOSTILE MONITORING OF PRD ACTIVITIES BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (BIA) AND THE POLICE. THE MARCH 21 MEETING, IN THIS SENSE, CONSTITUTED A TURNING POINT FOR THE PARTY. END COMMENT

10. (U) PRD LEADERS STILL IN PRISON INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING (ORIGINAL SENTENCES NOTED):

-- BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO, GENERAL CHAIRMAN (13 YEARS);
-- PETRUS H. HARIANTO, SECRETARY GENERAL (6 YEARS);
-- I. GUSTI ANOM ASTIKA, DEPT OF EDUCATION AND PROPAGANDA (4 YEARS);
-- JAOBUS KURNIAWAN, DEPT OF ORGANIZATION (8 YEARS);
-- IGNATIUS PRANOWO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF PPBI (9 YEARS);
-- GARDA SEMBIRING, CHAIRMAN OF THE STUDENT AFFILIATE "SMID" FOR THE CAPITAL REGION (12 YEARS);
-- SUROSO, MEMBER OF SMID FOR THE CAPITAL REGION (7 YEARS);
-- DITA INDRAH SARI, CHAIRPERSON OF PPBI (5 YEARS).

11. (U) CADRE LISTED AS KIDNAPPED AND STILL MISSING INCLUDE PETRUS BIMO ANUGRAH, HERMAN HENDRAWAN AND SUYAT. LEONADRUS (AKA KILANG) WAS A KIDNAP VICTIM WHOSE BODY WAS DISCOVERED IN JUNE 1998.
OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9212

PAGE 01 JAKART 00884 01 OF 03 231205Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------A66274 231451Z /38

R 231133Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6252
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000884

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/16
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: ACCOUNTABILITY AND ABRI

REF: (A) JAKARTA 0248, (B) JAKARTA 0557

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00884 01 OF 03 231205Z

2. (C) SUMMARY: CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITY FORCES APPEARS TO HAVE REACHED A NADIR IN THE WAKE OF REVELATIONS ABOUT PAST ABRI HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AS REPORTED IN A NEWLY FREE MEDIA. THE MEDIA HAS ALSO GIVEN BROAD COVERAGE TO RECENT INCIDENTS INVOLVING CIVILIAN DEATHS IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH ABRI. THE LATTER IN PARTICULAR HAVE PROMPTED GROWING CALLS FOR CREDIBLE, TRANSPARENT INVESTIGATIONS AND JUDICIAL ACTION. THESE DEMANDS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY HAVE GONE LARGELY UNMET WITH INVESTIGATIONS LANGUISHING OR TRIALS, WHEN THEY DO TAKE PLACE, GENERATING RESULTS WHICH ARE SEEN EITHER AS NOT CREDIBLE OR AS NOT HAVING AFFORDED PENALTIES COMMENSURATE WITH THE CRIMES INVOLVED. THIS ABSENCE OF

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

ACCOUNTABILITY IS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE DEARTH OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITY FORCES. IT ALSO APPEARS TO BE A FACTOR IN DELAYING REAL REFORM IN THE RANKS OF THE MILITARY AND POLICE. END SUMMARY

3. (U) CRITICISM OF THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (ABRI) FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE HAS BEEN A KEY THEME OF STUDENT PROTEST AND IN THE FREE NATIONAL MEDIA. THIS CRITICISM HAS FOCUSSED ON PAST ABRI ABUSES, ESPECIALLY IN EAST TIMOR, ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, LAMPUNG, TANJUNG PRIOK AND ON RECENT INCIDENTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WITH A JAKARTA FOCUS. WHILE DEMANDS FOR INVESTIGATION OF PAST ABUSES HAVE GONE LARGELY UNADDRESSED, ABRI AND THE GOVERNMENT APPEARED INITIALLY TO BE RESPONDING TO DEMANDS FOR ACTION REGARDING MORE RECENT INCIDENTS. IN RECENT MONTHS, HOWEVER, PLEDGES THAT CREDIBLE, TRANSPARENT INVESTIGATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE HAVE NOT BEEN FULFILLED.

NGO'S AND OTHERS HAVE UNDERTAKEN UNOFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS IN SOME CASES, BUT INVARIABLY CONCLUDING WITH CALLS FOR OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS.

RECENT INCIDENTS
---

4. (U) THE PRINCIPAL RECENT INCIDENTS WHICH HAVE DRAWN STUDENT, MEDIA AND POPULAR INTEREST HAVE BEEN:

-- THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE AND KILLING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS;

-- THE MAY 12, 1998 SHOOTING DEATH OF FOUR STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY;

-- THE MAY 13-15 RIOTS IN JAKARTA AND OTHER URBAN AREAS; AND THE SHOOTING DEATHS OF STUDENT AND OTHER PROTESTERS NOVEMBER 13, 1998 (THE "SEMANGGI" INCIDENT).

IN ALL OF THESE INCIDENTS THERE HAVE BEEN STRONG PUBLIC SUSPICION OF INAPPROPRIATE OR CRIMINAL ABRI INVOLVEMENT. RECENT UNREST IN ACEH HAS ADDED SEVERAL NON-JAKARTA INCIDENTS TO THE LIST. THESE INCLUDE THE TORTURE/ KILLING OF DETAINEES IN LHOKSEUMAWE ON JANUARY 14 (REF A) AND THE SHOOTING DEATH OF A STILL UNKNOWN NUMBER OF CIVILIANS BY THE MILITARY AT IDI CUT ON FEBRUARY 2-3 UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH REMAIN OBSCURE (REF B). THE BODIES OF VICTIMS WERE LATER DUMPED IN WEIGHTED BAGS IN A RIVER IN AN APPARENT COVER-UP ATTEMPT. SOME OF THE

BODIES HAVE BEEN RECOVERED.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00884 01 OF 03 231205Z

5. (U) IN ADDITION TO THESE INCIDENTS, THERE HAVE BEEN A SERIES OF RIOTS IN WHICH ABRI AS AN INSTITUTION IS NOT WIDELY HELD TO BE CULPABLE, ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR NOT INVESTIGATING WITH SUFFICIENT RIGOR. THESE INCIDENTS OF UNREST INCLUDE: THE KILLINGS OF SHAMAN AND MUSLIM CLERGY IN EAST JAVA; THE NOVEMBER 22 CHURCH BURNINGS IN THE KETAPANG SECTION OF JAKARTA AND SUBSEQUENT RELIGIOUS RIOTS IN KUPANG, WEST NUSA TENGGARA AS WELL AS ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE MOLUCCAS (AMBON) AND IN KARAWANG, WEST JAVA.

6. (U) WHILE SECURITY FORCE INVESTIGATIONS HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED INTO SOME OF THESE RECENT INCIDENTS, GREATEST PRESSURE FOR CREDIBLE RESULTS HAS BEEN WITH REGARD TO THOSE IN WHICH ABRI ELEMENTS ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN DIRECTLY CULPABLE: THE 4/97-5/98 KIDNAPPING/TORTURE/KILLING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, THE MAY 12 TRISAKTI KILLINGS, THE MAY RIOTS, THE NOVEMBER 13 SEMANGGI KILLINGS AND THE RECENT DEATHS IN ACEH. THE DEMAND HAS BEEN FOR ACCOUNTABILITY ENTAILING A CREDIBLE INVESTIGATION, A TRANSPARENT AND FAIR JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SENTENCING OF THOSE FOUND GUILTY, WITH PENALTIES THAT ARE PROPORTIONAL TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CRIME.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9316

PAGE 01 JAKART 00884 02 OF 03 231205Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------A66277 231451Z /38

R 231133Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6253
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 000884

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/16
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: ACCOUNTABILITY AND ABRI

7. (SBU) IN ALL BUT ONE OF THE RECENT INCIDENTS IN WHICH DIRECT ABRI CULPABILITY IS ALLEGED, ABRI/GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION HAS BEEN

INADEQUATE OR NON-EXISTENT.

THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE/KILLING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS

8. (U) A TOTAL OF 23 POLITICAL ACTIVISTS DISAPPEARED BETWEEN APRIL 1997 AND MAY 1998. ALL OF THEM WERE INVOLVED WITH ORGANIZATIONS AND PARTIES CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT WITH A LARGE PROPORTION HAVING TIES TO THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD). OF THE 23 WHO DISAPPEARED, NINE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED. A NUMBER OF THESE TOLD OF TORTURE AND BRUTAL TREATMENT IN THE COURSE OF INTERROGATIONS AND SEVERAL TESTIFIED THAT SOME OF THOSE 14 ACTIVISTS STILL MISSING WERE DETAINED WITH THEM.

9. (U) A MILITARY COURT OF HONOR INVESTIGATED LT. GENERAL PRABOWO AND TWO OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS (GENERALS MUCHDI AND SYAFRIE) FOR THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPINGS. BASED ON ITS FINDINGS WHICH REPORTEDLY TOUCHED ON THE MAY RIOTS AS WELL AS THE KIDNAPPINGS, MOST OF WHICH HAVE NOT BECOME PUBLIC, THE MILITARY COURT RECOMMENDED THAT PRABOWO BE HONORABLY DISCHARGED. THIS RECOMMENDATION WAS ACCEPTED BY GENERAL WIRANTO AND PRABOWO RETIRED LATER IN 1998. GENERAL MUCHDI AND SYAFRIE, WHOSE CONDUCT ALSO WAS REVIEWED BY THE HONOR BOARD, WERE REASSIGNED WITH NO SPECIFIC DUTIES.

10. (U) LATE IN 1998 A MILITARY COURT TRIAL BEGAN FOR 11 OFFICERS AND SENIOR NCO'S FOR THEIR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPINGS. THEY CONFESSED TO

"PICKING UP" THE NINE ACTIVISTS WHO WERE SUBSEQUENTLY

RELEASED. THEY DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF THE 14 STILL MISSING. THE CHARGES AGAINST THE 11 DID NOT INCLUDE TORTURE OR KILLING EVEN THOUGH SOME OF THE VICTIMS CLAIM TO HAVE BEEN TORTURED AND ONE VICTIM WAS KILLED (HIS BODY WAS RECOVERED). NOR WAS THERE MENTION MADE IN THE CHARGES OF THE 14 ACTIVISTS STILL MISSING. THE INCOMPLETENESS OF THE CHARGES, THE ABSENCE OF REFERENCE TO THOSE STILL MISSING AND LACK OF PROGRESS OF A PURPORTED MILITARY INVESTIGATION INTO THE WHEREABOUTS OF THOSE STILL MISSING, THE FAILURE TO PURSUE CHARGES OF MORE SENIOR-LEVEL INVOLVEMENT (THE MOST SENIOR MAN AMONG THE 11 NOW FACING TRIAL HOLDS THE RANK OF MAJOR), AND THE FAILURE TO PURSUE CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST PRABOWO AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS HAVE LED TO BROAD REJECTION OF THE TRIAL AS A WHITEWASH.

THE MAY RIOTS
---

11. (U) UNDER PRESSURE FROM HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND OTHERS, THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT, IN JULY 1998, APPOINTED A BLUE-RIBBON FACT FINDING TEAM TO INVESTIGATE THE MAY RIOTS. WHILE CRITICS CHARGED THAT THE TWO-MONTH DELAY HAD ALLOWED THE EVIDENCE TRAIL TO GROW COLD, THE STATURE AND RESPECTABILITY THOSE APPOINTED TO THE TEAM LED TO EXPECTATIONS A CREDIBLE INVESTIGATION WOULD TAKE PLACE. THE PANEL REPORTED ITS FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN OCTOBER. AMONG THE RECOMMENDATIONS WERE CALLS FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND SPECIFICALLY THE ROLE OF LT. GENERAL PRABOWO (RET) IN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00884 02 OF 03 231205Z

THE RIOTS. THE TEAM REPORTED ITS CONCLUSION THAT MILITARY UNITS HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN INSTIGATING THE DISORDER. TO DATE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT MOVED ON THOSE RECOMMENDATIONS.

THE TRISAKTI KILLINGS
---

12. (U) ON THE EVENING OF MAY 12, FOUR STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY WERE SHOT TO DEATH. THE FOUR WERE ON CAMPUS, FOLLOWING A CONFRONTATIONAL DEMONSTRATION WITH SECURITY AUTHORITIES WITHIN SEVERAL HUNDRED METERS OF THE JAKARTA DOWNTOWN CAMPUS. IN THE WAKE OF MASSIVE RIOTING WHICH FOLLOWED THE INCIDENT (SEE PARA 11), 22 POLICE WERE CHARGED WITH THE KILLINGS. A TRIAL WHICH ENSUED FOCUSSED ON TWO OF THE POLICE WHO WERE ACCUSED ONLY OF DISOBEYING INSTRUCTIONS. NEITHER WAS CHARGED

WITH THE KILLINGS. WELL-KNOWN HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION DEFENDED THE TWO POLICEMEN CLAIMING THEY WERE SCAPEGOATS. A MILITARY COURT FOUND THE TWO GUILTY OF CONDUCT UNRELATED TO THE ACTUAL KILLINGS. THE TRIAL HAS NOT RESUMED.

THE SEMANGGI INCIDENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9317

PAGE 01 JAKART 00884 03 OF 03 231205Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W

----------A6627A 231452Z /38

R 231133Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6254
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 000884

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/16
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: ACCOUNTABILITY AND ABRI

---

13. (U) ON NOVEMBER 13, A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SCORES OF THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS AND NON-STUDENT PROTESTERS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00884 03 OF 03 231205Z
ERUPTED IN VIOLENCE IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS, BUT MOST SERIOUSLY IN FRONT OF THE ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY CAMPUS NEAR THE SEMANGGI INTERCHANGE IN CENTRAL JAKARTA. SHOTS FIRED INTO PROTESTER RANKS KILLED AT LEAST SEVEN STUDENTS. SOME OF THE LETHAL SHOTS INVOLVED LIVE

AMMUNITION WHICH ACCORDING TO THE AUTHORITIES WAS NOT TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO EITHER POLICE OR ARMY TROOPS ON THE SCENE. OBSERVERS ON THE SCENE, INCLUDING EMBOFFS, SAW PROTRACTED FIRE INTO THE CAMPUS, FIRING OF FLARES HORIZONTALLY INTO CROWDS AND INTERFERENCE WITH THOSE ATTEMPTING TO REMOVE THE INJURED TO SAFETY. ONE SUCH WORKER WAS AMONG THOSE SHOT DEAD. HIS REMAINS WERE VIEWED BY EMBOFF.

14. (U) DEMANDS FOR A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION (ALONG WITH CALLS FOR THE REMOVAL OF ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO) WERE BROAD AND INTENSE. THE INVESTIGATION WHICH TRANSPIRED LED TO ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE FOR SOME OF THE POLICE AND MILITARY INVOLVED ALTHOUGH IN NO CASE DID THE ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS EXCEED THREE WEEKS. AT LEAST AS FAR AS THE PUBLIC AND WE ARE AWARE, THERE IS NO CONTINUING INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT.

RECENT ACEH VIOLENCE
---

15. (U) IN RECENT MONTHS THERE HAVE BEEN LETHAL ATTACKS BY CITIZENS ON TROOPS IN ACEH, INCLUDING THE KILLING OF SEVEN MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO WERE TAKEN OFF A BUS AND THE KIDNAPPING OF TWO OTHERS. THESE KILLINGS CAME IN THE CONTEXT OF A GENERAL DETERIORATION OF THE SECURITY

SITUATION WHICH INCLUDED CLASHES BETWEEN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS IN WHICH CIVILIANS WERE KILLED. A "POLICE" OPERATION CONDUCTED BY MILITARY TROOPS ON JANUARY 14 NETTED OVER 40 "SUSPECTS" FROM A VILLAGE WHERE A PURPORTED REBEL LEADER WAS BELIEVED HOLED UP. ON THE DAY OF THEIR DETENTION, THE 40 SUSPECTS WERE ASSAULTED, REPORTEDLY BY 100 MILITARY PERSONNEL. THAT ASSAULT CAUSED SERIOUS INJURY TO MANY AND THE DEATH OF FIVE. THE LOCAL COMMANDER IMMEDIATELY EXPRESSED HIS OUTRAGE AND PLEDGED THAT THE PERPETRATORS WOULD BE TRIED IN MILITARY COURTS BEFORE THE MONTH WAS OUT. A MILITARY COURT WHICH CONVENED IN LATE JANUARY, TRIED AND CONVICTED A MAJOR AND FOUR OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL, SENTENCING THE MAJOR TO SIX YEARS IMPRISONMENT. THE OTHER FOUR LOWER RANKING INDIVIDUALS RECEIVED SIMILAR OR LIGHTER SENTENCES (RANGING FROM 24 TO 30 MONTHS AND DISMISSAL FROM THE ARMY). SOME ACEHNESE HAVE CLAIMED THAT MANY MORE THAN FIVE INDIVIDUALS WERE INVOLVED IN THE BEATING AND TORTURING OF THE 40 DETAINEES. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE MILITARY WILL PROCEED WITH INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION OF 23 OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL

INITIALLY DETAINED IN THE BEATINGS.

16. (U) A SECOND MAJOR INCIDENT TOOK PLACE ON FEBRUARY 2 NEAR IDI CUT WHEN A LARGE CROWD WHICH HAD LISTENED TO A SPEECH THAT ALLEGEDLY INCLUDED SEPARATIST DEMANDS, WAS FIRED ON BY MILITARY PERSONNEL AFTER THE MEETING HAD BROKEN UP. CIRCUMSTANCES OF WHAT PROMPTED THE SHOOTING ARE UNCLEAR BUT THE GOVERNMNET HAS ACKNOWLEDGED AT LEAST 14 CIVILIANS WERE KILLED. THE INCIDENT WAS COMPLICATED BY AN APPARENT COVER-UP IN WHICH SOME OF THE DEAD WERE

DUMPED INTO A RIVER IN WEIGHTED BAGS. THUS FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO INVESTIGATION OF THIS INCIDENT.

COMMENT
---

17. (C) PROMINENT HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS ARGUE THAT UNLESS AND UNTIL MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARE SEEN TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR CRIMES, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND COVER-UP OF THOSE CRIMES, PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITY FORCES WILL REMAIN AT THE NADIR IT HAS REACHED IN THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA. MOREOVER, UNLESS AND UNTIL SECURITY FORCES IN THE RANKS BECOME CONVINCED THAT VIOLATING THE LAW AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE WILL MEET WITH FAIR JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND PENALTIES COMMENSURATE WITH THESE BREACHES, REAL REFORM WITHIN THE SECURITY FORCES WILL BE INCOMPLETE AND POSSIBLY UNOBTAINABLE. IN SHORT, ACCOUNTABILITY APPEARS KEY BOTH TO PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITY FORCES AND TO GENUINE REFORM.
ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9849

PAGE 01 JAKART 00262 01 OF 02 170647Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W	

----------97E879 170650Z /38

R 170634Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5568
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000262

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, MILI, PINR, PINS, ID

SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORTS ON 1998

1. SUMMARY: THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ANNUAL

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 00262 01 OF 02 170647Z
REPORT APPLAUDS HUMAN RIGHTS/DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRESS IN SOME AREAS IN 1998 IN INDONESIA, THOUGH MOST OF THE PROGRESS NOTED IS IN REFORM PROMISES NOT YET FULFILLED. THE REPORT IS STRONGLY CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR HAVING FAILED TO SEEK ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE FOR A SERIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN 1998. CONTINUED FAILURE TO DO SO, IT WARNS, WILL INVITE POPULAR FRUSTRATION AND ANGER. THE COMMISSION DESCRIBED THE MILITARY AS HAVING FALLEN TO ITS "LOWEST EBB" IN PUBLIC ESTEEM. ABRI, IT SAYS, FAILED TO OVERCOME VIOLENCE AND WAS ITSELF IMPLICATED IN SOME OF THE WORST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF 1998. THE REPORT IS INTERESTING IN THIS REGARD AS IT EMPHASIZES THAT ABRI FACES PUBLIC CRITICISM NOT ONLY FOR ITS ACTIONS REACHING WELL BACK INTO SOEHARTO'S 32-YEAR RULE BUT FOR VERY RECENT ACTIONS AS WELL. THE REPORT ALSO FAULTS THE MILITARY FOR SEEKING TO "JUSTIFY INACTION" IN RIOT AND OTHER SITUATIONS BY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

CLAIMING IT (ABRI) WANTED TO AVOID CHARGES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THE REPORT CLAIMS THAT ABRI HAS SUFFERED FROM "POLITIZATION WHICH HAS WEAKENED ITS INTEGRITY." THE COMMISSION CALLS FOR GOI RATIFICATION OF KEY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COVENANTS AND FOR SWIFT GOVERNMENT ACTION TO BRING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATERS TO TRIAL. THE COMMISSION WARNS THAT UNLESS INDONESIA MOVES IN THE DIRECTION OF RULE OF LAW, IT COULD DESCEND INTO "DESPOTISM AND ANARCHY." END SUMMARY

THE GLASS HALF-FULL
---

2. THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS ISSUED A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDONESIA IN 1998. THE ANNUAL REPORT, ISSUED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE COMMISSION'S JANUARY PLENARY MEETING, RECEIVED BROAD LOCAL MEDIA COVERAGE. THE COMMISSION COMMENDED

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARLIAMENT FOR A NUMBER OF ACTIONS AND SPECIFICALLY WELCOMED THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY'S (MPR) CALL FOR RATIFICATION OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM CONVENTION AS WELL AS THAT BODY'S CALL FOR STRENGTHENING THE POWERS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. THE COMMISSION ALSO WELCOMED THE MPR'S CALL FOR REMOVAL OF THE "ANTI-SUBVERSION" LAW AND HAILED THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) DISCUSSIONS AIMED AT CHANGING THE FIVE POLITICAL LAWS ALONG WITH OTHER STEPS TAKEN TO ADVANCE THE TRANSITION TO A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. MORE GENERALLY, THE COMMISSION NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN STEPS TO CREATE A FREER POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. THE REPORT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION THE FREEING OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, 43 MORE OF WHOM WERE RELEASED IN LATE DECEMBER, OR THE EMERGENCE OF A LARGELY FREE PRESS.

THE GLASS HALF-EMPTY
---

3. WHILE NOTING SOME PROGRESS, MOST OF IT IN THE CATEGORY OF PROMISED REFORM RATHER THAN REFORM ACTUALLY IN HAND, THE REPORT WAS LARGELY CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ESPECIALLY THE MILITARY (ABRI). MUCH OF THE REPORT FOCUSSED ON A BACKLOG OF MILITARY/POLICE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH THERE HAS BEEN NO ACCOUNTABILITY. THESE INCLUDED THE SHOOTING DEATH OF FOUR STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN MAY, THE MID-MAY RIOTS IN WHICH IT SAID MILITARY UNITS WERE INVOLVED, THE SHOOTING DEATH OF EIGHT STUDENTS AT ATMAJAYA UNIVERSITY, THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE MURDER OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, THE KILLING OF ISLAMIC LEADERS AND SHAMANS IN EAST JAVA, THE BURNING OF CHURCHES AND MOSQUES IN JAKARTA, WEST TIMOR AND ELSEWHERE AND THE VIOLENCE IN ALAS, EAST TIMOR. THE COMMISSION ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THE RISE IN CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 00262 01 OF 02 170647Z

A FOCUS ON THE MILITARY (ABRI)

4. THE COMMISSION DESCRIBED THE MILITARY (ABRI) AS "AT ITS LOWEST EBB" IN TERMS OF PUBLIC ESTEEM. ABRI, IT SAID, "FAILED TO OVERCOME VIOLENCE AND FAILED TO END UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE CAUSES AND BACKGROUND TO THE VIOLENCE." THE COMMISSION STATED THAT IN VARIOUS RIOT SITUATIONS MILITARY UNITS WERE INVOLVED AND ADDED, "(IT) IS NECESSARY TO APPEASE PUBLIC SUSPICION THAT THERE IS A CAMPAIGN TO COVER UP THE POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF ABRI PERSONNEL AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY."

5. THE COMMISSION ALSO SAID THAT ON OCCASION, SOME OF THE MILITARY HAD USED WHAT THE MILITARY CLAIMED WERE FEARS OF BEING ACCUSED OF VIOLATING HUMAN RIGHTS TO "JUSTIFY INACTION." FAILURE TO ACT, HOWEVER, LED TO THE LOSS OF PUBLIC TRUST, THE COMMISSION YEAR-END REVIEW CLAIMED. MOREOVER, THIS INACTION LED MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC TO THINK THEY COULD COMMIT CRIMES WITH IMPUNITY. RECENTLY, INCREASING CRIME HAS INCLUDED CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

6. THE REPORT SAID THAT "ABRI, AS AN INSTITUTION, (WAS) FACING INTERNAL OBSTACLES THAT WERE CREATED BY A POLITIZATION PROCESS WHICH WEAKEN(ED) ITS INTEGRITY." MOREOVER, THESE "OBSTACLES WITHIN ABRI DEMONSTRATE THAT IT IS STILL VULNERABLE TO VESTED INTERESTS." THE COMMISSION EXPRESSED FEAR THAT ABRI'S INTERNAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9850

PAGE 01 JAKART 00262 02 OF 02 170647Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W	

----------97E88D 170652Z /38

R 170634Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5569
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 000262

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, MILI, PINR, PINS, ID

SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORTS ON 1998

PROBLEMS COULD LEAD TO ITS "DISINTEGRATION" DURING INDONESIA'S
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 00262 02 OF 02 170647Z
"PERIOD OF TRANSITION." THE COMMISSION ALSO ACCUSED ABRI OF "COVERING UP VIOLATIONS WHICH COULD TARNISH ITS IMAGE." IN THIS CONTEXT IT CALLED FOR AN END TO THE TRIAL OF 11 SPECIAL FORCES TROOPS CHARGED WITH KIDNAPPING POLITICAL ACTIVISTS CONTENDING THAT THE TRIAL WAS FAIR NEITHER TO THE DEFENDANTS (SEEN BY MANY AS SCAPEGOATS FOR MORE SENIOR OFFICIALS) NOR TO THE VICTIMS, 13 OF WHOM ,IT NOTED, REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR. (NGOS AND STUDENTS HAVE ALSO CALLED FOR THE TRIAL TO BE STOPPED UNTIL STILL MISSING ACTIVISTS ARE ACCOUNTED FOR AND UNTIL THE MORE SENIOR-RANKING OFFICERS INVOLVED ARE CHARGED.)

7. THE COMMISSION CALLED FOR A "SYSTEMATIC DEPOLITIZATION" OF ABRI. IN THIS DIRECTION, IT SUGGESTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDER SEPARATING THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY MINISTRIES FROM THE ABRI COMMANDER (AS THE GOVERNMENT SAID IT WILL DO WITH FIRST STEPS REPORTEDLY SET FOR APRIL 1.)

OTHER COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS:
---

8. THE COMMISSION'S PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATION, MADE AT SEVERAL POINTS IN THE SEVEN-PAGE REPORT, WAS ITS ASSERTION THAT UNLESS VIOLENT INCIDENTS WERE FOLLOWED UP WITH A JUST AND SPEEDY LEGAL PROCESS, PUBLIC FRUSTRATION COULD LEAD TO MORE VIOLENCE. IT ADDED THAT UNLESS THE COUNTRY MOVED IN THE DIRECTION OF RULE OF LAW, IT COULD DESCEND INTO DESPOTISM AND ANARCHY.

9. THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT RATIFY THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, ON SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AS WELL AS THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

DISCRIMINATION.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0445

PAGE 01 STATE 118672 010857Z
ORIGIN SSO-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DS-00	OIGO-01
	FBIE-00	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	ADS-00	M-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	OCS-03	SS-00	ASDS-01	DSCC-00	DRL-04
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/015R				

DRAFTED BY: S/S-O:ATEPLITZ
APPROVED BY: S/S-O:JFMCNAMARA
----------4F4775 010857Z /38
O 010857Z JUL 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 118672

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 03534 DATED 30 JUN 98 SENT ACTION SECSTATE
INFO DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC, DEPT OF LABOR, BEIJING, ASEAN,
PORT MORESBY, CANBERRA, AIT TAIPEI, GENEVA, TOKYO AND USCINCPAC
HONOLULU HI BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO
QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003534

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 118672 010857Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

CINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

BEIJING FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 27-30 WRAP-UP

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY:

-- GENERAL WIRANTO HAS STATED THAT ABRI HAS IDENTIFIED SEVERAL OF ITS MEMBERS WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN THE KIDNAPPING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS -- THE DISAPPEARANCE CASES. AS MANY AS 14 ACTIVISTS ARE STILL REPORTEDLY MISSING. PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURE EMIL SALIM HAS

CALLED UPON PRESIDENT HABIBIE TO SET UP AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE DISAPPEARANCES AS WELL AS RECENT JAKARTA AREA RIOTS. (SEE SEPTEL).

-- A THIRD EAST TIMORESE HAS BEEN SHOT DEAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT OF EU AMBASSADORS TO EAST TIMOR (SEE SEPTEL).

-- FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAS USED HIS POSITION AS

CHAIRMAN OF GOLKAR'S BOARD OF PATRONS TO CANCEL A MEETING OF GOLKAR FACTIONS WHICH WAS PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE (SEE SEPTEL).

-- GENERAL WIRANTO HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE RETAINS CLOSE PERSONAL TIES WITH HIS FORMER BOSS, EX-PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, BUT DENIED THAT SOEHARTO EXERCISES ANY CONTROL OVER ABRI.

-- A MAJOR DAILY, THE JAKARTA POST, HAS EDITORIALLY SUPPORTED HOLDING OF A REFERENDUM IN EAST TIMOR TO DETERMINE THE WISHES OF THE EAST TIMORESE REGARDING INTEGRATION WITH INDONESIA.

-- LEADER OF THE 30 MILLION MEMBER NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU), ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (GUS DUR) HAS ANNOUNCED HE WILL SUPPORT THE FOUNDING OF TWO NEW PARTIES, ONE A NATIONALIST PARTY ALLIED WITH MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI AND THE OTHER A MODERATE ISLAMIC PARTY DRAWN FROM THE RANKS OF NU.

-- A LABOR PARTY WAS FORMALLY ORGANIZED JUNE 29. IT IS LED BY A DISSIDENT FORMER SENIOR FIGURE OF SPSI (THE

GOVERNMENT-BACKED LABOR FEDERATION).

-- PROMINENT LECTURER DELIAR NOER DECLARED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY PARTY ON JUNE 27

-- MEGAWATI'S PDI IS PLANNING DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE JAKARTA CENTRAL COURT HOUSE ON JULY 2 AND MUCH LARGER DEMONSTRATIONS ON JULY 27, MARKING THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE TAKEOVER OF HER PARTY HEADQUARTERS IN JAKARTA.

WIRANTO SUGGESTS LINK BETWEEN DISAPPEARANCE CASES AND ABRI

---

3. (U) THE JUNE 30 MEDIA REPORTS GENERAL WIRANTO AS STATING THAT, "ABRI HAS IDENTIFIED SEVERAL OF ITS PERSONNEL WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN THE KIDNAPPING OF ACTIVISTS. THEY HAVE ACTED BEYOND THEIR AUTHORITY.

ABRI IS NOW COOPERATING WITH THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO TRY TO UNCOVER THE TRUTH BEHIND OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THESE ACTIVISTS." MEANWHILE, "KONTRAS," A GROUP ESTABLISHED TO DEFEND DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS HAS HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH CRITICIZED WHAT IT SAID WAS SLOW PROGRESS IN THE INVESTIGATION OF DISAPPEARANCES AND IN THE RELEASE OF 14 ACTIVISTS IT CLAIMS ARE STILL MISSING. EMIL SALIM, A PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURE, HAS CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE BOTH THE DISAPPEARANCES AND THE MAY 13-15 RIOTING IN THE JAKARTA AREA.

EAST TIMOR VIOLENCE CONTINUES

CONFIDENTIAL

4. (U) THREE EU AMBASSADORS WHO TOURED EAST TIMOR FROM JUNE 27 TO JUNE 30 WERE WITNESS TO A KILLING ON JUNE 28 WHILE IN BAUCAU. IN ALL THERE HAVE BEEN THREE PEOPLE SHOT DEAD BY SECURITY FORCES DURING THE FOUR DAY VISIT WHICH HAS BEEN MARKED BY COMPETING DEMONSTRATIONS BY

GOVERNMENT-BACKED PRO-INTEGRATION ELEMENTS AND THE LARGER ANTI-INTEGRATION DEMONSTRATIONS. DESPITE THE THREE KILLINGS AND SERIOUS WOUNDING OF AT LEAST SEVEN OTHERS, ICRC HAS COMMENTED THAT GENE
RALLY, THE SECURITY FORCES
HAVE ACTED WITH RESTRAINT.

EX-PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SPIKES GOLKAR GATHERING CALLED BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE

5. (U) EX-PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, USING HAS POSITION AS CHAIRMAN OF THE GOLKAR BOARD OF PATRONS, HAS BLOCKED A GATHERING OF GOLKAR FACTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN CALLED FOR THE WEEKEND BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE. SOEHARTO HAS INSISTED INSTEAD THAT A PLENARY MEETING OF THE BOARD OF PATRONS SHOULD PRECEDE ANY SUCH FACTION MEETING. AN

EXTRAORDINARY GOLKAR CONGRESS WILL CONVENE JULY 9-11 AND POLITICAL MANEUVERING HAS BEEN INTENSIFYING WITHIN GOLKAR.

CONFIDENTIAL

WIRANTO DENIES SOEHARTO ROLE IN ABRI

6. (U) GENERAL WIRANTO HAS DENIED THAT EX-PRESIDENT SOEHARTO CONTINUES TO WIELD ANY INFLUENCE WITHIN ABRI. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, THAT HE HIMSELF RETAINS A "CULTURAL" RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS FORMER BOSS.

JAKARTA DAILY CALLS FOR REFERENDUM IN EAST TIMOR

7. (U) REFLECTING THE REMARKABLE EXPANSION OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN INDONESIA, A MAJOR DAILY, THE JAKARTA POST, JUNE 30 ISSUED AN EDITORIAL CALL FOR A REFERENDUM AMONG EAST TIMORESE ON WHETHER THEY WISH TO CONTINUE TO BE PART OF INDONESIA.

MAJOR ISLAMIC LEADER TO JOIN IN FORMING TWO NEW PARTIES, OTHER PARTIES ALSO FORM

8. (U) ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, (AKA GUS DUR), LEADER OF THE 30-MILLION MEMBER NAHDLATUL ULAMA, TOLD THE MEDIA THAT HE WILL LEND HIS NAME TO EFFORTS TO FORM TWO NEW POLITICAL PARTIES. ONE WILL BE A "NATIONALIST" PARTY WHICH HE WILL FORM WITH POPULAR OPPOSITION LEADER MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI. (NOTE: MEGAWATI IS STILL FIGHTING TO WIN RECOGNITION OF HER ROLE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF INDONESIA (PDI) WHICH THE GOVERNMENT STRIPPED HER OF IN JUNE 1996. END NOTE) WAHID WILL ALSO SUPPORT

THE FOUNDING OF A NEW ISLAMIC PARTY WHICH WILL BE BASED ON -- BUT NOT ACTUALLY INCORPORATE -- THE NU.

9. (U) A SEPARATE, SMALLER ISLAMIC PARTY WAS FORMED ON JUNE 27 BY ISLAMIC SCHOLAR AND REFORM ACTIVIST DELIAR NOER. A DISSIDENT SENIOR FIGURE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED LABOR FEDERATION, THE SPSI, ALSO HAS FORMED A LABOR PARTY. THERE ARE LIKELY TO BE AT LEAST TWO MORE ISLAMIC PARTIES AND AT LEAST ONE MORE LABOR PARTY FORMED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

MEGAWATI PLANS RALLIES
---

10. (C) MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WILL REPORTEDLY RALLY AT THE JAKARTA CENTRAL COURT HOUSE JULY 2 TO SUPPORT PRO-MEAGWATI LAWYERS WHO ARE BRINGING SUIT AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND OTHERS OVER THEIR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN OUSTING MEGAWATI FROM LEADERSHIP OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN JUNE 1996. REPORTEDLY, THERE WILL ALSO BE A LARGE RALLY IN THE SENAYAN AREA OF JAKARTA ON JULY 27, MARKING THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE TAKEOVER OF THE PRO-MEGAWATI PDI HEADQUARTERS IN JAKARTA.
ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ5132

PAGE 01 JAKART 06603 310945Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W	

----------925B37 310945Z /38

P 310938Z DEC 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5314
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS JAKARTA 006603

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: SECOND SESSION OF TRIAL OF SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIERS CHARGED IN DISAPPEARANCES

REF: A) JAKARTA ID 6534; B) JAKARTA 4380

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 06603 310945Z
1. SUMMARY: POLOFF ON DECEMBER 31 ATTENDED THE SECOND SESSION OF THE MILITARY TRIAL OF ELEVEN SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIERS. THEY ARE CHARGED WITH INVOLVEMENT IN THE ABDUCTION AND DISAPPEARANCES OF NINE ACTIVISTS IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1998. THE MILITARY DEFENSE ATTORNEY ISSUED "EXCEPTIONS," INCLUDING A REQUEST TO MOVE THE TRIAL OUT OF JAKARTA. LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS AND OTHERS HAVE CRITICIZED THE PROCEEDINGS FOR: FOCUSSING ONLY ON LOWER RANKING OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN AND CLAIMING THAT THESE KOPASSUS PERSONNEL TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO ABDUCT THE ACTIVISTS; FOR NOT CLARIFYING WHAT WILL BE DONE ABOUT FORMER SPECIAL FORCES LEADERS SUCH AS LT. GENERAL PRABOWO; FOR NOT CHARGING ANYONE WITH THE TORTURE OF THE ACTIVISTS;

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

AND FOR NOT DOING ANYTHING ABOUT THE OTHER ACTIVISTS WHO ARE STILL MISSING. END SUMMARY

SECOND SESSION OF COURT MARTIAL

2. POLOFF ON DECEMBER 31 ATTENDED THE SECOND SESSION OF THE TRIAL OF ELEVEN SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) SOLDIERS CHARGED IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF NINE ACTIVISTS IN 1998. AFTER BEING DETAINED IN JULY, THEIR TRIAL DID NOT BEGIN UNTIL LAST WEEK (DECEMBER 23, REFTEL A). THE MILITARY COURTROOM IN EAST JAKARTA WAS PACKED WITH SPECIAL FORCES COLLEAGUES OF THE DEFENDANTS, LOCAL PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA, AN INDONESIAN EMPLOYEE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY, AND SOME HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, INCLUDING MUNIR, WHO IS THE HEAD OF KONTRAS (THE COMMISSION FOR DISAPPEARANCE AND VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE).

3. THE DEFENDANTS STOOD AS THEIR MILITARY LAWYER READ OUT

"EXCEPTIONS" (EKSEPSI) TO THE PROSECUTION'S CHARGES. THOUGH THE LEGAL STATEMENT ITSELF WAS SOMEWHAT CONVOLUTED, MUNIR CLARIFIED TO POLOFF THAT THE MAIN THRUST OF THE DEFENSE'S STATEMENT WAS THAT THE JAKARTA MILITARY COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE TRIAL OF SEVEN OF THE DEFENDANTS, BECAUSE ONE OF THE ABDUCTIONS, INVOLVING ANDI ARIEF, HAD TAKEN PLACE IN LAMPUNG, SOUTH SUMATRA. THE DEFENSE ARGUED THAT THE TRIAL SHOULD BE MOVED TO PALEMBANG, SOUTH SUMATRA. (THERE WAS ALSO A REQUEST THAT THE CASE BE DROPPED.) THE PROSECUTION ASKED TO ANSWER THE DEFENSE ON JANUARY 5.

CRITICISM OF PROCEEDINGS

4. AS REPORTED REF A, CRITICS WERE ALREADY CALLING THE TRIAL A "FARCE" AND THE DEFENDANTS SCAPEGOATS AT THE TRIAL'S OPENING ON DECEMBER 23, TAKING AIM AT ITS FOCUS ON LOWER RANKING OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN RATHER THAN THEIR SUPERIORS, AS WELL AS OBJECTING TO THE FAILURE TO CHARGE ANYONE WITH TORTURING THOSE WHO HAD BEEN DETAINED.

5. THIS CRITICISM INCREASED IN RECENT DAYS. AS REPORTED IN THE INDONESIAN LANGUAGE DAILY KOMPAS, MARZUKI DARUSMAN, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, PUBLICLY ASSERTED ON DECEMBER 24 THAT ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO MUST CHANGE THE DIRECTION OF THE TRIAL BECAUSE NOW IT RESEMBLED AN OPERATION TO MINIMIZE THE IMPACT ON, AND DAMAGE TO, THE ARMED FORCES AND NOT A REAL EFFORT TO SEARCH FOR JUSTICE AND THE TRUTH. HE REPEATED

THESE STATEMENTS IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE JAKARTA POST REPORTED DECEMBER 28. HE ADDED THAT THIS

TRIAL WOULD "LEAD TO TOTAL CONFUSION BECAUSE THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THOSE WHO WERE IN CHARGE OF KOPASSUS POLITICS ARE GOING TO BE BROUGHT TO COURT."

6. REGARDING FORMER KOPASSUS COMMANDER LT. GEN. PRABOWO, MARZUKI REPORTEDLY SAID THAT "IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER HE IS GOING TO HAVE A SEPARATE TRIAL OR IS GOING TO BE LINKED WITH THIS PRESENT TRIAL...THIS NEEDS TO BE CLARIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT." ALONG SIMILAR LINES, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGNER HENDARDI CALLED FOR AN END TO THE TRIAL UNLESS IT INCLUDED KOPASSUS SUPERIORS, NOT JUST THE LOWER-RANKING PERSONNEL. ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO9131

PAGE 01 JAKART 04866 151104Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/014W						

----------6A8F6A 151104Z /38

R 151102Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3606
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 004866

USCINCPAC FOR HONOLULU HI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/16
TAGS: PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: SPECIAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE DISAPPEARANCES
- CALLED FOR BY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AT JAKARTA
- PRESS CONFERENCE

REF: JAKARTA 4739

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04866 151104Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (U) AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (AI) REPRESENTATIVE, KERRY BROGAN, CALLED FOR A SPECIAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE CASES OF ACTIVISTS WHO ARE STILL MISSING AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN JAKARTA ON SEPTEMBER 15 (REFTEL). THE EVENT WAS HELD AT THE KONTRAS (THE COMMISSION FOR DISAPPEARANCES AND VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE) HEADQUARTERS, WHICH IS LOCATED AT THE LEGAL AID FOUNDATION (LBH), AND THE HEAD OF KONTRAS, MUNIR, JOINED HER. BROGAN POINTED OUT THAT HER ORGANIZATION HAD NOT BEEN "OFFICIALLY INVITED" TO INDONESIA BY THE GOVERNMENT SINCE 1993, AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

THE "LIMITED ACCESS" IT HAD BEEN SUBSEQUENTLY PERMITTED HAD BEEN CUT OFF SINCE 1996. IN ADDITION, BROGAN WAS ABLE TO MEET WITH DEFENSE MINISTER/ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS.

3. (U) BROGAN TOLD A ROOM PACKED WITH JOURNALISTS AND A FEW DIPLOMATS (INCLUDING POLOFF) THAT THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CASES OF MISSING ACTIVISTS BY THE MILITARY POLICE WAS INADEQUATE. THE MILITARY ITSELF HAD BEEN IMPLICATED IN THE DISAPPEARANCES, AND IT DID NOT MEET INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS TO ALLOW THE INSTITUTION ACCUSED OF COMMITTING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO CARRY OUT THE INVESTIGATION, SHE SAID. SHE SUGGESTED THAT THE SPECIAL COMMISSION COULD BE A STRONGER VERSION OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. ACCORDING TO BROGAN, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MADE MANY GOOD RECOMMENDATIONS, BUT LACKED ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO INSURE THAT THE FINDINGS LED TO PROSECUTIONS; THUS THE NEW COMMISSION WOULD HAVE TO

BE MORE POWERFUL, SHE ARGUED. IT SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO QUESTION THE DETAINED SOLDIERS AND GIVEN ACCESS TO THE PLACES OF DETENTION. BROGAN ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT RECENT STATEMENTS FROM GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY LEADERS QUESTIONING WHETHER RAPES HAD OCCURRED DURING THE MAY RIOTS. SHE CALLED FOR AN END TO THIS "INTIMIDATION."

4. (U) BROGAN DID NOT SAY MUCH ABOUT HER MEETING WITH GENERAL WIRANTO, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WAS A POSITIVE STEP THAT SHE WAS ABLE TO DO SO. SHE BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS A NEW OPENNESS IN INDONESIA, BUT THE CRUCIAL ISSUE WAS WHETHER ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT TO ADDRESS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. SHE THOUGHT THERE WAS "A VERY LONG WAY TO GO," AND SHE WAS NOT SURE IF THE MILITARY WAS "READY TO GO THE WHOLE WAY."

5. (U) THE OBSERVER, AN ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILY, REPORTED SEPTEMBER 15 THAT THE MILITARY POLICE CHIEF SAID, IN APPARENT REACTION TO THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THAT HE REGRETTED THE PRESENCE OF AN OFFICIAL FROM AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AT THE KONTRAS' OFFICES. HE THOUGHT THAT KONTRAS SHOULD DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF THE DISAPPEARED WITH DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS, AND SHOULD NOT LOOK TO FOREIGN GROUPS.

6. (C) COMMENT: ONLY NINE OF THE CASES OF MISSING ACTIVISTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. CREDIBLE LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS SUCH AS KONTRAS BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST 12 ARE STILL MISSING, AND THERE ARE FEARS THAT MANY COULD BE DEAD.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE INVESTIGATION WILL ONLY BE ANSWERED IF IT IS BROUGHT TO CLOSURE IN A TIMELY

CONFIDENTIAL

FASHION AND IF IT YIELDS REAL ANSWERS. THIS VISIT BY A LEADING HUMAN RIGHTS WATCHDOG SERVES TO MAINTAIN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4382

PAGE 01 JAKART 04356 01 OF 04 170927Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W			

----------5FCD4D 170928Z /38

P 170924Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3122
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 004356

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/16
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, PINR, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE'S STATE ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE MIKE OWENS; REASON 1.5(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04356 01 OF 04 170927Z
SUMMARY
---

2. (C) PRESIDENT HABIBIE DELIVERED THE ANNUAL PRE-INDEPENDENCE DAY "ADDRESS OF STATE" TO THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) ON AUGUST 15. THE SPEECH WAS LONG, ALMOST TWO HOURS, AND WIDE-RANGING. IT COVERED POLITICAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT'S ALMOST THREE MONTHS IN OFFICE, AS WELL AS SOME OF HIS FUTURE PLANS. ON POLITICS, HABIBIE REITERATED HIS 16-MONTH ELECTION TIMETABLE AND FOCUSSED ON THE NEED TO DEVELOP CIVIL SOCIETY. HE CALLED FOR A NEW PARADIGM BASED ON TRANSPARENCY AND A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH, AND A SHIFT AWAY FROM THE OLD SECURITY FOCUS. HABIBIE SUGGESTED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

THAT THE DUAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE GIVING THE ARMED FORCES A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE "ADJUSTED," BUT HE WAS VAGUE ON THE DETAILS. HE ALSO CAUTIONED THAT MASS MOBILIZATION AND THE DEMAND FOR DEMOCRACY HAD TO BE BALANCED AGAINST THE NEED TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER.

3. (C) ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HABIBIE APOLOGIZED TO INDONESIAN SOCIETY FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE PAST THAT HAD OCCURRED IN CERTAIN AREAS, AND ALSO CONDEMNED THE VIOLENCE AGAINST SINO-INDONESIANS CARRIED OUT IN MAY. HE REVIEWED STEPS HE HAS TAKEN SINCE ASSUMING OFFICE, INCLUDING INSTRUCTING THE ARMED FORCES TO INVESTIGATE THE KIDNAPPING OF ACTIVISTS AND THE SHOOTINGS OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. HE SOUNDED A HOPEFUL NOTE ON THE PROSPECTS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE EAST TIMOR SITUATION, AND SAID THAT 30 MORE POLITICAL PRISONERS WOULD BE RELEASED SOON.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. (C) ON THE ECONOMY, HABIBIE SAID THAT RECOVERY DEPENDED ON THE RESTORATION OF CONFIDENCE, WHICH REQUIRED POLITICAL STABILITY AND ON OVERCOMING THE TRAUMA OF THE MID-MAY RIOTS, IN WHICH MANY SINO-INDONESIANS HAD SUFFERED. HE STATED THAT INDONESIANS HAD TO BE REALISTIC ABOUT THEIR EXPECTATIONS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY. MOST IMPORTANT NOW WAS RESTORING THE CONFIDENCE OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC PRIVATE INVESTORS. INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM WOULD BE A COMBINATION OF STRONG MONETARY POLICY, WHICH HABIBIE DESCRIBED IN IMF-PROGRAM TERMS, AND A MORE EXPANSIVE FISCAL STANCE TO PROVIDE A SOCIAL SAFETY NET. THE ECONOMIC PROGRAM HAD FOUR ELEMENTS, ADDRESSING: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, CORPORATE REFORM, INCREASED EFFICIENCY AND COMPETITION, AND GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE MANAGEMENT. END SUMMARY

ON POLITICS
---

5. (C) REGARDING THE POLITICAL SITUATION, PRESIDENT HABIBIE FOCUSSED ON THE NEXT 16 MONTHS. HE REAFFIRMED HIS PLANS FOR A PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN MAY 1999, PRECEDED BY A NOVEMBER 1998 SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) TO SET THE ELECTION DATE. FOLLOWING THE GENERAL ELECTION, THE MPR WOULD MEET IN DECEMBER 1999 TO CHOOSE A NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT.

6. (C) HABIBIE REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING "CIVIL SOCIETY," WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS THE FOUNDATION OF A "JUST, OPEN AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY." HE

INVITED ALL COMPONENTS OF THE NATION TO JOIN TOGETHER IN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04356 01 OF 04 170927Z
WORKING TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE.

7. (U) TO CREATE THIS CIVIL SOCIETY, HE BELIEVED THAT A "NEW PARADIGM" WAS NEEDED, BASED ON TRANSPARENCY AND A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE. THE "OLD PARADIGM" EMPHASIZED STABILITY, A "SECURITY APPROACH," AND A "TOP DOWN MECHANISM" CONTROLLED BY A STRONG GOVERNMENT. EVENTS LEADING UP TO MAY 21 DEMONSTRATED THAT THE OLD SECURITY APPROACH HAD BECOME INADEQUATE.

8. (U) ELABORATING ON THIS NEW PARADIGM, HABIBIE ARGUED THAT AN "ADJUSTMENT" OF THE ARMED FORCES' ROLE IN SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN COMING YEARS. WHILE NOTING THAT THERE WERE HISTORICAL REASONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES' UNIQUE ROLE IN INDONESIA, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE MILITARY NEEDED TO "CONDUCT INTERNAL REFORM" IN LINE WITH THE DEMANDS OF THE REFORM ERA TO BECOME INCREASINGLY PROFESSIONAL. THIS INCLUDED ADJUSTING THE STATUS OF THE POLICE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES.

9. (U) HABIBIE NOTED THAT POLITICAL REFORM ACTIVITIES WERE BEING CARRIED OUT THROUGH BOTH THE FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THROUGH MASS DEMONSTRATIONS. HE CALLED ON COMMUNITY LEADERS TO BE WARY OF MASS MOBILIZATION WHICH, HE SAID, COULD CREATE INSTABILITY, THEREBY HURTING ECONOMIC RECOVERY. HE DESCRIBED A BALANCE BETWEEN THE

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4386

PAGE 01 JAKART 04356 02 OF 04 170928Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	MR-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W		

----------5FCD53 170928Z /38

P 170924Z AUG 98

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3123
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 004356

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/16
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, PINR, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE'S STATE ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT

NEED FOR DEMOCRACY (WHICH HE SAID GUARANTEED FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION) ON THE ONE HAND AND

THE NEED TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER ON THE OTHER.

10. (U) HABIBIE SAID THAT ONE OF HIS PRIORITIES WAS CREATING "CLEAN AND AUTHORITATIVE GOVERNANCE," FREE FROM CORRUPT, COLLUSIVE, AND NEPOTISTIC PRACTICES, WHICH IS ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE, AND WHICH IS ABLE TO RENDER SERVICES TO THE COMMUNITY IN A JUST AND EQUITABLE MANNER.

11. (U) HABIBIE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT REFORM DID NOT MEAN THE CREATION OF A NEW STATE. EVERYTHING DID NOT HAVE TO BE BUILT FROM SCRATCH, AND THERE WERE ASPECTS OF THE PRE-REFORM ERA THAT WERE STILL USEFUL. HE URGED THAT THE SPIRIT OF INDONESIAN NATIONALISM BE MAINTAINED IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE UNITY OF INDONESIA. HE STATED THAT ALL INDONESIANS WERE "LEGITIMATE CITIZENS ON A PAR WITH ANYONE ELSE" WITHIN INDONESIA."

12. (U) HABIBIE CONTENDED THAT HIS ASCENSION TO THE PRESIDENCY WAS AN ANSWER TO THE DEMANDS IN SOCIETY FOR CHANGE AND NATIONAL REFORM. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BY MAY THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL CRISIS HAD COMBINED TO CREATE A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE. FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, HABIBIE SAID, HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO RESIGN "IN ORDER TO SAVE THE NATION." REVIEWING INDONESIAN HISTORY, HABIBIE NAMED SIX HISTORIC MILESTONES. THE FIRST FOUR WERE MAY 20, 1908 (NATIONAL AWAKENING DAY), OCTOBER 28, 1928 (YOUTH PLEDGE OF ONE HOMELAND, ONE NATION, ONE LANGUAGE), AUGUST 17, 1945 (PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE), AND JANUARY 10, 1966 (BEGINNING OF NEW ORDER). THE FIFTH WAS AUGUST 10, 1995, THE FIRST FLIGHT OF ONE OF THE AIRCRAFT BUILT BY

HABIBIE. THE SIXTH WAS MAY 21 WHEN SOEHARTO STEPPED DOWN
CONFIDENTIAL

AND HABIBIE BECAME PRESIDENT.

ON HUMAN RIGHTS
---

13. (U) PRESIDENT HABIBIE, ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT, EXPRESSED HIS "DEEPEST REGRETS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SEVERAL REGIONS COMMITTED BY INDIVIDUALS FROM THE STATE APPARATUS IN THE PAST," AND APOLOGIZED TO THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE, IN PARTICULAR TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS." (NOTE: HABIBIE DID NOT CLARIFY WHICH REGIONS HE HAD IN MIND. THE PRESS HAS REPORTED THAT HE MEANT THE AREAS FACING SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ACEH, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA. THE HEAVILY ISLAMIC PROVINCE OF ACEH HAS RECEIVED A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION IN RECENT WEEKS AND THE ARMED FORCES COMMANDER VISITED ACEH AND ALSO APOLOGIZED FOR PAST ABUSES THERE. END NOTE.) HABIBIE CONTINUED THAT THE ARMED FORCES LEADERSHIP WAS CARRYING OUT INVESTIGATIONS AND HE CALLED ON SOCIETY TO BE PATIENT.

14. (SBU) IN A SEPARATE PART OF THE SPEECH, HABIBIE ACKNOWLEDGED AND CONDEMNED THE MAY RIOTS AND RAPES. IN REFERRING TO THE MAY RIOTS, HE REFERRED TO "VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT AGAINST WOMEN, MOSTLY ETHNIC CHINESE." HE SAID THAT THESE IRRESPONSIBLE ACTS WERE DISGRACEFUL AND HAD SHAMED THE NATION, AND HE SAID THAT "WE CURSE THESE BARBARIC ACTS."

15. (SBU) HABIBIE WARNED THAT LOOTING WAS STILL CONTINUING AND THAT IT WAS SLOWING DOWN ECONOMIC RECOVERY. HE SAID
CONFIDENTIAL

THAT LOOTING HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH REFORM AND WAS A CRIMINAL ACT THAT MUST BE TACKLED BY THE LAW. HE PLEDGED THAT "FIRMER MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN BY LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL AGAINST LOOTING."

16. (SBU) HABIBIE REITERATED THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE ARMED FORCES COMMANDER TO "INVESTIGATE THOROUGHLY" THE ABDUCTIONS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND THE SHOOTINGS OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. IT WAS NECESSARY TO CLARITY THESE ISSUES TO "RESTORE THE DIGNITY AND HONOR OF THE ARMED FORCES."

17. (SBU) LEGAL REFORM WAS A HIGH PRIORITY ISSUE FOR HABIBIE. IN THE PAST, THE LAW WAS OFTEN USED AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POWER, HE SAID. NOW, IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF "SUPREMACY OF THE LAW" WAS A MAIN PILLAR.

18. (SBU) HABIBIE STRESSED THAT A "SOLUTION" TO THE EAST TIMOR SITUATION WAS PART OF POLITICAL REFORM. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD INVITED BISHOP BELO TO EXCHANGE IDEAS, AND THAT BELO HAD GIVEN HIM CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS WHICH WERE A STARTING POINT FOR A SOLUTION. HE REITERATED THAT AN OFFER HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO PORTUGAL AND THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO GIVE EAST TIMOR SPECIAL STATUS BASED ON EXTENSIVE AUTONOMY, AND THAT THE OFFER WAS BEING

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4387

PAGE 01 JAKART 04356 03 OF 04 170928Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------5FCD57 170928Z /38

P 170924Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3124
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 004356

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/16
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, PINR, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE'S STATE ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT

SERIOUSLY STUDIED BY ALL PARTIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

19. (U) HABIBIE REVIEWED OTHER STEPS HE HAD TAKEN SINCE ASSUMING OFFICE. 78 POLITICAL DETAINEES AND PRISONERS HAD BEEN RELEASED, AND 30 MORE WOULD SOON FOLLOW (25 REPORTEDLY WERE RELEASED AUGUST 17, SEE SEPTEL). THE GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE LOOKING INTO THE CASES OF OTHERS. THE PRESS "HAS BEEN ABLE TO COMMUNICATE NEWS AND OPINIONS FREELY WITHOUT ANY WORRIES," AND THE GOVERNMENT HAD ABOLISHED THE THREAT OF REVOKING PRINTING PERMITS. A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT CONFIRMED INDONESIA'S COMMITMENT TO RATIFY UN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS.

ON THE ECONOMY
---

20. (U) PRESIDENT HABIBIE NOTED THAT ECONOMIC RECOVERY DEPENDED ON THE RESTORATION OF CONFIDENCE WHICH REQUIRED POLITICAL STABILITY AND OVERCOMING THE TRAUMA, INFLICTED ESPECIALLY SEVERELY ON SINO-INDONESIANS, OF MAY. INDONESIANS HAD TO BE REALISTIC ABOUT THEIR EXPECTATIONS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY. DESPITE THE DIFFICULTY OF THE TASKS AHEAD, INDONESIA'S NATURAL RESOURCES, INFRASTRUCTURE, HUMAN RESOURCES, RAINFALL SINCE THE DROUGHT, AND EXISTING INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY GAVE HOPE. HABIBIE CLAIMED THAT THE FOREIGN DONOR COMMUNITY'S CONFIDENCE HAD ALREADY BEEN RESTORED, AS EVIDENCED BY THEIR SPONTANEOUS SUPPORT GIVEN IN SYMPATHY AND SOLIDARITY THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO NO LESS THAN USD 14 BILLION THIS INDONESIAN FISCAL YEAR. MOST IMPORTANT NOW WAS RESTORING THE CONFIDENCE OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC PRIVATE INVESTORS.

CONFIDENTIAL

21. (U) INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM WOULD BE A COMBINATION OF STRONG MONETARY POLICY, WHICH HABIBIE DESCRIBED IN IMF-PROGRAM TERMS, AND A MORE EXPANSIVE FISCAL STANCE TO PROVIDE A SOCIAL SAFETY NET. THE ECONOMIC PROGRAM HAD FOUR ELEMENTS:

-- FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING RECAPITALIZATION OF RELATIVELY HEALTHY BANKS AND AN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK;

-- CORPORATE REFORM, INCLUDING MANAGING CORPORATE DEBT, IMPLEMENTING THE NEW BANKRUPTCY LAW, AND ENCOURAGING RESTRUCTURING;

-- INCREASED EFFICIENCY AND COMPETITION, INCLUDING ABOLISHING OPPORTUNITIES TO GAIN ECONOMIC RENTS, CORRUPTION, COLLUSION, CRONYISM, AND NEPOTISM, CREATING A COMPETITIVE CLIMATE IN WHICH A LIMITED NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS ACCUMULATED WEALTH, AND CLEANING UP GOVERNMENT AND STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE PROCUREMENT; AND

-- GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE MANAGEMENT.

22. (U) ONE OUTCOME OF ECONOMIC POLICY WOULD BE AN ECONOMY "WHOSE CENTER OF GRAVITY LIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE WHICH WILL...SATISFY THE NEEDS OF PEOPLE THROUGH DOMESTIC MARKETS AND WILL BE ORIENTED TO EXPORT AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTES THAT RELY ON NATURAL RESOURCES, THE EMPHASIS BEING ON A STRONG AND INDEPENDENT AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY." HABIBIE ALSO MENTIONED THE IMPORTANCE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO INDONESIA'S

CONFIDENTIAL

DEVELOPMENT.

COMMENT

---

23. (C) HABIBIE'S SPEECH WAS FULL OF ENCOURAGING STATEMENTS. THE KEY, OF COURSE, WILL BE THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE CAN FOLLOW-UP AND MAKE IT MORE THAN RHETORIC. HABIBIE DID BREAK NEW GROUND WITH HIS APOLOGY TO INDONESIA FOR PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY THE STATE IN CERTAIN AREAS OF INDONESIA, ESPECIALLY THOSE AFFECTED BY SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS. HIS REMARKS ON THE MAY RIOTS ALSO WENT A LONG WAY TOWARD ACKNOWLEDGING THE NATION'S FAILURE TO PROTECT SINO-INDONESIAN CITIZENS.

24. (C) HABIBIE DID NOT REFER TO HIMSELF AS A TEMPORARY OR TRANSITIONAL LEADER IN THIS SPEECH. HIS TONE WAS THAT OF A POLITICIAN WHO HAD NO INTENTION OF VOLUNTARILY RETIRING FROM THE POLITICAL SCENE. THOUGH HE REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO HOLDING A FREE AND FAIR GENERAL ELECTION, HE SAID VERY LITTLE ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THE POLITICAL LAW REFORM PROPOSALS THAT ARE SAID TO BE ABOUT TO BE SENT TO PARLIAMENT.

25. (U) HABIBIE'S ECONOMIC REMARKS COVERED WELL-KNOWN GROUND (THE SOLE STARTLING MOMENT OF THE SPEECH CAME WHEN

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5064

PAGE 01 JAKART 04356 04 OF 04 171309Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W			

----------5FE264 171309Z /38

P 170924Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3125
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 004356

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/16
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, PINR, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE'S STATE ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT

HE LABELED THE AUGUST 1995 MAIDEN FLIGHT OF AN IPTN-
DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED AIRCRAFT AS THE FIFTH HISTORIC
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04356 04 OF 04 171309Z
MILESTONE OF 20TH CENTURY INDONESIA.) THE SPEECH
REFLECTED WHAT VARIOUS GROUPS IN GOVERNMENT ESPOUSE, NOT
NECESSARILY HARMONIOUSLY -- PRO-MARKET ECONOMICS, A PRO-
SMALL ANDMEDIUM ENTERPRISE BIAS, AND SCIENCE AND
TEHNOLOGY AS TOOLS OF DEVELOPMENT. IF THERE WAS NY
POINT IN HABIBIE'S SPEECH THAT DREW UNIVERAL APPROVAL, IT
WAS HIS PLEDGE TO ROOT OUT CORRUPTION, WHICH DREW REPEATED
APPLAUSE THROUGHOUT HIS REMARKS. OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0275

PAGE 01 JAKART 03534 01 OF 03 010802Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/036W		

----------4F42B5 010802Z /38

O 301008Z JUN 98 ZDK CTG RUEHCB 1508 1820242
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2363
INFO DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0852
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003534

CINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03534 01 OF 03 010802Z
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

BEIJING FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 27-30 WRAP-UP

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY:

-- GENERAL WIRANTO HAS STATED THAT ABRI HAS IDENTIFIED SEVERAL OF ITS MEMBERS WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN THE KIDNAPPING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS -- THE DISAPPEARANCE CASES. AS MANY AS 14 ACTIVISTS ARE STILL REPORTEDLY MISSING. PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURE EMIL SALIM HAS CALLED UPON PRESIDENT HABIBIE TO SET UP AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE DISAPPEARANCES AS WELL AS RECENT JAKARTA AREA RIOTS. (SEE SEPTEL).

-- A THIRD EAST TIMORESE HAS BEEN SHOT DEAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT OF EU AMBASSADORS TO EAST TIMOR (SEE SEPTEL).

-- FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAS USED HIS POSITION AS CHAIRMAN OF GOLKAR'S BOARD OF PATRONS TO CANCEL A MEETING OF GOLKAR FACTIONS WHICH WAS PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE (SEE SEPTEL).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-- GENERAL WIRANTO HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE RETAINS CLOSE PERSONAL TIES WITH HIS FORMER BOSS, EX-PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, BUT DENIED THAT SOEHARTO EXERCISES ANY CONTROL OVER ABRI.

-- A MAJOR DAILY, THE JAKARTA POST, HAS EDITORIALLY SUPPORTED HOLDING OF A REFERENDUM IN EAST TIMOR TO DETERMINE THE WISHES OF THE EAST TIMORESE REGARDING INTEGRATION WITH INDONESIA.

-- LEADER OF THE 30 MILLION MEMBER NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU), ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (GUS DUR) HAS ANNOUNCED HE WILL SUPPORT THE FOUNDING OF TWO NEW PARTIES, ONE A NATIONALIST PARTY ALLIED WITH MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI AND THE OTHER A MODERATE ISLAMIC PARTY DRAWN FROM THE RANKS OF NU.

-- A LABOR PARTY WAS FORMALLY ORGANIZED JUNE 29. IT IS LED BY A DISSIDENT FORMER SENIOR FIGURE OF SPSI (THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED LABOR FEDERATION).

-- PROMINENT LECTURER DELIAR NOER DECLARED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY PARTY ON JUNE 27

-- MEGAWATI'S PDI IS PLANNING DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE JAKARTA CENTRAL COURT HOUSE ON JULY 2 AND MUCH LARGER DEMONSTRATIONS ON JULY 27, MARKING THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE TAKEOVER OF HER PARTY HEADQUARTERS IN JAKARTA.

WIRANTO SUGGESTS LINK BETWEEN DISAPPEARANCE CASES AND ABRI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. (U) THE JUNE 30 MEDIA REPORTS GENERAL WIRANTO AS STATING THAT, "ABRI HAS IDENTIFIED SEVERAL OF ITS PERSONNEL WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN THE KIDNAPPING OF ACTIVISTS. THEY HAVE ACTED BEYOND THEIR AUTHORITY. ABRI IS NOW COOPERATING WITH THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO TRY TO UNCOVER THE TRUTH BEHIND OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THESE ACTIVISTS." MEANWHILE, "KONTRAS," A GROUP ESTABLISHED TO DEFEND DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS HAS HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH CRITICIZED WHAT IT SAID WAS SLOW PROGRESS IN THE INVESTIGATION OF DISAPPEARANCES AND IN THE RELEASE OF 14 ACTIVISTS IT CLAIMS ARE STILL MISSING. EMIL SALIM, A PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURE, HAS CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE BOTH THE DISAPPEARANCES AND THE MAY 13-15 RIOTING IN THE JAKARTA AREA.

EAST TIMOR VIOLENCE CONTINUES

---

4. (U) THREE EU AMBASSADORS WHO TOURED EAST TIMOR FROM JUNE 27 TO JUNE 30 WERE WITNESS TO A KILLING ON JUNE 28 WHILE IN BAUCAU. IN ALL THERE HAVE BEEN THREE PEOPLE SHOT DEAD BY SECURITY FORCES DURING THE FOUR DAY VISIT WHICH HAS BEEN MARKED BY COMPETING DEMONSTRATIONS BY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6853

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6853

PAGE 01 JAKART 03534 02 OF 03 301012Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00
	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W				

----------4ECCE9 301012Z /38

O 301008Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2364
INFO DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AIT TAIPEI 0853
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 003534

CINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03534 02 OF 03 301012Z
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

BEIJING FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 27-30 WRAP-UP

GOVERNMENT-BACKED PRO-INTEGRATION ELEMENTS AND THE LARGER ANTI-INTEGRATION DEMONSTRATIONS. DESPITE THE THREE KILLINGS AND SERIOUS WOUNDING OF AT LEAST SEVEN OTHERS, ICRC HAS COMMENTED THAT GENE
RALLY, THE SECURITY FORCES
HAVE ACTED WITH RESTRAINT.

EX-PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SPIKES GOLKAR GATHERING CALLED BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE

---

5. (U) EX-PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, USING HAS POSITION AS CHAIRMAN OF THE GOLKAR BOARD OF PATRONS, HAS BLOCKED A GATHERING OF GOLKAR FACTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN CALLED FOR THE WEEKEND BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE. SOEHARTO HAS INSISTED INSTEAD THAT A PLENARY MEETING OF THE BOARD OF PATRONS SHOULD PRECEDE ANY SUCH FACTION MEETING. AN EXTRAORDINARY GOLKAR CONGRESS WILL CONVENE JULY 9-11 AND POLITICAL MANEUVERING HAS BEEN INTENSIFYING WITHIN GOLKAR.

WIRANTO DENIES SOEHARTO ROLE IN ABRI

6. (U) GENERAL WIRANTO HAS DENIED THAT EX-PRESIDENT SOEHARTO CONTINUES TO WIELD ANY INFLUENCE WITHIN ABRI. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, THAT HE HIMSELF RETAINS A "CULTURAL" RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS FORMER BOSS.

JAKARTA DAILY CALLS FOR REFERENDUM IN EAST TIMOR

7. (U) REFLECTING THE REMARKABLE EXPANSION OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN INDONESIA, A MAJOR DAILY, THE JAKARTA POST, JUNE 30 ISSUED AN EDITORIAL CALL FOR A REFERENDUM AMONG EAST TIMORESE ON WHETHER THEY WISH TO CONTINUE TO BE PART OF INDONESIA.

MAJOR ISLAMIC LEADER TO JOIN IN FORMING TWO NEW PARTIES, OTHER PARTIES ALSO FORM

8. (U) ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, (AKA GUS DUR), LEADER OF THE 30-MILLION MEMBER NAHDLATUL ULAMA, TOLD THE MEDIA THAT HE WILL LEND HIS NAME TO EFFORTS TO FORM TWO NEW POLITICAL PARTIES. ONE WILL BE A "NATIONALIST" PARTY WHICH HE WILL FORM WITH POPULAR OPPOSITION LEADER MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI. (NOTE: MEGAWATI IS STILL FIGHTING TO WIN RECOGNITION OF HER ROLE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF INDONESIA (PDI) WHICH THE GOVERNMENT STRIPPED HER OF IN JUNE 1996. END NOTE) WAHID WILL ALSO SUPPORT THE FOUNDING OF A NEW ISLAMIC PARTY WHICH WILL BE BASED

ON -- BUT NOT ACTUALLY INCORPORATE -- THE NU.

9. (U) A SEPARATE, SMALLER ISLAMIC PARTY WAS FORMED ON JUNE 27 BY ISLAMIC SCHOLAR AND REFORM ACTIVIST DELIAR NOER. A DISSIDENT SENIOR FIGURE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED LABOR FEDERATION, THE SPSI, ALSO HAS FORMED A LABOR PARTY. THERE ARE LIKELY TO BE AT LEAST TWO MORE ISLAMIC PARTIES AND AT LEAST ONE MORE LABOR PARTY FORMED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

MEGAWATI PLANS RALLIES

10. (C) MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WILL REPORTEDLY RALLY AT THE JAKARTA CENTRAL COURT HOUSE JULY 2 TO SUPPORT PRO-MEAGWATI LAWYERS WHO ARE BRINGING SUIT AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND OTHERS OVER THEIR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN OUSTING MEGAWATI FROM LEADERSHIP OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN JUNE 1996. REPORTEDLY, THERE WILL ALSO BE A LARGE RALLY IN THE SENAYAN AREA OF JAKARTA ON JULY 27, MARKING THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE TAKEOVER OF THE PRO-MEGAWATI PDI HEADQUARTERS IN JAKARTA.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6854

PAGE 01 JAKART 03534 03 OF 03 301012Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00
	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W				

----------4ECCEB 301013Z /38

O 301008Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2365
INFO DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0854
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 003534

CINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03534 03 OF 03 301012Z
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

BEIJING FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 27-30 WRAP-UP

R#Y

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ4340

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4340

PAGE 01 JAKART 03430 01 OF 02 250038Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W			

----------4CED9E 250038Z /38

O 241029Z JUN 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2279
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0846
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003430

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03430 01 OF 02 250038Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 24 SITUATION REPORT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (U) SUMMARY:

-- WORKERS MOBILIZED AT SBSI HEADQUARTERS FOR A RALLY AT PARLIAMENT BUT WERE PREVENTED FROM TRAVELING FROM THEIR ASSEMBLY POINT TO THE PARLIAMENT BY MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES. THE SBSI LEADERSHIP ISSUED A STATEMENT PROTESTING SECURITY FORCE BLOCKAGE OF THE DEMONSTRATION, IN WHICH WORKERS DEMANDED HIGHER WAGES, LOWER PRICES, AND FREE ELECTIONS, INTER ALIA. A SMALL GROUP OF STUDENTS WERE ALLOWED TO DEMONSTRATE AT THE PARLIAMENT, HOWEVER.

-- PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAS APPEALED TO THE PUBLIC TO GIVE ABRI MORE TIME TO INVESTIGATE THE MAY 12 KILLING OF FOUR TRISAKTI STUDENTS, DISAPPEARANCE CASES AND CLAIMS THAT ORGANIZED GROUPS HELPED PRECIPITATE THE MAY 13-15 JAKARTA AREA RIOTS. THE PRESIDENT RELATED THE SLOWNESS WITH WHICH THE INVESTIGATIONS WERE PROCEEDING TO "ABRI'S INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION."

-- DEFENSE MINISTER/ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCED ON TELEVISION JUNE 24 THAT THE CHIEFS OF POLICE, NAVY AND AIR FORCE WOULD BE REPLACED. THE CHANGEOVER WOULD TAKE PLACE ON MONDAY JUNE 29.

-- FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS HAS SPOKEN PUBLICLY OF A GOI SPECIAL STATUS PROPOSAL FOR EAST TIMOR WHICH WOULD GIVE THE ISLAND

AUTONOMY IN AREAS OTHER THAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FINANCE AND DEFENSE. HE REITERATED THE GOI'S REJECTION OF A REFERENDUM AMONG EAST TIMORESE. A KEY GOI CONTACT ON EAST TIMOR HAS SAID THE PROPOSAL IS A CENTERPIECE FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT. AMENDMENTS ARE WELCOME, BUT NONE THAT WOULD ALLOW EAST TIMORESE AN ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

-- INFORMAL PRICE SURVEYS JUNE 24 SUGGEST RISING RICE PRICES. AT COB THE RUPIAH WAS AT 14,700 PER 1USD. THE JAKARTA SOTCK EXCHANGE ROSE SEVEN POINTS TO 430.86

END SUMMARY

LABOR NOT ALLOWED TO MARCH ON PARLIAMENT, BUT STUDENTS DO

2. (U) MILITARY AND POLICE PREVENTED MEMBERS OF THE SBSI LABOR UNION AND SUPPORTERS FROM CONVOYING FROM INDONESIAN PROSPERITY TRADE UNION (SBSI) HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER POINTS AROUND JAKARTA TO THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) IN JAKARTA JUNE 24. SBSI HAD ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO MOBILIZE 8,000-10,000 WORKERS FROM THE JAKARTA AREA TO BRING WORKERS' CONCERNS TO THE ATTENTION OF DPR MEMBERS, AND TO CALL FOR FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL CHANGE STARTING WITH AN IMMEDIATE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) TO ELECT A TRANSITIONAL PRESIDENT. SBSI LEADERS SAID SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED 20 BUSLOADS OF THE UNION'S SUPPORTERS FROM GATHERING AT SBSI HEADQUARTERS. ABOUT 70 ARMY TROOPS AND POLICE BLOCKED THE ROAD WHEN A GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY 500 SBSI ADHERENTS MOBILIZED TO MARCH ON FOOT IN THE DIRECTION OF PARLIAMENT. INSIDE SBSI HEADQUARTERS, LEADERS NEGOTIATED WITH THE LOCAL DISTRICT MILITARY COMMANDER TO GET A GREEN LIGHT FOR THE DEMONSTRATION. ULTIMATELY, AUTHORITIES OFFERED TO ALLOW A GROUP

OF 20 SBSI REPRESENTATIVES TO GO TO THE PARLIAMENT, BUT SBSI LEADERS REJECTED THIS AS "MANIPULATION". AFTER THE STANDOFF WENT ON FOR SEVERAL HOURS, UNION LEADERS ENDED EFFORTS TO GET TO THE DPR AND HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE. SBSI DEPUTY GENERAL CHAIRMAN TOHAP SIMANUNGKALIT EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AT THE AUTHORITIES' ATTITUDE, SAYING "THEIR JOB IS TO SECURE, NOT OBSTRUCT." HE PLEDGED THAT SBSI WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR WORKER RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL REFORMS.

3. (U) MEANWHILE, APPROXIMATELY 100-125 STUDENTS REPRESENTING THE STUDENT SENATE COMMITTEES OF JAKARTA GATHERED PEACEFULLY AT THE DPR TO CALL FOR LOWER PRICES AND A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR TO ELECT A NEW PRESIDENT. THEY WERE UNABLE TO MEET WITH LEGISLATORS AS THEY REQUESTED.

HABIBIE ASKS FOR PUBLIC PATIENCE WITH ABRI ON INVESTIGATIONS

4. (U) PRESIDENT HABIBIE CALLED PUBLICLY FOR PATIENCE WITH ABRI

OVER WHAT SOME CRITICS HAVE CHARGED IS THE SLOW PACE OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE KILLING OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS (SOME OF WHOM REMAIN MISSING) AND CLAIMS THAT ORGANIZED GROUPS, POSSIBLY WITH CONNECTIONS TO SECURITY FORCES, HELPED INSTIGATE THE MAY 13-15 JAKARTA-AREA RIOTING. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HIS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4341

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4341

PAGE 01 JAKART 03430 02 OF 02 250038Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W				

----------4CEDA5 250039Z /38

O 241029Z JUN 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2280
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0847

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003430

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 24 SITUATION REPORT

ADMINISTRATION'S CREDIBILITY DEPENDED HEAVILY ON THE RESOLUTION OF THOSE CASES, HABIBIE ADDED THAT THE INVESTIGATIONS WERE LINKED TO ABRI'S EFFORTS TO "CONDUCT INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION." MARZUKI DARUSMAN, THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, OFFERED THE VIEW THAT "WE ARE BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE MISSING PEOPLE, THE TRISAKTI INCIDENT AND THE RIOTS ARE STRONGLY RELATED TO ABRI'S INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION."

5. (U) MEANWHILE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS CALLED FOR THE OPENING OF AN INVESTIGATION OF THE 1984 TANJUNG PRIOK RIOTS IN WHICH, SOME CLAIM, OVER 400 DEMONSTRATORS DISAPPEARED IN A CONFRONTATION WITH THE MILITARY. THE GOI CLAIMS THAT ONLY 19 PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN THAT RIOTING. ALSO ON JUNE 24, A SMALL GROUP OF PRO-MEGAWATI DEMONSTRATORS GATHERED IN FRONT OF THE JAKARTA POLICE STATION TO DEMAND INVESTIGATION OF THE JULY 27, 1996 GOVERNMENT-BACKED ASSAULT ON THE PARTY HEADQUARTERS OF MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI.

CHANGEOVER IN ABRI
---

6. (U) DEFENSE MINISTER/ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCED ON TELEVISION JUNE 24 THAT THE CHIEFS OF POLICE, NAVY AND AIR FORCE WOULD BE REPLACED. THE CHANGEOVER WOULD TAKE PLACE ON MONDAY JUNE 29.

FOREIGN MINISTER ANNOUNCES NEW GOI PROPOSAL ON EAST TIMOR

7. (U) FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS, SPEAKING TO PRESS JUNE 23, SAID THAT HE HAD PRESENTED A NEW GOI PROPOSAL TO UNSYG KOFI ANNAN REGARDING EAST TIMOR. THE PROPOSAL, DESCRIBED BY ALATAS TO THE PRESS, AMOUNTS TO SUBSTANTIAL AUTONOMY FOR EAST TIMOR, WITH GOI RETAINING POWER IN THE AREAS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FINANCE AND DEFENSE. ALATAS CLAIMED THAT ANNAN WOULD SEND HIS REPRESENTATIVE AMBASSADOR MARKER TO LISBON (JUNE 24) TO RAISE THE PROPOSAL WITH THE PORTUGUESE. ALATAS SAID THAT HE TOLD THE UNSYG THAT THE GOI WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH THE PORTUGUESE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL (WITH UN COORDINATION) TO DISCUSS THE GOI PROPOSAL.

8. (C) SEPARATELY, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S ROVING AMBASSADOR FOR EAST TIMOR CONFIRMED TO US THAT THE AUTONOMY OFFER WAS MEANT TO BE THE "CENTERPIECE OF A FINAL SOLUTION." HE SAID THAT AMENDMENTS WOULD BE WELCOME, INCLUDING CALLS FOR RELEASE OF XANANA GUSMAO AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE GOI WILL REJECT ANY FORMULATION, HOWEVER, THAT AFFORDS EAST TIMORESE A CHANCE TO VOTE ON THEIR FUTURE. A FORMER TWO-TERM GOVERNOR OF EAST TIMOR TOLD US THE PROPOSAL IS AS MUCH AS THE GOI CAN LEGALLY OFFER BUT THAT HE DOUBTS IT WILL SATISFY RISING EXPECTATIONS AMONG EAST TIMORESE. (SEE SEPTEL)

RICE PRICES RISING

9. (U) AN INFORMAL JUNE 24-CHECK OF RICE PRICES IN JAKARTA APPEARS TO CONFIRM WORD-OF-MOUTH CONCERN THAT RICE PRICES ARE

RISING AND THAT, RICE GENERALLY, BUT PARTICULARLY LOWER QUALITY (LOWER PRICE) RICE, IS INCREASINGLY HARD TO FIND. EMBASSY'S WEEKLY MARKET SURVEY, WHICH REFLECTS MIDDLE-RANGE PRICE FOR RICE, HAS SHOWN A STEADY INCREASE IN PRICE THROUGH JUNE. OTHER PRICES FOR STAPLES APPEAR TO BE HOLDING STEADY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOME VEGETABLE PRICES WHICH CONTINUE TO CLIMB.

RUPIAH AND STOCK MARKET

10. (U) THE RUPIAH HELD RELATIVELY STEADY AGAINST THE USD AT 14,700 PER USD AT CLOSE. IT HAD SLIPPED BELOW 15,000 DURING TRADING BUT STRENGTHENED LATE IN THE DAY. THE STOCK MARKET ROSE SEVEN POINTS TO 430 AT END OF DAY TRADING.
OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2903

PAGE 01 JAKART 03430 01 OF 02 290700Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01
	ARA-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/036W		

----------4E3D8F 290701Z /38

O 241029Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2279
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0846
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003430

C O R R E C T E D COPY // PARA RE-NUMBERED //

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03430 01 OF 02 290700Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2006 200502501

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 24 SITUATION REPORT

1. () CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (U) SUMMARY:

-- WORKERS MOBILIZED AT SBSI HEADQUARTERS FOR A RALLY AT PARLIAMENT BUT WERE PREVENTED FROM TRAVELING FROM THEIR ASSEMBLY POINT TO THE PARLIAMENT BY MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES. THE SBSI LEADERSHIP ISSUED A STATEMENT PROTESTING SECURITY FORCE BLOCKAGE OF THE DEMONSTRATION, IN WHICH WORKERS DEMANDED HIGHER WAGES, LOWER PRICES, AND FREE ELECTIONS, INTER ALIA. A SMALL GROUP OF STUDENTS WERE ALLOWED TO DEMONSTRATE AT THE PARLIAMENT, HOWEVER.

-- PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAS APPEALED TO THE PUBLIC TO GIVE ABRI MORE TIME TO INVESTIGATE THE MAY 12 KILLING OF FOUR TRISAKTI STUDENTS, DISAPPEARANCE CASES AND CLAIMS THAT ORGANIZED GROUPS HELPED PRECIPITATE THE MAY 13-15 JAKARTA AREA RIOTS. THE PRESIDENT RELATED THE SLOWNESS WITH WHICH THE INVESTIGATIONS WERE PROCEEDING TO "ABRI'S INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION."

-- DEFENSE MINISTER/ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCED ON TELEVISION JUNE 24 THAT THE CHIEFS OF POLICE, NAVY AND AIR FORCE WOULD BE REPLACED. THE CHANGEOVER WOULD TAKE PLACE ON MONDAY JUNE 29.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03430 01 OF 02 290700Z
-- FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS HAS SPOKEN PUBLICLY OF A GOI SPECIAL STATUS PROPOSAL FOR EAST TIMOR WHICH WOULD GIVE THE ISLAND AUTONOMY IN AREAS OTHER THAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FINANCE AND DEFENSE. HE REITERATED THE GOI'S REJECTIO OF A REFERENDUM AMONG EAST TIMORESE. A KEY OI CONTACT ON EAST TIMOR HAS SAID THE PROPOSAL IS A CENTERPIECE FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT. AMENDMENTS ARE WELCOME, BUT NONE THAT WOULD ALLOW EAST TIMORESE AN ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

-- INFORMAL PRICE SURVEYS JUNE 24 SUGGEST RISING RICE PRICES. AT

COB THE RUPIAH WAS AT 14,700 PER 1USD. THE JAKARTA SOTCK EXCHANGE ROSE SEVEN POINTS TO 430.86
END SUMMARY

LABOR NOT ALLOWED TO MARCH ON PARLIAMENT, BUT STUDENTS DO

3. (U) MILITARY AND POLICE PREVENTED MEMBERS OF THE SBSI LABOR UNION AND SUPPORTERS FROM CONVOYING FROM INDONESIAN PROSPERITY TRADE UNION (SBSI) HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER POINTS AROUND JAKARTA TO THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) IN JAKARTA JUNE 24. SBSI HAD ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO MOBILIZE 8,000-10,000 WORKERS FROM THE JAKARTA AREA TO BRING WORKERS' CONCERNS TO THE ATTENTION OF DPR MEMBERS, AND TO CALL FOR FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL CHANGE STARTING WITH AN IMMEDIATE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) TO ELECT A TRANSITIONAL PRESIDENT. SBSI LEADERS SAID SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED 20 BUSLOADS OF THE UNION'S SPORTERS FROM GATHERING AT SBSI EADQUARTERS. ABOUT 70 ARMY TROOPS AND POLICE BLOCKED THE ROAD WHEN A GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY 500 SBSI ADHERENTS MOBILIZED TO MARCH ON FOOT IN THE DIRECTION OF PARLIAMENT. INSIDE SBSI HEADQUARTERS, LEADERS NEGOTIATED WITH THE LOCAL

DISTRICT MILITARY COMMANDER TO GET A GREEN LIGHT FOR THE DEMONSTRATION. ULTIMATELY, AUTHORITIES OFFERED TO ALLOW A GROUP OF 20 SBSI REPRESENTATIVES TO GO TO THE PARLIAMENT, BUT SBSI LEADERS REJECTED THIS AS "MANIPULATION". AFTER THE STANDOFF WENT ON FOR SEVERAL HOURS, UNION LEADERS ENDED EFFORTS TO GET TO THE DPR AND HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE. SBSI DEPUTY GENERAL CHAIRMAN TOHAP SIMANUNGKALIT EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AT THE AUTHORITIES' ATTITUDE, SAYING "THEIR JOB IS TO SECURE, NOT OBSTRUCT." HE PLEDGED THAT SBSI WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR WORKER RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL REFORMS.

4. (U) MEANWHILE, APPROXIMATELY 100-125 STUDENTS REPRESENTING THE STUDENT SENATE COMMITTEES OF JAKARTA GATHERED PEACEFULLY AT THE DPR TO CALL FOR LOWER PRICES AND A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR TO ELECT A NEW PRESIDENT. THEY WERE UNABLE TO MEET WITH LEGISLATORS AS THEY REQUESTED.

HABIBIE ASKS FOR PUBLIC PATIENCE WITH ABRI ON INVESTIGATIONS

5. (U) PRESIDENT HABIBIE CALLED PUBLICLY FOR PATIENCE WITH ABRI OVER WHAT SOME CRITICS HAVE CHARGED IS THE SLOW PACE OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE KILLING OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS (SOME OF WHOM REMAIN MISSING) AND CLAIMS THAT ORGANIZED GROUPS, POSSIBLY WITH CONNECTIONS TO SECURITY FORCES, HELPED INSTIGATE THE MAY 13-15 JAKARTA-AREA RIOTING. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HIS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ2906

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2906

PAGE 01 JAKART 03430 02 OF 02 290701Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01
	ARA-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/036W		

----------4E3D9E 290702Z /38

O 241029Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2280
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0847

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKART 003430

C O R R E C T E D COPY // PARA RE-NUMBERED //

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
CONFIDENTIAL

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 24 SITUATION REPORT

ADMINISTRATION'S CREDIBILITY DEPENDED HEAVILY ON THE RESOLUTION OF THOSE CASES, HABIBIE ADDED THAT THE INVESTIGATIONS WERE LINKED TO ABRI'S EFFORTS TO "CONDUCT INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION." MARZUKI DARUSMAN, THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, OFFERED THE VIEW THAT "WE ARE BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE MISSING PEOPLE, THE TRISAKTI INCIDENT AND THE RIOTS ARE STRONGLY RELATED TO ABRI'S INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION."

6. (U) MEANWHILE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS CALLED FOR THE OPENING OF AN INVESTIGATION OF THE 1984 TANJUNG PRIOK RIOTS IN WHICH, SOME CLAIM, OVER 400 DEMONSTRATORS DISAPPEARED IN A CONFRONTATION WITH THE MILITARY. THE GOI CLAIMS THAT ONLY 19 PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN THAT RIOTING. ALSO ON JUNE 24, A SMALL GROUP OF PRO-MEGAWATI DEMONSTRATORS GATHERED IN FRONT OF THE JAKARTA POLICE STATION TO DEMAND INVESTIGATION OF THE JULY 27, 1996 GOVERNMENT-BACKED ASSAULT ON THE PARTY HEADQUARTERS OF MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI.

CHANGEOVER IN ABRI
---

7. (U) DEFENSE MINISTER/ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCED ON TELEVISION JUNE 24 THAT THE CHIEFS OF POLICE, NAVY

AND AIR FORCE WOULD BE REPLACED. THE CHANGEOVER WOULD TAKE PLACE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03430 02 OF 02 290701Z
ON MONDAY JUNE 29.

FOREIGN MINISTER ANNOUNCES NEW GOI PROPOSAL ON EAST TIMOR

8. (U) FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS, SPEAKING TO PRESS JUNE 23, SAID THAT HE HAD PRESENTED A NEW GOI PROPOSAL TO UNSYG KOFI ANNAN REGARDING EAST TIMOR. THE PROPOSAL, DESCRIBED BY ALATAS TO THE PRESS, AMOUNTS TO SUBSTANTIAL AUTONOMY FOR EAST TIMOR, WITH GOI RETAINING POWER IN THE AREAS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FINANCE AND DEFENSE. ALATAS CLAIMED THAT ANNAN WOULD SEND HIS REPRESENTATIVE AMBASSADOR MARKER TO LISBON (JUNE 24) TO RAISE THE PROPOSAL WITH THE PORTUGUESE. ALATAS SAID THAT HE TOLD THE UNSYG THAT THE GOI WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH THE PORTUGUESE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL (WITH UN COORDINATION) TO DISCUSS THE GOI PROPOSAL.

9. (C) SEPARATELY, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S ROVING AMBASSADOR FOR EAST TIMOR CONFIRMED TO US THAT THE AUTONOMY OFFER WAS MEANT TO BE THE "CENTERPIECE OF A FINAL SOLUTION." HE SAID THAT AMENDMENTS WOULD BE WELCOME, INCLUDING CALLS FOR RELEASE OF XANANA GUSMAO AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE GOI WILL REJECT ANY FORMULATION, HOWEVER, THAT AFFORDS EAST TIMORESE A CHANCE TO VOTE ON THEIR FUTURE. A FORMER TWO-TERM GOVERNOR OF EAST TIMOR TOLD US THE PROPOSAL IS AS MUCH AS THE GOI CAN LEGALLY OFFER BUT THAT HE DOUBTS IT WILL SATISFY RISING EXPECTATIONS AMONG EAST TIMORESE. (SEE SEPTEL)

RICE PRICES RISING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

10. (U) AN INFORMAL JUNE 24-CHECK OF RICE PRICES IN JAKARTA APPEARS TO CONFIRM WORD-OF-MOUTH CONCERN THAT RICE PRICES ARE RISING AND THAT, RICE GENERALLY, BUT PARTICULARLY LOWER QUALITY (LOWER PRICE) RICE, IS INCREASINGLY HARD TO FIND. EMBASSY'S WEEKLY MARKET SURVEY, WHICH REFLECTS MIDDLE-RANGE PRICE FOR RICE, HAS SHOWN A STEADY INCREASE IN PRICE THROUGH JUNE. OTHER PRICES FOR STAPLES APPEAR TO BE HOLDING STEADY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOME VEGETABLE PRICES WHICH CONTINUE TO CLIMB.

RUPIAH AND STOCK MARKET

11. (U) THE RUPIAH HELD RELATIVELY STEADY AGAINST THE USD AT 14,700 PER USD AT CLOSE. IT HAD SLIPPED BELOW 15,000 DURING TRADING BUT STRENGTHENED LATE IN THE DAY. THE STOCK MARKET ROSE SEVEN POINTS TO 430 AT END OF DAY TRADING.
OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ5183

PAGE 01 JAKART 02655 01 OF 02 121211Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W			

----------3CD046 121212Z /38

P 121150Z MAY 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1498
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002655

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: SECOND DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM DETAILS HIS CAPTIVITY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 02655 01 OF 02 121211Z
1. SUMMARY: DESMON MAHESA, CHAIRMAN OF LBH NUSANTARA AND A MEMBER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY ALLIANCE (ALDERA), WHO WAS MISSING FOR TWO MONTHS (FEBRUARY 3 TO APRIL 3), ARRIVED IN JAKARTA FROM BANJARMASIN ON MAY 11 AT 2:00 PM AND GAVE TESTIMONY AT THE INDONESIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION (YLBHI) IN JAKARTA ON MAY 12. OVER 100 JOURNALISTS, STUDENT ACTIVISTS, AND SEVERAL DIPLOMATS ATTENDED THE SESSION. HE DESCRIBED IN DETAIL HIS ABDUCTION, THE FACILITY IN WHICH HE WAS HELD, AND THE NAMES OF OTHERS HELD WITH HIM. HE SAID THAT WHEN HE WAS RELEASED HE WAS THREATENED WITH DEATH IF HE DESCRIBED HIS EXPERIENCE PUBLICLY. HE SAID HE WAS INTERROGATED ON THE FIRST DAY WITH BEATINGS AND ELECTRIC SHOCK, BUT NOT ON THE SECOND AND THIRD DAYS OF INTERROGATION. HE SAID THAT HE WAS KIDNAPPED BY A GROUP THAT IS VERY WELL ORGANIZED. HE PLANS TO TESTIFY AT THE MILITARY POLICE HEADQUARTERS ON MAY 13 AT 10:00 AM. END SUMMARY

2. DESMOND MAHESA'S TESTIMONY (WITNESSED BY EMBOFFS AND ONE FSN):

HE WAS SPEAKING PUBLICLY IN PART BECAUSE HE WANTED TO SHOW THAT THE TESTIMONY OF PIUS LUSTRILANANG WAS VALID. ON FEBRUARY 3 AT 2:30 AM, EIGHT TO TEN MEN VISITED HIS OFFICE LOOKING FOR HIM. HE WAS NOT THERE, BUT WHEN HIS FRIENDS TOLD HIM, HE THOUGHT THAT THEY MUST HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR SOMEONE ELSE. ON THE AFTERNOON OF FEBRUARY 3, HE WAS ON HIS WAY TO A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL FORUM FOR INDONESIAN YOUTH (FKPI), WHICH WOULD DISCUSS AN AGENDA TO CALL FOR SOEHARTO NOT TO RUN AGAIN FOR PRESIDENT AT THE UPCOMING SESSION OF THE MPR.

HE GOT OUT OF A SMALL BUS NEAR THE OFFICE WHERE THE MEETING WAS TO BE HELD, THE OFFICE OF THE PROTESTANT STUDENT MOVEMENT (GMKI, ALSO THE OFFICE OF THE COUNCIL OF CHURCHES), AND WAS APPROACHED BY TWO

MEN WITH PISTOLS. THEY BEAT HIM AND HIS GLASSES FELL OFF. BEFORE HE LOST HIS GLASSES, HE SAW A GRAY "VITARA" CAR, INTO WHICH HE WAS THEN PULLED. A BLACK BAG WAS PUT OVER HIS HEAD. THEY DROVE FOR 40 TO 50 MINUTES AND ARRIVED AT A BUSY PLACE. HE HEARD A WOMAN LAUGHING. HE WAS TAKEN TO A ROOM AND INTERROGATED FOR THREE HOURS ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES. DURING THIS INTERROGATION HE WAS BEATEN. ELECTRIC SHOCK WAS USED ON HIM WHILE HIS HANDS AND FEET WERE BOUND. HE WAS PUSHED INTO THE BATHROOM (UNCLEAR WHAT HE MEANT). HE SAID HE WAS TORTURED ON THE FIRST DAY BUT NOT THE SECOND OR THE THIRD. HE COULD NOT SEE HIS INTERROGATORS BECAUSE THEY ALWAYS WORE BLACK

HOODS WITH ONLY THEIR EYES SHOWING. THEY DID NOT WEAR MILITARY BOOTS AND WORE PLAIN CLOTHES.

HE DIAGRAMED THE ROOMS OF THE FACILITY AND NAMED THE PEOPLE BEING HELD IN DIFFERENT ROOMS. HE SAID THERE WERE MANY OCCASIONS TO SPEAK TO THE OTHER PEOPLE BEING HELD, WHEN THE RADIO WAS OFF. HE SAID THAT ON 4TH, HE SPOKE WITH RIAN AND SONY, BOTH OF WHOM HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF BEING INVOLVED IN BOMB MAKING IN KELAPA GADING. ON THAT DAY, PIUS ARRIVED. LATER, HERMANN HENDRAWAN AND HARYANTO TASLAM WERE BROUGHT TO THE FACILITY. HE SAID HE ALSO MET RIZA AND DJATI, BUT NEVER MET ANDI ARIEF OR HEARD ABOUT HIS WHEREABOUTS. HE SAID HE OFTEN HEARD TRUMPETS. ONE ROOM HAD AN AIR CONDITIONER. HE HEARD FROM RIZA ABOUT A MAN MAKING ROUNDS IN A BATIK SHIRT WHO APPEARED TO BE IN CHARGE, BUT HE DID NOT SEE THIS MAN. HE SAID THAT RIZA WAS TORTURED DURING INTERROGATION, INCLUDING BEING FORCED TO LIE ON A LARGE BLOCK OF ICE.

AFTER ONE AND A HALF MONTHS, HE WAS GIVEN A "SCENARIO" BY HIS ABDUCTORS. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO INFORM LBH THAT HE WAS IN HIDING. THEN THE INSTRUCTION WAS CHANGED. HE WAS GIVEN AN OPTION TO GO INTO HIDING SOMEWHERE, AND HE CHOSE IRYAN JAYA, BECAUSE HE COULD

UNCLASSIFIED

WORK ON A RESEARCH PROJECT WITH AN AUSTRALIAN NAMED ALEX SIPONOPA. PROBLEMS WITH THIS SCENARIO AROSE LATER. HE ENDED HIS TESTIMONY BY SAYING THAT HE WAS KIDNAPPED BY A GROUP THAT IS VERY WELL ORGANIZED.
END TESTIMONY

3. DESMON TOOK QUESTIONS FROM REPORTERS. HE SAID HE WAS RELEASED APRIL 3 AT GARUDA TERMINAL F WITH A TICKET TO BANJARMASIN UNDER ANOTHER NAME. HE WAS TOLD THAT IF HE SPOKE ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCE HE WOULD BE KILLED. HE WAS GIVEN A BAG AND A PAGER, NUMBER 13011 ID 1092111, AND TOLD TO USE THE PAGER TO INFORM OF HIS WHEREABOUTS. AFTER DISCUSSING THE ISSUE WITH HIS MOTHER, HE DECIDED NEVER TO USE THE PAGER. WHEN ASKED WHY HE WAITED SO LONG TO SPEAK, HE SAID THAT HE WAS FORBIDDEN TO COME TO JAKARTA UNTIL AFTER MAY 1, AND HE HAD PROMISED HIS MOTHER HE WOULD STAY WITH HER FOR ONE MONTH. HE SAID HIS HOME WAS VISITED BY THE "FOLLOW UP TEAM" FROM THE MILITARY POLICE (POM, POSSIBLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABRI FACT-FINDING TEAM TO INVESTIGATE ABDUCTIONS FORMED BY ABRI COMMANDER WIRANTO), INCLUDING CAPTAIN WAYAN, SUHENDRY, ALIANSIA, AND TWO OTHERS.

4. HE SAID HE IS VERY AFRAID, BUT HOPES THAT THE SECURITY GUARANTEE PUBLICLY MADE BY THE ABRI COMMANDER TO PROTECT THOSE WHO WERE ABDUCTED CAN BE RESPECTED. (REPORT ON THE ABRI TEAM INVESTIGATING ABDUCTIONS TO FOLLOW SEPTEL). HE SAID THAT AS LONG AS HE FEELS

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ5184

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ5184

PAGE 01 JAKART 02655 02 OF 02 121212Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W			

----------3CD04A 121212Z /38

P 121150Z MAY 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1499
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002655

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: SECOND DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM DETAILS HIS CAPTIVITY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURE ENOUGH, HE DOES NOT WANT TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. HE WANTS TO SPEAK PUBLICLY IN INDONESIA. HE SAID HE WOULD TESTIFY AT MILITARY POLICE HEADQUARTERS AT 10:00 AM ON MAY 13. HE SAID HE HOPES THE OTHERS STILL BEING HELD WILL BE RELEASED.

5. A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SAID THAT PIUS'S HUMAN RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED, AND BASED ON DESMON'S TESTIMONY, SO WERE HIS. DESMON DID NOT NEED TO TESTIFY AT KOMNASHAM. THE REPRESENTATIVE SAID THE U.N. DID NOT NEED TO BE INVOLVED BECAUSE THE PROBLEM WAS AN INTERNAL ONE.

6. AN LBH REPRESENTATIVE LISTED THE SEVEN PEOPLE STILL CATEGORIZED AS MISSING:

- HERMANN HENDRAWAN
- YANI AFRI, ALSO KNOWN AS RIAN
- SONI
- BIMOPETRUS
- SUYAT
- NOVAL
- NAME WITHHELD AT FAMILY'S REQUEST. ACTIVIST FROM NADLAHTUL ULAMA STUDENT ORGANIZATION (PMII) IN GARUT, WHO DISAPPEARED IN FEBRUARY.

ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO1955

PAGE 01 JAKART 02427 300057Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	JUSE-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W		

----------38D67E 301006Z /38
R 291043Z APR 98 ZDK DUE TO MANY SVCS
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1286
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002427

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02427 300057Z
SUBJECT: THREE MORE MISSING PERSONS APPEAR: STRONG

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

PUBLIC REACTION TO VICTIM'S PUBLIC ACCOUNT

REF: JAKARTA 2406

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THREE "MISSING" ACTIVISTS HAVE REAPPEARED THOUGH THEY IMMEDIATELY HAVE GONE INTO HIDING. MEDIA REACTION TO THE REVELATIONS BY ANOTHER RELEASED DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE AND CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IS MEETING AND WILL REPORTEDLY ISSUE A STATEMENT BLAMING A SPECIFIC INSTITUTION FOR THE DISAPPEARANCES. DIPLOMATIC REACTION HAS BEEN STRONG WITH THE JAPANESE MAKING THEIR FIRST DEMARCHE ON DISAPPEARANCES, THE EU TROIKA PLANNING A DEMARCHE THIS WEEK AND THE AUSTRALIANS CONSIDERING PUBLIC CRITICISM. END SUMMARY

3. (U) THE LEGAL AID FOUNDATION IN JAKARTA (LBH) HAS CONFIRMED THAT THREE ACTIVISTS AMONG THOSE EARLIER REPORTED MISSING WERE RELEASED ON APRIL 26. THE THREE, RAHARDJO WALUYO DJATI, FAISOL RIZA AND HERMAN HENDRAWAN, ALL STUDENTS, HAVE BEEN MISSING FOR OVER ONE MONTH. RECENTLY RELEASED DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM PIUS LUSTRILANANG TESTIFIED PUBLICLY ON APRIL 27 THAT THE THREE WERE AMONG THOSE DETAINED AT THE FACILITY WHERE HE ALSO WAS HELD (REFTEL). ACCORDING TO A SOURCE AT LBH, THE THREE HAVE GONE INTO HIDING SINCE THEIR RELEASE. IT IS UNKNOWN WHETHER THEY WILL SPEAK OUT AS LUSTRILANANG HAS DONE.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. (C) HENDARDI, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INDONESIAN LEGAL AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, TOLD POLOFF THAT HE FEARS LUSTRILANANG'S STATEMENTS COULD LEAD TO ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON THE OTHER RELEASEES TO PREVENT THEM FROM CORROBORATING HIS STORY. SEPARATELY, HENDARDI, WHO PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN ORCHESTRATING PIUS'S DEPARTURE, CREDITED INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION AND EFFORTS WITH SECURING THE RELEASE OF A NUMBER OF THE DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS.

5. (U) INDONESIAN MEDIA, INCLUDING BOTH PRINT AND TELEVISION BROADCAST MEDIA, GAVE EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO THE LUSTRILANANG TESTIMONY ON APRIL 27. STRONG EDITORIALS CALLED FOR INVESTIGATIONS TO DETERMINE WHO IS BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES. AN LBH SPOKESMAN HAS ANNOUNCED IT WILL PURSUE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST THE POLICE FOR HAVING RECEIVED ANDI ARIEF FROM HIS KIDNAPPERS WITHOUT ARRESTING THE KIDNAPPERS. THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WHICH ORGANIZED LUSTRILANANG'S TESTIMONY, IS MEETING LATE APRIL 29 AND IS EXPECTED TO ISSUE A FORMAL STATEMENT WHICH ONE DIPLOMATIC SOURCE CLAIMS WILL POINT THE FINGER OF BLAME AT "A SPECIFIC INSTITUTION."

6. (C) SEVERAL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS HAVE TOLD US OF DEMARCHES THEY HAVE MADE OR WILL BE MAKING ON THE MATTER OF DISAPPEARANCES. THE JAPANESE EMBASSY DEMARCHED AT THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL APRIL 27 IN PROTEST OF THE SPATE OF DISAPPEARANCES. THE DUTCH TOLD US THAT THE EU TROIKA WOULD BE MAKING A "DISAPPEARANCES DEMARCHE"

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS WEEK. THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY REPORTED THAT THERE IS GROWING PRESSURE FOR CANBERRA TO SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY ON THE DISAPPEARANCES. CANBERRA IS REPORTEDLY CONSIDERING SUCH A STEP.

7. (C) OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, THE AMBASSADOR HAS USED THE OCCASIONS OF INITIAL CALLS ON NEWLY APPOINTED MINISTERS TO RAISE USG CONCERN ABOUT DISAPPEARANCES WITH APPROPRIATE MINISTERS. ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH ALSO RAISED USG CONCERN ABOUT DISAPPEARANCES WITH SENIOR CABINET AND MILITARY OFFICIALS DURING HIS RECENT VISIT. THE AMBASSADOR RAISED THE DISAPPEARANCE ISSUE WITH MINISTER OF JUSTICE MULADI ON APRIL 29, URGING THE GOI TO INVESTIGATE. MULADI SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE AN INVESTIGATION. (SEPTEL TO FOLLOW). ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3827

PAGE 01 JAKART 02406 01 OF 03 282348Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W				

----------3836DD 282349Z /38

P 280451Z APR 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1269
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002406

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM DETAILS HIS CAPTIVITY
- AND TORTURE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

(THIS IS A CORRECTED VERSION OF JAKARTA 2404, CORRECTING SPELLING OF NAMES OF SEVERAL OF THOSE DETAINED WITH PUIS AND ADDING ADDRESSEES. PLEASE DESTROY ALL COPIES OF 2404.)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (U) SUMMARY: PIUS LUSTRILANANG, CHAIRPERSON OF THE PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (ALDERA), WHO WAS MISSING FOR TWO MONTHS (FEBRUARY 4 - APRIL 2), GAVE TESTIMONY TO THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION APRIL 27. HIS IS THE FIRST PUBLIC TESTIMONY BY A KNOWN DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM. APPROXIMATELY 65 FOREIGN AND INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS ATTENDED THE SESSION WHICH COMMISSION OFFICIALS CAREFULLY BILLED AS "A REPORT TO US (THE COMMISSION) WHICH YOU ARE PRIVILEGED TO LISTEN TO." THE DESCRIPTION OF THE SETTING WAS PROMPTED BY PIUS'S CONTENTION THAT HE HAD BEEN THREATENED WITH DEATH IF HE DESCRIBED ANY PORTION OF HIS EXPERIENCE TO THE PRESS. PUIS WAS INVITED TO JAKARTA BY THE COMMISSION FROM HIS HOME IN PALEMBANG WHERE HE HAD BEEN RECUPERATING AT HIS PARENTS HOME. HE RECOUNTED TO THE COMMISSION AND JOURNALISTS WHAT HE CLAIMED WERE NUMEROUS INTERROGATION SESSIONS WHICH HE ENDURED DURING WHICH ELECTRIC SHOCK WAS APPLIED. HE WAS ALSO BEATEN REGULARLY AND AT ONE POINT WAS ALMOST DROWNED. HE DESCRIBED AN INCARCERATION FACILITY LOCATED, HE THOUGHT, NEAR BOGOR THROUGH WHICH A NUMBER OF MISSING PERSONS, INCLUDING CURRENTLY MISSING AND ALREADY RELEASED, WERE FUNNELED. AUTHORITIES, AS A

WARNING, TOLD HIM THAT SOME LEFT THE FACILITY ALIVE, AND SOME DID NOT. HE ALSO REPORTED THAT SOME OF THE OTHER DETAINEES WERE TORTURED. HE SAID HE COULD NOT IDENTIFY HIS CAPTORS BUT AT ONE POINT SAID HE THOUGHT HE WAS BEING QUESTIONED BY AN OFFICER AND NOTED THE PRESENCE OF ARMS USUALLY AVAILABLE ONLY TO THE MILITARY. HIS INTERROGATION RELATED TO THE ACTIVITIES OF PROMINENT GOVERNMENT CRITICS. COMMISSION MEMBER ALBERT HASIBUAN, CHAIRING THE MEETING, WAS STRONGLY CRITICAL OF THOSE WHO "USED TORTURE AS AN "INSTRUMENT OF POWER TO PRODUCE

FEAR."

3. (C) PIUS DEPARTED FOR SINGAPORE AT 1700 APRIL 27 ENROUTE TO AMSTERDAM. FOR PIUS'S PROTECTION, HE WAS ESCORTED TO HIS PLANE BY SEVERAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBERS. AS A PRECAUTION TAKEN AT PIUS'S REQUEST, POLOFF WAS AT THE AIRPORT BUT NOT WITH THE PARTY. THE COMMISSION WAS UNABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH ICRC OR UNHCR ABOUT MODALITIES OF DEPARTURE ARRANGEMENTS. THERE FOLLOWS A NEAR VERBATIM ACCOUNT OF KEY PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY. AT THIS POINT, WE MAKE NO ATTEMPT TO EVALUATE THE VERACITY OF PIUS'S ACCOUNT BUT WILL CROSS CHECK AGAINST SECOND HAND INFORMATION WHICH WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING. REACTION, FROM THE COMMISSION AND OTHERS WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL. END SUMMARY

4. (U) PUIS LUSTRILANANG'S TESTIMONY:

IT IS NOT TRUE THAT I WAS IN HIDING DURING MY DISAPPEARANCE. I WAS KIDNAPPED AT 1530 HOURS ON FEBRUARY 4 WHILE I WAS STANDING AT THE GATE OF A

HOSPITAL IN JAKARTA. A MAN APPEARED BEHIND ME AND PUSHED ME INTO A VEHICLE. I SAW THAT HE WAS HOLDING AN FN PISTOL (NFI). THE VEHICLE WAS A CORONA TWIN CAM, GREY IN COLOR. THERE WERE THREE PEOPLE ALREADY IN THE VEHICLE. I WAS HANDCUFFED AND TOLD TO GET DOWN. THEY ALSO BLINDFOLDED ME AND PUT A JACKET OVER MY HEAD. THEY TURNED UP MUSIC VERY LOUD IN THE VEHICLE.

THEY DROVE FOR 45 TO 60 MINUTES TO A PLACE I COULD NOT IDENTIFY. IT APPEARED TO BE AN OFFICE. THEY QUESTIONED ME THERE WHILE I WAS STILL BOUND AND BLINDFOLDED. THEY BEGAN WITH SIMPLE QUESTIONS ABOUT WHO I WAS AND WHY I THOUGHT I HAD BEEN TAKEN. AT ONE POINT SOMEONE SAT DOWN NEXT TO ME AND SAID HE WAS "THE KIND OF PERSON WHO DOES NOT LIKE TO SPEAK IN COMPLICATED SENTENCES." HE THEN SAID, "SOME PEOPLE LEAVE HERE ALIVE, SOME DO NOT." THEN THEY ATTACHED ELECTRIC WIRES TO MY FEET. BUT THE BATTERY WAS LOW SO THEY HAD TO GET A NEW ONE. AS THEY ELECTROCUTED ME THEY ALSO ASKED ME QUESTIONS, MOSTLY

ABOUT "SIAGA" (A GROUP FORMED TO SUPPORT OPPOSITION PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND AMIEN RAIS) AND THE ACTIVITIES OF PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURES, ESPECIALLY MEGAWATI, AS WELL AS SOME NGO'S. THEY ALSO ASKED ABOUT RATNA SARUMPAET (FOUNDER OF SIAGA,

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3828

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3828

PAGE 01 JAKART 02406 02 OF 03 282349Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W				

----------3836E1 282349Z /38

P 280451Z APR 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1270
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002406

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM DETAILS HIS CAPTIVITY
- AND TORTURE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AND ACTRESS) AND GING GINANJAR (A JOURNALIST, BOTH ARE NOW FACING TRIAL FOR HOLDING AN ILLEGAL POLITICAL MEETING).

AT ANOTHER POINT, THEY PUT ME IN A CEMENT WATER CONTAINER AND FILLED IT UP TO MY NOSE, THEN STEPPED ON MY HEAD. I THOUGHT I WOULD DROWN. (AT THIS POINT IN THE TESTIMONY, PIUS APPEARED TO BREAK DOWN BUT RESUMED HIS NARRATIVE AFTER SEVERAL MINUTES.)

LATER WHEN I DID NOT APPEAR TO BE RESPONDING QUICKLY ENOUGH THEY KICKED ME IN THE HEAD. THEY HIT MY ON THE HEAD WITH THEIR HANDS WHEN THEY THOUGHT I WAS NOT BEING RESPECTFUL TO THE MAN QUESTIONING ME WHOM I THINK WAS AN OFFICER. THEY THREW ME AGAINST THE WALL AND THEN ON THE WAY BACK TO MY CELL THEY BEAT ME.

IN THE EIGHT WEEKS AND ONE DAY I WAS DETAINED, I NEVER SAW ANYONE'S FACE. EITHER I WAS BLINDFOLDED OR THEY WORE MASKS (HOODS).

THE THIRD DAY WAS MORE OF THE SAME WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT MEGAWATI AND OTHERS. THEY ASKED ME ALSO IF I KNEW MURDANI (FORMER BRIGADIR GENERAL BENNY MURDANI). AS ON THE PREVIOUS TWO DAYS, THEY AGAIN USED ELECTRIC CURRENT ON ME. THIS WAS THE LAST DAY I WAS TORTURED OR INTERROGATED.

FROM 0500 TO 0200 THEY PLAYED VERY LOUD MUSIC FROM A

RADIO STATION (WHICH SHUT DOWN FROM 0200 TO 0500). IT

WAS THROUGH THE RADIO THAT I WAS ABLE TO KEEP TRACK OF THE DATE. WHEN THE RADIO WAS NOT PLAYING (FROM 0200 TO 0500) I TALKED WITH OTHERS IN OTHER CELLS. THESE INCLUDED FAISAL RIZA, DESMON (RELEASED), HARYANTO TASLAM (RELEASED), SONY, RYAN PINDAH, YANI, HERMANN HENDRAWAN AND RAHARDJO WALUYO DJATI. SONY AND YANI HAD BOTH BEEN CAPTIVE FOR A LONG TIME. SONY SAID HE HAD BEEN PICKED UP OVER NINE MONTHS AGO AND WAS TORTURED FOR FOUR AND ONE HALF MONTHS, PRINCIPALLY WITH ELECTRIC SHOCK AND WAS BEATEN. (NOTE: SONY WENT MISSING AT THE TIME OF THE MAY 1997 ELECTIONS. END NOTE)

I KNEW I WAS NEAR AN AIRPORT BECAUSE I COULD HEAR JETS AND WHAT I THINK WERE HERCULES AIRCRAFT BECAUSE OF THE PARTICULAR SOUND THEIR PROPELLERS MAKE. AT FIRST I THOUGHT I WAS NEAR HALIM AIRPORT (IN JAKARTA) BUT THEN CONCLUDED I WAS HELD BETWEEN BOGOR AND JAKARTA BECAUSE OF THE TOLL ROADS USED TO BRING ME TO THE AIRPORT WHEN I WAS FINALLY FREED. THERE WAS A SHORT TOLL ROAD AND THEN A LONG ONE. THERE WAS MOVEMENT OF DETAINEES LIKE ME INTO AND OUT OF THE FACILITY. SONY AND RYAN LEFT AND NELULAJATI TOOK SONY'S CELL. (NOTE: PUIS SKETCHED THE FACILITY ON A BOARD AND INDICATED IN WHICH CELL EACH OF THE OTHER DETAINEES WERE HELD. A CAMERA WAS LOCATED IN FRONT OF EACH CELL. END NOTE)

I THINK THEY DECIDED TO LET ME GO BECAUSE THEY DID NOT THINK I KNEW VERY MUCH. THEY ASKED ME FIRST IF THEY LET ME GO, WHAT I WOULD DO. I SAID I WILL SAY I WAS TAKEN CAPTIVE BY FUNCTIONARIES. THEY RESPONDED, GIVE US AN ALTERNATIVE. I SAID I WOULD SIMPLY GO TO MY PARENTS

HOUSE AND HIDE. WITH THIS THEY RETURNED ME TO MY CELL BUT BEFORE GOING THEY TOLD ME TO THINK ABOUT THE ALTERNATIVE OF GOING TO PARENTS AND KEEPING QUIET AND IF ASKED, I SHOULD SAY I WAS AFRAID AND HAD GONE INTO HIDING. WHEN THEY NEXT TALKED TO ME THEY SAID THEY HAD DECIEDED TO GO FOR A "WIN-WIN" SOLUTION. WHEN I SAID I DID NOT KNOW WHAT THAT MEANT, THEY SAID, WE BOTH GET WHAT IS GOOD FOR US. THEY EXPLAINED HOWEVER, THAT IF I TALKED ABOUT MY EXPERIENCE I WOULD BE EXECUTED. "WE ARE PATIENT PEOPLE," THEY SAID, WE WILL GET YOU, IF NOT TOMORROW, THEN THE DAY AFTER OR THE NEXT WEEK. THEY ALSO ASKED ME IF I LOVED MY MOTHER. (NOTE: AT THIS POINT PIUS BROKE DOWN FOR A SECOND TIME. END NOTE)

THE NEXT DAY I WAS PUT IN A KIJANG BLINDFOLDED. WE DROVE THE SOEKARTO-HATTA AIRPORT AND I WAS PUSHED OUT OF THE VEHICLE AFTER BEING TOLD I SHOULD NOT TRY TO LOOK BACK. I HAD A TICKET FOR PALEMBANG IN MY POCKET.

5. (U) IN RESPONDING BRIEFLY TO REPORTERS' QUESTIONS, PIUS SAID HE HOPED THAT HIS TESTIMONY WOULD GIVE OTHERS THE COURAGE TO SPEAK OUT ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THEM. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT REVEALED MUCH BECAUSE HE DID NOT KNOW MUCH. HE ADDED THAT ONE DETAINEE, WALUYO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3833

PAGE 01 JAKART 02406 03 OF 03 282351Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W				

----------383704 282351Z /38

P 280451Z APR 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1271
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002406

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM DETAILS HIS CAPTIVITY AND TORTURE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DJATI, HAD REVEALED A GREAT DEAL ABOUT FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES UNDER TORTURE AND "FELT VERY SORRY, BUT HE COULD NOT STAND THE PAIN." PRIVATELY, HE TOLD POLOFF THAT HE HOPED HIS TESTIMONY WOULD SHOW THAT A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO ARE STILL MISSING WERE STILL ALIVE AND DETAINED, AND WOULD HELP KEEP THEM ALIVE. WITH REGARD TO THE IDENTITY OF HIS CAPTORS HE NOTED THAT ON THREE OCCASIONS HE HAD SEEN REVOLVERS TYPICAL OF THOSE USED BY

THE MILITARY.

6. (U) HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBER ALBERT HASIBUAN TOLD THE PRESS THAT USE OF TORTURE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POWER TO PRODUCE FEAR WAS "UNCIVILIZED."
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4069

PAGE 01 JAKART 02404 01 OF 02 290155Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W				

------------------384038 290209Z /38

P 271209Z APR 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1266
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002404

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID

SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM DETAILS HIS CAPTIVITY
- AND TORTURE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02404 01 OF 02 290155Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS;

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

REASON 1.5(D)

2. (U) SUMMARY: PIUS LUSTRILANANG, WHO WAS MISSING FOR TWO MONTHS (FEBRUARY 4 - APRIL 2), GAVE TESTIMONY TO THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION APRIL 27. HIS IS THE FIRST PUBLIC TESTIMONY BY A KNOWN DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM. APPROXIMATELY 65 FOREIGN AND INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS ATTENDED THE SESSION WHICH COMMISSION OFFICIALS CAREFULLY BILLED AS "A REPORT TO US (THE COMMISSION) WHICH YOU ARE PRIVILEGED TO LISTEN TO." THE DESCRIPTION OF THE SETTING WAS PROMPTED BY PIUS'S CONTENTION THAT HE HAD BEEN THREATENED WITH DEATH IF HE DESCRIBED ANY PORTION OF HIS EXPERIENCE TO THE PRESS. PUIS WAS INVITED TO JAKARTA BY THE COMMISSION FROM HIS HOME IN PALEMBANG WHERE HE HAD BEEN RECUPERATING AT HIS PARENTS HOME. HE RECOUNTED TO THE COMMISSION AND JOURNALISTS WHAT HE CLAIMED WERE NUMEROUS INTERROGATION SESSIONS IN WHICH ELECTRIC SHOCK WAS APPLIED. HE WAS ALSO BEATEN REGULARLY AND AT ONE POINT ALMOST DROWNED. HE DESCRIBED AN INCARCERATION FACILITY LOCATED, HE THOUGHT, NEAR BOGOR THROUGH WHICH A NUMBER OF MISSING PERSONS, INCLUDING CURRENTLY MISSING AND ALREADY RELEASED, WERE FUNNELED. HE ALSO NOTED SOME OF THEM WERE TORTURED. HE SAID HE COULD NOT IDENTIFY HIS CAPTORS BUT AT ONE POINT SAID HE THOUGHT HE WAS BEING QUESTIONED BY AN OFFICER AND NOTED THE PRESENCE OF ARMS USUALLY AVAILABLE ONLY TO THE MILITARY. HIS INTERROGATION RELATED TO THE ACTIVITIES OF PROMINENT GOVERNMENT CRITICS. COMMISSION MEMBER ALBERT HASIBUAN WAS STRONGLY CRITICAL OF ANYONE WHO WOULD ATTEMPT TO USE FEAR AS AN "INSTRUMENT OF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02404 01 OF 02 290155Z
FEAR."

3. (C) PIUS DEPARTED FOR SINGAPORE AT 1730 APRIL 27 ENROUTE TO AMSTERDAM. HE WAS ESCORTED TO HIS PLANE BY SEVERAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBERS. AS A PRECAUTION TAKEN AT PIUS'S REQUEST, POLOFF WAS AT THE AIRPORT BUT NOT WITH THE PARTY. THE COMMISSION WAS UNABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH ICRC OR UNHCR ABOUT MODALITIES OF DEPARTURE ARRANGEMENTS. THERE FOLLOWS A NEAR VERBATIM ACCOUNT OF KEY PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY.

AT THIS POINT, WE MAKE NO ATTEMPT TO EVALUATE THE VERACITY OF PIUS'S ACCOUNT BUT WILL CROSS CHECK AGAINST SECOND HAND INFORMATION WHICH WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING. WE WILL ALSO ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY MISSING NAMES, SOME OF WHICH APPEAR NEW AND ARE RENDERED BELOW PHONETICALLY. REACTION, FROM THE COMMISSION AND OTHERS WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL, END SUMMARY

4. (U) PUIS LUSTRILANANG'S TESTIMONY:

IT IS NOT TRUE THAT I WAS IN HIDING DURING MY DISAPPEARANCE. I WAS KIDNAPPED AT 1530 HOURS ON FEBRUARY 4 WHILE I WAS STANDING AT THE GATE OF A HOSPITAL IN JAKARTA. A MAN APPEARED BEHIND ME AND PUSHED ME INTO A VEHICLE. I SAW THAT HE WAS HOLDING AN FN PISTOL (NFI). THE VEHICLE WAS A CORONA TWIN CAM, GREY IN COLOR. THERE WERE THREE PEOPLE ALREADY IN THE VEHICLE. I WAS HANDCUFFED AND TOLD TO GET DOWN. THEY ALSO BLINDFOLDED ME AND PUT A JACKET OVER MY HEAD. THEY TURNED UP MUSIC VERY LOUD IN THE VEHICLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THEY DROVE FOR 45 TO 60 MINUTES TO A PLACE I COULD NOT IDENTIFY. IT APPEARED TO BE AN OFFICE. THEY QUESTIONED ME THERE WHILE I WAS STILL BOUND AND BLINDFOLDED. THEY BEGAN WITH SIMPLE QUESTIONS ABOUT WHO I WAS AND WHY I THOUGHT I HAD BEEN TAKEN. AT ONE POINT SOMEONE SAT DOWN NEXT TO ME AND SAID HE WAS "THE KIND OF PERSON WHO DOES NOT LIKE TO SPEAK IN COMPLICATED SENTENCES." HE THEN SAID, "SOME PEOPLE LEAVE HERE ALIVE, SOME DO NOT." THEN THEY ATTACHED ELECTRIC WIRES TO MY FEET. BUT THE BATTERY WAS LOW SO THEY HAD TO GET A NEW ONE. AS THEY ELECTROCUTED ME THEY ALSO ASKED ME QUESTIONS, MOSTLY ABOUT "SIAGA" (A GROUP FORMED TO SUPPORT OPPOSITION PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND AMIEN RAIS) AND THE ACTIVITIES OF PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURES, ESPECIALLY MEGAWATI, AS WELL AS SOME NGO'S. THEY ALSO ASKED ABOUT RATNA SARUMPAET (FOUNDER OF SIAGA, AND ACTRESS) AND GING GINANJAR (A JOURNALIST, BOTH ARE NOW FACING TRIAL FOR HOLDING AN ILLEGAL POLITICAL MEETING).

AT ANOTHER POINT, THEY PUT ME IN A CEMENT WATER CONTAINER AND FILLED IT UP TO MY NOSE, THEN STEPPED ON MY HEAD. I THOUGHT I WOULD DROWN. (AT THIS POINT IN THE TESTIMONY, PIUS APPEARED TO BREAK DOWN BUT RESUMED HIS NARRATIVE AFTER SEVERAL MINUTES.)

LATER WHEN I DID NOT APPEAR TO BE RESPONDING QUICKLY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3829

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3829

PAGE 01 JAKART 02404 02 OF 02 282349Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/022W					

----------3836E6 282349Z /38

P 271209Z APR 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1267
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002404

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM DETAILS HIS CAPTIVITY
- AND TORTURE

ENOUGH THEY KICKED ME IN THE HEAD. THEY HIT MY ON THE HEAD WITH THEIR HANDS WHEN THEY THOUGHT I WAS NOT BEING

CONFIDENTIAL

RESPECTFUL TO THE MAN QUESTIONING ME WHOM I THINK WAS AN OFFICER. THEY THREW ME AGAINST THE WALL AND THEN ON THE WAY BACK TO MY CELL THEY BEAT ME.

IN THE EIGHT WEEKS AND ONE DAY I WAS DETAINED, I NEVER SAW ANYONE'S FACE. EITHER I WAS BLINDFOLDED OR THEY WORE MASKS (HOODS).

THE THIRD DAY WAS MORE OF THE SAME WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT MEGAWATI AND OTHERS. THEY ASKED ME ALSO IF I KNEW MURDANI (FORMER BRIGADIR GENERAL BENNY MURDANI). AS ON THE PREVIOUS TWO DAYS, THEY AGAIN USED ELECTRIC CURRENT ON ME. THIS WAS THE LAST DAY I WAS TORTURED OR INTERROGATED.

FROM 0500 TO 0200 THEY PLAYED VERY LOUD MUSIC FROM A RADIO STATION (WHICH SHUT DOWN FROM 0200 TO 0500). IT WAS THROUGH THE RADIO THAT I WAS ABLE TO KEEP TRACK OF THE DATE. WHEN THE RADIO WAS NOT PLAYING (FROM 0200 TO 0500) I TALKED WITH OTHERS IN OTHER CELLS. THESE INCLUDED REZA, DESMON (RELEASED), HARYANTO TASLAM (RELEASED), SONY, RYAN PINDAH, YANI, HERMANN AND REZA. REZA AND YANI HAD BOTH BEEN CAPTIVE FOR A LONG TIME. SONY SAID HE HAD BEEN PICKED UP OVER NINE MONTHS AGO AND WAS TORTURED FOR FOUR AND ONE HALF MONTHS, PRINCIPALLY WITH ELECTRIC SHOCK AND WAS BEATEN. (NOTE: SONY WENT MISSING AT THE TIME OF THE MAY 1997 ELECTIONS. END NOTE)

I KNEW I WAS NEAR AN AIRPORT BECAUSE I COULD HEAR JETS

AND WHAT I THINK WERE HERCULES AIRCRAFT BECAUSE OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02404 02 OF 02 282349Z
PARTICULAR SOUND THEIR PROPELLERS MAKE. AT FIRST I THOUGHT I WAS NEAR HALIM AIRPORT (IN JAKARTA) BUT THEN CONCLUDED I WAS HELD BETWEEN BOGOR AND JAKARTA BECAUSE OF THE TOLL ROADS USED TO BRING ME TO THE AIRPORT WHEN I WAS FINALLY FREED. THERE WAS A SHORT TOLL ROAD AND THEN A LONG ONE. THERE WAS MOVEMENT OF DETAINEES LIKE ME INTO AND OUT OF THE FACILITY. SONY AND RYAN LEFT AND NELULAJATI TOOK SONY'S CELL. (NOTE: PUIS SKETCHED THE FACILITY ON A BOARD AND INDICATED IN WHICH CELL EACH OF THE OTHER DETAINEES WERE HELD. END NOTE)

I THINK THEY DECIDED TO LET ME GO BECAUSE THEY DID NOT THINK I KNEW VERY MUCH. THEY ASKED ME FIRST IF THEY LET ME GO, WHAT I WOULD DO. I SAID I WILL SAY I WAS TAKEN CAPTIVE BY FUNCTIONARIES. THEY RESPONDED, GIVE US AN ALTERNATIVE. I SAID I WOULD SIMPLY GO TO MY PARENTS HOUSE AND HIDE. WITH THIS THEY RETURNED ME TO MY CELL BUT BEFORE GOING THEY TOLD ME TO THINK ABOUT THE ALTERNATIVE OF GOING TO PARENTS AND KEEPING QUIET AND IF ASKED, I SHOULD SAY I WAS AFRAID AND HAD GONE INTO HIDING. WHEN THEY NEXT TALKED TO ME THEY SAID THEY HAD DECIEDED TO GO FOR A "WIN-WIN" SOLUTION. WHEN I SAID I DID NOT KNOW WHAT THAT MEANT, THEY SAID, WE BOTH GET WHAT IS GOOD FOR US. THEY EXPLAINED HOWEVER, THAT IF I TALKED ABOUT MY EXPERIENCE I WOULD BE EXECUTED. "WE ARE PATIENT PEOPLE," THEY SAID, WE WILL GET YOU, IF NOT TOMORROW, THEN THE DAY AFTER OR THE NEXT WEEK. THEY ALSO ASKED ME IF I LOVED MY MOTHER. (NOTE: AT THIS POINT PIUS BROKE DOWN FOR A SECOND TIME. END NOTE)

THE NEXT DAY I WAS PUT IN A KIJANG BLINDFOLDED. WE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DROVE THE SOEKARTO-HATTA AIRPORT AND I WAS PUSHED OUT OF THE VEHICLE AFTER BEING TOLD I SHOULD NOT TRY TO LOOK BACK. I HAD A TICKET FOR PALEMBANG IN MY POCKET.

5. (U) IN RESPONDING BRIEFLY TO REPORTERS' QUESTIONS, PIUS SAID HE HOPED THAT HIS TESTIMONY WOULD GIVE OTHERS THE COURAGE TO SPEAK OUT ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THEM. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT REVEALED MUCH BECAUSE HE DID NOT KNOW MUCH. HE ADDED THAT ONE DETAINEE HAD REVEALED A GREAT DEAL ABOUT FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES UNDER TORTURE AND "FELT VERY SORRY, BUT HE COULD NOT STAND THE PAIN." PRIVATELY, HE TOLD POLOFF THAT HE HOPED HIS TESTIMONY THAT A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO ARE STILL MISSING WERE STILL ALIVE AND DETAINED WILL HELP KEEP THEM ALIVE. WITH REGARD TO THE IDENTITY OF HIS CAPTORS HE NOTED THAT ON THREE OCCASIONS HE HAD SEEN REVOLVERS TYPICAL OF THOSE USED BY THE MILITARY.

6. (U) HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBER ALBERT HASIBUAN TOLD THE PRESS THAT USE OF TORTURE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POWER TO PRODUCE FEAR WAS "UNCIVILIZED."
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4727

PAGE 01 JAKART 01988 01 OF 02 031353Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	PRME-01
	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/030W	

----------2F3873 031353Z /38

O 031350Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0889
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0603
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USDOC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001988

S/S-O FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01988 01 OF 02 031353Z
STATE PLEASE PASS USDA FOR FAS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2006 200502501

STATE PLEASE PASS EXIMBANK FOR AL-ASKARI
STATE PLEASE PASS AID FOR AA/ANE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS
TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC/LOUNGANI
TREASURY PASS TO OASIA/IET - PENTOLA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/03/2008
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PREF, ELAB, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN POLITICAL SITREP APRIL 3

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (U) SUMMARY: STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUED APRIL 3, THE LARGEST BEING A GATHERING OF UP TO 5,000 AT GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY IN JOGJAKARTA. IN A REPEAT OF VIOLENCE THERE YESTERDAY, THIS DEMONSTRATION ALSO PRODUCED A FIERCE CLASH BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES WITH INJURIES AND ARRESTS. THERE WAS A PEACEFUL GATHERING OF 500 STUDENT REPRESENTATIVES IN JAKARTA. IN ADDITION, A GROUP OF 70 EAST TIMORESE DEMONSTRATED PEACEFULLY IN CENTRAL JAKARTA WITHOUT POLICE INTERFERENCE. JUDGES DISMISSED A LAWSUIT BY 122 DEMONSTRATORS FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE--WHICH THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO PRESENT BECAUSE POLICE REFUSED TO ALLOW THEM TO APPEAR IN COURT. THE LEGAL AID FOUNDATION HAS ESTABLISHED A MONITORING POST FOR ACTIVISTS WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED. A SPOKESPERSON FOR THE RULING GOLKAR PARLIAMENTARY FACTION VOICED CONCERN ABOUT MISSING ACTIVISTS. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

EAST TIMORESE DEMONSTRATE IN CENTRAL JAKARTA
---

3. (U) SOME 70 EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS STAGED THE FIRST OPENLY PRO-FRETILIN DEMONSTRATION IN JAKARTA IN RECENT MEMORY. IT TOOK PLACE IN FRONT OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY, WHICH IS LOCATED ON ONE OF THE BUSIEST TRAFFIC CIRCLES IN THE CITY. THE EAST TIMORESE WERE DEMANDING THAT THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE BE INCLUDED IN THE AGENDA FOR

THE ASEM (ASIA-EUROPE) MEETING IN LONDON. AS SEVERAL DOZEN RIOT POLICE STOOD BY, THE DEMONSTRATION BROKE UP PEACEFULLY AFTER THE STUDENTS PRESENTED THEIR DEMANDS TO A BRITISH DIPLOMAT.

NO MILITARY-STUDENT DIALOGUE

4. (SBU) THERE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE NO STUDENT-ABRI DIALOGUE ON APRIL 4. ALL UNIVERSITIES INVITED TO PARTICIPATE, ALONG WITH MANY NOT INVITED TO PARTICIPATE, HAVE REJECTED THE PROPOSAL FOR DIALOGUE WITH ABRI ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT IS NOT ABRI THAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. WE HAVE HEARD OF NO UNIVERSITY THAT HAS ACCEPTED THE INVITATION. A JAKARTA STUDENT SENATE LEADER TOLD POLOFF THAT ANY STUDENT LEADER WHO AGREED TO PARTICIPATE WOULD BE "KICKED OUT" OF THE NETWORK. HE THOUGHT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT THE DIALOGUE WAS POSTPONED. IN WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN A FACE-SAVING EFFORT, ON APRIL 1, ABRI SPOKESMAN BRIG. GEN. WAHAB MOKODONGAN WAS QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS DISMISSING THE REPORTS THAT A DIALOGUE WAS SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 4, SAYING "IT'S NOT TRUE THAT THE DIALOGUE WILL BE HELD ON APRIL 4." ANOTHER JAKARTA STUDENT SENATE LEADER TOLD POLOFF THAT A DIALOGUE

WITH ABRI WAS "USELESS," AND SAID THAT THE STUDENTS WANT A DIALOGUE WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO.

STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS

5. (U) CONGEN SURABAYA REPORTS THAT 5,000 PERSONS DEMONSTRATED AT "GADJAH MADA CIRCLE" ON THE GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY (UGM) CAMPUS APRIL 3. THE ISLAMIC STUDENTS ASSOCIATION (HMI) ORGANIZED THE DEMONSTRATION. ACCORDING TO SOURCES IN JOGJAKARTA "OUTSIDERS" JOINED THE DEMONSTRATION AND URGED PARTICIPANT TO TRY TO MAKE A "LONG MARCH" OUTSIDE THE CAMPUS, BUT 7 TRUCKLOADS OF POLICE AND 2-3 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS BLOCKED THEM. ACCORDING TO A WESTERN REPORTER ON THE SCENE, TOWARDS THE END OF THE PLANNED DEMONSTRATION WHICH HAD BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY MORE MODERATE SLOGANS THAN IN THE APRIL 2 DEMONSTRATIONS THERE, A CLASH BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SECURITY FORCES ERUPTED. SECURITY FORCES PURSUED STUDENTS DEEP INTO THE CAMPUS FIRING TEAR GAS AND BEATING STUDENTS. THE SECURITY FORCES ALSO TRASHED ABOUT 100 MOTORCYCLES BELONGING TO STUDENTS AND THE

UNIVERSITY CAFETERIA WHICH HAS BEEN USED THE DAY BEFORE AS A CLINIC BY STUDENTS INJURED IN THE APRIL 2 CLASHES (SEE PARA 6). THE WESTERN JOURNALIST TOLD POLOFF THAT 20 STUDENTS WERE HOSPITALIZED AND 14 ARRESTED. ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION IS PLANNED FOR APRIL 4 AT THE SAME CAMPUS. STUDENTS REPORTEDLY ARE VERY ANGRY.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7728

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7728

PAGE 01 JAKART 01988 02 OF 02 060111Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	PRME-01
	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/030W	

---------2FDE84 060111Z /38

O 031350Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0890
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0604

AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USDOC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 01988

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01988 02 OF 02 060111Z

S/S-O FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA AND INR/IL
STATE PLEASE PASS USDA FOR FAS
STATE PLEASE PASS EXIMBANK FOR AL-ASKARI
STATE PLEASE PASS AID FOR AA/ANE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS
TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC/LOUNGANI
TREASURY PASS TO OASIA/IET - PENTOLA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/03/2008
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PREF, ELAB, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN POLITICAL SITREP APRIL 3

6. (U) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, AN APRIL 2 CLASH BETWEEN SECURITY PERSONNEL AND DEMONSTRATING STUDENTS AT UGM LEFT BETWEEN 50 AND 88 STUDENTS INJURED. CONGEN SURABAYA REPORTS THAT 24 OF THE INJURED REQUIRED HOSPITALIZATION, AND FOUR ARE STILL MISSING. TWO VOLLEYS OF WARNING SHOTS WERE FIRED BEFORE THE CLASH, AND TEAR GAS WAS USED DURING THE CLASH. A VEHICLE CARRYING TEAR GAS WAS TRASHED BY STUDENTS.

7. (U) ELSEWHERE, DEMONSTRATIONS ON APRIL 2 WERE HELD IN JAKARTA (APRIL 2 SITREP), BANDUNG, SEMARANG, PURWOKERTO, SURABAYA, AND PONTIANAK. A GROUP OF 100 STUDENTS IN SURABAYA AND A GROUP IN PONTIANAK MARCHED OFF CAMPUS WITHOUT INCIDENT. IN JAKARTA, APRIL 3,

APPROXIMATELY 500 STUDENTS FROM VARIOUS INSTITUTIONS GATHERED TO
CONFIDENTIAL

VOICE POLITICAL PROTESTS AND, INTER ALIA, CALLED FOR ABRI TO SUPPORT THE STUDENTS.

CATCH-22 IN COURT FOR JAKARTA DEMONSTRATORS

8. (U) ON APRIL 2 THE SOUTH JAKARTA COURT DISMISSED LAWSUITS BY 122 MEMBERS OF THE "RED AND WHITE FRONT" (DEMONSTRATORS ARRESTED FEBRUARY 11) AGAINST THE POLICE. THE JUDGES BASED THEIR RULING SOLELY ON EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE POLICE, AND SAID PLAINTIFFS HAD "WASTED" THEIR OPPORTUNITY TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE BY FAILING TO APPEAR AT EARLIER HEARINGS. THE JUDGES FAILED TO MENTION THAT THE 122 DID NOT APPEAR BECAUSE POLICE PREVENTED THEM FROM COMING TO THE COURT. LAWYERS FOR THE 122 BOYCOTTED THE COURT SESSION AGAIN.

DISAPPEARANCES

9. (U) THE INDONESIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION (YLBHI) HAS ESTABLISHED A MONITORING POST FOR FAMILIES OF MISSING PEOPLE TO HELP TRACE THEIR RELATIVES WHEREABOUTS. THE SECRETARY OF THE RULING GOLKAR PARLIAMENTARY FACTION, SYAMSUL MU'ARIF, EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE DISAPPEARANCES, AND NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBER ALBERT HASIBUAN URGED STATE AUTHORITIES TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINDING THE MISSING PERSONS.

PART II. LABOR DEVELOPMENTS

10. (U) DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER (DOM) SECRETARY GENERAL SUWARTO TOLD THE PRESS APRIL 2 THAT COMPANIES WHICH WERE ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH WORKERS ON AN INCREASE IN THEIR COMPANIES' MINIMUM WAGES, WILL
CONFIDENTIAL

NOT BE ALLOWED TO STOP THOSE NEGOTIATIONS OR CANCEL WAGE INCREASES ALREADY AGREED PRIOR TO THE MARCH 30 DOM DECISION NOT TO INCREASE REGIONAL MINIMUM WAGES THIS YEAR. SUWARTO ALSO SAID THAT 276 COMPANIES WHICH OBTAINED EXEMPTIONS FROM PAYING THE FULL MINIMUM WAGE IN 1997 MUST PAY THE FULL AMOUNT EFFECTIVE APRIL 1. SUWARTO DID NOT SAY WHETHER DOM WOULD ACCEPT NEW REQUESTS FOR EXEMPTIONS.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0813

PAGE 01 JAKART 01954 01 OF 02 021130Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	PRME-01	DRL-04
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/029W		

----------2EA602 021131Z /38

O 021129Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0843
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0598
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USDOC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001954

S/S-O FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01954 01 OF 02 021130Z
STATE PLEASE PASS USDA FOR FAS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2006 200502501

STATE PLEASE PASS EXIMBANK FOR AL-ASKARI
STATE PLEASE PASS AID FOR AA/ANE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS
TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC/LOUNGANI
TREASURY PASS TO OASIA/IET - PENTOLA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/02/2008
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PREF, ELAB, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN POLITICAL SITREP APRIL 2

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (U) SUMMARY: STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUED APRIL 2 WITH A MAJOR CLASH REPORTED IN JOGJAKARTA BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SECURITY FORCES. NEW DISAPPEARANCES HAVE BEEN ALLEGED. A SENIOR POLICE OFFICIAL HAS ISSUED A SHOOT ON SIGHT ORDER IN JAKARTA FOR PERSONS COMMITTING "THEFT WITH VIOLENCE." MORE MIGRANT WORKERS ALLEGED TO BE ILLEGAL WERE DEPORTED FROM MALAYSIA TO INDONESIA ON APRIL 1. SOURCES IN MEDAN CLAIM THAT DETAINED ACEHNESE MIGRANTS ARE CONFINED IN DIFFICULT CONDITIONS AT A MILITARY BASE IN ACEH. THEY ARE HELD INCOMMUNICADO AND THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT SOME MAY HAVE BEEN TORTURED. THE 13 UNIONS COMPRISING THE GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS HAS REJECTED THE DECISION NOT TO INCREASE THE MINIMUM WAGE. A DEMONSTRATION IN MEDAN ON APRIL 2 ALSO PROTESTED THE DECISION. END SUMMARY

PART I. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY IN JAKARTA
---

3. (U) JAKARTA DEPUTY POLICE CHIEF BRIG. GEN. GUNAWAN TOLD JOURNALISTS THAT SECURITY PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO "SHOOT ON THE SPOT" ANYONE INVOLVED IN "THEFT WITH VIOLENCE."

DISAPPEARANCES
---

4. .(U) A PRESS CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT LBH IN JAKARTA ABOUT DISAPPEARANCES AND VIOLENCE AGAINST STUDENT ACTIVISTS. FAMILY MEMBERS OF TWO MISSING STUDENTS, HERMAN HENDRAWAN FROM SURABAYA'S AIRLANGGA UNIVERSITY AND FAISOL REZHA FROM GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY IN JOGJAKARTA, WERE PRESENT AND PLAN TO TAKE THEIR CASES TO THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TOMORROW. A LIST OF 10 MISSING PEOPLE (JANUARY TO MARCH 1998) WAS DISTRIBUTED.

STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS
---

5. (U) A LARGE DEMONSTRATION AT JOGJAKARTA'S GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY WAS HELD APRIL 2. IT TURNED VIOLENT AFTER STUDENTS MOVED OFF CAMPUS. SECURITY FORCES, CHASING FLEEING STUDENTS, ENTERED THE CAMPUS AT ONE POINT BUT WERE DRIVEN BACK AFTER A COUNTER-ATTACK BY ROCK-THROWING STUDENTS. ACCORDING TO SOMEONE ON THE SCENE, THE POLICE AND MILITARY USED TEAR GAS AND BEAT STUDENTS. AT LEAST 26 STUDENTS WERE REPORTED HOSPITALIZED. ONE OF THE POLICE WAS INJURED. THIS SOURCE CLAIMS THAT ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION IS PLANNED TOMORROW IN JOGJAKARTA. MEANWHILE, A LATE APRIL 2 REPORT

CLAIMS THAT A "FOLLOW-ON" DEMONSTRATION DEVELOPED LATE IN THE DAY AND IS CONTINUING IN THE CITY.

6. (U) ABOUT 100 STUDENTS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LAMPUNG TRIED TO TAKE THEIR DEMONSTRATION OFF CAMPUS ON APRIL 1, BUT WERE BLOCKED BY SECURITY FORCES AT THE GATE, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. IN PONTIANAK, ABOUT 350 STUDENTS STAGED A CAMPUS DEMONSTRATION ON APRIL 1, AND IN ACEH, TENS OF STUDENTS VISITED THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT. A FORUM OF 26 SURABAYA STUDENT SENATES ISSUED A STATEMENT APRIL 1 REJECTING THE ABRI-STUDENT DIALOGUE. DEMONSTRATIONS ON JAKARTA CAMPUSES CONTINUED ON APRIL 2 WITH THE THEME "NO DIALOGUE" (WITH THE MILITARY).

DEPORTING MIGRANTS
---

8. (U) ANOTHER GROUP OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS ARRIVED AT THE NORTH SUMATRA PORT OF TANJUNGBALAI ON APRIL 1.

9. (C) NGOS IN MEDAN HAVE RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT SOME OF THE ACEHNESE DEPORTED BY MALAYSIA ON MARCH 27 AND NOW HELD INCOMMUNICADO BY THE MILITARY IN ACEH MAY HAVE BEEN TORTURED WHILE ON BOARD THE INDONESIAN NAVAL VESSEL WHICH RETURNED THEM. A MALAYSIAN DIPLOMAT WHO VISITED THE CAMP WHERE THE ACEHNESE RETURNEES ARE BEING HELD INDICATED CONDITIONS FOR THE DETAINEES ARE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0814

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0814

PAGE 01 JAKART 01954 02 OF 02 021130Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	PRME-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/030W		

----------2EA605 021131Z /38

O 021129Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0844
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0599

AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USDOC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001954

S/S-O FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

STATE PLEASE PASS USDA FOR FAS
STATE PLEASE PASS EXIMBANK FOR AL-ASKARI
STATE PLEASE PASS AID FOR AA/ANE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS
TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC/LOUNGANI
TREASURY PASS TO OASIA/IET - PENTOLA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/02/2008
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PREF, ELAB, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN POLITICAL SITREP APRIL 2

POOR. (SEE SEPTEL)

JUSTICE DELAYED
---

10. (U) DURING A COURT SESSION OF THE SUIT FILED BY 57 MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS AGAINST THE POLICE CHIEF FOR KEEPING THEM IN DETENTION, THE 15 LAWYERS FOR THE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WALKED OUT IN PROTEST BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFFS, AGAIN, WERE NOT PERMITTED TO BE PRESENT. A GROUP OF 65 OTHERS ALSO HAVE NOT BEEN PERMITTED TO APPEAR.

11. (U) OVER 100 PEOPLE FROM BOGOR STAGED A PROTEST YESTERDAY, WITNESSED BY POLOFF, IN FRONT OF THE BANK INTERNATIONAL INDONESIA HEADQUARTERS IN JAKARTA. THEY WERE DEMANDING COMPENSATION FOR LAND ACQUIRED BY A DEVELOPER 24 YEARS AGO.

PART II LABOR DEVELOPMENTS

CONFIDENTIAL

12. (U) THE 13 UNIONS COMPRISING THE GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED FEDERATION OF ALL-INDONESIAN TRADE UNIONS (SPSI) ISSUED A STATEMENT APRIL 1 REJECTING THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT SIGNED BY THE SPSI LEADERSHIP MARCH 30 TO FOREGO A MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE IN 1998. LEADERS OF THE 13 UNION SAID THEY WERE TAKING THE STEP OF PUBLICLY REPUDIATING THE WAGE AGREEMENT BECAUSE IT WAS DONE WITHOUT CONSULTING THEM. THEY ASSERTED THAT DENYING AN INCREASE SHORTCHANGED WORKERS IN INDUSTRIES WHICH COULD AFFORD TO PAY MORE. MOREOVER, THEY SAID, THE IMPACT OF A MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE ON COMPANIES' COSTS WAS MINIMAL COMPARED TO OTHER FACTORS.

13. (SBU) UNION REPRESENTATIVES, A SENIOR PARLIAMENTARIAN AND NGOS IN MEDAN TOLD POLOFF APRIL 1-2 THAT LABOR IN MEDAN WOULD REJECT THE DECISION NOT TO RAISE THE MINIMUM WAGE. APPROXIMATELY 350 WORKERS AND NGOS GATHERED AT THE NORTH SUMATRA PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT TO PROTEST THE GOVERNMENT DECISION NOT TO RAISE THE MINIMUM WAGE.

14. (C) IN A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR APRIL 2, MINISTER OF MANPOWER ACKNOWLEDGED THE UNION LEADERS' ANGRY REACTION, BUT ASSERTED THAT RAISING THE MINIMUM WAGE NOW WOULD PUT MORE COMPANIES OUT OF BUSINESS AND MAKE MORE WORKERS UNEMPLOYED.
ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9514

PAGE 01 JAKART 01849 01 OF 02 301030Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01
	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W	

----------2D20D7 301030Z /38

P 301027Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0766
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001849

NOFORN

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCE OF KEY OPPOSITION OFFICIAL

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS;
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01849 01 OF 02 301030Z
REASON 1.5(D)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2006 200502501

2. (C) SUMMARY: OPPOSITION FIGURE MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI IS CONTEMPLATING FURTHER STEPS TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF A KEY AIDE WHOM SHE BELIEVES HAS BEEN "DISAPPEARED" BY THE MILITARY. WITH PRIVATE APPROACHES TO SENIOR MILITARY FIGURES UNAVAILING, MEGAWATI IS CONSIDERING GOING PUBLIC WITH AN APPEAL TO THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. HER PLANS WILL POSSIBLY INCLUDE EFFORTS TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF SEVERAL OTHER PRO-REFORM FIGURES WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED AND ARE BELIEVED TO BE IN CUSTODY WITHOUT WARRANT AND INCOMMUNICADO. MEGAWATI'S AIDE HAD KEY RESPONSIBILITY FOR HER CONTACT WITH STUDENT GROUPS AND HIS ABSENCE HAS IMPEDED MEGAWATI'S COORDINATION WITH PRO-REFORM STUDENT GROUPS. HIS DISAPPEARANCE FOLLOWS THE PATTERN OF ANOTHER SENIOR MEGAWATI AIDE'S DISAPPEARANCE IN 1996. THAT OFFICIAL ESCAPED FROM WHAT HE CLAIMS WAS OVER ONE WEEK OF MILITARY CUSTODY WITHOUT WARRANT DURING WHICH TIME HE WAS ALTERNATELY OFFERED BRIBES AND THREATS TO COMPEL HIM TO TURN AGAINST MEGAWATI. THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN QUIETLY MAKING INQUIRIES WITH THE GOVERNMENT ABOUT THREE SPECIFIC DISAPPEARANCE CASES. END SUMMARY

3. (C) MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI, GOVERNMENT-OUSTED LEADER OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI), IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED AND ANGRY OVER THE DISAPPEARANCE O/A MARCH 9 OF HARYANTO TASLAM, DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PDI FACTION WHICH REMAINS LOYAL TO HER. A SENIOR ADVISOR TOLD POLOFF ON MARCH 29 THAT MEGAWATI IS CONSIDERING A PUBLIC CAMPAIGN, BEGINNING WITH AN APPROACH TO THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ON

BEHALF OF THE PDI OFFICIAL AND OTHER PRO-REFORM ACTIVISTS WHO RECENTLY HAVE DISAPPEARED.

4. (C) THIS INITIATIVE TO CLARIFY THE WHEREABOUTS OF HARYANTO TASLAM WILL LIKELY ALSO EMBRACE OTHER PRO-REFORM FIGURES WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED IN RECENT WEEKS, INCLUDING SEVERAL OFFICIALS ACTIVE IN THE PRO-MEGAWATI/AMIEN RAIS MOVEMENT "SIAGA" (DESMOND MAHESA AND PIUS LUSTRILANANG), WHO HAVE BEEN MISSING SINCE FEBRUARY 3 AND 4. MARCH 30 MEDIA REPORTED ANOTHER STUDENT, ANDI

ARIEF, ALSO MISSING. IDENTIFIED AS A LEADER OF THE BANNED "STUDENT SOLIDARITY FOR DEMOCRACY," RELATIVES CLAIM HE WAS "ABDUCTED" BY UNKNOWN MEN ON MARCH 28. LAMPUNG AUTHORITIES ARE NOW SEARCHING FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AT THE REQUEST OF HIS FAMILY.

5. (C) MEGAWATI REPORTEDLY IS CONSIDERING BROADENING HER EFFORT ON BEHALF OF HARYANTO WITH A PRESS CAMPAIGN COORDINATED WITH OTHER GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE ALREADY BEEN ACTIVE IN SEEKING INFORMATION ON TWO INDIVIDUALS AND POSSIBLY OTHERS, NOTABLY STUDENTS FROM LAMPUNG WHO HAVE BEEN MISSING SINCE MARCH 19. THE INDONESIAN LEGAL AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION ON MARCH 28 CALLED ON COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS FEISAL TANJUNG TO TURN HIS ATTENTION TO FINDING THE MISSING ACTIVISTS.

5. (C) PRIVATELY, MEGAWATI HAS TOLD AN AIDE THAT SHE BELIEVES ABRI TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE HARYANTO DISAPPEARANCE. THE MEGAWATI AIDE TOLD POLOFF MARCH 29 THAT MEGAWATI TOLD HER THAT SHE HAD APPROACHED SENIOR

ACTIVE DUTY ABRI OFFICERS WITH WHOM SHE MAINTAINS PRIVATE CONTACT TO SECURE THEIR ASSISTANCE, BUT TO NO AVAIL. THEY REPORTEDLY TOLD HER THAT HARYANTO WAS "NOT BEING HELD THROUGH NORMAL MILITARY CHANNELS" AND THAT THEY DID NOT KNOW WHERE HE WAS. MEGAWATI REPORTEDLY IS CONCERNED THAT HARYANTO'S DISAPPEARANCE COULD BE "ONLY THE BEGINNING," WITH MORE DISAPPEARANCES AMONG HER KEY AIDES TO FOLLOW.

6. (C) THE MEGAWATI AIDE SAID THAT THE PDI LEADER'S CONCERNS AND PLANS FOR ACTION ARE SHAPED BY THE EXPERIENCE OF HER PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL ALEX LITTAY WHO WAS ABDUCTED BY THE MILITARY IN THE PERIOD BEFORE THE JUNE 1996 CONGRESS. HE WAS HELD FOR TWO WEEKS IN AN OPERATION HE CLAIMED WAS ORGANIZED BY THEN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL HARTONO (NOW MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS). DURING HIS CONFINEMENT, HE WAS OFFERED PARTNERSHIPS IN LUCRATIVE BUSINESS VENTURES AND WAS ALSO THREATENED WITH THE AIM OF COMPELLING HIM TO DISAVOW

MEGAWATI AS LEADER OF PDI. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN HELD IN VARIOUS LOCATIONS AND TO HAVE BEEN "INTERVIEWED" BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ("BIA") AND OTHERS. HE EVENTUALLY ESCAPED HIS CAPTORS.

7. (C) EMBASSY PERSONNEL HAVE RAISED THE CASE OF

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9515

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9515

PAGE 01 JAKART 01849 02 OF 02 301030Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/033W			

----------2D20D9 301030Z /38

P 301027Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0767
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001849

NOFORN

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCE OF KEY OPPOSITION OFFICIAL

HARYANTO TASLAM WITH SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIALS BUT HAVE DRAWN NO SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE. NO GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL HAS STATED THAT ANY OF THE MISSING ARE HELD BY ANY GOVERNMENT AGENCY AND NO WARRANT HAS SURFACED FOR THE ARREST OF THE THREE INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED ABOVE.

8. (C) COMMENT: HARYANTO TASLAM HAS BEEN A KEY LIEUTENANT IN MEGAWATI'S OPERATION. IN ADDITION TO SPEECH WRITING DUTIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE COORDINATION, HE HAS BEEN MEGAWATI'S PRINCIPAL LIAISON WITH STUDENT GROUPS AND HAD ARRANGED HER APPEARANCES ON CAMPUSES EARLIER THIS YEAR. HIS THREE-WEEK ABSENCE HAS IMPEDED MEGAWATI'S POLITICAL EFFORTS, INCLUDING VISITS TO CAMPUSES.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO9738

PAGE 01 JAKART 01793 270336Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	UTED-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OES-01	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	EPAE-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10
	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/031W	

----------2C319D 270337Z /69

R 260813Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0686
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

UNCLAS JAKARTA 001793

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, SENV, PGOV, PREL, EAID, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: MARCH 15-19 TRIP TO KALIMANTAN

REF: JAKARTA 1661

1. (U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 01793 270336Z
SUMMARY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2006 200502501

2. (SBU) IN A MARCH 15-19 TRIP TO KALIMANTAN (INDONESIAN BORNEO), POLOFF OBSERVED FIRES AND PREVIOUSLY BURNT LANDSCAPE EXTENDING OVER A WIDE AREA IN EAST KALIMANTAN, BUT SAW ONLY ONE FEEBLE FIREFIGHTING EFFORT. IN CONTRAST TO A VISIT TO KALIMANTAN ONE YEAR AGO, A VARIETY OF RANDOMLY ENCOUNTERED RESIDENTS EXPRESSED HARSH CRITICISM AND DISBELIEF OF THEIR GOVERNMENT AND EXHIBITED A SURPRISINGLY SOPHISTICATED UNDERSTANDING OF ECONOMIC ISSUES FACING INDONESIA. NO ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT WAS ENCOUNTERED. DESPITE THIS EVIDENT WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION, ALL AGREED THAT THE SECURITY FORCES HAD THINGS WELL IN HAND IN EAST AND SOUTH KALIMANTAN, WHERE RELATIVELY WEAK NGO'S AND AN INDIGENOUS DAYAK POPULATION VICTIMIZED BY FIRES AND DEVELOPMENT ARE LARGELY POWERLESS AGAINST AN ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT, MILITARY, AND BIG LOGGING FIRMS. CONTACTS' MAJOR PREOCCUPATIONS WERE THE DROUGHT AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. MAJOR PROJECTS IN THE SAMARINDA AREA OF EAST KALIMANTAN HAD COME TO A HALT, AND IN BANJARMASIN LITTLE HAD BEEN DONE TO REPAIR MASSIVE DAMAGE TO THE DOWNTOWN AREA CAUSED BY MAY 1997 RIOTING. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) POLOFF TRAVELED MARCH 15-19 TO BALIKPAPAN, SAMARINDA AND TENGGARONG IN EAST KALIMANTAN, BANJARMASIN IN SOUTHERN KALIMANTAN, AND KUALA KAPUAS IN THE PROVINCE OF CENTRAL KALIMANTAN, MEETING WITH A VARIETY OF NGO'S, ACADEMICS, STUDENTS, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND OBSERVING THE TRIAL OF A

PROMINENT LOCAL DEFENDER OF DAYAK LAND RIGHTS (REFTEL). DUE TO THE NEED TO ADVANCE THE SCHEDULE OF THE TRIP TO ALLOW FOR COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL, POLOFF WAS UNABLE TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH MORE SENIOR OFFICIALS IN THESE LOCALES.

BURNT AND STILL BURNING

4. (U) DESCENDING THROUGH A THICK LAYER OF HAZE INTO

BALIKPAPAN'S AIRPORT ON MARCH 15, POLOFF SAW ABOUT A HALF DOZEN PLUMES OF WHITE SMOKE RISING FROM FIRES IN THE VICINITY. THE 100 KM DRIVE FROM BALIKPAPAN TO THE MAHAKAM RIVER ALONG THE RIDGES OF THE SOEHARTO HILLS TRAVERSED A PARCHED LANDSCAPE ALMOST TOTALLY DEVASTATED BY FIRE AS FAR AS THE EYE COULD SEE. MOST OF THE AREA WAS ALREADY BURNT, BUT IN THE FEW REMAINING GREEN AREAS THE FIRES CONTINUED, AND FIVE OR SIX SUCH FIRES WERE ALWAYS VISIBLE. IN TRAVELING THIS ROAD TWICE POLOFF SAW ONLY A SINGLE LOW TECH EFFORT TO FIGHT THE FIRES. A PICKUP TRUCK WITH A SMALL WATER TANK AND A MILITARY TROOP TRANSPORT TRUCK WERE PARKED BY THE SIDE OF THE ROAD, WITH SOLDIERS CARRYING BUCKETS OF WATER DOWN THE HILLSIDE TO INEFFECTUALLY TOSS THEM ON ONE OF THE MANY FIRES BURNING IN THE AREA.

5. (U) DESPITE THE CONTINUING FIRES, THE HAZE SITUATION WAS RELATIVELY GOOD IN EAST KALIMANTAN DURING POLOFF'S VISIT. VISIBILITY WAS ABOUT THREE TO FOUR KILOMETERS IN SAMARINDA AND BALIKPAPAN. CONTACTS REPORTED THAT THE HAZE HAD BEEN MUCH WORSE THE PREVIOUS WEEK (AND PRESS

REPORTS INDICATED THAT THE THICKER HAZE RETURNED TO THE AREA A FEW DAYS AFTER POLOFF'S DEPARTURE, WITH RESIDENTS OF SAMARINDA AGAIN DONNING FACE MASKS). A TRIP TO TENGGARONG, 44 KILOMETERS UP THE MAHAKAM RIVER FROM SAMARINDA, REVEALED MORE BLACKENED HILLSIDES AND ONGOING FIRES VISIBLE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE WITH BURNT AREAS OFTEN EXTENDING DOWN TO THE RIVERBANK.

DROUGHT AND WATER PROBLEMS

---

6. (U) PROLONGED DROUGHT IN EAST KALIMANTAN WAS A PRIME TOPIC OF CONVERSATION. THE CITY OF SAMARINDA WAS EXPERIENCING SEVERE WATER PROBLEMS DUE TO THE LOW WATER LEVEL OF THE MAHAKAM RIVER WHICH HAD PERMITTED TIDES TO CARRY SEA WATER FARTHER THAN USUAL INTO THE MAHAKAM ESTUARY. THE CITY'S WATER SUPPLY HAD BEEN CUT OFF FOR FOUR DAYS THE PREVIOUS WEEK TO PREVENT SALT DAMAGE TO PIPES. IN THE BALIKPAPAN AREA PEOPLE SAID THERE HAD BEEN VIRTUALLY NO RAIN FOR MONTHS AND THE PARCHED

LANDSCAPE REFLECTED THIS. IN SOUTH KALIMANTAN THE SITUATION APPEARED CLOSER TO NORMAL. THE FIRES OF LAST YEAR HAD NOT YET RETURNED BUT THERE WAS A SLIGHT HAZE, POSSIBLY FROM FIRES FURTHER NORTH, LIMITING VISIBILITY TO ABOUT 5 TO 6 KILOMETERS.

ACTS OF GOD?
---

7 (SBU) NGO CONTACTS IN SAMARINDA MAINTAINED THAT A NUMBER OF FIRES WERE INTENTIONALLY SET, AND SAID THEY HAD REPORTS OF LOCALS BEING PAID TO SET FIRE TO LANDS

WHERE LOGGING FIRMS WERE ATTEMPTING TO MOVE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OUT. THE NGO ACTIVISTS ARGUED ADAMANTLY THAT INDIGENOUS DAYAKS WERE NOT STARTING FIRES, BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE TRADITIONAL SEASON FOR THEM TO DO SO. THE FIRES BURNING BETWEEN BALIKPAPAN AND SAMARINDA WERE SCORCHING A VARIETY OF PREVIOUSLY LOGGED, REPLANTED, AND FORESTED LANDSCAPES. DROUGHT WAS OBVIOUSLY A MAJOR FACTOR FACILITATING THE BURNING. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CERTAIN NGO ACTIVISTS, MOST PEOPLE POLOFF ENCOUNTERED TOOK A RATHER FATALISTIC VIEW OF THE FIRES. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL NGO "WAHLI" IN BANJARMASIN SAID THAT THE STRONG INFLUENCE OF ISLAM IN THE AREA WAS A MAJOR OBSTACLE FOR NGO'S TRYING TO EDUCATE THE POPULACE ON THE FIRE PROBLEM. THE MUSLIM ULEMAS TENDED TO TELL THEIR PEOPLE THAT THE FIRES AND THE SMOKE WERE "ACTS OF GOD." HE SAID NGO'S NOW RECOGNIZED THIS PROBLEM AND WERE TRYING TO EDUCATE THE ISLAMIC LEADERS.

CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE FOOD SHORTAGES
---

8. (U) AN ALLIANCE OF EAST KALIMANTAN NGO'S RECENTLY ISSUED AN APPEAL TO THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT URGING THEM TO PREPARE FOR POSSIBLE FOOD SHORTAGES IN THE INTERIOR. A LOCAL GOLKAR PARLIAMENTARIAN WHO SPECIALIZED IN DAYAK AFFAIRS TOLD POLOFF THAT HUNGER PROBLEMS ALREADY EXIST IN THE MOST ISOLATED AREAS, AND

FOOD HAS BEEN AIR DROPPED BY HELICOPTER AND SMALL AIRCRAFT. THESE OPERATIONS WERE HAMPERED BY THE REEMERGENCE OF THE FIRES AND HAZE.

NGO'S FACE MANY OBSTACLES

9. (SBU) IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE NGO COMMUNITIES IN EAST AND SOUTHERN KALIMANTAN WERE SMALL IN NUMBER, CLOSELY WATCHED BY THE AUTHORITIES AND FRUSTRATED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO BRING THEIR MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE. NGO ACTIVISTS SAID THAT WHILE THEY HAD NOT BEEN DETAINED OR PHYSICALLY HARMED, THEY WERE OFTEN UNDER SURVEILLANCE, WITH THEIR PHONES TAPPED AND MAIL FROM ABROAD OPENED, AND WERE OCCASIONALLY THREATENED. THEY SAID MORE FRUSTRATING THAN THEIR OWN PROBLEMS WAS THE TENDENCY OF THE AUTHORITIES AND LOGGING COMPANIES TO INTIMIDATE THE LOCAL POPULATIONS INTO NOT MEETING WITH NGO'S. VILLAGE CHIEFS HAD REPORTEDLY BEEN TOLD TO REPORT ON ALL NGO ACTIVITY IN THEIR AREAS. NGO CONTACTS IN BANJARMASIN REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION ABOUT HAVING THEIR "ACCESS" TO THE LOCAL POPULATION BLOCKED BY THE AUTHORITIES. NGO'S COMPLAINED THAT THEY WERE OFTEN LABELLED AS "ANTI-DEVELOPMENT" WHICH WAS TANTAMOUNT TO BEING SUBVERSIVE IN KALIMANTAN.

SCAPEGOATING THE NGO'S

10. (SBU) NGO ACTIVISTS IN EAST KALIMANTAN COMPLAINED OF A CAMPAIGN TO SCAPEGOAT THEM FOR THE PROVINCE'S CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, WITH THE AUTHORITIES CHARGING THAT NGO'S ENCOURAGED FOREIGN FIRMS TO BOYCOTT KALIMANTAN'S PRODUCTS. FROM POLOFF'S OTHER CONTACTS, IT

PAGE 07 JAKART 01793 270336Z
APPEARED THAT THIS SCAPEGOATING CAMPAIGN WAS HAVING AT LEAST SOME EFFECT. ONE CONTACT ASKED IF IT WERE TRUE THAT NGO'S HAD CONVINCED JAPANESE FIRMS TO STOP BUYING PLYWOOD FROM KALIMANTAN, THUS EXPLAINING THE RECENT FALL IN PLYWOOD PRICES. AN NGO ACTIVIST IN BANJARMASIN SAID THE AUTHORITIES WERE EVEN CLAIMING THAT NGO'S WERE BEHIND THE DEVASTATING MAY 1997 RIOTS THERE.

STUDENTS CAUTIOUS

11. (SBU) NGO ACTIVISTS AND UNIVERSITY CONTACTS IN SAMARINDA AGREED THAT LOCAL STUDENTS WERE MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS THAN THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN JAVA, WHERE ACTIVIST NETWORKS ARE MUCH STRONGER. STUDENTS FROM MULAWARMAN UNIVERSITY HAD STAGED A DEMONSTRATION IN SAMARINDA THE PREVIOUS WEEK, BUT ACCORDING TO A UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR AND OTHER SOURCES, THE EVENT HAD BEEN CAREFULLY COORDINATED WITH THE AUTHORITIES AND HAD FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON ECONOMIC ISSUES. THE STUDENTS HAD BEEN PERMITTED TO MARCH FROM THEIR CAMPUS TO THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE.

ECONOMIC CRISIS HITS BIG PROJECTS

12. (U) MARKETS IN EAST AND SOUTHERN KALIMANTAN AND IN THE CENTRAL KALIMANTAN TOWN OF KUALA KAPUAS WERE BUSTLING AS USUAL. IN SAMARINDA, LARGER SCALE PROJECTS APPEARED ON HOLD. CONSTRUCTION APPEARED TO HAVE STOPPED AT A HUGE, PARTIALLY BUILT NEW SHOPPING CENTER ON THE

PAGE 08 JAKART 01793 270336Z
EDGE OF TOWN. CONSTRUCTION ON A NEW SUSPENSION BRIDGE SPANNING THE MAHAKAM BELOW TENGGARONG, WHICH WOULD HALVE THE DRIVING TIME BETWEEN THE LOWER MAHAKAM AREA AND THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, HAD COME TO A HALT. THE TWO IMPRESSIVE TOWERS WERE COMPLETED, BUT ACCORDING TO LOCAL

CONTACTS THE GOVERNMENT COULD NO LONGER AFFORD THE EXPENSIVE CABLE IMPORTED FROM THE NETHERLANDS NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE BRIDGE.

13. (U) THE GIANT KALIMANIS TIMBER FIRM HAD REPORTEDLY RECENTLY LAID OFF 3000 WORKERS IN SAMARINDA. CONTACTS SAID THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT MUCH OF KALIMANTAN'S PRODUCTION WAS EXPORTED, THE DEPRESSION OF OTHER ASIAN ECONOMIES, ESPECIALLY JAPAN, WAS HURTING BUSINESS. THEY SUGGESTED THAT BECAUSE SO MANY OF EAST KALIMANTAN'S INDUSTRIAL WORKERS WERE FROM OUTSIDE THE PROVINCE, THESE LAYOFFS MAY ONLY HAVE A MINIMAL SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPACT IN THE AREA. THE MAJORITY OF THE 3000 LAID OFF SAWMILL WORKERS WERE SAID TO HAVE ALREADY RETURNED TO THEIR HOME TOWNS IN EAST JAVA.

CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT SHARPENS
---

14. (SBU) WHILE NGO'S AND STUDENTS MAY STILL BE CAUTIOUS IN CONFRONTING THE GOVERNMENT, IN EAST AND SOUTH KALIMANTAN POLOFF WAS STRUCK BY THE DEGREE OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT SENTIMENT OPENLY EXPRESSED BY ORDINARY PEOPLE WHO WERE RANDOMLY ENCOUNTERED. IT CONTRASTED WITH A MORE CAUTIOUS ATTITUDE SEEN IN A PREVIOUS TRIP TO THE SAME AREA A LITTLE MORE THAN A YEAR AGO. A MOTORCYCLE

TAXI DRIVER IN TENGGARONG LAUNCHED INTO AN UNPROMPTED DIATRIBE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND CONGLOMERATES WHICH "TREAT THE LITTLE PEOPLE LIKE SLAVES," AND AS HE WAS DRIVING AWAY AFTER POLOFF DISMOUNTED HE SHOUTED BACK "AMERICA MUST HELP MEGAWATI!" PEOPLE SEATED NEXT TO POLOFF IN A BOAT TRAVELLING UPRIVER FROM BANJARMASIN TO KUALA KAPUAS DISCUSSED THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN RELATIVELY SOPHISTICATED TERMS, EXHIBITING A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE GOI'S FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT IMF REFORMS, THE PITFALLS OF A CURRENCY BOARD SYSTEM, AND THE NEED FOR POLITICAL CHANGES.

15. (SBU) IN A MEETING WITH SEVERAL DOZEN STUDENTS AND YOUNG PROFESSIONALS OF VERY MIXED ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS

BACKGROUNDS AT A NIGHT SCHOOL IN SAMARINDA, POLOFF HEARD REAL CONCERN THE OUTSIDE WORLD IS TURNING ITS BACK ON INDONESIA. HERE AND ELSEWHERE THERE WAS MUCH DISCUSSION OF CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA AND WHAT COULD BE DONE ABOUT IT. PEOPLE WERE ANXIOUS TO HEAR THE U.S. VIEW OF THE APPOINTMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL DAUGHTER TUTUT AND ASSOCIATE BOB HASAN TO THE CABINET (HASAN IS ESPECIALLY WELL-KNOWN IN KALIMANTAN). STRIKINGLY, IN NONE OF THESE MANY CONVERSATIONS WAS THERE ANY ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT EXPRESSED OR ANY ATTEMPT TO BLAME THE UNITED STATES OR THE IMF FOR INDONESIA'S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. PEOPLE PLACED THE RESPONSIBILITY SQUARELY ON THE PRESIDENT AND HIS FAMILY AND MADE CLEAR THAT THEY NO LONGER BELIEVED ANYTHING THE GOVERNMENT SAID. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THEY WERE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY POLITICAL CHANGE AS LONG AS PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WAS ALIVE.

MILITARY STILL DOMINATES

16. (SBU) A GOLKAR MEMBER OF THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT AND A UNIVERSITY INSTRUCTOR, BOTH CHRISTIANS, EXPRESSED FEARS THAT WHILE TO DATE SAMARINDA HAD EXPERIENCED NO SERIOUS DISTURBANCES, "CERTAIN LOCAL MUSLIM LEADERS ARE WAITING FOR A CHANCE" TO PROVOKE RIOTING. THEY WERE CONFIDENT THAT THE STRONG ARMY AND POLICE PRESENCE IN THE AREA (THE ARMY AND POLICE APPEARED TO HAVE A DOMINATING PRESENCE IN SAMARINDA AND TENGGARONG, EVEN BY INDONESIAN STANDARDS) WOULD PROTECT THE CHRISTIAN POPULATION IN THIS MIXED AREA. NGO CONTACTS, WHO WERE LESS PLEASED WITH THE PERVASIVE SECURITY PRESENCE, NEVERTHELESS AGREED THAT THE AUTHORITIES HAD THE SITUATION IN EAST KALIMANTAN WELL IN HAND THROUGH A COMBINATION OF INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT OF ALL POSSIBLE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS AND CO-OPTATION OF LOCAL TRADITIONAL TRIBAL LEADERS. ONE ACTIVIST SAID THE POLICE MOBILE BRIGADES OR "BRIMOB" WERE A SIGNIFICANT NEW ELEMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY IN THE MORE ISOLATED AREAS OF EAST KALIMANTAN BECAUSE, UNLIKE SOME

OF THE REGULAR POLICE AND MILITARY, THEY ADJUSTED WELL TO LIFE IN THE VILLAGES AND WERE HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO EXTORT A FEW CHICKENS NOW AND THEN FROM THE VILLAGERS.

SCENES OF DEVASTATION REMAIN IN BANJARMASIN

17. (U) IN BANJARMASIN, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS HAS MEANT

THAT THE DEVASTATING DAMAGE TO THE DOWNTOWN AREA INFLICTED BY THE MAY 1997 RIOTS HAS GONE LARGELY UNREPAIRED. TWO LARGE DOWNTOWN SHOPPING CENTERS, INCLUDING ONE IN WHICH 123 CHARRED BODIES WERE FOUND AFTER A FIRE, REMAIN BURNT OUT HULKS, AS DOES THE KALIMANTAN HOTEL, FORMERLY THE BIGGEST AND MOST LUXURIOUS IN THE CITY. THE MAIN CATHEDRAL HAS BEEN REPAIRED, BUT THE NEARBY BATAK PROTESTANT CHURCH WAS RAZED AND HAS NOT BEEN REPLACED. RESTORATION WORK ON THE BURNT OUT LIPPO BANK BUILDING WAS JUST BEGINNING. AN EERIE ATMOSPHERE ENVELOPED THE CENTRAL ARTERIES OF BANJARMASIN AFTER DARK, AS THE STILL UNREPAIRED AND UNOCCUPIED BUILDINGS WERE INTERSPERSED WITH VACANT AREAS WHERE DAMAGED STRUCTURES HAD BEEN TORN DOWN. HERE AND THERE SMALL BRIGHTLY LIT SHOPS HAD REOPENED AMONG THE RUINED BUILDINGS.

18. (SBU) NGO CONTACTS CHARGED THAT THE AUTHORITIES WERE COVERING UP A LARGE NUMBER OF STILL UNRESOLVED DISAPPEARANCES FROM THE MAY 1997 EVENTS, AND INTIMIDATING FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE VICTIMS INTO SILENCE. THEY COULD PROVIDE NO FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THIS, HOWEVER. THE ATMOSPHERE IN BANJARMASIN APPEARED OUTWARDLY CALM AND RESIDENTS, INCLUDING CHINESE SHOP OWNERS WHO REMAINED IN THE DOWNTOWN AREA, AGREED THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT PARTICULARLY TENSE. NEVERTHELESS, AS IN EAST KALIMANTAN, A NUMBER OF PEOPLE ENCOUNTERED AT RANDOM LAUNCHED INTO UNPROMPTED CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT, ALLUDING FREQUENTLY TO "DICTATORSHIP," CORRUPTION, AND NEPOTISM.

"MILLION HECTARE" PROJECT PROVOKES CONTROVERSY
---

19. (U) IN THE CENTRAL KALIMANTAN TOWN OF KUALA KAPUAS, POLOFF SPOKE WITH OFFICIALS AT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT (BUPATI) OFFICE, AS WELL LOCAL FORESTRY AND AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS ABOUT THE NEARBY "MILLION HECTARE" PROJECT TO CLEAR LAND AND DEVELOP RICE PRODUCTION OVER A VAST TRACT OF CENTRAL KALIMANTAN. WHILE THE STATISTICS WERE NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR, IT APPEARED THAT SOME 17,500 HECTARES OF LAND HAD ALREADY BEEN PREPARED FOR RICE PRODUCTION AND 2,500 FAMILIES, PRIMARILY TRANSMIGRANTS, HAD BEEN MOVED INTO THE AREA TO WORK THE NEW RICE PADDIES. AN AGRICULTURE OFFICIAL SAID INITIAL YIELDS COMPARED FAVORABLY TO PADDIES IN JAVA.

20. (SBU) PERHAPS NOT SURPRISINGLY, NGO ACTIVISTS IN BANJARMASIN HAD VERY DIFFERENT VIEWS. THEY SAID THE MEGA-PROJECT THREATENED THE LIVELIHOODS OF SOME 24 DAYAK VILLAGES, EACH COMPRISED OF TWO TO THREE THOUSAND INHABITANTS. ACCORDING TO THEM, DIVERSION OF RIVER WATERS TO IRRIGATE THE PROJECT HAD INCREASED SALINITY IN INLAND WATERS, DESTROYING DAYAK FISHING GROUNDS. THE GOVERNMENT HAD APPARENTLY PAID SOME COMPENSATION, BUT IN THEIR VIEW NOT NEARLY ENOUGH. THD CLEARING OF LARGE TRAPED THE R WITH DEVASTATING RESULTSHF RATTAN, ON WHICH MANY#EIR LIVELIHOOD. THE NGGE
AMOUNTS OF PESTICIN THE NEWLY
CLEARED LAND

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>
PTQ1116

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ1116

PAGE 01 JAKART 01793 01 OF 04 260815Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	UTED-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OES-01	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	EPAE-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10
	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/031W	

----------2BBE53 260815Z /38

R 260813Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0686
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 001793

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, SENV, PGOV, PREL, EAID, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: MARCH 15-19 TRIP TO KALIMANTAN

REF: JAKARTA 1661

1. (U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 01793 01 OF 04 260815Z
SUMMARY
---

2. (SBU) IN A MARCH 15-19 TRIP TO KALIMANTAN (INDONESIAN BORNEO), POLOFF OBSERVED FIRES AND PREVIOUSLY BURNT LANDSCAPE EXTENDING OVER A WIDE AREA IN EAST KALIMANTAN, BUT SAW ONLY ONE FEEBLE FIREFIGHTING EFFORT. IN CONTRAST TO A VISIT TO KALIMANTAN ONE YEAR

AGO, A VARIETY OF RANDOMLY ENCOUNTERED RESIDENTS EXPRESSED HARSH CRITICISM AND DISBELIEF OF THEIR GOVERNMENT AND EXHIBITED A SURPRISINGLY SOPHISTICATED UNDERSTANDING OF ECONOMIC ISSUES FACING INDONESIA. NO ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT WAS ENCOUNTERED. DESPITE THIS EVIDENT WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION, ALL AGREED THAT THE SECURITY FORCES HAD THINGS WELL IN HAND IN EAST AND SOUTH KALIMANTAN, WHERE RELATIVELY WEAK NGO'S AND AN INDIGENOUS DAYAK POPULATION VICTIMIZED BY FIRES AND DEVELOPMENT ARE LARGELY POWERLESS AGAINST AN ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT, MILITARY, AND BIG LOGGING FIRMS. CONTACTS' MAJOR PREOCCUPATIONS WERE THE DROUGHT AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. MAJOR PROJECTS IN THE SAMARINDA AREA OF EAST KALIMANTAN HAD COME TO A HALT, AND IN BANJARMASIN LITTLE HAD BEEN DONE TO REPAIR MASSIVE DAMAGE TO THE DOWNTOWN AREA CAUSED BY MAY 1997 RIOTING. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) POLOFF TRAVELED MARCH 15-19 TO BALIKPAPAN, SAMARINDA AND TENGGARONG IN EAST KALIMANTAN, BANJARMASIN IN SOUTHERN KALIMANTAN, AND KUALA KAPUAS IN THE PROVINCE OF CENTRAL KALIMANTAN, MEETING WITH A VARIETY OF NGO'S, ACADEMICS, STUDENTS, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND OBSERVING THE TRIAL OF A

PROMINENT LOCAL DEFENDER OF DAYAK LAND RIGHTS (REFTEL). DUE TO THE NEED TO ADVANCE THE SCHEDULE OF THE TRIP TO ALLOW FOR COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL, POLOFF WAS UNABLE TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH MORE SENIOR OFFICIALS IN THESE LOCALES.

BURNT AND STILL BURNING
---

4. (U) DESCENDING THROUGH A THICK LAYER OF HAZE INTO BALIKPAPAN'S AIRPORT ON MARCH 15, POLOFF SAW ABOUT A HALF DOZEN PLUMES OF WHITE SMOKE RISING FROM FIRES IN THE VICINITY. THE 100 KM DRIVE FROM BALIKPAPAN TO THE MAHAKAM RIVER ALONG THE RIDGES OF THE SOEHARTO HILLS TRAVERSED A PARCHED LANDSCAPE ALMOST TOTALLY DEVASTATED BY FIRE AS FAR AS THE EYE COULD SEE. MOST OF THE AREA WAS ALREADY BURNT, BUT IN THE FEW REMAINING GREEN AREAS

THE FIRES CONTINUED, AND FIVE OR SIX SUCH FIRES WERE ALWAYS VISIBLE. IN TRAVELING THIS ROAD TWICE POLOFF SAW ONLY A SINGLE LOW TECH EFFORT TO FIGHT THE FIRES. A PICKUP TRUCK WITH A SMALL WATER TANK AND A MILITARY TROOP TRANSPORT TRUCK WERE PARKED BY THE SIDE OF THE ROAD, WITH SOLDIERS CARRYING BUCKETS OF WATER DOWN THE HILLSIDE TO INEFFECTUALLY TOSS THEM ON ONE OF THE MANY FIRES BURNING IN THE AREA.

5. (U) DESPITE THE CONTINUING FIRES, THE HAZE SITUATION WAS RELATIVELY GOOD IN EAST KALIMANTAN DURING POLOFF'S VISIT. VISIBILITY WAS ABOUT THREE TO FOUR KILOMETERS IN SAMARINDA AND BALIKPAPAN. CONTACTS REPORTED THAT THE HAZE HAD BEEN MUCH WORSE THE PREVIOUS WEEK (AND PRESS

REPORTS INDICATED THAT THE THICKER HAZE RETURNED TO THE AREA A FEW DAYS AFTER POLOFF'S DEPARTURE, WITH RESIDENTS OF SAMARINDA AGAIN DONNING FACE MASKS). A TRIP TO TENGGARONG, 44 KILOMETERS UP THE MAHAKAM RIVER FROM SAMARINDA, REVEALED MORE BLACKENED HILLSIDES AND ONGOING FIRES VISIBLE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE WITH BURNT AREAS OFTEN EXTENDING DOWN TO THE RIVERBANK.

DROUGHT AND WATER PROBLEMS

---

6. (U) PROLONGED DROUGHT IN EAST KALIMANTAN WAS A PRIME TOPIC OF CONVERSATION. THE CITY OF SAMARINDA WAS EXPERIENCING SEVERE WATER PROBLEMS DUE TO THE LOW WATER LEVEL OF THE MAHAKAM RIVER WHICH HAD PERMITTED TIDES TO CARRY SEA WATER FARTHER THAN USUAL INTO THE MAHAKAM ESTUARY. THE CITY'S WATER SUPPLY HAD BEEN CUT OFF FOR FOUR DAYS THE PREVIOUS WEEK TO PREVENT SALT DAMAGE TO PIPES. IN THE BALIKPAPAN AREA PEOPLE SAID THERE HAD BEEN VIRTUALLY NO RAIN FOR MONTHS AND THE PARCHED LANDSCAPE REFLECTED THIS. IN SOUTH KALIMANTAN THE SITUATION APPEARED CLOSER TO NORMAL. THE FIRES OF LAST YEAR HAD NOT YET RETURNED BUT THERE WAS A SLIGHT HAZE, POSSIBLY FROM FIRES FURTHER NORTH, LIMITING VISIBILITY TO ABOUT 5 TO 6 KILOMETERS.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ1119

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ1119

PAGE 01 JAKART 01793 02 OF 04 260815Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	UTED-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OES-01	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	EPAE-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10
	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/031W	

----------2BBE57 260815Z /38

R 260813Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0687
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 001793

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, SENV, PGOV, PREL, EAID, ECON, ID
SUJECT: MARCH 15-19 TRIP TO KALIMANTAN

REF: JKARTA 1661

ACTS OF GOD?
---

7 (SBU) NGO CONTACTS IN SAMARINDA MAINTAINED THAT A NUMBER OF FIRES WERE INTENTIONALLY SET, AND SAID THEY HAD REPORTS OF LOCALS BEING PAID TO SET FIRE TO LANDS WHERE LOGGING FIRMS WERE ATTEMPTING TO MOVE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OUT. THE NGO ACTIVISTS ARGUED ADAMANTLY THAT INDIGENOUS DAYAKS WERE NOT STARTING FIRES, BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE TRADITIONAL SEASON FOR THEM TO DO SO. THE FIRES BURNING BETWEEN BALIKPAPAN AND SAMARINDA WERE SCORCHING A VARIETY OF PREVIOUSLY LOGGED, REPLANTED, AND FORESTED LANDSCAPES. DROUGHT WAS OBVIOUSLY A MAJOR FACTOR FACILITATING THE BURNING. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CERTAIN NGO ACTIVISTS, MOST PEOPLE POLOFF ENCOUNTERED TOOK A RATHER FATALISTIC VIEW OF THE FIRES. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL NGO "WAHLI" IN BANJARMASIN SAID THAT THE STRONG INFLUENCE OF ISLAM IN THE AREA WAS A MAJOR OBSTACLE FOR NGO'S TRYING TO EDUCATE THE POPULACE ON THE FIRE PROBLEM. THE MUSLIM ULEMAS TENDED TO TELL THEIR PEOPLE THAT THE FIRES AND THE SMOKE WERE "ACTS OF GOD." HE SAID NGO'S NOW RECOGNIZED THIS PROBLEM AND WERE TRYING TO EDUCATE THE ISLAMIC LEADERS.

CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE FOOD SHORTAGES
---

8. (U) AN ALLIANCE OF EAST KALIMANTAN NGO'S RECENTLY ISSUED AN APPEAL TO THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT URGING THEM TO PREPARE FOR POSSIBLE FOOD SHORTAGES IN THE INTERIOR. A LOCAL GOLKAR PARLIAMENTARIAN WHO SPECIALIZED IN DAYAK AFFAIRS TOLD POLOFF THAT HUNGER

PAGE 03 JAKART 01793 02 OF 04 260815Z
PROBLEMS ALREADY EXIST IN THE MOST ISOLATED AREAS, AND FOOD HAS BEEN AIR DROPPED BY HELICOPTER AND SMALL AIRCRAFT. THESE OPERATIONS WERE HAMPERED BY THE REEMERGENCE OF THE FIRES AND HAZE.

NGO'S FACE MANY OBSTACLES

9. (SBU) IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE NGO COMMUNITIES IN EAST AND SOUTHERN KALIMANTAN WERE SMALL IN NUMBER, CLOSELY WATCHED BY THE AUTHORITIES AND FRUSTRATED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO BRING THEIR MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE. NGO ACTIVISTS SAID THAT WHILE THEY HAD NOT BEEN DETAINED OR PHYSICALLY HARMED, THEY WERE OFTEN UNDER SURVEILLANCE, WITH THEIR PHONES TAPPED AND MAIL FROM ABROAD OPENED, AND WERE OCCASIONALLY THREATENED. THEY SAID MORE FRUSTRATING THAN THEIR OWN PROBLEMS WAS THE TENDENCY OF THE AUTHORITIES AND LOGGING COMPANIES TO INTIMIDATE THE LOCAL POPULATIONS INTO NOT MEETING WITH NGO'S. VILLAGE CHIEFS HAD REPORTEDLY BEEN TOLD TO REPORT ON ALL NGO ACTIVITY IN THEIR AREAS. NGO CONTACTS IN BANJARMASIN REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION ABOUT HAVING THEIR "ACCESS" TO THE LOCAL POPULATION BLOCKED BY THE AUTHORITIES. NGO'S COMPLAINED THAT THEY WERE OFTEN LABELLED AS "ANTI-DEVELOPMENT" WHICH WAS TANTAMOUNT TO BEING SUBVERSIVE IN KALIMANTAN.

SCAPEGOATING THE NGO'S

10. (SBU) NGO ACTIVISTS IN EAST KALIMANTAN COMPLAINED

PAGE 04 JAKART 01793 02 OF 04 260815Z
OF A CAMPAIGN TO SCAPEGOAT THEM FOR THE PROVINCE'S CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, WITH THE AUTHORITIES CHARGING THAT NGO'S ENCOURAGED FOREIGN FIRMS TO BOYCOTT KALIMANTAN'S PRODUCTS. FROM POLOFF'S OTHER CONTACTS, IT APPEARED THAT THIS SCAPEGOATING CAMPAIGN WAS HAVING AT

LEAST SOME EFFECT. ONE CONTACT ASKED IF IT WERE TRUE THAT NGO'S HAD CONVINCED JAPANESE FIRMS TO STOP BUYING PLYWOOD FROM KALIMANTAN, THUS EXPLAINING THE RECENT FALL IN PLYWOOD PRICES. AN NGO ACTIVIST IN BANJARMASIN SAID THE AUTHORITIES WERE EVEN CLAIMING THAT NGO'S WERE BEHIND THE DEVASTATING MAY 1997 RIOTS THERE.

STUDENTS CAUTIOUS

11. (SBU) NGO ACTIVISTS AND UNIVERSITY CONTACTS IN SAMARINDA AGREED THAT LOCAL STUDENTS WERE MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS THAN THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN JAVA, WHERE ACTIVIST NETWORKS ARE MUCH STRONGER. STUDENTS FROM MULAWARMAN UNIVERSITY HAD STAGED A DEMONSTRATION IN SAMARINDA THE PREVIOUS WEEK, BUT ACCORDING TO A UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR AND OTHER SOURCES, THE EVENT HAD BEEN CAREFULLY COORDINATED WITH THE AUTHORITIES AND HAD FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON ECONOMIC ISSUES. THE STUDENTS HAD BEEN

NNNNPTQ4044

PAGE 01 JAKART 01793 03 OF 04 270147Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	UTED-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OES-01	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00

SP-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 EPAE-00 DSCC-00 PRM-10
PRME-01 DRL-04 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /031W
----------2C2F59 270259Z /38

R 260813Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0688
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 001793

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, SENV, PGOV, PREL, EAID, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: MARCH 15-19 TRIP TO KALIMANTAN

REF: JAKARTA 1661

PERMITTED TO MARCH FROM THEIR CAMPUS TO THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ECONOMIC CRISIS HITS BIG PROJECTS
---

12. (U) MARKETS IN EAST AND SOUTHERN KALIMANTAN AND IN THE CENTRAL KALIMANTAN TOWN OF KUALA KAPUAS WERE BUSTLING AS USUAL. IN SAMARINDA, LARGER SCALE PROJECTS APPEARED ON HOLD. CONSTRUCTION APPEARED TO HAVE STOPPED AT A HUGE, PARTIALLY BUILT NEW SHOPPING CENTER ON THE EDGE OF TOWN. CONSTRUCTION ON A NEW SUSPENSION BRIDGE SPANNING THE MAHAKAM BELOW TENGGARONG, WHICH WOULD HALVE THE DRIVING TIME BETWEEN THE LOWER MAHAKAM AREA AND THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, HAD COME TO A HALT. THE TWO IMPRESSIVE TOWERS WERE COMPLETED, BUT ACCORDING TO LOCAL CONTACTS THE GOVERNMENT COULD NO LONGER AFFORD THE EXPENSIVE CABLE IMPORTED FROM THE NETHERLANDS NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE BRIDGE.

13. (U) THE GIANT KALIMANIS TIMBER FIRM HAD REPORTEDLY RECENTLY LAID OFF 3000 WORKERS IN SAMARINDA. CONTACTS SAID THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT MUCH OF KALIMANTAN'S PRODUCTION WAS EXPORTED, THE DEPRESSION OF OTHER ASIAN ECONOMIES, ESPECIALLY JAPAN, WAS HURTING BUSINESS. THEY SUGGESTED THAT BECAUSE SO MANY OF EAST KALIMANTAN'S INDUSTRIAL WORKERS WERE FROM OUTSIDE THE PROVINCE, THESE LAYOFFS MAY ONLY HAVE A MINIMAL SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPACT IN THE AREA. THE MAJORITY OF THE 3000 LAID OFF SAWMILL WORKERS WERE SAID TO HAVE ALREADY RETURNED TO THEIR HOME TOWNS IN EAST JAVA.

CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT SHARPENS
---

14. (SBU) WHILE NGO'S AND STUDENTS MAY STILL BE CAUTIOUS IN CONFRONTING THE GOVERNMENT, IN EAST AND SOUTH KALIMANTAN POLOFF WAS STRUCK BY THE DEGREE OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT SENTIMENT OPENLY EXPRESSED BY ORDINARY PEOPLE WHO WERE RANDOMLY ENCOUNTERED. IT CONTRASTED WITH A MORE CAUTIOUS ATTITUDE SEEN IN A PREVIOUS TRIP TO THE SAME AREA A LITTLE MORE THAN A YEAR AGO. A MOTORCYCLE TAXI DRIVER IN TENGGARONG LAUNCHED INTO AN UNPROMPTED DIATRIBE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND CONGLOMERATES WHICH "TREAT THE LITTLE PEOPLE LIKE SLAVES," AND AS HE WAS DRIVING AWAY AFTER POLOFF DISMOUNTED HE SHOUTED BACK "AMERICA MUST HELP MEGAWATI!" PEOPLE SEATED NEXT TO POLOFF IN A BOAT TRAVELLING UPRIVER FROM BANJARMASIN TO KUALA KAPUAS DISCUSSED THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN RELATIVELY SOPHISTICATED TERMS, EXHIBITING A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE GOI'S FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT IMF REFORMS, THE PITFALLS OF A CURRENCY BOARD SYSTEM, AND THE NEED FOR POLITICAL CHANGES.

15. (SBU) IN A MEETING WITH SEVERAL DOZEN STUDENTS AND YOUNG PROFESSIONALS OF VERY MIXED ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS BACKGROUNDS AT A NIGHT SCHOOL IN SAMARINDA, POLOFF HEARD REAL CONCERN THE OUTSIDE WORLD IS TURNING ITS BACK ON INDONESIA. HERE AND ELSEWHERE THERE WAS MUCH DISCUSSION

OF CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA AND WHAT COULD BE DONE ABOUT IT. PEOPLE WERE ANXIOUS TO HEAR THE U.S. VIEW OF THE APPOINTMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL DAUGHTER TUTUT AND ASSOCIATE BOB HASAN TO THE CABINET (HASAN IS ESPECIALLY WELL-KNOWN IN KALIMANTAN). STRIKINGLY, IN NONE OF THESE MANY CONVERSATIONS WAS THERE ANY ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT

EXPRESSED OR ANY ATTEMPT TO BLAME THE UNITED STATES OR THE IMF FOR INDONESIA'S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. PEOPLE PLACED THE RESPONSIBILITY SQUARELY ON THE PRESIDENT AND HIS FAMILY AND MADE CLEAR THAT THEY NO LONGER BELIEVED ANYTHING THE GOVERNMENT SAID. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THEY WERE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY POLITICAL CHANGE AS LONG AS PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WAS ALIVE.

MILITARY STILL DOMINATES

16. (SBU) A GOLKAR MEMBER OF THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT AND A UNIVERSITY INSTRUCTOR, BOTH CHRISTIANS, EXPRESSED FEARS THAT WHILE TO DATE SAMARINDA HAD EXPERIENCED NO SERIOUS DISTURBANCES, "CERTAIN LOCAL MUSLIM LEADERS ARE WAITING FOR A CHANCE" TO PROVOKE RIOTING. THEY WERE CONFIDENT THAT THE STRONG ARMY AND POLICE PRESENCE IN THE AREA (THE ARMY AND POLICE APPEARED TO HAVE A DOMINATING PRESENCE IN SAMARINDA AND TENGGARONG, EVEN BY INDONESIAN STANDARDS) WOULD PROTECT THE CHRISTIAN POPULATION IN THIS MIXED AREA. NGO CONTACTS, WHO WERE LESS PLEASED WITH THE PERVASIVE SECURITY PRESENCE, NEVERTHELESS AGREED THAT THE AUTHORITIES HAD THE

NNNNPTQ4059

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4059

PAGE 01 JAKART 01793 04 OF 04 270307Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	UTED-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OES-01	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	STR-00	SVC-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	EPAE-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/031W

----------2C2FEA 270307Z /20

R 260813Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0689
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 001793

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, SENV, PGOV, PREL, EAID, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: MARCH 15-19 TRIP TO KALIMANTAN

REF: JAKARTA 1661

SITUATION IN EAST KALIMANTAN WELL IN HAND THROUGH A

COMBINATION OF INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT OF ALL POSSIBLE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS AND CO-OPTATION OF LOCAL TRADITIONAL TRIBAL LEADERS. ONE ACTIVIST SAID THE POLICE MOBILE BRIGADES OR "BRIMOB" WERE A SIGNIFICANT NEW ELEMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY IN THE MORE ISOLATED AREAS OF EAST KALIMANTAN BECAUSE, UNLIKE SOME OF THE REGULAR POLICE AND MILITARY, THEY ADJUSTED WELL TO LIFE IN THE VILLAGES AND WERE HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO EXTORT A FEW CHICKENS NOW AND THEN FROM THE VILLAGERS.

SCENES OF DEVASTATION REMAIN IN BANJARMASIN
---

17. (U) IN BANJARMASIN, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS HAS MEANT THAT THE DEVASTATING DAMAGE TO THE DOWNTOWN AREA INFLICTED BY THE MAY 1997 RIOTS HAS GONE LARGELY UNREPAIRED. TWO LARGE DOWNTOWN SHOPPING CENTERS, INCLUDING ONE IN WHICH 123 CHARRED BODIES WERE FOUND AFTER A FIRE, REMAIN BURNT OUT HULKS, AS DOES THE KALIMANTAN HOTEL, FORMERLY THE BIGGEST AND MOST LUXURIOUS IN THE CITY. THE MAIN CATHEDRAL HAS BEEN REPAIRED, BUT THE NEARBY BATAK PROTESTANT CHURCH WAS RAZED AND HAS NOT BEEN REPLACED. RESTORATION WORK ON THE BURNT OUT LIPPO BANK BUILDING WAS JUST BEGINNING. AN EERIE ATMOSPHERE ENVELOPED THE CENTRAL ARTERIES OF BANJARMASIN AFTER DARK, AS THE STILL UNREPAIRED AND UNOCCUPIED BUILDINGS WERE INTERSPERSED WITH VACANT AREAS WHERE DAMAGED STRUCTURES HAD BEEN TORN DOWN. HERE AND THERE SMALL BRIGHTLY LIT SHOPS HAD REOPENED AMONG THE RUINED BUILDINGS.

18. (SBU) NGO CONTACTS CHARGED THAT THE AUTHORITIES WERE COVERING UP A LARGE NUMBER OF STILL UNRESOLVED DISAPPEARANCES FROM THE MAY 1997 EVENTS, AND INTIMIDATING FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE VICTIMS INTO SILENCE.

THEY COULD PROVIDE NO FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THIS, HOWEVER. THE ATMOSPHERE IN BANJARMASIN APPEARED OUTWARDLY CALM AND RESIDENTS, INCLUDING CHINESE SHOP OWNERS WHO REMAINED IN THE DOWNTOWN AREA, AGREED THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT PARTICULARLY TENSE. NEVERTHELESS, AS IN EAST KALIMANTAN, A NUMBER OF PEOPLE ENCOUNTERED AT RANDOM LAUNCHED INTO UNPROMPTED CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT, ALLUDING FREQUENTLY TO "DICTATORSHIP," CORRUPTION, AND NEPOTISM.

"MILLION HECTARE" PROJECT PROVOKES CONTROVERSY
---

19. (U) IN THE CENTRAL KALIMANTAN TOWN OF KUALA KAPUAS, POLOFF SPOKE WITH OFFICIALS AT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT (BUPATI) OFFICE, AS WELL LOCAL FORESTRY AND AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS ABOUT THE NEARBY "MILLION HECTARE" PROJECT TO CLEAR LAND AND DEVELOP RICE PRODUCTION OVER A VAST TRACT OF CENTRAL KALIMANTAN. WHILE THE STATISTICS WERE NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR, IT APPEARED THAT SOME 17,500 HECTARES OF LAND HAD ALREADY BEEN PREPARED FOR RICE PRODUCTION AND 2,500 FAMILIES, PRIMARILY TRANSMIGRANTS, HAD BEEN MOVED INTO THE AREA TO WORK THE NEW RICE PADDIES. AN AGRICULTURE OFFICIAL SAID INITIAL YIELDS COMPARED FAVORABLY TO PADDIES IN JAVA.

20. (SBU) PERHAPS NOT SURPRISINGLY, NGO ACTIVISTS IN

BANJARMASIN HAD VERY DIFFERENT VIEWS. THEY SAID THE MEGA-PROJECT THREATENED THE LIVELIHOODS OF SOME 24 DAYAK VILLAGES, EACH COMPRISED OF TWO TO THREE THOUSAND INHABITANTS. ACCORDING TO THEM, DIVERSION OF RIVER WATERS TO IRRIGATE THE PROJECT HAD INCREASED SALINITY IN INLAND WATERS, DESTROYING DAYAK FISHING GROUNDS. THE GOVERNMENT HAD APPARENTLY PAID SOME COMPENSATION, BUT IN THEIR VIEW NOT NEARLY ENOUGH. THD CLEARING OF LARGE TRAPED THE R WITH DEVASTATING RESULTSHF RATTAN, ON WHICH MANY#EIR LIVELIHOOD. THE NGGE
AMOUNTS OF PESTICIN THE NEWLY
CLEARED LAND

##OMISSION IN TEXT, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL PTO7835

RELEASED IN PART
B5, B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 020100 030237Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

020100
SOURCE: KODAKB.003042
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:RCLARKE/VMURRAY:RJC -- 02/02/99 7-2543
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------9E3B98 030240Z /38
O 030237Z FEB 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 020100

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/2/04
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 20

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM EAP/PIMBS

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS A. HARTWICK.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

1. (C) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT - DRL COMMENTS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 020100 030237Z

[redacted] B5

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 3 FEB 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200502501



B5

2. (U) USAID DOCUMENT ON ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE

WE WILL FAX THE FRONT OFFICE A SIX-PAGE USAID DISCUSSION PAPER PREPARED FOR USE IN A FEBRUARY 3 MEETING ON ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE. THE PAPER DESCRIBES WHAT USAID IS DOING WITH ITS $20 MILLION ELECTIONS PROGRAM AND WHAT IT MIGHT DO WITH AN ADDITIONAL ~10 MILLION. WE ARE PREPARING A PARALLEL TRACK MEMO MEANT FOR CRAIG JOHNSTONE THAT SHOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR SECURING ADDITIONAL ESF FUNDS FOR THIS ELECTION EFFORT.

3. (C) INFORMAL INTERAGENCY ON EAST TIMOR

DAB BOYCE WILL CHAIR AN INFORMAL INTERAGENCY MEETING ON EAST TIMOR ON FEBRUARY 3. THE GROUP WILL REVIEW THE SITUATION IN THE WAKE OF THE GOI'S NEW "AUTONOMY OR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 020100 030237Z

SEPARATION" OFFER, CONSIDER WHERE WE NEED TO FOCUS OUR ATTENTION IN THE COMING WEEKS, AND LOOK AT WHAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MIGHT BE NEEDED IN ANTICIPATION OF A/S ROTH'S RETURN. WE APPRECIATE THE EXCELLENT REPORTING JAKARTA IS PROVIDING ON EAST TIMOR AND WE WILL ENSURE THAT YOUR PROPOSALS ON WHAT IS NEEDED WILL BE TABLED. WE WOULD ALSO BENEFIT FROM ANY GOL REACTIONS TO YOUR EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE ABRI (AMB, DATT, A/S ROTH) TO DISARM THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IT HAS JUST ARMED.

4. (U) FREE, FAIR, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS

AS WE DISCUSSED OVER THE PHONE, WE WILL ALSO MEET TOMORROW TO CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSIONS OF ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE FOR INDONESIA. ONE THING WE'VE PROMISED INVITEES ARE THOUGHTS

ON, AS YOU DESCRIBED IT, THE $64,000 QUESTION: WHAT CONSTITUTES A FREE FAIR AND CREDIBLE ELECTION? OBVIOUSLY, THERE IS NO ABSOLUTE LIST OF CRITERIA THAT MUST BE MET, NOR WILL THE FAILURE TO ATTAIN ONE OF THE CRITERIA MEAN THAT AN ELECTION IS ULTIMATELY FLAWED. YOUR INPUT WILL BE CRITICAL TO ANY CREDIBLE ASSESSMENT. WE HAD ALSO ASKED NDI FOR THEIR THINKING, BUT HAD NOT RECEIVED A RESPONSE BY COB. BELOW ARE SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS.

PRE ELECTION:

--ADOPTION OF ACCEPTABLE ELECTORAL GROUND RULES; FRAMEWORK THAT ALLOWS FAIR OUTCOME - WERE PROCEDURES STACKED AGAINST OPPOSITION?

--DO ALL PARTIES HAVE EQUAL ACCESS TO THE MEDIA? ARE ALL POLITICAL PARTIES FREE TO CAMPAIGN?

--DO PARTIES HAVE EQUAL ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT MONEY?

--IS THERE AN ELECTION COMMISSION? DID IT WORK? DOES IT HAVE INDEPENDENT CONTROL OVER FUNDS AND PERSONNEL?

--ARE INDIVIDUALS PERMITTED TO REGISTER FOR PARTIES OF THEIR CHOOSING, OR ARE THEY COERCED?

--WAS THERE FRAUD IN REGISTERING VOTERS?

ELECTION DAY:

--WAS THERE SUFFICIENT SECURITY TO ENSURE PEACEFUL ENVIRONMENT, VOTER ACCESS TO POLLS?

--WAS THERE TRANSPARENT APPLICATION OF ELECTION RULES?

--TURNOUT AT THE ELECTION?

--WHAT IS THE PERCEPTION OF THE OPPOSITION?

--DO MONITORS HAVE FREE ACCESS TO POLLING SITES?

POST ELECTION:

--IS THERE A SYSTEM/MECHANISM IN PLACE TO SETTLE DISPUTES?

CONFIDENTIAL

--DO THOSE ELECTED TAKE OFFICE?

5. (SBU) CARTER CENTER AND THE ELECTIONS.

WE ARE INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER IS STILL MULLING OVER THE MODALITIES OF GETTING INVOLVED AND A DECISION IS EXPECTED BY THE WEEK'S END. ACCORDING TO HIS STAFF, HE IS SEIZED WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ELECTIONS BUT THERE IS AN EXISTING SCHEDULE CONFLICT THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED. THE CENTER'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE NIGERIAN ELECTIONS DUE AT THE END OF FEBRUARY COULD IMPINGE ON SENDING OUT AN ASSESSMENT TEAM IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. STAY TUNED.

6. (SBU) UN PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR?

MIKE JENDREJCZYK OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ASIA TELLS US THAT SIDNEY JONES, IN HER MEETINGS IN INDONESIA THIS WEEK, HEARD A GREAT DEAL OF CONCERN ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR. HER CONTACTS HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR A UN PRESENCE THERE. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THE IDEA OF A UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION WAS A NON STARTER, BUT THE NGO COMMUNITY SUGGESTS THAT IT MIGHT BE TIME TO APPROACH THE UNHCR TO REQUEST IT POST SOMEONE TO EAST TIMOR FULL TIME. WE'RE GUESSING SIDNEY HAS ALREADY MADE YOU AWARE OF THIS PROPOSAL, BUT PASS IT ALONG FOR A/S ROTH'S USE AS APPROPRIATE.



B1

1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE -- PLEASE SEE PARA 5.

[redacted]

B1



B1

[redacted]

8. (U) PLEASE ADVISE THE DEPARTMENT OF THE GOL'S RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

END DRAFT CABLE TEXT.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E92

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2326

PAGE 01 JAKART 05227 01 OF 04 210347Z
ACTION SWCI-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-00
	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-02	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-00	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	LBA-01	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W		

----------05D530 210347Z /38

P 210306Z OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0804
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 005227

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05227 01 OF 04 210347Z

STATE FOR S/WCI, DRL, S/P, EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: COOPERATION BETWEEN INDONESIAN AND INTERNATIONAL EAST TIMOR HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS

REFS: (A) JAKARTA 5123 (B) JAKARTA 5044

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR PAMELA SLUTZ. REASON 1.5(D).

2. [redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 21 OCT 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200502501

WOULD NOT INCLUDE KOMNAS HAM REPRESENTATION. EDWARDS ALSO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05227 01 OF 04 210347Z



B1

KPP COMPOSITION AND MANDATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2329

PAGE 01 JAKART 05227 02 OF 04 210347Z
ACTION SWCI-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-00
	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-02	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-00	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	LBA-01	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W		

----------05D535 210347Z /38

P 210306Z OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0805
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE

AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 005227

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05227 02 OF 04 210347Z

STATE FOR S/WCI, DRL, S/P, EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: COOPERATION BETWEEN INDONESIAN AND INTERNATIONAL EAST TIMOR HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS

---

6. (U) ON SEPTEMBER 23, KOMNAS HAM'S CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN ISSUED A "DECISION LETTER" (SURAT KEPUTUSAN) FORMING THE INVESTIGATION COMMISSION AND APPOINTING ITS MEMBERS. THE DECISION LETTER MANDATES KOMNAS HAM TO CREATE AN INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OCCURRING AFTER THE POPULAR CONSULTATION IN EAST TIMOR (KPP) AND PROPOSES THAT FINDINGS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION BE FORWARDED TO INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITIES AND ONWARD FOR PROCESSING IN A NEW HUMAN RIGHTS COURT WHEN SO MERITED. THE KPP IS LIMITED TO GATHERING FACTS AND DATA ON CASES OCCURRING IN THE PERIOD AFTER THE AUGUST 30 POPULAR CONSULTATION. IT IS INSTRUCTED TO PRESENT ITS FINDINGS BY DECEMBER 31, ALTHOUGH ITS ACTIVITIES CAN BE EXTENDED IF REQUIRED.

7. (U) THE KPP IS COMPOSED OF NINE COMMISSIONERS AND TWO STAFF MEMBERS. THE COMMISSIONERS RECEIVE STIPENDS OF RP 10 MILLION PER MONTH (ABOUT USD 1,200). COMMISSIONERS ARE: 1) MARZUKI DARUSMAN, CHAIRMAN OF KOMNAS HAM ; 2) ALBERT HASIBUAN, KOMNAS HAM MEMBER AND LAWYER; 3) KOESPARMONO IRSAN, KOMNAS HAM MEMBER AND RETIRED POLICE MAJOR GENERAL; 4) ASMARA NABABAN, KOMNAS HAM MEMBER; 5) H.S. DILLON, KOMNAS HAM MEMBER; 6) MULYA LUBIS,

CONFIDENTIAL

RENOWNED LAWYER; 7) MS. NURSYAHBANI KATJASUNGKANA, A LAWYER AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVIST; 8) ZOEMROTIN SUSILO, A CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTIVIST; AND 8) MUNIR, A LEADING RIGHTS ACTIVIST WITH THE COMMISSION FOR MISSING PERSONS AND VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE (KONTRAS).

8. (U) A GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION ESTABLISHING A HUMAN RIGHTS COURT WAS RATIFIED BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON OCTOBER 8. THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COURT (IHRC) HAS AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE, DECIDE, AND RESOLVE SIX TYPES OF CASES INVOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: 1) DESTRUCTION OF ALL OR PART OF A GROUP, AN ETHNIC GROUP, A GROUP BASED ON SKIN COLOR, RELIGION, GENDER, AGE, AND MENTAL OR PHYSICAL DISABILITY; 2) ARBITRARY KILLING OR KILLINGS OTHER THAN THOSE SANCTIONED BY A COURT; 3) THE FORCED DISAPPEARANCE OF AN INDIVIDUAL; 4) SLAVERY; 5) SYSTEMATIC DISCRIMINATION; AND 6) TORTURE CARRIED OUT BY AUTHORITIES WHICH CAUSES SERIOUS PHYSICAL OR MENTAL SUFFERING, WITH THE INTENTION OF OBTAINING INFORMATION OR A CONFESSION FROM THE PERSON BEING TORTURED, OR BY A THIRD PARTY.

9. (U) THE GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION ESTABLISHING THE IHRC RESTRICTS THE KPP'S SCOPE TO THE ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, WHILE THE INVESTIGATION AND INDICTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASES ARE TO BE EXECUTED BY A TEAM FORMED BY, AND UNDER THE COORDINATION OF, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. THE COURT'S INVESTIGATIVE TEAM MUST COMPLETE ITS WORK WITHIN A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE SUBMISSION OF THE ASSESSMENT BY THE KPP, WITH A MAXIMUM EXTENSION OF THREE MONTHS.

KPP ACTIONS
---

10. (U) IN MARZUKI'S OCTOBER 14 MEETING WITH EDWARDS, MARZUKI ADVISED THAT A KPP TEAM CO-LED BY KOMNAS HAM MEMBERS H.S. DILLON AND ASMARA NABABAN WOULD BE DISPATCHED TO WEST TIMOR ON OCTOBER 15 AND WOULD RETURN TO JAKARTA ON OCTOBER 17 TO REPORT THEIR FINDINGS. MARZUKI OFFERED TO SHARE THE TEAM'S FINDINGS WITH EDWARDS AT THEIR NEXT MEETING, SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER 19.

REALITIES, CONCERNS, AND NEEDS

[redacted] B1

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2327

PAGE 01 JAKART 05227 03 OF 04 210347Z
ACTION SWCI-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-00
	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-02	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-00	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	LBA-01	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W		

----------05D53C 210347Z /38

P 210306Z OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0806
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 005227

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05227 03 OF 04 210347Z

STATE FOR S/WCI, DRL, S/P, EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: COOPERATION BETWEEN INDONESIAN AND INTERNATIONAL EAST TIMOR HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS

B1



B1



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2328

PAGE 01 JAKART 05227 04 OF 04 210347Z
ACTION SWCI-00

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 INL-01

DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-00
EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-02	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01
SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-00	ADS-00
AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00
TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	LBA-01	PRM-01
DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W		

----------05D53E 210347Z /38

P 210306Z OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0807
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 005227

ROME FOR VATICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05227 04 OF 04 210347Z

STATE FOR S/WCI, DRL, S/P, EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: COOPERATION BETWEEN INDONESIAN AND INTERNATIONAL EAST TIMOR HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS

[redacted] B1

B1



GELBARD

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E78

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9888

PAGE 01 JAKART 00200 01 OF 04 131105Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------965BC5 131105Z /38

P 131056Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5490
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000200

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/09
TAGS: OREP, PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: CODEL KOLBE/BEREUTER'S JANUARY 13 MEETING WITH INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS. REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN A JANUARY 13 MEETING WITH CODEL KOLBE/BEREUTER, INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00200 01 OF 04 131105Z
CHAIRPERSON MARZUKI DARUSMAN SAID THAT THE COMMISSION WAS EXPERIENCING GROWING CREDIBILITY AS EVIDENCED BY THE INCREASING NUMBER OF APPEALS FROM CITIZENS FOR HELP. THE PARLIAMENT WILL SOON CONSIDER A BILL EXPANDING THE POWERS AND IMPROVING THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE COMMISSION. MARZUKI CLAIMED THE COMMISSION WAS LARGELY FREE OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION. ON EAST TIMOR, MARZUKI SAID THAT THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO VOTE ON THEIR STATUS VIA A REFERENDUM "AT SOME STAGE." ACCORDING TO MARZUKI, THE COMMISSION ALSO SUPPORTED THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF JAILED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A "POLITICAL PRISONER," ADDING THAT XANANA SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 13 JAN 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2006 200502501

"BARGAINING CARD." WITH REGARD TO THE RECENT KILLING OF FOUR DETAINEES BY ABRI TROOPS IN ACEH, MARZUKI SAID THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE, TRANSPARENT TRIAL. TO DEAL WITH THE ACEH PROBLEM COMPREHENSIVELY, MARZUKI PROPOSED A "TRUTH COMMISSION." A DELEGATION OF SENIOR ACEHNESE VISITED THE COMMISSION JANUARY 12 TO WARN THEY WOULD PRESS FOR A REFERENDUM ON INDEPENDENCE UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT "SOLVED THE ACEH PROBLEM (TO INCLUDE TRYING THOSE MILITARY INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE OVER THE PAST DECADE)." MARZUKI SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED FACT-FINDING TEAM ON THE MAY RIOTS HAD FOUND "DEFINITE INVOLVEMENT OF MILITARY UNITS IN THE RIOTS" TO INCLUDE SOME OF THE BURNING AND RAPING. THE RIOTS WERE TIED TO THE KILLING OF STUDENTS AND KIDNAPPING OF ACTIVISTS, AS PART OF A LARGER PLAN TO PROTECT THE "STATUS QUO."

[redacted] B1

MARZUKI SAID THE

COMMISSION WOULD WELCOME CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE BILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE PARLIAMENT WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE POWERS OF THE COMMISSION. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) CODEL KOLBE, ACCOMPANIED BY AID DIRECTOR, USIS OFFICER AND POLCOUNS (NOTETAKER) MET WITH THE LEADERSHIP AND SELECT MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION JANUARY 13. REPRESENTING THE COMMISSION WERE CHAIRPERSON MARZUKI DARUSMAN, SECRETARY GENERAL CLEMENTINO DOS AMARAL AND FIVE OTHER COMMISSION MEMBERS.

MARZUKI OFFERS A TOUR D'HORIZON

4. (C) AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF INTRODUCTIONS AND GREETINGS, CHAIRPERSON MARZUKI OFFERED A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ENVIRONMENT IN INDONESIA. MARZUKI NOTED THAT THE COMMISSION, WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE, WAS IN ITS SIXTH YEAR AND THAT THOSE SIX YEARS HAD SEEN GROWING PUBLIC CREDIBILITY FOR THE BODY. AMONG POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRONT IN 1998, MARZUKI NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD LAUNCHED A FIVE-YEAR NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION PLAN. AS PART OF THAT PLAN, IN NOVEMBER, THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) APPROVED A HUMAN RIGHTS CHARTER WHICH, INTER ALIA, CALLED UPON THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) TO LEGISLATE NEW POWERS TO THE COMMISSION.

5. (C) THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION BILL IS INTENDED TO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00200 01 OF 04 131105Z
ELEVATE THE STATUS OF THE COMMISSION BY REINFORCING ITS POWERS AND ESTABLISHING THE COMMISSION IN LAW, RATHER THAN SIMPLY BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE. MARZUKI SAID HE HOPED THE BILL WOULD BE PASSED IN TWO TO THREE MONTHS. WITH PASSAGE, THE COMMISSION WOULD BE ABLE TO ACT AS A "HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL ON AN AD HOC BASIS." THE BILL WOULD ALSO EMPOWER THE COMMISSION TO ACT AS A MEDIATOR IN DISPUTES. [redacted] B1

6. (C) MARZUKI EXPLAINED THAT, IN addition TO HIS DECEMBER-1998 SELECTION AS CHAIRPERSON AND AMARAL'S SELECTION AS SECRETARY GENERAL, SIX NEW MEMBERS WERE ELECTED TO THE COMMISSION FOR FIVE YEAR TERMS. THEIR SELECTION WAS BY COMMISSION MEMBER ELECTION WITHOUT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2661

PAGE 01 JAKART 00200 02 OF 04 140014Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------96BF2C 140350Z /38
P 131056Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5491
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 000200

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/09
TAGS: OREP, PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ELAB, ID

SUBJECT: CODEL KOLBE/BEREUTER'S JANUARY 13 MEETING WITH INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE SELECTION PROCESS. IN ADDITION TO 25 COMMISSION MEMBERS, THE COMMISSION HAS ESTABLISHED AN OFFICE IN EAST TIMOR (IN JULY 1996) AND HAS A "CORRESPONDENT" IN IRIAN JAYA AND TWO "CORRESPONDENTS" IN ACEH. THE COMMISSION HAS A STAFF OF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00200 02 OF 04 140014Z
30 ASSISTANTS. MARZUKI CLAIMED THAT ALTHOUGH THE COMMISSION RELIES ON STATE BUDGET FUNDING (1.5 BILLION RUPIAH PER YEAR OR ROUGHLY USD TWO MILLION) FOR MOST OF ITS EXPENSES, THE COMMISSION OPERATES FREE OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION. HE ALSO NOTED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE SOURCES, NOTABLY COOPERATION WITH THE UN, WITH THE CANADIAN AND AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND, HE EMPHASIZED AT SEVERAL POINTS, WITH THE ASIA FOUNDATION (USAID FUNDING).

EAST TIMOR
---

7. (C) REGARDING EAST TIMOR, MARZUKI SAID THAT IN 1998 A SPECIAL UN RAPPORTEUR ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE SECGEN'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE (JAMSHED MARKER) HAD VISITED EAST TIMOR. THIS WAS PART OF AN EFFORT TO GAUGE THE ATTITUDE OF THE EAST TIMORESE ABOUT AUTONOMY OR OTHER OPTIONS. "FRANKLY," MARZUKI SAID, "THE PUBLIC IS LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITY OF A REFERENDUM AT ONE STAGE. ... THIS IS ONE OF THE ASPIRATIONS THAT HAS DEVELOPED."

8. (C) MARZUKI ADDED THAT "WE (THE COMMISSION) ASK FOR THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF XANANA GUSMAO (THE JAILED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER) AND ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. THERE WAS A RELEASE OF SOME POLITICAL PRISONERS TWO WEEKS AGO BUT WE NEED A RELEASE OF XANANA AND ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. WE REGARD XANANA AS A POLITICAL PRISONER AND HE SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A BARGAINING CARD."

9. (C) MARZUKI SAID HE SAW A "STAGED" PROCESS FOR EAST TIMOR WHICH WOULD BEGIN WITH WIDE-RANGING AUTONOMY WITH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 00200 02 OF 04 140014Z
"THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EVENTUAL REFERENDUM AFTER A PERIOD IF THAT SEEMS NECESSARY." NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOW PROCEEDING ON POINTS WHICH COULD BE AGREED UPON AND NOT ON POINTS WHICH WERE CONSIDERED AS NON-NEGOTIABLE BY EITHER SIDE. WITHOUT ELABORATING, MARZUKI SAID THAT

NEGOTIATIONS WERE "ADVANCING ON SEVERAL FRONTS."

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

10. (U) FOLLOWING MARZUKI'S OPENING REMARKS, THE CODEL MEMBERS PRESENTED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS WHICH MARZUKI RESPONDED TO IN A SECOND PRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION. (NO OTHER COMMISSION MEMBER SPOKE.)

11. (C) MARZUKI SAID THE COMMISSION HAD A BACKLOG OF APPROXIMATELY 4,500 CASES. THERE WAS A 25 PERCENT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CASES BROUGHT TO THE COMMISSION EACH YEAR. WHILE THE FLOW OF CASES WAS WELCOME INASMUCH AS IT SHOWED STRONG AND GROWING FAITH IN THE COMMISSION, THE VOLUME WAS A PROBLEM WHICH THE COMMISSION WAS ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THROUGH COMPUTERIZATION. CASES INCLUDED BOTH INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ONES, MOST OF WHICH (60 PERCENT) DID NOT FALL INTO THE REALM OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BUT RATHER REFLECTED "POOR ACCESS TO THE APPROPRIATE DECISION MAKING BODIES IN GOVERNMENT." THE PRINCIPAL CATEGORIES OF COMPLAINTS WERE LAND PROBLEMS, LABOR ISSUES AND ABRI ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. IN SOME INSTANCES THE COMMISSION SOUGHT ONLY TO SHEPHERD THE CASES TO THE APPROPRIATE OFFICE. OFTEN CITIZENS SOUGHT COMMISSION HELP BECAUSE THEY ANTICIPATED THAT THIS WOULD

CONFIDENTIAL

BRING PRESS ATTENTION TO THEIR CASES, PARTICULARLY WHERE THERE WERE COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OVER ABUSES. THE COMMISSION WAS AWARE THAT IT WAS BEING "UTILIZED" IN THIS WAY, BUT ACCEPTED ITS ROLE IN THIS PROCESS.

12. (C) THE COMMISSION PRODUCES AN ANNUAL REPORT WHICH THIS YEAR NOTED THAT GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS INCLUDING THE MILITARY (ABRI) HAD REACHED A "LOW POINT IN PUBLIC CREDIBILITY." (SEPTEL REPORTS ON THIS YEAR'S REPORT WHICH MARZUKI SAID WAS STILL AT THE PUBLISHERS.)

13. (C) THE COMMISSION DEALS WITH MATTERS OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE, ESPECIALLY LABOR QUESTIONS. GENERALLY, THE COMMISSION SEEKS TO MEDIATE DISPUTES BETWEEN LABOR AND MANAGEMENT, A ROLE, MARZUKI ADDED, WHICH SHOULD BE HANDLED BY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.

ACEH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 00200 03 OF 04 131147Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------965FE8 131147Z /38
P 131056Z JAN 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5492
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 000200

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/09
TAGS: OREP, PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: CODEL KOLBE/BEREUTER'S JANUARY 13 MEETING WITH INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

---

14. (C) TURNING TO ACEH, MARZUKI SAID THE SITUATION WAS VERY COMPLEX. ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSION CHAIRPERSON, "THE KEY TO RESTORATION OF CONFIDENCE WOULD BE THE TRIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00200 03 OF 04 131147Z
OF THOSE INVOLVED" IN THE JANUARY 9 TORTURE-KILLING OF FOUR ACEHNESE DETAINED NEAR LHOKSEUMAWE. THE TRIAL SHOULD BE IN A "TRANSPARENT AND ACCEPTABLE MANNER." "THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST STEP," MARZUKI EXPLAINED, BUT ADDED THAT "COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTIONS" WERE NEEDED. IN ORDER TO GET TO THE TRUTH REGARDING A "DECADE OF ARBITRARY KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCES AND RAPES," IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A "TRUTH COMMISSION," AS IN SOUTH AFRICA.



B1

[redacted] B1

15. (C) RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS REGARDING THE CHINESE (SINO-INDONESIAN) POPULATION, MARZUKI RECALLED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD ESTABLISHED A "FACT FINDING TEAM" (WHICH HE CHAIRED). THE GOVERNMENT HAS "BEGUN TO REACT TO OUR RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE LAST THREE WEEKS," HE CLAIMED. HE NOTED THEY HAD ACCEPTED THE FINDINGS FOR THE MOST PART, AND HAD SPECIFICALLY ADMITTED THAT "RAPES OCCURRED ON A MULTIPLE BASIS." "THE TARGET WAS THE CHINESE," HE ADDED. MARZUKI SAID THAT JUDICIAL PROCESSES HAD BEGUN BUT THE RAPE CASES, BY THEIR NATURE, COULD TAKE A LONG TIME TO RESOLVE.

16. (C) THE TEAM FOUND THAT THREE HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS HAD BEEN INVOLVED. THE RAPES ASSOCIATED WITH THE RIOTS

WERE "SYSTEMATIC" ALTHOUGH THE TEAM WAS NOT ABLE TO CONCLUDE WHETHER THEY WERE "ORGANIZED." THE TEAM FOUND "DEFINITE INVOLVEMENT OF ARMED FORCES UNITS IN THE RIOTS." MARZUKI ADDED THAT THE ARMED FORCES UNITS' INVOLVEMENT "WAS NOT ACCIDENTAL." THE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WAS, SAID MARZUKI, "CONNECTED TO A PATTERN OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY, ESSENTIALLY AN EFFORT TO KEEP THE STATUS QUO AGAINST THOSE PRESSING FOR CHANGE, LED BY THE STUDENTS." MARZUKI ADDED THAT "IT WAS ALL CONNECTED TO TRISAKTI (THE INCIDENT IN WHICH FOUR STUDENTS WERE SHOT TO DEATH AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ON THE EVE OF THE RIOTS) AND TO THE KIDNAPPING (OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS)."

17. (C) MARZUKI CLAIMED THAT "MILITARY GROUPS" STARTED SOME OF THE FIRES WHICH ACCOUNTED FOR MOST OF THE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 PEOPLE KILLED (WHO WERE TRAPPED IN BURNING SHOPPING MALLS WHICH HAD DRAWN LOOTERS). "SOME MILITARY WERE ALSO INVOLVED IN THE VIOLATIONS AGAINST WOMEN," MARZUKI CLAIMED.

18. (C) MARZUKI CLARIFIED THAT THE COMMISSION DID NOT HAVE SUBPOENA POWER BUT THAT POWER IS INCLUDED IN THE NEW COMMISSION-EMPOWERING BILL TO BE CONSIDERED IN PARLIAMENT. CURRENTLY, THE COMMISSION MAKES RECOMMENDATION FOR JUDICIAL AND OTHER FOLLOW-UP TO THE GOVERNMENT. ASKED IF THE GOVERNMENT DID INDEED FOLLOW-UP ON SUCH RECOMMENDATIONS, MARZUKI ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY.

[redacted] B1

19. (C) MARZUKI SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD BROUGHT SOME OF THE ABRI PERPETRATORS OF THE MORE EGREGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO TRIAL RECENTLY. WHEN PRESSED BY SEVERAL CONGRESSMAN HE ADDED THAT THE MOST SERIOUS PENALTY HANDED DOWN RECENTLY (FOR AN "ARBITRARY KILLING IN EAST TIMOR") WAS 30 MONTHS IN PRISON. HE ACKNOWLEDGED ALSO THAT ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL TRIED FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE CRIMES WERE TRIED IN MILITARY COURTS.

20. (C) ASKED WHAT SUPPORT MARZUKI WOULD WELCOME FROM THE UNITED STATES, MARZUKI AGREED WITH CONGRESSMAN BEREUTER'S SUGGESTION OF A CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE COMMISSION AND FOR THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9889

PAGE 01 JAKART 00200 04 OF 04 131106Z
ACTION H-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /005W
----------965BD0 131106Z /38

P 131056Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5493
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 000200

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/09
TAGS: OREP, PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ELAB, ID

SUBJECT: CODEL KOLBE/BEREUTER'S JANUARY 13 MEETING WITH INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

COMMISSION EMPOWERING BILL IN THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT. MARZUKI ALSO NOTED THAT THE CODEL'S INTEREST IN AND SUPPORT FOR THE COMMISSION, AS WELL AS THAT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND U.S. GOVERNMENT GENERALLY OVER THE YEARS, WAS VERY USEFUL. [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

B1

[redacted]

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E76

RELEASED IN PART
B6

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 27 [illegible]

Dear Senator Feinstein:

Thank you for your letter of July 30, 1998, enclosing the inquiry of your constituent [redacted] who wrote you about treatment of the ethnic Chinese community in Indonesia and the shocking rapes of Indonesian Chinese women and girls last May. B6

Your constituent's letter and similar accounts have been important in calling the attention of the media and the international community to the situation of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. We are very concerned, and Secretary Albright and other senior officials have condemned in the strongest possible terms the violence, looting, property destruction, and rapes directed against Chinese Indonesians as well as disappearances, kidnappings and torture of activists, and the murders of students at Trisakti University in Indonesia. We have urged the Indonesian authorities to investigate these crimes and prosecute those who participated in and planned them. We have also emphasized to the Indonesian authorities that their failure to address these matters will badly tarnish Indonesia's image as a tolerant, multi-racial, multi-cultural nation.

We note that, in the period since your constituent's letter was written, President Habibie has condemned the May riots and attacks against Chinese Indonesians, and pledged that they will be thoroughly investigated. He has announced additional measures, special protective patrols for ethnic Chinese neighborhoods and plans to recapitalize looted stores, to begin to restore confidence in the Indonesian Chinese community.

President Habibie has also established a national committee to investigate the rapes and other crimes. Non-governmental organizations (NGO) are engaged in independent fact-gathering, and will submit their reports to the national committee. Indonesian NGOs are also assisting the

The Honorable
Dianne Feinstein,
United States Senate.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

4772

victims of the May riots and this may be a relief effort that your constituent can support. We note also that the Indonesian military is also conducting its own investigation into allegations of military involvement in criminal activities last May.

We are closely monitoring the conduct and outcome of these investigations and the situation of the ethnic Chinese Indonesian community. We will continue to raise our concerns with the Indonesian government.

Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

Correspondence returned. AUG 21 1998

Reply by H A/S Larkin to Senator Feinstein (2nd Letter) on Indonesia and Ethnic Chinese-Indonesians

Draft:EAP/PIMBS:RClarke x7-2543 8/21/98
O:\Indonesia\Human Rights\HCFein02.doc

Clear:EAP:JWolf, Acting
:EAP/PIMBS:JAloisi (ok)
:EAP/CM:SKim (ok)
:EAP/RSP:JStrotz (ok)
:H:DPittman (ok)



E73

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1209

PAGE 01 STATE 205716 050238Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

205716
SOURCE: KODAKA.005036
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:VEMURRAY:VEM -- 11/04/98 7-L823
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------7E0797 050240Z /38

O 050237Z NOV 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 205716

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/08
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 182

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM EAP/PIMBS DOUG HARTWICK

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS HARTWICK.
REASON: 1.5 (D)

1. (C) DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS EVENT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 205716 050238Z

WE'VE FLESHED OUT THE KIND OF ROUND TABLE EVENT FOLLOWING SOR'S CONSULTATION WITH S STAFF. SOR DESCRIBES THE ENCOUNTER AS A "DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS" MEETING BUT ONE THAT WILL INCLUDE PERSONS THAT CAN ADDRESS PRESS FREEDOMS, THE RIOTS/RAPE COMMISSION ISSUES, INTERNAL COMMUNAL HARMONY, EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA. STARTING WITH YOUR EXCELLENT LIST, THE INVITEES WOULD POSSIBLY INCLUDE

[redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 5 NOV 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501



IN ALL, 7-8 PERSONS WOULD SEEM ABOUT RIGHT. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE A BRIEF BIO ON EACH, AND THE SOONER THE BETTER AS YOU PUT THIS TOGETHER. I WAS ALSO REMINDED BY ROSE LIKINS THAT S/S ADVANCE STAFF WILL WANT TO SHAPE THIS EVENT FROM A LOGISTICAL STANDPOINT, BUT THEN YOU (AND I) HAVE BEEN THROUGH THIS DRILL BEFORE.

2. (U) PRESS RELEASE ON THE RIOT REPORT

BELOW IS THE PRESS RELEASE DRAFTED HERE THAT WAS TO BE RELEASED THIS AFTERNOON.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NOVEMBER 4, 1998

STATEMENT BY JAMES P. RUBIN, SPOKESMAN NOVEMBER 4, 1998

INDONESIA - REPORT BY FACT-FINDING TEAM

THE U.S. WELCOMED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT'S ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROAD-BASED FACT FINDING TEAM LAST AUGUST TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSES OF THE MAY RIOTS AND THE RAPES OF ETHNIC CHINESE WOMEN.

ON NOVEMBER 3, THE TEAM, WHICH INCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE GOVERNMENT, THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (ABRI), THE POLICE, AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, RELEASED THEIR

REPORT. DESPITE "RESERVATIONS" REGISTERED BY SOME MEMBERS, AND THE FACT THAT INVESTIGATORS, VICTIMS, WITNESSES, AND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 205716 050238Z

FAMILY MEMBERS FACED ANONYMOUS DEATH THREATS AND OTHER FORMS OF INTIMIDATION, THE FACT-FINDING TEAM ISSUED A CREDIBLE, BALANCED REPORT UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES.

THE REPORT FOUND THREE PATTERNS TO THE RIOTS, RANGING FROM LOCAL AND SPONTANEOUS, TO RIOTS AGGRAVATED BY PROVOCATEURS, AND OTHERS MORE OBVIOUSLY DELIBERATELY STIMULATED. THIS INCLUDED INVOLVEMENT BY ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY. THE REPORT CALLED FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS AND RECOMMENDED THAT LT. GEN. PRABOWO AND ALL OTHERS INVOLVED IN CASES OF KIDNAPPINGS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS BE BROUGHT BEFORE A MILITARY COURT.

THE REPORT ALSO VERIFIED THAT 85 ACTS OF VIOLENCE TARGETED AGAINST WOMEN OCCURRED, INCLUDING RAPES, TORTURE, SEXUAL ASSAULTS, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT DURING THE RIOTS, MOST AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE. WE FIND SUCH ACTS REPREHENSIBLE AND UNACCEPTABLE.

IT IS CRUCIAL IN ORDER TO RESTORE CREDIBILITY AND CONFIDENCE THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENT THE TEAM'S RECOMMENDATIONS, INCLUDING FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF MILITARY LEADERS AND OTHERS ALLEGED TO BE INVOLVED IN FOMENTING OR PARTICIPATING IN THE VIOLENCE. WE ALSO STRONGLY URGE THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TAKE STEPS TO PREVENT INTIMIDATION AND THREATS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST INVESTIGATORS, WITNESSES, AND THEIR FAMILIES. THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THESE ACTS SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE.

3. (U) STATUS OF SOMA SURYABRATA.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 205716 050238Z

CONGRESSMAN LEONARD BOSWELL HAS SENT US CORRESPONDENCE ABOUT THE STATUS OF SOMA SURYABRATA, WHOM HE DESCRIBES AS A PRISONER OF CONSCIENCE, IMPRISONED IN OCTOBER 1967 AFTER A CLOSED TRIAL. APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION YOU MIGHT HAVE ON THIS PRISONER.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E71

SECRET PTO8278

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

PAGE 01 STATE 151196 190101Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001R

151196
SOURCE: KODAKC.019021
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PTMBS:VEMURRAY/RCLARKE -- 08/18/98 7-2543
APPROVED BY: EAP:/PIMBS:JALOISI
EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------608C87 190102Z /38
O 190101Z AUG 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 151196

OFFICIAL INFORMAL, SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/18/08
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 134

FOR CHARGE MIKE OWENS FROM PIMBS - ALOISI.

CLASSIFIED BY ACTING EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR JON ALOISI.
REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D)

1. (S) PRABOWO AND THE MILITARY HONOR COURT

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 151196 190101Z

[redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 18 AUG 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

B1



2. (U) [redacted]

B6

THE NSC ASKS WHETHER YOU HAVE ANY BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON [redacted]

B6

HAS REQUESTED A MEETING WITH ERIC SCHWARTZ AT THE NSC. THE NAME IS NOT FAMILIAR TO US. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY

INFORMATION YOU COULD PROVIDE BY WEDNESDAY.

3. (U) TIFA TALKS

USTR HELD AN INITIAL PLANNING MEETING FOR TIFA TALKS TODAY. THE DISCUSSION OF THE AGENDA GENERATED SEVERAL QUESTIONS AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION. THE TRADE POLICY SUBCOMMITTEE ASKS YOUR HELP IN RESPONDING EITHER THROUGH O-I OR FRONT CHANNEL AS APPROPRIATE.

IPR: HAS THE GOL EVER RESPONDED TO THE IPR WORK PLAN PROPOSED IN STATE 111564 OF JUNE 20? WILL THE GOL BE WILLING/ABLE TO ADDRESS ANY OF THE PROPOSALS IN TIME TO DISCUSS PROGRESS BY OCTOBER?

BIT: HOW RECEPTIVE WILL THE GOL BE TO THE IDEA OF A BIT? DID GOL ECONOMIC OFFICIALS EVER REACT TO THE POINTS MADE IN STATE 129593, THE DEMARCHE ON SOUND INVESTMENT POLICY AT ASEAN?

LABOR LAW: HOW WOULD YOU RECOMMEND REVAMPING OUR EXISTING ACTION PLAN ON WORKER/LABOR RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS? ARE THERE NEW ISSUES TO BE ADDED? SHOULD WE REPRIORITIZE?

TEXTILES: DO YOU THINK IT LIKELY THE GOL WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE DOCUMENTATION ON THE SINGAPORE-INDONESIA QUOTA TRANSFER? DOES A PAPER TRAIL EXIST?

LAWYERS: WE WILL PROBABLY ASK TO ADD THIS ISSUE TO THE AGENDA. DO YOU FORESEE ANY RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF THE GOL TO DISCUSS THE TOPIC? (THOUGH USTR WILL NOT SEND YOU A FRONT CHANNEL REQUEST UNTIL EARLY SEPTEMBER, FEEL FREE TO

POSE THE QUESTION TO YOUR CONTACTS INFORMALLY.)

GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: THE GOL HAD ASKED TO ADD THIS TOPIC TO THE AGENDA WHEN WE WERE PLANNING THE ABORTED FEBRUARY TALKS. CAN YOU TELL US MORE ABOUT WHAT PRECISELY THEY ARE REFERRING TO?

SORRY TO ASK SO MUCH OF YOU IN TODAY'S IO.
TALBOTT

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E70

CONFIDENTIAL PTO1620

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 149211 142315Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001R

149211
SOURCE: KODAKA.014216
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:VEMURRAY/RCLARKE -- 08/13/98 7-2543
APPROVED BY: EAP:/PIMBS:JALOISI
EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------5F6679 142315Z /38

O 142315Z AUG 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 149211

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/13/08
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 131

FOR CHARGE MIKE OWENS FROM PIMBS.

CLASSIFIED BY ACTING PIMBS DIRECTOR ALOISI. REASON 1.5 (D).

1. (SBU) U.S.-INDONESIAN SOCIETY JAKARTA VISIT

DAN GOETZ OF THE U.S.-INDONESIA SOCIETY TELEPHONED TO SAY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 149211 142315Z
THAT THE SOCIETY DELEGATION IS SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE AT 11:00 A.M. ON AUGUST 25TH. THE INDONESIANS APPARENTLY HAVE ASKED WHETHER AMBASSADOR ROY WOULD ACCOMPANY THE GROUP. WHEN TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR WILL NOT YET HAVE RETURNED TO INDONESIA BY THAT DATE, GOETZ SAID HE'D GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU WITH FURTHER DETAILS.

2. (U) GRANTA MAGAZINE ON ITS WAY

WE'VE PURCHASED AND ARE MAILING TO ED MCWILLIAMS A COPY OF THE SUMMER `98 GRANTA WITH ARTICLES ON INDONESIA, INCLUDING THE PIECE BY RICHARD LLOYD PERRY ON DAYAK HEADHUNTING IN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 14 AUG 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2006 200502501

KALIMANTAN. REIMBURSMENT (USD 11.95 PLUS POSTAGE TBD) SHOULD BE SENT TO BOB CLARKE.

3. (C) DAR ITEMS

WE DID THE FOLLOWING INDONESIA-RELATED ITEMS TODAY:

INDONESIA -- FOREIGN INVESTIGATION OF RAPES? ACCORDING TO A LOCAL PRESS REPORT, HABIBIE HAS INSTRUCTED COORDINATING MINISTER FOR SECURITY FEISAL TANJUNG TO ALLOW FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN INVESTIGATIONS INTO VIOLENCE AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE LAST MAY. THE ARTICLE STATES INDONESIA WILL INVITE "INTELLIGENCE" PARTICIPATION FROM SINGAPORE, TAIWAN, HONG KONG, THE U.S. AND CHINA. HABIBIE'S ACTION WAS SAID TO BE IN RESPONSE TO A REPORT FROM WOMEN'S AFFAIRS MINISTER TUTTY ALAWIYAH.

B1

INDONESIA -- INDEPENDENCE DAY: RUMORS ARE SWEEPING THE SINO-INDONESIAN COMMUNITY THAT THERE WILL BE TROUBLE OVER THE WEEKEND AND ON THE AUGUST 1? INDEPENDENCE DAY HOLIDAY. SOME ETHNIC CHINESE AND FOREIGNERS HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT IS DOWNPLAYING THE DANGER OF UNREST, WHILE BOLSTERING SECURITY. THE INDONESIAN EMBASSY HERE DOES NOT PLAN TO HOST A NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION, PROBABLY FOR REASONS OF ECONOMY.

P.T. FREEPORT INDONESIA STRIKE OVER: THE NEW ORLEANS-BASED PARENT COMPANY OF P.T. FREEPORT INDONESIA INFORMED US TODAY THAT WORKERS AT THE COPPER, GOLD, AND SILVER MINING FACILITY IN IRIAN JAYA HAVE "VOLUNTARILY" RETURNED TO WORK. OPERATIONS REPORTEDLY HAVE RESUMED AFTER A FOUR-DAY STRIKE OVER WAGE, ALLOWANCES, AND REHIRING ISSUES. IT IS UNCLEAR AS YET WHETHER ANY OF THE DEMANDS OF THE STRIKERS WERE MET.

INDONESIA - MILITARY HONOR COUNCIL: THE MILITARY HONOR COUNCIL MISSED ITS AUGUST 13 DEADLINE TO WRAP UP INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF INVOLVEMENT BY THREE SENIOR ABRI OFFICERS, INCLUDING LT. GEN PRABOWO, IN ABDUCTIONS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS LAST MAY. PRESS REPORTS QUOTE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF AND HONOR COUNCIL HEAD GEN. SUBAGYO SAYING FURTHER QUESTIONING WAS NECESSARY. CRITICS COMPLAIN ABOUT THE COUNCIL'S LACK OF TRANSPARENCY.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

PTQ8781

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B2, B5

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8781

PAGE 01 STATE 131622 202325Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001R

131622
SOURCE: KODAKC.020148
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAROCHMAN -- 07/20/98 7-2543
APPROVED BY: EAP:/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------56427A 202330Z /38

O 202324Z JUL 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 131622

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/08
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 114

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM PIMBS DIRECTOR HARTWICK

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR HARTWICK. REASON 1.5(D).

1. (C) EMIL SALIM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 JUL 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2006 200502501

B1

2. (U) MY SCHEDULE

AS YOU KNOW, I WILL LEAVE WASHINGTON TUESDAY, JULY 21 FOR CONSULTATIONS IN BRUNEI (JULY 22-23) AND THE ARF/PMC MEETINGS IN MANILA (JULY 24-30). I WILL BE ON ANNUAL LEAVE IN THE U.S. AUGUST 1-18 AFTER WHICH I AM SCHEDULED TO SERVE ON A PROMOTION PANEL UNTIL THE THIRD WEEK OF SEPTEMBER. IN MY ABSENCE, PIMBS WILL BE IN JON ALOISI' S VERY CAPABLE HANDS.

3. (U) LEAHY AMENDMENT

DRL REQUESTS YOUR RESPONSE TO STATE 47790 OF MARCH 17 ON LEAHY AMENDMENT COMPLIANCE. IF YOU HAVE ALREADY RESPONDED,

PLEASE LET US KNOW THE CABLE NUMBER.

4. (SBU) PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES WHEAT INITIATIVE

AS ANTICIPATED IN STATE 130756, THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED JULY 18 OUR MASSIVE NEW FOOD AID INITIATIVE. WE ATTENDED A MONDAY MEETING CALLED BY ERIC SCHWARTZ OF THE NEC TO DISCUSS COORDINATION EFFORTS. AT THIS STAGE, USDA, USAID, STATE, NSC, AND NEC ARE WORKING OUT A LIST OF COUNTRIES TO BE OFFERED AID, AND TRYING TO DECIDE HOW TO SPLIT UP THE INITIAL 2.5 MILLION TONS. ON THE "WHO," THE PUBLIC LIST TO DATE INCLUDES FIVE NATIONS (THE PRESIDENT NAMED INDONESIA AND SUDAN, WHILE SECRETARY GLICKMAN ADDED ETHIOPIA, ERITREA AND NORTH KOREA) . ON "HOW MUCH" THE GROUP IS CONCERNED IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO COMMIT, TRANSPORT AND DISTRIBUTE EVEN THE INITIAL 2.5 MILLION TONS, DESPITE THE EXPECTED LENGTHENING OF THE LIST OF COUNTRIES NEEDING AID. DESPITE

THIS, ERIC AND USDA STRESSED THAT THE 2.5 MILLION "MINIMUM1, FIGURE COULD GROW.

ON MECHANICS, USDA U/S GUS SCHUMACHER WILL CHAIR MEETINGS OF THE LITTLE-USED "FOOD AID ADVISORY GROUP" (WHICH INCLUDES USDA, STATE, AID, AND OMB, ET AL) TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS POSED ABOVE. EVERYONE EXPECTS VERY QUICK ACTION, BUILDING TOWARD FIRST WHEAT PURCHASES THIS WEEK, FURTHER PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS, AND OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH GOVERNMENTS. THERE IS UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN ABOUT HOW OTHER WHEAT EXPORTERS WILL RESPOND TO THIS HUGE GIVE-AWAY PROGRAM, ESPECIALLY AUSTRALIA IN THE CASE OF TRANSFERS TO INDONESIA. THERE IS ALSO CONCERN THAT THE GOI AND THE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK WILL

NOT BE ABLE TO HANDLE A SURGE IN WHEAT SHIPMENTS. GIVEN THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL MENTION OF INDONESIA, HOWEVER, IT IS CERTAIN THAT JAKARTA WILL BE OFFERED A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF WHEAT, AND THAT WE'LL BE TASKED TO "MAKE IT WORK." WE EXPECT THAT DONORS WILL BE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING OUR PROGRAM DURING UPCOMING CGI TALKS.

AID WILL BE TAKING THE LEAD ON TECHNICAL ISSUES, AND WE'RE SURE YOUR PEOPLE THERE ARE ALREADY COMING UP WITH REQUIREMENTS AND PROPOSALS. WE'LL KEEP YOU INFORMED AS THIS PLAYS OUT FROM OUR PERCEPTIVE. HELP KEEP US IN THE

LOOP BY SHARING YOUR VIEWS, AND THE EXPECTATIONS/REACTIONS OF OUR INDONESIAN FRIENDS, EITHER VIA THIS CHANNEL, OR -- AS APPROPRIATE -- VIA FRONT CHANNEL CABLE.



B2

6. (U) FCS CASE

DAN KEELEAN OF REP. DAVE CAMP'S OFFICE CALLED TO SAY THAT HE IS SENDING A FAX TO LARRY JENSEN CONCERNING A MATTER YOU'VE BEEN DEALING WITH INVOLVING CHEMICAL BANK AND TRUST OF MIDLAND, MI, AND BANK TABUNGAN NEGARA. HE EXPECTS TO CALL LARRY TUESDAY MORNING, YOUR TIME.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. (SBU) SHATTUCK TESTIMONY

BELOW IS THE TEXT OF DRL'S FIRST DRAFT OF JOHN SHATTUCK'S HIRC TESTIMONY ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDONESIA. THE HEARING IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR JULY 24 AT 10 AM. WE PASSED YOUR SUGGESTIONS TO DRL, BUT THIS DRAFT WAS ALREADY DONE BEFORE DRL RECEIVED THEM. THIS JUST CAME TO US, SO WE HAVE NOT YET HAD A CHANCE TO READ/COMMENT ON IT TO DRL.

BEGIN TEXT:



B5



B5









CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

B5





CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 18 STATE 131622 202325Z

[redacted] B5

END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 19 STATE 131622 202325Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ7342

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

SECRET PTO6985

PAGE 01 STATE 085470 130051Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001R

085470
SOURCE: KODAKB.013010
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:VEMURRAY/DAROCHMAN -- 05/12/98 7-2543
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:ARABASA
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------3D1BB7 130052Z /38

O 130050Z MAY 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 085470

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/03
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 82

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM PIMBS DIRECTOR HARTWICK

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS HARTWICK. REASON:
1.5 (D)

1. (S) INDONESIA POLICY

SECRET

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 13 MAY 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200502501

B1

2. (SBU) PRESS GUIDANCE

HERE WAS THE CLEARED PRESS STATEMENT WE DRAFTED WHICH THE SECRETARY DID NOT USE. A SEPARATE PRESS RELEASE WHICH WAS THEN FASHIONED FROM THE FOLLOWING WAS ISSUED. THE ACTUAL STATEMENT HAS BEEN FAXED TO AMB. ROY.

Q. WHAT IS THE U.S. REACTION TO RECENT EVENTS IN INDONESIA?

A.: THE UNITED STATES DEPLORES THE KILLINGS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE AS INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES HAVE CONFRONTED DEMONSTRATORS.

WE STRONGLY URGE THE SECURITY FORCES TO SHOW RESTRAINT AND REFRAIN FROM VIOLENCE WHEN FACING PROTESTERS.

SECRET

SECRET

WE REPEAT OUR CALL FOR STUDENTS AND THE PUBLIC TO KEEP THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS PEACEFUL.

INDONESIA NEEDS TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE WHICH APPEARS TO BE EMERGING. ALL PARTIES IN INDONESIA RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR POLITICAL REFORM. SUCH POLITICAL REFORM CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS CITIZENS.

Q: DOES POLITICAL REFORM MEAN GETTING RID OF SOEHARTO?

A.: IT IS UP TO INDONESIA'S PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR POLITICAL LEADERS AND SHAPE THEIR OWN FUTURE.

3. (SBU) MONITORING GROUP

YOU PROBABLY HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED A CABLE TELLING YOU THAT, AT THE SECRETARY'S REQUEST, THE DEPARTMENT TODAY CREATED A "MONITORING GROUP" (ABOVE A WORKING GROUP BUT BELOW A TASK FORCE) ON INDONESIA, AND TASKING YOU TO PROVIDE VARIOUS PHONE LISTS, BEGIN A LOG, AND START DAILY SITREPS. THE MONITORING GROUP WILL MEET DAILY AND PRODUCE ITS OWN SITUATION REPORT FOR THE SECRETARY AND OTHER PRINCIPALS (DRAWING HEAVILY ON YOUR OWN SITREPS, OF COURSE). THE NEXT ITEM COMES FROM OUR FIRST MEETING.

4. (SBU) AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE PREPARATIONS

IN LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS, IT SEEMS WE ARE NOW FURTHER UP YOUR TRIP-WIRE CHAIN. WITH YOUR NEXT EAC IMMINENT, IT MAY BE TIME FOR THE EAC TO CONSIDER AND BEGIN CONCRETE

SECRET

PREPARATIONS FOR A POSSIBLE AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE. MANY IN THE BUILDING HAVE REQUESTED THAT YOU SPELL OUT YOUR VIEWS ON A POSSIBLE DRAWDOWN AS DISCUSSED IN YOUR MAY 13 EAC MEETING. THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT STAFF IS RETRANSMITTING THE INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES RELATED TO AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE THAT WERE TRANSMITTED TO POST IN FEBRUARY. IT WOULD ALSO BE VERY USEFUL TO HAVE POST'S ASSESSMENT OF ITS PREPAREDNESS TO IMPLEMENT AN AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE IF THIS BECOMES NECESSARY INCLUDING YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE ANTICIPATED AVAILABILITY OF COMMERCIAL AIRLINE SEATS IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. TIME CONSUMING OPERATIONS, SUCH AS THE PREPARATION OF TRAVEL ORDERS, SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN ADVANCE SO THAT ONLY THE FINAL FEW BITS OF DATA NEED TO BE ADDED. POST SHOULD ALSO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE DATABASE OF EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS SO AS TO PERMIT EASY TRACKING OF EVACUEES. EAP/EX CAN GUIDE AND ASSIST POST IN THESE

MATTERS. THIS IS PRELIMINARY, I EMPHASIZE, BUT WILL ENSURE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO MOVE IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATES.

5. (U) CONGRESSMAN HALL VISIT

CONGRESSMAN TONY HALL (D-OH) WOULD LIKE TO VISIT EITHER SUDAN OR INDONESIA OVER THE MEMORIAL DAY RECESS (MAY 25-29). IF HE DECIDES TO TRAVEL TO INDONESIA, HE WOULD LIKE TO VISIT EAST TIMOR AND TALK TO STUDENT AND OPPOSITION GROUPS. HE HAS A PARTICULAR INTEREST IN HUNGER AND FOOD ISSUES. CAN YOU REFRESH US ON WHAT PROCEDURES WOULD BE NEEDED TO GET PERMISSION FOR A CONGRESSMAN TO TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR? DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES, WE MAY NEED TO SEE HOW SERIOUS HE REALLY IS GIVEN THE LEVEL OF TENSIONS.

SECRET



B1

7. (U) STAFFING SUPPORT

WE ARE COMPILING A LIST OF BAHASA SPEAKERS WHO MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO HELP IF TDY ASSISTANCE IS APPROVED. WE ALSO SPOKE FURTHER TO CHARLES ASH ABOUT OTHER STAFFING OPTIONS WHICH WOULD HELP YOU OVER THE MEDIUM TERM. HE SUGGESTED

YOU CONSIDER REQUESTING A JUNIOR OFFICER FOR ONE TOUR; JO PERSONNEL IS CREATING ONE TOUR ONLY POSITIONS IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE THE RECENT INFLUX OF JUNIOR OFFICERS. THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY THAT A PMI WHO WILL BE IN MALAYSIA UNTIL DECEMBER COULD GET A LIMITED NON-CAREER APPOINTMENT TO SPEND A YEAR IN JAKARTA BEGINNING IN JANUARY. OF COURSE, IF YOU ARE IN ANY SORT OF DRAWDOWN STATUS, TDY

SUPPORT COULD BECOME A MORE COMPLICATED ISSUE. WE WILL TALK TO STANLEY TOMORROW ABOUT THIS ISSUE.

8. (SBU) PROPOSED VOA EDITORIAL

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 085470 130051Z

THE FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT EDITORIAL FROM VOA. WE THINK IT LOOKS GENERALLY ALL RIGHT, BUT STANLEY WOULD LIKE TO HEAR WHAT AMB. ROY THINKS. PLEASE LET US KNOW ASAP.

BEGIN DRAFT EDITORIAL.

AS INDONESIA GRAPPLES WITH A SEVERE ECONOMIC CRISIS, SOCIAL TENSIONS ARE INCREASING. DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE IN JAKARTA, THE CAPITAL, AND OTHER CITIES. DEMONSTRATORS HAVE CALLED FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM AND AN END TO GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION. SOME DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE TURNED VIOLENT, AND SEVERAL PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED. SUCH VIOLENCE -- BY EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OR ITS OPPONENTS -- WILL ONLY MAKE INDONESIA'S PROBLEMS WORSE. VIOLENCE WILL ALSO FURTHER ERODE THE VERY INVESTOR CONFIDENCE THAT INDONESIA NEEDS TO BEGIN ITS ECONOMIC RECOVERY.

MAINTAINING ORDER WHILE RESPECTING THE RIGHT TO LEGITIMATE PROTEST IS A DIFFICULT TASK FOR ANY GOVERNMENT. IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO PROTECT CITIZENS1 SAFETY IS UNDERSTANDABLE. BUT THE GOVERNMENT MUST ALSO AVOID EXCESSES. THE UNITED STATES IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE NUMEROUS CASES OF OPPOSITION ACTIVISTS WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED IN RECENT MONTHS. IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT SOME OF THE MISSING ACTIVISTS HAVE REAPPEARED. THE U.S. HAS URGED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THEY DISAPPEARED TO RESOLVE THE OUTSTANDING CASES, AND TO HOLD ACCOUNTABLE ANYONE INVOLVED IN ABDUCTIONS OR TORTURE.

IN THE WAKE OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS, THERE ARE REPORTS

SECRET

SECRET

THAT SENIOR MEMBERS OF INDONESIA1 S MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT ARE TALKING ABOUT THE NEED FOR BASIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. THESE VOICES HAVE JOINED THOSE OF THE STUDENTS AND OTHER INDONESIANS WHO ARE CALLING FOR DEMOCRATIZATION. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT COULD START TO RESTORE SOCIAL

PEACE AND PUT THE COUNTRY ON THE PATH TO LONG-TERM STABILITY BY OPENING A DIALOGUE WITH ITS CRITICS.

THE U.S. HAS A STRONG INTEREST IN HELPING TO RESTORE STABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH TO INDONESIA. THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH INDONESIA TO HELP ACHIEVE THESE GOALS. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE INDONESIA TO UNDERTAKE THE REFORMS THAT MANY NOW DEEM ESSENTIAL.

END DRAFT EDITORIAL.
ALBRIGHT

SECRET

NNNN

E63

PTQ4084

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTO4961

PAGE 01 STATE 062622 080259Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00
	SAS-00	/030R					

062622
SOURCE: KODAKA.008134
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAROCHMAN:DAR -- 04/07/98 X72543
APPROVED BY: EAP:SOROTH
EAP:AEBRAZEAL EAP/PIMBS:ARABASA PRM:GHOGEMAN
DRL:SSUTTON
----------30CABE 080302Z /38

O P 080259Z APR 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 062622

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/07
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 062622 080259Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 8 APR 2013
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PREF, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH'S APRIL 6 MEETING WITH AMB. DORODJATUN

CLASSIFIED BY EAP A/S STANLEY O. ROTH, REASONS 1.5(D)

1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE, SEE PARAGRAPH 16.

SUMMARY
---

2. (C) AT AN APRIL 6 MEETING, A/S ROTH TOLD INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN THAT HE HOPED THERE WOULD BE AGREEMENT ON A NEW INDONESIA-IMF AGREEMENT SOON AND THAT THE EXIM BANK WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO ANNOUNCE STEPS ON TRADE CREDITS. DORODJATUN CAUTIONED THAT BANK RESTRUCTURING WILL TAKE SOME TIME, POTENTIALLY DELAYING ACTION ON TRADE INSURANCE. ROTH AND ACTING A/S KRECZKO EXPRESSED USG CONCERNS OVER THE FORCIBLE REPATRIATION OF ACEHNESE REFUGEES AND REPORTS OF THEIR MISTREATMENT UPON THEIR RETURN. DORODJATUN SAID THAT ECONOMIC STRESSES WERE PRODUCING HIGH LEVELS OF ECONOMIC MIGRANTS. ROTH TOLD DORODJATUN OF USG CONCERNS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES INCLUDING A POSSIBLE BAN ON ON-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATIONS, DETENTIONS AND DISAPPEARANCES. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM INDONESIAN

DCM NASUTION, ROTH SAID THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE CURRENT MOVEMENT IN THE DIALOGUE ON EAST TIMOR. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY ROTH MET WITH INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN AT A/S ROTH'S REQUEST ON APRIL 6 AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT. ALSO IN ATTENDANCE WERE

INDONESIAN DCM NASUTION, INDONESIAN POLITICAL COUNSELOR WIJONO, PRM ACTING A/S KRECZKO, EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR HARTWICK, PRM STAFF, AND INDONESIA DESK OFFICER (NOTETAKER)

IMF AND EXIM ANNOUNCEMENTS
---

4. (C) ROTH BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE HOPED THERE WOULD BE A NEW INDONESIAN AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF PRIOR TO HIS APRIL 15

ARRIVAL IN JAKARTA AND THAT THE USG WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO CONCURRENTLY ANNOUNCE STEPS ON TRADE CREDITS. THE OUTSTANDING ISSUE FOR THE EXIM BANK, HE NOTED, IS A SOVEREIGN GUARANTY. WE WOULD THUS GREATLY APPRECIATE ANYTHING THE GOI COULD DO IN THIS REGARD, AS AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON TRADE CREDITS WOULD HELP GET THE NEW IMF AGREEMENT OFF TO A BETTER START BY ENHANCING MARKET CONFIDENCE.

B1

REFUGEES/MIGRANTS

7. (C) ROTH NOTED USG CONCERNS ON THE ISSUE OF REPATRIATION OF INDONESIAN REFUGEES AND ILLEGAL MIGRANTS FROM MALAYSIA. LIKE ANY OTHER COUNTRIES, INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA NEED TO CONTROL THEIR BORDERS, HE SAID, BUT IT IS

IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH REFUGEES FROM ECONOMIC MIGRANTS. THE USG IS VERY CONCERNED BY THE RIOTS IN THE CAMPS THAT LED TO NINE DEATHS, THE FORCIBLE REPATRIATION OF ACEHNESE TO INDONESIA AND BY REPORTS OF THEIR MISTREATMENT UPON THEIR RETURN. THE USG HOPES TO HAVE A SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH THE GOL ON THIS ISSUE, HE SAID.

S. (C) KRECZKO SAID THE USG CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT THAT THE GOT: 1) DOES NOTHING TO DISCOURAGE THE GOM FROM ALLOWING UNHCR SCREENING OF INDONESIANS IN MALAYSIA; 2) RESTORE ICRC ACCESS TO DETENTION CENTERS FOR RETURNING REFUGEES; AND 3) ALLOW THE ICRC TO RESUME ASSISTANCE TO RETURNEES. KRECZKO THEN REINFORCED THE MESSAGE OF

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES AND ENSURING THAT RETURNEES ARE NOT MISTREATED.

[redacted] B1

HUMAN RIGHTS/DISAPPEARANCES

10. (C) ROTH SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS HAVE OTHER CONCERNS ON HUMAN RIGHTS INCLUDING:

- A RECENT STATEMENT BY THE EDUCATION MINISTER THAT DEMONSTRATIONS MAY NOT BE ALLOWED ON CAMPUSES;
- THE CONTINUING DETENTION OF HUNDREDS OF PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION PARTICIPANTS; AND
- A NUMBER OF DISAPPEARANCES INCLUDING TIMORESE ACTIVISTS AND A KEY AIDE TO OPPOSITION LEADER MEGAWATI.

11. (C) THE USC APPRECIATES THE MILITARY'S RESTRAINT TO DATE IN DEALING WITH PROTESTS, THE ALLOWANCE OF ON-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATIONS SO FAR, AND THE DECREASE OF ANTI-SINO INDONESIAN VIOLENCE, ROTH SAID. DESPITE THESE POSITIVE

DEVELOPMENTS, HE CONTINUED, RECENT NEGATIVE REPORTS HAVE CAUSED A SENSE OF ALARM, AND PERCEPTIONS OF INCREASING GOI REPRESSION COULD BE A MAJOR BLOW TO EFFORTS TO ASSIST INDONESIA ECONOMICALLY AND TO ACHIEVE OTHER LONG-TERM GOALS SUCH AS RESUMPTION OF IMET.

[redacted] B1

ROTH REPLIED THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR A DIALOGUE WOULD LIKELY DIMINISH IF ON-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATIONS WERE BANNED. ROTH ADDED THAT THE USC OF COURSE BELIEVES THAT PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATORS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO VOICE THEIR OPINIONS ANYWHERE ON- OR OFF-CAMPUS.

[redacted] B1

14. (C) ROTH NOTED THAT AGREEMENT ON AND AGGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN IMF PROGRAM CAN RAPIDLY TURN AROUND A SEEMINGLY DIRE SITUATION, AS WAS THE CASE IN THE ROK AND

B1

EAST TIMOR

15. (C) NASUTION ASKED ABOUT USC PERCEPTIONS ON DEVELOPMENTS ON EAST TIMOR. ROTH RESPONDED THAT IN THEIR FEBRUARY MEETING, RAMOS HORTA WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE HAD BEEN ENOUGH PROGRESS THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO RETURN TO EAST TIMOR UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE INTRA TIMORESE DIALOGUE. HOWEVER, ROTH SAID, WHEN HE MET WITH FM ALATAS IN MARCH, ALATAS THOUGHT SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE PREMATURE AND WAS NOT A SERIOUS OPTION. ROTH ADDED THAT, DESPITE A LOT OF MOTION ON THE ISSUE INCLUDING AMB.

MARKER'S CONTINUED PURSUIT OF THE UN-FACILITATED DIALOGUE, PROGRESS ON EAST TIMOR APPEARS TO HAVE STALLED.

ACTION REQUEST

16 (C) EMBASSY IS INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH THE GOL AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL ON REFUGEE/HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES USING THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

- O WE UNDERSTAND THE STRAINS CAUSED BY THE ONGOING FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN INDONESIA AND YOUR GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN ORDER. HOWEVER, RECENTLY THERE HAVE BEEN SOME DISTURBING REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

- O WE ARE VERY CONCERNED BY REPORTS OF A NUMBER OF DISAPPEARANCES AND DETENTIONS OF REFORM AND OPPOSITION

FIGURES INCLUDING HAYANTO TASLAM AND ANDI ARIEF.

- O IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA PUT ITS FULL WEIGHT BEHIND SECURING THE IMMEDIATE AND FULL

INVESTIGATION OF ALL DISAPPEARANCES.

O WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS OF RECENT DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS OF ACTIVISTS INCLUDING RATNA SARUMPAET AND OVER 100 STUDENTS DETAINED FOLLOWING A FEBRUARY 11 PROTEST MARCH. WE ARE ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED BY REPORTS THAT SOME OF THOSE ARRESTED HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO PHYSICAL ABUSE WHILE IN DETENTION.

O WE EXPECT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA WILL ENSURE THAT ALL THOSE DETAINED AND ARRESTED ARE DEALT WITH IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES THAT THEIR DUE PROCESS RIGHTS ARE FULLY RESPECTED AND THAT THEY ARE NOT SUBJECTED TO INHUMANE OR DEGRADING TREATMENT.

O ALTHOUGH THE FIGURES NAMED ABOVE ARE AMONG THE MOST WIDELY KNOWN, THERE ARE MANY OTHER REPORTED DISAPPEARANCES AND DETENTIONS AS WELL. THE FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT NAMED ANY PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN THEIR CASE.

O WE ARE ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ALLEGED MISTREATMENT OF INDONESIAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES, IN PARTICULAR THE ACEHNESE.

O AS WE ARE ALSO DOING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA, WE URGE YOU TO FULLY INVOLVE THE UNHCR AND THE ICRC IN

THIS ISSUE SO THAT INDONESIA'S CREDIBILITY REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL RNIGRANTS AND RETURNEES IS ASSURED.

O WE ALSO STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN ACCESS TO RETURNED REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS.

O THIS IS A CRITICAL TIME OF INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN INDONESIA. SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT INDONESIA' S COMMITMENT TO DUE PROCESS AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WILL UNDERMINE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO WORK WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE GROWTH AND STABILITY.

ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

E58

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTO4247

PAGE 01 JAKART 06190 031027Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W			

----------889B21 031027Z /38

P 030953Z DEC 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4877
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 006190

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/03
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, MILI, ID
SUBJECT: STUDENT LEADER SAYS HE WAS ABDUCTED, INTERROGATED, BEATEN

1. (SBU) ANWAR, AN INDONESIAN STUDENT LEADER FROM THE DJUANDA LAW

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06190 031027Z
SCHOOL IN BOGOR, SOUTH OF JAKARTA, TOLD JOURNALISTS ON DECEMBER 2 THAT HE WAS ABDUCTED BY UNKNOWN PERSONS ON NOVEMBER 28 AND HELD FOR 24 HOURS BEFORE BEING RELEASED. ANWAR SAID HE WAS INTERROGATED FOR 12 HOURS ABOUT HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, AND IN PARTICULAR HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BOGOR BRANCH OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY (LBH). ACCORDING TO ANWAR, HIS CAPTORS WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN PLANS TO COMMEMORATE "HUMAN RIGHTS DAY" DECEMBER 8-10. ANWAR CLAIMED HIS CAPTORS WERE CONCERNED THAT LBH AND STUDENT GROUPS HAD INVITED PROMINENT HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS ROMO SANDYAWAN AND RATNA SURAMPAET TO THE EVENT. (NOTE: SURAMPAET SLIPPED OUT OF THE COUNTRY DECEMBER 2 AFTER SEVERAL WEEKS IN HIDING. SHE SAID SHE HAD RECEIVED WARNINGS THAT SHE MIGHT BE DETAINED OR ATTACKED AFTER SHE JOINED STUDENTS AT ATMA JAYA NOVEMBER 13 AT THE HEIGHT OF THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 3 DEC 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200502501

VIOLENCE. SHE WILL SPEAK ON THE MILITARY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE TO A GROUP IN PARIS AND RECEIVE AN AWARD IN TOKYO. END NOTE.)

2. (SBU) ANWAR TOLD JOURNALISTS HE WAS HELD IN A CHAIR WITH HIS ARMS BOUND BEHIND HIS BACK AND WAS DENIED FOOD OR WATER THROUGHOUT HIS ABDUCTION. ANWAR SAID HIS CAPTORS EVENTUALLY PROMISED TO FREE HIM, BUT WARNED HIM THAT "HUMAN RIGHTS DAY" CELEBRATIONS SHOULD NOT IMPUGN THE INDONESIAN MILITARY OR GOVERNMENT.

3. (C) ANWAR IS THE CHAIRMAN OF HIS LAW SCHOOL'S STUDENT SENATE, AND ALSO THE BOGOR BRANCH CHAIRMAN OF THE PMII, THE NU'S YOUTH WING. (NOTE: NU IS INDONESIA'S LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION. END NOTE.)

B1

4. (C) COMMENT: ANWAR'S ACCOUNT, IF ACCURATE, IS A DISTURBING REMINDER THAT STUDENT LEADERS MAY BE TARGETED BY SOME UNKNOWN ELEMENTS FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL PUNISHMENT/INTIMIDATION. 12 POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, INCLUDING STUDENTS, WHO DISAPPEARED IN THE RUN UP TO THE MAY STUDENT PROTESTS THAT HELPED BRING DOWN PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ARE STILL MISSING, AND FEARED DEAD. THOUGH WE HAVE HEARD SOME SECOND-HAND ALLEGATIONS WE DO NOT HAVE ANY CONCRETE DETAILS OF OTHER RECENT INSTANCES OF STUDENTS BEING TARGETED FOR THIS SORT OF TREATMENT. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E56

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9281

PAGE 01 JAKART 06120 01 OF 03 010952Z
ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	FAAE-00	FBIE-00
	IMMC-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	JUSE-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	DCP-01	NRCE-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	SNIS-00
	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/024W					

----------879A49 010953Z /38

R 010919Z DEC 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4802

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 006120

DEPARTMENT; S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/16
TAGS: PTER, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 1998 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: A) STATE 202128, B) 1997 JAKARTA 6773

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (U) FORMAT FOR THIS MESSAGE WAS DERIVED FROM REF A.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06120 01 OF 03 010952Z

A. RESPONSE OF THE INDONESIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 1998:

---

3. (U) THE GOI JUDICIAL SYSTEM WAS NOT CONFRONTED WITH ANY ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM DURING 1998. IT WAS, HOWEVER, CONFRONTED WITH INCIDENTS WHICH FALL INTO REF A'S DESCRIPTION OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM: "PREMEDITATED, POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE PERPETRATED AGAINST NONCOMBATANT TARGETS BY SUBNATIONAL GROUPS OR CLANDESTINE STATE AGENTS."

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

4. (U) THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BROUGHT TO TRIAL ANY OF THE MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO STAND ACCUSED OF CLANDESTINELY KIDNAPPING AND TORTURING POLITICAL ACTIVISTS IN 1997 AND 1998. A SENIOR MILITARY OFFICER, GENERAL PRABOWO, WAS SUBJECTED TO A MILITARY HONORS BOARD (NOT A COURT MARTIAL) AT WHICH HE ADMITTED INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPING OF NINE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. HE WAS HONORABLY RETIRED FROM MILITARY SERVICE. FOURTEEN ACTIVISTS REMAIN MISSING. A GROUP OF 11 MILITARY PERSONNEL HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS PENDING FORMAL CHARGES BUT ACTION IN MOVING THESE CASES TO TRIAL HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY DELAYED.

5. (U) THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BROUGHT TO TRIAL OR CHARGED ANY PARTY IN THE MAY FATAL SHOOTING OF PEACEFULLY DEMONSTRATING STUDENTS ON THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. IT HAS TRIED AND CONVICTED TWO

POLICE OFFICIALS FOR MISCONDUCT IN THE INCIDENT, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THEY WERE NOT GUILTY OF FIRING THE FATAL SHOTS. THE GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION INTO THESE KILLINGS AND THE WOUNDING OF A NUMBER OF OTHER INDIVIDUALS WITH LIVE AMMUNITION AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ON MAY 12 IS STALLED.

6. (U) THE GOVERNMENT HAS BROUGHT TO TRIAL A NUMBER OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF THE MURDER OF OVER 150 INDIVIDUALS INCLUDING ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS FIGURES AND SHAMANS, IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA. SOME OF THOSE CHARGED HAVE BEEN CONVICTED. THERE ARE REPORTS, CONSIDERED CREDIBLE BY THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THAT CLANDESTINE STATE AGENTS MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN SOME OF THESE KILLINGS. INVESTIGATIONS ARE PROCEEDING SLOWLY BUT ARE ACTIVE. THE MILITARY INTELIGENCE AGENCY, BIA, REPORTS THAT POLICE HAVE ARRESTED 157 SUSPECTS THUS FAR.

7. (U) THE GOVERNMENT APPOINTED A FACT-FINDING TEAM TO LOOK INTO MAY RIOTS IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES WHICH LED TO THE DEATH OF OVER 1,200 PEOPLE AND THE RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT OF MOSTLY SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND GIRLS. THE TEAM SUBMITTED ITS REPORT ON NOVEMBER 3, AND CALLED INTER ALIA ON THE GOVERNMENT TO CONDUCT A FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF THE RIOTS AND SPECIFICALLY TO BRING FORMER GENERAL PRABOWO BEFORE A COURT MARTIAL. IT NAMED ANOTHER SENIOR GENERAL, FORMER JAKARTA MILITARY COMMANDER SYAFRIE, AS SOMEONE WHOSE ROLE IN THE RIOTS SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED. THE REPORT ALSO URGED CLOSER

SUPERVISION OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (BIA)
WHICH A MEMBER OF THE FACT-FINDING TEAM DESCRIBED AS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 06120 01 OF 03 010952Z
"OUT OF CONTROL." PRESIDENT HABIBIE ANNOUNCED THAT KEY MINISTERS HAD ONE MONTH TO RESPOND TO THE TEAM'S REPORT. THE REPORT WAS ISSUED NOVEMBER 3. PRESIDENT HABIBIE TOLD AN AMERICAN VISITOR DECEMBER 1 THAT FOLLOW-UP ON THE REPORT WOULD BE DELAYED BECAUSE OF JUSTICE MULADI'S EMERGENCY HEART BY-PASS SURGERY IN NOVEMBER.

8. (U) IN EAST TIMOR, NON-COMBATANTS WERE TARGETS OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE CARRIED OUT BY SUBNATIONAL GROUPS OF ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST EAST TIMORESE AND BY MILITARY-BACKED PRO-INTEGRATIONIST GROUPS. IN 1998, THE OPPOSITION IN EAST TIMOR IS BELIEVED TO HAVE KILLED AT LEAST SIX CIVILIANS WHOM THEY ACCUSED OF BEING COLLABORATORS. ALSO IN 1998, GOI FORCES OR THEIR EAST TIMORESE PARAMILITARY AGENTS KILLED MORE THAN 30 NON-COMBATANTS WHOM THEY ACCUSED OF BEING CLANDESTINE SUPPORTERS OF THE REBELS, OR WHO WERE RELATIVES OF REBEL PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION TO THE NON-COMBATANTS, NINE ABRI PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN KILLED IN EAST TIMOR OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS.

9. (U) THE GOI POLICE/MILITARY AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS HAVE SOUGHT TO APPREHEND AND PROSECUTE ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST ELEMENTS ACCUSED OF ATTACKS ON NON-COMBATANTS (AND COMBATANTS). THE GOI IS ALSO SEEKING THE SURRENDER FROM REFUGE IN THE AUSTRIAN EMBASSY OF TWO

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9282

PAGE 01 JAKART 06120 02 OF 03 010952Z
ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	FAAE-00	FBIE-00
	IMMC-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	JUSE-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	DCP-01	NRCE-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	SNIS-00
	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/024W					

----------879A51 010953Z /38

R 010919Z DEC 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4803

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 006120

DEPARTMENT; S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/16
TAGS: PTER, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 1998 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: A) STATE 202128, B) 1997 JAKARTA 6773

PEOPLE IT ALLEGES ARE INVOLVED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF MUNITIONS AND EXPLOSIVES WHICH IT CLAIMS WERE TO BE USED BY ARMED ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST FORCES IN EAST TIMOR AND WHOM VARIOUS GOVERNMENT FIGURES HAVE DESCRIBED AS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06120 02 OF 03 010952Z
"TERRORISTS." ALLEGED ACCOMPLICES OF THESE INDIVIDUALS HAVE ALREADY BEEN FOUND NOT GUILTY BY AN INDONESIAN COURT, HOWEVER.

10. (U) THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT KNOWN TO HAVE BROUGHT TO TRIAL ANY OF THE MILITARY-BACKED STATE AGENTS WHO ARE CLAIMED BY VARIOUS DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVER ORGANIZATIONS TO HAVE TARGETED NON-COMBATANT EAST TIMORESE WHO OPPOSE EAST TIMOR'S INTEGRATION INTO INDONESIA.

11. (U) MOST REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES CONDUCTED BY STATE AGENTS (THE MILITARY) AGAINST NON-COMBATANTS IN ACEH AND IRIAN JAYA DURING 1998 AND IN EARLIER YEARS, INCLUDING REPORTS BY THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, HAVE GONE UNINVESTIGATED AND UNPROSECUTED BY THE SECURITY FORCES AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM. IN MOST BUT NOT ALL OF THESE CASES, THE ALLEGED PERPETRATORS WERE MILITARY NOT OPERATING CLANDESTINELY, AND THUS WOULD NOT FALL UNDER THE TECHNICAL DEFINITON OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM, REF A. THE GOVERNMNT HAS BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN APPREHENDING ARMED GROUPS ACCUSED OF BEING MEMBERS OF THE FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT (OPM) WHICH ATTACKED, TOOK HOSTAGE AND KILLED NON-COMBATANTS PRIOR TO 1998.

B. GOI EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION DURING 1998 OR ASSISTANCE IN RESPONSE TO U.S. REQUESTS IN TERRORIST CASES:

12. (U) THE GOI DID NOT EXTRADITE ANY SUSPECTED
CONFIDENTIAL

TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION IN 1998 OR ASSIST IN RESPONSE TO U.S. REQUESTS IN OTHER WAYS INASMUCH AS THERE WERE NO U.S. REQUESTS IN THIS AREA.

C. IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS:

13. (U) THE GOVERNMENT WAS FACED WITH NO EXTRADITION REQUESTS IN 1998. DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A FORMAL EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND INDONESIA, AND SOME CONSTRAINTS RELATED TO EXTRADITION CONTAINED IN INDONESIAN LAW, THE GOI HAS COOPERATED WITH THE UNITED STATES IN SUPPORT OF PROSECUTION OF ACCUSED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS IN THE RECENT PAST (1997).

14. (U) THE GOVERNMENT'S DELAYED INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM CASES INVOLVING LIKELY "CLANDESTINE STATE AGENTS MPLOYING POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE AGAINST NON-COMBATANTS," SUCH AS THE MAY 12 TRISAKTI KILLINGS, THE MAY RIOTING AND THE KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS APPEAR TO MOST OBSERVERS TO REFLECT AN ABSENCE OF POLITICAL WILL TO PURSUE THESE CASES. MOREOVER, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IS WIDELY REGARDED AS CORRUPT, INEFFICIENT AND SUBJECT TO POLITICAL PRESSURE ON IMPORTANT CASES.

15. (SBU) ALTHOUGH THE NEW GOVERNMENT THAT CAME TO POWER IN MAY HAS MOVED SLOWLY IN PURSUING INVESTIGATIONS INTO PAST MISDEEDS, INSTANCES OF KIDNAPPINGS, TORTURE OR KILLINGS BY CLANDESTINE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT-DIRECTED AGENTS APPEAR TO HAVE LARGELY CEASED SINCE IT TOOK
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE. INVESTIGATIONS ARE JUST BEING LAUNCHED, HOWEVER, INTO THE POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF CLANDESTINE ELEMENTS IN THE KILLING OF STUDENTS AND OTHERS ON NOVEMBER 13 AT ATMA JAYA UNIVERSITY AND IN RELIGIOUS RIOTING NOVEMBER 22.

D. INDONESIAN RESPONSE OTHER THAN PROSECUTION OF TERRORIST CASES:

16. (U) INDONESIA, WHICH HAS SIGNED FOUR OF THE 10 KEY INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORISM CONVENTIONS, HAS A CONSISTENT RECORD OF COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN IGHTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. FOLLOWING THE U.S. STRIKES AGAINST TERRORISM TARGETS IN SUDAN AND AFGHANISTAN IN AUGUST, PRESIDENT HABIBIE TOLD THE PRESS THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO PERCEIVE THE ACTION AS BEING ANTI-ISLAMIC. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT REGARDING THOSE U.S. ACTIONS INCLUDED CRITICISM OF THE U.S. ACTION. WHILE CONDEMNING "TERRORISM IN ANY FORM," THE STATEMENT WENT ON TO SAY: "HOWEVER, INDONESIA CANNOT CONDONE ACTS OF INTERVENTION IN AND AGGRESSION AGAINST THE TERRITORY OF OTHER SOVEREIGN STATES."

E. MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN BY THE GOI

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9286

PAGE 01 JAKART 06120 03 OF 03 010953Z
ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	FAAE-00	FBIE-00
	IMMC-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	JUSE-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	DCP-01	NRCE-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	SNIS-00
	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/024W					

----------879A56 010953Z /38

R 010919Z DEC 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4804

C O N F I D E N T I A SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 006120

DEPARTMENT;S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/16
TAGS: PTER, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 1998 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: A) STATE 202128, B) 1997 JAKARTA 6773

IN 1998:

---

17. (U) NONE

CONFIDENTIAL

F. HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORISTS OR TERRORIST GROUPS, INCLUDING POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION:

---

18. (U) INDONESIA HAD DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, INCLUDING RECIPROCAL RESIDENT DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE, WITH ALL SEVEN OF THOSE COUNTRIES CURRENTLY ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S TERRORISM LIST. GENERALLY, THE GOI HAS OPPOSED SANCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA WHICH TARGET THESE SEVEN GOVERNMENTS FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

G. GOI PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE:

---

19. THE GOI OCCASIONALLY IS CRITICAL OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON OTHER STATES FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, THE GOI IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH ANTI-TERRORISM SANCTIONS.

H. SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1997 IN THE GOI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC:

---

20. (U) THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FREE PRESS AND THE INCREASING STRENGTH OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY GROUPS HAS LED THE GOVERNMENT TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING THAN IN THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAST IN ACKNOWLEDGING MATTER OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM INVOLVING CLANDESTINE STATE AGENTS. THIS PROGRESS IN PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET EXTENDED TO PROMPT INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF SUCH CASES. TWO POLICE JUNIOR OFFICERS WERE CONVICTED FOR ACTIONS RELATED TO THE TRISAKTI INCIDENT BUT NOT CONNECTED DIRECTLY TO THE KILLING OF THE FOUR STUDENTS.

I. U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH

RESPECT TO THE GOI:

[redacted] B1

J. GOI COOPERATION IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS IN THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF AN ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS OR INTERESTS:

22. (U) AS NOTED IN PARA 12, THE GOI HAS COOPERATED WITH THE UNITED STATES IN CASES RELATED TO TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS OR INTERESTS.

K. GOI COOPERATION IN THE PREVENTION OF AN CT OF

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS IN INDONESIA:

[redacted] B1

ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E55

RELEASED IN PART
B6

PAGE 01 JAKART 06075 01 OF 02 272152Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	SAS-00	/022W					

----------86B9CD 272153Z /75

P 270931Z NOV 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4768
INFO ASSOCIQTION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBAQSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F ID E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 006075

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/06
TAGS: PHUM, PINR, PGOV, MILI, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: DEALING WITH THE NOVEMBER 13VIOLENCE AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS

REF: JAKARA 5940

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06075 01 OF 02 272152Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: ABRI HAS ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAS ARRAIGNED 44 PERSONNEL FOR UNDUE VIOLENCE IN DEALING WITHSTUDENTS AND OTHER DEMONSTRATORS IN THE NOVEMQER 13 "SEMANGGI TRAGEDY." IN ADDITION, 12 OFFICERS REPORTEDLY WERE DISCIPLINED FOR FAILIG TO CONTROL THEIR SUBORDINATES. AN ADDITIONQL 19 WERE DISCIPLINED FOR BEATING PROTESTERS. THE BRALED LITTLE ABOUT THE INVURE OF THE "DISCIPLINE" T GOVERNMENT, MEANWHI TREASON AGAINST GOVQCLAIMS INCITED THE PROTESTS. THE CHARGES QARRY A MAXIMUM SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT. THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS LAUNCHED ITS OWN INVESTIGATION INTO THE NOVEMBER 1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

VIOLENCE. IT HAS ALSO URGED THE GOVERNMENT QO BE CAUTIOUS IN THE PURSUIT OF TREASON CHQRGES. [redacted] B6 [redacted] DESCRIBED THOSE CHARGES AS "SILLY." GIVEN TE LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND STALLED STATUS OF ABQI SELF-INVESTIGATIONS RELATED TO THE KILLINGS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN MAY AND THE MATTER OF ABRI KIDNAPPING/TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIISTS, STUDENTS AND OTHERS ARE NOT LIKELY TO BQ IMPRESSED WITH THE ABRI INVESTIGATION OF ITSOWN PERSONNEL. END SUMMARY

ABRI LAUNCHES INQESTIGATION:

3. (U) ABRI HAS ANNOUNCED THAT 144 PERSONNEL FQOM VARIOUS MILITARY UNITS ARE BEING ARRAIGNEDFOR UNDUE VIOLENCE

AGAINST STUDENT AND OTHER DEMONSTRATORS ON NOVEMBER 13 (REFTEL). ABRI SPKESMAN MAJ. GENERAL SYAMSUL MA'ARIF ALSO ANNOQNCED THAT TWELVE OFFICERS HAD BEEN DISCIPLINQD FOR FAILING TO CONTROL SUBORDINATES DURING QHE UNREST. AN ADDITIONAL 19 SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN DISCIPLINED FOR BEATING PROTESTERS. HE SAIDWITHOUT FURTHER CLARIFICATION THAT THE SANCTINS IMPOSED RANGED FROM "HEAVY MEASURES" TO "LIGHT REPRIMANDS." ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO SAID THAT "WE HAVE ADMITTED THAT (OFFICERSWERE DISCIPLINED) AND WE WILL INVESTIGATE ANDPUNISH THOSE WHO ARE GUILTY." IN A DEVELOPMENQ RELATED TO A SEPARATE INCIDENT ON NOVEMBER 12, THE ABRI SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT FOUR MEMBERS OF THE ARMY WOULD BE COURT-MARTIALED FOR BATING THREE JOURNALISTS.

4. (U) IN A SEPAQATE BUT RELATED DEVELOPMENT, GENERAL WIRANTO QAS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT POLICE OFFICERS STANDING AT THE FRONT LINES IN DEMONSTRATION SITUATIONS SHOULD ONLY CARRY BATONS. ABRI SPOKESMAN MA'ARIF ELABORATED THAT "OFFICERS STANDING ON THE FRONT LINES WHO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE DEMONSTRATORS, MQST NOT CARRY AMMUNITION AT ALL. THEY ARE TO EQUIP THEMSELVES WITH BATONS, BODY PROTECTORS AND SHIELDS ONLY." HE MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THATTHOSE IN THE BACK ROWS WOULD STILL HAVE WEQPONS WITH BLANK AND RUBBER BULLETS.

AN INDEPQNDENT TEAM TO PROBE THE NOVEMBER 13 VIOLENCE:

5. (U) MEANWHILE, THE INDONESIAN NATIQNAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, NOVEMBER 24, QET UP ITS OWN INVESTIGATION TEAM

PAGE 04 JAKART 06075 01 OF 02 272152Z
TO PROBE THE NOVEMBER 13 VIOLENCE. COMMISSION SECRETARY GEERAL SAID THAT THE TEAM "IS TO COMPLEMENT THE DQTA GIVEN BY THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THERE ARE QTILL FACTS WHICH NEED TO BE REVEALED AND SO THAT THE ASPECT OF ACCOUNTABILITY BECOMES CLEARER." MARZUKI DARUSMAN, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THECOMMISSION SAID THAT ONE OF THE TEAM'S TASKS COULD BE TO IDENTIFY THE "RADICAL GROUPS" WHICH GENERAL WIRANTO AND OTHER GOVERNMENT FIGURES HAVE ALLEGED INITIQTED THE VIOLENCE. HE ADDED THAT "THERE ARE A NUMBER OF THINGS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY EXPLAINED THAT WE FEEL ARE IMPORTANT." COMMISSIN MEMBER BAMBANG SOEHARTO (NO RELATION TO THEFORMER PRESIDENT) HAS BEEN NAMED TO HEAD THE TEAM.

6. (U) THE NGO "KONTRAS" WHICH INTER ALA INVESTIGATED CASES OF MISSING PERSONS HAS CLAIMED THAT TEN INDIVIDUALS, SEVEN OF THEM QTUDENTS, REMAIN MISSING FROM THE VIOLENCE OF NOVEMBER 13 AND 14. EIGHT OF THE MISSING ARE DESRIBED AS HAVING LAST BEEN SEEN IN LOCATIONS OQHER THAN SEMANGGI ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO INFORMQTION RELATED TO WHERE THE REMAINING TWO WER LAST SEEN.

SENIOR RETIRED MILITARY AND OTHER HABIBIE REGIME CRITICS INVESTIGATED:

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 06075 02 OF 02 271036Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	SAS-00	/022W					

---867A3D 271036Z /38

P 270931Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTAQ
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4769
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 006075

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/06
TAGS: PHUM, PINR, PGOV, MILI, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: DEALING WITH THE NOVEMBER 13 VIOLENCE AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS

REF: JAKARTA 5940

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06075 02 OF 02 271036Z

7. (U) THE GOVERNMENT IS PURSUING "SEDITION" CHARGES AGAINST A GROUP WHICH INCLUDES SENIOR GOVERNMENT CRITICS AMONG THE RETIRED MILITARY AND IN PUBLIC LIFE. THEY HAVE BEEN FORBIDDEN FROM LEAVING THE COUNTRY. IN FORMAL TESTIMONY IN THE PARLIAMENT (DPR), ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO SAID THATTHE MEETING OF 18 OPPOSITION FIGURES AT A MAJQR DOWNTOWN JAKARTA HOTEL NOVEMBER 12 MET THE QRITERIA OF TREASON AS STIPULATED IN ARTICLES 110 AND 107 OF THE PENAL CODE. SPECIFICALLY, IRANTO SAID, "THEY AGREED TO FORM A REFORM PEQPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY AND A PRESIDIUM T REPLACE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT THROUGH AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL WAY." (NOTE: ARTICLE 110 DALS WITH "TREASON WITH A PURPOSE TO TOPPLE THQ GOVERNMENT. THE MOST SEVERE PUNISHMENT ALLOED UNDER THE ARTICLE IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT. AQTICLE 110 DEALS WITH CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT, FACILITATE, OR INCITE A CRIME UNDER ARTICLE 107 (OR OTHER STATUTES) OR IMPEDING GOVERNMENT ACTQON TO PREVENT A CRIME UNDER ARTICLE 107 (TREAQON). END NOTE)

8. (U) ACCORDING TO PRESS COVERAGE OF HIS REMARKS, WIRANTO UNDERSCORED THENEED TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBLE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE MEETING AND THE "SEMANGGI TRAGEDY," THE SHOOTING, CLUBBING AND TEAR GASSING OVER 400STUDENTS AND ORDINARY CITIZENS BY SECURITY FORCES. IT APPEARS EIGHT DEMONSTRATORS WERE KILLED. TWO SECURITY FORCE MEMBERS WERE INJURED AND ONE KILLED.

9. (U) NATIONAL POLICE SPOKESMAN BRIG. GENERAL SIANIPAR SAID ON NOVEMBER 23 THAT DOSSIERS OF 19 INDIVIDUALS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 06075 02 OF 02 271036Z

SUSPECTED OF TREASON WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE COURTS IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS. OF THE 19 SUSPECTS, 17 WERE SIGNATORIES OF THÉ NOVEMBER 12 COMMUNIQUE. POLICE SPOKESMAN BRIG. GENERAL TOGAR SIANIPAR TOLD REPORTERS THAT "FOLLOWING OUR INVESTIGATIONS WE HAVE FOUND VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW COVERING CONSPIRACY, ACTS OF TREASON AND AN ATTEMPT TO TOPPLE A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT." AN EIGHTEENTH SUSPECT, ALREADY QUESTIONED, IS POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND EDUCATOR SRI BINTANG PAMUNGAS HAS TOLD CANADIAN COLLEAGUES THAT HE WAS AT THE MEETING AT WHICH THE NOVEMBER 12 STATEMENT WAS SIGNED, BUT DID NOT HIMSELF SIGN IT AS HE ARRIVED LATE. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WERE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT CHARGES AGAINST SOME WILL BE EITHER REDUCED OR DROPPED. THE IDENTITY OF THE 19TH SUSPECT HAS BEEN THE SOURCE OF SOME SPECULATION SINCE THERE WERE ONLY 18 PEOPLE AT THE NOVEMBER 12 METING.

10. (U) THE GOVERNMENT'S PURSUIT OF PQSSIBLE PROSECUTION AGAINST THE SENIOR GOVERNMQNT CRITICS HAS DRAWN CRITICISM FROM MANY QUARTERS. IN A TWO-PAGE STATEMENT, THE GOVERNMET'S OWN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SAID THAT THE QGOVERNMENT SHOULD EXERCISE CAUTION TO AVOID GIVQNG THE IMPRESSION THAT POLITICAL MOTIVES LIE QEHIND THE ACCUSATIONS. IN A PRIVATE CONVERATION WITH VISITING A/S [redacted] DESCRIBED THE CHARGES AS "SILLY." B6

11. (C) CMMENT: ABRI'S REVELATION THAT IT IS INVESTIGQTING AND METING OUT DISCIPLINE WITHIN ITS RANKS FOR THE NOVEMBER 13 VIOLENCE IS NOT LIKELY TO CARRY MUCH WEIGHT WITH STUDENTS. THE STUDENTS AND OTHERS REMAIN HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE FAILURE OF THE MILITARY TO PURSUE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 06075 02 OF 02 271036Z

ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE KILLING OF FOUR TRISAKTI STUDENTS IN MAY OR THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. WHILE AN INVESTIGATION BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WOULD HAVE FAR MORE CREDIBILITY, THE COMMISSION LACKS THE POWER TO SUBPOENA AND CAN ONLY MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT ON THE BASIS OF ITS FINDINGS. ITS RECOMMENDATIONS OFTEN ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PROMPT GOVERNMENT ACTION. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E52

RELEASED IN PART
B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8804

PAGE 01 JAKART 05719 01 OF 03 041112Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W	

----------7DA2A5 041113Z /38

O 041050Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4404
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AIT TAIPEI 1064
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005719

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/03
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: REPORT ON MAY RIOTS BY FACT-FINDING TEAM FINDS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05719 01 OF 03 041112Z
REF: JAKARTA 5696

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND F. MCWILLIAMS, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: A GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED FACT FINDING TEAM, SET UP TO LOOK INTO THE CAUSES OF THE MAY RIOTS IN JAKARTA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES, PRODUCED A 28-PAGE REPORT, INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS AND "RESERVATIONS" BY WHICH MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE TEAM EXPRESSED DISAGREEMENTS WITH ASPECTS OF THE TEAM REPORT. THE REPORT CLAIMED THAT THE RIOTING WAS LINKED TO A CONSPIRACY AIMED AT CREATING A SITUATION WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE IMPOSITION OF EMERGENCY POWERS. THE RIOTING, ACCORDING TO THE TEAM, WAS RELATED TO A STRUGGLE WITHIN THE POLITICAL ELITE AND TO THE DETERIORATING ECONOMIC

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

SITUATION. THE RIOTING WAS ALSO SEEN AS LINKED TO AND A CULMINATION OF A SERIES OF VIOLENT DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDING KIDNAPPING OF ACTIVISTS AND THE FATAL SHOOTING OF STUDENTS. THE TEAM REPORT DIFFERENTIATED AMONG THREE TYPES OF RIOTING, INCLUDING SEEMINGLY SPONTANEOUS EVENTS AND THOSE WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED. ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES WERE INVOLVED IN INSTIGATING THE RIOTING IN WHICH RAPES OCCURRED, ACCORDING TO THE TEAM'S FINDINGS. THE TEAM ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE MAJORITY OF VICTIMS OF 52 IDENTIFIED RAPES WERE SINO-INDONESIANS ALTHOUGH IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE SEXUAL VIOLENCE WAS PREMEDITATED OR MERELY A CONSEQUENCE OF THE RIOTING. IN SEPARATE COMMENT, TEAM MEMBERS EMPHASIZED THAT THE TEAM REALIZED THAT THE NUMBER OF RAPES WAS HIGHER THAN 52 WHICH IT WAS ABLE TO DOCUMENT. THE TEAM RECOMMENDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE RIOTING AND SPEED UP RELATED INVESTIGATIONS INTO KIDNAPPING OF ACTIVISTS AND THE FATAL SHOOTING OF STUDENTS. IT CALLED FOR SECURITY FOR WITNESSES AND VICTIMS, GOVERNMENT COMPENSATION TO RIOT VICTIMS,
CONFIDENTIAL

RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AGAINST RACISM AND BETTER CONTROL OF THE MILITARY INTELIGENCE AGENCY. RESERVATIONS PRESENTED BY THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE TEAM DEALT WITH SOME OF THE BROAD CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE ORIGINS OF THE RIOTING, PARTICULARLY THOSE SUGGESTING THAT THERE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH EMERGENCY POWERS COULD BE IMPOSED OR THAT THE RIOTS REFLECTED COMPETITION WITHIN THE POLITICAL ELITE. ONE TEAM MEMBER OPPOSED COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS, WHILE TWO OPPOSED THE TEAM CONCLUSION THAT A MAJORITY OF THOSE RAPED WERE SINO-INDONESIANS. THERE WAS ALSO AN OBJECTION BY A SINGLE MEMBER OF THE TEAM TO A PORTION OF THE REPORT WHICH IDENTIFIED THE SPECIAL FORCES AS INVOLVED IN RIOTING IN SOLO. ONE MEMBER URGED THAT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE RIOTING BE DESCRIBED AS HAVING TAKEN "OUTSIDE THE INSTITUTION (OF THE ARMED FORCES). END SUMMARY

BACKGROUND
---

3. (U) THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED FACT-FINDING TEAM ASSIGNED TO LOOK INTO THE BACKGROUND OF THE MAY RIOTS IN JAKARTA, SOLO, PALEMBANG, LAMPUNG, SURABAYA AND MEDAN PRESENTED ITS FINDINGS (IN THE FORM OF AN "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY") TO THE PRESS IN AN EARLY EVENING PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE JUSTICE MINISTRY NOVEMBER 3. THE TEAM WAS TO HAVE PRESENTED THE REPORT FIRST TO THE FIVE GOVERNMENT MINISTERS (PLUS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL) WHO COMMISSIONED THE TEAM, BUT THESE OFFICIALS UNEXPECTEDLY WERE NOT PRESENT TO MEET WITH THE TEAM. TEAM MEMBERS WERE TOLD THAT THEY WERE AT THE PALACE FOR A SPECIAL CABINET MEETING (REFTEL).

4. (C) LAST MINUTE RESERVATIONS BY THE POLICE AND MILITARY MEMBERS

OF THE TEAM LED TO THREATS OF RESIGNATIONS BY NGO MEMBERS OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05719 01 OF 03 041112Z
TEAM, AND TWO NGO MEMBERS ACTUALLY DID WALK OUT OF THE NOVEMBER 3 MEETING. ABDUL HAKIM GARUDA NUSANTARA TOLD WAITING JOURNALISTS AND DIPLOMATS THAT IF THE REPORT WERE NOT ISSUED THAT EVENING, HE WOULD RELEASE IT THE FOLLOWING MORNING. IN THE END, FACED WITH WHAT TEAM MEMBER [redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS WAS A "POSSIBLE COLLAPSE OF THE TEAM," THE DISSENTERS AGREED TO RECORD THEIR OBJECTIONS IN "RESERVATIONS" WITHOUT DISASSOCIATING THEMSELVES FROM THE ENTIRE REPORT. (SEE BELOW FOR TEXT OF THESE RESERVATIONS.) B6

MAIN CONCLUSIONS
---

5. (U) THE 28-PAGE REPORT DREW THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS:

-- THE REPORT LINKED THE RIOTS TO A CONSPIRACY OF VARIOUS PARTIES INCLUDING ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY WHICH, THE REPORT CLAIMED, WAS AIMED AT CREATING AN EMERGENCY SITUATION THAT WOULD JUSTIFY THE IMPOSITION OF "EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS." (ASKED BY REPORTERS IF THIS MEANT THAT THE EMERGENCY WAS INTENDED TO KEEP FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IN POWER OR PUSH HIM OUT, TEAM CHIEF MARZUKI RESPONDED THAT NEITHER CONCLUSION WAS RULED OUT.)

-- THE REPORT SAID THAT THE RIOTING HAD BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE INTERACTION OF A STRUGGLE BY THE POLITICAL ELITE TO MAINTAIN THE POWER OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND THE PROCESS OF RAPID ECONOMIC

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8806

PAGE 01 JAKART 05719 02 OF 03 041112Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W	

----------7DA2A8 041113Z /38

O 041050Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4405
INFO USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AIT TAIPEI 1065
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 005719

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/03
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: REPORT ON MAY RIOTS BY FACT-FINDING TEAM FINDS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05719 02 OF 03 041112Z
REF: JAKARTA 5696

AND MONETARY DETERIORATION AFFLICTING THE NATION.

-- THE RIOTS WERE A CULMINATION OF VIOLENT EVENTS INCLUDING THE KIDNAPPING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND THE KILLING OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY, WHICH THE TEAM IDENTIFIED AS THE "TRIGGER OF THE RIOTS." THE RIOTS ALSO COULD NOT, IN THE TEAM'S VIEW, BE SEPARATED FROM WIDESPREAD FEAR OF AND AN ERODING CONFIDENCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

-- THREE TYPES OF RIOTS APPEARED TO HAVE OCCURRED:

LOCAL, LIMITED, SPORADIC, SPONTANEOUS RIOTS;

RIOTS IN WHICH OUTSIDE PROVOCATEURS WERE INVOLVED. THESE RIOTS WERE LARGER AND "SYSTEMATIC" BUT THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF PREMEDITATION.

RIOTING WHICH APPEARED TO REPRESENT A POLITICAL STRUGGLE WITHIN THE ELITE. THERE WAS ALSO MORE EVIDENCE (THAN IN THE ABOVE TWO TYPES) THAT THE RIOTS WERE DELIBERATELY INSTIGATED.

-- "CREATION OF THIS EMERGENCY SITUATION, INCLUDING THE FATAL SHOOTING OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, WAS UNDERTAKEN BY THOSE AT THE "HIGHEST DECISION-MAKING LEVEL. ... THE WHOLE PROCESS PRECEDING THE RIOTS HAD A VERY CLEAR POLITICAL DIMENSION ... INCLUDING EFFORTS TO SECURE EXTRAORDINARY POWERS BASED ON (THE EMERGENCY POWERS DECREE)."

-- "THE RAPID SPREAD OF THE VIOLENCE GREW OUT OF THE INADEQUATE

CONFIDENTIAL

SAFEGUARD MEASURES TO PREVENT, RESTRICT AND OVERCOME THE VIOLENCE WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED WOULD ESCALATE. THE VULNERABILITY AND WEAKNESSES IN SECURITY OPERATIONS IN JAKARTA PARTICULARLY WERE CLOSELY LINKED TO THE ENTIRE PROCESS OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY STRUGGLE, WHICH THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER OF GREATER JAKARTA (GENERAL SJAFRIE SJAMSUDDIN) MUST ACCOUNT FOR. INDICATIONS OF SECURITY VULNERABILITY AND WEAKNESSES IN DIFFERENT DEGREES IN OTHER CITIES WHERE RIOTS BROKE OUT WERE ALSO LINKED TO THE POLITICAL-MILITARY STRUGGLE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL."

-- THE REPORT CONCLUDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF CASES OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, INCLUDING 52 CASES OF RAPE. THE MAJORITY OF VICTIMS WERE SINO-INDONESIANS, ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, WHICH ALSO CONCLUDED THAT MOST OF THE RAPES WERE GANG RAPES. THE TEAM PROVIDED SEPARATE FIGURES FOR VICTIMS OF RAPE ACCOMPANIED BY VIOLENCE. THE TEAM ALSO NOTED VICTIMS WHO EXPERIENCED SEXUAL VIOLENCE BEFORE AND AFTER THE RIOTS, BUT WHO, IN ITS EVALUATION, WERE NONETHELESS LINKED TO THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE RIOTS. THE REPORT SAID THAT IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE SEXUAL VIOLENCE WAS PREMEDITATED OR WAS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE RIOTING. THE REPORT FOUND THAT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS WERE INADEQUATE IN THE AREA OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE.

-- THE TEAM SAID THAT IT FOUND A COMMON PATTERN DURING THE RIOTING IN VARIOUS PLACES INVOLVING THE PRESENCE OF PEOPLE WITH WELL-BUILT PHYSIQUES AND CREW CUTS WHO INCITED OTHERS TO VIOLENCE. THESE INSTIGATORS WERE USUALLY STRANGERS IN THE AREA IN WHICH THEY OPERATED, WERE HIGHLY MOBILE AND WERE EQUIPPED WITH DESTRUCTIVE MEANS TO INCLUDE FUEL, MOLOTOV COCKTAILS AND IN SOME INSTANCES FLAME THROWERS. THE TEAM SAID THAT "THERE WAS INVOLVEMENT OF MANY PARTIES FROM LOCAL THUGS, POLITICAL AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS TO

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMBERS AND ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES." ALSO AMONG THOSE INVOLVED IN THE RIOTS WERE "LOCAL HOODLUMS, MASS ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES WHO BENEFITTED FORM THEIR DELIBERATE EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT THE RIOTS AND FROM THEIR (OWN) INACTION."

-- THE TEAM SUGGESTED THE UNREST MAY HAVE BEEN LINKED TO A MEETING AT THE ARMY STRATEGIC RESERVE'S HEADQUARTERS ON MAY 14 AND CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE THIS MEETING FURTHER IN ORDER TO "REVEAL AND ASCERTAIN THE ROLE OF LT. GEN (RET) PRABOWO AND OTHER PARTIES IN THE WHOLE PROCESS WHICH PRECIPITATED THE RIOTS." (NOTE: THE "JAKARTA POST" AND THE "OBSERVER," CITING UNNAMED SOURCES, CLAIMED THAT THOSE AT THE MEETING INCLUDED THEN STRATEGIC FORCES COMMANDER PRABOWO AND HIS STAFF, THEN JAKARTA MILITARY COMMANDER GENERAL SJAFRIE SJAMSUDDIN, CURRENT MANPOWER MINISTER FAHMI IDRIS

AND BUSINESSMAN SETIAWAN DJODY. CURIOUSLY, HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS BUYUNG NASUTION AND BAMBANG WIJOJANTO FROM THE LEGAL AID FOUNDATION ALSO WERE SAID TO HAVE BEEN AT THE MEETING. A MAY 14 MEETING WOULD HAVE TRANSPIRED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE MAY 13-15 RIOT PERIOD. IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR WHAT THE TEAM SUSPECTS TRANSPIRED AT THIS MEETING. END NOTE)

RECOMMENDATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8805

PAGE 01 JAKART 05719 03 OF 03 041113Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W	

----------7DA2AF 041113Z /38

O 041050Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4406
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AIT TAIPEI 1066
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 005719

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/03
TAGS: PHUM, MILI, PGOV, PREL, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: REPORT ON MAY RIOTS BY FACT-FINDING TEAM FINDS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05719 03 OF 03 041113Z
REF: JAKARTA 5696

6. (U) THE TEAM PRESENTED SEVEN RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT:

-- THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONDUCT FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE RIOTS (NOTING THAT THE TEAM ITSELF WAS NOT EMPOWERED TO INVESTIGATE AND HAD NO SUBPOENA POWER). SPECIFICALLY, THE TEAM CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE THE MAY 14 MEETING AND "THE ROLE OF LT. GEN (RET) PRABOWO AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS."

-- THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEED UP INVESTIGATION OF THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY KILLINGS AND THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. IN THAT CONNECTION, PRABOWO AND OTHERS DETERMINED TO BE INVOLVED IN THE ABDUCTIONS SHOULD BE BROUGHT BEFORE A MILITARY TRIBUNAL.

-- THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE SECURITY GUARANTEES TO WITNESSES AND VICTIMS AND SET UP A WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM.

-- THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE COMPENSATION TO RIOT VICTIMS AND HELP WITH RECONSTRUCTION OF DAMAGED PROPERTY.

-- THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD RATIFY THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AGAINST RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION AND SHOULD IMPLEMENT THE ANTI-TORTURE CONVENTION.

-- THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ACT TO END ALL FORMS OF HOODLUMISM.

-- THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD FORMULATE A LAW REGULATING STATE INTELIGENCE AGENCIES TO ENSURE THAT THEY WILL CARRY OUT NECESSARY FUNCTIONS WITHOUT VIOLATING HUMAN RIGHTS AND ALSO NOT BECOME

INSTRUMENTS OF POLITICAL PARTIES OR VARIOUS OTHERS.

RESERVATIONS

7. (U) RESERVATIONS WERE REGISTERED ON SEVEN POINTS IN THE FINAL REPORT BY FOUR ABRI AND POLICE MEMBERS OF THE TEAM. THERE WAS NOT CONSENSUS AMONG THEM: NO RESERVATION WAS SUPPORTED BY ALL FOUR ABRI MEMBERS AND THREE OF THE SEVEN RESERVATIONS WERE SUPPORTED BY ONLY ONE OF THE ABRI MEMBERS:

-- THREE MEMBERS CALLED FOR REMOVAL OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE RIOTS THAT CONCLUDED THAT IT REFLECTED A COMPETITION AMONG POLITICAL ELITES;

-- TWO MEMBERS CALLED FOR REMOVAL OF THE ASSESSMENT THAT THE RIOTING WAS PRECIPITATED TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH EXTRA-

CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS COULD BE IMPOSED.

-- ONE MEMBER OBJECTED TO THE RECOMMENDATION THAT THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDE COMPENSATION TO THE VICTIMS OF THE RIOTING.

-- THREE MEMBERS, CLAIMING INCOMPLETE "VERIFICATION," OBJECTED TO IDENTIFICATION OF FOUR INDIVIDUALS AS KIDNAP VICTIMS, URGING THEY BE LISTED SIMPLY AMONG THE DEAD AND WOUNDED FROM THE RIOTING.

-- TWO MEMBERS OBJECTED TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE MAJORITY OF VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT WERE SINO-INDONESIANS, ON THE GROUNDS, THEY CLAIMED, THAT THIS WAS "NOT PROVEN."

-- ONE MEMBER OBJECTED TO A DESCRIPTION OF UNIFORMS WORN BY THOSE

INVOLVED IN THE RIOTING IN SOLO AS SIMILAR TO THOSE WORN BY THE SPECIAL FORCES, PROPOSING INSTEAD THAT THE DESCRIPTION SIMPLY STATE THE UNIFORMS WERE SIMILAR TO THOSE WORN BY THE MILITARY.

-- ONE MEMBER URGED THAT IN DISCUSSING INVOLVEMENT IN THE RIOTING BY MILITARY PERSONNEL THAT THE DESCRIPTION STATE THAT SUCH ACTIONS WERE CONDUCTED "OUTSIDE THE INSTITUTION (OF THE ARMED FORCES)."
ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E48

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTO7019

PAGE 01 JAKART 05241 061047Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	DINT-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/027W					

----------728AB0 061047Z /38

R 061037Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3965
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
DIA WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 005241

CINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/03
TAGS: PGOV, CASC, PINS, PHUM, MILI, ID
SUBJECT: ON ARMED FORCES DAY, AS ANTI-MILITARY PROTESTERS
- DEMONSTRATE, HABIBIE WARNS OF "RADICALS;"
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05241 061047Z

REF: JAKARTA 5213

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (U) SUMMARY: PRESIDENT HABIBIE, IN HIS OCTOBER 5 ARMED FORCES DAY SPEECH, WARNED OF RADICALS AND REVOLUTIONARIES AND URGED ABRI TO SAFEGUARD THE REFORM PROCESS HE CLAIMS IS UNDERWAY. HIS COMMENTS WERE SET AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF SMALL- TO MEDIUM-SIZE DEMONSTRATIONS IN FIVE INDONESIAN CITIES WHICH CALLED FOR AN END TO ABRI'S INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS. ABRI COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO, IN COMMENTS TO THE PRESS, WAS CRITICAL OF FORMER ABRI LEADERS WHO ARE NOW ANTI-REGIME. MEGAWATI APPEARED AT THE 53RD

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 6 OCT 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200502501

ANNIVERSARY CEREMONIES AND SEEMED TO LEND SUPPORT TO ARGUMENTS URGING RETENTION, IN SOME MANNER, OF ABRI'S SOCIO-POLITICAL ROLE. END SUMMARY

3. (U) OCTOBER 5 CEREMONIES MARKING THE FOUNDING OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI), FOR THE FIRST TIME, WERE MARKED BY DEMONSTRATIONS IN A NUMBER OF CITIES WHICH HAD AN ANTI-MILITARY CHARACTER. IN ADDITION TO DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA (REFTEL), DEMONSTRATIONS DEMANDING AN END TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS (ANTI-DUAL FUNCTION, AKA "DWIFUNGSI") TOOK PLACE IN JOGJAKARTA, SURABAYA, SEMARANG AND BOGOR. ALL TRANSPIRED PEACEFULLY.

4. (U) MEANWHILE, IN JAKARTA, PRESIDENT HABIBIE WARNED ABRI ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF "SMALL RADICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS." "SLOWLY THERE IS A TREND AMONG SOME SMALL GROUPS IN SOCIETY THAT SHOWS THE EMERGENCE OF SEEDS OF RADICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS WHICH CLAIM TO SPEAK AND ACT FOR THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 05241 061047Z

REFORM MOVEMENT." HE CALLED ON ABRI TO "SAFEGUARD THE PURITY OF THE NATION'S CURRENT REFORM CAMPAIGN SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE TARNISHED BY MANEUVERS OF RADICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS." HE ALSO WARNED OF GROUPS WHICH WERE "OPENLY WORKING TO CREATE AN UNCONTROLLABLE, UNSAFE AND UNSTABLE SITUATION." "THE NATION'S EFFORTS TO OVERCOME THE CRISIS AND CONTINUE WITH REFORM MUST SUCCEED WITHOUT THEIR BEING EXPLOITED BY ANY THIRD PARTIES," HE ADDED.

5. (U) ABRI COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO, FOR HIS PART, TOLD THE PRESS THAT "ABRI MUST TAKE FIRM ACTION AGAINST ANY RIOTERS TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF MOST OF INDONESIA'S 200 MILLION PEOPLE WHO DO NOT KNOW ABOUT OR EXPECT ANY SECURITY DISTURBANCES." REGARDING THE "NATIONAL FRONT," A GROUP OF RETIRED ABRI OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF THE REGIME, WIRANTO SPOKE OF "MEMBERS OF ABRI'S FAMILY WHO RAN FROM ABRI'S COMMITMENT."

6. (U) ABRI APPEARED TO DRAW A MODICUM OF SUPPORT FROM PROMINENT OPPOSITION POLITICIAN MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI WHO ATTENDED THE ARMED FORCES DAY CEREMONIES. MEGAWATI TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE "CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS COULD HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON ABRI'S RECOGNITION OF ITS SECURITY AND SOCIOPOLITICAL ROLES." THE STATEMENT APPEARED TO SUGGEST MEGAWATI'S SUPPORT FOR CONTINUATION OF ABRI'S SOCIOPOLITICAL ROLE, OR "DUAL FUNCTION".

B1

8. (C) COMMENT: SEPARATE INVESTIGATIONS INTO ABRI INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPING, TORTURE AND POSSIBLE KILLING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND THE SHOOTING DEATH OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS HAVE SHOWN LITTLE PROGRESS IN RECENT MONTHS. MEANWHILE, CHARGES OF ABRI ATROCITIES IN ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, LAMPUNG, TANJUNG PRIOK AND EAST TIMOR CONTINUE TO REVERBERATE. IRONICALLY, A KEY PART OF THE REFORM PROCESS THAT HABIBIE HAS CALLED UPON ABRI TO SAFEGUARD ENTAILS ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE IN THESE CASES. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E47

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 JAKART 05189 01 OF 04 021025Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	CTME-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01
	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/023W						

----------7156A5 021025Z /38

R 021017Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3915
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 005189

CINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/03
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, ECON, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: ACEH NOTEBOOK: CASUALTIES UNDERESTIMATED, THREATS AND INTIMIDATION, CASE STUDIES, TROOP LEVELS, ECONOMIC WOES.

REF: JAKARTA 4948 AND PREVIOUS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05189 01 OF 04 021025Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION SUGGEST THAT EARLIER COUNTS OF VICTIMS OF THE CONFLICT IN ACEH PROVINCE 1989-98 WERE SERIOUSLY UNDERESTIMATED. GRIM DETAILS OF INDIVIDUAL CASES CONTINUE TO EMERGE. A RECENT VISIT REVEALED THAT THE PRINCIPAL CITY OF BANDA ACEH IS CALM, BUT OTHER PARTS OF THE PROVINCE REMAIN TENSE. THERE HAVE BEEN CREDIBLE REPORTS OF HARASSMENT, THREATS, AND INTIMIDATION AIMED AT UNDERMINING INVESTIGATIONS. GOI OFFICIALS ARE SENDING MIXED SIGNALS AS TO WHETHER THE ACEHNESE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT STILL EXISTS. IN ANY CASE, THERE CONTINUES TO BE A STRONG MILITARY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 30 SEP 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200502501

PRESENCE IN THE PROVINCE, DESPITE TROOP WITHDRAWALS ANNOUNCED AT THE END OF AUGUST. MEANWHILE, LIKE ALL PARTS OF INDONESIA, ACEH IS FEELING THE EFFECTS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. END SUMMARY.

NEW FINDINGS ROCK PREVIOUS ASSUMPTIONS

3. (C) AN INDEPENDENT FACT-FINDING TEAM FORMED IN MID-SEPTEMBER HAS ALREADY FOUND EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT CASUALTIES IN THE ACEH CONFLICT WERE SERIOUSLY UNDERESTIMATED. (BACKGROUND NOTE: BETWEEN 1989-98, THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (ABRI) CONDUCTED A CAMPAIGN CODE NAMED "RED DRAGNET" TO CRUSH A SMALL ARMED SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN ACEH PROVINCE, ON THE NORTHERN TIP OF SUMATRA ISLAND. END NOTE.) THE FACT FINDING TEAM (TIM PENCARI FAKTA) (TPF), COMPOSED OF INDONESIAN ACTIVISTS, JOURNALISTS, SOME RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS, AND OTHERS, WAS FORMED IN SEPTEMBER TO INVESTIGATE THE EXTENT OF KILLINGS AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES DURING ABRI'S 9-YEAR

CONFIDENTIAL

CAMPAIGN IN THE PROVINCE. [redacted] B1

[redacted] THE TEAM HAS ALREADY POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AND REGISTERED MORE THAN 656 WIDOWS, AND PERSONALLY INSPECTED MORE THAN 166 BURNED HOMES IN JUST ONE DISTRICT (KABUPATEN) OF ACEH PROVINCE.

4. (C) THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, KOMNASHAM, ESTIMATED IN A PRELIMINARY REPORT RELEASED IN AUGUST THAT A TOTAL OF 781 PEOPLE WERE KILLED BY SECURITY FORCES, AND ANOTHER 163 HAD DISAPPEARED, IN THE ENTIRE PROVINCE. THE 656 WIDOWS FOUND SO FAR, ARE ALL IN THE KABUPATEN OF ACEH UTARA, AND THE TEAM HAS STILL NOT FINISHED ITS WORK IN THAT ONE DISTRICT. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT TWO OTHER DISTRICTS, PIDIE AND ACEH TIMUR, ACTUALLY HAD A HIGHER INCIDENCE OF KILLINGS AND OTHER VIOLATIONS THAN THE DISTRICT IN WHICH THE TEAM IS CURRENTLY WORKING. [redacted] B1

[redacted] THE TEAM HAS ALREADY CONFIRMED 166 HOMES BURNED BY SECURITY FORCES IN THE KABUPATEN OF ACEH UTARA, ALREADY MORE THAN KOMNASHAM'S ESTIMATE OF 102 HOMES BURNED PROVINCE WIDE. AS THE TEAM'S WORK CONTINUES, KOMNASHAM'S CASUALTY FIGURES WILL BEGIN TO APPEAR SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERESTIMATED. (NOTE: THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT TO CONGRESS IN 1993 REPORTED THAT "THOUSANDS" HAD BEEN KILLED. END NOTE.)

THREATS

5. (C) VARIOUS NGO'S IN ACEH PROVINCE ARE INVOLVED IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS PICTURE IN ACEH. INVESTIGATIONS ARE MOVING FORWARD AND

SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IS BEING MADE. [redacted] B1

[redacted] COL. ASRIL TANJUNG, THE MILITARY COMMANDER (DANREM) OF BANDA ACEH, TOLD POLOFF DURING A SEPTEMBER 29 CALL THAT HE WELCOMED INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIONS AND HAD DIRECTED HIS STAFF TO COOPERATE FULLY. INDEED, BANDA ACEH APPEARED TO BE GENERALLY CALM AND RELAXED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE SEVERE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS CURRENTLY EFFECTING MOST PARTS OF INDONESIA. HOWEVER, IN THE NORTHEASTERN PARTS OF THE PROVINCE, WHICH FALL UNDER THE COMMAND OF COL. DASIRI MUSMAR, WE HAVE PICKED UP SEVERAL ALLEGATIONS THAT BOTH RESEARCHERS CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS, AND POTENTIAL WITNESSES/PLAINTIFFS, RECENTLY HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO THREATS AND INTIMIDATION.

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 05189 02 OF 04 071308Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	CTME-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01
	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/023W						

----------730F5F 071308Z /99

R 021017Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3916

INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 005189

CINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/03
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, ECON, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: ACEH NOTEBOOK: CASUALTIES UNDERESTIMATED, THREATS AND INTIMIDATION, CASE STUDIES, TROOP LEVELS, ECONOMIC WOES.

REF: JAKARTA 4948 AND PREVIOUS
CONFIDENTIAL

B1

B1

[redacted]

CASE STUDIES YIELD GRIM DETAILS
---

10. (C) MORE GRIM DETAILS OF INDIVIDUAL CASES CONTINUE TO EMERGE. ACCORDING TO ALLEGATIONS MADE BY ACEHNESE SEPARATISTS BASED IN SWEDEN, AND ALLEGATIONS REPEATED TO POLOFF BY AN ACEHNESE STUDENT IN JAKARTA, AND ALSO BY INDONESIAN NGO STAFF IN ACEH, THAT THREE ALLEGED ACEHNESE SEPARATISTS, ISHAQ DAWOOD, BURHAN SYAMAUN, AND SYAHRUL SYAMAUN WERE ARRESTED ON MARCH 27, 1998 BY INDONESIAN SECURITY IN MALAYSIA, WITH THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT'S COOPERATION. ACCORDING TO THE ACCOUNT, DURING THE BOAT JOURNEY BACK TO INDONESIA ACROSS THE STRAIT OF MALACCA, THE THREE WERE REPORTEDLY CHAINED TO RUBBER INNER TUBES, TOSSED OVERBOARD, AND DRAGGED BEHIND THE BOAT. BURHAN DIED, ISHAQ DAWOOD IS CURRENTLY ON TRIAL FOR SEPARATIST ACTIVITY, AND SYAHRUL SYAMAUN IS REPORTEDLY STILL IN CUSTODY.

CONFIDENTIAL

B1

[redacted]

12. (C) THE LHOKSEUMAWE-BASED PUTRA DEWANTARA FOUNDATION (YPD), PARTIALLY FUNDED BY USAID, IS IMPLEMENTING A PROGRAM PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO 120 WOMEN IN 4 VILLAGES WHO WERE WIDOWED DURING THE RED DRAGNET OPERATION. THE PROGRAM AIMS AT EDUCATING THE WIDOWS REGARDING THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS, HELPING THEM GET ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 05189 03 OF 04 021025Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	CTME-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01
	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/023W						

----------7156AD 021025Z /38

R 021017Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3917
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 005189

CINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/03
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, ECON, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: ACEH NOTEBOOK: CASUALTIES UNDERESTIMATED, THREATS AND INTIMIDATION, CASE STUDIES, TROOP LEVELS, ECONOMIC WOES.

REF: JAKARTA 4948 AND PREVIOUS

SERVICES LIKE HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION FOR THEIR FAMILIES, AND ALSO PROVIDES SOME DIRECT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. THE YPD REPORTS THAT THE PROGRAM IS GOING WELL, BUT THAT THE OVERALL IMPACT IN THE PROVINCE IS SMALL, SINCE IT ONLY REACHES 120 WOMEN. (NOTE: THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ESTIMATED IN AUGUST THAT 3000 ACEHNESE WOMEN HAD BEEN WIDOWED AS A RESULT OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. END NOTE.)

SEPARATIST THREAT
---

13. (C) MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THE ACEH MERDEKA ("FREE ACEH") MOVEMENT (GPK), AN ARMED SEPARATIST GROUP, HAS CEASED TO EXIST AS ANY SORT OF VIABLE FORCE. IN A SEPTEMBER 29 MEETING, COL. SJAHRIL BAKRI, THE MILITARY CHIEF OF SOCIO-POLITICAL AFFAIRS (KADITSOSPOL) IN ACEH TOLD POLOFF THAT THE GPK WAS "FINISHED," AND THAT HE BELIEVED THERE WERE NO MORE GUERRILLAS IN THE HILLS. [redacted] B1 [redacted] IN BANDA ACEH AGREED, DRAWING A SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CONFLICT IN ACEH AND CONFLICTS IN EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA DURING A SEPTEMBER 30 MEETING WITH POLOFF. "THERE IS NO REASON TO SUPPORT SEPARATISM HERE," HE SAID, ADDING THAT ONLY 1 OR 2 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION SUPPORTED THE NOTION OF ACEHNESE INDEPENDENCE.

14. (C) HOWEVER, COL. ASRIL TANJUNG, ONE OF TWO MILITARY COMMANDERS (DANREM) WHO SUPERVISE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE PROVINCE, ALLEGED TO POLOFF ON SEPTEMBER 29 THAT A SMALL GPK FORCE CONTINUES TO OPERATE IN REMOTE AREAS. THERE HAVE BEEN AT LEAST THREE INCIDENTS IN THE PAST MONTH INDICATING PRO-INDEPENDENCE SENTIMENT: FIRST, A REPORT THAT AN "ACEHNESE FLAG" WAS RAISED IN A LHOKSEUMAWE PRISON

AS PRISONERS STAGED A MASS BREAKOUT AMID THE CHAOTIC RIOTING WHICH HIT THE TOWN AUGUST 31-SEPTEMBER 1; SECOND, A REPORT THAT AMID A CROWD OF HUNDREDS THAT GATHERED OUTSIDE THE COURTHOUSE WHERE ACEHNESE SEPARATIST ISHAQ DAWOOD IS CURRENTLY BEING TRIED, CRIES OF "LONG LIVE ACEH MERDEKA" WERE HEARD; AND THIRD, A REPORT THAT IN THE TOWN OF MATANG SEJUK TANGO, A VILLAGE IN THE PIDIE DISTRICT OF NORTH EAST ACEH, ABOUT ONE HUNDRED "ACEHNESE FLAGS" WERE SEIZED IN LATE SEPTEMBER. HOWEVER, NONE OF THESE REPORTS HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED, AND IN FACT SEVERAL NGO STAFFERS IN ACEH HAVE ALLEGED TO POLOFF THAT THESE AND OTHER INCIDENTS WERE FABRICATED OR STAGED BY MILITARY FORCES WANTING TO CREATE A THREAT, AND THUS PREVENT THEIR

WITHDRAWAL FROM THE REGION.

TROOP LEVELS
---

15. (C) ABRI REPORTED IN EARLY SEPTEMBER THAT IT HAD WITHDRAWN 908 TROOPS FROM ACEH, IN KEEPING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO'S PUBLIC PLEDGE TO DRAW DOWN FORCES DURING HIS AUGUST 7 VISIT TO THE PROVINCE. THE FIGURE OF 908 DEPARTED TROOPS WAS SAID TO COMPLETE THE WITHDRAWAL OF "NON-ORGANIC" TROOPS, I.E., THOSE WHO HAD BEEN DEPLOYED SPECIFICALLY TO CARRY OUT ANTI-SEPARATIST OPERATIONS AS OPPOSED TO THE "ORGANIC" FORCES ROUTINELY STATIONED IN EVERY PROVINCE OF INDONESIA. B1

16. (C) HOWEVER, THERE IS A PERSISTENT PERCEPTION AMONG SOME OF OUR CONTACTS IN THE PROVINCE THAT THE DRAW DOWN OF TROOPS WAS ILLUSORY. THESE SKEPTICS ARE NOT ABLE TO POINT AT ANY CONCRETE FACTS THAT UNDERMINE ABRI'S DRAWDOWN CLAIMS, BUT RATHER SUBSCRIBE TO THEORIES THAT RIOTING IN LHOKSEUMAWE WAS ENGINEERED (FOR WHICH THERE IS ABUNDANT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE - SEE REFTEL) AND NEW REPORTS OF SEPARATIST ACTIVITY WERE FABRICATED BY MILITARY OFFICERS WITH A VESTED (ECONOMIC) INTEREST IN REMAINING IN THE PROVINCE. B1

ESTIMATED THAT AT LEAST 6000 TROOPS WERE STATIONED IN ACEH, CLAIMING TO HAVE DEVELOPED THAT ESTIMATE FROM VARIOUS MEDIA REPORTS AND OTHER SOURCES. ANOTHER NGO STAFFER ALLEGED TO POLOFF THAT THERE ARE STILL MANY KOPASSUS (SPECIAL FORCES) TROOPS OPERATING AROUND LHOKSEUMAWE, ALTHOUGH THEY NOW WORE PLAIN CLOTHES.

IT'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID
---

17. (C) THE DANREM OF BANDA ACEH, COL. ASRIL TANJUNG, TOLD POLOFF

PAGE 01 JAKART 05189 04 OF 04 021025Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	CTME-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01
	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/023W						

----------7156AF 021026Z /38

R 021017Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3918
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 005189

CINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/03
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, ECON, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: ACEH NOTEBOOK: CASUALTIES UNDERESTIMATED, THREATS AND INTIMIDATION, CASE STUDIES, TROOP LEVELS, ECONOMIC WOES.

REF: JAKARTA 4948 AND PREVIOUS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05189 04 OF 04 021025Z

SEPTEMBER 29 THAT THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM FACING ACEH RIGHT NOW IS ECONOMIC, RATHER THAN SECURITY RELATED. THOUGH CONDITIONS ARE CONSIDERABLY BETTER THAN IN JAVA, ACEH, LIKE ALL PARTS OF INDONESIA, HAS BEEN HIT HARD BY THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. MAJOR PROJECTS, LIKE A LUXURY HOTEL SLATED TO BE BUILT IN BANDA ACEH THIS YEAR, HAVE BEEN HALTED. JOBS AND COMMERCE HAVE DROPPED SHARPLY, AND PRICES FOR STAPLE GOODS LIKE RICE HAVE RISEN. COL. BAKRI, IN CHARGE OF ABRI'S SOCIO-POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN ACEH, TOLD POLOFF SEPTEMBER 29 THAT THE MILITARY HAS SPENT RP 20 BILLION (USD 186 THOUSAND) ON A PROGRAM PROVIDING AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT TO THE LOCAL POPULATION. ACCORDING TO BAKRI, ABRI IS ALSO PROVIDING MATERIAL

AND LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE IMPORT AND DISTRIBUTION OF LOW-GRADE RICE FROM VIETNAM FOR THE PROVINCE'S POOR.

18. (C) [redacted] AGREED THAT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE PROVINCE WERE SERIOUS. ONE PARTICULARLY TROUBLING PATTERN SHE HAS NOTICED ARE AN INCREASING NUMBER OF CHILDREN LEAVING SCHOOL BOTH BECAUSE THEY CAN'T AFFORD SCHOOL FEES AND BECAUSE THEY NEED TO TRY TO EARN MONEY TO HELP SUPPORT THEIR FAMILY. [redacted] ALLEGED THAT THIS WAS BECOMING PARTICULARLY COMMON AMONG FAMILIES SHE CHARACTERIZED AS "VICTIMS OF THE MILITARY" IN WHICH AT LEAST ONE FAMILY MEMBER HAD BEEN KILLED BY SECURITY FORCES. STAFFERS OF THE PUTRA DEWANTARA FOUNDATION IN LHOKSEUMAWE REPORTED THEY HAD OBSERVED THE SAME PHENOMENON IN NORTH EAST ACEH AS A RESULT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. B1 B1

TENSION GAP
---

19. (C) THE TENSION GAP BETWEEN BANDA ACEH AND LHOKSEUMAWE IS CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] PALPABLE. B1

COMMENT
---

20. (C) THE ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVE HIGH STAKES FOR INDONESIAN POLITICS. SYARWAN HAMID, CURRENTLY MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS, WAS DANREM IN LHOKSEUMAWE DURING 1991-92, WHEN MANY OF THE ALLEGED KILLINGS AND OTHER INCIDENTS UNDER INVESTIGATION TOOK PLACE. COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICS AND SECURITY, FAISAL TANJUNG, AND FORMER VICE PRESIDENT TRY SUTRISNO, ALSO HELD KEY POSITIONS IN ABRI AT THIS TIME. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE GPK WILL REEMERGE TO POSE A THREAT TO ABRI IN THE PROVINCE IN THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE, AND IT IS ALSO UNLIKELY THAT ABRI WILL REVERT TO ITS PREVIOUS HARDBALL TACTICS. HOWEVER, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE INVESTIGATION, AND PERIODIC POLITICAL FALLOUT, WILL CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E46

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1356

PAGE 01 JAKART 05076 01 OF 02 251038Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/027W				

----------6E9E4D 251043Z /38

R 251032Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3802
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI 1007
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 005076

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/25/03
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: RIOT/RAPE INVESTIGATION TEAM LEADER SUSPECTS LINKS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05076 01 OF 02 251038Z
CONNECTING RECENT RIOTS, KIDNAPPINGS AND STUDENT KILLINGS

REF: A) JAKARTA 4985, B) JAKARTA 4680

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE LEADER OF THE FACT-FINDING TEAM INVESTIGATING THE RIOTS AND SEXUAL ASSAULTS/RAPES WHICH, ACCORDING TO WELL-FOUNDED REPORTING, TRANSPIRED IN A NUMBER OF INDONESIAN CITIES IN MAY, HAS TESTIFIED BEFORE A PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ABOUT THE TEAM'S PRELIMINARY FINDINGS. HE SAID THAT THE TEAM HAD A "VERY STRONG BASIS OF EVIDENCE THAT SEXUAL ASSAULTS AND RAPES OCCURRED." HE ALSO STATED THAT THE TEAM BELIEVED THE RIOTS MAY HAVE BEEN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 24 SEP 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200502501

CONNECTED TO THE KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND TO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. HE CLAIMED HE HAD ABRI COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO'S ASSURANCE THAT THE TEAM COULD INTERVIEW MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY HONOR BOARD WHICH INVESTIGATED THE INVOLVEMENT OF SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS, INCLUDING LT. GENERAL PRABOWO (RET), ABOUT THE KIDNAPPINGS SO AS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF LINKS.

B1

INTERIM TEAM REPORT ON SUBJECT OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RAPES:

3. (U) THE LEADER OF THE GOVERNMENT-ORGANIZED FACT FINDING TEAM

INVESTIGATING THE MAY RIOTING (AND RAPES) TESTIFIED BEFORE A PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON SEPTEMBER 24. HIS TESTIMONY, AS ANTICIPATED REF A, INCLUDED AN AFFIRMATION THAT THE TEAM HAD SOLID EVIDENCE THAT SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RAPES HAD OCCURRED. HE STATED THAT THE TEAM "HAD FOUND THAT THERE (WAS) A VERY STRONG BASIS OF EVIDENCE THAT SEXUAL ASSAULTS AND ALSO RAPES OCCURRED DURING THE RIOTS." HE ADDED THAT THE TEAM WAS SEEKING ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE REGARDING SEXUAL ASSAULTS (INCLUDING RAPE) IN SOLO, SURABAYA, MEDAN, PALEMBANG AND LAMPUNG, AS WELL AS JAKARTA. (COMMENT: WE ARE AWARE OF INVESTIGATIONS ALSO REGARDING SEXUAL ASSAULT/RAPE IN BEKASI AND TANGERANG. END COMMENT)

B1

TEAM LEADER SUSPECTS LINKS BETWEEN RIOTS AND OTHER INVESTIGATIONS:

5. (U) MARZUKI, WHO IS ALSO VICE CHAIRPERSON OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, TOLD THE PARLIAMENTARIANS THAT THE TEAM BELIEVED THERE WERE LINKS BETWEEN THE RIOTS, THE ABDUCTIONS/TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND THE SHOOTING DEATH OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. "THESE CONDITIONS (THE RIOTING) WERE SHAPED BY THE SHOOTING AT TRISAKTI, BUT WERE ALSO AFFECTED BY A SERIES OF VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST ACTIVISTS AND STUDENTS AND ABDUCTIONS OF THEM," MARZUKI TOLD THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. (U) MARZUKI ADDED THAT THE TEAM WAS LOOKING INTO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE MILITARY MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN THE RIOTS. "WE ARE LOOKING VERY CLOSELY INTO THAT POSSIBILITY AND INTO A VARIETY OF POSSIBILITIES OF LINKS BUT WE CANNOT MAKE ANY FIRM CONCLUSION AT THIS MOMENT."

7. (U) MARZUKI SAID THAT THE TEAM WAS SEEKING ACCESS TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE RECENT MILITARY HONOR BOARD WHICH TOOK TESTIMONY FROM FORMER LT. GENERAL PRABOWO AND OTHER SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIALS IN CONNECTION WITH THE KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. MARZUKI TOLD THE PARLIAMENTARIANS THAT "THE ABRI COMMANDER (WIRANTO) HAS ASSURED US THAT WE CAN HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE (HONOR BOARD) AND THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE TEAM."

PRABOWO YET TO FACE COURT MARTIAL?
---

8. (U) SEPARATELY, MILITARY POLICE COMMANDER MAJOR GENERAL SYAMSU DJALAL TOLD THE PRESS, SEPTEMBER 24, THAT FORMER LT. GENERAL PRABOWO WOULD BE BROUGHT BEFORE A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AFTER 11 MEMBERS OF THE ARMY'S SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) WERE TRIED FOR THEIR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPING OF DISSIDENTS. HE CLAIMED THAT THE COURT MARTIAL WOULD BEGIN SOON.

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1357

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/027W					

----------6E9E50 251043Z /38

R 251032Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3803
INFO SECDEF WASHDC

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI 1008
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 005076

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/25/03
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: RIOT/RAPE INVESTIGATION TEAM LEADER SUSPECTS LINKS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05076 02 OF 02 251038Z
CONNECTING RECENT RIOTS, KIDNAPPINGS AND STUDENT KILLINGS

REF: A) JAKARTA 4985, B) JAKARTA 4680

B1

[redacted]

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E44

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0998

PAGE 01 JAKART 04985 01 OF 02 220845Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6D29B9 220846Z /38

R 220842Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3718
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI 1005
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004985

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/22/03
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: TEAM INVESTIGATING MASS RAPES OF SINO-INDONESIANS TO CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04985 01 OF 02 220845Z
ISSUE INTERIM REPORT "CONFIRMING" RAPES TOOK PLACE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: A MEMBER OF THE FACT-FINDING TEAM INVESTIGATING RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND GIRLS DURING THE MAY 13-15 RIOTS IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT THERE IS STILL NO FIRST-HAND TESTIMONY REGARDING THE RAPES. NEVERTHELESS, THE TEAM (TPGF) WILL ISSUE AN INTERIM REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 24 FINDING THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND GIRLS WERE RAPED IN AN ORGANIZED AND SYSTEMATIC MANNER. THE TGPF REPORTEDLY HAS DEVELOPED EVIDENCE BASED ON AFFIDAVITS OF

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 22 SEP 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200502501

FAMILY MEMBERS AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL, AS WELL AS OTHER EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THESE CHARGES. IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH THE ARMED FORCES COMMANDER AND OTHER KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, THE TEAM'S CHAIRPERSON TOOK A STRONGER POSITION, STATING THAT CONTACT WITH VICTIMS HAD BEEN MADE AND THAT THE TEAM HAD "CONFIRMED" THAT RAPES AND SEXUAL ASSAULT HAD TAKEN PLACE. THE TEAM SOUGHT PROTECTION FROM INTIMIDATION FOR THOSE WILLING TO TESTIFY WHO HAD BEEN THREATENED. THE TEAM ALSO CRITICIZED SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO HAD EXPRESSED DOUBT ABOUT THE RAPES AND WHO HAD THREATENED TO PROSECUTE FABRICATORS. END SUMMARY.

TGPF MEMBER ON EVIDENCE

3. (C) REPORTS THAT AT LEAST 168 SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND GIRLS HAD BEEN RAPED IN A SYSTEMATIC AND ORGANIZED ASSAULT AMID THE RIOTING THAT STRUCK INDONESIA IN MAY SENT SHOCKWAVES ACROSS INDONESIA AND BEYOND. HOWEVER, IN THE MONTHS THAT FOLLOWED, VICTIMS AND WITNESSES WILLING TO GO ON RECORD FAILED TO MATERIALIZE

AND SENIOR INDONESIAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS ALLEGED THAT THE REPORTS WERE EXAGGERATED OR EVEN FABRICATED. [redacted] B1

[redacted] SAID THAT SHE WAS CONVINCED THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN WERE INDEED RAPED IN MAY. HOWEVER, SHE SAID THERE WERE NO VICTIMS WILLING TO TESTIFY, DUE IN PART TO THE FACT THAT VICTIMS REMAINED TRAUMATIZED. SHE ADDED THAT RELUCTANCE TO TESTIFY ALSO DERIVED FROM INTIMIDATION TARGETED AGAINST VICTIMS AND THEIR FAMILIES BY GOI OFFICIALS. IN PARTICULAR, SHE CRITICIZED OFFICIAL STATEMENTS BY NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF LT. GENERAL ROESMANHANDI, MINISTER OF DEFENSE/ARMED FORCES COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO AND ATTORNEY GENERAL MOHAMMAD GHALIB, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE REPORTS WERE FABRICATED AND THAT THOSE "SPREADING LIES" WOULD BE PROSECUTED. SHE CLAIMED THAT PRIOR TO THESE STATEMENTS, THREE WITNESSES WERE PREPARED TO COME FORWARD AND GIVE TESTIMONY, BUT THAT THE OFFICIALS' STATEMENTS CAUSED THEM TO WITHDRAW IN FEAR.

5. (C) [redacted] STATED THAT DESPITE THE LACK OF FIRST-HAND TESTIMONY FROM VICTIMS, THE TGPF HAD COMPILED A SUBSTANTIAL BODY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE MASS RAPE ALLEGATIONS. SHE SAID THAT THE TEAM HAS NUMEROUS AFFIDAVITS FROM DOCTORS AND PSYCHOLOGISTS WHO EXAMINED VICTIMS. THE TEAM ALSO HAD AFFIDAVITS FROM FAMILY MEMBERS OF VICTIMS, AS WELL AS "CIRCUMSTANTIAL" EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATIONS. [redacted] IN A COMPROMISE, [redacted] THE CRIMES PERPETRATED AGAINST [redacted] B1 B1

SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND GIRLS WILL BE DESCRIBED AS "SEXUAL ASSAULT" RATHER THAN RAPE. SHE EXPLAINED THAT THE CLAIMS OF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04985 01 OF 02 220845Z

ASSAULT, RATHER THAN RAPE, ENTAILED A DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF THE CRIME WITH DIFFERENT EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS, MAKING THE CASES EASIER TO PROVE.

6. (U) SEPARATELY AND SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTING [redacted] B1
COMMENTS, THE MEDIA, SEPTEMBER 22, CARRIED STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS BY TEAM CHAIRPERSON MARZUKI DARUSMAN INDICATING A FIRMER EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR THE RAPE ALLEGATIONS. HE TOLD THE PRESS THAT IN A MEETING WITH WIRANTO, JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI AND STATE MINISTER OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS TUTTY ALAWIYAH, "WE CONFIRMED TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT SEXUAL ASSAULTS INCLUDING RAPE OCCURRED DURING THE MAY RIOTS." DARUSMAN ALSO CLAIMED THAT "SEVERAL TEAM MEMBERS HAD MET WITH "A NUMBER OF VICTIMS." NOTING THAT THE TEAM WOULD COMPLETE THE REPORT IN OCTOBER, DARUSMAN ADDED "THE IMPORTANT THING IS WE WANT TO ASSURE THAT THESE THINGS HAVE HAPPENED AND THAT THIS (FACT) IS ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT." THE TEAM WILL GIVE AN INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PARLIAMENT ON SEPTEMBER 24.

7. (U) AFTER THE MEETING JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI INFORMED THE PRESS THAT GENERAL WIRANTO HAD TOLD THE FACT-FINDING TEAM THAT "THOSE WHO HAVE RECEIVED THREATS REGARDING WHAT THEY KNOW ABOUT THE RAPES WILL BE PROTECTED." THE PROMISE CAME IN THE WAKE OF REPORTING BY THE TEAM TO THE SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AS

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0999

PAGE 01 JAKART 04985 02 OF 02 220846Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W

----------6D29BE 220846Z /38

R 220842Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3719
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI 1006
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004985

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/22/03
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: TEAM INVESTIGATING MASS RAPES OF SINO-INDONESIANS TO ISSUE INTERIM REPORT "CONFIRMING" RAPES TOOK PLACE
CONFIDENTIAL

CARRIED IN THE MEDIA, THAT "RAPE VICTIMS, EYEWITNESSES AND MEMBERS OF THE INVESTIGATING ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE INVESTIGATING TEAM (TGPF), HAD RECEIVED PHONE CALLS THREATENING THEM WITH VIOLENCE." ACCORDING TO MULADI, WIRANTO "OFFERED THE SERVICES OF THE MILITARY TO ANYONE WHO FEELS THREATENED," INCLUDING AN OFFER TO TAP THE PHONES OF THOSE RECEIVING THREATENING PHONE CALLS SO AS TO CAPTURE THE PERPETRATORS.

8. (U) MULADI ALSO TOLD THE PRESS THAT TEAM MEMBERS HAD COMPLAINED TO WIRANTO ABOUT STATEMENTS MADE BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS EXPRESSING DOUBT THAT THE SEXUAL ASSAULTS HAD TAKEN PLACE. THE TEAM MEMBERS REPORTEDLY SAID THAT SUCH STATEMENTS DISCREDITED THEIR WORK. MULADI ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE TEAM HAD NOT PRESENTED THE GOVERNMENT WITH ANY CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF RAPE. MULADI SAID THAT ONCE SUCH EVIDENCE WAS IN HAND, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE ACTION, TO INCLUDE PROPOSING RATIFICATION OF UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST RACE DISCRIMINATION.

9. (C) COMMENT: THE TEAM INVESTIGATING THE MAY RIOTS IS THE ONLY ONE AMONG FOUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS NOW UNDERWAY, WHICH INCLUDES RESPECTED FIGURES FROM THE NGO COMMUNITY AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. (INVESTIGATIONS OF THE KIDNAPPING/TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND THE KILLING OF TRISAKTI STUDENTS IS IN THE HANDS OF THE MILITARY WHILE AN INVESTIGATION OF SOEHARTO'S WEALTH IS BEING RUN BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.) THE IMPRESSIVE CREDENTIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NON-GOVERNMENT MEMBERS OF THE RIOT INVESTIGATION TEAM WILL GIVE ITS CONCLUSIONS SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT. IF, AS PREDICTED, THE TEAM CONFIRMS THAT ORGANIZED, SYSTEMATIC RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT TOOK PLACE, DOUBTERS WILL BE UNDERMINED BUT PROBABLY NOT SILENCED.

CONFIDENTIAL

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E40

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4716

PAGE 01 JAKART 04739 01 OF 02 100742Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/027W		

----------692A53 102250Z /38

R 091036Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3502
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004739

C O R R E C T E D COPY FOR PARA THREE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04739 01 OF 02 100742Z
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: ASIA-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS FORUM CONVENES:
INFORMAL DISCUSSION TURNS TO TRUTH COMMISSION FOR INDONESIA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: INDONESIA PLAYED HOST TO A GROUPING OF REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS AT A FOUR-DAY WORKSHOP. THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAS RECOMMENDED TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT IT RATIFY KEY HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS. AMONG OBSERVERS WAS AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHICH IN THE PAST HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO VISIT INDONESIA OFFICIALLY. AMNESTY HAS HAD

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 9 SEP 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

PAGES MISSING

MEETINGS WITH SENIOR MILITARY FIGURES AT WHICH IT HAS SOUGHT ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING MISSING POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. AI IS TENTATIVE REGARDING THE DEGREE OF PROGRESS THESE MEETINGS MAY REPRESENT. SEPARATELY, MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN COMMISSION AND AI DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING A "TRUTH COMMISSION" TO DEAL WITH EMERGING REVELATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED BY THE ARMED FORCES. END SUMMARY

3. (U) THE THIRD ANNUAL "WORKSHOP" MEETING OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC FORUM FOR NATIONAL COMMISSIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENED IN JAKARTA SEPTEMBER 8. COMMISSIONS FROM SRI LANKA, AUSTRALIA, INDIA AND NEW ZEALAND HOSTED OBSERVERS FROM BANGLADESH, CHINA, CAMBODIA, IRAN, JORDAN, LAOS, MONGOLIA, NEPAL, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, SOUTH KOREA, FIJI, CANADA, NORWAY AND GREAT BRITAIN ATTENDED. PRESIDENT HABIBIE OPENED THE SESSION SEPTEMBER 8, TELLING THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04739 01 OF 02 100742Z

DELEGATES AND OBSERVERS THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTED RATIFYING SEVERAL UN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS. HE ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE HAD COMPLETED A HUMAN RIGHTS BILL WHICH, INTER ALIA, WOULD PROVIDE A STRONGER LEGAL FOOTING FOR THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (KOMNASHAM), HOST FOR THE THIRD ANNUAL MEETING. THE UNHRC AND THE AUSTRALIAN EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION SPONSORED THE MEETING.

4. (U) IN HER WELCOMING REMARKS, KOMNASHAM'S FIRST VICE CHAIRPERSON MIRIAM BUDIARDJO ANNOUNCED THAT KOMNASHAM HAD COMPLETED AND PRESENTED TO THE GOVERNMENT ITS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EARLY RATIFICATION OF THE UN COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AND THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. SHE ADDED THAT THE COMMISSION HAD ALSO RECOMMENDED RATIFICATION OF UN CONVENTIONS AGAINST RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE "SOME TIME AGO."

5. (SBU) AMONG THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING AS AN OBSERVER WAS KERRY BROGAN OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. IN PREVIOUS VISITS, AI HAS NOT HAD OFFICIAL STATUS AND HAS WORKED VIRTUALLY UNDER COVER WHILE VISITING INDONESIA. IN CONTRAST, THE AI REP IN THIS VISIT MET, ALONG WITH OTHERS, ARMED FORCES COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO. BROGAN TOLD POLCOUNS THAT SHE WOULD ALSO BE MEETING WITH GENERAL ZACKY ANWAR, CHIEF OF MILITARY INTELIGENCE (BIA) AND WOULD PRESENT HIM WITH A LIST OF 20 MISSING POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, THE SAME LIST SHE EARLIER PROVIDED TO WIRANTO. WIRANTO GAVE A PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO ASSIST IN LOCATING THE MISSING INDONESIANS AND TO REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH AI. BROGAN, IN PUBLIC COMMENTS, CALLED FOR AN "INDEPENDENT COMMISSION" TO INVESTIGATE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES. SHE TOLD POLCOUNS THAT WHILE WELCOMING THE MEETING WITH SENIOR ABRI OFFICIALS, "WHAT

CONFIDENTIAL

MATTERS IS FOLLOW-UP AND ACCOUNTABILITY. WE HAVE NO ASSURANCES ON THIS."

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E39

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8264

PAGE 01 JAKART 04529 01 OF 02 261027Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00
	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/029W				

----------63764A 261027Z /38

R 261019Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3315
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0955
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004529

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA, INR/IL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04529 01 OF 02 261027Z
AID/W FOR ANE

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/08
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EIND, PINR, PHUM, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN INTELIGENCE CHIEF SEES RAPE REPORTS
- AS AN ATTEMPT TO DEFAME INDONESIA

REF: JAKARTA 4526

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 25 AUG 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2006 200502501

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA, WHICH HAS SHOWN SENSITIVITY TO FOREIGN CRITICISM OVER THE FAILURE TO PROTECT SINO-INDONESIANS WHO WERE SINGLED OUT FOR RAPE AND OTHER ABUSE DURING MAY RIOTS, HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE RAPE REPORTS ARE FABRICATED. HIS COMMENTS HAVE DRAWN STRONG CRITICISM FROM THOSE RESEARCHING THE PROBLEM. WHILE SOME ALLEGATIONS PRESENTED ON THE INTERNET DO IN FACT APPEAR SUSPICIOUS, LEADING HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS REMAIN CONVINCED THE CHARGES ARE TRUE. ONE NEW INVESTIGATIVE INITIATIVE WILL ENGAGE A FOREIGN NGO. A LEADING RELIGIOUS FIGURE HAS CALLED THE DISTORTION OF EVENTS ON BOTH SIDES "EXTREMELY DANGEROUS." A SENIOR CHINESE DIPLOMAT HAS DESCRIBED BEIJING'S IRRITATION OVER GOI VACILLATION ON THE VERACITY OF THE RAPE CHARGES. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS STATED THAT IT HAS "ASCERTAINED UNEQUIVOCALLY" THAT RAPES TOOK PLACE AND HAS REFERRED TO THE "SYSTEMATIC" MANNER IN WHICH THEY WERE CARRIED OUT. END SUMMARY

CONFIDENTIAL

DOUBTS AND DENIALS

3. (U) THE INDONESIAN MEDIA ON AUGUST 25 GAVE PROMINENT COVERAGE TO STATEMENTS BY THE CHIEF OF STATE INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING BOARD (BAKIN), LT. GENERAL MOETOJIB, IN WHICH HE CLAIMED ALLEGATIONS OF EXTENSIVE RAPING OF SINO-INDONESIAN WOMEN AND CHILDREN DURING THE MAY RIOTS WERE FABRICATED. HE CLAIMED THAT AFTER CHECKING AT HOSPITALS AROUND THE CITY, "NONE CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THE INCIDENTS OCCURRED." NO WOMEN, HE SAID, HAVE REPORTED TO SECURITY OFFICERS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN RAPED. MOETOJIB ADDED, "I HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE RUMORS WERE SPREAD FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES TO DEFAME INDONESIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA AND TO CAUSE DISINTEGRATION OF NATIONAL UNITY. ... LOOKING AT THE INTENSITY OF THE REPORTS CIRCULATED TO CORNER THE NATION AND ABRI, I BELIEVE THERE IS AN INTENTION THAT INDONESIA, OR AT THE VERY LEAST THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT, COLLAPSES." TURNING TO THE PRESS HE ADDED, "I AM QUITE UPSET AT DOMESTIC DAILIES WHO CONTINUE TO WRITE REPORTS AS IF THESE EVENTS OCCURRED, WHILE IN FACT THEIR SOURCES ARE AMBIGUOUS." THE AUGUST 26 MEDIA CARRY STRONG CRITICISM OF THE INTELIGENCE CHIEF'S REMARKS. A SENIOR SINO-INDONESIAN ACADEMIC, MELY TAN, COMPLAINED THAT MOETOJIB'S STATEMENTS COULD DISCOURAGE WITNESSES FROM TESTIFYING.

4. (C) [redacted] B1
COMPARED RECENT GOVERNMENT DOUBTS ABOUT THE VERACITY OF THE RAPE REPORTS TO EARLIER ATTEMPTS BY ABRI OFFICIALS TO DISMISS REPORTS OF MISSING ACTIVISTS WITH SUGGESTIONS THAT THEY WERE MERELY IN HIDING. THE ACTIVISTS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SHOWN TO BE VICTIMS OF ABRI

KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE. [redacted] TOLD A CONGRESSIONAL STAFFDEL B1
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04529 01 OF 02 261027Z
AUGUST 25 THAT MILITARY OFFICIALS WITHIN THE GOI COMMITTEE SET UP TO INVESTIGATE THE RIOTS AND RAPES WERE PREPARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT RAPES HAPPENED BUT WERE RESISTING CONTENTIONS THAT THESE WERE ORGANIZED OR SYSTEMATIC (SEE SEPTEL). [redacted] B1

[redacted]

AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
---

5. (SBU) SEPARATELY, IN A RECENT DISCUSSION WITH TDY POLOFF, [redacted] B6
EXPRESSED HIS DEEP CONCERN OVER THIS EMERGING POLEMIC, STATING THAT NEITHER DENIAL ON THE ONE HAND NOR FABRICATION ON THE OTHER, WOULD HELP INDONESIA MOVE BEYOND THIS PAINFUL EPISODE. CALLING THE DISTORTION OF EVENTS ON BOTH SIDES "EXTREMELY DANGEROUS," [redacted] B6
DISCLOSED HIS PLAN TO ENGAGE A FOREIGN PERSPECTIVE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE RAPES AND RIOTS.

6. (SBU) SPECIFICALLY, HE HAS SECURED THE AGREEMENT OF THE "WORLD CONFERENCE ON RELIGION AND PEACE," WHICH IS HEADQUARTERED AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK, TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL TEAM TO INVESTIGATE THE MAY RIOTING. THE TEAM WILL WORK WITH OTHER BODIES CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING IN AN EFFORT TO GIVE INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF THEIR RESULTS. IT MIGHT ALSO EXPAND ITS FOCUS TO

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8265

PAGE 01 JAKART 04529 02 OF 02 261027Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00
	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/029W				

----------63764D 261027Z /38

R 261019Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3316
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0956
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004529

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA, INR/IL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04529 02 OF 02 261027Z
AID/W FOR ANE

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/08
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EIND, PINR, PHUM, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN INTELIGENCE CHIEF SEES RAPE REPORTS
- AS AN ATTEMPT TO DEFAME INDONESIA

REF: JAKARTA 4526

INCLUDE INVESTIGATION OF OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED MATTERS. [redacted] B6

[redacted] PLANS TO ANNOUNCE
HIS PLAN IN A PRESS CONFERENCE AUGUST 26.

BEIJING'S REACTION

[redacted] B1

THE "EVIDENCE"
---

8. (C) SEVERAL FOREIGN JOURNALISTS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN TO US THAT SOME OF THE "EVIDENCE" APPEARING ON THE INTERNET AND THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS APPEARS TO BE FALSE, NOTABLY PICTURES OF RAPE VICTIMS. WE HAVE ALSO SEEN PHOTO'S -- EVEN SOME OFFERED BY RESPECTABLE RESEARCHERS IN JAKARTA -- WHICH APPEAR TO BE BOGUS. THERE IS QUIET ADMISSION AMONG RESEARCHERS THAT THEY NEED TO ENSURE THAT THEIR WORK IS NOT CONTAMINATED BY PROPAGANDISTIC EFFORTS THAT COULD DISCREDIT THE RESEARCH OR ENGENDER A BACKLASH AMONG MUSLIMS, SOME OF WHOM ALREADY FEEL THEMSELVES VICTIMIZED BY THE INVESTIGATION.

9. (U) THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WHICH IS LEADING THE GOVERNMENT'S INVESTIGATION, HAS STATED THAT IT HAS "ASCERTAINED UNEQUIVOCALLY" THAT THE RAPES TOOK PLACE AND THAT THEY WERE CARRIED OUT SYSTEMATICALLY.
OWENS

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E38

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3160

PAGE 01 JAKART 04411 01 OF 02 200357Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/023W					

----------611051 200357Z /38

R 200353Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3186
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004411

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/08
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: RETIRED GENERAL'S VIEWS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04411 01 OF 02 200357Z

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: RETIRED GENERAL [redacted] SEES THE MAY RIOTS AS ORCHESTRATED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROMOTING INSTALLATION OF AN EMERGENCY SECURITY REGIME. HE MAINTAINS THAT PRABOWO ACTED LARGELY ON HIS OWN IN ORDERING THE ABDUCTION OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. [redacted] SEES POLITICALLY ACTIVE RETIRED GENERALS AS UNDERMINING GENERAL WIRANTO'S ABILITY TO CONSOLIDATE THE MILITARY. HE ARGUES THAT ABRI WOULD BE BETTER OFF REMOVING ITSELF FROM POLITICS. END SUMMARY.

B6

B6

[redacted]

B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 19 AUG 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501



ANY SUCH EFFORT WOULD GET VERY FAR. HE ARGUED THAT
PRABOWO COULD ONLY "BUY PEOPLE'S LOYALTY," AND DID NOT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04411 01 OF 02 200357Z



B1

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3161

PAGE 01 JAKART 04411 02 OF 02 200357Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------611056 200358Z /38

R 200353Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3187
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004411

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/08
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: RETIRED GENERAL'S VIEWS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E37

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0096

PAGE 01 JAKART 04388 01 OF 02 190652Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W		

----------60A0A0 190652Z /38

R 190648Z AUG 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3146
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004388

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT RELEASES MORE POLITICAL PRISONERS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA HAS RELEASED 27
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04388 01 OF 02 190652Z
POLITICAL PRISONERS AS PART OF A LARGER RELEASE OF CRIMINAL PRISONERS TO MARK NATIONAL DAY. THE POLITICAL PRISONERS INCLUDED MOSTLY THOSE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN SEPARATIST ACTIVITY IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THREE ELDERLY PRISONERS WITH ALLEGED AFFILIATION TO THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, JAILED SINCE THE LATE 1960'S, WERE AMONG THOSE RELEASED. OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE INCLUDED AMONG THE GENERAL PRISON POPULATION WHICH RECEIVED SLIGHT REMISSIONS IN THEIR SENTENCES. PROMINENT POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE NOT AMONG THOSE RELEASED. RELATIVES AND SUPPORTERS CONTINUE TO BE CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PIECEMEAL RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. DETERIORATING PRISON CONDITIONS ARE CLAIMED TO BE HEALTH AND EVEN LIFE THREATENING, PARTICULARLY FOR THE OLD AND INFIRM. END SUMMARY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 19 AUG 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2006 200502501

3. (U) IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CELEBRATION OF THE 53RD ANNIVERSARY OF INDONESIA'S FOUNDING, THE GOVERNMENT, AS IN THE PAST, ANNOUNCED PRISONER RELEASES, REMISSIONS OF SENTENCES AND SOME "REHABILITATIONS." UNLIKE THE PRACTICE DURING THE SOEHARTO ERA, THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT INCLUDED OUTRIGHT RELEASES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS (NOT THROUGH REMISSION OF SENTENCES). MANY POLITICAL AND CRIMINAL PRISONERS RECEIVED REMISSIONS OF SENTENCES OF UP TO SEVERAL MONTHS.

4. (U) IN ALL, THE GOVERNMENT FREED 27 POLITICAL PRISONERS AND REHABILITATED FOUR SENIOR ACTIVISTS, ONE OF WHOM, LT. GENERAL DHARSONO, IS DECEASED. AMONG THE POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASED WERE THREE WHO WERE ALLEGED TO HAVE AFFILIATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI) AND TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE ABORTED COUP OF 1965. IT WAS THE FIRST PRISONER RELEASE BY THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT TO HAVE INCLUDED "PKI PRISONERS." JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI, IN ANNOUNCING THE RELEASES SAID: "CONSIDERING THE LENGTH OF

CONFIDENTIAL

THE JAIL TERMS THAT HAVE BEEN SERVED BY THE PRISONERS AND FOR HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS, IT IS DEEMED NECESSARY TO GRANT CLEMENCY TO THESE PRISONERS." MULADI HAD TOLD CONGRESSMAN CHRISTOPHER SMITH DURING THE SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN'S JUNE VISIT, THAT HE WOULD SEEK TO INCLUDE ELDERLY OR ILL POLITICAL PRISONERS AS A "SPECIAL CATEGORY" AMONG THOSE CONSIDERED FOR RELEASE.

5. (U) ALSO RELEASED WERE NINE PRISONERS ACCUSED OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE FREE ACEH (ACEH MERDEKA) MOVEMENT; SIX EAST TIMORESE ACCUSED OF BEING SEPARATISTS; SIX ASSOCIATED WITH THE 1989 ISLAMIC-ABRI CONFRONTATION IN LAMPUNG; AND THREE ALLEGED SEPARATISTS FROM IRIAN JAYA. IN ADDITION, 1,587 PRISONERS SERVING CRIMINAL SENTENCES WERE RELEASED THROUGH REMITTED SENTENCES. A TOTAL OF 7,101 PRISONERS SAW THEIR SENTENCES REDUCED.

6. (U) PROMINENT AMONG THOSE POLITICAL PRISONERS NOT RELEASED WERE EAST TIMORESE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO, PRD LEADER BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO, LABOR LEADER DITA INDRA SARI AND PKI-ERA PRISONER ABDUL LATIF. GUSMAO AND SUDJATMIKO (AND POSSIBLY OTHERS) DID RECEIVE SENTENCE REMISSIONS.

7. (SBU) POLCOUNS AND A DUTCH DIPLOMAT WERE ON HAND AT CIPINANG PRISON IN JAKARTA AUGUST 17 TO MONITOR A DEMONSTRATION BY APPROXIMATELY 200 PERSONS INCLUDING PRD SUPPORTERS AND BACKERS OF MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI. THE TWO-HOUR PROTEST CALLED FOR RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON XANANA GUSMAO, BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO AND WEST PAPUAN JACOB RUMBIAK. AN ATTEMPT BY TWO DEMONSTRATORS TO LAUNCH A HUNGER STRIKE IN THE PRISON COURT YARD WAS FRUSTRATED BY SECURITY OFFICIALS. POLICE SHOWED RESTRAINT IN HANDLING THE DEMONSTRATION, WHICH BLOCKED SEVERAL LANES OF THE

HIGHWAY IN FRONT OF THE PRISON. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE POSITIONED

CONFIDENTIAL

NEARBY BUT REMAINED ON STAND-BY. IN MID-AFTERNOON, XANANA AND BUDIMAN WERE ALLOWED BRIEFLY TO ADDRESS THE DEMONSTRATORS. THEY CALLED FOR CONTINUED PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT FOR RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS AND REJECTED THEIR TOKEN SENTENCE REDUCTIONS (FOUR MONTHS FOR XANANA) AS IRRELEVANT. XANANA CALLED FOR RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS "WITHOUT REGARD TO CATEGORY OR CONDITION."

8. (C) NO PRISONERS WERE RELEASED FROM CIPINANG PRISON, FRUSTRATING SUPPORTERS INCLUDING FAMILY MEMBERS. B1

9. (U) REINFORCING THAT CONCERN WERE REPORTS CARRIED IN THE MEDIA AUGUST 19 THAT THE CHIEF WARDEN AT A GOVERNMENT PRISON IN MERAUKE, IRIAN JAYA HAD A BUDGET TO FEED 100 PRISONERS BUT THAT THE PRISON POPULATION WAS 162. RECENTLY RELEASED PRISONERS HAVE TOLD US THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0095

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W				

----------60A09C 190651Z /38

R 190648Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3147

INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004388

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT RELEASES MORE POLITICAL PRISONERS

THE ONLY MEDICINES AVAILABLE THROUGH THE PRISON SYSTEM TO CRIMINAL PRISONERS IN JAKARTA'S CIPINANG PRISON ARE "VITAMINS" OF QUESTIONABLE CONTENT. CIPINANG PRISON IS REPUTED TO BE ONE OF THE

GOI'S BEST PRISONS.

10. (C) COMMENT: THE GRADUAL NATURE OF THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS EMPLOYED BY THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT IS GENERATING ANGER AND IRRITATION AMONG THOSE WHO SEE THEIR RELATIVES AND FRIENDS AS THE VICTIMS OF DISCRIMINATION BY A "CATEGORY" APPROACH THEY CLAIM IS ARBITRARY AND UNFAIR. THE REGIME HAS EEN CRITICIZED ALSO FOR TREATING PRISONERS AS HOSTAGES, RELEASING GROUPS AT IMPORTANT JUNCTURES TO GAIN INTERNATIONAL GOOD WILL (SUCH AS THE RELEASE WHICH IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE PARIS CGI). ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RELEASE OF PKI-ERA PRISONERS REPRESENTS AN IMPORTANT EXPANSION OF THE CATEGORY OF PRISONERS TO BE RELEASED AND [redacted] B1

OWENS

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E36

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

SECRET PTQ7490

PAGE 01 JAKART 04380 181059Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------6044FF 181100Z /38

R 181024Z AUG 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3139
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
SECDEF WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

S E C R E T JAKARTA 004380

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/08
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, MILI, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: GENERAL PRABOWO REPORTEDLY FINGERS SOEHARTO ON KIDNAPPINGS; CLAIMS WIRANTO KNEW

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 04380 181059Z
REF: JAKARTA PR 130903Z AUG 98

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

[redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 17 AUG 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501



7. (U) GENERAL SUBAGYO, THE CHIEF OF THE OFFICERS HONOR COUNCIL, TOLD THE MEDIA OVER THE WEEKEND THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD RECOMMEND TO GENERAL WIRANTO THAT LT. GENERAL PRABOWO BE COURT-MARTIALLED FOR THE ABDUCTIONS AND TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. SUBAGYO NOTED THAT THE FINAL DECISION OF WHETHER TO COURT-MARTIAL PRABOWO WOULD BE MADE BY WIRANTO. THE COUNCIL WAS TO CONTINUE HEARING WITNESSES BEGINNING AUGUST 18, NOTWITHSTANDING EARLIER PREDICTIONS THAT IT WOULD WRAP-UP ITS WORK BY AUGUST 17.
OWENS

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E33

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4071

PAGE 01 JAKART 04290 01 OF 03 120907Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	ACQ-01	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	FDIC-01
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/027W				

----------5E34DE 120907Z /38

R 120708Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3054
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
SECDEF WASHDC
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004290

DOL FOR ILAB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/08
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, PGOV, MOPS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: COURT DECISION APPEARS TO REMOVE BAN
- ON PERSECUTED POLITICAL PARTY, "PRD"
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04290 01 OF 03 120907Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS: REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: A COURT HAS DECLARED ILLEGAL A HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY SEPTEMBER 1997 DECREE WHICH BANNED THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD). IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE DECISION WILL LEAD TO GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION OF THE PRD. PRD ACTIVISTS AND LAWYERS ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE DECISION, SO FAR NOT YET APPEALED BY THE GOVERNMENT, MAY, AT A MINIMUM, LEAD TO AMNESTY FOR REMAINING PRD POLITICAL PRISONERS, INCLUDING PRD LABOR AFFILIATE LEADER DITA SARI AND PRD CHAIRPERSON BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO. RECENTLY RELEASED PRD POLITICAL PRISONERS, CLAIMING THAT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 11 AUG 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY HAD A "PHOBIA" REGARDING THE PRD, NOTED THAT IN ADDITION TO THE PROSECUTION OF ITS LEADERS FOR POLITICAL CRIMES, PRD MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS COMPRISED MANY OF THE RECENT KIDNAP VICTIMS. ONE PRD MEMBER IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN KIDNAPPED AND KILLED. JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI HAS HINTED THAT PRD PRISONERS MAY BE RELEASED IN THE NEXT GROUP OF RELEASEES. THE RECENTLY RELEASED POLITICAL PRISONERS ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE WELFARE OF CRIMINAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL PRISONERS CLAIMING DETERIORATING CONDITIONS WHICH COULD BE HEALTH THREATENING. THEY EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT ELDERLY PRISONERS INCARCERATED BY SOEHARTO IN 1965-1966. THE JUSTICE MINISTER HAS HINTED THAT THEY MIGHT ALSO BE IN THE GROUP OF POLITICAL PRISONERS TO BE RELEASED FOR NATIONAL DAY, AUGUST 17. END SUMMARY

CONFIDENTIAL

THE PRD - MOVING TOWARD RECOGNITION?

---

3 (C) A PANEL OF JUDGES AT THE JAKARTA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT ON AUGUST 10 DECLARED THE SEPTEMBER 1997 HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY DECREE BANNING THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) ILLEGAL. PRD AND GOVERNMENT LAWYERS WERE SURPRISED BY THE DECISION. GOVERNMENT LAWYERS DID NOT IMMEDIATELY APPEAL, BUT HAVE ONE WEEK TO DO SO. THE MEDIA REPORTED AUGUST 12 THAT SYARWAN HAMID, THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS, SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT APPEAL THE DECISION, EXPLAINING THAT HE WOULD "BOW TO THE COURT DECISION." HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRD WOULD STILL HAVE TO CONFORM TO THE NATION'S POLITICAL LAWS (NOW BEING REVISED) IN ORDER TO REGISTER AS A LEGAL PARTY. PRD LAWYERS TOLD POLOFFS ON AUGUST 10 THAT IT WAS NOT APPARENTLY THE CASE THAT THE PRD WAS AUTOMATICALLY LEGALIZED BY THE DECISION BUT THAT IF THE GOVERNMENT CHOSE NOT TO APPEAL THE DECISION, THE CLEAR IMPLICATION WOULD BE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NO LONGER CONTEST PRD'S RIGHT TO EXIST AS A PARTY.

4. (C) THREE PRD CADRE, INCLUDING TWO RELEASED UNDER GOVERNMENT AMNESTY TWO WEEKS AGO, HELD A HEAVILY ATTENDED PRESS CONFERENCE ON AUGUST 11 TO ANNOUNCE THE COURT NEWS AND THE FORMATION OF A COMMITTEE TO PRESS FOR THE PRD'S LEGALIZATION. (NOTE: THE COMMITTEE WAS FORMED IN LATE JULY BUT ONLY ANNOUNCED AUGUST 11. INASMUCH AS THE PRD REJECTS THE CURRENT POLITICAL LAWS, THE PRD WILL LIKELY DELAY RE-REGISTRATION UNTIL NEW LAWS ARE FORMULATED. THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT'S DRAFT

POLITICAL LAWS ARE EXPECTED TO BE SUBMITTED TO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04290 01 OF 03 120907Z
PARLIAMENT NEXT WEEK. END NOTE) AT THE CONFERENCE, THE PRD SENIOR CADRES SAID THEY WOULD FIGHT FOR THE RELEASE OF PRD LEADERS STILL IMPRISONED. THE PRD CADRES ALSO REITERATED THE PRD'S OPPOSITION TO THE EXISTING FIVE POLITICAL LAWS AND TO "DWI FUNGSI" OR DUAL FUNCTION, THE MILITARY DOCTRINE BY WHICH THE ARMED FORCES PLAYS A ROLE IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE COUNTRY. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION, THE PRD CADRES SAID THAT THE PRD WAS ORGANIZED IN 12 PROVINCES AND 21 CITIES. THE PRD CADRE NUMBERS 189 MEMBERS.

BACKGROUND
---

5. THE PRD WAS A PRIMARY FOCUS OF THE SOEHARTO REGIME'S CRACKDOWN ON DISSIDENTS IN 1996 WITH ARRESTS AND SHOW TRIALS EXTENDING INTO 1998 (ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIES ROMO SANDYAWAN'S TRIAL FOR SHELTERING THREE OF THE PRD LEADERS CONCLUDED IN APRIL). NINE PRD LEADERS WERE SENTENCED TO BETWEEN 18 MONTHS AND 13 YEARS IN PRISON FOR "SUBVERSION," WITH PRD CHAIRPERSON BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO RECEIVING THE LONGEST TERM. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT CHARGE THEM WITH ANY VIOLENT OR OTHER COMMON CRIMES. INITIALLY, THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT APPEARED HESITANT ABOUT RELEASING PRD POLITICAL PRISONERS, THOUGH THE RECENT RELEASE OF 50 POLITICAL PRISONERS INCLUDED

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6578

PAGE 01 JAKART 04290 02 OF 03 130048Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	ACQ-01	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	FDIC-01
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/027W				

----------5E8BEA 130056Z /38

R 120708Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3055
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
SECDEF WASHDC
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 004290

DOL FOR ILAB

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04290 02 OF 03 130048Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/08
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, PGOV, MOPS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: COURT DECISION APPEARS TO REMOVE BAN
- ON PERSECUTED POLITICAL PARTY, "PRD"

PRD CADRE WILSON BIN NURTYAS, VICTOR DA COSTA, M. SHOLEH AND COEN HUSSEIN PONTOH (WILSON WAS ONE OF THE PRD SPOKESMAN AT THE AUGUST 11 PRESS CONFERENCE). ALL FOUR ARE MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRD WHICH ACTED AS AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION FOR STUDENT ACTIVISTS, A LABOR UNION, A FARMERS UNION, AN ARTISTS GROUP AND A GROUP REPRESENTING THE URBAN POOR.



B1



[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 JAKART 04290 02 OF 03 130048Z

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4075

PAGE 01 JAKART 04290 03 OF 03 120908Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	ACQ-01	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	FDIC-01
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/027W				

----------5E34F3 120908Z /38

R 120708Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3056
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
SECDEF WASHDC
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 004290

DOL FOR ILAB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/08

TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, PGOV, MOPS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: COURT DECISION APPEARS TO REMOVE BAN
ON PERSECUTED POLITICAL PARTY, "PRD"
CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] RECENTLY, WHEN ASKED BY THE MEDIA ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PRD RELEASES, MINISTER OF JUSTICE MULADI, WHO IN THE PAST IN PUBLIC [redacted] HAD RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY, SAID THAT "THIS WOULD BE CONSIDERED." IN THE AUGUST 12 MEDIA, HE SAID THAT 75 TO 100 PRISONERS WOULD BE RELEASED. B1 B1

11. (C) COMMENT: POST HAS REQUESTED PERMISSION FROM THE JUSTICE MINISTRY TO BE PERMITTED TO VISIT SARI AND SEMBIRING IN THEIR PRISONS.

THE PKI
---

12. (C) [redacted] ALSO UNDERSCORED THE PLIGHT OF ELDERLY POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO HAVE BEEN DETAINED SINCE THE 1965 COUP ATTEMPT. HE NOTED THAT ALL OF THEM ARE EITHER PHYSICALLY OR MENTALLY WEAK AND THAT A NUMBER STILL TECHNICALLY FACE A POSSIBLE DEATH PENALTY. B1

13. (C) MULADI ALSO HINTED TO THE AUGUST 12 MEDIA THAT THOSE TO BE RELEASED FOR NATIONAL DAY COULD INCLUDE SOME AGING PRISONERS INCARCERATED FOR THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE FAILED 1965 COUP WHICH THE SOEHARTO REGIME BLAMED ON THE PKI. MULADI EXPLAINED THAT THE ELDERLY AND GENERALLY ILL PRISONERS MIGHT BE RELEASED FOR "HUMANITARIAN REASONS." [redacted] B1

OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS IN DIRE STRAITS
---

14. [redacted] B1

B1



OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7331

PAGE 01 JAKART 04012 01 OF 05 281101Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------58ED33 281102Z /38

R 281048Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2768
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 004012

BRUSSELS FOR USEU

USCINCPAC FR AMB SALMON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04012 01 OF 05 281101Z
CANBERRA AND MANILA FOR A/S ROTH

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 28 FEB 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL REFORM IN INDONESIA

REF: A) JAKARTA 3759, B) JAKARTA 3596

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON, 1.5 (D).

SUMMARY
---

2. (C) NOTWITHSTANDING DAUNTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES, THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION HAS ESTABLISHED THE MOST OPEN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT THE COUNTRY HAS KNOWN IN MORE THAN THREE DECADES. THE SCOPE OF FREEDOMS IN SOME AREAS, NOTABLY FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, IS UNPRECEDENTED. IN OTHERS, REFORM HAS BEEN EVIDENT BUT HALTING. UNDER MOUNTING PUBLIC PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT BELATEDLY NAMED A HIGHLY CREDIBLE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE MAY RIOTS. PROGRESS IN INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION OF THE TRISAKTI KILLING CASES HAS BEEN SLOW AND THUS FAR NOT BROADLY CREDIBLE, WHILE THE ARMY'S EFFORTS TO UNCOVER THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SPATE OF KIDNAPPINGS AND DISAPPEARANCES EARLIER THIS YEAR APPEAR TO BE MAKING SOME PROGRESS. THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, AFTER A HIATUS OF OVER A MONTH, HAS RESUMED WITH A LIST OF 50 TO BE FREED. A NEW GOVERNMENT DECREE ON DEMONSTRATIONS LIMITS RIGHTS OF FREE ASSEMBLY BEYOND CURRENT PRACTICES. REGULATIONS ALSO HAVE BEEN PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04012 01 OF 05 281101Z

WHICH SEEM TO TARGET STUDENT ACTIVISM. SECURITY FORCES HAVE GENERALLY SHOWN RESTRAINT IN DEALING WITH FAR MORE FREQUENT DEMONSTRATIONS, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS, ESPECIALLY OUTSIDE JAKARTA. A HABIBIE IDEA TO LICENSE JOURNALISTS HAS RAISED CONCERNS.

3. (SBU) WHILE REGIME CRITICS HAVE CONTINUED (RIGHTLY) TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT ON A RANGE OF REFORM ISSUES, THE GOVERNMENT IS PROCEEDING WITH PLANS FOR EARLY ELECTIONS, SEEN BY MANY AS A LITMUS TEST OF ITS

COMMITMENT TO REFORM. MOREOVER, IT HAS PRESENTED AN AUTONOMY PLAN FOR EAST TIMOR THAT EVEN CRITICS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED IS SUBSTANTIVE, THOUGH IT REJECTS ANY POSSIBILITY FOR EAST TIMORESE TO VOTE ON THE PLAN OR THEIR FUTURE.

B1

OFF TO A QUICK START

5. (SBU) PRESIDENT HABIBIE IMPRESSED DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS IN THE FIRST FEW WEEKS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION BY MOVING BOLDLY ON SEVERAL REFORM FRONTS, NOTWITHSTANDING DAUNTING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SOME HABIBIE CRITICS FELL SILENT AS THE NEW PRESIDENT INITIALLY APPEARED TO EXCEED THE VERY LOW EXPECTATIONS SET FOR HIM BY MOST OBSERVERS AS HE PLEDGED TO USHER IN A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF UNPRECEDENTED BREADTH.

6. (SBU) THE SETTING OF A RELATIVELY RAPID ELECTION/TRANSITION SCHEDULE, THE RELEASE OF HIGH PROFILE POLITICAL PRISONERS, ASSURANCES TO THE PRESS THAT IT COULD AND SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS NEWLY WON INDEPENDENCE AND HABIBIE'S PLEDGE TO INITIATE SERIOUS INVESTIGATIONS OF DISAPPEARANCES AND TRISAKTI KILLINGS WERE WELL-RECEIVED.

BUT DOUBTS REMAIN

7. (SBU) IN RECENT WEEKS, HOWEVER, CRITICS HAVE BEGUN TO RE-EMERGE, CLAIMING THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SLOWING OF THE PACE OF REFORM. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THEIR

STRONG CRITICISM, PLAYED PROMINENTLY IN THE MEDIA, IS PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE, IN ITSELF, OF A DECIDEDLY FREER PRESS ENVIRONMENT.

8. (SBU) DOUBT AMONG DOMESTIC CRITICS ABOUT THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7334

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7334

PAGE 01 JAKART 04012 02 OF 05 281102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------58ED39 281102Z /38

R 281048Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2769
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA

USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 004012

BRUSSELS FOR USEU

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CANBERRA AND MANILA FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL REFORM IN INDONESIA

REF: A) JAKARTA 3759, B) JAKARTA 3596

HABIBIE'S COMMITMENT TO POLITICAL REFORM FALLS INTO SEVERAL AREAS:

DOES HABIBIE STILL SEE HIMSELF AS A TRANSITIONAL LEADER?

9. (C) HABIBIE HAS STEPPED BACK FROM HIS EARLIER POSITION THAT HE WAS A TRANSITIONAL LEADER WHO WOULD NOT SEEK REELECTION IN HIS OWN RIGHT AS PRESIDENT. INSTEAD, HE HAS INDICATED THAT HIS POLITICAL FUTURE WILL "DEPEND ON THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE." WE HAVE HEARD FROM HIS CAMP THAT HABIBIE INTENDS TO SEEK THE PRESIDENCY. HABIBIE'S OPPONENTS HAVE PRESSED FOR ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE THEY FEAR HE WILL ATTEMPT TO BUY TIME IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POSITION. THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF A MAY/JUNE 1999 TIME FRAME FOR PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, HOWEVER. WERE THAT TO SLIP, WITHOUT CREDIBLE JUSTIFICATION, MANY WOULD LIKELY CRY "FOUL."

SEEKING JUSTICE FOR PAST WRONGS

10. (SBU) THE GOVERNMENT HAS LOST SOME DOMESTIC AND

FOREIGN CREDIBILITY DUE TO THE MANNER IN WHICH IT HAS

PURSUED TWO MATTERS IN WHICH ELEMENTS OF THE SOEHARTO REGIME ARE GENERALLY ASSUMED TO HAVE BEEN IMPLICATED: THE KILLING OF FOUR TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND CLAIMS THAT THE MAY 13-15 JAKARTA AREA RIOTS WERE TO SOME EXTENT "ENGINEERED," TO INCLUDE WHAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS DESCRIBED AS THE "SYSTEMATIC" RAPE OF SINO-INDONESIANS.

11. (SBU) THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTING TO SCAPEGOAT THE POLICE, AND PROTECT THE ARMED FORCES, IN THE MATTER OF THE TRISAKTI KILLINGS. THE WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION CASE AGAINST TWO POLICE NOW ON TRIAL HAS BEEN EXPOSED BY A WELL-RESPECTED DEFENSE TEAM OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS WHO HAVE POINTED OUT, INTER ALIA, THAT THE POLICE APPEAR TO HAVE USED ONLY RUBBER BULLETS. THE FOUR STUDENTS WERE KILLED BY LIVE AMMUNITION.

12. (SBU) THE GOVERNMENT WAS ALSO SLOW TO INITIATE A FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE MAY 13-15 RIOTS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDINGS OF A NUMBER OF NGOS AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION THAT ORGANIZED ELEMENTS, POSSIBLY WITH CONNECTIONS TO THE SECURITY FORCES, WERE INVOLVED IN THE LOOTING, ARSON AND RAPES THAT TARGETED THE SINO-INDONESIAN COMMUNITIES IN JAKARTA, TANGERANG AND BEKASI. ON JULY 15, PRESIDENT HABIBIE MADE HIS FIRST EXPLICIT STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE VIOLENCE AGAINST SINO-INDONESIANS. ON JULY 23, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF A SENIOR-LEVEL, INTER-AGENCY COMMISSION WHICH, IMPRESSIVELY, INCLUDES KEY NGO HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS ALREADY INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATING THE RIOTS. THE WILLINGNESS OF THESE

FIGURES TO JOIN THE COMMISSION IS A COUP FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN THAT IT AUTOMATICALLY GIVES THE BODY CREDIBILITY. OBSERVERS WILL LOOK CLOSELY AT THE POWERS GIVEN THE COMMISSION AND ITS MANDATE. THE PRESIDENT EARLIER SET UP A SEPARATE COMMISSION TO ASSIST VICTIMS, WITH HABIBIE'S WIFE AS PATRON.

13. (SBU) IN OTHER AREAS, THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT MEMBERS OF KOPASSUS, THE ELITE ARMY SPECIAL FORCES CONTINGENT, ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION IN THE DISAPPEARANCE CASES HAS REDUCED CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ABRI ON THIS SCORE, ALTHOUGH THE FACT THAT 12 ACTIVISTS REMAIN MISSING IS A CONTINUING, SERIOUS CONCERN. THERE IS ALSO PUBLIC DOUBT THAT SENIOR OFFICERS WILL RECEIVE APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT, FUELED IN PART BY WIRANTO'S PUBLIC CONCLUSION THAT LOWER RANKING OFFICERS IN KOPASSUS MAY HAVE MISINTERPRETED THEIR ORDERS.

14. (SBU) THE TRISAKTI KILLINGS AND DISAPPEARANCE CASES HAVE HIGH RESONANCE AMONG REFORM FORCES, THE NATIONAL MEDIA, THE OPPOSITION AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS. THESE MATTERS HAVE A LESSER IMMEDIACY AMONG THE GROWING NUMBER OF INDONESIANS WHO ARE AT OR BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL AND WHO MUST FOCUS ON MORE IMMEDIATE CONCERNS.

NNNNPTQ7333

PAGE 01 JAKART 04012 03 OF 05 281102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------58ED41 281102Z /38

R 281048Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2770
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 004012

BRUSSELS FOR USEU

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CANBERRA AND MANILA FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL REFORM IN INDONESIA

REF: A) JAKARTA 3759, B) JAKARTA 3596

RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

15. (SBU) THE GOVERNMENT RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS SAW A HIATUS FOLLOWING THE EARLY JUNE FREEING OF PROMINENT POLITICAL DISSIDENTS MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN AND SRI BINTANG PAMUNGAS AND THE RELEASE OF A NUMBER OF EAST TIMORESE PRISONERS. ON JULY 24, HOWEVER, JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI ANNOUNCED THAT A FURTHER GROUP OF 50 PRISONERS WOULD BE RELEASED. THE GROUP INCLUDED FOUR MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH LINKS TO THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD), THOUGH NO SENIOR PRD MEMBERS WERE TO BE RELEASED. MEMBERS OF THE PRD AND ITS SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN RULED OUT AS POTENTIAL RELEASEES. THE INCLUSION OF FOUR WITH LINKS TO THE PRD WOULD APPEAR TO VALIDATE MULADI'S EARLIER ASSERTION TO US THAT HE WAS SEEKING TO EXPAND THE CATEGORIES OF PRISONERS ELIGIBLE FOR RELEASE. THE NEW LIST DOES NOT, HOWEVER, INCLUDE ELDERLY AND ILL PRISONERS ALLEGED TO BE MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI). IN JUNE MULADI TOLD CONGRESSMAN CHRISTOPHER SMITH THAT HE WOULD TRY TO INCLUDE SOME OF THEM IN FUTURE RELEASES.

CONFIDENTIAL

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

16. (SBU) THE GOVERNMENT HAS SIGNED A REGULATION IN LIEU OF A LAW ON "FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION" WHICH REGULATES PEACEFUL POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS, ORAL AND WRITTEN DISSENT AND LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS (APPARENTLY NOT TO INCLUDE STRIKES). THE REGULATION WILL REMAIN VALID UNTIL THE PARLIAMENT RATIFIES THE DOCUMENT, WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAS PLEDGED TO SUBMIT SOON. WHILE THE REGULATION (REPORTED IN DETAIL REF A) IS LIKELY TO BE STRONGLY OPPOSED BY NGOS AND SUBJECTED TO MAJOR REVISION IN PARLIAMENT, ITS PROMULGATION SUGGESTS A LOWER LEVEL OF HABIBIE GOVERNMENT TOLERANCE TOWARD POLITICAL DISSENT THAN WAS INITIALLY APPARENT. INTER ALIA, IT REQUIRES A POLICE PERMIT FOR DEMONSTRATIONS OF MORE THAN 50 INDIVIDUALS AND BANS DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, AMONG OTHER POINTS.

PREVIOUSLY, ANYONE PLANNING A DEMONSTRATION HAD ONLY TO INFORM THE POLICE IN ADVANCE. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, THE POLICE HAVE ASSUMED THE POWER TO PERMIT OR BAN SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS UPON BEING NOTIFIED. SINCE THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION TOOK OFFICE, THERE HAVE BEEN DAILY DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE, OFTEN INVOLVING MORE THAN 50 PEOPLE, AND OFTEN ABSENT ANY NOTIFICATION TO THE POLICE.

17. (SBU) PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S RECENT IDEA THAT INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS BE REQUIRED ANNUALLY TO OBTAIN RENEWABLE LICENSES FROM "AUTHORIZED BODIES" IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A "HIGH STANDARD OF PROFESSIONALISM" SMACKS OF

THE KIND OF CONTROL THAT HIS OWN MINISTER OF INFORMATION HAS STRENUOUSLY DISAVOWED. THE PROPOSAL HAS THE FULL BACKING OF THE GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED BOARD OF INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (PWI).

18. (SBU) WHILE THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT SOUGHT TO CRACK DOWN ON CRITICS, THERE HAS BEEN A GROWING CALL, NOTABLY FROM THE MILITARY BUT ALSO FROM PRESIDENT HABIBIE, FOR REGIME CRITICS TO QUIET DOWN. JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED TO BE "PATRIOTIC" AND NOT TO EXCITE THEIR READERS, WHOM THE GOVERNMENT DESCRIBES AS "UNSOPHISTICATED." (THUS FAR, THE MEDIA HAS APPEARED TO IGNORE SUCH CALLS.) THERE ARE ECHOES OF THE SOEHARTO-ERA IN THIS CHASTISING OF THOSE WHO WOULD CRITICIZE THEIR COUNTRY AND THUS DISCOURAGE FOREIGN INVESTMENT OR GIVE GRIST TO ANTI-INDONESIA FOREIGN CRITICS.

19. (SBU) STUDENTS ARE PROTESTING NEW REGULATIONS, STILL IN DRAFT FORM, WHICH WOULD GIVE UNIVERSITY RECTORS SIGNIFICANT NEW POWERS OVER STUDENT ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. THE REGULATIONS MAY REFLECT A PENDULUM SWING BACK TO THE MORE STRINGENT CONTROLS ON STUDENT ACTIVITY COMMON IN THE 1980'S AND MUCH OF THE 1990'S. ON THE OTHER HAND, RECTORS, WHO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7338

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7338

PAGE 01 JAKART 04012 04 OF 05 281102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------58ED49 281102Z /38

R 281048Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2771
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 004012

BRUSSELS FOR USEU

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04012 04 OF 05 281102Z
CANBERRA AND MANILA FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL REFORM IN INDONESIA

REF: A) JAKARTA 3759, B) JAKARTA 3596

THEORETICALLY WOULD BE EMPOWERED TO DEAL WITH STUDENTS, SHOWED THEMSELVES TO BE GENERALLY SYMPATHETIC TO REFORM IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE SOEHARTO RESIGNATION. STUDENTS ARE PRESSING FOR ELIMINATION OF ALL REGULATIONS GOVERNING THEIR POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

USE OF FORCE AGAINST PEACEFUL PROTEST

20. (SBU) SECURITY FORCES GENERALLY HAVE MAINTAINED A RESPONSIBLE POSTURE VIS-A-VIS PROTESTS, ALLOWING NEARLY DAILY DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE CAPITAL AND USING MINIMAL FORCE TO CONTROL SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS. THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT EXCEPTIONS, HOWEVER, ESPECIALLY OUTSIDE OF JAKARTA. THE SHOOTINGS OF MORE THAN 20 PRO-INDEPENDENCE DEMONSTRATORS IN BIAK AND IN JAYAPURA (IRIAN JAYA) AND AT LEAST SEVEN IN EAST TIMOR (WITH DEATHS RESULTING IN BOTH LOCATIONS) SUGGEST THAT A TOUGHER POSTURE STILL OBTAINS IN SOME AREAS. ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO'S JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF FORCE IN IRIAN JAYA, IN PARTICULAR, ARGUING THAT FORCES WERE DEALING WITH "TREASONOUS" ACTS, WAS A REMINDER OF ABRI'S STRONG AVERSION TO SEPARATIST AGITATION. THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN IRIAN JAYA, NOTABLY IN BIAK WHERE THERE APPEARS TO HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

BEEN A NUMBER OF KILLINGS, WERE BY AND LARGE, PEACEFUL, ALBEIT OVERTLY PRO-INDEPENDENCE POLITICAL PROTESTS. ABRI'S REACTION IN IRIAN JAYA CONTRASTED WITH AN APOLOGY BY THE ARMED FORCES COMMANDER IN EAST TIMOR OVER AN UNPROVOKED KILLING RECENTLY. SECURITY FORCE RESPONSE TO LATE JUNE DEMONSTRATIONS BY EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS IN JAKARTA ALSO WAS SEEN BY OBSERVERS AS EXCESSIVE, WITH A NUMBER OF STUDENTS SUFFERING INJURIES.

21. (SBU) SECURITY FORCES HAVE GENERALLY NOT INTERVENED IN THE GROWING NUMBER OF LABOR STRIKES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED RECENTLY. HOWEVER, MILITARY FORCES AND POLICE BLOCKED LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN FROM STAGING DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA IN LATE JUNE. ALSO IN LATE JUNE, MILITARY TROOPS USED RUBBER BULLETS AGAINST DEMONSTRATING WORKERS OUTSIDE JAKARTA, WOUNDING 23.

GOVERNMENT STILL PRO-ACTIVE IN SOME REFORM AREAS

22. (SBU) ANY ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN INDONESIA TODAY MUST ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE RIGHTS ENVIRONMENT UNDER THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION REPRESENTS A SEA CHANGE FROM THE SOEHARTO ERA. THE PRESS, FOR EXAMPLE, IS NOW AS FREE AS ANY IN THE REGION, AND FREER THAN MOST. WHILE SOME IMPROVEMENT WAS EVIDENT BEFORE SOEHARTO'S FALL, THE PRESS HAS BECOME MUCH MORE OPEN SINCE THEN.

23. (SBU) SECURITY FORCES APPEAR TO HAVE QUIETLY SOUGHT TO RIGHT OLD WRONGS IN ACQUIESCING IN THE RETURN OF INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY FACILITIES COUNTRY-WIDE TO

THE MEGAWATI FACTION OF THE PARTY. SIMILARLY, SECURITY FORCES HAVE ALLOWED THE NON-GOVERNMENT BACKED FACTION OF THE BATAK CHRISTIAN CHURCH TO RE-CLAIM FACILITIES FROM THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED FACTION. FIVE YEARS AGO THOSE SAME SECURITY FORCES EITHER ASSISTED THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED FACTION OR STOOD BY AND ALLOWED THE GOVERNMENT-

BACKED FACTION TO ATTACK ITS RIVALS.

24. (SBU) THE ADMINISTRATION IS PREPARING IN A TIMELY MANNER TO SUBMIT ITS PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF THE FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL AND ELECTION LAWS, IN KEEPING WITH PLEDGES TO MOVE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TOWARD EARLY ELECTIONS. IT IS CERTAIN THAT THESE DRAFT LAWS WILL SPARK ENERGETIC DEBATE. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THAT DEBATE IS GIVEN FREE REIN IN THE MEDIA AND THE WILLINGNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT TO DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH PUBLIC INPUT WILL HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REFORM CREDENTIALS AND ON THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION.

25. (SBU) DESPITE PRESSURE ON MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, POSSIBLY ORGANIZED WITH GOVERNMENT CONNIVANCE, NEW LABOR UNIONS ARE BEING ESTABLISHED AND PAKPAHAN'S SBSI HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO OPERATE OPENLY WITHOUT INTERFERENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7339

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7339

PAGE 01 JAKART 04012 05 OF 05 281102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00

T-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-04 G-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 /025W

----------58ED4B 281102Z /38

R 281048Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2772
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 004012

BRUSSELS FOR USEU

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CANBERRA AND MANILA FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL REFORM IN INDONESIA

REF: A) JAKARTA 3759, B) JAKARTA 3596

(OTHER THAN THE SUPPRESSION OF ITS JUNE 25 DEMONSTRATION NOTED ABOVE). THE GOI HAS MOVED TO RATIFY KEY INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS, OR PLEDGED TO DO SO. IT ALSO HAS PLEDGED TO RATIFY KEY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS, ALTHOUGH WITH REGARD TO THE ANTI-TORTURE CONVENTION, THE PARLIAMENT ACTUALLY HAS SEIZED THE INITIATIVE AND HAS PRODUCED ITS OWN RATIFICATION LANGUAGE, A HIGHLY UNUSUAL PARLIAMENTARY INITIATIVE.

EAST TIMOR POLICY

26. (SBU) IN A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT FROM SOEHARTO-ERA POLICY, THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION HAS PRODUCED AN AUTONOMY PROPOSAL FOR EAST TIMOR THAT FAR EXCEEDS THE "SPECAL STATUS" ACCORDED ACEH AND JOGJAKARTA AND ONLY RESERVES THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EXTENERAL DEFENSE, AND FINANCE. THE PROPOSAL ALSO LEAVES OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF BROAD POLITICAL PRISONER RELEASE (INCLUDING THAT OF XANANA GUSMAO), AS WELL AS REDUCTIONS IN THE MILITARY PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SHOWN INFLEXIBILITY REGARDING A KEY DEMAND OF EAST TIMORESE, SUPPORTED BY UNGA RESOLUTIONS, THAT THE EAST TIMORESE SHOULD

EVENTUALLY BE ACCORDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON THE MATTER OF THEIR OWN FUTURE THROUGH A REFERENDUM. ABSENT FLEXIBILITY ON THIS KEY QUESTION, THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL MAY HAVE DIFFICULTY GAINING ACCEPTANCE AMONG EAST TIMORESE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ANNOUNCED REMOVAL OF 1,000 TROOPS FROM EAST TIMOR SET FOR JULY 29 (IT REMAINS UNCLEAR IF THEY WILL BE REPLACED) SHOULD BE SEEN AS A GOI EFFORT TO CREATE A GOOD ATMOSPHERE FOR THE EARLY AUGUST UN-SPONSORED MINISTERIAL TALKS.

CONCLUSION

27. (C) IN SHORT, AFTER A GOOD START THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION IS STILL MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION ON REFORM. EVEN IN AREAS WHERE THE REGIME HAS APPEARED TARDY, SUCH AS IN ACKNOWLEDGING AND INVESTIGATING THE SYSTEMATIC RAPES WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE MAY RIOTS, BY RESPONDING TO PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THE MATTER THE GOI HAS DEMONSTRATED SENSITIVITY TO PUBLIC OPINION. THIS CONTINUING, IF OCCASIONALLY HALTING, PROGRESS IS IMPRESSIVE, GIVEN THE INEVITABLE DIVERTING OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FOCUS BY THE MASSIVE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS THE NATION FACES.

28. (C) AMONG ALL OF THE REFORM AREAS NOTED ABOVE, THE MOST CRITICAL ARE THOSE RELATED TO THE FREEDOM AND

FAIRNESS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. REFORM ADVOCATES WILL BE LOOKING CAREFULLY TO SEE WHETHER PRESIDENT HABIBIE ATTEMPTS TO RETAIN POWER FOR HIMSELF AND GOLKAR THROUGH NEW POLITICAL AND ELECTION LAWS WHICH, AS IN THE PAST, STACK THE DECK IN THE

CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNMENT'S FAVOR. THIS WILL BE A LITMUS TEST OF THE REFORM CREDENTIALS OF THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION.



B1

ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3840

PAGE 01 JAKART 03983 01 OF 02 270911Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------587098 270911Z /38

R 270756Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2738
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003983

BRUSSELS FOR USEU
USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03983 01 OF 02 270911Z
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT'S RELEASE OF 50 POLITICAL PRISONERS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 27 JUL 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

DRAWS MIXED REVIEWS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON, 1.5 (D).

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: THE GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED IT WILL RELEASE ANOTHER 50 POLITICAL PRISONERS, BRINGING OUR COUNT OF PRISONERS RELEASED BY THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION TO 69. THERE HAS BEEN CRITICISM, EVEN FROM SOME OF THOSE RELEASED, OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO RELEASE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. FOUR ON THE RELEASEE LIST HAVE RESISTED RELEASE IN SOLIDARITY WITH THOSE LEFT BEHIND. SOME CRITICS ARGUE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS TREATING THE POLITICAL PRISONERS LIKE HOSTAGES TO BE RELEASED WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IS IN NEED OF GOOD PUBLICITY. THERE IS ALSO CRITICISM THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS SHOWING ITSELF TO BE INDECISIVE AND DIVIDED OVER THE ISSUE OF WHICH PRISONERS SHOULD BE RELEASED. END SUMMARY

MORE POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASED

3. (U) AFTER AN EARLY JULY PLEDGE THAT THE GOI WOULD RELEASE 90 POLITICAL PRISONERS, JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI ANNOUNCED ON JULY 25 THE RELEASE OF 50 POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION BRINGS TO 69 THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASED AND IS THE FIRST RELEASE IN SIX WEEKS. (NOTE: THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS TO HAVE RELEASED 73, ALTHOUGH FOUR WERE DUE FOR RELEASE IN ANY EVENT, LEAVING THE COUNT AT 69. END NOTE) THE

CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNMENT UNOFFICIALLY HAS SAID THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 200 POLITICAL PRISONERS WHEN IT ASSUMED OFFICE ALTHOUGH THE ICRC AND SOME IN THE OPPOSITION BELIEVE THE FIGURE TO BE HIGHER.

4. (U) AMONG THOSE RELEASED WERE FOUR PRISONERS WHO WERE MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED TO THE BANNED PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD). MULADI TOLD CONGRESSMAN CHRISTOPHER SMITH IN EARLY JUNE THAT PRD MEMBERS WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE RELEASE PROGRAM BECAUSE

THE ORGANIZATION WAS OPPOSED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF "PANCASILA," THE STATE IDEOLOGY. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO HAS STATED THAT THOSE CONVICTED OF CRIMINAL ACTS, DISTORTING THE STATE IDEOLOGY OR WHO WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY WOULD NOT BE RELEASED.

5. (U) INCLUDED WERE PRISONERS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION, DEFAMATION OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1996 RIOT IN TASIKMALAYA. MEMBERS OF A STRANGE PARA-MILITARY CULT IN EASTQALSO RELEASED. THE TO-BE-RELEASEQ INCLUDE PRD CHAIRMAN BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO OR EAST TIMORESE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO. THE LIST ALSO EXCLUDED ACTIVISTS INVOLVED IN SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN IRIAN JAYA AND EAST TIMOR.

6. (SBU) A STATEMENT SIGNED BY 16 POLITICAL PRISONERS, INCLUDING XANANA GUSMAO, BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO AND FOUR OTHER PRISONERS WHO WERE ON THE RELEASEE LIST, CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT FOR NOT RELEASING ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE FOUR PRISONERS WHO SIGNED THE

STATEMENT ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD NOT LEAVE PRISON VOLUNTARILY, REJECTING RELEASE UNLESS ALL OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE ALSO FREED. AT 0200 JULY 26, TWO OF THOSE REJECTING RELEASE REPORTEDLY WERE FORCIBLY EVICTED FROM PRISON IN SURABAYA.

REACTION TO THE RELEASE

7. (U) THE JAKARTA POST IN A JULY 27 EDITORIAL WAS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR A PIECEMEAL APPROACH TO THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. IT ASSESSED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS REFLECTING INDECISIVENESS AND DIVISION IN ITS HESITANT APPROACH TO FREEING POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE POST CALLED FOR A RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS OUTRIGHT.

8. (C) ON THE EVENING OF JULY 26, THE EVE OF THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE SACKING OF MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI'S HEADQUARTERS IN JAKARTA BY THUGS AND GOVERNMENT SECURITY

FORCES, PRO-REFORM ACTIVISTS MET IN A COMMEMORATION. THE GATHERING INCLUDED REFORM ACTIVISTS INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATING DISAPPEARANCES, THE JAKARTA MAY RIOTS AND THE KILLING OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE PRISONER RELEASE. THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3843

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3843

PAGE 01 JAKART 03983 02 OF 02 270911Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/024W					

----------5870A0 270911Z /38

R 270756Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2739
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003983

BRUSSELS FOR USEU
USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ELAB, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT'S RELEASE OF 50 POLITICAL PRISONERS - DRAWS MIXED REVIEWS

[redacted] B1

10. (C) COMMENT: NOTWITHSTANDING THE CRITICISM, THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS IS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN THAT THERE IS STILL A REFORM IMPETUS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. RELUCTANCE TO RELEASE SOME PRISONERS, AS THE JAKARTA POST EDITORIAL POINTS OUT, DOES REFLECT A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT OVER WHO SHOULD BE

RELEASED AND POSSIBLY OVER THE PACE OF THOSE RELEASES.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WE EXPECT PRO-REFORM FORCES AND THE MEDIA TO CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT FOR RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ2581

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2581

PAGE 01 JAKART 03900 01 OF 02 220531Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00
	SSAS-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W			

----------56C4A4 220531Z /38

P 220512Z JUL 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2665
ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA// PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003900

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/16
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: KIDNAP VICTIM BELIEVES MORE THAN SPECIAL
- FORCES INVOLVED

REF: JAKARTA 3805 AND PREVIOUS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM MICHAEL P. OWENS: REASON
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03900 01 OF 02 220531Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN A JULY 21 PRESS CONFERENCE, ANDI ARIEF, HEAD OF THE STUDENT WING (SMID) OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) RECOUNTED HIS KIDNAPPING IN LAMPUNG, SUMATRA ON MARCH 28 AND SUBSEQUENT INTERROGATION. AFTER SOME THREE WEEKS IN THE CUSTODY OF UNKNOWN PARTIES, ARIEF WAS TRANSFERRED TO POLICE CUSTODY, AND RELEASED BY THEM ON JULY 15. IN RESPONSE TO A JOURNALIST'S QUESTION, ARIEF SAID HE WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY SOME OF HIS CAPTORS, AND THAT HIS EXPERIENCE SUGGESTED OTHER PORTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES WERE INVOLVED IN HIS ABDUCTION AND INTERROGATION. SAYING HE WAS ACTING ON THE ADVICE OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, AND THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO IMPERIL THE ONGOING INVESTIGATION, ARIEF DECLINED TO PROVIDE NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS OR AGENCIES. HE REITERATED DEMANDS FOR THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OR EITHER THE PERSONS OR THE REMAINS OF TWELVE ACTIVISTS WHO ARE STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR, NOTING THAT THE FAMILIES OF THOSE STILL MISSING PLANNED TO GATHER AT DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ON JULY 22. THE COMMITTEE ON DISAPPEARED PERSONS (KONTRAS) REITERATED ITS DEMANDS THAT THOSE SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL SO FAR ACCUSED OF INVOLVEMENT BE SUBJECT TO COURT MARTIAL RATHER THAN A MILITARY HONOR COUNCIL. THE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN ALSO SAID THAT THOSE VICTIMS NOT YET RELEASED COULD HAVE DIED OR BEEN MUTILATED BY TORTURE. THE LARGE NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS WHO ATTENDED ARIEF'S PRESS CONFERENCE WILL KEEP THE HEAT ON THE GOVERNMENT AND ARMED FORCES TO PRESS ON WITH INVESTIGATIONS OF DISAPPEARANCES AND OTHER INCIDENTS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03900 01 OF 02 220531Z
END SUMMARY.

2. (U) ON JULY, ANDI ARIEF, A HIGH PROFILE POLITICAL ACTIVIST RECENTLY RELEASED BY INDONESIAN POLICE, GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, ORGANIZED BY THE COMMISSION FOR THE DISAPPEARED (KONTRAS). ARIEF, THE HEAD OF THE STUDENT WING (SMID) OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) RECOUNTED HIS KIDNAPPING FROM HIS BROTHER'S SHOP IN LAMPUNG, TRANSFER

BY BOAT TO JAVA, CAPTIVITY FOR NEARLY THREE WEEKS IN JAKARTA ALONG WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, AND EVENTUAL TURNOVER TO INDONESIAN POLICE, WHO HELD HIM FOR NEARLY THREE MONTHS BEFORE HIS RECENT RELEASE.

3. (U) ARIEF MADE AVAILABLE A TRANSCRIPT OF A STATEMENT ON HIS EXPERIENCE TAKEN BY METROPOLITAN JAKARTA POLICE ON JUNE 17TH, APPARENTLY AFTER A DECISION HAD BEEN MADE TO RELEASE HIM AND TO PURSUE INVESTIGATIONS INTO WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS KIDNAPPINGS. THERE ARE SEVERAL ITEMS OF NOTE IN THE STATEMENT. FIRST, IT PROVIDES GENERAL DESCRIPTIONS OF SEVERAL OF HIS KIDNAPPERS, WHOM HE WAS ABLE TO SEE DURING AT LEAST A PORTION OF HIS TRANSPORTATION TO JAKARTA. SECONDLY, THE STATEMENT NOTES THAT HIS KIDNAPPERS APPARENTLY HAD SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY, AND AN APPROPRIATE DOCUMENT, THAT WHEN MILITARY POLICE ARRIVED ON THE SCENE DURING A DISPUTE AT THE FERRY POINT, THEY FOLLOWED INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE KIDNAPPERS. THIRDLY, THE STATEMENT INDICATES HE HAD EARLIER BEEN FORCED BY POLICE TO SIGN FRAUDULENT AND POST-DATED DOCUMENTS AUTHORIZING HIS DETENTION AND

FORMAL ARREST. FINALLY, ARIEF'S STATEMENT INDICATES THAT THE POLICE INTO WHOSE CUSTODY HE WAS RELEASED KNEW NOTHING ABOUT HIS PREVIOUS DETENTION, AND HAD BEEN TOLD HE WAS INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.

4. (U) DURING THE PRESS CONFERENCE, ARIEF SAID HE WAS QUESTIONED INTENSIVELY ABOUT THE IDEOLOGY, TACTICS AND GOALS OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD). HE ADDED THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE QUESTIONS PROBED FOR POSSIBLE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE PRD AND A HOST OF PROMINENT INDONESIAN CRITICS OF THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, AMIEN RAIS, BENNY MOERDANI, NURCHOLIS MADJID, AND FATHER ROMO SANDYAWAN. ARIEF SAID HIS QUESTIONERS WERE ALSO HIGHLY INTERESTED IN, AND ANGRY ABOUT, PRD ADVOCACY OF A REFERENDUM IN EAST TIMOR. HE CONTINUED THAT THE ORGANIZED NATURE OF THE QUESTIONS AND THEIR CLEAR ORIENTATION TO PROBING THE NATURE OF THE THREAT TO THE

SOEHARTO REGIME SUGGESTED THAT MORE THAN THE OPERATION OF ROGUE ELEMENTS IN THE ARMED FORCES WAS AT WORK IN THE KIDNAPPING OF HE AND OTHER POLITICAL ACTIVISTS.

5. (U) ASKED WHO HIS CAPTORS WERE, ARIEF SAID HE WAS "CERTAIN" THAT MORE THAN ONE UNIT OF THE ARMED FORCES

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ2582

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2582

PAGE 01 JAKART 03900 02 OF 02 220531Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00
	SSAS-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W			

----------56C4A9 220531Z /38

P 220512Z JUL 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2666
ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA// PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003900

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/16
TAGS: PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: KIDNAP VICTIM BELIEVES MORE THAN SPECIAL
- FORCES INVOLVED

REF: JAKARTA 3805 AND PREVIOUS

WAS INVOLVED AND THAT OTHER BRANCHES BESIDES THE SPECIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03900 02 OF 02 220531Z
FORCES (KOPASSUS) PLAYED A ROLE. ONE OF HIS INTERROGATORS, HE ADDED, TOLD HIM HE HAD ALSO INTERROGATED OTHER KIDNAPPED POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. ARIEF DECLINED TO MAKE PUBLIC DURING THE PRESS CONFERENCE WHAT OTHER AGENCIES HE BELIEVED WERE INVOLVED, OR TO REVEAL THE INDIVIDUAL IDENTITIES OF ANY OF HIS CAPTORS, SAYING THAT IN DOING SO HE WAS ACTING ON THE ADVICE OF KONTRAS AND THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, GIVEN THE ONGOING STATUS OF INVESTIGATIONS. ARIEF NOTED THAT INVESTIGATIONS OF MILITARY-PERPETRATED KIDNAPPINGS IN OTHER COUNTRIES (E.G. ARGENTINA) HAD EVENTUALLY BROUGHT TO LIGHT EXTENSIVE OFFICIAL RECORDS ON WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND WHO HAD ISSUED THE ORDERS. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS "OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE INVESTIGATIONS, PROVIDED "OUTSIDE FORCES" DO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE WORK OF THE MILITARY POLICE WHO ARE CHARGED WITH THE INVESTIGATION.

6. (U) BOTH KONTRAS AND ARIEF REITERATED THEIR PLEA FOR THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF ANY MISSING ACTIVISTS STILL BEING HELD BY SECURITY FORCES, AND FOR THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF ANY WHO HAVE DIED TO THEIR FAMILIES. KONTRAS SPOKESPERSON MUNIR PRESSED AGAIN FOR COURT MARTIALS, RATHER THAN A MILITARY HONOR BOARD (WHICH CAN ONLY APPLY MORE LIMITED PENALTIES AND WHOSE PROCEEDING ARE NOT PUBLIC,) OF THOSE MILITARY PERSONNEL INVOLVED.

7. (U) MUNIR ALSO SAID THAT KONTRAS HAS REASON TO

BELIEVE AT LEAST TWO OF THOSE STILL MISSING ARE DEAD. HE ADDED THAT KONTRAS BELIEVES THAT SOME OF THOSE STILL MISSING MAY HAVE BEEN MUTILATED DURING TORTURE,

CONFIDENTIAL

PROVIDING ANOTHER REASON THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN RELEASED. HE OBSERVED THAT THE KIDNAPPINGS APPEARED TO BE IN THREE "WAVES:" THE MAY 1997 ELECTION, THE FEBRUARY-MARCH PERIOD AT THE TIME OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY CONVENING AND THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING SOEHARTO RESIGNATION WHEN STUDENT PRESSURE WAS AT ITS HIGHEST. HE ADDED THAT NONE OF THE KIDNAP VICTIMS FROM THE FIRST AND THIRD WAVES HAVE BEEN RELEASED. MUNIR ADDED THAT LUCAS DE COSTA, AN EARLY-1998 KIDNAP VICTIM FROM SURABAYA WHO HAS NOT SPOKEN OUT PUBLICLY AND SEVERAL OTHER KIDNAP VICTIMS FROM BEFORE 1997 HAVE DESCRIBED TO KONTRAS THE FACILITY IN WHICH THEY WERE DETAINED WHICH APPEARS MAY HAVE BEEN THE SAME FACILITY DESCRIBED BY THE MORE RECENT KIDNAP VICTIMS.

[redacted] B1

9. (C) COMMENT: ARIEF'S PRESS CONFERENCE FOR INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS ELICITED A VERY LARGE TURNOUT, AND HIS STATEMENTS THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE KIDNAPPINGS WAS, IN HIS VIEW, NOT LIMITED TO THE SPECIAL FORCES ALONE, WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PROVOKE A NEW ROUND OF INQUIRIES, AND

CONFIDENTIAL

CREATE NEW PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR THE CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS TO PROCEED FURTHER. A SECOND BRIEFING WAS HELD FOR FOREIGN PRESS AND EMBASSIES (SIX EMBASSIES WERE REPRESENTED). ARIEF'S INDICATIONS THAT HE WAS "OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATIONS, ALONG WITH THE APPARENT COUNSEL OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY TO PROVIDE FEW PUBLIC DETAILS WHILE INVESTIGATIONS REMAIN UNDERWAY SUGGEST ACTIVISTS BELIEVE THEY CAN BEST SECURE A MORE THOROUGH INVESTIGATION THROUGH A COMBINATION OF PUBLIC PRESSURE AND QUIET PROVISION OF DETAILED INFORMATION NECESSARY TO PURSUE ACTUAL PROSECUTIONS. ROY

NNNN

PTQ9110

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9110

PAGE 01 JAKART 03805 01 OF 02 160940Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	IMCC-01	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/024W						

----------54D703 160940Z /38

P 160931Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2572
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA// PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003805

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL ARRESTED IN DISAPPEARANCE CASES

REF: JAKARTA 03759 AND PREVIOUS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM MICHAEL P. OWENS; REASON
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03805 01 OF 02 160940Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 16 JUL 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2006 200502501

1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: SEVEN SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL WERE REPORTEDLY ARRESTED JULY 14 ON CHARGES OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPING OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS (REFTELS). INVESTIGATIONS ARE STILL CONTINUING, WITH MORE ARRESTS POSSIBLE. THE JAKARTA POST REPORTS THAT THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT NEWS AGENCY, ANTARA, QUOTED "INFORMED SOURCES" AS INDICATING THAT ONE "GENERAL" WAS AMONG THOSE ARRESTED. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VICE CHAIR MARZUKI DARUSMAN TERMED THE ARRESTS "EXTRAORDINARY" STEPS WHICH PROVED THAT THE ARMED FORCES WERE CAPABLE OF SELF-CORRECTION. SOME OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, HOWEVER, AND THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY CRITICIZED THE JULY 13 ABRI CHARACTERIZATION OF THE KIDNAPPINGS AS "PROCEDURAL ERRORS" AND URGED ADDITIONAL STEPS. A PROMINENT MISSING ACTIVIST, ANDI ARIEF, WAS RELEASED FROM POLICE CUSTODY ON JULY 15, AND IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO HIS HOME IN LAMPUNG. A CIVILIAN OBSERVER OF MILITARY AFFAIRS TOLD POLOFFS ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO HAD REITERATED TO HIM HIS INTENT TO PROCEED WITH UNCOVERING THE EXTENT OF ABRI INVOLVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, ADDING HE BELIEVED WIRANTO UNDERSTOOD THE "NECESSITY" FOR DOING SO. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) ON JULY 14 MILITARY CHIEF OF POLICE MAJOR GENERAL SYAMSU DJALAL ANNOUNCED THAT SEVEN SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND ACCUSED OF INVOLVEMENT IN KIPNAPPINGS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. ARMED FORCES COMMANDER IN CHIEF WIRANTO MET THE SAME DAY WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE, BUT MADE NO COMMENTS TO THE

PRESS AS TO WHETHER THE ARRESTS WERE DISCUSSED.

3. (U) WHILE OFFICIAL ABRI STATEMENTS PROVIDED NO INFORMATION ABOUT THE RANKS OF THOSE ARRESTED, THE JAKARTA POST, REPORTED THAT THE OFFICIAL ANTARA NEWS SERVICE HAD QUOTED "INFORMED SOURCES" AS STATING THAT THOSE ARRESTED INCLUDED ONE CAPTAIN, ONE MAJOR, TWO COLONELS, AND ONE "GENERAL."

4. (C) ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF SUBAGYO EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE SEVEN ARRESTS, BUT CONTINUED HIS EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR "STRONG PROOF" BEFORE ANY FURTHER MEASURES WERE TAKEN AGAINST THE ACCUSED. MILITARY AFFAIRS OBSERVER [redacted] TOLD POLOFFS HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SUBAGYO HAD POLICY DIFFERENCES WITH WIRANTO, EVEN THOUGH SUBAGYO'S STATEMENTS SOMETIMES GAVE THE APPEARANCE OF GREATER RELUCTANCE TO PROCEED WITH INVESTIGATIONS THAN DID THOSE OF WIRANTO. ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT KOPASSUS GENERALS MIGHT HAVE BEEN IMPLICATED, [redacted] SAID USE OF THIS TERM SUGGESTED TWO FIGURES: EITHER GENERAL PRABOWO, WHO COMMANDED THE SPECIAL FORCES UNTIL MARCH 29, OR MAJOR GENERAL MUCHDI PURWOPRANJONO, WHO HELD THE TOP SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND FROM MARCH 29 THROUGH MAY 25. [redacted] ADDED THAT HE HAD REPEATEDLY HEARD COMPLAINTS FROM SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS OF PRABOWO'S "FREE LANCE" ACTIVITIES, AND OF PRABOWO'S REPEATED FAILURE TO KEEP OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS INFORMED OF WHAT HE WAS UP TO.

B6
B6
B6

5. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT BASED ON A NUMBER OF DIRECT CONVERSATIONS WITH WIRANTO, HE BELIEVED WIRANTO INTENDED TO PRESS FORWARD WITH INVESTIGATING AND CARRYING OUT AT

B6

CONFIDENTIAL

LEAST SOME PROSECUTIONS FOR ABUSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO ABRI PERSONNEL. WIRANTO [redacted] WAS AWARE THIS WOULD BE A WRENCHING EXPERIENCE FOR THE ARMED FORCES, BUT BELIEVED HE HAD TO PROCEED "IN ORDER TO RESTORE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ARMED FORCES, MAKE HIMSELF ACCEPTABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS THE LEADER OF INDONESIA'S ARMED FORCES, AND CREATE SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE THAT SECURITY HAD RETURNED TO INDONESIA THAT GOVERNMENT PROSPECTS TO FOSTER ECONOMIC REVIVAL WOULD IMPROVE."

B6

6. (C) THIS ANNOUNCEMENT OF ARRESTS OF SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL ELICITED A RANGE OF COMMENTARY FROM CIVILIAN HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCES. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VICE CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN TERMED THE MOVE AN "EXTRAORDINARY" STEP WHICH DEMONSTRATED THE "CONSOLIDATION" WITHIN ABRI RANKS AND THAT THE INSTITUTION WAS CAPABLE OF SELF-CORRECTION. DARUSMAN

CALLED ON THE POPULATION TO SUPPORT GENERAL WIRANTO'S EFFORTS TO UNCOVER MORE INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED. MARZUKI ADDED THAT THE PRELIMINARY ASSUMPTION MUST BE THAT THE INVOLVEMENT OF PERSONNEL FROM SUCH AN ELITE UNIT AS KOPASSUS COULD NOT BE SEPARATED FROM INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9111

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9111

PAGE 01 JAKART 03805 02 OF 02 160940Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	IMCC-01	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/024W						

----------54D706 160940Z /38

P 160931Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2573
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA// PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003805

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, MOPS, ID
SUBJECT: SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL ARRESTED IN DISAPPEARANCE CASES

REF: JAKARTA 03759 AND PREVIOUS

TO TRACE HOW FAR UP THE CHAIN OF COMMAND THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03805 02 OF 02 160940Z
RESPONSIBILITY RAN SO AS TO PUT TO REST ANY SUSPICIONS IN THE POPULACE THAT A HALF-HEARTED INVESTIGATION WAS BEING UNDERTAKEN. NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBER DR. WIGNOYOSUBROTO REACTED MORE CRITICALLY THAN DID DARUSMAN, TELLING THE PRESS THAT ABRI'S STATEMENT ONLY MADE PUBLIC WHAT WAS ALREADY AN "OPEN SECRET" AND THAT IT WAS URGENT AT THIS POINT TO CLARIFY THE WELFARE AND WHEREABOUTS OF THOSE STILL MISSING. (ANDI ARIEF, HEAD OF "SMID" THE STUDENT WING OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WAS REPORTEDLY RELEASED FROM POLICE CUSTODY ON JULY 15, AND RETURNED IMMEDIATELY TO HIS FAMILY HOME IN LAMPUNG.) WIGNOYOSUBROTO SECONDED THAT PORTION OF MARZUKI'S REMARKS THAT "INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY" COULD NOT BE AVOIDED FOR WHAT HAD HAPPENED.

6. (U) A STATEMENT MADE AVAILABLE TO EMBASSY BY THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY ALSO TOOK ISSUE WITH ABRI'S JULY 13 STATEMENT WHICH PORTRAYED THE KIDNAPPINGS AS "PROCEDURAL ERRORS." THE STATEMENT SAID THE FACILITIES USED AND THE EXTENT OF THE EQUIPMENT INVOLVED TO CARRY OUT THE KIDNAPPINGS AND SUBSEQUENT INTERROGATIONS AND TORTURE WERE BEYOND THE LOGISTICAL ABILITY OF A MERE GROUP OF ROGUE ELEMENTS. RATHER, THE KIDNAPPING COULD ONLY BE VIEWED AS A HIGHLY ORGANIZED ACTIVITY, BENEFITING FROM INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT AND AUTHORIZATION BY HIGHER LEVEL COMMANDERS. THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY STATEMENT ADDED THAT INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WAS THE

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INDONESIAN POLICE, NOT SPECIAL FORCES, AND THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SERIOUSLY INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF HIGH LEVEL

SPECIAL FORCES AND ARMED FORCES COMMANDERS.

7. (C) COMMENT: THE PRESS STATEMENTS TO DATE SUGGEST THAT MORE ARRESTS COULD BE FORTHCOMING, AND THAT THEY MAY NOT BE LIMITED TO SPECIAL FORCES. THERE WAS A RANGE OF CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, WITH FIGURES SUCH AS DARUSMAN NOTING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ARRESTS AND THE APPARENT IMPLICATION OF A GENERAL IN THE DISAPPEARANCES. OTHER CIVILIAN SOURCES, INSTEAD, HONED IN ON A LONG-RUNNING DEBATE HERE AS TO WHETHER THE SERIES OF ARMED FORCES-LINKED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES SHOULD BE VIEWED AS PROCEDURAL ERRORS AND EXCESSES CARRIED OUT BY MISCREANTS OR ROGUE ELEMENTS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES, OR, RATHER, AS INTIMATELY CONNECTED TO AN EXCESSIVELY BROAD AND UNCHECKED CONCEPT OF THE ARMED FORCES' ROLE AND PREROGATIVES IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY. THE PRESS REPORTS THAT A GENERAL HAS BEEN IMPLICATED WILL STRENGTHEN PUBLIC SUSPICIONS THAT THE SPOTLIGHT IS NOW TURNING IN PRABOWO'S DIRECTION. END COMMENT.

[redacted] B1

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6841

PAGE 01 JAKART 03533 01 OF 02 301010Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W

----------4ECCA6 301010Z /38

P 301006Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2361
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003533

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCE CASE CONTINUES TO FESTER

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS USED A JUNE 26 PRESS CONFERENCE TO STEP UP PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT AND ARMED FORCES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03533 01 OF 02 301010Z
TO INVESTIGATE DISAPPEARANCES OF ACTIVISTS WHICH OCCURRED EARLIER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 29 JUN 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

THIS YEAR. NO NEW CASES WERE REPORTED. THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON HOW HARD TO PUSH THE ISSUE FOR FEAR OF UNDERMINING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE BROADER STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL FIELD. THE ICRC HAS BEEN ENCOURAGED BY SOME TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE ISSUE BUT HAS BEEN CAUTIONED REGARDING ITS ROLE BY GOI INTERLOCUTORS. RECENT STATEMENTS BY SENIOR FIGURES FROM THE ARMED FORCES SUGGEST THAT THE HIGH COMMAND IS CLOSE TO AUTHORIZING CHARGES TO BE BROUGHT AGAINST SOME OF ITS PERSONNEL, BUT ALSO THAT THE ISSUE REMAINS A DELICATE ONE WITHIN ABRI, WITH NOT ALL ELEMENTS ON BOARD FOR MOVING FORWARD. END SUMMARY.

TESTIMONY OF A DISAPPEARED
---

3. (U) THE COMMITTEE ON DISAPPEARED PERSONS (KONTRAS) HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE JUNE 26 TO PRESENT PUBLIC TESTIMONY FROM A RECENTLY RELEASED MISSING PERSON (FAIZAL REZA) AT THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY. TDY POLOFF ATTENDED AND HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK PRIVATELY WITH SOME OF THOSE IN ATTENDANCE. REZA SAID HE WAS ABDUCTED AND THROWN INTO A CAR WHERE HE WAS BLINDFOLDED AFTER HE LEFT THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY HEADQUARTERS AND WAS WAITING FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT. REZA SAID HE WAS TAKEN TO A LARGE BUILDING SOMEWHERE IN JAKARTA WHERE HE WAS SUBJECTED TO A VARIETY OF ABUSE AND TORTURE, INCLUDING BEATINGS, APPLICATION OF ELECTRICITY TO VARIOUS PARTS OF HIS BODY, BURNING BY CIGARETTES, AND SLEEP DEPRIVATION. REZA SAID HIS QUESTIONERS FOCUSED ON HIS ROLE IN THE STILL-BANNED PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD), MOST IMPORTANTLY ITS LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CURRENT WHEREABOUTS OF KEY PRD FIGURES. THEY ALSO INQUIRED REPEATEDLY ABOUT HIS EVALUATION OF AND INVOLVEMENT WITH KEY REFORM

LEADERS SUCH AS NAHDLATUL ULAMA'S ABDURRAHMAN WAHID AND MUHAMMADIYAH HEAD AMIEN RAIS.

4. (C) REZA NOTED THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR HIM TO DESCRIBE IN DETAIL HIS EXPERIENCE, AS IT LARGELY PARALLELED THAT ALREADY RECOUNTED BY OTHER RECENTLY-RELEASED ACTIVISTS WHO HAD DISAPPEARED IN THE FIRST FEW MONTHS OF THIS YEAR. REZA ADDED THAT WHILE CONFINED, HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO COMMUNICATE VERBALLY WITH OTHERS BEING HELD IN ADJACENT CELLS, AND BY THAT MEANS ASCERTAIN THAT AT LEAST SOME INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE STILL MISSING WERE AT ONE TIME HELD

AT THE SAME LOCATION AS HE. THE PHOTOS OF NINE PERSONS STILL SAID TO BE MISSING WERE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED AT THE FRONT OF THE TABLE FROM WHERE REZA AND OTHERS SPOKE. REZA AND OTHERS PUT IN A STRONG PLEA FOR VIGOROUS ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT AND ARMED FORCES TO CLARIFY WITHOUT DELAY THE WELFARE AND WHEREABOUTS OF THESE NINE. HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST [redacted] TOLD TDY POLOFF B1
SEPARATELY THAT KONTRAS IS NOT AWARE OF ANY RECENT ABDUCTIONS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, ADDING THAT SUCH ACTIVITY SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN HALTED, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING.

STEPPING UP PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT.
---

5. (C) KONTRAS HEAD MUNIR SHARPLY CRITICIZED WHAT HE SAID WAS GOVERNMENT SLOWNESS IN INVESTIGATING THE DISAPPEARANCE CASES, ADDING THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THOSE INVOLVED TO CONCEAL THEIR ROLE IN THE ABDUCTIONS, AND WOULD ALSO RAISE DOUBTS AMONG THE POPULACE ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT. MUNIR ALSO REJECTED PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S RECENT STATEMENT THAT IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO RESOLVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DISAPPEARANCES, AND THAT SUCH A RESOLUTION WAS LINKED TO ONGOING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

"CONSOLIDATION" WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI). RATHER, MUNIR MAINTAINED THAT THERE WAS NO RELATION BETWEEN THE NEED TO CLARIFY THE WELFARE OF THOSE MISSING, AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN ABRI.

6. (C) IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH TDY POLOFF, HOWEVER, [redacted] B1
TOOK A MORE NUANCED LINE, SAYING THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY AND POLITICAL REFORM COMMUNITY FACED A SERIOUS DILEMMA IN DETERMINING WHAT APPROACH TO TAKE AND HOW HARD TO PUSH THE GOVERNMENT AND ARMED FORCES FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION ON THE DISAPPEARED AND OTHER ISSUES. [redacted] SUGGESTED THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE DID NOT HAVE THE ONLY SAY B1
ON HOW FAST THE GOVERNMENT COULD MOVE ON THE DISAPPEARANCES, THAT OVERALL IMPROVEMENT IN INDONESIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD WAS OBVIOUSLY LINKED TO THE SUCCESS OF EFFORTS TO WEED OUT OF ABRI THOSE WHO GAVE INSUFFICIENT PRIORITY TO THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THAT IF REFORMISTS PUSHED TO HARD AND TOO FAST, IT COULD BACKFIRE.

CURRENTS WITHIN ABRI

(7. C) RESPONDING TO CONTINUING PUBLIC CLAMOR TO RESOLVE THE DISAPPEARANCE CASES, SENIOR ABRI FIGURES HAVE ISSUED TWO STATEMENTS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0287

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0287

PAGE 01 JAKART 03533 02 OF 02 010807Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W

----------4F4302 010807Z /38

P 301006Z JUN 98 ZDK CTG RUEHCB 0711 1811943
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2362
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003533

USCINCPAC FOR AMB SALMON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCE CASE CONTINUES TO FESTER

IN THE LAST WEEK, SUGGESTING EITHER DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH, OR AN EVOLUTION IN THE STATUS OF ABRI'S OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE ABDUCTIONS. SPEAKING IN BANDUNG ON JUNE 26 AT THE ARMY COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE (SESKOAD) ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL SUBAGYO TOLD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A GROUP OF HIGH-RANKING GENERALS, INCLUDING LTG PRABOWO, THAT HE WAS AWARE OF CLAIMS THAT AN ELEMENT OF THE ARMY HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE ABDUCTIONS BUT THAT STRONG EVIDENCE OF SUCH INVOLVEMENT WAS NEEDED BEFORE ADVANCING FURTHER, SO THAT ABRI WAS NOT SLANDERED. SUBAGYO DOWNPLAYED THE NEED FOR AN INVESTIGATION AT THIS POINT, WARNING AGAINST ATTEMPTS TO SOW SUSPICION WITHIN THE RANKS OF ABRI AND THE INDONESIAN NATION. HE ADDED THAT IF STRONG PROOF WERE PRESENTED, THE ABRI LEADERSHIP WOULD CERTAINLY TAKE THE APPROPRIATE MEASURES.

8. (U) BY JUNE 29, HOWEVER, SUBAGYO'S APPROACH WAS SUPERSEDED BY A STATEMENT FROM ABRI COMMANDER WIRANTO INDICATING THAT "ABRI HAS IDENTIFIED SEVERAL OF ITS PERSONNEL WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN THE KIDNAPPING OF ACTIVISTS AND WHO EXCEEDED THEIR AUTHORITY." WITHOUT NAMING NAMES OR UNITS, WIRANTO REVEALED THAT ABRI IS COOPERATING WITH THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE DISAPPEARANCES. WIRANTO ALSO CLAIMED ABRI WAS WORKING WITH KONTRAS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE, AND THAT ITS INVESTIGATORS HAVE VISITED SITES ALLEGED TO HAVE HELD THE DISAPPEARED DURING THEIR QUESTIONING AND ABUSE.



B1



COMMENT
---

10. (C) THE REPORTED ABSENCE OF NEW CASES OF DISAPPEARANCE IS ENCOURAGING. HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT AND ARMED FORCES TO CLARIFY THE DISAPPEARANCE CASES QUICKLY AND HOLD APPROPRIATE PARTIES ACCOUNTABLE, AND THEIR EFFORTS APPEAR TO BE ACHIEVING SOME RESULTS. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE APPEARS TO BE A RANGE OF OPINION ON HOW HARD TO PUSH THE ISSUE FOR FEAR OF PRODUCING A BACKLASH WHICH COULD COMPLICATE EFFORTS TO SECURE BROAD REFORMS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL ARENAS. THE BACK-TO-BACK STATEMENTS BY GENERALS SUBAGYO AND WIRANTO SUGGEST THAT ABRI IS CLOSE TO GOING PUBLIC, OR AUTHORIZING OTHERS TO GO PUBLIC, WITH DETAILED CHARGES THAT SOME ABRI UNITS WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED. AT THE SAME TIME, THE STATEMENT OF GENERAL SUBAGYO, A FIGURE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED IN THE PUBLIC MIND WITH GENERAL PRABOWO, SUGGESTS THAT THERE MAY NOT YET BE CONSENSUS WITH ABRI ITSELF ON HOW TO PROCEED, AND THAT THE ISSUE IS OF SUFFICIENT SENSITIVITY THAT WIRANTO WILL HAVE TO PROCEED CAREFULLY. SOME SENIOR MILITARY OFFICE HAVE ALSO CITED THE NEED TO REMOVE CERTAIN KEY COMMANDERS (SUCH AS RECENTLY REMOVE JAKARTA MILILTARY DISTRICT COMMANDER --PANGDAM JAYA MAJOR -- GENERAL SJAFRIE SJAMSOEDDIN) BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH A THOROUGH ARMY INVESTIGATION. IN ADDITION, SENIOR MEMBERS OF ABRI MAY ALSO BE CONCERNED THAT THEY GATHER HARD PROOF OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER. THE TRI SAKTI TRIALS HAVE MADE MANIFEST THE DANGER OF PROCEEDING, FOR WHATEVER REASON, PRIOR TO HAVING FIRM EVIDENCE IN HAND.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9636

PAGE 01 JAKART 03156 01 OF 02 080434Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W		

------------------466925 080434Z /38

R 080427Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1997
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003156

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH [redacted] B6

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03156 01 OF 02 080434Z
2. (C) SUMMARY: [redacted] SUPPORTS B6

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

STUDENT CALLS FOR AN EARLY MPR SESSION TO REPLACE HABIBIE AND HIS CABINET. [redacted] ARGUES THAT THE MPR SHOULD CHOOSE A PRESIDIUM AND PARED DOWN PARLIAMENT TO PRESS FOR REFORMS. ALTERNATIVELY, HE ALSO HAS RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A REFERENDUM IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN THE WISHES OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE. HE SEES THE HABIBIE CABINET AS NOT UP TO THE CHALLENGES IT FACES, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH IS TO KEEP FOOD AVAILABLE AND AT PRICES LOW ENOUGH SO THE POOR CAN AFFORD TO EAT. [redacted] BELIEVES THE GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO RELEASE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. HE IDENTIFIES "CATEGORIES" OF PRISONERS TO BE RELEASED, AS DOES THE GOVERNMENT, BUT CASTS HIS NET FAR BROADER TO INCLUDE MANY THE GOVERNMENT SAYS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FOR RELEASE. [redacted] SAID THAT HE AND OTHERS WILL BEGIN PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS ON JUNE 8 CALLING FOR INVESTIGATIONS INTO ABRI'S HOSTILE ENGAGEMENTS WITH CIVILIANS WHICH RESULTED IN MANY CIVILIANS KILLED IN RECENT YEARS. THEY WILL PRESS FOR RELEASE OF DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS AND FOR RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIONS ABOUT THOSE DISAPPEARANCES. [redacted] WILL ALSO PUSH FOR AN END TO ABRI'S DUAL FUNCTION WHICH ACCORDS IT A ROLE IN THE SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SPHERES. END SUMMARY

B6
B6
B6
B6

3. (U) POLCOUNS MET WITH [redacted] JUNE

B6

5. [redacted]

B6

IDEAS FOR POLITICAL REFORM

CONFIDENTIAL

4. (C) [redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS THAT SINCE HIS RELEASE HE HAD BEEN BUSY MEETING WITH STUDENTS, MOST RECENTLY IN JOGJAKARTA AND SURABAYA. HE SAID HE FOUND STUDENTS NOT READY TO CONCLUDE THEIR "MORAL CAMPAIGN" TO REFORM INDONESIAN POLITICS AND THE ECONOMY. HE STRONGLY SHARED WHAT HE CLAIMED WAS THE MAJORITY STUDENT VIEW THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE WAS AN EXTENSION OF THE SOEHARTO REGIME AND WOULD HAVE TO BE REMOVED. THE OPTIMAL METHOD TO ACHIEVE THIS WOULD BE TO CONVENE A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, HE SAID. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE MPR WAS

B6

IN FACT COMPOSED OF MEMBERS WHO WERE EITHER NOMINATED BY OR SCREENED BY SOEHARTO, HE BELIEVED THAT POPULAR PRESSURE ON THE PARLIAMENT AND RESIGNATION OF SOME OF THE MEMBERS, COULD LEAD TO A REFORM-ORIENTED RESULT.

5. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE MPR SESSION SHOULD PUT IN PLACE AN EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A FIVE OR SIX-MEMBER PRESIDIUM WHICH WOULD DISCHARGE EXECUTIVE POWERS AND A 50-MEMBER PARLIAMENT WHICH COULD WORK QUICKLY TO REPLACE SOEHARTO-ERA LAWS, PARTICULARLY POLITICAL LAWS. HE BELIEVED THAT NO OFFICIALS WITH TIES TO THE SOEHARTO CABINETS SHOULD BE INCLUDED EITHER IN THE PRESIDIUM LEADERSHIP OR IN THE CABINET NAMED TO ENFORCE THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT'S STRONG REFORM AGENDA. HE SUGGESTED THAT WHILE KEY POLITICAL FIGURES LIKE MEGAWATI AND AMIEN RAIS MIGHT WISH TO APPOINT REPRESENTATIVES TO THE PRESIDIUM, THEY IDEALLY WOULD NOT THEMSELVES SIT ON THE PRESIDIUM. RATHER, THEY SHOULD BE PREPARING FOR THE NEXT ELECTION. B6

6. (C) [redacted] SAW THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT AS SHORT-LIVED. THE CABINET HAD LESS PROFESSIONAL DEPTH THAN EVEN CABINETS UNDER SOEHARTO. THE FOCUS ON POLITICAL COMPETITION WITHIN THE CABINET B6

CONFIDENTIAL

WAS OBSCURING THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL NEED AND THAT WAS TO ENSURE ADEQUATE AVAILABILITY AND MODERATE PRICING OF BASIC FOOD ITEMS. BEYOND THIS MOST ESSENTIAL TASK, PROBLEMS OF UNEMPLOYMENT, MEDICAL SHORTAGES, THE BANKING-FINANCIAL CRISIS, RECAPITALIZATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS AND INCREASING EXPORTS WERE CRITICAL TASKS. [redacted] BELIEVED THAT HABIBIE AND HIS CABINET WERE NOT UP TO THESE CHALLENGES. B6

7. (C) [redacted] ALSO RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF RELYING ON A REFERENDUM IN THE NEAR TERM WHICH WOULD INVITE THE PUBLIC TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN FUTURE, INCLUDING HOW THEIR NEXT PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE DETERMINED. THE REFERENDUM SHOULD BE PREPARED "TRANSPARENTLY" WITH PARTICIPATION OF RESPECTED PUBLIC FIGURES AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. B6

POLITICAL PRISONERS

---

8. (C) [redacted] URGED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER "INFLUENTIAL FOREIGN FRIENDS" APPLY PRESSURE ON THE GOI TO RELEASE B6

POLITICAL PRISONERS. HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO PRESS THE GOVERNMENT TO RELEASE PRISONERS IN THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES:

-- PRISONERS INCARCERATED FOR ENGAGING IN ARMED CONFLICT WITH ABRI. THESE WOULD INCLUDE "INDEPENDENCE FIGHTERS" FROM IRIAN JAYA, EAST TIMOR AND ACEH. HE WOULD INCLUDE THOSE IMPRISONED FROM 1989

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9637

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9637

PAGE 01 JAKART 03156 02 OF 02 080434Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W				

----------466927 080434Z /38

R 080427Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1998
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003156

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS

CLASHES WITH ABRI IN LAMPUNG. HE ALSO URGED THAT EAST TIMORESE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO BE RELEASED.

CONFIDENTIAL

-- PRISONERS INCARCERATED FOR THEIR POLITICAL THOUGHT, NOTABLY THE MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD).

-- HE ALSO URGED THAT FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, THE PRISONERS ACCUSED OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI), NOW IN THEIR SEVENTIES AND EIGHTIES, BE RELEASED. [redacted] SAID THAT ON THE DAY OF HIS RELEASE HE HAD SPOKEN WITH FORMER COLONEL LATIF WHO SAID HE HAD SERVED AS SOEHARTO'S COURIER IN 1965. HE SAID HE KNEW THAT SOEHARTO HAD ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE COUP ATTEMPT BY ABRI MEMBERS BECAUSE, LATIF SAID, "I TOLD HIM OF THIS MYSELF." [redacted] SAID THAT ONE REASON THAT SOEHARTO HAD REFUSED RELEASE TO THESE MEN WAS BECAUSE HE FEARED "WHAT THEY KNEW ABOUT HIM (SOEHARTO) AND HIS ROLE IN THE COUP." B6 B6

-- FINALLY, [redacted] URGED THAT THOSE INDONESIANS WHO HAVE LIVED IN SELF-IMPOSED OR FORCED EXILE SHOULD BE GIVEN GUARANTEES OF THEIR SAFETY IF THEY RETURN. B6

JUSTICE
---

9. (C) [redacted] ALSO CALLED FOR TRANSPARENT INVESTIGATIONS INTO ABRI AND POLICE ACTIONS AGAINST OPPONENTS IN INSTANCES OF MAJOR BLOOD LETTING, INCLUDING THE 1991 DILI MASSACRE, THE 1984 TANJUNG PRIOK (NORTH JAKARTA) KILLING OF ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS, AND THE KILLING OF ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS IN LAMPUNG. B6

10. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE DEMONSTRATIONS JUNE 8 AT THE SUPREME COURT, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE TO PRESS FOR OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS INTO THESE B6

"MASSACRES." THE DEMONSTRATORS WILL ALSO DEMAND ACTION ON THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASE OF DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS (STILL 6 OR 7 MISSING) AND AN ACCOUNT OF WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR KIDNAPPING AND TORTURING THE HANDFUL WHO HAVE BEEN RELEASED. THE DEMONSTRATION WILL INCLUDE CALLS FOR ABRI TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR ITS KILLING OF CIVILIANS AND WILL ARGUE AGAINST CONTINUATION OF "DWI FUNGSI," THE RUBRIC UNDER WHICH ABRI RETAINS A ROLE IN THE POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS OF THE COUNTRY.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6127

PAGE 01 JAKART 03143 01 OF 02 051216Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W		

----------45CC9D 051216Z /38

O 051210Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1981
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0802
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003143

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
BEIJING FOR A/S ROTH PARTY
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03143 01 OF 02 051216Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 5 SITUATION REPORT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: SMALL GROUPS OF DEMONSTRATORS BLOCKED ACCESS TO THE EMBASSY FOR SEVERAL HOURS JUNE 4 AND AGAIN ON JUNE 5. THE EMBASSY HAS REQUESTED THAT THE GOI FULFILL ITS HOST NATION RESPONSIBILITIES TO ENSURE THAT DEMONSTRATORS NOT INTERFERE WITH NORMAL EMBASSY (OR CONSULATE SURABAYA) OPERATIONS. PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAS CALLED ON UNIVERSITY OFFICIALS TO DAMPEN CAMPUS POLITICAL PROTESTS, MANY OF WHICH HAVE TARGETED HIS GOVERNMENT. A THIRD DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM HAS COME FORWARD TO DETAIL HIS KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE. HE TESTIFIED PUBLICLY THAT HE SAW A NUMBER OF OTHER ACTIVISTS WHO REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR. HE SAID HE WAS HELD AT THE SAME LOCATION WHERE OTHER ACTIVISTS WERE INCARCERATED WHICH HE BELIEVES WAS A MILITARY FACILITY. SEVERAL THOUSAND EAST TIMORESE PROTESTED JUNE 6 IN DILI, CALLING FOR THE OUSTER OF TRANSMIGRANTS AND INDEPENDENCE. SEVERAL HUNDRED IRIANESE, MEANWHILE, OCCUPIED THE IRIAN JAYA PARLIAMENT IN JAYAPURA DEMANDING AN END TO MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH CENTRAL HIGHLANDS WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAVE LED TO DEATH AND DESTRUCTION IN MANY VILLAGES. IN ACEH, ACTIVISTS AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS ARE CALLING FOR AN END TO MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST SEPARATISTS AND AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REPORTED DEATHS OF MANY ACEHNESE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS. END SUMMARY

SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATIONS:

3. (U) A SMALL DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING PERCEIVED U.S INTERFERENCE IN INDONESIAN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING U.S. FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO INDONESIAN NGOS, BLOCKED THE EMBASSY COMPOUND GATE FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS ON JUNE 5. POLOFFS SPOKE BRIEFLY WITH A SPOKESMAN AND ACCEPTED A LIST OF DEMANDS. AMCONSULATE SURABAYA ALSO EXPERIENCED A DEMONSTRATION THAT CAUSED EMBASSY OPERATIONS TO CEASE FOR A TIME. (SEE SEPTEL)

4. (U) ON JUNE 4, A PEACEFUL 45 MINUTE ANTI-NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATION CONSISTING OF ABOUT 50 PEOPLE WAS HELD OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY AT NOON. DEMONSTRATORS CAME, BY BUS, FROM DEMONSTRATING IN FRONT OF THE INDIAN AND THE PAKISTAN EMBASSIES. IN ADDITION TO PRESSING INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION THEMES, THE DEMONSTRATORS ALSO ADDRESSED THEMSELVES TO DOMESTIC CONCERNS DEMANDING THAT INDONESIA STOP BUILDING A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (BEING BUILT IN EAST JAVA), WITHDRAW THE NUCLEAR LAW WHICH "SMELLS OF COLLUSION," AND DEMAND THAT THE HABIBIE REGIME, WHICH HAS AN AMBITIOUS NUCLEAR PROGRAM, STEP DOWN. THE STATEMENT WAS SIGNED BY 28 GROUPS, INCLUDING A NUMBER OF LOCAL UNIVERSITY ENVIRONMENT ORGANIZATIONS, WALHI, JAKARTA LEGAL AID INSTITUTE (LBH), AND THE PEOPLE'S ANTI-NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION OF INDONESIA. AMCONSULATE SURABAYA ALSO EXPERIENCED A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH THE U.S. FLAG WAS TAKEN. (SEE SEPTEL)

5. (U) THERE WERE UNCONFIRMED MEDIA ACCOUNTS OF RIOTING AND LOOTING IN INDRAMAYU, A SMALL WEST JAVA CITY APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS EAST OF JAKARTA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS

PRESIDENT CALLS ON UNIVERSITY RECTORS TO DAMPEN STUDENT PROTESTS AGAINST HIS GOVERNMENT

---

6. (U) PRESIDENT HABIBIE TOLD UNIVERSITY RECTORS TO DAMPEN DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST HIM ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES. THE MEDIA CITED HIM AS STATING: "I AM CALLING ON THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND THE DIRECTOR OF TERTIARY EDUCATION NOT TO ALLOW CAMPUSES TO BE TURNED INTO POLITICAL ARENAS." THE PRESIDENTIAL CALL CAME AMIDST CONTINUING LOW-LEVEL PROTESTS IN JAKARTA, SURABAYA, PURWOKERTO (CENTRAL JAVA), MEDAN AND JOGJAKARTA. MANY OF THESE DEMONSTRATIONS ADDRESSED LOCAL CORRUPTION ISSUES.

NEW DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM SPEAKS OUT ON HIS KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE:

7. (U) DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM RAHARDJO WALUYO DJATI IS THE THIRD DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM TO OFFER A PUBLIC RECOUNTING OF HIS KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE. THE ACTIVIST, A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE (KNPD) SPOKE BEFORE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6268

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6268

PAGE 01 JAKART 03143 02 OF 02 051251Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W		

----------45D0E6 051251Z /38

O 051210Z JUN 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1982
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0803

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003143

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
BEIJING FOR A/S ROTH PARTY
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ELAB, CASC, ASEC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: JUNE 5 SITUATION REPORT

JOURNALISTS, ACTIVISTS AND INTEL AGENTS AT THE JAKARTA LEGAL AID OFFICE. HE SAID HE AND A FRIEND, FAIZOL REZA, HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED ON MARCH 12 AFTER THEY WERE CHASED INTO A JAKARTA HOSPITAL. RAHARDJO SAID HE WAS BEATEN AND TORTURED BY ELECTRIC SHOCK. AT ONE POINT HE SAID HE WAS FORCED TO LIE ON A BLOCK OF ICE FOR TEN MINUTES. QUESTIONING FOCUSED ON FUNDING FOR HIS ORGANIZATION AND WHETHER PROMINENT SINO-INDONESIAN SOFIYAN WANANDI OR FORMER MILITARY FIGURE BENNY MURDANI HAD BEEN A SOURCE OF FUNDS. HE WAS ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE WHEREABOUTS OF ANDI ARIEF, ANOTHER ACTIVIST WHO WAS LATER KIDNAPPED. HE STATED THAT AT ONE POINT HIS CAPTORS ATTEMPTED TO PERSUADE RAHARDJO SINO-INDONESIANS WERE TO BLAME FOR INDONESIA'S PROBLEMS, WITH SUGGESTIONS THAT HE AND HIS FRIENDS BURN SINO INDONESIAN-OWNED STORES.

8. (U) RAHARDJO CLAIMED THAT HE WAS HELD IN THE SAME FACILITY AS PIUS LUSTRILANANG AND DESMON MAHESA, OTHER ACTIVISTS WHO HAVE GIVEN PUBLIC TESTIMONY OF THEIR KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE. LIKE THE OTHER TWO, HE TESTIFIED THAT HE SAW OTHER ACTIVISTS AT THE FACILITY WHO ARE STILL MISSING. THESE INCLUDED: SONNY, BIMO PETRUS, SUYAT, YANI AVRI, LUKAS AND DEDDY HAMDUN. RAHARDJO WAS RELEASED APRIL 25 AND FACES NO CHARGES.

9. (C) [redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS JUNE 5 THAT THERE WILL BE A DEMONSTRATION AT THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE JUNE 8 PROTESTING, INTER ALIA, THE

B6

KIDNAPPED IN RECENT MONTHS. IT WILL ALSO ADDRESS MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ACHE, IRIAN JAYA, AND EAST TIMOR. THE PROTEST WILL ALSO DEMAND INVESTIGATION OF SECURITY FORCE CLASHES WITH LOCAL PEOPLE IN LAMPUNG IN 1989 AND IN TANJUNG PRIOK IN 1984 WHICH REPORTEDLY LEFT HUNDREDS DEAD.

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO PROBE REPORTED ACEH "MASS KILLINGS"

10. (U) THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WILL BEGIN INVESTIGATING REPORTS OF THOUSANDS OF DEATHS IN MILITARY CAMPAIGNS AGAINST SEPARATISTS IN ACEH IN THE 1989-91 PERIOD, AND SINCE. A COMMISSION SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE COMMISSION WOULD ASK ABRI TO PULL OUT ALL TROOPS DEPLOYED TO OPPOSE THE SEPARATIST INSURGENCY AS WELL AS TO LIFT THE "MILITARY OPERATION REGION" STATUS OF THE PROVINCE. ACEH STUDENTS, WHO APPEALED TO THE COMMISSION, PRESENTED WIDOWS WHO DESCRIBED WHAT THEY CLAIMED WERE THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLINGS OF THEIR HUSBANDS.

11. (U) SEPARATELY, MUSLIM LEADERS IN ACEH PROVINCE, REPRESENTING 420 ISLAMIC BOARDING SCHOOLS IN THE PROVINCE, SIGNED A LETTER TO PRESIDENT HABIBIE CALLING FOR ABRI TO END ITS SEARCH MISSIONS FOR SEPARATIST REBELS BECAUSE, THE LEADERS CLAIM, THE SITUATION IS NOW STABLE. THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE GROUP ALSO CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO RELEASE ACEHNESE PRISONERS JAILED FOR THEIR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN SEPARATIST ACTIVITY.

IRIAN JAYA PROTEST

12. (U) ACCORDING TO A REPORT FROM JAYAPURA 300 DEMONSTRATORS

HAVE OCCUPIED THE IRIAN JAYA PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT. THEY ARE DEMANDING THAT THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SEND A TEAM TO INVESTIGATE REPORTED MILITARY KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS AND DESTRUCTION OF CHURCHES AND HOMES IN THE SOUTH CENTRAL HIGHLANDS. THE DEMONSTRATORS ARE ALSO DEMANDING THAT THE MILITARY CEASE ITS OPERATIONS IN THE AREA AND END BANS ON TRAVEL TO AND WITHIN THE REGION.

13. (C) IN RECENT DAYS THERE HAS BEEN AN UPSURGE OF ACTIVITY AMONG IRIANESE WITH A FOCUS ON CALLS FOR GREATER OR FULL INDEPENDENCE FOR THE PROVINCE. PROMINENT IRIANESE WILL MEET JUNE 6 IN JAKARTA TO ADDRESS CONTINUING ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE IN IRIAN JAYA, AND TO DISCUSS CALLS FOR INDEPENDENCE. THEY WILL ALSO REPORTEDLY ADDRESS LARGE-SCALE ECONOMIC PROJECTS WHICH FOCUS ON EXPLOITATION OF IRIAN JAYA'S NATURAL RESOURCES.

EAST TIMOR
---

14. (SBU) REPORTS PASSED FROM DILI CLAIM THAT SEVERAL THOUSAND STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED MUCH OF THE DAY IN DILI DEMANDING THE EXPULSION OF TRANSMIGRANTS AND CALLING FOR EAST TIMOR'S INDEPENDENCE. THERE WERE NO REPORTED INCIDENTS BETWEEN DEMONSTRATORS AND SECURITY FORCES. MORE DEMONSTRATIONS ARE EXPECTED TOMORROW, JUNE 6.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9678

PAGE 01 JAKART 02591 01 OF 02 080429Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W		

----------3BED54 082051Z /38
R 070954Z MAY 98 ZDK CTG RUEHSD 0187W 1280223
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1425
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002591

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/16
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: JAILED POLITICAL PRISONERS UNCERTAIN ABOUT FUTURE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02591 01 OF 02 080429Z
REF: A) JAKARTA 1399, B) JAKARTA 1893

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: EMBOFFS MET IN PRISON MAY 7 WITH TWO DETAINED ACTIVISTS, ONE JUST RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL. THE TWO POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, DETAINED FOR PEACEFUL POLITICAL DISSENT ON MARCH 10, FACE POSSIBLE PROLONGATION OF THEIR DETENTION (WITHOUT TRIAL) OR POSSIBLE RELEASE MAY 9. ONE WHO WAS HOSPITALIZED FOR NINE DAYS COMPLAINS THAT A DOCTOR'S LETTER TO THE GOVERNMENT RECOMMENDING SHE BE RELEASED TO HOUSE ARREST FOR MEDICAL REASONS HAS BEEN IGNORED. THESE ACTIVISTS HAVE HEARD INFORMALLY FROM POLICE OFFICIALS THAT THEIR CASE IS NOW IN THE HANDS OF THE MILITARY REGIONAL COMMANDER, NO LONGER WITH THE POLICE. END SUMMARY

BACKGROUND
---

3. (U) POLCOUNS AND POLOFF ON MAY 7 MADE A PRISON VISIT TO RATNA SARUMPAET AND GING GINANJAR, TWO OF SIX POLITICAL ACTIVISTS WHO WERE DETAINED MARCH 10 ON CHARGES OF HAVING CONDUCTED AN ILLEGAL POLITICAL MEETING (ARTICLE 5, OF LAW 5 1963), REF A. SARUMPAET IS ALSO FACING CHARGES FOR "INSULTING THE PRESIDENT" (ARTICLE 154). SARUMPAET HAD GATHERED ABOUT 80 OTHER ACTIVISTS AT A SEASIDE PAVILION IN NORTH JAKARTA ON MARCH 10 FOR A "PEOPLE'S CONGRESS" WHICH IN FACT NEVER GOT UNDERWAY BECAUSE THE HOTEL WHICH OWNED THE PROPERTY, ASKED THEM

TO DESIST IN THE WAKE OF A POLICE REFUSAL OF PERMISSION FOR THE GATHERING. AFTER HAVING ANNOUNCED THE FACT THAT THE MEETING COULD NOT GO FORWARD, SINGING THE NATIONAL ANTHEM AND PRAYING, SARUMPAET AND HER ASSOCIATES SOUGHT TO LEAVE BUT WERE DETAINED. APPEALS AGAINST THEIR DETENTION, BASED ON DELAYED ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS AND TESTIMONY THAT NO MEETING IN FACT CONVENED, WERE REJECTED IN A COURT DECISION WHICH AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS REPRESENTATIVE WHO ATTENDED FOUND UNFAIR.

UPDATE
---

4. (U) SARUMPAET AND GING APPEARED IN GOOD SPIRITS ALTHOUGH SARUMPAET HAD JUST BEEN RELEASED FROM NINE DAYS HOSPITALIZATION FOR SPINAL AND BACK PROBLEMS WHICH DOCTORS SAID HAD BEEN AGGRAVATED BY THE CONDITIONS OF HER DETENTION. HER DOCTORS HAD SENT A LETTER TO THE GOVERNMENT RECOMMENDING THAT SHE BE PLACED UNDER HOUSE ARREST AND ALLOWED TO RECUPERATE AT HOME. THIS COMMUNICATION HAS GONE UNANSWERED, SHE AND GINANJAR SAID. OTHER LETTERS FROM SARUMPAET'S FAMILY AND THEIR LAWYER (PBHI'S HENDARDI) TO THE PROSECUTOR IN THE CASE ALSO HAVE GONE UNANSWERED, SHE SAID. GINANJAR SAID THAT HE AND THEIR FOUR ASSOCIATES WERE IN GOOD HEALTH. (POLOFF WILL OBTAIN A COPY OF THE LETTER MAY 8.)

5. (U) GINANJAR SAID THAT PRIOR TO THE FAILURE OF THEIR APPEALS, ALL OF THE SIX IN THE GROUP EXCEPT SARUMPAET HAD BEEN OFFERED HOUSE ARREST IF THEY WOULD SIGN

STATEMENTS THAT THEY WOULD NOT CHALLENGE ANY EVIDENCE DEVELOPED AGAINST THEM, AND AGREE NOT TO ENGAGE IN "SUCH CRIMES" AGAIN. ALL OF THE FIVE TO WHOM THE OFFERS WERE MADE REJECTED THEM, REFUSING TO ACKNOWLEDGE ANY GUILT ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR PEACEFUL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.



B1

7. (U) THEY NOTED THAT AFTER ONE EXTENSION OF THEIR DETENTION WITHOUT FORMAL CHARGES BEING BROUGHT, TECHNICALLY MAY 9 IS THE LAST DAY THAT THE SIX CAN BE HELD WITHOUT FORMAL CHARGES. BOTH WERE HOPEFUL THAT THE GROUP MIGHT SIMPLY BE RELEASED. SARUMPAET, HERSELF, WAS NOT HOPEFUL THAT HER DIFFICULTIES MIGHT END SO SIMPLY. SHE NOTED THAT IN A CONVERSATION WITH RELEASED

DISAPPEARANCE VICTIM PIUS LUSTRILANANG ON APRIL 27 (AS PIUS WAS ON THE WAY TO THE AIRPORT AFTER HIS PRESS CONFERENCE DESCRIBING HIS DETENTION AND TORTURE), PIUS TOLD HER THAT MUCH OF HIS INTERROGATION FOCUSSED ON HIS INVOLVEMENT IN "SIAGA," THE PRO-MEGAWATI AND AMIEN RAIS ORGANIZATION SARUMPAET HEADED. SHE SAID SHE FEARED THAT HER CASE WOULD BE A "NATIONAL CASE."

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ3637

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3637

PAGE 01 JAKART 02579 01 OF 02 070636Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W				

----------3B1EC9 070636Z /38

P 070636Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1417
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002579

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/02
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: WHO IS BEHIND RECENT DISAPPEARANCES?

REF: A) JAKARTA 2406, B) JAKARTA 2473, C) JAKARTA 1881

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02579 01 OF 02 070636Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 7 MAY 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200502501

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: [redacted] B1 THAT THE FACILITY USED TO DETAIN "DISAPPEARED" ACTIVISTS COULD BE A SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) FACILITY SOUTH OF JAKARTA. A STUDENT SOURCE HAS SAID THAT A KOPASSUS UNIT AND ITS FORMER COMMANDER, LT GEN PRABOWO, ARE INVOLVED. [redacted] NOTED THAT THE BODY IS PRESSING FOR A MULTI-AGENCY INVESTIGATION OF THE DISAPPEARANCES, B1 AND NOT ONE RUN BY THE MILITARY AS THAT WOULD LACK CREDIBILITY. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT GENERAL WIRANTO COULD BE DAMAGED POLITICALLY IF HE WERE TO LEAD SUCH AN INVESTIGATION. END SUMMARY

WHERE WERE ACTIVISTS DISAPPEARED TO?

[redacted] B1 BELIEVES THE FACILITY DESCRIBED BY RECENT DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS AS THE LOCATION WHERE THEY WERE DETAINED (REFTELS) IS A MILITARY FACILITY LOCATED BETWEEN JAKARTA AND BOGOR.

4. (C) SPECIFICALLY, [redacted] BELIEVES THE FACILITY IS THE OLD "KOPASSUS TEAM 81 ANTI-TERRORIST UNIT" FACILITY LOCATED OFF THE OLD ROAD TO BOGOR. [redacted] SAID THAT BOTH PIUS LUSTRILANANG'S B1

PUBLIC TESTIMONY AND TESTIMONY GIVEN CONFIDENTIALLY TO THE COMMISSION BY DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS "POINTED STRONGLY" TO THE TEAM 81 FACILITY AS THE LOCATION OF THE DETENTIONS AND TORTURE. IN PASSING, [redacted] MENTIONED THAT VICTIMS REPORTED HAVING HEARD MILITARY BUGLE CALLS, B1 AND THAT GEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTIONS LED THE COMMISSION TO SUSPECT THE "TEAM 81 SITE."

WHO IS BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES?

5. (C) SEPARATELY, A LEADER OF A MASS STUDENT ORGANIZATION TOLD POLOFF THAT HE WAS INFORMED BY A KOPASSUS SOURCE THAT THE DISAPPEARANCES WERE CARRIED OUT BY "GROUP FOUR" OF KOPASSUS, UNDER THE COMMAND OF "CHAIRAWAN." HE SAID THAT HIS SOURCE (NOT PART OF GROUP FOUR) SAID THERE ARE CONFLICTS AMONG KOPASSUS DIVISIONS, AND THAT GROUP 4 IS STILL UNDER THE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF PRABOWO. DISAPPEARANCES WERE ORDERED BY PRABOWO, WHO WAS FOLLOWING AN ORDER FROM PRESIDENT SOEHARTO.

[redacted] B1

HOW TO INVESTIGATE THE DISAPPEARANCES:

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] B1

[redacted] HAD URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO SET UP A "DISAPPEARANCE INVESTIGATION COMMISSION" ALONG THE LINES OF THE COMMISSION SET UP TO INVESTIGATE THE DILI MASSACRE IN 1991. ACCORDING TO [redacted] AN EXCLUSIVELY ABRI COMMISSION WOULD HAVE NO B1

CREDIBILITY. THE COMMISSION ENVISAGED [redacted] B1
WOULD INVOLVE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE MINISTRIES OF
JUSTICE, HOME AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SUPREME
COURT, THE DPR AND THE MILITARY. [redacted] SAID THAT B1
FORCES WITHIN ABRI OPPOSED TO WIRANTO (HE NAMED
LIEUTENANT GENERAL PRABOWO) WOULD USE THE INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3638

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3638

PAGE 01 JAKART 02579 02 OF 02 070636Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/023W					

----------3B1ECB 070636Z /38

P 070636Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1418
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002579

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/02
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: WHO IS BEHIND RECENT DISAPPEARANCES?

REF: A) JAKARTA 2406, B) JAKARTA 2473, C) JAKARTA 1881

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AGAINST WIRANTO. IF IT PRODUCED A LESS THAN CREDIBLE SOLUTION, WIRANTO WOULD LOSE FACE. IF HE PROBED TOO DEEPLY, HE MIGHT ANGER THE PRESIDENT. "OUR SOLUTION IS BEST FOR HIM AND FOR THE COUNTRY," CONCLUDED [redacted] ARMED FORCES COMMANDER IN CHIEF WIRANTO HAS STATED PUBLICLY HIS INTENT TO FORM AN ALL MILITARY INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION. B1

9. (C) COMMENT: [redacted] OBSERVATION IS ALREADY CIRCULATING IN THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MEDIA COMMUNITY THOUGH IT HAS NOT BEEN PRINTED IN ANY MEDIA THAT WE HAVE SEEN. PUBLIC SPECULATION ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE WILL PUT ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO GET ON WITH ITS PROMISED INVESTIGATION. SUCH PUBLIC SPECULATION AND A SERIOUS INVESTIGATION, SHOULD ONE BE LAUNCHED, WILL HAVE UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR THOSE STILL DETAINED. B1

[redacted] B1

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8204

PAGE 01 JAKART 02386 01 OF 02 270703Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/022W					

------------------376FBF 270704Z /38
P 270702Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1252
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002386

NOFORN

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/06
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: DEALING WITH DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS;
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02386 01 OF 02 270703Z
REASON 1.5(D)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 27 APR 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200502501

2. (C) SUMMARY: AN UMBRELLA TEAM OF NGOS HAS FORMED TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF DISAPPEARANCES. ONE OF ITS FOUNDERS HAD TOLD POLOFF THAT IT ALREADY HAS RECEIVED ANONYMOUS THREATS. IT HAS OFFERED TO WORK WITH THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ON THE MATTER OF DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS. [redacted] B1

THE POLICE ARE ATTRACTING CRITICISM FOR THEIR HANDLING OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ANDI ARIEF, WHO RECENTLY WAS DISCOVERED TO BE IN POLICE CUSTODY AFTER WEEKS OF POLICE DENIAL THAT THEY HAD INFORMATION ON THE CASE. AN APPARENTLY BACK-DATED WARRANT FOR HIS ARREST, DATED TO THE DAY OF HIS ABDUCTION, HAS APPEARED. END SUMMARY

ORGANIZING TO DEAL WITH DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS
---

3. (U) THE RECENT SPATE OF DISAPPEARANCES HAS LED TO THE FORMATION OF THE "TEAM OF VOLUNTEERS FOR HUMANITY," AN UMBRELLA GROUP OF NGOS SEEKING TO REPRESENT RELATIVES OF MISSING PRO-DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS. IT INCLUDES PROMINENT PRO-REFORM ACTIVISTS ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (GUS DUR), CATHOLIC PRIEST ROMO SANDYAWAN, AND ASTRONOMER

KARLINA LEKSONO, AMONG OTHERS. THIRTY MEMBERS OF THE GROUP MET WITH THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION APRIL 24 TO PRESENT A REPORT ON WHAT IT CLAIMED WAS THE DISAPPEARANCE OF 33 INDIVIDUALS. THE TEAM HAS OFFERED TO ASSIST THE COMMISSION BY JOINING IT IN THE SEARCH FOR MISSING ACTIVISTS AND STUDENTS.

[redacted] B1



B1

PUBLIC REACTION TO THE DISAPPEARANCES HEATS UP

6. (U) MARZUKI DARUSMAN, VICE CHAIR OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WAS REPORTED IN THE MEDIA APRIL 25 AS HAVING CONCLUDED THAT "IT ISN'T TOO DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE MILITARY APPARATUS IS LINKED TO THE ACTIVISTS DISAPPEARANCE." [redacted] IN AN APRIL 25 MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR, REFERRED TO THE DISAPPEARANCES, SAYING "THIS IS THE WORK OF THE MILITARY; THAT IS CLEAR." [redacted] TOLD THE EMBASSY THAT HE BELIEVED PRESIDENTIAL SON-IN-LAW MAJOR GENERAL PRABOWO WAS BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES. [redacted] A MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION, MET WITH POLOFFS APRIL 24 AND STRESSED WHAT HE SAID WAS THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC TESTIMONY BY

B6

B6

B6

DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS ABOUT THEIR ORDEALS AS A WAY OF ENDING THE ABDUCTIONS. HE INTENDS TO ATTEMPT TO INTERVIEW ONE OF THE VICTIMS, PIUS LISTRULANANG. HE TOO SAW THE MILITARY AS INVOLVED IN THE DISAPPEARANCES.

7. (U) MEANWHILE, ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION AND MUNIR,

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8205

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8205

PAGE 01 JAKART 02386 02 OF 02 270704Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/022W					

----------376FC2 270704Z /38

P 270702Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1253
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002386

NOFORN

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/06
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: DEALING WITH DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS

SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE LEGAL AID FOUNDATION, ASSERTED
CONFIDENTIAL

TO THE MEDIA APRIL 24 THAT ANDI ARIEF, WHO RECENTLY WAS DISCOVERED TO BE IN POLICE CUSTODY, WAS HELD INCOMMUNICADO FROM APRIL 17 TO 24 AT THE JAKARTA POLICE HEADQUARTERS. MUNIR TOLD THE PRESS THAT ARIEF SAID HE HAD BEEN BADLY BEATEN BEFORE BEING TURNED OVER TO THE POLICE ON APRIL 17. MUNIR ADDED THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ARIEF'S RETURN, "CLEARLY SHOWS THAT THERE IS COLLABORATION BETWEEN TWO SEPARATE INSTITUTIONS, WHEREBY THE POLICE RECEIVED ARIEF FROM UNKNOWN PEOPLE AFTER HE WAS BEATEN UP SOMEPLACE ELSE."

8. (U) CONFUSION WAS ALSO GENERATED BY THE APRIL 23 RECEIPT BY ARIEF'S FAMILY OF A WARRANT FOR ARIEF'S ARREST WHICH WAS DATED MARCH 29, THE DAY AFTER HE WAS SEIZED. SENIOR POLICE AND MILITARY OFFICIALS HAD REPEATEDLY DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF HIS WHEREABOUTS AND THE POLICE IN LAMPUNG WHERE HE WAS ABDUCTED HAD EVEN ISSUED A MISSING PERSON REPORT ON HIM. IN AN APPARENT FURTHER CONTRADICTION, NATIONAL POLICE SPOKESPERSON BRIG. GEN DA'I BACHTIAR WHO HAD HIMSELF CLAIMED FOR WEEKS NO MILITARY OR POLICE KNOWLEDGE OF ARIEF, SAID ON APRIL 24 THAT ARIEF HAD BEEN "ARRESTED" ON MARCH 28 AND OFFICIALLY DETAINED ON MARCH 29.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8870

PAGE 01 JAKART 02228 01 OF 05 171202Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/024W					

----------3475D9 172053Z /38

R 171108Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1101
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 235
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIOS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 002228

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/16

TAGS: PHUM, EAID, EFIN, PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: STAFFDELS VISIT WITH PRO-REFORM ACTIVISTS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02228 01 OF 05 171202Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2006 200502501

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: MEMBERS OF TWO STAFFDELS CALLED ON AN SENIOR FIGURES WITHIN THE OPPOSITION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT ON APRIL 13. COMMON THEMES THAT EMERGED INCLUDED A CONSENSUS THAT THE IMF PACKAGE GAVE SOEHARTO SHORT-TERM POLITICAL SUPPORT BUT COULD SPELL HIS UNDOING IN THE END WHETHER HE IMPLEMENTED IT OR NOT. MANY URGED THAT ASSISTANCE BE RENDERED THROUGH NON-GOVERNMENT CHANNELS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. REFORM ADVOCATES ARE ORGANIZING A WATCH DOG COMMITTEE TO MONITOR IMF PLAN IMPLEMENTATION. THEY ARGUED THAT POLITICAL REFORM MUST ACCOMPANY ECONOMIC REFORM. LUNCHEON INTERLOCUTORS NOTED SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 1965 AND 1998. THERE WAS BROAD CONCERN ABOUT DISAPEARANCES, WHICH MEGAWATI DESCRIBED AS ONE TIER IN A FOUR-TIER STRATEGY OF INTIMIDATION. MANY INTERLOCUTORS BELIEVED MAJOR GENERAL PRABOWO TO BE BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES. MOST SAW THE NEW CABINET AS DEEPLY FLAWED AND ASSESSED THAT HABIBIE, A "BIRD IN A GOLDEN CAGE," HAD LITTLE POWER IN THE GOVERNMENT. PRESIDENTIAL DAUGHTER TUTUT WAS MUCH STRONGER AND MIGHT BE BEING GROOMED AS SOEHARTO'S ULTIMATE SUCCESSOR. STUDENTS WERE GIVEN CREDIT FOR MAINTAINING A HIGH LEVEL OF ACTIVITY BUT SOME QUESTIONED THEIR LONG-TERM RESOLVE. MEGAWATI URGED THE UNITED STATES TO AVOID ANY ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE INDONESIA'S NEXT LEADER. END SUMMARY

3. (SBU) SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAFFER ROBIN CLEVELAND AND SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE STAFFER

FRANK JANNUZI ON APRIL 13 MET WITH PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURES IN JAKARTA. THE MEETINGS, WITH THE MAIN POINTS SUMMARIZED BELOW, INCLUDED:

-- LUNCH WITH FORMER TEMPO EDITOR GUNAWAN MOHAMMAD, HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER FRANS WINARDI, ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE UNRECOGNIZED LABOR UNION TOHAP SIMANUNGKULIT AND ANUNG KARYADI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION "WALHI."

-- CALL ON FORMER MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT FRANS SEDA AND SINO-INDONESIAN OBSERVER JOSEPH HALIM.

-- CALL ON ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, LEADER OF THE ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION NAHDLATUL ULAMA.

-- DINNER WITH MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI, GOVERNMNET-OUSTED LEADER OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND PARTY TREASURER AND ECONOMIST LAKSAMANA SUKARDI.

PART I (LUNCHEON DISCUSSIONS)

4. (C) [redacted] OBSERVED THAT THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 1965 AND THE CURRENT PERIOD. IN 1998, THERE ARE NO MASS ORGANIZATIONS, NO IDEOLOGY AND NO APOCALYPTIC VISION OF THE FUTURE IN WHICH PEOPLE WERE CONFRONTED WITH BASIC SURVIVAL ISSUES AS IN 1965. IN INDONESIA TODAY, NO ONE IS MAKING EXTRAVAGANT PROMISES THAT WILL TRANSFORM PEOPLE'S LIVES. [redacted] ADDED THAT, AS IN 1965, THERE IS NO RULE OF LAW IN INDONESIA IN 1998. B1 B1

CONFIDENTIAL

5. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT WHILE THERE WERE NO ALL-EMBRACING IDEOLOGICAL BATTLES IN TODAY'S INDONESIA, THERE IS BROAD ANGER OVER THE PROPORTION OF PROPERTY AND WEALTH OWNED BY SINO-INDONESIANS (70 PERCENT) AS COMPARED TO THE SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION THEY REPRESENT (3 PERCENT). HE ALSO NOTED THAT WHEREAS THE 1965 INDONESIAN POPULATION WAS "PARANOID" ABOUT POLITICAL SECURITY, THE 1998 INDONESIAN POPULATION WAS PARANOID ABOUT ECONOMIC SECURITY. B1

6. (C) [redacted] ADDED THAT LABOR PROBLEMS ARE GROWING, WITH MANY ALREADY WITHOUT WORK AND THEIR NUMBERS LIKELY TO INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE NEXT 60 DAYS. AS IN THE PAST, "FAMILY SOLIDARITY" HAD DONE MUCH TO CUSHION THOSE HARDEST HIT BY THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. HOWEVER, AS WORKERS HAD LITTLE OR NO SAVINGS, THAT CUSHION WAS VERY THIN AND FOR MOST, ALREADY EXHAUSTED. B1

7. (C) HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS WERE DESCRIBED AS GROWING ON A VARIETY OF FRONTS, NOTABLY TO INCLUDE DISAPPEARANCES, ARRESTS OF PEOPLE DEMONSTRATING PEACEFULLY FOR POLITICAL REFORM AND A STRONG MILITARY RESPONSE TO STUDENTS WHO TRIED TO MOVE THEIR RALLIES OFF CAMPUS.

8. (C) [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8944

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8944

PAGE 01 JAKART 02228 02 OF 05 172106Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	PRME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W				

----------3477AF 172106Z /69

R 171108Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1102
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/16
TAGS: PHUM, EAID, EFIN, PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: STAFFDELS VISIT WITH PRO-REFORM ACTIVISTS

BELIEVED STRATEGIC ARMED FORCES COMMANDER GENERAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PRABOWO WAS BEHIND THE RECENT INCREASE IN DISAPPEARANCES. [redacted] SAID THAT HE IS PART OF AN NGO EFFORT TO FORM AN ORGANIZATION WHICH WILL MONITOR THE FATE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND THE DISAPPEARED, PROVIDING FOOD AND LEGAL COUNSEL. B1

9. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT HARYANTO TASLAM, DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PDI-MEGAWATI FACTION, HAD MET WITH HIM AND WITH STUDENT LEADERS THE DAY HARYANTO DISAPPEARED. HE STATED THAT HARYANTO'S DISAPPEARANCE CAME ONLY 30 MINUTES AFTER THEY CONCLUDED THEIR MEETING. (AS REPORTED SEPTEL, HARYANTO SURFACED APRIL 17.) B1

THE ROLE OF U.S. AND MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE
---

10. (C) THE INDONESIAN GUESTS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT WHILE INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE WAS ESSENTIAL TO IMPROVE INDONESIA'S VERY DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION, BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM WERE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO REFORM THE SYSTEM. THERE WAS CONSENSUS THAT INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AT THIS TIME WOULD INEVITABLY IMPROVE PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S POLITICAL LONGEVITY. THE INDONESIANS URGED STRONGLY THAT THOUGHT BE GIVEN TO HOW ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, WOULD BE CHANNELED. [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

11. (C) [redacted] HAD BEGUN MEETING WITH A NUMBER OF KEY NGO'S, INCLUDING THOSE PRESENT AND THE MASS ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS MUHAMMADYAH AND NAHDLATUL ULAMA AND MEGAWATI'S PDI FACTION. THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO DEVELOP A MECHANISM TO CHANNEL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THESE MEETINGS ARE TAKING PLACE AT SENIOR LEVELS AND ARE CONTINUING. B1

12. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT HE WAS WORKING WITH A NUMBER OF GROUPS TO SET UP A NETWORK WHICH WOULD MONITOR THE GOI'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IMF AGREEMENT. LIKENING THE ORGANIZATION TO THE "INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMISSION" (KIPP) [redacted] HE WELCOMED THE POSSIBILITY OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO THE EFFORT. B1 B1

POLITICAL OBSERVATIONS

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

14. (C) [redacted] B1

(NOTE: MANY GOVERNMENT CRITICS BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT, FOR ITS OWN PURPOSES, PERIODICALLY HAS SOUGHT TO STIR UP LIMITED UNREST, IN THIS INSTANCE TO CAUSE THE IMF AND DONORS TO RELENT IN THEIR INSISTENCE THAT SOME SUBSIDIES SHOULD BE LIFTED IN APRIL AS CALLED FOR IN THE JANUARY 15 AGREEMENT. THE FACT THAT SUCH A PERSPECTIVE WOULD HAVE ATTAINED SIGNIFICANT CURRENCY IS A MEASURE OF THE CYNICISM AMONG GOVERNMENT CRITICS. END NOTE)

15. (C) [redacted] FOCUSSED ON CURRENT STUDENT ACTIVISM. HE BELIEVED THAT STUDENT EXPECTATIONS WERE TOO HIGH AND WERE NOT FOCUSSED ON AN AGENDA OR AROUND A LEADER. HE ALSO QUESTIONED STUDENT RESOLVE. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF SCHOOL TUITION WERE LOWERED? WOULD THIS END STUDENT POLITICAL ACTIVISM? LABOR WILL NOT JOIN STUDENTS ON CAMPUS. ONLY WHEN STUDENTS MOVE INTO THE STREETS COULD THEY JOIN THEM. BUT THE MILITARY HAS WARNED STUDENTS NOT TO DO THIS. THIS, HE SAID, SUGGESTED A SOEHARTO STRATEGY TO DIVIDE AND CONQUER BY KEEPING LABOR AND STUDENTS APART -- A STRATEGY WHICH IS WORKING. B1

NNNNPTQ6941

PAGE 01 JAKART 02228 03 OF 05 171109Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/024W					

----------343282 171109Z /38

R 171108Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1103
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 002228

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/16
TAGS: PHUM, EAID, EFIN, PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: STAFFDELS VISIT WITH PRO-REFORM ACTIVISTS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02228 03 OF 05 171109Z
PART II (CALL ON FRANS SEDA AND JOSEPH HALIM)

16. (C) FRANS SEDA AND JOSEPH HALIM PROVIDED THE STAFFDEL REPS WITH THEIR PERSPECTIVE ON RECENT AND CURRENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

B1

PART III (INTERVIEW WITH ABDURRAHMAN WAHID)

19. (C) WAHID (AKA GUS DUR), WHO IS RECUPERATING FROM A STROKE, MET WITH THE STAFFDEL REPS FOR 40 MINUTES AT HIS HOME IN SOUTH JAKARTA. THE RELIGIOUS LEADER MOVED WITH ASSISTANCE BUT OTHERWISE SEEMED TO BE RECOVERING WELL

FROM HIS NEAR FATAL STROKE IN JANUARY.

20. (C) GUS DUR APPEARED TO RELISH DISCUSSING CURRENT POLITICS.

[redacted]

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6942

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6942

PAGE 01 JAKART 02228 04 OF 05 171109Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------343287 171110Z /38

R 171108Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1104
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 002228

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/16
TAGS: PHUM, EAID, EFIN, PGOV, PINR, ID

SUBJECT: STAFFDELS VISIT WITH PRO-REFORM ACTIVISTS

B1

26. (C) WITH REGARDS TO STUDENTS, GUS DUR ARGUED THAT WERE STUDENTS TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF THEIR VOICES THEY WOULD BE HEARD BETTER. HE ADVOCATED THAT STUDENTS CEASE PRESENTING THEIR VIEWS THROUGH POLITICAL CHANNELS AND BEGIN TO USE CULTURAL CHANNELS. STUDENTS WILL GATHER TO PRAY AND READ POEMS IN JOGJAKARTA AT A RALLY ON APRIL 18 IN WHAT HE FELT WAS A MORE APPROPRIATE WAY FOR THE STUDENTS TO COMMUNICATE THEIR VIEWS.

CONFIDENTIAL

27. (C) GUS DUR EMPHASIZED THAT HE SUPPORTED THE STUDENTS, "BUT NOT THOSE WHO SEEK TO INTIMIDATE." HE WARNED THAT THERE WERE GROUPS WHICH WERE FINANCING STUDENT ACTIVITIES AND WHO WERE "PLAYING WITH THE STUDENTS."



B1

PART IV (INTERVIEW WITH MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND LAKSAMANA SUKARDI)

29. (C) MEGAWATI AND LAKSAMANA MET STAFFDEL REPS AT DINNER ON APRIL 13. SPEAKING ANIMATEDLY IN ENGLISH, MEGAWATI CAUTIONED THE STAFFDEL REPS ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES TO AVOID A SITUATION WHERE IT WOULD, IN HER WORDS, "AGAIN" SEEK TO INFLUENCE THE CHOICE OF A NATIONAL LEADER FOR INDONESIA (ALLUDING TO THE DOWNFALL OF HER FATHER). SHE NOTED THAT SUCH A STEP WOULD DAMAGE

RELATIONS BETWEEN INDONESIA AND THE UNITED STATES FOR A LONG TIME.

30. (C) MEGAWATI WELCOMED EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE INCLUDING THE IMF PACKAGE AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR

INDONESIA, THOUGH CLAIMING THAT THE ASSISTANCE AMOUNTED TO POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR SOEHARTO. SHE URGED THAT THE ASSISTANCE BE MONITORED CAREFULLY TO ENSURE IT WAS NOT DIVERTED TO PERSONAL USE AND TO PREVENT ITS USE FOR POLITICAL ENDS. SHE THOUGHT THAT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE MIGHT BEST BE CHANNELED THROUGH LOCAL, NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, LAKSAMANA NOTED THAT MEGAWATI'S PDI, THE ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS NAHDLATUL ULAMA AND MUHAMMADYAH AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF NGOS, HAD BEGUN HOLDING MEETINGS TO DISCUSS SETTING UP NON-GOVERNMENT CHANNELS FOR DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM ABROAD AND TO PROCEED WITH ARRANGEMENTS FOR A POST-SUHARTO ERA.



B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6943

CONFIDENTIAL PTO4717

PAGE 01 JAKART 02228 05 OF 05 171109Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00

NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00
P-00 CIO-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 T-00
USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-04 G-00 NFAT-00
SAS-00 /024W

----------343288 171110Z /38

R 171108Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1105
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 002228

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/16
TAGS: PHUM, EAID, EFIN, PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: STAFFDELS VISIT WITH PRO-REFORM ACTIVISTS

[redacted] B1

34. (U) STAFFDEL MEMBERS CLEVELAND AND JANNUZI CLEARED THIS MESSAGE BEFORE TRANSMISSION.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

E11

PTQ6862

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6862

PAGE 01 JAKART 02227 01 OF 03 171102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W		

----------343216 171102Z /38

P 171101Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1098
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002227

NOFORN

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH
CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON DISAPPEARANCES: SENIOR POLITICAL FIGURE REAPPEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02227 01 OF 03 171102Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 16 APR 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2006 200502501

REF: JAKARTA 2019

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS. REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MEGAWATI FACTION OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS REAPPEARED AFTER BEING MISSING FOR 39 DAYS. HE REPORTEDLY IS UNWILLING TO TALK ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCE. MEANWHILE, THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY NOW LISTS 12 ACTIVISTS AND STUDENTS AS MISSING FOR AT LEAST TWO WEEKS; OTHERS HAVE BEEN REPORTED MISSING MORE RECENTLY. ON THE OTHER HAND 59 STUDENTS LISTED AS MISSING TWO WEEKS OR MORE AFTER DEMONSTRATIONS IN SURABAYA, YOGYAKARTA, AND LAMPUNG HAVE RESURFACED. ONE OF THE TWO ACTIVISTS RELEASED APRIL 3 HAS PROVIDED LIMITED INFORMATION ON HIS KIDNAPPING, DETENTION, AND RELEASE. THE OTHER HAS NOT BEEN WILLING TO TALK ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCE, REPORTEDLY DUE TO THREATS. THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY AND THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CONTINUE TO PRESS THE GOVERNMENT TO STEP UP THE SEARCH FOR THE MISSING PERSONS. WE HAVE LEARNED RELIABLY THAT ONE OF THOSE MISSING IS A DIABETIC WHO FACES SIGNIFICANT HEALTH RISKS UNLESS HE RECEIVES REGULAR MEDICATION. MOREOVER, THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION REGARDS 16 PERSONS AS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR FROM THE JULY 27, 1996 VIOLENCE IN JAKARTA. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO STATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES AND THAT SECURITY FORCES ARE SEARCHING FOR THE MISSING. END SUMMARY.

ACTIVIST REAPPEARS

3. (U) HARYANTO TASLAM, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL OF

MEGAWATI'S FACTION OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) HAS SURFACED IN EAST JAVA. SOURCES AT THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY HAVE INFORMED US THAT HE HAS THUS FAR BEEN UNWILLING TO SPEAK ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCE. HE WENT MISSING ON MARCH 9 AFTER A MEETING WITH LABOR AND STUDENT ACTIVISTS. AS OF COB APRIL 17, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT COMMENTED ON HIS REAPPEARANCE.

LIST OF MISSING PERSONS

4. (U) THE INDONESIAN LEGAL AID SOCIETY (LBH) LISTS THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE AS HAVING BEEN MISSING FOR MORE THAN TWO WEEKS:

DATE/PLACE DISAPPEARED	NAME	POSITION
FEBRUARY 12, 1998 - -	SUYAT	STUDENT, SLAMET RIYADI UNIVERSITY, SOLO
MARCH 12, JAKARTA (REPORTED BY POLICE TO HAVE RETURNED, BUT NGO'S HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THIS)	HERMAN HENDRAWAN	STUDENT, AIRLANGGA UNIVERSITY, SURABAYA
MARCH 12, JAKARTA - -	FAIZAL REZA	STUDENT, GAJAH MADA UNIVERSITY (UGM), JOGJAKARTA
MARCH 12, JAKARTA	RAHARDJO WALUJATI	STUDENT, UGM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MARCH 12, JAKARTA	NEZAR PATRIA	STUDENT, UGM
MARCH 12, JAKARTA	MUGIANTO	STUDENT (NFI)
MARCH 12, JAKARTA	AAN RUSDIANTO	STUDENT (NFI)
MARCH 19, LAMPUNG (NOTE: A "GATRA" MAGAZINE REPORT SAID UMI HAD BEEN LOCATED AT HOME IN LAMPUNG)	UMI MASRIFA	STUDENT, LAMPUNG UNIVERSITY (UNILA)
MARCH 19, LAMPUNG	BAHRUL ALAM	STUDENT, UNILA
MARCH 19, LAMPUNG -	ANANDA B.	HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT
MARCH 28, LAMPUNG	ANDI ARIEF	STUDENT, UGM

5. (U) IN ADDITION TO THE LBH LIST, PRESS REPORTS IN RECENT DAYS

HAVE REPORTED TWO OTHER PERSONS AS MISSING:

YANI AVRI, AND SONNY, DETAINED BY POLICE FOR WEARING PRO-MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI T-SHIRTS AQ AN INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) RALLY DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN MAY 997.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8843

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8843

PAGE 01 JAKART 02227 02 OF 03 171201Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W		

----------3475BE 172051Z /38

P 171101Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1099
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002227

NOFORN

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON DISAPPEARANCES: SENIOR POLITICAL FIGURE REAPPEARS

REF: JAKARTA 2019

LBH HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PARENTS OF DISAPPEARED PERSONS; TEN NGO'S FORM COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE MISSING PERSONS

---

6. (U) ON APRIL 14, LBH HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE AT WHICH THE PARENTS OF FORMER PDI SECRETARY GENERAL HARYANTO TASLAM AND YANI AVRI DESCRIBED THEIR EFFORTS TO FIND THEIR SONS. LBH OPERATIONAL SECRETARY MUNIR SAID THAT LBH HAD SENT A LETTER TO ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO REQUESTING AN APPOINTMENT TO DISCUSS THE DISAPPEARANCES.

7. (U) ON APRIL 16, LBH AND NINE OTHER HUMAN-RIGHTS ORIENTED NGO'S FORMED A "COMMITTEE FOR MISSING PERSONS AND VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE" (KONTRAS) TO INVESTIGATE CASES AND PROVIDE LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR VICTIMS AND THEIR FAMILIES.

NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE DISAPPEARANCES

---

8. (U) THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION RECEIVED PETITIONS FROM THE FAMILIES OF TWO MISSING ACTIVISTS ON APRIL 14. THE COMMISSION, MEETING IN PLENARY SESSION FOR FOUR HOURS WITH ALL BUT ONE MEMBER PRESENT, DECIDED TO SEND TEAMS TO BANDUNG,

JOGJAKARTA, SURAKARTA, SEMARANG, SURABAYA, UJUNGPANDANG AND LAMPUNG TO INVESTIGATE MISSING ACTIVISTS AND STUDENTS. COMMISSION VICE CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN, IN COMMENTS TO THE

PRESS, POINTED OUT THAT THE INDONESIAN PUBLIC HAD BEEN CLOSELY WATCHING THE ISSUE, AND THE COMMISSION NEEDED TO VERIFY WHETHER THE DISAPPEARANCES WERE "VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY". THE COMMISSION STILL LISTS 16 PERSONS AS MISSING FROM THE GOVERNMNET-BACKED ATTACK ON THE HEADQUARTERS OF MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI, JULY 27, 1996.

GOLKAR AFFILIATE EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT DISAPPEARANCES

9. (U) IN A DEVELOPMENT REFLECTING THE GROWING CONCERN WITHIN THE ESTABLISHMENT OVER DISAPPEARANCES, KOSGORO, A MASS ORGANIZATION AFFILIATED WITH THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR, PUBLICLY CALLED ON THE ARMED FORCES TO TAKE ACTION TO LOCATE ACTIVISTS WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED. "KOSGORO IS CONCERNED BY THE DISAPPEARANCES OF STUDENTS, YOUTHS AND COMMUNITY MEMBERS AS A RESULT OF DEMONSTRATIONS ADVOCATING REFORMS AND OTHER PRACTICAL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES." KOSGORO, WHOSE CHIEF IS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBER BAMBANG SOEHARTO (NO RELATION TO THE PRESIDENT), ALSO COMMENDED STUDENTS FOR THEIR ACTIVISM AND DENIED CLAIMS THAT THE EXTERNAL PARTIES WERE TRYING TO ORCHESTRATE THE DEMONSTRATIONS.

59 MISSING STUDENTS REPORTEDLY TURN UP

10. (U) THE PRESS HAS REPORTED THAT ON APRIL 8, FOUR STUDENTS WHO WERE MISSING IN SURABAYA AFTER CLASHES THERE HAD REAPPEARED. IN ADDITION, THE APRIL 18 ISSUE OF "GATRA" WEEKLY MAGAZINE (OWNED BY MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE BOB HASAN) SAID THAT 18 STUDENTS INITIALLY REPORTED AS MISSING IN JOGJAKARTA HAD BEEN LOCATED, AND THAT 40 STUDENTS IN LAMPUNG HAD TURNED UP AS WELL. ON APRIL 16, SOUTH SULAWESI POLICE CHIEF ALI HANAFIAH ANNOUNCED

THAT MAQBUL HALIM, A STUDENT AT HASANUDDIN (UNHAS) UNIVERSITY IN UJUNGPANDANG, MISSING AFTER A DEMONSTRATION AT UNHAS APRIL 9, HAD "REPORTED HIS PRESENCE," AND WILL SOON UNDERGO POLICE QUESTIONING. MAQBUL, WHO WAS REPORTED TO LAST BEEN SEEN IN THE CUSTODY OF A MEMBER OF THE SECURITY FORCES, WAS THE SUBJECT OF A PROTEST DEMONSTRATION BY STUDENTS APRIL 15 IN UJUNG PANDANG.

ACCOUNTS OF TREATMENT DURING DETENTION

11. (U) THE APRIL 18 ISSUE OF "GATRA" QUOTES AN UNNAMED FRIEND OF DESMOND JUNAIDI MAHESA, WHO RESURFACED LAST WEEK AFTER TWO MONTHS, AS SAYING DESMOND WAS KIDNAPPED BY UNKNOWN PERSONS ON HIS WAY TO HIS OFFICE (LBH NUSANTARA) FEBRUARY 3. HIS ASSAILANTS COVERED HIS HEAD IN CLOTH, HANDCUFFED HIM, AND DROVE HIM AROUND FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF BEFORE TAKING HIM TO A SPARSELY FURNISHED ROOM IN A PLACE HE COULD NOT IDENTIFY. HE WAS INTERROGATED (WHILE BLINDFOLDED) NEARLY EVERY DAY ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES AND TIES TO THE BANNED PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD). HE WAS ALONE WHEN NOT BEING INTERROGATED. ON APRIL 3, HE WAS BLINDFOLDED, PUT IN A CAR, AND TAKEN TO JAKARTA'S SOEKARNO-HATTA AIRPORT, WHERE HE WAS RELEASED WITH A PLANE TICKET TO GO TO HIS FAMILY HOME IN BANJARMASIN, SOUTH KALIMANTAN. HE SAID HE WAS NEVER WAS ABLE TO DISCERN WHO HIS CAPTORS WERE.

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6863

PAGE 01 JAKART 02227 03 OF 03 171102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W			

----------34321B 171102Z /38

P 171101Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1100
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002227

NOFORN

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH
CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/08
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON DISAPPEARANCES: SENIOR POLITICAL FIGURE REAPPEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02227 03 OF 03 171102Z

REF: JAKARTA 2019

[redacted] B1

[redacted] THE "GATRA" ARTICLE ALSO DESCRIBED THE MAGAZINE'S UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO TALK TO PIUS LUSTRILANANG.

B1

14. (U) WE HAVE LEARNED RELIABLY THAT ANDI ARIEF IS A DIABETIC AND THAT WITHOUT REGULAR MEDICATION HE FACES SERIOUS HEALTH RISKS. WE ALSO HAVE LEARNED OF WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A FAILED

CONFIDENTIAL

ABDUCTION PLOT AGAINST A WELL-KNOWN CATHOLIC PRIEST AND ACTIVIST, FATHER ROMO SANDYAWAN (SEPTEL).

15. (U) GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, CONTINUE TO STATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES AND THAT SECURITY FORCES ARE SEARCHING FOR THE MISSING. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ9787

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9787

PAGE 01 JAKART 02156 01 OF 02 150947Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	PRME-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/029W			

------------------333209 150947Z /38

O 150944Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1034
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0630
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USDOC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002156

S/S-O FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02156 01 OF 02 150947Z
STATE PLEASE PASS USDA FOR FAS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 15 APR 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2006 200502501

STATE PLEASE PASS EXIMBANK FOR AL-ASKARI
STATE PLEASE PASS AID FOR AA/ANE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS
TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC/LOUNGANI
TREASURY PASS TO OASIA/IET - PENTOLA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/15/2008
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PREF, ELAB, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN POLITICAL SITREP APRIL 15

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (U) SUMMARY: UNRESOLVED DISAPPEARANCES OF ACTIVISTS AND STUDENTS CONTINUED TO ATTRACT CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION IN THE MEDIA AND POLITICAL CIRCLES. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS DECIDED TO DISPATCH INVESTIGATION TEAMS TO SIX CITIES WHERE DISAPPEARANCES HAVE BEEN REPORTED. A MASS ORGANIZATION WHICH IS AN AFFILIATE OF THE RULING GOLKAR PARTY ALSO HAS SPOKEN OUT ABOUT DISAPPEARANCES, CALLING ON THE ARMED FORCES TO TAKE ACTION TO LOCATE THOSE MISSING. STUDENTS IN SOUTH SULAWESI PROTESTED THE DISAPPEARANCE OF A STUDENT THERE WHO WAS LAST SEEN IN CUSTODY. STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED ON CAMPUSES THROUGHOUT JAKARTA ON APRIL 15. APRIL 14 DEMONSTRATIONS WERE REPORTED IN FOUR CITIES. IN TWO OF THOSE, STUDENTS RALLIED BOTH OFF AND ON CAMPUS. THE MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT HAS SPOKEN OUT ABOUT HIS FRUSTRATION IN PERSUADING THE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ACTION TO DEAL WITH MASSIVE FOREST FIRES AGAIN RAGING IN KALIMANTAN AND SUMATRA. HE BLAMED OIL PALM PLANTATION OWNERS FOR THE FIRES. THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02156 01 OF 02 150947Z
SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER MET WITH THE IMPRISONED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER. THE MILITARY HAS OPENED A CAMPAIGN TO FARM UNUSED LAND. [redacted] HAS DISMISSED THE UNDERTAKING AS "COSMETIC," BUT THE SCOPE OF THE EFFORT IS NOT YET CLEAR. END SUMMARY

B6

DISAPPEARANCES
---

3. (U) THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION RECEIVED PETITIONS

FROM THE FAMILIES OF TWO "DISAPPEARED" ACTIVISTS ON APRIL 14. IT SUBSEQUENTLY DECIDED TO SEND INVESTIGATION TEAMS TO BANDUNG, JOGJAKARTA, SURAKARTA, SEMARANG, SURABAYA, UJUNGPANDANG AND LAMPUNG TO INVESTIGATE MISSING ACTIVISTS AND STUDENTS. ON APRIL 8, FOUR STUDENTS WHO WERE MISSING IN SURABAYA AFTER CLASHES THERE REAPPEARED. IN A DEVELOPMENT REFLECTING THE GROWING CONCERN WITHIN THE ESTABLISHMENT OVER DISAPPEARANCES, KOSGORO, A MASS ORGANIZATION AFFILIATED WITH THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR, PUBLICLY CALLED ON THE ARMED FORCES TO TAKE ACTION TO LOCATE ACTIVISTS WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED. (SEE SEPTEL FOR UP-DATE ON DISAPPEARANCES.)

DEMONSTRATIONS
---

5. (U) STUDENTS ON AT LEAST SEVEN JAKARTA UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES RALLIED APRIL 15 IN PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS. AS OF COB, IT APPEARED ALL OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS WERE PEACEFUL, ALTHOUGH POLOFF OBSERVED A BRIEF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN APPROXIMATELY 500 STUDENTS AND A SMALLER NUMBER OF POLICE IN CENTRAL JAKARTA. THE STUDENTS HAD SOUGHT TO MARCH FROM THEIR SOUTH JAKARTA CAMPUS (UKI) TO UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA SALEMBA CAMPUS IN CENTRAL JAKARTA. POLICE INITIALLY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ATTEMPTED TO PREVENT THE STUDENTS FROM JOINING THE LARGER RALLY ALREADY UNDERWAY BUT EVENTUALLY RELENTED. SOME OF THE BANNERS DISPLAYED RAISED OBJECTION TO THE IMF PLAN AND A FORMAL STATEMENT CALLED FOR POLITICAL REFORM AS WELL AS ECONOMIC REFORM.

6. (U) ON APRIL 14 DEMONSTRATIONS TOOK PLACE AT CAMPUSES IN BANDUNG, SEMARANG, UJUNGPANDANG AND JOGJAKARTA. IN BANDUNG, STUDENTS LEFT THEIR CAMPUS FOR A MARCH, BRIEFLY SCUFFLING WITH POLICE. IN SEMARANG, 6,000 STUDENTS AND FACULTY GATHERED. STUDENTS AND FACULTY IN UJUNGPANDANG RALLIED AT BOTH THEIR CAMPUS AND AT THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT. PROTESTS THERE FOCUSSED ON A STUDENT ACTIVIST WHO DISAPPEARED ON APRIL 9 AFTER REPORTEDLY LAST BEING SEEN IN THE CUSTODY OF A SECURITY OFFICIAL.

7. (U) A STUDENT DELEGATION REPRESENTING CAMPUSES IN JOGJAKARTA AND JAKARTA CALLED AT THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ON APRIL 14 TO PRESENT WHAT IT CLAIMED WAS EVIDENCE OF VIOLENCE EMPLOYED BY SECURITY FORCES AGAINST STUDENTS IN RECENT CLASHES.

SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICIAL VISITS IMPRISONED EAST TIMORESE LEADER

8. (U) VISITING SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALFRED NZO MET WITH JAILED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO APRIL 14. THE SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICIAL HAD NO COMMENT FOR PRESS AFTER THE VISIT.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9788

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9788

PAGE 01 JAKART 02156 02 OF 02 150947Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	PRME-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/029W			

----------33320B 150947Z /38

O 150944Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1035
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0631

AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USDOC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002156

S/S-O FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02156 02 OF 02 150947Z
STATE PLEASE PASS USDA FOR FAS
STATE PLEASE PASS EXIMBANK FOR AL-ASKARI
STATE PLEASE PASS AID FOR AA/ANE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS
TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC/LOUNGANI
TREASURY PASS TO OASIA/IET - PENTOLA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/15/2008
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PREF, ELAB, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN POLITICAL SITREP APRIL 15

MINISTER SPEAKS OUT
---

9. (U) DEMONSTRATING UNUSUAL CANDOR FROM THE CABINET, JUWONO SUDARSONO, THE NEW MINISTER FOR ENVIRONMENT, PUBLICLY BLAMED "GREEDY BUSINESSMEN" FOR FOREST FIRES NOW AGAIN RAGING IN PARTS OF INDONESIA. HE SAID HE WAS "DESPERATELY TRYING TO CONVINCE OFFICIALS IN JAKARTA OF THE GREAT NECESSITY TO COORDINATE FOREST FIRE CONTROL, BUT TO NO AVAIL. MAYBE MY WORDS WILL BE HEARD WHEN THE THICK SMOKE BLANKETS THE CAPITAL CITY." THE MINISTER BLAMED THE CATASTROPHE ON THE "BUSINESSMEN WHO DELIBERATELY SET FIRES TO CLEAR FOREST LAND TO ESTABLISH PALM OIL PLANTATIONS." HE ADDED THAT THE FIRES WERE OUT OF CONTROL BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF EARLY AND SERIOUS HANDLING.

THE MILITARY SEEKS TO DEVELOP FARM LAND

10. (C) THE 18TH ARMED FORCES CONSOLIDATION PROGRAM OPENED IN PALEMBANG, SOUTH SUMATRA ON APRIL 14. THE PROGRAM'S PURPOSE IS TO MAKE THE NATION SELF-SUFFICIENT IN BASIC FOOD COMMODITIES AND REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON OTHER IMPORTED FOOD PRODUCTS. THE ARMY IS UNDERTAKING SIMILAR EFFORTS IN THE JAKARTA AREA. GENERAL WIRANTO, MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES, CALLED ON OWNERS OF UNUSED LAND TO OPEN IT UP TO CULTIVATION. HE GUARANTEED ON BEHALF OF ABRI THAT THE LAND WILL BE RETURNED TO THE OWNERS ONCE THE PROGRAM IS OVER. THE PROGRAM IS EXPECTED TO LOWER CRIME RATES BY EMPLOYING LOCAL RESIDENTS AND RECENTLY UNEMPLOYED WORKERS.

[redacted] B1

IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN, HOWEVER, HOW EXTENSIVE THIS ABRI UNDERTAKING BECOMES. ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4971

PAGE 01 JAKART 02041 01 OF 03 081114Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	PRME-01	DRL-04
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/029W		

----------30EDE0 081114Z /38

O 081112Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0936
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0619
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USDOC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002041

S/S-O FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02041 01 OF 03 081114Z
STATE PLEASE PASS USDA FOR FAS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 7 APR 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2006 200502501

STATE PLEASE PASS EXIMBANK FOR AL-ASKARI
STATE PLEASE PASS AID FOR AA/ANE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS
TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC/LOUNGANI
TREASURY PASS TO OASIA/IET - PENTOLA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/08/2008
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PREF, ELAB, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN POLITICAL SITREP APRIL 8

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (U) SUMMARY: STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS TOOK PLACE APRIL 6-7 IN JEMBER, JAMBI AND PURWOKERTO. IN JAMBI, 2,000 STUDENTS MARCHED FROM THEIR CAMPUS TO THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE. THE DEMONSTRATORS, WHO CALLED FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM, WERE NOT IMPEDED BY SECURITY FORCES. THE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF, IN SUPPORT OF THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION'S RECENT CALL FOR THE USE OF SECURITY FORCES ON CAMPUSES, SAID THAT POLICE HAVE THE RIGHT TO ENTER CAMPUSES BASED ON A CONTROVERSIAL POLICE LAW PASSED IN 1997. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ABRI CHIEF-OF-STAFF HAS REMINDED MILITARY PERSONNEL NOT TO TREAT STUDENTS AS "THE ENEMY." THE ICRC HAS SOUGHT GOI PERMISSION TO LAUNCH HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN ACEH.

[redacted] B1

IN JAKARTA, THE ICRC HAS SOUGHT PERMISSION TO VISIT 128 PERSONS DETAINED AND FACING CRIMINAL CHARGES FOR PEACEFUL POLITICAL ACTIONS. THE HUMAN RIGHTS

COMMISSION HAS LAUNCHED AN INVESTIGATION INTO DISAPPEARANCES AND INTO RECENT VIOLENCE ON THE GADJA MADA CAMPUS IN JOGJAKARTA. AMIEN RAIS HAS SAID IN AN INTERVIEW THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE MILITARY TO TAKE A VIEW DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE GOVERNMENT INASMUCH AS THE MILITARY'S ULTIMATE LOYALTY IS TO THE PEOPLE AND THE NATION. IN LABOR DEVELOPMENTS, THE 30 MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED SPSI LABOR FEDERATION HAVE SUSPENDED THE SPSI SECRETARY GENERAL BECAUSE OF HE REFUSED TO WITHDRAW HIS SIGNATURE ON THE GOVERNMENT DECISION NOT TO RAISE THE MINIMUM WAGE. END SUMMARY

STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS

3. (U) IN JAMBI ON APRIL 6, 2,000 STUDENTS CONDUCTED A MARCH FROM JAMBI UNIVERSITY TO THE LOCAL LEGISLATURE WHERE THEY DEMANDED ERADICATION OF CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND NEPOTISM. THE STUDENTS ALSO DEMANDED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. SECURITY FORCES MONITORED BUT DID NOT ATTEMPT TO BLOCK THE MARCH, WHICH COVERED A DISTANCE OF ABOUT ONE KILOMETER.

4. (U) IN JEMBER, STUDENTS AT THE UNIVERSITY PROTESTED THE ARREST OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS IN JAKARTA AND JOGJAKARTA.

5. (U) IN PURWOKERTO (CENTRAL JAVA) A GROUP OF 25 STUDENTS FROM THE "MUSLIM STUDENT COMMUNICATION FORUM" HELD A DEMONSTRATION IN THE TOWN SQUARE. ALTHOUGH SMALL, IT WAS THE FIRST DEMONSTRATION WHICH SECURITY FORCES HAD ALLOWED TO OCCUR OFF CAMPUS IN PURWOKERTO. THE STUDENTS CALLED FOR REVOCATION OF THE FIVE POLITICAL LAWS AND NEW LAWS AGAINST MONOPOLY, CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND NEPOTISM. THEY ALSO DEMANDED LOWER PRICES FOR ESSENTIAL GOODS.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEALING WITH STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS

6. (U) NATIONAL POLICE SPOKESPERSON BRIGADIER GENERAL DA'I BACHTIAR PUBLICLY BACKED MINISTER OF EDUCATION WIRANTO ARISMUNANDAR'S CALL FOR POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL TO ENTER UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES TO BREAK UP STUDENT RALLIES. HE REPORTEDLY TOLD THE MEDIA THAT POLICE HAVE THE RIGHT TO ENTER CAMPUSES BECAUSE A 1997 LAW STATES POLICE ARE TASKED TO PATROL THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE NATION. (NOTE: THE 1997 POLICE LAW WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED BY SOME NGO'S AND HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES BECAUSE OF WHAT THEY DESCRIBED AS ITS OVERLY BROAD WORDING. END NOTE)

7. (U) AT THE SAME TIME, ARMY CHIEF-OF-STAFF GENERAL SUBAGYO ADVISED ABRI PERSONNEL NOT TO REGARD PROTESTING STUDENTS AS "ENEMIES." HOWEVER, SUBAGAYO REITERATED THE ABRI POSITION OPPOSING DEMONSTRATIONS OFF CAMPUS. HE INDICATED PLANS FOR A STUDENT-ARBI DIALOGUE ARE PROCEEDING. (NOTE: AN APRIL 4 ABRI-STUDENT DIALOGUE WAS SCRUBBED AFTER STUDENTS BROADLY REJECTED THE PLAN. END NOTE)

8. (U) MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE PUBLICLY PRAISED AMIEN RAIS FOR INTERVENING ON THE UNIVERSITY CAMPUS AT JOGJAKARTA ON APRIL 4 TO STOP STUDENTS FROM ATTACKING A MILITARY "INTEL." THE PLAINCLOTHES OFFICIAL WAS GIVEN AWAY BY HIS RADIO WHICH WENT OFF AS HE WAS CLANDESTINELY MONITORING A PEACEFUL STUDENT RALLY ON THE JOGJAKARTA

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4972

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4972

PAGE 01 JAKART 02041 02 OF 03 081114Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	PRME-01
	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/030W	

----------30EDE7 081114Z /38

O 081112Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0937
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0620

AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USDOC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002041

S/S-O FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02041 02 OF 03 081114Z
STATE PLEASE PASS USDA FOR FAS
STATE PLEASE PASS EXIMBANK FOR AL-ASKARI
STATE PLEASE PASS AID FOR AA/ANE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS
TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC/LOUNGANI
TREASURY PASS TO OASIA/IET - PENTOLA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/08/2008
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PREF, ELAB, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN POLITICAL SITREP APRIL 8

CAMPUS. RAIS STEPPED IN TO STOP THE STUDENT ATTACK ON THE MAN WHO WAS INJURED BUT RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL ON APRIL 6. ANOTHER "INTEL" WAS ATTACKED ON THE SAME CAMPUS APRIL 4, BUT THE UNIVERSITY RECTOR STEPPED IN TO PROTECT THE MAN FROM ANGRY STUDENTS. HE TOO WAS RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL ON APRIL 6.

ICRC IN ACEH
---

9. (C) [redacted] SENT FORMAL PROPOSALS ON APRIL 6 TO FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS AND COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS FEISAL TANJUNG REGARDING INITIATING ICRC ACTIVITIES IN ACEH. SPECIFICALLY, HE PROPOSED ICRC VISITS TO "ALL PLACES F DETENTION," ASSISTANCE TO "FAMILIES OF THOS IN DETENTION," TO INCLUDE ARRANGING FAMILY VISITS TO DETAINEES, AND

B1

SOCIAL REINTEGRATION ASSISTANCE TO REPATRIATED ACHENESE. [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] THE LANGUAGE WAS MADE DELIBERATELYBROAD SO AS TO B1
ENCOMPASS NOT ONLY CONVICTED PRISONERS BUT ALSO PERSONS DETAINED
EXTRA-JUDICIALLY BY MILITARY FORCES (WITHOUT WARRANTS OR JUDICIAL
REVIEW). [redacted] B1
[redacted] IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE ICRC TO RE-
ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN ACEH IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT THESE
ACTIVITIES. ICRC HAS HAD NO FIXED PRESENCE IN THE TROUBLED
PROVINCE SINCE ITS LONE DELEGATE WAS ORDERED OUT IN MARCH 1997.

DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST TIMOR

10. (C) A RELIABLE WESTERN SOURCE HAS INFORMED AIDOFF THAT IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS, ARMED RESISTANCE FIGHTERS ATTACKED ABRI UNITS IN THE AIELIU AREA SOUTH OF DILI. ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE, IN BOTH INSTANCES, THE FALANTIL FORCES INFLICTED CASUALTIES (KIA'S) AMONG THE ABRI PERSONNEL.

[redacted] B1

DEALING WITH THE MISSING AND DETAINED

12. (U) THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON

LAUNCHED AN INVESTIGATION APRIL 8 INTO THE CLASHES BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SECURITY FORCES APRIL 2 AND 3 IN JOGJAKARTA, AND INTO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS IN RECENT MONTHS ACROSS THE ARCHIPELAGO. MEANWHILE, A POLICE SPOKESPERSON TOLD THE MEDIA ON APRIL 6 THAT THE POLICE WERE COMPILING A LIST OF MISSING PERSONS AND WOULD PUBLISH THAT LIST SOON. PIUS LUSTRILANANG, AN ACTIVIST WHO WAS MISSING FROM FEBRUARY 3 UNTIL HIS RELEASE APRIL 3 WAS DESCRIBED AS IN "PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMA" IN AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN THE WEEKLY MAGAZINE "AKTIF." HIS RELEASE AND THAT OF DESMOND MAHESA ON APRIL 3 HAVE NOT BEEN NOTED ELSEWHERE IN THE INDONESIAN MEDIA.

13. (C) THE ICRC HAS SOUGHT GOI PERMISSION TO MAKE VISITS TO 128 ACTIVISTS WHO REMAIN DETAINED IN JAKARTA FOR HAVING PARTICIPATED IN PEACEFUL POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS OR OTHER EVENTS OVER THE PAST SEVEN WEEKS. ALL ARE FACING CRIMINAL CHARGES.

AMIEN RAIS OFFERS VIEWS ON THE MILITARY
---

14. (U) IN AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN THE CURRENT ISSUE OF "UMAT," AN ISLAMIC-INFLUENCE WEEKLY MAGAZINE, OPPOSITION FIGURE AMIEN RAIS SAID THE FOLLOWING WITH REGARD TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE MILITARY:

"IN THE RANKS OF ABRI THERE ARE SOME DISREPUTABLE TYPES WHO ARE NOT

NNNNPTQ4973

PAGE 01 JAKART 02041 03 OF 03 081114Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	PRME-01	DRL-04
	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/030W		

----------30EDEC 081115Z /38

O 081112Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0938
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0621
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USDOC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002041

S/S-O FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA AND INR/IL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02041 03 OF 03 081114Z
STATE PLEASE PASS USDA FOR FAS
STATE PLEASE PASS EXIMBANK FOR AL-ASKARI
STATE PLEASE PASS AID FOR AA/ANE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS
TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC/LOUNGANI
TREASURY PASS TO OASIA/IET - PENTOLA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/08/2008
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PREF, ELAB, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN POLITICAL SITREP APRIL 8

SEEKING DEMOCRACY AND WHO ARE CORRUPT. BUT THE LARGER PART OF THEM HAVE A DOCTRINE WHICH COMMANDS LOYALTY TO THE PEOPLE AND TO THE NATION, NOT TO THE GOVERNMNET. IF THE GOVERNMENT IS PERCEIVED AS CORRUPT AND NOT CARRYING OUT ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, ABRI CAN SIMPLY TAKE A DIFFERENT POSITION (FROM THE GOVERNMENT)."

LABOR FEDERATION SECRETARY GENERAL SUSPENDED
---

15. (C) THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 8, THE 30 MEMBER NATIONAL EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE FEDERATION OF ALL-INDONESIAN TRADE UNIONS TOLD LABATT THAT THEY
HAD VOTED THAT AFTERNOON TO SUSPEND SECRETARY GENERAL ANDI HISBULDIN PA TUNRU FROM HIS POSITION BECAUSE HE REFUSED TO WITHDRAW HIS SIGNATURE ON THE DOCUMENT BY WHICH THE TRIPARTIT
E NATIONAL WAGE DETERMINATION BOARD AGREED NOT TO RAISE THE MINIMUM WAG E THIS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02041 03 OF 03 081114Z
YEAR. THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
CALLED HISBULDIN AND SPSI GENERAL CHAIRMAN DATUK BAGINDO TO ACCOUNT FOR NOT CONSULTING THE EXECUTIVE BOARD BEFORE SIGNING THE TRIPARTITE DOCUMENT. BAGINDO ADMITTED THE ERROR AND REPUDIATED HIS SIGNATURE ON THE DOCUMENT, THEREBY RETAINING HIS LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION FOR THE TIME BEING. WHEN HISBULDIN REFUSED TO CHANGE HIS STANCE, THE BOARD SUSPENDED HIM AND APPOINTED AN ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ8854

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8854

PAGE 01 JAKART 02019 01 OF 02 061145Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W				

----------300703 061152Z /38
P 061143Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0922
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002019

NOFORN

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCES IN INDONESIA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS;
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02019 01 OF 02 061145Z
REASON 1.5(D)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 5 APR 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200502501

2. (C) SUMMARY: TWO OF THE RECENT DISAPPEARANCE CASES IN INDONESIA HAVE BEEN RESOLVED WITH THE RELEASE OF PIUS LUSTRILANANG AND DESMON MAHESA. OTHER DISAPPEARANCE CASES CONTINUE TO OCCUR. THE ICRC AND TWO SENIOR OPPOSITION FIGURES HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE MISSING INDIVIDUALS, STRESSING THAT OTHER GOVERNMENT OPPONENTS WHO WENT MISSING PRIOR TO THE CURRENT SPATE OF DISAPPEARANCES, ALSO MERIT HUMANITARIAN CONCERN. END SUMMARY

3. (C) THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY IN JAKARTA HAS CONFIRMED REPORTS WE INITIALLY RECEIVED FROM THE ICRC AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY THAT PIUS LUSTRILANANG AND DESMON MAHESA, MISSING SINCE FEBRUARY 3 AND 4 RESPECTIVELY, WERE RELEASED ON APRIL 3. ACCORDING TO LBH, THE TWO WENT TO THEIR HOME VILLAGES WITHOUT ANY STATEMENT ABOUT WHO HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR DISAPPEARANCE.

4. (C) RECENTLY, THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS REPORTS OF DISAPPEARANCES INVOLVING PRINCIPALLY POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, HUMAN RIGHTS WORKERS AND STUDENTS. OPPOSITION LEADERS MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND AMIEN RAIS [redacted] IN MEETINGS WITH EMBASSY OFFICIALS B1 HAVE ENCOURAGED USG INTERVENTION WITH THE GOI CONCERNING THE WELFARE OF THESE INDIVIDUALS. REFTELS DESCRIBED SOME OF THOSE RECENT CASES. OTHER CASES HAVE EITHER EMERGED OR HAVE RETURNED TO THE SPOTLIGHT. THERE ARE ALSO SOME NEW REPORTS ABOUT THOSE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED AS

CONFIDENTIAL

"DISAPPEARED." WITNESSES SAW ANDI ARIEF, CHAIRMAN OF THE BANNED INDONESIAN STUDENTS UNION FOR DEMOCRACY (SMID), ABDUCTED BY ARMED MEN ON MARCH 28. IRONICALLY, ARIEF WAS PREVIOUSLY DECLARED "MISSING" IN THE WAKE OF THE JULY 27, 1996 VIOLENCE IN JAKARTA, BUT RESURFACED AFTER MONTHS IN HIDING.

EAST TIMORESE DISAPPEARED

LBH LIST
---

6. (U) THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY (LBH) IN JAKARTA HAS PUBLISHED A LIST OF 10 PERSONS IT BELIEVES HAVE "DISAPPEARED," SINCE FEBRUARY 3. IN ADDITION TO NAMES REPORTED REFTEL, THE LIST INCLUDES SIX NEW NAMES, ALL UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. (THAT LIST IS BEING FAXED TO THE INDONESIA DESK.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02019 01 OF 02 061145Z
INFORMATION/CONCERN OVER PREVIOUSLY NOTED CASES:
---

7. (C) OPPOSITION LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI TOLD POLOFF APRIL 2 THAT SHE HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION CLAIMING THAT HARYANTO TASLAM, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE FACTION OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) WHICH SHE HEADS, IS BEING HELD AT A MILITARY FACILITY IN SOUTH JAKARTA. THE ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE UNRECOGNIZED LABOR UNION, SBSI, TOLD POLOFF APRIL 3 THAT HARYANTO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN JOINT MEETINGS OF LABOR AND STUDENTS SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DISAPPEARANCE.

8. (C) MEGAWATI ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE 16 PDI SUPPORTERS WHICH THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION DESCRIBED AS "MISSING" IN ITS OCTOBER 1996 REPORT, NOT BE FORGOTTEN. SHE EMPHASIZED THAT AFTER 20 MONTHS, IT IS NO LONGER LOGICAL TO ASSUME THE 16 ARE SIMPLY IN HIDING AS SOME GOI OFFICIALS CLAIMED AT THE TIME.

9. (C) [redacted] TOLD POLOFF APRIL 4 THAT ACCORDING TO THE MOTHER OF PIUS LUSTRILANANG, (MISSING SINCE FEBRUARY 3) HE HAD BEEN SEEN ALONG WITH DESMON MAHESA (MISSING SINCE FEBRUARY 4) BY AN LBH LAWYER BY CHANCE AT A BIA FACILITY. SENIOR BIA OFFICIALS HAVE PROFESSED NOT TO

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8855

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8855

PAGE 01 JAKART 02019 02 OF 02 061145Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W				

----------300709 061152Z /38

P 061143Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0923
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002019

NOFORN

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCES IN INDONESIA

KNOW THE WHEREABOUTS OF ANY OF THE MISSING IN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02019 02 OF 02 061145Z
DISCUSSIONS WITH DATT AND POLCOUNS.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9886

PAGE 01 JAKART 01607 01 OF 03 181046Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W

------------------2889D9 181046Z /38

R 181046Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0517
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001607

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01607 01 OF 03 181046Z
TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2006 200502501

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/16/2003
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PINS, PINR, PGOV, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: HARSH TREATMENT FOR SOME REGIME CRITICS

REF: A) JAKARTA 1399 (NOTAL), B) JAKARTA 0794 (NOTAL)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO STAGE DAILY POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS ON CAMPUSES THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, MANY POLITICAL DISSIDENTS AND REFORM ADVOCATES HAVE BEEN ARRESTED IN JAKARTA AND OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL OVER THE PAST MONTH. THIS MESSAGE REVIEWS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ARREST CASES AND COVERS NEW CASES THAT HAVE RECENTLY COME TO OUR ATTENTION.

3. (SBU) WHILE THE EXTRA SECURITY MEASURES IMPOSED DURING THE SESSION OF THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT MIGHT IN PART ACCOUNT FOR THIS SPATE OF ARRESTS, THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CHARGES -- INCLUDING THOSE STEMMING FROM THE "ANTI-SUBVERSION" DECREE -- IN MANY OF THESE CASES SUGGEST THE ARRESTS HAD BROADER OBJECTIVES THAN SIMPLY ENSURING A QUIET ENVIRONMENT FOR THE SESSION. MEANWHILE, INVESTIGATIONS ARE CONTINUING OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL OPPONENTS IN THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY. OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL, THERE ARE REPORTS OF DISAPPEARANCE CASES AS WELL AS OF INTIMIDATION BY SECURITY FORCES AT HOMES AND OFFICES. THE EMBASSY HAS PRESENTED AN ORAL DEMARCHE AT THE DIRECTOR LEVEL IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO THE ABOVE DEVELOPMENTS. OTHER MISSIONS ARE CONSIDERING DEMARCHES. END SUMMARY

ARRESTS IN JAKARTA:
---

4. (U) WHILE THE AUTHORITIES HAVE PERMITTED THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS TO STAGE POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS ON CAMPUSES THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, OVER 140 PEOPLE WHO WERE ARRESTED DURING THE PAST MONTH FOR DEMONSTRATING IN THE STREETS IN

JAKARTA REMAIN IN CUSTODY. MOST ARE FACING CRIMINAL CHARGES DERIVING FROM THEIR PEACEFUL POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS. ALTHOUGH IT HAD THE OPTION OF LIGHTER, NON-CRIMINAL CHARGES FOR VIOLATORS OF ITS "NO POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS" ORDER COVERING THE DURATION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SESSION, THE GOI HAS CHOSEN IN MOST CASES TO IMPOSE CRIMINAL CHARGES WHICH CARRY STIFFER PENALTIES. THESE CRIMINAL CHARGES INCLUDE THE "SOWING HATRED" ARTICLE OF THE CRIMINAL CODE (ARTICLE 154; MAXIMUM SENTENCE SEVEN YEARS IMPRISONMENT) AND HOLDING UNAUTHORIZED POLITICAL MEETINGS, (ARTICLES 137, 138 AND 139; MAXIMUM SENTENCE ONE YEAR).

5. (U) IN ADDITION, THREE ALLEGED MEMBERS OF THE BANNED PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) WHO WERE ARRESTED MARCH 14 IN JAKARTA WILL BE CHARGED UNDER THE WIDELY-CRITICIZED "ANTI-SUBVERSION" LAW, ACCORDING TO POLICE SOURCES CITED IN MARCH 18 MEDIA REPORTS. THAT LAW CARRIES THE DEATH PENALTY ALTHOUGH DEATH SENTENCES HAVE NOT BEEN IMPOSED UNDER THIS LAW IN MANY YEARS. THE POLICE SOURCES DISPUTED INITIAL MILITARY CLAIMS THAT BOMB-MAKING PARAPHERNALIA HAD BEEN FOUND IN THE APARTMENT. THE POLICE SAID THAT IN FACT ONLY

PRD LITERATURE HAD BEEN SEIZED, INDICATING THE CASE WILL BE BASED ON THE DETAINEES DISSENTING VIEWS.

6. (SBU) AMONG THE OVER 140 ARRESTS OVER THE PAST FIVE WEEKS ARE THE FOLLOWING: ARRESTS TOOK PLACE ON FEBRUARY 11 (123 REMAIN DETAINED), MARCH 9 (SIX REMAIN DETAINED) AND MARCH 10 (NINE REMAIN DETAINED). AN ADDITIONAL SIX SBSI MEMBERS WERE ARRESTED FROM THEIR HOMES IN JAKARTA AND SERANG (WEST JAVA) ON THE NIGHT OF MARCH 8, PRIOR TO THE MARCH 9 DEMONSTRATION. AMONG THOSE ARRESTED MARCH 9 AND MARCH 10 AT JAKARTA DEMONSTRATIONS WERE THREE JOURNALISTS. ALL ARE MEMBERS OF THE UNOFFICIAL JOURNALISTS UNION, THE "ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS." ACCORDING TO SBSI, FOUR OF THOSE ARRESTED MARCH 8-9 WERE IN MILITARY CUSTODY, ALTHOUGH TWO OF THEM (INCLUDING THE ONE WHO WAS REPORTEDLY TORTURED) WERE LATER RELEASED. THE REST ARE IN POLICE CUSTODY. IN ADDITION, POLICE QUESTIONED THE SBSI SECRETARY GENERAL AS A WITNESS FOR THREE HOURS ON MARCH 16. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL HAS REPORTED OVER 250 ARRESTS ON POLITICAL

CHARGES NATIONWIDE OVER THE PAST MONTH.

7. (U) A PROMINENT ACTIVIST, BONAR TIGOR NAIPOSPOS (COKI) WHO WAS ARRESTED DURING A DEMONSTRATION MARCH 10, WAS "LOANED" BY THE POLICE TO THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9887

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9887

PAGE 01 JAKART 01607 02 OF 03 181046Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W

----------2889E0 181046Z /38

R 181046Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0518
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

USMISSION GENEVA
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 001607

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/16/2003
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PINS, PINR, PGOV, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: HARSH TREATMENT FOR SOME REGIME CRITICS

REF: A) JAKARTA 1399 (NOTAL), B) JAKARTA 0794 (NOTAL)

AGENCY "BIA" AND WAS HELD INCOMMUNICADO UNTIL HIS RELEASE MARCH 12, ACCORDING TO THE AJI CONTACTS CLOSE TO HIM. POLICE HELD NINE OF THE MARCH 10 ARREST GROUP FOR 32 HOURS BEFORE PRODUCING A WARRANT FOR THEIR ARREST. INDONESIAN LAW REQUIRES THAT ARREST WARRANTS BE PRODUCED WITHIN 24 HOURS. ALSO ARRESTED IN THIS MARCH 10 INCIDENT WAS THE LAWYER OF THE CHIEF DEFENDANT, THE ACTRESS RATNA SARUMPAET.

INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUE:
---

8. (C) IN ADDITION TO THE ARRESTS, A NUMBER OF INVESTIGATIONS ARE UNDERWAY WHICH TARGET PROMINENT BUSINESSMEN AND ACADEMICIANS WHO HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF THE REGIME, AND/OR SUPPORTIVE OF THE OPPOSITION. THE INVESTIGATION OF PROMINENT SINO-INDONESIAN BUSINESSMEN SOFIYAN AND YUSUF WANANDI IS CONTINUING WITH QUESTIONING RECENTLY EXTENDING TO THEIR PERSONAL STAFFS. ACCORDING TO MILITARY SOURCES CITED IN THE MEDIA, THE WANANDIS WERE ALLEGEDLY CONNECTED TO A SEPARATE INVESTIGATION OF PRD CADRE ARRESTED MARCH 12 (SEE PARA 4).

9. (C) [redacted] WHO OFFERED FINANCIAL B6
CONFIDENTIAL

SUPPORT TO OPPOSITION CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT AMIEN RAIS, TOLD POLOFF MARCH 17 THAT HE IS STILL BEING QUESTIONED AS ARE THREE OF HIS ASSOCIATES. IN A RECENT DISCUSSION, HE TOLD POLOFF THAT EIGHT OTHERS AMONG 120 ALUMNI OF THE PRESTIGIOUS BANDUNG TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE WHO SIGNED A PETITION CALLING FOR PRESIDENT SOEHARTO NOT TO SEEK A SEVENTH TERM IN OFFICE ALSO ARE NOW BEING QUESTIONED. IN A MARCH 17 DISCUSSION [redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT ALLEGATIONS B6
THAT HE PROPOSED A "SUBVERSIVE PLAN" AT AN EARLY FEBRUARY MEETING WITH AMIEN RAIS, HAVE BEEN REFUTED. HE NOTED THAT 13 OF 14 PEOPLE AT THE MEETING, INCLUDING OPPOSITION LEADER AMIEN RAIS HIMSELF, HAVE SIGNED A LETTER DISPUTING THE REPORT OF THE 14TH PARTICIPANT UPON WHICH [redacted] INVESTIGATION B6
WAS LAUNCHED. [redacted] SAID THAT THE POLICE HAD ADMITTED TO B6
HIM THAT WHILE THERE WAS NO BASIS TO PROCEED WITH THE INVESTIGATION, THEY WERE "ACTING ON ORDERS."

PRESSURE ON ACTIVISTS:
---

10. (C) A NUMBER OF SENIOR PRO-REFORM ACTIVISTS IN JAKARTA ARE EITHER IN HIDING OR ARE SEEKING TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY IN RESPONSE TO FORMAL POLICE SUMMONS, INFORMAL "INVITATIONS" BY THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION ("BIA") OR RAIDS ON THEIR OFFICES. THE ACTING LEADER OF SBSI (SERVING IN PLACE OF SBSI PRESIDENT MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN WHO IS NOW INCARCERATED) IS NOW IN HIDING, SHIFTING HIS RESIDENCE DAILY. A JOURNALIST IS LEAVING THE COUNTRY AFTER HER OFFICE WAS RANSACKED BY 15 PEOPLE WHO TOLD NEIGHBORS SHE WAS A SYMPATHIZER OF THE BANNED PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

11. (C) THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN RAIDS ON OFFICES OUTSIDE OF JAKARTA. THE BANDUNG OFFICE OF THE NATIONALIST STUDENT MOVEMENT (A LEGAL MASS ORGANIZATION) WAS RAIDED AND RANSACKED ON MARCH 13 BY ABOUT TEN "PREMAN" (THUGS). ONE PERSON IN THE OFFICE WAS BEATEN. THE NATIONAL FORUM FOR INDONESIAN YOUTH (FKPI) VISITED THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MARCH 16 TO PROTEST THE RAID. LEADERS OF THE NATIONALIST STUDENT MOVEMENT BELIEVE THE RAID WAS CARRIED OUT BY SECURITY FORCES. IN LATE FEBRUARY, THE SBSI OFFICE IN GARUT, WEST JAVA WAS RAIDED AND SEVEN SBSI OFFICIALS WERE BRIEFLY DETAINED.

12. (SBU) OUTSIDE OF JAKARTA, STUDENT ACTIVISTS REPORT THAT THEIR HOMES HAVE BEEN VISITED BY THE AUTHORITIES, PROMPTING THEM TO AVOID RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES AND CHOOSING INSTEAD TO REMAIN ON CAMPUS. THE PRESS REPORTS THAT POLICE IN OGJAKARTA ARE SEEKING COOPERATION OF UNIVERSITY AUTHORITIES IN IDENTIFYING STUDENTS WHO WERE DIRECTLY CRITICAL OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IN A MASSIVE DEMONSTRATION MARCH 10.

DISAPPEARANCES:
---

13. (U) OUTSIDE OF JAKARTA, THERE ARE WELL-DOCUMENTED

PAGE 01 JAKART 01607 03 OF 03 181046Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W

----------2889E2 181047Z /38

R 181046Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0519
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 001607

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/16/2003
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PINS, PINR, PGOV, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: HARSH TREATMENT FOR SOME REGIME CRITICS

REF: A) JAKARTA 1399 (NOTAL), B) JAKARTA 0794 (NOTAL)

CASES OF DISAPPEARANCES AND ARRESTS ON POLITICAL GROUNDS

AS WELL AS CASES OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE GONE INTO HIDING. PIUS LUSTRILANANG, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NGO "ALDERA" HAS BEEN MISSING SINCE FEBRUARY 4. DESMON MAHESA, DIRECTOR OF THE LEGAL AID FOUNDATION (NUSANTARA) HAS BEEN MISSING SINCE FEBRUARY 5. [redacted] A MEMBER OF THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, TOLD POLOFF ON MARCH 17 THAT THE COMMISSION HAS TWICE FORMALLY ASKED FOR MILITARY CLARIFICATION OF THE CASES AND HAD RECEIVED NO RESPONSE. POLOFFS ALSO WERE UNABLE TO ELICIT ANY RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS WITH REGARD TO THESE CASES PUT TO BRIG. GENERAL SANUSI, CHIEF OF THE "B" DIRECTORATE IN THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION "BIA," IN A MARCH 18 MEETING.

B6

14. (C) A DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL OF MEGAWATI'S FACTION OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS ALSO BEEN MISSING FOR OVER ONE WEEK.

15. (C) COMMENT: IN EMBASSY'S MARCH 10 ORAL DEMARCHE TO THE AMERICA'S DIRECTOR AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, POLCOUNS RAISED THE ABOVE CASES INCLUDING THE JAKARTA ARRESTS, DISAPPEARANCE CASES AND THE REPORT OF TORTURE REPORTEDLY METED OUT TO ONE SBSI MEMBER IN MILITARY CUSTODY. WE HAVE ALSO

RAISED THESE CASES WITH THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AND WITH THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION "BIA." TWO EUROPEAN EMBASSIES (BRITISH AND FINNISH) HAVE SOUGHT INFORMATION FROM US IN SUPPORT OF SIMILAR DEMARCHES WHICH THEY SAID THEY WERE CONSIDERING.

OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ7795

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ7795

PAGE 01 JAKART 06198 01 OF 03 220921Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ITCE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXME-00	E-00
	UTED-00	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00	/016W

----------F1DF5D 220926Z /38

P 220920Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO DEPTTREAS WASHDC PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7946
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USDOC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 006198

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA

TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTHAUS

TREASURY PLS PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC - LOUNGANI
AND FED RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO - CURRAN

COMMERCE FOR IEP/EAP/OKSA/MIKALIS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 06198 01 OF 03 220921Z
PASS EXIM FOR AL-ASKARI AND IMAM

PASS OPIC

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 22 FINANCIAL UPDATE
REF: JAKARTA 5975

1. (U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.

2. (U) SUMMARY. BANK INDONESIA HAS ANNOUNCED STEPS TO LOOSEN LIQUIDITY. THE INDONESIAN STATE SECRETARY TOLD THE PRESS THAT SINGAPORE WILL PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT ADDITIONAL TO THE IMF FINANCIAL PACKAGE; HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE GOI'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IMF ARE REACHING THEIR CONCLUSION. END SUMMARY.

BANK INDONESIA ANNOUNCEMENTS

3. (U) BANK INDONESIA HAS CUT BANKS' FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE REQUIREMENT FROM 5 PERCENT TO 3 PERCENT (BANKS' RUPIAH RESERVE REQUIREMENT REMAINS AT 5 PERCENT). THE POLICY IS AIMED AT INCREASING USD LIQUIDITY LOCALLY. PRESS REPORTS SAY THAT INTERBANK USD INTEREST RATES DECLINED FROM 7.5 PERCENT TO 5 PERCENT ON THE NEWS. AT THE SAME TIME, BANK INDONESIA INCREASED RUPIAH LIQUIDITY. IT RE-OPENED ITS MONEY MARKET SECURITIES ("SBPU") LENDING FACILITY, THE OPERATIONS OF WHICH HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED SINCE JULY 24. ON OCTOBER 21, THE CENTRAL BANK REPORTEDLY INCREASED LIQUIDITY BY RP 1.3 TRILLION, RP 1.1

TRILLION IN MATURING CENTRAL BANK CERTIFICATES ("SBI'S") AND RP 220 BILLION IN SBPU PURCHASES. BI ALSO LOWERED SBI RATES SLIGHTLY FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE LATE SEPTEMBER. WITH BOTH DOLLAR AND RUPIAH LIQUIDITY INCREASING, IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHAT EFFECT THE MOVES WILL HAVE ON THE EXCHANGE RATE, WHICH HOVERED AT THE 3,600 LEVEL ON OCTOBER 21 AND WAS STABLE ON OCTOBER 22. (SEE TABLES AT THE END OF THE MESSAGE FOR EXCHANGE RATE AND INTEREST RATE DEVELOPMENTS.)

4. (U) BANK INDONESIA ALSO CONTINUES TO INTERVENE SELECTIVELY IN

THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET. BI MANAGING DIRECTOR FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE PAUL SOETOPO TOLD THE PRESS ON OCTOBER 21 THAT BI HAS INTERVENED TO THE TUNE OF USD 1.5 BILLION, IN TOTAL, SINCE THE EXCHANGE RATE BAND WAS CANCELED IN MID-AUGUST. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE HAS CHANGED: BEFORE THE BAND WAS CANCELED, INTERVENTION WAS TO KEEP THE EXCHANGE RATE WITHIN BOUNDS; NOW INTERVENTION IS AIMED AT PREVENTING SHARP MOVEMENTS IN THE EXCHANGE RATE, BUT DOES NOT TARGET A PARTICULAR EXCHANGE RATE LEVEL.

FORMATION OF TEAM TO BOOST EXPORTS

5. (U) ON OCTOBER 14, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SIGNED A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE WHICH ESTABLISHED A TEAM TO BOOST EXPORTS. THE TEAM'S TASKS ARE TO: IDENTIFY OBSTACLES; RECOMMEND POLICIES TO ADDRESS THEM; DEVISE STRATEGIES FOR PRODUCTS WHICH HAVE A COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE; TAKE STEPS TO ELIMINATE IMPEDIMENTS TO EXPORT PRODUCTS' COMPETITIVENESS AND THE GENERAL PRODUCTION AND EXPORT PROCESSES; AND TO ESTABLISH CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BUSINESS WORLD IN ORDER TO INCREASE EXPORTS' VOLUME, COMPETITIVENESS, AND EASE WITH WHICH THEY ARE UNDERTAKEN.

THE TEAM IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE. MEMBERS ARE DRAWN FROM THE MINISTRIES OF FINANCE (CUSTOMS AND EXCISE AND TAXATION DIVISIONS), INDUSTRY AND TRADE, INTERNAL AFFAIRS, COMMUNICATIONS (E.G., TRANSPORTATION), AND MANPOWER, BANK INDONESIA, AND THE INDONESIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY. IN ADDITION, BANK INDONESIA IS IMPLEMENTING A SWAP FACILITY THAT WILL ALLOW EXPORTERS TO CONVERT FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS TO RUPIAH, WITH CERTAINTY THAT THEY WILL LATER BE ABLE TO PURCHASE FOREIGN EXCHANGE AT A PRESPECIFIED RATE. RESPONSE TO THIS HEDGING FACILITY HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN DISAPPOINTING.

SINGAPORE TO PITCH IN

6. (U) STATE SECRETARY MOERDIONO, REPORTING ON THE OCTOBER 21 MEETING BETWEEN VISITING SINGAPOREAN PRIME MINISTER GOH CHOK TONG AND PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SINGAPORE IS PREPARED TO GIVE INDONESIA A LOAN TO SUPPLEMENT THE IMF'S EFFORT TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE RUPIAH. THE LOAN WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF FUNDS TO STRENGTHEN INDONESIA'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE

RESERVES. LEADING BUSINESS DAILY "BISNIS INDONESIA" PUBLISHED IN ITS LEAD ARTICLE THE STARTLING RUMOR "CIRCULATING IN MARKET CIRCLES THAT THE LOAN PACKAGE INDONESIA WILL RECEIVE IS VERY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ7797

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ7797

PAGE 01 JAKART 06198 02 OF 03 220921Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ITCE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXME-00	E-00
	UTED-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00	/015W	

----------F1DF65 220926Z /38

P 220920Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO DEPTTREAS WASHDC PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7947
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USDOC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 006198

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA

TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTHAUS

TREASURY PLS PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC - LOUNGANI
AND FED RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO - CURRAN

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMERCE FOR IEP/EAP/OKSA/MIKALIS

PASS EXIM FOR AL-ASKARI AND IMAM

PASS OPIC

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 22 FINANCIAL UPDATE

LIKELY TO TOTAL ABOUT USD 30 BILLION, WITH ABOUT USD 10 BILLION FROM THE IMF, USD 5 BILLION EACH FROM SINGAPORE AND JAPAN. THE REST, ABOUT USD 10 BILLION, WILL COME FROM VARIOUS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES." ON THE OTHER HAND, PROMINENT BUSINESSMAN SOFYAN WANANDI IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT A US$ 10-15 BILLION IMF PACKAGE WOULD BE "MORE THAN ENOUGH, BECAUSE OUR SITUATION IS FAR BETTER THAN THAT OF THAILAND."

7. (SBU) THE ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT SINGAPORE'S PREPAREDNESS TO ASSIST COMES IN THE WAKE OF JAPANESE VICE FINANCE MINISTER EISUKE SAKAKIBARA'S OCTOBER 18 REMARKS TO THE PRESS ON JAPAN'S WILLINGNESS TO HELP. AN OFFICER AT THE JAPANESE EMBASSY CONFIRMED TO US THAT SAKAKIBARA HAD STATED THAT JAPAN IS WILLING TO OFFER FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, BUT SAID THAT THE EMBASSY HAD NO INFORMATION FROM THE JAPANESE FINANCE MINISTRY ON

THE AMOUNTS INVOLVED. THE JAPANESE EMBOFF ALSO SAID THAT
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JAKART 06198 02 OF 03 220921Z
SAKAKIBARA HAD TOLD THE PRESS THAT, IN HIS VIEW, INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS ARE QUITE GOOD. THE EMBOFF HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SAKAKIBARA HAD CONCLUDED THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE A NEED FOR A LONG LIST OF REFORMS, BUT THAT PERHAPS THE BANKING AND FINANCIAL SECTORS NEEDED REFORM.

TALKS ON SCHEDULE

8. (U) STATE SECRETARY MOERDIONO WAS QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS SAYING THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FUND ARE REACHING THEIR FINAL STAGE AND THAT HE HOPED THEY WOULD BE COMPLETED BY THIS WEEKEND. HE CONFIRMED THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAD MET WITH THE IMF'S HUBERT NEISS (WHO HAD JUST ARRIVED). MOERDIONO CONCLUDED THAT THE IMF BOARD WOULD DECIDE ON FUND ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA DURING A BOARD MEETING AT THE END OF OCTOBER.

TABLES

9. (U) TABLE 1:
RECENT RUPIAH/USD JAKARTA SPOT MARKET EXCHANGE RATES

DATE	RP/US$	COMMENT
1/1/97	2,383	
7/4	2,431	
7/11	2,445	EXCHANGE RATE BAND WIDENED
7/18	2,511	
7/25	2,608	
8/1	2,611	
8/8	2,598	
8/15	2,895	INTERVENTION BAND CANCELED 8/14

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

8/22	2,705	
8/29	2,910	
9/5	2,970	
9/12	2,950	
9/19	2,985	
9/26	3,100	
10/3	3,400	
10/10	3,483	ANNOUNCEMENT OF IMF CONSULTATIONS ON 10/8
10/17	3,656	
10/21	3,662	(DEPRECIATION: 53 PERCENT SINCE JANUARY; 33 PERCENT SINCE MID-AUGUST)

SOURCE: "BISNIS INDONESIA" NEWSPAPER.

10. (U) TABLE 2:
SBI INTEREST RATES

	TERM						
DATE	O/N	2-6 DAY	1 WK	2 WK	1-MO	3-MO	6-12 MO
AS OF 8/18	15	16	10.5	11	11.63	11.5	12.125-12.75
AS OF 8/19	15	16	20	22	30	28	12.125-12.75
AS OF 9/ 4	15	16	20	22	27	25	12.125-12.75
AS OF 9/ 9	15	16	19	21	25	23	12.125-12.75
AS OF 9/15	15	16	18	20	23	21	12.125-12.75
AS OF 9/22	15	16	17	19	21	29	12.125-12.75
AS OF 9/29	15	16	16	18	20	19	12.125-12.75
AS OF 10/21	14	15	16	18	20	18	12.125-12.75

NNNNPTQ7793

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ITCE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXME-00	E-00
	UTED-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	G-00	/014W		

----------F1DF47 220925Z /38

P 220920Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO DEPTTREAS WASHDC PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7948
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USDOC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 006198

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA

TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTHAUS

TREASURY PLS PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC - LOUNGANI
AND FED RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO - CURRAN

COMMERCE FOR IEP/EAP/OKSA/MIKALIS

PASS EXIM FOR AL-ASKARI AND IMAM

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PASS OPIC

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 22 FINANCIAL UPDATE

TABLE 3:
SBPU INTEREST RATES

	TERM				
	1 WK	2 WK	1-MO	2-MO	3-MO
DATE					
AS OF 10/21	18	20	22	21	20

NOTE: ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES. THE SBI IS THE INDONESIAN EQUIVALENT OF THE U.S. TREASURY BILL, EXCEPT THAT IT IS ISSUED DIRECTLY BY BANK INDONESIA RATHER THAN BY THE FINANCE MINISTRY. BANK INDONESIA USES THE SBI AND THE SBPU FOR OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS.
SOURCES: BANK INDONESIA, AND "BISNIS INDONESIA" AND "KOMPAS" NEWSPAPERS.

11. (U) TABLE 4:
INTERBANK RATES

TERM
UNCLASSIFIED

	TERM					
	O/N	1 WEEK	1 MONTH	3 MONTH	6 MONTH	12 MONTH
DATE						
6/30	13.78	13.85	13.69	13.11	14.45	15.07
7/31	18.27	17.19	17.19	17.17	17.17	17.47
8/19	85.7	51.9	45.95	34.34	31.52	30.80
8/27	27.14	31.90	40.00	39.76	30.71	26.19
9/ 4	33.50	34.95	35.45	31.96	27.64	24.32
9/ 9	31.27	29.66	28.61	27.66	24.05	21.72
10/2	22.66	23.66	23.66	24.00	2.00	20.66
10/21	16.88	19.97	23.04	23.41	23.16	21.69

NOTE: ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES. FIGURES ARE THE AVERAGE JAKARTA INTERBANK OFFER RATE (JIBOR). MOST INTERBANK BORROWING IS VERY SHORT-TERM.
SOURCE: "BISNIS INDONESIA" NEWSPAPER.

12. (U) TABLE 5:
DEPOSIT RATES

	TERM				
	1 MONTH	3 MONTHS	6 MONTHS	12 MONTHS	24 MONTHS
DATE					
6/30	14.26	14.72	15.10	15.26	14.90
7/31	14.26	14.71	15.10	15.25	14.90
8/19	14.71	15.04	15.27	15.43	15.10
8/27	17.94	17.26	15.95	15.88	15.19
9/ 4	19.04	18.00	16.07	15.98	15.31
9/ 9	19.16	18.02	16.02	15.95	15.29
10/2	20.54	19.01	16.58	16.32	15.55
10/21	23.25	21.26	17.89	17.27	16.57

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NOTE: ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES. FIGURES ARE THE AVERAGE FOR RUPIAH DEPOSITS FOR ALL JAKARTA BANKS.
SOURCE: "BISNIS INDONESIA" NEWSPAPER.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

E32

°PTQ3834

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3834

PAGE 01 JAKART 05938 01 OF 02 081155Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ITCE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXME-00	E-00
	UTED-00	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00	/023W			

----------ED000C 081155Z /38

O 081154Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7721
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USDOC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 005938

TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTHAUS AND FIN. SERV./KAPLAN

TREASURY PLS PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC AND FED RESERVE
SAN FRANCISCO - T. CURRAN

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS AND EB/OMA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MIKALIS

PASS EXIM FOR AL-ASKARI AND AMAM

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05938 01 OF 02 081155Z
PASS OPIC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: GOI REQUESTING IMF ASSISTANCE

REF: (A) JAKARTA 5679
(B) JAKARTA 5699
(C) JAKARTA 5866

1. (U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASIFFIED.

2. (U) SUMMARY. ON OCTOBER 8, THE GOI ANNOUNCED THAT, FOLLOWING UP ON INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, IT IS REQUESTING IMF AND WORLD BANK HELP TO STRENGTHEN ITS FINANCIAL SECTOR. A BANK/FUND MISSION IS EXPECTED HERE SHORTLY. THE STATEMENT NOTED THAT, ALTHOUGH FOREIGN RESERVES ARE STILL ADEQUATE TO COVER FIVE MONTHS OF IMPORTS, THE GOI IS EXPLORING THE AVAILABILITY OF LONG TERM SUPPORT FUNDS FROM INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING THE IMF. THE PRESIDENT INSTRUCTED THE MINISTER OF FINANCE AND THE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR TO CARRY OUT THE DECISION AND TAPPED PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR WIDJOJO NITISASTRO TO BE INVOLVED IN COORDINATION OF THESE EFFORTS. THE STATEMENT ALSO INDICATED THAT THE GOI WOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO DEFEND THE RUPIAH, WHICH HAS UNDERGONE "EXCESSIVE" DEPRECIATION. END SUMMARY.

EIGHT-POINT PRESS RELEASE

UNCLASSIFIED

3. (U) THE GOI'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT IS SEEKING IMF/WORLD BANK ASSISTANCE IS PART OF AN EIGHT-POINT PRESS RELEASE PUBLISHED FOLLOWING TODAY'S LIMITED CABINET MEETING, WHICH CONVOKED TWO COORDINATING MINISTRIES: ECONOMY, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT SUPERVISION (MINISTER SALEH AFIFF) AND PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION (MINISTER HARTARTO), ALONG WITH OTHER RELEVANT MINISTRIES. AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE POINTS FOLLOWS:

4. (U) BEGIN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION:

(1) ALL RELEVANT MINISTRIES AND INSTITUTIONS ARE TO SAFEGUARD STOCKS OF ESSENTIAL GOODS AND SERVICES AND STRIVE TO MAINTAIN PRICE STABILITY.

(2) PRESIDENTIAL DECISION NUMBER 39 OF 1997, CONCERNING THE POSTPONEMENT AND REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE PROJECTS, AS WELL AS PRIVATE PROJECTS RELATED TO GOVERNMENT AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (REFS A AND B), WILL BE STRICTLY ENFORCED AND WILL BE COORDINATED BY THE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR ECONOMY, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT SUPERVISION.

(3) IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, INCLUDING VOLATILITY WHICH ORIGINATES ABROAD (NOTE: THIS IS CLEARLY A REFERENCE TO CURRENCY TURBULENCE), THE GOVERNMENT WILL INCREASE ITS CAREFUL MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY, AND WILL IMPLEMENT STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENTS NEEDED TO MAKE THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY MORE EFFICIENT AND MORE COMPETITIVE GLOBALLY.

(4) TO MAKE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY PROCEED SMOOTHLY, AND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF HELPING MEDIUM-SIZED, SMALL, AND COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISES, THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO EASE THE LIQUIDITY IN THE ECONOMY, IN ACCORD WITH THE (ECONOMIC) SITUATION.

(5) WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO THE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE RUPIAH, WHICH REMAINS VOLATILE AND HAS UNDERGONE EXCESSIVE DEPRECIATION (REF C), THE GOVERNMENT WISHES TO MAKE CLEAR THAT, EVEN THOUGH A FREELY FLOATING EXCHANGE RATE HAS ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED, NEVERTHELESS THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO ACT TO MINIMIZE THE VOLATILITY OF THE EXCHANGE RATE AND PREVENT EXCESSIVE DEPRECIATION.

IN THIS CONTEXT, THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONDUCTED INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE WORLD BANK. AS

A FURTHER MEASURE, THE IMF AND WORLD BANK WILL SEND A MISSION TO INDONESIA IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE GOVERNMENT IS ALSO REQUESTING THAT THE IMF AND WORLD BANK ASSIST EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ3835

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3835

PAGE 01 JAKART 05938 02 OF 02 081155Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ITCE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXME-00	E-00
	UTED-00	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00	/023W			

ED0011 081155Z /38

O 081154Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7722
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USDOC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 005938

TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTHAUS AND FIN. SERV./KAPLAN

TREASURY PLS PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC AND FED RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO - T. CURRAN

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS AND EB/OMA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MIKALIS

PASS EXIM FOR AL-ASKARI AND AMAM

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: GOI REQUESTING IMF ASSISTANCE

(6) ALTHOUGH INDONESIA'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES REMAIN AT A SAFE LEVEL, SUFFICIENT TO COVER FIVE MONTHS OF IMPORTS, NEVERTHELESS, AS A CAUTIONARY MEASURE, THE GOVERNMENT IS SOUNDING OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF LONG-TERM SUPPORT FUNDS FROM INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS INCLUDING THE IMF. THE PRESIDENT HAS INSTRUCTED THE MINISTER OF FINANCE AND THE GOVERNOR OF BANK INDONESIA TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS IN THIS AREA.

(7) WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT, THE GOVERNMENT WILL MAINTAIN THE EXISTING FREE FOREIGN EXCHANGE SYSTEM.

(8) TO ASSIST WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DECISION, THE PRESIDENT HAS INSTRUCTED PRESIDENTIAL ECONOMIC ADVISOR, PROFESSOR WIDJOJO NITISASTRO, TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS, IN COORDINATION WITH THE RELEVANT INSTITUTIONS.

END UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION.

COMMENT
---

5. (SBU) THIS IS A STRONG STATEMENT, INDICATING THE

INDONESIAN ECONOMY AND THE APPARENTLY BOTTOMLESS EXCHANGE RATE. CALLING ON THE IMF IN THIS FASHION IS UNPRECEDENTED FOR INDONESIA; IT HAS BEEN AN ARTICLE OF FAITH WITH MOST OBSERVERS THAT INDONESIA WOULD NOT DO SO. THE STATEMENT CAN BE READ AS A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE AIMED AT BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN BUSINESS COMMUNITIES. IN ADDITION TO SEEKING AN IMF SEAL-OF-APPROVAL AND LINE OF CREDIT, THE GOVERNMENT IS PROMISING CASH-STRAPPED DOMESTIC FIRMS THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO EASE LIQUIDITY (POINT 4) AND FOREIGN FIRMS THAT IT WILL NOT IMPOSE CAPITAL CONTROLS (POINT 7). NAMING TECHNOCRAT WIDJOJO NITISASTRO AS OVERALL COORDINATOR OF THE ACTION PLAN IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT. A FORMER CABINET MINISTER (HE WAS SIMULTANEOUSLY COORDINATING MINISTER FOR ECONOMY-FINANCE-AND-INDUSTRY, AND FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, FROM 1978-1983), WIDJOJO IS CONSIDERED ONE OF THE MAIN ARCHITECTS OF INDONESIA'S REMARKABLE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OVER THE LAST TWO DECADES.

6. (U) FURTHER EMBASSY ANALYSIS WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL.
ROY

NNNN

E27

[redacted]L PTQ9670

PAGE 01 JAKART 06121 01 OF 04 180202Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EB-00
	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00
	SSAS-00	/021W					

----------F0A355 180205Z /38

R 180157Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC 7895
INFO USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

[redacted] L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 006121

DEPARTMENT FOR E, EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA

TREASURY FOR OASIA

PASS USTR FOR PHILLIPS AND LATIMER

PASS EXIMBANK

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 02 JAKART 06121 01 OF 04 180202Z

DECLASSIFIED BY TREASURY DEPARTMENT
Authority: Avon Bunker
Date: 5/16/07

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/16
TAGS: EFIN, ETRD, EIND, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN ECONOMY: WAITING FOR THE OTHER SHOE TO DROP

REF: A) JAKARTA 6024, B) JAKARTA 6113

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ECON COUNSELOR JUDITH FERGIN; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY. AS THE IMF AND WORLD BANK BEGIN THEIR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA, THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY CONTINUES TO ANTICIPATE THAT THE WORST IS YET TO COME. THE CONVERGENCE OF DROUGHT, FIRES, AND FINANCIAL CRISIS IS TAKING A HEAVY TOLL. THE PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION, TOURISM, AND AUTOMOBILE SECTORS ARE EXPERIENCING HARD TIMES. LACK OF INFORMATION AND TRANSPARENCY ARE INCREASINGLY BEING IDENTIFIED AS IMPORTANT SOURCES OF INDONESIA'S WOES. END SUMMARY.

THE BIG QUESTION MARK: SHORT-TERM DEBT

3. (C) NOBODY KNOWS THE AMOUNT OF UNHEDGED SHORT-TERM DEBT OWED BY PRIVATE INDONESIAN COMPANIES. MUCH COMMERCIAL PAPER (CP) AND MEDIUM-TERM NOTES DO NOT LEAVE A TRACEABLE PAPER TRAIL. ACCORDING TO MARKET SOURCES, INDONESIAN COMPANIES HAVE OFTEN MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFFSHORE BANKS WHICH "WASH" CP DEALS THROUGH LOCAL BANKS, BUT THE DEALS ARE NOT REGISTERED HERE. GUESSES

OF THE AMOUNT OF CP DUE BETWEEN SEPTEMBER AND DECEMBER 1997 RUN IN THE USD 6 TO 7 BILLION RANGE, BUT MOST OBSERVERS SAY THEY HAVE NO IDEA AND THAT THERE IS NO RELIABLE WAY TO FIND OUT.

4. (C) IT IS THOUGHT THAT MOST INDONESIAN CP IS IN THE THREE TO SIX MONTH RANGE. ONE BANKER CHARACTERIZED THE CP MARKET AS "PRETTY DEAD" FOR THE PAST TWO MONTHS. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT THINK THAT NECESSARILY MEANT THAT THE WORST HAD BEEN REVEALED. FIRST, THERE IS SOME PAPER

WITH LONGER (UP TO ONE YEAR) TENORS. SECOND, SOME BANKS HAVE AGREED TO ROLL CP OVER PARTIALLY OR COMPLETELY FOR, SAY, A MONTH. THIRD, ACCORDING TO OTHER MARKET SOURCES, THERE ARE SOME DERIVATIVES BASED ON INDONESIAN CP WHICH DO NOT SHOW UP ON ANYBODY'S BOOKS HERE BUT WHICH ARE A CONTINGENT LIABILITY.

5. MARKET SOURCES INDICATE THAT SOME INDONESIAN COMPANIES HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR CP OBLIGATIONS. THEY ATTRIBUTE THIS PARTLY TO A GENERAL CONTRACTION OF THE MARKET FOR INDONESIAN PAPER, WITH EVEN SOME EXPORTERS HAVING THEIR LINES REDUCED. THIS GENERAL REDUCTION IN THE ABILITY OF INDONESIAN FIRMS TO PLACE SHORT-TERM PAPER COUPLED WITH THE RUPIAH LIQUIDITY SQUEEZE, THE THIN SUPPLY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE TO THE JAKARTA MARKET AS FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNERS CHOOSE NOT TO REPATRIATE THEIR FUNDS, HIGH DOMESTIC BORROWING RATES, AND THE WEAK RUPIAH HAS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR SOME COMPANIES TO COVER THEIR OBLIGATIONS. IN SOME CASES, BANKERS SAY, INDONESIAN COMPANIES ARE TRYING TO PLAY CHICKEN WITH THEIR CREDITORS: ALTHOUGH THEY MAY HAVE

C[redacted]

C[redacted]

THE FUNDS STASHED OFFSHORE TO SERVICE THEIR DEBT, THEY TEST THEIR ABILITY TO OBTAIN A ROLLOVER BY CLAIMING INABILITY TO PAY.

6. BANKERS REPORT THAT THE BANKS AND OTHER PURCHASERS ARE BEING LEFT HOLDING CP THEY DON'T WANT, BUT FOR WHICH THE ISSUERS CANNOT OR WILL NOT PAY. THE PURCHASERS INCLUDE FOREIGN INSTITUTIONS; MANY ARE REPORTEDLY SOUTH KOREAN, TAIWANESE AND JAPANESE, BUT SINGAPOREAN, U.S., BRITISH, AND OTHER COUNTRIES' INSTITUTIONS ARE ALSO INVOLVED. ALTHOUGH CP IS SUPPOSED TO BE BACKED UP WITH A BANK LINE OF CREDIT, INDONESIAN BANKS ARE REDUCING THOSE FACILITIES. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CONCERN THAT COMPANIES WILL BEGIN TO CLOSE (AND NO END OF RUMORS ABOUT WHICH COMPANY WILL BE THE FIRST TO GO). IF COMPANIES FAIL, BANKS' BALANCE SHEETS, ALREADY WEAKENED BY THE RUPIAH'S DECLINE AND THE HIGH INTEREST RATE ENVIRONMENT, COULD TAKE A MAJOR BLOW.

7. (C) ONE SENIOR BUSINESSMAN SAID THAT, OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS, THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY HAD SIGNIFICANTLY OVER-BORROWED. THIS OVER-LEVERAGING WAS MANAGEABLE AS LONG AS THE ECONOMY WAS GROWING, MARGINS WERE HIGH, AND THE CURRENCY WAS STABLE. ANOTHER PROBLEM WAS TENOR

[redacted]

NNNNPTQ9674

[redacted] PTQ9674

PAGE 01 JAKART 06121 02 OF 04 180206Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EB-00
	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00
	SSAS-00	/021W					

----------F0A3B5 180206Z /38
R 180157Z OCT 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC 7896
INFO USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

[redacted] ION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 006121

DEPARTMENT FOR E, EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA

TREASURY FOR OASIA

PASS USTR FOR PHILLIPS AND LATIMER

PASS EXIMBANK

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/16
TAGS: EFIN, ETRD, EIND, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN ECONOMY: WAITING FOR THE OTHER SHOE TO DROP

MISMATCHES FOR BOTH RUPIAH AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE-DENOMINATED BORROWING. A THIRD PROBLEM WAS CURRENCY MISMATCHES AS A RESULT OF COMPANIES PRODUCING FOR THE LOCAL MARKET WITH RUPIAH REVENUES HAVING BORROWED OFFSHORE IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE. HE STATED THAT, OVER THE LONGER RUN, THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY WOULD BE ABLE TO SERVICE ITS DEBT, BUT ONLY IF ITS LINES OF CREDIT WOULD NOT BE WITHDRAWN. IT WAS THE REDUCTION IN CREDIT FACILITIES, IN HIS ANALYSIS, WHICH WAS DRIVING MANY COMPANIES TO THE WALL. HE GAVE AN EXAMPLE OF ONE COMPANY'S BEING GIVEN 14 DAYS TO REPAY USD 100 MILLION IN SHORT-TERM CREDIT AS THE LINE WAS PULLED BEFORE THE CREDIT FELL DUE. HIS PRESCRIPTION FOR RECOVERY WAS: BANKING SECTOR REFORM TO ADDRESS THE GEARING; THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LOCAL BOND MARKET; AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE FLOATING EXCHANGE RATE REGIME AS A CRITICAL FORCE FOR CHANGING INDONESIANS' BORROWING MENTALITY.

8. (C) FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, THE SENIOR BUSINESSMAN WISHED THAT CASH-STRAPPED INDONESIAN COMPANIES WOULD PAY THEIR WORKERS AND SUPPLIERS FIRST. INSTEAD, THEY ARE TRYING TO PAY THEIR BANKERS FOR FEAR THAT THE RUMOR MILLS WOULD TARGET THEM IF THEY FAILED TO COVER THEIR DEBT SERVICE. IN THE BUSINESSMAN'S VIEW,

THE BANKS HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO NEGOTIATE: IF THEY ROLL

[redacted]

[redacted]

CREDITS OVER, THE COMPANIES MAY SURVIVE TO GENERATE THE FUNDS TO PAY THEIR DEBTS; THE BANKS DO NOT WISH TO TAKE OVER COMPANIES; AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IS SO CORRUPT AND SLOW THAT BANKS AS A RULE PREFER TO NEGOTIATE OVER INITIATING LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.

FEELING FOR THE BOTTOM

9. (C) THERE IS HOPE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR THAT, IF INDONESIA AND THE IMF SUCCEED IN NEGOTIATING A PROGRAM, THE CENTRAL BANK WILL SUPPLY SOME FOREIGN EXCHANGE LIQUIDITY TO THE BANKING SYSTEM. THIS WOULD PERMIT THE BANKS TO "ROLL OVER" PRIVATE SECTOR SHORT TERM DEBT AND IN TURN SHIFT INDONESIAN CORPORATE RISK FROM FOREIGN TO DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS. THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS BEGGING THE GOVERNMENT TO LOWER INTEREST RATES AND LOOSEN UP LIQUIDITY. SOME ECONOMISTS BELIEVE THAT THE GOI MADE A MISTAKE WHEN IT SEVERELY TIGHTENED LIQUIDITY UPON REMOVING THE CURRENCY BAND BECAUSE, WHILE COMPANIES CAN LIVE WITH EVEN A SHARP DEPRECIATION, THEY CANNOT SURVIVE WITHOUT LIQUIDITY. OTHERS CRITICIZE THE GOVERNMENT FOR SENDING INCONSISTENT SIGNALS: REDUCING INTEREST RATES AND INTERVENING IN THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS HAS CAUSED CONFUSION ABOUT GOI INTENTIONS. ECONOMISTS AND BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES ALSO CRITICIZE THE GOVERNMENT FOR LAGGING IN ANNOUNCING ACTUAL POLICY MEASURES FOLLOWING THEIR AUGUST/SEPTEMBER ANNOUNCEMENTS OF FORTHCOMING BANK MERGERS AND DEREGULATION MEASURES AFFECTING THE REAL SECTOR.

10. (C) ACCORDING TO [redacted] B1

[redacted]

[redacted] ONLY BY FORCING THE SITUATION TO BOTTOM OUT CAN INDONESIA REGAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN COMMUNITY. THE LIQUIDITY CRUNCH TOGETHER WITH THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE CURRENCY'S DAILY FLUCTUATIONS ARE THE BIGGEST PROBLEMS FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR. HER PRESCRIPTION IS FOR A "REVERSE SHOCK OF A POSITIVE NATURE" SUCH AS ANNOUNCING AN IMF PACKAGE MARKED BY SERIOUS REFORMS AND THEN SLOWLY LETTING GO OF LIQUIDITY WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT WHERE THE EXCHANGE RATE FALLS. [redacted] HAS CALCULATED PURCHASING POWER PARITY FOR INDONESIA AND DETERMINED THAT 4000 RUPIAH/DOLLAR IS THE PROPER RATE, ACCORDING TO [redacted]

B1

B1

B1

11. (C) MANY OBSERVERS NOTE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SEEMS TO HAVE CONSIDERABLY MORE CONFIDENCE IN INDONESIA THAN THE INDONESIAN PRIVATE SECTOR ITSELF. A CHINESE-INDONESIAN CONGLOMERATE OWNER TOLD VISITING TREASURY DAS ZELIKOW AND EAP DAS BRAZEAL THAT SOCIAL UNREST OVER THE PAST YEAR HAD MADE INDONESIAN CAPITAL-HOLDERS NERVOUS. THE EXCHANGE RATE UNCERTAINTY ON TOP OF THIS PRE-EXISTING UNEASINESS HELPED EXPLAIN THE SCARCITY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE IN THE INDONESIAN MARKET. MULTIPLE SOURCES -- BANKS, VENTURE CAPITAL FIRMS, AND

[redacted]

NNNNPTQ9673

[redacted] PTQ9673

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EB-00
	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00
	SSAS-00	/021W					

----------F0A3AE 180206Z /38

R 180157Z OCT 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC 7897
INFO USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

[redacted] SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 006121

DEPARTMENT FOR E, EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA

TREASURY FOR OASIA

PASS USTR FOR PHILLIPS AND LATIMER

PASS EXIMBANK

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

[redacted]

[redacted]

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/16
TAGS: EFIN, ETRD, EIND, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN ECONOMY: WAITING FOR THE OTHER SHOE TO DROP

SECURITIES HOUSES -- REPORT "HUGE" INTEREST IN THE INDONESIAN MARKET ON THE PART OF FOREIGN (ESPECIALLY U.S.) INVESTORS. THE INVESTORS ARE, HOWEVER, WAITING

FOR THE STOCK MARKET TO BOTTOM OUT AND THE EXCHANGE RATE AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK TO STABILIZE BEFORE BRINGING THEIR FUNDS TO INDONESIA. IN THE INTERIM, SOME INTERNATIONAL BANKING HOUSES ARE INTERESTED IN ISSUING JUNK BONDS FOR INDONESIAN CORPORATIONS. THE COUPONS WILL BE HIGH, THEY REPORT, BUT A CORPORATION IN NEED OF FUNDS MIGHT BE WILLING TO PAY THE HIGH COST.

BANKING SECTOR

12. (SBU) THE BANKING SECTOR REMAINS UNSETTLED. THE TOP TEN BANKS HAVE AN INFORMAL AGREEMENT NOT TO OFFER MORE THAN 27 PERCENT ON DEPOSITS. WHILE THERE IS APPARENTLY NO FORMAL AGREEMENT AMONG THE LARGEST BANKS TO BAIL EACH OTHER OUT, THERE IS, AS ONE BANK PRESIDENT TOLD US, AN INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT TO PROVIDE LIQUIDITY IN HOURS OF NEED. THERE ARE CONFUSED REPORTS THAT THE CENTRAL BANK MAY HAVE ASKED EIGHT OF THE LARGEST BANKS TO COOPERATE WITH THE AUTHORITIES ON THE BANK BAIL-OUT/LIQUIDATION EFFORT.

13. (U) THE CENTRAL BANK APPEARS TO BE MOVING CLOSER

TO CLOSING DOWN INSOLVENT INSTITUTIONS. THE NAMES OF THE TARGETED BANKS HAVE NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED, BUT THE PUBLIC EMPHASIS HAS BEEN ON SMALL BANKS AND ON LARGER BANKS' ASSUMING THE CLOSING BANKS' LIABILITIES. THE HEAD OF A LARGE INDONESIAN BANK TOLD US THAT THE IMMINENT DEMISE OF UNSPECIFIED BANKS DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE CAUSED DEPOSITORS TO SHIFT THEIR FUNDS OUT OF SMALLER (OR ANY) BANKS.

14. (SBU) SOME OF THE MORE SOPHISTICATED MIDDLE CLASS DEPOSITORS ARE, HOWEVER, SHIFTING THEIR PRIVATE FUNDS FROM RUPIAH DEPOSITS TO FOREIGN CURRENCY-DENOMINATED ASSETS. ONE EMPLOYER TOLD US THAT HER MIDDLE-RANK STAFF (MAKING AROUND RP 4 MILLION PER MONTH) HAS BEEN BUYING AUSTRALIAN DOLLARS (SINCE U.S. DOLLARS ARE HARD TO OBTAIN). A BANKER CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME MOVEMENT TOWARD NON-RUPIAH DENOMINATED DEPOSITS.

BUSINESS IN GENERAL

15. THE BUSINESS OUTLOOK REMAINS GLOOMY, WITH COMPANIES SQUEEZED BY LACK OF CREDIT AND A WEAK RUPIAH. ONE KNOWLEDGEABLE BUSINESSMAN OPINED THAT RECOVERY OF THE EXCHANGE RATE TO RP 3,000/USD WOULD MAKE FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOSSES MANAGEABLE. HOWEVER, AT RP 4,000/USD, RARE WILL BE THE MAJOR CORPORATION WHICH DOES NOT SHOW A LOSS IN ITS 1997 BALANCE SHEET. AND IF CONFIDENCE IS NOT RESTORED SO THAT LINES OF CREDIT ARE NOT REOPENED OR CONTINUE TO CONTRACT, BUSINESSES WILL FAIL. THAT SAID, [redacted] REMARKED THAT SOME LARGE BUSINESSES WHICH EXPORT AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ARE B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BENEFITING FROM THE CURRENT SITUATION. THESE COMPANIES, HE ADDED, ARE MOSTLY LOCATED OFF-JAVA.

PROPERTY AND CONSTRUCTION

16. (U) PROPERTY DEVELOPERS HAVE FINALLY ADMITTED THAT THE OUTLOOK FOR NEW SALES AND RENTALS IS GLOOMY. RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES ARE MORE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY THE ECONOMIC TURMOIL THAN OFFICE PROPERTIES, BUT EVEN THE LATTER MARKET IS EXPECTED TO SAG. WORK ON PROJECTS UNDER WAY IS GRADUALLY WINDING DOWN. MANY DEVELOPERS REPORT THAT THEY ARE FINISHING THE PHASE OF THE PROJECT CURRENTLY BEING UNDERTAKEN (THE FOUNDATION, FOR EXAMPLE) AND HALTING CONSTRUCTION AT THAT POINT. LARGE NUMBERS OF DAY LABORERS HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, WITH CONCERN MOUNTING THAT THE TOTAL COULD RISE TO ALMOST 200,000 (SEE REF. B).

TOURISM

17. (U) THE TOURISM INDUSTRY IS BEING AFFECTED PRIMARILY BY THE DROUGHT AND HAZE (AND THE PUBLICITY ABOUT THEM) RATHER THAN BY THE RUPIAH'S FALL OR DOMESTIC INTEREST RATES. MOST FACILITIES CATERING TO FOREIGN

[redacted]

NNNNPTQ9672

[redacted] PTQ9672

PAGE 01 JAKART 06121 04 OF 04 180203Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EB-00
	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00
	SSAS-00	/021W					

----------F0A363 180205Z /38

R 180157Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC 7898
INFO USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

[redacted] SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 006121

DEPARTMENT FOR E, EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA

TREASURY FOR OASIA

PASS USTR FOR PHILLIPS AND LATIMER

PASS EXIMBANK

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

[redacted]

[redacted]

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/16
TAGS: EFIN, ETRD, EIND, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN ECONOMY: WAITING FOR THE OTHER SHOE TO DROP

VISITORS QUOTE IN DOLLARS. THE DOWNTURN IN TOURISM, WHICH HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT AND GROWING FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNER FOR INDONESIA, COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES BOTH FOR EMPLOYMENT AND FOR THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT INDUSTRIES.

VEHICLE INDUSTRY

18. (U) WHEN DOMESTIC INTEREST RATES ROSE IN 1991, MOTORCYCLE SALES WERE UNAFFECTED AND THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT TIME LAG BEFORE AUTOMOBILE SALES DECLINED. HOWEVER, THE LAG HAS BEEN SHORTER THIS TIME. ALTHOUGH AUTOMOBILE SALES WERE QUITE STRONG IN JULY AND AUGUST (BECAUSE PRICES DID NOT RISE AS MUCH AS THE RUPIAH FELL), THEY WERE DOWN SIGNIFICANTLY IN SEPTEMBER. AN INDUSTRY EXECUTIVE REPORTED THAT SALES HAVE SLUMPED EVEN FURTHER IN THE PAST FEW DAYS.

NATIONAL CAR PROGRAM: STYMIED

19. (U) THE NATIONAL CAR PROGRAM REMAINS OFFICIALLY ALIVE. HOWEVER, IN PRACTICAL TERMS, IT IS DEAD, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. TIMOR CARS CONTINUE TO SELL VERY SLOWLY AND IMPORTED STOCK STILL FILLS THE PARKING LOT NEAR JAKARTA'S MAIN AIRPORT (NOW SURROUNDED BY AN

[redacted]

IMPENETRABLE FENCE -- A CAR DEALER REPORTS THAT PARKING A NEW CAR ON GRASS LIKE THAT DECREASES THE SALES VALUE SINCE THE CAR TAKES ON A GRASSY, MOLDY ODOR). WE ASSUME THAT STATE-OWNED BANK BUMI DAYA REMAINS ON THE HOOK FOR THE "BRIDGE" LOAN IT PROVIDED TO FINANCE THE FIRST LOT OF NATIONAL CARS IMPORTED FULLY BUILT-UP FROM SOUTH KOREA'S KIA MOTOR COMPANY. HOWEVER, THE BANKS IN THE CONSORTIUM OF STATE-OWNED AND PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BANKS HAVE NOT YET EXTENDED ANY OF THE USD 690 MILLION LOAN NEGOTIATED TO FINANCE CONSTRUCTION OF LOCAL MANUFACTURING FACILITIES. THE PRESIDENT OF ONE OF THE PRIVATE BANKS IN THE CONSORTIUM SAID THAT THE BANKS, IF TIMOR SOUGHT TO DRAW DOWN ON THE LOAN, WOULD REFUSE TO PROVIDE FUNDS NOW ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE FUNDS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. THE FINE PRINT IN THE LOAN CONTRACT PROVIDES FOR THIS CONTINGENCY.

WHY?

---

20. (C) MOST INDONESIANS AND FOREIGN ANALYSTS STILL REPEAT THE CHANT THAT INDONESIA'S FUNDAMENTALS ARE GOOD (OR AT LEAST BETTER THAN THAILAND'S). BUT INDONESIANS ARE ALSO SEARCHING FOR REASONS WHY INDONESIA'S EXCHANGE RATE HAS BEEN HIT HARDER THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY'S IN THE REGION. THE ANSWER HAS BEEN FOUND AT HOME. FREQUENTLY IDENTIFIED CULPRITS ARE CORRUPTION, NEPOTISM, AND LACK OF TRANSPARENCY. WHILE THESE MAY HAVE PLACED TOLERABLE BURDENS ON THE ECONOMY (AND OPAQUENESS PERHAPS EVEN ENCOURAGED COMPANIES TO BORROW, EXPAND, AND DIVERSIFY) WHEN GROWTH WAS STRONG, THEY NOW TRANSLATE INTO A FUNDAMENTAL UNCERTAINTY WHICH WILL DELAY RECOVERY.

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENT: THE "BISA DIATUR" FACTOR'S DECLINE

---

21. (U) IN THE PAST, IN INDONESIA, THINGS HAD A WAY OF WORKING OUT. WHEN CONFRONTED WITH A SEEMINGLY UNSOLVABLE SITUATION, MOST INDONESIANS WOULD REMARK,

"BISA DIATUR" (IT CAN BE WORKED OUT). IN MANY IF NOT MOST CASES, THEY WERE RIGHT. THIS WILLINGNESS TO NUDGE THINGS ALONG SO THAT THEY WOULD EVENTUALLY SOMEHOW WORK OUT WAS ONE OF THE CHARMS OF INDONESIAN SOCIETY. IT WAS ALSO ONE OF THE FACTORS THAT TEMPERED THE ROUGH AND TUMBLE OF THE BUSINESS WORLD AND SOCIAL INTERACTION. AS TIMES HAVE GOTTEN TOUGHER, IT HAS APPEARED TO US THAT THE BISA DIATUR FACTOR HAS DECLINED BOTH IN EFFECTIVENESS AND IN PEOPLE'S WILLINGNESS TO GIVE IT A TRY.

22. (U) THIS MESSAGE WAS CLEARED IN DRAFT BY TREASURY DAS ZELIKOW AND STATE/EAP DAS BRAZEAL. ROY

[redacted]

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED BY TREASURY DEPARTMENT
Authority: [illegible]
Date: 5/16/07

PTQ5538

[redacted] PTQ5538

PAGE 01 JAKART 06082 01 OF 04 162343Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00	SSAS-00	/021W

----------F0220C 162344Z /38

O 162338Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7863
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USDOC WASHDC

[redacted] L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 006082

TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTHAUS AND FIN. SERV./KAPLAN

TREASURY PLS PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC AND FED RESERVE
SAN FRANCISCO - T. CURRAN

STATE FOR EAP DAS BRAZEAL, EAP/PIMBS, AND EB/OMA

MANILA FOR USADB

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MIKALIS

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 02 JAKART 06082 01 OF 04 162343Z
PASS EXIM FOR AL-ASKARI AND IMAM

DECLASSIFIED BY TREASURY DEPARTMENT
Authority: Andy Baukol
Date: 5/16/07

PASS OPIC

E.O. 12958: 10/16/07
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: TREASURY/STATE CONSULTATIONS WITH INDONESIAN FINANCE MINISTER ON APPROACH TO IMF

REFS: A) JAKARTA 5938, B) JAKARTA 6024

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY. REASON 1.5(D)

[redacted] B1

5. (U) ON THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 16, TREASURY DAS

[redacted]

[redacted]

DANIEL ZELIKOW, STATE DAS AURELIA BRAZEAL, AND THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH FINANCE MINISTER MAR'IE MUHAMMAD. TREASURY ECONOMIST ANDREW VELTHAUS, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD OF GOVERNORS ECONOMIST PRAKASH LOUNGANI, AND ECONOFFS PARTICIPATED AS WELL.

1. (C) TREASURY DAS ZELIKOW OPENED THE MEETING BY REITERATING THE POINTS SECRETARY RUBIN MADE DURING HIS OCTOBER 9 TELEPHONE CALL TO INDONESIAN FINANCE MINISTER MAR'IE MUHAMMAD AND SUBSEQUENTLY RELAYED ON OCTOBER 10

BY THE AMBASSADOR TO BANK INDONESIA GOVERNOR SOEDRADJAD DJIWANDONO (REF. B). THE MINISTER INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECRETARY'S POSITION THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO BE SUPPORTIVE OF INDONESIA'S EFFORTS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

B1

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

TREASURY PLS PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC AND FED RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO - T. CURRAN

STATE FOR EAP DAS BRAZEAL, EAP/PIMBS, AND EB/OMA

MANILA FOR USADB

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MIKALIS

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 02 JAKART 06082 02 OF 04 162343Z
PASS EXIM FOR AL-ASKARI AND IMAM

PASS OPIC

E.O. 12958: 10/16/07
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: TREASURY/STATE CONSULTATIONS WITH INDONESIAN FINANCE MINISTER ON APPROACH TO IMF

B1

B1

[redacted]

NNNNPTQ5539

[redacted] PTQ5539

PAGE 01 JAKART 06082 03 OF 04 162344Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00	SSAS-00	/021W

----------F0221C 162344Z /38

O 162338Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7865
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
JSDOC WASHDC

[redacted] SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 006082

TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTHAUS AND FIN. SERV./KAPLAN

TREASURY PLS PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC AND FED RESERVE
SAN FRANCISCO - T. CURRAN

STATE FOR EAP DAS BRAZEAL, EAP/PIMBS, AND EB/OMA

MANILA FOR USADB

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MIKALIS

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 02 JAKART 06082 03 OF 04 162344Z
PASS EXIM FOR AL-ASKARI AND IMAM

PASS OPIC

E.O. 12958: 10/16/07
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: TREASURY/STATE CONSULTATIONS WITH INDONESIAN
FINANCE MINISTER ON APPROACH TO IMF

[redacted]

NNNNPTQ5541

[redacted] PTQ5541

PAGE 01 JAKART 06082 04 OF 04 162344Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00	SSAS-00	/021W

----------F0221F 162344Z /38

O 162338Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7866
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USDOC WASHDC

[redacted] SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 006082

TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTHAUS AND FIN. SERV./KAPLAN

TREASURY PLS PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC AND FED RESERVE
SAN FRANCISCO - T. CURRAN

STATE FOR EAP DAS BRAZEAL, EAP/PIMBS, AND EB/OMA

MANILA FOR USADB

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MIKALIS

[redacted]

[redacted]

PASS EXIM FOR AL-ASKARI AND IMAM

PASS OPIC

E.O. 12958: 10/16/07
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: TREASURY/STATE CONSULTATIONS WITH INDONESIAN FINANCE MINISTER ON APPROACH TO IMF

B1

B1

17. (U) THIS MESSAGE WAS CLEARED BY THE DELEGATION.
ROY

[redacted]

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED BY TREASURY DEPARTMENT
Authority: [illegible]
Date: 5/16/07

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND PARTIAL RELEASE
B1, 1.4(D)
REFERRED FOR DIRECT REPLY - TRSY

R 8

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00	SSAS-00	/020W	

----------F0A343 180202Z /38

O 180157Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7891
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 006120

TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTHAUS AND FIN. SERV./KAPLAN

TREASURY PLS PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC AND FED RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO - T. CURRAN

Indonesia

STATE FOR EAP DAS BRAZEAL, EAP/PIMBS, AND EB/OMA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MIKALIS

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB
PASS EXIM FOR AL-ASKARI AND IMAM

PASS OPIC

E.O. 12958: 10/17/07
TAGS: EFIN, ETRD, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: TREASURY/STATE DISCUSSIONS IN INDONESIA, OCTOBER 16-17: PRIVATE VIEWS

REF: JAKARTA 6072

JAKARTA 01 OF 04 6120

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY. REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY. ON OCTOBER 16-17, TREASURY DAS DANIEL ZELIKOW, STATE DAS AURELIA BRAZEAL, AND THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH FINANCE MINISTER MAR'IE MUHAMMAD AND BANK INDONESIA GOVERNOR SOEDRADJAD DJIWANDONO (SEPTELS), AS WELL AS WITH INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REPRESENTATIVES, LOCAL ANALYSTS, AND FOREIGN BUSINESS PEOPLE TO DISCUSS INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC SITUATION AND ITS ONGOING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IMF AND WORLD BANK. THE PRIVATE OBSERVERS WERE GENERALLY PLEASED THAT THE GOI HAD APPROACHED THE IMF, FULL OF SUGGESTIONS FOR POSSIBLE REFORMS, AND APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE FINAL SHAPE AND IMPACT OF ANY PACKAGE OF MEASURES AGREED UPON. END SUMMARY.

3. (SBU) DURING THEIR OCTOBER 16-17 VISIT TO JAKARTA, TREASURY DAS DANIEL ZELIKOW AND STATE DAS AURELIA BRAZEAL, ALONG WITH TREASURY ECONOMIST ANDREW VELTHAUS AND FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD OF GOVERNORS ECONOMIST PRAKASH LOUNGANI, MET WITH A RANGE OF OFFICIALS AND BUSINESS PEOPLE TO DISCUSS INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC SITUATION AND ITS APPROACH TO THE IMF. MEETINGS WITH SENIOR INDONESIAN ECONOMISTS (NOT IN GOVERNMENT) AND REPRESENTATIVES OF U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF

DECLASSIFIED BY TREASURY DEPARTMENT
Authority: Malady Degan
Date: 2/5/09

Lot #98D624, box #3, file: ECON 2 East Asia + Pacific - Indonesia FY 1997

Printed By: Daniel J. Epstein

COMMERCE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INSIGHTS INTO PRIVATE THINKING ON THE ROLE OF THE FUND/BANK PROGRAM NOW UNDER DISCUSSION. SEPTEL PROVIDES AN.UPDATE ON INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC SITUATION.

THE CONTEXT

4. (SBU) MANY INTERLOCUTORS WORRIED ABOUT THE CONVERGENCE OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS WITH THE SERIOUS DROUGHT, THE FIRES/HAZE AND ASSOCIATED HEALTH RISKS, AND THE UPCOMING PRESIDENT SELECTION IN MARCH 1998. OBSERVERS FOUND THE SENIOR LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT INEXCUSABLY DIVORCED FROM THE DROUGHT AND FIRES PROBLEMS, SEEMINGLY TO THE POINT OF DENYING THERE ARE PROBLEMS. [redacted] B1 [redacted] OBSERVED THAT, WHILE THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION OUTCOME IS A SURE THING, THE PROSPECT OF THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION MAKES IT HARD FOR THE ELITES/SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO FIND COMMON GROUND.

THE IMF PROGRAM: PRIVATE VIEWS

5. (C) THE VIEWS OF THE VARIOUS PRIVATE SECTOR INTERLOCUTORS WITH WHOM THE PARTY MET RANGED FROM OPTIMISM THAT SOME OF THE SACRED COWS WOULD BE ATTACKED TO NERVOUSNESS THAT THE PROGRAM WOULD IN THE END PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF FAVORED GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS. A FREQUENTLY VOICED THEME WAS THAT FOREIGN CONFIDENCE IN INDONESIA IS HIGHER THAN DOMESTIC CONFIDENCE AND THAT THE MEASURES MUST THEREFORE ADDRESS DOMESTIC CONCERNS. THERE WAS CONCERN AMONG INDONESIAN ECONOMISTS AND KNOWLEDGEABLE U.S. BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES THAT INDONESIA'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IMF AND WORLD BANK COULD FOUNDER ON THE ROCKS OF VESTED INTERESTS. THAT SAID, THERE WAS NEAR UNANIMITY AMONG PRIVATE OBSERVERS THAT, UNLESS THE DISTORTIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO VESTED INTERESTS WERE ADDRESSED (SEE BELOW), THE PACKAGE WOULD BE WINDOW-DRESSING AND THEREFORE INSUFFICIENT TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE.

6. (C) ACCORDING TO OUR INTERLOCUTORS, THE INDONESIAN PRIVATE SECTOR IS SPLIT IN ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FUND PROGRAM. EEW UNDERSTAND WHAT A FUND PROGRAM IS; ONE BUSINESSMAN SUGGESTED THAT SOME PUBLICITY ABOUT HOW THE PROGRAM WILL WORK WOULD BE HELPFUL. SOME BUSINESS PEOPLE WELCOME THE PROGRAM IN THE EXPECTATION THAT FUNDS

WILL BE AVAILABLE TO COVER OFFSHORE OBLIGATIONS; OTHERS FEAR A DRACONIAN PROGRAM WHICH WILL LEAD TO PROLONGED DOMESTIC RECESSION. THERE IS NO CONSENSUS ON THE SIZE OF THE PACKAGE NEEDED TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE, BUT THE PRIVATE SECTOR APPEARS TO BE LEANING TOWARD MORE RATHER THAN LESS. ONE LEADING BUSINESSMAN THOUGHT ANYTHING LESS THAN THE THAI PACKAGE WOULD BE UNSATISFACTORY, AND THAT ONLY A BIGGER PACKAGE THAN THAILAND'S WOULD BE CONFIDENCE-RESTORING.

THE TECHNOCRATS' GAMBLE

7. (C) SENIOR ECONOMISTS FROM THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS) SAW THE GOI'S INVITATION TO THE IMF AS A STRATEGIC MOVE BY TECHNOCRATS TO BRING EXTERNAL PRESSURE TO BEAR AND FORCE TOUGH DECISIONS THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO PUSH THROUGH ON THEIR

OWN. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE EMERGENCE OF A STRONG IMF PACKAGE WILL SIGNAL THAT THE TECHNOCRATS "HAVE THE STICK" AND ALLAY CONCERNS ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEXT CABINET. BUT THIS STRATEGY IS RISKY, BECAUSE THEY CONSIDER THAT A WEAK IMF PACKAGE WOULD BE WORSE THAN NO IMF PACKAGE AT ALL. IF THE TOUGH DECISIONS FAVORED BY THE TECHNOCRATS CANNOT PREVAIL UNDER IMF INFLUENCE, THEN THE ABILITY OF THE GOI TO MAKE SOUND ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE FUTURE IS SERIOUSLY IN DOUBT.

8. (C) STATEMENTS IN RECENT DAYS FROM STATE MINISTER MOERDIONO (WHICH ARE SEEN TO REFLECT THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS) HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER THE PALACE HAD A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONDITIONALITIES AND CONSEQUENCES ASSOCIATED WITH IMF ASSISTANCE WHEN THEY REQUESTED IT. GIVEN THE PRESIDENT'S COMPLETE DOMINANCE OF THE POLITICAL SCENE, THERE IS EFFECTIVELY NO POLITICAL RISK TO HIM SHOULD HE DECIDE NOT TO OPT FOR IMF ASSISTANCE AND ITS CONDITIONS, THEY CONCLUDED.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] TOLD THE VISITORS, "THE SUCCESS OF THE IMF NEGOTIATIONS WILL DEPEND ALMOST ENTIRELY ON HOW DR. WIDJOJO PRESENTS THE PACKAGE TO THE PRESIDENT." [redacted] B1

[redacted] THOUGHT THAT THE PACKAGE COULD BE MADE "SALEABLE" TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE PUBLIC. HE SUGGESTED THAT RAISING THE PRICE OF KEROSENE BY LESS THAN 100 PERCENT (I.E., RETAINING A SUBSIDY ELEMENT) COULD LEAVE ROOM FOR TACKLING OTHER PROBLEMS SUCH AS COMMODITY IMPORT MONOPOLIES AND THE STATE AIRCRAFT FACTORY.

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN A PACKAGE

9. (C) THE MINISTER OF FINANCE INDICATED THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST BE INVOLVED IN A SIGNIFICANT, HIGHLY VISIBLE WAY (REFTEL). OTHER INTERLOCUTORS SUCH AS [redacted] B1

[redacted] ECHOED THIS THEME. [redacted] SAID THAT IF JAPAN CONTRIBUTED BILATERAL FUNDS AND THE UNITED STATES DID NOT, IT WOULD REINFORCE THE PERCEPTION OF A REGIONAL DIVIDE DEVELOPED BY MANY ASIAN OBSERVERS FROM THE THAILAND BAILOUT - THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL ONLY BAILOUT LATIN AMERICA AND ASIA IS ON ITS OWN. U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVES LONG RESIDENT IN INDONESIA OPINED THAT THE SIZE OF THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION WAS NOT AS IMPORTANT AS THE FACT OF A U.S. CONTRIBUTION.

TARGETS FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM

10. (C) EVERY ONE HAD A PERSONAL LIST OF TOP AREAS FOR REFORM. LEADING CANDIDATES WERE:

--THE NATIONAL CAR PROGRAM: THE NATIONAL CAR PROGRAM IS EFFECTIVELY DEAD (AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING) DUE TO THE FINANCIAL TROUBLES OF KIA MOTORS, THE POOR SALES OF THE IMPORTED TIMORS, AND BANKS' INABILITY/UNWILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE FUNDING SHOULD THE TIMOR CAR COMPANY ASK TO START DRAWDOWNS ON ITS LOAN. NONETHELESS, THE

PRESIDENT, TIMOR-SPONSOR AND PRESIDENTIAL SON TOMMY SOEHARTO, AND THE MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE CONTINUE TO STATE THAT THE NATIONAL CAR PROGRAM IS A NATIONAL PRIORITY. A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE PROGRAM WAS BEING CANCELED OR EVEN JUST POSTPONED WON THE MOST VOTES AMONG CONFIDENCE-BOOSTING REFORM

INITIATIVES. THIS WOULD ADDRESS BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC CONCERNS.

--THE NATIONAL LOGISTICS BOARD (BULOG): BULOG'S MONOPOLIES ON THE IMPORT OF CERTAIN "STRATEGIC" COMMODITIES WAS ANOTHER FAVORED CANDIDATE. BULOG'S INTERVENTION MEANS THAT INDONESIA'S CONSUMERS PAY TOO MUCH FOR MANY FOOD ITEMS AND ITS REVENUES ARE OFF BUDGET AND KNOWN TO BE USED AS A SOURCE OF POLITICAL FUNDS BY THE GOVERNMENT. AS SUCH, THIS MEASURE WOULD BE AIMED AT DOMESTIC CONFIDENCE, BUT WOULD WIN PLAUDITS FROM FOREIGN INVESTORS AS WELL.

-- INDONESIAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY (IPTN): IPTN EXEMPLIFIES THE HABIBIE PHILOSOPHY OF DEVELOPMENT, THAT THE COLLATERAL BENEFITS FROM HIGH TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS ALWAYS JUSTIFY THE EXPENSE. IPTN IS DROWNING IN RED INK AND RECEIVES REGULAR INJECTIONS OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES. AS WITH THE NATIONAL CAR PROJECT, SOME MEASURE AIMED AT REINING IN IPTN WOULD SIGNAL, MAINLY TO THE DOMESTIC AUDIENCE, THE SERIOUS AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY NATURE OF THE GOI'S AUSTERITY.

--TARIFF/NON-TARIFF PROTECTION: OBSERVERS ALSO HOPED THAT THE PACKAGE WOULD REMOVE DISTORTIONS SUCH AS THE SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR THE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY.

--TAX HOLIDAYS: MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVED THAT THE (RE-) INTRODUCTION OF TAX HOLIDAYS WAS A MISTAKE. ALTHOUGH TAX HOLIDAYS MIGHT BE NECESSARY (ALTHOUGH CLEARLY NOT SUFFICIENT) TO ENCOURAGE DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN INDONESIA, THE LIST OF BENEFICIARIES ANNOUNCED IN SEPTEMBER INDICATED THAT THE HOLIDAYS WERE BEING USED LARGELY TO REWARD CRONIES.

--DOMESTIC DISTRIBUTION: THE CONVOLUTED REGULATION OF WHOLESALE AND RETAIL DISTRIBUTION IS WIDELY VIEWED AS A BARRIER TO EFFICIENCY. FOREIGNERS WOULD LIKE THE REMOVAL OR EASING OF THE LIMITATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS ON THEIR ABILITY TO DISTRIBUTE THEIR PRODUCTS. THE EFFECTS OF SUCH A MEASURE ON DOMESTIC CONFIDENCE WERE UNCLEAR TO INTERLOCUTORS AS MANY SMALL RETAIL OUTLETS WOULD BE CONFRONTED WITH NEW COMPETITIVE PRESSURES.

--BANKING SECTOR: WEEDING OUT FINANCIAL SECTOR DEADWOOD AND RECAPITALIZING THE BANKING SYSTEM WERE FAVORED CANDIDATES. INCREASED TRANSPARENCY (ESPECIALLY IN STATE-OWNED BANK LENDING) WOULD BE WELCOME. THE MEASURES WOULD BE GREETED POSITIVELY BY BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC BUSINESS.

CONCLUSION
---

11. (C) THE PRIVATE SECTOR OBSERVERS WERE VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS THAT INDONESIA HAD THE WHEREWITHAL TO EMERGE FROM THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. IT WAS MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO IDENTIFY WHAT SHORT-TERM MEASURES COULD RESTORE CONFIDENCE SO THAT RECOVERY COULD START SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. MANY THOUGHT THAT THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY WOULD BE STRONGER AND MORE COMPETITIVE AT THE END OF THE PROCESS -- IF INDONESIA TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY NOW AT HAND TO REMOVE SOME OF THE IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO EFFICIENCY. HOWEVER, THEY WERE ALSO QUITE GLOOMY WHEN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE TALKS WITH THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK FAILED. THEY INEVITABLY PREDICTED DIRE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, PERHAPS EVEN IRRETRIEVABLE DAMAGE TO THE PRESIDENT'S STANDING.

Printed By: Daniel J. Epstein

12. DAS ZELIKOW AND DAS BRAZEAL CLEARED THIS MESSAGE IN

JAKARTA 04 OF 04 6120

DRAFT.
ROY

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

RELEASED IN FULL

December 2, 1997

SIA

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Soeharto, President of Indonesia (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Soeharto, President of Indonesia is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Indonesia for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (S)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 25 APR 2007 200502960

SECRET
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 11/25/07

RELEASED IN FULL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ID 9708468

REFERRAL DATE: 02 JAN 98

MEMORANDUM FOR: BURNS, W

STATE SECRETARIAT 9800069

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: SOEHARTO

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 30 DEC 97

SUBJ: LTR RE VANCOUVER APEC SUMMIT & IMF BAILOUT

S2B

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUEDATE: 03 JAN 98

COMMENT:

FOR JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

OTC CAT 1-5-98

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 25 APR 2007 200502960

RELEASED IN FULL UNCLASSIFIED

SLD

Pouch Transmittal Slip

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Date: January 5, 1998

To: AMERICAN EMBASSY JAKARTA

From: Executive Secretariat

For Transmittal to Addressee at Discretion of Post

S/S Number/Description: 9800069
Orig signed letter from the President to Indonesian President Soeharto

Pouch Reg. No.: 4031704

Office: S/S-RMD

Signature: for Charles G. Jackson, Jr.

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

DIPLOMATIC POUCH MAIL REGISTRATION

4031704

NAME OF SENDER: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

DATE OF REGISTRATION: January 5, 1998

OFFICE SYMBOL OF SENDER: S/S-RMD

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSEE: AMEMB JAKARTA ATTN: OFFICER-IN-CHARGE

IDENTIFICATION: 9800069- Orig signed letter from the President to Indonesian President Soeharto

OPTIONAL FORM 120
December 1992
STATE-AID-USIA
50120-105

Signature

(To Be Retained by Registering Officer)

4031704

REGISTER

SENDER'S OFFICE SYM: S/S-RMD

UNCLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION

TO BE AFFIXED TO COVER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 25 APR 2007 200502960

RELEASED IN FULL

S3D

December 31, 1997

9800035

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM: DAN BURKHARDT
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CORRESPONDENCE
AND PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES

SUBJECT: ACTION REQUESTED ON WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED LETTTER

FROM: The President

TO: His Excellency Soeharto
President of Indonesia
Jakarta

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 25 APR 2007 200502960

RELEASED IN FULL
S3L

DIPLOMATIC POUCH MAIL REGISTRATION

NAME OF SENDER: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

OFFICE SYMBOL OF SENDER: S/S/RMD

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

DATE OF REGISTRATION: JANUARY 2, 1998

4031712

ADDRESSEE: AMERICAN EMBASSY JAKARTA

OIC

IDENTIFICATION: 9800035

12/19/97 letter from President Clinton to Indonesian President Soeharto.

(To Be Retained by Registering Officer)

Signature

OPTIONAL FORM 139
(Rev. 6-93)
STATE-AID-USIA
5610-105

☆U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1996-721-589

REGISTERED

4031712

SENDER'S OFFICE SYMBOL: S/S/RMD

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

TO BE AFFIXED TO COVER

Pouch Transmittal Slip

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Date: JANUARY 2, 1998

To: AMERICAN EMBASSY JAKARTA

From: Executive Secretariat

For Transmittal to Addressee at Discretion of Post

S/S Number/Description: 9800035

12.19.97 letter from President Clinton to Indonesian President Soeharto.

Pouch Reg. No.: 4031712

Office: S/S-RMD

Signature: for Charles G. Jackson, Jr.

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 25 APR 2007 200502960

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED

Pouch Transmittal Slip

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Date: January 15, 1998

S5B

To: AmEmbassy Jakarta, Indonesia - OIC

From: Executive Secretariat

For Transmittal to Addressee at Discretion of Post

S/S Number/Description: S/S-9800696.

Orig. 1/14 letter from President Clinton

to: Soeharto.

Pouch Reg. No.: 4031926

Office: S/S-RMD

Signature: for Charles G. Jackson, Jr.

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

c:\win386\pmdoc\transm.pm4

DIPLOMATIC POUCH MAIL REGISTRATION

NAME OF SENDER: Executive Secretariat

OFFICE SYMBOL OF SENDER: S/S-RMD

ADDRESSEE: AmEmbassy Jakarta, Indonesia - OIC

IDENTIFICATION: S/S-9800696. Orig. 1/14 letter from President Clinton to: Soeharto.

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

DATE OF REGISTRATION: January 15, 1998

4031926

REGISTERED

SENDER'S OFFICE SYMBOL: S/S-RMD

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

4031926

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 25 APR 2007 200502960

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ID 9800241

REFERRAL DATE: 14 JAN 98

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT 9800696

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: SOEHARTO

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 14 JAN 98

SUBJ: THANKS FOR SUMMERS VISIT & ECONOMIC SITUATION

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUEDATE: 15 JAN 98

COMMENT:

FOR JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

1-15-98
0718
CAtimes

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 25 APR 2007 200502960

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 14, 1998

RELEASED IN FULL

S6A

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Soeharto, President of Indonesia (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Soeharto of Indonesia is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Treasury. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Indonesia for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 01/12/08

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 25 APR 2007 200502960

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

9801104
0384

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

RELEASED IN FULL

January 21, 1998

S7B

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Soeharto, President of Indonesia (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Soeharto of Indonesia on January 15, 1998 is provided for the information of the Secretaries of State and Treasury. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Indonesia for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 1/19/08

CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 25 APR 2007 200502960

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

RELEASED IN FULL

1124

S&A

February 19, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Soeharto, President of Indonesia (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Soeharto of Indonesia is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Treasury. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Secretary level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Indonesia for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

FOR. Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 25 APR 2007 200502960

CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 02/17/08

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL

1286

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4 PNP

2/25
DIST

NODIS
DECAPTIONED

S9

MEMORANDUM FOR

S
D MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
S/S. Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Soeharto, President of Indonesia (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Soeharto of Indonesia is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Treasury. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Secretary level. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 25 APR 2007 200502960

CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 02/21/08

PTQ1966

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1966

PAGE 01 JAKART 06237 01 OF 03 231042Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00
	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01
	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	ITC-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-04	G-00	/019W				

----------F263EA 231043Z /38

O 231041Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7984
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 006237

FOR D, EAP, AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/16
TAGS: PREL, ECON, OTRA, ID
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S VISIT
- TO INDONESIA

REF: STATE 185770

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06237 01 OF 03 231042Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 23 APR 2007 200502960

1.5(D)

INTRODUCTION
---

2. (C) ON THE EVE OF YOUR VISIT, INDONESIA TOGETHER WITH ITS ASEAN NEIGHBORS IS FACING A TIME OF TROUBLES MORE SEVERE THAN ANY IN SOEHARTO'S LONG PERIOD OF RULE. YOUR VISIT IS WELL TIMED TO CONVEY A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT THE U.S. REMAINS COMMITTED TO A STRONG BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, TO UNDERSCORE OUR ENGAGEMENT IN THIS REGION, TO PAVE THE WAY FOR THE APEC MEETING IN VANCOUVER AND THE BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN OUR TWO PRESIDENTS THERE, AND TO PROVIDE AUTHORITATIVE WASHINGTON VIEWS ON A RANGE OF KEY ISSUES AFFECTING OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS. SENIOR OFFICIALS WILL WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY YOUR VISIT AFFORDS TO GET A FIRST HAND READOUT ON THE JIANG ZEMIN VISIT. NONETHELESS, YOU WILL FIND YOUR HOSTS MORE INTROSPECTIVE THAN USUAL, GIVEN THE FORMIDABLE ARRAY OF PROBLEMS LOOMING AHEAD. YET THEY REMAIN ACTIVELY ENGAGED ON CAMBODIA AND ARE LIKELY TO ADDRESS THEIR ECONOMIC TRIBULATIONS THROUGH REFORM AND DEREGULATION RATHER THAN RECRIMINATIONS AND BACKSLIDING. RECENT U.S. INITIATIVES HAVE RESTORED CONFIDENCE THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP IS SOUND, BUT THE ATMOSPHERE FOR YOUR DISCUSSIONS WILL BE SHAPED BY THE PERCEPTION OF OUR ROLE IN THE IMF ASSISTANCE PACKAGE THAT MAY BE ANNOUNCED JUST PRIOR TO YOUR ARRIVAL.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

---

3. (C) THE U.S.-INDONESIAN RELATIONSHIP HAS TURNED A CORNER SINCE MID-SUMMER. THE ASSUMPTIONS, REAL AND IMAGINED, UNDERLYING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE F-16 SALE AND IMET TRAINING, AND THE SUBSEQUENT GOI DECISION TO PURCHASE MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM RUSSIA, ARE GIVING WAY TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS OF THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SOUND, LONG-TERM RELATIONS. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S

SEPTEMBER 30 LETTER TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO CONVEYED AN AUTHORITATIVE MESSAGE THAT THE UNITED STATES VALUES ITS TIES WITH INDONESIA AND WILL HANDLE CONTENTIOUS AREAS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A FULL-BODIED, FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP. THROUGH MEETINGS IN KUALA LUMPUR AND NEW YORK, THE SECRETARY HAS FORGED A CLOSE, PRODUCTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS, AND THESE CONTACTS HAVE TANGIBLY DEMONSTRATED THE VALUE WE PLACE ON INDONESIA'S CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE REGION AND IN THE WIDER WORLD.

4. (C) AGAINST THIS BACKDROP, THE RELATIONSHIP STILL NEEDS MUCH WORK. VISITS BY SENIOR U.S. MILITARY LEADERS, SUCH AS ADMIRAL PREUHER, THE MARINE COMMANDANT, AND SECRETARY COHEN, HAVE SHORED UP OUR SECURITY TIES, BUT THE PROLONGED ABSENCE OF IMET TRAINING OR MILITARY SALES IS WEAKENING THE LINKS BETWEEN OUR TWO MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS AND PROGRESSIVELY ERODING THE NUMBER OF SENIOR INDONESIAN MILITARY OFFICERS WITH EXTENDED EXPOSURE TO OUR SOCIETY AND VALUES. MOREOVER, AS MENTIONED ABOVE, OUR RESPONSIVENESS TO THE REGION'S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FINANCIAL TROUBLES WILL HAVE AN ENORMOUS IMPACT ON OUR CREDIBILITY AS A FRIEND ON WHOM INDONESIA CAN COUNT IN THE CRUNCH.

INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL ACTOR

---

5. (C) IN ITS QUIET, LOW-KEY WAY, INDONESIA IS AN INFLUENTIAL PLAYER IN THE REGION. IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND PARTS OF THE MILITARY ONE CAN STILL STUMBLE ACROSS POCKETS OF TRADITIONAL NON-ALIGNED THINKING, BUT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO CLEARLY SEES INDONESIA'S MOST IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIPS AS BEING IN THE ASEAN REGION, WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM AND APEC, AND WITH ITS MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS. HE IS ALSO PREPARED CAUTIOUSLY TO EXPLORE NEW SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS, AS IN THE 1995 SECURITY AGREEMENT WITH AUSTRALIA. IN INDONESIAN EYES, OUR REGIONAL PRESENCE IS A DESIRABLE COUNTERBALANCE TO A RISING CHINA, BUT THEY

WILL EXPLORE OTHER OPTIONS IF WE PROJECT A CONFUSED IMAGE OF OUR GOALS IN ASIA. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO PERSONALLY DIRECTED THE SWITCH FROM F-16S TO SUKHOI 30S WHEN HE FELT CONGRESSIONAL CRITICS WERE HAVING TOO STRONG AN INFLUENCE OVER OUR APPROACH TO INDONESIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1968

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1968

PAGE 01 JAKART 06237 02 OF 03 231042Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00
	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01
	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	/019W		

----------F263EE 231043Z /38

O 231041Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7985
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 006237

FOR D, EAP, AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/16
TAGS: PREL, ECON, OTRA, ID
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S VISIT - TO INDONESIA

6. (C) INDONESIA HAS BEEN A CONSISTENT PARTNER WITH THE
CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES ON MANY ISSUES. FROM 1975 TO 1996, INDONESIA PROVIDED SAFE HAVEN TO THOUSANDS OF VIETNAMESE FLEEING THEIR HOMELAND. IT IS THE ONLY SOUTHEAST ASIAN MEMBER OF KEDO, AND IT HAS TWICE SENT MILITARY PERSONNEL TO BOSNIA AS WELL AS TO SOMALIA. IT WAS CO-CHAIR OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT BROKERED THE CAMBODIAN PEACE PROCESS, AND IT IS PLAYING A LEADING ROLE IN THE ASEAN TROIKA EFFORT TO RESTORE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN CAMBODIA. IT SUPPORTED THE 1995 EXTENSION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND IN 1996 BACKED U.S. EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY. CONVERSELY, AT THE UNITED NATIONS, WHERE IT PLAYS TO THE NON-ALIGNED AND ISLAMIC GALLERIES, IT VIES FOR THE WORST VOTING RECORD IN THE REGION IN TERMS OF CONSISTENCY WITH U.S. VOTES.

7. (C) IN ITS RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND CHINA, INDONESIA IS PLAYING A COMPLEX HAND. IT REMAINS WARY OF CHINA'S REGIONAL INTENTIONS, BUT MILITARY TIES ARE EXPANDING THROUGH EXCHANGES OF VISITS, AND WE OCCASIONALLY STUMBLE ACROSS EYE-BROW RAISING ANGLES, E.G. THE DEPUTY HEAD OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY SCHOOL IS JUST WINDING UP A WEEK-LONG VISIT HERE FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH GOLKAR ON A NEW TRAINING INSTITUTE GOLKAR PLANS TO OPEN NEXT YEAR. THE RUSSIANS HAVE ALSO BEEN COMING IN DROVES, TOUTING THEIR DEMOCRATIC CREDENTIALS, OFFERING DAZZLING DEALS FOR SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY, AND EXPLOITING THE INDONESIAN PERCEPTION THAT WE ARE AN UNRELIABLE SOURCE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

8. (C) IN SHORT, WE SHOULD CONSTANTLY KEEP IN MIND THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THE FACE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA CHANGED FOR THE BETTER WHEN INDONESIA ABANDONED IDEOLOGICAL POSTURING, MADE PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, AND ADOPTED A MODERATE AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO REGIONAL PROBLEMS. ASIDE FROM ITS LEADING ROLE ON CAMBODIA, IT QUIETLY SPONSORED REGIONAL WORKSHOPS TO EASE TENSIONS OVER THE SPRATLYS, BROKERED A PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT AND THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, AND SUBMITTED A TERRITORIAL DISPUTE WITH MALAYSIA TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE FOR RESOLUTION.

INDONESIA TODAY
---

9. (C) NEVERTHELESS, MORE SO THAN AT ANY TIME IN RECENT MEMORY, INDONESIA IS FOCUSED ON ITS INTERNAL PROBLEMS -- THE SLUMPING ECONOMY, THE DROUGHT/FOREST FIRES, LATENT INSTABILITY FACTORS, THE MARCH 1998 PRESIDENTIAL/VICE PRESIDENTIAL/CABINET SELECTIONS, AND AN EVENTUAL LEADERSHIP TRANSITION. THESE ISSUES ARE PREOCCUPYING INDONESIANS, AND ABSORB A GREAT DEAL OF INTELLECTUAL AND EMOTIONAL ENERGY.

O THE ECONOMY IS FACING ITS MOST SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES EVER UNDER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS RECEIVED GENERALLY GOOD MARKS FOR ITS INITIAL RESPONSE, THE HARDEST KNOCKS LIE AHEAD. COMING WEEKS COULD SEE A RASH OF BUSINESS FAILURES AND GROWING UNEMPLOYMENT. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS COMPOUNDED BY THE DROUGHT THREATENS HARDSHIP FOR BOTH URBAN AND RURAL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INDONESIANS, THE MAJORITY OF WHOM REMAIN POOR DESPITE THE REGIME'S REMARKABLE SUCCESS IN RAISING PER CAPITA INCOME.

- O SOCIAL STABILITY CONCERNS AND THE PROSPECT OF THE EVENTUAL, INEVITABLE LEADERSHIP TRANSITION PREOCCUPY MANY INDONESIANS, BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT.

- O THE FOREST FIRES, AND THEIR HAZE, HAVE RAISED THE PROFILE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, WHICH HAVE ALSO BECOME AN ELEMENT IN THE NATIONAL DEBATE ON CORRUPTION AND FAVORITISM.

THEMES FOR YOUR VISIT

10. (C) THREE CENTRAL THEMES FOR YOUR VISIT NATURALLY EMERGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON'S SEPTEMBER 30 LETTER AND INDONESIA'S CURRENT SITUATION:

-- BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP: INDONESIA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE BOTH BENEFITED FROM A STRONG RELATIONSHIP BUILT OVER THE DECADES. THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO BE

NNNNPTQ1969

PAGE 01 JAKART 06237 03 OF 03 231042Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00
	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01
	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	ITC-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	/020W			

----------F263F2 231043Z /38

O 231041Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7986
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 006237

FOR D, EAP, AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/16
TAGS: PREL, ECON, OTRA, ID
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S VISIT TO INDONESIA

RESPONSIVE TO INDONESIA'S SERIOUS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND SEVERE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES. WITHIN THE CONTEXT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06237 03 OF 03 231042Z
OF A HEALTHY BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, WE WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE WORKING WITH THE GOI TO PROMOTE HUMAN AND WORKER RIGHTS. WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL ON THE EAST TIMOR PROBLEM, IF THE PARTIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE USEFUL.

-- MULTILATERAL COOPERATION: YOUR VISIT WILL BE FOLLOWED CLOSELY BY THE APEC LEADERS MEETING IN VANCOUVER. THE UNITED STATES ANTICIPATES CONTINUED

PROGRESS ON ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AT THAT MEETING. WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO COUNT ON PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S LEADERSHIP TO CARRY ON THE PRO-MARKET MOMENTUM EMBODIED IN THE 1994 BOGOR DECLARATION, WHICH SOEHARTO SPONSORED DURING INDONESIA'S APEC CHAIRMANSHIP.

-- ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION: THE FOREST FIRES AND THEIR RESULTANT POLLUTION HAVE BROUGHT HOME TO THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES SUCH AS THE ENVIRONMENT. THE UNITED STATES LOOKS FORWARD TO WORKING WITH INDONESIA IN THE RUN-UP TO THE DECEMBER GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE IN KYOTO. MOREOVER, WE ARE COMMITTED TO COOPERATING WITH INDONESIA AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN THE REGION TO ENLARGE OUR MUTUAL ABILITIES TO PREDICT AND DEAL WITH FUTURE EL NINOS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

11. (C) BEYOND THESE CENTRAL THEMES, YOUR INTERLOCUTORS WILL BE INTERESTED IN EXCHANGING VIEWS ON SEVERAL SPECIFIC ISSUES:

-- CAMBODIA, WHERE FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS HAS TAKEN A PROMINENT ROLE IN ASEAN TROIKA EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH HUN SEN'S POWER GRAB.

-- CHINA, WHOSE CONTINUED EMERGENCE AS A MAJOR REGIONAL POWER PRODUCES DECIDEDLY MIXED EMOTIONS AMONG INDONESIAN LEADERS, WHO WILL PARTICULARLY WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE CHINESE PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

-- UN REFORM, PARTICULARLY THE STATE OF PLAY ON SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION, SINCE INDONESIA DESIRES A PERMANENT SEAT FOR ITSELF ON THAT BODY.

-- NORTH KOREA AND KEDO, GIVEN INDONESIA'S STATUS AS THE

SOLE ASEAN MEMBER OF THAT ORGANIZATION.

-- APEC, WHERE PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IS LOOKING FORWARD TO A BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON. IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO ARRIVE HERE WITH THE LATEST READING ON PLANS FOR VANCOUVER. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1143

PAGE 01 JAKART 00129 091033Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 /000W
----------0D66F6 091033Z /38

O 091030Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9030
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000129

DECAPTIONED

EXDIS

STATE FOR A/S ROTH
TREASURY FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS AND DAS ZELIKOW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/16
TAGS: EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: SOEHARTO-CLINTON PHONE CALL

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) MINISTER FOR INDUSTRY AND TRADE TUNKY ARIWIBOWO TELEPHONED ME JANUARY 9 TO PROVIDE FEEDBACK ON PRESIDENT CLINTON'S TELEPHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO THIS MORNING (JAKARTA TIME). TUNKY SAID SOEHARTO HAD CALLED HIM IN TO BRIEF HIM ON HIS LONG TALK WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON. TUNKY FELT SOEHARTO HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE

PAGE 02 JAKART 00129 091033Z
DISCUSSION. HE CALLED THE PHONE CALL VERY TIMELY. HE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 20 APR 2007 200502960

NOTED THAT IN CONVERSATION WITH ECONOMIC COLLEAGUES ON JANUARY 8, THEY HAD AGREED SUCH A CALL SHOULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE CAMDESSUS ARRIVED. THIS HAD NOW HAPPENED. SOEHARTO HAD NOW HEARD DIRECTLY FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON HOW THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET FELT ABOUT THE SITUATION HERE. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD PRESENTED THE CASE WELL. THIS WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR THE MESSAGE THAT CAMDESSUS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BRING.

3. (C) TUNKY SAID HE WOULD BE MEETING SHORTLY WITH OTHER MINISTERS TO DISCUSS FOLLOW-UP TO THE SOEHARTO-CLINTON PHONE CALL AND TO PREPARE FOR THE VISITS NEXT WEEK. TUNKY NOTED THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAD ALSO TASKED HIM THIS MORNING TO COORDINATE IMF-RELATED ISSUES, INCLUDING STRUCTURAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID HE WOULD LOOK TO TUNKY FOR HOW TO IMPLEMENT SUCH MEASURES. THIS WAS IN ADDITION TO HIS OTHER DUTIES.

4. (C) TUNKY NOTED THAT JANUARY 8 HAD BEEN A BAD DAY, WITH PANIC BUYING OF RICE AND OIL. HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAD SUMMONED HIM AND OTHER MINISTERS THIS MORNING (JANUARY 9) TO DISCUSS THE MATTER. FOLLOWING THIS THEY (THE MINISTERS) HAD HELD A TV AND PRESS INTERVIEW ON NATIONAL TELEVISION AIMED AT CALMING THE SITUATION. THEY WOULD REPEAT THIS PERFORMANCE THIS EVENING, ASSURING LISTENERS THAT FOOD STUFFS WERE IN PLENTIFUL SUPPLY. (NOTE: IN FACT JAKARTA WAS CALMER JANUARY 9, WITH FEWER ALARMIST RUMORS. BANK INTERVENTION ALSO KEPT THE RUPIAH FROM CONTINUING ITS DOWNWARD SLIDE, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.) ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7483

PAGE 01 STATE 008811 160310Z
ORIGIN EB-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	INLB-01	AF-01	AID-00	AIT-03
	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00
	INL-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01
	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	SNIS-00
	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	/039R	

008811
SOURCE: KODAKC.160069
DRAFTED BY: EB/IFD/OMA:MPATRICK:SLM -- 01/15/98 X75913 SEOMA 1347
APPROVED BY: EB/IFD:RDEUTSCH
EAP:DRYAN S/S:MKOUNMANS
EAP:JANDRE EAP:JWOLF
EAP:JFOSTER
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP, EB, ARA, NEA, EUR, SA, SNIS, AF, INR, PM, 10
----------1001B2 160312Z /38
P 160308Z JAN 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY
ALL OECD CAPITALS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
INFO AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 008811 160310Z
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 20 APR 2007 200502960

AMEMBASSY KIEV
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 008811

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/15/08
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, PGOV
SUBJECT: FINANCIAL CRISIS WG: DAILY SIT REP - JAN 15

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: ROBERT S. DEUTSCH, OFFICE DIRECTOR REASON: 1.5(B) AND (D).

2. (U) THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE MORNING DAILY MARKET SUMMARY, THE DAILY SITUATION REPORT, AND THE DAILY FINANCIAL SITUATION REPORT WHICH THE FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP (FCWG) SENDS TO THE SECRETARY.

3. (SBU) BELOW IS TEXT OF JANUARY 15 DAILY MARKET SUMMARY.

INDONESIA: MARKETS RESUMED THEIR DECLINES IN INDONESIA AFTER SUHARTO SIGNED A NEW REFORM PACKAGE WITH THE RUPIAH FALLING 8.2 PERCENT. THE PACKAGE RAISES FUEL PRICES, SCRAPS THE CLOVE MONOPOLY AND TAX BENEFITS FOR THE NATIONAL CAR PROJECT. THE PACKAGE ASSUMES ZERO GROWTH 20 PERCENT INFLATION. THESE CHANGES ARE EXPECTED, HOWEVER ANALYSTS REPORTED THAT JAPANESE BANKS WERE DISAPPOINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO GUARANTEE PRIVATE SECTOR LOANS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 008811 160310Z

JAPAN: THE STOCK MARKET WAS CLOSED TODAY FOR A NATIONAL HOLIDAY.

KOREA: THE WON STRENGTHENED ON CONTINUED OPTIMISM AND THE STOCK MARKET ROSE 6.5 AS FOREIGN INVESTORS CONTINUED TO BUY IN. THE MAJOR TRADE UNIONS AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN A TRIPARTITE COMMISSION TO SHARE THE BURDEN OF IMF RESTRUCTURING.

HONG KONG: SHARES TUMBLED 7 PERCENT TRIGGED BY A SLIDE IN THE SHARES OF SINO LAND GROUP AND ON DEBT WORRIES AND FALLING PROPERTY PRICES.

END TEXT.

4. (C) BELOW IS THE TEXT OF THE JAN 15 SITUATION REPORT.

SOEHARTO AND CAMDESSUS ON IMF PROGRAM: AN ANIMATED PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ANNOUNCED THE REVISED IMF PROGRAM. TALKING TO THE PRESS WITHOUT NOTES OR A PODIUM. THE EMBASSY COMMENTS THEY HAVE NEVER SEEN HIM SO CHATTY AND INFORMAL IN PUBLIC. SEPARATELY, IMF MANAGING DIRECTOR CAMDESSUS DESCRIBED IN DETAIL A STRENGTHENED REFORM PROGRAM TO THE JAKARTA PRESS. THE PROGRAM WILL AIM TO AVOID A RECESSION WHILE CONTAINING INFLATION TO 20 PERCENT THIS YEAR; A 1 PERCENT BUDGET DEFICIT IS EXPECTED (AS OPPOSED TO THE 1 PERCENT SURPLUS IN THE EARLIER PROGRAM AND SOEHARTO'S PROPOSED BALANCED BUDGET JUST LAST WEEK); SUBSIDIES WILL BE CURBED AND EVENTUALLY PHASED OUT, EXCEPT FOR SOME SENSITIVE FUELS; MOST STRUCTURAL REFORMS WILL BE

CONFIDENTIAL

IMPLEMENTED, MOST MONOPOLIES AND MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE ABOLISHED, EXCEPT FOR RICE; SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FOR THE NATIONAL CAR AND NATIONAL AIRPLANE PROGRAMS WILL BE REVOKED IMMEDIATELY. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WILL IMMEDIATELY PUBLISH THE GOL LETTER OF INTENT WITH THE IMF.

MARKETS WERE MIXED AFTER SOEHARTO'S ANNOUNCEMENT. AMBASSADOR ROY CAUTIONS THAT IT IS TOO EARLY TO JUDGE WHAT THE GENERAL IMPACT WILL BE, AS MANY INDONESIANS AND FOREIGNERS ALIKE ARE IN A "WAIT AND SEE" MODE. MOREOVER, THE MARKETS HAD ALREADY ANTICIPATED THE ANNOUNCEMENT THE DAY BEFORE WITH BIG JUMPS IN BOTH STOCK VALUES AND THE RUPIAN EXCHANGE RATE. ARRANGEMENTS ARE IN PLACE FOR PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TO CALL PRESIDENT CLINTON THIS MORNING AT 11:20 AM TO DESCRIBE WHAT STEPS HE HAS TAKEN AND SEEK U.S. ENDORSEMENT.

COHEN'S VISIT TO INDONESIA: AMBASSADOR ROY REPORTS THAT

THE VISIT WENT FLAWLESSLY AND SERVED AS AN EXCELLENT COUNTERWEIGHT IN THE FACE OF BROAD CONCERN ABOUT THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. COHEN'S VISIT EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHES TO OUR ENDURING, LONG TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA, A MESSAGE THAT STRUCK HOME WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND HIS SENIOR DEFENSE ADVISORS IN THIS RESPECT, AMBASSADOR ROY REPORTS, THE TIMING COULDN'T HAVE BEEN BETTER. AS A RESULT OF THIS VISIT, OUR FOOTING WITH INDONESIA'S DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT HAS BEEN STRENGTHEN. COHEN DID UNDERSCORE THE NEED TO ADHERE PUBLICLY AND FAITHFULLY TO THE IMF PROGRAM.

SINGAPORE REMAINS CONCERNED: EMBASSY SINGAPORE TELLS US
CONFIDENTIAL

THAT THE SINGAPOREANS REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE REGION AS IT COPES WITH THIS ECONOMIC CRISIS. THE SINGAPORE MARKETS ARE OFF A BIT AND SINGAPORE FEELS A HEIGHTENED SENSE OF VULNERABILITY. PERHAPS AS A REACTION TO THIS SENTIMENT, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TONY TAN ANNOUNCED WITH ONLY MINIMAL ADVANCED NOTICE IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE WITH SECRETARY COHEN EARLIER TODAY THAT SINGAPORE WOULD OPEN ITS CHANGI NAVAL BASE TO U.S. WARSHIPS AND WOULD BE BUILDING OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS A PIER CAPABLE OF SERVICING U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN MADE PUBLIC.

5. (C) BELOW IS THE TEXT OF THE DAILY FINANCIAL SITUATION REPORT.

INDONESIA

AS PART OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WILL CHAIR A HIGH-LEVEL COORDINATING COMMITTEE TO OVERSEE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC REFORMS AND HAS ASKED MANAGING DIRECTOR CAMDESSUS TO SECOND AN IMF OFFICIAL TO PARTICIPATE.

IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THE NEW LETTER OF INTENT DOES NOT GO MUCH BEYOND THE NOVEMBER AGREEMENT AND MANY OF THE TIME COMMITMENTS ARE OPEN-ENDED.

KOREA

MAJOR KOREAN LABOR UNIONS AGREED YESTERDAY TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSIONS ON IMF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION WITH
CONFIDENTIAL

REPRESENTATIVES OF GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS. AS A RESULT OF LABOR'S AGREEMENT, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH CONVENED AN EMERGENCY SESSION YESTERDAY, WILL DELAY

CONSIDERATION OF A BILL TO AUTHORIZE LAYOFFS IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN THE HOPES THAT A COMPROMISE BILL CAN BE WORKED OUT. REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH PRESIDENT-ELECT KIM AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TOLD THE EMBASSY THAT THE LEGISLATION WOULD PASS BEFORE THE END-OF-JANUARY TARGET DATE IN THE IMF PROGRAM.

LATIN AMERICA

VENEZUELA: BOWING TO PRESSURES GENERATED BY FALLING OIL PRICES, ASIAN FLU AND CREEPING CURRENCY OVERVALUATION, THE CENTRAL BANK (BCV) DEVALUED THE BOLIVAR BY 2.2 PERCENT AND ACCELERATED THE MONTHLY DEVALUATION RATE. ANALYSTS BELIEVE THAT THE BOLIVAR IS OVERVALUED BY UP TO 30 PERCENT. SINCE 1/9, BCV HAD REPORTEDLY SPENT DOLLARS 300 MILLION TRYING TO PROP UP THE BOLIVAR.

ARGENTINA: ARGENTINA DELAYED A PROPOSED DOLLARS 750 MILLION GLOBAL BOND ISSUE DUE TO "MARKET VOLATILITY," ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. ARGENTINA HAD HOPED TO PLACE TEN YEAR BONDS AT AROUND 450 BASIS POINTS OVER COMPARABLE U.S. TREASURIES VIA CHASE, HOWEVER, AFTER PRELIMINARY TALKS WITH INVESTORS THEY DECIDED TO WAIT UNTIL THE MARKET TURBULENCE SUBSIDED.

INDIA

THE RUPEE BREACHED THE "PSYCHOLOGICAL" LEVEL OF 40 TO THE DOLLAR ON JANUARY 14 AND WEAKENED INCREMENTALLY AGAIN ON JANUARY 15, BRINGING DEPRECIATION TO 1.5PERCENT FOR THE WEEK.

ACCORDING TO INDIAN PRESS REPORTS, THE CENTRAL BANK SOLD AROUND DOLLARS 100 MILLION ON TUESDAY TO MEET HEAVY CORPORATE DEMAND, THE FIRST TIME IN NEARLY A MONTH THAT IT HAD INTERVENED OTHER THAN TO SMOOTH VOLATILITY. THE 40/DOLLAR LEVEL HAS AN IMPACT MORE AS A ROUND NUMBER THAN A MEANINGFUL LEVEL. INDIAN AUTHORITIES MAY HAVE MADE A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO LET THE MARKET SET A MORE ADVANTAGEOUS EXCHANGE RATE, AS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SUGGESTED TO U.S. OFFICIALS IN LATE 1997; THE RUPEE HAS FALLEN 11PERCENT SINCE LAST JULY BUT HAD BEEN VERY STEADY IN THE PRECEDING YEAR. STOCK PRICES IN BOMBAY FARED MORE POORLY, FALLING 6.4 PERCENT DURING THE WEEK, AFFECTED BY SLOWING GROWTH AND EXPORTS AND CONCERN OVER THE INDIAN SUBSIDIARY OF THE HONG KONG-BASED PEREGRINE.

END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT

PTQ8830

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO4827

PAGE 01 STATE 035125 270458Z
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000R

035125
SOURCE: KODAKC.270051
DRAFTED BY: EAP/RSP/TC:HASOMERS:DM -- 02/25/98 77711
APPROVED BY: EAP:RBRAZEAL
EAP/RSP/TC:SGSTANFIELD EAP:HHLANGE NSC:GDAVIES
EAP:JWOLF NSC:JBADER S/S:PNPETRIHOS
E:SVILLAROSA (PHONE) S/S-O:PNELSON
----------20D2A3 270459Z /38
O P 270454Z FEB 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE 9767
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 035125

DECAPTIONED

EXDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/08
TAGS: PREL, EFIN, ID, TW
SUBJECT: BRIEFING TAIWAN ON INDONESIA SITUATION

REF: TAIPEI 0820

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY EAP DAS AURELIA E. BRAZEAL, REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 035125 270458Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 20 APR 2007 200502960

2. (C) AIT MAY USE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN DISCUSSING THE INDONESIA FINANCIAL SITUATION WITH NSC SECRETARY-GENERAL DING:

-- IN THE WAKE OF THE FINANCIAL INSTABILITY IN INDONESIA, PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS SPOKEN WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SEVERAL TIMES, MOST RECENTLY ON FEBRUARY 20.

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS STRESSED THAT STRONG DEMONSTRABLE COMMITMENT TO FULL AND SUSTAINED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS AGREED TO WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECTS FOR RESTORING INDONESIA'S FINANCIAL STABILITY.

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED FORMER VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE TO TRAVEL TO JAKARTA AS HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND OTHER INDONESIAN OFFICIALS. AMBASSADOR MONDALE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH AND A SENIOR TREASURY OFFICIAL. THEY PLAN TO BE IN JAKARTA ON MARCH 2 AND 3.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5273

PAGE 01 JAKART 01297 01 OF 02 051123Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/024W						

----------234A9C 051123Z /38
O 051124Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0226
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001297

DEPARTMENT FOR E, EAP, EB

TREASURY FOR OASIA

USCINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA AMBASSADOR TEARE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01297 01 OF 02 051123Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/16

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 23 APR 2007 200502960

TAGS: EFIN, PREL, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: EARLY REACTIONS TO AMBASSADOR MONDALE'S VISIT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: REACTIONS TO THE MARCH 2-3 VISIT OF PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE WALTER MONDALE HAVE BEEN MIXED. ON MARCH 4, THE GOVERNMENT REAFFIRMED ITS INTENTION TO CARRY OUT SOME KEY STRUCTURAL REFORMS. THE MARKETS APPEAR TO BE FOCUSED MORE ON THE UPCOMING IMF REVIEW. OPPOSITION FIGURES EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT AMBASSADOR MONDALE'S MESSAGE DID NOT INCLUDE POLITICAL REFORM. LIMITED REACTION FROM GOVERNMENT FIGURES WAS MORE UPBEAT. EDITORIAL COMMENT WAS GENERALLY POSITIVE. END SUMMARY.

GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
---

3. (U) IN THE DAYS FOLLOWING VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE'S VISIT, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACTED TO REVERSE SIGNALS ON KEY STRUCTURAL REFORMS. ALTHOUGH JANUARY 21 DECREES HAD CODIFIED THE GOI'S COMMITMENTS TO THE IMF IN THE AREAS OF NATIONAL LOGISTICS AGENCY (BULOG) MONOPOLIES AND PLYWOOD, EMANATIONS FROM THOSE BODIES INITIALLY CONFUSED THE PICTURE. GOI SILENCE HAD FURTHERED THE IMPRESSION OF SAGGING COMMITMENT. JAKARTA'S MARCH 5 NEWSPAPERS, HOWEVER, CARRIED FRONT PAGE STORIES ON THE GOVERNMENT'S REAFFIRMATION OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS ANNOUNCED ON JANUARY 21. STATE SECRETARY MOERDIONO TOLD THE PRESS THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

INDUSTRY AND TRADE MINISTER TUNKY ARIWIBOWO AND SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISOR DR. WIDJOJO NITISASTRO HAD MET WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ON MARCH 4. MOERDIONO ANNOUNCED THAT THE GOI HAD ENDED BULOG MONOPOLIES ON ALL COMMODITIES EXCEPT RICE. HE SAID PRIVATE TRADING COMPANIES COULD IMPORT COMMODITIES SUCH AS WHEAT FLOUR, SOYBEANS, AND SUGAR PREVIOUSLY CONTROLLED BY BULOG. HE CONTINUED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD SUBSIDIZE THE PRICES OF STAPLES AND SPECIFIED THAT THE BUDGET WOULD COVER THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PREVAILING RUPIAH EXCHANGE RATE AND THE RP

5,000 RATE USED FOR THE IMPORT OF BASIC COMMODITIES.

4. (U) MOERDIONO ALSO CONFIRMED DECISIONS ANNOUNCED EARLIER BY THE INDONESIAN WOOD PANEL PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION (APKINDO). ACCORDING TO THE ANNOUNCEMENTS, APKINDO HAS REVOKED THE REQUIREMENT THAT EXPORTERS DEPOSIT RP 50,000 PER CUBIC METER OF PLYWOOD AND STATED THAT EXPORTERS ARE FREE TO USE SHIPPING LINES OF THEIR CHOICE.

ECONOMIC REACTIONS

5. (C) ECONOMIC CONTACTS HAVE BEEN VITALLY INTERESTED IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE VISIT, BUT NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT IT WOULD PRODUCE SUBSTANTIAL POLICY CHANGES. MOST CONTACTS (AND THE MARKETS) APPEAR FOCUSED ON THE SCHEDULED MARCH 15 IMF REVIEW AND THE UPCOMING INDONESIAN CABINET SELECTION. THE MEDIA GAVE FRONT PAGE COVERAGE TO TREASURY DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS' MARCH 3 TESTIMONY THAT THE INDONESIA HAD TO GET ITS PROGRAM BACK ON TRACK IN ORDER TO DRAW ITS NEXT IMF TRANCHE. NO ONE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TO WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN ANTICIPATES THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WILL SELECT A POWERFUL ECONOMIC CABINET WITH MEMBERS UNTAINTED BY CONNECTIONS TO FIRST FAMILY OR OTHER VESTED INTERESTS.

OPPOSITION REACTIONS

6. (C) SOME OPPOSITION FIGURES HAVE REACTED WITH DISAPPOINTMENT TO PRESS COVERAGE OF THE MONDALE MEETING WITH SOEHARTO WHICH INDICATED POLITICAL REFORM WAS NOT DISCUSSED. VETERAN HUMAN RIGHT CAMPAIGNER PONKA PRINCEN SAID THAT "WE KNEW HE (SOEHARTO) DIDN'T SEE THE LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM BUT WE ARE DISMAYED TO SEE THAT YOU (THE UNITED STATES) DON'T SEE THEM EITHER."

7. (C) IN A BRIEF INITIAL REACTION TO POLOFFS, OPPOSITION FIGURE MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI SAID THE MONDALE MISSION WAS EVIDENCE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ECONOMIC

CRISIS. SHE EMPHASIZED THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS CARRIED GREAT WEIGHT IN INDONESIA AND IN THIS CONTEXT, WELCOMED U.S. FIRMNESS ON IMF COMPLIANCE. WHILE SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. FIRMNESS ON ISSUES OF FIRST FAMILY CORRUPTION, SHE URGED CONSIDERATION OF THE IMPACT ON THOSE ALREADY IN DEEP

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ5274

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5274

PAGE 01 JAKART 01297 02 OF 02 051123Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/024W						

----------234A9F 051123Z /38

O 051124Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0227
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001297

DEPARTMENT FOR E, EAP, EB

TREASURY FOR OASIA

USCINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA AMBASSADOR TEARE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/16
TAGS: EFIN, PREL, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: EARLY REACTIONS TO AMBASSADOR MONDALE'S VISIT

POVERTY OF SUBSIDY REMOVAL FOR BASIC GOODS. SHE REGRETTED THE ABSENCE OF A CALL FOR "POLITICAL CHANGE."

8. (C) ARIFIN PANIGORO, AN IMPORTANT BUSINESSMAN WHO IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE GOVERNMENT FOR ALLEGEDLY OFFERING TO FINANCE ANTI-SOEHARTO RALLIES, SOUGHT OUT POLOFF TO SEEK CONFIRMATION THAT THERE WAS NO "POLITICAL MESSAGE" BEYOND THE ECONOMIC-FOCUS OF MONDALE'S REMARKS TO THE PRESS. HE DESCRIBED THIS AS "SURPRISING AND DISAPPOINTING."

GOVERNMENT REACTIONS

9. (C) A WELL-CONNECTED OPERATIVE FROM THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR TOLD POLOFF THAT HE HAD BEEN HEARING MIXED INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MONDALE VISIT FROM ELITES, ESPECIALLY FROM WITHIN THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY. SOME BELIEVED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE MISSION WAS TO REINFORCE U.S. CONCERN OVER THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IMF PACKAGE. OTHERS, HOWEVER, WERE SO DISILLUSIONED WITH THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND SOEHARTO THAT THEY BELIEVED OR HOPED THAT THE MONDALE MISSION WAS INTENDED AS A STEP TOWARD OUSTING SOEHARTO FROM POWER. THEY POINTED TO RAMPANT RUMORS THAT MONDALE MET WITH IMPRISONED LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN AND WITH MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AS EVIDENCE OF THIS MINDSET.

10. (C) A CIVILIAN ANALYST WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE MILITARY EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE MONDALE VISIT REPRESENTED A U.S. EFFORT TO WORK WITH, RATHER THAN AGAINST, SOEHARTO TO OVERCOME THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. WHILE VOICING RESERVATIONS ABOUT SOEHARTO, THE ANALYST BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE LEADER IN THE NEAR TERM. FOREIGN NEWS REPORTS SUGGESTING INDONESIA WAS ON THE BRINK OF CHAOS WERE INACCURATE, HE SAID, AND DAMAGING TO INDONESIA'S INTERESTS. HE BELIEVED SOEHARTO'S MILITARY LEADERS HAD THE SITUATION WELL IN HAND.

11. (C) LT GEN SYARWAN HAMID, THE ARMED FORCES DEPUTY SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT, WAS QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS URGING INDONESIANS NOT TO BE PREJUDICED AGAINST THE MONDALE VISIT. HE POINTED OUT AT A MARCH 3 PRESS CONFERENCE THAT AMBASSADOR MONDALE, AS PRESIDENT CLINTON'S ENVOY, COULD GIVE SUGGESTIONS AND INPUT, AND THAT HIS VISIT WAS A REMINDER THAT INDONESIA WAS A COUNTRY OF IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES.

EDITORIAL REACTION

12. (U) EDITORIAL COMMENT, ALTHOUGH RELATIVELY LIMITED, HAS BEEN GENERALLY FAVORABLE. THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE "OBSERVER," WHICH HAS CLOSE LINKS TO THE GOVERNMENT, TOLD ITS READERS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT "MONDALE'S VISIT TO INDONESIA SHOULD BE SEEN AS AN EXPRESSION OF CONCERN ON THE PART OF WASHINGTON AT THE DEEPENING FINANCIAL CRISIS CONFRONTING INDONESIA AND NOT AS AN ATTEMPT TO EXERT PRESSURE, OR IMPOSE ITS WILL ON THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF

INDONESIA."
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ9469

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9469

PAGE 01 STATE 005955 131530Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AIT-03 CG-00 OASY-00 DINT-00 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-01 ADS-00 SP-00 SSO-00
USIE-00 PRM-10 /016R

005955
SOURCE: KODAKC.130041
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:KHFRITZ -- 01/12/98 V1028
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES
----------0EB622 131531Z /52
O P 130517Z JAN 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMCONSUL PUSAN IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION USVIENNA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 005955 131530Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 23 APR 2007 200502960

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS// PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS PRIORITY
SACINCUNC KS PRIORITY
USCINCUNC SEOUL KS PRIORITY
CINCPACFLT HI PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 005955

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: JANUARY 12, 1998 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS -- ALSO FOR USIS
SEODEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINOPAC FOR FPA TEARE
USVIENNA FOR UNVIE
BEIJING PASS CHENGDU

1. INDEX

-- ASIA FINANCE PARAS 2 - 3
-- TREASURY GUIDANCE ON THE SITUATION IN ASIA PARAS 4 - 5
-- INDONESIA: DISCUSSIONS ON IMF PROGRAM PARAS 6 - 7
-- SUMMERS/COHEN TRIPS TO ASIA -- ROTH/WOLF WHEREABOUTS PARAS 6 AND 8
-- INDONESIA/SINGAPORE: STATUS OF VISIT PARAS 6 AND 9

-- CHINA - FORMER OFFICIAL ADVOCATES DEMOCRACY PARAS 6 AND 10
-- PRC INVITATION TO TAIWAN LOCAL POLITICIANS TO VISIT MAINLAND PARAS 6 AND 11

-- CHINA: WEAPONS DEALS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE PAPAS 6 AND 12
-- HUMAN RIGHTS: TPAFFICKING IN AMERICAN WOMEN PAPAS 6 AND

13
-- HUMAN RIGHTS: TPAFFICKING IN WOMEN PAPAS 6 AND 14

2. THE FOLLOWING Q AND A'S WERE PREPARED ON 1/12/98 AS "IF ASKED" GUIDANCE BY THE WHITE HOUSE FOR USE IN BACKGROUNDING THE MEDIA.

3. ASIA FINANCE

ECONOMIC IMPACT

Q: WHAT1S YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS ON AMERICA'S ECONOMY?

A: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY ARE EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD. GROWTH IS STRONG, WAGES ARE RISING, PRIVATE INVESTMENT IS BOOMING, INFLATION IS LOW, THE FEDERAL DEFICIT IS ON TRACK TO BE ELIMINATED, AND UNEMPLOYMENT LAST YEAR HIT ITS LOWEST LEVEL IN 24 YEARS.

AND THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THAT U.S. ECONOMIC PROSPECTS REMAIN STRONG. JUST LAST WEEK, WE LEARNED THAT THE ECONOMY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDED ANOTHER 370,000 NEW JOBS, BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF JOBS CREATED SINCE I TOOK OFFICE TO 14.3 MILLION.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE WORLD ECONOMY IS INCREASINGLY INTERCONNECTED AND RESTORING CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY IN ASIA IS VERY MUCH IN OUR LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. THAT IS WHY THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN AT THE CENTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO REESTABLISH STABILITY AND CONFIDENCE IN THE REGION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(IF PRESSED)

Q: BUT EXACTLY HOW MUCH LOWER WILL GROWTH BE BECAUSE OF THE ASIAN CRISIS?

A: THE WORLD ECONOMY IS INCREASINGLY INTERCONNECTED, AND

RESTORING CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY IN ASIA IS VERY MUCH IN OUR LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

THAT IS WHY WE ARE WORKING TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION.

INDONESIA

ECONOMIC PRESCRIPTION

Q: IS INDONESIA ON THE BRINK OF ECONOMIC COLLAPSE? WHAT MESSAGE WILL DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS BE DELIVERING TO THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT?

A: INDONESIA IS EXPERIENCING FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES THAT THE IMF PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO ADDRESS. AS PART OF THAT PROGRAM, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO IMPLEMENT A SERIES OF MEASURES TO REFORM AND CLEAN UP ITS FINANCIAL SYSTEM, TO ADJUST MONETARY POLICY, TO CONTROL PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING, AND TO STEM CORRUPTION.

LET'S REMEMBER THAT INDONESIA IS A COUNTRY WITH UNDERLYING ECONOMIC STRENGTHS THAT CAN PROVIDE A FOUNDATION FOR RENEWED ECONOMIC GROWTH.

WE BELIEVE THAT VIGOROUS AND SUSTAINED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMS AGREED BY INDONESIA IN CONJUNCTION WITH THEIR IME PROGRAM OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECTS FOR RESTORING CONFIDENCE. DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS IS IN INDONESIA TODAY AND WILL BE AFFIRMING THAT MESSAGE.

IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORM COMMITMENTS

Q: HOW DO YOU JUDGE WHETHER INDONESIA IS CARRYING THROUGH ON ITS POLICY COMMITMENTS?

A: THE IMP HAS THE FIRST LINE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVALUATING COMPLIANCE WITH IMP PROGRAMS. THE IMP TEAM IS IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO SUGGEST WAYS THAT POLICY IMPLEMENTATION CAN BE STRENGTHENED.

STANLEY FISCHER FROM THE IMP MET WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TODAY, AND MANAGING DIRECTOR CAMDESSUS WILL BE IN JAKARTA THURSDAY.

IN ADDITION, WE ARE IN REGULAR CONTACT BOTH WITH THE IMP TEAM AND THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES. DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS IS IN INDONESIA TODAY TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE

OF IMPLEMENTING THE ECONOMIC REFORM MEASURES ADOPTED BY INDONESIA.

STABILITY OF SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT

Q: IS THE U.S. CONCERNED ABOUT THE STABILITY OF THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT? DO YOU BELIEVE SOEHARTO SHOULD STEP DOWN?

A: INDONESIA IS EXPERIENCING FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES THAT THE IME PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO ADDRESS. VIGOROUS AND SUSTAINED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMS AGREED BY INDONESIA IN CONJUNCTION WITH THEIR IMF PROGRAM OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECTS FOR RESTORING CONFIDENCE.

UNDER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S LEADERSHIP, INDONESIA HAS ENJOYED A PERIOD OF REMARKABLE ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENT. AND PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAS PROVIDED IMPORTANT LEADERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASEAN AND IN THE REGION.

A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS SCHEDULED FOR MARCH. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SHOULD SEEK RE-ELECTION IS A MATTER FOR HIM TO DECIDE, AND THE CHOICE OF INDONESIA'S LEADERSHIP IS A MATTER FOR THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE.

REGIONAL COLLAPSE

Q: WHAT IS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION IN ASIA? ARE YOU CONCERNED IT MIGHT SPIRAL OUT OF CONTROL?

A: SEVERAL ECONOMIES IN THE REGION ARE EXPERIENCING SERIOUS FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION IS IMPORTANT TO US; WE HAVE SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS IN SEEING A RETURN OF CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THAT IS WHY WE SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO HELP THESE ECONOMIES ADJUST.

THE CENTERPIECE OF THESE EFFORTS IS IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORM COMMITMENTS ADOPTED BY THE AFFECTED GOVERNMENTS. VIGOROUS IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE COMMITMENTS OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECTS FOR RESTORING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE.

EOR THOSE COUNTRIES WHO HAVE DEMONSTRATED RESOLVE IN IMPLEMENTING REFORMS, THE IME AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY STAND READY TO EXTEND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO PROVIDE A BREATHING SPACE WHILE THE REFORMS TAKE EFFECT. INVESTOR CONFIDENCE IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES IS CLEARLY BASED ON THE SPECIFICS OF THEIR OWN UNIQUE SITUATION AND THE QUALITY OF THEIR COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENT REFORMS.

BAIL OUTS

Q: AREN'T CRITICS AT LEAST PARTIALLY RIGHT WHEN THEY ALLEGE THAT THESE IME PROGRAMS ARE BAILING OUT INVESTORS AND CORRUPT GOVERNMENTS?

A: IF THESE EFFORTS WERE DIRECTED AT BAILING OUT INVESTORS, WE WOULD NOT SPEND A PENNY ON THEM. THE CENTRAL

AIM OF THESE PROGRAMS IS TO HELP THESE ECONOMIES RESTORE GROWTH AND MARKET CONFIDENCE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, NOT TO BAIL THEM OR FOREIGN INVESTORS OUT.

THE CENTERPIECE OF THESE EFFORTS IS REFORM COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN BY THE AFFECTED GOVERNMENTS THEMSELVES -- TO RESTRUCTURE AND CLEAN UP THE BANKING SYSTEM, IMPROVE GOVERNANCE, FIGHT CORRUPTION, AND OPEN MARKETS.

FOR THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE DEMONSTRATED RESOLVE IN IMPLEMENTING A REFORM PROGRAM, THE IME STANDS READY TO EXTEND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO PROVIDE A BREATHING SPACE WHILE THE REFORMS TAKE EFFECT. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSCORE THAT NO RESOURCES WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO COUNTRIES WHO ARE NOT ACTIVELY GRAPPLING WITH THEIR PROBLEMS.

EFFECT ON BUDGET SURPLUS

Q: COULD SLOWER GROWTH ASSOCIATED WITH THE SLOWDOWN IN ASIA THREATEN THE PROJECTED BUDGET SURPLUS?

A: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY ARE EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD, AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS REMAIN STRONG. JUST LAST WEEK, WE LEARNED THAT THE ECONOMY ADDED ANOTHER 370,000 NEW JOBS, BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF JOBS CREATED SINCE I TOOK OFFICE TO 14.3 MILLION. GROWTH IS STRONG, WAGES ARE RISING, PRIVATE INVESTMENT IS BOOMING, INFLATION IS LOW, THE FEDERAL BUDGET IS ON TRACK TO BE ELIMINATED,

UNCLASSIFIED

AND UNEMPLOYMENT LAST YEAR HIT ITS LOWEST LEVEL (4.9 PERCENT) IN 24 YEARS.

NONETHELESS, IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT OUR BUDGET PROJECTIONS ARE EXTREMELY CONSERVATIVE -- IN LINE WITH BLUE CHIP FORECASTS. THEY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OFF BAD TIMES AS WELL AS GOOD TIMES. THAT IS WHY FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS, THE DEFICIT HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY LOWER AND GROWTH HIGHER THAN WE PROJECTED.

4. THE POLLOWING GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED ON 1/12/98 AS "IF

ASKED" GUIDANCE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY FOR USE IN BACKGROUNDING THE MEDIA.

5. TREASURY GUIDANCE ON THE SITUATION IN ASIA

TODAY'S QUOTES:

U.S. TREASURY SECRETARY ROBERT RUBIN SAID MONDAY IT WAS "VERY HARD TO KNOW" IF ASIA'S FINANCIAL CRISIS HAS BOTTOMED OUT OR COULD WORSEN. "THE KEY TO INDONESIA IS ADHERING TO THE IMP PROGRAM," RUBIN SAID. RUBIN SPOKE WITH DONALDSON JUST AFTER EMERGING FROM THE WHITE HOUSE.

ASKED IF AMERICANS SHOULD BE CONCERNED BY THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL IN ASIA, RUBIN SAID "WE LIVE IN ONE WORLD, ONE ECONOMY AND REALLY ONE-WORLD ECONOMY." HE ALSO SAID THE ASIA FINANCIAL CRISIS HAS THE POTENTIAL TO HAVE AN "ENORMOUS IMPACT" ON ECONOMIES ACROSS THE GLOBE.

DEPUTY SECRETARY LARRY SUMMERS: "IN PREPARATIONS, WE'VE HAD TWO GOOD MEETINGS HERE AT THE FINANCE MINISTRY," SUMMERS SAID. "ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT CLINTON WE WILL BE DISCUSSING THE MEASURES TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TOMORROW."

IMP FIRST DEPUTY MANAGING DIRECTOR STANLEY FISCHER MET WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FOR 90 MINUTES AND DESCRIBED THE ENCOUNTER AS "VERY, VERY GOOD." "THE PRESIDENT WAS VERY, VERY CLEAR IN HIS DETERMINATION TO STAY WITH THE (REFORM) PROGRAM AND TO STRENGTHEN IT AND ACCELERATE IT," FISCHER SAID. "THERE WAS NO AMBIGUITY IN WHAT HE SAID."

Q AND A:

Q: HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS' TRIP THUS FAR?

A: DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS TRIP HAS BEEN IN THE REGION TO TAKE STOCK OF THE SITUATION, HEAR THE AUTHORITIES' THOUGHTS AND SHARE THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEWS ON THE BEST

WAY TO RESOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS. THUS FAR HE HAS HAD SEVERAL PRODUCTIVE MEETINGS WITH VARIOUS OFFICIALS.

Q: WHAT WILL BE DISCUSSED IN DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS' MEETING WITH SOEHARTO?

A: DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS WILL CARRY THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE THAT INDONESIAN STABILITY IS IMPORTANT TO THE REGION AND IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES. HE WILL HEAR HIS THOUGHTS AND SHARE THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEWS THAT

SOUND POLICIES PROMOTE CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY AND ARE THE BEST WAY TO RESOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS AND RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE MARKETS. THE U.S. IS ENGAGED IN DOING WHAT IT CAN TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE AND SUPPORTIVE TO HELP THE REGION REGAIN STABILITY.

Q: WILL DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS "HOLD THE INDONESIANS FEET TO THE FIRE?"

A: DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS IS IN INDONESIA TO TAKE STOCK OF THE SITUATION, HEAR THEIR VIEWS AND SHARE THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEWS ON THE BEST WAY TO RESOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE INDONESIANS HE WILL UNDERSCORE THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT THAT INDONESIA DO WHATEVER APPROPRIATE TO FIND ITS WAY THROUGH THIS.

Q: IS INDONESIA TOO BIG TO FAIL?

A: THE U.S. WANTS INDONESIA TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS THAT WILL PERMIT US TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORT TO SUPPORT THEM THROUGH CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. STABILITY IN INDONESIA AND THE REGION IS CRITICAL TO STABILITY IN THE ENTIRE REGION AND ENSURING STABILITY IS IN OUR ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

Q: AFTER MEETING WITH SOEHARTO THE DELEGATION WILL TRAVEL TO MALAYSIA. WHY ISN'T DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS MEETING WITH MAHATHIR?

A: THE DELEGATION WILL BE IN MALAYSIA FOR AN EXTREMELY
UNCLASSIFIED

BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME AT THE INVITATION OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. THIS MEETING WILL SERVE AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH THE REGIONAL PARTNERS WHO HAVE AN INTEREST IN REGIONAL STABILITY.

Q: HOW IS THIS GOING TO AFFECT U.S. MARKETS?

A: WE DON'T COMMENT OR MAKE PREDICTIONS ABOUT U.S. MARKETS. WHAT'S IMPORTANT ARE THE SOUND FUNDAMENTALS OF THE U.S. ECONOMY.

IF PRESSED: THE CONTINUING REMARKABLE STRENGTH OF THE U.S. ECONOMY WILL REMAIN THE MAJOR FACTOR FOR U.S. MARKETS. AT THE SAME TIME, AS WE HAVE SAID BEFORE, WE LIVE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY AND LARGE DECLINE IN ITS CURRENCIES WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT BE GOOD FOR U.S. ECONOMIC OR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

Q: HOW IS THIS GOING TO AFFECT U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH?

A: THESE COUNTRIES ACCOUNT FOR A GROWING SHARE OF WORLD OUTPUT -- AND A GROWING SHARE OF OUR TRADE. EMERGING ASIA ACCOUNTED FOR ONE-THIRD OF OUR EXPORTS LAST YEAR. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE PRECISELY, GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTIES INVOLVED. AT THE SAME TIME, THE STRENGTH OF THE U.S. ECONOMY REMAINS CONSIDERABLE. BUT THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT TRADE IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY OF ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE LARGE DECLINE IN ITS CURRENCIES, WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT BE GOOD FOR U.S. ECONOMIC OR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. MUCH WILL DEPEND ON STABILITY BEING RESTORED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
UNCLASSIFIED

6. THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 1/12/98 AND NOT USED BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE DAILY BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

7. INDONESIA: DISCUSSIONS ON IMF PROGRAM

CONTEXT: DEPUTY TREASURY SECRETARY LARRY SUMMERS AND HIS DELEGATION ARE IN JAKARTA TO DISCUSS THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION AND INDONESIA'S ADHERENCE TO THE IMF PROGRAM WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. (FYI ONLY, OTHER WORLD LEADERS INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO OF

JAPAN AND PRIME MINISTER KOHL OF GERMANY HAVE SPOKEN TO SOEHARTO REGARDING THE SITUATION AND SINGAPORE P.M. GOH CHOK TONG HAS ANNOUNCED PLANS TO TRAVEL TO INDONESIA ON TUESDAY.)

Q: WHAT IS THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN INDONESIA? HAVE YOU HAD ANY FEEDBACK FROM THE SUMMERS DELEGATION ON ITS DISCUSSIONS IN JAKARTA?

A: WE UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION OVER THE WEEKEND WAS CALMER THAN THAT OF LAST WEEK, THOUGH THE PUBLIC IS STILL LINING UP AT SUPERMARKETS TO OBTAIN RICE AND OTHER FOOD STAPLES.

DEPUTY TREASURY SECRETARY LARRY SUMMERS AND HIS DELEGATION MET TODAY WITH INDONESIAN FINANCE MINISTER MAR'IE MOHAMMED, AND WITH DR. WIDJOJO NITISASTRO, SENIOR

ECONOMIC ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, AND OTHER SENIOR INDONESIAN ECONOMIC OFFICIALS. THE SUMMERS PARTY HAS ALSO HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONFER WITH IMF DEPUTY MANAGING DIRECTOR STANLEY FISCHER WHO IS ALSO IN JAKARTA AT THIS TIME.

--- THE DELEGATION HELD CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT INDONESIAN COMMITMENTS TO THE IMF PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REFORMS. THE DELEGATION WILL MEET TUESDAY MORNING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO.

8. SUMMERS/COHEN TRIPS TO ASIA -- ROTH/WOLF WHEREABOUTS

CONTEXT: IT WAS DECIDED LATE FRIDAY AT A WHITE HOUSE MEETING THAT EAP A/S ROTH SHOULD TRAVEL WITH TREASURY UNDER SECRETARY SUMMERS TO SINGAPORE AND JAKARTA AND JOIN DEFENSE SECRETARY COHEN'S DELEGATION FOLLOWING SECRETARY COHEN'S ARRIVAL IN JAKARTA, WHICH OCCURRED TODAY. U.S. COORDINATOR FOR APEC JOHN WOLF, WHO WAS SCHEDULED TO TRAVEL WITH U/S SUMMERS, INSTEAD HAS REMAINED IN WASHINGTON AS CO-COORDINATOR OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT WORKING GROUP ON THE ASIAN FINANCIAL SITUATION.

Q: WHO FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS ACCOMPANYING THE TWO DELEGATIONS TRAVELLING TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION?

A: AS STATED EARLIER, TREASURY UNDER SECRETARY SUMMERS IS BEING ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS ALAN LARSON. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE STANLEY ROTH ALSO ACCOMPANIED U/S SUMMERS TO SINGAPORE AND

INDONESIA, WHERE A/S ROTH WILL JOIN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COHEN'S DELEGATION. A/S ROTH WILL ACCOMPANY SECRETARY COHEN FOR THE REMAINDER OF HIS TRIP.

--- AMB. JOHN WOLF, WHO WAS EARLIER SCHEDULED TO ACCOMPANY U/S SUMMERS, INSTEAD WILL REMAIN IN WASHINGTON TO HELP COORDINATE THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S WORK RELATING TO THE ASIAN FINANCIAL SITUATION WITH HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE DEPARTMENT AND ELSEWHERE IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

9. INDONESIA/SINGAPORE: STATUS OF VISIT

Q: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE SUMMERS DELEGATION TRIP?

A: THIS MISSION WAS INITIATED FOLLOWING LAST WEEK'S

CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT CLINTON AND INDONESIAN PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. THE DELEGATION IS HEADED BY DEPUTY TREASURY SECRETARY LAWRENCE SUMMERS AND INCLUDES, FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STANLEY ROTH (SEE GUIDANCE ABOVE FOR TRAVEL PLANS IN ASIA) AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS ALAN LARSON.

--THE DELEGATION HELD TALKS IN SINGAPORE AND ARE NOW IN JAKARTA. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THEY WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ON TUESDAY. CURRENT PLANS CALL FOR THE SUMMERS DELEGATION TO MEET WITH OFFICIALS IN THAILAND, MALAYSIA, CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA LATER IN THE WEEK.

--OUR CENTRAL AIM IS TO AFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE OF RESTORING

ECONOMIC CONFIDENCE IN THE REGION, LISTENING TO THE VIEWS OF LEADERS IN THE REGION AND SHARING OUR VIEWS WITH THEM.

10. CHINA - FORMER OFFICIAL ADVOCATES DEMOCRACY

CONTEXT: BUSINESSMAN AND FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE FUZHOU PLANNING COMMISSION, FANG JUE, HAS CO-AUTHORED AN ESSAY ADVOCATING A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS AIMED AT DEMOCRATIZING CHINA. HE CLAIMS HIS VIEWS HAVE A

SUBSTANTIAL, THOUGH STILL ANONYMOUS, FOLLOWING IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

Q: WHAT IS OUR REACTION TO THE ESSAY CO-AUTHORED AND DISTRIBUTED BY FORMER FUZHOU PLANNING COMMISSION DEPUTY DIRECTOR FANG JUE ADVOCATING ELECTIONS, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND RELIGION, RELAXED OVERSIGHT OF SOCIAL CONDITIONS, AN END TO COMMUNIST PARTY CONTROL OF THE MILITARY, A REVERSAL OF THE VERDICT ON TIANANMEN, NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DALAI LARNA, A FURTHER OPENING OF THE ECONOMY, AND A PRO-U.S. FOREIGN POLICY?

A: WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESS ION AND ARE PLEASED TO SEE IT PUT INTO PRACTICE IN CHINA THROUGH EXAMPLES LIKE THIS ESSAY. WE ARE ALSO

PLEASED BY REPORTS THAT IN RECENT MONTHS THERE HAS BEEN INCREASING EXPRESSION OF VIEWS ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES, PRIMARILY THROUGH PUBLIC STATEMENTS, LETTERS AND PETITIONS BY SCORES OF OTHERS IN CHINA.

--- I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE DEPARTMENT'S ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR A DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CHINA. IN GENERAL WE URGE ALL STATES TO BRING THEIR PRACTICES IN LINE WITH THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

IF ASKED

--- OUR VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS ARE WELL KNOWN, INCLUDING SUPPORT WORLDWIDE FOR DEMOCRACY, ECONOMIC OPENNESS, AND DIALOGUE AS A MEANS OF ADDRESSING ISSUES OF CONCERN.

IF ASKED

--- IN PARTICULAR, WE VIEW DIALOGUE AS A MEANS OF ADDRESSING THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITION IN TIBET.

11. PRC INVITATION TO TAIWAN LOCAL POLITICIANS TO VISIT MAINLAND

CONTEXT: THE OPPOSITION (AND GENERALLY PRO-INDEPENDENCE) DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY (DPP) WON A MAJOR VICTORY IN TAIWAN'S MAGISTRATE/MAYOR ELECTIONS 11/29/97, TAKING 12 OF 23 SEATS COMPARED TO 8 FOR THE RULING NATIONALISTS (KMT); THREE INDEPENDENTS ALSO WON. OF TAIWAN'S POPULATION, 71 PERCENT NOW LIVES IN DPP-LED LOCALITIES COMPARED WITH ONLY 22 PERCENT UNDER KMT CONTROL. EVEN BETTER FOR THE DPP, THIS WAS THE FIRST MAJOR ELECTION IN

WHICH THE DPP POPULAR VOTE TOTAL WAS HIGHER THAN THAT FOR THE KMT, 43 PERCENT TO 42 PERCENT (WITH INDEPENDENTS TAKING 13 PERCENT).

THE JANUARY ISSUE OF THE PRC'S "CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONSU JOURNAL HAS INVITED "FAR-SIGHTED COUNTY MAGISTRATES AND MAYORS" TO VISIT THE MAINLAND "TO ENHANCE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND TRUST." THIS JOURNAL IS PUBLISHED BY THE PRC'S ASSOCIATION FOR RELATIONS ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT (ARATS), THE "UNOFFICIAL" BODY SET UP BY BEIJING FOR DEALING WITH TAIPEI; ITS COUNTERPART IS TAIWAN'S STRAITS EXCHANGE FOUNDATION (SEP)

THE MEDIA HAS INTERPRETED THE INVITATION AS AN "OLIVE BRANCH" TO TAIWAN'S OPPOSITION PARTY -- WHICH, UNDER ITS CURRENT CHAIRMAN (HSU HSIN-LIANG (PHON: SHOE SHIN-LIANG)), HAS BEEN DOWNPLAYING ITS PRO-INDEPENDENCE STANCE. THE JOURNAL ARTICLE WELCOMES VISITS BY ALL "WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AN EXTREMELY SMALL NUMBER OF STUBBORN TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS."

THE ARTICLE ENDS WITH A CALL BY ARATS FOR THE MAGISTRATES/MAYORS TO "EXPAND CROSS-STRAIT ECONOMIC EXCHANGE AND COOPERATION;" AND "ACCELERATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECT LINKS IN POSTAL SERVICE, AIR AND SHIPPING SERVICES, AND TRADE." BEIJING MAY HOPE THAT TAIWAN'S LOCAL POLITICIANS WILL JOIN THE TAIWAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN PRESSING THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES TO AGREE TO OPEN THESE "THREE LINKS" AS A WAY TO LOWER THE COSTS OF UNDERTAKING TRAVEL AND TRADE -- WHICH NOW HAVE TO BE DONE VIA HONG KONG OR OTHER THIRD LOCATION. WHILE THE

TAIWAN AUTHORITIES HAVE TAKEN SOME STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION, THEY REMAIN RELUCTANT TO FULLY OPEN THE THREE

LINKS UNTIL BEIJING AGREES TO RENOUNCE THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN.

Q. WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THE PRC DECISION TO INVITE NEWLY, LOCALLY-ELECTED DPP POLITICIANS TO VISIT THE MAINLAND?

A. WE BELIEVE CROSS-STRAIT VISITS AND EXCHANGES OF ALL TYPES HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO IMPROVE CROSS-STRAIT COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDING.

WE HOPE THIS PROCESS WILL LEAD TO A RESUMPTION OF THE CROSS-STRAIT DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, A STEP WE ENCOURAGE.

12. CHINA: WEAPONS DEALS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

CONTEXT: THE TIANANMEN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1990, AMONG OTHER THINGS, BANNED U.S. EXPORTS TO CHINA OF DEFENSE ARTICLES UNTIL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE THERE ON A PROGRAM OF POLITICAL REFORM OR UNLESS THE PRESIDENT DETERMINES THE EXPORT TO BE IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST. THE ACT ALSO BANNED PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH CHINA UNTIL THE PRESIDENT COULD CERTIFY THAT CHINA WAS NOT IMPROPERLY SPREADING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY. DURING THE OCTOBER U.S.-CHINA SUMMIT, PRESIDENT

UNCLASSIFIED

CLINTON ANNOUNCED THAT, BASED ON ASSURANCES RECEIVED FROM CHINA, HE WOULD SUBMIT TO CONGRESS THE CERTIFICATIONS NECESSARY UNDER U.S. LAW TO IMPLEMENT THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, WHILE SUCH A CERTIFICATION WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR U.S.-CHINA PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION, IT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE BAN ON EXPORTS TO CHINA OF DEFENSE ARTICLES.

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON STATEMENTS FROM

MR. COHEN ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF FUTURE WEAPONS DEALS WITH BEIJING?

A: THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY REGARDING THE EXPORT OF DEFENSE ARTICLES TO CHINA.

--- AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE SUSPENDED THE EXPORT OF DEFENSE ARTICLES TO CHINA UNLESS THE PRESIDENT CAN CERTIFY THAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE THERE ON A PROGRAM OF POLITICAL REFORM OR THAT THE EXPORT IS IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST.

--- THOUGH PRESIDENT CLINTON ANNOUNCED THAT HE WOULD FORWARD CERTIFICATION TO CONGRESS TO ALLOW FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1985 U.S.-CHINA AGREEMENT ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION, THIS CERTIFICATION WOULD HAVE NO CONNECTION TO THE ARMS EMBARGO CURRENTLY IN PLACE AGAINST CHINA.

PAGE 21 STATE 005955 131530Z

Q: HOW WOULD YOU ASSESS THE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA?

A: MILITARY-TO-MILITARY TIES WITH CHINA ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR OVERALL STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PRC. DOD'S RELATIONSHIP WITH PLA HAS RESULTED IN A NUMBER OF CONCRETE RESULTS, INCLUDING AN AGREEMENT ON CONTINUED U.S. MILITARY PORT CALLS TO HONG KONG, ESTABLISHMENT OF REGULAR DEFENSE CONSULTATIVE TALKS, AND AN AGREEMENT ON MILITARY MARITIME SAFETY.

Q: IF THE ADMINISTRATION IS PREPARED TO ALLOW U.S. COMPANIES TO SELL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA, WHY IS IT NOT PREPARED TO LIFT THE EMBARGO ON DEFENSE ARTICLES?

A: THE TIANANMEN SANCTIONS ACT MANDATES THAT ONE OF TWO SPECIFIC CONDITIONS BE MET BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERS LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO. THE PRESIDENT MUST CERTIFY THAT EITHER PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON A PROGRAM OF

POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA OR THAT A DEFENSE EXPORT TO CHINA IS IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST.

IF ASKED/PRESSED:
Q: HAS THE PRESIDENT SUBMITTED THE CERTIFICATION PACKAGE TO CONGRESS?

A: THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE SENDING THE NECESSARY CERTIFICATION PACKAGE TO THE CONGRESS SHORTLY. I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE WHITE HOUSE IN ASCERTAINING EXACTLY WHEN

THIS WILL HAPPEN.

13. HUMAN RIGHTS: TRAFFICKING IN AMERICAN WOMEN

CONTEXT: U.S. CITIZEN WOMEN HAVE SOMETIMES BECOME VICTIMS OF FROM MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN OFFERS OF EMPLOYMENT ABROAD. AMERICANS WHO CONTACT OUR OFFICE OF OVERSEAS CITIZENS SERVICES ARE ENCOURAGED TO ENSURE THEY HAVE THE CORRECT VISA STATUS SO AS NOT TO CREATE ANY DIFFICULTIES WHEREBY THEY BECOME EXPLOITED BY THEIR EMPLOYER. WE ARE AWARE OF SUCH SITUATIONS IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA, FOR EXAMPLE AND HAVE INFORMATION IN OUR CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEETS TO ALERT AMERICANS TO DISCUS THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO ACCEPTING ANY OFFER.

Q: HAVE AMERICAN CITIZENS BEEN FORCED TO WORK IN THE "SEX TRADE" AS CONDITIONS OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT ABROAD?

A: ON OCCASIONS U.S. CITIZENS WORKING OVERSEAS HAVE REPORTED CONTRACT VIOLATIONS WITH THEIR EMPLOYERS, INCLUDING ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT OR INTIMIDATION.

---FOR EXAMPLE, OUR CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEET FOR JAPAN TALKS OF MISREPRESENTATION BY JAPANESE EMPLOYERS WHO VIOLATE CONTRACTS WITH AMERICAN CITIZENS COME TO WORK AS ENGLISH TEACHERS, CARPENTERS, MODELS, ACTORS, ENTERTAINERS, EXOTIC DANCERS OR BAR HOSTESSES.

---WHEN REPORTED, OUR EMBASSY CAN ASSIST U.S. CITIZENS WHO ARE BEING HARASSED OR EXPLOITED. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TAKES

ALLEGATIONS OF HARASSMENT VERY SERIOUSLY.

---WE RECOMMEND THAT U.S. CITIZENS WHO DO PLAN TO WORK OVERSEAS ENSURE THAT THEY HAVE THE CORRECT VISA TO WORK AND SHOULD NEVER ENTER AS TOURISTS.

14. HUMAN RIGHTS: TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN

Q: WHAT IS THE USG DOING TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN?

A: MANY YOUNG WOMEN FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, EAST ASIA, AFRICA AND CENTRAL AMERICA ARE LEAVING THEIR HOMELANDS TO SEEK A BETTER LIFE IN WESTERN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND JAPAN. ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS POSING AS MODELING AGENCIES, DANCE COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL MATCHMAKING SERVICES AND DOMESTIC SERVICES LURE THESE VULNERABLE WOMEN, OR SOMETIMES THEIR PARENTS, WITH THE PROMISE OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES. ONCE THESE WOMEN ARE SUCCESSFULLY BROUGHT INTO A COUNTRY, THE CRIMINAL GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS THEN CONFISCATE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, USE DEBT BONDAGE, AND PHYSICAL, EMOTIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE TO FORCE THESE WOMEN TO WORK AND LIVE IN UNSAFE CONDITIONS AS PROSTITUTES, SWEATSHOP WORKERS, AND DOMESTIC SERVANTS.

---PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS SAID THE U.S. WILL LEAD THE WORLD'S EFFORTS IN COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN. AS SECRETARY ALBRIGHT SAID: "AND LET ME SAY THAT IF THOSE WHO TRAFFIC IN DRUGS SHOULD BE PUNISHED SEVERELY--AND THEY SHOULD--SO SHOULD THOSE WHO TRAFFIC IN HUMAN BEINGS."

---THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS WORKING PROACTIVELY TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, SPECIFICALLY:

--CHAIRING AN INTER-AGENCY GROUP LED BY THERESA LOAR WITH SEVERAL FEDERAL AGENCIES TO DEVELOP A SERIES OF INITIATIVES THAT INVOLVE PREVENTION, ENFORCEMENT AND PROTECTION;

--WORKING WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION TO IMPLEMENT AN INFORMATION CAMPAIGN TARGETING VULNERABLE WOMEN IN POLAND AND UKRAINE;

--DEVELOPING A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CAMPAIGN OVERSEAS DESCRIBING TACTICS CRIMINAL GROUPS USE TO COERCE AND TRAFFIC WOMEN, THE RISKS OF TRAFFICKING, WHAT WOMEN CAN DO TO PROTECT THEMSELVES, AND WHERE WOMEN CAN GET HELP IN THE UNITED STATES;

--IDENTIFYING WAYS TO IMPROVE DATA COLLECTION; AND

--CO-FUNDING A WORLD-WIDE STUDY OF EXISTING STATUTES ON TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN TO DEVELOP MODEL LEGISLATION AS A GUIDE FOR COUNTRIES SEEKING TO IMPROVE THEIR LAWS

---FOR INFORMATION CONTACT THE OFFICE OF THE SENIOR COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S ISSUES, THERESA LOAR ON (202) 647-6227.

ALBRIGHT

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

SECRET PTQ0213

PAGE 01 STATE 003734 090108Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

003734
SOURCE: KODAKB.090027
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:MURRAYVE:VEM -- 01/08/98 7-1823
APPROVED BY: EAP:AEBRAZEAL
EAP/PIMBS:DHARTWICK EAP/BCLTV:RHUSO
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------0D44AE 090109Z /38

O 090107Z JAN 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 003734

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/98
TAGS: AMGT, ID, TH, MY
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL

FOR AMBASSADORS FROM EAP REA BRAZEAL

CLASSIFIED BY EAP AURELIA E. BRAZEAL. REASON: 1.5(D)

SECRET

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 26 APR 2007 200502960

1. (C) THINGS ARE MOVING QUICKLY HERE IN WASHINGTON AS THE ADMINISTRATION DEBATES THE BEST POLICY COURSE FOR ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS. I WANT TO MAKE SURE YOU ARE ALL AWARE OF THE ATMOSPHERICS AND BUREAUCRATICS THAT ARE SHAPING THE DEBATE, SO INTEND TO SEND YOU REGULAR UPDATES VIA OFFICIAL/INFORMAL CHANNELS.

2. (S) AT LEAST THREE SENIOR MEETINGS AND SEVERAL CONFERENCE CALLS ON INDONESIA TOOK PLACE TODAY WITH PARTICIPANTS FROM TREASURY, STATE (INCLUDING THE SECRETARY), THE WHITE HOUSE AND NEC. ADDITIONAL MEETINGS AT THE DEPUTIES COMMITTEE LEVEL ARE EXPECTED FOR TOMORROW AND THE COMING WEEK.

3. (S) PRESIDENT CLINTON WILL CALL BOTH PRIME MINISTER GOH IN SINGAPORE AND PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. WE'VE PREPARED A DRAFT WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT WHICH WOULD REPORT THAT THE

PRESIDENT HAD SPOKEN TO GOH AND SOEHARTO TO UNDERSCORE THE REGION'S IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. AND THE NEED FOR INDONESIA TO FULLY IMPLEMENT IMF RECOMMENDED REFORMS.

4. (C) THE WHITE HOUSE INTENDS TO SEND LARRY SUMMERS, EB A/S AL LARSON, AND AMBASSADOR JOHN WOLF TO THE REGION IMMEDIATELY, PERHAPS TONIGHT. THEY WILL LIKELY STOP IN JAKARTA, SINGAPORE, AND THAILAND. WE PREPARED AN OPTIONS PAPER ON WAYS TO BOOST PUBLIC AND MARKET CONFIDENCE IN THAILAND'S POLITICAL STABILITY (E-MAILED TO EMBASSY BANGKOK) AND WILL LET YOU KNOW WHAT DECISIONS ARE MADE.

5. (C) STANLEY ROTH AND AL LARSON WILL INITIATE AN IN-

SECRET

SECRET

HOUSE FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP WITH PARTICIPATION FROM INR, S/P, H, PA, E, P, AND OTHERS. THE GROUP WILL ENSURE THAT THE SECRETARY AND OTHER PRINCIPALS ARE INFORMED ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS, AND ENSURE COORDINATION BETWEEN OVERSEAS MISSIONS AND STATE OFFICES. IT WILL PREPARE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRESSING REFORM AND SHORING UP CONFIDENCE IN INDONESIA AND THAILAND, A STRATEGY FOR

FOSTERING STRONGER GROWTH IN JAPAN, AND A
POLITICAL/ECONOMIC STRATEGY FOR LIMITING CONTAGION OUTSIDE
OF ASIA.
ALBRIGHT

SECRET

NNNN

PTQ3694

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO4871

PAGE 01 STATE 004665 100225Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	A-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	IM-01	TEDE-00
	IO-00	JUSE-00	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01	DCP-01	OIC-02
	OIG-04	TRSE-00	SA-01	SGHD-00	DRL-04	/023R	

004665
SOURCE: KODAKB.010007
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:EMMCDEVITT -- 01/09/98 71029
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES
----------0DBC3C 100228Z /38
O P 100223Z JAN 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION USVIENNA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 004665 100225Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 26 APR 2007 200502960

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS// PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS PRIORITY
SACINCUNC KS PRIORITY
USCINCUNC SEOUL KS PRIORITY
CINCPACFLT HI PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 004665

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: JANUARY 9, 1998 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS -- ALSO FOR USIS
SEODEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAO FOR FPA TEARE
USVIENNA FOR UNVIE
BEIJING PASS CHENGDU

1. INDEX
-- ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC SITUATION (PARAS 2 AND 3)
INDONESIA: PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT (PARAS 4 AND 5)

INDONESIA: STABILITY OF SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT (PARAS 8 AND 9)
-- CAMBODIA: BAN ON OPPOSITION NEWSPAPERS (PARAS 8 AND 10)
-- CAMBODIA: TENG BUNMA'S VISA (PARAS 8 AND 11)
-- CAMBODIA: ARREST OF JUAN MINH (PARAS 8 AND 12)

-- CHINA: HONG KONG DECISION ON VIETNAMESE ASYLUM-SEEKERS (PARAS 8 AND 13)
-- DEPARTMENT-WIDE SANCTIONS TEAM (PARAS 8 AND 14)

2. THE FOLLOWING PRESS STATEMENT ON THE ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC SITUATION WAS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY ON 1/08/98.

3. OVER THE PAST MONTHS, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN ENGAGED ACTIVELY WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION, AS WELL AS THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL COMMUNITY, IN ADDRESSING THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED IN THE REGION. THE UNITED STATES HAS SIGNIFICANT NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN A STABLE AND PROSPEROUS ASIA PACIFIC. THAT IS WHY THE UNITED STATES HAS SUPPORTED THE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMS DEVELOPED BY SEVERAL ASIAN COUNTRIES WITH THE IMF AND HAS STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION.

THE PRESIDENT SPOKE TODAY WITH SINGAPORE PRIME MINISTER GOH AND INDONESIA PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ABOUT RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS. THE PRESIDENT UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REGION TO THE UNITED STATES, DISCUSSED THE CURRENT SITUATION IN INDONESIA AND REITERATED OUR VIEW OF THE KEY ROLE INDONESIA PLAYS IN THE REGION, INCLUDING WITHIN ASEAN AND APEC. INDONESIA IS A COUNTRY WITH GREAT UNDERLYING STRENGTHS THAT CAN PROVIDE A FOUNDATION FOR RENEWED ECONOMIC GROWTH.

IN ORDER TO CONSULT FURTHER ON THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY LARRY SUMMERS,

ALONG WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WILL TRAVEL TO THE REGION SHORTLY.

4. THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON INDONESIA WAS ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT ON 1/09/98.

5. ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 9, 1998, THE U.S. EMBASSY IN JAKARTA ISSUED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMERICANS IN INDONESIA:

"DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED TENSION AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY ARISING FROM ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY IN INDONESIA, AMERICAN CITIZENS MAY WISH TO EXERCISE PRUDENCE AND COMMON SENSE, AND TO AVOID DEMONSTRATIONS AND OTHER SITUATIONS THAT COULD TURN VIOLENT."

UPDATED INFORMATION MAY BE ACCESSED THROUGH THE U.S.

EMBASSY'S HOME PAGE AT HTTP://WWW.USEMBASSYJAKARTA.ORG

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON TRAVEL TO INDONESIA, CONSULT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S LATEST CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEET.

6. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED ON 1/09/98. DEPUTY SPOKESMAN JAMES B. FOLEY USED THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE ANSWER AT THAT DAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE GUIDANCE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

7. INDONESIA: ADHERENCE TO IMF PROGRAM

CONTEXT: ON OCTOBER 31, INDONESIA AGREED TO PURSUE A

PACKAGE OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT MEASURES IN ORDER TO RESPOND TO THE MONETARY CRISIS IN ASIA. THAT PACKAGE, DEVELOPED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE IMF AND OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AIMED TO MAINTAIN A BALANCED BUDGET; STABILIZE THE LOCAL CURRENCY (RUPIAH); RESTORE THE HEALTH OF THE BANKING SYSTEM; STRENGTHEN INDONESIA'S CAPITAL MARKETS; AND ATTEMPT TO DECREASE ELEMENTS OF MONOPOLY, PROTECTION AND EXCESSIVE REGULATION.

THOUGH INITIAL STEPS TAKEN BY INDONESIA TO IMPLEMENT THE PACKAGE REASSURED WORLD MARKETS, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT

BILLION IN CONTINGENT SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING TO AUGMENT RESERVES SHOULD INDONESIA REMAIN FULLY ON TRACK WITH THE IMF PROGRAM, ADOPT APPROPRIATE ADDITIONAL POLICY MEASURES, AND THE NEED ARISE. STATEMENTS MADE BY A TREASURY OFFICIAL CRITICIZING INDONESIA'S ADHERENCE TO THE IMF PACKAGE WERE MISINTERPRETED TO SUGGEST THAT THE U.S. HAS ALREADY DECIDED NOT TO DISBURSE CONTINGENT SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING.

Q: HAS THE U.S. WARNED INDONESIA THAT IT RUNS THE RISK OF LOSING THE SUPPLEMENTAL U.S. FUNDING FOR THE IMF PROGRAM IF THE GOI FAILS TO IMPLEMENT ALL OF THE IMF RECOMMENDATIONS?

A: THE U.S. HAS MADE NO SUCH DECISION. THE ONLY STATEMENT MADE ON THIS ISSUE WAS ONE CALLING FOR INDONESIA TO COMPLY

WITH THE IMF AGREEMENT. SHOULD THE NEED ARISE, WE WOULD NOT OPPOSE FURTHER DISBURSEMENT OF IME ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA IF THE GOVERNMENT UNDERTAKES FIRMLY AND FULLY THE IMF RECOMMENDED FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 STATE 004665 100225Z

IF ASKED

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS ALAN LARSON AND AMBASSADOR JOHN WOLF WILL JOIN DEPUTY SECRETARY OF TREASURY LARRY SUMMERS WHEN HE TRAVELS

TO INDONESIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN ASIA TO CONSULT ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION.

8. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 1/09/98 AND WERE NOT USED BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE DAILY BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

9. INDONESIA -- STABILITY OF SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT

CONTEXT: IN THE PAST 24 HOURS, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAS BEEN RUMORED TO HAVE FLED THE COUNTRY, TO HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY FOR MEDICAL CARE IN GERMANY, AND THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN RUMORS OF A COUP OR IMMINENT COUP.

Q: IS THE U.S. CONCERNED ABOUT THE STABILITY OF THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT? WHAT ABOUT RUMORS OF AN IMMINENT COUP? IS SOEHARTO GRAVELY ILL? DO YOU BELIEVE THAT SOEHARTO SHOULD STEP DOWN OR DECIDE NOT TO RUN FOR RE ELECTION?

A: INDONESIA IS PRESENTLY EXPERIENCING FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES THAT THE IMF PROGRAM FOR INDONESIA IS MEANT TO ADDRESS. AN INDONESIAN MINISTER OF STATE, ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, RESTATED TODAY THAT INDONESIA INTENDS TO IMPLEMENT THAT PROGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED

THERE HAVE BEEN MANY UNFOUNDED RUMORS IN THE PAST 24 HOURS. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO REMAINS IN INDONESIA IN CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS A STRONG ECONOMIC TEAM. THERE HAS BEEN NO COUP, AND THERE HAS BEEN NO WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE OR DEMONSTRATIONS.

IN RESPONSE TO CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE PUBLIC REACTION TO EVIDENT ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS STEMMING FROM INDONESIA'S PRESENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, THE U.S. EMBASSY IN JAKARTA HAS ADVISED THAT "DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED TENSION AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY ARISING FROM ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY IN INDONESIA, AMERICAN CITIZENS MAY WISH TO EXERCISE PRUDENCE AND COMMON SENSE AND TO AVOID DEMONSTRATIONS AND OTHER SITUATIONS THAT COULD TURN VIOLENT."

IF ASKED

A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS SCHEDULED FOR MARCH. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SHOULD SEEK RE-ELECTION IS A MATTER FOR HIM TO DECIDE, AND THE CHOICE OF LEADERSHIP IN INDONESIA IS A MATTER FOR THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE.

10. CAMBODIA: BAN ON OPPOSITION NEWSPAPERS

CONTEXT: THE CAMBODIAN INFORMATION MINISTRY ISSUED A DECREE JANUARY 8 ORDERING SIX OPPOSITION NEWSPAPERS TO HALT PUBLICATION PENDING COURT DECISIONS OVER POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF THE NATIONAL PRESS LAW. THIS ORDER COMES

DURING A PERIOD IN WHICH OPPOSITION LEADERS IN EXILE HAVE BEGUN TO RETURN TO CAMBODIA, AND OTHERS ARE EVALUATING THE HUMAN RIGHTS CLIMATE.

Q: WHAT IS THE USG POSITION ON REPORTS THAT THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT HAS CLOSED DOWN SIX OPPOSITION NEWSPAPERS?

A: WE HAVE SEEN THESE REPORTS AND MUST DEPLORE THIS ACTION BY THE CAMBODIAN INFORMATION MINISTRY, WHICH HAS THE EFFECT OF LIMITING FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND FREE ACCESS TO THE MEDIA.

THERE ARE ONGOING EFFORTS BY THE US, ASEAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SUPPORT A RESTORATION OF POLITICAL CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN CAMBODIA, THAT WILL HELP LEAD TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN 1998 WITHIN THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS FRAMEWORK.

THESE ACTIONS BY THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THESE EFFORTS. WE HAVE RAISED OUR CONCERNS OVER THE ISSUE OF FREE ACCESS TO THE MEDIA, IN ADDITION TO THE OVERALL HUMAN RIGHTS CLIMATE, DIRECTLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT--MOST RECENTLY DURING A/S SHATTUCK'S DECEMBER VISIT. WE HAVE ALREADY BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE CAMBODIAN INFORMATION MINISTRY AND WILL PURSUE THIS MATTER TO REGISTER OUR STRONG CONCERN.

11. CAMBODIA: TENG BUNMA'S VISA

CONTEXT: CAMBODIAN OFFICIAL TENG BUNMA'S MOST RECENT VISA, WHICH WAS ISSUED IN BANGKOK ON MARCH 17, 1994, WAS REVOKED ON

UNCLASSIFIED

AUGUST 29, L997 AND PHYSICALLY CANCELED ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1997 A CONSULAR OFFICER FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH. HE BEEN ISSUED A B-L/B-2 MULTIPLE ENTRY VISA VALID FOR 10 YEAR . IN JULY 1997, NICK BURNS SAID BUNMA WOULD NEVER BE ALLOWED T COME TO THE U.S. ACTION ON THE REVOCATION HAD BEEN DELAYED

BECAUSE OF THE CRISIS AND EVACUATION OF AMERICANS FROM CAMBODI? IN JULY 1997. DRUG TRAFFICKERS ARE INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS UNDER SECTION 212(A) (2) (C) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT.

Q: DOES TENG BUNMA HAVE A U.S. VISA? WHEN AND WHY WAS IT REVOKED?

A: TENG BUNMA'S U.S. VISA HAD BEEN ISSUED ON MARCH 17, 1994 IN BANGKOK.

MR. BUNMA'S VISA WAS REVOKED ON AUGUST 29, 1997 BECAUSE IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS REASON TO BELIEVE HE MAY BE INELIGIBLE FOR A VISA UNDER SECTION 212(A) (2) (C) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT. THAT PROVISION RENDERS INADMISSIBLE ALIENS WHO HAVE TRAFFICKED IN NARCOTICS OR ASSISTED IN TRAFFICKING ACTIVITIES.

12. CAMBODIA: ARREST OF JUAN MINH

CONTEXT: JUSTICE HAS ASKED THAT WE NOT DISCUSS THE CASE OF AMERICAN CITIZEN, NINH KIM NGUYEN, AKA JOHN NGUYEN (JUAN MINH) ARRESTED IN CAMBODIA ON DECEMBER 30, 1997. THERE IS AN INTERP(AND FBI WARRANT TO RETURN HIM TO THE U.S. ON MANSLAUGHTER CHARGES. THE U.S. EMBASSY VISITED HIM ON JANUARY 7 AND HE DEC#INED TO SIGN A PRIVACY ACT WAIVER FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATI(

TO THE MEDIA. MR. NGUYEN MAY NOT BE AN AMERICAN CITIZEN AND W? ARE ATTEMPTING TO VERIFY HIS CITIZENSHIP. HE TOLD THE CONSULA? OFFICER DURING THE VISIT THAT "HE USED TO BE AN AMERICAN CITIZ? AND THAT HE LIVED IN THE U.S. FROM 1975 UNTIL 1983."

Q: ANY DETAILS OF THE ARREST OF JUAN MINH IN CAMBODIA?

A: I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

13. HONG KONG DECISION ON VIETNAMESE ASYLUM-SEEKERS

Q.: WHAT IS THE U.S. REACTION TO HONG KONG'S DECISION TO END ITS PRACTICE OF ACCORDING FIRST ASYLUM TO VIETNAMESE ASYLUM-SEEKERS?

A. ACCORDING TO THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT, THE CHANGE IN POLICY INVOLVES ELIMINATING LANGUAGE IN HONG KONG IMMIGRATION LAWS WHICH STATED VIETNAMESE "BOAT PEOPLE" MUST BE ALLOWED INTO HONG KONG.

THE CONSULATE GENERAL IN HONG KONG HAS BEEN ASSURED

BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES, HOWEVER, THAT HONG KONG WILL

CONTINUE TO SCREEN REFUGEES IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, AND THAT ACCEPTING LEGITIMATE REFUGEES REMAINS A PART OF HONG KONG POLICY.

THE U.S. SUPPORTS THE PRACTICE OF FIRST ASYLUM/TEMPORARY PROTECTION CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES ENSHRINED IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

14. DEPARTMENT-WIDE SANCTIONS TEAM

Q: IS MORE LIAISON BETWEEN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ENVISAGED AS PART OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SANCTIONS TEAM?

A: IT IS IMPORTANT TO IMPROVE OUR DIALOGUE WITH STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS SO THAT WE ARE ALL WORKING TOWARDS THE SAME OBJECTIVE. ONE OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SANCTIONS TEAM WILL BE TO ESTABLISH A SYSTEM TO IDENTIFY SANCTIONS PROPOSALS EMERGING FROM CONGRESS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND NGOS. THE TEAM WILL ALSO LOOK AT OTHER WAYS WE MIGHT IMPROVE OUR OUTREACH TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

SECRET PTQ6454

PAGE 01 JAKART 01120 01 OF 03 261329Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000W
----------207BDF 261329Z /38
O 261331Z FEB 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0071
INFO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001120

EXDIS

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/16
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MONDALE VISIT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY J. STAPLETON ROY, AMBASSADOR,
REASON: 1.5 (D)

2. (S) YOU WILL BE COMING TO INDONESIA AT A TIME OF ACUTE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SENSITIVITY. THE ECONOMY IS IN SHAMBLES, WITH WORSE TO COME. SOCIAL TENSIONS ARE NEAR THE BOILING POINT. [redacted]

B1

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 01120 01 OF 03 261329Z

[redacted]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 26 APR 2007 200502960

[redacted] B1

3. (S) THE UNITED STATES CAN NEITHER TURN A BLIND EYE TO THIS CATHARSIS NOR CONTROL THE COURSE OF EVENTS. INDONESIA MATTERS. AN ASEAN ANCHORED ON A STABLE AND PROSPERING INDONESIA HAS THE CAPABILITY TO BALANCE THE RISE OF CHINA IN A NON-CONFRONTATION WAY THAT EASES THE BURDEN ON US AND MESHES WELL WITH OUR CONTINUED CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN THE REGION. OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS ARE INEXTRICABLY LINKED WITH THE SUCCESS OF THESE FAST-GROWING COUNTRIES. CONVERSELY, AN INDONESIA THAT LAPSES BACK TOWARD INSTABILITY AND MISRULE WOULD SEND SHOCK WAVES THROUGHOUT THE REGION. PROLONGED ECONOMIC HARDSHIP COULD PROVIDE THE BREEDING GROUND FOR EXTREMISM, A CHILLING POSSIBILITY IN THIS OVERWHELMING MUSLIM COUNTRY THAT IS NOW A LEADING PROPONENT OF MODERATION. [redacted] B1 THEY LOOK TO US FOR WISDOM AND LEADERSHIP. IT IS A DAUNTING CHALLENGE BUT NOT ONE WE CAN SHY AWAY FROM.

4. (S) THE COMPLEXITY LIES IN THE CONJUNCTION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS. SOME BELIEVE THAT [redacted] INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC CRISIS CANNOT BE RESOLVED AND [redacted] CONFIDENCE IN THE CURRENCY RESTORED WITHOUT A CHANGE IN [redacted] THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. OTHERS CONSIDER [redacted]

SECRET

SOEHARTO THE ONLY LEADER WITH THE AUTHORITY AND EXPERIENCE NECESSARY TO HOLD THE COUNTRY TOGETHER AND SURMOUNT THE TROUBLES AHEAD. THE ISSUE IS INTELLECTUALLY CHALLENGING BUT OF MARGINAL POLICY RELEVANCE. [redacted] B1 OUR FOCUS SHOULD BE ON HELPING INDONESIA TO SURMOUNT THE CRISIS, STANDING FOR OUR

PRINCIPLES, AND MAINTAINING CORRECT BUT NOT INTIMATE RELATIONS WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. WE SHOULD ADJUST THIS STANCE IF AND WHEN DEVELOPMENTS WARRANT.

5. (S) A PRIMARY PURPOSE OF YOUR VISIT WILL BE TO REINFORCE PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S COMMITMENT TO VIGOROUS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JANUARY 15 IMF AGREEMENT AND TO CONVEY A STRONG SENSE OF OUR DESIRE TO ASSIST AND SPEED INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY. THIS IS THE RIGHT MESSAGE AT THE RIGHT TIME. THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING YOUR VISIT, HOWEVER, POSE SIGNIFICANT RISKS, BOTH OF MISINTERPRETATION OF OUR PURPOSE AND OF RESENTMENT TO OUR MESSAGE.

6. (S) AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF INDONESIA'S COLLAPSED CURRENCY, SEVERE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, UNSETTLED DOMESTIC CONDITIONS, AND UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE TO SOEHARTO'S LEADERSHIP, YOU WILL ARRIVE AT A TIME WHEN PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IS BELEAGUERED ON ALL FRONTS. WHILE HIS HOLD ON POWER MAY BE SLIPPING, HE IS STILL FIRMLY IN CONTROL. AS ONE WOULD EXPECT IN A COUNTRY OF TWO HUNDRED MILLION

PEOPLE, DOMESTIC FACTORS ARE DRIVING EVENTS AND, TO A DISTURBING DEGREE, OVERRIDING SOLEMN GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, RECEPTIVITY TO OUTSIDE ADVICE IS LOW IF THE MESSAGE IS NOT PALATABLE. YOUR MISSION, THEREFORE, WILL CONFRONT DELICATE BUT MANAGEABLE CHALLENGES.

7. (S) YOU WILL BE DEALING WITH A LEADER WHO HAS RULED INDONESIA FOR 32 YEARS. HIS SENIORITY AND MAGISTERIAL STYLE HAVE COWED HIS SUBORDINATES, MOST A GENERATION YOUNGER, AND INSULATED HIM FROM FRANK ADVICE. AWARE OF HIS JAVANESE ROOTS, INDONESIANS ADOPT A DEFERENTIAL AND INDIRECT MANNER IN DEALING WITH HIM. FOREIGNERS CAN AND SHOULD BEHAVE DIFFERENTLY, IN CONFORMITY WITH THEIR OWN NATIONAL STYLES. WHEN THEY CAUSE OFFENSE, HOWEVER, EVEN IF INADVERTENT, THEY FIND SOEHARTO STRONG-WILLED AND DETERMINED. SENIOR INDONESIANS BELIEVE THAT WELL-LAID PLANS TO SIDETRACK THE HABIBIE VICE PRESIDENCY WERE ABORTED BY FOREIGN EFFORTS TO ADVISE SOEHARTO AGAINST

SECRET

NNNNPTQ6456

SECRET PTQ6456
PAGE 01 JAKART 01120 02 OF 03 261329Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000W
----------207BE8 261330Z /38
O 261331Z FEB 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0072
INFO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 001120

EXDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/16
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MONDALE VISIT

CHOOSING HABIBIE.

8. (S) OUR AMERICAN PREDILECTION FOR BLUNTNESS IS NOT WELL SUITED TO DEALING WITH SOEHARTO, ESPECIALLY ON POLITICAL TOPICS WHERE HIS UNSTATED VIEW IS THAT OUR SHALLOW GRASP OF INDONESIAN POLITICAL REALITIES MAKES OFFERING ADVICE INHERENTLY PRESUMPTUOUS. OUR STRENGTHS LIE IN OUR OPENNESS, OUR MASTERY OF TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, AND OUR POWER (BOTH ECONOMIC AND MILITARY). THIS INSURES THAT OUR VIEWS GET ATTENTION, WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE FOLLOWED.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 01120 02 OF 03 261329Z

9. (S) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WILL HAVE HIS OWN EXPECTATIONS FOR HIS MEETING WITH YOU. TWO ISSUES WILL BE UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND: STABILIZING THE RUPIAH; AND DEFERRING PAYMENT ON SOVEREIGN DEBT.

-- THE CURRENCY BOARD IS ON HOLD FOR THE MOMENT, BUT THERE ARE NO GUARANTEES IT WILL REMAIN THERE. THE NEED TO STABILIZE THE RUPIAH AT A RATE THAT MAKE INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS FEASIBLE IS A DRIVING NECESSITY IN THE MINDS OF INDONESIANS BOTH IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY. UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM US AND OTHERS, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAS SHELVED THE CURRENCY BOARD, BUT HE IS LOOKING TO US TO OFFER ADVICE, EXPERTISE, AND SUPPORT ON APPROPRIATE ALTERNATIVES. IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE SEEING THE FIRST SIGNS OF UNILATERAL INDONESIAN MOVES TOWARD A TWO-TIER FOREIGN EXCHANGE SYSTEM, E.G., SOEHARTO'S DECISION IN RECENT DAYS TO UNDERWRITE FOOD AND OTHER VITAL COMMODITY IMPORTS VIA A FIXED 5000 RUPIAH/DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE.

-- INDONESIA IS APPROACHING G-7 GOVERNMENTS TO SEEK A TWO TO THREE YEAR DEFERRAL OF PAYMENTS OF PRINCIPAL ON INDONESIA'S SOVEREIGN DEBT, AN ISSUE THAT SOEHARTO TOUCHED ON IN HIS MOST RECENT TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON. WE UNDERSTAND THE FRENCH, GERMANS, ITALIANS, AND JAPANESE HAVE ALREADY BEEN APPROACHED. YOU SHOULD BE PREPARED, THEREFORE, FOR A PRESIDENTIAL REQUEST FOR U.S. HELP IN ARRANGING A DEFERRED PAYMENT PLAN FOR THE COUNTRY'S FOREIGN PUBLIC DEBT.

NEITHER OF THESE TWO MEASURES TRACKS WITH INDONESIA'S UNDERTAKINGS UNDER THE JANUARY IMF AGREEMENT. BOTH, HOWEVER, ARE KEY PARTS OF SOEHARTO'S EFFORTS TO PREVENT INDONESIA FROM EDGING EVEN CLOSER TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COLLAPSE. THEY THUS WILL HAVE TO BE HANDLED CAREFULLY IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK.

THE MESSAGE AND THE MEDIUM

10. (S) AS NOTED ABOVE, ONE OF YOUR CENTRAL PURPOSES WILL BE TO STRENGTHEN SOEHARTO'S COMMITMENT TO THE IMF PROGRAM AND TO REITERATE PRESIDENT CLINTON'S ASSURANCES THAT WE AND INDONESIA'S OTHER MAJOR FRIENDS WANT TO HELP THE GOI EASE THE INEVITABLE HARDSHIPS THAT WILL FLOW FROM PURSUING POLICY AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENTS NECESSARY TO RESTORE INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC HEALTH. IT IS IMPORTANT TO REAFFIRM THIS TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, YOUR MISSION TO JAKARTA AT THIS SENSITIVE POLITICAL MOMENT POSES THREE RISKS:

-- THAT WE WILL BE PERCEIVED AS LENDING SUPPORT TO SOEHARTO AT A CRITICAL MOMENT IN HIS RESELECTION AS PRESIDENT;

-- THAT WE WILL BE SEEN AS THE LEADING COUNTRY PREVAILING UPON THE GOI TO ADOPT RIGOROUS AND ONEROUS POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS, THUS SETTING US UP FOR CHARGES THAT WE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR RESULTING HARDSHIPS, FOR INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND/OR FOR UNSOUND POLICY ADVICE IF THE PROGRAM FAILS;

-- AND, FINALLY, THAT WE WILL RAISE EXPECTATIONS OF OFFERS OF SUBSTANTIAL NEW FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE THAT MAY BE UNREALISTIC AND UNFULFILLED.

AGAINST A BLEAK ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKDROP

11. (S) WHAT BEGAN AS AN EXCHANGE RATE PROBLEM LAST SUMMER HAS NOW DETERIORATED INTO A FULL-BLOWN ECONOMIC-POLITICAL CRISIS. THE RUPIAH'S COLLAPSE IS BRINGING NORMAL BUSINESS DEALINGS TO A STANDSTILL. MOST FIRMS HAVE STOPPED PAYING THEIR DEBTS, WHETHER TO DOMESTIC BANKS OR TO FOREIGN CREDITORS. A MAJOR U.S. OIL FIRM TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT THE STATE OIL COMPANY PERTAMINA HAD FOR THE FIRST TIME DEFAULTED ON A PAYMENT. EVEN ACCORDING TO CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT ESTIMATES, RAPIDLY GROWING UNEMPLOYMENT IS EXPECTED TO AFFECT AT LEAST 20 MILLION PERSONS OUT OF THE 90 MILLION WORKFORCE BY THE END OF 1998. SPIRALING INFLATION AND FOOD COSTS,

PAGE 01 JAKART 01120 03 OF 03 261329Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000W
----------207BEC 261329Z /38

O 261331Z FEB 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0073
INFO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 001120

EXDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/16
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MONDALE VISIT

ALONG WITH SHORTAGES OF BASIC COMMODITIES, ARE COMBINING TO SPARK WIDESPREAD, IF STILL SPORADIC, RIOTS AND SOCIAL UNREST. ALTHOUGH THE SECURITY FORCES ARE ABLE TO INSURE STABILITY FOR NOW IN MAJOR URBAN CENTERS, FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THE ECONOMY COULD ESCALATE UNREST TO LEVELS THAT WOULD SORELY TEST THEIR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER.

12. (S) IN THE MEANTIME, THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY IS SET TO BEGIN MEETING MARCH 1 IN A SESSION THAT WILL CONFIRM SOEHARTO ON MARCH 11 AS PRESIDENT FOR A SEVENTH TERM, WITH MINISTER HABIBIE AS HIS VICE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 01120 03 OF 03 261329Z
PRESIDENT. FEW SEE MUCH HOPE FOR A REVITALIZED GOVERNMENT EMERGING FROM THIS PROCESS. RATHER, THEY SEE A SOEHARTO WHOSE CREDIBILITY AS A LEADER IS SLIPPING AND WHO INSTEAD HAS BECOME A PRISONER OF HIS FAMILY'S NARROW INTERESTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE OPPOSITION REMAINS DISORGANIZED, WITH NO OBVIOUS FIGURES AROUND WHICH IT MIGHT COALESCE AS A MEANINGFUL NEAR-TERM THREAT TO THE REGIME. IN SHORT, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, LIKE INDONESIA'S ECONOMY, IS FROZEN IN A DYSFUNCTIONAL AND

ULTIMATELY UNSTABLE GRIDLOCK.

RESTORING THE RUPIAH

13. (S) FOR SOEHARTO, THE ROOT OF ALL EVILS CONFRONTING THE COUNTRY LIES IN A RUPIAH WHICH STUBBORNLY REFUSES TO RECOVER TO A MORE REASONABLE EXCHANGE RATE, NO MATTER THE SEVERITY OF THE STRUCTURAL AND POLICY REFORMS PLEDGED UNDER SUCCESSIVE IMF AGREEMENTS. HENCE HIS CONTINUING ATTRACTION TO A CURRENCY BOARD AS A ONE-SHOT CURE FOR INDONESIA'S ILLS. THE SAME IMPULSE PROMPTED HIS MOVE EARLIER THIS WEEK TO ESTABLISH A TWO-TIER EXCHANGE SYSTEM ALLOWING FOOD IMPORTS UNDER A FIXED 50000 RUPIAH/DOLLAR RATE, EVEN THOUGH THIS BREACHED A KEY UNDERTAKING WITH THE IMF. AS IMPLIED IN HIS FEBRUARY 20 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON, SOEHARTO SEES THESE SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS AS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM A CURRENCY BOARD, WHILE ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE A REASONABLY PRICED FOOD SUPPLY.

A RECOMMENDED APPROACH

SECRET

SECRET

14. (S) AGAINST THIS BACKDROP, WE RECOMMEND YOUR APPROACH INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

-- COUCH YOUR POLITICAL POINTS CAREFULLY. AN OVERLY DIRECT APPROACH, HOWEVER COMPATIBLE WITH OUR DOMESTIC IMPERATIVES, COULD HAVE UNINTENDED AND UNDESIRED CONSEQUENCES WHILE UNDERMINING THE FORCE AND CREDIBILITY OF THE ECONOMIC MESSAGE. SEEKING THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS ON WAYS TO BROADEN SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD BE A MORE EFFECTIVE LEAD IN TO AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT THAN GIVING HIM UNSOLICITED ADVICE.

-- SHOW WHERE WE CAN HELP. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS TOLD SOEHARTO WE ARE LOOKING FOR AREAS WHERE WE CAN HELP CUSHION THE HARDSHIP ARISING FROM THE IMF PLAN. UPDATING SOEHARTO ON OUR PLANS IN THIS AREA SHOULD BE A MAJOR FOCUS IN OUR PRESENTATION.

-- BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THE RUPIAH/FOOD PROBLEM: SOEHARTO UNDOUBTEDLY HOPES FOR SUPPORT REGARDING HIS EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERVALUED RUPIAH, AND ITS THREAT TO BASIC FOOD SUPPLIES. HE WOULD RESENT OUTRIGHT U.S. OPPOSITION, SEEING IT AS RIGID ADHERENCE TO A FORMULA THAT, IF BLINDLY PURSUED, COULD LEAD TO SUFFERING AND UNREST ON A MASSIVE SCALE. IRONICALLY, SOEHARTO COULD PROBABLY COUNT ON SUPPORT FOR HIS VIEW FROM EVEN HIS HARSHEST CRITICS, SOME OF WHOM ARE BEGINNING TO TURN AGAINST WHAT THEY SEE AS IMF-IMPOSED HARDSHIP FOR INDONESIA'S POOREST CLASSES.

SECRET

SECRET

-- SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA: OUR MESSAGE NEEDS TO BE ONE OF SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA AND INDONESIANS IN A TIME OF MASSIVE DIFFICULTIES. WE MAKE NO APOLOGY FOR PURSUING OUR EFFORTS THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR POLICY VIS A VIS INDONESIA'S CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION REMAINS AS IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN: WE BELIEVE INDONESIA NEEDS TO MOVE TOWARD A MORE PLURALISTIC, DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM BUT WE DO NOT BACK ANY PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS INVOLVED IN THAT PROCESS.

15. (S) WE LOOK FORWARD TO WELCOMING YOU HERE AND WILL DO ALL WE CAN TO SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVES OF YOUR MISSION.
ROY

SECRET

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B5

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5370

PAGE 01 JAKART 00165 01 OF 02 121035Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001W
----------0E1B5A 121038Z /38
O 121033Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9073

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000165

OFFICIAL INFORMAL - FOR EAP/PIMBS D.HARTWICK FROM DCM M. OWENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/08
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL JAKARTA TO PIMBS NO. 7

1. CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL P. OWENS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION. REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) COMMENTS ON TREASURY ANALYSIS

[redacted] B1, B5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00165 01 OF 02 121035Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 11 JAN 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 26 APR 2007 200502960

B1, B5



B1, B5



[redacted] B1, B5

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ5371

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5371

PAGE 01 JAKART 00165 02 OF 02 121035Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001W
----------0E1B5F 121038Z /38
O 121033Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9074

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 000165

OFFICIAL INFORMAL - FOR EAP/PIMBS D.HARTWICK FROM DCM M. OWENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/08
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL JAKARTA TO PIMBS NO. 7

[redacted] B1, B5

[redacted]

B1, B5

3. (U) SUMMERS VISIT

DEPSEC SUMMERS HAS APPOINTMENTS (SO FAR) WITH MAR'IE MUHAMMAD, DR. WIDJOJO, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, AND TUNKY ARIWIBOWO. HE'S HAVING DINNER WITH DENNIS DE TRAY, POSSIBLY STANLEY FISCHER.

4. (SBU) FISCHER VISIT

MINFIN MAR'IE MUHAMMAD CALLED THE AMBASSADOR TO SAY THAT STANLEY FISCHER AND PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAD HAD A VERY SUCCESSFUL MEETING. THEY HAD REACHED AGREEMENT ON MANY TOPICS. WE'LL FAX FISCHER'S PRESS STATEMENT, SAYING HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY HIS MEETING, TO YOU.

5. (C) OTHER REPORTING

YOU SHOULD LOOK FOR JAKARTA 161, A DATT MESSAGE, WHICH PROVIDES SOME INTERESTING INSIGHTS ON HOW ONE PROMINENT GENERAL SEES THE VP RACE SHAPING UP. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B5

SECRET PTQ8265

PAGE 01 JAKART 00187 01 OF 02 130938Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CCO-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00
SSO-00 SS-00 /002W
----------0E8CB5 130938Z /38
O 130940Z JAN 98 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 9081

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000187

PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH, DAS ZELIKOW IMMEDIATELY

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/WOLF AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/16
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (U) KUALA LUMPUR AND BANGKOK: PLEASE PASS TO THE SUMMERS PARTY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. JUSTIFICATION FOR NIACT IMMEDIATE: THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA HOPES FOR A REPLY BEFORE CLOSE OF BUSINESS TODAY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 00187 01 OF 02 130938Z
3. (S) STATE SECRETARY MOERDIONO AND DR. WIDJOJO

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 26 APR 2007 200502960

TOLD US THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ASKED THEM FOR A DETAILED TRANSCRIPTION OF THE POINTS DEPSEC SUMMERS MADE DURING HIS JANUARY 13 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. THEY ASKED IF WE COULD PROVIDE THE REPORT. BELOW PARA. 6 IS WHAT WE WERE ABLE TO DECIPHER FROM THE AMBASSADOR'S NOTES. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP ANY CORRECTIONS AND CHANGES AND IF WE CAN RELEASE THE NOTES TO THE SENIOR OFFICIALS.

4. (S) MOERDIONO SAID THE GOI NEEDS MORE DETAILS ON THE USG'S THINKING. HE POSED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

[redacted] B1

IN ADDITION, THIS IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE A RUN-DOWN OF ANY OTHER SPECIFIC MEASURES THE USG WOULD LIKE TO SEE. WE HAVE A COPY OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE MEETING IF THAT HELPS.

5. THE OFFICIALS NEED THE INFORMATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE WILL APPRECIATE YOUR ADVISING US QUICKLY, IF POSSIBLE IN TIME FOR FISCHER'S MEETING WITH SOEHARTO TONIGHT; OTHERWISE BEFORE SOEHARTO MEETS WITH CAMDESSUS ON THURSDAY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JAKART 00187 01 OF 02 130938Z

6. (S) BEGIN TEXT OF EMBASSY DECIPHERING OF AMBASSADOR'S NOTES:

[redacted] B1, B5

B1, B5

B1, B5

SECRET

NNNNPTQ8266

SECRET PTQ8266

PAGE 01 JAKART 00187 02 OF 02 130938Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CCO-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00
SSO-00 SS-00 /002W
----------0E8CB8 130938Z /38
O 130940Z JAN 98 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 9082

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 000187

PLEASE PASS A/S ROTH, DAS ZELIKOW IMMEDIATELY

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/WOLF AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/16
TAGS: AMGT, ID

B1, B5

[redacted]

B1, B5

[redacted] ROY

B1, B5

SECRET

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B5

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1462

PAGE 01 JAKART 00194 140847Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001W
----------0F0CB5 140847Z /21
O 140513Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL HONG KONG IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9096
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000194

BANGKOK AND HONG KONG PLEASE PASS TREASURY DAS ZELIKOW
IN DEPSEC SUMMERS' PARTY

MANILA FOR EXIM PARTY

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/16
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM MICHAEL P. OWENS; REASON 1.5(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00194 140847Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 26 APR 2007 200502960

2. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WILL RECEIVE EXIMBANK CHAIRMAN HARMON ON THE MORNING OF THURSDAY, JANUARY 15. PLEASE ADVISE HOW YOU WISH TO USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO FOLLOW UP ON DEPSEC SUMMERS' JANUARY 13 MEETING WITH SOEHARTO. UNLESS WE HEAR OTHERWISE, WE WILL WORK THE DEPSEC'S FOUR BASIC MESSAGES INTO MR. HARMON'S TALKING POINTS, BUT WILL NOT INCLUDE THE SPECIFIC POINTS CONTAINED IN THE ONE-PAGE LIST WE RECEIVED FROM DAS ZELIKOW VIA EMBASSY BANGKOK TODAY. HOWEVER, IF SOEHARTO ASKS ABOUT THE SPECIFIC POINTS, WE WILL CONFIRM THAT THEY REPRESENT THE USG'S THOUGHTS ON THE KINDS OF STRONG MEASURES NEEDED TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE.

[redacted] B1, B5

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B5

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1990

PAGE 01 JAKART 00202 141133Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001W
----------0F1D4C 141135Z /38
O 141133Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9106

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000202

OFFICIAL INFORMAL - FOR EAP/PIMBS D.HARTWICK FROM DCM M. OWENS

E.O. 12958:DECL: 01/14/08
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL JAKARTA TO PIMBS NO. 9

1. CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL P. OWENS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION.
REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) POSSIBLE SOEHARTO-CLINTON PHONECALL

PLEASE GIVE A HEADS-UP TO APPROPRIATE PEOPLE THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO MENTIONED TO SECDEF COHEN AT THE END OF THEIR JANUARY 14 MEETING THAT HE EXPECTED TO TALK TO PRESIDENT CLINTON AGAIN SHORTLY. SOEHARTO TOLD SECDEF THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH IMF MANAGING DIRECTOR CAMDESSUS ON JANUARY 15 AND THEN HAVE ANOTHER CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON. THE CAMDESSUS MEETING WITH SOEHARTO IS SET FOR 10:00 AM JANUARY 15 (10:00 PM JANUARY 14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00202 141133Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 26 APR 2007 200502960

WASHINGTON TIME). WE'VE FAXED A HEADS UP TO SUMMERS AND ZELIKOW IN HONG KONG.

3. (C) THE SILENT BUT CONCERNED MAJORITY

A NUMBER OF U.S. POWER COMPANIES HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT CALENERGY'S CAMPAIGN TO GET ONLY ITS POWER PROJECT REMOVED FROM THE GOI'S REVIEW/POSTPONED LIST (CALENERGY HOPES TO GET STATE SECRETARY MOERDIONO WITH USG SUPPORT TO MAKE AN EXCEPTION FOR ITS GEOTHERMAL PROJECT). THEY QUESTION HOW THE GOI CAN APPROVE CONTINUATION OF ANY PROJECT AT THIS TIME WITHOUT INCURRING THE WRATH OF THE IMF. PAT MET WITH ENRON LAST NIGHT AND UNOCAL TODAY AND BOTH FIRMS SAID THE COMPANIES SHOULD APPROACH PLN AND OFFER ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING TRANSPARENT CRITERIA WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE GOI TO MOVE FORWARD ON SOME OF THE POWER PROJECTS.

WHICH BRINGS US TO THE OPIC DRAFT LETTER.

4. (C) OPIC DRAFT LETTER

B1, B5

5. (U) MEXICAN ADVICE

FINANCE MINISTER MAR'IE MUHAMMAD CALLED THE AMBASSADOR TODAY TO ASK IF IT WOULD BE OKAY IF HE PASSED A COPY OF DEPSEC SUMMERS' LETTER ABOUT MEXICO'S WILLINGNESS TO SHARE ITS EXPERIENCES TO FORMER MINISTER RADIUS PRAWIRO (WHOM SOEHARTO APPOINTED TO HEAD THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE TEAM TO WORK ON PRIVATE SECTOR DEBT MANAGEMENT). THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS SURE TREASURY WOULD NOT MIND. IN CASE WE DON'T GET A CHANCE TO WRITE A FAX TO ANDREW VELTHAUS, COULD YOU PLEASE SEND THIS SNIPPET OVER TO HIM? WE THOUGHT TREASURY MIGHT LIKE TO INFORM THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INVOLVED THAT IT MIGHT BE RADIUS RATHER THAN MAR'IE WHO CALLS THEM.

6. (C) VISIT CONVERGENCE JITTERS

A VERY SOLID AMCIT CONTACT SAID HIS INDONESIAN FRIENDS ARE EXPRESSING SOME CONCERN ABOUT THE NUMBER OF SENIOR USG VISITORS. ALTHOUGH THE CONVERGENCE (SUMMERS, COHEN, HARMON, CODEL) WAS PURE COINCIDENCE, THEY INDICATED THAT IT GIVES THE IMPRESSION TO MANY INDONESIANS THAT WE ARE GANGING UP ON THEM. THAT SAID, THESE ARE LIKELY THE SAME PEOPLE WHO FELT SOME RELIEF WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S EFFORTS KICKED IN AT THE END OF LAST

WEEK. AND, THEY MAY ALSO BE THE SAME FOLKS WHO WERE COMPLAINING SEVERAL MONTHS AGO ABOUT HOW SENIOR U.S. TYPES SEEMED TO BE ADVERSE TO BEING SEEN PUBLICLY WITH ANY LIVE INDONESIAN. JUST PASSING THIS COMMENT ALONG IN THE FOR-WHAT-IT-IS-WORTH CATGORY.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B5

CONFIDENTIAL PTO4879

PAGE 01 STATE 007655 150153Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

007655
SOURCE: KODAKA.150008
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMES:DHARTWICK -- 1/14/98 71823
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:VEMURRAY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------0F7906 150154Z /38
O 150150Z JAN 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 007655

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/14/08
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA 07

FOR DCM OWENS FROM EAP/PIMBS HARTWICK

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS A. HARTWICK.
REASON: 1.5(D)

1. (C) SOEHARTO-CLINTON PHONE CALL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 14 JAN 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 26 APR 2007 200502960

THE WHITE HOUSE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A PHONE CALL FROM PRESIDENT SOEHARTO THURSDAY MORNING WASHINGTON TIME. WINDOW 15 11:15 TO 11:45 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME. PLEASE CONVEY THIS TO THE APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS. JIM GAGNON WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH MIKE OWENS TO PIN DOWN.

2. (C) HARMON CALL ON SOEHARTO

TREASURY AGREED WITH YOUR SUGGESTION IN JAKARTA 194 THAT MR. HARMON'S TALKING POINTS DRAW ON THE FOUR BASIC MESSAGES MADE BY DEPSEC SUMMERS. IF SOEHARTO ASKS ABOUT THE SPECIFIC POINTS, HE CAN CONFIRM THAT THEY REPRESENT THE

USG'S THOUGHT ON THE KINDS OF STRONG MEASURES NEEDED TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE.

3. (SBU) TIFA PREPARATIONS AND TEXTILES

RICK RUZICKA GAVE VIRGINIA A READOUT OF AN INTERAGENCY MEETING HELD LAST FRIDAY TO BEGIN PLANNING THE TIFA. (OUR INVITATION APPARENTLY GOT LOST IN TRANSMISSION.) THE MEETINGS WILL TAKE PLACE FEBRUARY 12-13. A PLENARY WITH THE DELEGATION HEADS (USTR CHARLENE BARSHEFSKY AND MINISTER TUNKY SHOULD HE MAKE THE TRIP) WILL OPEN THE PROGRAM. THE TWO SIDES WILL THEN BREAK INTO TWO WORKING GROUPS AND WORK FROM THE AGENDA THAT USTR SENT TO THE GOL EARLIER THIS MONTH. ONCE LISA ERRION ARRIVES HERE NEXT WEEK WE'LL ARRANGE TO SIT DOWN WITH RICK AND TALK FURTHER ABOUT PREPARATIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BARSHEFSKY APPARENTLY HAD A 30 MINUTE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH TUNKY ON JANUARY V. THEY DISCUSSED THE IMF CRISIS AND THE DECEMBER TEXTILE NEGOTIATIONS. BARSHEFSKY TOLD TUNKY THAT THE GOL NEEDS TO PROVIDE BETTER AND MORE COMPLETE DOCUMENTATION TO BOLSTER ITS ARGUMENTS.

4. (SBU) LABOR ACTION PLAN

[redacted]

B5

5. (C) DEPUTY COMPTROLLER FOR BANKING AND FINANCE

YOU WILL BE RECEIVING A COUNTRY CLEARANCE REQUEST FOR JOHN ABBOTT, DEPUTY COMPTROLLER FOR INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE, TO VISIT JAKARTA JAN 27-29. THOUGH THE CABLE DOES NOT SPECIFY, MR. ABBOTT WILL WANT TO MEET WITH BOTH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (CENTRAL BANK OFFICIALS, BANK SUPERVISION OFFICIALS, EXPERTS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF MONETARY AND FISCAL ISSUES) AND PRIVATE SECTOR TYPES (U.S. BANKERS, ECONOMIC ANALYSTS, SECURITY ANALYSTS, ETC.). THOUGH MR.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 007655 150153Z

ABBOTT NO DOUBT WILL BE GATHERING INFORMATION ON WHAT U.S. BANKS SHOULD DO ABOUT THEIR EXPOSURE IN ASIA, WE MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS VISIT TO SUPPORT IMF PROGRAM REFORMS IN THE BANKING SECTOR. MR. ABBOTT WILL HAVE A DAY AND A HALF FOR MEETINGS, AND IS WILLING TO HAVE WORKING BREAKFASTS, LUNCHES, OR DINNERS.

6. (C) CALENERGY

[redacted]

B1, B5

B1, B5

7. (C) ICRAS REVIEW

B1, B5

[redacted]

B1, B5

CONFIDENTIAL

8. (U) KUDOS

THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT ASKED US TO PASS ON THEIR COMPLIMENTS FOR YOUR CONTINUED EXCELLENT REPORTING ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS. THEY REMAIN IMPRESSED BY BOTH THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF THE WORK YOU ARE PROVIDING, AND RELY HEAVILY ON YOUR REPORTING TO ANSWER THE MANY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL IMPACTS FOR U.S. BUSINESS OF THE CONTINUING CRISIS. CONGRATULATIONS ON A JOB WELL DONE.

9. (C) WASHINGTON ATMOSPHERICS

I KNOW YOU ALL FEEL LIKE YOU ARE AT GROUND ZERO, BUT THAT'S BECAUSE YOU ARE. ALL OF WASHINGTON WILL BE WATCHING MOST CAREFULLY WHAT WILL COME OF THE SOEHARTO/CAMDESSUS MEETING AND WHETHER THE PROGRAM WILL BE STRONG ENOUGH TO DO THE TRICK. WE WILL BE WORKING ON ANOTHER PRESS STEMENT OOB THAT SHOULD ENDORSE WHAT WE ASSUME WILL BE A GOOD PACKAGE. I WILL ALSO NEED TO HAVE AT LEAST AN O-I STYLE DESCRIPTION OF THE COHEN VISIT HIGHLIGHTS SO THAT I CAN INCLUDE THIS IN THE MORNING SITREP BRIEFER TO THE SECRETARY. FYI, THE SECRETARY HAS REALLY GEARED UP ON THIS CRISIS AND, ACCORDING TO JOHN WOLF WHO ACCOMPANIED HER, DID A TERRIFIC JOB WITH SENIOR BUSINESS PERSONS IN NEW YORK AT A CLOSED CFR LUNCHEON ON THE SUBJECT. YOUR INPUT HAS BEEN A CRITICAL COMPONENT IN HELPING US KEEP HER PROPERLY BRIEFED. TALBOTT

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PTQ3239

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO8966

PAGE 01 STATE 036256 020410Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	SSAS-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/025R						

036256
SOURCE: KODAKB.002008
DRAFTED BY: WHITE HOUSE:JOAGNON:VEM -- 02/27/98 7-1823
APPROVED BY: EAP:SOROTH
EAP:AEBRAZEAL NSC:SKRISTOFF TREASURY:DLIPTON
S/S:JAMCVERRY S/S-O:JAMCVERRY NSCS:ERICE
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP, EUR, P, E
----------21987D 020411Z /38
O 020406Z MAR 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE 9791
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 036256 020410Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 036256

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/08
TAGS: OVIP (WALTER MONDALE), PREL, PGOV, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: VISIT OF FORMER VICE PRESIDENT WALTER MONDALE TO JAKARTA

CLASSIFIED BY EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE STANLEY O. ROTH. REASON: 1.5 (D)

1. (C) FORMER VICE PRESIDENT WALTER MONDALE WILL VISIT JAKARTA AT THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT CLINTON. HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY TREASURY DEPARTMENT UNDER SECRETARY DAVID LIPTON AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY ROTH. MR. MONDALE WILL ARRIVE IN JAKARTA ON MARCH 2 AND WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO MARCH 3. U/S LIPTON AND A/S ROTH ALSO WILL MEET SEPARATELY WITH A NUMBER OF INDONESIAN 9OVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR. MR. MONDALE WILL LEAVE JAKARTA MARCH 3.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 036256 020410Z
2. (C) ADDRESSEE POSTS MAY DRAW ON THE POINTS BELOW WHEN DISCUSSING THE MONDALE VISIT TO JAKARTA WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

-- THE UNITED STATES AND INDONESIA HAVE A STRONG, LONG STANDING RELATIONSHIP. INDONESIA IS AN IMPORTANT TRADING

PARTNER AND WE APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS IT HAS MADE TO THE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY OF THE REGION AND

THE LEADERSHIP ROLE IT HAS IN BOTH ASEAN AND APEC.

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS BEEN ENGAGED PERSONALLY ON THE FINANCIAL INSTABILITY CONFRONTING EAST ASIA AND INDONESIA, AND HAS BEEN IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE LEADERS OF THE REGION, INCLUDING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO.

-- MR. MONDALE WILL BE VISITING JAKARTA TO FOLLOW UP ON DISCUSSIONS PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS HAD WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. THE DISCUSSION WILL REVIEW ONGOING EFFORTS TO RESTORE FINANCIAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN INDONESIA AND THE STEPS NEEDED TO REESTABLISH MARKET CONFIDENCE.

-- MR. MONDALE WILL UNDERSCORE OUR BELIEF THAT A STRONG DEMONSTRABLE COMMITMENT TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS AGREED TO WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECTS FOR RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. THE SUCCESS OF THIS EFFORT WILL DEPEND ON PRESIDENT SOEHARTO PLACING THE FULL AUTHORITY OF HIS OFFICE BEHIND THE ECONOMIC REFORMS AGREED TO WITH THE IMF AND EXERTING THE POLITICAL WILL TO

ENSURE SUSTAINED IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE MEASURES TO COMPLETION.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

SECRET PTQ0826

PAGE 01 JAKART 01261 01 OF 05 040632Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000W
----------22A1A5 040632Z /38
O 040630Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0189
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 001261

DECAPTIONED

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR

TREASURY FOR DEPSEC SUMMERS, OASIA/GEITHNER, ZELIKOW

PASS NSC FOR BERGER, KRISTOFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/16
TAGS: EFIN, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MONDALE'S EXPANDED MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, MARCH 3

REF: JAKARTA 1226

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(B)

2. (S) SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR MONDALE AND PRESIDENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

SOEHARTO MET FOR ONE HOUR ON MARCH 3 WITH ADVISERS PRESENT, FOLLOWED BY A 30 MINUTE PRIVATE MEETING (SEPTEL). SOEHARTO REVIEWED IN DETAIL INDONESIA'S DEVELOPMENT, THE CAUSES OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS, AND THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE GAINS OF THE PAST QUARTER CENTURY. HE REITERATED HIS COMMITMENT TO THE IMF-SUPPORTED REFORM PROGRAM AND STATED HIS VIEW THAT INDONESIA WAS CONSISTENTLY AND SERIOUSLY IMPLEMENTING THE LETTER OF INTENT. HOWEVER, STABILIZATION OF THE RUPIAH WAS ESSENTIAL; HE WAS NOT WILLING TO RISK WORSENING CONDITIONS FOR THE INDONESIAN POPULATION. HE REPEATED THE APPEAL TO THE REST OF THE WORLD IN HIS MARCH 1 ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH TO PROVIDE ALTERNATIVES. HE CONCLUDED WITH A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE ONGOING PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) SESSION.

3. (S) AMBASSADOR MONDALE EMPHASIZED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S CONCERN ABOUT THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS INDONESIA WAS EXPERIENCING. THE FACT THAT THE IMF WAS MOVING TOWARD A DETERMINATION THAT INDONESIA WAS OUT OF COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROGRAM MADE THE CRISIS DOUBLY DANGEROUS. HE STATED THAT IT WAS URGENT TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO RESTORE STABILITY. ABOVE ALL, INDONESIA NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT ITS UNDERTAKINGS TO THE IMF, A NECESSARY CONDITION TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS' AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS' PROVIDING THE SUPPORT INDONESIA NEEDED. AREAS OF CONCERN INCLUDED MONETARY POLICY, STRUCTURAL REFORMS, AND APPOINTMENT OF KEY PERSONNEL TO IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAM. END SUMMARY.

PARTICIPANTS

4. (S) ON MARCH 3, AMBASSADOR MONDALE AND PRESIDENT SOEHARTO MET FOR ONE HOUR IN AN EXPANDED SESSION, FOLLOWED BY A HALF HOUR PRIVATE SESSION (REFTEL). OTHER INDONESIAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE EXPANDED SESSION WERE FOREIGN MINISTER ALI ALATAS, STATE SECRETARY MOERDIONO, AND ECONOMIC ADVISOR WIDJOJO; A NOTETAKER WAS ALSO PRESENT. PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETER WIDODO TRANSLATED IN BOTH DIRECTIONS COMPLETELY AND ACCURATELY. OTHER U.S.

PARTICIPANTS WERE TREASURY UNDER SECRETARY DAVID LIPTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC STANLEY ROTH, AMBASSADOR ROY, AND ECONCOUNS (NOTETAKER). THE EXPANDED SESSION BEGAN WITH AN EXTENDED PHOTO OPPORTUNITY. THE TWO MEETINGS CONCLUDED WITH A PRESS AVAILABILITY ON THE VERANDA, DURING WHICH AMBASSADOR MONDALE MADE A STATEMENT AND TOOK QUESTIONS.

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S OPENING REMARKS

5. (S) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WARMLY WELCOMED AMBASSADOR MONDALE AS PRESIDENT CLINTON'S EMISSARY AND THANKED HIM FOR THE VISIT. HE EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S ATTENTION TO INDONESIA IN THIS TIME OF CRISIS AND NOTED THAT THEY HAD HAD SEVERAL TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS. HE SAID THAT THE LAST CALL HAD TAKEN PLACE WHEN SOEHARTO WAS IN SOLO, CENTRAL JAVA; AT THAT TIME, PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD SAID HE WOULD SEND AMBASSADOR MONDALE. THIS WAS AN HONOR FOR SOEHARTO. HE TOLD PRESIDENT CLINTON IT WOULD BE A PLEASURE FOR HIM TO RECEIVE AMBASSADOR MONDALE AND THAT THE VISIT WAS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR HIM TO EXPLAIN OPENLY AND FRANKLY TO

AMBASSADOR MONDALE THE CURRENT SITUATION.

6. (S) THE CRISIS BEGAN ABOUT SIX MONTHS AGO. EVEN WHILE INDONESIA WAS CELEBRATING ITS INDEPENDENCE ON AUGUST 17, THERE WERE SIGNS OF MONETARY TURMOIL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA CAUSED BY CURRENCY CRISES VIS-A-VIS A STRONG U.S. DOLLAR. MONEY HAD BECOME MORE THAN AN INSTRUMENT OF PAYMENT; IT HAD BECOME A TRADED COMMODITY. THIS WAS WHAT THE LEADERS AT THE VANCOUVER APEC MEETING HAD ENTRUSTED TO PRESIDENT CLINTON: THAT IS, DISCUSSING WITH MINISTERS OF FINANCE, THE IMF, AND THE WORLD BANK HOW TO DEAL WITH CURRENCY AS A TRADED COMMODITY. IT WAS CLEAR, SOEHARTO SAID, THAT CURRENCY TRADING OCCURRED FOR MORE THAN JUST PROFIT; IT WAS ALSO FOR SPECULATION, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA COULD NOT WITHSTAND HEAVY SPECULATIVE ATTACKS.

7. (S) THE RUPIAH SHOCK WORSENED THE SITUATION OF INDONESIA'S PRIVATE COMPANIES, WHICH HAD BORROWED ABROAD

SECRET

NNNNPTQ0827

SECRET PTQ0827

PAGE 01 JAKART 01261 02 OF 05 040632Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000W
----------22A1AB 040632Z /38
O 040630Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0190
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 001261

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR

TREASURY FOR DEPSEC SUMMERS, OASIA/GEITHNER, ZELIKOW

PASS NSC FOR BERGER, KRISTOFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/16
TAGS: EFIN, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MONDALE'S EXPANDED MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, MARCH 3

REF: JAKARTA 1226

BUT COULD NOT REPAY THEIR LOANS AFTER THE DEPRECIATION. COMPANIES WERE ALSO AT FAULT FOR HAVING BORROWED SHORT TERM FOR LONG TERM PROJECTS. GOVERNMENT DEBT, SOEHARTO SAID, AS NEVER A PROBLEM. INDONESIA ALWAYS HAD AND

WOULD CONTINUE TO PAY SOVEREIGN PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST OBLIGATIONS ON TIME. THE EFFECT OF THE RUPIAH'S DEPRECIATION ON THE INDONESIAN POPULATION WAS SERIOUS. THERE WAS A LOSS OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE RUPIAH WHICH CREATED ADDITIONAL DEMAND FOR DOLLARS. THE PUBLIC WITHDREW FUNDS FROM THE BANKING SYSTEM, WHICH LED TO A LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE BANKS.

8. (S) THE GOVERNMENT WAS FORCED TO SEEK A SOLUTION IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE DEVELOPMENT GAINS OF THIRTY YEARS. THERE WAS CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT SUBSTANTIAL GAINS HAD BEEN MADE: GDP GROWTH HAD AVERAGED 7 PERCENT OVER THE PAST TWO TO FIVE YEARS; INFLATION HAD BEEN CURBED FROM 650 PERCENT TO UNDER 10 PERCENT A YEAR; GDP PER CAPITA HAD RISEN FROM USD 70 TO USD 1,150; EXPORTS HAD JUMPED FROM LESS THAN USD 1 BILLION TO ALMOST USD 50 BILLION A YEAR; THE COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS HAD SHIFTED FROM PREDOMINANTLY OIL AND GAS TO PREDOMINANTLY NON-OIL AND GAS PRODUCTS; IN 1984, INDONESIA HAD BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT IN RICE AND OTHER FOODS; THE SHARE OF POPULATION BELOW THE POVERTY LINE HAD SUNK FROM 60 PERCENT TO 11 PERCENT. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HAD BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY SOCIAL ADVANCES: COMPULSORY EDUCATION HAD BEEN EXTENDED FROM SIX TO NINE YEARS; HEALTH SERVICES HAD BEEN BROUGHT CLOSER TO THE RURAL POPULATION. THE GOAL THROUGHOUT HAD BEEN NOT JUST GROWTH, BUT EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT ACCORDING TO THE TRILOGY OF DEVELOPMENT (NATIONAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC

GROWTH, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FRUITS OF DEVELOPMENT).

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JAKART 01261 02 OF 05 040632Z

9. (S) THESE ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS MEANT THAT THE MONETARY CRISIS COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO JEOPARDIZE PROGRESS. THEREFORE, INDONESIA HAD ASKED THE IMF TO HELP OVERCOME THE CRISIS. THIS WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE CRISIS COULD AFFECT OTHER COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND EVEN SPREAD TO EAST ASIA.

10. (S) INDONESIA HAD REACHED CONSENSUS WITH THE FUND ON REFORMS. INDONESIA HAD AND WAS NOW IMPLEMENTING THOSE REFORMS. THEY INCLUDED: REVISION OF THE STATE BUDGET; ADDRESSING SHORTCOMINGS AND INEFFICIENCIES IN THE BANKING SECTOR; AND EXTENDING THE GOVERNMENT'S GUARANTEE TO ALL BANK PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS. OTHER STEPS INCLUDED ELIMINATING MONOPOLIES WHICH, HE EXPLAINED, INDONESIA DID NOT WANT EITHER, BUT WHICH WERE JUSTIFIED IN THE CONSTITUTION IF THEY BENEFITTED THE PEOPLE AT LARGE. THE NATIONAL LOGISTICS AGENCY (BULOG) FIT THIS CATEGORY. THE IMF INSISTED ON THE REMOVAL OF ALL BULOG MONOPOLIES EXCEPT RICE. THIS CAUSED PROBLEMS, WHICH INDONESIA HAD EXPECTED, BECAUSE THE PRIVATE SECTOR HAD NOT YET DEVELOPED TO THE POINT WHERE IT COULD PROCURE AND DISTRIBUTE THE HUGE AMOUNTS OF OTHER COMMODITIES BULOG HAD FORMERLY HANDLED. THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS THE VOLUMES INVOLVED. SINCE THE PRIVATE SECTOR WAS INCAPABLE OF TAKING OVER BULOG'S ROLE, SCARCITIES HAD RESULTED AND PRICES HAD RISEN. THIS HAD CAUSED UNREST AND PEOPLE STARTED TO HOARD. TO PREVENT THE SITUATION FROM DETERIORATING FURTHER, THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FORCED TO BEGIN IMPORTING BASIC COMMODITIES THROUGH BULOG AGAIN. SINCE IMPORTS REQUIRED FOREIGN EXCHANGE, THE PRICES WERE HIGH AND PEOPLE STILL COULD NOT PURCHASE

SECRET

THE BASIC GOODS. SO THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FORCED TO PROVIDE SUBSIDIES. THIS WAS PART AND PARCEL OF THE IMF'S INSISTENCE ON REMOVING MONOPOLIES. THE RESULTS HAD BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. THE IMF DID EVENTUALLY AGREE TO THE SUBSIDIES.

11. (S) OTHER STEPS HAD BEEN THE ELIMINATION OF THE CLOVE TRADING MONOPOLY AND OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FOR THE NATIONAL CAR AND AIRCRAFT. TARIFF REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN AMONG OTHER REFORMS TAKEN. OUT OF ALL THESE STEPS, THE EXPECTED IMPACT WAS STABILIZATION OF THE RUPIAH. ON THE CONTRARY, IT WEAKENED FURTHER. AS THE RUPIAH WEAKENED, COMPANIES COULD NOT PAY THEIR DEBTS OR IMPORT RAW MATERIALS AND SPARE PARTS. THEY HAD TO REDUCE THEIR ACTIVITIES AND SOME CLOSED. UNEMPLOYMENT WENT UP. THIS WOULD CAUSE UNREST. THE GOVERNMENT TOOK PROMPT ACTION THROUGH THE CREATION OF LABOR-INTENSIVE PROGRAMS TO PROVIDE INCOMES TO NEWLY UNEMPLOYED UNSKILLED WORKERS.

PAGE 01 JAKART 01261 03 OF 05 040632Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000W
----------22A1B0 040632Z /38
O 040630Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0191
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 001261

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR

TREASURY FOR DEPSEC SUMMERS, OASIA/GEITHNER, ZELIKOW

PASS NSC FOR BERGER, KRISTOFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/16
TAGS: EFIN, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MONDALE'S EXPANDED MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, MARCH 3

REF: JAKARTA 1226

OTHER SCARCITIES EMERGED, INCLUDING OF MEDICINES AND EVEN BABY FORMULA. RECENTLY, MOTHERS DEMONSTRATED FOR MILK POWDER AND FORMULA.

PAGE 02 JAKART 01261 03 OF 05 040632Z
12. (S) SOEHARTO SAID THAT INDONESIA HAD TO SEEK ALTERNATIVES. THE ENTIRE IMF PACKAGE HAD NOT HAD THE EXPECTED RESULTS, ESPECIALLY ON THE EXCHANGE RATE. A SINE QUA NON WAS RUPIAH STABILITY. WITHOUT IT, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR COMPANIES TO CALCULATE COSTS AND MAKE PLANS. A CURRENCY BOARD WAS ONE OF THE SYSTEMS IN THE

WORLD USED TO CREATE CERTAINTY. SOEHARTO HAD BEEN STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY AND MAKING PREPARATIONS TO APPLY A CURRENCY BOARD IN INDONESIA. THE IMF HAD INDICATED ITS DISAPPROVAL AND EVEN WARNED THAT INDONESIA WOULD NOT RECEIVE ADDITIONAL IMF TRANCHES OR FUNDING FROM OTHER SOURCES IF A CURRENCY BOARD WERE INTRODUCED. THIS WAS CONVEYED IN A LETTER ADDRESSED TO HIM, BUT IT WAS LEAKED AND THE RUPIAH DROPPED.

13. (S) SOEHARTO STATED THAT HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CLINTON AND OTHER HEADS OF STATE THAT, IF THEY REALLY DID NOT AGREE WITH A CURRENCY BOARD, THEY SHOULD SUGGEST ALTERNATIVES. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING, HE SAID, WAS A STABLE RUPIAH. HE COMMENTED THAT THE PRECONDITIONS FOR A CURRENCY BOARD WERE ALSO STRINGENT AND THAT A CURRENCY BOARD ENTAILED GREAT RISK, WHICH INDONESIA WAS CALCULATING. IT REQUIRED FOREIGN EXCHANGE TO COVER MONEY IN CIRCULATION. A BOARD WOULD MEAN THE END OF THE CENTRAL BANK'S FUNCTION AS LENDER OF LAST RESORT.

14. (S) AS HE HAD NOTED IN HIS MARCH 1 ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH TO THE MPR, INDONESIA HAD NOT ABANDONED THE IMF. HOWEVER, AN ALTERNATIVE -- "IMF-PLUS" -- WAS NEEDED. HENCE, HE HAD APPEALED TO THE IMF, WORLD BANK, G-7 AND OTHERS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE. IF THE ECONOMY COULD NOT

BE STABILIZED, INDONESIA FACED NOT JUST ECONOMIC SETBACK, BUT ECONOMIC COLLAPSE.

15. (S) IN ADOPTING ANY MEASURE, THE GOI RELIED UPON THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE. INDONESIA WAS AT THIS MOMENT EXERCISING DEMOCRACY THROUGH THE PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR). SOEHARTO NOTED THAT INDONESIA HAD HELD SUCCESSFUL ELECTIONS, WHICH HAD CHOSEN THE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT. THE MPR WAS IN THE PROCESS OF ADOPTING IMPORTANT DECREES, INCLUDING THE "BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY" FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. IT WOULD ELECT THE NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT ON MARCH 11.

16. (S) SMALL GROUPS WERE OPPOSED FROM THE BEGINNING

TO THE NEW ORDER, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID. THEY STYLED THEMSELVES CHAMPIONS OF DEMOCRACY, BUT THEY WERE REALLY UNDEMOCRATIC AND SOME EVEN VIOLATED THE LAW. IF THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION, THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT TAKE ACTION AGAINST THEM. HOWEVER, IF THEY BROKE THE LAW (INCITING, MAKING HOME-MADE BOMBS, ENDANGERING PUBLIC SAFETY), THE GOVERNMENT ACTED. THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI) REMAINED UNITED AND SO DID THE PEOPLE. THIS MEANT THE SITUATION COULD BE KEPT UNDER CONTROL. THERE HAD BEEN GROUPS TRYING TO MAKE THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY THE MONTH OF BLOOD IN JAKARTA -- THEY HAD FAILED. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO TRY DURING THE ENTIRE MPR GENERAL SESSION, BUT THE LAW AND ORDER AUTHORITIES WOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE THEM. THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK WAS TO OVERCOME THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, IN PARTICULAR THE LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE RUPIAH.

SECRET

17. (S) SOEHARTO CLOSED HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY AGAIN EXPRESSING HIS GREAT APPRECIATION TO PRESIDENT CLINTON FOR HIS INTEREST AND FOR SENDING AMBASSADOR MONDALE.

AMBASSADOR MONDALE'S OPENING REMARKS

18. (S) AMBASSADOR MONDALE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD HAD A LONG CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON. HE CONVEYED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S BEST WISHES AND RELAYED HIS INTEREST IN HELPING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND INDONESIA WORK THEIR WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS. AMBASSADOR MONDALE HOPED THAT HIS VISIT WOULD BE RECEIVED IN THIS SPIRIT.

19. (S) PRESIDENT CLINTON WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SEVERITY OF THE CRISIS IN INDONESIA. THIS MORNING'S PRESS HAD NOTED THAT INFLATION (12.76 PERCENT IN

SECRET

NNNNPTQ0830

SECRET PTQ0830

PAGE 01 JAKART 01261 04 OF 05 040632Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000W
----------22A1B6 040632Z /38
O 040630Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0192
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 001261

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR

TREASURY FOR DEPSEC SUMMERS, OASIA/GEITHNER, ZELIKOW

PASS NSC FOR BERGER, KRISTOFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/16
TAGS: EFIN, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MONDALE'S EXPANDED MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, MARCH 3

REF: JAKARTA 1226

FEBRUARY) WAS BECOMING SERIOUS AGAIN. WHAT HAD BEGUN AS A CURRENCY CRISIS WAS RAPIDLY BECOMING AN INFLATION CRISIS. THIS COULD MAKE REMEDIES EVEN MORE DIFFICULT THAN THOSE CONTEMPLATED A FEW WEEKS AGO. IN ADDITION,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 01261 04 OF 05 040632Z

FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES HAD DIMINISHED TO DANGEROUSLY LOW LEVELS. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE CRISIS WAS SERIOUS AND THAT THERE WAS URGENCY TO FINDING SOLUTIONS TO RESTORE STABILITY.

20. (S) AMBASSADOR MONDALE NOTED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE IMF WAS OF THE OPINION THAT INDONESIA WAS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROGRAM AND THAT THERE WAS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE SCHEDULED TRANCHE COULD NOT BE DRAWN. IF THAT WERE THE CASE, THE CRISIS WAS DOUBLY DANGEROUS. IT WOULD SEND A MESSAGE TO THE WORLD ABOUT THE SEVERITY OF THE CRISIS INDONESIA WAS UNDERGOING.

21. (S) PRESIDENT CLINTON BELIEVED THAT A PROFOUND COMMITMENT TO A STABILITY-ENHANCING STRATEGY WAS CRUCIAL. WHEN SOEHARTO CONFRONTED THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF 1966, HE DID TOUGH THINGS LIKE RAISING INTEREST RATES AND OPENING MARKETS. THESE TAMED THE PROBLEM AND LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR GROWTH. PRESIDENT CLINTON BELIEVED THAT THE SAME COMMITMENT TO A STABILITY STRATEGY WAS NEEDED NOW. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT WAS IMPLEMENTATION OF INDONESIA'S UNDERTAKINGS TO THE IMF. AMBASSADOR MONDALE STATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD HOW INDONESIA WAS SUFFERING. HOWEVER, IMF OFFICIALS BELIEVED THAT INDONESIA WAS ESSENTIALLY NOT IN COMPLIANCE, WHICH MEANT THERE WAS A CONFIDENCE PROBLEM TO BE DEALT WITH -- HOW TO RESTORE NOT ONLY THE IMF'S SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA THAT CHANGES WERE BEING MADE, BUT ALSO THE MARKETS' SO THAT THEY WOULD CONCLUDE THAT RUPIAH AND OTHER INDONESIAN ASSETS WERE VALUABLE AND WORTH INVESTING IN.

SECRET

SECRET

22. (S) PRESIDENT CLINTON WISHED THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WOULD REVIEW AGAIN INDONESIA'S IMF IMPLEMENTATION AND PROCEED ON A PATH THAT WOULD PRODUCE THE STABILITY THAT WOULD RESTORE CONFIDENCE. THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT THE RUPIAH'S VALUE MUST CHANGE. BUT THE VIEW OF PRESIDENT CLINTON, THE IMF, AND MOST SCHOLARS WAS THAT INDONESIA HAD TO DEAL WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES THAT BEAR ON THE RUPIAH.

23. (S) IN ONE OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON, SOEHARTO HAD DESCRIBED INDONESIA'S PROBLEMS. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD CALLED BACK WITH SOME VERY SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THE UNITED STATES, THE G-7, THE IMF, REGIONAL COUNTRIES, AND OTHERS COULD HELP IF THE IMF PROCESS WERE PROCEEDING IN A CREDIBLE WAY. IN SOEHARTO'S MARCH 1 SPEECH, HE SPOKE OF IMF-PLUS. IF THE IMF PROGRAM WERE REALLY BEING IMPLEMENTED, THEN ENORMOUS IMF RESOURCES COULD COME TO BEAR. WITH FIRM IMPLEMENTATION, IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR OTHER COUNTRIES TO COME IN BEHIND (THE IMF) TO PROVIDE THE EXTRA HELP NEEDED. BUT WITHOUT FUNDAMENTALS FOR STABILITY IN PLACE, IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE TO COME FORWARD. THEREFORE, PRESIDENT CLINTON ASKED THAT SOEHARTO LOOK AGAIN AND TAKE A BOLD APPROACH SO THAT HE COULD GET THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE.

24. (S) ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, THE WORLD ALSO NEEDED TO BE REASSURED THAT THE RIGHT PEOPLE WERE IN PLACE AND INDONESIA'S PRO-STABILITY MESSAGE CLEAR.

SECRET

SECRET

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S RESPONSE

---

25. (S) SOEHARTO EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM. THERE WERE NO DIFFICULTIES OF IMPLEMENTATION BECAUSE "INDONESIA WAS CARRYING THE PROGRAM OUT PRECISELY." THE PURPOSE OF THE PROGRAM WAS TO REINFORCE ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS. WHATEVER MASURES THE GOI TOOK TO COMPLY WITH ITS IMF PROGRAM, IT DID NOT WANT TO CREATE GREATER HARDSHIP FOR THE PEOPLE. IMPLEMENTATION HAD NOT BROUGHT IMPROVEMENT -- TO THE CONTRARY, THE BURDEN ON THE PEOPLE WAS HEAVIER. THE IMF NEEDED TO GIVE THE PEOPLE GROUNDS FOR HOPE SINCE THE PEOPLE NOW SAW THEMSELVES AS WORSE OFF THAN BEFORE THE PROGRAM. THE IMF BELIEVED THAT INDONESIA WAS NOT SERIOUSLY CARRYING OUT THE PROGRAM, BUT THERE HAD BEEN LEAKS FROM THE IMF WHICH HAD WEAKENED THE RUPIAH FURTHER. INDONESIA WAS DEALING WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES.

SECRET

NNNNPTQ0831

SECRET PTQ0831

PAGE 01 JAKART 01261 05 OF 05 040632Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000W

----------22A1BA 040632Z /38

O 040630Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0193
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 001261

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR

TREASURY FOR DEPSEC SUMMERS, OASIA/GEITHNER, ZELIKOW

PASS NSC FOR BERGER, KRISTOFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/16
TAGS: EFIN, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MONDALE'S EXPANDED MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, MARCH 3

REF: JAKARTA 1226

26. (S) SOEHARTO SAID THAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 1966 AND NOW WERE VAST. THEN, PEOPLE HAD BEEN VICTIMIZED BY POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND ALL HAD

SUFFERED. ANY GOI EFFORT HAD FULL PUBLIC SUPPORT. TWENTY-FIVE YEARS LATER, PEOPLE DID NOT WANT A SETBACK FROM THE PROGRESS OF THE PAST QUARTER CENTURY. IT WAS NOT EASY TODAY TO TAKE INDISCRIMINATE STEPS BECAUSE PEOPLE'S DEMANDS WERE VERY DIFFERENT. IF THE GOVERNMENT TOOK A WRONG STEP, IT FEARED THAT REVOLUTION WOULD BREAK OUT. THERE WERE MANY SMALL GROUPS WHICH INCITED PEOPLE TO ANGER. IF THAT HAPPENED, NOT JUST INDONESIA, BUT ALL SOUTHEAST ASIA WOULD FEEL THE IMPACT.

27. (S) SOEHARTO ASKED AMBASSADOR MONDALE TO REASSURE PRESIDENT CLINTON THAT HE WAS COMMITTED TO THE PROGRAM AND WOULD CONTINUE TO IMPLEMENT IT. HOWEVER, HE WOULD

NOT TOLERATE THE PEOPLE'S SITUATION WORSENING.

AMBASSADOR MONDALE'S CLOSURE

28. (S) AMBASSADOR MONDALE SAID HE WOULD REPORT TO PRESIDENT CLINTON, WHO WAS ANXIOUS TO LEARN ABOUT THE MEETING AND PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S VIEWS. HE CONCURRED THAT THE SITUATION WAS MORE COMPLEX TODAY THAN IN 1966, BUT SAID IT WAS TRUE THEN AND NEEDED TO BE TRUE NOW THAT SOEHARTO GAVE STABILITY CENTRALITY OF PLACE AND COURAGEOUS LEADERSHIP. TO OVERCOME THE DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS ON IMF COMPLIANCE, CRUCIAL AREAS WERE: MONETARY POLICY; STRUCTURAL CHANGES; AND KEY PERSONNEL, ESPECIALLY AS SOME OF THE PEOPLE WITH WHOM THE IMF HAD WORKED WELL WERE BEING REPLACED. PROBLEMS IN THESE AREAS DEFEATED THE STABILITY-SEEKING THRUST OF THE PROGRAM. THE LARGE DIFFERENCE OF PERCEPTION NEEDED TO BE ADDRESSED BECAUSE CLOSING THE GAP COULD TRIGGER RESOURCES TO ASSIST INDONESIA AND TELL WORLD MARKETS

SECRET

THAT STABILITY WAS ON THE WAY AND THAT THE RUPIAH WAS VALUABLE. WITHOUT THAT, INDONESIA WAS IN THE UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION WHERE NEITHER ALTERNATIVE WAS ATTRACTIVE. HOWEVER, NOT FACING UP TO THE PROBLEM WOULD BE WORSE THAN FACING UP TO IT, EVEN THOUGH THAT WOULD BE DIFFICULT.

29. (S) SOEHARTO CONCURRED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EFFORT TO RECONCILE DIFFERENCES AND TO REACH A COMMON VIEW WITH THE FUND. HE ASSURED AMB MONDALE THAT THE INTENTION OF THE SELECTION OF THE NEW TEAM WAS TO IMPROVE ITS EFFECTIVENESS. HE THEN INVITED AMBASSADOR MONDALE TO A PRIVATE MEETING (SEPTEL).

30. (U) AMBASSADOR MONDALE DID NOT CLEAR THIS MESSAGE PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. ROY

SECRET

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO1945

PAGE 01 140554Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 OASY-00 /000W
----------0F01B4 140555Z /21
O 140414Z JAN 98 ZFF-1/ZFF-4
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO AMCONSULATE HONG KONG NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASH DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L NIACT

NODIS

DECAPTIONED

.
BEGIN TEXT:
.
HONG KONG - PLEASE PASS TO SUMMERS DELEGATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
.
1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE AND NON-PAPER, AT

PARAS TWO AND THREE, FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE THE TEXT OF THIS MESSAGE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF THE

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA5762 C O N F I D E N T I A L
GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA WISHES TO DO SO. SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

PAGE 02 140554Z
2. BEGIN LETTER:

.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

.

THANK YOU FOR RECEIVING DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS DURING HIS RECENT TRIP TO JAKARTA. I APPRECIATE THAT YOU FOUND TIME TO DISCUSS YOUR ECONOMIC PROGRAM WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS IN SUCH DETAIL. HE HAS GIVEN ME A FULL REPORT OF YOUR MEETING.

.

I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR YOU TO HAVE THE ENCLOSED NON-PAPER, WHICH SUMMARIZES THE KEY POINTS MR. SUMMERS MADE ON MY BEHALF. I OFFER THESE AS KEY STEPS NECESSARY TO RESTORE FINANCIAL CONFIDENCE, AS PART OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSALS YOU ARE DEVELOPING WITH THE IMF.

.

AS I MENTIONED IN OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION LAST WEEK, WE

PAGE 3 RHEHAAA5762 C O N F I D E N T I A L
KNOW HOW DIFFICULT THE CURRENT SITUATION MUST BE FOR THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE AND ARE STANDING WITH YOU IN THESE DIFFICULT TIMES.

.

SINCERELY,

.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

.

HIS EXCELLENCY SOEHARTO
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 140554Z
JAKARTA

.

END LETTER.

.

3. BEGIN NON-PAPER:

.

CRITICAL STEPS TO RESTORE FINANCIAL CONFIDENCE

.

A. TAKE KEY SYMBOLIC ACTIONS:

.

TAKE DECISIVE ACTION ON IMPORTANT PROJECTS, SUCH AS THE NATIONAL CAR PROJECT, THE NATIONAL PLANE PROJECT AND CERTAIN POWER PLANTS AND BANKS. THESE HAVE TAKEN ON A SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE AND ARE BEING WATCHED EXTREMELY CLOSELY BY THE MARKETS.

.

B. RESTORE A CREDIBLE CURRENCY:

.

DIRECT MONETARY POLICY AT THE OBJECTIVE OF EXCHANGE RATE STABILITY AND RAISE INTEREST RATES AS NECESSARY.

.

THE BUDGET MUST BE BACKED BY CREDIBLE AND TRANSPARENT ASSUMPTIONS.

.

C. ASSURE THE STRENGTH OF THE BANKING SYSTEM:

.

NEED TO GUARANTEE RUPIAH DEPOSITS THROUGHOUT THE BANKING

SYSTEM.

.

NEED DRASTIC RESTRUCTURING IN WHICH MANAGERS AND EQUITY

OWNERS OF FAILED INSTITUTIONS PAY A PRICE.

.

D. IMPROVE PRESENTATION OF ECONOMIC POLICY:

.

DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL INVOLVEMENT IS CRUCIAL.

.

IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY: MAKE PUBLIC THE REVISED LETTER OF INTENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.

.

THE ECONOMIC TEAM MUST HAVE A CLEAR LEADER EMPOWERED TO

ACT AS A CREDIBLE INTERLOCUTOR WITH THE IMF AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL COMMUNITY.

.

END NON-PAPER.

.

.

.

DECL: X1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO1805

PAGE 01 STATE 012678 230124Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000R

012678
SOURCE: KODAKB.230002
DRAFTED BY: ORIGINAL TEXT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE:CAF -- 01/22/98 647-327
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK
S/S: MQUINN S/S-O:WDUNCAN
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
NODIS NOT FOR ADS

----------129C43 230125Z /38

P 230120Z JAN 98 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 012678

DECAPTIONED

NODIS

FOR AMB/DCM ONLY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/05
TAGS: EFIN, PREL, PGOV,ECON, ID
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SOEHARTO, PRESIDENT OF INDONESIA (S/S 9801104)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY GLYN T. DAVIES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. REASONS: 1.5. (B) AND (D).

2. (U) THIS CABLE CONTAINS A MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND SOEHARTO, PRESIDENT OF INDONESIA ON JANUARY 15, 1998. I ASK THAT YOU NOT PERMIT COPIES TO BE MADE OF THIS MESSAGE, AND THAT YOU NOT DISTRIBUTE IT OUTSIDE OF THE MISSION'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE.

3. (U) BEGIN TEXT:

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: TELECON WITH SOEHARTO, PRESIDENT-OF INDONESIA

PARTICIPANTS: SOEHARTO, PRESIDENT OF INDONESIA

INTERPRETER: DAN FIETKIEWICZ
NOTETAKERS: JAMES SMITH, JEFFREY RATHKE, LYLE HARRISON, ROBERT FORD, JAMES GAGNON

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: JANUARY 15, 1998, 11:27 - 11:36 A.M. EST OVAL OFFICE

4. (U) THE PRESIDENT: HELLO, MR. PRESIDENT.

5. (U) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO: GOOD MORNING, MR. PRESIDENT. THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO YOU ON THE TELEPHONE.

6. (U) THE PRESIDENT: I AM GLAD TO HEAR YOUR VOICE. THANK YOU AGAIN FOR TAKING TIME TO MEET WITH TREASURY DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS.

7. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO: THANK YOU VERY MUCH INDEED. THE LAST TWO DAYS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH DEPUTY MANAGING DIRECTOR STANLEY FISCHER OF THE IMF HAVE BEEN VERY GOOD INDEED. THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE FOLLOWED BY A MEETING WITH THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF THE IMF, MICHEL CAMDESSUS. THIS MORNING, I SIGNED A LETTER OF INTENT AND PRESENTED THE LETTER TO THE MANAGING DIRECTOR. AND SOON AFTER THAT, MR.

CAMDESSUS HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE AT WHICH HE MENTIONED HIS VERY GOOD IMPRESSION WITH THE AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN REACHED.

8. (C) AS A FOLLOW-ON TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT, I HAVE ESTABLISHED A COUNCIL OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RESILIENCE OVER WHICH I WILL PRESIDE. I WILL BE ASSISTED BY DR. WIDJOJO NITISASTRO WHO WILL BE THE SECRETARY GENERAL. THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL COME FROM THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES AND HAVE TWO REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR. THEY WILL IMMEDIATELY BEGIN TO CARRY OUT THE TASK OF IMPLEMENTING PLANS AND PROGRAMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LETTER OF INTENT THAT I PRESENTED TO MR. CAMDESSUS THIS MORNING.

9. (C) WITH THE VIEW OF MAINTAINING BETTER CONTACT BETWEEN INDONESIA AND THE IMF, I HAVE REQUESTED THE MANAGING DIRECTOR TO ASSIGN A SENIOR IMF OFFICIAL TO

JAKARTA TO ASSIST ME IN IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM. MR. CAMDESSUS HAS APPOINTED TEMPORARILY THE DIRECTOR FOR ASIA PACIFIC AFFAIRS OF THE IMF. HE WILL BE SUCCEEDED LATER BY A MORE SENIOR IMF OFFICIAL. EVERY THREE MONTHS, WE WILL

CONDUCT A REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAM AND PLAN WHAT IS TO BE DONE.

10. (C) I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE, YOUR EXCELLENCY, AND I BELIEVE IT APPROPRIATE TO ASK YOU TO MAKE A STATEMENT TO THE WORLD THAT INDONESIA AND THE IMF HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT. I ALSO MET WITH THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, MR. SUMMERS, AND RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGES, YOUR EXCELLENCY. AT ALMOST THE SAME TIME, I RECEIVED THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES. THESE TWO HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED STATES WERE BOTH ABLE TO SEE CLOSE UP THE REAL SITUATION IN JAKARTA.

11. (C) THE PRESIDENT: WELL, THANK YOU VERY MUCH MR. PRESIDENT. FIRST OF ALL, I THINK THE AGREEMENT IS GOOD, BUT I AM MOST ENCOURAGED BY THE EXPLANATION OF HOW IT WILL

BE IMPLEMENTED. THAT IS THE NEXT BIG STEP. INVESTORS WILL BE LOOKING AT THIS. YOU OBVIOUSLY HAVE A VERY GOOD PLAN FOR DOING THAT. I WILL RELEASE A STATEMENT SAYING YOU CALLED ME AND THAT I WELCOMED THESE STEPS, AND I AM ENCOURAGED BY THEM. WE INTEND TO CONTINUE OUR INVOLVEMENT AND TO WORK WITH YOU IN THIS DIFFICULT TIME. I HOPE THE STATEMENT WILL HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT.

12. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, YOUR EXCELLENCY. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM; THE WORLD IS ANXIOUSLY WAITING TO SEE WHAT WILL HAPPEN. THE MOST IMMEDIATE ACTION WILL BE THE REVISION OF THE STATE BUDGET I PRESENTED TO THE PARLIAMENT SEVERAL DAYS AGO. SECONDLY, WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE REFORM

OF THE BANKING SYSTEM, NOT ONLY THE CENTRAL BANK AND STATE BANKS, BUT ALSO PRIVATE BANKS.

13. (U) THE PRESIDENT: THANK YOU. THIS IS VERY GOOD NEWS. WE WILL KEEP WORKING WITH YOU. GOODBYE.

END OF CONVERSATION
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4307

PAGE 01 102233Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 OASY-00 /000W
----------0DDECC 102234Z /85
O 102213Z JAN 98 ZFF-1/ZFF-4
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASH DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L

NODIS

DECAPTIONED

QQQQ

.

SUBJ: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO

.

PLEASE DELIVER THE MESSAGE BELOW FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. THE WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE BUT HAS NO OBJECTIONS IF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA WISHES TO DO SO. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

.

BEGIN TEXT:

.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA5732 C O N F I D E N T I A L
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 102233Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

I GREATLY VALUED OUR CONVERSATION LAST WEEK. I APPRECIATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO SEE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY SUMMERS WHO HAS MY HIGHEST CONFIDENCE IN DEALING WITH THESE MATTERS. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO SPEND SOME TIME WITH HIM DISCUSSING THE FINANCIAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA WHILE HE IS IN JAKARTA. HE WILL BE ABLE TO TELL YOU FIRST-HAND HOW I VIEW IT.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

HIS EXCELLENCY
SOEHARTO
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
JAKARTA

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>
PTQ4306

PAGE 01 102233Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 OASY-00 /000W
----------0DDECB 102233Z /85
O P 102119Z JAN 98 ZFF-1/ZFF-4
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
INFO AIT TAIPEI TW ROUTINE
AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASH DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L

NODIS

QQQQ
.
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JIANG
.
PLEASE DELIVER THE MESSAGE BELOW FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT JIANG AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. THE WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE BUT HAS NO OBJECTIONS IF THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA WISHES TO DO SO. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
.
BEGIN TEXT:

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA5731 C O N F I D E N T I A L
.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 102233Z
DEAR PRESIDENT JIANG:
.
YOU WILL RECALL THAT DURING OUR MEETINGS AT THE WHITE HOUSE LAST OCTOBER, WE DISCUSSED AND AGREED ON OUR SHARED INTERESTS IN THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF EAST ASIA AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE REGION. WE

BOTH HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING CLOSELY SINCE THEN THE PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED BY A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES.

.

BECAUSE OF OUR CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS AND OUR DETERMINATION TO HELP THE ECONOMIES OF THE REGION RESTORE FINANCIAL STABILITY AND HIGH LEVELS OF SUSTAINED GROWTH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, I AM DISPATCHING OUR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, LAWRENCE SUMMERS, TO THE REGION TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS AND EXPLORE SOLUTIONS WITH OFFICIALS AT EACH STOP. CONSISTENT WITH OUR AGREEMENT TO CONSULT CLOSELY, I AM ASKING MR. SUMMERS TO VISIT BEIJING AS WELL. MR. SUMMERS, ALONG WITH SECRETARY RUBIN, HAS GUIDED OUR RESPONSE TO THE

PAGE 3 RHEHAAA5731 C O N F I D E N T I A L
TURMOIL IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS AND CAN SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY ON MY BEHALF. YOU WILL RECALL THAT WE AGREED THAT THESE MATTERS SHOULD BE HANDLED BY OUR TREASURY AND YOUR EXECUTIVE VICE PREMIER, AND I HOPE THAT YOU CAN ASSURE US THAT MR. SUMMERS WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH MR. ZHU RONGJI DURING HIS STOP IN BEIJING.

.

SINCERELY,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 102233Z

.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

.

.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5371

PAGE 01 JAKART 00226 01 OF 02 151133Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00
	CTME-00	OASY-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00
	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OES-01	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PM-00	PRS-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	EPAE-00
	PMB-00	DRL-04	G-00	/026W			

----------0FA579 151133Z /38

O 151132Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9129
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000226

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/IFD, H

DEPARTMENT PASS OPIC FOR PRESIDENT MUNOZ

DEPARTMENT PASS EXIM

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER AND INA/VELTHAUS

BEIJING PLEASE PASS TO DEPSEC SUMMERS PARTY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00226 01 OF 02 151133Z
SINGAPORE PLEASE PASS SECDEF PARTY FOR A/S ROTH AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 24 JUL 2008 200502960

TREASURY/CRAWFORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/16
TAGS: EFIN, EINV, OPIC, ENRG, ID
SUBJECT: ENERGY PROJECTS AND IMF PROGRAM: OPIC LETTER DELIVERED JANUARY 15

REF: JANUARY 14 MUNOZ LETTER TO GOI OFFICIALS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D)

DELIVERY OF MUNOZ LETTERS

2. (U) ON JANUARY 15, AMBASSADOR ROY PERSONALLY DELIVERED OPIC PRESIDENT MUNOZ' LETTER ALERTING GOI OFFICIALS TO THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A DETERMINATION THAT AN OPIC-INSURED CONTRACT HAD BEEN ABROGATED TO INDONESIAN PLANNING MINISTER GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA. THE EMBASSY DELIVERED THE LETTERS FOR MINES AND ENERGY MINISTER SUDJANA, FINANCE MINISTER MAR'IE MUHAMMAD, ELECTRIC UTILITY PLN PRESIDENT DIRECTOR DJITENG MARSUDI, AND STATE OIL COMPANY PERTAMINA PRESIDENT DIRECTOR SOEGIANTO BY FAX AND BY HAND.

OTHERS TO WHOM MESSAGE CONVEYED

3. (C) IN HIS JANUARY 15 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, EXIMBANK PRESIDENT JAMES HARMON INCLUDED IN HIS REMARKS THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSPARENCY AND CLARITY

FOR PROJECT SELECTION. HE ALSO MADE THIS POINT CLEAR AND UNDERLINED THE URGENCY OF DEVELOPING AND PUBLICIZING THE CRITERIA QUICKLY AND APPLYING THEM FAIRLY AND TRANSPARENTLY IN HIS MEETINGS LATER THE SAME DAY WITH MINES AND ENERGY MINISTER SUDJANA AND PLN DIRECTOR DJITENG. IN ADDITION, WE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH WORLD BANK RESIDENT DIRECTOR DENNIS DE TRAY WHO SAID WE COULD REPORT TO SENIOR INDONESIAN OFFICIALS THAT THE WORLD BANK ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLICATION OF CLEAR PROJECT SELECTION CRITERIA AND THAT

THE BANK IS RIGHT NOW WORKING WITH THE GOI ON THIS AND WITH PLN ON THE SPECIFIC CRITERIA FOR POWER PROJECTS.

GINANDJAR'S RESPONSE

4. (C) MINISTER GINANDJAR IMMEDIATELY GRASPED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OPIC LETTER'S MESSAGE CONCERNING THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF UNILATERALLY ABROGATING CONTRACTS. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BRING THE LETTER TO THE ATTENTION OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IMMEDIATELY. THE AMBASSADOR STRONGLY PRESSED THE POINT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GOI'S DEVELOPING AND PROMPTLY ISSUING FAIR, TRANSPARENT, AND OBJECTIVE GUIDELINES ON PROJECT SELECTION. THE AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT THE WORLD BANK IS WORKING ON SUCH GUIDELINES WITH PLN. HE NOTED THAT, IF THE REVIEWS UNDER THE GUIDELINES ARE CONDUCTED IN A FAIR, OPEN, AND TRANSPARENT MANNER, THIS WILL BOOST THE RETURN OF INVESTOR CONFIDENCE IN INDONESIA. [redacted] B1

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ5372

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5372

PAGE 01 JAKART 00226 02 OF 02 151133Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00
	CTME-00	OASY-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00
	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OES-01
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PM-00	PRS-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	EPAE-00	PMB-00	DRL-04
	G-00	/024W					

------------------0FA57D 151133Z /38

O 151132Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9130
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 000226

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/IFD, H

DEPARTMENT PASS OPIC FOR PRESIDENT MUNOZ

DEPARTMENT PASS EXIM

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER AND INA/VELTHAUS

BEIJING PLEASE PASS TO DEPSEC SUMMERS PARTY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00226 02 OF 02 151133Z
SINGAPORE PLEASE PASS SECDEF PARTY FOR A/S ROTH AND
TREASURY/CRAWFORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/16
TAGS: EFIN, EINV, OPIC, ENRG, ID
SUBJECT: ENERGY PROJECTS AND IMF PROGRAM: OPIC LETTER
DELIVERED JANUARY 15

REF: JANUARY 14 MUNOZ LETTER TO GOI OFFICIALS

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1271

PAGE 01 STATE 009749 162337Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 OASY-00 /000R

009749
SOURCE: KODAKA.160201
DRAFTED BY: WHITE HOUSE TEXT:CAF -- 01/16/98 647-3276
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK
S/S:MCHARLTON S/S:RMLIKINS
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
NODIS NOT FOR ADS
----------108AE5 162340Z /38
P 162334Z JAN 98 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 009749

NODIS

FOR AMB/DCM ONLY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/16/08
TAGS: ECON, EFIN, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
SOEHARTO, PRESIDENT OF INDONESIA (S/S 9800752)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY GLYN T. DAVIES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. REASONS: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (U) THIS CABLE CONTAINS A MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. HEDGBETH, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 15 JAN 2013
DATE/CASE ID: 12 MAY 2008 200502960

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND SOEHARTO, PRESIDENT OF INDONESIA ON JANUARY 8, 1998. I ASK THAT YOU NOT PERMIT COPIES TO BE MADE OF THIS MESSAGE, AND THAT YOU NOT DISTRIBUTE IT OUTSIDE OF THE MISSION'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE.

3. (U) BEGIN TEXT;

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SOEHARTO, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

PARTICIPANTS: SOEHARTO, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

INTERPRETER: LARRY FISHER
NOTETAKERS: SEAN RICE, LARRY WRIGHT, JIM SMITH, JOEL SCHRADER AND CINDY LAWRENCE

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: JANUARY 8, 1998, 9:42 - 10:08 P.M. EST
AIR FORCE ONE, JFK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, NEW YORK

4. (U) THE PRESIDENT: HELLO?

5. (U) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO: HELLO.

6. (C) THE PRESIDENT: MR. PRESIDENT, THANK YOU FOR TAKING
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MY CALL AT SUCH AN EARLY HOUR.

7. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO: THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, FOR YOUR KIND ATTENTION TO THE MONETARY TURMOIL NOT ONLY IN INDONESIA BUT ALSO IN OTHER SOUTH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES, AS WELL.

8. (C) THE PRESIDENT: I HAVE LONG VALUED OUR FRIENDSHIP,

AND I JUST WANTED TO TALK TO YOU PERSONALLY.

9. (U) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO: WELL INDEED, YOUR EXCELLENCY.

10. (C) THE PRESIDENT: I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE FINANCIAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA. I KNOW HOW PAINFUL THE CURRENT PROBLEMS MUST BE FOR YOU AND ALL INDONESIANS. AMERICA VALUES THE CRITICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE INDONESIA PLAYS IN THE REGION. IT IS BECAUSE WE APPRECIATE INDONESIA'S IMPORTANCE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF YOUR REFORM PROGRAM WITH THE IMF. INITIALLY THERE WAS A POSITIVE REACTION BY MARKETS TO YOUR COMMITMENT TO REFORM, BUT NOT ANYMORE BECAUSE OF A PERCEPTION THESE COMMITMENTS ARE NOT GOING TO BE IMPLEMENTED. YOU HAVE ALWAYS SHOWN GREAT COURAGE AND LEADERSHIP. I THINK IT IS VITAL NOW THAT YOU USE THOSE POWERS TO PROVIDE THIS SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC REFORM. I BELIEVE THIS IS THE BEST WAY TO

PRESERVE YOUR IMPRESSIVE ECONOMIC LEGACY IN INDONESIA AND TO GET OUT OF THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION.

11. (C) I KNOW IT IS DIFFICULT TO DO, BUT AMONG OTHER THINGS, INTEREST RATES SHOULD BE KEPT HIGH UNTIL THE RUPIAR

STABILIZES. THE SITUATION IS, I THINK, VERY SIMILAR TO THE SITUATION FACED BY KOREA AND PRESIDENT KIM BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION THERE. I UNDERSTAND IMF MANAGING DIRECTOR CAMDESSUS WILL BE IN JAKARTA SHORTLY, AND I URGE YOU AND YOUR ECONOMIC TEAM TO WORK CLOSELY WITH HIM. WE ARE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH YOUR TEAM. I KNOW YOU HAVE VERY CAPABLE ADVISORS, AND WE WANT TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THEM. I WOULD LIKE TO SEND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY LARRY SUMMERS TO CONSULT WITH YOUR ECONOMIC TEAM. HE HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH ME ON THE KOREAN AND MEXICAN SITUATIONS. HE IS PREPARED TO TRAVEL TO THE REGION IMMEDIATELY, AND I WOULD LIKE YOU TO SPEND SOME TIME WITH HIM TO DISCUSS THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION. HE WILL BE ABLE TO TELL YOU FIRST HAND HOW I VIEW IT.

12. (C) I ALSO INTEND TO RELEASE A STATEMENT IN THE NEXT FEW MINUTES REITERATING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND TO MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT WE SUPPORT YOU AND THAT WE WILL STAND WITH YOU THROUGHOUT THESE DIFFICULT TIMES.

13. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO: THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR VIEWS. THESE ARE VERY IMPORTANT NOT ONLY TO ME, BUT TO THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE. INDEED IN A SHORT TIME, JANUARY 15TH, THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF THE IMF IS GOING TO MEET WITH ME, MR. PRESIDENT. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR SENDING YOUR MISSION AND YOUR EFFORTS FOR RESOLVING THE PRESENT ECONOMIC CRISIS AND YOUR SUPPORT OF THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY IN GENERAL.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

[redacted]

16. (C) THE SITUATION FACED BY INDONESIA IS DIFFICULT TO OVERCOME HERE, AS WELL AS IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF SOUTH EAST ASIA. AS FAR AS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM IS CONCERNED, I CAN ASSURE YOU THERE IS NO PROBLEM, AS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE ARE WILLING TO SACRIFICE TO ENSURE A BENEFICIAL RESULT. THANK YOU VERY MUCH MR. PRESIDENT FOR ALLOWING ME TO MAKE THESE POINTS.

17. (C) THE PRESIDENT: THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT. IF I COULD SAY ONE OR TWO WORDS IN RESPONSE TO THE VERY HELPFUL SUMMARY YOU'VE GIVEN ME. FIRST, I KNOW HOW MUCH AN IMPACT

CURRENCY SPECULATION CAN HAVE; WE SAW THIS IN GREAT BRITAIN A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO. ONCE THEY GET STARTED IN ONE DIRECTION, IT1S HARD TO STOP IT. BUT I THINK THE WHOLE QUESTION IS ONE OF CHANGING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SITUATION TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE CURRENCY. IT'S OBVIOUS THAT THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA HAVE AN ENORMOUS PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY; ONE HAS ONLY TO LOOK AT THE PROGRESS OF THE LAST FEW YEARS TO SEE THAT.

18. (C) SO IN RESPONSE TO YOUR BRIEFING, I HAVE ONLY TWO OBSERVATIONS. FIRST, I THINK WHAT YOU ARE TRYING TO DO WITH PRIVATE LOANS; TO GET AS MANY AS POSSIBLE ROLLED OVER IS A GOOD THING. I'VE BEEN TALKING TO EXPERTS HERE, AND THEY HAVE TOLD ME SEVERAL THINGS. WHEN THE COMPANIES NEGOTIATE LOANS, THEY MUST MAKE SURE THE RECORDS OF THE LOANS ARE ACCURATE SO THE BANKS CAN GET A TRUE PICTURE OF THE STATUS OF THE COMPANY. I HOPE THAT WHEN MR. CAMDESSUS AND MR. SUMMERS COME THEY CAN ADVISE YOU ON THIS. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT. THE ONLY OTHER OBSERVATION I HAVE IS THAT SOMETIMES SMALL THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE. FOR INSTANCE, WHEN SEVERAL BANKS WERE CLOSED IT MADE A BIG DIFFERENCE FOR THE INVESTORS, BUT WHEN SOME WERE REOPENED UNDER NEW NAMES IT HAD A HUGE INFLUENCE ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTORS HERE. I THINK ANYONE CAN SYMPATHIZE WITH NOT WANTING TO END SUBSIDIES FOR FUEL OIL THAT WOULD HURT THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA, BUT YOU NEED TO SEE IF THERE ARE SOME SMALL STEPS THAT COULD HELP PSYCHOLOGICALLY TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION AND TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE REFORM PLAN FOR THE ECONOMY OF INDONESIA. MEANWHILE, I WILL ISSUE MY STATEMENT AND SEND MR. SUMMERS AND WE WILL WORK FOR THE BEST AND HOPE FOR THE BEST.

19. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO: THANK YOU VERY MUCH YOUR EXCELLENCY FOR YOUR INTEREST. YOUR DEMARCHE WILL BE VERY

VALUABLE. [redacted]

B1

20. (U) THE PRESIDENT: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, MR. PRESIDENT. GOODBYE.

21. (U) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO: GOODBYE.

CONFIDENTIAL

END OF CONVERSATION
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3392

PAGE 01 JAKART 00298 01 OF 06 201234Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00
	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OES-01	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PM-00
	PRS-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00
	EPAE-00	PMB-00	DRL-04	G-00	/021W		

----------113FD7 201234Z /38

O 201232Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9198
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USDOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 JAKARTA 000298

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/IFD, H

DEPARTMENT PASS OPIC FOR PRESIDENT MUNOZ

DEPARTMENT PASS EXIM FOR HULIHAN, AL-ASKARI, IMAM AND O'BOYLE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER AND INA/VELTHAUS

USDOC FOR IEP/EAP/OKSA/MIKALIS

USDOE FOR PO-72

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00298 01 OF 06 201234Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 24 JUL 2008 200502960

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/16
TAGS: EFIN, EINV, OPIC, ENRG, ID
SUBJECT: CALENERGY CHRONOLOGY: JANUARY 20

REF: GEITHNER/FERGIN TELCON 1/20/98

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ECONCOUNS JUDITH R. FERGIN; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (U) BELOW FOR EASY REFERENCE IS THE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SURROUNDING CALENERGY'S PATUHA GEOTHERMAL PROJECT:

3. (U) SEPTEMBER 23, 1997

-- AS PART OF THE EFFORT TO REDUCE BUDGETARY OUTLAYS AND CONTAIN THE CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT, THE GOI RELEASED A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE LISTING PROJECTS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH STATE-OWNED ENTITIES. THE PROJECTS WERE DIVIDED INTO THREE GROUPS: CONTINUED, POSTPONED, AND UNDER REVIEW. THE DECREE SUSPENDED PROJECTS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY SEVERAL U.S. FIRMS -- CALENERGY, DUKE, ENRON, MOBIL, COASTAL, UNOCAL, AND AMOSEAS (AKA CHEVRON/TEXACO) (97 JAKARTA 5846).

4. (U) NOVEMBER 1, 1997

-- A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE DATED NOVEMBER 1 BUT ISSUED

SEVERAL DAYS LATER REVIVED 15 INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, INCLUDING 8 POWER PROJECTS. AMONG THEM WAS CALENERGY'S PATUHA GEOTHERMAL PROJECT. SOME OF THE PROJECTS, LIKE CALENERGY'S, APPEARED TO FIT THE GOI'S CRITERIA FOR BEING PERMITTED TO PROCEED (I.E., THEY WERE UNDER CONSTRUCTION OR HAD REACHED SOME FORM OF FINANCIAL CLOSURE), BUT OTHERS SUCH AS THE PRESIDENTIAL FAMILY-CONNECTED TANJUNG JATI C PROJECT WERE CONTROVERSIAL. SHORTLY AFTER THIS DECREE GAVE THE PROJECT ITS GREEN

LIGHT AGAIN, CALENERGY DREW DOWN ON A USD 100 MILLION COMMERCIAL LOAN FOR PATUHA (97 JAKARTA 6621).

5. (SBU) DECEMBER 12, 1997

-- REPRESENTATIVES FROM CALENERGY BRIEFED AMBASSADOR ROY AND EMBASSY STAFF ON THE FIRM'S PLANS TO MEET WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THE IMF IN WASHINGTON TO ASK THESE ENTITIES TO PRESSURE THE GOI TO HONOR ITS POWER CONTRACTS IN LIGHT OF THE MINISTER OF MINES AND ENERGY'S CALL FOR RENEGOTIATION OF CONTRACTS. CALENERGY ALSO SAID THE FIRM FACED CONSIDERABLE FINANCIAL LOSSES IF SOME OF ITS PROJECTS DID NOT PROCEED (97 JAKARTA 7262).

6. (U) JANUARY 10, 1998

-- PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SIGNED A DECREE, REPORTEDLY HASTILY DRAFTED BY STATE SECRETARY MOERDIONO, WHICH RETURNED TO PROBATIONARY STATUS THE 15 INFRASTRUCTURE

PROJECTS REVIVED IN THE NOVEMBER 1 DECREE (E.G., STATUS QUO ANTE -- THIS DECREE MERELY CANCELED THE NOVEMBER 1 DECREE). THEY REJOINED THE APPROXIMATELY 100 PROJECTS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH STATE-OWNED ENTITIES WHICH HAD BEEN PLACED ON REVIEW OR POSTPONED STATUS IN SEPTEMBER (JAKARTA 163).

7. (U) JANUARY 11, 1998

-- RESOURCES OFFICER TOOK A CALL IN AMBASSADOR ROY'S ABSENCE FROM CONGRESSMAN DOUG BEREUTER REGARDING THE GOI'S POSTPONEMENT OF CALENERGY'S PATUHA PROJECT.

8. (C) JANUARY 12, 1998

-- PRESIDENT CALENERGY ASIA DONALD M. O'SHEI DELIVERED

TO IMF FIRST DEPUTY MANAGING DIRECTOR STANLEY FISCHER'S
JAKARTA HOTEL ROOM A LETTER REQUESTING A MEETING WITH
THE IMF NEGOTIATING TEAM TO DISCUSS PATUHA PROJECT
(COPIES OF LETTER SENT TO AMBASSADOR ROY).

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3394

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3394

PAGE 01 JAKART 00298 02 OF 06 201234Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00
	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OES-01	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PM-00	PRS-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	EPAE-00
	PMB-00	DRL-04	G-00	/021W			

----------113FE3 201234Z /38

O 201232Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9199
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USDOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 06 JAKARTA 000298

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/IFD, H

DEPARTMENT PASS OPIC FOR PRESIDENT MUNOZ

DEPARTMENT PASS EXIM FOR HULIHAN, AL-ASKARI, IMAM AND O'BOYLE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER AND INA/VELTHAUS

USDOC FOR IEP/EAP/OKSA/MIKALIS

USDOE FOR PO-72

CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/16
TAGS: EFIN, EINV, OPIC, ENRG, ID
SUBJECT: CALENERGY CHRONOLOGY: JANUARY 20

REF: GEITHNER/FERGIN TELCON 1/20/98

-- PER CALENERGY'S REQUEST, EMBASSY DELIVERED A LETTER TO VISITING TREASURY DEPUTY SECRETARY LAWRENCE SUMMERS REQUESTING A MEETING WITH TREASURY ON THE PATUHA PROJECT.

-- OPIC PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN GEORGE MUNOZ CALLED AND TALKED TO RESOURCES OFFICER TO GIVE US THE HEADS UP THAT THE GOI JANUARY 10 DECISION TO RETURN TO PROBATIONARY STATUS CALENERGY'S PATUHA GEOTHERMAL PROJECT COULD TRIGGER A "DOMINO EFFECT" WHICH COULD CULMINATE IN ACTIVATION OF CALENERGY'S OPIC INSURANCE COVERAGE. PRESIDENT MUNOZ ADDED THAT OPIC WAS IN THE PROCESS OF ALERTING THE GOI ON THIS MATTER.

-- CALENERGY PRESIDENT FOR ASIA DONALD M. O'SHEI ALSO CALLED RESOURCES OFFICER TO SAY THAT STATE SECRETARY MOERDIONO'S STAFF HAD TOLD CALENERGY THAT THE GOI WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN THE STATUS OF THE PATUHA PROJECT IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE NOT "PUNISHED" FOR TAKING SUCH AN ACTION. MOERDIONO'S STAFF TOLD CALENERGY THAT THE GOI WAS LOOKING FOR A "SIGN" THAT THE USG SUPPORTS

SUCH AN ACTION.

-- CALENERGY WENT PUBLIC IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE DAILY

"JAKARTA POST" PROTESTING THE GOI'S DECISION TO PUT ITS PATUHA PROJECT BACK ON THE POSTPONED LIST (COPY FAXED TO EAP/PIMBS).

9. (U) JANUARY 13, 1998

-- AMBASSADOR ROY RECEIVED LETTERS FROM NEBRASKA CONGRESSMEN JON CHRISTIANSEN AND DOUG BEREUTER ON BEHALF OF CALENERGY.

-- EMBASSY RECEIVED A COPY OF A LETTER FROM SENATE MAJORITY LEADER TRENT LOTT ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ON PATUHA PROJECT.

-- EMBASSY RECEIVED A COPY OF A LETTER ADDRESSED TO GOI MINISTERS FROM HOUSE SPEAKER NEWT GINGRICH ON PATUHA PROJECT.

10. (U) JANUARY 14, 1998

-- EMBASSY DUTY OFFICER RECEIVED A CALL FROM CONGRESSMAN CHRISTIANSEN'S OFFICE ASKING THAT THE EMBASSY SET UP A MEETING BETWEEN CALENERGY AND IMF. ECON COUNSELOR SPOKE TO CALENERGY BRUCE LUNDSTROM, WHO SAID HE WOULD CALL CALENERGY'S WASHINGTON OFFICE SO THEY COULD LET THE CONGRESSMAN'S OFFICE KNOW THAT THE LOOP HAD BEEN CLOSED IN TERMS OF THE EMBASSY'S HAVING RECEIVED THE MESSAGE. ECONCOUNS WAS UNABLE TO REACH THE IMF PARTY WHICH WAS COMPLETING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE

REVISED LETTER OF INTENT IN ANTICIPATION OF MANAGING DIRECTOR CAMDESSUS' MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SCHEDULED FOR THE MORNING OF JANUARY 15.

-- EMBASSY RECEIVED COPIES OF LETTERS FROM NEBRASKA SENATORS CHUCK HAGEL AND ROBERT KERREY ADDRESSED TO IMF MANAGING DIRECTOR MICHEL CAMDESSUS ON PATUHA PROJECT.

-- AMBASSADOR RECEIVED A LETTER FROM CALIFORNIA CONGRESSMAN VIC FAZIO ON BEHALF OF CALENERGY.

11. (C) JANUARY 15, 1998

-- IN HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, EX-IM BANK CHAIRMAN AND PRESIDENT JAMES HARMON INCLUDED IN HIS REMARKS THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSPARENCY AND CLARITY FOR PROJECT SELECTION. HE ALSO MADE THIS POINT CLEAR AND UNDERLINED THE URGENCY OF DEVELOPING AND PUBLICIZING THE CRITERIA QUICKLY AND APPLYING THEM FAIRLY AND TRANSPARENTLY IN HIS SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WITH SENIOR INDONESIAN OFFICIALS (JAKARTA 237).

PAGE 01 JAKART 00298 03 OF 06 201234Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00
	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OES-01	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PM-00
	PRS-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00
	EPAE-00	PMB-00	DRL-04	G-00	/021W		

------------------113FE7 201234Z /38

O 201232Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9200
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USDOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 06 JAKARTA 000298

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/IFD, H

DEPARTMENT PASS OPIC FOR PRESIDENT MUNOZ

DEPARTMENT PASS EXIM FOR HULIHAN, AL-ASKARI, IMAM AND O'BOYLE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER AND INA/VELTHAUS

USDOC FOR IEP/EAP/OKSA/MIKALIS

USDOE FOR PO-72

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00298 03 OF 06 201234Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/16
TAGS: EFIN, EINV, OPIC, ENRG, ID
SUBJECT: CALENERGY CHRONOLOGY: JANUARY 20

REF: GEITHNER/FERGIN TELCON 1/20/98

-- EX-IM CHAIRMAN HARMON AND AMBASSADOR ROY MET WITH MINISTER OF MINES AND ENERGY IDA BAGUS SUDJANA LATER IN THE MORNING. MR. HARMON ASKED ABOUT THE GOI'S JANUARY 10 DECISION TO PUT BACK ON HOLD THE EIGHT PRIVATE POWER PROJECTS. (NOTE: THIS MEETING TOOK PLACE BEFORE THE IMF REVISED LETTER OF INTENT WAS ANNOUNCED. THE LETTER OF INTENT AND IMF/MD CAMDESSUS' 11:30 A.M. PRESS STATEMENT SAID THAT THE GOI HAD CANCELED "12" INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS REINSTATED EARLIER, INCLUDING TANJUNG JATI C. END NOTE.) IMPLYING THAT HE HAD NO ROLE IN THE DECISION, MINISTER SUDJANA ASKED THAT MR. HARMON RAISE THE ISSUE DIRECTLY WITH FINANCE MINISTER MAR'IE MUHAMMAD. MR. HARMON REPLIED THAT HE WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE WITH THE FINANCE MINISTER ON JANUARY 16 (JAKARTA 256). MR. HARMON SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH BANK INDONESIA GOVERNOR SOEDRADJAD WHERE MR. HARMON STRESSED THE NEED TO ACT CONSTRUCTIVELY TO ENCOURAGE THE FLOW OF CAPITAL INTO INDONESIA (SEPTEL).

-- IN HIS MEETING WITH PLN PRESIDENT DIRECTOR DJITENG MARSUDI, EX-IM CHAIRMAN AND PRESIDENT HARMON RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE EIGHT POWER PROJECTS LISTED AS CANCELED IN THE GOI'S LETTER OF INTENT. DJITENG, WHO HAD NOT YET SEEN THE LIST OR THE LETTER OF INTENT, AGREED WITH MR.

HARMON THAT THE GOI NEEDED TO DEVELOP TRANSPARENT CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE NEED FOR THE POWER PROJECTS (SEPTEL).

-- AMBASSADOR ROY AND ECON COUNSELOR DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM OF THE CANCELED PROJECTS WITH WORLD BANK RESIDENT DIRECTOR DENNIS DE TRAY. DE TRAY SAID WE COULD REPORT TO SENIOR INDONESIAN OFFICIALS THAT THE WORLD BANK ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLICATION OF CLEAR PROJECT SELECTION CRITERIA AND THAT THE BANK WAS THEN WORKING WITH THE GOI ON THIS AND WITH PLN ON THE SPECIFIC CRITERIA FOR POWER PROJECTS (JAKARTA 258).

-- AMBASSADOR ROY MET WITH PLANNING MINISTER GINANDJAR

KARTASASMITA AT 2:00 P.M. AND PERSONALLY HANDED HIM OPIC PRESIDENT MUNOZ'S LETTER ALERTING THE GOI TO THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A DETERMINATION THAT AN OPIC-INSURED CONTRACT HAD BEEN ABROGATED. GINANDJAR ASKED FOR TIME TO SORT OUT THE ISSUE OF PROJECTS AND SAID HE HOPED TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF THE 12 PROJECTS WITHIN "A WEEK OR TWO." HE SAID HE WOULD RAISE THE PROBLEM WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO (JAKARTA 226).

-- ECON COUNSELOR OVER THE PHONE EXPLAINED TO IMF RESREP CALENERGY'S INCREASINGLY PRESSING PROBLEM AND FAXED A COPY OF OPIC'S LETTER TO THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE'S HOME. SHE ALSO CONVEYED CALENERGY'S REQUEST TO TALK TO THE MISSION. THE RESREP SAID HE WOULD TALK TO HEAD OF MISSION AGHEVLI ABOUT THE MEETING REQUEST.

CONFIDENTIAL

-- EMBASSY RECEIVED A COPY OF A LETTER ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FROM SENATOR TOM HARKIN ON PATUHA.

-- IN THE EVENING, ECON COUNSELOR AND OPIC HAD A CONFERENCE CALL REGARDING THE STATUS OF PATUHA, RELAYING THE ABOVE, INCLUDING WORLD BANK EFFORTS TO DEVELOP CRITERIA FOR REVIEWING ALL THE POWER PROJECTS.

12. (C) JANUARY 16, 1998

-- AMBASSADOR ROY AND ECONCOUNS MET WITH CALENERGY/O'SHEI. THE AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY DELIVERED A COPY OF OPIC PRESIDENT MUNOZ' LETTER TO MINISTER GINANDJAR AND THAT GINANDJAR HAD SAID HE WOULD RAISE THIS WITH THE PRESIDENT (JAKARTA 258).



B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3395

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3395

PAGE 01 JAKART 00298 04 OF 06 201234Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00
	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OES-01	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PM-00
	PRS-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00
	EPAE-00	PMB-00	DRL-04	G-00	/021W		

----------113FED 201234Z /38

O 201232Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9201
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USDOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 06 JAKARTA 000298

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/IFD, H

DEPARTMENT PASS OPIC FOR PRESIDENT MUNOZ

DEPARTMENT PASS EXIM FOR HULIHAN, AL-ASKARI, IMAM AND O'BOYLE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER AND INA/VELTHAUS

USDOC FOR IEP/EAP/OKSA/MIKALIS

USDOE FOR PO-72

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/16
TAGS: EFIN, EINV, OPIC, ENRG, ID
SUBJECT: CALENERGY CHRONOLOGY: JANUARY 20

REF: GEITHNER/FERGIN TELCON 1/20/98

[redacted] B1

--CALENERGY/O'SHEI HAD HIS FIRST CONVERSATION WITH IMF/AGHEVLI WHO, ACCORDING TO O'SHEI, SOUNDED HELPFUL AND ASKED O'SHEI TO CALL BACK LATER IN THE DAY.

-- ECON OFFICERS ATTENDED A MID-MORNING IMF BRIEFING ON THE NEW IMF PACKAGE. AGHEVLI SAID THE IMF'S MAIN INTEREST WAS ENSURING THAT PROJECTS THAT ARE NOT VIABLE NOT BE CONTINUED. THE IMF WAS AWAITING A WORLD BANK REVIEW OF ALL PUBLIC INVESTMENT DUE BY MID YEAR. FOLLOWING UP ON LIST-RELATED QUESTIONS POSED BY AMBASSADORS OF SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES, ECONOFF ASKED IF THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE 12 PROJECTS COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS POSTPONED, PENDING A REVIEW BASED ON OBJECTIVE AND TRANSPARENT CRITERIA THAT HAVE YET TO BE ESTABLISHED. AGHEVLI ANSWERED, "NO, THEY ARE CANCELED". HE ADDED THAT IF THERE ARE SOME THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CANCELED, THE DECISION ON THE CANCELATION MAY BE REVIEWED (JAKARTA 256).

-- CALENERGY O'SHEI CONTACTED INDONESIAN SOURCES WHO SAID THAT IMF AND MINISTRY OF FINANCE OFFICIALS HAD MET THAT DAY TO DISCUSS THE CANCELED PROJECTS. THE MINISTRY

OF FINANCE RAISED CALENERGY'S PATUHA, COASTAL'S PALEMBANG TIMUR AND AMOSEAS' DERAJAT AS PROJECTS THEY WISH TO PRESERVE FROM CANCELLATION (JAKARTA 258).

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

-- IN AN AFTERNOON MEETING WITH FINANCE MINISTER MAR'IE MUHAMMAD WITH AMBASSADOR ROY AND EX-IM BANK CHAIRMAN AND PRESIDENT JAMES HARMON, AMBASSADOR ROY PERSONALLY DELIVERED OPIC PRESIDENT GEORGE MUNOZ'S LETTER ALERTING THE GOI TO THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A DETERMINATION THAT AN OPIC-INSURED CONTRACT HAD BEEN ABROGATED. THE MINISTER WAS ASKED ABOUT GOI SUPPORT FOR POWER PROJECTS. MAR'IE MUHAMMAD SAID THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THERE WERE TOO MANY POWER PROJECTS, AND THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW HOW THE ISSUE WOULD BE HANDLED (JAKARTA 259).

-- THE EMBASSY DELIVERED THE OPIC LETTERS FOR MINES AND ENERGY MINISTER SUDJANA, ELECTRIC UTILITY PLN PRESIDENT

DIRECTOR DJITENG MARSUDI, AND STATE OIL COMPANY PERTAMINA PRESIDENT DIRECTOR SOEGIANTO BY FAX AND BY HAND.

-- FRIDAY EVENING JAKARTA TIME, RESOURCES OFFICER DISCUSSED WITH OPIC PRESIDENT MUNOZ THE STATUS OF PATUHA AND USG AND WORLD BANK EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE GOI WITH IMF SUPPORT TO DEVELOP AND PUBLISH TRANSPARENT CRITERIA FOR MOVING FORWARD ON SOME OF THE POWER PROJECTS.

13. (C) JANUARY 17, 1998

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3396

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3396

PAGE 01 JAKART 00298 05 OF 06 201234Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-08 ACDE-00 AID-00 CEA-01 CIAE-00 CTME-00

OASY-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 EB-00 EXIM-01 E-00
FRB-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 ITC-01 L-01
ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OES-01 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PM-00
PRS-00 CIO-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00 USIE-00
EPAE-00 PMB-00 DRL-04 G-00 /021W
----------113FF4 201234Z /38

O 201232Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9202
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USDOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 06 JAKARTA 000298

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/IFD, H

DEPARTMENT PASS OPIC FOR PRESIDENT MUNOZ

DEPARTMENT PASS EXIM FOR HULIHAN, AL-ASKARI, IMAM AND O'BOYLE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER AND INA/VELTHAUS

USDOC FOR IEP/EAP/OKSA/MIKALIS

USDOE FOR PO-72

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00298 05 OF 06 201234Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/16
TAGS: EFIN, EINV, OPIC, ENRG, ID
SUBJECT: CALENERGY CHRONOLOGY: JANUARY 20

REF: GEITHNER/FERGIN TELCON 1/20/98

[redacted] B1

B1

14. (C) JANUARY 19, 1998

-- AMBASSADOR ROY DELIVERED A COPY OF OPIC PRESIDENT MUNOZ' LETTER TO MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE TUNKY ARIWIBOWO. THE AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF FAIR AND OPEN CRITERIA. THE MINISTER AGREED THAT A RULE-BASED PROCESS WITH TRANSPARENCY WOULD BE IMPORTANT NOT ONLY FOR THESE PROJECTS, BUT FOR MANY OTHER SMALL AND MEDIUM PROJECTS WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED AS WELL. HE ALSO AGREED TO CONVEY A COPY OF THE MUNOZ LETTER FOR SENIOR ADVISOR DR.

CONFIDENTIAL

WIDJOJO AND TO DISCUSS IT WITH HIM. IN THE MEANTIME, ECONCOUNS HAD FAXED A COPY OF THE LETTER TO DR. WIDJOJO'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT AND EXPLAINED IT TO HIM.

BACKGROUND ON THE PROJECT

15. (U) THE PATUHA GEOTHERMAL PLANT IS LOCATED IN WEST JAVA. TO DATE, CALENERGY AND ITS LOCAL PARTNER (PT ENERSINDO SUPRA ABADI) HAVE INVESTED USD 360 MILLION IN THEIR THREE GEOTHERMAL PROJECTS IN JAVA AND BALI AND HAVE BUDGETED ANOTHER USD 660 MILLION IN 1998. AFTER CALENERGY RECEIVED THE GO-AHEAD FROM THE GOI TO MOVE FORWARD ON PATUHA IN NOVEMBER THEY DREW DOWN ON A USD 100 MILLION COMMERCIAL LOAN. THE FUNDING PROCESS FOR GEOTHERMAL PROJECTS IS DIFFERENT THAN FOR A CONVENTIONAL POWER PLANT -- UPFRONT INVESTMENT GOES INTO FINDING THE STEAM AND "DEVELOPING THE BOILER." FINANCING AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE ACTUAL POWER PLANT ARE THE LAST STAGES.

16. (U) CALENERGY'S POWER PURCHASE PRICE (PPA) FOR PATUHA AND ITS OTHER GEOTHERMAL PROJECTS IS HIGHER THAN PPA'S FOR COAL-FIRED PLANTS. THIS TAKES INTO ACCOUNT HIGHER DEVELOPMENT COSTS WHICH ARE BALANCED BY ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS FROM USING STEAM OVER COAL. ALTHOUGH OTHER U.S. COMPANIES HAVE PROJECTS ON THE REVIEW/POSTPONED LIST, ONLY CALENERGY HAS OPIC INSURANCE AND ITS FINANCIAL OUTLAY IS SUBSTANTIALLY LARGER THAN THE OTHER COMPANIES'.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00298 05 OF 06 201234Z

17. (U) OTHER U.S. POWER PROJECTS ON THE LIST OF 15

-- SARULLA GEOTHERMAL POWER PLANT (SHAREHOLDERS UNOCAL AND BOB HASAN'S NUSAMBA GROUP): SIMILAR TO OTHER GEOTHERMAL PROJECTS, UNOCAL HAS ALREADY EQUITY-FINANCED EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION OF THE STEAM.

-- DERAJAT 1, 2 GEOTHERMAL POWER PLANT (SHAREHOLDERS AMOSEAS AKA CHEVRON/TEXACO AND LOCAL PARTNER PT PRASARANA NUSANTARA): AMOSEAS HAS ALSO INVESTED UP FRONT TO DEVELOP THE STEAM.

-- PALEMBANG TIMUR COMBINED-CYCLE POWER PLANT (SHAREHOLDERS HOUSTON-BASED COASTAL POWER AND LOCAL PARTNER ASTRA INTERNATIONAL): PRIOR TO THE JANUARY 10 ANNOUNCEMENT, COASTAL HAD DRAWN DOWN ON THE REMAINDER OF ITS LOANS FOR FUNDING THE PLANT.

18. OTHER U.S. PROJECTS ON HOLD

-- CALENERGY HAS OTHER GEOTHERMAL PROJECTS PUT ON THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3398

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3398

PAGE 01 JAKART 00298 06 OF 06 201234Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00
	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OES-01	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PM-00
	PRS-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00
	EPAE-00	PMB-00	DRL-04	G-00	/021W		

------------------113FF9 201234Z /38

O 201232Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9203
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USDOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 06 JAKARTA 000298

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB/IFD, H

DEPARTMENT PASS OPIC FOR PRESIDENT MUNOZ

DEPARTMENT PASS EXIM FOR HULIHAN, AL-ASKARI, IMAM AND O'BOYLE

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER AND INA/VELTHAUS

USDOC FOR IEP/EAP/OKSA/MIKALIS

USDOE FOR PO-72

CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/16
TAGS: EFIN, EINV, OPIC, ENRG, ID
SUBJECT: CALENERGY CHRONOLOGY: JANUARY 20

REF: GEITHNER/FERGIN TELCON 1/20/98

REVIEW/POSTPONED LIST AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER: PATUHA UNITS 2 THROUGH 4 IN WEST JAVA, BEDUGUL UNITS 3 AND 4 IN BALI, AND DIENG UNIT 4 IN CENTRAL JAVA.

-- DUKE (OTHER SHAREHOLDERS ARE PT BIMANTARA CITRA AND MITSUBISHI) HAD ITS COAL-FIRED PROJECT, LOCATED IN CILACAP, CENTRAL JAVA, POSTPONED IN SEPTEMBER.

-- ENRON DEVELOPMENT (OTHER SHAREHOLDERS ARE PT PASURUAN POWER OF INDONESIA AND PRICE HOLDING LTD OF HONG KONG) HAD ITS COMBINED-CYCLE PROJECT IN PASURUAN, EAST JAVA POSTPONED IN SEPTEMBER. GAS FOR THE PLANT IS BEING SUPPLIED BY MOBIL.

COMMENT
---

19. (C) TANJUNG JATI C WAS THE MOST OBJECTIONABLE OF THE PROJECTS INCLUDED IN THE 15 (SEE 97 JAKARTA 7034 FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE PROJECTS). HAVING COME ONTO THE SCENE LATE AND HAD ITS PPA SIGNED ONLY IN LATE DECEMBER (I.E., AFTER THE SEPTEMBER DECREE SUSPENDED PROJECTS), ITS GREEN LIGHT WAS WIDELY INTERPRETED AS GOI POLITICS-AS-USUAL, DESPITE EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST IMF PROGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AGREED IN NOVEMBER. MANY OF THE OTHER PROJECTS IN THE GROUP WERE AT ADVANCED STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT IT WAS EASIER TO HANDLE THEIR RE-POSTPONEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT CANCELATION AS A GROUP. WHILE WE AGREE WITH GOI AND WORLD BANK ASSESSMENTS THAT DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY WILL BE REDUCED DURING THIS ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, POWER PROJECTS HAVE A LONG GESTATION PERIOD. ASSUMING ECONOMIC RECOVERY, INDONESIA WILL EVENTUALLY NEED MORE POWER. A PROPER REVIEW WOULD SHOW IF ANY OF THE POWER PROJECTS CANCELED UNDER THE LETTER OF INTENT SHOULD BE CONTINUED. AN UNFORTUNATE ASPECT OF THE JANUARY 15 ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE WORDING OF THE LETTER OF INTENT IS THE ABSENCE OF A TRANSPARENT PROCESS WHICH LED UP TO IT.

20. (C) THE SPOTLIGHT FOR THE MOMENT IS ON CALENERGY'S PROJECT BECAUSE OF ITS OPIC COVERAGE. HOWEVER, WE HEAR THAT THE GOI ALSO PLANS TO CANCEL OTHER (MAYBE ALL) REMAINING PROJECTS THAT ARE ON THE GOI'S REVIEW/POSTPONED LISTS. THIS ACTION WOULD TRIGGER CLAIMS FROM COMPANIES IN THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND, IF COMPENSATION WERE NOT PROMPT, EFFECTIVE, AND ADEQUATE, FURTHER DAMAGE INVESTOR CONFIDENCE IN INDONESIA. TO PREVENT SUCH A OUTCOME, THE AMBASSADOR AND ECON STAFF HAVE NOTED IN ALL OUR CONTACTS WITH THE GOI, IMF, WORLD BANK, AND PRIVATE U.S. COMPANIES THE NEED FOR THE GOI TO DEVELOP A FAIR, OBJECTIVE, AND TRANSPARENT PROCESS FOR EVALUATING THE PROJECTS WHICH WOULD THEN BE OPENLY AND TRANSPARENTLY APPLIED. U.S. COMPANIES WOULD GLADLY JOIN IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING THE CRITERIA, AS WE HAVE NOTED TO PLN PRESIDENT DIRECTOR DJITENG AND THE WORLD

BANK.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL 9800069

ORIG LTR TO AMEMB JAKARTA
REG#4031704
COPIES TO:
S S/S
D S/S-C
P EAP
E WIIS/dsm
T
G
M
C

'98 JAN -5 P1:37

52

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 30, 1997

Dear Mr. President:

I enjoyed the opportunity to talk with you at the APEC meeting, although I wish we could have had more time to share ideas. I thought the leaders' meeting went well this year and your leadership within ASEAN is an important element of APEC's success. I know how disappointed you must have been when your doctors advised against traveling to Kuala Lumpur for the informal ASEAN summit. After your hectic travel schedule over the past several weeks, I hope you are getting the rest you deserve.

As I mentioned in Vancouver, I am pleased we have been able to combine our efforts in fighting the devastating fires in your country. I understand the annual monsoon rains have begun providing some welcome relief to the region. The Vancouver initiative to begin joint planning for responding to natural disasters will help us react more efficiently in future disaster situations.

The financial difficulties facing Indonesia and others in the region are proving to be formidable challenges. Your willingness to undertake the far-reaching reforms negotiated with the IMF was a critical first step toward economic recovery. I want to encourage you to implement fully the letter and spirit of the IMF program as it represents the type of strong action needed to re-establish financial stability. Acting decisively and publicly affirming your commitment to implementing the IMF guidelines will be essential ingredients to restoring market confidence.

I have great admiration for the many contributions you have made to enhance economic prosperity in Indonesia and throughout Southeast Asia. I look forward to your continuing leadership and to building closer U.S.-Indonesia ties.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

His Excellency
Soeharto
President of the Republic of Indonesia
Jakarta

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

Department of State

PAGE 01 STATE 000472 030113Z SHB7631
ORIGIN EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 CPR-02 C-00 OASY-00 EB-00 UTED-00
IM-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 NSCE-00 PA-00 PRS-00 SSC-01
SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 G-00 /005R

000472
SOURCE: KODAKC.020015
DRAFTED BY: EAP:TEXT RECEIVED FROM THE WHITE HOUSE:VEM -- 01/02/98 7-1
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:ARABASA
EAP/PIMBS:WMURRAY S/S-C:BHAMBRICK
S/S:MQUINN
S/S-O:SEALEXANDER
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
ALSO S/S-C

----------0B7809 030114Z /38

O 030111Z JAN 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 000472

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPDC, ID
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AT APPROPRIATE TIME. THE WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT OF MESSAGE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA WISHES TO DO SO. THE SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW BY POUCH.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECEMBER 30, 1997

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I ENJOYED THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH YOU AT THE APEC MEETING, ALTHOUGH I WISH WE COULD HAVE HAD MORE TIME TO SHARE IDEAS. I THOUGHT THE LEADERS' MEETING WENT WELL THIS YEAR AND YOUR LEADERSHIP WITHIN ASEAN IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF APEC'S SUCCESS. I KNOW HOW DISAPPOINTED YOU MUST HAVE BEEN WHEN YOUR DOCTORS ADVISED AGAINST TRAVELING TO KUALA LUMPUR FOR THE INFORMAL ASEAN SUMMIT. AFTER YOUR HECTIC TRAVEL SCHEDULE OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, I HOPE YOU ARE GETTING THE REST YOU DESERVE.

AS I MENTIONED IN VANCOUVER, I AM PLEASED WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS IN FIGHTING THE DEVASTATING FIRES IN YOUR COUNTRY. I UNDERSTAND THE ANNUAL MONSOON RAINS HAVE BEGUN PROVIDING SOME WELCOME RELIEF TO THE REGION. THE VANCOUVER INITIATIVE TO BEGIN JOINT PLANNING FOR RESPONDING TO NATURAL DISASTERS WILL HELP US REACT MORE EFFICIENTLY IN FUTURE DISASTER SITUATIONS.

THE FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES FACING INDONESIA AND OTHERS IN THE REGION ARE PROVING TO BE FORMIDABLE CHALLENGES. YOUR WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE THE FAR-REACHING REFORMS NEGOTIATED WITH THE IMF WAS A CRITICAL FIRST STEP TOWARD ECONOMIC RECOVERY. I WANT TO ENCOURAGE YOU TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE IMF PROGRAM AS IT REPRESENTS THE TYPE OF STRONG ACTION NEEDED TO RE-ESTABLISH

STATE 000472 030113Z SHB7(
FINANCIAL STABILITY. ACTING DECISIVELY AND PUBLICLY AFFIRMING YOUR COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENTING THE IMF GUIDELINES WILL BE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS TO RESTORING MARKET CONFIDENCE.

I HAVE GREAT ADMIRATION FOR THE MANY CONTRIBUTIONS YOU HAVE MADE TO ENHANCE ECONOMIC PROSPERITY IN INDONESIA AND THROUGHOUT SOUTHEAST ASIA. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR CONTINUING LEADERSHIP AND TO BUILDING CLOSER U.S.-INDONESIA TIES.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON /S/

32A

HIS EXCELLENCY
SOEHARTO
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
JAKARTA

END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

9800035

RF

ORIG LETTER POUCHED TO AMEMB JAKARTA
UNDER REG. NO. 4031712

COPIES TO

S
D
P
E
T
M
G
C
SS
SSC
EAP
RF/jm

'98 JAN -2 P10:22

S3

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 19, 1997

Dear Mr. President:

I was pleased that we were able to meet during this year's APEC summit to reaffirm the partnership between our countries, and I found our discussion of trade valuable. I also appreciate your comments regarding U.S. support of your efforts to combat the forest fires and address to the financial crisis in the region.

I also want to thank you for the copy of *Green Indonesia*. It is a thoughtful reminder of the occasion and of the friendship between our two nations.

Mrs. Clinton joins me in sending best wishes to you.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

His Excellency
Soeharto
President of the Republic of Indonesia
Jakarta

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

S3A



To the Excellency Sechaba
Best Wishes,
Bill Clinton

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

RELEASED IN FULL

S3B



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

Orig. sent to Embassy Jakarta via Pouch
1/15, Reg. #4031926.

RELEASED IN FULL

S5

Copies to:
S
D
P
E
T
M
G
C
S/S
S/S-C
EAP
EB
WIIS/
rds
IPS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 14, 1998

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for receiving Deputy Secretary Summers during his recent trip to Jakarta. I appreciate that you found time to discuss your economic program with Deputy Secretary Summers in such detail. He has given me a full report of your meeting.

I thought it would be helpful for you to have the enclosed non-paper, which summarizes the key points Mr. Summers made on my behalf. I offer these as key steps necessary to restore financial confidence, as part of the comprehensive proposals you are developing with the IMF.

As I mentioned in our telephone conversation last week, we know how difficult the current situation must be for the Indonesian people and are standing with you in these difficult times.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

His Excellency Soeharto
President of the Republic of Indonesia
Jakarta

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

RELEASED IN FULL

S5A

CRITICAL STEPS TO RESTORE FINANCIAL CONFIDENCE

1. Take key symbolic actions:

- Take decisive action on important projects, such as the national car project, the national plane project and certain power plants and banks. These have taken on a symbolic importance and are being watched extremely closely by the markets.

2. Restore a credible currency:

- Direct monetary policy at the objective of exchange rate stability and raise interest rates as necessary.
- The budget must be backed by credible and transparent assumptions.

3. Assure the strength of the banking system:

- Need to guarantee rupiah deposits throughout the banking system.
- Need drastic restructuring in which managers and equity owners of failed institutions pay a price.

4. Improve presentation of economic policy:

- Direct Presidential involvement is crucial.
- Improve transparency: make public the revised Letter of Intent with the International Monetary Fund.
- The economic team must have a clear leader empowered to act as a credible interlocutor with the IMF and the international financial community.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RELEASED IN FULL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telecon with Soeharto, President of Indonesia (C)
PARTICIPANTS:	Soeharto, President of Indonesia Interpreter: Dan Fietkiewicz Notetakers: James Smith, Jeffrey Rathke, Lyle Harrison, Robert Ford, James Gagnon
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	January 15, 1998, 11:27 - 11:36 a.m. EST Oval Office

The President: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

President Soeharto: Good morning, Mr. President. Thank you for this opportunity to talk to you on the telephone. (U)

The President: I am glad to hear your voice. Thank you again for taking time to meet with Treasury Deputy Secretary Summers. (U)

President Soeharto: Thank you very much indeed. The last two days of discussions with Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer of the IMF have been very good indeed. These discussions were followed by a meeting with the Managing Director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus. This morning, I signed a letter of intent and presented the letter to the Managing Director. And soon after that, Mr. Camdessus held a press conference at which he mentioned his very good impression with the agreements that have been reached. (C)

As a follow-on to implementation of the agreement, I have established a Council of National Economic and Financial Resilience over which I will preside. I will be assisted by Dr. Widjojo Nitisastro who will be the Secretary General. The members of the Council will come from the economic ministries and have two representatives from the private sector. They will immediately begin to carry out the task of implementing plans

CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 1/19/08
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

and programs in accordance with the letter of intent that I presented to Mr. Camdessus this morning. (C)

With the view of maintaining better contact between Indonesia and the IMF, I have requested the Managing Director to assign a senior IMF official to Jakarta to assist me in implementing the program. Mr. Camdessus has appointed temporarily the Director for Asia Pacific Affairs of the IMF. He will be succeeded later by a more senior IMF official. Every three months, we will conduct a review of the development of the program and plan what is to be done. (C)

I would like to take this occasion to express my gratitude for your assistance, Your Excellency, and I believe it appropriate to ask you to make a statement to the world that Indonesia and the IMF have reached an agreement. I also met with the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Summers, and received your messages, Your Excellency. At almost the same time, I received the Secretary of Defense of the United States. These two high-ranking officials of the United States were both able to see close up the real situation in Jakarta. (C)

The President: Well, thank you very much Mr. President. First of all, I think the agreement is good, but I am most encouraged by the explanation of how it will be implemented. That is the next big step. Investors will be looking at this. You obviously have a very good plan for doing that. I will release a statement saying you called me and that I welcomed these steps, and I am encouraged by them. We intend to continue our involvement and to work with you in this difficult time. I hope the statement will have a positive effect. (C)

President Soeharto: Thank you very much, Your Excellency. The most important thing is implementation of this program; the world is anxiously waiting to see what will happen. The most immediate action will be the revision of the state budget I presented to the parliament several days ago. Secondly, we are committed to the reform of the banking system, not only the central bank and state banks, but also private banks. (C)

The President: Thank you. This is very good news. We will keep working with you. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SGB

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Indonesian President Soeharto

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Soeharto

Interpreter: Fred Burks
Notetakers: Sandra J. Kristoff, Sean Rice, David Higgins and George Chastain

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 13, 1998, 9:54 - 10:32 p.m. EDT
Camp David

The President: Since we spoke several weeks ago, I have followed developments in Indonesia closely. I wanted to stay in touch and am calling now because I am concerned about the financial situation. (C)

Your personal leadership has produced unprecedented economic growth and prosperity for Indonesia and its people. I am convinced you can get through this present difficulty. (C)

I share your desire to see rapid economic recovery and want to do what I can to work with you. I understand one of the proposals under consideration is establishment of a currency board. I have studied this proposal and have serious concerns about it that I want to share with you. (C)

I have consulted with the IMF and G-7 countries and everyone seems to believe that if you implement a currency board you could put at risk all the progress you have achieved. (C)

If markets go after the board, it could create a run that seriously depletes Indonesia's reserves and complicates the efforts of the IMF and the international community to provide support. It could drive up interest rates, lead to the collapse of banks and the banking system and make it easier for speculators to move against the rupiah. When speculators make a

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b(d)
Declassify on: 02/17/08

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

run, it can drive down a country, even as it did Great Britain, and this would worsen the situation for you. (C)

I know these currency boards seem to have worked in a couple of other countries, but everybody I know thinks it will not work for Indonesia. It seems a better course would be to focus on strengthening the banking system, resolving private sector debt and continuing to implement the IMF reforms. (C)

I want to work with you and with the IMF in supporting efforts to stabilize the exchange rate. We are mobilizing a multilateral effort to help restore trade finance lines to Indonesia, working with the IMF and the G-7. We also have a substantial program of food assistance to offer just to help you meet the temporary shortfall you now face. (C)

Mr. President, the task of restoring market confidence also has a political component and that is why it is important to implement the IMF reforms with a leadership team that commands broad public support and respect. And as you and I have discussed many times now, it is important to maintain openness and broad public participation in the political system to maintain growth and your impressive record of accomplishments. It seems to me that in order to complete the difficult economic adjustments you will need public support. Allowing a broad range of viewpoints to be heard will act to help generate that support. (C)

Mr. President, I believe in your leadership record and the fundamental strength of your country. I will do what I can to help. That's why I felt moved as a friend to share with you my concern about this currency board idea. (C)

President Soeharto: Thank you very much for your interest and I appreciate that you are a close friend of Indonesia and are paying close attention to the situation here. (C)

The problem is that after January 15, when I gave the letter of intent to the IMF, and even since November when the IMF started to provide assistance, the situation has gotten worse. (C)

I am trying to implement precisely the letter of intent. First, the state budget is being revised even though some in Parliament are reluctant to do so. Second, we are taking appropriate steps on banking reform, including merging banks and appointing new personnel. Eventually, there will be only three state banks. Third, we have established a restructuring program for private

banks. The task is to see that mergers take place. In order to restore confidence in the banking system, the government is guaranteeing savings and deposits. But we are not going to liquidate any more banks because we believe this would be disadvantageous. We will set up new rules about minimum accounts and banks that cannot meet those rules will be out of business. (C)

The problem is that despite all this, the decline in the exchange rate continues. The rupiah was at 15,000 to one dollar; now it is at 10,000. Companies have stopped their work, which has caused layoffs and unemployment and unrest. (C)

To stop this fall in the exchange rate, the government has intervened repeatedly and we have used $10 billion of our reserves to shore up the rupiah. Continuing to intervene will jeopardize our limited reserves, which are needed to import goods for industry, for example spare parts. If we continue to intervene, we will exhaust our reserves. (C)

One IMF requirement is expediting trade liberalization. I have done that, but a consequence has been that many companies cannot distribute basic goods. There is a scarcity of foodstuffs and supply and demand has driven up prices, which in turn has produced unrest. The public has called on the government to remedy the problem. But because of the continued decline of the rupiah, it is difficult to calculate how much we need to import, even of such items as medicine and powdered milk, which also now are in short supply. Unless we take control and try to stop the fall of the rupiah, I fear all companies will stop all business, even as we are in the process of reforming the banking system. (C)

At the moment we are contemplating introduction of a currency board system. But I share your view that there is a great risk in doing this. I fear, however, that unless we take this step all manner of things will get worse and there will be a great effect on the rest of Southeast Asia. (C)

If the currency board is not introduced, what is the alternative? How do we stop the rupiah's fall? I appeal to you to approach the G-7 and ask them to pay attention to the situation in Indonesia. I will not insist on a currency board in Indonesia. If there is a better alternative, I would be happy to apply it. (C)

So this is the situation in Indonesia now. I appreciate your help regarding our food shortages. (C)

The President: I hear your message and I understand your frustration. If the rupiah falls, you will lose your reserves. And if the currency board is caught short and falls, you will lose the reserves as well, just quicker. (C)

I want to go back to the G-7 and the IMF and talk to them about alternatives. I want this to work out and am worried the currency board will be an open target. I am worried about collapse. I will talk to the others and get back to you in a few days. (C)

President Soeharto: Thank you for your pledge. We need to make a decision soon as the people are demanding that their President do something to fix the situation and save the country. The Indonesian people see the IMF as a savior too late. (C)

The President: Thank you. I will get to work on it. (C)

President Soeharto: Thank you. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

0202

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

S6B

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Soeharto, President of the Republic of Indonesia

PARTICIPANTS: Soeharto, President of the Republic of Indonesia

Interpreter: Larry Fisher
Notetakers: Sean Rice, Larry Wright, Jim Smith, Joel Schrader and Cindy Lawrence

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 8, 1998, 9:42 - 10:08 p.m. EST
Air Force One, JFK International Airport, New York

The President: Hello? (U)

President Soeharto: Hello. (U)

The President: Mr. President, thank you for taking my call at such an early hour. (C)

President Soeharto: Thank you, Mr. President, for your kind attention to the monetary turmoil not only in Indonesia but also in other South East Asian countries, as well. (C)

The President: I have long valued our friendship, and I just wanted to talk to you personally. (C)

President Soeharto: Well indeed, your Excellency. (U)

The President: I have been following closely the financial situation in Indonesia. I know how painful the current problems must be for you and all Indonesians. America values the critical and constructive role Indonesia plays in the region. It is because we appreciate Indonesia's importance that the United States has been supportive of your reform program with the IMF. Initially there was a positive reaction by markets to your commitment to reform, but not anymore because of a

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 01/12/08

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. HEDGBETH, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 15 JAN 2013
DATE/CASE ID: 12 MAY 2008 200502960

perception these commitments are not going to be implemented. You have always shown great courage and leadership. I think it is vital now that you use those powers to provide this support for economic reform. I believe this is the best way to preserve your impressive economic legacy in Indonesia and to get out of this difficult situation. (C)

I know it is difficult to do, but among other things, interest rates should be kept high until the rupiah stabilizes. The situation is, I think, very similar to the situation faced by Korea and President Kim before the presidential election there. I understand IMF Managing Director Camdessus will be in Jakarta shortly, and I urge you and your economic team to work closely with him. We are in close contact with your team. I know you have very capable advisors, and we want to be in touch with them. I would like to send Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers to consult with your economic team. He has worked closely with me on the Korean and Mexican situations. He is prepared to travel to the region immediately, and I would like you to spend some time with him to discuss the current economic situation. He will be able to tell you first hand how I view it. (C)

I also intend to release a statement in the next few minutes reiterating the importance of the relationship between our countries and to make it absolutely clear that we support you and that we will stand with you throughout these difficult times. (C)

President Soeharto: Thank you very much for your views. These are very important not only to me, but to the Indonesian people. Indeed in a short time, January 15th, the managing director of the IMF is going to meet with me, Mr. President. I would also like to express my appreciation for sending your mission and your efforts for resolving the present economic crisis and your support of the Indonesian economy in general. (C)



B1

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

The situation faced by Indonesia is difficult to overcome here, as well as in other countries of South East Asia. As far as implementation of the program is concerned, I can assure you there is no problem, as the Indonesian people are willing to sacrifice to ensure a beneficial result. Thank you very much Mr. President for allowing me to make these points. (C)

The President: Thank you, Mr. President. If I could say one or two words in response to the very helpful summary you've given me. First, I know how much an impact currency speculation can

have; we saw this in Great Britain a couple of years ago. Once they get started in one direction, it's hard to stop it. But I think the whole question is one of changing the psychology of the situation to restore confidence in the currency. It's obvious that the people of Indonesia have an enormous productive capacity; one has only to look at the progress of the last few years to see that. (C)

So in response to your briefing, I have only two observations. First, I think what you are trying to do with private loans; to get as many as possible rolled over is a good thing. I've been talking to experts here, and they have told me several things. When the companies negotiate loans, they must make sure the records of the loans are accurate so the banks can get a true picture of the status of the company. I hope that when Mr. Camdessus and Mr. Summers come they can advise you on this. It is very important. The only other observation I have is that sometimes small things can make a big difference. For instance, when several banks were closed it made a big difference for the investors, but when some were reopened under new names it had a huge influence on the psychology of investors here. I think anyone can sympathize with not wanting to end subsidies for fuel oil that would hurt the people of Indonesia, but you need to see if there are some small steps that could help psychologically to deal with the situation and to restore confidence in the reform plan for the economy of Indonesia. Meanwhile, I will issue my statement and send Mr. Summers and we will work for the best and hope for the best. (C)

President Soeharto: Thank you very much Your Excellency for your interest. Your demarche will be very valuable.

B1

[redacted] B1

The President: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Goodbye. (U)

President Soeharto: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

RELEASED IN FULL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

S1B

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with ASEAN Leaders (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

United States
The President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Sylvia Matthews, Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff
Daniel Tarullo, Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs
Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Larry Summers, Deputy Secretary of Treasury
Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific
Stapleton Roy, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia
James Gagnon, NSC Director for Asian Affairs (Notetaker)

Indonesia
Soeharto, President
Hartarto Sastrosoenarto, Coordinating Minister for Production and Distribution
Ali Alatas, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moerdiono, Minister of State Secretary
Nana Suyresna, Ambassador-at-Large
Benjamin Parwoto, Indonesia Ambassador to Canada
Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, Ambassador for APEC Affairs
Widjojo Nitisastro, Advisor to the President for Economic Affairs
Dadang Sukandar, Head of State Protocol
Widod Sutyo, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of State/State Secretary
Nazaruddin Nasution, Director for American Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs

SECRET
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 11/25/07

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 30 APR 2008 200502960

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 24, 1997, 9:40 - 10:40 a.m. PST
Vancouver, Canada

The President: When did you arrive in Vancouver? (U)

President Soeharto: I arrived last night at 11:00 p.m. The flight from South Africa took almost twenty-two hours. There is progress in South Africa but it still needs assistance from other countries. (C)

Let me thank you for the great oppcrtunity to meet with you here at APEC. On behalf of the people of Indonesia, I would like to thank you for the assistance with the fires. We are suffering from the fires and the unusually long dry season. One third of our forests are supposed to remain untouched; one third are industrial forests with selective cutting to ensure continuing development; and one third are being converted to palm oil rubber and being used for slash and burn agriculture. (S)

Most of the converted land has deep peat soil. So if we try to extinguish the fire it causes a great deal of smoke and smoldering. The effects of the smoke have been felt in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei. We are expecting rain but there has been a delay. (S)

I want to thank the United States for the three Hercules aircraft. They have been very helpful in extinguishing the fires on the island of Java. Rains came two days ago so I hope the fires will be extinguished. (S)

I also want to thank you for helping Indonesia in the monetary crisis that has hit not only Southeast Asia but has spread to other parts of Asia such as Korea. (S)

If you look at the economic fundamentals, the Indonesian economy is relatively strong. But the effect of the speculators was too difficult to overcome. You will recall the financial crisis started in Thailand. In Indonesia, the situation worsened when loans came to maturity and had to be repaid. Government loans were under control but the private sector had to buy dollars to repay loans. While the private sector tried to buy dollars, the people also rushed to purchase dollars, weakening the rupiah. The Indonesian public has lost confidence in the rupiah and it has been difficult to restore confidence. In order to overcome this problem, we have tightened the monetary supply; rescheduled huge projects; and taken other measures to strengthen the

rupiah. Also included in our plan submitted to the IMF for evaluation was reforming the banking system. The IMF has approved a $10 billion loan; the World Bank $4.5 billion and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) $3.5 billion for a total of $18 billion. Other Asian countries also have demonstrated solidarity by providing contributions -- Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and Japan. (S)

Of course, I understand you yourself played a personal role in making possible a positive evaluation by the IMF. The Indonesian economy will require consolidation; economic growth this year will decline to 6 percent. With IMF lending and standby loans we will be able to import materials that will enable us to experience relatively high economic growth. The question remains how to find ways to identify the causes of financial disruption to guarantee that it does not happen again. (S)

We need to think about an emergency fund that would overcome financial turmoil before IMF help comes forward. If we rely on the IMF alone, we prolong the suffering. The fund would serve as a complement to the IMF. I hope the fund will supply the capital needed to prevent layoffs or unemployment. In export industries, the fund would help maintain continued export earnings. There will be a process of consolidation, because the won crisis has caused the rupiah to weaken after it had strengthened. (S)

The government of Indonesia did intervene some to defend the rupiah, but unlike Thailand we did not exhaust our reserves. We instead allowed the rupiah to float. (S)

Coming back to natural disasters, we can't totally prevent El Nino, but we need to focus on how to overcome it and to better identify this phenomenon. Indonesia is an ideal place to monitor climatic changes like El Nino but we don't have the resources or technology to do it. If chosen as a site for this research, Indonesia would cooperate in enhancing monitoring. (S)

I am reminded that you not only played a role with the IMF but provided assistance that helped Indonesia face its financial crisis as well. (S)

The President: I believe I have a strong bilateral and personal relationship with you. We were pleased to help with the financial crisis and the fires. We also have a deep strategic

role and interest in Indonesia and the whole region. I agree the underlying fundamentals of Indonesia are impressive. We need to build on them through the trade opening APEC provides. (S)

Your leadership in Bogor led to the International Telecommunications Agreement (ITA). This year we will be opening nine different sectors which will give a lot of growth to the region. (S)

As to the financial crisis, the Manila framework established a three step strategy -- each country is to implement responsible macroeconomic policies; the IMF is to be supportive, recognizing the nature of the economies may not require the same measures as twenty years ago; and back-up support by the United States and other countries. I have a slightly different view on what we need to do next. I think we should wait until Finance Ministers meet before deciding. I understand meetings are planned in Kuala Lumpur and Japan. However, I think the solution agreed to in Manila will work. (S)

With regard to the fires, I took great personal interest in the hurt and suffering experienced by the Indonesian people. I am pleased that you are interested in joint planning for natural disasters. If the scientists are right, there will be more natural disasters, because there is more global warming occurring now than in the last 1,000 years. In the United States, severe weather events have increased significantly. It seems a lot of this is due to climate change. This makes the climate change conference in Kyoto important. The United States is the largest cause of global warming because with Europe and Japan we produce the most greenhouse gases. For this reason, we have committed to accept specific targets for reducing emissions to 1990 levels by 2010. (S)

Big questions remain on whether there should be participation by developing economies. Those against developing country participation claim implementation would hurt economic growth and opportunities. Those in favor point out that if developing countries do not participate, emission savings by developed countries will be offset by increased emissions by developing countries in thirty years. The increase in greenhouse gases has been dramatic. Therefore, we have sought to involve developing countries in a way that doesn't require them to sacrifice growth. We know a lot more about energy than we did twenty years ago and can be more efficient now than the United States

has been in the last fifty years. It is far cheaper for a country to build energy efficient plants in the first place than to convert inefficient ones. We have developed a partial credit plan that gives developing countries access to technology and companies. Many people in Latin America are working with us on this, but in Asia not many are interested because of concerns about the effect on growth. We have sought to redesign the program so that it doesn't affect growth. I would ask you to reconsider and support this program. (S)

We very much value the security arrangement with Indonesia and want to support you with military equipment and training, with the understanding that it will not be used to put down unrest or destabilize the region. I think we have had that understanding. (S)

We have some differences on human rights, East Timor and Mr. Pakpahan. I understand from a discussion between our respective foreign ministers that you are going to permit foreign doctors to visit the imprisoned labor leader Pakpahan. (S)

I would like to take a moment to discuss this cluster of issues. For thirty years you have overseen development in Indonesia and have guided your country as it has made astonishing gains. The size and diversity of Indonesia and its accomplishments will make it one of the world's most important countries in the next century. (S)

But I also believe that the nature of a modern society requires accommodations for order and stability versus individual liberty and national versus individual identity. Failure to have the right balance can lead to tensions within a country's society and problems with its neighbors. Most disruptions stemming from expressions of free speech are only minor matters with which we have to deal. I say not only as the President of the United States but as a friend that I think you will have an incredible legacy when you complete your work. But in this world of universal literacy, provision for local concerns as opposed to national concerns is important and the political and economic costs significantly less than those incurred in maintaining rigid controls. For example, there has been an enormous positive response when you said you intended to investigate the shooting of the university students in East Timor. (S)

President Soeharto: In 1945, a conference adopted the Indonesian constitution that stipulates how Indonesia behaves with other countries in the world in order to have peace with social justice. Of course, not all citizens in Indonesia favor the government. Those who commit offenses or defy the people entrusted to uphold the constitution and those who violate the constitution will be brought to court to face the rule of law. This is what Indonesia has been doing for years and outsiders do not understand. Thank you. (S)

--End of Conversation--

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8717

PAGE 01 JAKART 00191 01 OF 02 131128Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001W
----------0E992E 131129Z /38
O 131130Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9092

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000191

OFFICIAL INFORMAL - FOR EAP/PIMBS D.HARTWICK FROM DCM M. OWENS

E.O.12958:DECL: 01/13/08
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL JAKARTA TO PIMBS NO. 8

1. CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL P. OWENS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION.
REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (SBU) CALENERGY CALLING AND CALLING AND CALLING

WE HAVE HAD A STEADY STREAM OF CALLS FROM CONGRESS, OPIC,
TREASURY AND CALENERGY REGARDING THE GOI'S DECISION ONCE AGAIN TO
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00191 01 OF 02 131128Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 23 JAN 2009 200502960

PUT CALENERGY'S PATUHA GEOTHERMAL PROJECT ON HOLD (THIS WAS ONE OF THE 15 PROJECTS PUT BACK ON PROBATIONARY STATUS LAST SATURDAY).

OPIC PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN GEORGE MUNOZ SPOKE TO PAT ON JANUARY 13 TO GIVE US A HEADS-UP THAT THE GOI JANUARY 10 DECISION TO RETURN TO PROBATIONARY STATUS CALENERGY'S PATUHA GEOTHERMAL PROJECT COULD TRIGGER A "DOMINO EFFECT" THAT COULD CULMINATE IN ACTIVATION OF CALENERGY'S OPIC INSURANCE COVERAGE. MUNOZ STRESSED THE "COULD" BUT ADDED THAT OPIC IS IN THE PROCESS OF ALERTING THE GOI ON THIS MATTER.

CALENERGY CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER FOR ASIA DONALD M. O'SHEI ALSO CALLED PAT THIS MORNING TO SAY STATE SECTRETARY MOERDIONO'S STAFF TOLD CALENERGY THAT THE GOI IS REPORTEDLY WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN THE STATUS OF THE PATUHA PROJECT IF THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT "PUNISHED" FOR TAKING SUCH A STEP. MOERDIONO'S STAFF TOLD CALENERGY THAT THE GOI IS LOOKING FOR "A SIGN" THAT THE USG SUPPORTS SUCH AN ACTION. O'SHEI FAXED US A COPY OF A LETTER FROM NEBRASKA CONGRESSMAN CHRISTIENSEN TO THE GOI (WHICH HE WANTED SUMMERS TO HAND OVER TO MOERDIONO) THAT SUPPORTS THE PROJECT. PAT ALSO MET WITH CALENERGY STAFF ON THE AFTERNOON OF JANUARY 13 WITH A LETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS. WE GOT THE LETTER TO SUMMERS IN TIME FOR HIS MEETING WITH INDUSTRY AND TRADE MINISTER TUNKY ARIWIBOWO. CALENERGY GAVE US A COPY OF A SIMILAR LETTER TO IMF STANLEY FISCHER. (PAT FAXED COPIES OF ALL THE LETTERS TO VIRGINIA.) THE EVENING OF JANUARY 12, CONGRESSMAN CHRISTIENSEN CALLED AMBASSADOR ROY, AND ON JANUARY 10 PAT FIELDED A CALL FROM NEBRASKA CONGRESSMAN BEREUTER ON CALENERGY. CALENERGY IS BASED IN OMAHA, NEBRASKA AND ACCORDING TO CONGRESSMAN BEREUTER EMPLOYEES ABOUT 5,000 PEOPLE. WE EXPECT TO ALSO GET A CALL FROM

SENATOR CHARLES HAGEL.

BACKGROUND: THE PATUHA GEOTHERMAL PLANT IS LOCATED IN WEST JAVA. TO DATE, CALENERGY HAS INVESTED USD 360 MILLION IN ITS THREE GEOTHERMAL PROJECTS IN JAVA AND BALI AND HAS BUDGETED ANOTHER USD 660 MILLION IN 1998. AFTER CALENERGY RECEIVED THE GO-AHEAD FROM THE GOI TO MOVE FORWARD ON PATUHA IN NOVEMBER THEY DREW DOWN ON A USD 100 MILLION COMMERCIAL LOAN. THE FUNDING PROCESS FOR GEOTHERMAL PROJECTS IS DIFFERENT THAN FOR A CONVENTIONAL POWER

PLANT -- ALL THE INVESTMENT GOES INTO FINDING THE STEAM AND "DEVELOPING THE BOILER." FINANCING AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE ACTUAL ELECTRICITY PLANT ARE THE LAST STAGES. WHILE CALENERGY'S POWER PURCHASE PRICE (PPA) FOR PATUHA AND ITS OTHER GEOTHERMAL PROJECTS IS HIGHER THAN PPA'S FOR COAL-FIRED PLANTS, THERE ARE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS FROM USING STEAM OVER COAL.

CALENERGY HAS MADE THE CASE THAT ALTHOUGH OTHER U.S. COMPANIES HAVE PROJECTS ON THE REVIEW/POSTPONED LIST (UNOCAL, AMOSEAS, DUKE, ENRON AND COASTAL), ONLY CALENERGY HAS OPIC INSURANCE AND ITS FINANCIAL OUTLAY IS SUBSTANTIALLY LARGER THAN THE OTHER COMPANIES. FOR THIS REASON, THEY ARE CALLING FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT.

OTHER COMPANIES ARE NOT PURSUING CALENERGY'S DRIVE FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT. PAT HAS SPOKEN TO BOTH UNOCAL AND ENRON WHICH ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONTINUED DELAY IN PROJECTS. THE COMPANIES HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT CALENERGY HAS BEEN "SO VOCAL" IN THE LOCAL PRESS ABOUT ITS PROJECT AND FEAR THAT IT COULD HAVE NEGATIVE RAMIFICATIONS ON OTHER POWER PROJECTS.

PLEASE SHARE THIS MESSAGE WITH TREASURY. ANDREW VELTHAUS ALSO
CONFIDENTIAL

CALLED FROM TREASURY ON THIS MATTER. WE WILL DO A FRONT CHANNEL CABLE ONCE THE DUST SETTLES FROM ALL OUR VISITORS.

3. (C) SUMMERS' JANUARY 13

DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS MET FOR 90 MINUTES WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. THE VIBES WERE NOT QUITE AS UPBEAT AS THOSE FROM THE ECONOMIC TEAM MEMBERS WITH WHOM HE MET YESTERDAY OR THOSE THAT EMANATED FROM IMF DEPUTY MD STANLEY FISCHER'S MEETING WITH SOEHARTO YESTERDAY. YESTERDAY'S CONVERSATIONS INDICATED A STRONGLY DETERMINED, COMMITTED PRESIDENT WHO WAS PREPARED TO TAKE VERY BOLD STEPS SUCH AS ELIMINATING THE FUEL PRICE SUBSIDY IN ONE GO IN FEBRUARY (OR AT LEAST AFTER RAMADAN). TODAY'S FACE-TO-FACE WITH THE PRESIDENT INDICATED THAT HE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE TIMING AND IMPACT OF SUCH MEASURES. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY WAS A BIT CONCERNED THAT THE PRESIDENT, WHILE IN COMMAND OF A REMARKABLE RANGE OF DETAIL, WAS MORE COMMITTED AT THE BIG PICTURE

LEVEL THAN AT THE NITTY-GRITTY LEVEL, THE LATTER BEING NECESSARY FOR THE BIG ACTIONS WHICH WOULD SPARK CONFIDENCE.

4. (C) SUMMERS' VISIT FOLLOW-UP

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8720

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8720

PAGE 01 JAKART 00191 02 OF 02 131128Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001W
----------0E994A 131130Z /38
O 131130Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9093

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 000191

OFFICIAL INFORMAL - FOR EAP/PIMBS D.HARTWICK FROM DCM M. OWENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/08
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL JAKARTA TO PIMBS NO. 8

THAT SAID, THE GOI FOLLOWED UP IMMEDIATELY ON SUMMERS' MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. MOERDIONO TOLD THE AMBASSADOR AND WIDJOJO

TOLD SUMMERS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SUMMONED THE TWO OF THEM FOR A POST-SUMMERS MEETING. ACCORDING TO THE SENIOR OFFICIALS, SOEHARTO ASKED THEM FOR A WRITTEN REPORT ON SUMMERS' PRESENTATION, INCLUDING THE FINER POINTS. THEY ASKED US FOR

SUMMERS' BRIEFING PAPER. SINCE HE DID NOT FOLLOW THE BRIEFING PAPER STRICTLY, WE HAVE TYPED UP THE AMBASSADOR'S COMPLETE NOTES AND ARE URGENTLY SEEKING THE PARTY'S CLEARANCE ON RELEASING THEM TO MOERDIONO AND WIDJOJO. MOERDIONO ALSO INDICATED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD TWO QUESTIONS OF DETAIL: DOES THE USG WANT THE CANCELLATION OF THE NATIONAL CAR PROGRAM OUTRIGHT OR THE ELIMINATION OF THE SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR IT (SUMMERS' BRIEFING PAPER SAID CANCEL THE WHOLE THING, BUT THE CONVERSATION DID NOT REACH THAT LEVEL OF SPECIFICITY). SECOND, WHAT IS THE USG POSITION ON THE TIMING OF THE ELIMINATION OF THE DOMESTIC FUEL SUBSIDY? WE WILL RELAY SUMMERS' RESPONSE AS SOON AS WE GET IT.

IN SUMMERS' FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH WIDJOJO, WIDJOJO AND ACCOMPANYING INDUSTRY AND TRADE MINISTER ARIWIBOWO SAID THAT STANLEY FISCHER WOULD BE MEETING AGAIN WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TONIGHT, JANUARY 13. THEY WOULD DISCUSS THE NEW DRAFT LETTER OF INTENT AT THE MEETING. WIDJOJO REPEATED THAT THIS LETTER WOULD BE ISSUED AND PUBLISHED ON THURSDAY.

AS SUMMERS WAS LEAVING TODAY'S MEETING WITH WIDJOJO, HE SPOTTED STANLEY FISCHER ENTERING MINISTER OF FINANCE MAR'IE'S OFFICE. SHAKING OFF HOT PRESS PURSUIT, THE SUMMERS PARTY HOTFOOTED IT INTO MAR'IE'S SUITE. SUMMERS AND FISCHER TALKED IN THE MINISTER'S OFFICE FOR ABOUT 20 MINUTES WHILE THE MINISTER JOINED THE REST OF US WHO WERE UPSTAIRS IN HIS, THE MINISTER'S, WAITING ROOM. IN THE MEANTIME, THE 30 OR SO DEMONSTRATORS WERE DOWNSTAIRS PROTESTING THE IMF PROGRAM. SINCE THE WIDJOJO STOP HAD BEEN UNSCHEDULED, THE DEMONSTRATORS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THERE

FOR SUMMERS. IN ANY EVENT, THEY DID NOT FOLLOW THE MOTORCADE VEHICLES WHEN THEY MOVED TO THE REAR EXIT OF THE BUILDING.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 00191 02 OF 02 131128Z

5. (C) BRIEFING GOH

SUMMERS BRIEFED SINGAPORE PRIME MINISTER GOH FOR HALF AN HOUR BY PHONE TODAY ON HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. HE PROVIDED A SUMMARY OF HIS MAIN POINTS FOR GOH'S REFERENCE. INTERESTINGLY, YESTERDAY DR. WARDHANA GAVE SUMMERS A COPY OF THE TALKING POINTS USED BY FISCHER IN HIS MONDAY, JANUARY 12 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. THEY ALL SEEM TO BE SINGING IN HARMONY.

6. (C) POLITICAL SHORT-TAKE

ALL OF THESE CONCENTRATED ECONOMIC COMINGS AND GOINGS ARE DEFLECTING ATTENTION FROM THE ONGOING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS ARISING OUT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. ALTHOUGH THE SMART MONEY IS STILL BETTING SOEHARTO WILL MAKE IT THROUGH TO MARCH (AND EVEN BEYOND), HE IS CERTAINLY GOING TO BE GOVERNING A MUCH DIFFERENT COUNTRY IN HIS SIXTH TERM. THE PRESS, FOR EXAMPLE, IS HAVING A FIELD DAY REPORTING INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CRITICISM OF HIS LEADERSHIP AND THE NUMEROUS CALLS THAT HE STEP DOWN. OPPONENTS LIKE MEGAWATI ARE ALSO DEVELOPING A REAL TASTE FOR SOUNDING OFF IN PUBLIC (AND SEEING THEIR REMARKS ON THE FRONT PAGES). MAYBE IT'S TOO SOON TO SAY FOR SURE, BUT IT'S BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE HOW A RE-ELECTED SOEHARTO WILL BE ABLE TO SHUT EVERYTHING DOWN ONCE HE'S INTO HIS NEXT TERM. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6166

PAGE 01 JAKART 00228 01 OF 07 151731Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 EB-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00
TRSE-00 /001W
----------0FCB75 151731Z /22
O 151339Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9132
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 JAKARTA 000228

PLEASE PASS TO DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS PARTY ASAP

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/16
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL: DEPSEC/SOEHARTO MEMCON

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (U) PLEASE PASS TO EB/LARSON, TREASURY/ZELIKOW FOR DEPSEC SUMMERS, AND A/S ROTH FOR CLEARANCE.

3. (C) BELOW IS THE DRAFT REPORTING CABLE ON DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS' JANUARY 13 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00228 01 OF 07 151731Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 23 JAN 2009 200502960

BEGIN TEXT:

4. (C) SUMMARY. TREASURY DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS MET WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FOR NINETY MINUTES ON JANUARY 13 TO DISCUSS THE CURRENT STATE OF INDONESIA'S ECONOMY AND THE STEPS IT IS TAKING TO RESOLVE THE CURRENT CRISIS. SOEHARTO RECOUNTED INDONESIA'S 30 YEAR HISTORY OF ELIMINATING POVERTY AND EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT THE MONETARY TURMOIL WAS NOW HINDERING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE INDONESIA'S STANDARD OF LIVING. ACCORDING TO SOEHARTO, THE CURRENT CRISIS WAS SET OFF BY SPECULATORS AND EXACERBATED BY RUMORS. HIS OWN ILLNESS WORSENED THE SITUATION AND CREATED A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE RUPIAH. INITIALLY INDONESIA ATTEMPTED DIRECT INTERVENTION TO PROTECT ITS CURRENCY, BUT AS THAT STRATEGY FAILED, THE COUNTRY ATTEMPTED OTHER REMEDIES WHICH WERE INSUFFICIENT TO SOLVE THE CRISIS.

5. (C) BECAUSE OF WEAKNESS OF THE DOMESTIC BANKING SECTOR, INDONESIA PLANS TO CONSOLIDATE STATE-OWNED BANKS AND HAS ENCOURAGED PRIVATE BANKS TO MERGE. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ELABORATED ON THE DIFFERENCES IN THE KOREAN CASE WHERE WEAKNESS RESULTS FROM LOANS TO PRIVATE BANKS AND THE INDONESIAN CASE WHERE PROBLEM LOANS COME FROM PRIVATE CORPORATIONS. THE PRESIDENT INDICATED THAT INDONESIA COULD CONTINUE TO SERVICE ITS NATIONAL DEBT AND FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT BANKS WHO GAVE LOANS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR RECOGNIZE THAT THEY ARE PARTLY TO BLAME FOR THE CURRENT FIASCO.

6. (C) INDONESIA AND THE IMF, THE PRESIDENT SAID, ARE

CONFIDENTIAL

IN FULL AGREEMENT. THE ONLY ISSUE IS TIMING. SOEHARTO GAVE STRONG ASSURANCES THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO CUTTING FUEL SUBSIDIES IN A WAY THAT WILL AVOID CREATING SOCIAL UNREST. BULOG MONOPOLIES, THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED, WILL REMAIN INTACT, AT LEAST FOR SUGAR AND RICE, BECAUSE RICE PRICES ARE TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT TO MARKET FORCES.

7. (C) DEPUTY SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT INDONESIA SUFFERS FROM A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE RUPIAH AND

THE BANKING SYSTEM. TO SOLVE THAT CRISIS, INDONESIA SHOULD LEARN FROM MEXICO'S EXPERIENCE BY ACTING STRONGLY AND QUICKLY. SPECIFICALLY, SUMMERS EXPLAINED THAT INDONESIA MUST BUILD CREDIBILITY BY CANCELING THE NATIONAL CAR AND AIRPLANE AND OTHER INVIABLE PROJECTS AND TO ELIMINATE CERTAIN MONOPOLIES. TO STRENGTHEN THE CURRENCY, A REALISTIC BUDGET, BASED ON CREDIBLE AND TRANSPARENT ASSUMPTIONS, AND A STRONG BANKING SYSTEM WOULD BE NEEDED. RENEWED CONFIDENCE IN INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC POLICY WAS NEEDED, SUMMERS CONTINUED. ACCORDINGLY, HE SAID, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO MUST BE SEEN AS PERSONALLY LEADING EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE THE CURRENT CRISIS. OTHER IMPORTANT STEPS INCLUDE INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND EFFECTIVELY PRESENTING POLICY TO MARKETS AND THE PUBLIC ARE ALSO ESSENTIAL IF INDONESIA IS TO RAPIDLY REBUILD THE CONFIDENCE THAT ITS POLICY PROCESS, CURRENCY, AND BANKING SYSTEM NEEDS. END SUMMARY.

8. (U) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND TREASURY DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS MET FOR NINETY MINUTES ON JANUARY 13. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SENIOR ECONOMIC

ADVISOR DR. WIDJOJO NITISASTRO. EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY ROTH AND AMBASSADOR ROY PARTICIPATED IN THE MEETING ON THE U.S. SIDE.

9. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO OPENED THE MEETING BY WARMLY WELCOMING DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS TO INDONESIA. HE EXPRESSED HIS GREAT APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S DECISION TO SEND THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AS HIS SPECIAL ENVOY TO THE REGION, AS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED DURING THE TWO PRESIDENTS' JANUARY 8 TELEPHONE CALL. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID HE BELIEVED THAT, AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE, THE VISIT WAS VERY CRUCIAL AND BENEFICIAL TO INDONESIA'S OVERCOMING ITS FINANCIAL TURMOIL.

10. (SBU) THE TURMOIL IS NOT JUST AFFECTING INDONESIA, HE SAID, BUT OTHER COUNTRIES TOO. NOTING THAT THE DEPUTY SECRETARY HAD DISCUSSED THE CURRENT FINANCIAL SITUATION WITH DR. WIDJOJO, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO PROVIDED

A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE BACKGROUND OF INDONESIA'S

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6167

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6167

PAGE 01 JAKART 00228 02 OF 07 151732Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 EB-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00
TRSE-00 /001W
----------0FCB96 151732Z /22
O 151339Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9133
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 07 JAKARTA 000228

PLEASE PASS TO DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS PARTY ASAP

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/16
TAGS: AMGT, ID

52 YEARS AS AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY. AFTER REVIEWING THE POST WORLD WAR II EVENTS WHICH CULMINATED IN INDEPENDENCE, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO DESCRIBED THE CHAOS AND HARDSHIP WHICH LED TO THE 1965 REBELLION AND ULTIMATELY TO THE NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT. THE THREE LINKED GOALS OF THE NEW ORDER'S DEVELOPMENT TRILOGY ARE STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION; THESE ARE IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLANS AND ENSHRINED IN THE BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY APPROVED BY THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), THE

PRESIDENT EXPLAINED.

11. (C) THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST 25-YEAR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT PLAN WERE ENCOURAGING. INDONESIA HAS ESTABLISHED THE FOUNDATION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN ALL SECTORS. INDICATORS OF HOW SOLID DEVELOPMENT HAD BEEN INCLUDED A 7 PERCENT AVERAGE GROWTH RATE, INFLATION REDUCTION FROM OVER 650 PERCENT IN 1969 TO SINGLE DIGIT LEVELS, 1996 PER CAPITA GDP OF USD 1115, EXPORT GROWTH TO ABOUT USD 50 BILLION/YEAR, SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN RICE, EXTENSION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION FROM SIX TO NINE YEARS, AND PROGRESS IN HEALTH SERVICES. THE PRESIDENT PROVIDED DETAILED STATISTICS ON PROGRESS IN POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND THE IMPROVEMENTS IN INDONESIA'S 66,000 VILLAGES.

12. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE MONETARY TURMOIL WAS DEEPLY AFFECTING EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY AND RAISE LIVING STANDARDS. HE SAID THAT SOUTHEAST ASIA'S MONETARY TURMOIL HAD BEEN SPARKED BY FOREIGN CURRENCY TRADING, SPECULATORS AND GAMBLERS. HE NOTED FURTHER FACTORS SUCH AS FOREIGN BANKS' COLLUDING WITH SPECULATORS, AND SPREADING POLITICAL RUMORS. THE FINAL BLOW WAS SOEHARTO'S ILLNESS. RUMORS ABOUT THE ILLNESS LED TO A WEAKENED RUPIAH, FIRST BECAUSE OF SPECULATORS AND THEN BECAUSE LOCAL COMPANIES THAT HAD INCURRED SHORT-TERM DEBT FOR LONG-TERM PROJECTS RUSHED TO BUY DOLLARS NEEDED TO PAY MATURING LOANS.

THIS RUSH WEAKENED THE RUPIAH FURTHER AND CAUSED PEOPLE TO FEAR FOR THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH. THE RESULT WAS A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE RUPIAH.
CONFIDENTIAL

13. (C) FIRST, THE PRESIDENT SAID, THE GOI TRIED INTERVENTION TO PREVENT FURTHERING WEAKENING OF THE CURRENCY, BUT BECAUSE OF THE STRENGTH OF FORCES PUSHING THE RUPIAH DOWNWARD, INTERVENTION PROVED USELESS AND THE RUPIAH CONTINUED TO WEAKEN. IF FOREIGN EXCHANGE WAS EXHAUSTED, HE SAID, THE COUNTRY COULD NOT IMPORT ITEMS NEEDED FOR BASIC INDUSTRY, RESULTING IN LAY OFFS AND UNEMPLOYMENT. THIS SITUATION MADE INDONESIA TRY TO CONTROL THE QUANTITY OF RUPIAH IN CIRCULATION WITH A TIGHT MONEY POLICY. RUPIAH WERE WITHDRAW FROM PENSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY FUNDS TO PREVENT THEM FROM BEING USED FOR SPECULATION. THE RESULTS WERE NOT ENCOURAGING, AND IT TURNED OUT THIS WAS NOT A GOOD IDEA.

14. (C) AS THE CRISIS PROCEEDED, THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED, ASSETS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM BANKS, CAUSING A LIQUIDITY CRUNCH AND MAKING BANKS BECOME INSOLVENT. THY ENCOURAGED DEPOSITS WITH HIGH INTEREST RATES,THAT ALSO AFFECTED PRIVATE COMPANIES. RUPIAH NLY CIRCULATED WITHIN THE BANKING SYSTEM RATHER THAN THROUGH CREDIT LINES TO COMPANIES, WHICH WERE FORCED TO LAY OFF WORKERS.

15. C) THE GOVERNMENT NEXT ATEMPTED TO CARRY OUT REFORMS TO BOOST EXPORTS. SINCE STATE REVENUES DECLINED, THE GOVERNMENT HALTED LARGE PROJECTS. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO REFORMED STATE ASSETS, HE SAID, SO STATE-OWNED COMPANIES COULD BE PRIVATIZED AS A SOURCE OF CAPITAL. INDONESIA HAS, THE PRESIDENT SAID, 160 STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES OF WHICH 100 WERE HEALTHY. THESE
CONFIDENTIAL

HEALTHY COMPANIES COULD BE PRIVATIZED.

16. (C) THE PRESIDENT ACKNOWLEDGED THE WEAKNESS OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE DOMESTIC BANKING SYSTEM AND THE FAILURE TO ENFORCE RULES CONTROLLING PRIVATE SECTOR BORROWING, RESULTING IN AN ACCUMULATION OF SHORT-TERM DEBT THAT COULD NOT BE REPAID. TO STRENGTHEN THE BANKING SECTOR, HE SAID, THE GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGED CONSOLIDATION THROUGH MERGERS AND TOOK THE INITIATIVE BY ANNOUNCING A PLAN TO MERGE FOUR OF THE SEVEN STATE-OWNED BANKS. TWO WERE HEALTHY, AND THE OTHER WAS THE CENTRAL BANK. THEY ALSO HOPED TO MERGE THE 240 PRIVATE BANKS INTO A SMALLER NUMBER OF GROUPS. THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT INDONESIA HISTORICALLY HAD STRICT RULES GOVERNING THE CREATION OF NEW BANKS. IN THE INTEREST OF EQUITY, THOUGH, THE REGULATIONS WERE ODIFIED TO ALLOW MORE BANKS TO FORM. THE NUMBER OF NEW BANKS MUSHROOMED BEYOND CONTROL AND EXCEEDED THE NUMBER NEEDED. DURING THE PRESENT CRISIS, HE SAID, THE GOVERNMENT LIQUIDATED

PAGE 01 JAKART 00228 03 OF 07 151732Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 EB-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00
TRSE-00 /001W
----------0FCBB6 151733Z /22
O 151339Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9134
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 07 JAKARTA 000228

PLEASE PASS TO DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS PARTY ASAP

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/16
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL: DEPSEC/SOEHARTO MEMCON

SOME BANKS WHICH WERE NOT SOLVENT, BUT THIS CREATED OTHER PROBLEMS, SO THE GOVERNMENT IS NOW ADVISING BANKS TO MERGE THEMSELVES. IF THE BANKS CANNOT MERGE AND MEET REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS, THEY WILL BE LIQUIDATED. ONCE BANKS ARE HEALTHY AND SOLVENT, THEY WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO FIND FOREIGN PARTNERS TO HELP WITH CONSOLIDATION. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS IMPORTANT TO CARRY OUT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE TARGETING POVERTY ALLEVIATION, BY PROVIDING AID FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCIAL AID TO VILLAGES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00228 03 OF 07 151732Z

17. (C) STARTING 32 YEARS AGO WITH 100,000 RPS PER VILLAGE, TEN DOLLARS AT TODAY'S EXCHANGE RATE, THE PRESIDENT RECOUNTED, THE GOI HAS ENCOURAGED THE DEVELOPMENT OF RURAL AREAS. NOW, 6.5 MILLION RPS ARE GIVEN TO EACH OF THE COUNTRY'S 66,000 VILLAGES. 2/3 OF

THESE VILLAGES CAN BE CLASSIFIED AS DEVELOPED; ONLY 1/3 ARE CLASSIFIED AS LEAST DEVELOPED. TO ASSIST THESE ESPECIALLY POOR VILLAGES, SOEHARTO EXPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: EACH VILLAGE CLASSIFIED AS LEAST DEVELOPED RECEIVES 20 MILLION RPS PER YEAR FOR 3 YEARS, TOTALING 60 MILLION RPS PER VILLAGE AS REVOLVING CAPITAL FOR DEVELOPMENT. THE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT THE LEAST DEVELOPED VILLAGES ARE NOT THE ONLY PLACES WHERE PEOPLE LIVE BELOW THE POVERTY LINE, 11.5 MILLION ARE PRESENT IN DEVELOPED VILLAGES AS WELL.

18. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO EXPLAINED THAT INDONESIA HAD MANY PROGRAMS TO REDUCE POVERTY. THOSE POLICIES INCLUDED FAMILY PLANNING TO ENSURE THAT CHILDREN COULD GET AN EDUCATION AND THAT FAMILIES COULD MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF THEIR CHILDREN. THERE WERE ALSO PROGRAMS TARGETING WOMEN. WOMEN AND MOTHERS, THE PESIDENT EXPLAINED, FREQUENTLY HAD SIDE BUSINESES TO INCREASE INCOME. THE GOVERNMENT TRAIND THEM IN HANDICRAFTS, FARMING, SEWING AND OTER TRADES SO THAT THEIR PRODUCTS COULD BE SOL TO SUPERMARKETS IN BIG CITIES.

19. (C) THE GOVERNMENT HAD TRIED TO ENCOURAGE HOMES TO SAVE MONEY, SOEHARTO EXPLAINED. 2,000 RPS WAS THE

MINIMUM AMOUNT REQUIRED TO OPEN A BANK ACCOUNT. 2,000 RPS WAS NOT SO MUCH MONEY, THE PRESIDENT SAID, SO THE GOI APPEALED TO BIG BUSINESS TO INVEST. SO FAR, 23 BILLION RPS HAD BEEN COLLECTED TO HELP THE 11.5 MILLION BELOW THE POVERTY LINE IN THE DEVELOPED VILLAGES. BY SAVING 2,000 RPS, PEOPLE COULD BORROW 10 TIMES THAT AMOUNT, OR 20,000 RPS. ONCE THIS MONEY WAS REPAID, THE BORROWER HAD TO PUT ASIDE 2,000 RPS MORE FOR A TOTAL OF 4,000 RPS. THEN, WITH 4,000 RPS IN THE BANK, 40,000 RPS COULD BE BORROWED. THE CYCLE WAS REPEATED AND THE CAPITAL REVOLVED. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT IN THIS PROGRAM, THE PRESIDENT SAID, WAS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOW INTEREST LOANS.

20. (C) ANOTHER INITIATIVE, THE PRESIDENT SAID, WAS

THE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM. COMPANIES WITH AFTER TAX PROFITS ABOVE 100 MILLION RUPIAH PUT ASIDE 2 PERCENT OF THEIR NET PROFIT FOR THE POOR. COMPANIES EARNING BELOW 100 MILLION RPS AFTER TAX PROFIT WERE NOT REQUIRED TO CONTRIBUTE. FUNDS COLLECTED IN THIS WAY WERE USED FOR THE PROMOTION OF WHT RESDET SOEHARTO DESCRIBED AS PROSPEROUSFAMILY PROGRAMS, WITH LOANS AVAILABLE AT SIX PERCENT. BY JOINING WITH SMALL TRADERS ELIGIBLE FOR LOW INTEREST LOANS FROM STATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AT 14, THESE GROUPS CAN GET CREDIT AT AN AVERAGE 12

21. (C) REFERRING TO THE ONGOING CRISIS, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID THAT INDONESIA WAS TRYING TO OVERCOME ITS CURRENT CHALLENGES BY REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING. THE ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM, HE ADDED, WAS THE SHORTAGE OF USD. INDONESIA IS ASSURED OF SOME DOLLARS THROUGH OIL

AND GAS EXPORTS BUT MUST BOOST NON OIL/GAS EXPORTS, WHICH HAVE BEEN EARNING 3-4 BILLION USD. BY PROTECTING THESE REVENUES AND AUGMENTING INCOME FROM PLANTATIONS INDONESIA HOPES TO WEATHER THE STORM.

22. (C) IN THE CONTEXT OF RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING SYSTEM, THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED THAT INDONESIA SOUGHT IMF COUNSEL AND WAS ALSO TRYING TO SAVE THE ASSETS OF STATE-OWNED COMPANIES AMOUNTING TO 370 TRILLION RPS. AT THE APEC MEETING IN VANCOUVER, THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT REALIZED THAT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES COULD NOT FACE THE CURRENT CRISIS ALONE. ALL APEC MEMBERS ASKED PRESIDENT CLINTON TO HEAD A TEAM WITH THE IMF TO DEAL WITH THE CURRENCY CRISIS AND TO OVERCOME THE LOSSES INCURRED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR. IF CREDITORS DID NOT HELP, THE BURDEN WOULD BE MORE THAN THE PRIVATE SECTOR COULD BEAR.

23. (C) THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED THAT THE SITUATIONS IN KOREA AND INDONESIA WERE DIFFERENT. IN KOREA, THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6169

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6169

PAGE 01 JAKART 00228 04 OF 07 151733Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 EB-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00
TRSE-00 /001W
----------0FCBDB 151733Z /22
O 151339Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9135
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 07 JAKARTA 000228

PLEASE PASS TO DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS PARTY ASAP

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/16
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL: DEPSEC/SOEHARTO MEMCON

BORROWING WHICH LED TO THE CURRENT CRISIS WAS BY PRIVATE BANKS, NOT THE PRIVATE SECTOR. THE CREDITOR BANKS WERE IN JAPAN, EUROPE, AND THE UNITED STATES, AND IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO AID FAILING BANKS IN KOREA.

24. (C) IN INDONESIA, THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED, BORROWERS WERE FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR, SO THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT TAKE OVER THE LOANS WHICH TOTAL USD 65 BILLION. STATE BORROWING, HE SAID, TOTALS ONLY 50 BILLION. IN CARRYING OUT DEVELOPMENT, SOEHARTO

EXPLAINED, INDONESIA REQUIRED LOANS. THE RESULT OF DEVELOPMENT, THOUGH, WAS THE ABILITY TO REPAY THOSE LOANS SO THAT, OVER THE YEARS, INDONESIA HAS HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS. THIS YEAR THE NATIONAL BUDGET EARMARKS 33 TRILLION RUPIAH FOR DEBT SERVICE. AT A RATE OF 4,000 RPS TO THE DOLLAR, THIS EQUALS 7.5 BILLION USD.

25. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO BELIEVES THAT THE BLAME FOR THE CURRENT CRISIS LIES PARTLY ON CREDITORS AND PARTLY WITH THE INDONESIAN PRIVATE SECTOR. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HOPES THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN HELP CREDITORS REALIZE THAT THEY ARE PARTLY TO BLAME FOR THE CURRENT FIASCO.

26. (C) REFERRING TO THE IMF PACKAGE, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID THAT INDONESIA AND THE IMF ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT ON THE REFORMS TO BE CARRIED OUT. THE ONLY QUESTION IS TIMING. A CASE IN POINT IS THAT OF SUBSIDIES. THE GOVERNMENT IS FIRM IN ITS DECISION TO ELIMINATE FUEL OIL SUBSIDIES. IN THE STATE BUDGET, SUBSIDIES FOR FUEL COSTS ARE ALLOTTED AT 10 TRILLION RUPIAH. SAVINGS AMOUNT TO 15 TRILLION RUPIAH. IF WE REMOVE THE SUBSIDIES AND ADD THIS TO THE SAVINGS, HE SAID, WE GET 25 TRILLION. REMOVING THE SUBSIDIES IS A SINE QUA NON. LOW FUEL PRICES RESULT IN WASTE, DISCOURAGING USE OF ALTERNATE FUELS AND SMUGGLING TO OTHER COUNTRIES. INDONESIA ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO REMOVE SUBSIDIES MONTHS AGO, BUT SEVERAL PROBLEMS INTERVENED--FIRST WIDE-SPREAD FOREST FIRES, FOLLOWED BY A LONG DROUGHT REDUCING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. THESE CRISES FELL CLOSE TO THE CHRISTMAS, NEW YEAR, AND RAMADAN

HOLIDAYS, SO THE GOVERNMENT MUST TAKE CARE IN REMOVING THE SUBSIDIES SO THE RESULT IS NOT BAD PSYCHOLOGICALLY. BECAUSE THE REMOVAL OF SUBSIDIES WILL DRIVE TRANSPORTATION COSTS AND ELECTRICITY PRICES UP, HE SAID, RAISING FUEL OIL PRICES WILL CREATE DISILLUSIONMENT AND SOCIAL UNREST. ULTIMATELY, HE SAID, THE IMF MIGHT BE BLAMED.

27. (C) THE PRESIDENT SAID HIS CONVERSATION WITH FISCHER HAD BEEN OPEN AND WIDE-RANGING. THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES OR MISUNDERSTANDINGS. THERE WAS FULL AGREEMENT TO CARRY OUT THE PROGRAM. THE QUESTION WAS TIMING SO AS TO PRODUCE THE MOST FRUITFUL RESULTS AND TO ENSURE STABILITY. THE ARMED FORCES WERE UNITED AND COHESIVE, ALTHOUGH ATTEMPTS WERE BEING MADE TO INFILTRATE AND SPLIT THEM. MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES WERE AWARE OF THE PLIGHT OF THE PEOPLE. THEIR OWN NEEDS WERE NOT BEING GIVEN DUE PRIORITY BECAUSE OF DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES. BUDGET ITEMS THAT REQUIRED USD FINANCING HAD BEEN SCRAPPED. BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR DOLLARS, THE ARMED FORCES HAD THEMSELVES DECIDED TO POSTPONE PURCHASES. WE FACE DIFFICULTIES, THE PRESIDENT SAID, BUT WE ARE CONVINCED WE CAN OVERCOME THEM. THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED EVEN BETTER WITH SUPPORT FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES.

28. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ASKED DEPSEC SUMMERS TO REPORT TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON HIS RETURN THAT THE RUSH OF PEOPLE TO BUY COMMODITIES SUFFICIENT FOR WEEKS OR EVEN MONTHS HAD LASTED ONE DAY ONLY. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTED TO PROVIDING BASIC

COMMODITIES. STOCKS WERE MORE THAN ADEQUATE. BASIC COMMODITIES WERE MANAGED BY BULOG, WHICH HAD THE

ATTRIBUTES OF A MONOPOLY. IN ACTUALITY, BULOG WAS AN INSTRUMENT TO STABILIZE THE PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES. NOW JUST TWO REMAINED: SUGAR AND RICE. BULOG PROTECTED CONSUMERS AND PRODUCERS BY SETTING CEILING AND FLOOR PRICES. IF THE PRICE WAS BELOW THE BULOG PRICE, BULOG BOUGHT. IF THE PRICE ROSE ABOVE THE CEILING, THE GOVERNMENT RELEASED GOODS FROM STOCKS. RICE WAS AN IMPORTANT COMMODITY, AND FLUCTUATIONS IN THE RICE PRICE AFFECTED OTHER COMMODITIES AND COULD DESTABILIZE THE NATION. BECAUSE OF THIS, HE SAID, RICE PRICES COULD NOT BE LEFT TO MARKET FORCES.

29. (C) CONTINUING, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID IT WAS EASIER TO CONTROL SUCH MATTERS IN A PLACE LIKE SINGAPORE. BUT INDONESIA WAS A VAST ARCHIPELAGO WITH OVER 17,000 ISLANDS AND CONSISTING TWO-THIRDS OF WATER. WHEN WAVES WERE HIGH, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DISTRIBUTE

NNNNPTQ6170

TRSE-00 /001W

----------0FCBF3 151734Z /22

O 151339Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9136
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 07 JAKARTA 000228

PLEASE PASS TO DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS PARTY ASAP

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/16
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL: DEPSEC/SOEHARTO MEMCON

RICE, AND THE COSTS WERE HIGH. WHAT PRIVATE COMPANY WOULD BE WILLING TO DO WHAT BULOG DID? SO, BULOG WAS NEEDED TO ENSURE SUFFICIENT RICE WAS DELIVERED TO LOCAL PEOPLE BEFORE BIG WAVES MADE THIS DIFFICULT. IT HAD LOCAL DEPOTS FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE BULOG APPROACH WAS BASED ON MILITARY LOGISTICS CONCEPTS. MANY OPPOSED THE USE OF MILITARY JARGON, SO THE WORD "COMMAND" WAS CHANGED TO "AGENCY" (BADAN). THE PURPOSE WAS THE SAME. IT WAS NOT SO MUCH A MONOPOLY AS A MEANS OF SERVING STATE INTERESTS, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONSTITUTION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00228 05 OF 07 151734Z

(NOTE: A PRESUMED REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 33 (2) OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH PROVIDES THAT "BRANCHES OF PRODUCTION WHICH ARE IMPORTANT FOR THE STATE AND WHICH AFFECT THE LIFE OF MOST PEOPLE SHALL BE CONTROLLED BY THE STATE). PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WOUND UP HIS PRESENTATION WITH THE HOPE THIS WOULD PROVIDE A BETTER PICTURE OF CONDITIONS IN INDONESIA.

30. (C) DEPSEC SUMMERS THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS EXPLANATION OF THE INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD BEEN SENT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON, WHO HAD ENORMOUS RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S ACHIEVEMENTS

OVER THE PAST THIRTY YEARS IN AREAS SUCH AS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, POVERTY REDUCTION, AND THE BUILDING OF A BETTER LIFE FOR INDONESIA'S CHILDREN. SUMMERS RECALLED HIS EARLIER EXPERIENCE WORKING WITH DR. WIDJOJO AND ALI WARDHANA 20 YEARS AGO, DURING WHICH HE HAD SEEN FIRST HAND THE COUNTRY'S REMARKABLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD BEEN PROFOUNDLY IMPRESSED BY PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S DESCRIPTION OF INDONESIA'S PROGRESS DURING THEIR MEETING AT THE APEC SUMMIT IN 1994. HE AND HIS DELEGATION WERE HERE AS A REFLECTION OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S STRONG FEELING FOR PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND OF THE UNITED STATES FOR INDONESIA. IF HE SPOKE FRANKLY, IT WAS BECAUSE OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S GREAT RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

31. (C) DEPSEC SUMMERS SAID HE BELIEVED THAT INDONESIA FACED A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE. ECONOMISTS WOULD LONG STUDY HOW IT STARTED AND WHY IT HAPPENED. THESE ISSUES DID NOT MATTER RIGHT NOW. WHAT MATTERED WAS RESTORING

CONFIDENCE IN THE RUPIAH AND IN THE BANKING SYSTEM. THE SITUATION WAS FRAGILE. IF THE PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED WITH MORE IMF OR U.S. MONEY, WE WOULD PROVIDE IT. IF IT COULD BE SOLVED BY CALLING UPON A BANK TO EXTEND CREDIT, WE WOULD DO IT.

32. (C) BUT IN THE JUDGMENT OF THOSE WHO HAD STUDIED THE PROBLEM, SUMMERS SAID, THE ONLY SOLUTION LAY IN THE STEPS PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WAS PREPARED TO TAKE. THE PROBLEMS NEED TO BE ADDRESSED VERY QUICKLY. THERE WAS LESS CONFIDENCE TODAY THAN ONE MONTH AGO. THINGS HAVE BEEN A LITTLE BETTER IN THE PAST FEW DAYS BECAUSE PEOPLE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE DRAMATIC CHANGES AS A RESULT OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IMF, PRESIDENT CLINTON, AND OTHERS. OTHERWISE, THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE WOULD OCCUR AGAIN.

33. (C) SUMMERS RECALLED THAT PRESIDENT ZEDILLO OF MEXICO HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CLINTON ABOUT THE LESSONS HE HAD LEARNED FROM MEXICO'S RECENT CRISIS. FIRST, WHEN MARKETS OVER-REACTED, POLICIES HAD TO OVER-REACT IN

RETURN. TO REGAIN CONFIDENCE, ONE HAD TO REACT DRAMATICALLY AND QUICKLY. OTHERWISE, THE SITUATION WOULD BECOME CHAOTIC. JUST AS INDONESIA HAD BEEN TESTED WHEN OIL PRICES FELL AND AT OTHER TIMES, SO TODAY IT FACED A PROFOUND TEST. IF THE PRESIDENT ACTED PROMPTLY AND STRONGLY, THIS WOULD PROVIDE THE BEST CHANCE OF PRESERVING HIS LEGACY OF THIRTY YEARS AND PROJECTING IT INTO THE FUTURE SO THAT ALL OF INDONESIA'S MANY VILLAGES COULD BE MODERNIZED.

34. (C) DEPSEC SUMMERS STRESSED THAT IN PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PERSPECTIVE, THERE WERE FOUR CRITICAL THINGS THAT THE UNITED STATES FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR INDONESIA TO DO:

-- ADDRESS A SET OF PARTICULAR ECONOMIC ISSUES THAT HAD GREATER SYMBOLIC THAN ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE. THIS INCLUDED THE NATIONAL CAR, THE NATIONAL AIRPLANE, CERTAIN POWER PROJECTS, AND CERTAIN BANKS THAT HAD BEEN CLOSED AND REOPENED IN A CERTAIN WAY. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FELT THERE NEEDED TO BE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ON THESE SYMBOLIC ACTS THAT HAD CREATED CONCERN OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS. HE RESPECTED THE PRESIDENT'S EXPLANATION ABOUT BULOG, BUT THERE WAS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION ABOUT REPLACING IMPORT MONOPOLIES WITH DISTRIBUTION MONOPOLIES.

-- IMPLEMENT MEASURES TO RESTORE THE RUPIAH'S CREDIBILITY. HIGH INTEREST RATES WERE PAINFUL FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6171

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6171

PAGE 01 JAKART 00228 06 OF 07 151734Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 EB-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00
TRSE-00 /001W
----------0FCC18 151734Z /22
O 151339Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9137
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 07 JAKARTA 000228

PLEASE PASS TO DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS PARTY ASAP

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/16
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL: DEPSEC/SOEHARTO MEMCON

BUSINESSES AND BANKS, BUT AS LONG AS MONEY WAS TOO FREELY AVAILABLE, THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH WOULD GO DOWN. IT WAS NO USE TO BLAME SPECULATORS. THEY WOULD ALWAYS BE THERE. HE HAD HEARD STORIES OF INDONESIANS' CHANGING THEIR RUPIAH INTO DOLLARS AND SENDING THEM TO SINGAPORE. PROSPECTS FOR AVOIDING CHAOS WOULD NOT BE GOOD UNLESS THAT PSYCHOLOGY WAS CHANGED. INDONESIA NEEDED A MONETARY POLICY WITH A STABLE VALUE FOR THE CURRENCY AND THAT ACCEPTED THE PROBLEMS THAT POLICY WOULD BRING. THERE HAD TO BE CONFIDENCE IN THE CURRENCY. INDONESIA

CONFIDENTIAL

HAD SHOWN OVER THE YEARS THAT THE MORE DETERMINATION YOU DEMONSTRATED, THE SHORTER THE TIME NEEDED FOR PEOPLE TO BELIEVE. TO BE STRONG, THE CURRENCY HAD TO BE BACKED BY A TIGHT MONEY POLICY AND A BUDGET BASED ON CREDIBLE AND TRANSPARENT ASSUMPTIONS. THE BUDGET PRESENTED HAD CAUSED CONCERN. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR INDONESIA TO SHOW THAT THERE WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE BUDGET.

-- RESTORE A STRONG BANKING SYSTEM. PRESIDENT CLINTON SAW THIS AS IMPORTANT. IT WAS IMPERATIVE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO ACT DECISIVELY TO ASSURE THAT DEPOSITORS IN INDONESIAN BANKS WOULD GET THE FULL VALUE OF THEIR DEPOSITS, THAT RUPIAH DEPOSITS WOULD BE REPAID IN FULL. IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO RECOGNIZE THAT THOSE WHO HAD NOT RUN BANKS WELL MUST ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCES. THIS WAS NOT A QUESTION OF WHAT THE IMF OR THE UNITED STATES WANTED; IT WAS A QUESTION OF MARKET CONFIDENCE. ABSOLUTE DEPOSIT PROTECTION WAS NEEDED. A GOOD CURRENCY WILL BE BASED ON TIGHT MONETARY POLICY.

-- BUILD THE CREDIBILITY OF INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC POLICY. THIS WAS A DIFFERENT KIND OF ISSUE. THERE WAS A SAYING IN THE MARKETS THAT IT CAN TAKE TWENTY YEARS TO BUILD A REPUTATION AND ONE WEEK TO DESTROY IT. CREDIBILITY IS RENTED, IT CANNOT BE OWNED. INDONESIA NOW FACED A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE AFTER A REMARKABLE THIRTY YEARS. THREE STEPS WERE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE: FIRST, PRESIDENT CLINTON BELIEVED THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO MUST BE SEEN PERSONALLY AS TAKING CHARGE OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY PROCESS, AS PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD DONE WITH THE U.S. BUDGET IN 1993, THUS LAYING THE BASIS FOR LATER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ECONOMIC SUCCESS. SECOND, TRANSPARENCY WAS NEEDED. THE AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF NEEDED TO BE MADE PUBLIC SO THERE WOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING AND SO THE WORLD COULD SEE INDONESIA WAS KEEPING ITS WORD ON THE IMF PROGRAM. THIRD, POLICY PRESENTATION NEEDED TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD MADE THE POINT THAT THERE NEEDED TO BE AN ECONOMIC TEAM, UNDER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S LEADERSHIP, WITH ONE OR TWO CAPTAINS WHO COULD INTERACT WITH THE MARKETS AND BE SEEN AS STRONG AND CREDIBLE. TREASURY SECRETARY RUPEN SERVED AS SUCH A CAPTAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. THERE SHOULD BE ONE OR TWO PERSONS OTHER THAN PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WHO WERE TRUSTED IMPLEMENTORS OF POLICY.

35. (C) DEPSEC SUMMERS STRESSED THAT IF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO COULD AGREE ON GOING FORWARD WITH SUCH A PROGRAM IN HIS MEETING WITH CAMDESSUS, IT QFER A STRONG CHANCE OF REGAINING THE CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S REMARKABLE RECORD ENTITLED HIM TO. FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PERSPECTIVE, THIS WAS A MOMENT OF GREAT CONCERN BECAUSE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN THE REGION. RAPID, BOLD ACTION WOULD BE WHAT MARKETS TESTED INDONESIA BY. PRESIDENT CLINTON CONVEYED HIS GREAT RESPECT. THESE STRONG STATEMENTS REFLECTED THE URGENCY OF THE NEED TO GET INDONESIA'S ECONOMY OUT OF THE INTENSIVE CARE UNIT.

36. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THIS COUNSEL AND ADVICE ON THE PART OF PRESIDENT CLINTON. HE WOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE SUGGESTED MEASURES, INCLUDING THE SYMBOLIC ACTS THAT THE WORLD CONSIDERED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NECESSARY. IN FACT, THE GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY TAKEN SOME STEPS WITH RESPECT TO VARIOUS MEGA-PROJECTS, SUCH AS POWER PROJECTS. OTHER MEASURES WOULD ALSO BE TAKEN IN ACCORD WITH INDONESIA'S CIRCUMSTANCES. THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF TIMING INVOLVING, BUT WE WERE IN ACCORD ON BASIC PRINCIPLES. HE ASKED THAT HIS WARM GREETINGS BE CONVEYED TO PRESIDENT CLINTON.

37. (C) IN CLOSING, DEPSEC SUMMERS EMPHASIZED THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON WAS VERY ENGAGED IN FOLLOWING THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA. AS PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ACTED, PRESIDENT CLINTON WAS WILLING TO BE SUPPORTIVE. HE BELIEVED THAT ACTIONS OVER THE NEXT TWO TO THREE WEEKS, INDEED DURING THIS WEEK, WOULD HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE ON WHETHER CONFIDENCE RETURNED. HE URGED THAT RESTORING CONFIDENCE BE THE TOP PRIORITY. PRESIDENT CLINTON WAS WATCHING CLOSELY AND WANTED TO HELP.

38. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID THAT HE HAD ASSIGNED

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6172

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6172

PAGE 01 JAKART 00228 07 OF 07 151735Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 EB-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00
TRSE-00 /001W
----------0FCC36 151735Z /22
O 151339Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9138
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 07 JAKARTA 000228

PLEASE PASS TO DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS PARTY ASAP

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/16
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL: DEPSEC/SOEHARTO MEMCON

PROFESSOR WIDJOJO TO COORDINATE MEETINGS IN JAKARTA. ON SOME OCCASIONS, HE WOULD TAKE ACTION HIMSELF, BUT SOMETIMES THIS CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT HE DID NOT TRUST HIS ASSISTANTS. IN FACT, THE CURRENT CABINET ONLY HAD ONE A HALF MORE MONTHS IN OFFICE. ON MARCH 1 THE PROCESS WOULD BEGIN OF SELECTING A NEW PRESIDENT AND CABINET. IT WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY DIFFICULT TO DO ANYTHING BEFORE THEN. BEING A FREEDOM FIGHTER, HE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS WERE NECESSARY TO SERVE THE COUNTRY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

39. (C) DEPSEC SUMMERS NOTED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR PROFESSOR WIDJOJO. HIS ROLE, UNDER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S GUIDANCE, WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP IN RESTORING CONFIDENCE. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1707

PAGE 01 JAKART 00814 01 OF 07 120816Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00
	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------1AD2F6 120817Z /38

R 120817Z FEB 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9747
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 JAKARTA 000814

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB, EB/IFD

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, INA/VELTHAUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/16
TAGS: EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS' MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, JANUARY 13

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00814 01 OF 07 120816Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 23 JAN 2009 200502960

1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY. TREASURY DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS MET WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FOR NINETY MINUTES ON JANUARY 13 TO DISCUSS THE CURRENT STATE OF INDONESIA'S ECONOMY AND THE STEPS IT IS TAKING TO RESOLVE THE CURRENT CRISIS. SOEHARTO RECOUNTED INDONESIA'S 30 YEAR HISTORY OF ELIMINATING POVERTY AND EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT THE MONETARY TURMOIL WAS NOW HINDERING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE INDONESIA'S STANDARD OF LIVING. ACCORDING TO SOEHARTO, THE CURRENT CRISIS WAS SET OFF BY SPECULATORS AND EXACERBATED BY RUMORS. HIS OWN ILLNESS WORSENED THE SITUATION AND CREATED A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE RUPIAH. INITIALLY INDONESIA ATTEMPTED DIRECT INTERVENTION TO PROTECT ITS CURRENCY, BUT AS THAT STRATEGY FAILED, THE COUNTRY ATTEMPTED OTHER REMEDIES WHICH WERE INSUFFICIENT TO SOLVE THE CRISIS.

3. (C) BECAUSE OF WEAKNESS OF THE DOMESTIC BANKING SECTOR, INDONESIA PLANS TO CONSOLIDATE STATE-OWNED BANKS AND HAS ENCOURAGED PRIVATE BANKS TO MERGE. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ELABORATED ON THE DIFFERENCES IN THE KOREAN CASE WHERE WEAKNESS RESULTS FROM LOANS TO PRIVATE BANKS AND THE INDONESIAN CASE WHERE PROBLEM LOANS COME FROM PRIVATE CORPORATIONS. THE PRESIDENT INDICATED THAT INDONEIA COULD CONTINUE TO SERVICE ITS NATIONAL DEBT AND FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT BANKS WHICH GAVE LOANS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR RECOGNIZE THAT THEY ARE PARTLY TO BLAME FOR THE CURRENT FIASCO.

4. (C) INDONESIA AND THE IMF, THE PRESIDENT SAID, ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT. THE ONLY ISSUE IS TIMING. SOEHARTO GAVE STRONG ASSURANCES THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO CUTTING FUEL SUBSIDIES IN A WAY THAT WILL AVOID CREATING SOCIAL UNREST. BULOG MONOPOLIES, THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED, WILL REMAIN INTACT, AT LEAST FOR SUGAR AND RICE, BECAUSE RICE PRICES ARE TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT TO MARKET FORCES.

5. (C) DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS EXPLAINED THAT INDONESIA SUFFERS FROM A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE

RUPIAH AND THE BANKING SYSTEM. TO SOLVE THAT CRISIS, INDONESIA SHOULD LEARN FROM MEXICO'S EXPERIENCE BY ACTING STRONGLY AND QUICKLY. SPECIFICALLY, SUMMERS EXPLAINED THAT INDONESIA MUST BUILD CREDIBILITY BY CANCELING THE NATIONAL CAR AND AIRPLANE AND OTHER INVIABLE PROJECTS AND TO ELIMINATE CERTAIN MONOPOLIES. TO STRENGTHEN THE CURRENCY, A REALISTIC BUDGET, BASED ON CREDIBLE AND TRANSPARENT ASSUMPTIONS, AND A STRONG BANKING SYSTEM WOULD BE NEEDED. RENEWED CONFIDENCE IN INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC POLICY WAS NEEDED, SUMMERS CONTINUED. ACCORDINGLY, HE SAID, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO MUST BE SEEN AS PERSONALLY LEADING EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE THE CURRENT CRISIS. OTHER IMPORTANT STEPS SUCH AS INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND EFFECTIVELY PRESENTING POLICY TO MARKETS AND THE PUBLIC ARE ALSO ESSENTIAL IF INDONESIA IS RAPIDLY TO REBUILD THE CONFIDENCE THAT ITS POLICY PROCESS, CURRENCY, AND BANKING SYSTEM NEEDS. END SUMMARY.

6. (U) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND TREASURY DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS MET FOR NINETY MINUTES ON JANUARY 13.

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISOR DR. WIDJOJO NITISASTRO. EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY ROTH AND AMBASSADOR ROY PARTICIPATED IN THE MEETING ON THE U.S. SIDE.

7. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO OPENED THE MEETING BY WARMLY WELCOMING DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS TO INDONESIA. HE EXPRESSED HIS GREAT APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S DECISION TO SEND THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AS HIS SPECIAL ENVOY TO THE REGION, AS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED DURING THE TWO PRESIDENTS' JANUARY 8 TELEPHONE CALL. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID HE BELIEVED THAT, AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE, THE VISIT WAS VERY CRUCIAL AND BENEFICIAL TO INDONESIA'S OVERCOMING ITS FINANCIAL TURMOIL.

8. (SBU) THE TURMOIL IS NOT JUST AFFECTING INDONESIA, HE SAID, BUT OTHER COUNTRIES TOO. NOTING THAT THE DEPUTY SECRETARY HAD DISCUSSED THE CURRENT FINANCIAL SITUATION WITH DR. WIDJOJO, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO PROVIDED

A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE BACKGROUND OF INDONESIA'S 52 YEARS AS AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY. AFTER REVIEWING THE POST WORLD WAR II EVENTS WHICH CULMINATED IN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1708

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1708

PAGE 01 JAKART 00814 02 OF 07 120817Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00
	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	USIE-00	SGHD-00	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00	/020W	

----------1AD2FA 120817Z /38

R 120817Z FEB 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9748
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 07 JAKARTA 000814

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB, EB/IFD

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, INA/VELTHAUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/16
TAGS: EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS' MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, JANUARY 13

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEPENDENCE, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO DESCRIBED THE CHAOS AND HARDSHIP WHICH LED TO THE 1965 REBELLION AND ULTIMATELY TO THE NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT. THE THREE LINKED GOALS OF THE NEW ORDER'S DEVELOPMENT TRILOGY ARE STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION; THESE ARE IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLANS AND ENSHRINED IN THE BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY APPROVED BY THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED.

9. (C) THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST 25-YEAR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT PLAN WERE ENCOURAGING. INDONESIA HAS ESTABLISHED THE FOUNDATION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN ALL SECTORS. INDICATORS OF HOW SOLID DEVELOPMENT HAD BEEN INCLUDED A 7 PERCENT AVERAGE GROWTH RATE, INFLATION REDUCTION FROM OVER 650 PERCENT IN 1969 TO SINGLE DIGIT LEVELS, 1996 PER CAPITA GDP OF USD 1115, EXPORT GROWTH TO ABOUT USD 50 BILLION/YEAR, SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN RICE, EXTENSIONOF COMPULSORY EDUCATION FROM SIX TO NINE YEAR, AND PROGRESS IN HEALTH SERVICES. THE PRESIDENT PROVIDED DETAILED STATISTICS ON PROGRESS IN POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND THE IMPROVEMENTS IN INDONESIA'S 66,000 VILLAGES.

10. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE MONETARY TURMOIL WAS DEEPLY AFFECTING EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY AND RAISE LIVING STANDARDS. HE SAID THAT SOUTHEAST ASIA'S MONETARY TURMOIL HAD BEEN SPARKED BY FOREIGN CURRENCY TRADING, SPECULATORS AND GAMBLERS. HE NOTED FURTHER FACTORS SUCH AS FOREIGN BANKS'

COLLUDING WITH SPECULATORS, AND SPREADING POLITICAL
CONFIDENTIAL

RUMORS. THE FINAL BLOW WAS SOEHARTO'S ILLNESS. RUMORS ABOUT THE ILLNESS LED TO A WEAKENED RUPIAH, FIRST BECAUSE OF SPECULATORS AND THEN BECAUSE LOCAL COMPANIES THAT HAD INCURRED SHORT-TERM DEBT FOR LONG-TERM PROJECTS RUSHED TO BUY DOLLARS NEEDED TO PAY MATURING LOANS. THIS RUSH WEAKENED THE RUPIAH FURTHER AND CAUSED PEOPLE TO FEAR FOR THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH. THE RESULT WAS A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE RUPIAH.

11. (C) FIRST, THE PRESIDENT SAID, THE GOI TRIED INTERVENTION TO PREVENT FURTHERING WEAKENING F THE CURRENCY, BUT BECAUSE OF THE STRENGTH O FORCES PUSHING THE RUPIAH OWWARD, INTERVENTION PROVED USELESS AND THE RUPIAH CONTINUED TO WEAKEN. IF FOREIGN EXCHANGE WAS EXHAUSTED, HE SAID, THE COUNTRY COULD NOT IMPORT ITEMS NEEDED FOR BASIC INDUSTRY, RESULTING IN LAY OFFS AND UNEMPLOYMENT. THIS SITUATION MADE INDONESIA TRY TO CONTROL THE QUANTITY OF RUPIAH IN CIRCULATION WITH A TIGHT MONEY POLICY. RUPIAH WERE WITHDRAW FROM PENSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY FUNDS TO PREVENT THEIRBEING USED FOR SPECULATION. THE RESULTS WERENOT ENCOURAGING, AND IT TURNED OUT THIS WAS NOT A GOOD IDEA.

12. (C) AS THE CRISIS PROEEDED, THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED, ASSETS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM BANKS, CAUSING A LIQUIDITY CRUNCH AND MAKING BANKS BECOME INSOLVENT. THEY ENCOURAGED DEPOSITS WITH HIGH INTEREST RATES, THAT ALSO AFFECTED PRIVATE COMPANIES. RUPIAH ONLY CIRCULATED WITHIN THE BANKING SYSTEM RATHER THAN THROUGH CREDIT LINES TO COMPANIES, WHICH WERE FORCED TO LAY OFF WORKERS.

13. (C) THE GOVERNMENT NEXT ATTEMPTED TO CARRY OUT REFORMS TO BOOST EXPORTS. SINCE STATE REVENUES DECLINED, THE GOVERNMENT HALTED LARGE PROJECTS. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO REFORMED STATE ASSETS, HE SAID, SO STATE-OWNED COMPANIES COULD BE PRIVATIZED AS A SOURCE OF CAPITAL. INDONESIA HAS, THE PRESIDENT SAID, 160 STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES OF WHICH 100 WERE HEALTHY. THESE HEALTHY COMPANIES COULD BE PRIVATIZED.

14. (C) THE PRESIDENT ACKNOWLEDGED THE WEAKNESS OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE DOMESTIC BANKING SYSTEM AND THE FAILURE TO ENFORCE RULESCONTROLLING PRIVATE SECTOR BORROWING, RESULTING IN AN ACCUMULATION OF SHORT-TERM DEBT THAT COULD NOT BE REPAID. TO STRENGTHEN THE BANKING SECTOR, HE SAID, THE GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGED CONSOLIDATION THROUGH MERGERS AND TOOK THE INITIATIVE BY ANNOUNCING A PLAN TO MERGE FOUR OF THE SEVEN STATE-OWNED BANKS OF WHICH TWO WERE HEALTHY AND TO REFORM THE CENTRAL BANK. THE GOI ALSO HOPED TO THAT THE NUMBER OF PRIVATE BANKS, NOW ABOUT 240, WOULD BE REDUCED. THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT INDONESIA HISTORICALLY HAD STRICT

PAGE 01 JAKART 00814 03 OF 07 120817Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00
	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------1AD303 120817Z /38

R 120817Z FEB 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9749
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 07 JAKARTA 000814

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB, EB/IFD

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, INA/VELTHAUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/16
TAGS: EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS' MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, JANUARY 13

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RULES GOVERNING THE CREATION OF NEW BANKS. IN THE INTEREST OF EQUITY, THOUGH, THE REGULATIONS WERE MODIFIED TO ALLOW MORE BANKS TO FORM. THE NUMBER OF NEW BANKS MUSHROOMED BEYOND CONTROL AND EXCEEDED THE NUMBER NEEDED. DURING THE PRESENT CRISIS, HE SAID, THE GOVERNMENT LIQUIDATED SOME BANKS WHICH WERE NOT SOLVENT, BUT THIS CREATED OTHER PROBLEMS, SO THE GOVERNMENT IS NOW ADVISING BANKS TO MERGE THEMSELVES. IF THE BANKS CANNOT MERGE AND MEET REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS, THEY WILL

BE LIQUIDATED. ONCE BANKS ARE HEALTHY AND SOLVENT, THEY WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO FIND FOREIGN PARTNERS TO HELP WITH CONSOLIDATION.

15. (C) IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS IMPORTANT TO CARRY OUT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE TARGETING POVERTY ALLEVIATION, BY PROVIDING AID FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCIAL AID TO VILLAGES. STARTING 32 YEARS AGO WITH RP 100,000 PER VILLAGE, TEN DOLLARS AT TODAY'S EXCHANGE RATE, THE PRESIDENT RECOUNTED, THE GOI HAS ENCOURAGED THE DEVELOPMENT OF RURAL AREAS. NOW, RP 6.5 MILLION ARE GIVEN TO EACH OF THE COUNTRY'S 66,000 VILLAGES. TWO-THIRDS OF THESE VILLAGES CAN BE CLASSIFIED AS DEVELOPED; ONLY ONE-THIRD ARE CLASSIFIED AS LEAST DEVELOPED. TO ASSIST THESE ESPECIALLY POOR VILLAGES, SOEHARTO EXPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: EACH VILLAGE CLASSIFIED AS LEAST DEVELOPED RECEIVES RP 20 MILLION PER YEAR FOR 3 YEARS, TOTALING RP 60 MILLION PER VILLAGE, AS REVOLVING CAPITAL FOR DEVELOPMENT. THE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT THE LEAST DEVELOPED VILLAGES ARE NOT THE ONLY PLACES WHERE PEOPLE LIVE BELOW THE POVERTY

LINE, 11.5 MILLION ARE PRESENT IN DEVELOPED VILLAGES AS WELL.

16. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO EXPLAINED THAT INDONESIA HAS MANY PROGRAMS TO REDUCE POVERTY. THOSE INCLUDED FAMILY PLANNING TO ENSURE THAT CHILDREN COULD GET AN EDUCATION AND THAT FAMILIES COULD MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF THEIR CHILDREN. THERE WERE ALSO PROGRAMS TARGETING WOMEN. WOMEN AND MOTHERS, THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED, FREQUENTLY HAD SIDE BUSINESSES TO AUGMENT INCOME. THE GOVERNMENT TRAINED THEM IN HANDICRAFTS, FARMING, SEWING AND OTHER TRADES SO THAT THEIR PRODUCTS COULD BE SOLD TO SUPERMARKETS IN BIG CITIES.

17. (C) THE GOVERNMENT HAD TRIED TO ENCOURAGE HOUSEHOLDS TO SAVE MONEY, SOEHARTO EXPLAINED. RP 2,000 WAS THE MINIMUM AMOUNT REQUIRED TO OPEN A BANK ACCOUNT. RP 2,000 WAS NOT SO MUCH MONEY, THE PRESIDENT SAID, SO

THE GOI APPEALED TO BIG BUSINESS TO INVEST. SO FAR, RP 23 BILLION HAD BEEN COLLECTED TO HELP THE 11.5 MILLION BELOW THE POVERTY LINE IN THE DEVELOPED VILLAGES. BY SAVING RP 2,000, PEOPLE COULD BORROW 10 TIMES THAT AMOUNT, OR RP 20,000. ONCE THIS MONEY WAS REPAID, THE BORROWER HAD TO PUT ASIDE RP 2,000 MORE FOR A TOTAL OF RP 4,000. THEN, WITH RP 4,000 IN THE BANK, RP 40,000 COULD BE BORROWED. THE CYCLE WAS REPEATED AND THE CAPITAL REVOLVED. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT IN THIS PROGRAM, THE PRESIDENT SAID, WAS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOW INTEREST LOANS.

18. (C) ANOTHER INITIATIVE, THE PRESIDENT SAID, WAS

THE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM. COMPANIES WITH AFTER TAX PROFITS ABOVE 100 MILLION RUPIAH PUT ASIDE 2 PERCENT OF THEIR NET PROFIT FOR THE POOR. COMPANIES EARNING BELOW RP 100 MILLION AFTER TAX PROFIT WERE NOT REQUIRED TO CONTRIBUTE. FUNDS COLLECTED IN THIS WAY WERE USED FOR THE PROMOTION OF WHAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO DESCRIBED AS PROSPEROUS FAMILY PROGRAMS, WITH LOANS AVAILABLE AT SIX PERCENT. BY JOINING WITH SMALL TRADERS ELIGIBLE FOR LOW INTEREST LOANS FROM STATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AT 14 PERCENT, THESE GROUPS CAN GET CREDIT AT AN AVERAGE 12 PERCENT.

19. (C) REFERRING TO THE ONGOING CRISIS, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID THAT INDONESIA WAS TRYING TO OVERCOME ITS CURRENT CHALLENGES BY REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING. THE ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM, HE ADDED, WAS THE SHORTAGE OF U.S. DOLLARS. INDONESIA IS ASSURED OF SOME DOLLARS THROUGH OIL AND GAS EXPORTS BUT MUST BOOST NON OIL/GAS EXPORTS, WHICH HAVE BEEN EARNING USD 3-4 BILLION (PER MONTH). BY PROTECTING THESE REVENUES AND AUGMENTING INCOME FROM PLANTATIONS INDONESIA HOPES TO WEATHER THE STORM.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1710

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1710

PAGE 01 JAKART 00814 04 OF 07 120817Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00
	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------1AD307 120817Z /38

R 120817Z FEB 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9750
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 07 JAKARTA 000814

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB, EB/IFD

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, INA/VELTHAUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/16
TAGS: EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS' MEETING WITH

20. (C) IN THE CONTEXT OF RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING SYSTEM, THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED THAT INDONESIA SOUGHT IMF COUNSEL AND WAS ALSO TRYING TO SAVE THE ASSETS OF STATE-OWNED COMPANIES AMOUNTING TO RP 370 TRILLION. AT THE APEC MEETING IN VANCOUVER, THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT REALIZED THAT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES COULD NOT FACE THE CURRENT CRISIS ALONE. ALL APEC MEMBERS ASKED PRESIDENT CLINTON TO HEAD A TEAM WITH THE IMF TO DEAL WITH THE CURRENCY CRISIS AND TO OVERCOME THE LOSSES INCURRED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR. IF CREDITORS DID NOT HELP, THE BURDEN WOULD BE MORE THAN THE PRIVATE SECTOR COULD BEAR.

21. (C) THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED THAT THE SITUATIONS IN KOREA AND INDONESIA WERE DIFFERENT. IN KOREA, THE BORROWING WHICH LED TO THE CURRENT CRISIS WAS BY PRIVATE BANKS, NOT THE PRIVATE SECTOR. THE CREDITOR BANKS WERE IN JAPAN, EUROPE, AND THE UNITED STATES, AND IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO AID FAILING BANKS IN KOREA.

22. (C) IN INDONESIA, THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED, BORROWERS WERE FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR, SO THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT TAKE OVER THE LOANS WHICH TOTAL USD 65 BILLION. STATE BORROWING, HE SAID, TOTALS ONLY 50 BILLION. IN CARRYING OUT DEVELOPMENT, SOEHARTO EXPLAINED, INDONESIA REQUIRED LOANS. THE RESULT OF DEVELOPMENT, THOUGH, WAS THE ABILITY TO REPAY THOSE LOANS SO THAT, OVER THE YEARS, INDONESIA HAS HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS. THIS YEAR THE NATIONAL BUDGET EARMARKS 33 TRILLION RUPIAH FOR DEBT SERVICE. AT A RATE OF RP 4,000 TO THE DOLLAR, THIS

EQUALS 7.5 BILLION USD.

23. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID HE BELIEVES THAT THE BLAME FOR THE CURRENT CRISIS LIES PARTLY WITH CREDITORS AND PARTLY WITH THE INDONESIAN PRIVATE SECTOR. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HOPES THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN HELP CREDITORS REALIZE THAT THEY ARE PARTLY TO BLAME FOR THE CURRENT FIASCO.

24. (C) REFERRING TO THE IMF PACKAGE, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID THAT INDONESIA AND THE IMF ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT ON THE REFORMS TO BE CARRIED OUT. THE ONLY QUESTION IS TIMING. A CASE IN POINT IS THAT OF SUBSIDIES. THE GOVERNMENT IS FIRM IN ITS DECISION TO ELIMINATE FUEL OIL SUBSIDIES. IN THE STATE BUDGET, SUBSIDIES FOR FUEL COSTS ARE ALLOTTED AT RP 10 TRILLION. SAVINGS AMOUNT TO RP 15 TRILLION (NOTE: IN GOI BUDGETARY TERMS, SAVINGS REFER TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REVENUES AND CURRENT EXPENDITURES. END NOTE). IF THE GOI REMOVES THE SUBSIDIES AND ADDS THE FUNDS TO SAVINGS, HE SAID, THE RESULT IS RP 25 TRILLION. REMOVING THE SUBSIDIES IS A SINE QUA NON. LOW FUEL PRICES RESULT IN WASTE, DISCOURAGING USE OF ALTERNATE FUELS AND SMUGGLING TO OTHER COUNTRIES. INDONESIA ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO REMOVE SUBSIDIES MONTHS AGO, BUT SEVERAL PROBLEMS INTERVENED -- FIRST WIDE-SPREAD FOREST FIRES, FOLLOWED BY A LONG DROUGHT REDUCING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. THESE CRISES FELL CLOSE TO THE CHRISTMAS, NEW YEAR, AND RAMADAN HOLIDAYS, SO THE GOVERNMENT MUST TAKE CARE IN REMOVING THE SUBSIDIES SO THE RESULT IS NOT BAD PSYCHOLOGICALLY. BECAUSE THE REMOVAL OF SUBSIDIES WILL

DRIVE TRANSPORTATION COSTS AND ELECTRICITY PRICES UP, HE SAID, RAISING FUEL OIL PRICES WILL CREATE DISILLUSIONMENT AND SOCIAL UNREST. ULTIMATELY, HE SAID, THE IMF MIGHT BE BLAMED.

25. (C) THE PRESIDENT SAID HIS CONVERSATION WITH IMF

DEPUTY MANAGING DIRECTOR STANELY FISCHER HAD BEEN OPEN AND WIDE-RANGING. THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES OR MISUNDERSTANDINGS. THERE WAS FULL AGREEMENT TO CARRY OUT THE PROGRAM. THE QUESTION WAS TIMING SO AS TO PRODUCE THE MOST FRUITFUL RESULTS AND TO ENSURE STABILITY. THE ARMED FORCES WERE UNITED AND COHESIVE, ALTHOUGH ATTEMPTS WERE BEING MADE TO INFILTRATE AND SPLIT THEM. MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES WERE AWARE OF THE PLIGHT OF THE PEOPLE. THEIR OWN NEEDS WERE NOT BEING GIVEN DUE PRIORITY BECAUSE OF DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES. BUDGET ITEMS THAT REQUIRED USD FINANCING HAD BEEN SCRAPPED. BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR DOLLARS, THE ARMED FORCES HAD THEMSELVES DECIDED TO POSTPONE PURCHASES. WE FACE DIFFICULTIES, THE PRESIDENT SAID, BUT WE ARE CONVINCED WE CAN OVERCOME THEM. THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED EVEN BETTER WITH SUPPORT FROM

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1712

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1712

PAGE 01 JAKART 00814 05 OF 07 120817Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00
	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00	/021W

R 120817Z FEB 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9751
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 07 JAKARTA 000814

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB, EB/IFD

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, INA/VELTHAUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/16
TAGS: EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS' MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, JANUARY 13

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FRIENDLY COUNTRIES.

26. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ASKED DEPSEC SUMMERS TO REPORT TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON HIS RETURN THAT THE RUSH OF PEOPLE TO BUY COMMODITIES SUFFICIENT FOR WEEKS OR EVEN MONTHS HAD LASTED ONE DAY ONLY. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTED TO PROVIDING BASIC COMMODITIES. STOCKS WERE MORE THAN ADEQUATE. BASIC COMMODITIES WERE MANAGED BY BULOG, WHICH HAD THE ATTRIBUTES OF A MONOPOLY. IN ACTUALITY, BULOG WAS AN INSTRUMENT TO STABILIZE THE PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES. NOW JUST TWO COMMODITIES REMAINED UNDER BULOG'S JURISDICTION: SUGAR AND RICE. BULOG PROTECTED CONSUMERS AND PRODUCERS BY SETTING CEILING AND FLOOR PRICES. IF THE PRICE WAS BELOW THE BULOG PRICE, BULOG BOUGHT. IF THE PRICE ROSE ABOVE THE CEILING, THE GOVERNMENT RELEASED GOODS FROM STOCKS. RICE WAS AN

IMPORTANT COMMODITY, AND FLUCTUATIONS IN THE RICE PRICEAFFECTED OTHER COMMODITIES AND COULD DESTABILIZE THE NATION. BECAUSE OF THIS, HE SAID, RICE PRICES COULD NOT BE LEFT TO MARKET FORCES.

27. (C) CONTINUING, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID IT WAS EASIER TO CONTROL SUCH MATTERS IN A PLACE LIKE SINGAPORE. BUT INDONESIA WAS A VAST ARCHIPELAGO WITH OVER 17,000 ISLANDS AND CONSISTING TWO-THIRDS OF WATER. WHEN WAVES WERE HIGH, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DISTRIBUTE RICE, AND THE COSTS WERE HIGH. WHAT PRIVATE COMPANY WOULD BE WILLING TO DO WHAT BULOG DID? SO, BULOG WAS NEEDED TO ENSURE SUFFICIENT RICE WAS DELIVERED TO LOCAL PEOPLE BEFORE STORMY SEAS MADE THIS DIFFICULT. IT HAD

LOCAL DEPOTS FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE BULOG APPROACH WAS BASED ON MILITARY LOGISTICS CONCEPTS. MANY OPPOSED THE USE OF MILITARY JARGON, SO THE WORD "COMMAND" WAS CHANGED TO "AGENCY" (BADAN). THE PURPOSE WAS THE SAME. IT WAS NOT SO MUCH A MONOPOLY AS A MEANS OF SERVING STATE INTERESTS, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONSTITUTION (NOTE: A PRESUMED REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 33 (2) OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH PROVIDES THAT "BRANCHES OF PRODUCTION WHICH ARE IMPORTANT FOR THE STATE AND WHICH AFFECT THE LIFE OF MOST PEOPLE SHALL BE CONTROLLED BY THE STATE). PRESIDENT SOEHARTO CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION WITH THE HOPE THIS WOULD PROVIDE A BETTER PICTURE OF CONDITIONS IN INDONESIA.

28. (C) DEPSEC SUMMERS THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS EXPLANATION OF THE INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD BEEN SENT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON, WHO HAD ENORMOUS RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S ACHIEVEMENTS OVER THE PAST THIRTY YEARS IN AREAS SUCH AS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, POVERTY REDUCTION, AND THE BUILDING OF A BETTER LIFE FOR INDONESIA'S CHILDREN. SUMMERS RECALLEDHIS EARLIER EXPERIENCE WORKING WITH DR. WIDJOJO AND ALI WARDHANA 20 YEARS AGO, DURING WHICH HE HAD SEEN FIRST HAND THE COUNTRY'S REMARKABLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD BEEN PROFOUNDLY IMPRESSED BY PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S DESCRIPTION OF INDONESIA'S PROGRESS

DURING THEIR MEETING AT THE APEC SUMMIT IN 1994. HE AND HIS DELEGATION WERE HERE AS A REFLECTION OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S STRONG FEELING FOR PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND OF THE UNITED STATES FOR INDONESIA. IF HE SPOKE FRANKLY, IT WAS BECAUSE OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S GREAT RESPECT FOR

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

29. (C) DEPSEC SUMMERS SAID HE BELIEVED THAT INDONESIA FACED A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE. ECONOMISTS WOULD LONG STUDY HOW IT STARTED AND WHY IT HAPPENED. THESE ISSUES DID NOT MATTER RIGHT NOW. WHAT MATTERED WAS RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN THE RUPIAH AND IN THE BANKING SYSTEM. THE SITUATION WAS FRAGILE. IF THE PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED WITH MORE IMF OR U.S. MONEY, WE WOULD PROVIDE IT. IF IT COULD BE SOLVED BY CALLING UPON A BANK TO EXTEND CREDIT, WE WOULD DO IT.

30. (C) BUT IN THE JUDGMENT OF THOSE WHO HAD STUDIED THE PROBLEM, SUMMERS SAID, THE ONLY SOLUTION LAY IN THE STEPS PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WAS PREPARED TO TAKE. THE PROBLEMS NEED TO BE ADDRESSED VERY QUICKLY. THERE WAS LESS CONFIDENCE TODAY THAN ONE MONTH AGO. THINGS HAVE BEEN A LITTLE BETTER IN THE PAST FEW DAYS BECAUSE PEOPLE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE DRAMATIC CHANGES AS A RESULT OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IMF, PRESIDENT CLINTON, AND OTHERS. OTHERWISE, THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE WOULD OCCUR AGAIN.

NNNNPTQ1713

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1713

PAGE 01 JAKART 00814 06 OF 07 120817Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00
	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------1AD310 120817Z /38

R 120817Z FEB 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9752
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 07 JAKARTA 000814

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB, EB/IFD

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, INA/VELTHAUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/16
TAGS: EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS' MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, JANUARY 13

CONFIDENTIAL

31. (C) SUMMERS RECALLED THAT PRESIDENT ZEDILLO OF MEXICO HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CLINTON ABOUT THE LESSONS HE HAD LEARNED FROM MEXICO'S RECENT CRISIS. FIRST, WHEN MARKETS OVER-REACTED, POLICIES HAD TO OVER-REACT IN RETURN. TO REGAIN CONFIDENCE, ONE HAD TO REACT DRAMATICALLY AND QUICKLY. OTHERWISE, THE SITUATION WOULD BECOME CHAOTIC. JUST AS INDONESIA HAD BEEN TESTED WHEN OIL PRICES FELL AND AT OTHER TIMES, SO TODAY IT FACED A PROFOUND TEST. IF THE PRESIDENT ACTED PROMPTLY AND STRONGLY, THIS WOULD PROVIDE THE BEST CHANCE OF PRESERVING HIS LEGACY OF THIRTY YEARS AND PROJECTING IT INTO THE FUTURE SO THAT ALL OF INDONESIA'S MANY VILLAGES COULD BE MODERNIZED.

32. (C) DEPSEC SUMMERS STRESSED THAT IN PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PERSPECTIVE, THERE WERE FOUR CRITICAL THINGS THAT THE UNITED STATES FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR INDONESIA TO DO:

-- ADDRESS A SET OF PARTICULAR ECONOMIC ISSUES THAT HAD GREATER SYMBOLIC THAN ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE. THIS INCLUDED THE NATIONAL CAR, THE NATIONAL AIRPLANE, CERTAIN POWER PROJECTS, AND CERTAIN BANKS THAT HAD BEEN CLOSED AND REOPENED IN A CERTAIN WAY. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FELT THERE NEEDED TO BE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ON THESE SYMBOLIC ACTS THAT HAD CREATED CONCERN OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS. HE RESPECTED THE PRESIDENT'S EXPLANATION ABOUT BULOG, BUT THERE WAS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION ABOUT REPLACING IMPORT MONOPOLIES WITH DISTRIBUTION MONOPOLIES.

-- IMPLEMENT MEASURES TO RESTORE THE RUPIAH'S CREDIBILITY. HIGH INTEREST RATES WERE PAINFUL FOR BUSINESSES AND BANKS, BUT AS LONG AS MONEY WAS TOO FREELY AVAILABLE, THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH WOULD GO DOWN.

IT WAS NO USE TO BLAME SPECULATORS. THEY WOULD ALWAYS BE THERE. HE HAD HEARD STORIES OF INDONESIANS' CHANGING THEIR RUPIAH INTO DOLLARS AND SENDING THEM TO SINGAPORE. PROSPECTS FOR AVOIDING CHAOS WOULD NOT BE GOOD UNLESS THAT PSYCHOLOGY WAS CHANGED. INDONESIA NEEDED A MONETARY POLICY WITH A STABLE VALUE FOR THE CURRENCY AND THAT ACCEPTED THE PROBLEMS THAT POLICY WOULD BRING. THERE HAD TO BE CONFIDENCE IN THE CURRENCY. INDONESIA HAD SHOWN OVER THE YEARS THAT THE MORE DETERMINATION YOU DEMONSTRATED, THE SHORTER THE TIME NEEDED FOR PEOPLE TO BELIEVE. TO BE STRONG, THE CURRENCY HAD TO BE BACKED BY A TIGHT MONEY POLICY AND A BUDGET BASED ON CREDIBLE AND TRANSPARENT ASSUMPTIONS. THE BUDGET PRESENTED HAD CAUSED CONCERN. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR INDONESIA TO SHOW THAT THERE WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE BUDGET.

-- RESTORE A STRONG BANKING SYSTEM. PRESIDENT CLINTON SAW THIS AS IMPORTANT. IT WAS IMPERATIVE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO ACT DECISIVELY TO ASSURE THAT DEPOSITORS IN INDONESIAN BANKS WOULD GET THE FULL VALUE OF THEIR DEPOSITS, THAT RUPIAH DEPOSITS WOULD BE REPAID IN FULL. IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO RECOGNIZE THAT THOSE WHO HAD NOT RUN BANKS WELL MUST ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCES. THIS WAS NOT A QUESTION OF WHAT THE IMF OR THE UNITED STATES WANTED; IT WAS A QUESTION OF MARKET CONFIDENCE. ABSOLUTE DEPOSIT PROTECTION WAS NEEDED. A GOOD CURRENCY

WILL BE BASED ON TIGHT MONETARY POLICY.

-- BUILD THE CREDIBILITY OF INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC POLICY. THIS WAS A DIFFERENT KIND OF ISSUE. THERE WAS A SAYING IN THE MARKETS THAT IT CAN TAKE TWENTY YEARS TO BUILD A REPUTATION AND ONE WEEK TO DESTROY IT. CREDIBILITY IS RENTED, IT CANNOT BE OWNED. INDONESIA NOW FACED A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE AFTER A REMARKABLE THIRTY YEARS. THREE STEPS WERE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE: FIRST, PRESIDENT CLINTON BELIEVED THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO MUST BE SEEN PERSONALLY AS TAKING CHARGE OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY PROCESS, AS PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD DONE WITH THE U.S. BUDGET IN 1993, THUS LAYING THE BASIS FOR LATER ECONOMIC SUCCESS. SECOND, TRANSPARENCY WAS NEEDED. THE

AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF NEEDED TO BE MADE PUBLIC SO THERE WOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING AND SO THE WORLD COULD SEE INDONESIA WAS KEEPING ITS WORD ON THE IMF PROGRAM. THIRD, POLICY PRESENTATION NEEDED TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD MADE THE POINT THAT THERE NEEDED TO BE AN ECONOMIC TEAM, UNDER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S LEADERSHIP, WITH ONE OR TWO CAPTAINS WHO COULD INTERACT WITH THE MARKETS AND BE SEEN AS STRONG AND CREDIBLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1714

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1714

PAGE 01 JAKART 00814 07 OF 07 120817Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00
	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------1AD315 120817Z /38

R 120817Z FEB 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9753
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 07 JAKARTA 000814

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EB, EB/IFD

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, INA/VELTHAUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/16
TAGS: EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS' MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, JANUARY 13

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TREASURY SECRETARY RUBIN SERVED AS SUCH A CAPTAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. THERE SHOULD BE ONE OR TWO PERSONS OTHER THAN PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WHO WERE TRUSTED IMPLEMENTORS OF POLICY.

33. (C) DEPSEC SUMMERS STRESSED THAT IF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO COULD AGREE ON GOING FORWARD WITH SUCH A PROGRAM IN HIS MEETING WITH CAMDESSUS, IT WOULD OFFER A STRONG CHANCE OF REGAINING THE CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S REMARKABLE RECORD ENTITLED HIM TO. FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PERSPECTIVE, THIS WAS A MOMENT OF GREAT CONCERN BECAUSE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN THE REGION. RAPID, BOLD ACTION WOULD BE WHAT MARKETS TESTED INDONESIA BY. PRESIDENT CLINTON CONVEYED HIS GREAT RESPECT. THESE STRONG STATEMENTS REFLECTED THE URGENCY OF THE NEED TO GET INDONESIA'S ECONOMY OUT OF THE INTENSIVE CARE UNIT.

34. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THIS COUNSEL AND ADVICE ON THE PART OF PRESIDENT CLINTON. HE WOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE SUGGESTED MEASURES, INCLUDING THE SYMBOLIC ACTS THAT THE WORLD CONSIDERED NECESSARY. IN FACT, THE GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY TAKEN SOME STEPS WITH RESPECT TO VARIOUS MEGA-PROJECTS, SUCH AS POWER PROJECTS. OTHER MEASURES WOULD ALSO BE TAKEN

IN ACCORD WITH INDONESIA'S CIRCUMSTANCES. THERE WEREQUESTIONS OF TIMING INVOLVING, BUT WE WERE IN ACCORD ON BASIC PRINCIPLES. HE ASKED THAT HIS WARM GREETINGS BE CONVEYED TO PRESIDENT CLINTON.

35. (C) IN CLOSING, DEPSEC SUMMERS EMPHASIZED THAT

PRESIDENT CLINTON WAS VERY ENGAGED IN FOLLOWING THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA. AS PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ACTED, PRESIDENT CLINTON WAS WILLING TO BE SUPPORTIVE. HE BELIEVED THAT ACTIONS OVER THE NEXT TWO TO THREE WEEKS, INDEED DURING THIS WEEK, WOULD HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE ON WHETHER CONFIDENCE RETURNED. HE URGED THAT RESTORING CONFIDENCE BE THE TOP PRIORITY. PRESIDENT CLINTON WAS WATCHING CLOSELY AND WANTED TO HELP.

36. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID THAT HE HAD ASSIGNED PROFESSOR WIDJOJO TO COORDINATE MEETINGS IN JAKARTA. ON SOME OCCASIONS, HE WOULD TAKE ACTION HIMSELF, BUT SOMETIMES THIS CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT HE DID NOT TRUST HIS ASSISTANTS. IN FACT, THE CURRENT CABINET ONLY HAD ONE A HALF MORE MONTHS IN OFFICE. ON MARCH 1 THE PROCESS WOULD BEGIN OF SELECTING A NEW PRESIDENT AND CABINET. IT WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY DIFFICULT TO DO ANYTHING BEFORE THEN. BEING A FREEDOM FIGHTER, HE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS WERE NECESSARY TO SERVE THE COUNTRY.

37. (C) DEPSEC SUMMERS NOTED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR PROFESSOR WIDJOJO. HIS ROLE, UNDER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S GUIDANCE, WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP IN RESTORING CONFIDENCE. ROY

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

Author: Luis Mendez at PO283A02
Date: 30/11/97 8:52 AM
Priority: Normal

Ed. Greg FYI (R01) FM+

TO: Mail List - #*Jakarta Staff, Agustina at PO283A01, Retnowati Alhabsyi at PO283A01, Steve Aswin at PO283A01, Samhari Baswedan at PO283A01, Friedhelm Betke at PO283A01, Henny Bufheim at PO283A01, Pieter Bult at PO283A01, Hanantoyati Bustamam at PO283A01, Eleanora De Guzman at PO283A01, Anne Marie Fonseka at PO283A01, Guest at PO283A01, Mita Gupta at PO283A01, Meyana Hernando at PO283A01, Ingrid Hindarmanto at PO283A01, Helena Hormein at PO283A01, Purwanta Iskandar at PO283A01, Emmy Janssen at PO283A01, Virginia Kadarsan at PO283A01, Robby Kamarga at PO283A01, Pretty Karsono at PO283A01, Sri Kartini at PO283A01, Yanti Koesnan at PO283A01, Siti Konio at PO283A01, Vivian Krause at PO283A01, Nuryahni Kusrin at PO283A01, Khin Sandi Lwin at PO283A01, Bob Mangunwidjojo at PO283A01, Yogeshwar Mathur at PO283A01, Shawn McKenzie at PO283A01, Moektijasih at PO283A01, Partini Moertjahjono at PO283A01, Faesol Muslim at PO283A01, Jang Muttalib at PO283A01, Daradjat Natanagara at PO283A01, Cynthia Pattiasina at PO283A01, Riitta Poutiainen at PO283A01, Bram Raubun at PO283A01, Charles Rycroft at PO283A01, Candy Sadewo at PO283A01, Kusbandinah Santoso at PO283A01, Enny Sastranegara at PO283A01, Rita Sastrodihardjo at PO283A01, Ernest Schoffelen at PO283A01, Sangita Sharma at PO283A01, Roger Shrimpton at PO283A01, Retno Siregar at PO283A01, Widodo Suhartoyo at PO283A01, Ita Suhita at PO283A01, Maja Suhud at PO283A01, Sunawang at PO283A01, Anton Talaha at PO283A01, Yenny Umar at PO283A01, Yoshiteru Uramoto at PO283A01, Brenda Vigo at PO283A01, Wibowo at PO283A01, Hilda Winarta at PO283A01, Stephen Woodhouse at PO283A01, Ray Yip at PO283A01, Mail List - #*Suboffices staff, Rihana Bakri at PO283I01, Verarati Budhisatria at PO283F01, Fify Joseph at PO283I01, Mahoko Kamatsuchi at PO283B01, Susy Katipana at PO283H01, Ram Koirala at PO283J01, Sinung Kristanto at PO283J01, Irwan Lubis at PO283F01, Mohammad Luthfi at PO283J01, Alex MacKenzie at PO283I01, Christa Marpaung at PO283H01, Soeseno Martokoesoemo at PO283B01, Hanna Satyawati at PO283F01, Ika Setiani at PO283H01, Sidarta at PO283B01, Toto Suharto at PO283B01, Made Sutama at PO283I01, Retno Wardhani at PO283J01, Sugiharti Weldy at PO283J01

Subject: El Nino/Indonesia. Red Cross sees famine in Indonesia's Iria

RELEASED IN FULL

bcc'd to Asia list, El Nino list, and WFP Country Office e-mail list.

INDONESIA - IRIAN JAYA 29 November 1997

1. Red Cross sees famine in Indonesia's Irian Jaya. Reuters. 29 Nov.
2. Red Cross finds another 103 drought casualties in eastern Indonesia. AFP. 29 Nov.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

****

1. Red Cross sees famine in Indonesia's Irian Jaya

04:32 a.m. Nov 29, 1997 Eastern [from the Web]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOM
DATE/CASE ID: 02 JUN 2006 200503065

By Jim Della-Giacoma

JAKARTA, Nov 29 (Reuters) - A drought-related famine in Indonesia's Irian Jaya province will cause thousands of deaths if emergency food supplies do not arrive soon, an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegate said on Saturday.

Speaking from the town of Timika, ICRC doctor Ferenc Myer told Reuters local people would be at risk from crop failure for up to six months, [illegible]ttered rains have started to fall in the province,

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

After visiting a number of highland villages in the Mimika and Jayawijaya regencies, Meyer said the death rate was increasing in badly affected villages.

In some up to 90 percent of the children were in the advanced stages of malnutrition, he added.

``I really hope people will understand the seriousness of the situation and help will come,'' Meyer said by telephone.

``Thousands will die,'' if help does not come, he added.

Indonesian authorities have said 528 people have died from drought-related illnesses in the regencies of Jayawijaya, Merauke and Puncak Jaya. Meyer said in Mimika regency he had learned of at least 40 more deaths since October.

The Jayawijaya regent has estimated more than 90,000 people are at risk in his district because of the drought, caused by the El Nino weather pattern in the Pacific Ocean.

Meyer said the joint ICRC-Indonesian Red Cross operation was designed to supplement efforts by local authorities and international bodies such as World Vision.

The ICRC originally made an appeal to foreign governments, answered by Switzerland and Australia, for $2 million over the next six months to help Irian Jaya, more than 4,000 km (2,500 miles) east of Jakarta.

But, after extensive visits to the Mimika and Jayawijaya regencies as well as calls for help by church leaders in Merauke, Meyer said the problem required funds closer to $5 million.

Hiring helicopters and buying food for villagers in the highlands, where there are no roads, would push the price up.

``Sixty percent of the children in Mapunduma are suffering malnutrition,'' Meyer said of the village which he visited on Friday. The village was the site of a hostage crisis involving Indonesian, British, Dutch and German researchers last year.

``I am convinced we will find worse outside of Mapunduma. If we leave the people as they are now, in one month they will start to die one after the other. It might be even three weeks,'' he said.

``It is a famine and the last stage of the famine as the people are starting to die,'' he said.

In their weakened state and without access to medicine, he said diseases such as cerebral malaria, respiratory infections and skin diseases were the main killers.

The ICRC hopes soon to have a second helicopter capable of carrying up to one tonne of supplies at a time. It also hopes to obtain highly nutritious ``Compact Food'' biscuits to ward off starvation and blankets to keep the weakened tribespeople warm.

Some were worried that the local people, many of whom still have a stone-age lifestyle, would prefer bulky rice or low-energy instant noodles to food supplements.

``But the small children ate (the compact food) because they are hungry,'' Meyer said, referring to a feeding at Mapunduma.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

... also needed.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

however, Meyer said, before they could harvest their staple crop -- sweet potato -- even if they were able to plant now.

Copyright 1997 Reuters Limited

---

same story, but additional details:

2. Red Cross finds another 103 drought casualties in eastern Indonesia

JAKARTA, Nov 29 (AFP) - The death toll from diseases linked to the severe drought in Indonesia's easternmost province of Irian Jaya has risen to more than 600, with a further 103 casualties reported, reports said Saturday.

A team from the Indonesian Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited three isolated villages in the Mimika district and found that 103 people had died of drought-related ailments since October 11, the Antara news agency said.

ICRC's Ferenc Meyer said the victims had died of ailments such as diarrhoea and malaria.

He said the health of some 1,000 people in the three villages of Alama, Ngim and Mvbua Jigi was very poor and more deaths were likely if no immeddiate relief was given.

The Red Cross team was providing medical help and also had a tonne of rice to distribute, Meyer said.

More drought victims may be found in other isolated villages in the area which authorities have yet to contact because of their isolation.

Officials in Jayawijaya, PuncakJaya and Merauke districts have already spoken of more than 500 drought-related deaths.

The drought that has hit Indonesia since May has wiped out the local yam harvest on which the tribes of Irian Jaya are highly dependent.

At least 90,000 tribesmen in Jayawijaya are threatened by a serious food shortage, the Jayawijaya district head J.B. Wenas has said.

The local tribes' high dependence on yam had left the population very susceptible to changes in the weather, and malnutrition greatly weakened their resistance to various ailments.

Relief operations have been forced to rely on a limited number of aircraft as most of the central range of Irian Jaya is only accessible by air.

The air relief has however been hampered by bad weather and the thick smoke from forest fires in the area during the dry season.

bs/cf

Copyright (c) 1997 Agence France-Presse
Received by NewsEDGE/LAN: 29-11-97 05:02 gmt+2

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL (R04)

Notes on Irian Jaya drought

The following is based on discussions with Oliver Humber-Droz of ICRC on Timika, various staff of WVI and MAF in Sentani (Jayapura) and Wamena, GOI officials in Timika, Jayapura and Wamena, and a visit to the Satlak (Persatuan Pelaksanaan) for the disaster relief effort in Wamena.

1. The relief effort. ICRC and WVI/MAF appear to be coordinating their relief efforts quite well to avoid duplication but provide maximum coverage. There is currently a question on how Mapenduma is to be covered - it is in ICRC's area, but CIDA has provided funds to WVI for this area and it appears the GOI prefers WVI to serve this area rather than ICRC. WVI has already deployed a nutritionist to Mapenduma to survey the area. ICRC and WVI feel that they have adequate supplies or commitments to provide food to their areas until May or June, when the sweet potato crop comes in. However, the GOI's emergency food supply, for those villages it supplies directly (through) MAF is nearly empty and no government resupply has occurred in January. Satlak staff expect BAPPENAS to allocate funds for resupply within the next few days.

2. USAID's program. WVI reports that packaged seed will leave Jakarta by sea on Friday (January 17) and arrive in Jayapura the following Friday. It should require only one day for air shipment to Wamena via Hercules and distribution will begin immediately after. An agronomist from the Surabaya seed company and WVI agriculture staff will begin Monday to advise villagers on proper preparation of fields and planting of seed.

3. The hunger situation. Both ICRC and WVI are satisfied that sufficient food is being distributed to meet at least half their calorie requirements through getting food from the airstrips to distant villages remains difficult because villagers have been weakened by their hunger. Rice is the primary staple supplied by the GOI and most donors (except ICRC) and it is being accepted and eaten-though not liked. ICRC's nutritions biscuits have been well received, particularly by children-who need the nutrition the most. Earlier fears that food distribution would encourage highland villagers to stay near the feeding points and neglect their fields have reportedly not materialized. Though people travel-sometimes a day's journey or more - to get their two-week allocation of food, they return to their villages. Since rains began several weeks ago, new crops of sweet potatoes and other vegetables, including corn, are in the ground. The fields are now green, but the new crop will not produce sweet potatoes until June. WVI feels confident enough about availability of food in the highland areas to have downgraded several villages from Category IV (100% dependent on emergency food supplies) to Category III (75% dependent). Nonetheless, relief workers and missionaries in these areas remarked that what little remains of last season's crop is nearly gone, and the primary food available locally is sweet potato leaves. Few livestock remain (apparently many pigs died in the drought). Continuation of emergency food supplies for at least the next three to six months is considered essential.

4. Complications. ICRC is working in the region where OPM took hostages in 1996 and the GOI is still concerned about possible OPM activity in the area. ICRC notes that there is a military presence in every village and that villagers are not allowed to go out to their fields without

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 02 JUN 2006 200503065

military permission. This may mean crop production for the June crop will suffer, and dependence on outside food supplies may remain in this area for some time longer.

5. Health. According to official statistics, 447 people have died from the drought. Malaria remains the biggest concern, since highland villages which have not experienced malaria in the past have very strong reactions. In a few villages, estimates are as high as 90% of residents with the disease. Pneumonia has also appeared in a dozen or so villages, primarily in the southern highlands.

6. Some comments/notes

- MAF seems to be doing a superb job, though they lack the right types of aircraft to reach some areas MAF complains that coordination (especially on the government side) has been inadequate, leading the some inefficiencies. However, this is apparently improving.

- I visited Pasema, a 12 minutes flight from Wamena. People living near the airfields are in pretty good shape.

- WVI has a number of questions:

- Is our grant to MAF just to transport WVI seed, or for their general operations? It makes a difference as to how WVI finances these flights.

- What are USAID's reporting requirements; how often, to whom, what format and info?

Recommendation:

1. Go out in mid Feb, see the seed planting program, stay overnight in village.

2. Yusak - check out with BAKORNAS to make sure food got delivered to Wamena

NOTE TO MYSELF

- Remember the two health duties

- Paul Murphy

P:\DIR\drought:1/20/98

VS OFFICE Electronic Mail Wednesday 02/18/98 07:47 am Page: 1

To: Fergin, Gregory G JAKARTA
From: Molldrem, Vivikka
Subject: fwd: Trip Report: Wamena Date: 02/17/98

RELEASED IN FULL

R05

Distribution:

Not Requested

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 02 JUN 2006 200503065

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

Item Subject: Message Body

RELEASED IN PART
B6

** SUBJECT: re: Ron Libby's Debrief On Indonesia and [redacted] Visits

R02

Ray/Ron:

We are sending in the cable today.

The cable includes recommendations for funding support for World Vision, MAF and the ICRC appeal. We received the WVRD proposal on Monday, 12/1/97. An analysis has been completed by our in-house agricultural staffer re: seeds, type selection, and in-country vendor/supplier. No major issues have been identified with regard to seeds and type. The vendor identified by WVRD is Tani Jaya in Bogor. This is a reputable company and can provide the quality and quantities of seeds required.

On the administrative side we have a small snag which Ron knows about (LIbby/Hubbard telecon 12/9/97 - JKT time) regarding WVRD/Indonesia's registration with USAID. Ms. Lynn B. Sauls is correct. WVRD/Indonesia is not registered and therefore, we will need to process the grant thorough WVRD/Washington. A letter has been prepared and faxed to WVRD/W requesting that they submit a formal proposal. A copy of the proposal submitted by WVRD/Indonesia is attached for their reference.

I strongly agree, time is of the essence. Our meeting with ICRC last week where they reported on their assessment of conditions in Irian Jaya confirmed everyone's fears and concerns, the situation is starting to deteriorate. ICRC reports that the mortality rates (based on overall population numbers) is running as high as an estimated 10% in certain areas (NOTE: this data is based on one village data sample from within the area assessed). ICRC's assessment of the situation is critical. Based on their assessment ICRC has revised its proposal in terms of the components of services and appeal funding level as follows:

Transportation
-- one large helicopter for 3 months @ $450k
-- one small helicopter for 6 months @ $420k
Food
-- ICRC is proposing to procure 30,000 tons of "compac food" from some where in Europe @ 1.2 million Swiss Francs.
Staff - Expats.
-- one doctor, nurse, and nutritionist for 6 months @160k Swiss Francs.
Indonesia Staff
- Health worker, nutritionist, and agronomist. No cost where discussed for the Indonesian staff.

Bottom line, the ICRC funding appeal request is 3,736,821 Swiss Francs or $2.6 million. Henry Fournier, Head of Delegation is awaiting Geneva approval on his revised proposal and budget. He also mentioned that Geneva normally tries to keep appeal amounts amounts at or below the two million dollar mark. Mr. Founier is definitely looking to USAID for funding assistance on their appeal.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 02 JUN 2006 200503065

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MAF: Met with Kenneth Frizzell, Air Serv and Robert Breuker, MAF this afternoon 12/9/97 and the MAF proposal will be ready on Thursday, 12/11/97. A copy will be forwarded to your office to your office as soon as it is received.

If you want to discuss any of the above, please feel free to call me at home. My number is [redacted] B6

Peace
Peter

Original Text
From Ray Dionne@BHR.OFDA@AIDW, on 12/9/97 5:00 AM:
Forwarded to: Peter R. Hubbard@EXO@JAKARTA
cc: Maria Rendon@DAG@JAKARTA,Ron Libby@BHR.OFDA@AIDWStephanie Fritz@BHR.OFDA@AIDW
Comments by: Ray Dionne@BHR.OFDA@AIDW
Comments:

Peter,

Today, Ron Libby and I discussed the debrief on his field trip to Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, which will be held tomorrow afternoon. I know that you must be very busy and are no doubt still obtaining answers to some of the issues which I raised in my e-mail to you last Friday. I hope to hear from you by e-mail or phone by my tomorrow morning. Ron has expressed some concern about the proposed WVRD seeds proposal. He feels that if there is not an executed grant for the WVRD seeds activity within the next week or so, it will be too late to be effective. Ron hopes to call you this evening (your morning) to discuss the matter.

Once again, here are the general activities and funding levels that we have informally discussed for an OFDA response in Indonesia, if requested and justified in a cable by USAID/Jakarta:

MAF (Air Transport Support)	$100,000
WVRD (Seeds Project)	200,000
ICRC (Agriculture and Health)	150,000
Total	450,000

Within the total figure there will probably be room to increase the dollar

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

funding of one or two of the activities, if one of the activities is reduced or dropped. But, the critical point is that the USAID must be strongly supportive of the activities which it does finally recommend. Also, it is now getting rather late, following the technical advisor's field visit, to still be discussing the proposed disaster response. I am sure that you feel the same way. We need to take some action or agree that one or some of these activities will fall out. If the definitive cable requesting OFDA funding that we discussed last week is now in draft, could you fax it to me so I will know where we stand at this point in time. Thank you for your continued good efforts.

Best Regards,

Ray

==========

Forwarded to: Leonard Rogers@BHR.AA@AIDW,DAVID HAGEN@BHR.FFP@AIDWPaula Bryan@ANE.ESA@AIDW
cc:
Comments by: Ray Dionne@BHR.OFDA@AIDW
Comments:

Please attend if you have an interest.

---------- [Original Message] ----------

Ron LIbby will discuss his month-long field visit to Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to assist both posts in thinking through the fire and drought-related problems that both countries are facing relative to this year's El Nino events. The meeting will be held in the OFDA Operations Center from 2:30PM to 4:00PM on Tueasday, 12-9-97. Interested staff are welcome to attend.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

VS OFFICE Electronic Mail Thursday 03/26/98 02:17 pm Page: 1

To: Fergin, Gregory G JAKARTA
From: Hubbard, Peter R.
Subject: fwd: Need to Talk Please Date: 02/01/98

RELEASED IN PART
B6
R07

Distribution:

Not Requested

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 02 JUN 2006 200503065

Item Subject: Message Body

** SUBJECT: fwd: Need to Talk Please Call!

No action required...FYI only...to ensure that the information loop is complete.

Original Text
From Vivikka Molldrem@DIR@JAKARTA, on 2/2/98 7:24 AM:
To: Peter R. Hubbard@EXO@JAKARTA

Peter - I suggest you pass this to whoever at the Embassy cares about such things. Mike Owens, perhaps. Thanks.

From Peter R. Hubbard@EXO@JAKARTA, on 1/30/98 6:58 PM:
To: Ray Dionne@BHR.OFDA@AIDW
Cc: Ron Libby@BHR.OFDA@AIDW, Vivikka Molldrem@DIR@JAKARTA, Sharon L Cromer@CM@JAKARTA, Yusak Oppusunggu@PPS@JAKARTA, James I Stein@UEM@JAKARTA, Maria Rendon@DAG@JAKARTA

Ray:

Happy New Year! I hope that you and your families enjoyed the holidays.

The USAID/Indonesia Mission Director recently travelled to Irian Jaya The first of what follows are her observations and report on activities in Irian Jaya.

1. Update: Irian Jaya

-- Relief effort: ICRC and WVI/MAF appear to be coordinating their relief efforts quite well to avoid duplication and are providing maximum coverage.

World Vision International(WVI) has already deployed a nutritionist to Mapenduma to survey the area. ICRC and WVI feel that they have adequate supplies or commitments to provide food to their areas until May or June, when the sweet potato crop comes in. However, the GOI's emergency food supply, for those villages it supplies directly (through) MAF is nearly empty and no government resupply has occurred in January. Satlak staff expect BAPPENAS to allocate funds for resupply within the next few days.

-- USAID's program: WVI reports that packaged seed will left Jakarta by sea on Friday (January 17) and arrived in Jayapura the following Friday. It should require only one day for air shipment to Wamena via Hercules and distribution will begin immediately after. An agronomist from the Surabaya seed company and WVI agriculture staff will begin Monday to advise villagers on proper preparation of fields and planting of seed.

-- Hunger and Food Situation: Both ICRC and WVI are satisfied that sufficient food is being distributed to meet at least half their calorie requirements through getting food from the airstrips to distant villages

remains difficult because villagers have been weakened by their hunger. Rice is the primary staple supplied by the GOI and most donors (except ICRC) and it is being accepted and eaten-though not liked. ICRC's nutritions biscuits have been well received, particularly by children-who need the nutrition the most. Earlier fears that food distribution would encourage highland villagers to stay near the feeding points and neglect their fields have reportedly not materialized. Though people travel-sometimes a day's journey or more - to get their two-week allocation of food, they return to their villages. Since rains began several weeks ago, new crops of sweet potatoes and other vegetables, including corn, are in the ground. The fields are now green, but the new crop will not produce sweet potatoes until June. WVI feels confident enough about availability of food in the highland areas to have downgraded several villages from Category IV (100% dependent on emergency food supplies) to Category III (75% dependent). Nonetheless, relief workers and missionaries in these areas remarked that what little remains of last season's crop is nearly gone, and the primary food available locally is sweet potato leaves. Few livestock remain (apparently many pigs died in the drought). Continuation of emergency food supplies for at least the next three to six months is considered essential.

-- Complications and the Politics of Providing Relief Assistance: ICRC is working in the region where OPM took hostages in 1996 and the GOI is still concerned about possible OPM activity in the area. ICRC notes that there is a military presence in every village and that villagers are not allowed to go out to their fields without military permission. This may mean crop production for the June crop will suffer, and dependence on outside food supplies may remain in this area for some time longer.

-- Health Conditions: According to official statistics, 447 people have died from the drought. Malaria remains the biggest concern, since highland villages which have not experienced malaria in the past have very strong reactions. In a few villages, estimates are as high as 90% of residents with the disease. Pneumonia has also appeared in a dozen or so villages, primarily in the southern highlands.

-- Logistics/Transportation: Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF) seems to be doing a superb job, though they lack the right types of aircraft to reach some areas MAF complains that coordination (especially on the government side) has been inadequate, leading the some inefficiencies. However, this is apparently improving. End of Mission Directors notes.

A FootNote: We have learned GOI supplies to Irian Jaya are not being provided
consistent with the areas needs. In fact, central staging areas in Irian Jaya
are reported to be empty without hope in sight due to the countries current economic condition.

Recommendations and Resouce Requirements:

1. AirServe has submitted a proposal, which I believe you have been copied

on, for OFDA funding in the amount of $50k for an ANG Twin Otter from the Redstone Arsenal. I met yesterday, Thursday, January 29, 1998, with AirServe and MAF's Jakarta representative Robert Breuker to discuss their proposal.

USAID/Indonesia supports the AirServe's proposal, however, we are uncertain as the whether the twin otter aircraft is still available.

I would like to discuss this in more detail. Item number one on my agenda for our telcon.

2. Drought Impact - East Timor:

USAID/Indonesia and the U.S. Ambassador have received a report on the drought conditions in East Timor from CARE and the conditions decribed in 10 to 13 villages areas discussed in the CARE report is not good at all.

USAID/Indonesia is hereby requesting and recommending that $25k be approved/authorized by OFDA for disaster relief assistance for East-Timor. The U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia will be travelling to the area next week would like to personally present the $25k grant of relief funds from the USG during his upcoming visit to East Timor.

Urgently need to discuss the details and specifics on a rapid response to the Ambassador's request.

Ray, please call me as soon as you have read this message. My home phone number is [redacted] B6

Peace
Peter

ASSESSMENT OF THE CRISIS IN INDONESIA

A report prepared by USAID for the Senate Appropriations Committee in response to a request for a comprehensive assessment of the situation in Indonesia. The report is based on extensive interviews by USAID staff, analysis of assessments and analyses included in the bibliography, and recent appraisals of the financial crisis in Asia preparatory to development of the Accelerating Economic Recovery in Asia Initiative.

November 9, 1998

CONTENTS

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

II. The Crisis and its Consequences 1

III. The Response 2

IV. USAID Strategy and Program 3

V. Appendices 10

A. Humanitarian and Social Impact 10
B. Economic Impact 23
C. Political Impact 41

The Crisis and its Consequences

"No country in recent history, let alone the size of Indonesia,
has suffered such as dramatic reversal of fortune."
-- The World Bank, 1998

Indonesia's economic collapse is without recent precedent. The national economy is expected to contract by 15 percent this year, following three decades of annual growth exceeding six percent. The rupiah is now worth roughly 30 percent of its value a year ago and inflation may exceed 80 percent by the end of 1998. Banks have ceased lending--commercial banks haven't made a loan since September 1997, and two-thirds of the corporations on the Jakarta Stock Exchange are bankrupt. Forty percent of the population now live near or below the poverty line, a figure expected to swell to 65 percent by early next year. Unemployment, now estimated at 20 million, grows by the thousands daily. What began as an economic crisis has quickly developed into a crisis of complex social and political dimensions with dramatic humanitarian implications.

THE IMPACT

Poverty and unemployment: Indonesia has seen a remarkable increase in "newly poor." Where last year annual per capita income was $1,200, this year it is estimated to be $400. The International Labor Organization estimates by the end of the year as many as 80 million people will be earning less than one dollar a day; unemployment could rise to 20 million and underemployment far higher. Nearly a third of Jakarta's workforce is unemployed.

Food: For the first time in years food availability has become a major concern. The problem is not so much supply as ability to buy. Inflation, unemployment, growing poverty, and the disruption of traditional distribution systems have reduced access to food, particularly in urban and peri-urban areas. Rice scarcity and price hikes contribute to social unrest. Prices spiked in September, triggering riots and burning of rice in a number of small towns, particularly on Java.

Health: Growing poverty has meant that people eat less. The government estimates that as many as 60 million Indonesians may not be able to meet their minimum food requirements. Recent surveys are showing disturbing signs of increasing anemia (particularly on Java), and cases of kwashiorkor and marasmus are beginning to appear in urban hospitals. UNICEF estimates that eight million infants are undernourished. Helen Keller reports a significant drop in young women's bodyweight and growing signs of vitamin A and iron deficiencies. The government's health budget, already one of the world's lowest, has been cut by 15-20 percent, and the government cannot afford the increased costs of imported pharmaceutical and family planning commodities. The private sector, responsible for servicing 50 percent of health needs, is at risk. Nearly 100 of 224 pharmaceutical manufacturers are technically bankrupt. for example, and three out of ten of the largest distributors.

Education: Poverty has begun to affect school enrollments as parents can't afford school

fees. The government estimates that nearly three million students are at risk.

Political: Demonstrations and riots forced Suharto to exit in May, unleashing a political reform movement of unquantifiable dimensions. There has been a flowering of debate and new institutions to carry the debate forward: more than 140 new newspapers and dozens of radio stations, 11 new unions, and more than 90 political parties. New election laws are being debated, and, for the first time since 1955, the government has pledged to hold free and open elections.

At the same time, the dramatic change has brought great uncertainties and concerns about a backlash as political groups and interests vie for power in an environment where new rules of the game are not yet established or even agreed-upon. Continued ethnic tension, a long-delayed investigation of last May's events targeting Indonesia's ethnic Chinese, the recent attack on a legal aid organization, and the "ninja" killings of 160 muslims in East Java, all support these concerns.

Economic: The collapse of the rupiah, growing inflation, mounting unemployment, failed companies, closed banks, all revealed clearly the institutional weaknesses of Indonesia's financial sector. The crisis did not affect all parts of the economy equally, however. Certain sectors--such as agriculture and natural resource-based exports--have profited from the rupiah's weakening, and certain parts of the country, particularly on the outer islands where coffee, copra, cocoa, palm oil and logging are important, continue to do reasonably well. Real recovery, in terms of significant new investment, awaits some confidence in reasonable security and a resolution of political uncertainties. In the meantime, however, the depth of the crisis has ushered in new interest in reform and remarkable opportunities for restructuring the financial sector and working out corporate debt while attacking major areas of weakness relating to governance, institutional supervision and accountability.

Environment: The economic crisis has brought new pressures on natural resources and the environment. Desperation among the rural poor has provoked rising conflict over access to land and other natural resources. In urban areas, increasing costs of energy and deteriorating urban infrastructure have added to the misery of the newly unemployed. But the crisis has also opened doors to democratic discussion and the possibility of improving transparency and governance in natural resources management--an area where corruption has been particularly severe.

THE RESPONSE

The international donor community has mounted a major rescue effort for Indonesia. Under the leadership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a $40 billion economic reform and recovery package, to be disbursed over three years, includes: IMF stand-by credits of $10.14 billion, $3.5 billion from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), $4.5 billion from the World Bank (WB), and pledges from bilateral donors as follows: Singapore, $10 billion; Japan, $5 billion; the U.S., $3 billion; and Australia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Malaysia, $1 billion each. The program is to stimulate domestic demand by

careful deficit spending; restart the shattered financial sector; resolve corporate sector debt issues and assist restructuring efforts and strengthen economic governance. Given the magnitude of Indonesia's crisis, with more than $60 billion in private sector debt alone, the donors' financial package provides an important lifeline, but not the answer to Indonesia's recovery.

In addition, donors are seeking to mitigate the impact of the crisis through programs focused on social safety net concerns. The World Bank and ADB are financing labor intensive works public works. The World Bank is funding a stay-in school program and has restructured its health program to help the GOI preserve basic health family planing services. The ADB is providing loans to decentralize and manage social services for the most vulnerable sections of the population, women and children, and Australia's aid to support the IMF, to help with labor intensive public works, and to provide drought relief. Many of the other donors are involved in programs related to the drought or to the last year's fires in Kalimatan.

Since the fall of Suharto and the announcement of elections, a growing number of donors are expressing interest in work related to the elections. Few have actually begun any work on the ground, but several, including USAID, the European Union, France, Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Australia, are discussing future assistance as part of an ongoing donor forum on elections under the aegis of the UNDP.

USAID'S STRATEGY AND PROGRAM

USAID's strategy responds to the immediate humanitarian needs of ordinary Indonesians through work on the social safety net--food, health and jobs--while simultaneously using the new opportunities offered by the momentum for reform to build foundations for a healthier, more productive and democratic Indonesia. It includes a large food program and works with the government, NGOs and donors to maximize the effectiveness of the government's relief efforts. It reshapes USAID's urban program to support NGOs and local governments in creating labor-intensive public works. It develops a new health program targeting the most vulnerable--mothers and children. It provides technical assistance aimed at economic recovery--to help Indonesia unravel corporate debt and failed banks and to put in place the policies, laws and institutions required to assure confidence in a restored system.

At the same time, it recognizes that although external factors played a role, fundumental problems of governance accrederated sharply exacerbated Indonesia's oasis. Systematic misgovernance and abuse of power created the conditions for economic collapse and the potential for a humanitarian disaster. The fall of Suharto and the impetus to democracy offers an opportunity for improvement. The upcoming elections and the wave of reform represent a remarkable opportunity to create a new consensus on how Indonesia is to be governed. Such a consensus is key to the restoration of confidence in Indonesia's future which will allow economic recovery to begin. The development of strong civic institutions to demand improved governance is critical if economic recovery is to be sustained.

Because the political transition scheduled for this year is so crucial and so uncertain, the strategy puts civic and community participation--elections support and free and open debate on critical issues--at the center of its program. USAID has been and will continue to be one of the largest and most active donors in civic and community participation (democracy and governance sectors). The USAID Program, more than any single donor program, has been instrumental in laying the groundwork for political reform and will continue to support and facilitate the active engagement of donor groups in strengthening democratic reforms. It will coordinate closely with other donors because the task of preparing 100 million voters on 17,000 islands across a 3,000 mile archipelago is so vast. A broad and active support from international donors will be important in responding to concerns about sovereignty and impartiality. Our work in this area will involve more than 200 new partners, Indonesian NGOs, political parties, media, legal authorities, academics and civic organizations.

We are currently developing a proposal with the support of the State Department and Department of Treasury for a five-year, $520 million program, "Accelerating Economic Recovery in Asia," AERA, for which work in Indonesia will be a central part. AERA's focus will be on job creation, better targeting of social safety net instruments and strenthening of the foundations for a sustained economic recovery.

Finally, because of continued USG interest in global issues such as biodiversity and global climate change and Indonesia's unique role in these issues, we will maintain an active presence in natural resource management. We will respond to crisis-related pressures on the environment and new-found opportunities for reform to focus on decentralization and support for community-based management of natural resources, including forests and coral reefs. The objective will be to strengthen NGOs advocating community-based management and reform of natural resources management.

USAID's strategy responds to the immediate needs of the crisis while simultaneously using new opportunities to build foundations for long-term, sustainable development. The program has two phases. Phase I (FY 1999 through FY 2000) the core of the strategy, responds to the immediate crisis. It focuses on immediate needs--the social safety net through food, jobs and health, while placing at the center of its program as its major emphasis, work with NGOs on the development of civic institutions and preparation for carrying out, monitoring and building on free and fair elections. At the same time, it initiates long-term work on economic reform, particularly corporate debt and bank restructuring, and maintains a strong base of support for natural resources management and the environment. During Phase II (FY 2001 to FY 2003), the strategy emphasizes recovery, long-term programs for economic growth, the strengthening of civil society, health and family planning and protection of the environment.

We have already made distinct shifts in our program strategy and are requesting budget changes to reflect them. We are asking to increase our allocation for civic and community participation (democracy and governance) to more than 40 percent of our

budget. To support social safety net activities, we are adding funds for technical assistance on food policy and for monitoring, increasing our emphasis on health and designing a new program for women and children, and realigning our urban program to focus on job creation. We are requesting a doubling of our allocation for economic reform to take advantage of new opportunities for major changes in key economic policy areas.

USAID is using a variety of sources of funding and mechanisms to implement its activities. They include development assistance, food assistance, economic support funds, international disaster assistance, and urban environmenal credits. We are employing grants, cooperative agreements, experimental combinations of contracts and grants, umbrella arrangments and are working with more than 200 local NGOs. Through US NGOs and contractors, we are working extensively with indigenous groups, including muslim and community-based organizations engaged in activities ranging from primary health care and feeding programs to protection of natural resources.

Humanitarian and Social Concerns

A social safety net is critical to ease the effect of the crisis on the most vulnerable and to allow time to build consensus on political and economic reforms necessary to achieve sustainable and broad-based growth. USAID's response to the humanitarian and social dimensions of the crisis includes technical assistance, commodities and training to create jobs, increase access to food, and provide critical health and family planning services, specifically:

Poverty and Unemployment

- o $25.5 million in urban environmental credit to the GOI for emergency public works programs, creating jobs and building urban infrastructure.

- o Technical assistance to municipal governments and local NGOs to develop public works. (220,000 person-days work created since March; an estimated 7,600,000 person-days of employment by March 2000.)

Food

- o $50 million in PL 480 Title II food through the World Food Program (WFP) and US NGOs working with Indonesian NGOs on the eastern islands, Kalimantan and central Java; nearly 10,000 tons have been delivered; 10,000 more is en route. The food is for food-for-work programs, supplementary feeding of vulnerable groups and targeted feeding for the poor.

- o Support to an Indonesian NGO to monitor food delivery to five major cities.

- o Planning with USDA on distribution or monetization of up to 1.5 million tons of wheat through WFP and NGOs.

- Work with Donor Food Group to maximize effectiveness of GOI food program.

Health and Family Planning

- Support for NGOs and local health providers on delivery of health and family planning services to meet crisis priority needs.

- Technical assistance to the Ministry of Health for its new crisis planning and response center and to the National Crisis Response Center for crisis impact monitoring.

- Donation of medical supplies and contraceptives.

- Fortification of wheat with iron.

- Support for midwives including emergency supplies, contraceptives, training and operational support.

- Support to NGOs and GOI working on prevention of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS.

Civic and Community Participation

Indonesia's most urgent political challenge at present is to hold free and fair elections that bring into office leaders committed to continuing the process of political and economic reform. Significantly, much of the current reform movement has flourished largely because of President Habibie's political weakness prevents him from resisting change. Should a 'strongman' take the Presidency, the reforms made to date could be summarily reversed. (Such turnabouts are not unknown in Indonesian history. The country did experiment with democratic reform under Sukarno in the 1950s, an endeavor that was sharply curtailed with the then-President's move to 'Guided Democracy' in 1957). Delays in holding elections would also afford the current administration time to consolidate its power base.

A free, transparent election is also essential to maintaining the public enthusiasm currently buoying 'Reformasi'. The continuing economic hardship may sap much of this enthusiasm as the benefits of political reformation are slow to manifest themselves in the economic realm. A tangible achievement within the political arena, namely a free election, will be vital to maintaining the momentum of the reform movement. In Phase I, USAID will encourage transparent, inclusive, and legitimate parliamentary and presidential elections. USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) plays a special role during this period with short-term activities, including support for the media, voter education, human rights, and civil-military relations. In Phase II, USAID will develop responsive public institutions, stronger civil society organizations and effective

mechanisms for oversight and accountability. USAID's response includes:

- o Support to 45 advocacy NGOs working on elections and political reforms. (This should grow to 150 to 200 in the run-up to the elections.)
- o Grants to NGOs for democracy, civil society, human rights and work related to the elections.
- o Establishment of NGO and donor working groups on the elections.
- o Voter education, independent media and election management and administrative needs assessments.
- o Support to groups working on human rights and violence against women, with specific reference to the rapes of Indonesian Chinese women in May.
- o Support for NGOs working on investigating human rights abuses in Irian Jaya, E. Timor, and Aceh.
- o Support for election law reviews and discussions on election laws, procedures, and regulations to the GOI, NGOs and political partieis.
- o Development of the nationwide public service announcement on interfaith tolerance.
- o Support to media groups developing or reviewing laws governing freedom of expression.
- o Expanded support to Indonesian umbrella organizations working on political reform.

Economic Reform

USAID is focusing on providing U.S. technical expertise to support achievement of the economic and financial reform agenda set under the IMF/GOI agreement and supported by all members of the Consultative Group for Indonesia. In the financial and corporate sectors, this allows Indonesia to benefit from U.S. experience related to such situations as resolution of the U.S. S&L crisis of the mid-80's and U.S. support to economic and financial restructuring in eastern Europe. Given the strength of the U.S. economic system, provision of U.S. expertise related to corporate governance, economic law and regulation, and macroeconomic policy, is also especially appropriate. The program is carefully coordinated with other involved U.S. institutions, such as the U.S. Treasury, as well as the IMF and the other multilaterals. It includes:

- o Bank restructuring in a joint activity with the US Treasury hrough advisors working at Bank Indonesia (central bank) and the Indonesian Bank Restructuring

Agency.

- o Strengthening of Bank Indonesia's system of bank supervision.
- o Corporate restructuring through technical assistance on laws relating to bankruptcy, competition, secured transactions, arbitration.
- o Support for debtor-creditor negotiations under the Jakarta Initiative.
- o Training and technical support to the new commercial court.
- o Assistance in developing the new independent competition agency (Federal Trade Commission) required to implement the new competition law.
- o Support to the GOI, civic organizations, NGOs, university groups, and think tanks working on the removal of barriers to trade and investment, focusing on obstacles to free and open trade and fair competion for small businesses.
- o Technical support to Bank Indonesia on monetary policy and exchange rate regimes heavily affected by the crisis, in coordination with the IMF and US Treasury.
- o Technical support to the Ministry of Finance to deal with changes in fiscal policy and tax reform to respond to the crisis and its impact.
- o Support partnerships between US NGOs and Indonesian universities, think tanks or NGOs to encourage discussion and debate on key reform issues.

Environment

The economic crisis has brought new pressures on natural resources and the environment. Desperation among the rural poor has provoked rising conflict over access to land and other natural resources. In urban areas, increasing costs of energy and deteriorating urban infrastructure have added to the misery of the newly unemployed. But the crisis has also opened doors to democratic discussion and ushered in a wealth of opportunities for debate on policy and regulatory issues with broad implications for Indoensia's economic recovery and the future of its environment. During Phase I, USAID will strengthen local capacity to manage natural resources, and restructure and reform the energy sector. This work will serve as a foundation for USAID's Phase II efforts to preserve Indonesia's biodiversity and reduce the generation of greenhouse gasses.

- o Support and strengthen 15 Indonesian NGOs working to redress human rights abuses stemming from confiscatory land use practices.
- o Technical assistance to local governments and NGOs to identify, articulate and arbitrate local resource conflicts.

- Provide assistance to NGOs working on efforts to rewrite laws affecting natural resource use and management in an effot to eliminate sources of corruption and misdirected exploitation of natural resources.

- Assist local communities in developing alternative income sources in coastal areas hardest hit by the economic recession and drought.

Cross-cutting Issues: There are four cross-cutting issues common to most activities in USAID's portfolio: transparency in decision-making and anti-corruption, women in development, the role of NGOs, and decentralization. USAID is actively exploiting synergies between activities to emphasis impact on these issues.

Appendices

I. HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES, NEEDS AND RESPONSE

A. Humanitarian Consequences of the Crisis

The ILO has estimated that by mid-1998, 75 million Indonesians were living below the poverty line--37 percent of the population. The number is expected to grow to 100 million by year end, and by the end of 1999, two of every three Indonesians--140 million people--will be living in poverty *(see figure 3.1)*. These numbers represent a serious set-back for Indonesia which by 1997 had managed to reduce poverty to about ten percent of the population, down from fifty percent in 1970. The rise was caused mainly by a dramatic increase in unemployment and high inflation--which drove food and medicine prices beyond the reach of many. The crisis was exacerbated by droughts caused by El Nino, which devastated last year's rice crop.

Food Shortages: Last year, El Nino's extremely dry weather, particularly in eastern Indonesia, caused widespread crop failures and delayed rice planting. El Nino, together with reduced food imports due to financial straits, diminished Indonesia's food supply late in the summer. By October 1998, however, although isolated shortages existed, there appeared to be adequate food supplies in-country (see fig. 3.2).
In early 1998, a sharp currency devaluation and rumors of price rises created a food rush that depleted stocks of staples such as rice, sugar, and cooking oil temporarily. Many households began hoarding food, fearing that these staples would not be available in the future at affordable prices.

Fears of food shortages--and the sharp increase in inflation--led to soaring food prices. The depreciation of the rupiah and the collapse of the Indonesian banking system hindered food imports, as many international banks refused to accept letters of credit (LCs) issued by Indonesian importers. To respond, the government set up a financing mechanism to guarantee food imports using international reserves.

The riots in May 1998 damaged distribution chains and destroyed stores that provided daily supplies. While distribution infrastructure appears to be in working order, the psychological impact of the riots continues to affect distribution. Consumers and farmers hold larger-than-normal stocks in anticipation of a breakdown of law and order, future shortages and increased prices. Traders limit the size of their stock, fearful of being charged with hoarding, an offense with heavy penalties, or out of concerns about looting of food stocks, which continues in isolated incidences, often with little protection from police. Thus, little food moves, and while adequate food stocks exist in-country, food prices remain high.

Food availability: Despite conflicting reports, an FAO September assessment estimated the rice crop deficit at 5.14 million tons for the period April 1998 to March 1999. By mid-September, Indonesia's national logistics agency had imported 2.42 million tons and contracted another 525,000 tons. Food pledges from donor countries added a further

765,000 tons, leaving a shortfall of 1.43 million tons to be secured on commercial terms or through grants.

Prices: The crux of the crisis is not food supply, but prices and consumers' ability to pay. Spot shortages still exist, but the main problem is access to food. Inflated prices and growing unemployment have put a large portion of Indonesia's population out of the reach of sufficient food. Inflation is expected to reach 80 percent this year and food prices have risen even faster. The FAO reports that the Indonesia Food Price Index has more than doubled between August 1997 and July 1998.

Basic Food Staples
(Rp per kg)

	Jul 97	*Apr 98*	*Nov 98*
sugar	1,550	1,800	3,590
cooking	1,700	3,600	3,600
eggs	3,000	5,200	7,000
milk	19,409	31,150	32,000
flour	-	1,150	3,500
beef	-	16,000	23,000

Production: The 1998 rice crop is estimated to fall by eight percent this year to 45.38 million tons–the smallest harvest since 1991. The reduction is caused by a delay in planting due to the drought, pest attacks, and a dramatic reduction in fertilizer and pesticide use (due to rising costs). Planting started in October for the next major harvest in March. Other food crops seem to have increased their outputs over the past year, including corn, up nine percent; soybeans, which increased eight percent, and cassava, which rose eight percent. Soaring prices of imported feed have created severe shortages in the supply of livestock products. Poultry output is estimated to have fallen by 30-50 percent.

The drought did not hit the country uniformly. Unfortunately, some regions which experienced the largest decrease in rainfall, such as East Timor, East Nusa Tenggara, and Irian Jaya, are also among Indonesia's poorest. Even before the crisis, the number of poor households in these provinces was three times the national average (see fig. 3.3). In general, the outer islands have the highest incidence of poverty, but Java with about 120 million people or 60 percent of the population, has the largest absolute number of poor (See fig 3.4) and the largest absolute number of unemployed. Food insecurity and malnutrition will have a different impact in urban areas than they do in rural areas, where alternative, less expensive foodstuffs may exist.

Mid-year reviews show regions producing and selling dollar-earning commodities faring better than others. Areas with export crops such as shrimp, coffee, rubber, cocoa, seaweed, etc. are experiencing unprecedented increases in income, which have generally

outpaced food price increases. The government has tried to ensure supplies of basic foods at affordable prices across the country through direct subsidies, export taxes on food commodities and bans on their export. This has led to smuggling of subsidized foods to countries where they can be sold at international prices, a problem which may have diminished as the rupiah strengthens.

The future is unclear. Rice prices may fall by the end of the year. A recent World Food Program assessment, for example, suggests that the demand for rice in the urban sector may, in fact, have fallen more than the supply. WFP officials noted the conflict between this finding and continued high prices which they attributed to farmers' keeping stock on hand and flaws in distribution. The end of the year could produce a steep rice price decrease as farmers begin to release stocks in anticipation of a healthy harvest.

Unemployment rises: The Ministry of Manpower estimates that as a result of the crisis, the number of unemployed will reach 20 million by the end of the year. Measuring Indonesia's unemployment has always been a difficult task. Although official unemployment was fairly low (less than 10 percent) before the crisis, combined with underemployment, the total now approaches 40 percent. Combined unemployment and underemployment was estimated at more than 30 million as of February 1998 (see fig 3.13).

Underemployment, defined as work in ill paying jobs to earn enough to survive and/or working less than 35 hours a week, has always been extremely high in Indonesia. In 1996, 37 percent of the workforce was underemployed. The crisis has increased this figure because so many formerly full-time employees now share underemployment opportunities to avoid open unemployment.

Indonesians have displayed an impressive resilience in times of crisis and hardship. Extended families and entire communities pull together to weather tough times. In the past, in times of rural hardship, they have sought urban opportunities and in times of urban crisis, they have returned to the village to ride out the storm. In this crisis, Indonesians have had to cope with twin shocks—financial crisis and drought, so neither cities nor villages provided the traditional safe haven, and customary strategies for dealing with unemployment are not functioning normally. The repatriation of Indonesians working overseas has blocked a third option in times of hardship. Malaysia, also in a deep conomic crisis, is sending home increasing numbers of the 250,000 Indonesian workers there.

Labor intensive projects: Although labor-intensive projects can help some to cope, the GOI has been overwhelmed by the growing number of unemployed. With the support of World Bank, ADB and other organizations, the GOI has begun several labor-intensive projects for village improvement and public works, but the programs have been unable to absorb the huge number of newly unemployed nor to accomodate the recently unemployed white-collar employees.

Women are as affected by the crisis as men. While the majority of lay-offs for men occur

in construction and manufacturing sector, women bear the brunt in the trade, hotel, and restaurant sectors as well as sub-sectors like textiles industry (see table 3.6). Unfortunately, the government's labor intensive projects are failing to create opportunities for females, leaving unemployed and destitute women vulnerable to commercial sex.

"There is indeed some merit to the view that employment of women should be given preference, because income in their hands tends to increase household welfare more than if it were in the hands of men." - The World Bank (3.9)

There are regional variations of unemployment according to the National Statistics Agency (BPS). The highest unemployment rates in 1998 are in Jakarta (32.7 percent), North Sulawesi (24.6 percent), and Riau (23.9 percent), while the biggest increase in unemployment rates since 1996 are found in some of the outer islands such as West Nusa Tenggara (533 percent), Jambi (521 percent), and South-East Sulawesi (405 percent).**Health, Population and Nutrition**

Health costs: The impact of the crisis on health is largely due to increasing unemployment, the drop in real income and purchasing power, and inflated prices due to the depreciated rupiah and a shrinking government budget. Many families simply lack funds to pay for goods and services essential to health, such as food, medicine--vaccines, contraceptives and other medical supplies--and health care. A survey quoted in the World Bank's *Indonesia in Crisis* indicated that in Jakarta and West Java, drug prices have increased two-to-three-fold since the crisis started. A shortage in drug supplies has forced some health centers in more remote areas to close. Indonesia's national health budget, just two percent of GDP, has long been one of the world's lowest. Further reductions could cut into critical public services.

Despite a previous objection, medical subsidies have been allowed to offset the soaring cost of medicine, which has high import content. The rising price of imported medicines and medicine components weighs heavily on the local pharmaceutical sector. According to the Indonesian Pharmaceutical Association, 100 of 224 pharmaceutical producers are technically bankrupt, three out of the ten of the largest distributors are beyond salvation, and 600 of 1,200 small, regional distributors are bankrupt.

Increasing maternal and infant mortality: Reductions in purchasing power have reduced the likelihood that mothers will use preventive health services, such as immunizations. Pregnant women seem likely to turn to untrained traditional midwives to reduce prenatal care and delivery costs. This would raise health risks for mothers and babies, possibly increasing Indonesia's already high maternal and infant mortality rates. Maternal mortality, already the worst in ASEAN, was estimated at 334 deaths per 100,000 births in 1995. Recent data from urban hospitals in East Java indicate that maternal deaths may be increasing and UNICEF estimates that by 1999 the rate could double (see fig 3.5). Infant mortality rates are now 53 deaths per 1000, with two-thirds of all infant deaths occurring within the first month of life. The rates are expected to rise 20 percent by 1999, based on current projections (see fig 3.6).

Reduced contraception: Family planning statistics show that the usage of modern contraceptives declined five percent between January 98 and June 1998, despite the GOI's efforts to ensure availability of sufficient stocks of injectable and oral pill contraceptives. This means at least 1.5 million women have ceased using contraception and are now using traditional herbal or rhythm methods, cheaper but less effective, as alternatives. The usage of oral contraceptives could drop more than 60 percent and injections 37 percent among current users due to shortage of supplies and price increases. This could push the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) up nearly 25 percent over the 1997 rate. Some experts are even expecting a future baby boom as families struggle to cover the costs of daily necessities, including birth control. The result--unwanted births and abortions. Although comprehensive data on the abortion rate is not available, social workers believe abortions are on the rise..

"...if they have to make a choice between buying food and birth control devices, they will certainly prioritized food," Former Chairman of the Indonesia Planned Parenthood Association. (Jakarta Post Oct 18, 1998)

Commercial sex: Reduction in real incomes and unemployment, particularly among females, have resulted a doubling of prostitution. Indonesia now has an estimated 650,000 prostitutes, including 150,000 registered sex workers. By comparison, there were 72,000 registered prostitutes in 1995. Many of these prostitutes are new to the trade with little or no understanding on sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Social workers worry that the rising number of prostitutes could spark an explosion in STDs and abortions. Before the crisis, 10 percent of family planning clients in Surabaya carried sexually transmitted infections. Today, it is three times that.

Malnutrition: Reduced food consumption has led to reduced average calorie consumption and lower quality diets. As a result of low quality diets, acute nutritional deficiencies are making a comeback. Research conducted by Helen Keller International up to June of this year found significant reoccurrence of malnutrition in Central Java. The prevalence of maternal malnutrition increased from 15.1 percent to 17.5 percent (see fig 3.10). The average bodyweight among women of reproductive age fell by about one kg between June-August 1996 and June-August 1998. The Body Mass Index (BMI) of these same women dropped by 0.45 kg/m^2 almost equivalent to the 0.50 kg/m^2 achieved over the last 30 years. Lower BMI can lead to increased morbidity and mortality, greater risk of pregnancy complications, and reduced quality of breast milk.

Vulnerable infants and children especially feel the impact of the health crisis. According to UNICEF, there are 8 million undernourished infants who face threats from diseases that had previously been drastically reduced if not alleviated. Social workers have found reoccurrences of severe protein malnutrition--kwashiorkor and marasmus--unseen in Indonesia for years.

Despite the fact that the percentage of malnourished children is highest in the Eastern

Islands, the absolute number of malnourished children is seven to ten times higher in Java, and three to five times higher in Sumatra than on other islands (see fig 3.7 & 3.8). A study in 1998 by Helen Keller International (HKI) and University of Diponegoro showed a dramatically reduced intake of micronutrient-rich foods such as eggs, meat, and milk due to the increase in the price of basic commodities and reduced purchasing power of the population. The reduction is especially drastic in South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, East Java, and Central Java. Across the country, more than four million children are affected.

The study showed a significant increase in mothers and children who had not been drinking milk during the crisis because it was too expensive. In Sulawesi, the occurrence of mother and children not drinking milk rose from around 40 percent in 1996 for both to almost 80 percent in 1998. In Kalimantan the figures for not being able to afford milk rose from less than 20 percent to more than 40 percent. Such changes in diet, especially Vitamin A, increase vulnerability to disease and increase mortality. (see fig 3.9)

There are alarming signs that micronutrient deficiencies are on the rise--in particular Vitamin A Deficiency (VAD) which can cause blindness and damage to the immune system--and iron deficiency which can cause anemia. Vitamin A is naturally found as retinol in breastmilk and foods from animal sources, and as carotene in foods from plant sources. (Graph on Childhood blindness and maternal blindness). Before the crisis, VAD in children over the age of one was no longer considered a public health problem in most provinces in Indonesia. Over the last 30 years, the country has successfully alleviated the VAD threat among pregnant women and children. Data shows that the incidence of childhood blindness in Central Java jumped from less than 10 percent in June 1996 to more than 20 percent in June 1998 (see fig 3.11).

Anemia is an increasing concern. Results of the 1995 National Household Health Survey found that 40.5 percent of under-five children suffered from anemia. Approximately 30 percent of female workers and 24 percent to 35 percent of school children were found to be anemic. Overall, as many as 50-70 million out of Indonesia's total population suffered from IDA. IDA impairs immunity and reduces the physical and mental capacities of population. In infant and young children, even mild anemia can impair intellectual development. Anemia in pregnancy is a significant cause of maternal mortality. Infants born to anemic mothers often suffer from low birth weight and anemia themselves. (HKI Bulletin 2, Issue 3, 1998). The post-crisis survey indicated that anemia in children in Central Java has increased from 40 percent in June 1996 to about 65 percent in June 1998. The prevalence of anemia among women of reproductive age has increased from 20 percent to 30 percent in 1998. These numbers are expected to rise further as the crisis continues (see fig. 3.12).

Children born into families that cannot afford micronutrient-rich foods due to the crisis may become a 'lost generation', sowing the seeds of today's problems to be reaped in an uncertain future. - Helen Keller International, Oct 98

Education

School leavers: The Minister of Education projected in June that at least 30 percent to 40 percent of all pupils will drop out of school due to the crisis. To cope, many households have pulled their children out of the school, both to save on educational expenditures and to get their children earning additional income. Government estimates suggest that about 6 percent of primary school students and 13 percent of junior secondary school students are at risk of dropping out (approx. 1,650,000 and 1,100,000 student respectively). While an additional 400,000 primary school students are unlikely to continue onto junior secondary school, the drop-outs among female students are expected to be higher.

"Evidence from other developing countries suggests that parents' decisions to send girls to school are more price sensitive than for boys." – the World Bank (3.8)

The government, with WB and ADB support, is launching a nationwide campaign to reduce the number of drop-outs this school year. WB and ADB have agreed to fund a nearly $400 million program to help an estimated 25 million children to stay in school. A national scholarship program has been launched to target children most at risk of dropping out of junior secondary school based on poverty criteria. Nationally the program will cover 17 percent of the enrollment of 9.7 million during the first three years of the program. One of the many criteria of the program is that female students will constitute at least 50 percent of total recipients. *(Tempo)*

For the GOI, education is not only a matter of economics but of culture as well. For many years the GOI has put an emphasis on the need and importance of education. Still, in many areas of rural Indonesia, education has never been a priority. Parents in poor households would rather their children contribute toward the families' livelihood than go to school. Therefore, the Minister of Education is convinced that educational issues are intertwined with cultural issues.

Social Problems

Social tensions: Ethnic tension has been growing for years. Indonesians of Chinese descent account for 3-to-4 percent of the population yet they are dominant players in the economy. During the Suharto years, tension was exacerbated through blatant favoritism and cronyism. Recent hardships, continuing uncertainties, and a dramatically more open society have encouraged a surfacing of anger and frustration. Sporadic unrest, often targeted at ethnic Chinese, has become a common occurrence. It peaked during the May riots in Jakarta and Solo which produced an exodus of an estimated 100,000 ethnic Chinese--some of whom have yet to return.

The May riots produced in a heavy loss of life, widespread damage to property and

businesses, and a dramatic drop in public confidence, both domestic and foreign. The National Human Rights Commission estimated that 1,188 people died, many looters trapped in fires set by rioters at shopping centers. Property damages have been officially estimated at almost $400 million. More importantly, a critical part of the population--ethnic Chinese Indonesians and expatriate managers--has yet to return to business, posing a real obstacle to recovery of Indonesia's commercial sector..

Political riots: The joint fact-finding team established by the government concluded in their report released November 3 that the May riots were not spontaneous but organized by Suharto's son-in law in support of a political agenda. The team reported that the riots had a clear political objective--to secure extraordinary powers for President Suharto to overcome a temporary emergency situation. The report states that preparation for the riots, including the shooting of four students at Trisakti University, was made at "the highest decision-making level." The report mentions Suharto's son-in-law, Lt. Gen. Prabowo, and then-Jakarta military commander, Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, as the probable organizers but mentions that further investigation is needed.

Protests and demonstrations: Since Suharto's resignation, unrest across Indonesia has increased in two basic forms: organized protest, often involving students and professionals against government officials who have allegedly been involved in corruption; and spontaneous disturbances, often driven by economic desperation. Typically this involves land occupations, commonly by people who have been displaced by projects associated with Suharto and his friends or family. Other participants include those who, after losing jobs in the city, have returned to rural areas to find the situation there no better.

Lawlessness: Indonesia has seen a general breakdown in law and order, including sporadic occurrences of looting and robbery--some organized with political motivation, as poverty grows, the military and police reexamine their role, and political interests begin to vie for power. The main target has often been businesses such as shrimp farms, coffee plantations, and food warehouses, linked to the skyrocketing price of goods and unemployment. Other incidents, however, such as the recent spate of mysterious killings in East Java, carry a darker, more political tone to them. The response of police and armed forces to declining law and order is unpredictable--they are often unable or unwilling to assert control.

B. Humanitarian Needs Arising from the Crisis

A viable social safety net includes:

1. Affordable supply of food:
- o supplying basic food commodities to hard hit areas;
- o monitoring to identify the changing needs and location of the poorest, giving priority to the hardest hit areas;

- o timely food imports and distribution, especially to remote areas;
- o halting illegal exports of subsidized commodities;
- o coordinating activities between various relief agencies and the government.

2. Provide access to basic health care services:

- o supporting the distribution of basic medical needs;
- o increasing access to affordable contraceptives to maintain family planning and preventing STDs in the commercial sex industry;
- o providing education to encourage the use of health services despite rising costs;
- o enhancing the capacity and efficiency of private sector suppliers of medical supplies, to reduce the reliance on imported drugs;
- o establishing a nationwide monitoring organization to identify the areas with greatest need for medical supplies;
- o continuing pilot projects on a private nationwide health care system.

3. Maintain current educational enrollment levels:

- o reducing the current drop-out rate and encouraging new enrollment;
- o improving public awareness on the value of education;
- o establishing a nationwide program of scholarship and grants to offset the cost of tuition;

4. Create employment generating activities:

- o developing labor intensive projects aimed at creating a large number of jobs;
- o giving special attention to ensure that women benefit equally from these programs.
- o developing credit mechanisms to stimulate job creation.

C. The Response

Food Availability: The USAID response to Indonesia's food crisis focuses on two areas: strengthening the GOI's food policy and management and improving accessibility to food. USAID responded quickly to Indonesia's drought-induced food crisis with $53 million in emergency food aid. Approximately 84,842 tons of commodities is being distributed through food for work and vulnerable groups feeding programs, targeting 982,620 beneficiaries, primarily in the eastern islands. As the crisis has developed, however, food insecurity has grown more severe in highly populated areas in and around cities, particularly on Java. We have begun to shift our food program to these areas, beginning in November with a feeding program in central Java. There will be a need for continued assistance to meet the needs of "the new poor" in Indonesia's urban areas.

Because the government's food program is so much larger than that of the donors, it is important that donors work with the government to increase its effectiveness. USAID is playing a strong role within the Donors' Food Group coordinating aid to the government and to NGOs monitoring the government's program. We will also provide technical assistance to the GOI to strengthen GOI policies and management systems for food prices and food stocks, targeting methodologies for subsidized food programs, and internal and independent program and nutritional monitoring capabilities.

Other donors continue to play an important and varied role in Indonesia's food crisis. Food donations, principally the U.S. World Food Program, Japan, Canada and Australia are sizeable. Data, provided by WFP, on the current commitments of food aid from other donors is as follows:

	Commodity	*Quantity (MT)*
WFP	*Rice*	*114,664*
(Total) Wheat		*214,900*
	Blended Foods	*17,000*
Japan	*Rice*	*60,000 (donation)*
		500,000 (concessional sale)
UNICEF	*Blended Food*	*8,500*
Others:	*Various*	*7,000*

The World Bank, in coordination with USAID and other donors, has begun work to strengthen GOI food policy. This work is being done in conjunction with the Bank's planning efforts for a large agriculture structural adjustment loan that seeks varied reforms in GOI food policy. The Bank, with USAID, and AusAID support, has started a nation-wide early warning system (the Social Monitoring and Early Response Unit) to collect, monitor and analyze previously unavailable information on food prices, availability and affordability, in addition to nutritional indicators, on a monthly basis. With this information and in coordination with USAID and other donors, UNDP is helping the GOI identify additional areas of greatest need in the country, and match these with future GOI and donor programs for all crisis-related activities, including food.

Health, Population and Nutrition: USAID and its partners are working to ensure that key primary health care services continue to be available throughout the crisis. This is accomplished through: attention to the nutritional status of key populations; ensuring that public health service outlets continue to function; maintenance of service quality; keeping private service providers operational, ensuring availability of products and services; and maintaining high demand for family planning and other primary health care interventions.

With USAID support, the GOI and NGOs play an active role in collection, analysis and dissemination of data required for crisis monitoring and surveillance. Policy-makers and program managers use these comprehensive crisis monitoring and surveillance data to mount appropriate responses. Over the long term, ad hoc assessments will take on less importance, and be supplanted by reliance on more functional, less frequent, and more streamlined monitoring mechanisms.

USAID interventions will contribute to reversing trends of lower demand for family planning and basic health services and eventually restore positive trends in utilization. Health workers, policy makers and the media are being mobilized to reinforce health messages. Knowledge among poor families about appropriate nutrition and cost-effective options will increase. As the crisis subsides, families will also have comprehensive information about service availability in the private sector.

Other Donors

ADB	Through two loans ($300 million) to finance a Social Protection Sector Development Program (SPSDP), the ADB aims to alleviate projected deficiencies in government provision of health, education and nutrition services, particularly among the poor. The loan package will provide: basic health education materials to six provinces; medical supplies in eight provinces, including a $14 million loan for contraceptives; block grants to health centers to cover operational costs and to cover high-risk mothers requiring hospital services; and block grants to village midwives to cover operational costs for pre and post natal care for poor women, including iron tablet distribution for pregnant women and vitamin A capsules for children 6-60 months.
Australia	As part of a $17.3 million humanitarian assistance programme coordinated by Australia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, $2.6 million in essential drugs, medical supplies and equipment is provided to NTT, NTB, Maluku, South and Southeast Sulawesi. We understand that Australia intends to announce a $200 million economic governance package at APEC in mid-November.
Canada	The CIDA will donate $3 million worth of oral pills to the GOI.
EU	The EU procured $17 million worth of contraceptives (injectables, oral pills and implants) for Indonesia.
Finland	The Finnish Government has approved a loan for $29 million for Norplant implants.
Japan	JICA assists the GOI in maintaining essential blood bank and transfusion services in Sulawesi. JICA contributes to the SPSDP program in Sulawesi and NTT (See ADB). Early this year, JICA provided a donation of about $16 million to the MOH for medicines and disposable medical supplies.
UNFPA	UNFPA donated $3 million worth of contraceptives (injectables and implants) for nationwide distribution to prevent shortages of contraceptive supplies which would interrupt and severely hinder the national family planning. UNFPA provides assistance to strengthen blood supply management and improve the availability of and access to emergency obstetric care in 77 district hospitals.
UNICEF	UNICEF initiated a child feeding program. Cereal, fortified with micro-nutrients, will be distributed at low cost to poor children through integrated health posts at the village level. The program will begin in seven provinces and will expand to other provinces depending on the level

of assistance from other donors. UNICEF will also continue the Universal salt iodization program and food fortification for wheat. UNICEF will assist the GOI in coordinating a household food security and nutrition surveillance program in 9 districts. UNICEF will continue to play an important role in coordinating donor crisis response efforts for the GOI.

WHO — WHO assists the GOI to coordinate crisis response efforts, particularly those related to safe motherhood.

World Bank: The World Bank provides loan support to the SPSDP (see ADB above) in 19 provinces.

Unemployment

Employment Generation Activities: According to a mid-October 1998 Citibank report, 2.7 million people are being added to Indonesia's 95 million labor force this year. The increase is dramatic: in early 1997 4.9 percent of the workforce was unemployed; by the end of 1998, it will be about 20 percent. Because most factory, bank, and service-industry workers who lost their jobs have stayed in the cities, the most volatile areas of unemployment are in urban and suburban areas. Through both donor (Asian Development Bank, World Bank and OECF) loan funds and state revenue, the Government of Indonesia has targeted more than Rp 6 billion through 20 different programs to urban employment generation in the next 18 months. More than half of the funds remain unspent mainly due to difficulties in identifying good employment generation projects and in matching good projects with funds. We are working with municipal governments and local community groups to identify appropriate projects.

The USAID response has been to:

- shift existing project resources for decentralized financing of urban infrastructure projects to work with local governments and community groups to identify employment generation projects and secure Government of Indonesia funding;
- assist NGO's to work with local governments to stimulate community participation in planning and implementing small urban infrastructure projects to be funded by Government of Indonesia programs;
- provide technical assistance to marry donor and Government of Indonesia funds with good projects;
- use technical assistance to expand the institutional capacity of local governments and NGO's to design and implement job creating public works projects;
- work with BAPPENAS to implement, manage and monitor donor and government-financed employment generation programs.

Preserving Urban Water Supplies: The Government of Indonesia realizes that the provision of piped water is as important to the urban poor as the provision of rice, cooking oil, soybeans, and sugar. Skyrocketing costs of inputs such as electricity and chemicals, combined with fixed tariffs have produced a cash crunch making almost one-third of Indonesia's 300 municipal water enterprises insolvent. As a last-ditch measure,

some are putting untreated water through the water mains. The closing of water enterprises can result in poor sanitation, acceleration of poverty, and rise of epidemic diseases. The Government of Indonesia has established a Water Enterprise Rescue Team to target subsidy CGI-committed funds tied to management reforms in ailing water enterprises. But the enterprises are spread all over the country, and financial data available in Jakarta is unreliable.

The USAID response is to:

- o provide teams of water efficiency experts to visit ailing water enterprises and recommend solutions to keep the water flowing through increased efficiency and accessing foreign assistance Water Enterprise Rescue funds;
- o through the water efficiency teams, help the Government of Indonesia to recommend policy steps and preconditions for releasing tranches of assistance for water enterprise development in a program loan being prepared by the World Bank for approval in 1999.

Other Donors

World Bank There are three major new initiatives including the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP), $225 million, Urban Poverty Alleviation Program(UPAP), $100 million and resources from the Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Program (IUIDP) $60 million. KDP is a national program which targets communities at the Kecamatan level for small enterprise, public works and other community activities. UPAP targets communities at even lower levels of government (RW level). IUIDP provided reprogrammed loan funds for investment in employment generating infrastructure projects. The Village Infrastructure Program is a $140 million employment generation program over five years targeted for rural areas.

ADB There is one major program called the Community and Local Government Support Program, a sector development program amounting to a program loan of $200 million to finance grants to local governments for public works projects. There was a re-allocation from four urban sector projects amounting to $40 million in resources to jump-start employment generation activities.

OECF The Japanese government is providing an additional $80 million for public works beyond the $40 million that had been allocated. The emphasis is on financing labor intensive projects with a 70 percent labor content. The first phase focused on directing resources through the Ministry of Public Works while the second phase will be directed to local governments where investment, planning and implementation decisions will be made.

II. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, NEEDS AND RESPONSE

A. Economic Consequences of the Crisis

Macroeconomic impact External and Internal factors: When the Asian currency crisis first appeared in Thailand in July 1997 and began spreading to other Asian countries, few people imagined that the regional crisis would be the beginning of Indonesia's economic collapse. Analysts cited Indonesia's sound macroeconomic indicators: high annual growth, large foreign exchange reserves, strict fiscal stance, and inflation rates long held to manageable levels (figure 1.1-1.6). Over the previous three decades the country had achieved rapid growth, political stability, self-sufficiency in rice, and a large reduction in poverty. A slow-down had been predicted by some observers, but not the total collapse of a seemingly sound economic system.

Before the crisis began, the central bank had been keeping the rupiah within an eight percent trading band. In July 1998, in response to increasing downward pressure on the currency, the band was widened to 12 percent. On August 14, the currency was floated, completely free of the trading bands. With the flotation, the internal and external factors that had been pressuring the rupiah set off a prolonged devaluation over the remainder of the year. By December 1997, the rupiah had plunged by 110 percent, an extreme drop, but roughly equivalent to the decline of other Southeast Asian currencies. Then in mid-December and early January 1998, political and economic uncertainty sent the rupiah plummeting, leaving other regional currencies far behind *(figure 1.7)*.

Many factors have contributed to Indonesia's currency crisis, including external factors. Disinvestment by foreign financial institutions, caused by regional financial problems, put considerable pressure on the rupiah. The growing strength of the U.S. dollar against most other global currencies added to this pressure. The contagion effect from the fall of other regional currencies also exacerbated the currency's decline. Internal factors contributing to the rupiah's weakness included perceptions of growing political risk in Indonesia, rampant corruption, substantial bad loans by Indonesian banks and financial institutions.

Investor panic: The rupiah's initial decline was accelerated when panicked foreign investors, many of whom had insufficiently studied the risks of investing in Indonesia, began rapidly withdrawing capital. The currency's decline was further propelled as Indonesian companies, many with massive unhedged foreign short-term borrowing, rushed to buy dollars to service dollar-denominated loans.

A subsequent series of political and economic missteps by the Indonesian government, some made under the guidance of international finance institutions, further eroded confidence in the rupiah. The closing of 16 ailing banks as part of the initial IMF agreement in November 1997 sparked a massive loss of public confidence in the banking system. Many Indonesians realized that the number of troubled banks was far higher. Concerns over the banking system were exacerbated by memories of the

nationalization of bank funds under President Sukarno in the 1960s. Such concerns, combined with the already tenuous condition of most Indonesian banks, induced many individuals and businesses to convert savings to dollars held in foreign banks or to hold cash.

Perceptions of President Suharto's failing health and the looming question of Presidential succession added to the atmosphere of high political risk. The May 1998 riots in Jakarta, Solo, and other cities sent the currency to an all-time low on May 19 of Rp 17,000 against the dollar, a massive overshoot in real terms. In addition, El Nino brought unusually dry weather that caused crop failures, creating a need to import food supplies, especially rice, and increasing the possibility of social unrest due to food shortages. (Specific details of the food shortages are covered in Section II– Humanitarian Consequences of the Crisis.)

As of the end of October 1998, the rupiah has strengthened somewhat to Rp. 8,000 – Rp. 9,000 to the dollar. Volatility remained a concern, however, as the daily volume on the rupiah foreign exchange market was so thin that even a million-dollar transaction could move the rate considerably. In addition, uncertainty regarding the short-term feasibility of the government's reform agenda added to the risk of future currency fluctuations. Analysts have suggested that the lack of supporting institutions make implementation of the economic reform agenda difficult. In addition, there are still many factions in the government resistant to economic liberalization.

Inflation: The rate of inflation soared to 75.5 percent between January and September 1998. Rates have been driven upward by the currency depreciation, as well as by an increase in the real money stock. From November 1997 until February 1998, the central bank, acting as a lender of last resort, had been providing money for a range of crisis-related activities, including liquidity assistance for ailing banks. This excess liquidity fueled inflation as it was not being soaked up by the main government money market instrument, Bank Indonesia Certificates (SBI), despite rates of up to 70 percent.

The consumer price index (CPI) peaked in June and July of 1998 after riots and looting the previous month paralyzed the distribution system. (Chinese-Indonesian merchants, who are central to Indonesia's distribution industry and who were one of the chief victims of the riots, have in many cases chosen not to reopen businesses, fearing further attacks) *(figure 1.8)*. The biggest contributors to price increases have been clothing, food and processed food, drinks, cigarettes and tobacco. It is the widely acknowledged that the CPI is not catching the full scale of price rises, especially for middle income household expenditures. Surveys conducted by various newspapers suggest that for part of the year prices rose much faster than was stated in the official figures.

There is still significant government intervention holding down the price of key commodities in order to provide assistance to the poor. A tax on the export of crude palm oil, for example, has kept the local price artificially low. Other foodstuffs still

receive targeted government subsidies that keep their prices below market rates. The timing for halting such intervention and allowing these prices to return to market rates is a key strategic decision facing the government.

Staple Prices
(Rp per kg)

	July 97	*April 98*	*percent change*
Maize	650	1,000	53.8
Rice	1,450	2,000	37.9
Sugar	1,550	1,800	16.1
Cooking Oil	1,700	3,600	111.8
Chicken	3,500	6,500	85.7
Eggs	3,000	5,200	73.3
Milk	19,409	31,150	60.5

The distribution system damaged during the May riots is largely back in working order. Many economists estimate that inflation will soon stabilize at around 20 percent per year.

The energy sector has experienced particularly high price increases, owing to its heavy dependence on dollar based inputs. The IMF-mandated repeal of subsidies on fuel and electricity prices in May 1998 is widely thought to have contributed to the unrest and riots in that month. The government subsequently reinstated those subsidies, although they are being gradually reduced. Despite subsidies, electrical power tariffs have nearly doubled from the pre-crisis rates. (Even after doubling, the current tariffs are still substantially below market rates).

Inflation has declined substantially since September 1998, and the government projects monthly rates of under three percent for the rest of the year. The decline is attributed to the fact that earlier currency spikes, most extreme in January 1998 and May 1998, have made their way through the economy. In addition, the exchange rate has been relatively stable for the past month. The government's tightening of the real money stock since February 1998 has also contributed to bringing inflation under control.
The required adjustment through inflation is by no means complete. Although initial shocks have passed through the economy, more than 50 percent in additional inflation shock remains to pass through the economy in the next 18 months to two years, even if the real exchange rate stabilizes.

Interest rates: High interest rates are another factor reining in inflation. In an effort to support the rupiah and reduce inflation, the central bank has increased the rate of SBIs several times since early this year, reaching a high of 70 percent and currently averaging 55 percent *(figure 1.9)*. High interest rates are also considered necessary to induce

businesses and individuals to hold savings in Indonesian banks and to compensate for Indonesia's country risk premium. The government sees high interest rates as necessary until the exchange rate stabilizes, at which time rates can be gradually reduced. In real terms, interest rates have remained negative, as they lag the current 80 percent year-on-year inflation rate. Nonetheless, recent expectations of lower inflation seem to have made the current interest rates more attractive, and many individuals and businesses have begun to move funds into rupiah savings accounts.

Many economists have stated that the current tight monetary policy has contributed significantly to the rupiah's recent stability. Stern criticism, however, has been sounded from private businesses, which claim that the high rates inhibit the access to finance needed to restart economic activities. Balancing the macroeconomic benefits of tight monetary policy with the business-side advantages of lower interest rates will be one of the greatest challenges facing decision-makers in the months ahead.

For many years before, and throughout the crisis, small finance institutions (SFIs) have played a valuable role in delivering credit to small businesses. SFIs are small, often village-based, lending institutions that make loans to small business and entrepreneurs at competitive rates. SFIs are capitalized both by individual deposits and by a regulation that requires commercial banks to make 25 percent of their loans to banks engaged in micro-finance. Active for over three decades, small finance institutions have been a leading source of credit to small-scale business in Indonesia.

Evidence indicates that many SFIs have continued to perform reasonably well amidst the current financial turmoil. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) reports that in its microfinance units there has been during the crisis have a 97 percent payback rate (down from 99 percent before the crisis) and a mild increase in nominal saving deposits. This minor increase is a substantial decline in savings in inflation-adjusted terms. SFIs serving urban areas and making larger loans seem to be having more difficulty than rural and village SFIs.

GDP growth: With the exception of the early 1980s when the price of oil dropped suddenly, Indonesia has maintained a consistently high economic growth rate over the past three decades. This growth, averaging 6-7 percent a year, transformed Indonesia from a lower-income country in the 1960s to a middle-income country with estimated income per head of almost $1,055 in 1996.

Gross Domestic Product 1996
(percent real change)

Agriculture	1.9
Mining and quarrying	7.1
Manufacturing	11.0
Utilities	12.8
Construction	12.4
Trade, hotels & restaurants	7.6
Transport	6.4
Communications	19.0
Financial, rental & bus. services	10.5
Public administration	4.1
Other services	7.6
GDP	**7.8**

Manufacturing has led GDP growth since the mid-1980s, expanding from a low base of eight percent of GDP in 1965 to 25 percent of GDP in 1996 (see figure 1.10 & 1.11). Manufacturing taxes have increasingly contributed to government coffers, reducing the past reliance on depleting oil resources and the mining sector. This initial acceleration in the manufacturing sector created a need for better infrastructure development that, in turn, stimulated further growth in construction, utilities and supporting services. In order to perpetuate this virtuous circle, the government made increasing non-oil exports a key priority.

The government predicts that GDP will shrink by 15 percent in 1998. GDP per capita is expected to decline to below $500 by the end of this year. The swing is largely due to a drop in domestic demand, corporate bankruptcy and debt problems and weak regional and worldwide demand. (see figure 1.12)

Gross Domestic Product 1998 (Jan-Jun)
(percent real change)

Agriculture	0.3
Mining and quarrying	-7.6
Manufacturing	-13.0
Utilities	0.3
Construction	-36.8
Trade, hotels & restaurants	-17.5
Transport & Communications	-6.4
Financial, rental & bus. services	-16.9
Other services	5.1
GDP	**-13.2**

USAID-sponsored analysis of national levels of electrical power usage suggests evidence that the actual contraction of GDP may be modestly lower than the government projection. The analysis found that as of August 1998 industrial electricity usage was only 5.5 percent lower than the previous year's level. Because industrial production is closely tied to electrical consumption, these findings suggest that industrial activity may have declined substantially less than anticipated. Even after adjusting the data for factors such as private power generation, the study still found evidence that industrial activity in the first three quarters of 1998 had declined only 6-9 percent from the 1997 level.

The change in GDP has been far from uniform across various sectors. The biggest losers this year have been manufacturing, construction, hotel & restaurant, and financial services. The agricultural sector, meanwhile, remained relatively resilient and did not contract even in the wake of El Nino. (Despite El Nino's devastating effect on rice production, many other agricultural areas grew significantly, offsetting the poor

rice harvest. Plantations' output for example, rose by 6.5 percent, while forestry grew by 2.5 percent growth and fisheries by 6.7 percent.) Some export-oriented industries, including a few areas of manufacturing, have also fared well, buoyed by the weaker rupiah.

In general, the industries hardest hit by the crisis are the ones that developed more recently (and were less established), that were most dependent on foreign inputs, or that were dependant on domestic demand without options for export. The biggest winners of the crisis are industries that generate dollar revenues and require minimal imported inputs.

Because of this varied sectoral impact, the economic effects of the crisis have been quite diverse in different regions of Indonesia. Heavily industrialized areas in Java,

particularly West Java and Jakarta, seem to be the hardest hit, while some agrarian regions in the outer islands have been less affected. Areas such as North Sumatra and North Sulawesi, which export agricultural commodities, have experienced mini-economic booms.

USAID-sponsored analysis of national electrical power data indicates that a substantial disparity indeed exists between the current economic activity in various regions. This analysis examined regional levels of industrial, commercial, and domestic power usage. The results indicated that industrial and commercial electrical usage in 1997 and 1998 dropped most significantly in Jakarta, followed closely by West Java. East Java experienced a more moderate decline. In the rest of the nation, power usage for commercial and industrial activities actually increased *(Figure 1.13 & 1.14)*. While electrical power is only one factor contributing to regional GDP, these figures suggest that the crisis has had widely varying consequences for economic activity in different parts of the archipelago.

Current account: The government projects a current account balance surplus this fiscal year of US$ 1.4 billion, up from last year's deficit of US$ 1.7 billion. The surplus is due mainly to a higher balance of merchandise trade surplus driven by the steep decline in imports. Some private economists estimate that the surplus may now be substantially higher than the government projection.

Capital account: The capital account has been in deficit since the last half of fiscal year 1997/98 when net inflows of official capital were not sufficient to compensate for a hemorrhage of private capital fleeing the country. The capital account went deeper into deficit after the riots in May 1998 accelerated capital flight and temporarily stopped the inflow of IMF aid.

Real incomes: The rupiah's depreciation and the subsequent high levels of inflation have caused a collapse of real incomes and purchasing power within Indonesia. As noted, income per head is thought to have declined to below $500, from a 1996 level of $1,055. The decline in real incomes, combined with rising unemployment and uncertainty over the country's future economic course, have resulted in a substantial

reduction in domestic demand. The continuing tight money policy has also affected interest-sensitive sectors such as the property and automotive sectors, which have been largely paralyzed by the interest rate hikes.

Regional variations in GDP growth (see above) are reflected in the fact that the crisis has not affected real incomes uniformly across the country. As noted, agrarian areas of Indonesia, traditionally the poorest regions, have generally suffered the least economic slow-down, and hence the smallest contraction in real income. It is important to note, however, that several poor areas, notably sections of East Nusa Tenggara, East Timor, and Irian Jaya, bore the brunt of last year's drought and have experienced some of the greatest drops in real income.

FINANCIAL SECTOR IMPACT

Private banking: Following the deregulation of the banking sector in October 1988, the number of private banks operating in Indonesia expanded rapidly. With limited banking expertise and weak regulation from the central bank (BI), many private banks were already in serious financial trouble by 1997. Even before the crisis, many of the 200-plus commercial banks were either undercapitalized or insolvent. The financial turmoil in Japan's banking sector exacerbated this situation as the Japanese banks began calling in their loans in Indonesia.

Following the closure of 16 insolvent banks by Bank Indonesia in early November 997, many depositors began to lose confidence in the private banking sector. The ensuing withdrawal of deposits compelled the government to provide liquidity support to keep many banks afloat. (This support was finally curtailed in February 1998 amid concerns over the risk of high inflation.) Additional deposit withdrawals occurred following the May riots and the government's suspension of an additional 54 private banks considered to be near insolvency *(figure 1.15 & 1.16)*.

Under the Suharto regime, the central bank held little actual authority to enforce banking regulations, especially in cases involving politically well-connected banks. Consequently, the banking sector was rife with delinquency and banking regulations were openly flouted. Political pressure was regularly applied to state banks to make loans to politically-connected businesses. BI itself was often pressured not to investigate or intervene in collusive lending practices.

Financial sector reform is essential to sustainably restore the flow of credit which is now largely stopped to the productive sector of the economy. Observers have identified four basic flaws that helped send Indonesia's banking system into crisis:

-the credit supply had expanded very rapidly with a concentration on short-term private debt;
-BI's practice of classifying loans by repayment performance rather than collectability masked the actual condition of loan portfolios;
-accounting and provisioning rules did not keep pace with the changing banking system;
-inadequate enforcement of BI regulations meant that rules covering intra-group lending, loan concentration, creditworthiness criteria, transparency, were regularly violated.

IBRA: The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) was set up in January 1998 to supervise and manage the restructuring of the banking sector. Banks with liquidity support from the central bank beyond certain levels are required to surrender their management to IBRA in successive stages. IBRA is empowered to restructure the banks placed under its control in order to remove bad assets. Non-performing assets are removed from these banks and placed in the Agency's Asset Management Unit. In

addition to eliminating bad assets, IBRA is tasked with recapitalizing banks and eliminating old management as well as old equity partners. Non-salvageable banks are to be dissolved, and their assets sold at market rates, or merged with other banks under IBRA.

Since the inception of IBRA, all Indonesian banks are undergoing due diligence audits and 54 insolvent banks have been put under the Agency's supervision. Several concerns regarding IBRA have already been voiced, including the risk that corruption and political pressure may compromise the Agency's impartiality in restructuring or disposing the substantial assets set to come under its control.

Another worry is that, with virtually all private Indonesian banks in financial trouble, the entire private banking sector may come under IBRA's control, leaving no banks operating on a private, independent basis. It is important to recognize the difficulty and magnitude of the task undertaken by IBRA. While the Agency has drawn criticism for its generally slow start, most critics recognize that, given the challenges organization faces, it may require some time to begin operating efficiently.

The Jakarta Stock Exchange: Prices on the Indonesian capital markets have fallen sharply during the crisis. From a historic high of more than 700 in early 1997, the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE) Index has plummeted to around 300 in recent month *(figure 1.17)*. The markets have been affected by a massive loss of confidence in Indonesia as well as by the depreciation of the rupiah, which has increased the losses in dollar terms. The market capitalization of the JSE has fallen from about US$ 100 billion in June last year to about US$ 11 billion in the early October. The Jakarta market was heavily dependent on foreign investors. Many of these investors had only a limited understanding of Indonesia, which may explain the 'herd-like' exodus from the market. Bearish regional markets also put pressure on Indonesian bourses. Herd-like withdrawal of capital from the JSE is not unique to Indonesia but has occurred in many emerging bourses around the world. Much of the continuing debate about reforming global financial systems centers managing on this problem of swift and unpredictable capital flight. By mid-1998, almost 80 percent of the listed companies, especially those in property and banking, were technically bankrupt. Under current supervisory rules, an estimated 88 percent of active stocks may be de-listed next year, dealing a harsh blow to some of Indonesia's most important companies.

There has been some mild interest in the market lately, as the price of underlying assets has become extremely low in dollar terms. Most local investors prefer to keep their money in the banks, however, which currently pay up to 55 percent for time deposits. The government plans a gradual reduction of time deposit rates, which may eventually generate renewed local interest in the stock markets.

Corporate sector: Before the crisis, Indonesian companies found overseas borrowing an attractive source of finance. The vast differences or spreads between domestic and international interest rates made it more desirable to borrow overseas, where large projects funds were more readily available. Meanwhile, the predictable policy of the

government to devalue the rupiah at around five percent per year made hedging the currency risk appear to be an unnecessary expense *(figure 1.18)*. Overseas lenders were eager to loan to Indonesia, often without proper risk assessment, as the country was perceived as a very lucrative market. Recognizing the dangerous exposure created by excessive offshore debt, the government sought in 1995 to restrict large-scale overseas borrowing, but well-connected businesses were able to skirt this restriction.

When the rupiah began to plummet, the potential losses from unhedged overseas borrowing became glaringly obvious. Downward pressure on the rupiah was heightened as Indonesian companies rushed to buy dollars to service their interest and principal due and also to purchase needed foreign inputs. By the beginning of 1998, most corporations were unable to continue servicing overseas debts, and creditors became unwilling to continue extending loans to Indonesian companies. Growing perceptions of political and economic risk in Indonesia made capital scarcer still.
The crisis has left the corporate sector with a considerable debt overhang. According to official figures, private corporate debt stood at $65.5 billion in July this year, about $20 billion of which comes due this year. Total amortization payments falling due for calendar year 1998 are estimated at US$32bn (before any restructuring) *(figure 1.19)*. Although not an immediate concern, an underlying problem facing the private sector is the lack of access to long-term capital. Some pension and life insurance funds were started recently and acquired significant assets over the past five years, but such funds are expected to be stagnant in the current crisis environment. Few other financial instruments exist in Indonesia for financing long-term debt. This raises the danger of companies continuing to borrow short-term funds for long-term projects, a practice partly responsible for the current debt overhang.

New bankruptcy law: One of the first new laws to be implemented, in line with IMF directives, is a new Bankruptcy Law which was enacted on August 20th. The law modifies the previous bankruptcy code based on the 1905 Dutch insolvency ordinance, which had been deemed too outdated and inefficient in resolving contemporary commercial cases. Until now there has not been any effective mechanism to help creditors recover their outstanding debts. Under the new law, companies entitled to call upon a 270-day suspension of payment period during which time they could work with receivers to develop a plan or composition, including an offer to pay creditors in full or in part. The rush of new bankruptcy cases is being handled through a new commercial court system set up for this purpose. The Ministry of Justice has provided training for lawyers, receivers, and judges to make the new system run. The new law is intended to bolster investor confidence in Indonesia, although early signs are not good. The court's first verdict in October 1998 was met with a hail of criticism from bankruptcy lawyers who faulted the judge for being inconsistent in implementing the proceedings. Modernland, a property developer with assets of about Rp. 1 trillion, was declared bankrupt for the relatively small claim of Rp. 94.13 million (about US$ 11,750). One other early decision has also attracted criticism as the judge set the fee for the court-appointed administrator of the assets at five percent of the defendant's total assets or Rp. 65 billion (about US$ 8.1m). This administrator's fee was four times higher than the disputed amount and an additional burden to a company already in trouble. The bankruptcy law has also drawn stern criticism for its lack of a US-style "Chapter 11" provision that would encourage work-outs to take place prior to legal action.

Jakarta Initiative: The Jakarta Initiative was launched by the government in September 1998 to serve as an umbrella organization under which to structure the overall effort to respond to corporate sector problems. The Initiative also serves to help debtors and creditors to come to agreement over restructuring financing through out of court settlement. The restructuring process is expected to involve debt forgiveness, extended maturity periods, debt-for-equity conversion and swap of assets. Under the framework, debtors will be required to reorganize their companies under an appointed advisor and to provide accurate and timely financial information. In return creditors will extend working capital and agree to "standstill" and not charge default interest and other penalties while restructuring negotiations are occurring. The plan assumes that, upon reaching an agreement, debtor companies will apply to INDRA (see below) in order to buy dollars at subsidized rate in order to begin debt repayments.

There does seem to be some initial interest from the corporate sector although creditors will have to be willing to write off some of the loans and debtors will have to show more intent to pay the loans. Previously, the government had set up the Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA), under central bank supervision, to bear the exchange rate risk by selling foreign exchange to debtor companies at a favorable rate. The Frankfurt Agreement, signed on June 4, 1998 by the government and 13 foreign banks with extensive outstanding loans in Indonesia, establishes a framework for Indonesian companies and their creditors to reschedule loans by up to eight years *(Box 1 on Frankfurt Agreement).*

As became clear once the initial euphoria over the agreement subsided, these terms are of little help to the many indebted companies now on the verge of bankruptcy. The agreement requires companies to continue making interest payments and makes no provision for debt discounts or write-offs. These problems are exacerbated by the weak rupiah.

Undoubtedly, many companies are facing bankruptcy. Factors such as weak domestic and export demand, difficulty in obtaining credit, and many other factors mentioned previously have been contributing factors. On top of this, some production activities are disrupted by sporadic riots and labor strikes demanding wage increase to make up for high inflation. It has been suggested that some companies would not be inclined to pay debts even if they were financial capable to do so. The seeming ineffectiveness of the bankruptcy law has induced many firms to continue operating without making provisions for debt repayment.

Exports: Early expectations of an export-led recovery have not yet been realized. Overall exports are expected by the government to increase by just 0.7 percent in dollar value in 1998/1999 based on a 18.6 percent dollar-value fall in oil and gas exports and a 5 percent rise in the value of non-oil exports. Export demand from Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and other Asian countries which typically account for approximately 50 percent of total exports, have declined drastically due to the regional economic crisis *(figure 1.20)*. Flagging worldwide demand projected for 1999, combined with the risk of more protectionist policies in Europe (Indonesia's third largest trading partner), may further inhibit export growth next year. As a percentage of GDP, net exports (defined as exports minus imports in GDP terms) have risen some 500 percent. While the real rate of growth next year remains in doubt, it seems clear that export industries will continue to be a vital contributor to GDP growth. In addition, the limited rise in exports is largely due to the substantial drop in oil and gas exports, which resulted mainly from external factors, particularly oversupply on the world market. The fact that non-oil exports managed to rise even amidst last year's turmoil suggests that this area may become a stronger contributor to the country's economic recover.

Exports with limited imported inputs in industries such as agriculture and natural resources have brought a windfall to several areas of the country. However, many of Indonesia's export industries, notably manufacturing, are heavily import-dependent. With the rupiah's depreciation, the cost of importing raw materials has risen sharply. Obtaining trade financing to purchase these inputs is problematic as overseas banks have refused to recognize letters of credit (LCs) from Indonesian banks. Indeed, US banks are barred by law from having financial dealings with foreign banks whose international credit rating falls below certain levels. At present, no Indonesian banks meet the minimum credit rating for dealing with US lending institutions. Under the Frankfurt debt-restructuring agreement, foreign banks were asked to maintain trade finance lines at current levels (estimated around US$ 2-3bn) provided Indonesian banks repaid the US$1.2bn in overdue credit lines which has been done. The scheme is backed by the central bank.

Natural resources: Indonesia is endowed with substantial natural resources, including oil and gas, a wide range of minerals, marine resources, and tropical forests. Its forests and biological diversity also hold an important place in global ecosystem. Indonesia has the most extensive forest reserves in Asia, representing ten percent of the world's tropical rainforests and harboring biodiversity among the richest in the world. The country's waters harbor over 8,500 species of fish, or 25 percent of the world total. In addition, there are 1,600 bird species in Indonesia. Many species of plants and animals are endemic to the archipelago, appearing nowhere else on earth.
Natural resource sectors have traditionally contributed significantly to the Government's revenue. The three natural resources related industries (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) account for approximately 20 percent of non oil GDP and for over 36 percent of non-oil export earnings. The current economic crisis following the collapse of rupiah has highlighted the importance of the natural resource sector as a major dollar earner. Fears have been voiced that increased reliance on natural resources as major revenue generation may further reduce forest cover due to an expansion of agricultural lands, expansion in mining areas, and increased timber cutting. Strong export demand gives incentives for government to expand the agricultural sector, potentially threatening forest cover further.

Mining, like agricultural exports, is very attractive during the crisis because most of its revenue is in dollars while the operating costs are largely in rupiah. The Ministry of Mines and Energy has stated that its top priority at present is to improve the investment climate in order to boost the government's earnings from this sector.
Meanwhile, international demand for Indonesian plywood is expanding due to reduction on Chinese log supply. Recently, Chinese government implemented a new policy requiring that logging in China be reduced by 60 percent. To fulfill the international demand for plywood, many Indonesian logging and processing companies have started to hire back workers.

Further pressure on Indonesia's natural resources has come from the return of many recently unemployed workers to agricultural activities. Research indicates that the number of small-holder plots in several areas has grown substantially in the last year. Many fear that this largely uncoordinated expansion of farming activities will pose significant dangers to the ecosystem.

Last year and early this year, Indonesia was plagued by devastating forest fires with as much as 264,000 ha of forest lands burned to ashes in 1997 alone. In 1998, up to September, another estimated 515,000 ha were burn down. Many of these forests are actually production forest and reserves forests. Financial losses from the fires have been estimated at US$4.4 billion alone, excluding the indirect health, transportation, and reforestation costs (*Tempo,* 11/2/98) (*Figure 1.21*).

Environmental NGOs: On the positive side, the growing political openness has allowed more freedom to NGOs, many of which are active in environmental issues. Increased assertiveness of environmental NGOs in demanding greater accountability and

transparency from civil servants and private business has accelerated and deepened the process of redressing long-standing governance and corruption issues which have constrained responsible management of Indonesia's natural resources.
Environmental policy changes under the IMF agreement include :

- Increasing timber stumpage fees;
- Creating new resource rent taxes on timber resources;
- Reducing land conversion target to environmentally sustainable levels and implementing a system of performance bonds for forest concessions;
- Incorporating the reforestation fund into national budget so that it is used solely for reforestation purposes.

The Habibie government has promised to limit the size of timber concession management units to 39,000 ha. At present, there are nine ownership holding companies that have total concession in the range of 1.3 to 3.5 million hectares. Timber concessions that have been obtained through collusive practices will be cancelled and no new forest concessions will be awarded in order to prevent further deterioration. The government will seek to return reforestation funds previously loaned to politically connected interests. In addition, proposals have been made to extend the duration of forest concessions above the current 30-year lifespan. Extended ownership of concession lands is expected to encourage concessionaires to pursue long-term reforestation programs.

Public sector impact: One of the key conditions of the IMF agreement is to promote pro-competition policies. The IMF program specifically targeted several high profile monopolies and cartels granted to relatives and friends of President Suharto.
It is not clear to what extent these moves have resulted in the creation of free markets. There is evidence that the cancellation of the clove monopoly has led to a boom in cloves sales in certain areas. Sales of sugar, previously monopolized, also seems to have expanded. However, a close colleague of Suharto, still appears to retain considerable influence over the plywood industry. Other monopolistic practices have been able to avoid public scrutiny because their owners operate as cartels rather than as formal monopolies and can therefore claim to be operating in a deregulated environment. The cement industry is a case in point, being overwhelmingly dominated by three well-connected companies. Politically, the most serious problems facing the country relate to the production and distribution of food. From the point of view of consumers, the reforms thus far announced have had little practical impact on the market. Potential competitors in the wheat milling industry are reluctant to invest in new plant and equipment in the current monoplistic environment.

Anti-monopoly: In October 1998, the House of Representatives began deliberation of an anti-monopoly practices bill which would outlaw monopolies, cartels, vertical integration and other kinds of market distorting practices. The bill advocates the establishment of a Commission for Business Competition that would investigate and advise on the monitoring of the laws' implementation. Passing the legislation is just the first step however, as the implementation of the law will require a strong base of human resources, including trained judges, lawyers and legal, and economic experts.

A danger has emerged that the anti-monopoly movement could be directed specifically against Chinese-Indonesian businessmen, who control many of the largest monopolies. The Minister of Cooperatives has proposed that control of some Chinese-controlled monopolies be transferred to the cooperatives system, which is dominated by indigenous Indonesian businessmen or *pribumi*. Some observers fear that such sentiments may result not in the dismantling of monopolistic practices, but rather in the re-distribution of the old monopolies to a new group of business interests.

A group of NGOs have submitted an alternative version of the anti-monopoly law to the House of Representatives. The group has requested that some of its suggestions be incorporated into the official bill. The suggestions include the establishment of an independent commission to oversee enforcement of the anti-monopoly law and strict sanctions against monopolistic practices.

The budget: The government budget for 1998/99 has been set at Rp. 263.9 trillion, roughly double the 1997/98 budget of Rp. 131.5 trillion and over three times the 1996 level of Rp. 95 trillion. This year's spending increase will be covered by a substantial rise in international donor aid, which is projected to total Rp. 127.8 trillion (US$12 billion at a projected exchange rate of Rp10,600:$1). The level of international aid is more than triple last year's figure of Rp. 32.3 trillion ($5.4 billion at an average exchange rate of Rp.6,000:$1). (In the face of year-on-year inflation approaching 80%, the real budget increase is closer to a doubling of last year's level.)

Despite the higher budget, the government has encountered significant difficulties in delivering services amidst the crisis environment. The ongoing policy reform process, preparations for the upcoming elections, and sporadic social unrest have slowed official efforts to put in place crisis-related programs. The government initially projected a budget deficit in 1998/99 of 8.5% of GDP. The deficit was to be totally covered by the increased international aid. Because spending programs have been slow the start, however, the budget has remained in surplus.

To mitigate the worst consequences of the crisis on the poor, government plans to continue targeted subsidies on essential commodities. Most subsidies will, however be gradually reduced over the coming year in accordance with the IMF agreement. The government has scrapped all budgetary and non-budgetary support for controversial projects such as state aircraft maker, IPTN, as well as bringing some off-budget funds into the budget, which in the past had been a vehicle for spending on questionable practices. The funds of many government bodies, however, remain off-budget.

Economic laws: In return for international financial support, the Indonesia government has committed itself to the wholesale restructuring of its existing economic and commercial laws and policies. These laws have long been criticized as being outdated, unclearly written, or inadequate to the needs of modern, global business transactions.

As noted, modification to the existing Bankruptcy law was one of the first legal reforms to be completed. In addition to the pro-competition law, a secured transactions law and a

contracts law are being debated. While the political commitment to passing these laws seems strong, fears have been voiced that the changes made by the new laws may not be comprehensive enough to achieve the sweeping change needed in the area of economic law. Other concerns include the worry that the government may lack the technical expertise to develop laws that are in keeping with the demands of a modern, global economy.

Privatization of state enterprises: The economic collapse has severely limited the scope for raising tax revenue. Partly to compensate for this shortfall, the government's agreement the IMF calls for additional funds to be raised by the partial privatization of state enterprises. The minister responsible for the state enterprises revealed on April 20 the privatization program involving increased divestment of state equity in the five firms already listed in the stock exchange and the partial sale on the government stock of seven other firms drawn up for 1999. These sales are expected to yield revenue of Rp 15 trn, which will be used to cover budget deficits and to restructure the troubled banking sector.

Progress on the privatization program has been slow and early work was mired by accusations of unfair competition. Existing regulations which give the government exclusive rights to manage key sectors such as resources and infrastructure, have been hampering progress. Another barrier is the current bearish sentiment of the capital markets, which has caused several privatizations to be postponed. The Minister of Empowerment of State Enterprises has stated that the government will retain the national telephone company stock until the market improves. The government also needs time to restructure the firms and check for the presence of corrupt or collusive contracts made within any of the companies. The seven state enterprises planned to be privatized by March 1999 include : two port management companies, a steel company; a toll road company, a plantation firm, a mining firm, and a airport operator.

B. ECONOMIC NEEDS OR CHALLENGES

Macro Economic Challenges: Reestablishing macro economic stability will be the first step toward a sustained economic recovery. The most important challenges in this area are:

Stabilizing the rupiah by:

-Clearly demonstrating government commitment to political and economic reform and good governance;
-Minimizing social unrest through social safety net programs;
-Maintaining positive real interest rates on rupiah-based savings accounts, which increases the attractiveness of holding rupiah. This policy, however, must be balanced with the need to eventually reduce interest rates in order to make finance more easily available to the private sector.)

Controlling inflation by:

-Strengthening the rupiah beyond its current level (Rp. 8,000 – Rp. 9,000 to the dollar) and achieving currency stability:
-Reducing the real monetary stock by continuing the tight monetary policy begun in March 1998:
-Continuing targeted government subsidies of key commodities while beginning a gradual phase-out period;

Stimulating economic activity by:

-Achieving the projected government deficit of 8.5 percent of GDP. (As noted, the 1997/98 budget, despite calling for an 8.5 percent deficit, is currently in surplus due to delays in launching many government programs. Delayed programs should be launched as quickly as possible in order to help 'kick-start' the economy.)
-Continuing to lower interest rates to make finance more easily available. It is critical, however, that interest rates remain relatively high until the rupiah has stabilized. (There have been some market indications that interest rates are prepared to drop below the October 1998 level of 55 percent. Determining the rate at which interests rates will be lowered is one of the most challenging macroeconomic decisions facing the government of Indonesia)

Financial Sector Challenges: Indonesia's financial sector is largely paralyzed and, some argue, on the verge of collapse. Resuscitating this sector and reestablishing an effectively flow of finance will be critical to beginning the country's economic recovery. At the same time, structural reforms need to be put into place to ensure that the sector can perform effectively in the future and that past mistakes are not repeated.

The greatest challenges in reforming the financial sector are:

Ensuring more stringent enforcement of banking sector regulations. This goal can be achieved by:

-Expanding BI's power to adjudicate delinquent banks. (As noted, Indonesia is generally considered to have reasonably sound banking regulations. The major problem has been that the regulations were weakly and inconsistently enforced;
-Reducing corrupt and collusive practices in the banking sector by strengthening BI's oversight capacity;
-Enhancing the technical capacity of BI personnel to identify deliquent banking practices;
-Increasing the independence of BI from other government agencies;
-Increasing the accountability of Bank Indonesia to ensure that it polices the banking sector fairly and equitably;
-Adopting within Indonesia improved standards for accounting and risk analysis;
-Increasing BI's accountability and transparency in order to prevent corrupt and collusive practices

-Increasing the capacity of the Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency to efficiently restructure the banking system. This goal can be achieved by:

-Enhancing the technical capabilities of personnel inside IBRA;

-Ensuring the Agency's independence from other government agencies. Such independence is critical. If the Agency is to restructure the banking sector effectively, it must operate on sound financial and economic principles, free from political influence

-Increasing the Agency's accountability and transparency in order to minimize opportunities for corruption;

-Developing oversight systems to ensure that new, competent management is introduced into restructured banks;

-Improving the capacity of the banking sector itself by:

-Increasing the ability of banking professionals to assess and manage risk;

-Developing more stringent standards for banking professionals.

-Improving access to trade finance for exporters. This can be achieved by:

-Reviewing the existing facility for government guarantees of L/Cs to identify the reasons it is being underutilized;

-Amending the program or developing an alternative facility.

Corporate Sector Challenges: The greatest challenge in the corporate sector is corporate debt overhang. Several efforts have been launched to help Indonesian corporates restructure their corporate debt, including the Frankfurt Agreements and the Jakarta Initiatives. In addition the finance sector must be reformed in order to sustainably restore the flow of credit which has now largely stopped in the corporate sector. Several further steps are also needed including:

Increasing the technical capacity for effectively restructuring corporate debts. This can be accomplished by:

-Utilizing the Jakarta Initiative to reach deals between debtor and creditor companies before restructuring packages are brought to INDRA;

-Enhancing the technical capabilities of personnel inside INDRA;

-Ensuring the Agency's independence from other government agencies, allowing it operate in a rational, disinterested way;

-Increasing the Agency's accountability and transparency in order to minimize opportunities for corruption.

-Stablilizing the real value of rupiah. This would help Indonesian companies to repay dollar denominated loans. (See 'Macroeconomic Challenges' subsection above.)

C. USAID AND OTHER DONOR RESPONSE

USAID is focusing on providing U.S. technical expertise to support achievement of the economic and financial reform agenda set under the IMF/GOI agreement and supported by all members of the Consultative Group for Indonesia. In the financial and corporate sectors, this allows Indonesia to benefit from U.S. experience related to such situations as resolution of the U.S. S&L crisis of the mid-80's and U.S. support to economic and financial restructuring in eastern Europe. Given the strength of the U.S. economic system, provision of U.S. expertise related to corporate governance, economic law and regulation, and macroeconomic policy, is also especially appropriate. The program is carefully coordinated with other involved U.S. institutions, such as the U.S. Treasury, as well as the IMF and the other multilaterals.

The international donor community has mounted a major rescue effort for Indonesia. Under the leadership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a $40 billion economic reform and recovery package was formulated for Indonesia. This package, to be disbursed over three years, include: IMF stand-by credits of $10.14 billion, $3.5 billion from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), $4.5 billion from the World Bank (WB), and pledges from bilateral donors as follows: Singapore, $10 billion; Japan, $5 billion; the U.S. , $3 billion; and Australia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Malaysia, $1 billion each. The goals of this program are: the stimulation of domestic demand by supporting a carefully managed program of government deficit spending; restarting the shattered financial sector; resolving corporate sector debt issues and assisting associated restructuring efforts; and strengthening economic governance.

The World Bank: A $1 billion structural adjustment loan is in place which, among other topics, contains an agenda focused on financial sector restructuring. In support of this program, the Bank is providing $20 million being used primarily to support accountancy work to establish the financial condition of many banks prior to restructuring. The Bank is also planning to provide $30 million to support corporate restructuring efforts.

The Asian Development Bank: The ADB also has a structural adjustment loan focused on finance, which includes $50 million in support for development of a secondary mortgage facility, and $50 million in technical support for the banking sector. Most of this $50 million is being used again for accounting services to determine the financial status of banking institutions. The ADB is also planning a $3-400 million SAL oriented toward trade and industry and small business development. This loan has been closely coordinated with USAID and other donors.

Other Bilateral Donors: Japan is the major bilateral donor to Indonesia. It does provide some technical assistance, such as to the Planning Ministry (BAPPENAS). However, most of its financing is lending in support of the IMF/GOI package, infrastructure development, or trade credits. Australia is providing AU$70 million is support of the strengthening of economic institutions, including support for the development of the new bankruptcy mechanism. The EC is supplying ECU15 million to ASEM Trust Fund of the World Bank to support technical assistance in economic and financial reform.

Trade Credits: In recognition of the major banking difficulties faced by the country, both the GOI and many international donors have established special facilities to support trade finance. The GOI has placed $1 billion in foreign exchange with ten foreign banks as collateral to confirm letters of credit from Indonesian banks. A guarantee program for up to 80% of the value of Indonesian letters of credit up to $1.5 million is also being planned by the GOI. Other such facilities include: Japan EXIM: $1 billion (operational); U.S. EXIM: $1 billion (under negotiation); Singapore $5 billion (planned); Canada: $30 million; Germany: $250 million; and Netherlands: $500 million (planned).

III. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, NEEDS AND RESPONSE

A. Political Consequences of the Crisis

New opportunities: Perhaps the most palpable consequence of the Indonesian crisis has been to open unprecedented opportunities for reforming the country's political process. During President Suharto's 32 years of rule, Indonesian society acquiesced to a corrupt, and authoritarian regime in exchange for the benefits of economic growth. The economy's sudden reversal beginning in mid-1997 brought increasingly vocal calls for political change, including explicit calls for Suharto to step down. These calls sounded not only from activists and student groups, but ultimately from elements of the bureaucratic elite, including the political party, Golkar, Suharto's long-time power base. This movement culminated in Suharto's resignation on May 21, 1998.

Suharto's successor, B.J. Habibie, appears on the surface to support the growing calls for political reform. In his inaugural speech, President Habibie explicitly accepted the agreement reached by his predecessor with the IMF, which calls for no less than 117 different measures of reform over the next 18 months. A flurry of reform-oriented legislation has been launched under Habibie's rule.

There is lingering concern, however, about the genuineness of Habibie's commitment to reform. As a protégé of Suharto, Habibie raises concerns that the authoritarianism and cronyism that defined the previous regime may live on.

Elections: The government has taken some significant steps toward reform. Shortly after taking office, Habibie called for elections to be held in 1999. Legislation was launched to establish new electoral regulations that would replace the existing system, which is widely considered corrupt and subject to official manipulation. Conducting open, equitable elections will be no small task. Under the current system, popular elections are held every five years to elect the national House or Representatives (DPR). In the same year as the House elections, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), formally the highest authority of government, convenes to sanction the guidelines of state policy and elect the president and vice president for the next five years. The Assembly is comprised of the 500 members of the House of Representatives and an additional 500 members appointed by the Executive. Traditionally, the President's power to appoint half of the Assembly seats virtually ensures his re-election. This privilege was one of the main tools Suharto used to perpetuate his seven consecutive terms in power.

Legislation is presently being debated to amend these serious shortcomings in the electoral system. Under the proposed legislation, the number of Executive appointees in the Assembly will be reduced to less than 30 percent of the body's total membership, thereby reducing the President's influence over the Assembly. Proposals have been made to reduce the number of appointees from the Armed Forces from 75 to 55, beginning the retreat of the military from the political realm. Critics have argued the presence of any appointees compromises the Assembly's accountability as an elected body, the proposed legislation does constitute a vital step towards more representative

government.

Legislation is also in the works to move the electoral process for the House Of Representatives from a system of proportional representation to one more heavily weighted towards district-based constituencies. Under the former system, each province's seats in the DPR were held by members of the political party that district elected, but not necessary by MPs who hailed from that district. The proposed district-based constituency system is expected to reduce the influence of political parties and strengthen the accountability of elected representatives to their constituents. Legislators will now for the first time be bound by a domicile rule stating they must live in the district they represent. Under the proposed system, 428 MPs will directly represent a district while only an additional 67 MPs will be elected on a proportional basis to represent the party.

Political Parties: For most of the Suharto period, party politics were tightly controlled. After 1972, only two political parties existed legally, the Muslim United Development Party (PPP), and the nationalist Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Both were overshadowed by the government-controlled Golkar, which held the status of a 'supra-party' dedicated to defending 'national prosperity'. As such, it was not subject to the same restriction on campaigning as the PDI and the PPP. Golkar's electoral successes (in the last general election it polled 74 percent of the vote) rested heavily on the mandatory support of the armed forces and the bureaucracy.

Shortly after assuming the presidency, Mr. Habibie announced that the party system would be opened. This announcement led to an explosion of new parties. Concerns surfaced that these parties were harbingers of either political fragmentation or political sectarianism, either of which could end in a return to authoritarianism. By June 1998, some 30 parties had emerged, included workers parties, religiously based parties, and at least two Chinese parties. The following month, a more reassuring political environment seemed to be emerging in which large parties, often in alliance with each other, would dominate the scene. Nonetheless, as of October 1998, some 90 parties had been officially registered.

Legislation is being debated to ensure fair competition among political parties. Under the proposed 'political parties law' many special privileges enjoyed by Golkar will end. Civil servants, for example, will no longer be obliged to vote for Golkar. The civil servants' association, Korps Pegawai Negeri (Korpri), will no longer form part of Golkar and its members will not be required to campaign for the party. In addition, all political parties will be recognized by the government provided they meet a list of conditions (See below).

While the proposed law does much to create a fair campaigning environment, concerns have been voiced about some of the law's proposed statutes. For example, to be officially recognized, all parties will be required to have 13 provincial branches as well as sub-branches in at least half of the regencies of any province. If a party fails to meet the above requirements, it must have at least one million signatures from its prospective

constituents, complete with names, addresses and copies of their identification cards. Some observers argue that such stringent requirements would be too demanding for many emerging parties and would cement the position of a well-established Golkar.

Another concern surrounds the bill's proposal to limit campaign contributions to Rp 5 million (US$ 600) on individual donations and Rp 50 million (US$ 6000) on donations from corporations. Such a stipulation would clearly benefit the already well-financed Golkar and hinder the myriad of fledgling opposition parties.

The government is also proposing to maintain its 'floating mass' policy which the Suharto regime used to effectively bar political parties from establishing branches or campaigning at the sub-district or village level. Golkar is excluded from this restriction as it is not considered a political party but rather a 'functional group'.

A final point of concern relates to the government's stance on the 'schism' within the PDI. The Suharto government was widely accused of engineering a rift in this increasingly popular party headed by Megawati Sukarnoputri. Mrs. Megawati was removed from the official party leadership in June 1996 in what was considered a government-orchestrated campaign. By continuing to recognize Mrs. Megawati's rival as the official party leader, the Habibie government has cast some doubt on its commitment to pursuing a 'hands-off' approach to party politics.

It must be recalled that all of the above legislation is still under deliberation with the final shape of the laws yet to be determined. Significantly, the legislation will ultimately be decided by MPs brought into office under the old, corrupt electoral process, many of whom stand to lose their office under a more open system. The steps the final legislation takes toward a clean, transparent electoral system will send a strong signal regarding the government's commitment to real reform.

The timing of elections also remains unclear. President Habibie has announced the possibility of a delay in the previous timetable, which called for House elections in May 1999 and an Assembly session the following December to elect the president and vice president. It is not clear whether the proposed delay is due to the purely technical reasons of running an open election for the first time.

The power of the Executive: The economic crisis has also brought about calls for improved institutions of governance and increased accountability and transparency of government institutions. Probably the loudest calls have been for limitations on the power of the Executive. Indonesia's constitution does call for a strong President. Indeed, the constitution gives the President the power to issue Presidential Decrees (INPRES and KEPPRES) which have the same legal force as laws enacted by the House and which do not require House approval.

Despite this substantial constitutional power, Suharto in his three decades of rule incrementally expanded the power of the Presidency until it effectively overshadowed all other parts of the government. For example, while Indonesia's constitution empowers

the House to reject legislation proposed by the Executive, the House of Representatives under Suharto never blocked an Executive-sponsored bill and proposed no original legislation of its own. Most observers agree that there is a strong need for the Presidency to be limited to its original powers granted in the constitution.

The House: With the resignation of President Suharto, there have been several signs that the House of Representatives is prepared to assume a more active role in governance. In June, the House proposed original legislation for the first time in 32 years. It has also actively contested several bills proposed by the Executive. In addition, all major factions of the House of Representatives recently recommended that the president and vice president be limited to two five-year terms in office. This proposal is expected to pass during the working sessions of the Assembly in November. Under this proposal, the President would also be required to address the Assembly every year instead of every five years.

The political rules of the game: It is still difficult to assess the political forces that will influence the future of the policy process under the new Habibie government. For over thirty years, policy was directed almost exclusively by a single man: President Suharto. Even influential ministers were reluctant to take political action without first seeking Presidential approval. The political process, while unrepresentative, was clear and predictable.

The sitting President holds a much narrower power base than his predecessor. Consequently, the number of influential political players, and the ability of these players to sway policy, has grown markedly. Table One provides an overview of the major power centers in the Habibie government. Many forces outside the government – NGOs, political parties, religious organazation, cooperatives – have also assumed a more active role in influencing policy decisions. The future of Indonesia politics will be strongly influenced by how the various political actors fill the power vacuum created by Suharto's departure.

Corruption: One of the loudest calls for reform this year has been for a reduction of corruption, collusion and nepotism. Indonesia ranked 80th out of 84 countries on the Transparency International's 1998 Corruption Perception Index. Under the previous administration, abuses by government officials and well-connected individuals, notably Suharto's own family, were widely known and generally went unpunished. Demands to reduce corruption were hushed amidst the climate of political repression. Since Suharto's resignation, the expanded media freedom has turned the spotlight on corruption. In addition, there is growing recognition among Indonesian society that the economic distortions created by corruption practices were partly responsible for the country's economic collapse.

Some observers have suggested that President Habibie is unlikely to move quickly to reduce corruption. Throughout the Suharto years, most of the earnings of the Timsco Group (Habibie's family business) came from government supply contracts, particularly from state-owned entities within Habibie's ministerial portfolio in research and strategic

industries.

The Armed Forces seem equally unlikely to take action against corruption. General Wiranto's public promise on May 21st to protect the Suharto family was widely understood to include its wealth. The replacement in late June of attorney-general

Sudjono Atmonegoro by Major-General Ghalib, an active army officer, suggested to many observers that Mr. Habibie had been pressured to slow the investigation into the Suharto family wealth.

The investigation into Suharto's wealth has assumed as high profile among Indonesian society, as it is symbolic of the previous regime's corrupt practices. Failure to reclaim at least some of Suharto's reported billions of dollars, will send a negative message to Indonesian society regarding the current administration's commitment to reform, a message that could add to the already growing social tensions.

Decentralization: The economic crisis has also increased calls for more local self-governance. Under the current political system, mayors and regents are selected in an election process that is heavily influenced by the Ministry of Home Affairs. As a consequence, 75 percent of current mayors and regents are active or retired military member, most with strong allegiances to the central government. Despite substantial progress in fiscal decentralization, approximately 70 percent of the funding for the local government expenditures still originates from central government grants and transfers.

The current political environment presents a potential watershed for political decentralization in Indonesia which can be translated into accelerated technical decentralization. Political will is emerging for legislation that could result in substantial authorities being delegated away from the central level.

Several outlying provinces have gone beyond calls for decentralization, demanding greater levels of political autonomy or even outright independence. East Timor, for example, has put forward a proposal to hold a referendum on self-determination. Little evidence has emerged, however, of a fundamental shift in the government's position on Timor. Ali Alatas, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, outlined a partial autonomy plan that would give an East Timorese government control over all political matters except foreign affairs, defense and monetary and fiscal policy. This would go beyond the very limited "special status" already granted to a few areas of Indonesia such as Yogyakarta and Jakarta. Initial reactions suggest that East Timorese regard the proposal as inadequate.

It is important to recall the potentially fractious nature of Indonesian Republic. The archipelago comprises hundreds of different ethnic and linguistic groups, many of which feel minimal allegiance to the nation. There is resentment in many regions toward the island of Java and the capital city Jakarta, which have developed much faster than the other islands and are believed to have received disproportionately high levels of development aid. Resentment is particularly strong in resource-rich areas, which have

regularly seen profits from resource-based industries returned to Jakarta, where most mining, forestry, and petroleum companies are based.

Civil Freedoms

Freedom of expression: One of the most visible effects of the Indonesian crisis has been an explosion of public expression not seen for decades. In the waning months of Suharto's rule, Indonesian society became much more aggressive and open in its calls for change. After an initial crackdown, the Military seemed reluctant to attack the growing number of demonstrators. It is unclear if this stance signals growing support among the armed forces for increased freedom, or, if the military is simply trying to improve its public image in the wake of the unrest in May 1998.

The position of the government is less clear. On October 22 the House of Representatives passed a new freedom of expression law that expanded rights to demonstrate in public places. Under the new law, protests cannot be staged within a certain radius of strategic locations, such as the presidential palace and military installations, and organizers are required to notify the police at least three days before a planned protest. The police are obliged to protect demonstrators as long as they have met all the legal requirements.

While the bill is considered an improvement on previous freedom of expression laws, critics argue that the registration requirements leave too much room for the government to prevent demonstrations from occurring. It is also significant to note that prior to the current bill's passage, President Habibie had proposed what was considered a much more repressive law on public gatherings.

The government has also taken steps to protect freedom of association. The bill on public protests passed through the House in just 20 days at a time when members were behind schedule on their debate of the new electoral laws. The swift passage of this law suggests that the government afforded it a high priority. During debate on the final draft of the bill, members of the House managed to convince the Executive to drop the condition that protesters must be granted a police permit before holding a protest of more than 50 people. Regular protests against the bill by students and NGOs at the House may have also influenced the government's decision to drop this controversial clause.

The media: In early June 1997, the new Information Minister rescinded the controversial 1984 Press Law which allowed him to unilaterally revoke press licenses from publications. The process to obtain a publishing license has also been cut from 16 conditions and three permits to just three conditions. Publishing companies no longer need government approval to appoint or change their editorial boards.

The government has also stated that the Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI) will no longer be the only organization allowed to represent journalists. Private radio stations are

now allowed to produce and manage their own news and are only required to relay four news broadcast a day from the state-run Radio Republic Indonesia, down from the previously required 14 broadcasts.

Critics worry that these changes are insufficient. The Information Minister, for example, still retains the right to revoke licenses for an unspecified period of time.

Many consider this a dangerous power, as license revocation was one of the main tools used by Suharto to control the media. President Habibie has also proposed the possibility of requiring journalists to be accredited and licensed, a requirement which could be closely controlled by the government.

Despite increased openness, it is important to recall that publishers and broadcasters, like many businesses in crisis-stricken Indonesia, will be struggling to survive in the face of falling revenues and rising costs. Almost all publications have had to reduce the number of pages they print or otherwise downsize operations. The price of newsprint rose almost 600 percent in rupiah terms from July 1997 to July 1998 *(figure 2.1)*. In addition, advertising revenues have fallen substantially as the market for many products has sharply contracted. (see figure 2.1)

Labor unions: Within days of becoming President, Habibie signed the International Labor Organization (ILO) convention No. 87, which guarantees workers the right to organize. One month later, the Minister of Labor issued a decree formally granting freedom to workers to form unions as long as they register with the government. The new decree also allows unions to form federations and confederations in order to strengthen their bargaining power. The Ministry of Manpower is currently drafting a new law on labor unions which is says will strengthen further the legal basis for labor organizations in the future.

These moves are a significant departure from the government's previous labor policy. Under the Suharto regime, workers could only form unions at the company level and these unions had to be affiliated with the government-sanctioned All-Indonesia Workers Union (FSPSI). In a highly publicized case, one union, the Indonesia Prosperous Labor Union (SBSI), founded in 1992 by lawyer Muchtar Pakpahan, was outlawed and several of its leaders, including Pakpahan, were jailed. SBSI has since been given official recognition and Pakpahan has been released from jail. Some 12 other independent unions have been established in the wake of the government's more liberal stance.

Several other key ILO Conventions, notably No. 105 on migrant workers, No. 111 on discrimination in employment and No. 138 on minimum wages, have yet to be signed by Indonesia. Officials at the Ministry of Manpower have said the government is studying these conventions before reaching a decision.

A concern has arisen that labor activities are growing at exactly the time when Indonesian companies are least able to provide improved terms and benefits for workers.

In July 1998 a group of factory workers in Bandung, West Java held a demonstration demanding a 75 percent wage increase. When company management proposed an increase of 35 percent, claiming the firm could bear no greater hike, the demonstrators flew into a rage, destroying factory facilities and equipment

NGOs and civil society: The recent change of administrations has also allowed NGOs and institutions of civil society to expand their activities. Under Suharto, the

government attempted to control or marginalize most civil society institutions and forced activist NGOs to operate at the fringes of the policy and political arena. In the new atmosphere of political openness, these institutions are enjoying new liberties.

Many civil society organizations and NGOs have played a significant role in responding to the ongoing crisis in Indonesia. When political activists disappeared earlier this year, the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) was instrumental in identifying and tracking the phenomenon, as well as providing advice and legal assistance to the families. They and other NGOs publicized the disappearances and kept the issue alive. A number of organizations have continued to publicize the issue of the sexual assaults in Jakarta during the May riots and a few have been included in the official investigation into the riots.

Other organizations are working with the press to support the free and open flow of information in an effort to maintain the momentum for reform. In October, a South Sumatran regional court found two logging concession holders guilty of starting forest fires. The companies had previously blamed the fires and the subsequent pollution last year on local slash and burn farmers. Using satellite photos as evidence, the Indonesian Forum on the Environment (Walhi) and the local Legal Aid Foundation were able to successfully identify the source.

The role of the military: The role of the Indonesian military has also come under close examination. The May riots in Jakarta are widely suspected to have been sparked by a military shooting of four student protestors at a local University. Since then, widespread criticisms have been sounded about the military's lack of professionalism and disregard for human rights.

Increased scrutiny of ABRI has also drawn into question the military's role in politics. At present, the military has a legally sanctioned political role, formalized in the doctrine of *dwifungsi* or "double function". This policy guarantees the military a set number of seats in both the House of Representatives and the Assembly. Many observers claim that under Suharto, *dwifungsi* came to mean not just military participation in House and the civilian bureaucracy but also the covert manipulation and suppression of political activity in general. The covert role usually involved a range of activities from gathering political intelligence, to orchestrating the elections of recognized political parties, to use of terror against political dissidents.

In the wake of Suharto's resignation there have been powerful voices within ABRI itself hinting about the need to reduce the political role of the military. While such calls are generally viewed as a favorable development, they do run the risk of exacerbating rifts in the already fractious military.

Calls have also been sounded for the military to abandon its extensive business activities. ABRI currently operates 64 major companies in Indonesia. This business role is considered necessary in order to complement the military's rather limited government funding. (Capital spending on defense averages only 2-4 percent of the total yearly government budget.) Because ABRI's business revenues are off-budget, however, they open substantial opportunities for abuse. Complaints have also been heard for years that the military uses intimidation and threats, and sometimes outright violence, to strong-arm its suppliers and competitors.

LEGAL PROCESS AND RULE OF LAW

New laws proposed: With the opening of the doors to political reform, unprecedented opportunities have emerged for reforming Indonesia's legal system. Analysts have for years insisted that a thorough overhaul of the country's legal system would be necessary for Indonesia to fully integrate into the global economy. Most of the legal code and legal institutions in place in Indonesia today originated from the time of the Dutch East Indies and have changed little since the middle of the 19th century. Significantly, many of the laws drafted since independence, including those issued during the Suharto era, continue the colonial legal policies of emphasizing national stability at the expense of individual liberties.

There has been a flurry of new bills drafted since President Habibie took office in May and it seems that the current Minister of Justice, Muladi, is indeed committed to pursuing legal reform in a proactive manner. The most high profile are the laws addressing freedom of expression, the elections, and political parties (see pages 2-3). Economic and commercial laws have also assumed high priority (see Section II).

Legal Institutions: Calls for new and better laws have been accompanied by growing public outcry for more independent legal institutions. Most frequently cited is the need for an independent and impartial judiciary. Under the present political system, the judiciary, as part of the Ministry of Justice, is strongly influenced by the Executive branch. Critics argue that because judges are appointed and can be fired directly by the Justice Minister, their impartiality is compromised. Adi Andojo, a former Supreme Court Judge who was sacked by Suharto after exposing acts of corruption within the Supreme Court has stated that money and power often prevail over justice.

To date, the government has taken no clear steps to reform this important area. Establishing the judiciary as an independent 'branch' of government, outside the Executive, would require a constitutional amendment. It is unclear if the current administration is prepared to go to these lengths.

The police: One of the results of the growing public demand for accountability from the Armed Forces is a new role for the 177,000-strong national police force. There has been increasing public criticism of the police for failing to impartially enforce the law and for violating human rights. Amidst this storm of criticism, Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Commander Wiranto announced in October that the National Police Force will be separated from the Armed Forces starting in April 1999.

Supervision of the police force will initially be transferred to the Ministry of Defense. After a six month interim, this responsibility will be handed over to the Ministry of Home Affairs or to the President, or possibly kept within the Ministry of Defense. The Defense Minister explained that the shift was intended to change in the police force's philosophy from one of being military-oriented officers to public-oriented civil servants.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Human Rights issues: One of the effects of the crisis was to turn the world spotlight on Indonesia, especially during the international broadcast of the May riots in Jakarta. Increased press coverage has raised international concern over the issues of human rights violations in Indonesia. Indonesian citizens and NGOs have also begun to speak out more actively on these issues amidst the liberalized atmosphere of expression.

The government has responded by making several significant human rights gestures. In June, President Habibie officially launched a five-year National Action Plan on Human Rights. The President set the ratification of human rights conventions, the dissemination of information and education on human rights principles as targets to be met by 2003.

Indonesia has only ratified four of the 24 UN conventions on human rights. The government has yet to ratify the prime convention, the International Bill of Human Rights, as well as two main covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
At least 50 political prisoners have been released in a blaze of publicity at various times since Habibie took power, although an estimated 120 anti-government activists still remain in jail.

The government-affiliated National Commission on Human Rights has pledged to increase its independence and authority. The rights body, which was established in 1993 based on a presidential decree, has traditionally been permitted only to make recommendations from the results of its findings in the field. It holds no authority to carry out investigations on its own or to compel authorities to take action against human rights abuses.

Vice Chairman Marzuki Darusman has stated that negotiations are on-going with the government and the House of Representatives to draft a law expanding the commission's authority in defending human rights. This stronger legal base would give the rights body the authority to investigate human rights violations on their own initiative and to promote legal action against violators.

The Jakarta riots in May resulted in a considerable loss of human life, caused heavy damage to property and businesses, and eroded confidence in the country. The National Human Rights Commission estimated that 1,188 people died, many in fires set by rioters at shopping centers while looters and others were trapped inside. Property damages have been officially estimated at almost $400m. The commission also concluded that an "organized group" was involved.

The Commission's report indicated that 168 women, most of whom were Chinese Indonesian, were sexually assaulted during the May riots in Jakarta, and that 20 died during or after the assaults.. More difficult to count is the intangible losses such as the forfeiture of international confidence and the exodus of ethnic-Chinese Indonesians, who play a pivotal role in the country's commercial life.

The military conducted its own investigation and was unable to locate any rape victims or evidence of an organized group behind the May riots. The military has also issued stern warnings to activists publicizing the assaults. Victims and NGO activists have reported numerous instances of military harassment and intimidation. In mid-October, an 18-year old girl who had been counseling the rape victims was found murdered in her home under mysterious circumstances. Other volunteers saw this as a threat one week before their planned trip to the United States to testify before the U.S. Congress.

On July 23rd the government set up a Joint Fact-Finding Team (TGPF) to look into the shooting of four students at Trisakti University, the Jakarta riots, and the reported rape of ethnic Chinese women. On the team were several independent figures, including representatives of respected NGOs, officials from the human rights commission and army officers.

Presenting its results on November 3rd, the TGPF team confirmed that the riots were engineered for political reasons with "preparations behind this having started at the highest decision-making level." Team Chairman Marzuki Darusman stated that the whole process had clear political dimensions aimed at securing extraordinary powers based on an existing decree which would have given President Suharto extra-constitutional powers to overcome any temporary emergency situation. The report mentions Suharto son-in-law Lt. Gen. Prabowo and then-Jakarta military commander Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, as the probable organizers. The team also found physical evidence of 66 rapes during the riots, the majority of which were gang rapes while the majority of the victims were ethnic Chinese women.

Since September, a series of mysterious killings has occurred in East Java has left more than 150 dead under unexplained circumstances. Abdurrahman Wahid, the head of the country's largest Muslim social organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) has suggested that the someone in the cabinet is behind the killings in an effort to split a growing alliance between NU and Megawati of the PDI, both of which have power bases in East Java. The head of the Armed Forces General Wiranto also admitted the deaths were politically motivated. In the weeks since these statements, little progress has been made in uncovering the truth or stopping the killings. Minister of Co-ops Adi Sasono has denied

reports that he and extreme Islamic groups are behind the killings.

Although the fall of Suharto has led to calls to open past cases of abuses by the government and ABRI, the new Habibie government has not been eager to investigate. The possible complicity of higher-ups, including Suharto, and the prospect of growing clamor for investigation into the long list of other abuses-in East Timor, Aceh, Irian Jaya, and against Muslims-allegedly committed by the military may also explain it. Many of the implicated organizers of these abuses still remain in power within the Habibie government.

The change of government has opened up the debate on East Timor. After its invasion and annexation in 1975-76 East Timor became a permanent impediment to Suharto's hopes for international respectability. The incorporation of East Timor as Indonesia's "27th province" was never recognized by the UN, which regards Portugal as administering power. Low-level armed guerrilla activity has continued. Since the late 1980s the main resistance to central authority has come from the urban youth. The Roman Catholic Church has played the difficult role of mediator and protector.

There have been separatist stirrings in Irian Jaya. One focus of the protests in Irian Jaya has been human rights abuses by the military. A church-sponsored report released in May describes an indiscriminate rampage by troops in the highlands last year, following the release of European and Indonesians hostages taken by Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organization).

Similar revelations have been coming-out about Aceh, the North Sumatran province where Muslim tinged-separatism has regularly flared-up over many years. At the end of July, a House fact-finding team was reported to have found mass graves, containing thousands of skeletons, suggesting that the scale the abuses was far larger than previously thought. The National Commission on Human Rights exhumed several mass graves and confirmed that 781 people were killed during the nine-year military operation. The Aceh NGOs forum recently estimated the number of casualties in several mass graves to range from 1,165 to 1,800. Again witnesses implicated Kopassus.

B. POLITICAL NEEDS AND CHALLENGES

Challenges of free and fair elections

Specific challenges in holding free, fair elections include:

Developing new laws that support open, transparent elections that are freely contested by all political parties. As noted, new laws on elections and political parties are currently being debated. Sound regulations in these areas will be crucial to free, fair elections. In timing the completion of these laws, the government must strike a delicate balance. It must avoid rushing the electoral legislation, which could compromise the effectiveness of the final laws. At the same time, it should avoid further postponements of the elections, as such delays have raised suspicions

regarding the official commitment to electoral reform.

Developing the capacity of political parties. The over 90 political parties that have sprung up in the past six months are in general poorly organized, inexperienced at campaigning, and devoid of clear, lucid platforms. These parties need support in clarifying their agendas and planing organized, professionally managed campaigns. Support is also needed to ensure that women participate substantively in party activities.

Strengthening the capability civil society institutions to serve as vehicles for political participation and expression. It must be recalled that the vast majority of voters in any democracy do not actively participate in political parties; political expression is more common through civil society institutions. Under the Suharto regime, civil society institutions were strongly discouraged from playing any political role. To begin to play an active political role, civil society institutions need legal recognition of their political activities. They will also need to develop their institutional capacity in order to allow them to operate effectively after years of political hibernation. Special attention should be given to ensure that women are included in the structure and activities of civil society institutions.

Encouraging public understanding and debate of political issues. Even with effective laws in place, there is a pressing need to encourage social dialogue on political issues in order to develop an informed electorate. Public discussion and debate, a practice discouraged under the Suharto regime, needs to be fostered among all segments of society.

Monitoring the election. One of the greatest challenges ahead is ensuring that the election is conducted in an equitable, transparent manner. This is no mean task in a nation of 210 million spread across some 13,000 islands. Well-planned, nationwide monitoring will be crucial to ensuring that the voting is fairly conducted. (Monitoring activities should be designed to ensure that both women and men are able to participate freely in the election.) Equally important, the fairness of the election (assuming that is the outcome) needs to be publicized to all segments of Indonesian society. After decades of tainted elections, Indonesians are ill inclined to acknowledge any election as clean. For the elected government to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its constituency, the fairness of the election needs to be documented and broadcast by respected sources.

Challenges of Good Governance: While fair elections are Indonesia's most pressing need, good governance is a more long-term, arguably more important challenge. International confidence in Indonesia will not return until a clear agenda is established for developing an open, accountable system of governance. Without the return of international confidence, and the attendant return of investment, Indonesia will be unable to being a sustained economic recovery.

In addition to the shoring up international confidence, good governance is required to

effectively guide Indonesia's future development. The system of patronage and corruption under Suharto caused enormous economic distortions and created a high-cost, high-risk economy. In boom times, with annual growth rates exceeding six percent, such economic problems could be largely overlooked. In the lean years ahead, however, Indonesia must establish sound systems of governance if it is to develop a healthy, growing economy. Finally, without taking concrete steps toward better systems of governance, Indonesian may run the risk of losing the stream of international aid that now forms the basis of the country's social safety net programs.

Specific challenges in the process of improving governance include:

Expanding the independence, capacity, and accountability of the House. As noted previously, the House of Representatives recently proposed legislation for the first time in 32 years. The House of Representatives needs to continue assuming a more active role in the policy process. At the same time, it needs to develop technical capacity to develop, analyze, and debate legislation. (Many current members of the House hold only high school degrees, with no formal training in the fields they must address. MP offices are also notoriously understaffed and lacking in resources.) The House of Representatives also needs to enhance its communications and constituency relations capacity in order to make it more accountable to voters.

Expanding the independence, capability, and accountability of the judiciary. A more autonomous court system dedicated to impartially enforcing the law will be crucial to supporting good governance in Indonesia. The judiciary needs to be granted greater autonomy from the Executive branch, possible by being separated from the Ministry of Justice. The capabilities and accountability of judges also need to be expanded to ensure laws are applied effectively and impartially.

Increasing the accountability and transparency of government bodies. As discussed previously, few systems exist within the Indonesian government for monitoring and adjudicating delinquent political bodies. Monitoring systems – both government and non-governmental -- will need to be developed to ensure official bodies operate in a clean, open way. Special attention should be given to increasing the accountability of the Executive, owning to this office's disproportionate influence on policy (see page four).

Reduction of corrupt practices within the government. This endeavor will clearly constitute a long-term process, as the system of corruption and patronage developed by Suharto is entrenched in most branches of the government. A concerted, well-planned, and transparent program for exposing and eliminating corrupt practices will be needed if progress is to be made in this area.

Decentralizing power from central government to regional and local government. Indonesia needs to achieve a better balance between the power afforded to central government and that of regional and local governments. Decentralization of power will give a greater voice in government decisions to citizens. It can also increase the

government's efficiency in delivering services by ensuring that local voices influence policy and decision-making. An unprecedented opportunity for decentralization has opened, as the current administration seems to recognize the limitations of central government to deliver services throughout the archipelago. Steps should be taken to capitalize on this opportunity and make progress toward increasing to power and responsibilities of regional and local governments.

Challenges of freedom of expression, association and information: Freedom of expression and free access to information are essential to any democratic government. While Indonesia has taken some steps towards liberalizing these areas over the past months, further measures are needed. Specific challenges include:

Developing stronger, more comprehensive laws to protect freedom of expression and freedom of association. While recent laws in these areas clearly improve on past regulations, most observers agree that the new laws are still incomplete and leave opportunities for government restrictions on freedoms. The government will need to give high priority to drafting more comprehensive laws as soon as its legislative agenda permits.

Increasing the freedom and capability of the media. Indonesia also needs to nurture its newly independent media, which can serve as a watchdog on government and can also stimulate public debate on political issues. Most important in this area is the drafting of clearer laws to protect media freedom. There is also a need for the media to enhance its professional capacity so that it can more effectively inform the public.

Increasing the ability of labor organization to promote workers' rights. Labor is another vitally important area. The leadership of most of the newly formed unions has little or no experience in lobbying government and championing labor rights. The unions clearly need to develop their capacity for lobbying, communications, and organization if they are to effectively advocate the rights of their members. Clearer, more comprehensive labor laws are also needed to ensure that the current environment of openness toward organizing labor is not curtailed or reversed in the future. Special attention should be given to ensure that women actively participate in labor unions.

Providing improved protection of human rights. Indonesia needs to take additional steps to improve its tarnished human right record. Better protection of human right can send a strong message, to Indonesian society and to the world, that the government is serious about reform. It will also be vital to maintaining the international and domestic support necessary to leading the country to recovery. The government needs to developing clearer policies and regulations to protect human rights, as well as better monitoring systems to report human right violations. Efforts to improve human rights protection should be designed to ensure that they provide equal protection to both women and men.

C. USAID AND DONOR RESPONSE

USAID has been and will continue to be one of the largest and most active donors in civic and community participation (democracy and governance sectors). The USAID Program, more than any single donor program, has been instrumental in laying the groundwork for political reform and will continue to support and facilitate the active engagement of donor groups in strengthening democratic reforms. The assistance requirements within the DG sector are enormous and no one donor will have sufficient resources to address the wide number of democracy and governance issues. Furthermore because of sovereignty and impartiality concerns, broad and active support from international donors is highly important and useful.

During the past ten years, USAID has actively supported the development of civil society groups in advocating for reforms. This support, joined with other donor programs has been instrumental in limiting powerful status quo groups which have acted with impunity and without regard for the rights and interests of the broader population. Our approach has been to strengthen a solid institutional base and encourage support and assistance from other donors to extend coverage and programs to civil society and reform groups. In highly sensitive areas of support we have established working groups among other donors and to identify gaps and areas of collaboration and coordination. Both of these approaches have extended the coverage and effectiveness of programs and flagged the resolve of the international community to support the political reform. During the next six months, our focus will be centered particularly on the work required to support free and fair elections.

Elections Support: The UNDP has agreed, at the request of the Government of Indonesia, to provide overall coordination and facilitation of support for the elections planned in May 1999. We have worked closely with the UNDP to assist their coordination and share information and analyses of the USAID supported election assistance work already underway. Our support at this critical time has been to provide feasibility and assessment analyses in such areas as election management assessments, media, voter and civic education needs, and the status of public information and to encourage other donors to identify programs in these areas.

Regrettably, most of the donor elections programs are at the identification and feasibility stages and we should expect a period of consolidation and review before more defined activities and programs are developed. However, a few activities have been initiated and some level of program interest has been identified. We will work closely with the UNDP to encourage additional support.

Other Donors

Australia	Provided training to elections officials and has indicated an interest in supporting election management.
Japan	The Japanese Government has indicated that they are willing to provide

election commodities such as ballot boxes and perhaps indelible voter identification ink.

Germany — The German Government and the UNDP are providing assistance on electoral reform and assistance to NGOs.

Many other donors have indicated an interest in supporting the election and we have met with the Swedish Aid (SIDA), British Aid, Danish AID (DANIDA)and other donor groups to support their programs.

Other Democracy and Governance Programs

In other democracy sectors, USAID has also been the most active and largest donor. There are encouraging signs that other donors will expand their assistance.

- CIDA and AUSAID are providing assistance to the National Human Rights Commission, and they are providing assistance for human rights training, community advocacy, election assistance, and are contemplating funding some programs with the national parliament. AUSAID is also reviewing a parliamentary support program and assistance to the Supreme Court.

- The WB has announced a comprehensive program of good governance and the elimination of corruption and support for legal reforms. They are actively seeking the support of civil society groups.

- The Canadian and German Foundations are providing media assistance especially print media.

- DANIDA, is extending some support to NGOs. They have indicated that they will fund seminars on electoral reforms and competition. The DANIDA has also informally indicated that they may be interested in supporting the political transition in East Timor.

USAID/INDONESIA POSITION DESCRIPTION

FOOD AID MONITOR FOR PL 480 TITLE II EMERGENCY FOOD SUPPORT ACTIVITY (TEFSA) IN INDONESIA

SCOPE OF WORK

INTRODUCTION

The Food Aid Monitor for PL 480 Title II Emergency Food Support Activity (TEFSA) in Indonesia is a local Personal Service Contractor (PSC) who guides and monitors in-country use of U.S. agricultural commodities provided under Title II of Public Law 480, as amended, to combat food insecurity in Indonesia. The functions of the Food For Peace Program are outlined in Handbook 9 and AID Regulation 11.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this contract is to ensure:

- Effective daily monitoring and management of food aid resources allocated by USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office of Food For Peace (BHR/FFP), and USAID/Indonesia DA funds in support of the PL 480 Title II emergency program (TEFSA) in Indonesia.

- The achievement of results expected from the expenditure of those resources.

BACKGROUND

BHR/FFP and USAID/Indonesia have invested significant resources for the PL 480 TEFSA program in Indonesia. In order to ensure adequate monitoring and management of Title II resources in Indonesia, and in conformity with management for results, a position of a Food Aid Monitor under a Personal Services Contract (PSC) is created in Indonesia. The incumbent is hired by USAID/Indonesia and is responsible to the Mission Director.

The incumbent of this position will liaise with USAID/Indonesia and BHR/FFP and will be responsible for the daily monitoring and management of the Title II emergency response activities in Indonesia under the TEFSA program.

ARTICLE I - DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Provides overall oversight of the PL 480 TEFSA program in Indonesia, monitors TEFSA's implementation by the Cooperating Sponsors and updates the program's food response and cash inputs levels.

2. Reviews grantee proposals and program implementation ensuring that they are consistent with the program's commitments under the PL 480 Title II Transfer Authorizations (T.A.) and USAID/Indonesia DA Grant Agreements pledged to all Cooperating Sponsors (CSs) under the TEFSA program.

3. Obtain and review commodity call forwards, arrivals, losses/damages, financial reports and other required reports from the Cooperating Sponsors (CSs) and coordinate any action taken with BHR/FFP.

4. Liaise with representatives of the voluntary agencies, World Food Program and other Cooperating Sponsors (CSs) to keep fully informed of the development of the food supply situation in the country and to discuss and resolve mutual problems with them.

5. Attends meetings with PVOs, GOI agencies, UN agencies and other private organization on matters related to the PL 480 TEFSA program.

6. In conjunction with USAID/Indonesia, reports to BHR/FFP on a wide range of implementation issues related to the management and use of Title II food aid resources by the Cooperating Sponsors (CSs).

Factor 1. Knowledge Required by this Position

1. Familiarity with the legislative requirements of the U.S. Government's food aid programs as they refer to emergency assistance.

2. Demonstrated ability to work effectively with personnel from various agencies on the resolution of problems connected with emergency food aid programs.

3. Professional knowledge and skills to generate and apply new concepts in planning and implementing projects for the solution of complex food security goals, or solutions to problems faced in implementing emergency food aid projects for vulnerable populations.

Factor 2. Supervisory Controls

The USAID/Indonesia Mission Director (or designee) will provide program policy direction. BHR/FFP will provide technical and general food aid policy direction. The incumbent works independently on implementing projects and coordinating with other personnel. Problems and issues of implementation consistent with the constraints which may affect the TEFSA program are resolved with USAID/Indonesia in concert with BHR/FFP. Project accomplishments are reviewed for compliance with USAID policy and in the context of achievement of intended results.

Factor 3. Guidelines

Guidelines consist of laws and legislative initiatives, and Agency and Bureau rules and regulations (USAID Regulation 11 and Regulation 2), governing the transport and use of the U.S. food assistance.

Factor 4. Complexity

The work requires the application of knowledge of managing food aid programs. Issues are often characterized by unusual demands of the vital role that food aid plays in meeting the emergency and short-range needs of food crisis condition. The contractor evaluates CSs' performance, develops a range of alternatives for the solution of problems, and coordinates with USAID/Indonesia personnel in the accomplishment of oversight and monitoring of TEFSA's implementation.

Factor 5. Scope and Effect

The purpose of the work is to assure that USAID's food aid response achieves its objectives, and that resources are well-managed and protected. The position requires a high degree of initiative, originality, foresight and judgement and organizational skills to assure effective implementation.

Factor 6. Personal Contacts

The Contractor works closely with USAID/Indonesia and regional FFP personnel; Bureau and Agency staff; host government officials and agencies; other donor agencies; U.N. agencies, CSs; and IO/NGO representatives. Contractor works with CSs, IOs/NGOs, and officials of the Indonesian government on the monitoring, implementation, and management of Title II emergency food aid. Some contacts with specific individuals are recurring since the Contractor functions in a monitoring and coordinating capacity. Other contacts may be characterized by their unstructured settings and by the flexibility of approach and breadth of subject matters.

Factor 7. Purpose of Contacts

The purpose of contacts is to assure that USAID's food assistance programs, guidelines, and procedures are effective; and to provide technical guidance in identifying, developing and evaluating various methods of improving implementation od TEFSA.

Factor 8. Physical Demands/Work Environment

Work is a combination of office and field settings. The requirement for field trips to visit food aid programs may expose the Contractor to difficult surroundings and security risks. Travel will be approximately 30%.

Factor 9. Relationships and Responsibilities

The Contractor will coordinate daily with the Mission Director or his/her designee. The Mission will provide intermediate supervision and support on issues of the country's food aid concern. BHR/FFP will provide direction and orders as necessary. Contractor performance will be evaluated by USAID/Indonesia.

ARTICLE II - PERIOD OF SERVICE

The effective date of this contract is ..... through .....

The contractor's period of service shall be approximately 15 months in Indonesia.

ARTICLE III - CONTRACTOR'S COMPENSATION AND REIMBURSEMENT IN U.S. DOLLARS

A. USAID/Indonesia shall pay the Contractor compensation after it has accrued and reimburse him/her in U.S. dollars for necessary and reasonable costs actually incurred by him/her in the performance of this contract within the categories listed in paragraph C, below, and subject to the conditions and limitations applicable thereto as set out herein and in the attached General Provisions (GP).

B. The amount budgeted and available as personal compensation to the Contractor is calculated to cover a calendar period of approximately 12 months (with the option for contract extension. up to 15 months) which is to include (1) vacation, sick, and home leave which may be earned during the Contractor's tour of duty (GP Clause No.5), (2) 4 days of authorized travel (GP Clause No. 10).

C. Allowable Costs

1. Compensation (base salary) is at a rate of $ ..... per annum (GS Class ..., step ...). Adjustments in compensation (pay) for the periods when the Contractor is not in compensable pay status shall be calculated at the rate of $ .... per hour.

2. Contractor shall work 40 hours per week. Unless specifically authorized in the schedule of this contract, no overtime hours shall be allowed.

D. Maximum U.S. Dollar Obligation

In no event shall the maximum U.S. Dollar obligation under this contract exceed $ ..... per year, including $..... of in-country support costs allotted for support of the PSC. The Contractor, in consultation with USAID/Indonesia Mission Director's designee, shall keep a close account of all obligations incurred and accrued hereunder and promptly notify the Contracting Officer whenever, in their opinion, the said maximum is not sufficient to cover all compensation and costs reimbursable in U.S. Dollars anticipated under the contract.

ARTICLE IV - COSTS REIMBURSABLE AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT

A. Costs Reimbursable

1. Method of payment of local Currency Costs: Once each bi-weekly period, the Contractor will submit to the paying office stated on the cover page of this contract a completed time sheet indicating hours worked and leave taken. This time sheet will be signed by the Contractor, approved by USAID/Indonesia Director's designee, and submitted in accordance with notices from the paying office. Required documentation may be changed from time to time by notice from the paying office.

2. Final Payment: A final payment voucher shall be submitted by the Contractor promptly following completion of the duties under this contract but in no event later than 120 days from the date of such completion. The Contractor's claim, which includes final settlement of compensation, shall not be paid until after the performance of the duties required under the terms of this Contract has been approved by the Contracting Officer or his/her designee.

B. Logistic Support

USAID/Indonesia will provide office space, office supplies and (what is normal?).

ARTICLE V - PRECONTRACT EXPENSES

No expense incurred before execution of this contract will be reimbursed unless such expense was incurred after receipt and acceptance of a precontract expense letter issued to the Contractor by the Contracting Officer, and then only in accordance with the provisions and limitations contained in such letter. The rights and obligations created by such letter shall be considered as merged into this contract.

ARTICLE VI - ADDITIONAL CLAUSES

A. Emergency Locator Information

Upon start of work, the Contractor shall provide the following information to the Contracting Officer, USAID/Indonesia:

1. The Contractor's name, home address, and telephone number, including any after-hours emergency number (s),

2. The name, address, and telephone number (s) of Contractor's next of kin, and

3. Any special instructions pertaining to emergency situations, such as power of attorney designees or alternate contact persons.

B. Medical Clearances

In accordance with GP 3, "Physical Fitness and Health Room Privileges", the Contractor is required to be examined by a licensed doctor, and the Contractor shall obtain from the doctor a certificate that, in the doctor's opinion, the Contractor is physically able to engage in the type of activity for which he is to be employed under the contract and is physically able to reside in the Cooperating Country. A copy of the certificate shall be provided to the Contracting Officer prior to the Contractor's departure for the Cooperating Country, and the Contractor shall provide the certificate before he starts work under the contract.

C. Medical Evacuation (Medevac) Services

In accordance with GP 27 "Medical Evacuation (Medevac) Services" the Contractor is required to obtain Medevac coverage from the USAID Medevac service indicated below, unless exempted in accordance with paragraph (b) of this provision.

Corporation (Medex) of Timonium, MD. under Contract No.FAO-0000-Q-00-2041-00. Applications for coverage should mention the above number and be made directly to:

MEDEX Assistance Corporation
P.O. Box 5375
Timonium, MD 21094-5375
Tel: (800) 537-2029 (toll free)
(410) 453-6301 (MD)
Fax: (410) 453-6301

D. Option to Extend Term of Contract

a. USAID/Indonesia may extend the term of this contract by written notice to the Contractor, provided that USAID/Jakarta shall give the Contractor a preliminary notice of its intent to extend at least fifteen (15) days before the contract expires. This preliminary notice does not commit USAID/Jakarta to an extension. The contract extension will be effected through a contract modification signed by both parties to the contract.

b. If USAID/Jakarta exercises this option, the extended contract shall be considered to include this option provision.

c. The total duration of this contract, including extensions under this option clause, shall not exceed 15 months.

BUDGET (.....1998 - .....1999)

Category	Total/per Annum
1. Compensation	.....
2.	.....
.....	

(b)(2)

CN FOR USAID/INDONESIA DA SUPPORT FOR TITLE II EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE

Program:	Indonesia
Title:	Title II Emergency Food Support Activity (TEFSA)
Funding Source:	Development Assistance (DA)
Number:	497-0392
New/Continuing:	New
Prior Reference:	None
Proposed FY98 Obligation:	**Up to $3 million DA**
Life of Project Funding:	**Up to $6 million DA**
Initial Obligation:	**FY 1998**
Estimated Final Obligation:	**FY 1999**
Estimated Completion Date:	**FY 1999**

Purpose: To increase food availability to the neediest rural populations affected by the drought in Indonesia through support for Food For Work and vulnerable groups feeding programs. USAID/BHR/FFP has committed up to $25 million in FY 1998 Title II emergency food commodities to help assist drought victims in Indonesia. USAID/Indonesia is creating the Title II Emergency Food Support Activity (TEFSA) to support the PVOs managing and administering the distribution of these food commodities through Food For Work and vulnerable groups feeding programs.

Background: An El Nino-related drought, the worst in 50 years, has caused widespread crop failure in Indonesia, resulting in shortages of staple foods in many areas. During October 1997 to January 1998, rainfall was 70% below normal levels in the hardest hit eastern island provinces of Nusa Tengara Barat (Lombok and Sumbawa), Nusa Tengara Timur (Sumba, Flores, and West Timor) and East Timor. In these islands, failed and delayed harvests have caused food shortages and taxed traditional coping mechanisms, risking the food security of the poorest families. Combined with the country's economic crisis which has caused the price of staples to soar, and expected further price increases as subsidies are removed in accordance with the IMF agreement, external assistance is needed to enable these families to survive the next twelve months. While the Government of Indonesia (GOI) is implementing subsidized market schemes and free distribution of rice in some areas, GOI resources and coverage are limited and are assessed to be insufficient to meet the immediate and near future needs of the poorest families. The GOI has acknowledged this need in its appeal to the World Food Program on February 27, 1998.

A food needs assessment has been carried out by USAID/BHR/FFP, which determined that FFP will make available up to $25 million in food commodities for drought victims in Indonesia, focussing on the eastern islands. USAID/Indonesia and BHR/FFP have received proposals from PVOs to utilize these food commodities to establish Food For Work and vulnerable groups feeding programs. FFP has food commodities available to respond to these proposals, but does not have funds to support the administrative costs of the PVOs. USAID/Indonesia is creating

TEFSA to support these PVO costs.

Project Description: TEFSA will fund the administration, monitoring and related support costs of the PVOs utilizing the Title II emergency food commodities for Food For Work and vulnerable groups feeding programs. These programs will supplement the nutritional needs of families in the hardest hit drought areas of the eastern islands. The primary focus will be Food For Work activities in the poorest villages. The activities will provide work/income opportunities for rural subsistence farmers whose crops have failed and who have few or no other income opportunities. Beyond providing food for employment, prioritization will be given to Food For Work activities which will be of longer term benefit to the food security of the area by teaching skills and addressing issues related to access to markets (roads and bridges), improved farming capacity (irrigation, land reclamation) and increased access to potable water (wells, water catchments). In all activities, participation by women will be maximized. The proposed grain ration of rice will provide approximately 45% of the total caloric need for a family of five (2 kg./person/day x 20 days/month = 40 kg./month).

To provide extra protection for the most vulnerable members in the same targeted populations, children under five and pregnant/lactating mothers, a ration of 4 kg./month of wheat soy blend (WSB) will be provided through certain institutions such as local health posts (Posyandu). This ration would provide 100% of the protein needs of a child under five and 45% of the protein needs for pregnant/lactating mothers. Also incorporated into the vulnerable groups feeding program will be health education aimed at improving mother/child health practices and reducing the risk of related illness.

Beneficiaries: The PVOs will target 250,000 beneficiaries or 50,000 families per month in the eastern islands. Data has been collected by the PVOs to ensure that these food programs benefit the neediest populations.

Donor Coordination: The World Bank and UNDP have established a coordination body that includes donors and PVOs/NGOs assisting drought victims in Indonesia. Through close coordination the group seeks to avoid overlap and prevent gaps in responding to the drought.

Expected Results: Expected results during the first year of operation include: 1) to supplement caloric intake among 50,000 of the neediest, drought-affected households in the eastern islands, helping to stabilize their nutrition levels during this critical period of drought and resulting food shortages; 2) to increase the capacity of villagers in target areas through infrastructure built or rehabilitated by Food for Work activities that will have long-term benefits to the community; 3) to provide up to 12,000,000 person days of employment to otherwise unemployed vulnerable groups; and 4) to increase the capacity of target households in the affected communities in livelihood skills training that will allow households to increase income and improve coping mechanisms for the future.

Principal Contractors/Grantees/Agencies: Catholic Relief Services, CARE, WFP.

U.S. RESPONSE TO DROUGHT IN INDONESIA

BACKGROUND: In late 1997/early 1998, the El Nino effect was the trigger mechanism for drought, forest fires and related food shortages and health problems throughout Indonesia. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has received three seperate disaster declarations in 1998 in response to the wide-ranging impacts of El Nino.

In response to a disaster declaration in October 1997, USAID's Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (BHR/OFDA) sent an assessment team to Irian Jaya and subsequently funded three relief projects. In late 1997, BHR/OFDA provided $248,200 to World Vision Relief and Development (WVRD) for a seeds distribution program on Irian Jaya. Short growing season seeds (carrots, beans, corn, cabbage, etc.) were flown into the isolated interior and passed to the indigenous areas by missionary groups working with WVRD, thus reducing the need to fly bulk food into the drought stricken areas later in the year. BHR/OFDA also provided $100,000 to Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF) to fly food, seeds, and other relief materials into the disaster affected region. This funding provided additional airlift capacity to both support the WVRD seeds program and ensure that MAF was able to continue other drought-related relief missions in Irian Jaya. Further, a $150,000 BHR/OFDA grant to ICRC provided medical supplies to targeted vulnerable populations in Irian Jaya.

International organizations, U.S. private and voluntary agencies (PVOs) and USAID carried out food need assessments in Indonesia in January-February, 1998. The assessments confirmed that the drought has been most severe in Sulawesi and in the eastern island provinces of Nusa Tengara Barat (Lombok and Sumbawa), Nusa Tengara Timur (Sumba, Flores and West Timor) and East Timor. In these islands, failed crops and delayed harvests have caused food shortages and have overtaxed traditional coping mechanisms, risking the food security of nearly 140,000 vulnerable families (or about 700,000 people based on an average family size of five). In response, the U.S. Ambassador declared a disaster for East Timor on February 2 and BHR/OFDA provided $25,000. These funds were provided via a grant to CARE to enhance their ongoing drought assistance program on East Timor.

On April 27, 1998, Ambassador Roy issued a third disaster declaration in Indonesia in response to drought and fires in East Kalimantan. BHR/OFDA responded with $22,500 to a consortium of indigenous NGOs for the purchase of rice seed. These seeds were distributed to affected populations for planting upon the resumption of rains.

In addition to these rapid relief efforts, USAID/Indonesia and USAID's Office of Food for Peace (BHR/FFP) created the Indonesia Emergency Food Support Activity (TEFSA) for the vulnerable groups most severely affected by the drought. BHR/FFP initially committed $25 million in Title II emergency food aid resources for TEFSA and the mission allocated $6 million in Development Assistance (DA) resources for administrative support and related costs. In May 1998, it became clear that the civil unrest in many parts of the country had exacerbated the situation for the country's most vulnerable drought-affected families. In response, BHR/FFP increase the Title II allocation from $25 million to $35 million. CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the Church World Service (CWS), Adventist Relief and Development Agency (ADRA) have submitted Title II proposals and all five have been approved and funded.

Description of Approved Title II Activities
Resources Allocated: $35 million
Resources Committed To Date: $32 million
Total Beneficiaries Targeted Under Approved Activites: 629,000
Tonnage of Commodities Committed To Date: 55,842 MT

CARE/Atlanta: USAID approved the programming of 18,200 MTs of commodities with an estimated value of $10.9 million (commodities- $6.6 million, ocean freight- $2.3 million, and Internal Transport, Storage and Handling costs (ITSH)- $2.0 million). CARE's 12-month intervention will assist the most vulnerable drought-affected groups (about 125,000 people) in East Timor and West Flores via food-for-work (FFW) activities during June 1, 1998 - June 1, 1999. CARE's FFW activities will largely be concentrated on the rehabilitation of rural roads, and water and sanitation systems.

CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES (CRS)/Baltimore: USAID approved the programming of 13,540 MTs of FY 1998 Title II emergency commodities with an estimated value of $7.7 million (commodities- $5.0 million, ocean freight- $1.7 million, and ITSH- $1.0 million) to Catholic Relief Services (CRS). CRS will carry out a 12-month emergency food aid program in West Timor, East Sumba, Sumbawa, East Flores, Lombok and South Sumatra. The CRS intervention will begin at the end of June and will reach 25,000 families (about 125,000 people based on an average family size of five) via the following three activities: (a) food-for-work for drought-affected communities (rice); (b) supplemental feeding for children under five and lactating and pregnant mothers (WSB); and (c) emergency food distribution (rice) in other areas when

needed. The general distribution component is for up to 500 MTs of rice and will be undertaken only if requirements can be reconfirmed through follow-up assessments.

CHURCH WORLD SERVICE (CWS)/New York: This 12-month CWS intervention will supplement the nutritional needs of 37,000 drought-affected people in the Sulawesi districts of Jeneponto, Takalor, Enrakany and Tana Torja. BHR/FFP committed a total of 3,582 MT of rice at an estimated value of $2.4 million (commodities- $1.3 million, ocean freight- $0.55 million and ITSH- $0.55 million). CWS will partner with the Communion of Churches of Indonesia (PGIW) as well as the Church of Tana Toraja and the Church of Central Sulawesi to facilitate the assessment, planning, implementation and evaluation of the community based public works activities undertaken through food-for-work (FFW). The FFW activities will be concentrated in the areas of road and bridge repair, water conservation, construction of water catchment systems, tree planning and terracing.

Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)/Silver Spring: BHR/FFP This 12-month ADRA intervention will supplement the nutritional needs for up to 30,000 drought-affected people in Pasir District of East Kalimantan (one of the most severely drought-affected districts in Kalimantan). BHR/FFP has committed a total of 3,520 MT of commodities with an estimated value of $2.0 million (commodities- $1.3 million, ocean frieght- $0.54 million and ITSH- $0.16 million). ADRA proposes to implement a two-pronged emergency initiative comprised of FFW (rice) and supplemental feeding (CSB) activities. The activity will provide work for 5,000 individuals (i.e., with an average family size of five the FFW will have an impact on nearly 25,000 people). The focus of FFW will be roads and bridges construction or repair. Additionally, ADRA will provide supplemental feeding for pregnant and lactating women and children under five years of age. Working together with the health service from the district and subdistrict level as well as the village midwife from 29 at-risk villages, ADRA will target nearly 800 pregnant and lactating women and nearly 2,000 children under five.

World Food Program/Rome: There are three components in WFP's $88.2 million Indonesia Emergency Operations Project (EMOP): (a) nutritional support to pregnant and lactating mothers and children under five (17,000 MT of blended foods for 312,000 beneficiaries), (b) a food-for-work activity (179,000 MT of rice for 771,000 beneficiareis), and (c) a general food distribution activity (30,000 MT of rice for 475,000 beneficiaries). BHR/FFP agreed to fully fund the nutritional support for vulnerable groups component at a level of 17,000 MT with an estimated value of $9.0 million (commodities- $6 million, ocean freight- $2.7 million, and ITSH- $0.3 million). The distribution of blended food will be through village health centers. Targeting at the sub-district level will be undertaken locally using information on food security, prevalence of malnutrition in under five children and levels of employment. Beneficiaries will be

July 22, 1998

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA IN ECONOMIC CRISIS DURING FY 98

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE:

$50 million in PL 480, Title II: grant food aid to be provided through the World Food Program and international and Indonesian NGOs. Food will be used for job creation and infant feeding programs. This program will provide approximately 88,000 metric tons.

$40 million in PL 480, Title I: concessional loans (five-year grace period) used to buy rice, wheat and soybeans. This program will provide approximately 170,000 metric tons.

$3 million in grants to handle administration of these programs.

$10.5 million in grants for medical supplies and contraceptives.

$850,000 in grants for nutrients to fortify flour provided by UNICEF for maternal health programs.

$550,000 in grants for disaster relief in Irian Jaya, East Timor, and East Kalimantan.

OTHER U.S. BILATERAL ECONOMIC AID DURING FY 98:

$1 billion for Ex-Im Bank short-term trade financing.

$400 million in credit guarantees for purchase of wheat and other designated commodities.

$100 million in credit guarantees for purchases of foodstuffs, breeder livestock, and agricultural equipment and services.

$69.2 million in ongoing USAID development assistance in the areas of economic growth, health, population and HIV/AIDS, environment, urban infrastructure, and strengthening civil society.

United States Information Service (USIS), Jakarta

Catholic Relief Services
Jl. Wijaya I No. 35
Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta 12170
P.O. Box 4484/JKTM Jakarta 12044
Telephone : 7253339 (Hunting)
Fax. : 7251566
E-mail : crs_indo@indo.net.id

Release date: Immediate

Contact: Michele F. Broemmelsiek
Jl. Wijaya I/35
Jakarta 12170
Indonesia
Tel: 62-21-7253339
Fax: 62-21-7251566
E-mail: crs_indo@indo.net.id

CRS STARTS EMERGENCY PROGRAM IN THREE PROVINCES IN INDONESIA

Jakarta, July 22 --- In response to the recent major drought in several parts of Indonesia, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is joining with seven local agencies to implement an $8.5 million emergency food program through the assistance of the U.S. Government (USAID) donation of 12,500 MT of rice and 1,040 MT of wheat-soy-blend.. The seven partners are Lembaga Karya Bakti (Lampung, Sumatra), Komisi Pembangunan Sosial Ekonomi Keuskupan Agung Ende (Ende, Flores), Yayasan Swadaya Membangun (Mataram, Lombok), Yayasan Sosial Santo Yoseph Keuskupan Atambua (Atambua, Timor) Yayasan Cinta Sesama (Maumere, Flores), Yayasan Tananua Sumba (Waingapu, Sumba), and Yayasan Pengembangan Sosial Keuskupan Agung Kupang (Kupang, Timor).

Each month CRS will provide 125,000 people (25,000 families) with up to 50 kilos of rice per family. In addition, 21,000 pregnant and lactating women, as well as children under five will be provided with four kilos of wheat-soy-blend per month. The project covers 225 villages in 69 sub-districts of East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara and Lampung Provinces.

In the Food for Work program, the target population is one able-bodied household member per family. Working 20 days a month, each will received 2.5 kilos of rice a day. The program is also aimed at contributing to long-term food security by providing a foundation through activities which enhance rural infrastructure, promote improved farming practices, increase access to water for farming and consumption, and improve nutritional knowledge and monitoring.

The situation in Lampung area is especially grim. According to a recent report, more than nine thousand families are seriously affected by the food shortage; more than three thousand families live in an area whose harvest has failed during the last 12 months. Almost seven thousand families live in an area with poor harvest during the last six months.

Indra Karya I is one of the villages hit the hardest. About 700 families in the village are suffering from food shortage. Mrs. Aminah, a mother of a one-year-old baby, explained that the harvest had failed for the last three consecutive seasons. Like other villagers, she and her husband planted "gogo rancah" rice, which relied on rainwater instead of irrigation system. Because the rainfall was minimal last year, the rice harvest suffered and 70 percent of their field was cultivated. Starting last year, Mrs. Aminah's husband abandoned the rice field and changed to another job as a day worker at a nearby rubber plantation. But as the economic situation worsened the plant closed.

CRS has operated in Indonesia providing emergency relief and social and economic development programs since 1957. It works with local organizations in rural areas to strengthen poor people's capacity to earn a decent living and care for their families. CRS provided food assistance for development in Indonesia until 1995, when Indonesia was declared self-sufficient in its staple food commodities. Food assistance resumed this year due to the drought caused by "El Nino." At the same time, Indonesia's economic crisis has caused the price of staples to soar, and outside assistance is required to enable poor families to survive the next 12 months.

CRS is the official overseas relief and development agency for the United States Catholic Church. With an annual budget of $218 million, it operates in more than 80 countries worldwide. It provides assistance solely on the basis of need, not creed.

416(B) SUMMARY

AT THE INDONESIA CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING (CGI) HELD IN PARIS ON JULY 30, THE USG ANNOUNCED THAT 500,000 MT OF WHEAT WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO INDONESIA WITH UP TO 1 MILLION MORE TONS TO BE MADE AVAILABLE IF CONDITIONS WARRANT AND AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER WHEAT SUPPLIERS TO THE INDONESIAN MARKET. A JOINT FAS/USAID REVIEW OF CURRENT NEEDS WAS CONDUCTED IN JAKARTA AUGUST 10-22. THE RESULTS OF THAT REVIEW ARE DESCRIBED BELOW.

CONCLUSION ON HUMANITARIAN NEED: FOOD SECURITY IS OF INCREASING CONCERN TO INDONESIA'S POPULACE AS BUYING POWER ERODES. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ESTIMATE THAT OVER 40 MILLION PEOPLE NOW LACK THE EARNING POWER TO ADEQUATELY PROVIDE FOR THEIR BASIC HUMAN NEEDS. UNICEF TEAMS NOTE RISING RATES OF PROTEIN DEFICIENCY AFFECTING THE URBAN POOR. THE GOVERNMENT IS ENGAGING ON PROGRAMS OF CASH AND FOOD-FOR-WORK, INCREASING FOOD SUBSIDY PROGRAMS BY OFFERING SUBSIDIZED RICE PACKAGES, AND IS ACTIVELY LOOKING FOR WAYS OF GETTING MONEY TO THE POOR. IBRD AND ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK SUPPORT FOR INCOME GENERATING PROGRAMS HAS DRAMATICALLY RISEN OVER THE YEAR. HOWEVER, THE PROGRAMS STILL CANNOT REACH ALL THE URBAN AND RURAL POPULACE.

THE WHEAT DONATIONS FROM THE U.S. CAN COMPLEMENT THE ONGOING DONOR AND INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT EFFORTS, ALTHOUGH WHEAT PRODUCTS ARE NOT ADVOCATED BY THE GOVERNMENT (BAPPENAS) FOR ITS SCHOOL FEEDING PROGRAMS BECAUSE WHEAT IS NOT INDIGENOUS TO INDONESIA. THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT DIRECT DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM WHICH COULD BE IMMEDIATELY SUPPORTED BY WHEAT WOULD BE INSTANT NOODLE DISTRIBUTION. AS A RESULT, THE MAJOR BENEFITS OF U.S. WHEAT DONATIONS ARE SEEN AS INDIRECTLY SUPPORTING THE POOR BY OFFSETTING OTHER PRODUCT COSTS THROUGH "SWAPS", PRIMARILY IN LOCAL CURRENCY, FOR RESOURCES NEEDED TO SUPPORT SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAMS.

THE WHEAT DONATIONS FROM THE U.S. SHOULD BE STRUCTURED AROUND THE THEME OF INDONESIA'S "FOOD SECURITY". THROUGH THIS THEME, U.S. DONATIONS SHOULD HELP THE INDONESIAN POOR INCREASE THEIR ACCESS TO FOOD THROUGH FOOD-FOR-WORK AND CASH-FOR-WORK EFFORTS; THROUGH RURAL MICRO-CREDIT SUPPORT; PROVISION OF SUPPORT TO SMALL FOOD PROCESSORS OR STREET VENDORS; AND SUPPORT TO PERI-URBAN COMMUNITY GROUPS. U.S. DONATIONS CAN ALSO BE SHOWN TO INCREASE THE AVAILABILITY OF FOOD FOR THE POOR BY SUPPORTING AGRICULTURAL RECOVERY ACTIVITIES IN THE DROUGHT-STRICKEN EASTERN ISLANDS; ASSISTING THE PRIVATE SECTOR'S EFFORTS AT DISTRIBUTING LOW-COST INSTANT NOODLES TO POOR NEIGHBORHOODS; AND ASSISTING UNICEF'S EFFORTS AT MAKING NUTRITIOUS CEREALS AVAILABLE TO RURAL HEALTH POSTS FOR SMALL CHILDREN. FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN HOUSEHOLD NUTRITION CAN BE SUPPORTED BY USING A PORTION OF THE DONATION TO OFFSET COSTS OF IMPORTING MICRONUTRIENTS TO NATIONALLY FORTIFY WHEAT FLOUR AS, CURRENTLY, INDONESIA HAS NO FORTIFICATION METHOD

AND IRON DEFICIENCY IS ENDEMIC.

UNICEF'S NUTRITIONAL INDICATORS SHOW THAT MALNUTRITION IN CHILDREN IS GROWING, AND ALL GOVERNMENT AND NGO REPORTS CLAIM FRAGILE ACCESS OF THE POOR TO FOOD. THE INITIAL TRANCHE OF FOOD AID WILL NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR THE RECOVERY OF THE INDONESIA POOR UNLESS ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IMPROVE RAPIDLY, AN UNLIKELY SCENARIO. A SECOND TRANCHE OF FOOD AID MAY BE NEEDED FOR NOVEMBER/DECEMBER PROCUREMENT WITH A FURTHER TRANCHE BY MARCH/APRIL 1999 IF LOCAL EFFORTS AT JOB CREATION FAIL.

RECOMMENDATIONS: INITIAL ABSORBABLE DONATIONS ARE ESTIMATED AT 450,000 METRIC TONS (MT) BY USAID. FAS AND USAID BELIEVE THAT ADDITIONAL DONATIONS CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS THE COUNTRY'S POOR FACE FURTHER INCOME EROSION IF INDONESIA FOLLOWS THROUGH ON ITS PLEDGE TO LIFT ITS WHEAT SUBSIDY.

-- WE CAN IMMEDIATELY PROVIDE 170,000 MT TO THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM (WFP) FOR ITS FOOD-FOR-WORK ACTIVITY. ADDITIONAL PROGRAMS UNDER DISCUSSION ARE:

-- A 50,000 MT INSTANT NOODLE DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM THROUGH INDOFOOD AND MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE WHERE U.S. WHEAT WOULD BE DONATED TO COVER PRODUCT AND DISTRIBUTION COSTS;

-- SUPPORT OF UNICEF'S PROGRAM FOR FORTIFYING CEREAL FOR INFANTS (40,000 MT).

-- SUPPORT OF UNICEF'S WORK AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL TO FORTIFY DOMESTIC FLOUR (40,000 MT).

-- AN "UMBRELLA" GRANT WITH INTERNATIONAL NGOS BY MONETIZING 115,000 MT OF WHEAT FLOUR (150,000 MT WHEAT EQUIVALENT) FOR RESOURCES TO ADDRESS THE FOOD SECURITY OF THE POOR. USAID/JAKARTA HAS ASKED THE NGOS TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE OPTIONS FOR DIRECT FOOD DISTRIBUTION PRIOR TO CONSIDERATION OF THIS PROGRAM.

USAID HAS ENTERED INTO DISCUSSION WITH MUSLIM NGOS FOR FOOD DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS. THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE LIKELY TO RESULT IN ADDITIONAL FOOD INTERVENTIONS FOR THE URBAN AND RURAL POOR VIA NOODLE OR CRACKER/BISCUIT DISTRIBUTION. ADDITIONALLY, USAID IS REVIEWING THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONTRIBUTION TO THE "COMMUNITY RECOVERY PROGRAM", A CONSORTIUM OF INDONESIAN PVOS, WHICH PARTIALLY DEALS WITH FOOD SECURITY.

DISCUSSION: USG DONATION/MULTILATERAL: FAS SHOULD UTILIZE ITS AUTHORITIES TO IMMEDIATELY DONATE 170,000 MT OF WHEAT TO THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM (WFP) EMERGENCY OPERATION (EMOP #6006) FOR INDONESIA, WHICH IS RECEIVING TITLE II SUPPORT THROUGH USAID. THIS WFP PROGRAM WORKS IN CONCERT WITH THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT FOOD-FOR-WORK ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT JAVA. THIS DONATION WOULD BE "SWAPPED" FOR AN EQUAL FX VALUE OF IMPORTED RICE, ESTIMATED AT 90,196 MT. THE SWAP WOULD ALLOW WFP AND THE GOVERNMENT TO MEET ITS COMMITMENTS IN GENERATING JOBS FOR 4.6

MILLION INDONESIANS WHILE SAVING AN APPROXIMATE $26 MILLION OF FX. THE CURRENT TITLE II AGREEMENT WITH WFP FOR THIS PROGRAM CONTAINS (A) UNIT SUPPORT COST DATA WHICH USDA/FAS SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR THE 90,196 MT OF RICE WHICH WILL BE DISTRIBUTED, AND (B) A FORMAT ACCEPTABLE TO WFP FOR REPORTING ON THE USE OF THE USG DONATION. THIS DONATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS' WORLD FOOD PROGRAM'S MULTILATERAL APPEAL WILL FILL SOME OF THE COUNTRY'S IMPORT GAP AND SAVE FX BY DOING SO.

USAID SHOULD SUPPORT A PRIVATE SECTOR PROGRAM WHICH PROVIDES INSTANT NOODLES TO 20 MILLION POOR, AS IDENTIFIED AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL BY THE MINISTRY OF FAMILY PLANNING AND MINISTRY FOR PEOPLES WELFARE. UNDER THIS PROGRAM, PT INDOFOOD SUKESES MAKMUR IS PROVIDING 400 MILLION 50 GRAM INSTANT NOODLE PACKS ON A REGULAR BASIS TO 20 MILLION PEOPLE. THESE NOODLE PACKS REPRESENT ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF INDOFOOD OUTPUT. THE RECIPIENTS CONTRIBUTE BY PAYING 300 RUPIAH PER PACK, BUT AS DISTANCE FROM JAKARTA INCREASES, THE ABILITY TO PAY 300 RUPIAH DIMINISHES. NOTE: AT CURRENT EXCHANGE RATES, $1.00 APPROXIMATES 12,000 RUPIAH.

IN JOINT USAID/FAS DISCUSSION WITH INDOFOOD, THE PROGRAM CAN BE EXPANDED TO MORE BENEFICIARIES AND CAN PROVIDE MORE NUTRITIONAL IMPACT. 50,000 TONS OF WHEAT CAN PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FLOUR FOR 800 MILLION PACKETS OF NOODLES TO THE 20 MILLION RECIPIENTS (2 KG/PERSON). THE WHEAT DONATION CAN DECREASE THE COST PER RECIPIENT TO BETWEEN 150 AND 200 RUPIAH BY COVERING THE WHEAT FLOUR COST. THE DISTRIBUTION OF 100 GRAM PACKETS (TWO MEALS PER PACKET) COULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER IMPACT ON A FAMILY THAN THE CURRENT PROGRAM.

OTHER NOODLE MANUFACTURERS AND BAKERS HAVE APPROACHED FAS AND USAID TO SOUND OUT ADDITIONAL PROGRAM PLANS. THESE POTENTIAL PRIVATE SECTOR PROGRAMS, IF SUPPORTED BY THE 416(B) WHEAT DONATION, OFFER THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE USG TO EXPAND THE DIRECT USE OF WHEAT PRODUCTS AIMED AT THE POOR.

IN THE CASE OF INDOFOOD, THE WHEAT WOULD BE MILLED BY BOGASARI MILLS. BOGASARI WOULD KEEP PART OF THE WHEAT FLOUR TO COVER ITS MILLING COSTS; INDOFOOD WOULD USE THE WHEAT FLOUR AS DONATED PRODUCT WITH ADDITIONAL FLOUR TONNAGE OFFSETTING A PORTION OF ITS PROCESSING AND DISTRIBUTION COSTS. CURRENTLY, FLOUR REPRESENTS 40 PERCENT OF INSTANT NOODLE PRODUCTION COSTS.

USAID AND FAS SUPPORT THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES:

INTERNATIONAL NGO FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMS: INTERNATIONAL NGOS HAVE APPROACHED FAS AND USAID WITH A PROPOSAL TO CREATE AN ECONOMIC RECOVERY FUND. PER CONSULTATION WITH WASHINGTON, USAID AND FAS CONCUR THAT FAS/WASHINGTON SHOULD NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE CONSORTIUM OF INTERNATIONAL NGOS VIA A DONATION OF 115,000 MT OF FLOUR (EQUIVALENT TO 150,000 MT OF WHEAT) TO THE CONSORTIUM FOR AUCTION IN INDONESIA TO GENERATE LOCAL CURRENCY (RUPIAH) PROCEEDS, IF FURTHER USAID/JAKARTA DISCUSSIONS ON DIRECT FEEDING PROGRAMS WITH THE NGOS ARE NOT SUCCESSFUL.

AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE PROPOSED TERMS OF THE FAS AGREEMENT WILL REQUIRE THE CONSORTIUM TO TARGET FLOUR TO URBAN WET NOODLE OR OTHER WHEAT-BASED PRODUCTS WHICH ARE TRADITIONALLY MARKETED TO LOWER INCOME GROUPS. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE PROCEEDS BE PLACED INTO A "FOOD SECURITY" FUND TO BE USED FOR REASONABLE ACTIVITIES THAT IMMEDIATELY IMPROVE HOUSEHOLD ACCESS TO FOOD, THE AVAILABILITY OF FOOD TO THE POOR, IMPROVED HOUSEHOLD NUTRITION, OR SIMILAR SOCIAL SAFETY NET ASSISTANCE ASSOCIATED WITH HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY, SUCH AS DIRECT FEEDING PROGRAM SUPPORT.

THE PVO CONSORTIUM IS CURRENTLY COMPOSED OF CARE, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES, AND WORLD VISION. HOWEVER, THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT WITH THE CONSORTIUM SHOULD SPELL OUT THAT ADRA (ADVENTIST DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF), LUTHERAN WORLD SERVICES/CHURCH WORLD SERVICE, SAVE THE CHILDREN, PROJECT CONCERN AND OTHER U.S. RELIEF GROUPS WOULD ALSO HAVE ACCESS TO THE FUND FOR FOOD SECURITY INITIATIVES.

UNICEF PROGRAMS: IT IS PROPOSED THAT 40,000 MT OF WHEAT BE MONETIZED IN INDONESIA TO SUPPORT UNICEF'S ATTEMPTS AT MOVING THE GOI TO FORTIFY WITH MICRONUTRIENTS ALL DOMESTICALLY PRODUCED WHEAT FLOUR. CURRENTLY, NO WHEAT FLOUR IN INDONESIA IS FORTIFIED. IRON DEFICIENCY IS A MAJOR PROBLEM IN INDONESIA AS IS LACK OF MANY MINERALS AND VITAMINS IN LOW INCOME HOUSEHOLDS. UNICEF HAS BEEN WORKING WITH THE GOI TO ESTABLISH A NATIONAL STANDARD FOR FLOUR FORTIFICATION. IT MAY TAKE TWO YEARS OR MORE FOR A STANDARD TO BE APPROVED. IN THE MEANTIME, UNICEF HAS AGREEMENT OF THE GOI TO TEST LOCAL FORTIFICATION OF FLOUR WITH IRON AND TO TEST OTHER MICRONUTRIENT FORTIFICATION. THE COST OF IRON FORTIFICATION FOR INDONESIA'S EXPECTED DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF ABOUT 3 MILLION TONS OF WHEAT FLOUR IS SLIGHTLY ABOVE $1.50 PER TON. THE APPLICATION OF THE U.S. WHEAT DONATION TO FORTIFY INDONESIA'S FLOUR WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT EVENT AND GREATLY CONTRIBUTE TO NUTRITIONAL IMPROVEMENT. BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE GATHERED OVER THE NEXT MONTHS WITH A FORTIFICATION PROGRAM, A SECOND YEAR OF SUPPORT WOULD SEEM LIKELY IF CONDITIONED BY AN AGREEMENT BY THE GOI TO ADOPT A NATIONWIDE STANDARD. SHOULD 416(B) WHEAT NOT BE AVAILABLE AT A LATER DATE, TITLE II PROGRAMMING WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE SECOND YEAR.

UNICEF IS ALSO SUPPLYING A NUTRITIOUS INFANT CEREAL THROUGH VILLAGE HEALTH POSTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO COMBAT MALNUTRITION IN LACTATING MOTHERS AND YOUNG (AGE 6 - 12 MONTHS) CHILDREN. UNICEF HAS REQUESTED AN ADDITIONAL $5 MILLION IN DONOR FUNDING TO CONTINUE THE PROGRAM WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY AN ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK LOAN. USAID/JAKARTA'S HEALTH OFFICE STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE PROGRAM AND HAS CONTRIBUTED TO ITS START-UP COSTS. MONETIZATION OF 40,000 MT OF THE 416(B) WHEAT (OR ITS "SWAP" FOR INFANT CEREAL FINISHED PRODUCT) WOULD OFFSET PROGRAM COSTS INCLUDING IMPORTED PREMIX COSTS AND ALLOW NATIONWIDE DISTRIBUTION TO BEGIN.

ADDITIONAL FOOD AID OPTIONS: USAID/JAKARTA IS INITIATING DISCUSSIONS WITH INDONESIA'S TWO LARGEST MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS: NU (NAHDLATUL ULAMA), THE LARGEST MUSLIM GROUP IN INDONESIA, AND

MUHAMMADIYAH, THE SECOND LARGEST MUSLIM GROUP. NU IS ACTIVE IN RURAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND MUHAMMADIYAH IS ACTIVE IN URBAN SELF HELP PROGRAMS. THE PURPOSE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS IS TO DETERMINE IF DIRECT FEEDING SUPPORT, OR OTHER ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO FOOD SECURITY, CAN BE ARRANGED THROUGH THESE ORGANIZATIONS. IF SO, A PROGRAM MAY BE DEVELOPED FOR A SECOND 416(B) TRANCHE.

USAID/JAKARTA IS ALSO REVIEWING THE POTENTIAL OF SUPPORTING FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMS UNDER THE "COMMUNITY RECOVERY PROGRAM", A SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAM DEVELOPED BY THE GOI (BAPPENAS) WITH THE IBRD (WORLD BANK), AND DONORS TO ASSIST IN RESPONDING TO THE SEVERE IMPACT ON THE POOR OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS THROUGH LOCAL NGOS. UNDER THE CURRENT STRUCTURE, DONOR FUNDS WOULD BE PROVIDED TO A UNDP-MANAGED TRUST FUND.

Tamera
cc to
Abas +
Andy

MEMORANDUM

To : Barry MacDonald

cc. : Anthony Chan
Robert H. Aten

From : M. Rum Ali MRA

Date : July 24, 1998

Subject : The US Govt. donation of wheat to Indonesia

The US government plan to purchase hundreds of millions of dollars worth of surplus US wheat and donate it to needy countries including Indonesia. The US would begin buying more than 80 million bushels of wheat (2.5 million tons). Under the humanitarian aid plan, the wheat would be given to Indonesia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea and North Korea.

The attached table shows how this humanitarian aid will affect to the Indonesian food economy. Column 2 depict 3 scenarios of the quantity of wheat that would be donated to Indonesia while column 3 contains the CIF price of wheat grain. The total value of wheat grain is calculated under three scenarios based on the quantity of wheat as shown in column 4 and 5. These magnitude reflects the economic value of the humanitarian aid of wheat. The next column shows the CIF price of rice at the world market, and column 7 is the average price of rice at the domestic market. The last two column are the equivalent value of wheat in terms of rice ex-import procured from the world market and rice ex-local produced domestically.

Suppose that Indonesia will receive 500,000 tons of wheat from the US government. Since wheat need to be milled before it can be consumed, the GOI

cannot distribute them directly to the consumers. One possible solution is that the GOI need to conduct swap with BULOG to trade them with rice then distribute them to the consumers. Bulog can take advantage by selling wheat to the flour milling factories such as PT Bogasari, PT Berdikari and so on. Under the assumption that Bulog would swap wheat with the import rice (procured from the world market) then the total quantity of rice that will be traded with wheat would amount to 400,000 tons. Meanwhile, the GOI will save international foreign reserve up to US $ 128 million this fiscal year under the assumption exchange rate is Rp 13,000 per US $1, and no additional import of rice. Total import of rice is held at 3.1 million tons this fiscal year. As a result, total food subsidy will drop by Rp 128 million or Rp 1.64 trillion, meaning that it could lower substantially the state budget deficit for this current fiscal year.

Suppose that Bulog will trade wheat with rice that produced domestically (Ex-Local). Since the average price of local rice in Indonesia is only Rp 1,640,450 per ton, the equivalent value of wheat donated by the US government would amount to 1.01 million tons of rice, which is approximately one-third of the total rice import for this current fiscal year. However, the most likely comparison is with the imported rice because Indonesia faces a deficit rice production.

Another impact of the wheat donation by the US government is that it can lower the demand for wheat grain in the world market, which in turn will lead to sustain the decline of its world price. The world price of wheat has been decreased since February 1997. But it does not help much for Indonesia because rupiah value has plunged since the beginning of the economic crisis, July 1997.

THE ESTIMATE OF US GOVERNMENT DONATION OF WHEAT TO INDONESIA UNDER HUMANITARIAN AID PLAN

Scenario	Volume Wheat grain from US govt. (Ton)	CIF price of Wheat grain (US $ / Ton)	Total Value of Wheat grain (Million US $)	Total Value of Wheat grain (Trillion Rupiah) 1/	CIF Price of Rice (US $ / Ton 2/	Price of Rice at domestic market (Rp / Ton)	Value of wheat grain equivalent to quantity of rice (Ex-Import) (Ton) 3/	Value of wheat grain equivalent to quantity of rice (Ex-Local) (Ton) 4/
Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9
I	500,000	256	128.0	1.66	320	1,640,450	400,000	1,014,356
II	400,000	256	102.4	1.33	320	1640450	320,000	811,485
III	300,000	256	76.8	1.00	320	1640450	240,000	608,613

Source : USAID staff estimate, July 24, 1998

Note :
1/ Exchange Rate : US $ 1 = Rp 13,000
2/ White rice, 15 % broken (Ex-Import from world market)
3/ Total value of wheat grain equivalent to rice procured from world market (Ex-Import)
4/ Total value of wheat grain equivalent to rice procured from domestic market (Ex-Local) or domestic production.

Atwood Roundtable Transcription
Indonesia Food Announcement
July 30, 1998

Opening Statement by Administrator J. Brian Atwood

The consultative group on Indonesia has just concluded today, and I was delighted to hear the news, that the overall amount of resources that would be made available to Indonesia by the international community is 7.9 billion dollars. This is ... much higher than the world bank had anticipated. It's at the very high end of the spectrum. I think that it is an indication that the international community is responding to the needs of Indonesia. It is a very, very good performance on the part of the international community. We like to think that the United States has offered some considerable degree of leadership in this ...we have... been working around the clock to try and convince other donors that Indonesia is much too important a country to ...allow... to sort of...muddle through a very, very difficult situation. The international community needs to come forward to help in this time of need, especially in reaction to Indonesia's commitment to move or uphold democracy. That point was underscored at the CG meeting in Paris by all of the international donors. I think the Indonesian delegation has gone home understanding that...there is a real expectation that Indonesia will... set and keep to a timetable for elections... as we proceed over the next year. The United States was able to announce... 300 million dollars in new assistance for the Indonesian fiscal year which is April 1998 to April 1999. This... more than doubles what we had been making available to Indonesia in our pledged response to the crisis there through three major funding initiatives... A very large increase in food aid...and an immediate suspension of the requirement that Indonesia contribute 25% of the cost of all of US development programs, and free and immediate increase of 8 million dollars in this year's development assistance programs to deliver desperately needed services and supplies to the people of Indonesia. Indonesia is a country that, in recent years, has received no food assistance from the United States. This year we have already sent 230,000 metric tons and it was announced in Paris that we have allocated 500,000 metric tons of food aid from the Presidential Food Aid Initiative that was just announced last week by the President in his radio address to the country. We will make available up to 1,000,000 additional metric tons of food over the next year subject to the availability of adequate distribution capacity and to the normal consultations with interested parties. This new commitment of food is valued at approximately an [additional] 190 million dollars, depends again on the market value of the food when we purchase it. That of course is in addition to 50 million dollars in Title II Food Aid we've already provided. The new food aid comes in the form of American wheat purchased by the department of Agriculture, United States Department of Agriculture, the program will be administered by USAID. We will use the food, working, obviously through the government, it has to be the government agreement... but... we've already had preliminary discussions with the government and we have identified several issues we want to be sure we can move, we can work with NGO's to distribute this food. We want to be sure we can work through religious organizations... we clearly will have

to, in the early days, work through the government distribution system that is set up but there is, we believe, a commitment to begin to dismantle that system and privatize it and we will use ... some of the food for the purpose of working with others to begin private distribution systems within Indonesia. There will be food for work programs, we will have stay in school programs that will encourage children to come to school, and of course maternal and child feeding programs. We've had the irony in the record yield of wheat this year, the US market has surpluses, whereas we have, of course, the people, including the people in Indonesia, who are suffering because of the economic collapse. That was a pleasant irony to have. We were therefore able to purchase some, up to 2.5 million metric tons of American wheat that is in surplus for use in other countries around the world. The countries that have thus far been identified by the President initially are Indonesia and Sudan. I'm pleased to announce that we were, are, increasing this year's funding for Indonesia by 8 million dollars effective immediately. This 8 million dollars has been recaptured from our India program where we were forced, because of the explosion of a nuclear device, to cut off all non-humanitarian development assistance programs in India. We will obviously use this 8 million dollars to facilitate some of the things that I mentioned before. The systems that will be used to distribute wheat and we hope those systems will become permanent systems that would be a benefit to Indonesian society. This increase of 8 million dollars represents an increase of 20% our FY '98 development assistance program for Indonesia at a time when our own development assistance resources are very short. On all funding to Indonesia, the US government has required that Indonesia, as our partner and of course an emerging market, emerging economy (at least until the economic problems), that they provide and economic counterpart contribution of at least 25% of the US dollar costs. We will waive that counterpart contribution for this fiscal year and next, and we've called upon other donors to do the same thing. In addition to redoing funding levels, US objectives in Indonesia have been redressed, re-prioritized to meet the new challenges.

There are four areas that we are going to be concentrating on. One is democracy and elections. It is clear that economic reform cannot happen unless full democratic election where the people feel as though their own views have been expressed, and the government will then have the mandate, the full mandate of the people, to carry out all of the difficult measures to carry out economic reform. We will support anti-corruption initiatives, again, working with the government and NGO's to try to bring about more transparency and more accountability to the economic and financial systems of Indonesia. We of course will create help... work with all of these elements to create a social safety net to meet humanitarian needs during what will be a prolonged economic decline. I said that when I was in Indonesia last, that as our country went through the Great Depression we did not have an international community that was here to help us, our depression lasted a lot longer than it need last in Indonesia so..and finally we'll be providing a... an agreement we have with the Ministry for Planning, a number of technical advisors to help the government and others to reform the banking system and the economic and financial systems so that they ... the ... economy can recover as quickly as possible. Obviously our increased funding is a show of commitment by the American people to the people of Indonesia. Our priority is to strengthen the social safety-net system. The top

priority has to be the humanitarian consequences of this problem. Estimates that there may be 100 million people living by the end of the year in extreme poverty in Indonesia. We need to care for the women, the children, the sick and the unemployed and hungry and we plan to make that our top priority. It's only if we can provide that kind of assistance that hope can be restored. There is, there has been a great deal accomplished in terms of development in the last 30 years in Indonesia. Children have been educated, people have had access to family planning services. People have dealt with environmental problems..there still remain problems, but we don't want Indonesia to lose the investment that it has made and we don't want to lose the development investments that we've made. We believe that the people of Indonesia, in particular, if they have the opportunity to elect their own government, will be able to get beyond this crisis a lot sooner, even than the United States did when we had to be faced with the Great Depression. I'd be happy to take questions on this ...on the ....program of course has also been discussed in Paris, of the 7.9 billion dollars, I'm sure that the World Bank has laid out exactly where all of that is coming from. We can only speak for the U.S. side of it.

Q&A

Question about what the $300 million dollar pledge is and why we don't know exactly how much will be needed.

The...The.. The word approximately is used there because we're not sure exactly when the wheat is actually purchased what the wheat price will be. But, here is the way that the development assistance is. The development assistance is 47 million dollars, the disaster assistance, a lot of medicine is being provided there, is 10 million dollars, loan guarantees are 5 million dollars, the Title II Food Aid Program is 50 million dollars, the first 500,000 metric tons of wheat is 63 million dollars, and then, of course, pending discussion of need we are prepared to go up to another million metric tons of wheat and right now we would value that at 125 million dollars. Discussions will be with, of course, Indonesia. We have been seeing that their gap will be something like 5 million metric tons over the coming year... We don't want to disrupt commercial markets We are going to be very careful to do all of the ground-trooping that we need to ensure that we don't disrupt either local production or what would normally be commercial transactions.

On the Food Aid Question, just so I understand this, the 500 million, I'm sorry the 500,000 now, up to 1 million later this year, that's all US wheat under the Presidential Initiative?

-That's Right.

And the up to 1 million that will be from the end of calendar year '98.....

-That's right. Well I'm sure... I'm sorry.. It's up to...what we are doing here is a bit confusing. What we're talking about is the Indonesian fiscal year which goes from April to April.

When will the food arrive?

It hasn't arrived, at least the second 25 million hasn't arrived, at least the 1st 25 million has just been arriving in the past couple of weeks. Mostly that goes to the eastern part of Indonesia.

Question-

... I think that that has been superseded by the CCC program .
Brian, you said that Indonesia was too important a country to allow them to simply "muddle through," could you talk about why Indonesia is such an important country? Also, was there any other re-programming done...?
-No , India was the only programming that was redone. A lot of the resources come from disaster accounts and from the wheat reserves. ..but on the first point... Indonesia is a country of about 200 million people. It is, I think, about the fourth largest country in the world. It has been in that region of... the South Pacific ... East Asia, a real source of stability... has been a very close friend of the United States. We have been probably the most critical of the former government at previous CG meetings, the only government to have raised the issue of democracy. But the potential for a democratic Indonesia to be a real force in Asia is tremendous and... for... while we're in very difficult times there is the prospect that Indonesia can strengthen itself enormously both politically and economically as it goes through this transition... but it has to... it can not obviously fall into anarchy. There are threats to the integrity of Indonesia. There are Independence movements in Irian Jaya that people are aware of. Those problems need to be resolved. The East Timor problem needs to be resolved. ... We support the U.N. process for resolving that. But, if we can resolve these problems over the next few years, and if Indonesians do not lose patience, this country can be a major world force. It has been an important world force, it could be an even more important on in the future as it's economy recovers and if it is able to achieve a stable democracy.
Question-
The first 50 million dollars was primarily rice... the wheat that will be provided will be whole wheat and some milled flour which is used in the noodles that people like to eat in Indonesia as we understand it. We had a good visit from the Indonesian ambassador and there is a growing ...need...appetite for that kind of processed wheat in the form of noodles that go with the food that you usually eat, as I understand it.
(Questions back and forth discussing the difference in cooking energy between noodles and rice, why noodles are more efficient.)
Question discussion the length of recovery-
I don't think that anyone can predict that but ...I think we will be seeing signs of recovery. We've of course made provisions in how a program for the next two years. We've said that we will not .. be asking the Indonesian government to contribute its 25% for the next two years. I think that you will begin to see the signs of recovery in that period. Clearly there is a banking crisis and ... it needs to be resolved through reform. We have a number of technical advisors that are being provided in that area in particular.
- there some process of review that is ongoing with this aid to meet the conditions that you have laid down about democracy and anti-corruption if the full democracy that you have mentioned is not prepared?
I think that... I can't speak for all of the other donors, but all of the other donors did sign the statement that ... was made in Paris that there is an expectation that Indonesia will move toward democracy and its current government has committed itself to do as the people of Indonesia itself expect will happen. It is our belief that if there is not continued movement toward that goal that it will be extremely difficult to see

economic recovery. We don't believe that the kind of explicit conditionally you are suggesting by your question is needed now because the commitment seems to be very broad within Indonesia. However, I can tell you that I'm sure that the international community will want to reconsider its position if there is any hesitancy to move in the direction that everyone wants to move in. The main reason that we will hesitate is because there is a very strong feeling here that we can not afford to put all of this IMF money toward all of this grant assistance if there is no prospect of recovery. I think that an Indonesia that does not commit itself to move toward a stable democracy is an inherently unstable nation and we would be basically be throwing good money at the bad if we would continue to do that. What I'm saying is that there will be constant evaluation. The relationship that we want to have with the Indonesian people, those in its current government and all those who aspire to be in its current government is one of partnership and not of conditionally.

Question-

Not yet Tom, there isn't any yet but there is ... a process of assessing the needs now. We have our own Food For Peace office there in Indonesia and we've had the Department of Agriculture there. We've been talking obviously to the Bulog people, to others, looking at how the food would be needed, how the food would be used once it arrives.

Tom Oliver, Food for Peace

We need to work with the local flour mills in terms of what their capacity is ... make that assessment along with the refined needs assessment and I think that ...and I think we can be specific about the amount of flour.

Question about the class of flour-

I don't know in terms of class what I do know is that the Indonesians prefer a higher than usual protein content to their wheat and... so we will be endeavoring to meet that protein requirement if we can. Of course the other side of the coin is that... the objective is to lift US wheat prices so at the same time we can't be too picky as to those things.

In terms of the additional 1 million, I know that you've addressed this but, under what circumstances would that go forward or not go forward.

Well we, first of all, need to do some of the examination that was mentioned here about the first 500,000 but what we always worry about whenever we have a food aid program is that we are not flooding a market with food that could be otherwise produced locally. That's the number one concern. The other concern is whether there are commercial interests that would be purchasing food.. in any case we are not interested in disrupting commercial markets so we would want to be in consultation with the Indonese government and with other Indonese normal suppliers, in particular Australia and Canada who provided food to Indonesia.

Question-

That's right. We've already, in terms of the 1st 50 million dollars worth of food aid have been working... our principle partner happens to be the Catholic Relief Service, the PVO, private voluntary organization operating on the ground. They already have good contacts with various Muslim organizations, Buddhist organizations, and others in Indonesia. We would hope that we could... even help them build capacity even beyond what they now have so that they could be the distributors of much of this food

aid. If they are closer to the people, the people trust them. I think there is still a lot of concern in Indonesia. For example, when I was there, I was asked a question at a press conference "Isn't it true that you are going to distribute your food through the Indonesian military?" ...I said no, that is not what we are going to do. I'm not sure that I convinced the person who asked the question. We have no desire to do that. We have to work initially with Bulog which is the government firm that distributes food. There is no better way to get food around that very large country at this juncture. We would hope to create other institutions to do that over time and indeed would like to see aspects of Bulog privatized. I know that from discussion with Minister [-] that the government would like to see that as well.
Well this is something, of course, that does depend on where we deliver it, there are a number of ports in Indonesia where we could deliver the food. We will have to do that examination. You're right, it is complicated we would not be able to say to you today for example that we might not use even military .. facilities to actually move the distribution of food. We certainly wouldn't be using their ships, but there are some islands that are only accessible that way.
Question-
We, I think the purchases have been made. We'd like to get this done within a four month period. Isn't that your goal Tom?
Tom Oliver, Food for Peace
Yes
Question-
The second traunch should be arriving in the next month or so.
Tom Oliver, Food for Peace
We hope for procurement by August the 4th.

SPECIAL REPORTS

BUSINESS PROFILE

PROSPECTS OF WHEAT FLOUR INDUSTRY AND MARKET IN INDONESIA

Introduction

The monetary turmoil that has put countries in this region in a brain racking period of difficult consolidation after major overhauling and reshuffles in their monetary policies, may have been in fact a blessing for the country's wheat flour industry. The turn of event has at least set the industry on a path to a new era free from the unpopular system of trade monopoly. Under a deregulation measure known as November Policy Package issued on November 3, 1997, the monopoly enjoyed by Bulog in wheat flour import was removed. The measure was part of the conditions demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a big financial assistance expected to serve as a short term panacea for the big financial problem faced by the country with the steep fall of the national currency.

However, the government has not announced the guideline rules as to how the new measure is to be brought to reality. The implementation regulation is still being discussed by the government.

The new measure has wide impact. It is expected to boost the growth of the wheat flour industry, but it will also bring about new challenge for the industry after being kept under the monopoly of a certain company group. General importers would not find it easy to compete with the powerful group .

The turn of events has prompted Indocommercial to undertake a survey on wheat flour industry. This report has been compiled as a result of the surveys with secondary data available from related government agencies including the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), the industry and trade ministry, the finance ministry, the Board of Logistics (BULOG), etc., and primary data collected through interviews with industrialists and traders.

Description of Product

Wheat flour referred to in this report is one extracted from wheat grains. According to the Indonesian Industrial Standard (SII) No. 0074-75, wheat flour has a certain quality standards namely it is allowed only to have a content of water maximum 16.5%, dust maximum 2.2%, silicate maximum 0.1% and acid maximum 4% and it must have a normal smell and taste and it must be free from insect and insect remainders such as eggs, larva, etc and may not contain preservatives and synthetic sweeteners.

In addition to producing flour and semolina pasta from wheat grains, the company produces by products like bran, pollard and industrial flour.

PT Bogasari Flour Mills produces wheat flour in three brands namely Cakra, Kembar and Segitiga Biru. Bran and pollard are used as a raw material for animal feed mostly for export. Its industrial flour with the brand name of Anggrek is used as adhesive material for plywood industry.

Wheat flour it produces is used by the company to produce pasta (macaroni). The company has a unit to produce pasta in Jakarta with an annual capacity of 60,000 tons mostly for export with the brand name of Bogasari. Its macaroni products include long pasta (10-spaghettini, 11-Spaghetti, 12-Vermicelli, 20-Bavette, 30-Linguine, etc.) and short pasta (80-Zitti Tagliati, 81-Penne Zitti, 82-Pennete, 83-Ditali, 60-Sedani, etc.).

The company also has a textile plant in Jakarta with an annual capacity to produce 100 million pieces of textile sacks. The sacks are needed by the company for its wheat flour. It also has three cargo ships for wheat transport with a total carrying capacity of 101,000 tons. The ships are chartered for the transport of wheat grains from the United States, Australia and Canada.

The company has performed well so far posting good profit every year. Based on its audited financial report, the company posted a net profit of Rp 27.6 billion in 1992, up to 89.6 billion in 1993 and to 94.6 billion in 1994.

On may 26, 1995, PT Indofood Sukses Makmur signed a sales contract with PT ITP to wholly take over PT Bogosari Flour Mills at a gross price of Rp 1,860 billion including assets and liabilities. The net selling price after being deducted with liabilities amounted to Rp 1,410 billion.

Industrial sources told CIC, the fund from the sale was used by PT ITP to strengthen its financial position, to pay for special interim dividend in 1995 and to increase investment in cement industry. In line with a decision of the shareholders on business diversification, PT ITP would continue to strengthen investment in food industry through share participation in Indofood and property sector.

The only competitor of Bogasari in wheat flour industry was PT Berdikari Sari Utama Flour Mills, which was set up in January 1970. In the beginning PT Berdikari was a PMA with the name of PT Prima Indonesia set up by Singaporean investors with an authorized capital of US$ 6 million and issued capital of US$ 1.2 million. The founding shareholders were Prima Ltd, a Singaporean company, Mr Cheng Tsang Man, Mr Cheng Chin Cheng and Mr Werner Lutz.

PT Berdikari Sari Utama Flour Mills, which is based in Ujungpandang, South Sulawesi, over a two hectare plot of land, started operation in 1973 with an annual capacity of 300,000 tons of wheat flour and 100,000 tons of wheat flour dust as a by-product.

The three wheat flour companies have a total capacity of 5.4 million tons a year. But based on a survey by CIC, the total installed capacity of the three companies was only 3 million tons or 55% of their total licensed capacity. PT Bogasari has two factories namely PT Bogasari I in Jakarta and Bogasari II in Surabaya with installed capacity of 2.4 million tons a year or 80% of the country's total installed capacity. PT Berdikari has only an installed capacity of 324,000 tons and PT Citra Flour 300,000 tons.

There are two other companies licensed to produce wheat flour. They are PT Amora Restu Flour Mills and PT Sriboga Raturaya. Amora Restu Flour is to build its factory in Samarinda with an annual capacity of 108,000 tons and Sriboga Raturaya in Semarang with an annual capacity of 363,000 tons. But the two companies have not indicated that they plan to implement their project in the near future. If all the projects could be implemented as scheduled, the country would have an annual licensed capacity of 7 million tons. See the following table.

Table - 1.
Wheat flour producers and projects in Indonesia, 1997

No.	Name of company	Location	Production capacity (tons/year)	Remarks
1	PT Indofood Sukses Makmur (PT Bogasari Flour Mills)	Jakarta Surabaya	2,928,000 1,044,000	Production Production
2	PT Berdikari Sari Utama Flour Mills	Ujung Pandang	1,110,000	Production
3	PT Citra Flour Mills	Cilacap Medan Bojonegoro	300,000 600,000 600,000	Production Planned Planned
4	PT Amora Restu Flour Mills	Samarinda	108,000	Planned
5	PT Sriboga Raturaya	Semarang	363,600	Planned
	Total		7,053,600	

Processed by Indocommercial

Interest in Investment

There is not many investors indicating interest in wheat flour industry. From 1996 to October 1997, there were only two companies seeking investment license in wheat flour industry. They are PT Berdikari Sari Utama Flour Mills in Ujungpandang and PT Corkindo Nusamas in Serang.

PT Corkindo Nusamas plans to build a new factory in Serang with an annual capacity of 1 million tons. The venture will cost about Rp 245 billion. PT Berdikari plans to increase its production capacity by 720,000 tons a year with an investment of Rp 169,499 million. See the following table.

Table - 3.
Indonesia's imports of wheat grains
1992 - 1996

Year	Volume (tons)	Growth (%)	Value (US$'000)	Growth (%)
1992	2,456,438	--	403,853	--
1993	2,525,520	2.8	442,004	9.4
1994	3,297,139	30.6	579,679	31.1
1995	4,054,202	23.0	803,407	38.6
1996	4,116,242	1.5	1,050,346	30.7
1997*)	1,732,377	--	376,386	--
Average growth (%/year)		14.5		27.5

*) January - July
Source : Central Bureau of Statistics, processed

Australia was the largest supplier of wheat grains for Indonesia in 1996. Imports from that country totaled 2.3 million tons valued at US$ 608 million or 56% of the country's total imports in 1996. The second largest supplier was Canada from which imports totaled 1.2 million tons valued at US$ 285 million in the same year, followed by the United States from which imports totaled 540,000 tons valued at US$ 129 million.

Table - 4.
Indonesia's imports of wheat grains by type and country of origin, 1996-1997

Kinds/Country of origin	1996		1997*)	
	Volume (tons)	Value (US$'000)	Volmue (tons)	Value (US$'000)
Durum wheat seeds other than seeds (HS.1001.10.900)				
Canada	4,400	1,415	--	--
USA	--	--	10	7
Sub Total	4,400	1,415	10	7
Wheat other than seeds (HS.1001.90.190)				
Australia	2,301,366	607,993	983,487	216,016
Canada	1,150,030	285,973	491,128	109,942
Saudi Arabia	54,000	11,709	--	--
Japan	22,325	5,920	--	--
Argentina	43,202	8,510	163,191	30,245
USA	540,919	128,827	31,795	5,900
United Kingdom	--	--	10,000	2,181
Hungary	--	--	52,766	12,096
Sub Total	4,111,842	1,048,931	1,732,367	376,378
Total	4,116,242	1,050,346	1,732,377	376,386

*) January - July
Source : Central Bureau of Statistics, processed

Table - 7.
Indonesia's production of wheat flour
1992 - 1996

Year	Production (tons)	Growth (%)
1992	1,879,654	--
1993	2,038,536	8.5
1994	2,385,258	17.0
1995	2,635,009	10.5
1996	2,776,830	5.4
Average growth (%/year)		10.3

Source : BULOG, processed by Indocommercial

In term of production capacity PT Bogasari Flour Mills is the largest producer of wheat flour in the country. The company, which is a subsidiary of the Salim Group, has two factories in Jakarta and Surabaya. In 1995 the two factories contributed 2.4 million tons or 89% to the country's total production. PT Berdikari produced 281,000 tons in the same year from its factory in Ujungpandang.

Table - 8.
Indonesia's production of wheat flour by company
1992 - 1996

(tons)

Year/Months	PT Bogasari I Jakarta	PT Bogasari II Surabaya	PT Berdikari Ujungpandang	Total
1992	1,096,403	571,646	211,605	1879,654
1993	1,181,492	639,250	217,794	2038,536
1994	1,392,613	753,928	238,717	2385,258
1995	1,536,606	817,320	281,083	2635,009
1996				
April	123,140	54,801	23,694	201,635
May	114,256	78,810	26,510	219,576
June	137,789	77,476	26,703	241,968
July	115,139	63,022	19,022	197,183
August	140,129	89,871	30,517	260,517
September	127,876	70,637	23,117	221,630
October	161,500	71,000	26,000	258,500
November	161,500	71,000	26,000	258,500
December	190,700	71,000	26,000	287,700
1997	168,800	71,000	26,000	265,800
January	168,800	71,000	26,000	265,800

Source : BULOG

Development of Wheat Flour Imports

Indonesia still imports wheat flour to make up for the shortage in supply from the local producers. Imports, which are still monopolized until the end of this year) by BULOG, totaled 38,900 tons valued at US$ 8.4 million in 1992. The import volume fluctuated in the following years. In 1996, imports totaled 20,200 tons valued at US$ 4.7 million. See the following table.

Supply of Wheat Flour

According to official records of BULOG and BPS, wheat flour supply which is assumed to be equivalent to production plus import minus export and the balance between stocks in the start and end of the year in 1992 totaled 1.9 million tons. In 1996, the supply rose to 2.8 million tons or an annual increase of 10.4% on the average.

Table - 11.
Development of wheat flour supply in Indonesia
1992 - 1996

Year	Early stock (tons)	Production (tons)	End stock (tons)	Import (tons)	Export (tons)	Supply (ton)	Growth (%)
1992	33,993	1,879,654	54,461	38,953	79	1,898,060	--
1993	54,461	2,038,536	53,869	41,572	3	2,080,697	9.6
1994	53,869	2,385,258	40,332	24,956	8	2,423,743	16.5
1995	40,332	2,635,009	59,065	157,897	0	2,774,173	14.5
1996	50,218	2,776,830	46,953	20,227	20	2,800,301	0.9
Average growth (%/year)							10.4

Processed from various sources

As the largest producer, PT Bogasari accounted for 92% or 2.6 million tons of the total supply of wheat flour in the country in 1996. The rest came from PT Berdikari and imports. See the following table.

Table - 12.
Development of wheat flour procurement by producers
1992 - 1996

(tons)

Description	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996*)
SUPPLY	1859,186	2,039,128	2,398,795	280,243	2,780,095
A. PT Bogasari I Jakarta	1075,140	1,182,658	1,411,937	166,763	1,654,339
B. PT Bogasari I Surabaya	572,310	639,480	758,875	92,432	916,953
C. PT Berdikari	211,736	216,990	227,983	21,048	208,802
EARLY STOCK	33,993	54,461	53,869	197,183	50,218
A. PT Bogasari I Jakarta	10,229	31,492	30,326	115,139	29,323
B. PT Bogasari I Surabaya	22,116	21,452	21,222	63,022	16,050
C. PT Berdikari	1,648	1,517	2,321	19,022	4,844
PRODUCTION	1,879,654	2,038,536	2,385,258	287,537	2,776,830
A. PT Bogasari I Jakarta	1,096,403	1,181,492	1,392,613	164,997	1,593,425
B. PT Bogasari I Surabaya	571,646	639,250	753,928	94,449	912,122
C. PT Berdikari	211,605	217,794	238,717	28,091	271,283
END STOCK	54,461	53,869	40,332	204,477	46,953
A. PT Bogasari I Jakarta	31,492	30,326	11,002	113,373	26,033
B. PT Bogasari I Surabaya	21,452	21.222	16,275	65,039	14,935
C. PT Berdikari	1,517	2,321	13,055	26,065	5,985
IMPORT	38,953	41,572	24,956	157,897	20,227
EXPORT	79	3	8	0	20
TOTAL SUPPLY	1,898,060	2,080,697	2,423,743	2,774,173	2,800,302

*) CIC figures
Processed from various sources

Consumption by Instant Noodle Industry

Among the food industries, instant noodle industry is the largest consumer of wheat flour. Instant noodle industry has been developed in Indonesia since 1968 after PT Lima Satu Sankyu was set up in April that year. Business in instant noodle has flourished. The expansion of the industry was marked with the growing competition among instant noodle producers.

PT Lima Satu Sankyu, which was set up as a joint venture between an Indonesian businessman and Sankyu Shokushin Kabushiki from Japan was later renamed PT Lima Satu Sankyu Indonesia and then PT Supermie Indonesia. Its instant, noodle product is popularly known as SUPERMIE.

In 1970, competition in instant noodle market was brisker with the operation of PT Sanmaru Food Manufacturing, a subsidiary of the Jangkar Jati Group with product known as INDOMIE. In 1982, PT Sarimi Asli of the Salim Group followed with factory in Tangerang. This company came with a product known as SARIMIE.

Since then the market of instant noodle has been tight in competition among large company groups especially after Indofood of the Salim Group merged with PT Sanmaru Food Manufacturing of the Jangkar Jati Group to form PT Indofood Interna Corporation. In 1986, PT Indofood Interna Corporation through its subsidiary PT Lambang Insan Makmur took over PT Supermie Indonesia. The acquisition strengthened the domination of the market by Indofood or the Salim Group. The step did not stop there. In 1992, the Salim Group acquired the entire shares of the Jangkar Jati Group in PT Indofood Interna Corporation. The ambition to dominate the market climaxed when Indofood replaced its distributor PT Wicaksana Overseas with Indomarco (Pebapan). Since then Indofood has virtually dominates the market with its instant noodle products of INDOMIE, SUPERMIE and SARIMIE.

After the success in taking control of the three producing groups, on February 5, 1994, Indofood changed its name into PT Indofood Sukses Makmur. PT Indofood Sukses Makmur was previously named PT Panganjaya Intikusuma set up on August 14, 1990 by Mr Soetoyo Koerniawan and Mr Herryjanto Setiadi. In June 1992, 15% of its shares were taken over by PT Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa.

On February 12, 1994, Indofood merged with 18 companies mostly its subsidiaries or affiliates operating in food processing industry including instant noodle and instant noodle flavors. The merger was aimed at simplifying the legal structure and business activities of the Indofood Group. The merger was made under the method of pooling of interest retroactive as from January 1994.

The 18 companies include 10 subsidiaries of the Indofood Group namely PT Intipangan Persada (instant noodle), PT Karyapangan Intisejati (instant noodle), PT Panganjaya Abadi (instant noodle), PT Karina Saricipta (instant noodle), PT Citrapratama Sentosa (instant noodle), PT Ultrasari Wahana (instant noodle flavors), PT Pandanwangi Nusantara (flavors), PT Asoka Cahaya Indah (flavors), PT Foodtech Utama International (research and development), PT Ciptaloka Bumisarana (central supplier).

The steps taken by Indofood were followed by other instant noodle producers like PT Asia Inti Selera, set up in Jakarta in 1990, and PTNissinmas set up in 1992 by the Rodamas Group (49%) and Nissin Co. Ltd (51%), PT ABC President Feed Enterprise set up in 1994 in Karawang as a joint venture between PT Aneka Bina Cipta Central Food (ABC Group) and Yu Yan Enterprise (Taiwan), and Nan Gai Investment Co. Ltd (Hongkong), PT Supmi Sakti, PT Jakarana Tama, PT Mie Barokah and other instant noodle companies. See the following table for more data.

Table - 15.
Instant noodle producers in Indonesia
capacity and brand names, 1997

No	Name of company	Location	Prod. capacity (000'packs)	Brandnames
1.	PT INDOFOOD SUKSES MAKMUR	Ancol, Jakarta Deliserdang, N. Sumatera Pekanbaru, Riau Palembang, S. Sumatera Bekasi, West Java Tangerang, West Java Padalarang, West Java Semarang, Central Java Pasuruan, East Java Banjarmasin,S.Kalimantan Ujungpandang,S. Sulawesi	✓ 10,400,000	INDOMIE SUPERMIE SARIMIE POP MIE MIKO VITAMIE INTERMIE ASELI MIE FAST FOOD, INDOFOOD ANAK MAS SAKURA
2	PT SURYA PANGAN INDONESIA	Surabaya, East Java	276,000	INDOMIE
3	PERUSAHAAN BAMBOE		n.a	ARIA MIE
4	PT ABC PRESIDENT ENTERPRISE		✓ 660,976	ABC
5	PT ASIA INTI SELERA		126,000	MIKITA
6	PT ASIA MEGAH FOOD MNFG		n.a.	BURUNG RAJAWALI
7	PT BUDI SATRIA UTAMA		240,000	
8	PT DELLI FOOD SENTOSA CORP		n.a	MIDUO
9	PT JAKARANATAMA		✓ 720,000	MICHIYO
10	PT KHONG GUAN	Jakarta	81,300	TOP MIE KHONG GUAN MAMEE
11	PT KUALA PANGAN		4,400	ATOOM BULAN
12	PT MATAHARI		39,700	
13	PT MEGAH PUTRA SEJAHTERA		5,280	MEGAH MIE
14	PT NISSINMAS	Cikarang, West Java	✓ 389,805	DORAEMON SASA NISSIN OMIE
15	PT PACIFIC FOOD INDONESIA		94,118	MAKMIE MISTERMIE
16	PT RAMEIN JAYA	Tangerang, West Java	n.a	MIKU CIAMI CAP TEK-TEK
17	PT SAMPURNA PANGAN INDONESIA	Sidoarjo, East Java	n.a	SURYA MIE ALFA MIE BURUNG DARA MATAHARI

Prepared by P T CAPRICORN Indonesia Consult Inc

Consumption by Bakery Industry

Based on a decision of the Drug and Food Supervision (POM) Directorate General No. 02240/B/SK/VII/91, bread or bakery product referred to here is one made of wheat flour fermented with baker's yeast or a mixture of wheat flour with water and yeast or one mixed with cake soda and then baked. In the process of baking, salt, sugar, milk, fat, chocolate and other ingredients could be added with water content normally not more than 40%.

Therefore, bakery or bread manufacturing industry is a major consumer of wheat flour as this industry has also expanded in the country. The growth is indicated by the fast growing production. Bakery products are no longer occasional food but they have become food for breakfast in almost urban people.

The country has many bakeries both small and large. Small scale bakeries include those operating as cottage industries. They are found in almost all areas in the country. According to the POM directorate general, there were 840 bakeries officially registered in the country. The number rose to 1,143 in 1994. See the following table for more data.

Table - 17.
Several bakeries, location and production capacity

No.	Name of company	Location	Production capacity	Brandnames
1	Gardenia Indonesia, PT	Bekasi, West Java	6,000 Tons	GARDENIA
2	Mon Ami Bakery	Jakarta Selatan	2,430 Tons	MON AMI
3	Rasa Cinta, Perusahaan Roti	Tangerang, West Java	2,000 Tons	RASA CINTA
4	Rosa Bakery	Jakarta Timur	1,620 Tons	ROSA
5	Aneka Baru, Perusahaan Roti	Jakarta Utara	1,600 Tons	ANEKA BARU
6	T. Bahagia	Dairi, North Sumatera	1,360 Tons	-
7	Aneka Baru II, Perusahaan Roti	Jakarta Timur	1,215 Tons	ANEKA BARU
8	Maxim's International Limited, PT	Bogor, West Java	1,200 Tons	MAXIM'S, DENNYS
9	Kurnia, Perusahaan Roti	Jakarta Timur	972 Tons	KURNIA
10	Ramayana Baru	Badung, Bali	835 Tons	RAMAYANA BARU
11	Sari Bunga, Perusahaan Roti	Jakarta Timur	810 Tons	SARI BUNGA
12	Maemonah I & II	Jakarta Utara	810 Tons	MAEMUNAH
13	Regina's Bakery	Jakarta Pusat	810 Tons	REGINA'S
14	Tak Ek Tjoan, Perusahaan Roti	Jakarta Pusat	810 Tons	TAN EK TJOAN
15	Bintang Harapan	Magelang, Central Java	6,000,000 pcs.	ALWADY
16	Bunga Tanjung	Aceh Timur, Aceh	4,200,000 pcs.	-
17	Asmak Almudi	Kediri, East Java	3,600,000 pcs.	BUNGA TANJUNG
18	Orion, Perusahaan Roti	Malang, East Java	3,400,000 pcs.	-
19	Wonder, Perusahaan Roti	Salatiga, Central Java	2,500,000 pcs.	ORION
20	Sumber	Salatiga, Central Java	2,500,000 pcs.	WONDER
21	Palm	Denpasar, Bali	2,400,000 pcs.	-
22	Bahari	Bulukumba, S. Sulawesi	1,944,000 pcs.	PALM
23	Sempurna	Pare-Pare, S. Sulawesi	1,635,000 pcs.	-
24	Holland	Banjarmasin, Kalimantan	1,440,000 pcs.	-
25	Dua Putra Cap Limus	Luwu, S. Sulawesi	1,440,000 pcs.	-
26	Matahari	Bone, S. Sulawesi	1,380,000 pcs.	-
27	Roti Huarpen	Koto Tengah, W. Sumatera	1,209,000 pcs.	-
28	Dempo	Ambon, Maluku	1,200,000 pcs.	-
29	Gayati, Perusahaan Roti	Cilacap, Central Java	1,050,000 pcs.	GAYATI
30	Osaka & Fuji	Banjarmasin, Kalimantan	1,050,000 pcs.	-
31	Merdeka, Perusahaan Roti	Tuban, East Java	1,000,000 pcs.	MERDEKA

Source : CIC

Table - 19.
Biscuit producing companies, location, production capacity and brand names

No.	Name of company	Location	Capacity (tons)	Brandnames
A.	PRODUCTION (1 + 2) Total Capacity 1 Total Capacity 2 (n.a)		325,222 319,587 5,635	
1.	Adyboga Pranata Industries, PT	Tangerang	5,000	SPARK, LITTMENTS
2.	Aloha	Balikpapan	250	SEGITA
3.	Arta Nusa, PT	Palembang	350	YOSHIDA, MIKADO
4.	Asia Megah Food Manufacture, PT	Padang	1,500	ASIA, BURUNG RAJAWALI, AINA
5.	Asia Sakti Wahid Foods Manufacture, PT	Medan	8,400	BURUNG RAJAWAI, MAHKOTA, HATARI BURTON'S, AINA, APIKO
6.	Berka Suka Cita Karya Boga, PT	Bekasi	1,500	BEN FIELDER, ROCKET, PAJERO, TOP STAR
7.	Bintang Mas	Bandung	n.a	HELTI
8.	Brama Permai, PT	Bandung	200	VALKENET
9.	BUKIT MANIKAM SAKTI, PT	Bekasi	12,500	AMARETTI, ASTRA, CHATTY, CHIPPY, COMBO, DIP-DIP, FLORIDA RONDOLETTI, HAPPY DAY LAMBADA, GOOD TIME, HELIOS, HAPPY DAY TANGO, JOODY, MIC-MAC, MILNA, NYAM-NYAM, PRETZY, SENAN, STIKKO, SUKAKU SWEET EBONY, SYMPHONY
10.	Ceres, PT	Bandung	500	NEAPOLITAN
11.	Cipta Rasa Primatama, PT	Jakarta	180	YIPPI, CADBURY'S
12.	Ciwangi Pabrik Biscuit, PT	Ujung Pandang	350	CIWANGI
13.	Danone Biscuits Indonesia, PT	Karawang	16,000	PRINCE DANONE
14.	Dinasty Lestari Senjaya, PT	Tangerang	600	DOMINO, MOON, AMONR, MANNA
15.	Fajar Mataram Sedayu, PT	Bandung	500	L'AGIE TIGER, L'AGIE GOLDEN CITY, SONNY
16.	For You Perusahaan Biskuit	Malang	600	FOR YOU
17.	Garuda Dunia, PT	Ternate	275	GARUDA DUNIA
18.	Garuda Indah Biscuit, PT	Tangerang	400	VESTA
19.	Garuda Teladan, PT	Binjai	220	KAMBING, SWEET HOME, MANALAGI, GARUDA TELADAN
20.	General Food Industries, PT	Bandung	2,400	SELAMAT
21.	Gloria Biscuit, PT	Gresik	1,800	GLORIA
22.	Glory	Malang	400	GLORY
23.	Golden Roder Perdana, PT	Tangerang	n.a	EMU BRAND
24.	Gunawan, PD	Malang	n.a	CHYPY-CHYPY
25.	Gurih Murni	Medan	450	KANCIL
26.	Hame Perana, PT	Sidoarjo	150	HAME, SHOFRES
27.	Indolezat Rasa Murni Biscuit Fact., CV	Ujung Pandang	2,000	SUSANA, BARONTE
28.	Inpovita Dharma Industry, PT	Tangerang	400	BESTA RIA, TOHO, ROSE, IMPOVIT, VINI VICI
29.	Interbis Sejahtera, PT	Palembang	43,500	INTERBIS, MERLION
30.	Ital Frans Multindo Food Industries, PT	Surabaya	450	FRAN'S
31.	Jadi Abadi Corak Biscuit Factory Indonesia, PT	Surabaya	9,200	MONDE, JACOB'S, HOOS, TOP, CAP MENJANGAN, MONA, CAMINDO
32.	Jangkar Nusantara Megah, PT	Gresik	n.a	KABINDO
33.	Java Biscuit Factory	Bandung	n.a	JAVA, SUN
34.	Jaya Abadi, CV	Jakarta	4,800	NADISCO, JACOB, REGAL
35.	Kadu Manis Utama, PT/Cipta Rasa Anugrah, PT	Jakarta	180	UTAMA, TAWON MAHKOTA, JANGO
36.	Kage Nutrimas Borneo, PT	Banjarbaru	500	KOOKIBIS, NUTRIBIS
37.	Khong Guan Biscuit Fac. Ind. Ltd., PT	Jakarta	10,800	KHONG GUAN, KING LION
38.	Kinos Coklat Utama, PT	Jakarta	300	VIVI, NINJA
39.	Konimex, PT	Sukoharjo	12,707	SNIPS, SNAPS
40.	Koya Manas Perusahaan Kue	Malang	250	MARINA

Prepared by P.T. CAPRICORN Indonesia Consult Inc.

Cont'd table - 19

No.	Name of company	Location	Capacity (tons)	Brandnames
94.	Tridaya Internusa Food Industri, PT	Bandung	n.a	SCANDIA
95.	Tulen Biscuit Factory	Bandung	350	ASOKA
96.	Tunggal Perusahaan Biscuit	Bandung	n.a	TUNGGAL
97.	Ubindo Aneka Biscuit, PT	Purwakarta	6,000	GOLDA, CANASTA, REDDY
98.	Unimos, PT	Gresik	180	KOKOLA, NARITA, RENA, UNIGOLD
99.	United Waru Biscuit Manufactory, PT	Bandung	n.a	ROSARIA
100.	United Waru Biscuit Manufactory, PT	Sidoarjo	27,250	HOCK GUAN, DIANA, 555, UMB, BORNEO, ARROW, ELEPHANT, TRI GAJAH, HANSEN'S
101.	Universal Indofood Product, PT	Medan	2,500	KHIAN GUAN, UNIBIS, GUAN-GUAN
102.	Veteran Jaya, CV	Ujung Pandang	200	OLYMPIC
103.	Victoria, CV	Jakarta	400	KERO KERO, LOPALOMA, JACKY
103.	Wans	Bandung	n.a	WANS
105.	Widico Stantina Biscuit, PT	Tangerang	200	ASRIH, SAMI, TORSA, EMIR
106.	Wijaya Perusahaan Biskuit	Surabaya	130	DAPU, SAPI, SEGI TIGA ANDUN
107.	Yudiya Wangi Biscuit Fac., PT	Tangerang	600	CBA, DUNIA FANTASI
B.	UNDER PREPARATION			
1.	Citra Pangantama Sejahtera, PT	Bogor	400	n.a.
2.	Jakarta Tama, PT	Bogor	1,200	n.a.
3.	Manohara Asri, PT	Sidoarjo	300	n.a.
4.	Tahunmas	Bandung	3,456	n.a.
5.	Tri Kuncimas Industri, PT	Musi Banguasin	1,800	n.a.
C.	NOT/STOP PRODUCTION			
1.	Borobudur Perusahaan Biskuit	Malang	360	BOROBUDUR
2.	Deli Saridona Industri Indonesia, PT	Medan	600	SHAN SHAN 33, HISSIN PLAZA
3.	Dewi Sri Murni, PT	Malang	600	DEWI SRI
4.	Gizi Prosana, PT	Bekasi	4,320	GOLDEN, KIDDY, GALAXY, BEN-BEN, PILO
5.	Madu Sari	Sidoarjo	600	MADU SARI, MONYEK MUSTIKA
6.	Pula Lima Pabrik Biskuit	Pontianak	500	PULAU LIMA

Source : Processed by Indocommercial from various sources

The production of cottage industries fluctuate depending on the market demand. Demand will increase during holy day celebrations. Many producers, which normally operate far below their capacities increase production to exceed their capacities during Idul Fitri or Christmas day celebrations.

Estimate of annual production, therefore, could not be based on the production of cottage industries. Estimate could be made based on the production figures of regular producers mainly medium and large scale companies.

In the past 5 years, the country's biscuit production has continued to rise, up 11.8% annually on the average from 85,900 tons in 1992 to 88,900 tons in 1993, 96,900 tons in 1994, 115,300 tons in 1995 and to 133,500 tons in 1996.

There are several types of biscuit produced in the country. Roughly they could be divided into Assorted biscuit, Marie, Crackers, Wafer and Cookies. Lactose is used for cookies.

Consumption by Household Sector

The large number of Indonesian households provide a potential consumers of wheat flour. The number of households grows fast to follow the growing population from year to year.

In 1992, Indonesia has 41.8 million households, up to 42.9 million in 1993 and to 46.3 million in 1996.

The growing population and number of households will guarantee a large market for wheat flour in the country in the future. In addition change in the food pattern in the country tends to contribute to increasing wheat flour consumption in the country.

According to a survey by Indocommercial wheat flour consumption by Indonesian households totaled 282,859 tons in 1992, up to 344,366 tons in 1996.

Table - 22.
Wheat flour consumption by households in the country
1992 - 1996

Year	Number of households ('000)	Wheat flour consumption (tons)	Growth (%)
1992	41,843	282,859	--
1993	42,913	294,814	4.2
1994	44,060	305,776	3.7
1995	45,267	327,733	7.2
1996	46,348	344,366	5.1
Average growth (%/year)			5.1

Processed by Indocommercial

The country's consumption of wheat flour totaled 1.8 million tons in 1992, up to 2 million tons in 1993 and to 2.8 million tons in 1996.

Sectors grouped in "Other industries" are the largest consumers accounting for 39% or 1 million tons of the total consumption of 2.8 million tons in 1996. Instant noodle industry accounted for 22.8% or 628,530 tons of the country's total consumption, bakeries accounted for 21.4% or 588,161 tons, household sector for 12.5% or 344,366 tons and biscuit industry for 3.9% or 106,768 tons.

BULOG cooperates with the state bank BNI-46, which arranges the payment of by distributors.

Diagram - 1
Distribution system of wheat flour in Indonesia



Price

The price of wheat flour is relatively the same and stable in all areas in the country. BULOG itself sets the price, but retail prices vary slightly because of the long distribution line from factories to consumers in some areas. Some of the retail price components are production cost, selling price by distributors, selling price by wholesalers and selling price by retailers.

Late in November in Jakarta, the retail prices of wheat grain ranged from Rp 19,400 to Rp 19,900 per sack of 25 kg. The price was Rp 19,400 for Kunci Biru, Rp 19,700 for Segitiga Biru and Rp 19,900 for Cakra Kembar.

Diversification of foods will also contribute to increasing consumption of wheat flour in the country. More people are expected to consume food made of wheat flour. Wheat flour has gained popularity not only in urban areas but also in rural areas.

Wheat flour consumption in Indonesia is estimated to reach 4.7 million tons in 2001 including 1.3 million tons for instant noodle industry, 1.2 million tons for bakeries and, 179,000 tons for biscuit industry and 1.6 million tons for other industries and 439,000 tons for household sector.

Table - 26.

Development of wheat flour consumption by sector
1997 - 2001

(tons)

Year	Instant noodle	Bakery & cake	Biscuit	Household	Others	Total
1997	729,095	676,385	118,512	361,584	1,172,366	3,057,942
1998	845,750	777,843	131,548	379,663	1,266,155	3,400,960
1999	981,070	894,519	146,019	398,646	1,367,448	3,787,702
2000	1,138,041	1,028,697	162,081	418,579	1,476,844	4,224,241
2001	1,320,128	1,183,002	179,910	439,507	1,594,991	4,717,538

Processed by Indocommercial

Including the capacity of projects to be built, the country's production capacity of wheat flour will total 8 million tons in 2001 more than enough to meet the domestic requirement.

Table - 27.

Projected production capacity of wheat flour in Indonesia
1997 - 2001

(Tons)

Factory	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
A. EXISTING FACTORIES (PRODUCTION)	5,082,000	5,082,000	5,082,000	5,082,000	5,082,000
B. EXPANSION UNITS	0	0	0	0	0
C. FACTORIES TO BE BUILT					
PT Citra Flour Mills Persada (Cilacap)	300,000	1,263,600	1,371,600	2,371,600	2,971,600
PT Citra Flour Mills Persada (Medan)	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000
PT Citra Flour Mills Persada (Bojonegoro)		600,000	600,000	600,000	600,000
PT Amora Restu Flour Mills (Samarinda)					600,000
PT Sriboga Raturaya (Semarang)			108,000	108,000	108,000
PTCorkindo Nusamas (Serang)		363,600	363,600	363,600	363,600
				1,000,000	1,000,000
Total (A+B+C)	5,382,000	6,345,600	6,453,600	7,453,600	8,053,600

Source : BKPM, processed

Prepared by P T CAPRICORN Indonesia Consult Inc.

August 26

TO: (b)(6)

FROM:

Subject: 416(b) PVO papers

(b)(6) received a package from CRS for 416(b) programs worldwide. I am faxing the section dealing with Indonesia. While it is essentially the package we saw last Friday, we would request the Mission's written comments on overall concept, specific elements, and your recommendations by the end of the week. They need not be extensive or complicated, just a page or so.

My concerns are:

-- Storage capacity.

-- Any additional feedback from the PVOs re direct distribution.

-- How they would prioritize among the subprograms.

-- The management of the fund.

There seems to be little concern or explanation on how flour would be made available for the small bakeries and venders.

There have been rounds of brief meetings on the Indonesia food program. (b)(6) desire to help remains paramount (1.5 million tons). My take is that program deliveries of 100,000 tons per month should be our goal for a period of 1 year as it would not distort commercial imports and I think, with effort, there is sufficient opportunity to achieve that level.

The schools "food for education" concept probably needs vetting at a level higher than Fazili. After all, The Bappenas's Minister helped accept the US intended donation. I am discussing the issue with (b)(6) in oredr to get feedback on approaching the Minister. If he is approached and rejects the "food for education" idea, we would have another substantive reason for not meeting the 1.5 commitment. I think he would want to save face.

How are things progressing with UNICEF?

Best regards,

(b)(6)

PVO Consortium in Indonesia

Humanitarian Response and Economic Recovery Assistance Program

Introduction

The country of Indonesia is experiencing the worst economic decline of any nation in recent history. This economic crisis is exacerbated by drought in the eastern islands, environmental disasters (fires) on the large islands of Borneo and Sumatra, and an uncertain political transformation in process since the fall of the 30-year Suharto regime. The impact of this crisis has resulted in a severe decline in health and social impact indicators: 20 million people are out of work; 48% of the population will be below the poverty level by the end of 1998 as compared with only 11% before the crisis; school drop out rate is expected to reach at least 20%; 60 % inflation rate at the end of July (8.5%per month); and increasing levels of malnutrition (a recent survey in an eastern island district showed an increase in malnutrition rates to 30%).

Not surprising, the poor and vulnerable groups are especially affected by this crisis. The following concept proposes a collaborative multi-PVO, multi-sector response to this humanitarian crisis that will ameliorate the immediate needs while simultaneously addressing the underlying causes of the crisis.

The Humanitarian Response and Economic Recovery Assistance Program will consist of eight programming components as described below:

Humanitarian Response

The foremost priority will support the social safety net mechanisms to prevent widespread hunger and hunger-related diseases. The situation in Indonesia is tense 98 million people under the poverty level of $1.00 per day. A funding mechanism will be established for local Indonesian NGOs to assist them in their efforts to assist the needy. Special priority will be given to those organizations that are assisting those hardest hit by the crisis – street children, homeless, elderly, hospices, orphanages. Any needy elements of the safety net system will be eligible for this support to help the most effected weather the current crisis. Grant funding will be provided to local groups engaged in programs that address the immediate needs of the poor and that will minimize the negative impacts of loss of income. These include, but are not limited to education, health and nutrition problems, social and political disturbances, inter-religious intolerance, rivalries, and conflicts at the community level.

Agricultural Recovery and Rehabilitation

A large number of the PVOs are engaged in agricultural development activities, primarily in the drought areas of Eastern Indonesia. In these rural areas, specifically in the outer islands such as Flores, Timor and Kalimantan, to

program proposes agricultural recovery and rehabilitation projects to follow on the current PVOs emergency food for work programs. Drought and fire have affected crop planting and harvesting cycles; these effects are exacerbated by the economic crisis. Recovery will require new land management practices, crop diversification, and special technical assistance to help small farmers get land back into productive sustainable use. Agricultural rehab projects may include the provision of seeds, inputs, tools, and technical assistance to assure that the tragic effects of successive recent crop failures are mitigated as speedily as possible. Interventions, which improve access to markets, movement from cash crops to food, and the use of new drought resistant crops, are important.

Education of Children

The decreasing school attendance of children is well documented as a direct result of the economic crisis. Children are being taken out of school not only to save on school fees but also to be put to work in seeking family income. There is a strong need to address this serious problem by providing families with an economic incentive to keep their children in school. The consortium will propose a variety of incentive schemes to attract the students who dropped out back to school and to keep others from falling out. Ideas include take-home ration of rice and financial subsidies for school fees and uniforms.

Strengthening Community Micro Businesses through BPRs

The past predominance of crony, monopolistic businesses must be replaced with a system that provides more opportunities and income potential for the poor if Indonesia is to recover from the economic crisis. A viable and healthy micro-business sector is an indicator of community self-development and an indicator of the determination of the poor to challenge economic pressures. The Rural Credit Banks (BPR) in Indonesia have the potential to serve the poor though these micro businesses, but because of the economic crisis, liquidity and inflation have limited their capacity. This BPR system has the capacity to serve 1 million micro-businesses that impact 10 million people.

This proposed program builds on PVO success in supporting the rural banking sector (BPR). It proposes to provide financial assistance to one million small businesses at affordable market rates. It would also provide financial and technical support to 700 rural banks (BPR). This would provide a crucial assistance to the small business sector, which reaches the poorer sector, which are not served by the main banks.

Empowering Small Urban Food processing Co-ops

This component would utilize either the commodity or the funds. The idea is to strengthen cooperative groups of small food processors or street vendors in the urban areas. The basic approach is to give the groups an infusion of capital or resources that they could use to strengthen their ability to compete during this time of high inflation. The GOI Ministry of Cooperatives and Small Businesses would most likely be interested in collaborating with the PVOs in such an activity.

A meeting with the Minister has been requested to discuss the program possibilities.

Urban and Peri-Urban Small Enterprise Development

In urban and peri-urban areas of Indonesia the consortium proposes to target populations hardest hit by the economic collapse. Drawing on its expertise in SEAD and micro-credit methodologies, the consortium proposes a variety of incomes generating scheme in selected urban and peri-urban settings. Small working capital loans, for instance, of from $250 to USD $3000, can help the poorest of the economically active weather the effects of formal unemployment, as they seek alternative ways to generate income and provide the basic needs of their families. These projects are geared to those who otherwise have little access to credit from formal financial institutions; instead borrowers form solidarity groups of three to five members to guarantee each other's loans. The projects are also designed to generate their own operating expenses, and include business training and technical assistance to small entrepreneurs.

Nutrition Education and Outreach

The economic crisis, coupled with the severe environmental/climactic and social disturbances, is directly affecting the nutritional and health status of the entire population, with particular impact on the poor and vulnerable groups such as pregnant and lactating mothers and malnourished children. Malnutrition rates are increasing drastically. In some areas, there are reports of under-5 malnutrition rates as high as 50% and 50% of in pregnant/lactating mothers suffering from acute anemia due to poor nutrition. The consortium will undertake programs to: maintain access of poor to essential health services; provide nutrition surveillance; provide special supplemental feeding; support community-based delivery of essential health and nutrition care; and, strengthen the capacity of Indonesian community-based NGO's to promote health, nutrition, and food security.

Conflict Resolution, Peace Building, and Strengthening Civil Society Structures

An underlying concern of the current situation is the potential for ethnic and/or inter-religious violence. In addition to the recent anti-Chinese violence, there have been outbreaks of religious/ethnic violence in East and Central Java, Sumba, Flores, West Kalimantan, Ache, and East Timor. The need for increased efforts in the areas of inter-faith dialogue and collaboration, conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening in is crucial. The economic and social/political crisis is straining the social fabric of Indonesia. Education and health systems are deteriorating; communities and smaller social units are experiencing new conflicts and tensions as they attempt to cope with the effects of job loss, exploding prices, economic uncertainty, and political instability. The consortium proposes a variety of civil society strengthening, inter-faith collaboration and conflict mitigation projects. These activities will focus on local leaders and selected NGOs to reduce social tensions before they escalate into violence, and

to find ways of channeling negative energy into positive action that will address the country's needs.

Monetization

The consortium proposes to monetize 300,000 MT of wheat at +/- $150/MT or 200,000 MT of wheat flour at +/- $290/MT. The current buying price for wheat grain is $150 per metric ton. Currently wheat flour is selling at the same rate due to the government subsidy but the wheat subsidies will end in October.

There is a monopoly on the flour milling in Indonesia. One company, PT Bogasari (also known as PT Indofood) controls the three mills in Indonesia. The only other mill in Cilicap, owned by Suharto's oldest daughter, is temporarily inoperative. Although this company provides for the country's needs at a subsidized rate (until October, it also a large noodle exporting operation. The quickest, easiest approach would be to sell 300,000 mt of grain directly to PT Bogasari.

The second option would be to sell wheat flour directly to the smaller distributors. The consortium could arrange sales agreements with buyers in the main distribution cities of Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Unjang Pandang, Semarang, Lampung, and Bandung. The buyers would be medium size wholesalers who supply the bakeries. The advantage of this option is that it ensures usage in the country. It would also open the possibilities for future purchases from the US flour market. With the lifting of the subsidies, PT Bogsasari/BULOG will no longer have monopoly on the importation of wheat products. Any buyer will be able to directly import. The flour would be either directly consigned to the buyer or to CRS (who will manage the monetization for the consortium). There would also be a need for a sample shipment (100kg) for the buyers to test the quality and taste.

The amount of 200,000 MT equals about 6.5% of the annual flour requirements in Indonesia. Since there is only one supplier at this time, PT Bogasari, there would be no commercial displacement. In fact, it would help to open up the market to more competition.

The Consortium

The core group currently consists of CARE, CRS, PCI, and WVRD. Other Cooperating Sponsors will also be invited to join – ADRA, CWS. The final proposal will include program plans for consortium members on how they will program funds in concordance with the programming sectors. The block grant for NGO grants will be managed by one of the consortium members with the assistance of a Consortium committee, which will establish programming and funding criteria and selection procedures. One consortium will manage the monetization (CRS). An audit plan will be built into all programs.

Catholic Relief Services/Indonesia
Title II Emergency Program

Revised Proposal
March 10, 1998

(Revised Budget: March 23, 1998)

Submitted to:

Thomas Oliver - USAID/FFP Director, Washington, D.C.
David J. Garms - USAID/Emergency Response, Washington, D.C.
Vivikka Molldrem - USAID/Jakarta

CRS Contacts:

Jim DeHarpporte
Michele Broemmelsiek
Catholic Relief Services/Indonesia
Jl. Wijaya I/35
Jakarta Selatan
Indonesia
(62-21) 725-3339

George Ropes
Catholic Relief Services HQ
209 West Fayette Street
Baltimore, MD 21230
USA
(410) 625-2220

I. Problem Statement

Indonesia is currently experiencing a major drought which is seriously affecting the food security of its poorest populations. While drought is recurrent in many areas of Indonesia, the 1997-98 El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is one of the strongest on record and has resulted in as little as 30% of average rainfall for the Oct. '97-Jan. '98 period in the hardest hit eastern islands of the province of Nusa Tenggara Barat (islands of Lombok, Sumbawa) and the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur (islands of Sumba, Flores, Timor). In these islands, which are food deficit even in good years, failed and delayed harvests have caused food shortages, taxed traditional coping mechanisms and are threatening food and livelihood security of its populations Similar situations exist in other parts of the country as well --including Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan -- where the chronically poor traditionally the most fragile coping mechanisms and least access to assistance during times of crisis.

At the same time, Indonesia's economic crisis has caused the price of staples to soar; further price increased can be expected as subsidies are removed to comply with the terms of the IMF bail-out. There is no doubt that outside assistance will be required to enable some families to survive the next twelve months, even assuming successful harvests in 1999 and stabilization of the economy. Listed below is sample data from some of the hardest hit drought affected areas.[1]

Province	Sample Sub-Districts	Sub-District Populations	Seriously Drought Affected Populations
East Timor	Baucau, Liquisa, Ambeno	172,900	34,695
NTT	Kupang, W. Timor	349,992	98,629
NTT	Atambua, W. Timor	166,781	114,508
NTT	Ngada, Flores	212,470	43,119
NTT	Ende, Flores	220,005	67,108
NTT	Maumere, Flores	261,690	50,690
NTT	Sumba Timor	225,000	18,983
NTB	Lobar, Lotim, Loteng, Sumbawa	950,780	23,722
South Sumatra	Lampung	325,420	70,242
Java Tenga	Wonogiri, Cilicap	820,000	130,800
Total		**3,705,038**	**652,496**

The Government of Indonesia is currently implementing subsidized market schemes and free distribution of rice in some areas to lessen the impact of the drought and economic

[1] Data received from CRS Counterparts in relevant areas.

crisis. Unfortunately, GOI resources and coverage are limited and ultimately insufficient to meet the immediate and imminent needs of the poorest families.

Assessment visits by USAID/FFP, CRS and CARE staff over the period Feb. 18-25, 1998 to Timor, Flores and Central Java documented the following affects of the drought on the most vulnerable rural families. These affects are only expected to worsen as the drought continues with the peak coming in June 1998.

- Failed harvest and/or delayed planting of rice crops, and uncertainty of sufficient rainfall for next harvest
- Multiple failed or substandard harvests of corn and soybean
- Family stocks depleted
- Number of meals per day reduced from 3x/day to 2x/day, and in some areas 1x/day
- Reduced in-take of animal products (eggs, chicken, milk)
- Selling of assets (animals, land)
- Inability to purchase staples such as oil and rice as well as some vegetables, due to lack of cash crops to sell and reduced remittances from family member working outside of village.

II. Project Purpose

The primary purpose of the proposed CRS/Indonesia Emergency Program is to increase food availability to the neediest rural populations to ensure maintenance of minimal family consumption needs until the next viable harvest, prevent the sale of livelihood assets, facilitate the ability to restock family food supplies, and prevent the most vulnerable populations (children under 5, pregnant/lactating mothers) from slipping into malnourished states.

Recognizing that drought is a recurring event in Indonesia and that vulnerable populations need longer term solutions to drought impacts, CRS' intervention strategies will be designed, to the extent possible, to contribute to longer term food and livelihood security and provide a foundation for longer term development programming. This will primarily be accomplished through activities which enhance rural infrastructure, promote improved farming practices, increase access to water for farming and consumption, and/or improve nutritional knowledge and monitoring.

All proposed activities involve a take-home ration which will effectively act as an income transfer to the family while directly increasing food availability. CRS will coordinate with other donors engaged in labor-intensive food-for-work or cash-for-work activities to ensure compatibility and appropriateness of rations.

III. Targeting, Timing and Intervention Strategies

Targeting

CRS will target approximately 125,000 beneficiaries or 25,000 families per month focusing on the drought affected areas of the eastern islands of Nusa Tenggara Timor -- West Timor, Flores and Sumba, and Nusa Tenggara Barat -- Lombok and Sumbawa. CRS will also monitor conditions in other drought affected areas in central Java, Southern Sumatra and Kalimantan and be prepared to provide resources to these areas if viable local counterparts exist.

Within the proposed geographic regions the need will obviously be greater than CRS alone can meet. CRS will further refine it's targeting based on:

1. the presence of a capable local Counterpart (see Appendix 1 for initial proposed counterparts and locations)
2. extent of community need, defined in conjunction with CRS local counterpart[2]
3.. the appropriateness of the proposed CRS interventions -- FFW and Supplemental Feeding -- to meet needs;
4. no overlap or conflict with other donor or GOI interventions

CRS will not be the only actor in the region and is actively involved in coordination with other NGO donors such as CARE and World Vision, as well as the World Bank, UN (UNDP, WFP) and local church networks to ensure compatibility and maximum effectiveness of targeted interventions. The GOI is also preparing a priority list of villages/sub-districts in the drought affected provinces and CRS will work with other donors to try to ensure maximum coverage of areas in need. CRS does not anticipate cumbersome data collection systems will be necessary for targeting since CRS' local counterparts have current and detailed knowledge of the areas which they serve.

Finally, to the extent possible, CRS will promote joint collaboration between religious and ethnic communities in responding to the drought situation. CRS counterparts are Christian, Muslim and secular and work in both Christian and Muslim communities. The promotion of religious harmony and acceptance is part of CRS/Indonesia's strategic vision and on-going programming efforts (through the USAID funded Endowment Fund and Microenterprise Innovation Project,) and will be carried into the emergency programming as well.

Timing

CRS proposes a twelve month intervention for the emergency program based on the following factors:

---

[2]. Need criteria could include such factors as: 1. number of families dependent on agricultural production, 2. percentage of crop failure, 3. level of existing community food stocks, 4. indications of threatened livelihood security (ie. selling of assets), 5. indications of malnutrition, 7. anticipated duration of food security crisis, 8. lack of GOI or other local response.

- in areas with only one planting season, the next harvest will not take place until March 1999
- projected continuation of the drought through June 1998 makes successful harvests doubtful in areas attempting delayed or second cropping this year
- the need to ensure that people do not deplete all of their livelihood assets during the crisis
- the need to ensure families have sufficient resources and energy to plant next year
- the limited resources of the GOI to meet the country's food import needs due to the fiscal crisis

The intervention strategies described below will be employed in the proposed program. CRS anticipates it will be ready to begin program implementation in at least some of the targeted areas by the time food arrives in Indonesia (call forward anticipated the beginning of April 1998). Prior to the arrival of the food, CRS will further refine its targeting and program interventions by conducting detailed community assessments with counterparts in priority areas. This process should begin by the beginning of April 1998. Actual project details will be developed at the local level through a participatory process which will actively engage community members in identifying priority needs and designing interventions.

Intervention Strategies

A. Food For Work

CRS' primary intervention strategy will be labor-intensive Food For Work projects targeting families in the poorest villages of drought affected regions. These projects will provide work/income opportunities for rural subsistence farmers whose crops have failed and who have little to no other income opportunities. Beyond providing employment opportunity, prioritization will be given to FFW projects which will be of longer term benefit to the food security of the area by addressing issues related to access to markets (roads and bridges), improved farming capacity (irrigation, land reclamation) and increased access to potable water (wells, water catchments).

In community-based Food For Work projects all families in a village are given the opportunity to participate; however, the neediest are most likely to participate since the ration will be valued at less than minimum wage and families with other options would likely choose other cash-based employment opportunities. CRS' past experience with FFW activities also indicates they do not discriminate against women. In any given project there exist activities which involve lighter labor and are appropriate for women and past CRS FFW projects have often employed up to 50% women. While women have been involved in work, they have had less involvement in planning. During this project, the participation of women in planning will be encouraged, aided by use of Rapid Rural Appraisal methodologies.

The proposed grain ration of rice will provide approximately 45% of the total caloric needs for a family of five.

Target Population	Ration (Rice)	Methodology
One able-bodied household member per family	2 kg/person/day x 20 work days/month = 40kg/month	Take Home Ration

B. Supplemental Feeding

CRS will provide extra protection for the most vulnerable members in the same targeted population, namely children under five and pregnant and lactating women. A ration of 4kg/month/individual of wheat soy blend (WSB) will be provided through the local health post (Posyandu). The ration will serve as income transfer to the family, an incentive to keep targeted children and mothers coming to the Posyandu to ensure monitoring of their condition, and make an important contribution to maintaining the quality of the diet of these vulnerable individuals.. Also incorporated into the program will be health education messages aimed at increasing the likelihood the ration will be consumed by the intended beneficiary, improving mother/child health practices and reducing the risk of related illness.

It is not considered feasible to provide wet feeding on a daily basis at the Posyandu since Posyandu health activities are only scheduled once monthly and most families do not have the time or resources to get there daily. Therefore, a take home ration that can be used throughout the month is considered the most appropriate means of distribution. While a take home ration has more chance to be shared within the family, in this case the likelihood is reduced because WSB is not a staple consumed by most adults and because recipes will be provided that are appropriate for children and pregnant/lactating women. (CRS' previous Posyandu food program utilized WSB and knows it is acceptable to the local population.) It is also less likely the WSB will be shared within the family because these same families will be receiving a rice ration through FFW activities.

If consumed by the targeted individual, the WSB ration will be sufficient to meet 100% of the protein needs of a child under five and 45% of the protein needs of pregnant or lactating women. Equally important, it will free up family cash resources to enable purchase of other key foods items such as eggs, soybean, and milk. CRS will evaluate the appropriateness of the ration during the upcoming field assessment and adjust if necessary.

Target Population	Ration (WSB)	Methodology
Children Under 5	4 kg/child/month	Take Home Ration
Pregnant/Lactating Mothers	4kg/woman/month	Take Home Ration

C. Targeted Emergency Distribution

CRS, in addition to the other strategies, as well proposes to maintain a contingency reserve of 500 MT of rice available for emergency distribution to targeted groups in locations where FFW or supplemental feeding interventions are not being implemented and where needs exist which can be ameliorated through a short-term general distribution. This will require some food stocks being kept in the storage, most likely in Surabaya, where they can be dispatched as quickly as possible for emergency distribution. Again, this modality would only be considered in areas where CRS is not implementing FFW or supplemental feeding programs and where viable counterparts exist for implementation.

IV. Management

CRS has a long history of Title II programming in Indonesia (1979-1995), most recently in the eastern islands. An April 1996 evaluation of the CRS Title II Food for Work and Health program indicated overall strong management and positive impact of the CRS Title II program. CRS will therefore draw heavily on its experience from this earlier program in terms of program interventions and use recommendations from the evaluation to enhance development impact. A number of CRS/Indonesia staff and counterparts maintain familiarity with Title II activities, and materials and systems for commodity import and management and project design and implementation remain available and appropriate.

Because of the rapid start-up and deployment of the proposed Emergency Program, and based on previous recommendations indicating the importance of strong support to counterparts and close monitoring of program implementation, CRS/Indonesia will set-up a separate office for the Emergency Program in the eastern part of Indonesia, most likely in Kupang, the capital of NTT. The Emergency Program Manager will be based in this office, with a full complement of logistics, monitoring, technical and administrative support staff reporting to him/her. Below is proposed staffing, for CRS.

1. Program Manager (1) - expatriate
2. Logistics Manager (1) - expatriate
3. Program Liaison (50%) - national (based in Jakarta)
4. Agricultural Specialist (1)) - national
5. Health Specialist (1) - national
6. FFW Engineer (1)- national
7. Project Officers (3) - national
8. Field Monitors (4) - national
9. Internal Auditor (1) - national
10. Logistics Officers (2) - national
11. Office Manager (1) - national
12. Finance Officer (1) - national
13. Finance Assistant (50%) - national (based in Jakarta)

14. Administrative Assistant (1) - national
13. Guard/Cleaning Staff/Driver (3) - national

CRS Counterparts will as well require staffing up in order to implement the emergency program. As mentioned, CRS has recent experience working with counterparts in food for work and supplement feeding programs and is familiar with the level of staffing necessary to carry-out these types of programs. CRS anticipates it will work with up to eight local counterparts and each counterpart will require dedicated staff comprised of:

1. Program Coordinator (1)
2. Food For Work Supervisor (1)
3. FFW Field Workers (6)
4. Health/Nutrition Supervisor (1)
5. Health Nutrition Field Workers (5)
6. Logistics Supervisor (1)
7. Logistics Field Worker (3)
8. Finance Supervisor (1)
9. Admin/Finance Officer (1)

V. Food Import Methodology

As it has done in the past, CRS proposes to have commodities delivered by through bill-of-lading to the ports closest to it's implementing partners and distribution sights. In the past this has involved commodities being first sent to the port of Surabaya, where they are stored pending transshipment to smaller islands. At times, delays have been experienced in Surabaya while ships wait to accumulate full loads.

One possibility which CRS will explore with the GOI commodity board responsible for rice imports (Bulog) is the possibility of swapping the imported rice for rice already available in local government stores (Dolog). This methodology has a number of advantages in terms of reducing CRS' cost and liability for losses during transport and storage and speeding up the time frame for rice being available at the local level. It is also potentially supportive of World Bank goals to improve Bulog logistics and distribution mechanisms by utilizing Bulog's system.

However it also has potential pitfalls such as the difference in the quality of the U.S. imported rice versus the quality of the rice in Dulog stocks and the uncertainty of future Dulog supplies at any given time or location. Nonetheless, CRS feels this is an option worth exploring and one that could possibly be tested in some of the targeted locations.

VI. Disincentive Analysis

Indonesian food production is expected to be 10% below normal this year due to the current drought, requiring an import of 6 million MT of food commodities compared with

normal import requirements of 2 million MT.[3] Due to the monetary crisis, the country's ability to afford imported commodities is severely compromised and in fact an appeal to the World Food Program is anticipated to help the country meet it's food needs for the next 12 months.

Rural areas suffer the most in times of food shortages due to problems of accessibility and political factors which cause urban needs to be addressed first. Rural farmers whose crops have failed are further suffering from shortages in the market and skyrocketing prices for staple commodities. The 13,540MT of commodities proposed for the CRS program will not provide any disincentive for local production or marketing and could potentially help stabilize markets in rural areas thereby benefiting the larger community.

VII. Constraints

Indonesia has always proved a challenging environment for food aid programming, and the short time frame necessary for start-up and expansion of an emergency program will only magnify the inherent difficulties. CRS' experience shows that significant levels of staffing, monitoring and training are necessary to minimize risks, and that program design must be adaptable to operational realities and capacity constraints as they arise.

CRS/Indonesia will respond to these challenges by opening an office in Kupang to facilitate monitoring and troubleshooting of activities, by working with counterparts with whom it has an on-going relationship (many of whom have experience in food aid programming), and by investing private resources in training counterparts in commodity management, finance and accounting, and monitoring and evaluation. CRS will also draw on recommendations from past audits to strengthen its food monitoring and internal control systems. CRS has on-going institutional strengthening activities with many of the proposed counterparts, as well as existing Food for Work and commodity and finance management manuals, in Bahasa Indonesia, which will be used for the proposed emergency program.

CRS will make all efforts to program resources in a timely and effective manner, balancing the urgent needs of beneficiaries with prudence to assure proper use of resources. Problems which arise, especially those related to issues of corruption and unaccounted loses, will require the full support and understanding of USAID for effective problem solving.

[3] Data provided by World Bank during Feb. 27, 1998 meeting in Jakarta.

VIII. Estimated Resource Requirements

A. Commodity Requirements

CRS will program approximately 13,540 MT of commodities over a 12 month period. for the proposed Emergency Program. While exact amounts will be determined based on the projects designed and implemented at the field level, it is anticipated the commodity make-up will breakdown as follows:

Commodity	Program Intervention	Targeted Beneficiaries	Total Tonnage	Estimated Value[4]
Rice	Food For Work	25,000 households	12,000 MT	$5,880,000
	Emergency Distribution	TBD	500 MT	245,000
WSB	Supplemental Feeding	child <5 = 15,462 preg. women = 3,000 lact. women = 2,250	1,040 MT	556,400
TOTAL		**125,000 individuals**	**13,542 MT**	**$6,681400**

B. Cash Requirements

The total cash budget of the proposed program is $1,780,890 (not including NICRA). Because Farm Bill 202(e) resources are not available to fund program administration, CRS will utilize ITSH resources to cover as much of program implementation as appropriate. USAID/Jakarta Development Assistance funds and CRS private resources will be requested to fund the remainder.

The proposed budget is consists of two components, one for CRS' operating expenses and one for counterpart operating expenses. CRS estimates it will have eight local counterparts for project implementation. For purposes of clarification, a prototype budget for one counterparts has been created which assumes one counterpart will program approximately 1/8th of the resources. Actual counterpart expenses will vary depending on the level of commodities they receive however, based on CRS past experience with Title II programming, the total for eight counterparts accurately reflects the total budget required to program 13,540 MTs of food commodities.

NOTE: For purposes of budgeting local currency expenses, CRS has used the exchange rate of $1 = 5,000 rph. This is the rate at which, if implemented, a proposed currency board) would fix the rupiah, and is the rate around which the rupiah was hovering before it collapse at the beginning of 1998. At the time of writing of the proposal, however, the

[4] Based on USDA Information received by CRS/HQ, 3/6/1998. Rice @ $365/MT, WSB @ $410/MT -- plus estimated $125/MT ocean freight

exchange rate was approx. 10,000rupiah/dollar. Inflation for the month of February was 12%.

a. ITSH

All expense related to commodity transportation, storage and handling are allocated to ITSH, as are all travel and staff dedicated to commodity management activities (i.e. logistics officers, field monitors, and field monitoring trips). Significant management and administrative time and materials will be required to support commodity management activities. Therefore, general management, and administrative support expenses, as detailed in the attached budget, will be split 50/50 between ITSH and DA funds. Total ITSH resources requested are $988,762.

b. Development Assistance Funds

Funding for expenses related to the agricultural and health/nutrition content of the program --which includes dedicated staff, travel, and support materials and equipment -- will be requested from USAID/Jakarta Development Assistance Funds, as will 50% of the general management supervision and administration, in the total amount of $880,064 (which includes 22.45% for CRS NICRA).

c. Potential Monetization

At time of proposal preparation, CRS does not envision the need or desirability to monetize any food commodities as long as ITSH and USAID/Jakarta DA funds are available to support program implementation. Uncertainties surrounding the Indonesian economy -- continued devaluation of the rupiah and skyrocketing inflation, failed banks and lack of foreign reserves, doubtful liquidity of the government, propped up markets, change in government -- make it difficult to adequately assess the viability of monetization at this time . Even though the GOI Commodity Board (Bulog)would be the buyer if CRS were to attempt to monetize rice, it is doubtful they would be willing or able to pay the CIF rate at this point in time.

This being said, depending on the course the Indonesian economy takes over the next six month, monetization could become viable, especially in smaller amounts. Given the multiple levels of uncertainty in the operating environment at time of proposal writing which affect program design and budget preparation, CRS would like to keep open the option of conducting a small scale monetization (maximum 500MT). The purpose would be to generate cash to cover ITSH, program management/administration and/or project material support expenses if the need arose.. This would only be considered if a cost/benefit analysis indicated use of resources for monetization was not harmful to the emergency program goals, and any proposal to monetize would be accompanied by a Bellmon analysis. CRS has extensive experience with monetization in Indonesia with it's past Title II program.

d. CRS Contribution

Over the last six months, CRS has provided approximately $90,000 in private resources for emergency food aid for populations in the eastern part of Indonesia (Irian Jaya, Flores and W. Timor) and medical assistance in West Kalimantan. CRS will continue to identify other funding sources (ie. the Caritas International network) to complement or expand the proposed Title II emergency program.

CRS/Indonesia will cover the costs of the next phase of field assessments for purposes of program refinement, including hiring of technical consultants. This is anticipated at between $20,000. CRS/Indonesia will fund from private resources all costs related to training required for implementation of the Emergency Program, up to $83,000.

CRS will contribute $20,000 to cover expenses related to the development and production of health education materials which will accompany the supplemental feeding component of the proposed program.

And finally, CRS/Indonesia plans to invest another $50,000-$100,000 in post-emergency non-food activities which will build on the Emergency Program to enhance longer term food security in targeted areas. These activities will be identified during project development and implementation and be incorporated into CRS/Indonesia's longer term development agriculture and health programming.

Appendix 1 - Geographic Targeting, Counterparts and Potential Interventions

Geographic Region	Site	Counterpart Name	Potential Interventions
W. Timor	Kupang	YASPENSKAK	FFW, SF, ED
	Atambua	YASSKA	FFW, SF, ED
Flores	Ende Ngada	PSE	FFW, SF, ED
	Maumere	YCS	SF, ED
Sumba	Sumba Timur	Tananua	FFW, ED
Lombok, Sumbawa	Lobar, Lotim, Loteng, Sumbawa	YCS	FFW, SF
Central Java	Situation to be monitored		
Southern Sumatra	Situation to be monitored		

FFW = Food for Work; SF = Supplementary Feeding; ED = Emergency Distribution

BUDGET NOTES:

Budget A = Consolidated Budget
Budget B = CRS Operating Expenses
Budget B1 = CRS Personnel Expenses
Budget C = Counterpart Operating Expenses
Budget C1 = Counterpart Personnel Expenses

I. SALARIES

A. Expatriate - See Budget B1. Proposed salaries are mid-range in the established CRS salary scale for these positions. Actual salaries will depend on the individual hired.

Program Manager - 50% ITSH:	$42,000 per year
Logistics Manager - 100% ITSH:	$35,000 per year

B. CRS National Staff - see Budget B1. Salary expenses break out approximately 60% DA, 40% ITSH. Proposed salaries are in line with existing salaries paid by international PVO's in Kupang and with the exiting CRS/Indonesia salary structure. Salaries range from 500,000-2,500,000 rupiah per month.

C. Counterpart Staff - see Budget C1 -- Salary expenses break out approximately 40% DA and 60% ITSH (primarily because food monitor staff have lower salaries than project officer staff). Proposed salaries are in line with existing local NGO salaries and range from 200,00 - 600,000 rupiah per month..

II. FRINGE BENEFITS

A. Expatriate - See Budget B1.
Insurance - the standard CRS benefits package for expatriates is valued at $14,000 per year.
Housing - costs in Kupang are budgeted at $800 per month for the Logistics Manager and $1000 for the Program Manager.

B. CRS National Staff - See Budget B1.
Insurance/Benefits - are calculated at four times the monthly salary and include lebaron bonus, medical and health insurance, and travel allowance.
Severance - is calculated at equal to one month's salary.

C. Counterpart Staff - See Budget C1
Calculations are the same as CRS National Staff.

III. TRAVEL IN-COUNTY

A. CRS - See Budget B.
Field Monitoring/Audit - applicable 100% ITSH. Anticipates four field monitors will take two trips per month spending an average of 6 days per trip in the field.
Project Monitoring/Community Organizing - applicable 100% DA funds. Three

project officers will take two trips per month spending an average of 6 days per trip in the field.
Project Manager/Supervisor Travel - applicable 100% to DA. Anticipates travel between Kupang and Jakarta for one person three times over the 12-month period for meetings with USAID and CRS/Jakarta staff.

B. Counterpart - See Budget C - 50% ITSH, 50% DA Funds
Counterpart travel is budgeted at approximately $375/counterpart/month. Each counterpart has approximately 15 field staff which allows $25/staff/month for local travel, including per diem.

IV. CONSULTANCIES - 100% DA Funds

A. CRS - See Budget 2 - anticipates engaging three technical specialist over the life of the project to assist in program design and training, for approximately 6 weeks each, in the areas of agriculture, health nutrition and logistics: Total monthly cost per consultant is:

Variable Costs for one month		
Fee:	$250/day x 30 days =	$ 7,500
Per Diem:	$ 30/day x 30 days =	900
Hotel:	$ 50/day x 30 days =	1,500
TOTAL		$9,900 per consultant
Fixed Costs:		
Travel:		
Int'l Travel:	Wash.DC.-> Jakarta	$1,600
Local Travel:		$ 500
		$2,100 per consultant

Total 6 week cost per consultant = $16,950 x 3 consultants = $50,850

V. Office Administration

A. CRS/Kupang office - See Budget B -- Expenses will be shared 50% ITSH, 50% DA

a. Office rent for Kupang is budgeted between $1,500-$1,800 per month. CRS will also assign a reasonable portion of the $2000/month total to defray costs of housing Emergency Program Staff in the existing CRS/Jakarta office.
b. Office Furniture/Equipment - this is a one-time expense to furnish the CRS office in Kupang with items such as desks, chairs, tables, file cabinets, telephones, etc.
c. Office supplies/maintenance - based on actual expenses of the CRS/Jakarta office.
d. Communications - includes phone, fax, e-mail, expenses. CRS will also assign a reasonable portion to defray expenses incurred by the CRS/Jakarta office in management and supervision of the Emergency Program.
e. Vehicle Fuel/Maintenance - budgeted at $250/month per vehicle.

f. Vehicle Rental - CRS is aware that for a one-year emergency program it is preferable to rent vehicles. Currently rental costs are $200-$250/month with longer-term discounted agreements not an option. CRS remains concerned, however, about the actual availabiliy of rental cars and how costs may increase under the current economic crisis.

g. Representation - to be paid by CRS.

h. Miscellaneous - includes bank fees, subscriptions and other sundry operating items.

B. Counterparts - See budget C. Expenses will be shared 50% ITSH, 50% DA.

a. Office Equipment/Furniture -- for office furniture, telephones and typewriters needed to accommodate extra staff.

b. Office Administration/Supplies - includes a portion of the counterpart rent and utilities, plus supplies, bank fees and other miscellaneous items.

c. Vehicle Rental -- budgeted at $50/month per motorcylce. Four motorcycles per counterpart.

VI. TRAINING/TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - 100% paid by CRS

A. CRS - See Budget B.

a. Needs Assessment -- CRS will conduct, and pay for, a 4-6 week detailed rapid rural appraisal to refine its targeting and interventions. This will involve 4-5 individuals, including expatriate staff, visiting all targeting geographic targeted areas to meet with counterparts and local communities, map the priority needs of the area, determine what project activities are most appropriate for that area, and decide how the food resources will be allocated.

b. Training Material - CRS will develop training materials for all trainings to be provided for its counterparts. This includes up-dating and reproduction of existing materials as well as any new materials.

c. Training - CRS plans to conduct 5 trainings for counterparts over the life of the project. 2 Commodity Management, 2 Finance and Reporting, 1 Monitoring and Evaluation. These trainings will be conducted in a central location -- Bali or Kupang -- and previous CRS experience indicates will cost between $12,000-$15,000 per training, depending on number of attendees.

B. Counterpart - See Budget C. All expenses paid by CRS.
Counterparts will conduct training with local Food For Work project holders and with local Posyandu health staff to increase the level of community participation in the projects.

VII. COMMODITY ITSH

A. CRS - Because commodities will likely be shipped from the States before RS has made final determination of their destination by counterpart, CRS expects that it will need to receive and store up to 1000 MT of commodities in Surabaya. These commodities will then be transshipped at a later date to their final

destination, and costs therefore need to be included in the CRS budget. Based on estimates received from freight forwarders, commodity ITSH expenses are budgeted at:

NOTE: 1MT = 1.3 m3 Ton

		/m3 Ton	/MT	USD/MT
Customs Clearance	USD	10	13	13.00
Loading/Unloading	Rph	10,000	13,000	2.60
Storage	Rph	7,500	9,750	1.95
Transport (Surabaya->NTB)	Rph	80,000	104,000	20.80
TOTAL / MT				$ 38.35
Total 1000 MT				$38,350

B. Counterparts - See budget C. Prototype counterpart receives 1/8th of 13,450MT or approx $1,700 MT x $32/MT = $54,500 counterpart. Total for 8 counterparts = $435,200.

VIII. PROGRAM SUPPORT

A. Counterparts

a. Health Material - 100% CRS - CRS will cover the costs of the design, production and distribution of all health education material produced to complement the supplemental feeding program. Budgeted expense = $20,000.

b. FFW Project Material Support - 100% DA Funds. The cost of materials to support FFW activities is estimated based on the value of the project, which is measured in units, or mandays (one unit = approx. 8000 mandays). Past experience shows that each unit requires approximately $370 worth of material inputs. Past experience also indicates that 12000MT of commodities (the total allocated for FFW) will support approximately 656 units. Therefore 656 units x $370/unit = $242,720, which as been rounded up to $245,000.

IX. CAPITAL EQUIPMENT - 50% DA, 50% ITSH

A. CRS - see Budget B

a. Office Equip

- Computers - CRS will purchase 5 desk top printers for the Kupang office and one for the Jakarta office. Est. cost = $1,500/computer.
- Printers - CRS will purchase 2 dot matrix and one laser printer for the Kupang office. Est. cost = $300 for the dot matrix/ $600 for the laser.
- Fax Machine, Photocopier, Telephone PBS -- see budget.

B. Counterpart - 50% DA, 50% ITSH

b. Each counterpart will receive two computers and printers. Est. Cost = $1,500/computer; $300/dot matrix printer.

c. Each counterpart will receive one fax machine and/or e-mail capability. Est. Cost = $500.

X. **AUDIT/EVALUATION - 100% DA Funds**

A Audit - No separate resources are requested for audit of this program. The CRS/Indonesia Title II Emergency Program, as are all CRS Title II, Monetization and U.S. Government Grant activities, will be audited in accordance with CRS' agency-wide A-133 Audit Plan. Audits arranged under the A-133 plan will address audit recommendations from the previous country audits and report progress."

B. Evaluation - CRS will design and implement a post-program evaluation conducted by a team from CRS, USAID, Counterparts and other relevant participants.

BUDGET A
Consolidated Budget

	CONSOLIDATED BUDGET LINE ITEM		TOTAL	SOURCE DA	ITSH	CRS
I.	SALARY					
A	CRS Expatriate Staff		98,000	34,000	92,600	21,000
B	CRS National Staff		76,200	43,800	32,400	-
C	Counterpart National Staff		183,360	73,344	110,016	-
	TOTAL SALARY		357,560	151,144	235,016	21,000
II	FRINGE BENEFITS					
A	Expat	Insurance	35,000	7,000	21,000	7,000
		Housing	30,600	6,000	15,600	9,000
B	National - CRS	Insurance	25,400	14,600	10,800	-
	National- CRS	Severance	6,350	3,650	2,700	-
C	Nat'l- Counterpart	Insurance	61,120	24,448	36,672	-
	Nat'l- Counterpart	Severance	15,280	6,112	9,168	-
	TOTAL FRINGE BENEFITS		173,750	61,810	95,940	16,000
III.	TRAVEL - In-Country					
A	CRS		65,005	28,088	36,968	-
B.	Counterpart		34,720	17,360	17,360	-
	TOTAL TRAVEL		99,725	45,448	54,328	-
IV.	CONSULTANCIES					
A	CRS		50,850	50,850		-
V.	OFFICE ADMINISTRATION					
A	CRS			~~27,700~~ 22,700 (X)		
B	Counterparts		76,600	~~27,700~~	37,700	1,200
			97,915	48,958	48,958	-
	TOTAL ADMINISTRATION		174,515	~~86,658~~ 71,658	86,658	1,200
VI.	TRAINING/TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE					
A	CRS		103,000	15,000 (X)		~~103,000~~ 88,000 (X)
B	Counterparts		20,000			20,000
	TOTAL TRAINING		123,000			123,000
VII	COMMODITY ITSH					
A	CRS		38,350		38,350	-
B	Counterparts		435,200		435,200	-
	TOTAL ITSH		473,550		473,550	-
VIII	PROGRAM SUPPORT					
A	Counterparts	Health	16,000			16,000
		FFW	245,000	245,000		-
			261,000	245,000	-	16,000
IX.	CAPITAL EQUIPMENT					
A	CRS	Vehicles	-	-	-	15,000 (X)
		Office Equip	12,540	6,070	6,070	-
B.	Counterparts	Motorcycles	-	-	-	-
		Office Equip	34,400	17,200	17,200	-
			46,940	23,270	23,270	-
X.	EVALUATION		20,000		20,000	-
	TOTAL CASH BUDGET		1,780,890	664,180	988,762	177,200
	(X), NICRA (on DA less capital equip)			143,884		
	TOTAL DA Request			808,064		
	TOTAL ITSH Request				988,762	
	TOTAL CRS Contribution					177,200

TOTAL USAID CASH		1,796,825
TOTAL USAID COMMODITIES		6,681,400
TOTAL USAID REQUEST		8,478,225
TOTAL CRS CONTRIBUTION	$	177,200

NICRA CALCULATION	
Subtotal DA Request	664,180
Less Capital Equipment	(23,270)
NICRA Eligible	640,910
TOTAL NICRA 22.45%	143,884

BUDGET B
CRS Operating Expenses

CRS/KUPANG OFFICE BUDGET
One Year

		#units/ mos.	# mos.	$/Unit/ Month	TOTAL	SOURCE DA	ITSH	CRS
I & II SALARY & BENEFITS								
A CRS	Program Spvr -Jkt	0.5	12	6,167	37,000			37,000
Expat	Program Manager	1	12	5,667	68,000	34,000	34,000	
	Logistics Manager	1	12	4,883	58,600		58,600	
	Total Expatriate				**163,600**	**34,000**	**92,600**	37,000
B. CRS	Prog Desk Officer-Jkt.	0 5	12	708	4,250	4,250		
National	Ag. Specialist	1	12	708	8,500	8,500		
	Health/Nutrition Spec	1	12	708	8,500	8,500		
	FFW Engineer	1	12	567	6,800	3,400	3,400	
	Proj Officers	3	12	708	25,500	25,500		
	Logistic Off - Kup.	1	12	425	5,100		5,100	
	Logistic Off - Jkt.	1	12	425	5,100		5,100	
	Field Monitors	4	12	283	13,600		13,600	
	Internal Auditor	1	12	567	6,800		6,800	
	Finance Officer	1	12	425	5,100	2,550	2,550	
	Finance Ass't-Jkt	1	12	283	3,400	1,700	1,700	
	Office Manager	1	12	425	5,100	2,550	2,550	
	Admin Assistant	1	12	283	3,400	1,700	1,700	
	Driver	1	12	142	1,700	850	850	
	Guard/Driver/Cleaning	3	12	142	5,100	2,550	2,550	
	Total National				**107,950**	**62,050**	**45,900**	0
	TOTAL CRS STAFF				**271,550**	**96,050**	**138,500**	37,000
II. TRAVEL								
A. Food Monitoring/Audit Visits								
Airfare		8	12	100	9,600		9,600	
Hotel		48	12	35	20,160		20,160	
Per Diem		48	12	10	5,760		5,760	
sub-total					35,520		35,520	
B. Project Monitoring/Community Organizing								
Airfare		6	12	100	7,200	7,200		
Hotel		36	12	35	15,120	15,120		
Per Diem		36	12	10	4,320	4,320		
sub-total					26,640	26,640		
C. Project Mgr/Supervisor Travel								
Airfare (Kupang-Jakarta)		1	3	200	600	300	300	
Hotel		3	9	75	2,025	1,013	1,013	
Per Diem		3	9	10	270	135	135	
sub-total					2,895	1,448	1,448	
TOTAL TRAVEL					**65,055**	**28,088**	**36,968**	
III. CONSULTANCIES								
A. Technical Specialists-expat		3	1.5	9,900	44,550	44,550		
B. Travel		3	1	2,100	6,300	6,300		
TOTAL CONSULTANCIES					**50,850**	**50,850**		
IV. OFFICE ADMINISTRATION								
A. Office Rent/Utilities		1	12	2,000	24,000	12,000	12,000	
B. Office Furniture/Equipment		1	1	1	10,000	5,000	5,000	
C. Office Supplies/Maintenance		1	12	600	7,200	3,600	3,600	
D. Communications		1	12	1,000	12,000	6,000	6,000	
E. Vehicle Fuel/Maintenance		4	12	250	12,000	6,000	6,000	
F. Vehicle Rental		4	12	200	9,600	4,800	4,800	
F. Representation		1	12	100	1,200			1,200
G. Miscellaneous		1	12	50	600	300	300	
TOTAL OFFICE ADMINISTRATION					**76,600**	**37,700**	**37,700**	1,200

continued

BUDGET B
CRS Operating Expenses

CRS OFFICE BUDGET
One Year

	#units/ mos.	# mos.	$/Unit/ Month	TOTAL	SOURCE DA	SOURCE ITSH	SOURCE CRS
V. TRAINING/TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE							
Needs Assessment				20,000			20,000
Training Materials	1	1	20,000	20,000			20,000
Trainings							
Commodity Management	1	2	12,000	24,000			24,000
Finance and Reporting	1	2	12,000	24,000			24,000
Monitoring and Evaluation	1	1	15,000	15,000			15,000
TOTAL TRAINING				103,000			103,000
VI. COMMODITY ITSH (For 1000MT of commodities received w/bout thru bill of lading)	1	1	38,350	38,350		38,350	
VII. CAPITAL EQUIPMENT							
Vehicles (see budget notes)	0	0	-	-	-	-	
Computers	6	1	1,500	9,000	4,500	4,500	
Printers	3	1	400	1,200	600	600	
Fax Machine	1	1	500	500	250	250	
Photocopier	1	1	1,200	1,200	600	600	
Telephone PBX	8	1	80	640	320	320	
TOTAL CRS CAP.EQUIP				12,540	6,270	6,270	
VIII COUNTERPART PROGRAM SUPPORT (see Budget C)							
IX AUDIT				-		-	
X EVALUATION				20,000		20,000	
TOTAL CRS OPERATING EXPENSE				637,945	218,958	277,788	141,200

BUDGET B1
CRS Personnel Expenses

Personnel Expenses		# Units /month	# Mos.	Monthly Salary	Monthly Benefits	Monthly Severance	Total Monthly	Total Yearly Expense
A. Expat	Program Spvr.-Jkt	0.5	12	1,750	1,333		3,083	37,000
	Program Manager	1	14	3,500	2,167		5,667	79,333
	Logistics Manager	1	12	2,917	1,967		4,883	58,600
	Total Expatriate			**8,167**	**5,467**		**13,633**	**163,600**
B. National	Prog. Desk Officer-Jkt.	0.5	14	250	83	21	354	4,250
	Ag. Specialist	1	12	500	167	42	708	8,500
	Health/Nutrition Spec.	1	12	500	167	42	708	8,500
	FFW Engineer	1	14	400	133	33	567	6,800
	Proj.Officers	3	12	1,500	500	125	2,125	25,500
	Logistic Off - Kup.	1	14	300	100	25	425	5,100
	Logistic Off - Jkt.	1	12	300	100	25	425	5,100
	Field Monitors	4	14	800	267	67	1,133	13,600
	Internal Auditor	1	14	400	133	33	567	6,800
	Finance Officer	1	12	300	100	25	425	5,100
	Finance Ass't-Jkt	1	12	200	67	17	283	3,400
	Office Manager	1	14	300	100	25	425	5,100
	Admin Assistant	1	14	200	67	17	283	3,400
	Driver	1	12	100	33	8	142	1,700
	Guard/Driver/Cleaning	3	14	300	100	25	425	5,100
	Total National			**6,350**	**2,117**	**529**	**$ 8,996**	**$ 107,950**
TOTAL CRS OFFICE STAFF				**14,517**	**7,583**	**529**	**22,629**	**$ 271,550**

BUDGET C
Counterpart Operating Expenses

Prototype Counterpart Budget - One year

	LINE ITEMS	BUDGET RUPIAH	BUDGET USD	TOTAL 8 Counterparts	SOURCE DA	SOURCE ITSH	SOURCE CRS
I.	PERSONNEL						
A.	Salaries	114,600,000	22,920	183,360	73,344	110,016	
II.	FRINGES						
A.	Insurance	38,200,000	7,640	61,120	24,448	36,672	
B.	Severance	9,550,000	1,910	15,280	6,112	9,168	
	TOTAL FRINGES	162,350,000	9,550	76,400	30,560	45,840	
III.	TRAVEL/PER DIEM	21,700,000	4,340	34,720	17,360	17,360	
IV.	CONSULTANCIES (see CRS Budget)		-	-	-	-	
V.	ADMINISTRATION						
A.	Office Equipment	5,000,000	1,000	8,000	4,000	4,000	
B.	Office Admin/Supplies	12,196,800	2,439	19,515	9,757	9,757	
C.	Communications	25,000,000	5,000	40,000	20,000	20,000	
D.	Motorcylce Fuel/Maint.	7,000,000	1,400	11,200	5,600	5,600	
E.	Motorcycle Rental	12,000,000	2,400	19,200	9,600	9,600	
	TOTAL ADMINISTRATION	61,196,800	12,239	97,915	48,957	48,957	
VI.	TRAINING						
A.	FFW Project Holder Training	5,000,000	1,000	8,000			8,000
B.	Posyandu Cadre Trainig	5,000,000	1,000	8,000			8,000
C.	Computer Training	2,500,000	500	4,000			4,000
	TOTAL TRAINING	12,500,000	2,500	20,000	-	-	20,000
VII.	COMMODITY ITSH	272,000,000	54,400			435,200	
VIII.	PROGRAM SUPPORT						
A.	Educational Material Supplies	10,000,000	2,000	16,000			16,000
B.	Project Material Support	151,806,635	30,361	245,000	245,000		
	TOTAL PROG. SUPPORT	161,806,635	32,361	261,000	245,000	-	16,000
IX.	CAPITAL EQUIP	-	-				
A.	Computer/printer (2)	19,000,000	3,800	30,400	15,200	15,200	
B.	Fax Machine	2,500,000	500	4,000	2,000	2,000	
C.	Motorcycles (4)	-	-	-	-	-	
	TOTAL CAP. EQUIP.	21,500,000	4,300	34,400	17,200	17,200	-
X.	EVALUATION (see CRS budget)						
	TOTAL COUNTERPART OPERATING EXPENSE			707,795	432,421	674,573	36,000

BUDGET C1
Counterpart Personnel Expenses

Counterpart Office Personnel - breakout of expenses

National Staff	Units/ Month	# Mos.	Cost/Mos/ Unit	Monthly Salary	Monthly Benefits	Monthly Severance	Yearly Salary	Yearly Benefits	Yearly Severance	TOTAL	SOURCE DA	SOURCE ITSH
Program Coordinator	8	12	120	960	320	80	11,520	3,840	960	16,320	8,160	8,160
Food for Work Supervis	8	12	110	880	293	73	10,560	3,520	880	14,960	7,480	7,480
FFW Field Workers	48	12	90	4,320	1,440	360	51,840	17,280	4,320	73,440	36,720	36,720
Health Supervisor	8	12	110	880	293	73	10,560	3,520	880	14,960	7,480	7,480
Health Field Workers	40	12	90	3,600	1,200	300	43,200	14,400	3,600	61,200	30,600	30,600
Logistics Supervisor	8	12	110	880	293	73	10,560	3,520	880	14,960		14,960
Logistics Field Workers	24	12	90	2,160	720	180	25,920	8,640	2,160	36,720		36,720
Finance Supervisor	8	12	110	880	293	73	10,560	3,520	880	14,960	7,480	7,480
Admin/Finance Officer	8	12	90	720	240	60	8,640	2,880	720	12,240	6,120	6,120
TOTAL COUNTERPART OFFICE STAFF				$ 15,280	$ 5,093	$ 1,273	$ 183,360	$ 61,120	$ 15,280	$ 259,760	104,040	155,720
											40%	60%

Staff Per Counterpart
Program Coordinator - 1
Food For Work Supervisor - 1
FFW Field Workers - 6
Health Supervisor -1
Health Field Workers - 5
Logistics Supervisor - 1
Losgistics Field Workers - 6
Finance Supervisor - 1
Admin/Finance Officer - 1

#4

USAID Title II Emergency Food Support Activities in Indonesia (as of 08/05/98)

1. **CARE/Indonesia** (approved):

Commodity	: 18,200 MTS. RICE
Total Program Value	: Approximately $11,357,199 or
	Rice.....$ 6,588,400
	O.Freight.....$ 2,275,000
	ITSH .....$ 2,031,500
	DA Funds.....$ 462,299
	Total:.....$11,357,199
Project Location	: Provinces of East Timor and East Nusa Tenggara (Flores)
Beneficiaries	: East Timor - 50,000 persons Flores -75,000 persons
Type of Program	: Food For Work
Contact	: (b) (6)

2. **CRS/Indonesia** (approved):

Commodity	: 12,500 MTS. RICE & 1,040 MTS WSB
Total Program Value	: Approximately $8,461,164 or
	Rice .....$ 4,525,000
	WSB .....$ 447,200
	O.Freight .....$ 1,692,500
	ITSH .....$ 988,400
	DA Funds.....$ 808,064
	Total:..... $ 8,461,164
Project Location	: - Province of East Nusa Tenggara (West Timor, East Sumba, Flores <Ende, Ngada, Maumere>) - Province of West Nusa Tenggara (Lombok and Sumbawa) - Province of Lampung, South Sumatra
Beneficiaries	: 125,000 persons
Type of Program	: Food For Work & Supplemental Feeding for pregnant/lactating mothers and children under five
Contact	: (b) (6)

3. CRS/Indonesia - Interfaith Program (approved):

Commodity : 6,000 MTS. RICE + 2,100 MT
Total Program Value : Approximately $3,405,000 or

Rice	$ 2,310,000
O. Freight	$ 900,000
ITSH	$ 150,000
DA Funds	$ 300,000
Total:	$ 3,660,000

Project Location : 21 Districts in Central Java and Special Region of Yogyakarta
Beneficiaries : 360,000 persons
Type of Program : General Distribution
Contact : (b)(6)

4. CWS/Indonesia (approved):

Commodity : 3,582 MTS. RICE
Total Program Value : Approximately $2,649,499 or

Rice	$ 1,296,700
O.Freight	$ 573,100
ITSH	$ 553,400
DA Funds	$ 226,299
Total:	$ 2,649,499

Project Location : - Province of South Sulawesi
- Province of Central Sulawesi
- Province of Southeast Sulawesi
Beneficiaries : 37,500 persons
Type of Program : Food For Work
Contact: : (b) (6)

5. ADRA/Indonesia (approved): ADVENTIST DEV. & RELIEF AGENCY
Commodity : 3,200 MTS Rice & 314 MTS CSB
Total Program Value : Approximately $ 2,328,189 or

Rice	$ 1,158,400
CSB	$ 101,700
O.Freight	$ 563,200
ITSH	$ 183,600
DA Funds	$ 321,289
Total :	$ 2,328,189

Project Location : East Kalimantan
Beneficiaries : 27,620 persons Makanan Tambahan bagi.
Type of Program : Food For Work & Supplemental Feeding
Contact (b) (6)

6. **World Food Program (WFP)** (approved):

Commodities : 10,000 MTS WSB
30,000 MTS RICE
Total Program Value : Approximately $23,614,700 or

WSB	$ 3,890,000
RICE	$ 11,550,000
O.Freight	$ 6,400,000
ITSH	$ 600,000
FFP Direct/Indirect Support Costs	$ 1,174,700
Total	$ 23,614,700

Project Location : 12 provinces
Beneficiaries : 180,000 persons for Supplementary Feeding
127,500 persons for Food For Work
Type of Program : Food For Work and Supplemental Feeding
Contact: (b) (6)

7. **Other Emergency Relief for drought areas:**

East Timor, Atauro Island, $25,000 to CARE for locally purchased food supplement
East Kalimantan, Kutai District, $22,500 to CARE/PLASMA for local purchase of seeds/distribution
Irian Jaya , $250,000 to World Vision for seed distribution
Irian Jaya, $100,000 to MAF for food transport
Irian Jaya, $150,000 to ICRC for medical relief
Irian Jaya, $25,000 to UNDHA for medical relief

8. **Others Active in Donor Coordination :**

(b) (6)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The World Bank

East Asia and Pacific Region

News Release No. 98/EAP

Contacts: *In Jakarta* Ben Fisher (62-21) 5299-3000
In Washington Graham Barrett (202) 458-0344
Kimberly Versak (202) 458-1575
fax (202) 522-3405
Internet: gbarrett@worldbank.org

DONORS AGREE TO BOLSTER HELP FOR INDONESIA'S URGENT SOCIAL NEEDS

Washington, April 1, 1998—International donors today agreed to work closely together in their efforts to help Indonesia overcome the urgent social consequences of the financial crisis and recover from its worst drought this century.

"We are pleased that the international community is responding so well to these important social needs at a time of crisis," **Jean-Michel Severino, Vice President of the World Bank's East Asia and Pacific Region**, said today as the meeting concluded. *"Indonesia's Government and people have mobilized their resources in the face of crisis. This gathering demonstrates our commitment to helping Indonesia protect its most vulnerable, and is an important step towards future donor coordination efforts."*

Senior representatives of Indonesia, the United States, Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Canada, as well as the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank, the European Commission, the United Nations agencies and other institutions, assessed Indonesia's needs at an all-day working-level session chaired by Mr. Severino.

They reviewed contributions, priorities and policy initiatives on poverty alleviation and drought relief and discussed ways of enhancing support for Indonesia. It was acknowledged that many activities were underway with many more to come, necessitating greater consultation and coordination. One important outcome of the meeting was a decision to develop a full coordination mechanism in Jakarta.

They acknowledged that Indonesia was experiencing critical short-term problems that call for an international response to ensure that the rural and urban poor secure adequate food, medicine and other basic social services until economic reforms take effect and the drought ends.

INDONESIA - FOOD SECURITY, FOOD MARKETS AND FISCAL COST OF FOOD SUBSIDIES

This note summarizes the food situation in Indonesia. Section I presents the evolution of food production and the expected outcome for 1998. Section II presents a balance of supply and demand of the commodities traded by BULOG, and the contribution of BULOG to meet the needs of Indonesia in these commodities. Section III presents the distribution of consumption of selected food products by income groups. Section IV discusses the implications on consumers real income of adjusting to international prices the price of the commodities traded by BULOG. V presents the fiscal implications of subsidizing the prices of certain foodstuffs.

I. Food Production

El Niño, the weather phenomenon behind this year's drought, caused a reduction in agricultural production (rice, corn, soybean, peanut, greenbean, cassava and sweet potato) of 4 percent in 1997. During 1998 El Nifio is expected to reduce agricultural production, food in particular, by another 3-5 percent. The total decline in food production over 1997 and 1998 represents a decline of about 10 percent relative to its trend value. Table 1, attached, presents the information on the actual production, area harvested and yield for the years 1995 and 1996, the estimated production for 1997 and the forecast for 1998. The government forecasts for 1998 a decline of 2 percent, but this seems to be an optimistic assessment of the prospects for food production. James Fox's report predicts a decline in rice production of about 4.0-4.4 percent for the first season of 1998.

Table 1 - Production of Paddy and Other Foodcrops: 1995-1998 (1000 tons)

	1995 Actual	1996 Actual	1997 Ramalan III Estimation	1998 Expected by Government	Percentage Change 1997/96	1998/97
Total	**78,368**	**81,985**	**78,805**	**77,169**	**-3.9**	**-2.1**
Paddy	**49,744**	**51,102**	**49,064**	**48,046**	**-4.0**	**-2.1**
Wetland	46,806	48,188	46,337	45,476	-3.8	
Dryland	2,939	2,913	2,728	2,570	-6.4	
Other Food Crops	**28,624**	**30,884**	**29,740**	**29,123**	**-3.7**	**-2.1**

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, monthly reports, and James Fox, El Nino Report: Indonesia, prepared for The World Bank

II. Supply and Demand

This section discusses the situation of supply and demand for rice, soybean, sugar and wheat flour.

Rice. Table 2 presents the situation for rice. Information on consumption comes from the household expenditure surveys (SUSENAS) done by the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). The supply is constrained to meet the demand estimated by BPS (There are serious discrepancies between the consumption and production data which I do not address in this note.) Table 2 shows that total rice consumption equaled about 22 million tons in 1997, out of which the rural sector consumes 15 million tons, and the urban sector consumes the rest, 7 million tons. The total supply is met by the private sector (18 million tons) and by BULOG (4 million tons). As production declined in 1997, the marketed surplus from farmers fell from 5.4 million tons in 1996 to 4.7 million tons in 1997. In 1998 the same is expected to happen. As production declines, farmers will offer for sale a smaller amount of their lower production, as they try to keep their consumption of rice stable.

Table 2 - Rice Market and Bulog's Market Operations (in million tons)

	FY 1996/97	FY 1997/98	FY 1998/99
Market of White Rice			
1. Consumption (from Susenas)	**21.75**	**22.27**	**22.66**
a. Rural Household	14.56	14.91	15.17
b. Urban Household	7.19	7.37	7.49
2. Supply	**21.75**	**22.27**	**22.66**
a. From BULOG	2.13	4.08	4.43
b. From Private Sector	19.63	18.19	18.24
c. (Marketed Surplus) (2b.-1a.+purchases BULOG)	5.40	4.69	4.07
Availability from BULOG	**2.13**	**4.08**	**4.43**
1. Stocks at End of Year	2.40	1.85	1.72
2. Purchases	2.16	3.54	4.30
Imports	1.83	2.14	3.30
Domestic	0.33	1.40	1.00
3. Stocks at Beginning of Year	2.37	2.40	1.85
Domestic Sales	**2.13**	**4.08**	**4.43**
1. Budget Group	1.69	1.69	1.80
2. Market Operations	0.35	2.26	2.50
3. PN/PNP	0.08	0.08	0.10
4. Others	0.01	0.04	0.03

Source: SUSENAS 1996 and Bulog, direct information

BULOG meets the shortfall in food production by importing. The data in Table 2 show clearly that BULOG imports rice to meet the demand of urban consumers, as the marketed surplus left by domestic producers is clearly insufficient to meet that demand. BULOG also purchases rice from domestic producers, and the purchases vary by year. BULOG has two main customers: the government employees (Budget group) to which it sells about 1.7 million tons of rice, and the traders and its own stores through which it sold in 1997 about 2.3 million tons.

Soybean. Table 3 presents the situation in the soybean market. As in rice, the table presents data on consumption from SUSENAS. According to SUSENAS total direct consumption of soybeans and in the form of tempe and tahu equals about 1.1 million tons of soybean; soybean is also consumed as soybean sauce, but the table does not count for that consumption..

According to SUSENAS, rural houscholds consume about 60 percent of total consumption. The consumption from SUSENAS is lower than the consumption estimate obtained from adding production, net imports and change in stocks, which equals about 2.1 million tons. On a 2.2 million ton basis of total consumption, rural households consume about 1.2 million tons of soybean, while urban households consume about 0.8 million tons. Farmers, thus, keep 80 percent of their production for direct consumption and sell in urban markets the difference, about 0.3 million tons. BULOG, practically, meets with imports the needs of urban consumers.

Table 3 - Soybean Market and Rolc of BULOG (million tons)

	FY 1996/97	FY 1997/98	FY 1998/99
1. Consumption	**1.05**	**1.08**	**1.10**
a. Household Consumption (from SUSENAS)	1.05	1.08	1.10
i. Rural Household	0.61	0.62	0.63
ii. Urban Household	0.45	0.46	0.47
b. Feed Consumption (Conversion factor=1.8)	0.00	0.00	0.00
2. Supply	**2.16**	**2.24**	**2.20**
a. From BULOG	0.66	0.74	0.70
b. From Private Producers	1.50	1.50	1.50
c. Marketed Surplus (2b.-1a.)	0.89	0.88	0.87
d. of which Domestic Production reported by BPS	1.50	1.50	1.50
3. Disappearances	0.13	0.13	0.13
4. Production-Implicit Volume	1.63	1.63	1.63

Sugar. Table 4 presents the situation in the sugar market. From information on

production (beverages, cookies and other food items.) Rural households consume about 0.36 million tons (60 percent of household consumption) and urban households consume about 0.24 million tons.

BULOG is the only distributor of sugar in Indonesia. BULOG buys all domestic production and imports all the sugar that enters the country. Domestic production supplies about 2/3 of total supply (about 2 million tons) and the rest is supplied by imports. BULOG sells the sugar throughout wholesale traders, and has very few retail operations.

Table 4 - Sugar Market and Role of BULOG (million tons)

	FY 1996/97	FY 1997/98
Market of Sugar		
1. Consumption	3.07	3.30
a. Household Consumption (from SUSENAS)	0.55	0.57
i. Rural Household	0.34	0.35
ii. Urban Household	0.21	0.22
b. Industrial Consumption (Total Sales-1.a.)	2.51	2.73
2. Supply	3.07	3.30
3. Total Production	2.03	2.04
Availability From BULOG	3.07	3.30
1. Stocks at Beginning of Year	0.46	0.53
2. Purchases	3.13	3.03
Imports Total	1.20	1.10
Domestic	1.93	1.93
3. Stocks at End of Year	0.53	0.26
Sales	3.07	3.30
To Traders	2.05	2.21
To Cooperatives	1.01	1.09

Wheat Flour. BULOG holds the nominal monopoly for importing wheat. BOGASARI, the wheat milling company owned by the Salim group, holds the de-facto monopoly for such import. BOGASARI handles the importing for the two other wheat millers in Indonesia, PT Citra, owned by one daughter of the President, and PT Sri Boga, owned by B. Arifin, former head of BULOG. BOGASARI has 90 percent of the installed wheat milling capacity in the country. Indonesia imports the wheat it consumes.

Indonesia imports about 4 million tons of wheat, equivalent to 2.96 million tons of wheat flour. According to SUSENAS surveys, households consume about 0.55 million tons of

actually take place, then the data on household consumption of wheat flour from SUSENAS indicate that the industrial sector consumes about 2.4 million tons for producing bread, pastas and cookies.

Table 5 - Wheat Flour Market and the Role of BULOG (in million tons)

	FY 1996/97	FY 1997/98	FY 1998/99
Market of Wheat Flour			
1. Consumption	**2.74**	**2.91**	**3.34**
a. Household Consumption (from SUSENAS)	0.52	0.54	0.55
i. Rural Household	0.26	0.27	0.27
ii. Urban Household	0.26	0.27	0.28
b. Industrial Consumption	2.22	2.37	2.79
2. Supply	**2.74**	**2.91**	**3.34**
Wheat Flour Availability			
1. Stocks at Beginning of Year	2.74	2.91	3.34
2. Production	0.09	0.19	0.19
3. Imports	2.73	2.72	3.15
4. Stocks at End of Year	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.08		
Sales	**2.74**	**2.96**	**3.15**

Source: Derived from SUSENAS 1996 and BULOG, direct information

III. Distribution of Consumption

This section shows the relative importance of consumption of rice, wheat flour, soybean, sugar and cooking oil by expenditure class in the rural and urban sectors. The following discussion uses information from SUSENAS. [1]

Table 6 shows data on total consumption of rice, soybeans, wheat flour, sugar, poultry and cooking oil for each income class in the rural and urban sectors. According to these data Indonesians consume about 22 million tons of rice, 1 million tons of soybeans, 1.5 million tons of cooking oil, 0.5 million tons of wheat flour, 0.7 million tons of poultry and 0.6 million tons of sugar. Tables 7 and 8, show the distribution of consumption in the urban and rural sectors.

Table 6 - Annual Consumption of Selected Food Products in Indonesia: 1996

Expenditure Group	Total Population (million)	Rice	Wheat Flour	Poultry	Soybean	Sugar	Cooking Oil
		(in million tons)					
I	0	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
II	2	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
III	21	2.02	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.04	0.10
IV	35	3.90	0.04	0.04	0.16	0.08	0.22
V	58	6.78	0.11	0.14	0.31	0.16	0.44
VI	31	3.63	0.10	0.13	0.19	0.10	0.28
VII	17	1.92	0.07	0.10	0.11	0.06	0.17
VIII	18	2.00	0.10	0.15	0.13	0.07	0.21
IX-XI *	13	1.32	0.09	0.13	0.09	0.05	0.16
	196	21.75	0.52	0.68	1.05	0.55	1.58

Source: SUSENAS 1996

Low-income groups (those in expenditure class I-IV) consume rice, soybean, sugar and cooking oil in a proportion similar to their share in population, but consume a small proportion of the poultry and wheat flour consumed in Indonesia. Low income groups represent 11 percent of the urban population (about 6 million people) and 41 percent of the rural population (about 30 million people). Low-income groups consume 11 percent of the rice and 7 percent of cooking oil consumed in urban areas, and 36 percent of the rice and 30 percent of the cooking oil consumed in rural areas. By contrast, middle- and high-income groups consume almost 100 percent of the poultry and wheat flour consumed in urban areas and about 80 and 90 percent of the amount consumed in rural areas.

Table 7 Urban Sector: Cumulative Distribution of Population and Consumption of Selected Food Products: 1996
(percentage)

Expenditure Group	Population	Rice	Wheat Flour	Poultry	Soybean	Sugar	Cooking Oil
I	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
II	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0
III	3.0	3	1	0	2	1	1
IV	11.4	11	3	2	9	7	7
V	34.3	35	15	13	31	26	25
VI	53.4	54	32	29	49	44	43
VII	67.0	68	47	43	63	59	57
VIII	85.2	85	73	71	83	80	80
IX-XI *	100.0	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 8 - Rural Sector: Cumulative Distribution of Population and Consumption of Selected Food Products: 1996
(percentage)

Expenditure Group	Population	Rice	Wheat Flour	Poultry	Soybean	Sugar	Cooking Oil
I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
II	2	1	0	0	1	1	1
III	17	14	5	3	10	10	11
IV	41	36	17	12	30	30	30
V	74	71	48	42	65	64	65
VI	88	87	69	65	82	82	82
VII	94	93	82	78	91	90	90
VIII	98	98	94	92	97	97	97
IX-XI *	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: SUSENAS 1996
Total population 125 million

Low-income groups devote a large proportion of their expenditures to buy rice (about 10 percent) and a smaller share (between 2 and 3 percent each) to buying sugar, soybean and cooking oil (See Table 9 below). They spend little in buying poultry and wheat flour. Large changes in the prices of rice, soybeans, sugar and cooking oil would thus reduce the income of low-income groups sharply, while similar changes in the prices of poultry and wheat flour would affect their real incomes little.

IV. International Prices and Real Income Effects of Price Changes

The shortfall in production, the depreciation of the rupiah and the loose monetary policy of Bank Indonesia have increased substantially the prices of basic foodstuffs consumed by the lower income groups. Between February 1997 and February 1998 the consumer price index increased 32 percent, while the general food price index rose 47 percent; rice prices alone increased 51 percent. The consumer prices of rice, sugar, soybean and cooking oil have increased much less than the rate of depreciation of the rupiah, however. If they had increased by the depreciation of the rupiah, the real income of low income groups would have fallen sharply. Table 9 shows the share of rice and sugar, soybean and cooking oil in total expenditures by income groups. These shares imply that the 50 percent increase in the price of rice has reduced the real income of the lowest income groups by 15 percent. If in addition, the price of soybeans, sugar, and cooking oil had

oil each represent a small share of the total expenditure of low income groups, the large changes in prices resulting from the depreciation of the rupiah can produce losses in real income larger than those associated with the increase in the price of rice.

Table 9 - Share in Total Expenditure
(in percentage)

Income Deciles	Rice Urban	Rice Rural Labor	Soya	Cooking Oil	Sugar	Sugar, Soya and Cooking Oil	Kerosene	Wheat Products	Non-Rice Commodities
1	27.2	30.4	1.9	2.8	3.0	7.7	2.0	0.6	9.7
2	21.8	26.9	2.2	2.7	2.9	7.8	2.0	0.7	10.5
3	19.4	25.1	2.3	2.5	2.8	7.6	2.1	0.8	10.5
4	17.4	22.6	2.2	2.4	2.6	7.2	2.1	0.9	10.2
5	15.2	20.5	2.1	2.3	2.5	6.9	2.1	0.9	9.9
6	13.3	19.7	2.0	2.2	2.3	6.5	2.1	1.1	9.8
7	11.4	17.4	1.9	2.0	2.2	6.1	2.2	1.1	9.4
8	9.8	14.6	1.7	1.9	1.9	5.5	2.2	1.2	9.4
9	7.8	11.8	1.5	1.6	1.7	4.8	1.9	1.2	7.9
10	4.7	8.5	1.0	1.1	1.1	3.2	1.2	1.0	5.4

Source : Poverty mission estimates, February 1998, based on SUSENAS 1996

V. Price Subsidies and Fiscal Cost of Subsidies

The government has tried to prevent large increases in the prices of rice, soybeans, sugar and cooking oil by selling them at subsidized prices through BULOG. The Treasury has paid for the subsidies in FY 1997/98 and it will pay for them in FY 1998/99. Besides subsidizing the price of rice, soybeans, sugar and wheat flour, the government also intends to subsidize the prices of corn, fish meal and soybean meal to protect the producers of poultry. The subsidies are estimated to cost the Treasury about 4.7 trillion rupiahs, equivalent to 0.5 percent of GDP (This is obtained with an exchange rate of Rp 6,000 per dollar and import estimates by BULOG, of which rice would count for 2.85 million tons)

#6

CRS/Indonesia

Central Java Interfaith Emergency Distribution

Program Assessment

August 31 to September 11, 1998

PROGRAM BACKGROUND

CRS Interfaith Emergency Title II Program for Indonesia

I. Problem Statement

Indonesia's economic crisis continues to deepen. President B.J. Habibie, who replaced Socharto on May 21, 1998 has not been able to restore confidence and secure IMF assistance. The Rupiah has fallen to record lows, touching Rp. 17,000 this week. Inflation is now expected to reach between 80% and 100% this year, and the number of poor is expected to increase from 22.5 million to 58 million.

At the same time, Indonesia has experienced a major drought, which has seriously affected the food security of its poorest populations. Failed and delayed harvests have caused food shortages. According to an April FAO assessment mission, 1998 paddy output was forecast to decline by 3.6 percent below 1997 and 6 percent below the 1996 harvest. Rice importation requirements are expected to reach a record 3.5 million tons, assuming a normal secondary crop harvest in August. Indonesia's commercial import capacity to cover the expected deficit is seriously constrained due to the financial crisis. International assistance is required for the supply of 2 million tones of rice in the form of loans, grants, concessional imports and targeted food aid.

The current economic crisis, poor agricultural performance, and the recent rioting in many major cities, have caused a rise in unemployment throughout the country. Unemployment is expected to top 15.4 million by year-end, a figure representing 17% of the country's 90 million workforce. At the same time, the crisis has caused the price of staples to soar. In this last week alone, the basic price of rice from the government procurement agency, BULOG, has risen from Rp. 1,300 to 2,200 per kilo. The loss of employment and high inflation rates is now causing extreme hardship and hunger among the unemployed, landless laborers, and vulnerable groups. This is especially true in many of the densely populated districts of central Java where nearly 80% of the people are landless laborers and the recent harvest has yielded about 60% of the normal production. Outside assistance is required to enable the poorest families in these areas to survive for at least until the next main harvest in April of next year.

II. Program

With the support of USAID CRS has already initiated a 13,500 MT food program in the Provinces most severly affected by drought, the eastern islands of Nusa Tenggara Timor and Nusa Tenggara Barat. This program is being implemented through 7 counterparts with Food For Work and supplemental food for women and children under 3 years of age.

Now, in response to the growing economic and nation-wide food crisis, CRS, in collaboration with interfaith groups, proposes to conduct an emergency food distribution program in rural and urban areas of selected districts of central Java. Over the last two years CRS has promoted interfaith collaboration as part of its strategy of developing new and strengthening existing micro-finance institutions under a USAID\Washington support MIP grant. Also, under a USAID\Jakarta Endowment Grant, CRS has been promoting the establishment of an interfaith foundation or Yayasan. This foundation was legally established on June 5, 1998. One of the

Another distribution system would be through Pos Pelayanan Terpadu (Posyandu or Integrated Health Service Center). All under-five-year children and their mothers come to the Posyandu every month for family planning, weighing babies, hygienic sessions, and other health-related programs. Experience has shown that if there is a ration of rice, the attendance will reach almost 100%. If not, it is only about 50%. Volunteers at the centers will do the distribution activities. In this way, the Emergency Program would enhance the existing community health programs in the areas which are stressed by the lack of resources during these difficult times.

Assessment groups will survey all target areas to determine the number of recipients and to identify the most urgent areas to cover. Areas already being served by other programs, will be selected out to avoid any duplication of efforts. When the distribution takes place, the interfaith committees in cooperation with other local foundations will oversee the implementation of the emergency program carried out by one religious group or posyandu.

This program would require 27,000 MT of rice for a six-month distribution period from September/October to March/April, when the next harvest should be due. The life of the project is 12 months to include the organization of the interfaith committees and all closure activities. CRS will be responsible for the receipt and distribution of all commodities. This will be managed through Yayasan Sosial Bina Sejahtera (YSBS) of Cilacap on the south coast of Java. Cilacap has a deep-water port, where 12,000 DWT ships can berth. YSBS has extensive experience as a CRS Title II counterpart. It has warehouse facilities able to accommodate 7,000 MT of rice and a fleet of 30 trucks, which can reach any of the areas in 24 hours.

Every month 4,500 MT of rice would be provided to 360,000 beneficiaries in the 16 districts at a ration of 12.5 kg per month for a period of six months. The number of recipients will be limited to a maximum of two persons per family.

IV. Budget

A. Proposed Development Assistance Grant required:

1. Personnel (10 staff)	$	45,000
2. Volunteers' transport/food/honoraria		17,000
3. Office supplies, telephone, fax		25,000
4. Training of staff and volunteers		30,000
5. Travel/Field Monitoring		12,000
6. Consultants/Assessment/Evaluation/Audit		30,000
7. NICRA @ 22.45%		35,695
TOTAL DA	**$**	**194,695**

B. Proposed ITSH Grant required:

1. Transport of 27,000 MT @ Rp200/kg	$	675,000
Total ITSH	**$**	**675,000**

C. Proposed Commodity Requirement $ 9,585,000

Calculated at Rp8000 = US$1.00

June 24, 1998

MAP OF INDONESIA



MEMORANDUM

TO : George Ropes
FROM: Michele F. Broemmelsick
RE : Response to Dave Garms Email "CRS Interfaith Proposal for Indonesia"
DATE : July 27, 1998

I. Interfaith Committee

a. There have been three meetings hosted by CRS to develop the Java Interfaith Emergency proposal – June 8th, June 18th, and July 14th. These meetings have included representatives from Muhammadiyah, NU, PGI (Protestant Churches of Indonesia), and the Catholic dioceses of Semarang and Purwokerto. During these meetings, agreement has been reached regarding the set-up of the Steering Committee and the relationship between the interfaith committees and the organizations doing the food distribution. As of the last meeting on July 14th, interfaith committee meetings have been held in two of the four target areas.

One critical decision made during these meetings was the form of the organizational structure for the project. There will be a parallel structure as seen below. The Food Counterparts will sign an agreement with CRS for the distribution of food commodities in the communities of Central Java. Central Java will be divided into four areas and each Food Counterpart will have one area of responsibility. In each area there will also be an Interfaith Committee. This committee will be responsible for assisting in desa selection, monitoring of distribution and communication to the communities regarding selection.



b. For each area, there will be an Interfaith Committee. At the district level, there will be Interfaith Committee Representatives. At this time, we are still assessing the most appropriate structure. It is unlikely that a sub-district representative will be necessary.

c. Please refer to the attached Implementation plan for the Interfaith infrastructure development plans. This process is already on-going and will be continuing through August and September. There should be no problem organizing these committees by the distribution date especially since it has been pushed back to December. At this point, CRS is not interested in a pilot project. Since the need is so great and the capacity of two of the four Food Counterparts is significant, we propose starting with the food arrival in November.

d. Two of the counterparts, YSBS and YSS, were CRS counterparts when CRS was distributing Title II commodities in Indonesia. Both YSBS and YSS are situated in port cities, Cilacap and Semarang. These ports have the capacity each to receive large consignments of commodities. YSBS and YSS are capable to receive, store and transport these commodities, either by their own means or by contracting the services of qualified partners such as PT VTP. PT VTP is capable of providing storage and trucks for the operation at reasonable costs.

In Cilacap, YSBS has warehousing capacity of 7,000 MTs in its office vicinity and PT VTP is able to provide about 7,000 MTs storage capacity at the port. While in Semarang, YSS owns a small warehouse with a capacity of 500 MTs. However, PT VTP is able to provide a warehouse with a capacity of 7,000 MTs at the port and another almost of the same size near the port area.

As for trucking, YSBS owns 40 x 10MT trucks and PT VTP has a large fleet with a capacity of 5 - 24 MTs for the movement of commodities. While in Semarang, YSS does not own any trucks. However, PT VTP has the capacity to provide the number of trucks needed to discharge the vessels and move commodities for distribution.

For YAKKUM and NU, there will be a need for more extensive training and preparation. This is one reason why the logistics capacities of YSBS and YSS were tapped for storage and distribution of the rice. There is a plan to provide all counterparts (including YSBS and YSS since they will have some new staff) on Proposal Writing, Financial Management, and Logistics. Other trainings will be added as necessary.

All Food Counterparts are expected to regularly attend the Interfaith Committee meetings in their area of responsibility. Attendance at the meetings will give regular avenues for communication and coordination.

e. The participation of the Interfaith Committee is ensured by a clear delineation of responsibilities. The Food Counterparts will handle the food distribution but the selection process depends on the involvement of the Interfaith Committees. It is also clearly in the best interest of all Food Counterparts that they work with the

Interfaith Committees so that there can be no claims that they are simply assisting one religious group.

f. Central Java is easily accessible to Jakarta by both train and plane. It is expected that the Emergency Coordinator and the Project Officers as well as other CRS staff will regularly visit. If there is a need for a staff to be based in Central Java, that possibility will also be explored. Most of the activities will be handled by the Food Counterparts and Interfaith Committees with assistance from CRS.

g. The responsibilities of the different organizations are detailed below:

CRS/Jakarta

- will be responsible for the food commodities and will sign agreements with the four Food Counterparts for distribution at the desa level.
- will provide technical assistance in terms of training and monitoring to the Food Counterparts on project management and logistics.
- will oversee logistics, finances and accountabilities on the food commodities.
- will provide technical assistance to the Interfaith Committees as needed during their organizational development and during the planning for future activities.
- staffing: Emergency Coordinator (50%), Project Officers (2), Logistics Officer (1), Finance Officer (1).

Padikasih

- will facilitate the Interfaith Steering Committee meetings.
- will provide regular assistance to the Interfaith Committees to ensure timely organizational development.
- will regularly communicate to the Steering Committee members.
- will organize planning meetings for the Interfaith Committees to determine future activities.
- will access outside resources to assist in the development of the interfaith committees.
- staffing: 1-3 staff assigned as needed

Food Counterparts

- will select villages and beneficiaries in coordination with the Interfaith Committees.
- will have responsibility for the commodities either from the transit warehouse or if no warehouse from the point of distribution.
- will oversee and monitor distribution.
- will communicate regularly with the Interfaith Committees and encourage their involvement.
- submit timely financial and commodity distribution reports to CRS. Commodity Distribution reports also submitted to Logistics Organizations.
- staffing: approximately 8 staff per Food Counterpart

Logistics Organizations

(are already Food Counterparts, additional responsibilities include)

- oversee food commodities from food arrival at port of discharge
- monitor that food commodities are stored and managed properly

- arrange the logistics distribution plan for timely delivery of commodities to their desa list and the desa list of one other Food Counterpart
- make sure that all logistics arrangements are made such as agreements with Forwarding Agent, Surveyors report, etc.
- submit timely financial and commodity reports to CRS.
- staffing: approximately 5 – 8 staff per Logistics Organization (in addition to the Food Counterpart staff)

Interfaith Committees

- will select villages and beneficiaries in coordination with the Food Counterparts.
- will assist in communicating project plans to local desas and other local leaders.
- will monitor distribution on a regular basis.
- will develop a clear plan of action following the Emergency Distribution for other future projects.
- staffing: volunteers paid honorarium and travel expenses.

h. There are clear plans to add additional staff in CRS to handle the additional responsibilities of this project. CRS does have the advantage of being able to rehire former staff who have extensive experience in food programs. In addition, an Emergency Coordinator position will be added to oversee both Emergency Projects on a day-to-day basis. With the proposed addition of project staff, logistics staff and finance staff, there should be no capacity limitations handling this project.

II. Ration

a. The ration of 12.5 kg/month for a minimum of two persons per family would give at least each beneficiary family up to 25 Kg/month. This ration will cover the rice needs of an average family of 4 persons for 20 days per month. As this is a supplementary ration, we feel that it is an appropriate amount since it will be covering just over 66% of their daily rice needs.

b. We believe that rice is an appropriate commodity for an emergency supplemental ration. Rice is the main staple food of Indonesians. The rice distribution is not a therapeutic supplementary ration. ADRA, CRS and WFP use soy-fortified grains for therapeutic supplementary feeding in the cases of malnutrition. In this case, the emergency distribution of rice ration is to avoid beneficiaries dropping into a malnourished state due to food shortage and the economic crisis.

III. Beneficiaries

a. Continuous monitoring and assessment of the situation will enable CRS to target the neediest population. Therefore re-targeting may occur during the project if needier areas/populations are located.

There will be several ways that targeting is prioritized to choose eligible recipients. There is no doubt that this project will be unable to serve all of the needy population. To assist with logistics arrangements, desas will be chosen that have significant numbers of target beneficiaries. This will prevent serving a small number of beneficiaries being served in several spread out desas; thereby limiting the scope of the project. In addition, targeting will be informed by the government's statistics on the neediest members of a specific community. There are several local level government offices that can assist by providing their statistics on the areas and families with greatest need.

b. The Interfaith Committee will keep the local government authorities informed of their activities. However, their participation will be limited to providing the data on individual villages. A representative of the local village authority could be included in the team visiting the families to identify the neediest population in accordance with the proposed criteria. As always, the involvement of local leaders depends on their interest and capacity. As much as possible, involvement will be encouraged from local leaders.

The interfaith committees at the area level and at the district level will have members who are not religious leaders, per se. They may be local leaders who are associated with a religious group and who are known as committed to interfaith work. In this case, they may be business or NGO leaders. We expect that the members of the interfaith committees will be multi-sectoral in representation.

c. There will be no FFW component in this program. The FFW mentioned in the beginning of the proposal refers to the current Emergency Program for Eastern Indonesia. The total number of beneficiaries will fall under the supplementary distribution. There will be no "supplemental feeding" as we currently have in Eastern Indonesia. Supplemental rice rations will be provided for each family's consumption.

The Java Interfaith Emergency Project is proposed solely as an Emergency Distribution. CRS has proposed this approach due to the limited capacity of the four food counterparts and due to the large number of people being served (360,000 beneficiaries).

IV. <u>Implementation</u>

a. It is usually before harvest that communities are the hungriest. This project targets providing the majority of the supplemental rations before the March to April 1999 harvest. While this is an important target, the poorest part of the population in Central Java will still have need after harvest especially since they do not own land.

The possible disincentive to production is negligible when the population numbers are considered. The total population of Central Java is approximately 30 million persons out of a total population in Indonesia of approximately 220

million. The target group of this program is 360,000 beneficiaries, being 1.2% of the total population. Central Java is the most densely populated area of Indonesia.

There are about 10% of the Central Java population who own most of the rice fields. 75% of the population, who are farmers, own 0.25 hectares or less of rice fields each. The rest of the population, about 15%, is either engaged as farm laborers or other businesses, either trade or petty trade as well as those who do not have any work due to the economic crisis or other reasons. Those without land will soon be the poorest due to the economic crisis. In addition, the Government of Indonesia has declared that those living in poverty may increase to 50% of the total population by the end of the year.

b. With the first Call Forward of rice for our Drought Project, the food was Call Forwarded on April 4th and arrived at the Java port by July 5th. With this type of timeframe, it seems reasonable to expect that with an August 4th Call Forward the food might arrive as early as November 1998. If this is not possible, the workplan will be adjusted. Due to the inexperience of two counterparts in food distribution and the necessary organizational development needed, a delay of two months in distribution will only provide valuable time for capacity building. The impact on the target populations will be a further worsening of their condition, but the planned rice distribution will immediately assist them in improving their condition once it arrives.

c. In each of the areas for the project, the Interfaith Committees and the Food Counterparts (NU, YAKKUM, Dioceses of Semarang and Purwokerto) are coordinating with local organizations trying to assist during this crisis. CRS is currently handling most of the coordinating with organizations doing food distribution in Java – the Indonesian Government, World Food Program, Perdaki (milk distribution from the Japanese government) and the World Bank (cash for work). This is mainly because the coordination is being handled at the national level and because most of these programs are not yet started. The work on the national level coordination will insure that there is no duplication of beneficiaries. There may be some similarity in geographical targeting, but, due to the population density in Central Java, duplication of beneficiaries is unlikely. Once the programs are started, linkages between the Interfaith Committees and Food Counterparts in Central Java and other food program implementers will be facilitated by CRS.

d. Currently, the target areas are mainly rural areas. However, there are some target populations on the outskirts of urban areas too that will also be targeted with the food distribution. The determination of whether to target rural or urban areas is being continuously re-assessed based on current conditions by CRS and the Food Counterparts. Once the Interfaith Committees are formed, they will also contribute to the on-going assessment.

V. Monitoring

a. The assessment teams will be at two levels – the Counterpart level and the CRS level. The teams at the Counterpart level will be more informal and on-going. The teams at the CRS level will be formed to look at specific issues regarding the project. For example, CRS has just completed a logistics assessment looking at the best arrangement for shipment and distribution of food in Central Java. The team for this assessment was only two members – one from CRS/Jakarta and one logistics expert from the CRS/Liberia program. Their recommendations have been incorporated into the answers here. Future assessment teams may involve consultants and other (government/non-government) participants from outside CRS as appropriate.

b. In the first three months of the project, it is expected that the counterparts will be continuously visiting areas and gathering data. The assessment teams for this will initially start with the Food Counterpart staff but will expand to include the Interfaith Committee members as the project progresses.

In addition, CRS will also hold assessments for various aspects of the project. At this time, CRS staff have just returned from a logistics assessment for the project. It is expected that soon a more general assessment visit will follow to evaluate individual Food Counterpart's capacity and to verify the status of the formation of the Interfaith Committees. In the next two months, a more focused assessment will be held regarding the Interfaith Committees. The members of the CRS teams will vary depending on the specific purpose of the assessment.

c. In the beginning, the assessments will focus on verifying target criteria and determining the appropriateness of selected desas. After the distribution has begun, the assessments will focus on ways to improve distribution, retarget according to need, and improving project implementation.

d. Each Food Counterpart will be actively encouraged to involve Interfaith Committee members in all assessments. The involvement of the Interfaith Committee members is not seen as a difficult objective to achieve since their involvement will lend a sense of objectivity to the selection of desas.

VI. Supplementary Feeding

a. Supplementary feeding will be done through a center chosen by the village authorities. The mention of Posyandu in the proposal was as a possible distribution point. This program is more in line with an "enhanced food security distribution" and distribution will target families who fit the criteria and not individuals visiting posyandus.

b. This is not applicable to this program.

VII. FFW

a. Not applicable to this project. It is hoped that further project ideas can be developed during the project by the Interfaith Committees. These projects may pursue such activities as infrastructure projects or urban revitalization. Future projects will depend on the capacity of the local interfaith committees to implement them.

b. Not applicable to this project.

VIII. Logistics

a. There has been a revision on logistics from our original proposal. We now propose that the food is shipped to two organizations – YSBS in Cilacap and YSS in Semarang. This would position the food on the north and south coasts of Java which would be more efficient for logistics operations.

YSBS and YSS will manage the two main warehouses where the bulk of the food is received. YSBS will store their commodity in their own warehouse. YSS will store their food at the PT VTP warehouse located at the Semarang port. Both warehouses have a capacity of 7,000 MT each.

YSS and YSBS will have a working coordination with PT VTP, a forwarding agent, and PT Sucofindo, the surveying company. It is unlikely that warehousing will be required in each district, but if the need arises, warehouses with adequate space are available at the district level. In the field, YSBS and YSS along with the other two partners (NU and YAKKUM) will manage the transit warehouses respectively (if they are needed). In case the warehousing capacity is not available to store the commodities, arrangement will be made to inform the population before the distribution and distribution will be made directly off the back of trucks.

b. YSBS and YSS, through YSBS and PT VTP have the capacity to transport the commodities to transit warehouses of other counterparts and/or to final distribution points. Food will be trucked on smaller trucks to distribution points in some cases where the bigger trucks are unable to go to. In case the counterpart is unable to move the food, YSBS and YSS will provide the transport vehicles required to move the food at the desa level.

IX. Budget

a. The exchange rate used in the original budget was Rp. 8,000 = $1 while the exchange rate today is approximately Rp. 14,000 = $1. At this time, we do not feel comfortable changing the original exchange rate since the rate here is still so volatile. Transportation costs have not been as dramatically affected by inflation to date due to the subsidies on fuel prices.

For transportation costs of ITSH, they will remain the same at this time. From the quotations provided by PT VTP, and discussions with YSBS and YSS, it does not seem that there is going to be a significant increase in the prices quoted in the original budget.

b. Warehouse and staff costs need to be added to the ITSH budget. We have listed a revised line item and amounts below. Both YSBS and YSS will need to rent warehouses to receive the food. PT VTP has already provided these costs in quotations to YSBS and YSS. With regards to transit warehouses, a small portion will be allocated to each counterpart. It is expected that most counterparts will use the amount to renovate the transit warehouse instead of renting.

Warehouse renovation is a cost that needs to be built in the budget. YSBS will need to renovate their warehouse to accommodate the food.

ITSH Revised Budget (original proposed budget = $675,000):

1.	Transport of 27,000 MT @ Rp. 200/kg	$ 675,000
2.	Processing of 27,000 MT @ Rp. 20,000/MT	$ 67,500
2.	Warehouse Expenses (Rentals/Renovations)	$ 60,000
2.	Logistics Staff (1 CRS, 20 Counterpart)	$ 50,000
Revised Total		**$ 852,500**

Implementation Plan

OBJECTIVE	INDICATORS	ACTIVITIES	TIMEFRAME (Month 1 = August)											
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Objective 1 To provide 360,000 poor recipients with 12.5 kilo supplementary rice rations for 6 months.	1 selection of desas completed with the interfaith com. 2 criteria for selection finalized 3 logistics arrangements made 4 distribution carried out	1 Assessment of Need and Counterpart Capacity, on-going now by counterpart and CRS	x											
		2 Proposal Writing Training	x											
		3 Submission of Proposals		x										
		4 Finalize Counterpart Agreements		x										
		5 Logistics Arrangements and Warehouse Renovations		x										
		6 Counterpart Management Mtg.		x										
		7 Finalize Budgets		x										
		8 Logistics Training		x										
		9 Financial Mgmt. Training		x										
		10 Disbursal of 1st Tranche of funds to 4 Counterparts			x									
		11 List of Desas and Tonnage			x									
		12 Distribution Plan Meeting												
		13 Arrival of 1st Call Forward of Food – 14,000 MT in C. Java				x								
		14 Distribution of Food to 360,000 Recipients (Nov. until April)				x	x	x	x	x	x			
		15 First Financial and Commodity Report (monthly until June '99)												
		16 Arrival of 2nd Call Forward of Food – 13,000 MT in C. Java						x						
		17 Counterpart Mid-term Mtg.							x					
		18 Final Report (May/June '99)										x	x	
		19 Final Assessment												x

OBJECTIVE	INDICATORS	ACTIVITIES	TIMEFRAME (Month 1 = August)											
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Objective 2 To increase the capacity of 25 (4 Area Committees with up to 21 sub-committess at the district level) interfaith committees to engage in joint activities in Central Java.	1 regular meetings held 2 plan prepared for follow-up activities	1 Org. Meetings held for area and district level committees on-going	x											
		2 Criteria Setting and Selection Meeting held for Desa level recipients, on-going		x										
		3 Communication to local communities on the project		x	x									
		4 Joint Meeting for all Area Interfaith Committees			x									
		5 Local Meetings to review distrib.					x	x	x	x	x	x		
		6 Monitoring of 1st Project Distrib. (Nov. until April)					x	x	x	x	x	x		
		7 Mid-term Joint Meeting for Planning							x					
		8 Concept Paper Submission by interfaith committees								x				
		9 1st Identified Training held for Interfaith Committees								x				
		10 2nd Identified Training held for Interfaith Committees									x			
		11 Final Planning Meeting for next project										x		

SCOPE OF WORK

SCOPE OF WORK

ASSESSMENT ON PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION FOR CENTRAL JAVA EMERGENCY PROGRAM

AUGUST 31 - SEPTEMBER 11, 1998

I. BACKGROUND

The current drought in Indonesia has heavily impacted the islands in Nusa Tenggara, East Indonesia. In addition there is a crisis throughout Indonesia. The situation is drastically affecting the poverty level in Indonesia, which is presently increased from 21% to 50 % of the total population as declared by GOI. Based on the data received from CRS counterparts, Central Java is one of the critical areas in Java, due especially to the economic crisis. CRS intends to solve the problem, and has developed food distribution program with other institutions to assist the needy people in rural and urban areas of selected Kabupatens of Central Java. The committee consists of four Food Counterparts which will implement the food distribution. The service area is divided into four regions and managed by the Food Counterparts in the following :

1. Region I : YSS for Semarang area.
2. Region II : NU for Pekalongan area.
3. Region III : YSBS for Cilacap area.
4. Region IV : YAKKUM for Solo area

(see the attachment of list of Kabupaten included in each Region)

The Food Counterparts Committee is also supported by Interfaith Steering Committees which consist of various religious institutions in Indonesia. They are : Catholic, Moslem, Hindu, Buddhist and Protestant. The Interfaith committees are formed at the required levels, and they are responsible for assisting village selection, monitoring of distribution and communication to communities regarding selection. In some areas these Interfaith committees representative at the district level with similar responsibility.

With the assistance of the Interfaith committee, the food counterparts have been asked to prepare a strategic plan to select the target villages in their region, determine the number of beneficiaries and calculate the amount of food needed based on the selected number of beneficiaries.

CRS/ID proposal on emergency program in Central Java has been approved by USAID. The amount of Rice approved by USAID is 27,000 M/T, for a six (6) months of program. As the Call Forward has been prepared, the first shipment of food is expected to arrive in Indonesia in November 1998, through the ports of Semarang and Cilacap. Based on the experience of food program in the past, YSS Semarang and YSBS Cilacap will manage the clearance and handling of the commodity, as well as storage and transportation. They will also coordinate the reporting system. YSS and YSBS will arrange the work coordination with all involved parties, including VTP and Sucofindo.

In this program YSS and YSBS have the role as logistics coordinator among the food counterparts. For budgeting in the logistic aspects, YSS and YSBS have to prepare the details which begins from port of destination, on the discharge from ocean vessel, storage at the warehouse, transporting to the village level and ends at the distribution point.

The Food Counterparts have conducted meetings among the counterparts. YSS in Semarang, YSBS in Cilacap and YAKKUM in Solo. The meeting is attended by member of Interfaith committee at the regions. The result is that counterparts have collected the data from the field and submitted to CRS through YSS, YSBS or YAKKUM, in the following subject :

a. number of proposed beneficiaries
b. selected target areas
c. estimation of expenditures to be budgeted for the operational cost.

However, the data submitted by The Food Counterparts is still insufficient. The number of beneficiaries and selected target area are very large and it seems that based on that data, the program should cover the whole area of Central Java, while the amount of food which have been called forward will be unfeasible to cover the whole area.

To have a reliable data and get a clear picture of the program, CRS plan to conduct the assessment to obtain inputs to implement the program.

The team will recommend the selected areas, the certain number of beneficiaries calculation of the total tonnage for the food counterparts based on a cursory needs assessment and assessment of each organization capacity, which will distribute the ration a maximum of 25 kgs. rice per family per month.

As the result of the assessment, it is expected that we will have a clear picture of Central Java emergency program. It is deemed necessary to have the certain data of the above subjects, so that the program could be matched with the amount of commodity approved by USAID.

II. OBJECTIVES

1. To initially assess the impact of economic crisis occurring in some areas in Central Java.
2. To assess the targeted areas and certain number of beneficiaries, and to assist in further modifying selection criteria.
3. To assess the counterparts on the capacity of the organization on :
   a. capability to manage the emergency program on programmatic and logistic aspects.
   b. Human Resources (staffing, technical skill)
   c. program support availability (warehouse and transportation).
   d. capability to manage relationship with the forwarding agent (VTP) and surveying company (Sucofindo)

III. EXPECTED OUTPUT

1. Food Allocation Tonnage for four Food Counterparts.
2. List of findings for improving projects implementation.
3. Assessment of capability as the Food Counterparts, are :
   - able to manage the emergency program on programmatic and logistic
   - having enough staff and skill to handle the program
   - program support available
   - able to communicate with other related parties

IV. THE TEAM

The Assessment team will consist of 6 members, They are :

- 3 members from CRS/Indonesia and CRS/Baltimore
- 3 members from other organizations

V. ITINERARY

Aug	31	Meeting in CRS office for the preparation of assessment, schedule, ticket preparation and divide the team.
Sep	01	Group A leaving for Semarang, meet with YSS Site visits near Semarang. Group B leaving for Yogya , meet with YSBS staff Site visits near Yogya, with YSBS staff
Sep	02	Group A : site visits with YSS Group B : site visits with YSBS, drive to Cilacap
Sep	03	Group A : meeting with YSS, inform NU Semarang Group B : meeting with YSBS
Sep	04	Group A : meeting with NU, site visits Group B : drive to Yogya (4 hours), inform YAKKUM Solo
Sep	05	Group A : site visits with YAKKUM, drive to Yogya Group B : site visits with NU, drive to Yogya
Sep	06	Internal team meeting on consolidation of findings, in Yogya
Sep	07	Group A : site visits with NU Group B : site visits with YAKKUM
Sep	08	Group A : meet with NU Group B : meet with YAKKUM
Sep	09-10	Consolidation and report writing, Group A and Group B
Sep	11	Presentation in Jakarta

Prepared by : BAMBANG SETIABUDHI
SOW2CD2.BS4

LIST OF REGIONS AND KABUPATENS

ATTACHMENT

CENTRAL JAVA EMERGENCY PROGRAM
LIST OF KABUPATENS IN REGIONS

REGIONS		I	II	III	IV
COORDINATED BY		YSS Semarang	NU Semarang	YSBS Cilacap	YAKKUM Solo
NAME OF KABUPATENS	1	Semarang (Kab)	Pekalongan	Cilacap	Solo
	2	Semarang (Kodya)	Batang	Kebumen	Wonogiri
	3	Kendal	Brebes	Banyumas	Sukoharjo
	4	Grobogan	Tegal	Wonosobo	Boyolali
	5	Demak	Pemalang	Purworejo	Sragen
	6	Rembang	—	Kulon Progo	Karanganyar
	7	—	—	Bantul	—
	8	—	—	Gunung Kidul	—

REGCJ1.B54

CENTRAL JAVA EMERGENCY PROGRAM
LIST OF BENEFICIARIES IN KABUPATENS

	I YSS Semarang	Number of Beneficiaries	II NU Jogya	Number of Beneficiaries	III YSBS Cilacap	Number of Beneficiaries	IV YAKKUM Solo	Number of Beneficiaries	TOTAL Number of Beneficiaries
1	Semarang (Kab)	2,400	Pekalongan	7,200	Cilacap	18,000	Solo	6,000	33,600
2	Semarang (Kod)	1,200	Batang	11,400	Kebumen	45,300	Wonogiri	6,000	63,900
3	Kendal	1,800	Brebes	900	Banyumas	21,900	Sukoharjo	9,300	33,900
4	Grobogan	3,600	Tegal	12,300	Wonosobo	-	Boyolali	7,800	23,700
5	Demak	2,700	Pemalang	9,000	Purworejo	69,293	Sragen	14,400	95,393
6	Rembang	5,400	—		Kulon Progo	40,046	Karanganyar	6,000	51,446
7	—		—		Bantul	-	—		-
8	—		—		Gunung Kidul	18,800	—		18.800
	TOTAL	17,100		40,800		213,339		49,500	320,739

NOTES

a. Data for Group I and II are based on estimation of beneficiaries as estimated in Jogya meeting on July 14,1998.
b. Data for Group III and IV are based on report from counterparts.

REGCJ2.B54

CENTRAL JAVA EMERGENCY PROGRAM
NUMBER OF VILLAGES IN KABUPATENS

	I		II		III		IV		TOTAL
	YSS Semarang	Number of Villages	NU Jogya	Number of Villages	YSBS Cilacap	Number of Villages	YAKKUM Solo	Number of Villages	Number of Villages
1	Semarang (Kab)	8	Pekalongan	24	Cilacap	60	Solo	20	112
2	Semarang (Kod)	4	Batang	38	Kebumen	151	Wonogiri	20	213
3	Kendal	6	Brebes	3	Banyumas	73	Sukoharjo	31	113
4	Grobogan	12	Tegal	41	Wonosobo	-	Boyolali	26	79
5	Demak	9	Pemalang	30	Purworejo	231	Sragen	48	318
6	Rembang	18	—		Kulon Progo	133	Karanganyar	20	171
7	—		—		Bantul	-	—		-
8	—		—		Gunung Kidul	63	—		63
	TOTAL	57		136		711		165	1,069

NOTES

a. Data for Group I and II are based on estimation of beneficiaries as estimated in Jogya meeting on July 14,1998.

b. Data for Group III and IV are based on report from counterparts.

REGCT2.BS4 Sheet2

SCHEDULE OF VISITS

SCHEDULE OF VISITS

GROUP A

No.	DATE	TIME	LOCATION	ACTIVITIES	REMARKS
1	31 Aug	08:00 - 15:00	CRS Office	Initial meeting to discuss preparation of the assessment and schedule.	
2	01 Sep	09:30 10:30 17:00	Jakarta Arrive in Semarang Back to Semarang	Leaving for Semarang Meet with YSS Site visits near Semarang with YSS Stay in Merbabu Hotel	o
3	02 Sep	08:00 - 17:00 17:00	Back to Semarang	Site visits with YSS Stay in Merbabu Hotel	o
4	03 Sep	08:00 - 12:00 13:00 - 15:00 17:00	YSS Office NU Office	Meeting with YSS, inform NU Meeting with NU Stay in Merbabu Hotel	o
5	04 Sep Friday	08:00 - 17:00 17:00	Drive to Pekalongan Pekalongan	Site visits with NU Stay in Sindang Sari Hotel	x
6	05 Sep	07:00 - 17:00 17:00	Drive to Yogya	Site visits with NU Stay in Ambarrukmo Hotel	=
7	06 Sep	08:00 - 15:00	Ambarrukmo Hotel, Yogya	Internal team meeting on consolidation of findings	
8	07 Sep	07:00 09:00 - 17:00 17:00	Drive to Semarang Pekalongan	 Site visits with NU Stay in Sindang Sari Hotel	
9	08 Sep	07:00 10:00 - 14:00 15:00	Drive to Semarang NU Office Drive to Yogya	 Meet with NU Stay in Ambarrukmo Hotel	
10	09 Sep	08:00 - 17:00	Ambarrukmo Hotel	Consolidation and report writing	Group A and Group B
11	10 Sep	08:00 - 14:00 17:30	Ambarrukmo Hotel Yogya	Consolidation and report writing Leaving for Jakarta	Group A and Group B
12	11 Sep	08:00 - 16:00	CRS Office	Report presentation	

SCHEDULE OF VISITS

GROUP B

No.	DATE	TIME	LOCATION	ACTIVITIES	REMARKS
1	31 Aug	08:00 - 15:00	CRS office	Initial meeting to discuss preparation of the assessment and schedule.	
2	01 Sep	08:00 09:05 17:00	Jakarta Arrive in Yogya Back to Yogya	Leaving for Yogya Meet with YSBS staff Site visits near Yogya Stay in Ambarrukmo Hotel	 G.Kidul, Bantul
3	02 Sep	08:00 13:00 19:00	 Drive to Cilacap Arrive in Cilacap	Site visits with YSBS Site visits to villages on the way to Cilacap Stay in Wijaya Kusuma Hotel	Kulon Progo Purworejo, Kebumen
4	03 Sep	07:30 17:00	YSBS Office Back to Cilacap	Meeting with YSBS / Fr. C. Burrows Site visits WITH YSBS Stay in Wijaya Kusuma Hotel	
5	04 Sep	07:00 - 13:00 13:00 14:00 - 17:00 17:00	Drive to Solo Arrive in Solo YAKKUM Office	 To Sahid Hotel Meet with YAKKUM Stay in Sahid Hotel	
6	05 Sep	07:00 - 17:00 17:00	 Drive to Yogya	Site visits with YAKKUM Stay in Ambarrukmo Hotel	
7	06 Sep	08:00 - 15:00	Ambarrukmo Hotel, Yogya	Internal team meeting on consolidation of findings	
8	07 Sep	07:00 - 08:30 09:00 - 17:00 17:00	Drive to Solo Solo	To YAKKUM Office Site visits with YAKKUM Stay in Sahid Hotel	
9	08 Sep	08:00 - 14:00 15:00	YAKKUM Office Drive to Yogya	Meet with YAKKUM Stay in Ambarrukmo Hotel	
10	09 Sep	08:00 - 17:00	Ambarrukmo Hotel	Consolidation and report writing	Group A and Group B
11	10 Sep	08:00 - 14:00 17:30	Ambarrukmo Hotel	Consolidation and report writing Leaving for Jakarta	Group A and Group B
12	11 Sep	08:00 - 16:00	CRS Office	Report presentation	

SCHDET1.Sheet1

INSTITUTIONAL PROFILES

YAKKUM

YAYASAN KRISTEN UNTUK KESEHATAN UMUM

SOLO

YAYASAN KRISTEN UNTUK KESEHATAN UMUM (YAKKUM)

Akte Notaris : No. 6 Tanggal 1 Pebruari 1950
Alamat : Jl. Brigjen. Slamet Riyadi 546 Surakarta 57143 Indonesia
P. O. Box : 194 Surakarta
Kawat : YAKKUM SALA
Telepon : (0271) 716482 - Faxc. (0271) 712114
N.P.W.P. : 1 . 139 . 894 . 8 . 526
E mail : yakkum@bumi.net.id

YAYASAN KRISTEN UNTUK KESEHATAN UMUM
(Y A K K U M)

KANTOR PUSAT : Jl. Brigjend. Slamet Riyadi 546 Surakarta 57143, PO. BOX. 194 - Telp. (0271) 716482, Faxc. 712114, NPWP 1.139.894.8.526

UNIT PUSAT :
1. **DANA PENSIUN YAKKUM,** Lantai III RS. Bethesda Jl. Jend. Sudirman No 70 Yogyakarta 55224, Telp. (0274) 586688 Pswt 1905 dan 520312.
2. **YEKATRIA FARMA** Dagen, Karanganyar PO. BOX 134 Surakarta Telp. (0271) 25381 Faxc. 25014
3. **YEKATRIA HUSADA FARMA,** Jl. Mojo 22 - Karangasem Surakarta Telp. (0271) 719032 Faxc. 719032
4. **PUSAT REHABILITASI YAKKUM,** Desa Besi Jl. Kaliurang Km. 13,5 Yogyakarta Telp. (0274) 895386 Faxc. 895181.
5. **YAKKUM CRAFT,** Desa Besi Jl. Kaliurang Km. 13,5 Yogyakarta Telp. (0274) 895386 Faxc. 895181
6. **PUSLATBIN UPKM YAKKUM** Jl. Amarta 1 Ngabeyan, Kartasura Telp. (0271) 780556 Faxc. ~~780556~~ 780857

No	CABANG	UNIT KERJA	ALAMAT
1	Banjarnegara	RSU Emanuel	Purworejo - Klampok Telp. (0286) 79030, 79031 Faxc. (0286) 79032 Banjarnegara 53474
2	Banyumas	RS. Sinar Kasih	Jl. Mariadireja II Telp. (0281) 38370 Faxc. (0281) 38370 Purwokerto 53111
3	Blora	BP Kristen Pulo	Kedungtuban - Cepu Telp. (0296) 23567 Blora 58381
4	Boyolali	BP Sari Waras I	Jl. Garuda - Boyolali
		BP Sari Waras II	Kedungjongkong - Simo, Boyolali
5	Cilacap	BP YAKKUM	Jl. Ahmad Yani No. 68 Sidareja Telp. (0280) 3322 Cilacap 57261
6	Grobogan	RS. Panti Rahayu	Jl. Letjen. Suprapto No. 6 Telp. (0292) 21370, 21087 Faxc. (0292) 21370 Purwodadi 58111
7	Kebumen	BP/RB Wisma Rukti	Jl. Pemuda No. 75 Telp. (0287) 81478 Kebumen 543111
8	Klaten	BP Panti Waluyo	Tanjung - Juwiring - Klaten
		RB Panti Waluyo	Sukoreja - Wedi - Klaten
		BP Panti Waluyo	Prambanan - Klaten Telp. (0274) 496297
		BP Tresno Sasomo	Gumulan - Klaten
		Bp Panti Waluyo	Ngupit - Klaten
		Bp Panti Waluyo	Beji - Klaten Telp. (0274) 98429
9	Kulon Progo	RB Maranatha	Nanggulan - Wates
10	Lampung Tengah	RS Mardi Waluyo	Jl. Jend. Sudirman 218 Po. Box 10 Telp. (0725) 42912 Faxc. (0725) 43053 Metro 34101
		BP Mardi Waluyo	Trukajaya - Lampung Tengah
		BP/RB Mardi Waluyo	Kota Gajah - Lampung Tengah
11	Magelang	BP/RB Yoga Dharma	Prajenan - Mertoyudan Telp. (0293) 62373 Magelang 56172
12	Ogan Komering Ulu	BP Panti Asih	Kepanditan Gunawang BK 10 Telp. (0735) 50590 OKU 32182
13	Purworejo	BP/RB Panti Waluyo	Jl. Ahmad Yani 21 Telp. (0275) 22096 Purworejo 51092
		BP/RB Panti Waluyo	Desa Cangkrep Telp. (0275) 21946 Purworejo 51092
14	Semarang	RS. Panti Wilasa Dr. Cipto	Jl. Dr. Cipto 50 Telp. (024) 546040 Faxc. (024) 546042 Semarang 50126
		RS. Panti Wilasa Citarum	Jl. Citarum 98 Telp. (024) 542224, 542033 Faxc. (024) 542063 Semarang 50126
15	Surakarta	RS Panti Waluyo	Jl. Ahmad Yani 1 Telp. (0271) 712077 Faxc. 712077 Surakarta 57143
		BP Panti Waluyo	Nusukan - Surakarta
		BP/RB Panti Waluyo	Perengsari - Kartasura Telp. (0271) 780902 Kartasura 57168
16	Temanggung	RSK Ngesti Waluyo	Parakan Telp. (0293) 96008, 96436, 96346, 96462 Faxc. (0293) 96410 Temanggung 56254
17	Yogyakarta	RS Bethesda	Jl. Jend. Sudirman 70 Telp. (0274) 586688, 586695, 562246 Faxc. (0274) 563312 Yogyakarta 55224
		RS. Bethesda Unit Lempuyangwangi	Jl. Hayam Wuruk 1 - Lempuyang wangi Telp. (0274) 588002 Yogyakarta
		CD Bethesda	Klitren Lor GK III/374 Telp. (0274) 514100 Faxc. (0274) 563312 Yogyakarta.

Y S B S

YAYASAN SOSIAL BINA SEJAHTERA

C I L A C A P

I. THE ORGANIZATION

A. BEGINNINGS

The Yayasan Sosial Bina Sejahtera (YSBS) is a non-sectarian foundation whose purpose is to improve the quality of life for the impoverished of Indonesia. It is affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church and is based in Cilacap, Central Java. It was started in 1976 in response to starvation caused by drought. The immediate problem of starvation was averted by the distribution of 50 tons of soya fortified wheat given to Catholic Relief Services (CRS) by United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Out of this emergency was born YSBS which could devote its efforts over a long period of time toward alleviating the plight of the poorest of the poor (Picture pg. 8).

B. FOCUS OF RESOURCES

Over a 21 year period of time (1976-1997), the YSBS has focused its resources toward the alleviation of poverty through the following efforts:

1. FOOD FOR WORK (1976-1991): YSBS procured materials for infrastructure to be built in villages, and villagers were given food for their labor to build the needed infrastructure (dikes, dams, roads, culverts, temporary bridges, full bridges, irrigation systems, village meeting places, sports fields, fish ponds, land reclamation, and land preparation for schools and hospitals). 50,000 families participated in this program.

2. WORK FOR MONEY (1991 to date): YSBS pays villagers money for their labor to procure materials and to build the infrastructure needed (Audit Report pg. 9-11 and Project Summary pg.12).

3. NUTRITION PROGRAM (1979-1991): Food given by USAID/CRS and distributed to children under 5 years, pregnant women and nursing mothers. 45,000 recipients.

4. USAHA BERSAMA (Income Generation) (1986 to date): Grant of Rp.200.000.000, from CRS to finance revolving fund for small business co-operatives. Groups of 10-40 persons each take a collective loan and are responsible as a group to repay the loan. The original amount has revolved 8 times to date, making an effective loan of Rp.1.600.000.000. 94% of interest payments and 96% of loan repayments have been received. This is a self sufficient project which pays wages for 10 organizers and all overhead expenditures. The goal of this project is to assist people who have the skills and desire to start a business but lack the funds to do so. 90% of the loans are given to women and are repaid within 3 to 12 months. 3,000 families have participated. (Interview with Father Charles Burrows, July 8, 1997; The Jakarta Post, May 28, 1995; and Indonesia Program Evaluation for CRS/USAID Small Enterprise Development Sequel Matching Grant, April, 1996).

5. EDUCATION (1976 to date): Program began with building a senior high school in Cilacap and a junior high school each in Kawunganten and Sidareja. Four class rooms were built in each place. The YSBS now operates 25 educational institutions with an enrollment of 8,000 students. Schools were established with funds from Australia raised through YSBS efforts. At present, operating costs for the schools are from tuition (80%), government support (10%) and YSBS (10%) (Report for 22 Schools pg. 13).

6. HEALTH (1982 to date): Clinic in Majenang with substation in Carui, clinic in Sockeraja with substation in Banyumas area. Australian embassy contributed 2 million rupiah to start the clinics. Total cost of the clinics was Rp.80,000,000. They are now self-sufficient.

7. CHRISTIAN CHILDREN'S FUND (1982 to date): Money from CCF is given directly to children to pay for school fees and to village development for projects such as drinking water, public toilets, and income generation (chickens, ducks, goats, water buffalo, and pedicabs).

8. WATER DEVELOPMENT (1976 - date): YSBS has dug and put in concrete linings in approximately 500 village wells, built approximately 20 small dams and piped water to the villages. It has built one dam (1988) which created a 100 hectare lake which keeps the ground water relatively high for wells and pumps in the dry season for the whole town of Cilacap. Funding from CRS (50%), MISEREOR (25%) and Dutch Bishop Development Fund (25%).

9. HOUSES FOR HOMELESS (1973 - date): YSBS has built approximately 340 houses for the people who had been living on the streets, large families living in one room, for some old people who had no living relatives and for the blind. Funds for first 40 houses were donated mainly by the St. Vincent de Paul parish branch of Sorrento, Victoria, Australia, Missionary Association of Mary Immaculate, Australia and the Cilacap Lenten Appeal Collection. Last 300 houses were paid for from construction truck rental.

C. YSBS VALUES AND ITS ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY

The goal of YSBS is to reach the poorest of the poor. It is a broad based community level foundation which uses the vehicle of infrastructure to develop better income, education, health care, and nutrition. Although YSBS operates under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church, it reaches out to all people in a given community. It co-operates with local government and with the military. Through its reputation for integrity and co-operation, it was able to serve as a vehicle for peace during the recent election unrest. In Tasikmalaya, a nearby town, riots occurred, lives were lost, businesses and churches were destroyed. When this occurred, the co-ordinator for the infrastructure projects in Majenang, a town near Tasikmalaya, was able to sponsor a meeting between government people, Islamic leaders, Protestants, Catholics and the business community.

They jointly stated that no such thing would happen in Majenang and set up a committee for quick communication between all groups. No such destruction occurred in Majenang!

X. ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY

a. Local Government Partnership Project:
YSBS traditionally builds the road base over a period of years, adding layers of gravel and rock periodically until it becomes stable. When it is stable enough, the local government paves the road with asphalt donated by a local government oil refinery.

b. Armed Forces of Indonesia Partnership Project:
Each year ABRI goes into one village of this kabupaten and does a major infrastructure project. YSBS has been involved in this for the last nine years. The projects originate with a request from the village head man who goes to sub-district and district levels for project approval.

c. Local Felt Needs Partnership Projects:
Each project of the YSBS is first requested by the village people. The head of a village personally visits the YSBS director and requests assistance. A typical request is the following made by the village headman of Muara Dua, Pak Sugito :

i. Continue road construction to the other two hamlets
ii. Provide a junior high school staff and run the school
iii. Provide an electric generator

iv. Rebuild the health center as the roof was blown off by a recent storm
v. Provide a drinking water system
vi. Provide credit to buy rice seed, fertilizers, insecticides and fingerlings for fish ponds
vii. Build a permanent bridge to replace the temporary one
viii. A motorcycle for memories because he has known Father Charlie for 20 years! Actually there are only 3 broken-down motorbikes available and the ride to Cilacap is Rp.15.000,00. Father Charlie is expected to pay for these transportation costs when village leaders come to see him. Meeting between Father Charlie and Pak Sugito, observed by CPE July 1997.)

The goal of ALL projects is alleviation of poverty and thus support is given to ALL groups of people. Indonesian national policy states that people of all religions must work together. An example is the AMD (ARBRI Masuk Desa/ARMED FORCES ENTER THE VILLAGE) road and village improvement program this year. The Indonesian Armed Forces, YSBS, the district government and the villagers worked together. In this community effort, a road was topped with asphalt, a mosque, sentry post and village pump were built. YSBS built the base for a mosque which is adjacent to a Catholic church (Picture pg.14).

II. THE PROBLEM

A. AREA PROFILE

The islands of Java and Madura account for 6.9 percent of the total land area of Indonesia while it contains 60 percent of the total population. (Indonesia Country Profile, 1992-93). "Around 77 percent or 21 million out of the estimated 27 million people still living beneath the poverty line in Indonesia reside in Java" (Jakarta Post, July 14, 1993). In August 1994, the Chief of Local Planning and Development Body stated that in the province of Central Java there are a total of 2,039 poverty stricken villages scattered in 252 sub-districts in 29 regencies (Jakarta Post). In the district of Cilacap, there are 270 villages, of these 81 are categorized as impoverished. Poverty is most acute in isolated villages of the coastal areas. "A poverty stricken village is one whose residents' income per capita, when converted to rice, is less than 360 kilograms." (Jakarta Post, August, 1994.

Although there are project sites throughout the kabupaten of Cilacap, the major sites are located in the Segara Anakan and other coastal areas. The Segara Anakan is a brackish water lagoon formed by the Citanduy and other smaller rivers of south Central Java. The rivers which empty into the Segara Anakan drain a total area of 4,460 square kilometers. As of 1984, the water surface (defined as high water without vegetation) area of the lagoon was 2,700 hectares. At the turn of the century the area was 6,898 hectares.

This rapid change in surface area is caused by sedimentation from the rivers of the Citanduy River basin. The lagoon is separated from the Indian Ocean by an island called Nusakambangan. The watershed lands of the Citanduy Basin has one of the highest population densities of the world (Schweithelm, James, "Watershed Land Use and Coastal Sedimentation: The Citanduy/Segara Anakan System," Tropical Coastal Area Management, Vol. 4, No. 1., Metro Manila, Philippines, 1989).

The Segara Anakan is an area of unusually fast sedimentation. It is estimated that 2.5 million tons of sediment settle in the lagoon each year. One result of this rapid sedimentation is the loss of water surface and the build up of land areas. Lagoon areas are slowly converted to mudflat, then to mangrove, then to low shrubs. As land reaches adequate height, it is converted to ricelands. Fishing area is lost and fishermen (about 80% of the population) must find other sources of income. By definition, the entire area is low and is affected by tides. This tidal activity brings brackish water into rice field where dikes are low or have been breached. The range for spring tides (highest water levels occurring during tidal cycle in Cilacap is 1.5 meters. The spring tides occur twice each lunar month. In addition to spring tides, flooding often occurs when heavy rains and spring tides occur at the same time. Flooding can reach up to 50 cm.

III. THE PROJECT

A. POVERTY ALLEVIATION

Poverty and population pressures force families to live in very isolated areas where survival is for the fittest. In the Segara Anakan, fishermen have to learn how to farm as fishing area is lost and farmers migrate into the area hoping to find just a few hundred square meters of land they can farm. Here access to basic necessities is limited and transportation is almost non-existent. Such conditions perpetuate cycles of poverty. This vicious cycle of poverty can only be broken by long term investment of money into infrastructure development which simultaneously gives access to markets, education, health care and better nutrition (See pgs 15 - 17 & Map of Coastal Project Area pg. 18).

B. DESA PANIKEL - A CASE STUDY OF NEED

Lura Muara Dua is one of eight hamlets collectively known as Kampung Laut (Sea Village). Kampung Laut is located in Segara Anakan, a quickly disappearing lagoon in Central Java, adjacent to the Indian Ocean. Lura Muara Dua is administratively under the village of Panikel and has 577 heads of family. Its educational facilities are limited to 1 primary school for grades 1-6. Approximately 240 children attend this school. There are 5 teachers (48 children/teacher) and one headmaster. There are no other schools. Men earn their living through fishing and rice cultivation. This year there has been no rice harvest, it was killed by salt water inundation. When rice crops are harvested, the yields average 2 tons/hectare. In contrast, the average for wet season harvest on the south coast of Java is 4.5 tons/hectare/harvest. North coast yield in wet season is 5-6 tons/hectare/harvest. Average income for Panikel is Rp/50.167, per capita per year, the

lowest in the sub-district of Kawunganten (Table p. 24). Kampung Laut has a high incidence of diseases characterized by diarrhea, malaria, dengue hemorrhagic fever, and various skin ailments. Lura Muara Dua is an area which was once lagoon, but due to rapid sedimentation from the Citunduy water shed, it is now an area which is above water level most of the time. Because of its location, it suffers both from salt water inundation and fresh water flooding. There is no source of fresh water. Water is brought by canoe 4 kilometers at the cost of Rp.500 for 20 liters. In 1994, a road was built. Now a vendor can come to buy fish and rice. The trip to Cilacap which costs Rp.5.000, by boat is now available by motorcycle to the national road and then by bus at the total cost of Rp.1.500,! Dikes need to be built to prevent salt water inundation. Since Central Java has definite drought periods, an irrigation system would make year-round-rice cultivation possible. Photo pg.19).

C. DESA GRUGU - A CASE STUDY OF SUCCESS

A trip to this village gives an exciting lesson in what the infrastructure project has accomplished over the years. Upon leaving the national highway on the way to Grugu, one enters Bojong and then Brinkeng, both YSBS project areas. There is a narrow but good road winds through rice fields which stretch as far as the eye can see. Bicycles, motorcycles and small pick-up trucks make up the local transportation system. Twenty years ago there were only two inhabitants in this area. Now Grugu has 617 families with a total population 2884 persons. The total land area is 681.0896 hectares, giving a ratio of about 1 hectare of land per family. Through the government sponsored Citanduy project, 489 hectares are irrigated. In 1975-76 YSBS built the first dike, in 1989 ABRI and YSBS built a road 1860 meters long. Today there are 3 primary schools, 23 shops and a health center. Crops can easily be transported to market. Brown sugar from coconut flowers and tempe as well as rice are sold outside the village. The first migrants into the area were anti-government fugitives. They have now settled into the area and in the last election (May, 1997) 87% of the vote was for Golkar, the dominam party of Indonesian. (Personal Interview, July 10, 1997) (Photos pgs. 20-22 and map of work finished/projected p.23).

Y S S

YAYASAN SOSIAL SOEGIYAPRANATA

S E M A R A N G

SEJARAH DAN PROFIL YAYASAN SOSIAL SOEGIJAPRANATA (YSS)



KEUSKUPAN AGUNG SEMARANG
Jl. Pandanaran 11 tilp. (024) 313341
SEMARANG 50244

SEJARAH DAN PROFIL YSS SEMARANG.

I. PENDAHULUAN.

Yayasan Sosial Soegiyapranata (YSS) Keuskupan Agung Semarang, merupakan sebuah Lembaga Sosial yang memberikan pelayanan kepada keluarga dan masyarakat penyandang masalah sosial, baik yang tinggal di daerah pedesaan maupun mereka yang tinggal di perkotaan, tanpa memandang asal - usul , golongan, kesukuan, maupun agama / kepercayaan tertentu di Indonesia.

Keluarga dan masyarakat penyandang masalah sosial yang dimaksud disini-adalah, mereka yang mempunyai masalah 'mental, spiritual dan kebutuhan-yang relatif masih rendah dibandingkan yang lain' untuk hidup bersama - ditengah masyarakat secara 'layak dan diakui',
Misalkan : para penderita gangguan mental dan pisik, tingak sosial ekonomi yang sangat rendah, sosial kesehatan yang juga rendah, tingkat pendidikan yang rendah pula. Mereka dengan kondisi seperti tersebut di atas, akan sangat sulit sekali untuk upaya meningkatan kesejahteraan hidup keluarganya. Dalam situasi yang demikian, maka jaminan hidup yang - lebih baik / layak guna menyesuaikan kelangsungan / kebutuhan hidup layak ditengah-tengah arus modernisasi - pembangunan yang demikian maju dan pesat ini, juga akan mengalami kesulitan serta akan semakin tertinggal jauh.

II. TUJUAN UMUM DAN KHUSUS.

Tujuan umum dan khusus pelaksanaan pengabdian YSS Semarang dalam bentuk karya nyata ditengah tengah masyarakat sebagai realisasi 'Dharma Bhakti Sosial' untuk Bangsa dan Negara Republik Indonesia, adalah :

A. Tujuan Umum.

1. Membantu keluarga dan masyarakat yang tidak mampu sebagai realisasi Dharma Bhakti Sosial, dengan berdasarkan Pancasila dan - Undang Undang Dasar 1945 dalam arti yang seluas-luasnya.

2. Dalam upaya untuk mencapai Dharma Bhakti Sosial tersebut, akan ditempuh segala daya dan usaha yang syah dan berjuang bersama - Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, guna membangun masyarakat - Indonesia seutuhnya sesuai dengan Garis Besar Haluan Negara yg sedang dilaksanakan.

B. Tujuan Khusus.

1. Mengupayakan dan melaksanakan bantuan kepada para penyandang masalah sosial, yang membutuhkan bantuan guna membantu memecahkan masalah yang dihadapi agar dapat meningkatkan kesejahteraan hidup yang lebih baik dan layak.

2. Mengupayakan dan melaksanakan bantuan pada para keluarga dan masyarakat yang kondisi sosial ekonomi - kesehatan - pendidikan - masih tergolong sangat rendah dan tak mampu, agar dapat meningkat kesejahteraan hidupnya.

3. Mengupayakan dan melaksanakan kegiatan dan bantuan bersama dengan masyarakat, Lembaga Swadaya masyarakat lain, Lembaga Pendidikan Negeri / Swasta, Instansi Pemerintah, serta Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I dan Tingkat II setempat, Kantor Departemen Pemerintah Republik Indonesia ; dalam upaya menanggulangi dan membantu mereka yang mempunyai permasalahan sosial, kebutuhan sarana umum yang lebih baik, dan musibah bencana alam, dls.

III. AWAL BERDIRINYA / KELAHIRAN YAYASAN.

Yayasan Sosial Soegiyapranata (YSS) Keuskupan Agung Semarang, dibentuk / didirikan oleh Bapak USKUP AGUNG Semarang (Mgr. Yustinus Darmoyuwono, Pr saat itu) dengan 'Akta Notaris Semarang' RM. Suppapto, Nomor. 6 , Tanggal. 2 September 1963.

Pembaharuan selanjutnya, dengan Akta Notaris K. Gondodiwiryo, Nomor 30, tanggal. 21 Agustus 1976. Dan berikutnya diperbaharui lagi dengan Akta-Notaris Siswadi Aswin, Nomor. 42, tanggal. 18 Maret 1985 di Semarang.

Pengakuan diberikan dari Pemerintah Republik Indonesia kepada Yayasan Sosial Soegiyapranata (YSS) Keuskupan Agung Semarang, dengan melalui Surat Menteri Sosial Republik Indonesia (Surat Keputusan Men. Sos. RI Nomor : 072-3 / KPTS / BBS / II / 1976 tertanggal. 25 Pebruari 1976) dengan memperoleh legalisasi dan klasifikasi D I A K U I .

Untuk hal NAMA YAYASAN dari awal berdirinya hingga saat ini, merupakan - pengabadian dari nama Bapak Uskup Agung Semarang yang asli PUTRA INDONESIA PERTAMA untuk jabatan Uskup Gereja Katolik di Indonesia, yaitu : Mgr. Albertus SOEGIYAPRANATA, SJ. Dan beliau telah wafat pada Tanggal. 22 Juli 1962 di Negeri Belanda. Dimakamkan di Taman Pahlawan Giri Tunggal - Semarang, dan dinyatakan sebagai Pahlawan Nasional dengan Pangkat JENDRAL ANUMERTA yang disyahkan oleh Bapak Presiden RI Bung Karno (Presiden Pertama Republik Indonesia).

IV. KEGIATAN AWAL DHARMA BHAKTI SOSIAL.

Kegiatan awal berdirinya Yayasan Sosial Soegiyapranata (YSS) Keuskupan - Agung Semarang, sebagai bentuk nyata dari realisasi Dharma Bhakti Sosial yang merupakan arah dasar kegiatan, antara lain ;

MEMBERIKAN pelayanan kesehatan melalui pengobatan pada para tuna wisma & tuna karya (gelandangan) yang tinggal di bawah Jembatan Sungai Berok dan diemperan Toko di Kota Semarang. Kegiatan awal tersebut dilakukan oleh Bruder SERVATIUS, FIC yang dibantu beberapa tenaga perawat, yang secara-langsung mengunjungi / mendatangi para gelandangan tersebut ditempat mereka tinggal.

PENGEMBANGAN kegiatan pelayanan selanjutnya untuk para Tuna Wisma & Tuna Karya (Gelandangan) tersebut adalah, perlunya mereka ditampung dan dimukimkan agar lebih bisa menata diri untuk kehidupannya bersama keluarga ; supaya lebih baik dari cara hidup sebelumnya yang kurang manusiawi. Adapun sebagai tempat penampungan dan pemukiman yang pertama (awal) di sediakan dan dibangun, adalah di daerah Gunung Brintik - Bergota (sekarang Randusari Semarang).

KEGIATAN penampungan dan pemukiman tersebut dilakukan setelah dilakukan-dialog dengan mereka para 'Gelandangan' , guna mengetahui masalah tempat tinggal yang merupakan kebutuhan pokok mereka bersama anggota keluarga. Pembangunan rumah penampungan / pemukiman ini, dilaksanakan pada Tahun. 1964 / 1965, dengan jumlah ± 80 unit rumah sangat sederhana (dihuni oleh ± 105 Kepala Keluarga, atau sebanyak ± 525 jiwa).

UKURAN BANGUNAN rumah pemukiman yang sangat sederhana tersebut, berukuran 4 x 6 meter setiap unitnya. Berdindingkan anyaman bambu, dengan atap dari genting terbuat dari tanah liat yang dibakar, serta dengan lantai yang masih berupa tanah asli.

V. JENIS KEGIATAN PELAYANAN DAN DAERAH LAYANAN.

Sesuai dengan perkembangan dari waktu ke waktu serta kebutuhan pelayanan bagi keluarga dan masyarakat yang membutuhkan, Yayasan Sosial Soegiyapranata (YSS) Keuskupan Agung Semarang telah dapat mengembangkan kegiatannya sesuai dengan Dharma Bhakti Sosial hingga sekarang ini. Adapun jenis kegiatan pelayanan dan daerah layanannya, sebagai berikut :

A. Jenis kegiatan pelayanan yang dilakukan.

1. Pemukiman bagi Tuna Wisma dan Tuna Karya.
2. Bantuan Umum bagi Keluarga penyandang masalah sosial.
3. Bantuan Umum untuk Bencana Alam dan Musibah.
4. Pelayanan Kesehatan Masyarakat, Poliklinik BP dan RB.
5. Panti Jompo dan Werdha untuk lanjut usia (lansia).
6. Rumah Panti Asuhan Cacad Ganda (Cacat Mental dan Phisik).
7. Bantuan pendidikan bagi anak-anak gelandangan.
8. Pelayanan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (KK dan KKS).
9. Kredit Candak Kulak (KCK) untuk Warga di Pemukiman / Usaha Kecil
10. Bantuan Peningkatan Sarana Umum (Jalan & Jembatan) di Pedesaan.
11. Usaha Peningkatan Gizi Keluarga (UPGK) dan Posyandu.
12. Bantuan Modal Usaha Ekonomi Produktif, melalui UP2K - UBSP.
13. Bantuan Pengadaan Sarana Air Bersih.
14. Transmigrasi Swakarsa dan Swakarsa.
15. Asrama Anak Sekolah Luar Biasa (SLB).

B. Daerah Pelayanan kegiatan.

1. Jawa Tengah.
2. Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta.
3. Jawa Timur.
4. Sumatra Selatan.
5. Bengkulu.
6. Lampung.
7. Kalimantan.
8. Nusa Tenggara Timur.
9. Timor Timur.

VI. SUMBERDAYA DAN PENGEMBANGANNYA.

Dalam pelaksanaan kegiatan pelayanan bagi keluarga dan masyarakat yang membutuhkan / perlu mendapat bantuan, sumberdaya dan usaha yang telah di lakukan sampai saat ini adalah :

A. Sumber Daya Manusia (SDM).

Secara keseluruhan, sumber daya manusia (SDM) yang ikut terlibat secara langsung dalam berbagai bidang kegiatan pelayanan ± 150 orang-karyawan. Seluruh jumlah tersebut di atas dalam pelaksanaan kerja terkoordinir dalam suatu program masing-masing bagian kegiatan (= 15 bagian program).

Berdasarkan catatan data yang ada, dari sebanyak ± 150 orang karyawan seperti tersebut di atas, mempunyai latar belakang sebagai berikut :

1. Pendidikan formal setingkat SLTA ditambah kursus-kursus = ± 80 %
2. Pendidikan formal Sarjana (S1) dan Akademi (D3) = ± 20 %.
3. Agama dan Kepercayaan : Katolik, Kristen, Islam, Kepercayaan pada Tuhan YME, dls.
4. Menurut asal kelahiran : Jawa, Sumatra Selatan, NTT, Sulawesi , dan Bali.

B. Sumber Dana Pembiayaan.

Sumber-sumber dana bagi pembiayaan kegiatan pelayanan sebagai karyanyata Dharma Bhakti Sosial Yayasan Sosial Soegiyapranata (YSS) Keuskupan Agung Semarang, antara lain berasal dari :

1. Sumbangan dari para Keluarga Golongan Mampu (rutin / isidentil).
2. Sumbangan dari para Pelajar / Siswa SD / SLTP / SLTA.
3. Dari Kelompok dan Organisasi Masyarakat dan Profesi (Dharma Wanita, PKK , Wanita Katolik, dls).
4. Sumbangan dari Pemerintah, melalui Kantor Dinas / Instansi, Departemen Sosial, Pemerintah Daerah, dls.
5. Sumbangan dari Lembaga Dana / Donatur Agency, baik dari dalam maupun luar negeri, seperti : Dharmais, CRS-USCC Indonesia, USC. Canada, OXSFAM, USAID, CEBEMO, SIMAFI, MISSERIOR, dls. Bantuan dari lembaga dana tersebut diatas ada yang bersufat rutin, dan ada yang berdasarkan usulan / proposal. Saat ini, sudah banyak b e r k u r a n g keterlibatan lembaga dana luar negeri yang membiayai program kegiatan di YSS Semarang.

C. Jalinan Kemitraan.

Dalam melaksahakan kegiatan program pelayanan bagi keluarga dan masyarakat penyandang masalah social tersebut, serta upaya gabi peningkatan Sumber Daya Manusia (SDM) yang ada, Yayasan Sosial Soegiyapranata (YSS) Keuskupan Agung Semarang melakukannya dengan berbagai cara, antara lain :

1. Menjalin kerjasama secara kemitraan dengan Pemerintah Daerah setempat, seperti : Pemerintah Daerah Tk. I , Pemerintah Daerah-Tk. II, Kecamatan, dan Desa / Kelurahan.
2. Dengan Pemerintah Pusat melalui jajaran Departemennya, seperti : Departemen Transmigrasi RI, Departemen Sosial RI, Kantor Menteri Negara Perumahan Rakyat RI, Kantor Menteri Negara Kependudukan / BKKBN Republik Indonesia (Tk. Pusat, Tk. I dan Tk. II), dls.
3. Dengan Kelompok Institusi yang ada dan Lembaga Pendidikan Tinggi Negeri / Swasta s e t e m p a t .
6. Dengan Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (LSM) maupun Lembaga Pengembangan Swadaya Masyarakat (LPSM) lainnya, seperti : Bina Swadaya (Jakarta) , Bina Desa (Jakarta) , Muhamadiyah (Jawa Tengah) , YBKS (Solo) , YSBS Cilacap , Dian Desa Yogyakarta, dls.

VII. STRUKTUR ORGANISASI YSS SEMARANG.

Berikut gambaran jalinan kerja dalam pengorganisasian dalam Yayasan Sosial Soegiyapranata (YSS) Keuskupan Agung Semarang pada saat ini sesuai dengan keadaan dan kegiatan pelayanan bagi keluarga dan masyarakat.

Gambar Struktur Organisasi



VIII. HASIL - HASIL KEGIATAN PELAYANAN.

Beberapa hasil kegiatan yang telah dapat dilaksanakan oleh Yayasan Sosial Soegiyapranata (YSS) Keuskupan Agung Semarang untuk para keluarga dan masyarakat penyandang masalah sosial, baik yang tinggal di Perkotaan maupun yang tinggal di Pedesaan, antara lain sebagai berikut :

1. Relokasi dan Pemukiman.

Hasil kegiatan ini dapat langsung dilihat dilokasi kegiatan Relokasi dan Pemukiman Tuna Wisma & Tuna Karya YSS. Semarang. Sampai saat

ini, terdapat 10 Lokasi Relokasi dan Pemukiman Tuna Wisma & Tuna - Karya YSS yang tersebar di daerah pinggiran Wilayah Kodya Dati II Semarang. Luas seluruh pemukiman tersebut ± 26,637 Hektar, dengan - jumlah kapling bangunan rumah sebanyak ± 1.838 unit, dan dengan jumlah penghuni sebanyak ± 2.084 Kepala Keluarga (KK).

Seluruh lokasi Pemukiman tersebut di atas, saat ini sudah masuk dalam Tata Pemerintahan Pemda Dati II Kodya Semarang, yang terbagi dalam wilayah 'Rukun Warga (RW)' Kelurahan setempat, yaitu sebanyak : 13 (Tiga Belas) RW.

Manfaat secara langsung yang dapat dirasakan oleh para pemukim antara lain : mereka telah memiliki rumah hunian yang tetap dan dapat-ikut berperan dalam kegiatan pembangunan masyarakat dilingkungannya, (menjadi Pengurus RT, Pengurus RW, PKK, Karang Taruna, Posyandu, Kader Kesehatan & KB, dls).

2. Transmigrasi Swajarsa Mandiri.

Kegiatan program Transmigrasi Swakarsa Mandiri ini dilakukan dengan-menjalin kerjasama secara kemitraan dengan Departemen Trasnmigrasi , mulai dari Tingkat Pusat s/d Tingkat I & II terkait. Sudah cukup banyak jumlah keluarga yang ditransmigrasikan / ikut transmigrasi melalui program Transmigrasi YSS Semarang ini.

Berdasarkan daerah asal keluarga / masyarakat yang ikut transmigrasi serta daerah tujuan transmigrasi seperti tersebut di atas, antara lain sebagai berikut :

a. Dari daerah asal : Kab. Kendal, Cilacap, Banjarnegara, Wonosobo, Boyalali, Banyumas, Magelang.

b. Lokasi transmigrasi : Lampung, Bengkulu, Sumatra Selatan, Kalimantan Barat, Kalimantan Selatan, dan Timor Timur.

3. Bantuan Umum dan Bencana Alam.

Pelaksanaan kegiatan ini masih lebih banyak / cenderung dalam bentuk bantuan karitatif. Pelayanan dan bantuan diberikan kepada para keluarga kurang mampu dan tidak mampu dalam bentuk santunan biaya pendidikan anak, biaya rawat jalan dan inap, bantuan material / perbaikan rumah yang terkena musibah bencana, pemberian bahan makanan, dls.

Mereka yang membutuhkan bantuan seperti tersebut diatas, hampir sebagian besar mendatangi Kantor YSS Semarang. Bantuan yang diberikan , disesuaikan dengan kondisi dan kebutuhan yang ada / diperlukan. Bila memang membutuhkan kunjungan guna melihat secara langsung keadaannya , maka staff YSS Semarang akan meninjau ke rumah keluarga yang membutuhkan untuk konfirmasi keadaan yang dihadapi oleh pemohon bantuan.

Sedangkan untuk jenis bantuan bagi keluarga / masyarakat yang terkena Musibah Bencana Alam , dengan tanpa membatasi lokasi wilayah jangkauan, maka melalui Panitia / Posko / Dinas Sosial setempat, YSS Semarang akan mengirimkan bantuan untuk korban musibah tersebut. Jenis bantuan yang diberikan oleh YSS Semarang dapat berupa : pakaian pantas pakai, bahan makanan, Team Kesehatan dari Poliklinik YSS Semarang, dls.

4. Bantuan Peningkatan Sarana Umum Masyarakat.

Kegiatan bantuan ini sebagian besar ditujukan bagi Peningkatan Kebutuhan Sarana Umum Masyarakat yang tinggal di Pedesaan; khususnya bagi peningkatan sarana jalan dan jembatan sebagai transpotasi penghubung antar desa, disamping untuk masalah kebutuhan Air Bersih dan Bak penampungnya.

Kegiatan program semacam ini sudah cukup banyak dilaksanakan dan hasilnya dapat dirasakan secara langsung oleh masyarakat pengguna dipedesaan. Lokasi dan daerah yang telah mendapatkan bantuan melaluiprogram ini, antara lain : Kab. Cilacap, Wonogiri, Rembang, Pati , Banjarnegara, Batang, Pemalang, Kebumen, Demak, Boyolali, Purbalinga, Kab. Semarang, Gunung Kidul, dls.

Adapun jenis bantuan yang telah dilaksanakan di daerah-daerah seperti tersebut di atas, antara lain : Pengadaan Sarana Air Bersih, Peningkatan / pembuatan jalan dan jembatan, Bak Penampung Air Bersih serta perpipaannya, Pembangkit Listrik Tenaga Air (PLTA), dls.
Sistem pelaksanaan kegiatan, dilakukan bersama dengan masyarakat dan Pemerintah Daerah setempat, dan LKMD setempat.

5. Pengembangan Program Pelayanan Masyarakat.

Bagian Pengembangan program Pelayanan Masyarakat ini, secara langsung kegiatannya tidak begitu dikenal oleh masyarakat yang menerimabantuan dari YSS Semarang. Bagian pengembangan program disini berfungsi sebagai pengolah dan mencari peluang agar program kegiatan dilapangan dapat berjalan dengan baik sesuai dengan rencana dan tujuan yang ditetapkan.

6. Bantuan Pengadaan Sarana Air Bersih.

Sebagian besar kegiatan bantuan Pengadaan Sarana Air Bersih YSS Semarang dilakukan di daerah pedesaan di wilayah Propinsi Dati I Jawa Tengah dan Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta. Jenis bantuan yang diberikan berupa pembuatan / pembangunan Sarana Air Bersih, Bak Penampung, dan Perpipaannya. Pembuatan saran air bersih yang dimaksud dapat berupa pembuatan Sumur (Galian / Pengeboran) , atau Bak penampung sumber mata air yang sudah ada sebelumnya.

Pada tahun-tahun terakhir ini, peogram Bantuan Pengadaan Sarana Air Bersih YSS Semarang, sudah mengembangkan daerah pelayanan ke wilayah Propinsi Timor Timur, yang berkaitan dengan hasil program kegiatan Transmigrasi (kerjasama Dep. Transmigrasi dengan YSS Semarang).

7. Bantuan Pelayanan melalui KK, KKS / CCF.

Ditujukan bagi para keluarga tidak mampu / kurang mampu bagi upaya peningkatan kesejahteraan keluarga, khususnya mereka yang tingkat sosial ekonomi rendah. Bantuan melalui kegiatan program ini berupa ; pemberian bantuan santunan untuk biaya pendidikan / sekolah anak (SD , SLTP dan SLTA), dan pembinaan hidup sehat dalam keluarga serta lingkungannya. Sebagian besar para keluarga yang mendapat bantuan dengan program ini adalah, para keluarga yang tinggal di tempat Relokasi & Pemukiman Tuna Wisma & Tuna Karya YSS Semarang. Walau demikian, sebagian lagi yang mendapat bantuan adalah mereka yang tinggal disekitar Pemukiman yang keadaan ekonominya memprihatinkan dan layak untuk dibantu.

8. Bantuan Modal Usaha Kecil (KCK).

Kegiatan bantuan ini lebih dikenal dengan istilah Kredit Candak Kulak (KCK). Diperuntukan bagi keluarga kurang mampu yang akan memulai atau mengembangkan usahanya, dengan tanpa ikatan pembinaan yang bersifat rutin.

Hampir sebagian besar yang datang dan membutuhkan KCK ini adalah para pedagang kecil / keliling (penjual es, tempe, sayuran, warungan), tukang becak, buruh bangunan, buruh / pembantu rumah tangga, dls. Besarnya pinjaman yang diajukan / diberikan pada mereka, berkisar antara Rp. 20.000,00 s/d Rp. 100.000,00 atau tergantung dari jenis usahanya maupun kemampuan untuk pengembaliannya. Sampai saat ini, jumlah keluarga yang dilayanan KCK sebanyak ± 1.000 orang KK yang sebagian besar tinggal di tempat Relokasi & Pemukiman Tuna Wisma dan Tuna Karya YSS Semarang (seperti : Pemukiman Deliksari, Mangunhardjo, Mayangsari, Langensari, dan Tenjungredjo).

9. Bantuan Usaha Peningkatan Pendapatan Keluarga, UP2K.

Bantuan bagi Usaha Peningkatan Pendapatan Keluarga (UP2K) ini dipe - runtukan bagi 'Ibu - ibu' di pedesaan guna membantu meningkatkan - penghasilan keluarga yang rata-rata masih tergolong rendah. Pelaksanaannya dengan menggunakan pendekatan pada sistem pembinaan rutin & kunjungan yang dilakukan oleh Petugas Lapangan YSS Semarang. Para kelompok sasaran program ini sebelumnya diberikan semacam Latihan untuk pengorganisasian kelompoknya, baik untuk latihan administrasi - maupun pengelolaan dana melalui kegiatan tabungan anggota (peserta).

Latihan yang diberikan seperti tersebut di atas, lebih dikenal dengan 'Kursus UP2K Usaha Bersama - Simpan Pinjam' selama 3 hari atau selama 24 Jam Efektif setiap angkatan kursus. Setelah selesai diberikan kursus, maka mereka akan membentuk Kelompok Usaha Bersama (UB) yang anggotanya berasal dari mereka yang tinggal di desa bersangkutan. Kegiatan pokok Kelompok Usaha Bersama adalah, menghimpun modal melalui kegiatan Tabungan Anggota dan melaksanakan Pinjaman kepada - para anggotanya.

Awal pelaksanaan program Bantuan UP2K ini, dimulai pada Tahun 1984 - sampai sekarang. Adapun lokasi kegiatan bantuan di luar Semarang, yaitu : di Kabupaten Dati II Pemalang (Kecamatan Pulosari, Kecamatan Belik, dan Kecamatan Watukumpul), serta di Kabupaten Dati II Batang (Kecamatan Wonotunggal dan Kecamatan Blado).
Jenis bantuan yang diberikan selain kunjungan pembinaan oleh Petugas Lapangan YSS secara rutin, juga berupa 'Modal Usaha' yang berupa - DANA secara tunai d a n Ternak Kambing. Kedua jenis bantuan modal usaha tersebut dikembalikan ke YSS Semarang dengan cara mengangsur.

10. Panti Asuhan / Asrama Anak SLB Ungaran.

Pengelolaan Panti Asuhan / Asrama Anak Sekolah Luar Biasa (SLB) YSS di Ungaran ini merupakan kegiatan yang tergolong masuh baru, dimulai tahun 1993 yang lalu. Panti tersebut sebelumnya dikelola oleh Dinas Sosial Kebupaten Dati II Semarang, dan YSS Semarang menjadi salah satu mitra-kerja yang memberikan bantuan tidak secara rutin.

Perkembangan selanjutnya, ditawarkan pada YSS Semarang melalui Bapak Kepala Dinas Sosial Kab. Dati II Semarang k e p a d a Bruder Servatius, FIC selaku Ketua Pelaksana YSS Semarang. Setelah mendapat persetujuan dari Instansi terkait (Pemda dan Dep. Sos), maka sejak itu secara resmi dikelola dan menjadi program baru di YSS Semarang.

11. Pelayanan Kesehatan dan Poliklinik.

Kegiatan pelayanan kesehatan untuk keluarga dan masyarakat, yang merupakan awal kegiatan YSS Semarang saat mulai berdiri tahun 1963, telah mengalami perkembangan yang cukup besar, baik jumlah yang dilayani maupun tempat -tempat pelayanannya.

Sampai saat ini perkembangan kegiatan pelayanan dibidang kesehatan , antara lain sebagai berikut :

a. Telah dimilikinya tempat - tempat pelayanan kesehatan masyarakay yang berupa Rumah Balai Pengobatan / Poliklinik & Rumah Bersalin yaitu ; 3 (Tiga) Poliklinik Balai Pengobatan, dan 2 (dua) Poliklinik Balai Pengobatan (BP) & Rumah Bersalin (RB). Balai Kesehatan tersebut telah mempunyai izin operasional dan dibina Dinas Kesehatan Kodya (DKK) Semarang.

b. Dengan telah dimilikinya Balai Kesehatan seperti tersebut diatas maka telah meningkat pula jumlah masyarakat yang dapat dilayani. Hal tersebut terlihat dari banyaknya jumlah kunjungan masyarakat (pasien) yang berobat setiap harinya dengan biaya yang dapat terjangkau oleh mereka yang tergolong kurang mampu ekonominya.

c. Telah dapat dilakukannya model pelayanan kesehatan 'Poliklinik - Keliling' seminggu sekali dimasing-masing daerah lokasi Relokasi & Pemukiman Tuna Wisma & Tuna Karya YSS Semarang, yaitu : Pemukiman YSS - Muktihardjo, Tanggungredjo, Tambak Dalem, dan - Tambak Lorok. Kegiatan ini bertujuan agar biaya yang diperlukan / dikeluarkan oleh mereka semakin terjangkau (Murah), karena tak dibutuhkan biaya transpotasi untuk berobat ke Balai Pengobatan.

12. Pelayanan Pendidikan bagi Anak Gelandangan / Terlantar.

Kegiatan pelayanan pendidikan bagi anak gelandangan / terlantar yang cukup banyak ditemui di sekitar Pasar Johar Semarang, dilaksanakan - mulai sekitar tahun 1986, dengan dibantu oleh para relawan yang menaruh kepedulian terhadap masalah pembinaan anak gelandangan oleh YSS Semarang ini.

Cara melaksanakan kegiatan tersebut adalah, mendatangi / mengunjungi tempat mereka biasa berkumpul dan mencari makan di area Pasar Johar. Mereka dikumpulkan dan mulai sedikit demi sedikit diarahkan, dibim - bing untuk bisa mempersiapkan diri dikehidupan mendatang yang lebih-baik / layak, mulai diperkenalkan dengan ketrampilan baca tulis dan lain sebagainya.

13. Panti Asuhan Anak Cacat Ganda Bhakti Asih.

Panti Asuhan Anak yang menderita Cacat Ganda Bhakti Asih - YSS dimaksudkan untuk membantu para keluarga yang mempunyai anak penderita Cacat Phisik dan Cacat Mental. Tentu saja dari para keluarga yang kurang dan tidak mampu secara ekonomi.

Anak cacat ganda tersebut 'tinggal dan asuh' di Panti, dengan usia antara 5 s/d 15 tahun (putra maupun putri). Saat ini baru dimiliki 1 (satu) unit Panti Asuhan Anak Cacat Ganda, yaitu : di Jl. Ismangil - Bongsari, Kodya Semarang.

14. Panti Jompo untuk Lanjut Usia (Lansia).

Sampai saat ini YSS Semarang telah memiliki 3 (tiga) Rumah Panti Jompo untuk lanjut usia.

Yaitu : Panti Werdha Rindang Asih I (Bongsari) , Panti Werdha Rindang Asih II (Ungaran) , dan Panti Werdha Rindang Asih III (Ngaliyan).

Adapun tujuan pengelolaan Panti Jompo tersebut, adalah sebagai sarana pelayanan bagi keluarga kurang mampu yang mempunyai anggota keluarga lanjut usia, dan kurang mampu dalam merawat dan membinanya.

15. Bantuan pelayanan bagi Usaha Peningkatan Gizi Keluarga (UPGK).

Kegiatan bantuan bagi Usaha Peningkatan Gizi Keluarga (UPGK) ini , dilakukan melalui pembinaan dan pendampingan secara terencana - rutin dan terarah / terpadu dengan program Pemerintah Daerah setempat melalui pelaksanaan program Posyandu & Penimbangan Balita.
Dan kegiatan UPGK tersebut, dilakukan dengan jalinan kerjasama kemitraan dengan Team Penggerak PKK Dati II / Pemda setempat.

Bentuk dan jenis kegiatan yang telah dilaksanakan yaitu : Posyandu Terpadu, Penimbangan Balita, Pemberian Makanan Tambahan untuk Balita dan Ibu hamil. Program tersebut dilaksanakan di Kabupaten Pemalang (Kec. Belik, Pulosari, dan Watukumpul) sampai dengan Th. 1988, dan di Kabupaten Batang (Kec, Wonotunggal dan Blado) sampai dengan tahun. 1991 (selama 3 tahun).

IX. P E N U T U P ,

JENIS kegiatan program dan hasilnya seperti yang di uraikan di atas, merupakan sebagian besar saja, baik yang telah dilaksanakan, masih dilaksanakan sampai saat ini, dan maupun yang telah tidak dilaksanakan lagi karena keterbatasan sumber dana pendukung yang membiayai kegiatan program yang dimaksud.

NAMUN demikian, sebagai usaha untuk merealisasi tujuan Dharma Bhakti Sosial yang telah ditetapkan sebagai 'karya dan misi' Yayasan (YSS Semarang) , maka sudah menjadi tekat untuk terus mengupayakan serta menguasahakan dengan membuka peluang baru secara positif guna terus mengembangkan kegiatan bantuan pelayanan bagi keluarga dan masyarakat kurang mampu yang membutuhkan / perlu bantuan.

S e m o g a ,

Semarang, 10 Pebruari 1995.

Mengetahui,	Penyusun.
br. Servatius, fic.	FB, Budiyono.
Ketua Pelaksana YSS Smg.	Staff Pengembangan Program YSS.

N U

NAHDLATUL ULAMA

SEMARANG

PENGURUS BESAR NAHDLATUL ULAMA

Jalan Kramat Raya No. 164, Jakarta 10430 Telp. (021) 323033 - 3908424 - 3926451
Fax. 3908425, E-mail : pbnu@indo.net.id

LAMPIRAN SK PBNU.

Nomor : 233 /A.II.04 d/VIII/1998
Tanggal : 19 Agustus 1998

SUSUNAN PWNU PROP. JAWA TENGAH
1998-2003

MUSTASYAR	:	**KH.MA. Sahal Mahfudz**
		KH. Muntaha Al Hafidz
		KH. Habib Luthfi bin Yahya
		KH. Mustolih Badawi
		KH. Cholil Bisri
		KH. Wildan Abdul Hamid
		DR.H. Zamachsyari Dhofier, MA
SYURIYAH	:	
Rais	:	**KH. MC. Amin Sholeh**
Wakil Rais		**DR.KH.Noer Iskandar Al-Barsany, MA**
Wakil Rais		**Drs. KH. Ahmad Adzro'i**
Wakil Rais		**Drs. KH. Syamsuddin Anwar**
Wakil Rais		**KH.M. Nadhif Zuhri, Lc**
Wakil Rais		**KH. Abdul Wahid Zuhdi**
Wakil Rais		**KH. Hanif Ismail, Lc**
Wakil Rais		**Drs. KH. Moh. Zuhri**
Wakil Rais		**KH. Musyaffa' Ahmad**
Katib	:	**KH.M. Hanif Muslich, Lc**
Wakil Katib		**KH. Ubaidillah Shodaqoh, SH**
Wakil Katib		**Drs. KH. EM. Nadjib Hasan**
Wakil Katib		**KH.A. Nur Kholis Ali**
A' W A N	:	**KH.A. Fayumi Munji**
		KH. Zaeni Mawardi
		KH. Hidayat
		Drs. KH. Musa Abdillah
		KH. Ni'am Zuhri
		KH. Chumaidi Abdul Haq
		KH. Subki Masyhadi
		Drs. H. Musthofa Sonhadji, MA
		KH. Nasucha Machalie
		KH. Achmad Nur Abdul Majid
		KH. Rofi' i Masyhuri
		KH. Abdul Aziz Mahfuf
		KH. Zuhri Ihsan
		KH. Masruri Mughni
		DR.H. Abdurrahman Mas'ud

TANFIDZIYAH : .....

PENGURUS BESAR NAHDLATUL ULAMA

Jalan Kramat Raya No. 164, Jakarta 10430 Telp. (021) 323033 - 3908424 - 3926451
Fax. 3908425, E-mail : pbnu@indo.net.id

TANFIDZIYAH :

Ketua	:	**Drs. H. Achmad**
Wakil Ketua		**KH.M. Masykuri CH.**
Wakil Ketua		**H. Ismail Abdullah, BA**
Wakil Ketua		**Drs. H. Moh. Djamilun**
Wakil Ketua		**Drs.H. Ali Mufiz, MPA**
Wakil Ketua		**Drs. H. Fatah Dahlan**
Wakil Ketua		**Drs. H. Muhammad Adnan, MA**
Sekretaris	:	**Drs. H.A. Rofiq, MA**
Wakil Sekretaris		**Drs. H. Abdullah Satori**
Wakil Sekretaris		**Drs. M. Muzamil**
Wakil Sekretaris		**H. Fatchullah Ahmadi, BA**
Bendahara	:	**HM. Ngadiyono**
Wakil Bendahara		**H. Abdullah Machrus**
Wakil Bendahara		**H. Musta'in**

PENGURUS BESAR NAHDLATUL ULAMA,

RAIS AM,	**KATIB AM,**	**KETUA UMUM,**	**SEKJEN,**
KH.MOH. ILYAS RUHIAT.	**KH.Drs.M.DAWAM ANWAR.**	**H. ABDURRAHMAN WAHID.**	**H. AHMAD BAGDJA**

R A L A T

halaman II bagian b tertulis :

R a i s : KH. Zubair
K e t u a : KH. Cholig

yang betul :

R a i s : KH. Zubair
K e t u a : KH. Zabidi

halaman II bagian C tertulis :

R a i s : KH. Muslih
K e t u a : KH. Jalil

yang betul :

R a i s : KH. Abdul Jalil
K e t u a : KH. Muslih

DINAMIKA NU PASCA KHITTAH 26

Dari Gerakan Politik menuju Gerakan Sosial

Oleh : Elyasa KH Dharwis

Kembali ke Khittah NU 1926 merupakan titik awal perubahan artikulasi politik NU. Semula diimplementasikan dalam gerakan politik (political movement) dengan orientasi dan target kekuasaan di parlemen atau lembaga legislatif, beralih dan menjelma dalam format politik yang lebih berorientasi pada pembangunan bangsa untuk terciptanya kondisi sosial, ekonomi dan politik yang berkeadilan dan demokratis.

Dataran baru itu dengan sendirinya mengantarkan kiprah NU pada horison yang cukup luas dibanding ruang gerak yang tersedia sebelumnya. Dari hanya sebatas pada politik praktis dengan semua perhatian terkonsentrasi pada usaha memperoleh kekuasaan, maka setelah kembali ke khittah NU 1926 format perjuanganya tampak sebagai gerakan sosial (social movement) dengan artikulasi yang dapat dimainkan cukup luas dan membangsa. Tidak lagi memikirkan diri sendiri sebagai kelompok yang partikularistik, tetapi lebih dari itu melewati sekat-sekat primordialisme mengarahkan pada persoalan kebangsaan yang cukup universal dan tidak lagi bergerak dengan laju mobilitas vertikal.

Artikulasi dan gerak yang dilakukan ialah bagaimana melakukan transformasi sosial ekonomi dan politik lapisan masyarakat bawah pada satu sisi sebagai ikhtiar membangun basis guna meningkatkan kualitas partisipasi masyarakat dalam proses-proses politik yang sedang berlangsung.

Sementara pada sisi lain dilakukan usaha untuk mencairkan suasana monoton dalam atmosfir politik dengan isu-isu demokratitasi, pembangunan politik yang aspiratif dan menekankan aspek keadilan dalam

sektor ekonomi; juga berusaha ikut berperan dalam menafsirkan ideologi negara yang sebelum itu sepertinya menjadi monopoli pemerintah saja.

Pilihan NU melakukan pemberdayaan masyarakat merupakan discourse (perbincangan) baru dalam kehidupan organisasi kemasyarakatan (ormas). NU yang sebelumnya oleh sementara pengamat diberi predikat oportunistik dan punya sikap akomodatif dalam ekspresi politiknya, pada saat terlihat kecenderungan elit politik membutuhkan dukungan untuk menegaskan eksistensi politiknya, NU justru meninggalkan politik praktis dan memilih kerja kebudayaan dan membangun kekuatan suatu lapisan masyarakat yang selama ini corpus dan sendi-sendinya kropos. Satu lapisan dalam struktur lapisan masyarakat Indonesia yang secara politik dan ekonomi jarang aspirasi dan opininya bisa bergulir dalam politik elit kecuali disebut-sebut sebagai atas nama. Sebagian besar lapisan ini jika dilihat socio geografisnya adalah warga NU.

Dalam iklim sekarang, langkah NU merupakan pemberdayaan masyarakat sipil (empowerment of civil society) memang suatu yang kurang populer karena hal itu berarti suatu kondisi politik yang lebih menghendaki adanya korporatisme dalam segala sektor strategis. Apalagi jika melihat kenyataan, dengan langkah semacam ini, NU tidak lain membangun suatu komunitas masyarakat yang memiliki kemandirian dalam sikap politik, ekonomi dan budaya.

Dilihat dari sini, maka upaya yang dilakukan NU sesungguhnya merupakan kerja yang sangat sulit tetapi sangat diperlukan.

Derasnya arus tantangan ekspoternal dari struktur makro yang policynya cukup dominan dalam mempertahankan stabilitas keamanan serta belum terbukanya iklim yang memungkinkan untuk menciptakan otonomi serta partisipasi yang bebas dari masyarakat, merupakan variabel utama yang menjadi kendala bagi upaya besar yang dilakukan NU ini. Belum lagi kondisi internal NU sendiri, yang tampaknya tidak sabar melihat kiprah

dan gerakan sosial yang dilakukan, acapkali mengganggu jalannya garis keberpihakan NU.

Dua hal ini membuat upaya NU untuk menciptakan ruang publik (publik sphare) yang dinamis di mana masyarakat bisa memiliki akses penuh terhadap setiap kegiatan publik, melakukan kegiatan secara merdeka dalam menyampaikan aspirasi, pendapat, berserikat serta bebas menyiarkan opini masyarakat dalam bentuk lisan atau tulisan, sampai saat ini, masih merupakan utopi karena pemerintah menganggap dirinya sebagai penaggung jawab tunggal pembangunan.

Karena itu, maka dalam iklim politik yang muncul dalam paket-paket yang harus dilakukan oleh masyarakat, kebijakan dalam pembangunan diatur dalam sentralistik sehingga ruang gerak masyarakat untuk mengembangkan segala potensi dan kreatifitas tidak tersedia.

Implikasinya kemudian dalam kehidupan sosial politik, masyarakat tidak cukup memiliki daya tanggap (responsiveness), serta relatif rendah tingkat partisipasinya dalam masalah-masalah kehidupan sosial politik yang ada. Dan NU mencoba meretas kebekuan ini dengan mengajukan suatu discourse baru dengan mengutamakan kehendak warga negara dan penolakan terhadap pemusatan dan sifat totalitas kekuasaan, melalui ekspresi politik selama ini ditampakkan.

Dalam bidang politik, misalnya, NU cukup mengambil jarak dengan pusat kekuasaan meskipun dalam beberapa waktu ini berkembang politik akomodasi, ditambah lagi misalnya, dalam sektor ekonomi, NU mencoba memfasilitasi kalangan bawah dengan mendirikan BPR-BPR.
Akumulasi pilihan NU disinyalir banyak pengamat sebagai langkah untuk menemukan kembali kekuatan masyarakat sipil (the recovery and empowerment of civil society) yang selama ini lenyap dari wacana politik kita. Betulkah ? sejarahlah yang akan menjawab. (bulletin lakpesdam NU).

NAHDLATUL ULAMA JAWA TENGAH

Selayang pandang

Sebagai organisasi kemasyarakatan yang mempunyai banyak massa, Nahdlatul Ulama Jawa Tengah mencoba berbuat untuk berkiprah demi kemaslahatan ummat, khususnya warga nahdliyyin. Hal ini sesuai dengan garis perjuangan Nahdlatul Ulama, yaitu yang popu-ler dengan istilah **kembali ke khitthah**, maka orientasi Nahdlatul Ulama tidak lagi ke politik praktis, akan tetapi menjadi organi-sasi kemasyarakatan yang berkiprah di bidang sosial keagamaan. Sejak berdirinya, yaitu tanggal 16 Rajab 1344 H atau 31 Januari 1926 Nahdlatul Ulama mengalami pasang surut bidang garapnya, semula di bidang sosial keagamaan, kemudian di bidang politik yang ditandai dengan ikut pemilu pada tahun 1955 dan tahun 1971. Kemudian pada tahun 1984 (pada Muktamar Nu ke 27 Situbondo) NU kembali ke bidang garap semula, yakni sosial keagamaan.

Demikian juga halnya Nahdlatul Ulama yang ada di Jawa Te- ngah, mau tidak mau harus mengikuti keputusan PBNU mengenai bidang garapnya. Maka tidak heran jika pada awal NU menjadi partai politik, orientasi kerjanya hanya bagaimana memperbanyak kursi di lembaga Legislatif, bukan bagaimana mengurusi ummat. Sehingga tidak heran kalau tak sempat untuk berfikir bagaimana memiliki sekretariat yang tetap yang dapat menampung segala aktifitas untuk tingkat Jawa Tengah. Di awal ini pula kondisi NU Jawa Tengah mengalami beberapa kali pindah kantor, antara lain :

a. Masa khidmat : 1953 - 1955

Rais	: KH. Zubair
K e t u a	: KH. Choliq
Kantor	: Jalan Layur 70 A, Semarang

b. Masa khidmat : 1955 - 1957
Rais : KH. Zubair
K e t u a : KH. Choliq
Kantor : Wisma PHI Jawa Tengah
Jalan KH. Wahid Hasyim 125-127, Semarang

c. Masa khidmat : 1957 -1958
Rais . KH. Muslih
K e t u a : KH. Jalil
Kantor : Wisma PHI Jawa Tengah
Jalan KH. Wahid Hasyim 125-127, Semarang

d. Masa khidmat : 1958 - 1967
Rais : KH. Zubair
K e t u a : H. Imam Sofwan
Kantor : Jalan dr. Cipto 133, Semarang

agar lebih berkonsentrasi dalam berkhidmat, tidak perlu setiap ganti pengurus pindah kantor, maka pada akhir periode ini, Nah- dlatul Ulama Jawa Tengah membeli rumah beserta tanah dari Bapak drh Samsoe Poespo Soegondo yang terletak di jalan dr. Cipto 180, Semarang. Maka sejak itu pula dengan kepengurusan yang baru, yaitu pada masa khidmah 1967 - 1977 Nahdlatul Ulama Jawa Tengah bermarkas di Jalan dr. Cipto 180, Semarang. Berikut ini kami sampaikan periodesasi PWNU Jawa Tengah hingga sekarang.

a. Masa khidmat : 1967 - 1977
Rais · KH. Bisri Mustofa
Ketua . H. Imam Sofwan
Kantor : Jalan dr. Cipto 180, Semarang

b. Masa khidmat : 1977 - 1981
Rais : KH. Ahmad Abdul Hamid
Ketua : H. Mochtar Chudlori
Kantor : Jalan dr. Cipto 180, Semarang

c. Masa khidmat : 1981 - 1985
Rais : KH. MA. Sahal Mahfudz
Ketua : H. Imam Sofwan
Kantor : Jalan dr. Cipto 180, Semarang

d. Masa khidmat : 1985 - 1989
Rais : KH. Maemun Zubair
Ketua : KH. Abdul Hadi Sofwan (Ymt. Ir. Mustofa Zuhad)
Kantor : Jalan dr. Cipto 180, Semarang

e. Masa khidmat : 1990 - 1994
Rais : KH. MC. Amin Sholeh
Ketua : Drs. KHA. Buchori Masruri (Ymt. KHM. Masykuri)
Kantor : Jalan dr. Cipto 180, Semarang

f. Masa khidmat : 1994 - 1998
Rais : KH. MC. Amin Sholeh
Ketua : Drs. H. Achmad
Kantor : Jalan dr. Cipto 180, Semarang

LIST OF VILLAGES

LAPORAN HASIL KEGIATAN PERTEMUAN
EMERGENCY PROGRAM KORWIL IV
Tanggal 21 Juli 1998

Menindaklanjuti peertemuan program emergency di Ambarukmo-Yogyakarta pada tanggal 14 Juli 1998, kama korwil IV melakukan inisiatif mengadakan pertemuan pada tanggal 21 Juli 1998 bertempat di Puslat UPKM YAKKUM Kartasura.
Dalam pertemuan tersebut diundang segenap unsur perwakilan antar umat beragama yaitu Walubi, PHDI,BAGK,NU,Kevikepan/Paroki dari kab. Wonogiri, Sukoharjo, Sragen, Karanganyar, Boyolali, dan Solo.
Kemudian dari undangan tersebut telah hadir wakil-wakil dari :

1. Walubi - Solo
2. PHDI - Solo
3. Bamusak- Wonogiri
4. NU - Surakarta
5. NU - Sragen
6. BKGS - Sragen
7. BAGKS - Solo
8. BKGS - Sukoharjo
9. Kevikepan - Solo
10. NU Sukoharjo
11. YPIO Boyolali
12. GKAI Sukoharjo
13. Walubi Karanganyar
14. NU Boyolali
15. PHDI Wonogiri
16. Walubi Wonogiri
17. NU Wonogiri
18. Walubi Boyolali
19. NU Karanganyar
20. PHDI Boyolali

Dalam pertemuan tersebut dibahas materi-materi pertemuan a.l. :
1. Informasi hasil pertemuan korwil-korwil bersama CRS di Ambarukmo Yogyakarta
2. Materi penyusunan proposal (Kriteria, penentuan/data wilayah, kepanitiaan dll)
3. Kesepakatan-kesepakatan dan usulan

Hasil-Hasil Pertemuan :

Informasi dari hasil pertemuan di Ambarukmo Yogyakarta ditanggapi positif oleh segenap peserta pertemuan.
Kemudian untuk menanggapi harapan-harapan dari pertemuan tersebut, terutama menyangkut materi Penentuan data wilayah sasaran, Kriteria, dan situasi wilayah , peserta sepakat untuk mengadakan Diskusi Kelompok. Peserta dikelompokkan per Kabupaten untuk membahas hal tersebut.
Rangkuman hasil diskusi kelompok dapat dilaporkan sebagai beerikut :
Kriteria Pemilihan wilayah sasaran adalah :

a. Daerah kumuh
b. Daerah sabuk kota/pinggiran
c. Kantong kemiskinan
d. Daerah tadah hujan/tandus
e. Mayoritas buruh tani
f. Masyarakat Desa IDT
g. Masyarakat miskin di Desa Non IDT
h. Masyoritas warga buruh
i. Daerah Terisolir

Rangkuman hasil diskusi Situasi Wilayah :
a. Banyak urbanisasi
b. Padat pengangguran
c. Lapangan kerja sempit
d. Pertanian tadah hujan
e. Daerah tandus dan hanya dapat ditanami palawija

Hasil pengumpulan data dari masing-masing Kabupaten tersebut terangkum sbb :

Wilayah Wonogiri

a. Kecamatan Wonogiri ..... Desa : 1. Selogiri
2. Ngadirojo
3. Nguntoronadi
4. Wuryantoro
5. Purworejo
6. Giritontro

b. Kecamatan Parang gupito.....Desa: 1. Pracimantoro
2. Eromoko
3. Manyaran

c. Kecamatan Jatisrono.....Desa : 1. Girimarto
2. Jatipurno
3. Jatiroto
4. Sidoharjo

d. Kecamatan Tirtomoyo.....Desa: 1. Batuwarno
2. Karangtengah
3. Giriwoyo

e. Kecamatan Baturetno.....Desa: 1. Kaliancar
2. Song bledel
3. Slogohimo
4. Kismantoro

Jumlah Desa = 20 Desa

Wilayah Sragen

a. Kecamatan Jenar.....Desa : 1. Banyuurip
2. Jenar
3. Kandang sapi
4. Ndawung
5. Japoh
6. Ngepringan
7. Mlale

b. Kecamatan Nggesi.....Desa : 1. Slendro
2. Poleng
3. Nggesi
4. Blangu
5. Srawung
6. Tanggan
7. Pilangsari

c. Kecamatan Miri.....Desa : 1. Gilirejo
2. Bogor
3. Soko
4. Ndoyong
5. Giri margo
6. Jeruk
7. Sunggingan
8. Brojol
9. Geneng

d. Kecamatan Mondokan.....Desa : 1. Sumberejo
2. Kedawung
3. Gumantar
4. Jambangan
5. Pare'
6. Sono
7. Tempelrejo
8. Trombol
9. Jekani

e. Kecamatan Tanon.....Desa : 1. Gading
2. Karangtalon
3. Sambiduwur
4. Karangasem
5. Slogo
6. Ketro
7. Tanon
8. Gabungan
9. Sono
10. Padas
11. Kecik
12. Nggawan
13. Pengkol
14. Kalikobak
15. Bonagung
16. Suatu

Jumlah Desa = 48 Desa

2. Ngadirejo
3. Pucangan

b. Kecamatan Polokarto.....Desa : 1. Polokarto 3. Genener
2. Jatisobo

c. Kecamatan Bendosari.....Desa : 1. Jagan 4. Mulur
2. Paluhombo 5. Mentan
3. Cabeyan

d. Kecamatan Tawangsari.....Desa : 1. Pojok
2. Grajegan
3. Ponowaren
4. Tambakboyo
5. Majasto

e. Kecamatan Bulu.....Desa : 1. Kamal
2. Kunden
3. Kedungsono
4. Sanggang
5. Gentan

f. Kecamatan Grogol .....Desa : 1 Kridoka
2. Tambak

g. Kecamatan Baki .....Desa : 1. Mancasan
2. Gentan
3. Bentaran

h. Kecamatan Sukoharjo.....Desa : 1. Kriwen
2. Sonorejo
3. Dukuh

I. Kecamatan Nguter.....Desa : 1. Serut
2. Celep

Jumlah Desa = 31 Desa

Wilayah Boyolali

a. Kecamatan Ampel .....Desa : 1. Jlarem 4 Candisari
2. Ngargoloka 5. Sampetan
3. Selodoko

b. Kecamatan Karanggede.....Desa : 1. Karangkepoh 3. Sempr[illegible]
2. Bangkoki 4. Dolog[illegible]

c. Kecamatan Wanasegara.....Desa : 1. Kalinanas 3. Repaking
2. Ketayon 4. Karangjati

d. Kecamatan Boyolali .....Desa : 1. Kebonbimo 3. Winong
2. Penggung 4. Pulisen

e. Kecamatan Mojosongo.....Desa : 1. Manggis
2. Tambak
3. Dlingo

f. Kecamatan Sambi.....Desa : Cermo

g. Kecamatan Musuk.....Desa : Kembangsari

h. Kecamatan Teras.....Desa : 1. Bangsalan 2. Mojolegi

I. Kecamatan Selo.....Desa : 1. Tlogolele 2. Klakah

Jumlah Desa = 26 Desa

Wilayah Solo

a. Kecamatan Laweyan.....Kalurahan : 1. Pajang 3. Jajar

2. Kedunglumbu 4. Joyosuran

c. Kecamatan Banjarsari.....kalurahan : 1. Punggawan 3. Nusukan
2. Kadipiro 4. Gilingan

d. Kecamatan Serengan .....Kalurahan : 1. Danukusuman 3. Joyotakan
2. Tipes

e. Kecamatan Jebres.....kalurahan : 1. Kampung sewu 3. Gandekan
2. Tegalhargo 4. Mojosongo

f. kepada para penderita cacat di Surakarta .... sebanyak 300 KK

Jumlah Desa = 19 Desa + 300 KK penyandang cacat

Wilayah Karanganyar

a. Kecamatan Gondangrejo.....Desa : 1. Tuban 3. Karang Turi
2. Sedayu 4. Bulurejo

b. Kecamatan Jumantono.....Desa : 1. Sedayu
2. Kebak

c. Kecamatan Jatipora.....Desa : 1. Jatiwarno 2. Jati Kuwung

d. Kecamatan Jatiyoso.....Desa : 1. Jati Sawit
2. Wono Keling

e. Kecamatan Jumapolo.....Desa : 1. Ploso 2. Giriwono 3. Kadipiro

f. Kecamatan Tasikmadu.....Desa : 1. Karangmojo
2. Wonolopo

g. Kecamatan Jaten.....Desa : 1. Brojol
2. Sroyo

h. Kecamatan Kebakkramat.....Desa : 1. Macanan
2. Mbangsri

I. Kecamatan Colomadu.....Desa : Tohudan

Jumlah Desa = 20 Desa

Data yang terkumpul sampai dengan tanggal 23 Juli 1998 ternyata melebihi target yang telah ditentukan sesuai dengan kesepakatan dalam pertemuan di Ambarukmo-Yogyakarta. Untuk ini korwil IV akan melakukan konfirmasi ulang kepada Kabupaten masing-masing apabila data tersebut tidak dapat disetujui oleh CRS.

Dampak program emergency yang terpantau sampai dengan hari ini :

- Antar umat beragama nampak menunjukkan kerjasama yang baik, kegiatan ini dapat dijadikan embrio kegiatan-kegiatan kerjasama antar umat beragama di Ex Karesidenan Surakarta. Hal ini perlu disampaikan karena selama ini kegiatan-kegiatan kerjasama semacam ini di wilayah ini nampaknya kurang responsif dan nampak mandeg.

Diusulkan untuk memasukkan wilayah Kabupaten Klaten sebagai target wilayah, karena melihat masing banyaknya kantong-kantong kemiskinan di wilayah tersebut.

Demikian laporan perkembangan proses persiapan kegiatan program emergency.
Terima kasih atas kerjasama CRS dg Korwil IV - Dijakini program ini akan sangat bermanfaat bagi masyarakat dalam kondisi keprihatinan akhir-akhir ini.

ASIL POKOK PERTEMUAN PANITIA PENGARAH TANGGAL. 14 JULI 1998 DI YOGYAKARTA
OGRAM BANTUAN EMERGENCY BAHAN PANGAN (BERAS) C.R.S. DI JAWA TENGAH.

JUMLAH BAHAN PANGAN DAN JUMLAH PENERIMA (RESIPIEM).

K E T E R A N G A N	JUMLAH BAHAN PANGAN PROGRAM EMERGENCY.	JML. DIBAGIKAN TIAP RESIPIEM.	JUMLAH RESIPIEM SASARAN PROGRAM	JML. DAERAH SASARAN (DATI II) PROGRAM.	CATATAN
SEBELUM PERTEMUAN DI YOGYA, 14 JULI 1998.	27.000 Ton / 6 Bln. 4.500 Ton / 1 Bln.	12,50 Kg. 12,50 Kg.	2.160.000 Rspn 360.000 Rspn	21 Kabupaten Dati II 21 Kabupaten Dati II	Alokasi B.P untuk Jateng dan DIY. Resipiem = Ka.Keluarga.
HASIL PERTEMUAN DI-YOGYA, 14 JULI 1998.	27.000 Ton / 6 Bln. 4.500 Ton / 1 Bln.	25,00 Kg. 25,00 Kg.	1.080.000 Rspn. 180.000 Rspn.	24 Kab / Kod Dati II 24 Kab / Kod Dati II	

PENETAPAN DAERAH SASARAN PENERIMA (RESIPIEM) BERDASARKAN PRIORITAS KEADAAN & KONDISI.
Khusus untuk WILAYAH I (Koordinator KEUSKUPAN AGUNG SEMARANG.).

DAERAH SASARAN TINGKAT II KABUPATEN / KOTAMADYA.	JUMLAH WILAYAH MENURUT KECAMATAN PRIORITAS.	JUMLAH DESA / KELURAHAN MENURUT PRIORITAS.	JUMLAH RESIPIEM PRIORITAS TIAP DESA.
1. Kabupaten Dati II KENDAL.	3 Kecamatan. (= 6 Kec)	6 Desa / Kelurahan.	± 350 KK / Desa.
2. Kotamadya Dati II SEMARANG.	2 Kecamatan. (=16 Kec)	4 Desa / Kelurahan.	± 350 KK / Desa.
3. Kabupaten Dati II SEMARANG.	4 Kecamatan. (= 4 Kec)	8 Desa / Kelurahan.	± 350 KK / Desa.
4. Kabupaten Dati II D E M A K .	3 Kecamatan. (= 5 Kec)	9 Desa / Kelurahan.	± 350 KK / Desa.
5. Kabupaten Dati II GROBOGAN.	4 Kecamatan. (= 4 Kec)	12 Desa / Kelurahan.	± 350 KK / Desa.
6. Kabupaten Dati II REMBANG.	6 Kecamatan. (= 6 Kec)	18 Desa / Kelurahan.	± 350 KK / Desa.

FBB.fbb.16.07.98.yss.

DAFTAR CALON PENERIMA BANTUAN SEMBAKO
KABUPATEN KEBUMEN PROPINSI JAWA TENGAH

a. 25 kg.

No Urt	Nama Kecamatan	Jm. Desa Seluruh	Jm. Desa Yg membutuhkan	Jm. KK Yg membutuhkan	Jm Beras yg dibutuhkan	Biaya Operasional
1	Ayah	18 Desa	6	1800	45.000 kg	Rp 2.250.000
2	Buayan	20 Desa	7	2100	52.500 kg	Rp 2.625.000
3	Puring	21 Desa	7	2100	52.500 kg	Rp 2.625.000
4	Petanahan	21 Desa	7	2100	52.500 kg	Rp 2.625.000
5	Klirong	24 Desa	8	2400	60.000 kg	Rp 3.000.000
6	Bulupesantren	21 Desa	7	2100	52.500 kg	Rp 2.625.000
7	Ambal	32 Desa	10	3000	75.000 kg	Rp 3.750.000
8	Mirit	33 Desa	11	3100	77.500 kg	Rp 3.850.000
9	Prembun	22 Desa	7	2100	52.500 kg	Rp 2.625.000
10	Kutowinagun	19 Desa	6	1800	45.000 kg	Rp 2.250.000
11	Alian	27 Desa	9	2700	67.500 kg	Rp 3.375.000
12	Kebumen	29 Desa	9	2700	67.500 kg	Rp 3.375.000
13	Pejagoan	19 Desa	6	1800	45.000 kg	Rp 2.250.000
14	Sruweng	17 Desa	5	1500	37.500 kg	Rp 1.875.000
15	Adimulyo	23 Desa	7	2100	52.500 kg	Rp 2.625.000
16	Kuwarasan	22 Desa	7	2100	52.500 kg	Rp 2.625.000
17	Rowokele	11 Desa	4	1200	30.000 kg	Rp 1.500.000
18	Sempor	16 Desa	5	1500	37.500 kg	Rp 1.875.000
19	Gombong	14 Desa	5	1500	37.500 kg	Rp 1.875.000
20	Karanganyar	11 Desa	4	1200	30.000 kg	Rp 1.500.000
21	Karanggayam	19 Desa	7	2100	52.500 kg	Rp 2.625.000
22	Sadang	21 Desa	7	2100	52.500 kg	Rp 2.625.000
	Jumlah	460 Desa	151 Desa	45300	1.132.500 kg	Rp 56.625.000

Kebumen, 22 Juli 1998

PANITIA PELAKSANA

Ketua,

Drs. H. Muhamad Maskub

Sekretaris,

Yohanes Sukir

NB : 1. Data tersebut di atas untuk Kebutuhan Setiap Bulanya.

2. Biaya Operasional yang dimaksud guna tranpotasi pendataan, rapat, distribusi dan ketenagaan, dihitung Rp. 50/Kg.

Panitia Pelaksana Program Emergency Bantuan P[illegible]an
Kabupaten Dati II Purworejo

No.	Propinsi	Mitra Kerja	Kabupaten	Kecamatan	Desa	Bentuk Bantuan	Peserta	Biaya
1.	Jawa Tengah	1. NU (PC NU Purworejo) 2. Katolik (Dewan Paroki Santa Perawan Maria Purworejo) 3. Kristen (YAKUBB)	Purworejo	Grabag	32	Beras	3.452	terlampir
				Ngombol	57		2.462	
				Purwodadi	40		3.116	
				Bagelen	17		3.397	
				Kaligesing	21		4.306	
				Purworejo	25		4.409	
				Banyuurip	27		2.203	
				Bayan	26		3.520	
				Kutoarjo	27		3.328	
				Butuh	41		4.377	
				Pituruh	49		4.589	
				Kemiri	40		8.237	
				Bruno	18		8.519	
				Gebang	25		3.638	
				Loano	21		4.188	
				Bener	28		5.549	
					494		69.293	

Purworejo, 6 Agustus 1998

P. Suwarto
Ketua I

Heri Sujarwo
Ketua II

Alb. Dwi Widyatmojo
Sekretaris I

JUMLAH KK MISKIN / KECAMATAN / DESA
KABUPATEN PURWOREJO Tahun 1998

2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Kecamatan	Jumlah Desa	Jumlah Penduduk Miskin	Jumlah KK Miskin (col 3 : 4,35)	KK Miskin per Desa (col 4 : col 5)	Jumlah Desa IDT	KK Miskin di Desa IDT (Kolom 6x7)	KK Miskin Menurut Penjaringan Data (Sampling)	Perkiraan KK Miskin Menurut Penjaringan Data (Kolom 3 x 108%)	Keterangan
Grabag	32	13.902	3.195,86	99,87	13	1.298	-	3.452	
Ngombol	57	9.918	2.280,00	40,00	12	480	-	2.462	
Purwodadi	40	12.550	2.885,06	72,13	7	505	3.653	3.116	
Bagelen	17	13.683	3.145,52	185,03	4	740	3.557	3.397	
Kaligesing	21	17.345	3.987,36	189,87	21	3.987	-	4.306	
Purworejo	25	17.757	4.082,07	163,28	4	653	-	4.409	
Banyuurip	27	8.875	2.040,23	75,56	1	76	-	2.203	
Bayan	26	14.179	3.259,54	125,37	2	251	-	3.520	
Kutoarjo	27	13.406	3.081,84	114,14	2	228	-	3.328	
Butuh	41	17.628	4.052,41	98,84	20	1.977	-	4.377	
Pituruh	49	18.484	4.249,20	86,72	18	1.561	1.528	4.589	
Kemiri	40	33.178	7.627,13	190,68	16	3.051	-	8.237	
Bruno	18	34.314	7.888,28	438,24	10	4.382	-	8.519	
Gebang	25	14.655	3.368,97	134,76	5	674	-	3.638	
Loano	21	16.869	3.877,93	184,66	7	1.293	-	4.188	
Bener	28	22.352	5.138,39	183,51	16	2.936	7.910	5.549	
Jumlah =	**494**	**279.095**	**64.160**	**-**	**158**	**24.092**	**-**	**69.293**	

se Jumlah KK miskin antara Data BPS (Kolom 5) hasil Penjaringan Data di Lapangan (Sampling 4 Kecamatan) sbb :

16.648
15.418
108 %

mber Data :
1. Kolom 3 ; 4 ; 5 dari Biro Pusat Statistik Kab. Purworejo
2. Kolom 7 dari Yaklusb

CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES (CRS)
RENCANA PROGRAM EMERGENCY PANGAN
PERIODE : JUNI 1998 - MEI 1999

NO	PROPINSI	MITRA KERJA	KABUPATEN	KECAMATAN	DESA	BENTUK BANTUAN	PESERTA	JUMLAH DANA
1.	JAWA - [redacted]	- Kristen - Katolik - Budha - Islam	W O N O S O B O	1 - Kejajar 2 - Garung 3 - Mojotengah 4 - Watumalang 5 - Wonosobo 6 - Leksono 7 - Selomerto 8 - Kaliwiro 9 - Wadaslintang 10 - Kertek 11 - Sapuran 12 - Kalikajar 13 - Kepil	-	B E R A S	490 K K 355 K K 50 K K [redacted]	-

	Pra Kel. Sejahtera		Jumlah	Kel. Sejahtera I		Jumlah	Jumlah total	Keterangan
	Ekon	Non-ekon		Ekon	Non Ek.			
BANYUMAS	57.784	64.180	121.964	5.132	22.641	28.773	150.737	
CILACAP	51.229	35.102	86.331	57.935	57.969	115.904	202.235	
PURBALINGGA	57.043	30.451	87.494	7.418	15.560	22.978	110.472	
BANJARNEGARA	38.971	40.514	79.485	15.744	24.487	40.231	119.716	
	205.027	170.247	375.274	86.259	120.657	207.886	583.160	

Purwokerto, 18 J u l i 1998.

an. PEMBANTU GUBERNUR JAWA TENGAH

WILAYAH BANYUMAS

Kepala Bidang Pembangunan,

PEMERINTAH PROPINSI DATI I JAWA TENGAH
KANTOR PEMBANTU GUBERNUR WILAYAH BANYUMAS

Drs. TJIPTO HARTONO

P e m b i n a

Nip. 500.041.510

ENGURUS CABANG NU KABUPATEN GUNUNGKIDUL
IAERAH ISTIMEWA YOGYAKARTA
ENCANA PROGRAM EMERGENCY PANGAN
ERIODE JUNI 1998 - MEI 1999

lo.	PROPINSI	MITRA KERJA	KABUPATEN	KECAMATAN	No.	D E S A	BENTUK BANTUAN	PESERTA
l.	D.I.YOGYAKARTA	YSBS	GUNUNGKIDUL	PANGGANG	1	Giriharjo	Beras	300 KK
					2	Girisekar	Beras	300 KK
					3	Giripurwo	Beras	300 KK
					4	Giritirto	Beras	300 KK
2.	D.I.YOGYAKARTA	YSBS	GUNUNGKIDUL	PALIYAN	1	Jetis	Beras	300 KK
					2	Kepek	Beras	300 KK
					3	Giring	Beras	300 KK
					4	Monggol	Beras	300 KK
					5	Mulusan	Beras	300 KK
					6	Karangasem	Beras	300 KK
3.	D.I.YOGYAKARTA	YSBS	GUNUNGKIDUL	RONGKOP	1	Jerukwudel	Beras	300 KK
					2	Balong	Beras	300 KK
					3	Nglindur	Beras	300 KK
					4	Melikan	Beras	300 KK
					5	Pringombo	Beras	300 KK
					6	Semunggih	Beras	300 KK
4.	D.I.YOGYAKARTA	YSBS	GUNUNGKIDUL	PONJONG	1	Gombang	Beras	300 KK
					2	Bedoyo	Beras	300 KK
					3	Sidorejo	Beras	300 KK
					4	Genjahan	Beras	300 KK
					5	Sumbergiri	Beras	300 KK
					6	Kenteng	Beras	300 KK
					7	Sawahan	Beras	300 KK

05	D.I.YOGYAKARTA	YSBS	GUNUNGKIDUL	KARANGMOJO	1	Wiladeg	Beras	300 KK
					2	Kelor	Beras	300 KK
					3	Ngipak	Beras	300 KK
					4	Karangmojo	Beras	300 KK
					5	Gedangrejo	Beras	300 KK
					6	Ngawis	Beras	300 KK
					7	Bejiharjo	Beras	300 KK
					8	Jatiayu	Beras	300 KK
06	D.I.YOGYAKARTA	YSBS	GUNUNGKIDUL	PLAYEN	1	Banyusoco	Beras	300 KK
					2	Bleberan	Beras	300 KK
					3	Plembutan	Beras	300 KK
					4	Ngawu	Beras	300 KK
					5	Ngumut	Beras	300 KK
					6	Dengok	Beras	300 KK
					7	Getas	Beras	300 KK
					8	Ngleri	Beras	300 KK
					9	Banaran	Beras	300 KK
07	D.I.YOGYAKARTA	YSBS	GUNUNGKIDUL	PATUK	1	Semoyo	Beras	300 KK
					2	Pengkok	Beras	300 KK
					3	B e j i	Beras	300 KK
					4	Bunder	Beras	300 KK
					5	Nglegi	Beras	300 KK
					6	Ngalang	Beras	300 KK
					7	Nglanggeran	Beras	300 KK
					8	S a l a m	Beras	300 KK
					9	Patuk	Beras	300 KK
08	D.I.YOGYAKARTA	YSBS	GUNUNGKIDUL	N G L I P A R	1	Kedungkeris	Beras	300 KK
					2	Nglipar	Beras	300 KK
					3	Kedungpoh	Beras	300 KK
					4	Katongan	Beras	300 KK
					5	N a t a h	Beras	300 KK

09.	D.I.YOGYAKARTA	YSBS	GUNUNGKIDUL	SEMIN	1	Semin	Beras	300 KK
					2	Pundungsari	Beras	300 KK
					3	Karangsari	Beras	300 KK
					4	Rejosari	Beras	300 KK
					5	Bulurejo	Beras	300 KK
					6	Bendung	Beras	300 KK
					7	Sumberejo	Beras	300 KK
					8	Candirejo	Beras	300 KK
10.	D.I.YOGYAKARTA	YSBS	GUNUNGKIDUL	TEPUS	1	Tepus	Beras	300 KK
					2	Purwodadi	Beras	300 KK
					3	Giripanggung	Beras	300 KK
					4	Sumberwungu	Beras	300 KK

Gunungkidul, 20 Juli 1998
Pengurus Cabang Nahdlatul Ulama
Kabupaten Gunungkidul

ROIS SYURIYAH

Drs.H.Sholeh Muslim
NKA.1204087002

KETUA,

Drs.H.Suharto
NKA.1204087005

SEKRETARIS,

Drs.Sutahir,B.Sc.
NKA.1204087007


Peta Jawa - Bali
Daerah Rawan Macet : PALIMANAN
Daerah Rawan Macet : PRUPUK
Cirebon
Brebes
Tegal
Pemalang
Pekalongan
Kendal
Kaliwungu
Semarang
Demak
Pati
Kudus
Lasem
Rembang
Blora
Purwodadi
Ciledug
Slawi
Bumiayu
Purbalingga
Purwokerto
Cilacap
Banyumas
Kebumen
Temanggung
Wonosobo
Magelang
Ambarawa
Salatiga
Sragen
Solo
Ngawi
Magetan
Ponorogo
Sukoharjo
Klaten
Yogyakarta
Bantul
Wates
Purworejo
Kutoarjo
Gombong
Wangon
Majenang
Banjar
Pangandaran
Cijulang
Tambak
Sumpiuh
Buntu
Rawalo
Prambanan
Kartosuro
Karanganyar
Cemoroseawu
Maospati
Caruban
Mantingan
Tiawi
Maospati
Mlilir
Ke Cirebon via Cikijing Kuningan
Ke Purwokerto
Ke Banyumas
Ke Semarang via Ambarawa Magelang
Ke Semarang
Ke Pangandaran
Ke Ponorogo

Documentation List FOI 240-05

Doc #	Document Details	Tot. Pgs
1	Field Trip Report- ***with-held in its entirety***	1
2	Revised Draft Action Memorandum to the Director, Office of Food for Peace dated March 27, 1998- ***with-held in its entirety***	1
3	Revised Draft Action Memorandum to the Director, Office of Food for Peace dated April 2, 1998- ***with-held in its entirety***	1
4	USAID Title II Emergency Food Support Activities in Indonesia (as of 8/05/98	3
5	The World Bank article titled " Donors Agree to Bolster Help for Indonesia's Urgent Social Needs"	9
6	CRS Interfaith Emergency Title II Program for Indonesia August 31 to September 11, 1998	74

USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Mr. Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20037

JAN 2 1 2009

RE: FOI-240/05

Dear Mr. Simpson:

This serves as a final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated July 12, 2005 requesting all documents from November 1, 1997 to November 1, 1998 relating in whole or in part to the decision that the United States would send food and medical emergency aid to Indonesia.

There are two documents responsive to your request. The first document which is enclosed and being released in its entirety is a copy of WFP EMOP 6006 "Emergency Assistance to Drought Victims Indonesia" dated August 1998. The second document is a USAID Transfer Authorization and is being withheld in it's entirety under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. §552 exemption (b)(5).

Exemption (b)(5) protects "inter-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than the agency in litigation with the agency. This document contains information that is part of the agency's decision-making process which is called the deliberative process privilege. The release could cause public confusion that might result from disclosure of reasons and rationales that were not in fact ultimately the grounds for an agency's actions.

You have a right to appeal the above exemption. You **must** submit your appeal in writing within 30 days from the date of this letter. To be considered an **official appeal**, your letter **must** be addressed as follows:

Director, Office of Administrative Services
U.S. Agency for International Development
Ronald Reagan Building, Room 4.06B
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20523-4601

U.S. Agency for International Development
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20523
www.usaid.gov

20050944AID009 AID
RECNO:31457 SEQCOR:145019
1/23/2009 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
US sends aid to Indonesia 1998, AFC

Both the appeal and the envelope should be plainly marked "**FOI APPEAL.**" Please make reference to your assigned FOIA number [FOI-240/05] that we may identify your case promptly.

For this response, 1 document totaling 8 pages are released. Thank you for your interest in the USAID. There is no fee associated with this request.

Sincerely,

J. M. Paskar, Chief
Information & Records Division
Office of Administrative Services

WFP EMOP 6006

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO DROUGHT VICTIMS

INDONESIA

Aug 98

WFP EMERGENCY OPERATION NO. 6006
"EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO DROUGHT VICTIMS"

In response to the request of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia for the provision of emergency food aid, the World Food Programme has agreed to provide an emergency food aid grant targeted at drought victims in Indonesia.

The overall objective of the WFP assistance under Emergency Operation (EMOP) 6006 is to prevent the present food shortage from developing into a famine situation, alleviating the hardship faced by the most vulnerable segments of the population in rural areas as the country is facing the combined impact of drought and economic crisis. More specifically, the intention is to:

- Distribute food free rations to the most seriously affected families who are unable to secure their daily food requirements;
- Agricultural rehabilitation and reconstruction through food-for-work (FFW) activities, enabling the beneficiary communities to re-establish their livelihoods;
- Maintain and/or improve the health/nutritional status of pregnant women, lactating mothers and underfives in selected areas which have been particularly affected by the drought and economic crisis.

The Emergency Operation will start in July 1998 with an overall duration of 395 days.

The following population groups are the direct target beneficiaries who will receive food assistance under this operation:

- Some 208,690 families (or 750,000 people) surviving on only one meal a day with no means of supporting themselves. This activity will use 30,000 MT of rice, with a daily ration of 400 gr/day/person and will be implemented by the Ministry of Social Affairs (Depsos) in 8 provinces of the country (see tables and maps attached).

- Workers participating in FFW activities, numbering about 771,000, will receive a family ration for themselves and four dependents; a total of 3.85 million beneficiaries would thus be assisted. The criteria for the selection of FFW schemes will be mutually agreed upon by the Government and WFP. This activity will use 160,000 MT of rice, with a daily family ration of 2.0 kg per worker and will be implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture in 12 provinces (see tables and maps attached).

- Pregnant women, lactating mothers and malnourished children aged under 5 years numbering some 708,000. This activity will use 17,000 MT of blended food, with a daily ration of 133 gr/day/person (4.0 kg/month) and will be implemented by the Ministry of Health (see tables and maps attached).

Commodities provided by WFP will be distributed free of charge to the beneficiaries and according to a distribution plan mutually agreed upon by the Government and WFP.

208,000 MT of cereals (rice, or rice equivalent)
17,000 MT of blended food
or a total of 225,000 MT at an estimated total cost to WFP of US$ 90,540,000.

WFP will supply the commodities to the Government at agreed points of delivery which will be such that the food assistance can be most efficiently transported to the target groups once it enters the country. Anticipated ports of first delivery for cereals are Jakarta and Surabaya. Blended food will be delivered by WFP to provincial ports nearest to the distribution sites.

BULOG (the National Logistic Agency) has been designated by the Government to take delivery of cereals provided under this Emergency Operation and perform the transport from the port of first entry to staging points (i.e. Sub-Dolog warehouses at the district level).

In the 208,000 MT of rice, 18,000 MT have been considered for the use of NGOs in Food For Work activities, which should be ideally carried out in the East of Indonesia. The rice will be delivered at Sub-Dolog warehouses and transported by the NGOs up to subdistrict and village distribution points. WFP will reimburse NGOs for the Sub-Dolog to subdistrict transport cost (ITSH) up to a maximum of US$ 12.67 per MT. This is the only available assistance in addition to the grain. The same ITSH subsidy will be paid to the Ministry of Agriculture and Depsos as reimbursement for the rice transported in their respective activities. Also some funds have been considered for air lift operation, but limited to only 1,000 MT for the whole project.

Attached is the tentative distribution plan made with the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) for FFW, Ministry of Social Affairs (Depsos) for relief food and Ministry of Health (MoH) for vulnerable group feeding (blended food).

Any FFW activity of NGOs that can be initiated or expanded with this rice is welcomed. Ideally it should be in districts not covered by EMOP 6006 in order o avoid overlapping and located in central or eastern Indonesia.

For more information please contact:

World Food Programme
Wisma Diners Club, 7th Floor
Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 34
Jakarta 10220
Tel. (62-21) 570-9004/5
Fax. (62-21) 570-9001
Email: Philip.Clarke@ibm.net

DISTRICT DISTRIBUTION PLAN - EMOP 6006

NO.	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	MoA			Depsos			MoH		TOTAL	
			MT Rice	%	# of villages	MT Rice	%	# of villages	MT WSB	%	MT	%
1	Jawa Tengah	1 Semarang				96		1			96	
		2 Rembang				1,875		35			1,875	
		3 Batang				764		11			764	
		4 Demak	5,839								5,839	
		5 Kendal	5,990								5,990	
		6 Pati	7,211								7,211	
		7 Banyumas	6,721								6,721	
	Subtotal	7	25,761	16	0	2,735	9	47	0	0	28,496	14
2	DI Aceh	8 Aceh Besar				650		61			650	
		9 Pidie				663		65			663	
		10 Aceh Utara				2,000		123			2,000	
		11 Aceh Selatan				682		41			682	
	Subtotal	4	0	0	0	3,995	13	290	0	0	3,995	2
3	Lampung	12 Lampung Tengah	7,442								7,442	
		13 Lampung Selatan	6,700								6,700	
	Subtotal	2	14,142	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	14,142	7
4	Kalimantan Selatan	14 Banjar	320								320	
	Subtotal	1	320	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	320	0
5	Kalimantan Timur	15 Kutai	1,505			2,354		90	506		4,365	
		16 Pasir							658		658	
	Subtotal	2	1,505	1	0	2,354	8	90	1,164	7	5,023	2
6	Kalimantan Tengah	17 Barito Selatan							238		238	
		18 Kota Waringin Timur							228		228	
		19 Kota Waringin Barat							245		245	
	Subtotal	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	711	4	711	0
7	Sulawesi Utara	20 Gorontalo							888		888	
		21 Minahasa							1,030		1,030	
		22 Sanhgihe Talaut							523		523	
	Subtotal	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,441	14	2,441	1
8	Sulawesi Tengah	23 Donggala	6,479			1,625		84			8,104	
		24 Poso	6,394			1,856		141			8,250	
		25 Banggai	8,237			470		32			8,707	
	Subtotal	3	21,110	13	0	3,951	13	257	0	0	25,061	12

DISTRICT DISTRIBUTION PLAN - EMOP 6006

NO.	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	MoA			Depsos			MoH		TOTAL	
			MT Rice	%	# of villages	MT Rice	%	# of villages	MT WSB	%	MT	%
9	Sulawesi Selatan	26 Polmas	4,479								4,479	
		27 Barru	125						244		369	
		28 Sidrap	242								242	
		29 Gowa							278		278	
		30 Mamuju							299		299	
		31 Tanatoraja							308		308	
		32 Luwu							282		282	
		33 Bantaeng							289		289	
		34 Jeneponto							263		263	
		35 Sidedreng Rappang							241		241	
		36 Pangkajene							375		375	
		37 Polkewali Mamasa							304		304	
		38 Selayer							224		224	
		39 Soppeng							288		288	
		40 Wajo	84						314		398	
	Subtotal	15	4,930	3	0	0	0	0	3,708	22	8,638	4
10	Sulawesi Tenggara	41 Kendari	9,550			1,910		114			11,460	
	Subtotal	1	9,550	6	0	1,910	6	114	0	0	11,460	6
11	Maluku	42 Maluku Tenggara	1,769								1,769	
		43 Maluku Tengah	2,330								2,330	
		44 Halmahera Tengah	1,528								1,528	
	Subtotal	3	5,627	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	5,627	3
12	NTB	45 Lombok Barat	8,840			1,038		14	785		10,663	
		46 Lombok Timur	18,250			241		9			18,491	
		47 Lombok Tengah							964		964	
		48 Bima							569		569	
		49 Sumbawa							539		539	
	Subtotal	5	27,090	17	0	1,279	4	23	2,857	17	31,226	15

DISTRICT DISTRIBUTION PLAN - EMOP 6006

NO.	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	MoA			Depsos			MoH		TOTAL	
			MT Rice	%	# of villages	MT Rice	%	# of villages	MT WSB	%	MT	%
13	NTT	50 Kupang	4,453			1,200		34			5,653	
		51 TTS	3,846			184		4			4,030	
		52 TTU	3,172			1,524		63			4,696	
		53 Belu	3,690			1,012		27			4,702	
		54 Alor	2,395			606		19			3,001	
		55 Flotim	3,463			311		5			3,774	
		56 Sikka	2,603			164		7			2,767	
		57 Ende	2,175			43		4			2,218	
		58 Ngada	2,469			192		8			2,661	
		59 Menggarai	2,718			85		7			2,803	
		60 Sumba Timur	1,573			1,308		32			2,881	
		61 Sumba Barat	1,763			1,525		35			3,288	
	Subtotal	12	34,320	21	0	8,154	27	245	0	0	42,474	21
14	Irian Jaya	62 Yapen Waropen	803			0					803	
		63 Merauke	2,856			1,978		70			4,834	
		64 Fak-fak	958								958	
		65 Manokwari	1,072						767		1,839	
		66 Jayapura							733		733	
		67 Paniai							1,029		1,029	
		68 Sorong							827		827	
		69 Jayawijaya	2,904			3,644		38			6,548	
	Subtotal	8	8,593	5	0	5,622	19	108	3,356	20	17,571	8
15	Timor-Timur	70 Aileu	492						216		708	
		71 Ambeno	793						191		984	
		72 Bobonaro	989						200		1,189	
		73 Elmera	975						225		1,200	
		74 Liquisa	709						191		900	
		75 Lautem	788						294		1,082	
		76 Kovalima	615						203		818	
		77 Manatuto	542						226		768	
		78 Manufahi	477						229		706	
		79 Baucau							285		285	
		80 Viqueque	673						230		903	
		81 Ainaro							260		260	
	Subtotal	12	7,053	4	0	0	0	0	2,749	16	9,802	5
	Total	80	160,001	100	0	30,000	100	1,174	16,988	100	206,989	100

INDONESIA

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE



E3

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 05385 01 OF 03 290220Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	

(ONY) /000W

----------5370C7 291235Z /38

R 290216Z JUL 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1643
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005385

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS PROCESS: A CALENDAR/PRIMER REFERENCE

REF: JAKARTA 5372

1. (U) SUMMARY: INDONESIA HAS ALREADY ENTERED ITS ELECTION SEASON, WHICH CULMINATES IN BALLOTING FOR THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR) AS WELL AS FOR PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEVEL LEGISLATIVE BODIES IN LATE MAY 1997. THE PROCESS IS CONVOLUTED AND DESIGNED TO GIVE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SUBSTANTIAL CONTROL OVER THE FINAL

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05385 01 OF 03 290220Z
RESULTS. THE "GENERAL ELECTION INSTITUTE," FOR EXAMPLE, HAS THE POWER TO REJECT CANDIDATES NOMINATED BY THE PARTIES ON SUBJECTIVE GROUNDS. CURRENT CHARGES OF GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ONE OF THE THREE "OFFICIAL" PARTIES, THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OR PDI, WHICH HAS LED TO COMPETING PARTY LEADERSHIPS, HAS FURTHER COMPLICATED AND TAINTED THE ELECTION PROCESS THIS YEAR. THE FOLLOWING IS MEANT TO SERVE AS A PRIMER/REFERENCE REGARDING THE ELECTIONS, OFFERING A CALENDAR OF STAGES IN THE ELECTION PROCESS AND AN EXPLANATION OF SOME OF ITS KEY INSTITUTIONS AND INTRICACIES. END SUMMARY

THE ELECTION CALENDAR:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 06 SEP 2006 200503235

2. (U) ELECTIONS FOR THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR) WILL BE HELD SOMETIME DURING THE WEEK OF MAY 23-JUNE 1, 1997 (THE EXACT DATE WILL BE ANNOUNCED THROUGH A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE). ALREADY, HOWEVER, THE FIRST OF 12 STAGES OF THE ELECTION PROCESS IS UNDERWAY. THE FOLLOWING PROVIDES A REVIEW OF THE COMPLICATED ELECTION PROCESS NOTING THE SEQUENCE OF PRE-BALLOTING STAGES. THIS REVIEW ALSO HIGHLIGHTS SOME OF THE UNUSUAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE THREE OFFICIAL PARTIES WHICH ARE AUTHORIZED TO COMPETE IN THE ELECTION.

3. (U) THE GENERAL ELECTION INSTITUTE (LPU) SUPERVISES THE ENTIRE ELECTION PROCESS SCHEDULES AND IMPLEMENTS EACH OF THE 12 STAGES OF THE ELECTION EXTENDING FROM REGISTRATION OF VOTERS TO THE SWEARING-IN OF THE VICTORS. THE ELECTION CALENDAR FOLLOWS:

-- REGISTRATION OF VOTERS: MAY 1 - 20, 1996 (WITH A PROVISIONAL LIST TO BE PREPARED BY THE LPU NO LATER THAN MAY 31, 1996.

THE LIST IS FINALIZED ON JULY 20, 1996)

-- DETERMINING THE NUMBER OF DEPUTIES TO BE ELECTED FROM EACH CONSTITUENCY: JULY 20 - 23, 1996

-- SUBMISSION OF PARTY NAMES AND SYMBOLS TO BE EMPLOYED IN THE ELECTION: MAY 1 - JUNE 29, 1996

-- NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES BY EACH OF THE THREE AUTHORIZED PARTIES: JULY 30 - SEPTEMBER 16, 1996 (NOTE: THIS YEAR THE LPU CONFRONTS THE PROSPECT OF COMPETING CANDIDATE LISTS FROM THE DIVIDED PDI. END NOTE)

-- EXAMINATION OF CANDIDATES' CREDENTIALS: SEPTEMBER 27 - OCTOBER 31, 1996 (THE LPU CAN LEGALLY REJECT PROPOSED CANDIDATES ON SPECIFIC GROUNDS SUCH AS AGE AS WELL AS VAGUER GROUNDS SUCH AS NOT BEING "LOYAL TO PANCASILA.")

-- ACCEPTANCE OF THE CANDIDATES BY THE LPU AND PREPARATION OF CANDIDATE LISTS: DECEMBER 1, 1996 - FEBRUARY 18, 1997)

-- ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CANDIDATE LISTS: FEBRUARY 19 - MARCH 31, 1997

-- ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS: APRIL 29 - MAY 23, 1997 (NOTE: THE CAMPAIGNS ARE USUALLY ORGANIZED IN A MANNER WHICH PRECLUDES TWO PARTIES FROM CAMPAIGNING ON THE SAME DAY IN THE SAME LOCATION. THIS PRECAUTION IS TAKEN TO REDUCE THE PROSPECT OF CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE. FOLLOWING THE CAMPAIGN A PERIOD

KNOWN AS "THE WEEK OF SILENCE" IS OBSERVED, USUALLY A FIVE DAY PERIOD RESERVED FOR "POPULAR CONTEMPLATION" PRIOR TO THE

BALLOTING. END NOTE)

-- BALLOTING: TO BE SET BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE (NOTE: BALLOTING WILL TAKE PLACE ONE DAY BETWEEN MAY 28 AND MAY 30, 1997. END NOTE)

-- COUNTING OF VOTES: MAY 30 - JUNE 17, 1997

-- VALIDATION OF GENERAL ELECTIONS RESULTS: JUNE 10 - 13, 1997 (NOTE: VALIDATION OF VOTES FOR REGIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE NATIONAL RESULTS ARE VALIDATED. END NOTE)

-- OATH TAKING BY VICTORS: OCTOBER 1, 1997

AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS:

---

4. (U) UNDER THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE LPU (WHICH IS HEADED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS) EACH OF THE THREE RECOGNIZED POLITICAL PARTIES HAS BEGUN PREPARING CANDIDATE SLATES WHICH MUST BE TURNED INTO THE LPU FOR ITS REVIEW BY JULY 30. THE THREE OFFICIAL PARTIES ARE:

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	

(ONY) /000W

----------5370C9 291235Z /38

R 290216Z JUL 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1644
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 005385

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS PROCESS: A CALENDAR/PRIMER REFERENCE

-- "GOLKAR" (THE PARTY, WHICH IN THE PAST WAS DESCRIBED BY THE GOVERNMENT AS A "FUNCTIONAL GROUP," COMPRISING GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY CADRE);

-- THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY OR "PDI:" (COMPRISING A GROUPING OF NATIONALIST AND CHRISTIAN PARTIES);

-- THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY OR "PPP:" (GROUPING ISLAMIC PARTIES)

THE LPU REVIEWS THE CANDIDATE LISTS SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES AT EACH OF THE THREE LEVELS (CENTRAL, PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT) TO SCREEN OUT INVALID PARTY NOMINEES. (COMMENT: GOLKAR, IN 1996, IMPOSED ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON ITS CANDIDATES, PREVENTING CANDIDATES WHO ARE OVER 65 OR HAVE ALREADY SERVED 20 OR MORE YEARS IN THE DPR FROM SEEKING RE-ELECTION. END COMMENT)

5. (U) LPU'S REVIEW OF PARTY SLATES IS NOT NORMALLY A CONTENTIOUS PROCESS THOUGH IN THIS UNUSUAL POLITICAL YEAR, IT COULD BECOME SO IF THE DIVIDED PDI PRODUCES COMPETING CANDIDATE SLATES. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S MEETING WITH THE PDI LEADER SOERJADI, JULY 25 (REFTEL), APPEARS TO ENSURE THAT THE PDI CANDIDATE LIST SUBMITTED BY HIS PARTY WILL BE ACCEPTED BY THE LPU OVER ANY CONTENDING LIST SUBMITTED BY THE MEGAWATI-LED PDI FACTION.

6. (U) FOLLOWING APPROVAL OF THE THREE SLATES, EACH PARTY IS ALLOTTED CAMPAIGN PERIODS IN WHICH TO PRESENT ITS CANDIDATES TO THE PEOPLE. THE PERIODS ARE STRICTLY LIMITED TO SPECIFIC DATES AND ARE ARRANGED SO THAT NO TWO PARTIES ARE COMPETING ANYWHERE IN INDONESIA ON THE SAME DAY. TYPICALLY, THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD RUNS FOR LESS THAN TWO WEEKS OF ACTUAL CAMPAIGN TIME. GOLKAR, THE GOVERNMENT PARTY, HAS PROPOSED A FURTHER TIGHTENING OF CONSTRAINTS ON CAMPAIGNING, URGING THAT ALL CAMPAIGNS BE LIMITED TO INDOOR EVENTS. (COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT GOLKAR'S PROPOSAL WILL SUCCEED. END COMMENT)

7. (U) FOLLOWING THE LIMITED CAMPAIGN THERE IS A "SILENT" WEEK,

DURING WHICH THE POLITICAL PARTIES ARE BARRED FROM FURTHER CAMPAIGNING UNTIL THE DAY OF BALLOTING. TYPICALLY, THE PRESS ALSO DOES NOT REPORT ON POLITICAL STATEMENTS, NOR DOES IT EDITORIALIZE ON BEHALF OF ONE PARTY OR ANOTHER.

KEY INSTITUTIONS: THE DPR AND THE MPR:
---

8. (U) THE DPR, THE NATIONAL LEVEL PARLIAMENT, IS VERY CIRCUMSCRIBED IN ITS OFFICIAL DUTIES AND IN TERMS OF ITS PRACTICAL INFLUENCE. IT IS COMPRISED OF 500 MEMBERS, 425 OF WHOM ARE ELECTED ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS FROM THE GOVERNMENT-APPROVED PARTY SLATES. THE REMAINING 75 ARE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT FROM THE RANKS OF ABRI, THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES, WHO DO NOT VOTE IN THE ELECTION.

9. (U) EVERY FIVE YEARS, IN THE YEAR FOLLOWING THE ELECTION, THE NEWLY ELECTED DPR MEMBERS JOIN WITH ANOTHER 500 APPOINTED DELEGATES IN A CONVENING OF THE MPR, THE PRINCIPLE FUNCTION OF WHICH IS THE SELECTION A NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT. THE MPR ALSO ESTABLISHES THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. THUS, THE MPR WILL MEET SOME TIME IN 1998. DURING THE PERIOD OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO'S "NEW ORDER" GOVERNMENT, ALL MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTIONS HAVE BEEN BY CONSENSUS WITH ONLY PRESIDENT SUHARTO EMERGING AS A CANDIDATE.

THE GENERAL ELECTION INSTITUTE (LPU):
---

10. (U) THE GENERAL ELECTION INSTITUTE (LPU) FUNCTIONS AS A GENERAL SUPERVISORY BODY MONITORING ALL ASPECTS OF THE ELECTION

PROCESS AND IS EMPOWERED TO ACCEPT OR REJECT PARTY-NOMINATED CANDIDATES. GROUNDS FOR REJECTION INCLUDE OBJECTIVE CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS ILLITERACY OR A CRIMINAL RECORD, AS WELL AS SUBJECTIVE CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS BEING DISLOYAL TO THE NATIONAL IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA. THE LPU ALSO DETERMINES THE NUMBER OF LEGISLATIVE MEMBERS TO BE ELECTED FOR EACH CONSTITUENCY. THE INSTITUTE, WHICH IS HEADED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS, INCLUDES AN EXECUTIVE BOARD, A COMMITTEE CHARGED WITH MONITORING THE BALLOTING, AND ONE WHICH SUPERVISES THE EXECUTION OF ALL OTHER PHASES OF THE GENERAL ELECTION (THE "INDONESIAN ELECTORAL COMMITTEE" OR PPI).

11. (U) THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE LPU CONSISTS OF:
-- MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS (CHAIRMAN);
-- MINISTER OF JUSTICE (DEPUTY CHAIRMAN);
-- MINISTERS OF INFORMATION, FINANCE, DEFENSE, TOURISM, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COMMUNICATIONS;
-- COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES.

INDONESIAN GENERAL ELECTION COMMITTEE (PPI):

10. (U) THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMITTEE (PPI) HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO ADMINISTER THE ELECTIONS. THE PPI CONSISTS OF

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	
(ONY)	/000W						

----------5370C8 291235Z /38
R 290216Z JUL 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1645
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 005385

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS PROCESS: A CALENDAR/PRIMER REFERENCE

THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS (CHAIRMAN) AND 25 OTHER MEMBERS. IT SUPERVISES THE ACTIVITIES OF ALL ELECTORAL COMMITTEES AND BOARDS; SETS THE ELECTION CALENDAR, ADVISES ELECTORAL COMMITTEES AND ANNOUNCES THE CANDIDATE LISTS.

THE ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE (THE NATIONAL CONTROL COMMITTEE ON THE GENERAL ELECTION'S EXECUTION):

12. WITHIN THE PPI IS THE "NATIONAL CONTROL COMMITTEE ON THE GENERAL ELECTION'S EXECUTION," WHICH IS CHARGED WITH MONITORING THE ACTUAL BALLOTING. IT IS CHAIRED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. THE OTHER STATUTORY MEMBERS INCLUDE THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS AND ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM EACH OF THE THREE OFFICIAL PARTIES. SUBORDINATE OFFICES FUNCTION AT THE PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEVELS.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO5686

PAGE 01 JAKART 03050 270448Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	OASY-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01
	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/048W						

----------BE8052 270448Z /22

P 231159Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5941
INFO USEU BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003050

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03050 270448Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 SEP 2006 200503235

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/07
TAGS: PINS, CASC, ELAB, PHUM, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: MORE CLASHES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE, AS WELL AS SOME PEACEFUL GATHERINGS, ON THE LAST DAY OF ELECTION CAMPAIGN

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS. REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: JAKARTA WAS IN A STATE OF ANXIETY MAY 23, THE LAST DAY OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN. MANY OFFICES CLOSED EARLY AND RUMORS OF RIOTS AND CONFRONTATIONS FLOWED FREELY THROUGHOUT THE DAY. AS OF 1800, WE HAVE RECEIVED ONE CONFIRMED REPORT OF A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN PPP AND GOLKAR SUPPORTERS IN THE CIPUTAT RAYA AREA OF SOUTHWEST JAKARTA, WITH STONES BEING THROWN AND PROPERTY DAMAGED. A CHURCH WAS BURNED IN KEBAYORAN LAMA (SOUTH CENTRAL JAKARTA). WE ALSO HAVE RELIABLE REPORTS OF SOME LARGE, PEACEFUL GATHERINGS OF PPP MEMBERS WHO DEFIED THEIR LEADERS' CALL NOT TO HOLD PUBLIC MEETINGS. THERE WERE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF FIRES AT A BANK AND A BUS STATION IN SOUTHWEST JAKARTA, AND PROPERTY DAMAGE AT A MCDONALDS' RESTAURANT IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA. AMCONSUL SURABAYA REPORTS THAT A LARGE PPP RALLY WAS TAKING PLACE IN A PARK ADJACENT TO THE U.S. INFORMATION SERVICE OFFICE, BUT AS OF 1630, THE CAMPAIGN EVENT WAS PROCEEDING PEACEFULLY. END SUMMARY.

PPP JAKARTA BRANCH CALLS OFF PUBLIC MEEETINGS MAY 23
---

3. (U) MAY 23 WAS THE FINAL DAY OF THE 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN, AND BY ROTATION, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY'S (PPP) TURN TO CAMPAIGN IN JAVA. IN VIEW OF INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURRED

DURING THE LAST SEVERAL ROUNDS OF THE CAMPAIGN IN JAKARTA, THE PPP EXECUTIVE BOARD ANNOUNCED MAY 22 THAT THE PARTY WOULD NOT HOLD PUBLIC MEETINGS IN JAKARTA, BUT WOULD SIMPLY DISTRIBUTE INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC "IN ORDER TO ELICIT THE SYMPATHY OF THE COMMUNITY." JAKARTA GOVERNOR SURJADI SOEDIRJA ISSUED HIS OWN APPEAL TO JAKARTA RESIDENTS NOT TO BE INCITED BY "IRRESPONSIBLE ISSUES" OR BY "GROUPS WHO WANT TO CAUSE THE ELECTIONS TO FAIL."

REPORTS OF TROUBLE IN SOUTHWEST JAKARTA AND WESTERN SUBURBS

4. (SBU) THE ONLY CONFIRMED REPORT OF LARGE-SCALE CROWDS AND INCIDENTS CAME FROM THE CIPUTAT RAYA OF SOUTHWEST JAKARTA--SITE OF DISTURBANCES DURING EARLIER PPP CAMPAIGN DAYS. THE RSO REPORTED FROM THE SCENE OF A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF PPP AND THE GOVERNMENT POLITICAL PARTY, GOLKAR, WITH CROWDS ESTIMATED AT 7,000. THE TWO SIDES WERE THROWING ROCKS AT EACH OTHER, BREAKING WINDOWS IN BUILDINGS ALONG THE STREET. THE CROWD ALSO SET TIRES ON FIRE. A PROTESTANT CHURCH IN KEBAYORAN LAMA, WHICH WAS STONED TWICE EARLIER THIS WEEK, WAS IN FLAMES AT 1800 LOCAL TIME.

5. (SBU) THE EMBASSY HAS ALSO HEARD UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF FIRES AT THE LEBAK BULUS BUS STATION (A MAJOR TRANSPORT DEPOT) AND AT A BANK ON CIPUTAT RAYA STREET. LIKEWISE, THERE IS AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT CROWDS RANSACKED A MCDONALD'S RESTAURANT IN CIPUTAT RAYA.

6. (C) THROUGHOUT THE DAY, THE EMBASSY HAS HEARD REPORTS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES THAT SECURITY AUTHORITIES BATTLED LARGE CROWDS IN THE WESTERN INDUSTRIAL SUBURB OF TANGERANG. AT 1700, THE DATT RECEIVED A REPORT FROM HIS AUSTRALIAN COUNTERPART THAT CROWDS HAD

BURNED CARS IN TANGERANG, AND A SEPARATE (UNCONFIRMED) REPORT INDICATED THAT BWO BUILDINGS HAD BEEN BURNED IN TANGERANG AS WELL. (NOTE: ASIDE FROM PROPERTY DAMAGE DURING A LABOR STRIKE IN TANGERANG IN LATE APRIL, TANGERANG HAS BEEN LARGELY FREE OF INCIDENTS IN THE CAMPAIGN UP TO NOW. END NOTE)

SOME LARGE PPP STREET CAMPAIGNS DESPITE PPP LEADERS' INSTRUCTION TO AVOID THEM

7. (SBU) AS DURING THE PREVOUS TWO ROUNDS OF THE CAMPAIGN, SOME PPP PARTISANS CHOSE TO IGNORE THEIR LEADERS' INSTRUCTION NOT TO HOLD STREET RALLIES OR OTHER PUBLIC MEETINGS. AT 1700, POLOFF WITNESSED A PEACEFUL GATHERING OF ABOUT 2,000 MOSTLY SCHOOL-AGE PPP SUPPORTERS IN FRONT OF A MOSQUE NEAR PPP HEADQUARTERS IN CENTRAL JAKARTA. SEVEN TRUCKLOADS OF INDONESIAN MARINES IN RIOT GEAR WERE PREPARING TO DISPERSE THE GROUP AT THE TIME, AND IT APPEARED THAT THE CROWD WOULD BREAK UP WITHOUT INCIDENT. OTHER RELIABLE

EYEWITNESSES SAW LARGE PPP GATHERINGS ON CASABLANCA STREET (CENTRAL JAKARTA), MAS MANSYUR STREET (EAST CENTRAL JAKARTA), AND KEBAYORAN LAMA (SOUTHWEST JAKARTA). POLICE WERE VISIBLE ON THE SCENE, AND WERE IN SOME INSTANCES VIDEOTAPING THE CROWD, BUT DID NOT INTERFERE.

RUMORS GALORE

8. (SBU) THROUGHOUT THE DAY JAKARTANS KEPT THE TELEPHONE LINES BUSY SHARING RUMORS OF INCIDENTS AROUND TOWN. THERE WERE MANY REPORTS OF PLANS FOR A MARCH ON THE NATIONAL MONUMENT (MONAS), BUT A HEAVY POLICE PRESENCE ON THE MAJOR ROADS LEADING TO MONAS INSURED

THAT THIS DID NOT TAKE PLACE. EMBASSY WAS UNABLE TO FIND ANY CORROBORATING EVIDENCE OF REPORTS OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS NEAR THE TANJUNG PRIOK PORT IN NORTH JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE AROUND TOWN. MANY BUSINESSES IN CENTRAL JAKARTA CLOSED EARLY BECAUSE OF CONCERNS THAT CROWDS WOULD GATHER AFTER FRIDAY PRAYERS AT MOSQUES. IRONICALLY, THE EARLY EXODUS FROM THE CENTER OF TOWN MADE TRAFFIC FLOW MORE SMOOTHLY THAN USUAL.

LARGE PPP MEETING IN SURABAYA

9. (U) AMCONSUL SURABAYA REPORTS THAT A LARGE PPP CAMPAIGN MEETING WAS TAKING PLACE DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON IN A PARK ADJACENT TO THE FORMER USIS OFFICE. OFFICES IN THE AREA CLOSED DOWN EARLY TO ALLOW EMPLOYEES TO DEPART BEFORE TRAFFIC BECAME CONGESTED BECAUSE OF THE CROWD, BUT NO INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE GATHERING.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>
PTQ9264

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9264

PAGE 01 JAKART 03050 01 OF 02 231159Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00
	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/047W

----------BDD674 231200Z /38

P 231159Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5941
INFO USEU BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003050

USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/07
TAGS: PINS, CASC, ELAB, PHUM, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: MORE CLASHES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE, AS WELL AS SOME PEACEFUL
CONFIDENTIAL

GATHERINGS, ON THE LAST DAY OF ELECTION CAMPAIGN

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: JAKARTA WAS IN A STATE OF ANXIETY MAY 23, THE LAST DAY OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN. MANY OFFICES CLOSED EARLY AND RUMORS OF RIOTS AND CONFRONTATIONS FLOWED FREELY THROUGHOUT THE DAY. AS OF 1800, WE HAVE RECEIVED ONE CONFIRMED REPORT OF A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN PPP AND GOLKAR SUPPORTERS IN THE CIPUTAT RAYA AREA OF SOUTHWEST JAKARTA, WITH STONES BEING THROWN AND PROPERTY DAMAGED. A CHURCH WAS BURNED IN KEBAYORAN LAMA (SOUTH CENTRAL JAKARTA). WE ALSO HAVE RELIABLE REPORTS OF SOME LARGE, PEACEFUL GATHERINGS OF PPP MEMBERS WHO DEFIED THEIR LEADERS' CALL NOT TO HOLD PUBLIC MEETINGS. THERE WERE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF FIRES AT A BANK AND A BUS STATION IN SOUTHWEST JAKARTA, AND PROPERTY DAMAGE AT A MCDONALDS' RESTAURANT IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA. AMCONSUL SURABAYA REPORTS THAT A LARGE PPP RALLY WAS TAKING PLACE IN A PARK ADJACENT TO THE U.S. INFORMATION SERVICE OFFICE, BUT AS OF 1630, THE CAMPAIGN EVENT WAS PROCEEDING PEACEFULLY. END SUMMARY.

PPP JAKARTA BRANCH CALLS OFF PUBLIC MEEETINGS MAY 23
---

3. (U) MAY 23 WAS THE FINAL DAY OF THE 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN, AND BY ROTATION, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY'S (PPP) TURN TO CAMPAIGN IN JAVA. IN VIEW OF INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURRED DURING THE LAST SEVERAL ROUNDS OF THE CAMPAIGN IN JAKARTA, THE PPP EXECUTIVE BOARD ANNOUNCED MAY 22 THAT THE PARTY WOULD NOT HOLD PUBLIC MEETINGS IN JAKARTA, BUT WOULD SIMPLY DISTRIBUTE INFORMATION

TO THE PUBLIC "IN ORDER TO ELICIT THE SYMPATHY OF THE COMMUNITY." JAKARTA GOVERNOR SURJADI SOEDIRJA ISSUED HIS OWN APPEAL TO JAKARTA RESIDENTS NOT TO BE INCITED BY "IRRESPONSIBLE ISSUES" OR BY "GROUPS WHO WANT TO CAUSE THE ELECTIONS TO FAIL."

REPORTS OF TROUBLE IN SOUTHWEST JAKARTA AND WESTERN SUBURBS

4. (SBU) THE ONLY CONFIRMED REPORT OF LARGE-SCALE CROWDS AND INCIDENTS CAME FROM THE CIPUTAT RAYA OF SOUTHWEST JAKARTA--SITE OF DISTURBANCES DURING EARLIER PPP CAMPAIGN DAYS. THE RSO REPORTED FROM THE SCENE OF A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF PPP AND THE GOVERNMENT POLITICAL PARTY, GOLKAR, WITH CROWDS ESTIMATED AT 7,000. THE TWO SIDES WERE THROWING ROCKS AT EACH OTHER, BREAKING WINDOWS IN BUILDINGS ALONG THE STREET. THE CROWD ALSO SET TIRES ON FIRE. A PROTESTANT CHURCH IN KEBAYORAN LAMA, WHICH WAS STONED TWICE EARLIER THIS WEEK, WAS IN FLAMES AT 1800 LOCAL TIME.

5. (SBU) THE EMBASSY HAS ALSO HEARD UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF FIRES AT THE LEBAK BULUS BUS STATION (A MAJOR TRANSPORT DEPOT) AND AT A BANK ON CIPUTAT RAYA STREET. LIKEWISE, THERE IS AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT CROWDS RANSACKED A MCDONALD'S RESTAURANT IN CIPUTAT RAYA.

6. (C) THROUGHOUT THE DAY, THE EMBASSY HAS HEARD REPORTS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES THAT SECURITY AUTHORITIES BATTLED LARGE CROWDS IN THE WESTERN INDUSTRIAL SUBURB OF TANGERANG. AT 1700, THE DATT RECEIVED A REPORT FROM HIS AUSTRALIAN COUNTERPART THAT CROWDS HAD BURNED CARS IN TANGERANG, AND A SEPARATE (UNCONFIRMED) REPORT INDICATED THAT TWO BUILDINGS HAD BEEN BURNED IN TANGERANG AS WELL. (NOTE: ASIDE FROM PROPERTY DAMAGE DURING A LABOR STRIKE IN

TANGERANG IN LATE APRIL, TANGERANG HAS BEEN LARGELY FREE OF INCIDENTS IN THE CAMPAIGN UP TO NOW. END NOTE)

SOME LARGE PPP STREET CAMPAIGNS DESPITE PPP LEADERS' INSTRUCTION TO AVOID THEM .

---

7. (SBU) AS DURING THE PREVOUS TWO ROUNDS OF THE CAMPAIGN, SOME PPP PARTISANS CHOSE TO IGNORE THEIR LEADERS' INSTRUCTION NOT TO HOLD STREET RALLIES OR OTHER PUBLIC MEETINGS. AT 1700, POLOFF WITNESSED A PEACEFUL GATHERING OF ABOUT 2,000 MOSTLY SCHOOL-AGE PPP SUPPORTERS IN FRONT OF A MOSQUE NEAR PPP HEADQUARTERS IN CENTRAL JAKARTA. SEVEN TRUCKLOADS OF INDONESIAN MARINES IN RIOT GEAR WERE PREPARING TO DISPERSE THE GROUP AT THE TIME, AND IT APPEARED THAT THE CROWD WOULD BREAK UP WITHOUT INCIDENT. OTHER RELIABLE EYEWITNESSES SAW LARGE PPP GATHERINGS ON CASABLANCA STREET (CENTRAL JAKARTA), MAS MANSYUR STREET (EAST CENTRAL JAKARTA), AND KEBAYORAN LAMA (SOUTHWEST JAKARTA). POLICE WERE VISIBLE ON THE SCENE, AND WERE IN SOME INSTANCES VIDEOTAPING THE CROWD, BUT DID NOT INTERFERE.

RUMORS GALORE

---

8. (SBU) THROUGHOUT THE DAY JAKARTANS KEPT THE TELEPHONE LINES

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9684

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9684

PAGE 01 JAKART 03050 02 OF 02 231352Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00

DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00
EBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01
LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	SVC-00	TRSE-00
USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
/047W						

----------BDE384 231352Z /45

P 231159Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5942
INFO USEU BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003050

USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/07
TAGS: PINS, CASC, ELAB, PHUM, PGOV, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: MORE CLASHES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE, AS WELL AS SOME PEACEFUL GATHERINGS, ON THE LAST DAY OF ELECTION CAMPAIGN

BUSY SHARING RUMORS OF INCIDENTS AROUND TOWN. THERE WERE MANY REPORTS OF PLANS FOR A MARCH ON THE NATIONAL MONUMENT (MONAS), BUT A HEAVY POLICE PRESENCE ON THE MAJOR ROADS LEADING TO MONAS INSURED THAT THIS DID NOT TAKE PLACE. EMBASSY WAS UNABLE TO FIND ANY CORROBORATING EVIDENCE OF REPORTS OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS NEAR THE TANJUNG PRIOK PORT IN NORTH JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE AROUND TOWN. MANY BUSINESSES IN CENTRAL JAKARTA CLOSED EARLY BECAUSE OF CONCERNS THAT CROWDS WOULD GATHER AFTER FRIDAY PRAYERS AT MOSQUES. IRONICALLY, THE EARLY EXODUS FROM THE CENTER OF TOWN MADE TRAFFIC FLOW MORE SMOOTHLY THAN USUAL.

LARGE PPP MEETING IN SURABAYA

9.REPORTS THAT A LARGE(##)TAKING PLACE DURING THE AFTERNOON IN A PARK ADJACENT TO
THE FORMER USIS OFFICE. OFFICES IN THE AREA CLOSED DOWN EARLY TO ALLOW EMPLOYEES TO DEPART BEFORE TRAFFIC BECAME CONGESTED BECAUSE OF THE CROWD, BUT NO INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE GATHERING.

ROY

NOTE:(##)OMISSIONS. CORRECTION WILL FOLLOW.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN



IMRNEWFILE

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9056

PAGE 01 JAKART 03047 231049Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/037W						

----------BDCF07 231049Z /38

R 231049Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5939
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003047

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/02
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: CALLS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTION NOT LIKELY
- TO PRODUCE ANY RESCHEDULING

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS 1.5(D)

2. (C) ASMARA NABABAN, MEMBER OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (KOMNASHAM), TOLD EMBOFF MAY 23 THAT THE COMMISSION WILL MEET MAY 27 TO CONSIDER FORMAL APPEALS FROM TWO GROUPS WHICH CALLED FOR A POSTPONEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS NOW SCHEDULED FOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 SEP 2006 200503235

MAY 29. THE TWO GROUPS INCLUDED A DELEGATION OF SENIOR CADRE REPRESENTING THE MEGAWATI FACTION OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, AND THE NATIONALITY FORUM OF THE YOUTH OF INDONESIA. THE YOUTH FORUM ALSO CALLED FOR KOMNASHAM TO ESTABLISH AN ELECTION COMMISSION WHICH WOULD SUPERVISE THE CONDUCT OF A RE-SCHEDULED ELECTION.

3. (C) NABABAN SAID THAT HE CONSIDERED IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT KOMNASHAM WOULD CALL FOR A POSTPONEMENT BUT THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A CONSENSUS FOR A STATEMENT WHICH WOULD NOTE VIOLATIONS OF LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED TO THE ELECTION. HE SAID THAT THE COMMISSION HAD BEEN "SHAKEN" BY A REPORT BY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MUNAWIR SOURCED TO MUNAWIR'S BROTHER THAT ON MAY 21 IN JEPARA, CENTRAL JAVA, THE MILITARY HAD DETAINED 26 MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND SEVERELY MISTREATED THEM. COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MUNAWIR SAID THAT ELECTRIC SHOCK HAD BEEN ADMINISTERED BUT THAT HE WOULD NOT GO INTO DETAIL AS THERE WERE LADIES PRESENT AT THE COMMISSION MEETING. NABABAN SPECULATED THAT THE ACTION WAS POSSIBLY AIMED AT INTIMIDATION BUT THAT IT WOULD LIKELY HAVE THE IMPACT OF A PROVOCATION.

4. (C) COMMENT: WE SHARE NABABAN'S EXPECTATION THAT THE COMMISSION WILL NOT CALL FOR POSTPONEMENT. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3800

PAGE 01 JAKART 03080 01 OF 02 271014Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CA-02	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/044W		

----------BE99BE 271015Z /38

P 271014Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5962
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003080

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/02
TAGS: PGOV, CASC, PHUM, PREL, ECON, ETTD, ID
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN CONCLUDES WITH WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE

REF: JAKARTA 3015

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03080 01 OF 02 271014Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 SEP 2006 200503235

1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE FINAL DAY OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGNING IN INDONESIA SAW UNUSUALLY EXTENSIVE VIOLENCE IN MANY PARTS OF INDONESIA. IN THE MOST VIOLENT EPISODE, OVER 130 PEOPLE APPEAR TO HAVE DIED IN CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE IN BANJARMASIN, A TOWN OF 500,000 IN SOUTH KALIMANTAN. MOST WERE VICTIMS CAUGHT IN ONE OF FOUR SHOPPING CENTERS SET ABLAZE BY RIOTERS. SERIOUS VIOLENCE ALSO ERUPTED IN BANGIL IN EAST JAVA, IN JAKARTA AND ITS ENVIRONS AND IN OTHER LOCATIONS. DESPITE PARTY LEADERS AGREEMENT TO CALL OFF CAMPAIGNING IN SOME AREAS SUCH AS JAKARTA, PARTY ADHERENTS AND OTHERS TOOK TO THE STREETS ANYWAY. OBSERVERS ARE EXPRESSING CONCERN THAT ELECTION DAY, MAY 29 OR THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF ELECTION RESULTS COULD SPARK NEW VIOLENCE. END SUMMARY

BANJARMASIN, SOUTH KALIMANTAN:
---

3. (U) MAY 23, THE FINAL DAY OF THE PARLIAMENTARY CAMPAIGN IN INDONESIA BEFORE A FIVE DAY "COOLING OFF PERIOD" PRIOR TO ELECTION DAY MAY 29, SAW UNPRECEDENTED VIOLENCE ACROSS INDONESIA. BY FAR THE WORST VIOLENCE TOOK PLACE IN THE LARGE CITY OF BANJURMASIN IN SOUTH KALIMANTAN. SUPPORTERS OF THE MUSLIM ORIENTED UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY, PPP, CLASHED WITH SUPPORTERS OF GOLKAR, THE GOVERNMENT PARTY/ORGANIZATION WHICH WAS SCHEDULED TO CAMPAIGN THAT DAY. RESULTING RIOTS LED TO WIDESPREAD ARSON TARGETING GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS,

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES AND CHURCHES. THE FIRES TOUCHED OFF OTHER FIRES IN ADJOINING NEIGHBORHOODS DESTROYING OVER 100 HOMES.

4. (U) AS OF MAY 27, DAMAGE AND DEATHS CAUSED BY THE RIOTING ARE STILL BEING COMPILED THOUGH THE MEDIA, QUOTING OFFICIAL SOURCES, CITE THE FOLLOWING:

HUMAN TOLL: POSSIBLY AS HIGH AS 164 ALTHOUGH THAT COUNT

IS FLUCTUATING WITH FIRMER ESTIMATES IN THE RANGE OF 130. MOST VICTIMS WERE KILLED IN A FOUR STORY DEPARTMENT STORE TORCHED BY RIOTERS. INITIAL CLAIMS BY OFFICIAL SOURCES ALLEGED THAT MOST OF THOSE KILLED WERE LOOTERS WHO HAD BROKEN INTO THE COMPLEX AFTER IT HAD BEEN CLOSED DUE TO THE RIOTING. OVER 100 LOCAL RESIDENTS, INCLUDING FIVE SECURITY OFFICIALS, ARE HOSPITALIZED. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CLAIM TO HAVE ARRESTED 181 ON SUSPICION OF RIOTING AND/OR LOOTING. THE MAYOR'S OFFICE IN BANJARMASIN, REACHED BY PHONE MAY 24, TOLD EMBOFF THAT TO THE BEST OF ITS KNOWLEDGE, NO FOREIGNERS WERE KILLED OR INJURED IN THE VIOLENCE.

PROPERTY DAMAGE: EIGHT MALLS AND DEPARTMENT STORES WERE BURNED, AS WERE FOUR HOTELS, FOUR GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, TWO CHURCHES, TWO BUDDHIST TEMPLES, TWO CINEMAS, AND 130 HOUSES. SCORES OF CARS AND MOTORCYCLES WERE ALSO DESTROYED OR DAMAGED.

JAKARTA:
---

5. (U) AS NOTED REFTEL, JAKARTA AND ITS ENVIRONS ALSO SAW SIGNIFICANT RIOTING ON MAY 23. IN ADDITION TO DESTRUCTION REPORTED REFTEL, A BANK AND PART OF AN ISLAMIC SCHOOL WERE BURNED ON BUNCIT RAYA STREET IN SOUTH JAKARTA. IN SOUTHWEST JAKARTA, A CHURCH WAS BURNED AND BUSINESSES ALONG A KILOMETER-LONG STRETCH OF ONE STREET WERE DAMAGED, PRINCIPALLY BY STONE THROWING. PUBLIC FACILITIES WERE ALSO DESTROYED IN OUTLYING JAKARTA SUBURBS OF MEKARSARI AND CIPONDOH.

TANGERANG, WEST JAVA:
---

6. (U) PRESS REPORTS NOTE THAT FOUR BANKS WERE VANDALIZED BY MOBS ESTIMATED BY THE MEDIA AS MORE THAN 100,000. LOCAL CONTACTS NOTE THAT A SUPERMARKET WAS ALSO BURNED AND THAN MANY VEHICLES WERE VANDALIZED.

BANGIL, EAST JAVA:

7. (U) MEDIA REPORTS NOTE THAT IN BANGIL NEAR PASAURAN IN EAST JAVA, RIOTERS TORCHED A POLICE STATION AND VANDALIZED FOUR BANKS, A CHURCH, NUMEROUS SHOPS AND MOTOR VEHICLES. POLICE REPORTEDLY FIRED ON THE CROWD AT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ5710

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5710

PAGE 01 JAKART 03080 02 OF 02 272324Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CA-02	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/044W		

----------BEDF27 272325Z /38
P 271014Z MAY 97 ZDK CTG RUEHCB 2762 1471126
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5963
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003080

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/02
TAGS: PGOV, CASC, PHUM, PREL, ECON, ETTD, ID
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN CONCLUDES WITH WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE

ONE POINT, WOUNDING SIX. SEPTEL FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA PROVIDES MORE DETAIL ON RIOTING IN BANGIL.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

8. (U) POLICE ALSO CLASHED WITH MOBS IN MALANG, SEMARANG AND CIANJUR. IN MALANG A POLICE STATION WAS ATTACKED. AMCONSUL SURABAYA NOTES THAT NONE OF THESE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A MAJOR INCIDENT.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>
PTQ6207

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6207

PAGE 01 JAKART 03080 02 OF 02 280133Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CA-02	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/044W		

----------BEE8DC 280133Z /38
P 271014Z MAY 97 ZDK CTG RUEHCB 2762 1471126
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5963
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003080

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/02
TAGS: PGOV, CASC, PHUM, PREL, ECON, ETTD, ID
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN CONCLUDES WITH WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE

ONE POINT, WOUNDING SIX. SEPTEL FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA PROVIDES MORE DETAIL ON RIOTING IN BANGIL.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

8. (U) POLICE ALSO CLASHED WITH MOBS IN MALANG, SEMARANG AND CIANJUR. IN MALANG A POLICE STATION WAS ATTACKED. AMCONSUL SURABAYA NOTES THAT NONE OF THESE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A MAJOR INCIDENT.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN



IMRNEWFILE

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4125

PAGE 01 JAKART 03188 01 OF 02 301037Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/038W					

----------BFF79A 301037Z /38

P 301037Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6041
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003188

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0082

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-30-02
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: INITIAL ELECTION FIGURES: SURABAYA CONSULAR DISTRICT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PRINCIPAL OFFICER. REASON 1.5 (D)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03188 01 OF 02 301037Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 SEP 2006 200503235

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE GOVERNMENT PARTY, GOLKAR, BOTH GOT A SUBSTANTIAL BOOST IN THIS YEAR'S ELECTION BY THE COLLAPSE OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY WHICH FELL TO 3.2 PER CENT OF THE EAST JAVA VOTE AND 2.6 PER CENT IN CENTRAL JAVA. THE PPP WON THE CENTRAL JAVA CITY OF PEKALONGAN AND THE EAST JAVA DISTRICT OF PASURUAN AGAIN. IT WON TWO OF THE THREE ELECTIONS IN THE CITY OF PASURUAN. IN EAST JAVA, THE NUMBER OF VOIDED BALLOTS SOMETIMES SIGNIFICANTLY OUT DISTANCED THE PDI TALLY. WHILE MOST OF EAST JAVA WAS CALM ON ELECTION DAY, SIGNIFICANT VIOLENCE BROKE OUT IN SAMPANG ON THE ISLAND OF MADURA. PPP OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT MAJOR FRAUD OCCURRED THROUGHOUT MADURA. THE SITUATION THERE REPORTEDLY IS TENSE. OUTSIDE JAVA, PROVINCES IN THE SURABAYA CONSULAR DISTRICT SEEM TO HAVE GONE GOLKAR OVERWHELMINGLY. END SUMMARY

3. (U) FOLLOWING ARE OUR FIRST STATISTICS FROM THE MAY 29 ELECTION IN INDONESIAN PROVINCES OF THE SURABAYA CONSULAR DISTRICT. ALL STATISTICS USED ARE STILL PRELIMINARY, ALTHOUGH FOR EAST JAVA WE ARE VERY CLOSE TO FINAL FIGURES. IN ALL CASES, EXCEPT WHERE NOTED, WE HAVE USED FIGURES FOR THE NATIONAL LEVEL RACE, STATISTICS FOR THE PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS VARY INSIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE NATIONAL ONE.

4. (U) EAST JAVA: WITH MOST OF EAST JAVA COUNTED, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL BUT NOT YET FINAL STATISTICS, THE PPP HAS WON 33.6 PER CENT OF THE VOTE (COMPARED WITH 25.3 PER CENT IN 1992), GOLKAR SAW ITS VICTORY RISE FROM 58.7 PER CENT IN 1992 TO 63.1 PER CENT, AND THE PDI FELL FROM 15.9 PER CENT TO 3.2 PER CENT. THE PPP APPARENTLY WON THE PASURUAN DISTRICT BY A CONVINCING MARGIN (IT WON PASURUAN IN 1992). IN THE PASURUAN CITY DISTRICT, THE PPP HAS BEEN

CONFIDENTIAL

EDGED OUT BY GOLKAR FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, BUT SQUEAKED BY THE GOVERNMENT PARTY AT THE PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS.

5. (SBU) THE GOLPUT VOTE IN EAST JAVA. GIVEN THE FLAWED NATURE OF STATISTICS IN SOME EAST JAVA DISTRICTS, WE CANNOT YET GIVE AN ACCURATE ESTIMATE ON THE NUMBER OF VOTERS WHO EITHER CHOSE TO STAY AWAY OR VOID THE BALLOT (GOLPUT). HOWEVER, IT SEEMS THAT THE PERCENTAGES SWUNG WIDELY FROM DISTRICT TO DISTRICT. IN SURABAYA CITY, 19 PER CENT DID NOT VOTE OR VOIDED THEIR BALLOTS. LIKEWISE, 18 PER CENT IN MALANG, A UNIVERSITY TOWN, DID THE SAME. IN MORE

RURAL SETTINGS, SUCH AS TUBAN, 13 PER CENT COULD BE GROUPED AS GOLPUT, AND IN SITUBONDO, ONE OF THE MOST RURAL COASTAL DISTRICTS, ONLY 9 PER CENT. THE VAST MAJORITY OF GOLPUT SIMPLY STAYED AWAY FROM THE POLLS. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SEE SOME OFFICIAL, BUT NOT FINAL STATISTICS ON ACTUAL VOIDED BALLOTS, AND IN A FEW CASES THE VOIDS OUT-POLLED THE PDI (IN PROBOLINGGO CITY BY MORE THAN TWO TO ONE, IN PASURUAN CITY FIVE TO ONE).

6. (U) MADURA, DISTURBANCES, AND POSSIBLE FRAUD: ALTHOUGH THE ELECTION WAS GENERALLY CALM THROUGHOUT EAST JAVA, DISTURBANCES ERUPTED IN THE FOUR DISTRICTS ON MADURA ISLAND, AMID CHARGES OF MAJOR ELECTION FRAUD. (THERE WAS ALSO MINOR VIOLENCE ELSEWHERE IN EAST JAVA.) IN SAMPANG, CROWDS DAMAGED SEVERAL GOVERNMENT AND POLICE BUILDINGS IN ONE SUBDISTRICT AND ASSAULTED SAMPANG CITY. AFTER DESTROYING GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND ATTACKING THE POLICE STATION AND THE RESIDENCE OF THE BUPATI (DISTRICT HEAD), THEY WERE REPORTEDLY BEATEN BACK BY THE MILITARY. WE UNDERSTAND FOUR WERE WOUNDED BY RUBBER BULLETS. THE SITUATION IS TENSE.

7. (C) THE SAMPANG VIOLENCE WAS APPARENTLY A REACTION TO ELECTION OFFICIALS NOT ALLOWING PPP WITNESSES TO ENTER SEVERAL POLLING

PLACES AND NOT PROVIDING THEM WITH VOTING SUMMARIES. ONE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SOURCE INDICATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS STAGING A RE-VOTE IN HALF OF SAMPANG'S SUBDISTRICTS. WE HAVE ALSO HEARD THAT AUTHORITIES ARE HUNTING A WELL-KNOWN RELIGIOUS LEADER, ALAWI MUHAMMAD, SUSPECTED OF INCITING THE RIOTING. PPP OFFICIALS TELL US THAT FRAUD WAS COMMITTED IN THE OTHER THREE MADURA DISTRICTS AS WELL. AS AN EXAMPLE, ONE PPP CONTACT TOLD US THAT UPWARDS OF 1000 BALLOT BOXES IN SUMENEP (OUT OF 1600) HAD BEEN REPLACED. OFFICIAL RECORDS INITIALLY INDICATED ALL FOUR MADURA DISTRICTS WENT GOLKAR, WITH SUMENEP AT MORE THAN 90 PER CENT. PPP CONTACTS ALLUDED TO INSTANCES OF FRAUD AT OTHER DISTRICTS IN EAST JAVA, BUT NOT ON THE MADURA SCALE.

8. (U) CENTRAL JAVA. FIGURES FOR CENTRAL JAVA, WITH LESS THAN 50 PER CENT OF THE VOTES TALLIED, HAVE THE PPP TAKING 27.3 PER CENT (IN 1992, IT WAS 22.9 PER CENT), GOLKAR 70.1 PER CENT (THE 1992 FIGURE WAS 55.4 PER CENT), AND THE PDI 2.6 PER CENT (DOWN FROM 20.2 PER CENT IN 1992). THE PPP APPARENTLY HAS HELD ON TO THE CITY OF PEKALONGAN, THE ONE VOTING DISTRICT IT WON IN 1992 AND SCENE OF

MAJOR CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE THIS YEAR. IN SOLO, ONE OF THE BETTER PDI SHOWINGS IN 1992, THE PPP VOTE WENT FROM 15.2 PER CENT IN 1992 TO 39.2 PER CENT, GOLKAR INCREASED FROM 49 PER CENT TO 57.6 PER CENT, AND THE PDI DROPPED FROM 35.2 PER CENT TO 3.2 PER CENT. WE ARE UNAWARE OF MAJOR DISTURBANCES IN CENTRAL JAVA, OR ELSEWHERE IN THE DISTRICT.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4126

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4126

PAGE 01 JAKART 03188 02 OF 02 301037Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/038W					

----------BFF79C 301037Z /38

P 301037Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6042
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003188

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0082

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-30-02
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: INITIAL ELECTION FIGURES: SURABAYA CONSULAR DISTRICT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

9. (U) YOGYAKARTA. PRELIMINARY YOGYAKARTA RESULTS GIVE THE PPP 29.8 PER CENT, GOLKAR 66.9 PER CENT AND THE PDI 3.3 PER CENT FOR THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT. WE HAVE NO FIGURES FOR THE DISTRICT/LOCAL RACE.

10. (U) BALI AND THE REST: BALI, WITH ABOUT HALF THE VOTES TABULATED, GIVES GOLKAR A 94.8 PER CENT WIN. WHILE STATISTICS FOR OTHER PROVINCES IN THE DISTRICT (EAST AND WEST NUSATENGGARA, MALUKU, AND THE FOUR PROVINCES OF SULAWESI) ARE STILL FRAGMENTARY, GOLKAR PREDICTABLY IS WINNING BY VERY LARGE MARGINS.

PIERCE/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN



IMRNEWFILE

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7630

PAGE 01 JAKART 03222 01 OF 02 041005Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	FDIC-01	/042W	

----------C1D8CB 042135Z /38

P 021036Z JUN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6074
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003222

C O R R E C T E D COPY (PARA.10 MIS-NUMBERED)

NEW DELHI FOR HARTWICK

USCINPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03222 01 OF 02 041005Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 SEP 2006 200503235

SUBJECT: LATEST NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS

REF: A) JAKARTA 3193; B) JAKARTA 3188; C) JAKARTA 3154

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE VOTE COUNTS ARE COMPLETE IN MOST OF INDONESIA, AND GOLKAR CONTINUES TO HOLD A MASSIVE LEAD (74.27 PERCENT), LEAVING THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY VIRTUALLY A NON-ENTITY (3.07 PERCENT). THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (22.6 PERCENT) HAS CALLED FOR A REPEAT OF THE VOTE IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY DUE TO ALLEGED ELECTORAL FRAUD, AND SO FAR THE GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO DO SO IN PARTS OF MADURA, EAST JAVA. AN ASIAN ELECTION MONITORING GROUP HAS JOINED THE INDONESIAN INDEPENDENT MONITORING GROUP IN SUPPORT OF ALLEGATIONS OF VOTE FRAUD. PRESIDENT SUHARTO CLAIMED PUBLICLY ON MAY 30 THAT A SMALL GROUP WHICH "CHAMPIONED DEMOCRACY" HAD TRIED TO MAKE THE ELECTION FAIL. WE ARE TOLD THAT MEGAWATI WILL MAKE A CAUTIOUSLY WORDED STATEMENT ABOUT THE ELECTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. EMBASSY'S ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL. END SUMMARY

3. (U) THE INDONESIAN ELECTION INSTITUTE (LPU) HAS INFORMED THE EMBASSY THAT THE VOTE COUNT IS COMPLETE IN 24 OF INDONESIA'S 27 PROVINCES. JAKARTA, IRIAN JAYA, AND EAST JAVA ARE STILL IN PROCESS. OVERALL RESULTS WILL NOT BE FINALIZED UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF JUNE.

4. (U) ACCORDING TO THE LATEST PROVISIONAL RESULTS (AS OF

JUNE 1, PUBLISHED IN INDONESIAN DAILY KOMPAS AND OTHER MAJOR NEWSPAPERS ON JUNE 2), GOLKAR WON 74.27 PERCENT, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) 22.6 PERCENT, AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) JUST 3.07 PERCENT (SEE PARA. 11). THIS COMPARES TO 68.1 PERCENT, 17 PERCENT, AND 14.9 PERCENT IN 1992 FOR THE PARTIES, RESPECTIVELY. GOLKAR'S MARGIN OF VICTORY IS WELL OVER THE TARGET OF 70.02 PERCENT THAT IT HAD SET FOR THIS ELECTION. ACCORDING TO AN ESTIMATE IN KOMPAS, GOLKAR WILL LIKELY

HAVE 325 SEATS IN PARLIAMENT (UP FROM 282), PPP 90 SEATS (UP FROM 62), AND PDI 10 SEATS (DOWN FROM 56).

5. (U) IT WAS ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY THAT THE ELECTION WOULD BE REPEATED IN SAMPANG AND PAMEKASAN, WHICH ARE AREAS LOCATED IN MADURA, EAST JAVA, WHERE UNREST, DUE TO SUSPICION OF VOTE FRAUD, HAD OCCURRED ON ELECTION DAY (REFTEL B). OFFICIALS CLAIMED THAT THIS WAS BEING PERMITTED BECAUSE BALLOT BOXES IN THOSE AREAS HAD BEEN BURNED OR BECAUSE UNREST HAD PREVENTED CITIZENS FROM CASTING THEIR VOTES. PPP OFFICIALS ALSO CALLED FOR A RE-VOTE IN THREE DISTRICTS IN SOUTH SULAWESI (GOWA, SIDRAP, POLMAS), THE DISTRICT OF JEMBER IN EAST JAVA, AND DISTRICTS IN WEST SUMATRA, WHERE IT BELIEVED THAT WIDE-SPREAD VOTE-FRAUD HAD OCCURRED.

6. (U) PRESIDENT SUHARTO WAS QUOTED IN KOMPAS ON MAY 31 AS SAYING PUBLICLY THAT: "THERE WERE INDEED EFFORTS TO MAKE ALL THIS FAIL, BY A SMALL GROUP WHICH CHAMPIONED DEMOCRACY, BUT TURNED OUT IN FACT TO SHOW BEHAVIOR THAT WAS NOT DEMOCRATIC. BECAUSE IT WAS A SMALL GROUP, IT THEN WANTED TO FORCE ITS WISHES ON THE MAJORITY. TRULY IN THE

FINAL INSTANCE IT IS THE PEOPLE WHO CAN EVALUATE WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS NOT. THEY HOPED THAT THE GENERAL ELECTIONS WOULD NOT RUN, FAIL OR AT LEAST BE TAINTED, THAT IS WHY THEY DISTURBED IT AND THE LIKE. BUT, THANKS BE, EVERYTHING WENT WELL. EXCEPT IN SOME PLACES WHICH THEY DID ON PURPOSE."

7. (C) A MEGAWATI ADVISER HAS INFORMED EMBOFFS THAT SHE WILL LIKELY MAKE A CAUTIOUSLY WORDED STATEMENT ON THE ELECTION BEFORE JUNE 10. THE ADVISER SAID THAT THE LOW VOTE FOR THE PDI WAS POSITIVE FOR MEGAWATI AS IT DEMONSTRATED THE EXTENT OF UNPOPULARITY OF THE GOVERNMENT INSTALLED PDI CHAIRMAN SURYADI.

8. (U) THE PPP ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON MAY 30 THAT, BASED ON REPORTS FROM ITS BRANCHES THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, IT HAD CONCLUDED THAT WIDESPREAD ELECTION VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED. IT WILL HOLD A LEADERS MEETING

ON JUNE 5 TO DECIDE WHAT FURTHER STEPS TO TAKE, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF REJECTING THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION. SUPPORTING CLAIMS OF VOTE FRAUD, AN ASIAN GROUP OF MONITORS, THE "ASIAN FORUM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT," IN A STATEMENT MAY 31, SPOKE OF "GLARING IRREGULARITIES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS" AND THE ABSENCE OF TRANSPARENCY IN THE CANVASSING AND THE FINAL COUNTING OF VOTES." (NOTE: THE MONITORS WERE FROM THE PHILIPPINES, THAILAND AND CAMBODIA. SRI LANKAN MEMBERS WERE DENIED VISAS. END NOTE)

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ2344

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2344

PAGE 01 JAKART 03222 02 OF 02 060445Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	FDIC-01	/042W	

----------C26B68 060448Z /38

P 021036Z JUN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6075
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003222

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - TEXT

NEW DELHI FOR HARTWICK
USCINPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: LATEST NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

9. (U) IN JAKARTA, WHERE THERE HAD BEEN A STRONG SHOW OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR PPP DURING THE CAMPAIGN, GOLKAR WON 59.19 PERCENT, PPP 38.85 PERCENT AND PDI 1.96 PERCENT (ACCORDING TO PROVISIONAL BASED ON 73.57 PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS). HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO A VOTE BREAK-OUT PUBLISHED IN THE JAKARTA POST JUNE 2, PPP WAS NARROWLY OUTPACING GOLKAR IN ONE AREA OF THE CITY, SOUTH JAKARTA, WITH A TOTAL OF 49.3 PERCENT, COMPARED TO GOLKAR'S 49 PERCENT.

10. (U) THE FOLLOWING ARE THE LATEST PROVISIONAL ELECTION RESULTS (JUNE 1), SEPARATED OUT BY PROVINCE (SOURCE: INDONESIAN ELECTION INSTITUTE, PRINTED IN KOMPAS):

	GOLKAR	PPP	PDI
1. ACEH	64.33	32.27	3.40
2. N. SUMATRA	81.20	12.97	5.83
3. W. SUMATRA	91.41	7.49	1.10
4. RIAU	82.33	13.89	3.78
5. JAMBI	92.43	6.00	1.57
6. S. SUMATRA	84.74	11.44	3.82

7. BENGKULU	94.84	3.73	1.43

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

8. LAMPUNG	93.14	4.88	1.98
9. JAKARTA	59.19	38.85	1.96
10. W. JAVA	72.11	26.17	1.72
11. C. JAVA	68.27	28.99	2.74
12. YOGYAKARTA	62.54	34.23	3.23
13. E. JAVA	63.06	33.75	3.18
14. W. KALIMANTAN	69.69	15.15	15.16
15. C. KALIMANTAN	86.29	10.32	3.40
16. E. KALIMANTAN	69.60	23.94	6.46
17. S. KALIMANTAN	71.21	25.86	2.93
18. BALI	93.12	3.31	3.57
19. W. NUSA TENG.	80.40	14.74	4.85
20. E. NUSA TENG.	94.86	1.54	3.60
21. E. TIMOR	83.93	2.18	13.89
22. S. SULAWESI	91.6	7.37	1.03
23. C. SULAWESI	84.79	10.43	4.78

CONFIDENTIAL

24. N. SULAWESI	95.48	2.63	1.89
25. SE. SULAWESI	97.08	2.11	0.81
26. MALUKU	82.30	12.81	4.89
27. IRIAN JAYA	88.93	3.55	7.52
TOTAL	74.27	22.66	3.07

HARVEY

NNNN
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>
PTQ8565

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8565

PAGE 01 JAKART 03222 01 OF 02 021036Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10
	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	FDIC-01	/041W		

----------C0A5F8 021037Z /38

P 021036Z JUN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6074
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003222

NEW DELHI FOR HARTWICK
USCINPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: LATEST NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS

REF: A) JAKARTA 3193; B) JAKARTA 3188; C) JAKARTA 3154

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03222 01 OF 02 021036Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE VOTE COUNTS ARE COMPLETE IN MOST OF

INDONESIA, AND GOLKAR CONTINUES TO HOLD A MASSIVE LEAD (74.27 PERCENT), LEAVING THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY VIRTUALLY A NON-ENTITY (3.07 PERCENT). THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (22.6 PERCENT) HAS CALLED FOR A REPEAT OF THE VOTE IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY DUE TO ALLEGED ELECTORAL FRAUD, AND SO FAR THE GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO DO SO IN PARTS OF MADURA, EAST JAVA. AN ASIAN ELECTION MONITORING GROUP HAS JOINED THE INDONESIAN INDEPENDENT MONITORING GROUP IN SUPPORT OF ALLEGATIONS OF VOTE FRAUD. PRESIDENT SUHARTO CLAIMED PUBLICLY ON MAY 30 THAT A SMALL GROUP WHICH "CHAMPIONED DEMOCRACY" HAD TRIED TO MAKE THE ELECTION FAIL. WE ARE TOLD THAT MEGAWATI WILL MAKE A CAUTIOUSLY WORDED STATEMENT ABOUT THE ELECTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. EMBASSY'S ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL. END SUMMARY

3. (U) THE INDONESIAN ELECTION INSTITUTE (LPU) HAS INFORMED THE EMBASSY THAT THE VOTE COUNT IS COMPLETE IN 24 OF INDONESIA'S 27 PROVINCES. JAKARTA, IRIAN JAYA, AND EAST JAVA ARE STILL IN PROCESS. OVERALL RESULTS WILL NOT BE FINALIZED UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF JUNE.

4. (U) ACCORDING TO THE LATEST PROVISIONAL RESULTS (AS OF JUNE 1, PUBLISHED IN INDONESIAN DAILY KOMPAS AND OTHER MAJOR NEWSPAPERS ON JUNE 2), GOLKAR WON 74.27 PERCENT, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) 22.6 PERCENT, AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) JUST 3.07 PERCENT (SEE

PARA. 11). THIS COMPARES TO 68.1 PERCENT, 17 PERCENT, AND 14.9 PERCENT IN 1992 FOR THE PARTIES, RESPECTIVELY. GOLKAR'S MARGIN OF VICTORY IS WELL OVER THE TARGET OF 70.02 PERCENT THAT IT HAD SET FOR THIS ELECTION. ACCORDING TO AN ESTIMATE IN KOMPAS, GOLKAR WILL LIKELY HAVE 325 SEATS IN PARLIAMENT (UP FROM 282), PPP 90 SEATS (UP FROM 62), AND PDI 10 SEATS (DOWN FROM 56).

5. (U) IT WAS ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY THAT THE ELECTION WOULD BE REPEATED IN SAMPANG AND PAMEKASAN, WHICH ARE AREAS LOCATED IN MADURA, EAST JAVA, WHERE UNREST, DUE TO SUSPICION OF VOTE FRAUD, HAD OCCURRED ON ELECTION DAY (REFTEL B). OFFICIALS CLAIMED THAT THIS WAS BEING

PERMITTED BECAUSE BALLOT BOXES IN THOSE AREAS HAD BEEN BURNED OR BECAUSE UNREST HAD PREVENTED CITIZENS FROM CASTING THEIR VOTES. PPP OFFICIALS ALSO CALLED FOR A RE-VOTE IN THREE DISTRICTS IN SOUTH SULAWESI (GOWA, SIDRAP, POLMAS), THE DISTRICT OF JEMBER IN EAST JAVA, AND DISTRICTS IN WEST SUMATRA, WHERE IT BELIEVED THAT WIDE-SPREAD VOTE-FRAUD HAD OCCURRED.

6. (U) PRESIDENT SUHARTO WAS QUOTED IN KOMPAS ON MAY 31 AS SAYING PUBLICLY THAT: "THERE WERE INDEED EFFORTS TO MAKE ALL THIS FAIL, BY A SMALL GROUP WHICH CHAMPIONED DEMOCRACY, BUT TURNED OUT IN FACT TO SHOW BEHAVIOR THAT WAS NOT DEMOCRATIC. BECAUSE IT WAS A SMALL GROUP, IT THEN WANTED TO FORCE ITS WISHES ON THE MAJORITY. TRULY IN THE FINAL INSTANCE IT IS THE PEOPLE WHO CAN EVALUATE WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS NOT. THEY HOPED THAT THE GENERAL ELECTIONS WOULD NOT RUN, FAIL OR AT LEAST BE TAINTED, THAT IS WHY THEY DISTURBED IT AND THE LIKE. BUT, THANKS BE,

EVERYTHING WENT WELL. EXCEPT IN SOME PLACES WHICH THEY DID ON PURPOSE."

7. (C) A MEGAWATI ADVISER HAS INFORMED EMBOFFS THAT SHE WILL LIKELY MAKE A CAUTIOUSLY WORDED STATEMENT ON THE ELECTION BEFORE JUNE 10. THE ADVISER SAID THAT THE LOW VOTE FOR THE PDI WAS POSITIVE FOR MEGAWATI AS IT DEMONSTRATED THE EXTENT OF UNPOPULARITY OF THE GOVERNMENT INSTALLED PDI CHAIRMAN SURYADI.

8. (U) THE PPP ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON MAY 30 THAT, BASED ON REPORTS FROM ITS BRANCHES THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, IT HAD CONCLUDED THAT WIDESPREAD ELECTION VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED. IT WILL HOLD A LEADERS MEETING ON JUNE 5 TO DECIDE WHAT FURTHER STEPS TO TAKE, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF REJECTING THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION. SUPPORTING CLAIMS OF VOTE FRAUD, AN ASIAN GROUP OF MONITORS, THE "ASIAN FORUM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT," IN A STATEMENT MAY 31, SPOKE OF "GLARING IRREGULARITIES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS" AND THE ABSENCE OF TRANSPARENCY IN THE CANVASSING AND THE FINAL COUNTING OF VOTES." (NOTE: THE MONITORS WERE FROM THE PHILIPPINES,

THAILAND AND CAMBODIA. SRI LANKAN MEMBERS WERE DENIED VISAS. END NOTE)

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8566

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8566

PAGE 01 JAKART 03222 02 OF 02 021037Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10
	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	FDIC-01	/041W		

----------C0A5FA 021037Z /38

P 021036Z JUN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6075
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003222

NEW DELHI FOR HARTWICK

USCINPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: LATEST NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS

9. (U) IN JAKARTA, WHERE THERE HAD BEEN A STRONG SHOW OF

POPULAR SUPPORT FOR PPP DURING THE CAMPAIGN, GOLKAR WON 59.19 PERCENT, PPP 38.85 PERCENT AND PDI 1.96 PERCENT (ACCORDING TO PROVISIONAL BASED ON 73.57 PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS). HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO A VOTE BREAK-OUT PUBLISHED IN THE JAKARTA POST JUNE 2, PPP WAS NARROWLY OUTPACING GOLKAR IN ONE AREA OF THE CITY, SOUTH JAKARTA, WITH A TOTAL OF 49.3 PERCENT, COMPARED TO GOLKAR'S 49 PERCENT.

11. (U) THE FOLLOWING ARE THE LATEST PROVISIONAL ELECTION RESULTS (JUNE 1), SEPARATED OUT BY PROVINCE (SOURCE: INDONESIAN ELECTION INSTITUTE, PRINTED IN KOMPAS):

	GOLKAR	PPP	PDI
1. ACEH	64.33	32.27	3.40
2. N. SUMATRA	81.20	12.97	5.83
3. W. SUMATRA	91.41	7.49	1.10
4. RIAU	82.33	13.89	3.78
5. JAMBI	92.43	6.00	1.57
6. S. SUMATRA	84.74	11.44	3.82
7. BENGKULU	94.84	3.73	1.43
8. LAMPUNG	93.14	4.88	1.98

9. JAKARTA	59.19	38.85	1.96
10. W. JAVA	72.11	26.17	1.72
11. C. JAVA	68.27	28.99	2.74
12. YOGYAKARTA	62.54	34.23	3.23
13. E. JAVA	63.06	33.75	3.18
14. W. KALIMANTAN	69.69	15.15	15.16
15. C. KALIMANTAN	86.29	10.32	3.40
16. E. KALIMANTAN	69.60	23.94	6.46
17. S. KALIMANTAN	71.21	25.86	2.93
18. BALI	93.12	3.31	3.57
19. W. NUSA TENG.	80.40	14.74	4.85
20. E. NUSA TENG.	94.86	1.54	3.60
21. E. TIMOR	83.93	2.18	13.89
22. S. SULAWESI	91.6	7.37	1.03
23. C. SULAWESI	84.79	10.43	4.78

24. N. SULAWESI	95.48	2.63	1.89
25. SE. SULAWESI	97.08	2.11	0.81
26. MALUKU	82.30	12.81	4.89
27. IRIAN JAYA	88.93	3.55	7.52
TOTAL	74.27	22.66	3.07

HARVEY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN



IMRNEWFILE

E1

PTQ3094

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B1, 1.4(D)

SECRET PTQ3094

PAGE 01 STATE 122946 132217Z
ORIGIN INR-00

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	INL-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01
	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	IO-00	L-01	MCO-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	PRMC-01	DRL-09	G-00	/033R

122946
SOURCE: KODAKC.130389
DRAFTED BY: INR/EAP/SEA: LIBIRD : BJ
APPROVED BY: INR/EAP: PCAUSEY
EAP:AARVIZU AIT:JWOOD
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
USTR, NSC, NSA, CIA, DOD/ISA/AP, EAP/PIA, EAP/K, EAP/EP

DECAPTIONED

----------43DD66 132218Z /20
R 132140Z JUN 96
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
AIT TAIPEI 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
XMT AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
AMEMBASSY KOROR
AMCONSUL PERTH

SECRET

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 13 JUN 2016
DATE/CASE ID: 14 SEP 2006 200503235

UNCLASSIFIED

NOFORN, USTR FOR SANDS/LEHR

E.O. 12958 DECL: 6/11/06 1.6X1
TAGS: ID, PINR, PGOV, PREL, SOCI
SUBJECT: // INR ASSESSMENT // - INDONESIA: PRE ELECTION PRESSURE (96-37, 6-13-96)

DOD/ISA/AP FOR EIKENBERRY, NSC FOR KRISTOFF/SUETTINGER, NSA FOR LANDIS, DIA FOR NIXON, CIA WASHDC, ROME PLEASE PASS TO EMBASSY VACATION, LONDON FOR HALL

THE FOLLOWING INR ASSESSMENT WAS PRODUCED BY THE OFFICE OF EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC ANALYSIS AND IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COMMENT.

1. CLASSIFIED BY PAULA CAUSEY, OFFICE DIRECTOR INR/EAP. REASON: 1.5 (D)

2. (C) GOVERNMENT EFFORTS AT UNDERMINING TWO OPPOSITION PARTIES RISK GIVING GREATER COHERENCE TO ANTI-REGIME SENTIMENT. INCREASING ACTIVITY BY STUDENTS, NGOS, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS MAY TEST THE PATIENCE OF THE SECURITY FORCES IN MAINTAINING ORDER.

3. (S/NF) NEXT SPRING ALMOST 120 MILLION INDONESIANS WILL GO TO THE POLLS TO ELECT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, WITH MORE

THAN 13 MILLION VOTING

FOR THE FIRST TIME. THE PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTIES PLUS SPECIAL APPOINTEES WILL MEET IN 1998 TO SELECT THE NEXT PRESIDENT, EXPECTED TO BE PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FOR A SEVENTH FIVE-YEAR TERM. SOEHARTO WANTS A LANDSLIDE VICTORY FOR GOLKAR, HIS GOVERNMENT PARTY, WITH NO LESS THAN 73OF THE VOTE. REPORTEDLY, IN 1987 GOLKAR WON BY

UNCLASSIFIED

A COMFORTABLE 73, THOUGH IT SLIPPED IN 1992 TO 68UNDER A RASH OF CRITICISM ABOUT THE AGING REGIME.

FOCUS ON THE PDI

4. (U) IN EARLY JUNE SEVERAL ARMY GENERALS CALLED IN LOCAL EDITORS TO DISCUSS THE PDI IN "MEDIA BRIEFINGS," A EUPHEMISM FOR INTIMIDATION SESSIONS. THE GENERALS REPORTEDLY WARNED THE PRESS ABOUT COVERAGE OF PDI CHAIRPERSON MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, DAUGHTER OF THE LATE PRESIDENT SOEKARNO, AND URGED POSITIVE REPORTING OF A MOVE BY PDI "DISSIDENTS" TO UNSEAT HER. THE GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN PERMISSION FOR THE DISSIDENTS, WHO CLAIM THEY REPRESENT A MAJORITY OF PDI CHAPTERS, TO HOLD AN EXTRAORDINARY NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS ON JUNE 20.

5. (C) IN A STATEMENT FOR THE FOREIGN PRESS RELEASED YESTERDAY, MEGAWATI SAID THE ARMED FORCES WERE ILLEGALLY INVOLVED IN THE OUSTER MOVE AND THAT THE PDI WOULD RECEIVE 80-85OF THE VOTE IN A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION. HER FOLLOWERS HAVE ANNOUNCED PLANS TO STAGE A LARGE RALLY IN JAKARTA IN HER SUPPORT IF THE CONGRESS IS HELD, BUT MEGAWATI CAREFULLY AVOIDED ENDORSING SUCH A RALLY IN HER STATEMENT.

SECRET

6. (S/NF) THROUGHOUT HIS LONG CAREER, SOEHARTO HAS EFFECTIVELY SIDELINED WOULD-BE RIVALS. HE SEES MEGAWATI, WITH HER NAME RECOGNITION AND APPEAL TO A SOCIETY INCREASINGLY QUESTIONING HIS EXTENDED TENURE, AS A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE AND BELIEVES HE CAN MANIPULATE PARTY STRUCTURES TO HIS ADVANTAGE, AS HE DID IN THE MID-1970S.

WAR OF THE WOMEN

7. (S/NF) SOEHARTO'S [redacted] DAUGHTER TUTUT IS ON THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF GOLKAR WITH OVERSIGHT FOR EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA. HAVING MADE HER EXTENSIVE FORTUNE [redacted] SHE IS SEEN AS EAGER TO ASSUME MORE POLITICAL POWER, ENGAGING ON ISSUES

B6

B6

8. (C) IN ADDITION TO CONCERNS ABOUT THE TWO OPPOSITION PARTIES, AUTHORITIES ARE NERVOUSLY WATCHING POTENTIAL WILD CARDS, INCLUDING DOZENS OF STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS, HUNDREDS OF ISSUE-ORIENTED NGOS, AND A NEWLY FOUNDED INDEPENDENT ELECTION WATCHDOG COMMITTEE CALLED KIPP. THESE GROUPS ARE LARGELY ELITIST AND MOST ARE NOT AFFILIATED WITH A PARTICULAR PARTY, BUT THEY APPEAR TO BE OVERWHELMINGLY CRITICAL OF THE REGIME AND HOSTILE TO GOLKAR.

9. (C) THUS FAR THE GROUPS HAVE NOT FOUND A SINGLE ISSUE OR LEADER THAT CAN TURN GENERAL GRUMBLING ABOUT CORRUPTION OR FIRST-FAMILY EXCESS INTO A BROAD COALITION TO DENY SOEHARTO ANOTHER TERM. A CURRENT SPATE OF STUDENT ACTIVITY - IN SYMPATHY WITH STUDENTS KILLED DURING A RECENT ALTERCATION WITH SECURITY FORCES - HAS REVEALED A NETWORK OF STUDENT CONTACTS AND THE POTENTIAL VOLATILITY OF THIS LARGE POPULATION, BUT ALSO THE MILITARY'S SUCCESS IN KEEPING LARGE NUMBERS OFF THE STREETS.

10. (C) MEGAWATI MAY NOT BE THE CATALYST FOR A UNIFIED OPPOSITION, BUT SOME OF THE NEW GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS AND STUDENTS MIGHT JOIN FORCES IN HER DEFENSE IF SHE IS PUSHED OFF-STAGE TOO BLATANTLY. THEY MIGHT EVEN FIND SOME SUPPORT FROM THE RUAAL MASSES, WHO NORMALLY VOTE DUTIFULLY FOR GOLKAR. RATHER THAN UNDERMINING THE OPPOSITION, THE AUTHORITIES MAY FIND THEY HAVE CREATED A MARTYR WHO HELPS ANTI-REGIME SENTIMENT TO COALESCE. A STREAM OF RALLIES AND DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD TEST THE PATIENCE OF THE SECURITY FORCES, RAISE THE RISK OF INJURIES OR ABUSE, AND CONTRIBUTE TO STRAINS WITHIN THE RULING ELITE, INCLUDING THE ARMED FORCES, OVER HOW TO MANAGE THE ELECTION PERIOD AND, ULTIMATELY, THE

SUCCESSION. (JBIRD) (SECRET/NOFORN)
YY
CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

NNNN

IMRNEWFILE

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8666

PAGE 01 STATE 153252 241311Z
ORIGIN INR-00

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	IO-00	L-01
	MCO-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	DRL-09
	G-00	/029R					

153252
SOURCE: KODAKC.240033
DRAFTED BY: INR/EAP/SEA: JBIRD : BJ
APPROVED BY: INR/EAP PCAUSEY
EAP:AARVIZU AIT:JWOOD
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
USTR, NSC, NSA, CIA, DOD/ISA/AP, DIA, EAP/PIA, EAP/K, EAP/EP
----------51D1A9 241312Z /38
R 241311Z JUL 96
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
AIT TAIPEI 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USCINCPAC HONOLULU
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 153252 241311Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 153252

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 24 JUL 2016
DATE/CASE ID: 14 SEP 2006 200503235

USTR FOR SANDS/LEHR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/23/06 1.6X1
TAGS: ID, PINR, PGOV, PREL
SUBJECT: INR ASSESSMENT // - INDONESIA: SUCCESSION OBSESSION (96-46, 7-23-96)

DOD/ISA/AP FOR ELKENBERRY, NSC FOR KRISTOFF/SUETTINGER, NSA FOR LANDIS, DIA FOR NIXON, CIA WASHDC, ROME PLEASE PASS TO EMBASSY VATICAN, LONDON FOR HALL

THE FOLLOWING INR ASSESSMENT WAS PRODUCED BY THE OFFICE OF EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC ANALYSIS ON JULY 19. WE REGRET THE DELAY IN TRANSMITTING TO YOU BUT WELCOME YOUR COMMENT IN ANY CASE.

1. CLASSIFIED BY JUDY BIRD, DIVISION CHIEF INR/EAP/SEA. REASON: 1.5 (D)

2. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S POLITICAL MACHINE IS LOOKING INCREASINGLY OUTDATED AND ILL-EQUIPPED TO FACE GROWING DEMANDS FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION.

3. (C) JUST RETURNED FROM A HEALTH EXAMINATION IN GERMANY, WHERE HE WAS DECLARED MORE THAN FIT FOR HIS 75 YEARS, SOEHARTO IS POSITIONED TO RUN FOR A SEVENTH FIVE-

YEAR TERM IN 1998; THE ODDS ARE GOOD THAT HE WILL BE REELECTED BUT LONG THAT HE WILL REMAIN FIT UNTIL 2003.

CONFIDENTIAL

THOUGH HIS CHOICE OF A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING MATE IS CRUCIAL, HE HAS BEEN TYPICALLY SPHINX-LIKE ON THE SUBJECT.

HERE TODAY, GONE TOMORROW

4. (C) IF SOEHARTO SHOULD DIE SUDDENLY, THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO VICE PRESIDENT TRY SUTRISNO WOULD PROBABLY BE

SMOOTH. A RETIRED GENERAL, SUTRISNO HAS PLAYED THE ROLE OF THE ULTIMATE LOYALIST SINCE THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI) FORCED SOEHARTO TO ACCEPT HIM AS RUNNING MATE IN 1993.

[redacted] B1

THE NEXT DANCE PARTNER

5. (C) SOEHARTO TRADITIONALLY HAS CHANGED DEPUTIES WITH EACH ELECTION; HIS CHOICES HAVE BEEN PREDOMINANTLY MILITARY FIGURES, THOUGH HE REWARDED CIVILIAN PARTNERS IN THE EARLY DAYS OF HIS NEW ORDER REGIME. INDONESIAN CULTURAL ATTITUDES PRECLUDE ACTIVE CAMPAIGNING FOR THE POST BY ANY FIGURE, MILITARY OR CIVILIAN.

6. (C) SOEHARTO'S RELATIONS WITH ABRI HAVE BEEN STRAINED

IN RECENT YEARS, BUT HE REMAINS IN A STRONG POSITION AND NOW BALANCES WOULD-BE RIVALS IN A JUGGLING ACT OF RAPID SHIFTS IN ASSIGNMENT. [redacted] B1

[redacted] OTHER IMPORTANT ABRI FIGURES ARE DISSATISFIED WITH SOEHARTO, THOUGH NOT OPENLY HOSTILE.

7. (C) IN THE CIVILIAN CAMP, SOEHARTO MAY FAVOR HIS PROTEGE AND ADVISER, TECHNOLOGY CZAR HABIBIE, BUT THE [redacted] BOTH PLANNING MINISTER GINANDJAR AND INFORMATION MINISTER HARMOKO FREQUENTLY ARE MENTIONED, BUT [redacted] B1 B1

B1

RISING PRESSURES

8. (C) THIS HAS NOT BEEN A GOOD YEAR FOR SOEHARTO: HIS WIFE DIED SUDDENLY THIS SPRING; HIS OWN HEALTH CONCERNS LED TO THE MEDICAL CHECKUP IN GERMANY; AND HIS DECISION TO FAVOR ONE OF HIS SONS WITH A NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE DEAL LED TO A FIRESTORM OF FAMILY, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

9. (C) INCREASING LABOR UNREST AND STUDENT PROTESTS, AND A SPATE OF SMALL-SCALE ANTI-CHINESE DISTURBANCES AND CHURCH FIRES, SHOW THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF STABILITY IN INDONESIA. ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS OUTBURSTS ARE MORE LIKELY AS THE ELECTION PERIOD APPROACHES. THE ARMY TENDS TO REACT REPRESSIVELY TO SUCH CHALLENGES - EAST TIMOR REMAINS A SORE, AND IRIAN JAYA HAS BECOME ONE.

10. (C) SOEHARTO'S RECENT POLITICAL GAMESMANSHIP IS ALSO TROUBLESOME. IN SEEKING TO ENSURE THAT HIS RULING PARTY WINS AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY IN THE 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, SOEHARTO RECENTLY ORDERED THAT FORMER PRESIDENT SUKARNO'S DAUGHTER MEGAWATI BE PURGED AS CHAIRMAN OF ONE OF TWO 'OPPOSITION" PARTIES. MEGAWATI HAS CHOSEN TO FIGHT BACK IN THE COURTS,

B1

WORST SCENARIO

B1



(JBIRD) (CONFIDENTIAL)
TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8666

PAGE 01 STATE 153252 241311Z
ORIGIN INR-00

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	IO-00	L-01
	MCO-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	DRL-09
	G-00	/029R					

153252
SOURCE: KODAKC.240033
DRAFTED BY: INR/EAP/SEA: JBIRD : BJ
APPROVED BY: INR/EAP PCAUSEY
EAP:AARVIZU AIT:JWOOD
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
USTR, NSC, NSA, CIA, DOD/ISA/AP, DIA, EAP/PIA, EAP/K, EAP/EP
----------51D1A9 241312Z /38
R 241311Z JUL 96
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
AIT TAIPEI 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USCINCPAC HONOLULU
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 153252 241311Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 153252

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 24 JUL 2016
DATE/CASE ID: 14 SEP 2006 200503235

USTR FOR SANDS/LEHR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/23/06 1.6X1
TAGS: ID, PINR, PGOV, PREL
SUBJECT: INR ASSESSMENT // - INDONESIA: SUCCESSION OBSESSION (96-46, 7-23-96)

DOD/ISA/AP FOR ELKENBERRY, NSC FOR KRISTOFF/SUETTINGER, NSA FOR LANDIS, DIA FOR NIXON, CIA WASHDC, ROME PLEASE PASS TO EMBASSY VATICAN, LONDON FOR HALL

THE FOLLOWING INR ASSESSMENT WAS PRODUCED BY THE OFFICE OF EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC ANALYSIS ON JULY 19. WE REGRET THE DELAY IN TRANSMITTING TO YOU BUT WELCOME YOUR COMMENT IN ANY CASE.

1. CLASSIFIED BY JUDY BIRD, DIVISION CHIEF INR/EAP/SEA. REASON: 1.5 (D)

2. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S POLITICAL MACHINE IS LOOKING INCREASINGLY OUTDATED AND ILL-EQUIPPED TO FACE GROWING DEMANDS FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION.

3. (C) JUST RETURNED FROM A HEALTH EXAMINATION IN GERMANY, WHERE HE WAS DECLARED MORE THAN FIT FOR HIS 75 YEARS, SOEHARTO IS POSITIONED TO RUN FOR A SEVENTH FIVE-

YEAR TERM IN 1998; THE ODDS ARE GOOD THAT HE WILL BE REELECTED BUT LONG THAT HE WILL REMAIN FIT UNTIL 2003.

CONFIDENTIAL

THOUGH HIS CHOICE OF A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING MATE IS CRUCIAL, HE HAS BEEN TYPICALLY SPHINX-LIKE ON THE SUBJECT.

HERE TODAY, GONE TOMORROW

4. (C) IF SOEHARTO SHOULD DIE SUDDENLY, THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO VICE PRESIDENT TRY SUTRISNO WOULD PROBABLY BE

SMOOTH. A RETIRED GENERAL, SUTRISNO HAS PLAYED THE ROLE OF THE ULTIMATE LOYALIST SINCE THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI) FORCED SOEHARTO TO ACCEPT HIM AS RUNNING MATE IN 1993.

[redacted] B1

THE NEXT DANCE PARTNER

5. (C) SOEHARTO TRADITIONALLY HAS CHANGED DEPUTIES WITH EACH ELECTION; HIS CHOICES HAVE BEEN PREDOMINANTLY MILITARY FIGURES, THOUGH HE REWARDED CIVILIAN PARTNERS IN THE EARLY DAYS OF HIS NEW ORDER REGIME. INDONESIAN CULTURAL ATTITUDES PRECLUDE ACTIVE CAMPAIGNING FOR THE POST BY ANY FIGURE, MILITARY OR CIVILIAN.

6. (C) SOEHARTO'S RELATIONS WITH ABRI HAVE BEEN STRAINED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 153252 241311Z

IN RECENT YEARS, BUT HE REMAINS IN A STRONG POSITION AND NOW BALANCES WOULD-BE RIVALS IN A JUGGLING ACT OF RAPID SHIFTS IN ASSIGNMENT. [redacted] B1

[redacted] OTHER IMPORTANT ABRI FIGURES ARE DISSATISFIED WITH SOEHARTO, THOUGH NOT OPENLY HOSTILE.

7. (C) IN THE CIVILIAN CAMP, SOEHARTO MAY FAVOR HIS PROTEGE AND ADVISER, TECHNOLOGY CZAR HABIBIE, BUT THE [redacted] BOTH PLANNING MINISTER GINANDJAR AND INFORMATION MINISTER HARMOKO B1 FREQUENTLY ARE MENTIONED, BUT [redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

RISING PRESSURES

8. (C) THIS HAS NOT BEEN A GOOD YEAR FOR SOEHARTO: HIS WIFE DIED SUDDENLY THIS SPRING; HIS OWN HEALTH CONCERNS LED TO THE MEDICAL CHECKUP IN GERMANY; AND HIS DECISION TO FAVOR ONE OF HIS SONS WITH A NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE DEAL LED TO A FIRESTORM OF FAMILY, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

9. (C) INCREASING LABOR UNREST AND STUDENT PROTESTS, AND A SPATE OF SMALL-SCALE ANTI-CHINESE DISTURBANCES AND CHURCH FIRES, SHOW THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF STABILITY IN INDONESIA. ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS OUTBURSTS ARE MORE LIKELY AS THE ELECTION PERIOD APPROACHES. THE ARMY TENDS TO REACT REPRESSIVELY TO SUCH CHALLENGES - EAST TIMOR REMAINS A SORE, AND IRIAN JAYA HAS BECOME ONE.

10. (C) SOEHARTO'S RECENT POLITICAL GAMESMANSHIP IS ALSO TROUBLESOME. IN SEEKING TO ENSURE THAT HIS RULING PARTY WINS AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY IN THE 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, SOEHARTO RECENTLY ORDERED THAT FORMER PRESIDENT SUKARNO'S DAUGHTER MEGAWATI BE PURGED AS CHAIRMAN OF ONE OF TWO 'OPPOSITION" PARTIES. MEGAWATI HAS CHOSEN TO FIGHT BACK IN THE COURTS, [redacted] B1

WORST SCENARIO

[redacted] B1



(JBIRD) (CONFIDENTIAL)
TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

IMRNEWFILE

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B1, 1.4(D)

SECRET PTQ3094

PAGE 01 STATE 122946 132217Z
ORIGIN INR-00

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	INL-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01
	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	IO-00	L-01	MCO-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	PRMC-01	DRL-09	G-00	/033R

122946
SOURCE: KODAKC.130389
DRAFTED BY: INR/EAP/SEA: LIBIRD : BJ
APPROVED BY: INR/EAP: PCAUSEY
EAP:AARVIZU AIT:JWOOD
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
USTR, NSC, NSA, CIA, DOD/ISA/AP, EAP/PIA, EAP/K, EAP/EP

DECAPTIONED

----------43DD66 132218Z /20
R 132140Z JUN 96
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
AIT TAIPEI 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
XMT AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
AMEMBASSY KOROR
AMCONSUL PERTH

SECRET

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 13 JUN 2016
DATE/CASE ID: 14 SEP 2006 200503235

UNCLASSIFIED

NOFORN, USTR FOR SANDS/LEHR

E.O. 12958 DECL: 6/11/06 1.6X1
TAGS: ID, PINR, PGOV, PREL, SOCI
SUBJECT: // INR ASSESSMENT // - INDONESIA: PRE ELECTION PRESSURE (96-37, 6-13-96)

DOD/ISA/AP FOR EIKENBERRY, NSC FOR KRISTOFF/SUETTINGER, NSA FOR LANDIS, DIA FOR NIXON, CIA WASHDC, ROME PLEASE PASS TO EMBASSY VACATION, LONDON FOR HALL

THE FOLLOWING INR ASSESSMENT WAS PRODUCED BY THE OFFICE OF EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC ANALYSIS AND IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COMMENT.

1. CLASSIFIED BY PAULA CAUSEY, OFFICE DIRECTOR INR/EAP. REASON: 1.5 (D)

2. (C) GOVERNMENT EFFORTS AT UNDERMINING TWO OPPOSITION PARTIES RISK GIVING GREATER COHERENCE TO ANTI-REGIME SENTIMENT. INCREASING ACTIVITY BY STUDENTS, NGOS, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS MAY TEST THE PATIENCE OF THE SECURITY FORCES IN MAINTAINING ORDER.

3. (S/NF) NEXT SPRING ALMOST 120 MILLION INDONESIANS WILL GO TO THE POLLS TO ELECT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, WITH MORE

THAN 13 MILLION VOTING

FOR THE FIRST TIME. THE PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTIES PLUS SPECIAL APPOINTEES WILL MEET IN 1998 TO SELECT THE NEXT PRESIDENT, EXPECTED TO BE PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FOR A SEVENTH FIVE-YEAR TERM. SOEHARTO WANTS A LANDSLIDE VICTORY FOR GOLKAR, HIS GOVERNMENT PARTY, WITH NO LESS THAN 73OF THE VOTE. REPORTEDLY, IN 1987 GOLKAR WON BY

UNCLASSIFIED

A COMFORTABLE 73, THOUGH IT SLIPPED IN 1992 TO 68UNDER A RASH OF CRITICISM ABOUT THE AGING REGIME.

FOCUS ON THE PDI

4. (U) IN EARLY JUNE SEVERAL ARMY GENERALS CALLED IN LOCAL EDITORS TO DISCUSS THE PDI IN "MEDIA BRIEFINGS," A EUPHEMISM FOR INTIMIDATION SESSIONS. THE GENERALS REPORTEDLY WARNED THE PRESS ABOUT COVERAGE OF PDI CHAIRPERSON MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, DAUGHTER OF THE LATE PRESIDENT SOEKARNO, AND URGED POSITIVE REPORTING OF A MOVE BY PDI "DISSIDENTS" TO UNSEAT HER. THE GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN PERMISSION FOR THE DISSIDENTS, WHO CLAIM THEY REPRESENT A MAJORITY OF PDI CHAPTERS, TO HOLD AN EXTRAORDINARY NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS ON JUNE 20.

5. (C) IN A STATEMENT FOR THE FOREIGN PRESS RELEASED YESTERDAY, MEGAWATI SAID THE ARMED FORCES WERE ILLEGALLY INVOLVED IN THE OUSTER MOVE AND THAT THE PDI WOULD RECEIVE 80-85OF THE VOTE IN A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION. HER FOLLOWERS HAVE ANNOUNCED PLANS TO STAGE A LARGE RALLY IN JAKARTA IN HER SUPPORT IF THE CONGRESS IS HELD, BUT MEGAWATI CAREFULLY AVOIDED ENDORSING SUCH A RALLY IN HER STATEMENT.

SECRET

6. (S/NF) THROUGHOUT HIS LONG CAREER, SOEHARTO HAS EFFECTIVELY SIDELINED WOULD-BE RIVALS. HE SEES MEGAWATI, WITH HER NAME RECOGNITION AND APPEAL TO A SOCIETY INCREASINGLY QUESTIONING HIS EXTENDED TENURE, AS A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE AND BELIEVES HE CAN MANIPULATE PARTY STRUCTURES TO HIS ADVANTAGE, AS HE DID IN THE MID-1970S.

WAR OF THE WOMEN

7. (S/NF) SOEHARTO'S [redacted] DAUGHTER TUTUT IS ON THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF GOLKAR WITH OVERSIGHT FOR EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA. HAVING MADE HER EXTENSIVE FORTUNE [redacted] SHE IS SEEN AS EAGER TO ASSUME MORE POLITICAL POWER, ENGAGING ON ISSUES

B6

B6

8. (C) IN ADDITION TO CONCERNS ABOUT THE TWO OPPOSITION PARTIES, AUTHORITIES ARE NERVOUSLY WATCHING POTENTIAL WILD CARDS, INCLUDING DOZENS OF STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS, HUNDREDS OF ISSUE-ORIENTED NGOS, AND A NEWLY FOUNDED INDEPENDENT ELECTION WATCHDOG COMMITTEE CALLED KIPP. THESE GROUPS ARE LARGELY ELITIST AND MOST ARE NOT AFFILIATED WITH A PARTICULAR PARTY, BUT THEY APPEAR TO BE OVERWHELMINGLY CRITICAL OF THE REGIME AND HOSTILE TO GOLKAR.

9. (C) THUS FAR THE GROUPS HAVE NOT FOUND A SINGLE ISSUE OR LEADER THAT CAN TURN GENERAL GRUMBLING ABOUT CORRUPTION OR FIRST-FAMILY EXCESS INTO A BROAD COALITION TO DENY SOEHARTO ANOTHER TERM. A CURRENT SPATE OF STUDENT ACTIVITY - IN SYMPATHY WITH STUDENTS KILLED DURING A RECENT ALTERCATION WITH SECURITY FORCES - HAS REVEALED A NETWORK OF STUDENT CONTACTS AND THE POTENTIAL VOLATILITY OF THIS LARGE POPULATION, BUT ALSO THE MILITARY'S SUCCESS IN KEEPING LARGE NUMBERS OFF THE STREETS.

10. (C) MEGAWATI MAY NOT BE THE CATALYST FOR A UNIFIED OPPOSITION, BUT SOME OF THE NEW GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS AND STUDENTS MIGHT JOIN FORCES IN HER DEFENSE IF SHE IS PUSHED OFF-STAGE TOO BLATANTLY. THEY MIGHT EVEN FIND SOME SUPPORT FROM THE RUAAL MASSES, WHO NORMALLY VOTE DUTIFULLY FOR GOLKAR. RATHER THAN UNDERMINING THE OPPOSITION, THE AUTHORITIES MAY FIND THEY HAVE CREATED A MARTYR WHO HELPS ANTI-REGIME SENTIMENT TO COALESCE. A STREAM OF RALLIES AND DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD TEST THE PATIENCE OF THE SECURITY FORCES, RAISE THE RISK OF INJURIES OR ABUSE, AND CONTRIBUTE TO STRAINS WITHIN THE RULING ELITE, INCLUDING THE ARMED FORCES, OVER HOW TO MANAGE THE ELECTION PERIOD AND, ULTIMATELY, THE

SUCCESSION. (JBIRD) (SECRET/NOFORN)
YY
CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

NNNN

IMRNEWFILE

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7630

PAGE 01 JAKART 03222 01 OF 02 041005Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	FDIC-01	/042W	

----------C1D8CB 042135Z /38

P 021036Z JUN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6074
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003222

C O R R E C T E D COPY (PARA.10 MIS-NUMBERED)

NEW DELHI FOR HARTWICK

USCINPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03222 01 OF 02 041005Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 SEP 2006 200503235

SUBJECT: LATEST NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS

REF: A) JAKARTA 3193; B) JAKARTA 3188; C) JAKARTA 3154

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE VOTE COUNTS ARE COMPLETE IN MOST OF INDONESIA, AND GOLKAR CONTINUES TO HOLD A MASSIVE LEAD (74.27 PERCENT), LEAVING THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY VIRTUALLY A NON-ENTITY (3.07 PERCENT). THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (22.6 PERCENT) HAS CALLED FOR A REPEAT OF THE VOTE IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY DUE TO ALLEGED ELECTORAL FRAUD, AND SO FAR THE GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO DO SO IN PARTS OF MADURA, EAST JAVA. AN ASIAN ELECTION MONITORING GROUP HAS JOINED THE INDONESIAN INDEPENDENT MONITORING GROUP IN SUPPORT OF ALLEGATIONS OF VOTE FRAUD. PRESIDENT SUHARTO CLAIMED PUBLICLY ON MAY 30 THAT A SMALL GROUP WHICH "CHAMPIONED DEMOCRACY" HAD TRIED TO MAKE THE ELECTION FAIL. WE ARE TOLD THAT MEGAWATI WILL MAKE A CAUTIOUSLY WORDED STATEMENT ABOUT THE ELECTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. EMBASSY'S ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL. END SUMMARY

3. (U) THE INDONESIAN ELECTION INSTITUTE (LPU) HAS INFORMED THE EMBASSY THAT THE VOTE COUNT IS COMPLETE IN 24 OF INDONESIA'S 27 PROVINCES. JAKARTA, IRIAN JAYA, AND EAST JAVA ARE STILL IN PROCESS. OVERALL RESULTS WILL NOT BE FINALIZED UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF JUNE.

4. (U) ACCORDING TO THE LATEST PROVISIONAL RESULTS (AS OF

JUNE 1, PUBLISHED IN INDONESIAN DAILY KOMPAS AND OTHER MAJOR NEWSPAPERS ON JUNE 2), GOLKAR WON 74.27 PERCENT, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) 22.6 PERCENT, AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) JUST 3.07 PERCENT (SEE PARA. 11). THIS COMPARES TO 68.1 PERCENT, 17 PERCENT, AND 14.9 PERCENT IN 1992 FOR THE PARTIES, RESPECTIVELY. GOLKAR'S MARGIN OF VICTORY IS WELL OVER THE TARGET OF 70.02 PERCENT THAT IT HAD SET FOR THIS ELECTION. ACCORDING TO AN ESTIMATE IN KOMPAS, GOLKAR WILL LIKELY

HAVE 325 SEATS IN PARLIAMENT (UP FROM 282), PPP 90 SEATS (UP FROM 62), AND PDI 10 SEATS (DOWN FROM 56).

5. (U) IT WAS ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY THAT THE ELECTION WOULD BE REPEATED IN SAMPANG AND PAMEKASAN, WHICH ARE AREAS LOCATED IN MADURA, EAST JAVA, WHERE UNREST, DUE TO SUSPICION OF VOTE FRAUD, HAD OCCURRED ON ELECTION DAY (REFTEL B). OFFICIALS CLAIMED THAT THIS WAS BEING PERMITTED BECAUSE BALLOT BOXES IN THOSE AREAS HAD BEEN BURNED OR BECAUSE UNREST HAD PREVENTED CITIZENS FROM CASTING THEIR VOTES. PPP OFFICIALS ALSO CALLED FOR A RE-VOTE IN THREE DISTRICTS IN SOUTH SULAWESI (GOWA, SIDRAP, POLMAS), THE DISTRICT OF JEMBER IN EAST JAVA, AND DISTRICTS IN WEST SUMATRA, WHERE IT BELIEVED THAT WIDE-SPREAD VOTE-FRAUD HAD OCCURRED.

6. (U) PRESIDENT SUHARTO WAS QUOTED IN KOMPAS ON MAY 31 AS SAYING PUBLICLY THAT: "THERE WERE INDEED EFFORTS TO MAKE ALL THIS FAIL, BY A SMALL GROUP WHICH CHAMPIONED DEMOCRACY, BUT TURNED OUT IN FACT TO SHOW BEHAVIOR THAT WAS NOT DEMOCRATIC. BECAUSE IT WAS A SMALL GROUP, IT THEN WANTED TO FORCE ITS WISHES ON THE MAJORITY. TRULY IN THE

FINAL INSTANCE IT IS THE PEOPLE WHO CAN EVALUATE WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS NOT. THEY HOPED THAT THE GENERAL ELECTIONS WOULD NOT RUN, FAIL OR AT LEAST BE TAINTED, THAT IS WHY THEY DISTURBED IT AND THE LIKE. BUT, THANKS BE, EVERYTHING WENT WELL. EXCEPT IN SOME PLACES WHICH THEY DID ON PURPOSE."

7. (C) A MEGAWATI ADVISER HAS INFORMED EMBOFFS THAT SHE WILL LIKELY MAKE A CAUTIOUSLY WORDED STATEMENT ON THE ELECTION BEFORE JUNE 10. THE ADVISER SAID THAT THE LOW VOTE FOR THE PDI WAS POSITIVE FOR MEGAWATI AS IT DEMONSTRATED THE EXTENT OF UNPOPULARITY OF THE GOVERNMENT INSTALLED PDI CHAIRMAN SURYADI.

8. (U) THE PPP ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON MAY 30 THAT, BASED ON REPORTS FROM ITS BRANCHES THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, IT HAD CONCLUDED THAT WIDESPREAD ELECTION VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED. IT WILL HOLD A LEADERS MEETING

ON JUNE 5 TO DECIDE WHAT FURTHER STEPS TO TAKE, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF REJECTING THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION. SUPPORTING CLAIMS OF VOTE FRAUD, AN ASIAN GROUP OF MONITORS, THE "ASIAN FORUM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT," IN A STATEMENT MAY 31, SPOKE OF "GLARING IRREGULARITIES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS" AND THE ABSENCE OF TRANSPARENCY IN THE CANVASSING AND THE FINAL COUNTING OF VOTES." (NOTE: THE MONITORS WERE FROM THE PHILIPPINES, THAILAND AND CAMBODIA. SRI LANKAN MEMBERS WERE DENIED VISAS. END NOTE)

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ2344

PAGE 01 JAKART 03222 02 OF 02 060445Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	FDIC-01	/042W	

------------------C26B68 060448Z /38

P 021036Z JUN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6075
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003222

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - TEXT

NEW DELHI FOR HARTWICK
USCINPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: LATEST NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

9. (U) IN JAKARTA, WHERE THERE HAD BEEN A STRONG SHOW OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR PPP DURING THE CAMPAIGN, GOLKAR WON 59.19 PERCENT, PPP 38.85 PERCENT AND PDI 1.96 PERCENT (ACCORDING TO PROVISIONAL BASED ON 73.57 PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS). HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO A VOTE BREAK-OUT PUBLISHED IN THE JAKARTA POST JUNE 2, PPP WAS NARROWLY OUTPACING GOLKAR IN ONE AREA OF THE CITY, SOUTH JAKARTA, WITH A TOTAL OF 49.3 PERCENT, COMPARED TO GOLKAR'S 49 PERCENT.

10. (U) THE FOLLOWING ARE THE LATEST PROVISIONAL ELECTION RESULTS (JUNE 1), SEPARATED OUT BY PROVINCE (SOURCE: INDONESIAN ELECTION INSTITUTE, PRINTED IN KOMPAS):

	GOLKAR	PPP	PDI
1. ACEH	64.33	32.27	3.40
2. N. SUMATRA	81.20	12.97	5.83
3. W. SUMATRA	91.41	7.49	1.10
4. RIAU	82.33	13.89	3.78
5. JAMBI	92.43	6.00	1.57
6. S. SUMATRA	84.74	11.44	3.82

7. BENGKULU	94.84	3.73	1.43

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

8. LAMPUNG	93.14	4.88	1.98
9. JAKARTA	59.19	38.85	1.96
10. W. JAVA	72.11	26.17	1.72
11. C. JAVA	68.27	28.99	2.74
12. YOGYAKARTA	62.54	34.23	3.23
13. E. JAVA	63.06	33.75	3.18
14. W. KALIMANTAN	69.69	15.15	15.16
15. C. KALIMANTAN	86.29	10.32	3.40
16. E. KALIMANTAN	69.60	23.94	6.46
17. S. KALIMANTAN	71.21	25.86	2.93
18. BALI	93.12	3.31	3.57
19. W. NUSA TENG.	80.40	14.74	4.85
20. E. NUSA TENG.	94.86	1.54	3.60
21. E. TIMOR	83.93	2.18	13.89
22. S. SULAWESI	91.6	7.37	1.03
23. C. SULAWESI	84.79	10.43	4.78

CONFIDENTIAL

24. N. SULAWESI	95.48	2.63	1.89
25. SE. SULAWESI	97.08	2.11	0.81
26. MALUKU	82.30	12.81	4.89
27. IRIAN JAYA	88.93	3.55	7.52
TOTAL	74.27	22.66	3.07

HARVEY

NNNN
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>
PTQ8565

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8565

PAGE 01 JAKART 03222 01 OF 02 021036Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10
	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	FDIC-01	/041W		

----------C0A5F8 021037Z /38

P 021036Z JUN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6074
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003222

NEW DELHI FOR HARTWICK
USCINPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: LATEST NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS

REF: A) JAKARTA 3193; B)JAKARTA 3188; C) JAKARTA 3154

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03222 01 OF 02 021036Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE VOTE COUNTS ARE COMPLETE IN MOST OF

INDONESIA, AND GOLKAR CONTINUES TO HOLD A MASSIVE LEAD (74.27 PERCENT), LEAVING THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY VIRTUALLY A NON-ENTITY (3.07 PERCENT). THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (22.6 PERCENT) HAS CALLED FOR A REPEAT OF THE VOTE IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY DUE TO ALLEGED ELECTORAL FRAUD, AND SO FAR THE GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO DO SO IN PARTS OF MADURA, EAST JAVA. AN ASIAN ELECTION MONITORING GROUP HAS JOINED THE INDONESIAN INDEPENDENT MONITORING GROUP IN SUPPORT OF ALLEGATIONS OF VOTE FRAUD. PRESIDENT SUHARTO CLAIMED PUBLICLY ON MAY 30 THAT A SMALL GROUP WHICH "CHAMPIONED DEMOCRACY" HAD TRIED TO MAKE THE ELECTION FAIL. WE ARE TOLD THAT MEGAWATI WILL MAKE A CAUTIOUSLY WORDED STATEMENT ABOUT THE ELECTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. EMBASSY'S ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL. END SUMMARY

3. (U) THE INDONESIAN ELECTION INSTITUTE (LPU) HAS INFORMED THE EMBASSY THAT THE VOTE COUNT IS COMPLETE IN 24 OF INDONESIA'S 27 PROVINCES. JAKARTA, IRIAN JAYA, AND EAST JAVA ARE STILL IN PROCESS. OVERALL RESULTS WILL NOT BE FINALIZED UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF JUNE.

4. (U) ACCORDING TO THE LATEST PROVISIONAL RESULTS (AS OF JUNE 1, PUBLISHED IN INDONESIAN DAILY KOMPAS AND OTHER MAJOR NEWSPAPERS ON JUNE 2), GOLKAR WON 74.27 PERCENT, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) 22.6 PERCENT, AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) JUST 3.07 PERCENT (SEE

PARA. 11). THIS COMPARES TO 68.1 PERCENT, 17 PERCENT, AND 14.9 PERCENT IN 1992 FOR THE PARTIES, RESPECTIVELY. GOLKAR'S MARGIN OF VICTORY IS WELL OVER THE TARGET OF 70.02 PERCENT THAT IT HAD SET FOR THIS ELECTION. ACCORDING TO AN ESTIMATE IN KOMPAS, GOLKAR WILL LIKELY HAVE 325 SEATS IN PARLIAMENT (UP FROM 282), PPP 90 SEATS (UP FROM 62), AND PDI 10 SEATS (DOWN FROM 56).

5. (U) IT WAS ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY THAT THE ELECTION WOULD BE REPEATED IN SAMPANG AND PAMEKASAN, WHICH ARE AREAS LOCATED IN MADURA, EAST JAVA, WHERE UNREST, DUE TO SUSPICION OF VOTE FRAUD, HAD OCCURRED ON ELECTION DAY (REFTEL B). OFFICIALS CLAIMED THAT THIS WAS BEING

PERMITTED BECAUSE BALLOT BOXES IN THOSE AREAS HAD BEEN BURNED OR BECAUSE UNREST HAD PREVENTED CITIZENS FROM CASTING THEIR VOTES. PPP OFFICIALS ALSO CALLED FOR A RE-VOTE IN THREE DISTRICTS IN SOUTH SULAWESI (GOWA, SIDRAP, POLMAS), THE DISTRICT OF JEMBER IN EAST JAVA, AND DISTRICTS IN WEST SUMATRA, WHERE IT BELIEVED THAT WIDE-SPREAD VOTE-FRAUD HAD OCCURRED.

6. (U) PRESIDENT SUHARTO WAS QUOTED IN KOMPAS ON MAY 31 AS SAYING PUBLICLY THAT: "THERE WERE INDEED EFFORTS TO MAKE ALL THIS FAIL, BY A SMALL GROUP WHICH CHAMPIONED DEMOCRACY, BUT TURNED OUT IN FACT TO SHOW BEHAVIOR THAT WAS NOT DEMOCRATIC. BECAUSE IT WAS A SMALL GROUP, IT THEN WANTED TO FORCE ITS WISHES ON THE MAJORITY. TRULY IN THE FINAL INSTANCE IT IS THE PEOPLE WHO CAN EVALUATE WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS NOT. THEY HOPED THAT THE GENERAL ELECTIONS WOULD NOT RUN, FAIL OR AT LEAST BE TAINTED, THAT IS WHY THEY DISTURBED IT AND THE LIKE. BUT, THANKS BE,

EVERYTHING WENT WELL. EXCEPT IN SOME PLACES WHICH THEY DID ON PURPOSE."

7. (C) A MEGAWATI ADVISER HAS INFORMED EMBOFFS THAT SHE WILL LIKELY MAKE A CAUTIOUSLY WORDED STATEMENT ON THE ELECTION BEFORE JUNE 10. THE ADVISER SAID THAT THE LOW VOTE FOR THE PDI WAS POSITIVE FOR MEGAWATI AS IT DEMONSTRATED THE EXTENT OF UNPOPULARITY OF THE GOVERNMENT INSTALLED PDI CHAIRMAN SURYADI.

8. (U) THE PPP ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON MAY 30 THAT, BASED ON REPORTS FROM ITS BRANCHES THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, IT HAD CONCLUDED THAT WIDESPREAD ELECTION VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED. IT WILL HOLD A LEADERS MEETING ON JUNE 5 TO DECIDE WHAT FURTHER STEPS TO TAKE, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF REJECTING THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION. SUPPORTING CLAIMS OF VOTE FRAUD, AN ASIAN GROUP OF MONITORS, THE "ASIAN FORUM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT," IN A STATEMENT MAY 31, SPOKE OF "GLARING IRREGULARITIES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS" AND THE ABSENCE OF TRANSPARENCY IN THE CANVASSING AND THE FINAL COUNTING OF VOTES." (NOTE: THE MONITORS WERE FROM THE PHILIPPINES,

THAILAND AND CAMBODIA. SRI LANKAN MEMBERS WERE DENIED VISAS. END NOTE)

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8566

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8566

PAGE 01 JAKART 03222 02 OF 02 021037Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10
	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	FDIC-01	/041W		

----------C0A5FA 021037Z /38

P 021036Z JUN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6075
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003222

NEW DELHI FOR HARTWICK

USCINPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: LATEST NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS

9. (U) IN JAKARTA, WHERE THERE HAD BEEN A STRONG SHOW OF

POPULAR SUPPORT FOR PPP DURING THE CAMPAIGN, GOLKAR WON 59.19 PERCENT, PPP 38.85 PERCENT AND PDI 1.96 PERCENT (ACCORDING TO PROVISIONAL BASED ON 73.57 PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS). HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO A VOTE BREAK-OUT PUBLISHED IN THE JAKARTA POST JUNE 2, PPP WAS NARROWLY OUTPACING GOLKAR IN ONE AREA OF THE CITY, SOUTH JAKARTA, WITH A TOTAL OF 49.3 PERCENT, COMPARED TO GOLKAR'S 49 PERCENT.

11. (U) THE FOLLOWING ARE THE LATEST PROVISIONAL ELECTION RESULTS (JUNE 1), SEPARATED OUT BY PROVINCE (SOURCE: INDONESIAN ELECTION INSTITUTE, PRINTED IN KOMPAS):

	GOLKAR	PPP	PDI
1. ACEH	64.33	32.27	3.40
2. N. SUMATRA	81.20	12.97	5.83
3. W. SUMATRA	91.41	7.49	1.10
4. RIAU	82.33	13.89	3.78
5. JAMBI	92.43	6.00	1.57
6. S. SUMATRA	84.74	11.44	3.82
7. BENGKULU	94.84	3.73	1.43
8. LAMPUNG	93.14	4.88	1.98

UNCLASSIFIED

9. JAKARTA	59.19	38.85	1.96
10. W. JAVA	72.11	26.17	1.72
11. C. JAVA	68.27	28.99	2.74
12. YOGYAKARTA	62.54	34.23	3.23
13. E. JAVA	63.06	33.75	3.18
14. W. KALIMANTAN	69.69	15.15	15.16
15. C. KALIMANTAN	86.29	10.32	3.40
16. E. KALIMANTAN	69.60	23.94	6.46
17. S. KALIMANTAN	71.21	25.86	2.93
18. BALI	93.12	3.31	3.57
19. W. NUSA TENG.	80.40	14.74	4.85
20. E. NUSA TENG.	94.86	1.54	3.60
21. E. TIMOR	83.93	2.18	13.89
22. S. SULAWESI	91.6	7.37	1.03
23. C. SULAWESI	84.79	10.43	4.78

UNCLASSIFIED

24. N. SULAWESI	95.48	2.63	1.89
25. SE. SULAWESI	97.08	2.11	0.81
26. MALUKU	82.30	12.81	4.89
27. IRIAN JAYA	88.93	3.55	7.52
TOTAL	74.27	22.66	3.07

HARVEY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4125

PAGE 01 JAKART 03188 01 OF 02 301037Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/038W					

----------BFF79A 301037Z /38

P 301037Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6041
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003188

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0082

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-30-02
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: INITIAL ELECTION FIGURES: SURABAYA CONSULAR DISTRICT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PRINCIPAL OFFICER. REASON 1.5 (D)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03188 01 OF 02 301037Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 SEP 2006 200503235

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE GOVERNMENT PARTY, GOLKAR, BOTH GOT A SUBSTANTIAL BOOST IN THIS YEAR'S ELECTION BY THE COLLAPSE OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY WHICH FELL TO 3.2 PER CENT OF THE EAST JAVA VOTE AND 2.6 PER CENT IN CENTRAL JAVA. THE PPP WON THE CENTRAL JAVA CITY OF PEKALONGAN AND THE EAST JAVA DISTRICT OF PASURUAN AGAIN. IT WON TWO OF THE THREE ELECTIONS IN THE CITY OF PASURUAN. IN EAST JAVA, THE NUMBER OF VOIDED BALLOTS SOMETIMES SIGNIFICANTLY OUT DISTANCED THE PDI TALLY. WHILE MOST OF EAST JAVA WAS CALM ON ELECTION DAY, SIGNIFICANT VIOLENCE BROKE OUT IN SAMPANG ON THE ISLAND OF MADURA. PPP OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT MAJOR FRAUD OCCURRED THROUGHOUT MADURA. THE SITUATION THERE REPORTEDLY IS TENSE. OUTSIDE JAVA, PROVINCES IN THE SURABAYA CONSULAR DISTRICT SEEM TO HAVE GONE GOLKAR OVERWHELMINGLY. END SUMMARY

3. (U) FOLLOWING ARE OUR FIRST STATISTICS FROM THE MAY 29 ELECTION IN INDONESIAN PROVINCES OF THE SURABAYA CONSULAR DISTRICT. ALL STATISTICS USED ARE STILL PRELIMINARY, ALTHOUGH FOR EAST JAVA WE ARE VERY CLOSE TO FINAL FIGURES. IN ALL CASES, EXCEPT WHERE NOTED, WE HAVE USED FIGURES FOR THE NATIONAL LEVEL RACE, STATISTICS FOR THE PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS VARY INSIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE NATIONAL ONE.

4. (U) EAST JAVA: WITH MOST OF EAST JAVA COUNTED, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL BUT NOT YET FINAL STATISTICS, THE PPP HAS WON 33.6 PER CENT OF THE VOTE (COMPARED WITH 25.3 PER CENT IN 1992), GOLKAR SAW ITS VICTORY RISE FROM 58.7 PER CENT IN 1992 TO 63.1 PER CENT, AND THE PDI FELL FROM 15.9 PER CENT TO 3.2 PER CENT. THE PPP APPARENTLY WON THE PASURUAN DISTRICT BY A CONVINCING MARGIN (IT WON PASURUAN IN 1992). IN THE PASURUAN CITY DISTRICT, THE PPP HAS BEEN

CONFIDENTIAL

EDGED OUT BY GOLKAR FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, BUT SQUEAKED BY THE GOVERNMENT PARTY AT THE PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS.

5. (SBU) THE GOLPUT VOTE IN EAST JAVA. GIVEN THE FLAWED NATURE OF STATISTICS IN SOME EAST JAVA DISTRICTS, WE CANNOT YET GIVE AN ACCURATE ESTIMATE ON THE NUMBER OF VOTERS WHO EITHER CHOSE TO STAY AWAY OR VOID THE BALLOT (GOLPUT). HOWEVER, IT SEEMS THAT THE PERCENTAGES SWUNG WIDELY FROM DISTRICT TO DISTRICT. IN SURABAYA CITY, 19 PER CENT DID NOT VOTE OR VOIDED THEIR BALLOTS. LIKEWISE, 18 PER CENT IN MALANG, A UNIVERSITY TOWN, DID THE SAME. IN MORE

RURAL SETTINGS, SUCH AS TUBAN, 13 PER CENT COULD BE GROUPED AS GOLPUT, AND IN SITUBONDO, ONE OF THE MOST RURAL COASTAL DISTRICTS, ONLY 9 PER CENT. THE VAST MAJORITY OF GOLPUT SIMPLY STAYED AWAY FROM THE POLLS. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SEE SOME OFFICIAL, BUT NOT FINAL STATISTICS ON ACTUAL VOIDED BALLOTS, AND IN A FEW CASES THE VOIDS OUT-POLLED THE PDI (IN PROBOLINGGO CITY BY MORE THAN TWO TO ONE, IN PASURUAN CITY FIVE TO ONE).

6. (U) MADURA, DISTURBANCES, AND POSSIBLE FRAUD: ALTHOUGH THE ELECTION WAS GENERALLY CALM THROUGHOUT EAST JAVA, DISTURBANCES ERUPTED IN THE FOUR DISTRICTS ON MADURA ISLAND, AMID CHARGES OF MAJOR ELECTION FRAUD. (THERE WAS ALSO MINOR VIOLENCE ELSEWHERE IN EAST JAVA.) IN SAMPANG, CROWDS DAMAGED SEVERAL GOVERNMENT AND POLICE BUILDINGS IN ONE SUBDISTRICT AND ASSAULTED SAMPANG CITY. AFTER DESTROYING GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND ATTACKING THE POLICE STATION AND THE RESIDENCE OF THE BUPATI (DISTRICT HEAD), THEY WERE REPORTEDLY BEATEN BACK BY THE MILITARY. WE UNDERSTAND FOUR WERE WOUNDED BY RUBBER BULLETS. THE SITUATION IS TENSE.

7. (C) THE SAMPANG VIOLENCE WAS APPARENTLY A REACTION TO ELECTION OFFICIALS NOT ALLOWING PPP WITNESSES TO ENTER SEVERAL POLLING

PLACES AND NOT PROVIDING THEM WITH VOTING SUMMARIES. ONE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SOURCE INDICATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS STAGING A RE-VOTE IN HALF OF SAMPANG'S SUBDISTRICTS. WE HAVE ALSO HEARD THAT AUTHORITIES ARE HUNTING A WELL-KNOWN RELIGIOUS LEADER, ALAWI MUHAMMAD, SUSPECTED OF INCITING THE RIOTING. PPP OFFICIALS TELL US THAT FRAUD WAS COMMITTED IN THE OTHER THREE MADURA DISTRICTS AS WELL. AS AN EXAMPLE, ONE PPP CONTACT TOLD US THAT UPWARDS OF 1000 BALLOT BOXES IN SUMENEP (OUT OF 1600) HAD BEEN REPLACED. OFFICIAL RECORDS INITIALLY INDICATED ALL FOUR MADURA DISTRICTS WENT GOLKAR, WITH SUMENEP AT MORE THAN 90 PER CENT. PPP CONTACTS ALLUDED TO INSTANCES OF FRAUD AT OTHER DISTRICTS IN EAST JAVA, BUT NOT ON THE MADURA SCALE.

8. (U) CENTRAL JAVA. FIGURES FOR CENTRAL JAVA, WITH LESS THAN 50 PER CENT OF THE VOTES TALLIED, HAVE THE PPP TAKING 27.3 PER CENT (IN 1992, IT WAS 22.9 PER CENT), GOLKAR 70.1 PER CENT (THE 1992 FIGURE WAS 55.4 PER CENT), AND THE PDI 2.6 PER CENT (DOWN FROM 20.2 PER CENT IN 1992). THE PPP APPARENTLY HAS HELD ON TO THE CITY OF PEKALONGAN, THE ONE VOTING DISTRICT IT WON IN 1992 AND SCENE OF

MAJOR CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE THIS YEAR. IN SOLO, ONE OF THE BETTER PDI SHOWINGS IN 1992, THE PPP VOTE WENT FROM 15.2 PER CENT IN 1992 TO 39.2 PER CENT, GOLKAR INCREASED FROM 49 PER CENT TO 57.6 PER CENT, AND THE PDI DROPPED FROM 35.2 PER CENT TO 3.2 PER CENT. WE ARE UNAWARE OF MAJOR DISTURBANCES IN CENTRAL JAVA, OR ELSEWHERE IN THE DISTRICT.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4126

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4126

PAGE 01 JAKART 03188 02 OF 02 301037Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/038W					

----------BFF79C 301037Z /38

P 301037Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6042
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003188

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0082

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-30-02
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: INITIAL ELECTION FIGURES: SURABAYA CONSULAR DISTRICT

CONFIDENTIAL

9. (U) YOGYAKARTA. PRELIMINARY YOGYAKARTA RESULTS GIVE THE PPP 29.8 PER CENT, GOLKAR 66.9 PER CENT AND THE PDI 3.3 PER CENT FOR THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT. WE HAVE NO FIGURES FOR THE DISTRICT/LOCAL RACE.

10. (U) BALI AND THE REST: BALI, WITH ABOUT HALF THE VOTES TABULATED, GIVES GOLKAR A 94.8 PER CENT WIN. WHILE STATISTICS FOR OTHER PROVINCES IN THE DISTRICT (EAST AND WEST NUSATENGGARA, MALUKU, AND THE FOUR PROVINCES OF SULAWESI) ARE STILL FRAGMENTARY, GOLKAR PREDICTABLY IS WINNING BY VERY LARGE MARGINS.

PIERCE/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

IMRNEWFILE

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9056

PAGE 01 JAKART 03047 231049Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/037W						

----------BDCF07 231049Z /38

R 231049Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5939
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003047

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/02
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: CALLS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTION NOT LIKELY
- TO PRODUCE ANY RESCHEDULING

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS 1.5(D)

2. (C) ASMARA NABABAN, MEMBER OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (KOMNASHAM), TOLD EMBOFF MAY 23 THAT THE COMMISSION WILL MEET MAY 27 TO CONSIDER FORMAL APPEALS FROM TWO GROUPS WHICH CALLED FOR A POSTPONEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS NOW SCHEDULED FOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 SEP 2006 200503235

MAY 29. THE TWO GROUPS INCLUDED A DELEGATION OF SENIOR CADRE REPRESENTING THE MEGAWATI FACTION OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, AND THE NATIONALITY FORUM OF THE YOUTH OF INDONESIA. THE YOUTH FORUM ALSO CALLED FOR KOMNASHAM TO ESTABLISH AN ELECTION COMMISSION WHICH WOULD SUPERVISE THE CONDUCT OF A RE-SCHEDULED ELECTION.

3. (C) NABABAN SAID THAT HE CONSIDERED IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT KOMNASHAM WOULD CALL FOR A POSTPONEMENT BUT THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A CONSENSUS FOR A STATEMENT WHICH WOULD NOTE VIOLATIONS OF LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED TO THE ELECTION. HE SAID THAT THE COMMISSION HAD BEEN "SHAKEN" BY A REPORT BY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MUNAWIR SOURCED TO MUNAWIR'S BROTHER THAT ON MAY 21 IN JEPARA, CENTRAL JAVA, THE MILITARY HAD DETAINED 26 MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND SEVERELY MISTREATED THEM. COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MUNAWIR SAID THAT ELECTRIC SHOCK HAD BEEN ADMINISTERED BUT THAT HE WOULD NOT GO INTO DETAIL AS THERE WERE LADIES PRESENT AT THE COMMISSION MEETING. NABABAN SPECULATED THAT THE ACTION WAS POSSIBLY AIMED AT INTIMIDATION BUT THAT IT WOULD LIKELY HAVE THE IMPACT OF A PROVOCATION.

4. (C) COMMENT: WE SHARE NABABAN'S EXPECTATION THAT THE COMMISSION WILL NOT CALL FOR POSTPONEMENT. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

IMRNEWFILE

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2170

PAGE 01 JAKART 02521 290915Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-09
	G-00	/026W					

----------B4BCC5 290916Z /38

R 290915Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5581
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002521

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0061

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-30-02
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: PDI CAMPAIGNS IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA; CLASH IN SURABAYA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PRINCIPAL OFFICER. REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: ON ITS FIRST DAY OF CAMPAIGNING IN EAST JAVA, THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI-SURYADI FACTION) WAS CHASED OFF THE STAGE BY SEVERAL HUNDRED MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS AT A MAJOR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02521 290915Z
RALLY IN SURABAYA. SUFFICIENT SECURITY ARRIVED TOO LATE. PDI

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

ELECTION OFFICIALS HAVE SAID PDI SURABAYA WILL NO LONGER CAMPAIGN SINCE SECURITY IS INADEQUATE AND PDI EVENTS SEEM UNDER A THREAT OF CONTINUED DISRUPTION BY MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS, BUT THE PDI WILL STAY ON THE BALLOT. PDI-SURYADI FACTION MORALE IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA WAS NEVER STRONG AND HAS BEEN ERODING. IF SURABAYA PDI DOES NOT PARTICIPATE IN FURTHER CAMPAIGNING, WE SUSPECT OTHER PDI CHAPTERS IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA WILL FOLLOW SUIT. PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES WILL LIKELY PRESS THE PDI TO RECONSIDER SINCE THE PRESENCE OF THE TWO MINORITY PARTIES IS IMPORTANT FOR THE IMAGE OF A SUCCESSFUL ELECTION. END SUMMARY

3. (U) ON THE SECOND DAY OF THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN (APRIL 28), THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) WAS ALLOTTED EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA FOR CAMPAIGNING. (NOTE: UNDER GOVERNMENT CAMPAIGN REGULATIONS, RIVAL PARTIES CAN NOT CAMPAIGN ON THE SAME DAY IN THE SAME AREA. END NOTE) IN SURABAYA SUPPORTERS OF GOVERNMENT-OUSTED PDI CHAIRPERSON MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI, THROUGH HECKLING AND STONE THROWING, BROKE UP THE PDI-SURYADI FACTION EVENT QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY. ACCORDING TO PRESS AND WITNESS ACCOUNTS, DURING THE WARM UP TO THE RALLY IN THE CITY CENTER AS LOCAL SINGERS WERE PERFORMING JUST BEFORE THE PROGRAM, A MEGAWATI SUPPORTER TOOK OVER THE STAGE AND MICROPHONE, WARMING THE AUDIENCE TOWARD MEGAWATI, AND TURNING THE EVENT TEMPORARILY INTO A MEGAWATI RALLY. AFTER THE PDI'S OWN SECURITY TRIED TO BREAK UP THE SHOW, SEVERAL HUNDRED MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS PELTED THE STAGE WITH STONES AND CHASED AWAY THE PERFORMERS AND PDI-SURYADI FACTION OFFICIALS. (SOME PRESS ACCOUNTS NUMBER THE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS AS HIGH AS 5000.) THE AREA WAS RANSACKED. MILITARY SECURITY RUSHED IN AFTER THE INCIDENT WAS OVER. THERE WERE MINOR INJURIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. (U) SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, SURABAYA'S PDI-SURYADI FACTION ELECTION COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN DECLARED THAT PDI SURABAYA WOULD NO LONGER BE CAMPAIGNING IN SURABAYA, SINCE SECURITY WAS INADEQUATE AND THE PDI WAS FACING PROSPECTS OF CONTINUOUS CLASHES WITH MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS. HE NOTED THAT PDI SURABAYA WOULD STILL TAKE PART IN THE ELECTION, BUT CAMPAIGNING WAS OUT. HE WAS SUPPORTED BY THE VICE PDI CHAIRMAN FOR EAST JAVA. SURABAYA'S MILITARY COMMANDER UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIED TO CONVINCE HIM TO RESTART THE DAY'S EVENT AND STAY IN THE CAMPAIGN.

5. (U) NOWHERE ELSE IN CENTRAL AND EAST JAVA WERE THERE CLASHES AS VIOLENT AS IN SURABAYA, ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THE PDI SHOW IN NEARBY SIDOARJO WAS STRONGLY HECKLED, AND SECURITY WAS TIGHT AT OTHER PDI RALLIES. SEVERAL PDI-SURYADI EVENTS WERE REPORTEDLY CANCELED THROUGHOUT EAST JAVA (JEMBER, SAMPANG, SITUBONDO, AND BOJONEGORO) AND MANY IN YOGYAKARTA. OTHERS WERE ATTENDED BY CROWDS OF UP TO A FEW HUNDRED, USUALLY WITH HEAVY SECURITY. IN NGANDJUK, REPORTEDLY THE NUMBER OF SECURITY PERSONNEL WAS DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF ON-LOOKERS, WHO AMOUNTED TO 100.

6. (C) (COMMENT) MORALE WITHIN PRO-SURYADI PDI RANKS HAS NEVER BEEN HIGH IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA. MANY CHAPTERS ARE PLAGUED BY A LACK OF FINANCES AND INTERNAL REVOLT BY THOSE WHO MAINTAIN VARYING DEGREES OF LOYALTY TO MEGAWATI. PDI OFFICIALS' FUMBLING ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE HAVE BEEN AGGRAVATED BY THE PERSISTENT SPECTER OF VIOLENT DISRUPTION AND THE CHALLENGES IN THE COURTS DIRECTED AGAINST THEM BY MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS. THE EAST JAVA PDI WAS FURTHER DISHEARTENED EARLIER THIS MONTH WHEN ONE OF ITS VERY FEW PRO-SURYADI LEADERS WITH A STRONG PERSONAL FOLLOWING DIED ON HAJJ. IF SURABAYA PDI GETS OUT OF THE CAMPAIGN, OTHERS WILL LIKELY FOLLOW SUIT.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. (C) (FURTHER COMMENT) SINCE BOTH MINORITY PARTIES ARE AN ESSENTIAL COSMETIC FOR A SUCCESSFUL ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND THE GOVERNMENT WISHES TO SHOW THAT PRO-SURYADI PDI IS THE LEGITIMATE PDI REPRESENTATION, WE SUSPECT THAT PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY WILL PRESS STRONGLY FOR PDI SURABAYA TO RECONSIDER ITS DECISION. MOREOVER, PROVINCIAL MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN THE RUN-UP TO THE CAMPAIGN HAD MADE MUCH ABOUT THEIR INTENT TO KEEP ORDER AND DEAL HARSHLY WITH CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE. THIS INCIDENT AND THE PDI ACCUSATION OF A SECURITY LAPSE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY EMBARRASSING AND WILL DEEPEN THE MILITARY'S RESOLVE TO KEEP THE PDI IN THE CAMPAIGN AND REACT STRONGLY IF FURTHER VIOLENCE ERUPTS. WHETHER THE PDI STAYS IN OR GETS OUT, THE PARTY APPEARS WEAKER THAN EVER. MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS UNDOUBTEDLY WILL RECEIVE A MAJOR BOOST AND CONTINUE TO MAKE THEIR PRESENCE LOUDLY OBVIOUS.
PIERCE/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

IMRNEWFILE

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4576

PAGE 01 JAKART 02779 01 OF 02 120817Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/039W						

----------B938D3 120817Z /38

R 120815Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5749
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002779

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/16
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: MUSLIM PARTY SURGE SEEN AT MID-POINT IN
- PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS;
REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02779 01 OF 02 120817Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

CONVOYED, RALLIED OR SIMPLY STOOD ALONG THE STREETS OF THE CAPITAL MAY 11 WATCHING A RAUCOUS BUT GOOD NATURED SEA OF SUPPORTERS FOR THE MINORITY UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) STRUT ITS STUFF. GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS INTENDED TO LIMIT OR PREVENT CONVOYS AND RALLIES WERE SWEPT ASIDE BY THE LARGE EXUBERANT CROWDS. PPP'S NUMBERS IN THE STREETS MAY HAVE BEEN TWICE THE SIZE OF THOSE ATTRACTED ONLY THREE DAYS EARLIER, A MUSLIM HOLIDAY, WHEN PPP CROWDS IMMOBILIZED SOUTH JAKARTA. VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE CAPITAL APPEARED IN GRIDLOCK MAY 11. THERE WAS SOME EVIDENCE OF MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS JOINING THE PPP BANDWAGON, DESPITE MISGIVINGS BY SENIOR MEGAWATI ADVISORS WHO SEE RELIGIOUS SPLITS IN HER PARTY AS ONE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCE DERIVING FROM SUCH ACTIVITY. IT IS YET TO BE SEEN WHETHER PPP'S SURGING STRENGTH IN THE STREETS LEADS TO A LARGER HARVEST OF VOTES. DOUBTS ABOUT THE FAIRNESS OF GOVERNMENT VOTE COUNTING ARE COMMONPLACE. END SUMMARY

JAKARTA AWASH IN PPP GREEN:
---

3. (U) JAKARTA, MAY 11, WAS TRANSFORMED INTO A SEA OF GREEN AS HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF GREEN CLAD SUPPORTERS OF THE LARGELY ISLAMIC UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY SWARMED INTO THE CAPITAL'S STREETS IN IMPROMPTU PARADES AND GATHERINGS. THE SIZE OF THE CROWDS AND THEIR PENCHANT FOR MASSING AT INTERSECTIONS AND FORMING UP MOTORCADES ON ALL MAIN THOROUGHFARES CAUSED THE CITY OF 11 MILLION VIRTUALLY TO GRIND TO A HALT. THE NUMBERS IN SOUTH JAKARTA, ACCORDING TO ONE POLOFF, WERE APPROXIMATELY

DOUBLE THE SIZE OF PPP CROWDS WHICH TOOK TO THE STREET ON THE LAST SCHEDULED PPP CAMPAIGN DAY, MAY 8, AN ISLAMIC HOLIDAY. ONLY SELECTED AREAS WHERE POLICE AND MILITARY BARRED THE FESTIVE CROWDS REMAINED QUIET. ONE SUCH NEIGHBORHOOD WAS CENTRAL JAKARTA'S MENTENG WHERE THE PRESIDENT AND HIS FAMILY RESIDE. POLICE AND MILITARY UNITS WERE ABLE TO SCREEN OUT MOST PPP VEHICLES AS THEY SOUGHT TO ENTER MENTENG.

4. (U) MUCH OF THE REST OF THE CITY WAS FESTIVE GRIDLOCK. WHILE OFFICIAL SCHEDULED RALLIES ATTRACTED LARGE CROWDS IN NORTH AND SOUTH JAKARTA, THEY TENDED TO BE ONLY HUBS FOR MUCH MORE FRENETIC ACTIVITY OF MOSTLY TEENAGE YOUTHS WHO CLAMORED ABOARD ALL SORTS OF CONVEYANCES TO FORM CONVOYS WHICH SNAKED THROUGH THE CITY, OR MORE TYPICALLY BECAME TRAPPED BY OTHER PPP CELEBRANTS AT INTERSECTIONS. SOME YOUTHS THUMPED ON CARS TRYING TO WEAVE THEIR WAY THROUGH THE CROWDS DEMANDING THE INDEX FINGER PPP SALUTE FROM ALL PASSERSBY. ONE EXPATRIATE FAMILY WHICH OPENED ITS CAR DOORS SAW THE CAR BRIEFLY COMMANDEERED. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF SCUFFLES WITH SECURITY FORCES WHICH WERE OUT IN FORCE, MANY ARMED WITH SEMI-AUTOMATIC RIFLES.

5. (U) THE CROWDS WERE A CROSS BETWEEN MARDI GRAS AND A WELCOME GIVEN A TRIUMPHANT HOMECOMING SPORTS TEAM WITH VERY LITTLE POLITICAL FEEL. THE RALLIES TENDED TO BE MUSIC CONCERTS WITH FEW SPEECHES AND LITTLE PAMPHLETEERING. EVEN OFF THE MAIN STREETS IN THE DENSELY POPULATED BACK ALLIES GREEN BANNERS WERE IN ABUNDANCE AND PEOPLE OF ALL AGES APPEARED GENUINELY

CAUGHT UP IN THE ATMOSPHERE. YELLOW GOLKAR (GOVERNMENT PARTY) FLAGS WERE RELATIVELY RARE AND PDI RED FLAGS WERE NON-EXISTENT.

6. (U) SPOTTED AMONG THE CROWDS WERE SOME "FUSION" ENTHUSIASTS, SUPPORTERS OF THE GOVERNMENT-OUSTED CHAIRPERSON OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI WHO PLAN TO VOTE FOR PPP IN PROTEST OVER THE GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE IN THE PDI. WHILE A FEW "MEGA BINTANG" POSTERS WERE SPOTTED AT THE RALLIES IN NORTH JAKARTA, THE PHENOMENON APPEARED TO BE MORE COMMON IN SOUTH JAKARTA (BINTANG MEANS STAR, WHICH IS THE PPP SYMBOL). ONE EMBOFF WITNESSED AN HOURS LONG STREET RALLY IN WHICH THREE TO FIVE THOUSAND PPP SUPPORTERS DROVE AROUND AND AROUND. GREEN (PPP) AND RED (PDI) FLAGS AND PHOTOS OF MEGAWATI WERE PLENTIFUL, AND MANY WERE FLASHING THE MIXED HAND SIGNAL FOR BOTH THE PPP AND THE MEGAWATI BRANCH OF THE PDI. AT ONE INDONESIAN HIGH

SCHOOL WITH WHICH EMBOFF WAS FAMILIAR, MANY OF THE YOUNG MEN, SOME OF WHOM HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE UNREST ON JULY 27, WERE CROSSING OVER TO SUPPORT PPP, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.

THE MEGA-BINTANG MOVEMENT:

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4577

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4577

PAGE 01 JAKART 02779 02 OF 02 120817Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/039W						

----------B938D5 120817Z /38

R 120815Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5750
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002779

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/16
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: MUSLIM PARTY SURGE SEEN AT MID-POINT IN
- PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN

---

7. (C) A SENIOR MEGAWATI LIEUTENANT TOLD POLCOUNS MAY 11 THAT MEGAWATI AND HER SENIOR ADVISORS ARE CONCERNED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02779 02 OF 02 120817Z
ABOUT THE "MEGA-BINTANG" MOVEMENT . HE NOTED THAT THERE ARE GENUINE AND DEEP POLICY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PPP AND PDI (HE NOTED PPP OPPOSITION TO FAMILY PLANNING AS ONE) AND, MOREOVER, THERE IS INCHOATE CONCERN THAT PPP COULD YET BE A VEHICLE WHICH ISLAMIST HARDLINERS MIGHT SEEK TO EXPLOIT. (NOTE: MOST OBSERVERS DO NOT SEE PPP AS FERTILE GROUND FOR ISLAMIST HARDLINERS. IN 1985 THE GOVERNMENT FORCED PPP AND ALL OTHER PARTIES AND SOCIO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO DECLARE THAT THEY WERE BASED ON THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA, I.E., NOT ISLAM. END NOTE)

8. (C) THE MEGAWATI LIEUTENANT ADDED THAT THE APPEAL OF "MEGA-BINTANG" IS STRONGEST AMONG MUSLIM PDI SUPPORTERS WHILE PDI'S SUBSTANTIAL CHRISTIAN CONSTITUENCY WOULD PREFER TO ABSTAIN FROM VOTING OR "GOLPUT." MEGAWATI AND HER ADVISORS REPORTEDLY FEAR POSSIBLE LONG TERM DAMAGE TO PDI UNITY IF THERE IS A DIVIDE BETWEEN SUPPORTERS WHO SUPPORT THE PPP AND THOSE WHO DO NOT.

8. (C) COMMENT: LOCAL OBSERVERS HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED WITH THE SIZE AND ENTHUSIASM OF PPP CROWDS IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE (SEE SEPTEL). MOREOVER, THE CROWDS APPEAR TO HAVE GROWN SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE FIRST FIVE THREE-DAY ROUNDS OF CAMPAIGNING. WHETHER THIS SURGING PPP APPEAL TRANSLATES INTO SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER VOTE NUMBERS FOR THE PPP REMAINS TO BE SEEN. NO ONE HERE

UNDERESTIMATES THE ABILITY OR WILLINGNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO MANIPULATE VOTE TOTALS ALTHOUGH SUCH ACTION THIS TIME AROUND, COULD LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT

PROTEST.

9. (C) COMMENT CONT: ONE OBSERVER (PDI), REFLECTING ON THE MEGA-BINTANG OR FUSION PHENOMENON, CONTENDED THAT BY MUTING PDI THROUGH OUSTER OF ITS POPULAR CHAIRPERSON, THE GOVERNMENT HAD TRANSFORMED THE ELECTION EFFECTIVELY INTO A TWO PARTY RACE (I.E., GOLKAR VS. PPP) WHICH, NOTWITHSTANDING A VERY UNEVEN PLAYING FIELD, HELD SOME NEW INTEREST. THE ELECTION, HE SUGGESTED, COULD TAKE ON THE APPEARANCE OF A REFERENDUM ON THE GOVERNMENT WITH THOSE VOTERS WHO ARE FED UP WITH CORRUPTION, SECURITY AUTHORITY ABUSE, ECONOMIC AND OTHER GAPS AND A FAILED JUSTICE SYSTEM SEIZING AN OPPORTUNITY TO REGISTER A SINGLE PROTEST VOTE. ROY

NNNN



IMRNEWFILE

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3289

PAGE 01 JAKART 02913 01 OF 03 171330Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/037W						

----------BBB3DB 171330Z /52

R 161052Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5857
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002913

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: NEW PPP SUPPORTERS "GOING WITH THE STREAM;" PPP ALLEGES VOTER MANIPULATION AND VOTE FRAUD

REF: JAKARTA 2798

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02913 01 OF 03 171330Z
1.5(D)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

2. (C) SUMMARY: MANY NEW, YOUNG UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) SUPPORTERS EVIDENT IN STREET RALLIES ARE "GOING WITH THE STREAM," ACCORDING TO A PPP CENTRAL BOARD MEMBER AND NATIONAL CAMPAIGNER. PPP WAS THEIR VEHICLE FOR BECOMING PART OF THE EXCITEMENT OF STREET RALLIES THIS YEAR IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE, JUST AS THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) WAS THE VEHICLE FOR MANY OF THEM IN THE 1992 ELECTION. AT A BASIC LEVEL, IT WAS A CHANNEL FOR THEM TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES. ALTHOUGH NOTING THE MARKEDLY INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR PPP IN JAKARTA DURING THE CAMPAIGN, SHE DID NOT BELIEVE PPP WOULD BE PERMITTED TO WIN THE CAPITAL. IT WAS CLEAR AT A LARGE PPP RALLY ON MAY 14 THAT THE PPP CENTRAL LEADERSHIP HAD LITTLE CONTROL, IF ANY, OVER THE MASSES IN ATTENDANCE. THE EFFORTS TO PUBLICIZE AN ATTEMPTED FUSION BETWEEN THE PPP AND SUPPORTERS OF OUSTED INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI ("MEGA-BINTANG") WERE NOT AS EVIDENT ON MAY 14 AS ON THE PREVIOUS CAMPAIGN DAY. THIS FOLLOWED THE GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT MATERIALS CALLING FOR SUCH A FUSION WERE PROHIBITED. PPP HAS MADE SEVERAL PUBLIC ALLEGATIONS OF VOTER MANIPULATION AND FRAUD. END SUMMARY.

3. (SBU) UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) NATIONAL CAMPAIGNER LENA MARIANA MUKTI INVITED POLOFF TO ACCOMPANY HER TO A PPP PUBLIC RALLY ON MAY 14. SHE IS A MEMBER OF THE PPP NATIONAL BOARD, AND A CANDIDATE FOR PARLIAMENT FROM JAKARTA (ALTHOUGH TOO LOW RANKED ON PPP'S CANDIDATE

LIST TO HAVE A REALISTIC CHANCE OF WINNING A SEAT).

LARGE PPP RALLY: WHOSE IN CHARGE?
---

4. (SBU) POLOFF AND PPP NATIONAL CAMPAIGNER LENA MARIANA MUKTI JOURNEYED TO TANJUNG PRIOK, A POOR, PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM AREA IN THE FAR NORTH OF JAKARTA, ON MAY 14 TO OBSERVE A LARGE PPP RALLY. UPON ARRIVING AT NOON, THE SOCCER FIELD WAS VIRTUALLY EMPTY, EXCEPT FOR SOME POLICE

AND MILITARY. MUKTI WAS NOT SPEAKING AT THE CAMPAIGN EVENT HERSELF AS HER RESPONSIBILITY THAT DAY WAS TO MONITOR THE PPP RALLIES IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THE CITY FOR THE PPP CENTRAL BOARD.

5. (SBU) AS THE START TIME OF 1:00 PM DREW NEAR, WAVE AFTER WAVE OF MOSTLY YOUNG MEN ARRIVED IN THE PARKING LOT ON MOTORCYCLES AND OTHER VEHICLES, AND AFTER PARKING RAN ONTO THE FIELD. SEVERAL PPP CAMPAIGNERS ON THE STAGE BEGAN WARMING UP THE CROWD WITH MUSIC, BUT NOBODY FROM PPP APPEARED TO BE IN CHARGE IN THE PARKING LOT OR IN THE FIELD. MOREOVER, THE ARRIVING GROUPS OF MOTORCYCLES WERE NOT WELL-ORGANIZED AND WERE VIRTUALLY LEADERLESS. MUKTI EXPLAINED TO POLOFF THAT THE PEOPLE SIMPLY GATHERED TOGETHER IN THE "KAMPUNGS" (POOR NEIGHBORHOOD) SURROUNDING THE FIELD AND SET OFF FOR THE RALLY.

6. (SBU) MUKTI POINTED OUT THAT THE ATTENDEES WANTED TO JOIN THE STREET RALLIES AND WERE NOT INTERESTED IN THE SPEECHES. SHE ALSO DISAPPROVED OF THE OFFICIALS ON THE STAGE WHOSE PRIMARY FORM OF COMMUNICATING WITH THE CROWD

CONFIDENTIAL

WAS TO YELL AND SHOUT THAT PPP WAS NUMBER ONE, THAT IT SHOULD BE SUPPORTED, ETC. SHE SAID THAT WHEN SHE SPOKE TO CAMPAIGN CROWDS SHE ALWAYS TRIED TO GIVE SOME SUBSTANCE. BUT IN GENERAL SHE WAS RESIGNED BECAUSE THE STREET RALLIES AND PARTY ATMOSPHERE WERE SO PERVASIVE.

7. (SBU) THE FEATURED SPEAKER, ALAWI MUHAMMAD, A "CHARISMATIC KIAI" (RELIGIOUS SCHOLAR) FROM MADURA ARRIVED AND THE EVENT KICKED INTO FULL GEAR. FIVE TO TEN THOUSAND PEOPLE WERE ON THE FIELD AND IN THE STANDS. HE SPOKE FOR ABOUT HALF AN HOUR AND HIS MAIN MESSAGE TO THE MASS OF PEOPLE WAS TO SUPPORT PPP AND TO CARRY OUT THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION SMOOTHLY. AS SOON AS IT WAS OVER, THE CROWD STREAMED OFF THE FIELD, ONTO MOTORCYCLES, SCOOTERS AND OTHER VEHICLES AND INTO THE NARROW STREETS OF TANJUNG PRIOK.

8. (SBU) POLOFF WATCHED THE EVENT FROM THE EDGE OF THE CROWD. THE VAST MAJORITY WERE TREATING THE EVENT LIKE A

PARTY RATHER THAN A POLITICAL SPEECH. HOWEVER, A FEW OF THE ATTENDEES WITH WHOM POLOFF SPOKE WERE INTENT ON TAKING A MORE SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH. ONE OLDER MAN, WITH HIS WIFE, SON, DAUGHTER-AND-LAW AND GRANDCHILDREN, TOLD POLOFF HOW GOLKAR WAS THE GOVERNMENT PARTY, THE PPP WAS THE ISLAMIC PARTY, AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI)

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0408

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0408

PAGE 01 JAKART 02913 02 OF 03 161053Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/037W						

----------BB4EC8 161053Z /38

R 161052Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5858
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002913

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: NEW PPP SUPPORTERS "GOING WITH THE STREAM;" PPP ALLEGES VOTER MANIPULATION AND VOTE FRAUD

WAS THE "DEMOCRACY PARTY." HE AND HIS FRIEND EMPHASIZED THAT GOLKAR HAD BEEN IN POWER FOR MANY YEARS AND THAT THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS RIGHT. THEY SEEMED ANNOYED BY

THE PACK OF YOUNG MEN HOVERING NEARBY WHO WERE MORE INTENT ON CAROUSING THAN ON LISTENING TO THE SPEECH.

9. (SBU) SEPARATELY, POLOFF SPOKE WITH A YOUNG MAN NOT WEARING THE PPP GREEN WHO SEEMED SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSED TO BE THERE. HE SAID HE WAS A STUDENT FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA (UI), AND THAT HE, ALONG WITH OVER FIFTY PERCENT OF THE STUDENTS AT UI, PLANNED TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTION. HE PROFESSED TO BE A SUPPORTER OF SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS, THE DISSIDENT RECENTLY ARRESTED FOR CALLING FOR AN ELECTION BOYCOTT, AND SAID THAT HE DID NOT PLAN TO STAY LONG AT THE RALLY.

"MEGA-BINTANG" MATERIALS BANNED BY THE GOVERNMENT

10. (U) THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ON MAY 12 THAT CAMPAIGN MATERIALS SUCH AS BANNERS AND POSTERS THAT CALLED FOR A FUSION BETWEEN OUSTED PDI LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND THE PPP WOULD BE BANNED (NOTE: REFERRED TO AS "MEGA-BINTANG," BINTANG MEANS STAR IN INDONESIAN, THE PPP SYMBOL. END NOTE). MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS YOGIE REPORTEDLY SAID THAT "I DECLARE THAT PEOPLE ARE NOT TO USE THOSE BANNERS. WE NEVER RECOGNIZE ANY PARTY BUT THE THREE POLL CONTESTANTS." THE GOI ALSO BASED ITS MOVE ON REGULATIONS THAT REQUIRE ALL CAMPAIGN MATERIAL TO BE SCREENED BY THE POLICE.

11. (U) POLOFF DID NOT SEE MEGA-BINTANG SIGNS AT THE EVENT IN NORTH JAKARTA ON MAY 14. THIS COULD BE EXPLAINED IN PART BY THE GOVERNMENT BAN, BUT ALSO BY THE FACT THAT

TANJUNG-PRIOK IS A HEAVILY MUSLIM AREA AND NOT FERTILE
CONFIDENTIAL

GROUND FOR OBTAINING SUPPORT FROM THE MORE NATIONALIST/ CHRISTIAN PDI. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, IN SOUTH JAKARTA MATERIALS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO MOVE AGAINST "MEGA-BINTANG" WERE CIRCULATED ON MAY 14, AND LEAFLETS SUPPORTING THE FUSION APPEARED IN MANY AREAS OF JAVA ON THAT DAY.

WAVE OF SUPPORT FOR PPP: "GOING WITH THE STREAM"
---

12. (C) THE PPP CAMPAIGN OFFICIAL, MUKTI, WAS ENCOURAGED THAT THE PPP WAS ATTRACTING MORE SUPPORTERS AND INTEREST IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, POINTING TO THE MASSES ON THE SOCCER FIELD, SHE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THESE WERE NOT PPP'S TRADITIONAL SUPPORTERS, BUT RATHER YOUNG MEN "GOING WITH THE STREAM." SHE ASSESSED THAT IN THE LAST ELECTION IN 1992 MANY FROM THIS GROUP (NOTE: POOR YOUNG MEN. END NOTE) ENTERED THE STREETS FOR THE PDI. THIS TIME PPP WAS THE WAY FOR THEM TO BECOME PART OF THE EXCITEMENT OF STREET RALLIES AND AT A BASIC LEVEL TO "EXPRESS THEMSELVES." SHE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD REMAIN WITH PPP THROUGH MAY 29 WHEN THE ELECTION WOULD BE HELD, AND ACTUALLY CAST THEIR VOTES FOR THE PARTY.

13. (C) DESPITE PPP CHAIRMAN ISMAIL HASAN METAREUM'S PUBLIC STATEMENT ON MAY 5 THAT HIS PARTY WOULD PREVAIL IN THE CAPITAL AS IT HAD IN 1977, MUKTI DID NOT BELIEVE THAT "GOLKAR WOULD ALLOW PPP TO WIN THE ELECTION" IN JAKARTA. CURRENTLY, OF THE FOURTEEN PARLIAMENT SEATS FROM JAKARTA, GOLKAR HOLDS EIGHT, PPP THREE, AND PDI THREE. SHE THOUGHT
CONFIDENTIAL

THAT PPP COULD CONCEIVABLY DOUBLE ITS TOTAL OF SEATS TO SIX, BUT NO MORE. EVEN IF IT APPEARED THAT PPP HAD IN REALITY WON THE VOTE IN JAKARTA BUT HAD BEEN CHEATED BY THE GOVERNMENT, SHE DOUBTED THAT THE PUBLIC REACTION WOULD BE STRONG. SHE NOTED WITH RESIGNATION THAT THE GOVERNMENT "WOULD HAVE SOME EXPLANATION" THAT THE PEOPLE WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT.

PPP ALLEGES FRAUD AND VOTER MANIPULATION IN THE WORKS

14. (C) MUKTI SHOWED POLOFF A LETTER FROM THE PPP CENTRAL BOARD TO THE GOI ALLEGING THAT GOLKAR WAS PLANNING TO CARRY OUT "OPERATION DAWN" TO MANIPULATE VOTERS ON ELECTION DAY. THE PPP MADE THESE CHARGES PUBLIC ON MAY 13. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, PPP CLAIMED THAT IT HAD OBTAINED LETTERS FROM THE "COMMUNICATION FORUM FOR GOLKAR AFFILIATED ISLAMIC MASS ORGANIZATIONS" INSTRUCTING ITS BRANCH OFFICES TO GIVE FOOD AND MONEY TO PEOPLE EARLY IN THE MORNING ON MAY 29, WHEN THE VOTING WOULD BE HELD. ACCORDING TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY PPP'S SECRETARY GENERAL TOSARI WIJAYA, THIS "OPERATION" WOULD TARGET AREAS WHERE GOLKAR HAD LOST VOTES IN THE LAST ELECTION. ALL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY IS SUPPOSEDLY BANNED AFTER MAY 23.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0409

PAGE 01 JAKART 02913 03 OF 03 161053Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00 /037W	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00

----------BB4ECC 161053Z /38

R 161052Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5859
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002913

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: NEW PPP SUPPORTERS "GOING WITH THE STREAM;" PPP ALLEGES VOTER MANIPULATION AND VOTE FRAUD

15. (U) THE PPP HAD PREVIOUSLY PUBLICLY CHARGED THAT IT HAD DISCOVERED A DOCUMENT FROM A SUBDISTRICT HEAD ("CAMAT") IN BENGKULU, SUMATRA WHICH REPORTED ELECTION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02913 03 OF 03 161053Z
RESULTS INDICATING THAT GOLKAR WOULD WIN 86.29 PERCENT IN THE SUBDISTRICT, THE PPP 7 PERCENT, AND THE PDI 6.71 PERCENT. PPP'S GENERAL CHAIRMAN METAREUM ARGUED THAT THIS WAS EVIDENCE THAT THE RESULTS IN THE SUBDISTRICT WERE ALREADY DETERMINED. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS RESPONDED THAT THE DOCUMENT CONTAINED THE "ESTIMATES" OF WHAT THE RESULTS WOULD BE.

ANECDOTAL EXAMPLES OF VOTER MANIPULATION

16. (C) THE EMBASSY PERIODICALLY RECEIVES CREDIBLE ACCOUNTS OF VOTER MANIPULATION OR FRAUD. ONE INVOLVES THE INDONESIAN FRIEND OF AN EMBOFF WHO WAS SELECTED BY THE ADMINISTRATOR (LURAH) IN HER SOUTH JAKARTA NEIGHBORHOOD TO BE THE LOCAL "GOLKAR ORGANIZER." EVEN THOUGH SHE WAS A SUPPORTER OF MEGAWATI, SHE FELT THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA FOR HER TO ACCEPT THE POSITION OTHERWISE HER LIFE COULD BE MADE DIFFICULT. THE "LURAH" GAVE HER A TARGET NUMBER OF VOTES FOR GOLKAR IN HER AREA FOR HER TO OBTAIN, AND MONEY AND CAMPAIGN MATERIALS SUCH AS T-SHIRTS TO HAND OUT. IT WAS MADE CLEAR TO HER THAT AFTER THE ELECTION IT WOULD BE DETERMINED WHETHER THE NEIGHBORHOOD HAD ACHIEVED ITS TARGET, AND THAT IF NOT THE LURAH MIGHT LOSE HIS JOB.

17. (C) ANOTHER CREDIBLE ACCOUNT INVOLVES THE FRIEND OF A FOREIGN SERVICE NATIONAL WHO IS A CIVIL SERVANT WORKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT AIRPLANE COMPANY IPTN. THE FRIEND SAID THAT TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE ELECTION, ON MAY 19, HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD RECEIVE A FULL MONTH'S EXTRA PAYCHECK. THEY REFERRED TO THIS AS THEIR "GOLKAR SUBSIDY."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

18. (C) A LOCAL CONTACT EXPLAINED THAT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS JUST ABOVE VILLAGE LEVEL (CALLED SUB-SUB DISTRICT) IN THE JAKARTA AREA AND PRESUMABLY MORE WIDELY ARE ORGANIZING "EVENING MEETINGS" ON THE EVE OF GOLKAR CAMPAIGN DAYS AT WHICH PEOPLE ARE RECRUITED TO CAMPAIGN FOR GOLKAR THE FOLLOWING DAY. THEY ARE OFFERED MONEY, USUALLY ABOUT 10,000 RUPIAH (A PARALLEL REPORT INDICATED THAT WOMEN ARE OFFERED SUBSTANTIALLY MORE, UP TO 40,000 RUPIAH), PLUS GOLKAR T-SHIRTS OR LIGHT JACKETS AND FOOD. THE OTHER PARTIES ARE NOT PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN ORGANIZATIONS BELOW THE DISTRICT LEVEL AND MOREOVER DO NOT HAVE THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO GOLKAR. SOURCE EXPLAINED THAT MOST PARTICIPANTS WERE YOUNG UNEMPLOYED MEN. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9056

PAGE 01 JAKART 03047 231049Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/037W						

----------BDCF07 231049Z /38

R 231049Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5939
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003047

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/02
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: CALLS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTION NOT LIKELY
- TO PRODUCE ANY RESCHEDULING

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS 1.5(D)

2. (C) ASMARA NABABAN, MEMBER OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (KOMNASHAM), TOLD EMBOFF MAY 23 THAT THE COMMISSION WILL MEET MAY 27 TO CONSIDER FORMAL APPEALS FROM TWO GROUPS WHICH CALLED FOR A POSTPONEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS NOW SCHEDULED FOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 SEP 2006 200503235

MAY 29. THE TWO GROUPS INCLUDED A DELEGATION OF SENIOR CADRE REPRESENTING THE MEGAWATI FACTION OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, AND THE NATIONALITY FORUM OF THE YOUTH OF INDONESIA. THE YOUTH FORUM ALSO CALLED FOR KOMNASHAM TO ESTABLISH AN ELECTION COMMISSION WHICH WOULD SUPERVISE THE CONDUCT OF A RE-SCHEDULED ELECTION.

3. (C) NABABAN SAID THAT HE CONSIDERED IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT KOMNASHAM WOULD CALL FOR A POSTPONEMENT BUT THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A CONSENSUS FOR A STATEMENT WHICH WOULD NOTE VIOLATIONS OF LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED TO THE ELECTION. HE SAID THAT THE COMMISSION HAD BEEN "SHAKEN" BY A REPORT BY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MUNAWIR SOURCED TO MUNAWIR'S BROTHER THAT ON MAY 21 IN JEPARA, CENTRAL JAVA, THE MILITARY HAD DETAINED 26 MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND SEVERELY MISTREATED THEM. COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MUNAWIR SAID THAT ELECTRIC SHOCK HAD BEEN ADMINISTERED BUT THAT HE WOULD NOT GO INTO DETAIL AS THERE WERE LADIES PRESENT AT THE COMMISSION MEETING. NABABAN SPECULATED THAT THE ACTION WAS POSSIBLY AIMED AT INTIMIDATION BUT THAT IT WOULD LIKELY HAVE THE IMPACT OF A PROVOCATION.

4. (C) COMMENT: WE SHARE NABABAN'S EXPECTATION THAT THE COMMISSION WILL NOT CALL FOR POSTPONEMENT. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2170

PAGE 01 JAKART 02521 290915Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-09
	G-00	/026W					

----------B4BCC5 290916Z /38

R 290915Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5581
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002521

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0061

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-30-02
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: PDI CAMPAIGNS IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA; CLASH IN SURABAYA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PRINCIPAL OFFICER. REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: ON ITS FIRST DAY OF CAMPAIGNING IN EAST JAVA, THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI-SURYADI FACTION) WAS CHASED OFF THE STAGE BY SEVERAL HUNDRED MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS AT A MAJOR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02521 290915Z
RALLY IN SURABAYA. SUFFICIENT SECURITY ARRIVED TOO LATE. PDI

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

ELECTION OFFICIALS HAVE SAID PDI SURABAYA WILL NO LONGER CAMPAIGN SINCE SECURITY IS INADEQUATE AND PDI EVENTS SEEM UNDER A THREAT OF CONTINUED DISRUPTION BY MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS, BUT THE PDI WILL STAY ON THE BALLOT. PDI-SURYADI FACTION MORALE IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA WAS NEVER STRONG AND HAS BEEN ERODING. IF SURABAYA PDI DOES NOT PARTICIPATE IN FURTHER CAMPAIGNING, WE SUSPECT OTHER PDI CHAPTERS IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA WILL FOLLOW SUIT. PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES WILL LIKELY PRESS THE PDI TO RECONSIDER SINCE THE PRESENCE OF THE TWO MINORITY PARTIES IS IMPORTANT FOR THE IMAGE OF A SUCCESSFUL ELECTION. END SUMMARY

3. (U) ON THE SECOND DAY OF THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN (APRIL 28), THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) WAS ALLOTTED EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA FOR CAMPAIGNING. (NOTE: UNDER GOVERNMENT CAMPAIGN REGULATIONS, RIVAL PARTIES CAN NOT CAMPAIGN ON THE SAME DAY IN THE SAME AREA. END NOTE) IN SURABAYA SUPPORTERS OF GOVERNMENT-OUSTED PDI CHAIRPERSON MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI, THROUGH HECKLING AND STONE THROWING, BROKE UP THE PDI-SURYADI FACTION EVENT QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY. ACCORDING TO PRESS AND WITNESS ACCOUNTS, DURING THE WARM UP TO THE RALLY IN THE CITY CENTER AS LOCAL SINGERS WERE PERFORMING JUST BEFORE THE PROGRAM, A MEGAWATI SUPPORTER TOOK OVER THE STAGE AND MICROPHONE, WARMING THE AUDIENCE TOWARD MEGAWATI, AND TURNING THE EVENT TEMPORARILY INTO A MEGAWATI RALLY. AFTER THE PDI'S OWN SECURITY TRIED TO BREAK UP THE SHOW, SEVERAL HUNDRED MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS PELTED THE STAGE WITH STONES AND CHASED AWAY THE PERFORMERS AND PDI-SURYADI FACTION OFFICIALS. (SOME PRESS ACCOUNTS NUMBER THE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS AS HIGH AS 5000.) THE AREA WAS RANSACKED. MILITARY SECURITY RUSHED IN AFTER THE INCIDENT WAS OVER. THERE WERE MINOR INJURIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. (U) SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, SURABAYA'S PDI-SURYADI FACTION ELECTION COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN DECLARED THAT PDI SURABAYA WOULD NO LONGER BE CAMPAIGNING IN SURABAYA, SINCE SECURITY WAS INADEQUATE AND THE PDI WAS FACING PROSPECTS OF CONTINUOUS CLASHES WITH MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS. HE NOTED THAT PDI SURABAYA WOULD STILL TAKE PART IN THE ELECTION, BUT CAMPAIGNING WAS OUT. HE WAS SUPPORTED BY THE VICE PDI CHAIRMAN FOR EAST JAVA. SURABAYA'S MILITARY COMMANDER UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIED TO CONVINCE HIM TO RESTART THE DAY'S EVENT AND STAY IN THE CAMPAIGN.

5. (U) NOWHERE ELSE IN CENTRAL AND EAST JAVA WERE THERE CLASHES AS VIOLENT AS IN SURABAYA, ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THE PDI SHOW IN NEARBY SIDOARJO WAS STRONGLY HECKLED, AND SECURITY WAS TIGHT AT OTHER PDI RALLIES. SEVERAL PDI-SURYADI EVENTS WERE REPORTEDLY CANCELED THROUGHOUT EAST JAVA (JEMBER, SAMPANG, SITUBONDO, AND BOJONEGORO) AND MANY IN YOGYAKARTA. OTHERS WERE ATTENDED BY CROWDS OF UP TO A FEW HUNDRED, USUALLY WITH HEAVY SECURITY. IN NGANDJUK, REPORTEDLY THE NUMBER OF SECURITY PERSONNEL WAS DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF ON-LOOKERS, WHO AMOUNTED TO 100.

6. (C) (COMMENT) MORALE WITHIN PRO-SURYADI PDI RANKS HAS NEVER BEEN HIGH IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA. MANY CHAPTERS ARE PLAGUED BY A LACK OF FINANCES AND INTERNAL REVOLT BY THOSE WHO MAINTAIN VARYING DEGREES OF LOYALTY TO MEGAWATI. PDI OFFICIALS' FUMBLING ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE HAVE BEEN AGGRAVATED BY THE PERSISTENT SPECTER OF VIOLENT DISRUPTION AND THE CHALLENGES IN THE COURTS DIRECTED AGAINST THEM BY MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS. THE EAST JAVA PDI WAS FURTHER DISHEARTENED EARLIER THIS MONTH WHEN ONE OF ITS VERY FEW PRO-SURYADI LEADERS WITH A STRONG PERSONAL FOLLOWING DIED ON HAJJ. IF SURABAYA PDI GETS OUT OF THE CAMPAIGN, OTHERS WILL LIKELY FOLLOW SUIT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

7. (C) (FURTHER COMMENT) SINCE BOTH MINORITY PARTIES ARE AN ESSENTIAL COSMETIC FOR A SUCCESSFUL ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND THE GOVERNMENT WISHES TO SHOW THAT PRO-SURYADI PDI IS THE LEGITIMATE PDI REPRESENTATION, WE SUSPECT THAT PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY WILL PRESS STRONGLY FOR PDI SURABAYA TO RECONSIDER ITS DECISION. MOREOVER, PROVINCIAL MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN THE RUN-UP TO THE CAMPAIGN HAD MADE MUCH ABOUT THEIR INTENT TO KEEP ORDER AND DEAL HARSHLY WITH CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE. THIS INCIDENT AND THE PDI ACCUSATION OF A SECURITY LAPSE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY EMBARRASSING AND WILL DEEPEN THE MILITARY'S RESOLVE TO KEEP THE PDI IN THE CAMPAIGN AND REACT STRONGLY IF FURTHER VIOLENCE ERUPTS. WHETHER THE PDI STAYS IN OR GETS OUT, THE PARTY APPEARS WEAKER THAN EVER. MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS UNDOUBTEDLY WILL RECEIVE A MAJOR BOOST AND CONTINUE TO MAKE THEIR PRESENCE LOUDLY OBVIOUS.
PIERCE/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3861

PAGE 01 STATE 169126 142139Z
ORIGIN INR-00

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	INL-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01
	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	IO-00
	L-01	MCO-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OIG-04	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00
	DRL-09	G-00	/029R				

169126
SOURCE: KODAKC.140249
DRAFTED BY: INR/EAP/SEA: JBIRD : BJ
APPROVED BY: INR/EAP/NA: RCARLIN
EAP:AARVIZU AIT:JWOOD
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
USTR, NSC, NSA, CIA, DIA, DOD/ISA/AP, EAP/PIA, EAP/K, EAP/EP
----------59847F 142140Z /38
R 142138Z AUG 96
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
AIT TAIPEI 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USCINCPAC HONOLULU
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 169126 142139Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 169126

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 13 AUG 2016
DATE/CASE ID: 14 SEP 2006 200503235

USTR FOR SANDS/LEHR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/06
TAGS: ID, PINR, PGOV, PREL
SUBJECT: // INR VIEWPOINT // INDONESIA: DEMOCRACY TESTED (96-15, 8-13-96)

DOD/ISA/AP FOR ELKENBERRY, NSC FOR KRISTOFF/SUETTINGER, NSA FOR LANDIS, DIA FOR NIXON, LONDON FOR HALL

THE FOLLOWING INR VIEWPOINT WAS PRODUCED BY THE OFFICE OF EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC ANALYSIS AND IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COMMENT.

1. CLASSIFIED BY ROBERT CARLIN, DIVISION CHIEF INR/EAP/NA. REASON: 1.5 (D)

2. (C) THE STREETS ARE QUIET IN JAKARTA, BUT THE JULY 27-28 RIOT HAS SET ALARM BELLS RINGING THROUGHOUT INDONESIA. ELITES WHO ARE FRUSTRATED BY THE REGIME'S POLITICAL INEPTNESS IN THIS LATEST EPISODE AND SYMPATHETIC TO THE CALL FOR CHANGE HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN STABILITY. THEY HAVE BEEN REMINDED VIVIDLY OF THE VOLATILITY OF LARGE YOUTHFUL, URBAN POPULATIONS AND THE DANGER THAT PROTESTS CAN SPIN OUT OF CONTROL. AS THE REGIME CALCULATES HOW BEST TO ISOLATE THE EXTREMISTS AND RESTORE CONFIDENCE, WE ARE LIKELY TO SEE DISAGREEMENTS INTENSIFY

WITHIN THE MILITARY OVER TACTICS. SOME MAY QUESTION THE UTILITY OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO STAYING ON.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. (U) COMMUNIST" NGOS. THE ARMY HAS IDENTIFIED THE PARTAL RAKYAT DEMOKRATIK (PRD) AS BEHIND THE VIOLENCE, CITING A JUNE MANIFESTO "CHAMPIONING THE PLIGHT OF WORKERS, FARMERS AND THE OPPRESSED, LEADING PEOPLE'S POWER IN A POLITICAL REVOLUTION" TO LINK THE PRD TO THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE 1960S. ON AUGUST 12, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT ITS LEADER, 27-YEAR OLD BUDIMAN

SUDJATMIKO, HAD BEEN TRACKED DOWN AND ARRESTED WITH FOUR OTHER PRD MEMBERS.

4. (C) FOUNDED IN 1994 AS A LOOSE GROUPING OF YOUNG RADICALS AFFILIATED WITH VARIOUS NGO ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, LABOR, AND ETHNIC PROBLEMS, PRD APPARENTLY SHIFTED ITS FOCUS IN EARLY 1996 TO MORE ACTIVE OPPOSITION. IT HAS SPONSORED NUMEROUS PRO-REFORM, PRO-DEMOCRACY ACTIVITIES SUCH AS LABOR STRIKES, LAND REFORM DEMONSTRATIONS, AND SYMPATHY DRIVES FOR IRIANESE AND EAST TIMORESE MINORITIES. SOME OF ITS MEMBERS ARE ALREADY IN JAIL FOR LABOR/STUDENT STRIKES. ONE OBSERVER DESCRIBES THE PRD YOUTH AS "FULL OF 70S RHETORIC, VERY POPULIST, KNOWN FOR GOING DOWN TO RURAL VILLAGES, LIVING AMONG THE PEOPLE. THEY ALL HATE THE ARMY; THEY ALL KNOW HOW TO USE THE INTERNET AND LINK UP WITH AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL." A NUMBER OF THE ORGANIZATIONS LINKED TO THE PRD RECEIVE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING US PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENTAL AID.

5. (C) THE GOVERNMENT'S TARRING OF THE PRD WITH THE COMMUNIST BRUSH EVOKES UNPLEASANT MEMORIES AMONG ELITES AND PEASANTRY ALIKE OF THE MASSIVE ANTI-COMMUNIST

KILLINGS IN THE MID-1960S. ALTHOUGH THERE IS GROWING PRESSURE THROUGHOUT INDONESIA FOR MORE OPENNESS, THE PRD APPEARS TO HAVE A RELATIVELY SMALL FOLLOWING DOMESTICALLY. THE GROUP, WITH ITS "QUAINT MARXIST TRAPPINGS", AS ONE HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVER NOTED, WAS NOT AN ORGANIZATION ABLE ON ITS OWN TO GALVANIZE OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME. MANY OF ITS 100-ODD MEMBERS HAVE GONE UNDERGROUND. ON AUGUST 7, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID THAT THE PRD "COMMITTED ACTIVITIES WITH THE CHARACTER OF TREASON", AND THE NEXT DAY A TRAVEL BAN WAS ANNOUNCED FOR FIVE MEMBERS.

6. (C) CRACKDOWN. IN ADDITION TO THE NATIONWIDE DRAGNET ON PRD, THE RGIME HAS STEPPED UP EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE "TROUBLEMAKERS" BEFORE NEXT YEAR' S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, ESPECIALLY THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH NGOS OR

SUPPORTIVE OF THE MEGAWATT FACTION OF THE PDI. B1

7. (C) PDI SYMPATHIES. THE GOVERNMENT'S [redacted] B1
ORCHESTRATION OF THE PDI SPLIT AND USE OF FORCE TO OUST

CONFIDENTIAL

THE TRADITIONAL MEMBERS FROM THEIR HEADQUARTERS - THE PRECIPITATING EVENT FOR THE RIOT - HAVE BACKFIRED. DOMESTIC PRESS FLASHED PICTURES OF THE DISTURBANCES THROUGHOUT THE OUTER ISLANDS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS HAD A FIELD DAY LAMBASTING THE SOEHARTO REGIME. BY THE NEXT WEEK THE FOCUS HAD SHIFTED FROM THE STREET TO THE COURT, AS THE REGIME SOUGHT TO JUSTIFY ITS PREEMPTIVE ACTIONS. MEGAWATT WAS SUMMONED BEFORE JAKARTA POLICE HEADQUARTERS FOR A SIX-HOUR INTERROGATION ON AUGUST 9 AND HAS PROMISED TO RETURN AUGUST 15. AT THE SAME TIME, SHE HAS RESOLVED TO PLEAD HER CASE THROUGH LEGAL CHANNELS IN A SUIT AGAINST HER OUSTER FROM THE PDI, WITH THE FIRST SESSION RESCHEDULED TO AUGUST 22. HER CAUTIOUS AND NON CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH HAS WIDENED SYMPATHY FOR HER, BUT IT HAS NOT YET REACHED THE STATUS OF A "PEOPLE POWER" MOVEMENT.

8. (C) THE REAL PROBLEM. EVEN IF THE GOVERNMENT SHOWS RESTRAINT, THE PDI ADOPTS LEGAL OR NON-CONFRONTATIONAL TACTICS, AND THE PRD REMAINS SUBTERRANEAN, INDONESIA WOULD NOT BE ANY CLOSER TO RESOLVING THE SUCCESSION ISSUE. MORE AND MORE INDIVIDUALS ARE PUBLICLY SAYING THAT IT IS TIME FOR A CHANGE, AND THE PRIVATE CRITICISM ABOUT SOEHARTO IS UNANIMOUS THAT HE STEP DOWN.

9. (C) SOEHARTO'S ACTIONS THUS FAR SUGGEST A DEFIANT,

TOUGH POSTURE IS LIKELY. IF SO, ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES IMPOSED BEFORE EVERY ELECTION ARE LIKELY TO BE INTENSIFIED, INCLUDING BANS ON DEMONSTRATIONS. THE REGIME WILL USE THE PRD'S LEFTIST MANIFESTO TO JUSTIFY CLOSING DOWN "AFFILIATED" NGOS OR SEVERELY RESTRICTING

THEIR OPERATIONS. PRESSURE COULD BE EXERTED ON THE LEGAL AID FOUNDATION (LBH), WHICH THE US HAS SUPPORTED FOR YEARS.

B1

THE POSSIBILITIES FOR CONFRONTATION WILL REMAIN HIGH, WITH THE RISK OF AN INCIDENT OF POLICE BRUTALITY PLAYING ON THE EVENING NEWS.

10. (C) DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE MILITARY ELITE OVER TACTICS WILL PROBABLY INTENSIFY, AS DIEHARD BACKERS OF SOEHARTO MEET INCREASING CRITICISM. THE INNER CIRCLE, ALREADY FILLED WITH INDIVIDUALS OF NARROW INTERESTS AND PEEVISH TEMPERAMENTS, COULD ABSORB EVEN MORE OF SOEHARTO'S ATTENTION AND LEAD TO A QUARRELSOME AND INEFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP. HOW TO AVOID THIS SCENARIO IS THE CHALLENGE FACING THE MILITARY LEADERS WHO ULTIMATELY WILL DETERMINE THE PACE OF THE TRANSITION, AND TRY TO KEEP IT AN ORDERLY ONE. (JBIRD) (CONFIDENTIAL)
TARNOFF

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4388

PAGE 01 JAKART 06608 01 OF 02 110955Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	JUSE-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/028W					

----------633DF6 110955Z /38

R 110956Z SEP 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
SECSTATE WASHDC 2440
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 006608

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: THE INDONESIAN ELECTION PROCESS: A MERE FORMALITY [redacted] B1

REF: JAKARTA 05385

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ADCM ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: [redacted] B1 DISMISSED THE UPCOMING ELECTION FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AS A MERE "FORMALITY," WITH GOLKAR'S VICTORY A FOREGONE CONCLUSION,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 06 SEP 2006 200503235

DURING A SEPTEMBER 9 MEETING WITH POLOFF. HE CITED RECENT PROPOSALS TO LIMIT MASS CAMPAIGNING, IN ADDITION TO THE PRACTICE OF SCREENING HOUSE CANDIDATES BY THE GOVERNMENT, AS EXAMPLES OF A SYSTEM HEAVILY SLANTED TOWARD RULING PARTY GOLKAR. HE BELIEVED STRONGLY IN THE NEED FOR FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL CHANGE, BUT DID NOT THINK IT COULD OCCUR UNTIL AFTER PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION, AND DID NOT WANT TO WASTE TIME STRUGGLING FOR IT UNTIL THAT FUTURE DATE. HOWEVER, HE WAS APPRECIATIVE OF MEGAWATI'S EFFORTS AND EXPRESSED PRIVATE SYMPATHY FOR HER. END SUMMARY.

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS A MERE FORMALITY

[redacted] B1

AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE SLANTED SYSTEM, HE CITED GOLKAR AND PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S RECENT TALK OF CHANGING CAMPAIGN LAWS TO LIMIT, OR EVEN BAN, MASS RALLIES DURING THE RUN UP TO THE ELECTION.

4. (C) GOLKAR HAD DISCUSSED THIS PROPOSAL TO LIMIT MASS CAMPAIGNING AS EARLY AS LAST OCTOBER. HOWEVER, THE ISSUE RECEIVED FRESH ATTENTION OVER THE PAST WEEK WHEN PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SIGNALLED PUBLICLY THAT DURING THE CAMPAIGN THE PARTIES SHOULD "TRY NOT TO STRESS MASS POWER, BUT AIM MORE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR PROGRAM PROPOSALS AND THESE CAN BE DONE INDOORS." THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PPP, ISMAIL HASAN METAREUM, PUBLICLY OBJECTED TO THIS PROPOSAL, ARGUING THAT "THE BUILDUP OF MASSES CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BE STOPPED." [redacted] EXPLAINED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS AN ATTEMPT BY GOLKAR TO SHUT DOWN CAMPAIGNING. THIS COULD ONLY BENEFIT GOLKAR, HE SAID, WITH ITS ALREADY EXISTING OVERWHELMING MAJORITY, BY MAKING IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR PPP AND PDI TO CARRY OUT B1

CAMPAIGNS THAT HAD ANY CHANCE OF ATTRACTING INCREASED SUPPORT.

5. (C) ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, [redacted] IS THE SCREENING OF LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATES BY THE GOVERNMENT. OSTENSIBLY, THIS IS INTENDED TO ELIMINATE CANDIDATES WITH PAST LINKS TO THE OUTLAWED INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI). HOWEVER, [redacted] ARGUED THAT IT IS ALSO A TOOL USED IN AN ATTEMPT TO ELIMINATE CANDIDATES WHO MIGHT BE CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT. B1 B1

FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL CHANGE MUST OCCUR, BUT POST SOEHARTO

6. (C) MAKING CLEAR HIS DISGUST WITH THE FEEBLENESS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM, [redacted] WAS ADAMANT THAT THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN INDONESIA MUST BE FUNDAMENTALLY RESTRUCTURED. HOWEVER, HE WAS CAREFUL TO HEDGE AND SAY THAT THIS CHANGE COULD ONLY OCCUR AFTER SOEHARTO LEFT OFFICE AND A NEW PRESIDENT TOOK POWER. B1

7. (C) DRAWING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN HIS APPROACH TO

REFORM AND THAT OF THE PRO-MEGAWATI PEOPLE, HE SAID THAT HE AND HIS FRIENDS WERE CONSERVING THEIR ENERGY NOW AS THEY LOOKED TOWARD THE FUTURE, AND NOT WASTING THEIR TIME STRUGGLING AGAINST AN IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION. WHILE SPEAKING ADMIRINGLY OF MEGAWATI AND HER SUPPORTERS, HE SAID HE DID NOT THINK THEY HAD "STAYING POWER."

8. (C) [redacted] ACKNOWLEDGED THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT SIMPLY CHANGING PRESIDENTS AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE WOULD IN NO WAY INSURE A TRANSFORMATION OF THE SYSTEM. HE THOUGHT THAT CHANGE WOULD BE DETERMINED BY BARGAINING BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POWER HOLDERS, WHICH HE BROADLY IMPLIED WAS BEGINNING EVEN NOW (NOTE: WITHOUT OFFERING ANY SPECIFICS. END NOTE.). [redacted] B1 B1

B1

A NEW "DEMOCRACY" PARTY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4390

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4390

PAGE 01 JAKART 06608 02 OF 02 110955Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	JUSE-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/028W					

----------633DFA 110955Z /38

R 110956Z SEP 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
SECSTATE WASHDC 2441
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 006608

E.O. 12958:. DECL: 09/11/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: THE INDONESIAN ELECTION PROCESS: A MERE
FORMALITY [redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7630

PAGE 01 JAKART 03222 01 OF 02 041005Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	FDIC-01	/042W	

------------------C1D8CB 042135Z /38

P 021036Z JUN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6074
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003222

C O R R E C T E D COPY (PARA.10 MIS-NUMBERED)

NEW DELHI FOR HARTWICK

USCINPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03222 01 OF 02 041005Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 SEP 2006 200503235

SUBJECT: LATEST NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS

REF: A) JAKARTA 3193; B)JAKARTA 3188; C) JAKARTA 3154

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE VOTE COUNTS ARE COMPLETE IN MOST OF INDONESIA, AND GOLKAR CONTINUES TO HOLD A MASSIVE LEAD (74.27 PERCENT), LEAVING THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY VIRTUALLY A NON-ENTITY (3.07 PERCENT). THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (22.6 PERCENT) HAS CALLED FOR A REPEAT OF THE VOTE IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY DUE TO ALLEGED ELECTORAL FRAUD, AND SO FAR THE GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO DO SO IN PARTS OF MADURA, EAST JAVA. AN ASIAN ELECTION MONITORING GROUP HAS JOINED THE INDONESIAN INDEPENDENT MONITORING GROUP IN SUPPORT OF ALLEGATIONS OF VOTE FRAUD. PRESIDENT SUHARTO CLAIMED PUBLICLY ON MAY 30 THAT A SMALL GROUP WHICH "CHAMPIONED DEMOCRACY" HAD TRIED TO MAKE THE ELECTION FAIL. WE ARE TOLD THAT MEGAWATI WILL MAKE A CAUTIOUSLY WORDED STATEMENT ABOUT THE ELECTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. EMBASSY'S ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL. END SUMMARY

3. (U) THE INDONESIAN ELECTION INSTITUTE (LPU) HAS INFORMED THE EMBASSY THAT THE VOTE COUNT IS COMPLETE IN 24 OF INDONESIA'S 27 PROVINCES. JAKARTA, IRIAN JAYA, AND EAST JAVA ARE STILL IN PROCESS. OVERALL RESULTS WILL NOT BE FINALIZED UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF JUNE.

4. (U) ACCORDING TO THE LATEST PROVISIONAL RESULTS (AS OF

JUNE 1, PUBLISHED IN INDONESIAN DAILY KOMPAS AND OTHER MAJOR NEWSPAPERS ON JUNE 2), GOLKAR WON 74.27 PERCENT, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) 22.6 PERCENT, AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) JUST 3.07 PERCENT (SEE PARA. 11). THIS COMPARES TO 68.1 PERCENT, 17 PERCENT, AND 14.9 PERCENT IN 1992 FOR THE PARTIES, RESPECTIVELY. GOLKAR'S MARGIN OF VICTORY IS WELL OVER THE TARGET OF 70.02 PERCENT THAT IT HAD SET FOR THIS ELECTION. ACCORDING TO AN ESTIMATE IN KOMPAS, GOLKAR WILL LIKELY

HAVE 325 SEATS IN PARLIAMENT (UP FROM 282), PPP 90 SEATS (UP FROM 62), AND PDI 10 SEATS (DOWN FROM 56).

5. (U) IT WAS ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY THAT THE ELECTION WOULD BE REPEATED IN SAMPANG AND PAMEKASAN, WHICH ARE AREAS LOCATED IN MADURA, EAST JAVA, WHERE UNREST, DUE TO SUSPICION OF VOTE FRAUD, HAD OCCURRED ON ELECTION DAY (REFTEL B). OFFICIALS CLAIMED THAT THIS WAS BEING PERMITTED BECAUSE BALLOT BOXES IN THOSE AREAS HAD BEEN BURNED OR BECAUSE UNREST HAD PREVENTED CITIZENS FROM CASTING THEIR VOTES. PPP OFFICIALS ALSO CALLED FOR A RE-VOTE IN THREE DISTRICTS IN SOUTH SULAWESI (GOWA, SIDRAP, POLMAS), THE DISTRICT OF JEMBER IN EAST JAVA, AND DISTRICTS IN WEST SUMATRA, WHERE IT BELIEVED THAT WIDE-SPREAD VOTE-FRAUD HAD OCCURRED.

6. (U) PRESIDENT SUHARTO WAS QUOTED IN KOMPAS ON MAY 31 AS SAYING PUBLICLY THAT: "THERE WERE INDEED EFFORTS TO MAKE ALL THIS FAIL, BY A SMALL GROUP WHICH CHAMPIONED DEMOCRACY, BUT TURNED OUT IN FACT TO SHOW BEHAVIOR THAT WAS NOT DEMOCRATIC. BECAUSE IT WAS A SMALL GROUP, IT THEN WANTED TO FORCE ITS WISHES ON THE MAJORITY. TRULY IN THE

FINAL INSTANCE IT IS THE PEOPLE WHO CAN EVALUATE WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS NOT. THEY HOPED THAT THE GENERAL ELECTIONS WOULD NOT RUN, FAIL OR AT LEAST BE TAINTED, THAT IS WHY THEY DISTURBED IT AND THE LIKE. BUT, THANKS BE, EVERYTHING WENT WELL. EXCEPT IN SOME PLACES WHICH THEY DID ON PURPOSE."

7. (C) A MEGAWATI ADVISER HAS INFORMED EMBOFFS THAT SHE WILL LIKELY MAKE A CAUTIOUSLY WORDED STATEMENT ON THE ELECTION BEFORE JUNE 10. THE ADVISER SAID THAT THE LOW VOTE FOR THE PDI WAS POSITIVE FOR MEGAWATI AS IT DEMONSTRATED THE EXTENT OF UNPOPULARITY OF THE GOVERNMENT INSTALLED PDI CHAIRMAN SURYADI.

8. (U) THE PPP ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON MAY 30 THAT, BASED ON REPORTS FROM ITS BRANCHES THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, IT HAD CONCLUDED THAT WIDESPREAD ELECTION VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED. IT WILL HOLD A LEADERS MEETING

ON JUNE 5 TO DECIDE WHAT FURTHER STEPS TO TAKE, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF REJECTING THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION. SUPPORTING CLAIMS OF VOTE FRAUD, AN ASIAN GROUP OF MONITORS, THE "ASIAN FORUM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT," IN A STATEMENT MAY 31, SPOKE OF "GLARING IRREGULARITIES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS" AND THE ABSENCE OF TRANSPARENCY IN THE CANVASSING AND THE FINAL COUNTING OF VOTES." (NOTE: THE MONITORS WERE FROM THE PHILIPPINES, THAILAND AND CAMBODIA. SRI LANKAN MEMBERS WERE DENIED VISAS. END NOTE)

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ2344

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2344

PAGE 01 JAKART 03222 02 OF 02 060445Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	FDIC-01	/042W	

----------C26B68 060448Z /38

P 021036Z JUN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6075
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003222

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - TEXT

NEW DELHI FOR HARTWICK
USCINPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: LATEST NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

9. (U) IN JAKARTA, WHERE THERE HAD BEEN A STRONG SHOW OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR PPP DURING THE CAMPAIGN, GOLKAR WON 59.19 PERCENT, PPP 38.85 PERCENT AND PDI 1.96 PERCENT (ACCORDING TO PROVISIONAL BASED ON 73.57 PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS). HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO A VOTE BREAK-OUT PUBLISHED IN THE JAKARTA POST JUNE 2, PPP WAS NARROWLY OUTPACING GOLKAR IN ONE AREA OF THE CITY, SOUTH JAKARTA, WITH A TOTAL OF 49.3 PERCENT, COMPARED TO GOLKAR'S 49 PERCENT.

10. (U) THE FOLLOWING ARE THE LATEST PROVISIONAL ELECTION RESULTS (JUNE 1), SEPARATED OUT BY PROVINCE (SOURCE: INDONESIAN ELECTION INSTITUTE, PRINTED IN KOMPAS):

	GOLKAR	PPP	PDI
1. ACEH	64.33	32.27	3.40
2. N. SUMATRA	81.20	12.97	5.83
3. W. SUMATRA	91.41	7.49	1.10
4. RIAU	82.33	13.89	3.78
5. JAMBI	92.43	6.00	1.57
6. S. SUMATRA	84.74	11.44	3.82

7. BENGKULU	94.84	3.73	1.43

8. LAMPUNG	93.14	4.88	1.98
9. JAKARTA	59.19	38.85	1.96
10. W. JAVA	72.11	26.17	1.72
11. C. JAVA	68.27	28.99	2.74
12. YOGYAKARTA	62.54	34.23	3.23
13. E. JAVA	63.06	33.75	3.18
14. W. KALIMANTAN	69.69	15.15	15.16
15. C. KALIMANTAN	86.29	10.32	3.40
16. E. KALIMANTAN	69.60	23.94	6.46
17. S. KALIMANTAN	71.21	25.86	2.93
18. BALI	93.12	3.31	3.57
19. W. NUSA TENG.	80.40	14.74	4.85
20. E. NUSA TENG.	94.86	1.54	3.60
21. E. TIMOR	83.93	2.18	13.89
22. S. SULAWESI	91.6	7.37	1.03
23. C. SULAWESI	84.79	10.43	4.78

UNCLASSIFIED

24. N. SULAWESI	95.48	2.63	1.89
25. SE. SULAWESI	97.08	2.11	0.81
26. MALUKU	82.30	12.81	4.89
27. IRIAN JAYA	88.93	3.55	7.52
TOTAL	74.27	22.66	3.07

HARVEY

NNNN
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>
PTQ8565

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8565

PAGE 01 JAKART 03222 01 OF 02 021036Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10
	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	FDIC-01	/041W		

----------C0A5F8 021037Z /38

P 021036Z JUN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6074
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003222

NEW DELHI FOR HARTWICK
USCINPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: LATEST NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS

REF: A) JAKARTA 3193; B)JAKARTA 3188; C) JAKARTA 3154

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03222 01 OF 02 021036Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE VOTE COUNTS ARE COMPLETE IN MOST OF

INDONESIA, AND GOLKAR CONTINUES TO HOLD A MASSIVE LEAD (74.27 PERCENT), LEAVING THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY VIRTUALLY A NON-ENTITY (3.07 PERCENT). THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (22.6 PERCENT) HAS CALLED FOR A REPEAT OF THE VOTE IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY DUE TO ALLEGED ELECTORAL FRAUD, AND SO FAR THE GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO DO SO IN PARTS OF MADURA, EAST JAVA. AN ASIAN ELECTION MONITORING GROUP HAS JOINED THE INDONESIAN INDEPENDENT MONITORING GROUP IN SUPPORT OF ALLEGATIONS OF VOTE FRAUD. PRESIDENT SUHARTO CLAIMED PUBLICLY ON MAY 30 THAT A SMALL GROUP WHICH "CHAMPIONED DEMOCRACY" HAD TRIED TO MAKE THE ELECTION FAIL. WE ARE TOLD THAT MEGAWATI WILL MAKE A CAUTIOUSLY WORDED STATEMENT ABOUT THE ELECTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. EMBASSY'S ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL. END SUMMARY

3. (U) THE INDONESIAN ELECTION INSTITUTE (LPU) HAS INFORMED THE EMBASSY THAT THE VOTE COUNT IS COMPLETE IN 24 OF INDONESIA'S 27 PROVINCES. JAKARTA, IRIAN JAYA, AND EAST JAVA ARE STILL IN PROCESS. OVERALL RESULTS WILL NOT BE FINALIZED UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF JUNE.

4. (U) ACCORDING TO THE LATEST PROVISIONAL RESULTS (AS OF JUNE 1, PUBLISHED IN INDONESIAN DAILY KOMPAS AND OTHER MAJOR NEWSPAPERS ON JUNE 2), GOLKAR WON 74.27 PERCENT, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) 22.6 PERCENT, AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) JUST 3.07 PERCENT (SEE

PARA. 11). THIS COMPARES TO 68.1 PERCENT, 17 PERCENT, AND 14.9 PERCENT IN 1992 FOR THE PARTIES, RESPECTIVELY. GOLKAR'S MARGIN OF VICTORY IS WELL OVER THE TARGET OF 70.02 PERCENT THAT IT HAD SET FOR THIS ELECTION. ACCORDING TO AN ESTIMATE IN KOMPAS, GOLKAR WILL LIKELY HAVE 325 SEATS IN PARLIAMENT (UP FROM 282), PPP 90 SEATS (UP FROM 62), AND PDI 10 SEATS (DOWN FROM 56).

5. (U) IT WAS ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY THAT THE ELECTION WOULD BE REPEATED IN SAMPANG AND PAMEKASAN, WHICH ARE AREAS LOCATED IN MADURA, EAST JAVA, WHERE UNREST, DUE TO SUSPICION OF VOTE FRAUD, HAD OCCURRED ON ELECTION DAY (REFTEL B). OFFICIALS CLAIMED THAT THIS WAS BEING

PERMITTED BECAUSE BALLOT BOXES IN THOSE AREAS HAD BEEN BURNED OR BECAUSE UNREST HAD PREVENTED CITIZENS FROM CASTING THEIR VOTES. PPP OFFICIALS ALSO CALLED FOR A RE-VOTE IN THREE DISTRICTS IN SOUTH SULAWESI (GOWA, SIDRAP, POLMAS), THE DISTRICT OF JEMBER IN EAST JAVA, AND DISTRICTS IN WEST SUMATRA, WHERE IT BELIEVED THAT WIDE-SPREAD VOTE-FRAUD HAD OCCURRED.

6. (U) PRESIDENT SUHARTO WAS QUOTED IN KOMPAS ON MAY 31 AS SAYING PUBLICLY THAT: "THERE WERE INDEED EFFORTS TO MAKE ALL THIS FAIL, BY A SMALL GROUP WHICH CHAMPIONED DEMOCRACY, BUT TURNED OUT IN FACT TO SHOW BEHAVIOR THAT WAS NOT DEMOCRATIC. BECAUSE IT WAS A SMALL GROUP, IT THEN WANTED TO FORCE ITS WISHES ON THE MAJORITY. TRULY IN THE FINAL INSTANCE IT IS THE PEOPLE WHO CAN EVALUATE WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS NOT. THEY HOPED THAT THE GENERAL ELECTIONS WOULD NOT RUN, FAIL OR AT LEAST BE TAINTED, THAT IS WHY THEY DISTURBED IT AND THE LIKE. BUT, THANKS BE,

EVERYTHING WENT WELL. EXCEPT IN SOME PLACES WHICH THEY DID ON PURPOSE."

7. (C) A MEGAWATI ADVISER HAS INFORMED EMBOFFS THAT SHE WILL LIKELY MAKE A CAUTIOUSLY WORDED STATEMENT ON THE ELECTION BEFORE JUNE 10. THE ADVISER SAID THAT THE LOW VOTE FOR THE PDI WAS POSITIVE FOR MEGAWATI AS IT DEMONSTRATED THE EXTENT OF UNPOPULARITY OF THE GOVERNMENT INSTALLED PDI CHAIRMAN SURYADI.

8. (U) THE PPP ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON MAY 30 THAT, BASED ON REPORTS FROM ITS BRANCHES THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, IT HAD CONCLUDED THAT WIDESPREAD ELECTION VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED. IT WILL HOLD A LEADERS MEETING ON JUNE 5 TO DECIDE WHAT FURTHER STEPS TO TAKE, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF REJECTING THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION. SUPPORTING CLAIMS OF VOTE FRAUD, AN ASIAN GROUP OF MONITORS, THE "ASIAN FORUM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT," IN A STATEMENT MAY 31, SPOKE OF "GLARING IRREGULARITIES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS" AND THE ABSENCE OF TRANSPARENCY IN THE CANVASSING AND THE FINAL COUNTING OF VOTES." (NOTE: THE MONITORS WERE FROM THE PHILIPPINES,

THAILAND AND CAMBODIA. SRI LANKAN MEMBERS WERE DENIED VISAS. END NOTE)

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8566

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8566

PAGE 01 JAKART 03222 02 OF 02 021037Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10
	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	FDIC-01	/041W		

----------C0A5FA 021037Z /38

P 021036Z JUN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6075
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003222

NEW DELHI FOR HARTWICK

USCINPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: LATEST NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS

9. (U) IN JAKARTA, WHERE THERE HAD BEEN A STRONG SHOW OF
CONFIDENTIAL

POPULAR SUPPORT FOR PPP DURING THE CAMPAIGN, GOLKAR WON 59.19 PERCENT, PPP 38.85 PERCENT AND PDI 1.96 PERCENT (ACCORDING TO PROVISIONAL BASED ON 73.57 PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS). HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO A VOTE BREAK-OUT PUBLISHED IN THE JAKARTA POST JUNE 2, PPP WAS NARROWLY OUTPACING GOLKAR IN ONE AREA OF THE CITY, SOUTH JAKARTA, WITH A TOTAL OF 49.3 PERCENT, COMPARED TO GOLKAR'S 49 PERCENT.

11. (U) THE FOLLOWING ARE THE LATEST PROVISIONAL ELECTION RESULTS (JUNE 1), SEPARATED OUT BY PROVINCE (SOURCE: INDONESIAN ELECTION INSTITUTE, PRINTED IN KOMPAS):

	GOLKAR	PPP	PDI
1. ACEH	64.33	32.27	3.40
2. N. SUMATRA	81.20	12.97	5.83
3. W. SUMATRA	91.41	7.49	1.10
4. RIAU	82.33	13.89	3.78
5. JAMBI	92.43	6.00	1.57
6. S. SUMATRA	84.74	11.44	3.82
7. BENGKULU	94.84	3.73	1.43
8. LAMPUNG	93.14	4.88	1.98

UNCLASSIFIED

9. JAKARTA	59.19	38.85	1.96
10. W. JAVA	72.11	26.17	1.72
11. C. JAVA	68.27	28.99	2.74
12. YOGYAKARTA	62.54	34.23	3.23
13. E. JAVA	63.06	33.75	3.18
14. W. KALIMANTAN	69.69	15.15	15.16
15. C. KALIMANTAN	86.29	10.32	3.40
16. E. KALIMANTAN	69.60	23.94	6.46
17. S. KALIMANTAN	71.21	25.86	2.93
18. BALI	93.12	3.31	3.57
19. W. NUSA TENG.	80.40	14.74	4.85
20. E. NUSA TENG.	94.86	1.54	3.60
21. E. TIMOR	83.93	2.18	13.89
22. S. SULAWESI	91.6	7.37	1.03
23. C. SULAWESI	84.79	10.43	4.78

UNCLASSIFIED

24. N. SULAWESI	95.48	2.63	1.89
25. SE. SULAWESI	97.08	2.11	0.81
26. MALUKU	82.30	12.81	4.89
27. IRIAN JAYA	88.93	3.55	7.52
TOTAL	74.27	22.66	3.07

HARVEY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

E1

PTQ3094

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B1, 1.4(D)

SECRET PTQ3094

PAGE 01 STATE 122946 132217Z
ORIGIN INR-00

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	INL-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01
	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	IO-00	L-01	MCO-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	PRMC-01	DRL-09	G-00	/033R

122946
SOURCE: KODAKC.130389
DRAFTED BY: INR/EAP/SEA: LIBIRD : BJ
APPROVED BY: INR/EAP: PCAUSEY
EAP:AARVIZU AIT:JWOOD
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
USTR, NSC, NSA, CIA, DOD/ISA/AP, EAP/PIA, EAP/K, EAP/EP
----------43DD66 132218Z /20

DECAPTIONED

R 132140Z JUN 96
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
AIT TAIPEI 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
XMT AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
AMEMBASSY KOROR
AMCONSUL PERTH

SECRET

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 13 JUN 2016
DATE/CASE ID: 14 SEP 2006 200503235

UNCLASSIFIED

NOFORN, USTR FOR SANDS/LEHR

E.O. 12958 DECL: 6/11/06 1.6X1
TAGS: ID, PINR, PGOV, PREL, SOCI
SUBJECT: // INR ASSESSMENT // - INDONESIA: PRE ELECTION PRESSURE (96-37, 6-13-96)

DOD/ISA/AP FOR EIKENBERRY, NSC FOR KRISTOFF/SUETTINGER, NSA FOR LANDIS, DIA FOR NIXON, CIA WASHDC, ROME PLEASE PASS TO EMBASSY VACATION, LONDON FOR HALL

THE FOLLOWING INR ASSESSMENT WAS PRODUCED BY THE OFFICE OF EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC ANALYSIS AND IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COMMENT.

1. CLASSIFIED BY PAULA CAUSEY, OFFICE DIRECTOR INR/EAP. REASON: 1.5 (D)

2. (C) GOVERNMENT EFFORTS AT UNDERMINING TWO OPPOSITION PARTIES RISK GIVING GREATER COHERENCE TO ANTI-REGIME SENTIMENT. INCREASING ACTIVITY BY STUDENTS, NGOS, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS MAY TEST THE PATIENCE OF THE SECURITY FORCES IN MAINTAINING ORDER.

3. (S/NF) NEXT SPRING ALMOST 120 MILLION INDONESIANS WILL GO TO THE POLLS TO ELECT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, WITH MORE

THAN 13 MILLION VOTING

FOR THE FIRST TIME. THE PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTIES PLUS SPECIAL APPOINTEES WILL MEET IN 1998 TO SELECT THE NEXT PRESIDENT, EXPECTED TO BE PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FOR A SEVENTH FIVE-YEAR TERM. SOEHARTO WANTS A LANDSLIDE VICTORY FOR GOLKAR, HIS GOVERNMENT PARTY, WITH NO LESS THAN 73OF THE VOTE. REPORTEDLY, IN 1987 GOLKAR WON BY

UNCLASSIFIED

A COMFORTABLE 73, THOUGH IT SLIPPED IN 1992 TO 68UNDER A RASH OF CRITICISM ABOUT THE AGING REGIME.

FOCUS ON THE PDI

4. (U) IN EARLY JUNE SEVERAL ARMY GENERALS CALLED IN LOCAL EDITORS TO DISCUSS THE PDI IN "MEDIA BRIEFINGS," A EUPHEMISM FOR INTIMIDATION SESSIONS. THE GENERALS REPORTEDLY WARNED THE PRESS ABOUT COVERAGE OF PDI CHAIRPERSON MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, DAUGHTER OF THE LATE PRESIDENT SOEKARNO, AND URGED POSITIVE REPORTING OF A MOVE BY PDI "DISSIDENTS" TO UNSEAT HER. THE GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN PERMISSION FOR THE DISSIDENTS, WHO CLAIM THEY REPRESENT A MAJORITY OF PDI CHAPTERS, TO HOLD AN EXTRAORDINARY NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS ON JUNE 20.

5. (C) IN A STATEMENT FOR THE FOREIGN PRESS RELEASED YESTERDAY, MEGAWATI SAID THE ARMED FORCES WERE ILLEGALLY INVOLVED IN THE OUSTER MOVE AND THAT THE PDI WOULD RECEIVE 80-85OF THE VOTE IN A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION. HER FOLLOWERS HAVE ANNOUNCED PLANS TO STAGE A LARGE RALLY IN JAKARTA IN HER SUPPORT IF THE CONGRESS IS HELD, BUT MEGAWATI CAREFULLY AVOIDED ENDORSING SUCH A RALLY IN HER STATEMENT.

6. (S/NF) THROUGHOUT HIS LONG CAREER, SOEHARTO HAS EFFECTIVELY SIDELINED WOULD-BE RIVALS. HE SEES MEGAWATI, WITH HER NAME RECOGNITION AND APPEAL TO A SOCIETY INCREASINGLY QUESTIONING HIS EXTENDED TENURE, AS A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE AND BELIEVES HE CAN MANIPULATE PARTY STRUCTURES TO HIS ADVANTAGE, AS HE DID IN THE MID-1970S.

WAR OF THE WOMEN

7. (S/NF) SOEHARTO'S [redacted] DAUGHTER TUTUT IS ON THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF GOLKAR WITH OVERSIGHT FOR EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA. HAVING MADE HER EXTENSIVE FORTUNE [redacted] SHE IS SEEN AS EAGER TO ASSUME MORE POLITICAL POWER, ENGAGING ON ISSUES

B6

B6

[redacted]

B1

8. (C) IN ADDITION TO CONCERNS ABOUT THE TWO OPPOSITION PARTIES, AUTHORITIES ARE NERVOUSLY WATCHING POTENTIAL WILD CARDS, INCLUDING DOZENS OF STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS, HUNDREDS OF ISSUE-ORIENTED NGOS, AND A NEWLY FOUNDED INDEPENDENT ELECTION WATCHDOG COMMITTEE CALLED KIPP. THESE GROUPS ARE LARGELY ELITIST AND MOST ARE NOT AFFILIATED WITH A PARTICULAR PARTY, BUT THEY APPEAR TO BE OVERWHELMINGLY CRITICAL OF THE REGIME AND HOSTILE TO GOLKAR.

SECRET

9. (C) THUS FAR THE GROUPS HAVE NOT FOUND A SINGLE ISSUE OR LEADER THAT CAN TURN GENERAL GRUMBLING ABOUT CORRUPTION OR FIRST-FAMILY EXCESS INTO A BROAD COALITION TO DENY SOEHARTO ANOTHER TERM. A CURRENT SPATE OF STUDENT ACTIVITY - IN SYMPATHY WITH STUDENTS KILLED DURING A RECENT ALTERCATION WITH SECURITY FORCES - HAS REVEALED A NETWORK OF STUDENT CONTACTS AND THE POTENTIAL VOLATILITY OF THIS LARGE POPULATION, BUT ALSO THE MILITARY'S SUCCESS IN KEEPING LARGE NUMBERS OFF THE STREETS.

10. (C) MEGAWATI MAY NOT BE THE CATALYST FOR A UNIFIED OPPOSITION, BUT SOME OF THE NEW GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS AND STUDENTS MIGHT JOIN FORCES IN HER DEFENSE IF SHE IS PUSHED OFF-STAGE TOO BLATANTLY. THEY MIGHT EVEN FIND SOME SUPPORT FROM THE RUAAL MASSES, WHO NORMALLY VOTE DUTIFULLY FOR GOLKAR. RATHER THAN UNDERMINING THE OPPOSITION, THE AUTHORITIES MAY FIND THEY HAVE CREATED A MARTYR WHO HELPS ANTI-REGIME SENTIMENT TO COALESCE. A STREAM OF RALLIES AND DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD TEST THE PATIENCE OF THE SECURITY FORCES, RAISE THE RISK OF INJURIES OR ABUSE, AND CONTRIBUTE TO STRAINS WITHIN THE RULING ELITE, INCLUDING THE ARMED FORCES, OVER HOW TO MANAGE THE ELECTION PERIOD AND, ULTIMATELY, THE

SUCCESSION. (JBIRD) (SECRET/NOFORN)
YY
CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

NNNN

PTQ0330

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0330

PAGE 01 JAKART 06766 01 OF 02 170919Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/027W

----------656C0C 170924Z /38

R 170918Z SEP 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECSTATE WASHDC 2552
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 006766

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: PARTIES SUBMIT LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATE LISTS; MEGAWATI TO SUE GOI OVER REJECTION OF HER LIST

REF: JAKARTA 06722

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ADCM ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: MEGAWATI AND HER SUPPORTERS WILL SUE THE GOI OVER ITS REJECTION ON SEPTEMBER 16 OF THEIR LIST OF LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATES FOR THE 1997 PARLIAMENTARY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

ELECTIONS, [redacted] B1

GOLKAR, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), AND THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED FACTION OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) SUBMITTED THEIR PRELIMINARY LISTS OF LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATES TO THE INDONESIAN ELECTION COMMITTEE ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 16. MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS IN THE PDI WAITED UNTIL LATER IN THE DAY TO SUBMIT THEIR CANDIDATE LIST, BUT, AS THEY EXPECTED, WERE REBUFFED AND THE LIST WAS NOT EVEN ACCEPTED FOR CONSIDERATION. ON A SEPARATE BUT RELATED ISSUE, THE ABRI CHIEF OF SOCIOPOLITICAL AFFAIRS, SYARWAN HAMID, STEPPED UP HIS CONDEMNATION OF THE OPENING OF MEGAWATI'S NEW HEADQUARTERS. HE WAS QUOTED SEPTEMBER 16 AS SAYING THAT ABRI WAS PREPARED TO "PUT IN ORDER" MEGAWATI'S NEW HEADQUARTERS, AND REITERATED HIS EARLIER STATEMENT THAT THE OFFICE'S EXISTENCE WAS ILLEGAL. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, [redacted] THAT LOCAL B1
COMMUNITY AUTHORITIES HAD RECENTLY OBJECTED TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE NEW PDI OFFICE. END SUMMARY.

THREE PARTIES SUBMIT LISTS AT GENERAL ELECTION INSTITUTE

3. (C) SEPTEMBER 16 WAS THE DEADLINE FOR THE THREE RECOGNIZED POLITICAL PARTIES TO SUBMIT THEIR PRELIMINARY CANDIDATE LISTS FOR THE UPCOMING 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION (NOTE: EACH LIST WILL THEN BE SCREENED BY THE GOI). THE CHAIRMEN OF THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED PARTIES,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HARMOKO (GOLKAR), ISMAIL HASAN METAREUM (PPP), AND SOERJADI (PDI) SUBMITTED THEIR LISTS TO THE INDONESIAN ELECTION COMMITTEE THAT MORNING AT A CEREMONY ATTENDED BY HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER YOGIE MEMET, DEFENSE MINISTER SUDRADJAT, ARMED FORCES COMMANDER FEISAL TANJUNG, AS WELL AS OTHER GOVERNMENT MINISTERS. GOLKAR AND PPP SUBMITTED 850 NAMES EACH (EACH ONE PROVIDING TWO CANDIDATES FOR THE 425 CONTESTED PARLIAMENT SEATS), AND PDI SUBMITTED 903

NAMES. SOERJADI'S LIST DID NOT INCLUDE MEGAWATI OR ANY OF HER CLOSE SUPPORTERS.

MEGAWATI'S LIST IS SUMMARILY REJECTED

4. (C) SIX PDI MEGAWATI MEMBERS, LED BY SOETARDJO SOERJOGOERITNO AND ALEXANDER LITAAY, WENT TO THE GENERAL ELECTION INSTITUTE LATER ON SEPTEMBER 16 AND ATTEMPTED TO SUBMIT THEIR ALTERNATIVE PDI LIST OF 750 NAMES. TWO LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS AT THE NATIONAL ELECTION INSTITUTE MET WITH THEM, BUT REFUSED TO ACCEPT THEIR LIST.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

PUT TO REST RUMORS THAT WELL-KNOWN DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS

SUCH AS ABDURRAHMAN WAHID AND ALI SADIKIN WERE ON MEGAWATI'S LIST,
SAYING THAT THEY WERE NOT.

GOVERNMENT STEPS UP PRESSURE ON NEW MEGAWATI HEADQUARTERS

6. (C) [redacted] MENTIONED THAT THE PRO-MEGAWATI PDI FACTION RECENTLY RECEIVED WORD, FROM THE LOCAL COMMUNITY HEAD WHERE THE NEW HEADQUARTERS WAS LOCATED, THAT IT HAD NOT OBTAINED THE PROPER PERMIT TO OPERATE A POLITICAL OFFICE. THE ABRI CHIEF OF SOCIOPOLITICAL AFFAIRS, SYARWAN HAMID, WAS QUOTED AS SAYING SEPTEMBER 16 THAT ABRI WAS PREPARED TO "PUT IN ORDER" MEGAWATI'S NEW HEADQUARTERS, AND HE REITERATED HIS EARLIER STATEMENT THAT THE OFFICE'S EXISTENCE WAS ILLEGAL. B1

7. (C) [redacted] CONCLUDED THAT THIS MEANT THAT ABRI WANTED THE OFFICE CLOSED. HOWEVER, HE OPINED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY FOOLISH OF THE GOVERNMENT TO REPEAT THE VIOLENT APPROACH USED TO CLOSE THE OLD PDI HEADQUARTERS ON

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0333

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0333

PAGE 01 JAKART 06766 02 OF 02 170919Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/027W

----------656C12 170924Z /38

R 170918Z SEP 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECSTATE WASHDC 2553
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 006766

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: PARTIES SUBMIT LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATE LISTS; MEGAWATI TO SUE GOI OVER REJECTION OF HER LIST

JULY 27, AND THAT INSTEAD IT WOULD USE MEANS SUCH AS INSTRUCTING LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO HARASS MEGAWATI AND HER SUPPORTERS WITH RED-TAPE.

WHAT NEXT FOR THE MEGAWATI CAMP?

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06766 02 OF 02 170919Z

6. (C) [redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

8. (C) [redacted] A PUBLIC STATEMENT FROM MEGAWATI AND ALEXANDER LITAAY (SECRETARY GENERAL OF MEGAWATI PDI), RELEASED SEPTEMBER 16, THAT LAMBASTED THE GOVERNMENT'S REJECTION OF HER CANDIDATE LIST WHILE CALLING ON HER SUPPORTERS AND SYMPATHIZERS TO REMAIN CALM AND AVOID BREAKING THE LAW IN THE FACE OF THIS REJECTION. B1
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3946

PAGE 01 JAKART 08467 01 OF 02 291102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10
	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/028W			

----------8126FE 291152Z /38

R 291101Z NOV 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3629
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 008467

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: PDI RIFT COULD DISRUPT "SMOOTH" ELECTION

REF: A) JAKARTA 08444; B) JAKARTA 08411

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 08467 01 OF 02 291102Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE GOVERNMENT IS BEHIND RECENT DISCUSSION REGARDING THE CONVENING OF ANOTHER INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) CONGRESS, [redacted] THE MEGAWATI CAMP IS NOT INTERESTED IN THE IDEA, THE CONGRESS WILL NOT HAPPEN, AND THE GOI INITIATED IT BECAUSE IT IS CONFUSED OVER WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE CONTINUING POPULARITY OF MEGAWATI AND THE FAILURE OF GOVERNMENT-BACKED PARTY CHAIRMAN SURJADI TO "CONSOLIDATE" HIS CONTROL OVER THE PARTY. SPECIFICALLY, IT IS FEARFUL ABOUT THE POTENTIAL DISRUPTIONS THE ONGOING RIFT WITHIN THE PDI COULD CREATE DURING THE RUN UP TO THE MAY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WANTS TO HAVE A "SMOOTH" ELECTION. THE 124 MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS TRIED IN CONNECTION WITH THE JULY 27 TAKEOVER OF PDI HEADQUARTERS BELIEVED THAT 10-20 OF THEIR FRIENDS WERE KILLED IN THE BUILDING RAISING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MIGHT SEEK RETRIBUTION AGAINST SURJADI AND HIS SUPPORTERS. END SUMMARY. B1

GOI DESPERATE FOR A SMOOTH ELECTION

3. (C) IT WAS THE GOVERNMENT THAT STARTED THE DISCUSSION ABOUT HOLDING ANOTHER "EXTRAORDINARY" CONGRESS IN THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) TO REPLACE CHAIRMAN SURJADI, [redacted] (REFTEL B). DURING A MEETING WITH POLOFF NOVEMBER 27, HE WAS ADAMANT THAT MEGAWATI HAD NO INTEREST IN EITHER HOLDING SUCH A CONGRESS OR IN EVER NEGOTIATING WITH SURJADI, AS BOTH WOULD IMPLY THAT SHE B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECOGNIZED THE CONGRESS HELD JUNE 20 THAT OUSTED HER. [redacted] B1

4. (C) INSTEAD, HE BLAMED A CONFUSED GOVERNMENT THAT DID NOT KNOW HOW TO DEAL WITH MEGAWATI'S CONTINUED POPULARITY, AND SURJADI'S FAILURE TO CONSOLIDATE HIS CONTROL OF THE

[redacted] (NOTE: THE GOI'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN CONFUSING. AFTER A HIGH LEVEL HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY OFFICIAL PUBLICLY URGED A CONGRESS LAST WEEK, THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS HIMSELF TOLD THE PRESS NOVEMBER 26 THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ISSUE A PERMIT FOR SUCH A CONGRESS. END NOTE.) [redacted] BELIEVED THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WAS "OBSESSED" WITH THE DESIRE TO SEE THE MAY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS GO SMOOTHLY, AND HAD GIVEN HIS USUAL CRYPTIC INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES TO THAT EFFECT. (NOTE: [redacted] SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO TWO RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT CALLING FOR A "SMOOTH ELECTION." END NOTE.) NOW, THE PRESIDENT'S UNDERLINGS WERE SCARED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S WISHES COULD NOT BE FULFILLED GIVEN SURJADI'S RECENT DIFFICULTIES. THE FACT THAT SURJADI WAS BEING SHOUTED AT, SUFFERED AN ATTACK ON HIS MOTORCADE AND COULD NOT EVEN SPEAK DURING MANY OF HIS APPEARANCES MADE THE GOI APPREHENSIVE THAT A SURJADI-LED PDI COULD FACE REAL PROBLEMS ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL. B1 B1 B1

5. (C) [redacted] DID NOT THINK THAT A CONGRESS WOULD ACTUALLY BE HELD, BUT THAT, IN ADDITION TO CONFUSION, THIS PUBLIC TALK REPRESENTED A KIND OF WARNING TO SURJADI THAT HE MUST B1

GET HIS ACT TOGETHER AND FIND A WAY TO CONSOLIDATE THE PARTY. [redacted] BELIEVED THIS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR SURJADI TO ACCOMPLISH GIVEN MEGAWATI'S GRASS ROOTS POPULARITY. ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE GOVERNMENT WAS ALSO ANGRY WITH SURJADI IN GENERAL BECAUSE HE HAD PROMISED THAT HE, NOT MEGAWATI, WAS THE POPULAR FIGURE IN THE PDI, SO IT WOULD BE NO PROBLEM FOR HIM TO TAKE CONTROL AFTER THE JUNE MEDAN CONGRESS. IN ADDITION TO HIS FAILURE TO BE EFFECTIVE AS PARTY LEADER, SURJADI HAD ALSO ANGERED THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE HE HAD TRUMPETED PUBLICLY THAT HE WOULD REFUSE TO TAKE ORDERS. B1 B1

WHY SURJADI CANNOT "CONSOLIDATE" CONTROL OVER THE PDI

---

6. (C) [redacted] ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SURJADI HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN GAINING CONTROL OF THE FORMAL PARTY APPARATUS, MEANING THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PROVINCIAL AND BRANCH BOARDS, IN B1

MOST PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE LOCAL POLITICIANS WANTED TO KEEP THEIR JOBS. HOWEVER, HE CLAIMED THAT OF THE ROUGHLY 12 MILLION PEOPLE WHO HAD CAST THEIR VOTES FOR THE PDI IN THE 1992 ELECTION, A FIGURE HE ARRIVED AT BASED ON THE 56 PARLIAMENTARY SEATS NOW HELD BY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3947

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3947

PAGE 01 JAKART 08467 02 OF 02 291103Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10
	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/028W			

----------812705 291152Z /38

R 291101Z NOV 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3630
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 008467

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: PDI RIFT COULD DISRUPT "SMOOTH" ELECTION

THE PARTY, 90 PERCENT WERE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE PDI HAD NEVER HAD MUCH LUCK FORMALLY REGISTERING VOTERS TO BECOME PART OF THE PARTY CADRES, AND INSTEAD THE 12 MILLION WERE PART OF THE "FLOATING MASS" IN THE ELECTORATE THAT SIMPLY CAST A VOTE WITHOUT DECLARING

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR ANY PARTICULAR PARTY.

7. (C) THE MEGAWATI CAMP SENSED ITS SUPPORT IN THE COUNTRY BECAUSE IT HAD A NETWORK OF PEOPLE THROUGHOUT ALL 27 PROVINCES WITH WHICH IT WAS IN CONSTANT CONTACT. MOREOVER, MEGAWATI HAD RECENTLY BEEN TRAVELLING AROUND THE COUNTRY, WHICH SHE WOULD CONTINUE TO DO. THUS, WHILE SURJADI MIGHT BE ABLE TO USE HIS GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED POSITION TO ESTABLISH A FORMAL PARTY STRUCTURE, HE DID NOT HAVE THE POPULARITY TO ATTRACT VOTES. MOREOVER, EVEN SOME "OFFICIAL" LOCAL PARTY CADRE WERE BEGINNING TO TURN AWAY FROM HIM. [redacted] B1

MEGAWATI GROUP WAITING IN THE WINGS

8. (C) "NOBODY KNOWS WHAT TO DO WITH THE FUTURE OF OUR COUNTRY," NOT EVEN CURRENT DEFENSE MINISTER EDI SUDRADJAT OR FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER BENNY MURDANI, [redacted] CONTENDED. B1 FOR THIS REASON, MEGAWATI AND HER GROUP WERE WORKING HARDER THAN EVER SINCE HER OUSTER IN JUNE. IN ADDITION, TO THE ONGOING COURT CASES AND COMMUNICATION AMONG THEIR NATION-WIDE NETWORK, THEY PLANNED TO COMPLETE A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY PLATFORM WITHIN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS.

9. (C) [redacted] EXPLAINED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS EFFORT BY LOOKING WELL PAST THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS. HE SAID THAT IF THE TIME COMES THAT THE MEGAWATI GROUP WAS "INVITED TO

B1

PARTICIPATE IN GOVERNMENT," IT WOULD HAVE THE PLATFORM, THE CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE POPULAR SUPPORT NECESSARY. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY WOULD KNOW WHAT TO DO WITH THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE NOT ALONE, AND THAT OTHER "GROUPS" WERE ENGAGED IN SIMILAR PLANNING.

10. (C) AT THIS TIME, MORE THAN THE CURRENT EFFORT WAS "USELESS" AND IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE IT WOULD BE DECLARED "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" OR A "REBELLION" BY THE GOVERNMENT. THE PRESIDENT HAD THE POWER TO DESTROY THE CAREERS AND REPUTATIONS OF ANYONE, AND NOBODY WANTED TO TAKE THIS RISK.

FATE OF 124 SUPPORTERS IN JULY 27 TRIAL

11. (C) [redacted] THE 124 MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WHO STOOD TRIAL IN CONNECTION WITH THE JULY 27 TAKEOVER OF PDI HEADQUARTERS. MOST, IF NOT ALL, WERE SENTENCED ON NOVEMBER 27 (REFTEL A), AND WERE ABOUT TO BE FREED. HE SAID THAT THESE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS BELIEVED THEY HAD SEEN 10-20 OF THEIR FRIENDS KILLED IN THE VIOLENT TAKEOVER OF PDI HEADQUARTERS ON JULY 27 BY GOVERNMENT BACKED ELEMENTS, INCLUDING BY INDIVIDUALS POSING AS SURJADI SUPPORTERS. (NOTE: MANY OF THE WOUNDED COULD HAVE BEEN MISTAKEN FOR DEATHS. END NOTE) THESE EX-DETAINEES TENDED TO BE A MORE MILITANT GROUP OVERALL BECAUSE THEY WERE THE ONES THAT HAD STAYED IN THE HEADQUARTERS BUILDING UNTIL THE END. MOVEOVER, THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN IN JAIL AND KNEW WHAT IT WAS LIKE. HE HAD

B1

HEARD TALK THAT THEIR VIEW WAS THAT "ONE LIFE SHOULD BE PAID FOR WITH ONE LIFE." THUS THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THEY MIGHT SEEK RETRIBUTION [redacted] B1

12. (C) COMMENT: THE ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF THE PDI DETAINEES AT THE MAIN COURT HOUSE OVER RECENT WEEKS HAS GENERATED VERY EMOTIONAL DEMONSTRATIONS OF SUPPORT FROM MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS AT THE CROWDED COURTHOUSE SCENE. THEIR RELEASE FROM DETENTION BACK INTO THE PDI-FOLD NOVEMBER 27 COULD INFLUENCE SOME PDI SUPPORTERS, NOTABLY YOUTH, TOWARD A MORE CONFRONTATIONAL POSTURE VIS-A-VIS THE GOVERNMENT AND SURJADI, PARTICULARLY AS THEIR CHARGES OF MURDERED COMPATRIOTS (SEPTEL) AND POLICE ABUSE WHILE IN DETENTION CIRCULATE.

13. (C) COMMENT CONT: THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT ON JULY 27 HAS ALSO PRODUCED PRESSURE ON THE GOI TO ACCOUNT FOR THOSE MISSING AND TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST SURJADI AND THOSE WHO ATTACKED THE PDI HEADQUARTERS. END COMMENT
ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4556

PAGE 01 JAKART 00298 01 OF 03 141137Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10
	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/028W			

----------8F2C51 141137Z /38

R 141137Z JAN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4184
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000298

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: MEGAWATI WON'T GO AWAY

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: SEVEN MONTHS AFTER THE GOVERNMENT ENGINEERED MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI'S OUSTER FROM THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00298 01 OF 03 141137Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI), IT HAS FAILED TO REMOVE HER FROM INDONESIAN POLITICS. SHE GAVE A FEISTY POLITICAL SPEECH JANUARY 10 TO COMMEMORATE THE 24TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE PDI'S FORMATION. THIS UNAUTHORIZED CELEBRATION WAS ATTENDED BY HUNDREDS OF GRASS ROOTS PDI MEMBERS AND SYMPATHIZERS, HIGH-LEVEL ADVISORS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PRESS CORPS (INCLUDING CNN, AFP, AP, AND REUTERS). THE EVENT ALSO RECEIVED SUBSTANTIVE COVERAGE IN THE LOCAL INDONESIAN AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE PRINT MEDIA. MOREOVER, IN RECENT WEEKS HER SUPPORTERS IN THE HUNDREDS HAVE BEEN IN THE STREETS OF JAKARTA, SURABAYA, SEMARANG AND OTHER CITIES TO PROTEST HER EXCLUSION FROM THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS. ALTHOUGH MEGAWATI REPEATED MANY FAMILIAR THEMES, SHE DEMONSTRATED HER POTENTIAL TO CALL INTO QUESTION THE LEGITIMACY OF ANY ELECTIONS THAT EXCLUDED HER. HOWEVER, IN THIS SPEECH SHE INSTRUCTED HER SUPPORTERS TO OBEY THE LAW.

3. (C) [redacted] SHE EXPLAINED HER CONCERN THAT HER FRUSTRATED SUPPORTERS MIGHT GET OUT OF CONTROL DURING THE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTION. SHE HOPED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM BY RETURNING HER TO THE PDI CHAIRMANSHIP AND ALLOWING HER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. ALTHOUGH THIS IS UNLIKELY, IT IS CLEAR THAT SHE WILL NOT GO AWAY, AS THE GOVERNMENT HAD HOPED. HER REFUSAL TO BACK DOWN AND EXIT THE POLITICAL SCENE MIGHT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT A SMOOTH, TROUBLE-FREE ELECTION. END SUMMARY. B1

MEGAWATI'S CELEBRATION: BACKGROUND

CONFIDENTIAL

---

4. (C) MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI CELEBRATED THE 24TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY AT HER HOME IN SOUTH JAKARTA ON JANUARY 10. BILLED AS A COMBINATION ANNIVERSARY PARTY AND "BREAKING OF THE FAST" (IT WAS THE FIRST DAY OF RAMADAN), THE EVENT WAS IN FACT POLITICAL. SHE HAD ORIGINALLY SOUGHT TO HOLD IT IN BALI, ONE OF HER STRONGEST BASES OF SUPPORT, BUT WAS

DENIED PERMISSION BY THE POLICE. SHE DID NOT HAVE PERMISSION FOR THE EVENT IN JAKARTA EITHER. A FOREIGN JOURNALIST TOLD POLOFF AT THE SPEECH THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ARMED FORCES COMMANDER FEISAL TANJUNG HAD THREATENED THAT THE EVENT WOULD BE CLOSED DOWN. HOWEVER, THERE WERE NO OBVIOUS SECURITY FORCES PRESENT, AND THE CELEBRATION PROCEEDED PEACEFULLY. (NOTE: THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED LEADER OF THE PDI, SOERJADI, CELEBRATED THE PDI ANNIVERSARY IN SOUTH SULAWESI, JOINED BY FEISAL TANJUNG AND MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR YOGIE MEMET. END NOTE)

5. (C) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, MEGAWATI USED THE FACT THAT IT WAS AT HER HOME, AND THAT IT WAS AT LEAST PARTIALLY A DINNER OR "BREAKING OF THE FAST," TO SKIRT THE RULES ON HOLDING POLITICAL EVENTS WITHOUT PERMISSION. ON JANUARY 13, BISNIS INDONESIA REPORTED THAT THE POLICE WOULD INVESTIGATE WHETHER MEGAWATI'S CELEBRATION WAS A "CAMPAIGN" EVENT OR JUST A "SYUKURAN" (EVENT TO EXPRESS THANKS TO GOD). THE POLICE REPORTEDLY SAID THAT PERMISSION FOR A CAMPAIGN EVENT HAD NOT BEEN REQUESTED AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED. MOREOVER, IF THE INVESTIGATION SHOWED THAT IT WAS A CAMPAIGN EVENT, FIRM

ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.

THE RESPONSE TO MEGAWATI'S CELEBRATION

6. (C) HUNDREDS OF PDI MEMBERS AND MEGAWATI SYMPATHIZERS IN RED SHIRTS ATTENDED THE SPEECH AND DINNER. THEY WERE ENTHUSIASTIC AND VOCAL BUT PEACEFUL DURING HER REMARKS. IN ADDITION, KEY MEGAWATI ADVISORS SUCH AS ECONOMIST KWIK KIAN GIE AND PDI PARLIAMENTARIANS SUKOWALUYO, SOPHAN SOPHIAAN AND SABAAM SIRAIT WERE PRESENT. AT LEAST FIVE TELEVISION CAMERAS RECORDED THE EVENT, WHICH TOOK PLACE ON THE FRONT LAWN OF HER COMPOUND; THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS CORPS ON THE SCENE INCLUDED CNN, AP, AFP AND REUTERS. IN ADDITION TO POLOFF, THE CANADIAN POLITICAL COUNSELOR ATTENDED.

7. (U) LOCAL INDONESIAN AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE MEDIA GAVE

THE EVENT SUBSTANTIVE COVERAGE THE FOLLOWING DAY. SUARA PEMBARUAN, A POPULAR DAILY, CARRIED A STORY ON THE FRONT PAGE WITH A PICTURE OF MEGAWATI, FIST RAISED IN THE AIR, ON THE THIRD PAGE. THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE JAKARTA POST ALSO CARRIED A FRONT PAGE STORY AND A FRONT PAGE PICTURE.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4559

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4559

PAGE 01 JAKART 00298 02 OF 03 141137Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10
	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/028W			

----------8F2C56 141137Z /38

R 141137Z JAN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4185
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 000298

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: MEGAWATI WON'T GO AWAY

KOMPAS WAS MORE CONSERVATIVE, RUNNING A FRONT PAGE STORY THAT FOCUSSED MOSTLY ON THE SOERJADI EVENT, BUT THAT COVERED MEGAWATI'S SPEECH IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE STORY. SOME IN THE PRESS CONTINUED TO DESCRIBE HER ROLE IN A WAY THAT GAVE HER EQUALITY WITH SOERJADI AND A DEGREE OF

LEGITIMACY. THE JAKARTA POST CALLED HER AND SURJADI "RIVAL LEADERS" OF THE PDI. BISNIS INDONESIA'S HEADLINE SAID THAT THE CENTRAL BOARDS OF MEGAWATI AND SOERJADI CELEBRATED THE 24TH ANNIVERSARY SEPARATELY, AND SUARA PEMBARUAN RAN ONE FRONT PAGE HEADLINE MENTIONING MEGAWATI'S CELEBRATION ALONE. KOMPAS REFERRED TO A PDI CENTRAL BOARD FOR 1993-1998 UNDER HER LEADERSHIP.

MEGAWATI'S SPEECH
---

8. (U) MEGAWATI'S SPEECH WAS FEISTY, BUT FOR THE MOST PART DID NOT DEPART FROM THE BASIC MESSAGES THAT SHE HAS RAISED IN THE PAST. SOUNDING A FAMILIAR THEME, SHE FOCUSSED ON THE ILLEGALITY OF HER OUSTER FROM THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE PDI. PUTTING A SHARPER POINT ON HER MESSAGE, SHE EMPHASIZED THAT SHE ALONE HAD THE RIGHT TO LEAD THE PDI IN THE 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION. IN THIS WAY SHE IMPLICITLY DEMONSTRATED HER CAPACITY TO CALL INTO QUESTION THE LEGITIMACY OF ANY ELECTION THAT DID NOT INCLUDE HER AND HER FOLLOWERS.

9. (C) HOWEVER, SHE AVOIDED STEPPING OVER ANY RHETORICAL LINES THAT WOULD GET HER IN BIG TROUBLE WITH THE GOVERNMENT, BY EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF CARRYING OUT A "BETTER QUALITY" ELECTION IN 1997. SHE ALSO INSTRUCTED ALL PDI MEMBERS AND SYMPATHIZERS TO OBEY THE LAW AND ALSO TO TAKE CARE OF THEIR "YELLOW" OR VOTING CARDS. IN THE

[redacted]

B1

(NOTE: SHORT FOR "NEUTRAL GROUP," MEANING THAT THE VOTER ABSTAINS FROM VOTING OR SPOILS THE BALLOT. END NOTE).

10. (U) MEGAWATI ALSO TOUCHED UPON THE VIOLENCE THAT OCCURRED IN INDONESIA IN 1996, SPECIFYING EAST JAVA, CENTRAL JAVA, WEST JAVA, JAKARTA, NORTH SUMATRA, IRIAN JAYA, EAST TIMOR, AND WEST KALIMANTAN AS THE AFFECTED AREAS. SHE ARGUED THAT WHETHER THIS VIOLENCE WAS CAUSED BECAUSE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC "GAPS" OR BECAUSE OF THIRD PARTY MANIPULATION, THE DISORDER WAS EVIDENCE THAT "DISORDER" AND INJUSTICE EXISTED IN SOCIETY. SHE ALSO CALLED ON THE "APPARATUS" ASSIGNED TO THE FIELD AND THE GROUPS OF COMMANDERS WHO MADE DECISIONS TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE STATE AND NOT TO BE THE TOOLS OF SPECIFIC GROUPS.

[redacted]

B1

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENT:
---

16. (C) ALTHOUGH MEGAWATI REMAINS A FACTOR IN INDONESIAN POLITICS, HER ROLE IS STILL EVOLVING. BEFORE HER OUSTER FROM THE PDI CHAIRMANSHIP, SHE WAS BECOMING A RALLYING POINT FOR THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION. ALTHOUGH THE VIOLENT GOVERNMENT-BACKED TAKEOVER OF PDI HEADQUARTERS FROM HER SUPPORTERS ON JULY 27 ELEVATED HER STATUS AND PROFILE IN INDONESIA AND ABROAD, THE ENSUING CRACKDOWN PUT A SEVERE DAMPER ON EMBRYONIC OPPOSITION FORCES AND SIDELINED ANY IMMEDIATE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS SHE MIGHT HAVE HAD. IT APPEARED THAT SHE WOULD FADE AWAY FROM THE POLITICAL SCENE.

B1



ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0846

PAGE 01 JAKART 02211 01 OF 03 140218Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/039W						

----------AF3C81 140218Z /38

P 140218Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5377
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002211

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: ILL WILL ABOUNDS: POLITICAL PARTIES IN NORTH SUMATRA
- PREPARE FOR THE GENERAL ELECTION

REFS: A) 96 JAKARTA 7597 B) 96 JAKARTA 8243 C) JAKARTA 1148

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON 1.5(D).
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02211 01 OF 03 140218Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 14 APR 2017
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE OFFICIAL INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) REPRESENTATIVES CLAIMED INTERNAL PARTY CONFLICT WAS NOTHING NEW FOR PDI, AND ALL THE PUBLICITY MIGHT EVEN INCREASE VOTES FOR PDI. HOWEVER, "CHAIRMEN" FROM DISTRICTS ALL OVER NORTH SUMATRA MEETING AT THE SHADOW PDI OFFICE SUPPORTING MEGAWATI WERE PASSIONATE IN THEIR CLAIMS THAT THE ELECTION WOULD BE ILLEGAL IF MEGAWATI COULD NOT PARTICIPATE. MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS, CLAIMING THEY NUMBERED 60 TO 70 PERCENT OF PDI SUPPORTERS IN NORTH SUMATRA, WOULD NOT VOTE IF MEGAWATI WAS NOT REINSTATED AS PARTY CHAIRPERSON BEFORE THE MAY ELECTION. GOLKAR INTERNAL PROBLEMS WERE BEING AIRED IN THE PRESS, AS THE OFFICIAL FINAL CANDIDATE LIST WAS PUBLISHED APRIL 1, INCLUDING THE OUSTED CHAIRMAN EFFENDI RITONGA AS NUMBER EIGHT ON THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT LIST. THE MUSLIM-ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT UNITY PARTY (PPP) ACCUSED GOLKAR OF PLANNING TO "STEAL THE ELECTION AGAIN" AND WAS TRAINING ITS 15,000 ELECTION OBSERVERS TO BE BRAVER AND TO "USE THEIR EYES BETTER." END SUMMARY

3. (SBU) POLOFF MET WITH NORTH SUMATRA PROVINCIAL POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS IN MEDAN, NORTH SUMATRA APRIL 1-3. THE FINAL CANDIDATE LISTS FOR THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WERE PUBLISHED APRIL 1. PARTY LEADERS DISCUSSED ACTIVITIES FOR TRAINING ELECTION OBSERVERS/WITNESSES. AS IN PREVIOUS ELECTIONS, EACH POLLING STATION, INCLUDING 2400 IN MEDAN, WOULD BE RUN BY THE "PIMIMPIN KPPS" (POLLING ORGANIZING GROUP, WHICH GIVES OUT BALLOTS AND CONDUCTS THE VOTE COUNT), AND EACH PARTY COULD HAVE ONE OBSERVER PRESENT. IN 1992, THE ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE NORTH SUMATRA PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT (DPRD I) WERE 29 SEATS FOR THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED GOLKAR, SEVEN FOR THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI), AND FOUR FOR THE DEVELOPMENT UNITY PARTY (PPP).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL PDI: TRYING TO SEE A BRIGHT SIDE

---

4. (C) DURING A MEETING WITH A VICE CHAIRMAN AND THREE OTHER PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBERS OF THE OFFICIAL PDI OFFICE, POLOFF WAS TOLD THAT PDI HAD A TRADITION OF INTERNAL SPLITS, AND THUS HAVING "TWO CHAIRMEN" (SOERJADI AND MEGAWATI) WAS NOT A PROBLEM. THEY WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT THE SPLIT IN PDI HAD HELPED THE PARTY GAIN PUBLICITY, WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN MORE SUPPORT

FOR PDI DURING THE ELECTION, ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT APPEAR CONVINCED OF THIS LOGIC. THE VICE CHAIRMAN STRESSED THAT PDI SUPPORTERS HAD BEEN PDI SUPPORTERS FOR A LONG TIME, AND THEY SHOULD, AND WOULD, SUPPORT THE PARTY NOT AN INDIVIDUAL. WHILE SOME PEOPLE STILL SUPPORTED MEGAWATI, LOYALTY TO THE OFFICIAL SOERJADI PDI IN NORTH SUMATRA WAS STRONG, AND THE ELECTION WOULD RUN SMOOTHLY WITH PDI SUPPORTERS VOTING FOR PDI AS USUAL. PDI REPRESENTATIVES WERE IN THE PROCESS OF TRAINING ELECTION OBSERVERS THROUGHOUT NORTH SUMATRA.

5. (SBU) THEY EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS A NORMAL PRACTICE FOR EACH PARTY TO SEND PARTY REPRESENTATIVES TO THE HOUSES OF VILLAGERS WHO HAD NOT YET VOTED TO "REMIND" THEM TO VOTE. HOWEVER, FORCE OR CAMPAIGNING COULD NOT BE USED TO CONVINCE PEOPLE TO VOTE. REMINDERS COULD ALSO BE GIVEN BY PARTY REPRESENTATIVES DURING THE WEEK BEFORE THE ELECTION, ALTHOUGH CAMPAIGNING WAS PROHIBITED.

6. (C) THE SOERJADI PDI REPRESENTATIVES WOULD NOT DISCUSS THE PDI CAMPAIGN PLATFORM, SAYING THAT IT WAS DECIDED IN JAKARTA, AND HAD NOT BEEN RELEASED. THEY ALSO SAID THEY WERE NOT AT LIBERTY TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. ONE YOUNG CANDIDATE FOR PARLIAMENT SAID, IN A SEPARATE MEETING, THAT HE THOUGHT MOST PDI SUPPORTERS WOULD VOTE FOR PDI. HE SAID THAT ANYONE WHO WANTED

CONFIDENTIAL

TO STAY IN THE PARTY HAD TO SUPPORT SOERJADI, EVEN IF "IN HIS HEART" HE FELT DIFFERENTLY. THE PDI OFFICE HAD BEEN CLEANSED OF LARGE MEGAWATI PHOTOS AND POSTERS, WHICH WERE STILL UP IN SEPTEMBER 1996. THERE WERE NO PHOTOS OF SEORJADI POSTED.

WAITING FOR MEGAWATI

---

7. (C) POLOFF VISITED THE UNMARKED MEGAWATI NORTH SUMATRA PROVINCIAL PDI OFFICE IN MEDAN, ALTHOUGH THE OFFICIAL PDI LEADERS HAD NOT ADMITTED THAT ONE EXISTED. THERE WERE ABOUT 30 PDI ACTIVISTS IN THE OFFICE, ALMOST ALL OF WHOM WERE MEN IN THEIR FORTIES OR FIFTIES. THE OFFICE WAS IN A LARGE UNMARKED HOUSE OFF A MAIN ROAD. [redacted] INTRODUCED HIMSELF AS THE CHAIRMAN, AND EXPLAINED THAT 60 TO 70 PERCENT OF PDI SUPPORTERS IN NORTH SUMATRA WERE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS. THE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WOULD REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION (NOT VOTE) IF MEGAWATI WAS NOT ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE AS THE LEGAL PDI CHAIRMAN. PDI MEMBERS

B1

WERE AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS FROM MEGAWATI.

8. (C) AFTER CONFIRMING THAT POLOFF HAD NO TAPE RECORDER, THE CHAIRMAN GAVE AN IMPASSIONED SPEECH ON THE HISTORY OF THE PDI, EXPLAINING THAT THE SOEHARTO REGIME HAD DESIGNED AND MANAGED THE CURRENT THREE PARTY SYSTEM TO PRESERVE GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0848

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0848

PAGE 01 JAKART 02211 02 OF 03 140218Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/039W						

----------AF3C89 140218Z /38

P 140218Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5378
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002211

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: ILL WILL ABOUNDS: POLITICAL PARTIES IN NORTH SUMATRA
- PREPARE FOR THE GENERAL ELECTION

PROHIBIT INDEPENDENCE. MEGAWATI HAD EMERGED AS THE FIRST REAL PARTY LEADER, WHICH CAUSED THE GOVERNMENT TO BECOME ALARMED AND TO REMOVE HER. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD ILLEGALLY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REMOVED MEGAWATI AND PUT IN A "PUPPET" (SOERJADI) WHO ARMED FORCES COMMANDER FEISEL TANJUNG HAD FORMERLY CALLED A CRIMINAL. (NOTE: SOERJADI WAS REMOVED FROM THE PDI CHAIRMANSHIP IN 1993, AFTER LEADING A RAMBUNCTIOUS 1992 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN DURING WHICH HE SURFACED THE ISSUE OF PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS. END NOTE) THE MEDAN CONGRESS WAS ILLEGAL, [redacted] SAID. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD BEEN PDI ACTIVISTS BEFORE THE MEDAN CONGRESS, AND HAD REFUSED TO ATTEND THE CONGRESS. THOSE WHO ATTENDED WERE PRESSURED AND PAID TO ATTEND, HE ADDED. THE CURRENT ELECTION WOULD BE ILLEGAL UNLESS MEGAWATI WAS ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE. B1

9. (C) REPRESENTATIVES SAID THAT MEGAWATI WOULD VISIT MEDAN ON APRIL 8, IN ORDER TO APPEAL THE VERDICT FROM HER COURT CASE WHICH CLAIMED THAT THE JUNE 1996 MEDAN CONGRESS WHICH OUSTED HER WAS ILLEGAL. THE CASE WAS RECENTLY THROWN OUT OF COURT, AS AN INTERNAL PARTY MATTER THAT SHOULD BE DECIDED OUT OF COURT. THE FORMER HEAD [redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT SEVERAL HUNDRED MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS CAME TO THE COURTHOUSE FOR THE FINAL COURT SESSION, AND CLAIMED THAT MANY OTHERS FROM OUTSIDE MEDAN HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY THE MILITARY FROM ENTERING THE CITY. HE SAID THAT INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE (KIPP) WAS ACTIVE IN MEDAN AND WAS HELPING PPP AND PDI WITH THEIR TRAINING OF ELECTION OBSERVERS. B1

10. (C) AS POLOFF WAS DEPARTING, AT LEAST FIVE OF THE PDI REPRESENTATIVES INTRODUCED THEMSELVES AS CHAIRMEN FROM DIFFERENT NORTH SUMATRA DISTRICT MEGAWATI PDI OFFICES. THEY SAID MEGAWATI PDI HAD BRANCHES "IN ALL DISTRICTS (KABUPATEN)" IN NORTH SUMATRA.

11. (C) NOTE: [redacted] REPORTED ON B1
APRIL 8 THAT MEGAWATI HAD BEEN WELCOMED BY OVER 1500 SUPPORTERS
CONFIDENTIAL

UPON ARRIVAL IN MEDAN APRIL 7. SHE HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE, AND WAS GOING TO PEMATANG SIANTAR TO ATTEND A COURT HEARING OF HER SUIT AGAINST THE SOERJADI PDI. END NOTE

PPP CALLS GOLKAR OFFICIALS "THIEVES WITH TIES"

---

12. (C) NORTH SUMATRA [redacted] EXPLAINED B1
TO POLOFF THAT GOLKAR "STEALS" THE ELECTIONS, AND THAT CHEATING TECHNIQUES WERE USED TO OBTAIN THE MANDATED TARGETS. INDICATING THAT PPP WOULD NO LONGER TOLERATE THIS, HE NOTED THE NEW IMPORTANCE PLACED ON THE OFFICIAL PARTY ELECTION OBSERVERS/WITNESSES. HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM A TRIP TO A NORTH SUMATRA DISTRICT TO TRAIN SEVERAL HUNDRED ELECTION OBSERVERS, AND WAS PLANNING TO DEPART FOR ANOTHER DISTRICT THAT AFTERNOON. HE SAID THAT 15,000 PPP ELECTION OBSERVERS WOULD BE TRAINED, NOTING THAT A NEW TRAINING BOOK HAD BEEN PREPARED. THE TRAINING WOULD TEACH OBSERVERS "TO USE THEIR EYES BETTER" AND TO BE BRAVER THAN IN PAST ELECTIONS. OTHER ELECTIONS HAD REVEALED GOLKAR "CHEATING" BUT NOTHING COULD BE DONE ABOUT IT. ONCE THE PARTY CHAIRMEN FROM EACH PARTY SIGNED THE ELECTION RESULTS, THE DEBATE WAS SILENCED.

13. (C) [redacted] SHOWED POLOFF DIAGRAMS OF WHERE THE OFFICIAL PARTY B1
OBSERVERS (ONE FROM EACH PARTY) WOULD SIT IN RELATION TO THE "PIMIMPIN KPPS" DURING THE VOTING AND THE VOTE COUNTING. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE KPPS WERE WORKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT, AND THUS HAD TO SUPPORT GOLKAR. HE NOTED THAT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PLACEMENT OF OBSERVERS WAS THAT DURING VOTING, THEY WERE NEAR THE KPPS OFFICIALS, BUT DURING COUNTING, THEY WERE MOVED TO THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ROOM. HE SAID THAT DURING COUNTING IN THE PREVIOUS ELECTION, IN CERTAIN POLLING STATIONS ESPECIALLY IN
CONFIDENTIAL

VILLAGES, ELECTION OFFICIALS PUT NAILS IN THEIR TABLES WITH WHICH TO SPOIL (PUNCH HOLES IN) BALLOTS THAT THEY SAW WERE FOR PDI OR PPP. THIS COULD BE DONE SUBTLY BEFORE THE INDIVIDUAL VOTE WAS ANNOUNCED, AND WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE OBSERVERS TO CATCH IF THEY WERE NOT LOOKING FOR IT. HE CALLED GOLKAR OFFICIALS "THIEVES WITH TIES," NOTING THAT THEY HAD TO USE SUCH METHODS TO GET THE TARGETS REQUIRED BY GOLKAR LEADERS FROM JAKARTA.

14. (C) [redacted] PREDICTED THAT PPP WOULD GAIN VOTES BECAUSE OF THE INTERNAL GOLKAR DISPUTES IN NORTH SUMATRA. HE PREDICTED THAT FOR THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT, GOLKAR WOULD KEEP THE SAME NUMBER OF SEATS AT 29, PDI WOULD DROP FROM SEVEN TO FIVE, AND PPP WOULD RISE FROM FOUR TO NINE SEATS. (NOTE: THE ADDITIONAL THREE SEATS WOULD BE GAINED FROM ABRI SEATS, WHICH WERE BEING REDUCED BY THREE. END NOTE.) [redacted] SAID THAT FOR THE VICE PRESIDENCY, THE KEY WAS TO CHOOSE A CIVILIAN AND NOT A MILITARY CANDIDATE. [redacted] POINTED TO A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR AS SIGNIFICANT. (COMMENT: [redacted] WAS THE FIRST TO BRING TO OUR ATTENTION THE INTERNAL GOLKAR CONFLICT, WHICH PROVED LATER TO BE SERIOUS. END COMMENT) CORRUPTION WOULD BE A CENTRAL THEME OF THE PPP CAMPAIGN PLATFORM, AND WOULD BE SPOKEN OF OPENLY. PPP WAS NOT HAPPY WITH NEW RESTRICTIVE CAMPAIGN REGULATIONS, AND [redacted] COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE CLASHES BETWEEN PPP AND GOLKAR DURING THE CAMPAIGN EVEN THOUGH

B1
B1
B1
B1
B1

PAGE 01 JAKART 02211 03 OF 03 140218Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/039W						

----------AF3C8B 140218Z /38

P 140218Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5379
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002211

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: ILL WILL ABOUNDS: POLITICAL PARTIES IN NORTH SUMATRA
- PREPARE FOR THE GENERAL ELECTION

PARTIES HAD TO CAMPAIGN ON DIFFERENT DAYS.

15. (C) [redacted] COMMENTED ON RECENT UNREST AND POINTED TO SEVERAL B1
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02211 03 OF 03 140218Z
FACTORS: THE POLITICAL FRUSTRATIONS FELT BY THE POPULATION AND THEIR ANGER ABOUT CORRUPTION; THE ECONOMIC GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR, WHICH WAS WIDENING; AND THE MILITARY'S NEED FOR CONFLICT IN INDONESIA TO JUSTIFY ITS ROLE.

GOLKAR: OUT OF TOWN

16. (C) GOLKAR SENT AN OFFICIAL LETTER TO POLOFF TO DECLINE THE REQUEST FOR A MEETING, EXPLAINING THAT ALL PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS WERE OUT OF TOWN MEETING WITH DISTRICT LEVEL OFFICIALS IN PREPARATION FOR THE GOLKAR CAMPAIGN. THE DISMISSAL IN OCTOBER OF NORTH SUMATRA GOLKAR CHIEF EFFENDI RITONGA WAS STILL CAUSING PROBLEMS FOR THE PARTY. THE SPLIT WAS REFLECTED IN THE PUBLICATION OF THE FINAL GOLKAR CANDIDATE LIST ON APRIL 1, WHICH INCLUDED RITONGA AS THE NUMBER EIGHT CANDIDATE DESPITE THE PROTESTS FROM THE NEW GOLKAR LEADERSHIP IN MEDAN. THE PRESS WAS CLOSELY FOLLOWING AND REPORTING ON THE CONFLICT. IN SIANTAR, NORTH SUMATRA, THE GOLKAR CHAIRMAN WAS DISMISSED ON APRIL 2, SHOWING A LACK OF UNITY IN ANOTHER NORTH SUMATRA DISTRICT.

17. (C) ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, PPP CHAIRMAN AND OTHERS, GOLKAR'S "GROUP OF 29," MADE UP OF 29 OUT OF 51 NORTH SUMATRA GOLKAR BOARD MEMBERS, WAS PLANNING TO GO TO COURT TO TRY TO HAVE THE FINAL GOLKAR LIST CHANGED. (NOTE: RITONGA WAS OUSTED IN OCTOBER 1996 FOR "NOT MEETING EXPECTATIONS," INCLUDING ISSUING THE TEMPORARY GOLKAR LIST WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SIGNATURE OF THE PARTY SECRETARY. REFTELS. END NOTE) ACCORDING TO ONE GOLKAR SUPPORTER, RITONGA'S LIST BECAME FINAL BECAUSE THE GOVERNOR, A GOLKAR ADVISOR, WAS ANGRY THAT HE WAS NOT CONSULTED WHEN THE COMPLAINTS WERE LODGED ABOUT RITONGA'S LIST. SINCE HE WAS NOT CONSULTED ABOUT THE DESIRE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02211 03 OF 03 140218Z

CHANGE THE LIST, THE LIST REMAINED THE SAME. MOST CONTACTS DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE LIST WOULD BE CHANGED.

18. (C) POLOFF MET WITH A JOURNALIST WHOSE FATHER WAS A GOLKAR REPRESENTATIVE IN THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT. THE JOURNALIST THOUGHT THAT GOLKAR WAS "STRONG ENOUGH" DESPITE INTERNAL CONFLICTS, AND THAT GOLKAR HAD "PROVIDED A LOT" TO THE PEOPLE. HE PREDICTED A SECURE ELECTION, CALLING NORTH SUMATRA A SPECIAL AREA WHICH WAS "MORE VOLATILE AND MORE CONTROLLED." WHILE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT GOLKAR PROSPECTS FOR THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, HE NOTED THAT THE PARLIAMENT IN INDONESIA AT ALL LEVELS WAS "WORSE THAN A RUBBER STAMP" AND DID NOTHING.

B1

THAT HE WAS STILL SUPPORTING GOLKAR EVEN THOUGH CHRISTIANS WERE BEING MARGINALIZED OUT OF POLITICS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NO CHANCE TO BECOME A CANDIDATE FOR PARLIAMENT WITHIN GOLKAR FOR THIS REASON. (SEPTEL ON CHRISTIAN VIEWS IN MEDAN TO FOLLOW)

20. (C) ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE CHRISTIAN YOUTH GROUP, AN OFFICIAL PDI CANDIDATE FOR PARLIAMENT, SAID THAT GOLKAR WAS STILL ENGAGED IN INTIMIDATING PEOPLE IN RURAL VILLAGES INTO VOTING GOLKAR. HE GAVE AN EXAMPLE FROM HIS OWN VILLAGE WHERE THE PRINCIPAL OF A SCHOOL TOLD STUDENTS TO ENSURE PARENTS VOTED FOR GOLKAR. ONE STUDENT, THE SON OF A PDI SUPPORTER, WAS TOLD THAT IF HIS FATHER CHOSE PDI, THE CHILD WOULD BE HELD BACK A GRADE. HE CLAIMED THAT THE TACTIC OF TELLING VILLAGERS THAT CHOOSING PDI OR PPP MEANT SUPPORT FOR THE PKI (FORMER COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA) WAS STILL USED IN VILLAGES. HE COMMENTED THAT THESE TACTICS WORKED IN THE PAST, BUT HE THOUGHT POLITICAL AWARENESS WAS GROWING EVEN IN RURAL VILLAGES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HE NOTED THAT IN HIS DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PDI IN HIS VILLAGE HE SAW A GROWING WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SUPPORTING PDI EVEN THOUGH PEOPLE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THEY COULD BE ACCUSED OF SUPPORTING THE COMMUNISTS IF THEY DID NOT SUPPORT GOLKAR.

21. (C) [redacted] B1
COMMENTED THAT AT THE SUB-DISTRICT LEVEL AND BELOW, GOLKAR FALSIFICATION OF RESULTS HAD BEEN COMMON IN THE LAST ELECTION. HE SAID RESULTS FROM VILLAGES COULD BE ALTERED WHEN THE RESULTS WERE TAKEN TO THE SUBDISTRICT LEVEL. DURING TALLYING AT THIS LEVEL, THERE WERE NO OBSERVERS/WITNESSES, AND IT WAS EASY TO MAKE A NEW REPORT OF RESULTS BASED ON THE TARGET. THERE WAS PRESSURE ON VILLAGE CHIEFS TO BRING IN THE GOLKAR VOTE, AND SOME WERE TOLD THEY WOULD LOSE THEIR JOBS IF THEY DID NOT. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0334

PAGE 01 JAKART 02436 01 OF 07 240629Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/042W					

----------B31C23 240629Z /38

R 240628Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5523
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 JAKARTA 002436

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS
USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ECON, ID, PINR
SUBJECT: THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN: AT THE STARTING GATE

REF: A) JAKARTA 2365; B) JAKARTA 2211; C) JAKARTA 2234;
D) JAKARTA 2172; E) JAKARTA 2143; F) JAKARTA 2135;

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02436 01 OF 07 240629Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

G) JAKARTA 1907; H) JAKARTA 1437

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: INDONESIA'S THREE CONTESTANTS IN THE GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN, SET TO BEGIN APRIL 27, PLAN TO ADDRESS SUBJECTS RANGING FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS (GOLKAR), REFORM OF THE POLITICAL PARTY LAWS (GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY), TO IMPROVED POVERTY ALLEVIATION (UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY). THE MORE RESTRICTIVE RULES PUT FORWARD BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR THIS CAMPAIGN WILL BE A KEY FACTOR IN DETERMINING HOW IT IS CARRIED OUT. GOLKAR ENVISAGES A MORE EDUCATIONAL, LESS VIOLENCE PRONE "DIALOGUE" CAMPAIGN THAT DOWNPLAYS THE MASS STREET RALLIES POPULAR IN THE PAST. THE MINORITY PARTIES FEAR THAT THE NEW RESTRICTIONS WILL REMOVE THEIR OPPORTUNITIES TO REACH OUT TO MASS VOTERS, MAKING THEM EVEN MORE UNCOMPETITIVE THAN BEFORE. THE MINORITY PARTIES BELIEVE THAT FRAUD WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE VOTING, ESPECIALLY OUTSIDE JAVA. SPORADIC, BUT LIMITED, POLITICAL VIOLENCE HAS ALREADY OCCURRED IN THE PRE-CAMPAIGN PERIOD. GIVEN THE INTERNAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PDI, AS WELL AS THE TENSIONS THAT HAVE ALREADY COME TO THE SURFACE BETWEEN GOLKAR AND PPP, SIMILAR INCIDENTS COULD RECUR DURING THE CAMPAIGN. END SUMMARY

3. (U) POLOFF ON APRIL 22 DISCUSSED THE UPCOMING ELECTION CAMPAIGN WITH ABDUL GAFUR, ONE OF GOLKAR'S EIGHT NATIONAL CHAIRPERSONS AND THE HEAD OF ITS ELECTION EFFORT. GAFUR

WAS ACCOMPANIED BY TWO OTHER GOLKAR OPERATIVES. EARLIER, POLOFF HELD SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS WITH NATIONAL LEVEL OFFICIALS FROM GOLKAR, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), AND THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED FACTION OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI). LABATT DISCUSSED THE CAMPAIGN WITH PPP SECRETARY GENERAL TOSARI WIDJAJA, AND POLCOUNS AND POLFF MET WITH SURYADI, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GOVERNMENT BACKED FACTION OF THE PDI, ON APRIL 18 (REFTEL A). A MEETING WITH OUSTED PDI LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI WAS

COVERED IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE (REFTEL E).

GOLKAR CLAIMS TO WANT "SUBSTANTIVE" CAMPAIGN: OUTLINES

APPROACH TO CAMPAIGNING AND THEMES

4. (C) ABDUL GAFUR, ONE OF EIGHT GOLKAR NATIONAL CHAIRPERSONS AND THE HEAD OF ITS ELECTION EFFORT, DESCRIBED FOR POLOFF ON APRIL 22 GOLKAR'S CAMPAIGN PREPARATIONS. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY TWO OTHER CENTRAL BOARD MEMBERS, ABUDLLAH ALATAS FAHMI AND DIN SYAMSUDDIN, THE CHIEFS OF GOLKAR'S COMMUNICATIONS AND RESEARCH OFFICES RESPECTIVELY. THE MEETING WAS HELD AT GOLKAR NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS IN GAFUR'S OFFICE, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS THE HEART OF THE CAMPAIGN "WAR ROOM."

5. (C) GAFUR EMPHASIZED THE ENORMOUS LOGISTICAL CHALLENGE OF ORGANIZING AND DEPLOYING GOLKAR'S THOUSAND-PLUS NATIONAL LEVEL CAMPAIGNERS, WHO WOULD BE LINKED UP WITH REPRESENTATIVES AT LOCAL LEVELS, THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY DURING THE CAMPAIGN. ALL OF THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGNERS

CONFIDENTIAL

WOULD GATHER IN JAKARTA ON APRIL 24 FOR A FINAL MEETING BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN. THEMATICALLY, GOLKAR WOULD FOCUS ON ITS FUTURE VISION OF WHAT INDONESIA SHOULD BE IN THE YEAR 2018, CURRENT ISSUES FACING THE COUNTRY, AND OBJECTIVES ALREADY ACHIEVED. GAFUR OFFERED NO DETAILS ON GOLKAR'S IDEAS OR PROGRAMS, BUT PRESENTED POLOFF WITH SIX BOOKS THAT WERE BEING USED TO PREPARE THE CAMPAIGNERS. THE BOOKS ARE TITLED:

BOOK ONE: "RESULTS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT"

BOOK TWO: "RESULTS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, LEVEL TWO" (PROFILES EACH PROVINCE)

BOOK THREE: "GOLKAR'S STANDPOINT ON CURRENT PROBLEMS"

BOOK FOUR: "VISION OF NEW ORDER DEVELOPMENT WITHIN SECOND LONG TERM TIMEFRAME: PICTURE OF INDONESIAN SOCIETY IN 2018"

BOOK FIVE: "MAIN THEMES, THEMES, SUB-THEMES AND SLOGANS FOR GOLKAR'S 1997 ELECTION CAMPAIGN"

BOOK SIX: "IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES FROM GOLKAR CENTRAL BOARD"

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0338

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0338

PAGE 01 JAKART 02436 02 OF 07 240629Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/042W					

----------B31C29 240629Z /38

R 240628Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5524
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS
USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ECON, ID, PINR
SUBJECT: THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN: AT THE STARTING GATE

6. (SBU) BOOKS ONE AND TWO ARE FULL OF STATISTICS. THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST IS DIVIDED INTO SECTIONS ON THE ECONOMY, THE PEOPLE'S PROSPERITY, AND POLITICS, GOVERNMENT APPARATUS, LAW AND INFORMATION. THE SECOND HAS STATISTICS AND INFORMATION FOR EACH OF INDONESIA'S 27 PROVINCES. THE THIRD PROVIDES SUGGESTED ANSWERS FOR CAMPAIGNERS TO USE TO DIFFICULT QUESTIONS THAT MIGHT BE ASKED IN THE DIALOGUES. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE ARE SECTIONS ON "GOLPUT" (ELECTION BOYCOTT), DUAL FUNCTION OF THE MILITARY, PARLIAMENT'S ROLE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, COLLUSION/CORRUPTION, THE ROLE OF NGOS, THE ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW, ETC. BOOK FOUR IS A "VISION STATEMENT," AND BOOK FIVE FLESHES OUTS SLOGANS AND SUB-THEMES TO ACCOMPANY BROADER THEMES.

7. (C) GAFUR DESCRIBED A THREE PRONGED SYSTEM FOR CONDUCTING THE NEW STYLE "DIALOGUE" CAMPAIGN PLANNED FOR THIS ELECTION. CAMPAIGNERS WOULD STILL ADDRESS VOTERS IN "MONOLOGUES" (SPEECHES), COMPLETE WITH ENTERTAINMENT, WHICH COULD TAKE PLACE IN PUBLIC OUTDOOR SPACES. HOWEVER, THESE GATHERINGS WOULD BE MORE CONTROLLED AND NOT AS LARGE AS IN THE PAST. THERE WOULD ALSO BE "DIALOGUE" EVENTS INSIDE BUILDINGS HIRED BY GOLKAR WHERE CAMPAIGNERS WOULD HAVE EXCHANGES WITH GOLKAR MEMBERS AND "SYMPATHIZERS." FINALLY, THERE WERE NINE TELEVISION SPOTS FOR EACH PARTY THAT WOULD BE BROADCAST NATION WIDE ON THE GOVERNMENT TELEVISION STATION "TVRI." TWO OF THE NINE WOULD BE "MONOLOGUES," ONE BY PARTY GENERAL CHAIRMAN HARMOKO AND ONE BY GAFUR.

8. (C) ONE OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVES WOULD BE TO STOP THE LARGE MASS STREET RALLIES THAT HAD BEEN POPULAR IN PAST CAMPAIGNS. EACH PARTY WOULD HAVE TO REGISTER ITS VEHICLES

WITH THE POLICE AND PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE ROUTES THAT WOULD BE USED TO ARRIVE AT PUBLIC CAMPAIGN EVENTS. HOWEVER, GAFUR EXPECTED THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS NEW SYSTEM WOULD NOT BE SMOOTH, AND IMPLIED THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME FLEXIBILITY, AT LEAST AT THE OUTSET, IN ITS ENFORCEMENT. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A WHOLE NEW SYSTEM OF RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE BOOKS, IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN HOW THE NEW SYSTEM WOULD BE "PRACTICED IN THE FIELD." THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO "WAIT AND SEE." FOR EXAMPLE, IT WOULD BE A PROBLEM IF AFTER A CAMPAIGN EVENT THE PARTICIPANTS BOARDED THEIR VEHICLES AND PARADED AROUND THE CITY.

9. (C) GAFUR DESCRIBED GOLKAR'S BIGGEST ELECTION CHALLENGE AS "WINNING OVER YOUNG PEOPLE" WHO, AS A RESULT OF SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT POLICES, NOW "TAKE THINKS FOR GRANTED." MOVEOVER, THEY WERE BETTER EDUCATED AND HAD ACCESS TO MORE EDUCATION WHICH MADE THEM MORE CRITICAL. (NOTE: IT IS WIDELY EXPECTED THAT, GIVEN THE YOUTH OF THE INDONESIAN POPULATION, FIRST-TIME VOTERS WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THIS ELECTION. END NOTE.)

10. (C) BESIDES BEING THE [redacted] B1

HE SAID THAT GOLKAR'S VOTE TARGET IN JAKARTA WAS SIXTY PERCENT (UP FROM THE 54.4 IT OFFICIALLY SECURED IN 1992) AND 72 PERCENT IN WEST JAVA (ACHIEVED 70.4 IN 1992). HE SAID THAT EVERYONE WANTED TO WIN THE CAPITAL, [redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

DOWNPLAYED THE RESTRICTIVENESS OF THE NEW RULES (NOTE: IN ADDITION TO SEVERELY CIRCUMSCRIBING MASS STREET RALLIES IN FAVOR OF A "DIALOGUE CAMPAIGN" IN CONTROLLED AREAS, THESE INCLUDED RULES THAT WOULD EFFECTIVELY REDUCE THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD TO NINE DAYS IN EACH AREA OF THE COUNTRY, REQUIRE PRE-SCREENING BROADCAST CAMPAIGN SPEECHES ON OTHER MATERIAL, ETC. END NOTE.). SHE CONTENDED THAT THE CONCEPT OF MOVING FROM A MASS BASED EFFORT TO A MORE CONTROLLED "DIALOGUE" CAMPAIGN WAS INTENDED TO PREVENT THE VIOLENCE THAT HAD OCCURRED IN THE PAST, AS WELL AS TO MAKE THE CAMPAIGN MORE "SUBSTANTIVE." IN THE PAST, PEOPLE HAD ATTENDED CAMPAIGN EVENTS SIMPLY TO LISTEN PASSIVELY OR TO BE ENTERTAINED. IN THE NEW CAMPAIGN, THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO ENGAGE WITH THE CANDIDATES AND THE CAMPAIGN REPRESENTATIVES. SHE DID ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT WOULD BE

PAGE 01 JAKART 02436 03 OF 07 240629Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/042W					

----------B31C2D 240629Z /38

R 240628Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5525
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 07 JAKARTA 002436

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS
USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ECON, ID, PINR
SUBJECT: THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN: AT THE STARTING GATE

EASIER FOR "EDUCATED PEOPLE" TO BECOME ADJUSTED TO THE NEW CAMPAIGN SYSTEM.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02436 03 OF 07 240629Z

B1

12. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT GOLKAR HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY PREPARING ITS REPRESENTATIVES TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS NEW CAMPAIGN FRAMEWORK. THE TRAINING ADDRESSED PROCESS ISSUES SUCH AS HOW TO ORGANIZE THE CAMPAIGN EVENTS. IT ALSO SERVED TO FAMILIARIZE THE CAMPAIGNERS WITH THE CONCERNS OF PEOPLE IN

SPECIFIC AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. CAMPAIGNERS WERE BRIEFED ON ISSUES THAT THEY WOULD BE ASKED ABOUT, SUCH AS THE PROBLEMS OF THE BUREAUCRACY, BANKING, ETC.

13. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT GOLKAR'S TELEVISION CAMPAIGN WOULD FOCUS ON "WHERE INDONESIA WOULD BE BY THE YEAR 2018." GOLKAR WOULD USE SEVEN OF THE NINE TELEVISION SPOTS PERMITTED BY THE RULES TO FOCUS ON A "STRATEGIC TARGET GROUP." SHE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED WOMEN, FARMERS AND THE FISHING INDUSTRY, AND YOUTH. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL APPROACHES IN THIS AND OTHER PARTS OF THE CAMPAIGN WOULD BE TO FOCUS ON THE RELATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN PEOPLE'S LIVES. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE TELEVISION SESSION ON FARMERS AND THE FISHING INDUSTRY, THE GOLKAR REPRESENTATIVES WOULD USE STATISTICS TO SHOW WHERE PEOPLE HAD STARTED FROM ECONOMICALLY, WHERE THEY WERE NOW, AND WHERE THEY WERE GOING. SHE THOUGHT THAT ALL CAMPAIGN SESSIONS INVOLVING YOUTH GROUPS WERE ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT BECAUSE THEY ASKED THE TOUGHEST QUESTIONS. B1

14. (C) [redacted] IS RESPONSIBLE FOR GOLKAR'S OVERALL CAMPAIGN EFFORT IN THE FOUR PROVINCES OF SULAWESI. SHE MENTIONED THAT GOLKAR TRADITIONALLY WON 90 PERCENT OF THE VOTE IN SULAWESI, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HER JOB WAS FAR EASIER THAN THAT OF PRESIDENTIAL DAUGHTER SITI HARDIYANTI B1

CONFIDENTIAL

(TUTUT), WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF THE CAMPAIGN IN CENTRAL AND EAST JAVA WHERE GOLKAR'S SECURED RELATIVELY LESS VOTES IN 1992 (55.4 AND 58.8 PERCENT RESPECTIVELY). SHE SAID MORE REGIONAL AUTONOMY WAS A MAJOR INTEREST OF CITIZENS IN SULAWESI [redacted]. A MAJOR OBJECTIVE WAS TO LISTEN TO THEIR CONCERNS AND TO RECEIVE THEIR INPUT. B1

15. (C) HOWEVER, SHE SAID THAT GOLKAR'S APPROACH TO DEALING WITH THESE CONCERNS ABOUT AUTONOMY WAS TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE PEOPLE, MAINLY THROUGH THE USE OF STATISTICS, THAT THEY REALLY WERE BETTER OFF THAN THEY PERCEIVED. MOVEOVER, IT WAS IMPRESSED UPON THE CAMPAIGNERS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT MAKE PROMISES BECAUSE THE CITIZENS MIGHT EXPECT THEM TO FOLLOW THROUGH.

16. (C) [redacted] TOLD B1
POLCOUNS APRIL 19 THAT GOLKAR WOULD INCLUDE AMONG ITS THEMES FOR THE CAMPAIGN "OPENNESS," "EMPOWERMENT OF THE PEOPLE" AND "DEMOCRATIZATION. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO OFFER SPECIFIC POLICY IDEAS WHICH WOULD ADVANCE THESE OBJECTIVES, BUT ADDED THAT BY "EMPOWERMENT," GOLKAR AIMED TO INCREASE BOTH THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POWER OF THOSE OUTSIDE THE MIDDLE CLASS. [redacted] SAID THAT IT WOULD BE B1
WRONG TO THINK THAT GOLKAR WAS ONLY EMPLOYING THESE OBJECTIVES RHETORICALLY, ADDING THAT GOLKAR CANDIDATES LIKE HIMSELF WOULD BE WORKING DIRECTLY AMONG THE PEOPLE IN THEIR ASSIGNED DISTRICTS AND WOULD THEREFORE NEED TO RESPOND TO VOTERS' QUESTIONS ABOUT SPECIFICS.

PPP AND GOVERNMENT-BACKED PDI SAY CAMPAIGN TILTED AGAINST
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02436 03 OF 07 240629Z

THEM AND ELECTION WILL BE MARRED BY FRAUD

17. (C) [redacted] B1
THAT ALL OF THE NEW RESTRICTIVE CAMPAIGN RULES WERE DETRIMENTAL TO HIS PARTY'S EFFORTS. HE BELIEVED THE RULES CUT OFF THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE MINORITY PARTIES TO "REACH OUT" TO FOLLOWERS AND POTENTIAL NEW SUPPORTERS, ESPECIALLY THE YOUNG. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TRY TO ENFORCE THE NEW RULES WAS A KEY QUESTION, ACCORDING TO [redacted] IT WAS NOT CLEAR B1
WHETHER PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WOULD BE FULLY AWARE OF THE NEW SITUATION. HE ALSO CITED THE LACK OF CAMPAIGN FUNDS TO BE SUPPLIED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO EACH PARTY AS A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT. FUNDS WERE REQUIRED ESPECIALLY FOR TRANSPORTATION AND TO PREPARE AREAS FOR THE CAMPAIGN (SUPPLYING T-SHIRTS IN THE PDI COLOR RED, FOR EXAMPLE). B1

18. (C) [redacted] EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF ELECTION FRAUD. THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWED EACH PARTY TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO EACH OF THE THOUSANDS OF POLLING STATIONS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY TO OBSERVE THE

VOTING AND THE VOTE COUNTING. [redacted] EXPLAINED THAT THIS B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0340

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0340

PAGE 01 JAKART 02436 04 OF 07 240629Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/042W					

----------B31C39 240629Z /38

R 240628Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5526
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 07 JAKARTA 002436

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS
USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ECON, ID, PINR
SUBJECT: THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN: AT THE STARTING GATE

SOUNDED GOOD IN THEORY, BUT IN PRACTICE THE MECHANISM BY WHICH THE WITNESSES WERE SELECTED AND APPROVED WAS DEEPLY

FLAWED. THE LOCAL DISTRICT HEAD (OR "BUPATI," A GOLKAR MEMBER) HAD APPROVAL AUTHORITY OVER THE ENTIRE LIST FOR HIS AREA AND COULD BLOCK CHOICES PROPOSED BY THE MINORITY PARTIES. IN ADDITION, THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT LOGISTICAL PROBLEM. IN MANY CASES, THE PROPOSED PARTY WITNESS HAD TO JOURNEY FROM THE VILLAGE WHERE HE OR SHE LIVED, AND WOULD WITNESS THE ELECTION, TO THE LOCATION OF THE DISTRICT HEAD TO GET APPROVAL. IF THE DISTRICT HEAD WAS UNAVAILABLE OR FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER, THE PROPOSED WITNESS WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED ON THE LIST. IN THIS WAY, THE MINORITY PARTIES DID NOT HAVE THE WITNESSES THEY WANTED, OR ANY WITNESSES AT ALL, AT MANY POLLING STATIONS.

19. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT IN AN EFFORT TO REMEDY THIS SITUATION, PDI HAD WRITTEN TO THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS PROPOSING THAT ALL PARTIES BE PERMITTED TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN ELECTION WITNESSES (TWO FOR EACH POLLING STATION) WITHOUT APPROVAL FROM THE DISTRICT HEAD. THEY HAD NOT YET RECEIVED A RESPONSE. [redacted] ALSO MENTIONED THAT WHILE IN PRINCIPLE THE WITNESSES WERE SUPPOSED TO BE PERMITTED TO SEE CLEARLY EACH BALLOT AS IT WAS PUBLICLY COUNTED, IN PRACTICE THIS WAS OFTEN NOT THE CASE. THE WITNESSES WERE PLACED FAR ENOUGH AWAY FROM THE COUNTING AREA SO THAT THEY COULD NOT SEE IF THE BALLOT THAT WAS HELD UP HAD BEEN MARKED FOR GOLKAR, THE PPP, OR PDI. (NOTE: IRONICALLY, FRAUD AND RESTRICTIONS ON MASS CAMPAIGNING COULD HELP THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED PDI. IT FEARS DISRUPTIONS FROM SUPPORTERS OF OUSTED PDI LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI. ALSO, SOME OBSERVERS SUSPECT THAT THE GOI WILL BE FORCED TO HELP THE PDI THROUGH FRAUD IF THAT PARTY IS TO HAVE A RESPECTABLE SHOWING, GIVEN THE ANGER OF MEGAWATI'S

B1

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

SUPPORTERS AT THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED LEADERSHIP OF THE PDI. END NOTE.)

20. (C) PPP HAS BEEN SIMILARLY FOCUSSED ON A FLAWED CAMPAIGN PROCESS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF ELECTION FRAUD. [redacted] AND A PARLIAMENTARIAN, EXPRESSED CONCERNS SIMILAR TO [redacted] HE TOLD POLOFF THAT THE NEW CAMPAIGN RULES "MADE IT VERY HARD FOR THE PPP TO COMPETE" AGAINST GOLKAR. HE QUESTIONED GOLKAR'S MOTIVES FOR PUSHING A "DIALOGUE" CAMPAIGN. PPP HAD SUGGESTED THAT THESE DIALOGUES BE HELD BETWEEN THE THREE PARTIES, BUT HAD BEEN REBUFFED BY GOLKAR WHO HAD INSISTED THAT THE PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS BE HELD STRICTLY WITHIN EACH PARTY. [redacted] BELIEVED THAT GOLKAR WANTED A "SCRIPTED" DIALOGUE ONLY. GIVEN THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE OFFICIAL CAMPAIGN RULES, THE HEAD PPP'S "WINNING THE ELECTION" COMMITTEE HAD EARLIER TOLD POLOFF THAT THE PARTY WOULD ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT THE RULES BY HOLDING SMALL, NON-OFFICIAL MEETINGS WITH EXISTING AND NEW SUPPORTERS.

B1

B1

B1

21. (C) [redacted] EMPHASIZED HIS BELIEF THAT ELECTION FRAUD WOULD PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE, IN SOME PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, IN GOLKAR'S INEVITABLE VICTORY. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ELECTION WAS RELATIVELY COMPETITIVE IN JAVA BECAUSE OF MEDIA EXPOSURE AND A RELATIVELY HIGHER DEGREE OF CULTURAL SOPHISTICATION (NOTE: HE IS FROM CENTRAL JAVA. END NOTE.) HOWEVER, HE CONTENDED THAT OUTSIDE OF JAVA, THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR HAD "RELATIVELY MORE CONTROL" THROUGH FRAUD, AND HE HAD NO IDEA WHAT PPP'S PROSPECTS MIGHT BE IN THOSE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. HE HAD EMPHASIZED TO THE

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE (KIPP) THAT IT SHOULD FOCUS ITS EFFORTS ON THE OUTER ISLANDS.

22. (C) PPP'S SECRETARY GENERAL TOSARI WIDJAJA WAS SIMILARLY FOCUSSED ON THE CERTAINTY OF CAMPAIGN VIOLATIONS AND ELECTION FRAUD, AND WAS DISCOURAGED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR PPP TO BE ABLE TO COMPETE EFFECTIVELY, IN A DISCUSSION WITH LABATT ON APRIL 10. HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM MEDAN, WHERE PPP HAD BEEN TRAINING IT CAMPAIGNERS TO SPOT PROBLEMS IN THE CAMPAIGN PROCEDURES AND VOTING (REFTEL B). HE SAID THAT PPP WAS MAKING A SPECIAL EFFORT TO COMPILE A RECORD OF VIOLATIONS IN THE CAMPAIGN AND VOTING, AND THAT IT PLANNED TO SHARE THIS INFORMATION WITH THE EMBASSY AFTERWARD. LIKE [redacted] HE WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT AREAS OUTSIDE OF JAVA (SPECIFICALLY SOUTH SUMATRA, LAMPUNG, KALIMANTAN, AND NUSA TENGGARA), WHICH HE SAID WERE BEYOND THE REACH OF MONITORS AND WERE COMPLETELY CONTROLLED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLITICAL APPARATUS. B1

EXAMPLES OF GOVERNMENT BACKED PDI'S CAMPAIGN THEMES

23. (C) SURYADI, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GOVERNMENT BACKED PDI, DISCUSSED SOME OF HIS PARTY'S CAMPAIGN THEMES DURING A MEETING WITH POLCOUNS AND POLOFF ON APRIL 17. HE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0341

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0341

PAGE 01 JAKART 02436 05 OF 07 240629Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-10 ACDE-00 AID-00 ACQ-01 CEA-01 CIAE-00

SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
G-00	/042W					

----------B31C3C 240629Z /38

R 240628Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5527
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 07 JAKARTA 002436

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS
USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ECON, ID, PINR
SUBJECT: THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN: AT THE STARTING GATE

BELIEVED THAT THE BASIC NATIONAL PROBLEMS REMAINED THE SAME AS FIVE YEARS AGO, AND LISTED POVERTY, DEMOCRACY,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02436 05 OF 07 240629Z

EDUCATION, MANPOWER, AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GAPS AS EXAMPLES. IN TERMS OF SOLUTIONS, HE BELIEVED THAT THE PRIORITIES OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS SHOULD BE CHANGED. WITHIN THE NATION'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, THE ECONOMY HAD BEEN EMPHASIZED AT THE EXPENSE OF POLITICAL LIFE, EDUCATION, CULTURE AND MORAL CHARACTER BUILDING.

24. (C) DISCUSSING POLITICAL REFORM, SURYADI SAID THAT INDONESIA HAD "THE STRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS THAT A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT NEEDED." HOWEVER, IT DID NOT YET HAVE THE "SUBSTANCE OF DEMOCRACY," AND THIS WAS A PRINCIPAL PDI OBJECTIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, PDI AND PPP SHOULD

NOT JUST "EXIST AS POLITICAL PARTIES," BUT SHOULD ACT AS THE CONSTITUTION PROMISED. HE SAID THE PDI WOULD PROPOSE REVIEW OF FOUR OF THE FIVE "POLITICAL LAWS." (NOTE: THESE ARE WIDELY SEEN AS PROVIDING PART OF THE BASIC FOUNDATION OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE THAT GUARANTEES GOLKAR DOMINANCE AND WEAKENS THE MINORITY POLITICAL PARTIES. CALLING FOR REPEAL OF THESE LAWS HAS BEEN A PLATFORM ITEM OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S PARTY OR PRD, AND ONE OF THE REASONS CITED BY THE GOI FOR CHARGING IT WITH SUBVERSION. END NOTE.) HE ALSO WANTED TO CHANGE THE SYSTEM SO THAT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) AND THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) WERE NO LONGER THE SAME, AND HE REPEATED HIS PUBLIC CALL FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW MINORITY PARTY MEMBERS INTO THE CABINET.

25. (C) REGARDING SOCIAL JUSTICE, PDI DID NOT SEEK TO STOP THE GROWTH OF THE RICH, BUT INSTEAD BELIEVED THERE SHOULD BE MORE PRIORITY ON HELPING POOR, WEAK, AND REMOTE AREAS OF INDONESIA. SURYADI SAID THAT HE FULLY SUPPORTED

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S STATE BUDGET FOR 1997-98 WHICH PLACED MORE EMPHASIS ON REMOTE AREAS AND THE POOR.

EXAMPLES OF PPP CAMPAIGN THEMES

26. (C) [redacted] OUTLINED B1
SEVERAL ISSUES THAT HIS PARTY WOULD BE FOCUSSING ON DURING THE CAMPAIGN AND AFTERWARD. PPP WANTED "FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF PANCASILA DEMOCRACY" BY ALLOWING REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE MINORITY PARTIES INTO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (NOTE: THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR COMPLETELY CONTROLS THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. END NOTE.) HE POINTED OUT THAT THE CURRENT SYSTEM ALLOWED NO OPPOSITION, AND ALL POLITICAL PLAYERS WERE SUPPOSED TO WORK TOGETHER TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THE MINORITY PARTIES, PPP AND PDI, WERE PERMITTED A ROLE IN FORMULATING THE STATE GUIDELINES APPROVED EVERY FIVE YEARS BY THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY. HOWEVER, ONCE THAT WAS COMPLETE, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH CARRIED OUT THE IMPLEMENTATION AND THE MINORITY PARTIES WERE COMPLETELY EXCLUDED. IN

ADDITION TO SOME REPRESENTATION IN THE CABINET, THE MINORITY PARITIES SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AS VICE-GOVERNORS AND VICE-REGENTS. IF THIS WAS NOT PERMITTED, THEN PPP WOULD CONSIDER BECOMING A TRUE OPPOSITION. THE MINORITY PARTIES WERE REPRESENTED AND GIVEN LEADERSHIP ROLES WITHIN THE PARLIAMENT, BUT THE PARLIAMENT WAS FOR THE MOST PART AN "OBSERVER," IN SOME CASES A "CONTROLLER," BUT NEVER AN IMPLEMENTER.

27. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THE PPP'S ECONOMIC THEMES B1
CONFIDENTIAL

WOULD FOCUS ON POVERTY ALLEVIATION, AND MAKING SURE THAT MANY WHO WERE NOT COVERED NOW WERE INCLUDED IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS. THE PARTY WOULD SPOTLIGHT THE PROBLEM OF THE RULING PARTY'S "NEPOTISM," ESPECIALLY IN ITS SELECTION OF CAMPAIGN CANDIDATES FOR THE ELECTION. HE CLAIMED THAT PPP DID NOT ENGAGE IN ANY NEPOTISM. HE SAID THAT ANOTHER THEME WOULD BE THE "POLITICS OF TAXPAYERS." THE GOVERNMENT ONLY RECOGNIZED THE IFLUENCE OF THE COUNTRY'S LARGEST TAXPAYERS, INORING TAXES PAID BY REGULAR CITIZENS IN EVERY DAY LIFE. THIS SHOULD MAKE THE GOVERNMENT MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE PEOPLE. FOR EXAMPLE, HE CITED THAT 70 PERCENT OF THE MILITARY BUDGET WAS PAID FOR BY TAXPAYERS. OTHER ISSUES THAT THE PARTY WOULD ADDRESS WOULD INCLUDE CLEAN GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATION.

GOI'S CONCERNS ABOUT CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION

[redacted] B1

RECENTLY OUTLINED HIS VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION AT A SMALL PRIVATE BRIEFING FOR THE U.S.-ASEAN BUSINESS COUNCIL. [redacted] B1 POINTED OUT THAT WHILE THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR ALWAYS WON, IT LOST SEVENTEEN SEATS IN PARLIAMENT IN THE 1992 ELECTION

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0342

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0342

PAGE 01 JAKART 02436 06 OF 07 240630Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/042W					

----------B31C4C 240630Z /38

R 240628Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5528
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 07 JAKARTA 002436

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS
USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ECON, ID, PINR
SUBJECT: THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN: AT THE STARTING GATE

(PDI GAINED SIXTEEN AND PPP ONE). HE BELIEVED THIS LOSS
WAS EXTRAORDINARY GIVEN THE "RESOURCES AND BACKING" THAT

THE GOVERNMENT PARTY RECEIVED FROM THE "BUREAUCRACY" (REFTEL H). THIS OUTCOME, HE CONTENDED, SHOWED THAT THE HIGHLY CONSTRAINED ELECTION SYSTEM COULD "REGISTER PUBLIC MOODS" AND ACT AS "SOMETHING OF A POLLING MECHANISM." GOLKAR WAS DETERMINED TO GAIN BACK THE LOST SEATS IN THIS ELECTION, AND HAD SET A GOAL OF WINNING 70 PERCENT OF THE VOTE.

29. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT INDONESIA TYPICALLY HAD A VOTING TURNOUT OF 95 PERCENT (NOTE: OTHER OBSERVERS HAVE ESTIMATED THE NUMBER TO BE 90 PERCENT. END NOTE.) HE CHARACTERIZED THIS AS VOTER "INVOLVEMENT" NOT "PARTICIPATION," DUE TO ITS OBLIGATORY NATURE. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO LAW REQUIRING A CITIZEN TO VOTE, THE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY "ENCOURAGED" PEOPLE TO DO SO. MOREOVER, HE SAID, VOTING WAS SEEN AS A "MORAL OBLIGATION" AND A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EVENT, AND IF THE LOCALS GATHERED AROUND THE VOTING STATION ON ELECTION DAY NOTICED THAT ONE OF THEIR NEIGHBORS WAS NOT PRESENT, THEY WOULD GO LOOKING FOR THAT PERSON. B1

30. (C) [redacted] EXPLAINED THAT THE GOI WANTED TO "PERFECT" THE ELECTION. THE "REPUTATION" OF THE ELECTION HINGED MORE ON THE PERCENTAGE OF NON-VOTERS THAN ON ITS ORDERLY IMPLEMENTATION. [redacted] BELIEVED THAT THIS ELECTION HAD BEEN COLORED BY "MORE VISIBLE VOICES OF DISSENT." THERE WERE THOSE WHO QUESTIONED WHETHER THEY SHOULD VOTE OR WHETHER THE ELECTION WOULD BE "FAIR AND EVEN-HANDED." THE GOVERNMENT WAS "APPREHENSIVE" AND WORRIED THAT THERE WOULD BE A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF NON-VOTERS ("GOLPUT" WHICH MEANS "GOLONGAN PUTIH" OR WHITE/NEUTRAL GROUP). B1 B1

31. (C) REPEATED PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, AS WELL AS OTHER HIGH LEVEL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS, IN THE RUN UP TO THE ELECTION HAVE UNDERSCORED THE GOI'S CONCERNS ABOUT VOTER PARTICIPATION AND POTENTIAL DISRUPTIONS TO THE CAMPAIGN. SOEHARTO WAS QUOTED IN THE PRESS ON MARCH 14 AS WARNING PUBLICLY THAT "WHOEVER ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT THE PEOPLE FROM GOING TO THE POLLS ON ELECTION DAY AND DISTURBS THE COURSE OF THE EVENT WILL BE DEALT WITH SEVERELY." THIS CAME TWO WEEKS AFTER HE SAID PUBLICLY THAT ALL CITIZENS SHOULD VOTE BECAUSE IT WAS THEIR OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF DEVELOPMENT. AT THE BEGINNING OF APRIL, IT WAS WIDELY REPORTED IN THE MEDIA THAT THE PRESIDENT TOLD TOP MILITARY LEADERS TO ENSURE THAT THE ELECTION WAS "SMOOTH."

PROSPECTS FOR VIOLENCE DURING THE CAMPAIGN
---

32. (C) THERE IS WIDESPREAD CONCERN THAT POLITICAL VIOLENCE WILL OCCUR DURING THE CAMPAIGN, ESPECIALLY IN CENTRAL JAVA. THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN SPORADIC INCIDENTS DURING THE PRE-CAMPAIGN IN CENTRAL JAVA, BALI, JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE (REFTELS C, D, G AND F). GAFUR, THE HEAD OF GOLKAR'S ELECTION EFFORT, OFFERD HIS VIEW TO POLOFF THAT THERE WAS "GREAT EMOTION" IN THE COUNTRY AT THE MOMENT. THIS COULD BE SEEN FROM THE RIOTS IN SITUBONDO, TASIKMALAYA, AND MORE RECENTLY IN PEKALONGAN. THIS MEANT THAT GOLKAR HAD TO BE VERY CAREFUL DURING THE CAMPAIGN. GAFUR SPECIFIED THAT ACEH WAS CALM (NOTE: HAS BEEN A TROUBLE SPOT FOR GOLKAR IN THE PAST. END NOTE), BUT THAT

"JAVA WAS ANOTHER THING."

33. (C) SURYADI, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED FACTION OF THE PDI, DIRECTLY ACKNOWLEDGED TO POLCOUNS AND POLOFF THAT HIS OPERATION WAS UNDER THREAT FROM MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS IN CENTRAL JAVA. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN TRYING TO INTIMIDATE HIS PEOPLE, EVEN THROUGH "PHYSICAL POWER." IF HIS SUPPORTERS TRIED TO PUT UP A PDI FLAG,

WITHIN TWO TO THREE HOURS IT WOULD BE REMOVED BY THE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS. HE CLAIMED THAT THEY WOULD EVEN COME TO THE PDI OFFICES TO DESTROY THE BUILDINGS. IN A FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SURYADI'S WEAK POSITION, PDI CENTRAL BOARD MEMBER ANWAR DATUK TOLD POLOFF THAT IT WAS HIS HOPE THAT TRADITIONAL PDI VOTERS, ESPECIALLY MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS, WOULD SIMPLY "SEE THE NAME PDI" AND GIVE THEIR VOTES TO THE PARTY.

B1

34. (C) [redacted] MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, TOLD POLOFF HE WAS HOPEFUL, BUT NOT OPTIMISTIC, THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MORE VIOLENCE DURING THE CAMPAIGN SIMILAR TO THE CLASHES BETWEEN GOLKAR AND THE PPP THAT HAVE OCCURRED SINCE THE END OF MARCH IN CENTRAL JAVA. HE BELIEVED THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF ANGER IN THE POPULATION THAT WAS BEING FOCUSSED ON SUCH ISSUES AS A POPULAR ENTERTAINMENT FIGURE AND CAMPAIGNER, WHO USED TO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0344

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0344

PAGE 01 JAKART 02436 07 OF 07 240630Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09

G-00 /042W

----------B31C50 240630Z /38

R 240628Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5529
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 07 JAKARTA 002436

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS
USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ECON, ID, PINR
SUBJECT: THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN: AT THE STARTING GATE

BE PPP, SWITCHING OVER TO GOLKAR. A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL BOARD OF MUHAMMADIYAH, INDONESIA'S SECOND LARGEST ISLAMIC

CONFIDENTIAL

ORGANIZATION, SIMILARLY COMMENTED TO POLOFF THAT THE RECENT POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL JAVA WAS A PRODUCT OF AN "ACCUMULATION OF ANGER," PARTICULARLY WITH THE PERCEPTION THAT OFFICIALS WERE "COLLUDING" WITH THE RULING PARTY. PEOPLE WERE ESPECIALLY UPSET OVER THE "YELLOWIZATION" CAMPAIGN (OFFICIAL COLOR OF RULING PARTY GOLKAR) THAT HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT OVER THE PAST YEAR IN CENTRAL JAVA. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1882

PAGE 01 JAKART 02633 01 OF 04 021100Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/040W						

----------B60F8A 021100Z /38

R 021100Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5648
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002633

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: MUSLIM YOUTH AND EDUCATIONAL GROUPS INDIRECTLY CALL FOR ELECTION BOYCOTT

REF: JAKARTA 1500

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON 1.5 (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02633 01 OF 04 021100Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

2. (C) SUMMARY: A "MORAL MESSAGE" IN THE NAME OF EIGHT YOUTH AND EDUCATIONAL GROUPS OF THE "BIG FAMILY OF NAHDLATUL ULAMA" (NU IS INDONESIA'S LARGEST MUSLIM ORGANIZATION) RELEASED APRIL 25 HAS INDIRECTLY CALLED FOR AN ELECTION BOYCOTT. THE CHAIRMAN OF NU, ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, QUICKLY DISTANCED HIMSELF FROM THE MESSAGE, CALLING THE YOUTH "IMPUDENT" AND SAYING HE WAS NOT INFORMED ABOUT IT IN ADVANCE. ON OF HIS CHIEF POLITICAL DEPUTIES REITERATED TO US PRIVATELY THAT NU DID NOT AGREE WITH THE PARTS OF THE STATEMENT THAT INDIRECTLY CALLED FOR AN ELECTION BOYCOTT. THE SPONSORS, HOWEVER, SAID ABDURRAHMAN WAHID "HAD TO BE ANGRY" TO PROTECT THE ORGANIZATION. THEY SAID THAT THEY HAD CONSULTED WITH HIM AND OTHER NU LEADERS MANY TIMES PRIOR TO DRAFTING THE MESSAGE, AND THEY BELIEVED THAT HE AGREED WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF IT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GROUPS ARE ALSO REMINDING WAHID THAT THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS CANNOT BE TAKEN LIGHTLY AND OF THEIR INFLUENCE WITHIN NU. END SUMMARY.

3. (SBU) ON APRIL 25, SEVERAL NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) YOUTH AND STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS, AND THREE NU INSTITUTES, ISSUED THE FOLLOWING MORAL MESSAGE CONCERNING THE MAY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS:

TEXT OF THE MESSAGE (INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION):

TITLE: MORAL MESSAGE OF THE BIG FAMILY OF THE NU IN THE RUN-UP TO THE 1997 GENERAL ELECTION

THE GENERAL ELECTION IS AN IMPORTANT TOOL WHEREBY TO GAUGE WHETHER POWER IN A COUNTRY IS GAINED THROUGH PUBLIC CONSENT OR SEIZED BY AN ILLEGITIMATE FORCE, WHETHER POWER CAN BE CIRCULATED

PERIODICALLY, OPEN TO ANYBODY, OR WHETHER IT HAS BECOME A VESTED INTEREST FOR A CERTAIN CLAN, WHETHER POWER IS BEING ADMINISTERED IN A DEMOCRATIC MANNER, OR WHETHER IT HAS BECOME AN "INTERNAL" AFFAIR OF A PRIVILEGED GROUP, WHETHER POWER IS ADMINISTERED IN A "NORMAL" MANNER OR BASED ON EMERGENCY MEASURES.

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, WE CONSIDER THE GENERAL ELECTION IMPORTANT.

THE GENERAL ELECTION IS A RIGHT, NOT AN OBLIGATION TO EVERY INDONESIAN CITIZEN. IT IS A RIGHT BECAUSE EVERY CITIZEN HAS FULL FREEDOM TO EXPRESS OR RESCIND HIS APPROVAL OF THE EXISTING "SYSTEM." IT IS NOT AN OBLIGATION, SINCE IT IS CONTRARY TO SUCH FREEDOM. IN LINE WITH THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK DESIRED BY THE NU'S 1926 ORIGINAL LINE, EVERY NU MEMBER HAS THE FULL RIGHT TO VOTE FOR ANY OF THE THREE PARTIES WITH NO ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT TO ANY OF THEM. THE POLITICAL LINE OF THE NU REQUIRES THAT EVERY NU MEMBER USES HIS/HER RIGHT IN A FULLY RESPONSIBLE MANNER.

BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO PRETEND TO OVERLOOK THE REALITY THAT SOME SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY FEEL THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO USE THEIR RIGHTS FOR SOME REASONS OR OTHER. THERE IS A STRONG DISSATISFACTION AMONG MEMBERS OF SOCIETY WITH THE EXISTING "SYSTEM," WHILE THEY THINK THAT THE ELECTION ITSELF IS UNABLE TO FULLY ENSURE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE SYSTEM. THERE IS A FEELING THAT THE GENERAL ELECTION HAS BECOME A "TOOL" IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING POWER, NOT TO ENSURE CIRCULATION OF POWER OPEN TO EVERY CITIZEN. THERE IS A FEELING THAT THE ELECTION IS A MERE "TRICK" WHEREBY TO SHOW TO THE PEOPLE THAT THE CURRENT POWER IS LEGITIMATE. THERE IS A FEELING THAT THE "RULING" POLITICAL PARTY SEEKS TO WIN VICTORY BY ANY MEANS, SO POLITICAL DECORUM IS NO

LONGER HEEDED. THERE IS A FEELING THAT THE RIGHT TO SUPERVISE THE GENERAL ELECTION HAS BECOME THE MONOPOLY OF A CERTAIN GOVERNMENT AGENCY, AS A RESULT, AN AUTONOMOUS PUBLIC CONTROL IS BECOMING DIFFICULT TO EXERCISE. THERE IS A FEELING THAT A CERTAIN POLITICAL PARTY HAS BEEN DELIBERATELY "PARALYZED" IN SUCH A WAY, SO THAT ITS MEMBERS LOSE A PLACE TO TAKE SHELTER UNDER AND ARE THUS LEFT IN THE LURCH.

OBVIOUSLY, SUCH FEELING DOES EXIST AMONG SOME SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY. IT IS THIS KIND OF FEELING THAT UNDERLIES THE STANCE OF SOME PEOPLE NOT TO USE THEIR VOTING RIGHTS. WE DO UNDERSTAND SUCH A FEELING AND STANCE, AND REGARD IT AS ONE OF THE POLITICAL MANIFESTATIONS WHICH CAN BE JUSTIFIED.

THE GENERAL ELECTION IS A WAY WHEREBY TO BUILD A CIVILIZED POLITICAL LIFE. THEREFORE, ALL FORMS OF IMPOLITE AND IMPROPER METHODS IN TRYING TO SECURE VICTORY IN A GENERAL ELECTION ARE CONTRARY TO THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE LAND IN BUILDING A

CIVILIZED LIFE.
END TEXT OF MESSAGE.

WHO'S BEHIND THE MESSAGE?

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1892

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1892

PAGE 01 JAKART 02633 02 OF 04 021100Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/039W

----------B60F98 021101Z /38

R 021100Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5649
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 002633

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: MUSLIM YOUTH AND EDUCATIONAL GROUPS INDIRECTLY CALL FOR ELECTION BOYCOTT

4. (U) THE "MORAL MESSAGE" FROM THE "BIG FAMILY OF NU" (KELUARGA BESAR NAHDLATUL ULAMA) WAS ISSUED ON FRIDAY APRIL 25 ON BEHALF OF EIGHT OF ITS AUTONOMOUS BODIES AND INSTITUTES, MOST OF THEM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONSIDERED TO BE NU YOUTH, STUDENT, AND EDUCATIONAL GROUPS. ACCORDING TO NU'S LITERATURE, THE ORGANIZATIONS'S NATIONAL LEVEL EXECUTIVE BOARD, "RELIGIOUS BODY," ADVISERS, AND 279 LOCAL BRANCHES ARE SUPPLEMENTED BY TEN "AUTONOMOUS BODIES," 12 INSTITUTES, AND FIVE COMMITTEES. THE AUTONOMOUS BODIES ARE UNDER THE EXECUTIVE BOARD, BUT THEIR LEADERS ARE ELECTED IN A SEPARATE "NU AUTONOMOUS BODY NATIONAL CONFERENCE." THE PURPOSE OF THE AUTONOMOUS BODIES IS TO "HELP IMPLEMENT THE NU POLICIES RELATED TO CERTAIN TARGET GROUPS (IN THE) COMMUNITY."

5. (U) THE EIGHT GROUPS LISTED AS SPONSORS OF THE MESSAGE ARE:
-YOUNG MEN STUDENT ASSOCIATION (IPNU);
-YOUNG WOMEN STUDENT ASSOCIATION (IPPNU);
-YOUNG WOMEN OF NU (FATAYAT);
-YOUNG MEN OF NU (ANSOR);
-THE INSTITUTE OF FAMILY WELFARE OF NU (LKKNU);
-THE INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RESOURCES STUDIES AND DEVELOPMENT (LAKPESDAM NU);
-EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE MA'ARIF NU (SAID TO MANAGE 4114 KINDERGARTENS, 780 JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS, 299 SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS, 26 ACADEMIES AND 19 UNIVERSITIES).

6. (U) THE MESSAGE WAS SIGNED BY ONLY SEVEN OF THE EIGHT GROUPS LISTED AS SPONSORS OF THE MESSAGE. ANSOR DECLINED TO SIGN.

VIEW FROM NU'S NATIONAL LEADERSHIP
---

7. (U) ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (ALSO KNOWN AS GUS DUR), THE GENERAL CHAIRMAN OF NU, REACTED QUICKLY AND NEGATIVELY IN PUBLIC TO THE
CONFIDENTIAL

STATEMENT. ACCORDING TO ONE PRESS REPORT HE SAID "THIS IS IMPUDENT OF THEM. THEY ARE OVERSTEPPING THE BOUNDARY. THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF NU KNEW NOTHING OF THEIR MESSAGE." ACCORDING TO ANOTHER PRESS REPORT HE ADDED THAT IF THE STATEMENT DID NOT PURPORT TO BE ON BEHALF OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD, AND ONLY REPRESENTED THE VIEWS OF "THE BIG FAMILY OF NU YOUTH," THEN "BE MY GUEST."

8. (C) [redacted] TRIED TO DISTANCE NU AS FAR AS POSSIBLE FROM THE POTENTIALLY MORE CONTROVERSIAL PARTS OF THE "MORAL MESSAGE" AND TO DOWNPLAY THE DEGREE TO WHICH IT REPRESENTED NU SENTIMENT. HE TOLD POLOFF THAT THERE WERE SPECIFIC PARTS OF THE STATEMENT THAT "WERE NOT NU AND THAT NU DID NOT AGREE WITH." HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE SECTIONS THAT INDIRECTLY CALLED FOR AN ELECTION BOYCOTT, AND EMPHASIZED THAT NU DID NOT SUPPORT SUCH A MOVE. HE ALSO QUESTIONED WHETHER THE STATEMENT TRULY REPRESENTED THE VIEWS OF ALL OF THE ORGANIZATIONS LISTED AS SPONSORS, OR WHETHER ITS CREATION HAD BEEN DRIVEN BY CERTAIN "ARCHITECTS," AND OTHERS HAD FOLLOWED ALONG TO EXPRESS WHAT THEY BELIEVED WAS NU SOLIDARITY. HE SPECULATED THAT SOME OF THOSE WHO JOINED MIGHT NOT HAVE KNOWN THE "INTERNAL ESSENCE" OF THE DOCUMENT. B1

9. (C) [redacted] SPECULATED THAT THE "ARCHITECTS" OF THE MORAL MESSAGE MIGHT HAVE BEEN TWO OF ITS SIGNATORIES, [redacted] HE BELIEVED THAT BOTH WERE INFLUENCED BY THOSE IN THE NGO MOVEMENT SEEKING AN ELECTION BOYCOTT. HE ALSO SAID THE PERSON WHO SIGNED FOR SEVERAL OF THE B1 B6

GROUPS WAS NOT THE ORGANIZATIONS'S CHAIRMAN, BUT INSTEAD ITS SECOND IN COMMAND, AND CALLED ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT ONE OF THE EIGHT ORGANIZATIONS, ANSOR, HAD NOT SIGNED.

10. (C) [redacted] EMPHASIZED THAT NU COULD "TOLERATE DIFFERENT OPINIONS." IT WAS NOT SEEKING TO BRING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SIGNATORIES OF THE "MORAL MESSAGE" AND WAS NOT EVEN ENGAGING IN DISCUSSION WITH THE GROUPS ON THE MATTER AT THIS TIME. B1

THE YOUTH MESSAGE: DON'T BE TOO SERIOUS ABOUT THE ELECTION

---

11. (C) ACCORDING TO LEADERS OF THE NU UNIVERSITY STUDENT ORGANIZATION (PMII), AND YOUNG WOMEN STUDENTS ASSOCIATION OF NU (IPPNU), THE MESSAGE SERVED TO REMIND PEOPLE THAT THE ELECTION SHOULD NOT BE JUST A "RITUAL OF A POLITICAL GAME." THEY WANTED TO REMIND "PEOPLE AND GUS DUR" THAT GIVEN THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION, "DON'T BE TOO SERIOUS ABOUT THIS ELECTION." THEY WANTED TO SERVE AS A "MORAL FORCE" TO SHOW THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE QUESTIONED. THEY BELIEVED THAT THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM INVOLVED "NO PARTICIPATION" AND "NO TRUE LOYALTIES."

NNNNPTQ1886

PAGE 01 JAKART 02633 03 OF 04 021100Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/040W						

----------B60FA1 021101Z /38

R 021100Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5650
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 002633

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: MUSLIM YOUTH AND EDUCATIONAL GROUPS INDIRECTLY CALL FOR ELECTION BOYCOTT

12. (C) THE MESSAGE WAS FROM THE CENTRAL BOARDS OF THE SIGNATORY GROUPS, OFFERING GUIDANCE TO THE MEMBERSHIP. THEY THOUGHT THE MESSAGE WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON VOTING, BUT NOT ONE THAT COULD BE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02633 03 OF 04 021100Z
EASILY MEASURED. THE GREATEST IMPACT WOULD BE ON JAVA.

13. (C) LEADERS OF PMII AND IPPNU SAID THAT DISCUSSIONS AND PLANS FOR THE STATEMENT HAD BEEN IN THE WORKS FOR OVER A MONTH, AND INVOLVED MANY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN GROUP LEADERS AND CONSULTATIONS WITH NU "PARENTS," INCLUDING WAHID. THEY SAID THAT THE DAY

BEFORE THE PRESS RELEASE OF THE STATEMENT, ANSOR DECIDED NOT TO SIGN THE STATEMENT. (NOTE: ANSOR IS THE YOUNG MEN BRANCH OF NU. MEMBERSHIP CATEGORIES IN SEVERAL NU GROUPS OVERLAP, AND SOME PEOPLE ARE MEMBERS OF MORE THAN ONE GROUP AT THE SAME TIME. END NOTE) THE CHAIRMAN OF ANSOR WAS A CANDIDATE FOR PARLIAMENT FOR GOLKAR, AND CERTAIN OTHER MEMBERS OF ANSOR LEADERSHIP WERE CANDIDATES FOR GOLKAR AND FOR PPP. THE PMII AND IPPNU LEADERS SAID THAT THE MESSAGE WAS BASED ON CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ALL EIGHT GROUPS, BUT THAT A GROUP OF PEOPLE WAS APPOINTED TO WRITE THE ACTUAL STATEMENT AFTER ALL CONSULTATIONS WERE DONE.

[redacted] B1

THEY WERE FOLLOWING WAHID'S PHILOSOPHY FOR THIS ELECTION, WHICH WAS THAT VOTING WAS A RIGHT AND NOT AN OBLIGATION. (NOTE: THE PAMPHLETS AND NOTEPADS FROM THE PMII NATIONAL CONFERENCE IN YOGYAKARTA IN MID-APRIL CONTAINED A HINT OF AN ELECTION BOYCOTT WITH CARTOONS INCLUDING A WHITE BOX READING "FREE TO MOVE, FREE TO READ, FREE TO SPEAK AND FREE WHITE" (A REFERENCE TO THE WHITE VOTE, OR NEUTRAL GROUP, USED TO INDICATE NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTION. END NOTE) LEADERS FROM THESE GROUPS HAVE CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR WAHID, AND HAVE TRIED TO EXPLAIN AND JUSTIFY HIS STRATEGIES TO POLOFF, INCLUDING HIS RECENT ALLIANCE WITH PRESIDENTIAL DAUGHTER SITI "TUTUT" HARDIYANTI, WHICH HAS DRAWN SOME CRITICISM INSIDE NU. ACCORDING TO THEM, THERE WAS A

DANGER THAT INDONESIA WOULD FACE A CRISIS WITHIN SEVERAL YEARS DUE TO A LEADERSHIP TRANSITION. TUTUT WAS, THEY WERE ALMOST SURE, BEING GROOMED FOR LEADERSHIP. GUS DUR'S STRATEGY WAS TO WORK WITH HER SO THAT NU COULD END YEARS OF POLITICAL MARGINALIZATION.

15. (C) [redacted] B1

THE MORAL MESSAGE WAS NOT A REFLECTION OF ANY SPLITS IN NU, AND THAT THEY CONTINUED TO BE "GUS DURIANS." THEY ADMITTED THAT THEY HAD NOT SHOWN THE "FINAL DRAFT" TO GU DUR, AND THAT HE WAS SURPRISED BY THEIR PRES CONFERENCE TO RELEASE THE MESSAGE. HE WAS ASKD BY THE PRESS TO COMMENT ON THE MESSAGE BEFORE HE HAD SEEN IT. THIS MADE HIM ANGRY, THEY SAID, BUT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE TECHNICAL ASPECT OF THEM PRESENTING HIM WITH A "FAIT ACCOMPLI." THEY SAID HE DID NOT

OBJECT TO THEM USING THE NAME OF THE BIG FAMILY OF NU YOUTH, BUT DID OBJECT TO THE USE OF THE BIG FAMILY OF NU.

16. (C) THE STUDENT LEADERS WERE NOT CONCERNED ABOUT WAHID'S ANGER, BECAUSE "HE HAS TO EXPRESS ANGER ABOUT IT IN ORDER TO PROTECT NU." RELATIONS INSIDE NU AND BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT NU ORGANIZATIONS WERE GOOD, AND WOULD NOT SUFFER ROM THE MESSAGE PUT OUT BY THE YOUTH, THEY BEIEVED. THEY INTERPRETED THE SITUATION AS POLTICALLY CLEVER, BECAUSE IT ALLOWED FOR AN NU MESSAGE ABOUT THE ELECTION WHILE PROTECTING WAHID AND THUS THE ORGANIZATION AS A WHOLE. IT WAS "GOOD FOR THE GAME." THEY SAID THAT "MANY WITNESSES" HAD HEARD WAHID SAY AT AN APRIL 28 DEMOCRACY FORUM MEETING, "I AM HAPPY WITH THE CHILDREN OF NU BECAUSE THEY HAVE BECOME SMARTER AND BRAVER."

17. (C) THE STUDENT LEADERS SAID THAT THEIR MESSAGE COULD HELP NU

BY SHOWING MEMBERS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT TAKE THE ELECTION TOO SERIOUSLY. UNTIL TWO ELECTIONS AGO, NU MEMBERS WERE ALL SUPPOSED TO SUPPORT THE MUSLIM ORIENTED UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) OF WHICH NU HAD BEEN PART. OVER THE PAST YEAR, WAHID WAS SEEN AS CLOSE TO OUSTED DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHAIRMAN MEGAWATI, AND MOST RECENTLY AS CLOSER TO RULING PART GOLKAR THROUGH PRESIDENTIAL DAUGHTER TUTUT. WITHINNU THEE WAS NO UNITY ABOUT WHICH OF THE THREE PARTIES TO SUPPORT, THEY EXPLAINED, WHICH COULD CAUSE INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN NU. THE SOLUTION WAS TO DOWNPLAY THE ELECTION AND THUS AVOID SPLITS IN NU.

18. (C) [redacted] B1

WHO WORKS CLOSELY WITH SEVERAL NU YOUTH AND STUDENT GROUPS, WAHID DID NOT DISAGREE WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE STATEMENT, BUT HAD TO DISTANCE HIMSELF FROM IT TO PROTECT HIMSELF AND HIS ORGANIZATION. IF HE HAD ENDORSED THE STATEMENT, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD REACT AGAINST NU AS A WHOLE AND WAHID AS ITS LEADER. BY APPEARING TO BE ANGRY THAT HE WAS NOT CONSULTED ABOUT IT, WAHID HAS ENABLED NU TO SPEAK OUT WITHOUT PUTTING THE ORGANIZATION AT RISK. HE CLAIMED THAT WAHID HAD DISTRIBUTED "TO MANY NU MEMBERS" THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS STATEMENT, WHICH INCLUDED THE CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENT THAT IT WAS NOT A SIN NOT TO VOTE.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1889

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1889

PAGE 01 JAKART 02633 04 OF 04 021100Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/040W						

----------B60FA5 021101Z /38

R 021100Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5651
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 002633

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SCUL, ID

SUBJECT: MUSLIM YOUTH AND EDUCATIONAL GROUPS INDIRECTLY CALL FOR ELECTION BOYCOTT

ANOTHER NU GROUP ISSUES STRONG STATEMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02633 04 OF 04 021100Z

19. (SBU) ON MAY 1, ACCORDING TO A PRESS REPORT, ABOUT 20 NU YOUTH FROM AN ORGANIZATION CALLED "COMMUNICATION FORUM YOUTH GENERATION OF NU" (FKGMNU), MET WITH NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS MEMBERS TO REQUEST ASSISTANCE IN FIGHTING FOR DEMOCRACY. THE CRITICISM FROM THESE YOUNG PEOPLE WENT TO THE HEART OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM, CLAIMING THAT THE FIVE POLITICAL LAWS HAMPERED DEMOCRACY. THIS GROUP IS RELATIVELY UNKNOWN, AND ACCORDING TO A SECRETARIAT MEMBER OF IPPNU, IS AN ORGANIZATION CREATED THREE YEARS AGO TO ACCOMMODATE ALL YOUTH WHO WERE NOT MEMBERS OF NU YOUTH OR STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS. IT IS NOT AN OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED NU YOUTH GROUP AND HAS NO OFFICE IN THE NU BUILDING, BUT MEMBERS ARE SAID TO BE KNOWN TO THE NU OFFICIAL YOUTH GROUPS.

COMMENT

---

20. (C) [redacted] B1

THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR DECREASED VOTER PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTION. GIVEN THE POLITICAL COURSE WAHID HAS APPARENTLY SET FOR NU AT THE MOMENT, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HE COULD BE PLEASED ABOUT A LARGE BLOCK WITHIN HIS ORGANIZATION ISSUING A STATEMENT INDIRECTLY CALLING FOR AN ELECTION BOYCOTT. HOWEVER, NU HAS NEVER BEEN A UNIFIED ORGANIZATION, AND WAHID HAS MANY DIFFERENT INTEREST GROUPS TO ACCOMMODATE. HE CANNOT AFFORD TO ANTAGONIZE THE YOUNG PEOPLE WITHIN HIS ORGANIZATION WHO WANTED TO MAKE KNOWN THEIR VIEWS ON THE ELECTION. THIS COULD HELP EXPLAIN WHY HE HAS GIVEN THEM SOME SPACE ON THE ISSUANCE OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

"MORAL MESSAGE," APPARENTLY BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER IT WAS RELEASED.

21. (C) THE MESSAGE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE THE ACTION OF ONLY ONE OR TWO "INTELLECTUAL ACTORS," BUT THE RESULT OF A PROCESS THAT INVOLVED MOST IF NOT ALL THE GROUPS LISTED, AND POSSIBLY OTHER NU LEADERS. WHILE THE GROUPS DID SURPRISE WAHID WITH THE RELEASE OF THEIR MESSAGE, THEY APPEAR TO GENUINELY (IF NAIVELY) BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE SERVING THE INTERESTS OF NU AND EVEN OF WAHID. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY ARE ALSO "REMINDING" HIM OF THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS AND THEIR INFLUENCE WITHIN NU.

22. (C) AS IMPORTANT IS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MESSAGE, WHICH CONTAINS STRONG LANGUAGE AND INDIRECTLY ADVOCATES AN ELECTION BOYCOTT, NOT SOMETHING THE GOVERNMENT LOOKS UPON LIGHTLY. WE HAVE SEEN NO REACTIONS FROM GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE PRESS. PERHAPS THE GOVERNMENT IS TAKING THE SAME POSITION AS THE NU LEADERSHIP IN DOWNPLAYING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MESSAGE. AT A MINIMUM, THE MESSAGE PROVIDES ANOTHER CLEAR INDICATION THAT THE "YOUTH" GENERATION IS INCREASINGLY UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE STATUS QUO FOR THE ELECTION AND FOR POLITICS IN GENERAL. WHETHER THEIR STATEMENTS WILL TURN INTO MASS ACTIONS, SUCH AS ELECTION BOYCOTTS, REMAINS TO BE SEEN. ROY

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

E24

RELEASED IN PART
B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0693

PAGE 01 JAKART 02767 01 OF 02 090952Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-09	G-00	/025W	

----------B89830 090952Z /38

R 090952Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5740
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002767

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/07
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL PARTIES IN ACEH PREPARE FOR ELECTION

REFS: 96 JAKARTA 7300

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MILITARY, AND POLITICAL PARTY OFFICIALS PREDICTED A SMOOTH AND SECURE CAMPAIGN PERIOD AND ELECTION IN ACEH PROVINCE. NO ONE DOUBTED THAT GOLKAR WOULD WIN THE ELECTION. THERE WAS NO VISIBLE SIGN OF PRO-MEGAWATI DEMOCRATIC PARTY ACTIVITY IN BANDA ACEH. THE ISLAMIC UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) CAMPAIGN WOULD FOCUS ON UPHOLDING THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02767 01 OF 02 090952Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

CONSTITUTION. THE PPP CHAIRMAN SAID THE LINE BETWEEN GOLKAR AND THE GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME LESS CLEAR. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) DURING AN APRIL 23-26 VISIT TO ACEH PROVINCE (ALSO KNOWN AS THE SPECIAL REGION OF ACEH), POLOFF MET WITH THE CHAIRPERSONS OF PDI AND PPP IN PROVINCIAL CAPITAL BANDA ACEH. GOLKAR OFFICIALS WERE UNAVAILABLE. THE DCM AND POLOFF ALSO MET WITH THE GOVERNOR OF ACEH PROVINCE, THE MAYOR OF BANDA ACEH, AND MILITARY COMMANDERS IN LHUKSEUMAWE AND BANDA ACEH. (SEPTEL)

UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY

---

4. (SBU) [redacted] B6 TOLD POLOFF THAT THE CENTRAL THEME OF HIS PARTY'S CAMPAIGN WOULD BE "UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTION." HE SAID THAT INCLUDED PROMOTION OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS. IF ONLY THE CONSTITUTION WERE UPHELD, HE SAID, MANY OF THE CURRENT PROBLEMS IN SOCIETY WOULD BE SOLVED.

5. (C) HE COMPLAINED THAT RULING PARTY GOLKAR HAD BECOME "MORE BRAVE" TO DROP THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOLKAR AND GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY. THE PEOPLE NOW WERE MORE AWARE OF THE UNFAIR ELECTION PROCEDURES. RASYIDI COMPLAINED THAT GOLKAR GOT A HEAD START IN THE CAMPAIGN, AND HAD THE BENEFIT OF MONEY AND HELP FROM GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. PPP WAS THE PARTY FOR THE POOR, HE SAID.

6. (C) PPP OBTAINED A MAJORITY OF VOTES IN ACEH PROVINCE IN 1977 AND 1982, BUT [redacted] B6 DID NOT EXPRESS ANY HOPE THAT HIS PARTY WOULD OBTAIN A MAJORITY IN THE MAY 29 ELECTION. PPP WOULD HAVE ELECTION WITNESSES/OBSERVERS IN AS MANY POLLING STATIONS AS

POSSIBLE, BUT IT WAS HARD TO FIND ENOUGH WILLING PARTY MEMBERS BECAUSE "NOT EVERYONE IS BRAVE" TO SERVE IN THIS CAPACITY, ESPECIALLY IN VILLAGES. HE NOTED THAT PARTY MEMBERS SERVING AS OFFICIAL ELECTION WITNESSES WERE SUBJECTED TO PRESSURES FROM THE RULING PARTY, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE FURTHER.

INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY

---

7. (SBU) THERE APPEARED TO BE ONLY ONE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) OFFICE IN BANDA ACEH, AND NO VISIBLE OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED SOERJADI PDI FACTION. MEGAWATI POSTERS THAT WERE ON DISPLAY AT THE PDI OFFICE IN BANDA ACEH IN SEPTEMBER 1996, HAD BEEN REMOVED. PROVINCIAL PDI CHAIRMAN NAZARUDDIN ABDULLAH TOLD POLOFF THAT MEGAWATI HAD MANY SUPPORTERS IN THE PROVINCE, BUT HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD STILL SUPPORT THEIR PARTY AND VOTE FOR PDI IN THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. HE SAID THAT SOERJADI HAD VISITED THE PROVINCE APRIL 15, INCLUDING A STOP IN PIDIE DISTRICT (KABUPATEN), AND HAD ENCOUNTERED NO PROBLEMS. HE SAID THAT GOLKAR WOULD WIN THE ELECTION, BUT THAT HE HOPED PDI COULD INCREASE THEIR NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE REGIONAL PARLIAMENT.

GOLKAR
---

8. (C) GOLKAR OFFICIALS WERE TOO BUSY TO MEET WITH POLOFF, AS EVIDENCED BY GOLKAR VISITORS FROM JAKARTA AND A LARGE GOLKAR GATHERING HOSTED BY THE GOVERNOR ON APRIL 24 (PRIOR TO THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN ON APRIL 28). THE MAYOR OF BANDA ACEH, SAYED HUSSAIN AL-HAJ, TOLD THE DCM THAT "GOLKAR HAS TO WIN" AND THAT A "CALM" ELECTION WAS NEEDED IN ACEH. HE SAID THAT GOLKAR GOT 52

PERCENT IN THE LAST ELECTION IN BANDA ACEH, AND GOLKAR'S TARGET FOR THE CURRENT ELECTION WAS 80 PERCENT. ONE LOCAL UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR BELIEVED THAT GOLKAR WOULD HAVE A "LANDSLIDE VICTORY" IN NORTH ACEH BECAUSE OF WHAT HE CALLED "THE SECURITY VOTE." HE SAID THAT OLD MILITARY POSTS IN TOWNS IN NORTH ACEH, WHICH HAD BEEN LEFT UNOCCUPIED FOR SEVERAL YEARS, HAD BEEN RE-OCCUPIED SINCE THE FEBRUARY BANK ROBBERY AND SUBSEQUENT DISCOVERIES OF WEAPONS CACHES. HE SAID THAT THE MILITARY PRESENCE IN TOWNS WOULD INTIMIDATE PEOPLE INTO CHOOSING GOLKAR. (COMMENT: SECURITY IN ACEH HAD BECOME TIGHTER SINCE THE FEBRUARY BANK ROBBERY. HOWEVER, SOURCES TOLD DCM AND POLOFF THAT THE NUMBER OF MILITARY CHECK-POINTS HAD DECREASED IN RECENT WEEKS AND THE SITUATION WAS RETURNING TO NORMAL. SEPTEL. END COMMENT)

QUIET PRE-ELECTION ATMOSPHERE
---

9. (SBU) THE GOVERNOR HOSTED A LARGE GATHERING FOR GOLKAR ON THE

EVENING OF APRIL 24, AS A PRE-CAMPAIGN EVENT, AND MEETINGS WITH THE GOVERNOR AND ALL THREE PARTIES TOOK PLACE APRIL 25 FOR ELECTION PREPARATIONS. THERE WERE FEW POLITICAL PARTY FLAGS FLYING IN BANDA ACEH JUST BEFORE THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN. A

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0694

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0694

PAGE 01 JAKART 02767 02 OF 02 090952Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-09	G-00	/025W	

----------B89832 090952Z /38

R 090952Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5741
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002767

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/07
TAGS: PGOV, ID

SUBJECT: POLITICAL PARTIES IN ACEH PREPARE FOR ELECTION

GOLKAR RALLY OF ABOUT 100 PEOPLE WAS WITNESSED IN THE CITY BY AIR FORCE ATTACHE ON APRIL 25. GOI MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE GOVERNOR OF ACEH PROVINCE AND THE MAYOR OF BANDA ACEH, EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION WOULD RUN SMOOTHLY IN ACEH.

10. (C) COMMENT: TRADITIONALLY A STRONGHOLD FOR THE ISLAMIC PARTY PPP, THE TRAUMA SUFFERED IN THE REGION DURING THE 1989-91 INSURGENCY AND SUBSEQUENT CRACK-DOWN ON THE FREE ACEH MOVEMENT, WILL PROBABLY HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE ELECTION. THE SECURITY

ENVIRONMENT IN ACEH, STILL CONSIDERED A "TROUBLED AREA" ALONG WITH IRIAN JAYA AND EAST TIMOR, MAY INDIRECTLY SERVE GOLKAR BECAUSE PEOPLE WILL PROBABLY NOT WANT TO BE VIEWED IN ANY WAY AS SUPPORTING AN "OPPOSITION." END COMMENT. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 JAKART 02798 01 OF 04 130351Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/038W					

----------B99C48 130351Z /38

R 130351Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5760
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002798

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN WEST JAVA:
"MOBILIZATION WITHOUT PARTICIPATION"

REF: A) JAKARTA 2779; B) JAKARTA 2747

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02798 01 OF 04 130351Z
1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) IN WEST JAVA BOASTED THAT IT WAS ATTRACTING THREE TIMES MORE POPULAR SUPPORT IN THIS CAMPAIGN THAN DURING THE 1992 ELECTION. LARGE STREET RALLIES IN THE PROVINCE'S CAPITAL OF BANDUNG ON MAY 8, AS WELL AS THE NUMBER OF ENTHUSIASTIC ONLOOKERS THROUGOUT THE CITY, GAVE SOME CREDIBILITY TO THIS CLAIM. THE PPP ARGUED PRIVATELY TO POLOFF THAT PEOPLE WANTED FASTER POLITICAL CHANGE, AND THAT THE AGGRESSIVE DISREGARD BY THE YOUNG FOR THE RESTRICIVE CAMPAIGN RULES INTENDED TO STOP STREET CAMPAIGING WAS IN PART A REACTION TO A POLITICAL SYSTEM THAT WAS FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR. THE PPP WELCOMED VOTES FROM THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

SUPPORTERS OF OUSTED INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI, AND BELIEVED THAT MANY OF THESE VOTERS WERE ALREADY MOVING TOWARD THE PPP.

3. (C) YOUNG SUPPORTERS OF RULING PARTY GOLKAR ENJOYED SIMILARLY AGGRESSIVE STREET RALLIES IN THE TOWN OF CIANJUR ON MAY 9. GOLKAR HAD THE ADDED BENEFIT OF ATTRACTING INTEREST BY HOLDING A "DANGDUT" CONCERT BILLED AS A "PUBLIC MEETING." FEW SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED DURING THIS "CAMPAIGN EVENT." HUNDREDS OF MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS OPENLY CAMPAIGNED IN THE STREETS OF BOGOR ON MAY 10, WHICH LED TO AT LEAST ONE CONFRONTATION WITH SECURITY FORCES THAT ENDED PEACEFULY. AN OBSERVER CHARACTERIZED ALL OF THIS STREET ACTIVITY BY YOUTH AS "MOBILIZATION WITHOUT PARTICIPATION," UNDERSCORING THE ABSENCE OF POLITICAL CONTENT. END SUMMARY

CONFIDENTIAL

4. (U) POLOFF TRAVELLED BY CAR THROUGH WEST JAVA FROM MAY 8 TO MAY 10 TO OBSERVE THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND MEET WITH LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS. THE ROUTE COVERED SUBANG, BANDUNG, CIRANJANG, CIANJUR, SUKABUMI, AND BOGOR.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY OWNS BANDUNG STREETS ON ITS CAMPAIGN DY

---

5. (U) LARGE YELLOW GOLKAR FLAGS DOMINATE WEST JAVA'S CAPITAL OF BANDUNG, BUT THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) OWNED THE CITY'S STREETS ON MAY 8, ITS FOURTH TURN TO CAMPAIGN IN THAT AREA. AS POLOFF ENTERED THE CITY, A HUGE OUTDOOR PPP CAMPAIGN RALLY FEATURING NATIONAL CHAIRMAN ISMAIL HASAN METAREUM ("BUYA") WAS BREAKING UP. TRUCKLOADS OF ATTENDEES WERE STREAMING INTO THE CITY, FROM THE FIELD ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY WHERE IT HAD BEEN HELD, AND SNARLING TRAFFIC. LOCAL PRESS REPORTED THE FOLLOWING DAY THAT TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PPP SUPPORTERS HEARD BUYA'S SPEECH, AND LOCAL PARTY LEADERS CLAIMED TO POLOFF THAT 100,000 HAD BEEN IN ATTENDANCE.

6. (SBU) AT THE IMMENSE, CAMPAIGN-DEBRIS LITTERED FIELD WHERE THE EVENT TOOK PLACE, POLOFF SPOKE WITH ONE OF THE PPP'S SECURITY OFFICIALS WHO SAID THAT ALL HAD PROCEEDED SMOOTHLY. HOWEVER, A GROUP OF PPP STRAGGLERS WAS AT THE MOMENT LEAPING INTO THE BED OF A LARGE TRUCK ABOUT TO HEAD INTO TOWN TO JOIN THE STREET CONVOYS. ON THE WAY, THEY PULLED DOWN A LARGE GOLKAR BANNER STRETCHED OVER THE ROAD, AND ONE OF THE YOUNG MEN FELL OUT OF THE TRUCK, APPARENTLY

WITHOUT ANY SERIOUS INJURY. DURING THE CAMPAIGN THUS FAR, MANY CLASHES BETWEEN THE PARTIES ERUPTED BECAUSE ONE SIDE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02798 01 OF 04 130351Z
DESTROYED THE CAMPAIGN BANNERS OR FLAGS OF THE OTHER, AND MANY PEOPLE HAVE BEEN INJURED IN TRAFFIC-RELATED MISHAPS.

7. (SBU) GOING TO AND FROM APPOINTMENTS ON MAY 8, POLOFF OBSERVED THE PPP SUPPORTERS CAREENING THROUGH THE CITY ON MOTORCYCLES, SCOOTERS, OPEN TRUCKS AND ON TOP OF JEEPS. TRUCKS FULL OF RIOT POLICE AND MILITARY AS WELL AS AN ANTI-RIOT ARMORED VEHICLE COULD BE OBSERVED IN THE STREET, BUT THEY SEEMED UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO TAKE ANY ACTION TO STOP THIS ACTIVITY WHICH HAD BEEN BANNED AS IMPROPER CAMPAIGN PROCEDURE.

8. (SBU) THE STREETS OF BANDUNG WERE LINED WITH PEOPLE ENTHUSIASTICALLY WATCHING THE PPP STREET CONVOYS. THEY WOULD FLASH BACK THE PPP'S SIGN OF A RAISED FOREFINGER. STREET CAMPAIGNERS FROM ALL PARTIES AGGRESSIVELY FLASH THEIR SIGNS, ONE FINGER FOR PPP, TWO FOR GOLKAR, AND THREE FOR PDI, AND ONLOOKERS ARE EXPECTED TO RESPOND IN KIND.

WEST JAVA PPP LEADERSHIP UPBEAT ABOUT INCREASED MASS SUPPORT

---

9. (C) POLOFF MET WITH THE PPP'S WEST JAVA PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP IN BANDUNG ON MAY 8. THIS INCLUDED [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNADP363

PAGE 01 JAKART 02798 02 OF 04 130351Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	A-00	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01
	DRL-09	G-00	/038W				

----------B99C4D 130351Z /38

R 130351Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5761
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 002798

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN WEST JAVA:
"MOBILIZATION WITHOUT PARTICIPATION"

[redacted] B1
NATIONAL PARTY CHAIRMAN
"BUYA" HAD JUST DEPARTED THEIR HEADQUARTERS AFTER GIVING
CONFIDENTIAL

HIS SPEECH, AND THEY WERE UPBEAT ABOUT HIS APPEARANCE AND THE POPULAR RESPONSE THE PPP WAS RECEIVING TO DATE. (NOTE: GOLKAR HAS BEEN DOMINANT IN WEST JAVA AND WON 70.4 PERCENT OF THE VOTE IN 1992. PPP RECEIVED 14.9 PERCENT AND PDI RECEIVED 14.5 PERCENT. END NOTE.)

10. (C) [redacted] ESTIMATED THAT THEY WERE SEEING B1
THREE TIMES MORE MASS SUPPORT FOR PPP THAN IN THE LAST CAMPAIGN. HE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD TRANSLATE INTO REAL VOTES AND INCREASED SEATS IN THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE. HE SAID THAT OUT OF 100 SEATS IN THAT BODY (DPRD-I), PPP CURRENTLY HELD 12, PDI 12, THE ARMED FORCES 20 AND GOLKAR THE REMAINING 56.

11. (C) [redacted] CONTENDED THAT THE INCREASED B1
MASS SUPPORT FOR PPP WAS BECAUSE PEOPLE WANTED CHANGE. THEY WERE BETTER INFORMED, AND KNEW ABOUT ALL OF THE "IMBALANCES" IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY KNEW THAT A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE CONTROLLED A VAST MAJORITY OF THE WEALTH. THEY KNEW THAT "130,000 RUPIAH" PER MONTH WAGE (NOTE: A REFERENCE TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR'S MINIMUM WAGE EQUAL TO APPROXIMATELY $55.00. END NOTE) WAS INADEQUATE, AND THEY KNEW THAT INDONESIA'S RESOURCES WERE BEING EXPLOITED WITHOUT ANY BENEFIT GIVEN TO THE AVERAGE PERSON. HE SAID THAT THE "ALI MURTOPO SYSTEM OF DEVELOPMENT" HAD BEEN USEFUL THIRTY YEARS AGO AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW ORDER, BUT TIMES HAD CHANGED. (NOTE: A REFERENCE TO ONE OF THE ARCHITECTS OF THE SUHARTO GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGY OF EMPHASIZING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RESTRICTING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION. END NOTE.) HE

CONTENDED THAT POLITICAL CHANGE WAS OCCURRING, BUT "NOT
CONFIDENTIAL

FAST ENOUGH."

12. (C) [redacted] ALSO ARGUED THAT THE REFUSAL B1
OF THE YOUNG PEOPLE TO ABIDE BY THE CAMPAIGN RULES DESIGNED TO STOP STREET RALLIES WAS A REACTION TO THE UNFAIR SYSTEM. AVERAGE PEOPLE FELT "PROVOKED AND INTIMIDATED." FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID IT WAS WELL-KNOWN THAT THE "BUREAUCRACY" BACKED RULING PARTY GOLKAR IN THE ELECTION. IT TOLD VILLAGES THAT IF THEY DID NOT SUPPORT GOLKAR, THEY WOULD NOT RECEIVE ELECTRICITY, NEW ROADS, ASSISTANCE WITH FARMING SUPPLIES, AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT SUCH AS MARRIAGE LICENSES. ALL THREE PPP OFFICIALS BELIEVED THAT THE STREET RALLIES WERE BEYOND THE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES. ONE EXPLAINED THAT IF IT WERE ONLY TEN PEOPLE CONVOYING IN THE STREETS, THE POLICE OR MILITARY COULD STOP THEM. BUT ONCE IT REACHED "FIFTY PEOPLE OR MORE" THE IT BECAME MORE DIFFICULT.

13. (C) ALL THREE PPP OFFICIALS AGREED THAT MOST OF THE PDI IN WEST JAVA WERE SUPPORTERS OF MEGAWATI AND THAT THEY WERE MOVING TOWARD THE PPP (REFTEL B). ACCORDING TO THE [redacted] THE "FLOATING MASS" POLITICAL SYSTEM MEANT THAT B1
THERE WAS NOTHING WRONG OR ILLEGAL ABOUT MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS CHOOSING TO SIDE, IF ONLY TEMPORARILY, WITH THE PPP (NOTE: A REFERENCE TO THE THEORY THAT MOST VOTERS ARE NOT FORMAL PARTY MEMBERS AND CAN THUS VOTE, THEORETICALLY, FOR WHOM THEY CHOOSE ON ELECTION DAY. END NOTE.) THE CHAIRMAN SAID WITH A SMILE THAT HE CERTAINLY HAD NO OBJECTION TO THIS TREND AS IT WOULD MEAN MORE VOTES FOR THE PPP, BUT HE EXPECTED THE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WOULD
CONFIDENTIAL

RETURN TO THE PDI AFTER THE ELECTION.

14. (C) ALL THREE PPP OFFICIALS SAID THAT, ASIDE FROM ISOLATED INCIDENTS, THE TYPE OF CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE SEEN IN CENTRAL AND EAST JAVA WAS NOT OCCURRING IN WEST JAVA. THE B1
[redacted] MADE THE SAME POINT ABOUT BANDUNG IN A LATER MEETING. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT SEVERAL MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS HAD BEEN ARRESTED PRIOR TO THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN ON SUSPICION THAT THEY HAD DAMAGED THE OFFICIAL PDI HEADQUARTERS.

BANDUNG GOVERNMENT BACKED PDI MEMBERS NOT TOO ENERGETIC;
PROVINCIAL GOLKAR TURNS DOWN MEETING REQUEST

---

15. (C) POLOFF MET BRIEFLY ON MAY 8 WITH THE [redacted] B1
A FEW OF THEIR YOUNGER COLLEAGUES WERE SEWING AND PAINTING RED PDI HEAD BANDS TO BE USED DURING THEIR TURN TO CAMPAIGN IN BANDUNG TWO DAYS LATER, BUT OTHERWISE NOT MUCH WAS HAPPENING. THE MEMBERS EMPHASIZED THAT THE LARGE STREET RALLIES WERE DUE TO THE "EMOTION OF THE PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY THE YOUNG." THEY SAID THAT PDI HAD NOT ENGAGED MUCH IN THESE ACTIVITIES. ONE SAID THAT EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE BANDUNG PDI MEMBERS WOULD

CONFIDENTIAL

NNADP364

PAGE 01 JAKART 02798 03 OF 04 130351Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/038W					

----------B99C55 130351Z /38

R 130351Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5762
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 002798

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN WEST JAVA:
"MOBILIZATION WITHOUT PARTICIPATION"

STILL VOTE FOR THE PDI EVEN THOUGH MOST LIKED MEGAWATI. OUT OF THE REMAINDER, TEN PERCENT WOULD VOTE FOR PPP AND TEN PERCENT WOULD VOTE GOLKAR.

16. (C) PRIOR TO DEPARTING ON TRIP, REQUESTS HAD BEEN MADE VIA FAX AND PHONE FOR A MEETING WITH THE WEST JAVA PROVINCIAL GOLKAR CHAIRMAN. UPON ARRIVING IN BANDUNG AND CALLING TO CONFIRM THE MEETING, POLOFF WAS INFORMED THAT NEITHER THE CHAIRMAN NOR ANY OTHER REPRESENTATIVE WAS AVAILABLE TO MEET DUE TO CAMPAIGN RESPONSIBILITIES. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED SIMILAR RESPONSES WHEN IT ATTEMPTED TO MEET WITH LOCAL GOLKAR OFFICIALS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD IN SOLO, ACEH, AND MEDAN.

GOLKAR CAMPAIGN EVENT IN CIANJUR: MOSTLY ENTERTAINMENT

17. (C) IN CIANJUR ON MAY 9, POLOFF ATTENDED THE MAIN GOLKAR CAMPAIGN EVENT, A LARGE OUTDOOR PUBLIC MEETING WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE A "DANGDUT" CONCERT (NOTE: DANGDUT IS INDIAN INFLUENCED POPULAR MUSIC WITH A LARGE FOLLOWING IN INDONESIA. END NOTE.) IT IS FREQUENTLY ADVERTISED THAT GOLKAR HAS A STABLE OF HUNDREDS OF PERFORMERS THAT IT USES TO ENTERTAIN PEOPLE AT CAMPAIGN EVENTS. THIS EVENT WAS ALMOST PURE ENTERTAINMENT WITH VIRTUALLY NO POLITICAL CONTENT.

18. (C) HUNDREDS OF LOCALS DRESSED IN YELLOW GOLKAR T-SHIRTS ATTENDED, INCLUDING MANY WOMEN AND CHILDREN. AS THE CONCERT WAS BEGINNING, TRUCKLOADS OF YOUNG MEN ROARED UP AND WENT UP TO THE AREA NEAR THE STAGE TO JOIN IN THE DANCING (IN WHICH GOLKAR CAMPAIGNERS ALSO PARTICIPATED ON THE STAGE). THERE WAS VERY LITTLE SPEECH-MAKING BY THE CAMPAIGN SPOKESMEN DURING THE SHORT BREAKS IN THE CONCERT, MOST CONSISTING OF YELLING "LONG LIVE GOLKAR."

19. (C) WITHIN A HALF HOUR, MANY OF THE YOUNG MEN ON THE FIELD WERE BECOMING BORED WITH THE EVENT AND BEGAN CONGREGATING IN THE BACK OF THE FIELD. A FIST-FIGHT BROKE-OUT BETWEEN TWO GROUPS. SOON THEY WERE BOARDING THEIR VEHICLES, OBVIOUSLY INTENDING TO BEGIN THE STREET CONVOYS THAT ARE PROHIBITED. TWO LOCAL MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICIALS LOOKED ON WITHOUT TAKING ACTION, AND SOME OF THE OLDER GOLKAR CADRE MADE INEFFECTUAL STABS AT TRYING TO CONTROL THE YOUNG MEN, BUT SOON GAVE UP.

20. (C) PRIOR TO THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN EVENT/CONCERT, POLOFF SPOKE AT LENGTH TO A LOCAL WHO WAS SITTING WITH THE ORGANIZERS OF THE EVENT. HE WAS A SCHOOL TEACHER. ALL PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ARE CIVIL SERVANTS AND THUS OBLIGATED TO SUPPORT GOLKAR. HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE STREET RALLIES THAT WERE BEING CARRIED OUT BY ALL OF THE PARTIES, AND WAS APPREHENSIVE THAT NOT ENOUGH OF A CROWD WOULD SHOW UP AT THE EVENT.

21. (C) POLOFF LEFT THE CAMPAIGN CONCERT MIDWAY THROUGH AND WENT OUT TO THE NEARBY MAIN ROAD. TRUCKLOADS OF GOLKAR SUPPORTERS WERE CIRCLING THE CITY. THEY WERE JUST AS RAUCOUS, IF NOT AS NUMEROUS, AS THE PPP STREET RALLIERS THE DAY BEFORE IN THE MUCH LARGER CITY OF BANDUNG.

MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS ON THE STREETS OF BOGOR
---

22. (C) ON MAY 10 POLOFF PULLED INTO BOGOR JUST AS A CONFRONTATION WAS BREWING BETWEEN SEVERAL HUNDRED MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS OPENLY CAMPAIGNING IN THE STREETS AND A

TRUCKFUL OF SECURITY FORCES. THE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WERE IN LARGE TRUCKS AND ON MOTORCYCLES STREWN WITH PICTURES OF MEGAWATI. THEY WERE CHANTING "LONG LIVE MEGA" AND FLASHING THE MEGAWATI VERSION OF THE PDI SIGN.

23. (C) APPROXIMATELY TWENTY SOLDIERS ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS JUMPED OUT OF THEIR TRUCK AND FOLLOWED THE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS DOWN A MAJOR, CROWDED THOROUGHFARE. THE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS MADE SEVERAL LOOPS AROUND THIS ROAD, UNTIL FINALLY THEY MASSED THEIR TRUCKS AND MOTORCYCLES TOGETHER AND BEGAN ADVANCING TOWARD THE CENTER OF THE CITY.

24. (C) THE MILITARY FORCES LINED UP TO STOP THE ADVANCE, AND THEN MOVED THEIR LARGE TRUCK ACROSS THE ROAD CREATING A BLOCKADE. THE PRESSURE BUILT AS THE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS HONKED THEIR HORNS, YELLED, AND CHANTED. SEVERAL YOUNG MEN STANDING ON TRUCKS TURNED THEIR BACKS TO THE SECURITY FORCES AND MADE RUDE GESTURES. A LARGE CONTINGENT OF RIOT POLICE ARRIVED, AND THE CROWD BEGAN CHANTING "LONG LIVE THE ABRI." ONE SECURITY OFFICIAL WAS OBSERVED TALKING WITH THE DRIVER OF ONE OF THE DEMONSTRATORS' TRUCKS. JUST AS IT SEEMED THAT THE PRESSURE HAD BUILT TO A POINT WHERE THE SITUATION WOULD GET OUT OF CONTROL, THE MILITARY TRUCK WAS

PAGE 01 JAKART 02798 04 OF 04 130401Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/038W					

----------B99CD4 130401Z /38

R 130351Z MAY 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5763
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 002798

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN WEST JAVA:
"MOBILIZATION WITHOUT PARTICIPATION"

WITHDRAWN AND THE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WERE PERMITTED TO PASS. WHILE ISOLATED MEGAWATI VEHICLES COULD BE SEEN IN THE STREETS FOR SOMETIME AFTER, IT APPEARED THAT SOME KIND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02798 04 OF 04 130401Z
OF AN AGREEMENT MUST HAVE BEEN REACHED TO CALL OFF THE RALLY.

25. (SBU) ON THE WAY TO BOGOR ON MAY 10, POLOFF HAD ENCOUNTERED HUNDREDS OF PDI CAMPAIGNERS FROM THE GOVERNMENT BACKED FACTION (SURYADI). THEY WERE ON THEIR WAY TO AN EVENT IN THE OTHER DIRECTION IN THE TOWN OF SUKABUMI.

"MOBILIZATION WITHOUT PARTICIPATION"
---

26. (C) POLOFF ON MAY 8 MET WITH THE [redacted] B1

YOUNG ACTIVIST FROM THE AREA WHO WAS WORKING FOR THE NATIONAL LEVEL LBH IN JAKARTA. THE YOUNG ACTIVIST CHARACTERIZED THE CAMPAIGN AS "MOBILIZATION WITHOUT PARTICIPATION." YOUTH WERE INVOLVED IN STREET RALLIES, BUT WERE NOT EXPECTED TO DRAW A CONNECTION BETWEEN THEIR CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES AND SUBSTANTIVE POLITICS. THEY WERE NOT POLITICAL PARTICIPANTS, BUT RATHER INTENT ON ATTENDING THE ENTERTAINMENT EVENTS AND ROLLICKING THROUGH THE STREETS BLOWING OFF STEAM. PEOPLE WERE BRAVER THAN BEFORE, BUT NOT IN A POLITICAL WAY. HE CHARACTERIZED THOSE WHO RALLIED IN THE STREETS, AT LEAST IN THE CITIES, AS THE "URBAN POOR," AND HE AND HIS MORE EDUCATED FRIENDS HAD LITTLE INTEREST IN BECOMING INVOLVED.

27. (C) COMMENT: IT IS WIDELY KNOWN THAT THE PARTIES PROVIDE MATERIAL INCENTIVES TO PEOPLE TO JOIN IN THE CAMPAIGN FESTIVITIES WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN "MOBILIZATION" AND REAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION.
CONFIDENTIAL

IT IS SAID THAT SOME PEOPLE ACCEPT INDUCEMENTS FROM MORE THAN ONE PARTY. ALTHOUGH THE OVERALL PICTURE OF WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE CAMPAIGNERS IS PAID IS DIFFICULT TO PIN DOWN, THERE IS AMPLE ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE OF THE PRACTICE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE JAKARTA POST QUOTED A MOTORCYCLE TAXI DRIVER AS CLAIMING THAT "THE PPP USUALLY GIVES 15,000 RUPIAH, AND A T-SHIRT, WHILE GOLKAR, BESIDES THE MONEY, GIVES US A SNACK." END COMMENT.

RANGE OF LOCAL OPINION ABOUT THE ELECTION

28. (SBU) SOME OF THE RANDOM CONVERSATIONS WITH PEOPLE MET DURING THE THREE DAY TRIP THROUGH WEST JAVA, WHILE OF COURSE ANECDOTAL, DEMONSTRATE A RANGE OF OPINIONS ABOUT THE PARTIES, THE CAMPAIGN, AND THE ELECTION. AT THE MEGAWATI RALLY IN BOGOR ON MAY 10, A YOUNG MAN GUARDING A KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN NEAR THE RALLY WAS WEARING A RED PDI SHIRT AND A PDI HEAD BAND. HE TOLD POLOFF HE WAS DRESSED THAT WAY TO HELP PROTECT HIM FROM CAMPAIGNERS AS HE CARRIED OUT HIS GUARD DUTIES, BUT THAT HE SUPPORTED GOLKAR. WHEN ASKED WHY HE SUPPORTED GOLKAR, HE REPLIED THAT HE "WAS NOT SURE." HE ELABORATED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT HE WOULD BE VOTING, AND HE ACTUALLY DID NOT KNOW WHO HE WOULD CHOOSE.

29. (SBU) ANOTHER BYSTANDER AT THE BOGOR RALLY HD LITTLE USE FOR ANY OF THE PARTIES, BUT LIKED MEGAWATI BECAUSE SHE WAS THE DAUGHTER OF INDONESIA'S FIRST PRESIDENT SUKARNO.

ANOTHER CONFESSED THAT BECAUSE SHE WAS A CIVIL SERVANT (WORKED FOR THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT BANK) SHE HAD TO VOTE FOR GOLKAR, BUT PRIVATELY SHE SUPPORTED MEGAWATI.

CONFIDENTIAL

30. (SBU) POLOFF'S LOCAL DRIVER IN BANDUNG SAID HE DID NOT CARE ABOUT ANY OF THE PARTIES BECAUSE HE WAS STILL GOING TO HAVE TO WORK HARD NO MATTER WHO WON. HOWEVER, HE POINTED TO THE CROWDS WATCHING THE PPP CAMPAIGN AND CONTENDED THAT SEVENTY PERCENT SUPPORTED MEGAWATI. SEVERAL SHOPKEEPERS AT A BUSY MARKET IN A VILLAGE OUTSIDE BANDUNG HAD NO IDEA WHO WAS CAMPAIGNING ON MAY 9 (GOLKAR). THE ONE WHO DID KNEW THAT A "DANGDUT" CONCERT WAS PLANNED WHICH HE WAS EXCITED ABOUT.

31. (SBU) AT THE GOLKAR RALLY/DANGDUT CONCERT IN CIANJUR ON MAY 9, ONE YELLOW-SHIRTED TTENDEE TOLD POLOFF HE SUPPORTED GOLKAR, AND ALWAYS HAD, BECAUSE IT WAS GOOD FOR "DEVELOPMENT." HE TOOK POLOFF TO MEET HIS FRIEND, A SIDEWALK FOOD VENDOR, WHO HEARTILY AGREED ABOUT GOLKAR AND DEVELOPMENT. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NN

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E27

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 JAKART 02797 01 OF 02 130341Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-09	G-00	/025W

----------B99BE9 130341Z /38

R 130341Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5758
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002797

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/09
TAGS: PGOV, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: NATIONAL YOUTH COUNCIL ON ELECTION

REFS: A) JAKARTA 2493 B) 96 JAKARTA 7897

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE INDONESIAN YOUTH COUNCIL CLAIMS TO BE ACTIVELY APPEALING TO MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE MILITARY TO KEEP THE PEACE DURING THE CAMPAIGN AND TO ENSURE A SMOOTH ELECTION. KNPI HAS OFFICIALLY ENDORSED PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FOR ANOTHER TERM, BUT CLAIMS THAT IT IS NOT ENDORSING A PARTICULAR POLITICAL PARTY. [redacted] SAID B1
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02797 01 OF 02 130341Z
THAT THE MOST RECENT YOUTH CONGRESS SHOWED THAT THE ORGANIZATION WAS BECOMING MORE INDEPENDENT, BY ITS REJECTION OF MILITARY-SPONSORED CANDIDATES FOR CHAIRMANSHIP. WE HAVE YET TO SEE CLEAR INDICATIONS OF GREATER INDEPENDENCE FROM KNPI, BUT THE NEWLY ELECTED CHAIRMAN HAS INSPIRED CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM FROM SOME OF THE MORE INDEPENDENT-MINDED YOUTH AND STUDENT GROUPS. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) POLOFF MET WITH THE [redacted] B1
ON APRIL 30. KNPI IS THE OFFICIAL UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION FOR INDONESIAN YOUTH AND STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS, AND IS MADE UP OF APPROXIMATELY 66 GROUPS, 39 OF WHICH ARE VOTING MEMBERS. KNPI CONSIDERS YOUTH MEMBERSHIP TO BE FROM AGE 17 TO 40. [redacted] SAID THAT KNPI WAS B1
"INDEPENDENT" AND DID NOT CAMPAIGN FOR ANY ONE PARTY. KNPI

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

MEMBERS WHO WERE CAMPAIGNING DID SO AS INDIVIDUALS AND NOT AS REPRESENTATIVES OF KNPI.

4. (SBU) THE PRESS REPORTED IN APRIL THAT KNPI HELD MASS RALLY IN JAKARTA TO MOBILIZE YOUTH TO ASSIST WITH SECURITY FOR THE ELECTION (REF A). KNPI CLAIMED TO REPRESENT ALL YOUTH GROUPS IN THESE ACTIONS TO SECURE THE ELECTION, ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE MEMBER GROUPS PROTESTED THE CLAIM, AND TOLD POLOFF THAT ONLY GOLKAR AND ABRI-AFFILIATED GROUPS PARTICIPATED. THE PRESS REPORTED ON APRIL 22 THAT THOUSANDS OF LOCAL MEMBERS OF KNPI IN EAST TIMOR HAD PLEDGED TO ENSURE A SMOOTH GENERAL ELECTION, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EAST TIMOR CHAPTER SAID THAT YOUTH "WILL SUPPORT THE ARMED FORCES' LEGAL ACTION TO DEAL WITH THOSE SEEKING TO FOIL THE ELECTION AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY."

5. (C) WHEN POLOFF ASKED [redacted] ABOUT KNPI ASSISTANCE IN SECURING THE ELECTION, HE SAID THAT KNPI WAS IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING APPEALS TO YOUTH TO SUPPORT THE ELECTION AND USE THEIR B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02797 01 OF 02 130341Z

VOTING RIGHT IN A RESPONSIBLE MANNER. HOWEVER, HE LSO NOTED THAT FORCE WAS NOT USED, BECAUSE VOTING WAS A RIGHT AND NOT AN OBLIGATION. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE MANY YOUNG PEOPLE WOULD BOYCOTT THE ELECTION. KNPI WAS APPEALING TO YOUTH, THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE MILITARY TO KEEP THE PEACE DURING THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD.

6. (SBU) ON APRIL 1, KNPI LEADERSHIP MET WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED SUPPORT FOR HIS NOMINATION FOR ANOTHER TERM. THE MEETING WAS BROADCAST ON NATIONAL TELEVISION. KAHARUDDIN SAID THAT THE ORGANIZATION'S ENDORSEMENT OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO DID NOT REPRESENT SUPPORT FOR GOLKAR BUT REPRESENTED THEIR WISHES TO AVOID UPHEAVAL AND PRESERVE CONTINUITY. THEY SAW NO ONE ELSE CAPABLE OF LEADING THE COUNTRY AT THIS TIME.

KNPI MORE INDEPENDENT?

---

7. (C) [redacted] COMMENTED ON THE MOST RECENT KNPI CONGRESS HELD IN NOVEMBER 1996, AND SAID IT WAS THE MOST "DEMOCRATIC" CONGRESS KNPI HAS EVER HAD. B1

[redacted] B1

B1

[redacted]

MAULANA ISMAN, BROTHER OF THE YOUTH AND SPORTS MINISTER, WAS THE FOURTH CANDIDATE AND WINNER. [redacted] SAID THAT THE SUCCESS OF ISMAN PROVED KNPI WAS MORE INDEPENDENT, SINCE THE PRESSURES FROM ABRI FAILED. (NOTE: DURING THE CONGRESS, NINE YOUTH GROUPS THREATENED TO RESIGN FROM KNPI IF IT DID NOT BECOME MORE INDEPENDENT. MANY PARTICIPATING YOUTH GROUPS AGREED THAT ALTHOUGH MAULANA ISMAN WAS FROM A GOLKAR YOUTH GROUP, HIS ELECTION REPRESENTED A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT THAT COULD MEAN MORE INDEPENDENCE. REF B. END NOTE)

B1

8. (C) COMMENT: WHEN POLOFF FIRST TRIED TO OBTAIN AN APPOINTMENT WITH KNPI LEADERSHIP, POLASSISTANT WAS TOLD BY THE KNPI OFFICE THAT THE LEADERS WERE UNAVAILABLE BECAUSE THEY WERE OUT CAMPAIGNING, PRESUMABLY FOR GOLKAR. KNPI CLAIMS OF INDEPENDENCE ARE CONTRADICTED BY THE REALITY OF THE HISTORY OF KNPI AS A GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED YOUTH GROUP THAT HAS HAD A DEFACTO CONNECTION TO GOLKAR. WE HAVE YET TO SEE CLEAR INDICATIONS OF GREATER INDEPENDENCE FROM KNPI, BUT THE NEWLY ELECTED CHAIRMAN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNADP352

PAGE 01 JAKART 02797 02 OF 02 130341Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-09	G-00	/025W

----------B99BEA 130341Z /38

R 130341Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5759
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002797

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/09
TAGS: PGOV, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: NATIONAL YOUTH COUNCIL ON ELECTION

HAS INSPIRED CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM FROM SOME OF THE MORE INDEPENDENT-MINDED YOUTH AND STUDENT GROUPS. END COMMENT. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NN
<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1918

PAGE 01 JAKART 03016 211150Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-09	G-00	/026W				

----------BCE34C 211151Z /38

P 211151Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5923
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003016

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/02
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MEGAWATI TO ANNOUNCE SHE WILL NOT VOTE

REF: JAKARTA 2747

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: MEGAWATI, THE GOVERNMENT-OUSTED CHAIRPERSON OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03016 211150Z
DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WILL ANNOUNCE MAY 22 THAT SHE WILL NOT USE HER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 21 MAY 2017
DATE/CASE ID: 14 SEP 2006 200503235

"RIGHT TO VOTE," AND WILL URGE HER FOLLOWERS TO MAKE UP THEIR OWN MINDS ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT TO VOTE. SHE WILL REMIND THEM THAT VOTING IS A RIGHT NOT AN OBLIGATION. SHE WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO SWING VOTES TO THE OTHER MINORITY PARTY. NEITHER WILL SHE CALL FOR POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTIONS AS URGED BY SOME OF HER SENIOR LIEUTENANTS. SHE WILL MAKE HER STATEMENT AT A SMALL PRESS CONFERENCE, AWARE THAT THE PRESS CONFERENCE FORMAT ITSELF COULD DRAW GOVERNMENT IRE. SHE WILL CONSIDER CALLING FOR INVALIDATING OF THE ELECTION RESULTS IF THERE IS BLATANT FRAUD. ONE SUPPORTER SEES THE BEGINNINGS OF "PEOPLE POWER" IN THE FRUSTRATION FELT COMMONLY BY HER SUPPORTERS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE OTHER MINORITY PARTY, WHICH IN HIS VIEW WILL LIKELY BE THE VICTIM OF VOTE RIGGING. THE POLITICAL SITUATION REMAINS FLUID AND RATHER VOLATILE. END SUMMARY

3. (C) A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY FROM THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI), [redacted], B1
TOLD EMBOFF MAY 21 THAT GOVERNMENT OUSTED LEADER PDI CHAIRPERSON MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI WILL ANNOUNCE MAY 22 THAT SHE WILL NOT USE HER "RIGHT TO VOTE." THE PHRASING IS SPECIFIC AND INTENDED TO REMIND HER FOLLOWERS THAT VOTING IS A RIGHT NOT A DUTY. SHE WILL MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT AT A SMALL PRESS CONFERENCE. MEGAWATI IS AWARE THAT THE PRESS CONFERENCE MIGHT BE REGARDED AS AN ACTIVITY BANNED DURING THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD AND THEREFORE COULD ANGER THE GOVERNMENT. SHE WILL ISSUE HER ANNOUNCEMENT AS A HAND WRITTEN STATEMENT TO PRECLUDE THE GOVERNMENT POSSIBILITY OF ALTERING THE TEXT OF HER STATEMENT, A PROBLEM SHE HAS ENCOUNTERED IN THE PAST. [redacted] NOTED THAT SHE WILL CONSIDER CALLING FOR THE INVALIDATION OF THE ELECTION RESULTS IF THERE IS TOO MUCH VOTE RIGGING. B1

4. (C) SEPARATELY, [redacted] A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FROM THE B1
CONFIDENTIAL

INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (MEGAWATI FACTION) TOLD EMBOFF MAY 19 THAT AT A MEETING SEVERAL DAYS AGO WITH HER SENIOR ADVISORS, MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI DECIDED THAT SHE WOULD ANNOUNCE HER INTENTION NOT TO VOTE IN THE UPCOMING ELECTION. AT THE SAME TIME SHE INFORMED HER KEY LIEUTENANTS THAT SHE WOULD ADVISE HER FOLLOWERS THAT IF THEY DECIDE TO VOTE, THEN THEY SHOULD VOTE FOR A "LEGAL" PARTY, A BROAD HINT THAT THEY SHOULD NOT VOTE FOR THE PDI NOW UNDER WHAT SHE AND HER FOLLOWERS CLAIM IS AN ILLEGAL LEADERSHIP IMPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

5. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT MEGAWATI WAS CONCERNED THAT WERE SHE TO URGE PEOPLE TO VOTE FOR THE OTHER MINORITY PARTY, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), SHE WOULD DIVIDE HER OWN SUPPORTERS. MUSLIMS WHO BACK HER WOULD LIKELY FOLLOW HER ADVICE AND VOTE FOR THE MUSLIM ORIENTED PPP. CHRISTIANS IN THE PDI, NOTABLY THOSE IN THE OUTER ISLANDS, BEDING STRESSED, WOULD BE "LEFT VERY CONFUSED." B1

6. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT HE AND OTHERS HAD URGED MEGAWATI TO CONSIDER CALLING FOR A POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTIONS BECAUSE COURT CONSIDERATION OF HER SUIT AGAINST HER OUSTER AS CHAIRPERSON WAS STILL PENDING. THIS WAS A POSITION TAKEN BY [redacted] AND 16 OTHER PDI PARLIAMENTARIANS MAY 12 WHO PETITIONED THE PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER TO CALL FOR A POSTPONEMENT. [redacted] SAID THAT MEGAWATI HAD REJECTED A CALL FOR POSTPONEMENT AND HAD DISPLAYED HER "IRON WILL" ABOUT FOLLOWING THE LAW. SHE ALSO REPORTEDLY FEARED THAT SUCH A CALL COULD LEAD SOME OF HER FOLLOWERS INTO VIOLENCE AIMED AT STOPPING THE ELECTION. B1 B1 B1

7. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT HE AND SOME OTHER MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS EXPECT THAT THE ELECTION OUTCOME COULD SOW THE SEEDS OF "REAL PEOPLE POWER." HE ARGUED THAT PPP SUPPORTERS WILL LIKELY FEEL B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CHEATED IF, AS IN THE PAST, THE GOVERNMENT ENGAGES IN VOTE RIGGING TO HELP GOLKAR IN JAKARTA AND CENTRAL JAVA. HE SAID THAT ANGERED PPP SUPPORTERS WOULD SHARE THE SAME FRUSTRATION NOW FELT BY SUPPORTERS OF MEGAWATI INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE PDI. [redacted] NOTED THAT THERE IS ALREADY BROAD SYMPATHY IN PPP FOR MEGAWATI. B1

8. (C) SEPARATELY A POLITICAL ACTIVIST IN CENTRAL JAVA TOLD EMBOFF MAY 20 THAT PRO-MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS PLAN TO STAGE PUBLIC DISPLAYS OF SUPPORT THE SAME DAY IN THE PROVINCE -- MAY 22, THE DAY ALLOCATED TO THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED PDI FACTION FOR CAMPAIGNING, INTER ALIA, IN JAKARTA AND CENTRAL JAVA. EMBOFF ALSO LEARNED THAT AT LEAST ONE PDI MEGAWATI BRANCH ALREADY INSTRUCTED ITS MEMBERS NOT TO VOTE FOR PDI.

9. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: MEGAWATI'S REPORTED DECISION TO ANNOUNCE SHE WOULD NOT VOTE AND URGE OTHERS TO FOLLOW THEIR CONSCIENCE WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE OF DEMONSTRATING HER PROTEST OVER THE ELECTION AND HER EXCLUSION FROM IT. AT THE SAME TIME SHE WOULD PRECLUDE GOVERNMENT ACTION AGAINST HERSELF AND HER SENIOR

LIEUTENANTS, AS SHE WILL NOT BE URGING PEOPLE NOT TO VOTE, WHICH IS AN ILLEGAL ACT. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6922

PAGE 01 JAKART 03117 01 OF 04 280846Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/038W						

----------BF0034 280847Z /38

R 280844Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5987
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 003117

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB. TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ASEC, ID
SUBJECT: THE ELECTION AS THEATER: LAMPUNG PROVINCE ISN'T TALKING

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: LAMPUNG HAS BEEN A STRONG GOLKAR AREA SINCE 1987, AND GOLKAR WILL PROBABLY DO WELL THERE IN THE CURRENT ELECTION. THE OFFICIAL INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) UNDER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03117 01 OF 04 280846Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 28 MAY 2016
DATE/CASE ID: 08 SEP 2006 200503235

SURYADI APPEARED TO BE IN BAD SHAPE, WITH MOST PDI SUPPORTERS FAVORING OUSTED PDI LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI. MOREOVER, PDI MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WERE INTIMIDATING PDI SURYADI INTO NOT CAMPAIGNING. THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) HAD ATTRACTED SOME MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS TO ITS SIDE, AND WAS CONFIDENT THAT SUPPORT FOR PPP WAS STRONG. PDI MEGAWATI CHAIRPEOPLE COMPLAINED THAT THE ELECTION HAD BEEN RIGGED BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR GOLKAR SINCE 1987, AND REAL ELECTION RESULTS THROWN OUT IN 1992 WHEN THEY REACHED THE SUB-DISTRICT LEVEL, WHERE THERE WERE NO WITNESSES. END SUMMARY

3. (C) POLITICAL PARTY OFFICIALS IN LAMPUNG PROVINCE WERE WARNED BY THE GOVERNMENT NOT TO SPEAK TO FOREIGNERS ABOUT THE ELECTION, AND ALL SCHEDULED MEETINGS WITH PARTY OFFICIALS ARRANGED BY EMBOFF, FROM JAKARTA AND THROUGH THE CENTRAL PARTY BOARDS, DID NOT TAKE PLACE AS PLANNED DURING A THREE DAY VISIT TO THE PROVINCE MAY 19 THROUGH 21. REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE AND THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE ALSO DID NOT ATTEND SCHEDULED MEETINGS WTIH EMBOFF. DESPITE SUCH OFFICIAL BARRIERS TO OBTAINING INFORMATION ABOUT THE CAMPAIGN IN LAMPUNG PROVINCE, A PICTURE OF A TIGHTLY CONTROLLED, REPRESSIVE AND SECURE ELECTION ENVIRONMENT EMERGED.

GOLKAR: THE COLD SHOULDER

---

4. (C) A TOUR OF LAMPUNG PROVINCE (THE SOUTHERN TIP OF SUMATRA) FROM SOUTH TO NORTH REVEALED ONLY GOLKAR FLAGS IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBER, AND MANY OF THOSE WERE NO LONGER VISIBLE ON A NON-GOLKAR CAMPAIGN DAY. ON PPP AND PDI DAYS, ALMOST NO FLAGS OF ANY COLORS WERE SEEN. SCHEDULED AND CONFIRMED MEETINGS WITH GOLKAR

OFFICIALS IN BANDAR LAMPUNG AND KOTA BUMI DID NOT TAKE PLACE, DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF ALL OFFICIALS AUTHORIZED TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE PARTY. IN BANDAR LAMPUNG, OFFICIALS WERE "OUT OF TOWN," AND THE OFFICE WAS OCCUPIED BY YOUTH IN PARA-MILITARY SATGAS (ELECTION SECURITY) UNIFORMS. THE CHAIRMAN OF YOUTH GROUP AMPI (INDONESIAN DEVELOPMENT YOUTH) AGREED TO MEET EMBOFF OUTSIDE GOLKAR OFFICES AS A YOUTH LEADER AND NOT A GOLKAR OFFICIAL. HE SAID THAT MEMBERS FROM ALL GOLKAR YOUTH GROUPS (INCLUDING AMPI, PEMUDA PANCASILA (WHICH POSTURES AS BEING INDEPENDENT), AND ABRI

YOUTH) WERE SERVING AS ELECTION SECURITY FORCES FOR THE GOLKAR CAMPAIGN. HE ASKED WHY EMBOFF HAD NOT MET WITH THE MILITARY COMMANDER, IMPLYING THAT ONE COULD NOT CONDUCT MEETINGS IN TOWN WITHOUT BLESSINGS FROM THE COMMANDER.

5. (C) THE AMPI CHAIRMAN SAID LAMPUNG WAS STRONG GOLKAR TERRITORY AND WAS "VERY SECURE." HE SAID THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES WERE "INSTRUCTED" NOT TO SPEAK TO FOREIGNERS ABOUT THE CAMPAIGN OR ELECTION. IN ADDITION, LOCAL PARTY LEADERS WERE AFRAID TO SPEAK BECAUSE ALL AUTHORITY CAME FROM JAKARTA AND NO ONE WANTED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK MAKING A MISTAKE. IN GENERAL, GOVERNMENT/GOLKAR YOUTH GROUPS ALSO HAD TO DEFER TO JAKARTA AND LACKED THE AUTHORITY TO SPEAK FOR THEIR ORGANIZATIONS. HE SAID THE GOVERNMENT FELT THREATENED BY FOREIGNERS COMING TO SEE THE CAMPAIGN, BECAUSE TO THEM THERE WAS NO LINE BETWEEN "OBSERVING" AND "ENTERING," WHICH TO THEM MEANT INTERFERING. HE SAID THAT A MALAYSIAN DIPLOMAT WHO HAD BEEN IN LAMPUNG SINCE BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN "HAD NOT LEARNED ANYTHING" YET BECAUSE NO ONE WOULD TALK TO HIM.

6. (C) WHILE WAITING FOR THE CANCELLATION OF THE MEETING WITH GOLKAR VICE CHAIRMAN IN KOTA BUMI, EMBOFF SAT IN THE CHAIRMAN'S

OFFICE, AND STUDIED A "POLITICAL MAP" WHICH CONTAINED TWO PARTS, ELECTION 1992 AND ELECTION 1997. EACH TOWN IN THE NORTH LAMPUNG DISTRICT WAS LISTED WITH PERCENTAGES AND WHAT APPEARED TO BE VOTE NUMBERS. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE IF THEY WERE ELECTION PREDICTIONS OR RESULTS. EMBOFF WAS RECEIVED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE "SECTION FOR WINNING THE ELECTION," THOUGH HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO SPEAK ABOUT THE ELECTION. HE DID SAY THAT GOLKAR HAD NO TARGETS FOR THE ELECTION, AND TOLD EMBOFF TO CHECK THE MEDIA FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE GOLKAR CAMPAIGN. HE SAID THAT GOLKAR CAMPAIGNS WERE LIMITED TO TWO HOURS FOR SECURITY REASONS.

7. (SBU) PARTICIPATING IN THE MAY 19 GOLKAR CAMPAIGN IN LAMPUNG WERE PRESIDENTIAL DAUGHTER SITI HARDIYANTI (TUTUT), MINISTER OF COOPERATIVES SOEBYAKTO, AND FORMER MINISTER OF RELIGION ALAMSYAH. GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AND MINISTER OF INFORMATION HARMOKO HAD BEEN IN LAMPUNG MAY 16 FOR THE GOLKAR CAMPAIGN. EMBOFF TRIED TO GO TO A GOLKAR CAMPAIGN IN BANDAR LAMPUNG WHICH BEGAN AT 1300, BUT IT HAD ALREADY BROKEN UP BY 1500. SEVERAL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES NOTED

THAT ALL CAMPAIGNS IN THE PROVINCE WERE LIMITED TO TWO HOURS, SO THAT THE CAMPAIGN WOULD NOT GET "TOO HOT." EMBOFF SAT IN TRAFFIC LEAVING THE CAMPAIGNS FOR OVER AN HOUR AND OBSERVED BETWEEN 5,000 AND 10,000 PEOPLE LEAVING THE RALLY. MANY VEHICLES HAD SIGNS INDICATING THEY WERE FROM CERTAIN SUB-DISTRICTS. MANY PARTICIPANTS INSIDE VEHICLES APPEARED TO BE CIVIL SERVANTS, AND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6926

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6926

PAGE 01 JAKART 03117 02 OF 04 280847Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/038W						

----------BF003A 280847Z /38

R 280844Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5988
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 003117

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB. TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ASEC, ID
SUBJECT: THE ELECTION AS THEATER: LAMPUNG PROVINCE ISN'T TALKING

THOSE IN TRUCKS AND ON TOP OF VEHICLES WERE MOSTLY YOUNG MEN AND BOYS, MANY BELOW VOTING AGE. THE RALLY DISPERSED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

PDI SURYADI: DEAD IN LAMPUNG
---

8. (SBU) ARRIVING AT A SCHEDULED MEETING WITH THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN IN BANDAR LAMPUNG, THE CAPITAL OF THE PROVINCE, EMBOFF WAS GREETED BY A VIDEO-CAMERA AND APPROXIMATELY 12 MEN WHO SAID THEY WERE NOT PDI OFFICIALS BUT PDI MEMBERS ONLY, "GUESTS" AT THE PDI OFFICE. THEY SAID NO ONE PRESENT COULD MEET WITH EMBOFF, AND THEY WERE ALSO UNABLE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT WHERE THE CAMPAIGN EVENTS WERE SCHEDULED TO BE HELD THE FOLLOWING DAY. PDI OFFICIALS WERE "OUT OF TOWN" PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGN THE NEXT DAY. THEY TOLD EMBOFF TO GO TO THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OFFICE TO GET INFORMATION ABOUT THE CAMPAIGN SCHEDULE.

9. (C) A SCHEDULED MEETING WITH THE PDI CHAIRMAN IN KOTA BUMI, CAPITAL OF NORTH LAMPUNG DISTRICT, ALSO DID NOT TAKE PLACE. EMBOFF WAS RECEIVED "UNOFFICIALLY" BY A PARTY SECRETARY NAMED KADIR. HE SAID THAT PDI HAD NO PROBLEMS FROM THE PARTY SPLIT. HE ESTIMATED THAT PDI HAD 3000 MEMBERS IN THE DISTRICT. HE SAID MANY YOUNG PEOPLE CAME TO THE OFFICE EVERY DAY ASKING FOR MEMBERSHIP CARDS, BUT MOST COULD NOT RECEIVE THEM BECAUSE THEY WERE TOO YOUNG TO VOTE.

10. (C) DURING A TWO-HOUR DRIVE TO KOTA BUMI ON A PDI CAMPAIGN DAY, EMBOFF SAW ONLY A FEW PDI FLAGS, NO CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY, AND NO PEOPLE WEARING PARTY COLORS. ACCORDING TO A PPP SECRETARY WHO OBSERVED THE PDI CAMPAIGN IN AGUNG, THERE WERE ABOUT 1,000 PEOPLE IN ATTENDANCE, AND NO DISTURBANCES. THE GOLKAR YOUTH

REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT PDI CAMPAIGNS WERE HARD TO LOCATE BECAUSE THEY WERE SMALL AND QUICK. HE SAID THAT MOST PDI SUPPORTERS IN LAMPUNG SUPPORTED MEGAWATI.

CONFIDENTIAL

11. (C) PDI CURRENTLY HOLDS TWO OUT OF THE 45 SEATS IN THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT. IT APPEARED THAT PDI WAS ALMOST COMPLETELY FINISHED IN THE PROVINCE, AND HAD BEEN INTIMIDATED BY PDI MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS INTO HALTING ALMOST ALL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY. ON MAY 14, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL OBSERVERS, PDI MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS HAD DISRUPTED A PDI CAMPAIGN DIALOGUE BEING HELD IN BANDAR LAMPUNG, AND FIGHTING HAD BROKEN OUT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY DOING WELL BUT CAN'T WIN, FOR NOW

---

12. (C) IN BANDAR LAMPUNG, THE CHAIRMAN OF PPP WAS UNAVAILABLE, BUT EMBOFF WAS RECEIVED BY THE VICE CHAIRMAN FOR SOCIAL WELFARE WHO SAID HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS THE ELECTION. HE WAS WILLING TO TALK TO EMBOFF AND GAVE SOME IMPRESSIONS. HE SAID THAT PPP WAS DOING WELL AND DRAWING A LOT OF SUPPORTERS FOR ITS CAMPAIGNS IN LAMPUNG. THERE WERE PDI SUPPORTERS WHO WERE JOINING PPP CAMPAIGNS IN SUPPORT OF THE UNOFFICIAL FUSION BETWEEN PPP AND MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS. THE PARTY DECIDED TO LIMIT CAMPAIGNS TO TWO HOURS BECAUSE PEOPLE GET RESTLESS AND THE PARTY WANTED TO PREVENT CLASHES. PPP, WHICH CURRENTLY HAD ONLY ONE SEAT OUT OF 45 IN THE REGIONAL PARLIAMENT, WAS HOPING FOR 10 SEATS FROM THIS ELECTION. THEY LAST HAD 10 SEATS IN 1982. HE SAID THAT "WE DON'T PAY OUR PEOPLE (TO CAMPAIGN)" SO THE PPP CROWDS WERE MORE GENUINE THAN OTHERS.

13. (C) DURING AN UNPLANNED STOP AT THE PPP OFFICE IN KOTA BUMI, EMBOFF WAS RECEIVED BY THE CHAIRMAN AND A PPP OFFICIAL FROM BANDAR LAMPUNG ASSIGNED TO KOTA BUMI FOR THE ELECTION PERIOD.

CONFIDENTIAL

THEY WERE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE SUCCESS OF THE PPP CAMPAIGN IN NORTH LAMPUNG, AND SHOWED EMBOFF PICTURES OF LARGE PPP RALLIES. THEY SAID IN 1992 THERE WERE 4300 CARD-CARRYING PPP MEMBERS (CADRE) IN THE DISTRICT, AND 49,000 VOTES FOR PPP. AS OF MAY 1997, THE NUMBER OF CARD-CARRYING MEMBERS HAD RISEN TO 21,000, AND PPP WAS PREDICTING OVER 200,000 VOTES OUT OF 847,250 REGISTERED VOTERS IN NORTH LAMPUNG. (NOTE: THEY WERE PROBABLY BEING OVERLY OPTIMISTIC GIVEN THAT THEIR ARITHMETIC WAS SIMPLY TO USE THE SAME RATIO OF CADRE TO VOTES FROM 1992 FOR 1997. END NOTE) ACCORDING TO THE PPP CHAIRMAN, DURING THE LAST PPP CAMPAIGN DAY IN NORTH LAMPUNG, THERE WERE 1,000 TO 1,500 PEOPLE IN ATTENDANCE WHO WERE OF THE MEGA-BINTANG GROUP OF PDI SUPPORTERS.

14. (C) PARTY PRIORITIES FOR THE DISTRICT WERE TO WORK TO "DIVIDE THE CAKE EQUALLY." PPP WANTED TO HELP FARMERS, ESPECIALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LOSS OF LAND TO CONGLOMERATES. LAND ISSUES WERE MOST SIGNIFICANT TO THEIR PLATFORM. THEY SAID THAT THERE WERE LOTS OF GOVERNMENT SLOGANS ABOUT RULE BY ALL THREE PARTIES, BUT THEY WERE NOTHING MORE THAN SLOGANS. IN THE DISTRICT LEVEL LEGISLATURE, PPP CURRENTLY HELD THREE OF 36 SEATS. THEY HOPED TO GAIN MORE SEATS, AND "KNEW" PPP WOULD SOMEDAY WIN AGAIN IN THE PROVINCE, THOUGH IT COULD NOT HAPPEN THIS TIME. GOLKAR WAS THE "SINGLE MAJORITY" ONLY FOR NOW. THE PPP OFFICIAL FROM BANDAR

PAGE 01 JAKART 03117 03 OF 04 280847Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/038W						

----------BF003E 280847Z /38

R 280844Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5989
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 003117

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB. TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ASEC, ID
SUBJECT: THE ELECTION AS THEATER: LAMPUNG PROVINCE ISN'T TALKING

LAMPUNG SAID THAT THE 1987 AND 1992 ELECTIONS WERE OF "POOR QUALITY" (NOT FAIR) BUT THAT HE COULD NOT SPEAK OPENLY ABOUT IT. (NOTE: MEGAWATI CHAIRPEOPLE LATER STRONGLY STATED THAT GOLKAR HAD ALTERED ELECTION RESULTS IN THE PROVINCE TO THE DESIRED GOLKAR NUMBERS SINCE THE 1987 ELECTION. END NOTE)
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03117 03 OF 04 280847Z

15. (C) WHEN ASKED ABOUT ELECTION WITNESSES (ONE PERSON FROM EACH PARTY IS ALLOWED TO SERVE AS A WITNESS IN EACH POLLING STATION), THEY SAID PPP WOULD BE REPRESENTED IN 91 PERCENT OF THE POLLING STATIONS IN NORTH LAMPUNG. THE OTHER NINE PERCENT WERE IMPOSSIBLE SINCE THE STATIONS WERE WITHIN TWO STRONG COMPANIES,

BETASENA AND D.BASENA (PHONETIC). THE COMPANIES AND THE LOCAL BUREAUCRACY WERE BARRING PPP FROM SENDING WITNESSES TO THEIR POLLING STATIONS. THE DISTRICT CHIEF HAD TOLD PPP THEY NEEDED SPECIAL PERMISSION FROM JAKARTA TO ENTER. THE PPP CHAIRMAN CLAIMED THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO COLLUDE WITH THE CURRENT DISTRICT CHIEF, BUT HE DECLINED BECAUSE SOMEDAY PPP WOULD CONTROL THE AREA AND PICK THEIR OWN DISTRICT CHIEF AND GOVERNOR.

PDI MEGAWATI

---

16. (C) [redacted] B1 THEY WERE BOTH ACTIVISTS OF THE NATIONALIST STUDENT ORGANIZATION (GMNI) WHILE THEY WERE STUDENTS. THEY RUN THE OFFICES OUT OF THEIR HOME, WHICH THEY CLAIM IS MONITORED 24 HOURS A DAY. THEY CLAIMED THAT MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS NUMBERED 85 TO 87 PERCENT OF PDI SUPPORTERS IN THE PROVINCE AND SUPPORTERS GATHERED AT THE OFFICE EVERY AFTERNOON. THEY CLAIMED THAT PDI MEGAWATI HAD BRANCHES IN ALL SUB-DISTRICTS AND ALSO HAD PEOPLE WORKING IN EVERY VILLAGE IN THE PROVINCE. SOME MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WERE CAMPAIGNING FOR PPP.

17. (C) [redacted] SAID PDI WON THE PROVINCE IN 1982, AND B1
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

STARTING IN 1987, THE ELECTION WAS RIGGED AND THE RESULTS WERE PLANNED IN ADVANCE AND KEPT IN GOLKAR DISTRICT OFFICES. STATEMENTS OF ELECTION RESULTS SIGNED AT THE SUB-DISTRICT LEVEL WERE PREPARED BEFORE ELECTION DAY, THEY CLAIMED, AND IT WAS AT THIS LEVEL THAT THE CHANGES IN RESULTS WERE MADE. WITNESSES WERE ONLY PRESENT AT POLLING STATIONS, AND NOWHERE ELSE UP THE CHAIN FOR REPORTING RESULTS. SRIE SAID THEY HAD EVIDENCE THAT WHOLE BALLOT BOXES FULL OF VOTES WERE "THROWN IN THE RIVER" AFTER THE 1992 ELECTION, ONLY TO BE REPLACED WITH NEW BOXES FILLED WITH THE "CORRECT" NUMBERS OF GOLKAR VOTES.

18. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT PDI SURYADI WAS TOO AFRAID TO B1
CAMPAIGN ANY MORE IN THE CAPITAL BECAUSE THEY WOULD BE ATTACKED BY PDI MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS. [redacted] SAID THAT SHE HAD ORDERED "THE B1
KIDS OF PDI" TO DISRUPT THE PDI SURYADI CAMPAIGN. SHE SAID SHE

HAD COMPLAINED TO REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER BIBIT WALUYO THAT THE MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT WAS CONDUCTING THE CAMPAIGN FOR SURYADI PDI SINCE THEY WERE TOO AFRAID TO CAMPAIGN. SHE SAID THAT THE MILITARY WAS DISTRIBUTING PDI T-SHIRTS AND TRYING TO MAKE PEOPLE CAMPAIGN FOR PDI TO SHOW THAT THE ELECTION WAS NORMAL IN THE PROVINCE. THE AUTHORITIES WERE ALSO TRYING UNSUCCESSFULLY TO PAY MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS TO JOIN THE CAMPAIGN FOR PDI SURYADI.

19. (C) THE STUDENTS OF THE PROVINCE WERE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS, AND HAD HELD DEMOCRACY MEETINGS, ACCORDING TO [redacted] A CATHOLIC STUDENT ACTIVIST IN BANDAR LAMPUNG TOLD EMBOFF THAT STUDENTS IN THE PROVINCE WERE NOT GENERALLY POLITICALLY ACTIVE, BUT MOST SUPPORTED MEGAWATI. THE LAST STUDENT DEMONSTRATION IN THE PROVINCE WAS APRIL 10, CALLING FOR AN ELECTION POSTPONEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH UNFAIR TREATMENT FOR MEGAWATI. THE NEXT PLANNED ACTIVITY HAD FAILED, ACCORDING TO HIM, BECAUSE OF NEW INFORMERS B1

CONFIDENTIAL

WITHIN THE GROUPS. STUDENTS HAD STOPPED THEIR ELECTION-RELATED ACTIVITY AFTER THAT. STUDENTS HAD BEEN CALLED TO A MEETING THE WEEK OF MAY 12 WITH THE REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER AND TOLD NOT TO DO ANYTHING RELATED TO THE ELECTION. THEY WERE ALSO TOLD NOT TO MEET FOREIGNERS BECAUSE THEY SHOULD "NOT REVEAL THEIR WEAKNESSES OR DEFAME THEIR COUNTRY." STUDENTS WERE INTIMIDATED BECAUSE "THE SECURITY FORCES KNOW EVERYTHING." MOST STUDENTS WERE NOT PARTICIPATING IN ANY CAMPAIGNS.

20. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT SHE BECAME CONCERNED ABOUT PDI UNDER MEGAWATI BEGINNING IN OCTOBER 1995, BECAUSE GOVERNMENT HARASSMENT BEGAN THEN. SHE SAID SHE HAD BEEN CALLED IN FOR QUESTIONING BY THE MILITARY MANY TIMES, AND DESCRIBED EXTREME ARROGANCE FROM THE MILITARY COMMANDER. SHE DESCRIBED HIM AS CONTROLLING THE PROVINCE AND OF FREQUENTLY SAYING THAT HE SERVED IN EAST TIMOR FIVE TIMES AND THAT HIS "BOOTS WERE STILL THICK" SO "IF HE KICKS YOU HE WILL HURT YOU." (NOTE: THE STUDENT ACTIVIST, IN A SEPARATE MEETING, GAVE THE SAME QUOTE FROM THE MILITARY COMMANDER, WHO HE ALSO DESCRIBED AS ARROGANT AND MAINTAINING TIGHT SECURITY IN THE REGION. END NOTE) [redacted] SAID BIBIT WAS ASSIGNED TO THE PROVINCE FROM KOPASSUS (SPECIAL FORCES), AND WAS "ONE OF PRABOWO'S MEN." ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE PROVINCIAL POLICE CHIEF (POLRES) HAD GONE TO STUDY AT LEMHANAS (NATIONAL RESILIENCE INSTITUTE, UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE) FOR THE B1 B1 B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6925

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6925

PAGE 01 JAKART 03117 04 OF 04 280847Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/038W						

----------BF0041 280847Z /38

R 280844Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5990
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 003117

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB. TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ASEC, ID
SUBJECT: THE ELECTION AS THEATER: LAMPUNG PROVINCE ISN'T TALKING

ENTIRE ELECTION PERIOD BECAUSE HE DID NOT WANT TO BE PART OF THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY ELECTION ACTIVITIES.

AN ILLUSTRATION OF SENSITIVITIES

---

21. (C) AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE SENSITIVITIES IN THE PROVINCE, EMBOFF FACED MONITORING WHICH PROGRESSED INTO HARASSMENT. ALTHOUGH THE EMBASSY HAD INFORMED THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OFFICE OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS (SOSPOL) THAT EMBOFF WOULD VISIT THE PROVINCE AND HAD BEEN TOLD WE WERE "WELCOME," THE EMBASSY WAS CALLED ON MAY 19 BY THE SOSPOL OFFICE, AFTER DEPARTURE OF EMBOFF, AND TOLD THAT PERMISSION FROM THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS WAS NEEDED FOR TRAVEL TO LAMPUNG. EMBOFF CALLED THE SOSPOL OFFICE UPON ARRIVAL IN LAMPUNG, AND AFTER A DISCUSSION ABOUT THE UNUSUAL NATURE OF THE REQUEST FOR PERMISSION FROM THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, IT WAS AGREED THAT SINCE EMBOFF WAS ALREADY IN THE PROVINCE, THE VISIT COULD GO ON AS SCHEDULED. HOWEVER, EACH POLITICAL PARTY OFFICE WAS VISITED BY INTEL SEEKING INFORMATION ABOUT EMBASSY VISIT AND ASSURANCES THAT NO ONE WOULD SPEAK TO EMBOFF.

22. (C) DURING THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF VISIT, EMBOFF NOTICED TWO SUSPICIOUS LOOKING MEN IN THE HOTEL LOBBY, ONE OF WHOM WAS LATER SEEN OUTSIDE THE PDI OFFICE IN KOTA BUMI, A CITY TWO HOURS FROM THE HOTEL, AND ANOTHER IN A RESTAURANT WHERE EMBOFF ATE DINNER. THE MAN WHO FILMED EMBOFF IN THE PDI OFFICE WAS ALSO SEEN IN THE RESTAURANT. AT 8:30 PM ON DAY TWO A MAN CALLED EMBOFF'S HOTEL ROOM TO ASK FOR THE NEXT DAY'S SCHEDULE, SAYING HE WAS "ASSIGNED" TO MONITOR AND PROTECT EMBOFF, AND THAT HE WAS IN THE HOTEL ANY TIME EMBOFF WAS IN THE HOTEL. WHEN PUSHED FOR HIS IDENTITY, HE SAID HE WAS FROM THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT. FOUR INTEL OFFICERS IN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT UNIFORMS HAD VISITED THE MEGAWATI PDI OFFICE ON THE DAY BEFORE EMBOFF'S VISIT AT 6:00 AM AND AGAIN FROM 7:00 PM UNTIL 11:00 PM, ACCORDING TO PDI MEGAWATI CHAIRPEOPLE, WANTING INFORMATION ABOUT IF AND WHEN EMBOFF WOULD VISIT THEM. ON DAY

UNCLASSIFIED

THREE, EMBOFF MET WITH THE PDI MEGAWATI CHAIRPERSON AND WAS FOLLOWED FROM THERE TO THE HOTEL BY TWO CARS CONTAINING EIGHT MEN. ONE OF THE CARS AND AT LEAST ONE OF THE MEN HAD BEEN SEEN IN KOTA BUMI THE DAY BEFORE, AND ONE OF THE MEN HAD EARLIER APPEARED TO BE WORKING IN THE HOTEL. SEVERAL OF THE MEN TRIED TO ELICIT INFORMATION FROM THE EMBASSY DRIVER.

23. (C) ONE CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT THE AUTHORITIES IN LAMPUNG WERE CONCERNED THAT EMBOFF MIGHT LEARN ABOUT THE TRUE NATURE OF THE ELECTION IN THE PROVINCE, WHICH APPEARS TO BEAR LITTLE RESEMBLANCE TO A REAL COMPETITION BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES.
ROY

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7139

PAGE 01 JAKART 03128 01 OF 05 281005Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-09	G-00
	/024W						

----------BF0769 281005Z /38

R 281003Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5998
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 003128

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0076

E.O. 12958: DECL:05/26/12
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN OBSERVATIONS: CENTRAL JAVA AND YOGYAKARTA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PRINCIPAL OFFICER. REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN THE LAST WEEK OF CAMPAIGNING FOR INDONESIA'S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03128 01 OF 05 281005Z
GENERAL ELECTIONS, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) SENSES IT HAS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 SEP 2006 200503235

MOMENTUM IN CENTRAL JAVA AND YOGYAKARTA. NONETHELESS, GOLKAR, THE GOVERNMENT PARTY, SHOULD MANAGE A STRONG WIN. THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DEFLATED BY LOYALISTS OF OUSTED PDI LEADER MEGAWATI AND IN CENTRAL JAVA IT COULD SEE A 70 PER CENT DROP IN ITS VOTE FROM THE 1992 ELECTION. THE PHENOMENON OF MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS VOTING FOR THE PPP (MEGA-BINTANG) SEEMS TO HAVE MIXED SUPPORT FOR THE WHILE. MANY DOUBT MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WOULD VOTE FOR THE PPP IN LARGE NUMBERS, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY IN SOLO. PPP LEADERS NOTE YOUNG PEOPLE ARE PREVALENT AT PARTY RALLIES, MANY ARE UNAWARE OF THE PPP IN ANY DEPTH BUT ARE DRAWN TO IT BY OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT. LENGTHY, COLORFUL DEMONSTRATIONS AND HIGHWAY PROCESSIONS MARKED CAMPAIGNING BY THE PPP AND GOLKAR. THE MILITARY MONITORED THEM CLOSELY. PDI RALLIES WERE VIRTUALLY INVISIBLE. LOCALIZED INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE DID NOT SPREAD. IN YOGYAKARTA, SULTAN HAMENGKUBUWONO, GOLKAR CHAIRMAN, SPOKE OF THE CRITICAL NEED TO KEEP A HEALTHY PDI PRESENCE IN THE YOGYAKARTA DISTRICT GOVERNMENT IF IT IS TO REMAIN BALANCED AND NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE ABRI FACTION. END SUMMARY

3. (U) INTRODUCTION: IN A TRIP THROUGH CENTRAL JAVA AND YOGYAKARTA MAY 19-23, PO, LATER JOINED BY ECON OFF, SPOKE WITH AN ARRAY OF OFFICIALS, POLITICAL OBSERVERS, AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS. FOLLOWING IS AN ACCOUNT OF CONVERSATIONS HELD AND EVENTS WITNESSED DURING THE TIME. END INTRODUCTION

---REMBANG, CENTRAL JAVA--

4. (SBU) REMBANG, A DISTRICT LOCATED IN THE FAR NORTHEASTERN CORNER OF CENTRAL JAVA, IS NOTORIOUSLY POOR AND VERY DRY. WITH NO INDUSTRY TO SPEAK OF, REMBANG'S SOCIETY RESTS ON SMALL FARMING,

LOCAL FISHING, SHOPKEEPING, AND A PERVASIVE GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY. AS PART OF THE NORTH CENTRAL COAST HISTORICALLY TIED TO THE INTRODUCTION OF ISLAM INTO JAVA, REMBANG HAS A POPULATION LARGELY DEVOUT MUSLIM, PREDOMINANTLY NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU). IT WENT FOR GOLKAR TWO FOR ONE OVER THE PPP IN 1992. THE PDI TOOK 13 PERCENT. PASSING THROUGH THE AREA ON MAY 19, A PDI CAMPAIGN DAY, PO SAW NO SIGN OF CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY AND WAS TOLD THAT THE PDI HAD NOT CAMPAIGNED THERE AT ALL, NO PDI BANNERS VISIBLE. GOLKAR AND THE PPP HAD BEEN ACTIVELY CAMPAIGNING

5. (SBU) A LOCAL KIAI (ISLAMIC LEADER) IN REMBANG CITY SAID THAT GOLKAR WOULD INVARIABLY WIN THE DISTRICT AGAIN, THE BUREAUCRACY WAS TOO STRONG, AND MANY RESIDENTS WITH OLD TIES TO THE NATIONALIST PARTY FELL UNDER THE GOLKAR ORBIT. HOWEVER, ENTHUSIASM FOR THE PPP WAS GROWING. PEOPLE HAD BEGUN TO LOSE THEIR FEAR OF GOVERNMENT PRESSURE TO VOTE GOLKAR. THE PHENOMENON OF MEGAWATI PDI SUPPORTERS EMBRACING THE PPP (THE MEGA-BINTANG CAMPAIGN) WAS INVISIBLE THERE. NO VIOLENT CAMPAIGN INCIDENTS HAD OCCURRED IN REMBANG.

---SEMARANG, A MEGAWATI SUPPORTER---

6. (C) IN SEMARANG, CENTRAL JAVA'S CAPITAL, A MEGAWATI PDI SUPPORTER TOLD PO ON MAY 19 THAT MEGAWATI LOYALISTS' INITIATIVE TO WRECK THE PDI CAMPAIGN HAD SUCCEEDED. PDI RALLIES WERE CONSISTENTLY UNDER-ATTENDED, WITH BARE HANDFULS OF SPECTATORS. HE STATED THAT SOME 2.7 MILLION PDI MEMBERS IN CENTRAL JAVA WOULD NOT VOTE PDI THIS TIME. THE PDI, WITH 3.4 MILLION VOTES IN THE LAST ELECTION, WOULD LOSE 70-80 PER CENT OF ITS VOTERS.

7. (C) ACCORDING TO THE MEGAWATI LOYALIST, SOME 60 PER CENT OF THOSE ATTENDING PPP RALLIES WERE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS. MEGA-

BINTANG, HOWEVER, AS A VOTING PHENOMENON, WAS A PASSING PHASE. THE MESSAGE HAD GONE OUT TO MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS TO SUPPORT THE PPP IN STREET RALLIES, IF THEY WISHED, BUT TO WAIT FOR GUIDANCE FROM MEGAWATI ON WHAT TO DO ON ELECTION DAY. IN HIS OPINION, MEGAWATI WOULD ADVISE HER SUPPORTERS TO ABSTAIN OR VOID THE BALLOT (GOLPUT). IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE THAT ANYONE FROM THE PDI, A MEGAWATI SYMPATHIZER OR NOT, COULD VOTE FOR THE PPP, WHICH WAS TOO IMMERSED IN ISLAMIC POLITICS. THE PHILOSOPHIES OF THE PPP AND PDI WERE IRREVOCABLY FAR APART. (NOTE: THIS CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE BEFORE MEGAWATI ANNOUNCED HER INTENTION TO ABSTAIN IN THE ELECTION.)

8. (C) THE MEGAWATI ORGANIZER SAID THAT IN SEMARANG THE MILITARY HAD BEEN USING EXCESSIVE FORCE TO COMBAT MEGAWATI FOLLOWERS. IN HIS VIEW, THE MILITARY, AT LEAST IN CENTRAL JAVA, WANTED TO LEND AS MUCH SUPPORT AS POSSIBLE TO THE PDI AND ITS CHAIRMAN SOERJADI, SINCE, HE SAID, PANGAB FEISAL TANJUNG AND SOSPOL SYARWAN HAMID HAD BEEN MAJOR PLAYERS IN INSTALLING SOERJADI AS PDI CHAIRMAN AND UNSEATING MEGAWATI. THE MILITARY WAS NOW WORRIED THAT THE DRAMATIC DEFEAT AWAITING THE PDI IN CENTRAL JAVA WOULD WEAKEN SOERJADI'S

PRETENSIONS OF LEGITIMACY AND THUS EMBARRASS THE ABRI. HE FEARED A MILITARY CRACKDOWN ON MEGAWATI ACTIVISTS IN CENTRAL JAVA. IRONICALLY, HE NOTED, CENTRAL JAVA'S CONTROVERSIAL GOVERNOR, SOEWARDI, AND SEMARANG'S MAYOR WISHED TO SEE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS CONTINUE TO LAME THE PDI, SINCE IT WOULD HELP INCREASE THE GOLKAR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7140

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7140

PAGE 01 JAKART 03128 02 OF 05 281006Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-09	G-00
	/024W						

----------BF077F 281006Z /38

R 281003Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5999
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 003128

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0076

E.O. 12958: DECL:05/26/12
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN OBSERVATIONS: CENTRAL JAVA AND YOGYAKARTA

TOTALS IN CENTRAL JAVA. (COMMENT: WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE CENTRAL JAVA MILITARY COMMANDER, MAJOR GENERAL SOEBAGIO, HAS BARELY CONCEALED HIS DISLIKE FOR THE GOVERNOR'S BLATANT, EXAGGERATED

SUPPORT FOR GOLKAR AND OTHER EXCESSES. END COMMENT)

9. (C) OUR CONTACT NOTED THAT STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS WERE TRYING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CAMPAIGN EVENTS TO STAGE THEIR OWN PROTEST MARCHES. HE WAS AWARE OF A DEMONSTRATION PLANNED FOR THE FOLLOWING DAY (MAY 20). THE DEMONSTRATION WAS TO CALL FOR AN END TO DWI-FUNGSI (THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN CIVILIAN AFFAIRS), A LOWERING OF BASIC FOOD PRICES, AND THE TRIAL OF THE SUHARTO CHILDREN FOR CORRUPTION. ORGANIZED BY THE SOLIDARITY OF INDONESIAN STUDENTS FOR DEMOCRACY (SMID), IT WOULD COINCIDE WITH A LARGE MAY 20 PPP RALLY IN SEMARANG. (NOTE: WE ARE NOT AWARE WHETHER A SMID-INSPIRED DEMONSTRATION OCCURRED. SEE EMBASSY JAKARTA SEPTEL FOR AN ACCOUNT OF PPP ACTIVITIES IN SEMARANG ON MAY 20.)

---SEMARANG PPP---

10. (C) [redacted] DOWNPLAYED A MEGA-BINTANG ALLIANCE. OBVIOUSLY NOT INTERESTED HIMSELF IN TRYING TO ENLIST MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS, HE SAID THE PPP HAD LITTLE IN COMMON WITH THE POLITICS OF MEGAWATI. BESIDES, WHEN MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS DID ATTEND PPP RALLIES, THEY OCCASIONALLY SMELLED OF ALCOHOL AND WERE A LITTLE TIPSY--NOT VIRTUOUS CONDUCT IN THE EYES OF THE PPP. MEGA-BINTANG AS A MOVEMENT HAD LITTLE CHANCE IN CENTRAL JAVA, EXCEPT PERHAPS IN SOLO, WHERE THE PPP WAS SMALL AND ITS CHAIRMAN, MUDRICK, WAS ACTIVELY COURTING MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS. [redacted] B1

B1

11. (C) ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE PPP WAS VERY STRONG ALONG THE NORTHERN COAST OF JAVA, BUT FARTHER SOUTH INTO JAVA'S HEARTLAND, B1

SUPPORT WANED AS THE POPULATION WAS INCREASINGLY ABANGAN (I.E. NOT
CONFIDENTIAL

STRONGLY INCLINED TOWARDS ORTHODOX ISLAM). HE THOUGHT THAT 75 PER CENT OF PPP VOTERS WERE NU. MORE YOUTH WERE BECOMING ATTRACTED TO THE PPP CALL. AT RALLIES, HE SAID, FULLY 70-80 PER CENT OF THE PARTICIPANTS WERE YOUNG, THEY WANTED CHANGE AND REFORM. HE CAUTIOUSLY VENTURED THAT THE PPP WOULD LIKELY MAKE SOME GAINS IN CENTRAL JAVA. HE CONCURRED IN THE VIEW THAT THE MILITARY HAD BEEN USING EXCESSIVE FORCE DURING THE CAMPAIGN, BUT STILL NOTED THAT THE PROPENSITY FOR VIOLENCE HAD HEIGHTENED. MANY YOUTHS HAD PICKED UP A HABIT COMMON TO EAST JAVA OF CARRYING THEIR SICKLES AND OTHER SHARP INSTRUMENTS. SEVERAL STABBING INCIDENTS HAD OCCURRED.

12. (U) IN DRIVING SOUTH FROM SEMARANG TO THE SPECIAL DISTRICT OF YOGYAKARTA MAY 20 (A PPP DAY), PO SAW SEVERAL PPP CONVOYS IN THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZING, PARTICULARLY AT MAGELANG, SITE OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY. POLICE AND MILITARY WERE SEEN FREQUENTLY ALONG THE MAJOR NORTH-SOUTH HIGHWAY.

---PPP RALLY IN YOGYAKARTA---

13. (SBU) IN THE MID-AFTERNOON OF MAY 20, PO AND ECONOFF WITNESSED WHAT HAS BECOME THE HALLMARK OF PPP RALLIES IN YOGYAKARTA AND CENTRAL JAVA, THE RALLY-MUFFLER CONCERT. FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS, MAJOR STREETS THROUGHOUT YOGYAKARTA (EXCEPT THE VERY CENTER OF TOWN AND THE MAIN COMMERCIAL STREET) WERE FILLED WITH THOUSANDS OF PPP ADHERENTS ON MOTOR BIKES, MOSTLY IN GROUPS OF TWENTY TO FIFTY SLOWLY PROCEEDING DOWN THE STREETS IN A LOOSE DISCIPLINE, SHOUTING SUPPORT FOR THE PPP, AS WELL AS OUTLAWED MEGA-BINTANG SLOGANS. THESE TROUPES HAD ALMOST ALL CUT OFF THEIR MOTORCYCLE MUFFLERS AND REVVED THE ENGINES TO A BEAT WHICH WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DANCING AND SWAYING. POLICE AND SECURITY STOOD AT STREET CORNERS AND OFTEN DIRECTED THE GROUPS. MOST PARTICIPANTS WERE YOUTHS, SOME WERE
CONFIDENTIAL

MIDDLE AGED. BANNERS OF GREEN (THE PPP COLOR), EVEN AN OCCASIONAL PROSCRIBED MEGA-BINTANG FLAG, WERE EVERYWHERE. IT WAS CHAOTIC FESTIVENESS. AT SUNSET, THE PROCESSIONS BROKE UP. WHILE WE SAW NO HINT OF VIOLENCE, APPARENTLY AT YOGYAKARTA'S MUHAMMADIYAH UNIVERSITY, MILITARY CLASHED WITH STUDENTS, TWO-THREE WERE REPORTEDLY INJURED WHEN THE MILITARY FIRED WARNING SHOTS.

---GOLKAR RALLY IN CENTRAL JAVA---

14. (SBU) GOLKAR PLANNED ITS LAST DAY OF CAMPAIGNING IN CENTRAL JAVA (MAY 21) AS A MAJOR EVENT. PO AND ECONOFF DROVE THROUGH THE BOYOLALI DISTRICT, SITE OF A MAJOR GOLKAR VICTORY IN 1992, TO SALATIGA. SECONDARY AND MAJOR HIGHWAYS WERE PARALYZED WITH CONVOYS OF MOTOR BIKES AND TRUCKS, DECKED IN YELLOW, THE GOLKAR COLOR, PROFUSE WITH BANNERS WITH SLOGANS SUCH AS "GOLKAR. MY LIFE, MY BLOOD." VILLAGERS, HOLDING NEW, YELLOW TEE-SHIRTS, LINED THE ROADS. MANY BIKERS WERE YOUNG, BUT THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL MIX OF MIDDLE AGED. WHILE MANY OF THE CONVOY MEMBERS WERE IN A FESTIVE MOOD, THERE WAS A NOTICEABLE PRESENCE OF SOMBER FACES, AS THOUGH THEY CAME BECAUSE THEY HAD TO. ONE SALATIGA CONTACT TOLD US THAT EARLIER A MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, EXHORTING PEOPLE TO GET TO THE ROADS TO CHEER PASSING CONVOYS, HAD PASSED THROUGH HIS NEIGHBORHOOD,

NNNNPTQ7143

PAGE 01 JAKART 03128 03 OF 05 281006Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-09	G-00
	/024W						

----------BF0792 281006Z /38

R 281003Z MAY 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6000
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 003128

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0076

E.O. 12958: DECL:05/26/12
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN OBSERVATIONS: CENTRAL JAVA AND YOGYAKARTA

15. (SBU) MILITARY AND POLICE, OFTEN WITH ANTI-RIOT GEAR, DIRECTED TRAFFIC THROUGH VILLAGES AND TOWNS ON THE MAIN HIGHWAYS. THERE WERE FEW ON SECONDARY ROADS. MILITARY VEHICLES JOINED IN CONVOYS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03128 03 OF 05 281006Z
FOR SECURITY REASONS. WE SAW TWO INCIDENTS WHERE ANTI-RIOT POLICE STOPPED GOLKAR TRUCKS AND HIT A SUPPORTER ON THE HEAD WITH THICK WOODEN POLES. WE PASSED A LOCATION WHERE A STONETHROWING INCIDENT HAD JUST OCCURRED, PRESUMABLY AN ANTI-GOLKAR REACTION BY LOCAL VILLAGERS. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, IN ONE VILLAGE NEAR YOGYAKARTA, LOCAL RESIDENTS HAD THROWN STONES AT A GOLKAR CONVOY WHOSE MEMBERS HAD PULLED UP PPP FLAGS. WHEN PURSUED BY THE MILITARY, VILLAGERS APPARENTLY FOUGHT BACK WITH SHARPENED BAMBOO STAKES, STABBING FIVE. THE MILITARY LATER FOUND A CACHE OF FORTY

SHARPENED BAMBOO STAKES NEARBY. (PRESS REPORTS INDICATE BAMBOO STAKES WERE ALSO DISCOVERED IN JEPARA, NEAR SEMARANG.)

16. (SBU) ON RETURN TO YOGYAKARTA, WE NOTICED SEVERAL CAKRA UNITS (ABOUT TEN MEN IN EACH) DEPLOYING ON STREET CORNERS ABOUT THE CITY. THE CAKRA, WE WERE TOLD BY SEVERAL CONTACTS, WERE PARA-MILITARY BANDS FROM A NUMBER OF YOGYAKARTA'S GOLKAR GROUPS, PRIMARILY PEMUDA PANCASILA. THEY HAVE BEEN ACCUSED BY PPP OFFICIALS AND OTHERS OF STONETHROWING AND ATTACKS AGAINST PPP BUILDINGS, MEMBERS, AND MOSQUES. A CONTACT AT YOGYAKARTA'S LEGAL AID SOCIETY (LBH) CONCURRED, MUSING ON HOW STRANGE TO HAVE THESE GANGS UNDER GOLKAR AUSPICES ATTACKING MOSQUES EVEN AS GOLKAR WAS SUPPOSEDLY COURTING THE ISLAMIC VOTE.

17. (U) MAY 22 WAS THE FINAL PDI DAY IN YOGYAKARTA. PRESS REPORTS NOTED A FEW SMALL EVENTS ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE DISTRICT. WE SAW ONE PDI MOTORBIKER DRIVING THROUGH THE CITY.

---YOGYAKARTA PPP---

18. (C) ACCORDING TO [redacted] B1
PPP SUPPORT IS SWELLING IN THE DISTRICT, WITH WELL OVER 90 PER CENT

OF ITS RALLIES COMPOSED OF YOUTHS. HE ADMITTED THAT MANY WHO ATTENDED HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE PPP BUT WERE ATTRACTED TO ITS CALLS FOR HONESTY IN GOVERNANCE AND IN REACTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. HE BELIEVED THAT IN YOGYAKARTA A LARGE NUMBER OF MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WOULD SIDE WITH THE PPP IF ONLY IN OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME (A VIEW WE HAD HEARD ELSEWHERE). THEY WILL REMAIN UNITED WITH US IN OPPOSITION, IF NOT IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, HE MUSED. IN HIS VIEW, THE PPP COUNT, WHICH HAD GATHERED JUST OVER 20 PER CENT IN 1992, WOULD INCREASE BY A THIRD. (TWO MONTHS AGO [redacted] TOLD US THAT THE PPP TALLY WOULD BE ABOUT THE SAME AS IN 1992.) GOLKAR WOULD WIN COMFORTABLY, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE MILITARY HAD SUPPORTED THE PARTY SO OPENLY. (AS PROOF OF MILITARY SUPPORT, HE RECALLED THAT A NUMBER OF WIVES OF GENERALS WERE ON THE NATIONAL GOLKAR SLATE. HOW COULD THEIR HUSBANDS BE NEUTRAL, [redacted] WONDERED.) B1 B1

19. (SBU) [redacted] AGREED THAT A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER AT THE LARGE PPP RALLIES IN YOGYAKARTA, A UNIVERSITY TOWN, WERE STUDENTS WHO WOULD B1

NOT BE VOTING IN THE DISTRICT. SOME WOULD RETURN HOME TO VOTE. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, THEY WERE A CONDUIT FOR CONVEYING SUPPORT FOR THE PPP TO THEIR HOME AREAS. AS A VISUAL EXAMPLE OF HIS ARGUMENT, HE NOTED THAT PPP BANNERS EARLY IN THE CAMPAIGN WERE DARK GREEN. YOGYAKARTA STUDENTS BEGAN USING LIGHT GREEN, WHICH HAD THEN SUDDENLY BECOME THE PREFERRED COLOR THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

[redacted] B1

21. (C) THE [redacted] LAID OUT HIS VIEWS IN A MAY 23 MEETING. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN CAMPAIGNING AS NEVER BEFORE, GOING FROM VILLAGE TO VILLAGE. WHILE IN SUPPORT OF GOLKAR, HE WAS ALSO RELAYING THE MESSAGE TO THE VOTERS NOT TO DESSERT THE PDI AT THE LOCAL AND DISTRICT LEVEL. IN HIS VIEW, PDI VOTERS NEED NOT VOTE FOR THE PDI AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, BUT IT WAS IMPERATIVE TO MAINTAIN A STRONG PDI PRESENCE IN THE YOGYAKARTA GOVERNMENT. A BALANCE HAD TO BE KEPT, OR GOLKAR WOULD WIN OVERWHELMINGLY, A SITUATION THAT WOULD PUT THE ABRI FACTION (THE MILITARY BLOCK OF SEATS) AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL IN A POSITION TO DOMINATE THE LEGISLATURE. (COMMENT: HE WAS UNCLEAR AS TO HOW ABRI DOMINATION WOULD HAPPEN, BUT PRESUMABLY THE ABRI FACTION CAN EASILY INTIMIDATE GOLKAR MEMBERS. END COMMENT) [redacted] NOTED A LOCAL GOLKAR STATEMENT THAT HE ENGINEERED ANNOUNCING THAT GOLKAR ESTIMATED IT

B1

B1

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7142

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-09	G-00
	/024W						

----------BF078F 281006Z /38

R 281003Z MAY 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6001
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 003128

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0076

E.O. 12958: DECL:05/26/12
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN OBSERVATIONS: CENTRAL JAVA AND YOGYAKARTA

WOULD TAKE ONLY 66 PER CENT OF THE VOTE, IN CONTRAST TO THE

UNCLASSIFIED

STANDARD 70 PER CENT THAT GOLKAR WAS PREDICTING NATIONWIDE. WE DID THIS, HE SAID, TO SEND A SIGNAL THAT WE DO NOT WANT TO WIN AS MUCH

AS POSSIBLE, BUT RATHER PREFER TO KEEP A BALANCE. IF GOLKAR WERE TO WIN 70 PER CENT, IT WOULD ATTAIN AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY AND THE BALANCE WOULD BE UPSET. DEMOCRATIZATION IN YOGYAKARTA WOULD BE SET BACK. (NOTE: CURRENTLY THE PPP HAS SEVEN SEATS, GOLKAR 21, AND THE PDI EIGHT.)

22. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT HE HAD ALSO TRIMMED THE GOLKAR PREDICTION TO BLUNT PPP CHARGES THAT HE WAS ARROGANT, A LAMBAST USED BY THE PPP AGAINST GOLKAR IN CENTRAL JAVA, WHERE THE GOVERNOR WANTS GOLKAR TO WIN THE MAXIMUM. IN ADDITION, HE HAD LET IT BE KNOWN THAT NATIONAL GOLKAR PROMOTERS COULD COME TO YOGYAKARTA FOR OPEN RALLIES AT HIS INVITATION ONLY. MINISTERS WOULD WANT TO VISIT TO PUMP UP THE VOTE. HE FEARED THAT THEY WOULD EXPECT RESIDENTS TO LINE THE STREETS AND APPLAUD THEM IN WELCOME. THEY WOULD MAKE EXALTED PROMISES OF A LIFE THAT WOULD BE BETTER AFTER ANOTHER GOLKAR VICTORY. THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL AWARENESS IN YOGYAKARTA IS TOO SOPHISTICATED, HE REFLECTED. B1

23. (C) CLEARLY UNHAPPY WITH ANY CHANCE OF PPP GAINS IN YOGYAKARTA, [redacted] SAW THE MAIN PPP SUPPORT IN YOGYAKARTA AS COMING FROM STUDENTS, MORE THAN TWO THIRDS OF WHOM, FORTUNATELY IN HIS VIEW, DID NOT VOTE IN THE DISTRICT. MOREOVER, HE SAID, THE MEGA-BINTANG MOVEMENT WOULD NOT PERSUADE MANY VOTERS. PDI MEMBERS IN YOGYAKARTA KNEW THAT THE PPP WAS A DICTATORIAL MINORITY THAT WOULD NEVER LOOK AFTER THEIR INTERESTS. [redacted] REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT THE TRUE INHABITANTS OF YOGYAKARTA WERE JAVANESE WHO WERE MUSLIMS, NOT THE OTHER WAY AROUND. WE HAVE A SPECIAL CULTURE THAT WE WILL PRESERVE, HE AVERRED. HE SAID THAT THE YOGYAKARTA NU HAD RECENTLY TRIED TO WEAN THE LOCAL KIAIS TO SUPPORT THE PPP AND UNDERMINE NU CHAIRMAN ABDURRAHMAN WAHID. HE HAD SUMMONED THE KIAIS AND REMINDED THEM OF THE CONTINUED STRONG BACKING THAT [redacted] B1 B1

HAD GIVEN THEM SINCE THE 1950'S. [redacted] NOTED THAT ONLY TWO PROMINENT PESANTREN (ISLAMIC SCHOOLS) IN YOGYAKARTA WERE TRADITIONALLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE PPP AND THEY WERE TRANSPLANTS, ALBEIT SOME TIME AGO.) B1

24. (C) [redacted] TOLD US THAT LEAFLETS HAD BEEN CIRCULATING THE CITY PROMISING THAT A REBELLION WOULD START IN YOGYAKARTA THAT DAY (MAY 23) TO COINCIDE WITH THE FINAL PPP RALLY. OVER THE PREVIOUS NIGHT, MILITARY UNITS HAD BEEN DEPLOYED TO YOGYAKARTA FROM JAKARTA, BANDUNG, AND ELSEWHERE. HE SAID THAT A MASSIVE FINANCING EFFORT (500 MILLION RUPIAHS) HAD BEEN SPENT TO BACK THE CAMPAIGN WITH BUSES AND POSTERS, FOR EXAMPLE. WHILE [redacted] WAS VAGUE AT THIS POINT, HE SEEMED TO BE REFERING TO THE PPP CAMPAIGN. (COMMENT: WE ARE UNAWARE OF ANY MAJOR SECURITY PROBLEMS HAPPENING IN YOGYAKARTA ON MAY 23. END COMMENT) [redacted] AGREED THAT CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE IN YOGYAKARTA WAS COMPARATIVELY LOWER THAN IN THE PAST. B1 B1 B1

---SOLO PPP---

25. (C) WE MET WITH [redacted] MAY 22. AN UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICIAN, [redacted] OVER RECENT MONTHS HAS AGGRESSIVELY ASSAILED GOLKAR AND THE CENTRAL JAVA GOVERNMENT OVER SEVERAL ISSUES. MOST PROMINENT HAS BEEN HIS ATTACK ON THE GOVERNOR'S YELLOWIZATION PROGRAM (WHEREBY THE GOVERNMENT HAS HAD TRESS, POLES, BRIDGES, ROAD CROSSINGS THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE PAINTED YELLOW. [redacted] HAD PPP CADRES REPAINT MANY OF SOLO'S YELLOWED SITES WHITE, WHICH CAUSED SEVERAL FIGHTS). HE TOLD US TWO MONTHS AGO THAT HE WAS CONSTANTLY SEEKING WAYS TO KEEP THE LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OFF-BALANCE. [redacted] HAS MADE POLITICAL ENEMIES. IN MID-MAY, A BOX WAS DELIVERED TO HIS DOOR. IT CONTAINED THE SEVERED HEAD OF A DOG WITH A KNIFE IN ITS MOUTH--AN B1 B1 B1 B1

INCIDENT [redacted] BRUSHED OFF AS TRIVIAL. B1

26. (C) [redacted] IS AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE MEGA-BINTANG CAMPAIGN, ALTHOUGH HE DECLARES THAT MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS IN SOLO, ADMIRING HIS ATTACK ON YELLOWIZATION, URGED HIM TO IT. HE SPOKE OF HIS MEETING WITH MEGAWATI IN JAKARTA EARLIER THIS MONTH. ALTHOUGH THE PRESS B1 B1

CONSIDERED IT A MEGAWATI BLESSING OF MEGA-BINTANG, HE SAID THAT SHE HAD SIMPLY LISTENED SYMPATHETICALLY TO HIS POINTS. CONVINCED THAT HER SUPPORTERS WOULD STAY WITH THE PPP, [redacted] SAID THAT THE PPP COULD WIN IN SOLO. TWO MONTHS AGO HE HAD SAID THAT THE PARTY MIGHT MAKE SOME SMALL GAIN, BUT HE NOTED THAT WAS BEFORE THE MASSIVE SUPPORT FOR THE PPP. (IN 1992, THE PPP HELD 16 PER CENT OF THE VOTE, COMPARED WITH THE PDI'S 36 PER CENT SHARE AND GOLKAR'S 48 PER CENT.) IF THE PPP LOSES FROM VOTE FRAUD, [redacted] STATED A SEVERE POPULAR REACTION WOULD OCCUR. [redacted] HELD LITTLE ESTEEM FOR CENTRAL JAVA'S GOVERNOR, BUT THOUGHT HIGHLY OF THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, MAJ GEN SOEBAGIO, WHOSE FORCES HAD NOT BEEN INTRUSIVE IN SOLO. B1 B1 B1

27. (C) POLITICAL OBSERVERS IN CENTRAL JAVA SEE [redacted] AS A POPULIST. A NATURAL POLITICIAN WITH HIS OWN POWER BASE, HE SEIZES ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE PEOPLE AND NOT TO THE ELITES, AN LBH CONTACT NOTED. NOT AN ELECTED OFFICE HOLDER IN GOVERNMENT, BUT A BUSINESSMAN WITH HIS OWN ENTERPRISE, HE IS NOT BEHOLDEN TO THE B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7141

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7141

PAGE 01 JAKART 03128 05 OF 05 281006Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-09	G-00

/024W

----------BF0787 281006Z /38

R 281003Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6002
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 003128

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0076

E.O. 12958: DECL:05/26/12
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN OBSERVATIONS: CENTRAL JAVA AND YOGYAKARTA

GOVERNMENT AS MOST POLITICIANS FROM ANY OF THE PARTIES ARE. HE CLEARLY MAKES THE PPP LEADERSHIP UNCOMFORTABLE, AND, THE OBSERVER SAID, IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING IF [redacted] WERE MANIPULATED OUT OF B1

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SOLO PPP CHAIR AT A DECENT INTERVAL AFTER THE ELECTION.

---YOGYAKARTA TO SURABAYA---
28. (U) ON MAY 23, THE LAST DAY OF THE CAMPAIGN, A PPP DAY IN JAVA, WE DROVE FROM YOGYAKARTA THROUGH SOLO TO SURABAYA. IN SOLO, CONVOYS OF THOUSANDS OF MOTOR CONVOYS IN MUFFLER CONCERT CHOKED THE STREETS, ALTHOUGH POLICE WERE ABLE TO CHART PATHS FOR TRAFFIC THROUGH TOWN. THE MOOD WAS FESTIVE ON THE MAIN STREETS, ALTHOUGH A NEWS REPORT INDICATED THAT MILITARY UNITS FIRED A WARNING VOLLEY OVER THE HEADS OF ONE CONVOY TO TURN THEM AROUND. SMALLER TOWNS ALONG THE WAY, KLATEN AND SLEMAN, WERE FILLED WITH CONVOYS. CROSSING INTO EAST JAVA, A PPP CONVOY OF SEVERAL HUNDRED MOTOR BIKES AND TRUCKS, ACCOMPANIED BY MILITARY VEHICLES, MONOPOLIZED THE HIGHWAY AS IT ROLLED BY RETURNING FROM EAST JAVA AT SUNSET.

PIERCE/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6688

PAGE 01 JAKART 03113 01 OF 06 280743Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/038W					

----------BEFA7A 280743Z /38

R 280741Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5979
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 JAKARTA 003113

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN PEKALONGAN, CENTRAL JAVA

REF: A) JAKARTA 2172; B) JAKARTA 1907

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03113 01 OF 06 280743Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 SEP 2006 200503235

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE SMALL CITY OF PEKALONGAN, LOCATED ON THE NORTH COAST OF CENTRAL JAVA, WAS WON BY THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) IN 1992, AND WAS ONE OF ONLY TWO AREAS IN ALL OF INDONESIA LOST BY RULING PARTY GOLKAR IN THAT ELECTION. THE LOCAL PPP EXPECTS TO IMPROVE ITS PERFORMANCE IN THIS ELECTION, AND A STRONG NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTION IS ANTICIPATED IF THE PARTY DOES NOT AT LEAST REPEAT ITS EARLIER VICTORY. HOWEVER, MANY OBSERVERS IN CENTRAL JAVA BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND GOLKAR HAVE BEEN PAYING SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE CAMPAIGN IN PEKALONGAN AS PART OF A DELIBERATE EFFORT TO MAKE SURE THAT GOLKAR WINS BACK THE CITY IN THIS ELECTION. THE CITY WAS TENSE BUT PEACEFUL DURING EMBOFF'S VISIT ON THE WEEKEND OF MAY 17-18. PPP AND GOLKAR HELD SMALL CAMPAIGN EVENTS IN A SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO AVOID STREET RALLIES. THE PPP PROMISED THAT EVENTS DURING ITS FINAL TWO ROUNDS OF CAMPAIGNING WOULD BE MUCH LARGER, WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE TRUE AND REPORTEDLY LED TO SOME UNREST ON MAY 20 AFTER EMBOFF HAD DEPARTED. LOCAL PPP OFFICIALS CLAIMED THAT SECURITY AUTHORITIES TOOK HARSH ACTION AGAINST THE PARTY'S SUPPORTERS EARLY IN THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD. UNREST HAD ALSO ERUPTED THERE IN LATE MARCH AND EARLY APRIL OVER FRICTION WITH GOLKAR. VIOLENCE OCCURRED AGAIN AT THE END OF APRIL BECAUSE MANY PPP MEMBERS BELIEVED THEY HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY LOCAL OFFICIALS FROM REGISTERING TO VOTE. PPP OFFICIALS IN THE NEIGHBORING DISTRICT OF BATANG SAID THAT "THUGS" WERE TERRORIZING PPP SUPPORTERS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. (C) LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEGAWATI BRANCH OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) CLAIMED THAT GOVERNMENT OUSTED PDI CHAIRPERSON MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI ENJOYED OVERWHELMING SUPPORT AMONG PDI MEMBERS AND SYMPATHIZERS IN PEKALONGAN. MOREOVER, THE LOCAL LEADERSHIP HAD INSTRUCTED PDI MEMBERS NOT TO VOTE FOR THE PDI, AND EXPECTED THAT MOST WOULD BOYCOTT THE ELECTION. IN CONTRAST, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED FACTION OF THE PDI CLAIMED THAT THE PARTY'S LEADERSHIP RIFT WAS UNIMPORTANT

BECAUSE PDI MEMBERS WOULD VOTE FOR THE PARTY NO MATTER WHAT. OTHER MEGAWATI-PDI OFFICIALS IN SEMARANG ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME OF PDI'S MORE ISOLATED RURAL-BASED SUPPORTERS MIGHT BE CONFUSED, AND END UP VOTING FOR THE PDI AGAINST THE LEADERSHIP'S WISHES. THE MEGAWATI REPRESENTATIVES IN PEKALONGAN SAID THAT NO ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE TO ALLOW A LOCAL FUSION BETWEEN PPP AND MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS, BUT IN PRACTICE MANY OF HER YOUNG SUPPORTERS WHO WANTED TO JOIN THE CAMPAIGNING WERE DOING SO THROUGH THE PPP. MINORITY PARTY CONTACTS IN PEKALONGAN ARGUED THAT POPULAR ENTHUSIASM FOR GOLKAR WAS WEAK AND THAT THE RULING PARTY RELIED ON MATERIAL INCENTIVES TO DRAW CROWDS TO EVENTS. GOLKAR OFFICIALS IN PEKALONGAN CLAIMED GENERALLY THAT THE CAMPAIGN WAS PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY, BUT WERE NOT RECEPTIVE TO AN IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION WITH EMBOFF ABOUT THE CAMPAIGN. END SUMMARY

4. (SBU) EMBOFF OBSERVED THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AT POINTS ALONG THE NORTH COAST OF CENTRAL JAVA FROM MAY 17-20. IN ADDITION TO PEKALONGAN, EMBOFF STAYED IN SEMARANG, THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL (SEE SEPTEL). MANY WESTERN JOURNALISTS, INCLUDING CNN AND BBC, WERE IN PEKALONGAN IN

THE DAYS AND WEEKS PRECEDING EMBOFF'S ARRIVAL.

CAMPAIGN IN PEKALONGAN

5. (C) ACCORDING TO MANY LOCAL OBSERVERS, THE CAMPAIGNING IN PEKALONGAN HAD BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY NOISY STREET RALLIES ON BEHALF OF GOLKAR AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), AND VERY LITTLE VISIBLE SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT BACKED INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI). REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PPP AND BOTH BRANCHES OF THE PDI OFFERED SIMILAR VIEWS THAT POPULAR ENTHUSIASM FOR GOLKAR WAS WEAK AND THAT THE RULING PARTY WAS PAYING PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ITS CAMPAIGNS.

TENSE ATMOSPHERE IN PEKALONGAN

6. (SBU) MOST SHOPKEEPERS ALONG THE NORMALLY BUSY COMMERCIAL STREETS IN THE CENTER OF PEKALONGAN HAD LOWERED

THEIR PROTECTIVE GATES AND CLOSED UP TIGHT ON SATURDAY, MAY 17, PPP'S CAMPAIGN DAY. LOCAL SOURCES REPORTED THAT ON PPP'S PREVIOUS TURN TO CAMPAIGN, MAY 14, THOUSANDS PARTICIPATED IN OR WATCHED THE STREET RALLIES. IT WAS SAID THAT ALTHOUGH NO MAJOR INCIDENTS HAD OCCURRED RECENTLY IN THE CITY, THERE WAS FEAR THAT VIOLENCE COULD

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6694

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6694

PAGE 01 JAKART 03113 02 OF 06 280743Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/038W					

----------BEFA84 280743Z /38

R 280741Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5980
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 06 JAKARTA 003113

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN PEKALONGAN, CENTRAL JAVA

RESURFACE, SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH HAD OCCURRED IN THE MONTH BEFORE THE CAMPAIGN BEGAN. EMBOFF OBSERVED CONTINGENTS OF
CONFIDENTIAL

RIOT POLICE STATIONED AT STREET CORNERS, MANY ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND TEAR GAS.

7. (SBU) DESPITE EXPECTATIONS, STREET RALLIES DID NOT MATERIALIZE ON MAY 17 BECAUSE THE LOCAL PPP LEADERSHIP HAD DECIDED AGAINST BIG OUTDOOR MASS GATHERINGS THAT DAY. INSTEAD, SMALL EVENTS WERE HELD THROUGHOUT THE CITY. EMBOFF ATTENDED TWO OF THEM IN THE ALLEYWAYS OFF THE MAIN CITY STREETS, AND WAS WELCOMED AT BOTH. IN ONE, A GROUP OF MEN, WHO APPEARED TO BE LOCAL LEADERS, WERE SITTING ON PLASTIC CHAIRS IN A CIRCLE TAKING A BREAK FROM WHAT THEY SAID WAS THEIR ATTEMPT TO HOLD ONE OF THE DIALOGUE CAMPAIGN EVENTS ENCOURAGED BY THE GOVERNMENT. MANY WOMEN DRESSED IN TRADITIONAL MUSLIM CLOTHING, AS WELL AS CHILDREN, WERE MILLING ABOUT. ONE OF THE MEN ASKED EMBOFF IF THE POLICE AND MILITARY WERE ALREADY PATROLLING THE STREETS. WHEN EMBOFF REPLIED THAT CONTINGENTS OF RIOT POLICE WERE VISIBLE, THE MAN QUERIED WHETHER SECURITY FORCES WERE USED DURING U.S. CAMPAIGNS. HE THEN POINTEDLY SAID THAT THE AUTHORITIES ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CAMPAIGN WAS SIMILAR TO "WAGING WAR."

PREVIOUS UNREST IN PEKALONGAN
---

8. (C) PEKALONGAN HAS RECEIVED A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION BECAUSE OF PRE-CAMPAIGN UNREST IN MARCH AND APRIL (REFTELS) AND BECAUSE THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) PREVAILED IN THE CITY IN THE 1992 ELECTION WITH 42.5

PERCENT OF THE VOTE (GOLKAR 36.4 PERCENT, PDI 21 PERCENT). THIS WAS ONE OF ONLY TWO AREAS IN THE COUNTRY WHERE A PARTY OTHER THAN GOLKAR WAS PERMITTED TO WIN, THE OTHER

BEING PASURAN (CITY AND DISTRICT) IN EAST JAVA. IN THE LARGER SURROUNDING PEKALONGAN DISTRICT (KABUPATEN), GOLKAR WON WITH 49.7 PERCENT, AND PPP RECEIVED ONLY 25.3 (PDI 25).

9. (C) SEVERAL LOCAL SOURCES ATTRIBUTED THE MARCH UNREST IN PEKALONGAN TO GOVERNMENT AND GOLKAR "ARROGANCE" AND RESULTING LOCAL "DISCONTENT." ACCORDING TO ONCE SOURCE, THE PPP HAD PLANNED A LARGE PRE-CAMPAIGN EVENT, INVOLVING A LARGE GROUP OF KIAI (RELIGIOUS TEACHERS), ON MARCH 26. AT THE LAST MINUTE, A HIGH PROFILE GOLKAR DELEGATION, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT'S DAUGHTER SITI HARDIYANTI (TUTUT), AND A POPULAR MUSICIAN AND A RELIGIOUS LEADER (BOTH WITH PREVIOUS TIES TO THE PPP), DECIDED TO COME TO PEKALONGAN TO HOLD A PRE-CAMPAIGN EVENT ON THE SAME DAY. THEY RECEIVED THE PERMIT, AND THE PPP WAS FORCED POSTPONE ITS EVENT.

PPP COMPLAINS OF INTIMIDATION AND VOTER MANIPULATION
---

10. (C) [redacted] TOLD EMBOFF ON MAY 18 THAT A SURGE IN POPULAR SUPPORT FOR PPP SHOULD LEAD TO A FIFTY PERCENT INCREASE IN ITS SEATS IN THE CITY'S LEGISLATURE. CURRENTLY, PPP HOLDS EIGHT, GOLKAR SEVEN, PDI FOUR AND ABRI FIVE. HE ESTIMATED THAT PPP'S TOTAL IN THE 1997 ELECTION COULD RISE TO 12 SEATS, AND THAT GOLKAR AND PDI COULD SPLIT THE REMAINING EIGHT SEATS (ABRI WOULD BE GIVEN 5 AUTOMATICALLY, AND THE OVERALL SEATS IN THE LEGISLATURE WOULD BE INCREASED FROM 24 TO 25). B1

11. (C) [redacted] BASED HIS OPTIMISM UPON A PERCEIVED "RISING UP" OF THE POPULARITY OF THE PPP AMONG MOST SECTORS OF SOCIETY, INCLUDING "LABOR, FARMERS, TRADERS, ULAMAS (RELIGIOUS LEADERS OR TEACHERS) AND SANTRI (RELIGIOUS STUDENTS)." HE CLAIMED THAT WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PPP LEADERSHIP, MASSES OF PEOPLE WERE DONNING THE GREEN CLOTHING (OFFICIAL PPP COLOR) AND SUPPORTING THE PARTY AT PUBLIC EVENTS. HE SAID THAT IF THE PPP DID NOT AT LEAST WIN THE CITY OF PEKALONGAN AS IT HAD IN 1992, THERE WOULD BE A STRONG NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTION AS PEOPLE WOULD KNOW THAT THE RESULTS WERE UNFAIR. B1

12. (C) ALTHOUGH THE PPP CAMPAIGN ON MAY 17 HAD BEEN KEPT RELATIVELY LOW KEY BY THE PARTY LEADERS, HE PROMISED MUCH LARGER EVENTS DURING THE FINAL TWO PPP ROUNDS CLOSING OUT THE CAMPAIGN. (NOTE: ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS AND A FOLLOW-UP PHONE CALL TO THE PPP IN PEKALONGAN, PROBLEMS DID OCCUR DURING PPP'S CAMPAIGN ON MAY 20. LOCAL MEDIA REPORTED THAT SEVERAL MOTORCYCLES WERE DESTROYED WHEN THEIR RIDERS DID NOT RESPOND TO THE PPP HAND SIGN, AND THAT A LOCAL LEGISLATOR'S CAR WAS DAMAGED. THE PPP CLAIMED THAT A SMALL LOCAL OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT-CONNECTED YOUTH GROUP "PEMUDA PANCASILA" HAD BEEN DAMAGED BY CROWDS, AND THAT TWO HOUSES BELONGING TO PPP SUPPORTERS

PAGE 01 JAKART 03113 03 OF 06 280743Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/038W					

----------BEFA8A 280743Z /38

R 280741Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5981
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 06 JAKARTA 003113

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN PEKALONGAN, CENTRAL JAVA

HAD BEEN DAMAGED BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES. END NOTE.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03113 03 OF 06 280743Z
13. (C) ACCORDING TO [redacted] AND OTHER LOCAL SOURCES, B1
SECURITY FORCES DEALT HARSHLY WITH THE PPP EARLY IN THE CAMPAIGN DURING THE PARTY'S SECOND TURN IN PEKALONGAN (MAY 2). CONVOYING CAMPAIGNERS WERE FORCIBLY DISPERSED BY SECURITY FORCES AS THEY WERE RETURNING HOME FROM A RALLY. HE SAID THAT A COUPLE OF HUNDRED RIOT POLICE AND MILITARY

HAD BEEN SENT TO PEKALONGAN, MOSTLY FROM THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL SEMARANG. IN ADDITION, HE DESCRIBED "NINJAS" DRESSED IN BLACK, WHO HE CLAIMED WERE CONNECTED TO GOLKAR, AS HAVING BEEN IN PEKALONGAN (NOTE: POLOFF OBSERVED RIOT POLICE ONLY AT THIS LATER TIME IN THE CAMPAIGN. END NOTE.)

14. (C) [redacted] DID NOT SPECIFY THE MIX OF SECURITY FORCES THAT HE BELIEVED TOOK PART IN THE MAY 2 INCIDENT WITH PPP CAMPAIGNERS. HOWEVER, HE SPECIFIED THAT MANY CAMPAIGNERS WERE INJURED, FOUR SERIOUSLY ENOUGH TO BE HOSPITALIZED, 10 WERE DETAINED OVERNIGHT, AND 28 MOTORCYCLES OR SCOOTERS WERE DAMAGED OR SEIZED. OFFICIALS FROM THE MEGAWATI BRANCH OF THE PDI ALSO REFERRED TO AN EARLY "SHOW OF FORCE" BY SECURITY OFFICIALS IN THE CITY, AND A SEPARATE LOCAL SOURCE ALSO TOLD EMBOFF ABOUT THE "NINJAS." B1

15. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN OTHER MAJOR INCIDENTS DURING THE CAMPAIGN (THIS WAS ECHOED BY SEVERAL LOCAL SOURCES). HOWEVER, HE DID MENTION THAT MATERIALS CALLING FOR A FUSION BETWEEN THE PPP AND OUSTED INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI HAD BEEN SEIZED BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES DURING PPP'S ROUND OF CAMPAIGNING ON MAY 14. B1

16. (C) [redacted] ALLEGED THAT MANY PPP SUPPORTERS IN B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PEKALONGAN OF LEGAL VOTING AGE HAD BEEN BLOCKED FROM REGISTERING FOR THIS ELECTION. [redacted] ON MAY 20 TOLD EMBOFF THAT THIS HAD LED CITIZENS IN PEKALONGAN TO ATTACK THE HOME OF THE OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR ELECTION REGISTRATION AT THE END OF APRIL. ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS ARTICLES PROVIDED TO EMBOFF BY [redacted] CITIZENS FROM THE CITY OF PEKALONGAN HAD COMPLAINED TO THE PPP PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS IN SEMARANG THAT THEY HAD BEEN PREVENTED FROM REGISTERING TO VOTE. THE PROVINCIAL PPP VICE-CHAIRMAN WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THOUSANDS OF CITIZENS HAD EXPERIENCED THIS PROBLEM. B1

[redacted] B1

EMBOFF ON MAY 19 THAT "PREMAN" (HOODLUMS) WERE "TERRORIZING" PPP SUPPORTERS AND SYMPATHIZERS DURING THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD. ECHOING [redacted] CLAIMED PPP WAS "GROWING STRONGER," WAS THE "PARTY OF THE PEOPLE," AND THAT HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT IT WOULD IMPROVE ITS TOTALS IN THIS ELECTION. PEOPLE WANTED "CHANGE." (NOTE: PPP HAD ACHIEVED 23 PERCENT OF THE VOTE IN 1992 IN BATANG. END NOTE.) HOWEVER, ON PPP'S TURNS TO CAMPAIGN THE "PREMAN" WERE TAKING SUCH ACTIONS AS GOING TO THE HOMES OF PPP SUPPORTERS AND THROWING ROCKS THROUGH THE WINDOWS. HE SPECULATED THAT THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO "STOP PPP" FROM IMPROVING ITS PERFORMANCE. B1

GOVERNMENT-BACKED PDI ALSO COMPLAINS OF INTIMIDATION

18. (C) [redacted] B1

[redacted] (AS OPPOSED TO THE CITY) OF PEKALONGAN, ALLEGED TO EMBOFF ON MAY 18 THAT GOLKAR SUPPORTERS HAD ATTACKED PDI CAMPAIGNERS JUST DAYS BEFORE ON MAY 16. HE SAID THAT A VILLAGE HEAD, WITHIN THE PEKALONGAN DISTRICT, HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE ATTACK BE CARRIED OUT. HUNDREDS COMPLIED AS THE PDI CAMPAIGNERS WERE RETURNING HOME. EIGHTEEN PDI MEMBERS WERE INJURED AND FOUR PDI HOUSES WERE SMASHED. B1

19. (C) [redacted] CLAIMED THAT THE LEADERSHIP RIFT WITHIN THE PDI WAS UNIMPORTANT BECAUSE PDI MEMBERS WOULD VOTE FOR PDI NO MATTER WHAT. ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT THERE WAS LITTLE SUPPORT FOR GOLKAR, HE SAID THAT THE RULING PARTY WOULD USE "DIRTY TRICKS," INCLUDING PAYING 10,000 RUPIAH (APPROXIMATELY 4 USD) FOR A VOTE, TO ENSURE ANOTHER VICTORY. (NOTE: IN THE DISTRICT OF PEKALONGAN IN 1992, GOLKAR SECURED 49.7 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, PPP 25.3 AND PDI 24.9. END NOTE.) B1

LEADERSHIP OF MEGAWATI PDI FACTION WANTS VOTER BOYCOTT

20. (C) EMBOFF MET WITH THE EADERSHIP OF THE MEGAWATI FACTION OF THE PDI N PEKALONGAN ON MAY 17. THIS INCLUDED [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6696

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6696

PAGE 01 JAKART 03113 04 OF 06 280743Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/038W					

----------BEFA8E 280744Z /38

R 280741Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5982
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 06 JAKARTA 003113

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/16

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN PEKALONGAN, CENTRAL JAVA

[redacted] WAS CLEARLY IN CHARGE. HE B1
TOOK EMBOFF, WITH THE OTHERS FOLLOWING LATER, FROM THE

PARTY'S HEADQUARTERS (THE BACKROOM OF A SMALL HOUSE NEXT TO A MOSQUE) IN A POOR NEIGHBORHOOD TO HIS RELATIVELY WELL-APPOINTED HOME ON THE OTHER SIDE OF TOWN. HE RAN HIS OWN BUSINESS AS [redacted] B1
[redacted] AND EMPHASIZED TO EMBOFF THAT HE WAS AN "INDEPENDENT MAN." HE MOVED THE MEETING BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THE LOCATION OF THE PDI OFFICE WAS NOT SECURE BECAUSE PPP WOULD BE CAMPAIGNING IN THE AREA AND PDI MEMBERS WOULD START DROPPING BY LATER IN THE DAY.

21. (C) [redacted] CLAIMED THERE B1
WAS OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR MEGAWATI AMONG PDI MEMBERS IN THE CITY OF PEKALONGAN. THEY SAID THAT AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL, PRACTICALLY ALL THE PDI SUPPORTED HER RATHER THAN THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED CHAIRMAN SURYADI. THEY FURTHER ESTIMATED THAT SHE ENJOYED 90 PERCENT SUPPORT AT THE SUB-DISTRICT LEVEL ("KECAMATAN"). THEY CALCULATED THAT THERE WERE 25,000 MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS IN TOTAL IN THE CITY OF PEKALONGAN (NOTE: ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES, 26,735 CITIZENS IN PEKALONGAN VOTED FOR THE PDI IN 1992. END NOTE.) [redacted] STRONGLY SUPPORTED MEGAWATI'S LEGAL B1
ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHY HER OUSTER FROM THE PARTY CHAIRMANSHIP AT THE JUNE MEDAN CONGRESS WAS ILLEGAL. HE WALKED EMBOFF PAGE BY PAGE THROUGH THE PARTY CONSTITUTION ADHERED TO BY THE MEGAWATI FACTION OF THE PDI TO MAKE HIS ARGUMENTS.

22. (C) [redacted] SHOWED EMBOFF A WRITTEN INSTRUCTION TO
PDI MEMBERS SIGNED BY THE LOCAL MEGAWATI BOARD, DATED B1
MARCH 21, INSTRUCTING THEM NOT TO VOTE FOR THE PDI. HE SAID PDI MEMBERS WOULD WAIT FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM MEGAWATI ABOUT WHAT ELSE COULD BE DONE WITH THEIR VOTE, WHICH THEY

CONFIDENTIAL

EXPECTED SHE WOULD ISSUE ON MAY 22 (NOTE: WHICH SHE DID. END NOTE). HE SAID THAT BOTH GOLKAR AND PPP WERE COURTING THE MEGAWATI PDI VOTE, EVEN WITH MONEY, BUT SO FAR HE THOUGHT THAT MEMBERS WERE WAITING. HE EXPECTED THAT MOST MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS IN THE AREA WOULD BOYCOTT THE ELECTION (NOTE: EITHER BY STAYING AWAY FROM THE POLLS OR BY INVALIDATING THE BALLOT BY CHOOSING ALL THREE PARTIES. BOTH ARE REFERRED TO IN INDONESIA AS "GOLPUT." END NOTE).

23. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MADE IN PEKALONGAN TO ALLOW A FUSION BETWEEN THEIR SUPPORTERS AND THE PPP (NOTE: KNOWN AS "MEGA-BINTANG," BINTANG IS INDONESIAN FOR STAR, THE SYMBOL OF THE PPP). HOWEVER, SOME OF THE YOUNG PEOPLE WHO WANTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CAMPAIGN WERE DOING SO BY JOINING PPP RALLIES. HE ESTIMATED THAT 10 PERCENT OF THE 24,000 MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS MIGHT BE PURSUING SUCH A COURSE. B1

[redacted] B1

ISSUE OF MEGAWATI'S POLITICAL MANIFESTO. THEY WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT WAS FULL OF "FREE-MARKET" IDEAS WITH WHICH THEY AGREED. [redacted] ARGUED THAT THE "NEW GENERATION OF PDI WANT DEMOCRACY LIKE IN THE UNITED STATES." MOREOVER, HE CONTINUED, THEY WERE PRAGMATIC PEOPLE WHO SOUGHT EDUCATION, GOOD JOBS, AND GOOD SALARIES. HE STRONGLY MADE THE PITCH THAT THIS "NEW GENERATION" OF MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WERE NOT "SUKARNOIST" (SOCIALIST) IN THEIR ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY. B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WHAT IS GOLKAR HIDING?
---

25. (C) EMBOFF ON MAY 17 MET BRIEFLY WITH THE [redacted] B1
THE MEETING WAS QUICKLY INTERRUPTED BY A DISPUTE INVOLVING SUNARIO AND AN UNNAMED OFFICIAL "FROM JAKARTA," ALSO IN ATTENDANCE, OVER WHETHER EMBOFF HAD "AUTHORIZATION" TO MEET WITH THE LOCAL GOLKAR OFFICE OR TO WITNESS THE LOCAL GOLKAR CAMPAIGN. UPON REQUESTING THE MEETING EARLIER IN THE WEEK, EMBASSY HAD BEEN ASKED TO INFORM THE NATIONAL GOLKAR OFFICE IN JAKARTA, WHICH IT DID BY LETTER.

26. (C) THE MEETING WAS ALSO MONITORED BY AN INDIVIDUAL WHO APPEARED TO BE SECURITY. HE SAT JUST BEHIND THE CHAIRS AND COUCH WHERE THE MEETING WAS TAKING PLACE. HE WAS NOT INTRODUCED, BUT WAS WATCHING THE PROCEEDINGS CLOSELY. HE HAD NO FRONT TEETH AND WAS BAREFOOT.

27. (C) THE [redacted] WANTED TO KNOW WHAT EMBOFF B1
NEEDED FROM THE GOLKAR BRANCH OFFICE. EMBOFF EXPLAINED
THAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF
THE CAMPAIGN, AND WANTED TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE [redacted] B1
EMBOFF ASKED ABOUT HOW THE CAMPAIGN WAS
PROCEEDING IN PEKALONGAN. THE [redacted] ANSWERED THAT B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6699

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6699

PAGE 01 JAKART 03113 05 OF 06 280744Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-08 ACDE-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 ACQ-01 CIAE-00

SMEC-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00
FBIE-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 L-01
ADS-00 M-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01
PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 CIO-00 SP-00 STR-00
TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-10 PRME-01 DRL-09
G-00 /038W

----------BEFA9C 280744Z /38

R 280741Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5983
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 06 JAKARTA 003113

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN PEKALONGAN, CENTRAL JAVA

IT HAD BEEN RELATIVELY CALM, AND WAS SIMILAR TO THE SITUATION IN JAKARTA. THE DAYS WHEN GOLKAR AND PPP
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CAMPAIGNED SAW ACTIVE STREET CAMPAIGNS, AND THE DAYS WHEN PDI CAMPAIGNED WERE MORE QUIET.

28. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT GOLKAR'S MAIN CAMPAIGN EVENT THE FOLLOWING DAY, SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE AT "LAPANGAN MINI" (SMALL FIELD), WOULD FOCUS ON YOUTH ISSUES. HE WAS HOPING THAT A NATIONAL CAMPAIGNER WHO WAS A MAJOR YOUTH FIGURE WOULD BE SENT IN FROM JAKARTA, BUT WAS STILL NOT SURE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN. POLOFF MENTIONED INTEREST IN ATTENDING THE EVENT, AND THE VICE-CHAIRMAN AGREED. B1

29. (C) THE OFFICIAL "FROM JAKARTA," WHO HAD SAID LITTLE TO THAT POINT, WANTED TO KNOW WHY POLOFF WAS IN PEKALONGAN. HE BEGAN DISCUSSING WITH [redacted] B1
WHETHER EMBOFF HAD "AUTHORIZATION" TO TALK TO GOLKAR IN PEKALONGAN OR TO WITNESS THE GOLKAR CAMPAIGN. EMBOFF EXPLAINED THAT THE GOLKAR CENTRAL BOARD HAD BEEN INFORMED IN WRITING AS HAD BEEN REQUESTED. THE OFFICIAL REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NOT SUFFICIENT. HE SAID THAT THE "PROCEDURE" WAS THAT PERMISSION HAD TO BE OBTAINED FROM THE PROVINCIAL GOLKAR AUTHORITIES. HE SAID THAT EMBOFF SHOULD GO TO THE CAPITAL OF CENTRAL JAVA, SEMARANG, AND TALK TO THE GOLKAR CHAIRMAN THERE, AND UPON RECEIVING AUTHORIZATION COULD RETURN TO PEKALONGAN TO TALK TO LOCAL GOLKAR OFFICIALS AND WATCH THE CAMPAIGN. EMBOFF RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT AS SEMARANG WAS FAR AWAY, AND THAT TRAVEL PLANS HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE FOR THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THE OFFICIAL INSISTED THAT IT WAS "ONLY TWO HOURS TO SEMARANG," AND THAT IN ANY CASE THIS WAS THE PROCEDURE.

CONFIDENTIAL

30. (C) [redacted] INTERVENED, ARGUING THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WAS A PROBLEM FOR EMBOFF TO BE THERE. HOWEVER, THE OTHER OFFICIAL WAS ADAMANT THAT THE "PROCEDURE" BE FOLLOWED. [redacted] SAID HE COULD TALK TO EMBOFF AS A "FRIEND AND VISITOR" BUT NOT ABOUT THE CAMPAIGN IN HIS CAPACITY AS A GOLKAR OFFICIAL. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT EMBOFF TALK TO THE GOI'S LOCAL ELECTION COMMITTEE IN PEKALONGAN IF HE WANTED TO SEE THE CAMPAIGN EVEN THE NEXT DAY. [redacted] WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE A PHONE NUMBER. EMBOFF HAD SEVERAL OTHER MEETINGS SCHEDULED THE DAY OF THE GOLKAR CAMPAIGN (MAY 18), AND DID NOT ATTEMPT TO ATTEND THE EVENT.

B1

B1

B1

31. (C) EMBOFF LEARNED LATER THAT [redacted] HIMSELF, WHO HAD ORIGINALLY AGREED TO THE MEETING, HAD CALLED THE EMBASSY ON SATURDAY MAY 17 TRYING TO REVERSE HIMSELF. ACCORDING TO THE PHONE MESSAGE, HE SAID THE MEETING WAS NOT AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE GOLKAR NATIONAL LEVEL CENTRAL BOARD.

B1

STRENGTH OF NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) IN PEKALONGAN

32. (C) NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) INDONESIA'S LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION, ENJOYS GREAT STRENGTH IN PEKALONGAN AND OTHER AREAS ALONG THE NORTH COAST OF CENTRAL JAVA. ACCORDING TO ONE LOCAL ESTIMATE, NINETY PERCENT OF THE MUSLIMS IN THE CITY WERE NU MEMBERS. ACCORDING TO ANOTHER ESTIMATE, A LARGE MAJORITY OF ALL THE LOCAL INHABITANTS BELONGED TO THE ORGANIZATION. RANDOM CONVERSATIONS WITH

LOCAL CITIZENS ILLUSTRATED THE EXTEND TO NU'S SUPPORT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE HOSTESS AND THE WAITER IN THE HOTEL RESTAURANT PROUDLY TOLD EMBOFF THAT THEY BELONGED TO NU.

33. (C) EMBOFF MET WITH THE LOCAL LEADERSHIP OF NU IN PEKALONGAN ON MAY 18 AT A SMALL ISLAMIC BOARDING SCHOOL (PESANTREN) ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF TOWN. THE MEETING WAS SUPPOSED TO BE FOCUSED ON NU'S RELIGIOUS ROLE AND THE OPERATION OF THE PESANTREN, HOWEVER, THE [redacted] B1
[redacted] WHO RAN THE PESANTREN, AND THE OTHERS WANTED TO TALK POLITICS. THEY EMPHASIZED THAT MOST NU MEMBERS WERE "INDEPENDENT PEOPLE," MEANING THAT THEY WERE NOT DEPENDENT ON THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE (E.G. WERE NOT CIVIL SERVANTS) TO MAKE A LIVING, BUT RATHER HAD INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF INCOME THROUGH TRADING, ETC. THUS, THEY WERE ABLE TO TAKE A MORE INDEPENDENT POLITICAL STANCE VIS A VIS THE GOVERNMENT. (COMMENT: MANY OBSERVERS IN CENTRAL JAVA BELIEVE THAT THE STRONG INDEPENDENCE OF PEKALONGAN'S RESIDENTS FROM THE GOVERNMENT IS THE PRIMARY REASON THAT THE CITY DID NOT FALL TO GOLKAR IN 1992. END COMMENT.)

34. (C) THE NU LEADERS WANTED TO KNOW IF THE UNITED STATES WOULD MAKE A PUBLIC REPORT ABOUT THE INDONESIAN ELECTION AND RAISED THE ISSUE OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING "HUMAN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6719

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6719

PAGE 01 JAKART 03113 06 OF 06 280756Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09
	G-00	/038W					

----------BEFB73 280756Z /38

R 280741Z MAY 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5984
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 06 JAKARTA 003113

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN PEKALONGAN, CENTRAL JAVA

RIGHTS AND GSP." THEY WERE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMAGE OF NU IN INDONESIA AND IN THE OUTSIDE WORLD, ESPECIALLY

THE UNITED STATES, GIVEN THAT NU MEMBERS HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF PARTICIPATING IN MUCH OF THE UNREST THAT HAS OCCURRED IN INDONESIA RECENTLY. ROY

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3289

PAGE 01 JAKART 02913 01 OF 03 171330Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/037W						

----------BBB3DB 171330Z /52

R 161052Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5857
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002913

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: NEW PPP SUPPORTERS "GOING WITH THE STREAM;" PPP ALLEGES VOTER MANIPULATION AND VOTE FRAUD

REF: JAKARTA 2798

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02913 01 OF 03 171330Z
1.5(D)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

2. (C) SUMMARY: MANY NEW, YOUNG UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) SUPPORTERS EVIDENT IN STREET RALLIES ARE "GOING WITH THE STREAM," ACCORDING TO A PPP CENTRAL BOARD MEMBER AND NATIONAL CAMPAIGNER. PPP WAS THEIR VEHICLE FOR BECOMING PART OF THE EXCITEMENT OF STREET RALLIES THIS YEAR IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE, JUST AS THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) WAS THE VEHICLE FOR MANY OF THEM IN THE 1992 ELECTION. AT A BASIC LEVEL, IT WAS A CHANNEL FOR THEM TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES. ALTHOUGH NOTING THE MARKEDLY INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR PPP IN JAKARTA DURING THE CAMPAIGN, SHE DID NOT BELIEVE PPP WOULD BE PERMITTED TO WIN THE CAPITAL. IT WAS CLEAR AT A LARGE PPP RALLY ON MAY 14 THAT THE PPP CENTRAL LEADERSHIP HAD LITTLE CONTROL, IF ANY, OVER THE MASSES IN ATTENDANCE. THE EFFORTS TO PUBLICIZE AN ATTEMPTED FUSION BETWEEN THE PPP AND SUPPORTERS OF OUSTED INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI ("MEGA-BINTANG") WERE NOT AS EVIDENT ON MAY 14 AS ON THE PREVIOUS CAMPAIGN DAY. THIS FOLLOWED THE GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT MATERIALS CALLING FOR SUCH A FUSION WERE PROHIBITED. PPP HAS MADE SEVERAL PUBLIC ALLEGATIONS OF VOTER MANIPULATION AND FRAUD. END SUMMARY.

3. (SBU) UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) NATIONAL CAMPAIGNER LENA MARIANA MUKTI INVITED POLOFF TO ACCOMPANY HER TO A PPP PUBLIC RALLY ON MAY 14. SHE IS A MEMBER OF THE PPP NATIONAL BOARD, AND A CANDIDATE FOR PARLIAMENT FROM JAKARTA (ALTHOUGH TOO LOW RANKED ON PPP'S CANDIDATE

CONFIDENTIAL

LIST TO HAVE A REALISTIC CHANCE OF WINNING A SEAT).

LARGE PPP RALLY: WHOSE IN CHARGE?
---

4. (SBU) POLOFF AND PPP NATIONAL CAMPAIGNER LENA MARIANA MUKTI JOURNEYED TO TANJUNG PRIOK, A POOR, PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM AREA IN THE FAR NORTH OF JAKARTA, ON MAY 14 TO OBSERVE A LARGE PPP RALLY. UPON ARRIVING AT NOON, THE SOCCER FIELD WAS VIRTUALLY EMPTY, EXCEPT FOR SOME POLICE

AND MILITARY. MUKTI WAS NOT SPEAKING AT THE CAMPAIGN EVENT HERSELF AS HER RESPONSIBILITY THAT DAY WAS TO MONITOR THE PPP RALLIES IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THE CITY FOR THE PPP CENTRAL BOARD.

5. (SBU) AS THE START TIME OF 1:00 PM DREW NEAR, WAVE AFTER WAVE OF MOSTLY YOUNG MEN ARRIVED IN THE PARKING LOT ON MOTORCYCLES AND OTHER VEHICLES, AND AFTER PARKING RAN ONTO THE FIELD. SEVERAL PPP CAMPAIGNERS ON THE STAGE BEGAN WARMING UP THE CROWD WITH MUSIC, BUT NOBODY FROM PPP APPEARED TO BE IN CHARGE IN THE PARKING LOT OR IN THE FIELD. MOREOVER, THE ARRIVING GROUPS OF MOTORCYCLES WERE NOT WELL-ORGANIZED AND WERE VIRTUALLY LEADERLESS. MUKTI EXPLAINED TO POLOFF THAT THE PEOPLE SIMPLY GATHERED TOGETHER IN THE "KAMPUNGS" (POOR NEIGHBORHOOD) SURROUNDING THE FIELD AND SET OFF FOR THE RALLY.

6. (SBU) MUKTI POINTED OUT THAT THE ATTENDEES WANTED TO JOIN THE STREET RALLIES AND WERE NOT INTERESTED IN THE SPEECHES. SHE ALSO DISAPPROVED OF THE OFFICIALS ON THE STAGE WHOSE PRIMARY FORM OF COMMUNICATING WITH THE CROWD

WAS TO YELL AND SHOUT THAT PPP WAS NUMBER ONE, THAT IT SHOULD BE SUPPORTED, ETC. SHE SAID THAT WHEN SHE SPOKE TO CAMPAIGN CROWDS SHE ALWAYS TRIED TO GIVE SOME SUBSTANCE. BUT IN GENERAL SHE WAS RESIGNED BECAUSE THE STREET RALLIES AND PARTY ATMOSPHERE WERE SO PERVASIVE.

7. (SBU) THE FEATURED SPEAKER, ALAWI MUHAMMAD, A "CHARISMATIC KIAI" (RELIGIOUS SCHOLAR) FROM MADURA ARRIVED AND THE EVENT KICKED INTO FULL GEAR. FIVE TO TEN THOUSAND PEOPLE WERE ON THE FIELD AND IN THE STANDS. HE SPOKE FOR ABOUT HALF AN HOUR AND HIS MAIN MESSAGE TO THE MASS OF PEOPLE WAS TO SUPPORT PPP AND TO CARRY OUT THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION SMOOTHLY. AS SOON AS IT WAS OVER, THE CROWD STREAMED OFF THE FIELD, ONTO MOTORCYCLES, SCOOTERS AND OTHER VEHICLES AND INTO THE NARROW STREETS OF TANJUNG PRIOK.

8. (SBU) POLOFF WATCHED THE EVENT FROM THE EDGE OF THE CROWD. THE VAST MAJORITY WERE TREATING THE EVENT LIKE A

PARTY RATHER THAN A POLITICAL SPEECH. HOWEVER, A FEW OF THE ATTENDEES WITH WHOM POLOFF SPOKE WERE INTENT ON TAKING A MORE SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH. ONE OLDER MAN, WITH HIS WIFE, SON, DAUGHTER-AND-LAW AND GRANDCHILDREN, TOLD POLOFF HOW GOLKAR WAS THE GOVERNMENT PARTY, THE PPP WAS THE ISLAMIC PARTY, AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI)

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0408

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0408

PAGE 01 JAKART 02913 02 OF 03 161053Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/037W						

----------BB4EC8 161053Z /38

R 161052Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5858
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002913

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: NEW PPP SUPPORTERS "GOING WITH THE STREAM;" PPP ALLEGES VOTER MANIPULATION AND VOTE FRAUD

WAS THE "DEMOCRACY PARTY." HE AND HIS FRIEND EMPHASIZED THAT GOLKAR HAD BEEN IN POWER FOR MANY YEARS AND THAT THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS RIGHT. THEY SEEMED ANNOYED BY

THE PACK OF YOUNG MEN HOVERING NEARBY WHO WERE MORE INTENT ON CAROUSING THAN ON LISTENING TO THE SPEECH.

9. (SBU) SEPARATELY, POLOFF SPOKE WITH A YOUNG MAN NOT WEARING THE PPP GREEN WHO SEEMED SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSED TO BE THERE. HE SAID HE WAS A STUDENT FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA (UI), AND THAT HE, ALONG WITH OVER FIFTY PERCENT OF THE STUDENTS AT UI, PLANNED TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTION. HE PROFESSED TO BE A SUPPORTER OF SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS, THE DISSIDENT RECENTLY ARRESTED FOR CALLING FOR AN ELECTION BOYCOTT, AND SAID THAT HE DID NOT PLAN TO STAY LONG AT THE RALLY.

"MEGA-BINTANG" MATERIALS BANNED BY THE GOVERNMENT
---

10. (U) THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ON MAY 12 THAT CAMPAIGN MATERIALS SUCH AS BANNERS AND POSTERS THAT CALLED FOR A FUSION BETWEEN OUSTED PDI LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND THE PPP WOULD BE BANNED (NOTE: REFERRED TO AS "MEGA-BINTANG," BINTANG MEANS STAR IN INDONESIAN, THE PPP SYMBOL. END NOTE). MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS YOGIE REPORTEDLY SAID THAT "I DECLARE THAT PEOPLE ARE NOT TO USE THOSE BANNERS. WE NEVER RECOGNIZE ANY PARTY BUT THE THREE POLL CONTESTANTS." THE GOI ALSO BASED ITS MOVE ON REGULATIONS THAT REQUIRE ALL CAMPAIGN MATERIAL TO BE SCREENED BY THE POLICE.

11. (U) POLOFF DID NOT SEE MEGA-BINTANG SIGNS AT THE EVENT IN NORTH JAKARTA ON MAY 14. THIS COULD BE EXPLAINED IN PART BY THE GOVERNMENT BAN, BUT ALSO BY THE FACT THAT

TANJUNG-PRIOK IS A HEAVILY MUSLIM AREA AND NOT FERTILE
CONFIDENTIAL

GROUND FOR OBTAINING SUPPORT FROM THE MORE NATIONALIST/ CHRISTIAN PDI. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, IN SOUTH JAKARTA MATERIALS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO MOVE AGAINST "MEGA-BINTANG" WERE CIRCULATED ON MAY 14, AND LEAFLETS SUPPORTING THE FUSION APPEARED IN MANY AREAS OF JAVA ON THAT DAY.

WAVE OF SUPPORT FOR PPP: "GOING WITH THE STREAM"
---

12. (C) THE PPP CAMPAIGN OFFICIAL, MUKTI, WAS ENCOURAGED THAT THE PPP WAS ATTRACTING MORE SUPPORTERS AND INTEREST IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, POINTING TO THE MASSES ON THE SOCCER FIELD, SHE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THESE WERE NOT PPP'S TRADITIONAL SUPPORTERS, BUT RATHER YOUNG MEN "GOING WITH THE STREAM." SHE ASSESSED THAT IN THE LAST ELECTION IN 1992 MANY FROM THIS GROUP (NOTE: POOR YOUNG MEN. END NOTE) ENTERED THE STREETS FOR THE PDI. THIS TIME PPP WAS THE WAY FOR THEM TO BECOME PART OF THE EXCITEMENT OF STREET RALLIES AND AT A BASIC LEVEL TO "EXPRESS THEMSELVES." SHE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD REMAIN WITH PPP THROUGH MAY 29 WHEN THE ELECTION WOULD BE HELD, AND ACTUALLY CAST THEIR VOTES FOR THE PARTY.

13. (C) DESPITE PPP CHAIRMAN ISMAIL HASAN METAREUM'S PUBLIC STATEMENT ON MAY 5 THAT HIS PARTY WOULD PREVAIL IN THE CAPITAL AS IT HAD IN 1977, MUKTI DID NOT BELIEVE THAT "GOLKAR WOULD ALLOW PPP TO WIN THE ELECTION" IN JAKARTA. CURRENTLY, OF THE FOURTEEN PARLIAMENT SEATS FROM JAKARTA, GOLKAR HOLDS EIGHT, PPP THREE, AND PDI THREE. SHE THOUGHT
CONFIDENTIAL

THAT PPP COULD CONCEIVABLY DOUBLE ITS TOTAL OF SEATS TO SIX, BUT NO MORE. EVEN IF IT APPEARED THAT PPP HAD IN REALITY WON THE VOTE IN JAKARTA BUT HAD BEEN CHEATED BY THE GOVERNMENT, SHE DOUBTED THAT THE PUBLIC REACTION WOULD BE STRONG. SHE NOTED WITH RESIGNATION THAT THE GOVERNMENT "WOULD HAVE SOME EXPLANATION" THAT THE PEOPLE WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT.

PPP ALLEGES FRAUD AND VOTER MANIPULATION IN THE WORKS

14. (C) MUKTI SHOWED POLOFF A LETTER FROM THE PPP CENTRAL BOARD TO THE GOI ALLEGING THAT GOLKAR WAS PLANNING TO CARRY OUT "OPERATION DAWN" TO MANIPULATE VOTERS ON ELECTION DAY. THE PPP MADE THESE CHARGES PUBLIC ON MAY 13. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, PPP CLAIMED THAT IT HAD OBTAINED LETTERS FROM THE "COMMUNICATION FORUM FOR GOLKAR AFFILIATED ISLAMIC MASS ORGANIZATIONS" INSTRUCTING ITS BRANCH OFFICES TO GIVE FOOD AND MONEY TO PEOPLE EARLY IN THE MORNING ON MAY 29, WHEN THE VOTING WOULD BE HELD. ACCORDING TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY PPP'S SECRETARY GENERAL TOSARI WIJAYA, THIS "OPERATION" WOULD TARGET AREAS WHERE GOLKAR HAD LOST VOTES IN THE LAST ELECTION. ALL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY IS SUPPOSEDLY BANNED AFTER MAY 23.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0409

PAGE 01 JAKART 02913 03 OF 03 161053Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00 /037W	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00

----------BB4ECC 161053Z /38

R 161052Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5859
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002913

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: NEW PPP SUPPORTERS "GOING WITH THE STREAM;" PPP ALLEGES VOTER MANIPULATION AND VOTE FRAUD

15. (U) THE PPP HAD PREVIOUSLY PUBLICLY CHARGED THAT IT HAD DISCOVERED A DOCUMENT FROM A SUBDISTRICT HEAD ("CAMAT") IN BENGKULU, SUMATRA WHICH REPORTED ELECTION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02913 03 OF 03 161053Z
RESULTS INDICATING THAT GOLKAR WOULD WIN 86.29 PERCENT IN THE SUBDISTRICT, THE PPP 7 PERCENT, AND THE PDI 6.71 PERCENT. PPP'S GENERAL CHAIRMAN METAREUM ARGUED THAT THIS WAS EVIDENCE THAT THE RESULTS IN THE SUBDISTRICT WERE ALREADY DETERMINED. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS RESPONDED THAT THE DOCUMENT CONTAINED THE "ESTIMATES" OF WHAT THE RESULTS WOULD BE.

ANECDOTAL EXAMPLES OF VOTER MANIPULATION

16. (C) THE EMBASSY PERIODICALLY RECEIVES CREDIBLE ACCOUNTS OF VOTER MANIPULATION OR FRAUD. ONE INVOLVES THE INDONESIAN FRIEND OF AN EMBOFF WHO WAS SELECTED BY THE ADMINISTRATOR (LURAH) IN HER SOUTH JAKARTA NEIGHBORHOOD TO BE THE LOCAL "GOLKAR ORGANIZER." EVEN THOUGH SHE WAS A SUPPORTER OF MEGAWATI, SHE FELT THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA FOR HER TO ACCEPT THE POSITION OTHERWISE HER LIFE COULD BE MADE DIFFICULT. THE "LURAH" GAVE HER A TARGET NUMBER OF VOTES FOR GOLKAR IN HER AREA FOR HER TO OBTAIN, AND MONEY AND CAMPAIGN MATERIALS SUCH AS T-SHIRTS TO HAND OUT. IT WAS MADE CLEAR TO HER THAT AFTER THE ELECTION IT WOULD BE DETERMINED WHETHER THE NEIGHBORHOOD HAD ACHIEVED ITS TARGET, AND THAT IF NOT THE LURAH MIGHT LOSE HIS JOB.

17. (C) ANOTHER CREDIBLE ACCOUNT INVOLVES THE FRIEND OF A FOREIGN SERVICE NATIONAL WHO IS A CIVIL SERVANT WORKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT AIRPLANE COMPANY IPTN. THE FRIEND SAID THAT TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE ELECTION, ON MAY 19, HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD RECEIVE A FULL MONTH'S EXTRA PAYCHECK. THEY REFERRED TO THIS AS THEIR "GOLKAR SUBSIDY."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

18. (C) A LOCAL CONTACT EXPLAINED THAT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS JUST ABOVE VILLAGE LEVEL (CALLED SUB-SUB DISTRICT) IN THE JAKARTA AREA AND PRESUMABLY MORE WIDELY ARE ORGANIZING "EVENING MEETINGS" ON THE EVE OF GOLKAR CAMPAIGN DAYS AT WHICH PEOPLE ARE RECRUITED TO CAMPAIGN FOR GOLKAR THE FOLLOWING DAY. THEY ARE OFFERED MONEY, USUALLY ABOUT 10,000 RUPIAH (A PARALLEL REPORT INDICATED THAT WOMEN ARE OFFERED SUBSTANTIALLY MORE, UP TO 40,000 RUPIAH), PLUS GOLKAR T-SHIRTS OR LIGHT JACKETS AND FOOD. THE OTHER PARTIES ARE NOT PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN ORGANIZATIONS BELOW THE DISTRICT LEVEL AND MOREOVER DO NOT HAVE THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO GOLKAR. SOURCE EXPLAINED THAT MOST PARTICIPANTS WERE YOUNG UNEMPLOYED MEN. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4576

PAGE 01 JAKART 02779 01 OF 02 120817Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/039W						

----------B938D3 120817Z /38

R 120815Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5749
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002779

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/16
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: MUSLIM PARTY SURGE SEEN AT MID-POINT IN
- PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS;
REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02779 01 OF 02 120817Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

CONVOYED, RALLIED OR SIMPLY STOOD ALONG THE STREETS OF THE CAPITAL MAY 11 WATCHING A RAUCOUS BUT GOOD NATURED SEA OF SUPPORTERS FOR THE MINORITY UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) STRUT ITS STUFF. GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS INTENDED TO LIMIT OR PREVENT CONVOYS AND RALLIES WERE SWEPT ASIDE BY THE LARGE EXUBERANT CROWDS. PPP'S NUMBERS IN THE STREETS MAY HAVE BEEN TWICE THE SIZE OF THOSE ATTRACTED ONLY THREE DAYS EARLIER, A MUSLIM HOLIDAY, WHEN PPP CROWDS IMMOBILIZED SOUTH JAKARTA. VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE CAPITAL APPEARED IN GRIDLOCK MAY 11. THERE WAS SOME EVIDENCE OF MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS JOINING THE PPP BANDWAGON, DESPITE MISGIVINGS BY SENIOR MEGAWATI ADVISORS WHO SEE RELIGIOUS SPLITS IN HER PARTY AS ONE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCE DERIVING FROM SUCH ACTIVITY. IT IS YET TO BE SEEN WHETHER PPP'S SURGING STRENGTH IN THE STREETS LEADS TO A LARGER HARVEST OF VOTES. DOUBTS ABOUT THE FAIRNESS OF GOVERNMENT VOTE COUNTING ARE COMMONPLACE. END SUMMARY

JAKARTA AWASH IN PPP GREEN:
---

3. (U) JAKARTA, MAY 11, WAS TRANSFORMED INTO A SEA OF GREEN AS HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF GREEN CLAD SUPPORTERS OF THE LARGELY ISLAMIC UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY SWARMED INTO THE CAPITAL'S STREETS IN IMPROMPTU PARADES AND GATHERINGS. THE SIZE OF THE CROWDS AND THEIR PENCHANT FOR MASSING AT INTERSECTIONS AND FORMING UP MOTORCADES ON ALL MAIN THOROUGHFARES CAUSED THE CITY OF 11 MILLION VIRTUALLY TO GRIND TO A HALT. THE NUMBERS IN SOUTH JAKARTA, ACCORDING TO ONE POLOFF, WERE APPROXIMATELY

DOUBLE THE SIZE OF PPP CROWDS WHICH TOOK TO THE STREET ON THE LAST SCHEDULED PPP CAMPAIGN DAY, MAY 8, AN ISLAMIC HOLIDAY. ONLY SELECTED AREAS WHERE POLICE AND MILITARY BARRED THE FESTIVE CROWDS REMAINED QUIET. ONE SUCH NEIGHBORHOOD WAS CENTRAL JAKARTA'S MENTENG WHERE THE PRESIDENT AND HIS FAMILY RESIDE. POLICE AND MILITARY UNITS WERE ABLE TO SCREEN OUT MOST PPP VEHICLES AS THEY SOUGHT TO ENTER MENTENG.

4. (U) MUCH OF THE REST OF THE CITY WAS FESTIVE GRIDLOCK. WHILE OFFICIAL SCHEDULED RALLIES ATTRACTED LARGE CROWDS IN NORTH AND SOUTH JAKARTA, THEY TENDED TO BE ONLY HUBS FOR MUCH MORE FRENETIC ACTIVITY OF MOSTLY TEENAGE YOUTHS WHO CLAMORED ABOARD ALL SORTS OF CONVEYANCES TO FORM CONVOYS WHICH SNAKED THROUGH THE CITY, OR MORE TYPICALLY BECAME TRAPPED BY OTHER PPP CELEBRANTS AT INTERSECTIONS. SOME YOUTHS THUMPED ON CARS TRYING TO WEAVE THEIR WAY THROUGH THE CROWDS DEMANDING THE INDEX FINGER PPP SALUTE FROM ALL PASSERSBY. ONE EXPATRIATE FAMILY WHICH OPENED ITS CAR DOORS SAW THE CAR BRIEFLY COMMANDEERED. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF SCUFFLES WITH SECURITY FORCES WHICH WERE OUT IN FORCE, MANY ARMED WITH SEMI-AUTOMATIC RIFLES.

5. (U) THE CROWDS WERE A CROSS BETWEEN MARDI GRAS AND A WELCOME GIVEN A TRIUMPHANT HOMECOMING SPORTS TEAM WITH VERY LITTLE POLITICAL FEEL. THE RALLIES TENDED TO BE MUSIC CONCERTS WITH FEW SPEECHES AND LITTLE PAMPHLETEERING. EVEN OFF THE MAIN STREETS IN THE DENSELY POPULATED BACK ALLIES GREEN BANNERS WERE IN ABUNDANCE AND PEOPLE OF ALL AGES APPEARED GENUINELY

CAUGHT UP IN THE ATMOSPHERE. YELLOW GOLKAR (GOVERNMENT PARTY) FLAGS WERE RELATIVELY RARE AND PDI RED FLAGS WERE NON-EXISTENT.

6. (U) SPOTTED AMONG THE CROWDS WERE SOME "FUSION" ENTHUSIASTS, SUPPORTERS OF THE GOVERNMENT-OUSTED CHAIRPERSON OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI WHO PLAN TO VOTE FOR PPP IN PROTEST OVER THE GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE IN THE PDI. WHILE A FEW "MEGA BINTANG" POSTERS WERE SPOTTED AT THE RALLIES IN NORTH JAKARTA, THE PHENOMENON APPEARED TO BE MORE COMMON IN SOUTH JAKARTA (BINTANG MEANS STAR, WHICH IS THE PPP SYMBOL). ONE EMBOFF WITNESSED AN HOURS LONG STREET RALLY IN WHICH THREE TO FIVE THOUSAND PPP SUPPORTERS DROVE AROUND AND AROUND. GREEN (PPP) AND RED (PDI) FLAGS AND PHOTOS OF MEGAWATI WERE PLENTIFUL, AND MANY WERE FLASHING THE MIXED HAND SIGNAL FOR BOTH THE PPP AND THE MEGAWATI BRANCH OF THE PDI. AT ONE INDONESIAN HIGH

SCHOOL WITH WHICH EMBOFF WAS FAMILIAR, MANY OF THE YOUNG MEN, SOME OF WHOM HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE UNREST ON JULY 27, WERE CROSSING OVER TO SUPPORT PPP, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.

THE MEGA-BINTANG MOVEMENT:

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4577

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4577

PAGE 01 JAKART 02779 02 OF 02 120817Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/039W						

----------B938D5 120817Z /38

R 120815Z MAY 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5750
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002779

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/16
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: MUSLIM PARTY SURGE SEEN AT MID-POINT IN
- PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN

---

7. (C) A SENIOR MEGAWATI LIEUTENANT TOLD POLCOUNS MAY 11 THAT MEGAWATI AND HER SENIOR ADVISORS ARE CONCERNED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02779 02 OF 02 120817Z
ABOUT THE "MEGA-BINTANG" MOVEMENT . HE NOTED THAT THERE ARE GENUINE AND DEEP POLICY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PPP AND PDI (HE NOTED PPP OPPOSITION TO FAMILY PLANNING AS ONE) AND, MOREOVER, THERE IS INCHOATE CONCERN THAT PPP COULD YET BE A VEHICLE WHICH ISLAMIST HARDLINERS MIGHT SEEK TO EXPLOIT. (NOTE: MOST OBSERVERS DO NOT SEE PPP AS FERTILE GROUND FOR ISLAMIST HARDLINERS. IN 1985 THE GOVERNMENT FORCED PPP AND ALL OTHER PARTIES AND SOCIO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO DECLARE THAT THEY WERE BASED ON THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA, I.E., NOT ISLAM. END NOTE)

8. (C) THE MEGAWATI LIEUTENANT ADDED THAT THE APPEAL OF "MEGA-BINTANG" IS STRONGEST AMONG MUSLIM PDI SUPPORTERS WHILE PDI'S SUBSTANTIAL CHRISTIAN CONSTITUENCY WOULD PREFER TO ABSTAIN FROM VOTING OR "GOLPUT." MEGAWATI AND HER ADVISORS REPORTEDLY FEAR POSSIBLE LONG TERM DAMAGE TO PDI UNITY IF THERE IS A DIVIDE BETWEEN SUPPORTERS WHO SUPPORT THE PPP AND THOSE WHO DO NOT.

8. (C) COMMENT: LOCAL OBSERVERS HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED WITH THE SIZE AND ENTHUSIASM OF PPP CROWDS IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE (SEE SEPTEL). MOREOVER, THE CROWDS APPEAR TO HAVE GROWN SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE FIRST FIVE THREE-DAY ROUNDS OF CAMPAIGNING. WHETHER THIS SURGING PPP APPEAL TRANSLATES INTO SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER VOTE NUMBERS FOR THE PPP REMAINS TO BE SEEN. NO ONE HERE

UNDERESTIMATES THE ABILITY OR WILLINGNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO MANIPULATE VOTE TOTALS ALTHOUGH SUCH ACTION THIS TIME AROUND, COULD LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT

PROTEST.

9. (C) COMMENT CONT: ONE OBSERVER (PDI), REFLECTING ON THE MEGA-BINTANG OR FUSION PHENOMENON, CONTENDED THAT BY MUTING PDI THROUGH OUSTER OF ITS POPULAR CHAIRPERSON, THE GOVERNMENT HAD TRANSFORMED THE ELECTION EFFECTIVELY INTO A TWO PARTY RACE (I.E., GOLKAR VS. PPP) WHICH, NOTWITHSTANDING A VERY UNEVEN PLAYING FIELD, HELD SOME NEW INTEREST. THE ELECTION, HE SUGGESTED, COULD TAKE ON THE APPEARANCE OF A REFERENDUM ON THE GOVERNMENT WITH THOSE VOTERS WHO ARE FED UP WITH CORRUPTION, SECURITY AUTHORITY ABUSE, ECONOMIC AND OTHER GAPS AND A FAILED JUSTICE SYSTEM SEIZING AN OPPORTUNITY TO REGISTER A SINGLE PROTEST VOTE. ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2170

PAGE 01 JAKART 02521 290915Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-09
	G-00	/026W					

----------B4BCC5 290916Z /38

R 290915Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5581
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002521

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0061

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-30-02
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: PDI CAMPAIGNS IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA; CLASH IN SURABAYA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PRINCIPAL OFFICER. REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: ON ITS FIRST DAY OF CAMPAIGNING IN EAST JAVA, THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI-SURYADI FACTION) WAS CHASED OFF THE STAGE BY SEVERAL HUNDRED MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS AT A MAJOR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02521 290915Z
RALLY IN SURABAYA. SUFFICIENT SECURITY ARRIVED TOO LATE. PDI

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

ELECTION OFFICIALS HAVE SAID PDI SURABAYA WILL NO LONGER CAMPAIGN SINCE SECURITY IS INADEQUATE AND PDI EVENTS SEEM UNDER A THREAT OF CONTINUED DISRUPTION BY MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS, BUT THE PDI WILL STAY ON THE BALLOT. PDI-SURYADI FACTION MORALE IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA WAS NEVER STRONG AND HAS BEEN ERODING. IF SURABAYA PDI DOES NOT PARTICIPATE IN FURTHER CAMPAIGNING, WE SUSPECT OTHER PDI CHAPTERS IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA WILL FOLLOW SUIT. PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES WILL LIKELY PRESS THE PDI TO RECONSIDER SINCE THE PRESENCE OF THE TWO MINORITY PARTIES IS IMPORTANT FOR THE IMAGE OF A SUCCESSFUL ELECTION. END SUMMARY

3. (U) ON THE SECOND DAY OF THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN (APRIL 28), THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) WAS ALLOTTED EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA FOR CAMPAIGNING. (NOTE: UNDER GOVERNMENT CAMPAIGN REGULATIONS, RIVAL PARTIES CAN NOT CAMPAIGN ON THE SAME DAY IN THE SAME AREA. END NOTE) IN SURABAYA SUPPORTERS OF GOVERNMENT-OUSTED PDI CHAIRPERSON MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI, THROUGH HECKLING AND STONE THROWING, BROKE UP THE PDI-SURYADI FACTION EVENT QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY. ACCORDING TO PRESS AND WITNESS ACCOUNTS, DURING THE WARM UP TO THE RALLY IN THE CITY CENTER AS LOCAL SINGERS WERE PERFORMING JUST BEFORE THE PROGRAM, A MEGAWATI SUPPORTER TOOK OVER THE STAGE AND MICROPHONE, WARMING THE AUDIENCE TOWARD MEGAWATI, AND TURNING THE EVENT TEMPORARILY INTO A MEGAWATI RALLY. AFTER THE PDI'S OWN SECURITY TRIED TO BREAK UP THE SHOW, SEVERAL HUNDRED MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS PELTED THE STAGE WITH STONES AND CHASED AWAY THE PERFORMERS AND PDI-SURYADI FACTION OFFICIALS. (SOME PRESS ACCOUNTS NUMBER THE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS AS HIGH AS 5000.) THE AREA WAS RANSACKED. MILITARY SECURITY RUSHED IN AFTER THE INCIDENT WAS OVER. THERE WERE MINOR INJURIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. (U) SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, SURABAYA'S PDI-SURYADI FACTION ELECTION COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN DECLARED THAT PDI SURABAYA WOULD NO LONGER BE CAMPAIGNING IN SURABAYA, SINCE SECURITY WAS INADEQUATE AND THE PDI WAS FACING PROSPECTS OF CONTINUOUS CLASHES WITH MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS. HE NOTED THAT PDI SURABAYA WOULD STILL TAKE PART IN THE ELECTION, BUT CAMPAIGNING WAS OUT. HE WAS SUPPORTED BY THE VICE PDI CHAIRMAN FOR EAST JAVA. SURABAYA'S MILITARY COMMANDER UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIED TO CONVINCE HIM TO RESTART THE DAY'S EVENT AND STAY IN THE CAMPAIGN.

5. (U) NOWHERE ELSE IN CENTRAL AND EAST JAVA WERE THERE CLASHES AS VIOLENT AS IN SURABAYA, ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THE PDI SHOW IN NEARBY SIDOARJO WAS STRONGLY HECKLED, AND SECURITY WAS TIGHT AT OTHER PDI RALLIES. SEVERAL PDI-SURYADI EVENTS WERE REPORTEDLY CANCELED THROUGHOUT EAST JAVA (JEMBER, SAMPANG, SITUBONDO, AND BOJONEGORO) AND MANY IN YOGYAKARTA. OTHERS WERE ATTENDED BY CROWDS OF UP TO A FEW HUNDRED, USUALLY WITH HEAVY SECURITY. IN NGANDJUK, REPORTEDLY THE NUMBER OF SECURITY PERSONNEL WAS DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF ON-LOOKERS, WHO AMOUNTED TO 100.

6. (C) (COMMENT) MORALE WITHIN PRO-SURYADI PDI RANKS HAS NEVER BEEN HIGH IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA. MANY CHAPTERS ARE PLAGUED BY A LACK OF FINANCES AND INTERNAL REVOLT BY THOSE WHO MAINTAIN VARYING DEGREES OF LOYALTY TO MEGAWATI. PDI OFFICIALS' FUMBLING ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE HAVE BEEN AGGRAVATED BY THE PERSISTENT SPECTER OF VIOLENT DISRUPTION AND THE CHALLENGES IN THE COURTS DIRECTED AGAINST THEM BY MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS. THE EAST JAVA PDI WAS FURTHER DISHEARTENED EARLIER THIS MONTH WHEN ONE OF ITS VERY FEW PRO-SURYADI LEADERS WITH A STRONG PERSONAL FOLLOWING DIED ON HAJJ. IF SURABAYA PDI GETS OUT OF THE CAMPAIGN, OTHERS WILL LIKELY FOLLOW SUIT.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. (C) (FURTHER COMMENT) SINCE BOTH MINORITY PARTIES ARE AN ESSENTIAL COSMETIC FOR A SUCCESSFUL ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND THE GOVERNMENT WISHES TO SHOW THAT PRO-SURYADI PDI IS THE LEGITIMATE PDI REPRESENTATION, WE SUSPECT THAT PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY WILL PRESS STRONGLY FOR PDI SURABAYA TO RECONSIDER ITS DECISION. MOREOVER, PROVINCIAL MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN THE RUN-UP TO THE CAMPAIGN HAD MADE MUCH ABOUT THEIR INTENT TO KEEP ORDER AND DEAL HARSHLY WITH CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE. THIS INCIDENT AND THE PDI ACCUSATION OF A SECURITY LAPSE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY EMBARRASSING AND WILL DEEPEN THE MILITARY'S RESOLVE TO KEEP THE PDI IN THE CAMPAIGN AND REACT STRONGLY IF FURTHER VIOLENCE ERUPTS. WHETHER THE PDI STAYS IN OR GETS OUT, THE PARTY APPEARS WEAKER THAN EVER. MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS UNDOUBTEDLY WILL RECEIVE A MAJOR BOOST AND CONTINUE TO MAKE THEIR PRESENCE LOUDLY OBVIOUS.
PIERCE/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8805

PAGE 01 JAKART 02493 01 OF 02 281023Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00 /040W	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00

----------B4524E 281023Z /38

R 281023Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5568
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002493

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: STUDENT AND YOUTH GROUPS LOOK TO THE ELECTION

REF: JAKARTA 1500

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON 1.5 (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02493 01 OF 02 281023Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 07 SEP 2006 200503235

2. (C) SUMMARY: THERE ARE GROWING INDICATIONS THAT MANY STUDENTS THROUGHOUT INDONESIA PLAN TO BOYCOTT THE UPCOMING PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION. STUDENTS AT YOGYAKARTA'S GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATED FROM APRIL 1-3 FOR MEGAWATI AND IN FAVOR OF AN ELECTION BOYCOTT. OVER 30 STUDENTS WERE DETAINED DURING THE COURSE OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS, WHICH WERE BROKEN UP BY SECURITY FORCES ON TWO OF THE THREE DAYS. MEANWHILE, THE OFFICIAL INDONESIAN YOUTH COUNCIL HELD A MASS RALLY TO PREPARE FOR ASSISTING WITH SECURITY FOR THE ELECTIONS. END SUMMARY.

STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS

---

3. (C) ON APRIL 1 AT GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY (UGM) IN YOGYAKARTA APPROXIMATELY 200 STUDENTS, CALLING THEMSELVES "COMMITTEE FOR INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY," HELD A DEMONSTRATION IN SUPPORT OF OUSTED DEMOCRATIC PARTY LEADER MEGAWATI, AND CALLING FOR A BOYCOTT OF THE MAY ELECTION. THE DEMONSTRATION WAS BROKEN UP BY SECURITY PERSONNEL, AND 24 STUDENTS WERE DETAINED, AND THEN RELEASED ON APRIL SECOND. ON APRIL SECOND, STUDENTS HELD ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION, THIS TIME ALSO PROTESTING AGAINST THE "SECURITY AUTHORITIES' INVASION OF CAMPUS." USISOFF SAW THE DEMONSTRATION IN PROGRESS ON APRIL SECOND, ESTIMATING THAT THERE WERE ABOUT 70 DEMONSTRATORS AND ABOUT 200 ONLOOKERS. AT NOON, THE DEMONSTRATION WAS BROKEN UP AND EIGHT STUDENTS WERE DETAINED. THEY WERE RELEASED APRIL THIRD, FOLLOWING A STRONG STATEMENT FROM THE RECTOR OF THE UNIVERSITY. HE SAID THAT, "ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE CARRIED OUT BY THE STUDENT SENATE AND EXECUTIVE BODY OF STUDENTS OF UGM ARE OFFICIAL. WE REQUEST THAT ALL SIDES DO NOT DISTURB THEM AND ASK THE SECURITY APPARATUS NOT TO ENTER CAMPUS."

4. (C) ON APRIL THIRD, APPROXIMATELY 400 (ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS) STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED ON CAMPUS. THIS DEMONSTRATION WAS NOT DISPERSED BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES. USISOFF SPOKE WITH SEVERAL STUDENTS ON THE SCENE THAT DAY, WHO SAID THAT THEY WERE MORE NERVOUS ABOUT POLICE ACTION, AND THAT THE CALL FOR BOYCOTT OF THE ELECTION WAS SEEN AS THE MOST DANGEROUS FOR THEM. USISOFF WAS TOLD BY JOURNALISTS AT TWO OF THE MAJOR LOCAL NEWSPAPERS THAT THE AUTHORITIES HAD CALLED EACH DAY OF THE DEMONSTRATION TO TELL THEM TO DOWNPLAY THE ELECTION BOYCOTT ASPECT OF THE

DEMONSTRATIONS. ON APRIL FIFTH, THERE WAS NO DEMONSTRATION.

5. (C) USISOFF WAS TOLD BY STUDENTS THAT THEY WERE AFRAID THE SECURITY RESPONSE WOULD BE STRONG IF THEY DEMONSTRATED AGAIN. IN A CONVERSATION APRIL FIFTH WITH SEVEN STUDENTS, USISOFF WAS TOLD THAT ALTHOUGH THEY HAD NOT DEMONSTRATED, THEY WERE UNITED WITH THE STUDENTS WHO DID. THEY SAID MANY STUDENTS DID NOT PLAN TO VOTE IN THE ELECTION. THEY EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR MEGAWATI AND NONE FOR SURYADI OR GOLKAR. THEY SAID THERE WAS STILL STRONG SUPPORT FOR PPP, BUT NOT AS MUCH AS THERE WAS IN 1992. (NOTE: A CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION STAFF MEMBER WHO WAS IN YOGYAKARTA MARCH 23, TOLD POLOFF SHE WITNESSED A CONVOY OF OVER 600 MOTORCYCLES AND CARS DECKED OUT IN PPP GREEN GO THROUGH TOWN. MOST OF THE PARTICIPANTS WERE YOUNG MEN. SHE SAID THE AREA WAS TENSE AND TRAFFIC CAME TO A STANDSTILL, BUT THERE WAS NO NOTICEABLE POLICE PRESENCE. END NOTE)

6. (C) STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS FOR MEGAWATI AND AGAINST THE ELECTION TENTATIVELY PLANNED FOR THE SECOND WEEK OF APRIL IN YOGYAKARTA, BANDUNG, JAKARTA, UJUNG PANDANG AND POSSIBLY SURABAYA DID NOT OCCUR. WHEN ASKED IF STUDENTS AT DIFFERENT UNIVERSITIES WERE IN CONTACT WITH ONE ANOTHER, THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA UNIVERSITY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

STUDENT ORGANIZATION (PMII) LEADERS EXPLAINED THAT SOME STUDENT ACTIVITIES WERE PURELY LOCAL AND OTHERS HAD BROADER CONNECTIONS. ALTHOUGH POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS WERE BANNED FROM CAMPUSES, STUDENTS COULD STILL PARTICIPATE IN EXTRA-UNIVERSITY ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS PMII AND OTHERS. THESE GROUPS HAVE A NATIONWIDE NETWORK, WITH BRANCHES IN MOST PROVINCES. SOME OF THE DEMONSTRATORS ARRESTED IN YOGYAKARTA WERE FROM PMII BUT WERE NOT DEMONSTRATING AS MEMBERS OF PMII. SUPPORT FROM PMII AND OTHER GROUPS COULD BE GIVEN ONLY INDIRECTLY, FROM BEHIND, THEY EXPLAINED.

7. (SBU) INTERNET REPORTS ARE CIRCULATING FROM A GROUP CALLING ITSELF THE WHITE GROUP STUDENT MOVEMENT (GEMA GOLPUT), WHICH CLAIMS TO BE COMPOSED OF STUDENT GROUPS FROM SURABAYA, MALANG, JOMBANG, YOGYAKARTA, BALI, PURWOKERTO, PROBOLINGGO, WONOSOBO, SEMARANG AND MADURA. THE GROUP WAS CREATED TO ADVOCATE STUDENT BOYCOTTS OF THE ELECTION. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, STUDENTS AT AIRLANGGA UNIVERSITY IN SURABAYA, BRAWIJAYA UNIVERSITY IN

MALANG, AND JEMBER UNIVERSITY IN JEMBER, AND DARUL ULUM UNIVERSITY IN JOMBANG HAVE STAGED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE ELECTION IN RECENT DAYS.

MANY STUDENTS TO SIT OUT THIS ELECTION?

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8807

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8807

PAGE 01 JAKART 02493 02 OF 02 281023Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/040W						

----------B45252 281024Z /38

R 281023Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5569
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002493

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: STUDENT AND YOUTH GROUPS LOOK TO THE ELECTION

---

8. (SBU) ACCORDING TO A NUMBER OF SURVEYS AND CONVERSATIONS WITH STUDENT AND YOUTH LEADERS, THERE ARE CLEAR INDICATIONS THAT MANY STUDENTS INTEND TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTION. A SURVEY IN MALANG

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02493 02 OF 02 281023Z
CONDUCTED BY OFFICIAL YOUTH ORGANIZATION KNPI DETERMINED THAT 92.4 PERCENT OF THE STUDENTS SURVEYED DID NOT INTEND TO VOTE (REF B). A POLL CONDUCTED IN 1996 BY A LECTURER IN THE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES AT YOGYAJARTA'S GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY DETERMINED THAT 60 PERCENT OF 1000 STUDENTS SURVEYED PLANNED TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTION. A POLL CONDUCTED AT THE ISLAMIC INSTITUTE IN YOGYAKARTA CONCLUDED THAT 39.3 PERCENT OF THE STUDENTS THERE WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION. A POLL CONDUCTED BY A STUDENT CLUB AT THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA IN JAKARTA FOUND THAT 48.7 PERCENT OF 1000 RESPONDENTS DID NOT PLAN TO VOTE.

9. (C) A PROTESTANT STUDENTS MOVEMENT (GMKI) LEADER TOLD POLOFF HE THOUGHT HIS ORGANIZATION WOULD BE ISSUING A STATEMENT SIMILAR TO THAT PUT OUT BY THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS COUNCIL, WHICH SAID THAT IT WAS NOT A SIN NOT TO VOTE (REFTEL). THEY WERE GOING TO SAY THAT IT WAS OK TO VOTE OR NOT VOTE. HIS IMPRESSION OF STUDENT SENTIMENT WAS THAT SINCE MEGAWATI WAS NOT ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE, THERE WERE NO REAL CANDIDATES AND THUS NO REAL CHOICE TO MAKE. HE SPECULATED THAT MANY STUDENTS WOULD NOT VOTE.

10. (C) THE NATIONALIST STUDENT (GMNI) LEADERS TOLD POLOFF THAT THEY THOUGHT STUDENTS WOULD NOT VOTE, BUT THAT THE ELECTION WOULD PROCEED AS USUAL, AND THE RESULTS WERE PREDETERMINED. THE YOUNG GENERATION WAS FRUSTRATED BECAUSE INDONESIA STILL REQUIRED A CHARISMATIC LEADER, AND NEEDED A MORE DEMOCRATIC LEADER. NO POSSIBLE CANDIDATES HAD EMERGED EXCEPT ABDURRAHMAN WAHID AND MEGAWATI, BOTH OF WHOM HAD BEEN EXCLUDED FROM PARTICIPATION.

11. (C) THE NU STUDENT LEADERS SHOWED POLOFF A BROCHURE FOR THEIR NATIONAL CONFERENCE IN YOGYAKARTA APRIL 15-17, WHICH HAD
CONFIDENTIAL

ILLUSTRATIONS INCLUDING A WHITE SQUARE ON THE BOTTOM CORNER, SAYING "FREE TO MOVE, FREE TO READ, FREE TO SPEAK, FREE TO WHITE" (NOTE: THE SO-CALLED WHITE OR NEUTRAL GROUP, OR GOLPUT, IS A TERM USED FOR REFRAINING FROM VOTING OR FOR SPOILING THE BALLOT BY CHOOSING ALL THREE PARTIES. END NOTE) THEY SAID THAT THEIR STANCE ON THE ELECTION WAS NOT OFFICIAL YET, BUT WOULD PROBABLY BE IN SUPPORT OF THE WHITE VOTE. THEIR GROUP WOULD PROBABLY SUPPORT THE CONCEPT THAT "VOTING IS A RIGHT NOT AN OBLIGATION." (NOTE: EIGHT NU GROUPS, INCLUDING PMII, HAVE SINCE ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT SAYING THAT VOTING IS A RIGHT NOT AN OBLIGATION. SEE SEPTEL. END NOTE) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION SAID THAT DURING A RECENT INTERVIEW WITH INDONESIAN PUBLICATION TERBIT, HE TOLD THE JOURNALIST THAT WHEN PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID TO CONSIDER HIS AGE WHEN THINKING ABOUT THE ELECTIONS, HE INTERPRETED IT TO MEAN THAT OTHER CANDIDATES COULD BE CONSIDERED. HE COMPLAINED THAT WHAT WAS PRINTED WAS INACCURATE AND QUOTED HIM AS SAYING THAT PMII OFFICIALLY GAVE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE RENOMINATION OF SOEHARTO.

INDONESIAN YOUTH COUNCIL

---

12. (SBU) MEANWHILE, THE INDONESIAN YOUTH COUNCIL (KNPI), THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION FOR ALL RECOGNIZED YOUTH AND STUDENT GROUPS, HELD A MASS RALLY RECENTLY TO PRACTICE FOR ASSISTING WITH SECURITY FOR THE ELECTIONS. THE CHAIRMAN OF KNPI DID NOT ATTEND, ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, DUE TO ILLNESS. KNPI CLAIMED TO REPRESENT ALL YOUTH GROUPS IN THESE ACTIONS TO SECURE THE ELECTION.

13. (C) IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS WITH LEADERS OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL

NAHDLATUL ULAMA UNIVERSITY STUDENT ORGANIZATION AND THE PROTESTANT STUDENT ORGANIZATION, POLOFF WAS TOLD THAT THEIR GROUPS DID NOT PARTICIPATE AND HAD PROTESTED THE CLAIMS MADE BY KNPI. THEY ADDED THAT ONLY GOLKAR AND ABRI SPONSORED GROUPS, NAMING GOLKAR AFFILIATED INDONESIAN DEVELOPMENT YOUTH (AMPI) AND ARMED FORCES YOUTH GROUP FORUM FOR CHILDREN OF RETIRED SERVICEMEN (FKPPI), PARTICIPATED. THE PRESS REPORTED ON APRIL 22 THAT THOUSANDS OF LOCAL MEMBERS OF KNPI IN EAST TIMOR HAD PLEDGED TO ENSURE A SMOOTH GENERAL ELECTION, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EAST TIMOR CHAPTER SAID THAT YOUTH "WILL SUPPORT THE ARMED FORCES' LEGAL ACTION TO DEAL WITH THOSE SEEKING TO FOIL THE ELECTION AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY." (NOTE: POLOFF TRIED TO MAKE AN APPOINTMENT TO MEET WITH KNPI REPRESENTATIVES, BUT WAS TOLD BY THEIR OFFICE THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTION, SINCE THE LEADERS HAD BEEN "DISBURSED TO DO CAMPAIGNING (FOR GOLKAR)."
ALTHOUGH IT IS WIDELY KNOWN TO HAVE AFFILIATIONS WITH GOLKAR, KNPI BILLS ITSELF AS AN "INDEPENDENT" YOUTH GROUP REPRESENTING ALL YOUTH AND STUDENT GROUPS. END NOTE)
ROY

NNNN

R11

COMMENTARY ON THE RESULTS OF ELECTION CAMPAIGN OBSERVATION 97
INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE
KIPP

RELEASED IN FULL

Based on the mandate which we decided together and because of our responsibility to society, KIPP would like to present some commentary based on our observations during 1997 election campaign. The commentary is based on the monitoring reports from KIPP participants in 47 cities, covering 17 provinces.

The comments below cover, among other issues, restrictions existing in the elections laws and regulations, the manifestation of these restrictions in a campaign which did not fulfill the function of a facility for people's political education, the lack of response by the election organizing institutions to the concerns of poll contestant, and unfair efforts to win the election.

I. The material of campaign which is limited by law & electorate system, caused the content of campaign material to tend to cover abstract concepts, which are sterile in relation to the realities of society, law, morality, ethics, politics, economy, security & defense and culture. There are no campaign material from the three poll contestants which criticize concrete and contextual realities. The strictness of the rules & regulations impacts the monologue campaign which tends to be simple & and appears to be engineered only for the sake of fulfilling legal formality, without even relating to strategic issues in those fields.

II. The format of the campaign, which still depends on mass mobilization which is advantageous for political education, is the logical consequence from the policy of floating mass, but this can cause negative excesses. Some destruction which was done by poll contestant supporters should to be seen as a problem caused by the limitation of political space, lack of socialization in the value of non-violence, inadequate anticipation by all sides involved of election activities, and accumulation of disappointments in society. The nature and extent of the collective violence and other destructive behaviors are very important to notice, as are the loss human lives and physical property. It is proper to question how far is the dimension of public accountability of the government, in this case the election organizing institutions, about the increase of frequency, and negative impact of various collective violence and mass destructive behavior. Despite this situations, the government, which has the mandate to hold the election, does not want to conduct an evaluation of the campaign.

III. Reports of electoral frauds and forms of political corruption forwarded by PPP, as well as "PDI congress", seemed not to be followed up legally as well as politically. Election organizing and supervising institution which should use these reports as preliminary material to conduct their own correction and investigation, did not respond appropriately, they even tended to neglect such findings.

IV. The efforts by a certain poll contestant to win the election by mobilizing various kinds of state resources, and in order to maintain a single majority, was an open phenomenon that appeared not only occasionally but as a general tendency. The principle of an honest and fair *status confessionis* is a must which must be recognized in Electoral laws. This is reflect in the result of KIPP monitoring which shows the following imbalance

A. A sample of 18 days broadcast of the campaign on state television news broadcast (TVRI-state facility) reveals the following:

Lot: OOD257
Box: 6605(Box3)
File: IN0097
PGOV-ELECTIONS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 29 AUG 2006 200503235

National News TVRI (19.00 hours)
1. PPP given air-time duration of 80 minutes 13 seconds.
2. GOLKAR given air-time duration of 143 minutes 33 second (the most)
3. "PDI congress" given 44 minutes 50 seconds.

TVRI World News (19.00 hours)
1. PPP given air time 39 minutes 50 seconds.
2. Golkar given air time 104 minutes 29 seconds (the most).
3. "PDI congress" given air time 44 minutes 50 seconds.

B. Power and authority abuse which an be classified as political corruption have taken place in various cases, among others, are the letter of Religious affair Office Head (Ka KUA) Tiga Dolok, Pematang Siantar (North Sumatra) on 1st May 1997, to organize the mass for Golkar's victory in churches and mosques.

C. Legal neglect by the government, in this case Indonesia Election Committee (PPI), of the justice institution□s verdict which has already had permanent legal status, of the verdict of Bekasi District court No.:166/Pdt.G/1997/PN.BKS, dated 19 March 1997, which acknowledged DPP-PDI Munas (National Concensus) under the Chairperson leadership of Megawati Sukarnoputri and Secretary General Alexander Litaay, as having the right to represent and to hold the name of PDI internally as well as externally (legitimate DPP-PDI). The neglect of this decision caused the loss of constitutional political rights to participate in General Election and the increase of those people who were pushed aside in formal political processes.

From its understanding of the political and legal context of the general election this year, KIPP recorded a number of phenomenon and is proposing the following recommendations:

Firstly, there have been political phenomenon which show political creativity, even grass-root political innovation, materialized in the form of "temporary political alliance such as mass grouping with "Mega-Bintang" attribute. Such political phenomenon must be responded to positively and constructively as the people's way to express themselves politically and to accommodate society's political dynamics in the context of the limited formal political process. Open political corridors must be realized in future political policy so that similar grass-root political innovations can be contained within the political system, in order that it will not explode in the form of destructive collective behavior.

Secondly, there are juridical weakness in handling the emergence of electoral frauds and political corruption phenomenon, considering the Articles of Law No. 1/1985 on General Election that there is no clear punitive threat against the criminal actors, therefore General Election Law must be as wide as possible and contain criminal articles toward the actors of electoral frauds and political corruptions during General Election period. For that purpose corrective steps are needed in this ongoing election process, and possibilities should be open for those who suffered to take the legal actions. Besides that, immediate steps are needed to increase society's access, especially for contestant witnesses, to information in order to prevent potential violations, such as multiple voting. Upholding of transparency principle must be functionalized to decrease the society's doubt about the result of the election.

Thirdly, there are political phenomenon which show the variety of open resistance against General Election, such as the statement of not to vote in General Election, the Evaluation on General Election as legally incorrect consequently it cannot be continued, etc., must be viewed as the extension of those who are outside the formal political processes which in turn, regardless the size, be it small or big, is very influential on political legitimacy of General Election. Against such various forms of political resistance, state power holder should not overreact, let alone conducting repression, because General Election constitutes the implementation of people's sovereignty which basically must acknowledge the diversity of selections of constitutional political rights.

Fourthly, Government, in this case Election Organizing and Supervising Institution must openly show its responsibility in General Election implementation, especially those cases involving violation, social, economic and physical loss/destruction because of political violence and riots related to General Election.

Fifthly, the future of national political life is greatly determined by how far the General Election fulfills democratic principles for general elections. Various problems taking place before and during General Election implementation such as deep intervention of state power holder in political party's affair (PDI case), problems of integrity of government institutions in upholding general election healthy and clean principle as well as other problems which cause the present general election has not yet fulfilled the above requirements.

Sixthly, KIPP calls on its participants and partners and all sides being involved in the implementation of the election to support the creation of peaceful and healthy election situations so that voters can exercise their constitutional political rights freely in accordance with democratic values. Citizens can participate in this process by conducting monitoring of the on going election process.

It is the correct place that future MPR/Parliament□s stipulations provide wider constitutional guarantee in achieving general election fundamental requirements which have been openly/generally prevailing/effective in the countries applying democracy

Further results of monitoring and further recommendations will be presented by KIPP beginning on 30 May, 1997.

Issued in: Jakarta
Date : 26th May 1997

KIPP Presidium

Mulyana W. Kusumah

Secretary General

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

Elections

R12

Post Election Statement of KIPP
Issued 30 May, 1997
Jakarta, Indonesia

KIPP has received reports from 8000 volunteers in 47 cities spread over in the 17 provinces of Indonesia, including reports from the 20 priority cities. Based on these preliminary reports, KIPP has made the following evaluation of the election held on May 29, 1997:

First, although the election generally went smoothly and most of the country was calm, KIPP's volunteers reported several problems in the election process. These include instances of: multiple voting, intimidation of party witnesses, discrimination in the treatment of voters and various procedural irregularities. In some cases, the counting process was not transparent and there is uncertainty concerning the results of the counting.

KIPP's volunteers found that:

- unregistered persons were permitted to vote;
- party witnesses were forced to leave the polling stations, and as a result the counting process lacked transparency;
- there were incidents of violence and disruption near several polling stations; and
- some KIPP volunteers were not allowed to observe the election process.

Second, the election process is now conducted with sophisticated communications technology and is coordinated by several senior officials of the government. For example, the computerized election database is accessible to the President and Vice President, Chief of the Armed Forces, Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Information. The party leaders, however, do not have access to the data base and therefore there is no independent check on its accuracy. There is generally a lack of transparency in all aspects of the election.

Third, the preliminary results of ballot counting show an overwhelming victory for GOLKAR. This is in part a reflection of one party's political strength, but it also reflects political and social influences that lie outside the formal political process. It may also reflect the fact that there were many ballots that may have been deliberately spoiled by individual voters. In addition, an organized boycott of the election was not allowed. Thus, there was no organized means by which people could indicate their discontent with the electoral system.

Fourth, there are still problems related to the attitude of some security personnel who do not allow citizens to openly express their political opinion. For example, there was an investigation of some of the 292 persons of Kedung Ombo Society who expressed their political option by returning their voting cards.

Lot: 000257
Box: 6605 (Box 3)
File: INDO 97
PGOV · ELECTIONS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 29 AUG 2006 200503235

UNCLASSIFIED

Fifth, since some voters still doubt and/or are dissatisfied with the official results of the ballot counting, KIPP insists that election authorities at the central and regional levels disclose the vote count honestly and openly, including the number of spoiled ballots.

The irregularities that have been reported must be rectified. This is essential if the principle of public accountability is to be upheld. This will demonstrate that there is political legitimacy and that the people's sovereignty has been respected.

KIPP Indonesia

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brief
05/31/1997

Indonesia: Troubled Victory (U)

Indonesian President Soeharto doubtless is buoyed by the May 29 electoral triumph of the government party, GOLKAR, and will interpret it as a clear mandate for his candidacy for a seventh term next year, when his tightly controlled congress meets to elect a president and vice president. (C)

Wide margin. GOLKAR scored a clear win in the parliamentary election, easily surpassing its anticipated 70 percent of the vote, according to Embassy Jakarta and press reports. Home Affairs Minister Memed on May 30 announced Soeharto was "satisfied" with the polling; Memed claimed there was no fraud during vote counting. Both an independent election monitoring committee and the Muslim-dominated Development Unity Party, however, allege that significant violations occurred at polling time and during the campaign. (C)

Emboldened opposition? The violence-wracked campaign and the lopsided government win will be fodder for increasingly vocal public criticism about the methods used to keep the regime in power and will raise the chances that Muslim dissatisfaction will erupt into even greater unrest. Postelection violence broke out briefly on the strongly Muslim island of Madura after announcement of a GOLKAR win there. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

INR Home Page | Briefs | Intel Assessments | Intel Reports | Viewpoints | Conference Reports

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 29 AUG 2006 200503235

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASED IN FULL

September 3, 1997

R16

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 1.6X1

PGOV elections

TO: EAP - Mr. Roth

FROM: INR - Daniel C. Kurtzer, Acting

SUBJECT: Indonesia: Soeharto and Domestic Politics

President Soeharto is taking steps to ensure smooth sailing during the run up to his re-election in March 1998. He shows no signs of ending speculation about his choice for vice-president, preferring to let the Jakarta rumor mill roll on while he intermittently rewards and punishes the most obvious contenders. Economic problems—particularly a severe drought--could endanger the tranquillity of the period ahead.

* * *

Setting up the institutions. Since last May's parliamentary election, in which GOLKAR won an overwhelming victory, Soeharto has tightened control to guarantee validation of his 31-year rule and make next year's session of the MPR (The People's Consultative Assembly) a flawless production. All new members of parliament (DPR) were recently "offered" a special introductory course on the principles of government, the state philosophy, and general indoctrination--designed by GOLKAR chairman and former Minister of Information Harmoko to ensure that everyone is reading from the same political sheet of music. In addition, Soeharto has floated to the new parliamentarians the idea that an old decree (which lapsed in 1993) giving him extraordinary national security powers should be "reconsidered" by the MPR at its session next March. The head of the military and other prominent military figures quickly seconded the idea. Human rights activists and lawyers were strongly opposed.

Virtually the entire military and political establishment is now in Soeharto's pocket. Military commands at all levels were completely reshuffled in August, marking the most major turnover in the armed forces' history. Almost all of the military's highest echelons have served as adjutants to Soeharto; loyalty, not performance, is the key to their success. The PDI, the party which ousted its leader Megawati under government pressure last year, lies dismembered. An incipient rival grouping--the People's Democratic Party—found its leadership jailed and its members scattered underground after the July 1996 riots. Soeharto apparently is also gutting ICMI, an Islamic organization he set up in 1990 to become a quasi-official voice for social improvement. He has downgraded his former favorite, Dr. Habibi, who was its chairman, and inserted a favored retired general, Hartono, as a member and watchdog.

CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel C. Kurtzer, Acting INR/AS
REASON: 1.5(c)(d)

Lot: 00257
Box: 6605 (Box 3)
File: IN00097.
PGOV ELECTIONS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 30 AUG 2006 200503235

Setting up the people. Aspirants for the vice-presidency are, for the most part, an unappealing mix of sycophants and family members. Traditionally, the position has gone to a new person with each Soeharto administration. The current incumbent, former General Try Sutrisno, is known for his affability and low intelligence (Soeharto has called him a "leaky pot"). Recently retired General Hartono, the only declared military contender for the slot, has been made Minister of Interior to give him some cabinet-level experience. Hartono is not well-liked in the Army but has one outstanding advantage, his close personal links with Soeharto's powerful eldest daughter, Tutut. Tutut herself has been repeatedly mentioned as a new chairman of GOLKAR. Both Minister for Science and Technology Habibie and Minister "for special projects" Harmoko seem to be losing favor with Soeharto, although they both served as presidential lapdogs for so long that they could come back at the next whim. In the dark horse category is presidential son-in-law and commander of Indonesia's special commando forces, Major General Prabowo, at 45 the youngest and certainly the most intelligent of the candidates. Prabowo constantly denies any presidential ambitions, but he reportedly told the Japanese recently that he might make a run in 2003.

Soeharto does not have to make his choice until next March. An astute Indonesian political commentator has observed that it is in the nature of Javanese thinking on the exercise of power to withhold any decision until the last moment, or even to let Javanese cosmology influence the date. Soeharto has become more of a feudal Javanese sultan in his behavior as he ages; he has tightened control over his associates so thoroughly that no one contradicts him and in his decision-making has depended increasingly on his family, especially daughter Tutut. Tutut and her brother-in-law Prabowo apparently get along well, and have joined in some endeavors such as working the East Timor problem. But Soeharto must realize that propelling either one of them into the vice-presidency next March could bring charges of nepotism.

What could go wrong. At this point, Soeharto's stately re-installation at the presidential palace could be derailed only by his own demise or disability. He should be able to weather the current economic crisis, devaluation of the rupiah, and the Jakarta stock market's plunge, which basically affects the thin layer of elite and middle class Indonesians. But the el Nino's dreadful effects of prolonged drought could have politically negative fallout among the rural masses. In 1996 and early 1997, Indonesia had more civil strife than at any time in the New Order. The countryside remains a tinderbox of unsolved social, religious, and ethnic grievances. Even Soeharto cannot control the weather, and he may be tested in the months ahead to use his security forces to assist, as well as control, a disgruntled populace.

Drafted: **INR/BIRD, x74455**

Cleared: **INR/CARLIN, x 74766**

Approved: **INR/FINGAR**

File Name: soeharto domestic politics.doc

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1265

PAGE 01 JAKART 01524 01 OF 03 140659Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00
	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSC-01	SSO-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/028W				

----------272397 140659Z /38

O 140700Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0439
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0521
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001524

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 15 SEP 2006 200503193

TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC/LOUNGANI AND

TREASURY PASS TO OASIA/IET - PENTOLA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

STATE PLEASE PASS USDA FOR FAS

STATE PLEASE PASS EXIMBANK FOR AL-ASKARI

USAID FOR AA/ANE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/13/2008
TAGS: PINR, PREL, PINS, PGOV, ELAB, ECON, EFIN, MILI, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA'S NEW CABINET -- HUNKERING DOWN

REF: A) JAKARTA 1481, B) JAKARTA 1293

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

CIRCLING THE WAGONS
---

2. (C) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO MOVED TO CIRCLE THE WAGONS IN NAMING HIS SEVENTH CABINET IN A MARCH 14 NATIONALLY TELEVISED NEWS CONFERENCE. WITH NEWLY ELECTED VICE PRESIDENT HABIBIE (WHO HIMSELF WAS ACCORDED RESPONSIBILITIES IN SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC AREAS) AT HIS SIDE, SOEHARTO CONFIRMED WIDESPREAD SPECULATION THAT FIRST-FRIEND MOHAMAD "BOB" HASAN WOULD BE TAPPED FOR THE INDUSTRY AND TRADE CABINET SLOT AND THAT FIRST DAUGHTER SITI HARDIYANTI RUKMANA

("TUTUT") WOULD RECEIVE A MINISTERIAL POSITION (SOCIAL AFFAIRS) AS WELL. SOEHARTO NAMED ANOTHER CLOSE FAMILY FRIEND, FUAD BAWAZIER, TO THE FINANCE MINISTER JOB AND FORMER INFORMATION MINISTER HARTONO (AND TUTUT'S SIGNIFICANT OTHER) TO THE HOME AFFAIRS SLOT. FEISAL TANJUNG, THE FORMER MILITARY COMMANDER AND FERVENT HABIBIE SUPPORTER, COLLECTED THE POLITICS AND SECURITY COORDINATING MINISTER POSITION. PROMINENT SUPPORTERS OF THE "BERKLEY MAFIA" TECHNOCRATS THAT SPEARHEADED SOEHARTO'S GENERALLY ACCLAIMED MACRO-ECONOMIC POLICES IN RECENT DECADES FAILED TO MAKE THE NEW CABINET LIST.

A FEW GLIMMERS

3. (C) SOME INDIVIDUALS REMAIN FROM THE LAST CABINET WITH WHOM WE WERE ABLE TO WORK WELL. GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA WILL BE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR ECONOMICS, FINANCE AND INDUSTRY. AS SUCH, HE WILL HAVE NOMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING BOB HASAN AND FUAD BAWAZIER ON TRACK IN THEIR NEW ECONOMIC DUTIES. (GINANDJAR IS HOSTING VISITING TREASURY UNDER SECRETARY LIPTON IN MEETINGS THIS AFTERNOON (MARCH 14) WITH THE NEW MINISTERIAL ECONOMIC TEAM). ALI ALATAS IS STAYING ON AS FOREIGN MINISTER AND GENERAL WIRANTO IS BEING DOUBLE-HATTED AS ARMED FORCES COMMANDER AND DEFENSE MINISTER. JUWONO SUDARSONO, A LONG-TIME INTERLOCUTOR FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA AND MILITARY THINK TANK LEMHANNAS, TAKES ON THE ENVIRONMENT PORTFOLIO. AND THEO SAMBUAGA, THE ONLY CHRISTIAN ON THE NEW LIST AND A HELPFUL CONTACT FROM THE GOLKAR RULING PARTY, WAS GIVEN THE LABOR/MANPOWER JOB.

OTHER INITIAL OBSERVATIONS

4. (C) THE CABINET COMPOSITION WAS ESSENTIALLY WHAT HAD BEEN

PREDICTED IN A LIST WHICH CIRCULATED WIDELY IN RECENT DAYS (REFTEL). THE ANTICIPATED LINE-UP HAD ALREADY DRAWN CRITICISM AS A "FIRST-FAMILY CABINET," WITH MANY KEY POSTS BEING FILLED BY CRONIES AND ACOLYTES NOT NOTED FOR THEIR RECTITUDE OR COMPETENCE. MUSLIM GROUPS WHO HAVE BEEN STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF VICE PRESIDENT HABIBIE, NOTABLY THE ISLAMIC INTELLECTUALS ASSOCIATION ICMI, WILL BE PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTED THAT FEW OF THOSE REGARDED AS FROM THE RANKS OF THE MUSLIM MODERNISTS WERE INCLUDED.

5. (C) ON THE OTHER HAND, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HABIBIE WOULD "ASSIST" THE PRESIDENT IN A NUMBER OF BROAD AREAS MAY ASSUAGE SOME OF THIS DISAPPOINTMENT. THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT HABIBIE WOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES IN "GLOBAL RELATIONS," IN "HARMONIZING" INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND IN DEVELOPING UNITY OF THE NATION THROUGH RELIANCE ON THE NATIONS'S RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP.

6. (C) THE CABINET IS COMPOSED PRINCIPALLY OF JAVANESE WITH WHAT WILL BE SEEN AS THE USUAL UNDER-REPRESENTATION FROM EASTERN INDONESIA. THERE IS ONE SINO-INDONESIAN (BOB HASAN) AND ONE

CHRISTIAN (THEO SAMBUAGA) ON THE LIST. HASAN IS NOT LIKELY TO WIN PRAISE FROM THE SINO-INDONESIAN COMMUNITY WHO DO NOT REGARD HIM AS ONE OF THEIR OWN.

7. (C) IN INTRODUCTORY REMARKS THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT HE HAD CONSULTED WITH VICE PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON THE CABINET SELECTION AND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1266

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1266

PAGE 01 JAKART 01524 02 OF 03 140659Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00
	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSC-01	SSO-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/028W				

----------27239B 140659Z /38

O 140700Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0440
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0522

AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 001524

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01524 02 OF 03 140659Z
TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS

TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC/LOUNGANI AND

TREASURY PASS TO OASIA/IET - PENTOLA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

STATE PLEASE PASS USDA FOR FAS

STATE PLEASE PASS EXIMBANK FOR AL-ASKARI

USAID FOR AA/ANE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/13/2008
TAGS: PINR, PREL, PINS, PGOV, ELAB, ECON, EFIN, MILI, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA'S NEW CABINET -- HUNKERING DOWN

REF: A) JAKARTA 1481, B) JAKARTA 1293

SAID THAT IN MAKING HIS CHOICES, HE HAD FOCUSSED ON KEY TARGETS FOR THE NATION. THESE WERE: STABILITY, GROWTH, UNITY AND SELF RELIANCE (KEMANDIRIAN) IN INDONESIA'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES AND ORGANIZATIONS. HE ADDED, "THESE RELATIONS SHOULD BE BETWEEN EQUALS."

CABINET LIST
---

8. (U) FOLLOWING IS THE LINE-UP FOR THE SEVENTH SOEHARTO CABINET. (THIS LIST IS BASED ON PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S TELEVISED REMARKS ON

THE MORNING OF MARCH 14). THUMBNAIL BIOS WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL:
CONFIDENTIAL

COORDINATING MINISTERS:

FEISAL TANJUNG: POLITICS AND SECURITY

GIANDJAR KARTASASMITA: ECONOMIC, FINANCE, INDUSTRY (RETAINS POSITION AS HEAD OF PLANNING AGENCY OR BAPPENAS)

HARTARTO: DEVELOPMENT SUPERVISION AND STATE APPARATUS

HARYONO SUYONO: WELFARE (POVERTY ELIMINATION)

MINISTERS:

HARTONO: HOME AFFAIRS (INTERNAL)

ALI ALATAS: FOREIGN AFFAIRS

WIRANTO: DEFENSE (RETAINS POSITION AS ARMED FORCES COMMANDER)

MULADI: JUSTICE

ALWI DAHLAN: INFORMATION (RETAINS POSITION AS PANCASILA PROPAGATION CHIEF)

FUAD BAWAZIER: FINANCE

MOHAMAD ("BOB") HASAN: INDUSTRY AND TRADE

MUSTIKA SJARIFUDIN BAHARSJAH: AGRICULTURE

KUNTORO MANGKUSUBROTO: MINING AND ENERGY

SUMAHADI: FORESTRY

RACHMADI BAMBANG SOEMADYO: PUBLIC WORKS

GIRI SUSENO: COMMUNICATIONS (I.E. TRANSPORTATION)
ABDUL LATIEF: TOURISM AND CULTURE

SUBIAKTO TJAKRAWERDAYA: COOPERATIVES AND SMALL ENTERPRISES

THEO SAMBUAGA: MANPOWER (I.E. LABOR)

HENDRO PRIYONO: TRANSMIGRATION

WIRANTO ARISMUNANDAR: EDUCATION

FARID ANTAMA MULUK: HEALTH

QURAISH SHIHAB: RELIGION

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1267

PAGE 01 JAKART 01524 03 OF 03 140659Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ARA-01
	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00
	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSC-01	SSO-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/029W			

----------27239D 140659Z /38

O 140700Z MAR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0441
DEPTTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AIT TAIPEI 0523
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 001524

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01524 03 OF 03 140659Z
TREASURY FOR A/S GEITHNER, DAS ZELIKOW, OASIA/VELTHAUS

TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO FED RESERVE WASHDC/LOUNGANI AND

TREASURY PASS TO OASIA/IET - PENTOLA

COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/MIKALIS AND 6904/TD/OEPC/IEPD

STATE PLEASE PASS USDA FOR FAS

STATE PLEASE PASS EXIMBANK FOR AL-ASKARI

USAID FOR AA/ANE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/13/2008
TAGS: PINR, PREL, PINS, PGOV, ELAB, ECON, EFIN, MILI, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA'S NEW CABINET -- HUNKERING DOWN

REF: A) JAKARTA 1481, B) JAKARTA 1293

SITI HARDIYANTI RUKMANA (TUTUT): SOCIAL AFFAIRS

STATE MINISTERS:

SAADILLAH MURSJID: STATE SECRETARY

RAHARDI RAMELAN: RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

SANYOTO SASTROWARDOYO: INVESTMENT

ARI MARDJONO: LAND AFFARIS

AKBAR TANJUNG: HOUSING

JUWONO SUDARSONO: ENVIRONMENT

HARYANTO DHANUTIRTO: FOOD/MEDICINES

TANRI ABENG: STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

TUTI ALAWIYAH: WOMEN

AGUNG LAKSONO: YOUTH AND SPORTS

CABINET RANK:

SUDJONO: ATTORNEY GENERAL

SYAHRIL SABIRIN: GOVERNOR BANK INDONESIA
OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PTQ9869

E22

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9869

PAGE 01 JAKART 01159 01 OF 02 271102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	SSAS-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W			

----------20F36E 271103Z /38

P 271057Z FEB 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0096
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001159

USCINCPAC FOR FPR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: CHOOSING THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT: SCHEDULE FOR
- THE GENERAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

1. (U) THE GENERAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) OPENS ON SUNDAY MARCH 1, AND RUNS THROUGH MARCH 11. THE PRIMARY TASKS BEFORE THE MPR ARE TO CHOOSE THE PRESIDENT AND VICE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 15 SEP 2006 200503193

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PRESIDENT FOR THE 1998-2003 TERM AND TO ENDORSE THE DRAFT OF THE 1998-2003 STATE POLICY GUIDELINES.

2. (U) FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF THE SCHEDULE FOR THE MPR SESSION AS PROVIDED BY THE MPR:

MARCH 1, SUNDAY

0900:
- OPENING OF THE FIFTH MPR PLENARY SESSION, AND APPROVAL OF THE SCHEDULE (NOTE: THE FIRST FOUR PLENARY SESSIONS WERE HELD FROM OCTOBER 3 TO JANUARY 12, DURING WHICH THE NEW MPR MEMBERS WERE SWORN IN AND THE CHAIRPERSONS FOR THE MPR AND THE MPR FACTIONS WERE CHOSEN. END NOTE)
- OPENING SPEECH BY MPR CHAIRMAN HARMOKO
- PRESIDENT'S ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH
- CLOSING OF THE SESSION BY MPR CHAIRMAN HARMOKO

1430:
- SEPARATE MPR FACTION MEETINGS TO PREPARE THE FACTION VIEWS ON THE DRAFT MPR DECREES AND THE PRESIDENT'S ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH FOR FULFILLING THE MPR MANDATE.

MARCH 2, MONDAY

0900:
- CONTINUATION OF SEPARATE MPR FACTION MEETINGS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MARCH 3, TUESDAY

0900:
- MPR CHAIRMAN OPENS THE SIXTH MPR PLENARY SESSION
- MPR FACTIONS PRESENT THEIR VIEWS ON THE DRAFT MPR DECREES.

1930:
- CONTINUATION OF SEPARATE MPR FACTION MEETINGS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MARCH 4, WEDNESDAY

0900:
- MPR CHAIRMAN OPENS THE SEVENTH MPR PLENARY SESSION
- FACTIONS PRESENT THEIR VIEWS ON THE PRESIDENT'S ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH

1930:
- CONTINUATION OF SEPARATE MPR FACTION MEETINGS

MARCH 5, THURSDAY

0900:
- MEETING OF MPR CHAIRMAN WITH MPR FACTION CHAIRPERSONS TO PREPARE TO FORM MPR COMMISSIONS

1400:
- MPR CHAIRMAN OPENS THE EIGHTH MPR PLENARY SESSION
- FACTIONS PRESENT THEIR VIEWS ON THE FORMATION OF MPR COMMISSIONS
- FORMATION OF MPR COMMISSIONS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 01159 01 OF 02 271102Z
COMMISSION A: FOR STATE GUIDELINES (GBHN)
COMMISSION B: FOR NON-GBHN ISSUES
COMMISSION C: FOR PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
- MPR CHAIRMAN CLOSES THE SESSION

1930:
- COMMISSIONS MEET SEPARATELY AND ELECT CHAIRPERSONS
- COMMISSIONS PLAN THEIR SCHEDULES

MARCH 6, FRIDAY

0900:
- COMMISSIONS MEET SEPARATELY TO DISCUSS DRAFT MPR DECREES

MARCH 7, SATURDAY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

0900:

- CONTINUATION OF SEPARATE COMMISSION MEETINGS TO DISCUSS DRAFT MPR DECREES

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9851

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9851

PAGE 01 JAKART 01159 02 OF 02 271059Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	SSAS-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W			

----------20F2C9 271059Z /38

P 271057Z FEB 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0097
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001159

USCINCPAC FOR FPR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: CHOOSING THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT: SCHEDULE FOR
- THE GENERAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

1430:
- CONTINUATION OF SEPARATE COMMISSION MEETINGS TO PREPARE REPORTS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MARCH 8, SUNDAY

0900:
- SEPARATE MPR FACTION MEETINGS TO PREPARE PAPERS FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION AND FINAL COMMENTS ON DRAFT MPR DECREES
- SEPARATE MPR FACTION CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE (NOTE: ALTHOUGH LEGALLY THERE CAN BE MORE THAN ONE CANDIDATE, THE SCHEDULE USES THE SINGULAR, "CANDIDATE." END NOTE)

1930:
- FACTIONS SUBMIT THE NAME OF THEIR CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT TO MPR CHAIRMAN BY 1900
- MPR CHAIRMAN MEETING WITH FACTION CHAIRPERSONS TO NOMINATE PRESIDENT AND PREPARE FOR ELECTION OF PRESIDENT

MARCH 9, MONDAY

0900:
- MPR LEADERSHIP MEETING TO EXAMINE THE ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT

1000:
- MPR CHAIRMAN OPENS THE NINTH PLENARY SESSION
- PRESENTATION OF COMMISSION REPORTS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
- MPR FACTIONS PRESENT FINAL VIEWS ON DRAFT MPR DECREES FROM THE COMMISSIONS

1900 TO 2000:
- MPR LEADERSHIP MEETING TO EXAMINE THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE

UNCLASSIFIED

DIRECTLY

2030:
- ENDORSEMENT OF THE MPR DECREES BY THE MPR

MARCH 10, TUESDAY

0900:
- MPR CHAIRMAN OPENS THE TENTH PLENARY SESSION
- MPR CHAIRMAN ANNOUNCES THE NAME OF THE CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT
- PRESIDENT IS ELECTED

1430:
- SEPARATE MPR FACTION MEETINGS TO CONSULT WITH THE ELECTED PRESIDENT ABOUT THE CANDIDATE FOR VICE PRESIDENT

1930:
- MPR LEADERSHIP MEETING TO PREPARE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S SWEARING-IN CEREMONY

MARCH 11, WEDNESDAY

0900:
- MPR CHAIRMAN OPENS THE ELEVENTH PLENARY SESSION
- SWEARING IN OF THE PRESIDENT
- SUBMISSION OF THE MPR DRAFT DECREES TO THE PRESIDENT
- SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT

1200:

UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

- MPR FACTIONS SUBMIT NAME OF VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE TO THE MPR CHAIRMAN BY 1130.
- MPR CHAIRMAN AND FACTION CHAIRPERSONS MEET TO ACCEPT THE NOMINATION OF THE VICE PRESIDENT AND TO PREPARE FOR THE ELECTION OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
- MPR LEADERSHIP MEETING TO EXAMINE THE ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, AND TO EXAMINE THE VICE PRESIDENT DIRECTLY

2000:
- MPR CHAIRMAN OPENS THE TWELFTH MPR PLENARY SESSION AND NAMES THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
- ELECTION OF VICE PRESIDENT

2200:
- MPR CHAIRMAN OPENS THE THIRTEENTH MPR PLENARY SESSION
- SWEARING IN OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
- SPEECH BY VICE PRESIDENT
- MPR CHAIRMAN PRESENTS CLOSING SPEECH

ROY

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1462

PAGE 01 JAKART 06145 01 OF 02 201102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01
	DRL-04	G-00	/033W				

----------F0FE4D 201107Z /38

R 201057Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7908
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 006145

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: GOLKAR RE-NOMINATES SOEHARTO FOR SEVENTH TERM

REF: A) JAKARTA 5966; B) JAKARTA 4877

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06145 01 OF 02 201102Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 13 SEP 2006 200503193

1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WAS OFFICIALLY RE-NOMINATED FOR A SEVENTH TERM AS PRESIDENT BY RULING PARTY GOLKAR ON OCTOBER 19 AT ITS ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATION. HISTORICALLY, WHEN ASKED ABOUT HIS PLANS FOR THE FUTURE, SOEHARTO HAS TENDED TO RESPOND THAT IT WAS UP TO THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE AS EXPRESSED THROUGH THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) HELD EVERY FIVE YEARS. FOLLOWING A PREPARED SPEECH TO THE GOLKAR ANNIVERSARY GATHERING, SOEHARTO SPOKE OFF-THE-CUFF AND EXPANDED UPON THIS THEME. HE SAID THAT BETWEEN NOW AND THE MARCH MPR SESSION IT SHOULD BE DETERMINED IF THE PEOPLE STILL BELIEVED IN HIS LEADERSHIP. OTHERWISE, HE COULD STAND ACCUSED OF IMPEDING SUCCESSION. HE DESCRIBED HOW IN JAVANESE WAYANG FOLKLORE THE KING COULD STEP DOWN AND BECOME A "WISE ADVISER" (PANDITA) WHOSE MAIN RESPONSIBILITIES WERE TO BECOME CLOSER TO GOD AND TO MAKE SURE THAT HIS CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN BECAME USEFUL TO THE NATION. END SUMMARY

GOLKAR OFFICIALLY RENOMINATES SOEHARTO FOR PRESIDENT

3. (U) GOLKAR GENERAL CHAIRMAN HARMOKO ON OCTOBER 19 OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED THE RULING PARTY'S RENOMINATION OF SOEHARTO FOR PRESIDENT. HE MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT AT AN OFFICIAL CEREMONY COMMEMORATING GOLKAR'S 33RD ANNIVERSARY WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY SOEHARTO, GOLKAR LEADERS, THE GENERAL CHAIRMEN OF THE TWO MINORITY PARTIES, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS (INCLUDING EMBOFF), REPRESENTATIVES OF POLITICAL PARTIES FROM ASEAN

COUNTRIES, AND SEVERAL THOUSAND GOLKAR CADRE. THE COMMEMORATION WAS HELD AT THE CLOSE OF GOLKAR'S LEADERSHIP MEETING WHICH HAD BEGUN ON OCTOBER 16. HARMOKO'S ANNOUNCEMENT CAME AS NO SURPRISE AND DREW A POLITE, BRIEF STANDING OVATION FROM THE GOLKAR FAITHFUL.

SOEHARTO COY IN OFF-THE-CUFF REMARKS

4. (U) FOLLOWING A SHORT PREPARED SPEECH (PARA. 5),

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF HIS RENOMINATION. HISTORICALLY, WHEN ASKED ABOUT HIS PLANS FOR THE FUTURE, SOEHARTO HAS TENDED TO RESPOND THAT IT WAS UP TO THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE AS EXPRESSED THROUGH THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) HELD EVERY FIVE YEARS. HE EXPANDED UPON THIS THEME IN HIS OFF-THE-CUFF REMARKS, SUMMARIZED BELOW (BASED ON INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION):

-- IS IT TRUE THAT THE PEOPLE BELIEVE IN ME?

-- ALTHOUGH MOST PEOPLE BELIEVE IN ME, I HOPE THIS SUPPORT IS NOT BEING FORCED UPON THEM. IF WE DO NOT KNOW ABOUT THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS, I COULD BE ACCUSED OF IMPEDING SUCCESSION, OR OF NOT UNDERSTANDING MY OWN SHORTCOMINGS AND WEAKNESSES. IN THE MONTHS BEFORE THE MARCH MPR, LET ALL OF US REFLECT UPON WHETHER THE PEOPLE REALLY TRUST IN ME.

-- IF THEY DO NOT, IT IS NOT A PROBLEM BECAUSE I CAN PROCEED WITHIN THE SUCCESSION PHILOSOPHY OF THE "WAYANG" (JAVANESE SHADOW PUPPET FOLKLORE). THE KING (SANG NATA

BATARA SANG PRABU) IS ASSISTED BY THE EQUIVALENT OF A PRIME MINISTER (PATIH). IN ADDITION, THE WISE ADVISER (PANDITA OR PUNDIT) HELPS THE KING WITH SPIRITUAL MATTERS.

-- THE JAVANESE WAYANG PHILOSOPHY OF SUCCESSION IS THAT THE KING LEAVES THE THRONE TO BECOME A PANDITA. UPON LEAVING, HIS DUTIES ARE TO BRING HIMSELF CLOSER TO GOD AND TO LOOK AFTER HIS CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN SO THAT THEY CAN BECOME USEFUL TO THE NATION.

-- THE PANDITA WILL OFFER HIS SUGGESTIONS TO THOSE WHO NEED HIS ADVICE. TO THE NEW KING, HE WILL OFFER ENCOURAGEMENT AND GUIDANCE FROM BEHIND, AND A GOOD EXAMPLE UP FRONT (THE JAVANESE EXPRESSION "TUT WURI HANDAYANI") IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE NEW KING IS ABLE TO RUN THE COUNTRY IN A PEACEFUL MANNER.

-- THAT IS WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF IN THE END THE PEOPLE NO

LONGER BELIEVE IN ME TO HOLD THE REIGNS OF GOVERNMENT. FOR THIS REASON, LET US MAKE USE OF THE FIVE MONTHS LEFT TO FIND OUT WHETHER THE PEOPLE STILL BELIEVE IN ME TO LEAD THIS NATION.

5. (C) POLITICAL SCIENTIST ARBI SANIT CONTENDED TO EMBOFF

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1463

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1463

PAGE 01 JAKART 06145 02 OF 02 201102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04
	G-00	/032W					

----------F0FE5A 201107Z /38

R 201057Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7909
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: GOLKAR RE-NOMINATES SOEHARTO FOR SEVENTH TERM

ON OCTOBER 20 THAT SOEHARTO WAS ENGAGING IN PURE RHETORIC WHEN HE ASKED SOCIETY TO EXAMINE ITS SUPPORT FOR HIM. THE PRESIDENT KNEW THAT UNDER THE EXISTING SYSTEM IT WAS
CONFIDENTIAL

IMPOSSIBLE FOR SIGNIFICANT OBJECTIONS TO BE RAISED TO HIS CONTINUATION IN OFFICE. THOUGH THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF THIS STATEMENT WAS DIFFERENT THAN BEFORE, SOEHARTO HAD MADE SIMILAR COMMENTS IN 1987 WHEN HE SAID THAT HE FELT "UNCOMFORTABLE" ABOUT BEING RENOMINATED.

SOEHARTO'S PREPARED SPEECH
---

6. (U) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO CLAIMED IN HIS SHORT PREPARED SPEECH AT THE GOLKAR ANNIVERSARY THAT "THE SUCCESS OF THE LAST GENERAL ELECTION HAS TRULY MADE US PROUD AND ENCOURAGED." HE WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT 90 PERCENT OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS HAD PARTICIPATED. (NOTE: HE HAD MADE SIMILAR CLAIMS DURING HIS PRE-INDEPENDENCE DAY ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT ON AUGUST 16, REFTEL B). HE REFERRED TO UPHEAVALS DURING THE CAMPAIGN, AND EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE THAT THE UNREST WAS "SATISFACTORILY PUT UNDER CONTROL" AND THAT THIS "VALUABLE EXPERIENCE SHOULD SERVE AS OUR PRIMARY ASSET IN SECURING THE SUCCESS OF THE" MPR.

7. (C) ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT AGAIN GLOSSED OVER WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD, WHICH WAS THE MOST VIOLENT IN INDONESIAN HISTORY AND MARRED BY CREDIBLE ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD, HE DID ACKNOWLEDGE THE GOVERNMENT'S NEED TO BECOME MORE ATTUNED TO SOCIETY. HE SAID THAT "THE WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN MORE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMPLAINTS AND TO ACT WISELY UPON THEM SHOULD BE THE KEY TO GOLKAR'S SUCCESS IN THE FUTURE.

COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

8. (C) SOEHARTO'S REMARKS ABOUT THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF HIS USUAL RHETORIC ABOUT THE "PEOPLE'S" ROLE IN HIS DECISIONS ABOUT CONTINUING ON AS PRESIDENT. THE WAY IN WHICH HE EXPRESSED HIMSELF, HOWEVER, WAS INTRIGUING. IN FORMAL SETTINGS, SUCH AS BEFORE THE GOLKAR FAITHFUL, SOEHARTO SELDOM STRAYS FROM HIS PREPARED TEXT. HE UTTERED THE WORD "SUCCESSION" AND GAVE A MODEL FOR HOW IT COULD OCCUR. PERHAPS COINCIDENTALLY, IN EXPLAINING WHAT A FORMER "KING" IS SUPPOSED TO DO, HE REFERRED TO THE MANAGEMENT OF HIS CHILDREN, WHICH IN THE POPULAR MIND IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL WEAKNESSES OF HIS REGIME. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8119

PAGE 01 JAKART 05893 01 OF 04 061739Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	/036W	

----------EC3904 061934Z /38

R 061110Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7684
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 005893

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ISLAMIC LEADER FLOATS SUCCESSION SCENARIO

REF: A) JAKARTA 5770; B) JAKARTA 4988; C) JAKARTA 1360;
- D) 96 JAKARTA 6702; E) 96 JAKARTA 6594;
- F) 96 JAKARTA 4980

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKARTA 05893 01 OF 04 061739Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 13 SEP 2006 200503193

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: AMIEN RAIS, AN INFLUENTIAL AND PROVOCATIVE NATIONAL ISLAMIC LEADER, SAID PUBLICLY ON SEPTEMBER 25 THAT "GOD WILLING," HE WOULD BE "BRAVE" ENOUGH TO BECOME A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. HE CLAIMED TO THE AMBASSADOR THAT HIS STATEMENT WAS SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE

IT HAD "BROKEN THE MYTH" THAT ONLY SOEHARTO COULD BE A CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT. MORE CONCRETELY, HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT HE WAS RECEIVING "AMAZING" SUPPORT FROM STUDENTS WHO WERE COLLECTING SIGNATURES ON BEHALF OF HIS CANDIDACY. HE BELIEVED THAT IF THEY GATHERED 100,000 SIGNATURES, IT WOULD CHANGE THE "PSYCHOLOGICAL BALANCE" OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION. RAIS FLOATED THE POSSIBILITY OF A SCENARIO WHERE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR HIM WOULD BE SO STRONG THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO STEP FORWARD AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. HE WOULD NEVER MAKE SUCH A MOVE, HOWEVER, WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THE "POWER STRUCTURE;" OTHERWISE, ANY "PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT" WOULD BE CRUSHED, RESULTING IN BLOODSHED. RAIS HOPED THAT A NATIONAL DIALOGUE WOULD BE HELD LEADING TO A CHANGE IN NATIONAL LEADERSHIP. HE BELIEVED THAT "POLITICAL TRUST" WAS DISINTEGRATING AND THAT THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP WAS OUT OF TOUCH WITH THE NATION'S PROBLEMS. THE MOST INTERESTING ASPECTS OF RAIS'S STATEMENT ABOUT THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION ARE THAT HE CONTINUES TO CRITICIZE THE REGIME AND THAT THE IDEA OF HIS CANDIDACY COULD BECOME A SYMBOL OF PROTEST. END SUMMARY

3. (SBU) AMIEN RAIS, THE LEADER OF INDONESIA'S SECOND

LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION, MUHAMMADIYAH, HAD LUNCH WITH AMBASSADOR ROY ON OCTOBER 1. RAIS DISCUSSED HIS RECENT PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION, AS WELL AS A WIDE RANGE OF OTHER SUBJECTS. POLCOUNS AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER) ALSO ATTENDED.

RAIS' PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

4. (C) RAIS HAS BEEN TALKING PUBLICLY SINCE 1993 ABOUT THE

NEED FOR PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN 1998. AT A SEPTEMBER 25 SEMINAR ON NATIONAL LEADERSHIP HELD BY THE LEGAL AID FOUNDATION (LBH), HE WENT FURTHER AND SAID THAT "GOD WILLING," HE WOULD BE "BRAVE" ENOUGH TO BECOME A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. HIS REMARK RECEIVED WIDE PRESS COVERAGE. RAIS TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT HIS STATEMENT HAD NOT BEEN PLANNED IN ADVANCE. HE EXPLAINED THAT PERMADI, THE WELL-KNOWN SOOTHSAYER AND DISSIDENT, CAUGHT HIM OFF GUARD AT THE SEMINAR BY DIRECTLY ASKING IF RAIS WOULD ACCEPT THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION.

5. (C) RAIS ARGUED THAT HE HAD "BROKEN THE ICE" AND "CHANGED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MAP" WITH HIS AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER. BY "OUT OF NOWHERE" STATING THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO RUN, RAIS HAD "BROKEN THE MYTH" THAT SOEHARTO WAS THE ONLY ONE WHO COULD BE A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. IT WAS PREVIOUSLY SACROSANCT THAT ONLY SOEHARTO COULD BE CONSIDERED AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AS THOUGH IT WERE HIS "EXCLUSIVE RIGHT." (NOTE: SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS, THE FORMER UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY LEGISLATOR, HAS PROCLAIMED HIMSELF A CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT. BUT HE IS NOT IN THE SAME POLITICAL LEAGUE AS RAIS WHO IS THE LEADER OF A

CONFIDENTIAL

MULTI-MILLION MEMBER MASS ORGANIZATION, MUHAMMADIYAH. BINTANG IS IN JAIL HAVING BEEN CONVICTED OF "INSULTING THE PRESIDENT." END NOTE.)

6. (C) WHEN ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY REALISTIC POSSIBILITY THAT DIFFERENT GROUPS IN SOCIETY WOULD COME TOGETHER AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO SOEHARTO IN 1998, RAIS ANSWERED "AT AN OFFICIAL LEVEL, NO." HE CLAIMED TO HAVE NO DOUBT THAT AT THE MARCH SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), SOEHARTO WOULD BE RE-ELECTED, THE BROAD GUIDELINES OF STATE POLICY WOULD BE ENDORSED, AND SOEHARTO WOULD SELECT A VICE PRESIDENT.

7. (C) AT THE SAME TIME, RAIS NOTED THAT A BROAD RANGE OF SOCIETY HAD REACTED FAVORABLY TO HIS STATEMENT. HE REFERRED TO THE "AMAZING" SUPPORT THAT HE WAS RECEIVING FROM STUDENT GROUPS. HE SAID THAT EARLIER IN THE DAY TWO PROMINENT NATIONALIST LEADERS HAD EXPRESSED THEIR MORAL

SUPPORT TO HIM. THE PREVIOUS WEEK HE MET FOR THREE HOURS WITH MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND HER ADVISER KWIK KIAN GIE. HE SAID THAT SHE SPOKE OF HER VISION, HE SPOKE OF HIS, AND THEIR PLATFORMS WERE SIMILAR. (NOTE: LATER IN THE CONVERSATION HE TOOK A DIFFERENT TACK, ARGUING THAT MEGAWATI HAD NO CLEAR VISION. SEE PARA. 14. END NOTE.)

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8122

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8122

PAGE 01 JAKART 05893 02 OF 04 061739Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	/036W	

----------EC3930 061935Z /38

R 061110Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7685
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ISLAMIC LEADER FLOATS SUCCESSION SCENARIO

RAIS CLAIMED THAT OVER THE PAST TWO OR THREE MONTHS HE HAD MET WITH THE LEADERS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITY GROUPS, INCLUDING PROTESTANTS AND CATHOLICS. HE ADDED THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

PROMINENT MILITARY LEADERS, SUCH AS ARMED FORCES COMMANDER FEISAL TANJUNG AND ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS YUNUS YOSFIAH, WHILE NOT ENCOURAGING HIM, HAD NOT ATTACKED HIM FOR MAKING HIS PRONOUNCEMENT.

RAIS'S STATEMENT MORE THAN SYMBOLISM?
---

8. (C) ALTHOUGH RAIS WAS CAREFUL TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS STATEMENT WAS LARGELY SYMBOLIC, I.E. HE HAD OPENED THE SUBJECT OF ALTERNATIVE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES FOR DISCUSSION, IT SEEMED THAT BIGGER POSSIBILITIES WERE ALSO IN THE BACK OF HIS MIND. HE SAID THAT STUDENTS WERE COLLECTING SIGNATURES ON BEHALF OF HIS CANDIDACY. HE CONTENDED THAT IF THEY COLLECTED MORE THAN 100,000 SIGNATURES, "IT WOULD CHANGE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BALANCE" OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT SOME STUDENT LEADERS WERE "IMAGINING" THAT THEY WOULD LAUNCH A MASSIVE DEMONSTRATION ON THE FIRST DAY THAT THE MPR RECONVENED NEXT MARCH. (NOTE: LEADERS OF THE MUHAMMADIYAH STUDENT ORGANIZATION (IMM) TOLD EMBOFF RECENTLY THAT THERE WAS GREAT SUPPORT FOR RAIS, BUT MADE NO MENTION OF PETITIONS, SEE REFTEL A. IN FACT, THE CHAIRMAN WAS CAREFUL TO EXPLAIN THAT AS AN ORGANIZATION, IMM COULD NOT SUPPORT RAIS AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. ONE STUDENT LEADER TOLD EMBOFF THAT FORMALLY THE MUHAMMADIYAH YOUTH/STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE BRAVE ENOUGH TO ACT ON BEHALF OF RAIS AS A CANDIDATE, BUT THAT INFORMALLY AND AT LOWER LEVELS, THERE

MIGHT BE WIDESPREAD AND MORE OPEN SUPPORT FOR HIM. END NOTE.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 05893 02 OF 04 061739Z

9. (C) RAIS WENT AS FAR AS TO SAY THAT "PEOPLE POWER" MIGHT ARISE IN THE FUTURE. (NOTE: THIS WAS A CONCEPT THAT THE GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATED WITH MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI. THE IDEA THAT SHE MIGHT HAVE BEEN LEADING A MASS BASED MOVEMENT WAS ONE OF THE FACTORS THAT LED THE GOVERNMENT TO OUST HER FROM THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI). END NOTE.) RAIS SAID THAT THE MILITARY WAS "UNPRINCIPLED" AND WOULD ABANDON SOEHARTO IF IT SAW THAT "THE PEOPLE" WERE WINNING. HE DREW A COMPARISON TO 1965-66 WHEN STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS HELPED DRIVE INDONESIA'S FIRST PRESIDENT, SUKARNO, FROM OFFICE. HE REFERRED TO A CONVERSATION HE HAD TWO YEARS AGO WITH A GENERAL WHO SAID, RAIS CLAIMED, THAT THE ARMED FORCES WOULD NOT TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA IF THEY WERE "IN THE STREETS."

10. (C) PROVIDING MORE EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS TOYING WITH THE POTENTIAL CONCRETE IMPLICATIONS OF HIS STATEMENT ON BECOMING A CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT, RAIS PRESENTED THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO, WITH THE CAVEAT THAT HE WAS "JUST IMAGINING THE POSSIBILITY" THAT IT COULD OCCUR, AND ASKED FOR FEEDBACK. HE SAID THAT IF THE STUDENTS OBTAINED A HUGE NUMBER OF SIGNATURES HE MIGHT BE FACING A NEW SITUATION. WHILE HE WAS NOW VERY "PASSIVE," HE COULD NEITHER HIDE NOR RUN AWAY FROM A LARGE SHOWING OF PUBLIC SUPPORT. HE MIGHT THEN HAVE TO MAKE A "REASONABLE AND CALCULATED" DECISION TO "STEP FORWARD," PRESUMABLY MEANING AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. HE WOULD NEVER CONSIDER MAKING SUCH A MOVE UNLESS HE HAD THE "FULL PERMISSION OF THE POWER STRUCTURE," SPECIFICALLY THE ARMY. WITHOUT THIS SUPPORT, A "PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT" WOULD BE "CRUSHED." IN

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO, HE SAID, ANY CONFRONTATION OR BLOODSHED WOULD LEAD HIM TO STEP BACK.

11. (C) THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT AT A CERTAIN STAGE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKELY INTERPRET RAIS' ACTIONS AS A THREAT TO NATIONAL STABILITY. IF THE UNITED STATES WERE ASKED FOR ITS POSITION ON THE POLITICAL PROSPECTS OF SOMEONE LIKE AMIEN RAIS, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE ANSWER WOULD BE THAT THIS WAS A MATTER FOR THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE. THE UNITED STATES WOULD ALWAYS SUPPORT DEMOCRATIZATION GENERALLY, BUT NOT IN A WAY THAT WOULD INVOLVE THE UNITED STATES IN INDONESIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS.

NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON INDONESIA'S POLITICAL FUTURE

12. (C) RAIS HAS BEEN TALKING PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY ABOUT THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON INDONESIA'S POLITICAL FUTURE. HE EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD FOCUS ON THE NATION'S "NATIONAL AGENDA FOR THE NEXT MILLENNIUM," AND THAT IT HOPEFULLY WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR NEW LEADERSHIP. HE ENVISAGED THE DIALOGUE AS INCLUDING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS. THE "GENERATION OF 1945" COULD BE REPRESENTED BY FIGURES SUCH AS PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, PROMINENT DISSIDENT AND RETIRED GENERAL ALI

NNNNPTQ8126

PAGE 01 JAKART 05893 03 OF 04 061739Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	/035W		

----------EC3934 061935Z /38

R 061110Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7686
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 005893

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ISLAMIC LEADER FLOATS SUCCESSION SCENARIO

SADIKIN, RETIRED GENERAL NASUTION, AND FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SUDHARMONO. THE "GENERATION OF 1966" COULD BE REPRESENTED BY FIGURES SUCH AS FINANCE MINISTER MAR'IE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05893 03 OF 04 061739Z
MUHAMMAD, GOLKAR EXECUTIVE ABDUL GAFUR, AND ISLAMIC SCHOLAR NURCOLISH MADJID. IN ADDITION, THERE WOULD BE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE "NEW GENERATION," RELIGIOUS GROUPS, BUSINESS AND THE MEDIA. HE THOUGHT THAT STUDENTS MIGHT BE THE APPROPRIATE GROUP TO HOLD SUCH A DIALOGUE. WHEN ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ALLOW

THE EVENT TO TAKE PLACE, RAIS REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT SURE, BUT THAT SOME OF HIS FRIENDS HAD CONTACTED INDONESIAN INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES AND THEY DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE A PROBLEM.

RAIS COMMENTARY ON CURRENT POLITICAL SCENE

13. (C) RAIS MAINTAINED THAT "POLITICAL TRUST" WAS DISINTEGRATING AND THAT THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP WAS OUT OF TOUCH WITH CURRENT PROBLEMS. RAIS SAID THAT ALL THE SPEAKERS AT THE SEPTEMBER 25 SEMINAR HAD LASHED OUT AT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. ANIMOSITY AND HATRED TOWARD HIS REGIME WAS BECOMING STRONGER IN BOTH URBAN AND RURAL AREAS. PART OF THE CAUSE WAS THE GOVERNMENT MISHANDLING OF THE GENERAL ELECTION IN MAY. IN ADDITION, ALTHOUGH FORESTS WERE BURNING AND THE RUPIAH FALLING, THE PRESIDENT SHOWED "NO CONCERN" AND JUST "SMILED" IN HIS PUBLIC APPEARANCES.

14. (C) RAIS WAS CRITICAL OF MEGAWATI, SAYING THAT SHE DID NOT HAVE A STRATEGY, WAS NOT PREPARED, AND DID NOT HAVE A CLEAR VISION FOR THE FUTURE. WHEN HE ASKED MEGAWATI WHAT SHE HAD IN MIND FOR THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA DURING THEIR RECENT MEETING, SHE DID NOT HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE ANSWER. RAIS THOUGHT SHE RELIED TOO MUCH ON HER ADVISERS FOR HER

IDEAS, ESPECIALLY ECONOMIST KWIK KIAN GIE, THE HEAD OF HER INTERNAL "THINK TANK," AND COULD TURN OUT TO BE A "PUPPET LEADER." ACCORDING TO RAIS, HER WEAKNESS WAS THAT SHE HAD NO INDEPENDENT JUDGEMENTS; HER STRENGTH LAY ONLY IN THE CHARISMA SHE DERIVED FROM BEING THE DAUGHTER OF SUKARNO.

15. (C) RAIS WAS ALSO CRITICAL OF ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (GUS DUR), WHO -- AS THE LEADER OF INDONESIA'S LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION, NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) -- IS A RIVAL. HE SAID THAT THE NGOS WERE NOT HAPPY WITH WAHID BECAUSE HE HELPED SOEHARTO'S ELDEST DAUGHTER, SITI HARDIYANTI (TUTUT), DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. ACCORDING TO RAIS, MEGAWATI HAD NOT MET WITH WAHID, WHO HAS BEEN HER POLITICAL FRIEND AND ALLY, SINCE BEFORE THE ELECTION WHEN HE WAS NOT

SUPPORTIVE OF HER POLITICAL STRATEGY. (NOTE: MEGAWATI HAD PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT SHE WOULD NOT VOTE, BUT THAT HER FOLLOWERS WERE FREE TO DO AS THIS WISHED. END NOTE.) AT THE END OF THE DAY, HOWEVER, WAHID AND THE NU HAD NOT BEEN REWARDED BY SOEHARTO FOR SUPPORTING TUTUT. FOR EXAMPLE, WAHID HAD SUPPLIED A LIST OF 15 NAMES TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR CONSIDERATION AS MPR MEMBERS, BUT THE GOVERNMENT CHOSE ONLY ONE. RAIS CLAIMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT TRUST WAHID BECAUSE IT HAD OBTAINED A TAPED SPEECH IN WHICH WAHID SAID THAT THE NEXT PRESIDENT WOULD NOT BE SOEHARTO, AND THAT WAHID WOULD BE "KING-MAKER," AND MAYBE EVEN PRESIDENT. THE TAPE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO SOEHARTO BY MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY HABIBIE, RAIS CLAIMED.

16. (C) RAIS THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT SOEHARTO WOULD CHOOSE HIS DAUGHTER TUTUT AS VICE PRESIDENT. HE HAD NOT

COME TO THIS CONCLUSION BECAUSE HE BELIEVED IT WAS A POLITICALLY SMART MOVE, BUT BECAUSE SOEHARTO WAS BECOMING "KIND OF SENILE." THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED THAT TUTUT WAS LOVED BY THE PEOPLE, AND DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW MUCH THEY HATED NEPOTISM. RAIS SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE TUTUT NAMED VICE PRESIDENT BECAUSE IT WOULD "ACCELERATE SUHARTO'S BANKRUPTCY." HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, EXCEPT FOR HABIBIE AND MINISTER OF PLANNING GINANDJAR, HAD VISITED TUTUT IN HER HOME.

17. (C) RAIS ARGUED THAT ICMI WAS LESS POWERFUL SINCE HE HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE ORGANIZATION LAST FEBRUARY. MINISTER OF INFORMATION HARTONO HAD BECOME AN ICMI MEMBER IN ORDER TO "DIRECT" ICMI (REFTEL B), RAIS SAID. HE SPECULATED THAT HABIBIE SOMETIMES WAS NOT OBEDIENT ENOUGH FOR SOEHARTO. NOW, ICMI WAS AT LEAST PARTIALLY IN THE "HANDS OF HARTONO," WHO WOULD CARRY OUT THE WILL OF THE PRESIDENT. HE BELIEVED THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT HARTONO MIGHT REPLACE HABIBIE AS THE HEAD OF ICMI, BUT THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO BE ELECTED AT ICMI'S NEXT CONGRESS IN 2000.

COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8129

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8129

PAGE 01 JAKART 05893 04 OF 04 061740Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	/035W		

----------EC393D 061936Z /38

R 061110Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7687
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 005893

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/16

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ISLAMIC LEADER FLOATS SUCCESSION SCENARIO

---

18. (C) AMIEN RAIS HAS BEEN ONE OF THE FEW VOICES BOLD ENOUGH TO CALL PUBLICLY FOR PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION TO

TAKE PLACE IN 1998. HE HAS BEEN CONSISTENT IN THIS POSITION SINCE JUST AFTER THE LAST PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION IN 1993, AND HAS ALSO BEEN PROMOTING THE NEED FOR A "NATIONAL DIALOGUE" ON INDONESIA'S POLITICAL FUTURE. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO REPORTEDLY HAS NEVER BEEN PLEASED THAT RAIS BECAME THE LEADER OF MUHAMMADIYAH, AND REMOVED RAIS FROM AN ICMI LEADERSHIP POSITION IN FEBRUARY AFTER RAIS WAS PUBLICLY CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT ON VARIOUS ISSUES. SPECULATION AT THE TIME THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD REMOVE RAIS FROM THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF MUHAMMADIYAH HAS BEEN REVIVED BY HIS RECENT BOLD STATEMENT ON A POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL BID.

19. (C) WHILE RAIS HAS BEEN PROVOCATIVELY CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR YEARS, HE HAS NOW RAISED THE STAKES BY ANNOUNCING THAT HE MIGHT BE WILLING TO BE A CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT. AT ONE LEVEL, THIS IS A SYMBOLIC GESTURE AND AN EXTENSION OF HIS EFFORTS TO STIMULATE EARLY DISCUSSION ABOUT PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. BUT AT A DEEPER LEVEL, HE SEEMS TO BE GENERALLY INTRIGUED BY THE IDEA THAT HIS CANDIDACY MIGHT ACTUALLY CATCH FIRE. FEW DOUBT THAT RAIS ENJOYS SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT AMONG MUHAMMADIYAH AND A BROAD RANGE OF ISLAMIC YOUTH. GIVEN HIS PROMINENT POSITION IN THE "MODERNIST" MUSLIM CAMP, HOWEVER, THERE ARE SERIOUS QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER HIS SUPPORT COULD EXTEND BEYOND THESE SECTORS, ALTHOUGH SOME MIGHT COME ON BOARD WHO ARE SIMPLY LOOKING FOR A SYMBOLIC WAY TO EXPRESS OPPOSITION TO THE EXISTING REGIME. MANY LEADERS IN SOCIETY, INCLUDING ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN IN RECENT YEARS THAT A GREATER ROLE FOR ISLAM IN POLITICS, OF WHICH RAIS IS PERCEIVED TO BE A MAJOR PROPONENT, WOULD LEAD INDONESIA

UNCLASSIFIED

IN A LESS RELIGIOUSLY TOLERANT DIRECTION.

20. (C) AT THE END OF THE DAY, RAIS'S PROSPECTS FOR MOUNTING A CHALLENGE FROM WITHIN THE SYSTEM TO SOEHARTO'S SELECTION FOR A SEVENTH FIVE-YEAR PRESIDENTIAL TERM HAVE TO BE JUDGED AS VIRTUALLY ZERO, GIVEN THE GOVERNMENT'S TIGHT CONTROL OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS. RAIS'S VIABILITY AS A SERIOUS POLITICAL CANDIDATE IS ALSO UNDERMINED BY THE WIDELY HELD VIEW THAT HE IS TOO OUTSPOKEN FOR THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. A SERIOUS CHALLENGE FROM OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM BEFORE MARCH SEEMS UNLIKELY IN ANY EVENT. AS RAIS ACKNOWLEDGED, ANY "PEOPLE'S POWER" MOVEMENT WOULD BE CRUSHED UNLESS THE MILITARY WERE SUPPORTIVE, AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH SUPPORT AT THIS TIME. OF MORE IMMEDIATE INTEREST IS RAIS' CONTINUED CRITICISM OF THE REGIME (SEPTEL) AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE IDEA OF A RAIS CANDIDACY COULD BECOME A SYMBOL OF PROTEST. BOTH DEVELOPMENTS WOULD HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO DRAW A STRONG REACTION FROM THE GOVERNMENT. ROY

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9613

PAGE 01 JAKART 05770 01 OF 03 301112Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04
	G-00	SIO-01	/034W				

----------EA02A4 301113Z /38

R 301102Z SEP 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7606
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005770

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: STUDENT GROUPS ON SUCCESSION

REF: JAKARTA 3131

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: LEADERS OF MAJOR MASS STUDENT AND YOUTH GROUPS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05770 01 OF 03 301112Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 13 SEP 2006 200503193

NOT DIRECTLY AFFILIATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY APPEAR UNITED IN THEIR THINKING THAT IT IS TIME FOR INDONESIA TO ADDRESS THE SUCCESSION ISSUE AND THAT IT IS TIME FOR SOEHARTO TO BE REPLACED. HOWEVER, MOST ARE ALSO RESIGNED TO THE LIKLIHOOD THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WILL BE RE-ELECTED DURING THE MARCH GENERAL SESSION OF PARLIAMENT. THE NATIONALITY FORUM FOR INDONESIAN YOUTH, MADE UP OF NINE YOUTH AND STUDENT GROUPS, HAS THUS FAR BEEN MORE WILLING THAN OTHER GROUPS TO SPEAK CRITICALLY AND TO PUSH FOR CHANGE, BUT THEY HAVE NOT STEPPED SO FAR OUT OF LINE WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO BE SANCTIONED. GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY-AFFILIATED YOUTH GROUPS CAN BE EXPECTED TO CALL FOR THE NOMINATION OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FOR RE-ELECTION OVER THE COMING MONTHS. END SUMMARY

INTER-RELIGIOUS YOUTH FORUM BUILDING "DEMOCRACY PLATFORM"

---

3. (C) THE NATIONALITY FORUM FOR INDONESIAN YOUTH (FKPI), WHICH REPRESENTS NINE MASS STUDENT AND YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDING MUSLIM (NAHDLATUL ULAMA), PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, AND HINDU YOUTH, HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET SINCE THE MAY ELECTIONS. PRIOR TO THE MAY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, THEY ISSUED A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS, INCLUDING ONE CALLING THE ELECTION INVALID WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF MEGAWATI (REFTEL). LEADERS FROM SEVERAL GROUPS BELONGING TO FKPI TOLD EMBOFF THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO MAKE A STATEMENT AFTER THE ELECTION, BECAUSE THEIR POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED. THEY EXPLAINED THAT AFTER THE ELECTION THEIR STRATEGY SHIFTED TO A LESS PUBLIC BUT NO LESS ACTIVE EFFORT TO BUILD DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCES. OFFICIALLY, FKPI WAS NOT ALLIED WITH OTHER GROUPS, BUT LEADERS SAID THAT THEY WERE IN COMMUNICATION WITH MEGAWATI, CERTAIN NGO'S, AND CERTAIN ACTIVE AND RETIRED MILITARY

FIGURES.

4. (C) FKPI WAS CURRENTLY TRYING TO CONSOLIDATE THE VIEWS OF MEMBER GROUPS INTO ONE "DEMOCRACY PLATFORM," AND TO FORM MORE BRANCHES THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, LEADERS FROM FOUR OF THE NINE MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS TOLD EMBOFF IN SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS. ONE FKPI LEADER, FROM THE CATHOLIC STUDENT ASSOCIATION, TOLD EMBOFF THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA WAS DANGEROUS BECAUSE THE PRO-DEMOCRACY FORCES DID NOT HAVE A UNIFIED AND COMMON

PLATFORM. THEY ONLY HAD "A COMMON ENEMY." IT WAS EASY TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE CURRENT REGIME, BUT THE CRITICAL NEED WAS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE. FKPI LEADERS HOPED THAT THEIR PLATFORM WOULD BE READY BEFORE THE MARCH GENERAL SESSION OF PARLIAMENT. THEY PLANNED TO PRESENT THEIR PROPOSALS TO THE NEW PARLIAMENT PRIOR TO MARCH.

5. (C) TWO FKPI LEADERS FROM THE NATIONALIST STUDENT ORGANIZATION TOLD EMBOFF THAT FKPI INTENDED TO CONDUCT POLLING OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS RELATING TO "THE SUCCESSION." IN THEIR VIEW, ALTHOUGH MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLES CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) DID NOT REPRESENT THE PEOPLE IN CHOOSING THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AT THE MARCH SESSION, THE PEOPLE DID HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY, AND COULD APPLY PRESSURE TO TRY TO MAKE THE MPR RESPONSIVE. FKPI WAS PLANNING TO HOLD A SEMINAR TO PROMOTE EMPOWERMENT FOR MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT. FKPI SPONSORED A SEMINAR ON SEPTEMBER 26, DURING WHICH PARTICIPANTS ADVOCATED IMPLEMENTATION OF A 10-YEAR PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMIT.

ISLAMIC STUDENT POLL ON SUCCESSION

---

6. (C) ONE OF THE LEADERS OF INDONESIA'S LARGEST AND OLDEST

STUDENT ORGANIZATION, THE ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS (HMI), TOLD EMBOFF RECENTLY THAT "ALMOST ALL UNIVERSITY STUDENTS WANT SOEHARTO OUT OF THE PRESIDENCY." HMI STUDENTS WERE ALREADY DISCUSSING THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA. THIS LEADER, AN UNSUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE FOR THE HMI CHAIRMANSHIP DURING THE ORGANIZATION'S RECENT CONGRESS, PERSONALLY THOUGHT THAT STATE MINISTER FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING GINANJAR WOULD MAKE THE BEST VICE PRESIDENT BECAUSE HE "HAS VISION." MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY HABIBIE WOULD NOT BE THE BEST CHOICE BECAUSE HE WAS "A SCIENTIST" NOT A POLITICIAN, AND MINISTER OF INFORMATION HARTONO LACKED VISION. HE WORRIED THAT ECONOMIC JEALOUSIES CREATED A SITUATION IN WHICH VIOLENCE EASILY ERUPTS, AND PREDICTED MORE SOCIAL UNREST BEFORE THE MARCH GENERAL SESSION. HE SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE PEOPLE TRYING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF DISSATISFACTIONS FOR POLITICAL GAIN. SEPARATELY ANOTHER LEADER OF HMI TOLD EMBOFF THAT THESE WERE THE "DAYS OF HARTONO," AND THAT HARTONO WAS POWERFUL AND WOULD HAVE TO HAVE A GOOD POSITION. DURING THE RECENT 31ST ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION OF

THE HMI ALUMNI ORGANIZATION (KAHMI), HARTONO WAS THE KEYNOTE SPEAKER AND NOMINATED HIMSELF FOR AN HONORARY HMI ALUMNI MEMBERSHIP.

7. (C) LEADERS OF A JAKARTA CHAPTER OF HMI TOLD EMBOFF THAT HMI WOULD CALL FOR ALTERNATIVE CANDIDATES TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE MPR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9614

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9614

PAGE 01 JAKART 05770 02 OF 03 301113Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00
	/032W						

----------EA02B8 301113Z /38

R 301102Z SEP 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7607
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 005770

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: STUDENT GROUPS ON SUCCESSION

IN MARCH. THEY FAVORED A CIVIL RATHER THAN A MILITARY LEADER FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENT, AND A RETURN TO A "MORE TRADITIONAL" ROLE FOR THE MILITARY IN PRESERVING AND PROTECTING THE COUNTRY. THEY SAID THAT HMI HAD CONDUCTED A POLL OF 2000 MEMBERS THROUGHOUT JAVA ASKING WHO THEY WANTED AS THE NEXT PRESIDENT. THE POLL GAVE 20

CHOICES FOR PRESIDENT. THE RESULTS, IN ORDER, WERE:
- HABIBIE
- TRY SUTRISNO (VICE PRESIDENT)
- AMIEN RAIS (LEADER OF ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION MUHAMMADIYAH)
- SRI BINTANG (FORMER PPP PARLIAMENTARIAN AND SELF-DECLARED CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT, CURRENTLY SERVING A PRISON SENTENCE FOR INSULTING THE PRESIDENT)
- NURCHOLIS MADJID (ISLAMIC SCHOLAR)
- MAR'IE MUHAMMAD (FINANCE MINISTER)
- ABDURAHMAN WAHID (GUS DUR, LEADER OF NAHDLATUL ULAMA)

(NOTE: THE STUDENTS DID NOT PROVIDE THE COMPLETE LIST OF CHOICES. THE PREFERENCE FOR GINANJAR NOTED BY THE HMI LEADER IN PARA 6 WAS A PERSONAL OPINION, AND DID NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT BROADER HMI VIEWS. END NOTE)

8. (C) HMI REPRESENTATIVES CLAIMED THAT THEY GAVE THEIR REPORT ON THE POLL TO THE PRESS, BUT NO ONE WAS WILLING TO PUBLISH IT. THEY SAID THEY DID NOT WANT DEMOCRACY "LIKE LIPSTICK," HAVING ONLY A FACADE AND STANDING FOR SOMETHING IN NAME ONLY. MORE DEMOCRACY MEANS MORE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, ACCORDING TO THEM. (COMMENT: THE DESIRE FOR CHANGE EXPRESSED BY HMI REPRESENTATIVES IS INTERESTING BECAUSE HMI HAS BEEN VIEWED OVER THE PAST YEAR AS HAVING MOVED CLOSER TO THE GOVERNMENT. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO GAVE THE KEYNOTE SPEECH AT THE HMI 50TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION EARLIER THIS YEAR. HMI IS ALSO SEEN AS CLOSE TO ICMI, AND HMI LEADERS CLAIM THAT MOST ICMI MEMBERS ARE HMI ALUMNI. END COMMENT)

MUHAMMADIYAH STUDENTS: AMIEN RAIS FOR PRESIDENT?

9. (C) ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE MUHAMMADIYAH STUDENT MOVEMENT

(IMM), WHO CLAIMED TO BE "LIKE A RIGHT HAND MAN" TO AMIEN RAIS, TOLD EMBOFF THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT SOCIAL UNREST PRIOR TO THE GENERAL SESSION OF PARLIAMENT, DUE IN PART TO THE FACT THAT PEOPLES ASPIRATIONS WERE NOT REFLECTED IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS OF THE MPR. HE SAID THAT IF PRESIDENTIAL DAUGHTER SITI "TUTUT" HARDIYANTI WERE CHOSEN AS VICE PRESIDENT, MUHAMMADIYAH CHAIRMAN AMIEN RAIS WOULD BE THE FIRST TO SPEAK OUT AND STAND UP AGAINST IT. SUCH A CHOICE WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY MUHAMMADIYAH MEMBERS. HARTONO, SEEN AS CLOSE TO TUTUT, WAS STILL POWERFUL AND HAD HIS OWN CONSTITUENCY, HE ADDED. HE SAID THERE WAS TREMENDOUS SUPPORT FOR AMIEN RAIS AMONG MUHAMMADIYAH YOUTH, AND THAT MANY WOULD LIKE TO SEE AMIEN RAIS BECOME PRESIDENT OR VICE PRESIDENT. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE REMOVAL OF RAIS AS MUHAMMADIYAH CHAIRMAN, HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE, AND THAT A "SPECIAL SESSION" OF MUHAMMADIYAH WAS HELD JULY 31 TO REAFFIRM HIS LEADERSHIP UNTIL THE YEAR 2000.

10. (C) THE CHAIRMAN AND THE TREASURER OF IMM, IN A SEPARATE MEETING WITH EMBOFF FOLLOWING RAIS' PARTICIPATION IN A SEMINAR ON NATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN WHICH HE SAID THAT IT WAS TIME TO SEEK A SUCCESSOR FOR THE PRESIDENCY, WERE CAREFUL TO DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN AMIEN RAIS AS THE LEADER OF MUHAMMADIYAH AND AMIEN RAIS AS A POLITICAL FIGURE. ALTHOUGH MANY IF NOT MOST OF THEIR MEMBERS WERE STRONG RAIS SUPPORTERS, INCLUDING FOR PRESIDENT, THEY COULD NEVER ADVOCATE THIS IN THE NAME OF THE ORGANIZATION. IMM WAS "NON-POLITICAL" AND THE EXISTING POLITICAL PROCESS FOR SUCCESSION AND THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT HAD TO BE RESPECTED. AMIEN RAIS WAS SPEAKING "OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM," AND MUHAMMADIYAH AS AN ORGANIZATION COULD NOT SUPPORT THIS.

11. (C) ONE HAD TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT

WAS STILL EXTREMELY STRONG, THEY EXPLAINED, AS EVIDENCED BY THE DECISION TO CONTROL EVEN MORE THAN USUAL THE COMPOSITION OF THE MPR BY ELIMINATING TRADITIONAL MEMBERS SUCH AS THE CHAIRMAN OF MUHAMMADIYAH AND THE CHAIRMAN OF NAHDLATUL ULAMA. NO CRITICS WOULD BE TOLERATED, AND THERE WAS NO REAL POSSIBILITY FOR CHANGE DURING THE 1998 SESSION. ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE ALTERNATIVE CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT, THEY WERE RESIGNED TO THE FACT THAT THERE WOULD BE ONLY ONE CANDIDATE, AND THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO GO OUT ON A LIMB, EVEN TO SUPPORT RAIS, TO CALL FOR CHANGE AT THIS TIME. THEIR MESSAGE WAS THAT THEY HAD THEIR OWN HOPES FOR THE PRESIDENCY (IN RAIS), BUT HAD TO BE PRAGMATIC AND SAFE. THEY ALSO NOTED THAT THEY SUPPORTED DEMOCRATIZATION IN INDONESIA BUT THAT IT HAD TO BE "INDONESIAN-STYLE" DEMOCRACY WHICH WAS NOT THE SAME AS UNITED STATES DEMOCRACY.

OTHER GROUPS

---

12. (C) OVER THE COMING MONTHS, GOLKAR, GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY SPONSORED YOUTH GROUPS CAN BE EXPECTED TO NOMINATE PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FOR ANOTHER TERM. THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL YOUTH COUNCIL (KNPI), THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED UMBRELLA FOR ALL OFFICIAL YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS, NOMINATED PRESIDENT SOEHARTO DURING A TELEVISED MEETING BETWEEN KNPI LEADERS AND THE PRESIDENT IN APRIL. THE

PAGE 01 JAKART 05770 03 OF 03 301113Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00
	/032W						

----------EA02BA 301113Z /38

R 301102Z SEP 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7608
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 005770

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: STUDENT GROUPS ON SUCCESSION

COMMUNICATION FORUM FOR CHILDREN OF RETIRED SERVICEMEN (FKPPI) NOMINATED THE PRESIDENT DURING THEIR SEPTEMBER CONGRESS. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), 1.4(B)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3565

PAGE 01 JAKART 02796 01 OF 05 191208Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------3F7BD1 191208Z /38

O 191208Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1629
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0712
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 002796

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02796 01 OF 05 191208Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 18 MAY 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 15 SEP 2006 200503193

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: MAY 19 SITUATION REPORT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ANNOUNCED HE WOULD WORK WITH THE PARLIAMENT AND A SPECIAL REFORM COMMISSION TO ORGANIZE NEW ELECTIONS IN WHICH HE WOULD NOT STAND FOR THE PRESIDENCY. THE ABSENCE OF A DATE SPECIFIC FOR THE ELECTIONS, AMONG OTHER CONCERNS, LED TO MIXED REACTIONS. OPPOSITION LEADER AMIEN RAIS TOLD US HE WILL LEAD A LARGE RALLY DEMANDING THE PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION MAY 20. GUS DUR, LEADER OF INDONESIA'S LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION, IS CALLING ON HIS FOLLOWERS TO AVOID THE DEMONSTRATIONS. NATION-WIDE DEMONSTRATIONS CALLING FOR THE PRESIDENT TO STEP DOWN ARE STILL EXPECTED ON MAY 20, THOUGH IT IS UNCLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT STUDENTS, WHO HAVE BEEN THE DRIVING REFORM/RESIGNATION FORCE, WILL PERSIST IN THEIR EFFORTS IN THE WAKE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PLEDGE TO STEP DOWN. MEANWHILE, FOOD PRICES ARE SOARING IN JAKARTA AND CASH RUNS ON ATMS AND BANKS CONTINUE. END SUMMARY

SOEHARTO OFFERS TO STEP DOWN
---

3. (U) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, AFTER MEETING WITH "LEADERS OF SOCIETY," MOST OF WHOM REPRESENTED MUSLIM CONSTITUENCIES, SPOKE

LIVE TO A NATIONWIDE AUDIENCE AT APPROXIMATELY 1130 HOURS. AFTER LENGTHY COMMENTS MADE WITHOUT NOTES, THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THAT HE WOULD INSTITUTE REFORM AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE BY ESTABLISHING A REFORM COMMISSION. THE COMMISSION WOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH THE PARLIAMENT TO ENSURE ADOPTION OF REFORM MEASURES, TO INCLUDE REFORM OF THE LAWS WHICH GOVERN THE ELECTION. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD HOLD A NEW GENERAL ELECTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BASED ON NEW ELECTION LAWS, THAT HE WOULD ORGANIZE A GENERAL SESSION OF THE MPR TO ESTABLISH NEW MPR MEMBERS, AND THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO BE NOMINATED AGAIN AS PRESIDENT. HE ALSO REPEATED

HIS ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WOULD RESHUFFLE THE CABINET, FORMING A CABINET WHICH WILL BE CALLED THE "NEW REFORM CABINET." HE REPEATED HIS STATEMENT MADE LAST WEEK IN CAIRO THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM FOR HIM TO STEP DOWN AND BECOME A "PANDITO" (WISE MAN).

SOEHARTO HOLDS DIALOGUE WITH ISLAMIC LEADERS

4. (U) PRIOR TO THE SPEECH, SOEHARTO HELD A CLOSED DIALOGUE WITH MASS LEADERS, ALMOST ALL OF WHOM REPRESENTED MUSLIM CONSTITUENCIES. THE LEADERS INCLUDED ABDURAHHMAN WAHID (GENERAL CHAIRMAN OF NADHLATUL ULAMA), NURCHOLISH MADJID (RESPECTED MUSLIM SCHOLAR), ALI YAFIE (GOVERNMENT SPONSORED INDONESIAN COUNCIL OF ULAMAS), ANWAR HARYONO (DEWAN DAKWAY ISLAMIYAH INDONESIA OR THE ISLAMIC PROSELYTIZING COUNCIL), MALIK FAJAR (MUHAMMADIYAH), ACHMAD BAJA (SECRETARY GENERAL OF NU), YUSRIL MAHENDRA (PROFESSOR AT UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA), AND AINUN NAJIB (ISLAMIC PREACHER).

REACTION AMONG ISLAMIC AND OTHER LEADERS

5. (C) IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE SPEECH LOCAL MEDIA INTERVIEWED

CONFIDENTIAL

ABDURRAHMAN WAHID AND NURHCOLISH MADJID, TWO KEY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN THE GROUP WHICH MET WITH THE PRESIDENT. WAHID SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER WAS THE BEST POSSIBLE RESULT, AND ACCORDING TO MEDIA REPORTS, THAT THIS COMPROMISE SHOULD HELP CALM DOWN SOCIETY. HE WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT "IT WOULD BE BEST IF THE STUDENTS HAD NO NEED TO DEMONSTRATE AGAIN." NURCHOLISH MADJID SAID THAT EXPERTS WOULD BE UTILIZED FOR THE COMMISSION AND THAT THOSE WHO MET WITH SOEHARTO ASKED HIM NOT TO PICK ONE OF THEM. MADJID TOLD POLCOUNS THAT THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAD "COMMITTED TO NOTHING AND ENDORSED NOTHING," BUT "WERE GLAD HE LISTENED TO OUR VIEWS."

6. (C) [redacted] B1

TOLD POLOFF MAY 19 THAT NU AND WAHID WANTED SUCCESSION TO TAKE PLACE CONSTITUTIONALLY AND THAT THEY AGREED WITH SOEHARTO'S PLAN (THE TOP NU LEADERS HAD MET WITH WAHID AFTER HE RETURNED FROM THE DIALOGUE WITH SOEHARTO, AND WOULD BE MEETING WITH HIM AGAIN LATER THAT AFTERNOON). [redacted] MADE CLEAR THAT WHAT NU REALLY WANTED B1

WAS A SUCCESSION THAT LED TO A NEW LEADER THAT NU COULD SUPPORT. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IF SOEHARTO RESIGNED IMMEDIATELY WITHOUT CHANGES TO THE LAWS, THE NEW PRESIDENT WOULD BE HABIBIE WHO NU OPPOSES DUE TO THE NU'S PERCEPTION THAT HABIBIE'S ELITE CONSTITUENCY SEEKS A GREATER POLITICAL ROLE FOR ISLAM. HE THOUGHT THAT NEW ELECTIONS COULD BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN 3-6 MONTHS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3566

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3566

PAGE 01 JAKART 02796 02 OF 05 191208Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------3F7BD7 191208Z /38

O 191208Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1630
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0713

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 002796

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02796 02 OF 05 191208Z

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: MAY 19 SITUATION REPORT

(NOTE: MADJID TOLD POLCOUNS THAT ORGANIZING ELECTIONS IN LESS THAN THREE MONTHS WOULD BE TECHNICALLY UNFEASIBLE. END NOTE). [redacted] SAID THAT NU WANTED FULL PARTICIPATION IN SOEHARTO'S REFORM PROCESS, AND THAT WAHID WOULD CONSIDER BECOMING A PART OF THE REFORM COMMISSION (NOTE: WE ARE NOT SURE IF THIS IS TRUE GIVEN MADJID'S STATEMENT THAT NONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO BE ON THE COMMISSION. END NOTE.) B1

7. (C) [redacted] EMPHASIZED THAT NU WOULD TELL ITS MEMBERS NOT TO DEMONSTRATE, AND THAT THE STUDENTS SHOULD KEEP QUIET FOR SIX MONTHS. THE LEADERSHIP OF NU'S MAIN STUDENT ORGANIZATION HAS ALREADY HEARD THIS MESSAGE AND IS ATTEMPTING TO COMPLY (SEE BELOW). B1

8. (C) [redacted] MID-AFTERNOON MAY 19, TOLD POLCOUNS THAT HE HAD BEEN "STUNNED" BY THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH. "IT SHOWS HOW OUT OF TOUCH WITH REALITY HE IS." [redacted] ALSO STRONGLY CRITICIZED GENERAL WIRANTO, CLAIMING THAT "AT FIRST I THOUGHT HE WAS AN INTELLECTUAL BUT HE IS JUST LIKE OTHER GENERALS, HE IS BLINDED BY WORLDLY INTERESTS." COMMENTING ON HIS INTENTIONS, [redacted] SAID HE WAS PROCEEDING WITH PLANS A MASS RALLY [redacted] B1 B1 B1 B1

[redacted]

B1

END COMMENT.)

B1

9. (C) [redacted] SAID HE BELIEVES THAT THERE WERE MANY IN THE ARMY WHO WERE NOT PLEASED WITH WIRANTO'S MAY 18 STATEMENT REJECTING PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER HARMOKO'S CALL FOR SOEHARTO TO RESIGN. HE ADDED THAT HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN SEEKING TO CONVINCE "ARMY LEADERS" OF THE IMPATIENCE FELT BY STUDENTS, HOUSEWIVES AND LABORERS WITH THE NEED TO CHANGE. "THE ESSENCE OF ALL THEIR DEMANDS," HE CLAIMED, WAS THAT SOEHARTO MUST RESIGN. [redacted]

B1

(PANGAB).

10. (C) [redacted] B1 CHARACTERIZED SOEHARTO'S SPEECH TO POLOFF AS A "POLITICAL JOKE." HE REPEATED INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY REPORTED FROM ANOTHER SOURCE THAT ICMI SECRETARY GENERAL ADI SASONO AND HIS GROUP HAD BEEN OFFERED JOBS IN THE NEW "RESHUFFLED" CABINET, BUT ADI HAD TURNED THE DEAL DOWN BECAUSE IT WAS "TOO LATE." [redacted] REITERATED [redacted] STATEMENT THAT THERE WERE PLANS B1 FOR A MASS RALLY MAY 20 AT THE MONAS IN THE HEART OF JAKARTA.

11. (C) [redacted] TOLD POLOFF B1 AT THE [redacted] THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WAS "TOO VAGUE." SIMILARLY, A SENIOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER TOLD POLOFF THAT WHILE THERE WERE GOOD POINTS IN THE SPEECH, IT WAS INADEQUATE AS AN IMMEDIATE PRESIDENTIAL RESIGNATION AND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR WERE REQUIRED.

STUDENT REACTION
---

12. (C) ABSENCE OF A COMMITMENT TO STEP DOWN IMMEDIATELY LEFT MOST STUDENTS UNSATISFIED. THE MOMENTUM FOR THE COUNTRYWIDE MAY 20 DEMONSTRATIONS HAS ALREADY DEVELOPED TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT IT IS HARD TO ENVISAGE STUDENTS ACCEPTING ANYTHING LESS THAN AN

PAGE 01 JAKART 02796 03 OF 05 191208Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------3F7BDD 191208Z /38

O 191208Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1631
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0714
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 002796

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02796 03 OF 05 191208Z

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: MAY 19 SITUATION REPORT

IMMEDIATE SUCCESSION. AT LEAST 10,000 STUDENTS GATHERED PEACEFULLY AT THE DPR COMPLEX ON MAY 19, AND APPEARED ENERGIZED BY THEIR NUMBERS. STUDENTS CLAIM THEY WILL NOT STOP DEMONSTRATING UNTIL SOEHARTO STEPS DOWN, AND SAY THEY WILL REMAIN ON THE DPR COMPLEX. AS THE NEWS OF SOEHARTO'S STATEMENT SPREAD, MORE STUDENTS WERE MOBILIZING (SOME SAID IN REACTION TO THE STATEMENT) FROM CAMPUSES AND TAKING BUSES TO THE DPR TO JOIN THE PROTEST.

13. (C) STUDENTS FROM OTHER CITIES ARE ON THEIR WAY TO JAKARTA. STUDENTS BELIEVE THAT THOUSANDS WILL GO TO SPECIFIC LOCATIONS IN CITIES ACROSS INDONESIA TOMORROW TO PUSH FOR SOEHARTO TO STEP DOWN. LEAFLETS ARE CIRCULATING IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES INVITING LOCAL PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, WHO HAS BEEN SUPPORTING DEMONSTRATIONS, SAID THAT HE AGREES WITH GUS DUR'S STATEMENT, AND THAT AN IMMEDIATE TRANSITION WOULD BE DANGEROUS BECAUSE HABIBIE WOULD BECOME PRESIDENT AND HE COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE PEOPLE. HIS ORGANIZATION IS TRYING TO CALL BACK THEIR PEOPLE, ANTICIPATING DISASTER IF STUDENTS TAKE TO THE STREETS TOMORROW TO BE MET WITH REPRESSIVE MILITARY MEASURES. LEADERS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF ISLAMIC STUDENTS (HMI) WERE HOLDING A MEETING ON

CONFIDENTIAL

THE EVENING OF MAY 19 TO DISCUSS THE DEVELOPMENTS. LEADERS OF THE NATIONALIST STUDENTS SAID THAT WHAT SOEHARTO HAS SAID COMES TOO LATE AND THE STUDENTS DO NOT BELIEVE WHAT HE SAYS. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT WHILE SOME STUDENTS MAY ACCEPT SOEHARTO'S STATEMENT, THE MAJORITY WILL NOT.

MEGAWATI REACTION

14. (C) A KEY AIDE TO [redacted] B1
FOCUSSED ON THE FAILURE OF THE PRESIDENT TO MENTION A DATE FOR THE ELECTION. THE AIDE, WHO WATCHED THE SPEECH WITH [redacted] B1
NOTED THAT WHILE THE PRESIDENT COULD BE SEEN AS SEEKING A GRACEFUL EXIT, ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC TIME FRAME FOR THE ELECTION RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT SOEHARTO'S SINCERITY, ADDING, "HE IS PLAYING A JAVANESE GAME." THE AIDE ALSO NOTED THAT EVEN IF SOEHARTO WERE TO CONTINUE FOR ONLY A RELATIVELY BRIEF PERIOD, THAT TENURE WOULD FURTHER STALL ECONOMIC RECOVERY, AT A TIME WHEN THE ECONOMY IS ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE. [redacted] LEFT [redacted] HOME IN B1

SOUTH JAKARTA TO CONSULT WITH ABDURRAHMAN WAHID.

DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE OF JAKARTA

15. (U) AN AMCIT CALLER TO THE EMBASSY CRISIS LINE REPORTED THAT STUDENTS IN UJUNG PANDANG ARE GATHERING FOR A DEMONSTRATION AND THAT MANY OUTSIDERS ARE COMING INTO THE AREA. AUTHORITIES HAVE LIMITED PARTICIPATION TO PEOPLE WEARING SCHOOL UNIFORMS. ACCORDING TO THE CALLER, PEOPLE ARE CONFUSED BY THE ANNOUNCEMENTS BY SOEHARTO AND OTHERS AND ARE NOT SURE HOW TO REACT. THERE ARE REPORTS OF 20 TO 30 INJURIES IN CLASHES BETWEEN DEMONSTRATORS AND SECURITY FORCES IN SURABAYA MAY 19. IN MEDAN, AS ELSEWHERE, LEAFLETS ARE BEING DISTRIBUTED URGING PEOPLE TO JOIN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02796 03 OF 05 191208Z

DEMONSTRATIONS MAY 20.

RECAPPING LATE MAY 18 EVENTS: MEETING IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

16. (U) THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (DPR), HARMOKO, TOLD THE PRESS ON THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 18 THAT SOEHARTO SHOULD RESIGN FROM OFFICE. THE STATEMENT, WHICH WE OBTAINED DIRECTLY FROM THE PARLIAMENT'S PRESS OFFICE, WAS MADE ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND THE FOUR DEPUTY SPEAKERS OF THE HOUSE, EACH OF WHOM IS FROM ONE OF THE FOUR FACTIONS -- RULING PARTY GOLKAR, THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI), THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI). HARMOKO SAID THAT THE HOUSE LEADERS (SPEAKER AND DEPUTY SPEAKERS) MET MAY 18, AND DISCUSSED THE RECENT NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE PEOPLE'S ASPIRATIONS FOR REFORM, INCLUDING HOLDING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR AND THE RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT. FOLLOWING DPR REGULATIONS FOR DECISION MAKING, HE SAID THAT THE HOUSE LEADERS WOULD MEET MAY 19 WITH THE LEADERS OF THE HOUSE FACTIONS. THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING WOULD BE FORWARDED TO THE PRESIDENT. HE SAID THAT HE AND THE DEPUTY SPEAKERS HOPED THAT SOEHARTO WOULD RESIGN FOR THE GOOD OF THE NATION. HE APPEALED TO THE PEOPLE TO STAY CALM AND MAINTAIN NATIONAL UNITY AND ORDER. THE PARLIAMENT FACTIONS WERE MEETING ON MARCH 19, BUT AS OF LATE AFTERNOON THERE HAD BEEN NO ANNOUNCMENT OF ANY DECISIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3569

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3569

PAGE 01 JAKART 02796 04 OF 05 191208Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------3F7BE4 191209Z /38

O 191208Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1632
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0715
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 002796

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFID01: MAY 19 SITUATION REPORT

17. (C) A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI) FACTION TOLD POLOFF LATE IN THE AFTERNOON ON MAY 18 THAT HIS FACTION HAD JUST FINISHED A MEETING TO FORMULATE ITS POSITION. HE SAID THAT THEY "SUPPORTED REFORMATION AND THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THEY WOULD REQUEST THAT SOEHARTO STEP DOWN." HARMOKO HAD NOT DISCUSSED HIS REMARKS WITH THE ABRI FACTION IN ADVANCE, SAID THE PARLIAMENTARIAN, THUS A COMMON POSITION HAD TO BE FORMALLY BLESSED AT THE MAY 19 MEETING WITH ALL FACTION LEADERS. WHILE THE ABRI FACTION AGREED THAT SOEHARTO SHOULD STEP DOWN, IT PREFERRED THAT HE DO IT FOR THE GOOD OF THE NATION, WITHOUT BEING PUSHED, SAID THIS PARLIAMENTARIAN.

18. (C) A MEMBER OF THE PPP FACTION IN PARLIAMENT TOLD POLOFF MAY 18 THAT HIS PARTY HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO ASK SOEHARTO TO RESIGN AND FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR. HE THOUGHT THAT THE GOLKAR FACTION WAS HEADING IN THE SAME DIRECTION.

19. (U) GENERAL WIRANTO GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE AT 2100 ON MAY 18 FOLLOWING A MEETING WITH TOP MILITARY BRASS REACTING TO THE STATEMENT MADE EARLIER THAT DAY BY HOUSE SPEAKER CALLING ON SOEHARTO TO STEP DOWN. HE SAID THAT HARMOKO'S CALL WAS AN

INDIVIDUAL STATEMENT ALTHOUGH MADE IN A COLLECTIVE MANNER, AND HAD NO LEGAL BASIS. ABRI WOULD FORM A SPECIAL REFORM COUNCIL TO INCLUDE STUDENTS AND OTHER REFORM-MINDED PEOPLE. THERE SHOULD BE NO MASS ACTIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO ANARCHY. THE GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE WAS DELAYED BY OVER AN HOUR BY THE ARRIVAL OF GENERAL PRABOWO. WITH PRABOWO ON THE SCENE ALL JOURNALISTS WERE USHERED OUT OF THE ROOM. WHEN THEY RETURNED, WIRANTO READ HIS UNSIGNED WRITTEN DOCUMENT.

ECONOMIC INDICATORS: MAY 19

20. (U) FOOD: OUR POLL OF SHOPPERS IN TRADITIONAL MARKETS INDICATED THAT PRICES HAVE BEGUN TO RISE STEEPLY. RICE, COOKING OIL, AND SUGAR PRICES HAD REMAINED STABLE BETWEEN MAY 13 AND MAY 18 IN SOME MARKETS. IN ONE MARKET, THE PRICE OF RICE DOUBLED, IN OTHERS THE PRICE WAS UP ABOUT 15 PERCENT. ONE MARKET SURVEYED EARLY THE MORNING HAD NO RICE OR INSTANT NOODLE STOCKS. COOKING OIL WAS UP BY A THIRD IN ONE MARKET, 10 PERCENT IN ANOTHER. IN A THIRD MARKET, THE PRICE OF COOKING OIL HAD ALMOST DOUBLED BETWEEN LAST NIGHT'S CLOSING PRICE AND THIS MORNING'S OPENING PRICE AND FINALLY STOCKS RAN OUT. SUGAR AND BEEF WERE UP ABOUT 10-15 PERCENT IN TWO MARKETS. EGGS WERE UP BY 50 PERCENT IN BEKASI AND BY 20 PERCENT IN A CENTRAL JAKARTA MARKET. VEGETABLE PRICES (WHICH TEND TO BE MORE VOLATILE) WERE UNIFORMLY REPORTED SHARPLY UP BY AS MUCH AS 50 PERCENT AND WERE LARGELY OUT OF STOCK BY AFTERNOON. ONE STALL OWNER TOLD US THAT SUPPLIERS ARE NOT COMING BECAUSE THEY FEAR THEIR TRUCKS WILL BE PLUNDERED. AN EMPLOYEE OF A GROCERY STORE NEAR JAKARTA'S CHINA TOWN EXPLAINED LAST NIGHT THAT SHELVES WERE EMPTY BECAUSE DISTRIBUTORS WERE NOT BRINGING MORE SUPPLIES.

21. (U) ATM'S: AT 9 A.M., HUNDREDS OF CUSTOMERS WERE QUEUED AT BCA BRANCHES AS BCA WAS RUSHED AGAIN TODAY. HOWEVER, OTHER BANKS' ATM'S DID NOT HAVE LONG LINES AND CUSTOMERS TOLD US THEY DID NOT HAVE TO WAIT LONG FOR THEIR TURN. BANKS CONTINUE TO LIMIT THE AMOUNTS THAT MAY BE WITHDRAWN.

22. (U) BANKS: MOST BANKS WERE OPEN TODAY, BUT MANY CLOSED AT 1 P.M. THE REPORT ON LAST WEEK'S DAMAGE TO BCA FACILITIES WAS: OF 800 BRANCHES, OVER 120 WERE DAMAGED AND 12 WERE DESTROYED; A LARGE NUMBER OF BCA'S ATM'S WERE PILLAGED. IN CONTRAST TO BCA'S RUSH, BANK LIPPO, BANK PAPAN, AND BANK BALI EXPERIENCED HEAVIER THAN USUAL BUT NOT UNMANAGEABLE CASH DEMAND FROM CUSTOMERS. INDONESIAN BANKS HAVE INSTRUCTED THEIR EMPLOYEES TO REPORT TO WORK TOMORROW, MAY 20.

23. (U) FUEL SUPPLIES: SEVERAL PURVEYORS IN A NEIGHBORHOOD MARKET QUOTED RP 600/LITER PRICE FOR KEROSENE. HOWEVER, THEY HAD NO STOCKS TO SELL AND HAD NOT RECEIVED DELIVERIES SINCE LAST FRIDAY WHEN THE PRICE ROLLBACK WAS ANNOUNCED.

24. (U) PUBLIC TRANSPORT: THE GOVERNMENT HAS ROLLED BACK THE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION FARE HIKES ANNOUNCED AFTER THE MAY 4 FUEL PRICE INCREASES (WHICH HAVE ALSO BEEN ROLLED BACK). EFFECTIVE MAY 20, ECONOMY BUS FARES RETURN TO THEIR 1996 LEVELS; OTHER BUS AND RAIL FARE INCREASES HAVE BEEN REDUCED FROM THEIR POST-MAY 4

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3570

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3570

PAGE 01 JAKART 02796 05 OF 05 191209Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01

PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 CIO-00 SCT-00 SP-00
SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00 T-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00
PRM-01 DRL-04 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /035W
----------3F7BE6 191209Z /38

O 191208Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1633
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0716
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 002796

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02796 05 OF 05 191209Z

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: MAY 19 SITUATION REPORT

ANNOUNCEMENT LEVELS.

25. (U) EXCHANGE RATE: THE EXCHANGE RATE POSTED AT MONEY CHANGERS' WINDOWS IS RP 15,000-16,000/USD. HOWEVER, THE MONEY CHANGERS DO NOT HAVE ANY CASH DOLLARS TO SELL. THE TELETRAC RATE HELD STEADY TODAY AT RP 12,500. WE HEARD THAT THE CURBSIDE RATE AT THE AIRPORT WAS RP 25,000 AS DEPARTING TRAVELERS SOUGHT DOLLARS.

26. (U) STOCK MARKET: THE JSX WAS UP 18 POINTS TO 407 AT 2:30 AND CLOSED EVEN HIGHER AT 414, UP 6 PERCENT FROM MONDAY'S CLOSE. ONE BROKER CHARACTERIZED THE RISE AS "PHANTOM" AND EXPLAINED THAT STATE-OWNED MUTUAL FUND DANAREKSA HAD SOLD AND REPURCHASED TELKOM HOLDINGS TO LIFT THE MARKET. HE NOTED THAT THIS DIDN'T COST DANAREKSA MUCH SINCE IT HAD TO BUY LESS THAN 200 LOTS. THE MARKET WAS EXTREMELY THIN (ALTHOUGH NOT AS THIN AS IT WAS LAST FRIDAY WHEN 28 TRADES WERE REGISTERED). MOST TRADERS DID NOT SHOW UP FOR THE SECOND SESSION. ABOUT 80 PERCENT OF TRADERS HAVE INFORMED THE JAKARTA STOCK EXCHANGE THAT THEY WILL NOT COME TO WORK TOMORROW.

27. (U) BI STATISTICS: WE UNDERSTAND THAT BANK INDONESIA WILL
CONFIDENTIAL

NOT PUBLISH ITS WEEKLY STATISTICS THIS WEEK.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ4651

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

SECRET PTQ4651

PAGE 01 JAKART 02595 01 OF 04 071233Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------3B3EC6 071234Z /38

O 071234Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1429
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002595

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (S) INDONESIA IS PASSING THROUGH TROUBLED TIMES. NERVES AND TEMPERS ARE WEARING THIN IN THE FACE OF THE RELENTLESS PRESSURE FROM POLITICALLY ACTIVE STUDENTS AND

PAGE 02 JAKART 02595 01 OF 04 071233Z
THE ECONOMIC MELTDOWN. THE FUEL PRICE RISE,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 6 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 15 SEP 2006 200503193

PREDICTABLY, HAS TRIGGERED FURTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF DISCONTENT AND CREATED NEW UNCERTAINTIES. NEW VOICES ARE JOINING THE CHORUS OF DEMANDS FOR FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL REFORMS. THE STAKES ARE IMMENSE. MISSTEPS COULD PROVE COSTLY, OR EVEN DISASTROUS.

UNANSWERABLE QUESTIONS

3. (S) THE MAIN QUESTIONS CANNOT BE ANSWERED:
-- WILL THE STUDENTS SPARK IRRESISTIBLE PRESSURES FOR FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL CHANGE?
-- WILL THE SURGE OF DISSATISFACTION UNLEASHED BY THE RISE IN FUEL PRICES REPRESENT A TEMPORARY SPIKE OR WILL IT LAUNCH THE COMBINED POLITICAL/ECONOMIC CRISIS INTO A NEW PHASE?
-- IF PRESSURES KEEP MOUNTING, WILL SOEHARTO INVOKE HIS EMERGENCY POWERS, DECLARE MARTIAL LAW, AND TRY TO RULE THROUGH FIAT?
-- COULD SOEHARTO SUSTAIN SUCH A COURSE AND KEEP THE MILITARY UNITED AND LOYAL, ESPECIALLY IF HE FORFEITS IMF SUPPORT?
-- HOW LONG CAN INDONESIA REMAIN COMMITTED TO AN ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM THAT FUELS SOCIAL TENSIONS, HITS ORDINARY CITIZENS IN THE POCKETBOOK, AND WEAKENS THE PRESIDENT'S POWER BASE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY RETURN OF MARKET CONFIDENCE OR STRENGTHENING OF THE RUPIAH?
-- WILL THE INDONESIAN MILITARY PROVE RELIABLE IF OPPOSITION TO THE POLITICAL STATUS QUO ASSUMES A MASS CHARACTER?

SECRET

4. (S) THE NUMBER OF SUCH QUESTIONS IS RISING. THE ONE QUESTION WE CANNOT AVOID, OF COURSE, IS: WHAT POSTURE SHOULD WE ADOPT AS THESE EVENTS UNFOLD? THE BROAD ANSWER IS EASY: WE SHOULD STAND BY OUR PRINCIPLES AND MAKE CLEAR BY WORD AND DEED OUR SUPPORT FOR REPRESENTATIVE AND RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT, OPEN SOCIETIES, RESPECT FOR THE PEACEFUL EXERCISE OF THE RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION, AND FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH THAT INCREASES THE WELL-BEING OF THE INDONESIAN

PEOPLE. THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS. HERE CAUTION IS CALLED FOR. BEFORE RUSHING TO JUDGMENT, WE SHOULD STEP BACK AND TAKE A LONGER RANGE VIEW.

CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY

5. (S) THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM IS A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY. AN AGING PRESIDENT HAS FORCED HIS OWN REELECTION THROUGH A PLIANT, HAND-PICKED, AND UNREPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY. WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION BARELY CONCLUDED, SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF INDONESIANS ARE REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMACY OF THAT OUTCOME, AS SYMBOLIZED BY THE DEMAND OF THE STUDENTS THAT SOEHARTO STEP DOWN. INDONESIA'S FLAWED POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS DO NOT CONFER SUFFICIENT LEGITIMACY TO REMAIN CREDIBLE IN THE FACE OF STRONG POPULAR PRESSURES FOR CHANGE. THAT FACT IS SINKING IN. THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT IS NOW SCRAMBLING TO HOLD OUT THE HOPE OF POLITICAL REFORMS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTHINKABLE A FEW SHORT MONTHS AGO. THE STUDENTS VIEW

THESE AS SOPS, BUT OTHERS MAY SEE OPPORTUNITIES THAT SHOULD BE SEIZED. THE SINCERITY OF THESE REFORM OFFERS, AND THE WISDOM AND TENACITY OF THOSE SEEKING CHANGE, HAVE NOT YET BEEN TESTED.

6. (S) INDONESIA'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN FLAWED FROM THE START. THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE HALF CENTURY OF INDONESIA'S INDEPENDENCE, THE COUNTRY'S LEADERS HAVE GIVEN PRIORITY TO NATION BUILDING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, NOT TO STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONS. THESE SHORTCOMINGS SEEMED LESS GLARING DURING THE THREE DECADES WHEN INDONESIA EXPERIENCED RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH. SOEHARTO BASKED IN THE LEGITIMACY CONFERRED BY STABILITY AND RISING LIVING STANDARDS. MANY INDONESIANS WERE PREPARED TO WAIT FOR THE POST-SOEHARTO PERIOD TO PRESS FOR CHANGE. THE PROLONGED ECONOMIC CRISIS REMOVED THESE PROPS, EXPOSING THE UNDERLYING FRAGILITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL MANDATE. FORCING SOEHARTO FROM OFFICE WITHOUT ADDRESSING THESE INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES

WILL NOT CORRECT THIS SITUATION. IT COULD SIMPLY SUBSTITUTE NEW LEADERS FOR OLD, WITH THE NEW MANDATES NO MORE VALID THAN THE FORMER ONES.

7. (S) BOTH THE STUDENTS AND INDONESIA'S POLITICAL

SECRET

NNNNPTQ4653

SECRET PTQ4653

PAGE 01 JAKART 02595 02 OF 04 071233Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W			

----------3B3ECC 071234Z /38

O 071234Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1430
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 002595

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES

REFORMERS HAVE BEEN SLOW TO ADDRESS THESE INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES THROUGH SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS AND CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE. UNTIL RECENTLY, IDEAS FOR POLITICAL REFORM FROM WITHIN THE ESTABLISHMENT AMOUNTED TO LITTLE MORE THAN TINKERING. IN PART, THIS REFLECTED THE UNREALITY OF PROMOTING MEANINGFUL REFORM WHILE

SECRET

SECRET

SOEHARTO KEPT HIS IRON GRIP ON THE POLITICAL APPARATUS.

8. (S) NOW REFORMERS ARE BECOMING BOLDER IN THEIR THINKING AND ARE BEGINNING TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS THAT WOULD, IF IMPLEMENTED, GIVE INDONESIA'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS A MORE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER. NEVERTHELESS, FOR THE MOMENT THERE ARE PRECIOUS FEW WELL-FORMED IDEAS ON HOW TO TRANSFORM THE PRESSURES FOR CHANGE ARISING FROM THE STUDENTS INTO CONCRETE REFORMS THAT WOULD CONFER GREATER LEGITIMACY ON INDONESIA'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. THIS INTELLECTUAL VACUUM INCREASES THE DANGER THAT THOSE SEEKING TO CURB OR BLOCK REFORM WILL SMOTHER CHANGE BY APPEARING TO PROMOTE IT.

OPPOSITION TO FIVE MORE YEARS
---

9. (S) PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IS PERCHED UNEASILY AT THE CENTER OF THIS MAELSTROM. THE COMPOSITION OF HIS CABINET SYMBOLIZED HIS INABILITY, OR PERHAPS UNWILLINGNESS, TO BROADEN HIS POLITICAL BASE AT THE CRITICAL MOMENT WHEN THIS WAS MOST NEEDED. THE BROAD OUTLINES OF NATIONAL POLICY THAT EMERGED FROM THE MARCH 1998 SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY CONTAINED NOT A GLIMMER OF NEW POLITICAL THINKING. ESSENTIALLY, ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, HE OFFERED THE COUNTRY FIVE MORE YEARS OF THE SAME STALE POLITICS THAT IS THE HALLMARK OF HIS "NEW ORDER" REGIME. THE STUDENTS ARE NOT BUYING IT. SOEHARTO'S MIND SET IS TO TOUGH IT THROUGH, AS HE HAS DONE SUCCESSFULLY IN THE PAST. TO

DATE, HE HAS DISPLAYED NO SIGNS OF RECOGNIZING THAT HIS

TIME-TESTED METHODS OF MAINTAINING POLITICAL CONTROL MAY NOT FIT INDONESIA'S NEW CIRCUMSTANCES.

10. (S) WHAT IS NEW IS THE PERCEPTION OF THOSE AROUND SOEHARTO THAT THE COUNTRY IS ON THE EVE OF THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA AND THAT HOW THEY CONDUCT THEMSELVES WILL DEFINE THEIR OWN FUTURE PROSPECTS. EVEN LOYAL SUPPORTERS, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, MUST NOW HEDGE THEIR BETS AGAINST THE FUTURE. THIS HAS SUBTLY ERODED HIS GRIP ON POWER. THE ONLY LOYALISTS HE CAN COUNT ON IN WORST CASE SCENARIOS ARE THOSE WHOSE FATES ARE INEXTRICABLY LINKED WITH HIS, SUCH AS HIS FAMILY. LTG PRABOWO, NOW COMMANDER OF THE STRATEGIC RESERVE FORCES, COULD FIT THIS PATTERN THROUGH HIS MARRIAGE TO ONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S DAUGHTERS. THIS COULD BE THE CRUCIAL FAULT LINE DETERMINING WHETHER THE MILITARY WILL REMAIN UNITED IN A HIGH STAKES POLITICAL CRISIS.

CONSTRAINTS ON CHANGE
---

11. (S) IT IS TOO EARLY TO WRITE OFF SOEHARTO. HE IS DETERMINED, EXPERIENCED, AND A FORMIDABLE PLAYER IN AN END GAME. THE OPPOSING FORCES DEMANDING POLITICAL CHANGE ARE FRAGMENTED, LEADERLESS, AND WITHOUT A COHERENT PROGRAM. AND YET THESE FORCES HAVE GRASPED BETTER THAN SOEHARTO THAT THE COUNTRY IS READY FOR A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP. BY TAPPING INTO THAT SENTIMENT, THEY HAVE SEIZED THE INITIATIVE AND PUT THE GOVERNMENT ON THE DEFENSIVE. THEIR PROBLEM, AND POTENTIALLY THEIR WEAKNESS, IS THAT THEY LACK THE MEANS TO FORCE CHANGE

THROUGH PEACEFUL CHANNELS, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE THESE CHANNELS ARE DESIGNED BY SOEHARTO TO PRECLUDE CHANGE NOT ORDAINED BY HIM. IF THEY OPT FOR VIOLENCE AND CONFRONTATION, THE MEANS WILL SHAPE THE ENDS AND THEY WILL LESSEN PROSPECTS THAT THE RIGHT SORT OF CHANGES WILL EMERGE FROM THE CATHARSIS, REGARDLESS OF WHO EMERGES ON TOP.

12. (S) FOR THE MOMENT, OPPORTUNISM IS STILL THE SAFE COURSE FOR INDONESIANS WATCHING THE UNFOLDING DRAMA WITH MIXED HOPES AND FEARS. AS LONG AS SOEHARTO CAN MAINTAIN THE APPEARANCE THAT HE HAS THE UPPER HAND, WE CAN EXPECT THAT THE INDONESIAN POWER ESTABLISHMENT WILL DO HIS BIDDING. IF HIS AUTHORITY SHOWS SIGNS OF ERODING, MATTERS COULD MOVE QUICKLY INTO A NEW PHASE.

OUTLOOK CLOUDY

13. (S) IT IS TOO EARLY TO REACH INFORMED JUDGMENTS ON WHAT LIES AHEAD. THE NEXT TWO WEEKS WILL OFFER IMPORTANT CLUES. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAS PUBLICLY COMMITTED HIMSELF TO ATTEND THE G-15 SUMMIT IN CAIRO. HE IS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE ON SATURDAY, MAY 9. THE TIMING IS NOT IDEAL. HIS ABSENCE COULD ENERGIZE THE STUDENTS.

SECRET

NNNNPTQ4652

SECRET PTQ4652

PAGE 01 JAKART 02595 03 OF 04 071234Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------3B3ED6 071234Z /38

O 071234Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1431
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 002595

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES

CHANGING HIS PLANS MIGHT BE PRUDENT BUT WOULD BE SEEN AS AN ADMISSION OF WEAKNESS. HE HAS RUN OUT OF EASY CHOICES. MAY 20, NATIONAL AWAKENING DAY, IS BEING TARGETED BY THE STUDENTS FOR MAJOR NATION-WIDE DEMONSTRATIONS. THE DATE MARKS THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE MEETING THAT LAUNCHED THE MODERN INDONESIAN NATIONALIST

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 02595 03 OF 04 071234Z
MOVEMENT. THE ISSUE BEING PUT TO THE MILITARY BY THE STUDENTS, AND BY OPPOSITION LEADERS MEGAWATI AND AMIEN RAIS, IS: DO YOU SIDE WITH THE COUNTRY OR THE PRESIDENT? THAT ISSUE WILL PROVIDE THE EMOTIONAL BACKDROP FOR WHAT TRANSPIRES ON MAY 20 THIS YEAR.

RESTRAINTS ON RASH ACTIONS
---

14. (S) THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES ARE TREADING CAUTIOUSLY. THEY ARE AWARE OF THE VOLATILITY OF THE SITUATION AND DO NOT WANT TO SET OFF THE SPARK THAT LIGHTS A PRAIRIE FIRE. FOR THE MOMENT THEY ARE RELYING ON TEAR GAS, SHIELDS, AND RUBBER BULLETS AS THEIR PRIMARY MEANS OF CONTAINING THE STUDENTS, WITH ONLY SPORADIC RESORT TO LIVE AMMUNITION. THEY ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED, HOWEVER, TO KEEPING THEIR COOL IN THE FACE OF TAUNTING MOBS. SOME AMONG THE STUDENTS ADVOCATE MORE CONFRONTATIONAL TACTICS IN PRESSING THE STUDENT CAUSE. ALLEGATIONS, MANUFACTURED OR REAL, ARE BEING SPREAD BY THE AUTHORITIES THAT SINISTER THIRD FORCES (SOMETIMES IDENTIFIED AS "COMMUNISTS" OR MUSLIM EXTREMISTS FOR AMERICAN EARS) ARE SEEKING TO MANIPULATE THE STUDENTS FOR NEFARIOUS PURPOSES. SUCH CLAIMS WILL BE PUSHED MORE VIGOROUSLY TO JUSTIFY A CRACKDOWN, IF IT COMES TO THAT.

15. (S) INDONESIANS OF ALL STRIPES RECOGNIZE THAT THE COUNTRY IS IN AN INTERNATIONAL SPOTLIGHT AND IN NEED OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IF THERE IS TO BE ANY HOPE OF SHORTENING THE TIME REQUIRED FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY. THESE ARE POWERFUL BUT NOT ABSOLUTE DETERRENTS AGAINST

RASH REPRESSIVE ACTIONS. IF SOEHARTO IS FORCED TO THE WALL, HIS NATURE IS TO BECOME HARDER, MORE RUTHLESS, AND LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO COMPROMISE. IN THE PAST, THIS WAS HIS ACE IN THE HOLE. IN INDONESIA'S CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES IT COULD BE HIS ACHILLES HEEL.

SOEHARTO'S OPTIONS LIMITED

16. (S) CURRENT TENSIONS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE RESOLVED BY A SERENDIPITOUS SERIES OF GOOD BREAKS. NOR ARE OTHER OPTIONS ATTRACTIVE.

-- EVEN OPTIMISTS IN THE GOVERNMENT, A RARER BREED THESE DAYS, DO NOT SEE AN ECONOMIC UPTURN AS A NEAR TERM WAY OUT OF THE COUNTRY'S MOUNTING TROUBLES.

-- IN EXTREMIS, THE PRESIDENT COULD INVOKE HIS EMERGENCY POWERS, SHUT DOWN THE UNIVERSITIES, AND TRY TO SWEEP UP LEADING ACTIVISTS. HE PRESUMABLY IS EYEING SUCH

MEASURES. THE RISKS WOULD BE IMMENSE. SUCH ACTION WOULD COMPROMISE HIS CLAIM ON INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, HIGHLIGHT HIS LEGITIMACY PROBLEM, AND PERHAPS STRAIN THE LOYALTY OF THE MILITARY TO THE BREAKING POINT. IN SHORT, A CRACKDOWN COULD LAUNCH HIM ONTO A SLIPPERY DOWNWARD SLOPE.
-- SOEHARTO'S INSTINCTS ARE AGAINST SUPPORTING SERIOUS POLITICAL REFORM AS A WAY OF EASING THE PRESSURES FOR POLITICAL CHANGE, AND IT MAY BE TOO LATE FOR THAT COURSE.

17. (S) WITH RIOTERS IN THE STREETS, THE OUTLOOK CAN ONLY BE ONE OF MOUNTING UNCERTAINTY. A FEW DAYS OF

CALM, HOWEVER, WOULD ALTER THE PICTURE AND MAKE MORE CREDIBLE PROSPECTS FOR MUDDLING THROUGH. FOR THE MOMENT, WATCHFUL WAITING IS THE BEST POSTURE.

U.S. ROLE
---

18. (S) [redacted] B1

WE ARE POSITIONED ABOUT RIGHT:
-- WE ARE IN REGULAR TOUCH WITH ALL POLITICAL ELEMENTS, INCLUDING THE STUDENTS AND OUTSIDE LEADERS SUCH AS MEGAWATI AND AMIEN RAIS.
-- WE HAVE BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT OF THOSE DEMANDING AN END TO THE DISAPPEARANCES AND AN INVESTIGATION INTO THOSE RESPONSIBLE. THE QUICK REACTION OF OURSELVES AND OTHERS (INCLUDING THE INDONESIAN MEDIA AND INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS WHO FOCUSED ATTENTION ON THE PROBLEM) WERE PROBABLY INSTRUMENTAL IN BRINGING A HALT TO THE PRACTICE AND IN THE RESURFACING OF THOSE ABDUCTED.
-- WE ARE SUPPORTING AND CONTRIBUTING TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE.

SECRET

NNNNPTQ4654

SECRET PTQ4654

PAGE 01 JAKART 02595 04 OF 04 071234Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------3B3ED8 071234Z /38

O 071234Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1432
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 002595

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES

[redacted] B1

19. (S) WE NEED TO BE READY FOR CONTINGENCIES.
-- WE ARE REVIEWING AND UPDATING OUR EMERGENCY ACTION

PLANS IN CONSULTATION WITH WASHINGTON AND THE RELEVANT U.S. MILITARY COMMANDS.

[redacted] B1

-- WE SHALL BE LOOKING AT OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS, INCLUDING HOW BEST TO ENSURE THAT WE ARE UNEQUIVOCALLY SEEN AS SUPPORTING CONSTRUCTIVE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE.

20. (S) SOME FINAL POINTS MAY BE WORTH NOTING.
-- THUS FAR THE RIOTING AND DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE NOT ASSUMED AN ANTI-FOREIGN CHARACTER. DESPITE THE IMF'S PROMINENT ROLE, THIS IS STILL PLAYING OUT DOMESTICALLY AS AN INDONESIAN CRISIS (THE INDONESIANS, TO THEIR CREDIT, JUSTIFIED THE FUEL PRICE RISES AS A BUDGETARY NECESSITY AND NOT AS AN ONEROUS BURDEN FORCED ON THEM BY AN UNFEELING IMF).
-- WE SHOULD REMAIN MODESTLY CONSCIOUS OF OUR LIMITS, BOTH THE LIMITS TO OUR UNDERSTANDING AND TO OUR POWER TO INFLUENCE DEVELOPMENTS WITH PREDICTABLE RESULTS. ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1107

PAGE 01 JAKART 02451 01 OF 05 302329Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W		

----------392B0A 302342Z /38

R 302328Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1316
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 002451

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA'S "FIVE POLITICAL LAWS"

REF: 97 JAKARTA 1437

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02451 01 OF 05 302329Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 25 APR 2014
DATE/CASE ID: 16 NOV 2006 200503193

UNCLASSIFIED

2. (U) SUMMARY: GROWING CALLS FOR POLITICAL REFORM, TO ACCOMPANY AND SUPPORT ECONOMIC REFORM, FOCUS ON THE "FIVE POLITICAL LAWS" WHICH SET THE PARAMETERS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN INDONESIA AND WHICH GOVERN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES. THE LAWS, AS AMENDED MOST RECENTLY IN 1985, PRECLUDE TRUE OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES AND TIP THE PLAYING FIELD TO ENSURE VICTORY FOR THE RULING "PARTY" IN THE FIVE-YEAR ELECTION CYCLES. THE LAWS ALSO EFFECTIVELY PREVENT THE EVOLUTION OF AN INDEPENDENT LEGISLATIVE BRANCH BY ENSURING ALL PARLIAMENT MEMBERS, EVEN THOSE REPRESENTING THE MINOR PARTIES, ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT. UNDER THESE FIVE POLITICAL LAWS, THE GOVERNMENT CONTROLS THE MEMBERSHIP AND ORIENTATION OF ALL NON-POLITICAL "MASS ORGANIZATIONS" BY DEMANDING THAT ALL SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS BE GROUPED INTO A SINGLE UNIT AND REQUIRING THAT MASS ORGANIZATIONS ADHERE TO THE VAGUELY DEFINED STATE IDEOLOGY OF "PANCASILA," A GOVERNING PHILOSOPHY WHICH PROMOTES CONSENSUS POLITICS AND STRONGLY DISCOURAGES DISSENT. SOME CRITICS CONTEND THAT RATHER THAN REDUCING DIVISIVE CONFLICTS ARISING FROM COMPETING POLITICAL INTERESTS, THE HEAVY CONTROLS AND ABSENCE OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS HAVE REDIRECTED THE CONFLICTS IN SOCIETY INTO ULTIMATELY MORE DAMAGING CHANNELS. RECENTLY, THERE HAVE BEEN HINTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE CONSIDERING SOME REVISIONS IN THE LAWS, THOUGH OBSERVERS DOUBT IT IS READY TO ENTERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES. END SUMMARY

THE FIVE POLITICAL LAWS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. (U) IN RECENT WEEKS AT CAMPUSES ACROSS INDONESIA, A COMMON THEME HAS BEEN A CALL TO REFORM OR SIMPLY ABOLISH THE "FIVE POLITICAL LAWS." DEMANDS FOR THE ABOLITION OR SIGNIFICANT REVAMPING OF THESE LAWS HAVE ALSO FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN CRITIQUES OF THE REGIME OVER THE PAST DECADE, INCLUDING THOSE OFFERED BY IMPRISONED LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, FORMER PARLIAMENTARIAN SRI BINTANG PAMUNGAS, AND THE BANNED PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD). THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY AND WE HAVE RECEIVED INDICATIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY THE ABRI FACTION IN THE PARLIAMENT, MIGHT BE CONSIDERING SOME CHANGES TO

UNCLASSIFIED

THE LAWS BUT MOST HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVERS DOUBT THIS WILL RESULT IN FUNDAMENTAL REVISIONS.

4. (U) THE LAWS, DATING TO 1975 AND 1985, FORM THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRICTS POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN INDONESIA AND ASSURES VICTORY AT THE NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL LEVEL TO THE GOVERNMENT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, GOLKAR, IN THE FIVE-YEAR ELECTION CYCLE. THE FIVE LAWS HAVE BEEN MODIFIED OVER THE YEARS, MOST RECENTLY IN 1985.

5. (U) THE ORIGINAL "POLITICAL PARTIES AND GOLKAR" LEGISLATION, PASSED IN 1975, LEGALIZED THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL OVER THE TWO MINORITY PARTIES (PDI AND PPP) AS WELL AS GOLKAR. IT GAVE THE PRESIDENT THE POWER TO "FREEZE" POLITICAL PARTIES, PREVENTING THE CREATION OF ANY NEW PARTIES WHICH MIGHT EVOLVE INTO REAL OPPOSITION PARTIES. GOLKAR AND THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS WERE ACCORDED AUTHORITY TO SUPERVISE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW. THE LEGISLATION MANDATED THAT POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS COULD NOT ESTABLISH BRANCHES AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL, WHERE MOST INDONESIANS LIVED, THEREBY INSTITUTIONALIZING THE "FLOATING MASS" PRINCIPLE WHEREIN NO PARTY CAN BUILD MASS-BASED MEMBERSHIP BUT MUST INSTEAD

COMPETE IN THE FIVE-YEAR PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CYCLE FOR SUPPORT. GOLKAR DOES NOT NEED TO ESTABLISH BRANCHES AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL IN ORDER TO OPERATE; ITS OFFICIALS ARE ALREADY THERE. THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS FORMALIZED IN 1981 WHEN ALL VILLAGE HEADMEN BECAME MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS CORPS (KORPRI), WHICH HAS BECOME AN INTEGRAL COMPONENT OF GOLKAR.

6. (U) THE 1975 LAW WAS A MAJOR STEP IN THIS PROCESS OF LINKING CIVIL SERVANTS POLITICALLY TO GOLKAR AND THE GOVERNMENT. IT REQUIRED CIVIL SERVANTS TO INFORM (IN PRACTICE GAIN THE PERMISSION OF) THEIR SUPERVISORS BEFORE JOINING ANY OF THE THREE POLITICAL GROUPS. GIVEN THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL OF GOLKAR, THIS MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR ANY STATE EMPLOYEE TO JOIN A MINORITY PARTY. IN 1981 CIVIL SERVANTS WERE REQUIRED TO SIGN A STATEMENT PROMISING THAT THEY WOULD GIVE THEIR SUPPORT TO GOLKAR. WHEN GOLKAR ESTABLISHED A FORMAL MEMBERSHIP SYSTEM IN 1984, MANY MEMBERS OF THE ELITE FELT OBLIGATED TO JOIN. IN 1997 KORPRI REQUESTED THAT EACH OF ITS MEMBERS SECURE TEN VOTES FOR GOLKAR, AND THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS PUBLICLY REAFFIRMED THE

KORPRI-GOLKAR CONNECTION, SAYING THAT WHILE THE LAW ALLOWED KORPRI MEMBERS TO VOTE FOR ANY OF THE THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, KORPRI STATUTES REQUIRED ITS MEMBERS TO VOTE FOR GOLKAR.

7. (U) THE GOVERNMENT FURTHER TIGHTENED THE SYSTEM AND WEAKENED THE MINORITY PARTIES WHEN IT AMENDED THE "POLITICAL PARTIES AND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1108

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1108

PAGE 01 JAKART 02451 02 OF 05 302329Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W			

----------392B0D 302343Z /38

R 302328Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1317
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 002451

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA'S "FIVE POLITICAL LAWS"

REF: 97 JAKARTA 1437

CONFIDENTIAL

GOLKAR" LEGISLATION IN 1985 TO FORCE ALL THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO DECLARE THAT THEY WERE BASED SOLELY ON THE GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA. THE "MASS ORGANIZATIONS LAW," PASSED AT THE SAME TIME, IMPOSED THE SAME REQUIREMENT ON OTHER NON-POLITICAL GROUPS SUCH AS THE LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION, NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU). WHILE GOLKAR ALREADY CONFORMED TO THIS REQUIREMENT, IT MEANT THAT PPP LOST MUCH OF ITS UNDERLYING ISLAMIC IDENTITY AND THAT THE PDI WAS LESS DIRECTLY IDENTIFIED WITH ITS NATIONALIST AND CHRISTIAN ORIGINS.

IMPACT OF THE LAWS ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
---

8. (U) UNDER THE FIVE POLITICAL LAWS, GOLKAR REPRESENTS "FUNCTIONAL GROUPS" AND THEORETICALLY COVERS MOST SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY. IT IS DELIBERATELY NOT DEFINED AS A POLITICAL PARTY; AT THE OUTSET OF THE NEW ORDER POLITICAL PARTIES WERE BLAMED BY THE MILITARY AND OTHERS FOR CAUSING INSTABILITY DURING THE SUKARNO PERIOD (NOTE: NEVERTHELESS, GOLKAR IS OFTEN REFERRED TO AS THE "RULING PARTY." END NOTE). IN 1973, THE NINE EXISTING POLITICAL PARTIES WERE CONSOLIDATED INTO TWO NEW POLITICAL PARTIES, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP, ISLAMIC) AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI, NATIONALIST AND CHRISTIAN). AS NOTED ABOVE, THE MINORITY PARTIES ARE SUPPOSED TO BE THE "POLITICAL PARTNERS" OF GOLKAR, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATE, RATHER THAN COMPETITORS, OPPONENTS OR CRITICS.

8. (U) THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM, SHAPED BY THE FIVE POLITICAL LAWS, WAS ALSO DELIBERATELY DESIGNED TO REMOVE THE CITIZENRY FROM POLITICS. VOTERS WOULD CONSTITUTE A "FLOATING MASS," DIVORCED

FROM POLITICAL ACTIVITY, TO BE ACTIVATED ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS TO
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIRM THE RULE OF THE REGIME. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GENERAL ELECTION FOR PARLIAMENT, OR THE "FESTIVAL OF DEMOCRACY," AS IT IS CALLED BY THE GOVERNMENT, WOULD IN THEORY PROVIDE A LIMITED OUTLET FOR OTHERWISE CONTAINED POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS. DIFFERENT INTEREST GROUPS, FOR EXAMPLE, COMPETE FOR SLOTS IN THE NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND DISTRICT LEVEL LEGISLATURES.

9. (U) GOLKAR DEVELOPED OUT OF AN ORGANIZATION OF "FUNCTIONAL GROUPS" ESTABLISHED UNDER MILITARY AUSPICES IN 1964 TO COUNTER THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) AND ITS AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS. WHEN THE NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT DECIDED THAT HOLDING AN ELECTION WOULD GIVE IT INTERNATIONAL, AND NATIONAL, LEGITIMACY, IT TURNED TO GOLKAR AS ITS VEHICLE. FROM THE START, A SUCCESSFUL ELECTION WAS DEFINED AS A GOLKAR VICTORY.

10. (C) AS A GOVERNMENT CREATION, GOLKAR HAS AT ITS DISPOSAL ALL OF THE POWER OF THE STATE TO SECURE VOTES FOR ITSELF AND TO DISCOURAGE SUPPORT FOR THE MINORITY PARTIES. [redacted] B1 [redacted] GAVE POLOFF SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF THE TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED:
-- GOLKAR OPERATES ON AN ESPECIALLY UNEVEN PLAYING FIELD IN RURAL AREAS WHERE SEVENTY PERCENT OF INDONESIANS LIVE. MOST RURAL INHABITANTS ARE FARMERS OR LABORERS, AND ARE THUS MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY, AND VULNERABLE TO, CHANGES IN BASIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES. THEREFORE, IT IS NOT DIFFICULT FOR GOVERNMENT/GOLKAR OFFICIALS (DOWN TO THE VILLAGE HEADMAN) TO REMIND RURAL VOTERS PRIOR TO ELECTION TIME, EITHER IMPLICITLY OR EXPLICITLY, OF THE "DEBT" THEY OWE TO THE RULING PARTY FOR IMPROVEMENTS THAT OCCURRED OR THAT THEY HOPED WOULD OCCUR IN THEIR AREAS, AND OF THE PENALTIES THAT WOULD FOLLOW IF THEY WERE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT COOPERATIVE.

-- A LESS SUBTLE GOLKAR TECHNIQUE INVOLVED TARGETING AREAS WHERE IT KNEW IT WAS WEAK AND PAYING VOTERS TO SIT OUT THE ELECTION. SEVERAL WEEKS BEFORE THE ELECTION, A VOTER KNOWN NOT TO SUPPORT GOLKAR WOULD BE GIVEN 10,000 RUPIAH (APPROXIMATELY 4 USD AT THE TIME) OR TEN KILOS OF RICE TO LEAVE TOWN ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION AND REFRAIN FROM VOTING. [redacted]CITED AS A MORE EXTREME CASE OF GOLKAR MANIPULATION THE INTIMIDATION BY "PREMAN" (HOODLUMS) OF PPP AND PDI SUPPORTERS IN POORER URBAN AREAS SUCH AS TANAH ABANG, JAKARTA SO THAT THEY WOULD VOTE FOR GOLKAR. B1

11. (U) ALTHOUGH A FORMAL GOLKAR PARTNER IN THE 1987 AND 1992 ELECTIONS, ABRI, UNDER GENERAL BENNY MURDANI, PLAYED A LESS PARTISAN ROLE THAN IT DID IN THE 1997 ELECTIONS. WHILE ALWAYS CHARGED WITH ENSURING SECURITY AND ORDER FOR THE ELECTION, IN 1997 THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GEN. HARTONO, NOW MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, WENT SO FAR AS TO DECLARE THAT ABRI MEMBERS WERE GOLKAR CADRE. (NOTE: SEVERAL SENIOR MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS DISTANCED THEMSELVES FROM HARTONO'S REMARKS. END NOTE)

12. (U) CURRENT GOLKAR PARTY LITERATURE, PUBLISHED BY ITS CENTRAL BOARD, ILLUSTRATES HOW THE RULING PARTY PERCEIVES ITS ROLE WITHIN THE SYSTEM:

PAGE 01 JAKART 02451 03 OF 05 302330Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	DCP-01	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W		

----------392B1B 302343Z /38

R 302328Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1318
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 002451

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA'S "FIVE POLITICAL LAWS"

REF: 97 JAKARTA 1437

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GOLKAR "...WAS SET UP TO FIGHT AGAINST THE SUPPRESSION IMPOSED BY POLITICAL PARTIES, ESPECIALLY THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI)... OTHER SOCIOPOLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, NAMELY THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), ARE GOLKAR'S POLITICAL PARTNERS.

SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE FIVE POLITICAL LAWS
---

13. (U) OPPOSITION TO THE FIVE POLITICAL LAWS (LAWS NO. 1, 2, 3, 5, AND 8/1985, ALL EXCEPT THE LATTER TWO BASED ON 1975 LAWS) FOCUSES ON A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE LAWS' UNFAIRNESS AND INHERENTLY UNDEMOCRATIC CHARACTER. THE MOST COMMONLY CRITICIZED ASPECTS ARE HIGHLIGHTED BELOW:

LAW NO. 1/1985: (ON GENERAL ELECTIONS) (BASED ON LAW NO. 15/1969, AMENDED AS LAW NO. 4/1975):

-- ARTICLE 8 OF THAT LAW IDENTIFIES THE GOVERNMENT AS THE ORGANIZER OF THE GENERAL ELECTION. THERE ARE POPULAR CALLS FOR AN INDEPENDENT AND NEUTRAL BODY TO BE ESTABLISHED TO ORGANIZE THE ELECTIONS, WHICH ARE NOW UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR WHO SUPERVISES THE ELECTION COMMISSION. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAS ALWAYS APPOINTED AN EX-MILITARY OFFICIAL TO THAT POSITION.

-- ARTICLE 16 OF THIS LAW AUTHORIZES THE GOVERNMENT TO DETERMINE WHETHER A CANDIDATE FOR ANY PARTY WILL BE ALLOWED TO STAND FOR OFFICE.

-- ARTICLE 17 EMPOWERS PARTY LEADERS TO DISCIPLINE PARTY MEMBERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, WHO VIOLATE PARTY DECISIONS. PARLIAMENT MEMBERS ARE THUS RESPONSIBLE TO THEIR PARTY LEADERS AND NOT TO THE PEOPLE.

-- ARTICLE 19 REQUIRES THAT PARTIES ADHERE TO GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVES AND PRECEPTS WITH REGARDS TO SELECTION OF CANDIDATES. THIS REQUIREMENT IS IN ADDITION TO REQUIREMENTS THAT ALL CANDIDATES NOMINATED BY THE PARTIES BE VETTED THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT (ARTICLE 16 OF THIS LAW). THIS PROVISION WAS REINFORCED WITH THE 1990 PRESIDENTIAL REGULATION (NO. 16) WHICH UNDERSCORED THAT ALL PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES WERE TO BE SCREENED BY THE GOVERNMENT. TWO CANDIDATES SCREENED OUT BY THE GOVERNMENT, BRIG. GENERAL ROEMINI ASTUTI AND MARZUKI DARUSMAN, SUBSEQUENTLY BECAME MEMBERS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. INITIALLY, GOVERNMENT SCREENING SOUGHT TO IDENTIFY OPPONENTS FROM THE SEPTEMBER 1965 PERIOD BUT SINCE THAT TIME HAS EXPANDED TO PERSONS "INFLUENCED" BY THOSE EVENTS, INCLUDING PERSONS BORN

AFTER 1965.

-- ARTICLES 22 AND 23 EMPOWER THE GOVERNMENT TO SUPERVISE ALL BALLOTING AND THE COUNTING OF VOTES, ALTHOUGH PARTY REPRESENTATIVES ARE PERMITTED TO BE PRESENT DURING BALLOTING AND WHEN VOTES ARE TALLIED.

LAW NO. 2/1985 (ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY AND THE PARLIAMENT) (BASED ON LAW NO 16/1969, AMENDED AS LAW NO. 5/1975):

-- ARTICLE 1 STIPULATES THAT THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT BODY, THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH IS EMPOWERED INTER

ALIA TO SELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT, IS TO BE COMPOSED OF 500 UN-ELECTED, PRESIDENTALLY-SELECTED MEMBERS, IN ADDITION TO THE 425 ELECTED MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENT (DPR). AN ADDITIONAL 75 MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENT AND THE MPR, REPRESENTING ABRI, ARE ALSO SELECTED BY THE PRESIDENT.

-- ARTICLES 2 AND 5 CITE SEVEN CONDITIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE MPR AND STIPULATE THAT DISMISSAL OF AN MPR MEMBER SHALL BE BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE, RENDERING MEMBERS (WHO ARE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS) SUBJECT TO PRESIDENTIAL WILL.

-- ARTICLE 10 REQUIRES THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE DPR BE THE APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVES OF EXISTING POLITICAL PARTIES OR ABRI AND GOLKAR (THE LATTER IS TECHNICALLY NOT REGARDED AS A PARTY). THIS EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDES "INDEPENDENT" MEMBERS OF THE DPR.

-- ARTICLES 11 AND 13 STIPULATE THAT THE INAUGURATION AND DISMISSAL OF THE DPR IS BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE.

-- ARTICLE 17 DEFINES REGULATIONS FOR THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS (DPRD) WHICH ARE IDENTICAL TO THOSE GOVERNING THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT, REPLICATING THE SAME PRESIDENTIAL POWER OVER THOSE PARLIAMENTS, EXERCISED THROUGH THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS.

-- ARTICLES 18 AND 20 STATE THE INAUGURATION AND DISMISSAL OF

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1112

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1112

PAGE 01 JAKART 02451 04 OF 05 302330Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	DCP-01	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W		

----------392B2A 302344Z /38

R 302328Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1319
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 002451

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA'S "FIVE POLITICAL LAWS"

CONFIDENTIAL

PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS WILL BE BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS ACTING AT THE BEHEST OF THE PRESIDENT.

-- ARTICLE 24 EMPOWERS EACH PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS, TO NOMINATE MEMBERS OF ABRI TO THE LOCAL PARLIAMENT (DPRD).

-- ARTICLES 25 AND 27 EMPOWER EACH GOVERNOR TO INAUGURATE AND DISMISS THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT AT THE BEHEST OF THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS.

-- ARTICLE 43 PERMITS REGULATION OF NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL LEVEL ELECTIONS TO BE BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE.

LAW NO. 3/1985 (ON POLITICAL PARTIES AND GOLKAR) (BASED ON LAW NO. 3/1975):

-- ARTICLE 1 RENDERS UNCONSITUTIONAL ANY PARTY OTHER THAN THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI), THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) OR GOLKAR. TWO RECENT ATTEMPTS TO CREATE POLITICAL PARTIES, SRI BINTANG PAMUNGAS'S "INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC UNITY PARTY" AND BUDIMAN SUDJAKMITO'S "PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY," WERE BLOCKED.

-- ARTICLE 8 REQUIRES THAT PUBLIC SERVANTS WHO WISH TO JOIN A POLITICAL PARTY (OTHER THAN GOLKAR) MUST INFORM THEIR SUPERVISORS, EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDING SUCH POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

-- ARTICLE 14 EMPOWERS THE PRESIDENT TO DISBAND THE DPR, THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND EVEN GOLKAR.

CONFIDENTIAL

LAW NO. 5/1985 (ON REFERENDA)

-- ARTICLE 2 STATES THAT THE 1945 CONSTITUTION CAN BE CHANGED ONLY THROUGH REFERENDA. THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN USED TO PRECLUDE MEETINGS OR MOVEMENTS AIMED AT REFORMING ANY ASPECT OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION. (NOTE: THIS LAW IS IN CONFLICT WITH ARTICLE 37 OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION, WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE CONSTITUTION CAN BE AMENDED BY A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY VOTE IF TWO-THIRDS OF THE MEMBERS ARE PRESENT.)
-- ARTICLES 8 AND 9 STIPULATE THAT ANY REFERENDUM MUST BE CARRIED OUT UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE PRESIDENT THROUGH AN INSTITUTION WHICH WOULD BE CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS AS IS THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION. THUS, ANY FUNDAMENTAL REFORM NOT FAVORED BY THE PRESIDENT WOULD PROBABLY NOT SUCCEED EVEN IF IT WERE TO REACH THE STAGE OF A REFERENDUM.

LAW NO. 8/1985 (ON PUBLIC/SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS)

-- ARTICLE 2 REQUIRES THAT ALL ORGANIZATIONS BE "BASED ON" THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA.

-- ARTICLE 8 REQUIRES THAT ALL ORGANIZATIONS PERTAINING TO MASS INTERESTS BE COMBINED UNDER A SINGLE LEADERSHIP WHICH UNITES "SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS." IT IS ON THIS BASIS THAT ONLY ONE LABOR FEDERATION (SPSI) IS RECOGNIZED AND RIVAL ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE SBSI LABOR FEDERATION, ARE RESTRICTED TO NGO STATUS OR BANNED.

-- ARTICLES 12, 13, 14, 15 AND 16 EMPOWER THE GOVERNMENT TO ASSIST IN ORGANIZING ALL MASS ORGANIZATIONS. THESE ARTICLES ALSO EMPOWER THE GOVERNMENT TO SUSPEND A MASS ORGANIZATION'S BOARD OR

DISBAND THE ORGANIZATION.

14. (C) COMMENT: THE PUSH FOR POLITICAL REFORM, ESSENTIALLY A DEMOCRATIZING OF POLITICAL LIFE AND PROCESS IN INDONESIA, IS GAINING STRENGTH, WITH STUDENT DEMANDS NOW ECHOING THROUGH THE MEDIA INTO SOCIETY AT LARGE. OBSERVERS SUCH AS GOENAWAN MOHAMAD

MAINTAIN THAT ECONOMIC REFORM WITHOUT POLITICAL REFORM IS "LIKE TRYING TO WASH ONLY ONE HAND." [redacted] B1
[redacted] DESCRIBED HOPES OF INSTITUTING REAL ECONOMIC REFORM WITHOUT POLITICAL REFORM AS "A DREAM WHICH WILL NEVER COME TRUE," OFFERING AS AN EXAMPLE THE FUTILITY OF FORMULATING A NEW BANKRUPTCY LAW IF IT IS TO OPERATE IN A CORRUPT JUDICIAL SYSTEM CONTROLLED BY THE PRESIDENT. [redacted] B1
ARGUES THAT ECONOMIC REFORM WITHOUT AN EXPANSION OF LABOR RIGHTS AND POLITICAL REFORM IS MEANINGLESS, ADDING, "THAT IS WHAT YOU (SOEHARTO) HAVE TAUGHT US." POLITICAL REFORM, IF IT IS TO COME, WILL REQUIRE REVISION OR SCRAPPING OF THE FIVE POLITICAL LAWS WHOSE OVERLAPPING AND REDUNDANT FEATURES COMPLICATE ANY EFFORT TO AMEND THEM.

15. (C) GROWING UNREST OVER THE PAST 24 MONTHS AND THE EMERGENCE OF LESS CONSTRAINED PRESS OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS, ARE MAKING THE GOVERNMENT'S TIGHT CONTROL ON POLITICAL LIFE A LESS EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ENSURING STABILITY. SUCH CONTROLS, IN RESTRICTING CONFLICTS WHICH ARISE FROM COMPETING POLITICAL INTERESTS, MAY IN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1415

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1415

PAGE 01 JAKART 02451 05 OF 05 302330Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00

TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-04
G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /023W
----------392B2C 010230Z /38

R 302328Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1320
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 002451

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/02
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA'S "FIVE POLITICAL LAWS"

REF: 97 JAKARTA 1437

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FACT HAVE REDIRECTED THESE SOCIETAL CONFLICTS INTO ULTIMATELY MORE DAMAGING CHANNELS.

16. (C) [redacted] REFLECTING ON INDONESIA'S TRANSITION B1
FROM SOEKARNO'S "GUIDED-DEMOCRACY" TO SOEHARTO'S "PANCASILA-DEMOCRACY" COMMENTED RECENTLY, "PERHAPS IT IS TIME WE TRIED DEMOCRACY WITHOUT THE HYPHENS." INDONESIA'S CURRENT POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS DO NOT PERMIT SUCH TRANSITIONS TO OCCUR SMOOTHLY.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2611

PAGE 01 JAKART 07380 01 OF 02 230835Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	/022W

----------08E9BE 230835Z /38

R 230832Z DEC 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8826
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 007380

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ISLAMIC PARTY DELAYS ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE

REF: A) JAKARTA 6244; B) JAKARTA 6145; C) JAKARTA 3744

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 07380 01 OF 02 230835Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 22 DEC 2022
DATE/CASE ID: 15 SEP 2006 200503193

1.5(D). DECLASSIFY ON 12/22/16. 1.6X6

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN A SURPRISE MOVE, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) DELAYED ITS ANNOUNCEMENT OF A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AT THE END OF ITS LEADERSHIP MEETING ON DECEMBER 16. IN THE MIDST OF RUMORS ABOUT SOEHARTO'S HEALTH, THE PARTY'S GENERAL CHAIRMAN SAID HE WOULD MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT AT THE "APPROPRIATE TIME" BEFORE MARCH. ACCORDING TO PUBLIC ACCOUNTS OF THE MEETING, THERE WERE DIVISIONS AMONG THE PPP'S PROVINCIAL BRANCHES, WITH ONE BRANCH, YOGYAKARTA, OPTING FOR MUSLIM LEADER AMIEN RAIS AS THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. [redacted] B1 [redacted] TOLD EMBOFFS THAT THE DECISION TO DELAY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARTY'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN BARGAINING LEVERAGE IN AN EFFORT TO PUSH POLITICAL REFORM MEASURES THROUGH THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR). HE MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE END PPP WOULD LIKELY ENDORSE SOEHARTO FOR ANOTHER TERM. THE PARTY WOULD RELENT, AS USUAL, WHEN FACING GOVERNMENT PRESSURE. IN COMMENT WE NOTE THAT FRESH DOUBTS ABOUT SOEHARTO'S HEALTH COULD FURTHER COMPLICATE PPP'S DECISION-MAKING. END SUMMARY

PPP DELAYS ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE

3. (U) THE MUSLIM-ORIENTED UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) ENDED ITS NATIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING ON DECEMBER 16, AMIDST RUMORS ABOUT SOEHARTO'S HEALTH, WITHOUT ANNOUNCING ITS CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT. INSTEAD, IT SAID THAT THE PARTY'S GENERAL CHAIRMAN, ISMAIL HASAN METAREUM ("BUYA"), WOULD DO SO AT THE "APPROPRIATE TIME." METAREUM INSISTED,

SOMEWHAT UNCONVINCINGLY, THAT THE DELAY HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PRESIDENT'S HEALTH. THE DAY BEFORE, DECEMBER 15, PPP SECRETARY GENERAL TOSARI WIDJAJA HAD PUBLICLY APOLOGIZED FOR SUSPENDING THE PRESS CONFERENCE SCHEDULED TO MAKE PUBLIC THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING, SAYING THAT THE MEETING HAD NOT YET REACHED ANY DECISIONS.

4. (C) RULING PARTY GOLKAR HAD ANNOUNCED ON OCTOBER 19, FOLLOWING ITS LEADERSHIP MEETING, THAT IT WOULD SUPPORT

SOEHARTO FOR A SEVENTH TERM AS PRESIDENT (REFTEL B). SINCE THE PPP'S NATIONAL LEADERSHIP SIGNED OFF IN JUNE ON THE RESULTS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION (REFTEL C), DESPITE THE PROTESTS OF MANY OF ITS LOCAL BRANCHES ABOUT ELECTORAL FRAUD, THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE TO SUGGEST THAT THE NATIONAL PARTY LEADERSHIP MIGHT EXHIBIT INDEPENDENCE REGARDING THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION. AS HISTORICAL CONTEXT, THE PPP HAD PUBLICLY BACKED SOEHARTO'S RE-ELECTION LONG BEFORE THE LAST MPR IN 1993.

5. (C) THE MAJORITY (20) OF PPP'S 27 PROVINCIAL BRANCHES HAD OPTED AT THE LEADERSHIP MEETING TO DELEGATE THE ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING THE PARTY'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE TO THE GENERAL CHAIRMAN, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. THE YOGYAKARTA BRANCH WANTED AMIEN RAIS FOR PRESIDENT, AND SIX SUPPORTED SOEHARTO OUTRIGHT (IRIAN JAYA, WEST JAVA, SOUTH SUMATRA, BENGKULU, WEST NUSA TENGGARA). CONGEN SURABAYA HAS PICKED UP FROM LOCAL PPP CONTACTS THAT A GENUINE DESIRE TO PRESERVE THE PARTY'S OPTIONS WAS AT LEAST PARTLY BEHIND THE DECISION TO DELAY PPP'S ANNOUNCEMENT (SEE SEPTEL).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PPP LEADER: "I'LL USE MY FREEDOM UNTIL I'M PRESSURED"

---

6. (C) DURING A MEETING WITH ACTING POLCOUNS AND POLOFF ON [redacted] SAID B1 THAT THE PPP CENTRAL BOARD WANTED TO USE AN EVENTUAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AS LEVERAGE IN ITS "BARGAINING" FOR THE POLITICAL REFORM AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROPOSALS THAT IT WAS PURSUING WITHIN THE MPR WORKING COMMITTEE. THE COMMITTEE IS CURRENTLY PREPARING FOR THE MARCH GENERAL SESSION OF THE MPR (REFTEL A).

7. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THE PPP WAS SEEKING REFORM OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, TO BE INCORPORATED EITHER IN THE "BROAD OUTLINES OF NATIONAL POLICE" (GBHN) OR AN MPR DECREE ("KETETAPAN"). SPECIFICALLY, IT WANTED THE MINORITY PARTIES (NOT JUST THE GOVERNMENT/GOLKAR) TO BE INVOLVED IN VOTER REGISTRATION, THE CARRYING OUT OF THE ELECTION, AND VOTE COUNTING. IN THIS REGARD, ONE KEY CHANGE WHICH PPP B1

IS SEEKING IS RECEIPT BY PARTY REPRESENTATIVE OF A COPY OF THE FINAL VOTE TALLY IN EACH POLLING STATION -- A CHANGE WHICH COULD MAKE POSSIBLE AN INDEPENDENT TALLY OF VOTES. PPP WAS ALSO SEEKING REFORM OF THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM THAT WOULD ALLOW PPP AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ2612

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2612

PAGE 01 JAKART 07380 02 OF 02 230835Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	/022W

----------08E9C5 230835Z /38

R 230832Z DEC 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8827
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 007380

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ISLAMIC PARTY DELAYS ANNOUNCEMENT OF
- PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE

REF: A) JAKARTA 6244; B) JAKARTA 6145; C) JAKARTA 3744

(PDI) TO ESTABLISH BRANCHES BELOW THE DISTRICT LEVEL
CONFIDENTIAL

(NOTE: CURRENTLY, ONLY GOLKAR IS IN EFFECT ABLE TO OPERATE AT THE SUB-DISTRICT AND VILLAGE LEVEL. END NOTE). PPP ALSO STRONGLY ADVOCATED THAT THE MPR ENDORSE SOME KIND OF PROVISION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

8. (C) [redacted] B1 INSISTED THAT THESE WERE REQUIREMENTS FOR PPP'S ENDORSEMENT OF SOEHARTO FOR PRESIDENT, HE MADE CLEAR THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY THERE WAS LITTLE DOUBT THAT PPP WOULD NOMINATE SOEHARTO (COMMENT: PRESUMABLY IF THE PRESIDENT WAS SUFFICIENTLY HEALTHY AND THE REGIME WANTED PPP TO DO SO. END COMMENT.) IN A CLASSIC EXPRESSION OF THE CURRENT PPP NATIONAL LEADERSHIP'S SUBSERVIENCE TO THE GOVERNMENT, HE CANDIDLY SAID "I WILL USE MY FREEDOM UNTIL I'M PRESSURED."

9. (U) A PROMINENT POLITICAL ANALYST FROM THE INDONESIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCES (LIPI), INDRIA SAMEGO, PUBLICLY CONCLUDED THAT PPP WAS PLAYING FOR TIME AND PUTTING OFF THE INEVITABLE BY DELAYING ITS ANNOUNCEMENT OF A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. HE WAS QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS SAYING THAT "IT HAS BEEN WIDELY KNOWN THAT PPP WILL RENOMINATE PAK HARTO (SOEHARTO) AS IT DID IN THE PAST, THOUGH SOME MEMBERS DISAGREE WITH THE DECISION." PPP WAS TRYING TO DELAY MAKING A DECISION THAT WOULD BE CONTROVERSIAL AMONG SOME OF ITS MEMBERS, HE CONTENDED. SAMEGO CONCLUDED, MOREOVER, THAT THE PPP LEADERSHIP HAD CALCULATED THAT ONCE IT ANNOUNCED ITS NOMINATION OF SOEHARTO, THE PARTY'S "POPULARITY AND IMAGE" WOULD

DECLINE.
DYNAMICS IN THE MPR WORKING COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

10. (C) [redacted] B1
[redacted] PREPARING FOR THE MPR'S GENERAL SESSION IN MARCH, EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S CHILDREN, SITI HARDIYANTI RUKMANA (TUTUT) AND BAMBANG TRIHATMODJO WERE PROVING TO BE VERY ACTIVE MEMBERS IN THE MPR. [redacted] B1
HE OBSERVED THAT SHE WOULD GO STRAIGHT TO HER FATHER TO RESOLVE ISSUES AND GET DECISIONS, AND CLAIMED THAT THIS WAS IN FACT A USEFUL ROLE. HE SAID THAT MEMBERS OF THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR WERE PREPARED TO "DIALOGUE" WITH THE OTHERS THIS YEAR, BUT ALSO CONTENDED THAT KEY POSITIONS IN THE MPR WERE DOMINATED BY THE MILITARY, AS EVEN THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR WAS FIELDING MANY RETIRED OFFICERS.

COMMENT

11. (C) PPP'S DECISION TO POSTPONE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE HAS BEEN EXPLAINED AS A BID TO GAIN BARGAINING LEVERAGE OR AN ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN PARTY UNITY BY DELAYING A DECISION THAT COULD BE UNPOPULAR WITH SOME OF ITS MEMBERS. IN EITHER CASE, THE RUMORS ABOUT SOEHARTO'S HEALTH COULD HAVE BEEN A FACTOR THAT PROMPTED AND EMBOLDENED THE PARTY TO POSTPONE THE ANNOUNCEMENT. IT SEEMS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE NATIONAL PARTY LEADERSHIP WILL IN THE END ENDORSE SOEHARTO IF HE IS PERCEIVED TO BE SUFFICIENTLY HEALTHY, ALTHOUGH FRESH DOUBTS ABOUT HIS HEALTH COULD AGAIN THROW THE DECISION INTO QUESTION. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0210

PAGE 01 JAKART 06931 01 OF 07 261052Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	/032W						

----------FF5149 261054Z /38
R 261051Z NOV 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8498
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 JAKARTA 006931

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/07

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: UNCERTAINTY OVER VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION
- WITHIN THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06931 01 OF 07 261052Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 30 OCT 2017
DATE/CASE ID: 15 SEP 2006 200503193

REF: A) JAKARTA 6244; B) JAKARTA 6145; C) JAKARTA 5893;
- D) JAKARTA 5735; E) JAKARTA 5463; F) JAKARTA 4988
G) JAKARTA 3619; H) JAKARTA 3386; I) JAKARTA 2437

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: UNCERTAINTY OVER WHOM WILL BE CHOSEN AS VICE PRESIDENT IN MARCH, ADDED TO THE LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN THE SELECTION PROCESS AND THE ENORMITY OF WHAT IS POTENTIALLY AT STAKE, GENERATES TREMENDOUS INCENTIVE FOR BACKSTAGE COMPETITION AND POLITICAL INTRIGUE AMONG THE ASPIRING NOMINEES AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. SPECULATION WITHIN THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT ABOUT THE UPCOMING VICE PRESIDENTIAL CHOICE IS MORE INTENSE THAN BEFORE PREVIOUS SESSIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR). DESPITE SOEHARTO'S REFUSAL TO ADDRESS THE SUCCESSION ISSUE OPENLY, IT IS WIDELY ASSUMED THAT THE NEXT VICE PRESIDENT COULD BECOME PRESIDENT IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN SOEHARTO'S ADVANCING AGE. CURRENT CONVENTIONAL WISDOM IS THAT SOEHARTO ALONE WILL DECIDE WHO WILL BECOME VICE PRESIDENT, AND THAT HE PROBABLY HAS NOT MADE UP HIS MIND YET. SOEHARTO'S PERCEIVED IRON-TIGHT CONTROL OVER THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION THIS TIME AROUND CONTRASTS WITH THE WIDELY HELD BELIEF THAT IN 1993 THE ARMED FORCES JUMPED THE GUN BY ANNOUNCING THEIR CHOICE PREMATURELY, EFFECTIVELY PRESENTING SOEHARTO WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI.

3. (C) FIVE HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE REPEATEDLY MENTIONED IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AS THE MAIN CONTENDERS FOR THE VICE PRESIDENCY: THE INCUMBENT TRY SUTRISNO, MINISTER

OF INFORMATION HARTONO, MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY HABIBIE, STATE PLANNING MINISTER GINANDJAR, AND SPEAKER OF THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) AND PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) HARMOKO. OTHERS ALSO RECEIVE SERIOUS MENTION, INCLUDING ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WIRANTO, COORDINATING MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE HARTARTO, DEFENSE MINISTER SUDRADJAT, AND FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SUDHARMONO. ON THE OTHER HAND, ALL OF THE SUPPOSED FRONT RUNNERS HAVE POTENTIAL FLAWS WHICH COULD PREVENT THEM FROM

GETTING THE NOD IN 1998. ONE INFLUENTIAL ANALYST PUBLICLY REMARKED THAT CIVILIANS WERE NOT READY TO ASSUME NATIONAL LEADERSHIP, REFLECTING A BELIEF THAT THE NEXT VICE PRESIDENT WOULD BE CONNECTED TO THE MILITARY. MOST COMMENTATORS ARE CAREFUL TO POINT OUT THAT A DARK HORSE COULD YET EMERGE. THE PRESIDENT'S ELDEST DAUGHTER, SITI HARDIYANTI RUKMANA, LOOMS OVER THE ENTIRE FIELD. ALTHOUGH FEW ARE WILLING TO PREDICT THAT SHE COULD BE NAMED VICE PRESIDENT IN 1998, THE ESTABLISHMENT SEES HER AS AN ASCENDING POLITICAL FIGURE WHO COULD PLAY A MAJOR LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE FUTURE, AND BELIEVES THAT AT THE LEAST SHE WILL BECOME THE GOLKAR GENERAL CHAIRPERSON IN OCTOBER. END SUMMARY

4. (U) THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS BASED ON POLOFF'S RECENT MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM A BROAD RANGE OF GROUPS, INCLUDING: THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI), INDONESIA'S TWO LARGEST MASS ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS, NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) AND MUHAMMADIYAH, THE ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS (ICMI), ITS THINK TANK, THE CENTER FOR

INFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (CIDES), THE MILITARY'S NATIONAL RESILIENCE INSTITUTE (LEMHANNAS), AND THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS).

ASSUMPTIONS WITHIN POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT ABOUT SUCCESSION

---

5. (C) GIVEN THE OPAQUE AND MANIPULATIVE NATURE OF THE SOEHARTO REGIME, THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT HAS DIFFICULTY ASSESSING AND REACHING A CONSENSUS ON THE STATE OF POLITICAL PLAY AT ANY GIVEN TIME. SOEHARTO KEEPS THEM GUESSING, WHICH - AS HAS OFTEN BEEN OBSERVED THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF THE NEW ORDER - IS A MAJOR SOURCE OF HIS POWER AND CONTROL. THIS UNCERTAINTY IS PARTICULARLY ACUTE NOW IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MARCH SELECTION OF A PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT BY THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR). POLITICAL PLAYERS IN JAKARTA AGREE ON ONLY THE MOST BASIC AND OBVIOUS POINTS. THE CONSENSUS IN MOST

QUARTERS IS THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WILL BE SELECTED FOR A SEVENTH TERM IF HE REMAINS HEALTHY AND IF THAT IS HIS DESIRE, DESPITE HIS RECENT CALL FOR A REAFFIRMATION OF THE PEOPLE'S BELIEF IN HIS LEADERSHIP (REFTEL B).

6. (C) THERE IS EVEN STRONGER AGREEMENT THAT SOEHARTO ALONE WILL DETERMINE WHO WILL BECOME THE NEXT VICE PRESIDENT. FOR EXAMPLE, GOLKAR CENTRAL BOARD MEMBER AND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0195

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0195

PAGE 01 JAKART 06931 02 OF 07 261052Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	/033W					

----------FF5117 261052Z /38

R 261051Z NOV 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8499
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/07
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: UNCERTAINTY OVER VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION
- WITHIN THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT

REF: A) JAKARTA 6244; B) JAKARTA 6145; C) JAKARTA 5893;
[redacted] COMMENTED TO POLOFF B1
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THAT "ONLY THE PRESIDENT KNOWS WHO WILL BE THE CHOICE,"
AND QUESTIONED WHY "ANY ONE MAN HAD SO MUCH POWER." [redacted] B1
AGREED THAT "EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON SOEHARTO." HAROLD CROUCH, THE WELL-KNOWN AUSTRALIAN ANALYST OF INDONESIAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, WAS QUOTED BY THE POLITICAL JOURNAL FORUM KEADILAN AS CONTENDING THAT "EVERYONE IS WAITING FOR PAK HARTO'S (SOEHARTO) DECISION" ON THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. SOEHARTO'S DOMINANCE OVER THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS THIS TIME AROUND IS LARGELY INTERPRETED AS DESIGNED TO PREVENT A REPETITION OF 1993 EVENTS, WHEN IT WAS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE ARMED FORCES FACTION AND OTHER POLITICAL PLAYERS PREMATURELY ANNOUNCED THEIR CANDIDATE FOR VICE PRESIDENT, TRY SUTRISNO, AND THUS EFFECTIVELY PRESENTED SOEHARTO WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI (REFTEL A).

7. (C) DISCUSSION OF THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION SUBSTITUTES FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION DEBATE THAT, AT LEAST IN OFFICIAL CIRCLES, IS NOT PERMITTED TO OCCUR OPENLY. THE ISSUE OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY, AND EVEN ITS CONNECTION TO POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION, HAS BEEN A HOT TOPIC OF GOSSIP BEFORE PREVIOUS MPR'S. THE QUESTION OF WHO WILL BE VICE PRESIDENT HAS TAKEN ON NEW URGENCY THIS TIME, HOWEVER, AS THE PRESIDENT'S AGE (76) AND TENURE IN OFFICE (30 PLUS YEARS) MAKE THE EXPECTATION THAT HE WILL LEAVE OFFICE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER EVER MORE TANGIBLE. EVEN THOUGH THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID VIRTUALLY

NOTHING ON THE MATTER OF WHO WILL SUCCEED HIM, POLITICAL PLAYERS AND ANALYSTS PRESUME THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT WHOMEVER IS CHOSEN VICE PRESIDENT IN MARCH COULD

SUCCEED SOEHARTO, IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT BECOME PRESIDENT IF THE INCUMBENT DIES OR STEPS DOWN DURING HIS TERM (NOTE: ALTHOUGH THERE IS AN INFLUENTIAL INTERPRETATION THAT ASSERTS THAT THE MPR WOULD STILL HAVE TO MEET TO GIVE ITS MANDATE TO THE NEW PRESIDENT, REFTEL I. END NOTE).

8. (C) IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOEHARTO WANTS TO SEE HOW THE VARIOUS POTENTIAL CANDIDATES BEHAVE OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, AND WILL CHOOSE THE ONE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS TO HIS POLITICAL POSITION. [redacted] B1 RECENTLY CONTENDED TO POLOFF THAT SOEHARTO PROBABLY HAD NOT DECIDED YET WHOM HE WANTED FOR VICE PRESIDENT. THIS UNCERTAINTY OVER WHOM WILL BE CHOSEN, ADDED TO THE LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN THE SELECTION PROCESS AND THE ENORMITY OF WHAT IS POTENTIALLY AT STAKE, BREEDS TREMENDOUS INCENTIVE FOR BACKSTAGE COMPETITION AMONG THE POTENTIAL NOMINEES AND THEIR SUPPORTERS, AND AMPLE GROUNDS FOR SUSPICIONS OF POLITICAL INTRIGUE. ACCORDING TO THIS INTERPRETATION, THE CONTENDERS ARE ATTEMPTING TO BE SELECTED FOR THE VICE PRESIDENCY BY COMPETING FOR SOEHARTO'S FAVOR WHILE AT THE SAME TIME TAKING ACTIONS TO DISCREDIT THEIR OPPONENTS.

9. (C) FOR EXAMPLE, POLITICAL PLAYERS AND ANALYSTS FROM ACROSS THE SPECTRUM HAVE REPEATEDLY CHARGED THAT THE WAVE OF RIOTS IN INDONESIA OVER THE PAST 18 MONTHS HAS BEEN CAUSED, OR AT LEAST EXPLOITED, BY "THIRD PARTIES" OR ELITES COMPETING OVER THE VICE PRESIDENCY AND FUTURE LEADERSHIP. THESE THEORIES ARE MOST OFTEN ASSOCIATED WITH

HARTONO, HABIBIE, AND ICMI. DESPITE THE DEARTH OF SUPPORTING EVIDENCE, THE PERSISTENCE OF THIS ARGUMENT INEVITABLY COLORS PERCEPTIONS OF ACTUAL MANEUVERING. MOST RECENTLY, ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, THE LEADER OF NU AND A LONGTIME CRITIC OF ICMI, REFERRED TO POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES AND WAS QUOTED IN THE JAKARTA POST ON OCTOBER 7 AS SAYING THAT IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MPR "THERE WILL BE CERTAIN PRESSURE GROUPS WAGING A CAMPAIGN FOR THEIR OWN VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES." HE STATED FURTHER THAT "I'M NOT SURE THAT THE PEOPLE'S VIOLENT ACTIONS IN THE RIOTS IN THE PAST WERE SPONTANEOUS. I BELIEVE THEY WERE PROVOKED."

10. (C) WAHID, ON THE SAME DAY, WAS QUOTED IN THE INDONESIAN LANGUAGE DAILY KOMPAS AS SAYING THAT NU WOULD USE "MASS ACTIONS" TO STOP ANY "UNCONSTITUTIONAL STEPS" IN ADVANCE OF THE MPR. HE FEARED THAT VARIOUS GROUPS WERE SEEKING TO FORCE THEIR CANDIDATES ON THE PRESIDENT AND WOULD ATTEMPT TO PRESENT HIM WITH A "FAIT ACCOMPLI." (NOTE: THIS IS THE SAME TERMINOLOGY THAT IS USED BY LOCAL ANALYSTS TO REFER TO THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION IN 1993. END NOTE.) ONE [redacted] EXPLAINED TO B1
POLOFF THAT THE CONTESTANTS WERE COMPETING TO GET THE NOD FROM SOEHARTO AND THAT WAHID MEANT THAT SOMEONE MIGHT

PAGE 01 JAKART 06931 03 OF 07 261052Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	/021W	

----------FF5119 261053Z /38

R 261051Z NOV 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8500
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 07 JAKARTA 006931

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/07
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: UNCERTAINTY OVER VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION
- WITHIN THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT

REF: A) JAKARTA 6244; B) JAKARTA 6145; C) JAKARTA 5893;
ATTEMPT TO PRESSURE SOEHARTO OVER THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL
SELECTION. (NOTE: SOEHARTO HAD, WITHOUT GIVING DETAILS,
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06931 03 OF 07 261052Z
USED THE TERM "BLACKMAIL" IN HIS PUBLIC COMMENTS. END
COMMENT.)

THE PLAYING FIELD AND PLAYERS
---

11. (C) MANY OF INDONESIA'S TOP SITTING GOVERNMENT AND

MILITARY OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN OPENLY DISCUSSED AS POTENTIAL VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES OVER THE PAST YEAR. A GROUP OF FIVE HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN MENTIONED IN THE PRESS FOR MANY MONTHS, AND IT INCLUDES SITTING VICE PRESIDENT TRY SUTRISNO, MINISTER OR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY HABIBIE, INFORMATION MINISTER HARTONO, STATE PLANNING MINISTER GINANDJAR, AND PARLIAMENT SPEAKER HARMOKO. THIS SAME GROUP IS REFERRED TO IN MANY PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, THOUGH AS OF LATE HARMOKO IS OFTEN DISMISSED OUT OF HAND, WHILE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WIRANTO, COORDINATING MINISTER FOR INDUSTRY AND TRADE HARTARTO AND DEFENSE MINISTER SUDRADJAT RECEIVE MORE SERIOUS MENTION (NOTE: THOUGH NEITHER WIRANTO, RUMORED TO BE IN LINE FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES, NOR HARTARTO RECEIVE MUCH, IF ANY, PUBLIC ATTENTION AS POTENTIAL CANDIDATES. END NOTE)

12. (C) MANY ANALYSTS ARE CAREFUL TO NOTE THAT THE SELECTION COULD ALWAYS TURN OUT TO BE A DARK HORSE AS HAS HAPPENED IN THE PAST. THE PRESS OFTEN ADDS A SECOND TIER OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND MILITARY OFFICERS AS POSSIBILITIES TO THE GROUP MENTIONED ABOVE, INCLUDING ARMED FORCES COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FEISAL TANJUNG AND STATE MINISTER MOERDIONO. FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SUDHARMONO AND SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER MAJOR GENERAL PRABOWO ARE SOMETIMES MENTIONED AS WELL IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS AS

CONFIDENTIAL

POSSIBLE CONTENDERS.

13. (C) OPINIONS DIVERGE WIDELY OVER WHO HAS THE BEST CHANCE TO BE TAPPED. IN MANY CASES, NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE CANDIDATE PROMOTED DEPENDS ON THE POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF THE COMMENTATOR. IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH POLOFF, [redacted] B1
[redacted] THOUGHT THAT SUTRISNO MIGHT BE RETAINED, [redacted] B1
NAMED GINANDJAR AS A STRONG CANDIDATE WHO COULD POSSIBLY EMERGE AS A COMPROMISE CHOICE BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS. [redacted] B1
[redacted] OFFERED SUTRISNO, SUDHARMONO, AND SUPREME ADVISORY BOARD (DPA) CHAIRMAN SUDOMO AS THE THREE STRONGEST CANDIDATES. [redacted] B1
WAS CONFIDENT THAT HABIBIE WAS IN LINE FOR THE POSITION, AND

MILITARY AND POLITICAL ANALYST, [redacted] THOUGHT B1
THAT WIRANTO MIGHT HAVE A GOOD SHOT. [redacted] B1
[redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS AND POLOFF THAT THE RACE WAS BETWEEN HARTONO AND HABIBIE. AN NU STUDENT LEADER TOLD POLOFF THAT THE ONLY TWO FIGURES WHO COULD BE ACCEPTED BY ALL SIDES WERE SUTRISNO OR SUDRADJAT.

RISE OF SOEHARTO'S DAUGHTER: "FUTURE LEADERSHIP FIGURE"

14. (C) LOOMING OVER THIS FIELD OF OFT MENTIONED VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IS THE PRESIDENT'S ELDEST DAUGHTER SITI HARDIYANTI RUKMANA (TUTUT). WITH THE BACKING OF HER FATHER, SHE HAS BECOME ONE OF THE WEALTHIEST PEOPLE IN THE COUNTRY AND A POLITICAL OPERATOR IN HER OWN RIGHT AS ONE OF THE EIGHT CHAIRPERSONS OF THE GOLKAR CENTRAL BOARD. THOUGH SHE NOW FIGURES PROMINENTLY IN MANY CURRENT

PROJECTIONS OF THE FUTURE POLITICAL PICTURE, FEW ARE WILLING TO GO AS FAR AS TO SAY THAT SHE COULD BE NOMINATED AS VICE PRESIDENT IN 1998. [redacted] TOLD THE B1
AMBASSADOR, HOWEVER, THAT HE THOUGHT THE PROBABILITY WAS HIGH (REFTEL C), AND [redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT SHE B1
COULD BE A DARK HORSE. ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, THE LEADER OF NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU), PROVIDED HER A PLATFORM TO REACH OUT TO THE NU MASSES IN THE RUN-UP TO THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, OPENLY CALLING HER A "FUTURE LEADERSHIP FIGURE." IN JUNE WAHID OUTLINED SEVERAL SCENARIOS TO EMBOFFS IN WHICH SHE COULD ASSUME LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS (REFTEL G). [redacted] B1
[redacted] TOLD AMBASSADOR ROY THERE WAS A STRONG CHANCE THAT TUTUT WOULD BE SELECTED, [redacted] B1

15. (C) CURRENT CONVENTIONAL WISDOM IS THAT TUTUT WILL BE ELECTED AS THE NEXT GENERAL CHAIRPERSON OF GOLKAR IN OCTOBER 1998, REPLACING HARMOKO. A WIDE RANGE OF SOURCES HAVE COMMENTED TO POLOFF THAT TUTUT SEEMS TO STAND IN A CATEGORY BY HERSELF, APART FROM THIS FIELD OF VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0223

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0223

PAGE 01 JAKART 06931 04 OF 07 261052Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	/032W						

----------FF519A 261056Z /38

R 261051Z NOV 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8501
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 07 JAKARTA 006931

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/07

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: UNCERTAINTY OVER VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION
- WITHIN THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

REF: A) JAKARTA 6244; B) JAKARTA 6145; C) JAKARTA 5893;
TO POLOFF THAT WHILE INDONESIANS WERE ACCUSTOMED TO "BAPAK-ISM," (GENERAL TITLE OF RESPECT, DERIVING FROM INDONESIAN WORD FOR "FATHER"), THEY WERE NOW MOVING TOWARD THE ERA OF "MBAK-ISM" (GENERAL TITLE OF RESPECT DERIVED FROM "OLDER SISTER," MEANING TUTUT). FORMER [redacted] B1
[redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT TUTUT'S INFLUENCE WAS ALREADY HEAVILY FELT IN THE JOCKEYING OVER THE NEXT CABINET. [redacted] B1
[redacted] TOLD POLCOUNS AND POLOFF THAT TUTUT WAS "GAINING MORE AND MORE POLITICAL INFLUENCE." (NOTE: IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT [redacted] ON HIS NEW POSITION WITH THE BACKING OF TUTUT. END NOTE.) SOURCES HAVE REPORTED TO THE EMBASSY THAT PRESENT CABINET MEMBERS HAVE BEEN PAYING CALLS ON TUTUT AT HOME, AND THAT IT IS NOW HER NAME, NOT HARMOKO'S, THAT CARRIES WEIGHT AT MEETINGS OF GOLKAR POLITICOS. B1

16. (C) AS POLITICAL PLAYERS AND ANALYSTS THEORIZE ABOUT FUTURE SUCCESSION SCENARIOS, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT SOEHARTO SEEK A WAY TO PROTECT HIMSELF AND HIS FAMILY FROM RETRIBUTION. FOR EXAMPLE, [redacted] B1
[redacted] THEORIZED TO POLOFF THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS SEEKING AN EQUATION THAT WOULD ALLOW HIM TO STEP DOWN, AVOID THE "SOUTH KOREA" SCENARIO, AND PROTECT HIS FAMILY AND ITS ENORMOUS WEALTH. HE INTERPRETED THE PRESIDENT'S AUGUST REQUEST FOR THE REINSTITUTION OF AN MPR DECREE GIVING HIM EXTRAORDINARY, EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS WITHIN THIS CONTEXT. (NOTE: THE DECREE HAD BEEN IN FORCE FROM 1966 TO 1993 WHEN IT WAS PERMITTED TO LAPSE. END

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE.) [redacted] ADVANCED THE THEORY THAT SOEHARTO COULD TAKE THESE EXTRAORDINARY POWERS AND SOMEHOW ENABLE TUTUT TO USE THEM TO BOLSTER THE FAMILY'S POSITION WHEN SOEHARTO HAD STEPPED DOWN. SHE WOULD NOT BE NAMED VICE PRESIDENT OR PRESIDENT, BECAUSE THAT WOULD BE TOO BLATANTLY "NEPOTISTIC," SAID [redacted] HE THOUGHT THAT A CANDIDATE SUCH AS ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WIRANTO MIGHT BECOME THE SUCCESSOR, IMPLYING THAT WIRANTO WOULD BE ABLE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY'S INTERESTS. HE SPECULATED THAT THIS COULD OCCUR AS EARLY AS 1999. B1 B1

THE "RED AND WHITE CANDIDATE": INCUMBENT TRY SUTRISNO

17. (C) [redacted] CONTENDED TO POLOFF THAT THE "RED AND WHITE" OFFICERS (NATIONALIST, OFTEN CONTRASTED WITH THE ISLAMIC, SANTRI OR "GREEN" GENERALS SUCH AS FEISAL TANJUNG), A GROUP WITHIN WHICH HE INCLUDED ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL WIRANTO, ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS LT. GENERAL YUNUS YOSFIAH, AND YOSFIAH'S ASSISTANT MAJ. GENERAL BAMBANG YUDHOYONO, WANTED ONE OF THEIR OWN AS VICE PRESIDENT. B1

[redacted] ACCORDING TO [redacted] THESE "RED AND WHITE" OFFICERS LIKED TRY SUTRISNO (NOTE: WHO IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN BACKED BY BENNY MOERDANI IN 1993. END NOTE) AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE EDI SUDRADJAT. HOWEVER, THEY KNEW THAT SOEHARTO DID NOT LIKE SUDRADJAT, SO HE WAS A LESS REALISTIC POSSIBILITY. B1

18. (C) [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] RECENTLY TOLD POLOFF THAT SUTRISNO STILL HAD STRONG SUPPORT WITHIN NU AND WAS CONSIDERED A "GOOD B1

MUSLIM" IN NU'S SENSE OF THE TERM. [redacted] ALSO POINTED B1
OUT THAT SUTRISNO'S SELF-EFFACING BEHAVIOR WHEN
ACCOMPANYING THE PRESIDENT IN PUBLIC WAS A STRONG FACTOR
IN HIS FAVOR. FOR EXAMPLE, SUTRISNO SELDOM WAVED TO
CITIZENS WHEN APPEARING WITH SOEHARTO. ACCORDING TO
[redacted] SOEHARTO DISTRUSTED ANYONE WHO APPEARED TO BE B1
OVERLY AMBITIOUS, AS HE ALWAYS SUSPECTED THAT SUCH
AMBITIONS COULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST HIM.

19. (C) THE USUAL ARGUMENT MADE AGAINST SUTRISNO REMAINING IN HIS JOB IS THAT THIS WOULD VIOLATE THE TRADITION OF THE NEW ORDER IN WHICH VICE PRESIDENTS HAVE NOT SERVED MORE THAN ONE TERM (THOUGH SRI SULTAN HAMENGKUBUWONO X WAS OFFERED AND DECLINED A SECOND TERM). A MORE SERIOUS OBSTACLE, HOWEVER, COULD BE PRECISELY THE SUPPORT THAT MOERDANI, THE FORMER ARMED FORCES COMMANDER AND DEFENSE MINISTER, WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE GIVEN SUTRISNO IN 1993. MOERDANI WAS WIDELY BELIEVED TO HAVE PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN PROMPTING THE ABRI FACTION TO ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY THAT SUTRISNO WAS ITS CANDIDATE FOR VICE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE 1993 MPR, THEREBY PRESENTING THE PRESIDENT WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI ON THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION.

THE ISLAMIC CANDIDATE AND PRESIDENTIAL PROTEGE: HABIBIE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0224

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0224

PAGE 01 JAKART 06931 05 OF 07 261052Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-08 ACDE-00 AID-00 ACQ-01 CIAE-00 SMEC-00

OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
/032W						

----------FF51A1 261057Z /38

R 261051Z NOV 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8502
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 07 JAKARTA 006931

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/07

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: UNCERTAINTY OVER VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION - WITHIN THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REF: A) JAKARTA 6244; B) JAKARTA 6145; C) JAKARTA 5893;

---

20. (C) MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY HABIBIE'S SUPPORTERS, THE CORE OF WHOM ARE MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS (ICMI) WHICH HE LEADS, POINT TO HIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP TO THE PRESIDENT, AND HIS POSITION WITHIN THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY, AS REASONS WHY HE WILL BE CHOSEN AS VICE PRESIDENT. ONE [redacted] B1 /ARGUED TO POLOFF RECENTLY THAT HABIBIE WAS STILL THE "CLOSEST MAN TO THE PRESIDENT" AND THAT THERE WAS "ALMOST A MYSTICAL CONNECTION" BETWEEN THE TWO MEN.

21. (C) [redacted] ADDED THAT HABIBIE'S LOYALTY TO THE PRESIDENT MEANT THAT THE MINISTER WAS "THE LEAST DANGEROUS" PERSON IN THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY FROM SOEHARTO'S STANDPOINT. BECAUSE OF THIS LOYALTY, [redacted] CONTENDED, SOEHARTO KNEW THAT HABIBIE WOULD NOT MOBILIZE MUSLIMS AGAINST HIM. HE CLAIMED THAT SOEHARTO, RECALLING THE ROLE THAT GROUPS LIKE THE INDONESIAN MUSLIM STUDENT ASSOCIATION (HMI) HAD PLAYED IN PRESSURING SUKARNO OUT OF POWER IN 1966-67, RECOGNIZED THE POTENTIAL DANGER OF THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY TO HIM AND THUS NEEDED SOMEONE TO CONTROL IT.

22. (C) AS CONCRETE PROOF THAT HABIBIE WAS ON THE RISE, [redacted] SAID THAT SOEHARTO WANTED "NO CONTACT WITH THE FACTION LEADERS AT THE MPR" AND INSTEAD WOULD HANDLE EVERYTHING THROUGH HABIBIE, [redacted] HE ARGUED THAT HABIBIE WAS THE FUTURE LEADER WHO COULD CARRY OUT DEMOCRATIZATION IN INDONESIA, BUT THAT HE COULD ONLY

ATTAIN POWER THROUGH SOEHARTO. HE DISAGREED WITH HIS "FRIEND" AMIEN RAIS ABOUT THE TIMING OF SUCCESSION, BELIEVING THAT IF IT HAPPENED TOO QUICKLY, SUCH AS IN 1998 AS CALLED FOR BY RAIS, THE MILITARY WOULD FORCEFULLY OBJECT. (DATT NOTE: THE MILITARY WOULD DEFINITELY NOT LIKE TO SEE HABIBIE AS VICE PRESIDENT IN 1998, BUT WOULD ACCEPT IT IF SOEHARTO PICKED HIM.)

23. (C) HABIBIE'S DETRACTORS HAVE POINTED OUT THAT HE IS DISLIKED BY MANY IN THE ARMED FORCES AND IS NOT JAVANESE. MORE SPECIFICALLY, HABIBIE IS THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN POLITICALLY DAMAGED BY PROBLEMS WITH HIS AIRPLANE COMPANY IPTN, MOST RECENTLY A STRIKE BY HIS COMPANY'S WORKERS IN BANDUNG AND SURABAYA, BY HIS FAILURE TO CARRY THE DAY WITH HIS PLANS FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY IN INDONESIA, AND BY THE PRESIDENT'S ANGER OVER THE CRITICAL POSTURE TAKEN BY SOME OF HABIBIE'S UNDERLINGS IN ICMI SUCH AS AMIEN RAIS, ADI SASONO, AND DAWAM RAHARDJO. ADDITIONALLY, MINISTER OF INFORMATION HARTONO'S MUCH PUBLICIZED ENTRY INTO ICMI WAS INTERPRETED BY SOME AS AN INCURSION INTO HABIBIE'S POLITICAL TURF, AND FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT ALL WAS NOT WELL

BETWEEN HABIBIE AND THE PALACE.

24. (C) HABIBIE'S ICMI SUPPORTERS POINT TO HIS CLOSE CONNECTION TO SO-CALLED ISLAMIC OR "GREEN GENERALS" IN THE ARMED FORCES LEADERSHIP, SUCH AS WITH FEISAL TANJUNG AND SYARWAN HAMID, AS EVIDENCE THAT HE CAN PREVAIL WITHIN THE MILITARY. OTHERS, HOWEVER, SUCH AS [redacted] B1
ACKNOWLEDGE HABIBIE'S ALLIANCE WITH TANJUNG, BUT ARGUE IT IS NOT ENOUGH "AS THE REST OF THE MILITARY DOES NOT FEEL THE SAME WAY." (COMMENT: IN ADDITION, IT IS RUMORED THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

TANJUNG COULD BE REPLACED BEFORE THE MPR BY ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WIRANTO. SYARWAN HAMID IS NOW THE ABRI FACTION LEADER IN THE MPR AND OUT OF DAY-TO-DAY ARMY POLITICS. EVEN TANJUNG HAS NOT PUBLICLY SUPPORTED HABIBIE. END COMMENT.) IT IS ALSO ARGUED THAT ICMI'S CLOUT WITH THE PRESIDENT IS ON THE WANE BECAUSE THE ORGANIZATION HAS ALREADY SERVED ITS INTENDED POLITICAL PURPOSE OF SHOWING THE ARMED FORCES THAT SOEHARTO COULD TURN TO OTHER POLITICAL ALLIES.

TUTUT'S CANDIDATE?: HARTONO

25. (C) HARTONO'S MAIN POLITICAL STRENGTH IS HIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH TUTUT. HE HAS BEEN GIVEN AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE MPR AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FORMULATING THAT "BROAD OUTLINES OF NATIONAL POLICY" (REFTEL A). TELEVISION NEWS COVERAGE OF THE SESSIONS OF THE MPR'S WORKING COMMITTEE SHOWS HIM SEATED IN THE FRONT ROW NEXT TO TUTUT. AFTER HIS RETIREMENT FROM THE ARMY THIS YEAR, HE EMERGED FORCEFULLY AS THE NEW MINISTER OF INFORMATION, REPLACING THE HUMILIATED HARMOKO (REFTEL H). HE MADE HEADLINES AGAIN IN AUGUST WHEN HE BECAME A MEMBER OF ICMI, IN AN APPARENT REBUKE TO THE EXISTING ICMI LEADERSHIP, ESPECIALLY HABIBIE (REFTEL F). WHILE HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH TUTUT IS A FORMIDABLE ASSET IN THE PRESENT POLITICAL PICTURE, IT IS FAR FROM CLEAR WHETHER IT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0201

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0201

PAGE 01 JAKART 06931 06 OF 07 261053Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	/021W	

----------FF5127 261053Z /38

R 261051Z NOV 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8503
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 07 JAKARTA 006931

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/07
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: UNCERTAINTY OVER VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION
- WITHIN THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT

REF: A) JAKARTA 6244; B) JAKARTA 6145; C) JAKARTA 5893;
WOULD BE ENOUGH TO PROPEL HIM ALL THE WAY TO THE VICE
PRESIDENCY. HARTONO IS INTENSELY AMBITIOUS AND ACCORDING

CONFIDENTIAL

TO MANY ACTIVE AND RETIRED GENERALS HE COVETS THE VICE PRESIDENCY.

26. (C) WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF TUTUT, CONTENDED [redacted] HARTONO'S ACTIVE ELITE CIVILIAN SUPPORT WAS LIMITED TO THE CENTER FOR POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (CPDS), RUN BY UP-AND-COMING GOLKAR OPERATIVES AMIR SANTOSO AND DIN SYAMSUDDIN. [redacted] IN DESCRIBING HARTONO'S FUTURE TO POLOFF IN AUGUST, FELT MORE COMFORTABLE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM THAT HARTONO WAS IN LINE TO ASSUME THE POWERFUL JOB OF HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER, AND WAS ONLY WILLING TO INCLUDE HARTONO AS A "DARK HORSE" CANDIDATE FOR THE VICE PRESIDENCY. B1 B1

27. (C) WHILE CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF THE ISLAMIC OR "GREEN" GENERALS (HE IS NOW RETIRED), HARTONO DOES NOT APPEAR TO ENJOY STRONG SUPPORT FROM EITHER THE ISLAMIC ACTIVIST COMMUNITY AND EVEN LESS WITHIN THE MILITARY. HE TRIGGERS A STRONG RESPONSE FROM A RANGE OF COMMENTATORS, AND SOME HAVE GONE AS FAR AS TO ALLEGE THAT HE WAS THE "MASTERMIND" BEHIND SOME OF THE UNREST THAT HAS OCCURRED IN INDONESIA OVER THE PAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS, INCLUDING IN SITUBONDO. HE MAKES CHRISTIANS NERVOUS, AS THEY WORRY THAT HE WOULD BRING MORE ISLAM INTO POLITICS. [redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT HARTONO COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE FOR VICE PRESIDENT BECAUSE HE SIMPLY "WAS NOT APPROPRIATE." SOME SOURCES HAVE INFORMED AMBASSADOR ROY THAT HARTONO IS NO LONGER IN THE RUNNING FOR VICE PRESIDENT, AND THAT HE WILL BE SELECTED AS HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER. B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THE OTHERS
---

28. (C) GIVEN HIS LEADERSHIP OF RULING PARTY GOLKAR, AND HIS SUCCESS IN SECURING ITS BIGGEST WIN EVER IN THE MAY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, IT HAD BEEN WIDELY EXPECTED THAT HARMOKO WAS IN THE RUNNING FOR VICE PRESIDENT. HIS FORTUNES, HOWEVER, TOOK A PRECIPITOUS TUMBLE AFTER THE ELECTION, AND MOST COMMENTATORS NOW PRIVATELY DISMISS HIM AS A POTENTIAL CANDIDATE, THOUGH HIS NAME STILL APPEARS REGULARLY IN THE PRESS AS A CONTENDER. THIS LONG-SERVING INFORMATION MINISTER AND SOEHARTO LOYALIST WAS HUMILIATED IN JUNE WHEN SOEHARTO SUDDENLY REMOVED HIM FROM HIS POST AND PLACED HIM INTO A HASTILY CREATED JOB OF MINISTER OF SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS. ALTHOUGH HE WAS ELECTED TO THE PRESTIGIOUS, IF LARGELY POWERLESS, POST OF MPR/DPR SPEAKER IN OCTOBER, HE FACED SOME ROUGH SPOTS ALONG THE WAY AS THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC SPECULATION THAT THE ARMED FORCES WOULD RUN ITS NEW DPR LEADER, LT. GENERAL SYARWAN HAMID, AGAINST HIM.

29. (C) NUMEROUS EXPLANATIONS ARE OFFERED FOR HARMOKO'S SLIDE. [redacted] TOLD THE EMBASSY IN JUNE THAT HARMOKO WAS SEEN BY THE PALACE TO HAVE BECOME TOO CONFIDENT AND AMBITIOUS FOLLOWING THE BIG GOLKAR WIN, AND THAT HE HAD BEEN CUT DOWN TO SIZE. OTHERS POINT TO THE PRESIDENT'S DISPLEASURE WITH THE ORIGINALLY-PASSED BROADCAST BILL THAT HARMOKO HAD OVERSEEN AS MINISTER OF INFORMATION. THE PRESIDENT REFUSED TO ACCEPT IT, AND IN AN UNPRECEDENTED AND POSSIBLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MOVE, SENT IT BACK TO PARLIAMENT TO BE AMENDED AND RE-APPROVED, A TASK HARTONO WAS ONLY TOO WILLING TO COORDINATE. B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

30. (C) THE MOST PERSUASIVE EXPLANATION, HOWEVER, FOR HARMOKO'S DECLINING FORTUNES LIES IN THE RIFT THAT MANY HAVE REFERRED TO BETWEEN HARMOKO AND TUTUT. FOR EXAMPLE, [redacted] SPECULATED THAT HIS OWN PROBLEMS WITH THE GOVERNMENT WERE PARTLY A RESULT OF THE PERCEPTION THAT HE WAS PART OF THE "HARMOKO GROUP" IN GOLKAR, AND THUS TUTUT AND HER ALLIES HAD MOVED AGAINST [redacted] B1 B1

[redacted] EXPLAINED THAT TUTUT, IN A RARE INSTANCE WHEN SHE DID NOT PREVAIL IN A POLITICAL MANEUVER, UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTEMPTED TO BLOCK HARMOKO'S ELECTION AS DPR/MPR SPEAKER. [redacted] ONE OF THE NEW GROUP OF 25 EXPERT STAFF THAT HARMOKO BROUGHT INTO THE PARLIAMENT TO ADVISE GOLKAR ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, TOLD POLOFF THAT HARMOKO WAS A LAME DUCK AS GOLKAR GENERAL CHAIRMAN. B1 B1

31. (C) [redacted] SPECULATED TO POLOFF THAT GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA, THE STATE MINISTER FOR PLANNING, COULD EMERGE AS A COMPROMISE CANDIDATE BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS. GINANDJAR IS A RETIRED AIR VICE MARSHALL, BUT HAS BEEN CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE CIVILIAN SECTOR THROUGHOUT HIS CAREER. HE WAS A PROTEGE OF SUDHARMONO, THE FORMER GENERAL CHAIRMAN OF GOLKAR AND B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0203

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0203

PAGE 01 JAKART 06931 07 OF 07 261053Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	/021W	

----------FF512B 261053Z /38

R 261051Z NOV 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8504
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 07 JAKARTA 006931

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/07
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: UNCERTAINTY OVER VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION
- WITHIN THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT

REF: A) JAKARTA 6244; B) JAKARTA 6145; C) JAKARTA 5893;
VICE PRESIDENT, AND HAS BEEN A PATRON OF THE PRIBUMI
(MEANING NON-ETHNIC CHINESE, USUALLY MUSLIM) BUSINESSMEN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TRYING TO EXPAND THEIR SLICE OF THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY.
OTHERS HAVE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT GINANDJAR'S
POLITICAL BASE IS EXCEEDINGLY NARROW.

32. (C) IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE EMBASSY, [redacted] HAS MENTIONED COORDINATING MINISTER FOR INDUSTRY AND TRADE HARTARTO AS A CANDIDATE FOR VICE PRESIDENT (REFTEL G). SOURCES HAVE INFORMED AMBASSADOR ROY THAT HARTARTO SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED OUT, AND [redacted] ALSO MENTIONED HIM AS A POSSIBILITY TO POLOFF. A TOP NU LEADER TOLD POLOFF THAT MINISTER OF DEFENSE SUDRADJAT WAS VERY POPULAR WITH THE NU RANK AND FILE. AN NU STUDENT LEADER CONFIRMED THIS. ACCORDING TO THE NU LEADER, SUDRADJAT HAD VISITED NU PESANTREN (ISLAMIC BOARDING SCHOOLS) ELEVEN TIMES OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS AND HAD MET WITH 800 KIAI (MUSLIM LEADERS) IN WEST JAVA BANDUNG ON OCTOBER 25. OWENS

B1

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5180

PAGE 01 JAKART 06679 01 OF 02 131043Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	/018W				

----------FA34D1 131044Z /38

R 131040Z NOV 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8284

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 006679

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0166

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-06-12
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: YOGYAKARYA POLITICAL OBSERVER ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AND OTHER TOPICS

REF: JAKARTA 5890

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY THE AMBASSADOR. REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO [redacted] B1
OBSERVER CLOSE TO MILITARY CIRCLES, INDONESIAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WIRANTO HAS FORMED A SMALL GROUP OF INTELLECTUALS TO FOCUS ON HOW INDONESIA'S POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE SHOULD CHANGE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06679 01 OF 02 131043Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 SEP 2006 200503193

WHEN PRESIDENT SOEHARTO LEAVES THE SCENE. THE GROUP UNDER ARMED FORCES DEPUTY CHIEF AND DEPUTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS (SOSPOL) BAMBANG YUDHOYONO WILL EXAMINE HOW TO DEAL WITH PRESS FREEDOM, CORRUPTION, NEPOTISM, AND ENHANCING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE. WIRANTO SHOULD BECOME INDONESIA'S MILITARY COMMANDER NEXT YEAR. [redacted] SAW YUDHOYONO AND BRIG GEN SHAMSUL MU'ARIF, BRAWIJAYA, MILITARY REGION CHIEF OF STAFF, AS THE TWO MOST PROMISING MILITARY THINKERS. HE THOUGHT LESS OF MAJ GEN PRABOWO SUBIANTO. [redacted] VIEW, SOEHARTO'S NEXT VICE PRESIDENT WOULD BE AS POWERLESS AS HIS PREDECESSORS. [redacted] SAW A LARGE SCALE TURNOVER IN THE CABINET AFTER SOEHARTO'S ELECTION IN MARCH. [redacted] SAID THAT MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI HAD LITTLE POTENTIAL FOR LEADERSHIP. HE BELIEVED THAT ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, LEADER OF THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU), HAD LOST GROUND SINCE THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN LAST MAY. END SUMMARY. B1 B1 B1 B1

3. (C) [redacted] MET WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND CG [redacted] NOVEMBER 2. [redacted] IS KNOWN AS AN INTELLECTUAL CLOSE TO NATIONAL MILITARY, ISLAMIC, AND POLITICAL CIRCLES. HE TALKED ABOUT THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AND A WIDE RANGE OF OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES. B1 B1

4. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THE CHIEF CONCERN AMONG MILITARY CIRCLES WAS HOW THE POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE OF INDONESIA SHOULD CHANGE AFTER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO LEAVES THE SCENE. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL WIRANTO HAD RECENTLY DECIDED TO FORM AN INFORMAL, UNPUBLICIZED BRAIN TRUST, UNDER DEPUTY SOSPOL MAJ GEN BAMBANG YUDHOYONO, TO FOCUS ON THE SUBJECT. BAMBANG [redacted] DR. RASYID (OF THE INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN JAKARTA), AND A YET-TO-BE-DETERMINED ECONOMIST FROM GADJAH MADA WOULD MAKE UP THE B1 B1

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP. [redacted] WHEN WIRANTO HAD MET [redacted] TO DISCUSS FORMING THIS GROUP, THE GENERAL HAD INDICATED HE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO PLAN (AND ULTIMATELY EXECUTE) NECESSARY CHANGES DURING A TRANSITION AND SUCCESSION. B1

5. (C) WIRANTO'S GROUP [redacted] WOULD WORK ON THE CENTRAL ISSUES THAT HAD TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE SUCCESSION PERIOD. ITS MEMBERS WOULD LOOK AT HOW TO RELAX PRESS CONTROLS. WHILE THE STUDY COULD NOT RECOMMEND A TOTALLY UNFETTERED MEDIA, THE PRESS SHOULD B1

HAVE CONSIDERABLY MORE LEEWAY THAN IT NOW ENJOYS. BANNING THE PRESS WOULD BE ELIMINATED. THE GROUP WOULD EXPLORE HOW TO DEAL WITH CORRUPTION AND NEPOTISM IN GOVERNMENT. (AT THIS POINT, [redacted] B1 WRYLY POINTED OUT THE INTRACTABLE DIFFICULTY OF NEPOTISM SINCE WIRANTO HIMSELF HAD TWO FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE CURRENT MPR WHICH WOULD BE ELECTING THE PRESIDENT NEXT SPRING.) AS TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, WAYS HAD TO BE DEVISED TO GIVE LEGISLATORS MORE POWER. ANOTHER ISSUE WAS HOW TO PROTECT INDONESIA'S CITIZENS OF CHINESE DESCENT FROM DISCRIMINATION. WITH SO MANY OF THEM SMALL SHOPKEEPERS, THEY WERE ALWAYS THE FIRST TARGETS DURING CIVIL UNREST. THEY WERE PAYING FOR THE EXCESSES OF A HANDFUL OF SUPER-RICH CLOSE TO POWER. THERE MUST BE A MEANS TO STOP THIS. WHEN ASKED, [redacted] SAID THAT PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS WOULD NOT BE ON THE B1 FORMAL AGENDA. NONETHELESS, PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS WOULD LIKELY BECOME THE PRACTICE IN FUTURE GOVERNMENTS.

6. (C) LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, [redacted] EXPANDED ON CHANGES IN THE B1 LEGISLATIVE ROLE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE DPR REPRESENTATION SHOULD REMAIN AS IT WAS. MEMBERS OF THE MPR, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE DISTRICT-BASED. THIS WAS ONE IDEA HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING AT A SEMINAR FOR DIVISION COMMANDERS AND OTHER MILITARY LEADERS THAT WOULD SHORTLY BE HELD IN BANDUNG.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

7. (C) [redacted] BELIEVED THE NEXT VICE PRESIDENT WOULD BE JUST AS B1 POWERLESS AS HIS PREDECESSORS. A SOEHARTO VICE PRESIDENT WOULD NEVER HAVE VIABILITY, HE SAID, SINCE THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD GIVEN AWAY SOME OF HIS POWER--WHICH HE WOULD NOT DO. SUCCESSION/TRANSITION THUS BECAME THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE.

8. (C) WHEN ASKED HOW REFORMS COMING OUT OF THIS GROUP WOULD ACTUALLY BE ADOPTED, [redacted] REPLIED THAT WIRANTO WOULD HAVE THE POWER B1 TO MAKE THEM HAPPEN. HE WOULD BECOME ABRI COMMANDER, REPLACING GENERAL FEISAL TANJUNG, IN APRIL OF NEXT YEAR, JUST AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, [redacted] PREDICTED. (TANJUNG MIGHT BECOME B1 MINISTER OF DEFENSE.) IF, AS SOME THOUGHT, WIRANTO BECAME COMMANDER IN DECEMBER, IT COULD WELL MEAN THAT HE WOULD BECOME THE NEXT VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. AS ABRI COMMANDER, [redacted] SAID, B1 WIRANTO'S VIEWS WOULD BECOME THE MILITARY POSITION.

9. (C) [redacted] HE DESCRIBED MAJ GEN BAMBANG AS B1
THE MOST INTELLECTUAL LEADER WITHIN THE SENIOR INDONESIAN MILITARY.
BAMBANG COULD DEAL WITH THE TASK OF ADAPTING THE INDONESIAN MILITARY
ROLE TO THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA AND BEGIN A DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS.
HE DID NOT FIT THE MOLD OF TRADITIONAL INDONESIAN MILITARY THINKING

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ5174

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5174

PAGE 01 JAKART 06679 02 OF 02 131040Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	/019W			

----------FA34A0 131041Z /38

R 131040Z NOV 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8285

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 006679

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0166

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-06-12

TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: YOGYAKARYA POLITICAL OBSERVER ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AND OTHER TOPICS

REF: JAKARTA 5890

WHICH WAS AT ODDS WITH GREATER CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS. (COMMENT. [redacted] TOLD US OVER A YEAR AGO THAT BAMBANG HAD LONG BEEN B1
VOICING CONCERN OVER THE COMPLETE LACK OF PLANNING WITHIN THE MILITARY AND THE GOVERNMENT OVER THE SUCCESSION.) ANOTHER OFFICER OF THE SAME INTELLECTUAL CALIBER, [redacted] WAS BRIG GEN SHAMSUL B1
MU'ARIF, CHIEF OF STAFF IN EAST JAVA'S BRAWIJAYA COMMAND. MU'ARIF,

CONFIDENTIAL

AS IS WELL-KNOWN, HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT HAMPERED IN HIS CAREER BY HIS HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION WITH THE PII (A MUSLIM STUDENT GROQP BANNED BY THE NEW ORDER).

10. (C) WHEN QSKED FOR HIS IMPRESSION OF MAJ GEN PRABOWO SUBIANTO, [redacted] SAID HE WAS NOT AN INTELLECT. HE DI NOT FIGURE IN THE B1
FOREFRONT OF THE MILITARY'Q APPROACH TO THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN A SQCCESSION. MOREOVER, PRABOWO'S INTEREST IN INFLATING HIS OWN IMAGE HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY EXPSED. FOR EXAMPLE, PRABOWO HAD LONG TAKEN CREIT FOR THE CAPTURE OF FRETILIN COMMANDER LOBATOIN EAST TIMOR IN 1978, AND THIS HAD BEEN PQOVEN FALSE. HE ALSO HAD CLAIMED THAT HIS RED BERETS HAD ENDED THE FOREIGN HOSTAGE TAKING IN IRIAN LAST MAY, WHILE IT WAS EVIDENT THAT KOSTRQD ELEMENTS WERE THE MILITARY UNITS ON THE SCENE. FURTHERMORE, [redacted] OBSERVED, DURING B1
LAST YEAR'S JULY 27 RIOTING IN JAKARTA, PRABOWO HAD MOVED SOME OF HIS UNITS TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, HE SAID, WAS NOT PLEASED. (COMMENT: OTHER POLITICAL OBSERVERS IN YOGYAKARTA AND SURABAYA, WHILE NOT GIVING ANY DEGREE OF DETAIL, TEND TO SEE PRABOWO IN A SIMILAR LIGHT. THIS VIEW, HOWEVER,IS NOT UNANIMOUS.)

11. (C) [redacted] BELIEVED THAT MAJ GEN JOHNY LUMINTANG AND MAJ GEN B1
AGUM GUMELAR HAD BEEN MARGINALIZED BECAUSE OF THEIR TIES TO FORMER MILITARY COMMANDER BENNY MURDANI. FOR THIS REASON, GUMELAR HAD BEEN POSTED TO SULAWESI, PERENNIALLY PLAGUED BY ETHNIC TENSION AND RIOTS LIKE THE ONE IN UJUNG PANDANG DURING SEPTEMBER, [redacted] B1

12. (C) IN [redacted] VIEW, THE CABINET WOULD SEE A LARGE-SCALE B1
TURNOVER AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. HE THOUGHT THAT BOTH

ENVIRONMENT MINISTER SARWONO AND TRANSMIGRATION MINISTER SISWONO WOULD GO. BOTH WERE ANTI-TUTUT (PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S ELDEST DAUGHTER, SITI HARDIYANTI, AND LIKELY NEXT GOLKAR CHAIRMAN).

CONFIDENTIAL

SARWONO, WITH HIS TIES TO THE INDONESIA SOCIALIST PARTY, WOULD END UP IN A SMALL FACTION OF LIKE PERSUASION WITHIN GOLKAR, THE GOVERNMENT PARTY. SISWONO, WITH AN INDONESIAN NATIONAL PARTY HERITAGE, WOULD DO THE SAME. FROM THEIR CORNERS THEY WOULD EACH SNIPE AT TUTUT'S LEADERSHIP OF GOLKAR. TUTUT WAS ALREADY MAKING HER INFLUENCE PREDOMINANT. [redacted] SAID THAT TUTUT, NOT MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY HABIBIE, WAS THE CONTROLLING AGENT ORCHESTRATING THE UPCOMING MPR. B1

13. (C) [redacted] CONSIDERED OUSTED PDI LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI A "NON-PHENOMENON". MUHAMMADIYAH [redacted] SHARED THE SAME VIEW, [redacted] SHE HAD NO VISION, NO DEPTH, AND WAS CAREFULLY SHELTERED FROM DIRECT PUBLIC ARTICULATIONS OF ANY SUBSTANCE. SHE DOES HAVE CHARISMA, HE OBSERVED, AN ATTRACTION THAT WILL GET PEOPLE TO COME AND LISTEN TO HER. IN A TRUE DEMOCRACY, SHE WOULD FADE, ONLY ATTRACTING JAVANESE ABANGAN (I.E., STRAIN OF ISLAM INCORPORATING LOCAL BELIEFS AND CUSTOMS) VILLAGE SOCIETY (COMMENT: THE BEDROCK OF SUPPORT FOR HER FATHER). B1 B1

14. (C) ACCORDING TO [redacted] ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, CHAIRMAN OF THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU), HAD LOST GROUND SINCE THE CAMPAIGN LAST MAY. WAHID HAD FARED BADLY BECAUSE OF HIS PUBLIC CLOSENESS TO TUTUT WHEN SHE WAS CAMPAIGNING AS GOLKAR POLITICIAN LAST APRIL AND MAY. [redacted] SAID THAT THE EAST JAVA MILITARY HAD GIVEN HIM [redacted] A SECRET TAPE OF WAHID TRYING TO DEFEND HIMSELF IN A SESSION WITH EAST JAVA RELIGIOUS LEADERS. WAHID, [redacted] SAID, SOUGHT TO DOWNPLAY ANY ILL EFFECTS THAT MAY HAVE COME FROM HIS TUTUT TIE. WAHID STRESSED THAT THE GOLKAR WIN IN NU CONSTITUENCIES WAS NOT THAT LARGE. (COMMENT: AS WE HAVE REPORTED, GOLKAR INDEED DID NOT MAKE IMPRESSIVE GAINS IN MANY EAST JAVA NU STRONGHOLDS.) MOREOVER, WAHID SAID THE NU NOW B1 B1 B1

HAS A FOOT IN AN IMPORTANT DOOR FOR POLITICAL MANEUVERING.

[redacted] B1

PIERCE/ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4612

PAGE 01 JAKART 06244 01 OF 06 240412Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	/020W			

----------F2C41D 240412Z /38

R 240408Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7996
INFO AMEMBASSY CABERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 JAKARTA 006244

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT/VICE PRESIDENT SELECTION: MPR

- COMPOSITION AND PROCESS

REF: A) JAKARTA 5966; B) JAKARTA 5735; C) JAKARTA 4988
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06244 01 OF 06 240412Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 14 SEP 2006 200503193

D) JAKARTA 2437; E) JAKARTA 1012; F) 96 JAKARTA 8650

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), SCHEDULED TO MEET FROM MARCH 1-11 TO SELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT, IS DOMINATED BY HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS AND THEIR FAMILIES. IT CONTAINS THE ENTIRE CABINET, NUMEROUS SUB-CABINET AND OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND -- DESPITE A REDUCTION IN THE OVERALL NUMBER OF DESIGNATED SEATS FOR THE MILITARY -- ALMOST THE SAME NUMBER (108 VS. 107) AS IN 1993 OF ACTIVE-DUTY GENERAL OFFICERS, IDENTIFIED IN THE MILITARY AND REGIONAL FACTIONS. PROMINENT BUSINESSMEN WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE FIRST FAMILY, SUCH AS BOB HASAN AND ANTHONY SALIM, ARE ALSO MPR MEMBERS. SUSPICIONS EXPRESSED BY POLITICAL ANALYSTS EARLIER THIS YEAR THAT THE MPR WOULD BE TAINTED BY EVEN MORE NEPOTISM THAN USUAL APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ACCURATE. FOUR OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S SIX CHILDREN ARE MEMBERS OF THIS SUPREME STATE INSTITUTION, TWO IN IMPORTANT LEADERSHIP POSITIONS, IN ADDITION TO THE WIVES AND OTHER FAMILY OF CABINET MEMBERS, RULING PARTY GOLKAR OPERATIVES AND MILITARY OFFICERS. ACCORDING TO A SOCIOLOGIST'S STUDY OF THIS MPR, 36 PERCENT OF ITS 1000 MEMBERS HAVE SOME KIND OF FAMILY CONNECTION TO THE GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY.

3. (C) IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MARCH SESSION, AN MPR WORKING COMMITTEE IS PREPARING THE "BROAD OUTLINES OF NATIONAL POLICY" AND OTHER POLICY DECISIONS THAT THE MPR WILL

CONSIDER, AND INEVITABLY ENDORSE. THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION, GENERAL (RET.) HARTONO, AND THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL WIRANTO, HAVE KEY LEADERSHIP POSITIONS ON THIS WORKING COMMITTEE AND ARE EXPECTED TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE MPR. SOEHARTO'S EFFORT TO MAINTAIN TIGHTER CONTROL THAN EVER OVER THIS MPR CAN BE INTERPRETED, IN PART, AS A RESPONSE TO 1993 WHEN THE PRESIDENT WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE LOST CONTROL OVER THE SELECTION OF THE VICE PRESIDENT. ADDITIONALLY, HE LIKELY

HAS PACKED THE MPR WITH LOYALISTS BECAUSE IT COULD PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN CONFIRMING THE NEXT PRESIDENT IF SUCCESSION WERE TO OCCUR IN THE MIDDLE OF THE 1998-2003 TERM. END SUMMARY.

PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) SWORN IN

4. (U) THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) FOR THE PERIOD 1997-2002 WAS SWORN IN ON OCTOBER 1, AS WAS THE NEW PARLIAMENT (DPR). BOTH INSTITUTIONS ELECTED LEADERS ON OCTOBER 2. OFFICIALLY, THE MPR IS THE HIGHEST STATE INSTITUTION. EVERY FIVE YEARS IT SELECTS THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT, RECEIVES SOEHARTO'S SPEECH OF ACCOUNTABILITY, APPROVES THE "BROAD OUTLINES OF NATIONAL POLICY" (GBHN), AND CONSIDERS MPR DECREES (KETETAPAN OR "TAP") AND MPR DECISIONS. THE ENTIRE MPR (1000 MEMBERS) WILL RECONVENE MARCH 1-11 TO CARRY OUT THESE RESPONSIBILITIES. IN THE MEANTIME, AN MPR WORKING COMMITTEE, MADE UP OF 90 MPR MEMBERS, BEGAN WORK ON OCTOBER 20 IN PREPARATION FOR THE MARCH SESSION.

SELECTION ON DIVISION OF MPR MEMBERS

5. (SBU) THE 1000 MEMBER MPR IS COMPRISED OF FIVE FACTIONS: GOLKAR, THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI), THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI). THE 500 MEMBER DPR AUTOMATICALLY CONSTITUTES HALF OF THE MPR. (425 OF THE DPR'S MEMBERS WERE ELECTED IN THE MAY POLL, AND THE REMAINING 75 ARE ACTIVE DUTY ARMED FORCES (ABRI) MEMBERS APPOINTED BY ABRI COMMANDER IN CHIEF FEISAL TANJUNG.) THE 425 ELECTED DPR SEATS ARE DIVIDED AS FOLLOWS: GOLKAR 325, PPP 45, AND PDI 11. THE SECOND HALF OF THE MPR ENTERS THROUGH FOUR DIFFERENT CHANNELS.

-- FIRST, 149 REGIONAL DELEGATES OFFICIALLY REPRESENT EACH OF INDONESIA'S 27 PROVINCES. IN REALITY, THEY REPRESENT GOLKAR AND THE MILITARY. THE GOVERNORS OF EVERY PROVINCE (27) AND THE 10 AREA MILITARY COMMANDERS (MAJOR GENERALS), AND ALL HEADS OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES (GOLKAR AND

ABRI), AUTOMATICALLY BECOME REGIONAL DELEGATES. THE REGIONAL (KOREM) COMMANDER BECOMES A REGIONAL DELEGATE IN THE REMAINING 17 PROVINCES THAT DO NOT HAVE AN AREA COMMAND. THE REST OF THE REGIONAL DELEGATES ARE FORMALLY SELECTED BY THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES, WHICH ARE ALL CONTROLLED BY GOLKAR OR THE ARMED FORCES, BUT THE FINAL DECISIONS ON THESE CANDIDATES ARE SAID TO BE MADE BY THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4607

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4607

PAGE 01 JAKART 06244 02 OF 06 240409Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	/020W			

----------F2C3F7 240410Z /38

R 240408Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7997
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 06 JAKARTA 006244

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT/VICE PRESIDENT SELECTION: MPR
- COMPOSITION AND PROCESS

PRESIDENT.

-- SECOND, GOLKAR, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 06244 02 OF 06 240409Z
THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) HAVE AN ALLOTMENT OF MPR REPRESENTATIVES IN ADDITION TO THEIR DPR MEMBERS. THEY SELECT THE ADDITIONAL MPR REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATES WHO WERE NOT ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT IN MAY. EACH PARTY'S ADDITIONAL ALLOTMENT IS APPROXIMATELY HALF THE SIZE OF ITS PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION. THE ADDITIONAL ALLOTMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: GOLKAR 163, PPP 45, AND PDI 5.

-- THIRD, ABRI'S ADDITIONAL ALLOTMENT OF APPOINTED ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS IS 38 (APPROXIMATELY HALF AS MANY AS ITS BLOCK OF 75 IN THE DPR).

-- FOURTH, THERE IS A GROUP OF 100 REPRESENTATIVES OF "SOCIETAL GROUPS." IN PRACTICE, THESE MEMBERS ARE SELECTED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND BELONG TO THE GOLKAR FACTION.

6. (U) IN TOTAL, THE GOLKAR FACTION NUMBERS 588 (INCLUDING THE 100 REPRESENTATIVES OF "SOCIETAL GROUPS"), THE ABRI FACTION 113, THE REGIONAL DELEGATES FACTION 149, THE PPP FACTION 134, AND THE PDI FACTION 16. (32 MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL DELEGATES FACTION ARE IDENTIFIED AS ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY.) IN PRACTICE, THE GOLKAR, ABRI, AND REGIONAL DELEGATES FACTIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT, GIVING IT 850 OUT OF 1000 REPRESENTATIVES.
WHO IS IN THE MPR

7. (SBU) ALL 37 CABINET MEMBERS, PLUS BANK OF INDONESIA GOVERNOR SUDRADJAT DJIWANDONO, ARMED FORCES COMMANDER AND
CONFIDENTIAL

CHIEF FEISAL TANJUNG, AND ATTORNEY GENERAL SINGGIH ARE IN THE MPR. MOST ARE FROM GOLKAR'S ADDITIONAL ALLOTMENT OF SLOTS DRAWN FROM ITS LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATES WHO DID NOT ENTER PARLIAMENT, ALTHOUGH HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER YOGIE MEMET, INFORMATION MINISTER HARTONO, SINGGIH, AND SUDRADJAT DJIWANDONO WERE SELECTED AS "REPRESENTATIVES OF SOCIETAL GROUPS." MANY OTHER SUB-CABINET OFFICIALS WERE ALSO REPORTEDLY SELECTED AS GOLKAR MPR MEMBERS. POLITICAL ANALYST ARBI SANIT PUBLICLY ASSERTED THAT THIS MPR CONTAINS A "BUREAUCRAT-DOMINATED LINEUP" AND THAT "THE TOP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY EXERCISE THEIR POWER TO INFLUENCE, OR AT LEAST GUIDE, THE SESSION TO RUN ON THEIR DESIRED TRACK."

8. (SBU) THE MILITARY'S ALLOTMENT OF ACTIVE-DUTY DPR MEMBERS HAS BEEN REDUCED FROM 100 TO 75, LEADING TO A REDUCTION IN ACTIVE-DUTY MILITARY MPR MEMBERS FROM 184 TO 145. DESPITE THIS REDUCTION, THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE-DUTY GENERAL OFFICERS WHO HAVE BECOME MPR MEMBERS, 108, REMAINS ALMOST IDENTICAL TO THE NUMBER IN 1993 (107). THE REDUCTION WAS CARRIED OUT BY ELIMINATING LOWER-LEVEL OFFICERS AT THE RANK OF COLONEL AND LT. COLONEL. THIS MILITARY PRESENCE IS IN ADDITION TO THE NUMEROUS RETIRED OFFICERS, AND POSSIBLY OTHER ACTIVE-DUTY OFFICERS WHO HAVE NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED AS SUCH ON THE OFFICIAL MPR LIST, WHO HAVE BECOME MPR MEMBERS IN THEIR CAPACITY AS CABINET (10 OF 37) AND SUB-CABINET OFFICIALS, GOVERNORS, GOLKAR PARLIAMENTARIANS, HEADS OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES, ETC. THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE-DUTY TWO, THREE, AND FOUR STAR ARMY OFFICERS HAS RISEN SUBSTANTIALLY FROM 37 IN 1993 TO 53 IN 1998, WITH A CORRESPONDING DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF LOWER
CONFIDENTIAL

LEVEL BRIG. GENERALS. THE ACTIVE-DUTY ARMY OFFICERS INCLUDE TWO FULL GENERALS (SAME IN 1993), EIGHT LT. GENERALS (SIX IN 1993), 43 MAJ. GENERALS (29 IN 1993), AND 18 BRIG. GENERALS (27 IN 1993). IN ADDITION TO FEISAL TANJUNG AND SYARWAN HAMID, THE ACTIVE-DUTY MILITARY IS REPRESENTED BY SUCH HEAVYWEIGHTS AS ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL WIRANTO, ABRI CHIEF OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS LT. GENERAL YUNUS YOSFIAH, AND SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER MG. GENERAL PRABOWO SUBIANTO.

9. (C) THE CHARGES OF NEPOTISM MADE IN FEBRUARY ABOUT GOLKAR'S LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATE LIST, AND THE FEARS EXPRESSED THEN THAT THE "NEPOTISTIC CANDIDATES" WOULD BE PLACED IN THE MPR, APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIATED (REFTEL E). FOUR OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S SIX CHILDREN ARE MPR MEMBERS FROM THE GOLKAR'S ADDITIONAL ALLOTMENT: BAMBANG TRIHATMODJO, SITI HARDIYANTI RUKMANA (TUTUT), HUTOMO MANDALA PUTRA (TOMMY), AND SITI HEDIYATI (MARRIED TO MG. GENERAL PRABOWO). IN ADDITION, THE PRESIDENT'S DAUGHTER-IN-LAW, HALIMAH TRIHATMODJO, AND HALF-BROTHER, PROBOSUTEDJO, WERE ALSO SELECTED. THE WIVES OF PROMINENT GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS, SUCH AS ABRI DPR FACTION HEAD SYARWAN HAMID, HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER YOGIE

PAGE 01 JAKART 06244 03 OF 06 240409Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04	G-00	/031W	

----------F2C3FB 240410Z /38

R 240408Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7998
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 06 JAKARTA 006244

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT/VICE PRESIDENT SELECTION: MPR
- COMPOSITION AND PROCESS

MEMET, ARMED FORCES COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FEISAL TANJUNG, MPR/DPR SPEAKER HARMOKO AND GOLKAR EXECUTIVES ARY MARDJONO AND ABDUL GAFUR ARE IN THE MPR. SIMILARLY, CHILDREN OF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OTHER PROMINENT GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY FIGURES, SUCH AS VICE PRESIDENT TRY SUTRISNO'S SON AND ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WIRANTO'S 21 YEAR OLD DAUGHTER, ARE MPR MEMBERS.

10. (C) A SOCIOLOGIST AND NGO LEADER, KASTORIUS SINAGA, HAS RESEARCHED THE BACKGROUNDS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE 1997-

2002 MPR AND PUBLICLY REPORTED THAT 36 PERCENT HAD SOME KIND OF FAMILY CONNECTION TO THE GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY. HE EXPLAINED TO POLOFF ON OCTOBER 21 THAT THIS FIGURE INCLUDED THOSE WHO HAD DIRECT FAMILY TIES TO THE GOVERNMENT/MILITARY (SPOUSE, PARENT, CHILD, SIBLING), INDIRECT FAMILY TIES (UNCLE, PARENT-IN-LAW, SON/DAUGHTER-IN-LAW) AND EVEN MORE INDIRECT OR "THIRD-PARTY" FAMILY TIES (E.G. FAMILY MEMBER OF A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL'S SON/DAUGHTER-IN-LAW, PARENT-IN-LAW, UNCLE, ETC.) AS AN EXAMPLE OF A "NEPOTISTIC" MPR MEMBER, HE MENTIONED THE SON-IN-LAW OF THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER.

11. (U) AS HAS BEEN WIDELY REPORTED IN THE PRESS, THE OUTSPOKEN LEADERS OF INDONESIA'S TWO LARGEST MASS-BASED ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS, ABDURAHHMAN WAHID (NAHDLATUL ULAMA, NU) AND AMIEN RAIS (MUHAMMADIYAH) WERE NOT SELECTED FOR THE MPR. ALTHOUGH SOME PROMINENT NU MEMBERS HAVE BECOME MPR MEMBERS, THEY ARE EITHER OFFICIALLY REPRESENTING OTHER ORGANIZATIONS OR WERE REPORTEDLY NOT FROM AMONG WAHID'S LIST OF SUGGESTIONS. SIMILARLY, AS ANTICIPATED, PROMINENT ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS FROM THE ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS, IN ADDITION TO AMIEN RAIS, SUCH AS ADI SASONO AND DAWAM RAHARDJO, WERE EXCLUDED -- THOUGH AS COMMENTATORS POINTED OUT AT THE TIME, OTHER MEMBERS OF ICMI WERE SELECTED (REFTEL C).

CONFIDENTIAL

LEADERSHIP OF MPR AND ITS FACTIONS

12. (U) THE LEADERS OF THE MPR ARE VIRTUALLY THE SAME AS THE LEADERS IN THE DPR. IN BOTH BODIES, HARMOKO IS THE SPEAKER, AND ABDUL GAFUR (GOLKAR FACTION), ISMAIL HASAN METAREUM (PPP FACTION), FATIMAH ACHMAD (PDI FACTION) AND LT. GENERAL SYARWAN HAMID (ABRI FACTION) ARE THE DEPUTY SPEAKERS. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER FOR THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES FACTION IN THE MPR, WHICH DOES NOT EXIST IN THE DPR, IS LT. GENERAL (RET.) POEDJONO PRANYOTO, THE GOVERNOR OF LAMPUNG.

13. (C) THIS LEADERSHIP CAN BE RELIED UPON TO DELIVER FEW SURPRISES DURING THE MARCH MPR SESSION. HARMOKO, A

SOEHARTO LOYALIST, WAS THE PRESIDENT'S LONG-SERVING INFORMATION MINISTER. AS GOLKAR'S GENERAL CHAIRMAN SINCE 1993, HE PULLED OUT EVERY STOP TO SECURE THE BIGGEST VICTORY EVER FOR THE RULING PARTY (ALTHOUGH FOLLOWING THE ELECTION, HE ENDURED THE PUBLIC HUMILIATION OF BEING OUSTED FROM THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND GIVEN THE HASTILY ESTABLISHED POST OF MINISTER OF SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS). GAFUR, A GOLKAR FUNCTIONARY, PLAYED A SUPPORTING ROLE TO HARMOKO IN OVERSEEING GOLKAR'S ELECTION EFFORTS. HASAN METAREUM, THE GENERAL CHAIRMAN OF PPP, IS GENERALLY THOUGHT TO BE A WEAK LEADER, AND, DESPITE SOME FIERY SPEECHES IN THE RUN-UP TO THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, WAS WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S WISHES ON IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. FATIMAH ACHMAD WAS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS WITHIN PDI WHO COOPERATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN ENGINEERING MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI'S OUSTER

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE PDI IN JUNE 1996. HAMID, SAID TO BE A FIRM SOEHARTO LOYALIST, WAS ONE OF THE MAJOR ACTORS WITHIN THE MILITARY RESPONSIBLE FOR ENGINEERING MEGAWATI'S OUSTER.

14. (U) STATE MINISTER FOR PLANNING GINANDJAR KARTASAMITA WILL LEAD GOLKAR'S MPR FACTION, AND HIS DEPUTIES WILL BE HARTONO, TUTUT, STATE MINISTER OF PUBLIC HOUSING AKBAR TANDJUNG, MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION HARYANTO DHANUTIRTO, AND GOLKAR EXECUTIVES AGUNG LAKSONO AND SOFIAN LUBIS. ONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S SONS, BAMBANG TRIHATMODJO, WILL SERVE ON THE GOLKAR FACTION'S EXECUTIVE BOARD.

15. (SBU) THE LEADERS OF THE OTHER FOUR MPR FACTIONS ARE: LT. GENERAL YUNUS YOSFIAH (ABRI), YUSUF SYAKIR (PPP), BUTTU HUTAPEA (PDI), AND WEST SUMATRA GOVERNOR HASAN BASRI (REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES). SOERJADI, THE PDI GENERAL CHAIRMAN, WHO WAS NOT ELECTED TO A SEAT IN THE DPR, HAS NOT ENTERED THE MPR EITHER. A PDI CENTRAL BOARD MEMBER TOLD POLOFF THAT SOERJADI "CHOSE NOT TO ENTER" THE MPR, AND THAT HE LIKEWISE WOULD CHOOSE NOT TO RUN AGAIN FOR PDI GENERAL CHAIRMAN AT THE PARTY CONGRESS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN JULY 1998.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4609

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4609

PAGE 01 JAKART 06244 04 OF 06 240410Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	/020W			

----------F2C400 240410Z /38

R 240408Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7999
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 06 JAKARTA 006244

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT/VICE PRESIDENT SELECTION: MPR - COMPOSITION AND PROCESS

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

16. (U) AN MPR "WORKING COMMITTEE", COMPOSED OF 90 MPR MEMBERS, PLAYS A KEY ROLE IN PREPARING FOR THE MARCH GENERAL SESSION; THUS ITS MEMBERSHIP IS CAREFULLY CHOSEN. DIVIDED INTO TWO AD HOC COMMITTEES, IT BEGAN WORK ON OCTOBER 20. LT. GENERAL (RET.) POEDJONO PRANYOTO WILL CHAIR THE WORKING COMMITTEE, IN ADDITION TO HIS DUTIES AS MPR DEPUTY SPEAKER. GENERAL HARTONO (RET.) AND LT. GENERAL WIRANTO WILL CHAIR AD HOC COMMITTEES 1 AND 2 RESPECTIVELY. PRESIDENTIAL CHILDREN TUTUT AND BAMBANG TRIHATMODJO, MINISTERS ABDUL LATIEF AND AKBAR TANJUNG, AND YOUNG GOLKAR OPERATIVES DIN SYAMSUDDIN AND AMIR SANTOSO ARE AMONG THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WORKING COMMITTEE.

17. (U) AD HOC COMMITTEE 1 IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE "BROAD OUTLINES OF NATIONAL POLICY" (GBHN). THE GBHN IS THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL GUIDING POLICY DOCUMENT FOR THE NEXT FIVE-YEAR PERIOD BEGINNING IN 1998. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY COUNCIL, OFFICIALLY CHAIRED BY THE PRESIDENT AND OVERSEEN DIRECTLY BY LT. GENERAL SOEKARTO (RET.), HAS PREPARED A FIRST DRAFT OF THE GBHN. THE OTHER FACTIONS HAVE ALSO PREPARED DRAFTS, AND THE JOB OF AD HOC COMMITTEE 1 IS TO MELD THEM TOGETHER FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE FULL MPR IN MARCH.

18. (U) AD HOC COMMITTEE 2 IS RESPONSIBLE FOR "NON-GBHN" MATTERS, INCLUDING MPR "DECREES" AND "DECISIONS." AN MPR DECREE HAS HIGHER LEGAL STANDING THAN LAWS PASSED BY THE DPR, AND ITS AUTHORITY IS SURPASSED ONLY BY THE 1945 CONSTITUTION. TWO DRAFT DECREES HAVE RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC ATTENTION SO FAR. ONE WOULD EXTEND SPECIAL AUTHORITY TO THE PRESIDENT TO RESTORE SECURITY IN

THE NAME OF PRESERVING NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. THIS MPR DECREE ("KETETAPAN MPR VI 1988") WAS IN FORCE CONTINUALLY FROM 1996 UNTIL 1993, WHEN IT WAS NOT RENEWED. THE OTHER DECREE SETS OUT AN INDONESIAN CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS. ALTHOUGH PREPARED BY THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY COUNCIL, GOLKAR AND ABRI HAVE ALREADY PUBLICLY EXPRESSED OBJECTIONS TO THIS DECREE, CLAIMING THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE ALREADY ADEQUATELY PROTECTED BY THE 1945 CONSTITUTION. THE PPP HAS PUBLICLY SUPPORTED THE HUMAN RIGHTS DECREE, AND A PPP DPR/MPR MEMBER TOLD POLOFF THAT THE PARTY PLANNED TO PUSH FOR THE DECREE IN THE PRE-MARCH WORKING GROUP.

19. (U) TECHNICALLY, THE SELECTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT ARE NON-GBHN MATTERS AND UNDER THE PURVIEW OF AD HOC COMMITTEE 2. IN PRACTICE, THIS HAS REPORTEDLY NOT BEEN DISCUSSED AT THE WORKING-GROUP LEVEL IN THE PAST. ONCE THE MARCH MPR SESSIONS BEGIN, THE TWO AD HOC COMMITTEES ARE RENAMED COMMISSION A AND B. AT THAT TIME, COMMISSION C WILL ALSO BE ESTABLISHED AND CHARGED WITH RESPONDING TO THE PRESIDENT'S "SPEECH OF ACCOUNTABILITY."

20. (U) GOLKAR OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE RENOMINATION OF SOEHARTO AS PRESIDENT ON OCTOBER 19 AT THE CONCLUSION OF ITS LEADERSHIP MEETING. GOLKAR'S ANNOUNCEMENT CAME EARLIER IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MPR THAN IN 1993. THE OTHER MPR FACTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO FOLLOW SUIT IN THE COMING MONTHS, WELL BEFORE MARCH, AS THEY HOLD THEIR LEADERSHIP MEETINGS.

21. (U) THE MPR WILL RECONVENE ON MARCH 1 AND MEET EVERY

DAY THROUGH MARCH 11. IN THE PAST, THE MPR MARCH SESSION BEGAN WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S SPEECH OF ACCOUNTABILITY,

PROCEEDED TO CONSIDERATION OF THE GBHN AND MPR DECREES AND DECISIONS, AND ENDED WITH THE SELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND THEN THE VICE PRESIDENT.

HIGH LEVEL "TEAM 11"

22. (C) ACCORDING TO VARIOUS PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, A SPECIAL COUNCIL OF ADVISERS WAS FORMED BEFORE PREVIOUS MPR GENERAL SESSIONS, KNOWN AS "TEAM 11," TO HELP THE PRESIDENT MAKE MAJOR DECISIONS IN ADVANCE OF THE MPR. THIS ADVISORY COUNCIL WAS ESTABLISHED BY GOLKAR'S TOP RULING BODY, THE BOARD OF PATRONS, WHICH IS CHAIRED BY THE PRESIDENT. THE ADVISORY COUNCIL WOULD WEIGH IN ON THE GBHN, LEADERSHIP POSITIONS WITHIN THE MPR, AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. ACCORDING TO NUMEROUS REPORTS, IT APPEARS THAT THIS MECHANISM WILL NOT BE USED IN THIS MPR. MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY HABIBIE RECENTLY TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE PRESIDENT DID NOT INTEND TO DESIGNATE AN INFORMAL COUNCIL OF ADVISORS TO RECOMMEND SUITABLE VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES (REFTEL B).

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4610

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4610

PAGE 01 JAKART 06244 05 OF 06 240410Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-08 ACDE-00 AID-00 ACQ-01 CIAE-00 SMEC-00

OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00
NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	/020W			

----------F2C404 240410Z /38

R 240408Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8000
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 06 JAKARTA 006244

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT/VICE PRESIDENT SELECTION: MPR
- COMPOSITION AND PROCESS

23. (C) HABIBIE WILL BECOME THE "DAILY COORDINATOR" OF THE POWERFUL GOLKAR BOARD OF PATRONS CHAIRED BY SOEHARTO. THIS WAS A ROLE HE PLAYED DURING THE 1993 MPR. HABIBIE

ADVISERS HAVE REPEATEDLY ARGUED TO POLOFF THAT THE ANTICIPATED RE-SELECTION OF HABIBIE FOR THIS POST WAS EVIDENCE THAT THE MINISTER WAS IN LINE TO BE NAMED VICE PRESIDENT. HABIBIE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT SOEHARTO HAD ASKED HIM TO COORDINATE THE SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AND OTHER MPR MATTERS BY OVERSEEING THE WORK OF THE GOLKAR, ABRI, AND REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES FACTIONS. THE POLITICAL MAGAZINE, FORUM KEADILAN, AGREED THAT THIS POST AGAIN GAVE HABIBIE AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN GOLKAR. THE MAGAZINE ALSO SPECULATED THAT THE KEY POSITIONS GIVEN TO TWO FOUR-STAR GENERALS, WIRANTO AND HARTONO (RET.), AS LEADERS OF THE MPR WORKING

COMMITTEE (BP), MEANT THAT THEY WOULD BE RELIED UPON TO CONTROL GOLKAR AND ABRI AND "SECURE" THE MPR GENERAL SESSION.

THE 1993 MPR

24. (C) RECENT HISTORY HAS HAD AN IMPACT ON CURRENT THINKING ABOUT THE UPCOMING MPR. SEVERAL SOURCES DESCRIBED TO POLOFF THE MANEUVERING THAT TOOK PLACE OVER THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN 1993. [redacted] B1 EXPLAINED THAT THERE WERE REPORTS ABOUT SOEHARTO'S ILL HEALTH CIRCULATING AT THAT TIME, AND MANY PLAYERS FEARED THAT THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA WOULD BE THREATENED IF THE PRESIDENT WERE TO LEAVE THE SCENE. (COMMENT: THIS IS PROBABLY A REFERENCE TO CONCERNS ABOUT THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAM IN POLITICS. PANCASILA IS THOUGHT TO BE A BULWARK AGAINST THE DESIRES OF THOSE WHO WANT A CLOSER CONNECTION BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE GOVERNMENT. HABIBIE, THE GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY THROUGH HIS LEADERSHIP OF ICMI, WAS WIDELY BELIEVED TO HAVE A GOOD SHOT AT THE VICE PRESIDENCY. END COMMENT.) ALONG THE SAME LINES, [redacted] B1 SAID, THE MILITARY WANTED TO PROTECT ITS ROLE IN GOVERNMENT.

25. (C) POLITICAL SCIENTIST [redacted] B1 SEPARATELY EXPLAINED TO POLOFF THAT GENERAL BENNY MURDANI (RET.), WHO WAS MINISTER OF DEFENSE IN 1993, WAS THE MOST INFLUENTIAL OF THIS CONCERNED GROUP. MURDANI'S CANDIDATE WAS TRY SUTRISNO, WHO AT THAT TIME WAS ARMED FORCES COMMANDER IN CHIEF. AT A MEETING OF THE MPR INFORMAL COUNCIL OF ADVISERS (TEAM 11) PRIOR TO THE MARCH 1993 MPR SESSION, SAID [redacted] B1 A HEAD COUNT WAS CONDUCTED REGARDING THE COUNCIL'S RECOMMENDATION ON WHO SHOULD BE THE VICE PRESIDENT. HABIBIE BEAT SUTRISNO BY A VOTE OF SIX TO FIVE. (COMMENT: THE POLITICAL MAGAZINE GATRA AGREES THAT THIS MEETING TOOK PLACE, BUT HAS REPORTED THAT THE VOTING WAS EIGHT FOR HABIBIE, SEVEN FOR SUTRISNO, AND FIVE FOR STATE SECRETARY MOERDIONO. END COMMENT.)

26. (C) FOLLOWING THIS MEETING, LT. GENERAL HARSUDIONO HARTAS, A MEMBER OF THE "MURDANI GROUP" IN THE ARMED FORCES, WHO WAS THEN THE HEAD OF THE ABRI MPR FACTION AND THE ABRI CHIEF OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS, PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT SUTRISNO WAS ABRI'S CANDIDATE FOR VICE PRESIDENT. THE OTHER MPR FACTIONS FOLLOWED ABRI'S LEAD, AND [redacted] SAID THAT THE PDI HAD ANNOUNCED ITS SUPPORT FOR SUTRISNO "AT VIRTUALLY THE SAME TIME AS DID ABRI." [redacted] AND MANY OTHER COMMENTATORS HAVE CHARACTERIZED THIS AS A

B1

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

FAIT ACCOMPLI THAT DID NOT PLEASE THE PRESIDENT, BECAUSE SOEHARTO HAD NOT ALREADY SIGNALLED HIS CHOICE FOR VICE PRESIDENT.

27. (C) [redacted] BELIEVES SUCH A MANEUVER BY ABRI "WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO HAPPEN AGAIN" IN THIS MPR. IN HIS OPINION, THE NEW MILITARY LEADERS, SUCH AS ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WIRANTO, WERE ALL LOYAL FOLLOWERS OF SOEHARTO SINCE MOST WERE HIS FORMER ASSISTANTS (ADJUTANTS). [redacted] WENT FURTHER, AND SPECULATED THAT SOEHARTO WAS IN FIRM CONTROL OF "ALL THE GENERALS." CONDITIONS HAVE CHANGED SINCE THE LAST MPR WHEN MURDANI STILL WIELDED CONSIDERABLE INDEPENDENT INFLUENCE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES, [redacted] ARGUED. A GOLKAR MPR MEMBER, WHO IS ALSO [redacted] IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF, AGREED THAT THE CURRENT MILITARY LEADERS HAD NO CONNECTION TO MURDANI. A PPP CENTRAL BOARD MEMBER POINTED OUT TO POLOFF THAT SOEHARTO HAD RESPONDED TO THE 1993 MANEUVER BY DROPPING MANY OF THOSE INVOLVED, SUCH AS MURDANI, FROM THE CABINET. SIMILARLY, LT. GENERAL HARTAS, SAID [redacted] WAS SUBSEQUENTLY "PARKED" AT THE VIRTUALLY POWERLESS SUPREME ADVISORY BOARD (DPA).

B1

B1

B1

B1

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4611

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4611

PAGE 01 JAKART 06244 06 OF 06 240410Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	/021W		

----------F2C407 240410Z /38

R 240408Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8001
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 06 JAKARTA 006244

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT/VICE PRESIDENT SELECTION: MPR
- COMPOSITION AND PROCESS

COMMENT
---

28. (C) THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO ENSURE EVEN

GREATER CONTROL OVER THE MPR THAN IN THE PAST, THROUGH THE ENTRANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL FAMILY MEMBERS AND FAMILY MEMBERS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS, AND THE DOMINANT ROLE OF SENIOR BUREAUCRATS AND GENERALS, CAN BE INTERPRETED IN PART AS A RESPONSE TO THE GLITCHES THAT OCCURRED IN 1993. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS SOUGHT TO CONTROL THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE MPR TO GUARANTEE THAT THE SELECTION PROCESS OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT PROCEEDS SMOOTHLY. THIS OBJECTIVE HAS LIKELY BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THE MANEUVERING OVER THE VICE PRESIDENCY AND THE FAIT ACCOMPLI HANDED TO THE PRESIDENT IN 1993. SOEHARTO IS PROBABLY MORE DETERMINED THAN EVER TO CONTROL THE PROCESS AND AVOID BEING PUSHED ON THE CHOICE OF VICE PRESIDENT.

29. (C) PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THESE PAST ISSUES, HOWEVER, IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THIS MPR WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE SUCCESSION IF IT SHOULD OCCUR BETWEEN 1998-2003 THROUGH THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH OR HIS DECISION TO STEP DOWN. ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION STATES THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT BECOMES PRESIDENT IF SUCCESSION OCCURS MID-TERM, AN INFLUENTIAL INTERPRETATION ASSERTS THAT THE MPR WOULD STILL HAVE TO MEET IN ORDER TO EMPOWER THIS NEW PRESIDENT. AS NOTED REFTEL D, THIS WOULD INTENSIFY SOEHARTO'S INTEREST IN HAVING AS MANY LOYALISTS AS POSSIBLE IN THE MPR TO ENSURE THAT HIS CHOICE OF A SUCCESSOR WOULD BE CONFIRMED. ROY

PTQ1335

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1335

PAGE 01 JAKART 04988 01 OF 04 220549Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-09	G-00	/025W			

----------DCD805 220550Z /15

R 211119Z AUG 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7100
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 004988

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: LOOKING TOWARD THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION:
- INFORMATION MINISTER HARTONO'S ENTRANCE INTO
- ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION (ICMI)

REF: A) JAKARTA 3981; B) JAKARTA 3773; C) JAKARTA 3619;
C) JAKARTA 3386

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04988 01 OF 04 220549Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 16 NOV 2006 200503193

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: FORMER ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF HARTONO, WHO IS NOW THE MINISTER OF INORMATION, RECENTLY ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO OIN THE ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS (ICMI). ALTHOUGH NUMEROUS GOVERNMENT MINISTERS ALREADY BELONG TO ICMI, HARTONO'S POLITICAL AMBITIONS, AND CONNECTIONS TO THE PALACE VIA HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT'S ELDEST DAUGHTER SITI HARDIYANTI (TUTUT), WERE ENOUGH TO MAKE HIS PROPOSED ENTRANCE CAUSE A STIR IN THE PRESS AND ELITE POLITICAL CIRCLES. MOREOVER, HE SEEMED TO BE MOVING IN ON THE POLITICAL BASE OF ONE OF HIS RIVALS, MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY HABIBIE, WHO IS THE GENERAL CHAIRMAN OF ICMI. IT IS PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY SPECULATED THAT BOTH ARE AMONG A SMALL GROUP JOCKEYING TO BE SELECTED BY PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AS THE NEXT VICE PRESIDENT.

3. (C) A PRESS LEAK THAT SEVERAL PROMINENT MEMBERS OF ICMI WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED ON GOLKAR'S LIST OF MEMBERS FOR THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), THE INSTITUTION THAT SELECTS THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT, FURTHER FUELED SPECULATION THAT SOMETHING WAS GOING ON BETWEEN TH GOVERNMENT AND ICMI. TWO PLAUSIBLE, NOT NECSSARILY INCOMPATIBLE, THEORIES ABOUT THESE DEELOPMENTS ARE THAT HARTONO IS BEING PERMITTED TO USE ICMI AS A BASE TO HELP POSITION HIMSELF IN THE JOCKEYING OVER WHO WILL BECOME VICE PRESIDENT, AND THAT THE PRESIDENT IS USING HARTONO TO REIGN IN ICMI ACTIVISTS DEEMED TO BE TOO CRITICAL OF THE

GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY

HARTONO BECOMING ICMI MEMBER COMBINED WITH PUBLIC SLAP AT ICMI ACTIVISTS

---

4. (SBU) RETIRED GENERAL HARTONO, THE FORMER ARMY COMMANDER AND CURRENT MINISTER OF INFORMATION, HAS CAUSED A STIR IN ELITE POLITICAL CIRCLES BY ANNOUNCING (AUGUST 1) HIS INTENTION TO JOIN THE ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM

INTELLECTUALS (ICMI). ICMI IS LED BY MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY HABIBIE, A HARTONO RIVAL. BOTH HARTONO AND HABIBIE ARE AMONG THE HANDFUL OF PROMINENT FIGURES, INCLUDING GOLKAR GENERAL CHAIRMAN HARMOKO, MINISTER OF PLANNING GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA, CURRENT VICE PRESIDENT TRY SUTRISNO, AND SOMETIMES THE PRESIDENT'S ELDEST DAUGHTER SITI HARDIYANTI (TUTUT), OFTEN MENTIONED IN PUBLIC AS POTENTIAL CANDIDATES FOR THE VICE-PRESIDENCY. JOCKEYING FOR POSITION BETWEEN ALL OF THEM IS WIDELY BELIEVED TO BE INTENSE.

5. (SBU) INCREASING SPECULATION THAT SOMETHING WAS AFOOT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND ICMI, AN UNATTRIBUTED REPORT BEGAN CIRCULATING IN THE PRESS ON AUGUST 9 THAT FIVE PROMINENT ICMI MEMBERS WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED ON THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR'S LIST OF PROSPECTIVE CANDIDATES TO ENTER THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) THAT WILL SELECT A PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT IN MARCH. GOLKAR AND THE OTHER TWO POLITICAL PARTIES ARE PERMITTED TO SELECT SOME REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MPR FROM THOSE WHO WERE ON THEIR ORIGINAL LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATE LISTS BUT WHO WERE LOW RANKED AND NOT ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT. THE FIVE SUCH

GOLKAR/ICMI MEMBERS WHO THE PRESS REPORTED WOULD NOT BE SENT TO THE MPR WERE ICMI'S SECRETARY GENERAL ADI SASONO, DAWAM RAHARDJO, MULADI, DJIMLI ASSIDDIQUI, AND WATIK PRATIKNYA.

6. (C) THESE DEVELOPMENTS SET OFF A TORRENT OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPECULATION AND THEORIZING ABOUT HARTONO'S INTENTIONS AND PROSPECTS, THE STATUS OF ICMI VIS-A-VIS THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE UPCOMING MPR. HARTONO, A POLITICAL "HEAVY" GIVEN HIS WELL KNOWN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT'S ELDEST DAUGHTER SITI HARDIYANTI (TUTUT), WAS NOISILY ENTERING ONE OF HABIBIE'S BASTIONS OF ELITE SUPPORT. HAD THE PRESIDENT SENT HIM, WOULD HE SEEK TO TAKEOVER ICMI, WHO WAS HE AFTER, AND DID THIS MEAN THAT HE WAS BEING GROOMED FOR THE VICE PRESIDENCY, WERE SOME OF THE QUESTIONS THAT IMMEDIATELY AROSE ABOUT HARTONO'S MANEUVER.

CONTROLLING ICMI?

7. (C) ONE PLAUSIBLE THEORY EXPLAINING HARTONO'S ENTRANCE INTO ICMI IS THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WANTS HIM TO CONTROL SOME ICMI MEMBERS, SUCH AS AMIEN RAIS, THE LEADER OF

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8837

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8837

PAGE 01 JAKART 04988 02 OF 04 211118Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-09	G-00	/025W			

----------DC84FB 211119Z /38

R 211119Z AUG 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7101
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 004988

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: LOOKING TOWARD THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION:
- INFORMATION MINISTER HARTONO'S ENTRANCE INTO
- ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION (ICMI)

INDONESIA'S SECOND LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION
MUHAMMADIYAH, WHO HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN CRITICAL OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04988 02 OF 04 211118Z
GOVERNMENT. (NOTE: RAIS HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM A LEADERSHIP POSITION IN ICMI IN FEBRUARY AFTER MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT THE BUSANG MINING DEAL THAT ANGERED THE PRESIDENT. END NOTE.) GOLKAR OPERATIVE [redacted] B1
[redacted] OFFERED THIS AS ONE POSSIBILITY TO POLOFF.
SIMILARLY, A [redacted] B1
[redacted] SPECULATED TO POLOFF THAT THE PRESIDENT'S HIGHEST PRIORITY WAS FOR THE MPR TO PROCEED AS SMOOTHLY AS POSSIBLE, AND IT WAS FEARED THAT ICMI ACTIVISTS AND GOVERNMENT CRITICS SUCH AS SASONO, RAIS, AND RAHARDJO HAD THE POTENTIAL TO BE CRITICAL AND DISRUPTIVE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MPR, OR EVEN IN THE MPR IF THEY WERE CHOSEN TO ENTER. ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE, THE PRESIDENT WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT ICMI LEADER HABIBIE HAD FAILED TO "CONTROL" HIS PEOPLE IN ICMI, AND HAD THUS SENT IN HARTONO TO DO THE JOB WITH A STRONG HAND. ACCORDING TO A LOCAL JOURNALIST, HABIBIE WAS OUT OF FAVOR WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR NOT BEING ABLE TO "CONTROL HIS CHILDREN" IN ICMI.

8. (U) THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM, AS EXEMPLIFIED IN A RECENT ARTICLE IN THE POLITICAL MAGAZINE GATRA, IS THAT ICMI, NEVER CONSIDERED TO BE A MONOLITHIC ORGANIZATION, IS SPLIT INTO AT LEAST TWO GROUPS. ONE GROUP IS INCLINED TO BE CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND IS DOMINATED BY FIGURES SUCH AS AMIEN RAIS AND ADI SASONO (NOTE: WHAT MANY ANALYSTS REFER TO THE ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS. END NOTE). THE OTHER IS DOMINATED BY FIGURES SUCH AS MINISTER OF

EDUCATION AND CULTURE WARDIMAN DJOJONEGORO AND MINISTER OF COMMUNICATION HARYANTO DHANUTIRTO (NOTE: WHAT MANY ANALYSTS REFER TO AS THE BUREAUCRATS. END NOTE.)

CONFIDENTIAL

9. (C) [redacted] LEADERS RECENTLY B1
DESCRIBED TO EMBOFF WHAT THEY BELIEVED WAS A FACTION WITHIN THE ICMI ACTIVIST GROUP, WHICH THEY SAID WAS AN ORGANIZATION OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC STUDENT ASSOCIATION (HMI) FORMED IN 1985 CALLED KAHMI, THAT THEY THEORIZED HAD BECOME THE DRIVING FORCE IN ICMI. THEY PLACED SASONO, DAWAM RAHARDJO, AND OTHERS WITHIN THIS GROUP, AND CHARACTERIZED THEM AS ANTI-SOEHARTO AND ANTI-WEST. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS [redacted] B1
POLOFF HAS FOUND THE FORMER TO BE AT LEAST PARTIALLY TRUE, HOWEVER, BOTH MAKE A BIG EFFORT NOT TO APPEAR ANTI-WEST AND TO EMPHASIZE THEIR BELIEF IN DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

10. (C) RESPECTED POLITICAL ANALYST [redacted] HAD B1
PREDICTED THAT HARTONO WOULD BE USED TO CONTROL ICMI DURING A LUNCH WITH THE AMBASSADOR [redacted] (REFTEL A). HE HAD ARGUED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS INTENT ON "CONTAINING ISLAMIC POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT" THAT HAD BEEN GIVEN VOICE THROUGH ICMI, BECAUSE HE NO LONGER NEEDED ICMI TO BALANCE THE MILITARY AND GOLKAR. [redacted] THOUGHT THAT HARTONO B1
COULD BE AN APPROPRIATE VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FOR THIS PURPOSE BECAUSE HE PROVIDED IDEOLOGICAL BALANCE. HE SYMBOLICALLY REPRESENTED ISLAM, BUT WAS "PART OF THE SYSTEM AND CONTROLLABLE."

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STRUGGLE FOR THE VICE PRESIDENCY?

11. (C) [redacted] ALSO ADDRESSED HARTONO'S BID FOR THE B1
VICE PRESIDENCY WITH POLOFF, OFFERING IT AS A SECOND

CONFIDENTIAL

THEORY ABOUT HARTONO'S ENTRANCE INTO ICMI. HE TERMED HARTONO A "DARK HORSE" CANDIDATE. ICMI COULD HELP THE INFORMATION MINISTER, ACCORDING TO [redacted] BY GIVING HIM A BASE AMONG, OR MAKING HIM ACCEPTABLE TO, THE MORE URBAN "MODERNIST" MUSLIMS. [redacted] CLAIMED THAT HARTONO ALREADY HAD A GOOD BASE AMONG THE RURAL "TRADITIONALIST" MEMBERS OF INDONESIA'S LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION, NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU). THIS WAS DESPITE THE FACT THAT HARTONO WOULD "BREAK" WITH NU LEADER ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, WITH WHOM HE HAD COOPERATED DURING THE ELECTION, BECAUSE WAHID HAD CRITICIZED HIS PLAN TO ENTER ICMI. THERE WAS A HISTORY OF BAD BLOOD BETWEEN THE TWO, AND HARTONO'S CLOSENESS WITH WAHID HAD BEEN PURELY A MATTER OF POLITICAL PRAGMATISM, SAID [redacted] SPECULATED SEPARATELY THAT ICMI MEMBERSHIP WOULD GIVE HARTONO A CHANCE TO COMPETE WITH HABIBIE FOR MUSLIM SUPPORT.

B1

B1

B1

12. (C) THE ABOVE THEORIES ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE, BUT IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE FIRST COULD APPLY BY ITSELF. TWO WELL-PLUGGED IN POLITICAL OBSERVERS SEPARATELY SPECULATED TO POLOFF THAT SOEHARTO MIGHT BE USING HARTONO AS HIS FIXER OR EVEN "BULLDOZER" TO SOLVE SPECIFIC POLITICAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 04988 03 OF 04 211119Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-09	G-00	/025W			

----------DC8502 211119Z /38

R 211119Z AUG 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7102
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 004988

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: LOOKING TOWARD THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION:
- INFORMATION MINISTER HARTONO'S ENTRANCE INTO
- ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION (ICMI)

PROBLEMS, AND THAT IT DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT HE WAS MOVING IN ON THE VICE PRESIDENCY. EVEN THE GOLKAR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04988 03 OF 04 211119Z
OPERATIVE [redacted] ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HARTONO MIGHT END UP AS HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER, IN A CONSTELLATION OF POWERFUL FIGURES THAT INCLUDED PRESIDENTIAL DAUGHTER TUTUT AS GOLKAR GENERAL CHAIRPERSON AND CURRENT ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WIRANTO MOVING UP TO BECOME THE ARMED FORCES COMMANDER IN CHIEF. [redacted] SEEMED FAIRLY CERTAIN THAT

B1

B1

TUTUT STOOD A GOOD CHANCE OF ASSUMING THIS POSITION, SAYING THAT "THERE WERE NO OBSTACLES AMONG THE GOLKAR LEADERSHIP" TO HER BECOMING THE GENERAL CHAIRPERSON.

PROMINENT ICMI MEMBERS NOT INCLUDED ON GOLKAR MPR LIST

13. (C) IN AN EARLIER INTERVIEW WITH POLOFF FOLLOWING THE GENERAL ELECTION, [redacted] HAD ARGUED THAT SOME OF THE ICMI ACTIVISTS HAD NOT CONTRIBUTED SUFFICIENTLY TO GOLKAR'S EFFORTS DURING THE CAMPAIGN, AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT GAIN FROM THE ELECTION. HE SAID THAT THE GOLKAR CENTRAL BOARD HAD RECEIVED COMPLAINTS FROM THE LEADERSHIP IN CENTRAL JAVA THAT ICMI MEMBERS SUCH AS ADI SASONO AND DAWAM RAHARDJO "DID NOT WANT TO CAMPAIGN." B1

14. (C) DURING THE MOST RECENT MEETING, HOWEVER, [redacted] REITERATED TO POLOFF GOLKAR GENERAL CHAIRMAN HARMOKO'S PUBLIC CLAIMS THAT THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THESE FIVE PROMINENT ICMI MEMBERS WOULD BE INCLUDED ON THE GOLKAR MPR LIST ISSUE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THEIR ICMI MEMBERSHIP. [redacted] AND OTHERS ARGUED TO POLOFF THAT MANY ICMI MEMBERS, INCLUDING FROM THE ACTIVIST WING, WOULD BE ENTERING THE PARLIAMENT AND THE MPR, THUS THE INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION OF THESE FIVE PROVED NOTHING. HE CLAIMED THAT RAHARDJO AND WATIK WERE NOT INCLUDED FOR "TECHNICAL" B1 B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REASONS, AND THAT DJIMLY WOULD IN FACT BE SELECTED FOR THE MPR. MULADI'S FATE WAS LEFT UNCLEAR, BUT [redacted] DIRECTLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SASONO WAS BEING EXCLUDED FOR POLITICAL REASONS BECAUSE OF HIS OPENLY CRITICAL POSITIONS. B1

IS ICMI BEING LED IN A MORE OPENLY ANTI-GOVERNMENT DIRECTION?

15. (C) DURING A MEETING WITH POLOFF ON AUGUST 18, [redacted] APPEARED MORE LIKE THE NGO LEADER THAT HE USED TO BE THAN THE GOVERNMENT INSIDER THAT HE HAD BECOME, AT LEAST SINCE HE WAS SELECTED [redacted] CRITICIZED THE CRIME, ENVIRONMENT, AND LABOR BILLS, THREE OF THE PIECES OF B1 B1

LEGISLATION STILL BEFORE PARLIAMENT THAT HAVE DRAWN NGO FIRE. .HE PROVIDED POLOFF WITH ICMI'S DETAILED CRITIQUE OF THE LABOR BILL WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THE GOI THAT DAY. HE DESCRIBED A SET OF POLICY AREAS THAT HE THOUGHT INDONESIA AND THE WORLD SHOULD FOCUS ON, WHICH INCLUDED "HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, ENVIRONMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND STANDARDIZATION." (COMMENT: SOME INFLUENTIAL INDONESIANS, SUCH AS [redacted] B1
SUSPECT THAT ICMI IS SECTARIAN AND CHARGE THAT IN TRYING TO PROMOTE ITS VIEW OF MODERNIST ISLAM ICMI COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT CHRISTIANS, OTHER MINORITIES, AND "TRADITIONALIST" MUSLIMS. END COMMENT.) WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO HAVE ANY INFLUENCE ON PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AT THIS POINT IN HIS LONG TENURE [redacted] CONTENDED THAT THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED ONLY B1
TO POWER OR PRESSURE. MOREOVER, HE OFFERED HIS VIEW THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04988 03 OF 04 211119Z
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT WAS BENEFICIAL BECAUSE IT GAVE REFORMERS IN INDONESIA, A GROUP WITHIN WHICH HE PLACED HIMSELF, "ROOM TO MANEUVER."

16. (C) [redacted] ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT LIKE B1
HARTONO OR SEE HIM AS ANY KIND OF ALLY. HE SAID THAT HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES "KNEW HARTONO, AND THEY COULD NEVER ACCEPT HIM AS A LEADER." HE CONTENDED THAT ICMI'S RELATIONS WITH THE MILITARY WERE GOOD DESPITE HARTONO, AND GAVE AS EXAMPLES ARMED FORCES COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FEISAL TANJUNG, FORMER CHIEF OF ABRI SOCIAL-POLITICAL AFFAIRS SYARWAN HAMID, AND NEW ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WIRANTO. HE ELABORATED THAT HARTONO COULD NOT HELP ICMI IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE ARMED FORCES BECAUSE HARTONO HIMSELF WAS UNPOPULAR WITH THE MILITARY. HE SAID THERE WAS A PERCEPTION WITHIN THE MILITARY THAT HARTONO'S PERSONAL CONNECTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S DAUGHTER TUTUT WAS AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THE INSTITUTION.

17. (C) [redacted] ALSO UNDERLINED HIS CONTINUED LOYALTY TO B1
HABIBIE. HE CONTENDED, UNCONVINCINGLY, THAT HARTONO WAS JUST ANOTHER OF THE MANY GOVERNMENT MINISTERS BELONGING TO ICMI, AND THAT WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION "HARTONO STILL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8843

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8843

PAGE 01 JAKART 04988 04 OF 04 211120Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-09	G-00	/025W			

----------DC851E 211120Z /38

R 211119Z AUG 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7103
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 004988

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID

SUBJECT: LOOKING TOWARD THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION:
- INFORMATION MINISTER HARTONO'S ENTRANCE INTO
- ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION (ICMI)

WORKED FOR HABIBIE." HE ATTEMPTED TO REBUT THE
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM THAT HABIBIE'S POLITICAL POSITION HAS
CONFIDENTIAL

SLIPPED AS OF LATE. HE CLAIMED THAT "NOTHING HAD REALLY CHANGED" IN HABIBIE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH SOEHARTO. LITTLE HAD BEEN HEARD FROM HABIBIE PUBLICLY BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN OUT OF THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, WHILE HE WAS AWAY, HABIBIE STILL KEPT IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND MET WITH HIM TWICE, AND EVEN WENT FISHING WITH THE PRESIDENT, UPON HIS RETURN. [redacted] CONCLUDED THAT GIVEN THIS B1
CONTINUED INFLUENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT, HABIBIE STILL HAD A GOOD CHANCE OF BEING NAMED VICE PRESIDENT. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD CHOOSE A "SIMPLE" PERSON LIKE HARTONO.

COMMENT
---

18. (C) MANEUVERING WITHIN THE ELITE IN THE RUN UP TO THE MPR AND AN EVENTUAL POLITICAL TRANSITION, ESPECIALLY OVER THE VICE PRESIDENCY, HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE ONE OF THE PRISMS THROUGH WHICH INDONESIAN POLITICS IS INTERPRETED. MANY INDONESIANS HAVE APPLIED IT, OFTEN WITH LITTLE EVIDENCE, TO POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT THEY OTHERWISE HAVE DIFFICULTY EXPLAINING, SUCH AS THE SERIES OF RIOTS THAT STRUCK INDONESIA OVER THE PAST YEAR. THE RECENT STIR OVER HARTONO'S ENTRY INTO ICMI, AND THE EXCLUSION OF SOME ICMI MEMBERS FROM THE GOLKAR MPR LIST, IS AN EXAMPLE WHERE THIS MANEUVERING SEEMS TO HAVE BROKEN TO THE SURFACE, PROVIDING SOCIETY A GLIMPSE INTO A MURKY POLITICAL WORLD IN WHICH LITTLE IS EVER CLEAR. HARVEY

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9080

PAGE 01 JAKART 02739 01 OF 02 180141Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/036W	

----------3EE4AA 180234Z /38

O 161100Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1575
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0699
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002739

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDING USCINCPAC AS ADDEE)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02739 01 OF 02 180141Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 05 DEC 2006 200503180

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FIANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA EARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/16)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASO: 1.5(D).
2. (C) SUMMARY: SOEHARTO SIGNALLEDON MAY 16 THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO "RE-SHUFFLE" THE CABINET, ACCORDING TO THE SPEAKER OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) AND PARLIAMENT (DPR) HARMOKO. HE ALSO MET WITH A DELEGATION FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA TO DISCUSS REFORM. THE PRESIDENT, THROUGH HIS INFORMATION MINISTER, DENIED (SORT OF) THAT HE HAD SAID IN CAIRO THAT HE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO STEP DOWN. EVEN SOME TRADITIONAL SUPPORTERS OF THE REGIME, SUCH AS THE ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) AND THE ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS (ICMI), ARE PUBLICLY SUGGESTING THAT HE GIVE WAY. AMONG GOVERNMENT CRITICS, EFFORTS ARE STILL ONGOING TO FORGE A PUBLIC DISPLAY OF UNITY BY MAJOR OPPOSITION FIGURES. THERE IS GROWING CONCERN AMONG SOME OF OUR CONTACTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT MOVE TO ARREST ONE OF THESE FIGURES, AMIEN RAIS. STUDENT LEADERS TELL US THAT PLANS OF NATIONWIDE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 20 ARE STILL FIRM BUT, DUE TO THEIR CONCERN OVER THE RECENT RIOTS, THEY MIGHT NOT TRY TO LEAVE THE CAMPUSES. AS OF

MID-AFTERNOON MAY 16, JAKARTA AND SURABAYA WERE RELATIVELY QUIET.
END SUMMARY

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS
---

3. (U) IT WAS ANNOUNCED ON MAY 16 THAT PRESDENT SOEHARTO HAD AGREED TO REPLACE ("RE-SHUFFLE") MEMBERS OF THE CABINET. HARMOKO, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AND PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLE (MPR), SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE AND OTHER MPR LEADERS HAD

MET WITH SOEHARTO. A GOLKAR SOURCE RECOUNTED TO POLOFF THAT HARMOKO HAD "EXPLAINED THE PEOPLE'S IDEAS" -- INCLUDING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR AND A CABINET "RE-SHUFFLE" -- TO THE PRESIDENT, AND THAT SOEHARTO HAD INDICATED HE WOULD CHANGE THE CABINET. HARMOKO PROVIDED NO DETAILS ABOUT WHO WOULD BE REPLACED AND WHO MIGHT ENTER THE CABINET. SOEHARTO EARLIER IN THE DAY MET WITH A DELEGATION FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA, INCLUDING THE RECTOR AND PROMINENT ALUMNI, TO DISCUSS REFORM ISSUES, AND HE REPORTEDLY REITERATED HIS SUPPORT FOR REFORM, PROVIDED IT WAS VIA THE DPR.

4. (U) UPON RETURNING FROM CAIRO MAY 15, SOEHARTO ISSUED WHAT WAS INTENDED TO BE A DENIAL OF HIS EARLIER SIGNAL THAT HE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO STEP DOWN. ACCORDING TO THE JAKARTA POST, INFORMATION MINISTER ALWI DAHLAN ANNOUNCED "HE NEVER SAID THAT 'I'M READY TO RESIGN' AS INTERPRETED BY SOME IN THE MEDIA." THE CLARIFICATION, HOWEVER, INCLUDED THE SAME LANGUAGE INITIALLY REPORTED IN THE MEDIA THAT IMPLIED THE PRESIDENT WAS CONSIDERING RESIGNATION, AND SIMPLY LEFT OUT THE EXPLICIT MENTION OF THE WORD "WITHDRAW."

5. (SBU) EVEN SOME TRADITIONAL SUPPORTERS OF THE REGIME ARE

WITHDRAWING SUPPORT FOR SOEHARTO. INDONESIA'S LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION, NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU), ISSUED A STATEMENT MAY 15 WELCOMING SOEHARTO'S INITIAL SIGNAL THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE WAY. THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS (ICMI) ISSUED A SIMILAR STATEMENT, AS DID A GROUP OF PROMINENT RETIRED GENERALS (SOME IN THE GROUPS, SUCH AS ALI SADIKIN, HAVE LONG OPPOSED THE REGIME).

6. (C) AMONG GOVERNMENT CRITICS, AIDES TO SENIOR OPPOSITION LEADERS MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI AND AMIEN RAIS TOLD US MAY 16 THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING PREVIOUS DIFFICULTIES, EFFORTS ARE STILL UNDERWAY TO FORGE A PUBLIC DISPLAY OF UNITY BY THOSE TWO OPPOSITION FIGURES AND ISLAMIC LEADER ABDURRAHMAN WAHID. A SOURCE CLOSE TO AMIEN RAIS TOLD POLCOUNS MAY 16 THAT THERE IS GROWING CONCERN THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT MOVE TO ARREST AMIEN RAIS, POSSIBLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORMATION OF THE PEOPLE'S MANDATE ASSEMBLY (MAJELIS AMANAT RAKYAT). A GROUP OF PROMINENT RETIRED GENERALS FROM THE GENERATION OF 1945.

STUDENTS
---

7. (C) STUDENT LEADERS IN JAKARTA, PADANG (WEST SUMATRA), BOGOR, AND SURAKARTA (CENTRAL JAVA) TELL US THAT THE PLANS FOR NATIONWIDE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 20 ARE STILL FIRM, AND STUDENTS ARE CURRENTLY HOLDING INTENSIVE INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9083

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9083

PAGE 01 JAKART 02739 02 OF 02 180246Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01
	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/036W	

----------3EE4D5 180249Z /38

O 161100Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1576
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AIT TAIPEI 0700
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002739

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDING USCINCPAC AS ADDEE)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02739 02 OF 02 180246Z
DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/16)

ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED. AMCONSUL SURABAYA ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK HAVE NOT ALTERED PLANS FOR MASSIVE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 20. STUDENTS HAVE BEEN UPSET BY RIOTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN RECENT DAYS, AND SOME LEADERS ARE PUSHING FOR THE MAY 20 DEMONSTRATIONS (WHICH MAY BEGIN ON MAY 19) TO REMAIN ON CAMPUS.

SECURITY SITUATION
---

8. (U) AS OF MID-AFTERNOON MAY 16, JAKARTA CONTINUED TO BE RELATIVELY QUIET. SURABAYA WAS RELATIVELY CALM, ACCORDING TO THE CONSULATE, AFTER A TIMOR DEALERSHIP AND A TRAVEL AGENCY NOT FAR FROM THE CONSULATE WERE BADLY DAMAGED THE NIGHT BEFORE. ARMORED VEHICLES WERE STATIONED AROUND SURABAYA AND OTHER AREAS THAT COULD BE SUBJECTED TO LOOTING. IN GENERAL, SOME SHOPS WERE OPEN AND TRAFFIC WAS BRISK. LITTLE OR NO ACTIVITY WAS OBSERVED AT THE

UNIVERSITIES IN SURABAYA, WHICH HAVE RECENTLY BEEN A HOT BED OF ACTIVITY LATELY. THE AIRPORT WAS OPEN, AND AMERICANS WERE ABLE TO OBTAIN TICKETS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, ALTHOUGH AIRCRAFT WERE

HEAVILY BOOKED FOR DAYS TO COME.

9. (U) LOCAL SURABAYA CONTACTS REPORTED THAT SEMARANG WAS CALM AND THE AIRPORT OPEN (CONTRARY TO EARLIER REPORTS), THOUGH TICKETS WERE DIFFICULT TO GET. YOGYAKARTA WAS QUIET AND UJUNG PANDANG WAS PEACEFUL AND ITS AIRPORT WAS OPEN. SOLO, WHICH HAD BEEN HIT HARD BY RIOTING AND LOOTING, WAS STILL TENSE AND ITS AIRPORT WAS CLOSED. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF DEMONSTRATIONS OR RIOTING IN BALI.

10. (C) THE BRITISH EMBASSY TOLD POLOFF THAT IT WAS INSURING THAT EXTRA BRITISH AIRWAYS FLIGHTS WERE AVAILABLE MAY 16 AND 17 FOR ITS CITIZENS WHO WANTED TO LEAVE INDONESIA. THE BRITS WERE NOT PLANNING TO EVACUATE ANY EMBASSY PERSONNEL. THE SINGAPORE EMBASSY WAS MAKING PROVISIONS AS WELL FOR EXTRA SINGAPORE AIR FLIGHTS. ROY

NNNN
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>
PTQ8872

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8872

PAGE 01 JAKART 02739 01 OF 02 171306Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	SVC-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/035W						

----------3ED29E 171306Z /49

O 161100Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1575
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0699
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002739

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/16)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: SOEHARTO SIGNALLED ON MAY 16 THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO "RE-SHUFFLE" THE CABINET, ACCORDING TO THE SPEAKER OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) AND PARLIAMENT (DPR) HARMOKO. HE ALSO MET WITH A DELEGATION FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA TO DISCUSS REFORM. THE PRESIDENT, THROUGH HIS INFORMATION MINISTER, DENIED (SORT OF) THAT HE HAD SAID IN CAIRO THAT HE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO STEP DOWN. EVEN SOME TRADITIONAL SUPPORTERS OF THE REGIME, SUCH AS THE ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) AND THE ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS (ICMI), ARE PUBLICLY SUGGESTING THAT HE GIVE WAY. AMONG GOVERNMENT CRITICS, EFFORTS ARE STILL ONGOING TO FORGE A PUBLIC DISPLAY OF UNITY BY MAJOR OPPOSITION FIGURES. THERE IS GROWING CONCERN AMONG SOME OF OUR CONTACTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT MOVE TO ARREST ONE OF THESE FIGURES, AMIEN RAIS. STUDENT LEADERS TELL US THAT PLANS OF NATIONWIDE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 20 ARE STILL FIRM BUT, DUE TO THEIR CONCERN OVER THE RECENT RIOTS, THEY MIGHT NOT TRY TO LEAVE THE CAMPUSES. AS OF

MID-AFTERNOON MAY 16, JAKARTA AND SURABAYA WERE RELATIVELY QUIET.
END SUMMARY

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS

3. (U) IT WAS ANNOUNCED ON MAY 16 THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAD AGREED TO REPLACE ("RE-SHUFFLE") MEMBERS OF THE CABINET. HARMOKO, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AND PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLE (MPR), SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE AND OTHER MPR LEADERS HAD MET WITH SOEHARTO. A GOLKAR SOURCE RECOUNTED TO POLOFF THAT HARMOKO HAD "EXPLAINED THE PEOPLE'S IDEAS" -- INCLUDING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR AND A CABINET "RE-SHUFFLE" -- TO THE PRESIDENT, AND THAT SOEHARTO HAD INDICATED HE WOULD CHANGE THE CABINET. HARMOKO PROVIDED NO DETAILS ABOUT WHO WOULD BE REPLACED AND WHO MIGHT ENTER THE CABINET. SOEHARTO EARLIER IN THE DAY MET WITH A DELEGATION FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA, INCLUDING THE RECTOR AND PROMINENT ALUMNI, TO DISCUSS REFORM ISSUES, AND HE REPORTEDLY REITERATED HIS SUPPORT FOR REFORM, PROVIDED IT WAS VIA THE DPR.

4. (U) UPON RETURNING FROM CAIRO MAY 15, SOEHARTO ISSUED WHAT WAS INTENDED TO BE A DENIAL OF HIS EARLIER SIGNAL THAT HE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO STEP DOWN. ACCORDING TO THE JAKARTA POST, INFORMATION MINISTER ALWI DAHLAN ANNOUNCED "HE NEVER SAID THAT 'I'M READY TO RESIGN' AS INTERPRETED BY SOME IN THE MEDIA." THE CLARIFICATION, HOWEVER, INCLUDED THE SAME LANGUAGE INITIALLY REPORTED IN THE MEDIA THAT IMPLIED THE PRESIDENT WAS CONSIDERING RESIGNATION, AND SIMPLY LEFT OUT THE EXPLICIT MENTION OF THE WORD "WITHDRAW."

5. (SBU) EVEN SOME TRADITIONAL SUPPORTERS OF THE REGIME ARE

WITHDRAWING SUPPORT FOR SOEHARTO. INDONESIA'S LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION, NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU), ISSUED A STATEMENT MAY 15 WELCOMING SOEHARTO'S INITIAL SIGNAL THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE WAY. THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS (ICMI) ISSUED A SIMILAR STATEMENT, AS DID A GROUP OF PROMINENT RETIRED GENERALS (SOME IN THE GROUPS, SUCH AS ALI SADIKIN, HAVE LONG OPPOSED THE REGIME).

6. (C) AMONG GOVERNMENT CRITICS, AIDES TO SENIOR OPPOSITION LEADERS MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI AND AMIEN RAIS TOLD US MAY 16 THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING PREVIOUS DIFFICULTIES, EFFORTS ARE STILL UNDERWAY TO FORGE A PUBLIC DISPLAY OF UNITY BY THOSE TWO OPPOSITION FIGURES AND ISLAMIC LEADER ABDURRAHMAN WAHID. A

SOURCE CLOSE TO AMIEN RAIS TOLD POLCOUNS MAY 16 THAT THERE IS GROWING CONCERN THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT MOVE TO ARREST AMIEN RAIS, POSSIBLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORMATION OF THE PEOPLE'S MANDATE ASSEMBLY (MAJELIS AMANAT RAKYAT). A GROUP OF PROMINENT RETIRED GENERALS FROM THE GENERATION OF 1945.

7. (C) STUDENT LEADERS IN SUMATRA), BOGOR, AND SURTELL US THAT THE PLANS DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 20 (#) STUDENTS ARE CURRENTLY (#) DISCUSSIONS

(##) GARBLED TEXT CORRECTIONS WILL FOLLOW

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8743

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8743

PAGE 01 JAKART 02739 02 OF 02 170403Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W

----------3EC822 170403Z /38

O 161100Z MAY 98 ZDK RUEHC
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1576
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0700
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002739

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02739 02 OF 02 170403Z

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/16)

ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED. AMCONSUL SURABAYA ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK HAVE NOT ALTERED PLANS FOR MASSIVE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 20. STUDENTS HAVE BEEN UPSET BY RIOTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN RECENT DAYS, AND SOME LEADERS ARE PUSHING FOR THE MAY 20 DEMONSTRATIONS (WHICH MAY BEGIN ON MAY 19) TO REMAIN ON CAMPUS.

SECURITY SITUATION

8. (U) AS OF MID-AFTERNOON MAY 16, JAKARTA CONTINUED TO BE RELATIVELY QUIET. SURABAYA WAS RELATIVELY CALM, ACCORDING TO THE

CONSULATE, AFTER A TIMOR DEALERSHIP AND A TRAVEL AGENCY NOT FAR FROM THE CONSULATE WERE BADLY DAMAGED THE NIGHT BEFORE. ARMORED VEHICLES WERE STATIONED AROUND SURABAYA AND OTHER AREAS THAT COULD BE SUBJECTED TO LOOTING. IN GENERAL, SOME SHOPS WERE OPEN AND TRAFFIC WAS BRISK. LITTLE OR NO ACTIVITY WAS OBSERVED AT THE UNIVERSITIES IN SURABAYA, WHICH HAVE RECENTLY BEEN A HOT BED OF ACTIVITY LATELY. THE AIRPORT WAS OPEN, AND AMERICANS WERE ABLE TO OBTAIN TICKETS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, ALTHOUGH AIRCRAFT WERE HEAVILY BOOKED FOR DAYS TO COME.

CONFIDENTIAL

9. (U) LOCAL SURABAYA CONTACTS REPORTED THAT SEMARANG WAS CALM AND THE AIRPORT OPEN (CONTRARY TO EARLIER REPORTS), THOUGH TICKETS WERE DIFFICULT TO GET. YOGYAKARTA WAS QUIET AND UJUNG PANDANG WAS PEACEFUL AND ITS AIRPORT WAS OPEN. SOLO, WHICH HAD BEEN HIT HARD BY RIOTING AND LOOTING, WAS STILL TENSE AND ITS AIRPORT WAS CLOSED. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF DEMONSTRATIONS OR RIOTING IN BALI.

10. (C) THE BRITISH EMBASSY TOLD POLOFF THAT IT WAS INSURING THAT EXTRA BRITISH AIRWAYS FLIGHTS WERE AVAILABLE MAY 16 AND 17 FOR ITS CITIZENS WHO WANTED TO LEAVE INDONESIA. THE BRITS WERE NOT PLANNING TO EVACUATE ANY EMBASSY PERSONNEL. THE SINGAPORE EMBASSY WAS MAKING PROVISIONS AS WELL FOR EXTRA SINGAPORE AIR FLIGHTS. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8826

PAGE 01 STATE 090926 202138Z
ORIGIN SSO-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AIT-03	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	PRME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EUR-01	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	D-00
	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00	/025R		

090926
SOURCE: KODAKB.020086
DRAFTED BY: TFIDOL:FCALHOUN -- 05/20/98 (202) 647-6614
APPROVED BY: TEIDOL:FCALHOUN
S/S-O:P NELSON-DOUVELIS
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
S, D, P, E, T, M, TFIDOL, SSO-2, S/S-3, S/S-IRM, S/S-O/CMS, S/S-EX, EAP-5
----------403E04 202138Z /75
O 202122Z MAY 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9676
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1897
USCINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA IMMEDIATE
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
USCINCSO MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 090926 202138Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 090926

INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/20/2008
TAGS: PREL, PINS, AEMR, MARR, CASC
SUBJECT: TFIDOL SITUATION REPORT NO. 16 AS OF 1500 EDT WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 1998.

CLASSIFIED BY F CALHOUN, COORDINATOR. REASONS 1.5 B AND D.

(U) SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S SPEECH

1. (U) IN A GRADUATION SPEECH AT THE U.S. COAST GUARD ACADEMY, SECRETARY AIBRIGHT STATED THAT "PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAS GIVEN MUCH TO HIS COUNTRY OVER THE PAST 30 YEARS, RAISING INDONESIA'S STANDING IN THE WORLD AND HASTENING INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. NOW HE HAS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR AN HISTORIC ACT OF STATESMANSHIP, ONE THAT WILL PRESERVE HIS LEGACY AS A MAN WHO NOT ONLY LED HIS COUNTRY BUT ALSO PROVIDED FOR ITS DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION. IN THIS DELICATE AND DIFFICULT TIME, WE STRONGLY URGE THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO USE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT IN RESPONSE TO PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS." THE SPEECH AND THE INDONESIA COMMENTS WERE QUICKLY PICKED UP BY INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCIES. (CNN AND OTHERS)

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) HARMOKO CALLS FOR RESIGNATION

2. (U) SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT HARMOKO HAS RENEWED HIS CALL UPON PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TO RESIGN, THIS TIME BY FRIDAY. OTHERWISE, HARMOKO PROMISED TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF CONVENING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY NEXT MONDAY, MAY 25TH, FOR THE

PURPOSE OF SELECTING A NEW PRESIDENT. (CNN, AFP AND OTHERS)

(U) PEACEFUL GATHERINGS

3. (C) THE GATHERING OF STUDENTS AT THE PARLIAMENT REMAINED PEACEFUL AS OF 11 PM WEDNESDAY, MAY 20TH, DESPITE EARLY CONCERNS OF POSSIBLE DISRUPTION BY TROOPS OR THUGS (PEMUDA PANCASILA) . UPON HEARING RUMORS OF DISRUPTION, AMBASSADOR ROY DISPATCHED EMBASSY OFFICERS TO MONITOR THE SITUATION FOR AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT. AT THE INVITATION OF THE SULTAN, SOME 500,000 PEOPLE REPORTEDLY GATHERED PEACEFULLY ON THE PALACE GROUNDS IN YOGYAKARTA. THE SULTAN STATED THAT HE WAS "JOINING THE STRUGGLE." THERE WERE OTHER PEACEFUL GATHERINGS OF 50,000 - 100,000 IN UJUNGPANDANG IN SULAWESI, AND A GATHERING OF 2000 IN BALI. (EMBASSY TELCON, CG SURABAYA TELCON)

4. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1119

PAGE 01 STATE 091230 211631Z
ORIGIN SSO-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03
	ARA-01	AS-01	A-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CCO-00	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00
	EUR-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FBO-01	FSI-00	H-01	IMMC-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	MCO-01	ADS-00
	MFLO-03	MMP-00	M-00	NEA-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIG-04	OIS-01	OMB-01	OPIC-01	OPR-01	PA-00
	PC-01	PER-01	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	DTSP-00	CIO-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01
	FMP-00	IMCC-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	MR-00	SAS-00	/050R				

091230
SOURCE: KODAKB.021098
DRAFTED BY: TFID01:CCARVIS -- 05/21/98 (202) 647-6614
APPROVED BY: TFID01:CCARVTS
S/S-O:ETMILLARD
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
S, D, P, E, T, M, TFIDOL, SSO-2, S/S-3, S/S-IRM,
S/S-O/CMS, S/S-EX, EAP-5
----------409A64 211631Z /02
O 211017Z MAY 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9740
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1926
USCINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 091230 211631Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
USCINCSO MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 091230

INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/21/2008
TAGS: PREL, PINS, AEMR, MARR, CASC
SUBJECT: TFID01 SITUATION REPORT NO. 17 AS OF 0600 EDT THURSDAY, MAY 21, 1998.

CLASSIFIED BY CCARVIS, COORDINATOR. REASONS 1.5 B AND D

SUHARTO RESIGNS; HABIBIE ASSUMES PRESIDENCY

1. (C) AT APPROXIMATELY 10:20 PM WASHINGTON TIME, PRES. SUHARTO BOWED TO PUBLIC PRESSURE AND RESIGNED. VICE PRESIDENT HABIBIE WAS IMMEDIATELY SWORN IN AS PRESIDENT. WHETHER HABIBIE REPRESENTS SUFFICIENT CHANGE TO SATISFY POPULAR DEMAND, AND HOW LONG HABIBIE'S TERM WILL BE, ARE SUBJECTS OF INTENSE SPECULATION. STUDENTS REACTED JOYOUSLY TO THE RESIGNATION. ABRI COMMANDER GEN. WIRONTO PUBLICLY SUPPORTED AND ENDORSED THE HABIBIE PRESIDENCY, THOUGH THE DEPTH OF THAT COMMITMENT IS UNDER SCRUTINY. OPPOSITION LEADER RAIS, EXPRESSING CONCERNS OVER CONTINUED CORRUPTION, INDICATED THAT HE WOULD WITHHOLD HIS ENDORSEMENT OF HABIBIE UNTIL THE NEW CABINET IS ANNOUNCED.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 091230 211631Z
(CNN, EBC, TF/EMBASSY TELCON)

HABIBIE TO SPEAK

2. (C) HABIBIE IS EXPECTED TO GIVE A SPEECH AT 8:30 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME WHICH MAY INCLUDE DETAILS OF HIS CABINET AND HIS INTENT WITH RESPECT TO THE REFORM PROCESS. EMB. JAKARTA IS PREPARING A "REACTIONS TO HABIBIE

PRESIDENCY" CABLE. (EMB. JAKARTA)

FINANCIAL MARKETS REACT CAUTIOUSLY

3. (U) INDONESIA'S FINANCIAL MARKETS ARE CLOSED DUE TO A LOCAL HOLIDAY, BUT OTHER ASIAN MARKETS INITIALLY REACTED POSITIVELY TO THE SUHARTO RESIGNATION. SUBSEQUENTLY, ANALYSTS INDICATE THAT THE MARKETS ARE TAKING A "WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE" IN LIGHT OF UNCERTAINTY OVER HABIBIE'S INTENTIONS. (CNN.)

EMBASSY UNABLE TO ACCOMMODATE CODEL

4. (U) EMBASSY JAKARTA REPORTS THAT CONGRESSMAN CHRIS SMITH HAS REQUESTED A CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION (CODEL) VISIT JAKARTA ON MONDAY, MAY 25. CITING STAFFING LIMITATIONS, THE FLUIDITY OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION, AND THE LACK OF INDONESIAN INTERLOCUTORS, EMBASSY ASKS TO DELAY THE CONGRESSIONAL VISIT AND SUGGESTS THAT THE FEASIBILITY OF A CODEL BE REASSESSED ON SATURDAY, MAY 23. (TF/EMBASSY TELCON)

CONFIDENTIAL

5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0023

PAGE 01 MANILA 06056 210955Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	SAS-00	/019W					

----------40712C 211023Z /38

O 210950Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8971
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANILA 006056

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/04
TAGS: PREL, ID, RP
SUBJECT: TFID01: INITIAL PHILIPPINE REACTION TO SOEHARTO RESIGNATION

(U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR A. M. O'NEILL, REASON 1.5(D).

1. (U) DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR ASIA-PACIFIC AFFAIRS PHOEBE GOMEZ TOLD US TODAY THAT DFA HAS DRAFTED A STATEMENT FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MANILA 06056 210955Z
PRESIDENT RAMOS PRAISING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO FOR HIS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

YEARS OF SERVICE TO THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE AND HIS DECISION TO STEP DOWN IN THE INTEREST OF AN ORDERLY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RESOLUTION TO THE CURRENT CRISIS. THE DRAFT ALSO CONGRATULATES HABIBIE ON HIS ASSUMPTION OF THE PRESIDENCY. THE STATEMENT IS EXPECTED TO BE RELEASED TOMORROW.

2. (C) COMMENT: THE GOP HAS BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE AND DISORDER IN INDONESIA. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE HEARD CONCERNS FROM DFA ABOUT HABIBIE'S UNPOPULARITY WITH THE MILITARY AND HIS ABILITY TO GOVERN IN THE LONG TERM, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THE GOP IS RELIEVED SOEHARTO AGREED TO STEP DOWN IN AN ORDERLY MANNER AND AVOID THE PROSPECT OF BEING DRIVEN FROM OFFICE BY FURTHER VIOLENCE.

3. (U) JAKARTA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

HUBBARD

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1751

PAGE 01 STATE 091755 212054Z
ORIGIN SSO-00

INFO	LOG-00	AF-01	ARA-01	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00	CIAE-00
	DODE-00	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	E-00	H-01	IMMC-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	PM-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	T-00
	SA-01	PMB-00	SAS-00	/013R			

091755
SOURCE: KODAKC.021104
DRAFTED BY: TFID01:DEHENIFIN -- 05/21/98 (202) 647-6614
APPROVED BY: TFID01:DEHENIFIN
S/S-O:JMROBERTS
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
S, D, P, E, T, M, TFID0L, 550-2, S/S-3, S/S-IRM, S/S-O/CMS, S/S -EX, EAP-5

----------40B00A 212054Z /45
O 212045Z MAY 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9768
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1942
USCINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA IMMEDIATE
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFE FL IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
USCINCSO MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFE FL IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 091755 212054Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 091755

IN FORM CONSULS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/21/2008
TAGS: PREL, PINS, AEMR, MARR, CASC
SUBJECT: TFID0L SITUATION REPORT NO. 18 AS OF 1500 EDT THURSDAY, MAY 21, 1998.

CLASSIFIED BY DEHENIFIN, COORDINATOR. REASONS 1.5 B AND D.

1. (U) HABIBIE SPEECH: SHORT ON DETAILS

2. (U) IN A BRIEF SPEECH JUST AFTER 0830 EDT, PRESIDENT HABIBIE RECOGNIZED THE PEOPLES' ASPIRATIONS AND PROMISED TO GRADUALLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPLEMENT REFORMS, ENHANCE DEMOCRACY AND UPGRADE THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM. HABIBIE DID NOT NAME A NEW CABINET; HIS SPOKESPERSON SAID A CABINET WOULD BE ANNOUNCED ON MAY 22 (THURSDAY EVENING, EDT) . HABIBIE CALLED FOR A GOVERNMENT FREE FROM CORRUPTION AND NEPOTISM. HE SAID THAT THE NEW CABINET WOULD REVIEW LAWS DEALING WITH SUPPRESSION AND UNFAIR MONOPOLIES AND WOULD PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE BUDGET, REORGANIZATION OF THE BANKING SYSTEM AND IMPLEMENTATION OF IMF REFORMS. HABIBIE ALSO CALLED FOR AN END TO THE CONFLICT AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. HE THANKED SOEHARTO FOR HIS LEADERSHIP AND ASKED INDONESIA TO NEVER FORGET THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S CONTRIBUTIONS. (CNN, BBC)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 091755 212054Z
3. (U) PEACEFUL TRANSITION WELCOMED

4. (C) JAKARTA AND THE REST OF INDONESIA APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN LARGELY FREE OF VIOLENCE MAY 21. SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION WAS GREETED MORE WITH RELIEF AND CELEBRATION. POLITICAL JOCKEYING HAS BEGUN, WITH SOME CALLS TO HOLD THE SOEHARTO FAMILY ACCOUNTABLE FOR ITS "ILL-GOTTEN" WEALTH. AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES HAVE ALL

WELCOMED SOEHARTO' S RESIGNATION. PRESIDENT CLINTON WELCOMED SOEHARTO'S "WISE" DECISION, AND SAID THE U.S. STANDS READY TO WORK WITH INDONESIA. REGIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS WERE UP, ALTHOUGH INDONESIA'S IS CLOSED FOR A NATIONAL HOLIDAY. OPPOSITION LEADER RAIS REFUSED TO ENDORSE HABIBIE UNTIL THE NEW CABINET IS NAMED. (JAKARTA 2843, BANGKOK 6719, BBC, CNN)

5. (U) LONG ROAD AHEAD

6. (C) . THE POLITICAL TRANSITION IS OFF TO A REASONABLY ORDERLY AND CONSTITUTIONAL START, BUT HABIBIE'S TENURE COULD BE MEASURED IN DAYS UNLESS RESPECTED REFORMERS JOIN THE GOVERNMENT, ACCORDING TO EMBASSY JAKARTA. HABIBIE MUST NAME A CREDIBLE ECONOMIC TEAM URGENTLY, AND HE NEEDS AN INDEPENDENT, PRESTIGIOUS COUNCIL TO PROPOSE ECONOMIC REFORMS. USG EXPECTATIONS SHOULD BE REALISTIC; THE GOOD MAY BE THE ENEMY OF THE ACHIEVABLE. THE USG SHOULD REMAIN ENGAGED, COMMENTS EMBASSY JAKARTA. (JAKARTA 2844)

7. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0261

PAGE 01 JAKART 02843 01 OF 02 211136Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W	

----------4079EE 211137Z /38

O 211136Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1675
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0731
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002843

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02843 01 OF 02 211136Z
CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/21/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/21)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: DEVELOPMENTS TOOK ON A HEAVY POLITICAL TONE MAY 21 AS THE NATION REACTED TO THE DEPARTURE OF ITS LONGEST SERVING PRESIDENT AND WITNESSED THE INAUGURATION OF ONLY ITS THIRD PRESIDENT IN ITS 52 YEAR HISTORY. JOCKEYING FOR POSITION AND EXPLORATION OF ALLIANCES WHICH COULD SHAPE POLITICS IN POST-SOEHARTO INDONESIA DOMINATED THE DAY'S AGENDA. SOME FEAR POLITICS OUTSIDE THE STATE CONTROLLED POLITICAL ARENA OF THE PAST 30 YEARS COULD PROVE DIVISIVE AND UNDEMOCRATIC. THE BITTERNESS OF POPULAR ANGER TOWARD THE SOEHARTO FAMILY SURFACED IN CALLS FOR THE SOEHARTO FAMILY TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR ITS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH. WHILE SECURITY CONCERNS WERE HIGH OVERNIGHT, JAKARTA AND THE REST OF INDONESIA APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN LARGELY FREE OF VIOLENCE ON MAY 21.

REACTION TO SOEHARTO RESIGNATION
---

3. (U) EXCEPT FOR A CELEBRATIVE REACTION OF TIRED STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS WHO HAD BEEN AT PARLIAMENT FOR UP TO 48 HOURS, WHO WERE JOINED BY FRESHER STUDENTS DURING THE DAY, SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION APPEARED TO BE GREETED IN JAKARTA MORE WITH RELIEF

AND SATISFACTION RATHER THAN BOISTEROUS DISPLAY. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF TARGETING OF SOEHARTO-FAMILY ASSETS, UBIQUITOUS THROUGHOUT INDONESIA.

4. (U) IN THE FIRST DAY OF THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA, THE POLITICAL REACTION FOCUSSED LARGELY ON THE SHAPE AND LIKELY LENGTH OF TENURE OF THE NEW HABIBIE GOVERNMENT. (SEPTEL REPORTS MORE SPECIFICALLY ON INITIAL REACTIONS FROM A RANGE OF CONTACTS.)

5. (C) MANY AMONG THE OPPOSITION ALLIANCE WHICH HELPED TOPPLE

SOEHARTO, ARE FOCUSSING ON THE SOEHARTO FAMILY WEALTH, WIDELY SEEN AS THE PRODUCT OF DECADES OF SYSTEMATIC CORRUPTION AND COLLUSION. AMIEN RAIS HAS CALLED FOR SOEHARTO TO BE BROUGHT TO COURT TO EXPLAIN HIS WEALTH, ECHOING A CALL MADE MONTHS AGO BY MEGAWATI. STUDENTS HAVE ALSO PICKED UP THIS THEME. IN THE MEANTIME, THE UBIQUITOUS PRESENCE OF SYMBOLS OF SOEHARTO FAMILY WEALTH THROUGHOUT INDONESIA COULD PROVIDE THE SPARKS FOR OR BE THE TARGETS OF UNREST. DURING THE DAY, MAY 21, STUDENTS AT THE PARLIAMENT CHANTED DEMANDS FOR THE RETURN OF SOEHARTO WEALTH AS WELL AS CALLING FOR THE RESIGNATION OF HABIBIE. STUDENTS IN SOLO AND ELSEWHERE ECHOED THE THEME WITHIN HOURS OF SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION. IN THIS CONTEXT, GENERAL WIRANTO'S PLEDGE, FOLLOWING THE HABIBIE NOMINATION, THAT ABRI WOULD PROTECT THE HEALTH/SAFETY AND THE RESPECT OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS FAMILY MAY RUN COUNTER TO THE INTENTIONS OF SOME.

SECURITY IN JAKARTA
---

6. (U) DURING MAY 21, A HOLIDAY, JAKARTA WAS QUIET. CONTINUING BUT REDUCED MILITARY ARMOR AND TROOP DEPLOYMENTS CONTINUED TO

IMPEDE TRAFFIC, PARTICULARLY IN THE CITY CENTER PARK/MONUMENT OF MONAS, ADJOINING THE U.S. EMBASSY.

THE FIRST DAY OF POST-SOEHARTO INDONESIAN POLITICS
---

7. (C) A SENIOR GOLKAR OFFICIAL TOLD POLCOUNS THAT THE HISTORICALLY DOMINANT GOVERNMNET PARTY, GOLKAR, WOULD SOON BE "IRRELEVANT." HE PREDICTED THAT EVEN IN THE PERIOD BEFORE EXPECTED BUT AS YET NOT DATE-CERTAIN ELECTIONS, GOLKAR WOULD BE SIDELINED. THE FORMER GOLKAR SECGEN SAID THAT NEW POLITICAL ALLIANCES AND PARTIES WERE FORMING OUTSIDE OF THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL BOUNDARIES. HE EXPRESSED FEAR THAT SOME WOULD NOT HAVE DEMOCRATIC VIEWS AND THAT SOME MIGHT NOT USE DEMOCRATIC MEANS. "WE COULD REGRESS TO A MUCH MORE CONFUSED STATE," HE SAID.

8. (C) MEANWHILE, A LEADING NGO ACTIVIST AND MEMBER OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OFFERED A MORE OPTIMISTIC VIEW OF THE FUTURE. HE SAID THAT THE TWO KEY ISLAMIC LEADERS IN THE

NATION, ABDURRAHMAN WAHID AND AMIEN RAIS, PERSONAL RIVALS FROM ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ALSO HAVE BEEN RIVALS, WERE TO MEET MAY 21 TO SEEK A BASIS FOR AN OPPOSITION ALLIANCE. IF SUCH AN ALLIANCE WERE FORMED, HE PREDICTED, MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI WOULD IMMEDIATELY JOIN, GIVEN HER TRUST IN WAHID. WITH THAT TRIUMVIRATE, OTHER PROMINENT FIGURES SUCH AS EMIL SALIM, ALI

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0262

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0262

PAGE 01 JAKART 02843 02 OF 02 211137Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W		

----------4079F1 211137Z /38

O 211136Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1676
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0732

USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002843

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/21/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/21)

SADIKIN COULD BE EXPECTED TO JOIN AS WELL. ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE, WITH ABRI ACCEPTANCE AND POSSIBLY ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT, SUCH A UNION OF POPULAR FIGURES COULD PRESENT A CREDIBLE "LEADERSHIP PRESIDIUM" WHICH MIGHT GUIDE INDONESIA TO NATIONAL ELECTIONS. AT COB, HOWEVER, A MEGAWATI LOYALIST SHED DOUBT ON ANY NEAR-TERM HOPES FOR SUCH AN ALLIANCE.

9. (C) THE AIDE ADDED THAT MEGAWATI FEARED THAT HABIBIE AND THOSE WHO SUPPORT HIM, MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO "PLAY THE ISLAMIC CARD," I.E., APPEAL TO THE ONE CONSTITUENCY THAT COULD PROVIDE HABIBIE A POWER BASE TO "BALANCE" THE MILITARY. HE SAID THAT POLITICIZING RELIGION IN THAT MANNER COULD DESTABILIZE INDONESIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY (SEE SEPTEL). (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH RELIGIOUS POLITICS COULD EVOLVE, WE DO NOT BELIEVE HABIBIE COULD PLAY THAT CARD SUCCESSFULLY AT THIS TIME. END COMMENT) ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0265

PAGE 01 BANGKO 06719 211128Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	INLB-01	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	INL-01	DODE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W

------------------407A18 211138Z /38

O 211125Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0664
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA// PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 006719

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/03
TAGS: PREL, ID, TH
SUBJECT: TFID01: OFFICIAL THAI REACTION TO SOEHARTO RESIGNATION

1. (U) CONFIDENTIAL. CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNSELOR BARBARA

TOBIAS. REASON: 1.5(B)(D).

2. (C) THE THAI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ISSUED A STATEMENT A FEW HOURS AFTER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BANGKO 06719 211128Z
TODAY (MAY 21) COMMENDING HIS DECISION "TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

THE CALLS AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE AND IN ACCORD WITH CONSTITUTIOANL PROCESSES" AND EXTENDING BEST WISHES TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT. THE STATEMENT, TEXT AT PARA. 4, REFLECTS THE VIEWS SHARED WITH US PRIVATELY IN RECENT DAYS BY NUMEROUS THAI MFA AND MILITARY OFFICIALS: BELIEF THAT INDONESIA NEEDED POLITICAL REFORM, INCLUDING SOEHARTO'S DEPARTURE WHICH WAS WELL OVERDUE; COUPLED WITH CONCERN THAT THE TRANSITION PROCESS NOT UNDERMINE LONG-TERM STABILITY OR PROMPT A VIOLENT ERUPTION IN A KEY REGIONAL NEIGHBOR.

3. (C) THE THAI GOVERNMENT UNTIL YESTERDAY (MAY 20) HAD MAINTAINED OFFICIAL SILENCE ON EVENTS IN INDONESIA, LEST IT EMBARRASS OR OFFEND THE REGIME OF A FELLOW ASEAN MEMBER. HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE MASS DEMONSTRATIONS CALLED FOR THAT DAY COULD LEAD TO A CATACLYSM PROMPTED EVACUATION OF ALL BUT FIVE THAI EMBOFFS FROM JAKARTA AND DEPARTURE OF MOST THAI PRIVATE CITIZENS ABOARD THAI AIR COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS MAY 19. THE STANDDOWN OF MASS STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND AVOIDANCE OF MAJOR VIOLENCE ON THE 20TH, COUPLED WITH FURTHER INDICATIONS THAT THE SOEHARTO REGIME WAS NOW ALL BUT FINISHED, EMBOLDENED THE THAI MFA TO BREAK SILENCE THAT DAY WITH A STATEMENT COMMENDING THE RESTRAINT OF ALL SIDES AND EXPRESSING HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WOULD EMERGE... WITH A "RENEWED SENSE OF PURPOSE IN THE PURSUIT OF...POLITICAL REFORMS AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING." WITH SOEHARTO'S DEPARTURE TODAY, THE THAI WENT A STEP FURTHER.

4. (U) TEXT OF MFA STATEMENT:

THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT COMMENDS THE DECISION OF

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TO RESIGN FROM THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA. THIS COURAGEOUS AND STATESMANLIKE ACTION WAS BASED ON CONSIDERATION OF TRUE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF INDONESIA. THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT HOPES THAT THIS DECISION TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE CALLS AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE AND IN ACCORD WITH CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES, WOULD EASE THE CURRENT TENSION AND ALLOW THE NECESSARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS TO BE CARRIED OUT.

NOW THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS HAS BEEN STRICTLY

OBSERVED, THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT HOPES THAT RECONCILIATION WILL PREVAIL, THEREBY ALLOWING INDONESIA TO REGAIN STABILITY AND RETURN TO SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH.

THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT EXPRESSES BEST WISHES TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA IN ITS MISSION TO RESTORE PEACE AND PROSPERITY TO THE COUNTRY. THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT IS CONFIDENT THAT INDONESIA WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE ROLE IN REGIONAL AND WORLD AFFAIRS.

END TEXT

5. (U) JAKARTA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

ITOH

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9755

PAGE 01 JAKART 02835 01 OF 02 210804Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	ITCE-00	ANHR-01
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00	EXME-00	EUR-01	E-00
	UTED-00	FRB-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

------------------406873 210804Z /38

P 210638Z MAY 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1662
DEPTTREAS WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0726
AMEMBASSY SEOUL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002835

PASS INDONESIA TASK FORCE

TREASURY FOR UNDER SECRETARY LIPTON, OASIA AND
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OFFICE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 02835 01 OF 02 210804Z
MANILA FOR USADB

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

RETRANSMISSION WITH CORRECTED TEXT

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: TF1D01: SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION SPEECH

1. FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S MAY 21 RESIGNATION SPEECH, HABIBIE'S OATH, ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO'S REMARKS, AND OUTGOING INFORMATION MINISTER ALWI DAHLAN'S STATEMENT.

2. SOEHARTO STATEMENT

FOR SOME TIME, I HAVE CLOSELY WATCHED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NATIONAL SITUATION, ESPECIALLY THE PEOPLE'S ASPIRATIONS FOR REFORM IN ALL SPHERES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE. ON THE BASIS OF MY DEEP UNDERSTANDING OF THESE ASPIRATIONS AND PROMPTED BY THE CONVICTION THAT THESE REFORMS MUST BE IMPLEMENTED IN AN ORDERLY, PEACEFUL, AND CONSTITUTIONAL MANNER, IN ORDER TO GUARD THE UNITY OF THE NATION AS WELL AS THE CONTINUATION OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, I DECIDED TO FORM A REFORM COMMITTEE AND RESHUFFLE THE SEVENTH DEVELOPMENT CABINET (NOTE: THE CABINET INSTALLED IN MARCH 1998. END NOTE.)

HOWEVER, IN THE EVENT, IT TURNED OUT THAT UP UNTIL NOW IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO FORM SUCH A REFORM COMMITTEE

BECAUSE THE RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL TO FORM THE COMMITTEE WAS NOT SATISFACTORY. IN THE DESIRE TO UNDERTAKE REFORM AS WELL AS POSSIBLE, I CONCLUDED THAT THE INABILITY TO FORM THE COMMITTEE MEANT IT WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY TO RESHUFFLE THE CABINET EITHER.

TAKING THE ABOVE INTO ACCOUNT, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO EXECUTTE MY GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT WELL. FOR THIS REASON, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ARTICLE 8 OF THE 1945

CONSTITUTION, AND AFTER SINCERELY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) LEADERS AND LEADERS OF THE FRACTIONS WITHIN PARLIAMENT (DPR), I DECIDED TO DECLARE THAT I AM RESIGNING FROM MY POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, EFFECTIVE AS OF WHEN I READ THIS STATEMENT, THURSDAY, MAY 21, 1998. (SCATTERED CLAPPING)

THE STATEMENT MADE AS I RESIGN FROM MY POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, I CONVEY BEFORE ALL OF YOU, LEADERS OF THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, AND THERE ARE ALSO LEADERS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) HERE THIS MORNING ON THE OCCASION OF THIS FRATERNAL GATHERING.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 8 OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION, IT IS THE VICE PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, PROF. DR. IR. B.J. HABIBIE WHO WILL FULFILL THE REMAINING TERM OF THE PRESIDENT WHO HOLDS THE MANDATE FROM THIS MPR 1998-2003. FOR THE ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE AS LONG AS I LED THIS COUNTRY AND PEOPLE, I EXPRESS MY

THANKS AND REQUEST FORGIVENESS FOR ANY SHORTCOMINGS AND MISTAKES, MAY THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA REMAIN GREAT WITH PANCASILA AND THE 1945 CONSTITUTION.

BEGINNING TODAY ALSO, THE SEVENTH DEVELOPMENT CABINET IS "DEMISSIONER" (NOTE: THIS HAS MEANT IN THE PAST THAT OUTGOING MINISTERS PERFORM HOUSEKEEPING DUTIES, BUT MAKE NO POLICY DECISIONS. END NOTE.) AND TO THE MINISTERS I EXPRESS MY THANKS. BECAUSE CIRCUMSTANCES MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ADMINISTER THE OATH BEFORE THE DPR, IN ORDER TO AVOID A VOID IN GOVERNING, THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL TAKE THE PRESIDENTIAL OATH NOW BEFORE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDONESIA. (NOTE: THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE 1973 DECREE OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY ON SUCCESSION. END NOTE.)

3. HABIBIE'S PRESIDENTIAL OATH

(SPOKESMAN: VICE PRESIDENT HABIBIE BEFORE THE INDONESIAN SUPREME COURT)

BEFORE GOD, BASED ON ARTICLE 9 OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION, BEFORE I ASSUME THE POSITION OF PRESIDENT, I WILL IMPLEMENT MY CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES, INCLUDING TAKING THE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9565

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9565

PAGE 01 JAKART 02835 02 OF 02 210638Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	ITCE-00	ANHR-01
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00	EXME-00	EUR-01	E-00
	UTED-00	FRB-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/025W					

----------4061AB 210638Z /38

P 210638Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1663
DEPTTREAS WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0727

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002835

PASS INDONESIA TASK FORCE

TREASURY FOR UNDER SECRETARY LIPTON, OASIA AND
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OFFICE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 02835 02 OF 02 210638Z
MANILA FOR USADB

RETRANSMISSION WITH CORRECTED TEXT

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: TF1D01: SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION SPEECH

OATH ACCORDING TO THE RELIGION IN WHICH I BELIEVE.

BEFORE GOD, I SWEAR AS FOLLOWS: BEFORE GOD, I PLEDGE TO FULFILL THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITIES, AS JUSTLY AS POSSIBLE, TO UPHOLD FIRMLY THE CONSTITUTION, TO IMPLEMENT EACH AND EVERY LAW AND THEIR REGULATIONS AS UPRIGHTLY AS POSSIBLE AND WITH DEVOTION TO THE COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE. (NOTE: THIS IS THE TEXT OF THE OATH CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 9 OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION. END NOTE.)

4. ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO'S REMARKS

WITH THE CEREMONY WHICH WE WITNESSED THIS MORNING ON THE REPLACEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT, I, MINISTER OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE AND CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF INDONESIA, WILL CONVEY POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE AND APPEALS TO ALL THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA.

FIRST, CONTEMPLATING THE DEVELOPING SITUATION AND THE PEOPLE'S ASPIRATIONS, ABRI SUPPORTS AND GREETS WELL THE

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND ALSO, BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION, SUPPORTS VICE PRESIDENT BAPAK B. J. HABIBIE AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA.

SECOND, ABRI REMAINS UNITED, HOPES AND SUGGESTS TO ALL THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA THAT THEY ACCEPT THE PERSONAL DESIRE OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WHICH IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 8 OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION.

THIRD, IN THIS REGARD, ABRI WILL CONTINUE O PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE TO PREVENT DEVIATIONS AND SUCH THINGS WHICH COULD THREATEN THE WHOLENESS OF THE PEOPLE.

FOURTH, HOLDING IN HIGH RESPECT THE NOBLE VALUES OF THE PEOPLE'S CULTURE, ABRI WILL CONTINUE TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF AND RESPECT FOR THE FORMER PRESIDENT-MPR MANDATE HOLDER INCLUDING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY.

FIFTH, ABRI URGES ALL SIDES TO REMAIN CALM, TO AVOID DESTRUCTION AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR WHICH IN THE END WILL ONLY DAMAGE THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES. THANK YOU.

4. ALWI DAHLAN

DR. HABIBIE HAS EXPRESSED THE COMMITMENT OF THE NEW PRESIDENT TO FULFILLING THE PEOPLE'S ASPIRATIONS IN A CONSTITUTIONAL MANNER. THOSE ASPIRATIONS ARE TO IMPLEMENT REFORM IN A THOROUGH WAY, INCLUDING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL, AND ALL OTHER TYPES OF REFORMS. CONCERNING FOREIGN RELATIONS, HE ANNOUNCED THAT THE

INDONESIAN PEOPLE ARE THANKFUL THEY CAN WORK TOGETHER WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS AND PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND WILL IMPLEMENT COMMITMENTS THAT ARE ALREADY AGREED INCLUDING COMMITMENTS FOR REFORM MADE TO THE IMF. THANK YOU.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9500

PAGE 01 JAKART 02834 01 OF 02 210601Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	ITCE-00	ANHR-01
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00	EXME-00	EUR-01	E-00
	UTED-00	FRB-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/025W				

----------405F7E 210601Z /38

R 210600Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1660
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0724
AMEMBASSY SEOUL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002834

PASS INDONESIA TASK FORCE

TREASURY FOR UNDER SECRETARY LIPTON, OASIA AND
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OFFICE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 02834 01 OF 02 210601Z
MANILA FOR USADB

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: TF1D01: SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION SPEECH

1. FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S MAY 21 RESIGNATION SPEECH, HABIBIE'S OATH, ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO'S REMARKS, AND OUTGOING INFORMATION MINISTER ALWI DAHLAN'S STATEMENT.

2. SOEHARTO STATEMENT

FOR SOME TIME, I HAVE CLOSELY WATCHED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NATIONAL SITUATION, ESPECIALLY THE PEOPLE'S ASPIRATIONS FOR REFORM IN ALL SPHERES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE. ON THE BASIS OF MY DEEP UNDERSTANDING OF THESE ASPIRATIONS AND PROMPTED BY THE CONVICTION THAT THESE REFORMS MUST BE IMPLEMENTED IN AN ORDERLY, PEACEFUL, AND CONSTITUTIONAL MANNER, IN ORDER TO GUARD THE UNITY OF THE NATION AS WELL AS THE CONTINUATION OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, I DECIDED TO FORM A REFORM COMMITTEE AND RESHUFFLE THE SEVENTH DEVELOPMENT CABINET (NOTE: THE CABINET INSTALLED IN MARCH 1998. END NOTE.)

HOWEVER, IN THE EVENT, IT TURNED OUT THAT UP UNTIL NOW IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO FORM SUCH A REFORM COMMITTEE BECAUSE THE RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL TO FORM THE COMMITTEE WAS NOT SATISFACTORY. IN THE DESIRE TO

UNDERTAKE REFORM AS WELL AS POSSIBLE, I CONCLUDED THAT THE INABILITY TO FORM THE COMMITTEE MEANT IT WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY TO RESHUFFLE THE CABINET EITHER.

TAKING THE ABOVE INTO ACCOUNT, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO EXECUTTE MY GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT WELL. FOR THIS REASON, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ARTICLE 8 OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION, AND AFTER SINCERELY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) LEADERS AND LEADERS

OF THE FRACTIONS WITHIN PARLIAMENT (DPR), I DECIDED TO DECLARE THAT I AM RESIGNING FROM MY POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, EFFECTIVE AS OF WHEN I READ THIS STATEMENT, THURSDAY, MAY 21, 1998. (SCATTERED CLAPPING)

THE STATEMENT MADE AS I RESIGN FROM MY POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, I CONVEY BEFORE ALL OF YOU, LEADERS OF THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, AND THERE ARE ALSO LEADERS OF THE SUPREME PARLIAMENT (MPR) HERE THIS MORNING ON THE OCCASION OF THIS FRATERNAL GATHERING.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 8 OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION, IT IS THE VICE PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, PROF. DR. IR. B.J. HABIBIE WHO WILL FULFILL THE REMAINING TERM OF THE PRESIDENT WHO HOLDS THE MANDATE FROM THIS MPR 1998-2003. FOR THE ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE AS LONG AS I LED THIS COUNTRY AND PEOPLE, I EXPRESS MY THANKS AND REQUEST FORGIVENESS FOR ANY SHORTCOMINGS AND MISTAKES, MAY THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA REMAIN GREAT WITH

PANCASILA AND THE 1945 CONSTITUTION.

BEGINNING TODAY ALSO, THE SEVENTH DEVELOPMENT CABINET IS "DEMISSIONER" (NOTE: THIS HAS MEANT IN THE PAST THAT OUTGOING MINISTERS PERFORM HOUSEKEEPING DUTIES, BUT MAKE NO POLICY DECISIONS. END NOTE.) AND TO THE MINISTERS I EXPRESS MY THANKS. BECAUSE CIRCUMSTANCES MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ADMINISTER THE OATH BEFORE THE DPR, IN ORDER TO AVOID A VOID IN GOVERNING, THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL TAKE THE PRESIDENTIAL OATH NOW BEFORE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDONESIA.

3. HABIBIE'S PRESIDENTIAL OATH

(SPOKESMAN: VICE PRESIDENT HABIBIE BEFORE THE INDONESIAN SUPREME COURT)

BEFORE GOD, BASED ON ARTICLE 9 OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION, BEFORE I ASSUME THE POSITION OF PRESIDENT, I WILL

IMPLEMENT MY CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES, INCLUDING TAKING THE OATH ACCORDING TO THE RELIGION IN WHICH I BELIEVE.

BEFORE GOD, I SWEAR AS FOLLOWS: BEFORE GOD, I PLEDGE TO FULFILL THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITIES, AS JUSTLY AS

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9501

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9501

PAGE 01 JAKART 02834 02 OF 02 210601Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	ITCE-00	ANHR-01
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00	EXME-00	EUR-01	E-00
	UTED-00	FRB-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/025W					

----------405F80 210601Z /38

R 210600Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1661
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0725

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002834

PASS INDONESIA TASK FORCE

TREASURY FOR UNDER SECRETARY LIPTON, OASIA AND
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OFFICE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 02834 02 OF 02 210601Z
MANILA FOR USADB

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: TF1D01: SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION SPEECH

POSSIBLE, TO UPHOLD FIRMLY THE CONSTITUTION, TO IMPLEMENT EACH AND EVERY LAW AND THEIR REGULATIONS AS UPRIGHTLY AS POSSIBLE AND WITH LOYALTY TO THE COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE.

4. ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO'S REMARKS

WITH THE CEREMONY WHICH WE WITNESSED THIS MORNING ON THE REPLACEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT, I, MINISTER OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE AND CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF INDONESIA, WILL CONVEY POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE AND APPEALS TO ALL THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA.

FIRST, CONTEMPLATING THE DEVELOPING SITUATION AND THE PEOPLE'S ASPIRATIONS, ABRI SUPPORTS AND GREETS WELL THE RESIGNATION REQUEST OF BAPAK SOEHARTO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND ALSO, BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION, SUPPORTS VICE PRESIDENT BAPAK B. J. HABIBIE AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA.

SECOND, ABRI REMAINS UNITED, HOPES AND SUGGESTS TO ALL THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA THAT THEY ACCEPT THE PERSONAL DESIRE OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WHICH IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 8 OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION.

THIRD, IN THIS REGARD, ABRI WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE TO PREVENT DEVIATIONS AND SUCH THINGS WHICH COULD THREATEN THE WHOLENESS OF THE PEOPLE.

FOURTH, HOLDING IN HIGH RESPECT THE NOBLE VALUES OF THE PEOPLE'S CULTURE, ABRI WILL CONTINUE TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF AND RESPECT FOR THE FORMER PRESIDENT-MPR MANDATE HOLDER INCLUDING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY.

FIFTH, ABRI URGES ALL SIDES TO REMAIN CALM, TO AVOID DESTRUCTION AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR WHICH IN THE END WILL ONLY DAMAGE THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES. THANK YOU.

4. ALWI DAHLAN

DR. HABIBIE HAS EXPRESSED THE COMMITMENT OF THE NEW PRESIDENT TO FULFILLING THE PEOPLE' ASPIRATIONS IN A CONSTITUTIONAL MANNER. THOE ASPIRATIONS ARE TO IMPLEMENT REFORM IN A THQROUGH WAY, INCLUDING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, QEGAL, AND ALL OTHER TYPES OF REFORMS. CONCERNING FOREIGN RELATIONS, HE ANNOUNCED THAT THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE ARE THANKFUL THEY CAN WORK TOGETHER WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS AND PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND WILL IMPLEMENT COMMITMENTS THAT ARE ALREADY AGREED INCLUDING COMMITMENTS FOR REFORM MADE TO THE IMF. THANK YOU.
ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9141

PAGE 01 JAKART 02831 01 OF 02 210122Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/030W					

----------404E37 210122Z /38

R 210120Z MAY 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1657
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002831

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE
DEPARTMENT FOR TFID01
S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER
EAP/PIMBS

FROM AMCONGEN SURABAYA 0097

E.O. 12958: N/A

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 02831 01 OF 02 210122Z
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

SUBJECT: TFIDOI:SITUATION IN EASTERN INDONESIA MAY 20

1. SUMMARY: STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUED MAY 20 IN SURABAYA AT SURABAYA UNIVERSITY (UBAYA), THE NOVEMBER 10TH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (ITS), AND THE TEACHER TRAINING COLLEGE (IKIP). DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEEN MOSTLY PEACEFUL, THE STUDENTS DID NOT LEAVE CAMPUS. POLICE AND MILITARY IN SURABAYA LATER SOUGHT TO CHECK UNAUTHORIZED CONVOYS OFF CAMPUS. IN YOGYAKARTA, THOUSANDS GATHERED AT THE SULTAN'S PALACE FOR AN ADDRESS AND DEMONSTRATION. CONTACTS REPORTED CROWDS GATHERING IN THE MALIOBORO AREA AND WERE WARNED BY POLICE TO EXPECT VIOLENCE LATER IN THE DAY. IN UJUNG PANDANG, MASSIVE CROWDS GATHERED IN THE CITY CENTER FOR A DEMONSTRATION CALLING ON PRESIDENT SUHARTO TO RESIGN. AS OF 1500 DEMONSTRATORS WERE CIRCLING THE CITY IN CONVOYS BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO VIOLENCE. THE SEMARANG AIRPORT MAY BE CLOSED. THOUSANDS DEMONSTRATED PEACEFULLY IN SOLO. 1000 LABORERS DEMONSTRATED MAY 19 IN FRONT OF THE SURABAYA OFFICE OF THE SPSI. DEMONSTRATING STUDENTS WERE BEATEN BY MILITARY FORCES OUTSIDE AIRLANGGA UNIVERSITY IN SURABAYA THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 19. TWENTY FOUR WERE INJURED, THREE OF THEM SERIOUSLY. END SUMMARY.

2. IN SURABAYA ON MAY 19 STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS WERE BEATEN BY MILITARY FORCES AS THEY ATTEMPTED TO CONTINUE STREET PROTESTS. TWENTY-FOUR STUDENTS WERE INJURED, THREE OF THEM SERIOUSLY. STUDENTS HAD REPORTEDLY RECEIVED POLICE PERMISSION TO CIRCLE THE AIRLANGGA UNIVERSITY (UNAIR) CAMPUS ON MOTORCYCLES AS THEY DEMONSTRATED. AFTER SEVERAL TRIPS AROUND THE CAMPUS THE POLICE ASKED THE STUDENTS TO RETURN TO CAMPUS. WHEN THE STUDENTS REFUSED THEY WERE AMBUSHED BY KOSTRAD TROOPS WHO IMMEDIATELY BEGAN BEATING THE DEMONSTRATORS WITH RATTAN STAFFS. STUDENTS

FLED INTO THE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL AND WERE NOT PURSUED. THREE STUDENTS RECEIVED SERIOUS HEAD INJURIES THAT REQUIRED THEM TO BE ADMITTED TO INTENSIVE CARE, FOURTEEN WERE TREATED AND RELEASED. ONE SOLDIER WHO WAS SERIOUSLY INJURED WHEN HE FELL OUT OF HIS TRUCK WAS JEERED BY STUDENTS WHEN HE WAS BROUGHT TO THE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL FOR TREATMENT. HE HAS NOT REGAINED CONSCIOUSNESS.

3. WE DROVE THROUGH THE SCENE OF THE ATTACK SOON AFTERWARDS. WE SAW A SIZEABLE MILITARY PRESENCE WAITING NEAR CAMPUS, INCLUDING

TWO TRUCKS FULL OF SOLDIERS AND ANOTHER GROUP ON MOTORCYCLES, BUT TRAFFIC WAS MOVING SMOOTHLY. WE HAVE HEARD REPORTS THAT STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS WERE PUSHED BY MILITARY TRUCKS ON MAY 18. NO SERIOUS INJURIES WERE REPORTED.

4. ALSO ON MAY 19, CLOSE TO 1000 LABORERS DEMONSTRATED AT THE OFFICE OF THE OFFICIAL LABOR UNION (SPSI). THE WORKERS, LED BY THE PROVINCIAL CHAIRMAN OF THE SPSI, DEMANDED SUHARTO'S RESIGNATION AND AN END TO COLLUSION, CORRUPTION, AND NEPOTISM. THE DEMONSTRATION BROKE UP PEACEFULLY. AT ONE SHOE FACTORY IN THE RUNGKUT INDUSTRIAL AREA, THE OWNERS WERE REPORTEDLY HELD FOR TEN HOURS BY SCORES OF MOSTLY FEMALE WORKERS DEMANDING UNPAID WAGES. POLICE FREED THE OWNERS WITHOUT VIOLENCE.

5. ON MAY 20, DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUED AS STUDENTS FROM AROUND SURABAYA GATHERED ON THE CAMPUSES OF UBAYA, ITS, AND IKIP. THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS EXPECTED DID NOT MATERIALIZE AS MANY STUDENTS, FRIGHTENED BY THE INCIDENT AT UNAIR THE PREVIOUS DAY, STAYED AWAY. STUDENT LEADERS AT UBAYA TOLD US THAT THE RECTOR HAD REQUESTED THEY REMAIN ON CAMPUS. AT EACH CAMPUS A FEW THOUSAND DEMONSTRATORS HELD FREE SPEECH FORUMS AND SANG

NATIONALIST SONGS THROUGH THE EARLY AFTERNOON. AT IKIP, A SMALL GROUP OF RADICAL STUDENTS ATTEMPTED TO MOVE OFF CAMPUS. THEY WERE CONFRONTED BY POLICE AND RETURNED TO CAMPUS. THROUGHOUT THE CITY, SANCTIONED DEMONSTRATIONS BROKE UP IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON AND STUDENTS LEFT CAMPUS IN SMALL GROUPS. MILITARY UNITS ARE BEING REENFORCED, WE UNDERSTAND, AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS FROM SINGOSARI ARE IN SURABAYA. PEMUDA PANCASILA (PROFESSIONAL THUGS CLOSE TO THE GOVERNMENT) AND PEMUDA PANCA MANGGA UNITS (YOUTH GROUPS TIED TO THE ABRI), AND BANSER (THE PARAMILITARY WING OF THE NU) ARE ALSO SUPPORTING THE MILITARY.

6. CONVOYS OF STUDENTS AND YOUTH BEGAN FORMING MID-AFTERNOON FROM CAMPUSES SUCH AS AIRLANGGA, IKIP, AND UBAYA. THE CONVOYS WERE JOINED BY OTHERS FROM SOCIETY IN GENERAL. MILITARY FORCES ACTED QUICKLY TO BREAK UP THESE SMALL GROUPS AND PURSUED THEM AT HIGH SPEED WITH TRUCKS AND SHOOTING INTO THE AIR. A SIMILAR INCIDENT WAS REPORTED AT 1420 AT UBAYA. AT 1530 WE RECEIVED A REPORT OF A CONVOY OF 1000 STUDENTS, YOUTHS, AND LOCAL RESIDENTS HEADING AWAY FROM ITS AND UNAIR TOWARDS THE CENTER OF TOWN. WE

SAW ONE CONVOY OF MORE 3000 PEOPLE PASS THE CONSULATE AT 1615 THROUGH THE MAIN CITY STREET NORTH AND TURN BACK SOUTH. THE MAIN BANNER SAID: STRUGGLE FOR REFORMATION AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CELEBRATIVE. THE MILITARY APPEARED TO BE ATTEMPTING TO CHANNEL IT ONTO THE MAIN STREETS. WE HEARD WARNING SHOTS. (COMMENT: THE CONVOYS RESEMBLED THE BOISTEROUS DEMONSTRATIONS DURING LAST MAY'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN.)

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9152

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9152

PAGE 01 JAKART 02831 02 OF 02 210121Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/030W					

----------404E98 210127Z /38

R 210120Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1658
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSYTOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002831

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE
DEPARTMENT FOR TFID1
S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER
EAP/PIMBS

FROMAMCONGEN SURABAYA 0097
UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGQ: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID,
SUBJECT: TFIDOI:SITUATION IN EASTERN INDONESIA MA 20

7. IN YOGYAKARTA, TWO MAJOR DEMONSTRATQONS WERE HELD, ONE IN THE MORNING OF ABOUT 5000 AT THE GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY DURING WHICH THE SULTAN SPOKE, AND ONE LATER AT THE KRATON (SULTAN'S PALACE) THAT SWELLED TO ABOUT 500,000. STUDENTS FROM ALL REGIONAL UNIVERSITIES GATHERED AT THE SULTAN'S PALACE, WHERE THE SULTAN GAVE AN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF REFORM. BY 1330 THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS WERE GATHERING IN THE MALIOBORO DISTRICT. POLICE WERE WARNING FACTORY AND SHOP OWNERS THAT STUDENT CONVOYS WOULD ATTACK NON-PRIBUMI PLACES OF BUSINESS. AN ACADEMIC CONTACT DISMISSED THIS AS SCARE-MONGERING. NO VIOLENCE WAS REPORTED DURING THE DAY.

8. SOLO CONTACTS REPORTED THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN FRONT OF THE MAYOR'S OFFICE. STUDENTS RETURNED TO THEIR UNIVERSITIES IN THE AFTERNOON. CAR LOADS OF PROTESTORS PASSING THROUGH THE STREETS OF THE BUSINESS DISTRICT WERE CLOSELY FOLLOWED BY THE MILITARY. STREETS INTO MOST RESIDENTIAL AREAS WERE BARRICADED AND GUARDED BY CIVILIANS. ALL BANKS HAVE BEEN DAMAGED AND ARE NOT EXPECTED TO REOPEN BEFORE MAY 25. ONE AMERICAN TOLD US TWENTY OF HIS WORKERS WERE LIVING WITH HIM AND HIS BALINESE WIFE IN ORDER TO ASSURE HIS SAFETY. FIFTY WORKERS GUARDED HIS FACTORY. HIS BUSINESS HAD BEEN SPARED EARLIER IN THE

WEEK WHEN HIS STAFF WAS ABLE TO PROVE TO LOOTERS THAT IS WAS
UNCLASSIFIED

OWNED BY A NON-CHINESE INDONESIAN. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF BURNING ORLOOTING IN SOLO SINCE SATURDAY.

9. IN UJUNGPANDANG, LOCAL SOURCES REPORTED THAT MORE THAN NE HUNDRED THOUSAND GATHERED AT 0800 IN THQ CENTER OF THE CITY TO PROTEST. (NOTE: THIS UPDATES THE SITREP WHICH REPORTED NO MASSIVE CRWDS. END NOTE). AT 1100 DEMONSTRATORS BEGAN TO CONVOY AROUND THE CITY. BY 1330 THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF VIOLENCE OR DESTRUCTION. A RELIABLE HUMAN RIGHTS CONTACT TOLD US CHINESE-INDONESIANS WERE ENCOURAGED TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS DEMONSTRATION, CLOSE TO 1000 DID SO. IN PALU, CENTRAL SULAWESI, 5000 STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED AND MARCHED OFF CAMPUS TO TVRI AND THE DPRD. MILITARY UNITS TIGHTLY GUARDED TVRI BUT ALLOWED THE DEMONSTRATORS TO ENTER THE DPRD. MANADO WAS CALM AND REPORTED NO DEMONSTRATIONS.

10. CONAGENT BALI REPORTS THAT A FEW THOUSAND DEMONSTRATED AT UDAYANA, THE LARGEST UNIVERSITY IN DENPASAR, BUT THAT STUDENTS REMAINED ON CAMPUS. A SMALL GROUP PROTESTED AT THE DPRD WITHOUT INCIDENT. MILITARY IS GUARDING KEY BUILDINGS AND INTERSECTIONS BUT TOURIST AREAS ARE CALM AND INCIDENT FREE.

11. AS OF 1630 LOCAL TIME, WE ARE AWARE OF NO INJURIES OR DIRECT CLASHES ON MAY 20 BETWEEN DEMONSTRATORS AND AUTHORITIES IN THE SURABAYA CONSULAR DISTRICT. CONVOYS, HOWEVER, ARE STILL CONTINUING HERE AND MOST LIKELY IN YOGYAKARTA, AND POSSIBLY UNJUNG PANDANG AND ELSEWHERE. PIERCE/ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ2809

PAGE 01 SINGAP 02240 220918Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AIT-03 ACQ-01 CA-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
SRPP-00 DS-00 FBIE-00 UTED-00 IM-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
ADS-00 NSAE-00 VO-03 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /011W
----------40DEC2 220918Z /38

O 220914Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1720
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AIT TAIPEI 4475
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USIA WASHDC 8620

UNCLAS SINGAPORE 002240

USIA FOR EA - DMILLER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, CVIS, ID, SN
SUBJECT: TFID01: SOEHARTO RESIGNATION -- SINGAPORE REACTS WITH RELIEF AND CAUTION

REF: (A) SINGAPORE 2187 (B) SINGAPORE 2141

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SINGAP 02240 220918Z
(C) SINGAPORE 2140 (D) SINGAPORE 2121

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

1. (U) PRIME MINISTER GOH CHOK TONG ISSUED THE FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE ON SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION:

BEGIN TEXT

STATEMENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF SINGAPORE, 21 MAY 1998

I AM RELIEVED THAT POLITICAL TRANSITION IN INDONESIA HAS TAKEN PLACE PEACEFULLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY. IN DECIDING TO STEP DOWN IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATION AND THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO HAS ACTED IN A RESPONSIBLE, DIGNIFIED MANNER. HE HAS MADE GREAT CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDONESIA AND TO ASEAN.

INDONESIA FACES FORMIDABLE CHALLENGES AHEAD. WE HOPE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT UNDER PRESIDENT B.J. HABIBIE WILL BE ABLE TO RESTORE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY, A PREREQUISITE FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY. SINGAPORE LOOKS FORWARD TO CONTINUING ITS CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA.

END TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE.

2. (U) NON-OFFICIAL PUBLIC REACTION HAS BEEN CAUTIOUSLY POSITIVE. ON A SPECIAL EDITION OF TV'S "INSIGHT," INDONESIA WATCHERS LEONARD SEBASTIAN (SINGAPOREAN; INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES) AND FARID ALATAS (INDONESIAN; SOCIOLOGIST; NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE) VIEWED HABIBIE AS A TRANSITION FIGURE WHO, IF HE MADE THE RIGHT MOVES, COULD FACILITATE ORDERLY POLITICAL REFORM AND A CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFER OF POWER. SEBASTIAN ESPECIALLY EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF A STABLE, CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION. THE

THIRD PARTICIPANT, BRUCE GALE, (AUSTRALIAN; POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RISK CONSULTANCY) EMPHASIZED THE POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY AND THE DAUNTING CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL REFORM.

3. (U) EDITORIALS IN THE MAY 22 PRESS WERE MORE CAUTIOUS THAN POSITIVE ABOUT THE FUTURE, PRAISED SOEHARTO'S HISTORICAL RECORD, BUT FRANKLY ASSESSED THE WEAKNESSES THAT BROUGHT HIS DOWNFALL. THE MAY 22 "STRAITS TIMES" EDITORIAL EMPHASIZED THE FORCE OF POPULAR OPINION IN SOEHARTO'S DOWNFALL AND THE MANY UNPREDICTABLE POLITICAL FORCES UNLEASHED. IT SAID IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL WHETHER HABIBIE

WILL DO WHAT IS NEEDED, BUT EMPHASIZED NEGATIVE REACTIONS TO HABIBIE FROM THE FORCES THAT BROUGHT DOWN SOEHARTO. A CRUCIAL FIRST TEST WOULD BE THE QUALITY OF HIS NEW CABINET. THE MAY 22 "BUSINESS TIMES" EMPHASIZED THE SOEHARTO LEGACY: THREE DECADES OF GOOD YEARS FOR INDONESIANS, WITH RISING INCOME, LOWERED ILLITERACY, AND IMPROVEMENTS IN HEALTH; AN END TO AN ERA OF HOSTILITY IN THE REGION AND A KEY ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASEAN. HOWEVER, SOEHARTO DID NOT ALLOW ANY LEGITIMATE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS TO DEVELOP, PROVIDED FOR NO SUCCESSION, AND, WITH HIS OWN LEGITIMACY BASED SOLELY ON RISING PROSPERITY, BECAME THE VICTIM OF HIS OWN POLITICAL MACHINATIONS WHEN PROSPERITY ENDED.

4. (U) OTHER ARTICLES IN THE MAY 22 PRESS REFLECTED THE THEMES OF CAUTIOUS WAITING AND PRAISE FOR SOEHARTO'S PAST. THE "STRAITS TIMES" CARRIED A SERIES OF NOSTALGIC PHOTOGRAPHS OF SOEHARTO'S CAREER, INCLUDING ONE OF A FLOWER-BEDECKED LEE KUAN YEW WITH SOEHARTO DURING A 1973 VISIT TO JAKARTA. BUSINESS LEADERS, INTERVIEWED IN THE "BUSINESS TIMES," WERE MILDLY ENCOURAGED THAT INDONESIANS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE STRONG OBJECTIONS TO HABIBIE, THOUGH THEY RECOGNIZED THE FORCE OF STUDENT OPINION. THEY WERE UNANIMOUS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF HABIBIE'S SENDING POSITIVE SIGNALS

TO THE WORLD BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL COMMUNITY.

5. (U) THE "STRAITS TIMES" INTERVIEWED 40 INDONESIANS WHO HAD FLED THE UNREST IN INDONESIA. MOST OF THEM, THE "STRAITS TIMES" REPORTED, SAID THAT NEW PRESIDENT HABIBIE WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AND THAT THE UNREST IN INDONESIA WOULD CONTINUE. SOME SAID THEY WOULD APPLY FOR VISAS TO THE U.S. OR AUSTRALIA, AND OTHERS WERE PLANNING TO REGISTER THEIR CHILDREN AT THE INDONESIAN SCHOOL IN SINGAPORE. THE "STRAITS TIMES" REPORTED THAT 120 INDONESIANS APPLIED FOR AUSTRALIAN VISAS ON MAY 21. 130 INDONESIANS, VIRTUALLY ALL ETHNIC CHINESE, APPLIED FOR VISAS AT THE U.S. EMBASSY THIS WEEK, A SIGNIFICANT UPSURGE.

6. (U) JAKARTA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. GREEN

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2421

PAGE 01 BEIJIN 08451 01 OF 02 220623Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	C-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/023W					

----------40D08A 220623Z /38

O 220612Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7160
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL SHENYANG
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AIT TAIPEI 7251
AMCONSUL CHENGDU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 008451

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/22/18
TAGS: PREL, ID, CH
SUBJECT: TFID01: INITIAL CHINESE REACTION TO SOEHARTO RESIGNATION IS MUTED

REFS: A) BEIJING 8216; B) BEIJING 3471

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BEIJIN 08451 01 OF 02 220623Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

(U) CLASSIFIED BY WILLIAM A. STANTON, POLMINCOUNS.
REASONS: 1.5 (B) AND (D). EXEMPTION: 1.6X6.

SUMMARY
---

1. (C) CHINESE OFFICIAL REACTION TO INDONESIAN PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION HAS BEEN MUTED. ON MAY 21, THE MFA SPOKESPERSON EXPRESSED CHINA'S DESIRE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INDONESIA'S SOCIAL STABILITY BUT REFUSED TO COMMENT ON THE LEADERSHIP TRANSITION. CHINESE PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA HAVE REPORTED EVENTS IN INDONESIA EXTENSIVELY, BUT APPEAR TO HAVE AVOIDED ANY MENTION OF STUDENT PROTESTS THERE. CNN RECEPTION IN BEIJING HAS BEEN PERIODICALLY INTERRUPTED OVER THE PAST 24 HOURS. CNN BEIJING HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SERVICE BREAKS ARE DUE TO CHINESE CENSORSHIP OR A GENUINE TECHNICAL PROBLEM. END SUMMARY.

MFA REACTION
---

2. (C) CHINESE OFFICIAL REACTION TO INDONESIAN PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION HAS BEEN MUTED. DURING A REGULARLY SCHEDULED MFA PRESS BRIEFING ON THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 21, MFA SPOKESPERSON ZHU BANGZAO SAID CHINA HOPED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF SOCIAL STABILITY AND THE RESTORATION OF NORMAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA FOLLOWING SOEHARTO'S ANNOUNCEMENT. HE REFUSED TO COMMENT ON THE LEADERSHIP TRANSITION, CALLING IT AN INDONESIAN INTERNAL AFFAIR. (NOTE: MFA OFFICIALS HAVE NOT YET RESPONDED TO OUR REQUESTS FOR MEETINGS ABOUT THE

SITUATION IN INDONESIA. THE EMBASSIES OF AUSTRALIA, MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE HAVE SIMILAR APPOINTMENT REQUESTS PENDING WITH THE MFA.)

CHINESE MEDIA REACTION
---

3. (U) CHINESE PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA HAVE REPORTED EVENTS IN INDONESIA EXTENSIVELY, BUT APPEAR TO HAVE AVOIDED ANY MENTION OF STUDENT PROTESTS THERE. ON MAY

21, CHINESE STATE-RUN TELEVISION'S LATE EVENING CHINESE-LANGUAGE NEWS RAN AS ITS LEAD STORY SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION. IT DID NOT INCLUDE ANY FILM FOOTAGE OF STUDENT PROTESTERS. THE REPORT INDICATED THAT THE CAUSE OF THE LEADERSHIP TRANSITION WAS THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES FACED BY INDONESIA AS A RESULT OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS.

4. (C) ON MAY 22, THE CHINESE-LANGUAGE "PEOPLE'S DAILY" CARRIED THREE BRIEF FRONT-PAGE REPORTS: ON SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION, ON THE MFA PRESS BRIEFING, AND ON EXPRESSING THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF OVERSEAS CHINESE, INCLUDING THOSE FROM TAIWAN, HONG KONG, AND MACAO. THE ARTICLE NOTED THAT THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN JAKARTA WOULD DO EVERYTHING IT COULD TO PROTECT OVERSEAS CHINESE IN INDONESIA AND ASSIST THOSE WHO WISHED TO DEPART INDONESIA. OTHER LENGTHIER ARTICLES ON INDONESIA WERE RELEGATED TO PAGES SIX AND SEVEN OF THE PAPER. THESE INCLUDED STORIES ON THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF INDONESIA'S TURMOIL ON THE REGION'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY, THE RIOTS AND FIRES, AND THE INDONESIAN MILITARY'S SUPPORT FOR THE LEADERSHIP TRANSITION. NONE OF THE

ARTICLES WE HAVE SEEN THUS FAR HAVE MENTIONED STUDENT PROTESTS. XINHUA'S ENGLISH-LANGUAGE REPORTING ON INDONESIA FOCUSED ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE TRANSFER OF POWER FROM SOEHARTO TO HABIBIE.

CNN CENSORED?

5. (C) CNN RECEPTION AT SEVERAL BEIJING DIPLOMATIC COMPOUNDS WAS INTERRUPTED THROUGHOUT THE EVENING OF MAY 21 AND MORNING OF MAY 22. TECHNICAL PERSONNEL IN CNN'S BEIJING OFFICE SAID THEY HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE RECEPTION PROBLEMS AND ARE PURSUING THE MATTER WITH CHINESE AUTHORITIES. WHILE THEY FIRST SUSPECTED IT MIGHT BE A CENSORSHIP BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT, THEY HAVE NOT RULED OU
T TECHNICAL
DIFFICULTIES.

COMMENT
-------.

6. (C) THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S LOW-KEY REACTION TO THE SOEHARTO RESIGNATION DOES NOT SURPRISE US. THROUGHOUT THE TURMOIL OF THE PAST FEW WEEKS AND MONTHS, THE CHINESE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ2422

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2422

PAGE 01 BEIJIN 08451 02 OF 02 220623Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	C-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/022W						

----------40D090 220623Z /38

O 220612Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7161
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL SHENYANG
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU

AIT TAIPEI 7252
AMCONSUL CHENGDU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIJING 008451

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/22/18
TAGS: PREL, ID, CH
SUBJECT: TFID01: INITIAL CHINESE REACTION TO SOEHARTO RESIGNATION IS MUTED

HAVE TRIED TO PLAY THE ROLE OF A SYMPATHETIC AND HELPFUL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BEIJIN 08451 02 OF 02 220623Z
NEIGHBOR. DURING THE CAREFULLY TIMED APRIL 12-13 VISIT TO JAKARTA OF FOREIGN MINISTER TANG JIAXUAN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED A USD 200 MILLION PACKAGE OF EXPORT CREDITS AND USD 3 MILLION IN FREE FOOD AND MEDICINES. WHILE MFA OFFICIALS HAVE INDICATED TO US PRIVATELY THAT THEY ARE NOT PARTICULARLY ENAMORED OF NEWLY INSTALLED PRESIDENT HABIBIE (REF B), IT IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD PUBLICLY VOICE THESE SENTIMENTS. EVEN IF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY WERE TO CONTINUE IN INDONESIA, THE CHINESE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO TAKE ANY STRONG ACTIONS SUCH AS A MILITARY-ASSISTED EVACUATION OF ETHNIC CHINESE CITIZENS. AS ONE SINGAPORE DIPLOMAT IN BEIJING TOLD US YESTERDAY, CHINA WOULD "NEVER" TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT "CONFIRM THE WORST FEARS OF ITS ASIAN NEIGHBORS."

7. (C) WHILE CHINESE MFA OFFICIALS HAVE PRIVATELY EXPRESSED TO US ANXIETY ABOUT THE IMPACT AND INFLUENCE OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN INDONESIA (REF A), OFFICIAL CHINESE STATEMENTS AND MEDIA REPORTS APPEAR TO HAVE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED ANY MENTION OF INDONESIA'S "PEOPLE POWER." THIS IS TO BE EXPECTED GIVEN THAT THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1989 TIANANMEN PROTESTS IS JUST TWO WEEKS AWAY.
MCCAHILL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2582

PAGE 01 KUALA 03109 01 OF 02 220745Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/018W				

----------40D70D 220745Z /38

R 220502Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0064
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 003109

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/03
TAGS: PREL, MY, ID
SUBJECT: TFID01: MALAYSIAN REACTION TO SUHARTO RESIGNATION: CONCERN FOR STABILITY

1. CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR JEFF LUNSTEAD FOR REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. THE KING AND THE GOVERNMENT HAVE CONGRATULATED B.J. HABIBIE ON ASSUMING THE INDONESIAN PRESIDENCY. THE PM AND DPM NOTED THEIR PLEASURE WITH SMOOTH CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFER OF POWER. SOME NGOS CALLED FOR RAPID REFORM. ACADEMICS AND BUSINESSMEN STRESSED THE NEED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KUALA 03109 01 OF 02 220745Z
FOR A RETURN TO NORMALCY. IN SUM, MALAYSIA'S MAIN CONCERN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

IS THAT CALM AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY RETURN TO INDONESIA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY.

KING AND GOVERNMENT OFFER CONGRATULATIONS

---

3. (U) AS MALAYSIA'S HEAD OF STATE, THE KING OFFERED CONGRATULATIONS TO HABIBIE WITH PREDICTABLE EXPRESSIONS OF CONFIDENCE AND CALLS FOR EVEN BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA. PM MAHATHIR SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE TRANSITION HAD BEEN CONDUCTED PEACEFULLY AND ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION. THE PM SAID HE HOPES THAT "INDONESIA WILL SPEEDILY RECOVER ... A CALM AND PEACEFUL SITUATION." THE PM SAID HE IS CONFIDENT THAT INDONESIANS WILL GIVE HABIBIE THEIR FULL SUPPORT "TO LEAD THE COUNTRY INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM." THE PM ALSO SAID HE HOPED THE SPECIAL FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA WOULD CONTINUE. DEPUTY PM ANWAR SAID SEPARATELY THAT THE PM (WHO IS RECOVERING IN THE HOSPITAL FROM A MINOR OPERATION) HAD FURTHER INSTRUCTED HIM TO ANNOUNCE THAT THE GOM IS "HAPPY THAT THE TRANSFER OF POWER WAS DONE IN PEACE ACCORDING TO THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTION." FOREIGN MINISTER ABDULLAH, SPEAKING AT THE NAM SESSION IN CARTAGENA, MADE SIMILAR REMARKS.

NGOS CALL FOR REFORM

---

4. (U) HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC INTEREST NGOS EXULTED OVER SUHARTO'S RESIGNATION AND CALLED ON HABIBIE TO IMPLEMENT SWIFT REFORMS. POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE DIRECTOR ABDUL RAHMAN ADNAN SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE HOPED SUHARTO'S RESIGNATION WOULD ALLOW FOR FACTIONS TO "CALM DOWN" AND BRING ABOUT "POLITICAL REFORM AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY." CENPEACE SENIOR COORDINATOR NOR AZMI ABDUL KADIR CALLED EVENTS IN INDONESIA A "TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY." OTHER NGO LEADERS MADE SIMILAR PUBLIC REMARKS.

ACADEMICS AND BUSINESSMEN
---

5. (U) MOST ACADEMICS AND BUSINESS LEADERS CALLED FOR A QUICK RETURN TO CALM. CHINESE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL DAVID CHUA SAID THE MAIN CONCERN OF THE MALAYSIAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY IS THAT "NORMALCY" SHOULD RETURN AND INVESTOR CONFIDENCE BE RESTORED. ACADEMICS MADE MEASURED ASSESSMENTS OF THE DIFFICULTIES FACING HABIBIE, THE DAUNTING TASK OF RECONSTRUCTING THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY, AND THE PRESSING NEED FOR RESTORING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ALLEVIATING POVERTY.

THE SYMBOLISM
---

6. (C) SOME COMMENTATORS ARE ALREADY NOTING THE SYMBOLISM OF SUHARTO'S FALL FROM POWER AND ITS APPLICABILITY--OR LACK THEREOF--TO MALAYSIA. WITH SUHARTO GONE, PRIME MINISTER

MAHATHIR IS NOW THE LONGEST SERVING RULER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE KING OF BRUNEI, WHO IS OBVIOUSLY IN A DIFFERENT CLASS. AND MAHATHIR ALSO FACES A DECLINING ECONOMY AND CHARGES OF CRONYISM. A SENATOR FROM THE RULING BARISAN NASIONAL (FROM ONE OF THE SMALLER BORNEO-BASED PARTIES, NOT FROM UMNO) TOLD US AFTER SUHARTO RESIGNED THAT HE WAS SURE THIS WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT WITHIN UMNO. MAHATHIR WOULD BE MORE ANXIOUS ABOUT HIS POSITION, HE SAID, AND ANWAR'S MEN WOULD BE MORE ASSERTIVE ABOUT THE NEED FOR A CHANGE. STILL, HE WAS NOT TALKING ABOUT IMMEDIATE CHANGE, BUT MORE ABOUT WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN AT THE UMNO GENERAL ELECTIONS IN MID-1999.

COMMENT
---

7. (C) THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS OF MALAYSIAN COMMENTATORS (PM, DPM, FM, NGO, BUSINESSMEN, ACADEMICS) WERE SO PREDICTABLE

THAT THEY COULD HAVE BEEN SCRIPTED. THE ONLY REMARKABLE ITEM WAS THE PM'S BEING "CONFIDENT" THAT HABIBIE WOULD LEAD INDONESIA "INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM." IN OUR VIEW HOWEVER, THIS STATEMENT IS SIGNIFICANT MAINLY AS EVIDENCE THAT THE PM DOES NOT CAREFULLY WEIGH EVERY WORD OF HIS PUBLIC REMARKS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ2581

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2581

PAGE 01 KUALA 03109 02 OF 02 220744Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/018W				

----------40D705 220745Z /38

R 220502Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0065
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 003109

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/03
TAGS: PREL, MY, ID
SUBJECT: TFID01: MALAYSIAN REACTION TO SUHARTO RESIGNATION:

CONCERN FOR STABILITY

IN SUM, MALAYSIA'S VIRTUALLY SOLE CONCERN IS THAT INDONESIA GET BACK ON ITS FEET AGAIN. MALAYSIANS HOPE THAT INDONESIA WILL QUICKLY AND BY WHATEVER MEANS RESTORE A CALM SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND BEGIN AN ECONOMIC RECOVERY.

8. (C) WITH REGARD TO THE EFFECT ON MAHATHIR AND UMNO, WE WOULD CAUTION NOT TO MAKE TOO MUCH OF THIS OR TO EXPECT ANY IMMEDIATE CHANGES. NONETHELESS, THE SYMBOLISM IS REAL, AND

COULD PLAY OUT IN A SUBTLE WAY AS THE POLITICAL PROCESS GATHERS STEAM TOWARD 1999-2000. IN THE SHORT RUN, MAHATHIR HAS COMMENTED RECENTLY THAT OUTSIDE FORCES WERE TRYING TO BRING SUHARTO DOWN, AND THAT THE SAME FORCES WERE AFTER HIM. THIS PERSECUTION COMPLEX WILL NO DOUBT BE REINFORCED BY SUHARTO'S FALL. CERTAINLY DR. M. WILL BE CONFIRMED IN HIS OWN CONVICTION THAT THE IMF IS DANGEROUS TO THE HEALTH OF LONG-TERM RULERS.

MALOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ3124

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO9934

PAGE 01 JAKART 02865 221114Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/026W		

----------40E9D9 221115Z /38

R 221113Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1687
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS JAKARTA 002865

DEPARTMENT FOR S/S-O AND INDONESIA TASK FORCE
ALSO FOR EAP/PIMBS

FROM AMCONGEN SURABAYA 0099

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, CASC, PINR, PINS, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: TFID01: SITUATION IN EASTERN INDONESIA - MAY 21

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 02865 221114Z
1. SUMMARY: MILITARY UNITS IN SURABAYA CONFRONTED STUDENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

DEMONSTRATORS MAY 20 IN SURABAYA, MORE THAN 30 WERE INJURED. DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED IN OTHER MAJOR CITIES IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA AS WELL, INCLUDING A GATHERING OF MORE THAN 100,000 IN SEMARANG. ALL APPEARED PEACEFUL. DEMONSTRATORS IN SOUTHEAST SULAWESI REPORTEDLY FORCED THE GOVERNOR TO LOWER THE INDONESIAN FLAG. SOME SURABAYA STUDENT LEADERS, UNPREPARED FOR SUHARTO'S RESIGNATION MAY 21, RUSHED TO CAMPUSES TO CONFER WITH COLLEAGUES. BY AFTERNOON, A PEACEFUL STUDENT DEMONSTRATION SUPPORTING REFORM HAD OCCURRED NEAR THE GOVERNOR'S MANSION. ANOTHER, CALLING FOR HABIBIE'S RESIGNATION, WAS PLANNED FOR 1600 AT THE LOCAL LEGISLATURE. END SUMMARY.

SURABAYA SITUATION MAY 21

2. SECURITY WAS TIGHT AROUND THE CENTER OF SURABAYA BEFORE SUHARTO'S RESIGNATION. TROOPS HAD SET UP CHECKPOINTS NEAR THE NATIONAL RADIO STATION (RRI) BUILDING NEAR A POPULAR SHOPPING CENTER. IN OTHER PLACES TROOP DEPLOYMENTS REMAINED NORMAL. SOME STUDENT GROUPS APPEARED SURPRISED BY SUHARTO'S RESIGNATION AND MANY STUDENTS TOLD US THEY WERE TRYING TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO NEXT. WE HEARD OF MEETINGS ON MANY SURABAYA CAMPUSES AS STUDENTS SOUGHT TO DETERMINE THE PROPER RESPONSE TO THE NEW PRESIDENT.

3. BY NOON, A GROUP OF MUSLIM AIRLANGGA STUDENTS HAD BEGUN A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION ACROSS FROM THE GOVERNOR'S MANSION. BANNERS CALLED FOR PEACEFUL REFORM. FEMALE STUDENTS, ALL IN TRADITIONAL MUSLIM DRESS, WERE BROUGHT BACK TO CAMPUS BY MILITARY VEHICLES, ONE OF WHICH SPORTED A BANNER READING "WE THIRST FOR THE GOALS OF REFORM!" ABOUT 100 MILITARY AND POLICE GUARDED THE 500 DEMONSTRATORS UNTIL THE DEMONSTRATION BROKE UP ABOUT 1330.

4. WE UNDERSTAND SOME STUDENT GROUPS HAVE REJECTED PRESIDENT HABIBIE, AND ARE DEMANDING HIS IMMEDIATE RESIGNATION AND THE SCHEDULING OF A SPECIAL SESSION. SURABAYA UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND OTHERS WERE PLANNING TO DEMONSTRATE AT THE LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BUILDING AT 1600.

EVENTS IN EASTERN INDONESIA MAY 20TH, CONT.

5. LATE AFTERNOON MAY 20 IN SURABAYA, A CONVOY OF CLOSE TO 3000 CIRCLED THE CITY. THEY WERE STOPPED BY MILITARY AS THEY TRIED TO

PASS INTO THE CENTER OF TOWN. THE CONVEYERS THEN STONED THE OLYMPIC HOTEL BEFORE THEY WERE CHASED BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN TRUCKS. TENS OF MOTORCYCLES WERE WRECKED AFTER THEY WERE HIT BY TRUCKS. STUDENTS WERE CHASED BY MILITARY INTO THE SIDE STREETS. MORE THAN 30 WERE REPORTED INJURED, AT LEAST ONE BYSTANDER BY A RUBBER BULLET. BY EVENING SURABAYA WAS QUIET.

6. IN MALANG, BANYUWANGI, AND JEMBER THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS TOOK TO THE STREETS MAY 20 IN MOTORCYCLE CONVOYS TO DEMAND REFORM. HUNDREDS RALLIED AT UNIVERSITIES IN GRESIK AND SITUBONDO. IN JOMBANG, THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS, LABORERS, AND RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS TOOK TO THE STREETS BUT WERE PREVENTED FROM ENTERING THE CENTER OF THE CITY BY MILITARY. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF INJURIES, BUT 15 PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED IN MALANG AS THEY TRIED TO ENTER A SHOPPING AREA.

7. IN SEMARANG MAY 20, MORE THAN 100,000 STUDENTS AND PROFESSORS TOOK TO THE STREETS IN VARIOUS LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE CITY TO DEMAND REFORM AND CALL FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR. THE DEMONSTRATION WAS PEACEFUL, THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF VIOLENCE. PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IN AND AROUND THE CITY WAS COMPLETELY SHUT

DOWN. THE DIPONEGORO UNIVERSITY RECTOR REPORTEDLY DELIVERED A STATEMENT CALLING FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT BY JUNE 1 AND ELECTIONS BY DECEMBER 1998.

OUTSIDE JAVA

---

8. MORE THAN 10,000 STUDENTS IN MATARAM, LOMBOK MAY 20 HELD A LONG MARCH FROM MATARAM UNIVERSITY TO THE DPRD TO DEMAND SUHARTO'S RESIGNATION AND PROSECUTION, AS WELL AS AN ACCOUNTING OF HIS FAMILY WEALTH. IN KENDARI, SOUTHEAST SULAWESI, MORE THAN 7000 STUDENTS GATHERED MAY 20 TO DEMAND SUHARTO'S RESIGNATION AND A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR. AFTER THEIR DEMONSTRATION THEY MOUNTED TRUCKS FOR A PROCESSION AROUND THE CITY. UPON SEEING THE INDONESIAN FLAG AT THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE FLYING AT FULL STAFF, THE CONVOY HALTED AND CALLED UPON GOVERNOR KAINUDIN TO COME OUT AND LOWER HIS FLAG TO HALF MAST. INITIALLY RELUCTANT, THE GOVERNOR FINALLY ADDRESSED THE STUDENTS AS THEY STOOD IN THE RAIN, THEN WENT OUT AND LOWERED HIS FLAG. WE HAVE ALSO HEARD THAT AS MANY AS 10,000 DEMONSTRATED IN KUPANG, EAST NUSATENGGARA.

ONE CONTACT REPORTS THAT IT WAS PEACEFUL. PIERCE/ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3055

PAGE 01 ROME 03832 221049Z
ACTION EUR-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DS-00	EAP-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	ADS-00
	NEA-01	NSAE-00	OPIC-01	SA-01	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	SAS-00	/011W					

----------40E73B 221049Z /38

R 221035Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3552
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
AMCONSUL FLORENCE
AMCONSUL MILAN
AMCONSUL NAPLES

UNCLAS ROME 003832

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PINR, XD, ID, IT
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: ITALIAN FM DINI SAYS CHANGE IS FOR THE BETTER

1. IN STATEMENTS TO THE ITALIAN NEWS AGENCY ANSA MAY 21, ITALIAN FM DINI SAID THE CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP IN INDONESIA FOLLOWING PRESIDENT

SUHARTO'S RESIGNATION THE SAME DAY "IS SURELY FOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

THE BETTER." DINI EXPRESSED ITALY'S HOPE THAT INDONESIA WILL PASS FROM AN "AUTHORITARIAN REGIME" TO "GREATER DEMOCRACY...ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF WESTERN DEMOCRACIES." DINI CHARACTERIZED INDONESIA'S FINANCIAL CRISIS AS THE "FIRST MAJOR POLITICAL CRISIS CAUSED BY GLOBALIZATION." ACCORDING TO DINI, THE CRISIS WAS "PARTLY THE RESULT OF ERRORS IN INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC POLICIES," AND PARTLY THE RESULT OF "TOO MANY LOANS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, WITHOUT TAKING DUE PRECAUTIONS." DINI RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT "ALTHOUGH SUHARTO WAS AUTHORITARIAN," HE HAD "OBTAINED RESULTS" FOR INDONESIA'S ECONOMY.

2. IN RESPONSE TO A SPECIFIC QUESTION ON INDONESIA'S NEW PRESIDENT YUSUF HABIBIE BEING SUHARTO'S "GODSON" AND THUS TOO CLOSE TO THE EX-PRESIDENT, DINI RESPONDED, "I KNOW HABIBIE PERSONALLY. YES, IT IS TRUE, BUT EACH COUNTRY MAKES ITS OWN DECISIONS REGARDING ITS LEADERS. AS MINISTER (OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY), HABIBIE HAS SHOWN GREAT QUALITY. WE SHALL SEE."
CUNNINGHAM

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

KEDUTAAN BESAR REPUBLIK INDONESIA
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

No. 042/KD/V/98

The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America, and has the honor to inform the latter that on 21 may 1998, President Soeharto resigned as the President of the Republic of Indonesia. Immediately thereafter, Vice President B.J. Habibie took his oath of office as the Third President of Indonesia before Supreme Court Chief Justice Sarwata.

In accordance with Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution, in case of the President's death, resignation or incapacity to carry out the duties of his office, the Vice President shall assume the Presidency and serve out the rest of the terms of office.

In order to carry out his new responsibilities, President B.J. Habibie has formed a new cabinet, the Development Reform Cabinet. The Cabinet was installed on 23 May 1998.

The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State of the United States of America the assurances of its highest consideration.

29 May 1998

The Department of State of
The United States of America
Washington, D.C.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7603

PAGE 01 TOKYO 03524 080946Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	SAS-00	/020W					

----------3BA7EC 080946Z /38

R 080915Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9405
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 003524

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/10
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINT, ID, JA
SUBJECT: [redacted] SOEHARTO "OUT BY YEAR END" B1

REF: TOKYO 1838

CLASSIFIED BY: NEIL E. SILVER, POLMINCOUNS, EMBASSY TOKYO.
REASON: 1.5(D).

1. (C) ON MAY 8, WE DISCUSSED THE INDONESIA SITUATION WITH [redacted] SAID HE WAS FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE SCALE, FREQUENCY, AND COMPOSITION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 03524 080946Z
OF THE ANTI-SOEHARTO DEMONSTRATIONS. THE MOST IMPORTANT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 7 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 17 NOV 2006 200503180

POTENTIAL CHANGE WOULD BE WHEN LARGE GROUPS OF NON-STUDENTS (HOUSEWIVES AND UNEMPLOYED MEN, PARTICULARLY) JOINED THE DEMONSTRATIONS; THIS WOULD LIKELY OCCUR, THOUGHT [redacted] B1 WHEN THAT HAPPENED, THE DEMONSTRATIONS COULD QUICKLY REACH A CRITICAL MASS THAT WOULD PROMPT SOEHARTO TO ORDER THE ARMY TO CLAMP DOWN. THIS WOULD FORCE THE ARMED FORCES LEADERSHIP, ALREADY SHOWING SIGNS OF A SPLIT ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION, TO DECIDE HOW COMMITTED IT WAS TO SOEHARTO.

2. (C) THE ARMED FORCES LEADERSHIP WAS SHOWING SIGNS OF A BASIC SPLIT ON HOW TO HANDLE THE CURRENT DEMONSTRATIONS, SAID [redacted] COMMANDER IN CHIEF WIRANTO, ALREADY INSTRUCTED BY B1 SOEHARTO TO CLAMP DOWN ON THE DEMONSTRATORS, WAS WALKING A TIGHTROPE. WIRANTO HAD SENT WARNINGS TO THE STUDENTS NOT TO TAKE THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS TO THE STREET, BUT AT THE SAME TIME HE WAS TELLING THEM THE ARMED FORCES WERE NOT HOSTILE. [redacted] SAID HE HAD RECEIVED TODAY AN E-MAIL FROM JAKARTA REPORTING THAT WIRANTO'S DEPUTY, ARMED FORCES CHIEF FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS SUSILO BANBANG, HAD COMMENTED (NOT PUBLICLY) THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO CONVENE THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY TO DECIDE THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE (PRESUMABLY, BY REPLACING SOEHARTO). IF TRUE, PERHAPS THIS SIGNALED THE INTENTIONS OF THE "WIRANTO WING" OF THE ARMED FORCES, THOUGHT [redacted]

3. (C) ON THE OTHER HAND, ARMY STRATEGIC RESERVE COMMANDER (AND SOEHARTO SON IN LAW) PRABOWO WAS DOING HIS BEST TO PREVENT DEMONSTRATIONS FROM GETTING OUT OF CONTROL IN JAKARTA, WHERE ANY "FINAL SHOWDOWN" WOULD TAKE PLACE. PRABOWO WAS ALSO ENGAGED IN A POWER STRUGGLE WITH WIRANTO, WHICH WOULD REACH A

"MOMENT OF TRUTH" WHEN SOEHARTO ORDERED AN ARMY CRACKDOWN IN THE FACE OF MASS DEMONSTRATIONS. THE QUESTION WAS NOT IF THIS MOMENT WOULD COME, BUT WHEN, THOUGHT [redacted]

[redacted] B1

[redacted] THE GROUP HAD CONCLUDED RECENTLY THAT SOEHARTO'S REGIME WOULD NOT SURVIVE THE SERIES OF DEMONSTRATIONS THAT

WOULD CONTINUE TO BUILD AND EXPAND IN COMING WEEKS AND MONTHS. THIS DID NOT MEAN SOEHARTO WOULD BE OVERTHROWN OR FORCED TO STEP DOWN IN THE NEXT MONTH OR TWO. BUT HE WOULD MOST LIKELY NO LONGER BE INDONESIA'S LEADER BY THE END OF THIS YEAR, THE GROUP CONCLUDED.

5. (C) AS IN REFTEL REPORT, WE PROVIDE [redacted] B1
COMMENTS AS THE VIEWS OF A LONGSTANDING ACADEMIC OBSERVER OF INDONESIAN AFFAIRS. LAFLEUR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4513

PAGE 01 JAKART 02639 01 OF 02 120807Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	FDIC-01
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/030W				

----------3CBB72 120808Z /38

R 120807Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1481
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002639

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0083
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-09-08
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, CASC, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: AIRLANGGA UNIVERSITY CALLS FOR SUHARTO'S SUCCESSION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02639 01 OF 02 120807Z
REF: JAKARTA 2451

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 11 MAY 2020
DATE/CASE ID: 17 NOV 2006 200503180

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PRINCIPAL OFFICER. REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: ON MAY 8, AIRLANGGA UNIVERSITY HELD A MASSIVE REFORMATION DEMONSTRATION ON CAMPUS. THE MAIN THEME WAS SUHARTO'S REPLACEMENT. STUDENTS, PROFESSORS, AND UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SPOKE. LATER DOCTORS AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL AT NEARBY DR SUTOMO HOSPITAL ALSO DEMONSTRATED. CROWDS OF DEMONSTRATORS LATER CIRCULATED THROUGH PARTS OF TOWN. THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMANDER HAD GIVEN HIS PERMISSION FOR THE AIRLANGGA DEMONSTRATION. ORGANIZERS CONSIDER THIS A MAJOR VICTORY. THEY SEE AIRLANGGA AS THE FIRST STATE-RUN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION TO CALL OPENLY FOR PRESIDENT SUHARTO TO BE REPLACED. END SUMMARY.

3. (SBU) THE ADMINISTRATION OF AIRLANGGA UNIVERSITY (UNAIR) HAS OPENLY HOSTED A MASSIVE CAMPUS DEMONSTRATION FOR REFORMATION AND SUHARTO'S SUCCESSION. ON MAY 8, SOME 5000-7000 STUDENTS AND FACULTY, AS WELL AS SOME FROM THE GENERAL POPULATION, STAGED A THREE HOUR RALLY ORGANIZED WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE AIRLANGGA ADMINISTRATION. EXAMS WERE POSTPONED, THE DEAN OF STUDENTS WENT AROUND CAMPUS ENCOURAGING STUDENTS AND FACULTY TO ATTEND. PERHAPS A THOUSAND FROM OTHER UNIVERSITIES JOINED IN.

4. (SBU) A PARADE OF ACADEMIC LEADERS--STUDENTS, PROFESSORS, ALUMNI, AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS--SPOKE BEFORE A HIGHLY MOTIVATED CROWD AGAINST A BACKDROP OF POSTERS AND PLACARDS DEMANDING THAT A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) BE HELD IMMEDIATELY TO REPLACE PRESIDENT SUHARTO. THE BANNER BEHIND THE PODIUM READ "STEP DOWN SUHARTO AND FACE TRIAL." IN FRONT, A LARGE BANNER STATED: "THE UNIVERSITY OF

AIRLANGGA DEMANDS A SPECIAL SESSION." SPEAKERS CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FIVE POLITICAL LAWS (REF). THEY REJECTED THE 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS AS ILLEGAL AND UNDEMOCRATIC AND THE 1998 SESSION OF THE MPR (WHICH REELECTED PRESIDENT SUHARTO). THEY CALLED FOR THE ABOLISHMENT OF THE MILITARY'S DWI-FUNGSI ROLE (WHEREBY MILITARY OFFICIALS HOLD CIVILIAN POSITIONS) AND FOR THE LOWERING OF PRICES.

5. (SBU) STUDENTS HAD SOME SUCCESS IN GETTING PARTICIPATION FROM OTHER GROUPS OF SOCIETY. FORTY LABORERS, NOW STRIKING AGAINST

THEIR COMPANY, CAME, AS DID OTHERS. A NUMBER OF DOCTORS FROM NEAR-BY DR. SUTOMO HOSPITAL WANDERED THROUGH.

6. (SBU) OUTSIDE THE UNIVERSITY GROUNDS NEAR ALL EXITS ONE COULD SEE DOZENS OF RIOT POLICE. MORE WERE FARTHER DOWN THE STREETS. PLAINCLOTHES SECURITY WERE OBVIOUS AMONG THE CROWDS INSIDE.

7. (SBU) AIRLANGGA'S RECTOR WAS SCHEDULED TO READ THE PROCLAMATION CALLING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCCESSION AND OTHER THEMES (LOWER PRICES, APPEAL TO THE ARMY TO UNITE WITH THE PEOPLE, ETC). THE RECTOR ULTIMATELY DECIDED NOT TO. (WE DO NOT BELIEVE HE CAME.) THE DEAN OF STUDENTS FILLED IN.

8. (U) LATER IN THE DAY, AS MANY AS 2500 DOCTORS, STAFF, AND STUDENT NURSES FROM DR. SUTOMO HOSPITAL AND UNAIR HELD THEIR OWN DEMONSTRATION IN THE STREETS STRETCHING AROUND THE HOSPITAL AND UNAIR. REPORTEDLY, THE HOSPITAL'S DIRECTOR JOINED IN. SECURITY, APPARENTLY SURPRISED, WERE RELUCTANT TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE GROUP.

9. (U) THE PRESS REPORTED OTHER GROUPS OF STUDENTS SUCCESSFULLY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02639 01 OF 02 120807Z
GOT INTO THE CITY CENTER TO DEMONSTRATE IN FRONT OF THE LOCAL ASSEMBLY. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF CLASHES.

10. (C) ACADEMICS AND STUDENTS BELIEVE THE UNAIR DEMONSTRATION A MAJOR SUCCESS. PROFESSOR MARSETIO DONOSEPUTRO, INDONESIA'S FORMER AMBASSADOR TO UNESCO AND A FORMER UNAIR RECTOR, WAS AT THE PODIUM. [redacted] TOLD PO THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST OPEN SUPPORT BY A STATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION FOR A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP. [redacted] BELIEVED THAT PRESIDENT SUHARTO WOULD STEP DOWN IN A FEW MONTHS, PROBABLY UNDER THE GUISE OF HEALTH REASONS. THE PRESSURE AND MOMENTUM WAS TOO GREAT TO WITHSTAND.) ONE ACADEMIC, WHO HAD COMPOSED THE DEMONSTRATION'S MAIN DEMANDS SAID THAT THE ACADEMICS AND DEANS WHO HAD ORGANIZED THIS HAD REALIZED THAT THEY COULD BE FIRED IN THE DAYS TO COME. BUT, IN THE END, WE JUST DECIDED TO GO AHEAD, HE REMARKED. (COMMENT: RECTORS AT OTHER UNIVERSITIES HAVE BRIEFLY JOINED IN DEMONSTRATIONS, AS HAS UNAIR'S RECTOR EARLIER. BUT, WE DO NOT BELIEVE EARLIER SUPPORT FOR REFORMATION BY UNIVERSITIES HAS BEEN AS GREAT AS AT THE AIRLANGGA EVENT.)

B1

B1

11. (C) SEVERAL SOURCES TOLD US THAT THE DEMONSTRATION HAD BEEN APPROVED BY EAST JAVA MILITARY COMMANDER DJADJA SUPARMAN. AS THEY WERE ORGANIZING THE EVENT, THEY HAD DECIDED TO ASK HIM INFORMALLY. HE TOLD THEM TO REQUEST PERMISSION IN ACCORD WITH PROCEDURE. WHEN THEY DID, HE APPROVED IT. HE PUNCTUATED HIS APPROVAL BY AN ADMONITION NOT TO TAKE THE DEMONSTRATION TO THE STREETS. DEMONSTRATION LEADERS WERE EXTREMELY PLEASED. THEY TAKE IT TO MEAN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ4514

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4514

PAGE 01 JAKART 02639 02 OF 02 120808Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/029W						

----------3CBB73 120808Z /38

R 120807Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1482
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002639

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0083
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-09-08
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, CASC, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: AIRLANGGA UNIVERSITY CALLS FOR SUHARTO'S SUCCESSION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REF: JAKARTA 2451

THAT SUPARMAN IS SUPPORTIVE OF THEIR DEMANDS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE GIVEN HIS POSITION.

[redacted] B1

TO DATE SURABAYA HAS HAD FEW CLASHES WITH AUTHORITIES, EVEN WHEN DEMONSTRATORS MADE IT TO THE FRONT OF THE LOCAL ASSEMBLY HALL IN THE MIDDLE OF TOWN EARLIER THIS WEEK.) PIERCE/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6017

PAGE 01 JAKART 02729 01 OF 02 151250Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	ED-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/027W				

----------3E52E6 151251Z /38

P 151159Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1568
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002729

FOR S/S-O (CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER), EAP/PIMBS, CA/OCS/ACS/EAP,
AND DS/OP/RD/EAP, DS/OP/SPC, DS/DSS/OSAC
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONGEN SURABAYA 0092

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/18
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02729 01 OF 02 151250Z
TAGS: PGOV, CASC, PINR, SCUL, ID

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

SUBJECT: SURABAYA STUDENTS COORDINATED, NON-VIOLENT

1. CLASSIFIED BY ECON/POLOFF. REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: A COMMITTEE HAS BEEN FORMED TO HELP COORDINATE THE ACTIVITIES OF STUDENT PROTESTORS IN SURABAYA. THE GROUP HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN EDUCATIONAL AND FUND-RAISING EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE STUDENTS. MEMBERS OF THE GROUP HAVE A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER AND ATTRIBUTE THE RELATIVE LACK OF VIOLENCE IN SURABAYA IN PART TO THIS RELATIONSHIP. STUDENT LEADERS ARE COMMITTED TO NON-VIOLENT PROTESTS BUT LEADERLESS NON-STUDENTS WILL LIKELY PUSH THE DEMONSTRATIONS TOWARD DESTRUCTIVE ACTS. END SUMMARY

3. (C) THE EVENING OF MAY 14 AND THE MORNING OF MAY 15 ECON/POLOFF MET WITH TWO MEMBERS OF THE AIRLANGGA UNIVERSITY FACULTY WHO HAVE BEEN CLOSELY INVOLVED WITH STUDENT ACTIVITIES. ACCORDING TO THESE SOURCES, A COORDINATING COMMITTEE, MADE UP OF 54 ACADEMICS AND INTELLECTUALS, HAS BEEN CREATED TO DIRECT AND COORDINATE STUDENT ACTIVISTS IN SURABAYA. THIS GROUP OPERATES IN UNISON WITH THE CITY-WIDE NETWORK OF STUDENT ORGANIZERS TO EDUCATE THE STUDENTS, COORDINATE DEMONSTRATION SCHEDULES, AND RAISE MONEY. THE COMMITTEE GREW FROM A SMALL GROUP OF AIRLANGGA PROFESSORS WHO HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY ADVISING STUDENTS SINCE BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. THEY HAVE BEEN GIVING COURSES TO INTERESTED STUDENT LEADERS AT NIGHT ON SUBJECTS RANGING FROM MILITARY OPERATIONS TO INDONESIAN HISTORY. STUDENT LEADERS HAVE COME TO THEM FOR ADVISE AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT. THE COMMITTEE MEMBERS ARE NOW TAKING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN ASSISTING AND COORDINATING THE DEMONSTRATORS, INCLUDING RAISING SIX MILLION

RUPIAH FROM PRIVATE DONORS (INCLUDING [redacted] TO FUND AN AIRLANGGA CAMPUS NEWSLETTER. (EMBASSY NOTE: [redacted] IS ALSO CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH AND FINANCIALLY SUPPORTIVE OF STUDENTS IN THE JAKARTA, BANDUNG AND OTHER AREAS. IN A MAY 15 MEETING WITH HIM IN JAKARTA, HE SAID THAT STUDENTS WOULD RESUME DEMONSTRATIONS MAY 18 IN THE JAKARTA AREA. END NOTE) B1 B1 B1

4. (C) COMMITTEE MEMBERS ARE ALSO BEGINNING TO THINK ABOUT WHAT MIGHT COME AFTER A SUHARTO REGIME. TO DATE, STUDENTS AND OTHERS

WORKING FOR REFORM HAVE NOT SPOKEN ABOUT THEIR GOALS BEYOND THE RESIGNATION OF THE SUHARTO GOVERNMENT AND THE REDUCTION OF PRICES. EVEN THE LAST HAS BEEN LOST IN RECENT DAYS AS THE CROWDS HAVE BECOME MORE BOLD IN CALLING FOR SUHARTO'S OUSTER. THE COMMITTEE IS PLANNING TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES DURING A THREE DAY SEMINAR TO BE HELD MAY 25-27 AT SURABAYA UNIVERSITY. AMIEN RAIS, KWIK KIAN GEE, RIZAL RAMLI AND OTHERS ARE SCHEDULED TO ATTEND.

5. (C) SURABAYA HAS YET TO SEE THE WIDE SCALE DESTRUCTION, LOOTING, AND BURNING EVIDENT IN JAKARTA, SOLO, YOGYAKARTA AND OTHER PLACES. (NOTE: SEPTEL, COMPLETED AFTER THIS MESSAGE WAS PREPARED REPORTS SOME LATE MAY 15 DESTRUCTION IN SURABAYA, THOUGH APPARENTLY WITHOUT STUDENT INVOLVEMENT. END NOTE) ACADEMIC LEADERS ATTRIBUTE THIS TO TWO FACTORS: A STUDENT LEADERSHIP COMMITTED TO NON-VIOLENT PROTEST AND ACADEMICS WITH A CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER DJADJA SUPARMAN. STUDENT LEADERS IN SURABAYA HAVE EMBRACED A NON-VIOLENT PHILOSOPHY ESPOUSED BY THEIR PROFESSORS AND ARE MAKING REAL EFFORTS TO AVOID DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE MILITARY. THESE EFFORTS HAVE BEEN SUPPORTED BY ACADEMIC ADVISORS WHO HAVE NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS WITH MILITARY UNIT COMMANDERS WHEN

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATIONS THREATENED TO SPILL OUT OF CONTROL.

6. (C) IN ADDITION, SOME MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE A CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH GENERAL [redacted] AND HAVE KEPT HIM B1
INFORMED OF PLANS FOR STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS. THIS KNOWLEDGE ALLOWS THE REGIONAL MILITARY A MEASURE OF FLEXIBILITY AND HAS ALLOWED THE STUDENTS MORE ROOM TO PROTEST. [redacted] IS WIDELY B1
REGARDED AS A WIRANTO PROTEGE. ONE NOTED THAT PROTESTORS IN UJUNG PANDANG ALSO HAD ORGANIZED LARGE DEMONSTRATIONS BUT THAT THESE HAD BEEN MOSTLY PEACEFUL. [redacted] B1

[redacted]

7. (C) THE CHARACTER OF DEMONSTRATIONS IS EXPECTED TO CHANGE DRAMATICALLY AS LARGE NUMBER OF NON-STUDENTS BEGIN TO JOIN IN THE ACTION. THE STUDENTS ARE COORDINATED AND HAVE A CERTAIN DEGREE OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE. MANY OF THOSE WHO ARE NOW PARTICIPATING IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF PROTESTS ARE NON-STUDENTS, LEADERLESS, LACKING IN CRITICAL THOUGHT, AND IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTROL. IT IS

LIKELY THAT ENOUGH OF THESE LEADERLESS MASSES COULD SPARK THE KIND OF RIOTING AND VIOLENCE SEEN IN OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. (NOTE: THESE ACADEMICS ATTRIBUTED THE BURNING OF SHOPS LAST NIGHT TO THIS GROUP.) THIS COULD BREAK THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE STUDENTS.

8. (C) COMMENT: THESE ACADEMICS WERE CLEARLY AFRAID THAT UNCONTROLLABLE ELEMENTS WOULD PROVOKE THE SECURITY FORCES TO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ5964

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5964

PAGE 01 JAKART 02729 02 OF 02 151229Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	ED-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/027W				

----------3E5126 151234Z /38

P 151159Z MAY 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1569
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002729

FOR S/S-O (CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER), EAP/PIMBS, CA/OCS/ACS/EAP,
AND DS/OP/RD/EAP, DS/OP/SPC, DS/DSS/OSAC
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONGEN SURABAYA 0092

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/18
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02729 02 OF 02 151229Z
TAGS: PGOV, CASC, PINR, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: SURABAYA STUDENTS COORDINATED, NON-VIOLENT

RESPOND VIOLENTLY. THEY WERE VERY PROUD THAT SURABAYA HAD THUS FAR BEEN SPARED THE VIOLENCE RAVAGING OTHER CITIES. GENERAL WIRANTO WAS SOMEONE THEY FELT MIGHT BE SYMPATHETIC TO CALLS FOR REFORM, BUT THEY WERE VERY CRITICAL OF GENERAL PRABOWO, AND FEARED THAT HE MIGHT ASSUME A POSITION FROM WHICH HE WOULD HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO BEGIN MASS ARRESTS (A RECONSTITUTED KOKAMTIB WAS RUMORED). WHILE OUR CONTACTS ARE BEGINNING TO THINK BEYOND THE NEXT DEMONSTRATION, THERE IS NO REAL CONSENSUS EVEN AMONG ACADEMICS WHAT REFORM MEANS ONCE SUHARTO IS OUT OF THE PICTURE.
END COMMENT.
PIERCE/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

E11

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8854

PAGE 01 JAKART 02752 01 OF 02 171230Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W		

----------3ED19A 171231Z /38

O 171228Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1581
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0703
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOC WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002752

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02752 01 OF 02 171230Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 10 OCT 2020
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: SHIFTS IN SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CABINET POSITIONS (5/17)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE ARMED FORCES MET ON THE MORNING OF MAY 17 TO RESOLVE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE FACTIONS LED BY DEFENSE MINISTER/CINC WIRANTO AND STRATEGIC RESERVE COMMANDER PRABOWO, ACCORDING TO A SENIOR GOLKAR FIGURE. THE SOURCES SAID THAT ABRI WAS FACED WITH TWO ALTERNATIVES: TO BROADEN WIRANTO'S MANDATE (UNCLEAR EXACTLY HOW) OR TO CHOOSE A NEW COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF WHO WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH FACTIONS. BY THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 17, LOCAL JOURNALISTS WERE REPORTING THAT WIRANTO HAD BEEN REMOVED AS CINC BUT WOULD RETAIN HIS DEFENSE MINISTER PORTFOLIO. THERE ARE ALSO INCREASINGLY RELIABLE REPORTS THAT A POWERFUL INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCY WOULD BE RE-CREATED, POSSIBLY UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PRABOWO. WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE CABINET RESHUFFLE COULD BE ANNOUNCED ON THE MORNING OF MAY 18. THE ARMED FORCES AND AN ELITE MUSLIM ORGANIZATION (ICMI) APPEAR TO AGREE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S ELDEST DAUGHTER "TUTUT", CRONY BOB HASAN, AND RETIRED GENERAL HARTONO SHOULD BE REPLACED. WE HAVE ALSO HEARD THAT ICMI

ACTIVISTS ADI SASONO, AMIEN RAIS AND NURCHOLISH MADJID HAVE BEEN OFFERED SPOTS IN THE CABINET, BUT THAT ICMI TURNED THE DEAL DOWN BECAUSE OF OBJECTIONS FROM RAIS.

REPLACEMENT OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF

3. (C) A SENIOR GOLKAR FIGURE [redacted] TOLD POLOFF MAY 17 THAT ABRI MET ON THE MORNING OF MAY 17 TO RESOLVE TENSIONS WITHIN ABRI OVER RIVAL PRABOWO AND WIRANTO FACTIONS. THE SOURCE

B1

SAID THAT ABRI WAS FACED WITH TWO ALTERNATIVES: TO BROADEN WIRANTO'S MANDATE IN ORDER TO END FACTIONALISM WITHIN ABRI (UNCLEAR EXACTLY HOW), OR TO CHOOSE A NEW COMMANDER IN CHIEF WHO WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH FACTIONS. LOCAL JOURNALIST SOURCES REPORT AS OF LATE MAY 17 THAT WIRANTO HAS BEEN REMOVED AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF BUT THAT HE RETAINS HIS POSITION AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE. A SOURCE WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE ARMED FORCES REPORTED THAT THE ABRI LEADERSHIP ISSUE WOULD BE RESOLVED WHEN SOEHARTO ANNOUNCED THE CABINET "RESHUFFLE," WHICH COULD COME AS EARLY AS THE MORNING OF MONDAY MAY 18.

CABINET RESHUFFLE

4. (C) THE SENIOR GOLKAR SOURCE ALSO NOTED THAT MINISTER OF TOURISM, ARTS AND CULTURE ABDUL LATIEF RESIGNED MAY 17. LATIEF WAS ONE OF EIGHT CURRENT CABINET MEMBERS THAT ABRI SUPPOSEDLY WANTED PURGED, ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATS. IN ADDITION TO LATIEF, THEY INCLUDED MINISTER OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS SITI RUKMANA HARDIYANTI (TUTUT, THE PRESIDENT'S ELDEST DAUGHTER), MINISTER OF TRADE BOB HASAN, MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS HARTONO, MINISTER OF EDUCATION WIRANTO ARISMUNANDAR, STATE MINISTER FOR FOOD, DRUGS, AND HORTICULTURE HARYANTO DHANUTIRTO, AND MINISTER OF INFORMATION

ALWI DAHLAN. ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED THAT UP TO 20 MEMBERS COULD BE REPLACED, AND THAT IT WAS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT SOME WOULD SIMPLY SWITCH MINISTRIES.

5. (U) SOEHARTO'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO RE-SHUFFLE HIS CABINET CREATED SCANT ENTHUSIASM IN MOST POLITICAL CIRCLES. FORMER ENVIRONMENT MINISTER SARWONO SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE WAS "NOT IMPRESSED," SOEHARTO SHOULD HAVE ANNOUNCED A GOOD CABINET FROM THE BEGINNING. THIS MOVE WOULD NOT SOLVE ANY PROBLEMS. HE RECOMMENDED THAT SOEHARTO STEP DOWN INSTEAD, SAYING "AS A FORMER AIDE OF HIS, I WILL BE SAD AND I PITY HIM IF HE STAYS FOR HIS OWN INTERESTS BECAUSE WE ALREADY KNOW THAT HE'S INCREASINGLY BECOMING PART OF THE PROBLEM." FORMER MINISTER FRANS SEDA SAID "IT'S TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE," AND ANOTHER FORMER MINISTER, SUBROTO, SAID THAT AN ENTIRELY NEW GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, WAS NEEDED. AMIEN RAIS SAID THAT A CABINET RESHUFFLE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT BECAUSE THE PEOPLE WERE DEMANDING THAT SOEHARTO STEP DOWN.

B1

[redacted] TOLD POLOFF MAY 17 THAT MINISTER OF DEFENSE/ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO HAD BEEN PUT IN CHARGE OF THE CABINET RE-SHUFFLE, AND WAS PREPARED TO OFFER SPOTS TO THREE ICMI MEMBERS, SECRETARY GENERAL ADI SASONO, AMIEN RAIS, AND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ8855

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8855

PAGE 01 JAKART 02752 02 OF 02 171231Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W				

----------3ED19D 171231Z /38

O 171228Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1582
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AIT TAIPEI 0704
USMISSION GENEA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
UDOC WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002752

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02752 02 OF 02 171231Z
DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/08/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: SHIFTS IN SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CABINET POSITIONS (5/17)

NURCHOLISH MADJID. ADI SASONO WAS ALSO TOLD HE COULD GIVE AS MUCH INPUT AS HE WANTED ON OTHER SPOTS. IN ADDITION TO SEVERAL OF THE MEMBERS THAT BRI WAS TRYING TO HAVE REPLACED (PARA. 4), ICMI ALSO SOUGHT THE REMOVAL OF MINISTER OF FINANCE FUAD BAWAZIER.

7. (C) SASONO WAS PREPARED TO TAKE THIS DEAL, ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE, AS A WAY TO ACHIEVE A COMPROMISE (COMMENT: AND OF COURSE TO GAIN THE INFLUENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT THAT BELIEVED IT WAS DENIED BY THE FIRST FAMILY DOMINATED CABINET FORMED IN MARCH. END COMMENT) BUT ONLY WITH AMIEN RAIS' ENDORSEMENT. ALSO, SASONO THOUGHT THAT RAIS SHOULD ENTER THE SUPREME ADVISORY COUNCIL (DPA) RATHER THAN THE CABINET. AT FIRST, IT SEEMED THAT RAIS WOULD GO ALONG, BUT ON THE MORNING OF MAY 17, AFTER MEETING WITH HIS ADVISORS IN YOGYAKARTA, RAIS INFORMED SASONO THAT HE DID NOT WANT

TO ENTER THE GOVERNMENT AND REJECTED THE DEAL. AFTERWARD, SASONO COMMUNICATED TO WIRANTO, VIA SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HARMOKO, THAT ICMI WOULD NOT GO ALONG WITH THIS

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSAL.

8. (C) SOEHARTO COULD HAVE DIFFICULTY PERSUADING SERIOUS PEOPLE TO ENTER HIS CABINET AT THIS POINT. FOR EXAMPLE, SOURCE SAID THAT SASONO HAD CALLED THE RECTOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GADJA MADAH IN YOGYAKARTA TO SEE IF HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN BEING CONSIDERED FOR THE POST OF MINISTER OF EDUCATION. THE RECTOR REFUSED, SAYING THAT HE DID NOT WANT THE STUDENTS TO "BURN HIS HOUSE DOWN."

9. (C) SOURCE ALSO SAID THAT SASONO, WHO HAD A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH KOSTRAD COMMANDER LT. GENERAL PRABOWO, HAD "OPENED HIS EYES" AFTER THE REPORTS CIRCULATING THAT PRABOWO WAS CONNECTED TO THE KIDNAPPING OF ACTIVISTS AND THE SHOOTING OF STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. PRABOWO AND MUSLIM LEADER AMIEN RAIS WERE SUSPICIOUS OF EACH OTHER, ESPECIALLY SINCE RAIS HAD FORMED THE PEOPLE'S COUNCIL (MAR), WHICH PRABOWO VIEWED AS EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL AND A THREAT TO HIS OWN LEADERSHIP ASPIRATIONS.

POSSIBLE RECREATION OF POWERFUL INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS

10. (C) RUMORS HAVE BEEN RUNNING THROUGH JAKARTA FOR DAYS THAT SOEHARTO MIGHT RECREATE THE POWERFUL INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCY KNOWN AS KOPKAMTIB ("LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COMMAND"). A SOURCE [redacted] TOLD POLOFF MAY 16 THAT SOEHARTO MIGHT BE PLANNING TO RECREATE THE KOPKAMTIB UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF GENERAL PRABOWO. ON MAY 17, POLCOUNS LEARNED FROM THE [redacted] THAT THIS WOULD HAPPEN. B1 B1

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PTQ9997

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9997

PAGE 01 JAKART 02776 01 OF 04 181100Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W

------------------3F02DD 181113Z /38

O 181057Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1608
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0708
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002776

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02776 01 OF 04 181100Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 16 MAY 2020
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/17)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS GATHERED AT THE PARLIAMENT IN JAKARTA MAY 18 TO PRESS FOR A PRESIDENTIAL RESIGNATION. THE GATHERING WAS BILLED AS A PRECURSOR TO NATION-WIDE RALLIES CULMINATING WEDNESDAY WITH WHAT STUDENTS AND OTHER FORCES IN OPPOSITION TO THE PRESIDENT CLAIM WILL BE MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS. THE JAKARTA PROTESTS MAY 18 (AND ELSEWHERE) APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN PEACEFUL WITH THE MILITARY COOPERATING IN THE MOVEMENT OF STUDENTS TO THE PARLIAMENT BY BUS. DEBATE CONTINUES OVER SOEHARTO'S INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS A RE-SHUFFLED CABINET AND POSSIBLE MILITARY SHAKEUP. THIS MAY ALL BE OVER TAKEN BY EVENTS AS PRESSURE MOUNTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION. A LATE REPORT (SEPTEL) INDICATES THE PARLIAMENT IS PREPARED TO ASK FORMALLY FOR THE PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION (SEPTEL). THE ARMY HAS GIVEN NO PUBLIC SIGN THAT IT IS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT ALTHOUGH THE ARMY FACTION IN PARLIAMENT APPEARS READY TO SUPPORT THE PARLIAMENT CALL FOR HIM TO STEP DONW. IN UNJUNG PANDANG, INDONESIA'S FOURTH LARGEST CITY, EXPATRIATES ARE TRYING TO LEAVE THE CITY BEFORE THE MASS DEMONSTRATIONS SCHEDULED FOR MAY 20. IN MEDAN, AS OF LATE MAY 18, STUDENTS WERE AGAIN GATHERING FOR DEMONSTRATIONS. OVER 20,000 STUDENTS GATHERED IN

BANDA ACEH FOR A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION AT THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT. JAKARTA WAS QUIET MAY 18 ALTHOUGH LONG LINES AT BANKS, SKYROCKETING PRICES FOR BASIC FOODS IN SOME MARKETS AND CONTINUED TENSION INDICATED THAT THE CITY IS BY NO MEANS BACK TO BUSINESS AS USUAL. FOOD AVAILABILITYSUPPLY WAS SPOTTY IN JAKARTA WITH MANY OUTLETS STILL CLOSED. BANKS REPORTED HEAVY WITHDRAWALS TODAY WITH CUSTOMERS WITHDRAWING BOTH DOLLARS AND RUPIAH. SOEHARTO CRONY AND CHILDREN'S BANKS WERE RUSHED. BUSINESSES AND GOVERNMENT OFFICES OPENED MAY 18 BUT MOST CLOSED EARLY. THE RUPIAH HOVERED BETWEEN 12,000 AND 13,000 BUT WAS TRADING IN THE

15,000'S AT MONEY CHANGERS. END SUMMARY

THOUSANDS HOLD PEACEFUL RALLY AT DPR

3. (U) A FREE SPEECH FORUM WAS HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA (UI) SALEMBA. FOLLOWING THE FORUM, SEVERAL THOUSAND STUDENTS LEFT BY BUS FOR THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR). ABOUT TEN BUSES (SOME WITH PROFESSORS VISIBLE IN FRONT) WERE ALLOWED TO ENTER THE COMPLEX, AND SOME STUDENTS WERE ALLOWED TO ENTER ON FOOT. AFTER THE BUSES ENTERED, THE GATE WAS SHUT AND THE STUDENTS STILL ARRIVQTHE GATES. POLOFFS SAW STUDENTS FROM BETWEEN TEN AND TWENTY UNIVERSITIES THERE, MANY WEARING THEIR UNIVERSITY JACKETS. ALSO PRESENT WERE AMIEN RAIS, UI ALUMNI AND REPRESENTATIVES OF SEVERAL MASS STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS, AND A GROUP OF 15 RETIRED GENERALS FROM THE GENERATION OF 1945. THERE WAS A LARGE PRESS PRESENCE. SEVERAL CARS FROM THE NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE (ISTN) WITH RED CROSS SIGNS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES WERE PRESENT TO ASSIST STUDENTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. (U) THE DPR COMPLEX WAS HEAVILY GUARDED BY TROOPS FROM VARIOUS DIVISIONS OF ABRI, INCLUDING KOSTRAD CAVALRY BATTALION SEVEN AND PARACHUTE BATTALION 502. THERE WERE TWO ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AT THE GATE. HEAVILY ARMED TROOPS WERE STATIONED ALONG THE FENCE NEAR THE ENTRANCE, AND OTHERS WERE STATIONED INSIDE THE FENCE AROUND THE COMPLEX. TWO MORE APC'S WERE AT THE BACK ENTRANCE TO THE DPR.

5. (U) A STUDENT FROM ATMA JAYA TOLD POLOFF TODAY WAS A TEST TO SEE THE RESPONSE OF THE SECURITY FORCES. HE SAID "WE ARE NOT AFRAID BECAUSE WE ARE RIGHT." HE THOUGHT THAT ABRI SUPPORTED THE STUDENTS, AND MENTIONED WIRANTO'S RECENT STATEMENTS WHICH, HE CLAIMED, WERE SUPPORTIVE OF STUDENTS. A LARGE BANNER PUT UP ON THE FENCE IN THE MAIN ROAD OUTSIDE THE DPR READ, "DOWN WITH SOEHARTO, DOWN WITH PRICES." MANY STUDENTS WERE CARRYING SMALL WHITE FLAGS READING "PEACEFUL REFORMATION." THERE WERE ABOUT 1000 STUDENTS INSIDE THE COMPLEX. THE STUDENT REPRESENTATIVES WERE MET BY HARRY SABARNO OF THE ABRI FRACTION, WHO RECEIVED THEIR STATEMENT DEMANDING SOEHARTO IMMEDIATELY STEP DOWN AND

DEMANDING A SPECIAL MPR, BUT DID NOT MAKE A STATEMENT. AS OF 1400, NEGOTIATIONS WERE ONGOING TO MEET WITH OTHER REPRESENTATIVES AND STUDENTS WERE STILL ARRIVING AT THE DPR. AS OF 1530, STUDENTS WERE NEGOTIATING FOR PERMISSION TO REMAIN ON THE COMPLEX AND SET UP TENTS. IF THE ANSWER WAS NO, THEY WANTED THE MILITARY TO SECURE THEIR RETURN TO CAMPUSES.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0259

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0259

PAGE 01 JAKART 02776 02 OF 04 181100Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W

----------3F02E1 181255Z /38

O 181057Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1609
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0709

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 002776

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/17)

EVACUATIONS
---

6. (U) THE EMBASSY CRISIS CENTER PHONE BANK IS RECEIVING THREE TO FIVE CALLS PER MINUTE, FROM THE AMCIT COMMUNITY IN INDONESIA.

7. (C) THE FRENCH ARE EVACUATING PART OF THEIR EMBASSY TODAY. OVER THE WEEKEND, SIX C-130'S ARE PRE-POSITIONED IN SINGAPORE FOR USE BY THE JAPANESE. ONE HERCULES PLANE IS PRE-POSITIONED IN SINGAPORE FOR USE BY THE SOUTH KOREANS.

8. (U) A FINNAIR EVACUATION FLIGHT WITH AMCITS WILL LEAVE FOR SINGAPORE TODAY. SINGAPORE AIR HAS ADDED FLIGHTS (TWO ON MAY 17) AND REPORT THEY WILL TAKE ALL OR MOST PASSENGERS. PASSENGERS MUST MAKE ALL ARRANGEMENTS AT THE AIRPORT (NOT BY PHONE).

9. (U) THE CHARTER FOR SURABAYA IS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE LATE MAY 18. REPORTS FROM BALI INDICATE THAT MANY FOREIGNERS ARE GOING TO BALI WITH THE EXPECTATION THAT THAT ISLAND WILL BE SPARED VIOLENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEBATE OVER SOEHARTO'S INTENTIONS

---

10. (U) AMIEN RAIS SPOKE AT A COMMISSION SESSION AT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE MORNING OF MAY 18. ACCORDING TO A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FROM THE GOLKAR FACTION WHO WAS THERE, HE REPEATED HIS CALL FOR SOEHARTO TO STEP DOWN AND THAT AT MOST SOEHARTO HAD WEEKS LEFT.

11. (C) THE PARLIAMENTARIAN TOLD POLOFFS THAT MOST OF THE MEMBERS AT THE COMMITTEE MEETING AGREED WITH RAIS'S BASIC POINT, BUT BELIEVED THAT TIME WAS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO CREATE INSTITUTIONS AND RULES TO INSURE A SMOOTH TRANSITION. THE LEGISLATOR ALSO REITERATED THE REPORTS THAT SOEHARTO WAS PREPARING TO RE-ESTABLISH THE INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCY KOPKAMTIP, THOUGH PERHAPS UNDER A DIFFERENT NAME, AND CONTENDED THAT SOEHARTO WOULD NOT BE PLANNING TO STEP DOWN IF HE WAS RESHUFFLING HIS CABINET AND CREATING THIS NEW SECURITY MECHANISM. THE PARLIAMENTARIAN SPECULATED THAT SOEHARTO MIGHT BE PLANNING TO BAN RALLIES AND DEMONSTRATIONS, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE CRUCIAL QUESTION WAS WHETHER HE COULD SUCCEED IF HE CHOSE TO GO THAT ROUTE.

12. (C) NEVERTHELESS, [redacted] HAS SHARED WITH US B1
A REPORT THAT CLAIMS THAT SOEHARTO HAS ALREADY AGREED TO RESIGN AND THAT AS OF MID-DAY MAY 18, DISCUSSIONS WERE FOCUSSED ON CREATING A TRANSITION MECHANISM ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND CONFIRMATION FOR THIS REPORT WHICH [redacted] [redacted] BELIEVE IS PROBABLY TRUE.

PARSING THE ABRI ATTITUDE

CONFIDENTIAL

13. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT HE MET WITH WIRANTO ON MAY 17. (NOTE: WE HAVE HAD OTHER INDICATIONS THAT NU HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH WIRANTO. END NOTE) HE SAID HE TOLD WIRANTO THAT STUDENTS WANT HIM TO STAND BEHIND THE PEOPLE AND TO SUPPORT THEIR DEMANDS FOR SOEHARTO TO STEP DOWN. HE SAYS THAT WIRANTO ANSWERED THAT HE WAS NOT CONFIDENT THAT IF HE SUPPORTED EFFORTS TO PUSH SOEHARTO OUT, AND IF HE HIMSELF TOOK POWER, THAT THE SITUATION WOULD IMPROVE. THIS CONTACT [redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT THEY THINK THAT IN THE CHOICE BETWEEN SUPPORTING THE PEOPLE OR THE PRESIDENT, WIRANTO IS LEANING TOWARDS THE PRESIDENT BUT HIS FINAL POSITION IS NOT YET CLEAR. BOTH SAID HE WOULD BE PUT IN CHARGE OF THE NEW VERSION OF KOPKAMTIP. B1

ATMOSPHERICS

14. (U) THERE ARE LONG LINES AT BANKS ALL AROUND JAKARTA, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH WERE HIT IN RIOTS. PRICES HAVE JUMPED CONSIDERABLY SINCE THE RIOTING WITH PRICES FOR KEY PRODUCTS FOR THE POOR ESPECIALLY MORE EXPENSIVE. COOKING OIL IS 8000 PER LITER (5/7 PRICE 5,000), EGGS 7000 PER KG (5/7 PRICE 5,200), RICE: LOW QUALITY, 2000 PER KILO (5/7 PRICE 1200), AND TEMPE 2500

PAGE 01 JAKART 02776 03 OF 04 181329Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/035W

----------3F1384 181329Z /54

O 181057Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1610
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0710
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 002776

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02776 03 OF 04 181329Z

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/17)

PER PIECE (5/7 PRICE 1000).

OUTSIDE JAKARTA
---

15. (C) UJUNGPANDANG: A CANADIAN UN EMPLOYEE IN UJUNGPANDANG TOLD US THAT EXPATS WERE TRYING TO GET OUT OF TOWN BEFORE MAY 20, WHEN A MASSIVE DEMONSTRATION WAS PLANNED. HE SAID SEIMENS HAD CHARTERED A PLANE TO GET ITS PEOPLE OUT, AND ALL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WERE SENDING PEOPLE OUT. ON MAY 20, ALL LOCAL UNIVERSITIES, HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS, WORKERS UNIONS INCLUDING FISHERMEN AND STEVEDORES, AND OTHERS WOULD GATHER AT A CENTRAL PARK FOR A RALLY. MANY PEOPLE THERE FEAR THAT WHEN GROUPS HEAD INTO TOWN AFTER THE RALLY, RIOTS COULD ERUPT. THE NEW MILITARY COMMANDER ARRIVED ON MAY 15, AND IT IS NOT CLEAR IF HE WILL BE AS ACCOMMODATING TO STUDENTS AS THE PREVIOUS COMMANDER, GUMALAR (SEEN AS A WIRANTO MAN).

16. (U) MEDAN: STUDENTS IN MEDAN HELD A DEMONSTRATION OF ABOUT 500 PEOPLE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH SUMATRA. AS OF 1530, THEY WERE BEGINNING TO BURN TIRES IN THE ROAD OUTSIDE THE GATE. THE MILITARY COMMANDER HAS SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE KNOWS ABOUT PLANS FOR MAY 20 AND HE IS READY TO KEEP MEDAN SECURE. ONE NGO SOURCE

IN MEDAN SAID HE SAW A LOCAL GOLKAR AFFILIATED YOUTH GROUP (IPK, MOST KNOWN AS PREMAN, HOOLIGANS AND EXTORTIONISTS) BEING TRAINED BY THE MILITARY. OUR MEDAN FSN SAID THAT LOCAL GOLKAR AFFILIATED YOUTH GROUPS INCLUDING IPK AND PEMUDA PANCASILA WERE USED DURING THE RIOTS AS SECURITY GUARDS. 52 NGO'S WERE PLANNING TO MEET ON MAY 19 TO DISCUSS STRATEGY FOR MAY 20, WHEN THEY WOULD JOIN THE STUDENTS ON A LONG MARCH TO THE MEDAN FREEDOM FIELD.

17. (U) PADANG AND BANDA ACEH: 2000 STUDENTS IN PADANG HAVE REPORTEDLY TAKEN OVER THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING, WITH NO RESISTANCE FROM ABRI. AS OF 1600 MAY 18, UP TO 20,000 STUDENTS WERE HOLDING A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION AT THE DPR, ACCORDING TO A SOURCE IN BANDA ACEH.

ECONOMIC INDICATORS
---

18. (U) FOOD AVAILABILITY: ACCORDING TO INDONESIANS LIVING IN

VARIOUS PARTS OF JAKARTA, FOOD SUPPLIES IN STORES AND STALLS WERE ADEQUATE THROUGH THE WEEKEND. MANY STORES/STALLS WERE CLOSED, THEY SAID, ADDING THAT IT DIDN'T MATTER IF THE OWNER WERE CHINESE-INDONESIAN OR PRIBUMI -- THEY DIDN'T OPEN BECAUSE THEY WERE AFRAID. THROUGH THE WEEKEND, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO FIND COOKING OIL, VEGETABLES, AND MILK IN SCATTERED LOCATIONS; RICE WAS GENERALLY AVAILABLE ACCORDING TO THOSE WE POLLED. CONTACTS WHO HAD BOUGHT BASIC FOODSTUFFS OVER THE WEEKEND IN MARKETS IN EAST, SOUTH, WEST, AND CENTRAL JAKARTA INDICATED THAT FOOD PRICES THROUGH THE WEEKEND REMAIN AT LAST WEEK'S HIGH LEVELS, BUT THEY REPORTED NO PRICE SPIKES. POLOFFS NOTED SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER PRICES IN SOME AIR MARKETS HE VISITED LATE ON SUNDAY, MAY 17.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

19. (U) ON MONDAY, MAY 18, GROCERY STORES WERE SEVERELY CROWDED, BUT BASIC FOODSTUFFS WERE AVAILABLE. BABY FORMULA/POWDERED MILK APPEARED TO BE SCARCE.

20. (U) OUR MINI-POLL INDICATED THAT FOODSTUFFS WERE AVAILABLE IN MARKETS AND STALLS AT WHICH OUR CONTACTS HAD SHOPPED AND THAT PRICES HAD NOT RISEN ON MONDAY, MAY 18. WE WILL CONTINUE TO TRACK FOOD AVAILABILITY AND PRICES. WE DO NOT KNOW IF TODAY'S HEAVY SHOPPING WAS PANIC BUYING. IF IT WAS OR IF IT BEGINS, THE VOLUMES WILL OVERWHELM NORMAL DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS AND SHORTAGES AND PRICE GOUGING WILL SURELY EMERGE. MORE BASICALLY, WE ARE TRYING TO ASCERTAIN IF DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS ARE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY ENOUGH TO GET BASIC COMMODITIES TO THE RETAIL LEVEL.

21. (U) ATM'S: THERE WERE LONG LINES AT ATM MACHINES. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE OBSERVED ENSURING THAT PEOPLE STAYED IN ORDERLY LINES AND MAINTAINING ORDER WHEN THE CASH IN THE MACHINE RAN OUT.

22. (U) BANKS: BANKS REPORTED HEAVY CASH WITHDRAWALS STARTING AT OOB. CUSTOMERS WERE WITHDRAWING BOTH DOLLARS AND RUPIAH. ONE U.S. BANK REPORTED THAT BANK INDONESIA HAD PLACED A USD 100,000 DAILY LIMIT ON THE AMOUNT OF CASH DOLLARS A BANK COULD BUY FROM THE CENTRAL BANK. ANOTHER CONFIRMED THAT DOLLARS WERE IN SHORT SUPPLY. BANKS REPORTED THAT BANK INDONESIA HAD BEEN SLOW PROVIDING CASH RUPIAH. BANK DANAMON REPORTED THAT CUSTOMER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9999

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9999

PAGE 01 JAKART 02776 04 OF 04 181101Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W		

----------3F02FC 181116Z /38

O 181057Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1611
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0711
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 02776

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02776 04 OF 04 181101Z

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: INDONESIA SITUATION REPORT (5/17)

BUSINESS WAS FAIRLY NORMAL. A DANAMON BANK EMPLOYEE TOLD US THAT THE BANK HAD CLOSED AT 2:00 "IN ANTICIPATION" (OF TROUBLE IN THE CITY). BANK CENTRAL ASIA, OWNED BY LIEM SIOE LIONG (SUDONO SALIM) AND TWO OF SOEHARTO'S CHILDREN, WAS RUSHED TODAY, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL SOURCES.

23. (U) FUEL SUPPLIES: STATE-OWNED OIL COMPANY PERTAMINA TOLD US TODAY THAT FUEL SUPPLIES IN REFINERIES AND IN PERTAMINA DEPOTS AROUND THE COUNTRY WERE ADEQUATE FOR A MONTH. PREMIUM GASOLINE AND KEROSENE SUPPLIES ARE SUFFICIENT FOR 35 DAYS, PERTAMINA SAID. PERTAMINA CONFIRMED NEWSPAPER REPORTS THAT IT PLANS TO IMPORT MORE PRODUCT, INCLUDING HIGH OCTANE MOTOR GASOLINE COMPONENT (THIS PRODUCT'S IMPORT REQUIRED BECAUSE OF CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH THE BALONGAN REFINERY).

24. (U) BUSINESS: MANY BUSINESSES REOPENED ON MONDAY. HOWEVER, BY EARLY AFTERNOON, WE HAD RECEIVED SEVERAL REPORTS THAT EMPLOYEES HAD BEEN SENT HOME. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES WERE LEAVING THEIR OFFICES EARLY AS WELL AS INDIVIDUALS' SECURITY CONCERNS MOUNTED. MANY FIRMS ARE CONSIDERING CLOSING ON WEDNESDAY, MAY 20.

CONFIDENTIAL

25. (U) EXCHANGE RATE: BANKERS COMMENTED THAT THE RUPIAH DROPPED AT OOB TO THE 12,00-13,000 RANGE AND STAYED THERE MOST OF THE DAY IN VERY LIGHT TRADING. REUTERS AND TELETRAC REPORT THAT THE RUPIAH WAS TRADING AT ABOUT 12,500 AT COB. THE MARKET WAS VERY THIN AND DID NOT REFLECT THE COST ON THE STREET. DOLLARS FROM AUTHORIZED MONEY CHANGERS STARTED IN THE MID-15,000'S.

26. (U) STOCK MARKET: THE JSX CLOSED DOWN 4.2 PERCENT (17 POINTS) TO 388.9, ITS FIRST TIME BELOW 400 IN MONTHS.
ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3768

PAGE 01 JAKART 02797 01 OF 02 191329Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W	

----------3F84A9 191329Z /38

O 191329Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1634
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0717
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002797

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02797 01 OF 02 191329Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 18 MAY 2022
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/17/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: STUDENT MOMENTUM GROWS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: OVER TEN THOUSAND STUDENTS JOINED A PEACEFUL AND EXUBERANT DEMONSTRATION ON JAKARTA'S PARLIAMENT COMPLEX ON MAY 19, CALLING ON SOEHARTO TO IMMEDIATELY STEP DOWN. DEMONSTRATIONS FOR MAY 20 HAVE NOT BEEN CANCELED IN THE WAKE OF SOEHARTO'S MAY 19 STATEMENT, BUT STUDENTS ARE REVIEWING PLANS CAREFULLY IN THE FACE OF A POSSIBLY SEVERE MILITARY RESPONSE. END SUMMARY

STUDENTS AT PARLIAMENT
---

3. (C) ABOUT 100 STUDENTS SPENT THE NIGHT CAMPED OUT AT PARLIAMENT MAY 18. STUDENTS FROM UP TO 35 JAKARTA CAMPUSES BEGAN TO ARRIVE IN THE MORNING OF MAY 19 AND BUSES CONTINUED TO ENTER THE COMPLEX THROUGH THE DAY. BUSES FROM ONE UNIVERSITY OUTSIDE JAKARTA, IKIP BANDUNG, ALSO ENTERED. 15 RETIRED GENERALS FROM THE GENERATION OF 1945 RETURNED TO PARLIAMENT FOR A SECOND DAY. BY 1400, AT LEAST 10,000 STUDENTS HAD ENTERED THE DPR COMPLEX. THEY FILLED THE LOBBY WITH CHANTING AND SOME WERE ON THE ROOF WITH BANNERS. THE CLEAR THEME OF THE DEMONSTRATION WAS FOR SOEHARTO TO STEP DOWN IMMEDIATELY. SOME BANNERS AND CHANTS CALLED FOR SOEHARTO TO BE TRIED IN COURT, A THEME THAT HAS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02797 01 OF 02 191329Z

EMERGED RECENTLY. MANY OF THE STUDENTS WE SPOKE TO SAID THAT THEY AND THE OTHER STUDENTS INTENDED TO CAMP OUT AT THE DPR UNTIL SOEHARTO STEPS DOWN. A GROUP OF NGO'S IN JAKARTA IS COLLECTING DONATIONS TO FEED THE STUDENTS. THEY ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE 65,000 STUDENTS IN JAKARTA WHO NEED SUPPORT.

PEMUDA PANCASILA AT PARLIAMENT
---

4. (C) [redacted] REPORTED FROM A HOTEL NEAR B1

PARLIAMENT THAT HE WATCHED A LARGE GROUP OF PEMUDA PANCASILA "YOUTH" IN ORANGE CAMOUFLAGE FORMING UP IN THE STADIUM. (NOTE: PEMUDA PANCASILA IS A MASS ORGANIZATION AFFILIATED WITH GOLKAR AND KNOWN FOR THUGGISH BEHAVIOR. END NOTE). HE SAID IT LOOKED LIKE THEY WERE BEING ORGANIZED BY MILITARY PERSONNEL. (NOTE: IN MEDAN, MEMBERS OF IPK (A LOCAL GOLKAR YOUTH GROUP KNOWN FOR EXTORTION ACTIVITIES IN THE CITY) WERE BEING TRAINED BY THE MILITARY TO SECURE DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS, ACCORDING TO AN NGO SOURCE THERE. END NOTE). WHEN POLOFFS ARRIVED AT THE DPR, THERE WERE SEVERAL HUNDRED MEMBERS OF PEMUDA PANCASILA HOLDING A COUNTER DEMONSTRATION. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS TENSE AS STUDENTS ASSUMED THE GROUP HAD COME TO START A FIGHT. THE PEMUDA PANCASILA WERE CLEARLY OUTNUMBERED AND EVENTUALLY RETREATED AND LEFT. LATER IN THE DAY, POLOFFS WITNESSED STUDENTS CHECKING ID'S OF PEOPLE ENTERING THE GATE, PRESUMABLY TO PREVENT PROVOCATEURS FROM ENTERING.

REACTION TO WIRANTO'S AND SOEHARTO'S STATEMENTS

5. (C) STUDENTS ARE INCREASINGLY WORRIED ABOUT THEIR SECURITY IN THE WAKE OF ABRI COMMANDER WIRANTO'S MAY 18 STATEMENT THAT IMPLIED THAT THEIR MAY 20 ACTIONS WOULD BE STOPPED. HE DID NOT

DIRECTLY MENTION STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS BUT SAID THAT CERTAIN PEOPLE WERE TRYING TO PROVOKE OTHERS TO MASS ON MAY 20, WHICH COULD LEAD TO ANARCHY. ABRI WOULD NOT ALLOW THIS. ON TUESDAY, STUDENTS HELD DISCUSSIONS THROUGHOUT INDONESIA TO DECIDE HOW TO PROCEED ON MAY 20. MANY EMPHASIZED THAT THEY DO NOT WANT VIOLENCE. SOME STUDENT CONTACTS HAVE TOLD US THAT PLANS FOR MAY 20 CANNOT BE CALLED OFF, AND THAT THE STUDENTS WOULD CONTINUE WITH THEIR PROTESTS. HOWEVER, THEY ARE CLEARLY AWARE THAT GREATER REPRESSION IS IMMINENT, AND THIS MAY CONVINCE SOME NOT TO MOVE TO THE STREETS ON MAY 20.

MASS STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS

6. (C) [redacted] WHO HAS BEEN SUPPORTING DEMONSTRATIONS, SAID THAT HE AGREES WITH GUS DUR'S MAY 19 STATEMENT, AND, ECHOING WHAT WE HEARD FROM [redacted] BELIEVES THAT AN IMMEDIATE TRANSITION WOULD BE DANGEROUS BECAUSE HABIBIE WOULD BECOME

B1

PRESIDENT AND HE COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE PEOPLE. HIS ORGANIZATION IS TRYING TO CALL BACK THEIR PEOPLE, TELLING THEM TO BE SILENT TOMORROW, ANTICIPATING DISASTER IF STUDENTS TAKE TO THE STREETS TO BE MET WITH REPRESSIVE MILITARY MEASURES.

7. (C) LEADERS OF THE [redacted] WERE B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ3770

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3770

PAGE 01 JAKART 02797 02 OF 02 191329Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W		

----------3F84B3 191329Z /38

O 191329Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1635
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0718

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002797

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/17/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: STUDENT MOMENTUM GROWS

HOLDING A MEETING THE EVENING OF MAY 19 TO DISCUSS THE DAY'S DEVELOPMENTS. [redacted] TOLD POLOFF EARLIER AT THE DPR THAT ON MAY 20 STUDENTS WOULD GO EITHER TO THE NATIONAL MONUMENT (MONAS) WITH AMIEN RAIS OR TO THE DPR. LEADERS OF THE [redacted] SAID THAT WHAT SOEHARTO HAS SAID COMES TOO LATE AND THAT STUDENTS DO NOT BELIEVE HIM. THEY SAY SOEHARTO IS NOW TRYING TO USE THE TRADITIONALIST MUSLIMS (IE. GUS DUR) TO COUNTER THE MODERNISTS (IE. AMIEN RAIS). THEY THINK SOEHARTO SHOULD LEAVE INDONESIA IMMEDIATELY TO PRESERVE THE NATION. B1

OUTSIDE JAKARTA
---

8. (C) STUDENTS FROM OTHER CITIES ARE ON THEIR WAY TO JAKARTA, AND THOSE REMAINING IN CITIES OUTSIDE JAKARTA PLAN TO GATHER IN SPECIFIC LOCATIONS, SOME ON CAMPUSES. STUDENTS IN PADANG, WEST SUMATRA ARE PLANNING A MASS RALLY AT ANDALAS UNIVERSITY ON MAY 20, WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT LEAVE CAMPUS. STUDENTS THERE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT PLANS BY A "CERTAIN GROUP" TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF

THE DEMONSTRATION TO RUIN THE STUDENT IMAGE. LOCAL PEOPLE WERE REPORTEDLY COLLECTING FOOD AND DONATIONS FOR THE STUDENTS IN PADANG. STUDENTS IN SOLO, CENTRAL JAVA ARE WORRIED ABOUT MAY 20
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02797 02 OF 02 191329Z
BECAUSE OF THE THREAT OF A STRONG MILITARY RESPONSE TO DEMONSTRATIONS. ONE STUDENT LEADER SAID THAT THEY NO LONGER FEEL SECURE ON CAMPUS, AND THE MILITARY PRESENCE NEAR CAMPUS HAS BEEN INCREASING IN RECENT DAYS. STUDENTS IN BOGOR, WEST JAVA ARE HOLDING DISCUSSIONS TO DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE MAY 20. THEY WORRY THAT MANY PEOPLE COULD DIE IF THE MILITARY CRACKS DOWN. THEY MAY OR MAY NOT TAKE THEIR DEMONSTRATION TO THE STREETS.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2023

PAGE 01 SINGAP 02222 212309Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00	/020W			

----------40B998 212309Z /38

O 212305Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1700
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SINGAPORE 002222

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/21/08
TAGS: PREL, IN
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: [redacted] IN SINGAPORE, DISCUSS INDONESIA SITUATION B1

(U) CLASSIFIED BY ECONOMIC/POLITICAL COUNSELOR WILLIAM T. MONROE.
REASON: 1.5 (D)

1. (C) SUMMARY. [redacted] WAITING IN SINGAPORE TO SEE HOW EVENTS UNFOLD IN INDONESIA, IN A MAY 21 DISCUSSION WITH THE AMBASSADOR HAD HIGH PRAISE FOR GEN. WIRANTO, WHOM THEY CALLED A STABILIZING FACTOR. THEY SUGGESTED THAT A "DREAM TEAM" FOR B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SINGAP 02222 212309Z
INDONESIA WOULD BE A WIRANTO/EMIL SALIM COMBINATION. THEY SPOKE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

BITTERLY OF GEN. PRABOWO, SAYING HE HAD BEEN PREPARED TO LAUNCH A TIANANMEN-TYPE MASSACRE. THEY THOUGHT HABIBIE MIGHT STAY ON A FEW MONTHS. COMMENDING THE BRAVERY OF AMIEN RAIS, THEY THOUGHT RAIS "SHOULD BE ON THE TEAM." [redacted] SAID THAT HE WAS SHOCKED AT EXTENT OF THE RIOTING (WORSE THAN IN 1966). THE ETHNIC CHINESE WHO HAVE FLED TO SINGAPORE WILL SEE IF OVER THE NEXT ONE TO TWO WEEKS THE SITUATION STABILIZE AND WATCH WHAT HABIBIE DOES BEFORE RETURNING. END SUMMARY. B1

2. (C) [redacted] AND MET LATE ON THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 21 WITH THE AMBASSADOR. THE MEETING WAS BROKERED BY [redacted] ECON/POL COUNSELOR ALSO PARTICIPATED. B1

3. (C) [redacted] TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE HAD COME TO SINGAPORE FROM JAKARTA LAST WEEK AFTER BEING WARNED AT 10:00 PM ON MAY 14 BY [redacted] ESTIMATED THAT 10-20,000 ETHNIC CHINESE HAD FLED INDONESIA, MANY OF THEM WAITING AND WATCHING IN SINGAPORE.

4. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THE EXTENT OF THE RIOTING IN JAKARTA. SO MANY CHINESE HAD EVERYTHING THEY OWNED DESTROYED OR LOOTED. HE SAID THAT THE RIOTING WAS MUCH WORSE THAN IN 1966, IN PART BECAUSE THE CHINESE THEN DID NOT HAVE AS MUCH AS THEY DID NOW.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. (C) [redacted] WHO HAVE BEEN IN REGULAR PHONE CONTACT WITH JAKARTA, HAD HIGH PRAISE FOR GEN. WIRANTO, WHOM THEY CALLED A STABILIZING FACTOR. THEY DESCRIBED HIS PERFORMANCE OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS AS "INCREDIBLE," NOTING THAT HE HAD STRESSED HIS LOYALTY TO SOEHARTO (AND "SAVED" SOEHARTO) WHILE MANAGING TO CONTROL THE VIOLENCE. [redacted] STATED THAT, ACCORDING TO HIS INFORMATION, ON THE EVENING OF MAY 20 WIRANTO ARRANGED FOR A SERIES OF GENERALS AND EX-VICE PRESIDENTS TO MEET WITH SOEHARTO TO CONVINCE HIM THAT IT WAS NOW TIME TO STEP DOWN. B1

6. (C) THEY SPOKE BITTERLY OF GEN. PRABOWO. THEY SAID THAT THE DAY BEFORE THE PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 20, PRABOWO HAD WARNED AMIEN RAIS AGAINST DEMONSTRATING, SAYING THAT HE DID NOT CARE IF THERE WAS A BLOODBATH LIKE THAT AT TIANANMEN SQUARE. [redacted] B1 SUGGESTED THAT ETHNIC CHINESE WILL BE WATCHING CLOSELY WHAT HAPPENS WITH PRABOWO IN DETERMINING WHEN THEY MIGHT RETURN TO INDONESIA.

7. (C) ASKED WHAT THEIR BEST CASE SCENARIO FOR NEW LEADERSHIP WOULD BE, [redacted] SAID THAT HIS "DREAM TEAM" WOULD BE SOME KIND OF GEN. WIRANTO/EMIL SALIM COMBINATION. THEIR WORST CASE: HABIBIE STAYS ON AND LINKS WITH PRABOWO. ASKED IF THEY THOUGHT THEIR WORST CASE SCENARIO WAS A POSSIBILITY, THEY REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT IMPOSSIBLE. MORE PROBABLE, THEY THOUGHT, WAS THAT HABIBIE WOULD STAY ON FOR A FEW MONTHS. [redacted] SUGGESTED THAT THE ARMY WOULD BACK HIM FOR AT LEAST A FEW DAYS, NOT OUT OF SUPPORT FOR HABIBIE, WHOM THE ARMY DOES NOT LIKE, BUT OUT OF RESIDUAL SUPPORT FOR SOEHARTO, WHO HAD ASKED THE ARMY TO SUPPORT HABIBIE. THERE WERE TWO SCENARIOS FOR REPLACING HABIBIE, THEY SAID. ONE WAS THROUGH A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE DPR. THE OTHER WAS THROUGH A GENERAL ELECTION, WHICH COULD TAKE AS LONG AS A YEAR TO ARRANGE.

CONFIDENTIAL

8. (C) [redacted] NOTED THAT INDONESIAN ECONOMISTS HATED BOTH B1 HABIBIE AND AMIEN RAIS, BUT [redacted] THOUGHT THAT RAIS "SHOULD BE ON THE TEAM." HE SAID THAT ONE CANNOT DENY THAT RAIS HAS BEEN BRAVE, STICKING HIS NECK OUT IN OPPOSITION TO SOEHARTO.

9. (C) [redacted] SPECULATED THAT MUCH OF SOEHARTO'S FAMILY MAY HAVE ALREADY FLED INDONESIA, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TUTUT AND BAMBANG. THEY ALSO WONDERED IF BOB HASAN HAD LEFT, NOTING THAT HE WAS CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT AMONG THE ECONOMIC MINISTERS TENDERING THEIR RESIGNATIONS. THEY SPECULATED THAT ONE WAY TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF ILL-GOTTEN FAMILY WEALTH MIGHT BE TO FOLLOW THE METHOD B1 USED AFTER SUKARNO AND SIMPLY NATIONALIZE WHAT IS IN INDONESIA.

10. (C) THEY SAID THAT THE ETHNIC CHINESE WHO HAVE FLED INDONESIA WILL WAIT TO SEE IF THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA STABILIZES. [redacted] SAID THAT THE CHINESE WILL WAIT ONE TO TWO WEEKS TO SEE WHAT HABIBIE DOES, ALTHOUGH THEY FELT THAT THEY COULD NOT BE SURE OF THEIR SECURITY AS LONG AS HABIBIE WAS PRESENT. BUT THEY CANNOT

STAY AWAY TOO LONG, BECAUSE THEY WILL LOSE THEIR FACTORIES IF THEY DO NOT RETURN. THEY THOUGHT THE MIDDLE RANK ETHNIC CHINESE WOULD GO BACK FIRST.

B1

GREEN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ2051

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2051

PAGE 01 JAKART 02841 01 OF 03 212326Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W			

----------40BB0A 212329Z /38

O 211126Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1670
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0728
USMISSION GENEVA
AEMBASSY TOKYO 1873
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002841

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02841 01 OF 03 212326Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFID01: REACTIONS TO SOEHARTO RESIGNATION

REF: JAKARTA 2807

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND STUDENTS QUICKLY MOVED BEYOND SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION TO DISCUSS HABIBIE'S ASSUMPTION OF THE PRESIDENCY AND THE DIFFICULT ISSUES THAT MUST NOW BE TACKLED. ONE INFLUENTIAL HABIBIE OPPONENT, THE MUSLIM LEADER ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, HELD HIS FIRE AND PUT OUT THE WORD THAT HABIBIE WAS A TRANSITIONAL FIGURE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO HIS ORGANIZATION, AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT. AMIEN RAIS, MAJOR ISLAMIC ACTIVIST AND SOMETIME HABIBIE SUPPORTER, BACKED HABIBIE, PROVIDED HE FORMED AN ACCEPTABLE CABINET. MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI WAS NOT HEARD FROM BY DAY'S END BUT REPORTEDLY TOLD AIDES SHE FEARED THAT HABIBIE MIGHT "PLAY THE ISLAMIC CARD" IN AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE WHAT IS NOW A NON-EXISTENT POWER BASE. AS FOR THE STUDENTS, WHO WERE THE DRIVING FORCE IN PRESSURING SOEHARTO TO STEP DOWN, INITIAL INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE DEMONSTRATIONS WILL CONTINUE, IN EFFORTS TO KEEP UP PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT AND FOR A HABIBIE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02841 01 OF 03 212326Z
RESIGNATION AS WELL. HQWEVER, BECAUSE SOME ARE WILLING TO GIVE HABIBQE A CHANCE, THEY WILL NOT BE AS LARGE AS THOSE IN RECENT DAYS. THE MANEUVERING WITHIN THE LITE THAT ENDED SOEHARTO'S REIGN AND ALLOWED ABIBIE TO ASSUME OFFICE REMAINS MURKY. THOUGH THE GOLKAR FACTION IN PARLIAMENT VOTED TO ASK SOEHARTO TO STEP DOWN, THE PARTY OVERALL IS FAR FROM UNITED BEHIND HABIBIE. DEMOCRATIC ACTIVISTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN FORMULATING PLANS FOR BRINGING ABOUT FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL CHANGE. END SUMMARY

MASS ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND OPPOSITION FIGURES

3. (C) ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, THE LEADER OF INDONESIA'S LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION, NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU), HAS INDICATED THAT HE COULD ACCEPT HABIBIE AS A TRANSITIONAL FIGURE. ONE OF WAHID'S TOP POLITICAL ADVISORS IN NU TOLD POLOFF THAT NU CONSIDERS THIS A TRANSITION PERIOD, AND WILL INSIST THAT REAL REFORM BE CARRIED OUT. AMCONSUL SURABAYA HAS HEARD FROM LOCAL NU CONTACTS THAT THEY ACCEPT THEIR ORGANIZATION'S POSITION THAT PHASE ONE OF A LONGER PROCESS HAS BEGUN. WAHID AND NU LEADERS EARLIER THIS WEEK BACKED SOEHARTO'S GRADUAL REFORM PLAN BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED IT WOULD ALLOW A PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION THAT WOULD NOT LEAD TO NU OPPONENT HABIBIE TAKING POWER.

4. (C) AMCONSUL SURABAYA WAS TOLD BY A MADURESE KIAI CONTACT THAT HE HAD RECEIVED GUIDANCE FROM EAST JAVA NU THAT, ACCORDING TO THE WISHES OF ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, NU ULAMA (RELIGIOUS LEADERS) FOR THE INTERIM SHOULD ACCEPT HABIBIE. THE NU HAD TO DO THIS, HE SAID, TO GUARD AGAINST DISSENSION WITHIN THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY. THIS SURABAYA CONTACT ADDED THAT THE SITUATION NEEDED TO COOL OFF, BUT LATER A SPECIAL SESSION TO REPLACE HABIBIE WOULD BE DEMANDED. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, EAST JAVA GOVERNOR BASOFI HAD TELEPHONED A

CONFIDENTIAL

SENIOR NU KIAI IN MADURA AND ASKED THE KIAIS TO ENDORSE HABIBIE.

5. (C) AMCONSUL SURABAYA ALSO CONTACTED [redacted] HAD JUST PRIOR TO SUHARTO'S ANNOUNCEMENT B1
MADE KNOWN TO US HIS VIEW THAT A HABIBIE PRESIDENCY WOULD BE
DISASTROUS FOR THE COUNTRY.) [redacted] HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY B1
GOVERNOR BASOFI. HE READ TO US A DRAFT STATEMENT THAT EAST JAVA
NU WOULD SOON GET OUT. THE STATEMENT WELCOMED THE PEACEFUL
REPLACEMENT OF SUHARTO. IT SAID THAT THE NU WOULD HELP MAINTAIN
PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY AND URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE REFORMATION
SERIOUSLY. THE NU HOPED THAT REFORMISTS WOULD PRODUCE BETTER
RESULTS THAN SUHARTO AND CAUTIONED THAT THE MAIN ISSUE WAS NOT
ONE OF SIMPLY REPLACING A MAN BUT OF REPLACING A POLITICAL
STRUCTURE. THE STATEMENT ASSERTED THAT THE PEOPLE EXPECT
RESULTS. [redacted] UNDERLINED THAT HABIBIE'S NAME WAS NOT MENTIONED B1
AT ALL IN THE STATEMENT. HE SAID THAT THE STATEMENT WAS REALLY
DIRECTED TO HABIBIE WITH THE MESSAGE THAT "NU KIAIS WILL NOW SIT
BY THE SIDE AND WATCH YOUR EVERY MOVE." [redacted] HAS BEEN IN B1
CONSTANT CONSULTATION WITH KIAIS, AS WELL AS CHRISTIAN LEADERS

SINCE EARLY THIS MORNING--ALL VERY ALARMED.

6. (C) AMIEN RAIS, THE LEADER OF INDONESIA'S SECOND LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION, MUHAMMADIYAH, MADE A STATEMENT THIS MORNING IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION IN WHICH HE SAID, ACCORDING TO MEDIA REPORTS AND OUR SOURCE, THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE FORMATION OF A NEW CABINET. IF THE CABINET WAS FREE FROM COLLUSION, CORRUPTION AND NEPOTISM, HE WOULD SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT ON A PROVISIONAL BASIS UNTIL IT HELD NEW ELECTIONS IN SIX TO EIGHT MONTHS. RAIS HAS, UP UNTIL THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0239

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0239

PAGE 01 JAKART 02841 02 OF 03 211128Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	IM-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/034W			

----------40790B 211128Z /38

O 211126Z MAY 98 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1671
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0729
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002841

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: REACTIONS TO SOEHARTO RESIGNATION

REF: JAKARTA 2807

SELECTION OF A NEW CABINET MARCH 14, BEEN WILLING TO WORK WITH HABIBIE IN AN EFFORT TO GAIN MORE ISLAMIC INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT. BUT RAIS HAS HAD MULTIPLE AGENDAS AND HAS ALSO BEEN A STAUNCH CRITIC OF GOVERNMENT "CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND NEPOTISM," AND A MAJOR OPPOSITION FIGURE. HE APPEARED TO WALK A LINE BETWEEN THESE POSITIONS IN THE STATEMENT ISSUED TODAY.

7. MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI WAS MEETING WITH HER ADVISERS ON THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 21 AND NO READ-OUT WAS AVAILABLE BY COB.

STUDENT REACTIONS
---

8. (C) INDICATIONS ARE THAT STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS WILL CONTINUE IN ORDER TO KEEP UP PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT, BUT BECAUSE SOME STUDENTS ARE WILLING TO GIVE HABIBIE A CHANCE, THEY WILL NOT BE AS BIG AS THOSE OF RECENT DAYS. MANY STUDENTS IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES ARE NOT SATISFIED THAT A HABIBIE PRESIDENCY REPRESENTS THE TOTAL CHANGE THEY WERE DEMANDING. MANY CALL HABIBIE CORRUPT AND BELIEVE HE IS STILL ANSWERING TO SOEHARTO. A SIGNIFICANT PROPORTION OF STUDENTS ARE STILL CALLING FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR. HABIBIE HAS LONG BEEN SEEN BY MANY

STUDENT GROUPS AS REPRESENTING POLITICAL ISLAM, WHICH WORRIES STUDENTS FROM CHRISTIAN, NATIONALIST, AND NAHDLATUL ULAMA (TRADITIONAL MUSLIM) GROUPS. STUDENTS ARE DIVIDING ALONG POLITICAL ISLAMIC VS. NATIONALIST/CHRISTIAN LINES, WITH THE TRADITIONAL MUSLIMS UNDER NAHDLATUL ULAMA TAKING A CAUTIOUS POSITION THAT THEY WILL WATCH TO SEE HOW REFORMS ARE CARRIED OUT. ISLAMIC STUDENTS WILL NOT SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ON HABIBIE. THE ISLAMIC STUDENTS CLOSE TO ICMI MAY GO ALONG WITH THE HABIBIE PRESIDENCY. THOSE ISLAMIC STUDENTS WHO ARE MORE FOCUSED ON THE DEMOCRACY/REFORM AGENDA WILL CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR A SPECIAL SESSION BECAUSE THEY DO NOT SEE HABIBIE AS A DEPARTURE FROM THE STATUS QUO. ONE JAKARTA STUDENT LEADER SAID THAT DIVISIONS AMONG STUDENTS WERE EMERGING BECAUSE WHAT WAS A MORAL MOVEMENT WITH A UNIFIED POSITION HAS NOW BECOME POLITICAL, MORE COMPLEX AND SUBJECT TO SPECIAL INTERESTS.

NGO AND LABOR ACTIVISTS
---

9. (C) A PROMINENT HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST TOLD POLOFF THAT SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION WAS A GOOD FIRST STEP BUT THAT THE REFORM PROCESS WAS FAR FROM OVER. HABIBIE'S PRESIDENCY PRESENTED TWO PROBLEMS, HE BELIEVED. ON THE ONE HAND, IT WAS LIKELY THAT THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI) WERE THE REAL POWER BEHIND THE SCENES. ON THE OTHER, TO THE EXTENT THAT HABIBIE DID WIELD POWER (UNLIKELY IN OUR VIEW), HE COULD BE DIVISIVE AS IT WAS LIKELY THAT AN INCREASE IN ISLAMIC INFLUENCE WOULD BE PART OF HIS AGENDA.

10. (C) [redacted] INDONESIA, IS "GLAD" THAT SOEHARTO STEPPED DOWN. HE WAS IMMEDIATELY IN CONTACT WITH ABDURRAHMAN WAHID AND THEY AGREED THAT HABIBIE WAS ACCEPTABLE AS A TRANSITIONAL FIGURE. [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

WAS DISCUSSING TWO SCENARIOS FOR CARRYING OUT A REFORM PROCESS. THE FIRST WOULD INVOLVE HOLDING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THAT WOULD ESTABLISH THE OUTLINES OF REFORM MACHINERY, INCLUDING REVAMPING THE ELECTION LAWS SO THAT A NEW ELECTION COULD BE HELD. THE SECOND ENVISAGED HOLDING A "REFORM" SESSION OF THE MPR, MADE UP OF LEADING UNIVERSITY AND NGO FIGURES, TO ELECT A NEW PRESIDENT, AFTER WHICH WHOLESALE REFORM

WOULD BE CARRIED OUT.

ELITE ORGANIZATIONS
---

11. (C) THOUGH THE GOLKAR FACTION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AGREED TO ASK SOEHARTO TO WITHDRAW AND HAND OVER POWER TO HABIBIE, THE PARTY AS A WHOLE IS STILL DIVIDED BETWEEN FIGURES INCLUDING HABIBIE, HARMOKO, HARTONO AND GINANDJAR (WITH THE CLOUT OF THE PRESIDENT'S DAUGHTER TUTUT, PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT TO BE THE NEXT GOLKAR CHAIRMAN, EVAPORATING WITH HER FATHER'S RESIGNATION).

[redacted] B1

WITH GOLKAR, TOLD POLOFF THAT THERE WAS NO OTHER CHOICE BUT TO HOLD A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR. THE MPR SHOULD BE CONVENED IN ORDER TO HOLD ACCOUNTABLE BOTH SOEHARTO AND HABIBIE. KOSGORO IS AN IMPORTANT CIVILIAN COMPONENT IN THE GOLKAR CONSTELLATION THAT GREW INCREASINGLY CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT, DUE IN PART BECAUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0236

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0236

PAGE 01 JAKART 02841 03 OF 03 211127Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	FRB-00	HHS-01	H-01
	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00

T-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-04 G-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 /033W

----------4078E0 211127Z /38

O 211126Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1672
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AIT TAIPEI 0730
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002841

DEPARTMENT FOR TFIDO1

S/S-O OPERATIONS CENTER FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS WORKING GROUP

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/OMA/ AND INR/IL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2008
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, SCUL, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: TFIDO1: REACTIONS TO SOEHARTO RESIGNATION

REF: JAKARTA 2807

ITS ALLOCATION OF GOLKAR'S SEATS IN THE PARLIAMENT WAS VASTLY REDUCED IN THE LAST ELECTION. KOSGORO AND ITS LEADER WERE ALSO UNUSUALLY VOCAL IN OPPOSITION TO THE SELECTION OF HABIBIE AS VICE PRESIDENT JUST THREE MONTHS AGO.

13. (C) ADI SASONO, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS (ICMI), WHICH IS A HABIBIE POLITICAL BASE, APPEARED AT MUHAMMADIAYAH HEADQUARTERS WITH AMIEN RAIS

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH. HE ASSOCIATED HIMSELF IN CONDITIONALLY BACKING HABIBIE, DEPENDING ON THE QUALITY OF THE NEW CABINET. ACCORDING TO A SOURCE CLOSE TO HIM, SASONO WILL PROBABLY NOT GET THE POSITION THAT HE IS SEEKING IN THE CABINET, THE POWERFUL STATE SECRETARY JOB (COULD GO TO AKBAR TANJUNG), BUT INSTEAD WILL HAVE TO SETTLE FOR MINISTER OF COOPERATIVES. WE HAVE HEARD FROM [redacted] THAT HE AND SASONO, THOUGH STILL INFLUENTIAL, HAVE BEEN PUSHED OUT OF HABIBIE'S INNER CIRCLE BY PRESENT CABINET MEMBERS AKBAR TANJUNG AND TANRI ABENG. B1

14. (C) ANOTHER INFLUENTIAL MEMBER [redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT HE DID NOT SUPPORT THE POSITION

TAKEN BY SASONO AND RAIS, AND WANTED TO SEE HABIBIE SERVE UNTIL 2003, THE END OF SOEHARTO'S TERM. HE ARGUED, AS HAVE MANY OTHERS, THAT CALLING AN EARLY ELECION (OUTSIDE THE AEGIS OF AN MPR) WOULD BEUNCONSTITUTIONAL. HE WANTED TO SEE MORE GRADUAL REFORM OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, AND THEN HAVE A NEW ELECTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHANGED SYSTEM. MORE IMPORTANT, HE THOUGHT, INDONESIA NEEDED TO FOCUS ON PULLING ITSELF OUT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. [redacted] BELIEVED THAT HABIBIE MIGHT PICK VICE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE LT. GEN. SYARAWAN HAMID AS THE NEW VICE PRESIDENT, AND THAT THE SECULAR/NATIONALIST CAMP WOULD SOON BE COUNTERING HABIBIE'S RISE TO THE TOP WITH A TICKET LED BY FORMER VICE PRESIDENT GENERAL (RET.) TRY SUTRISNO AND FORMER GOVERNMENT MINISTER EMIL SALIM. B1

15. (C) A CIVILIAN ACADEMIC WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI) TOLD POLOFF THAT HABIBIE WOULD BE SUPPORTED NOW, EVEN WITHIN ABRI, FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REASONS. IT WAS THE MAXIMUM THAT THE SYSTEM COULD HANDLE, HE ARGUED. HE BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT HABIBIE'S CABINET WAS THE KEY, AND THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT WOULD BE POLITICALLY DEAD UNLESS HE CHOSE A GOOD LINEUP.

16. (C) A SENIOR MEGAWATI AIDE TOLD POLOFF (AND A GATHERING OF STUDENTS AT PARLIAMENT) ON MAY 21, THAT SOEHARTO ALONE COULD NOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF INDONESIA'S ECONOMY, CONTENDING THAT HABIBIE WAS ONE OF SOEHARTO'S MOST CORRUPT CRONIES AND SHARED IN THE BLAME. TO US, THE AIDE ALSO ARGUED THAT ANY ATTEMPT BY HABIBIE TO RETAIN POWER WITHOUT RESORTING TO

A FORMAL MPR SESSION WOULD AMOUNT TO PREEMPTING POPULAR WILL. HE ADDED, MOREOVER, THAT BY NOT ORGANIZING AN MPR TO OUST SOEHARTO, THE NATION HAD BEEN ROBBED OF ITS DEMAND FOR SOEHARTO'S OWN ACCOUNTABILITY FOR "KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCES AND ECONOMIC

COLLAPSE." THE AIDE ALSO CLAIMED THAT HE BELIEVED SOEHARTO SON-IN-LAW GENERAL PRABOWO WAS NOW ATTEMPTING TO ORGANIZE ISLAMIC SUPPORT AND EXPRESSED FEAR THAT HABIBIE WOULD BEGIN TO PLAY TO AN ISLAMIC AUDIENCE, NOTABLY ABOUT THE "RIGHT" OF ISLAMIC PEOPLES TO HAVE A SHARE OF THE NATIONAL WEALTH IN PROPORTION WITH THEIR NUMBERS. "WE WILL SEE THE RISE OF THE ULTRA RIGHT ISLAMICS IN INDONESIA," HE WARNED. THIS COULD BE THE BEGINNING OF RELIGIOUS POLITICS. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH RELIGIOUS POLITICS COULD EVOLVE OVER TIME, WE DO NOT BELIEVE HABIBIE ENJOYS THE KIND OF SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT AMONG MAJOR POWER GROUPS THAT WOULD ALLOW HIM TO PLAY THAT CARD SUCCESSFULLY AT THIS TIME. END COMMENT)
ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9747

PAGE 01 CANBER 01903 210801Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------406829 210801Z /38

O 210801Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0481
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USEU BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION GENEVA
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
SECDEF WASHDC
AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMCONSUL SYDNEY
AMCONSUL PERTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 001903

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 CANBER 01903 210801Z
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503180

PARIS FOR USOECD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/21/08
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, EFIN, PGOV, PINS, ID, AS
SUBJECT: TFID01: AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA: REACTION TO SOEHARTO RESIGNATION

REF: (A) CANBERRA 1865, (B) JAKARTA 2788 (NOTAL), (C) CANBERRA 1841, (D) CANBERRA 1830, (E) CANBERRA 1580, (F) CANBERRA 1563 (NOTAL), (G) CANBERRA 1478 (NOTAL)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL/C STEPHEN ENGELKEN. REASON 1.5 (B AND D).

2. (U) RESPONDING TO THE INDONESIAN PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION, PRIME MINISTER JOHN HOWARD WELCOMED ON MAY 21 THE ORDERLY AND PEACEFUL POLITICAL TRANSITION IN INDONESIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE CONTRIBUTION SOEHARTO MADE TO STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA AND COMMITTED THE GOA TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION AND ANY FUTURE GOI ADMINISTRATION. HOWARD HAD NO COMMENT ON A JOURNALIST'S QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER HABIBIE WOULD SERVE OUT SOEHARTO'S TERM, BUT DID SAY HE BELIEVES THE REFORM PROCESS SHOULD BE ADHERED TO AND ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONSTITUTION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS IS A DECISION OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE.

CONFIDENTIAL



B1

B1

[redacted]

5. (U) JAKARTA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

HOLMES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTO9578

PAGE 01 TOKYO 03905 220834Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04
	G-00	SAS-00	/019W				

----------40DACE 220834Z /38

O 220756Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9846
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 003905

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/03
TAGS: PREL, ID, JA
SUBJECT: TFID01: JAPANESE REACTION TO SOEHARTO RESIGNATION

CLASSIFIED BY: JAMES A. PIERCE, A/POLCOUNS, EMBASSY TOKYO.
REASON: 1.5(D).

1. (U) IN THE WAKE OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION, PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO TOLD REPORTERS MAY 21 THAT JAPAN WOULD SUPPORT INDONESIA'S NEW LEADERSHIP, BUT WOULD KEEP A CAREFUL WATCH ON INDONESIA'S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY. THE PRIME MINISTER PLEDGED TO MAINTAIN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 03905 220834Z
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 21 MAY 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 05 DEC 2006 200503180

B1



5. (U) JAKARTA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FOLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

The National Security Archive

The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000
Fax: 202/994-7005
nsarchiv@gwu.edu
www.nsarchive.org

Monday, August 01, 2005

Margaret P. Grafeld
Director
Office of IRM Programs and Services
A/RPS/IPS, SA-2
Department of State
Washington, DC 205226001

Re: Request under the FOIA, in reply refer to Archive# 20051137DOS359

Dear Ms. Grafeld :

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), I hereby request disclosure of the following documents for inspection and possible copying:

All documents from 1 January 1999 to 1 January 2000 relating in whole or in part to Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth's February 1999, April 1999, and July 1999 visits to Indonesia and East Timor. Please include, but not limit, your search to Roth's meetings with the following people during these visits:
-Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie
-Defense Minister and Armed Forces Chief Wiranto
-Foreign Minister Ali Alatas
-Megawati Sukarnoputri
-Xanana Gusmao (born Jose Alexandre Gusmao)

If you regard any of these documents as potentially exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements, I request that you nonetheless exercise your discretion to disclose them. As the FOIA requires, please release all reasonably segregable non exempt portions of documents. To permit me to reach an intelligent and informed decision whether or not to file an administrative appeal of any denied material, please describe any withheld records (or portions thereof) and explain the basis for your exemption claims.

As you know, the National Security Archive qualifies for a waiver of search and review fees as a representative of the news media. This request is made as part of a scholarly and news research project and not for commercial use. For details on the Archive's research and publication activities, please see our Web site at the address above. Please notify me before incurring in photocopying costs over $100.

To expedite the release of the requested documents, please disclose them on an interim basis as they become available to you, without waiting until all the documents have been processed. If you have any questions regarding the identity of the records, their location, the scope of the request or any other matters, please call me at (202) 994-7000. I look forward to receiving your response within the twenty day statutory time period.

20051137DOS359 DOS
RECNO:31696 SEQCOR:115657
FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Roth visits Indonesia and East Timor, 1999

Sincerely yours,

Brad Simpson

An independent non-governmental research institute and library located at the George Washington University, the Archive collects and publishes declassified documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Publication royalties and tax deductible

Thank you. Your request has been submitted.

This is a request filed under the Freedom of Information Act.

Return to FOIA Request Generator

Return to FOIA Home Page

Request Date: **8/1/2005**
Request Reference Number: B1394

The time period of my request is between 1/1/1999 and 1/1/2000

Description of request:
National Security Archive Number 20051137DOS359 All documents from 1 January 1999 to 1 January 2000 relating in whole or in part to Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth's February 1999, April 1999, and July 1999 visits to Indonesia and East Timor. Please include, but not limit, your search to Roth's meetings with the following people during these visits: -Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie -Defense Minister and Armed Forces Chief Wiranto - Foreign Minister Ali Alatas -Megawati Sukarnoputri -Xanana Gusmao (born Jose Alexandre Gusmao) Documents pertaining to this request include but are not limited to cables, reports, memoranda, and finished intelligence. Please search the U.S. embassy and consulates in Indonesia.

☐ For faster processing please restrict the parameters of this FOIA request to the State Archiving System (SAS)--over 25 million electronic records consisting of telegrams from mid-1973 to present.

I am willing to pay fees for this request up to a maximum of $100

In order to help to determine my status to assess fees, you should know that I am

◉ a representative of the news media affiliated with The National Security Archive and this request is made as part of a news gathering effort and not for commercial use.(Additional documentation or comments will be required. See

○ affiliated with an educational or noncommercial scientific institution, and this request is made for a scholarly or scientific purpose and not for commercial use.(Additional documentation will be required. See

○ an individual seeking information for personal use and not for commercial use.

○ affiliated with a private corporation and am seeking information for use in the company's business.

Additional Comments
National Security Archive Number 20051137DOS359

Thank you for your consideration of my request. Sincerely,
Brad Simpson.

E-mail Address:

nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Street Address:
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701, 2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20037

Telephone Number: **202-994-7000**
Fax Number: **202-994-7005**

Print

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 2, 2005
Case Number: 200503302

NSArchive Control Number: 20051137DOS359

Mr. Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Mr. Simpson:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated August 1, 2005, for copies of documents occurring between January 1, 1999 and January 1, 2000 concerning Secretary of State, Stanley Roth's February 1999, April 1999, and July 1999 visits to Indonesia and East Timor.

We will begin the processing of your request based upon the information provided in your letter. As soon as responsive material has been retrieved and reviewed, we will notify you.

We wish to advise you that the cut-off date for retrieving records is either the date you have given the Department by specifying a particular time frame or the date the search is initiated. Only existing records are subject to the Freedom of Information Act.
Please review the fee information provided below.

Office of Information Programs and Services
U.S. Department of State SA- 2
Washington, DC 20522-8100
Web site: foia.state.gov

Inquiries:
Phone: 1- 202- 261- 8314
FAX: 1- 202- 261- 8579
email: FOIAStatus@state.gov

20051137DOS359 DOS
RECNO:31696 SEQCOR:115791
8/8/2005 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Roth visits Indonesia and East Timor, 1999

Fee Information: The Freedom of Information Act requires agencies to access fees to recover the direct costs of processing requests, unless a fee waiver has been granted

Based upon the information that you have provided, this request will be processed in accordance with the fees schedule designated for the "representative of the news media" category of requesters (pays duplication costs after first 100 pages).

Copy costs are assessed at the rate of $0.15 per page.

You have stated your willingness to pay the fees incurred in the processing of this request up to $100.00.

We will notify you of the costs incurred in processing your request as soon as the search and review actions have been completed.

While we will make every effort to meet the time limits cited in the FOIA (5 USC § 552), unusual circumstances may arise for extending the time limit.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us. We can provide faster service if you include the case number of your request in your communications with us.

We are pleased to be of service to you.

Sincerely,

Michael Stewart, Jr.
Requester Communications Branch

Office of Information Programs and Services
U.S. Department of State SA- 2
Washington, DC 20522-8100
Web site: foia.state.gov

Inquiries:
Phone: 1- 202- 261- 8314
FAX: 1- 202- 261- 8579
email: FOIAStatus@state.gov

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No. 200503302 ER1

Mr. Brad Simpson
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037

JUL 17 2006

Dear Mr. Simpson:

I refer to your request of August 1, 2005, Archive File No. 20051137DOS359, for the release of information under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552). To retrieve those documents, we initiated a search of the following record systems under the control of the Department of State: the Central Foreign Policy Records (the Department's principal record system), and the retired files of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

The search of the records of the Central Foreign Policy Records has been completed, resulting in the retrieval of 34 documents that appear responsive to your request. These documents have been grouped together as segment number ER1. After reviewing them, we have determined that 17 may be released in full, six may be released with excisions, and 11 may not be released. All released documents are enclosed.

The material in the excised portions of six of the documents released in part and in nine of the documents withheld in full is currently and properly classified under Executive Order 12958 in the interest of national defense or foreign relations. As such, it is exempt from release under subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act.

Subsection (b)(5) of the Freedom of Information Act exempts from disclosure inter-agency or intra-agency communications containing deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work product information. The information in the excised portions of one of the documents released in part is exempt from release under exemption 5 because it consists of pre-decisional deliberative process material.

20051137DOS359 DOS
RECNO:31696 SEQCOR:122970
7/20/2006 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Roth visits Indonesia and East Timor, 1999

The material in one of the documents released in part and one withheld in full is of such a nature that its release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. As such, it is exempt from release under subsection (b)(6) of the Freedom of Information Act.

In some cases, two or more exemptions may apply to the same document.

With respect to material we have withheld under the Freedom of Information Act, you have the right to appeal our determination within sixty days. Appeals should be addressed to: Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/ISS/IPS/PP/LC, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, D.C. 20522-8100. The letter of appeal should refer to the case and segment numbers shown above. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

In addition, the search of the retired files of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs remains in progress. Additional information will be provided as soon as it becomes available.

If you have any questions with respect to the processing of your request, you may write to: Office of Information Programs and Services, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, D.C. 20522-8100. You also may telephone (202) 261-8314. Please refer to the case and segment numbers shown above in all communications about this case.

Your continuing cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely,

for Margaret P. Grafeld
Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTO7244

PAGE 01 STATE 008200 150317Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

008200
SOURCE: KODAKA.015073
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:VEMURRAY/RCLARKE:VEM -- 01/14/99 7-L823
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------973CEA 150319Z /38
O 150314Z JAN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 008200

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/04
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 9

FOR A/DCM GONG FROM EAP/PIMBS

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS HARTWICK.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

1. (U) SOR AT DAVOS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 008200 150317Z

WE HOPE YOU'VE BEEN NOTIFIED FORMALLY THAT STANLEY ROTH, LIKE LARRY SUMMERS, HAS CANCELLED HIS TRIP TO INDONESIA. (IF NOT, CONSIDER IT DONE.) SOR WILL GO TO DAVOS AT THE END OF THE MONTH FOR THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM. HE'D LIKE TO SCHEDULE A MEETING WITH AMIEN RAIS ON THE MARGINS OF DAVOS (JANUARY 29-31). CAN YOU GIVE AMIEN RAIS A HEADS-UP? DEBBIE BOYER (647-9596) WILL COORDINATE SEEKING UP ACTUAL APPOINTMENTS, BUT STANLEY WANTED TO BE SURE THAT HE WAS ALERTED TO HIS INTEREST.

2. (SBU) HARMON BRIEFING

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200503302

A/S ROTH CONDUCTED A BRIEFING FOR EXIM CHAIRMAN HARMON TODAY. THE BRIEFING WAS DRIVEN BY HARMON'S DESIRE TO

GATHER SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO MAKE AN EDUCATED DECISION ON WHETHER TO MOVE FORWARD ON MORE THAN $1.5 BILLION IN EXIM FINANCING (INCLUDING THE CARUDA FUNDS). ROTH, EB A/S LARSON, DAVID WOFFORD OF OPIC, LAURE REDIFER OF TREASURY, INR'S JUDY BIRD, COMMERCE, AND USDA ALL PARTICIPATED. HARMON IS CONSIDERING A VISIT TO JAKARTA IN THE COMING WEEKS. HE ALSO INTENDS TO PLACE INDONESIA ON THE AGENDA OF THE MARCH MEETING OF C-7 EXPORT CREDIT AGENCIES TO WORK OUT A UNIFIED POSITION.

[redacted] B1

P

3. (C) ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE - I

[redacted] B1

THE BRITS INTEND TO PROVIDE ONE MILLION POUNDS (APP. $1.6 MILLION) TO THE ELECTION EFFORT. THEY SHARE OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE EU'S READINESS TO HELP, ARE DISAPPOINTED IN THE EU'S RESPONSE, AND ARE TRYING TO SQUEEZE THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO PROVIDE MORE. EUROPEAN COMMISSION PLANNING IS BASED ON UNDP ESTIMATES THAT $45 MILLION IN OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE WILL BE NEEDED FOR THE

ELECTION, WITH THE GOI PONYING UP A MATCHING $45 MILLION. (WE HAVE NO IDEA WHERE THIS ESTIMATE COMES FROM, BUT IT FLIES IN THE FACE OF OUR MUCH LARGER ESTIMATES, BOTH OF

WHAT WILL BE REQUIRED OF THE DONOR COMMUNITY AND WHAT THE GOI HAS BUDGETED.) BASED UPDN THESE NUMBERS, THE EC

PROJECTS A SHORTFALL OF $10 TO $15 MILLION. THE COMMISSION'S DG FOR SOUTH ASIA HAD HOPED TO SET ASIDE 10 MILLION EUROS FOR INDONESIAN ELECTION ASSISTANCE, BUT COMMISSION MEMBERS OPPOSED SUCH A HIGH FIGURE, PARTICULARLY IF THE MONEY WERE TO BE FUNNELED THROUGH THE UNDP. INSTEAD, THE EC IS NOW PROPOSING TWO TRANCHES OF ONE MILLION EUROS EACH, OR APPROXIMATELY $3.5 MILLION TOTAL. THE EC MAY ALSO CONSIDER CONTRIBUTING TO THE COST OF PROJECTS THAT MEMBER STATES HAVE UNDERWAY. THE KICKER IS THAT FOR BUDGETARY OR BUREAUCRATIC REASONS, THE MONEY WOULDN'T BE PROVIDED UNTIL MAY, FAR TOO LATE TO BE OF REAL HELP.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION DG, NAMED MORGAN WE BELIEVE, MAY ACTUALLY STILL BE IN JAKARTA, WHERE HE HAS BEEN DOING SOME INFORMATION GATHERING. [redacted] IT MIGHT BE WORTH THE TIME TO TRACK HIM DOWN AND TOUCH BASE WITH HIM. WE PROVIDED SOR WITH THE NAME AND PHONE NUMBER OF HIS DEPUTY IN BRUSSELS, BUT HAVE BEEN TOLD THE DG WILL HAVE THE MOST INFLUENCE. SOR WILL TALK TO A/S GROSSMAN TO GET HIS THOUGHTS ON GENERATING A MORE SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSE FROM THE EUROPEANS. HE'LL ALSO SEEK TREASURY'S HELP IN GETTING A STRONGER GERMAN COMMITMENT. B1

N.B.: [redacted] B1

4. (SBU) ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE, PART II

UNDER SECRETARIES PICKERING AND EIZENSTAT ARE SCHEDULED TO HAVE A CONFERENCE THIS WEEK (TODAY? TOMORROW?) AT WHICH THEY WILL ANNOUNCE THE FOUR COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION STATUS THAT THE SECRETARY HAS DETERMINED ARE PRIORITY COUNTRIES: INDONESIA, UKRAINE, COLUMBIA, AND NIGERIA. THE SECRETARY WILL INSTRUCT BUREAUS TO ALLOCATE AND SQUEEZE RESOURCES

APPROPRIATELY. THE TIMING IS SERENDIPITOUS, AS IT COINCIDES WITH OUR PUSH TO GET ANOTHER $10 MILLION IN ELECTION ASSISTANCE. STANLEY ROTH HOSTED A MEETING OF S/RPP, S/P, DRL, USIA, USAID, AND PIMBS TODAY TO TRY AND MAKE THIS HAPPEN. S/RPP THINKS THEY MAY BE ABLE TO COME UP WITH MORE RESOURCES (THOUGH NOT ALL $10 MILLION) TO BE USED IN SUPPORT OF THE ELECTIONS. S/RPP WILL FIND IT EASIER TO MAKE THIS RECOMMENDATION IF WE CAN POINT TO CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER AGENCIES AS WELL.

KAREN TURNER GAVE A TERRIFIC PRESENTATION ON WHAT OUR PRIORITIES ARE, AND HOW WE ARE USING AVAILABLE FUNDS TO ADDRESS AREAS CRITICAL TO SUCCESS OF THE ELECTIONS. WHAT THE GROUP NEEDS, HOWEVER, AND WHAT WE HOPE YOU CAN PRESS AID TO SEND TO WASHINGTON BY NEXT WEEK, IS A BETTER DEFINED SENSE OF OUR $33 MILLION ELECTION BUDGET; WHAT WE ARE DOING WITH THE $23 MILLION ALREADY ALLOCATED FOR DEMOCRATIZATION ACTIVITIES; AND WHERE EXACTLY THAT OTHER $10 MILLION WOULD BE USED. S/RPP ALSO SUGGESTED THAT AID LOOK CLOSELY AT WHERE USIA OR DRL OR ESF FUNDS MIGHT BE USED TO FUND ALREADY BUDGETED ACTIVITIES, ALLOWING AID TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 008200 150317Z

REALLOCATE MONEY TO OTHER DEMOCRATIZATION PRIORITIES. WE CAN'T UNDERSCORE HOW CRITICALLY USEFUL A TOOL THIS SPECIFIC BUDGET OUTLINE WOULD BE.

THE MEETING ENERGIZED USIS AT A WORKING LEVEL (GRETA MORRIS) TO PROMISE TO DEVELOP A DETAILED ACTION PLAN WITH BUDGET TO DESCRIBE SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES (PREPARING VOTER EDUCATION PAMPHLETS, VOA CAMPAIGNS, ETC.) THAT USIA CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THIS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. USIA MADE A PITCH FOR CLOSER COORDINATION BETWEEN USIS AND USAID, NOTING THAT YOU (RICHARD GONG) HAD APPROACHED USAID EARLIER THIS WEEK.

DRL WAS MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT ITS WILLINGNESS TO ADD MONEY TO THE POT, AND WILL RESERVE A DECISION UNTIL IT SEES AID'S BUDGET PROJECTIONS ON HOW THE ADDITIONAL $10 MILLION WOULD BE USED.

5. (C) ELECTION ASSISTANCE - PART III

WITH SOR HAVING GOTTEN CAUTION SIGNS FROM ALATAS TUESDAY AFTERNOON AND AMBASSADOR ROY A MIRROR IMAGE MESSAGE FROM GINANDJAR THE FOLLOWING MORNING (WE WOULD APPRECIATE AN OI ACCOUNT OF THAT DISCUSSION IF IT IS NOT COMING SEPTEL), IT IS LOOKING INCREASINGLY LIKE THE INDONESIANS ARE NOT QUITE READY FOR OUR EMBRACE ON THE JANUARY 25-26 AROUND THE CGI.

SOR HAS NOT THROWN IN THE TOWEL, BUT WE ARE REALISTIC. ON THE PLUS SIDE, IT IS OUR IMPRESSION HERE THAT WE HAVE GOTTEN SEVERAL COUNTRIES' ATTENTION REGARDING THE CHALLENGE WHICH WE WILL NEED TO FACTOR INTO A FALL BACK STRATEGY. SOR HAS LEANED PRETTY HEAVILY ON THE JAPANESE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 008200 150317Z

AND THEY HAVE BEGUN TO WAKE UP TO DOING MORE. (FYI, SOR LEARNED FROM THEM THAT GINANDJAR IS HEADED TO TOKYO ON JANUARY L7 SO WILL PROBABLY NOT LINK UP WITH ALATAS UNTIL LATER RE DISCUSSING INTL ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE.) THE AUSSIES ARE NOT PLEDGING AND STILL SOUND CAUTIOUS, BUT WILL COME AROUND. FINALLY, THE EUROPEANS WILL NEED SERIOUS

WORK AND WE WILL BE TALKING TO EUR HERE TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE.

I'M NOT SURE HOW ALL OF THIS TALLIES WITH WHAT YOU PERCEIVE TO BE THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND THERE, BUT WE'D APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON THE ABOVE AND YOUR THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS. A POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL GATHERING OUTSIDE INDONESIA MAY BE AN OPTION WE WILL WANT TO CONSIDER AS WELL A SWING BY SOR TO EUROPE ON HIS WAY BACK FRO~ DAVOS (WHERE HE'LL MEET WITH LEE KUAN YEW, SIAZON, AND OTHERS) ANYWAY, STAY TUNED. IN THE MEANTIME, WE AT THE DESK STILL FEEL LARGELY IN THE DARK ABOUT WHAT THE UNDP COORDINATORS ARE DOING ON THE GROUND IN JAKARTA. WOULD YOU GIVE US AN UPDATE?

6. (U) ACEH/SIDNEY JONES VISIT

JUST TO GIVE YOU A HEADS UP: SIDNEY JONES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ASIA, INTENDS TO VISIT INDONESIA IN EARLY FEBRUARY, WITH AN EYE TO FINDING OUT MORE ABOUT WHAT'S GOING ON IN ACEH. SHE WILL SEEK TO MEET WITH IAN MCCARY AT SOME POINT DURING HER STAY.

7. (U) IPP LETTER

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 008200 150317Z

WE'VE FAXED TO YOU A COPY OF THE SIGNED LETTER ON IPPS FROM TREASURY UNDER SECRETARY GEITHNER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF FINANCE. YOU MIGHT HELP OUT TREASURY BY MAKING SURE THE APPROPRIATE GOL OFFICIALS HAVE SEEN IT (AND YOU CAN EXPLAIN AWAY THE LAST PARAGRAPH BY NOTING THAT IT WAS SIGNED BEFORE SUMMERS DECIDED TO CANCEL HIS TRIP, BUT THAT WE DO HOPE HE'LL MAKE IT TO INDONESIA SOON.)

ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1282

PAGE 01 STATE 015195 270320Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

015195
SOURCE: KODAKB.027082
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:RCLARKE:RJC -- 01/26/99 7-2543
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
EAP/PIMBS:ALUDWIG
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------9B5EF6 270322Z /38
O 270320Z JAN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 015195

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/04
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 15

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM EAP/PIMBS

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS ACTING DIRECTOR JON ALOISI.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

1. (U) A/S ROTH'S INDONESIA SCHEDULE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 015195 270320Z

A/S ROTH HAS REVIEWED THE NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR HIS FEBRUARY 2-4 VISIT CONTAINED IN JAKARTA 3~3. HE THANKS ALL FOR THEIR EFFORTS. AS ALREADY CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR ROY, HE APPRECIATES, BUT DECLINES, THE INVITATION TO STAY AT THE RESIDENCE. HE WOULD LIKE A COUNTRY TEAM MEETING EARLY IN HIS STAY. CONCERNING THE PROPOSED 2/3 1800 HRS GENERAL ELECTRIC "LIGHTING UP" EVENT, ROTH ASKED WHETHER IT WOULDN'T BE BEST TO INSTEAD RETURN TO JAKARTA THAT EVENING FOR FURTHER SUBSTANTIVE WORK, SUCH AS A WORKING DINNER. HE REQUESTS A FULL 60 MINUTES WITH FM ALATAS ON 2/4. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE A MEETING WITH THE UNDP

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200503302

REPRESENTATIVE, AS WELL AS A PRESS CONFERENCE ON DEPARTURE, WORKED INTO THE SCHEDULE.

2. (C) A/S ROTH TRIP PLANNING MEETING

A/S ROTH MET WITH DAS BOYCE, KAREN BROOKS, AND EAP/PIMBS THIS MORNING TO CONTINUE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION ON THE SECRETARY'S INDONESIA VISIT. HE STARTED OFF BY NOTING THAT HE HAD SPOKEN WITH AMBASSADOR ROY ABOUT THE OPPOSITION "ELECTION-FOCUSED MEET-AND-GREET WITH THREE `PULL-ASIDES'" AND ON A SPEECH, AND THAT THE AMBASSADOR WAS CHECKING FURTHER ON THEIR FEASIBILITY. ROTH CONTINUES TO FAVOR BOTH IDEAS. WE AWAIT YOUR INPUT. ALTHOUGH THERE IS SOME PRESSURE TO MOVE THE FINAL ACTION MEMO WITH PROPOSALS FOR THE JAKARTA SCHEDULE TO THE SEVENTH FLOOR TOMORROW, ROTH PLANS TO HOLD IT UNTIL THE AMBASSADOR'S FURTHER COMMENTS ARE RECEIVED.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 015195 270320Z

3. (SBU) DRL PLEASED WITH HRR; FLAGS SEVERAL POINTS

DRL WAS PLEASED WITH THE SUBSTANTIAL UPDATES TO V-1 OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT PROVIDED IN JAKARTA 258, AND ASKED US TO CONVEY THEIR GRATITIUDE FOR YOUR IMPRESSIVELY THOROUGH WORK. WE ECHO THE SENTIMENT, AND THINK WE SEE THE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL. WE SEE NO SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM WITH MOST OF DRL'S LARGELY FORMAL COMMENTS AND COUNTER-SUGGEST IONS (WHICH WE WILL RESOLVE AT THIS END), BUT DO WISH TO FLAG SEVERAL MORE IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE POINTS FOR YOUR FURTHER ATTENTION AND/OR COMMENT.

-- YOUR SUGGESTED REWRITE TO PARA 7 OF THE INTRODUCTION DOES NOT PASS THE DRL TEST. IN ORDER TO KEEP ALL COUNTRY REPORTS FORMALLY CONSISTENT, AND TO AVOID TRYING TO MASSAGE OR "CONTEXTUALIZE" PROBLEMS AWAY, DRL INSISTS ON THE ORIGINAL "BAD NEWS BEFORE GOOD" ORDER.

-- YOUR SUGGESTED ADDITION TO THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PART B (DISAPPEARANCES), NAMELY THE PHRASE "WERE ACCUSED OF", WILL NOT GET A GREEN LIGHT FROM DRL. DRL INSISTS ON A RETURN TO THE INITIAL LANGUAGE, WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE EVIDENCE AND MAKES EXPLICIT OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT SECURITY FORCES DID IN FACT DO WHAT THEY WERE ACCUSED OF DOING.

-- IN PART C, PARAGRAPH 15 (REGARDING TROOP WITHDRAWALS IN EAST TIMOR) OF THE INITIAL VERSION, DRL WOULD PROPOSE A

REDRAFT. IN THE SECOND SENTENCE, REPLACE EVERYTHING AFTER THE PHRASE "EAST TIMOR, BUT..." WITH: "SUBSEQUENT EVIDENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 015195 270320Z

STRONGLY SUPPORTS ALLEGATIONS THAT TROOP LEVELS WERE ACTUALLY INCREASED". IF THIS LANGUAGE SEEMS TOO STRONG, DRL IS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE.

-- THE LAST (SINGLE SENTENCE) PARAGRAPH OF THE INTRODUCTION EXPRESSES, UNAMBIGUOUSLY, THAT INSURGENTS CARRIED OUT SIX EXECUTIONS. DRL WONDERS WHETHER WE CAN BE SO CATEGORICALLY SURE THAT "INSURGENTS", AND NOT SOME OTHER TYPE OF GROUP OR GROUPS, WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE EXECUTIONS. TO THAT END, PLEASE DETAIL WHICH SIX EXECUTIONS YOU ARE REFERRING TO. IT MAY BE THAT OUR INTELLIGENCE ACTUALLY SUPPORTS YOUR UNAMBIGUOUS STATEMENT.

-- PLEASE EXPLAIN WHAT GOING FROM A "MILITARY OPERATIONS AREA" TO A "CRITICAL CONTROL AREA" MEANS BY PROVIDING BRIEF DEFINITIONS OF BOTH TERMS.

-- DRL RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB OF AMERICA ALLEGING THAT A JOURNALIST FROM THE [redacted] B6
[redacted] BY THE NAME OF [redacted] WAS REFUSED ENTRY B6
INTO INDONESIA ON NOVEMBER 10. [redacted] WAS B6 B6
ALLEGEDLY ON A GOVERNMENT BLACKLIST FOR PREVIOUS WRITINGS ON EAST TIMOR. IF THIS IS TRUE (AND SUBSTANTIATED), IT MAY MERIT INCLUSION INTO THE REPORT. HAVE YOU HEARD ANYTHING?

THANKS AGAIN FOR YOUR HARD WORK, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR REACTIONS TO THE POINTS ABOVE.

4. (C) [redacted] B1

[redacted]

B1

5. (C) JANUARY 24 MEETING AT WIRANTO'S

THERE IS VERY KEEN INTEREST IN THE JANUARY 24 GATHERING AT GENERAL WIRANTO'S RESIDENCE. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT THAT MAJOR OPPOSITION LEADERS(AMIEN RAIS, GUS DUR, MEGAWATI, THE SULTAN OF YOGYAKARTA) AND A WIDE RANGE OF BUSINESS AND INTELLECTUAL FIGURES ATTENDED, AND THAT HABIBIE PEOPLE WERE CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT. APPRECIATE ANYTHING YOU CAN GATHER FROM EMBASSY CONTACTS ON WHAT WAS DISCUSSED OVER THE REPORTED FIVE HOURS OF EXCHANGES.
TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 015195 270320Z

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4811

PAGE 01 STATE 016221 280312Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

016221
SOURCE: KODAKB.028038
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PTMBS:RCLARKE:RJC -- 01/27/99 7-2543
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMES:JALOISI
EAP/PIMBS:ALUDWIG
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------9BE6DE 280314Z /38
O 280311Z JAN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 016221

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/04
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 16

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM EAP/PIMBS

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUG HARTWICK. REASON: 1.5 (D).

1. (U) MORE ON A/S ROTH'S INDONESIA SCHEDULE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 016221 280312Z

A/S ROTH AGREES WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT HE STAY IN JOGJA OVERNIGHT AND ATTEND THE DANCE CEREMONY. HE WOULD LIKE A SEPARATE MEETING WITH THE UNDP, AND WE THINK IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE IF CORRINA PERELLI FROM UN'S ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE DIVISION COULD BE INCLUDED (SEE READOUT OF MY TRIP TO NEW YORK FOR MORE; SHE SHOULD BE VISITING AT THAT TIME.) HOW TO HANDLE THE PRESS WILL DEPEND ON TIMING OF THE HABIBIE MEETING. IF ROTH MEETS WITH HABIBIE EARLY IN THE VISIT, HE WOULD LIKE A SEPARATE PRESS EVENT WHEN HE LEAVES JAKARTA, SO THAT HE CAN COMMENT ON THE FULL RANGE OF HIS MEETINGS, NOT JUST MEETINGS WITH SENIOR GOI

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200503302

OFFICIALS. IF THE MEETING WITH HABIBIE TAKES PLACE NEARER THE END OF ROTH'S STAY, HE'LL BE ABLE TO MAKE HIS POINTS ABOUT CONSULTATIONS WITH NGOS AND OPPOSITION AT THE SAME TIME HE COMMENTS ON HIS MEETING WITH HABIBIE. FINALLY, IS THERE ANY WAY TO SHAKE THE BUSHES AND FIND SOMEBODY TO TALK ABOUT ACEH AT THE LUNCH MIKE OWENS' IS HOSTING?

2. (SBU) MEETINGS AT THE UN

[redacted] MADE CLEAR TUESDAY THAT THE UNDP IS BUSY COORDINATING INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AT THE GOI'S REQUEST BUT INFERRED IT IS LESS DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH RALLYING ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL ELECTION AID. UNDP WILL NOT PLAY A ROLE AT THIS POINT IN THE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER EFFORT -- TOO POLITICAL. THEY MAY OFFER LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO OBSERVERS, BUT NOTHING MORE. WHILE CLEARLY AWARE OF TIME CONSTRAINTS IN PREPARING FOR ELECTIONS, UNDP OFFICIALS IN NEW YORK SEEMED MORE B1

CONCERNED ABOUT THE APPEARANCE OF REMAINING "NEUTRAL" AND SUPPORTIVE IN THE EYES OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT THAN OF THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY. [redacted] SPOKE OF A LATE FEBRUARY/EARLY MARCH TIME FRAME FOR A POSSIBLE DONORS PLEDGING CONFERENCE, AN IDEA WHICH UNDP RESREP RAJAN WOULD BROACH WITH THE GOT FOLLOWING CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS THIS WEEK IN JAKARTA (WHICH HATTIE BABBITT WAS EXPECTED TO ATTEND). SUCH A PLEDGING SESSION WOULD BEST FOLLOW COMPLETION OF THE MOU (ALMOST DONE) AND A DETAILED ELECTION WORKPLAN STILL TO BE NEGOTIATED (OPTIMISTICALLY TWO WEEKS OFF) TO GUIDE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS. OUR FEELING IS THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO GET FIRM PLEDGES OF ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER DONORS UNTIL THIS WORKPLAN IS READIED. SOR WILL MAKE THIS POINT IN HIS DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK IN JAKARTA. ANY INFORMATION THAT YOU OR AID CAN GLEAN ON HOW THAT TECHNICAL PLAN IS SHAPING UP, WHAT THE GOT WILL BUDGET FOR ELECTIONS, WHAT ACTIVITIES THE GOT WILL HANDLE ITSELF, AND WHERE THEY WILL NEED OUTSIDE HELP WOULD BE APPRECIATED. B1

[redacted] SHE HAS EXTENSIVE KNOWLEDGE OF ELECTIONS PREPARATIONS, AND HAS A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT STEPS -AND PITFALLS -- THE GOT AND THE DONOR COMMUNITY MUST CONSIDER. AT RAJAN'S REQUEST AND DESPITE GOT AMBIVALENCE, SHE PLANS A ~-LO DAY TRIP TO JAKARTA

"NEXT WEEK" (ON HER WAY TO NIGERIA) TO LEND SUPPORT TO UNDP'S INCREASINGLY STRESSED COORDINATION EFFORT. SHE

FELT THAT INDONESIA WAS ENTERING THE "DANGER ZONE" OF TRANSITION ELECTIONS WHERE THE REAL STAKES ARE BECOMING CLEAR TO ALL POLITICAL PLAYERS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT. SHE ARTICULATED THE NEED TO GET THE PUBLIC (INCLUDING OPPOSITION, STUDENTS, AND NGOS) TO BUY IN TO THE ENTIRE ELECTION PROCESS, PERHAPS THROUGH A PUBLIC DIALOGUE. POTENTIAL "DISENFRANCHISED" ELEMENTS NEEDED TO BE A PARTICULAR FOCUS OF ATTENTION.

SHE MADE THE POINT THAT THE GOI'S DESIRE FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IS AT ODDS WITH ITS DESIRE FOR A LOW INTERNATIONAL PROFILE IN THE ASSISTANCE EFFORT. EVENTUALLY, THE GOI WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT MONETARY DONATIONS. FINALLY, SHE MADE THE SENSIBLE OBSERVATION THAT INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DONORS NEED TO ENSURE THAT THEY COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER IN THE VARIOUS TASKS THEY TAKE ON, NOT COMPETE. THIS, SHE SAYS, IS A COMMON STUMBLING BLOCK AS COUNTRIES GENERALLY HOPE TO TAKE ON THE EASIER TASKS (E.G., PROVIDING BALLOT BOXES) LEAVING THE HARDER BUT MORE IMPORTANT TASKS (E.G. UPDATING VOTER REGISTRATION) TO THE OVERWHELMED GOVERNMENT.

ON FUNDING, BASED ON HER EXPERIENCE IN NIGERIA, [redacted] B1
WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THE EU WOULD BE ABLE TO DONATE SIGNIFICANT SUMS OF MONEY TO THE GOL, GIVEN THE EU'S MADDENING BUREAUCRACY AND ONGOING KICKBACK SCANDAL INVESTIGATION. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE WILL WANT TO ENCOURAGE EUROPEAN DONORS TO CONTRIBUTE BILATERALLY AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

3. (SBU) WORKING GROUP ON ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE

BILLING IT AS THE FIRST FOLLOW UP MEETING IN THE WAKE OF THE 4 PRIORITY EMERGING DEMOCRACY COUNTRIES, SKIP BOYCE CHAIRED A MEETING ON ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE WITH DRL, USIA, AID, S/RPP, AND INR IN ATTENDANCE. WE'LL MEET ON A WEEKLY BASIS TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION AND AGREE ON ACTIONS ON THE WEEK AHEAD. DRL'S DAVID YANG HAS AGREED TO CALL SOME OF HIS EUROPEAN CONTACTS TO PRESS FOR MORE ATTENTION TO THE ELECTION RESOURCE ISSUE. AND WE WILL BE FOLLOWING UP SEPARATELY TO THE EU AND ASIA ON THE RESOURCE SHORTAGE

ISSUE. FINALLY, SO THAT WE CAN HELP ADDRESS PERSISTENT QUESTIONS HERE ABOUT JUST WHAT IS A "CREDIBLE ELECTION" WE'D LIKE YOUR INPUT ON HOW WE WOULD OPERATIONALIZE (SORRY FOR THE JARGON) A REASONABLE TEST/BENCHMARK FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA.

FINALLY, WE NEED TO KNOW HOW AID WOULD SPEND AN ADDITIONAL $10 MILLION IN ELECTION ASSISTANCE THAT HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF VARIOUS MEETINGS FOR WEEKS. I CAN'T TELL YOU HOW EXASPERATED DRL AND S/RPP HAVE BECOME WITH AID'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION, OVER A MONTH AFTER IT WAS FIRST REQUESTED. POOR KAREN TURNER JUST HAD TO SIT THER AND APOLOGIZE SINCE SHE HAD NOTHING NEW TO OFFER. WE REGOCOGNIZE THAT BABBITT'S VISIT HAS COMPLICATED THINGS A BIT BUT IT IS DRAGGING ON TOO LONG. OTHER OFFICES ARE CLAMORING FOR THE RESOURCES; IF AID CAN'T PROVIDE AN ANSWER BY THE END OF THE WEEK, DRL AND S/RPP ARE QUITE PREPARED TO PUT THEIR MONEY ELSEWHERE (NIGERIA, FOR EXAMPLE).

WHAT BECOMES CLEAR, BOTH FROM OUR MEETINGS HERE AND IN NEW

YORK, IS THAT WE IN WASHINGTON NEED BETTER ACCESS TO REAL TIME INFORMATION ON A LOT OF THE DISCUSSIONS THAT YOU, AID, OR PERHAPS THEIR CONTRACTORS, ARE HAVING ABOUT THEIR ELECTION PROCESS. NOW I KNOW THAT THE AMBASSADOR MAY ROLL HIS EYES AND RIGHTLY COMPLAIN THAT WE TOO OFTEN DON'T READ WHAT WE ARE ALREADY BEING SENT, BUT BELIEVE ME, WE NEED MORE E-MAIL TYPE INFO ABOUT ELECTION PREPS -- WHAT THE GOL IS DOING, WHAT UNDP IS DOING, WHAT WE HEAR OTHER DONORS DOING OR CONSIDERING DOING. WE WILL TRY HARDER TO SHARE WITH YOU ALL WHAT IS HAPPENING ON OUR END (AS YOU SEE FORM ABOVE)

4. (C) THE SECRETARY'S VISIT

A/S ROTH HAS DEPARTED FOR DAVOS THIS AFTERNOON. I KNOW THIS IS A FUNNY QUESTION, BUT WE ARE UNSURE IF AMBASSADOR ROY, AFTER FURTHER CHECKING OUT THEIR FEASIBILITY, SPOKE WITH HIM AGAIN ABOUT THE OPPOSITION "ELECTION-FOCUSED MEET-AND-GREET WITH THREE `PULL-ASIDES'" IDEA AND AN S SPEECH ON U.S.-INDONESIAN RELATIONS. IF HE HAS, OR DOES, WE'D APPRECIATE THE EMBASSY DOUBLE-TRACKING THAT COMMUNICATION WITH PIMBS. WE ARE UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE TO MOVE THE FINAL ACTION MEMO WITH PROPOSALS FOR THE JAKARTA SCHEDULE TO THE SEVENTH FLOOR BY TOMORROW AND SIMPLY DON'T KNOW THE OUTCOME IF ANY OF THAT DISCUSSION.

5.. (SBU) HARMON VISIT

EXIM CHAIRMAN HARMON IS PLANNING A TWO DAY TRIP TO JAKARTA. HE'LL ARRIVE ON THE 15TH, AND SEEK MEETINGS EITHER FEB 15-16 OR FEB 16-17. HARMON HAS ALREADY SPOKEN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 016221 280312Z

TO AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN, AND HAS SAID HE WILL ONLY GO IF HE CAN GET MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE, MINISTER OF

FINANCE SUBIANTO, AND GINANDJAR. HE'LL ALSO WANT MEETINGS WITH TANRI ABENG AND THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION. ANY OTHER SUGGESTIONS YOU HAVE WOULD BE WELCOME. LET US KNOW IF THESE DATES WILL WORK (WE'VE ALREADY POINTED OUT TO EXIM THAT FEB 15 IS A HOLIDAY.)
TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTO0298

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 067537 122328Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

067537
SOURCE: KODAKA.012215
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PTMBS:VEMURRAY/RCLARKE -- 04/12/99 7-1823
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------BAD7A7 122330Z /38

O 122328Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 067537

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/04
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 63

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM PIMBS

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS HARTWICK.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

1. (C) EAST TIMOR DEMARCHES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 067537 122328Z

WE APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S EXCELLENT CABLE (JAKARTA 1809) ON NEXT STEPS ON EAST TIMOR. DRAWING ON IT, PIMBS PREPARED A CABLE INSTRUCTING JAKARTA TO DELIVER A STRONG MESSAGE TO HIGH-LEVELS OF THE GOT AND TNT. WE ARE WORKING ON GETTING U/S PICKERING TO CALL IN AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN TOMORROW TO MAKE THE SAME POINTS. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT A/S ROTH APPROVES THE PICKERING-DORODJATUN IDEA, BUT PREFERS TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE HIMSELF DURING HIS APRIL 14-16 VISIT. THEREFORE, FYI, AND FOR PASSING TO A/S ROTH WHEN HE ARRIVES, WE PROVIDE THE TEXT OF U/S PICKERING'S TALKING POINTS, WHICH HAS BEEN WIDELY CLEARED, INCLUDING BY THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 11 APR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 29 JUN 2006 200503302

-- WE HAVE, AND ARE AWARE THAT YOU HAVE, CONCRETE INFORMATION ABOUT THE MILITIA GROUPS INVOLVED IN RECENT

[redacted] B1

END TALKING POINTS.

2. (U) E-MAIL COMMUNICATIONS

WE RECEIVED THE TEST MESSAGE FROM DCM/OMS THIS MORNING, BUT GOT THE FOLLOWING ERROR MESSAGE WHEN WE SENT A REPLY:

"THE FOLLOWING RECIPIENTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN SYNCHRONIZED AND CANNOT BE DELIVERED TO: PCM:VINESGATE/STDA/ST (DCMOMS@DCM@JAKAR EMBA)." HOPE YOU CAN USE THIS INFORMATION TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM.

3. (C) AI, EAST TIMOR, AND DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR

[redacted] WITH DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR, WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE PERSUADED PRESIDENT HABIBIE TO ALLOW AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL INTO EAST TIMOR TO INVESTIGATE THE VIOLENCE AND KILLINGS IN LIQUICA ON APRIL 5-6 (JAKARTA 1808). WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM DIRECTLY WITH AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. ANWAR TOLD [redacted] THAT SHE AGREED WITH THE NEED TO REDUCE TENSIONS BUT THAT THE BLAME ON CURRENT TROUBLES SHOULD NOT BE "ONE WAY" (I.E. PRO-INDEPENDENCE ELEMENTS SHARE THE BLAME, TOO). SHE AGREED THAT THE UN-LED PROCESS OF CONSULTATION NEEDED TO MOVE FORWARD BUT THAT INDONESIA COULD NOT PERMIT NON-INDONESIAN

B1

B1

SECURITY PERSONNEL TO PROVIDE SECURITY ON INDONESIAN (EAST TIMOR) SOIL. SHE ALSO CHARACTERIZED XANANA'S STATEMENTS OF LAST WEEK AS "EXTREMELY PROVOCATIVE."

4. (C) KOFI ANNAN CALLS HABIBIE

TAMRAT SAMUEL IN MARKER'S UNDPA OFFICE THIS MORNING CONFIRMED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL DID CALL PRESIDENT HABIBIE OVER THE WEEKEND. SAMUEL LACKED FULL DETAILS OF THE EXCHANGE, BUT DID SAY THAT ANNAN WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE RESPONSES THAT HE RECEIVED FROM HABIBIE, AND THAT A "FOLLOW UP" CALL MIGHT BE NECESSARY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ROSE LIKINS SAID THE SECRETARY WAS INVOLVED WITH PLACING CALLS TO ALL 18 NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS OVER THE WEEKEND AND WAS UNABLE TO CALL ANNAN.

5. (U) HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

MIKE JENDRZEJCZYK OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ASIA WILL BE TRAVELLING TO JAKARTA EARLY NEXT WEEK AND HOPES TO CALL ON THE EMBASSY. WE'VE FAXED TO YOU A COPY OF HRW'S FRIDAY PRESS RELEASE, IN WHICH CALL ON CGI GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE A JOINT DEMARCHE URGNING THE DISARMING OF ARMY-BACKED MILITIAS IN EAST TIMOR.

6. (SBU) RESCHEDULING EIZENSTAT

U/S EIZENSTAT'S OFFICE IS MAKING TENTATIVE PLANS TO RESCHEDULE HIS TRIP TO ASIA FOR THE SECOND HALF OF 1999, AVOIDING SEPTEMBER BECAUSE OF APEC. INDONESIA, CHINA, JAPAN, AND POSSIBLY THAILAND OR KOREA WOULD BE KEY STOPS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 067537 122328Z

WE'LL KEEP YOU INFORMED AS PLANS FIRM UP.

7. (C) CROWD CONTROL FUNDING ISSUE

FYI -- INL A/S BEERS RECOMMENDED WE TAKE THE 5 451 WAIVER PATH TO FUND THE CROWD CONTROL TRAINING AND, IF THAT FAILS, TURN TO THE INL "NOTWITHSTANDING AUTHORITY" OPTION. H STRONGLY DISAGREES. THE CHOICE WILL COME DOWN TO WHICH APPROACH THE HILL WILL ACCEPT. WE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY GET A CLEAR SENSE OF THAT TOMORROW WHEN WE MEET CAROLYN BARTHOLOMEW, ET AL. AT THAT POINT, WE WILL SORT OUT WHICH WAY TO PROCEED WITH INL AND H TO MOVE OUR PROJECT FORWARD. TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO5656

PAGE 01 STATE 126881 071749Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AEX-01 CIAE-00 IPS-01 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
ADS-00 PM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 PMB-00 CCR-01 SAS-00
/005R

126881
SOURCE: CLOUTCLS.007263
DRAFTED BY: EAP/FO:DFBOYER -- 07/07/99 202-647-9596
APPROVED BY: EAP/FO:SOROTH
EAP/FO:CARVIS
EAP/FO:DKEEGAN
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP

----------DE05B4 071750Z /38
P 071748Z JUL 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 126881

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/99
TAGS: OTRA, OVIP, ID
SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE REQUEST

CLASSIFIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY O. ROTH, REASON 1.5 (D)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 126881 071749Z

1. REQUEST COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY O. ROTH AND BUREAU CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON DAVID KEEGAN FOR TRAVEL TO JAKARTA JULY 13 THROUGH JULY 17.

2. FOR SINGAPORE: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH WILL ARRIVE SNGAPORE AT 11:35 PM ON JULY 12 VIA UA 897 EN ROUTE JAKARTA. DAVID KEEGAN ARRIVES AT 11:59 PM ON JULY 12 VIA NORTHWEST FLIGHT 19. THEY DEPART FOR JAKARTA VIA SILKAIR 202 AT 9:00 AM ON TUESDAY, JULY 13. REQUEST HOTEL RESERVATION IN SINGAPORE FOR NIGHT OF JULY 12 FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH AND DAVID KEEGAN (NOT THE AIRPORT HOTEL).

3. FOR JAKARTA: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH AND MR. KEEGAN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200503302

ARRIVE JAKARTA 9:35 AM ON JULY 13 AND ARE PLEASED TO ACCEPT THE AMBASSADOR'S INVITATION TO STAY AT THE RESIDENCE.

4. ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH AND MR. KEEGAN DEPART JAKARTA FOR DENPASAR AT 8:45 PM ON JULY 14 VIA GARUDA FLIGHT 880, CONTINUING ON TO DILI ON MERPATI NUSA FLIGHT DEPARTING DENPASAR AT 9:30 AM ON JULY 15 AND ARRIVING DILI AT 11:30 AM. REQUEST HOTEL RESERVATION IN DENPASAR.

5. ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH AND MR. KEEGAN DEPART DILI VIA MERPATI NUSA FLIGHT 643 AT 12:25 PM ON SATURDAY, JULY 17, ARRIVING JAKARTA AT 4:00 PM, CONNECTING TO JAPAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 726 LEAVING JAKARTA AT 11:30 PM ON JULY 15. FLIGHT ARRIVES TOKYO NARITA AT 8:40 AM ON SUNDAY, JULY 18 AND DEPARTS TOKYO NARITA EN ROUTE WASHINGTON AT 11:35 AM ON JULY 18. NO ASSISTANCE FROM EMBASSY TOKYO REQUIRED. REGARDS. TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 126881 071749Z

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E22

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7002

PAGE 01 JAKART 01922 01 OF 04 170919Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/015W				

----------BD2EE1 170919Z /38

O 170853Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7293
INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 001922

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01922 01 OF 04 170919Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/04
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH CALLS ON FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY:

[redacted]

B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 16 APR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 29 JUN 2006 200503302

[redacted]

B1

END SUMMARY

3. (U) A/S ROTH, ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSAODOR, EAP ASSISTANT ARVIS AND POLCOUNS (NOTETAKER), MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS FOR 75 MINUTES APRIL 15. DIRECTOR OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS SAMODRA AND DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS WIDODO AND TWO OTHER STAFF ACCOMPANIED ALATAS.

EAST TIMOR

4. [redacted]

B1

[redacted]

B1

5. (C) [redacted]

B1

6. (C) A/S ROTH NOTED THAT ONLY SIX WEEKS AGO, DURING THE VISIT OF SECRETARY ALBRIGHT, PROSPECTS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE EAST TIMOR PROBLEM HAD APPEARED "PRETTY POSITIVE," BUT THAT WITH THE NEW FIGHTING, THE "TERRIBLE INCIDENT IN LIQUICA" AND THE SLOWING OF PROGRESS ON THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE THE SITUATION HAD BECOME "FAR MORE ALARMING." THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO GOI POLICY WAS NOW NEGATIVE WHEREAS IT HAD RECENTLY BEEN POSITIVE, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF ABRI'S FAILURE TO DISARM PARAMILITARY GROUPS. US

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7004

PAGE 01 JAKART 01922 02 OF 04 170919Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/015W				

----------BD2EE6 170919Z /38

O 170853Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7294
INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 001922

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01922 02 OF 04 170919Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/04
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH CALLS ON FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS

CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN WAS AGAIN BEING EXPRESSED AND UNSYG KOFI ANNAN RECENTLY HAD CALLED PRESIDENT HABIBIE TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERN. THERE WAS ALSO AN EFFORT TO GENERATE A STATEMENT ABOUT EAST TIMOR AT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN GENEVA. SEVERAL COUNTRIES WERE CONSIDERING REQUESTING A SECURITY COUNCIL BRIEFING ON EAST TIMOR, WHICH MIGHT THEN RESULT IN A RANGE OF FOLLOWUP ACTIONS, INCLUDING A PRESS STATEMENT, A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER, OR EVEN A RESOLUTION. IN SUM, EAST TIMOR WAS AGAIN BECOMING A MAJOR NEGATIVE ISSUE FOR INDONESIA.

7. (C) [redacted] B1

8. (C) [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01922 02 OF 04 170919Z

[redacted] B1

9. (C) [redacted] B1

10. (C) [redacted] B1

11. [redacted] B1

12. [redacted] B1

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7005

PAGE 01 JAKART 01922 03 OF 04 170919Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/016W				

----------BD2EF0 170919Z /38

O 170853Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7295
INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 001922

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01922 03 OF 04 170919Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/04
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH CALLS ON FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS

[redacted]

B1

13. (C) [redacted]

B1

14. (C) [redacted]

B1

15. (C) A/S ROTH THANKED THE MINISTER FOR HIS DETAILED ACCOUNT, ADDING THAT HE WOULD HAVE NOTED A FEW OTHER POINTS, INCLUDING THAT "A LOT OF WEAPONS FOUND THEIR WAY FROM THE MILITARY TO PARAMILITARY GROUPS." "THERE WERE JUST TOO MANY REPORTS OF THE TNI COOPERATING WITH THE MILITIAS." THIS WAS NOT TO SAY THAT GENERAL WIRANTO OR PRESIDENT HABIBIE WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED, HOWEVER. ROTH SAID THAT SEVERAL STEPS WERE ESSENTIAL: THE AUTNOMY PACKAGE HAD TO BE COMPLETED; IT WAS NECESSARY TO GET ALL SIDES TALKING; AND THERE NEEDED TO BE DISARMAMENT OF BOTH SIDES. IN REGARD TO THE LATTER, XANANA'S WILLINGNESS TO SEE THE FALINITL DISARMED WITH ARMS SURRENDERED TO THE UN WAS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO

TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS PROPOSAL WITH SOME CREATIVE DIPLOMACY, ROTH SUGGESTED. PERHAPS IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR ARMED GROUPS TO SURRENDER THEIR ARMS BEFORE (BUT NOT TO) UN OBSERVERS PRESENT IN EAST TIMOR AS PART OF THE UN TEAM PREPARING THE AUTONOMY BALLOTING.

16. (C) THE USG WAS NOT ADVOCATING A PEACE KEEPIING OPERATION BUT RATHER WAS CALLING FOR AN "INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE." THIS WOULD POSE NO THREAT TO INDONESIAN SOVREIGNTY. WITH REGARD TO PEACEKEEPING, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE POLICE ADVISORS WORKING IN ASSOCIATION

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01922 03 OF 04 170919Z
WITH THE UN PRESENCE AND ASSISTING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EAST TIMROESE POLICE FORCE. THERE WERE MANY POSSIBILITIES. IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF XANANA'S PROPOSAL ON DISARMING AND GENERAL WIRANTO'S STATED WILLINGNESS TO DISARM SOME OF THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS. IT WAS ESENTIAL THAT "WE NOT GO BACKWARDS."

17. (C) WITH REGARD TO A HUMANITARIAN PRESENCE, THERE WERE TWO ISSUES. ONE INVOLVED ENABLING THE ICRC TO INVESTIGATE THE LIQUICA INCIDENT. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THERE WAS THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, REPRESENTED IN PART BY NEED FOR A SURGICAL CAPACITY, NOTABLY AMONG THE LIQUICA WOUNDED. THERE WAS ALSO THE LARGER ISSUE OF MEDICAL CARE THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND, INCLUDING SHORTAGES OF DOCTORS, NURSES, AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

18. (C) ALATAS RESPONDED THAT THE UNDP WOULD BE HEADING UP A MULTI-AGENCY ASSESSMENT TEAM THAT WOULD GO TO EAST TIMOR NEXT WEEK. IT WOULD INCLUDE REPRESENATIVES FROM WHO, WFP AS WELL AS UNDP. ALTATAS SAID HE WAS COUNTING ON THE UNDP TO PROVIDE AN "OBJECTIVE, NON-POLITICIZED REPORT." ROTH RECALLED PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S CONCERN ABOUT THE FINANCIAL COST OF EAST TIMOR FOR THE NATIONAL BUDGET AND NOTED THAT THE GOI WOULD BE WISE TO ACCEPT OFFERS OF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7003

PAGE 01 JAKART 01922 04 OF 04 170919Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00

PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00
USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 G-00 MR-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 /015W

----------BD2EF5 170919Z /38

O 170853Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7296
INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 001922

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01922 04 OF 04 170919Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/04
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH CALLS ON FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS

HUMANITARIAN HELP WHICH REDUCED ITS OWN FINANCIAL BURDEN IN EAST TIMOR.

19. (C) CONCLUDING HIS REMARKS, ALATAS CLAIMED THAT THE LAST THING THAT THE AMRED FORCES OR THE GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL WANTED WAS A CIVIL WAR, ALLEGDING THAT THIS WAS WHAT CAUSED INDONESIA TO ENTER EAST TIMOR IN 1975. THE NOTION THAT THE GOI SOUGHT MORE FIGHTING AS PROPOGATED ON THE INTERNET WAS WRONG. IN THIS REGARD, ALATAS OFFERED WHAT HE SAID WAS THE VERSION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED IN LIQUICA AS TOLD TO HIM BY THE POLICE AND MILITARY COMMANDERS IN EAST TIMOR. HE CLAIMED THAT TWO PLATOONS OF MOBILE POLICE BRIGADE TROOPS HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING TO NEGOTIATE WITH FATHER RAFAEL (A "POLITICAL PRIEST") FOR THE SURRENDER OF FIVE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD TAKEN REFUGE IN HIS HOUSE. AS NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDERWAY, HE SAID, A SINGLE SHOT RANG OUT WHICH WOUNDED ONE POLICEMEN SUPERFICIALLY IN THE LEG. SUBSEQUENT BALISTICS TESTS AND THE ANGEL OF HE SHOT, HE CLAIMED, PROVED THAT THE SHOT HAD COME FROM THE PRIEST'S HOUSE.

20. (C) THE SHOT IGNITED A CROWD OF APPROXIMATELY 1,000 PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS WHO ATTACKED THE PRIEST'S HOUSE (AND HUNDREDS OF LOCAL PEOPLE WHO HAD SOUGHT REFUGE NEAR THE ADJOINING CHURCH). ALATAS QUOTED THE SECURITY FORCE COMMANDERS AS CLAIMING THAT THE SITUATION WAS OUT OF CONTROL AND SECURITY FORCES WERE NOT SUFFICIENT TO STOP

THE BLOODSHED.

21. (C) ROTH RETURNED TO HIS PREVIOUS POINT THAT THERE NEEDED TO BE DISARMING OF BOTH SIDES. ROTH NOTED THAT HE HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO XANANA AFTER THE LATTER'S CALL FOR EAST TIMORESE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, IN WHICH HE TOLD XANANA THAT THIS HAD BEEN UNHELPFUL. IT WAS TIME TO FOCUS ON STEPS TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT SECRETARY ALBRIGHT RETAINED INTENSE PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE SITUATION.

22. (C) THE AMBASSADOR URGED THAT THE MINISTER ASSIST DIPLOMATS TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR WHICH IN RECENT WEEKS HAD BEEN BLOCKED. ALATAS SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES WERE A DIPLOMAT TO BE INJJURED OR KILLED IN EAST TIMOR BUT UNDERTOOK TO TRY TO BE HELPFUL.

23. (C)

B1

ELECTIONS

24. (C) IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE ELECTIONS, ROTH SAID THAT EXCEPT FOR SOME TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES INCLUDING TIMELY WORK ON COMPLETING REGULATIONS AND QUESTION ABOUT WHAT LEVEL MONITORS WOULD WORK AT, THE

ELECTION PREPARATIONS APPEARED TO BE PROCEEDING ACCEPTABLY. MOREOVER, HE HAD HEARD NO SUPPORT FOR A POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTIONS (WHICH WOULD BE POLITCALLY COSTLY). ROTH RAISED THE MATTER OF VISAS FOR FOREIGN TECHNICAL EXPERTS ASSISTING WITH ELECTION PREPARATION NOTING THAT THEY CURRENTLY MUST WORK ON TOURIST VISAS BECAUSE THE APPROPRIATE VISAS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. ALATAS UNDERTOOK TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM WITH "IN DEPTH" DIRECTIVES ENSURING THE PROPER VISAS WITH APPROPRIATE DURATION WOULD BE ISSUED.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B5

CONFIDENTIAL PTO6489

PAGE 01 STATE 121107 290051Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

121107
SOURCE: KODAKA.029030
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:RCLARKE -- 06/28/99 7-2543
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
EAP/PIMBS:ALUDWIG
----------DAAB2D 290052Z /38
O 290048Z JUN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 121107

STADIS

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/28/09
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 114

FOR DCM OWENS FROM PIMBS

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUG HARTWICK. REASON:
1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (C) CROWD CONTROL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 121107 290051Z

THANKS FOR THE UPDATE ON NGO'S. WE KNOW YOU'RE SHORT-HANDED NOW AND APPRECIATE THE HARD WORK. WE'VE ASKED THAT JERRY HARPER MAKE SURE THAT EMBASSY JAKARTA IS FULLY APPRISED IN ADVANCE OF THE NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE POLICE TRAINERS -- FROM INTERPRETERS TO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. HE PLANS TO E-MAIL MARK HUNTER WITH ALL QUESTIONS AND QUERIES AS THEY COME UP, CC-ING ICITAP AND THE DESK (ALEXIS LUDWIG). THIS WILL HELP AVOID UNPLEASANT LAST-MINUTE SURPRISES. PLEASE LET US KNOW IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS THAT AREN'T GETTING ANSWERED. BY THE WAY, ICITAP SAYS IT SENT OUT A MESSAGE LAST WEEK WITH THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 28 JUN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200503302

REQUESTED FUNDSITE FOR TRANSLATING THE TRAINING VIDEOTAPE. DID YOU RECEIVE IT?

2. (C) INDONESIA THINK PIECE

[redacted] B1, B5

3. (C) YOUR VIEWS ON A/S ROTH TRIP TO EAST TIMOR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 121107 290051Z

ON ANOTHER TOPIC, WE FORWARDED ROTH'S REQUEST FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S THOUGHTS ON ANOTHER ISSUE IN OUR O/I 112. ROTH WOULD APPRECIATE THE AMBASSADOR'S VIEWS ON A POTENTIAL ROTH VISIT TO EAST TIMOR IN MID-JULY, PERHAPS ACCOMPANIED BY CINCPAC ADMIRAL BLAIR, LTGEN EDWARD SMITH, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE U.S. ARMY PACIFIC REGION, OR ANOTHER COMPARABLY RANKED OFFICIAL.

4. (C) EAST TIMOR MONEY

I LED A TEAM THAT DISCUSSED THE REPROGRAMMED $3.5 MILLION FOR UNAMET WITH SFRC STAFFER (LATIN AMERICA SUBCOMMITTEE) NORIEGA AND OTHERS TODAY. HIS CONCERN WAS THE SOURCE OF THE $3.5 MILLION FOR EAST TIMOR INCLUDED $600 THOUSAND ORIGINALLY DESTINED FOR A HAITI SECURITY DETAIL AND $1.53 MILLION IN UNALLOCATED FUNDS (WHICH MIGHT ALSO POTENTIALLY BE USED FOR HAITI). NORIEGA REQUESTED WRITTEN ANSWERS. WHILE NOBODY HAS PUT A HOLD FOR THESE EXTRANEOUS REASONS ON THE $3.5 MILLION FOR EAST TIMOR (FOR WHICH THE 15-DAY NOTIFICATION PERIOD EXPIRES JUNE 30), IT POTENTIALLY COULD HAPPEN, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A/S ROTH'S INTERVENTION. WE'LL KEEP YOU APPRISED.

5. (U) PRESS CLIPS

WE KNOW IT IS A BURDEN, BUT WE REALLY MISS THOSE PRESS

CLIPS THAT SUDDENLY STOPPED A FEW WEEKS AGO. INR AND WE READ THEM RELIGIOUSLY. ANY CHANCE WE CAN RE-INSTITUTE THEM? INTERNET ACCESS IS QUITE SPOTTY, UNFORTUNATELY.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 121107 290051Z
PICKERING

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ5768

PAGE 01 JAKART 03352 01 OF 02 120223Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AEX-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 UTED-00 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 SS-00 CCR-01 SAS-00
/004W

----------DF884C 120223Z /69

O 120015Z JUL 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8758
INFO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003352

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP, OTRA, ID
SUBJECT: UPDATE OF NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR A/S ROTH'S INDONESIA VISIT

REFS: A. SECSTATE 126881 B. JAKARTA 3319

FOLLOWING IS AN UPDATED NOTIONAL SCHEDULE AS OF JULY 9 FOR A/S ROTH'S VISIT TO INDONESIA JULY 13-17. EVENTS ARE TENTATIVE, EXCEPT WHERE INDICATED.

TUESDAY, JULY 13

0935 -- ARRIVE JAKARTA VIA SILKAIR 202

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 03352 01 OF 02 120223Z

1000 -- MEET WITH AMBASSADOR ROY AND EMBASSY STAFF

1100 -- FOREIGN MINISTER ALI ALATAS

1200 -- LUNCH WITH UN DEP. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FRANCESC VENDRELL, AT DCM'S RESIDENCE.

1300 -- GENERAL WIRANTO, MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY

1430 -- XANANA GUSMAO, SALEMBA

1600 -- PRESIDENT HABIBIE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200503302

1800 -- TEA WITH MEGAWATI AND LAKSAMANA SUKARDI, AT DCM'S RESIDENCE (JOINT WITH TREASURY U/S GEITHNER)

2000 -- DINNER WITH ECONOMIC COORDINATING MINISTER GINANDJAR AND OTHER MINISTERS (JOINT WITH U/S GEITHNER)

RON -- JAKARTA (AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE)

WEDNESDAY, JULY 14

0830 -- HAMZA HAZ, CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP)

1000 -- RUDINI, CHAIRMAN OF THE KPU

1200 -- LUNCH WITH KEY AMBASSADORS: AUSTRALIA, SINGAPORE, UK, JAPAN, AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE

1430 -- GUS DUR, NU CHAIRMAN

2045 -- DEPART FOR DENPASAR, GARUDA 880; MET AT DENPASAR BY AMERICAN CONSULAR AGENT ANDY TOTH, TEL (62-361) 233-605, FAX (62-361) 222-426, HOME (62-361) 281-427, HAND PHONE (62) 081-238-02540

RON -- DENPASAR. HOTEL RESERVATIONS AT BALI HILTON, NUSA DUA (62-361) 771-102, FAX: (62-361) 771-616, RATE IS $90/NIGHT

PLUS 21 PER CENT TAX AND SERVICE, BREAKFAST INCLUDED.

THURSDAY, JULY 15

0940 -- DEPART DENPASAR ON MERPATI 642

1130 -- ARRIVE DILI VIA MERPATI 642, MET BY GARY GRAY

1230 -- LUNCH WITH AUSTRALIAN CONSUL GENERAL JAMES BATLEY

1400 -- MEETING WITH GOVERNOR ABILIO SOARES

1500 -- MEETING WITH MILITARY COMMANDER TONO SURATMAN OR GEN. ZACKY ANWAR

1700 -- MEETING WITH BISHOP BELO (CONFIRMED)

1800 -- MEETING WITH ICRC REPRESENTATIVE

1900 -- DINNER WITH UNAMET CHIEF IAN MARTIN

(CONTACT NUMBER IN DILI, HANDPHONE 0816-935-772, HANDPHONE NOT OPERABLE OUTSIDE DILI)

FRIDAY, JULY 16

0830 -- MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR AGUS TARMIDZI, CHIEF OF DFA TASK FORCE

1000 -- DEPART FOR BAUCAU

1300 -- ARRIVE BAUCAU, MEETING WITH BISHOP BASILIO

1500 -- DEPART FOR DILI

1800 -- ARRIVE DILI

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AEX-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	ADS-00	SSO-00	SS-00	CCR-01	SAS-00
	/004W						

----------DF884D 120223Z /69

O 120015Z JUL 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8759
INFO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003352

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP, OTRA, ID
SUBJECT: UPDATE OF NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR A/S ROTH'S INDONESIA VISIT

SATURDAY, JULY 17

0900 -- MEETING WITH PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS

1000 -- MEETING WITH CNRT REPRESENTATIVES

1225 -- DEPART DILI VIA MERPATI 643

1420 -- ARRIVE DENPASAR

1600 --- RETURN TO JAKARTA

2330 --- DEPART FOR TOKYO VIA JAL

ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO9603

PAGE 01 JAKART 03319 090136Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AEX-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 UTED-00 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 SS-00 CCR-01 SAS-00
/004W

----------DEA43A 090136Z /64

O 090004Z JUL 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8720
INFO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

UNCLAS JAKARTA 003319

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP, OTRA, ID
SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR A/S ROTH

REF: SECSTATE 126881

1. (U) EMBASSY WELCOMES THE VISIT OF A/S ROTH AND CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON DAVID KEEGAN TO INDONESIA, JULY 13-17. CONTROL OFFICER FOR A/S ROTH'S VISIT IS POLOFF IAN MCCARY, TEL. (62-21) 344-2211; FAX 380-5583; HOME: 722-0127; CELLULAR (0816) 935765. ALTERNATE CONTACT POINT IS ACTING POLCOUNS WILLIAM PIERCE, TEL. 344-2211 EXT. 2146; HOME: 314-4302.

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR JAKARTA

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 03319 090136Z

2. (U) BELOW IS A NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR A/S ROTH'S VISIT TO JAKARTA. ALL EVENTS ARE TENTATIVE AT THIS POINT.

TUESDAY, JULY 13, 1999

0935 ARRIVE VIA SILKAIR 202

1000 MEET WITH AMBASSADOR ROY AND EMBASSY STAFF

1100 FOREIGN MINISTER ALI ALATAS

1300 GEN. WIRANTO, MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200503302

1430 XANANA GUSMAO, SALEMBA

1600 PRESIDENT HABIBIE

1800 TEA WITH MEGAWATI AND LAKSAMANA SUKARDI AT THE DCM'S RESIDENCE

2000 DINNER WITH ECONOMIC COORDINATING MINISTER GINANDJAR, AND OTHER INDONESIAN MINISTERS AND (JOINT WITH U/S GEITNER)

RON JAKARTA (AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE)

WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 1999

0830 HAMZA HAZ, CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT

PARTY (PPP)

1000 RUDINI, CHAIRMAN OF THE KPU

1200 LUNCH WITH KEY AMBASSADORS: AUSTRALIA, SINGAPORE,

UK, JAPAN AT AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE

1400 GUS DUR, NU CHAIRMAN

1600 FAISAL BASRI, CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL MANDATE

2045 DEPART FOR DO

RON DENPASSAR (L

THURSDAY, JULY 15
DEPART FOR DILI, BE MET BY POLOFF
T TIMOR PROGRAM (SCHEDULE PRDAY, JULY 17

1330 DEPART DILI

1600 RETURN TO JAKARTA

2330 DEPART FOR TOKYO VIA JAL 726

SCHEDULE NOTES: AMIEN RAIS, MARZUKI DARUSMAN, AND DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR WILL ALL BE IN SINGAPORE JULY 13-14. ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 03319 090136Z

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

EAP

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

JUL 13 1999

Dear Mr. Wolf:

Thank you for your letter of June 23 to Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth concerning the situation in East Timor. We share your deep interest and that of your congressional colleagues in ensuring that the United Nations has every opportunity to conduct a credible referendum in August to determine the views of East Timorese on their future. We also agree that the international community must insist that Indonesia live up to its obligations to ensure security and create a climate for the vote that is free of coercion and intimidation.

The United States has a critical role to play in helping bring about peaceful resolution of this long-standing issue. In close collaboration with Congress, we are providing more than $10 million in support to the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), and Americans are participating in the civilian police and military liaison officer components of the mission. Assistant Secretary Roth is personally in frequent contact with the UNAMET Mission directly and with the Secretary General's Personal Representative on East Timor Ambassador Jamsheed Marker.

In response to the unacceptable security situation in East Timor, we have publicly and privately pressed the Indonesian government to rein in and disarm the militias. As you know, Secretary Albright, Defense Secretary Cohen, and other senior USG and military officials have repeatedly raised the issue of human rights abuses by the Indonesian military and pro-integration militias with senior officials of the Indonesian government. We will continue these efforts.

I thank you for your constructive suggestion that Assistant Secretary Roth visit East Timor, perhaps accompanied by a senior U.S. military officer. He is seriously considering such a trip in the immediate future.

The Honorable
Frank R. Wolf,
House of Representatives.

H- NO #

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200503302

We appreciate working with you on East Timor. Please do not hesitate to contact us again if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Congressional Reply to Rep. Frank R. Wolf 6/23/99 Letter Re: A/S Roth Visit to E. Timor

Draft:EAP/PIMBS:MMadia x7-2543 6/30/99
O:\Indonesia\East Timor\Cong. Wolf-SOR, E. Timor, Jun 30.doc

Clearances:EAP:SRoth
:EAP:SBoyce
:EAP/PIMBS:DHartwick/JAloisi/RClarke (ok)
:EAP/RSP:DKeegan (info)
:DRL:SSutton (ok)
:H:DPittman (info)
:S/P:MLandweber (ok)

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9789

PAGE 01 JAKART 01797 01 OF 02 120855Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 UTED-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 M-00
DRL-02 SAS-00 /004W
----------BA7CD0 120855Z /38

O 120833Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 7150
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001797

SENSITIVE

TOKYO PLEASE PASS TO EAP A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OTRA, ID
SUBJECT: UPDATED SCHEDULE FOR A/S ROTH'S VISIT TO INDONESIA

REF: (A) STATE 66478 (NOTAL); (B) JAKARTA 1781

1. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS POSED IN REF A:

-- UNDP MEETING: THE MEETING WITH UNDP RESREP RAVI RAJAN IS ON APRIL 16 RATHER THAN APRIL 14 BECAUSE RAJAN IS OUT OF TOWN APRIL 13-15. A MEETING WITH UNDP STAFF WITHOUT

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 01797 01 OF 02 120855Z
HIM WOULD NOT BE ALL THAT USEFUL.

-- DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR: WE THINK THE PROTOCOL QUESTION CAN BE FINESSED IF THE MEETING WITH HER TAKES PLACE AFTER A POSSIBLE HABIBIE MEETING. WE ARE EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING WITH HER THURSDAY OR FRIDAY AFTERNOON.

-- ACEH/IRIAN: WE HAVE ALERTED ACEHNESE AND IRIANESE INTERLOCUTORS ABOUT A/S ROTH'S INTEREST IN MEETING BUT HAVE NOT YET SUGGESTED SPECIFIC TIMES UNTIL WE HAVE A BETTER SENSE WHEN THE GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL LEADERS, AND EAST TIMOR MEETINGS WILL BE. WE HOPE TO HAVE A BETTER IDEA BY TOMORROW.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200503302

-- BAMBANG YUDHOYONO: FOR PROTOCOL REASONS, BAMBANG WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO A SEPARATE MEETING IF A WIRANTO MEETING COMES THROUGH. BAMBANG MIGHT JOIN A WIRANTO MEETING, HOWEVER. IF WIRANTO CANNOT MEET ROTH, THEN BAMBANG CAN BE PURSUED AS A SUBSTITUTE.

-- INDONESIAN ELECTION-MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS: WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR WHAT THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE FACING AS THEY PREPARE FOR THE ELECTIONS AND TO URGE THEM TO INTENSIFY THEIR ORGANIZING EFFORTS. THIS MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ONE-HOUR SESSION WITH U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE GROUPS.

-- AMIEN RAIS OUT OF TOWN: AMIEN'S STAFF TOLD US TODAY THAT AS IT TURNS OUT HE WILL BE IN MANADO APRIL 14-15 AND

GOES DIRECTLY TO YOGYAKARTA APRIL 16. IF A/S ROTH WISHES, WE COULD PURSUE A MEETING WITH PAN SECRETARY GENERAL FAISAL BASRI, WHO IS ALSO GOOD VALUE.

2. SCHEDULE.

NOTE LUNCH WITH MARZUKI DARUSMAN (APRIL 15) AND MEETING WITH FEISAL TANJUNG (APRIL 16) ARE NOW CONFIRMED.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14

0850 ARRIVE ON SQ-152. MET BY CONTROL OFFICER GREG FERGIN AND EXPEDITER.

1000 ELECTIONS BRIEFING WITH USAID AND U.S. NGO'S. (CONFIRMED)

1115 MEETING WITH INDONESIAN ELECTION-MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS (PROPOSED).

1230 LUNCH WITH FOREIGN AMBASSADORS (CONFIRMED).

1430 INDONESIAN ELECTIONS COMMISSION (REQUESTED).

1600 MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI (REQUESTED).

1730 IRIANESE LEADERS (PROPOSED)

THURSDAY, APRIL 15

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 01797 01 OF 02 120855Z

0700 MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS SYARWAN HAMID (TIME PROPOSED BY MINISTER'S STAFF).

0830 IN PLACE AT PRESIDENTIAL PALACE.

0900 PRESIDENT HABIBIE (REQUESTED).

LIKELY PRESS ENCOUNTER FOLLOWING PRESIDENTIAL MEETING.

1100 MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALATAS (REQUESTED).

1230 LUNCH WITH HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHAIRMAN AND GOLKAR LEADER MARZUKI DARUSMAN (CONFIRMED).

1400 MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY/ARMED FORCES COMMANDER GEN. WIRANTO (REQUESTED).

TBD AMIEN RAIS (REQUESTED).

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9790

PAGE 01 JAKART 01797 02 OF 02 120855Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 UTED-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 M-00
USIE-00 SAS-00 /002W

----------BA7CD2 120855Z /38

O 120833Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 7151
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001797

SENSITIVE

TOKYO PLEASE PASS TO EAP A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OTRA, ID
SUBJECT: UPDATED SCHEDULE FOR A/S ROTH'S VISIT TO INDONESIA

TBD DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR (REQUESTED)

TBD MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF ACEHNESE COMMUNITY IN JAKARTA.

1900 DINNER WITH SENIOR INDONESIANS (CONFIRMED).

0730 COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS FEISAL TANJUNG (CONFIRMED).

0900 ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (CONFIRMED).

1045 PRESS CONFERENCE AT USIS AUDITORIUM (CONFIRMED).

1200 LUNCH WITH ANA GOMES, CHIEF OF PORTUGUESE INTERESTS SECTION (CONFIRMED).

1400 XANANA GUSMAO (REQUESTED).

1500 UNDP RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE RAVI RAJAN (CONFIRMED).

(CONTINGENCY TIME AVAILABLE FOR MEETINGS NOTED ABOVE WHICH COULD NOT BE SCHEDULED EARLIER IN THE WEEK.)

1830 DEPART FOR AIRPORT.

2000 DEPART FOR SINGAPORE ON SQ-163.

ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8276 RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 066478 100035Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00 OIC-02 SAS-00
/003R

066478
SOURCE: KODAKB.010019
DRAFTED BY: EAP/FO:CCARVIS:CCA; FO/CCARVIS/TELINDONESIASCHED -- 04/09/
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DHARTWICK
----------BA0D4B 100035Z /38
O 100034Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 066478

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OTRA, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH SCHEDULE

REF: (A) JAKARTA 1781, (B) STATE 64283

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE TREAT ACCORDINGLY.

2. SUMMARY: REF A CONVEYS A NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR A/S ROTH'S UPCOMING VISIT TO INDONESIA. THANK YOU FOR YOUR EFFORTS IN SO SHORT A TIME PERIOD. ON THE WHOLE, THE SCHEDULE LOOKS LIKE IT IS SHAPING UP NICELY. WE DO, HOWEVER, HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS. END
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 066478 100035Z
SUMMARY.

UNDP MEETING

3. IN ORDER TO HAVE THE MOST ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATION WITH WHICH TO PRESS THE FOREIGN AMBASSADORS, A/S ROTH WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH THE UNDP PRIOR TO MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADORS. PRESENTLY THE UNDP MEETING IS AT THE END OF A/S ROTH'S SCHEDULE. UNLESS THERE IS A

COMPELLING REASON FOR THIS PLACEMENT, WE SUGGEST THE UNDP MEETING PRECEDE THE MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADORS.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2006 200503302

MEETING PRIORITIES

4. FROM THE PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE, WE DO NOT SEE INDIVIDUAL MEETINGS WITH DEWI ANWAR, BAMBANG YUDHOYONO, AND GINANDJAR, OR GROUP MEETINGS ON THE THEMES OF ACEH OR IRIAN. IF POSSIBLE, ACKNOWLEDGING THE INHERENT PROTOCOL PROBLEMS, A/S ROTH IS PARTICULARLY KEEN TO MEET INDIVIDUALLY WITH DEWI ANWAR. IS THERE A SPECIFIC REASON WHY NEITHER THE ACEH NOR IRIAN FOCUSSED MEETINGS CAN BE ACCOMMODATED IN THE SCHEDULE? BAMBANG AND GINANDJAR REMAIN LESSER PRIORITIES.

5. WE NOTE SUGGESTIONS FOR A MEETING WITH INDONESIAN ELECTION MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS AND A DINNER WITH SENIOR INDONESIANS. A/S ROTH IS VERY PLEASED WITH THE SUGGESTED PARTICIPANTS FOR THE DINNER WITH SENIOR INDONESIANS AND LOOKS FORWARD TO THAT EVENT. HOWEVER, THE UTILITY OF A MEETING WITH INDONESIAN ELECTION MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS

SHOULD BE WEIGHED AGAINST THE PRIORITIES NOTED ABOVE. ALSO, IN ORDER TO BETTER ACCOMMODATE AS MANY MEETINGS AS POSSIBLE, WE ASSUME THAT THE INITIAL EMBASSY BRIEFING WILL BE NO LONGER THAN ONE HOUR.

PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

6. WE CONCUR WITH YOUR SUGGESTIONS ON PRESS ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING A BRIEF PRESS AVAILABILITY AFTER MEETING WITH THE ELECTIONS COMMISSION, AND PRESS CONFERENCE NEAR CONCLUSION OF VISIT.
ALBRIGHT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ5734

PAGE 01 JAKART 01781 01 OF 02 091113Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 UTED-00 IM-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00
M-00 USIE-00 DRL-02 SAS-00 /005W
----------B9B589 091124Z /38

O 091053Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7135
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001781

SENSITIVE

FOR EAP A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OTRA, ID

SUBJECT: NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR A/S ROTH'S VISIT TO INDONESIA

REF: (A) STATE 62500; (B) JAKARTA 1742

1. SCHEDULE

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR A/S ROTH'S APRIL 14-16 VISIT TO

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 01781 01 OF 02 091113Z
JAKARTA FOLLOWS BELOW. EVENTS ARE NOT/NOT CONFIRMED UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED. PLEASE NOTE THAT ROTH WILL LIKELY ENCOUNTER PRESS AFTER HIS MEETING WITH THE ELECTION COMMISSION APRIL 14 AND FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE (ASSUMING THE LATTER TAKES PLACE), AND THAT WE ARE PROPOSING HE HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE NEAR THE END OF HIS VISIT. ACTION REQUESTED PARA 3.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14

0850 ARRIVE ON SQ-152. MET BY CONTROL OFFICER GREG FERGIN AND EXPEDITER.

1000 ELECTIONS BRIEFING WITH USAID AND U.S. NGO'S.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2006 200503302

(CONFIRMED)

1230 LUNCH WITH FOREIGN AMBASSADORS (CONFIRMED).

1430 INDONESIAN ELECTIONS COMMISSION (REQUESTED).

1600 MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI (REQUESTED).

TBD INDONESIAN ELECTION MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS.

THURSDAY, APRIL 15

0700 MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS SYARWAN HAMID (TIME PROPOSED BY MINISTER'S STAFF).

0830 IN PLACE AT PRESIDENTIAL PALACE.

0900 PRESIDENT HABIBIE (REQUESTED).

LIKELY PRESS ENCOUNTER FOLLOWING PRESIDENTIAL MEETING.

1100 MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALATAS (REQUESTED).

1230 LUNCH WITH HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHAIRMAN AND GOLKAR LEADER MARZUKI DARUSMAN (REQUESTED).

1400 MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY/ARMED FORCES COMMANDER GEN. WIRANTO (REQUESTED).

TBD AMIEN RAIS (REQUESTED).

1900 DINNER WITH SENIOR INDONESIANS.

GUEST LIST INCLUDES ARIFIN SIREGAR, EMIL SALIM, SARWONO KUSUMAATMADJA, SISWONO YUDOHUSODO, FRANS SEDA, MOHAMMAD SADLI, MAR'IE MUHAMMAD, A.R. RAMLI, NURCHOLIS MADJID, AND JUSUF WANANDI.

FRIDAY

0730 COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS FEISAL TANJUNG (PROPOSED BY MINISTER'S STAFF).

0900 ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (CONFIRMED).

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 01781 01 OF 02 091113Z
1100 PRESS CONFERENCE AT USIS AUDITORIUM (PROPOSED).

1200 LUNCH WITH ANA GOMES, CHIEF OF PORTUGUESE INTERESTS SECTION (CONFIRMED).

1400 XANANA GUSMAO (REQUESTED).

1500 UNDP RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE RAVI RAJAN (CONFIRMED).

1830 DEPART FOR AIRPORT.

2000 DEPART FOR SINGAPORE ON SQ-163.

2. PRESS ARRANGEMENTS.

ELECTIONS COMMISSION: COMMISSION CHAIRMAN RUDINI HAS CULTIVATED THE PRESS IN ORDER TO BUILD THE COMMISSION'S STATURE, AND AS A RESULT THERE IS A LARGE RESIDENT PRESS CONTINGENT AT THE COMMISSION THAT DESCENDS ON VISITORS AFTER THEIR MEETINGS WITH COMMISSION MEMBERS. OPTIONS ARE 1) BEING SWARMED BY THE PRESS ON DEPARTURE FROM THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ5735

PAGE 01 JAKART 01781 02 OF 02 091113Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 UTED-00 IM-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00
M-00 USIE-00 SAS-00 /003W
----------B9B592 091124Z /38
O 091053Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7136
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001781

SENSITIVE

FOR EAP A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OTRA, ID

SUBJECT: NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR A/S ROTH'S VISIT TO INDONESIA

COMMISSION AND ANSWERING A FEW QUESTIONS WHILE MOVING TOWARD DEPARTURE VEHICLE; OR 2) HAVING A BRIEF PRESS AVAILABILITY IN A ROOM MADE AVAILABLE BY THE COMMISSION. WE RECOMMEND THE LATTER.

PRESIDENTIAL MEETING: THE PALACE PRESS CORPS STAKES OUT VISITORS TO PRESIDENT HABIBIE UNLESS PRIOR ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR A PRESS AVAILABILITY IN THE PALACE PRESS ROOM. WE RECOMMEND THAT ROTH NOT/NOT HAVE A PRESS BRIEFING THERE, BUT RATHER WAIT UNTIL THE END OF HIS VISIT FOR A FULL-SCALE PRESS CONFERENCE (SEE BELOW). WE WOULD INFORM PRESS WHO STAKE OUT THE PALACE ABOUT THE PRESS CONFERENCE SO THAT ROTH NEED NOT ANSWER QUESTIONS AT THE PALACE.

PRESS CONFERENCE: IN ORDER TO DRAW MAXIMUM LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL COVERAGE NEAR THE END OF HIS VISIT, WE RECOMMEND THAT ROTH HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE USIS AUDITORIUM LATE MORNING OF FRIDAY, APRIL 16. THIS WILL INSURE LOCAL BROADCAST COVERAGE AS WELL AS PRINT COVERAGE.

3. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE ADVISE A/S ROTH'S REACTION TO SCHEDULE AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED ABOVE.

ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8617

PAGE 01 JAKART 01742 071032Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 UTED-00 IM-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00
SAS-00 /003W
----------B8A417 071040Z /38

O 071010Z APR 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7100
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

UNCLAS JAKARTA 001742

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OTRA, JA, ID, SN (ROTH, STANLEY)
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH'S APRIL 14-16 VISIT TO INDONESIA

REF: STATE 62500

1. EMBASSY WELCOMES A/S ROTH'S ANDMS. ARVIS' VISIT. CONTROL

OFFICER WILL BE LABATT GREG FERGIN, OFFICE TELEPHONE 62-21-344-211, EXT. 2146, FAX 386-2259, E-MAIL "FERGINGG(A)JAKARTAC.US-STATE.GOV", HOME TELEPHONE 314-Q302.

2. EMBASSY WILL PROVIDE NOTIONAL SCHEDULE AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE A/S ROTH'S LIST OFAPPOINTMENT REQUESTS.

ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 01742 071032Z

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2006 200503302

UNCLASSIFIED PTO3983 RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 062500 060241Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 ADS-00
OPIC-01 SSO-00 SS-00 FMP-00 CCR-01 SAS-00 /004R

062500
SOURCE: KODAKB.006051
DRAFTED BY: EAP/FO:JPHYLAND -- 07/18/98 647-6921
APPROVED BY: EAP:SOROTH
EAP/FO:JPHYLAND

----------B7FEEE 060241Z /38
O 060240Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 062500

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP, JA, ID, SN (ROTH, STANLEY)
SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE REQUEST: A/S ROTH TRAVEL TO JAPAN, INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE, APRIL 10-18, 1999

1. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY ROTH, WHO PLANS TO TRAVEL ON CONSULTATIONS TO JAPAN, INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE, APRIL 10-18, 1999. HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY CONSTANCE ARVIS, EAP SPEECHWRITER/INCOMING SPECIAL ASSISTANT.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 062500 060241Z
2. ROTH AND ARVIS WILL DEPART WASHINGTON, DC, ON SATURDAY, APRIL 10, ARRIVING IN TOKYO/NARITA AT 1500 ON APRIL 11, VIA UA 881. THEY WILL DEPART TOKYO APRIL 13 AT 1910 ON CL 11, ARRIVING IN SINGAPORE AT 0100 ON APRIL 14. PLEASE ARRANGE HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS FOR ROTH AND ARVIS AT A HOTEL INSIDE THE AIRPORT. THEY WILL DEPART SINGAPORE AT 0800 APRIL 14 ON CL 152, ARRIVING JAKARTA 0830. ROTH AND ARVIS ACCEPT AMBASSADOR ROY'S GRACIOUS OFFER TO STAY AT THE RESIDENCE THE NIGHTS OF APRIL 14 AND 15. THEY WILL DEPART JAKARTA APRIL 16 AT 2000 ON CL 163 FOR SINGAPORE, ARRIVING AT 2230. PLEASE RESERVE HOTEL ROOMS AT THE REGENT HOTEL THE NIGHTS OF APRIL 16 AND 17. THEY WILL DEPART SINGAPORE FOR WASHINGTON, DC ON UA 890 AT 0725 VIA TOKYO/NARITA ON APRIL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2006 200503302

18. PLEASE MEET AND ASSIST DURING TOKYO, JAKARTA AND SINGAPORE STOPS. HOWEVER, ROTH DOES NOT/NOT REQUEST ASSISTANCE FOR OVERNIGHT IN SINGAPORE ON APRIL 14 (NIGHT OF APRIL 13), OR FOR TOKYO TRANSIT APRIL 18.

3. PLEASE PROVIDE NAMES AND CONTACT INFORMATION FOR CONTROL OFFICERS AT EACH POST. WE ARE SENDING REQUESTS FOR APPOINTMENTS AT EACH STOP BY SEPARATE CHANNEL.

4. WE APPRECIATE YOUR COOPERATION.
ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ1141

PAGE 01 STATE 033866 240248Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

033866
SOURCE: KODAKC.024041
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PTMBS:VEMURRAY:VEM -- 02/23/99 7-1823
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK
----------A6BC88 240249Z /38
O 240248Z FEB 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 033866

OFFICIAL INFORMAL, SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 32

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

1. (SBU) MULADI/MADJID VISIT UPDATES

A/S ROTH IS SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH MINISTER MULADI THURSDAY. SO TOO IS JOHN HARRIS, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 033866 240248Z
WE'LL PUT TOGETHER SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR HARRIS. ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO WILL DROP BY THAT MEETING FOR A FIVE-MINUTE PHOTO OP. EB INVITED AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN TO SIT ON ONE OF THE CORRUPTION CONFERENCE PANELS, BUT THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT MINISTER MULADI MIGHT BE WILLING TO DO IT. WE'RE WAITING TO HEAR FROM EB WHETHER THEY'VE ISSUED THAT INVITATION, AND WHETHER MULADI HAS ACCEPTED.

MADJID IS NOW ON FOR TOMORROW, WEDNESDAY AT 11AM, USINDO ON THURSDAY.

2. (SBU) LARSON MEETINGS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200503302

ASSISTANT SECRETARY LARSON IS WILLING TO MEET WITH THE INDIVIDUALS YOU SUGGEST (BOEDIONO AND KUNTORO.) HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT HE PROBABLY WON'T JOIN THREE OF THE SECRETARY'S EVENTS (GUSMAO, POLITICAL LEADERS GATHERING, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY ROUNDTABLE) HE WONDERS WHETHER YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO ARRANGE ONE ADDITIONAL MEETING, WITH COORDINATING MINISTER GINANDJAR. HE COULD FOLLOW UP ON SOCIAL SAFETY NET AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES AS APPROPRIATE, OR ON ISSUES THAT DEPSEC SUMMERS WAS NOT ABLE TO COVER IN HIS MEETINGS IN JAKARTA. A/S LARSON SAID HE IS WILLING TO FOLLOW AMBASSADOR ROY'S ADVICE ON WHETHER THERE IS VALUE TO HIS MEETING GINANDJAR.

3. (SBU) LEGAL ADVISER APPOINTMENTS

THE LEGAL ADVISER, DAVID ANDREWS, WILL ALSO BE ACCOMPANYING THE SECRETARY ON HER TRIP TO CHINA, THAILAND AND INDONESIA. HE HAS ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE

AND APPROPRIATE TO SET UP SIDE MEETINGS WITH HIS COUNTERPART(S). IN THIS CONNECTION, WHO WOULD HIS COUNTERPART(S) BE? IS THERE A LEGAL ADVISER TO THE MFA? WOULD YOU SUGGEST HE MEET WITH MINISTER MULADI OR THK ATTORNEY GENERAL? HOW SHOULD WE PROCEED?

4. (U) EXIM APPOINTMENTS

FAHMILA IMAM AT EXIM HAS ASKED FOR A COPY OF THE SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS THAT BRUCE PARASOL HAS ARRANGED FOR THE EXIM TEAM TRAVELLING TO JAKARTA. COULD YOU PLEASE FAX THEM TO HER?

5. (U) SFRC HEARING RESCHEDULED - SORT OF

THE EAP SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SFRC WILL HOLD ITS HEARING ON INDONESIA EITHER 18 OR 25 MARCH. A/S ROTH WILL TESTIFY.

6. (U) RAIS VISIT

COULD YOU PLEASE PROVIDE A CONTACT NUMBER IN JAKARTA FOR AMIEN RAIS THAT WE COULD PASS ALONG TO THE FRONT OFFICE? THEY'D LIKE TO ARRANGE A TIME FOR RAIS TO MEET WITH A/S

ROTH THE SECOND WEEK IN MARCH. WE PROMISE WE'LL HOLD ON TO THE NUMBER THIS TIME...

7. (U) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

DRL HAS ACCEPTED YOUR MOST RECENT COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS.

8. (U) UNDP AND PLEDGING CONF

IN HIS ABSENCE, I CALLED UNDP ASST ADMINISTRATOR NAY THUN'S DEPUTY MAXINE OLSON AT UNDP NEW YORK TO PRESS HER ON AN PLEDGING CONFERENCE UPDATE. SHE WAS NOT PARTICULARLY UP TO DATE ON NAY THUN'S/ RAVI RAJAN'S LATEST EFFORTS IN JAKARTA. I TOLD HER WE WERE STILL KEEN ON A CONFERENCE, THAT AMB ROY HAD GOTTEN A GREEN LIGHT FROM HABIBIE, THAT WE WERE MAKING SOME PLEDGING PROGRESS ELSEWHERE (EU'S RECENT INCREASE TO 6 MILLION), BUT WE NEEDED UNDP TO GIVE AN ORGANIZATIONAL PUSH TO LAUNCH THIS BABY. SHE PROMISED TO UPDATE HERSELF WITH RAVI AND GET BACK TO ME, PROBABLY TOMORROW. I E-MAILED TERRY WITH THE SAME MESSAGE.

9. (U) INR TRAVEL

FOR GARY GRAY: KATHY KERR'S TRAVEL PLANS ARE COMING TOGETHER. AS THINGS NOW STAND, SHE PLANS TO BE IN MANILA MARCH 22-25, TRAVEL TO SINGAPORE FOR A DAY, THEN BE IN JAKARTA FROM MARCH 27 THROUGH 30. SHE ASKS WHETHER YOU FORESEE ANY PROBLEMS WITH THE DATES (WE THINK ID AL ADHA MAY FALL IN THERE SOMEWHERE.) SHE WILL SEND A COUNTRY CLEARANCE CABLE AT A LATER DATE.
PICKERING

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3307

PAGE 01 STATE 031848 200144Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

031848
SOURCE: KODAKA.020074
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:VEMURRAY:VEM -- 02/19/99 7-L823
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK
----------A54B8A 200146Z /38
O 200144Z FEB 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 031848

OFFICIAL INFORMAL, SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 30

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

1. (SRU) TRIP PREPARATIONS

A/S ROTH IS SCHEDULED TO CONDUCT HIS PRE-BRIEF WITH THE SECRETARY ON MONDAY AM. WE ANTICIPATE HE WILL GET ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SPEECH AT THAT TIME. ANY

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 031848 200144Z
UPDATES TO THE VISIT PREPS THAT YOU CAN PROVIDE WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL BY OUR OOB.

NEEDLESS TO SAY, AS THE TRIP DATE APPROACHES EVER NEARER, WE'RE PREDICTING A EXPLOSION OF URGENCY FROM THE SEVENTH FLOOR ON GETTING ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT SPECIFIC EVENTS. THE FIRST SALVO CAME TODAY. S/S DEPUTY EXEC SEC ROSE LIKINS SAID THAT ALL OF THE "ROUNDTABLE" EVENTS FOR THE SECRETARY'S UPCOMING TRIP TO CHINA, THAILAND AND INDONESIA NEED TO HAVE THEIR PROPOSED GUEST LISTS CAREFULLY CLEARED IN THE BUILDING (WITH EB, DRL, L ETC.). SHE ASKS THAT POSTS PROVIDE PROPOSED INPUT NLT MONDAY.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2006 200503302

FOR YOUR PURPOSES THAT WOULD MEAN THE POLITICAL LEADERS' RECEPTION AND THE DEMOCRACY/HUMAN RIGHTS ROUND TABLE. WE OF COURSE HAVE YOUR OL SUGGESTIONS (BUT NO SOR REACTION) BUT NOW WOULD LIKE THE `FOR REAL' PROPOSED GUESTLISTS.

ROSE ALSO SAID THAT S STAFF IS LOOKING TO GET A SENSE OF WHAT HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS (BOTH US AND FOREIGN) WILL BE IN THE COUNTRIES SHORTLY BEFORE, DURING, AND SHORTLY AFTER THE TRIP. WE'VE ALERTED THEM TO THE SUMMERS AND DOWNER/ AUSTRALIAN MINISTERS' TRIPS NEXT WEEK. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE WE SHOULD BE AWARE OF?

2. (SBU) NAMRU ISSUES

PM PROMISES TO TAKE CARE OF GETTING YOU A RESPONSE EARLY NEXT WEEK. THEY SUGGEST THAT THE AMBASSADOR TAKE THE NAMRU COMMANDER WITH HIM TO ISSUE AN INVITATION TO MIN HEALTH AND HIS STAFF AS WELL AS ANY OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES TO

VISIT THIS FACILITY.

3. (U) POLITICAL FSN TRAINING

THOUGH FSI WILL NOT MAKE ITS DECISION ON NOMINEES FOR A FEW MORE WEEKS, PEG WILLINGHAM SEEMS FAVORABLY DISPOSED TO INCLUDING KUS WAHYUNI IN THE CLASS ON THE BASIS OF THE VERY STRONG RECOMMENDATION YOU SENT IN. JIM SEEVERS SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED AN E-MAIL FROM HER WITH THE SAME MESSAGE.

4. (SBU) AUSSIE TALKS

YOU WILL RECALL THAT AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY ASHTON CALVERT WILL LEAD A SMALL DELEGATION TO THE STATES NEXT WEEK FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON, PRIMARILY, INDONESIA. HE HAS A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR NANCY SODERBERG AT THE UN ON MONDAY AFTERNOON TO TALK EAST TIMOR. A/S ROTH WILL ATTEMPT TO BRIEF HER BY PHONE IN ADVANCE OF THAT MEETING. ROTH WILL HOST A LUNCH FOR THE DELEGATION WEDNESDAY, THEN LEAD A 3 HOUR DISCUSSION ON THURSDAY AFTERNOON. WE UNDERSTAND THAT YOU AND A/S ROTH MAY HAVE DISCUSSED THIS LAST NIGHT(YOUR FRIDAY MORNING), BUT HE WANTED TO ME TO REITERATE THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED BASED UPON HIS RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH FM DOWNER, THAT THE AUSSIES WERE

FULLY ON BOARD WITH A PLEDGING CON~ERENCE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

5. (U) NURCHOLISH MADJID AGAIN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 031848 200144Z

WE HAVE GONE AROUND A FEW TIMES TODAY ABOUT MADJID'S BUSINESS TRAVEL DEMANDS AND LEARNED FROM EX TODAY THAT IF YOU WISH TO PURCHASE A BUSINESS CLASS TICKET WITH THE INL FUND CITE, AND ASSUMING THERE IS ENOUGH MONEY TO DO SO, IT IS WITHIN DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS SINCE THE FLIGHT IS OVER 14 HOURS. IF THERE ISN'T ENOUGH MONEY, IT BECOMES STICKIER SINCE INL AND SOMEONE ELSE HAVE TO AGREE TO SHARE THE COST. I KNOW THAT USIS HAS BEEN WORKING OVERTIME TO GET THIS TO HAPPEN TO GET MADJID HERE. IN THE MEANTIME, A/S ROTH STILL WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO GET AN APPOINTMENT CONFIRMED WITH HIM DURING HIS VISIT HERE.

6. (U) MULADI APPTS.

THE INDONESIAN EMBASSY HAS REQUESTED AN APPOINTMENT WITH S TODAY FOR MULADI BUT WILL GET A/S ROTH WHO IS KEEN TO GET TOGETHER. WE WILL PUT A MEMO FORWARD TO THE 7TH FLOOR BUT DO NOT EXPECT MUCH RESONANCE. WE WILL WORK YOUR ECON PIECES INTO BRIEFING MATERIAL FOR SOR AS WELL AS FARM IT AROUND TOWN FOR MULADI'S OTHER MEETINGS.

7. (U) SOR'S CONTROL OFFICER

CAN YOU LET US KNOW WHO WILL BE STANLEY'S CONTROL OFFICER ON THE TRIP, AND PROVIDE CONTACT INFO? SPECIAL ASSISTANT JASON HYLAND ALSO ASKS THAT YOU ARRANGE TO HAVE AN EAP CONTROL ROOM THAT STANLEY AND JASON CAN USE DURING THE VISIT.

TALBOTT

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 031848 200144Z

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ2981

PAGE 01 JAKART 00488 011045Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 UTED-00 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
M-00 OIC-02 USIE-00 SAS-00 /004W
----------9D5BC9 011045Z /38

O 011025Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5827
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS JAKARTA 000488

TOKYO PLEASE PASS TO A/S ROTH/JASON HYLAND

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OTRA, OVIP, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA SCHEDULE FOR FEBRUARY 2-5 VISIT OF A/S ROTH

1. FOLLOWING IS UPDATED SCHEDULE FOR VISIT FOR THE FEBRUARY 2-5 VISIT TO INDONESIA OF EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY ROTH AND EAP SPECIAL ASSISTANT JASON HYLAND. ALL MEETINGS ARE CONFIRMED UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED. EMBASSY CONTROL OFFICER IS POLOFF GARY GRAY. OFFICE TELEPHONE (62-21) 344-2211 EXT. 2282; HOME 392-6144; CELLULAR 081-693-5772; EMAIL GRAYWG@JAKARTAC.US-STATE.GOV.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 00488 011045Z

1625 - ARRIVE VIA JAPAN AIR FLIGHT 725
CONTROLOFF AND DCM WILL MEET UPON ARRIVAL.
PROCEED TO HOTEL (IF TIME PERMITS) OR DIRECTLY TO AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE

1800 - MEETING WITH MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI AT AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE

1900 - DINNER WITH FOREIGN AMBASSADORS/WORLD BANK (SINGAPORE, GERMANY, AUSTRALIA, U.K., JAPAN, PLUS WORLD BANK DIRECTOR DENNIS DETRAY)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2006 200503302

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3

0730 - BREAKFAST AT ARYADUTA HOTEL WITH MARZUKI DARUSMAN

0845 - COUNTRY TEAM BRIEFING, EMBASSY

1000 - MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE

1245 - DEPART FOR YOGYAKARTA ACCOMPANIED BY THE
- AMBASSADOR VIA GARUDA 432

1350 - ARRIVE YOGYAKARTA, MET BY SURABAYA CONSUL GENERAL
- BILL PIERCE

1430 - MEETING WITH SULTAN OF YOGYAKARTA

1800 - GENERAL ELECTRIC "LIGHTING UP" EVENT AT PRAMBANAN TEMPLE (RECEPTION FOLLOWED BY DANCE PERFORMANCE).

THE SULTAN, MINISTER OF TOURISM MARZUKI USMAN, AND MINISTER FOR STATE ENTERPRISES TANRI ABENG WILL ATTEND.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4

0730 - DEPART YOGYAKARTA VIA GA 203

0835 - ARRIVE JAKARTA

0915 - MEETING ON POLITICAL SITUATION WITH KEY EMBASSY
- OFFICERS, EMBASSY

1030 - MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS (NOT CONFIRMED)

1215 - MEETING WITH UNDP DIRECTOR RAVI RAJAN, AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE (TENTATIVE)

1300 - LUNCH WITH MEMBERS OF THE AID MISSION AND U.S. NGO'S ON ELECTION PREPARATIONS, AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE

1500 - MEETING WITH ADI SASONO

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 5

0900 - MEETING WITH GUS DUR (IN CIGANJUR, APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR'S DRIVE FROM THE RESIDENCE)

1100 - PRESS CONFERENCE AT USIS

1230 - LUNCH WITH IRIANESE LEADERS, DCM RESIDENCE

1600 - MEETING WITH ACEHNESE, POLCOUNS RESIDENCE
(TENTATIVE)

NOTE: STILL AWAITING CONFIRMATION ON MEETINGS WITH AKBAR TANJUNG, GENERAL WIRANTO, AND XANANA GUSMAO.

1940 - DEPART JAKARTA VIA KLM 838

ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8743

PAGE 01 JAKART 00373 261001Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 UTED-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SS-00
SAS-00 /002W
----------9AFC4A 261004Z /38

P 260944Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5693
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS JAKARTA 000373

E.O. 12958; N/A
TAGS: OTRA, OVIP, ID
SUBJECT: NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR FEBRUARY 2-5 VISIT OF A/S ROTH

REFS: A) STATE 12950; B) CLARKE-MCCARY TELCON 1/26

1. FOLLOWING IS NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR VISIT FOR THE FEBRUARY 2-5 VISIT TO INDONESIA OF EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY ROTH AND EAP SPECIAL ASSISTANT JASON HYLAND. EMBASSY CONTROL OFFICER IS POLOFF GARY GRAY. OFFICE TELEPHONE (62-21) 344-2211 EXT. 2282; HOME 392-6144; CELLULAR 081-693-5772; EMAIL GRAYWG@JAKARTAC.US-

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 00373 261001Z
STATE.GOV.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2

1625 - ARRIVE VIA JAPAN AIR FLIGHT 725
CONTROLOFF WILL MEET UPON ARRIVAL.
PROCEED TO AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE

1900 - DINNER WITH KEY FOREIGN AMBASSADORS

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3

0730 - BREAKFAST AT RESIDENCE WITH MARZUKI DARUSMAN

1000 - MEETING WITH MEGAWATI

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2006 200503302

1245 - DEPART FOR YOGYAKARTA ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSADOR VIA GARUDA 432

1350 - ARRIVE YOGYAKARTA, MET BY SURABAYA CONSUL GENERAL BILL PIERCE, PROCEED TO HYATT

1500 - MEETING WITH SULTAN OF YOGYAKARTA
1800 - GENERAL ELECTRIC "LIGHTING UP" EVENT AT PRAMBANAN TEMPLE (RECEPTION FOLLOWED BY DANCE PERFORMANCE). THE SULTAN, MINISTER OF TOURISM MARZUKI USMAN, AND MINISTER FOR STATE ENTERPRISES TANRI ABENG WILL ATTEND.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4

0730 - DEPART YOGYAKARTA VIA GA 203

0835 - ARRIVE JAKARTA

1030 - MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS

1130 - MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE

1300 - LUNCH WITH MEMBERS OF THE AID MISSION AND U.S. NGO'S ON ELECTION PREPARATIONS

1500 - MEETING WITH GENERAL WIRANTO

1630 - MEETING WITH AKBAR TANDJUNG

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 5

0900 - MEETING WITH GUS DUR (IN CIGANJUR, APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR'S DRIVE FROM THE RESIDENCE)

1100 - MEETING WITH XANANA GUSMAO AT CIPINANG PRISON

1230 - LUNCH WITH ACEHNESE AND IRIANESE LEADERS

1430 - MEETING WITH ADI SASONO

1600 - MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF "TEAM 11" (ASSUMING THAT SUCH A BODY HAS BEEN FORMED)

1940 - DEPART JAKARTA VIA KLM 838

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 00373 261001Z
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4793

PAGE 01 JAKART 00341 250713Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DS-00	UTED-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OES-01
	OIC-02	PA-00	PM-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	T-00	USIE-00	IMCC-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	CCR-01	SAS-00	/024W			

----------9A6A96 250717Z /38

P 250659Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5660
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS JAKARTA 000341

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OTRA, OVIP, ID
SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR EAP A/S ROTH

REF: STATE 12950

1. EMBASSY WELCOMES FEBRUARY 2-5 VISIT TO INDONESIA OF EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY ROTH AND EAP SPECIAL ASSISTANT JASON HYLAND. EMBASSY CONTROL OFFICER IS POLOFF GARY

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 00341 250713Z
GRAY. OFFICE TELEPHONE (62-21) 344-2211 EXT. 2282; HOME 392-6144; CELLULAR 081-693-5772; EMAIL GRAYWG@JAKARTAC.US-STATE.GOV. CONTROLOFF WILL MEET ROTH AND HYLAND UPON ARRIVAL.

2. THE AMBASSADOR HAS INVITED A/S ROTH AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT HYLAND TO STAY AT HIS RESIDENCE.

3. EMBASSY WILL REQUEST MEETINGS FOR A/S ROTH WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE, DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO, FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS, STATE SECRETARY AKBAR TANDJUNG, MINISTER OF COOPERATIVES ADI SASONO, AND OPPOSITION LEADERS AMIEN RAIS, MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, AND ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (GUS DUR). DEPENDING ON THE STATUS OF THE POLITICAL LAWS (SCHEDULED TO BE PASSED BY THE END OF THIS MONTH) EMBASSY WILL SET UP A MEETING WITH THE MOST RELEVANT PARLIAMENTARIANS OR MEMBERS OF AN INTERIM ELECTORAL COMMITTEE,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2006 200503302

SHOULD ONE HAVE MATERIALIZED BY THAT TIME. ALSO PLEASE ADVISE IF A/S ROTH IS INTERESTED IN TRAVEL OUTSIDE JAKARTA. NOTIONAL SCHEDULE WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL.

4. THREAT ASSESSMENT: INDONESIA HAS EXPERIENCED A DOWNTURN IN ITS ECONOMY THAT HAS HAD A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF MOST INDONESIANS. LARGE NUMBERS OF WORKERS HAVE LOST THEIR JOBS, WHICH HAS CONTRIBUTED TO AN OVERALL INCREASE IN CRIMINALITY. MOST CRIMES ARE THOSE OF OPPORTUNITY SUCH AS PICKPOCKETS, THEFT OF UNATTENDED PROPERTY, AND OTHER MINOR THEFTS. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN SPORADIC REPORTS OF MORE SERIOUS CRIME WITHIN THE EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY. MOST CRIMES AGAINST THE EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY HAVE BEEN NON-VIOLENT, HOWEVER. IF PLANNING TO TRAVEL BY TAXI, VISITORS ARE ADVISED NOT TO HAIL CABS ON THE STREET, BUT TO USE TAXIS FROM THE QUEUES AT MAJOR HOTELS. ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO3612

PAGE 01 STATE 012950 230206Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AIT-03	A-00	CA-02	CIAE-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DS-00	UTED-00	H-01	IMMC-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OES-01	OIC-02	OIG-03	OPR-01	PA-00	PM-00
	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STPD-01	T-00
	USIE-00	IMCC-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	CCR-01	SAS-00	/033R				

012950
SOURCE: KODAKC.023023
DRAFTED BY: EAP/FO:CHEGADORN (O:\FO\JPHYLAND\ASIACCCABLE) -- 1/21/9
APPROVED BY: EAP/FO:SOROTH
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP

----------9A142F 230206Z /38
O R 230206Z JAN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS

UNCLAS STATE 012950

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OTRA, AMGT
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR COUNTRY CLEARANCE: EAP A/S ROTH

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 012950 230206Z
1. (U) DEPARTMENT REQUESTS COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR VISIT TO TOKYO, JAKARTA AND SEOUL BY EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY ROTH. A/S ROTH WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY EAP SPECIAL ASSISTANT JASON HYLAND.

2. (U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH WILL ARRIVE IN TOKYO VIA SWISSAIR FLIGHT 168 FROM ZURICH AT 0830 ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 1. (HYLAND WILL ARRIVE JANUARY 31 IN NARITA AT 1450 ON UNITED 8229, AND WILL MAKE OWN TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS PLEASE RESERVE SINGLE ROOM FOR HYLAND AT HOTEL OKURA FOR NIGHT OF JANUARY 31.)

3. (U) DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT SINGLE ROOMS BE RESERVED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2006 200503302

FOR ROTH AND HYLAND FOR NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 1.

4. (U) A/S ROTH AND HYLAND WILL DEPART TOKYO AT 1050 AM TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, VIA JAPAN AIR FLIGHT 725 FOR JAKARTA, ARRIVING 1625.

5 (U) DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT SINGLE ROOMS BE RESERVED AT THE ARYUDUTA HOTEL THE NIGHTS OF FEBRUARY 2,3, AND 4.

6. (U) A/S ROTH AND HYLAND WILL DEPART JAKARTA FOR SEOUL VIA KLM FLIGHT 838 AT 1940 (VIA SINGAPORE) ON FEBRUARY 5. SINGAPORE AIR FLIGHT 882 ARRIVES SEOUL/KIMPO AT 0655 AM ON FEBRUARY 6. DEPARTURE FROM SEOUL EN ROUTE WASHINGTON, DC WILL BE ON DELTA 8641 AT 1850 ON SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 7.

7. (U) DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT SINGLE ROOMS BE RESERVED

AT THE WESTIN HOTEL IN SEOUL FOR THE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 6.

8. (U) PLEASE MEET AND ASSIST AT TOKYO, JAKARTA AND SEOUL. PLEASE PROVIDE CONTACT INFORMATION FOR CONTROL OFFICER AT EACH POST (NO ASSISTANCE REQUESTED FOR SINGAPORE TRANSIT).

9. (U) WE APPRECIATE YOUR SUPPORT FOR A/S ROTH'S UPCOMING TRAVEL TO ASIA.
ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ2784

PAGE 01 JAKART 00190 140114Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DS-00	EB-00	UTED-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
	OES-01	OIC-02	PA-00	PM-00	P-00	SCT-00	SEC-01
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	IMCC-01
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	CCR-01	SAS-00	/025W

----------96C592 140618Z /38

P 130705Z JAN 99 (TAO)
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5480
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS JAKARTA 000190

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OTRA, OVIP, ID
SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR EAP A/S ROTH

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 00190 140114Z

REF: (A) JAKARTA 175 (B) STATE 5237

1. EMBASSY GRANTS COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR THE JANUARY 22-23 VISIT TO INDONESIA OF EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY ROTH AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT JASON HYLAND. EMBASSY CONTROL OFFICER IS POLOFF IAN MCCARY. OFFICE TELEPHONE (62-21) 344-2211 EXT. 2276; HOME 722-0127; CELLULAR 081-693-5765; EMAIL MCCARYIJ@JAKARTAC.US-STATE.GOV. CONTROLOFF WILL MEET ROTH AND HYLAND, ALONG WITH SUMMERS PARTY, UPON ARRIVAL.

2. HOTEL RESERVATIONS HAVE BEEN FOR A/S ROTH AND MR. HYLAND ALONG WITH TREASURY DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS AND PARTY AT THE REGENT HOTEL, JALAN H.R. RASUNA SAID. (TEL: (62-21) 252-3456; FAX 252-4480).

3. EMBASSY HAS REQUESTED MEETINGS FOR A/S ROTH WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE (JOINT MEETING WITH DEP. SEC. SUMMERS), DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO, FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS, STATE SECRETARY AKBAR TANDJUNG,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2006 200503302

MINISTER OF COOPERATIVES ADI SASONO (JOINT WITH SUMMERS), OPPOSITION LEADERS AMIEN RAIS (JOINT WITH SUMMERS), MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI (JOINT WITH SUMMERS), AND AQWAHID (GUS DUR). NOTIONAL SCHEDULE WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL.

4. THREAT ASSESSMENT: INDONESIA HAS EXPERIENCED A DOWNTURN IN ITS ECONOMY THAT HAS HAD A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF QESIANS. LARGE NUMBERS OF WORKERS HAVE LOST THEIR JOBS, WHICH HAS CONTRIBUTED TO AN OVERALL INCREASE IN CRIMINALITY. MOST CRIMES ARE THOSE OF OPPORTUNITY SUCH AS PICKPOCKETS, THEFT OF UNATTENDED PROPERTY, AND OTHER MINOR THEFTS. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN

SPORADIC REPORTS OF MORE SERIOUS CRIME WITHIN THE EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY. MOST CRIMES AGAINST THE EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY HAVE BEEN NON-VIOLENT, HOWEVER. IF PLANNING TO TRAVEL BY TAXI, VISITORS ARE ADVISED NOT TO HAIL CABS ON THE STREET, BUT TO USE TAXIS FROM THE QUEUES AT MAJOR HOTELS. ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 005237 120453Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	CA-02	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	DS-00	EB-00	UTED-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
	OES-01	OIC-02	PA-00	PM-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	IMCC-01
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	CCR-01	SAS-00	/024R

005237
SOURCE: KODAKB.012030
DRAFTED BY: EAP/FO:DBOYER:DFB -- 01/11/99 7-9596
APPROVED BY: EAP:SOROTH
EAP/FO:JHYLAND
----------95C332 120453Z /38
P 120450Z JAN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 005237

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OTRA, OVIP
SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 005237 120453Z
1. (U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

2. (SBU) ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT JASON HYLAND WILL ACCOMPANY TREASURY DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS ON TRAVEL TO THE REGION. ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH'S ITINERARY FOLLOWS:

15 JAN
1010 AM LV WASHINGTON/DULLES VIA UNITED 881
1620 PM AR TOKYO

16 JAN
1805 PM LV TOKYO/NARITA VIA NORTHWEST 9

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2006 200503302

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

2050 PM AR SEOUL/KIMPO

19 JAN
0850 AM LV SEOUL/KIMPO VIA KOREAN AIR 851
1005 AM AR BEIJING

20 JAN

1510 PM LV BEIJING VIA ALL NIPPON 906
1920 PM AR TOKYO/NARITA

21 JAN
1800 PM LV TOKYO/NARITA VIA NORTHWEST 19

22 JAN
1230 PM AR SINGAPORE

22 JAN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 005237 120453Z
1300 PM LV SINGAPORE VIA SINGAPORE 156
1330 PM AR JAKARTA

23 JAN
1145 PM LV JAKARTA/CGK VIA JAPAN AIR 726

24 JAN
0835 AM AR TOKYO/NARITA
1845 PM LV TOKYO/NARITA VIA UNITED 882
1912 PM AR WASHINGTON/REAGAN

WAITLISTED
1045 AM LV TOKYO/NARITA VIA UNITED 8228
1655 AM AR WASHINGTON/DULLES

3. (SBU) REQUEST COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT HYLAND. TREASURY WILL REQUEST COUNTRY CLEARANCE VIA SEPARATE CABLE. PLEASE RESERVE LODGING FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT HYLAND AT THE SAME VENUE AS DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS WHEREVER POSSIBLE. ROTH ACCEPTS AMBASSADOR FOLEY'S INVITATION TO STAY AT HIS RESIDENCE THE NIGHT OF JANUARY 20.
ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No.: 200503302 ER2
Archive File No.: 20051137DOS359

Mr. Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
The George Washington University
The Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037

MAR 19 2007

Dear Mr. Simpson:

I refer to your FOIA request dated August 1, 2005 regarding the release of certain Department of State material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552).

The search of the retired files of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs has been completed, and has resulted in the retrieval of 45 documents responsive to your request. We reviewed these documents and determined that 16 may be released in full, 12 may be released with excisions, and 17 must be withheld in full. All released material is enclosed.

An enclosure provides information on Freedom of Information Act exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made excisions, the applicable exemptions are marked on each document. Of the documents withheld in full, 15 were withheld under exemption B1 and two under exemption B5.

In some cases, two or more exemptions may apply to the same document. In the case of a document released in part, all non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released.

20051137DOS359 DOS
RECNO:31696 SEQCOR:130818
3/23/2007 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Roth visits Indonesia and East Timor, 1999

With respect to material withheld by the Department of State, you have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

We have now completed the processing of your case.

If you have any questions, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, DC 20522-8100, or telephone us at (202) 261-8484. Please be sure to refer to the case number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

The Freedom of Information Act provides for the recovery of the direct cost of duplicating records requested for non-commercial use by a representative of the news media. No charge is made for the first one hundred pages of duplication. Total fees due in this case are $9.00, representing an additional 60 pages duplicated @ $0.15 per page. Please make your check or money order payable to the Treasurer of the United States, and mail it to the Office of Information Programs and Services, Room 8100, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20522-8100. Please be sure to write the case number on your check or money order.

We hope that the Department has been of service to you in this matter.

Sincerely,

for Margaret P. Grafeld, Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001W
----------9E616A 081411Z /38
O 031033Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5878

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000544

OFFICIAL INFORMAL - FOR EAP/PIMBS D. HARTWICK FROM DCM M. OWENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/09
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL JAKARTA TO PIMBS NO. 20

JAKARTA 01 OF 02 544

1. CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL P. OWENS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) UN PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR

[redacted] HE SAYS THAT IN FACT B1
HIS "HOME OFFICE" HAS BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO EAST TIMOR RECENTLY. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT UNHCR INVOLVEMENT MAY BE TRIGGERED IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE BY AN OUTFLOW OF REFUGEES (I.E., FROM THE STATE OF EAST TIMOR TO THE STATE OF INDONESIA). MOREOVER, UNHCR DOES GIVE CONSIDERATION TO DISPLACED PERSONS WITHIN STATES AND UNHCR IS AWARE OF RELIABLE REPORTS OF SOME THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED AS A RESULT OF RECENT UNREST IN EAST TIMOR. SEPARATELY, WE HAVE ALSO TALKED WITH [redacted] WHO SHARES OUR CONCERN B1, B6
THAT FURTHER DETERIORATION OF THE SECURITY CONDITION AS WELL AS FOOD, WATER AND MEDICAL NEEDS COULD WARRANT CONSIDERATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION. [redacted] IS PARTICULARLY B1
CONCERNED ABOUT THE WEEK-LONG CLOSING OF THE DILI CIVILIAN HOSPITAL (SINCE JANUARY 27.) [redacted] BELIEVES THE CLOSING WAS FOR B1
POLITICAL AS WELL AS SECURITY REASONS. (THIS MATTER DID NOT B1, B6
ARISE IN POL'S DISCUSSION FEBRUARY 2 WITH [redacted])
OUR INTERLOCUTORS AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL (UN AND OTHER) PRESENCE COULD HAVE A CALMING/REASSURING EFFECT. MOREOVER, IN THE EVENT THAT THERE IS A TRANSITION IN EAST TIMOR'S POLITICAL STATUS, THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN LAYING SOME OF THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE INEVITABLE NEW HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS WHICH WILL FOLLOW.

3. (C) INFORMAL INTERAGENCY ON EAST TIMOR

WE WOULD SUGGEST DISCUSSION OF THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

-- WE ARE GETTING CONFLICTING SIGNALS ON HOW THE EAST TIMORESE WILL BE "CONSULTED" REGARDING THEIR ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION OF THE AUTONOMY OFFER. DEPLU SEEMS TO BE INDICATING THAT JUNE ELECTIONS FOR THE LOCAL ASSEMBLY IN EAST TIMOR COULD BE SEEN AS A SORT OF SELF-DETERMINATION EXERCISE (ALATAS STILL SEEMS DEAD SET AGAINST A REFERENDUM). OBVIOUSLY FOR THIS TO HAVE ANY VALIDITY XANANA AND THE VARIOUS EAST TIMORESE PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO PARTICIPATE IN A FREE AND FAIR PROCESS, A BIG ORDER GIVEN THE SHORT TIME FRAME. WE NEED TO PUSH THE GOI TO ESTABLISH, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, A CLEAR PROCESS WHICH CAN BE APPROVED BY ALL THE MAJOR PLAYERS. IF THE UN PROCESS IS TO REMAIN RELEVANT, THE REAL EAST TIMORESE LEADERS WILL HAVE TO BE BROUGHT IN MORE DIRECTLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AT THE END OF THE DAY, THE REALITY MAY SIMPLY BE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 2 FEB 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAR 2007 200503302

UNCLASSIFIED

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

THAT NEITHER JAKARTA NOR THE EAST TIMORESE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE THE KIND OF COMPROMISES THAT WOULD GIVE AUTONOMY A CHANCE. MINDSETS IN DILI AND JAKARTA ARE HARDENING FAST. MANY OBSERVERS BELIEVE INDEPENDENCE IS A DONE DEAL.

-- THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR IS MURKY BUT MOST AGREE (INCLUDING DEPLU, IT APPEARS, [redacted] REMARKS BEFORE THE HABIBIE MEETING TODAY) THAT ABRI'S ARMING OF CIVILIANS IS A MAJOR PROBLEM. AS YET WE HAVE NO REACTIONS FROM OUR DEMARCHES ON THIS ISSUE, ALTHOUGH WIRANTO'S DENIAL THAT ARMING OF RATIH ELEMENTS IS TAKING PLACE AT LEAST SHOWS THAT HE IS NOW AWARE OF THE CONCERN OVER THIS ISSUE. IT MAY ULTIMATELY BE HARDER TO CONVINCE ABRI TO STOP ARMING AND START DISARMING NOW THAT WIRANTO HAS TAKEN SO DISINGENUOUS A POSITION. XANANA HAS PROPOSED A CEASEFIRE ON THE PART OF THE GUERRILLAS ALONG WITH A MORATORIUM ON PRO-REFERENDUM DEMONSTRATIONS IN EXCHANGE FOR DISARMING THE CIVILIAN MILITIAS. THIS WOULD GIVE ABRI SOME FACE. B1

-- THE RECENT CONFLICTS HAVE CREATED A POTENTIAL HUMANITARIAN CRISIS. BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ICRC, THE PRESENCE OF UNHCR AND/OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES COULD PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IN REDUCING ABUSES. WE MAY NEED TO BEGIN THINKING ABOUT THE SHAPE OF AND PARTICIPANTS IN AN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION. QUIET CONSULTATIONS AND PLANNING SEEM TO BE IN ORDER AT THIS STAGE. GOI REACTION IS HARD TO ANTICIPATE: WHILE RESIDUAL RESISTANCE TO INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN EAST TIMOR MAY BE A FACTOR, THE DESIRE TO END THE FINANCIAL OUTLAYS AND DESIRE TO BE SEEN TO BE DOING THE RIGHT THING MIGHT OVERRIDE THIS.

4. (U) FREE, FAIR AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS

WE THINK THAT YOU HAVE MADE A VERY GOOD BEGINNING ON THE DIFFICULT QUESTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A FREE, FAIR AND CREDIBLE ELECTION. AT THIS EARLY STAGE, WE STILL HAVE NOT HAD A CHANCE TO COME UP WITH WHAT WE WOULD REGARD AS A COMPLETE ANSWER, BUT HERE ARE SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS THAT MOST INDONESIANS WILL REGARD AS KEY, SOME OF WHICH ELABORATE UPON WHAT YOU HAVE ALREADY LISTED.

PRE-ELECTION

-- DOES ABRI REFRAIN FROM INTERFERING IN THE ELECTION? (E.G. MOBILIZING VOTERS FOR A PARTICULAR PARTY

****
* Missing section 2 *
****

GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO HOLD EITHER NATIONAL OR PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS IN EAST TIMOR IS PROBLEMATIC.) THERE ARE OTHER IMPORTANT PROBLEMS: E.G., HOW TO PROVIDE FOR PRO-INDEPENDENCE PARTIES TO FORM, CAMPAIGN, AND PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS. THE INDONESIANS RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEM, BUT THEIR THINKING HAS NOT YET JELLED ON THE RIGHT SOLUTION.

-- PRESIDENT HABIBIE OUTLINED FOR A/S ROTH A TIME TABLE PROVIDING FOR SEPARATION OF EAST TIMOR FROM INDONESIA ON JANUARY 1, 2000 IF AUTONOMY IS REJECTED. FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS TOLD A/S ROTH THAT HE HAD CAUTIONED THE PRESIDENT THAT SUCH A COMPRESSED TIME TABLE WAS UNREALISTIC. ALATAS RECOGNIZES THAT A TRANSITION PROCESS IS NEEDED, BUT CLEARLY THERE IS STILL NO INTERNAL INDONESIAN CONSENSUS ON THIS MATTER.
-- UN ROLE. THE INDONESIANS HAVE OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS MUST PLAY A ROLE IN ANY TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE FOR EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING BY HAVING A PRESENCE ON THE GROUND (E.G. PRESS REPORTS QUOTE ALATAS AS SAYING THAT THE UN SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT PRO-INDONESIAN EAST TIMORESE ARE NOT ATTACKED IF THE TERRITORY SECEDES). THEY HAVE NOT AS YET DISPLAYED ANY WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO INTRODUCING A UN PRESENCE INTO EAST TIMOR TO HELP STABILIZE THE SITUATION THERE NOW, WHICH THEY REJECT AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR POSITION THAT EAST TIMOR IS STILL PART OF INDONESIA. THEY MAY DISPLAY MORE FLEXIBILITY ON THIS QUESTION OVER TIME, BUT FOR THE MOMENT THEY ARE STILL ADHERING TO THE POSITION THAT A UN PRESENCE CAN ONLY BE INTRODUCED AFTER AUTONOMY IS REJECTED.

7. (C) THESE ARE VITAL ISSUES. THE LACK OF CLARITY ON HOW TO APPROACH THEM ILLUSTRATES BOTH THE SUDDENNESS OF THE SHIFT IN INDONESIAN THINKING ON EAST TIMOR, AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM.

8. (C) STABILIZING THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND: THE RECENT ABRI ARMING OF UNDISCIPLINED PRO-JAKARTA CIVILIAN ELEMENTS IN EAST TIMOR HAS WORSENED AN ALREADY BAD SECURITY SITUATION THERE AND ALARMED MODERATE LEADERS SUCH AS [redacted] B1, B6

[redacted] B1

HE FAVORED FORMATION OF A COUNCIL REPRESENTING ALL SHADES OF OPINION AIMED AT REACHING AGREEMENT TO HALT FIGHTING, DISARM CONTENDING FACTIONS, AND FACILITATE PEACEFUL DISCUSSION. [redacted] B1, B6

[redacted] IS THINKING ALONG SIMILAR LINES BY CALLING FOR EVERYBODY TO SIT AND TALK RATHER THAN TAKING UP ARMS.

[redacted] B1

CLEARLY, A TOP PRIORITY MUST BE TO FIND A MECHANISM TO CALM THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR AND GET THE ARMS AWAY FROM IRRESPONSIBLE ELEMENTS. OTHERWISE, POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO EITHER AUTONOMY OR SEPARATION WILL BE DEGRADED OR DESTROYED.

9. (C) NEED FOR A CREDIBLE PROCESS: [redacted] B1
ALONG WITH MANY OTHERS, BELIEVES THAT NOW THAT INDEPENDENCE HAS BEEN HELD OUT AS AN OPTION, AUTONOMY WILL NOT BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AS AN OPTION. THIS DOES NOT ALTER THE NEED FOR A CREDIBLE PROCESS OF DETERMINING THE PREFERENCES OF THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR.

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

THUS FAR, EARLY INDONESIAN REACTIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT'S SHIFT IN POLICY HAVE BEEN BROADLY SUPPORTIVE. AN EXCEPTION HAS BEEN [redacted] THE PDI-P, THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY - PERJUANGAN, WHICH IS GIVEN STRONG CHANCES OF MAKING A GOOD SHOWING IN THE B1

JAKARTA 03 OF 03 598

ELECTIONS.

10. (C) MEGAWATI'S POSITION HAS BEEN THAT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT LACKS SUFFICIENT LEGITIMACY TO MAKE SUCH A FAR-REACHING POLICY SHIFT INVOLVING INDONESIA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. [redacted] B1

11. (C) GENERAL WIRANTO HAS STATED [redacted] PUBLICLY [redacted] THAT THE MILITARY WILL DUTIFULLY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION, BUT MANY SUSPECT THE MILITARY'S SUPPORT IS LUKEWARM AT BEST. GIVEN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHIFT IN INDONESIAN ATTITUDES CANNOT BE EXCLUDED, ESPECIALLY IF THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING EAST TIMORESE ATTITUDES IS PERFUNCTORY. FOR THAT REASON, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PROCESS HAVE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY. THIS REQUIRES THAT THERE BE A MEANINGFUL AUTONOMY OPTION ON THE TABLE. B1 B1

12. (C) THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS ISSUE CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED. BOTH ACEHNESE AND IRIANESE HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED TO US THAT INDEPENDENCE HOPES IN THOSE AREAS HAVE BEEN SPURRED BY DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO EAST TIMOR. A BROAD AUTONOMY OPTION FOR EAST TIMOR COULD ALSO BECOME THE STARTING POINT FOR AUTONOMY DEMANDS BY OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA. IF THE INDONESIANS FALTER IN THEIR EFFORTS TO HANDLE EAST TIMOR SEPARATELY FROM THE LARGER ISSUES INVOLVING THE INTEGRITY OF INDONESIA ITSELF, A COMPLEX SITUATION WILL BE RENDERED EVEN MORE DIFFICULT.

13. (C) INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL CLEARLY ARE STILL IN THE PROCESS OF RETHINKING THEIR APPROACHES IN THE WAKE OF THE SUDDEN GOI POLICY SHIFT. FOR THAT REASON, A CRITICAL GOAL OF THE MEETINGS BETWEEN ALATAS AND HIS PORTUGUESE COUNTERPART IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS SHOULD BE TO SMOOTH THE PROCESS OF READJUSTING THINKING ON BOTH SIDES SO THAT THE FOCUS CAN BE ON THE NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND NOT ON THE OLD DIFFERENCES. THERE IS NOW LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL, BUT THERE ARE NUMEROUS PITFALLS ALONG THE WAY. ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED/IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/022W				

----------A01F40 080143Z /38

O 072324Z FEB 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5931
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000599

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ID, UN
SUBJECT: ALATAS ON EAST TIMOR

REF: JAKARTA 583

JAKARTA 01 OF 02 -599

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR J. STAPLETON ROY. REASON: 1.5 (B).

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN A FEBRUARY 4 MEETING WITH A/S ROTH, FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS CALLED A JANUARY 1, 2000 DEADLINE FOR EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE UNREALISTIC, HINTED THAT A REFERENDUM STILL MAY BE POSSIBLE, AND REJECTED THE NOTION THAT THE JUNE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS COULD SERVE AS A SELF-DETERMINATION EXERCISE IN EAST TIMOR. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALI ALATAS ON FEBRUARY 4. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AMERICAS DIRECTOR SAMODRA SRIWIJAYA AND ASIA-PACIFIC DIRECTOR HADI WAYARABI ALSO SAT IN. A/S ROTH WAS JOINED BY AMBASSADOR ROY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT JASON HYLAND, AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER).

EAST TIMOR -- FINAL AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE

3. (C) THE DISCUSSION FOCUSSED PRIMARILY ON EAST TIMOR BUT OTHER ISSUES WERE ALSO COVERED AND ARE REPORTED SEPTEL. ALATAS OBSERVED THAT HE WOULD BE IN NEW YORK FEBRUARY 7-8 FOR MEETINGS WITH PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER DA GAMA. ALATAS SAID HIS PURPOSE WAS TO REPORT DIRECTLY ON THE MEANING OF THE GOI'S NEW APPROACH ON EAST TIMOR AND TO ASSESS THE PROGRESS MADE AT THE TRIPARTITE TALKS AT THE SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL.

[redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 6 FEB 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAR 2007 200503302

02D052,2

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

[redacted] B1

JANUARY 1, 2000 NOT FIRM

4. (C) [redacted] B1

5. (C) A/S ROTH SAID THE GOI DESERVED MUCH CREDIT FOR ITS TWO DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES ON EAST TIMOR (BROAD-BASED AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE), BUT THAT THE NEW OPPORTUNITY TO REACH A SOLUTION ALSO PRESENTED DANGERS. EVEN WITH THE BEST OF INTENTIONS, VIOLENCE COULD RESULT, PARTICULARLY IF INDONESIA WITHDREW PRECIPITOUSLY WITHOUT LEAVING ADEQUATE TIME TO PUT TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN PLACE. THE GOI WOULD THEN EMERGE WITH A BLACK EYE INTERNATIONALLY IF A CIVIL WAR ERUPTED. ROTH SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW EAST TIMORESE LEADERS COULD ACCEPT AUTONOMY NOW THAT INDEPENDENCE HAD BEEN PUT ON THE TABLE. WITH EAST TIMOR TOTALLY UNPREPARED FOR QUICK INDEPENDENCE, THE HOPE WAS THAT LOGIC WILL PREVAIL IF AN AGREEMENT WERE REACHED THAT PROVIDED FOR AN ADEQUATE TRANSITION PERIOD.

6. (C) ROTH STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING THE EAST TIMORESE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, EITHER CONCERNING AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. ROTH EMPHASIZED THAT ANY AGREEMENT NOT ACCEPTABLE TO EAST TIMOR WOULD NOT WORK AND IT WAS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO INVOLVE THE TIMORESE IN ANY NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

[redacted] B1

7. (C) ACKNOWLEDGING THE GOI'S DIFFICULTY AT A TIME OF FINANCIAL HARDSHIP TO COMMIT TO FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR EAST TIMOR DURING A

JAKARTA 02 OF 02 599

MULTI-YEAR TRANSITION, ROTH ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A "DEFERRED INDEPENDENCE" OPTION. UNDER SUCH AN OPTION, IT WOULD BE CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THE OUTCOME WOULD BE INDEPENDENCE, MAKING A REFERENDUM UNNECESSARY, BUT DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD ASSUME MUCH OF THE FINANCIAL AND SECURITY BURDEN FOR EAST TIMOR. ROTH SAID MUCH MORE ATTENTION MUST BE GIVEN TO CALMING THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, AND A PACKAGE OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES WAS URGENTLY NEEDED. THESE SHOULD INCLUDE DISARMING THE MILITIAS, TROOP REDUCTIONS WITH AN INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION MECHANISM, AND IN GENERAL A GREATER SENSE OF INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR. ROTH OBSERVED THAT THE UNHCR COULD PLAY A ROLE, AND THAT THERE WERE OTHER CREATIVE POSSIBILITIES, INCLUDING OPENING AN OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE,

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

AMBASSADOR MARKER, IN DILI.

JUNE ELECTIONS WON'T WORK

8. (C) A/S ROTH ASKED ABOUT THE RELEVANCE OF THE JUNE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS FOR EAST TIMOR. [redacted] B1

ALATAS, THE AMBASSADOR AND A/S ROTH BRIEFLY DISCUSSED PUERTO RICO, QUEBEC, AND OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD WITH AUTONOMY/INDEPENDENCE ISSUES AND THEIR POSSIBLE RELEVANCE TO EAST TIMOR. ALL AGREED THAT THE MOST URGENT TASK NOW WAS TO AVOID ANY EXPLOSION ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR WHICH COULD DISRUPT ALL THE OTHER PROCESSES.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W	

----------9F6886 051112Z /38

R 051025Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5918
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000594

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: UNDP SIGNS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH GOI ON ELECTION ASSISTANCE

JAKARTA 01 OF 02 594

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: A/S ROTH STRESSED TO UNDP REPRESENTATIVE RAVI RAJAN ON FEBRUARY 3 THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS ARE CRUCIAL TO INDONESIA'S POLITICAL FUTURE AND THAT THE INDONESIANS WILL NEED SUBSTANTIAL AND TIMELY ASSISTANCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN ORDER TO HOLD A GOOD ELECTION. RAJAN AGREED AND NOTED THAT THE UNDP AND THE GOVERNMENT HAD SIGNED AN MOU AND FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT EARLIER THAT DAY ON ELECTION ASSISTANCE, AND CHARACTERIZED FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS'S STATEMENT AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY AS "VERY GOOD" WITH "NO CAVEATS."

[redacted]

SUMMARY

B1

3. (U) A/S ROTH ON FEBRUARY 3 MET WITH RAVI RAJAN, THE UNDP'S RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE, ON ELECTION ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA. AMBASSADOR ROY AND USAID DIRECTOR ACCOMPANIED A/S ROTH, AND THE UNDP DEPUTY RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER) WERE ALSO PRESENT. ROTH ALSO DISCUSSED ELECTION ASSISTANCE DURING HIS FEBRUARY 3 MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS.

URGENCY OF THE ELECTION AND THE NEED FOR ASSISTANCE

---

4. (C) A/S ROTH STRESSED TO UNDP REPRESENTATIVE RAVI RAJAN THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS ARE CRUCIAL TO

02D052,2

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 4 FEB 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 14 MAR 2007 200503302

UNCLASSIFIED

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

INDONESIA'S POLITICAL FUTURE AND THAT THE INDONESIAN'S WILL NEED SUBSTANTIAL AND TIMELY ASSISTANCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN ORDER TO HOLD A GOOD ELECTION. HE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE A CONTRIBUTION OF BETWEEN 30-33 MILLION USD. ROTH SAID THAT AS OF YET OTHER COUNTRIES WERE NOT VIEWING THIS SITUATION WITH SUFFICIENT URGENCY AND WERE "IN SLOW MOTION," THEREFORE, HE WAS TRYING TO ARRANGE AN INTERNATIONAL PLEDGING CONFERENCE. ROTH EXPLAINED THAT BASED ON A MEETING HE HAD A FEW DAYS EARLIER IN DAVOS WITH COORDINATING MINISTER GINANDJAR, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOW TURNED AROUND AND FULLY ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE. GINANDJAR HAD REQUESTED THAT THE PLEDGING CONFERENCE BE HELD IN JAKARTA (TO AVOID ANY COMPARISONS TO THE CAMBODIA EXPERIENCE), BE COORDINATED BY UNDP, AND BE ATTENDED AT THE VICE MINISTER LEVEL. THE MINISTER HAD ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE CONFERENCE MUST SUCCEED.

[redacted] B1

5. (C) RAJAN SAID THAT THE MOU BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA AND UNDP ON ELECTION ASSISTANCE HAD BEEN SIGNED THAT MORNING, AND A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT WAS ALSO COMPLETE. HE CHARACTERIZED FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS'S STATEMENT AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY AS "VERY GOOD," WITH "NO CAVEATS." HE BELIEVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS BEING "VERY FORTHCOMING," AND WAS NOT "RESTRICTING" UNDP.

[redacted] B1

6. (C) RAJAN EXPRESSED ENTHUSIASM ABOUT THE IDEA OF HOLDING A PLEDGING CONFERENCE, EXPRESSING A DESIRE THAT IT SHOULD BE HELD BEFORE THE END OF FEBRUARY AT THE VICE MINISTER LEVEL, AS SUGGESTED BY COORDINATING MINISTER GINANDJAR.

7. (C) [redacted] B1

8. (C) [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

[redacted]
ROY

B1

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/021W					

----------9F6A3A 051106Z /38

P 051041Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5922
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000596

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/05/04
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: ACEH VILLAGE TOUCHED BY VIOLENCE PAST AND PRESENT

JAKARTA 01 OF 02 596

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: AN EARLY FEBRUARY VISIT TO A SMALL VILLAGE IN NORTH ACEH ILLUSTRATED HOW RECENT VIOLENCE IN THE PROVINCE HAS TOUCHED RURAL ACEH, AND ALSO REVEALED THE LINGERING IMPACT OF THE INDONESIAN MILITARY'S 1989-98 ANTI-SEPARATIST MILITARY OPERATION (DOM). VILLAGERS HAVE FOUND FIVE CORPSES DUMPED IN THE NEARBY WOODS IN THE PAST SIX WEEKS, AND SEVERAL VILLAGE YOUTHS WERE AMONG THOSE DETAINED AND BEATEN BY SECURITY FORCES IN A JANUARY 14 INCIDENT THAT LEFT FOUR OTHER PRISONERS DEAD. THE VILLAGE IS HOME TO 12 WIDOWS WHOSE HUSBANDS WERE TAKEN AWAY BY SECURITY FORCES IN 1990 AND NEVER SEEN AGAIN. THE VILLAGERS SUFFER FROM POVERTY EXACERBATED BY A SHORTAGE OF MALE HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD, AND COMPLAIN THAT THEIR GRIEVANCES HAVE YET TO BE ADDRESSED. THE VILLAGERS DISPLAYED ALIENATION AND ANTIPATHY TOWARD THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND MILD ENTHUSIASM FOR ACEHNESE INDEPENDENCE, BUT DISAVOWED SUPPORT FOR ARMED RESISTANCE. END SUMMARY.

VIOLENCE PAST AND PRESENT
---

3. (C) ON FEBRUARY 2, POLOFF VISITED THE VILLAGE OF ALOERAMBE, A SMALL, RURAL VILLAGE ABOUT 30 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF LHOKSEUMAWE, THE SEAT OF NORTH ACEH REGENCY ON THE NORTHERN TIP OF SUMATRA. POLOFF MET WITH THE VILLAGE HEAD ("KEPALA DESA") AND ABOUT 30 RESIDENTS OF THE VILLAGE OF 180. THE VILLAGERS TALKED ABOUT HOW THEY HAVE BEEN PERSONALLY AFFECTED BY THE CONFLICT IN ACEH, BOTH IN THE RECENT AND THE MORE DISTANT PAST: ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN 1990, SECURITY FORCES (ABRI) ENTERED THEIR VILLAGE AND DETAINED SOME RESIDENTS, ALL MALE, SUSPECTED OF SEPARATIST ACTIVITY. ALL BUT ONE OF THOSE TAKEN AWAY, WHO TOTALED 13, WERE NEVER HEARD FROM AGAIN. (NOTE: ONE OF THE GROUP WAS RELEASED BUT DIED OF DISEASE SHORTLY THEREAFTER. END NOTE.) NINE OF THE WIDOWS ATTENDED THE FEBRUARY 2 MEETING WITH POLOFF. THE VILLAGERS ADAMENTLY DENIED THAT ANY OF THOSE DETAINED WAS AN ACTIVE OF PASSIVE SUPPORTER OF THE ELUSIVE "ACEH MERDEKA" SEPARATIST MOVEMENT.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 4 FEB 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 15 MAR 2007 200503302

02D 032.2

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

4. (C) THE MEN WHO DISAPPEARED LEFT BEHIND DOZENS OF CHILDREN, WHOSE MOTHERS SUFFERED, AND CONTINUE TO SUFFER, FROM SEVERE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP CAUSED BY THE ABSENCE OF A BREAD-WINNING MEMBER OF THE FAMILY. VILLAGERS NOTED THAT 4 OF THE 12 WIDOWS IN THE VILLAGE STILL HAD NOT QED THE ONE MILLION RUPIAH (ABOUT 130 USD) GRANT TO WHICH EACH IS ENTITLED UNDER THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT'S COMPENSATION PROGRAM, AND INDICATED THAT IN ANY CASE THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THE SUM ADEQUATE.

5. (C) ALOERAMBE HAS ALSO BEEN TOUCHED BY THE MOST RECENT SPASM OF VIOLENCE TO STRIKE THE AREA. THREE VILLAGE TEENAGERS WERE PICKED UP IN EARLY JANUARY BY AN ABRI PATROL DURING A SWEEP OF THE LARGER VILLAGE OF MAKMURA, ABOUT 5 KILOMETERS TO THE NORTH. THE SWEEP WAS PART OF "OPERATION WIBAWA 99" (FORCE 99), A CRACK-DOWN OPERATION LAUNCHED IN RESPONSE TO THE BRUTAL ABDUCTION AND MURDER OF SEVEN ABRI ENLISTED PERSONNEL ON DECEMBER 29, 1998. THE TEENAGERS CLAIMED THEY WERE HELD FOR SEVERAL DAYS IN A GYMNASIUM TURNED INTO A MAKESHIFT DETENTION CENTER NEXT TO THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN LHOKSEUMAWE. THERE, THEY CLAIMED, THEY WERE BADLY BEATEN ON JANUARY 14. (NOTE: ON JANUARY 14, A GROUP OF ABRI PERSONNEL ENTERED THE GYMNASIUM AND CONDUCTED A MASS BEATING OF DETAINEES, WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF FOUR. INVESTIGATORS ARRESTED 30 ABRI PERSONNEL FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT, AND HAVE ALREADY CONVICTED ONE OFFICER, WHO WAS SENTENCED TO SIX YEARS. SEE REFTELS. END NOTE.) THE VILLAGE TEENAGERS SUFFERED NO PERMANENT INJURIES FROM THE BEATING, ALTHOUGH ONE STILL HAD A LARGE GASH ON HIS CHEEK.

CORPSES
---

6. (C) ON DECEMBER 22, 1998, VILLAGERS FOUND THREE CORPSES DUMPED IN THE FOREST NEAR ALOERAMBE. THEY BURIED THEM WITHOUT MAKING A FORMAL REPORT TO AUTHORITIES, POSSIBLY OUT OF FEAR. ON DECEMBER 25, THEY FOUND TWO MORE CORPSES AT A SEPARATE LOCATION AND BURIED THEM AS WELL. THE VILLAGERS DID NOT HAVE ANY IDEA AS TO THE INDENTITIES OF THE DECEASED. WORD OF THE CORPSES LATER REACHED POLICE, AND THE VILLAGE CHIEF WAS SUMMONED FOR QUESTIONING, BUT NOT DETAINED. AN ABRI TEAM CAME ON JANUARY 3 AND EXHUMED THE BODIES.

[redacted] B1

SUPPORT FOR SEPARATISM
---

7. (C) THE VILLAGERS EXPRESSED DISDAIN FOR ABRI AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND SAID THEY SUPPORTED CALLS FOR ACEHNESE INDEPENDENCE. HOWEVER, THEY WERE QUICK TO ADD THAT THEY WOULD ONLY SUPPORT A PEACEFUL INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AND NOT AN ARMED REBELLION. THE

VILLAGERS SAID THEY DID NOT KNOW IF AN ACTIVE ARMED SEPARATIST MOVEMENT EXISTED BUT ADDED THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THERE IS ANY ARMED SEPARATIST ACTIVITY IN THEIR AREA.

[redacted] B1

ELECTIONS, BOYCOTTS, AND POLITICS
---

8. (C) ASKED ABOUT THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE, THE VILLAGERS WERE DECIDEDLY AMBIVALENT. THEY DISPLAYED A SENSE OF ALIENATION FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND DISINTEREST

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

IN POLITICS IN JAKARTA. THE VILLAGERS INDICATED THEIR MAIN PRIORITIES WERE AN ACCOUNTING OF PAST EXCESSES BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND PAYMENT OF APPROPRIATE COMPENSATION, NOTING THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THE CURRENT COMPENSATION PACKAGE (SEE PARA 4) ADEQUATE. ASKED WHETHER THEY WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS, THE VILLAGERS INDICATED THEY WOULD TAKE THEIR CUES FROM COMMUNITY LEADERS SUCH AS THE DISTRICT CHIEF (CAMAT) AND LOCAL ISLAMIC CLERGY (ULEMA). ASKED ABOUT PARTY AFILIATION, THE VILLAGERS NAMED THE PPP (UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY), BUT NOTED THAT WHAT THEY CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT WAS A POLITICAL PARTY'S IDENTIFICATION WITH ISLAM.

USAID BENEFICIARIES
---

9. (C) THE VILLAGE OF ALOERAMBE IS A BENEFICIARY OF A PROGRAM ADMINISTERED BY A LOCAL NGO, FUNDED BY USAID, TO PROVIDE SCHOLARSHIPS AND FINANCIAL ASSISTENCE TO THE RELATIVES OF DOM VICTIMS. THE NGO ALSO RUNS CIVIC EDUCATION SESSIONS AND HELPS WIDOWS AND ORPHANS APPLY FOR THE LIMITED BENEFITS CURRENTLY MADE AVAILABLE BY THE GOVERNMENT TO DOM VICTIMS.

COMMENT:

10.(C) ALOERAMBE'S EXPERIENCE IN MANY WAYS TYPIFIES THE EXPERIENCE OF RURAL COMMUNITIES IN THE THREE STRIFE-RIDDEN REGENCIES (KAPUBATEN) OF ACEH PROVINCE: NORTH ACEH, EAST ACEH, AND PIDIE. ALOERAMBE'S RESIDENTS SUFFER FROM GRINDING POVERTY, EXACERBATED BY THE LOSS OF A DOZEN HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD, AND FEEL CONTINUING ANGER AND RESENTMENT OVER THE DISAPPEARANCES. IF TIME HAD DONE ANYTHING TO HEAL THE SCARS LEFT BY THE 1990 DISAPPEARANCES, THE RECENT DETENTION AND BEATING OF THE THREE VILLAGE TEENS, AS WELL AS THE DISCOVERY OF FIVE CORPSES NEAR THE VILLAGE, SERVED AS GRIM REMINDERS THAT ACEH'S TROUBLES HAVE NOT YET BEEN PUT TO REST. IN SPITE OF ALL THIS, THE VILLAGERS DID NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING FANATIC ON THE INDEPENDENCE ISSUE. PROGRESS ON THE ISSUE OF AUTONOMY AND FURTHER COMPENSATION FOR PAST EXCESSES COULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARD DISSIPATING SEPARATIST SENTIMENTS. ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/021W					

----------9F677A 0510592 /38

P 051008Z FEB 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5911
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000592

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMP TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/16
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHIEF SEEKS CLOSURE OF "SOEHARTO PROBLEM," PREDICTS GOLKAR ELECTION VICTORY

JAKARTA 01 OF 04 592

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D)

SUMMARY

---

2. (C) [redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 4 FEB 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 14 MAR 2007 200503302

3. (C) DARUSMAN, ALSO A TOP GOLKAR OFFICIAL, CHARACTERIZED THE NEW POLITICAL LAWS AS "REASONABLE," BUT FEARED THE POSSIBILITY OF A BACKLASH AFTER THE ELECTION IF THE HOPES OF MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES WERE NOT REALIZED. HE UNABASHEDLY PREDICTED A GOLKAR VICTORY IN THE ELECTION, PREDICTING THAT IT WOULD TAKE 30-40 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, GIVEN "THE AMOUNT OF MONEY BEING MOBILIZED" AND THE PARTY'S PREPAREDNESS FOR THE CONTEST RELATIVE TO OTHER NEW PARTIES. HE SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT OF AN INTERNATIONAL

02D052,2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

PLEDGING CONFERENCE TO SUPPORT THE INDONESIAN ELECTION AS WELL AS THE IDEA OF HELPING INDONESIA WITH CROWD CONTROL TRAINING.

4. (U) A/S ROTH MET WITH MARZUKI DARUSMAN, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND A VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR ROY AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT HYLAND. POLOFF ATTENDED AS NOTETAKER.

THE SOEHARTO PROBLEM: DROP THE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION?

5. (C) [redacted] B1

THE BLOODY UNREST IN AMBON

8. (C) [redacted] B1

GOVERNMENT'S RHETORIC ON HUMAN RIGHTS GOOD

9. (C) DARUSMAN SAID THAT THE "BRIGHT SIDE" WAS THAT THE

UNCLASSIFIED

GOVERNMENT WAS IN THE PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. A MPR DECREE PASSED IN NOVEMBER CALLED FOR THE COMMISSION TO BE ESTABLISHED IN LAW (NOT JUST BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE), AND SUCH LEGISLATION WAS IN PROCESS, AND THE COMMISSION WOULD RECEIVE EXPANDED POWERS. THE GOVERNMENT HAD ALSO HAD ADOPTED A FIVE YEAR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION PLAN THAT INCLUDED THE RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS.

10. (C) HE CONCLUDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S "RHETORIC" ON HUMAN RIGHTS WAS "VERY GOOD," B1

B1

MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS CASES

12. (C) B1

13. (C) REGARDING THE FINDINGS OF THE JOINT FACT FINDING TEAM AND THE MAY RIOTS, DARUSMAN SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT FINALLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE RAPES TOOK PLACE. HE WAS ENCOURAGED THAT GOVERNMENT POSITION HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR, BUT ANTICIPATED THAT THE PROSECUTION OF THE CASES WOULD BE A VERY SLOW PROCESS.

14. (C) B1

EAST TIMOR

15. (C) DARUSMAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT INDONESIA'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON EAST TIMOR WAS POPULAR WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, BUT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT IT HAD THE POTENTIAL TO "BACKFIRE." IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO MAKE THE PROPOSAL AT THIS TIME, AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO FOCUS ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS PLAGUING THE REST OF THE COUNTRY. HE QUESTIONED WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT EVEN HAD THE INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY TO MANDATE UNILATERALLY THAT EAST

UNCLASSIFIED

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

TIMOR COULD BECOME INDEPENDENT, AND WORRIED THAT IT WAS A SPUR OF THE MOMENT DECISION (PROMPTED BY THE AUSTRALIAN LETTER) MADE IN AN ATTEMPT TO PROP UP HABIBIE'S PRESIDENCY.

JAKARTA 03 OF 04 592

16. (C) ASKED WHAT COULD BE DONE ON THE GROUND TO STOP VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, DARUSMAN SAID THAT PEOPLE COULD BE SENT IN TO "MEDIATE" AND REINFORCE THOSE WHO SOUGHT COMPROMISE. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ABRI COULD DISARM PARAMILITARY GROUPS RAISED THE SAME ISSUES ON WHETHER ABRI WAS PREPARED TO TAKE ACTION ON OTHER OUTSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS. SPECIFICALLY, DISARMING GROUPS IN THE FIELD RAISED THE QUESTION OF "WHERE WERE THESE PEOPLE GETTING THEIR ARMS FROM IN THE FIRST PLACE."

POLITICAL LAWS

17. (C) DARUSMAN ASSERTED POLITICAL LAWS RECENTLY APPROVED BY THE PARLIAMENT WERE "REASONABLE." HE CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD BEEN "THOROUGHLY DEBATED" AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN "MULTIPLE MEETINGS WITH THE OPPOSITION." HE BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE PUBLIC UNDERSTAND THAT THE CONTENTIOUS ISSUES RELATED TO THE LAWS HAD BEEN RESOLVED. REGARDING SOME ISSUES INCLUDING THE TYPE OF ELECTION SYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF CIVIL SERVANTS, HE ASSERTED THAT "IF GOLKAR HAD ITS WAY, IT WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED" THE AGREEMENTS THAT WERE ULTIMATELY REACHED. HE SAID THAT BOTH SIDES (MEANING PRESUMABLY GOLKAR AND PPP) GAVE GROUND. HE CHARGED THAT BECAUSE THE POLITICAL PARTIES DO NOT HAVE A "REAL PLATFORM," THEY WERE CONTINUING TO ATTACK THE BILLS AS THOUGH THE STALEMATE HAD CONTINUED. (NOTE: HE WAS PRESUMABLY REFERRING TO SOME OF THE SMALLER PARTIES WHO HAVE BEEN VOCAL. THE BIG PARTIES HAVE NOT OFFERED MUCH CRITICISM THIS WEEK.) HE THOUGHT THAT THIS CRITICISM WOULD DIE DOWN IN A COUPLE OF MONTHS. THE BOTTOM LINE WAS THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES NEEDED THE ELECTION. THE FORMER BECAUSE HABIBIE WANTED TO BE RE-ELECTED, AND THE LATTER BECAUSE THAT IS WHY THEY HAD BECOME PARTIES.

DANGER OF A BACKLASH AFTER THE ELECTION

18. (C) DARUSMAN FORESAW THE POSSIBILITY OF A BACKLASH AFTER THE JUNE 7 ELECTION BY SOME OF THE BIG PARTIES WHO HAD WHAT HE VIEWED COULD BE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE THEY WERE GOING TO WIN. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID THAT MEGAWATI AND HER CAMP WERE CONVINCED THEY WOULD WIN 25-30 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, GIVING THEM UP TO 140 SEATS IN THE NEW PARLIAMENT. THIS WAS NOW VIEWED BY THEM AS A NON-DEBATABLE, NON-NEGOTIABLE BENCHMARK. HE QUESTIONED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THESE EXPECTATIONS WERE NOT TO BE REALIZED.

19. (C) A/S ROTH RESPONDED THAT SUCH A SCENARIO WOULD DEPEND ON THE TYPE OF CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION THAT WERE RUN. IF IT WERE A VIOLENT AND CORRUPT CAMPAIGN, IF SUFFICIENT INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS WERE NOT PRESENT, AND ESPECIALLY IF RULING PARTY GOLKAR WON UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE COULD BE REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR AN OPPOSITION PARTY TO PROTEST.

GOLKAR PREDICTED TO WIN THE ELECTION

UNCLASSIFIED

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

20. (C) [redacted] B1

21. (C) A/S ROTH RESPONDED THAT THIS SEEMED TO CONTRADICT THE USUAL ELECTORAL PATTERN WORLD-WIDE, WHERE A PARTY IDENTIFIED WITH A FALLEN, DISCREDITED LEADER WAS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN ITS PREVIOUS HOLD ON POLITICAL POWER. DARUSMAN COUNTERED THAT IF GOLKAR COULD "TRANSFORM ITSELF" IN THE NEXT 2-3 MONTHS (HOW IT IS GOING TO DO THIS HE DID NOT SPECIFY), THIS ASSUMPTION WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HOLD. GOLKAR'S SELLING POINT WOULD BE ITS ABILITY TO PROVIDE STABILITY. IF SOCIAL DISRUPTIONS CONTINUED TO OCCUR, ALL PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO ANSWER THE QUESTION IN THE PUBLIC MIND OF WHICH COULD PROVIDED THE MOST STABILITY. HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT GOLKAR BE HELPED IF A SIZABLE PORTION OF THE POPULATION REMAINED UNDECIDED AND DID NOT VOTE AND IF THE ECONOMY BEGAN TO TURN AROUND.

22. (C) DARUSMAN PREDICTED THAT GOLKAR WOULD WIN 30-40 PERCENT OF THE VOTE. ON PAPER, THE PARTY HAD 30 MILLION CARD CARRYING MEMBERS. IN THE PAST, 2.5 TIMES THAT NUMBER VOTED FOR GOLKAR, MANY BEING MOBILIZED BY THE ARMED

JAKARTA 04 OF 04 592

FORCES. DURING THIS ELECTION GOLKAR WAS AIMING TO SECURE 50 MILLION VOTES FROM 110 TO 115 MILLION ELIGIBLE VOTERS.

DARUSMAN EXPRESSES SUPPORT FOR WASHINGTON INITIATIVES

23. (C) A/S ROTH EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. WAS PURSUING AND INTERNATIONAL PLEDGING CONFERENCE TO SUPPORT THE INDONESIAN ELECTION. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE ELECTION WAS GOING TO BE VERY EXPENSIVE, AND WOULD NEED TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND LOTS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

24. (C) DARUSMAN RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A "VERY GOOD" IDEA. IT WOULD EVEN BE APPROPRIATE FOR DOMESTIC MONITORS TO RECEIVE SUCH ASSISTANCE.

25. (C) A/S ROTH ALSO EXPLAINED WASHINGTON'S INTEREST IN HELPING INDONESIA'S POLICE IMPROVE THEIR CROWD CONTROL CAPABILITIES, GIVEN THEIR POOR RECORD OF HANDLING DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE OVER THE PAST YEAR.

26. (C) DARUSMAN RESPONDED THAT THIS ISSUE WAS EVEN ARISING AS THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT SET UP "MILITIAS" TO HELP THE SECURITY FORCES. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THEY WERE BEING WELL-TRAINED, AND THE WORRY WAS THAT SUCH MILITIAS WOULD BE RECRUITED FROM THE YOUTH PARA-MILITARY GROUPS THAT HISTORICALLY HAVE BEEN USED BY THE MILITARY. DARUSMAN BELIEVED THAT INDONESIAN NGO'S COULD ACCEPT THE PROVISION OF CROWD CONTROL TRAINING AND THAT IT WAS A GOOD IDEA. HE OFFERED TO SET UP A MEETING BETWEEN A U.S. ASSESSMENT TEAM, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND NGOS.

27. (U) A/S ROTH CLEARED THIS MESSAGE. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

R23

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W		

----------A0417C 081050Z /38

R 081028Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5948
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000616

USCINCPAC FOR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/08/04
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: THE INCREASINGLY ASSERTIVE PROVINCE OF ACEH

JAKARTA 01 OF 03 616

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THERE IS A RISING CHORUS OF CALLS FOR FEDERALISM, AUTONOMY, AND EVEN SEPARATISM IN THE LONG-TROUBLED PROVINCE OF ACEH ON THE NORTHERN TIP OF SUMATRA. THE CALLS ARE NOW BEING LED BY ACEH'S GOVERNOR, SYAMSUDDIN MAHMUD, WHO IS STRONGLY RUMORED TO BE SLATED FOR REPLACEMENT BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH A BROAD RANGE OF CONTACTS IN ACEH INDICATES THAT GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ARE REAL AND DEEPLY FELT. THE PERCEPTION AMONG MANY, OR EVEN MOST, ACEHNESE IS THAT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS EXTRACTING WEALTH FROM THE PROVINCE BUT GIVING NOTHING BACK IN RETURN OTHER THAN MILITARY SUPPRESSION. NONETHELESS, MOST CONTACTS CONCUR THAT RECENT CALLS FOR A REFERENDUM ON ACEHNESE INDEPENDENCE ARE BASED MORE ON ANGER AND FRUSTRATION WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN ON A SENSE OF SEPARATE NATIONAL IDENTITY OR A COHERENT NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY. GENUINE REFORMS, INCLUDING A REALLOCATION OF THE PROVINCE'S REVENUES, AND GREATER AUTONOMY WOULD PUT MOST SEPARATIST SENTIMENTS TO REST. END SUMMARY.

ACEH GOVERNOR IN OPEN CONFLICT WITH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

3. (C) DURING A FEBRUARY 1 SPEECH BEFORE AN ACEHNESE STUDENT CONGRESS IN THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF BANDA ACEH, GOVERNOR SYAMSUDDIN MAHMUD OPENLY CRITICIZED THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FOR BEING UNRESPONSIVE TO THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE ACEHNESE PEOPLE AND CALLED FOR GREATER AUTONOMY FOR THE PROVINCE AND A GREATER SHARE IN THE REVENUES GENERATED BY LUCRATIVE ENERGY OPERATIONS BASED IN THE LHOKSEUMAWE AREA, SOUTHEAST OF BANDA ACEH. IN OTHER PUBLIC FORA, THE GOVERNOR HAS PROPOSED THAT INDONESIA BE TRANSFORMED INTO A FEDERAL STATE, DEVOLVING GREATER POLITICAL POWER AND AUTONOMY TO OUTLYING PROVINCES LIKE ACEH.

4. (C) THE GOVERNOR'S INCREASINGLY BOLD STATEMENTS HAVE DRAWN ANGRY PUBLIC RESPONSES FROM CABINET MINISTERS LIKE JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI, WHO WAS QUOTED IN THE JAKARTA PRESS ON FEBRUARY 8 AS DEEMING MAHMUD'S COMMENTS INAPPROPRIATE FOR SOMEONE WHO "TOOK HIS OATH AS AN OFFICIAL OF THE UNITARY STATE OF INDONESIA." [redacted] B1

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS,
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 7 FEB 2024
DECLASSIFIED 15 MAR 2007 200503302

CONFIDENTIAL

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

[redacted] B1

[redacted] THE GOVERNOR LED A DELEGATION OF ACEHNESE LEADERS TO SEE PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON JANUARY 8, AND PUBLICLY CALLED FOR THE PROVINCE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BE REVISED AND REQUESTED/DEMANDED THAT 80 PERCENT OF THE REVENUES GENERATED BY NATURAL GAS OPERATIONS IN ACEH BE REINVESTED IN THE PROVINCE.

ACEHNESE STUDENTS A DRIVING FORCE

5. (C) STUDENTS IN ACEH HAVE BEEN A DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE INCREASINGLY ASSERTIVE TONE OF THE PROVINCE IN ITS DIALOGUE WITH JAKARTA. ACEHNESE STUDENTS HELD A CONGRESS IN THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL FEBRUARY 1-4. AT THE CONGRESS, THE STUDENTS OVERWHELMINGLY AGREED TO DEMAND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HOLD A REFERENDUM ON WHETHER ACEH SHOULD BECOME AN INDEPENDENT STATE. AS THE CONGRESS WAS UNDERWAY, ON FEBRUARY 2, [redacted] B1

THAT ACEHNESE STUDENTS WERE SPLIT BETWEEN THOSE THAT WANT TO BOYCOTT THE JUNE ELECTIONS AND PUSH FOR INDEPENDENCE AND THOSE THAT WILL SETTLE FOR MORE AUTONOMY. ALL PRESENT AT THE MEETING WERE THAT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WAS AT FAULT FOR IMPOSING ITS WILL ON THE COMMUNITY AND RESPONDING TO LOCAL GRIEVANCES WITH BRUTE MILITARY FORCE. ON FEBRUARY 8, IN BANDAR ACEH, TENTS HAD BEEN SENT UP WHERE PETITIONS CALLING FOR A REFERENDUM ON ACEH'S POLITICAL STAUTS WERE BEING SIGNED.

6. (C) [redacted] HE SAW ABRI AS BEHAVING LIKE AN ARMY OF OCCUPATION THAT WAS INSENSITIVE TO LOCAL FEELINGS. HE CITED SOLDIERS OPENLY SMOKING CIGARETTES ON THE STREETS DURING THE FASTING MONTH OF RAMADHAN, AND ENTERING MOSQUES WITHOUT REMOVING THEIR BOOTS, AS EXAMPLES OF ARROGANT AND INSENSITIVE BEHAVIOR. (NOTE: AS A PEOPLE, ACEHNESE ARE AMONG THE MOST STRICTLY OBSERVANT MUSLIMS IN INDONESIA. WHILE IT IS NOT UNUSUAL FOR MUSLIMS IN THE REST OF INDONESIA TO SMOKE DURING RAMADAN, WE FIND IT UNLIKELY THAT ANY MUSLIMS, FROM JAVA OR ELSEWHERE, WOULD FAIL TO REMOVE FOOTGEAR BEFORE ENTERING A MOSQUE. END NOTE.) B1

[redacted] B1

LIKE THEIR COMPATRIOTS IN JAKARTA, ACEHNESE STUDENTS HAVE TAKEN TO THE STREETS TO VOICE THEIR VIEWS, DOING SO ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN BANDA ACEH IN DECEMBER AND JANUARY, BUT NOT RECENTLY IN LHOKSEUMAWE. ACEHNESE STUDENTS HAVE ALSO BEEN ABLE TO CASH IN ON SOME OF THE CLOUT THE NATIONAL STUDENT MOVEMENT HAS DEVELOPED:

JAKARTA 02 OF 03 616

STUDENT COMMUNIQUES AND POLITICAL POSITIONS HAVE RECEIVED WIDE COVERAGE IN THE LOCAL AND NATIONAL MEDIA.

ACTIVISTS SEE GOVERNMENT AS INSINCERE, NON-RESPONSIVE

7. (C) NGO REPRESENTATIVES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS IN ACEH, MANY OF WHOM ARE WORKING TO DOCUMENT PAST MILITARY EXCESSES AND ASSIST VICTIMS, HAVE ALSO BEEN STRIDENT IN VOICING GRIEVANCES AND CRITICISM AGAINST THE MILITARY AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. COMMON THEMES IN POLOFF'S RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH NGO'S IN THE AREA HAVE BEEN A PERCEIVED "LACK OF SINCERITY" ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT TO RIGHT PAST WRONGS, AND A PERCEIVED DESIRE TO PAPER OVER DEEP WOUNDS BY DISTRIBUTING BASIC FOOD TUFFS (SEMBAKO) AND MAKING SMALL CASH PAYMENTS (ABOUT 1 MILLION RUPIAH/120.00 USD) TO VICTIMS OR THEIR WIDOWS. [redacted] B1

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

[redacted] B1

BACKLASH AGAINST MIITARY OPERATIONS

8. (C) THE CURRENT ROUND OF CALLS FO A REFERENDUM ON INDEPENDENCE, TALK OF AN ELECTION BOYCOTT, AND STRONG CRITICISM OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WAS TRIGGERED BY OPERATION WIBAWA '99 (FORCE '99) A CRACKDOWN OPERATION LAUNCHED BY THE SECURITY FORCES FOLLOWING THE BRUTAL ABDUCTION/MURDER OF SEVEN ABRI PERSONNEL AT THE END OF DECEMBER. BETWEEN 17 AND 22 CIVILIANS WERE KILLED DURING THE CRACKDOWN, INCLUDING A NUMBER OF DETAINEES BEATEN TO DEATH BY THEIR CAPTORS. MANY MORE SUFFERED SEVERE BEATINGS AND OTHER MISTREATMENT, BUT ESCAPED DEATH. ABRI COMMANDERS HAVE RESPONDED TO SUCH EXCESSES PROMPTLY - ARRESTING 27 TROOPS, ONE OF WHOM, A MAJOR, HAS ALREADY BEEN CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO SIX YEARS IN PRISON. OUR CIVILIAN INTERLOCUTORS IN ACEH WELCOMED THE COURT MARTIAL AS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, BUT WERE QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT THIS IS ONE OF THE FIRST TIMES ABRI HAS HELD TROOPS ACCOUNTABLE AFTER YEARS OF EXCESSES.

9. (C) BAD BLOOD BETWEEN LOCALS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT GOES BACK MUCH FURTHER THAN THE LAST FEW WEEKS. FOLLOWING A SERIES OF ATTACKS CARRIED OUT BY A SMALL ARMED GROUP SEEKING NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE FOR ACEH IN THE 1980'S, THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (ABRI) DECLARED THE PROVINCE A MILITARY OPERATIONS AREA (DOM) IN 1989. THE DOM REMAINED IN PLACE UNTIL THE FALL OF SOEHARTO IN MAY, 1998. DURING THE DOM, THOUSANDS OF ACEHNESE MEN WERE KILLED OR DISAPPEARED, THOUSANDS MORE WERE IMPRISONED WITHOUT DUE PROCESS AND TORTURED. HUNDREDS OF HOMES WERE BURNED, AND MANY WOMEN WERE RAPED, ALTHOUGH DUE TO THE STGMA FACTOR, THIS LAST CATEGORY IS BELIEVED TO BE GREATLY UNDERDOCUMENTED. MORE FACTS AND STATISTICS ARE COMING OUT ABOUT THE DOM PERIOD, AND WHILE MOST AGREE A FULL ACCOUNTING IS AN ESSENTIAL STEP TOWARDS HEALING, NEW AND OFTEN GRUESOME DISCLOSURES ALSO HAVE THE AT LEAST SHORT TERM EFFECT OF REOPENING OLD WOUNDS AND REVIVING LATENT ANGER.

DEMANDS FOR REALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

10. (C) THE CURRENT SURGE IN EMOTIONS AMONG ACEHNESE IS ALSO FUELED BY LONG-STANDING COMPLAINTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT ABSORBS ALL OF THE REVENUE FROM LUCRATIVE NATURAL GAS OPERATIONS IN THE LHOKSEUMAWE AREA AND RETURNS LITTLE TO THE PROVINCE. MANY WHO SPOKE TO POLOFF VOICED THEIR (MISPLACED) ANGER AT MOBIL OIL AND P.T. ARUN, THE CONCESSIONAIRES, AS WELL AS THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, OVER THIS ISSUE. THE PERCEPTION THAT ACEH IS NOT GETTING ITS DUE FROM THE ENERGY OPERATIONS IS A COMMON DENOMINATOR AMONG ACEHNESE FROM ALMOST ALL WALKS OF LIFE. [redacted] B1

COMMENT

11. (C) THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT ACEHNESE HAVE MANY GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND FEEL THEM DEEPLY. RECENT VIOLENCE IN THE AREA AND A PERCEPTION THAT JAKARTA IS NOT MOVING ON ADDRESSING ACEH'S LONG STANDING GRIEVANCES HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE

ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
INCOMING
R25
RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)
EAP/L CARDS CENTER

INFO: EAP (04) P (01)
---------- 25/0853Z A1 DDK (TOTAL COPIES: 008)
ACTION EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-00	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-00	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/020W						

----------A74F2D 250455Z /38
R 210316Z FEB 99 ZDK CTG RUEHCB 2321
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6208
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000844

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/04
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, MILI, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH MEETS WITH ACEH HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS. REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: A/S ROTH MET WITH TWO NGO OFFICIALS LONG ACTIVE IN ACEHNESE AFFAIRS ON FEBRUARY 4. THEY DESCRIBED VIEWS IN ACEH AS DIVIDED AMONG GROUPS FAVORING THE STATUS QUO, A FEDERATED STATUS, BROAD AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE. THE LATTER SENTIMENT WAS GAINING SUPPORT IN THE WAKE OF RECENT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE CASES PERPETRATED BY THE ARMY. ANGER OVER ABUSES, UNFAIR DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES AND REVENUES BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND INADEQUATE ACEHNESE REPRESENTATION AT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL HAS PERSISTED FOR MANY YEARS. ACEHNESE DO NOT TRUST THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND HAVE LITTLE FAITH IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WHOSE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE IGNORED BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. ACEHNESE LACK THE UNITY TO APPROACH THE GOVERNMENT FOR FORMAL DIALOGUE ABOUT GRIEVANCES AND ASPIRATIONS. THE NGO OFFICIALS CALLED FOR GREATER INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN ACEH AND PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO END ABUSES. THE ISLAMIC PARTIES WILL RUN WELL IN ACEH, AS WILL AMIEN RAIS'S NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN). SOME STUDENTS AND OTHERS FAVOR A BOYCOTT OF THE JUNE NATIONAL ELECTIONS. END SUMMARY

3. (C) [redacted]

---

4. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THE ACEH POPULATION CURRENTLY IS DIVIDED INTO FOUR GROUPINGS:

-- THOSE WHO ARE "LOYAL REPUBLICANS" (WHO SUPPORT CONTINUED INTEGRATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA);

-- FEDERATIONISTS SEEKING A FEDERATED RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA;

-- THOSE FAVORING AUTONOMY;

-- SEPARATISTS.

[redacted] SAID THAT IN RECENT MONTHS, SUPPORT FOR THE SEPARATIST POSITION HAS GROWN, THOUGH IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ASSESS ITS CURRENT STRENGTH. B1

5. (C) SUPPORT FOR THE SEPARATIST POSITION HAS DEVELOPED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DISAPPOINTMENT WITH JAKARTA, INCREASED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE AND CONFLICT BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS. HE NOTED THAT STUDENTS WHO GATHERED EARLIER IN THE WEEK IN BANDA ACEH SUPPORTED A REFERENDUM ON ACEH'S POLITICAL STATUS. [redacted] ADDED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, REGARDING THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A CHANGE. SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE GENERALLY WAS "MORE EMOTIONAL THAN RATIONAL." B1

BEHIND THE SUPPORT FOR SEPARATISM

6. (C) [redacted] HE HAD FOUND SYMPATHY FOR ONLY TWO OPTIONS: BROAD AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. PEOPLE GENERALLY WERE VERY ANGRY, WITH ESPECIALLY STRONG FEELING AGAINST CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM JAVA AND THOSE IN MEDAN (SEAT OF THE MILITARY REGION RESPONSIBLE FOR ACEH). RECENT KILLINGS OF ALLEGED COLLABORATORS (CUAK) AND SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL BY CIVILIANS WAS A MEASURE OF THIS NEW AND GROWING ANGER, AS WAS THE BURNING OF MILITAY INSTALLATIONS. B1

7. (C) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAD EXACERBATED ACEHNESE ANGER. THE "WIBAWA" SECURITY OPERATIONS, SAID BY THE GOVERNMENT TO BE A POLICE OPERATION, WAS IN FACT CONDUCTED BY THE MILITARY. DESPITE CLAIMS THAT SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) PERSONNEL HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN, 60 OF THEM REMAINED, MOST OF THEM IN LHOKSEUMAWE DISTRICT, WEARING CIVILIAN CLOTHES AND SPECIALIZING IN INTELLIGENCE FOR THE "WIBAWA" OPERATION, ACCORDING TO THE ACEHNESE INTERLOCUTORS.

8. (C) EXPLAINING THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE, [redacted] SAID THAT OLDER ACEHNESE ARGUED THAT THEY HAD STRONGLY SUPPORTED SOEKARNO WHEN HE DECLARED THE REPUBLIC BUT HAD RECEIVED LITTLE FOR THEIR LOYALTY. THEY ALSO SUPPORTED B1

THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT WHEN IT CAME TO POWER, BUT WERE REWARDED WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS WHICH, HASBALLAH CLAIMED, LEFT OVER 6,000 DEAD IN A DECADE (1989 TO PRESENT) AND EXPLOITATION OF ACEH'S NATURAL RESOURCES B1

WITH LITTLE RETURN FOR LOCAL PEOPLE. BASED ON THIS EXPERIENCE, PEOPLE WERE RELUCTANT TO OFFER SUPPORT TO A THIRD INDONESIAN PRESIDENT. MOREOVER, RECENT PROMISES BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF REFORMS, ACCOUNTABILITY BY ABRI AND GREATER AUTONOMY HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY AT THIS POINT.

9. (C) [redacted] ECHOED THESE VIEWS, SAYING THAT "BASICALLY, THE PROBLEM IS TRUST," WHICH IS LACKING AS A RESULT OF THE PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF MANY ACEHNESE WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OR ITS REPRESENTATIVES. OFFERS BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF A FAIRER SHARE OF REVENUES FOR B1 B1

02D0522

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 FEB 2024

ACEHNESE, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO CHANGE ATTITUDES BECAUSE THE OFFERS WOULD NOT BE BELIEVED. MOREOVER, PROMISES OF ABRI REFORM AND FUTURE ACCOUNTABILITY WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO DISSIPATE THE REAL HATRED FELT BY ACEHNESE TOWARD THE MILITARY. EVEN ACEHNESE OFFICIALS EXPRESS ANGER OVER WHAT THEY CLAIM IS "UNFAIR TREATMENT" BY JAKARTA, HE SAID.

10. (C) [redacted] AGREED THAT ACEHNESE GRIEVANCES OVER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES WERE MORE IMPORTANT IN SHAPING CURRENT ATTITUDES THAN THE RESOURCE SHARING ISSUE. THE GROWING POSSIBILITY THAT JAKARTA MAY ALLOW EAST TIMOR TO BECOME INDEPENDENT HAD GIVEN ACEHNESE CONFIDENCE BUT WAS NOT A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN SHAPING OPINIONS AMONG ACEHNESE. OVER THE YEARS, ACEHNESE ALSO RESENTED THE FACT THAT RELATIVELY FEW ACEHNESE HAD BEEN APPOINTED TO SENIOR POSITIONS; THERE IS NO NATIVE-BORN ACEHNESE IN THE CURRENT CABINET. HASBALLAH CLAIMED THAT THE SUPREME ADVISORY COUNCIL HAS NEVER HAD AN ACEHNESE

B1

AMONG ITS 45 MEMBERS. MOREOVER FOUR OF EIGHT DISTRICT PARLIAMENTS ARE CHAIRED BY NON-ACEHNESE.

11. (C) WHILE AGREEING THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES CONSTITUTED THE MOST IMPORTANT GRIEVANCE, [redacted] ADDED THAT THE ABUSES HAD GROWN OUT OF PROTESTS WHICH WERE LARGELY OVER ECONOMIC ISSUES. "WHEN WE COMPLAINED ABOUT ECONOMIC ISSUES, JAKARTA ACCUSED US OF BEING SEPARATISTS AND ANSWERED US WITH MILITARY FORCE," HE SAID.

B1

HOW TO DEAL WITH ACEH-CENTRAL GOVERNMENT PROBLEMS

12. (C) [redacted] BELIEVED IT WOULD BE PREMATURE FOR THE ACEHNESE TO HOLD A DIALOGUE WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BECAUSE ACEHNESE WERE NOT YET UNIFIED ON KEY QUESTIONS, SUCH AS THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE PROVINCE. ONLY WHEN THE FOUR PERSPECTIVES NOTED ABOVE HAD ACHIEVED A CONSENSUS COULD ACEHNESE APPROACH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FOR DIALOGUE. MOREOVER, ATTEMPTS AT DIALOGUE THUS FAR HAD ONLY TAKEN PLACE AMONG JAVANESE OF THE SAME GENERATION (ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, AMIEN RAIS, MEGAWATI, WIRANTO, AND SULTAN HAMENGKUBUWONO X). THESE PEOPLE DID NOT SPEAK FOR NON-JAVANESE, NOR FOR STUDENTS AND OTHER YOUTHS. HABIBIE, AS A NATIVE OF SULAWESI, APPEARED MORE SENSITIVE TO THE NON-JAVANESE, HOWEVER.

B1

13. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT SEVERAL NATIONAL FIGURES APPEARED TO UNDERSTAND AND BE SYMPATHETIC TO THE ACEHNESE PERSPECTIVE. [redacted] CLAIMED THAT

B1

RAIS HAD ATTRACTED A CROWD OF 300,000 RECENTLY WHEN HE SPOKE IN ACEH -- THE LARGEST CROWD HE HAS ATTRACTED ANYWHERE TO DATE. MINISTER OF COOPERATIVES AND SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES ADI SASONO HAS VISITED THE PROVINCE AND, MOREOVER, WORKED ON ACEH-RELATED PROBLEMS WHEN HE WAS AN NGO ACTIVIST IN THE 1980'S. FORMER CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF; LTG FACHRUL RAZI, THOUGH FROM ACEH, IS NOT SEEN SYMPATHETICALLY BY ACEHNESE.

14. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE, ESPECIALLY THOSE ASPECTS INVOLVING THE MILITARY, WARRANTED GREATER INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION, TO INCLUDE A GREATER INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE. [redacted] NOTED THAT IN THE EARLY JANUARY VIOLENCE INVOLVING MILITARY SWEEPS OF VILLAGES OUTSIDE LHOKSEUMAWE, SEVERAL HUNDRED PEOPLE FLED TO THE ICRC OFFICE FOR PROTECTION REFLECTING TRUST IN THAT INSTITUTION. (NOTE: THE ICRC TELLS US THAT ON FEBRUARY 5 IT SECURED A TWO-MONTH EXTENSION FOR ITS

B1

B1

PRESENCE IN ACEH. END NOTE) "WE NEED INTERNATIONAL EYES TO STOP THE ARMY AND TO SEE WHAT IS GOING ON," AND TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO STOP IT, [redacted] SAID.

B1

15. (C) [redacted] THE IMPACT OF

B1

THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (KOMNASHAM), CLAIMING THAT ITS GENERALLY GOOD REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS INVARIABLY SAW NO GOVERNMENT FOLLOW-UP. IN JANUARY, ON ITS FOURTH VISIT SINCE THE SUMMER OF 1998, THE COMMISSION WAS TOLD BY LOCAL ACEHNESE THAT UNLESS THE COMMISSION COULD PRODUCE TANGIBLE CHANGES IN THE

SITUATION, IT SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY MORE VISITS.

16. (C) [redacted] DISCOUNTED THE IMPORTANCE OF RECENT PROSECUTIONS AND SENTENCING OF ABRI MEMBERS WHO HAD COMMITTED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. HE DESCRIBED THE STRATEGY AS AIMED AT FOCUSSING ATTENTION ON INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF ABRI WHO WERE CHARGED WITH "DISOBEDIENCE." [redacted] INSISTED THAT ABRI AS AN INSTITUTION WAS TO BLAME, NOT SIMPLY INDIVIDUAL ABRI PERSONNEL. THE INSTITUTION NEEDED FUNDAMENTAL REFORM AND, MOREOVER, SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE.

B1

B1

THE ELECTIONS

17. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT MANY ACEHNESE STUDENTS WITH WHOM HE IS IN CONTACT BELIEVE THAT THE JUNE 7 ELECTIONS WOULD BE "USELESS." "THE ACEHNESE WENT THROUGH SEVEN ELECTIONS AND NOTHING CHANGED." MANY, THEREFORE, OPENLY ARGUE FOR BOYCOTTING THE ELECTION. [redacted] ACKNOWLEDGED THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THIS ELECTION COULD BE FAR MORE FREE AND FAIR THAN IN THE PAST AND THAT SUPPORT FOR PARTICIPATION IN IT WOULD DEPEND ON THE ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE IN ACEH IN THE MONTHS LEADING UP TO JUNE.

B1

B1

18. (C) [redacted] SAID THAT THE ISLAMIC UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) WAS STRONG IN ACEH AND THAT NEW PARTIES LIKE THE JUSTICE PARTY (KEADILIAN) AND THE CRESCENT MOON AND STAR PARTY (BULAN BINTANG) WOULD DO WELL. ALTHOUGH NOT AN ISLAMIC PARTY, AMIEN RAIS'S PAN WOULD RUN STRONGLY, AS ACEHNESE SAW IT AS A PARTY THAT COULD "CHANGE THE SITUATION." PAN'S SUPPORT FOR A

B1

FEDERAL SYSTEM IN INDONESIA WAS POPULAR IN ACEH.

19. (U) A/S ROTH CLEARED THIS MESSAGE
ROY

ROUTINE
RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

EAP/L CARDS CENTER

INCOMING
R 29

ACTION: PMS (03)

INFO: ANP (03) EAP (04) P (01)
---------- 23/0800Z A2 DDK (TOTAL COPIES: 011)
ACTION EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-00	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-00	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W

----------A63053 230127Z /38

R 212338Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6217
INFO AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000848

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/04
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH MEETS WITH LEADING FIGURES FROM IRIAN JAYA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS. REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY:

[redacted] B1

END SUMMARY

3. (U) ON FEBRUARY 5, A/S ROTH MET WITH SENIOR FIGURES FROM IRIAN JAYA AT LUNCH HOSTED BY THE DCM. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSADOR, POLCOUNS AND LABATT (NOTETAKERS). THE IRIANESE INCLUDED: BARNABAS SUEBU (FORMER IRIAN JAYA GOVERNOR), DR. SIMON MORIN (MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT), DR. BENNY GIAY (CHAIRPERSON OF THE KINGMI CHURCH), REV. PHIL ERARI (SECRETARY OF THE TASK FORCE ON IRIAN JAYA FOR THE INDONESIAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES), JOHN DJOPARI (DEAN OF STUDIES AT THE INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION), PETER KAMAREA

(MEMBER OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON IRIAN JAYA), THEO WAYMURI (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS) AND WILLIAM MANDOWEN, A UNIVERSITY LECTURER IN JAYAPURA.

[redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 FEB 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 15 MAR 2007 200503302

CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

B1

19. (U) A/S ROTH HAS CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.
ROY

Clarke, Robert J

R51

From: Boyer, Debbie F
Sent: Friday, July 09, 1999 9:27 AM
To: Boyer, Debbie F; Watch Information
Cc: Deming, Rust M; Adanza, Nelia G; Arvis, Constance C; Rhodes, Patricia K; Handler, Phuong B.; Campbell, Ian P; Burger, David J; Wazelle, Holly A; Fowler, Ardella D; Thomas, Ruby P; Hartwick, Douglas A; Clarke, Robert J
Subject: Roth Whereabouts Update

Importance: High

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Additional Contact Information Included:

7/9-7/11		On Leave in Denver, Colorado Tel: [redacted] B6
7/11	0825	Depart Denver via UA1003
	0943	Arrive Los Angeles
	1245	Depart LA via UA 897
7/12	2335	Arrive Singapore
	RON	Venue TBD*
7/13	0900	Depart singapore via Silkair 202
	0935	Arrive Jakarta
7/13 -	RON	Amb. Residence: (62-21) 344-2211 x 2101
7/14		Control Officer: Ian McCary O: 62-61-344-2211 x 2276
		Fax: 380-5583; Home: [redacted] Cellphone: [redacted] B6 B6
7/14	2045	Depart Jakarta via Garuda 880
	2325	Arrive Denpasar
		POC: Consular Agent Andy Toth (62-361) 233-605;
		Fax: (62-361) 222-426; Home [redacted] B6
		Cellular: (62) 081-238-02540
		RON: Bali Hilton, Nusa Dua (62-361) 771-102;
		FAX: (62-361) 771-616
715	0930	Lv Denpasar
	1130	Arrive Dili
		POC in Dili via Cellpone [redacted] (phone not operable outside Dili) B6
7/17	1225	Lv Dili via Merpati Nusa 643
	1600	Arrive Jakarta
	2330	Lv Jakarta via Japan Air 726
7/18	1055	Arrive washington Dulles

*Further contact info will be forwarded as soon as provided by Post.

Acting Assistant Secretary: P/DAS Rust Deming - O: 202-736-4393; Home: [redacted] Cellphone: [redacted] B6 B6

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

02D 052,2

CONFIDENTIAL

R46

Printed By: Robert J Clarke 07/30/99 03:33:53 PM

JAKARTA 3411

From: AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
Subject: TREASURY UNDER SECRETARY GEITHNER'S JAKARTA MEETINGS: SUPPORT FOR CONTINUATION OF IMF-SUPERVISED REFORM PROGRAM

MRN: 3411
ICNbr: TED6462

Date/Time: 150902Z JUL 99
Precedence: ROUTINE

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

Cable Text:

TED6462
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AIT-03	CEA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00
	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OES-01	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	USIE-00	FMP-00	EPAE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00
	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	(ANHR-01	IO-00	) /016W	

----------E1B19E 161140Z /38

R 150902Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8809
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AIT TAIPEI 1144

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003411

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS

TREASURY FOR OASIA/INA-R, KURIYAN, ALSO FOR MDB/SHEERLING

COMMERCE/USDOC FOR 4430/MIKALIS

AID FOR ANE

PASS EXIM FOR IMAM

PASS OPIC FOR BRACEY

HONG KONG FOR TREASATT/QUINN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2009
TAGS: ECON, EFIN, ENRG, PGOV, ID

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 14 JUL 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 07 MAR 2007 200503302

(92D052)

SUBJECT: TREASURY UNDER SECRETARY GEITHNER'S JAKARTA MEETINGS: SUPPORT FOR CONTINUATION OF IMF-SUPERVISED REFORM PROGRAM

1. (U) Classified by DCM Michael P. Owens. Reason 1.5 (d).

Summary
---

2. (C) Under Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner met with opposition party advisors, civil society representatives, GOI officials and U.S. business representatives during a July 13 visit to Jakarta. Among the topics discussed were:

The current economic reform program -- generally accepted as on the right track, but with additional (and more difficult) legal and institutional reform seen as necessary;

The July 27-28 CGI meeting -- generally supported, though some civil society representatives oppose the meeting;

Economic conditions -- confidence improving, but little evidence of real sector recovery;

Economic prospects that will face a new government -- fiscal difficulties, in light of large domestic and foreign debts; and,

The ongoing political transition -- uncertainty about dates and outcomes.

End Summary.

PDI-P Economic Advisors: Need Transparency and Law Enforcement
---

3. (C) PDI-P Economic Advisors Laksamana Sukardi and Kwik Kian Gie discussed the ongoing economic reform program, PDI-P's goals for a new government, Indonesia's external economic relations, the upcoming CGI meeting, and the independent power projects (IPPs):



B1



B1

Lunch Discussion: Money Politics and Future Economic Policy

---

10. (SBU) The Ambassador hosted lunch for U/S Geithner, A/S Roth, and former cabinet ministers Mohammad Sadli (Manpower, 1971-73, Mines and Energy, 1973-78, now Chairman of Indonesia Forum economists' association), Emil Salim (Environment, 1978-83), and Tunky Ariwibowo (Industry and Trade, 1993-98). Others attending were agriculture specialist and [redacted] H.S. Dillon, Bank Indonesia Senior Deputy Governor-select Anwar Nasution, Director of economic consulting agency "Econit" Rizal Ramli, World Bank economist Vikkram Nehru, Merrill Lynch Country Director Richard Fischer, Asia Foundation representative Douglas Ramage, Treasury's Saeger, and emboffs.

B6

11. (SBU) MONEY POLITICS: [redacted] SAID THAT THE MPR'S PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS WOULD BE MONEY-DRIVEN. PRESIDENT HABIBIE, HAVING PAID OFF GOLKAR MEMBERS TO SUPPORT HIM INSTEAD OF PARTY CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANDJUNG, HAD SET ASIDE RP 2 BILLION (ABOUT US$ 300,000) EACH TO BRIBE MEMBERS OF THE MPR WHOSE SUPPORT HE NEEDED. OTHERS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MONEY WOULD PLAY A ROLE, BUT DID NOT SECOND [redacted] SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS. SALIM SAID THERE WAS POLITICAL CONSENSUS FOR MEGAWATI AS PRESIDENT, AND THAT THE DEBATE NOW WAS OVER VICE PRESIDENT. SEVERAL PARTICIPANTS SAW THE POSSIBILITY OF STREET ACTIVITY PICKING UP BEFORE THE SELECTION PROCESS IS SETTLED.

B6

B6

12. (SBU) ECONOMIC CONDITIONS: RAMLI SAID THERE WAS NOW STABILITY BUT NOT RECOVERY. SALIM AGREED THAT IT WAS INCORRECT TO TALK ABOUT A REAL SECTOR RECOVERY BECAUSE THE ONLY POSITIVE GROWTH SO FAR WAS IN AGRICULTURE. NASUTION SAID THAT A "NEW GUARD" OF ECONOMISTS FROM UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA AND YOGYAKARTA'S GADJAH MADAH UNIVERSITY WOULD DOMINATE ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING IN A NEW GOVERNMENT. THIS NEW GROUP WAS WELL-TRAVELED, PRO-MARKET, AND READY TO ADOPT POLICIES THAT HAD PROVEN SUCCESSFUL IN OTHER COUNTRIES SO THAT INDONESIA COULD "BENEFIT FROM GLOBALIZATION." THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT ON WHETHER PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE ON TACKLING CORRUPTION. SADLI SAID THAT THERE WAS IMPROVEMENT IN THE SENSE THAT POWERFUL INTERESTS COULD NOT SIMPLY SIEZE LAND FOR CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS AS THEY HAD IN THE PAST. SALIM SAID THAT LACK OF ACTION ON ATTORNEY GENERAL GHALIB'S CASE SHOWED THE GOI'S LACK OF SERIOUSNESS. TUNKY SAID THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF CIVIL SERVANTS BY CONTRACTING MORE WORK TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, AND THEN TO IMPROVE THE REMAINING CIVIL SERVANTS' PAY STRUCTURE. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT IT WOULD BE HARDER TO REACH CONSENSUS ON ECONOMIC POLICIES UNDER A MORE PLURALISTIC GOVERNMENT.



B1

ECONOMIC MINISTERS: DEBT PROBLEMS FOR NEXT GOVERNMENT

17. (C) U/S GEITHNER, A/S ROTH, THE AMBASSADOR, TREASURY'S SAEGER, ROTH ASSISTANT KEEGAN AND ECONOFF DINED WITH COORDINATING MINISTER FOR ECONOMICS, FINANCE, AND INDUSTRY GINANDJAR KARTA BAMBANG SUBIANTO, TRADE AND INDUSTRY MINISTER RAHARDI RAMELAN, AND MINISTER FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING (BAPPENAS) BOEDIONO.

[redacted] B1

18. (U) U/S GEITHNER DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR THIS MESSAGE.
ROY
NNNN

End Cable Text

Printed By: Robert J Clarke 07/30/99 03:33:53 PM

R44

Printed By: Robert J Clarke 07/30/99 03:30:50 PM

JAKARTA 3610

From: AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
Subject: EAST TIMOR: A/S ROTH'S MEETINGS WITH UNAMET
MRN: 3610
ICNbr: TED9330
Date/Time: 270218Z JUL 99
Precedence: PRIORITY

Cable Text:

TED9330
ACTION EAP-01

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/021W			

----------E58A94 270223Z /38

P 270218Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8983
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSYROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUEHWLAMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0331
USMISSION GEEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 003610

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: A/S ROTH'S MEETINGS WITH UNAMET

REF: USUN NEW YORK 1877

JAKARTA 01 OF 05 3610

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS WILLIAM PIERCE, REASON 1.5(D).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 26 JUL 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

SUMMARY
---

2. (C) IN A JUNE 15-17 VISIT TO EAST TIMOR, A/S ROTH AND THE AMBASSADOR HEARD UNAMET OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS PRESENT A GRIM ASSESSMENT OF THE OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION. THEY SAID

027052,2

INTIMIDATION BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS HAD NOT ABATED AND NO POLITICAL SPACE HAD OPENED FOR THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE. UNAMET OFFICIALS WERE GREATLY CONCERNED BY BOTH THE HUMANITARIAN AND LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS POSED BY 40 TO 60 THOUSAND DISPLACED PERSONS, WHOM THEY CHARACTERIZED AS "POLITICAL HOSTAGES." WHILE UNAMET CIVPOL AND MILITARY LIAISON OFFICERS DESCRIBED THEIR COOPERATION WITH THEIR INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS AS GOOD, THE ASSURANCES GIVEN BY INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES HAD NOT TRANSLATED INTO IMPROVEMENS ON THE GROUND. UNAMET INTERLOCUTERS STRESED THAT THE MILITIAS WERE MERELY SYMPTOMS OF HE LARGER PROBLEM OF THE TNI'S OVERALL STRATEY. UNAMET OFFICIALS REFUTED GOI ACCUSATIONS THAT THEIR INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL AND LOCAL STAFF WERE PRO-INDEPENDENCE, AND THEY PRESENTED VIDEO TAPE EVIDENCE TO COUNTER GOI CLAIMS THAT CIVPOL HAD "RANSACKED" A HOUSE. A/S ROTH CONVEYED STRONG USG SUPPORT FOR THE UNAMET MISSION. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) A/S ROTH, ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSADOR, EAP CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS OFFICER, AND POLOFF, VISITED EAST TIMOR JUNE 15-17. AT UNAMET'S HEADQUARTERS IN DILI, ROTH MET ON JUNE 15 WITH UNAMET [redacted] MILITARY LIAISON OFFICERS, AND SEVERAL UNAET POLITICAL OFFICERS. HE ALSO MET [redacted] ON JULY 16, THE FIRST DAY OF VOTER REGISTRATION, ROTH AND PARTY ACCOMPANIED [redacted] UNAMET OFFICIALS ON HELICOPTER TRIPS TO MALIANA AND SUAI, WHERE THEY MET WITH UNAMET PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THOSE SITES AND VISITED VOTER REGISTRATION CENTERS. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A MEETING WITH DILI-BASED AMCIT UNAMET PERSONNEL AND AN OVERLAND TRIP TO LIQUICA. ROTH'S MEETINGS IN DILI WITH INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES AND EAST TIMORESE POLITICAL FIGURES ARE REPORTED SEPTEL. B1 B1

SECURITY ISSUES

4. (C) UNAMET WAS FOCUSING ON THREE SECURITY CONCERNS: THE SAFETY OF UNAMET'S OWN PERSONNEL AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUFFICIENTLY SECURE CONDITIONS TO CARRY OUT THE REGISTRATION PROCESS; THE WIDESPREAD INTIMIDATION WHICH WAS CORRUPTING THE PROCESS; AND THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS PROBLEM. [redacted] DESCRIBED THE SITUATION AS "ABYSMAL ALL OVER," ADDING THAT IT WAS BEYOND DISPUTE THAT TNI WAS ORCHESTRATING THE MILITIA ACTIVITY. HE CHARACTERIZED THE MILITIA AS "NOTHING MORE THAN THUGS" AND SAID THERE WAS EVIDENCE MANY HAD BEEN CONSCRIPTED AGAINST THEIR WILL. HE AND OTHER UNAMET OFFICIALS REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT THEIR CONCLUSIONS WERE NOT BASED SOLELY ON RUMORS OR PRO-INDEPENDENCE SOURCES BUT ON FIRSTHAND OBSERVATIONS AND A LARGE VOLUME OF HARD EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD. [redacted] RECALLED THAT UNAMET PERSONNEL HAD STUMBLED ACROSS "SOCIALIZATION" GATHERINGS IN WHICH LOCAL OFFICIALS, MILITIAS, AND TNI PERSONNEL WERE JOINTLY INVOLVED IN THREATENING THE LOCAL RESIDENTS. UNAMET OFFICIALS ALSO HAD DIRECTLY OBSERVED JOINT TNI-MILITIA OPERATIONS AND SAID THEY HAD ASSEMBLED EXTENSIVE DOSSIERS OF EVIDENCE REGARDING PUBLIC FUNDING FOR THE PRO-INTEGRATION EFFORT AND ON THE NEXUS OF PUBLIC OFFICALS, TNI, AND THE MILITIAS. B1 B1

5. (C) [redacted] SAID CIVPOL'S STRATEGY WAS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENHANCE THE ROLE OF THE INDONESIAN POLICE VIS-A-VIS TNI AND TO FOCUS QUICKLY ON "HOTSPOTS" WHEN THEY DEVELOP. CIVPOL'S RELATIONS WITH ITS INDONESIAN POLICE (POLRI) COUNTERPARTS WERE DESCRIBED AS GOOD, [redacted] WAS PLEASED THAT B1 B1

POLRI RECENTLY HAD AGREED TO JOINT NIGHT PATROLS WITH CIVPOL. IN RESPONSE TO THE MOST SERIOUS INCIDENTS, MILLS WAS FLYING TO THE AREAS INVOLVED WITH INDONESIAN POLICE COMMANDER TIMBUL SILAEN. IN MANUTUTO, THE LOCAL DISTRICT CHIEF HAD PUBLICLY THREATENED THE LIVES OF UNAMET PERSONNEL, BUT HAD SHOWN A MORE COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE WHEN CONFRONTED BY SILAEN AND MILLS ON JULY 14. IN ISOLATED DELORI, WEST OF VIQUEQUE, THE LOCAL MILITARY CHIEF, A SERGEANT, HAD ORGANIZED A MILITIA AND INSTITUTED A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: A/S ROTH'S MEETINGS WITH UNAMET

REIGN OF TERROR. WHEN [redacted] AND SILAEN ARRIVED TO INVESTIGATE ON JULY 14, THE SERGEANT HAD DISAPPEARED, BUT IT WAS FEARED THAT HE WOULD RETURN TO EXACT RETRIBUTION AGAINST THE LOCAL POPULATION. [redacted] BELIEVED THAT THE EXTENSION OF UNAMET ACTIVITY TO 200 REGISTRATION CENTERS WAS CERTAIN TO REVEAL MANY MORE PROBLEM LOCALITIES. B1 B1

IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING

6. (C) TNI HAD FORMED ITS OWN LIAISON OFFICE CONSISTING OF 60 OFFICERS. UNAMET OFFICALS COMPLAINED THAT THESE PERSONNEL WERE ATTEMPTING TO DRESS LIKE UNAMET CIVPOL PERSONNEL IN ORDER TO CONFUSE THE POPULATION. WHILE THE UNAMET MLO'S DESCRIBED THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE TNI LIAISON OFFICERS AS COOPERATIVE AND FRIENDLY, THEY SAID THESE OFFICERS WERE ATTEMPTING TO ACT AS A BUFFER BETWEEN THEM AND THE LOCAL MILITARY. ONE MLO NOTED THAT "WE HAVE TO KEEP TRYING TO SHOVE THEM ASIDE TO GET TO THE RELEVANT OFFICERS." [redacted] SAID THAT BECAUSE THE INDONESIAN MILITARY HAD LITTLE RESPECT FOR THEIR OWN POLICE FORCES AND PERHAPS FOR POLICE IN GENERAL, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT UNAMET'S CIVPOL BE AUGMENTED BY SOME MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO COULD MORE EFFECTIVELY INTERACT WITH THEIR TNI COUNTERPARTS. B1

DISPLACED PERSONS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PROCESS

7. (C) UNAMET OFFICIALS ESTIMATED INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS TOTALED 40 TO 60 THOUSAND. [redacted] SAID THE IDP SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR DIFFERED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD BECAUSE THE EAST TIMORESE WERE BEING DISPLACED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE BALLOT AND WERE ESSENTIALLY "POLITICAL HOSTAGES." UNAMET [redacted] ARGUED THAT THE DISPLACED WERE NOT A PURELY HUMANITARIAN ISSUE BUT PART OF A WELL-FUNDED AND WELL-COORDINATED PROCESS TO COMPEL THE POPULATION TO VOTE FOR AUTONOMY. HE STRESSED THAT THE MODE OF OPERATIONS DID NOT DIFFER FROM AREA TO AREA, ESSENTIALLY INVOLVING CLOSE MILITARY-MILITIA COOPERATION IN "KILLING A FEW PEOPLE AND BURNING SOME HOUSES" TO INSTILL A CLIMATE OF FEAR AND DRIVE PEOPLE FROM THEIR HOMES. [redacted] ARGUED THAT BECAUSE THE THREATS (SUCH AS THAT A PRO-INDEPENDENCE VOTE WOULD LEAD TO A BLOODBATH WORSE THAN 1975) WERE THE SAME IN EVERY LOCALE, IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE EMANATING FROM A CENTRAL SOURCE. B1 B1 B1

8. (C) IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING, [redacted] LARGELY ECHOED THE POINTS MADE BY THE UNAMET OFFICIALS. HE SAID GOOD COOPERATION WITH GOI OFFICIALS AND MILITARY OFFICERS AT THE B1

TOP LEVELS HAD NOT TRANSLATED INTO DEEDS IN THE FIELD. [redacted] SAW THE POPULATION AS DISTRESSED AND LACKING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. [redacted] CURRENT EFFORTS TO AID THE DISPLACED WERE DESCRIBED AS AN ULTIMATELY HOPELESS AND UNSUSTAINABLE ENDEAVOR BECAUSE ONLY AN ADEQUATE SECURITY SITUATION WOULD RESOLVE THE ISSUE. [redacted] SAID THE SITUATION HAD ENTERED THE STAGE OF A LESS DRAMATIC WAR OF ATTRITION. B1 B1 B1

LOSING THE HEARTS AND MINDS BATTLE

9. (C) [redacted] POLOFF AND VISITING IO/PHO OFFICER IN EARLIER MEETINGS) UNAMET WORKING-LEVEL PERSONNEL GENERALLY GAVE A MORE NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONSULTATION THAN THAT PRESENTED BY [redacted] IN NEW YORK (REFTEL). THEY SAID UNAMET SECTION CHIEFS HAD UNANIMOUSLY JUDGED THAT CURRENT CONDITIONS WOULD NOT PERMIT A FREE AND FAIR BALLOT. [redacted] SAID "WE ARE LOSING THE HEARTS AND MINDS BATTLE" TO CONVINCE THE POPULATION THAT THEY COULD SAFELY VOTE THEIR CONSCIENCE. [redacted] STRESSED THAT THE INTIMIDATION MECHANISMS ALREADY WERE IN PLACE, THAT "THE PLAY IS SET, THEY DO NOT REALLY NEED TO MAKE MORE ATTACKS." UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICERS POINTED OUT THAT THE MILITIAS ARE INCREASINGLY INSTITUTIONALIZED AND EXERCISING REAL AUTHORITY AS A LAW UNTO THEMSELVES. (COMMENT: THIS PARALLELS OUR REPORTS FROM OTHER CONTACTS. IN MAUBISSE, FOR EXAMPLE, [redacted] REPORT THAT THE "MAHIDI" MILITIA HAS OPENED A NEW HEADQUARTERS IN THE MIDDLE OF TOWN, AND THE LOCAL MAHIDI LEADER HAS INFORMED [redacted] PERSONNEL THAT ALL THE CUTOMARY PAYOFFS MUST BE DIRECTED THROUGH HIM RATHER THAN THROUGH TNI OR POLICE AUTHORITIES AS PREVIOUSLY. END COMMENT.) B1 B1 B1 B1

PRESSURE NOT WORKING

JAKARTA 03 OF 05 3610

10. (C) UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICERS STRESSED AS THE UNAMET OPERATION EXTENDED ITS REACH IT WAS DISCOVERING THAT THE LEVEL OF INTIMIDATION HAD NOT DECLINED, I.E., THE FUNDAMENTALS DID NOT APPEAR TO BE CHANGING DESPITE UNAMET'S MORE PERVASIVE PRESENCE. SOME UNAMET OFFICIALS EXPRESSED EXASPERATION THAT EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO INFLUENCE THE GOI WERE INEFFECTIVE. "WHATEVER PRESSURE YOU ARE PUTTING ON THESE GUYS, IT IS NOT WORKING," [redacted] COMPLAINED. THESE UNAMET OFFICIALS WERE NOT ENTIRELY REASSURED BY THE ABSENCE OF ATTACKS ON UNAMET SINCE THE JULY 4 LIQUICA INCIDENT, ASSERTING THAT TNI'S APPROACH HAD NOT CHANGED AND "AT ANY MOMENT THE PUPPET MASTERS CAN RILE THINGS UP AGAIN." DESPITE THESE UNIFORMLY NEGATIVE ASSESSMENTS OF CURRENT CONDITIONS, UNAMET OFFICIALS WERE NOT READY TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SITUATION COULD BE TURNED AROUND IN TIME FOR THE CONSULTATION TO TAKE PLACE BY LATE AUGUST. THEY SAID THAT, FOR THIS TO OCCUR, "WINDOW DRESSING" ADJUSTMENTS SUCH AS ARRESTING A FEW MILITIA MEMBERS WOULD NOT SUFFICE. THEY STRESSED THAT IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT "THIS SHOW IS VERY MUCH BEING RUN BY TNI" AND THAT NO FREE AND FAIR PROCESS WOULD BE POSSIBLE UNLESS SUFFICENT PRESSURE WERE BROUGHT ON TNI TO CHANGE ITS OVERALL STRATEGY, WITHDRAW ITS FORCES TO AT LEAST THE DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS LEVEL, STOP MOBILIZING THE MILITIAS, AND STOP TAKING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE CAMPAIGNING. B1

GOI ACCUSATIONS OF "BIAS"

11. (C) A/S ROTH TOLD [redacted] OF [redacted] CONTENTIONS (SEPTEL) THAT SOME UNAMET PERSONNEL WERE BIASED AND THAT UNAMET FAVORED PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE IN ITS LOCAL HIRING. [redacted] SAW GOI/TNI CONCERN ABOUT UNAMET'S GROWING BODY OF EVIDENCE ON GOI/TNI SUPPORT OF THE MILITIAS AS BEHIND THESE GOI COUNTERATTACKS ON UNAMET'S CREDIBILITY. [redacted] TOOK EXCEPTION TO PROPOSALS THAT UNAMET REPLACE PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF "BIAS." HE DENIED THAT ANY OF THOSE ACCUSED HAD DONE ANYTHING OUT OF LINE. MARTIN SAID [redacted] HAD RECEIVED SERIOUS DEATH THREATS AND BEEN GIVEN SECURITY PROTECTION, BUT EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THIS SITUATION NOW WAS UNDER CONTROL, AS THE GOI HAD NOT SAID ANYTHING PUBLICLY ABOUT SPECIFIC UNAMET PERSONNEL FOR SOME TIME. (COMMENT: NEVERTHELESS, TNI OFFICERS AND PRO-INTEGRATION LEADERS CONTINUED TO LEVEL THESE ACCUSATIONS IN THEIR MEETINGS WITH ROTH. END COMMENT.)

B1 B1 B1 B1

12. (C) [redacted] STRONGLY ASSERTED THAT UNAMET'S PERSONNEL WERE EXPERIENCED PROFESSIONALS FROM 90 COUNTRIES, NOT POLITICIZED PEOPLE WHO WERE ENEMIES OF INDONESIA. HE ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE A BAD PRECEDENT TO BOW TO GOI PRESSURE TO REMOVE SPECIFIC UNAMET PERSONNEL.

B1

13. (C) ROTH ALSO ASKED ABOUT GOI/TNI CHARGES, WHICH HAD BEEN REPEATED BY ALATAS, THAT UNAMET PERSONNEL HAD EXCEEDED THEIR MANDATE BY ALLEGEDLY RANSACKING A HOUSE IN MAUBARA ON JUNE 19 WHILE SEARCHING FOR WEAPONS. [redacted] SAID THAT, IN REALITY, CIVPOL HAS ACCOMPANIED INDONESIAN POLICE IN A ROUTINE SEARCH OF A HOUSE. NO WEAPONS HAD BEEN FOUND, AND THE POLICE/CIVPOL TEAM HAD DEPARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. ACCORDING TO UNAMET'S INVESTIGATION, TNI SOLDIERS HAD RANSACKED THE SAME HOUSE TWO DAYS LATER, AND CALLED IN AN INDONESIAN TELEVISION CREW TO FILM THE SCENE AND INDUCED ONE OF THE INHABITANTS TO CLAIM THAT UNAMET WAS RESPONSIBLE. UNAMET OFFICIALS PRESENTED A VIDEO TAPE OF THE CIVPOL VISIT TO THE HOUSE ON JUNE 19 THAT CLEARLY INDICATED NOTHING UNUSUAL HAD OCCURRED AND THAT THE SEARCH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN A FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE.

B1

LOCAL STAFF RECRUITMENT

14. (C) [redacted] SAID RECRUITMENT OF LOCAL STAFF HAD BEEN A "NIGHTMARE," SINCE FINDING PEOPLE WITH EVEN MINIMAL SKILLS WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. RECENT UNIVERSITY GRADUATES WERE ONE OF THE FEW POSSIBILITIES, AND THEY TENDED TO BE MORE PRO-INDEPENDENCE THAN THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE. MOST QUALIFIED PRO-INTEGRATION PEOPLE ALREADY HAD GOOD JOBS WITH THE GOVERNMENT, [redacted] POINTED OUT. [redacted] SAID APPLICANTS WERE NOT ASKED ABOUT THEIR POLITICAL VIEWPOINTS BUT UNAMET SHIED AWAY

B1

B1 B1

FROM HIRING ANY KNOWN ACTIVISTS FROM EITHER SIDE. ALL LOCAL EMPLOYEES WERE REQUIRED TO SIGN A DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY. HE

SAID UNAMET HAD ENCOURAGED THE PRO-INTEGRATION FPDK EARLY ON TO RECOMMEND POTENTIAL APPLICANTS, BUT FPDK HAD NOT RESPONDED FOR A MONTH, WHILE MOST SLOTS WERE BEING FILLED. UNAMET FINALLY HAD RECEIVED A LIST OF NAMES FROM FPDK THE PREVIOUS WEEK (PRE-DATED JUNE 19) AND WAS NOW EXAMINING IT.

THE VIEW FROM MALIANA

15. (C) IN MALIANA, SITE OF THE JUNE 29 ATTACK ON UNAMET'S OFFICE, [redacted] SAID CONDITIONS IN THE AREA WERE NOT CONDUCIVE FOR A FREE AND FAIR VOTE. WHILE UNAMET'S OWN SECURITY POSITION HAD IMPROVED FOLLOWING ASSURANCES FROM THE LOCAL MILITIA LEADER, TNI AND THE POLICE, [redacted] SAID SECURITY FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION WAS CURRENTLY "MINIMAL" AND VERY DIFFICULT TO UPGRADE, GIVEN THE INABILITY OF THE POLICE TO EXERT JURISDICTION OVER THE MILITIA GROUPS AND THE RESULTANT CLIMATE OF IMPUNITY. AS A RESULT, THERE WAS "ZERO POLITICAL SPACE FOR THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE." THE THREE OVERTLY PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS IN MALIANA HAD BEEN UNDER POLICE PROTECTION SINCE APRIL AND MILITIA LEADER JOAO TAVERES HAD SAID OPENLY THAT HE WOULD NOT TOLERATE A CNRT PRESENCE. BARTU ADDED THAT "THERE IS A LARGE GAP BETWEEN THE AUTHORITIES' PERCEPTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTED MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A FREE AND FAIR PROCESS AND OUR OWN, AND WE ARE UNABLE TO BRIDGE THAT GAP IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS AND TNI OFFICERS." HE SAID LOCAL AUTHORITIES CLEARLY COULD NOT MOVE ON THESE ISSUES WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM DILI OR HIGHER. IN MALIANA, ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE MILITIAS CONTINUED TO TRAIN DAILY WITH MOCK WEAPONS FOR "POST-CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES," SENDING A CLEAR SIGNAL TO THE POPULATION.

B1
B1
B1

16. (C) [redacted] SAID HE HAD MET FALINTIL COMMANDERS IN THE REGION ON JULY 12. THEY HAD SAID THEIR FIGHT WAS WITH TNI AND THE POLICE AND THEY WOULD NOT SURRENDER WEAPONS UNLESS THESE TWO GROUPS LEFT EAST TIMOR, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE MILITIAS DISARMED OR NOT. [redacted] SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE FALINTIL MEMBERS WOULD NOT OPENLY PARTICIPATE IN ANY ASPECT OF THE PROCESS UNLESS THE ENVIRONMENT IMPROVED. NEVERTHELESS, FALINTIL WAS CARRYING OUT ITS OWN "CAMPAIGN" BY TALKING TO VILLAGE CHIEFS, AND THIS WAS PROVOKING TNI/MILITIA RESPONSES. [redacted] PREDICTED THAT THIS WOULD INCREASE TENSION AS THE PROCESS UNFOLDED AND CREATE "GREAT DIFFICULTIES" SINCE THERE WERE AT BEST AMBIGUOUS SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE MORE URBANIZED AREAS WHILE IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO REGULATE ARMED GROUPS IN THE MORE RURAL REGIONS. MALIANA-BASED CIVPOL PERSONNEL SAID THAT HALF THE TNI PERSONEL IN BOBONARO DISTRICT WORE PLAIN CLOTHES. THEY CITED NUMEROUS REPORTS THAT REGULAR TNI PERSONNEL FORMED THE CORE OF THE MILITIA GROUPS. UNAMET OFFICIALS IN MALIANA EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE DISPLACED POPULATIONS TO THE NORTH AROUND CAILACO WHERE "PEOPLE ARE DYING ON A DAILY BASIS." THEY HAD COUNTED 366 MALES ABOVE THE AGE OF 17 WHO WERE TAKING REFUGE IN THE FORESTS IN THE BOBONARO/CAILACO SUBDISTRICT BORDER AREA.

B1
B1
B1

SUAI

17. (C) IN SUAI, LOCAL OFFICIALS WERE DEALING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA MAHIDI'S EFFORTS TO EXTEND ITS INFLUENCE OVER THE LOCAL POPULATION. ACCORDING TO THE LOCALLY BASED UNAMET POLITICAL OFFICER, MAHIDI AND LOCAL OFFICIALS WERE ATTEMPTING TO BLOCK UNAMET REGISTRATION SITES IN

THE HILLS NEAR ZUMELAI, INSISTING THAT THE STATIONS SHOULD BE LOCATED ONLY ALONG THE MAIN ROAD, WHICH MAHIDI CONTROLLED. IN THE PREVIOUS DAYS, MAHIDI'S ATTEMPT TO MOVE INTO VILLAGES NORTH OF ZUMELAI HAD PROVOKED THE LOCAL POPULATION AND RESULTED IN CLASHES WHICH LEFT ONE MAHIDI MEMBER DEAD. AS A RESULT, ZUMELAI WAS TENSE ON JULY 16 AND UNAMET OFFICIALS WERE UNABLE TO OPEN REGISTRATION IN THE AREA. IN LATE JUNE/EARLY JULY UNAMET OFFICIALS IN SUAI HAD PERSUADED TWO GROUPS OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE RESIDENTS WHO HAD FLED TO THE FOREST TO RETURN TO SUAI, WHERE SEVERAL HUNDRED NOW WERE TAKING REFUGE IN THE CHURCH AND BEING PROVIDED FOOD BY CARITAS. A THIRD GROUP REMAINED IN THE HILLS NEAR THE AREA WHERE MAHIDI HAD CARRIED OUT RECENT ATTACKS.

A/S ROTH EXPRESSES SUPPORT FOR UNAMET

18. (C) IN HIS MEETINGS WITH UNAMET PERSONNEL, A/S ROTH ASSURED THEM OF STRONG U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE MISSION AND APPRECIATION FOR

THEIR INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS. HE STRESSED THAT THE EAST TIMOR PROCESS WAS RECEIVING ATTENTION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN WASHINGTON AND ASSURED UNAMET OFFICIALS OF CONTINUING U.S. PRESSURE ON THE GOI TO ACHIEVE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR A FREE AND FAIR VOTE. IN REGARD TO [redacted] CHARGES OF UNAMET BIAS, ROTH PLEDGED TO CONVEY TO [redacted] HIS OWN FINDINGS THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. B1
ROY
NNNN

End Cable Text

Printed By: Robert J Clarke 07/30/99 03:30:50 PM

ROUTINE
RELEASED IN PART
B1; 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED INCOMING

EAP/L CARDS CENTER

R31

PAGE 01 OF 02 JAKART 02111 00 OF 02 280746Z 003361 S049685
ACTION: PIMS (03)

INFO: P (01) EP (01) EAP (04)
---------- 28/1017Z A2 YW (TOTAL COPIES: 009)
ACTION EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00
	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	IEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	LAB-01
	L-00	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-09
	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W			

----------C17B52 280746Z /21

R 280104Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7480
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 002111

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/09
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH'S MEETING WITH ECONOMIC COORDINATING MINISTER GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA, APRIL 16

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM MICHAEL P. OWENS FOR REASON 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY.

[redacted] B1

END SUMMARY.

3. (U) ON APRIL 16, A/S ROTH AND THE AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY EAP OFFICER CONSTANCE ARVIS AND ECONCOUNS (NOTETAKER) MET WITH COORDINATING MINISTER FOR ECONOMICS, FINANCE, AND INDUSTRY GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
~~REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN~~
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 27 APR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 15 MAR 2007 200503302

RD 052, 2

PAGE 02 OF 02 JAKART 02111 00 OF 02 2807462 003361 S049685

[redacted] B1

11. (U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.
ROY

Clarke, Robert J

R53

From: Hartwick, Douglas A
Sent: Friday, July 02, 1999 12:05 PM
To: Boyer, Debbie F
Cc: Aloisi, Jonathan M; Clarke, Robert J; Ludwig, Alexis; Murray, Virginia E; Keegan, David; Arvis, Constance C
Subject: RE: Roth return flight info from Indonesia

I bought my ticket washdc to jakarta to denpasar, then denpasar to Singapore and return, i.e. a round trip to Denpasar via Jakarta. all teh embassy did for me then was get me a ticket from denpasar to dili and return. the trick for Stanley will be to get him ticketed to return to the US from Denpasr via either singapore, Tokyo, over even Sydney. D

—Original Message—
From: Boyer, Debbie F
Sent: Friday, July 02, 1999 9:46 AM
To: Hartwick, Douglas A
Cc: Aloisi, Jonathan M; Clarke, Robert J; Ludwig, Alexis; Murray, Virginia E; Keegan, David; Arvis, Constance C
Subject: RE: Roth return flight info from Indonesia
Importance: High

Doug, can you ask the Embassy to reserve and get tickets for Stanley and for David Keegan who will travel with him. He wants to fly the Thursday to Saturday route and return via best connection back to Washington on Saturday. No need to return to Jakarta after E. Timor. I will get fiscal data to you as soon as I get orders. I'll copy you on the outgoing portion of the itinerary I have with AMEX. Did you get the ticket all the way to the US via the Embassy on the return or should I be reserving the Denpasaar to Washington portion with AMEX?

—Original Message—
From: Hartwick, Douglas A
Sent: Thursday, July 01, 1999 3:10 PM
To: Boyer, Debbie F
Cc: Aloisi, Jonathan; Clarke, Robert; Ludwig, Alexis; Murray, Virginia
Subject: RE: Roth return flight info from Indonesia

Debbie, below is what the OI had in it today that should guide you. when I did this last month, I left the jakarta-dili ticketing to the embassy (gave them the fiscal data ahead of time so they could purchase the ticket).

READ the OI portion below and then come back to this part: From what I know of it, the merpati flight from Jakarta which leaves quite early Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays to Denpasar (Bali) , one hour layover, then to Dili. That is the most efficient way. The return flight is the same flight which leaves the following Thursday at around noon, back to Denpasar and on to Jakarta arriving fairly late. If Stanley wanted to do what I did, he could visit Dili and then get off at Denpasar and catch a flight directly to Singapore or other places (Hong Kong, possibly Tokyo) bound back to the U.S. without returning to Jakarta. This obviously means he has to get his Jakarta work finished BEFORE he leaves for Dili. DH

begin 7/1 OI text:
SOR travel to Dili.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE DAO AIRCRAFT IS ALREADY SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO THE U.S. FOR MAINTENANCE IMMEDIATELY UPON ITS RETURN FROM ACEH (TONIGHT). IT WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR SOR TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR IN MID-JULY. FLIGHTS TO DILI FROM DENPASAR REMAIN AT THREE PER WEEK: MERPATI FLIES IN AND OUT ON TUESDAYS, THURSDAYS AND SATURDAYS. (IT IS THE ONLY CARRIER SERVICING DILI.) (TRAVELERS CAN FLY DIRECT FROM JAKARTA AT 0600 OR CAN OVERNIGHT THE PREVIOUS EVENING AT DENPASAR AND PICK UP THE FLIGHT THE NEXT MORNING EN ROUTE TO DILI.) THE FLIGHTS DEPART DILI MID-DAY, ARRIVING BACK IN JAKARTA MID-EVENING.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

(2)D052,2

LOOKING AT THE CALENDAR, IF SOR WERE TO ARRIVE IN JAKARTA BY EVENING JULY 12, HE COULD TAKE THE 0600 TO DILI ON TUESDAY, JULY 13, RETURNING JULY 15. (HE COULD ALSO FLY DIRECTLY TO DENPASAR AND CATCH THE SAME FLIGHT AS IT TRANSITS DENPASAR AT APPROXIMATELY 0900.) ALTERNATIVELY, HE COULD PLAN TO TRAVEL TO DILI VIA THE THURSDAY - SATURDAY FLIGHT (JULY 15 - 17), RETURNING TO JAKARTA (VIA DENPASAR) MID-EVENING SATURDAY.

—Original Message—
From: Boyer, Debbie F
Sent: Thursday, July 01, 1999 8:49 AM
To: Hartwick, Douglas A
Subject: Roth return flight info from Indonesia

Doug, Stanley said Amb. Roy had ideas for his flights and that you'd get the info. to me so I can book his return from Indonesia. Have you had a chance to get the details yet?

A/S Roth July 13-14 Meetings in Indonesia

R52D

Meeting with Coordinating Minister for Economics Ginandjar

East Timor

- Economic recovery, and the international community's willingness to help, could be jeopardized if Indonesian government is blamed for a failure of the effort to conduct a referendum on East Timor.

- Deterioration in East Timor could have an impact on the international community's generosity; perhaps even a topic at upcoming CGI at the end of the month.

- Example: The Senate voted 98-0 to link U.S. votes at the IFIs for Indonesia with developments in East Timor. Similar amendment being considered in the House. While not yet law, momentum for such measures will build if GOI not perceived as backing up its words with actions. Could ultimately make it difficult for U.S. to support Indonesia in international financial institutions.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

A/S Roth July 13-14 Meetings in Indonesia

Themes for A/S Roth July 1999 Trip to Indonesia/East Timor

Drafted by: RClarke/VMurray/ALudwig x7-2543 7/7/99
O:Indo/Briefers/Roth Meetings July 7, 1999

Cleared by:
EAP:SRoth
EAP:RBoyce
EAP/PIMBS:DHartwick (ok)
S/P:KBrooks (ok)
OSD/ISA:KCampbell(ok)
OSD/ISA:RScher(ok)
JCS:GENRalston (ok)
JCS/J-5:SBall (ok)
NSC:AArvizu (ok for KLieberthal)
NSC:ESchwarz(ok)
Treas:LKuriyan (ok for TGeithner)

RELEASED IN FULL

R52C

Meeting with Opposition Leaders/PDI-P Leader Megawati

Elections

- Congratulations; enthusiastic participation of the great majority of Indonesian voters. Clear that people voted for a change. The elections themselves were a hugely important first step, but the road ahead is more difficult.

- Important for the credibility of the election process that remaining steps in the transition proceed in transparent fashion and reflect the will of the people.

- Almost countless number of potential stumbling blocks ahead could undermine chances for a peaceful transition acceptable to majority of the Indonesian people.

- KPU has decisive role in maintaining transparency on many outstanding issues: how MPR delegates representing functional groups and regional parliaments are chosen; when the MPR meets; whether the presidential selection is conducted by open or closed ballot.

- Opposition needs to be responsible in its behavior. Small parties must get message that selfish efforts to obstruct vote count and obtain DPR seats they did not win legitimately undermine broader national interest in clean election outcome.

East Timor

- International community deeply concerned. Militias are undermining the security environment in Timor. Government and military need to move beyond rhetoric and provide security they insisted on being responsible for.

- Political parties likely to play role in next government need to know that international support -- and with it Indonesia's economic recovery -- could be jeopardized if effort to conduct a referendum on East Timor fails.

- Genuine potential for a backlash if referendum does not take place in a secure environment. U.S. Senate already voted to link U.S. votes at the IFIs for Indonesia with developments in East Timor. Similar amendment being considered in the House. While not yet law, momentum for

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

such measures will build if GOI not perceived as acting in good faith on its commitments.

- It would be tragic if the next government comes to power through a commendable electoral process, only to inherit international ill will because of East Timor.

- Believe that TNI needs to understand the potential damage to Indonesia's image that will result if current deterioration in the situation in East Timor is not turned around. Can you get this message to General Wiranto?

A/S Roth July 13-14 Meetings in Indonesia R52B

Meeting with CNRT Leader Xanana Gusmao

- Visiting to assess situation and consider next steps. Your views essential. Deep concern; need to keep UNAMET on track.

- How do you assess DARE II and what are the next steps on reconciliation?

- Can voter registration go forward given militia activities?

- Are there circumstances under which you would argue that the UN not proceed with the consultation process?

- Would like your views on your meetings with FM Alatas and General Wiranto.

(If asked about UN PKO)

- At this point there is little appetite in UN for a peacekeeping operation. Would require GOI invitation.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

RELEASED IN FULL

A/S Roth July 13-14 Meetings in Indonesia

R52A

Meeting with General Wiranto

Elections:

- Congratulations; elections free, fair, democratic. Enthusiastic participation of the great majority of Indonesian voters. The elections themselves were a hugely important first step, but the road ahead is more difficult.

- TNI played important supportive, neutral role. World took notice. TNI contribution to Indonesia's democratization key to establishing more normal military-military ties with U.S.

East Timor

- Deeply concerned about developments in East Timor. Indonesia has not lived up to May 5 obligations to provide an environment of security in East Timor to permit a credible ballot in August.

- Welcome assurances on security to international community and UN, and your work with Xanana Gusmao and personal role in peace brokering and reconciliation among East Timorese.

- However, situation for UNAMET sharply deteriorating: attacks, compounded by unhelpful GOI spokesmen claiming that UNAMET is pro-independence and part of problem.

- International opinion supports UN and views militias as unrestrained; cannot understand why TNI and police presence of over 15 thousand cannot bring them under control; provide adequate protection.

- Over long period of time, overwhelming multi-source evidence of continuing close cooperation with militias by elements of TNI. Although we know that orders have come from you directing that TNI be neutral in East Timor, there are elements on the ground not obeying that direction. Need effective TNI steps on security: arrests; disarming bad militia elements. Unless turned around, entire UNAMET operation at risk. Not now question of blame but results.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

A/S Roth July 13-14 Meetings in Indonesia

- If UNAMET collapses, international readiness to assist Indonesia very difficult as pressures in U.S. Congress already demonstrate.

A/S Roth July 13-14 Meetings in Indonesia

R52

Meetings with Habibie, Alatas, Dewi Fortuna Anwar

RELEASED IN FULL

Elections

- Congratulations; your leadership key. Elections free, fair, democratic. Enthusiastic participation of the great majority of Indonesian voters. The elections themselves were a hugely important first step, but the road ahead is more difficult.

- Equally vital is that the appointment of the remaining MPR representatives and the selection of the president be made in a free and transparent manner so as to preserve and build on the initial gains of the elections.

East Timor

- Deeply concerned about developments in East Timor. Indonesia has not lived up to May 5 obligations to provide an environment of security in East Timor to permit a credible ballot in August.

- UNAMET cannot be blamed for this failure. You cannot win this fight against the UN. Information coming to us from a wide variety of sources clearly indicates that UNAMET activity is not the problem. The pro-integration militias are. These militias must be brought under control.

- International pressure on Indonesia over East Timor is growing and will continue to grow unless the GOI delivers on its responsibility. The same holds for pressure from the U.S. Congress. This could bode ill for Indonesia's relations with the international community and for U.S. - Indonesia relations. Tremendous good will following elections is evaporating. We do not wish to see this happen.

- Indonesia up against time-table dilemma. You agreed to provide the security environment needed for a credible ballot in August, but such an environment does not presently exist and UN will not proceed without it.

- We welcome initial steps taken, such as the introduction of more police in East Timor. But real improvements, not mere rhetoric, is needed to create an environment conducive to a credible ballot.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

02D052,2

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL

R50

EAP Bureau Submission
Secretary's Weekly Report
Week of July 12-19, 1999

(C) Indonesia-Roth Travel: EAP A/S Roth will be in Indonesia July 13-17. Two topics top his agenda: the post-election political transition and East Timor. On the political transition, he will engage the government and those political leaders whose parties had strong showings in the June national elections on next steps, urging transparency in the final stages of the vote count and in the selection of the President in the upcoming Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPR). On East Timor, he will press for the GOI to provide immediately for an intimidation-free autonomy consultation vote in late August, including credible actions to curb pro-integration militia violence against UNAMET and pro-independence East Timorese. He will also travel to East Timor to assess the situation first hand and emphasize the importance of this issue in our bilateral relationship.

In Jakarta, Roth will meet with President Habibie, FM Alatas, Defense Chief General Wiranto, jailed East Timorese Resistance leader Xanana Gusmao, Megawati and other major political leaders. While in East Timor July 15-17, Roth will meet with UNAMET officials, Bishop Belo, Indonesian government and military representatives, and pro-integation and pro-independence East Timorese leaders.)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

S Weekly July 12-19: Indonesia: A/S Roth Trip

Draft:EAP/PIMBS:RClarke x7-2543 7/12/99
O:\Indonesia\Briefers\S Weekly Roth Trip Jul 12.doc

Clear: EAP:SBoyce
EAP/PIMBS:DHartwick(ok)
D:RDeVillafranca(info)
P:DShields(ok)
S/P:KBrooks(ok)
DRL:SSutton(ok)
IO/UNP:KLarson(ok)
IO/PHO:MJones(ok)

NEWS FROM THE CARTER CENTER
ONE COPENHILL, ATLANTA, GA 30307

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Tuesday, July 27, 1999

CONTACT: In Atlanta, Deanna Congileo
404 420-5108

In Dili, Brent Preston or
Gillian Flies
62 390 313 777

R45B

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

Carter Center Weekly Report on East Timor, No. 2 July 19 – 25, 1999: Registration Continues to Run Smoothly, Security Issues Remain Key Concern

(Background: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the public consultation process on autonomy in East Timor through neutral, nonpartisan observers assessing preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign. Following is the second in a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation).

Dili, East Timor... During the past week, registration for the public consultation in East Timor continued with strong turnout of potential voters, and few reported incidents of violence. UNAMET operations are in full swing, but no date has been set for the consultation vote. While registration and other UNAMET activities are now proceeding well, The Carter Center is concerned that an atmosphere of fear and intimidation continues to prevail in many parts of East Timor.

The Center is particularly concerned about persistent reports of Indonesian military involvement in the activities of pro-integration militia groups. In direct interviews with local residents, self-proclaimed members and commanders of armed pro-integration groups, Indonesian soldiers and senior military personnel in Baucau district, Carter Center observers were told that one Timorese pro-integration group known as Saka is being armed, trained, equipped, directed and paid by the Indonesian military.

This report is based on field visits to Baucau and Manatuto districts during the past several days, and on meetings in Dili with senior Indonesian Government, military, and police officials; members of the Indonesian Government Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular Consultation; the Commission for Peace and Stability; Timorese nongovernmental organizations; UNAMET officials; representatives of international organizations; diplomats; and members of groups which favor integration into Indonesia as well as pro-independence groups.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

The Carter Center is very encouraged by the following developments in East Timor and believes that the continuation of such conditions will further enhance the opportunity for the fair conduct of the consultation.

- **Voter Registration**: Large numbers of people are registering at centers across East Timor. Carter Center observers witnessed long lines at all registration centers visited. Numerous interviews with potential voters indicate that the majority are satisfied with the conduct of registration and remain committed to participating in a peaceful, fair, and democratic consultation. Carter Center observers received no complaints about the identification requirements for registration, but many people are unaware of the availability of a UNAMET Affidavit of Birth for those who do not have the required identification. With the notable exception of internally displaced persons, it appears that the large majority of eligible voters will have the opportunity to register for the upcoming consultation.

- **The Pre-Consultation Role of UNAMET**. UNAMET has nearly completed deployment of its personnel to East Timor. The mission was fully ready for registration to begin and registration is proceeding smoothly. The UN deployed rapidly for this mission. Indonesian police have provided good security for UNAMET personnel during the registration period.

The Center continues to have serious concern, however, about continuing intimidation of the East Timorese, violations of the New York agreements and the issue of redeployment of the Indonesian military. These concerns were noted in our weekly report released July 20, 1999. To date, these issues have not been adequately addressed.

The Carter Center remains particularly concerned about reports of Indonesian military support of armed pro-integration groups and the plight of internally displaced persons. Both of these issues must be addressed to ensure conditions established by the May 5 New York Agreements for the popular consultation are met.

- **Military Support of Pro-Integration Groups**. The Carter Center has received numerous reports of Indonesian military (TNI) involvement in the activities of militias over the past several weeks, but until now has been unable to independently confirm a direct link between armed pro-integration groups and the military. Carter Center observers recently visited a number of camps in several districts that local residents claim are militia posts, and in several cases observers found evidence of Indonesian military involvement in these camps. Carter Center observers have now identified at least one group in Baucau district known as Pusaka or Saka that is being armed, trained, equipped, directed, and its members paid by the military. The existence of this group and its ties to the Indonesian military have been confirmed through interviews with local residents, members of Saka, and local senior military personnel.

- **Harassment and Intimidation Continues**. Local residents in several different areas in Bacau complained of harassment and intimidation by pro-integration groups. Residents identified Saka and Rajawali as militia groups that work in cooperation with the TNI, and say armed members visit them at night, threatening violence and bloodshed after the vote if autonomy is rejected. Members of the militia groups who were interviewed described Saka and Rajawali as Timorese military groups that fight for autonomy and reported that they work with local TNI units to provide security and promote the autonomy option.

- **Internally Displaced Persons**. Poor security conditions continue to prevent tens of thousands of internally displaced persons in East Timor from returning to their homes. For internally displaced persons to be able to participate in the consultation as provided in the New York Agreements, adequate security conditions must exist for them to return to their homes immediately and to ensure that no others are driven from their homes by intimidation or violence.

  Note: Paragraph 4 of the Security Agreement states that the Indonesian police are solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order during the consultation process. Paragraph 1 of the same agreement states that the Indonesian police and military must be absolutely neutral throughout the consultation process. It is essential that all support for Timorese groups of any description by the military cease at once and that all security functions are handed over to the police.

- **Post-Consultation Security**. Many of those interviewed by Carter Center observers fear that UNAMET will leave East Timor immediately after the vote, and are concerned about their safety. It is important, therefore, that UNAMET clearly explains the role the UN will play in East Timor after the consultation.

-END-

UNCLASSIFIED

UNAMET
USG
US Emb
GOI

Evidence of Military Support for Armed Pro-Integration Groups in Baucau District

Carter Center observers recently visited Quelicai sub-district in Baucau to observe registration activities and the overall security climate in the area. Local residents in several different areas complained of harassment and intimidation by pro-integration groups known as Saka and Rajawali, as well as by TNI soldiers. Subsequent investigations over the following days, including extensive interviews with local residents, members, former members and leaders of Saka and Rajawali, military personnel and district military commanders, revealed the following:

- Residents of Quelicai sub-district report widespread and persistent harassment and intimidation by Saka, Rajawali and the TNI. Residents identify Saka and Rajawali as militia groups that work in cooperation with the TNI, and say armed members visit them at night, threatening violence and bloodshed after the vote if autonomy is rejected. They also say that militia members and TNI officers are actively explaining and promoting the autonomy option through public meetings.

- Saka and Rajawali operate out of a post in the area that is within sight of a UNAMET registration center. Carter Center observers witnessed large amounts of military equipment and personnel wearing military fatigues within the post. Members and former members of Saka and Rajawali both within the post and in surrounding villages claim that both groups are part of the TNI and are funded, equipped, trained, directed, armed and their members paid by the DANDIM (district military commander) in Baucau. Members describe Saka and Rajawali as Timorese military groups that fight for autonomy and say that they work with local TNI units to provide security and promote the autonomy option.

- TNI personnel in Quelicai sub-district report to Carter Center observers that Saka and Rajawali are part of the TNI and that they work together to provide security and promote the autonomy option. Local TNI personnel claim that Saka and Rajawali are funded, directed, equipped, trained, armed and their members paid by the DANDIM in Baucau.

- An individual who claimed to be the commander of the Saka group met with Carter Center observers in Baucau town and claimed that Saka, Rajawali and several other groups under his control in Baucau and neighboring districts are funded, directed, equipped, trained, and their members paid by the DANDIM in Baucau, and that Saka is armed by the TNI. The commander described all of these groups as Timorese military organizations that support autonomy. The commander claimed to be a KOPASSUS (Indonesian Army Special Forces) officer. The commander confirmed that Saka and other groups are providing security but denied that they are promoting the autonomy option.

- The DANDIM for Baucau stated that Saka is part of the TNI and is composed of two parts: one official and one militia. He stated that both components are funded, directed, equipped, trained, and their members paid by his office and the official component is armed. The DANDIM denied that the TNI or pro-integration groups are providing security or promoting autonomy.

UNCLASSIFIED

"non-attribution"
basis only for use with press

UNCLASSIFIED

RASA

Carter Center Weekly Report on East Timor, No.1 July 11 - 17, 1999:
Large Turnout for Registration despite Continuing Security Concerns

RELEASED IN FULL

*(**Background:** Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the public consultation process on autonomy in East Timor. The Center opened an office with two observers in Dili on July 4. They will be joined next week by eight long-term observers who will travel throughout East Timor to assess preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign, while remaining strictly neutral and nonpartisan. The following is the first of a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation).*

Dili, East Timor...The past week saw a significant decrease in the level of intimidation and violence directed at personnel of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) who are supervising the upcoming popular consultation. However, the security situation for the people of East Timor does not seem to have improved significantly.

Initial reports on voter registration, which began on July 16, indicate potential voters flooded registration centers all across East Timor during the first few days of voter registration. The Carter Center is greatly encouraged by the opening of registration and the high turnout so far. Clearly, the large majority of the people of East Timor are committed to participating in a peaceful, fair and democratic consultation.

However, this commitment is being severely tested by an atmosphere of violence, intimidation, and insecurity that continues to pervade most areas of East Timor. Information gathered in direct interviews during field visits by Carter Center observers and from other independent reports from all parts of East Timor, indicate that pro-integration militias in many areas are threatening to harm or kill those who do not vote for autonomy. Similar reports indicate that the militias also are largely responsible for creating tens of thousands of internally displaced persons and preventing them from returning to their homes to participate in the consultation.

This report is based on field visits to Liquica and Ermera districts during the past several days, including observation of the opening of registration, and on meetings in Jakarta and Dili with senior Indonesian Government, military, and police officials; members of the Indonesian Government Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular Consultation; the Commission for Peace and Stability; Timorese non-governmental organizations; UNAMET officials; representatives of international organizations; diplomats; and members of pro-autonomy groups (which favor integration into Indonesia) and pro-independence groups.

The Carter Center is particularly concerned about the following problems, which must be addressed to ensure that conditions established by the May 5 New York Agreements for the popular consultation are met:

- **Intimidation of Voters.** While all sides must accept some responsibility for the hostile climate that now prevails, our interviews and other independent reports indicate that responsibility for the large majority of incidents of intimidation and violence lies with pro-integration militias. These groups are subjecting potential voters to an intense and systematic campaign of intimidation in an attempt to influence the outcome of the consultation. Individuals interviewed by The Carter Center observers spoke uniformly about widespread harassment and intimidation by the militia, and described similar incidents of militia visiting people at their homes at night and threatening

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

violence after the poll if autonomy is rejected. Similar reports from other independent groups indicate such incidents are occurring throughout East Timor.

According to paragraph 1 of the Security Agreement, the appropriate Indonesian security forces are responsible for ensuring a secure environment devoid of violence and intimidation. In addition, paragraph 4 provides that the Indonesian police are solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order during the consultation process. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the Indonesian Police have been successful in improving the security situation. In order for the conditions of the New York Agreements to be fulfilled, the activities of violent militia groups must be curtailed.

- **Internally Displaced Persons.** The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has documented the existence of more than 32,000 internally displaced persons in East Timor, most of whom report having been driven from their homes in the past six months by pro-integration militias as a direct result of their presumed political beliefs. It appears little is being done to facilitate their safe return to their homes. Some militia leaders have openly stated that they will not permit internally displaced persons to return home until after the completion of the consultation.

  For internally displaced persons to be able to participate in the consultation as provided in the New York Agreements, it is essential that adequate security conditions exist for all of them to return to their homes immediately and to ensure that no others are driven from their home by violence and intimidation.

- **Active Campaign for Autonomy.** According to many credible observers, elements of the Indonesian Government and military continue to campaign for the autonomy option in violation of the New York Agreements. One senior army leader in Dili admitted that the military is actively promoting the autonomy package and distributing food and services to people to encourage votes for autonomy.

  Such practices are in violation of paragraph 1 of the Security Agreement, which establishes that the absolute neutrality of the Indonesian armed forces and the Indonesian police is essential. Similarly, the "Agreement on Modalities for the Popular Consultation" provides that officials of the Indonesian Government will not participate in the campaign in support for either option. It is imperative that all sides abide by these commitments.

- **Need for Redeployment.** Although senior military commanders indicated to Carter Center observers that all military forces in East Timor will be confined to their barracks in advance of the consultation, no timetable for this redeployment has been established and military units continue to operate throughout the territory. To improve the current climate of fear, a timetable for completion of the redeployment of the Indonesia military should be established and implemented.

END

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

R45

THE
CARTER CENTER

FACSIMILE

Date: July 29, 1999 3:24 PM
Number of pages including cover: 7

To: Mr. Alexis Ludwig
State Department
Phone:
Fax: (202) 736-4559
cc:

From: Rachel Fowler
Phone: (404) 420-5182
Fax: (404) 420-5196

Message:

Please find attached:

The Carter Center
Public Reports #1 and #2 (with evidence sheet)

0220-52,2

DEMOCRACY PROGRAM
[illegible] • ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30307 • (404) 420-5188 • FAX (404) 420-5196

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001W

----------A047E9 081147Z /38

O 081125Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5952

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000618

OFFICIAL INFORMAL - FOR EAP/PIMBS D. HARTWICK FROM DCM M. OWENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/08/09
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL JAKARTA TO PIMBS NO. 23

JAKARTA 01 OF 02 618

1. CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL P. OWENS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (SBU) ELECTION SUPPORT

TO FOLLOW UP ON A/S ROTH'S DISCUSSIONS IN DAVOS, TOKYO, AND JAKARTA ON SUPPORT FOR THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS, THE AMBASSADOR HAS DETECTED A MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE EU AMBASSADORS IN SUPPORTING THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS. APPARENTLY, THERE WILL BE A MEETING OF THE EU POLITICAL COMMITTEE (OR SOMETHING OF THAT ILK) ON FEBRUARY 11 AT WHICH SUPPORT FOR THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS WILL BE DISCUSSED. THE FINNISH AMBASSADOR SEPARATELY TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAS COMMITTED ROUGHLY 1 MILLION USD FOR INDONESIAN ELECTION SUPPORT AND MAY USE PART OF THESE FUNDS TO BRING AN INDONESIAN DELEGATION -- DRAWN FROM TEAM 11, THE POLITICAL PARTIES, AND ELECTION MONITORING GROUPS -- TO OBSERVE THE MARCH 21 FINNISH ELECTIONS. SEPARATELY, THE UNDP HERE IS PLANNING TO HOST AN AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL BRIEFING HERE ON MARCH 12 TO DISCUSS ELECTION SUPPORT.

WE HAVE NOT YET HEARD BACK FROM THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE QUESTION OF A DONORS CONFERENCE AND DOUBT WE WILL DO SO UNTIL FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS GETS BACK FROM NEW YORK. WE WILL DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO GET A QUICK ANSWER ON THAT QUESTION BUT SUGGEST WE PROCEED ON TWO TRACKS: TO GIN UP SUPPORT FOR A DONORS CONFERENCE AND GENEROUS PLEDGES IF THE INDONESIANS GIVE THEIR BLESSING TO THE CONCEPT; AND A PARALLEL EFFORT TO GAIN BROADER SUPPORT FOR GENEROUS ELECTION SUPPORT FROM POTENTIAL DONORS WHETHER OR NOT A PLEDGING CONFERENCE TAKES PLACE. THE EU MEETING ON FEBRUARY 11 MIGHT BE A CRUCIAL EVENT IN THAT RESPECT.

3. (U) ADDITIONAL FACTUAL CLARIFICATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT COMMENTS

WE WOULD LIKE TO OFFER ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION ON ONE POINT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR ACCURACY'S SAKE. WE ORIGINALLY SAID THAT "AT LEAST NINE DEMONSTRATORS, MOSTLY STUDENTS, DIED AS A RESULT OF GUNSHOT WOUNDS AND SEVERE BEATINGS" IN SECTION ONE (C), AND USED THE "AT LEAST NINE" FORMULATION IN SECTION 1 (A). WE'VE NOTED IN RECENT PRESS REPORTS REFERRING BACK TO THE NOVEMBER 13 INCIDENT THAT THERE HAS BEEN A TENDENCY TO USE THE NUMBER "THIRTEEN" IN REFERRING TO DEATHS FROM THAT DAY. WE WENT BACK AND CHECKED REPORTS IN KOMPAS, AND IT CITED 14 DEATHS OF DEMONSTRATORS, NINE OF WHOM WERE STUDENTS AND LOCAL PEOPLE (SEVEN OF WHOM WERE SHOT AND TWO DIED OF OTHER VIOLENCE) AND FOUR "PAM SWAKARSA" (THE BAMBOO WIELDING, GOVERNMENT-CONNECTED PRO-MPR DEMONSTRATORS). IF IT IS DECIDED TO INCLUDE THE FOUR "PAM SWAKARSA," WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE REPORT CLARIFY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 MAR 2007 200503302

UNCLASSIFIED

THAT THEY DID NOT DIE AT THE HANDS OF SECURITY FORCES DURING THE ATMA JAYA INCIDENT, BUT WERE BEATEN TO DEATH BY CIVILIANS AT ANOTHER LOCATION.

4. (C) POLITICAL LAWS

YOUR OI NO 21 (2/4/99) RAISES SOME IMPORTANT ISSUES CONNECTED TO THE POLITICAL LAWS. A FRONT CHANNEL BASED ON AN EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT OF THE LAWS THAT WILL BE GOING OUT SHORTLY COVERS ALL OF THESE MATTERS.

YOU MENTIONED THAT YOUR RECENT DISCUSSION PIQUED INTEREST IN AREAS THAT HAVE "NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY TREATED," INCLUDING THE FACT THAT ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD ON THREE LEVELS IN JUNE AND THAT ELECTION ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN RELAXED.

WE WOULD REFER YOU TO JAKARTA 6582 (DECEMBER 30, 1998). THE SUMMARY SAID "IN CONTRAST, THE DECISIONS TO HOLD NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS AT THE SAME TIME, AND TO RELAX RESTRICTIONS ON THE PARTICIPATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE ELECTION, WILL LIKELY BE RECEIVED FAVORABLY." THERE WAS AN ENTIRE SUB-SECTION ON "TIMING OF THE NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND LOCAL ELECTIONS" AS WELL AS ONE ON "REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTY PARTICIPATION IN ELECTION LOOSENED."

5. (U) GINANDJAR VISIT OQ----------

TO CONFIRM EARLIER E-MAIL NOTIFICATIONS, COORDINATING MINISTER GINANDJAR WILL NOT BE VISITING WASHINGTON ON SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 13, AFTER ALL.

6. (U) NURCHOLISH MADJID/CORRUPTION CONFERENCE

DR. NURCHOLISH MADJID, CHAIR OF "TEAM 11" WHICH IS VETTING POLITICAL PARTIES TO DETERMINE WHICH QUALIFY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE JUNE 7 ELECTION, WILL BE IN WASHINGTON FEBRIARY 23-26 TO ATTEND THE VICE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON FIGHTING CORRUPTION, TAKING PLACE AT STATE. MADJID WILL PARTICIPATE IN A FEBRUARY 25 PANEL DISCUSSION WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF WORLD RELIGIONS ON THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS VALUES IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION. THAT PANEL IS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED TO BEGIN AT 1145 (LUNCH FOLLOWS AT 1330). AT 1515 THE SAME DAY, THE PANEL OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS WILL SPEAK AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY'S SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION. IF YOU WANT TO TRY TO SCHEDULE AN APPOINTMENT WITH HIM, PLEASE ADVISE. THE USIA CONTACT OFFICER WHO IS ARRANGING THE VISIT IS

RICHARD WERKSMAN, 202/619-6983. USIA'S INDONESIA DESK OFFICER, BRUCE BYERS, 202/619-5836, IS ALSO AWARE OF THIS VISIT.

IN THE MEANTIME, WE'RE DOING WHAT WE CAN TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE GOI PLANS TO SEND AN OFFICIAL DELEATION TO THE VP'S CONFERENCE.

7. (U) STREEB VISIT

STREEB MIGHT USEFULLY SEE THE FOLLOWING:

-- NURCHOLISH MAJID AND OTHER MEMBERS OF TEAM 11, CHARGED WITH THE EARLY PHASE OF ELECTION PREPARATION. THIS IS A TEAM OF NOTABLES WHICH WILL FUNCTION UNTIL THE OFFICIAL ELECTION COMMISSION FORMS.

-- MULIYA LUBIS, HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER AND ACADEMIC WHO IS PUTTING TOGETHER A STUDENT-BASED ELECTION MONITORING EFFORT WHICH, IF IT GETS OFF THE GROUND, WILL LIKELY BE THE LARGEST SINGLE MONITORING EFFORT.

-- RYAAS RASHID, KEY MAN IN THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY WHO HAS DONE MUCH OF THE DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING ON THE ELECTION LAWS.

-- U.S. NGO EXPERTS ALREADY WORKING ON THE ELECTION (E.G., IFES, NDI, IRI, ETC).

-- UNDP OFFICIALS

-- HE WOULD PRESUMABLY ALSO WISH TO TOUCH BASE WITH AID AND THE POL SECTION.

SEPARATELY, ABDURRAHMAN WAHID HAS TOLD A/S ROTH HE INTENDS TO FORM A TRUTH COMMISSION AND HOPES THAT THE FORMER PRESIDENT WOULD BE AMONG PROMINENT INTERNATIONAL FIGURES WHO WOULD PARTICIPATE. THIS MAY BE A NON-STARTER, BUT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR STREEB TO SEE GUS DUR -- ALTHOUGH AS WE EXPECT HE MAY BE HAVING EYE SURGERY IN EUROPE AND LEAVING HERE O/A FEBRUARY 13, THIS MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE. STREEB COULD MEET WITH SOMEONE FROM HIS STAFF, HOWEVER. WE WILL EXPLORE THIS IF STREEB IS INTERESTED IN SUCH A MEETING.

8. (C) EAST TIMOR

AT PRESS TIME WORD WAS JUST REACHING JAKARTA OF THE GOI'S REPORTED AGREEMENT TO A VOTING EXERCISE IN EAST TIMOR ON THE AUTONQ THE LOCAL TV NEWS IS REPORTING IT AS GOI AGREEMENT TO A "REFERENDUM," BUT GOI OFFICIALS MAINTAIN THAT THIS WILL NOT BE A REFERENDUM BUT A "PUNGUTAN SUARA" OR "TAKING OF THE VOTE" (SEEMINGLY A MINOR DISTINCTION). A SPOKESMAN FOR MEGAWATI'S PDI HAS REACTED TO THE AGREEMENT BY REITERATING THE PDI'S OPPOSITION TO EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE, ARGUING THAT HABIBIE DOES NOT HAVE THE LEGITIMACY TO MAKE SUCH A DECISION. MEANWHILE, THE NEW PORTUGUESE INTEREST SECTION HERE TELLS US THE FOLLOWING: LISBON AND JAKARTA HAVE AGREED THAT THE UN WILL PRESENT AN AUTONOMY PROPOSAL FOR A "BALLOT CONSULTATION" IN AUGUST IN EAST TIMOR, WHICH WILL BE CONDUCTED BY THE UN. THE LISBON DIPS INSIST THAT LISBON HAS NOT AND WILL NOT APPROVE THE PROPOSAL UNLESS AND UNTIL IT IS APPROVED BY THE EAST TIMORESE IN THE AUGUST "CONSULTATION."

WE HAVE NOT HAD A CHANCE TO RUN THIS BY DEPLU AND SALVADOR SOARES WAS UNAWARE OF THE GOI POSITION IN NEW YORK (HE HAS BEEN IN DILI DURING THE LAST WEEK TRYING, IN VAIN, TO SAVE HIS POSITION IN PARLIAMENT). RECOMMEND YOU AWAIT A FORMAL USUN ACCOUNT BUT WANTED TO SHARE INFORMALLY WHAT WE ARE HEARING AS THIS VERSION HAS BEEN PASSED TO A NUMBER OF EMBASSIES.
ROY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

R17

UNCLASSIFIED

Printed By: PIMBS Office

ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00
SAS-00 /001R

RELEASED IN FULL

020946
SOURCE: KODAKA.004035
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:MURRAYVE:VEM -- 02/03/99 7-L823
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------9EB3DB 0400482 /38

O 040047Z FEB 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 020946

OFFICIAL INFORMAL, SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO A/S ROTH NO.2

Sensitive but unclassified. Protect accordingly.

1. (sbu) EUR has passed to us a memo for you from A/S Grossman on EU elections assistance. The staff assistants are e-mailing it to Gary Gray, but we wanted to make sure you had the information ASAP.

2. (sbu) Begin text of memo:

TO: EAP - Stan Roth

FROM: EUR - Marc Grossman

SUBJECT: Indonesian Electoral Assistance and the EU

Stan,

Our Mission in Brussels reports that the European Commission will make the maximum contribution it is administratively able to at this time, 2 million euro

(roughly $2.3 million), in support of the Indonesian elections. Commission reps. have indicated that their hands are administratively tied in terms of the amount they can independently authorize because bilateral financial/technical assistance with less than 12 months advance preparation must come from the Commission's "emergency" fund. The maximum the Commission can contribute from this fund for any one purpose is 2 million euros. The Indonesia folks at the Commission have informally voiced their frustration with this policy, and the way in which it is tying the Commission's hands vis-a-vis Indonesia.

The European Commission's Human Rights and Asia Committees met today to further discuss these issues. We understand that, in addition to the 2 million euro contribution, the Commission has proposed that member states consider authorizing an additional 2-3 million euro ($2.3-3.46 million) contribution out of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget. This would require member

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 MAR 2007 200503302

UNCLASSIFIED

Printed By: Christopher S Hegadorn

R13

ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 UTED-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SS-00
SAS-00 /002W
----------9AFC4A 261004Z /38

RELEASED IN FULL

P 260944Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5693
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS JAKARTA 000373

E.O. 12958; N/A
TAGS: OTRA, OVIP, ID
SUBJECT: NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR FEBRUARY 2-5 VISIT OF A/S ROTH

REFS: A) STATE 12950; B) CLARKE-MCCARY TELCON 1/26

1. FOLLOWING IS NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR VISIT FOR THE FEBRUARY 2-5 VISIT TO INDONESIA OF EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY ROTH AND EAP SPECIAL ASSISTANT JASON HYLAND. EMBASSY CONTROL OFFICER IS POLOFF GARY GRAY. OFFICE TELEPHONE (62-21) 344-2211 EXT. 2282; HOME 392-6144; CELLULAR 081-693-5772; EMAIL GRAYWG@JAKARTAC.US-STATE.GOV.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2

1625 - ARRIVE VIA JAPAN AIR FLIGHT 725
CONTROLOFF WILL MEET UPON ARRIVAL.
PROCEED TO ~~AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE~~ Hotel - already spoken w/ Steve

1900 - DINNER WITH KEY FOREIGN AMBASSADORS

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3

0730 - BREAKFAST AT RESIDENCE WITH MARZUKI DARUSMAN
country team
1000 - MEETING WITH MEGAWATI ?

1245 - DEPART FOR YOGYAKARTA ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSADOR VIA GARUDA 432

1350 - ARRIVE YOGYAKARTA, MET BY SURABAYA CONSUL GENERAL BILL PIERCE, PROCEED TO HYATT

1500 - MEETING WITH SULTAN OF YOGYAKARTA
1800 - GENERAL ELECTRIC "LIGHTING UP" EVENT AT PRAMBANAN TEMPLE (RECEPTION FOLLOWED BY DANCE PERFORMANCE). THE SULTAN, MINISTER OF TOURISM MARZUKI USMAN, AND MINISTER FOR STATE ENTERPRISES TANRI ABENG WILL ATTEND.

Couldn't I go back that night, have working dinner instead

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4
0730 - DEPART YOGYAKARTA VIA GA 203

0835 - ARRIVE JAKARTA

1030 - MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS Need more time to motivate without travel time

1130 - MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 MAR 2007 200503302

Printed By: Christopher S Hegadorn

1300 - LUNCH WITH MEMBERS OF THE AID MISSION AND U.S. NGO'S ON ELECTION PREPARATIONS

1500 - MEETING WITH GENERAL WIRANTO

1630 - MEETING WITH AKBAR TANDJUNG

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 5

0900 - MEETING WITH GUS DUR (IN CIGANJUR, APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR'S DRIVE FROM THE RESIDENCE)

1100 - MEETING WITH XANANA GUSMAO AT CIPINANG PRISON

1230 - LUNCH WITH ACEHNESE AND IRIANESE LEADERS

1430 - MEETING WITH ADI SASONO

1600 - MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF "TEAM 11" (ASSUMING THAT SUCH A BODY HAS BEEN FORMED)

1940 - DEPART JAKARTA VIA KLM 838
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

R11

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/022W		

----------A02076 080241Z /38

P 261025Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5702
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000379

C O R R E C T E D COPY//PARA MARKINGS//

USCINCPAC FOR HONOLULU HI

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: BUMPY RIDE FOR THE POLITICAL BILLS; THOUGH FOCUS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

JAKARTA 01 OF 02 379

PAGE 02 JAKART 00379 01 OF 02 080240Z
STILL ON JANUARY 28 PASSAGE

REF: A) JAKARTA 327; B) JAKARTA 6582

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (U) SUMMARY: THE ISLAMIC PARTY "PPP" REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN FORMAL DELIBERATIONS OF THE PARLIAMENT'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE (PANSUS) ON THE POLITICAL BILLS ON JANUARY 25, APPARENTLY FEARING THAT IT WOULD BE FORCED INTO A VOTE THAT IT COULD NOT WIN ON SEVERAL OUTSTANDING CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. CLOSED DOOR NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE MAJOR PLAYERS CONTINUED, HOWEVER. AMIEN RAIS ACCOMPANIED BY SEVERAL HUNDRED MEMBERS OF HIS NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN) HELD A "DIALOGUE" WITH MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT ON JANUARY 25 AT WHICH HE RAISED CONCERNS ABOUT THE THREE MAJOR OUTSTANDING CONTENTIOUS ISSUES -- THE NUMBER OF APPOINTED MILITARY SEATS IN THE DPR, THE TYPE OF ELECTION SYSTEM TO BE USED, AND THE POLITICAL ROLE OF CIVIL SERVANTS -- AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE ON THE FUTURE ELECTION COMMISSION AND "MONEY POLITICS." HE URGED THAT MILITARY MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT BE NON-VOTING AND THAT APPOINTED MILITARY MEMBERS OF PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS BE REMOVED. THE MANDATE OF AN ELEVEN-MEMBER TEAM OF MOSTLY INDEPENDENT FIGURES THAT REPORTEDLY WILL HELP OVERSEE THE PREPARATION OF THE NEW ELECTION COMMISSION IS UNCLEAR. THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER TOLD THE PRESS THAT THIS TEAM WOULD NOT DETERMINE WHICH PARTIES WERE ELIGIBLE TO

RELEASED IN FULL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 MAR 2007 200503302

02D 052,2

UNCLASSIFIED

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION, BUT WOULD SIMPLY "GIVE ADVICE," WITH THE GOVERNMENT MAKING THE DECISION ABOUT WHAT PARTIES MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION. END SUMMARY

PPP EXPRESSES ITS DISPLEASURE WITH POLITICAL BILLS

3. (U) THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) WAS SET TO RESUME ITS FORMAL DELIBERATION OF THE POLITICAL BILLS IN THE "SPECIAL COMMITTEE" (PANSUS) ON JANUARY 25, BUT WAS FORCED TO PUT OFF THE SESSION AFTER THE ISLAMIC "UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY" (PPP) MEMBERS REFUSED TO ENTER THE MEETING ROOM. ACCORDING TO ONE PPP MP QUOTED IN THE INDONESIAN LANGUAGE DAILY KOMPAS, PPP DID NOT WANT TO ENTER BECAUSE IT FEARED THAT A VOTE WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE PANSUS ON THE OUTSTANDING CONTENTIOUS ISSUES, AND IT DID NOT WANT TO BEAR ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OUTCOME OF THIS VOTE. WHILE PPP MEMBERS ASSERTED PUBLICLY THAT THIS MOVE HAD THE BLESSING OF PARTY LEADER HAMZAH HAZ, THEY ALSO WERE CAREFUL TO INSIST THAT PPP HAD NOT CARRIED OUT A "WALK OUT" BECAUSE THEY HAD NEVER ENTERED THE ROOM. THE PANSUS MEETING WAS QUICKLY ADJOURNED, BUT WAS FOLLOWED BY A CLOSED MEETING OF THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS LT. GENERAL SYARWAN HAMID, AND DPR FACTION LEADERS (INCLUDING PPP FACTION LEADERS).

AMIEN RAIS AND PARTY RAISE CONCERNS AT THE PARLIAMENT

4. (U) AS ANTICIPATED (REFTEL), AMIEN RAIS LED A DELEGATION OF SEVERAL HUNDRED NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN) MEMBERS TO PARLIAMENT ON JANUARY 25 TO RAISE CONCERNS ABOUT THE PENDING POLITICAL BILLS. SOURCES IN THE DPR HAVE DESCRIBED IT TO US AS A "DIALOGUE," RATHER THAN A DEMONSTRATION. THE GROUP WAS RECEIVED BY MEMBERS OF THE PANSUS, INCLUDING THE CHAIRMAN ABU HASAN SADZIL (GOLKAR) AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ABRI, INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI, GOVERNMENT FACTION) AND UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY.

5. (U) RAIS AND HIS GROUP FOCUSSED ON THE THREE OUTSTANDING CONTENTIOUS ISSUES (REFTEL) -- THE NUMBER OF APPOINTED SEATS IN THE DPR, THE BASIS OF THE ELECTION SYSTEM, AND THE POLITICAL ROLE OF CIVIL SERVANTS -- AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE ON THE ELECTION COMMISSION AND "MONEY POLITICS."

-- ABRI IN THE DPR: PAN CONTENDED THAT ABRI SHOULD RECEIVE NO MORE THAT 15 APPOINTED SEATS IN THE DPR, AND THAT THESE MEMBERS SHOULD NOT HAVE VOTING RIGHTS BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT ELECTED. THE PARTY ARGUED THAT ABRI SHOULD RECEIVE NO APPOINTED SEATS IN THE PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEVEL LEGISLATURES.

-- NEUTRALITY OF CIVIL SERVANTS: PAN URGED THAT A SEPARATE GOVERNMENT REGULATION MANDATING THE NEUTRALITY OF CIVIL SERVANTS BE ISSUED PRIOR TO PASSAGE OF THE POLITICAL LAWS. (NOTE: ACCORDING PRESS REPORTS, IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THIS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT AS EARLY AS SOON AS JANUARY 26)

-- ELECTION SYSTEM TO BE USED: PAN URGED THAT A PROPORTIONAL ELECTION SYSTEM BE BASED ON PROVINCES (PPP

JAKARTA 02 OF 02 379

STILL ON JANUARY 28 PASSAGE

POSITION) RATHER THAN THE REGENCIES (GOLKAR/ABRI POSITION) BE USED.

Printed By: Robert J. Clarke

-- GOVERNMENT ROLE ON ELECTION COMMISSION: PAN INSISTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SERVE ONLY AS A FACILITATOR OF THE ELECTION AND THAT THE ELECTION PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE IN CHARGE. THIS IS IN CONTRAST TO THE CURRENT PLAN THAT ENVISAGES THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PARTIES SHARING AN EQUAL ROLE ON THE NEW ELECTION COMMISSION.

-- MONEY POLITICS: PAN URGED THAT TOUGH SANCTIONS BE PUT INTO EFFECT TO COMBAT THE USE OF MONEY TO INFLUENCE THE ELECTION.

5. (U) RAIS WAS QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS SAYING THAT "IF THE HOUSE REFUSES TO INSERT OUR RECOMMENDATION INTO THE POLITICAL BILLS, THAT MEANS WE ARE DEFEATED POLITICALLY, BUT PEOPLE WILL KNOW THAT WE WON A MORAL VICTORY."

FORMATION OF ELEVEN-MEMBER ELECTION TEAM
---

6. (U) AS REPORTED REFTEL A, THE GOVERNMENT IS FORMING AN ELEVEN-MEMBER TEAM WHOSE MANDATE WILL BE RELATED TO THE FORMATION OF THE NEW ELECTION COMMISSION TO BE ESTABLISHED BY THE POLITICAL LAWS. A MEMBER OF THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY'S GROUP THAT DRAFTED THE GOVERNMENT'S VERSION OF THE POLITICAL LAWS WAS REPORTED WIDELY IN THE PRESS ON JANUARY 25 AS SIGNALLING THAT THE TEAM'S MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY WOULD BE TO DETERMINE WHICH POLITICAL PARTIES MET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE UPCOMING ELECTION (ONLY SUCH PARTIES CAN BECOME MEMBERS OF THE PERMANENT NEW ELECTION COMMISSION.) NUMEROUS PROMINENT, INDEPENDENT FIGURES WERE FLOATED IN THE PRESS AS TEAM MEMBERS, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS MULYA LUBIS AND ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION, FORMER HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBER MIRIAM BUDIARDJO, MUSLIM INTELLECTUAL NURCHOLIS MADJID, FORMER SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANDI ANDOYO, INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE LEADER MULYANAH KUSUMAH, NGO LEADER KASTORIUS SINAGA, ACADEMIC AFFAN GAFAR (PART OF GOVERNMENT TEAM THAT DRAFTED LAWS), ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM STUDENTS LEADER ANA URBANINGRUM, AND UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA STUDENT LEADER RAMA PRATMA.

7. (U) SEVERAL OF THESE INDIVIDUALS HAVE CONFIRMED TO US THAT THEY WILL BE MEMBERS OF THE TEAM. THEIR MANDATE, HOWEVER, REMAINS UNCLEAR. HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER SYARWAN HAMID WAS QUOTED PUBLICLY BY THE JANUARY 26 INDONESIAN OBSERVER AS SAYING THAT "THE TEAM (OF ELEVEN) HAS NOT AUTHORITY TO DECIDE WHICH POLITICAL PARTIES WILL BE PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTION. IT WILL MERELY GIVE ADVICE ABOUT WHICH OF THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES FULFILL (ELECTION) REQUIREMENTS STATED IN THE POLITICAL LAWS NOW BEING DISCUSSED BY THE PARLIAMENT...THE GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE THE FINAL DECISIONS."
ROY

RELEASED IN FULL
R37

Printed By: Shaana J Tolson 07/19/99 07:50:35 AM

JAKARTA 3449

From: AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
Subject: SECURITY CLIMATE IN EAST TIMOR DURING ROTH VISIT.

MRN: 3449
ICNbr: TED8077

Date/Time: 161105Z JUL 99
Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Cable Text:

TED8077
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-01	AGRE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W			

----------E1CF0C 161531Z /38

O 161105Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8838
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003449

ROME PASS VATICAN CITY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, PINS, MOPS, CASC, ID

SUBJECT: SECURITY CLIMATE IN EAST TIMOR DURING ROTH VISIT

CONFIDENTIAL

JAKARTA 01 OF 02 3449

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM MICHAEL P. OWENS, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: JULY 16, THE FIRST DAY OF REGISTRATION FOR THE UN-ADMINISTERED CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF EAST TIMOR, SET FOR LATE AUGUST, COINCIDED WITH EAP A/S ROTH'S TO EAST TIMOR. REGISTRATION FOR THE CONSULTATION APPEARS TO HAVE GONE RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY SO FAR. HOWEVER, BRIEFINGS PROVIDED TO A/S ROTH BY UNAMET OFFICIALS AND OTHER CONTACTS PAINT A GRIM PICTURE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH INTIMIDATION AND FEAR HAVE MADE AN IMPACT ON THE POPULACE, AND UN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 MAR 2007 200503302

02D032, 2

OFFICIALS ON THE GROUND HAVE EXPRESSEO RESERVATIONS AND UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. THERE ARE PARTICULAR FEARS THAT DISTURBANCES MAY EMERGE FROM COMMEMORATIONS OF "INTEGRASI (INTEGRATION) DAY" ON JULY 17. END SUMMARY.

FIRST OAY OF REGISTRATION

3. (C) EAP A/S ROTH, AMBASSADOR, EAP CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON, AND POLOFF ARE CONDUCTING A THREE OAY VISIT TO EAST TIMOR (JULY 15-17). CONVERSATIONS WITH A/S ROTH'S PARTY, CURRENTLY IN DILI, INDICATE THAT JULY 16, THE FIRST DAY OF REGISTRATION FOR UN-ADMINISTERED CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE TERRITORY, SET FOR LATE AUGUST, HAS GONE RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY. ON JULY 16, A/S ROTH AND PARTY TRAVELED BY UNAMET HEIJCOPTER TO SUAI IN SOUTHEAST EAST TIMOR AND MALIANA ON THE EASTERN FRINGE OF THE TERRITORY. A/S ROTH AND PARTY ALSO TRAVELED BY ROAD TO LIQUICIA, SITE OF SOME OF THE WORST VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR IN RECENT MONTHS. IN EACH PLACE, REGISTRATION OPERATIONS APPEARED TO BE GOING RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY, WITH 50-150 CITIZENS OBSERVED REGISTERING AT DESIGNATED SITES. WHILE IT IS TOO EARLY TO PROCLAIM A "GOOD TURNOUT" FOR REGISTRATION, EARLIER TALK OF A SIGNIFICANT BOYCOTT NOW APPEARS UNFOUNDED, POLOFF OPINED. A/S ROTH AND PARTY ORSERVED SOME SIGNS OF INTIMIDATION: A SKULL AND CROSS BONES WERE PAINTED ON THE DOOR OF ONE REGISTRATION STATION IN LIQUICIA, AND THERE WERE VARIOUS REPORTS OF MILITIA MEMBERS LOITERING IN THE VICINITY OF THE REGISTRATION SITES, AS WELL AS OTHER ACCOUNTS OF MINOR OBSTRUCTIONISM. POLOFF TRAVELLING WITH A/S ROTH OPINED THAT THE DOMINANT THEME WAS THE RELATIVE NORMALITY OF THE FIRST DAY OF REGISTRATION AND THE LACK OF ANY SERIOUS VIOLENT INCIDENTS, PARTICULARLY IN PROBLEMATIC SPOTS LIKE LIQUICIA, SUAI, AND MALIANA.

GRIM MOOD AMONG UNAMET STAFF

4. (C) A/S ROTH ANO PARTY WERE BRIEFED JULY 15 BY SENIOR UNAMET STAFF IN DILI. THE OVERALL MOOD OF THE UN OFFICIALS WAS GRIM. THE STAFF INDICATED THAT UN OFFICIALS ENJOY GOOD FORMAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH THEIR INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS BUT THAT ASSURANCES OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION THEY RECEIVE ARE STILL NOT BEING FULLY TRANSLATED INTO DEEDS. CONTRARY TO INDONESIAN CLAIMS, UN STAFFERS SAID, LOGISTICAL ISSUES ARE NOT IMPEDING PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONSULTATION. THE PROBLEM, ACCORDING TO UNAMET'S ANALYSIS, IS THE DEGREE TO WHICH GOI-SPONSORED MILITIAS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN INTIMIDATING THE GENERAL PUBLIC. PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS HAVE BEEN TOO AFRAID TO CAMPAIGN, OR EVEN TO COME OUT OF HIDING. UNAMET PERSONNEL MEETING WITH A/S ROTH AND PARTY PRIVATELY EXPRESSED UNCERTAINTY OVER WHETHER THE CONSULTATION COULD BE CARRIED OUT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. ALTHOUGH UNAMET STAFF STATED THEY WERE SOMEWHAT MORE CONFIDENT ABOUT THEIR OWN SECURITY THAN THEY HAD BEEN LAST WEEK, UNAMET CONTINUES TO RECEIVE THREATS FROM PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS VIA TELEPHONE, RADIO, AND IN

PERSON.

FEARS ABOUT "INTEGRASI DAY"
---

5. (SBU) FEARS ARE WIOESPREAD OF UNREST ASSOCIATED WITH COMMEMORATIONS OF "INTEGRASI (INTEGRATION) DAY" SET FOR JULY . UNAMET STAFF STATED THEY MAY NEED TO POSTPONE REGISTRATION IN BALIBO, AN INTEGRATIONIST STRONGHOLO, AND ELSEWHERE IN EAST TIMOR, IF THE MILITIA-ORGANIZED COMMEMORATIONS APPEAR TOO ROWDY OR AGGRESSIVE.

JAKARTA 02 OF 02 3449

MILITIA MEMBER KILLED
---

6. (SBU) A MEMBER OF THE "MAHIDI" PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA WAS KILLED JULY 15, APPARENTLY AS HE WAS PARTICIPATING IN A MAHIDI ATTACK ON THE VILLAGE OF ZUMALAI. POLOFF PREDICTED THAT THE DEATH WILI, RE DEPICTEO BY MAHIDI AS AN ATTACK BY ARMED PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS, ALTHOUGH OTHER REPORTS SUGGEST THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WAS KILLED BY OTHER PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS, AS PART OF AN INTRA-MILITIA DISPUTE.

7. (SBU) SINCE OUR CONVERSATION WITH A/S ROTH'S PARTY IN DILI, WE HAVE RECEIVEO MEDIA REPORTS OF SEVERAL ATTACKS AGAINST REGISTRATION STATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE "MAHIDI" PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA (NFI).

8. (SBU) A/S ROTH'S VISIT TO EAST TIMOR WILL BE REPORTED IN GREATER DETAIL SEPTEL. ROY
NNNN

End Cable Text

Printed By: Shaana J Tolson 07/19/99 07:50:35 AM

RELEASED IN FULL R49

Bailes, Kenneth

From: Vance, John C. [jcvance@exbridge.usia.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, July 14, 1999 7:54 PM
To: jslvrmn@exbridge.usia.gov; bailes@exbridge.usia.gov; bkbyers@exbridge.usia.gov; holdenr@exbridge.usia.gov; phu@exbridge.usia.gov
Cc: rdgjkt@exbridge.usia.gov
Subject: Roth Media Availability, Jakarta, 7/14

Press Conference by Stanley O. Roth
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Wednesday, July 14, 1999
U.S. Embassy, Jakarta, Indonesia

Good evening. Let me apologize in advance for my voice. I appear to be in the early stages of a cold, but we will do the best that we can. I am delighted to be back in Indonesia. I believe it's now the 13th trip, although I'm starting to lose count, since I was appointed Assistant Secretary almost two years ago. Not surprisingly, I had two primary topics on my mind when I came here. One was to update myself on the status of the elections, and the second was to get a better understanding of the situation in East Timor, and in fact to visit East Timor for the first time in 18 or 19 years. I haven't been there since the early 1980s and thought that this was a good moment to get updated on that situation.

In a sense, I'm doing this press conference at the halfway point, because I have not yet been to East Timor. I've only been here for about two days and completed my government meetings in Jakarta. And so, I will be less than definitive in my conclusions about East Timor since I have not yet seen the situation for myself. But while I've been here, I have been very fortunate to have had excellent access to senior officials within the Indonesian Government. I had a long session of more than two hours yesterday with President Habibie. I had a lengthy discussion today with Foreign Minister Alatas. I had a discussion with General Wiranto, the Defense Minister, spent some time with Coordinating Minister Ginandjar yesterday, and I have had several good conversations as well with leaders of the opposition including Megawati and Gus Dur. So, even though I've been here a brief time, I think I have had a pretty good start. In terms of my trip to East Timor, the schedule is still in some flux in terms of the precise meetings, but it is my intent to meet a range of individuals reflecting the many different viewpoints on the island itself and not just to see one element, and my hope is to get out of Dili as well and see at least one or two other points on the island, so that I can make the best possible assessment of the situation there.

Let me make a general observation and then comment on each of the two topics that I have highlighted. I think, first, that there is a relationship between the two issues in one sense -- elections and East Timor. I think the electoral situation is one which has brought great credit thus far to the government and to the people of Indonesia because the elections have been conducted peacefully and thus far have gone very well, although obviously they have not yet been brought to conclusion, which I will discuss. But I think that the fact that there was such a large turnout and such an expression for democracy, and the fact that it was achieved with so little violence, were very positive steps. And this has enhanced Indonesia's stature worldwide and has been a credit to everyone involved.

The issue of East Timor, I think, is related in this sense: If, after

(RD 052) UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAR 2007 200503302

more than 20 years of conflict, it can be brought to a successful conclusion, and if the parties, including the Government of Indonesia, can implement the UN agreement successfully and in a credible fashion, then I think that, too, will reflect very well on Indonesia, and that Indonesia's international stature will be enhanced. So I think there is a major incentive for the government to try to make this agreement work. Now, let me comment a little bit more on the two issues that I have flagged.

With respect to the election, there has been significant change even since I left the United States last week. When I left the United States, I was concerned because the count appeared to be frozen somewhere in the 60% range where it had been for many weeks. And it was unclear to me what steps were necessary to get the count completed and to move on with the process. I am pleased that by the time that I actually arrived here, a fact that has absolutely nothing to do with me, that procedures have been worked out to proceed with the count. And I have been informed that in 24 of 27 provinces basically the count is completed. There is almost 90% of the vote in, and that the general breakdowns are basically the same as we've seen all along suggesting that the delay has not in fact been an opportunity for tampering with the vote or changing the outcome in any way, but rather due, as was suggested all along, to technical factors relating to the procedural difficulties rather than to malfeasance. I've been informed also by General Rudini, with whom I met with today, that he hopes the election results will be finalized next week, on the 21st, as has been previously stated. Although that was not an absolute commitment, he did express his strong desire, and so I think that is a positive development.

Obviously, it is a two-step process, and the election process is not over even though a significant milestone has been passed. One of the issues I wanted to discuss was the question of how do we proceed from here. And I had extensive discussions about some of the crucial procedural issues. Obviously, given the fact that no candidate or no party received a majority, or even close to a majority, there is going to have to be some type of coalition arrangement in order to form a government. And, under the circumstances, the 200 appointed seats -- the 65 functional seats and the 135 seats from the local legislatures -- will be very crucial in helping to put together a coalition.

I wanted to get a better understanding of that process and how it would take place. I received assurances from government officials that this would be an impartial process subject to criteria, that it would not be used simply to have 200 seats fall into the lap of one particular party so as to somehow change the outcome of the election, that the individual legislatures at the provincial level be allowed to select their own people, that the KPU will select functional groups but the groups will select their own representatives, and so the procedures seem designed to allow for impartiality and to ensure that the 200 seats will not be a bloc. But we have a saying in English, that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. So, obviously we have to see the actual arrangements and who these 200 people are before anything can be said authoritatively about the process. But I think there is widespread recognition within the government of the significance of these seats and how they are allocated. I believe that the government is aware that both the people of Indonesia and the international community are scrutinizing this closely, and the opposition figures are, of course, highly seized of the importance of this issue and watching the process, although they did not register complaints with me at this stage about the process.

With respect to East Timor, as I've indicated on many previous occasions in Indonesia, I think there is an historic process underway, which after

more than 20 years holds out the possibility of a resolution through the UN agreement and through the voting process or consultation that will hopefully take place in August. And this, of course, is a major change from where the situation has been in past years. At the same time, I must say that I also came to express my concerns about some of the difficulties that have emerged, some very serious difficulties, including the attacks which you are all familiar with on three different UNAMET facilities in East Timor, including the failure thus far to establish a secure environment for the people of East Timor and the fact that there have been numerous reports of support for militia groups by elements of the military, and that thus far it has not been possible to state that a secure environment exists. I obviously come here shortly after the decision was taken by the United Nations to temporarily delay by several weeks the holding of the election to try to obtain a more secure environment. Of course, there have been many developments just within the past week, including Ambassador Marker's trip here, Ian Martin, the head of UNAMET, meeting with General Wiranto, and the very important meeting in which, I think, 13 or 14 members of the Indonesian cabinet visited Dili this past Monday, which I think was an important demonstration of the government's concern about the situation.

While these developments are in themselves encouraging and suggest that the government wants to see the agreement work, which is all the officials assured me, obviously what matters is the situation on the ground itself. Is there an improvement in the security situation? We're going to have to wait and see, and, in fact, this is one of the reasons I am going there myself for the next two days, because I want to make my own assessment about the situation on the ground so that I can report to senior U.S. officials. So, I think we are at a moment where the United Nations is about to make an important decision. And that decision is whether or not the registration process can begin on Friday of this week. That is, I emphasize, the United Nations' decision and not an American decision. And so I cannot make any pronouncement on that point, although I do wish to state that I thought it quite significant that when I met with Xanana Gusmao today, he indicated his own hope that the registration process would begin on schedule this week, so that if possible a delay in the process could be avoided, although I should add, he made it very clear that this beginning of registration should not be interpreted as a final decision that all is well on East Timor, and that the process could continue to conclusion, but rather was an effort to keep the process moving while an effort was made to improve the situation on the ground. There would have to be a later determination in his view as to whether the conditions existed to finish the process and hold the referendum or vote as scheduled. This again is a UN decision, and I cannot speak for the United Nations as to what decision will be made later this week. I think the decision is relatively imminent.

Why don't I stop at this point and open it up to your questions.

Q: I just wanted to get your views about the sincerity of the Indonesian Government in relation to restoring the security situation and having a fair and free ballot, especially your view about the military's sincerity following your meeting with General Wiranto.

Roth: Well, I haven't come here to give a report card nor to point fingers. I have come here to look for results. And the question is quite clear, what is the situation on the ground? Are there any, you know, any additional attacks on UNAMET facilities or does the situation become more secure? Is UNAMET able to move out of the eight regional centers to open up the 200 registration centers across East Timor so that they can begin the process of registration, coming up with an accurate list? Is there a cessation of violent activity by the militia groups and

an end to the climate of intimidation? Are the IDPs, the internally displaced people, allowed to return home, allowed to register, allowed to participate without fear? I think one has to look at the question of results. One has to look at where the people are punished for some of the intimidation that has taken place, whether all parties are able to campaign equally so that there is a fair process. There are many concrete indicators and, as I said, since I haven't gone there yet, it is a little premature for me to share my impressions with you or pass judgment at this point. But those are the types of things I will be looking at.

Q: I have two questions. The first question is, is it right that you bring a letter from Madeleine Albright and Kofi Annan and what is it about? And is there any special message from Kofi Annan and Albright, especially on East Timor? Second question: Is there any plan, after the attacks on UNAMET, or any US Government plan or recommendation to send peacekeeping troops to East Timor? Thanks.

Roth: First, let me state categorically, I have brought no letters, not from the Secretary of State, not from the United Nations, or any official of the U.S. Government. I came here in my stature as Assistant Secretary of State as part of a regular process, as I mentioned. But I am not bearing special letters and I am not here as an emissary. In terms of the attacks on UNAMET, I think my government has spoken very clearly expressing our sharp disapproval of what happened. We have emphasized the point that the Government of Indonesia insisted in the negotiations in New York on having responsibility for the security of the consultation that was going to take place; therefore, it has to live up to the obligation it asked for. And that's what we are looking for. But it is an Indonesian job to provide for the security. The United Nations is there as advisors; that is their role. They are not conducting the peacekeeping. Indonesia is responsible for security, and there is no American plan to introduce peacekeepers.

Q: If Indonesia fails to guarantee security in East Timor, what kind of action can we expect from the U.S. and the international community against Indonesia if the vote has to be delayed again?

Roth: As always it's difficult for me to respond to a hypothetical question except in the most general of terms. What I tried to say in my opening remarks was that East Timor represents a potential opportunity for Indonesia to demonstrate just how much Indonesia has changed from the government of the past, and that, you know, if Indonesia can demonstrate that it is committed to a fair resolution of this issue, that that will redound to the government's credit and to the credit of the people of Indonesia and there will be positive consequences. If the opposite is the case, and the agreement falls apart, and it is viewed to be the failure of the Government of Indonesia, I think it will obviously have consequences too in terms of Indonesia's reputation and in terms of the closeness in the relationship between Indonesia and a number of countries around the world including my own. But without having the specifics and without wanting getting into different scenarios, I can't get into any greater detail.

Q: Was the issue of disbanding the militias been discussed in your talks with General Wiranto? What seems to be the problem there, in not disbanding the militias?

Roth: Yes, I did discuss that topic extensively both with General Wiranto, also with Xanana Gusmao. In one sense, the problem is, who goes first? You know, each side is concerned that if it surrenders its arms and the other side doesn't, that they will be placed at a comparative

disadvantage. There are also the complex details of surrender arms to whom. Is it surrendering arms, or laying down arms, which is something different. There is a question of, does either side have total control of forces, and can they speak for all people, and so, who would implement such an agreement? So, there are many details to be worked out. But each of them expressed an interest in seeing this take place, indicating that it was an important part of the process, and it's certainly something that the United States would support. It seems to me that this is something that needs to be worked on by the Commission for Peace and Stability, or by some other mechanism, maybe through the Dare process, but that there are lots of creative opportunities for carrying this out if the two parties want to see it happen.

Q: Did you discuss the situation in Aceh with General Wiranto?

Roth: No, not this time. The discussion today focused overwhelmingly on East Timor, although I must say that the situation in Aceh remains of significant concern to the United States. We are concerned about the increasing violence that has been witnessed there, increasing in tension, and I believe one of the challenges that will face the next government of Indonesia, regardless of who is at the top, will be to try to bring the situation in Aceh to a peaceful resolution without a major loss of life. That will be a significant effort, but I believe it is essential that it be undertaken.

Q: What is your response to Mr. Alatas' statement yesterday that UNAMET seems to be biased, and that it recruited some local staff from pro-independence (groups)? Any comments on this?

Roth: I have been very candid in all my conversations with officials here to indicate that it is simply not acceptable to blame the United Nations or UNAMET for the problems; that the United Nations has great experience in many places and many continents around the world in carrying out operations of this type; that the people involved are overwhelmingly professionals who have been in many difficult situations before; and that, leaving aside the question of whether or not UNAMET has behaved perfectly, it is clear that the primary problem does not relate to the activities of UNAMET, and that that should not be the focus of concern. The real focus of concern should be getting the violence under control. And that, primarily, at this stage means the militias. Although, again, I emphasize the United States has condemned violence by all parties.

Q: Can you give us any details of your meeting with Megawati, and particularly whether she feels entitled to the presidency, and what she makes of the campaign that suggests a woman cannot be president in Indonesia?

Roth: No, I think that she has spoken for herself and doesn't need me to speak for her. Obviously, our conversation focused primarily on the electoral process itself. She obviously believes that she received a very significant mandate by virtue of the plurality where she was far ahead of the next largest candidate. And, you know, she has made public statements to this effect and I would rather let her speak for herself.

Q: In your talks with Megawati did you get a sense that there was going to be a policy reversal on East Timor should she become president? Secondly, in all your talks, to what did you get a sense that there is a twin track being pursued in East Timor between the military on the one hand and what President Habibie is hoping to achieve in East Timor?

Roth: On the first point, my clear impression from my conversation was that if the UN process had played itself out prior to the point at which,

you know, if she were selected, chosen, through the MPR process as president, that she would abide by the results. And so, there is not an intent to reverse the process.

On the second, I would say definitely not: no sense that there was a two-track policy with a split between the military and other officials. And, in fact, there were very similar comments from all the people I spoke with: the president, the foreign minister, the defense minister, about Indonesian policy, identical commitments by all of them in terms of their commitment to the process working out, to wanting to see the agreement enforced. I did not pick up a sense of differences.

***

Security enhanced document. See back for details.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
GELMAN LIBRARY - SUITE 701
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, DC 20037-2521

Bank of America
ACH R/T 054001204

6123

15-120/540 DC
0400

DATE 3.28.2007

Security features are included. Details on back.

PAY One hundred twenty-four & 20/100 DOLLARS $ 124.20

TO THE ORDER OF

Treasurer of the United States

FOIA request duplicating charges:
Cases 200503425 / 200504983 / 200503302 ER2

William Burr

MP

⑈006123⑈ ⑆054001204⑆ 00191422592 5⑈

The National Security Archive
ATTN: Stephen R. Paschke
2130 H Street, NW - Suite 701
Washington, DC 20037-2521

39 USA

2006

20051137DOS359 DOS
RECNO: 31696 SEQCOR: 131012
DATER: Simpson, Brad
Roth visits Indonesia and East Timor, 1999

20051641DOS593 DOS
RECNO: 32352 SEQCOR: 131011
DATER: Tajima, Hikaru
Shultz's visit to Indonesia - 1984

20051210DOS399 DOS
RECNO: 31788 SEQCOR: 131010
DATER: Lilley, Mary
"Dignity Plan"

Accounts Receivable/FOIA Fees
IRM Programs & Services Office
U.S. Department of State
Building SA-2 - Room 6001
Washington, DC 20522-6001

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4973

PAGE 01 JAKART 05525 051135Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ANHR-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 NSAE-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------0C07CB 051138Z /38
O 051050Z NOV 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1182

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 005525

PLEASE PASS TO NSA BERGER

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR GELBARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/05
TAGS: PREL, ID
SUBJECT: DESIRABILITY OF CLINTON-WAHID MEETING

REF: D/NSA STEINBERG-AMB GELBARD 11/04 TELCON

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. ROBERT S. GELBARD. REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HELP SHAPE OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA AND INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY BY ARRANGING AN INFORMAL MEETING FOR PRESIDENT WAHID WITH THE PRESIDENT IN WASHINGTON. PRESIDENT WAHID WILL BE TRAVELING TO SALT LAKE CITY FOR FOLLOW-UP MEDICAL (EYE) TREATMENT AND IS WILLING TO FLY TO WASHINGTON FOR A SHORT,

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05525 051135Z
INFORMAL MEETING ON NOVEMBER 10, 11 OR 12. I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS TIME FRAME MAY FIT THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE.

3. (C) PRESIDENT WAHID (GUS DUR) HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT HE IS WELL-DISPOSED TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND WILLING (EAGER) TO SEEK AND TAKE OUR ADVICE. I HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN REORIENTING HIM, FOR EXAMPLE, AWAY FROM HIS INITIAL IDEA OF MAKING CHINA HIS FIRST FOREIGN TRIP. INSTEAD, HE IS FIRST MEETING WITH HIS ASEAN COUNTERPARTS AND PLANS TO VISIT THE U.S. -- BEFORE VISITING JAPAN, CHINA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST. EVEN A SHORT, INFORMAL MEETING IN WASHINGTON WOULD REINFORCE HIS SOUND INSTINCTS AND SEND A STRONG SYMBOLIC MESSAGE OF SUPPORT AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE WORLD'S SECOND AND THIRD LARGEST DEMOCRACIES. IT WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHOWCASE GUS DUR AND INDONESIA TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CONGRESS. HE IS OPEN TO ADDITIONAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 08 DEC 2006 200503352

PROGRAMMING IN WASHINGTON (IMF/IBRD, THE HILL, ETC.).

4. (C) AND THERE ARE MANY GOOD THINGS TO SAY ABOUT WAHID'S ADMINISTRATION IN ITS FIRST FEW WEEKS: THE IMF TEAM LEFT HERE HAPPY WITH PROGRESS ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY MEASURES, INCLUDING THE RELEASE OF THE BANK BALI SCANDAL DOCUMENTS AND COMMITMENTS TO PROSECUTE THOSE INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES. AS WE HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY, NEISS WILL GIVE A POSITIVE PRESENTATION ON MONDAY TO THE IMF BOARD. WAHID HAS CALLED FOR INVESTIGATIONS INTO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN EAST TIMOR AND ACEH, AND WITH MARZUKI DARUSMAN AS ATTORNEY GENERAL THERE IS EVERY EXPECTATION THAT THESE WILL BE SERIOUS. AS WE HAVE REPORTED, THE INDONESIAN INVESTIGATION INTO EAST TIMOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IS PROCEEDING ON THE GROUND WITH THE EXPECTATION OF DEVELOPING CASES FOR PROSECUTION BY THE END OF DECEMBER.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. (C) IN SUM, WE HAVE A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE AND SET THE STAGE FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE (FIRST) DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THIS IMPORTANT ASIAN NATION AS IT BEGINS ITS DIFFICULT TRANSITION. GELBARD

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1706

PAGE 01 JAKART 05593 091136Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	AEX-01	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	LAB-01	L-00	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/008W	

----------0D4E97 091137Z /38

O 091049Z NOV 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1274

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 005593

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP DAS BOYCE; EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/99
TAGS: PREL, OVIP (WAHID, ABDURRAHMAN), ID
SUBJECT: WAHID VISIT TO WASHINGTON: PREFERRED MEETING TIME

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS PAMELA SLUTZ; REASON 1.5(B).

2. (C) MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS NORTH AMERICAN DIVISION DIRECTOR SAMODRA CALLED TODAY TO CONVEY INDONESIA'S PREFERENCE FOR A 10:00 A.M. MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON NOVEMBER 12. SAMODRA SAID THIS REQUEST WAS ALSO BEING CONVEYED VIA THE INDONESIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. APPARENTLY PRESIDENT WAHID

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05593 091136Z
HAS AN AFTERNOON MEDICAL APPOINTMENT (IN WASHINGTON). GELBARD

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 08 DEC 2006 200503352

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO4914

PAGE 01 STATE 214206 130119Z
ORIGIN EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AF-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	A-00	INL-01
	DIM-00	ANHR-01	WHA-01	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-00	ADS-00	MMP-00
	AC-01	NEA-01	DCP-01	OIC-02	OIG-03	PER-01	PM-00
	ACE-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SS-00	STR-00	USIE-00	SA-01
	IIP-00	SGHD-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	SAS-00
	/022R						

214206
SOURCE: CBLEXCLS.007379
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:DALARGENT -- 11/12/99 202-647-1028
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KBAILES
----------0EEC79 130125Z /38
O P 130117Z NOV 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CHENGDU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL AUCKLAND IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL FUKUOKA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL NAGOYA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SAPPORO IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 214206 130119Z
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 08 DEC 2006 200503352

USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS// PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 214206

MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 12 PRESS GUIDANCE FOR THE EAP REGION

SECDEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA AND OASD/SOLIC/SOP
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
UNVIE FOR FITZPATRICK

1. INDEX:
-- STATEMENT: INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR--HOLBROOKE/ROTH TRAVEL (PARAS 2-3)
-- STATEMENT: TIMOR/CHECHNYA--U.S. CONTRIBUTES TO HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES (PARAS 2,4)
-- NE ASIA SECURITY: COMMENTS BY CINCPAC ADM BLAIR (PARAS 5-6)
-- TAIWAN: MAJORS LIST (PARAS 7-8)
-- CHINA: WTO TALKS (PARAS 7,9)
-- CHINA: FORMAL U.S. INQUIRY ABOUT PANCHEN LAMA (PARAS 7,10)
-- CHINA: WESTERN LAND POVERTY REDUCTION PROJECT (PARAS 7,11)
-- INDONESIA: WAHID VISIT (PARAS 6,12)
-- INDONESIA: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FM SHIHAB (PARAS 7,13)
-- US-JAPAN CENTRAL AMERICAN CHIEF OF MISSION MEETING (PARAS 7,14)
-- STATEMENT: NEW ZEALAND--PRESIDENT ON CONFIRMATION OF CAROL MOSELEY-BRAUN (PARAS 15-16)
-- STATEMENT: NEW ZEALAND--VICE PRESIDENT ON CONFIRMATION OF CAROL MOSELEY-BRAUN (PARAS 15,17)
-- TEXT OF LETTER ON MAJORS LIST (PARAS 15,18)

2. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS WERE ISSUED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 11/12/1999.

3. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN

UNCLASSIFIED

STATEMENT BY JAMES P. RUBIN, SPOKESMAN

INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR -- HOLBROOKE/ROTH TRAVEL

SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT HAS ASKED U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS RICHARD HOLBROOKE AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STANLEY ROTH TO GO TO JAKARTA, WEST TIMOR, AND EAST TIMOR, NOVEMBER 18-22, TO MEET WITH INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND UN OFFICIALS AND TO DISCUSS ISSUES RELATED TO THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING UN OPERATIONS IN EAST AND WEST TIMOR.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH WILL DEPART ON NOVEMBER 18 FOR JAKARTA, WHERE THEY WILL MEET WITH INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. IN WEST TIMOR THEY WILL VISIT CAMPS FOR DISPLACED PERSONS AND MEET WITH UNHCR REPRESENTATIVES DEALING WITH THAT ISSUE. IN EAST TIMOR, IT IS ANTICIPATED THEY WILL MEET WITH UN TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATOR SERGIO DE MELLO, AS WELL AS INTERFET COMMANDER GEN. COSGROVE, AND EAST TIMORESE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO. DETAILS OF THE SCHEDULE ARE STILL BEING WORKED OUT.

4. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN

STATEMENT BY JAMES P. RUBIN, SPOKESMAN

TIMOR/CHECHNYA: U.S. CONTRIBUTES $40 MILLION TO HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES

TODAY THE PRESIDENT HAS AUTHORIZED THE BUREAU OF POPULATION,

UNCLASSIFIED

REFUGEES AND MIGRATION (PRM) THE USE OF $40 MILLION FROM HIS EMERGENCY REFUGEE AND MIGRATION ASSISTANCE FUND (ERMA) TO RESPOND TO THE HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES IN NORTH CAUCASUS REGION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND TIMOR.

WE WILL PROVIDE $10 MILLION TO RESPOND TO UNEXPECTED URGENT NEEDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA'S NORTH CAUCASUS REGION. RUSSIA BEARS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADDRESSING HUMANITARIAN NEEDS CREATED BY THE CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA AND MUST ENSURE THAT ALL BORDERS BETWEEN CHECHNYA AND NEIGHBORING REGIONS REMAIN OPEN TO DISPLACED PERSONS. AS MANY AS 200,000 HAVE BEEN DISPLACED BY FIGHTING IN CHECHNYA AND DAGESTAN, AND RUSSIA'S MILITARY RESPONSE TO INSURGENT

ATTACKS HAS LED LARGE NUMBERS OF CIVILIANS TO FLEE TO INGUSHETIYA AND OTHER NEIGHBORING AREAS. $3,000,000 OF THESE FUNDS WILL BE PROVIDED IMMEDIATELY TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) TO HELP ADDRESS THE MOST URGENT NEEDS. THE BALANCE OF THE FUNDS WILL BE PROVIDED TO OTHER HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS, MOST NOTABLY THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), ABLE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION TO REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS.

THE WHITE HOUSE WILL RELEASE A STATEMENT LATER TODAY ON THE REMAINING $30 MILLION THAT WILL BE USED TO RESPOND TO THE NEEDS OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN EAST AND WEST TIMOR.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S EFFORTS, PRIMARILY THROUGH ICRC AND UNHCR, ARE AN IMPORTANT SUPPLEMENT. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS ESPECIALLY GRATEFUL TO ICRC AND UNHCR FOR THEIR COURAGEOUS EFFORTS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS AND TIMOR.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THE MANY FAMILIES DISPLACED BY THESE CONFLICTS. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CALLS ON ALL PARTIES TO SEEK POLITICAL RESOLUTIONS TO THESE CONFLICTS AND TO CEASE THE USE OF FORCE THAT HAS PRODUCED MANY CASUALTIES AND CAUSED PEOPLE TO FLEE.

5. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED ON 11/12/1999. STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN JAMES RUBIN USED THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION AT THE PRESS BRIEFING THAT DAY. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THE REMAINDER ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

6. NORTHEAST ASIA SECURITY: COMMENTS BY CINCPAC ADM BLAIR

CONTEXT: IN AN INTERVIEW THAT APPEARS IN TODAY'S WASHINGTON TIMES, CINCPAC ADMIRAL BLAIR COMMENTS ON A NUMBER OF NORTHEAST ASIA SECURITY ISSUES. THE STORY SAYS THAT BLAIR CALLED FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE (TMD) TO PROTECT U.S. TROOPS FROM A GROWING THREAT FROM NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE MISSILES, STATED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD HELP TAIWAN BUILD MISSILE DEFENSES, AND REPORTEDLY DISMISSED CHINESE CONCERNS ABOUT SUCH U.S. ASSISTANCE. HE ALSO IS SAID TO HAVE INDICATED THAT WE HAVE INFORMED THE PRC THAT WE WILL DEFEND TAIWAN AGAINST AGGRESSION BY BEIJING, THAT CHINA IS STEALING WEAPONS KNOW-HOW AS PART OF ITS MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, THAT THE PRC HAS REPORTEDLY GIVEN A "HEAD-NOD" TO THE RESUMPTION OF MILITARY-TO-MILITARY TALKS, AND THAT HE WANTS TO TALK TO CHINESE MILITARY LEADERS ABOUT A RECOMMENDATION BY TWO PLA COLONELS THAT CHINA SHOULD USE

"UNRESTRICTED WARFARE," INCLUDING BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS, IN ANY CONFLICT WITH THE U.S.
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 07 STATE 214206 130119Z

Q. ADMIRAL BLAIR REPORTEDLY CALLS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF TMD IN NORTHEAST ASIA. IS THIS THE ADMINISTRATION POSITION?

A. TO PROTECT U.S. FORCES AGAINST THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILES (TBM), THE UNITED STATES EMBARKED ON PROGRAMS TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY IMPROVED DEFENSES AGAINST THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILES.

-- TMD IS A RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILES. WE HAVE BEEN CONSULTING WITH OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS ON THIS TOPIC. HOWEVER, NO DECISIONS ON DEPLOYMENT HAVE BEEN MADE OTHER THAN FOR PROTECTING FORWARD-DEPLOYED U.S. FORCES IN THE REGION.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO ASSIST TAIWAN IN MEETING ITS LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE NEEDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT AND CONSISTENT WITH THE 1982 JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH THE PRC.

-- AMONG THE ITEMS TAIWAN ALREADY HAS PURCHASED HAS BEEN TECHNOLOGY FOR TAIWAN'S MODIFIED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (MADS), WHICH HAS ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-MISSILE CAPABILITIES.

-- THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES ARE ASSESSING THEIR OWN CAPABILITIES AND NEEDS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE.

-- AS I SAID, NO U.S. DECISIONS ON DEPLOYMENT OF TMD SYSTEMS, OTHER THAN FOR THE PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES, HAVE BEEN MADE.

-- THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBLE SALE OF TMD SYSTEMS TO TAIWAN IN THE FUTURE. OUR INTEREST IS IN
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 08 STATE 214206 130119Z
PRESERVING PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION. TMD IS A SYSTEM STILL UNDER DEVELOPMENT. IT IS PREMATURE TO MAKE THAT DECISION NOW.

Q. WHAT ABOUT HIS COMMENT ON DEFENDING TAIWAN? HAVE WE TOLD THE PRC WE WILL DEFEND TAIWAN AGAINST PRC AGGRESSION?

A. AS WE'VE STATED MANY TIMES, WE REMAIN FIRMLY COMMITTED TO FULFULLING THE SECURITY AND ARMS TRANSFER PROVISIONS OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT. UNDER THE TRA, WE PROVIDE TAIWAN WITH DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES TO ENABLE TAIWAN TO MAINTAIN A

SUFFICIENT SELF-DEFENSE.

-- THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT PROVIDES THAT IT IS THE POLICY OF THE U.S. TO, "CONSIDER ANY EFFORT TO DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN BY OTHER THAN PEACEFUL MEANS... A THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC AREA AND OF GRAVE CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES."

-- UNDER THE TRA, THE PRESIDENT, IN CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS, WILL DETERMINE ANY APPROPRIATE ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Q. WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO PRC CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF TMD IN THE REGION?

A. TMD IS A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM AND SHOULD NOT BE PERCEIVED AS A THREAT TO ANY COUNTRY'S SECURITY.

-- WE BELIEVE THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON WHAT GIVES RISE TO INTEREST IN TMD--I.E., THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PROLIFERATION

OF MISSILES. AS THE SECRETARY HAS NOTED, THE THREAT OF MISSILE PROLIFERATION IS AN ISSUE THAT THE U.S. AND CHINA HAVE TO WORK TOGETHER ON.

IF ASKED:
Q. ARE THE U.S. AND CHINA NEAR AN AGREEMENT ON RESUMING MILITARY TIES? WILL YOU DISCUSS THEIR MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND THE TOPIC OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION?

A. AS WE HAVE SAID BEFORE, THE U.S. REMAINS READY TO ENGAGE WITH CHINA ON OUR FULL RANGE OF BILATERAL ISSUES, INCLUDING MILITARY-TO-MILITARY TIES.

-- WE LOOK FORWARD TO HOLDING THIS DIALOGUE AND HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH CHINA ABOUT CONTINUING OUR DISCUSSIONS. WE FEEL THAT MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS WITH CHINA ARE IMPORTANT TO MAINTAINING PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE PACIFIC, AS IT LOWERS THE PROBABILITY OF MISCALCULATION ON BOTH SIDES.

7. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 11/12/1999. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THESE GUIDANCES ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

8. TAIWAN: MAJORS LIST

CONTEXT: IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 490 (H) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, TAIWAN CONTINUES TO BE LISTED AS A MAJOR DRUG-TRANSIT TERRITORY. THE U.S.

GOVERNMENT DOES NOT CONSIDER TAIWAN TO BE A MAJOR ILLICIT DRUG PRODUCER. TAIWAN HAS BEEN ON THE MAJORS LIST SINCE 1995.

Q. WHY IS TAIWAN STILL LISTED ON THE MAJORS LIST? WHAT

EVIDENCE DO YOU HAVE THAT SUGGESTS TAIWAN SHOULD STILL BE LISTED AS A MAJOR ILLICIT DRUG-PRODUCING OR MAJOR DRUG-TRANSIT CENTER?

A. THE MAJOR'S LIST IS DEVELOPED THROUGH AN INTER-AGENCY PROCESS LED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND INCLUDING INPUT BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER EXECUTIVE AGENCIES INVOLVED IN COMBATING NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. THE LIST INCLUDES BOTH ILLICIT DRUG-PRODUCING AND DRUG-TRANSIT CENTERS. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS NEVER CONSIDERED TAIWAN TO BE A MAJOR ILLICIT DRUG-PRODUCING AREA. HOWEVER, TAIWAN'S CLOSE GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY TO AREAS WHERE DRUGS ARE CULTIVATED, AS WELL AS ITS WELL-DEVELOPED COMMERCIAL TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE, HAVE HISTORICALLY MADE IT A NATURAL TRANSIT POINT FOR DRUGS MOVING FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA TO THE U.S.

Q. DOES TAIWAN'S CONTINUED PRESENCE ON THE MAJORS LIST MEAN THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DOES NOT VIEW TAIWAN AS BEING HELPFUL IN ITS ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS?

A. NO. THIS IS JUST THE FIRST STEP OF A TWO-STEP PROCESS. THE SECOND STEP, THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS, WILL EXAMINE THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES' AND ECONOMIES' COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUGS. EVERY YEAR THAT TAIWAN HAS APPEARED ON THE MAJORS' LIST, IT HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN CERTIFIED AS FULLY COOPERATING IN THIS EFFORT. IN HIS LETTER TO CONGRESS ON THE MAJORS' LIST, PRESIDENT CLINTON STATED THAT TAIWAN HAS AN EXCELLENT COUNTER-DRUG RECORD AND COOPERATES CLOSELY WITH THE UNITED STATES ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES THROUGH THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN.

9. CHINA -- WTO TALKS

CONTEXT: U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE CHARLENE BARSHEFSKY, NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL ADVISOR GENE SPERLING AND AN INTERAGENCY TEAM ARE CURRENTLY IN BEIJING TO CONTINUE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. THEY HELD MEETINGS WEDNESDAY, THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 10-12 WITH SENIOR CHINESE TRADE OFFICIALS, INCLUDING MINISTER OF TRADE SHI GUANGSHENG AND

VICE MINISTER OF TRADE LONG YONGTU. A NOVEMBER 12 WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE QUOTES AMBASSADOR BARSHEFSKY AS SAYING WE ARE "DISCOURAGED THAT PROGRESS HAS NOT BEEN MADE AT THIS POINT. THE CLOCK HAS NEARLY RUN OUT." ACCORDING TO THE POST, SOME SOURCES SPECULATE THAT CHINESE LEADERS ARE SERIOUSLY DIVIDED ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES RELATED TO CHINA'S ENTRY INTO THE WTO AND ARE UNABLE TO MADE FINAL DECISIONS REGARDING WTO COMMITMENTS. NEITHER U.S. NOR CHINESE NEGOTIATORS HAVE PROVIDED ANY DETAILS ON THE NEGOTIATIONS.

Q. WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE CURRENT TALKS IN BEIJING?

A. USTR BARSHEFSKY, NEC ADVISOR SPERLING AND AN INTERAGENCY TEAM HAVE BEEN IN BEIJING FOR THREE DAYS OF TALKS WITH CHINESE OFFICIALS REGARDING CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.

-- AS AMBASSADOR BARSHEFSKY SAID, "THERE ARE NO POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS TO REPORT AT THIS TIME."

(IF ASKED)
Q. IS THE U.S. DISCOURAGED AT THE LACK OF PROGRESS?

A. YES. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO MAKE MORE PROGRESS.

Q. ARE THERE PLANS TO MEET AGAIN?

A. NO FURTHER MEETINGS HAVE BEEN SCHEDULED AT THIS TIME.

Q. WHEN WILL THE U.S. DELEGATION RETURN TO THE U.S.?

A. THEY CURRENTLY PLAN TO LEAVE ON SATURDAY MORNING, BEIJING TIME. THEY ARE SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN THE U.S. OVER THE WEEKEND.

10. CHINA: FORMAL U.S. INQUIRY ABOUT PANCHEN LAMA

CONTEXT: REPORTS HAVE APPEARED ON THE INTERNET THAT THE BOY IDENTIFIED BY THE DALAI LAMA AS THE PANCHEN LAMA IS DEAD AND THAT HIS BODY HAS BEEN CREMATED IN A GANSU PROVINCE PRISON. THESE REPORTS HAVE BEEN PICKED UP BY HONG KONG'S SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, WHICH ALSO REPORTED AN OFFICIAL DENIAL BY THE PRC. AT THIS POINT, WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THE REPORT AND TIBET EXPERTS HAVE EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE REPORT'S ACCURACY. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THIS UNCONFIRMED REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF

STATE. THE USG HAS REPEATEDLY INQUIRED WITH CHINESE AUTHORITIES ABOUT THE BOY'S WHEREABOUTS. HE AND PARENTS HAVE BEEN HELD INCOMMUNICADO BY CHINESE AUTHORITIES SINCE MID-1995.

Q. WHEN DID WE LAST MAKE A FORMAL INQUIRY ABOUT THE WELFARE

AND WHEREABOUTS OF THE BOY IDENTIFIED AS THE PANCHEN LAMA BY THE DALAI LAMA?

A. WE REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE CONTINUED INCOMMUNICADO DETENTION OF THE BOY BY CHINESE AUTHORITIES. OUR EMBASSY IN BEIJING HAS MADE REPEATED FORMAL REPRESENTATIONS EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT THE WHEREABOUTS AND WELFARE OF THE BOY. OUR EMBASSY LAST EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN TO CHINESE AUTHORITIES ON OCTOBER 22.

-- THE ISSUE HAS ALSO BEEN RAISED REPEATEDLY AND AT HIGH LEVELS IN MEETINGS ON HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE THE ISSUE AROSE IN MID-1995. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HAROLD HONGJU KOH RAISED THIS ISSUE IN THE FORMAL HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE LAST JANUARY AND REITERATED OUR LONG-STANDING REQUEST THAT THE CHINESE PERMIT AN INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER TO MEET WITH THE BOY TO VERIFY HIS WELL-BEING.

(IF ASKED)
-- WE HAVE NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM THE REPORT THAT THE BOY IDENTIFIED BY THE DALAI LAMA AS THE PANCHEN LAMA IS DEAD. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAS PUBLICLY DENIED THE STORY OF HIS DEATH.

11. CHINA: UPDATE ON WESTERN LAND POVERTY REDUCTION PROJECT

BACKGROUND: THE WORLD BANK EXECUTIVE BOARD APPROVED THE 'CHINA-WESTERN POVERTY REDUCTION' PROJECT JUNE 22 OVER U.S. OBJECTIONS. U.S. CONCERNS CENTERED ON THE BANK'S FAILURE TO SATISFY ITS OWN CRITERIA; THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT DOCUMENTATION ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE LOAN AND ON

THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE RESETTLEMENT OF 58,0000 IMPOVERISHED FARMERS FROM EASTERN QINGHAI TO A MONGOL-TIBETAN AUTONOMOUS PREFECTURE IN CENTRAL QINGHAI. THE PROJECT WAS WIDELY CRITICIZED ON THE HILL AND IN THE NGO COMMUNITY, WITH OPPONENTS WARNING THAT CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF WORLD BANK FUNDING WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED IN THE FY2000 FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL. IN AN UNUSUAL MOVE,

THE BANK ANNOUNCED THAT FUNDING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QINGHAI COMPONENT WOULD BE WITHHELD, PENDING REVIEW BY THE BANK'S INDEPENDENT INSPECTION PANEL OF WHETHER THE PROJECT VIOLATED BANK RULES. THE BANK BOARD APPROVED THE PANEL'S RECOMMENDATION FOR A FULL INVESTIGATION ON SEPTEMBER 9, AND AN INSPECTION TEAM VISITED CHINA IN OCTOBER. IT HAS NOT YET COMPLETED ITS REPORT TO THE BOARD.

THE CHINESE INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD FACILITATE ACCESS TO THE PROJECT SITES FOR OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES. A LARGE PRESS CONTINGENT VISITED THE AREA IN EARLY AUGUST. HOWEVER, TWO INDIVIDUALS (ALONG WITH THEIR LOCALLY-HIRED INTERPRETER) CONDUCTING AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION WERE DETAINED IN AUGUST. ONE, AN AUSTRALIAN, WAS DEPORTED, WHILE THE AMERICAN (OF TIBETAN ANCESTRY) DAJA MESTON, WAS MEDEVAC-ED AFTER SUFFERING SERIOUS INJURIES FROM A FAILED ATTEMPT TO ESCAPE INTENSIVE INTERROGATION BY CHINESE AUTHORITIES BY JUMPING FROM HIS 3RD-FLOOR HOTEL ROOM.

Q: WHY DID THE U.S. OPPOSE THE WORLD BANK WESTERN POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROJECT LOAN?

A: -- WE OPPOSED THE LOAN WHEN IT WAS PRESENTED TO THE BOARD ON JUNE 22. THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS, WE CLEARLY STATED OUR

CONCERNS REGARDING THE BANK'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE DOCUMENTATION ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RESETTLEMENT PLAN AND THE PROJECT'S ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT.

-- WE APPRECIATED THE ASSURANCES OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT THAT ACCESS TO THE PROJECT AREAS WOULD BE FACILITATED.

Q: HAVE YOU RECEIVED A REPORT FROM THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION TEAM WITH REGARD TO ITS RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE QINGHAI PORTION OF THE WESTERN LAND POVERTY REDUCTION LOAN?

A: -- NO. THE TEAM HAS NOT YET ISSUED ITS FINDINGS.

Q: WHAT IS THE CURRENT CONDITION OF THE AMERICAN CITIZEN WHO WAS INJURED IN A FALL WHILE BEING DETAINED BY CHINESE PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICIALS.

A: -- BECAUSE OF PRIVACY CONCERNS, WE ARE NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING MR. MESTON. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, WE WOULD DIRECT YOU TO THE MESTON FAMILY.

12. INDONESIA: WAHID VISIT

CONTEXT: NEWLY-ELECTED INDONESIAN PRESIDENT ABDURRACHMAN WAHID IS VISITING WASHINGTON NOVEMBER 11-12, PRIOR TO RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT IN SALT LAKE CITY. IN ADDITION TO HIS MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON FRIDAY MORNING AT 11:00 AM, HE IS MEETING WITH BUSINESS LEADERS AND TOP OFFICIALS OF THE WORLD BANK, THE IMF AND EX-IM BANK. THE SECRETARY WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING, AND WILL MEET SEPARATELY WITH FM SHIHAB.

Q. ANY FUTHER DETAILS ON THE VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY NEWLY-ELECTED INDONESIAN PRESIDENT ABDURRACHMAN WAHID? ANY MEETINGS WITH STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS?

A. PRESIDENT WAHID WILL MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT LATE ON FRIDAY MORNING, NOV. 12. THE SECRETARY WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS MEETING.

-- THE MEETING WAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONGRATULATE THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE ON A SUCCESSFUL POLITICAL TRANSITION, WHICH CULMINATED IN WAHID'S ELECTION LAST MONTH. THE DISCUSSIONS INCLUDED THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, THE CONTINUING DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN INDONESIA, AND THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR.

-- THE SECRETARY WILL MEET SEPARATELY WITH HER NEW COUNTERPART, FOREIGN MINISTER ALWI SHIHAB, FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.

13. INDONESIA -- SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FM ALWI SHIHAB

CONTEXT: SECRETARY ALBRIGHT HELD HER FIRST MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH INDONESIA'S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, ALWI SHIHAB, FOLLOWING THE MEETING EARLIER TODAY AT THE WHITE HOUSE BETWEEN PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND WAHID.

Q: CAN YOU GIVE US A READ-OUT OF SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALWI SHIHAB?

A: -- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT MET WITH HER INDONESIAN COUNTERPART,

FOREIGN MINISTER ALWI SHIHAB, ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 12. THIS WAS THEIR FIRST MEETING, AND THE SECRETARY AND FM SHIHAB DISCUSSED WIDE-RANGING ISSUES OF SHARED CONCERN. FIRST AMONG THESE WAS THE IMPORTANCE OF A STABLE AND PROSPEROUS INDONESIA AND A SOUND U.S.-INDONESIA RELATIONSHIP. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT

REAFFIRMED THAT DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN INDONESIA WAS AN IMPORTANT U.S. INTEREST, AND THAT WE WOULD ASSIST THE NEW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO MEET THESE CHALLENGES ANY WAY WE COULD.

-- FM SHIHAB WELCOMED U.S. ASSISTANCE, AND UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S. TO INDONESIA'S INTERESTS--EXEMPLIFIED BY THE PRESENT VISIT OF PRESIDENT WAHID AND HIMSELF TO WASHINGTON AT THIS EARLY STAGE. FM SHIHAB ALSO ADDRESSED INDONESIA'S OTHER FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES, AMONG THESE CREATING STRONG RELATIONSHIPS WITH ITS ASIAN NEIGHBORS, EXPANDING INDONESIA'S DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS BEYOND ASIA--INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST --, AND THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE TO INDONESIA OF STRONG TIES TO THE WEST.

-- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT ALSO ADDRESSED ISSUES OF CONTINUED U.S. CONCERN. THESE INCLUDED THE NEED TO RESOLVE CONTINUING PROBLEMS RELATING TO EAST TIMOR, ESPECIALLY FACILITATING THE RETURN OF REFUGEES FROM WEST TIMOR. SHE EMPHASIZED THAT RESUMING OUR MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WOULD DEPEND ON MILITARY COOPERATION IN WEST TIMOR, SEPARATING REFUGEES FROM THE GRIP OF THE MILITIAS, CREDIBLE STEPS TO BRING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ABUSES, AND DEMONSTRATED COMMITMENT TO MILITARY REFORM IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVILIAN CONTROL.

14. US-JAPAN CENTRAL AMERICAN CHIEF OF MISSION MEETING

Q. WHY ARE THE U.S. AND JAPANESE AMBASSADORS TO THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES MEETING IN EL SALVADOR ON NOVEMBER 18? WHAT ARE THE U.S. AND JAPAN PLANNING?

A. THE US AND JAPANESE AMBASSADORS TO NICARAGUA, HONDURAS, GUATEMALA, COSTA RICA, BELIZE, PANAMA AND EL SALVADOR ARE HOLDING A ONE-DAY CONFERENCE ON NOVEMBER 18 TO DISCUSS WAYS TO PROMOTE COOPERATION AND DISCUSSION ON ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST TO BOTH COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. ALSO PRESENT WILL BE POLICY-LEVEL OFFICIALS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN WASHINGTON (SUSAN WOOD, THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE RESPONSIBLE FOR CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN TOKYO (DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL MITSUO SAKABA).

Q. WILL ANY AGREEMENTS BE SIGNED BETWEEN THE U.S., JAPAN, AND ANY OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES?

A. NO. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING IS FOR U.S. AND JAPANESE TO DISCUSS THEIR EXPERIENCES AND EXCHANGE IDEAS. NO BILATERAL

OR MULTILATERAL ACCORDS WILL BE SIGNED.

Q. WILL THE U.S. AND JAPANESE AMBASSADORS MEET WITH SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS?

A. WE ENVISION THAT THERE WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S. AND JAPANESE AMBASSADORS TO MEET SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHILE THEY ARE HERE.

15. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS AND LETTER WERE ISSUED BY THE

WHITE HOUSE ON 11/12/1999.

16. THE WHITE HOUSE

OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT THE SENATE HAS CONFIRMED CAROL MOSELEY-BRAUN TO BE OUR NATION'S AMBASSADOR TO NEW ZEALAND. THE SENATE'S OVERWHELMING BIPARTISAN VOTE IS A STRONG ENDORSEMENT OF HER OUTSTANDING EXPERIENCE AND CREDENTIALS FOR THIS POSITION. I APPRECIATE HER WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ON THIS RESPONSIBILITY, AND I EXPECT HER TO DO A SUPERIOR JOB REPRESENTING OUR COUNTRY'S VERY SIGNIFICANT INTERESTS IN NEW ZEALAND.

17. THE WHITE HOUSE

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

STATEMENT BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT THE SENATE TODAY VOTED ON A BIPARTISAN BASIS TO CONFIRM CAROL MOSELEY-BRAUN AS OUR NATION'S NEW AMBASSADOR TO NEW ZEALAND AND SAMOA.

DURING HER TIME IN THE SENATE, CAROL WAS NOT JUST A PATH-BREAKER--THE FIRST AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMAN TO SERVE IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE--SHE WAS A STRONG VOICE FOR THE PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS AND INDEED THE NATION.

I BELIEVE THAT STRONG VOICE, HER DEDICATION TO PUBLIC SERVICE AND HER WEALTH OF EXPERIENCE WILL SERVE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

WELL IN HER NEW POSITION AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF OUR NATION.

18. THE WHITE HOUSE

OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE CHAIRMEN OF THE SENATE COMMITTEES ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS AND THE CHAIRMEN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS

DEAR CHAIRMAN:

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 490(H) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED, I HAVE DETERMINED THAT THE FOLLOWING ARE MAJOR ILLICIT DRUG PRODUCING OR DRUG TRANSIT "COUNTRIES" (INCLUDING CERTAIN ENTITIES THAT ARE NOT SOVEREIGN STATES): AFGHANISTAN, THE BAHAMAS, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, BURMA, CAMBODIA, CHINA, COLOMBIA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HONG KONG, INDIA, JAMAICA, LAOS, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PAKISTAN, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, TAIWAN, THAILAND, VENEZUELA, AND VIETNAM.

THIS YEAR I HAVE REMOVED ARUBA AND BELIZE FROM THE MAJORS LIST; ADDED BELIZE AS PART OF THIS YEAR'S CENTRAL AMERICA REGION OF CONCERN; ADDED THE ENTIRE EASTERN AND SOUTHERN CARIBBEAN, INCLUDING THE LEEWARD AND WINDWARD ISLANDS, ARUBA, AND THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES, AS A REGION OF CONCERN; AND

ALSO ADDED NORTH KOREA AS A COUNTRY OF CONCERN.

I WISH TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE INCLUSION OF A COUNTRY OR ENTITY ON THE MAJORS LIST DOES NOT REFLECT AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS GOVERNMENT'S COUNTER-DRUG EFFORTS OR EXTENT OF COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES. FOR EXAMPLE, AMONG THE REASONS THAT A TRANSIT COUNTRY OR ENTITY IS PLACED ON THE MAJORS LIST IS THE COMBINATION OF GEOGRAPHICAL, COMMERCIAL, AND/OR ECONOMIC FACTORS THAT ALLOW DRUG TRAFFICKERS TO OPERATE DESPITE THE MOST ASSIDUOUS ENFORCEMENT MEASURES OF THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNED. IN THE CASE OF HONG KONG AND TAIWAN, FOR INSTANCE, BOTH ENTITIES HAVE EXCELLENT COUNTER-DRUG RECORDS AND COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THE UNITED STATES.

ARUBA. ARUBA WAS DESIGNATED AS A MAJOR TRANSIT COUNTRY IN 1997. WHILE GEOGRAPHY MAKES ARUBA, LIKE MOST OF THE OTHER ISLAND COUNTRIES IN THE EASTERN AND SOUTHERN CARIBBEAN, A POTENTIAL DRUG TRANSIT POINT, AT THIS TIME WE DO NOT HAVE

EVIDENCE THAT IT IS A MAJOR TRANSIT COUNTRY FOR DRUGS BOUND FOR THE UNITED STATES. RATHER, THE DRUG TRADE THERE APPEARS DIRECTED TOWARD EUROPE. WE WILL CONTINUE, HOWEVER, TO KEEP ARUBA UNDER OBSERVATION TOGETHER WITH THE REST OF THE ISLANDS IN THE REGION.

BELIZE. BELIZE'S GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION NEXT TO MEXICO ON THE YUCATAN PENINSULA OFFERS WOULD-BE DRUG SMUGGLERS AN ATTRACTIVE CORRIDOR FOR MOVING DRUGS INTO MEXICO AND ON TO THE UNITED STATES. TRAFFICKERS HAVE USED BELIZEAN TERRITORY IN PREVIOUS YEARS, WHEN ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES ELSEWHERE ENHANCED THE VALUE OF THIS ROUTE. RECENTLY, HOWEVER, WE HAVE

DETECTED SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED DRUG FLOWS TO AND THROUGH BELIZE.
THEREFORE, I HAVE DECIDED TO REMOVE BELIZE FROM THE MAJORS LIST. IF FUTURE MONITORING OF CENTRAL AMERICA INDICATES A RESUMPTION OF IMPORTANT DRUG FLOWS THROUGH BELIZE BOUND FOR THE UNITED STATES, I WILL AGAIN PLACE THE COUNTRY ON THE MAJORS LIST.

CENTRAL AMERICA. CENTRAL AMERICA'S LOCATION BETWEEN SOUTH AMERICA AND MEXICO, TOGETHER WITH ITS THOUSANDS OF MILES OF COASTLINE, SEVERAL CONTAINER-HANDLING PORTS, THE PAN-AMERICAN HIGHWAY, AND LIMITED LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITY MAKE THE ENTIRE REGION A LOGICAL CONDUIT AND TRANSHIPMENT AREA FOR ILLICIT DRUGS BOUND FOR MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES. THE VARIANCE IN SEIZURE STATISTICS FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY, AND THEIR FLUCTUATION FROM YEAR TO YEAR, UNDERSCORE MY CONCERN WITH CENTRAL AMERICA'S POTENTIAL AND VOLATILE ROLE AS A TRANSIT REGION. FOR INSTANCE, PANAMA AND GUATEMALA CONTINUE TO REPORT MORE SEIZURES THAN OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, WHILE SEIZURES TO DATE BY COSTA RICA, HONDURAS, AND NICARAGUA ARE BELOW LEVELS DURING THE SAME PERIOD IN PREVIOUS YEARS AND FLOW LEVELS IN EL SALVADOR REMAIN LOW. TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATE A NEED TO CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

CUBA. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN SOME REPORTS THAT TRAFFICKING SYNDICATES USE CUBAN LAND TERRITORY FOR MOVING DRUGS, WE HAVE YET TO RECEIVE ANY CONFIRMATION THAT THIS TRAFFIC CARRIES SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF COCAINE OR HEROIN TO THE UNITED STATES. IN PARTICULAR, THE INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITIES REVIEWED THE INFORMATION CONCERNING WHETHER THE

7.2 METRIC TON SHIPMENT OF COCAINE SEIZED IN COLOMBIA IN

DECEMBER 1998, IN A CONTAINER REPORTEDLY HEADED TO CUBA, WAS DESTINED FOR THE UNITED STATES. THEIR JUDGMENT REMAINS THAT SPAIN, AND NOT THE UNITED STATES, WAS THE INTENDED FINAL DESTINATION.

WE ALSO LOOKED CLOSELY AT THE USE OF CUBAN WATERS AND AIRSPACE FOR TRANSIT OF DRUGS TO THE UNITED STATES, AS THE TERM "MAJOR DRUG TRANSIT COUNTRY" IS UNDERSTOOD TO APPLY TO THE LAND, WATERS, AND AIRSPACE OF A COUNTRY OVER WHICH SOVEREIGNTY MAY BE EXERCISED, CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNITED STATES PRACTICE. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE DETECTED WHAT APPEARS TO BE SOME AIR AND SEA ACTIVITY CONSISTENT WITH TRAFFICKING PATTERNS, THIS ACTIVITY HAS DECREASED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE LAST YEAR AND INDICATES A CORRESPONDING DECREASE IN DRUG FLOW. WE CONTINUE TO KEEP TRAFFICKING IN THE AREA UNDER CLOSE OBSERVATION AND WILL ADD CUBA TO THE MAJORS LIST IF THE EVIDENCE WARRANTS.

EASTERN AND SOUTHERN CARIBBEAN. THE LEEWARD AND WINDWARD ISLANDS, TOGETHER WITH ARUBA AND THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES, CONSTITUTE A BROAD GEOGRAPHICAL AREA THROUGH WHICH DRUGS BOUND FOR THE UNITED STATES MAY PASS EN ROUTE FROM LATIN AMERICA. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THAT ANY OF THESE EASTERN CARIBBEAN NATIONS IS A MAJOR DRUG TRANSIT COUNTRY UNDER THE STATUTORY DEFINITION. THE INFORMATION WE DO HAVE INDICATES THAT DRUGS MOVING THROUGH THE AREA ARE OVERWHELMINGLY DESTINED FOR EUROPE. WE ARE, THEREFORE, KEEPING THE REGION UNDER OBSERVATION, AND I WILL ADD THE RELEVANT COUNTRIES TO THE MAJORS LIST SHOULD CONDITIONS WARRANT.

IRAN. ALTHOUGH IRAN IN THE PAST HAD BEEN A TRADITIONAL OPIUM PRODUCING COUNTRY, OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN REPORTED SUCCESS IN ERADICATING ILLICIT OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION. A SURVEY OF THE COUNTRY THIS YEAR REVEALED NO DETECTABLE POPPY CULTIVATION IN THE TRADITIONAL GROWING AREAS. WHILE ONE CANNOT RULE OUT SOME CULTIVATION IN REMOTE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE ENOUGH TO MEET THE THRESHOLD DEFINITION OF A MAJOR DRUG PRODUCING COUNTRY. IMPORTANT QUANTITIES OF OPIATES REPORTEDLY CONTINUE TO TRANSIT
IRAN EN ROUTE TO EUROPE, BUT WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THESE DRUGS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE UNITED STATES, A REQUIREMENT FOR DESIGNATION AS A MAJOR DRUG TRANSIT COUNTRY UNDER CURRENT LEGISLATION.

MALAYSIA. MALAYSIA WAS REMOVED FROM THE MAJORS LIST LAST

YEAR BECAUSE DRUG FLOW ESTIMATES DID NOT INDICATE THAT DRUGS TRANSITING THE COUNTRY HAD REACHED THE UNITED STATES IN SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES.

NORTH KOREA. OUR OBSERVATIONS TO DATE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM REPORTS THAT SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF OPIUM POPPY MAY BE UNDER CULTIVATION IN NORTH KOREA OR THAT HEROIN ORIGINATING IN THE COUNTRY MAY BE ENTERING THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRADE. WE CONTINUE, HOWEVER, TO MONITOR THE SITUATION. IF WE CONFIRM THAT THERE IS INDEED SIGNIFICANT POPPY CULTIVATION, OR THAT NORTH KOREA IS A TRANSIT POINT FOR DRUGS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING THE UNITED STATES, I WILL ADD THE COUNTRY TO THE MAJORS LIST.

SYRIA AND LEBANON. WE REMOVED SYRIA AND LEBANON FROM THE MAJORS LIST 2 YEARS AGO AFTER WE DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION IN LEBANON'S BIQA' VALLEY. RECENT SURVEYS HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO DETECTABLE REPLANTING OF OPIUM POPPY, AND WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT DRUGS TRANSITING THESE COUNTRIES SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE UNITED STATES. WE CONTINUE, HOWEVER, TO KEEP THE AREA UNDER OBSERVATION.

TURKEY AND OTHER BALKAN ROUTE COUNTRIES. WE REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT THE LARGE VOLUME OF SOUTHWEST ASIAN HEROIN MOVING THROUGH TURKEY AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO WESTERN EUROPE ALONG THE BALKAN ROUTE. WE HAVE NO CLEAR EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT THIS HEROIN SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTS THE UNITED STATES AS REQUIRED FOR A COUNTRY TO BE DESIGNATED A MAJOR TRANSIT COUNTRY. IN THE EVENT THAT WE DETERMINE THAT HEROIN TRANSITING TURKEY, BULGARIA, GREECE, SERBIA-MONTENEGRO, BOSNIA, CROATIA, THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA, OR OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ON THE BALKAN ROUTE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTS THE UNITED STATES, I WILL ADD THE RELEVANT COUNTRIES TO THE MAJORS LIST.

MAJOR CANNABIS PRODUCERS. WHILE KAZAKSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, MOROCCO, THE PHILIPPINES, AND SOUTH AFRICA ARE IMPORTANT CANNABIS PRODUCERS, WE HAVE NOT INCLUDED THEM ON THE MAJORS LIST SINCE IN ALL CASES THE ILLICIT CANNABIS IS EITHER CONSUMED LOCALLY OR EXPORTED TO COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES. I HAVE DETERMINED THAT SUCH ILLICIT CANNABIS PRODUCTION DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE UNITED STATES.

CENTRAL ASIA. WE HAVE CONDUCTED PROBES IN UZBEKISTAN AND

TAJIKISTAN, TRADITIONAL OPIUM POPPY GROWING AREAS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. THESE PROBES HAVE NOT SHOWN SIGNIFICANT OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION. IF ONGOING ANALYSIS REVEALS CULTIVATION OF 1,000 HECTARES OR MORE OF POPPY, I WILL ADD THE RELEVANT COUNTRIES TO THE MAJORS LIST.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON
ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

EAP

9920435

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

PMBS

R1

RML

ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S

NOV 10 1999

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EAP - Stanley Roth SDR

SUBJECT: Appointment Request: Indonesian Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab

Request: Office call

Purpose: To continue discussions following Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid's meeting with President Clinton.

Other Appointments Sought: None

Timing: Friday afternoon, November 12

Location: Your office

Proposed Participants:

Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab
Indonesian Ambassador Dorodjatun
Ambassador Gelbard
Assistant Secretary Roth
Notetaker
Others to be determined

Media: N/A.

Recommendation

That you agree to meet Foreign Minister Shihab on November 12 for one hour.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Date _____ Time _____

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 08 DEC 2006 200503352

UNCLASSIFIED

02D052, box 2, folder - OVIP Pres. Wahid Visit, Nov. 11-12, 1999

Drafted: EAP/PIMBS:JHuskey *(x7-2031)*
Doc: O:/BCLTV/FM Shihad - SS *Date: 11/10/99*

Cleared: EAP: DHartwick, Acting ok
EAP/PIMBS: JAloisi ok
D: TCynkin ok
P: DShields ok

EAP

9920462 revised

United States Department of State

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 10, 1999

R2

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S KH

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 11/10/09

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EAP - Stanley O. Roth

SUBJECT: Your Participation in POTUS' Meeting with Indonesian President Wahid

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Support POTUS in welcoming President Wahid and underscoring the desire of the United States to work closely with the new Indonesian administration on democratic transition and economic reform and recovery.

2. Ensure that the message is conveyed on what the Wahid Administration must do in West Timor (on disbanding the militias, facilitating refugee repatriation, supporting human rights accountability inquiries). GOI follow through will be crucial to restoration of our suspended military-to-military relations.

3. Raise and strongly argue against Wahid's notion of meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

II. APPROACH

We have provided extensive briefing material (enclosed at Tab C) to the White House for President Clinton's use in his November 12 meeting with Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid. The overriding theme is our desire to engage the new reformist Indonesian government at every level and help promote a democratic, stable, prosperous, and unified Indonesia. The key areas we expect will be discussed are: a) Supporting Democratic Transition; b) Economic Reform and Recovery; c) Military-to-Military

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 9 NOV 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 11 DEC 2006 200503352

Classified by Stanley O. Roth
Reason 1.5 (b) and (d)

02D052, box 2, folder - OVIP Pres. Wahid Visit, Nov. 11-12, 1999

Relations; and d) Aceh. The talking points for the "Military-to-Military" agenda item fully outline our concerns about militia activities in West Timor, their impact on the international refugee repatriation process, and their implications for Indonesia's credibility and relations with the international community and new East Timorese state. It is crucial that this message be conveyed effectively to Wahid if East Timor is not to remain a serious obstacle to improving relations with Indonesia.

[redacted] B1

Providing that Clinton delivers the right message on Timor, we think you should use your opportunity to make an intervention with Wahid to invite him to send his Minister for Human Rights and his Attorney General to a multinational conference that State and USIP will host on Justice and Reconciliation in Democratic Transitions in December. Prior to becoming President, Wahid had repeatedly expressed interest in learning how other countries in transition to democracy have dealt with justice and reconciliation. Last year, in the wake of the rapes and riots which accompanied Suharto's downfall, he even toyed with the idea of getting international leaders such as Nelson Mandela together to discuss these issues.

With this in mind, and knowing how important the accountability issue will be for the new government, State is interested in hosting a conference in conjunction with USIP to examine the role of accountability in Indonesia's democratic transition. The goal will be to bring the relevant players from Indonesia together with prominent individuals from other democracies - notably Chile, Argentina, Salvador, South Africa and South Korea - to examine the various mechanisms through which their societies addressed these questions and to learn from the successes and failures of other processes in other places. Indonesia's new Minister for Human Rights has been approached and is eager to participate, and funding has already been secured. We anticipate that Wahid will be pleased with the initiative.

We have provided President Clinton with a "Must Do" point regarding the possibility of his meeting with Saddam Hussein.

[redacted] B1

Attachments:

Tab A - Checklist of Key Issues
Tab B - Talking Points
Tab C - Briefing Material for POTUS-Wahid Meeting

Briefing Material for the Secretary's Participation in the POTUS-Wahid Meeting, November 12, 1999.

Drafted:EAP/PIMBS: RClarke 7-2543 11/10/99
O:Indonesia\Wahid '99\S Participation in Clinton-Wahid Mtg, Nov 12.doc

Cleared:EAP:SORoth
:EAP:DAHartwick, Acting
:EAP/PIMBS:JAloisi (ok)
:D:TCynkin(ok)
:P:DShields(ok)
:DRL:SO'Sullivan
:NEA/NGA:PDibble (ok)
:S/P:KBrooks
:PRM:DNeher
:IO/PKO:KBrown
:PM:RMBeecroft

EAP

9920470
RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

PMBS

NOV 10 R3

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

KH

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 11/10/2009

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EAP - Stanley O. Roth

SUBJECT: Your November 12 Meeting with Indonesian Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Underscore the importance of our bilateral ties and our desire to have an active and constructive relationship.

2. Solicit Shihab's views on Indonesia's foreign policy goals, including in Asia and the Middle East.

3. Address domestic Indonesian issues of continued concern, namely East/West Timor, Aceh, economic reform, and military reform.

4. Offer to help arrange reconciliation conference.

II. APPROACH

Your first meeting with new Indonesian Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab will follow President Clinton's meeting with President Wahid. It is the perfect opportunity for you to get acquainted with Shihab, who, not limited to his foreign policy portfolio, serves as one of President Wahid's closest advisors on all political and governmental matters. You should use this meeting to

Classified by EAP Assistant Secretary Stanley O. Roth
Reason: E.O. 12958 1.5 (D)

UNCLASSIFIED
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 11 DEC 2006 200503352

OAD052, box 2, folder - OVIP Pres. Wahid Visit, Nov. 11-12, 1999

reinforce President Clinton's message that we attach importance to a stable, prosperous, and secure Indonesia and see a sound U.S.-Indonesia relationship as an important national interest.

Since starting out with potentially contentious domestic issues such as East/West Timor could provoke an unnecessarily defensive response, I recommend that you first solicit Shahib's views on the Wahid administration's foreign policy priorities. There may be "less than meets the eye" in Wahid's public statements concerning Indonesia's interest in establishing an "Asian Axis" (China, India, and ASEAN) to counterbalance the power of the West, but you should nonetheless inquire about its significance. You also could ask that he amplify on the GOI's intentions with regard to APEC and ASEAN, which would segue into a discussion on Burma, and the useful role the new democratically elected government of Indonesia could play in supporting democracy in that country. Shahib may also bring up Wahid's overtures toward Israel, which you should praise as courageous, and President Wahid's desire to meet with Saddam Hussein, which you should strongly discourage as the wrong message for a nascent democracy to send to the world.

You should also engage Shihab on a number of "domestic" Indonesian issues of continued concern to the U.S. First among these is Indonesian military behavior in West Timor. You should stress that this is not strictly an Indonesian issue. Rather, it has the continued attention of the international community and will significantly affect the ability of the United States to reengage fully with Indonesia. You can stress that we are looking for progress on the return of refugees from West Timor, active cooperation to disarm militias and to prevent militia incursions into East Timor, and credible movement on military accountability for abuses. You should underline the importance of having full Indonesian cooperation on getting the UN International Commission of Inquiry (ICOI) to East Timor as soon as possible.

You should also address the issues of Aceh, military reform, and economic reform. On Aceh, you should emphasise U.S. support for Indonesia's territorial integrity, commend the new GOI for refraining from using violence and repression, and solicit Shihab's thoughts on whether a political solution short of a referendum remains viable.

On military reform, you should make clear that our ability to resume defense ties will depend on: progress in West Timor, decisive movement on military accountability for past abuses, restraint in hotspots like Aceh and Irian Jaya, and a demonstrated commitment to the principle of civilian supremacy. On a positive note, you can extend an offer to help arrange a reconciliation conference, which responds to a request of the new government for assistance in learning from the experience of others in this regard.

III. MEDIA

There will be no media.

IV. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	Foreign
The Secretary	Minister Shihab
~~A/S Roth~~	~~tbd~~
A/S Koh	
Ambassador Gelbard	
EAP Notetaker	

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Checklist.
Tab 2 - Talking points.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASED IN FULL

1. Bilateral Relations
2. Foreign Policy Issues
3. Timor
4. Internal Indonesian Issues
5. Reconciliation Conference

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 11/10/09

Checklist of Key Issues
Meeting with Shihab

R3 A

1. **Importance of Bilateral Relations:** Pleased to exchange views; U.S. interest in Indonesia's stability, prosperity; bilateral relationship crucial to regional stability, strengthening ties clearly in U.S. interest.

2. **Foreign Policy Issues:** Interested in views on other foreign policy priorities, Asian Axis? GOI intentions with ASEAN? Welcome overture to Israel, deeply concerned about possible Saddam meeting, bad message at wrong time.

3. **Timor:** Hope situation resolved soon, look for GOI to encourage TNI cooperation with repatriation from West Timor, disarm and disband militias; Hope GOI will act to prevent incursions into East Timor, provide accountability for past abuses, cooperate with ICOI.

4. **Other "Internal" Indonesia Issues:** U.S. supports Indonesian territorial integrity, Wahid's effort to resolve Aceh by political means; military reform must occur before defense ties resumed; IMF-backed economic reform urgent, corporate debt, anti corruption efforts key to recovery.

5. **Reconciliation Conference:** Would like to organize multinational conference, hopefully in December, at which new GOI ministers could learn how other emerging democracies handled justice and reconciliation issues.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 11 DEC 2006 200503352

1. Importance of Bilateral Relations

- Enjoyed our phone call a few weeks back.
- Pleased to have the opportunity to meet with you, and of course with President Wahid, so soon.
- Like to reinforce President Clinton's message - that U.S. attaches great importance to a stable, prosperous, and unified Indonesia; U.S. interest in Indonesia's stability, prosperity; strengthening ties clearly in U.S. interest.
- Seek to assist Indonesia realize democratic aspirations and recover economic prosperity in any way we can; interested in your views on how we can help do this.

2. Foreign Policy Issues

- Am interested in your views on new government's foreign policy priorities.

- Have heard public statements concerning Indonesia's interest in "Asian Axis (China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore)"; your views? What is purpose of such an axis? My fear - many in U.S> see it as somehow "anti-American."

- U.S. values key Indonesian role in APEC, ASEAN; how does GOI plan to reactivate its leadership in these fora, the region?

- Regret President Wahid did not meet ASSK in Burma, good opportunity to support democratic opening there; hope that as icons of democratic struggle both you and President will take leadership role in trying to foster change in Burma; your views?

- Pleased to hear of your overtures to Israel, sends positive message on political, religious tolerance of your government.

- Deeply concerned that Wahid might consider meeting with Saddam Hussein; the choice is yours, but meeting would send disturbing message about Indonesia -- a new democracy -- associating with Saddam's dictatorship; would undermine international efforts to isolate Saddam.

3. Timor

- U.S. interest in Indonesia comprehensive and vast; hope not to have to mention East Timor in future conversations, but must do so now.

- International community still focused on problems in East and West Timor; U.S. ability to reengage fully with Indonesia depends on further progress in West Timor; GOI actions extremely important.

- Role of military in West Timor especially important; specifically need to see active military cooperation to facilitate return of refugees from West Timor, disarm and disband militias, and prevent militia incursions across the East Timor border.

- Further, crucial to see demonstrable progress on accountability for military abuses in East Timor

- Call on you to do all possible to ensure the International Commission of Inquiry dispatched to East Timor as soon as possible.

4. Other "Internal" Indonesian Issues

Aceh

- Developments in Aceh of great concern; U.S. supports territorial integrity of Indonesia; encouraged byWahid's efforts to resolve situation by political means.

- Want to encourage continued restraint and offer any U.S. assistance you believe useful toward peaceful result.

Military Reform

- Military reform of paramount importance, key to resumption of our defense ties.

- In addition to Timor points I made earlier, also entails restraint in other disputed territories (Aceh, Irian Jaya) and demonstrated commitment to principle of civilian supremacy.

Economic Reform

- Economic reform also crucial, applaud steps taken thus far release of Bank Bali report, window of opportunity for further progress is now.

- Sound IMF-backed economic program key; move ahead with corporate debt restructuring and resolve all contract disputes; tackling corruption essential

5. Accountability Conference (If not adequately addressed in President's Meeting with Wahid)

- Am told that in past President Wahid has expressed interest in learning how other countries in transition to democracy have dealt with issues of justice and reconciliation.

- We could help organize multinational conference on justice and reconciliation so that some of your new ministers can sit down with key figures from Chile, Argentina, Salvador, South Africa and South Korea to examine various mechanisms through which their socieities have addressed these questions.

- While Indonesia will need to choose path that fits its unique cultural and political circumstances, such a gathering would provide opportunity for some of your new ministers to learn from successes and failures of other processes in other places.

- If you agree, would be very pleased to host your new Minister for Human Rights, your Attorney General, and other senior officials who will have to manage these issues to come to a conference here in Washington, perhaps in December. They could also use the opportunity to hold consultations with their relevant counterparts in government, members of our Congress, and NGOs.

- A/S Roth, my Policy Planner Mort Halperin, and my A/S for Human Rights Harold Koh have all expressed interest in participating. I understand that your Minister for Human Rights has been approached about this and is also enthusiastic.

Secretary's Meeting with Indonesian FM Shihab

Draft: EAP/PIMBS: x7-1221 11/10/99
O:\Indonesia\Briefers\BM to S re Shihab Meeting

Clear: EAP:SRoth
EAP:DHartwick (ok)
EAP/PIMBS:JAloisi (ok)
D:TCynkin (info)
P:DShields (ok)
S/P:KBrooks (ok)
DRL:SO'Sullivan (info)

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

9920440 (Revised)
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

EAP

NOV 10 1999

'99 NOV 10 P5:24

PMMBS
R4

ACTION MEMORANDUM
S/S

CONFIDENTIAL (UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachment)
DECL: 11/10/09

TO: The Acting Secretary

FROM: EAP - Stanley O. Roth SOL by CA

SUBJECT: Memo to the President on his Meeting with Indonesian President Wahid

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to approve the attached memo to the President outlining the background and goals of his November 12 Oval Office meeting with Indonesian President Wahid.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to forward the attached memo to the President regarding his November 12 meeting with Indonesian President Wahid.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:
Memo to the President on meeting with Wahid.

CONFIDENTIAL (UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachment)
Classified by EAP A/S Stanley O. Roth
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 11 DEC 2006 200503352

UNCLASSIFIED

02D052, box 2, folder - OVIP Pres. Wahid Visit, Nov. 11-12, 1999

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL



R7

November 12, 1999

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT CLINTON AND INDONESIAN PRESIDENT WAHID IN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY The Oval Office

12:20 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release November 12, 1999

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT CLINTON
AND INDONESIAN PRESIDENT WAHID
IN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY
The Oval Office

12:20 P.M. EST

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Let me say, it's a great honor for me and for all of our team to welcome President Wahid here, with the members of his government. He is now the leader of the world's third-largest democracy, and we are very encouraged by that. We have seen this peaceful transition in Indonesia; we've seen a resolution in East Timor, even though there's still the problem of refugees in West Timor. And I'm looking very much forward to this visit.

I think the American people know that a strong and stable and prosperous and democratic Indonesia is very much in our interest. That's the sort of partnership we're interested in pursuing, and I hope I can be helpful in that regard.

So I'm delighted to have you here, Mr. President. And if you'd like to make any public comment to the press while you're here --

PRESIDENT WAHID: Well, thank you for putting a little time for me today to visit you, Mr. President, because you know that I come from Indonesia just to make sure that we are still great friends of the United States, that we are still in good touch with you. And I think that in the future, we meet you more than before. So also that you know that although there is a shift in policy, but not at the expense of the American-Indonesian relationship. This is very important to know, since you understand that this is one world, so we have to create that kind of one world.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 11 DEC 2006 200503352

UNCLASSIFIED

02D052, box 2, folder - OVIP Pres. Wahid Visit, Nov. 11-12, 1999

And I'm interested in the comment you made about our religious dialogue, which goes toward one world, in that sense. You see, from far away we heard that you made very nice comments on those inter-religious dialogues in Indonesia. And I hope that two months to come, in January, we'll have a discussion initiated by the Americans from Philadelphia, with the Foreign Minister to be a participant there, to be on the organizing committee. We will invite, of course, chief rabbi of Israel as well as the -- former chief rabbi. And from here, from the Catholic side and so forth, I don't know who will come. But anyway, around 50 people will come there, of the three Abrahamic traditions.

And since, you know, that kind of thing is special for us in Indonesia, I would like to use this occasion to inform you about this, before anything else -- economic things. Those are the troubles there.

So I'm very glad. Today I met people from the World Bank and the IMF and then from the Ex-Im Bank, in which we see the possibility of having more hands extended towards us, to help us to overcome the difficulties in the economic shape, now.

Well, you mentioned about East Timor. I think that, of course, we still have trouble, and we would like the United States to take attention to this kind of problem as well. But I would like to inform you, Mr. President, that -- will come to Jakarta, and I'll meet him. So I hope that will ease a little bit the situation in that area, because East Timor is, you know, our brothers.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Thank you very much. That's very good news.

Q President Wahid, sir, President Wahid, sir, why are you inclined to be willing to pardon your predecessor, President Soeharto? And President Clinton, what do you think of the possibility of a pardon for him?

PRESIDENT WAHID: I think if we -- we will use law, of course. And we would like to know whether he is guilty or not, according to the law. But after that, we will pardon him because of two reasons. First is that he was our President, so we have to be careful about this for the future generations. Second thing is that, you know, that it's not easy, because Mr. Soeharto still has big followers. So we have to be careful not to, let's say, topple the cart.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I think the decision, first of all, is one for the Indonesian people and government to make. And I think every country has to decide how to resolve the tension between the pursuit of a particular case and the desire for the reconciliation of people, and to go forward. And I think that that's a decision that the President has to make, and we ought to support his -- anything that he's trying to do to build democracy and to take Indonesia into the future.

Yes, you had a question?

Q Mr. President, after this meeting will you resume military assistance to Indonesia?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, we're going to talk about that, and about what kinds of things that we both can do, over a period of time, to strengthen our relationships, including the issue of military-to-military ties. And I look forward to talking to the President about that.

Q How important is the structural integrity -- the territorial integrity of Indonesia? And is it more important than the self-determination of the peoples of Indonesia?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, I don't think it has to be an either-or thing. I think the -- I said, at the time when Indonesia supported giving the East Timorese a vote, that I would support that, and that having given them the vote, that the vote had to be respected.

On the other hand, we support the territorial integrity of

Indonesia. And I think we have to acknowledge that it's quite a challenging task to preserve a democracy so widespread and so diverse. And I hope we can be somewhat helpful in the President dealing with this challenge.

Q Sir, are you willing to compromise on the abortion funding issue in order to get the U.N. dues paid? And where is the status of those talks concerning the budget matter?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, I think it's very important that we pay our United Nations arrears. We can hardly ask others to do their part unless we do ours. And it's a big national security issue for us.

And it's related to this whole idea of whether we're going to fulfill our responsibilities in the world. And we have negotiations ongoing. They haven't been resolved yet. And I think I should follow the same admonition I try to give others when they're involved in negotiations around the world: the less we say, the better -- until we have an agreement that we think we can all stick by. But we're working on it, and I hope we can work it out.

MR. SIEWERT: Thank you, pool.

Q -- Mrs. Barshefsky coming back tomorrow? Have you given up hope of any deal, a WTO deal before the end of the year?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: No. You know, they're actually -- I have committed not to talk about the details of the talks, and I won't. But there are a finite and limited number of issues over which there are still differences, and they're working on them. And I have not given up.

I think it would be a very good thing for the world, and a very good thing for the Chinese if China were in the WTO. But the reason it would be a good thing is that it would give them participation in a rule-based system, where you could have more and more open trade on fair and balanced terms. So the entry has to be a decision that has some real integrity to it, and it makes sense in terms of everybody else's membership and everybody else's responsibilities. And we're just trying to work through that. I hope we can.

But I think it's a very, very important objective. And I'm certainly glad we've pursued it, and we will continue to do so. And I hope we'll be successful, but I don't really have anything to say. I wouldn't read too much one way or the other into developments so far. Let's wait and see where we are when we've actually run out of time.

Q On Pakistan, do you have any information?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Not yet.

END 12:29 P.M. EST



Go to previous day | Back to this day's list of Press Releases



ouse.gov/WH/Welcome.html
mlhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/html/briefroom.html

E2

CONFIDENTIAL PTO6553

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 JAKART 05589 01 OF 03 150243Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	NP-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-00
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00
	USIE-00	R-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/008W				

----------0F47D7 150334Z /38

O 091009Z NOV 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1268
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ISA/AP// IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005589

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDING E.O. & TAGS LINES)

DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP - A/S ROTH
TREASURY FOR U/S GEITHNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2004
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT WAHID GOES TO WASHINGTON -- SCENESETTER

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05589 01 OF 03 150243Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT S. GELBARD FOR REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) ABDURRAHMAN WAHID'S ACCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY MARKS A SEISMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA'S NATIONAL HISTORY. THE FIRST POPULARLY ELECTED LEADER IN OVER A GENERATION, WAHID EXEMPLIFIES THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF INDONESIA'S STILL IMPERFECT TRANSITION AWAY FROM THE CENTRIST-AUTHORITARIAN TRADITION OF THE PAST 30 YEARS TOWARD A MORE PROMISING DEMOCRATIC FUTURE. ALTHOUGH HIS INSTINCTS ON MOST KEY ISSUES ARE SOUND, HE AND HIS NEW CABINET ARE SHORT ON EXPERIENCE AND PRONE TO OCCASIONAL STUMBLES WHEN ADDRESSING CHALLENGES THAT REQUIRE MORE CAREFUL HANDLING. MOREOVER, HIS CABINET ITSELF IS SHOWING SIGNS OF INTERNAL FISSURES (MEGAWATI AND GOLKAR SUPPORTERS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. HEDGBETH, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 8 NOV 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2008 200503352

LINING UP AGAINST MUSLIM MEMBERS ALIGNED WITH MPR CHAIRMAN AMIEN RAIS) WHICH WILL REQUIRE STRONG LEADERSHIP FROM THE TOP TO KEEP UNDER CONTROL.

3. (C) THIS SAID, WAHID HAS ALREADY RACKED UP AN IMPRESSIVE RECORD IN PUSHING THE ENVELOPE IN DESIRABLE DIRECTIONS. MARZUKI DARUSMAN AS ATTORNEY GENERAL, A NEW HUMAN RIGHTS MINISTRY HEADED BY A RESPECTED ACEHNESE FIGURE, RELEASE OF THE FULL BANK BALI AUDIT REPORT FOLLOWED BY COMMITMENTS TO PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES, AND SUPPORT FOR INVESTIGATIONS INTO EAST TIMOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ARE AMONG THE MORE PROMINENT.

B1

SEPARATIST PRESSURES IN ACEH AND IRIAN JAYA
CONFIDENTIAL

ARE ALSO GROWING, AND WAHID HIMSELF HAS SHOWN A TENDENCY IN ADDRESSING THIS MAJOR CHALLENGE TO NATIONAL UNITY TO TRY TO APPEASE EVERYONE, SUPPORTING THE PRINCIPLE OF A REFERENDUM BUT FORECLOSING THE OPTION OF INDEPENDENCE. HIS CONFLICTING STATEMENTS LEAVE EVERYONE UNCERTAIN OF HIS TRUE INTENTIONS. IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ALTHOUGH WAHID HAS SAID ALL THE RIGHT THINGS ABOUT THE IMF AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, HE OCCASIONALLY RETURNS TO THE IDEA THAT INDONESIA, CHINA, AND INDIA NEED TO WORK TOGETHER SO THAT THEY CAN DEAL WITH THE WEST ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY. SIMILARLY, ALTHOUGH HE IS COMMITTED TO CLOSER TIES WITH ISRAEL, HIS RUMINATIONS (AND OLD SCHOOL TIES IN EGYPT AND IRAQ) ABOUT A LARGER ROLE FOR INDONESIA IN PROMOTING MIDDLE EAST PEACE HAVE LED HIM TO CONSIDER (BUT PROBABLY REJECT) THE IDEA OF ENGAGING SADDAM HUSSEIN.

4. (C) IN SHORT, WAHID IS A COMPLEX BLEND OF SOMETIMES CONFLICTING INCLINATIONS, WHO GENERALLY PURSUES POLICIES THAT TRACK WELL WITH OUR INTERESTS IN SEEING INDONESIA'S DEMOCRATIC REFORMS SUCCEED. HE WELCOMES OUR ADVICE, AS DOES HIS CLOSE CONFIDANT AND FOREIGN MINISTER, ALWI SHIHAB. BUT HE IS GOING TO NEED OUR HELP (ALONG WITH THAT OF THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY) IF HE IS TO SUCCEED IN TACKLING INDONESIA'S STILL DAUNTING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS.

5. (C) IN HIS WASHINGTON MEETINGS, WAHID'S SENIOR INTERLOCUTORS MIGHT WANT TO SOUND THE FOLLOWING THEMES.

COMMITMENT TO HEALTHY, COOPERATIVE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP:

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05589 01 OF 03 150243Z
-- WE AMERICANS HAVE WATCHED WITH ADMIRATION AS INDONESIANS TOOK THE DIFFICULT STEPS NECESSARY TO MOVE RAPIDLY (IN 17 MONTHS) FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO DEMOCRACY. WE ARE COMMITTED TO A HEALTHY BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND COMMON INTERESTS. U.S SUPPORTS A STRONG, STABLE, PROSPEROUS, AND UNIFIED INDONESIA AND WANTS TO WORK WITH WAHID AND HIS GOVERNMENT TOWARD THAT OUTCOME.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY:

-- THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS EAGER TO SUPPORT INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM. WAHID'S DECISION TO RELEASE THE BANK BALI REPORT SENT AN EXCELLENT FIRST SIGNAL OF HIS ADMINISTRATION'S WILLINGNESS TO TAKE THE ACTIONS THAT ARE NECESSARY TO ALLOW THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO HELP. WE AWAIT CONCRETE FOLLOW-UP TO EARLY STATEMENTS OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO COMPLETE THE BANK BALI INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTE WRONG-DOERS. WE AND INDONESIA'S OTHER FRIENDS ALSO AWAIT DECISIONS TO ENSURE THE INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDONESIAN BANK RESTRUCTURING AGENCY (IBRA), WHICH CONTROLS A HUGE SHARE OF THE NATION'S PRODUCTIVE ASSETS.

--TO BUILD THE CONFIDENCE OF MARKETS AND FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INVESTORS ALIKE, CONSISTENCY OF ECONOMIC POLICY SIGNALS IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO OVERCOME UNCERTAINTIES ENGENDERED BY THE APPOINTMENT OF A UNTESTED ECONOMIC CABINET. THIS ENTAILS REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON A CONVINCING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 JAKART 05589 01 OF 03 150243Z

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO6554

PAGE 01 JAKART 05589 02 OF 03 150245Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	NP-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-00
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00
	USIE-00	R-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/008W				

----------0F47DE 150335Z /38

O 091009Z NOV 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1269
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ISA/AP// IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 005589

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDING TAGS & E.O. LINES)

DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP - A/S ROTH
TREASURY FOR U/S GEITHNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2004
TAGS: PGOV
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT WAHID GOES TO WASHINGTON -- SCENESETTER

ECONOMIC PROGRAM, SHOWING UNIFIED GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THAT PROGRAM, AND CONSISTENTLY IMPLEMENTING IT. TAKING STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE LEGAL SYSTEM PROVIDES RELIABLE AND OBJECTIVE JUSTICE WILL BE A KEY ELEMENT OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY.

--IN ADDITION, MARKETS AND INVESTORS WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR CLOSELY HOW THE NEW GOVERNMENT RESOLVES OUTSTANDING CONTRACT ISSUES SUCH AS THOSE INVOLVING THE INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCER (IPP) PROJECTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS.

--WAHID'S CONTINUING TO SEND THE RIGHT SIGNALS ON ALL THESE ACCOUNTS WILL ENABLE US TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE AND EVEN TO EXPAND OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

EAST TIMOR:

-- IT IS CRUCIAL, AS A FIRST STEP IN RESTORING INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY AFTER THE DISASTER IN EAST TIMOR, THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HELP INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCCEED IN REPATRIATING THE MORE THAN 150,000 REFUGEES IN WEST TIMOR WHO WANT TO RETURN. TNI HAS MOVED FROM HELPING THE MILITIAS TO A STATE ESSENTIALLY OF PASSIVITY. THEY NOW NEED TO HELP UNHCR IMPEDE THE MILITIAS FROM BLOCKING VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE WITH THE RAINY SEASON UPON US. IT IS ALSO

IMPORTANT THAT WAHID PUBLICLY SUPPORT THE UNTAET, INDONESIAN AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS (AND PROSECUTIONS) OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, AND THE PROCESS OF
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 05589 02 OF 03 150245Z
RECONCILIATION AMONG EAST TIMORESE (INCLUDING THOSE WHO OPPOSED INDEPENDENCE) AND BETWEEN EAST TIMOR AND INDONESIA. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE WAHID TO FOLLOW UP ON HIS STATED WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH XANANA GUSMAO.

MIDDLE EAST POLICY:

-- IN SETTING FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTIONS, THE NEW GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO BE MORE COGNIZANT OF THE IMPACT ITS ACTIONS WILL HAVE ON INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION. WE APPRECIATE WAHID'S INCLUSIVE APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY, PARTICULARLY HIS WILLINGNESS TO OPEN TRADE AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, DESPITE OPPOSITION FROM SOME INDONESIAN MUSLIM ELEMENTS. THIS WILL SEND POSITIVE SIGNALS. WAHID ALREADY IS PLAYING A PERSONAL ROLE IN INTERFAITH PEACE AND RECONCILIATION EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WOULD LIKE INDONESIA TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, EVEN IF ONLY SYMBOLIC. (WAHID IS A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF THE SHIMON PERES FOUNDATION AND ONE OF THE ORGANIZERS OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON PEACE AND RECONCILIATION, SCHEDULED TO MEET IN AMMAN IN JANUARY.) IT WOULD HELP WAHID TO "SELL" HIS ISRAELI POLICY AT HOME IF INDONESIA WERE INVITED TO PLAY A ROLE, EVEN IF ONLY SYMBOLIC, IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. WAHID SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS, HOWEVER, ABOUT OVER-ESTIMATING INDONESIA'S INFLUENCE ON A PROCESS ALREADY UNDERWAY AND HE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO EXTEND HIS INTERMEDIARY APPROACH TO SITUATIONS WHERE IT IS UNWARRANTED AND UNWELCOME. FOR EXAMPLE, HIS INTENTION TO MEET WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN IS SERIOUSLY MISPLACED AND HE SHOULD REFRAIN FROM MEETING WITH
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05589 02 OF 03 150245Z
SADDAM. SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE A MAJOR SET-BACK FOR BOTH HIS MIDDLE EAST POLICY AND FOR HIS EFFORTS TO GENERATE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION.

ACEH:

-- THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF INDONESIA. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT UNREALISTIC

EXPECTATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE FOR ACEH HAVE BEEN RAISED BY STATEMENTS MADE BY WAHID AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS AND THAT, AS A RESULT, THE SITUATION IN ACEH IS BECOMING MORE, NOT LESS, VOLATILE. WE APPRECIATE WAHID'S GESTURES -- CALL FOR INVESTIGATION INTO TNI'S PAST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND FOR WITHDRAWAL OF NON-TERRITORIAL COMBAT MILITARY UNITS -- AND HIS PROMISE OF A POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND GREATER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AUTONOMY. EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION AND CONCRETE PROGRESS ARE REQUIRED TO TURN THE SITUATION AROUND AND WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE THE ACTIVE PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT ON WAHID HIMSELF.

MILITARY REFORM:

-- WE WELCOME STEPS TAKEN TO PLACE THE MILITARY UNDER CIVILIAN CONTROL AND THE REALIZATION BY SOME IN THE GOVERNMENT (AND ELEMENTS OF TNI) OF THE NEED TO ACCOUNT FOR PAST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND TO UNDERTAKE INTERNAL REFORMS THAT WILL EVENTUALLY ABOLISH THE "DUAL FUNCTION" AND REORIENT THE MILITARY AWAY FROM INTERNAL SECURITY AND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 JAKART 05589 02 OF 03 150245Z

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7291

PAGE 01 JAKART 05589 03 OF 03 150246Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	NP-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-00
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00
	USIE-00	R-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/008W				

----------0F47EB 150336Z /38

O 091009Z NOV 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1270
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ISA/AP// IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 005589

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDING TAGS & E.O. LINES)

DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP - A/S ROTH
TREASURY FOR U/S GEITHNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2004
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT WAHID GOES TO WASHINGTON -- SCENESETTER

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05589 03 OF 03 150246Z
TOWARD EXTERNAL DEFENSE. WE SUPPORT THE THRUST OF WAHID'S INTENTION TO BEEF UP THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE TO SECURE INDONESIA'S BORDERS AND SHOULD FOCUS OUR PHASED RESUMPTION OF MILITARY-TO-MILITARY PROGRAMS ON THESE SERVICES.

B1

THE U.S. VALUES A FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA AND, IN THE PAST, HAD A ROBUST PROGRAM OF EQUIPMENT SALES, TRAINING, AND JOINT EXERCISES. SERIOUS AND CONCRETE ACTIONS BY THE INDONESIAN MILITARY TO ACCOUNT FOR ITS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND TO UNDERTAKE REFORM WILL PERMIT US TO RESUME MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COOPERATION.

6. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS THEMES: INTERNATIONAL AND INDONESIAN MEDIA WILL GIVE EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO THE VISIT. INDONESIA MEDIA WILL FOCUS CLOSELY ON THE TREATMENT ACCORDED TO THEIR PRESIDENT, LOOKING SIGNS OF RESPECT AND RECOGNITION. IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE VISIT, WE SHOULD NOTE THAT, IN DECEMBER 1999, THE U.S. AND INDONESIA ARE CELEBRATING 50 YEARS OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE U.S. AMBASSADOR WAS THE FIRST FOREIGN AMBASSADOR TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS TO THE NEW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IN 1949. DESPITE THE VAST DISTANCES AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, BOTH ARE LARGE (GEOGRAPHICALLY AND DEMOGRAPHICALLY), MULTI-ETHNIC AND MULTI-CULTURAL SOCIETIES WHICH EMERGED FROM COLONIALISM TO TAKE LEADING ROLES ON THE WORLD STAGE. WE CONGRATULATE INDONESIA FOR ITS RAPID TRANSFORMATION OVER THE PAST 17 MONTHS FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO OPEN, PLURALISTIC, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY. TODAY, THE U.S. AND INDONESIA ARE THE WORLD'S

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 05589 03 OF 03 150246Z
SECOND AND THIRD LARGEST DEMOCRACIES. WE WANT TO BE HELPFUL TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND TO THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE. WE RECOGNIZE INDONESIA'S PROUD HISTORY AS A LEADER AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND A MODERATE AND RESPONSIBLE VOICE IN ASEAN, THE ARF, APEC, THE OIC, THE G-77 AND THE UNITED

NATIONS. WE RESPECT INDONESIA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND OFFER OUR SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED REFORMS AS INDONESIA DECIDES HOW BEST TO ADDRESS ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES. WE SEEK RESUMPTION OF MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COOPERATION WHEN CONDITIONS PERMIT. IN SUM, WE LOOK FORWARD TO A HEALTHY AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM. GELBARD

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8072 RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 223111 242314Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000R

223111
SOURCE: KODAKA.024068
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE:RWC -- 11/24/99 7
APPROVED BY: EAP:RLBOYCE
EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK EAP/PIMBS:JMALOISI
S/S:KAKENNEY S/S-O:DFETTER
----------13C1F3 242316Z /38
O 242312Z NOV 99 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 223111
NODIS DECAPTIONED

FOR AMBASSADOR AND DCM ONLY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2009
TAGS: PREL, OVIP, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT CLINTON'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN PRESIDENT WAHID
CLASSIFIED BY: ROBERT A. BRADTKE, NSC EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.
REASONS: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (U) THIS CABLE CONTAINS A MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATION INDONESIAN PRESIDENT WAHID ON NOVEMBER 12, 1999. I ASK THAT YOU NOT PERMIT COPIES TO BE MADE OF THIS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 223111 242314Z
MESSAGE, AND THAT YOU NOT DISTRIBUTE IT OUTSIDE OF THE MISSION'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE.

2. (U) BEGIN TEXT:

PARTICIPANTS:

THE PRESIDENT
MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE
LAWRENCE SUMMERS, SECRETARY OF TREASURY
JOHN PODESTA, WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF
SAMUEL BERGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2008 200503352

SECURITY AFFAIRS

STANLEY ROTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
ROBERT GELBARD, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO INDONESIA
JAMES STEINBERG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ROBERT WESCOTT, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL
RAVIC HUSO, DIRECTOR FOR ASIAN AFFAIRS, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NOTETAKER)

PRESIDENT ABDURRAHMAN WAHID
ALWI SHIHAB, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DORODJATUN KUNTJORI-JAKTI, INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES
NASRUDDIN NASUTION, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, INDONESIAN EMBASSY
PERWITORINI WIJONO, MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL

AFFAIRS, INDONESIAN EMBASSY
ZANNUBA ARIFAH CHAFSOH RAHMAN, PHYSICIAN (AND DAUGHTER OF PRESIDENT WAHID)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE:

NOVEMBER 12, 1999
12:10 - 12:45 P.M.
OVAL OFFICE

3. (U) THE PRESIDENT: I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF SYMPATHY FOR INDONESIA IN THE UNITED STATES.

4. (C) PRESIDENT WAHID: THANK YOU. INDONESIA NEEDS HELP FROM ALL OF ITS FRIENDS. WHEN I GO BACK HOME, I WILL TELL THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE THAT ALL IS SAFE CONCERNING OUR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

5. (C) THE PRESIDENT: IT IS. THIS IS AN ISSUE WE ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT. ALL OVER THE WORLD, THERE ARE CASES OF OPPRESSION, SOME VERY INTENSE. YOU KNOW I SUPPORTED THE KOSOVAR MUSLIMS. THE DIFFICULTY IS IN HOW TO DEAL WITH BIG, COMPLEX COUNTRIES IN WAYS THAT RESPECT RELIGIOUS AND OTHER DIFFERENCES. NOT EVERY GROUP SHOULD HAVE TO SET UP ITS OWN COUNTRY TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES.

6. (C) PRESIDENT WAHID: IN INDONESIA, I WANT EVERYTHING

TO BE CLEAR; TO BE TRANSPARENT. WE NOW WILL PRACTICE TRANSPARENCY, ALTHOUGH SINCE INDEPENDENCE WE HAVE NOT. I

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 223111 242314Z
HOPE WE CAN DO SO AND, WITH HELP FROM OUR FRIENDS, SUCCEED. ESTABLISHING A DEMOCRACY IS NOT EASY.

7. (C) THE PRESIDENT: NO, IT IS NOT EASY. YOU ARE OFF TO A GREAT START, THOUGH. I VERY MUCH ENJOYED WATCHING THE WAY YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO AFFIRM YOUR OWN RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS BUT IN A WAY THAT DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THOSE WITH DIFFERENT CONVICTIONS WILL BE OPPRESSED.

8. (U) PRESIDENT WAHID: INDONESIA SHOULD LOOK AT THE PREAMBLE OF ITS CONSTITUTION TO SEE IF A BILL OF RIGHTS IS INCLUDED. WE HAVE MUCH WE CAN LEARN FROM YOU.

9. (C) THE PRESIDENT: ONE OF THE TOUGH PROBLEMS IS THE BALANCE BETWEEN MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS. I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO SEEK AVENUES TO STRENGTHEN MINORITY RIGHTS, NOT UNDERMINE THEM. IF YOU LOOK AT WHAT CHINA IS DOING TO THE FALUN GONG, THEY ARE AFRAID DISSENT WILL WEAKEN THEIR SYSTEM. INSTEAD, I BELIEVE IT IS THEIR REACTION THAT WILL WEAKEN IT. INDONESIA IS A COUNTRY OF ENORMOUS POTENTIAL. IF YOU CAN CONVINCE MINORITIES TO REMAIN IN INDONESIA, YOU WILL HAVE YOUR BEST OPPORTUNITY TO EXPAND YOUR INFLUENCE IN THE REGION AND THE WORLD. THIS IS A GOAL WORTH PURSUING.

10. (C) PRESIDENT WAHID: YOU KNOW I WAS THE CANDIDATE OF THE "AXIS" GROUP OF MUSLIM PARTIES. THEIR MEMBERS ARE NOT FANATICS OR TERRORISTS. THEY WANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO INDONESIA. I WOULD LIKE TO HELP ACHIEVE THE MATURITY OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, AND I BELIEVE THIS IS ACCEPTABLE TO INDONESIANS AS A WHOLE. HOWEVER, THIS COURSE IS ALSO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 223111 242314Z
FRAUGHT WITH SOME DANGER. FOR THIS REASON, I ASKED ALWI SHIHAR, A PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY, TO BE FOREIGN MINISTER AND HELP EXPLAIN WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AN INDONESIAN AND A MUSLIM.

11. (U) THE PRESIDENT: THAT WAS A GOOD IDEA FOR THE WORLD AT LARGE.

12. (C) PRESIDENT WAHID: YOU KNOW THAT HE (ALWI SHIHAB) FACES DEMONSTRATIONS EVERY DAY BECAUSE OF MY STANCE ON

ISRAEL.

13. (C) THE PRESIDENT: YOU MADE A VERY GOOD DECISION THAT WILL HELP THE CAUSE OF PEACE. ISRAEL IS CONCERNED THAT IT DOES NOT HAVE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH ENOUGH MUSLIM COUNTRIES. PEACE IS MORE THAN THE ABSENCE OF WAR. WHEN COUNTRIES REFUSE TO DO BUSINESS WITH ISRAEL OR DEAL WITH

THEM, ISRAEL FEELS ISOLATED. IT WAS VERY POSITIVE FOR YOU TO SAY YOU WOULD BEGIN TO ESTABLISH TIES.

14. (C) RESIDENT WAHID: THIS WILL BE STEP-BY-STEP, BEGINNING WITH COMMERCIAL RELATIONS, THEN CULTURAL, AND FINALLY DIPLOMATIC. THIS COULD TAKE PERHAPS FIVE YEARS.

15. (U) THE PRESIDENT: I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR PRIORITIES FOR THE ECONOMY.

16. (C) PRESIDENT WAHID: PUTTING DOWN CORRUPTION IS THE FIRST PRIORITY. THIS IS NECESSARY TO ENCOURAGE NEW INVESTMENT. WE MUST SHOW PEOPLE THAT INDONESIA HAS GREAT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 223111 242314Z

POTENTIAL, AND I HOPE YOU WILL ASSIST IN PERSUADING PEOPLE OF THIS. I AM SEEKING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE IMF AND WORLD BANK. I ALSO SPOKE WITH YOUR EX-IM BANK. I NEED THEIR HELP TO SETTLE OUR PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY FOOD SHORTAGES BUT ALSO INCREASING THE INCOME OF PEOPLE. THIS RELATES ALSO TO MILITARY REFORM AND ENDING THE MILITARY'S "DUAL FUNCTION." THE MILITARY'S "DUAL FUNCTION" ROLE IS IN PART RELATED TO PROVIDING INCOME FOR INDIVIDUALS. IF SOLDIERS CANNOT LIVE ON THEIR SALARIES, IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET THEM OUT OF THEIR "DUAL FUNCTION" ROLE. WE NEED TO RAISE THEIR INCOME SO THIS ROLE CAN BE ENDED. I WOULD LIKE TO FINISH THIS IN PERHAPS SIX YEARS. I CANNOT DO IT NOW. I COULD SHOUT ABOUT THIS BUT IT WOULD DO NO GOOD.

17. (C) THE PRESIDENT: THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE. A QUICK RECOVERY IN INDONESIA WOULD BENEFIT ALL OF ASIA. I WAS AMAZED AT WHAT I SAW WHEN I VISITED BOGOR FOR THE APEC SUMMIT. I WILL DO ALL I CAN TO HELP. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THOUGH, INVESTORS HAVE TO WANT TO PUT THEIR MONEY SOMEWHERE; YOU CANNOT MAKE THEM DO SO. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU ADDRESS BANK RESTRUCTURING AND SHOW SERIOUS, EARLY PROGRESS IN THIS AREA. THAT WOULD BOOST CONFIDENCE; AGAIN, I AM PREPARED TO HELP IN THIS.

18. (C) PRESIDENT WAHID: I INTEND TO PURSUE THREE

PRINCIPLES: OBJECTIVITY, FAIR TREATMENT, AND RULE OF LAW IN THIS REGARD. I HAVE TAKEN MEASURES TO SHOW THAT IF THERE ARE VIOLATIONS OF LAW, ACTION WILL BE TAKEN. I LEARNED THE DAY I LEFT OF DEVELOPMENT LOANS FROM JAPAN GOING TO A COMPANY OWNED BY A MINISTER. I TOLD MY CABINET THAT EVERY

MINISTER IS ACCOUNTABLE. IF FOUND GUILTY, HE WILL HAVE TO RESIGN. I ASKED OUR NATIONAL POWER COMPANY NOT TO SIGN THE CONTRACT AND HAVE ASKED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO INVESTIGATE. IF THERE IS EVIDENCE, THE MINISTER WILL BE

ASKED TO STEP ASIDE AND WILL BE REMOVED IF GUILTY. THERE MUST BE A PROCESS OF RULE OF LAW. ERADICATING CORRUPTION CAN ONLY BE DONE FROM THE TOP, DOWN. DEMOCRACY, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS BUILT FROM THE BOTTOM UP. IF THESE TWO COUNTERVAILING PROCESSES CAN BE MADE TO WORK, INDONESIA WILL ENJOY A RENAISSANCE.

19. (C) THE PRESIDENT: I WOULD LIKE TO TURN TO WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THE MILITIAS IN WEST TIMOR.

20. (C) PRESIDENT WAHID: YES, THE MILITIAS ARE A PROBLEM. THE ARMY HAS ITS OWN ELEMENTS IN THE MILITIA AND SOME USE ARMS TO CREATE OBSTACLES. I HAVE ASKED THE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF TO PREPARE CONDITIONS TO ALLOW PEOPLE TO GO BACK FREELY. SOME 40 THOUSAND HAVE GONE BACK BUT WE NEED TO SEND MORE HOME. BY AIR IS BETTER THAN BY LAND. I ALSO ORDERED THE MINISTER OF SECURITY TO PREPARE PLANS.

21. (C) THE PRESIDENT: THE SPEED AND EFFECTIVENESS OF HOW THE SITUATION IS DEALT WITH WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON INVESTMENT TOO. IT WOULD SHOW THE CAPACITY OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO SOLVE PROBLEMS. WEAK GOVERNMENTS DRIVE AWAY INVESTORS. TIMOR MAY NOT BE AN ECONOMIC ISSUE BUT IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW YOUR CAPACITY TO FULFILL YOUR INTENTIONS. IF YOU SUCCEED, PEOPLE WILL BELIEVE IN YOU AND WILL WANT TO FOLLOW YOU. INVESTORS INTERESTED IN REFORM

WILL BE LOOKING AT TIMOR AS AN INDICATOR OF YOUR CAPACITY. THERE ARE MANY EXAMPLES AROUND THE WORLD OF THIS. IN AFRICA, FOR EXAMPLE, WHERE AIDS IS A HUGE PROBLEM, UGANDA HAS SHOWN A CAPACITY TO ADDRESS IT AND THAT HAS HELPED ATTRACT INVESTMENT. IN ANY CASE, THE RIGHT THING TO DO IS TO ALLOW THE REFUGEES TO GO HOME.

22. (C) PRESIDENT WAHID: I EXPECT THAT WITHIN TWO TO

THREE MONTHS, ALL WILL RETURN. XANANA GUSMAO WILL BE IN JAKARTA THIS MONTH. I HOPE TO WORK WITH HIM ON A FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST TIMOR AND INDONESIA.

23. (C) THE PRESIDENT: I AM PLEASED YOU ARE WILLING TO RECEIVE HIM.

24. (C) PRESIDENT WAHID: HE AND I ARE "BROTHERS." WHEN I MET HIM WHILE HE WAS STILL IN PRISON, I TOLD HIM I HOPED THE PLEBISCITE WOULD KEEP EAST TIMOR IN INDONESIA SO IF I BECAME THE PRESIDENT HE COULD BECOME FOREIGN MINISTER. HE SAID, "NO, NO. I WANT INDEPENDENCE." WE CAN JOKE WITH EACH OTHER.

25. (C) THE PRESIDENT: THAT IS IMPORTANT. IT IS HARD TO DEHUMANIZE PEOPLE IF YOU KNOW THEM AS PEOPLE.

26. (C) PRESIDENT WAHID: I WANT TO EXPLAIN TO YOU ABOUT MY VISIT TO ASEAN COUNTRIES. I KNEW THAT YOU WOULD BE RATIONALISTIC ABOUT MY DECISIONS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL BUT NOT SO ASEAN LEADERS. I NEEDED TO GIVE THEM ATTENTION.

27. (C) THE PRESIDENT: GOOD, YOU WERE RIGHT. I CAN SEE

THEY MIGHT BE HAPPY FOR INDONESIA BUT ALSO A BIT JEALOUS OF THE ATTENTION IT IS RECEIVING. YOU DID THE RIGHT THING. I WONDER IF SECRETARY SUMMERS WOULD LIKE TO SAY SOMETHING?

28. (C) SECRETARY SUMMERS: THANK YOU FOR RECEIVING MY COLLEAGUES FROM TREASURY. THEY HAD GOOD DISCUSSIONS. I WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF CAPITAL IS THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF YOUR OWN CITIZENS. TENS OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS HAVE LEFT YOUR COUNTRY. THE OWNERS WERE NOT CONFIDENT THEIR MONEY WOULD BE PROTECTED BY THE RULE OF LAW. RULE OF LAW, PROPERTY RIGHTS, BANK RESTRUCTURING ARE NECESSARY TO BRING THIS CAPITAL BACK. I HOPE YOU WILL MOVE FORWARD AS FAST AS YOU POSSIBLY CAN. WE ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. DURING THE DECADES OF THE 70S THROUGH THE 90S, INDONESIA BY SOME MEASURES WAS THE WORLD'S MOST SUCCESSFUL ECONOMY. I HOPE YOU CAN ENJOY THAT STATUS ONCE AGAIN.

29. (C) PRESIDENT WAHID: IT IS VERY REASSURING TO HEAR THIS FROM YOU. THE BANKING SECTOR SHOULD BE FREE AND INDEPENDENT. THE GOVERNMENT WILL ASSURE THEM OF THIS.

30. (C) THE PRESIDENT: I WOULD LIKE TO FOLLOW UP ON THE DISCUSSION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. I HAVE SPENT A LOT OF

TIME ON THIS IN OTHER CONTEXTS. WHAT ARE YOUR PLANS? IF THERE IS ANYTHING YOU BELIEVE WE CAN DO, WE WILL HELP. WE DO NOT WANT TO MEDDLE OR INTERVENE BUT I AM CURIOUS TO KNOW WHAT YOU INTEND TO DO IN ACEH.

31. (C) PRESIDENT WAHID: THANK YOU FOR YOUR OFFER OF A HELPING HAND. I INTEND TO HOLD OUT THE OLIVE BRANCH AND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 223111 242314Z

WILL NEGOTIATE WITH THOSE WHO ARE PREPARED TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE. FOR THOSE WHOSE ONLY MOTIVE IS SEPARATION, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO USE THE STICK. SO, I AM OFFERING A CARROT AND STICK APPROACH. THERE ARE SOME WHO WANT TO CREATE DIFFICULTIES IN ACEH, AND I NEED TO KNOW WHICH ONES THEY ARE. I CANNOT RISK GETTING THIS WRONG. I AM PLEASED THE U.S. IS INTERESTED IN HELPING US FIND A RESOLUTION.

32. (C) THE PRESIDENT: I AM INTERESTED IN THE QUESTION THE INDONESIAN REPORTER ASKED ABOUT MILITARY-TO-MILITARY TIES. WHAT ARE YOUR PLANS FOR DEALING WITH THE MILITARY?

33. (C) PRESIDENT WAHID: WE MUST USE ALL OUR WITS TO "DISARM" THEM. FIRST, I HAVE TRIED TO PUT THE POLITICALLY MINDED GENERALS IN CHARGE OF MINISTRIES SO THE MILITARY CAN BE RUN BY COMPETENT OFFICERS WHO HAVE MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS, NOT POLITICAL ONES, IN MIND. I CAN DO THIS OVER TIME. SECOND, I WOULD LIKE TO SEPARATE THE INTERNAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION FROM THE MILITARY. I PLAN TO PHASE THEM OUT OF THIS ROLE IN A FEW MONTHS. THIRD, I HAVE TO ALLOW SOLDIERS TO DEVELOP ACTIVITIES THAT WILL ENSURE THEIR OWN WELFARE. IT IS IMPORTANT TO INCREASE THEIR INCOMES. AS TO THE QUESTION PUT BY THE REPORTER, I WOULD LET THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DO WHAT IT THINKS BEST. I BELIEVE WE CAN FIND A COMMON ANSWER. I KNOW IT IS NOT EASY FOR YOU AND THAT CONGRESS HAS VIEWS. IT IS ALSO NOT EASY FOR US BUT WE CAN WORK TOGETHER.

34. (U) THE PRESIDENT: THAT APPROACH SOUND GOOD TO ME. WILL YOU SEE OTHERS IN WASHINGTON?

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 11 STATE 223111 242314Z

35. (U) PRESIDENT WAHID: FROM HERE I WILL GO TO SALT LAKE CITY. MY FOREIGN MINISTER WILL STAY AND HAS A LIST OF REQUESTS HE WILL RAISE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

36. (U) THE PRESIDENT: THANK YOU. AGAIN, I ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO BE A GOOD FRIEND.

END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

R 2A

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 11/10/09

Annotated Checklist of Issues for Participation in POTUS' Meeting with Indonesian President Wahid November 12, 1999

1. Reinforcing the Welcome
2. Underscoring the Timor and Indonesian Military Messages
3. (Must Do) Wahid Meeting with Saddam

1. Reinforcing the Welcome: Want to do everything possible to help with democratic transition and economic recovery; will work closely with FM Shihab; invite participation in multinational conference on justice and reconciliation in democratic transition.

2. Underscoring the Timor and Indonesian Military Messages: ~~East Timor does not drive our Indonesia policy. In your~~ interest to help solve problems in East Timor. Hope new GOI moves to disband militias, end TNI support for them, facilitate repatriation, and cooperate with human rights investigations.

3. (Must Do) Wahid Meeting with Saddam: Concerned about report of possible Wahid-Saddam meeting. Saddam has made Iraq pariah state; meeting him would damage Indonesia's reputation, create unwillingness in U.S. Congress to assist. Hope you won't associate democratic Indonesia with Saddam's dictatorship.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2008 200503352

Reinforcing the Welcome; Proposing Conference

- Fully support what President Clinton has said. Indonesia important country; your election an historic opportunity for us to help Indonesian people realize democratic aspirations and recover economic prosperity.

- Pledge to do all I can, working with Foreign Minister Shihab, to improve relations on basis of common interests and mutual respect.

- Previously you expressed interest in how other countries in transition to democracy dealt with issues of justice and reconciliation.

- We could host multinational conference on justice and reconciliation allowing some of your ministers to explore these issues with key figures from Chile, Argentina, Salvador, South Africa and South Korea.

- While Indonesia must choose path that fits its unique cultural and political circumstances, a conference would provide opportunity to learn from successes and failures of others.

- Would be pleased to host your Minister for Human Rights, your Attorney General, and others at a conference here, perhaps in December. Participants could also meet with government counterparts, members of our Congress, and NGOs.

Underscoring the Timor and Indonesian Military Messages

- Hope in near future, we no longer have to talk about East Timor.
- Want to reassure you that United States recognizes the enormous strategic importance of Indonesia, and does not formulate policy toward your country on the basis of the situation in East Timor.
- Must also emphasize that actions in East Timor critical in persuading American people that there has been a real change in Indonesia; that Indonesia deserves strong U.S. support.
- Progress on problems in East Timor in the interest of better U.S.-Indonesian relations.
- Must underscore seriousness of our concerns about the militias in West Timor, role of the Indonesian military (TNI).
- Hope your government can disband and disarm the militias, facilitate refugee repatriation, and prevent any effort to destabilize East Timor from the West Timorese side of the border.

(Must Do) Wahid Meeting with Saddam

- Hear you may consider meeting with Saddam Hussein.
- Understand you studied in Iraq and have a special attachment to the Iraqi people.
- Share your concerns about welfare of Iraqi people; doesn't justify meeting with Saddam, who made Iraq pariah state, subject to UN sanctions.
- Meeting him would severely damage Indonesia's reputation; could impact willingness of U.S. Congress to provide assistance to your country.
- Concerned this would associate you -- the democratic leader of a new Indonesian government -- with Saddam's dictatorship; undermine international efforts to isolate Saddam's regime.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

MEETING WITH INDONESIAN PRESIDENT WAHID R2B

I. KEY OBJECTIVES

- Supporting Democratic Transition: Underscore our long term commitment to working closely with and aiding Wahid and his government to promote a democratic, stable, prosperous, and unified Indonesia. Emphasize our commitment to Indonesia's territorial integrity.

- Economic Reform and Recovery: Stress our support for Indonesia's economic recovery program, while indicating that our ability to help Indonesia will be heavily influenced by the economic policies adopted by the new government.

- Military-to-Military Relations: Emphasize that we want to get bilateral relations back on track, but must see credible evidence of military reform, including improved military behavior in East Timor (disarming military, expediting repatriation of refuges, securing the border with East Timor against militia raids), some form of accountability for the abuses in East Timor, military restraint in other territorial disputes (Aceh, Irian Jaya) and a demonstrated commitment to the principle of civilian supremacy.

- Aceh: Express our concern about the deteriorating situation in Aceh, emphasize need to manage situation carefully, both to preserve Indonesia's territorial integrity and to avoid human rights abuses. Support Wahid's use of political dialogue over military options and ask if the international community can be helpful.

- (Watch Out For): If Wahid raises a possible meeting with Saddam Hussein, explain this would severely damage Indonesia's reputation. Not in the interest of new, democratic Indonesia to be seen as supporting dictator who is international pariah.

II. CONTEXT OF MEETING

Abdurrahman Wahid exemplifies the strengths and weaknesses of Indonesia's still imperfect transition from Soeharto's legacy of a centrist-authoritarian regime a more

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 8 NOV 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2008 200503352

promising democratic future. His reputation for tolerance and his reform instincts on most key issues are sound, but he and his new cabinet are short on experience and appear prone to occasional stumbles when addressing challenges that require careful handling. Moreover, his broad-based cabinet itself is a mixed bag and unproven. Wahid, frail and almost blind, will need to exercise strong leadership from the top to keep things on course.

Barely two weeks in office, Wahid has racked up an impressive record with selection of a human rights activist as his attorney general, creation of a new human rights ministry headed by a respected Acehnese figure, and support for investigations into East Timor human rights abuses among the most prominent achievements. Release of the full Bank Bali audit report (a controversial corruption symbol from the Habibie Administration) demonstrated Wahid's commitment to fight corruption.

B1

Separatist pressures in Aceh and Irian Jaya threaten to undermine Indonesia's territorial integrity, and Wahid, with his innate tolerance of competing views must be careful not to heighten expectations that could undermine Indonesian unity.

Thus far, Wahid and his key foreign policy advisors have demonstrated a surprising willingness to seek our counsel on issues of importance to us, such as relations with Israel. Your meeting will be Wahid's first with a non-ASEAN leader. It should serve to strengthen a sense of cooperation, and to create the momentum and goodwill necessary to deal with the difficult bilateral issues we face without letting them come to dominate the overall bilateral relationship. Wahid will see his meeting with you as U.S. recognition of Indonesia's important role in the region, and an opportunity to enhance his own image as a leading Asian democrat of this huge emerging democracy.

CONFIDENTIAL
reason: 1.5 (b)(d)
declassify on: 11/09/2009

III. AGENDA/POINTS

Supporting Democratic Transition. Indonesia has undergone a tumultuous but steady transition to democracy since the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, a transition process we strongly supported. The election of reformists President Wahid and Vice President Megawati last month sets the stage for consolidating these hard-earned democratic gains. But U.S.-Indonesia ties have been strained over Indonesia's handling of East Timor. Engaging the Wahid Administration offers the U.S. an historic opportunity to repair the damage and help Indonesia rebuild its democratic institutions.

- The American people welcome your historic election as president and are honored by your early visit to the U.S. I want to work closely with you and your government to support a democratic, stable, prosperous, unified Indonesia.

- Our nations have much in common. We are both large and diverse multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies. And, ~~with Indonesia's rapid transformation from~~ authoritarianism to an open, pluralistic, and participatory system, we are both democracies.

- I am aware of the personal role you have played in the political democratization process and your personal reputation for tolerance and reconciliation. I hope you will let us know if there are ways we can help you move Indonesia toward greater respect for human rights, and deeper reform, including of the Indonesian military.

- Ambassador Gelbard has spoken to you of our desire for close engagement. I have asked UN Ambassador Holbrooke to visit Indonesia next week to explore ways we can be helpful and, in the next few weeks, we will dispatch an interagency assessment team to flesh out priorities where our close cooperation might be most effective.

- Indonesia's quick recovery and political stability is important to the United States. Our two countries have enjoyed good relations in the past and I sincerely hope to see these relations strengthen and deepen in the period ahead. I pledge my government to this goal and look forward to working with you toward that end.

Economic Reform and Recovery. Although inexperienced and a product of political compromise, the new GOI economic cabinet seems willing to break with bad past practices.

Wahid and Coordinating Economic Minister Kwik Kian Gie have stated their intention to pursue economic recovery and reform in close cooperation with the international community and the IMF.

- We strongly support Indonesia's economic recovery, which is key to political stability. It is for this reason that we have already dispatched a team of senior economic experts to Indonesia to engage your new economic team.

- Release of the Bank Bali report sent an excellent first signal of willingness to take necessary actions to allow the international community to help with Indonesia's economic recovery program.

- From our experience, the confidence of markets and foreign and domestic investors depends on consistent economic policy signals. The most important of these will be to reach early agreement with the international financial institutions on a convincing economic program and to implement it faithfully.

- Our experience tells us that the markets and investors will monitor several key areas. Transparency, fairness, and a commitment to contracts and the rule of law will be key. I understand that your financial markets, corporate sector, and power industry damaged severely during the Asian financial crisis, still require much hard work. My government is committed to helping you put these challenges behind you.

Military-to-Military Relations. The Indonesian military (TNI) remains the biggest hurdle to further political reform and closer bilateral relations. Military to military relations remain suspended. While we would like to be in a position to resume this relationship, it will depend on clear evidence of military reform, including better behavior in West Timor, accountability for past abuses, restraint in other territorial disputes (Aceh) and a demonstrated commitment to civilian supremacy.

- Mr. President, my government applauds your initial efforts to place the military (TNI) under civilian control and support for internal military reforms that could reorient the military away from internal security and politics toward external defense. We also commend your intention not to use TNI to try to solve the latest

problems in Aceh by violence and repression. These are bold, constructive steps that bode well for your country:

- Mr. President, please allow me to be direct with you as a friend of Indonesia and one who is deeply committed to helping our relationship grow.

- As Secretary Cohen indicated to General Wiranto in his trip to Indonesia just before your selection as President, the United States desires closer military-to-military ties, but the future of these ties rests squarely on TNI's willingness to reform.

- In assessing TNI's commitment to reform, we will be looking for evidence of changed behavior on the ground, including: 1) cooperation on Timor issues, including expediting the repatriation of refugees, disarming the militias and securing the border against militia raids into East Timor; 2) restraint in other territorial disputes, including Aceh; 3) some form of accountability for past abuses; and 4) a demonstrated commitment to the principle of civilian supremacy.

- Taking these steps would be powerful signals to the international community and to the U.S. Congress that Indonesia's military has embarked on new path consistent with the democratic transition that you, Mr. President, personally represent.

Aceh. There is no problem facing the new GOI more serious or urgent than the future of Aceh. Outrage over past TNI human rights abuses has combined with economic grievances to fuel growing separatist sentiments. A relatively small minority less than two years ago, pro-independence Acehnese are probably in the majority today. It is unclear that Wahid will be able to resolve the problem by political means short of a referendum. However, at a minimum, he must take quick and credible steps to account for and pursue justice for grave abuses perpetrated by TNI over the past decade. He must also carry out his pledge to draw down the military presence in the province and probably will have to provide Aceh with greater control over its considerable oil and gas resources.

- I want to commend your bold initiatives to begin real political dialogue in Aceh, without resorting to a military crackdown.

- Like you, the U.S. is deeply concerned by recent developments in Aceh and the questions they pose for Indonesia's future given the existence of other separatist movements in Irian Jaya and elsewhere.

- As you know, the U.S. strongly supports the territorial unity of Indonesia, but, like you, believes these problems must be addressed through dialogue, not force.

- Peaceful resolution of the Aceh situation clearly will require your continuing deep personal involvement. I would appreciate a sense of how you plan to deal with rising demands for a referendum.

- Let me say that the U.S. stands ready to support your efforts in any way possible. Is there anything the international community can do to help?

Watch Out For. President Wahid, who is Iraqi-educated, hopes that Indonesia can play a mediating role between Iraq and the U.S. and he is toying with the idea of meeting quietly with Saddam Hussein later this month. He may raise this notion in the context of his willingness to open commercial and trade ties with Israel.

- (If Saddam meeting raised) Understand that you studied in Iraq and so have a special attachment to the Iraqi people.

- We share your concerns about welfare of Iraqi people. But that doesn't justify meeting with Saddam, who has made Iraq into a pariah state, subject to UN sanctions. Meeting him would severely damage Indonesia's reputation and could impact the willingness of the U.S. Congress to provide assistance to your country.

- Holding such a meeting is, of course, your decision to make. But I am concerned that this would associate you -- the democratic leader of a new Indonesian government -- with Saddam's dictatorship and undermine international efforts to isolate Saddam's regime.

November 12 Meeting between President Clinton and President Wahid

Draft:EAP/PIMBS:RClarke x7-2543 11/9/99
O:\PIMBS\Indonesia\Wahid '99\Wahid-Clinton2.doc

Clear:EAP:SRoth
:EAP:SBoyce
:EAP/PIMBS:DHartwick/JAloisi
:D:TCynkin
:P:DShields
:E:DNorland
:EB/:SPinkham
:IO/PKO:KBrown
:DRL:SO'Sullivan
:PRM:DNeher
S/P: MHalperin

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

R44

CONFIDENTIAL
Decl: 11/10/2009

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Strobe Talbott, Acting

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Indonesian President Wahid

Wahid's trip presents an unexpected opportunity to influence the new president of the world's fourth largest nation in his first weeks in office. Despite indications that he planned to make Asia his diplomatic priority and, by default, relegate the United States and the West to secondary priority, Wahid, in his eagerness to see you, revealed the obvious importance he places on the bilateral relationship. He cut his ASEAN tour short to accommodate his White House meeting, which will come before much-heralded visits to Tokyo and Beijing.

Wahid is a difficult leader to assess. There is much good news. He comes to the presidency with a lifetime reputation for tolerance, just what Indonesia needs at this juncture. While inexperienced at governance, he has skillfully led an organization of 40 million Muslims for over a decade, sometimes in courageous opposition to the authoritarian rule of former President Soeharto. Unlike Habibie, he has made resolution of the dangerous territorial issues (Aceh, Irian Jaya, and the Moluccas) a high priority.

[redacted] B1

Classified by: Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary of State
Reason: E.O. 12958 1.5 (d)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 9 NOV 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2008 200503352

[redacted] B1

Wahid, who studied in Iraq, also has toyed with the idea of meeting Saddam Hussein during an upcoming Middle East visit to signal his love for the Iraqi people.

[redacted] B1

To the extent possible, I think you should steer the discussion away from potentially contentious foreign policy issues and toward domestic challenges Wahid faces at home (including East Timor). You should underscore our support for his government's efforts to further Indonesia's democratic transition, which we see as strongly in our own interest and that of the entire region, and ask what the U.S. can do to help. On economic matters, you must emphasize that our ability to help Wahid and his government rests on his ability to work out arrangements with the World Bank and the IMF. On East Timor, you should tell Wahid that if he can get the Indonesian military (TNI) to rein in the militias, expedite repatriation, and prevent raids from West Timor into East Timor, he will be in a position to recover much of the ground Indonesia lost with the international community. He also needs to manage the accountability issue, both in terms of a credible Indonesian investigation and by cooperating with UN-sanctioned international investigations.

The restive province of Aceh will be on Wahid's mind. Wahid appears to have altered his schedule to travel to Aceh immediately before coming to Washington. Massive demonstrations there -- with as much as one quarter of Aceh's population in the streets earlier this week -- demonstrate the volatility of the situation. If mishandled, Aceh has the potential to dwarf East Timor as a security issue and a challenge to Indonesia's territorial integrity. In addition to asking for Wahid's assessment of the situation, you should stress our serious concerns about the dangerous situation and the need to manage it expeditiously. You should also reassure him that we strongly support his efforts for reconciliation, and ask if there is anything the United States or the international community can do to help.

Drafted by:EAP/PIMBS:JMAloisi x7-1221

o:/PIMBS/Indonesia/Wahid '99/Albright-Clinton.doc

Cleared by:EAP:SORoth
EAP:RLBoyce
EAP/PIMBS:DAHartwick
P:DStraub
D:TCynkin
E:DNorland (ok)
S/P:KBrooks (ok)
DRL:HKoh
PRM:JTaft
EB/IFD/OMA:DNelson
S/S-C:BHambrick (info)

ORIG + 2 DISKETTES GIVEN TO SWO @ 11:15 P.M. S/S 9920480
FOR DELIVERY TO WH VIA OP-CTR COURIER, United States Department of State
REC.# 3280398 (3280397).
COPIES TO:

RELEASED IN FULL

Washington, D.C. 20520

R5

S
D
P
E
T
M
G
R
C
S/P
PA
PA-JR
S/S
S/S-S
EAP
EB
IO
DRL
PRM
PM
RF/CWA

'99 NOV 10 P11:14

November 10, 1999

CONFIDENTIAL
(UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachments)

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. BRADTKE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Briefing Materials for the President's Meeting with Indonesian President Wahid, November 12, 1999

Attached is briefing material and two diskettes for use by the President during his meeting with Indonesian President Wahid.

Karl Hofmann
for: Kristie A. Kenney
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
1. Briefing Memo: Meeting with Indonesian President Wahid
2. Issue Paper: Indonesia Economic Issues
3. Issue Paper: Indonesia's Foreign Policy
4. Issue Paper: East Timor
5. Issue Paper: Military Reform
6. Issue Paper: Aceh

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2008 200503352

22D052, box 2, folder - OVIP Pres. Wahid Visit, Nov. 11-12, 1999

Drafted: S/S-S:KDDueholm (7-7817)
GEN/Kenney-Bradtke - Wahid

Cleared: S/S-S:KDDueholm

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

MEETING WITH INDONESIAN PRESIDENT WAHID

R5A

I. KEY OBJECTIVES

- Supporting Democratic Transition: Underscore our long term commitment to working closely with and aiding Wahid and his government to promote a democratic, stable, prosperous, and unified Indonesia. Emphasize our commitment to Indonesia's territorial integrity.

- Economic Reform and Recovery: Stress our support for Indonesia's economic recovery program, while indicating that our ability to help Indonesia will be heavily influenced by the economic policies adopted by the new government.

- Military-to-Military Relations: Emphasize that we want to get bilateral relations back on track, but must see credible evidence of military reform, including improved military behavior in East Timor (disarming military, expediting repatriation of refuges, securing the border with East Timor against militia raids), some form of accountability for the abuses in East Timor, military restraint in other territorial disputes (Aceh, Irian Jaya) and a demonstrated commitment to the principle of civilian supremacy.

- Aceh: Express our concern about the deteriorating situation in Aceh, emphasize need to manage situation carefully, both to preserve Indonesia's territorial integrity and to avoid human rights abuses. Support Wahid's use of political dialogue over military options and ask if the international community can be helpful.

- Wahid-Saddam Hussein Meeting: Explain that this planned meeting would severely damage Indonesia's reputation. Not in the interest of new, democratic Indonesia to be seen as supporting dictator who is international pariah.

II. CONTEXT OF MEETING

Abdurrahman Wahid exemplifies the strengths and weaknesses of Indonesia's still imperfect transition from

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4()
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 8 NOV 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2008 200503352

Soeharto's legacy of a centrist-authoritarian regime a more promising democratic future. His reputation for tolerance and his reform instincts on most key issues are sound, but he and his new cabinet are short on experience and appear prone to occasional stumbles when addressing challenges that require careful handling. Moreover, his broad-based cabinet itself is a mixed bag and unproven. Wahid, frail and almost blind, will need to exercise strong leadership from the top to keep things on course.

Barely two weeks in office, Wahid has racked up an impressive record with selection of a human rights activist as his attorney general, creation of a new human rights ministry headed by a respected Acehnese figure, and support for investigations into East Timor human rights abuses among the most prominent achievements. Release of the full Bank Bali audit report (a controversial corruption symbol from the Habibie Administration) demonstrated Wahid's commitment to fight corruption. B1

Separatist pressures in Aceh and Irian Jaya threaten to undermine Indonesia's territorial integrity, and Wahid, with his innate tolerance of competing views must be careful not to heighten expectations that could undermine Indonesian unity.

Thus far, Wahid and his key foreign policy advisors have demonstrated a surprising willingness to seek our counsel on issues of importance to us, such as relations with Israel. Your meeting will be Wahid's first with a non-ASEAN leader. It should serve to strengthen a sense of cooperation, and to create the momentum and goodwill necessary to deal with the difficult bilateral issues we face without letting them come to dominate the overall bilateral relationship. Wahid will see his meeting with you as U.S. recognition of Indonesia's important role in the region, and an opportunity to enhance his own image as a leading Asian democrat of this huge emerging democracy.

III. AGENDA/POINTS

Supporting Democratic Transition. Indonesia has undergone a tumultuous but steady transition to democracy since the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, a transition process we strongly supported. The election of reformists President Wahid and Vice President Megawati last month sets the stage

for consolidating these hard-earned democratic gains. But U.S.-Indonesia ties have been strained over Indonesia's handling of East Timor. Engaging the Wahid Administration offers the U.S. an historic opportunity to repair the damage and help Indonesia rebuild its democratic institutions.

- The American people welcome your historic election as president and are honored by your early visit to the U.S. I want to work closely with you and your government to support a democratic, stable, prosperous, unified Indonesia.

- Our nations have much in common. We are both large and diverse multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies. And, with Indonesia's rapid transformation from authoritarianism to an open, pluralistic, and participatory system, we are both democracies.

- I am aware of the personal role you have played in the political democratization process and your personal reputation for tolerance and reconciliation. I hope you will let us know if there are ways we can help you move Indonesia toward greater respect for human rights, and deeper reform, including of the Indonesian military.

- Ambassador Gelbard has spoken to you of our desire for close engagement. I have asked UN Ambassador Holbrooke to visit Indonesia next week to explore ways we can be helpful and, in the next few weeks, we will dispatch an interagency assessment team to flesh out priorities where our close cooperation might be most effective.

- Indonesia's quick recovery and political stability is important to the United States. Our two countries have enjoyed good relations in the past and I sincerely hope to see these relations strengthen and deepen in the period ahead. I pledge my government to this goal and look forward to working with you toward that end.

Economic Reform and Recovery. Although inexperienced and a product of political compromise, the new GOI economic cabinet seems willing to break with bad past practices. Wahid and Coordinating Economic Minister Kwik Kian Gie have stated their intention to pursue economic recovery and reform in close cooperation with the international community and the IMF.

- We strongly support Indonesia's economic recovery, which is key to political stability. It is for this reason

that we have already dispatched a team of senior economic experts to Indonesia to engage your new economic team.

- Release of the Bank Bali report sent an excellent first signal of willingness to take necessary actions to allow the international community to help with Indonesia's economic recovery program.

- From our experience, the confidence of markets and foreign and domestic investors depends on consistent economic policy signals. The most important of these will be to reach early agreement with the international financial institutions on a convincing economic program and to implement it faithfully.

- Our experience tells us that the markets and investors will monitor several key areas. Transparency, fairness, and a commitment to contracts and the rule of law will be key. I understand that your financial markets, corporate sector, and power industry which were damaged severely during the Asian financial crisis, still require much hard work. My government is committed to helping you put these challenges behind you.

Military-to-Military Relations. The Indonesian military (TNI) remains the biggest hurdle to further political reform and closer bilateral relations. Military to military relations remain suspended. While we would like to be in a position to resume this relationship, it will depend on clear evidence of military reform, including better behavior in West Timor, accountability for past abuses, restraint in other territorial disputes (Aceh) and a demonstrated commitment to civilian supremacy.

- Mr. President, my government applauds your initial efforts to place the military (TNI) under civilian control and your support for internal military reforms that could reorient the military away from internal security and politics toward external defense. We also commend your intention not to use TNI to try to solve the latest problems in Aceh by violence and repression. These are bold, constructive steps that bode well for your country.

- Mr. President, please allow me to be direct with you as a friend of Indonesia and one who is deeply committed to helping our relationship grow.

- As Secretary Cohen indicated to General Wiranto in his trip to Indonesia just before your selection as President, the United States desires closer military-to-military ties, but the future of these ties rests squarely on TNI's willingness to reform.

- In assessing TNI's commitment to reform, we will be looking for evidence of changed behavior on the ground, including: 1) cooperation on Timor issues, including expediting the repatriation of refugees, disarming the militias and securing the border against militia raids into East Timor; 2) restraint in other territorial disputes, including Aceh; 3) some form of accountability for past abuses; and 4) a demonstrated commitment to the principle of civilian supremacy.

- Taking these steps would be powerful signals to the international community and to the U.S. Congress that Indonesia's military has embarked on new path consistent with the democratic transition that you, Mr. President, personally represent.

Aceh. There is no problem facing the new GOI more serious or urgent than the future of Aceh. Outrage over past TNI human rights abuses has combined with economic grievances to fuel growing separatist sentiments. A relatively small minority less than two years ago, pro-independence Acehnese are probably in the majority today. It is unclear that Wahid will be able to resolve the problem by political means short of a referendum. However, at a minimum, he must take quick and credible steps to account for and pursue justice for grave abuses perpetrated by TNI over the past decade. He must also carry out his pledge to draw down the military presence in the province and probably will have to provide Aceh with greater control over its considerable oil and gas resources.

- I want to commend your bold initiatives to begin real political dialogue in Aceh, without resorting to a military crackdown.

- Like you, the U.S. is deeply concerned by recent developments in Aceh and the questions they pose for Indonesia's future given the existence of other separatist movements in Irian Jaya and elsewhere.

- As you know, the U.S. strongly supports the territorial unity of Indonesia, but, like you, believes these problems must be addressed through dialogue, not force.

- Peaceful resolution of the Aceh situation clearly will require your continuing deep personal involvement. I would appreciate a sense of how you plan to deal with rising demands for a referendum.

- Let me say that the U.S. stands ready to support your efforts in any way possible. Is there anything the international community can do to help?

Iraq. President Wahid, who is Iraqi-educated, hopes that Indonesia can play a mediating role between Iraq and the U.S. and he is planning to meet quietly with Saddam Hussein later this month. He may raise this notion in the context of his willingness to open commercial and trade ties with Israel.

- Understand that you studied in Iraq and so have a special attachment to the Iraqi people.

- We share your concerns about welfare of Iraqi people. But that doesn't justify meeting with Saddam, who has made Iraq into a pariah state, subject to UN sanctions. Meeting him would severely damage Indonesia's reputation and could impact the willingness of the U.S. Congress to provide assistance to your country.

- Holding such a meeting is, of course, your decision to make. But I am concerned that this would associate you -- the democratic leader of a new Indonesian government -- with Saddam's dictatorship and undermine international efforts to isolate Saddam's regime.

November 12 Meeting between President Clinton and President Wahid

Draft:EAP/PIMBS:RClarke x7-2543 11/9/99
O:\PIMBS\Indonesia\Wahid '99\Wahid-Clinton2.doc

Clear:EAP:SRoth
:EAP:SBoyce
:EAP/PIMBS:DHartwick/JAloisi
:D:TCynkin
:P:DShields
:E:DNorland
:EB/:SPinkham
:IO/PKO:KBrown
:DRL:SO'Sullivan
:PRM:DNeher
S/P: MHalperin
PM: RmBecraft

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 11/30/2009

INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

R5 C

I. OBJECTIVES

Encourage President Wahid to keep a moderate course in foreign policy with constructive and positive U.S.-Indonesia relations. Thank Wahid for his interest in playing a positive role in the Middle East. Discourage him from meeting with Saddam Hussein.

II. BACKGROUND

The new Indonesian administration is inexperienced in foreign policy. However, Wahid and his Foreign Minister, Alwi Shihab, are both well-traveled and appear surprisingly responsive to U.S. views. In fact, they have asked for U.S. thoughts on a number of topics - Middle East peace; Iran/Iraq; Burma - which we are preparing to share. Wahid's decision to invite the U.S. Ambassador to make the first official foreign call on him demonstrates the President's sense of the importance of the United States to Indonesia's interests.

This contrasts somewhat with Wahid and Shihab's initial public emphasis on Indonesia's ties with Asia. Wahid's first trip as President was to his ASEAN neighbors, starting with Singapore and Malaysia, countries he sees as sources of aid and investment. Prior to arriving in Burma, Wahid publicly indicated he would seek to meet with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, but the encounter did not take place. However, it is unlikely that Indonesia will reclaim its full ASEAN role, simply because the Wahid government will have to focus on Indonesia's economic recovery and political rebirth.

In addition to the United States and the ASEAN countries, Wahid sees China, Japan and India as very important for Indonesia. [redacted] B1

[redacted] Wahid seems determined to pursue a course of engagement with Israel, beginning with the opening of trade and cultural relations. Wahid and Shihab have sought our assistance in selling ties with Israel to the Indonesian people via a symbolic role in the Middle East peace process. Potentially most troubling is Wahid's interest in meeting

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 29 NOV 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2008 200503352

with Saddam Hussein. Educated in Iraq, Wahid most likely wishes to demonstrate his empathy for the Iraqi people. He may even want to mediate between the United States and Iraq. We should emphasize to Wahid that associating himself with Hussein could well taint the fledgling Indonesian democracy in the eyes of the world. [redacted] B1

III. POINTS TO BE MADE

- We have a strong interest in maintaining a deep and broad bilateral relationship. We look forward to working with Indonesia on a host of issues of mutual concern.

- We hope that as a newly democratic country, Indonesia will work to foster democratic values abroad. This could include meeting with the democratic opposition in Burma and pressing the SPDC to begin a meaningful dialogue with democracy leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi.

- We appreciate Indonesia's offer to be a moderating influence in the Middle East, and we encourage Indonesia to build on early contacts with Israel toward eventual normalization of relations.

- I was very concerned to learn that you are proposing to meet with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein during your Middle East tour at the end of this month. A meeting with Saddam Hussein would be a very grave mistake:

  -- Iraq is in flagrant violation of UNSC Resolutions. International isolation of the Iraqi regime is an important means to maintain pressure on Iraq to comply with its obligations.

  -- Given Indonesia's international standing and its weight in the Islamic world, a meeting between you and Saddam would severely undermine that effort. It would tarnish Indonesia's reputation in the process and make it more difficult for the U.S. to be helpful.

  -- The timing of such a meeting would be particularly unfortunate. A new UN Security Council Resolution on Iraq is imminent and may be adopted during your trip. It will be critical at that time not to suggest, as a meeting between you and Saddam would do, that Iraq has any alternative to complying with its obligations.

- I urge you not to go forward with this meeting.

- (If raised: mediating role between Iraq and the U.S.): We are not seeking any mediation between Iraq and the U.S. The issue is between Iraq and the UNSC, and its only resolution must be full Iraqi compliance with UNSC Resolutions.

O:Indonesia/Wahid 99/FrnPol.doc

drafted: EAP/PIMBS:RWCarlson
7-2769 11/9/99

approved: EAP:SORoth
cleared: EAP/PIMBS:DAHartwick ✓
EAP/BCLTV:PMurphy ✓
P:DShields ✓
S/P:KBrooks (info)
D:TCynkin ✓
NEA/NGA:PDibble/TBarry ✓

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 11/09/09

EAST TIMOR

R5D

I. CORE OBJECTIVES

Emphasize the need to facilitate quick repatriation of East Timorese who wish to return home by providing secure overland routes and protection from militia intimidation.

Urge the GOI to move quickly to have the Indonesian military (TNI) disarm and disband militias, and prevent creation of a base in West Timor from which militias might attack INTERFET, UNTAET, or an independent East Timor.

Highlight the importance of GOI cooperation with international and national human rights inquiries into violations in East and West Timor.

II. BACKGROUND

The August 30 consultation vote in East Timor and the October 19 decision of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to rescind the decree annexing East Timor set the stage for a UN-administered Phase III transition in East Timor toward independence. In the interim, the Australian-led INTERFET multi-national force has quelled the militia violence that erupted after the consultation. The UN has authorized creation of UNTAET, including a follow-on PKO force and named Sergio Vieira de Mello as the UNTAET Transition Administrator. He is overseeing international preparations to help East Timor become a fully independent, viable nation. The U.S. plans to participate actively in Phase-III.

The new GOI has an opportunity to reverse international condemnation of Indonesian military-sponsored militia violence in East Timor during the last Indonesian administration. To do so, it must move decisively against militias in West Timor so as to facilitate repatriation of refugees to East Timor and prevent the more radical militia from pursuing a guerrilla operation. It must cooperate with international and national accountability investigations into human rights abuses. It must also take strong, unambiguous steps to lay to rest concerns that

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2008 200503352

UNCLASSIFIED

elements of the Indonesian government will act to destabilize UN efforts or the new East Timorese state.

III. POINTS TO BE MADE

- We seek your help to facilitate repatriation of refugees in West Timor, which is proceeding much too slowly. The problem is intimidation by militia members, who are endangering refugees and international humanitarian workers.

- Militia activities in areas along parts of the border with West Timor make it dangerous for organized overland conveys to repatriate refugees and for refugees to return spontaneously to their homes in East Timor.

- President Wahid's Administration has issued forthcoming declarations of positive intentions toward East Timor and indicated willingness by the Indonesian military (TNI) to control the militias. However, the TNI has not actually acted to end militia activities.

- We believe the GOI must disarm and disband the militias in West Timor, and disavow any pro-integration agenda. This could resolve the immediate repatriation concerns by providing protection for refugees and international workers and could secure overland repatriation routes.

- GOI action would also demonstrate seriousness about preventing the militias -- with support from elements of TNI -- from converting West Timor into a base from which to launch attacks against INTERFET, UNTAET, or an independent East Timor.

- In addition, the UN has appointed an international Commission of Inquiry (COI) to investigate allegations of gross human rights violations against East Timorese by the militias and elements of the TNI. The Indonesian National Human Rights Commission is conducting its own investigations. We believe it important that the GOI support the quest for accountability and justice by cooperating fully with the international and national inquiries.

Wahid November 12 Visit, East Timor Paper for White House

Draft:EAP/PIMBS:RClarke x7-2543 11/9/99
O:\Indonesia\Wahid '99\Wahid Visit, East Timor Paper, Nov 12.doc

Clear:EAP:SRoth
:EAP:DHartwick,Acting(ok)
:EAP/PIMBS:JAloisi(ok)
:D:TCynkin(ok)
:P:DShields(ok)
:S/P:KBrooks(info)
:IO/PHO:KBrown(ok)
:DRL:SO'Sullivan(info)
:PRM:MMcKelvey(ok)

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 11/10/2009

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)
R5E

MILITARY REFORM

I. OBJECTIVES

Welcome steps taken to place the military under civilian control and encourage a redirection of a military role away from "dual function" toward external defense.

Emphasize the value the U.S. attaches to a cooperative defense relationship while underscoring that this will be possible as the Indonesian military takes credible action to account for its past human rights abuses and undertakes real reform.

II. BACKGROUND

Soeharto's departure in May 1998 opened the door to an era of democratic and military reform. Revelations of past human rights abuses and military heavy-handedness incited a popular backlash against the security forces, which provided serious momentum to military reform efforts. At the same time, separatist crosscurrents and inter-ethnic tensions placed the military under extreme stress, in a kind of damned-if-you-do and damned-if you-don't position. East Timor brought out the worst of the Indonesian military, revealing a scorn for civilian policies with which it disagreed and brutality that further tainted the reputation of the entire institution.

[redacted] B1

President Wahid and Vice-President Megawati both support gradual military reform, including the eventual abolishment of the military's "dual function" role, and the phasing out over five years of the military's 38 seats in parliament. Wahid appointed the first civilian defense minister in over four decades and named a Navy Admiral as Commander of the Armed Forces. We support these steps [redacted] B1

The U.S. would like to resume a cooperative defense relationship with Indonesia including equipment sales, training, and joint exercises. But for this to occur, the military must undertake serious, concrete actions to cooperate in West Timor, to account for its human rights

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 9 NOV 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2008 200503352

abuses, and to demonstrate its commitment to the principle of civilian supremacy.

III. POINTS TO BE MADE

- We support initial steps you've taken to place the military under civilian control. We encourage you to continue your efforts to consolidate civilian control and to convert the military into a modern, professional force.

- We would like to resume our defense cooperation. But we will only be able to do so as the Indonesian military shows concrete action to cooperate in West Timor, to provide accountability for abuses in East Timor, to exercise restraint in other disputed territories (Aceh, Irian Jaya) and to undertake concrete institutional reform in accord with the principle of civilian supremacy. We urge you to help make this happen.

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 11/10/2009

O:Indonesia/Wahid 99/Military Reform.doc

drafted: EAP/PIMBS:ALudwig
7-2931 11/9/99

approved: EAP:SORoth
cleared: EAP/PIMBS:DAHartwick ✓
P:DShields ✓
PM:GStirling (ok)
S/P:KBrooks (info)
D:TCynkin ✓

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 11/10/2009

RELEASED IN FULL

R 5 F

ACEH

I. OBJECTIVES

Solicit President Wahid's views on developments in Aceh, especially whether he believes a political solution short of a referendum remains possible.

Encourage Wahid's efforts to resolve the Aceh problem with quick and credible steps to address Acehnese grievances and aspirations within the framework of a unitary Indonesia.

II. BACKGROUND

Aceh is one of the new Indonesian government's most serious problems. Unlike East Timor, events in Aceh will have ramifications across the archipelago. Aceh has been part of Indonesia since the nation's first day; it is staunchly Islamic; and its fate will inevitably influence political developments in other provinces.

~~Outrage over past human rights injustices has combined~~ with economic grievances and the precedent set by East Timor to fuel growing separatist sentiments in the province. A small minority less than two years ago, pro-independence Acehnese are probably in the majority today. It is unclear that President Wahid's government will be able to resolve the problem by political means short of a referendum. Still, he must take quick and credible steps to do just that. First, he must bring justice for the grave abuses perpetrated by Indonesian security forces over the past decade. He will also need to carry out his pledge to draw down the military presence in the province, and provide Aceh with greater control over its political destiny and its considerable oil and gas resources. The situation in Aceh has been made more volatile, not less, by Wahid's recent public statements in support of a referendum, which have only heightened expectations.

The U.S. supports Indonesia's territorial integrity, and encourages Wahid's efforts to bring a peaceful, political solution to the province within this framework. Nonetheless, should the situation go from bad to worse, we would have serious problems with the human rights consequences of the military crackdown that would likely result. In short, Aceh may become to Indonesia - and to U.S. relations with Indonesia - what the Kurds are to Turkey.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2008 200503352

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 11/10/2009

III. POINTS TO BE MADE

- I am interested in your views about developments in Aceh. Do you believe your government will be able to resolve the situation, short of offering a referendum? What specific plans do you have in this connection?

- We support your efforts to address Acehnese grievances and aspirations by means of political negotiations in the context of a unitary Indonesia.

- Especially urgent is to heed Acehnese calls of justice for the serious abuses that occurred during the period of special military rule.

We also encourage you to act on your pledge to draw down the military presence in Aceh, and offer greater political autonomy and economic control to the Acehnese people. We stand ready to support you in any way we can.

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 11/10/2009

O:Indonesia/Wahid 99/Aceh.doc

drafted: EAP/PIMBS:ALudwig
7-2931 11/9/99

approved: EAP:SORoth
cleared: EAP/PIMBS:DAHartwick ✓
P:DShields ✓
S/P:KBrooks (info)
D:TCynkin ✓
DRL:SOSullivan (info)

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 11/10/99

R5 B

INDONESIA: ECONOMIC ISSUES

I. **OBJECTIVE**

To encourage Wahid to implement economic reforms, resume relations with international financial institutions (IFIs), and tackle corruption.

II. **BACKGROUND**

Indonesia was the country hit hardest by the Asian financial crisis and, with severe political turmoil exacerbating its economic difficulties, it has yet to recover. Capital flight, a bankrupt financial sector, huge private sector debt and arrears, major foreign investment disputes, endemic corruption, and a post-July suspension of most IFI loans pending progress in handling a bank scandal are among the problems the new government must address.

Among his first acts as President, Wahid's direct request convinced Parliament to release the Bank Bali report which, if followed by full investigation and prosecution of wrong-doers, will allow essential IFI lending to resume. Wahid also gave the go-ahead for talks with the IMF on a new economic program (he wants to focus on agriculture and small and medium enterprises). Speaking to a business audience in Singapore November 6, he emphasized the rule of law, market forces and free trade. However, Wahid's economic team is untested and not yet cohesive. Lenders and investors, both at home and abroad, want to see a convincing reform program that enjoys unified government support and is implemented consistently.

Legal system reforms to provide reliable and objective justice will be a key element of economic recovery. The new government must reenergize the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), which controls a huge share of the country's assets, and revive the corporate debt restructuring process. To reassure investors, the government needs to resolve outstanding contract issues such as those involving independent power producer projects and telecommunications service providers. (On November 15, OPIC will pay MidAmerican (CalEnergy) a $217 million claim on a power project, giving OPIC a claim on the GOI. OPIC and EXIM are both involved in another serious power project dispute now under negotiation.)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2008 200503352

Coordinating Minister Kwik has suggested the GOI, which has foreign debt of about $80 billion, will request debt rescheduling and/or debt reduction. The U.S. normally supports Paris Club debt rescheduling for countries on IMF programs when IMF analysis shows a balance of payments financing gap. Indonesia does not qualify for debt reduction under current rules, and would require far more money than Congress would be likely to fund.

III. **POINTS TO BE MADE**

- Your government has a window of opportunity to put Indonesia back on the road to economic growth and prosperity.

- A sound economic reform program backed by the IMF, resumed strong relations with the IFIs, and a determined fight against corruption will attract investment and stimulate growth.

- Strengthening IBRA, moving ahead with corporate debt restructuring, and resolving outstanding contract disputes are also essential.

- (If asked) In the context of an IMF program of economic reform, the U.S. would support a GOI request for debt rescheduling through the Paris Club, if needed.

\\Sebsntsa\SEIFD\SEOMA\Indonesia\for POTUS - INDONESIA econ paper.doc

Drafted:EB/IFD/OMA:SCPinkham
11/9/99 ext. 75910
Cleared:EB/IFD/OMA:DNelson ok
EB/IFD/OIA:Tdelare ok
EB/IFD/ODF:MSakaue ok
EAP/PIMBS:ALudwig
EB:BSamuel
EAP:SRoth
P:DShields ok
D:TCynkin ok
S/P:ELief ok
Treas/OASIA:CMcCoy (subs)
E:DNorland ok

The National Security Archive

The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000

Fax: 202/994-7005
nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Wednesday, August 03, 2005

Margaret P. Grafeld
Director
Office of IRM Programs and Services
A/RPS/IPS, SA-2
Department of State
Washington, DC 205226001

Re: Request under the FOIA, in reply refer to Archive# 20051148DOS366

Dear Ms. Grafeld :

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), I hereby request disclosure of the following documents for inspection and possible copying:

All documents from 1 May 1998 to 1 January 1999 relating in whole or in part to United States Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright's July 1998 attending of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila, Philippines.

If you regard any of these documents as potentially exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements, I request that you nonetheless exercise your discretion to disclose them. As the FOIA requires, please release all reasonably segregable non exempt portions of documents. To permit me to reach an intelligent and informed decision whether or not to file an administrative appeal of any denied material, please describe any withheld records (or portions thereof) and explain the basis for your exemption claims.

As you know, the National Security Archive qualifies for a waiver of search and review fees as a representative of the news media. This request is made as part of a scholarly and news research project and not for commercial use. For details on the Archive's research and publication activities, please see our Web site at the address above. Please notify me before incurring any photocopying costs over $100.

To expedite the release of the requested documents, please disclose them on an interim basis as they become available to you, without waiting until all the documents have been processed. If you have any questions regarding the identity of the records, their location, the scope of the request or any other matters, please call me at (202) 994-7000. I look forward to receiving your response within the twenty day statutory time period.

Sincerely yours,

Brad Simpson

An independent non-governmental research institute and library located at the George Washi
collects and publishes declassified documents obtained through the Freedom of Information A

20051148DOS366 DOS
RECNO:31712 SEQCOR:115730
FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Albright attends ASEAN conference, 1998

Thank you. Your request has been submitted.

This is a request filed under the Freedom of Information Act.

Return to FOIA Request Generator

Return to FOIA Home Page

Request Date: **8/3/2005**
Request Reference Number: B1411

The time period of my request is between 5/1/1998 and 1/1/1999

Description of request:
National Security Archive Number 20051148DOS366 All documents from 1 May 1998 to 1 January 1999 relating in whole or in part to United States Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright's July 1998 attending of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila, Philippines. Documents pertaining to this request include but are not limited to cables, reports, memoranda, and finished intelligence. Please search the U.S. embassy and consulates in Indonesia.

☐ For faster processing please restrict the parameters of this FOIA request to the State Archiving System (SAS)--over 25 million electronic records consisting of telegrams from mid-1973 to present.

I am willing to pay fees for this request up to a maximum of $100

In order to help to determine my status to assess fees, you should know that I am

◉ a representative of the news media affiliated with The National Security Archive and this request is made as part of a news gathering effort and not for commercial use.(Additional documentation or comments will be required. See

○ affiliated with an educational or noncommercial scientific institution, and this request is made for a scholarly or scientific purpose and not for commercial use.(Additional documentation will be required. See

○ an individual seeking information for personal use and not for commercial use.

○ affiliated with a private corporation and am seeking information for use in the company's business.

Additional Comments
National Security Archive Number 20051148DOS366

Thank you for your consideration of my request. Sincerely,
Brad Simpson.

E-mail Address:
nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Street Address:
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701, 2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20037

Telephone Number: **202-994-7000**
Fax Number: **202-994-7005**

Print

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 5, 2005
Case Number: 200503343

NSArchive Control Number: 20051148DOS366

Mr. Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Mr. Simpson:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated August 3, 2005, for copies of documents occurring between May 1, 1998 and January 1, 1999 concerning United States Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright's July 1998 attending of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila, Philippines.

We will begin the processing of your request based upon the information provided in your letter. As soon as responsive material has been retrieved and reviewed, we will notify you.

We wish to advise you that the cut-off date for retrieving records is either the date you have given the Department by specifying a particular time frame or the date the search is initiated. Only existing records are subject to the Freedom of Information Act.

Office of Information Programs and Services
U.S. Department of State SA- 2
Washington, DC 20522-8100
Web site: foia.state.gov

Inquiries:
Phone: 1- 202- 261- 8314
FAX: 1- 202- 261- 8579
email: FOIAStatus@state.gov

20051148DOS366 DOS
RECNO:31712 SEQCOR:115906
8/10/2005 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Albright attends ASEAN conference, 1998

Please review the fee information provided below.

Fee Information: The Freedom of Information Act requires agencies to access fees to recover the direct costs of processing requests, unless a fee waiver has been granted

Based upon the information that you have provided, this request will be processed in accordance with the fees schedule designated for the "representative of the news media" category of requesters (pays duplication costs after first 100 pages).

Copy costs are assessed at the rate of $0.15 per page.

You have stated your willingness to pay the fees incurred in the processing of this request up to $100.00.

We will notify you of the costs incurred in processing your request as soon as the search and review actions have been completed.

While we will make every effort to meet the time limits cited in the FOIA (5 USC § 552), unusual circumstances may arise for extending the time limit.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us. We can provide faster service if you include the case number of your request in your communications with us.

We are pleased to be of service to you.

Sincerely,

Michael Stewart, Jr.
Requester Communications Branch

Office of Information Programs and Services
U.S. Department of State SA- 2
Washington, DC 20522-8100
Web site: foia.state.gov

Inquiries:
Phone: 1- 202- 261- 8314
FAX: 1- 202- 261- 8579
email: FOIAStatus@state.gov

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No. 200503343
Segment Nos. ER-1 and ER-2

Mr. Brad Simpson
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037

MAY 10 2006

Dear Mr. Simpson:

I refer to your request of August 3, 2005 for the release of information under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552). To retrieve those documents, we initiated a search of the following record systems under the control of the Department of State: Two searches of the Central Foreign Policy Records (the Department's principal record system), the retired files of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the retired files of the Office of the Secretariat, and the retired files of the American Embassy in Manila.

The two searches of the records of the Central Foreign Policy Records have been completed, resulting in the retrieval of 30 documents that appear responsive to your request. These documents have been grouped together as segment numbers ER-1 and ER-2. After reviewing them, we have determined that 26 may be released in full, three may be released with excisions, and one may not be released. All released documents are enclosed.

The material in the excised portions of two of the documents released in part and in the document withheld in full is currently and properly classified under Executive Order 12958 in the interest of national defense or foreign relations. As such, it is exempt from release under subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act.

The material in the excised portions of one of the documents released in part is of such a nature that its release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal

20051148DOS366 DOS
RECNO:31712 SEQCOR:121181
5/17/2006 FOISG: Simpson, Brad
Albright attends ASEAN conference, 1998

privacy. As such, it is exempt from release under subsection (b)(6) of the Freedom of Information Act.

In the case of a document released in part, all non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released.

With respect to material we have withheld under the Freedom of Information Act, you have the right to appeal our determination within sixty days. Appeals should be addressed to: Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/ISS/IPS/PP/, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, D.C. 20522-8100. The letter of appeal should refer to the case and segment numbers shown above. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

Still in progress are the searches of the records of the retired files of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the retired files of the Office of the Secretariat, and the retired files of the American Embassy in Manila.

Additional information will be provided as soon as it becomes available.

If you have any questions with respect to the processing of your request, you may write to: Office of Information Programs and Services, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, D.C. 20522-8100. You also may telephone (202) 261-8314. Please refer to the case and segment numbers shown above in all communications about this case.

Your continuing cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Charles Labuzzetta

for Margaret P. Grafeld
Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

REI

Case Number: 199901819

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL PTO2166

PAGE 01 SECTO 25006 011404Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 SAS-00 /000W
----------5AAAE3 011404Z /45
O 011333Z AUG 98 ZFF4
FM SECRETARY AIRCRAFT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTO 25006

NODIS

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2008
TAGS: OVIP, (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), PREL, RP
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH JOSEPH ESTRADA, PRESIDENT, JULY 28, 1998, MANILA, PHILIPPINES

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY S/S DEPUTY ROSE LIKINS. REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (U) JULY 28, 1998, MALACANANG PALACE, MANILA, PHILIPPINES.

3. (C) LIST OF PARTICIPANTS:

US:
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT
THOMAS HUBBARD, U.S. AMBASSADOR
ELAINE SHOCAS, CHIEF OF STAFF
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SECTO 25006 011404Z
STANLEY ROTH, ASST. SEC. EAP
KURT CAMPBELL, DEP. ASST. SEC., OSD

PHILIPPINES:
PRESIDENT JOSEPH ESTRADA
DOMINGO SIAZON, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY
RONALDO ZAMORA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CLEMENCIO MONTESA, ASST. SEC. FOR AMERICAN AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

Case Number: 199901819

SUMMARY
---

4. (C) SUMMARY: DURING A THIRTY-MINUTE MEETING AT MALACANANG PALACE ON JULY 28, THE SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT ESTRADA AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE PHILIPPINES, INCLUDING IN THE SECURITY AREA. ESTRADA STRESSED HIS COMMITMENT TO SECURING SENATE RATIFICATION OF THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT. HE POINTED TO THE AUSTERITY PROGRAM ANNOUNCED IN HIS JULY 27 "STATE OF THE NATION" MESSAGE AND DISCUSSED IN GENERAL TERMS HIS PROGRAMS TO ALLEVIATE RURAL POVERTY AND TO COMBAT CRIME. END SUMMARY.

SUPPORT FOR VFA
---

5. (C) PRESIDENT ESTRADA NOTED THAT HIS "STATE OF THE NATION" MESSAGE THE PREVIOUS DAY HAD OUTLINED A SEVERE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SECTO 25006 011404Z
PROGRAM OF AUSTERITY, WHICH NONETHELESS HAD BEEN PRAISED BY PRESS AND PUBLIC. HE ASKED IF WE HAD NOTICED HIS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA) IN THE SPEECH. THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAD INDEED NOTICED AND APPRECIATE HIS SUPPORT FOR THIS AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ZAMORA ADDED THE VFA WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE BY OCTOBER 1. HE HOPED IT WOULD BE RATIFIED BY THE TIME OF THE APEC LEADERS' MEETING IN KUALA LUMPUR. NOTING THAT HE HAS MANY CLOSE FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE U.S., ESTRADA SAID HE WAS COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING CLOSE U.S.-PHILIPPINE TIES.

STRONG PHILIPPINE SUPPORT ON TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES
---

6. (C) THE SECRETARY CONGRATULATED ESTRADA ON HIS ELECTORAL VICTORY. ESTRADA SAID HE HOPED TO EMULATE PRESIDENT REAGAN, THE "GREAT COMMUNICATOR," BY EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATING HIS GOALS AND POLICIES TO THE PEOPLE. AGREEING ON THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATION TO GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAD ALSO READ HIS SPEECH TO THE ASEAN MINISTERS WITH

GREAT INTEREST. HE HAD TOUCHED UPON ALL OF THE ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US IN THE REGION, INCLUDING TRANSNATIONAL ISSUE LIKE CRIME AND ABUSE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN. ESTRADA NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN CHAIRMAN OF AN ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION AS VICE PRESIDENT. [redacted] B1 [redacted] HE PLANNED TO CHANGE THIS FACT, IN PART BY PROVIDING ADEQUATE HOUSING TO SEPARATE THE POLICE FROM

CRIMINALS. REFERRING TO THE ASEAN PMC DISCUSSION OF NARCOTICS, SIAZON SAID THERE WOULD HENCEFORTH BE AN ANNUAL ASEAN REPORT ON THE ISSUE. THE SECRETARY SAID WE WANTED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO COMBAT DRUGS THROUGH EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION.

STRONG NGO ROLE

---

7. (C) THE SECRETARY LAUDED ESTRADA FOR HIS ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAM AND STRESSED OUR CONCERN OVER ABUSE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN PARTICULARLY DURING THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN. NOTING THAT SHE HAD JUST MET WITH AN IMPRESSIVE GROUP OF FEMALE ENTREPRENEURS, LABOR LEADERS, AND NGO REPRESENTATIVES, THE SECRETARY ASKED WHY THE SITUATION OF WOMEN SEEMED TO BE BETTER IN THE PHILIPPINES THAN ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION. ESTRADA ATTRIBUTED IT TO THE STRENGTH OF NGOS. NOTING HER WORK WITH MRS. CLINTON, THE SECRETARY STRESSED HER VIEW THAT THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN MAKES DEMOCRACY MORE STABLE. HER FILIPINO INTERLOCUTORS AGREED. ZAMORA ADDED THAT, IN PART DUE TO A RELATIVELY STRONG BANKING SYSTEM, THE PHILIPPINES STILL EXPECTS SOME POSITIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THIS YEAR OF ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE REGION. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE DEMOCRACIES IN THE REGION, INCLUDING THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND, WERE PROVING MORE RESILIENT THAN THE OTHERS DURING THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN. DURING A DISCUSSION OF ESTRADA'S PLANS FOR REFORMING THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, THE PRESIDENT NOTED THE NEED TO IMPROVE LAND REFORM PROGRAMS ADOPTED DURING THE AQUINO ADMINISTRATION TO ENSURE THAT THOSE RECEIVING LAND HAD THE CAPABILITY AND MEANS TO DEVELOP IT.

Case Number: 199901819

DEMOCRACY SUPPORTS DEVELOPMENT

---

8. (C) ESTRADA STRESSED HIS COMMITMENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY GO HAND-IN-HAND. CITING THE IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONS, ESTRADA SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING PRESIDENT CLINTON AT APEC.

ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< *END OF DOCUMENT* >>

PTQ1560

RELEASED IN PART
B6

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ1560

PAGE 01 MANILA 06571 01 OF 02 010905Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EAP-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00	/018W

----------43D828 010905Z /38

P 010841Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9289
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ISA/AP//
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA/J5//

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 006571

DEPT FOR S/S, EAP AND PM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, ASEAN, ARF, RP
SUBJECT: OUTLINE SCHEDULE FOR THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM AND ASEAN POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE, MANILA, JULY 26-29

1. THE PHILIPPINE DEPARMTENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) HAS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING OUTLINE SCHEDULE OF EVENTS FOR THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM AND THE POST MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE. ALL MEETINGS AND EVENTS EXCEPT THE JOINT MINISTERIAL CALL ON

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MANILA 06571 01 OF 02 010905Z
THE PRESIDENT WILL BE AT THE MANILA HOTEL.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

JULY 26, SUNDAY

0700 ASEAN MINISTERIAL GOLF TOURNAMENT

1930 ARF MINISTERS' INFORMAL WORKING DINNER
(MINISTER +1, INCLUDING ALL DIALOGUE PARTNERS)

JULY 27, MONDAY

0900-1200 5TH ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM
(IN THE MAIN MEETING ROOM WILL BE MINISTERS PLUS TWO; TWO MORE OFFICIALS/NOTE TAKERS WILL BE IN AN ADJACENT "LISTENING ROOM.")

1030 - 1045 COFFEE BREAK

1200 WORKING LUNCH OF MINISTERS

WORKING LUNCH OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS
(TENTATIVE)

1400-1700 RESUMPTION OF ARF SESSION

1530-1545 COFFEE BREAK

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1730 PRESS CONFERENCE OF THE ARF CHAIRMAN

JULY 28 TUESDAY

0830 COURTESY CALL ON THE PRESIDENT BY THE PMC MINISTERS AT MALACANANG PALACE

1000 OPEN SESSION OF THE POST-MINISTERIAL

CONFERENCE
ASEAN + DIALOGUE PARTNERS (9+10)
SPEAKER: PHILIPPINE FOREIGN SECRETARY

1015 CLOSED SESSION OF THE POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE (9+10)

1300 WORKING LUNCH

1500 POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES (9+1)
(DETAILED SCHEDULE BEING FINALIZED)

2000 PMC DINNER HOSTED BY THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND MRS. SIAZON
AT THE MANILA HOTEL FIESTA PAVILION

(NOTE: AT THIS DINNER, THE DELEGATIONS ARE EXPECTED TO PERFORM SKITS; THERE WILL ALSO BE A 30 MINUTE PERFORMANCE BY THE PHILIPPINE "BAYANIHAN" FOLK DANCE TROUPE.)

JULY 29, WEDNESDAY

0900 POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE (9+1)
(DETAILED SCHEDULE BEING FINALIZED)

1200 PMC JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE

1300 LUNCHEON

PM DEPARTURE OF DELEGATES

2. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE SECRETARY ARRIVE EARLY ENOUGH ON SUNDAY, JULY 26 TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INFORMAL WORKING DINNER.

3. THE CONTROL OFFICER FOR SECRETARY ALBRIGHT IS DCM G. EUGENE MARTIN. HIS PHONE NUMBERS ARE 63-2-523-1262____

(OFFICE) AND 63-2-523-1001 X 2099 OR [redacted] (HOME). DCM'S B6
OFFICE FAX NUMBER IS 63-2- 523-1163. OVERALL COORDINATOR
FOR THE U.S. DELEGATION'S PARTICIPATION IN THE ARF/PMC IS
POLCOUNS ALOYSIUS O'NEILL. HIS PHONE NUMBERS ARE 63-2-522-

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ1561

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ1561

PAGE 01 MANILA 06571 02 OF 02 010905Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EAP-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00	/018W

----------43D82A 010905Z /38

P 010841Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9290
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ISA/AP//
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA/J5//

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 MANILA 006571

DEPT FOR S/S, EAP AND PM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, ASEAN, ARF, RP
SUBJECT: OUTLINE SCHEDULE FOR THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM AND ASEAN POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE, MANILA, JULY 26-29

3566 (OFFICE) AND [redacted] (HOME). THE POLITICAL SECTION FAX NUMBER IS 63-2-523-1195. B6

MARTIN

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTO3264

PAGE 01 STATE 143580 062056Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CCO-00	CIAE-00
	CPR-02	DIM-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00
	H-01	IMMC-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00
	IMCC-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	SWCI-00	/023R					

143580
SOURCE: KODAKB.006062
DRAFTED BY: EAP:DHARTWICK:DR -- 08/06/98
APPROVED BY: S/S:RLIKINS
EAP:SROTH S:DHALE S/S-O:LARREAGA
----------5C79F7 062058Z /38
O P 062056Z AUG 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 143580 062056Z
AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 143580

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/08
TAGS: OVIP (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), PREL, ASEAN, RP
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PHILIPPINES FOREIGN SECRETARY SIAZON JULY 26, 1998, MANILA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY S/S DEPUTY ROSE LIKINS REASON: 1.5 (D)

2. (U) JULY 26, 1998 MANILA, PHILIPPINES

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

3. (U) PARTICIPANTS: U.S

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT
AMBASSADOR HUBBARD
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH
ASSISTANT SECRETARY LARSON
S/P DIRECTOR CRAIG
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DEFENSE CAMPBELL
EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR HARTWICK (NOTETAKER)

PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT:

FOREIGN SERCRETARY SIAZON

UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY BAJA
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AMERICAS AMBASSADOR MONTESA

DIRECTOR FOR AMERICAN AFFAIRS ESTRADA
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO FOREIGN SECRETARY AMBASSADOR PALACIOS

4. (C) SUMMARY: CONGRATULATING FOREIGN SECRETARY SIAZON ON THE ESTRADA GOVERNMENT'S ELECTION VICTORY, SECRETARY ALBRIGHT UNDERSCORED VALUE OF EARLY CONCLUSION OF VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA) TO BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.



B1

6. (C) SIAZON SUGGESTED THE NEED TO CONSIDER OVERALL INDO-

THERE. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THE U.S WAS "FORWARD LOOKING," SEEKING TO PERSUADE INDIA AND PAKISTAN NOW TO JOIN INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION CONVENTIONS BUT NOT TREAT THEM AS NUCLEAR STATES UNDER THE NPT. THEY DISCUSSED THE HANDLING OF THE ISSUE IN THE ARF CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT. END SUMMARY

7. (C) BILATERAL ISSUES/VFA: THE SECRETARY CONGRATULATED THE ESTRADA GOVERNMENT ON ITS ELECTION VICTORY. PRESIDENT CLINTON LOOKED FORWARD TO MEETING PRESIDENT ESTRADA AT APEC. SHE EXPRESSED HER PERSONAL SATISFACTION THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SIAZON REMAINED IN OFFICE; "IT WAS GOOD FOR

BILATERAL RELATIONS." B1



[redacted]

B1

[redacted]

B1

11. (C) CLIMATE CHANGE: THE SECRETARY NOTED THE IMPORTANCE

OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS AND URGED ASEAN TO INCREASE ITS INVOLVEMENT.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

PICKERING

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ1912

PAGE 01 MANILA 05786 140837Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CCO-00 CPR-02 DIM-00 DS-00 EAP-01
FBIE-00 UTED-00 IMMC-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 NSCE-00 PA-00
PRS-00 SSO-00 USSS-00 IMCC-01 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /006W
----------3DBE8E 140838Z /38

P 140833Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8761

UNCLAS MANILA 005786

FOR S/S AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE), ARF, RP
SUBJECT: AMCHAM REQUEST FOR SPEECH BY SECRETARY ALBRIGHT

1. ON MAY 14, EMBASSY RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN THE PHILIPPINES (TEXT BELOW) REQUESTING SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S PARTICIPATION AS A GUEST SPEAKER AT AN AMCHAM EVENT DURING HER JULY VISIT TO THE PHILIPPINES.

2. (BEGIN TEXT)
DEAR SECRETARY ALBRIGHT;

WE UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WILL BE IN MANILA DURING THE WEEK OF JULY 26-29, 1998 TO ATTEND THE ASEAN POST MINISTERIAL MEETING.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MANILA 05786 140837Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 08 MAY 2006 200503343

ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, I WOULD LIKE TO INVITE YOU TO BE OUR GUEST SPEAKER AT A GENERAL MEMBERSHIP BREAKFAST MEETING ON EITHER MONDAY, 27 JULY OR TUESDAY, THE 28TH. WE PLAN TO INVITE OTHER FOREIGN CHAMBERS AND PHILIPPINE BUSINESS GROUPS TO CO-SPONSOR THIS EVENT AS SOON AS AN APPROPRIATE DATE HAS BEEN DETERMINED.

YOUR AUDIENCE WILL BE A MIXTURE OF SENIOR AMERICAN AND FILIPINO CORPORATE CHIEF EXECUTIVES REPRESENTING MAJOR U.S. AND PHILIPPINE COMPANIES OPERATING IN THE PHILIPPINES. AS TO TOPIC, WE LEAVE IT UP TO YOUR DISCRETION. AFTER YOUR SPEECH, WE WOULD APPRECIATE AN OPEN FORUM.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO HAVING YOU WITH US.

SINCERELY YOURS,

CARLOS A. CONTRERAS
PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER
(END TEXT)

HUBBARD

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E2

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ5234

PAGE 01 MANILA 05843 150853Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CCO-00 CPR-02 DIM-00 ANHR-01 DS-00
EAP-01 FBIE-00 IMMC-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 NSCE-00 PA-00
PRS-00 SSO-00 USSS-00 IMCC-01 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /007W
----------3E3B00 150853Z /38

R 150848Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8796

UNCLAS E F T O MANILA 005843

SENSITIVE

FOR S/S AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE), ARF, RP
SUBJECT: ENDORSEMENT OF SECRETARY ALBRIGHT SPEECH AT AMCHAM BREAKFAST

REF: MANILA 5786

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

1. (SBU) POST STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE REQUEST (REFTEL) BY THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR AN APPEARANCE BY SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AT AN AMCHAM BREAKFAST DURING HER JULY VISIT TO THE PHILIPPINES. THE EVENT WOULD GIVE THE SECRETARY THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MANILA 05843 150853Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 08 MAY 2006 200503343

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

OPPORTUNITY TO HIGHLIGHT U.S. CONFIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY AND OUR COMMITMENT TO ASSIST THE GROWING NUMBER OF U.S. CORPORATIONS OPERATING IN THE PHILIPPINES. IT IS LIKELY TO BE THE SECRETARY'S ONLY PUBLIC VENUE WHILE HERE.

2. (SBU) SINCE MANILA WILL BE THE SECRETARY'S ONLY STOP IN AN ASEAN COUNTRY, AN AMCHAM SPEECH WOULD ALSO PROVIDE A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS WIDER REGIONAL ECONOMIC CONCERNS IN A VISIT OTHERWISE FOCUSED ON SECURITY AND GLOBAL ISSUES.

HUBBARD

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8537

PAGE 01 MANILA 07707 01 OF 02 260551Z
ACTION PA-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	DODE-00	DS-00	EAP-01
	EB-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	OIC-02	SP-00	TRSE-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/008W					

----------4D7B31 260551Z /38

R 260545Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0245
INFO USIA WASHDC 0938

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 007707

USIA

SECSTATE FOR PA, EAP/P AND EAP/PIMBS
USIA FOR EA - NMELE AND HHARA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, SCUL, ECON, RP
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDED PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES FOR SECRETARY ALBRIGHT DURING THE ASEAN MEETINGS

REF: A) MANILA 5786 (NOTAL), B) MANILA 5843 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S VISIT TO MANILA TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM AND PMC WILL BE THE FIRST VISIT TO THE PHILIPPINES BY A

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MANILA 07707 01 OF 02 260551Z
CABINET-LEVEL OFFICIAL IN ALMOST TWO YEARS. THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

EMBASSY BELIEVES THERE WILL BE SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC AND MEDIA INTEREST IN HER VISIT AND IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDING THAT SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S SCHEDULE INCLUDE AT LEAST TWO PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES. THE FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT IS A PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD BE OPEN TO PHILIPPINE, LOCAL AMERICAN AND THIRD COUNTRY MEDIA, AS WELL AS THE TRAVELING PRESS. THE SECOND IS A SPEECH BEFORE AN ORGANIZATION SUCH AS THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE WHICH HAS ALREADY INVITED THE SECRETARY (REFTELS). IN ADDITION, ONE OF THE TWO MAJOR PRIVATE TV NETWORKS IN THE PHILIPPINES, GMA, HAS REQUESTED A 15-30 MINUTE INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY ALBRIGHT DURING HER VISIT TO THE PHILIPPINES. THE INTERVIEW WOULD BE FOR GMA'S FLAGSHIP PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND NEWS PROGRAM "FIRING LINE," CONDUCTED BY LEADING PRINT AND BROADCAST JOURNALIST TEODORO BENIGNO. IF HER SCHEDULE PERMITS, THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT THE SECRETARY GRANT THIS INTERVIEW. EACH PROPOSAL IS OUTLINED BELOW. END SUMMARY.

2. PRESS CONFERENCE:

EMBASSY PROPOSES THAT SECRETARY ALBRIGHT HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE DURING HER VISIT WHICH WOULD BE OPEN TO FILIPINO, LOCAL AMERICAN AND THIRD COUNTRY JOURNALISTS AS WELL AS MEDIA TRAVELING WITH THE SECRETARY. THIS COULD BE DONE AT THE MANILA HOTEL, IN EITHER THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS CENTER OR IN ANOTHER FUNCTION ROOM. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT A PRESS

CONFERENCE (AS WELL AS A POSSIBLE TV INTERVIEW) WOULD SUPPORT OUR REGIONAL INTERESTS AND BE VERY USEFUL IN ENCOURAGING THE PHILIPPINES TO STAY THE COURSE ON ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND IN PERSUADING THE PHILIPPINE SENATE TO RATIFY THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT. AT THE TIME OF THE ASEAN MEETINGS THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT JOSEPH ESTRADA WILL HAVE BEEN IN OFFICE FOR LESS THAN A MONTH.

3. AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE SPEECH:

EMBASSY CONTINUES TO RECOMMEND THAT THE SECRETARY ACCEPT THE INVITATION TO ADDRESS THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (REFTELS). IF THE SECRETARY AGREES, EMBASSY WILL RECOMMEND THAT AMCHAM ALSO INVITE IMPORTANT FILIPINO GUESTS FROM GOVERNMENT, THE BUSINESS SECTOR AND ACADEMIA. SELECTED MEDIA COULD ALSO BE INVITED. EMBASSY SUGGESTS THAT THIS SPEECH FOCUS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, PARTICULARLY ON THE LINK BETWEEN GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED ECONOMIC REFORM AND CONTINUING U.S. PRIVATE BUSINESS SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES.

4. TV INTERVIEW REQUEST:

THE EXECUTIVE PRODUCER OF "FIRING LINE," THE LEADING PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM OF THE GMA NETWORK, ONE OF THE TWO MAJOR PRIVATE TV NETWORKS IN THE PHILIPPINES, HAS REQUESTED AN INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY ALBRIGHT DURING HER VISIT TO MANILA. THE INTERVIEW WOULD BE

UNCLASSIFIED

CONDUCTED BY TEODORO "TEDDY" BENIGNO, THE ANCHOR OF FIRING LINE. THE INTERVIEW WOULD TAKE 15-30 MINUTES AND COULD BE CONDUCTED AT SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S HOTEL AT A TIME CONVENIENT TO HER. PREVIOUSLY ON HIS PROGRAM, MR. BENIGNO HAS INTERVIEWED MARGARET THATCHER, BENAZIR BHUTTO, ZBIGNIEW BRZENZINSKI AND HENRY KISSINGER. "FIRING LINE" HAS RECEIVED HONORS FROM THE NEW YORK INTERNATIONAL TV FESTIVALS. IN ADDITION TO HOSTING FIRING LINE, MR. BENIGNO WRITES A REGULAR COLUMN IN ONE OF THE MAJOR MANILA PAPERS. HE WAS BUREAU CHIEF OF AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE AND A FOUNDING MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES. HE SERVED AS PRESS SECRETARY IN THE CABINET OF FORMER PRESIDENT AQUINO. IF TIME PERMITS, THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AGREE TO DO THIS INTERVIEW.

NOTE: THIS IS THE ONLY REQUEST FOR A ONE-ON-ONE INTERVIEW WHICH EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED THUS FAR. IF

OTHER TV NETWORKS REQUEST INTERVIEWS AS WELL, EMBASSY WILL PRIORTIZE REQUESTS OR RECOMMEND THAT TV NETWORKS COVER THE PRESS CONFERENCE IN LIEU OF SEPARATE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ8538

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8538

PAGE 01 MANILA 07707 02 OF 02 260551Z
ACTION PA-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	DODE-00	DS-00	EAP-01
	EB-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	OIC-02	SP-00	TRSE-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/008W					

----------4D7B32 260551Z /38

R 260545Z JUN 98
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0246
INFO USIA WASHDC 0939

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 MANILA 007707

USIA

SECSTATE FOR PA, EAP/P AND EAP/PIMBS
USIA FOR EA - NMELE AND HHARA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS:, PREL, SCUL, ECON, RP
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDED PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES FOR SECRETARY ALBRIGHT DURING THE ASEAN MEETINGS

REF: A) MANILA 5786 (NOTAL), B) MANILA 5843 (NOTAL)

INTERVIEWS.

HUBBARD

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO3797

PAGE 01 HANOI 02278 100524Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/019W			

----------52A4A5 100524Z /38

O 100115Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2830
INFO AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY

UNCLAS HANOI 002278

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP, PREL, VM, US
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER CAM REQUESTS MANILA MEETING WITH SECRETARY

1. AMERICA'S DEPARTMENT DEPUTY DIRECTOR SANH CALLED AMBASSADOR TO REPORT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER/FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN MANH CAM WOULD BE ARRIVING IN MANILA ON JULY 22 FOR THE ASEAN MEETINGS AND DEPARTING ON THE 30TH. DURING THE DAYS HE IS THERE, HE REQUESTS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A MEETING WITH SECRETARY ALBRIGHT.

2. SANH DID NOT INDICATE ANY SPECIFIC SUBJECTS CAM WISHED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 HANOI 02278 100524Z
TO RAISE, BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT HE WILL WANT TO DISCUSS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON -- DEPARTMENT HAD SUGGESTED DEFERRAL OF THE SPRING REQUEST TO SEPTEMBER -- AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS AT THE WHITE HOUSE AT THAT TIME.

3. AS THE ASEAN MEETINGS TAKE PLACE, CONGRESS WILL BE FINALIZING ITS REVIEW OF THE JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER RENEWAL FOR VIETNAM, AND VIETNAM WILL BE ENGAGED IN ITS FIRST FORMAL DIALOGUE WITH THE WTO COMMITTEE IN GENEVA. THESE TOO WILL BE KEY CONCERNS FOR THE VIETNAMESE.

4. ACTION REQUEST: PLEASE ADVISE IF THE SECRETARY IS PLANNING TO SCHEDULE BILATERALS IN MANILA AND WHETHER SHE AGREES TO CAM'S REQUEST FOR A MEETING.

PETERSON

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6735

PAGE 01 STATE 126166 110225Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	ACQ-01
	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	ITCE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXME-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01
	E-00	UTED-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01
	L-01	MCO-01	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	SNIS-00
	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/027R						

126166
SOURCE: KODAKC.011036
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:MEHAYES:MEH -- 07/08/98 72927
APPROVED BY: EAP:AEBRAZEAL
EAP/RSP:PSLUTZ EAP/PIMBS:DHARTWICK (SUBS)
S/S:RLIKINS (SUBS)
----------5319D9 110226Z /38
P 110223Z JUL 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 126166 110225Z
AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL AUCKLAND PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY PRIORITY
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 126166

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECIN, PREL
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S BILATERALS DURING THE ARF-PMC

REF: (A) STATE 119546, (B)MANILA 7750

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.

2. (SBU) THE SECRETARY HAS AGREED TO HOLD BILATERAL MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS OF THE ARF-PMC WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF CHINA, JAPAN, KOREA, THAILAND, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, AND RUSSIA. SHE WILL ALSO HOLD A TRILATERAL MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF RUSSIA AND CHINA.

SHE HAS ALSO AGREED TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT ESTRADA AND TO TAKE PART IN ANOTHER BILATERAL EVENT (TBD) DURING HER STAY IN MANILA.

3. (U) THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS PROPOSE TIMES FOR THE BILATERALS. ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO PASS ON THESE PROPOSED TIMES TO THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS AND REPORT REACTION. SLUG REPLIES FOR S/S - ROSE LIKINS AND EAP FRONT OFFICE.

4. (SBU) PROPOSED BILATERAL SCHEDULE:

SUNDAY, JULY 26
3:00 PM FOREIGN MINISTER SIAZON

4:00 PM PRESIDENT ESTRADA

5:30 PM JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER (30 MINUTES)

MONDAY, JULY 27
7:45 AM TO 8:45 AM CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER (BREAKFAST)

5:45 PM INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

6:30 PM THAI FOREIGN MINISTER

8:00 PM DINNER WITH RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER (ALREADY PROPOSED)

TUESDAY, JULY 28
3:15 PM TO 4:15 PM TRILATERAL MEETING WITH RUSSIAN AND CHINESE FM'S

6:00 PM KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER

WEDNESDAY, JULY 29

BREAKFAST - POSSIBLE EVENT WITH AMCHAM (FINAL DECISION HAS NOT BEEN MADE)

5. (SBU) FOR MANILA: THE SECRETARY PROPOSES TO MEET WITH FM SIAZON ON SUNDAY, JULY 26 AT 3 PM. IF CONVENIENT FOR FM SIAZON, SHE PREFERS TO HOLD THE MEETING IN THE HOTEL. SHE SUGGESTS CALLING ON PRESIDENT ESTRADA IN THE AFTERNOON OF SUNDAY, JULY 26, PERHAPS AROUND 4 PM. IF THE PRESIDENT CANNOT ACCOMMODATE HER ON SUNDAY, HER SECOND PREFERENCE

WOULD BE MONDAY, JULY 27. THE SECRETARY HAS NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO MEET WITH VICE PRESIDENT MACAPAGAL-ARROYA.
ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0708

PAGE 01 MANILA 08520 01 OF 02 132229Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	DODE-00
	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W				

----------53BFAC 132229Z /38
O 132229Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0865
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 008520

SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EAP/RSP AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PREL, ASEAN, ECON, RP
SUBJECT: ARF/PMC: UPDATED SCHEDULE FOR EVENTS INVOLVING THE SECRETARY

REF: STATE 126166

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MANILA 08520 01 OF 02 132229Z
1. (SBU) THE NINE PLUS ONE MEETING FOR THE U.S. IS STILL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

SCHEDULED TO BEGIN ON TUESDAY, JULY 28 AT 1630. WE UNDERSTOOD THE DEPARTMENT PREFERRED TUESDAY AFTERNOON TO WEDNESDAY MORNING. THE ONLY RECENT CHANGE IS THAT DFA TELLS US THE MEETING WILL END AT 1730 VICE 1800. DFA EXPLAINED THAT SHORTENING EACH 9+1 MEETING WAS INTENDED TO ALLOW THREE ASEAN MINISTERS RATHER THAN ONE PARTICIPATE IN EACH SESSION.

2. (SBU) THE MORNING OF WEDNESDAY JULY 29 IS THE TIME PERIOD IN WHICH WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SECRETARY PREFERS TO DO THE "OUTSIDE EVENT." WE ARE PROCEEDING ON THIS BASIS AND WE ARE PROVIDING OPTIONS IN SEPTEL.

3. (U) FOLLOWING IS THE LATEST ARF/PMC SCHEDULE FROM DFA, INCLUDING THE NINE PLUS ONE MEETINGS:

26 JULY 1998 SUNDAY

0700 ASEAN MINISTERIAL GOLF TOURNAMENT

1930 ARF MINISTERS' INFORMAL WORKING DINNER

27 JULY 1998 MONDAY

0900 5TH ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM

1230 ARF WORKING LUNCH
ARF MINISTERS + 2 VENUE: SAMPAGUITA ROOM
ARF LISTENERS VENUE: RIGODON ROOM

1400 RESUMPTION OF ARF

1730 PRESS CONFERENCE OF THE ARF CHAIRMAN

28 JULY 1998 TUESDAY

0830 COURTESY CALL ON THE PRESIDENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF DIALOGUE PARTNERS
VENUE: MALACANANG PALACE

1000 OPEN SESSION OF THE POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE

(PMC)

ASEAN+DIALOGUE PARTNERS PLENARY (9+10)
SPEAKER: SECRETARY SIAZON

1030 CLOSED SESSION OF THE POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 9+10

1300 WORKING LUNCH

1500 POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES - ASEAN + DIALOGUE PARTNER (9+1)
ASEAN + CANADA
ASEAN + CHINA
ASEAN + JAPAN

1600 POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES 9+1
ASEAN + REPUBLIC OF KOREA
ASEAN + RUSSIAN FEDERATION
ASEAN + UNITED STATES

2000 PMC DINNER HOSTED BY OF FOREIGN SECRETARY AND MRS.

29 JULY 1998 WEDNESDAY

0900 POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES 9+1
ASEAN + EUROPEAN UNION
ASEAN + NEW ZEALAND

1030 POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES 9 + 1
ASEAN + AUSTRALIA
ASEAN + INDIA

1200 PMC JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE

1300 LUNCH

END SCHEDULE.

4. (SBU) AS INSTRUCTED IN REFTEL, EMBASSY HAS REQUESTED A

MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AND SECRETARY SIAZON FOR SUNDAY JULY 26 AT 1500, AT THE MANILA HOTEL. WE ARE ALSO EXPLORING WITH PRESIDENT ESTRADA'S EXECUTIVE SECRETARY THE POSSIBLITY OF A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ0709

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0709

PAGE 01 MANILA 08520 02 OF 02 132229Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	DODE-00
	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W				

----------53BFAD 132229Z /38

O 132229Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0866
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 02 OF 02 MANILA 008520

SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EAP/RSP AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PREL, ASEAN, ECON, RP
SUBJECT: ARF/PMC: UPDATED SCHEDULE FOR EVENTS INVOLVING THE SECRETARY

REF: STATE 126166

HUBBARD

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MANILA 08520 02 OF 02 132229Z

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ2621

PAGE 01 MANILA 08803 01 OF 02 171036Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CCO-00	CIAE-00	CPR-02	DIM-00
	DODE-00	ANHR-01	DS-00	EAP-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	IMMC-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	PA-00	PRS-00
	SSO-00	USSS-00	IMCC-01	DSCC-00	PRM-01	NFAT-00	CCR-01
	SAS-00	/011W					

------------------554FE3 171036Z /38

O 171034Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1101
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 008803

SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT FOR S/S AND EAP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), PREL, ARF, RP
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S VISIT UPDATE: ACTION REQUESTS

REF: HANOI 2278

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

1. (U) PLEASE SEE ACTION REQUESTS IN PARAS 4 THROUGH 8.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

BILATERAL MEETINGS

2. (SBU) WE HAVE INFORMED THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AT MALACANANG PALACE THAT THE SECRETARY WILL BE UNABLE TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT ESTRADA ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON AND ASKED HIM TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING AT ABOUT 1415 ON TUESDAY, JULY 28.

3. (SBU) DFA HAS INFORMED US THAT THE LATEST FOREIGN SECRETARY SIAZON WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR A BILATERAL WITH THE SECRETARY ON JULY 26 WOULD BE AT 6:00 FOR THIRTY MINUTES.

4. (SBU) THE VIETNAMESE DCM, PHAM VAN THANG, REQUESTED A BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN MANH CAM AT 9:00 AM ON JULY 28, FOLLOWING THE GROUP CALL ON PRESIDENT ESTRADA (REF A). POST ADVISED THANG THAT WE WOULD CONVEY HIS REQUEST TO THE DEPARTMENT.

5. (SBU) THE CHINESE EMBASSY ASKED IF THE U.S. SIDE PLANS ANY PRESS ACCESS FOR THE BILATERAL BREAKFAST MEETING ON JULY 27. ACCORDING TO THE EMBASSY, FOREIGN MINISTER TANG WILL BE JOINED IN THE MEETING BY 10-11 OFFICIALS. THE EMBASSY TOLD US THEY DO NOT HAVE ANTICIPATED NUMBERS FOR THE JULY 29 TRILATERAL MEETING. WE UNDERSTAND DEPARTMENT DESIRES MINISTER PLUS ONE PLUS INTERPRETER. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND DEPARTMENT WILL PROVIDE SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETER

EQUIPMENT.

FLIGHT CLEARANCE AND MANIFEST

6. (U) DFA HAS ASKED US TO SUBMIT A FLIGHT CLEARANCE REQUEST FOR THE SECRETARY'S AIRCRAFT. THE GOP GENERALLY REQUIRES FLIGHT CLEARANCE REQUESTS FOR FOREIGN AIRCRAFT BE SUBMITTED 15 DAYS BEFORE ARRIVAL.

7. (U) PLEASE PROVIDE THE MANIFEST FOR THE

SECRETARY'S PLANE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO COORDINATE WITH PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION.

MILITARY PERSONNEL

8. (SBU) DOD REQUIRES ALL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL OBTAIN A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL (A&T) STATUS FROM THE GOP BEFORE THEY ENTER THE PHILIPPINES. THE EMBASSY MUST SUBMIT REQUESTS FOR A&T STATUS TO DFA IN ADVANCE TO ENSURE THE ISSUANCE OF THE PROPER VISAS IN WASHINGTON. PLEASE ADVISE DOD PERSONNEL IN THE SECRETARY'S PARTY (INCLUDING FLIGHT CREW) TO CONSULT THE DOD'S FOREIGN COUNTRY CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PHILIPPINES AND SUBMIT THE REQUIRED INFORMATION PROMPTLY.

PHOTOGRAPHS

9. (U) PLEASE ADVISE ALL ARRIVING PERSONNEL TO BRING TWO 2X2 PHOTOGRAPHS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF HOTEL AND MEETING CREDENTIALS. EAP OFFICIALS APPLICATIONS WERE

CARRIED BY THE DCM.

SECRETARY'S SPEECH ON US-RP RELATIONS

10. (SBU) WE HAVE RESERVED THE MAYNILA ROOM AT THE MANILA HOTEL FOR THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH ON THE STATE OF US-RP RELATIONS. INVITEES WOULD BE SEATED BY 0730, WITH THE SECRETARY JOINING THE FUNCTION AT 0740 AND GIVING A TWENTY MINUTE SPEECH, WITH NO Q AND A'S. SHE WOULD LEAVE AT 0810 FOR THE TRILATERAL MEETING WITH THE RUSSIAN AND CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTERS ELSEWHERE IN THE MANILA HOTEL.

11. (SBU) FOR LOGISTICAL AND SECURITY REASONS, WE BELIEVE THE AUDIENCE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO A MAXIMUM OF ONE HUNDRED FIFTY PEOPLE. WE ENVISION HAVING EIGHTY GUESTS FROM THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN THE PHILIPPINES (AMCHAM) AND ANOTHER TWENTY PROMINENT FILIPINOS. THIS WOULD ALLOW SEATING FOR

THE SECRETARY'S PRESS PLUS THE SECRETARY'S STAFF, AS WELL AS POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION FROM A FEW LEADING FOREIGN JOURNALISTS BASED IN MANILA. THE ROOM CAN COMFORTABLY FIT THAT NUMBER, AND WOULD HAVE FIFTEEN

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ2622

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ2622

PAGE 01 MANILA 08803 02 OF 02 171036Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CCO-00	CIAE-00	CPR-02	DIM-00
	DODE-00	ANHR-01	DS-00	EAP-01	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	IMMC-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	PA-00
	PRS-00	SSO-00	USSS-00	IMCC-01	DSCC-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/010W						

----------554FE4 171037Z /38

O 171034Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1102
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 02 OF 02 MANILA 008803

SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT FOR S/S AND EAP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), PREL, ARF, RP
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S VISIT UPDATE: ACTION REQUESTS

REF: HANOI 2278

TABLES, WITH TEN PERSONS PER TABLE. FOR THIS EARLY MORNING EVENT, WE BELIEVE BREAKFAST SHOULD BE SERVED, AND ARE LOOKING INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING CONTINENTAL BREAKFASTS ON THE TABLES TO MINIMIZE

UNCLASSIFIED

DISRUPTION DURING THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH. THE AMCHAM WOULD FORMALLY HOST THE EVENT, THOUGH AMCHAM MEMBERS WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR BREAKFAST. THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD PAY FOR THE MEALS OF THE OTHER GUESTS.

HUBBARD

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E9

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0476

PAGE 01 MANILA 08946 01 OF 03 211320Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 CPR-02 DIM-00 DS-00 EAP-01 IMMC-01
TEDE-00 ADS-00 NSCE-00 PA-00 PRS-00 SSO-00 DSCC-00
SAS-00 /004W
----------567B67 211320Z /49

O 210931Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1183

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 008946

SENSITIVE

EAP - A/S ROTH AND EAP/RSP - SLUTZ

S/S FOR ELAINE SHOCAS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP, RP
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S VISIT
TO MANILA

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

1. FOLLOWING AT PARA 2 IS POST'S SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JULY 26-29 VISIT TO MANILA

2. BEGIN TEXT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MANILA 08946 01 OF 03 211320Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

OVERVIEW

IN 1998, THE PHILIPPINES MARKED ITS CENTENNIAL AS ASIA'S FIRST DECLARED REPUBLIC AND REAFFIRMED ITS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS THROUGH A NATIONAL ELECTION AND SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION TO A NEW ADMINISTRATION. NEWLY INAUGURATED PRESIDENT ESTRADA HAS ENDORSED STRONG U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONS. HE HAS PUBLICLY SUPPORTED PHILIPPINE SENATE RATIFICATION OF THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA). RETENTION OF FOREIGN SECRETARY SIAZON DEMONSTRATES THE CONTINUITY OF PHILIPPINE FOREIGN POLICY. ALTHOUGH THE REGIONAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAS HIT THE PHILIPPINES LESS SEVERELY THAN ITS NEIGHBORS, THE NEW ADMINISTRATION FACES A DAUNTING BUDGET DEFICIT CAUSED BY REVENUE SHORTFALLS. NEVERTHELESS, EXPORT GROWTH REMAINS STRONG, THE BANKING SECTOR IS STILL SOUND, AND THE ECONOMY SHOULD SEE GROWTH OF 1% IN 1998.

DEMOCRACY AFFIRMED

OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS, THE PHILIPPINES HAS MARKED THE CENTENNIAL OF THE COUNTRY'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FROM SPAIN BY REAFFIRMING THE STRENGTH OF ITS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. A PEACEFUL, FREE AND FAIR NATIONAL ELECTION MAY 11 (WITH AN 80TURNOUT), THE SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION TO A NEW PRESIDENT AND ADMINISTRATION JUNE 30, AND OPENING A NEW CONGRESS JULY 27, ARE THE LATEST MILESTONES IN THE DEMOCRATIC HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINES. THIS WAS THE SECOND DEMOCRATIC

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TRANSFER OF POWER SINCE THE FALL OF FERDINAND MARCOS IN 1986. IN A FIELD OF TEN CANDIDATES, VICE PRESIDENT JOSEPH ESTRADA, A ONE-TIME MOVIE ACTOR, MAYOR AND SENATOR, WON THE PRESIDENCY WITH ALMOST 40OF THE VOTE AS THE "UNITED OPPOSITION'S" CANDIDATE. SENATOR GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, DAUGHTER OF A FORMER PRESIDENT AND GEORGETOWN CLASSMATE OF PRESIDENT CLINTON, WON THE VICE-PRESIDENCY WITH ALMOST 50OF THE VOTE AS THE CANDIDATE OF THE THEN-RULING PARTY.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THE TRANSITION TO THE ESTRADA ADMINISTRATION WENT SMOOTHLY, WITH A RESPECTED CABINET SWORN IN THE SAME DAY AS THE PRESIDENT. (PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES TAKE OFFICE IMMEDIATELY IN THE PHILIPPINES, BEFORE CONFIRMATION BY THE HOUSE-SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPOINTMENTS.) PRESIDENT ESTRADA REASSURED THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY BY NAMING MAINSTREAM ECONOMISTS AND BUSINESS LEADERS TO THE KEY ECONOMIC PORTFOLIOS AND RETAINING THE GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK FOR THE TIME BEING (HIS TERM EXPIRES IN 1999). HE ANNOUNCED HE WOULD CONTINUE THE RAMOS ADMINISTRATION'S OPEN MARKET ECONOMIC POLICIES, WHILE ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS OF THE POOR AND STRENGTHENING THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR. HE ALSO PROMISED A CRACKDOWN ON CRIME AND CORRUPTION AND CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT AND THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT TO END THEIR LONG-RUNNING INSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS.

THE SMOOTH TRANSITION NOTWITHSTANDING, INITIAL MISSTEPS BY THE NEW ADMINISTRATION ON BURIAL OF FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS, THE REPLACEMENT OF SUBIC BAY ECONOMIC ZONE

CHAIRMAN RICHARD GORDON, AND NOMINATION OF DUBIOUS INDIVIDUALS TO SOME SENSITIVE POSITIONS HAVE LED TO A SOMEWHAT ROCKY START FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION.

FOREIGN POLICY

FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES WERE VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THE RETENTION OF FOREIGN SECRETARY DOMINGO "JUN" SIAZON (A HIGH SCHOOL CLASSMATE OF ESTRADA AND THE ONLY RAMOS CABINET SECRETARY KEPT IN OFFICE) IS A STRONG SIGN OF CONTINUITY. SIAZON IS LIKELY TO HAVE EVEN GREATER INFLUENCE IN THE ESTRADA ADMINISTRATION BECAUSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S LACK OF INTEREST IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE ABSENCE OF A STRONG NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR.

ASEAN AND THE REGION ARE THE FOCUS OF PHILIPPINE FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS. THE PHILIPPINES HAS BEEN A

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

KEY PLAYER WITHIN ASEAN, AND A COLLABORATOR OF THE
UNITED STATES IN MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO FOSTER

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ0479

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0479

PAGE 01 MANILA 08946 02 OF 03 211320Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	CCO-00	CPR-02	DIM-00	DS-00	EAP-01	IMMC-01
	TEDE-00	ADS-00	NSCE-00	PA-00	PRS-00	SSO-00	DSCC-00
	SAS-00	/004W					

----------567B79 211321Z /49

O 210931Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1184

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 02 OF 03 MANILA 008946

SENSITIVE

EAP - A/S ROTH AND EAP/RSP - SLUTZ

S/S FOR ELAINE SHOCAS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS:.OVIP, RP
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S VISIT TO MANILA

DEMOCRACY IN CAMBODIA, AND MORE RECENTLY, BURMA. AS THIS YEAR'S ASEAN CHAIR, THE PHILIPPINES IS HOSTING THE ANNUAL ARF MINISTERIAL, ASEAN MINISTERIAL AND POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE (PMC). PHILIPPINE SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE REGION ARE FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON THE ROLE OF CHINA IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA. TIES WITH BEIJING HAVE BEEN STRAINED BY THE SPRATLY ISSUE AND

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PHILIPPINE CONTACTS WITH TAIWAN. THE PHILIPPINES HAS MADE A SUSTAINED EFFORT TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH BEIJING IN ALL AREAS, AND ISOLATE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES FROM OTHER ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP.

U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONS

BEYOND ASIA, THE MOST IMPORTANT BILATERAL PARTNER OF THE PHILIPPINES IS THE UNITED STATES. PRESIDENT ESTRADA HAS TAKEN SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES TO HIGHLIGHT THE IMPORTANCE HE PLACES ON A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. ALTHOUGH HE WAS AN ANTI-U.S. BASES ACTIVISTS EARLIER IN HIS CAREER, ESTRADA WENT OUT OF HIS WAY DURING THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSURE THE U.S. OF HIS SUPPORT FOR STRONG U.S.-PHILIPPINE TIES AND THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA). HE HAS SINCE COME OUT PUBLICLY IN SUPPORT OF THE VFA, WHICH THE PHILIPPINE SENATE IS LIKELY TO TAKE UP IN LATE SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER. SIAZON AND DEFENSE SECRETARY MERCADO WILL LEAD THE ADMINISTRATION'S CAMPAIGN FOR SENATE RATIFICATION. MERCADO MAY PLAY A PARTICULARLY PIVOTAL ROLE SINCE HE VOTED AGAINST THE 1991 MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT AS A SENATOR (AS DID ESTRADA) AND HAS AN ESTABLISHED REPUTATION IN THE SENATE AS AN EXPERT ON MILITARY AFFAIRS. ESTRADA'S VIEWS WILL WEIGH HEAVILY WITH THE SENATORS FROM HIS LAMP PARTY, WHO MAKE UP NINE OF THE 23 MEMBERS OF THE INCOMING SENATE. APPROVAL WILL REQUIRE 16 VOTES OUT OF 23.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

WHILE INDICATIONS ARE POSITIVE, TANGENTIAL ISSUES, LIKE THE CLARK TOXIC WASTE ISSUE OR THE PHILIPPINE

CONSTITUTION'S ANTI-NUCLEAR PROVISIONS, WILL LEAD TO LENGTHY SENATE DEBATE ON THE AGREEMENT. WE HAVE STRESSED THAT THE VFA IS SIMILAR TO OUR SOFA'S WITH 77 OTHER COUNTRIES, THAT NONE OF ITS PROVISIONS ARE UNIQUE TO THE PHILIPPINES, NOR PREDICATED ON ANY CONDESCENSION TO THE PHILIPPINES.

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

THE PHILIPPINES HAS BEEN WHIPSAWED BY THE REGION'S CRISIS BUT ITS ECONOMY IS NOT AS TROUBLED AS THOSE OF ITS NEIGHBORS. WHILE GROWTH ESTIMATES FOR 1998 HAVE BEEN SCALED BACK REPEATEDLY AS THE REGION'S DIFFICULTIES MOUNTED, THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT AND MOST OUTSIDERS STILL EXPECT GDP GROWTH OF AT LEAST 1 IN 1998 AND AN IMPROVEMENT IN 1999. PART OF THE PHILIPPINES' RESILIENCE IS THE RESULT OF SOUND ECONOMIC POLICIES IMPLEMENTED EFFECTIVELY DURING THE RAMOS YEARS; PART IS DUE TO THE CLOSE COOPERATION OF THE IMF OVER THREE DECADES OF ECONOMIC CRISES; AND PART IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE PHILIPPINES DID NOT ENJOY THE DECADE OF HIGH GROWTH EXPERIENCED, IN PARTICULAR, BY MALAYSIA AND THAILAND.

THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY IS KEEPING ITS HEAD ABOVE WATER LARGELY ON THE STRENGTH OF EXPORTS. DOMESTIC CONSUMER DEMAND HAD BEGUN TO WEAKEN IN THE SECOND QUARTER ON 1997 (CAR SALES PEAKED IN MARCH 1997), WELL BEFORE THE CRISIS HIT. EXPORTS DURING THE FIRST FIVE MONTHS OF 1998 WERE UP 21OVER THE SAME PERIOD IN 1997 -- A MAJOR DIFFERENCE FROM ITS ASEAN PARTNERS. MOST OF THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

GROWTH HAS COME FROM ELECTRONICS, MAINLY PRODUCED BY AMERICAN FIRMS LIKE INTEL, TEXAS INSTRUMENTS AND MOTOROLA, WHICH ARE GROWING 45PER YEAR AND ARE THE COUNTRY'S LEADING EXPORT. THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THIS GROWTH WILL SLOW IN THE COMING MONTHS, DUE TO SLOWING GROWTH OF DEMAND FOR COMPUTERS. EXPORTS OF AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS HAVE ALSO BEEN STRONG, BECOMING THE SECOND LEADING EXPORT THIS YEAR, AHEAD OF GARMENTS.

THE GREATEST SHOCKS TO THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN THE CURRENCY AND STOCK MARKETS. AFTER REACHING A LOW OF P45.3/US$, A DEPRECIATION OF ABOUT 42FROM ITS JUNE 1997 LEVEL OF P26.4/US$, THE PESO REBOUNDED AND STABILIZED AT ABOUT P38-40/US$ UNTIL THE YEN'S WEAKNESS AFFECTED ALL SOUTHEAST ASIAN CURRENCIES IN JUNE. THE PESO NOW TRADES IN THE P41-42/US$ RANGE. THE STOCK MARKET ALSO RECOVERED ABOUT A THIRD OF ITS VALUE IN THE FIRST TWO MONTHS OF THE YEAR, BUT HAS RECENTLY WEAKENED ALONG WITH OTHER ASIAN MARKETS AND STANDS 50DOWN FROM THE JANUARY 1997 LEVEL. INTEREST

NNNNPTQ0480

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 MANILA 08946 03 OF 03 211321Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 CPR-02 DIM-00 DS-00 EAP-01 IMMC-01
TEDE-00 ADS-00 NSCE-00 PA-00 PRS-00 SSO-00 DSCC-00
SAS-00 /004W
----------567B8D 211321Z /49
O 210931Z JUL 98
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1185

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 03 OF 03 MANILA 008946

SENSITIVE

EAP - A/S ROTH AND EAP/RSP - SLUTZ

S/S FOR ELAINE SHOCAS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP, RP
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S VISIT
TO MANILA

RATES REMAIN HIGH, WITH PRIME RATES AT 16AND AVERAGE
FINANCING COSTS NEAR 20FOR MOST BUSINESSES.

THE NEW ADMINISTRATION FACES A SERIOUS PUBLIC SECTOR
BUDGET DEFICIT THIS YEAR (AFTER THREE YEARS IN WHICH
THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT POSTED SMALL SURPLUSES). THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT'S DEFICIT IS ESTIMATED AT $1.0
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MANILA 08946 03 OF 03 211321Z
BILLION, WHILE SOME FORECASTS PUT THE CONSOLIDATED
PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT AS HIGH AS $2.5 BILLION. THE
MAIN PROBLEM HAS BEEN A DRAMATIC FALL IN BOTH INCOME
TAX AND CUSTOMS REVENUES THAT ARE WELL BELOW BUDGET
ESTIMATES BECAUSE OF THE CRISIS. THE ADMINISTRATION IS
WORKING ON A TAX AMNESTY PROGRAM BUT INSISTS THAT ITS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
REAL PURPOSE IS TO STRENGTHEN LONGER-TERM REVENUE COLLECTION BY IDENTIFYING HIDDEN WEALTH.

SO FAR, THE IMF, WORLD BANK, AND ADB HAVE GENERALLY GIVEN THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT CREDIT FOR THE WAY IT HAS HANDLED THE CRISIS. IN THE SPRING, THE PHILIPPINES "GRADUATED" FROM ITS THREE DECADES-LONG IMF PROGRAM, FULFILLING A KEY OBJECTIVE OF THE RAMOS ADMINISTRATION. USED TO ADVERSITY, PHILIPPINE BANKS AND INDUSTRIES ARE PROBABLY IN BETTER SHAPE TO RIDE OUT THE CRISIS THAN THEIR REGIONAL COUNTERPARTS.

ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER ESTRADA

PRESIDENT ESTRADA DOES NOT APPEAR TO DIFFER FROM THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION ON THE BASIC COURSE OF MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMIC REFORM. DURING THE CAMPAIGN AND SINCE THE ELECTION, HE HAS PLEDGED TO CONTINUE THE REFORMS INITIATED BY THE AQUINO AND RAMOS ADMINISTRATIONS, THOUGH WITH A GREATER EMPHASIS ON IMPROVING THE WELFARE OF THE POOR AND ON STRENGTHENING THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR.

THE ADMINISTRATION IS EXPECTED TO DECLARE A NUMBER OF ECONOMIC REFORM BILLS AS "PRIORITY MEASURES" FOR EARLY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION BY CONGRESS. THESE INCLUDE REFORM OF THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR, LEADING TO PRIVATIZATION OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, AND OPENING UP THE RETAIL TRADE SECTOR, CLOSED TO FOREIGN EQUITY FOR FOUR DECADES. SENIOR OFFICIALS HAVE TALKED OF ALLOWING FOREIGN BANKS TO BUY 100OF LOCAL BANKS (THE CURRENT LIMIT -- 60IS STILL THE HIGHEST IN ASEAN). ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE ALSO CALLED FOR LIBERALIZING RESTRAINTS ON FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, ALTHOUGH CHANGING THE BAN ON FOREIGN LAND OWNERSHIP WOULD REQUIRE A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.

END TEXT

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

HUBBARD

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 1998

Dear Mr. Gilman:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Benjamin Gilman,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk SO
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok DK
H:HDPittman ok DP
S/P:BWoo ok BW
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok SO

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 998

Dear Ms. Roybal-Allard:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Lucille Roybal-Allard,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk SO
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok DK
H:HDPittman ok DP
S/P:BWoo ok BW
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok SO

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 1998

Dear Mr. Nadler:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Jerrold Nadler,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk SO
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok DK
H:HDPittman ok DP
S/P:BWoo ok BW
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok SO

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 [illegible]

Dear Mr. DeFazio:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Peter DeFazio,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok
H:HDPittman ok
S/P:BWoo ok
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 [illegible]

Dear Mr. Sabo:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Martin Olav Sabo,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk SO
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok DK
H:HDPittman ok DP
S/P:BWoo ok BW
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok SO

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 1998

Dear Mr. Lewis:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
John Lewis,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk SO
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok DK
H:HDPittman ok DP
S/P:BWoo ok BW
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok SO

E17

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 1998

Dear Mr. Dixon:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Julian Dixon,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok
H:HDPittman ok
S/P:BWoo ok
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok

E18

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 1998

Dear Mr. Meehan:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Martin Meehan,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk SO
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok DK
H:HDPittman ok DP
S/P:BWoo ok BW
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok SO

E19

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 1998

Dear Mr. McDermott:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Jim McDermott,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok
H:HDPittman ok
S/P:BWoo ok
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 1998

Dear Mr. Hinchey:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Maurice Hinchey,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk SO
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok DK
H:HDPittman ok DP
S/P:BWoo ok BW
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok SO

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 1998

Dear Mr. Kucinich:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Dennis Kucinich,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk SO
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok DK
H:HDPittman ok DP
S/P:BWoo ok BW
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok SO

E22

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 1998

Dear Mr. Frank:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Barney Frank,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk SO
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok DK
H:HDPittman ok DP
S/P:BWoo ok BW
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok SO

E23

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 1998

Dear Mr. Abercrombie:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Neil Abercrombie,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok
H:HDPittman ok
S/P:BWoo ok
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok

E24

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 1998

Dear Mr. Olver:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
John Olver,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk SO
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok DK
H:HDPittman ok DP
S/P:BWoo ok BW
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok SO

E25

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 2000

Dear Mr. McGovern:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
James McGovern,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk SO
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok DK
H:HDPittman ok DP
S/P:BWoo ok BW
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok SO

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 998

Dear Ms. Morella:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Constance Morella,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk SO
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok DK
H:HDPittman ok DP
S/P:BWoo ok BW
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok SO

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 1998

Dear Mr. Underwood:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Robert A. Underwood,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk SO
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok DK
H:HDPittman ok DP
S/P:BWoo ok BW
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok SO

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 17 1998

Dear Mr. Brown:

Thank you for your letter of July 22 urging Secretary Albright to take a leadership role on Burma at the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post Ministerial Conference in Manila.

While in Manila Secretary Albright vigorously condemned the Burmese military government's mistreatment of Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and also successfully forged an international consensus among nations deeply concerned by the Burmese junta's actions. During the conference Secretary Albright pulled together a group of like-minded Foreign Ministers to voice concern with the political situation in Burma, in particular protesting the roadside standoff between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government to Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw. Later that day the Secretary convened a group of concerned Foreign Ministers to discuss further options with regard to Burma.

One direct result of Secretary Albright's action was an initiative by ten countries, coordinated by the U.S., to deliver a joint demarche to the Burmese government. This formal statement, delivered on August 10, deplores the government's mistreatment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; urges the government to address the underlying cause of the problem; and voices concern for imprisoned National League for Democracy (NLD) Members of Parliament-elect.

As Secretary Albright said in Manila, Burma is a country in great and growing distress and dialogue is the only way to resolve this. We share your concern with the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and will continue to work vigorously to press for a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC and the democratic opposition, in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

The Honorable
Sherrod Brown,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 MAY 2006 200503343

We hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

o:bcltv\burma\congress\ARAF-PMC.doc

drafted: EAP/BCLTV:SOudkirk
7-0056 8/6/98

approved: EAP:JWolf, Acting

cleared: EAP/BCLTV:RHuso/SVillarosa
EAP/RSP:DKeegan ok
H:HDPittman ok
S/P:BWoo ok
P:DStraub info
DRL/BA:SO'Sullivan ok

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLAS . SENSITIVE SECSTATE 126107
MANILSVA:
ACTION: POL
INFO: DAO ECON CHRON TA AMB RA DCM
Lasers:
INFO: XEROX04C USIS CONS AIDC JUSMAG

DISSEMINATION: POLSENS
CHARGE: PROG

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 04 JAN 2007 200503343

VZCZCMLO690
OO RUEHML
DE RUEHC #6107/01 1920112
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 110109Z JUL 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 4926
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 4529
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 5638
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 5554
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 9249
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 6459
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0300
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 9100
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 126107

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEAN, PREL, ETRD
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR ASEAN COUNTRIES FOR ASEAN/PMC

1. (U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

2. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.

3. (U) IN PREPARATION FOR THE ASEAN POST MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE (ASEAN/PMC) AND "NINE PLUS ONE" AT THE END OF JULY, THE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT POSTS DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 5 TO THE APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND SEND BACK IMMEDIATELY ANY QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS IF GIVEN.

4. (U) DUE TO THE LENGTH OF TALKING POINTS, POSTS MAY LEAVE THE TEXT WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AS A NON-PAPER.

5. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS

IN PREPARATION FOR THE UPCOMING ASEAN POST MINISTERIAL

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

04F93/

CONFERENCE, WE WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU OUR THINKING ON THE ECONOMIC ISSUES THAT WILL DOMINATE DISCUSSION AT THIS IMPORTANT MEETING.

WE HAVE A COMMON GOAL TO PRESERVING PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION -- AN ABIDING STRATEGIC INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. THE REGION'S CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE REAL THREATS TO THIS CRUCIAL, JOINT OBJECTIVE.

SINCE THERE ARE NO "QUICK FIXES," IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE PROJECT A SENSE OF CONFIDENCE THAT PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED AND THAT PRACTICAL STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO OVERCOME THEM.

WE WANT TO REAFFIRM OUR SUPPORT OF THE BASIC APPROACH OUTLINED IN THE MANILA FRAMEWORK, ONE WHICH RECOGNIZES THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE IMF IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AND UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING SOUND MACROECONOMIC AND STRUCTURAL POLICIES.

WE ALSO WANT TO BUILD ON THE OUTCOME THE FINANCE MINISTERS IN KANANASKIS THIS SPRING. AT THIS MEETING, THE MINISTERS GAVE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS, THE IMF, WORLD BANK AND ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, AN OVERWHELMING MANDATE TO EXPAND ACTIVITIES STRENGTHENING SOCIAL SAFETY NETS IN ASEAN COUNTRIES SEVERELY AFFECTED BY THE CURRENT ECONOMIC TURMOIL IN ASIA, NAMELY INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND. THESE ENTITIES ALREADY ARE RESPONDING.

BUT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ALONE CANNOT SOLVE THE DEEPER LONG-TERM PROBLEMS IN THOSE ASEAN COUNTRIES AND THE REGION GENERALLY. WHILE INCREASED DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FLOWS HAVE HELPED STABILIZE CURRENT BALANCE OV PAYMENTS PROBLEMS AND SOFTEN THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL STRIFE RESULTING FROM THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT OFFICIAL LENDING/ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS -- NO MATTER HOW GENEROUS -- WILL BE ABLE MAKE UP FOR THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN LOST PRIVATE INVESTMENT.

TO ILLUSTRATE, NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO ASEAN IN 1996 ALONE TOTALED MORE THAN $29 BILLION, WHILE NET POSITIVE FLOWS OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE WERE NEARLY ZERO. THOUGH EXACT FIGURES ARE HARD TO OBTAIN FOR EARLY 1998, IT IS CLEAR THAT NET FDI TO THE REGION HAS

FALLEN DRAMATICALLY, WITHOUT AN OFFSETTING INCREASE IN ODA. THIS APPARENT SHORTFALL HAS LEFT A HUGE GAP IN OVERALL CAPITAL INFLOWS.

THEREFORE, IT IS CRITICAL THAT WE INCREASE QUICKLY THE AMOUNT OF NEW FDI INTO THE REGION. REBUILDING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND CREATING SECURE, OPEN AND TRANSPARENT MARKETS FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR, PARTICULARLY IN THOSE COUNTRIES SEVERELY AFFECTED BY THE CRISIS, IS THE KEY TO

SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY. THE TANGIBLE BENEFITS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN ASEAN IS WELL-KNOWN. FDI WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN ASEAN'S PAST DYNAMIC GROWTH. IT PROVIDED ASEAN WITH MORE JOBS AND HIGHER WAGES, BETTER TECHNOLOGY AND GREATER SKILLS, INCREASED EXPORTS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE, CHEAPER CAPITAL AND INDUSTRIAL INPUTS. MOREOVER, CONTINUED AND STABLE INFLOW OF FDI REDUCES A COUNTRY'S EXPOSURE TO RISK AS EXCHANGE RATES AND INTEREST RATES FLUCTUATE.
WE ARE COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH ASEAN TO DEVELOP POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS THAT WILL REESTABLISH THE FLOW OF FDI AND ENCOURAGE NEW FDI. THE USG STANDS READY TO WORK IN PARTNERSHIP WITH ASEAN -- AND TO PROVIDE ANY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE THAT MAY BE NECESSARY -- TO ENSURE THAT OUR JOINT ACTION FOR INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND SUCCEEDS. MOREOVER, IF WE INCLUDE THE INPUT OF A DYNAMIC AND COOPERATIVE PRIVATE SECTOR, ANY RESULTING PROGRAMS WOULD UNDENIABLY HAVE MORE CREDIBILITY. INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH BUSINESS HAVE REVEALED THAT THE U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR ALSO STANDS READY TO JOIN ASEAN WITH ITS URGENT TASK TO REBUILD THOSE OF ITS ECONOMIES IN GREAT STRESS. YOU WILL RECALL THAT BUSINESS HAD A FORMAL AND POSITIVE ROLE IN THE U.S.-ASEAN DIALOGUE IN THE FORM OF THE U.S. -ASEAN AND ASEAN-U.S. BUSINESS COUNCILS.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF AREAS UPON WHICH WE ALL COULD COLLECTIVELY FOCUS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT WORK IN THE FOLLOWING OR LIKE AREAS WOULD SEND A PARTICULARLY STRONG SIGNAL TO INTERNATIONAL MARKETS:

INVESTMENT:

- ASEAN MEMBERS WHO HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO MIGHT CONSIDER ACCELERATING THEIR COMMITMENTS IN THE APEC INVESTMENT GROUP AND SIGN, RATIFY,

AND IMPLEMENT THE IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF ARBITRATION, INCLUDING THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AND WASHINGTON CONVENTION.

- [FOR SINGAPORE, THE PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA, THAILAND ONLY]: WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE ON A BILATERAL BASIS COMMITMENTS TO OPEN INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES THROUGH BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES.

TRANSPARENCY:

- SEVERAL ASIAN LEADERS HAVE CITED THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY IN BUSINESS PRACTICES.

-- THE PACIFIC BASIN ECONOMIC COUNCIL HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN ENCOURAGING GOOD GOVERNANCE

INITIATIVES AS A MEANS TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND DEVELOPMENT.

- IN LINE WITH THEIR CALL, WE PROPOSE THAT WE CONSIDER AN INITIATIVE ON TRANSPARENCY AND GOOD BUSINESS PRACTICES. THIS COULD FOLLOW THE MODEL OF BUSINESS ETHICS SET FORTH BY THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.

- AN ASEAN-LED INITIATIVE IN THE AREA OF GOOD GOVERNANCE WILL PROVIDE AN ENORMOUS BOOST TO THE REGION AT A TIME WHEN IT IS SEEKING TO IMPROVE ITS IMAGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT.

- YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO CONSIDER JOINING THE OECD CONVENTION ON CRIMINALIZING THE BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS.

MARKET LIBERALIZATION:

WE NEED TO REAFFIRM OUR COMMITMENT TO OPEN MARKETS.

- IN VANCOUVER LAST NOVEMBER LEADERS MANDATED THE CONCLUSION OF AN APEC EARLY VOLUNTARY SECTORAL LIBERALIZATION (EVSL) PACKAGE, OFFERING REAL BENEFITS TO ALL ECONOMIES. WE SHOULD REAFFIRM OUR COMMITMENT TO THIS PROCESS.

- WE CAN FURTHER OPEN MARKETS THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE URUGUAY ROUND BUILT IN AGENDA AND FOR ASEAN TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THE EXPANSION OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION IN AFTA.

TRADE FINANCING:

THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN OUR EFFORTS TO REVIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EXPORTS.

- THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDONESIA AND THAILAND TO FINALIZE DETAILS OF CREDIT FACILITIES IN EACH COUNTRY. WE HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS BY THE TIME OF THE ASEAN MEETING.
- WE EXPECT THESE FACILITIES, EACH OF WHICH IS FOR $1 BILLION IN SHORT-TERM TRADE CREDITS, TO BECOME OPERATIVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. EX-IM PROGRAMS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE IN THE PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, BRUNEI, AND VIETNAM.
- WE HOPE OTHER NON-ASEAN COUNTRIES WILL TAKE SIMILAR ACTION.

THE U.S. FORMAL STATEMENT TO THE PMC WILL OUTLINE THESE AREAS OF ACTION. SIMILAR STATEMENTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD CONFIRM TO INTERNATIONAL MARKETS THAT THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT PRACTICAL STEPS TO ADDRESS THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL IN ASIA.

OUR MEETINGS WILL ALSO PROVIDE AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS SEVERAL GLOBAL ISSUES. IN PARTICULAR, WE WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS ENVIRONMENT CONCERNS, INCLUDING SUCH TOPICS AS CLIMATE CHANGE AND HAZE; MIGRATION ISSUES, INCLUDING TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN; AND COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS.

GLOBAL ISSUES CONTRIBUTE TO AND COMPOUND OTHERS, SUCH AS THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. WE POSTPONE ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES AT OUR PERIL.

IN LIGHT OF THIS RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF GLOBAL ISSUES, OVER THE LAST YEAR, WORKING IN CONSULTATION WITH

THE ASEAN ENVIRONMENT MINISTERS, THE U.S. HAS DEVELOPED ITS "SOUTHEAST ASIAN ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVE" TO HELP ADDRESS THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE FIRES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR COMMENTS AND REACTIONS.

END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS.

6. (SBU) ACTION ITEM FOR EMBASSIES MANILA, SINGAPORE, JAKARTA, AND BANGKOK: WE SEEK HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF THE ECONOMIC POINTS SET FORTH ABOVE AND AGREEMENT THEY WILL SPEAK ALONG SUCH LINES DURING THE PMC AND POSSIBLY THE "NINE PLUS ONE" MEETING.

7. (SBU) ACTION ITEM FOR EMBASSIES KUALA LUMPUR, JAKARTA, BANGKOK, SINGAPORE, MANILA: WE SEEK HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR OUR DESIRE TO DISCUSS GLOBAL/TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES AT THE "NINE PLUS ONE" AND FOR THEIR COOPERATIVE ACTION IN THREE AREAS -- ENVIRONMENT, MIGRATION/TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN, AND COUNTERNARCOTICS.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#6107
NNNN

(X3)

RELEASED IN FULL

As of 1400 July 25, 1998 DRAFT

Summary Schedule for Secretary Albright's Participation
In the ASEAN in Manila
July 26-July 29, 1998

Sunday, July 26

	1125	Arrive Yokota AFB
	1255	Depart Yokota AFB en route Manila Flight time: 3 hours 55 minutes Time change: - 1 hour
	1520	Arrive Manila, the Philippines
(Archabal)	1535	Depart airport en route to hotel Drive time 30 minutes Press: Camera spray
(DS)		Hotel Arrival Scenario
(Sullivan) L KELLY	1800	Bilateral Meeting with Secretary Siazon (S + 4) Press: Camera spray Venue: The Manila Hotel - Room 1023 (PHIL SUITE)
(Sullivan) L KELLY	1830	(T) Bilateral Meeting with Japanese FM Obuchi Press: Camera spray Venue: Cabinet Lounge
(Lewis) L KELLY	1930	Dinner hosted by Secretary Siazon for Ministers (S +1) Press: Closed Venue: The Manila Hotel - Champagne Salon

Monday, July 27

(Lewis)	0745	Bilateral Breakfast with Chinese FM Tang (S+) Press: Camera spray Venue: The Manila Hotel - Champagne Salon

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 04 JAN 2007 200503343

04F73,1

(Potter)	0900	ASEAN Regional Forum Plenary - morning session (S + 2)
BYERS	1030	Pull-aside with Indian rep Jaswant Singh at coffee break
		Press: Camera Spray
		Venue: The Manila Hotel - Polkabal Room NOTETAKERS NEXT DOOR
		Venue for pull-aside: The Manila Hotel - Archives Room
(Lewis)	1230	Working lunch (S + 2)
		Press: Closed
		Venue: The Manila Hotel - Rigodon Room NOTETAKERS LUNCH W SAMPANGUITA
(Potter)	1400	ASEAN Regional Forum Plenary - afternoon session (S + 2)
		Press: Closed
		Venue: The Manila Hotel - Polkabal Room
(Sullivan)	1730	Bilateral with Korean FM Park
LONNY		Press: Camera spray
		Venue: The Manila Hotel - Room 457 (Hold Room 456)
(Snelsire)	1930	Joint press availability with Russian FM Primakov
		Press: Open (±150)
		Venue: The Manila Hotel - Rigodon Room
(Snelsire)	‡ 2000	Working Dinner with Russian FM Primakov (to include time for rehearsal if necessary) (S + 3)
		Press: Closed
		Venue: The Manila Hotel - MacArthur Suite

Tuesday, July 28

(Bracken)	0830	Depart hotel for courtesy call on President Estrada by all FMs of ASEAN dialogue partners (S only)
		Drive time hotel to palace 10 minutes
GRETA		Press: Camera Spray
		Venue: Malacanang Palace - CONFERENCE HALL

(Potter) LONNY	1000	ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference morning session (9 + 10) (Possible pull-asides with Brunei, Singapore, EU) Press: Open for first 15 minutes (DFA will confirm) Venue: The Manila Hotel - Polkabal/Rigodon Room Venue for pull asides: The Manila Hotel - Archives Room
	1300	Private lunch
	1400	Depart Hotel for Embassy Drive time hotel to Embassy 5 minutes
(Ortblad)	1415	NGO Meeting Press: TBD Venue: U.S. Embassy - 1st fl. Conference room
(Herbert)	1500	Embassy Meet and Greet Press: Closed (Embassy official photographer) Venue: U.S. Embassy, Ball Room
(Bracken)	1530	Call on Philippine President Estrada Drive time embassy to palace - 20 minutes Press: Camera spray Venue: Malacanang Palace - Music Room
	1615	Depart Palace for Manila Hotel Drive time palace to hotel 10 minutes
(Lewis)	1630	ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference 9 + 1 session (S + 4) Press: Camera spray Venue: The Manila Hotel - Champagne Salon
(Sullivan) LONNY	1800	Bilateral with Thai FM Surin Press: Camera spray Venue: The Manila Hotel - Cabinet Lounge
(Hutchens)	1900 (1830?)	Rehearsal on stage for dinner entertainment Press: Closed Venue: The Manila Hotel - Polkabal/Rigodon Room

U/S LIPTON TAKES OVER DURING SEC POLL ASIDES

NEED SCHEDULE FOR REHEARSAL TIME: 6:30 - 7:00 POSSIBLE?

(Snelsire)	2000	ASEAN PMC Dinner (featuring "entertainment")	
		Press:	Closed
		Venue:	The Manila Hotel - Polkabal/Rigodon Room

Wednesday, July 29

(Klecheski)	0740	Remarks to American Chamber of Commerce	
		Press:	Open
		Venue:	The Manila Hotel - Maynila Room
(Sullivan)	0815	Bilateral with Indonesian FM Alatas	
		Press:	Camera spray
		Venue:	The Manila Hotel - Cabinet Lounge
	0845	Depart hotel en route to airport Drive time 40 minutes	
(Archabal)	0930	Depart Manila en route to Papua New Guinea	

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

TRIP OF SECRETARY MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT TO THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 04 JAN 2007 200503343

Manila, Philippines
Monday, July 27, 1998

04F73, 1

UNCLASSIFIED

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

7:45 a.m.	Breakfast with Chinese FM Tang
9:00 a.m.	ASEAN Regional Forum Plenary-Morning Session
10:30 a.m.	Pull-aside with Indian Representative Singh
10:45 a.m.	ASEAN Regional Forum-Morning Session Con't
12:30 p.m.	ASEAN Regional Forum Working Lunch
2:00 p.m.	ASEAN Regional Forum Plenary-Afternoon Session
3:30 p.m.	COFFEE BREAK
3:45 p.m.	ASEAN Regional Forum-Afternoon Session Con't
5:35 p.m.	Bilateral with Korean FM Park
6:10 p.m.	PRESS PRE-BRIEF/PRIVATE TIME: 1 hr 15 mins
7:30 p.m.	Jt. Press Conference with Russian FM Primakov
8:00 p.m.	Working Dinner with Russian FM Primakov

RON: Manila Hotel
Manila, Philippines

EVENT: Breakfast with Chinese FM Tang

7:40 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Suite and proceeds to Champagne Salon.

7:45 a.m. Breakfast begins.

POOL SPRAY AT TOP

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	PRC	Foreign Minister Tang
	E. Shocas		Assistant Foreign Minister Wang
	A/S Roth		Asian Dept. DG Zhang
	Gen. Foglesong		Americas & Oceania Affrs. DG Lu
	G. Craig		ACDA Director General Sha
	A/S Larson		Asian Dept. Counselor Yang
	B. Einhorn		Info. Dept. Counselor Yang
	J. Foley		FM Secretary Tian
	M. Daley		Interpreter
	K. Campbell		
	R. Greene, Notetaker		
	Interpreter		

CONSECUTIVE INTERPRETATION

8:45 a.m. Breakfast concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Champagne Salon and proceeds to Polkabal Room.

EVENT: ASEAN Regional Forum Plenary-Morning Session

9:00 a.m. Plenary begins.

POOL SPRAY AT TOP

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	ASEAN	Foreign Secretary Siazon
	A/S Roth		Foreign Ministers
	K. Campbell		Dialogue Partners
	P. Slutz/P. Sommers, Notetakers		Observers

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

Order of Events

-- Foreign Minister Siazon makes welcoming remarks.

-- Adoption of agenda.

-- Business arrangements.

NOTE: Ministers have no set time for interventions.

-- Discussion of regional & int'l issues:
- S. Asia nuclear testing
- Asian financial crisis
- Cambodia
- Burma
- Korean peninsula/KEDO
- China-US Summit
- Contingency points (APLs, Spratly Islands, SEANWFZ)

-- Consideration of reports of ARF Track I activities.

-- Discussion of ARF membership:
- Mongolia
- N. Korea
- Other applicants
- Moratorium

-- Discussion of future directions of ARF:
- Confidence building & preventative diplomacy
- Contingency points (ARF Summit)

-- Discussion of other matters:
- Chairman's statement
- Institutionalization (ARF Communications Network)

EVENT: Pull-aside with Indian Representative Singh

10:30 a.m. Session breaks for coffee. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Polkabal Room and proceeds to Archives Room.

Pull-aside begins.

CLOSED PRESS

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT G. Craig B. Einhorn M. Daley	GOI	Jaswant Singh Others TBD

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

10:45 a.m. Pull-aside concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Archives Room and returns to Polkabal Room.

Session resumes.

12:30 p.m. Session concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Polkabal Room and proceeds to Rigodon Room.

EVENT: ASEAN Regional Forum Working Lunch

Lunch begins.

CLOSED PRESS

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT A/S Roth K. Campbell	ASEAN	Foreign Secretary Siazon Secretary General Severino Dialogue Partners Observers
OTHERS	European Commssn. VP Marin (UK) For. Office Min. of State Fatchett (Germany) For. Ministry Min. of State Hoyer (Germany) UNDP Regional Director Htun Princess Masna (Brunei)		

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

Order of Events

-- Continuation of agenda.

2:00 p.m. Lunch concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Rigodon Room and returns to Polkabal Room.

EVENT: ASEAN Regional Forum Plenary-Afternoon Session

Session begins.

CLOSED PRESS

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT A/S Roth K. Campbell	ASEAN	Foreign Secretary Siazon Foreign Ministers Dialogue Partners Observers

Order of Events

-- Continuation of agenda.

3:30 p.m. Session breaks for coffee.

3:45 p.m. Session resumes.

5:30 p.m. Session concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Polkabal Room and proceeds to Room 457, 4th floor.

EVENT: Bilateral with Korean Foreign Minister Park

5:35 p.m. Bilateral begins.

POOL SPRAY AT TOP

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT A/S Roth Gen. Foglesong G. Craig A/S Larson B. Einhorn J. Foley K. Campbell A. O'Neill, Notetaker	GOK	Foreign Minister Park Deputy Minister Kim N. American Affrs. DG Kwon Econ. Affrs. Dep. DG Lee Asia & Pacific Trade Dir. Jeon

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

6:05 p.m. Bilateral concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Room 457 and proceeds to Suite.

6:10 p.m. PRESS PRE-BRIEF/PRIVATE TIME: 1 hr 15 mins

EVENT: Joint Press Conference with Russian Foreign Minister Primakov

7:25 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Suite and proceeds to Rigodon Room.

7:30 p.m. Event begins.

OPEN PRESS

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	GOR	Foreign Minister Primakov

CONSECUTIVE INTERPRETATION

Order of Events

-- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT makes statement.

-- Foreign Minister Primakov makes statement.

-- Qs & As.

7:55 p.m. Event concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Rigodon Room and proceeds to Suite.

EVENT: Working Dinner with Russian Foreign Minister Primakov

8:00 p.m. Dinner begins.

OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	GOR	Foreign Minister Primkov
	Amb. Sestanovich		Deputy FM Berdennikov
	B. Einhorn		Asst. to FM Makarian
	P. Afanasenko, Interpreter		Interpreter

CONSECUTIVE INTERPRETATION

10:30 p.m. Dinner concludes. Foreign Minister Primakov departs.

RON: Manila Hotel
Manila Philippines

00-13

(X2)

UNCLAS OFFICIAL INFORMAL SECSTATE 128091
MANILSVA:
ACTION: AMB
INFO: CHRON TA DCM
Lasers:
INFO: XEROX01

DISSEMINATION: OI
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCMLO446
OO RUEHML
DE RUEHC #8091 1952257
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 142255Z JUL 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 6816
BT
UNCLAS STATE 128091

RELEASED IN PART
B6

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 04 JAN 2007 200503343

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT, RP
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL NUMBER 52 FROM EAP/PIMBS

POL ADMIN/GSO RSO

U.S. DELEGATION TO THE ARF AND PMC

1. THE COMPOSITION OF OUR DELEGATION HAS NOT BEEN FINALIZED, BUT SINCE YOU INQUIRED, WE CAN GIVE YOU A PARTIAL LIST. BESIDES THE SECRETARY AND A/S ROTH, YOU CAN ALSO EXPECT GREG CRAIG OF S/P, AL LARSON OF EB, BOB EINHORN OF PM, MATTHEW DALEY OF SA, STEVE SESTANOVICH OF S/NI S, KURT CAMPBELL OF DOD AND GENERAL FOGELSONG OF JCS. THERE WILL ALSO LIKELY BE AN OFFICIAL FROM TREASURY (HOPEFULLY DAVID LIPTON). IN THE WORKER-BEE CATEGORY, WE ANTICIPATE JIM FOSTER, PAM SLUTZ, JASON HYLAND, SCOTT KWAK, HARVEY SOMERS, MICKIE FOWLER, CRAIG LARSON, RAVIC HUSO AND DOUG.

JUSMAG DAO USIS EBUR

PLANNED PROTESTS

2. ACCORDING TO AN ARTICLE IN THE JULY 14 EDITION OF MANILA BUSINESS WORLD (AS REPORTED VIA FBIS), A GROUP CALLED THE "MOVEMENT FOR NATIONWIDE DEMOCRACY" (KDP) WILL BE SPEARHEADING DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. ACCORDING TO ITS SPOKESPERSON, THE GROUP IS PROTESTING USG EFFORTS TO LOBBY FOR RATIFICATION OF THE VFA AS WELL AS THE "STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN THE U.S. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRANGLEHOLD OVER THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION." WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR READOUT (VIA FRONT-CHANNEL MESSAGE) OF WHAT KIND OF DEMONSTRATIONS MIGHT OCCUR TO PROTEST THE

POL mk-ad

04F13/1

SECRETARY'S VISIT. DO YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR GROUP?

CERF MEETING

3. [redacted] AND [redacted] OF THE CIVIL ENGINEERING RESEARCH FOUNDATION CALLED ON US ON JULY 13; GENE MARTIN JOINED US. THEY NOTED THE MOU SIGNED BETWEEN CERF AND GENERAL DAVID IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR, UNDER WHICH CERF WILL LOOK AT POSSIBLE WAYS TO ADDRESS THE PHILIPPINES CONCERNS ABOUT ALLEGED TOXIC WASTE AT THE FORMER CLARK AIR BASE. CERF'S STRATEGY IS TO SCREEN APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGIES, THEN DEVELOP A PROTOCOL TO DEMONSTRATE HOW THE TECHNOLOGY WORKS. THE OWNER OF THE TECHNOLOGY (A PRIVATE COMPANY) WOULD BE ENLISTED TO PUT THE TECHNOLOGY INTO PRACTICE. FINALLY, CERF WOULD CARRY OUT A STUDY OF THE EFFICACY OF THE PROJECT AND PUBLISH ITS FINDINGS. B6

ECON
FCS
AID
POL
JUSMF
DAO

4. CERF DOES NOT YET HAVE FUNDING TO CARRY OUT PHASE I OF ITS PROGRAM IN THE PHILIPPINES. [redacted] AND [redacted] NOTED THAT THE REQUIRED SEED MONEY (WHICH WOULD BE USED MAINLY TO CARRY OUT A FEASIBILITY STUDY AND ANALYSES OF WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE) IS ONLY ABOUT 50,000 USD. ONE OF THE FIRST STEPS WOULD INVOLVE ASSEMBLING A TEAM OF U.S. EXPERTS TO SCREEN THE TECHNOLOGIES THAT COULD BE USED IN A CLEAN-UP EFFORT. THEY STATED THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL POSSIBLE SOURCES OF SEED MONEY, AMONG THEM THE TRADE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (CERF WILL PRESENT A PROPOSAL TO TDA IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, AND WE URGED THEM TO GET MOVING ON IT AND TO SEEK YOUR SUPPORT WHEN THEY FINALLY HAVE THE PROPOSAL BEFORE TDA). WE OFFERED OUR SUPPORT FOR CERF'S EFFORTS. WE ALSO URGED THEM TO VISIT MANILA SOON TO RENEW OLD CONTACTS AND MAKE SOME NEW ONES IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT; GENE OFFERED EMBASSY MANILA SUPPORT. WE WILL KEEP YOU APPRISED OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS FROM THIS END. B6

ALBRIGHT
BT
#8091
NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7003

PAGE 01 JAKART 04942 01 OF 02 060902Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/009W	

----------00366C 060903Z /38

R 060828Z OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0392
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
SECDEF WASHDC//OSD-ISA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004942

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 00143

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/09
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: MPR: GOLKAR RUNS AWAY WITH REGIONAL REPS IN EASTERN INDONESIA

REF: JAKARTA 4817

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PRINCIPAL OFFICER, ROBERT POLLARD. REASON 1.5 (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04942 01 OF 02 060902Z

2. (U) SUMMARY: THOUGH GOLKAR WON 27 PERCENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SEATS IN 11 EASTERN INDONESIAN PROVINCES, IT GRABBED 58 PERCENT (32 OF 55 SEATS) OF THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES. CHALK IT UP TO GOLKAR POLITICAL ACUMEN, PDI-P FLOUNDERING, AND PERHAPS "MONEY POLITICS." IF MUSLIM "MIDDLE AXIS" PARTIES CONTINUE TO COZY UP TO GOLKAR (AS EARLY MANEUVERS IN THE MPR MIGHT SUGGEST), 69 PERCENT OF THESE REGIONAL SEATS ARE IN THEIR CORNER. END SUMMARY

3. (U) BELOW ARE THE BREAKDOWNS OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES ("UTUSAN DAERAH") IN 11 EASTERN PROVINCES AND THE CORRESPONDING PARLIAMENTARY SEATS EACH PARTY WON IN THE GENERAL ELECTION.

UTUSAN DAERAH DPR SEATS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

EAST JAVA	PDI-P: 3	PKB: 24
	PKB: 2	PDI-P: 23
		GOLKAR: 9
		PAN: 4
		PPP: 3
		OTHERS: 5
CENTRAL JAVA	PDI-P: 3	PDI-P: 26
	GOLKAR: 1	PKB: 10
	PKB: 1	GOLKAR: 8
		PPP: 6
		PAN: 4
		OTHERS: 6
YOGYAKARTA	PDI-P: 2	PDI-P: 2
	GOLKAR: 1	GOLKAR: 1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04942 01 OF 02 060902Z

	PKB: 1	PKB: 1
	PAN: 1	PAN: 1
		OTHERS: 1
BALI	INDEP: 3	PDI-P: 7
	PDI-P: 2	GOLKAR: 1
		PKB: 1
WEST NUSATENGGARA	GOLKAR: 4	GOLKAR: 4
	PDI-P: 1	PDI-P: 1
		PPP: 1
		PAN: 1
		OTHERS: 2
EAST NUSATENGGARA	GOLKAR: 4	GOLKAR: 6
	OTHER: 1	PDI-P: 5
		OTHERS: 2
SOUTH SULAWESI	GOLKAR: 5	GOLKAR: 16
		PDI-P: 2
		PPP: 2
		PKB: 1
		PAN: 1
		OTHERS: 2
NORTH SULAWESI	GOLKAR: 5	GOLKAR: 4
		PDI-P: 2
		OTHERS: 1
CENTRAL SULAWESI	GOLKAR: 5	GOLKAR: 3

PDI-P: 1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04942 01 OF 02 060902Z

OTHERS: 1

SOUTHEAST SULAWESI	GOLKAR: 5	GOLKAR: 3
		PDI-P: 1
		OTHERS: 1
MALUKU	GOLKAR: 2	GOLKAR: 2
	PDI-P: 2	PDI-P: 2
	PPP: 1	PPP: 1
		OTHERS: 1

4. (U) A CLEAR PATTERN EMERGES: THE PARTY DISTRIBUTION OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES IS MORE OR LESS PROPORTIONAL TO DPR SEAT TALLIES (AND THUS REFLECTIVE OF THE POPULAR VOTE) EXCEPT WHERE GOLKAR WAS THE STRONGEST PARTY. IN SULAWESI, WHERE GOLKAR SWEPT ALL 20 REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE SEATS, THE PARTY FLEXED ITS MUSCLE TO FORCE A WINNER-TAKE-ALL SELECTION PROCESS UPON THE RESPECTIVE REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS. (NOTE: EACH PROVINCE WAS GIVEN THE FREEDOM TO DETERMINE ITS OWN METHOD OF SELECTION.) WHERE GOLKAR ENJOYED A PLURALITY (ABOUT 45 PERCENT IN WEST AND EAST NUSATENGGARA), IT STILL GRABBED 4 OF 5 SEATS.

5. (U) THUS GOLKAR HAS BENEFITED DOUBLY FROM THE "UTUSAN DAERAH"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7005

PAGE 01 JAKART 04942 02 OF 02 060903Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/009W

----------003671 060903Z /38

R 060828Z OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0393
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
SECDEF WASHDC//OSD-ISA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004942

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 00143

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/09
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: MPR: GOLKAR RUNS AWAY WITH REGIONAL REPS IN EASTERN INDONESIA

SYSTEM. FIRST, THE FIVE-SEATS-PER-PROVINCE RULE, REGARDLESS OF POPULATION, HAS BEEN A BOON GIVEN GOLKAR STRENGTH IN SPARSELY POPULATED OUTER-ISLANDS. NOW, DISPROPORTIONALITY HAS BEEN MAGNIFIED AS GOLKAR SEIZED "MORE THAN ITS SHARE" OF SEATS WITHIN 6

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04942 02 OF 02 060903Z
OF 11 PROVINCES IN THIS CONSULAR DISTRICT. THUS, GOLKAR CONTROLS 58 PERCENT OF THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES IN THESE PROVINCES WHILE IT WON ONLY 27 PERCENT OF THE DPR SEATS. EARLY MANEUVERS IN THE MPR HAVE POINTED TO COOPERATION BETWEEN GOLKAR AND THE MUSLIM "MIDDLE AXIS" PARTIES (REFTEL). IF THESE "POROS TENGAH" PARTIES' SEATS WERE JOINED WITH GOLKAR'S, TOGETHER THEY WOULD REPRESENT 69 PERCENT OF THESE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES.

6. (C) POLITICAL OBSERVERS IN THESE AREAS SEE THREE EXPLANATIONS FOR GOLKAR'S STRONG SHOWING:

--GOLKAR IS SMART. THEY KNOW HOW TO TRANSLATE A POLITICAL ADVANTAGE INTO AN ABSOLUTE POLITICAL VICTORY.
--PDI-P IS INEXPERIENCED. THEY HAVE BEEN OUTMANEUVERED.
--GOLKAR MAY BE TOSSING MONEY AROUND.
POLLARD/GELBARD

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4402

PAGE 01 JAKART 04866 01 OF 03 011133Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-01	NP-01	AID-00	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	FBO-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/012W					

----------FE8860 011134Z /38

O 011100Z OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0310
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004866

E.O. 12958:DECL:10/01/09
TAGS: PGOV, ASEC, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE BOOED AT MPR OPENING; PDI-P PROPOSES ALTERNATIVE MPR SCHEDULE (C-AL9-01098)

REF A) JAKARTA 4562 (MPR SCHEDULE THREATENED)
B) JAKARTA 4721 (OCT 1 MPR)
C) JAKARTA 4698 (MIDDLE AXIS)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04866 01 OF 03 011133Z
D) JAKARTA 4780 (PARTIES AGREE)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR PAMELA J. SLUTZ, REASON 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: INDONESIA'S FIRST DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED PARLIAMENT (DPR) AND PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) IN MORE THAN 40 YEARS WERE SWORN-IN OCTOBER 1. IN A SIGN OF NEW ASSERTIVENESS, ALL BUT A HANDFUL OF LEGISLATORS REFUSED TO STAND, AND A FEW EVEN BOOED, WHEN PRESIDENT HABIBIE ENTERED THE ASSEMBLY HALL. MANY OBSERVERS TOOK THE MEMBERS' ACTIONS AS FURTHER INDICATIONS THAT GOLKAR WILL SOON FIND A WAY TO WITHDRAW ITS SPONSORSHIP OF HABIBIE'S CANDIDACY. PARTIES OF THE MIDDLE AXIS CALLED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

ON THE PRESIDENT AT HIS HOME SEPTEMBER 29 TO REQUEST HE RECONSIDER STANDING AS A CANDIDATE. HE REFUSED TO DO SO, SAYING HE WOULD ACCEPT THE MPR'S VERDICT ON HIS FITNESS FOR A SECOND TERM. PDI-P TURNED UP THE PRESSURE AT THE MPR OPENING BY PROPOSING THE PRESIDENT'S ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH BE HELD ON OCTOBER 5 AND THE ELECTION HELD ON OCTOBER 12, EVEN EARLIER THAN THE ACCELERATED SCHEDULE MAJOR PARTIES RECENTLY AGREED UPON (REF D). A DECISION ON THE SCHEDULE IS EXPECTED LATE IN THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 1. HABIBIE'S MAJOR CHALLENGE IS TO STAY IN THE RACE UNTIL THE FINAL ROUND OF THE ELECTION, WHICH HE APPEARS DETERMINED TO DO. ALTHOUGH GOLKAR SEEMS INCREASINGLY LIKELY TO WITHDRAW ITS SUPPORT FOR HIS CANDIDACY, IN THE MPR HE RETAINS A CHANCE OF BEING ELECTED ON THE BASIS OF STRONG OPPOSITION TO MEGAWATI AMONG MODERNIST MUSLIMS (REF C), CONTINUING OUTER ISLAND SUPPORT, AND THE POWER OF MONEY. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. (U) A SMALL GROUP OF PERHAPS 20-30 PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) DELEGATES BOOED AS PRESIDENT HABIBIE AND THE TEMPORARY MPR LEADERSHIP WALKED INTO THE ASSEMBLY HALL FOR THE OATH-TAKING CEREMONY OF THE MPR AND PARLIAMENT (DPR) OCTOBER 1. THE 695-MEMBER MPR INCLUDES THE 500-MEMBER DPR, 462 OF WHOM WERE ELECTED JUNE 7 AND 38 OF WHOM WERE APPOINTED BY THE ARMED FORCES (TNI). IN THE ONLY DEVIATION FROM THE CEREMONY'S PROGRAM, AN UNIDENTIFIED MPR MEMBER LATER INTERRUPTED TO OBJECT TO THE BOOING, WHICH HE SAID WAS BENEATH THE DIGNITY OF THE COUNTRY'S HIGHEST INSTITUTION. THIS COMMENT PROVOKED MILD APPLAUSE AND A SHORT ROUND OF WHISPERED COMMENTS AMONG THE DELEGATES. PRESIDENT HABIBIE SAT IMPASSIVELY THROUGHOUT THE CEREMONY AND DID NOT ADDRESS THE BODY. HE DEPARTED QUICKLY AT THE END OF THE PROCEEDINGS, SMILING AND GESTURING TO SOME MEMBERS AS HE LEFT.

4. (SBU) IN ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE NEW DPR/MPR'S ASSERTIVENESS, ONLY GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANDJUNG AND 15-20 OTHER DELEGATES STOOD AS THE PRESIDENT AND LEADERSHIP MADE THEIR WAY DOWN THE ASSEMBLY'S CENTER AISLE. DISAGREEMENT HAD BROKEN OUT DURING A REHEARSAL THE EVENING BEFORE OVER WHETHER MPR DELEGATES SHOULD STAND DURING THE PRESIDENT'S ENTRANCE. FEISTY NEW DELEGATES, THE FIRST DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED DPR/MPR REPRESENTATIVES IN MORE THAN 40 YEARS, DECIDED THEY SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO STAND FOR THE PRESIDENT, SINCE THE MPR IS CONSTITUTIONALLY THE HIGHEST BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT. COMMENT: WHAT REMAINS UNCLEAR IS WHETHER THE

100-PLUS GOLKAR DELEGATES WHO CHOSE NOT TO STAND FOR
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04866 01 OF 03 011133Z
HABIBIE DURING THE OATH-TAKING CEREMONY HAD ACCEPTED THE LOGIC OF THE MPR'S SUPREMACY OR, AS OBSERVERS SPECULATED, WERE SIGNALING THEIR FEELINGS ABOUT HABIBIE'S CONTINUED CANDIDACY. END COMMENT.

POROS TENGAH ASKS HABIBIE TO RECONSIDER CANDIDACY
---

5. (C) HABIBIE LOYALISTS HAVE EVERY REASON TO BE NERVOUS ABOUT HIS CHANCES OF REMAINING THE GOLKAR CANDIDATE. ON SEPTEMBER 29, LEADERS OF "MIDDLE AXIS" (POROS TENGAH) PARTIES, INCLUDING GUS DUR AND AMIEN RAIS, CALLED ON HABIBIE AT HIS RESIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT HE DROP HIS ELECTION BID. ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO WAS PRESENT IN THE MEETING AND AKBAR TANDJUNG JOINED AFTER THE MEETING BEGAN. HABIBIE FLATLY REFUSED, SAYING HE WOULD LEAVE IT TO THE MPR TO DECIDE. BUT SOURCES CLOSE TO HABIBIE WERE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE MESSAGE HAD SHOCKED THE PRESIDENT, SINCE HE THOUGHT THE LEADERS HAD CALLED THE MEETING TO BRIEF HIM ON OTHER MPR DEVELOPMENTS. AKBAR TANDJUNG HAS CONTINUED TO PUBLICLY BACK HABIBIE, BUT HAS REPEATEDLY TOLD THE PRESS THAT TO WIN HABIBIE WILL NEED SUPPORT FROM OTHER PARTIES, AND

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4403

PAGE 01 JAKART 04866 02 OF 03 011133Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-01	NP-01	AID-00	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	FBO-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/012W					

----------FE8869 011134Z /38
O 011100Z OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0311
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 004866

E.O. 12958:DECL:10/01/09
TAGS: PGOV, ASEC, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE BOOED AT MPR OPENING; PDI-P PROPOSES ALTERNATIVE MPR SCHEDULE (C-AL9-01098)

THAT SUPPORT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE FORTHCOMING. AKBAR CONTINUES TO INDICATE HABIBIE'S CHANCES OF BEING ELECTED WILL FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN WHETHER THE PARTY DECIDES TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04866 02 OF 03 011133Z
CONTINUE SUPPORTING HIS CANDIDACY AT ITS LEADERSHIP MEETING PLANNED FOR MID-OCTOBER.

6. (C) THERE ARE OTHER WORRYING SIGNS FOR HABIBIE. MARZUKI DARUSMAN, AN OUTSPOKEN OPPONENT OF HABIBIE'S CANDIDACY, WAS ELECTED CHAIRMAN OF THE GOLKAR MPR FACTION SEPTEMBER 29. HABIBIE SUPPORTERS DEEPLY DISTRUST MARZUKI, WHOM THEY BELIEVE SHOULD BE DISCIPLINED FOR WORKING TO UNDERMINE HABIBIE'S CHANCES. AKBAR TANDJUNG HAS STEADFASTLY REFUSED TO DO SO, SAYING GOLKAR NEEDS MARZUKI BECAUSE OF HIS CREDENTIALS AS A REFORMER. HABIBIE SUPPORTERS HAVE LONG WORRIED THAT MARZUKI MIGHT BECOME MPR FACTION LEADER, GIVING HIM CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER MPR POLICIES AND GOLKAR VOTING. MEANWHILE, A SINGAPORE EMBASSY CONTACT TOLD POLOFF SEPTEMBER 30 THAT HIS SOURCES WITHIN TNI SAY MANY OF THEIR COLLEAGUES ARE RESISTANT TO BACKING HABIBIE, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER TNI COMMANDER WIRANTO IS THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. WIRANTO HAS STILL NOT CONFIRMED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF HABIBIE'S OFFER, THOUGH HE IS BELIEVED TO WANT THE JOB UNDER ONE CANDIDATE OR ANOTHER AND TO NO LONGER HAVE A REALISTIC CHANCE OF AN OFFER FROM MEGAWATI.

PDI-P PROPOSES EARLIER ELECTION
---

7. (U) JUST BEFORE THE MPR OPENING, THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF STRUGGLE (PDI-P) FINALLY RESPONDED TO THE MPR SCHEDULE ALL OTHER MAJOR PARTIES HAD EARLIER AGREED UPON (REF D), BY SUGGESTING THE ELECTION SCHEDULE BE BROUGHT FORWARD EVEN FURTHER TO OCTOBER 12. THE PDI-P

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04866 02 OF 03 011133Z
PLAN AND THE MULTI-PARTY PLAN ARE BEING PRESENTED AS

ALTERNATIVES. THE MPR IS SET TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE TWO PLANS DURING A PLENARY SESSION LATE IN THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 1. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PDI-P SCHEDULE FOR STAGE I OF THE MPR ARE AS FOLLOWS:

OCT 1-4: DETERMINATION OF RULES OF PROCEDURE AND AGENDA; SELECTION OF DPR/MPR LEADERSHIP; OATH-TAKING OF LEADERSHIP; FORMATION OF FACTIONS

OCT 5: PRESIDENT'S ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH

OCT 6: FACTIONS GIVE VIEWS OF PRESIDENT'S ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH

OCT 7: PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO FACTION'S VIEWS OF ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH; FORMATION OF WORKING GROUPS

OCT 8-11: AD HOC COMMITTEE WORK

OCT 11: ADOPTION OF MPR DECREES.

OCT 12: NOMINATIONS FOR AND ELECTION OF PRESIDENT

OCT 13: SWEARING-IN OF PRESIDENT; NOMINATIONS FOR AND ELECTION OF VICE PRESIDENT

OCT 14: SWEARING-IN OF VICE PRESIDENT; FORMATION OF MPR WORKING GROUPS

THE PDI-P ALTERNATIVE FOR STAGE I WAS CIRCULATED AT THE
CONFIDENTIAL

SWEARING-IN CEREMONY. THE INCLUSION OF THE ITEM "FORMATION OF MPR WORKING GROUPS" ON OCTOBER 14 INDICATES PDI-P HAS IN MIND A SECOND MPR STAGE TO DISCUSS THE "BROAD GUIDELINES OF STATE POLICY" (GBHN), NON-GBHN ISSUES, AND PERHAPS CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. PDI-P'S SCHEDULE PROPOSAL DOES NOT GO INTO DETAIL, AND WE ARE UNSURE WHEN PDI-P WOULD LIKE TO VOTE ON EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE.

8. (C) COMMENT: HABIBIE'S CANDIDACY IS UNDER EVER-MORE PRESSURE, BUT HE STILL APPEARS DETERMINED TO FORCE THE MPR TO COME TO A VERDICT ON HIS FUTURE. INDICATIONS OF COLD FEET FROM POROS TENGAH AND THE MILITARY, FROM WHICH HABIBIE MUST DRAW MANY VOTES TO BE ELECTED, MUST BE DEEPLY UNSETTLING FOR HIS SUPPORTERS IN GOLKAR, WHO KNOW THEY ALREADY FACE LIKELY DEFECTIONS OF SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THEIR OWN PARTY. PDI-P'S ELEVENTH-HOUR SCHEDULING

PROPOSAL APPEARS DESIGNED TO RATCHET UP THE PRESSURE EVEN FURTHER. IT WOULD FORCE HABIBIE TO GIVE HIS ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH JUST A FEW DAYS FROM NOW, AT A TIME WHEN HE DOES NOT HAVE EVEN SYMBOLIC GESTURES TO POINT TO ON KEY ISSUES HE MUST ADDRESS, SUCH AS THE BANK BALI SCANDAL AND THE SOEHARTO INVESTIGATION. GIVEN THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0210

PAGE 01 JAKART 04866 03 OF 03 021522Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-01	NP-01	AID-00	CIAE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	FBO-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/012W					

----------FEF77B 021536Z /38
O 011100Z OCT 99 (CCY-ADXFEA605-045)
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0312
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 004866

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -MRN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X
TAGS: PGOV, ASEC, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE BOOED AT MPR OPENING; PDI-P PROPOSES ALTERNATIVE MPR SCHEDULE (C-AL9-01098)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04866 03 OF 03 021522Z

EARLIER BROAD AGREEMENT AMONG ALL OTHER PARTIES, WE SUSPECT THE PDI-P PROPOSAL WILL NOT BE ADOPTED, BUT IT MAY WELL SUCCEED IN ENCOURAGING A SENSE OF PANIC AMONG HABIBIE SUPPORTERS. BUT PANIC MAY BE THEIR BIGGEST ENEMYDVE THAT IN A HEAD-TO-H HABIBIE STILL HAS A (####) OUTER ISLAND SUPPORT,GAWATI AMONG MODERNIST MUS FAILS,

LITTLE BROWN PACP

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7524

PAGE 01 JAKART 04397 01 OF 03 100328Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	SSAS-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W			

----------F62044 100330Z /38

R 100304Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9779
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004397

DEPT FOR EAP/PIMBS AND INR/REA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/04
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA'S POST-ELECTORAL PROCESS: BACK IN THE DOLDRUMS AND THE DOGHOUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04397 01 OF 03 100328Z

REF: A) JAKARTA 3131 B) JAKARTA 4080 C) JAKARTA 4215

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS PAMELA SLUTZ; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. AS INDONESIA MOVES TOWARD FORMATION OF A NEW PARLIAMENT (DPR) AND NEW PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) IN PREPARATION FOR ELECTION OF A PRESIDENT, IT IS INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT THE SYSTEM THAT SERVED TWO PREVIOUS AUTHORITARIAN PRESIDENTS IS OUT OF SYNCH WITH NEW POLITICAL AND SOCIAL REALITIES. THE TUG-OF-WAR BETWEEN THE OLD CONCEPT OF CO-OPTATION OR INCLUSION AND THE NEW ELECTORAL "WINNERS/LOSERS" APPROACH IS COMPLICATING THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING HOW INDONESIA

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAY 2006 200503412

WILL CHOOSE ITS PRESIDENT. THIS MESSAGE EXAMINES HOW THE NEW STRUCTURE FOR CHOOSING THE 200 NON-PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE MPR, THE UTUSAN DAERAH (REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES) AND UTUSAN GOLONGAN (INTEREST GROUPS) HAS PROLONGED THE AGONY OF CONSTITUTING A LEGISLATIVE BODY TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT. END SUMMARY

3. (C) THIS ASSESSMENT IS BASED ON CONVERSATIONS TDY POLOFF HAD IN EARLY AUGUST WITH POLITICAL SCIENTISTS/ANALYSTS RANGING IN AGE FROM A REVOLUTIONARY-ERA STUDENT OF 1945, TO A MEMBER OF THE 1970'S GROUPS THAT DEMONSTRATED AGAINST SOEHARTO, TO A THIRTY-SOMETHING ACTIVIST FOR AMIEN RAIS' NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN) AND MUHAMMADIYAH IN THE JUNE 1999 ELECTION. IT ALSO DRAWS ON A STUDY OF THE POST-ELECTORAL PERIOD PREPARED BY USAID EXPERTS AT THE END OF JULY. ACCORDING TO THE INDONESIAN

COMMENTATORS MENTIONED ABOVE, THE CONSTITUTION, WITH ITS VAGUENESS, JAPANESE CORPORATIST ORIGINS, AND ABUSE BY TWO PREVIOUS PRESIDENTS, IS NOW BEING RE-INTERPRETED TO FIT THE DESIGNS OF PRESIDENT HABIBIE AND GOLKAR, AND SHOULD BE AMENDED. ALTHOUGH ALL THREE GENERATIONS VOLUNTEERED THIS INTERPRETATION SEPARATELY, EACH THEN FOLLOWED UP BY EMPHASIZING THE IMMEDIATE NEED TO GET THROUGH TO THE MPR SESSION AND ELECT A NEW PRESIDENT, EVEN IF THE LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS FOR DOING SO ARE FAIRLY AD HOC. ALL FELT THAT THE CURRENT SCANDALOUS BEHAVIOR BY THE ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU), BICKERING AND MANEUVERING BY SELFISH SMALL PARTY AND INTEREST GROUP MEMBERS, AND SUSPICION THAT HABIBIE HAS NO STAKE IN A QUICK RESOLUTION, HAVE SOMEWHAT ERODED THE REFORMIST EUPHORIA FOLLOWING THE ELECTION.

KPU-OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLE

4. (C) AS ONE CONTACT PUT IT, SETTING UP THE KPU WAS ITSELF A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE NEW ELECTION LAWS, LARGELY CONCEIVED BY WESTERN-EDUCATED INDONESIANS WHO PUSHED FOR A SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICT SYSTEM, AND THE OLD WAY EMBODIED IN THE 1945 CONSTITUTION, WHICH EMPHASIZED INCLUSION AND CONSENSUS-BUILDING ("MUSYAWARAH/MUFAKAT" IN INDONESIAN). THE COMPROMISE RESULTED IN AN INITIAL FLOWERING OF POLITICAL PARTIES LAST SPRING TO MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED, WHICH WAS THEN WHITTLED DOWN TO A STILL UNMANAGEABLE 48, SHOT THROUGH WITH OPPORTUNISTIC GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS WHO LITERALLY FOUGHT TO GET THE GOVERNMENT SEED MONEY ALLOCATED TO EACH PARTY.

PAGE 04 JAKART 04397 01 OF 03 100328Z
5. (C) THE SAME MIXTURE OF GREED AND THE "BIG TENT" IDEOLOGY PERVADED THE KPU'S MAKEUP, WHICH INCLUDED ALL THE 48 PARTIES, PLUS FIVE INDIVIDUALS APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT. AFTER THE OFFICIAL KPU COUNT OF THE JUNE 7 ELECTION FAILED TO MATERIALIZE QUICKLY, AND THE WEEKS DRAGGED BY, IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT THE KPU WAS SPLITTING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SUCCESSFUL MAJOR PARTIES ON ONE SIDE VERSUS THE LOSING, SMALLER PARTIES AND QUASI-PARTIES WHOSE INTRANSIGENCE AND INTRIGUE CONTINUE TO MAKE EVERY DECISION DIFFICULT. AS ONE COMMENTATOR, A SENIOR SOCIOLOGIST, REMARKED TO TDY POLOFF, "WHAT DID YOU EXPECT? THE FIRST THING THE SMALLER PARTIES VOTED FOR THEMSELVES WAS A HIGH HONORARIUM, THE SECOND A CELL PHONE, THE THIRD AN AUTOMOBILE."

FAST FORWARD TO THE DPR/MPR FORMATION
---

6. (C) EVEN THOUGH THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY SAY THAT THE DPR, A SUPPOSEDLY REPRESENTATIVE BODY FROM ALL 27 PROVINCES, IS TO BE ELECTED, THE ELECTION LAWS PROVIDED FOR ALMOST ALL MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL DPR TO BE AN ELECTED BODY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE 38 SEATS APPOINTED FROM THE MILITARY. IN THE PROVINCES, THE PARTIES DREW UP THEIR

PAGE 01 JAKART 04397 02 OF 03 100329Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	SSAS-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W			

----------F6204D 100330Z /38
R 100304Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9780
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 004397

DEPT FOR EAP/PIMBS AND INR/REA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/04
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA'S POST-ELECTORAL PROCESS: BACK IN THE DOLDRUMS AND THE DOGHOUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04397 02 OF 03 100329Z

OWN LISTS OF LOCAL CANDIDATES FOR THE REGIONAL ASSEMBLIES' (DPRD) SEATS, AND MOST INFORMANTS THINK THAT THIS PROCESS HAS GONE RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY, ALTHOUGH THERE IS REPORTEDLY SOME IN-PARTY FIGHTING AT THAT LEVEL, PARTICULARLY WITHIN PDI-P AND PAN.

7. (C) AT THE SAME TIME, EACH DPRD HAS BEEN GIVEN THE BLESSING TO CHOOSE, BY WHATEVER RULES IT SETS, FIVE INDIVIDUALS (UTUSAN DAERAH) TO COME AS REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MPR, A LIBERTY THAT INVITES COMPROMISE, CORRUPTION, AND MOST LIKELY SOME ARM-TWISTING FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEES OF THE MAJOR PARTIES. BECAUSE THE NATIONAL VOTE FAVORED GOLKAR IN FOURTEEN OF THE PROVINCES (EITHER BY MAJORITY OR PLURALITY), THE FIVE-SEATS-PER-PROVINCE ALLOCATION OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES IN THE MPR WILL FAVOR GOLKAR. THE UTUSAN DAERAH MAY ALSO INCREASE MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN THE MPR, DUE TO MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE DPRD'S, WHERE THEY GET AN AUTOMATIC TEN PER CENT ALLOTMENT. SOME POLITICAL OBSERVERS HOPE THAT THIS GOLKAR OUTER-ISLAND STRENGTH IN THE MPR MIGHT NOT BE AS SOLIDLY LOYAL AS EXPECTED TO THE HABIBIE WING WHEN THE CRUNCH COMES IN NOVEMBER. ON THE OTHER HAND, HABIBIE IS REPORTEDLY TRYING TO PLACE SOME OF HIS JAKARTA-BASED MINISTERS IN THE MPR AS REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES (A PROCESS KNOWN LOCALLY AS "DROPPING"). "IT'S NOT ILLEGAL, BUT IT'S NOT ETHICAL", SAID ONE INFORMANT INDIGNANTLY.

8. (C) BLATANT OUTRAGES ALSO OCCURRED, HOWEVER, IN THE PROCESS OF SELECTING FUNCTIONAL GROUPS ELIGIBLE TO SEND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04397 02 OF 03 100329Z

REPRESENTATIVES ("UTUSAN GOLONGAN") TO THE MPR. THE

INTEREST GROUPS ARE ALLOCATED 65 SEATS. THE 1945 CONSTITUTION DRAFTERS ENVISIONED A LIMITED NUMBER OF PARTIES AND SET UP THIS "RAINBOW" GROUP TO ENSURE THE REPRESENTATION OF SOCIETAL GROUPS NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO BE REPRESENTED THROUGH THE PARTY SYSTEM. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT SPECIFY HOW INTEREST GROUP REPRESENTATIVES ARE TO BE CHOSEN, BUT THE 1998 SPECIAL MPR SESSION DECREED THAT THE JOB WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE KPU. WHEN THE COMMISSION OPENED THE DOOR FOR REGISTRATION, MORE THAN FIVE HUNDRED "ORGANIZATIONS" SIGNED UP. THE KPU SET UP A "TEAM OF FIFTEEN" TO SELECT THE GROUPS THAT WOULD SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MPR. UNFORTUNATELY, THE TEAM OF 15 WAS LARGELY MADE UP OF REMNANTS OF THE DISCREDITED "PARTAI GUREM", THE SMALL PARTIES THAT BLOCKED VALIDATION OF THE JUNE 7 ELECTIONS THROUGHOUT JUNE AND JULY (REF A). (PARTAI GUREM IS AN OLD SOEKARNOIST DESIGNATION FROM THE FIFTIES FOR SMALL PARTIES, WHICH SOEKARNO DISMISSED AS "GUREM", CHICKEN LICE.)

9. (C) THE TEAM OF FIFTEEN'S CHOICES FOR THE 65 INTEREST GROUP REPRESENTATIVES WERE LEAKED ON AUGUST 5, AND IMMEDIATELY PRODUCED AN UPROAR. THE LIST OF VETERANS, CIVIL SERVANTS, YOUTH, RELIGIOUS GROUPS, FARMERS, HANDICAPPED, AND INTELLECTUAL GROUPS SMACKED OF THE OLD SOEHARTO DAYS, WITH AN OVER-REPRESENTATION OF GOLKAR-FUNDED GROUPS AND HACKS AFFILIATED WITH OLD SOEHARTO CRONIES. ONE PARTICULARLY EGREGIOUS EXAMPLE WAS AGUS MIFTACH, AN OLD OPERATIVE OF SOEHARTO'S INTELLIGENCE NETWORK AND HIS BUDDY BOB HASAN. MIFTACH SHOWED UP ON

THE LIST HEADING A BOGUS ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME HE HEADED A SMALL PARTY CALLED THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY, WHICH HAD OBTAINED LESS THAN 1% OF THE VOTE IN THE JUNE 7 GENERAL ELECTION.

10. (C) OUTRAGE OVER THE UTUSAN GOLONGAN WAS QUICK IN COMING FROM THE POLITICAL ELITE. THE JAKARTA POST SET THE TONE BY WRITING ON AUGUST 10 THAT THE KPU HAD AGAIN BECOME "AN OBJECT OF PUBLIC SCORN" FOR ITS SLUGGISH WORKING HABITS AND THE "BLATANT PERSONAL INTERESTS" OF MEMBERS OF THE TEAM OF FIFTEEN, AS THEY TRIED TO GET THEIR OWN MEMBERS INTO THE COUNTRY'S HIGHEST CONSTITUTIONAL BODY. NOTING THAT THE CONSTITUTION SAYS THAT INTEREST GROUPS MUST BE REPRESENTED BUT IS NOT EXPLICIT ABOUT HOW, THE EDITORIAL CONTENDED THAT PUTTING IN THIS FACTION IS "STARKLY AWKWARD AND REDUNDANT" BECAUSE ALL GROWN CITIZENS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THESE

ORGANIZATIONS, ALREADY VOTED FOR PARTIES IN THE JUNE POLLS. THE "POST" CALLED ON THE MPR TO PHASE OUT THE UTUSAN GOLONGAN, OR BE "ETHICAL AND RESPONSIBLE" BY HAVING THE KPU RULE THAT THESE MEMBERS COULD NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. THE DAY BEFORE, A GROUP OF 200 STUDENTS HOLDING A DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF THE KPU BUILDING WERE EVEN MORE DIRECT, AS THEY SLAUGHTERED A WHITE GOAT AND PRESENTED ITS HEAD TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7528

PAGE 01 JAKART 04397 03 OF 03 100329Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	SSAS-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W			

----------F62059 100330Z /38

R 100304Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9781
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 004397

DEPT FOR EAP/PIMBS AND INR/REA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/04
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA'S POST-ELECTORAL PROCESS: BACK IN THE DOLDRUMS AND THE DOGHOUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04397 03 OF 03 100329Z

KPU CHAIRMAN RUDINI. EMBARRASSED BY THE UPROAR, RUDINI AGREED TO RECONSIDER THE LIST OF INTEREST GROUP REPRESENTATIVES AND SELECTION CRITERIA FOR IT. OTHER PARTIES AND POLITICAL COMMENTATORS TOOK UP THE CALL FOR

DROPPING THE INTEREST GROUP MEMBERS FROM FUTURE MPR'S, CHARGING THAT THEY CONSTITUTE AN ANACHRONISM IN A MODERN ELECTORAL SYSTEM. THE KPU TOOK ALMOST THREE MORE WEEKS TO FINALIZE A MORE CREDIBLE LIST OF CHOICES (REF B).

WHAT LIES AHEAD
---

11. (C) ALTHOUGH A FEW CHALLENGES LIE AHEAD, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH IS SELECTION OF THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES. THERE REMAINS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE MPR WILL BE SWORN IN ON SCHEDULE ON OCTOBER 1, HOWEVER, AND THAT ITS WORKING COMMITTEE (BADAN PEKERJA) WILL BEGIN WORK ON THE DRAFT "BROAD GUIDELINES OF STATE POLICY" (GBHN), WHICH WILL SPECIFY CRUCIAL ASSEMBLY PROCEDURES, SUCH AS WHETHER VOTING, PARTICULARLY FOR PRESIDENT, WILL BE OPEN OR SECRET. EACH OF THESE STEPS COULD BE PAINLESS, BUT MOST OBSERVERS EXPECT THAT THEY WILL BE AS FRAUGHT WITH DIFFICULTY AND CONTROVERSY AS PREPARATIONS FOR THE MPR HAVE BEEN TO DATE.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E15

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2585

PAGE 01 JAKART 04163 01 OF 02 310126Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W	

----------F23E3C 310127Z /38

P 302350Z AUG 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9553
INFO AMCONSUL SYDNEY PRIORITY
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 004163

SYDNEY FOR A/S ROTH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04163 01 OF 02 310126Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S TOUR D'HORIZON

REF: A) 99 JAKARTA 4145

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL P. OWENS, DCM. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. DURING A THREE-HOUR FAREWELL LUNCH HOSTED BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE FOR AMBASSADOR ROY, THE PRESIDENT OUTLINED HIS THOUGHTS AND PLANS FOR THE UPCOMING MPR SESSION AND BEYOND, DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR (REFTEL), AND RESPONDED TO THE AMBASSADOR'S

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

REMARKS ON THE SITUATION IN ACEH. NOTING THAT AN INDONESIAN CABINET TEAM WAS TO BE IN ACEH THAT DAY (AUGUST 28), AMBASSADOR ROY OUTLINED OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE AND URGED A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH ACEHNESE OF ALL PERSUASIONS TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION AND COMPROMISE. HABIBIE REPLIED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT DECISIONS ABOUT THEIR FUTURE BE MADE BY THE ACEHNESE THEMSELVES AND NOTED THAT, AFTER CONSIDERATION OF THE OPTIONS, HE HAD DECIDED TO LEAVE THE SELECTION OF THE NEW GOVERNOR TO THE NEW PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE. IN CLOSING THE LUNCH, HABIBIE REPEATED THE THEME THAT INDONESIA IS THE "MOST LOYAL AND RELIABLE" FRIEND OF THE U.S. IN ASIA AND THAT HE PERSONALLY CONSIDERS THE U.S. TO BE AN HONEST AND NON-PARTISAN BROKER. HE INVITED THE U.S. TO CONSULT WITH HIS STAFF ON MEASURES TO AVERT VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR AND APPEALED TO THE U.S. TO UNDERSTAND AND HELP OTHERS TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF RULE OF LAW AS IT

APPLIES TO THE ROUTING OUT CORRUPTION, CRONYISM, AND NEPOTISM IN GENERAL, AND AS IT APPLIES TO THE CASE OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IN PARTICULAR. END SUMMARY.

ATMOSPHERICS

3. (C) HABIBIE INVITED AMBASSADOR ROY TO A FAREWELL LUNCH ON AUGUST 28 AT HIS HOME. ACCOMPANYING HABIBIE WAS COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS GEN. FEISAL TANJUNG, MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL WIRANTO, GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANJUNG, DEPUTY STATE SECRETARY LTG (RET) TONI HARTONO, AND PRESIDENTIAL STAFFER/SECRETARY FOR OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (SIC) LTG (RET) SINTONG PANJAITAN. (NOTE: HABIBIE SAID HE HAD ALSO INVITED PPP CHAIRMAN HAMZAH HAZ, BUT HAZ HAD A CONFLICT AND COULD NOT ATTEND.) AMBASSADOR ROY WAS JOINED BY DCM, POLCOUNS, AND DATT. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CONGENIAL BUT STILTED, WITH HABIBIE DOING MOST OF THE TALKING (AND SINGING) ON THE INDONESIAN SIDE. WE DETECTED THAT SOME OF HIS THINKING WAS "NEW" TO HIS INDONESIAN GUESTS. THE COMPOSITION OF THE GUESTS ON THE INDONESIAN SIDE WAS INTERESTING. THE ATTENDANCE OF GENERAL WIRANTO WAS UNEXPECTED BY US BUT WELCOME; WE HAD HEARD HE WAS TRAVELING TO ACEH. MORE SURPRISING WAS AKBAR TANJUNG'S INCLUSION, GIVEN HIS PUBLIC DISAGREEMENT WITH HABIBIE OVER THE BANK BALI SCANDAL. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT AKBAR HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED OF THE INVITATION TO HAZ. OTHER THAN A FEW MEASURED WORDS ABOUT THE IMPASSE IN THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) OVER ALLOCATION OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS, AKBAR WAS SILENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04163 01 OF 02 310126Z
ACEH
---

4. (C) NOTING THE TRAVEL OF A CABINET-LEVEL TEAM TO ACEH THAT DAY (AUGUST 28), AMBASSADOR ROY RAISED OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE AND URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO SEEK POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND SEARCH FOR RECONCILIATION AND COMPROMISE. SPECIFICALLY, HE ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE INCUMBENT GOVERNOR AND THE SELECTION OF HIS SUCCESSOR. HABIBIE RESPONDED THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION HAD IMPROVED AND ABOUT ONE-HALF OF THE IDP'S HAD RETURNED TO THEIR HOMES. (NOTE: WE HAVE HEARD THIS FROM NGO AND ACEHNESE SOURCES AS WELL. END NOTE) THE VISITING CABINET TEAM WAS TO CONTINUE AND DEEPEN THE DIALOGUE WITH ALL SECTORS AND VIEWS AND ADDRESS ACEHNESE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT NEEDS. (RESULTS OF THE VISIT WILL BE DISCUSSED SEPTEL.)

5. (C) WITH REGARD TO THE GOVERNOR WHOSE TERM IS SOON TO EXPIRE BUT WHOSE PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN CRITICIZED BY SOME IN JAKARTA FOR BEING TOO PARTIAL TO ACEHNESE COMPLAINTS, HABIBIE SAID HE HAD WEIGHED SEVERAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND HAD DECIDED NOT TO REPLACE THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2583

PAGE 01 JAKART 04163 02 OF 02 310126Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W

----------F23E38 310126Z /38

P 302350Z AUG 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9554
INFO AMCONSUL SYDNEY PRIORITY
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 004163

SYDNEY FOR A/S ROTH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04163 02 OF 02 310126Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/04
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S TOUR D'HORIZON

INCUMBENT WITH A TEMPORARY SUCCESSOR AT THIS TIME BUT RATHER TO LEAVE THE SELECTION TO THE NEW PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE AS PART OF INSTILLING A "BOTTOM-UP" DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

DPR/MPR
---

6. (C) REFERRING TO THE IMPASSE IN THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) OVER ALLOCATION OF SOME DPR SEATS, HABIBIE SAID HE MIGHT HAVE TO STEP IN TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK IF THE SMALL PARTIES, SOME OF WHICH FAILED TO WIN SEATS IN THE JUNE 7 GENERAL ELECTION, PERSISTED IN THEIR INTRANSIGENCE. AKBAR TANJUNG CONFIRMED THAT THE KPU WAS MEETING AGAIN THAT EVENING (AUGUST 28).

7. (C) ASKED ABOUT THE MPR TIMETABLE, HABIBIE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED THE FIRST MPR SESSION WOULD COMMENCE ON/ABOUT OCTOBER 1 AND RUN THROUGH NOVEMBER; THE MEMBERS NEEDED THAT AMOUNT OF TIME TO DRAFT THE MANDATE -- BROAD GUIDELINES OF STATE POLICY -- FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT. HE SURMISED THE SECOND SESSION WOULD MEET IN EARLY DECEMBER TO ELECT THE NEW PRESIDENT. THAT WOULD GIVE THE NEW PRESIDENT SEVERAL WEEKS TO PUT TOGETHER THE BUDGET AND FIVE-YEAR PLAN, WHICH WOULD THEN BE ANNOUNCED IN EARLY JANUARY. HE CLARIFIED THAT HE PROPOSED TO ALTER THE FISCAL AND BUDGET YEAR CYCLE, BEGINNING JANUARY 1, 2001

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04163 02 OF 02 310126Z
(NOT 2000), TO RUN FROM JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31 INSTEAD

OF THE CURRENT APRIL 1-MARCH 31 CYCLE.

8. (C) HABIBIE SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED HIS ADVISORS TO FOCUS ON FOUR AREAS FOR HIS MPR PRESENTATION: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (AND ACHIEVEMENT OF A BALANCED BUDGET IN 5-7 YEARS); INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY; SCORECARD ON HIS GOVERNMENT'S ACCOUNTABILITY; AND THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE, INCLUDING AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION TO PROVIDE FOR A DIRECTLY ELECTED PRESIDENT AND CREATION OF MULTIPLE VICE PRESIDENCIES.

9. (C) AT SEVERAL POINTS IN HIS RAMBLING DISCOURSE, HABIBIE ASKED FOR U.S. UNDERSTANDING AND PATIENCE WITH THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CORRUPTION AND THE FORMER PRESIDENT. EMPHASIZING THE NEED TO INSTILL WIDESPREAD APPRECIATION FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY, HABIBIE ARGUED THAT HE COULD NOT INSTANTLY SETTLE THE MATTER; THE PROCESS TAKES TIME. IN THIS CONNECTION, HABIBIE APPEARED TO BE TRYING OUT ON US THE MAJOR LINES OF THE DEFENSE HE WILL OFFER TO THE MPR REGARDING THE SLOW PACE OF HIS ADMINISTRATION'S INVESTIGATION: HOW COULD HE BE EXPECTED TO CONCLUDE THE CASE AGAINST SOEHARTO IN ONLY 15 MONTHS WHEN THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN UNABLE TO RECOVER ANY OF MARCOS' MILLIONS AFTER 13 YEARS? AMBASSADOR ROY RESPONDED THAT RULE OF LAW AND ACCOUNTABILITY ARE IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES AND SHOULD BE UPHELD; THE TEST IS WHAT WILL BENEFIT THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE.

COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

10. (C) WE COULD NOT HAVE TIMED THE LUNCHEON MEETING BETTER IF WE HAD TRIED. IT PROVIDED US AN OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE OUR CONCERNS ABOUT EAST TIMOR AND ACEH AND TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE DPR/MPR. HABIBIE HAD AN AGENDA, AS WELL, REFLECTED IN HIS FOCUS ON THE FUTURE OF INDONESIA AND THE FRAMEWORK HE IS HOPING TO PUT IN PLACE FOR THE BENEFIT OF, HE SAID, THE "NEXT PRESIDENT, WHOEVER IT MAY BE." HE WAS ALSO CLEARLY HOPING TO ENLIST OUR SYMPATHY REGARDING HIS DIFFICULTIES IN RESPONDING TO CONTINUING CRITICISMS OF HIS HANDLING OF THE SOEHARTO CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5123

PAGE 01 JAKART 04080 01 OF 03 250926Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/011W						

----------F03720 250926Z /38

R 250912Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9452
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004080

E.O. 12958:DECL:08/24/09
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: HALTING PROGRESS IN PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS

REF A) JAKARTA 3131 B) JAKARTA 3740

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS P. SLUTZ, REASON 1.5 (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04080 01 OF 03 250926Z
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) HAS ANNOUNCED ITS SELECTION OF 60 OUT OF 65 "FUNCTIONAL GROUPS" ELIGIBLE TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH WILL SELECT INDONESIA'S NEXT PRESIDENT LATER THIS YEAR. WITH NO PARTY HAVING EMERGED FROM THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN A COMMANDING POSITION, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MPR, WHICH INCLUDE THE 65 GROUP REPRESENTATIVES, REMAIN AN IMPORTANT PIECE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PUZZLE. IT APPEARS A SMALL MAJORITY OF THE KPU'S CHOICES WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE RULING GOLKAR CANDIDATE OVER OPPOSITION LEADER MEGAWATI, DUE TO THEIR LONGSTANDING TIES TO THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

ESTABLISHMENT. THE BICKERING AND OPPORTUNISM SOME KPU MEMBERS HAVE DISPLAYED IN DECIDING UPON ELIGIBLE GROUPS HAS REINFORCED A STRONG SENTIMENT THAT ELIMINATING UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES IN THE MPR SHOULD BE A PRIME TARGET OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. POST WILL SEND A LIST OF THE SELECTED GROUPS TO EAP/PIMBS BY FAX. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) INDONESIA'S GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) HAS MADE MEASURED BUT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN RECENT DAYS TOWARD COMPLETING THE CONTROVERSIAL PROCESS OF SELECTING THE 65 "FUNCTIONAL GROUPS" ELIGIBLE TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHERE THEY WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ELECTING THE COUNTRY'S NEXT PRESIDENT LATER THIS YEAR. AS OF AUGUST 23, THE KPU HAD DECIDED UPON ALL BUT FIVE OF THE 65 GROUPS. YET TO BE SELECTED ARE FIVE INDIGENOUS MINORITY ETHNIC GROUPS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04080 01 OF 03 250926Z

4. (U) INDONESIA'S CONSTITUTION MANDATES THAT THE MPR CONSIST OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENT (DPR), AUGMENTED BY DELEGATES FROM THE PROVINCES AND FROM FUNCTIONAL GROUPS. AS CURRENTLY CONSTRUED, THE 700-MEMBER MPR COMPRISES ALL 500 MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT (38 OF WHOM ARE APPOINTED FROM THE ARMED FORCES), REPRESENTATIVES OF 65 "FUNCTIONAL GROUPS", AND AN ADDITIONAL 135 REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES (FIVE FROM EACH OF THE 27 PROVINCES) TO BE SELECTED BY THE NEWLY-FORMED PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES, SCHEDULED TO BE SWORN IN AT THE END OF AUGUST.

5. (U) IN JUNE, 1999 THE KPU ISSUED A DECREE STIPULATING THE NUMBER OF GROUPS IN VARIOUS CATEGORIES ELIGIBLE TO SEND DELEGATES TO THE MPR. THESE INCLUDED: 20 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS; 5 VETERANS AND "PATRIOTS" ORGANIZATIONS; 9 ECONOMIC AND COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS; 5 WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS; 5 MINORITY ETHNIC GROUPS; 2 ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE DISABLED; 9 CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND INTELLECTUAL ORGANIZATIONS; 5 CIVIL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS, AND 5 UNIVERSITY STUDENT/YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS AND NGO'S. THE KPU HAS NOW SELECTED THE SPECIFIC GROUPS ELIGIBLE IN EACH CATEGORY EXCEPT THOSE FOR MINORITY ETHNIC GROUPS.

KPU - OLD HABITS DIE HARD

6. (U) EARLIER THIS MONTH, THE KPU WAS FORCED BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD WHEN A LEAKED LIST SHOWED THE SUBCOMMITTEE

CHARGED WITH SELECTING ELIGIBLE GROUPS (CALLED "TEAM 15") HAD FAVORED MARGINAL GROUPS, WHO IN SOME CASES HAD TIES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04080 01 OF 03 250926Z

TO SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS, OVER MORE ESTABLISHED AND POLITICALLY NEUTRAL GROUPS. ASSUMING TEAM 15'S CHOICES STAND THIS TIME (PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY WILL), CONCLUDING THE SELECTION OF ELIGIBLE GROUPS REPRESENTS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD, IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN IT GETS BEYOND ONE MORE CONTENTIOUS ISSUE THE KPU HAS FOUGHT OVER. THE KPU CONSISTS OF 5 GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM EACH OF THE 48 PARTIES THAT PARTICIPATED IN THE GENERAL ELECTION. IN THE MONTHS SINCE THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION, THE KPU HAS EARNED A REPUTATION FOR INFIGHTING AND OPPORTUNISM ON THE PART OF MANY OF ITS POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS, WHO HAVE AT TIMES DELIBERATELY OBSTRUCTED AN ALREADY OVERBURDENED PROCESS IN AN ATTEMPT TO WRING CONCESSIONS FROM THE WINNING PARTIES AND FROM THE GOVERNMENT (REF A). ON AUGUST 3 PRESIDENT HABIBIE WAS FORCED TO STEP IN AND DECLARE THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION VALID AFTER REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MANY PARTIES THAT HAD FARED VERY POORLY REFUSED TO CERTIFY THE RESULTS (REF B).

7. (U) ONCE THE KPU SELECTS THE FINAL FIVE MINORITY ETHNIC GROUPS, IT WILL BE UP TO EACH SELECTED GROUP TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5124

PAGE 01 JAKART 04080 02 OF 03 250926Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/011W

----------F03724 250926Z /38

R 250912Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9453
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE

AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 004080

E.O. 12958:DECL:08/24/09
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: HALTING PROGRESS IN PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS

CHOOSE ITS REPRESENTATIVE. THE JUNE KPU DECREE SUGGESTS THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN A DEMOCRATIC AND FAIR MANNER, THOUGH IN PRACTICE IT IS LIKELY THE EXISTING LEADERS OF MANY GROUPS WILL TAKE ON THE ROLE OF BEING DELEGATES TO THE MPR ON BEHALF OF THEIR ORGANIZATIONS. PROCEDURES

REQUIRE THAT THE KPU THEN CERTIFY AND PRESIDENT HABIBIE SIGN OFF ON THE FINAL LIST OF GROUP REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MPR.

POLITICAL IMPACT
---

8. (U) WITH THE ACTUAL REPRESENTATIVES YET TO BE SELECTED, THE DETERMINATION OF ELIGIBLE GROUPS APPEARS TO PROVIDE POLITICAL ACTORS LITTLE ADDITIONAL USEFUL INFORMATION WITH WHICH TO MANEUVER. EVEN AFTER THE REPRESENTATIVES ARE SELECTED, THEY WILL FORM AN AMORPHOUS GROUP, WITH VARYING AGENDAS AND POLITICAL SYMPATHIES. PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS WILL MOST LIKELY HAVE TO APPROACH EACH FOR SUPPORT ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MPR SESSION.

9. (U) THE AMBIGUOUS OUTCOME OF THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, FROM WHICH NO PARTY EMERGED IN A POSITION TO ENSURE SUCCESS FOR ITS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, HAS INCREASED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GROUP REPRESENTATIVES' VOTES, HOWEVER. OBSERVERS HAVE BEEN ANXIOUS TO SEE WHETHER THE GROUPS SELECTED BY THE KPU WOULD APPEAR MORE LIKELY TO FAVOR GOLKAR CANDIDATE PRESIDENT HABIBIE OR OPPOSITION INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF STRUGGLE (PDI-P) LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI. MANY HAVE LONG SPECULATED THAT THE MAJORITY WOULD TEND TO FAVOR A GOLKAR CANDIDATE SIMPLY BECAUSE OLDER, MORE ESTABLISHED (AND THUS PRESUMABLY MORE PRO-STATUS QUO) GROUPS WOULD HAVE AN INSIDE TRACK ON BEING SELECTED.

10. (C) REFLECTING ON THE KPU'S NEWLY-RELEASED LIST OF ELIGIBLE GROUPS OVER COFFEE WITH POLOFF ON AUGUST 20, RESPECTED GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE KPU ANDI MALLARANGENG BELIEVED THAT THIS INDEED HAD BEEN THE CASE. MALLARANGENG, WHO HAS FREQUENTLY BEEN AT ODDS WITH POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES ON THE KPU, CHARACTERIZED THE KPU'S LATEST SELECTIONS AS REASONABLE IN COMPARISON TO ITS EARLIER CHOICES BUT STILL OVERWEIGHTED WITH PRO-STATUS QUO AND ESTABLISHMENT GROUPS. CONSIDERING THAT THE SELECTED GROUPS WILL MOST LIKELY BE REPRESENTED BY THEIR OLDER, MORE ESTABLISHMENT LEADERS, MALLARANGENG ESTIMATED THAT AS MANY AS 35-40 OF THE 65 GROUP REPRESENTATIVES WOULD TEND TO FAVOR A GOLKAR CANDIDATE. OTHER CONTACTS AGREED THAT THE LIST APPEARS TO INCLUDE A SLIGHT MAJORITY OF GROUPS LIKELY TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO GOLKAR.

COMMENT
---

11. (SBU) TEAM 15'S HANDLING OF THE GROUP SELECTIONS HAS HEIGHTENED A PERVASIVE DISGUST WITH THE KPU AND REINFORCED A WIDELY-HELD VIEW THAT HAVING UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES IN THE MPR IS AN ANACHRONISM UNSUITED TO A MODERN DEMOCRACY. DURING THE SOEHARTO ERA, THE PRESIDENT SIMPLY APPOINTED THE REGIONAL AND GROUP REPRESENTATIVES AS A WAY OF ENSURING HIS TIGHT CONTROL OVER THE POLITICAL AND POLICY APPARATUS. STUCK WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT TO HAVE UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES IN THE MPR, THE 1998 SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR HANDED THE JOB OF SELECTING GROUPS OVER TO THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NOMINALLY INDEPENDENT KPU. IT WAS HOPED THAT DRAMATICALLY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES AND IMPROVING THE METHODS BY WHICH THEY WERE SELECTED WOULD PREVENT THE WORST ABUSES OF THE OLD SYSTEM.

12. (U) IN THE RUSH TO HOLD THE GENERAL ELECTION BY THE JUNE 7 DEADLINE, HOWEVER, PROCEDURES FOR SELECTING THE UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES WERE NOT CLEARLY ESTABLISHED, AND THE KPU WOUND UP HAVING TO MAKE THEM UP AS IT WENT ALONG. SOME REPRESENTATIVES FROM SMALL PARTIES, WHICH FACE EXTINCTION DUE TO THEIR POOR PERFORMANCE IN THE ELECTION, HAVE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE CONFUSION TO ATTEMPT TO EXTRACT ANYTHING OF VALUE -- INCLUDING, WE HAVE HEARD, CASH -- YET TO BE GAINED FROM THEIR TENURE ON

THE KPU. WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES' VOTES LOOMING LARGER THAN EVER, OTHER KPU MEMBERS HAVE SOUGHT POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. IF ANYTHING GOOD IS TO COME OUT OF THIS SAD EPISODE, IT IS THAT ELIMINATING UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES WILL LIKELY BE AN EARLY TARGET OF ANY FUTURE GOVERNMENT THAT CHOOSES TO TAKE ON THE THORNY BUT URGENT PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5125

PAGE 01 JAKART 04080 03 OF 03 250926Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/011W

----------F03726 250926Z /38

R 250912Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9454
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 004080

E.O. 12958:DECL:08/24/09
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: HALTING PROGRESS IN PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS

REFORM.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04080 03 OF 03 250926Z

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8974

PAGE 01 JAKART 03962 01 OF 03 161150Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	ITCE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EXME-00	E-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/014W					

----------ECD01D 161150Z /38

R 161139Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9326
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003962

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958:
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, ECON, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE'S DEFENDS HIS RECORD

1. (U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT.
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 03962 01 OF 03 161150Z

2. (U) SUMMARY: IN A TWO-HOUR AUGUST 16 SPEECH BEFORE THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) TO COMMEMORATE INDONESIA'S AUGUST 17 NATIONAL DAY, PRESIDENT HABIBIE CALLED FOR A RENEWAL OF THE IDEALS OF THE COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE IN PURSUING ITS CURRENT EFFORTS AT SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. RECALLING THE POLITICAL UPHEAVAL AND BLEAK ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF A YEAR AGO, HABIBIE CLAIMED CREDIT ON BEHALF OF HIS "REFORM-DEVELOPMENT CABINET" FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN INDONESIA'S PROSPECTS.

3. (U) SUMMARY CONTINUED: IN FACING THE NEW MILLENIUM,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

HE SAID INDONESIA STILL FACES THREE SERIOUS PROBLEMS: OVERCOMING THE ECONOMIC CRISIS; RESOLVING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS, MANY OF WHICH HAVE THEIR ORIGINS IN UNRESOLVED PAST CONFLICTS, AND; DEVELOPING A STRATEGY FOR FACING A FUTURE OF INCREASING GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION. HABIBIE ASKED FOR UNDERSTANDING OF HIS GRADUAL APPROACH TO REFORM, ARGUING IN FAVOR OF "ACCELERATED EVOLUTION" RATHER THAN REVOLUTION, WHICH INVARIABLY CAUSES SUFFERING. HABIBIE CLAIMED CREDIT FOR PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS WHILE CALLING FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENT. END SUMMARY.

THE ECONOMY
---

4. (U) IMPROVED PERFORMANCE: COMPARING RECENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE WITH THE SITUATION WHEN HE TOOK OFFICE IN MAY 1998, PRESIDENT HABIBIE STATED THAT THE ECONOMY HAD

ENTERED THE RECOVERY PHASE. INDICATORS INCLUDED PRELIMINARY DATA ON GDP GROWTH IN THE FIRST TWO QUARTERS OF 1999; LOWER INFLATION, INCLUDING DEFLATION FOR THE PAST FIVE MONTHS; SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED DOMESTIC INTEREST RATES; FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN STOCKS LISTED ON THE JAKARTA EXCHANGE; AND A STRONGER AND MORE STABLE RUPIAH. HABIBIE ATTRIBUTED THE RUPIAH'S RECENT WEAKENING TO EXTERNAL FACTORS AND (IN A CLEAR REFERENCE TO THE BANK BALI SCANDAL) EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE BANK RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM "THAT WE WILL ADDRESS RESOLUTELY."

5. (U) NEW FOUNDATIONS: HABIBIE POINTEDLY GAVE CREDIT NOT ONLY TO EXTERNAL ACTORS, BUT ALSO TO THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE WHO HAD SHOULDERED THE BURDEN. HE ENUMERATED HOW THE GOVERNMENT WAS BUILDING A MARKET ECONOMIC SYSTEM THAT WOULD BE MORE EFFICIENT, FAIR, AND ABLE TO COMPETE IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION. MEASURES INCLUDED A HOST OF NEW LAWS AND RATIFICATION OF ILO CONVENTIONS. HE ASSERTED THAT THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAM WOULD CONTINUE TO IMPROVE AND URGED LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO BE PRO-ACTIVE IN ENSURING PROPER IMPLEMENTATION. HE DESCRIBED PROGRESS IN ADDRESSING CORRUPTION (THE NEW LAW ON CLEAN GOVERNANCE, A FIVE-FOLD INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CORRUPTION CASES UNDER INVESTIGATION). ON CORRUPTION, COLLUSION, AND NEPOTISM (KKN), HE URGED THAT ACCUSED PERSONS RECEIVE DUE PROCESS AND NOT BE TRIED IN THE MEDIA. THE GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN CIVIL SOCIETY A CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN ERADICATING KKN; THE PROCESS HAD TO BE RESPONSIBLE. CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT HAD TO BE ELIMINATED, AND CIVIL

SERVICE SALARIES SIMULTANEOUSLY RAISED.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 03962 01 OF 03 161150Z

6. (U) THE ECONOMIC AGENDA: TO ENSURE ECONOMIC RECOVERY, HABIBIE AVERRED, INDONESIA HAD FIVE MAIN TASKS:

(A) TO STRIVE FOR A FEELING OF SECURITY FOR ALL ECONOMIC ACTORS, DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN.
(B) TO COMPLETE BANK RESTRUCTURING AND RECAPITALIZATION.
(C) TO WORK OUT PRIVATE SECTOR DEBT, INCLUDING THROUGH THE JAKARTA INITIATIVE AND THE INDONESIAN DEBT RESTRUCTURING AGENCY (INDRA).
(D) TO PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO DEVELOPMENT BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION. IN THIS REGARD, THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT FUNDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT BUDGET WAS QUITE SAFE FOR THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR (ENDING MARCH 31, 2000), THANKS TO THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INDONESIA. THE CARRYING COSTS OF THE BANK RECAPITALIZATION BONDS WOULD PEAK THEREAFTER, HE SAID, AND INDONESIA WOULD ALSO HAVE TO FINANCE REBUILDING DAMAGED INFRASTRUCTURE IN VARIOUS AREAS. TO COVER THE COSTS, INDONESIA PINNED ITS HOPES ON SELLING MINORITY SHARES IN STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND INCREASING TAX REVENUES.
(E) TO CONTINUE REFORM AT THE MACRO- AND MICROECONOMIC LEVELS.

7. (SBU) COMMENT: THE IMF-SUPPORTED STABILIZATION PROGRAM AND BETTER WEATHER HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8975

PAGE 01 JAKART 03962 02 OF 03 161150Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	ITCE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EXME-00	E-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/014W					

----------ECD022 161150Z /38

R 161139Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9327

INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 003962

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958:
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, ECON, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE'S DEFENDS HIS RECORD

SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS OVER THE

PAST FOURTEEN MONTHS. ALL PARTIES HAVE ENDORSED CONTINUING TO WORK WITH THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND HAVE ESPOUSED MARKET-BASED ECONOMIC POLICIES. THE COMBINATION ALLOWS THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION TO AVOID RUNNING ON AN "IMF HARDSHIP" PLATFORM. OFFERING HOPE WHILE POINTING OUT THAT THE BILLS HAD YET TO BE PAID, THE SPEECH OFFERED NO STARTLING NEW INSIGHTS ON THE GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM. END COMMENT.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
---

8. (U) REFORM CHALLENGES: HABIBIE NOTED THAT INDONESIA IS PART OF A WORLDWIDE WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION WHICH IS ACCOMPANIED BY FREE TRADE AND GLOBALIZATION. IN KEEPING WITH THESE CHANGES, HE SAID THE PEOPLE NATURALLY ASPIRE TO HAVE A LARGER SAY IN HOW THEY ARE GOVERNED. HE SAID INDONESIA'S CHALLENGES ARE TO DEVELOP A MORE TOLERANT CULTURE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE DIFFERING ASPIRATIONS, BUILD DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS WHICH PROVIDE FOR A DIVISION OF POWER, AND WORK TOWARD FOR A BETTER BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE PROVINCES AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. HE CALLED FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO THE 1945 CONSTITUTION SO THAT IT BETTER REFLECTS THE PEOPLE'S CURRENT ASPIRATIONS, BUT SAID THE PREAMBLE SHOULD BE LEFT INTACT. (NOTE: ISLAMIC GROUPS HAVE LONG SOUGHT A RETURN TO AN EARLY DRAFT OF THE PREAMBLE WHICH ENSHRINED A PREEMINENT ROLE FOR ISLAM. ANY ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THE PREAMBLE WOULD PROVOKE STRONG OPPOSITION FROM VARIOUS QUARTERS OF SOCIETY. END NOTE.)

PAGE 03 JAKART 03962 02 OF 03 161150Z

9. (U) ACCOMPLISHMENTS: HABIBIE CLAIMED HIS ADMINISTRATION HAD MADE LARGE STRIDES IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE IN THE PAST YEAR, PARTICULARLY THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW LAWS ON POLITICAL PARTIES, GENERAL ELECTIONS, AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) AND PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR). THESE LAWS PROVIDED THE LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR THE JUNE 7 GENERAL ELECTION, WHICH HE SAID INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS HAD DEEMED TO BE "HONEST, JUST AND FAIR". HABIBIE CONGRATULATED THE PARTIES WHICH HAD WON SEATS IN PARLIAMENT, DRAWING APPLAUSE WHEN HE BEGAN BY NAMING FIRST-PLACE PDI-PERJUANGAN. HE SAID HIS ADMINISTRATION HAD ENSURED THAT THE ARMED FORCES (TNI) HAD REMAINED NEUTRAL IN THE ELECTION AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NO LONGER PLAY A DOMINANT ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING ELECTIONS.

10. (U) THE PRESIDENT NOTED THE EXPANSION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY DURING HIS TERM IN OFFICE, INCLUDING FREEDOMS OF SPEECH, ASSEMBLY, AND THE PRESS. HE COMPLAINED THAT THE PRESS MUST ACT RESPONSIBLY, HOWEVER, PROVIDING COMPLETE INFORMATION RATHER THAN A SINGLE SIDE OF A STORY. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT HAD ENACTED LEGISLATION ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN ORDER TO LAY DOWN RULES THAT WOULD PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF ALL CONCERNED WHILE HELPING TO MAINTAIN ORDER. THE GOVERNMENT HAD SEPARATED THE POLICE FROM THE ARMED FORCES IN ORDER TO REALIZE THE IDEAL OF A "PEOPLE'S POLICE", WHICH WOULD BE RESPECTED FOR ITS ABILITIES AND SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE AND NO LONGER SERVE AS AN INSTRUMENT TO MAINTAIN POWER. HABIBIE NOTED EFFORTS UNDERWAY WITHIN TNI TO "REDEFINE" ITSELF, SAYING WHAT IS GOOD FOR THE PEOPLE IS GOOD FOR TNI.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 03962 02 OF 03 161150Z

11. (U) ACEH: HABIBIE DEPLORED THE ATMOSPHERE OF CONFLICT WHICH HAS ARISEN IN INDONESIA - NOTING IN PARTICULAR ACEH, WHERE HE BLAMED THE VIOLENCE ON PROVOCATEURS AND DEMONSTRATORS. HEEDING DEMANDS TO WITHDRAW SECURITY FORCES FROM ACEH, HE SAID, WOULD ONLY EXPOSE THE PEOPLE TO MORE DANGER. HE SAID THE VIOLENCE MUST END SO THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE ACEHNESE COULD BE ADDRESSED. THE PRESIDENT WELCOMED THE INITIATIVE OF ACEH'S REGIONAL PARLIAMENT IN PROPOSING LEGISLATION TO DESIGNATE ACEH A "SPECIAL PROVINCE" IN THE FIELDS OF RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND CUSTOMARY LAW. HABIBIE PRAISED AT LENGTH THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ACEHNESE TO INDONESIA'S

STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND STRESSED HIS SINCERITY IN WANTING TO FIND A SOLUTION THAT WOULD RELIEVE THEIR SUFFERING.

12. (U) HABIBIE NOTED THAT MANY CONFLICTS IN INDONESIA STEMMED FROM A FAILURE TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. FOR THIS REASON HIS GOVERNMENT HAD ENACTED LEGISLATION AIMED AT DEVOLVING POWER TO THE PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL LEVELS AND AT ACHIEVING A BETTER FISCAL BALANCE BETWEEN THE PROVINCES AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID WEALTHIER PROVINCES MUST CONTINUE TO BE READY TO HELP LESS WELL-OFF PARTS OF THE COUNTRY TO

PAGE 01 JAKART 03962 03 OF 03 161150Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	ITCE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	EXME-00	E-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/014W					

----------ECD025 161150Z /38

R 161139Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9328
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 003962

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958:
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, ECON, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE'S DEFENDS HIS RECORD

DEVELOP.

13. (U) HUMAN RIGHTS: HABIBIE SAID THAT INDONESIA MUST ADHERE TO ITS HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS, NOTING THAT THE COUNTRY "CANNOT ENFORCE THE LAW WITH METHODS THAT VIOLATE THE LAW". HE SAID THE GOI HAD COMMITTED ITSELF TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS BY: ADOPTING THE 1998 NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON HUMAN RIGHTS; PASSING INTO LAW INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON TORTURE AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND ELIMINATING ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, AND; RATIFYING A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS. SAYING THAT HUMAN RIGHTS DO NOT RECOGNIZE GENDER BARRIERS, HE SAID IT WAS TIME FOR INDONESIA TO PUT WOMEN ON THE SAME FOOTING AS MEN.

14. (U) EAST TIMOR: HABIBIE SAID INDONESIA HOPED EAST TIMOR WOULD ACCEPT ITS OFFER OF BROAD AUTONOMY IN THE AUGUST 30 REFERENDUM BUT WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT INDEPENDENCE IF THAT IS WHAT THE PROVINCE CHOSE. EITHER WAY, HE STRESSED INDONESIA WOULD REMAIN INTACT AS A UNITARY STATE, WHICH HAD BECOME A FACT OF HISTORY.

ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5254 RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 03827 01 OF 02 061136Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	ED-01	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	IRM-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00
	SSAS-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/017W			

----------E99D15 061136Z /38

R 061129Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9201
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003827

DEPT FOR EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, SOCI, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03827 01 OF 02 061136Z
SUBJECT: PDI-P'S STRATEGY, TAKE TWO

REF: JAKARTA 3698

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS GREG FERGIN; REASON 1.5(D).

2. SUMMARY: A SECOND STRATEGIST FOR MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI'S PARTY HAS REITERATED WHAT ONE OF HIS COLLEAGUES TOLD US LAST WEEK, THAT THE MILITARY FACTION IN THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY WILL SUPPORT MEGAWATI'S CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENT. THE STRATEGIST, JAKOB TOBING, WAS NON-COMMITTAL ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO BEING MEGAWATI'S RUNNING MATE. TOBING DISMISSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT MUSLIM PARTIES COULD BE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR THROUGH A "MIDDLE AXIS" COALITION, AND OUTLINED HOW MEGAWATI PLANS TO CONSOLIDATE MUSLIM SUPPORT FOR HER CANDIDACY. TOBING PREDICTED THAT THE MPR WOULD REJECT PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH, LEADING TO HIS RESIGNATION. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) AT A QUICK LUNCH AUGUST 5, JAKOB TOBING, ELECTIONS COMMISSION (KPU) MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE ELECTIONS IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE (PPI)AS WELL AS INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF STRUGGLE (PDI-P) STRATEGIST, SHARED WITH TDY POLOFF SOME THOUGHTS ON THE NEXT ROUND OF HORSETRADING IN WHICH PDI-P HOPES TO LOCK UP THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN NOVEMBER FOR PDI-P LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI. TOBING, WHO HAS BEEN AT THE EYE OF THE HURRICANE SWIRLING AROUND THE DELAYED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03827 01 OF 02 061136Z

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS, WAS HIS TYPICAL UNFLAPPABLE SELF, BUT LOOKED DRAWN AND TIRED, AND WAS DUE TO GO OFF TO ANOTHER LONG KPU SESSION. TOBING DISCUSSED IN PASSING SOME DETAILS OF THE DISTRICT, PROVINCIAL, AND NATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY SELECTION, BUT HIS MOST INTERESTING INSIGHTS DEALT WITH PDI-P'S RELATIONS WITH THE MILITARY, THE MUSLIMS, AND GOLKAR.

4. (C) TOBING, LIKE FELLOW PDI-P LEADER MOCHTAR BUCHORI (REFTEL), EXUDED CONFIDENCE THAT THE MILITARY'S (TNI) THIRTY-EIGHT SEAT BLOC WILL GO WITH MEGAWATI AND PDI-P. (COMMENT: THIS IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTED BY HABIBIE SUPPORTERS AND SOME OUTSIDE OBSERVERS). TOBING ADDED THAT WIRANTO HIMSELF HAS DECLARED THE END OF THE MILITARY'S DUAL FUNCTION ("DWI FUNGSI")AND THAT SIGNIFICANT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY HIERARCHY ARE COMMITTED TO SUCH A STEP, MENTIONING BAMBANG YUDHOYONO WHEN PRESSED FOR SPECIFIC TNI LEADERS' NAMES. TOBING ALSO POINTED OUT THAT MEGAWATI'S JULY 29 SPEECH WAS VERY CLEAR ABOUT CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY. (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF HER REMARKS SAYS "I REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT CIVILIAN AUTHORITY MUST TAKE SUPREMACY OVER MILITARY AUTHORITY"). HE REMARKED ON THE TEN PERCENT RESERVED FOR THE MILITARY IN REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND SAID THAT PDI-P HAD TRIED HARD TO CONVINCE THOSE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES NOT TO USE THEIR BLOC STRENGTH IN THE REGIONAL LEVEL DPR TO FORCE THEMSELVES AS CANDIDATES TO BE SENT TO THE LARGER NATIONAL BODY, THE MPR, WHERE THEY COULD JOIN WITH THE THIRTY-EIGHT SEATS TO MAKE A LARGER BLOC OF OVER

FIFTY, THUS MAKING THEMSELVES CRUCIAL TO THE FINAL VOTE ON THE PRESIDENT (SEE REFTEL).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03827 01 OF 02 061136Z

5. (C) ON WIRANTO AS A PDI-P VICE PRESIDENTIAL CHOICE, TOBING WAS NONCOMMITTAL, SAYING THAT IT WAS STILL BEING WORKED OUT, REFUTING OTHER STORIES THAT WIRANTO AS VP WAS THE PRICE FOR TNI BLOC SUPPORT FOR PDI-P. TOBING HAD NO OTHER CANDIDATES TO OFFER UP, HOWEVER, AND HE DID NOT RESPOND TO A SUGGESTION THAT PDI-P MIGHT LOSE ITS INTELLECTUAL AND STUDENT SUPPORT IF WIRANTO JOINED THE MEGAWATI TICKET.

6. (C) TOBING RESPONDED TO A QUERY ABOUT THE POSSIBLE "MIDDLE AXIS" COALITION OF BOTH PRO AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT MUSLIM PARTIES, WITH A DISMISSIVE WAVE THAT THE ELECTIONS HAD PROVED ONE THING, THAT INDONESIA WANTED A SECULAR GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO SAID, FAIRLY UNCONVINCINGLY, THAT MEGAWATI'S APPARENT ALOOFNESS FROM MEETING WITH MUSLIM KIYAI WAS PART OF HER STRATEGY OF SILENCE. HE SAID PDI-P HAD A PLAN FOR HER TO CONSOLIDATE HER MUSLIM CREDENTIALS (OR DE-FANG ATTACKS ON HER ELIGIBILITY TO LEAD A MUSLIM-BASED STATE) BY VISITING (1) NU LEADERS (2) MUHAMMADIYAH HEADQUARTERS AND (3) MUI LEADERS, IN THAT ORDER, IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. (COMMENT: THIS STATELY PROCESSION ACROSS THE INDONESIAN ISLAMIC LANDSCAPE MAKES GOOD POLITICAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5255

PAGE 01 JAKART 03827 02 OF 02 061136Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	ED-01	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	SSAS-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/016W				

----------E99D17 061136Z /38

R 061129Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9202
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003827

DEPT FOR EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, SOCI, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PDI-P'S STRATEGY, TAKE TWO

SENSE AND SMARTLY LEAVES THE WORST FOR THE LAST. END COMMENT)

7. (C) ON HABIBIE AND GOLKAR, TOBING STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT HABIBIE COULD NOT LAST THROUGH THE NOVEMBER 1999 PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR). THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH OF ACCOUNTABILITY WOULD BE HIS DOWNFALL BECAUSE THE MPR WOULD TURN IT DOWN. (NOTE: THIS RECALLS PRESIDENT SOEKARNO'S FAMOUS SPEECH BEFORE THE PROVISIONAL MPR (MPRS) IN 1967 ACCOUNTING FOR HIS ACTIONS DURING AND AFTER THE 1965 ABORTIVE COUP. THE MPRS REJECTED HIS ACCOUNT, FORCING HIS RESIGNATION. END NOTE) TDYER REMARKED THAT THE MPR OF 1999 COULD BE PACKED WITH SO MANY SUPPORTERS OF GOLKAR THAT A TURNDOWN WAS QUESTIONABLE. NEVERTHELESS, TOBING ASSERTED THAT HABIBIE MIGHT RESIGN IF THE MPR REJECTED HIS ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH, BECAUSE GOLKAR WAS VERY UNSTABLE AND WAS DIVIDING INTO AN "ICMI/HABIBIE" CAMP AND A MORE SECULAR CAMP. TDYER ASKED WHOM GOLKAR WOULD CHOOSE AS ITS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN THAT CASE, AND TOBING RESPONDED, "PROBABLY WIRANTO."

8. (C) TOBING ENDED HIS DISCUSSION OF PROSPECTS FOR THE MPR SESSION BY AFFIRMING THAT THERE IS A CONSTANT, UNDERLYING SENTIMENT AMONG THE STUDENTS AND THE PEOPLE WHICH THEY EXPRESSED VIA THE JUNE ELECTION, THAT MEGAWATI WILL TRIUMPH BECAUSE THEY WISH IT. THE ALTERNATIVE, HE WARNED, WILL BE A "MOBILIZATION OF DISCONTENT".

CONFIDENTIAL

9. (C) COMMENT: TOBING SHOWED CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL AGILITY IN OVERSEEING THE CONDUCT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND THEIR AFTERMATH, EMERGING RELATIVELY UNSCATHED BY ACCUSATIONS OF THE ELECTION COMMISSION'S BIAS AND INCOMPETENCE. HIS CENTRAL POSITION IN THE ELECTIONS COMMISSION HIERARCHY GIVES HIM A GOOD VANTAGE POINT TO ASSESS THE POLITICAL MANEUVERING GOING ON AROUND HIM (OF WHICH HE IS VERY MUCH A PART EVEN AS HE CARRIES OUT HIS COMMISSION DUTIES). NEVERTHELESS, SOME OF HIS ASSERTIONS ARE UNCONVINCING AT THIS POINT, E.G., HIS CONFIDENCE THAT THE MILITARY WILL BACK MEGAWATI IN THE NOVEMBER MPR SESSION, AND HIS DESCRIPTION OF HER STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH MUSLIM GROUPS OPPOSED TO HER PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6958

PAGE 01 JAKART 03651 01 OF 02 281106Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/010W				

----------E62671 281107Z /38

R 281100Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9052
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003651

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/05
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICIANS EMERGE AT NU PRAY-IN

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY A/POLCOUNS WILLIAM PIERCE. REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: LEADERS OF INDONESIA'S EIGHT LARGEST POLITICAL PARTIES GATHERED AT A RECENT JAKARTA PUBLIC CONCLAVE OSTENSIBLY TO OFFER PRAYERS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03651 01 OF 02 281106Z
UPCOMING PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR). NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) CHAIRMAN ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, WHOSE ORGANIZATION SPONSORED THE GATHERING, OPENED THE PROCEEDINGS BY INTER ALIA OFFERING A PRAYER FOR FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, WHICH RECEIVED A ROUND OF BOOS FROM THE CROWD. CATCALLS AND BOOING ALSO GREETED GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANJUNG'S BRIEF REMARKS. PDI-P PERJUANGAN CHAIRMAN MEGAWATI'S COMMENTS, WHILE LIGHT ON SUBSTANCE, WERE LOUDLY CHEERED. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) INDONESIAN POLITICAL DRAMA GOT A BOOST SUNDAY, JULY 25, WHEN THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU), INDONESIA'S LARGEST RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION, HELD AN ISTIGHOSAH (PRAY-IN) FOR THE NU COMMUNITY AT SENAYAN STADIUM IN CENTRAL JAKARTA. ALTHOUGH THE EVENT WAS BILLED AS STRICTLY RELIGIOUS (TO

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

OFFER A PRAYER OF THANKS FOR THE SUCCESS OF JUNE'S DPR ELECTION AND TO PRAY FOR A SUCCESSFUL MPR SESSION LATER THIS YEAR), IT WAS OPENLY POLITICAL. UNDER THE AUSPICES OF ITS CHAIRMAN, ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, THE NU INVITED LEADERS OF THE EIGHT LARGEST PARTIES, AS WELL AS ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO TO ATTEND AND SPEAK. ALL EIGHT POLITICIANS SHOWED, INCLUDING PDI-P'S MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI. WIRANTO, WHO WAS OFF IN SURABAYA ATTENDING EAST JAVA NU'S OWN ISTIGHOSAH, SENT HIS NEW DEPUTY, ADMIRAL WIDODO. SOME 100,000 PEOPLE ATTENDED.

4. (SBU) WAHID, AS NU CHAIRMAN, LED OFF. IN WELCOMING REMARKS, HE INCLUDED A PRAYER FOR MOROCCO'S LATE KING HASAN AND FOR AILING FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO (THE LATTER'S NAME WAS MET WITH BOOS FROM THE CROWD). LATER AS WAHID LISTED THOSE LEADERS WHO WOULD SPEAK, CHEERS AROSE WHEN HE ANNOUNCED MEGAWATI AND TO A LESSER DEGREE PAN CHAIRMAN

AMIEN RAIS. GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANJUNG'S NAME ELICITED HOOTS AND MORE BOOING.

5. (U) AFTER WAHID OBSERVED THAT THE PRESENCE OF ALL MAJOR PARTY LEADERS REPRESENTED A SPIRIT OF BROTHERHOOD, HE SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY SUPPORTED MEGAWATI FOR PRESIDENT SINCE "IT IS THE PEOPLE'S DESIRE" THAT SHE BE ELEVATED TO THAT OFFICE. PKB CHAIRMAN MATORI FOLLOWED WAHID'S EXAMPLE AND SAID HE TOO SUPPORTED MEGAWATI.

6. (SBU) PAN CHAIRMAN AMIEN RAIS REPEATED A CALL HE HAD MADE A FEW DAYS PREVIOUSLY THAT WAHID HIMSELF SHOULD BE PRESIDENT. RAIS WAS ECHOED IN THIS SENTIMENT BY PPP CHAIRMAN HAMZAH HAZ, WHO, AS AN NU MEMBER HIMSELF, EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE PKB AND PPP WOULD BECOME UNITED. (NOTE: AFTER THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWED NEW PARTIES TO BE CREATED, THE PPP LOST MANY NU MEMBERS, WHO JOINED THE PKB, ESPECIALLY IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA.) THE REMARKS OF BOTH WERE APPLAUDED. THE OTHER PARTY CHAIRS DID NOT NAME OR SUPPORT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AT ALL. GOLKAR'S AKBAR TANJUNG, WHOSE PRESENCE ON THE PODIUM SPARKED RENEWED BOOING, SAID THAT HE HAD ATTENDED BECAUSE THE CEREMONY REFLECTED A SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC AND NATIONALIST BROTHERHOOD.

7. ((SBU)) MEGAWATI'S REMARKS REPRESENTED HER FIRST PUBLIC ADDRESS SINCE THE ELECTION, AND THOUSANDS IN THE CROWD SURGED TOWARD THE PODIUM AS SHE APPROACHED IT. SHE THANKED THE NU COMMUNITY FOR ITS CLOSE TIES TO THE PDI-P AND STRESSED THAT THE ELECTION WIN WAS NOT JUST FOR ANY ONE PARTY BUT FOR THE PEOPLE. UNFORTUNATELY FOR DEPUTY TNI

COMMANDER WIDODO, HE SPOKE JUST AFTER MEGAWATI. AS HE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03651 01 OF 02 281106Z
DELIVERED HIS OPENING, MOST OF THE CROWD HAD ALREADY HEADED FOR THE EXITS.

8. (C) COMMENT: THE JAKARTA GATHERING HAD A HEAVY POLITICAL CONTENT, UNLIKE THE SURABAYA EVENT, WHICH WAS A FAR MORE RELIGIOUSLY FOCUSED AFFAIR. MEGAWATI, WHILE AS USUAL LIGHT ON SUBSTANCE, SPOKE WITH ATYPICAL CLARITY AND EMOTION. MEANWHILE, MEGAWATI ADVISOR LAKSAMANA SUKARDI TOLD VISITNG PIMBS DEPUTY DIRECTOR ALOISI JULY 28 THAT MEGAWATI WILL DELIVER A "POLITICAL ADDRESS" ON JULY 29, LAYING OUT HER VIEWS ON EAST TIMOR, SOEHARTO, TNI REFORMS, AMONG OTHER TOPICS.

9. (C) THAT A COMPLETE SET OF MAJOR ISLAMIC POLITICAL PLAYERS (PPP, PAN, PK) SHOWED UP AT THIS NU SPONSORED EVENT WILL GIVE FURTHER FUEL TO CURRENT SPECULATION THAT EFFORTS ARE AFOOT TO FORM A CENTRIST GROUPING THAT WOULD FIELD AN ALTERNATIVE CANDIDATE TO HABIBIE OR MEGAWATI. AMIEN RAIS HAS BEEN PUSHING THE IDEA (WITH VARIOUS DEGREES FOR SERIOUSNESS) FOR SEVERAL DAYS, AND HAS USUALLY ACCOMPANIED HIS CALLS FOR SUCH A BLOCK WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT WAHID BE ITS CANDIDATE. WAHID, FOR HIS PART CONTINUES TO LEND HIS "PERSONAL" SUPPORT TO A MEGAWATI PRESIDENCY. THUS FAR, MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVE LONGSTANDING PERSONAL ANIMOSITIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6959

PAGE 01 JAKART 03651 02 OF 02 281106Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/010W					

----------E62673 281107Z /38

R 281100Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9053
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003651

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/05
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICIANS EMERGE AT NU PRAY-IN

AMONG THOSE WHO WOULD HAVE TO BE PARTY TO A THIRD, CENTRIST BLOCK WILL PREVENT IT FROM GETTING OFF THE GROUND.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03651 02 OF 02 281106Z

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

CONFIDENTIAL PTO0897 RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 03625 271956Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01
	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/020W						

----------E5E9FD 271956Z /64

R 270946Z JUL 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9023
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003625

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HABIBIE MEETING WITH A/S ROTH

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J.STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D).
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03625 271956Z

2. (C) SUMMARY. PRESIDENT HABIBIE OFFERED HIS ANALYSES OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS AND THE UPCOMING PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS DURING A TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH ON JULY 13. DISCUSSING MEGAWATI'S PDI-P, HABIBIE DESCRIBED THE PARTY AS A DISPARATE BAND OF GROUPS THAT HAD JOINED TOGETHER MAINLY OUT OF DISLIKE FOR A COMMON ENEMY, GOLKAR UNDER SOEHARTO. NOW, WITH SOEHARTO OUT OF THE PICTURE, THE COMMON ENEMY WAS FADING, ACCORDING TO HABIBIE, AND PDI-P'S SENSE OF PURPOSE WAS AS WELL. HABIBIE RECALLED PDI-P CAPTURED 34 PERCENT OF THE POPULAR VOTE IN THE JUNE DPR ELECTIONS. HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT CHOSEN BY POPULAR VOTE OR BY THE 500-MEMBER PARLIAMENT (DPR), BUT RATHER BY THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH INCLUDED 200 ADDITIONAL DELEGATES. THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

PDI-P ONLY CONTROLLED 22 PER CENT OF THIS LARGER BODY, AND BY IMPLICATION WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DICTATE THE OUTCOME OF THE MPR'S DELIBERATIONS. HABIBIE BELIEVED THE MPR WOULD PLACE GREAT STORE IN CANDIDATES' BACKGROUNDS IN CHOOSING A NEW PRESIDENT, AND EXTOLLED WHAT HE VIEWED AS HIS OWN EXTENSIVE CREDENTIALS IN THIS REGARD. HABIBIE INDICATED THE MPR SESSION WOULD START OCTOBER 1, BUT NOTED THAT HAD NOT YET BEEN ANNOUNCED OFFICIALLY. AFTER COMPLIMENTING HABIBIE ON HIS EAST TIMOR INITIATIVE, ROTH STRESSED THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION WAS BEING IMPEDED BY THE MILITARY'S FAILURE TO CARRY OUT ITS SECURITY OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE MAY 5 AGREEMENT. ON XANANA GUSMAO'S STATUS, HABIBIE SAID THAT BECAUSE OF CONCERNS FOR XANANA'S PERSONAL SAFETY HE WAS UNWILLING TO RELEASE THE EAST TIMOR RESISTANCE LEADER BEFORE THE UN-SUPERVISED CONSULTATION TOOK PLACE THERE. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH AND THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON JULY 13 FOR OVER TWO HOURS. STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRETARY/JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI, PRESIDENTIAL MILITARY ADVISER SINTONG PANJAITAN, AND MFA AMERICAS DIRECTOR SAMODRA ALSO ATTENDED. EAP CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON OFFICER KEEGAN AND A/POLCOUNS WERE PRESENT AS WELL.

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

4. (C) ROTH CONGRATULATED HABIBIE ON THE SUCCESS OF THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. THE PROCESS WAS CARRIED OUT PEACEFULLY, ROTH RECALLED, WITH FEW CHARGES OF SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES. ROTH NOTED THAT PERHAPS HABIBIE HAD DONE HIS JOB TOO WELL. AS OCCASIONALLY HAPPENED IN THE UNITED STATES WHEN PRESIDENTS WERE SUCCESSFUL, THE PEOPLE SOMETIMES WANTED A CHANGE AND THE INCUMBENT PARTY DID NOT WIN. IN ANY EVENT, ROTH STRESSED, THE U.S. SUPPORTED THE PROCESS, NOT ANY CANDIDATE OR PARTY. IN THE MEANTIME, THOSE WHO HAD PREDICTED THAT SERIOUS PROBLEMS WOULD ACCOMPANY THE ELECTIONS HAD BEEN PROVEN WRONG. FEARS OF ELECTION VIOLENCE, FEARS OF A COUP, FEARS THAT GOLKAR WOULD STEAL THE ELECTION--NONE OF THESE HAD COME TO PASS. NOW THERE WERE CONCERNS THAT ATTEMPTS MIGHT BE MADE TO RIG THE UPCOMING MPR SESSION THAT WILL SELECT THE NEXT PRESIDENT. AN OPEN, TRANSPARENT PROCESS, ROTH SAID, COULD HELP ASSUAGE THESE FEARS AS WELL.

HABIBIE'S ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION

5. (C) THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION, HABIBIE ELABORATED HIS OWN INTERPRETATION OF THE DPR ELECTION RESULTS AND OFFERED HIS SENSE OF HOW THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS WOULD PLAY OUT IN THE MPR. FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT, HABIBIE STRESSED THE

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS HAD BEEN FREE AND FAIR. AT THE SAME
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03625 271956Z
TIME, HOWEVER, THE RESULTS REFLECTED A CONTINUATION OF THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL EVOLUTION. THE THREE LARGEST VOTE GETTERS WERE THE TRADITIONAL PARTIES: GOLKAR, THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE PARTY (PDI-P), AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP). TOGETHER THEY HAD TAKEN 73 PERCENT OF THE VOTE. EACH HAD ORIGINS THAT WENT BACK TO THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC OR BEFORE.

MEGAWATI AND THE PDI-P
---

6. (C) HABIBIE CONTINUED BY OFFERING HIS THOUGHTS ON THE REASONS FOR PDI-P'S RELATIVE SUCCESS AT THE POLLS THIS TIME AROUND. THE PDI (PDI-P'S PREDECESSOR) USUALLY RECEIVED LESS THAN 10 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, HE NOTED, AND NOW PDI-P HAD CAPTURED 34 PERCENT. IN 1971, AFTER THE THEN NUMEROUS PARTIES WERE CONSOLIDATED INTO GOLKAR, PPP, AND PDI, HABIBIE SAID, THE PPP WAS THE EASIEST TO CONTROL BECAUSE OF ITS COMMON ISLAMIC BACKGROUND. GOLKAR, THE MORE PROFESSIONAL GROUP, WAS IN THE MIDDLE. THE PDI, WITH A MIX OF CHRISTIANS, NATIONALISTS, AND SOCIALISTS, WAS THE MOST DIFFICULT.

7. (C) OVER THE YEARS, HABIBIE REMARKED, VARIOUS OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS AND GROUPS EMERGED, AND LOOKED FOR A PARTY TO JOIN. PPP WAS UNPOPULAR. GOLKAR, AS THE GOVERNING PARTY, WAS A COMMON ENEMY. THUS, THEY THREW THEIR SQPPORT TO PDI-P. BUT NOW GOLKAR'S IMAGE AS THQ COMMON ENEMY WAS FADING, AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE PDI-P WAS FADING AS WELL, HABIBIE MAINTAIND. SUCH GROUPS, HE ARGUED, CANNOT CONTINUQ TO COOPERATE WITHOUT A COMMON ENEMY. HABIBIQ SAID THEIR LAST REAL ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE SPECTER OF A COMMON ENEMY WAS REFLECTED IN THE TIMEMAGAZINE REPORT ON SUHARTO'S WEALTH AND IN THQ CAMPAIGN AGAINST ATTORNEY
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 JAKART 03625 271956Z
GENERAL ANDI GHQLIB.

8. (C) IN HABIBIE'S VIEW, PDI-P SUPPORT CAME FROM FOUR MAIN GROUPS: THE OLD PDI MEMBESHIP, MILITARY OFFICERS WHO HAD BECOME DISAFFQCTED UNDER SOEHARTO (SUCH AS FORMER GENERAL THE SYAFEI), THE "NEPOTIST CAMP" AROUND MEGAWQTI'S BUSINESSMAN HUSBAND, AND INDIVIDUALS IN TROUBLE WITH THE LAW, SUCH AS BUSINESSMAN ARIFINQ PANIGORO. NOW THEY WERE LOSING THEIR COMMON PQRPOSE, HABIBIE SAID, AND OVER TIME THE PARTY QOULD COLLAPSE--A DEVELOPMENT, HABIBIE INSISTED, HE DID NOT WANT TO SEE. HE HOPED THAT IN FQVE YEARS THE PARTY WOULD BE ABLE TO RESTORE IQSELF, SINCE IT REFLECTED THE LEGITIMATE VIEWSOF A SECTOR OF SOCIETY.

PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS

9. (C) HABIBIE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT THE NQXT PRESIDENT WOULD NOT BE SELECTED ON THE BASQS OF THE POPULAR VOTE OUTCOME OR ACCORDING TOTHE BREAKDOWN IN SEATS IN THE DPR. INSTEAD, ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, IT WAS THE MPR, WIT 700 MEMBERS, THAT WOULD CHOOSE THE PRESIDQNT. MEGAWATI, HE NOTED PARENTHETICALLY, WOULQ CONTROL 34 PERCENT OF THE 500-MEMBER DPR, BUQ ONLY 22 PERCENT OF THE 700-STRONG MPR. GOLKAR WAS NOT FAR BEHIND, WITH 17 PERCENT OF THE MPRMEMBERS.

10. (C) ANOTHER IMPORTANT CONSIERATION AFFECTING THE SELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, ACCORDING TO HABIBIE, WAS THAT THE MPR MEMBERS WOULD BE A "MORE INTELLECTUAL" GROUP THAN THE 160 MILLION PEOPLE WHO HAD VOTED IN THE DPR ELECTION. THE CURRENT SYSTEM HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, HE SAID, AT INDONESIA'S FOUNDING, WHEN THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE WERE STILL UNEDUCATED AND UNSOPHISTICATED. IT WAS THOUGHT THAT SOCIETY HAD TO EVOLVE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 JAKART 03625 271956Z

BEFORE IT COULD MORE DIRECTLY CHOOSE THE PRESIDENT. IT STILL HAD A WAY TO GO, HE SAID. (NOTE: AT ANOTHER POINT IN THE MEETING, HABIBIE SAID HE FAVORED DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.)

11. (C) THUS, HABIBIE DECLARED, THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED HIS MANDATE FROM THE MPR, AND NOT FROM ANY POLITICAL PARTY. IN THE CASE OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT, HE SAID, THE MPR GAVE HIM AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF MORE THAN 70 PERCENT (SIC). (NOTE: ACTUALLY, SOEHARTO WAS ROUTINELY ENDORSED BY UNANIMOUS ACCLAMATION.) FORTUNATELY, NO ONE PARTY NOW ENJOYED AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY. INDONESIA HAD ALREADY ENDURED 30 YEARS OF THAT, HABIBIE SAID, AND THE COUNTRY WAS FED UP WITH IT.

HABIBIE ON MPR MECHANICS

12. (C) OF THE 48 PARTIES THAT ENTERED THE ELECTION, SIX CAME AWAY WITH MORE THAN TWO PERCENT OF THE VOTE, HABIBIE OBSERVED. ONLY THESE SIX PARTIES COULD SUBMIT RESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES TO THE MPR. (NOTE: WE ARE UNAWARE OF A TWO-PERCENT THRESHOLD FOR NOMINATING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IN THE MPR; PARTIES GAINING LESS THAN TWO PERCENT OF THE VOT CAN HOLD SEATS IN THE NEW MPR BUT ARE TECHNIQALLY BANNED FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE NEXT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.) IN CONTRAST TO PREVIUS PRACTICE, HABIBIE SAID, OTHER GROUPINGS IN THE MPR--E.G., THE 38 APPOINTED MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES IN THE DPR, THE 135 MPR REPRESENTATIVES ELECTED BY THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS, AND THE 65 MPR MEMBERS FROM OTHERWISE "UNDER-REPRESENTED" SOCIETAL ELEMENTS--WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO NOMINATE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. EACH PARTY,

HABIBIE SAID, WOULD BE ABLE TO SUBMIT A CANDIDATE'S APPLICATION TO THE DPR SPEAKER. AFTER CANDIDATES PASSED THE USUAL CHECKS (HEALTH RECORDS, POLICE AND LEGAL RECORDS, PAST TIES WITH
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 JAKART 03625 271956Z
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS COMMUNIST GROUPS), THEIR NAMES WOULD BE FORWARDED TO THE MPR.

13. (C) THE MPR WOULD SELECT THE PRESIDENT ON THE BASIS OF ONE MAN/ONE VOTE, HABIBIE SAID. MEMBERS WOULD CAST VOTES BASED ON CRITERIA THE MPR HAD DETERMINED IMPORTANT IN REGARD TO EACH CANDIDATE'S CAPABILITIES. UNLIKE BEFORE, NO ONE FACTION WOULD DOMINATE. THUS, THE PRESENTATION OF A CANDIDATE'S CAPABILITIES WOULD BECOME KEY. IN HABIBIE'S VIEW, THE MPR WOULD LOOK AT THE EXPERTISE OF EACH CANDIDATE AND DECIDE WHICH ONE COULD CONTRIBUTE GOOD IDEAS IN GOVERNING. THUS, THE PRESIDENT SAID, THE MPR MEMBERS NEEDED TO BE GIVEN THE RIGHT INPUT BEFORE MAKING THEIR DECISION. WITH HIS OWN RECORD OF EXTENSIVE SERVICE, HABIBIE SAID, HE WOULD BE SEEN AS A "NATIONAL ASSET."

14. (C) ROTH ASKED HABIBIE HOW A COALITION WOULD WORK IN THE MPR, SINCE NO PARTY ON ITS OWN WOULD HAVE ENOUGH STRENGTH TO FORM A GOVERNMENT OR PASS LEGISLATION. HABIBIE SAID THAT INDONESIA'S SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WAS NOT PARLIAMENTARY AND THUS COALITIONS PLAY NO REAL ROLE. THE MPR VOTE FOR PRESIDENT WOULD NOT BE A PARTY-BASED CONTEST, HE SAID. THE MPR WAS DESIGNED TO REFLECT THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE. ITS TWO CONTINGENTS OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS AND SOCIETAL GROUPS WERE DESIGNED TO BALANCE OFF THE PRESENCE OF THE PARTIES AND TO REPRESENT THOSE PEOPLE NOT TIED TO PARTIES. NEITHER SHOULD THE PRESIDENT BE A MEMBER OF A POLITICAL PARTY. IN FACT, HE HIMSELF WAS NO LONGER A GOLKAR MEMBER, HABIBIE SAID.

15. (C) DISCUSSING THE MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS, HABIBIE ENVISIONED A SERIES OF ELIMINATING VOTES, EACH PARING DOWN THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES TO THE POINT WHERE ONE CANDIDATE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 JAKART 03625 271956Z
RECEIVED A MAJORITY. THE VOTE COULD EASILY BE CONCLUDED IN 24 HOURS. HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE BY SECRET BALLOT--WHICH HE ARGUED WOULD HELP PREVENT INTIMIDATION.

HABIBIE ON HIS RECORD
---

16. (C) HABIBIE SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME RECOUNTING HIS PROFESSIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS OVER THE PAST 30 YEARS AND THE NEW LAWS AND POLICIES HIS GOVERNMENT HAD PUT IN PLACE DURING ITS 13 MONTHS IN OFFICE, WHICH HE BELIEVED MADE A STRONG CASE FOR HIS

REELECTION AS PRESIDENT. IT WOULD BE UNWISE, HE SUGGESTED, TO ENTRUST A NEW (AND INEXPERIENCED) LEADER WITH THE FATE OF INDONESIA'S 211 MILLION PEOPLE OR WITH THE COUNTRY'S IMPORTANT REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. CHANGING TACK SLIGHTLY, HABIBIE, INDICATED ONE REASON HE HAD PUSHED THROUGH SO MANY LAWS MANDATING REFORM WAS TO GET THEM IN PLACE SO THAT A NEW LEADER COULD NOT VEER FROM THE REFORM PATH HE (HABIBIE) HAD BLAZED.

17. (C) DURING HIS TENURE AS PRESIDENT, HABIBIE SAID, INDONESIA HAD CONFRONTED TWO ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO PURSUE CHANGE: REVOLUTION, OR A CONSTITUTIONAL, SYSTEMATIC PATH TOWARD REAL DEMOCRACY. MOST INDONESIANS, HE SAID, HAD OPTED FOR THE LATER PATH, WHICH HE TERMED "ACCELERATED EVOLUTION." HENCE, HABIBIE SAID, HE HAD HELPED PROVIDE A SYSTEM THAT IS LEADING TO A MORE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, IN WHICH THE PEOPLE ACTUALLY SELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES TO THE DPR AND THE MPR, WHICH IN TURN ELECTS THE PRESIDENT.

MPR DATES
---

18. (C) HABIBIE CONFIRMED THAT OCTOBER 1 WOULD BE THE DATE FOR

OPENING THE MPR. THE DATE WAS NOT YET OFFICIAL, BECAUSE HE WAS STILL AWAITING A FORMAL REQUEST FROM THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, BUT IT SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED SHORTLY. HABIBIE RECALLED HE HAD EARLIER AGREED TO AN AUGUST 29 OPENING DATE, BUT THE SCHEDULE HAD TO BE PUSHED BACK BECAUSE THE VOTE COUNT WAS DELAYED BEYOND ITS SCHEDULED JUNE 21 COMPLETION DATE.

EAST TIMOR
---

19. (C) HABIBIE REITERATED HIS DETERMINATION THAT THE TIMORESE PEOPLE SHOULD DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY. IF THEY CHOSE INDEPENDENCE, LET THEM DEPART IN PEACE AND HONOR, HE STATED. IF THEY CHOSE INTEGRATION, EAST TIMOR WOULD BECOME JUST LIKE THE OTHER PROVINCES. HE HIMSELF HAD NO STAKE IN INTEGRATION. HIS ONLY INTEREST WAS IN PEACE AND STABILITY.

20. (C) ROTH BLUNTLY WARNED THE PRESIDENT THAT HIS INITIATIVE IN OFFERING THE TIMORESE PEOPLE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE WAS IN DANGER OF FAILURE BECAUSE OF MILITIA VIOLENCE SUPPORTED BY ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY. CONSEQUENTLY INDONESIA HAD NOT YET FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATION UNDER THE MAY 5 TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT TO ENSURE SECURITY FOR THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO PROPERLY CARRY OUT THE AGREEMENT, ROTH SAID, WOULD BE SEVERE, BOTH IN TERMS OF INDONESIA'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S.-INDONESIAN RELATIONS. IN THE LATTER REGARD, ROTH NOTED

THAT CONGRESS WAS ALREADY URGING THE ADMINISTRATION TO PLACE MORE EMPHASIS ON THE EAST TIMOR SITUATION IN DETERMINING U.S. POSITIONS ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA. ROTH SAID HE WOULD BE RAISING EAST TIMOR IN GREATER DETAIL WITH GENERAL WIRANTO THE NEXT DAY, BUT STRESSED HE WISHED TO ENSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 JAKART 03625 271956Z
THE PRESIDENT UNDERSTOOD THE DEPTH OF OUR CONCERNS ON THIS MATTER. HABIBIE RESPONDED THAT WHEN HE LEARNED OF THE ACTIONS THE UN REQUIRED BEFORE IT COULD PROCEED WITH THE VOTER REGISTRATION PROCESS, HE IMMEDIATELY ORDERED HIS MINISTERS TO IMPLEMENT THEM.

21. (C) ROTH URGED THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO RELEASING XANANA GUSMAO. HABIBIE DEMURRED, ARGUING HE COULD NOT RISK XANANA'S BECOMING A TARGET FOR PERSONS SEEKING REVENGE OVER THE DEATHS OF FAMILY MEMBERS AT THE HANDS OF FRETELIN. IF XANANA WERE KILLED, CHAOS WOULD RESULT, SOMETHING HABIBIE SAID HE HAD TO PREVENT AT ALL COST.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0060

PAGE 01 JAKART 03625 01 OF 03 270952Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01
	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/020W						

----------E5A8C9 270952Z /38

R 270946Z JUL 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9023
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003625

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HABIBIE MEETING WITH A/S ROTH

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J.STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D).
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03625 01 OF 03 270952Z

2. (C) SUMMARY. PRESIDENT HABIBIE OFFERED HIS ANALYSES OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS AND THE UPCOMING PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS DURING A TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH ON JULY 13. DISCUSSING MEGAWATI'S PDI-P, HABIBIE DESCRIBED THE PARTY AS A DISPARATE BAND OF GROUPS THAT HAD JOINED TOGETHER MAINLY OUT OF DISLIKE FOR A COMMON ENEMY, GOLKAR UNDER SOEHARTO. NOW, WITH SOEHARTO OUT OF THE PICTURE, THE COMMON ENEMY WAS FADING, ACCORDING TO HABIBIE, AND PDI-P'S SENSE OF PURPOSE WAS AS WELL. HABIBIE RECALLED PDI-P CAPTURED 34 PERCENT OF THE POPULAR VOTE IN THE JUNE DPR ELECTIONS. HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT CHOSEN BY POPULAR VOTE OR BY THE 500-MEMBER PARLIAMENT (DPR), BUT RATHER BY THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH INCLUDED 200 ADDITIONAL DELEGATES. THE PDI-P ONLY CONTROLLED 22 PER CENT OF THIS LARGER BODY, AND BY IMPLICATION WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DICTATE THE OUTCOME OF THE MPR'S DELIBERATIONS. HABIBIE BELIEVED THE MPR WOULD PLACE GREAT STORE IN CANDIDATES' BACKGROUNDS IN CHOOSING A NEW PRESIDENT, AND EXTOLLED WHAT HE VIEWED AS HIS OWN EXTENSIVE CREDENTIALS IN THIS REGARD. HABIBIE INDICATED THE MPR SESSION WOULD START OCTOBER 1, BUT NOTED THAT HAD NOT YET BEEN ANNOUNCED OFFICIALLY. AFTER COMPLIMENTING HABIBIE ON HIS EAST TIMOR INITIATIVE, ROTH STRESSED THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION WAS BEING IMPEDED BY THE MILITARY'S FAILURE TO CARRY OUT ITS SECURITY OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE MAY 5 AGREEMENT. ON XANANA GUSMAO'S STATUS, HABIBIE SAID THAT BECAUSE OF CONCERNS FOR XANANA'S PERSONAL SAFETY HE WAS UNWILLING TO RELEASE THE EAST TIMOR RESISTANCE LEADER BEFORE THE UN-SUPERVISED CONSULTATION TOOK PLACE THERE. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH AND THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON JULY 13 FOR OVER TWO HOURS. STATE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03625 01 OF 03 270952Z
SECRETARY/JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI, PRESIDENTIAL MILITARY ADVISER SINTONG PANJAITAN, AND MFA AMERICAS DIRECTOR SAMODRA ALSO ATTENDED. EAP CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON OFFICER KEEGAN AND

A/POLCOUNS WERE PRESENT AS WELL.

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

4. (C) ROTH CONGRATULATED HABIBIE ON THE SUCCESS OF THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. THE PROCESS WAS CARRIED OUT PEACEFULLY, ROTH RECALLED, WITH FEW CHARGES OF SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES.

ROTH NOTED THAT PERHAPS HABIBIE HAD DONE HIS JOB TOO WELL. AS OCCASIONALLY HAPPENED IN THE UNITED STATES WHEN PRESIDENTS WERE SUCCESSFUL, THE PEOPLE SOMETIMES WANTED A CHANGE AND THE INCUMBENT PARTY DID NOT WIN. IN ANY EVENT, ROTH STRESSED, THE U.S. SUPPORTED THE PROCESS, NOT ANY CANDIDATE OR PARTY. IN THE MEANTIME, THOSE WHO HAD PREDICTED THAT SERIOUS PROBLEMS WOULD ACCOMPANY THE ELECTIONS HAD BEEN PROVEN WRONG. FEARS OF ELECTION VIOLENCE, FEARS OF A COUP, FEARS THAT GOLKAR WOULD STEAL THE ELECTION--NONE OF THESE HAD COME TO PASS. NOW THERE WERE CONCERNS THAT ATTEMPTS MIGHT BE MADE TO RIG THE UPCOMING MPR SESSION THAT WILL SELECT THE NEXT PRESIDENT. AN OPEN, TRANSPARENT PROCESS, ROTH SAID, COULD HELP ASSUAGE THESE FEARS AS WELL.

HABIBIE'S ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION

5. (C) THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION, HABIBIE ELABORATED HIS OWN INTERPRETATION OF THE DPR ELECTION RESULTS AND OFFERED HIS SENSE OF HOW THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS WOULD PLAY OUT IN THE MPR. FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT, HABIBIE STRESSED THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS HAD BEEN FREE AND FAIR. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE RESULTS REFLECTED A CONTINUATION OF THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL EVOLUTION. THE THREE LARGEST VOTE GETTERS WERE THE TRADITIONAL PARTIES: GOLKAR, THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE PARTY (PDI-P), AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP). TOGETHER THEY HAD TAKEN 73 PERCENT OF THE VOTE. EACH HAD ORIGINS THAT WENT BACK TO THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC OR BEFORE.

MEGAWATI AND THE PDI-P

6. (C) HABIBIE CONTINUED BY OFFERING HIS THOUGHTS ON THE REASONS FOR PDI-P'S RELATIVE SUCCESS AT THE POLLS THIS TIME AROUND. THE PDI (PDI-P'S PREDECESSOR) USUALLY RECEIVED LESS THAN 10 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, HE NOTED, AND NOW PDI-P HAD CAPTURED 34 PERCENT. IN 1971, AFTER THE THEN NUMEROUS PARTIES WERE CONSOLIDATED INTO GOLKAR, PPP, AND PDI, HABIBIE SAID, THE PPP WAS THE EASIEST TO CONTROL BECAUSE OF ITS COMMON ISLAMIC BACKGROUND. GOLKAR, THE MORE PROFESSIONAL GROUP, WAS IN THE

MIDDLE. THE PDI, WITH A MIX OF CHRISTIANS, NATIONALISTS, AND SOCIALISTS, WAS THE MOST DIFFICULT.

7. (C) OVER THE YEARS, HABIBIE REMARKED, VARIOUS OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS AND GROUPS EMERGED, AND LOOKED FOR A PARTY TO JOIN. PPP WAS UNPOPULAR. GOLKAR, AS THE GOVERNING PARTY, WAS A COMMON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1651

PAGE 01 JAKART 03625 02 OF 03 271402Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01
	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/020W						

----------E5C4F9 271402Z /45

R 270946Z JUL 99 (TAO)
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9024
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
RUEHLIQAMEMBASSY LISBON 1165
AMEMBASSY TOKYO Q511
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 003625

E.O. 12958: DECL; 7/27/03
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HABIBIE MEETING WITH A/S ROTH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03625 02 OF 03 271402Z

ENEMY. THUS, THEY THREW THEIR SQPPORT TO PDI-P. BUT NOW GOLKAR'S IMAGE AS THQ COMMON ENEMY WAS FADING, AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE PDI-P WAS FADING AS WELL, HABIBIE MAINTAIND. SUCH GROUPS, HE ARGUED, CANNOT CONTINUQ TO COOPERATE WITHOUT A COMMON ENEMY. HABIBIQ SAID THEIR LAST REAL ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE SPECTER OF A COMMON ENEMY WAS REFLECTED IN THE TIMEMAGAZINE

REPORT ON SUHARTO'S WEALTH AND IN THQ CAMPAIGN AGAINST ATTORNEY GENERAL ANDI GHQLIB.

8. (C) IN HABIBIE'S VIEW, PDI-P SUPPORT CAME FROM FOUR MAIN GROUPS: THE OLD PDI MEMBESHIP, MILITARY OFFICERS WHO HAD BECOME DISAFFQCTED UNDER SOEHARTO (SUCH AS FORMER GENERAL THE SYAFEI), THE "NEPOTIST CAMP" AROUND MEGAWQTI'S BUSINESSMAN HUSBAND, AND INDIVIDUALS IN TROUBLE WITH THE LAW, SUCH AS BUSINESSMAN ARIFINQ PANIGORO. NOW THEY WERE LOSING THEIR COMMON PQRPOSE, HABIBIE SAID, AND OVER TIME THE PARTY QOULD COLLAPSE--A DEVELOPMENT, HABIBIE INSISTED, HE DID NOT WANT TO SEE. HE HOPED THAT IN FQVE YEARS THE PARTY WOULD BE ABLE TO RESTORE IQSELF, SINCE IT REFLECTED THE LEGITIMATE VIEWSOF A SECTOR OF SOCIETY.

PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS
---

9. (C) HABIBIE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT THE NQXT PRESIDENT WOULD NOT BE SELECTED ON THE BASQS OF THE POPULAR VOTE OUTCOME OR ACCORDING TOTHE BREAKDOWN IN SEATS IN THE DPR. INSTEAD, ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, IT WAS THE MPR, WIT 700 MEMBERS, THAT WOULD CHOOSE THE PRESIDQNT. MEGAWATI, HE NOTED PARENTHETICALLY, WOULQ CONTROL 34 PERCENT OF THE 500-MEMBER DPR, BUQ ONLY 22 PERCENT OF THE 700-STRONG MPR. GOLKAR WAS NOT FAR BEHIND, WITH 17 PERCENT OF THE MPRMEMBERS.

CONFIDENTIAL

10. (C) ANOTHER IMPORTANT CONSIERATION AFFECTING THE SELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, ACCORDING TO HABIBIE, WAS THAT THE MPR MEMBERS WOULD BE A "MORE INTELLECTUAL" GROUP THAN THE 160 MILLION PEOPLE WHO HAD VOTED IN THE DPR ELECTION. THE CURRENT SYSTEM HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, HE SAID, AT INDONESIA'S FOUNDING, WHEN THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE WERE STILL UNEDUCATED AND UNSOPHISTICATED. IT WAS THOUGHT THAT SOCIETY HAD TO EVOLVE BEFORE IT COULD MORE DIRECTLY CHOOSE THE PRESIDENT. IT STILL HAD A WAY TO GO, HE SAID. (NOTE: AT ANOTHER POINT IN THE MEETING, HABIBIE SAID HE FAVORED DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.)

11. (C) THUS, HABIBIE DECLARED, THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED HIS MANDATE FROM THE MPR, AND NOT FROM ANY POLITICAL PARTY. IN THE CASE OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT, HE SAID, THE MPR GAVE HIM AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF MORE THAN 70 PERCENT (SIC). (NOTE: ACTUALLY, SOEHARTO WAS ROUTINELY ENDORSED BY UNANIMOUS ACCLAMATION.) FORTUNATELY, NO ONE PARTY NOW ENJOYED AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY. INDONESIA HAD ALREADY ENDURED 30 YEARS OF THAT, HABIBIE SAID, AND THE COUNTRY WAS FED UP WITH IT.

HABIBIE ON MPR MECHANICS
---

12. (C) OF THE 48 PARTIES THAT ENTERED THE ELECTION, SIX CAME AWAY WITH MORE THAN TWO PERCENT OF THE VOTE, HABIBIE OBSERVED. ONLY THESE SIX PARTIES COULD SUBMIT RESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES TO THE MPR. (NOTE: WE ARE UNAWARE OF A TWO-PERCENT THRESHOLD FOR NOMINATING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IN THE MPR; PARTIES GAINING LESS THAN TWO PERCENT OF THE VOT CAN HOLD SEATS IN THE NEW MPR BUT ARE TECHNIQALLY BANNED FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE NEXT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.) IN CONTRAST TO PREVIUS PRACTICE,

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03625 02 OF 03 271402Z
HABIBIE SAID, OTHER GROUPINGS IN THE MPR--E.G., THE 38 APPOINTED MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES IN THE DPR, THE 135 MPR REPRESENTATIVES ELECTED BY THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS, AND THE 65 MPR MEMBERS FROM OTHERWISE "UNDER-REPRESENTED" SOCIETAL ELEMENTS--WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO NOMINATE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. EACH PARTY, HABIBIE SAID, WOULD BE ABLE TO SUBMIT A CANDIDATE'S APPLICATION TO THE DPR SPEAKER. AFTER CANDIDATES PASSED THE USUAL CHECKS (HEALTH RECORDS, POLICE AND LEGAL RECORDS, PAST TIES WITH POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS COMMUNIST GROUPS), THEIR NAMES WOULD BE FORWARDED TO THE MPR.

13. (C) THE MPR WOULD SELECT THE PRESIDENT ON THE BASIS OF ONE MAN/ONE VOTE, HABIBIE SAID. MEMBERS WOULD CAST VOTES BASED ON CRITERIA THE MPR HAD DETERMINED IMPORTANT IN REGARD TO EACH CANDIDATE'S CAPABILITIES. UNLIKE BEFORE, NO ONE FACTION WOULD DOMINATE. THUS, THE PRESENTATION OF A CANDIDATE'S CAPABILITIES WOULD BECOME KEY. IN HABIBIE'S VIEW, THE MPR WOULD LOOK AT THE EXPERTISE OF EACH CANDIDATE AND DECIDE WHICH ONE COULD CONTRIBUTE GOOD IDEAS IN GOVERNING. THUS, THE PRESIDENT SAID, THE MPR MEMBERS NEEDED TO BE GIVEN THE RIGHT INPUT BEFORE MAKING THEIR DECISION. WITH HIS OWN RECORD OF EXTENSIVE SERVICE, HABIBIE SAID, HE WOULD BE SEEN AS A "NATIONAL ASSET."

14. (C) ROTH ASKED HABIBIE HOW A COALITION WOULD WORK IN THE MPR, SINCE NO PARTY ON ITS OWN WOULD HAVE ENOUGH STRENGTH TO FORM A GOVERNMENT OR PASS LEGISLATION. HABIBIE SAID THAT INDONESIA'S SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WAS NOT PARLIAMENTARY AND THUS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0059

PAGE 01 JAKART 03625 03 OF 03 270952Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01
	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00

OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00
DSCC-00 /020W	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00

----------E5A8C5 270952Z /38

R 270946Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9025
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 003625

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, KCRM, SOCI, MOPS, UN, ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HABIBIE MEETING WITH A/S ROTH

COALITIONS PLAY NO REAL ROLE. THE MPR VOTE FOR PRESIDENT WOULD
CONFIDENTIAL

NOT BE A PARTY-BASED CONTEST, HE SAID. THE MPR WAS DESIGNED TO REFLECT THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE. ITS TWO CONTINGENTS OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS AND SOCIETAL GROUPS WERE DESIGNED TO BALANCE OFF THE PRESENCE OF THE PARTIES AND TO REPRESENT THOSE PEOPLE NOT TIED TO PARTIES. NEITHER SHOULD THE PRESIDENT BE A MEMBER OF A POLITICAL PARTY. IN FACT, HE HIMSELF WAS NO LONGER A GOLKAR MEMBER, HABIBIE SAID.

15. (C) DISCUSSING THE MPR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS, HABIBIE ENVISIONED A SERIES OF ELIMINATING VOTES, EACH PARING DOWN THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES TO THE POINT WHERE ONE CANDIDATE RECEIVED A MAJORITY. THE VOTE COULD EASILY BE CONCLUDED IN 24 HOURS. HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE BY SECRET BALLOT--WHICH HE ARGUED WOULD HELP PREVENT INTIMIDATION.

HABIBIE ON HIS RECORD
---

16. (C) HABIBIE SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME RECOUNTING HIS PROFESSIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS OVER THE PAST 30 YEARS AND THE NEW LAWS AND POLICIES HIS GOVERNMENT HAD PUT IN PLACE DURING ITS 13 MONTHS IN OFFICE, WHICH HE BELIEVED MADE A STRONG CASE FOR HIS REELECTION AS PRESIDENT. IT WOULD BE UNWISE, HE SUGGESTED, TO ENTRUST A NEW (AND INEXPERIENCED) LEADER WITH THE FATE OF INDONESIA'S 211 MILLION PEOPLE OR WITH THE COUNTRY'S IMPORTANT

REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. CHANGING TACK SLIGHTLY, HABIBIE, INDICATED ONE REASON HE HAD PUSHED THROUGH SO MANY LAWS MANDATING REFORM WAS TO GET THEM IN PLACE SO THAT A NEW LEADER COULD NOT VEER FROM THE REFORM PATH HE (HABIBIE) HAD BLAZED.

17. (C) DURING HIS TENURE AS PRESIDENT, HABIBIE SAID, INDONESIA HAD CONFRONTED TWO ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO PURSUE CHANGE:

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03625 03 OF 03 270952Z

REVOLUTION, OR A CONSTITUTIONAL, SYSTEMATIC PATH TOWARD REAL DEMOCRACY. MOST INDONESIANS, HE SAID, HAD OPTED FOR THE LATER PATH, WHICH HE TERMED "ACCELERATED EVOLUTION." HENCE, HABIBIE SAID, HE HAD HELPED PROVIDE A SYSTEM THAT IS LEADING TO A MORE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, IN WHICH THE PEOPLE ACTUALLY SELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES TO THE DPR AND THE MPR, WHICH IN TURN ELECTS THE PRESIDENT.

MPR DATES

18. (C) HABIBIE CONFIRMED THAT OCTOBER 1 WOULD BE THE DATE FOR OPENING THE MPR. THE DATE WAS NOT YET OFFICIAL, BECAUSE HE WAS STILL AWAITING A FORMAL REQUEST FROM THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, BUT IT SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED SHORTLY. HABIBIE RECALLED HE HAD EARLIER AGREED TO AN AUGUST 29 OPENING DATE, BUT THE SCHEDULE HAD TO BE PUSHED BACK BECAUSE THE VOTE COUNT WAS DELAYED BEYOND ITS SCHEDULED JUNE 21 COMPLETION DATE.

EAST TIMOR

19. (C) HABIBIE REITERATED HIS DETERMINATION THAT THE TIMORESE PEOPLE SHOULD DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY. IF THEY CHOSE INDEPENDENCE, LET THEM DEPART IN PEACE AND HONOR, HE STATED. IF THEY CHOSE INTEGRATION, EAST TIMOR WOULD BECOME JUST LIKE THE OTHER PROVINCES. HE HIMSELF HAD NO STAKE IN INTEGRATION. HIS ONLY INTEREST WAS IN PEACE AND STABILITY.

20. (C) ROTH BLUNTLY WARNED THE PRESIDENT THAT HIS INITIATIVE IN OFFERING THE TIMORESE PEOPLE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE WAS IN DANGER OF FAILURE BECAUSE OF MILITIA VIOLENCE SUPPORTED BY ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY. CONSEQUENTLY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03625 03 OF 03 270952Z

INDONESIA HAD NOT YET FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATION UNDER THE MAY 5 TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT TO ENSURE SECURITY FOR THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO PROPERLY CARRY OUT THE AGREEMENT, ROTH SAID, WOULD BE SEVERE, BOTH IN TERMS OF INDONESIA'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S.-INDONESIAN RELATIONS. IN THE LATTER REGARD, ROTH NOTED

THAT CONGRESS WAS ALREADY URGING THE ADMINISTRATION TO PLACE MORE EMPHASIS ON THE EAST TIMOR SITUATION IN DETERMINING U.S. POSITIONS ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA. ROTH SAID HE WOULD BE RAISING EAST TIMOR IN GREATER DETAIL WITH GENERAL WIRANTO THE NEXT DAY, BUT STRESSED HE WISHED TO ENSURE THE PRESIDENT UNDERSTOOD THE DEPTH OF OUR CONCERNS ON THIS MATTER. HABIBIE RESPONDED THAT WHEN HE LEARNED OF THE ACTIONS THE UN REQUIRED BEFORE IT COULD PROCEED WITH THE VOTER REGISTRATION PROCESS, HE IMMEDIATELY ORDERED HIS MINISTERS TO IMPLEMENT THEM.

21. (C) ROTH URGED THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO RELEASING XANANA GUSMAO. HABIBIE DEMURRED, ARGUING HE COULD NOT RISK XANANA'S BECOMING A TARGET FOR PERSONS SEEKING REVENGE OVER THE DEATHS OF FAMILY MEMBERS AT THE HANDS OF FRETELIN. IF XANANA WERE KILLED, CHAOS WOULD RESULT, SOMETHING HABIBIE SAID HE HAD TO PREVENT AT ALL COST.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0428

PAGE 01 JAKART 03625 03 OF 03 271105Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	ED-01	EUR-01
	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	HHS-01	H-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	SVC-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	SWCI-00	/020W					

----------E5AFD0 271105Z /22

R 270946Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9024
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
RUEHLIQAMEMBASSY LISBON 1165
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM UN, ID
E.O. 12958: DECL; 7/27/03

CONFIDENTIAL

ENEMY. THUS, THEY THREW THEIR SQPPORT TO PDI-P. BUT NOW GOLKAR'S IMAGE AS THQ COMMON ENEMY WAS FADING, AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE PDI-P WAS FADING AS WELL, HABIBIE MAINTAIND. SUCH GROUPS, HE ARGUED, CANNOT CONTINUQ TO COOPERATE WITHOUT A COMMON ENEMY. HABIBIQ SAID THEIR LAST REAL ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE SPECTER OF A COMMON ENEMY WAS REFLECTED IN THE TIMEMAGAZINE REPORT ON SUHARTO'S WEALTH AND IN THQ CAMPAIGN AGAINST ATTORNEY GENERAL ANDI (###).

8. (C) IN HABIBIE'S VIEW, PDI-P SUPPORT CAME FROM FOUR MAIN GROUPS: THE OLD PDI MEMBESHIP, MILITARY OFFICERS WHO HAD BECOME DISAFFQCTED UNDER SOEHARTO (SUCH AS FORMER GENERAL THE SYAFEI), THE "NEPOTIST CAMP" AROUND MEGAWQTI'S BUSINESSMAN HUSBAND, AND INDIVIDUALS IN TROUBLE WITH THE LAW, SUCH AS BUSINESSMAN ARIFINQ PANIGORO. NOW THEY WERE LOSING THEIR COMMON PQRPOSE, HABIBIE SAID, AND OVER TIME THE PARTY WOULD COLLAPSE--A DEVELOPMENT, HABIBIE INSISTED, HE DID NOT WANT TO SEE. HE HOPED THAT IN (##) YEARS THE PARTY WOULD BE ABLE TO RESTORE (##), SINCE IT REFLECTED THE LEGITIMATE VIEWSOF A SECTOR OF SOCIETY.

PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS
---

9. (C) HABIBIE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT THE NEXT PRESIDENT WOULD NOT BE SELECTED ON THE BASQS OF THE POPULAR VOTE OUTCOME OR ACCORDING TOTHE BREAKDOWN IN SEATS IN THE DPR. INSTEAD, ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, IT WAS THE MPR, WIT 700 MEMBERS,

CONFIDENTIAL

THAT WOULD CHOOSE THE PRESIDQNT. MEGAWATI, HE NOTED PARENTHETICALLY, WOULQ CONTROL 34 PERCENT OF THE 500-MEMBER DPR, BUQ ONLY 22 PERCENT OF THE 700-STRONG MPR. GOLKAR WAS NOT FAR BEHIND, WITH 17 PERCENT OF THE MPRMEMBERS.

10. (C) ANOTHER IMPORTANT CONSIERATION AFFECTING THE SELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, ACCORDING TO HABIBIE, WAS THAT THE MPR MEMBERS WOULD BE A "MORE INTELLECTUAL" GROUP THAN THE 160 MILLION PEOPLE WHO HAD VOTED IN THE DPR ELECTION. THE CURRENT SYSTEM HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, HE SAID, AT INDONESIA'S FOUNDING, WHEN THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE WERE STILL UNEDUCATED AND

UNSOPHISTICATED. IT WAS THOUGHT THAT SOCIETY HAD TO EVOLVE BEFORE IT COULD MORE DIRECTLY CHOOSE THE PRESIDENT. IT STILL HAD A WAY TO GO, HE SAID. (NOTE: AT ANOTHER POINT IN THE MEETING, HABIBIE SAID HE FAVORED DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.)

11. (C) THUS, HABIBIE DECLARED, THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED HIS MANDATE FROM THE MPR, AND NOT FROM ANY POLITICAL PARTY. IN THE CASE OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT, HE SAID, THE MPR GAVE HIM AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF MORE THAN 70 PERCENT (SIC). (NOTE: ACTUALLY, SOEHARTO WAS ROUTINELY ENDORSED BY UNANIMOUS ACCLAMATION.) FORTUNATELY, NO ONE PARTY NOW ENJOYED AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY. INDONESIA HAD ALREADY ENDURED 30 YEARS OF THAT, HABIBIE SAID, AND THE COUNTRY WAS FED UP WITH IT.

HABIBIE ON MPR MECHANICS
---

12. (C) OF THE 48 PARTIES THAT ENTERED THE ELECTION, SIX CAME AWAY WITH MORE THAN TWO PERCENT OF THE VOTE, HABIBIE OBSERVED. ONLY THESE SIX PARTIES COULD SUBMIT RESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES TO THE MPR. (NOTE: WE ARE UNAWARE OF A TWO-PERCENT THRESHOLD FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

NOMINATING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IN THE MPR; PARTIES GAINING LESS THAN TWO PERCENT OF THE VOT CAN HOLD SEATS IN THE NEW MPR BUT ARE TECHNIQALLY BANNED FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE NEXT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.) IN CONTRAST TO PREVIUS PRACTICE, HABIBIE SAID, OTHER GROUPINGS IN THE MPR--E.G., THE 38 APPOINTED MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES IN THE DPR, THE 135 MPR REPRESENTATIVES ELECTED BY THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS, AND THE 65 MPR MEMBERS FROM OTHERWISE "UNDER-REPRESENTED" SOCIETAL ELEMENTS--WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO NOMINATE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. EACH PARTY, HABIBIE SAID, WOULD BE ABLE TO SUBMIT A CANDIDATE'S APPLICATION TO THE DPR SPEAKER. AFTER CANDIDATES PASSED THE USUAL CHECKS (HEALTH RECORDS, POLICE AND LEGAL RECORDS, PAST TIES WITH POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS COMMUNIST GROUPS), THEIR NAMES WOULD BE FORWARDED TO THE MPR.

13. (C) THE MPR WOULD SELECT THE PRESIDENT ON THE BASIS OF ONE MAN/ONE VOTE, HABIBIE SAID. MEMBERS WOULD CAST VOTES BASED ON CRITERIA THE MPR HAD DETERMINED IMPORTANT IN REGARD TO EACH CANDIDATE'S CAPABILITIES. UNLIKE BEFORE, NO ONE FACTION WOULD DOMINATE. THUS, THE PRESENTATION OF A CANDIDATE'S CAPABILITIES WOULD BECOME KEY. IN HABIBIE'S VIEW, THE MPR WOULD LOOK AT THE EXPERTISE OF EACH CANDIDATE AND DECIDE WHICH ONE COULD CONTRIBUTE GOOD IDEAS IN GOVERNING. THUS, THE PRESIDENT SAID, THE MPR MEMBERS NEEDED TO BE GIVEN THE RIGHT INPUT BEFORE MAKING THEIR DECISION. WITH HIS OWN RECORD OF EXTENSIVE SERVICE, HABIBIE SAID, HE WOULD BE SEEN AS A "NATIONAL ASSET."

14. (C) ROTH ASKED HABIBIE HOW A COALITION WOULD WORK IN THE MPR, SINCE NO PARTY ON ITS OWN WOULD HAVE ENOUGH STRENGTH TO FORM A GOVERNMENT OR PASS LEGISLATION. HABIBIE SAID THAT INDONESIA'S SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WAS NOT PARLIAMENTARY AND THUS

(##)OMISSION IN TEXT. CORRECTION WILL FOLLOW.

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9742

PAGE 01 JAKART 03620 01 OF 03 270834Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AEX-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	IRM-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W		

----------E5A326 270834Z /38

R 270829Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9016
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003620

E.O. 12958: DECL:07/13/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, OVIP, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH DISCUSSES SLOW VOTE COUNT AND NEXT STEPS FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WITH KPU CHAIRMAN RUDINI

REF: JAKARTA 3131

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J.STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5 (D)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03620 01 OF 03 270834Z
2. (C) SUMMARY: A/S ROTH MET GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) CHAIRMAN RUDINI JULY 14 TO DISCUSS DELAYS IN COUNTING RESULTS OF THE JUNE 7 GENERAL ELECTION AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) LATER THIS YEAR. ROTH GAVE RUDINI AND THE KPU CREDIT FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE ELECTION, BUT NOTED THE SLOW VOTE COUNT AND ACTIONS OF SMALL PARTIES ON THE KPU HAD THE POTENTIAL TO UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTION. PROGRESS IN THE PAST FEW DAYS HAD REDUCED THIS CONCERN. RUDINI SAID THE KPU WILL ANNOUNCE FINAL ELECTION RESULTS BY JULY 21. AS FOR NEXT STEPS, RUDINI SAID THE KPU HAD FORMED A 15-MEMBER TEAM TO CHOOSE WHICH 65 FUNCTIONAL GROUPS WOULD

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MPR. EACH GROUP WOULD CHOOSE ITS OWN REPRESENTATIVE. AS FOR THE 135 PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVES, EACH PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE WOULD DETERMINE ITS OWN METHOD FOR CHOOSING ITS FIVE REPRESENTATIVES. RUDINI DENIED SMALL PARTIES WERE BEING COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IN THE KPU, BUT LATER REVEALED HE WAS CONSIDERING WAYS TO ACCOMMODATE THEIR DEMANDS. END SUMMARY

3. (C) A/S ROTH AND THE AMBASSADOR MET KPU CHAIRMAN LT. GENERAL (RET.) RUDINI ON JULY 14 TO DISCUSS DIFFICULTIES IN COUNTING THE VOTES IN THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION AND NEXT STEPS TOWARD THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LATER THIS YEAR. RUDINI WAS ACCOMPANIED BY KPU DEPUTY PUBLIC RELATIONS CHIEF B. AHMADI. EAP CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON DAVID KEEGAN AND POLOFF ALSO PARTICIPATED IN THE MEETING.

VOTE COUNT DELAY

---

4. (C) A/S ROTH CONGRATULATED RUDINI FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE JUNE 7 ELECTION, FOR WHICH RUDINI AND THE KPU DESERVED CREDIT. HE SAID THE ELECTION HAD PROVED THE NAYSAYERS WRONG, AS THERE HAD BEEN MUCH LESS VIOLENCE THAN PREDICTED AND NO EVIDENCE OF SYSTEMATIC FRAUD. AS INDONESIA'S FIRST FREE AND FAIR ELECTION SINCE THE 1950'S, IT HAD BEEN AN IMPRESSIVE ACHIEVEMENT. THE ELECTION DEMONSTRATED INDONESIANS' ENTHUSIASM FOR DEMOCRACY.

5. (C) A/S ROTH SAID CONCERN ABOUT PROBLEMS WITH THE VOTE TABULATION HAD BEEN A MAJOR REASON FOR HIS VISIT TO INDONESIA, BECAUSE THE PERCEPTION THE PROCESS WAS "STUCK" OR WAS BEING ABUSED HAD THE POTENTIAL TO LEAD TO INSTABILITY. APPARENT PROGRESS IN VOTE COUNTING AND IN HANDLING PROBLEMS WITH THE SMALL PARTIES (REFTEL) IN RECENT DAYS HAD LESSENED HIS CONCERN. AT THIS POINT, HE HOPED TO GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF NEXT STEPS TOWARD THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. GIVEN THAT NO PARTY HAD EMERGED FROM THE ELECTION WITH A CLEAR MAJORITY, THE PROCESS FOR CHOOSING THE 135 PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) SEATS RESERVED FOR PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVES AND 65 SEATS RESERVED FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF FUNCTIONAL GROUPS COULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE. IF ALL OF THESE REPRESENTATIVES ENDED UP COMING FROM THE GOVERNING PARTY, IT WOULD RAISE CONCERNS.

6. (C) RUDINI ASSURED A/S ROTH THAT ELECTION RESULTS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03620 01 OF 03 270834Z
WOULD BE ANNOUNCED BY THE KPU'S NEW DEADLINE OF JULY 21. HE SAID THE MAJOR CAUSE OF THE DELAYS HAD NOT BEEN THE SMALL PARTIES BUT THE POOR TRAINING OF DISTRICT AND VILLAGE POLL WORKERS. THEY HAD NOT BEEN GOVERNMENT WORKERS, BUT RATHER PARTY REPRESENTATIVES AND POLL WORKERS WHO WERE OFTEN POORLY EDUCATED.

7. (C) THE SMALL PARTIES, ACCORDING TO RUDINI, WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT DEFEAT AND WOULD NOT MISUSE THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE KPU UNNECESSARILY TO HOLD UP THE VOTE COUNT. THEY WERE SIMPLY TRYING TO ENSURE THE ELECTION WAS "JUST AND HONEST," AS IRREGULARITIES AND MISTAKES COULD MAKE A LARGE DIFFERENCE. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT HE "COULD HANDLE THIS PROBLEM". (NOTE: RUDINI HIMSELF IS A BOARD MEMBER AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF THE PARTAI MUSYAWARA KEKELUARGAAN GOTONG-ROYONG, OR MKGR, A SMALL PARTY WHICH FARED POORLY IN THE ELECTION. END NOTE.)

REGIONAL AND GROUP REPRESENTATIVES
---

8. (C) RUDINI SAID THAT THE KPU HAD FORMED A "TEAM 15" TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9757

PAGE 01 JAKART 03620 02 OF 03 270837Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AEX-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	IRM-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W		

----------E5A35C 270837Z /38

R 270829Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9017
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 003620

E.O. 12958: DECL:07/13/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, OVIP, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH DISCUSSES SLOW VOTE COUNT AND NEXT STEPS FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WITH KPU CHAIRMAN RUDINI

DETERMINE WHICH 65 FUNCTIONAL GROUPS WOULD BE GIVEN THE RIGHT TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MPR. (NOTE: TEAM 15 IS A SUB-SET OF THE KPU, WHICH ITSELF IS MADE UP OF ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM EACH OF THE 48 POLITICAL PARTIES
CONFIDENTIAL

PLUS FIVE GOVERNMENT APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVES. ON THE BASIS OF PRESS REPORTS, IT APPEARS TEAM 15 CONSISTS OF A NEARLY EQUAL NUMBER OF MEMBERS FROM PARTIES WHICH COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE PRO-MEGAWATI AND PRO-HABIBIE. END NOTE.) THE KPU HAD ALREADY IDENTIFIED CATEGORIES OF ELIGIBLE GROUPS (E.G., LABOR, WOMEN'S GROUPS, ETC.). IT WOULD BE UP TO "TEAM 15" TO CHOOSE THE SPECIFIC GROUPS FROM A LIST OF 160 THE KPU HAD ALREADY CERTIFIED AS ELIGIBLE. IF TEAM 15 WERE UNABLE TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION, THE KPU WOULD MAKE FINAL DECISIONS IN PLENARY SESSION. THE GROUPS THEMSELVES WOULD SELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVE BY A PROCESS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING.

9. (C) ASKED HOW THE KPU WOULD PROTECT ITSELF FROM POSSIBLE CHARGES THAT IT HAD PICKED ONLY PRO-GOVERNMENT GROUPS, RUDINI SAID CRITERIA HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED RULING OUT ANY GROUP WITH EXISTING OR HISTORICAL AFFILIATIONS WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY. THE REPRESENTATIVE MUST NOT BE A MEMBER OF A POLITICAL PARTY OR BE AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES (TNI). (NOTE: EMBASSY'S COPY OF THE RELEVANT KPU DECREE RULES OUT GROUPS WITH A PARTY AFFILIATION BUT DOES NOT APPEAR TO PROHIBIT REPRESENTATIVES WHO ARE MEMBERS OF PARTIES OR TNI. END NOTE.)

10. (C) RUDINI SAID THE METHOD OF CHOOSING THE 135 PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVES (FIVE FROM EACH OF THE 27 PROVINCES) WOULD BE UP TO EACH PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT (DPR-D) TO DECIDE. RUDINI RESPONDED AFFIRMATIVELY TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION WHETHER THIS MEANT DPR-D'S WOULD BE ABLE TO DECIDE TO USE EITHER A PROPORTIONAL OR "WINNER-
CONFIDENTIAL

TAKE-ALL" METHOD FOR CHOOSING THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. A/S ROTH OBSERVED THAT EACH PROVINCE MAKING ITS OWN RULES MIGHT CREATE CONFUSION AND LEAD TO CHARGES THAT THE PROCESS HAD BEEN UNFAIR.

11. (C) RUDINI SAID KPU'S ONLY ROLE WOULD BE TO MAKE SURE ALL REPRESENTATIVES MET CRITERIA FOR BEING SEATED IN THE MPR, WHICH STIPULATED THAT MEMBERS MUST BE GRADUATES OF JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL. RUDINI ADDED THAT THEY "SHOULDN'T" BE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT OR TNI, BUT DID NOT CLARIFY WHETHER THIS WAS MERELY A PERSONAL OPINION. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM A/S ROTH, RUDINI SAID THAT RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS WOULD BE ELIGIBLE TO BE PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVES. (NOTE: THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ACTIVE TNI MEMBERS COULD SERVE AS REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES HAS BEEN A TOPIC OF ONGOING DEBATE. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY RECENT POLICY DECISION ON THIS POINT. END NOTE.)

12. (C) RUDINI EXPECTED THE PROCESS OF CHOOSING REGIONAL AND GROUP REPRESENTATIVES AND OF DETERMINING THE ACTUAL DPR SEAT WINNERS WOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF AUGUST. HE THOUGHT THE NEW DPR WOULD BE INAUGURATED ON SEPTEMBER 27 AND THE NEW MPR WOULD BE SWORN IN ACCORDING TO KPU'S SCHEDULE ON OCTOBER 1. ON THE SAME DAY THE KPU'S WORK WOULD BE FINISHED. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE AMBASSADOR, RUDINI SAID HE EXPECTED THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WOULD TAKE PLACE AS PLANNED ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 10.

MUTUAL HELP -- FOR THE SMALL PARTIES

CONFIDENTIAL

13. (C) THE AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT A GROUP OF SMALL ISLAMIC PARTIES APPEARED TO HAVE BENEFITED GREATLY FROM A VOTE SHARING ARRANGEMENT, CALLED A "STEMBUS ACCORD". (NOTE: THESE AGREEMENTS - WHICH HAD TO BE REGISTERED WITH THE KPU BEFORE THE ELECTION -- ALLOW PARTIES TO COMBINE "LEFTOVER" VOTES WITH THOSE OF OTHER PARTIES TO OBTAIN SEATS, WHICH ARE THEN ALLOCATED TO PARTICIPANT PARTIES ACCORDING TO PRIOR ARRANGEMENT. END NOTE.) THE PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN ONE OF THE TWO APPROVED STEMBUS ACCORDS (THE LEGITIMACY OF A THIRD WAS REJECTED) HAD COLLECTIVELY SURPASSED THE SEAT OTAL OF AMIEN RAIS' NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN).

14. (C) IN THE COURSE OF A TECHNICAL DISCUSSION THAT

FOLLOWED, RUDINI INDICATED THAT THE PROBLEM OF SMALL PARTIES HOLDING UP THE WORK OF THE KPU MAY BE FAR FROM RESOLVED. IN REFERENCE TO THE SMALL PARTIES' UNHAPPINESS OVER BEING BARRED FROM CONTESTING THE NEXT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION BY VIRTUE OF HAVING FAILED TO GAIN THE REQUIRED TWO PERCENT OF SEATS IN THE DPR, HE SAID PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAD SUGGESTED HAT, IN THE SPIRIT OF "GOTONG-ROYONG" (MUTUALHELP), SOME WAY BE FOUND TO ACCOMMODATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9743

PAGE 01 JAKART 03620 03 OF 03 270834Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AEX-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	IRM-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W		

----------E5A32A 270834Z /38

R 270829Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9018
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 003620

E.O. 12958: DECL:07/13/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, OVIP, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH DISCUSSES SLOW VOTE COUNT AND NEXT STEPS FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WITH KPU CHAIRAN RUDINI

THEIR NEEDS.

15. (C) SINCE THERE WAS NO CLEAR GUIDANCE IN THE LAW ON HOW TO ALLOCATE SEATS FROM SOME 13 MILLION "LEFTOVER"

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03620 03 OF 03 270834Z
VOTES, RUDINI PLANNED TO PROPOSE, IN EFFECT, GIVING SOME BLOCKS OF THESE VOTES TO SMALL PARTIES THAT HAD FAILED TO WIN A SEAT IN PARLIAMENT, SO THAT EACH OF THE 48 PARTIES

THAT CONTESTED THE ELECTION WOULD GET AT LEAST ONE SEAT. (NOTE: IT APPEARS ONLY 7 OF 48 PARTIES ARE IN POSITION TO REACH EVEN ONE PERCENT OF THE VOTE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. A HANDFUL OF THE OTHER 41 WOULD WIN SEATS IN THEIR OWN RIGHT AND BE ELIGIBLE TO SIT IN THE COMING SESSION OF PARLIAMENT. UNDER CURRENT LAW, HOWEVER, ANY PARTY THAT FAILED TO GAIN TWO PERCENT OF DPR SEATS WOULD BE INELIGIBLE TO COMPETE IN THE NEXT ELECTION WITHOUT REGISTERING AS A NEW PARTY WITH A DIFFERENT NAME. END NOTE.) RECOVERING FROM THE SURPRISED REACTIONS OF HIS INTERLOCUTORS, RUDINI HASTILY ADDED THAT HIS ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL WOULD BE TO POSTPONE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TWO PERCENT THRESHOLD UNTIL 2004.

16. (C) A/S ROTH OBSERVED THAT EITHER COURSE WOULD ENCOURAGE THE PROLIFERATION OF PARTIES AND CAUSE CONFUSION. THIS WOULD RUN COUNTER TO THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW AND MIGHT RAISE QUESTIONS OF FAIRNESS. HE RECALLED INDONESIA'S EXPERIENCE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE 1950'S, WHEN THE LARGE NUMBER OF PARTIES CONTRIBUTED TO THE WEAKNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS EVENTUAL COLLAPSE.

17. (C) THE AMBASSADOR CAUTIONED RUDINI AGAINST REPEATING THE MISTAKE OF ALLOWING SMALL PARTIES TO HAVE UNDUE INFLUENCE, AS THEY CURRENTLY HAVE IN THE KPU. FROM A THEORETICAL POINT OF VIEW AND ON THE BASIS OF THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES, HE NOTED, LEGISLATIVE SYSTEMS WORK BETTER IF THERE ARE FEWER PARTIES INVOLVED.

CONFIDENTIAL

WHILE CONSOLIDATION MUST NOT BE FORCED, IT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED. A/S ROTH ADDED THAT, GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY OF THE TIMES, ANY DECISIONS MUST BE TAKEN WITH FULL PUBLIC SCRUTINY AND IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF FAVORING ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER.

18. (C) IN THAT CASE, RUDINI SAID, MAYBE IT IS "BEST TO LET THE 13 MILLION VOTES GO". HE ADDED THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVORED NO MORE THAN ABOUT FIVE PARTIES IN THE DPR, BUT THE QUESTION OF HOW TO HANDLE THE EXCLUDED PARTIES REAINED AN "EMOTIONAL" ISSUE.

19. (C) COMMENT: THE FACT THAT RUDINI IS ACTIVELY EXPLORING WAYS IN ESSENCE TO CAVE TO SMALL PARTY DEMANDS SUGGESTS THE PROBLEM OF THE SMALL PARTIES' STRANGLEHOLD ON THE KPU IS FAR FROM RESOLVED, NOTWITHSTANDING HIS ASSERTIONS TO THE CONTRARY IN THIS MEETING AND TO THE PRESS. THE MOMENT OF TRUTH WILL COME AFTER JULY 21 WHEN TWO-THIRDS OF PARTIES ON THE KPU MUST CERTIFY FINAL

RESULTS OF THE ELECTION. AS EXPLAINED IN REFTEL, THE LAW ALLOWS THE ELECTIONS SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE (PANWASLU) TO CERTIFY THE RESULTS WITHOUT TWO-THIRDS OF PARTY SIGNATURES IF IT JUDGES THE OBJECTIONS OF THOSE REFUSING TO SIGN TO BE INSUBSTANTIAL. WE SUSPECT THAT FOR CULTURAL, PRACTICAL, AND, PERHAPS, POLITICAL REASONS, HOWEVER, OFFICIALS WILL BE RELUCTANT TO INVOKE THIS AUTHORITY. RATHER, THERE WILL BE PRESSURE TO ACCOMMODATE, THUS POSTPONING YET ANOTHER HARD DECISION WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING A WELL-FUNCTIONING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO2969

PAGE 01 STATE 129610 100054Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 NP-01 AIT-03 AMAD-01 A-00 DS-00 EB-00
EUR-01 UTED-00 TEDE-00 IO-00 L-01 ADS-00 AC-01
NEA-01 OIC-02 OIG-03 ACE-00 IRM-01 SA-01 SGHD-00
DSCC-00 SAS-00 /017R

129610
SOURCE: KODAKA.010045
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES:KNB -- 7/9/99 72538
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES
----------DF39BD 100057Z /38
O 100055Z JUL 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
USOFFICE BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 129610 100054Z
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

UNCLAS STATE 129610

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: JULY 9 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS - ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF - ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
UNVIE FOR FITZPATRICK
USEU FOR RUTH

1. INDEX:

--CHINA: BELGRADE EMBASSY BOMBING FOLLOW UP (PARAS 2-3)
--INDONESIA: EAP A/S ROTH'S TRIP TO JAKARTA AND EAST

TIMOR (PARAS 2 AND 4)
--INDONESIA: ROLE OF INDONESIAN MILITARY IN SELECTING THE NEXT PRESIDENT (PARAS 2 AND 5)
--INDONESIA: MEGAWATI MANDATE (PARAS 2 AND 6)
--INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR AUTONOMY VOTE: ANOTHER DELAY? (PARAS 2 AND 7)
--DEUTCH COMMISSION REPORT ON WMD (PARAS 2 AND 8)

2. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 7/9/99. THERE WAS NO REGULAR PRESS BRIEFING ON THAT DAY. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THESE GUIDANCES ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

3. CHINA: BELGRADE EMBASSY BOMBING FOLLOW UP

CONTEXT: DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER DAVID ANDREWS WILL LEAD AN INTERAGENCY DELEGATION TO BEIJING NEXT WEEK (JULY 14-17) TO FOLLOW UP ON OUR OFFER OF HUMANITARIAN PAYMENTS FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE ACCIDENTAL BOMBING IN BELGRADE. THE DELEGATION ALSO WILL BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF ISSUES RELATED TO DAMAGE TO THE PRC EMBASSY AND OUR PROPERTY IN CHINA. HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY EAP DAS SUSAN SHIRK AND MEMBERS OF DOD AND STATE'S LEGAL STAFFS. THE JAPANESE NEWSPAPER SANKEI SHIMBUN HAS REPORTED THAT DAS SHIRK WILL TRAVEL TO CHINA NEXT WEEK.

Q. WHY IS THE LEGAL ADVISER GOING TO CHINA? WHAT ABOUT REPORTS IN THE JAPANESE PRESS OF TRAVEL BY EAP DAS SHIRK?

DURING HIS TRIP TO BEIJING LAST MONTH, UNDER SECRETARY

PICKERING CONVEYED OUR WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE A

HUMANITARIAN PAYMENT TO THE INJURED AND THE FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED, WITH THE DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT DIPLOMATICALLY SOON.

DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISOR DAVID ANDREWS, ACCOMPANIED BY AN INTERAGENCY DELEGATION INCLUDING EAP DAS SUSAN SHIRK, WILL TRAVEL TO BEIJING NEXT WEEK TO FOLLOW UP ON OUR OFFER OF A HUMANITARIAN PAYMENT AND DISCUSS ISSUES RELATED TO PROPERTY DAMAGE.

IF ASKED:

HE WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF THE DAMAGE DONE TO CHINA'S EMBASSY IN BELGRADE. WE UNDERSTAND THE CHINESE WILL DISCUSS WITH US THE ISSUE OF DAMAGE TO U.S. PROPERTY IN CHINA.

4. INDONESIA: EAP A/S ROTH'S TRIP TO JAKARTA AND EAST TIMOR

CONTEXT: EAP A/S ROTH WILL BE IN INDONESIA JULY 13-17. HE WILL VISIT EAST TIMOR DURING HIS TRIP. HIS JAKARTA APPOINTMENT SCHEDULE HAS NOT BEEN FIRMED UP BUT REQUESTS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE AND SEVERAL CABINET MINISTERS, INCLUDING DEFENSE MINISTER

GENERAL WIRANTO, ELECTIONS COMMISSION OFFICIALS AND XANANA GUSMAO. HE HOPES TO MEET WITH SEVERAL LEADERS OF INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES THAT HAD STRONG SHOWINGS IN THE RECENT JUNE 7 NATIONAL ELECTIONS. IN EAST TIMOR, PREPARATIONS FOR HIS MEETING SCHEDULE ARE EVEN MORE

PRELIMINARY, BUT HE EXPECTS TO MEET WITH UNAMET AND LOCAL OFFICIALS.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS OF A/S ROTH'S TRIP - DATES, WHOM HE'LL SEE, ETC. WHY IS HE GOING? (TAKEN QUESTION)

A: EAP A/S ROTH WILL VISIT INDONESIA JULY 13-17, INCLUDING EAST TIMOR. OUR EMBASSY IN JAKARTA IS SEEKING APPOINTMENTS WITH SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND LEADERS OF INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES THAT HAD STRONG SHOWINGS IN THE RECENT JUNE 7 NATIONAL ELECTIONS. IN EAST TIMOR, HE EXPECTS TO MEET WITH UNAMET AND LOCAL OFFICIALS, BUT

HIS SCHEDULE AT THIS POINT IS STILL PRELIMINARY.

A/S ROTH IS MAKING THIS TRIP TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA, PROSPECTS FOR THE UPCOMING PEOPLES CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) IN VIEW OF THE RECENT JUNE 7 NATIONAL ELECTIONS, AND CONTINUING INDONESIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. HE WILL ALSO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR, WHERE THE UN MISSION TO EAST TIMOR (UNAMET) IS PREPARING TO CONDUCT AN AUTONOMY CONSULTATION VOTE IN LATE AUGUST.

5. INDONESIA : ROLE OF INDONESIAN MILITARY IN SELECTING THE NEXT PRESIDENT

CONTEXT: THE NEW INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT (DPR) CONSISTS OF 462 ELECTED OFFICIALS AND 38 APPOINTEES DESIGNATED BY THE INDONESIA MILITARY (TNI). THESE 500 DPR MEMBERS JOIN WITH 200 OTHER REPRESENTATIVES TO FORM THE 700-STRONG PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH WILL SELECT THE NEXT

INDONESIAN PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT. THOSE ADDITIONAL 200 MPR MEMBERS CONSIST OF 5 REPRESENTATIVES EACH FROM INDONESIA'S 27 PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES (I.E. 135 TOTAL) AND 65 "FUNCTIONAL/SOCIAL" (SMALL FARMERS, LABOR, WOMEN'S GROUPS, ETC) APPOINTEES. TNI HAS APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVES IN PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES AND SOME MAY BE SELECTED AS MPR MEMBERS.

Q: WHAT ROLE DO WE SEE THE MILITARY PLAYING IN SELECTING THE COUNTRY'S NEXT LEADER?

A: THE 700-STRONG PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) WILL SELECT INDONESIA'S NEXT PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT. THE MPR IS MADE UP IN PART BY THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT (DPR) WHICH, AS A RESULT OF THE JUNE 7 ELECTIONS WILL CONSIST OF462 NEWLY-ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES AND 38 APPOINTEES DESIGNATED BY THE INDONESIAN MILITARY (TNI). THE REST OF THE MPR IS COMPOSED OF 135 REPRESENTATIVES FROM ELECTED PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES - SOME OF WHOM MAY BE TNI OFFICERS -- AND 65 "FUNCTIONAL/SOCIAL" (SMALL FARMERS, LABOR, WOMEN'S GROUPS, ETC) APPOINTEES. THE INDONESIAN MILITARY, THEREFORE, HAS A VOICE IN SELECTION OF INDONESIA'S NEW NATIONAL LEADERSHIP.

INDONESIA IS GOING THROUGH A TRANSITION TO GREATER DEMOCRACY, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE JUNE 7 ELECTIONS. THE NEXT CRUCIAL STEP IS SELECTION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT BY THE MPR. WE URGE THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY MPR MEMBERS,

ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF POLITICAL PARTIES, AND APPOINTEES TO THE MPR ENSURE THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS IS TRANSPARENT AND OPEN, AND REFLECTS

THE DESIRE OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE FOR CONTINUING DEMOCRATIC REFORM.

6. INDONESIA: MEGAWATI MANDATE

CONTEXT: OPPOSITION PARTY LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI SAID TUESDAY THAT RESULTS OF LAST MONTH'S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS HAVE GIVEN HER "THE MANDATE" TO LEAD THE COUNTRY. VOTE COUNTING FOR THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION STILL CONTINUES, AND FINAL RESULTS ARE NOT EXPECTED UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH. NO SINGLE PARTY WILL GAIN A CLEAR MAJORITY OF VOTES CAST, BUT UNOFFICIAL VOTER TALLIES SUGGEST THAT MEGAWATI'S PARTY, THE PDI-P, IS EXPECTED TO RECORD THE LARGEST PLURALITY WITH AROUND 35 PERCENT.

INDONESIA DOES NOT HAVE DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. THE PRESIDENT IS CHOSEN BY MEMBERS OF A SPECIAL ASSEMBLY, THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), THAT MEETS EVERY FIVE YEARS. MEMBERSHIP IN THE MPR INCLUDES THE 500 MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (462 OF WHO ARE ELECTED PLUS 38 APPOINTED MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY). THE PARLIAMENTARIANS ARE JOINED IN THE MPR BY 200 APPOINTEES REPRESENTING SOCIETAL GROUPS AND REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS. THE MPR IS SCHEDULED TO MEET LATER THIS YEAR TO SELECT INDONESIA'S NEXT PRESIDENT.

Q: WHAT IS OUR REACTION TO MEGAWATI'S ASSERTION THAT THE ELECTION HAS GIVEN HER THE MANDATE TO LEAD THE COUNTRY?

A: FINAL ELECTION RESULTS ARE STILL PENDING, THOUGH

MEGAWATI'S PARTY APPEARS TO HAVE WON THE LARGEST NUMBER OF SEATS - A PLURALITY. WE CAN SAY THAT THE ENTHUSIASM OF THE INDONESIAN ELECTORATE, THE PARTICIPATION OF SO MANY PARTIES IN THE ELECTION, AND THE PEACEFULNESS OF ELECTION DAY DEMONSTRATE THAT THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE ARE READY TO EMBRACE GREATER DEMOCRACY.

THE ELECTION IS ONLY ONE STEP IN THE PROCESS OF SELECTING A NEW PRESIDENT AND ESTABLISHING A CREDIBLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN INDONESIA. THE MAKE-UP OF THE PEOPLE'S

CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (OR MPR), WHOSE MEMBERS WILL CHOOSE THE NEXT PRESIDENT, WILL NOT BE KNOWN FOR SEVERAL MORE WEEKS. IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR THE U.S. TO SPECULATE ON THE ELECTION'S ULTIMATE OUTCOME, OR WHOM THE MPR WILL CHOOSE AS PRESIDENT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR NEW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING A FREE PRESS, WILL ENSURE THAT THE PROCESS CONTINUES TO BE TRANSPARENT AND CLOSELY MONITORED.

THE U.S. DOES NOT SUPPORT ANY INDIVIDUAL OR PARTY. OUR INTEREST IS IN SEEING CREDIBLE ELECTION RESULTS THAT REFLECT THE WILL OF THE INDONESIAN VOTERS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGES FROM THESE ELECTIONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT SELECTION OF A PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT LATER THIS YEAR.

(IF ASKED)

Q: WHAT IS OUR REACTION TO RUMORS THAT THE MPR MAY BE DELAYED UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR?

WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION COULD BE PUT OFF UNTIL NEXT YEAR, GIVEN THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS THIS UNCERTAINTY MAY HAVE ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND POLITICAL UNREST. WE URGE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA TO MAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS TO CARRY THE ELECTION PROCESS THROUGH TO THE SELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE.

Q: IS THE U.S. CONCERNED THAT THE SLOW PACE OF THE VOTE COUNT IS A SIGN OF POSSIBLE CHEATING?

A: WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF PROBLEMS IN SOME AREAS, WE DO NOT AT THIS POINT HAVE ANY INDICATION THAT

THE SLOWNESS OF THE INITIAL VOTE COUNT REFLECTS WIDESPREAD EFFORTS TO MANIPULATE THE RESULTS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT PART OF THE SLOWNESS IN COUNTING AND COLLATING THE VOTES IS DUE TO THE INEXPERIENCE OF ELECTION OFFICIALS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, A DESIRE TO BE AS THOROUGH AND ACCURATE AS POSSIBLE, AND A VARIETY OF TECHNICAL PROBLEMS. AS INTERNATIONAL MONITORS HAVE NOTED, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE AUTHORITIES RESOLVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT IRREGULARITIES FAIRLY AND EFFECTIVELY. CLEARLY, IT IS IMPORTANT TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE ELECTION PROCESS THAT THE OFFICIAL VOTE BE COMPLETE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND FINAL RESULTS DISCLOSED.

7. INDONESIA -- EAST TIMOR AUTONOMY VOTE: ANOTHER DELAY?

CONTEXT: THE UN MISSION TO EAST TIMOR (UNAMET) IS PREPARING TO CONDUCT A POPULAR VOTE AMONG EAST TIMORESE ON
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 10 STATE 129610 100054Z
AUTONOMY. THE SCHEDULED DATE FOR THE BALLOTING HAD INITIALLY BEEN AUGUST 8, 1999, BUT THAT WAS POSTPONED TO AUGUST 21 OR 22 FOR BOTH LOGISTICAL AND SECURITY REASONS. ACCORDING TO NEWS REPORTS, THE UN IS CONSIDERING ANOTHER DELAY OF THE VOTE UNLESS THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ACTS TO END THE ESCALATING SECURITY PROBLEMS ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR -- INCLUDING ATTACKS BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS ON UNAMET. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION THAT THE UN IS PLANNING ANOTHER DELAY. MEANWHILE, UNAMET DEPLOYMENT CONTINUES TO BUILD TOWARD FULL STRENGTH, AND UNAMET PREPARATIONS FOR THE LATE AUGUST BALLOT CONTINUE APACE.

Q: WHAT ARE THE FACTS AND WHAT IS OUR REACTION TO THE REPORT THAT THE AUTONOMY VOTE IN EAST TIMOR HAS BEEN DELAYED AGAIN BY THE UN?

A: WE HAVE STRONGLY BACKED THE EFFORTS OF THE UN ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR EAST TIMOR (UNAMET) TO IMPLEMENT A CREDIBLE POPULAR CONSULTATION OF THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE TO ACCEPT OR REJECT INDONESIA'S AUTONOMY PROPOSAL. ON JUNE 22, THE UN CITED BOTH SECURITY AND LOGISTICAL REASONS WHEN IT ANNOUNCED THAT THE VOTE HAS BEEN POSTPONED FROM THE ORIGINAL SCHEDULED DATE OF AUGUST 8 BY ROUGHLY TWO-WEEKS. WE HAVE NOT HEARD THAT THE UN IS PLANNING TO DELAY THE VOTE FURTHER.

THE U.S. SHARES INTERNATIONAL CONCERN ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR AND IS DEEPLY DISTURBED BY RECENT MILITIA TARGETING OF UNAMET FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL. UNAMET IS CLEARLY PLAYING A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE UN'S CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT OF ITS
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 11 STATE 129610 100054Z

PERSONNEL WILL BE A CRITICAL STABILIZING FACTOR IN CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO THE AUGUST BALLOT.

UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MAY 5 UN AGREEMENT BETWEEN INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY IN EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING ENSURING THAT A PEACEFUL ATMOSPHERE EXISTS IN WHICH THE BALLOTING

WILL TAKE PLACE. THE MILITIA ATTACKS UNDERSCORE THAT THIS ATMOSPHERE DOES NOT YET EXIST. WE AGAIN URGE INDONESIA TO TAKE STEPS TO RESTORE CALM IN EAST TIMOR AND CURB FURTHER MILITIA VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION.

8. DEUTCH COMMISSION REPORT ON WMD

CONTEXT: THE DEUTCH COMMISSION WAS COMMISSIONED BY THE CONGRESS TO EXAMINE HOW THE USG DEALS WITH THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THE COMMISSION'S FINAL REPORT IS TO BE SENT TO THE CONGRESS NEXT WEEK AND IS CRITICAL OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S HANDLING OF NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AND PREPAREDNESS. IT WILL RECOMMEND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NONPROLIFERATION CZAR AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

Q: WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF THE DEUTCH COMMISSION REPORT THAT CONCLUDES THE U.S. IS UNPREPARED FOR THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREAT?

A: THE DEUTCH COMMISSION REPORT HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED AND WE CANNOT COMMENT ON ITS SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS UNTIL WE

HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY IT IN DETAIL.

WE CERTAINLY AGREE THAT THE THREAT OF PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE MEANS TO DELIVER THEM IS REAL AND GROWING.

THE DEPARTMENT HAS LONG RECOGNIZED THIS PROBLEM AND ENGAGES IN A WIDE RANGE OF INTENSIVE ACTIVITIES TO ADDRESS NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES.

TO STRENGTHEN THE DEPARTMENT EVEN MORE ON NONPROLIFERATION, THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY HAVE REORGANIZED THE DEPARTMENT TO BEST DEAL WITH WMD AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION.

OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE DEUTCH COMMISSION HAS ENDORSED THIS REORGANIZATION AS A POSITIVE STEP.

IF ASKED ABOUT THE RECOMMENDATION TO CREATE A WHITE HOUSE NONPROLIFERATION CZAR:

WE CANNOT COMMENT ON ANY SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT UNTIL WE HAVE A CHANCE TO REVIEW IT IN FULL.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF ACDA INTO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND

THE CREATION OF A NEW BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION, EMPHASIZES THE CENTRALITY OF THE DEPARTMENT'S CONCERN ABOUT PROLIFERATION AND THE THREAT IT POSES TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, OUR INTERESTS, AND OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES ABROAD. THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT CHANNEL FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL

SECURITY TO THE PRESIDENT FURTHER STRENGTHENS THE DEPARTMENT'S ABILITY TO MANAGE NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.
TALBOTT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4731

PAGE 01 JAKART 03323 01 OF 04 090203Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/011W					

----------DEABF4 090317Z /38

R 090209Z QUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8723
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEFWASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
RHHMUNAQUSCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMCONQUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 003323

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: AMQASSADOR DISCUSSES PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION STRAQEGY WITH GOLKAR HEAD AKBAR TANJUNG

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03323 01 OF 04 090203Z

REF: (A) JQKARTA 3232 (B) JAKARTA 3207

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J.S. ROY; REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR MET GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANJUNG JULY 8 TO DISCUSS RESULTS OF THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION AND PARTY STRATEGY FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION AT THE MPR SESSION LATER THIS YEAR. AKBAR PROVIDED GOLKAR'S PROJECTED SEAT TOTALS, WHICH PLACED PDI-P IN FIRST (150-154), GOLKAR SECOND (120), PPP THIRD (59), PKB FOURTH (50) AND PAN FIFTH (35). HE REITERATED CONTINUING GOLKAR SUPPORT FOR HABIBIE BUT ALLOWED THAT THE SITUATION WAS "DYNAMIC". AKBAR ADMITTED AN ALLQANCE OF PDI-P, PKB, AND PAN WOULD POSE A SERIUS CHALLENGE FOR GOLKAR. TO SUCCEED, THOUGH, THE ALLIANCE MIGHT REQUIRE SUPPORT FROM THE MLITARY,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

WHOSE INTENTIONS WERE STILL UNKNOWN. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACCEPTED THE ELECTION COMMQSSION'S SCHEDULE TO OPEN THE MPR ON OCTOBER 1, THOUGH IT MAY STILL TAKE UNTIL DECEMBER TOSELECT A PRESIDENT. THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED CQNCERN THAT EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR MAY CAUSE THEINTERNATIONAL GOODWILL THE ELECTION HAS GENERQTED TOWARD INDONESIA TO EVAPORATE.

END SUMMARY

3. (C) ON JUNE 8 AMBASSADOR ROY MET WITH GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANJUNG AS PART OF ANONGOING ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WITH MAJOR PARTYLEADERS FOLLOWING THE JUNE 7 ELECTION (REFTELQ). GOLKAR PARLIAMENT (DPR) MEMBERS ABU HASAN

SAZILI AND EKI SYACHRUDIN PARTICIPATED WITH AKBAR. SAZILI IS A GOLKAR VICE CHAIRMAN AND HEAED THE DPR COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE FOR REVISING THE POLITICAL LAWS EARLY THIS YEAR. DCM AND QOLOFF ALSO PARTICIPATED.

4. (C) THE AMBASSADO CONGRATULATED AKBAR ON INDONESIA'S PEACEFUL UNE 7 ELECTION AND GOLKAR'S ROLE IN BRINGINGIT ABOUT. HE NOTED THAT INDONESIA'S SUCCESS QN HOLDING THE ELECTION HAD GAINED THE COUNTRY CREDIT IN WASHINGTON AND ELSEWHERE IN THE INTENATIONAL COMMUNITY. HE SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD BEEN HAPPY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE ELECTION. HOWEVER, THE AMBASSADOR STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. DID NOT SUPPORT ANY PARTICULAR PARTY OR CANDIDATE AND WOULD BE PLEASED TO WORK WITH WHOMEVER WAS CHOSEN THROUGH A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. (COMMENT: ALLEGATIONS HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING AMONG DEFEATED PARTIES THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTED PDI-P IN THE ELECTION. ON JULY 5, AMIEN RAIS CHARGED PUBLICLY THAT FOREIGNERS WERE "MEDDLING" IN THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. AT THIS POINT WE SEE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THESE CLAIMS WILL ACHIEVE CREDENCE AMONG MORE SERIOUS THINKERS OR THE WIDER PUBLIC -- IF ONLY BECAUSE THE ELECTION RESULTS THUS FAR LARGELY MATCH PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE GENERAL POPULARITY OF THE MAJOR CONTENDERS. END COMMENT)

GOLKAR'S SELF ASSESSMENT

5. (C) AKBAR PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING PREDICTION OF THE NUMBER OF SEATS EACH PARTY WOULD WIN, BASED ON GOLKAR'S

PAGE 04 JAKART 03323 01 OF 04 090203Z
OWN QNTERNAL VOTE COUNTING SYSTEM:

PDI-P: 150 T 154
GOLKAR: 120
PPP 59
PKB 50
PAN 35
PBB 13
PK 6
PKP 6
PNU 3
PDI 2
Q
SEVERAL SMALLER PARTIES WOULD WIN ONE SEAT EACQ TO BRING THE TOTAL TO 462.

6. (C) THE AMBASSADOR ASKED IF GOLKAR HAD TRIED TO PREDICT THE PARTY AFFILIATIONS FOR THE REGIONAL REPRESENATIVES TO THE MPR. HE ALSO WONDERED WHETHER THE ARMED FORCES WOULD BE ABLE TO PICK UP ADDITIONAL MPR SEATS AS REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES. AKBAR REPLIED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PREDIC HOW MANY MPR SEATS EACH PARTY WOULD GAIN BECAUSE EACH REGIONAL ASSEMBLY (DPR-D) WOULD DETERMINE ITS OWN PROCESS FOR SELECTING REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES, WHICH WOULD HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON THEIR PARTY AFFILIATION. HE HOPED THAT THE ELECTION COMMISSION AND HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY WOULD PROVIDE GUIDELINES, BUT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4444

PAGE 01 JAKART 03323 02 OF 04 090203Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/011W					

----------DEA693 090203Z /38

R 090209Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8724
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 003323

E.O. 12958: DECL:07/08/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION STRATEGY WITH GOLKAR HEAD AKBAR TANJUNG

THE DECISION WAS UP TO THE DPR-D'S. HE MENTIONED THAT GOLKAR WOULD MEET ITS PROVINCIAL PARTY LEADERS SOON TO BEGIN DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES.

7. (C) AKBAR INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT GOLKAR EXPECTED TO DO RELATIVELY WELL REGARDLESS OF THE SELECTION SYSTEM USED. GOLKAR PROJECTED IT WOULD WIN 14 OF THE 27 PROVINCES, WHILE PDI-P WOULD WIN 11 AND PPP AND PKB WOULD WIN ONE EACH. AS FOR TNI, EKI ADDED THAT GOLKAR OPPOSED ACTIVE MILITARY OFFICERS GAINING ANY ADDITIONAL MPR SEATS AS REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES, BUT THE DPR-D'S WOULD DECIDE THIS MATTER. AKBAR NOTED THAT THE DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONAL GROUP REPRESENTATIVES WAS ALSO UP IN THE AIR, AS THE ELECTION COMMISSION HAD YET TO IDENTIFY WHICH GROUPS WOULD BE CHOSEN TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES. IT WOULD BE UP TO THE FUNCTIONAL GROUPS TO CHOOSE THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AND DECIDE WHETHER ANY WOULD BE ACTIVE MILITARY MEMBERS.

8. (C) (NOTE: THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OR MPR CONSISTS OF ALL 462 ELECTED DPR MEMBERS, 38 APPOINTED MILITARY DPR MEMBERS, 135 REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES APPOINTED BY THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES, AND 65 REPRESENTATIVES OF "FUNCTIONAL GROUPS". THE 700-MEMBER MPR WILL SELECT THE PRESIDENT THIS FALL. DPR-D'S CANNOT BE SWORN IN AND BEGIN ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF HOW TO SELECT THEIR MPR REPRESENTATIVES UNTIL THEIR MEMBERSHIP IS DETERMINED WHEN FINAL RESULTS OF THE JUNE 7 BALLOTING BECOME AVAILABLE. END NOTE)

PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
---

9. (C) AKBAR WAS FIRM BUT NOT ALTOGETHER CONVINCING ON

THE QUESTIONS OF WHETHER GOLKAR WOULD STICK BY HABIBIE AS ITS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND WHETHER HE COULD WIN. THE AMBASSADOR MENTIONED NEWS REPORTS OF GOLKAR LEADERSHIP MEETINGS TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE PARTY SHOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT PRESIDENT HABIBIE AS ITS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND OF PERSISTENT RUMORS OF AN ANTI-HABIBIE FACTION WITHIN THE PARTY. AKBAR REAFFIRMED GOLKAR WAS BEHIND HABIBIE AND SAW HIM AS A CREDIBLE CANDIDATE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE PARTY, BUT SAID THAT GOLKAR WAS NOW AN OPEN AND DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION, WHOSE DIFFERENCES WERE OFTEN AIRED PUBLICLY. HOWEVER, AKBAR ALSO ALLOWED THAT THE SITUATION,WITH REGARD TO GOLKAR'S CANDIDATE WAS "DYNAMIC".

10. (C) AKBAR SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT, IF THE VOTE IN THE MPR CAME DOWN TO A CHOICE BETWEEN HABIBIE AND MEGAWATI, HABIBIE WOULD WIN. IN ADDITION TO GOLKAR, HABIBIE WOULD DRAW SUPPORT FROM PPP, THE SMALLER ISLAMIC PARTIES, AND PERHAPS SOME MEMBERS OF PAN. EKI ADDED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DRAW ANTI-MEGAWATI MEMBERS AWAY FROM PKB IF GUS DUR DID NOT BECOME A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE.

THIRD CANDIDATE
---

11. (C) AKBAR APPEARED TO AGREE WITH THE AMBASSADOR'S OBSERVATION THAT SUPPORTING HABIBIE COULD MAKE AMIEN RAIS APPEAR UNPRINCIPLED. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF AMIEN RAIS THREW HIS SUPPORT TO A THIRD CANDIDATE OR IF A "CENTER FACTION" COOPERATED TO BLOCK

EITHER GOLKAR OR PDI-P CANDIDATES AND DEMAND A COMPROMISE CANDIDATE. AKBAR SAID THIS WOULD POSE A DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR GOLKAR. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, WHILE HAMZAH HAZ APPEARED READY TO SUPPORT HABIBIE, THERE WERE INDICATIONS SOME WITHIN PPP WOULD NOT. HE HAD ALSO HEARD THE MUSLIM PARTIES WOULD NAME THEIR OWN CANDIDATE.

12. (C) ACCORDING TO AKBAR, GOLKAR BELIEVED A SUCCESSFUL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SHOULD BE CHOSEN FROM ONE OF THE PARTIES THAT CONTESTED THE ELECTION, RATHER THAN AN OUTSIDE "COMPROMISE" FIGURE. EKI ADDED THAT "A PLAYER SHOULD TAKE THE TROPHY, NOT SOMEONE FROM THE AUDIENCE". AKBAR CITED THE OFTEN-HEARD VIEW THAT, IF MEGAWATI WERE ELECTED, SHE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY GOVERNING BECAUSE OF OPPOSITION FROM ISLAMIC FORCES AND STUDENTS, WHEREAS IF HABIBIE WERE ELECTED, HE WOULD FACE OPPOSITION IN THE

STREETS FROM MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS. THIS IS WHY SOME PEOPLE PREFERRED AN ALTERNATIVE, HE ACKNOWLEDGED.

TNI
---

13. (C) WHEN ASKED GOLKAR'S VIEW OF A POSSIBLE PDI-P,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4459

PAGE 01 JAKART 03323 03 OF 04 090203Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/011W					

----------DEA697 090205Z /38

R 090209Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8725
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 003323

E.O. 12958: DECL:07/08/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION STRATEGY WITH GOLKAR HEAD AKBAR TANJUNG

PKB, PAN ALLIANCE, AKBAR SAID GOLKAR TOOK THIS VERY SERIOUSLY AS IT WOULD CONTROL A LARGE NUMBER OF MPR SEATS. IN THAT CASE, THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION MIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03323 03 OF 04 090203Z
COME DOWN TO WHOM TNI WOULD SUPPORT, WHICH SO FAR WAS UNPREDICTABLE. AKBAR MENTIONED WIRANTO'S FREQUENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT TNI WOULD "SUPPORT THE WINNER", BUT HE DID NOT CLARIFY WHETHER HE THOUGHT WIRANTO WAS REFERRING TO THE WINNER OF THE POPULAR ELECTION OR THE SIDE WITH

THE MOST SEATS IN THE MPR. AKBAR SAID MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER TNI VOTED AS A BLOCK OR INDIVIDUALLY, WHICH IN TURN MIGHT DEPEND ON WHETHER THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION WERE DONE BY OPEN OR SECRET BALLOT. (NOTE: THIS A KEY ISSUE TO BE DECIDED WHEN THE NEW MPR DETERMINES THE ELECTION RULES. END NOTE)

14. (C) AS FOR WHAT WIRANTO WOULD EXPECT IN RETURN FOR TNI SUPPORT, AKBAR NOTED THAT GOLKAR HAD ALREADY PROPOSED WIRANTO AS VICE-PRESIDENT BUT THAT MEGAWATI HAD INDICATED SHE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MAKE THE SAME OFFER. THIS LEFT WIRANTO IN A GOOD POSITION. SO FAR, HE HAD NOT TIPPED HIS HAND.

15. (C) THE AMBASSADOR ASKED IF ANTI-WIRANTO FEELING AMONG HABIBIE'S ISLAMIC SUPPORTERS AND PPP'S PAST OPPOSITION TO THE MILITARY'S DUAL FUNCTION ROLE MIGHT PUT HABIBIE AT A DISADVANTAGE IN GAINING TNI SUPPORT. AKBAR AND HIS AIDES THOUGHT THIS UNLIKELY, SAYING PRESENT INTERESTS WERE MORE IMPORTANT THAN PAST DIFFERENCES. RECALLING THE DEBATE OVER MILITARY SEATS IN THE DPR, EKI NOTED THAT IN THE END GOLKAR HAD TAKEN A HARDER LINE THAN PPP, STICKING TO ITS POSITION THAT TNI SHOULD HAVE ONLY 25 SEATS. ALTHOUGH PPP ORIGINALLY PUSHED FOR ONLY 12 TNI SEATS, IN THE END IT SUPPORTED 38 SEATS IN EXCHANGE FOR A TNI SUPPORT FOR A PROPORTIONAL - RATHER THAN A DISTRICT -

ELECTORAL SYSTEM.

MPR
---

16. (C) AKBAR CONFIRMED THAT GOLKAR PREFERRED A SECRET TO AN OPEN BALLOT FOR PRESIDENT IN THE MPR. THIS WAS IN LINE WITH CURRENT RULES THAT STIPULATE VOTES ON POLICY MATTERS ARE TO BE OPEN WHEREAS VOTES FOR INDIVIDUALS ARE TO BE SECRET. THE AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED THAT UNDER THE AMERICAN SYSTEM THE PRINCIPLE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE'S ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE REQUIRED THAT VOTES IN CONGRESS BE OPEN. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, HE ADDED, SECRET VOTING COMPLICATES THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING SUPPORT SINCE THERE IS NO GUARANTEE A MEMBER WILL DELIVER HIS VOTE IN RETURN FOR PROMISES THAT ARE MADE.

17. (C) NOTING THAT THIS WOULD BE INDONESIA'S FIRST OPEN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, AKBAR SAID THAT POLITICS HERE WERE STILL TOO PERSONAL TO ALLOW OPEN VOTING FOR INDIVIDUALS. EKI AGREED, SAYING THIS ALLOWED PEOPLE TO CONTINUE AS

FRIENDS AFTER THE VOTE, AN IMPORTANT CULTURAL CONSIDERATION. GOLKAR WAS COMMITTED TO GIVING ITS MEMBERS MORE RESPONSIBILITY AND NEEDED TO TRUST THEM. THE PARTY WOULD HONOR ITS COMMITMENTS NO MATTER HOW PEOPLE VOTED.

18. (C) RECALLING THAT HABIBIE IS FROM SULAWESI, THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER JAVANESE MIGHT NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A SECRET BALLOT TO SHOW RESISTANCE TO A NON-JAVANESE. AKBAR REPLIED THAT JAVANESE TEND TO BE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03323 03 OF 04 090203Z
ACCOMMODATING. IF THEY RESIST HABIBIE IT WILL NOT BE OVER THIS ISSUE. EKI AGREED, SAYING PEOPLE HAVE ALREADY HAD TWO JAVANESE LEADERS WHO HAVE FAILED AND ARE NOW READY FOR A CHANGE.

19. (C) REGARDING THE OPENING OF THE MPR, AKBAR SAID HE ANTICIPATED THERE WOULD NOT BE A DELAY. SAZILI ADDED THAT THE AGREED UPON DATE FOR THE OPENING SESSION OF THE WORKING COMMITTEE MATCHED THE ELECTION COMMISSION'S SCHEDULED DATE OF OCTOBER 1-3. THE MPR WORKING COMMITTEE WOULD SET TO WORK ON THE NATIONAL POLICY PLANNING DOCUMENT AND DECIDE THE DATE FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION, WHICH "MAY BE IN DECEMBER". (NOTE: THE ELECTION COMMISSION'S DATE FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION IS NOVEMBER 10. HOWEVER, THIS MAY BE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE, GIVEN THE MANY ISSUES THE MPR WORKING COMMITTEE WILL HAVE TO RESOLVE. END NOTE)

EAST TIMOR
---

20. (C) THE DCM RECALLED THAT BUSINESS LEADERS WITH WHOM HE HAD MET IN THE UNITED STATES WERE VERY IMPRESSED WITH

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4461

PAGE 01 JAKART 03323 04 OF 04 090203Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/011W					

----------DEA69A 090205Z /38

R 090209Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8726
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 003323

E.O. 12958: DECL:07/08/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION STRATEGY WITH GOLKAR HEAD AKBAR TANJUNG

THE PEACEFULNESS AND TRANSPARENCY OF INDONESIA'S ELECTION. THE AMBASSADOR AGREED, ADDING THAT INDONESIA WAS GAINING CREDIBILITY WITH MANY IN THE USG, INCLUDING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03323 04 OF 04 090203Z

CONGRESS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR COULD UNDERMINE THE GOODWILL THAT INDONESIA HAD EARNED AS A RESULT OF THE ELECTION. THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT OUR POSITION WAS NOT OF SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE OR CONTINUED INTEGRATION - BUT RATHER FOR THE GOI-DETERMINED POLICY THAT THE EAST TIMORESE SHOULD DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE. HE PRAISED THE GOI POLICY BUT SAID IT HAD NOT BEEN MATCHED BY TNI ACTIONS ON THE GROUND. IF THE SITUATION DID NOT IMPROVE, THE AMBASSADOR WARNED THAT THE GOODWILL FOR INDONESIA COULD WELL EVAPORATE. AKBAR APPEARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM BUT DID NOT OFFER A DIRECT RESPONSE.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E26

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO9006

PAGE 01 STATE 125385 030119Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AGRE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	A-00
	SRPP-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	IO-00	ADS-00
	NEA-01	DCP-01	OIC-02	OIG-03	IRM-01	SA-01	SAS-00

/017R

125385
SOURCE: KODAKC.003018
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:EMMCDEVITT:KNB -- 07/02/99 71029
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES
----------DCBFB1 030127Z /38
O 030118Z JUL 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL NAGOYA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SAPPORO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL FUKUOKA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 125385 030119Z
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 125385

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: JULY 2, 1999 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS - ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF - ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
UNVIE FOR FITZPATRICK
USEU FOR RUTH

1. INDEX:
-- KOREA: ROK-DPRK TALKS "BREAKDOWN" (PARAS 2 AND 3)
-- NORTH KOREA: UPDATE ON DETENTION OF AMERICAN CITIZEN (PARAS 2 AND 4)
-- KOREA: PANMUNJOM TALKS/NLL DISPUTE (PARAS 2-7)
-- DPRK: "CLINTON LETTER" AWAITS REPLY? (PARAS 8 AND 9)
-- DPRK: DROUGHT CLAIMS (PARAS 8 AND 10)
-- JAPAN: NORMALIZATION TALKS WITH NORTH KOREA SUSPENDED (PARAS 8 AND 11)
-- JAPAN: LOWER HOUSE APPROVAL OF KEDO CONTRIBUTION (PARAS 8 AND 12)
-- HONG KONG: RIGHT OF ABODE (PARAS 8 AND 13)

-- INDONESIA: DARE II RECONCILIATION TALKS (PARAS 8 AND 14)
-- INDONESIAN ELECTION UPDATE (PARAS 8 AND 15)
-- H.R. 1794: TAIWAN AND WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO) (PARAS 8 AND 16)
-- COMPUTER EXPORT POLICY (PARAS 8, 17-19)

2. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 07/02/99 AND WERE USED BY DEPUTY SPOKESMAN JAMES B. FOLEY AT THAT DAY'S PRESS BRIEFING.

3. KOREA: ROK-DPRK TALKS "BREAKDOWN"

CONTEXT: ALL MEDIA REPORT THE ROK-DPRK VICE-MINISTERIAL TALKS ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION ISSUES IN BEIJING "BROKE

DOWN" JULY 2. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE TALKS, WHICH
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 125385 030119Z
HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN FITS AND STARTS SINCE BEGINNING JUNE 22 , WILL RESUME SOON. TO PRESSURE THE DPRK TO RETURN TO THE TABLE, MEDIA REPORT, THE ROK HAS SUSPENDED SHIPMENT OF 100,000 TONS OF FERTILIZER PROMISED AS PART OF AN AGREEMENT TO TAKE UP FAMILY REUNIFICATION ISSUES REACHED IN LOW-LEVEL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN MAY. THE TALKS WERE CONDUCTED IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL RECRIMINATION, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. THE ROK SIDE PRESSED FOR GUARANTEES ON THE SAFTEY OF TOURISTS VISITING MT. KUMGANG IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT ARREST THERE OF A HOUSWIFE. THE NORTH KOREANS CALLED FOR A ROK APOLOGY FOR THE VNAVAL FIREFIGHT JUNE 15 AND ALSO FOR AN APOLOGY FOR REMARKS BY A DPRK DEFECTOR.

Q.: ANY COMMENT ON THE BREAK UP OF THE ROK-DPRK TALKS IN BEIJING?

A: AS WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY OBSERVED, DIALOGUE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA IS KEY TO ACHIEVING PROGRESS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. TALKS AT THE VICE-MINISTERIAL LEVEL BEGAN JUNE 22 IN BEIJING AND CONTINUED JULY 2, ENDING WITHOUT RESULT. WE HOPE THE TALKS CAN RESUME SOON.

WE STRONGLY SUPPORT PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG'S POLICY OF ENGAGING THE NORTH IN DIRECT DIALOGUE IN ORDER TO SEEK IMPROVED TIES AND ENHANCE PEACE AND STABILITY.

I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE ROK FOR ANY FURTHER READ-OUT ON THE BEIJING TALKS.

4. NORTH KOREA: UPDATE ON DETENTION OF U.S. CITIZEN
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 125385 030119Z

CONTEXT: THE SWEDISH CHARGE IN PYONGYANG HAD A MEETING WITH KIM SOK KYUN, THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE DPRK'S MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS' AMERICAN DEPARTMENT ON JULY 1. THE MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO PRESS FOR A DATE FOR CONSULAR ACCESS TO DETAINED AMERICAN CITIZEN, KAREN JUNG-SOOK HAN. THE MEETING RESULTED IN NO FURTHER CONCRETE DETAILS ABOUT THE HAN CASE AND NO FIRM COMMITMENT AS TO WHEN THE SWEDISH CHARGE WOULD BE PERMITTED TO TRAVEL TO RAJIN.

WE CONTINUE TO BE OPTIMISTIC THAT CONSULAR ACCESS WILL BE GRANTED AND ARE ALSO PURSUING THIS MATTER THROUGH THE "NEW

YORK CHANNEL." WE DO NOT YET BELIEVE IT IS BENEFICIAL TO MS. HAN TO PUBLICLY COMPLAIN ABOUT THE LACK OF ACCESS OR THE TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF THE U.S.-NORTH KOREA INTERIM CONSULAR AGREEMENT.

ALSO, OUR EMBASSY IN BEIJING RECEIVED A COPY OF A JUNE 30 LETTER FROM THE ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE KOREAN COMMITTEE FOR PROMOTION OF EXTERNAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN PYONGYANG THAT WAS SENT TO THE PRESIDENT OF A CATHOLIC MEDICAL ORGANIZATION IN GERMANY. THE LETTER MENTIONS THE HAN CASE AND THE ONGOING CONSTRUCTION OF THE RAJIN PEOPLE'S HOSPITAL.

BACKGROUND: J.S. KAREN HAN, A KOREAN-BORN U.S. CITIZEN, WAS ARRESTED ON JUNE 17. THE MFA SENT A DIPLOMATIC NOTE TO THE SWEDISH CHARGE INFORMING OF THE ARREST ON JUNE 22. THE SWEDISH EMBASSY MADE THE FIRST FORMAL REQUEST FOR CONSULAR ACCESS ON JUNE 23 (NINE DAYS AGO).

Q: HAVE THE SWEDES BEEN GRANTED ACCESS TO THE AMERICAN CITIZEN BEING HELD IN NORTH KOREA?

A: ARRANGEMENTS HAVE STILL NOT BEEN MADE FOR THE SWEDISH CHARGE IN DPRK TO PAY A CONSULAR VISIT TO THE DETAINED AMERICAN CITIZEN IN NORTH KOREA.

WE CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS MATTER ACTIVELY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DPRK, AND ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE DPRK WILL SHORTLY PERMIT THE SWEDISH CHARGE TO TRAVEL TO RAJIN AND BE GRANTED CONSULAR ACCESS.

IF ASKED:
Q: AREN'T THE NORTH KOREANS IN VIOLATION OF THE INTERIM CONSULAR AGREEMENT?

AS WE HAVE SAID, UNDER THE INTERIM CONSULAR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

KOREA, NOTIFICATION OF THE ARREST OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN IS SUPPOSED TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN FOUR DAYS OF THE ARREST AND CONSULAR VISITATION IS SUPPOSED TO BE PERMITTED WITHIN TWO DAYS AFTER A REQUEST IS MADE BY THE SWEDISH PROTECTING POWER ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. WE FULLY EXPECT THE DPRK TO ABIDE BY ITS INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND GRANT THE NECESSARY ACCESS.

5. KOREA: PANMUNJOM TALKS/NLL DISPUTE

CONTEXT: NO INCIDENTS AT SEA REPORTED, ALTHOUGH BELLICOSE COMMENTS FROM THE DPRK 'S OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY ARE CITED
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 07 STATE 125385 030119Z
IN THE MEDIA. MEANWHILE, IN PANMUNJOM, GENERAL OFFICERS TALKS WERE HELD JULY 2 (UNC PRESS RELEASE ATTACHED, FYI.) THE TALKS CONCLUDED WITHOUT RESULT, BUT WITH A DPRK SUGGESTION TO CONTINUE. ACCORDING TO THE UNC, "THE KPA STATED THEY ARE PREPARED TO MAKE JOINT EFFORTS TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND PREVENT FUTURE NAVAL CONFLICTS IN THE WEST SEA." NO DATE HAS BEEN SET FOR ANOTHER ROUND.

(NOTE: THE UN COMMAND OFFICIALLY REFERS TO "NORTHERN LIMITING LINE, FYI.)

Q.: WHAT IS THE SITUATION WITH ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE YELLOW SEA ISSUE?

A.: GENERAL OFFICER TALKS HOSTED BY THE UN COMMAND WERE HELD AT PANMUNJOM JULY 2. THE TALKS CONCLUDED WITHOUT RESULT, BUT ANOTHER MEETING HAS BEEN PROPOSED. THERE IS NO DATE FOR IT YET, HOWEVER.

WE CONTINUE TO WELCOME DPRK PARTICIPATION IN THE GENERAL OFFCIERS TALKS, WHICH ARE AIMED AT REDUCING TENSIONS AND PREVENTING FUTURE INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE.

I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE UN COMMAND IN SEOUL FOR DETAILS ON THE TALKS.

6. THE FOLLOWING NEWS RELEASE WAS ISSUED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMAND, SEOUL, KOREA, ON 7/2/99.

7. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND THE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 08 STATE 125385 030119Z
NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY MET TODAY AT PANMUMJOM TO DISCUSS THE SERIES OF NORTH KOREAN INTRUSIONS SOUTH OF THE NORTHERN LIMIT (NLL) IN THE WEST SEA (YELLOW SEA). DURING THE TWO-HOUR MEETING, THE KPA STATED THAT THEY ARE

PREPARED TO MAKE JOINT EFFORTS TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND PREVENT FUTURE ACCIDENTAL NAVAL CONFLICTS IN THE WEST SEA.

THE UN COMMAND PRESENTED A DOCUMENT TO THE KPA REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FORM OF A JOINT STATEMENT TO

CONFIRM PRACTICAL MEASURES TAKEN BY BOTH SIDES TO REDUCE CURRENT TENSIONS IN THE WEST SEA. HOWEVER, DIFFERENCES REMAINED OVER THE PROPOSED MEASURES.

THE UN COMMAND RE-STATED THE ROK GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL TO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE MARITIME BOUNDARY WITH THE KPA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1992 BASIC AGREEMENT. THEY ALSO STATED THAT THE CURRENT BOUNDARY LINE SHOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT IN THE ABSENCE OF A NORTH-SOUTH AGREEMENT ON THE BOUNDARY.

THE UN COMMAND REITERATED ITS EIGHT-POINT PROPOSAL TO AVOID ANY FUTURE INCIDENTS INVOLVING SOUTH AND NORTH KOREAN NAVAL VESSELS IN THE WEST SEA. THESE INCLUDED IMPROVED SIGNALING METHODS AND DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA.

"THE UN COMMAND ACKNOWLEDGED THE RESTRAINT SHOWN BY BOTH SIDES, THEREBY PREVENTING FURTHER ESCALATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY." SAID COL. CARL KROPF, UN COMMAND SPOKESMAN. "TODAY'S MEETING UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE OF

MAINTAINING A DIALOGUE CHANNEL WITH THE NORTH KOREANS."

REPRESENTING THE UNG AT TODAY'S MEETING WAS MAJ. GEN. MICHAEL M. DUNN, U.S. AIR FORCE; BRIG. GEN. KEUM, KL YEUN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA AIR FORCE; BRIG. GEN. JOHN BAKER, COMMONWEALTH MEMBER OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION; AND, COLONEL FRANCOIS TORRES, FRENCH LIAISON GROUP.

THIS WAS THE EIGHTH GENERAL OFFICER MEETING SINCE THEY BEGAN IN MARCH 1998. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETINGS IS TO DISCUSS PRACTICAL ARMISTICE-RELATED ISSUES, REAFFIRM ITS COMMITMENT TO THE GENERAL OFFICER FORUM, AND REDUCE TENSION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

8. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 7/2/99 AND WERE NOT USED BY THE DEPUTY SPOKESMAN AT THAT DAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

9. DPRK: "CLINTON LETTER" AWAITS REPLY?

CONTEXT: THE WASHINGTON TIMES CLAIMS THAT A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER WHICH WAS PASSED TO THE DPRK LEADERSHIP DURING THE PERRY VISIT TO PYONGYANG LAST MAY IS STILL "AWAITING A RESPONSE," CITING A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. THE STORY MISREPORTS REMARKS MADE BY A/S ROTH YESTERDAY IN A

BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO THE FOREIGN PRESS. ACCORDING TO THE TRANSCRIPT OF THAT SESSION, ROTH, REPLYING TO A REPORTER, STATED THAT DR. PERRY SHARED IDEAS WITH DPRK OFFICIALS AND THE NORTH KOREANS HAD NOT "COME BACK WITH ANYTHING I WOULD CONSIDER A RESPONSE...." THE WASHINGTON

TIMES CONFUSES THE PERRY CONCEPTS DISCUSSED WITH HIS DPRK HOSTS AND A "CLINTON LETTER" CONGRESS REQUESTED WHEN IT SAW DPRK TV COVERAGE OF PERRY GIVING HIS DPRK HOSTS A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT (THE CONTENTS OF WHICH WERE NEVER PUBLICLY DESCRIBED). THE CONGRESS HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON THE CONTENTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE BY DR. PERRY. STILL, SOME STAFFERS IN THE CONGRESS, ACCORDING TO THE TIMES, COMPLAIN THAT A COPY OF THE LETTER HAS NOT BEEN PROVIDED.

Q.: ANY COMMENT ON THE REPORT THAT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IS AWAITING A REPLY FROM THE DPRK TO A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON? WHAT WAS ITS CONTENT?

A.: THE REPORT IS INCORRECT. THE SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL CITED IN THE ARTICLE WAS REFERRING TO IDEAS DR. PERRY DISCUSSED WITH HIS DPRK HOSTS IN PYONGYANG DURING HIS VISIT IN MAY. THE OFFICIAL STATED THAT THE DPRK HAD YET TO PROVIDE WHAT HE CONSIDERED A RESPONSE TO DR. PERRY'S CONCEPTS.

Q.: WHAT ABOUT THE CLINTON LETTER? WAS CONGRESS BRIEFED ON IT?

A. DR. PERRY PRESENTED HIS DPRK HOSTS A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT AND ON HIS RETURN BRIEFED THE CONGRESS EXTENSIVELY ON ITS CONTENT. I WON'T GET INTO THE CONTENTS HERE IN KEEPING WITH OUR USUAL PRACTICE.

YOU WILL RECALL THAT DR. PERRY EMPHASIZED THAT HE TRAVELED "AS A PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY, NOT A NEGOTIATOR," AND THAT IT

WILL TAKE SOME TIME FOR THE DPRK TO REFLECT UPON THE VIEWS HE EXPLORED WITH THE DPRK .

Q.: DOES THE PERRY REVIEW REQUIRE A DPRK RESPONSE FOR ITS COMPLETION?

A.: WHEN DR. PERRY FEELS HE HAS COMPLETED HIS REVIEW, HE WILL PRESENT HIS FINDINGS TO THE PRESIDENT.

10. DPRK: DROUGHT CLAIMS

CONTEXT: PRESS REPORTS REPEAT OFFICIAL DPRK MEDIA ACCOUNTS THAT A DROUGHT IS AFFECTING CROP PRODUCTION RESULTING IN LOW YIELDS OF MUCH NEEDED FOODSTUFFS. THERE ARE NO INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS OF CLIMATE CONDITIONS IN NORTH KOREA. HOWEVER, FIELD STUDIES CONDUCTED IN THE DPRK BY INTERNATIONAL DONOR GROUPS IN MAY CONCLUDED THAT THE FOOD SITUATION IN THE DPRK REMAINS DIRE AND THAT INTERNATIONAL FOOD ASSISTANCE IS REACHING ITS INTENDED TARGET OF CIVILIANS MOST VULNERABLE--CHILDREN, PREGNANT WOMEN, AND THE ELDERLY--THUS ATTENUATING THE EFFECTS OF SEVERE MALNUTRITION AND FAMINE.

IN APRIL, THE UN'S WORLD FOOD PROGRAM (WFP) ANNOUNCED ITS NEW APPEAL FOR HUMANITARIAN FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR THE DPRK. THE NEW EMERGENCY OPERATION CALLED FOR 585,000 TONS OF FOOD ASSISTANCE, VALUED AT $260 MILLION, TO FEED ITS TARGET VULNERABLE GROUPS FROM JULY 1999 UNTIL JULY 2000. THE UN INTERAGENCY ESTIMATE OF THE FOOD DEFICIT IS OVER 1.3 MILLION METRIC TONS OF GRAIN FOR THE CURRENT CALENDAR YEAR. THE U.S. ANNOUNCED ITS RESPONSE TO THE APRIL 1999

WFP APPEAL MAY 17. THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF THIS YEAR'S U.S. DONATIONS TO THE WFP MATCHES LAST YEAR'S, 500,000 METRIC TONS. LAST YEAR'S U.S. DONATION COST $183 MILLION TO PURCHASE THE FOOD AND SHIP IT TO THE DPRK.

IN ADDITION, THE U.S. IS PROVIDING 100,000 TONS OF FOOD IN CONNECTION WITH A PILOT AGRICULTURAL PROJECT IN THE DPRK TO HELP IMPROVE NORTH KOREA'S POTATO YIELD. THAT PROJECT IS GOING FORWARD. THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF DRAUGHT AFFECTING THE POTATO CROP AT THIS POINT.

Q.: ANY COMMENT ON DPRK REPORTS OF DRAUGHT CONDITIONS AFFECTING CROP YIELDS?

A.: WE HAVE NO INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CONDITIONS IN THE DPRK, SO I AM UNABLE TO COMMENT. STILL, FIELD STUDIES CONDUCTED IN THE DPRK BY INTERNATIONAL DONOR GROUPS IN MAY CONCLUDED THE FOOD SITUATION IN THE DPRK REMAINS DIRE.

IT HAS BEEN LONG-STANDING U.S. POLICY TO DONATE FOOD AID BASED ON HUMANITARIAN NEED. OBVIOUSLY, THERE REMAINS A SUBSTANTIAL NEED FOR HUMANITARIAN FOOD ASSISTANCE.

WE CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CURRENT WORLD FOOD PROGRAM APPEAL.

Q.: WHAT IS THE CURRENT U.S. HUMANITARIAN FOOD AID CONTRIBUTION FOR NORTH KOREA?

A.: IN MAY THE U.S. ANNOUNCED A 400,000 METRIC TON DONATION TO THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM APPEAL. DELIVERIES OF THAT FOOD ARE NOW UNDERWAY.

IN ADDITION, THE U.S. IS PROVIDING 100,000 TONS OF FOOD IN CONNECTION WITH A PILOT AGRICULTURAL PROJECT IN THE DPRK TO HELP IMPROVE NORTH KOREA'S POTATO YIELD.

THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF THIS YEAR'S U.S. DONATIONS TO THE WFP MATCHES LAST YEAR'S, 500,000 METRIC TONS.

AS WITH ALL FOOD ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES, THE FOOD DISTRIBUTION WILL BE CAREFULLY MONITORED TO ENSURE IT REACHES THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF CHILDREN, PREGNANT WOMEN AND THE ELDERLY FOR WHOM SUCH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IS INTENDED.

11. JAPAN - NORMALIZATION TALKS WITH NORTH KOREA SUSPENDED

CONTEXT: PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE DPRK REGIME HAS SUSPENDED INFORMAL NORMALIZATION TALKS WITH JAPAN UNTIL JAPAN RESUMES FOOD AID FOR NORTH KOREA. JAPAN HAS BEEN CONDUCTING INFORMAL TALKS WITH THE DPRK IN AN ATTEMPT TO START NORMALIZATION TALKS. THE GOJ SUSPENDED FOOD AID TO THE DPRK LAST YEAR IN THE WAKE OF THE AUGUST 31 MISSILE LAUNCH OF A DPRK MISSILE OVER THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS.

Q. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT A NORTH KOREAN DEMAND FOR FOOD AID FROM JAPAN BEFORE IT WILL CONTINUE NORMALIZATION TALKS WITH THAT COUNTRY?

A: WE CONSULT REGULARLY WITH THE JAPANESE ON NORTH KOREA AND WORK CLOSELY WITH JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA ON NORTH KOREAN ISSUES. WE WOULD WELCOME DIALOGUE BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND JAPAN, BUT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO COMMENT ON THE MOST RECENT EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE TWO

COUNTRIES.

12. JAPAN - LOWER HOUSE APPROVAL OF KEDO CONTRIBUTION

CONTEXT: PURSUANT TO THE 1994 U.S.-DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK, THE U.S. ESTABLISHED THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (KEDO) TO PROVIDE PROLIFERATION RESISTANT LIGHT-WATER REACTORS (LWR) AND HEAVY FUEL OIL (PENDING COMPLETION OF THE FIRST LWR) FOR NORTH KOREA, IN RETURN FOR THE NORTH FREEZING AND ULTIMATELY DISMANTLING ITS NUCLEAR FACILITIES AT YONGBYON AND TAECHON. JAPAN WAS A FOUNDING MEMBER OF KEDO AND HAS PLEDGED THE YEN EQUIVALENT OF $1.0 BILLION TOWARD CONSTRUCTION OF THE LWRS. THE ROK WILL PAY 70 PERCENT OF THE ESTIMATED PROJECT COST.

IN REACTION TO NORTH KOREA'S MISSILE TEST OVER JAPAN IN AUGUST 1998, THE GOJ HALTED SUPPORT FOR KEDO, BUT RESUMED AFTER STRONG URGING BY SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AND OTHER U.S. OFFICIALS. ON JUNE 3, 1999, THE LOWER HOUSE OF THE JAPANESE DIET PASSED LEGISLATION APPROVING THE $1 BILLION CONTRIBUTION. ON JUNE 30, 1999, THE UPPER HOUSE APPROVED THE $1 BILLION CONTRIBUTION AS WELL.

THE FIRST TRANCHE OF JAPANESE FUNDING FOR LWR REACTION

CONSTRUCTION COULD BEGIN TO FLOW THIS SUMMER, ASSUMING THAT THE ROK IS ALSO READY TO BEGIN DISBURSEMENTS.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION AND A REACTION REGARDING THE PASSAGE IN THE DIET OF $1 BILLION FOR KEDO'S LIGHT WATER REACTOR CONSTRUCTION IN NORTH KOREA.

A: WE WARMLY WELCOME THE JAPANESE DIET APPROVAL OF JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (KEDO), WHICH IS A TANGIBLE DEMONSTRATION OF JAPAN'S COMMITMENT TO KEDO AND THE U.S.-DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK, AND A FURTHER INDICATION OF OUR CLOSE COOPERATION WITH JAPAN ON NORTH KOREA POLICY.

13. HONG KONG -- RIGHT OF ABODE

CONTEXT: JULY 1, 1999 MARKED THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE HONG KONG REVERSION. IN A JULY 2 ARTICLE DISCUSSING THE ANNIVERSARY, THE "WASHINGTON TIMES" ASSERTS THAT "CRITICS NOW FEAR HONG KONG'S FREEDOMS WILL CRUMBLE." THE ARTICLE STATES THAT SOME OBSERVERS IN HONG KONG BELIEVE THAT THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS INTERPRETATION OF THE

BASIC LAW IN THE RIGHT OF ABODE CASE HAS UNDERCUT HONG KONG'S HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY. REP. CHRIS COX IS QUOTED AS COMMENTING THAT BEIJING BROKE ITS COMMITMENT TO RESPECT THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL BY ISSUING THE

INTERPRETATION. THE "WASHINGTON TIMES" ARTICLE ALSO MENTIONS A LETTER SENATOR HELMS SENT TO THE SECRETARY IN MARCH IN WHICH HE ACCUSED THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OF "KOTOWING" TO CHINA IN THE RIGHT OF ABODE CASE.

Q: DOES THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVE THAT HONG KONG COMPROMISED ITS AUTONOMOUS STATUS BY SEEKING AN INTERPRETATION ON THE RIGHT OF ABODE DECISION BY THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS?

A: AS WE HAVE STATED PREVIOUSLY, WE ATTACH THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO THE PRESERVATION OF AND RESPECT FOR HONG KONG'S HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY, ITS RULE OF LAW, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES.

THE INTERPRETATION BY THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS WAS REQUESTED IN MAY BY THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT.

SEEKING AN INTERPRETATION FROM THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS IS LAWFUL UNDER THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION AND THE BASIC LAW. WE WOULD HOPE THAT BROAD OR FREQUENT REVIEW OF THE HONG KONG COURT OF FINAL APPEALS' POWER OF FINAL JURISDICTION WOULD NOT OCCUR, INSOFAR AS THAT COULD ERODE THE INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY OF THE HONG KONG JUDICIARY AND POTENTIALLY UNDERMINE HONG KONG'S AUTONOMY.

THE RULE OF LAW IS A KEY PILLAR ON WHICH THE PROSPERITY AND FUTURE OF HONG KONG REST. WE WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW CLOSELY FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.

Q: DID CHINA BREACH ITS COMMITMENT TO GIVE FULL AUTHORITY TO HONG KONG'S COURT OF FINAL APPEAL, AS REP. COX HAS CHARGED?

A: AS WE HAVE STATED PREVIOUSLY, SEEKING AN

INTERPRETATION FROM THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS IS LAWFUL UNDER THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION AND THE BASIC LAW.

Q: HAS THE DEPARTMENT RESPONDED TO SENATOR HELMS' LETTER

TO THE SECRETARY ON THIS SUBJECT?

A: YES. THE SECRETARY'S REPLY EMPHASIZED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHARED THE SENATOR'S DESIRE TO ENCOURAGE DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT, THE RULE OF LAW, AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN HONG KONG, AND NOTED THAT WE CONTINUE TO FOLLOW CLOSELY DEVELOPMENTS IN HONG KONG.

14. INDONESIA - DARE II RECONCILIATION TALKS

CONTEXT: PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE LEADERS MET JUNE 25-30 IN JAKARTA FOR RECONCILIATION TALKS KNOWN AS THE "DARE II." XANANA GUSMAO, LEADER OF THE EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE, WAS RELEASED TEMPORARILY FROM HOUSE ARREST BY THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT (GOI) SO THAT HE COULD PARTICIPATE. NOBEL LAUREATE JOSE RAMOS HORTA AND SEVERAL OTHER PROMINENT PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS IN EXILE RETURNED, WITH GOI PERMISSION, TO ATTEND THE RECONCILIATION TALKS. THE DARE II STEERING COMMITTEE PRESS RELEASE, ENTITLED "DARE II TALKS END ON A SUBDUED NOTE," ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE TALKS HAD NOT PRODUCED ANY SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENTS, WHICH PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTED THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE. THE PRO-INTEGRATION SIDE BLOCKED ANY ATTEMPTS TO REACH SUCH AGREEMENTS, ACCORDING TO EMBASSY JAKARTA. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, THE ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT THE DAYS OF DISCUSSION WAS CORDIAL AND REPORTEDLY SOME STEPS WERE

MADE TOWARDS OPENING A DEEPER DIALOGUE.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION AND A REACTION REGARDING PEACE TALKS AMONG EAST TIMORESE FACTIONS?

A: EAST TIMORESE OPPONENTS AND SUPPORTERS OF INDEPENDENCE MET JUNE 25- 30 IN JAKARTA FOR RECONCILIATION TALKS KNOWN AS THE "DARE II" PROCESS. RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO WAS RELEASED TEMPORARILY FROM INDONESIAN HOUSE ARREST TO PARTICIPATE. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ALSO ISSUED VISAS TO ALLOW NOBEL LAUREATE JOSE RAMOS HORTA AND OTHER PROMINENT PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS TO PARTICIPATE.

THE U.S. WELCOMED ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DARE II TALKS. WE HOPE THAT THIS DIALOGUE PROCESS WILL HELP RESTORE STABILITY IN EAST TIMOR , HELP CREATE THE PEACEFUL CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR A FREE AND FAIR UN-ADMINISTERED POPULAR VOTE ON AUTONOMY IN LATE AUGUST, AND LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR ENDURING RECONCILIATION AMONG THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE.

WE ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE INITIAL ROUND OF TALKS DID NOT PRODUCE ANY FORMAL SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENTS, SUCH AS CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR DISARMAMENT. HOWEVER, WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE FIRST ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WERE CORDIAL THROUGHOUT, AND THAT PARTICIPANTS FOUND THE FACE-TO-FACE CONTACT AND PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS USEFUL. WE URGE BOTH SIDES TO ENGAGE ACTIVELY IN THE COMING WEEKS TO RESOLVE CONTENTIOUS ISSUES, AND WE CALL ON THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO FACILITATE THIS ENGAGEMENT.

15. INDONESIAN ELECTION UPDATE

CONTEXT: THE VOTE COUNTING PROCESS CONTINUES OVER THREE WEEKS AFTER THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA, WITH SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 80 PERCENT OF THE ESTIMATED 100 MILLION BALLOTS REPORTED IN THE "UNOFFICIAL" COUNT. THE INDONESIAN ELECTION COMMISSION HAD EXPECTED TO ANNOUNCE EARLY OFFICIAL RESULTS IN LATE JUNE.
AT THAT TIME, IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE COUNTING PROCESS HAD BOGGED DOWN, AND THE DEADLINE FOR ANNOUNCING THE RESULTS WAS POSTPONED UNTIL JULY 8. TODAY, THAT DATE IS IN DOUBT. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS IN TABULATING RESULTS, LACK OF PREPARATION, THE ATTEMPT BY SMALL PARTIES TO SLOW THE COUNTING IN ORDER TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS, AND THE FAILURE TO PAY POLL WORKERS HAVE COMBINED TO STALL THE VOTE TABULATION. THE PROCESS IS COMPLICATED, ENTAILING HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS AT POLLING STATIONS BEFORE THEY ARE CONSOLIDATED AT (SEQUENTIALLY) THE SUB-DISTRICT, DISTRICT, AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS.

SLOWNESS OF THE UNOFFICIAL COUNT HAS INCITED FRUSTRATIONS. THERE ARE FEW INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, OF MASS DISCONTENT, IN PART BECAUSE PERCENTAGES OF THE REPORTED VOTE STILL SHOW OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THE LEAD OVER THE GOLKAR PARTY. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY JAKARTA, THE CLASH BETWEEN PROTESTORS AND POLICE AT THE ELECTION COMMISSION HEADQUARTERS ON JULY 1 WAS NOTABLE FOR ITS VIOLENCE BUT DOES NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE TRANSFORMATION OF POPULAR FRUSTRATION INTO BROADER UNREST. 37 DEMONSTRATORS WERE HOSPITALIZED, SEVEN SUFFERING WITH WOUNDS FROM RUBBER BULLETS, IN THAT DEMONSTRATION, WHICH WAS ORGANIZED BY A POLITICAL PARTY

THAT OPPOSED THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE RULING PARTY, GOLKAR, IN THE ELECTIONS.

NO SINGLE PARTY IS EXPECTED TO GAIN A CLEAR MAJORITY OF VOTES CAST, ALTHOUGH THE PARTY LED BY MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI, THE PDI-P, IS EXPECTED TO RECORD THE LARGEST PLURALITY. 462 REPRESENTATIVES TO THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT WILL BE CHOSEN FROM PARTY LISTS ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS. THESE 462 PARLIAMENTARIANS PLUS 38 APPOINTED MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY WILL HAVE FIVE-YEAR TERMS IN THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT, OR DPR. THE 500 DPR MEMBERS PLUS 200 OTHERS REPRESENTING SOCIETAL GROUPS AND REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS WILL FORM THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR.) ATHOUGH THE MPR IS SCHEDULED TO MEET LATER THIS YEAR TO SELECT INDONESIA'S NEXT PRESIDENT, THERE HAVE RECENTLY APPEARED SKETCHY REPORTS THAT THIS COULD BE POSTPONED.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON THE ELECTIONS.

A: ROUGHLY 80 PERCENT OF THE VOTES HAVE BEEN COUNTED. THE ELECTION COMMISSION HAS ANNOUNCED IT WILL RELEASE THE FINAL RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL ELECTION BY MID-JULY, ALTHOUGH TECHNICAL PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO HAMPER THE COUNTING.

THE PRELIMINARY TRENDS SUGGEST THAT MEGAWATI'S PDI-P PARTY COULD WIN THE LARGEST PLURALITY OF THE VOTE, BUT NO SINGLE PARTY IS EXPECTED TO GAIN A MAJORITY IN THE PARLIAMENT.

AS WE HAVE NOTED ALL ALONG, THIS ELECTION IS ONLY ONE STEP IN THE PROCESS OF SELECTING A NEW PRESIDENT AND

ESTABLISHING A CREDIBLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN INDONESIA. THE MAKE-UP OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (OR MPR), WHOSE MEMBERS WILL CHOOSE THE NEXT PRESIDENT, WILL NOT BE KNOWN FOR SEVERAL MORE WEEKS. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SPECULATE ON THE ELECTION'S ULTIMATE OUTCOME, OR WHOM THE MPR WILL CHOOSE AS PRESIDENT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR NEW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING A FREE PRESS, WILL ENSURE THAT THE PROCESS CONTINUES TO BE TRANSPARENT AND CLOSELY MONITORED.

WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL SECLECTION COULD BE PUT OFF UNTIL NEXT YEAR, AND URGE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA TO MAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS TO CARRY THE ELECTION PROCESS THROUGH TO THE SELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE.
(IF ASKED)

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE VIOLENCE ON JULY 1?

A: ACCORDING TO MEDIA AND EMBASSY REPORTS, 37 PEOPLE WERE HOSPITALIZED AFTER A CLASH BETWEEN DEMONSTRATORS AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES IN JAKARTA. THE GROUP WAS REPORTEDLY PROTESTING ALLEGED MALFEASANCE BY THE RULING PARTY IN THE ELECTIONS.

WE CALL ON ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND AVOID VIOLENCE. WE CALL ON INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES, IN PARTICULAR, TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IN RESPONDING TO PROTESTORS.

(IF ASKED)

Q: WHAT WOULD BE THE U.S. REACTION IF MEGAWATI'S PDI-P PARTY WERE TO GAIN A PLURALITY OF THE VOTES, OR IF PRESIDENT HABIBIE WERE RETURNED TO OFFICE?

A: THE U.S. DOES NOT SUPPORT ANY INDIVIDUAL OR PARTY. OUR INTEREST IS IN SEEING CREDIBLE ELECTION RESULTS THAT REFLECT THE WISHES OF THE INDONESIAN VOTERS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGES FROM THESE ELECTIONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT SELECTION OF A PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT LATER THIS YEAR.

(IF ASKED)

Q: WHAT ARE THE FACTS CONCERNING A REPORT THAT INDONESIA'S ELECTION PANEL HAS POSTPONED RELEASE OF FINAL VOTING RESULTS UNTIL POSSIBLY AS LATE AS MID-JULY?

A: THE INDONESIAN ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) HAD HOPED TO ANNOUNCE OFFICIAL EARLY RESULTS BY JUNE 21, BUT HAS NOW STATED THAT THOSE RESULTS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL JULY 8. THIS DATE IS IN LINE WITH THE ORIGINAL TIMETABLE WRITTEN INTO THE ELECTION LAWS PASSED LAST JANUARY, WHICH CALLED FOR RELEASE OF RESULTS FOR THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT DURING THE JULY 3-12 TIMEFRAME.

(IF ASKED)

Q: IS THE U.S. CONCERNED THAT THE SLOW PACE OF THE VOTE COUNT IS A SIGN OF
POSSIBLE CHEATING?

A: WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF PROBLEMS IN SOME AREAS, WE DO NOT AT THIS POINT HAVE ANY INDICATION THAT THE SLOWNESS OF THE INITIAL VOTE COUNT REFLECTS WIDESPREAD EFFORTS TO MANIPULATE THE RESULTS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT PART OF THE SLOWNESS IN COUNTING AND COLLATING THE VOTES IS DUE TO THE INEXPERIENCE OF ELECTION OFFICIALS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, A DESIRE TO BE AS THOROUGH AND ACCURATE AS POSSIBLE, AND A VARIETY OF TECHNICAL PROBLEMS. AS INTERNATIONAL MONITORS HAVE NOTED, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE AUTHORITIES RESOLVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT IRREGULARITIES FAIRLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

16. H.R. 1794: TAIWAN & WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO)

CONTEXT: H.R. 1794, A BILL INTRODUCED BY REP. SHERROD BROWN THAT HAS BEEN REPORTED OUT OF THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, WOULD REQUIRE THE

SECRETARY OF STATE TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ADMINISTRATION EFFORTS TO "MORE ACTIVELY SUPPORT TAIWAN'S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, IN PARTICULAR THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION." THE DEPARTMENT OPPOSES THIS BILL.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR LONG-STANDING "ONE CHINA" POLICY, THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT SUPPORT TAIWAN'S MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE UNITED NATIONS OR WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), THAT REQUIRE STATEHOOD FOR MEMBERSHIP. WHILE WE DO NOT SUPPORT TAIWAN'S MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS WHERE STATEHOOD IS REQUIRED, WE DO SUPPORT

FINDING WAYS FOR TAIWAN'S VOICE TO BE HEARD IN THESE ORGANIZATIONS. THE ADMINISTRATION DOES BELIEVE THAT THE PEOPLE ON TAIWAN SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO AS WELL AS BENEFIT FROM THE WORK OF THE WHO. THE ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTS ANY MODALITIES OR ARRANGEMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE WHO TO ALLOW FOR TAIWAN TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION.

Q. CAN YOU CONFIRM THAT THE ADMINISTRATION OPPOSES H.R. 1794?

A: YES. NONETHELESS, WE SHARE THE OVERALL GOAL OF THE COMMITTEE TO FACILITATE TAIWAN'S EFFORTS TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. IN FACT, WE HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY WORKING TO IDENTIFY AND PROMOTE WAYS FOR TAIWAN'S VOICE TO BE HEARD IN THE WHO AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS WHERE STATEHOOD IS A REQUIREMENT. WE HAVE ALSO SUPPORTED TAIWAN'S MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHERE STATEHOOD IS NOT AN ISSUE.

HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT PROVIDING A WRITTEN REPORT TO CONGRESS WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO TAIWAN'S EFFORTS TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

THE REPORT COULD REDUCE FLEXIBILITY OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED AND MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR TAIWAN TO ATTRACT SUPPORT IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

IF ASKED:

IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR "ONE CHINA" POLICY, WHILE WE DO NOT

SUPPORT TAIWAN'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO) OR ANY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION THAT REQUIRES STATEHOOD FOR MEMBERSHIP, WE BELIEVE THAT THE PEOPLE ON TAIWAN SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO AS WELL AS TO BENEFIT FROM THE WORK OF THE WHO.

17. COMPUTER EXPORT POLICY

CONTEXT: AS REPORTED IN SEVERAL PAPERS, YESTERDAY THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED IMPORTANT CHANGES IN U.S. EXPORT POLICY FOR COMPUTERS. THE NSC PREPARED FACT SHEET IS ATTACHED TO THIS GUIDANCE.

Q: WHAT ARE THE DETAILS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S DECISION TO RELAX EXPORT CONTROLS ON HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS?

A: YESTERDAY THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED AN UPDATE OF U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS ON COMPUTERS THAT WILL PROMOTE OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM, AND EASE UNNECESSARY REGULATORY BURDENS ON BOTH GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY.

TODAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT IS PRESIDENT CLINTON'S THIRD REVISION TO U.S. EXPORT CONTROL PARAMETERS SINCE 1993. WHEN CONTROLS WERE LAST REVISED IN 1995, WE KNEW COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY WOULD CONTINUE TO ADVANCE RAPIDLY - AND THAT WE WOULD NEED TO UPDATE CONTROL LEVELS PERIODICALLY.

YESTERDAY'S DECISION MOVES HUNGARY, POLAND, THE CZECH REPUBLIC, AND BRAZIL FROM TIER 2 TO TIER 1. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL CONSIDER MOVING ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES

INTO TIER 1 IN THE FUTURE.

FOR TIER 2 COUNTRIES (SOUTH AMERICA, SOUTH KOREA, ASEAN, SLOVENIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA, THE LEVEL REQUIRING AN INDIVIDUAL LICENSE IS BEING RAISED FROM 10,000 MTOP (MILLIONS OF THEORETICAL OPERATIONS PER SECOND) TO 20,000 MTOP. IN ADDITION, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL REVIEW THIS LEVEL IN SIX MONTHS, WITH THE EXPECTATION OF RAISING IT TO THE 32,000 - 36,000 MTOP RANGE. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO REVIEW THIS LEVEL EVERY SIX MONTHS.

FOR TIER 3 COUNTRIES (INDIA, PAKISTAN, ALL MIDDLE EAST/MAGREB, THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, CHINA, VIETNAM, AND CENTRAL EUROPE) THE CURRENT TWO-LEVEL SYSTEM FOR CIVILIAN VERSUS MILITARY

PROLIFERATION END-USERS WILL BE MAINTAINED. FOR MILITARY END-USERS THE INDIVIDUAL LICENSING LEVEL IS RAISED FROM 2000 MTOP TO 6500 MTOP, AND FOR CIVILIAN USERS IT IS RAISED FROM 7000 TO 12,300 MTOP.

THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT WILL IMMEDIATELY RAISE THE LICENSE LEVEL FOR CIVILIAN USERS. THE LICENSE LEVEL FOR MILITARY END-USERS WILL BE RAISED IN SIX MONTHS, AT THE SAME TIME THAT IT ADJUSTS THE LEVEL THAT TRIGGERS THE NDAA (NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.

THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION WILL RAISE THE NDAA NOTIFICATION LEVEL FROM 2000 MTOP TO 6500 MTOP. THE PRESEIDENT HAS ADVISED THE APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES OF HIS DECISION TO RAISE THE NDAA NOTIFICATION LEVEL. BY LAW,

CONGRESS HAS SIX MONTHS TO REVIEW THIS DECISION, AT WHICH TIME THE CHANGE TO THE NDAA NOTIFICATION LEVEL WILL GO INTO EFFECT (FEBRUARY 2000).

THE ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO REVIEW THE LICENSING LEVELS AND THE NDAA NOTIFICATION EVERY SIX MONTHS TO DETERMINE IF FURTHER ADJUSTMENTS ARE WARRENTED.

FINALLY, THE LEVEL FOR GENERAL PURPOSE - SO CALLED "MASS MARKET" -- MICROPROCESSORS WILL BE REVISED IMMEDIATELY FROM THE CURRENT CONTROL LEVEL OF 1200 MTOP TO 1900 MTOP.

19. THE FOLLOWING FACT SHEET WAS PREPARED BY THE NSC ON 7/1/99 AND IS PROVIDED FOR POSTS' INFORMATION.

20. FACT SHEET: EXPORT CONTROLS ON COMPUTERS

THE PRESIDENT TODAY ANNOUNCED AN UPDATE OF U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS ON COMPUTERS THAT WILL PROMOTE OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM, AND EASE UNNECESSARY REGULATORY BURDENS ON BOTH GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY.

TODAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT IS PRESIDENT CLINTON'S THIRD REVISION TO U.S. EXPORT CONTROL PARAMETERS SINCE 1993. TODAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT REFLECTS THIS ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE CONTROLS ON MILITARILY SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF COMMODITY PRODUCTS, SUCH AS SERVERS AND WORKSTATIONS, OF WHICH MILLIONS ARE MANUFACTURED AND SOLD WORLDWIDE EVERY YEAR.

WHEN CONTROLS WERE LAST REVISED IN 1995, WE KNEW COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY WOULD CONTINUE TO ADVANCE RAPIDLY - AND THAT WE WOULD NEED TO UPDATE CONTROL LEVELS PERIODICALLY. ACCORDINGLY, FOR THE PAST YEAR, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS CONDUCTED A REVIEW OF OUR COMPUTER EXPORT CONTROLS THAT TOOK INTO ACCOUNT (1) THE RAPID ADVANCE OF COMPUTING

TECHNOLOGY WINCE 1995, (2) OUR SECURITY, NONPROLIFERATION AND OTHER NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, AND (3) THE NEED FOR A POLICY THAT WOULD REMAIN EFFECTIVE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S COMPUTER EXPORT CONTROLS ARE DESIGNED TO PERMIT THE GOVERNMENT TO CALIBRATE CONTROL LEVELS AND LICENSING CONDITIONS DEPENDING UPON THE NATIONAL SECURITY OR PROLIFERATION RISK POSED AT A SPECIFIC DESTINATION, AND TO ENHANCE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND PRESERVE THE TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD OF THE U.S. COMPUTER INDUSTRIAL BASE BY ENSURING CONTROLS ON COMPUTER EXPORTS ARE EFFECTIVE AND DO NOT UNNECESSARILY IMPEDE LEGITIMATE COMPUTER EXPORTS.

THIS REVIEW FOUND THAT ADVANCED IN THE POWER AND CAPABILITIES OF WIDELY AVAILABLE COMPUTING SYSTEMS HAVE MORE THAN EXCEEDED OUR 1995 CONTROL LEVELS. IN FACT, DURING THE COMING MONTHS, INDUSTRY ANALYSTS ESTIMATE THAT SYSTEMS DESIGNATED AS "HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS" IN 1995 (2,000 MTOPS (MILLIONS OF THEORETICAL OPERATION PER SECOND, A COMPUTER PERFORMANCE METRIC FOR EXPORT CONTROL PURPOSES) WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE TENS OF THOUSANDS.

THIS REFLECTS THE EXPONENTIAL GROWTH IN INDIVIDUAL

MICROPROCESSOR SPEEDS THAT HAS OCCURRED SINCE 1995. WE FULLY EXPECT THIS GROWTH TO CONTINUE - U.S. COMPANIES PLAN COMMERCIAL SALES OF INDIVIDUAL "CHIPS" RATED OVER 2000 MTOPS BY LATE 1999/EARLY 2000. MOREOVER, WHILE THERE ARE MILITARY APPLICATIONS ACROSS A RANGE OF MTOPS LEVELS, THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCIES HAVE DETERMINED THAT THERE IS NO DEFINITIVE LINE THAT SEPARATES LEVELS OF COMPUTING POWER ON THE BASIS OF THEIR USEFULNESS FOR MILITARY APPLICATIONS. IN LIGHT OF THIS FINDING, THE ADVANCES IN BASIC COMPUTING TECHNOLOGIES, AND THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN TRYING TO CONTROL COMMODITY LEVEL ITEMS, IT IS CLEAR OUR CONTROL LIMITS NEEDED TO BE RAISED. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS DETERMINED THAT WIDESPREAD COMMERCIAL AVAILABILITY MAKES COMPUTERS WITH A PERFORMANCE OF 6,500 MTOPS OR LESS UNCONTROLLABLE.

THE REVISED CONTROLS

THE REVISED CONTROLS ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT MAINTAIN THE FOUR COUNTRY GROUPS ANNOUNCED IN 1995, BUT AMENDS THE COUNTRIES IN, AND CONTROL LEVELS FOR, THOSE GROUPS AS FOLLOWS:

TIER 1 (WESTERN EUROPE, JAPAN, CANADA, MEXICO, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND): GENERAL LICENSE FOR ALL COMPUTERS (I.E. NO

PRIOR GOVERNMENT REVIEW, BUT COMPANIES MUST KEEP RECORDS ON HIGHER PERFORMANCE SHIPMENTS THAT WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AS DIRECTED).

-- THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TODAY WILL MOVE HUNGRY,

POLAND, THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND BRAZIL FROM TIER 2 TO TIER 1. IN ADDITION, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL CONSIDER MOVING ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES INTO TIER 1 IN THE FUTURE.

TIER II (SOUTH AMERICA, SOUTH KOREA, ASEAN, SLOVENIA, SOUTH AFRICA): GENERAL LICENSE UP TO 10,000 MTOPS WITH RECORD-KEEPING AND REPORTING AS DIRECTED, INDIVIDUAL LICENSE (REQUIRING PRIOR GOVERNMENT REVIEW) ABOVE 10,000 MTOPS.

-- TODAY'S DECISION WILL RAISE THE INDIVIDUAL LICENSING LEVELS FROM 10,000 MTOPS TO 20,000 MTOPS IMMEDIATELY. IN

ADDITION, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL REVIEW THIS LEVEL IN SIX MONTHS, WITH THE EXPECTATION OF RAISING IT TO THE 32,000-36,000 MTOPS RANGE. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO REVIEW THIS LEVEL EVERY SIX MONTHS, WITH THE EXPECTATION OF RAISING IT TO THE 32,000-36,000 MTOPS RANGE. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO REVIEW THIS LEVEL EVERY SIX MONTHS TO DETERMINE IF FURTHER ADJUSTMENTS ARE WARRANTED.

TIER III (INDIA, PAKISTAN, ALL MIDDLE EAST/MAGHREB, THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, CHINA, VIETNAM, CENTRAL EUROPE): CURRENT REGULATIONS PERMIT GENERAL LICENSE EXPORTS UP TO 2000 MTOP, AND REQUIRE INDIVIDUAL LICENSES FOR MILITARY END-USES AND END-USERS ABOVE THAT FIGURE. GENERAL LICENSE EXPORTS ARE PERMITTED FOR CIVIL END-USERS BETWEEN 2000 MTOPS AND 7000 MTIOS, WITH EXPORTER RECORD KEEPING AND REPORTING AS DIRECTED. INDIVIDUAL LICENSE FOR ALL END-USERS ABOVE 7000 MTOPS.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TODAY WILL MAINTAIN THE CURRENT TWO-LEVEL SYSTEM FOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY/PROLIFERATION END USERS. THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT WILL IMMEDIATELY RAISE THE LICENSE LEVEL FOR CIVILIAN END-USERS, AND WILL RAISE THE LICENSE LEVEL FOR MILITARY END-USERS IN SIX MONTHS, AT THE SAME TIME AS IT ADJUSTS THE LEVEL THAT TRIGGERS THE NDAA NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT, WHICH IS DISCUSSED BELOW.

THE 1998 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT (NDAA), P.L. 105-85, IMPOSED A REQUIREMENT FOR COMPANIES TO PROVIDE THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT WITH PRIOR NOTICE OF EXPORTS FOR

SYSTEMS ABOVE 2,000 MTOPS TO ALL TIER 3 END-USERS. U.S. EXPORT CONTROL AGENCIES HAVE 10 DAYS TO INFORM THE COMPANY IF IT MUST APPLY FOR A LICENSE.

-- THE PRESIDENT' DECISION TODAY WILL RAISE THE NDAA NOTIFICATION LEVEL FROM 2,000 MTOPS TO 6,500 MTOPS. THE PRESIDENT HAS ADVISED THE APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES OF HIS DECISION TO RAISE THE NDAA NOTIFICATION LEVEL. BY LAW, CONGRESS HAS SIX MONTHS TO REVIEW THIS DECISION AT WHICH TIME THE CHANGE TO NDAA NOTIFICATION LEVEL WILL GO INTO EFFECT (FEBRUARY 2000).

-- THE ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE THE LICENSING LEVELS AND THE NDAA NOTIFICATION LEVEL EVERY SIX MONTHS TO DETERMINE IF FURTHER ADJUSTMENTS ARE WARRANTED.

TIER IV (IRAQ, IRAN, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, CUBA, SUDAN, AND SYRIA). THERE ARE NO PLANNED CHANGES FOR TIER IV, CURRENT
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 32 STATE 125385 030119Z
POLICIES CONTINUE TO APPLY(I.E., THE UNITED STATES WILL MAINTAIN A VIRTUAL EMBARGO ON COMPUTER EXPORTS).

FOR ALL THESE GROUPS, REEXPORT AND RETRANSFER PROVISIONS CONTINUE TO APPLY. THE REVISED CONTROLS WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE WHEN THEY ARE IMPLEMENTED IN FORMAL COMMERCE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO IMPLEMENT THE ENHANCED PROLIFERATION CONTROL INITIATIVE (EPCI) WHICH PROVIDES AUTHORITY FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO BLOCK EXPORTS OF COMPUTERS OF ANY LEVEL IN CASES INVOLVING EXPORTS TO END-USES OR END-USERS OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN OR RISKS OF DIVERSION TO PROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES. CRIMINAL AS WELL AS CIVIL PENALTIES APPLY TO VIOLATORS OF THE EPCI. IN ADDITION, THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WILL CONTINUE TO ADD TO ITS LIST OF PUBLISHED ENTITIES OF CONCERN AS A MEANS OF INFORMING EXPORTERS OF THEIR DUTY TO CHECK SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES AND INQUIRE ABOUT END-USES AND END-USERS. EXPORTERS WILL BE ADVISED TO CONTACT THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE IF THEY HAVE ANY CONCERN WITH THE IDENTITY OF ACTIVITIES OF THE END-USERS. THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT ALSO WILL WORK TO EXPAND ITS EFFORTS - THROUGH PUBLIC SEMINARS AND CONSULTATIONS WITH COMPANIES - TO KEEP INDUSTRY REGULARLY INFORMED REGARDING PROBLEM END-USERS AND PROGRAMS OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN.

MICROPROCESSOR CONTROLS: IN ADDITION TO REVISING COMPUTER EXPORT CONTROLS, CONTROLS ON GENERAL-PURPOSE MICROPROCESSORS WILL BE REVISED IMMEDIATELY, FROM THE CURRENT CONTROL LEVEL OF 1200 MTOPS TO 1900 MTOPS. EXPORT CONTROL AGENCIES ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT GENERAL PURPOSE OR

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 33 STATE 125385 030119Z
SO-CALLED "MASS MARKET" MICROPROCESSORS ARE NOT CONTROLLABLE BECAUSE THEY ARE USED IN VIRTUALLY ALL CONSUMER AND BUSINESS PERSONAL COMPUTERS, ARE HIGHLY PORTABLE, AND ARE SOLD IN VERY LARGE QUANTITIES THROUGH MULTIPLE DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS WORLDWIDE. GIVEN THE CONTINUING INCREASES IN MICROPROCESSOR TECHNOLOGY, THE ADMINISTRATION LIKELY WILL ADJUST MICROPROCESSOR CONTROL LEVELS AGAIN IN THE FALL, 1999. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CONTROLS ON HIGHER PERFORMANCE, GENERAL PURPOSE MICROPROCESSORS THAT ARE SOLD IN SMALL QUANTITIES FOR

HIGH-END COMPUTER AND OTHER APPLICATIONS, AND THOSE APPLICATION-SPECIFIC MICROPROCESSORS THAT HAVE MILITARY APPLICATIONS AND ARE SOLD IN RELATIVELY SMALL QUANTITIES.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL: PER THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1998, CONGRESS REQUIRES A SIX-MONTH NOTICE PERIOD IF THE PRESIDENT DECIDES TO RAISE THE LEVEL THAT TRIGGERS THE 10-DAY PRE-EXPORT NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR TIER 3 EXPORTS. CONGRESS ALSO REQUIRES A FOUR-MONTH NOTICE IF THE PRESIDENT DECIDES TO MOVE A COUNTRY OUT OF TIER 3. THE SIX-MONTH NOTICE PERIOD IN PARTICULAR LIMITS OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND QUICKLY TO RAPID CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY. WE WILL WORK WITH CONGRESS TO CHANGE BOTH WAITING PERIODS TO ONE MONTH, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FORMAL NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO RAISE THE CURRENT NDAA NOTIFICATION LEVEL FROM 2,000 MTOPS TO 6,500 MTOPS.

ON A LONGER-TERM BASIS, WE INTEND TO WORK WITH CONGRESS TO ADOPT AN APPROACH THAT DOES NOT RELY ON AS HOC JUDGEMENTS ABOUT APPROPRIATE LEVELS OF CONTROL, BUT RATHER KEYS OUR

EXPORT CONTROLS TO RECOGNIZE THE PRACTICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONTROLLING ITEMS SO WIDELY AVAILABLE THAT THEY AMOUNT TO COMMODITY ITEMS, LIKE COMPUTERS AND MICROPROCESSORS WHICH ARE SOLD BY THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS AND EVEN MILLIONS.

MULTILATERAL COORDINATION: THE ADMINISTRATION IS CONSULTING WITH OTHER NATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR COMMON CONTROLS ON HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS, AND WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT -- THE MULTILATERAL SUCCESSOR TO COCOM, TO ENSURE THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THE BASIS FOR THE CHANGES IN CONTROLS. WE ARE COMMITTED TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH THEM TO ADJUST MULTILATERAL CONTROLS TO REFLECT TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY CONCERNS. OUR CONTROLS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE BASIC FOUNDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT -- TO DENY ARMS AND SENSITIVE DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES TO

COUNTRIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN, AND TO DEVELOP MECHANISMS FOR INFORMATION SHARING AMONG THE PARTNERS AS A WAY TO HARMONIZE OUR EXPORT CONTROL PRACTICES AND POLICIES.
PICKERING

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1202

PAGE 01 JAKART 03207 01 OF 04 020410Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00
	CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01
	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W	

----------DC43CA 020410Z /38

P 020414Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8602
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL SURABAYA PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 003207

DEPT FOR EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: DECL:07/02/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ECON, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION STRATEGY WITH MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI

REF:(A) JAKARTA 3131 (B) JAKARTA 3012
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03207 01 OF 04 020410Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J.S. ROY; REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: ON JUNE 30, 1999 AMBASSADOR ROY MET WITH MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI TO DISCUSS HER STRATEGY FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION, PRIORITIES IF ELECTED AND VIEWS ON EAST TIMOR. MEGAWATI EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE PDI-P'S STRONG LEAD OVER GOLKAR WOULD HOLD UP. SHE IS FRUSTRATED WITH THE SLOW VOTE COUNT BUT SEES NO CHOICE BUT TO LET ELECTION AUTHORITIES RESOLVE PROBLEMS AND INVESTIGATE ELECTION IRREGULARITIES WITHOUT HER INVOLVEMENT. MEGAWATI RECOGNIZED SHE WILL NEED HELP FROM OTHER PARTIES TO WIN THE PRESIDENCY BUT SEES THE SITUATION AS HIGHLY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

FLUID BEFORE THE MPR. PDI-P EXPECTS OTHER PARTIES WILL NOT REMAIN UNITED IN THE VOTE, SO IT IS CANVASING ITS SUPPORT IN TERMS OF INDIVIDUALS AS WELL AS PARTIES. A NUMBER OF UNRESOLVED ISSUES, INCLUDING HOW REGIONAL AND GROUP REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE APPOINTED, WHETHER THE VOTE WILL BE OPEN OR SECRET, AND THE NOMINATION PROCESS COULD HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE OUTCOME.

3. (C) SUMMARY CONT.: MEGAWATI EXPRESSED VIEWS ON A NUMBER OF KEY ISSUES FACING A MEGAWATI PRESIDENCY. SHE IS NOT OPPOSED TO AMENDING SPECIFIC ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION (NOT THE PREAMBLE) BUT WORRIED THAT A FAILURE TO LIMIT THE SCOPE WOULD REOPEN THE VERY SENSITIVE ISSUE OF A PREEMINENT ROLE FOR ISLAM. SHE STRESSED THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY AND LEGAL REFORM. THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO ATTACK CORRUPTION. MEGAWATI SAID SOEHARTO'S FAMILY COULD BE HANDLED IN THIS CONTEXT, AS JUST SOME AMONG MANY CASES. SOEHARTO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03207 01 OF 04 020410Z

PRESENTS A SPECIAL PROBLEM, AS THERE IS ALSO A NEED TO PROTECT THE INSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENCY. MEGAWATI EXPRESSED CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR IMF-LED ECONOMIC REFORMS AND FOR ABIDING BY THE MAY DECISION ON EAST TIMOR. END SUMMARY

THE SLOW COUNT

4. (C) ON JUNE 30 THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND HER KEY ADVISORS IN THE FIRST OF A PLANNED ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WITH MAJOR PARTY LEADERS FOLLOWING THE JUNE 7 ELECTION. PDI-P ADVISORS KWIK KIAN GIE AND LAKSAMANA SUKARDI ACCOMPANIED MEGAWATI. ACTING ECON COUNSELOR AND POLOFF (NOTETAKERS) ALSO ATTENDED.

5. (C) THE AMBASSADOR CONGRATULATED MEGAWATI ON INDONESIA'S PEACEFULL JUNE 7 ELECTION AND THE RESULTS WHICH SHOW HER PDI-P PARTY AS THE STRONG FRONTRUNNER. RECALLING EXPECTATIONS OF VIOLENCE, HE NOTED THAT INDONESIA'S SUCCESS IN HOLDING THE ELECTION HAD GAINED THE COUNTRY CREDIT IN WASHINGTON AND ELSEWHERE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. HOWEVER, HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE VOTE COUNT APPEARED TO BE BOGGING DOWN, WHICH COULD ERODE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE PROCESS.

6. (C) MEGAWATI NOTED A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS FACING THE ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU), INCLUDING DELIBERATE ACTIONS OF SMALL PARTIES TO HOLD UP THE PROCESS (REF A). SHE EXPRESSED CONCERN RESULTS MIGHT NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR

SEVERAL WEEKS. THIS HAD THE POTENTIAL TO DELAY THE MPR. WHILE THERE HAD BEEN EARLIER DISCUSSION OF MOVING UP THE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03207 01 OF 04 020410Z
TIMETABLE FOR THE MPR AND PDI-P WAS PREPARED TO GO FORWARD, COMPLICATIONS WITH THE VOTE COUNT NOW MADE THIS UNLIKELY. MEANWHILE, SHE FELT HER WISEST COURSE WAS TO REMAIN QUIET ABOUT THE PROCESS AND APPARENT OUTCOME. HER MAIN PROBLEM FOR THE TIME BEING WAS TO MAKE SURE HER SUPPORTERS REMAINED PATIENT AND DID NOT TAKE TO THE STREETS.

PDI-P STRENGTH
---

7. (C) NOTING GOLKAR ESTIMATES THAT IT WILL ULTIMATELY RECEIVE 28 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, THE AMBASSADOR ASKED FOR MEGAWATI'S ASSESSMENT OF THE TWO PARTIES' RELATIVE STRENGTH. SHE REPLIED THAT PDI-P'S ESTIMATES WERE IN LINE WITH THE KPU'S PARTIAL OFFICIAL RESULTS. (NOTE: KPU'S PARTIAL OFFICIAL RESULTS SHOW PDI-P AND GOLKAR WITH APPROXIMATELY 36 AND 19 PERCENT OF THE VOTE RESPECTIVELY.) MEGAWATI ESTIMATED THAT GOLKAR WOULD RECEIVE A MAXIMUM OF 18 PERCENT OF THE VOTE.

8. (C) MEGAWATI DISMISSED GOLKAR CLAIMS OF HAVING WON 17 OF THE 27 PROVINCES, NOTING THE MANY ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD IN AREAS WHERE GOLKAR WAS CLAIMING VICTORY. RESULTS WOULD NOT BE CLEAR UNTIL THE ELECTIONS SUPERVISORY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1205

PAGE 01 JAKART 03207 02 OF 04 020410Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00
	CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01
	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W	

----------DC43CD 020411Z /38

P 020414Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8603
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL SURABAYA PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 003207

DEPT FOR EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: DECL:07/02/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ECON, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION STRATEGY WITH MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI

COMMITTEE (PANWASLU) COMPLETED INVESTIGATING AND LEGAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PROCESSING OF COMPLAINTS. THE PANWASLU WAS WEAK, BUT THERE WAS NO CHOICE BUT TO LET IT DO ITS WORK.

COALITION BUILDING
---

9. (C) THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT WHILE PDI-P HAD STRONGLY OUTDISTANCED THE COMPETITION, IT COULD NOT BY ITSELF COMMAND A MAJORITY IN THE MPR AND WOULD NEED TO BUILD COALITIONS. MEGAWATI REPLIED THAT WITHOUT KNOWING THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE VOTE, SHE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO ASSESS HER NEEDS. SHE WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE ONGOING POLITICAL MANEUVERING, WHICH SHE REGARDED AS PREMATURE. (NOTE: OTHER PARTIES, PARTICULARLY POTENTIAL COALITION PARTNERS PKB AND PAN HAVE INDICATED DEEP FRUSTRATION WITH MEGAWATI'S ALOOF POLITICAL STANCE SINCE THE ELECTION. END NOTE) MEGAWATI DOWNPLAYED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GUS DUR'S WEEKEND MEETINGS WITH AMIEN RAIS AND PPP HEAD HAMZAH HAZ (WHICH WERE PLAYED IN THE MEDIA AS A SETBACK FOR HER CHANCES FOR THE PRESIDENCY), SAYING GUS DUR WAS MERELY GIVING OTHER PARTY LEADERS A CHANCE TO EXPRESS THEIR OPINIONS.

10. (C) ALLUDING TO THE CONTROVERSY KEPT ALIVE BY VARIOUS ISLAMIC FACTIONS OVER WHETHER A WOMAN COULD LEAD AN ISLAMIC NATION, MEGAWATI ACKNOWLEDGED GUS DUR'S PROBLEMS MANAGING MEMBERS OF HIS GRASS ROOTS ORGANIZATION NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU), WHICH IS THE MOST IMPORTANT LOCUS OF DEBATE ON THE GENDER ISSUE. BUT SHE FELT HER POSITION HAD STRENGTHENED IN RECENT DAYS AS A RANGE OF WOMEN'S GROUPS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS, AND PROMINENT POLITICAL FIGURES HAD WEIGHED IN ON THE ISSUE AND OBJECTED TO THE
CONFIDENTIAL

USE OF RELIGION FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. IF SHE BEGAN MAKING POLITICAL MOVES NOW, IT WOULD ONLY TEND TO BRING THE DISPARATE ISLAMIC ELEMENTS CLOSER TOGETHER.

11. (C) MEGAWATI AND HER ADVISORS INDICATED THEY DID NOT EXPECT MEMBER OF OTHER PARTIES TO VOTE IN UNISON, AND WERE ASSESSING THEIR POTENTIAL SUPPORT IN TERMS OF INDIVIDUALS AS WELL AS PARTIES. SHE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE MAJORITY OF NU WOULD IN THE END DISREGARD GENDER AND SUPPORT HER. NO NU MEMBER HAD EVER HELD THE PRESTIGIOUS MINISTER OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO, WHICH SHE WAS PREPARED TO OFFER. ACCEPTANCE BY NU WOULD HELP HER DRAW SUPPORT FROM NU MEMBERS OF PPP AS WELL AS PKB. LAKSAMANA ESTIMATED THAT 30 NU MEMBERS OF PPP MIGHT GET SEATS AND CONSIDER SUPPORTING HER. SHE MIGHT DRAW ON THE REFORMIST WING OF PAN AS WELL AS ITS MODERATE MUHAMMADIYA MEMBERS.

12. (C) MEGAWATI ACKNOWLEDGED THE PERCEPTION THAT IT WAS NOW BECOMING A RACE BETWEEN PRESIDENT HABIBIE AND HERSELF, BUT CAUTIONED THAT THE SITUATION WILL REMAIN HIGHLY FLUID IN THE MONTHS BEFORE THE MPR. FISSURES WITHIN GOLKAR MEANT HABIBIE COULD NOT BE CERTAIN HE WOULD REMAIN GOLKAR'S CANDIDATE AND PROVIDED MEGAWATI OPPORTUNITIES TO DRAW GOLKAR SUPPORT.

13. (C) REGARDING THE POSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES (TNI), WHOSE LARGE BLOCK OF MPR SEATS ARE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR, MEGAWATI ACKNOWLEDGED SHE DID NOT HAVE MUCH MORE TO GO ON THAN TNI LEADERS' PUBLIC STATEMENTS. (NOTE: TNI STATEMENTS IN RECENT WEEKS INCLUDED INDICATIONS THAT: A CONFIDENTIAL

WOMAN PRESIDENT WAS ACCEPTABLE; TNI WOULD SUPPORT THE BEST CANDIDATE, AND; TNI WOULD RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE. END NOTE) LAKSAMANA AND KWIK BELIEVED THAT IN THE EVENT HABIBE AND MEGAWATI WERE ABLE TO MUSTER ROUGHLY EQUAL NUMBERS OF SEATS, TNI WOULD HAVE TO SUPPORT MEGAWATI AS THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE. THIS WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE TNI'S IMAGE, WHICH HAD REACHED ITS LOWEST POINT IN HISTORY, AND TNI WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE ANGER OF THE PEOPLE IF THEIR ASPIRATIONS WERE DENIED.

14. (C) RECALLING INDONESIA'S TRADITION OF SEEKING UNITY GOVERNMENTS, THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER PDI-P WERE OPEN TO A COMPROMISE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. MEGAWATI RULED OUT THAT APPROACH AS LONG AS INDONESIA RETAINED A

PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM. SHE SAID HER OPPONENTS WERE WILLING TO SKIRT THE CONSTITUTION IN ORDER TO BAR HER FROM BECOMING PRESIDENT.

MPR PROCESS

15. (C) THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT PROBLEMS IN THE LAW LEFT MANY KEY ISSUES YET TO BE RESOLVED ABOUT THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS. HE ASKED HOW PDI-P WOULD PROTECT ITS INTERESTS GIVEN THE LARGE NUMBER OF MPR SEATS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1203

PAGE 01 JAKART 03207 03 OF 04 020410Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00
	CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01
	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W	

----------DC43D2 020410Z /38

P 020414Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8604
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL SURABAYA PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 003207

DEPT FOR EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: DECL:07/02/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ECON, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION STRATEGY WITH MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI

THAT WOULD GO TO REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES APPOINTED BY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03207 03 OF 04 020410Z
PROVINCIAL DPR'S (DPR-D). MEGAWATI SAID EACH DPR-D WOULD

HAVE TO ESTABLISH ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE. IN PRINCIPLE, THE PARTY WITH THE LARGEST VOTE SHARE IN A PROVINCE SHOULD GET THE LEADERSHIP OF THE DPR-D, WHICH WOULD PLAY A KEY ROLE IN DETERMINING HOW REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MPR WERE SELECTED. ANOTHER KEY ISSUE WAS WHETHER MEMBERS OF TNI, WHO WILL ENCUMBER AT LEAST 10 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN EACH DPR-D, WOULD BE ALLOWED TO BECOME REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES. MEGAWATI SAID THE POLITICAL PARTIES AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT TNI SHOULD NOT GET A SHARE OF THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE SEATS SINCE IT WOULD ALREADY GET 38 SEATS BY VIRTUE OF ITS MEMBERSHIP IN THE DPR.

16. (C) A KEY ISSUE IS WHETHER THE PRESIDENTIAL BALLOT WILL BE OPEN OR SECRET. IN PRINCIPLE AN OPEN VOTE WAS BETTER, BUT MEGAWATI WORRIED IT MIGHT ENCOURAGE VOTE BUYING. (KWIK ADDED THAT SOME PARTIES -PRESUMABLY GOLKAR- HAD ALREADY COMPILED LISTS OF OPPOSITION PARTY CANDIDATES WHO MIGHT BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO BRIBES.) ANOTHER IMPORTANT ISSUE WAS HOW CANDIDATES WOULD BE NOMINATED. SHOULD A LIST OF CANDIDATES BE WINNOWED IN STAGES, AS WAS RECENTLY BEEN SUGGESTED BY A PROMINENT ACADEMIC? WOULD PARTIES SUBMIT SLATES OF CANDIDATES OR WOULD THE VICE-PRESIDENCY SIMPLY GO TO THE SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE? ALL OF THESE ISSUES HAVE IMPORTANT RAMIFICATIONS BUT HAVE YET TO BE RESOLVED.

PRIORITIES FOR A MEGAWATI PRESIDENCY

17. (C) THE AMBASSADOR ASKED ABOUT THE PROGRAM OF A
CONFIDENTIAL

MEGAWATI PRESIDENCY ON CONTENTIOUS ISSUES INCLUDING CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND NEPOTISM ("KKN"), HANDLING SOEHARTO, JUDICIAL REFORM, AND ECONOMIC REFORM. MEGAWATI SAID SHE WAS OPEN TO THE IDEA OF AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION IN PRINCIPLE, ACKNOWLEDGING CERTAIN ARTICLES NEED TO BE CLARIFIED. BUT SHE WORRIED THAT THE VERY GENERAL DEMANDS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM COULD INDICATE A CREEPING AGENDA. OPENING UP DISCUSSION ON THE PREAMBLE IN PARTICULAR WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS. (NOTE: BECAUSE IT WOULD REINVIGORATE THE HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER A PREEMINANT ROLE FOR ISALM. END NOTE)

18. (C) ON THE QUESTION OF HOW TO HANDLE SOEHARTO, MEGAWATI STRESSED THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE LEGAL SYSTEM SO THAT CORRUPTION COULD BE ATTACKED THROUGHOUT SOCIETY. SOEHARTO'S FAMILY COULD BE HANDLED LIKE EVERYONE ELSE. LAKSAMANA NOTED THIS MEANT IT WOULD BE THE LEGAL SYSTEM

GOING AFTER SOEHARTO, NOT MEGAWATI. HOWEVER, RECALLING HER PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AS SUKARNO'S DAUGHTER, MEGAWATI ACKNOWLEDGED HAVING DIFFICULTY WITH THE ISSUE OF HOW TO HANDLE SOEHARTO. SHE FELT AN OBLIGATION TO PROTECT THE INSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENCY, SAYING "IT IS NOT WISE TO MAKE EVERY FORMER PRESIDENT A FUGITIVE".

19. (C) MEGAWATI SAID A HIGH PRIORITY WOULD BE ESTABLISHING A TRULY INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY. LAKSAMANA SAID THIS WOULD NOT REQUIRE A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AS THERE WAS ALREADY A NOMINAL SEPERATION OF POWERS. YET THE CHIEF JUSTICE REMAINED UNDER THE GOVERNMENT, A PROBLEM HABIBIE HAD FAILED TO ADDRESS. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE SEPARATION OF THE LEGISLATURE WAS CLEAR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03207 03 OF 04 020410Z
BUT NOT OF THE JUDICIARY. MEGAWATI SAID SHE WAS OPEN TO AN AMENDMENT TO STRENGTHEN THE JUDICIARY'S INDEPENDENCE.

20. (C) THE IMF PROGRAM: MEGAWATI SAID THAT SHE HAD DISCUSSED THE IMF PROGRAM WITH IMF FIRST DEPUTY MANAGING DIRECTOR STANLEY FISCHER AND WITH WORLD BANK COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR INDONESIA MARK BAIRD. SHE SAID SHE GENERALLY SUPPORTS THE DIRECTION OF THE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM, BUT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS NEED TO UNDERSTAND THAT ALONG WITH ECONOMIC REFORM INDONESIA NEEDS TO INSTITUTE CLEAN GOVERNMENT. SHE ADDED THAT SHE SUPPORTED CONTINUED QUARTERLY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE IMF AND THE GOI UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE GOI'S LETTER OF INTENT TO THE IMF.

21. (C) WHEN THE AMBASSADOR CITED RECENT POSITIVE ECONOMIC INDICATORS, I.E., STRONGER RUPIAH AND LOW INFLATION, MEGAWATI SAID THAT THERE IS A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE RUPIAH'S STRENGTH AND CREDIBLE GOVERNMENT. LAKSAMANA ADDED THAT CONTINUED HIGH INTEREST RATES WERE AT THE "EXPENSE OF BUSINESS." KWIK SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT "MONEY POLITICS" IN THE MPR MIGHT ANGER THE PEOPLE AGAIN, WHICH WOULD HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE RUPIAH.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1204

PAGE 01 JAKART 03207 04 OF 04 020410Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 ACQ-01 CEA-01 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 COME-00

CTME-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01
E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00
DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W	

----------DC43D4 020410Z /38

P 020414Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8605
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL SURABAYA PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 003207

DEPT FOR EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: DECL:07/02/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ECON, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION STRATEGY WITH MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI

CONFIDENTIAL

EAST TIMOR
---

22. (C) MEGAWATI SAID THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S DECISION ON EAST TIMOR "WAS NOT WISE" AND THAT HE HAD "VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTION." NEVERTHELESS, SHE RECOGNIZED THE VALIDITY OF THE MAY 5 AGREEMENT. SHE SAID IN HER RECENT MEETING WITH UN ENVOY JAMSHEED MARKER SHE HAD RAISED CONCERNS ABOUT THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE AUGUST 21 REFERENDUM AND THE CONVENING OF THE PEOPLES CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER. MEGAWATI ASKED WHO WOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EAST TIMOR DURING THAT TIME PERIOD IF THE RESULT OF THE REFERENDUM WAS "PRO-INDEPENDENCE." MARKER RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD REPORT HER CONCERN TO THE UN GENERAL COUNSEL (REF JAKARTA 3156). THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTED THAT SINCE THE U.S. ACCEPTED EAST TIMOR AS PART OF INDONESIA, WE WOULD EXPECT INDONESIA TO CONTINUE ADMINISTERING EAST TIMOR FROM AUGUST TO NOVEMBER. IN REFERENCE TO THE JUNE 29 ATTACK BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA ON THE UNAMET OFFICE IN MALIANA, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT TNI-BACKED ACTIONS ON THE GROUND APPEAR NOT TO BE CONSISTENT WITH GOI POLICY

AND COULD DAMAGE INDONESIA'S REPUTATION. MEGAWATI NODDED HER HEAD IN AGREEMENT BUT DID NOT COMMENT FURTHER.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1934

PAGE 01 JAKART 03151 291254Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/011W					

----------DAE617 291257Z /38

P 291112Z JUN 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8549
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003151

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 00110

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-29-02
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: HABIBIE IN SURABAYA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PO WILLIAM A PIERCE. REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (C) PRESIDENT HABIBIE OPENED A RELIGIOUS FESTIVAL IN SURABAYA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03151 291254Z
JUNE 26. HEAVY SECURITY AND AN ENERVATED STUDENT MOVEMENT ASSURED NO STRONG PROTEST. IN HIS ADDRESS HABIBIE LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE WOULD STAY IN THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE ALL THE WAY TO THE MPR AND RECALLED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS CHOSEN THROUGH THE MPR, NOT BY DIRECT POPULAR VOTE. THE FEW RELIGIOUS LEADERS PRESENT WERE MOSTLY GOLKAR SUPPORTERS, EVEN SO AUDIENCE REACTION WAS COOL WHEN HABIBIE SPOKE POLITICS. HABIBIE PULLED OFF THE VISIT WITHOUT SECURITY PROBLEMS, IN COMPARISON FROM THE DIFFICULT TIME HE HAD HERE LAST SEPTEMBER. IN THAT LIMITED SENSE THE VISIT COULD BE TERMED A SUCCESS. END SUMMARY

3. (SBU) PRESIDENT HABIBIE VISITED SURABAYA JUNE 26, THE PROPHET'S BIRTHDAY, TO OPEN A RELIGIOUS EXHIBITION CELEBRATING THE NINE MUSLIM SAINTS OF JAVA (WALISONGO). HE HAD LAST COME HERE IN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

SEPTEMBER 1998 WHEN HE WAS CONFRONTED BY THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS AND HAD TO EXIT THE CITY UNCEREMONIOUSLY. WITH THE THREAT OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AGAIN, THE CITY CENTER WAS UNDER HEAVY SECURITY, AUGMENTED BY GROUPS OF CITIZEN "VOLUNTEERS." GIVEN TIGHT SECURITY AND LASSITUDE WITHIN THE STUDENT MOVEMENT HERE, NO ONE MATERIALIZED, ALTHOUGH PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT A RUMP GROUP HELD A SMALL PROTEST AT A DISTANT LOCAL PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL.

4. (SBU) IN THE COURTYARD OF THE GOVERNOR'S RESIDENCE, NOT FAR FROM THE EXHIBIT HALL, 10-15,000 GATHERED TO OPEN THE FESTIVAL. HABIBIE'S DELAY (2 AND ONE HALF-HOURS), NOT OUT OF THE ORDINARY FOR HIM WE UNDERSTAND, DID NOT GO DOWN WELL. ONE LOCAL OBSERVER LATER QUIPPED THAT'S WHY EAST JAVA DIDN'T VOTE FOR HIM, THEY'RE TIRED OF WAITING.

5. (U) HABIBIE SPOKE OF THE ROLE OF THE WALISONGO IN BRINGING ISLAM TO JAVA THEN WENT INTO POLITICS. HE URGED INDONESIA TO BE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03151 291254Z

PATIENT WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS. THE JUNE ELECTION WAS FOR THE 462 DPR MEMBERS, BUT, HE RECALLED, IT WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY THE SELECTION OF ANOTHER 200 MEMBERS TO JOIN IN THE MPR. WE SHOULD ACCEPT THIS DEMOCRATIC PROCESS WITH A GOOD HEART, HABIBIE SAID. HE URGED INDONESIA TO KEEP FAITH IN THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS AS FOUND IN THE 1945 CONSTITUTION, WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT. ALTHOUGH DIRECT ELECTION WOULD BE IDEAL, UNDER THE CONSTITUTION IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE.

6. (C) COMMENT. HABIBIE'S APPEARANCE AT THIS RELIGIOUS FESTIVAL HADTHE AIR OF POLITICS. ORGANIZED BY GOLKAR FUNCTINARY FADEL MUHAMMAD, IT ATTRACTED FEW PROMINENT RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND KIAIS, MOST OF THOSE THAT DID COME HAD STRONG TIES TO GOLKAR. EVEN SO, HABIBIE'S SURABAYA AUDIENCE REACTED IMPASSIVELY OR IN SOME INSTANCES NEGATIVELY WHEN HE TOUCHED ON POLITICS. CLEARLY, HE WAS CONFIRMING HIS INTENT TO STAY ON A COURSE TO GAIN THE PRESIDENCY AND PUTTING HIS MONEY ON A WIN IN THE MPR.

7. (C) THUS, HABIBIE GOT THROUGH THE SURABAYA VISIT WITHOUT MAJOR SECURITY PROBLEMS. IN THOSE TERMS THE VISIT WAS A SUCCESS, BUT ONE THAT OWES MORE TO AN ENERVATED STUDENT MOVEMENT THAN THE PRESIDENT'S OWN STANDIG. BEYOND THAT, IT IS HARD TO SEE WHAT MORE E ACCOMPLISHED HERE. PIERCE/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTO4077 RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 117425 230056Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AIT-03	AMAD-01	A-00	CA-02	EUR-01
	UTED-00	TEDE-00	IO-00	JUSE-00	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00
	NEA-01	DCP-01	OIC-02	OIG-03	PER-01	IRM-01	SA-01
	DRL-02	SAS-00	/022R				

117425
SOURCE: KODAKC.023018
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:EMMCDEVITT:KNB -- 6/22/99 71029
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES
----------D869BF 230100Z /38
O 230055Z JUN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 117425 230056Z
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 117425

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: JUNE 22, 1999 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS - ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF - ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
UNVIE FOR FITZPATRICK
USEU FOR RUTH

-- U.S.,ROK, JAPAN TO MEET IN WASHINGTON,DC JUNE 25 (PARAS 2 AND 3)
-- DPRK: U.S.-ROK-GOJ TRILATERAL COORDINATION (PARAS 4 AND 5)
-- DPRK: POST-NAVAL INCIDENT UPDATE (PARAS 4 AND 6)
-- NORTH KOREA: UPDATE ON DETENTION OF AMERICAN CITIZEN (PARAS 4 AND 7)

-- INDONESIAN ELECTION UPDATE (PARAS 4 AND 8)
-- UN NGO COMMITTEE DE-ACCREDITATIONS (PARAS 4 AND 9)
-- SFRC ARREARS BILL: ADMINISTRATION POSITION (PARAS 4 AND 10)

2. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT BY SPOKESMAN JAMES P. RUBIN ON A MEETING OF OFFICIALS FROM THE U.S., THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND JAPAN IN WASHINGTON, DC ON JUNE 25 WAS RELEASED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 6/22/99.

3. U.S., REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND JAPANESE OFFICIALS WILL MEET IN WASHINGTON BEGINNING JUNE 25 FOR TRILATERAL CONSULTATIONS REGARDING NORTH KOREA. STATE DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR AMBASSADOR WENDY SHERMAN WILL LEAD THE U.S. DELEGATION. THE ROK DELEGATION WILL BE LED BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER JANG JAI-RYONG. FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR GENERAL RYOZO KATO WILL LEAD THE JAPANESE DELEGATION.

IN APRIL, THE U.S., ROK, AND JAPAN AGREED THAT AN EFFECTIVE POLICY TOWARD THE DPRK MUST BE A CLOSELY COORDINATED EFFORT AND ESTABLISHED A TRILATERAL COORDINATION AND OVERSIGHT GROUP (TCOG) TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION AND POLICY COORDINATION.

THE JUNE 25 MEETING IS A CONTINUATION OF THAT PROCESS AND FOLLOWS UP TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS THAT TOOK PLACE IN TOKYO AND SEOUL MAY 24 AND 29 RESPECTIVELY.

4. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 6/22/99. THERE WAS NO REGULAR PRESS BRIEFING ON THAT DAY.

POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

5. DPRK: U.S.-ROK-GOJ TRILATERAL COORDINATION

CONTEXT: IN APRIL 23-25 MEETINGS IN HONOLULU, DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY, ROK SENIOR SECRETARY LIM DONG-WON, AND JAPANESE DIRECTOR GENERAL RYOZO KATO ESTABLISHED A FORMAL MECHANISM FOR IMPLEMENTING A POSSIBLE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE DPRK . A JOINT PRESS STATEMENT WAS RELEASED APRIL 25, 1999 ANNOUNCING THE FORMATION OF THE TRILATERAL COORDINATION AND OVERSIGHT GROUP (TCOG) TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION AND NORTH KOREA POLICY COORDINATION. THE GROUP MET MAY 24 AND MAY 29 IN TOKYO AND SEOUL RESPECTIVELY IN CONJUNCTION WITH DR. PERRY'S PYONGYANG TRIP. STATE DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR, AMBASSADOR WENDY SHERMAN, WILL LEAD THE U.S. AT THE UPCOMING TCOG MEETING, SET FOR JUNE 25-6 IN WASHINGTON. THE ROK SIDE WILL BE LED BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER JANG JAI-RYONG AND THE GOJ BY DIRECTOR GENERAL RYOZO KATO. DR. PERRY, WHO IS TRAVELING PRIVATELY, WILL NOT ATTEND.

Q: WHAT MORE CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE TRILATERAL MEETING WITH THE ROK AND JAPAN YOU ARE ANNOUNCING?

A: THE JUNE 25 MEETING WILL CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO REDUCING TENSIONS AND INSTABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY MET WITH SENIOR JAPANESE AND KOREAN OFFICIALS IN HONOLULU FROM APRIL 23 TO 25 TO CONTINUE

CONSULTATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH HIS NORTH KOREA POLICY REVIEW. DR. PERRY EARLIER TRAVELED TO SEOUL AND TOKYO AS PART OF THIS PROCESS. THE THREE SIDES AGREED THAT AN EFFECTIVE POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA SHOULD BE CLOSELY COORDINATED BETWEEN THE U.S., ROK, AND JAPAN.

THE THREE SIDES AGREED TO ESTABLISH A TRILATERAL COORDINATION AND OVERSIGHT GROUP (TCOG) TO INSTITUTIONALIZE COORDINATION ON NORTH KOREA POLICY ISSUES AND HAVE MET SINCE IN TOKYO AND SEOUL MAY 24 AND 29 RESPECTIVELY.

Q.: WHAT IS THE RELATION TO THE PERRY REVIEW? WILL PERRY ATTEND?

A: FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE POLICY REVIEW, THE PERRY TEAM HAS CLOSELY CONSULTED WITH OUR ROK AND GOJ ALLIES. THIS TRILATERAL CONSULTATION IS CONTINUING THAT VALUABLE DIALOGUE. OBVIOUSLY, ANY SUCCESSFUL POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA MUST BE A CLOSELY COORDINATED JOINT EFFORT OF THE U.S., ROK AND GOJ.

DR. PERRY IS TRAVELING AND WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ATTEND.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE ROK-DPRK NAVAL CONFRONTATIONS ON PERRY'S PROPOSALS? ARE THEY IN DEEP TROUBLE ALREADY AS A RESULT OF THE SEA INCIDENT? IS HE PROPOSING A PLAN THAT WOULD LIFT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS GRADUALLY IN RETURN FOR COMMITMENTS FROM NORTH KOREA TO STOP TESTING MISSILES AND SELLING MISSILE TECHNOLOGY, AND TO EXPAND A FREEZE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT?

A: DR. PERRY HAS NOT COMPLETED THE REVIEW. DR. PERRY HAS INDICATED THAT HIS THINKING HAS INCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR EXPANSION IN OUR RELATIONS AND COOPERATION, AS PART OF A PROCESS IN WHICH U.S. AND ALLIED CONCERNS ABOUT MISSILE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS ARE ADDRESSED. I WILL NOT SPECULATE, HOWEVER, ON WHAT DR. PERRY'S REVIEW WILL ULTIMATELY INCLUDE OR WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS HE MAY

MAKE. CLEARLY, SUCH INCIDENTS DO NOT HELP. BUT DR. PERRY'S REVIEW IS GOING FORWARD AND IS MOVING TOWARD COMPLETION.

Q.: IS THE PERRY REVIEW COMPLETE? IF NOT, WHEN WILL IT BE?

A: I CAN ONLY NOTE THAT DR. PERRY'S THOROUGH REVIEW IS STILL UNDERWAY. HE HAS SAID HIMSELF THAT HE HAS NOT FORMED ANY CONCLUSIONS OR MADE ANY RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT.

Q.: IS THIS MEETING A RESULT OF THE "CRISIS" ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA CREATED BY THE NAVAL INCIDENTS THERE?

A: WHILE THE THREE PARTIES WILL REVIEW THE PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THE TALKS ARE NOT INTENDED TO SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS ANY CURRENT

SITUATION. AS OUR ANNOUNCEMENT STATES, THE TALKS ARE AIMED AT CONTINUING THE CLOSE POLICY COORDINATION AMONG THE PARTIES.

6. DPRK: POST-NAVAL INCIDENT UPDATE

CONTEXT: ONE WEEK AFTER NAVAL HOSTILITIES AT THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE (NLL), FOCUS HAS SHIFTED FROM THOSE WATERS TO TALKS AT PANMUNJOM AND BEIJING. NO DPRK NAVAL CRAFT HAVE CROSSED THE NLL SINCE THE JUNE 15 FIREFIGHT, ALTHOUGH OFFICIAL DPRK MEDIA HAVE ACCUSED THE ROK OF TRANSGRESSING ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS. KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY (KPA) GENERALS ATTENDED GENERAL OFFICERS' TALKS HOSTED BY THE UN COMMAND (UNC) JUNE 22 IN PANMUNJOM. IN ADDITION TO THE NAVAL INCIDENTS, MIA REMAINS REPATRIATION PROCEDURES WERE RAISED BY THE UNC AT THE TALKS. (IT REMAINS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE MIA REMAINS ISSUE IS CONNECTED TO THE NAVAL INCIDENT IN THE MINDS OF DPRK OFFICIALS.) WHILE NO PROGRESS WAS MADE ON EITHER ISSUE, AND WHILE ANOTHER MEETING IS YET TO BE AGREED TO BY THE DPRK, THE TALKS WERE "FRANK, OPEN, AND USEFUL," ACCORDING TO THE U.N. COMMAND SPOKESMAN.

MEANWHILE, THE POSTPONED BILATERAL MEETING OF DPRK AND ROK VICE MINISTERS IN BEIJING CONVENED JUNE 22. ACCORDING TO ROK OFFICIALS, NO PROGRESS ON THE OFFICIAL AGENDA OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION ISSUES NOR ON THE AD HOC NLL ISSUE WAS MADE, BUT ANOTHER DAY'S TALKS MAY BE SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 23. U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY AMBASSADOR CHARLES KARTMAN ARRIVED IN BEIJING AND IS PREPARING TO MEET WITH DPRK VICE

FOREIGN MINISTER KIM GYE GWAN JUNE 23 AS A FOLLOW UP TO THE KUMCHANG-NI SITE VISIT.

FINALLY, A SOUTH KOREAN TOURIST WAS DETAINED AT THE PORT

WHERE THE MT. KUMGANG TOUR SHIP DOCKS. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE WOMAN TOLD A NORTH KOREAN THAT DEFECTORS ARE WELL TREATED IN THE SOUTH. THE ROKG AND HYUNDAI, WHICH RUNS THE TOURS, ARE WORKING TO OBTAIN THE WOMAN'S RELEASE AND THE ROKG HAS THREATENED SUSPENSION OF FUTURE TOURS. (SEE SEPARATE CA GUIDANCE ON THE REPORTS OF A DETAINED AMERICAN CITIZEN IN RAJIN, NORTH KOREA.)

Q.: WHAT ABOUT THE POSTPONED DPRK-ROK VICE-MINISTERIAL

TALKS IN BEIJING? ANY REACTION?

A.: WE WARMLY WELCOME THE RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH ON JUNE 22. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG'S POLICY OF ENGAGING THE NORTH IN DIRECT DIALOGUE. AS WE HAVE OBSERVED MANY TIMES IN THE PAST, DIALOGUE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA IS KEY TO ACHIEVING PROGRESS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOUTH AND NORTH AGREED TO REMAIN IN CONTACT ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER MEETINGS. I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE ROK FOR AN UPDATE ON THE STATUS OF THOSE TALKS.

Q.: WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THE DETENTION OF A SOUTH KOREAN TOURIST BY THE DPRK AT MT. KUMGANG?

A.: WE HOPE THIS MATTER WILL BE RESOLVED QUICKLY AND SMOOTHLY. I'D REFER YOU TO THE ROK FOR FURTHER INFORMATION.

Q.: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF UN COMMAND GENERAL OFFICER

TALKS?

A.: KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY (KPA) GENERALS ATTENDED GENERAL OFFICERS' TALKS HOSTED BY THE UN COMMAND JUNE 22 IN PANMUNJOM. THE TALKS RECESSED , AND THE UN COMMAND HAS DESCRIBED THE TALKS AS, "FRANK, OPEN, AND USEFUL." THE UN COMMAND HAS INVITED THE DPRK TO ATTEND ANOTHER MEETING AND A REPLY FROM PYONGYANG IS PENDING.

WE WELCOME THE DPRK'S PARTICIPATION IN THE DISCUSSIONS, WHICH ARE AIMED AT RESOLVING THE YELLOW SEA SITUATION PEACEFULLY AND PREVENTING RECURRENCES.

WE HOPE THE TALKS SUCCEED IN FINDING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION THAT WILL PREVENT FUTURE INCIDENTS. I'D REFER YOU TO THE UN COMMAND IN SEOUL FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON THE TALKS.

Q.: WHAT IS THE SITUATION TODAY AT THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE?

A: THERE HAVE BEEN NO FURTHER INCIDENTS SINCE THE JUNE 15 CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ROK AND DPRK NAVAL VESSELS. NO CROSSINGS OF THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE BY DPRK WARSHIPS HAVE BEEN NOTED SINCE THE INCIDENT.

SHIPS FROM BOTH THE ROK AND DPRK REMAIN IN THE AREA.

Q.: WHAT ABOUT REPORTS IN NORTH KOREA'S OFFICIAL MEDIA OF ROK SHIPS MOVING INTO DPRK WATERS? IS THIS AN INDICATION THAT TENSIONS ARE INCREASING?

WE NOTE THAT THE ROK HAS DENIED THESE CLAIMS. I WILL REFER YOU TO THE ROK FOR FURTHER COMMENT.

THE ALERT STATUS OF OUR FORCES IS UNCHANGED. THEY REMAIN IN THEIR NORMAL STATE OF READINESS.

WE CONTINUE TO WORK HARD WITH OUR ROK ALLY TO SEEK WAYS TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION PEACEFULLY.

I UNDERSTAND THE PENTAGON HAS FURTHER INFORMATION ON OUR FORCES. I WOULD REFER YOU THERE FOR DETAILS ABOUT THEIR STATE AND READINESS.

Q.: CAN YOU COMMENT ON THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE MIA REMAINS RETURN CEREMONY SCHEDULED AT PANMUNJOM? IS THE DPRK REACTING TO THE NAVAL INCIDENT?

A.: PAST U.S.-DPRK COOPERATION IN THIS AREA HAS BEEN GENERALLY VERY GOOD, AND WE CERTAINLY HOPE THAT THIS PURELY HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM CONTINUES TO MOVE FORWARD. I UNDERSTAND THE RETURN OF REMAINS ISSUE WAS RAISED BY THE U.N. COMMAND AT THE JUNE 22 GENERAL OFFICERS' TALKS. THE DELAY IN REPATRIATION APPEARS TO BE UNRELATED TO THE RECENT INCIDENT. I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE PENTAGON FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON THIS AND ON THE JOINT RECOVERY OPERATION IN THE DPRK.

Q.: HOW DO YOU ASSESS DPRK MOTIVES BEHIND THE RECENT INCIDENT? ARE THEY PROVOKING A CONFRONTATION?

A: I WON'T ENGAGE IN SPECULATION ABOUT MOTIVES.

ALONG WITH OUR ROK ALLIES, WE WILL WORK TO ENSURE THAT TENSIONS ARE NOT INCREASED AND THAT TENSIONS ARE EVENTUALLY REDUCED.

7. NORTH KOREA: UPDATE ON DETENTION OF U.S. CITIZEN

CONTEXT: A JUNE 22 ARTICLE IN THE SOUTH KOREAN PRESS REPORTS THAT A KOREAN-BORN U.S. CITIZEN WAS DETAINED BY NORTH KOREAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES ON THE MORNING OF JUNE 17 IN THE CITY OF NAJIN, NORTH KOREA. THE ARTICLE NAMES THE AMERICAN AS 52 YEAR-OLD BUSINESSWOMAN, KAREN HAN AND MENTIONS THAT SHE IS THE PRESIDENT OF A COMPANY THAT HANDLES NORTH KOREAN CLOTHING IN BEIJING. THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BEIJING HAS RECEIVED CONFLICTING INFORMATION ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING HER DETENTION.

OUR EMBASSY IN BEIJING HAS ALERTED THE EMBASSY OF SWEDEN, OUR PROTECTING POWER IN NORTH KOREA, OF THE POSSIBLE DETENTION OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN. SWEDISH AUTHORITIES ARE LOOKING INTO THE MATTER AND IF SHE IS, IN FACT, DETAINED, WILL REQUEST IMMEDIATE CONSULAR ACCESS UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS AND BILATERAL CONSULAR AGREEMENTS.

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY UPDATED INFORMATION ABOUT THE DETENTION OF AN U.S. CITIZEN BY NORTH KOREAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS?

A: WE ARE AWARE OF REPORTS THAT AN AMERICAN CITIZEN MAY HAVE BEEN DETAINED ON JUNE 17TH IN NORTH KOREA.

WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH SWEDISH AUTHORITIES, WHO ARE THE U.S. PROTECTING POWER IN NORTH KOREA, TO FOLLOW UP ON THOSE REPORTS. IF WE CONFIRM AN AMERICAN IS BEING DETAINED WE WILL REQUEST CONSULAR ACCESS UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS AND THE INTERIM CONSULAR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

UNTIL SUCH TIME AS WE CONFIRM THE DETENTION OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN AND OBTAIN A PRIVACY ACT RELEASE FROM THE INDIVIDUAL, WE WILL BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

8. INDONESIAN ELECTION UPDATE

CONTEXT: THE VOTE COUNTING PROCESS CONTINUES TWO WEEKS AFTER THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA. BY LATE TUESDAY IN JAKARTA, SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 78 PERCENT OF THE ESTIMATED 100 MILLION BALLOTS HAD BEEN REPORTED IN THE "UNOFFICIAL" COUNT. THE PROCESS IS COMPLICATED, ENTAILING HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS AT POLLING STATIONS BEFORE THEY ARE CONSOLIDATED AT (SEQUENTIALLY) THE SUB-DISTRICT,

DISTRICT, AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS. THE INDONESIAN ELECTION COMMISSION HAD EXPECTED TO ANNOUNCE EARLY OFFICIAL RESULTS IN LATE JUNE, BUT IS NOW REVERTING TO THE ORIGINAL TIMETABLE THAT CALLS FOR ELECTION RESULTS TO BE ANNOUNCED DURING THE JULY 3-12 TIMEFRAME.

WHILE SLOWNESS OF THE UNOFFICIAL COUNT IS FRUSTRATING, REPORTS FROM THE FIELD SUGGEST INEXPERIENCE AT THE VILLAGE

LEVEL AND PLODDING THOROUGHNESS IS TO BLAME FOR PART OF THE PROBLEM. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, OF MASS DISCONTENT, IN PART BECAUSE PERCENTAGES OF THE REPORTED VOTE STILL SHOW OPPOSITION PARTIES WELL IN THE LEAD OVER THE GOLKAR PARTY. REPORTS OF POSSIBLE IRREGULARITIES ARE BEING INVESTIGATED THROUGH APPROPRIATE ELECTION COMMISSION CHANNELS.

NO SINGLE PARTY IS EXPECTED TO GAIN A CLEAR MAJORITY OF VOTES CAST, ALTHOUGH THE PARTY LED BY MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI, THE PDI-P, IS EXPECTED TO RECORD THE LARGEST PLURALITY. 462 REPRESENTATIVES TO THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT WILL BE CHOSEN FROM PARTY LISTS ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS. THESE 462 PARLIAMENTARIANS PLUS 38 APPOINTED MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY WILL HAVE FIVE-YEAR TERMS IN THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT, OR DPR. THE 500 DPR MEMBERS PLUS 200 OTHERS REPRESENTING SOCIETAL GROUPS AND REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS WILL FORM THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR.) THE MPR WILL MEET LATER THIS YEAR TO SELECT INDONESIA'S NEXT PRESIDENT.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON THE ELECTIONS. WILL REFORMERS BE DISAPPOINTED IN THE OUTCOME OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION AND THE SELECTION OF THE NEXT PRESIDENT?

A: ROUGHLY 78 PERCENT OF THE VOTES HAVE BEEN COUNTED. THE ELECTION COMMISSION HAS ANNOUNCED IT WILL RELEASE THE FINAL RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL ELECTION BY MID-JULY.

THE PRELIMINARY TRENDS SUGGEST THAT MEGAWATI'S PDI-P PARTY

COULD WIN THE LARGEST PLURALITY OF THE VOTE, BUT NO SINGLE PARTY IS EXPECTED TO GAIN A MAJORITY IN THE PARLIAMENT.

AS WE HAVE NOTED ALL ALONG, THIS ELECTION IS ONLY ONE STEP IN THE PROCESS OF SELECTING A NEW PRESIDENT AND

ESTABLISHING A CREDIBLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN INDONESIA. THE MAKE-UP OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (OR MPR), WHOSE MEMBERS WILL CHOOSE THE NEXT PRESIDENT, WILL NOT BE KNOWN FOR SEVERAL MORE WEEKS. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SPECULATE ON THE ELECTION'S ULTIMATE OUTCOME, WHOM THE MPR WILL CHOOSE AS PRESIDENT, AND WHAT CREDENTIALS THAT PRESIDENT WILL HAVE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR NEW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING A FREE PRESS, WILL ENSURE THAT THE PROCESS CONTINUES TO BE TRANSPARENT AND FAIR.

(IF ASKED)

Q: WHAT WOULD BE THE U.S. REACTION IF MEGAWATI'S PDI-P PARTY WERE TO GAIN A PLURALITY OF THE VOTES, OR IF PRESIDENT HABIBIE WERE RETURNED TO OFFICE?

THE U.S. DOES NOT SUPPORT ANY INDIVIDUAL OR PARTY. OUR INTEREST IS IN SEEING CREDIBLE ELECTION RESULTS THAT REFLECT THE WISHES OF THE INDONESIAN VOTERS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGES FROM THESE ELECTIONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT SELECTION OF A PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT LATER THIS YEAR.

(IF ASKED)

Q: WHAT ARE THE FACTS CONCERNING A REPORT THAT INDONESIA'S ELECTION PANEL HAS POSTPONED RELEASE OF FINAL VOTING RESULTS UNTIL POSSIBLY AS LATE AS MID-JULY?

THE INDONESIAN ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) HAD HOPED TO ANNOUNCE OFFICIAL EARLY RESULTS BY JUNE 21, BUT HAS NOW STATED THAT THOSE RESULTS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL JULY 8. THIS DATE IS IN LINE WITH THE ORIGINAL TIMETABLE WRITTEN INTO THE ELECTION LAWS PASSED LAST JANUARY, WHICH CALLED FOR RELEASE OF RESULTS FOR THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT DURING THE JULY 3-12 TIMEFRAME.

(IF ASKED)

Q: IS THE U.S. CONCERNED THAT THE SLOW PACE OF THE VOTE COUNT IS A SIGN OF POSSIBLE CHEATING?

WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF PROBLEMS IN SOME AREAS, WE DO NOT AT THIS POINT HAVE ANY INDICATION THAT THE

SLOWNESS OF THE INITIAL VOTE COUNT REFLECTS WIDESPREAD

EFFORTS TO MANIPULATE THE RESULTS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT PART OF THE SLOWNESS IN COUNTING AND COLLATING THE VOTES IS DUE TO THE INEXPERIENCE OF ELECTION OFFICIALS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL AND A DESIRE TO BE AS THOROUGH AND ACCURATE AS POSSIBLE. AS INTERNATIONAL MONITORS HAVE NOTED, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE AUTHORITIES RESOLVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT IRREGULARITIES FAIRLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

9. UN NGO COMMITTEE DE-ACCREDITATIONS

CONTEXT: ON THURSDAY, JUNE 17 THE UN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC) NONGOVERNMENTAL (NGO) COMMITTEE VOTED TO RECOMMEND ECOSOC WITHDRAW AND ACCREDITATION OF THE CHRISTIAN SOLIDARITY INTERNATIONAL (CSI). SUDAN ACCUSED CSI OF VIOLATING UN RULES BY ACCREDITING JOHN GARANG, CHAIRMAN OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY, AS A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 555 UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING. THE U.S. DELEGATION RAISED NUMEROUS OBJECTIONS AND CALLED FOR NUMEROUS VOTES. THE FINAL VOTE WAS 12 YES-1 NO (U.S.) WITH FRANCE, CHILE, IRELAND, AND ROMANIA ABSTAINING. IN A PREVIOUS ACTION THE COMMITTEE VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY TO REFUSE ACCREDITATION TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, A GROUP IN NEW YORK THAT MONITORS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CHINA. ONLY THE U.S. AND FRANCE VOTED IN FAVOR.

Q: WHAT ARE THE FACTS ON REPORTS THAT THE UN COMMITTEE FOR NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS HAS INFLICTED MAJOR SETBACKS ON HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS THAT SEEK TO EXPOSE POLITICAL OPPRESSION?

THE PARTICIPATION OF NONGOVERMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.N. HAS A LONG AND AUGUST HISTORY. IT GOES BACK TO ARTICLE 71 OF THE CHARTER.

LAST THURSDAY, THE U.S.'S NGO COMMITTEE VOTED TO RECOMMEND THAT THE ECOSOC WITHDRAW CHRISTIAN SOLIDARITY INTERNATIONAL'S ACCREDITATION.

THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT THIS ACTION VIOLATED THE RELEVANT U.N. RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND ECOSOC RESOLUTION 1996/31.

FURTHER, THE U.S. DELEGATION VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED THIS ACTION IN THE NGO COMMITTEE MEETINGS.

THE NGO COMMITTEE INCLUDES MANY UN MEMBER STATES WHO ARE NOT FRIENDS OF CIVIL SOCIETY. THE FINAL VOTES WERE 12

YES-1 NO (U.S.) WITH FRANCE, CHILE, IRELAND,AND ROMANIA ABSTAINING.

IN THE CASE OF "HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA" THE U.S. AGAIN VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED THE DENIAL OF ACCREDITATION BY THE NGO COMMITTEE. WE CALLED FOR A VOTE BUT ONLY FRANCE AND IRELAND SUPPORTED US.

WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT.

10. SFRC ARREARS BILL: ADMINISTRATION POSITION

CONTEXT: THE AP REPORTS THAT THE SENATE IS EXPECTED TO AUTHORIZE PAYMENT OF $819 MILLION IN U.S. ARREARS TO THE UN OVER A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS AND FORGIVE $107 MILLION THAT THE UN OWES THE U.S., IN RETURN FOR CUTTING THE U.S. SHARE OF THE UN BUDGET FROM 25 TO 20 PERCENT, AND DROPPING THE SHARE OF PEACEKEEPING FROM 31 TO 25 PERCENT.

MORE ACCURATELY, THE $819 MILLION CONTAINED IN THE SFRC-APPROVED BILL WOULD AUTHORIZE PAYMENT TO THE UN AND ABOUT 40 OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH THE U.S. OWES ARREARS. THREE "TRANCHES" OF PAYMENTS WOULD BE

AUTHORIZED; THE PAYMENTS ARE NOT LINKED TO SPECIFIC YEARS, BUT RATHER TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THREE SETS OF SPECIFIC REFORM BENCHMARKS. A KEY BENCHMARK IN LAST YEAR'S ARREARS LEGISLATION-REQUIRING THE U.S. ASSESSMENT RATE IN THE UN TO DROP TO 20 PERCENT-COULD BE WAIVED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW BILL. MOST OF THE FUNDING WHICH WE PLAN TO PAY TO THE UN WOULD BE LINKED TO A LOWERING OF THE U.S. ASSESSMENT RATE TO 22 PERCENT.

Q: WHAT IS THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION ON THE ARREARS PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE BILL APPROVED BY THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE PASSED SHORTLY BY THE FULL SENATE?

A: THE ADMINISTRATION IS COMMITTED TO PAYMENT OF U.S. ARREARS AND TO REFORM OF THE UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

AND WE APPRECIATE THE EFFORTS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN

RELATIONS COMMITTEE IN WORKING TO RESOLVE THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

THE ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTS THE COMMITTEE'S PROPOSAL, AND IS ANXIOUS TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE ARREARS ISSUE.
ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO6920

PAGE 01 STATE 115010 190125Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AIT-03	AMAD-01	A-00	WHA-01	EUR-01
	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	IO-00	JUSE-00	L-01	ADS-00
	NEA-01	DCP-01	OIC-02	OIG-03	IRM-01	SA-01	PRM-01
	DRL-02	SAS-00	/022R				

115010
SOURCE: KODAKC.019028
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:EMMCDEVITT:KNB -- 6/18/99 71029
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES
----------D7175F 190130Z /38
O 190124Z JUN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 115010 190125Z
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

UNCLAS STATE 115010

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: JUNE 18, 1999 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS - ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF - ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
UNVIE FOR FITZPATRICK
USEU FOR RUTH

1. INDEX:
-- U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY CHARLES KARTMAN TO MEET DPRK OFFICIALS IN BEIJING JUNE 23 (PARAS 2-5)

-- DPRK: NAVAL INCIDENT UPDATE (PARAS 4 AND 6)
-- CHINA: PICKERING DELEGATION ON BOMBING INCIDENT (PARAS 4 AND 7)
-- CHINA: WORLD BANK POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROJECT (PARAS 4 AND 8)
-- HONG KONG: COX COMMITTEE REPORT AND S&T COOPERATION (PARAS 4 AND 9)
-- INDONESIAN ELECTION UPDATE (PARAS 4 AND 10)
-- PHILIPPINES: JIMENEZ CASE (PARAS 4 AND 11)
-- U.S.-VIETNAM RELATIONS (PARAS 4 AND 12)

-- CHILD LABOR CONVENTION (PARAS 4 AND 13)

2. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT BY ACTING SPOKESMAN JEFFREY C. MURRAY ON U.S SPECIAL ENVOY KARTMAN'S JUNE 23 MEETING WITH DPRK OFFICIALS IN BEIJING WAS RELEASED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 6/18/99.

3. U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE KOREAN PEACE TALKS, AMBASSADOR CHARLES KARTMAN, WILL LEAD A DELEGATION OF U.S. OFFICIALS TO MEET WITH DPRK COUNTERPARTS IN BEIJING JUNE 23. AMBASSADOR KARTMAN WILL MEET DPRK VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KIM GYE GWAN TO DISCUSS RESULTS OF THE U.S. VISIT TO KUMCHANG-NI, THE UPCOMING FOUR PARTY TALKS, AND AGREED FRAMEWORK ISSUES.

A U.S. TEAM VISITED THE KUMCHANG-NI SUSPECT UNDERGROUND CONSTRUCTION SITE MAY 20 TO MAY 24. THE TEAM FOUND AN UNFINISHED SITE, THE UNDERGROUND PORTION OF WHICH WAS AN EXTENSIVE, EMPTY TUNNEL COMPLEX. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

UNCLASSIFIED

AGREEMENT REACHED WITH THE DPRK IN MARCH, ANOTHER VISIT TO THE SITE WILL TAKE PLACE IN MAY 2000.

THE SIXTH ROUND OF THE FOUR PARTY TALKS IS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA IN EARLY AUGUST.

4. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 06/18/99. THERE WAS NO REGULAR PRESS BRIEFING ON THAT DAY. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

5. DPRK: KARTMAN VISIT TO BEIJING JUNE 23

CONTEXT: AFTER THE VISIT BY A U.S TEAM TO THE KUMCHANG-NI UNDERGROUND CONSTRUCTION SITE MAY 20 TO 24, A THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF THE TEAM'S OBSERVATIONS WAS CONDUCTED. BY PRIOR AGREEMENT WITH THE DPRK, AMBASSADOR KARTMAN WILL APPRISE DPRK OFFICIALS OF THE RESULTS. THE MEETING IN BEIJING, PLANNED BEFORE THE ROK-DPRK NAVAL CONFRONTATION INCIDENTS, WAS SUGGESTED BY THE DPRK AS A MATTER OF CONVENIENCE. AMBASSADOR KARTMAN HAS ALREADY BRIEFED CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS AS WELL AS OUR ROK AND GOJ ALLIES. THE NEXT VISIT TO THE KUMCHANG-NI SITE, PER THE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED IN MARCH, WILL BE IN MAY 2000.

THE PRC WILL CHAIR THE SIXTH ROUND OF THE FOUR PARTY TALKS, PER THE AGREED ROTATION. THE TALKS ARE SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA IN EARLY AUGUST. AMB. KARTMAN

PLANS TO MEET WITH HIS CHINESE COUNTERPART, AMB. QIAN YONGNIAN, TO CONFER ON FOUR PARTY MATTERS BILATERALLY

UNCLASSIFIED

WHILE HE IS IN BEIJING.

SEPARATELY, THE DPRK HAD AGREED TO MEET WITH ROK OFFICALS AT THE VICE- MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN BEIJING JUNE 21. THE NAVAL INCIDENTS OF THE PAST TWELVE DAYS HAVE THUS FAR NOT AFFECTED DPRK PLANS TO ATTEND EITHER MEETING.

Q: WHY IS AMBASSADOR KARTMAN MEETING WITH THE DPRK AT THIS TIME? IS IT RELATED TO THE NAVAL INCIDENTS BETWEEN THE ROK AND DPRK?

A: THESE U.S.-DPRK BILATERAL TALKS WERE PLANNED PRIOR TO THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE ROK AND DPRK.

BY PRIOR AGREEMENT WITH THE DPRK, AMBASSADOR KARTMAN WILL APPRISE DPRK OFFICIALS OF THE RESULTS OF THE KUMCHANG-NI VISIT. AS YOU RECALL, AFTER THE VISIT BY A U.S. TEAM TO THE KUMCHANG-NI CONSTRUCTION SITE MAY 20 TO 24, A THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF THE TEAM'S OBSERVATIONS WAS CONDUCTED.

BEIJING WAS PROPOSED AS THE SITE FOR THE MEETING BY THE DPRK AS A MATTER OF CONVENIENCE.

AMBASSADOR KARTMAN HAS ALREADY BRIEFED CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS. OUR ROK AND JAPANESE ALLIES HAVE ALSO BEEN BRIEFED.

THE NEXT VISIT TO THE KUMCHANG-NI SITE, PER THE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED IN MARCH, WILL BE IN MAY 2000.

IN ADDITION TO THE SITE VISIT, AMBASSADOR KARTMAN WILL DISCUSS ISSUES RELATED TO THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AND TO THE UPCOMING FOUR PARTY TALKS, SCHEDULED FOR EARLY AUGUST IN GENEVA.

(IF ASKED):

AMBASSADOR KARTMAN EXPECTS TO MEET WITH HIS PRC COUNTERPART IN THE FOUR PARTY TALKS, AMBASSADOR QIAN YONGNIAN. THE PRC WILL CHAIR THE NEXT ROUND.

Q: IS THE DPRK IN VIOLATION OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK?

A: THE U.S. TEAM REPORTED THAT THE UNDERGROUND SITE AT KUMCHANG-NI IS AN EXTENSIVE, EMPTY TUNNEL COMPLEX. THE

FULLER TECHNICAL ANALYSIS WAS CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE AS BEST WE CAN WHAT THE SITE MIGHT HAVE BEEN INTENDED FOR. WHILE SUSPICIONS REMAIN, AT PRESENT THERE IS STILL NOTHING THAT LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE IS A VIOLATION OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK. WE EXPECT TO HAVE A PRESS STATEMENT ON THE U.S. ASSESSMENT IN A FEW DAYS.

Q: WHY DO YOU NEED TO GO BACK TO THE SITE NEXT YEAR IF YOU HAVE FOUND NOTHING?

A: AS YOU WILL RECALL, WE SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED FOR MULTIPLE ACCESS TO THE SITE. IT WAS PRECISELY IN ANTICIPATION OF AN OUTCOME SUCH AS THIS ONE THAT WE WANTED

TO ENSURE FUTURE VISITS SO THAT WE COULD FULLY REMOVE OUR SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE INTENDED USE OF THE SITE. SO WE WILL

RETURN NEXT MAY FOR ANOTHER VISIT PER OUR AGREEMENT WITH THE DPRK AND FOR SUBSEQUENT VISITS TO REMOVE FULLY OUR SUSPICIONS.

Q: WILL AMB. KARTMAN DISCUSS THE PERRY REVIEW?

A: WE EXPECT THE DISCUSSIONS TO BE FOCUSED ON THE SUBJECTS I'VE OUTLINED. HOWEVER, SHOULD THE DPRK RAISE THIS MATTER, CERTAINLY AMB. KARTMAN WILL BE PREPARED TO RESPOND.

6. DPRK: NAVAL INCIDENT UPDATE

CONTEXT: CALM CONTINUES AT THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE (NLL) FOR THE THIRD DAY AFTER THE JUNE 15 FIREFIGHT. NO DPRK NAVAL CRAFT HAVE CROSSED THE NLL SINCE THAT INCIDENT. TODAY, JUNE 18, DPRK STAFF LEVEL MILITARY OFFICERS ATTENDED UN COMMAND TALKS, NOT TECHNICALLY GENERAL OFFICERS TALKS, AFTER AN INCONCLUSIVE OPENING MEETING JUNE 15. THE MEETING WAS CONDUCTED IN A PROBLEM SOLVING ATMOSPHERE. (AN MIA REMAINS REPATRIATION CEREMONY AT PANMUNJOM WAS AGAIN POSTPONED, BUT THE UN COMMAND ADVISES THE POSTPONEMENT WAS UNCONNECTED TO THE NAVAL INCIDENT. THE UN COMMAND DID, HOWEVER, ISSUE A PRESS STATEMENT DENOUNCING THE NORTH FOR ITS "INSENSITIVITY TO THE FAMILIES" OF THE MIA'S WHEN DPRK MILITARY PERSONNEL FAILED TO APPEAR. THE DATE FOR THE CEREMONY IS NOW BEING DISCUSSED BY DPRK OFFICIALS AND DPMO STAFF, ACCORDING TO DOD.)

EVEN THOUGH PRESS REPORTS INDICATE A DPRK DECISION TO

RESTRICT CONTACTS WITH THE ROK "IN PYONGYANG," EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THE NAVAL INCIDENTS HAVE HAD MINIMUM DIPLOMATIC

IMPACT: EMBASSY SEOUL REPORTS INDICATIONS OF DPRK INTENTIONS TO ATTEND THE BILATERAL VICE-MINISTERIAL MEETING SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 21 WITH THE ROK IN BEIJING. PREPARATIONS ARE WELL UNDER WAY FOR U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY AMBASSADOR CHARLES KARTMAN TO MEET WITH DPRK VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KIM GYE GWAN NEXT WEEK IN BEIJING AS A FOLLOW UP TO THE KUMCHANG-NI SITE VISIT. THERE ARE STILL NO INDICATIONS CONCERNING DPRK CHANGES IN PLANS TO ATTEND

THAT MEETING.

Q: WHAT IS THE SITUATION TODAY AT THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE?

A: THERE HAVE BEEN NO FURTHER INCIDENTS SINCE THE JUNE 15 CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ROK AND DPRK NAVAL VESSELS. NO CROSSINGS OF THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE BY DPRK WARSHIPS HAVE BEEN NOTED SINCE THE INCIDENT.

SHIPS FROM BOTH THE ROK AND DPRK REMAIN IN THE AREA.

Q: WHAT ABOUT REPORTS OF MORE U.S. FORCES MOVING TO THE AREA? IS THIS AN INDICATION THAT TENSIONS ARE INCREASING?

THE ALERT STATUS OF OUR FORCES IS UNCHANGED. THEY REMAIN IN THEIR NORMAL STATE OF READINESS.

I WOULD NOT INTERPRET REPORTS OF U.S. FORCE MOVEMENTS AS ANYTHING MORE THAN THE MOST MINIMUM MEASURES TO MAINTAIN

VIGILANCE. WE CONTINUE TO WORK HARD WITH OUR ROK ALLY TO SEEK WAYS TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION PEACEFULLY.

THE MOVEMENT OF THE FORCES YOU DESCRIBE IS PART OF ROUTINE ROTATIONS.

I UNDERSTAND THE PENTAGON HAS FURTHER INFORMATION. I WOULD REFER YOU THERE FOR DETAILS ABOUT THE STATE AND READINESS OF OUR FORCES.

Q: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF UN COMMAND GENERAL OFFICER TALKS?

A: DPRK STAFF LEVEL MILITARY OFFICERS ATTENDED TALKS WITH THE UN COMMAND JUNE 18. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE MEETING WAS CONDUCTED IN A PROBLEM SOLVING ATMOSPHERE. ANOTHER MEETING IS BEING PLANNED THROUGH A LONG-ESTABLISHED UN COMMAND-DPRK CHANNEL, BUT THE DATE HAS NOT BEEN SET.

WE WELCOME THE DPRK'S PARTICIPATION IN THE DISCUSSIONS, WHICH ARE AIMED AT RESOLVING THE SITUATION PEACEFULLY AND PREVENTING RECURRENCES.

I'D REFER YOU TO THE UN COMMAND IN SEOUL FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON THE TALKS.

Q: CAN YOU COMMENT ON THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE MIA REMAINS

RETURN CEREMONY SCHEDULED TODAY AT PANMUNJOM? IS THE DPRK REACTING TO THE NAVAL INCIDENT?

A: U.S.-DPRK COOPERATION IN THIS AREA HAS BEEN GENERALLY

VERY GOOD IN THE PAST, AND WE CERTAINLY HOPE THAT THIS PURELY HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM CONTINUES TO MOVE FORWARD. I UNDERSTAND A PROPOSAL OF A DATE FOR THE RETURN OF REMAINS IS BEING DISCUSSED BETWEEN U.N. COMMAND AND DPRK COUNTERPARTS. THE DELAY IN REPATRIATION APPEARS TO BE UNRELATED TO THE RECENT INCIDENT. I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE PENTAGON FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON THIS AND ON THE JOINT RECOVERY OPERATION IN THE DPRK.

Q: HOW DO YOU ASSESS DPRK MOTIVES BEHIND THE RECENT INCIDENT? ARE THEY PROVOKING A CONFRONTATION?

A: I WON'T ENGAGE IN SPECULATION ABOUT MOTIVES.

ALONG WITH OUR ROK ALLIES, WE WILL WORK TO ENSURE THAT TENSIONS ARE NOT INCREASED AND THAT TENSIONS ARE EVENTUALLY REDUCED.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE IMPACT ON PERRY'S PROPOSALS? ARE THEY IN DEEP TROUBLE ALREADY AS A RESULT OF THE SEA INCIDENT? IS HE PROPOSING A PLAN THAT WOULD LIFT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS GRADUALLY IN RETURN FOR COMMITMENTS FROM NORTH KOREA TO STOP TESTING MISSILES AND SELLING MISSILE TECHNOLOGY, AND TO EXPAND A FREEZE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT?

A: DR. PERRY HAS NOT COMPLETED THE REVIEW. DR. PERRY HAS INDICATED THAT HIS THINKING HAS INCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR EXPANSION IN OUR RELATIONS AND COOPERATION, AS PART OF A PROCESS IN WHICH U.S. AND ALLIED CONCERNS ABOUT MISSILE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS ARE ADDRESSED. I WILL NOT SPECULATE, HOWEVER, ON WHAT DR.

PERRY'S REVIEW WILL ULTIMATELY INCLUDE OR WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS HE MAY MAKE. CLEARLY, SUCH INCIDENTS DO NOT HELP. BUT I CERTAINLY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT DR. PERRY'S REVIEW IS "IN TROUBLE" BECAUSE OF THEM.

Q: WHAT IS THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE (NLL)? IS IT IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS?

A: THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE WAS -AND STILL IS-DEMARCATED

BY THE UN COMMAND TO SERVE AS A PRACTICAL WAY TO SEPARATE FORCES. IT HAS BEEN AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF PREVENTING MILITARY TENSION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCES FOR FORTY-SIX YEARS.

WE CONTINUE TO URGE THE DPRK TO RECOGNIZE THIS PRACTICALITY BY KEEPING ITS CRAFT NORTH OF THE LINE.

IF PRESSED:

IN 1953 THE AREA WAS A WAR ZONE AND TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS THERE REMAIN IN DISPUTE TODAY.

Q: IN CALLING FOR "ALL SIDES" TO "EXERCISE RESTRAINT" ARE YOU TAKING AN EVEN- HANDED APPROACH TO THE NAVAL CONFRONTATION?

A: NO. WE HAVE REMAINED IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH OUR ALLY, THE ROK GOVERNMENT, THROUGHOUT THIS PROCESS AND ARE CONTINUING TO MONITOR THE SITUATION CAREFULLY. WE ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE ROK TO TRY TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION.

WE URGE THE DPRK TO AVOID FURTHER CONFRONTATIONS BY KEEPING ITS CRAFT NORTH OF THE NLL.

7. CHINA: PICKERING DELEGATION ON BOMBING INCIDENT

CONTEXT: THERE WAS EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION ON THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT FOR VICTIMS OF THE BOMBING AND DAMAGE TO PRC EMBASSY IN BELGRADE AND OUR PROPERTY IN CHINA. THESE ARE TWO SEPARATE MATTERS. PAYMENT TO THE VICTIMS OF THE BOMBING WILL BE "EX GRATIA" (I.E., VOLUNTARY; PROMPTED BY OUR HUMANITARIAN TRADITION). (THE CHINESE OBJECT STRONGLY TO THE USE OF TERM "EX GRATIA.") DAMAGE TO PROPERTIES IS A MORE COMPLICATED MATTER AND WILL REQUIRE FURTHER EXAMINATION AND DISCUSSION. U/S PICKERING OFFERED "EX GRATIA" PAYMENT FOR THE INJURED AND THE FAMILIES OF THOSE WHO DIED, WITH DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS VERY SOON. HE EXPRESSED OUR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF DAMAGE TO THE PRC EMBASSY IN BELGRADE, AND THE CHINESE INDICATED THAT THEY WILL DISCUSS WITH US THE ISSUE OF DAMAGE TO U.S. PROPERTY.

RELEASE OF THE REPORT IS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION BY THE INTERAGENCY. A DECISION ON TIMING IS EXPECTED SOME TIME NEXT WEEK.

Q: IS THE QUESTION OF "COMPENSATION" FOR PRC LOSSES IN BELGRADE (THE U.S. HAS INDICATED A WILLING TO PROVIDE PAYMENTS TO THOSE WHO WERE INJURED AND TO THE FAMILIES OFTHOSE WHO DIED) A U.S.-PRC ISSUE, OR IS THERE SOME NATO INVOLVEMENT?

A: OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE HAVE FOCUSED ON HOW THE U.S. AND CHINA WOULD ADDRESS THE ISSUE. UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING CONVEYED OUR WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE PAYMENT TO THE INJURED AND THE FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED, WITH THE DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT DIPLOMATICALLY VERY SOON.

UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING TOLD THE CHINESE THAT WE ALSO ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF THE DAMAGE DONE TO CHINA'S EMBASSY IN BELGRADE.

IF ASKED ONLY

WE UNDERSTAND THE CHINESE WILL DISCUSS WITH US THE ISSUE OF DAMAGE TO U.S. PROPERTY IN CHINA.

(IF PRESSED)

Q: HOW MUCH WILL BE PAID TO THE INJURED AND FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED?

A: DETAILS WILL BE WORKED OUT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS SOON.

Q: ANYTHING MORE ON THE TRIP?

A: A PROFESSIONAL ATMOSPHERE PREVAILED DURING THE NEARLY NINE HOURS OF TALKS. THE CHINESE SIDE ACCORDED OUR EXPLANATION SERIOUS HEARING, RAISED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE DETAILED PRESENTATION.

WE WOULD CAUTION AGAINST QUICK JUDGEMENTS ABOUT THE CHINESE RESPONSE. THEIR IMMEDIATE REACTION WAS NOT ENTIRELY UNEXPECTED. IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME FOR THEM TO ABSORB THE DETAILED PRESENTATION THAT UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING MADE.

Q: DO WE HAVE A REPORT TO ISSUE? WHEN?

A: WE PLAN TO PROVIDE THE SAME REPORT TO THE CONGRESS SHORTLY. MEANWHILE, SENIOR U.S. LEADERS ARE BEING BRIEFED ON UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING'S TRIP.

Q: DID ANY OTHER SUBJECTS COME UP?

A: I UNDERSTAND THAT UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING'S DISCUSSIONS, WHILE FOCUSED ON OUR EXPLANATION OF THE ACCIDENT, ALSO COVERED A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES, INCLUDING THE SITUATIONS IN SOUTH ASIA, KOREA PENINSULA, SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND BILATERAL MATTERS. BOTH SIDES INDICATED THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNDERLYING IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING A CONSTRUCTIVE U.S.-CHINA RELATIONSHIP. WE LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH CHINA IN THE MUTUAL INTERESTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

8. CHINA: WORLD BANK POVERTY WESTERN CHINA POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROJECT

Q: WHAT IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW OF THE WORLD BANK'S PROPOSED POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROJECT FOR WESTERN CHINA?

A: WE HAVE A NUMBER OF TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE LOAN. WE ARE WORKING WITH OTHER BANK MEMBERS TO ENCOURAGE THE BANK TO RESTRUCTURE THE LOAN SO THAT THESE ISSUES CAN BE SOLVED. WE HOPE TO RECEIVE A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM BANK MANAGEMENT AND OUR CHINESE COUNTERPARTS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

Q: (IF ASKED) IF THE LOAN IS NOT REVISED, WHAT POSITION WILL THE USG TAKE?

A: P.L. 101-240 REQUIRES THAT THE UNITED STATES NOT VOTE IN FAVOR OF ANY ACTION PROPOSED TO BE TAKEN BY THE WORLD BANK WHICH WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT UNLESS, AT LEAST 120 DAYS BEFORE THE DATE OF THE VOTE, AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (EIA) WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE LISTED INSTITUTION'S EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS, AND THE EIA OR A SUMMARY THEREOF WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO AFFECTED GROUPS AND LOCAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. THE WORLD BANK DID NOT MEET THIS REQUIREMENT SO WE WILL NOT VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE LOAN.

9. HONG KONG: COX COMMITTEE REPORT AND S&T COOPERATION

CONTEXT: RECENT MEDIA REPORTS IN HONG KONG HAVE CLAIMED THAT AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC SCHOLARS INVITED TO ATTEND

CONFERENCES IN HONG KONG HAVE EITHER PULLED OUT OR BEEN DENIED PERMISSION TO ATTEND IN THE WAKE OF THE COX REPORT.

Q: WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO SUGGESTIONS THAT CONCERN ABOUT THE COX COMMITTEE REPORT IS HAVING AN ADVERSE IMPACT

ON SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES WITH HONG KONG?

A: RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BENEFIT IMMENSELY FROM INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND HONG KONG TO CONTINUE TO BRING OUR EXPERTS TOGETHER TO COMBINE THEIR EXPERIENCE AND LEARN FROM EACH OTHER. ONLY THROUGH SUCH COLLABORATION CAN WE HOPE TO SOLVE SUCH GLOBAL PROBLEMS AS CLIMATE CHANGE.

FOR THIS REASON, WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO OUR S&T RELATIONSHIP WITH HONG KONG. THERE HAVE BEEN NO POLICY CHANGES THAT SHOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR ONGOING AND PRODUCTIVE EXCHANGES IN CIVILIAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

THE COX REPORT HAS RECENTLY HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT U.S. NATIONAL SECRETS ARE PROTECTED AND THAT OUR CIVILIAN EXPORTS OF TECHNOLOGY ARE NOT DIVERTED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. THIS APPLIES TO OUR EXPORTS WORLDWIDE.

WE HOPE AND EXPECT THAT, WITH THE APPROPRIATE PROTECTIONS IN PLACE, SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND HONG KONG WILL CONTINUE AND FLOURISH.

10. INDONESIAN ELECTION UPDATE

CONTEXT: THE VOTE COUNTING PROCESS CONTINUES MORE THAN TEN DAYS AFTER THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA. BY LATE FRIDAY, SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 70 PERCENT OF THE ESTIMATED 100 MILLION BALLOTS HAD BEEN REPORTED IN

THE "UNOFFICIAL" COUNT. THE PROCESS IS COMPLICATED, ENTAILING HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS AT POLLING STATIONS BEFORE THEY ARE CONSOLIDATED AT (SEQUENTIALLY) THE SUB-DISTRICT, DISTRICT, AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS. THE INDONESIAN ELECTION COMMISSION EXPECTS TO ANNOUNCE THE FINAL OFFICIAL

RESULTS IN LATE JUNE.

THE SLOWNESS OF THE UNOFFICIAL COUNT IS UNEXPECTED. REPORTS FROM THE FIELD SUGGEST INEXPERIENCE AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL IS TO BLAME FOR PART OF THE PROBLEM, BUT THE FACT THAT THE TABULATION IS DRAGGING ON DAY AFTER DAY LEADS TO WORRIES OF MANIPULATION. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS,

HOWEVER, OF MASS DISCONTENT, IN PART BECAUSE PERCENTAGES OF THE REPORTED VOTE STILL SHOW OPPOSITION PARTIES WELL IN THE LEAD OVER THE GOLKAR PARTY.

THE OUTCOME REMAINS UNPREDICTABLE, AND NO SINGLE PARTY IS EXPECTED TO GAIN A CLEAR MAJORITY OF VOTES CAST. THE PARTY LED BY MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI, THE PDI-P, IS EXPECTED TO BE THE SINGLE LARGEST VOTE GETTER. 462 REPRESENTATIVES TO THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT WILL BE CHOSEN FROM PARTY LISTS ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS. THESE 462 PARLIAMENTARIANS PLUS 38 APPOINTED MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY WILL HAVE FIVE-YEAR TERMS IN THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT, OR DPR. THE 500 DPR MEMBERS PLUS 200 OTHERS REPRESENTING SOCIETAL GROUPS AND REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS WILL FORM THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR.) THE MPR WILL MEET LATER THIS YEAR TO SELECT INDONESIA'S NEXT PRESIDENT.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON THE ELECTIONS.

A: BY THE END OF THE DAY FRIDAY IN JAKARTA, ROUGHLY 71 PERCENT OF THE VOTES HAD BEEN COUNTED. THE PRELIMINARY TRENDS SUGGEST THAT MEGAWATI'S PDI-P PARTY COULD WIN THE LARGEST PLURALITY OF THE VOTE, BUT NO SINGLE PARTY IS EXPECTED TO GAIN A MAJORITY (MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE SEATS) IN THE PARLIAMENT. THE FINAL RESULTS ARE NOT EXPECTED UNTIL LATER THIS MONTH.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THIS ELECTION IS ONLY ONE STEP IN THE PROCESS OF SELECTING A NEW PRESIDENT AND ESTABLISHING A TRULY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN INDONESIA. WE BELIEVE THAT THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR NEW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING A MUCH STRONGER PRESS, WILL INSIST THAT THE PROCESS CONTINUE TO BE TRANSPARENT AND FAIR. WHILE WE PLAN TO CLOSELY MONITOR THE PROCESS, WE CONTINUE TO BE HOPEFUL THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL REFLECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE. AS WE HAVE SAID PREVIOUSLY, WE WELCOMED THE PEACEFUL AND RELATIVELY SMOOTH CONCLUSION OF THE BALLOT ON JUNE 7, AND THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE'S ENTHUSIASM FOR THE ELECTION.

(IF ASKED)

Q: IS THE U.S. CONCERNED THAT THE SLOW PACE OF THE VOTE COUNT IS A SIGN OF
POSSIBLE CHEATING?

WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF PROBLEMS IN SOME AREAS, WE DO NOT AT THIS POINT HAVE ANY INDICATION THAT THE

SLOWNESS OF THE INITIAL VOTE COUNT REFLECTS WIDESPREAD EFFORTS TO MANIPULATE THE RESULTS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT PART OF THE SLOWNESS IN COUNTING AND COLLATING THE VOTES IS DUE TO THE INEXPERIENCE OF ELECTION OFFICIALS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. AS INTERNATIONAL MONITORS HAVE NOTED, IT'S IMPORTANT THAT THE AUTHORITIES RESOLVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT IRREGULARITIES FAIRLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

IF ASKED

Q: WHAT WOULD BE THE U.S. REACTION IF MEGAWATI'S PDI-P PARTY WERE TO
GAIN A PLURALITY OF THE VOTES?

THE U.S. DOES NOT SUPPORT ANY INDIVIDUAL OR PARTY. OUR INTEREST IS IN SEEING CREDIBLE ELECTION RESULTS THAT REFLECT THE WISHES OF THE INDONESIAN VOTERS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGES FROM THESE ELECTIONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT SELECTION OF A PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT LATER THIS YEAR.

11. PHILIPPINES - JIMENEZ CASE

BACKGROUND: ON APRIL 16, 1999, THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT CAMPAIGN FINANCE TASK FORCE ANNOUNCED A FORTY-SEVEN COUNT INDICTMENT AGAINST MARK B. JIMENEZ FOR CONSPIRACY, MAIL FRAUD, TAX EVASION FALSE STATEMENTS AND THE MAKING AND CONCEALING OF ILLEGAL CONDUIT CONTRIBUTION TO A NUMBER OF DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGNS. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN CHARGED IN A SEVENTEEN COUNT INDICTMENT IN WASHINGTON, D.C. LAST SEPTEMBER. THOSE CHARGES WERE INCORPORATED INTO THE NEW

INDICTMENT. REUTERS REPORTS THAT IT HAS OBTAINED A COPY OF A DIPLOMATIC NOTE SENT FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO THE PHILIPPINE FOREIGN MINISTRY REQUESTING JIMENEZ'S

EXTRADITION.

Q. CAN YOU CONFIRM THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS SENT A DIPLOMATIC NOTE ON BEHALF OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ASKING THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT FOR THE EXTRADITION OF MARK JIMENEZ?

A: EXTRADITION REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT ARE MADE UNDER THE U.S. - PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION TREATY, WHICH HAS BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE 1996.

ANY REQUEST FOR EXTRADITION WOULD BE HANDLED IN A NORMAL MANNER THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SHOULD BE CONTACTED FOR FURTHER DETAILS.

12. U.S - VIETNAM RELATIONS

CONTEXT: ON JUNE 3, THE PRESIDENT EXTENDED THE WAIVER OF THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT TO VIETNAM BECAUSE HE DETERMINED THAT THE WAIVER WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY PROMOTE GREATER FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION IN VIETNAM. A RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL WAS INTRODUCED IN THE HOUSE BY CONGRESSMAN ROHRABACHER. THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE HELD A HEARING ON JUNE 17 IN WHICH AMBASSADOR PETERSON GAVE TESTIMONY. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE HEARING AND THE EIGHT ROUND OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS THIS WEEK BEING HELD IN

WASHINGTON BETWEEN THE U.S. AND VIETNAM, THE VIETNAMESE EMBASSY RELEASED A PRESS STATEMENT REGARDING PROGRESS IN U.S. - VIETNAM RELATIONS AND CALLED FOR U.S. SUPPORT IN REFORMING THEIR ECONOMY.

Q. WHAT IS THE U.S. REACTION TO VIETNAMESE SUGGESTIONS THAT THEIR COUNTRY HAS MADE GREAT PROGRESS IN RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND THE IT SHOULD BE REWARDED FOR ITS REFORMS?

A. VIETNAM HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN AREAS OF INTEREST AND CONCERN TO THE U.S., AMONG THEM POW/MIA ACCOUNTING, EMIGRATION AND ECONOMIC REFORM.

THE HIGHEST PRIORITY OF THE U.S. IN VIETNAM IS THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF POW/MIAS. VIETNAMESE COOPERATION IN THIS EFFORT ALLOWED US TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 1995. U.S. POLICY SINCE THEN HAS BEEN TO INCREMENTALLY NORMALIZE OUR BILATERAL POLITICAL,

ECONOMIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONSHIP.

IN ADDITION TO COOPERATION ON POW/MIA ACCOUNTING, WE CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE VIETNAMESE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON A NUMBER OF OTHER PRIORITY ISSUES, INCLUDING FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION, ECONOMIC REFORM AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE VIETNAMESE HAVE MADE GOOD PROGRESS ON EMIGRATION ISSUES, AND WE ANTICIPATE IMMINENT COMPLETION OF A NUMBER OF SPECIAL REFUGEE PROGRAMS IN VIETNAM. PRESIDENT CLINTON DECIDED ON JUNE 3 TO EXTEND VIETNAM'S JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER FOR ONE YEAR ON THE BASIS OF VIETNAM'S

CONTINUED AND INTENSIFIED COOPERATION ON U.S. REFUGEE PROGRAMS.

VIETNAM IS IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSITIONING FROM A CENTRALLY PLANNED TO A OPEN, MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY. THE USG IS USING A VARIETY OF LEVERS TO INFLUENCE THAT POLICY INCLUDING NEGOTIATION OF A BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT. IN ADDITION TO WINNING GREATER MARKET ACCESS AND A LEVEL-PLAYING FIELD FOR U.S. BUSINESS, THIS AGREEMENT WILL SERVE AS AN ENGINE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND LIBERALIZATION IN VIETNAM. ONCE THIS AGREEMENT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED AND APPROVED BY CONGRESS, VIETNAM WILL RECEIVE NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS (NTR) STATUS. WITH ECONOMIC REFORM AND NTR WITH THE UNITED STATES, VIETNAM'S ECONOMY WILL GROW AND MODERNIZE AND ITS PEOPLE WILL BECOME MORE PROSPEROUS.

WE HAVE ALSO SEENSOME IMPROVEMENTS IN VIETNAM'S HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE SUCH AS PRISONER RELEASES AND MODEST RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON PERSONAL LIBERTY. HOWEVER, THE U.S. REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT THE COUNTRY'S HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES. VIETNAM CONTINUES TO DENY OR CURTAIL BASIC FREEDOMS INCLUDING FREEDOM OR SPEECH, ASSOCIATION AND RELIGION.

13. CHILD LABOR CONVENTION

CONTEXT: ON JUNE 17, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) ADOPTED A CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION AND IMMEDIATE ELIMINATION OF THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR. BY THIS ACTION, THE MEMBER NATIONS OF THE ILO HAVE PLEDGED

TO BAN A NUMBER OF ABUSES, INCLUDING CHILD SLAVERY OR

BONDED LABOR, CHILD PROSTITUTION AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE USE OF CHILDREN FOR DRUG-TRAFFICKING AND OTHER ILLICIT ACTIVITIES, AND THE FORCED OR COMPULSORY RECRUITMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER 18 FOR USE IN ARMED CONFLICT. IN THE 1999 STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS, PRESIDENT CLINTON PLEDGED TO WORK TOWARD THIS CONVENTION AND, IN HIS JUNE 16 SPEECH TO THE ILO URGED ADOPTION OF THE CONVENTION. HE ALSO PLEDGED QUICKLY TO SEND THE NEW CONVENTION TO THE SENATE FOR RATIFICATION. THE CONVENTION IS A LANDMARK DEVELOPMENT, BUT HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR NOT GOING FAR ENOUGH.

Q: HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO CRITICISM THAT THE NEW ILO CONVENTION ON CHILD LABOR IS FLAWED?

A: ON JUNE 17, THE ILO UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED A NEW CONVENTION TO ELIMINATE THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR.

THE NEW CONVENTION INCLUDES A PROHIBITION ON THE FORCED OR COMPULSORY RECRUITMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 18 FOR USE IN ARMED CONFLICT.

THIS RAISES THE STANDARD FROM THE CURRENT RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONAL STANDARD OF AGE 15, WHICH IS REFLECTED IN THREE INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS: THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD; ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949; AND THE 1998 AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT.

THIS IS A LANDMARK CONVENTION AND REFLECTS PRESIDENT CLINTON'S COMMITMENT ON A WORLDWIDE BAN ON THE WORST FORMS

OF CHILD LABOR THAT CAN BE RATIFIED IN ALL COUNTRIES.

THE UNITED STATES WILL PRESS FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS NEW CONVENTION, AND WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK ADDITIONAL WAYS TO STOP ABUSIVE AND EXPLOITATIVE CHILD LABOR.

THE BROADER ISSUE OF CHILDREN SERVING IN ARMED CONFLICT CAN BE BETTER ADDRESSED IN THE WORKING GROUP ON THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, WHICH IS REVIEWING THIS ISSUE.
COHEN

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E34

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO0944

PAGE 01 STATE 112895 170247Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AIT-03	AMAD-01	A-00	DOEE-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	UTED-00	FOE-01	H-01	TEDE-00	IO-00
	ADS-00	MMP-00	AC-01	NEA-01	DCP-01	OIC-02	OIG-03
	ACE-00	IRM-01	STR-00	SA-01	FMP-00	DRL-02	SAS-00

/022R

112895
SOURCE: KODAKB.017027
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:EMMCDEVITT:KNB -- 6/16/99 71029
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES
----------D60279 170254Z /38

O 170245Z JUN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SYDNEY IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL MELBOURNE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL PERTH IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 112895 170247Z
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS//PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 112895

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRO, XE, US
SUBJECT: JUNE 16, 1999 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS - ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF - ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
UNVIE FOR FITZ[[ATRICK
USEU FOR RUTH

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 112895 170247Z

1. INDEX:
-- REPORT BY THHE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S WEAPONS LABORATORIES (PARAS 2-7))
-- CHINA: PICKERING DLEGATION ON BOMBING INCIDENT (PARAS 8 AND 9)
-- DPRK: NAVAL INCIDENT UPDATE (PARAS 10-13)
-- CAMBODIA: DONOR EVALUATION MEETING (PARAS 14 AND 15)
-- HONG KONG: ANSON CHAN'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY ALBRIGHT (PARAS 16 AND 17)
-- NORTH KOREA: MISSILE TEST (PARAS 16 AND 18)
-- AUSTRALIA: FOREIGN MINISTER ALEXANDER DOWNER'S MEETING WITH ACTING SECRETARY TALBOTT (PARAS 16 AND 19)

-- INDONESIAN ELECTION UPDATE (PARAS 16 AND 20)
-- AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL REPORT AND CRITICISM (PARAS 16 AND 21)
-- PRESIDENT CLINTON'S SPEECH ON CHILD LABOR AT THE ILO CONFERENCE (PARAS 16 AND 22)

2. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT WAS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, ON 6/15/99.

3. ON MARCH 18, 1999, I ASKED THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, THE PFIAB, TO UNDERTAKE A REVIEW OF THE SECURITY THREAT AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S WEAPONS LABS AND THE MEASURES THAT HAVE BEEN

TAKEN TO ADDRESS IT. PFIAB CHAIRMAN WARREN B. RUDMAN
PRESENTED THE BOARD'S FINDINGS TO ME TODAY. I HAVE ASKED

THE PFIAB TO MAKE THE REPORT AVAILABLE TO CONGRESS AND TO
THE PUBLIC.

I WOULD LIKE TO THANK SENATOR RUDMAN AND THE BOARD MEMBERS
WHO UNDERTOOK THIS IMPORTANT STUDY OVER A 90-DAY PERIOD,
REVIEWING HUNDREDS OF DOCUMENTS AND CONDUCTING DOZENS OF
INTERVIEWS. AS THE REPORT RECOGNIZES, THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY REPRESENTS THE BEST OF AMERICA'S SCIENTIFIC TALENT
AND EXPERTISE. THE VALUE OF THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS MAKES IT
IMPERATIVE THAT' WE PLACE A PREMIUM ON ENSURING THAT WE
HAVE INSTITUTEED) THE BEST POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF O)UR NATION'S MOST VALUABLE SECRETS AT
DEPARTMENT FACILITIES.

THIS ADMINISTRATION ALREADY HAS TAKEN UNPRECEDENTED STEPS
TO REDUCE THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR SECRETS AT THE LABS.
OVER A YEAR AGGO) I ISSUED A SWEEPING DIRECTIVE TO
STRENGTHEN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACROSS THE BOARD AT THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND SECRETARY RICHARDSON HAS
AGGRESSIVELY INSTITUTED NEW RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AT DOE FACILITIES. THE
PFIAB HAS MADE A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS WHICH WE WILL
CAREFULLY REVIEEW. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO TAKING THE
NECESSARY STEPSP TO SAFEGUARD OUR NATION'S SECRETS.

AS THESE VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES ARE ADDRESSED, WE
WILL BE MOST SUUCCCESSFUL IF WE CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS IN A
BIPARTISAN MANNER WITH CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
EXECUTIVE AND LEEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT.

4. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED BY THE NSC

ON 6/15/99. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THIS PRESS GUIDANCE FOR
USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

5. PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
(PFIAB) REPORT

Q: WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THIS REPORT? IT'S PRETTY
HARD-HITTING.

A: WE APPRECIATE THE WORK OF THE PFIAB AND ITS STAFF IN
UNDERTAKING THIS REVIEW. THE BOARD DID A COMMENDABLE JOB

IN A SHORT TIME. THE REPORT CHRONICLES THE LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS AT DOE LABS, AS NOTED IN PREVIOUS CONGRESSIONAL, INTERNAL AND GAO REPORTS.

Q: BUT WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE REPORT'S CONCLUSIONS THAT YOU ESSENTIALLY HAVE A BUREAUCRACY OUT OF CONTROL?

A: WE RECOGNIZE, AS DID THE PFIAB, THAT THE WORK AT THE LABS REPRESENTS AMERICA'S MOST BRILLIANT SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS ON A SUSTAINED BASIS. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE SOME SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS THAT COULD POTENTIALLY MAKE OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECRETS VULNERABLE TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING EFFORTS.

-- IT WAS THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONCERNS ABOUT THESE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VULNERABILITIES THAT PROMPTED THE PRESIDENT TO ISSUE PDDD-61 OVER A YEAR AGO. AS THE REPORT SAYS, "IN THE PAST TWO YEARS THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS PROPOSED AND BEGUN TO IMPLEMENT SOME OF THE MOST FAR-REACHING REFORMS IN DOE HISTORY."

Q: YES, BUT YOU STILL HAVE A PROBLEM.

A: WE HAVE IN PLACE THE MECHANISMS NEW TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF THE PDD. HOWEVER, AS THE PFIAB REPORT POINTS OUT, THHEE IMPLEMENTATION CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED OVERNIGHT. IT WILL TAKE CONSTANT VIGILANCE AND ATTENTION, BUT THE NATIONAL SECURITY LEADERSHIP, BY THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY IN PARTICULAR AND BY THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Q: SO, WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE PROPOSAL THAT DOE'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS BE PLACED UNDER A SEMI-AUTONOMOUS OR INDEPENDENT AGENCY?

A: WE WILL CAREFULLY REVIEW THE RECOMMENDATIONS.

Q: HOW ABOUT THE ALLEGATION IN THE REPORT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION MOVED TOO SLOWLY IN ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM AT THE LABS?

A: WE TOOK WHAT WE CONSIDERED AT THE TIME TO BE FAR-REACHING AND UNPRECEDENTED ACTION. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD LONG BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD.

-- ACCORDINGLY, IN THE WAKE OF THE AMES CASE WE ORGANIZED

THE GOVERNMENT TO WORK TOGETHER TO IMPROVE OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY.

-- IN 1994, THE PRESIDENT HAD ISSUED AN EARLIER DIRECTIVE

ESTABLISHING THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELL POLICY BOARD.

-- THEN IN 1997, WHEN THE PROBLEMS AT THE LABS BECAME APPARENT, THE POLICY BOARD COMPOSED OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS, WAS ABLE TO EXAMINE THE PROBLEM AND COME BACK IN VERY SHORT ORDER TO RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT ISSUE A DIRECTIVE, WHICH LATER BECAME PDD-61.

Q: DOES THE PRESIDENT AGREE WITH SECRETARY RICHARDSON THAT OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECRETS ARE SAFE TODAY?

-- THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT THE SECRETARY HAS MOVED QUICKLY AND FOR'CEFULLY TO PUT IN PLACE THE REFORMS NECESSARY TO REDUCE THE VULNERABILITIES TO OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECRETS. BUT WHEN IT COMES TO SECURITY, THE JOB IS NEVER DONE.

6. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF ENERGY RICHARDSON WAS RELEASED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ON 6/15/99.

7. I WOULD LIKE TO COMMEND THE REVIEW OF SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIIGENCE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S WEAPONS LABORATORIES DONE BY THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD (PFLAB). CHAIRMAN RUDMAN AND HIS PANEL HAVE PUT VIGOROUS EFFORT INTO THIS REPORT AND HAVE BROUGHT FORWARD IMPORTANT RECOMMENDATIONS THAT UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE OF 'HE AGGRESSIVE CHANGES WE'VE MADE TO ADDRESS SERIOUS AND SYSSTTEMIC SECURITY PROBLEMS AT THE DEPARTMENT'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABS.

SINCE TAKING OVER AS SECRETARY NOTHING HAS BEEN A HIGHER PRIORITY FOR ME AND I APPRECIATE THE PANEL'S RECOGNITION

OF THE ACTIONS WE'VE ALREADY TAKEN TO CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS.

I AGREE WITH THE REPORT'S CONCLUSION THAT SERIOUS CHANGE IS NEEDED IN THE DEPARTMENT'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. THAT IS WHAT MOTIVATED THE SWEEPING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

WE ARE MAKING TO STRENGTHEN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT BY ESTABLISHING CLEAR LINES OF AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY. IN FACT I'VE GONE SO FAR AS TO HAVE THE SECURITY OFFICE REPORT DIRECTLY TO ME. THE PFLAB RECOMMENDATIONS ARE HELPFUL IN THAT THEY PROPOSE TO CODIFY MANY OF THE CHANGES I HAVE ANNOUNCED OVER THE PAST SEVEN WEEKS.

IN FACT, I BELIEVE THE SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ARE BROADER THAN THE BOARD RECOGNIZES. THESE PROBLEMS CUT ACROSS THE ENTIRE DEPARTMENT AND ARE NOT LIMITED TO THE WEAPONS LABS AND PRODUCTION SITES. THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NEEDS TO IMPROVE SECURITY AT ALL OF ITS SITES. PLUTONIUM LOCATED AT OUR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SITES DEMANDS THE SAME LEVEL OF SECURITY AS PLUTONIUM AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY AND CLASSIFIED RESEARCH AT ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY NEEDS TO BE JUST AS SECURE FROM ESPIONAGE AS NUCLEAR DESIGNS; AT THE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY.

I HAVE STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION TO ESTABLISH A SEMI-INDEPENDENT OR

INDEPENDENT AGEENNCY FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATTERS. BY ESTABLISHING AN AUTONOMOUS SECURITY STRUCTURE WITHIN A NEW AGENCY, THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION WOULD RISK ERODING THE LINK BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY AND "SCIENCE AT ITS BEST," WHICH HAS BEEN THE STRENGTH OF OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENT FROM ITS VERY INCEPT'ION. I AM ALSO CONCERNED THAT THE U.S. NUCLEAR DETERREENT DESERVES CABINET-LEVEL ATTENTION. THE BOARD'S RECOMMEENNDATION WOULD PLACE IT IN A LESS PROMINENT POSITION WHERE THE TENSION BETWEEN PROGRAMMATIC GOALS AND SECURITY WOULD PERSIST.

THESE ARE SERIOUS ISSUES THAT DESERVE FULL AND CONTINUING DISCUSSION. WE WILL STUDY THE PFLAB'S RECOMMENDATIONS IN MORE DETAIL ANNDD ASSESS WHAT ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS WE SHOULD INCORPORATE INTO OUR ONGOING EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ARE THE BEST IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

8. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED ON 6/16/99. DEPUTY SPOKESMAN JAMES B. FOLEY DREW FROM THIS PRESS

GUIDANCE AT THAT DAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THIS GUIDANCE FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

9. CHINA: PICKERING DELEGATION ON BOMBING INCIDENT

CONTEXT: AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT, U/S PICKERING LED AN INTER-AGENCY DELEGATION INCLUDING THE NSC, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE A MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE COURSE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE ACCIDENTAL BOMBING OF THE CHINESE

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 10 STATE 112895 170247Z
EMBASSY IN BELGRADE. THE DELEGATION INCLUDES ADCI FOR ADMINISTRATION JAMES SIMON, ASD FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS FRANK KRAMER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY JEREMY CLARK, EAP DAS SUSAN SHIRK, NSC DIRECTOR FOR ASIA JIM KEITH, AND P SPECIAL ASSISTANT DAVID STRAUB. AMBASSADOR PICKERING MET WITH VFM YANG AND FOREIGN MINISTER TANG YESTERDAY. WE DO NOT YET HAVE A FULL READ-OUT CF HIS DISCUSSIONS.

Q: ANY READ-OUT OF PICKERING'S MEETINGS?

A: UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING TRAVELED TO CHINA TO PRESENT A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE COURSE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE MISTAKEN BOMBING OF THE PRC EMBASSY IN BELGRADE. HE MET EARLIER TODAY FOR SEVERAL HOURS WITH BOTH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER YANG J-IECHI AND FOREIGN MINISTER TANG JIAXUAN. WE DO NOT YET HAVE A FULL READ-OUT OF THE MEETINGS, HOWEVER.

Q: DID ANY OTHER SUBJECTS COME UP?

A: AS I INDICATED, WE DO NOT YET HAVE A FULL READ-OUT OF THE MEETINGS. HOWEVER, I UNDERSTAND THAT HIS MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER TANG COVERED A NUMBER OF BILATERAL ISSUES.

10. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED ON 6/16/99. DEPUTY SPOKESMAN JAMES B. FOLEY USED THE FIRST THREE ANSWERS AT THAAT' DAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THE REMAINDER FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 11 STATE 112895 170247Z
11. DPRK: NAVAL INCIDENT UPDATE

CONTEXT: AFTER YESTERDAY'S BLOODSHED, THE TENSE SEA STANDOFF AT THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE (NLL) HAS ABATED-FOR NOW. NO DPRK NAVAL CRAFT HAVE CROSSED THE NLL SINCE THE INCIDENT. THE UN COMMAND INVITED THE DPRK FOR A SECOND ROUND OF GENERAL OFFICERS TALKS, AFTER AN INCONCLUSIVE

OPENING MEETING JUNE 15. THE DPRK HAS YET TO REPLY TO THE UN COMMAND INVITATION.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE YET TO GAUGE THE BROADER IMPACT OF YESTERDAY'S FIRE FIGHT: THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF DPRK INTENTIONS CONCERNING THE BILATERAL VICE-MINISTERIAL MEETING SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 21 WITH THE ROK IN BEIJING, ALTHOUGH A ROK GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN IS QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS SAYING THE ROK WILL ATTEND. (U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY AMBASSADOR CHARLES KARTMAN IS ALSO PLANNING TO MEET-NOT ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY-- WITH DPRK VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KIM GYE GWAN NEXT WEEK IN BEIJING AS A FOLLOW UP TO THE KUMCHANG-NI SITE VISIT. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS CONCERNING DPRK CHANGES IN PLANS TO ATTEND.)

Q.: WHAT IS THE SITUATION TODAY AT THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE?

A: THERE HAVE BEEN NO FURTHER INCIDENTS SINCE THE JUNE 15 CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ROK AND DPRK NAVAL VESSELS. NO CROSSINGS OF THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE BY DPRK WARSHIPS HAVE BEEN NOTED IN THE LAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS.

SHIPS FROM BOTH THE ROK AND DPRK REMAIN IN THE AREA.

Q.: WHAT ABOUT REPORTS OF MORE U.S. FORCES MOVING TO THE AREA?

A: OUR FORCES REMAIN IN THEIR NORMAL STATE OF READINESS.

I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE PENTAGON FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE STATEE AND READINESS OF OUR FORCES.

Q.: WHAT IS THE U.S. DOING DIPLOMATICALLY? WHAT IS THE STATUS OF UN COMMAND GENERAL OFFICER TALKS?

A: WE REMAIN -INN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE ROK GOVERNMENT THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS AND ARE CONTINUING TO MONITOR THE SITUATION CAREFULLY. WE ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE ROK TO TRY TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION AND REDUCE TENSIONS.

WE CONTACTED THHE DPRK THROUGH THE NEW YORK CHANNEL TO URGE STRONGLY THAT THEY REMAIN NORTH OF THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE. WE NOTE THAT DPRK NAVAL FORCES ARE CURRENTLY STAYING NORTH OF THE NLL. REDUCING TENSIONS BY AVOIDING ANOTHER CONFRONTATION IS IN EVERYONE'S BEST INTEREST.

WE WELCOMED THE DPRK DECISION TO ATTEND THE UN COMMAND GENERAL OFFICERS' TALKS JUNE 15 IN PANMUNJOM. UNFORTUNATELY, THOSE TALKS RECESSED WITHOUT RESULT. A UN COMMAND INVITATION TO THE DPRK FOR A SECOND ROUND IS PENDING A REPLY FROM THE NORTH.

WE URGE THE DPRK TO CONTINUE PARTICIPATING IN THE

DISCUSSIONS SO THAT A WAY TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION PEACEFULLY CAN BE FOUND AND RECURRENCES PREVENTED. I'D REFER YOU TO THE UN COMMAND IN SEOUL FOR DETAILS ON THE TALKS.

Q.: HOW DO YOU ASSESS DPRK MOTIVES? ARE THEY PROVOKING A CONFRONTATION?

A: I WON'T ENGAGE IN SPECULATION ABOUT MOTIVES.

ALONG WITH OUR ROK ALLIES, WE WILL WORK TO ENSURE THAT TENSIONS ARE NOT INCREASED AND THAT TENSIONS ARE EVENTUALLY REDUCED.

Q.: WHAT IS TNE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE (NLL)?

A: I'D REFER YOU TO THE UN COMMAND IN SEOUL, WHICH IS CHARGED WITH MO)NITORING THE KOREAN WAR ARMISTICE, FOR AUTHORITATIVE I-NFORMATION ABOUT THE NLL .

THE NLL HAS SEPRVED AS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF PREVENTING MILITARY TENSII)N BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCES FOR FORTY-SIX YEARS. IT SERVES AS A PRACTICAL DEMARCATION LINE WHICH HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SEPARATION OF FORCES.

WE CONTINUE TO URGE THE DPRK TO RECOGNIZE THIS PRACTICALITY BY KEEPING ITS CRAFT NORTH OF THE LINE.

Q.: WHAT ABOUT CASUALTIES?

A: THE ROK MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE REPORTED THAT SEVEN OF ITS SAILORS WERE INJURED. THERE HAVE BEEN VARIOUS REPORTS OF DPRK CASUALTIES, BUT I CANNOT CONFIRM THESE. WE ARE WORKING HARD TO URGE THE DPRK TO AVOID FURTHER CONFRONTATIONS BY KEEPING ITS CRAFT NORTH OF THE

NLL.

12. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ON 6/16/99. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THIS PRESS GUIDANCE FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

13. CURRENT NEWS

"KOREAN FIGHT AT SEA EVOLVES INTO EXCHANGES OF CHARGES" NEW YORK TIMES JUNE 16, 1999 BY SHERYL WUDUNN

TOKYO - VERBAL CLASH, NORTH KOREA DEMANDS APOLOGY FROM SOUTH KOREA FOR SINKING A WARSHIP.

MESSAGE

-- THERE WAS NO CONTACT BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND SOUTH KOREAN NAVAL VESSELS TODAY. NORTH KOREAN PATROL SHIPS REMAINED NORTH OF THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE. NORTH KOREAN FISHING VESSELS CROSSED OVER THE NLL IN THE MORNING, BUT HAD RETURNED TO NORTH KOREAN WATERS BY 10:00 A.M.

-- BOTH NORTH KOREA AND SOUTH KOREA ARE PATROLLING IN THE VICINITY OF THE NLL. IT'S NOT APPROPRIATE FOR US TO RELEASE INFORMATION ON ROK OPERATIONS.

-- SEVEN ROK SAILORS WERE INJURED, NONE SERIOUSLY. TWO OFFICERS AND FIVE ENLISTED SAILORS WERE HOSPITALIZED. WE DON'T HAVE CASUALTY NUMBERS FOR NORTH KOREA.

-- FOUR PATROL KILLER MEDIUM (PKM) AND ONE PATROL COMBAT CORVETTE (PCC) ROK NAVAL VESSELS WERE DAMAGED. THEY HAVE BEEN REPAIRED AND RETURNED TO SEA. ONE NORTH KOREA TORPEDO VESSEL WAS SUNK AND FIVE VESSELS DAMAGED, ACCORDING TO THE ROK JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF.

-- WE ARE IN CLOSE CONTACT AND COORDINATION WITH THE ROK GOVERNMENT AND ARE URGING THE NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT TO URGE THAT THEY REMAIN NORTH OF THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE.

-- THE NLL HAS SERVED AS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF PREVENTING MILITARY TENSION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCES FOR DECADES AND SERVES AS A PRACTICAL DEMARCATION LINE, WHICH HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SEPARATION OF FORCES. WE URGE THE DPRK TO RECOGNIZE THIS PRACTICALITY AND TO AVOID EXACERBATING THIS SITUATION BY KEEPING ITS CRAFT NORTH OF THE LINE.

-- MEANWHILE, SHIPS FROM BOTH SIDES ARE STILL IN THE AREA. WE REMAIN IN CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ROK ALLIES, ARE MONITORING THE SITUATION CAREFULLY, AND ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE ROK TO ENSURE THAT THIS SITUATION IS DEFUSED AND TENSIONS ARE REDUCED.

-- NORTH KOREA IS AN OPAQUE SOCIETY; WE DO NOT KNOW THE INTENTIONS BEHIND THE INTRUSIONS INTO SOUTHERN WATERS.

U.S. FORCES

-- IN ORDER TO MONITOR THE SITUATION AND CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC REGION, TWO COMMAND AND CONTROL SHIPS FROM THE SEVENTH FLEET WILL DEPLOY NEAR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. ADDITIONAL SURVEILLANCE ASSETS WILL BE COMMITTED TO THIS MISSION AND WILL INCLUDE EA-6B ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES AIRCRAFT AND OTHER SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT.

-- THE SHIPS (USS VINCENNES AND ANOTHER SHIP TBD) ARE FORWARD DEPLOYED IN YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE, JAPAN.

-- THE EA-6BS ARE FROM NAVAL AIR STATION WHIDBEY ISLAND, WASHINGTON. THE AIRCRAFT WILL OPERATE OUT OF A U.S. FACILITY IN THE; REGION.

-- USS CONSTELLATION IS DEPARTING ITS HOME PORT OF SAN DIEGO ON JUNE 18 FOR THE PERSIAN GULF. AS PREVIOUSLY PLANNED, THE CO)NSTELLATION BATTLE GROUP WILL BE CONDUCTING TRAINING NEAR KOREA DURING ITS TRANSIT.

-- ASSETS STILL ON ALERT WHILE USS KITTY HAWK IS DEPLOYED TO THE PERSIAN GULF ARE:
- TWO FA-18D HO)RNET SQUADRONS
- TEN B52 STRATOFORTRESS BOMBERS
- ONE PATRIOT BATTALION AND BATTALION HEADQUARTERS
- EIGHT F-16CJ FIGHTING FALCON AIRCRAFT
- ADDITIONAL EA-6B PROWLER ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES AIRCRAFT

FORCES DEPLOYED TO KOREA TO MONITOR THE SITUATION AND
- CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC REGION SINCE USS KITTY HAWK DEPLOYED

- EIGHTEEN F-115E STRIKE EAGLE AIRCRAFT FROM ELMENDORF AFB, ALASKA, DEPLOYED TO KOREA AND TWO AC-130 GUNSHIPS FROM HURLBURT FIELD, FLORIDA, REMAIN IN KOREA

-- THERE ARE NO PLANS FOR A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN COMBAT CAPABILITIES ON THE PENINSULA OR IN THE REGION. BUT THE ASSETS WE ARE DDEPLOYING ARE A PRUDENT MEASURE INTENDED TO MONITOR THE SITUATION. THIS IS A REASONABLE RESPONSE AND DEMONSTRATES OUUR COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

-- THE CINC HAS THE PREROGATIVE TO REQUEST ADDITIONAL ASSETS IF DEEMED NECESSARY BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE IS MONITORING THE SITUATION CLOSELY AND IS CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL HAVE THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES REQUIRED TO MEET ANY FORSEEABLE CONTINGENCIES.

-- THE KEY POINT TO NOTE AT THIS STAGE IS THAT THE LEVEL OF READINESS OF U.S. FORCES ON THE PENINSULA REMAINS UNCHANGED FROM ITS NORMAL CONDITION AT THIS TIME.

-- WE CONTINUE TO URGE THE NORTH TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS THROUGH TALKS AT PANMUNJOM OR OTHER APPROPRIATE CHANNELS.

-- IT IS LONG-STANDING POLICY THAT WE DO NOT DISCUSS THE NATURE OF OUR INTELLIGENCE-SHARING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ROK.

UN OFFER OF DISCUSSION (USFK PRESS RELEASE)

-- DURING THE JUNE 15 MEETING BETWEEN THE UN COMMAND AND THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY, THE TWO SIDES WERE UNABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF REDUCING TENSIONS IN THE WEST SEA (YELLOW SEA). TODAY, THE UN COMMAND SENT A REQUEST TO THE KPA FOR ANOTHER MEETING. AS OF THIS TIME, THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO THE UN COMMAND REQUEST.

-- DURING THE NINETY-MINUTE MEETING, UN COMMAND GENERALS RECOMMENDED THAT BOTH SIDES WITHDRAW THEIR NAVAL FORCES TO THEIR RESPECTIVE SIDES OF THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE. THE COMMAND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT CONTINUED NAVAL INTRUSIONS COULD FURTHER ESCALATE TENSION IN THE REGION. THE UN COMMAND STRESSED TO THE NORTH KOREAN DELEGATES THAT THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE HAS EXISTED FOR MANY DECADES AND BOTH SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A PRACTICAL

SEPARATION LINEE EXISTS IN THE WATERS OFF THE EAST AND WEST COASTS OF THE KKOREA PENINSULA.

-- MEASURES WERE PRESENTED TO THE NORTH'S DELEGATES TO REDUCE THE TENSSION AND THE UN COMMAND URGED IMMEDIATE NORTH KOREAN COOPERATION. ADDITIONALLY, THE UN COMMAND RECOMMENDED THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS REMAIN OPEN AT PANMUNJOM WHILE ATTEMPTS ARE MADE TO RESOLVE THIS SITUATION.

-- ALTHOUGH THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLES ARMY SHOWED ITS CONTINUED SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE KOREAN ARMISTICE

AGREEMENT, THE TWO SIDES WERE UNABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF REDUCING TENSIONS IN THE WEST SEA. AT THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNC, THE MEETING WAS RECESSED WHILE THE NORTH KOREAN SIDE CONFERRED WITH ITS LEADERSHIP ON THE UNC PROPOSED TENSION REDUCTION MEASURES.

-- "THE TALKS WERE CONDUCTED IN A BUSINESS-LIKE MANNER, WITH EACH SIDE GAINING AN INCREASED UNDERSTANDING OF THE OTHER'S VIEWS," SAID COL. CARL KROPF, UN COMMAND SPOKESMAN. "THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE MEETING WAS TO SEEK A RESOLUTION TO THE SITUATION OFF KOREA'S WEST COAST AND REDUCE TENSION IN THAT AREA."

-- THIS WAS THE SIXTH GENERAL OFFICER MEETING SINCE THE MEETINGS BEGAN IN MARCH 1998. THE PURPOSE OF THE GENERAL OFFICER MEETINGS IS TO DISCUSS PRACTICAL ARMISTICE-RELATED ISSUES, REAFFIRM ITS COMMITMENT TO THE GO FORUM, AND REDUCE TENSION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

14. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED ON 6/16/99. THE DEPUTY SPOKESMAN USED THE GUIDANCE, EXCEPT FOR THE "IF ASKED" PORTION, AT THAT DAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THIS PORTION OF THE GUIDANCE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

15. CAMBODIA: DONOR EVALUATION MEETING

CONTEXT: AT THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING HELD IN TOKYO FEB. 25 - 26, 17 BILATERAL DONORS AND SIX INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AGREED TO GIVE $470 MILLION IN AID TO CAMBODIA IN 1999. THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT AGREED TO

HOLD QUARTERLY MEETINGS WITH THE DONOR COMMUNITY IN ORDER

TO MONITOR AND EVALUATE HOW EFFECTIVELY THIS ASSISTANCE IS BEING USED. THE FIRST SUCH EVALUATION MEETING WAS HELD IN PHNOM PENH ON JUNE 14.

Q: WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT A MEETING IN CAMBODIA ON JUNE 14 OF THE DONOR EVALUATION COMMITTEE? WHAT IS THE U.S. INVOLVEMENT /DONATION?

A: ON JUNE 14, LOCAL DONORS, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, AND VISITING REPRESENTATIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MET WITH CAMBODIAN PRIME MINISTER HUN SEN AND HIS SENIOR MINISTERS. HUN SEN INDICATED THAT CAMBODIA IS COMMITTED TO PUSHING FORWARD THE AMBITIOUS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM IT

ANNOUNCED AT THE FEBRUARY 25-26 INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING IN TOKYO.

DONORS OFFERED UNANIMOUS PRAISE FOR THE STEPS TAKEN SINCE THE CONSULTATIV'E GROUP MEETING, PARTICULARLY THE CRACKDOWN ON ILLEGAL LOGGING, THE BETTER THAN EXPECTED BUDGET PICTURE FOR THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF 1999, AND THE SUCCESSFUL REGISTRATION OF 25,000 SOLDIERS UNDER THE GOVERNMENT'S MILITARY DEMOBILIZATION PROGRAM. LESS POSITIVELY, A N'UMBER OF DONORS EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO SHIFT SPENDING FROM DEFENSE AND SECURITY TO THE SOCIAL SECTOR.

THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE JUNE 14 MEETING DEMONSTRATES THAT THE QUARTERLY MONITORING PROCESS CAN PROVIDE A GOOD

BASIS FOR CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE DONOR COMMUNITY ON BOTH BROAD REFORM POLICIES AND SPECIFICS.

(IF ASKED)

THE U.S. DOES NOT PROVIDE AID DIRECTLY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA. WE CHANNEL OUR ASSISTANCE THROUGH NGO'S AND PVO'S. U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN CAMBODIA SUPPORT DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE AND HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMS, INCLUDING DEMINING ASSISTANCE.

OUR PLANNED AID) LEVEL FOR FY 2000 IS $20 MILLION SUBJECT, OF COURSE, TO CONTINUED ALLOCATION AND FUNDING BY CONGRESS.

16. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON

6/16/99 AND WERE NOT USED BY THE DEPUTY SPOKESMAN AT THAT DAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

17. HONG KONG: ANSON CHAN'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY ALBRIGHT

CONTEXT: HONG KONG CHIEF SECRETARY ANSON CHAN IS CURRENTLY ON A TWO-WEEK, FIVE-CITY TOUR OF THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND MEXICO. SHE VISITED WASHINGTON ON JUNE 14-15. ON JUNE 14, SECRETARY ALBRIGHT DROPPED BY CHAN'S MEETING WITH EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH. WHILE IN WASHINGTON, CHAN ALSO MET WITH PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF JOHN PODESTA, DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER JAMES

STEINBERG, VICE PRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER LEON FUERTH, PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY

GENE SPERLING, AND TREASURY SECRETARY-DESIGNATE LARRY SUMMERS.

Q: CAN YOU PLEASE PROVIDE A READ-OUT ON SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S MEETING WITH ANSON CHAN?

A: SECRETARY ALBRIGHT MET ON JUNE 14 AT THE DEPARTMENT WITH HONG KONG CHIEF SECRETARY ANSON CHAN. THE SECRETARY REVIEWED WITH THE CHIEF SECRETARY HONG KONG'S PROGRESS SINCE THE 1997 REVERSION TO CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY. SHE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE KEY ROLE CHAN HAS PLAYED IN PRESERVING FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, RULE OF LAW, AND HONG KONG'S HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY.

CHAN THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR HER SUPPORT BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE REVERSION. THEY REVIEWED THE CURRENT SITUATION IN HONG KONG, INCLUDING A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE LANDMARK RIGHT OF ABODE CASE AND QUESTIONS RAISED RECENTLY ABOUT HONG KONG'S EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM. THEY AGREED ON THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING AND PROTECTING THE INDEPENDENCE OF' HONG KONG'S JUDICIARY AND CONTINUED CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND HONG KONG IN THE AREA OF EXPPORT CONTROLS.

IF ASKED:

Q: WHAT IS THE ADMINISTRATION'S ASSESSMENT OF HONG KONG'S EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM?

A: HONG KONG MAINTAINS AN AUTONOMOUS AND EFFECTIVE EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM. WHILE ALL SUCH SYSTEMS CAN BE IMPROVED, AS WE STATED IN OUR APRIL 1 U.S.-HONG KONG POLICY ACT REPORT TO CONGRESS, "THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND THE UNITED STATES IN EXPORT CONTROL COOPERATION."

18. NORTH KOREA: MISSILE TEST

CONTEXT: THE D)PRK HAS BEEN DEVELOPING TWO LONGER RANGE MISSILES, THE TAEPO DONG-1 (1500+ KM) AND THE TAEPO DONG-2 (4,000-6,000 KRM)). ON AUGUST 31, 1998, THE DPRK FLIGHT TESTED THE TAEPO DONG-L WITH A SMALL THIRD STAGE IN A FAILED ATTEMPT TO DEPLOY A VERY SMALL SATELLITE. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SUBSEQUENT FLIGHT TESTS. HOWEVER, THERE WAS A FLURRY OF PREESS REPORTING IN DECEMBER, IN FEBRUARY, AND AGAIN IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, THAT ANOTHER DPRK MISSILE FLIGHT TEST WAS IMMINENT. JAPANESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE COMMENTED PUBLICLY THAT THEY HAVE NO INFORMATION THAT

ANOTHER DPRK TAEPO DONG LAUNCH IS IMMINENT. WE CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION CAREFULLY. WE SHOULD STRESS THAT NORTH KOREA'S MISSILE PROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN -- AND CONTINUE TO BE -- OF GREAT CONCERN TO US, AND THAT WE REPEATEDLY HAVE URGED NORTH KOREA TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT.

Q: IS NORTH KOREA PLANNING ANOTHER BALLISTIC MISSILE TEST?

A: WE HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS ON A POSSIBLE UPCOMING NORTH KOREAN MISSILE LAUNCH.

THE U.S. VIEWS THE NORTH KOREAN MISSILE PROGRAM AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE REGION AND TO OUR NONPROLIFERATION INTERESTS. WE CONTINUE TO PRESS NORTH KOREA TO CEASE ALL PRODUCTION, DEPLOYMENT, TESTING, AND EXPORT OF MISSILES AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY.

WE CONTINUE TO CONSULT VERY CLOSELY WITH OUR SOUTH KOREAN AND JAPANESE ALLIES ON THE FULL RANGE OF NORTH KOREAN ISSUES.

(IF ASKED WHETHER DR. PERRY HAS RAISED THIS ISSUE IN THE COURSE OF HIS TALKS WITH THE DPRK.)

WE REPEATEDLY HAAVE MADE CLEAR TO PYONGYANG THAT ANY FURTHER MISSILEE TESTS WOULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA, WITH DIRECT IMPLICATIONS FOR PROSPECTS FOR MOVING FORWARD WITH PLANS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS THAT FORMER SECRETARY PERRY DISCUSSED WITH DPRK LEADERS DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO PYONGYANG.

Q: HAS THE NEXT ROUND OF MISSILE TALKS BEEN SCHEDULED?

A: NO DATE HAS YET BEEN SET FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF U.S.-DPRK MISSILE TALKS.

19. AUSTRALIA - FOREIGN MINISTER ALEXANDER DOWNER'S MEETING WITH ACTING SECRETARY TALBOTT

CONTEXT: IN ADDITION TO HIS MEETING WITH ACTING SECRETARY TALBOTT, DOWNER WILL HAVE MEETINGS WITH USTR BARSHEFSKY, ASSISTANT TO THHE VICE PRESIDENT LEON FUERTH, DEPUTY AID ADMINISTRATOR BABBIT, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE WORLD BANK AND IMF. DOWNER'S PRIMARY PURPOSE IN COMMIING TO THE U.S. IS TO DISCUSS THE EVOLVING SITUATION IN INDONESIA, INCLUDING EAST TIMOR. ON MONDAY

HE DISCUSSED INDONESIA WITH UNSYG KOFI ANNAN IN NEW YORK, DOWNER AND EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH WILL DISCUSS INDONESIA IN DEPTH AT LUNCH TODAY. DOWNER HAS NO OTHER MEETINGS IN THE DEPARTMENT.

Q: WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE ACTING SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER THIS MORNING?

A: ACTING SECRETARY TALBOTT MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER THIS MORNING AT 10 AM. THEY SHARED VIEWS ON TOPICS OF MUTUAL INTEREST INCLUDING KOSOVO, THE FIGHTING IN KASHMIR, U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, BILATERAL TRADE ISSUES, AND THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS.

WE GREATLY VALUE THE OPPORTUNITY PROVIDED BY TODAY'S MEETING TO DISCUSS ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN WITH OUR CLOSE ALLY AUSTRALIA.

20. INDONESIAN ELECTION UPDATE

CONTEXT: THE VOTE COUNTING PROCESS CONTINUES MORE THAN ONE WEEK AFTER THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN

PAGE 26 STATE 112895 170247Z
INDONESIA. BY LATE WEDNESDAY, SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 60 PERCENT OF THEE ESTIMATED 100 MILLION BALLOTS HAD BEEN REPORTED IN THE "UNOFFICIAL" COUNT. THE PROCESS IS COMPLICATED, ENTAILING HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS AT POLLING STATIONS BEFORE THEY ARE CONSOLIDATED AT (SEQUENTIALLY) THE SUB-DISTRICT, DISTRICT, AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS. THE INDONESIAN ELEC'TION COMMISSION EXPECTS TO ANNOUNCE THE FINAL OFFICIAL RESULTS IN LATE JUNE.

THE SLOWNESS OOF' THE UNOFFICIAL COUNT IS UNEXPECTED AND FRUSTRATING. REPORTS FROM THE FIELD SUGGEST INEXPERIENCE AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL IS TO BLAME FOR PART OF THE PROBLEM, BUT THE FACT THAT THE TABULATION IS DRAGGING ON DAY AFTER DAY LEADS TO WORRIES OF MANIPULATION. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, OF MASS DISCONTENT, IN PART BECAUSE PERCENTAGES OF THE REPORTED VOTE STILL SHOW OPPOSITION PARTIES WELL IN THE LEAD OVER THE GOLKAR PARTY.

THE OUTCOME REMAINS UNPREDICTABLE, AND NO SINGLE PARTY IS EXPECTED TO GAA-N A CLEAR MAJORITY OF VOTES CAST. THE PARTY LED BY MEEGGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI, THE PDI-P, IS EXPECTED TO BE THE SINGGLLE LARGEST VOTE GETTER. 462 REPRESENTATIVES TO THE NATIONAAL PARLIAMENT WILL BE CHOSEN FROM PARTY LISTS ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS. THESE 462 PARLIAMENTARIANS PLUS 38 APPOINTED MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY WILL HAVE FIVE-YEAR

TERMS IN THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT, OR DPR. THE 500 DPR MEMBERS PLUS 200 OTHERS REPRESENTING SOCIETAL GROUPS AND REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS WILL FORM THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR.) THE MPR WILL MEET LATER THIS YEAR TO SELECT INDONESIA'S NEXT PRESIDENT.
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 27 STATE 112895 170247Z

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON THE ELECTIONS.

A: BY THE END OF THE DAY WEDNESDAY IN JAKARTA, SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 60 PERCENT OF THE VOTES HAD BEEN COUNTED. THE PRELIMINARY TRENDS SUGGEST THAT MEGAWATI'S PDI-P PARTY COULD WIN THE LARGEST PLURALITY OF THE VOTE, BUT NO SINGLE PARTY IS EXPECTED TO GAIN A MAJORITY (MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE SEATS) IN THE PARLIAMENT. THE FINAL RESULTS ARE NOT EXPECTED UNTIL LATER THIS MONTH.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THIS ELECTION IS ONLY ONE STEP IN THE PROCESS OF SELECTING A NEW PRESIDENT AND

ESTABLISHING A TRULY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN INDONESIA. WE BELIEVE THAT' THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR NEW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING A MUCH STRONGER PRESS, WILL INSIST THAT THE PROCESS CONTINUE TO BE TRANSPARENT AND FAIR. WHILE WE PLAN TO CLOSELY MONITOR THE PROCESS, WE CONTINUE TO BE HOPEFUL THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL REFLECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE. AS WE HAVE SAID PREVIOUSLY, WE WELCOMED THE PEACEFUL AND RELATIVELY SMOOTH CONCLUSION OF THE BALLOT ON JUNE 7, AND THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE'S ENTHUSIASM FOR THE ELECTION.

(IF ASKED)
Q: IS THE U.S. CONCERNED THAT THE SLOW PACE OF THE VOTE COUNT IS A SIGN OF POSSIBLE CHEATING?

WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF PROBLEMS IN SOME AREAS, WE DO NOT AT THIS POINT HAVE ANY INDICATION THAT THE SLOWNESS OF THHEE INITIAL VOTE COUNT REFLECTS WIDESPREAD

EFFORTS TO MANIPULATE THE RESULTS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT PART OF THE SLOWNESS IN COUNTING AND COLLATING THE VOTES IS DUE TO THE INEXPERIENCE OF ELECTION OFFICIALS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. AS INTERNATIONAL MONITORS HAVE NOTED, IT'S IMPORTANT THAT THE AUTHORITIES RESOLVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT IRREGULARITIES FAIRLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

IF ASKED

Q: WHAT WOULD BE THE U.S. REACTION IF MEGAWATI'S PDI-P PARTY WERE TO GAIN A PLURALITY OF THE VOTES?

THE U.S. DOES NOT SUPPORT ANY INDIVIDUAL OR PARTY. OUR INTEREST IS IN SEEING CREDIBLE ELECTION RESULTS THAT REFLECT THE WISHES OF THE INDONESIAN VOTERS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGES FROM THESE ELECTIONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT SELECTION OF A PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT LATER THIS YEAR.

21. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL REPORT AND CRITICISMS

CONTEXT: NORA BOUSTANY OF THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTS ON HER INTERVIEW OF WILLIAM F. SCHULTZ OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL WHICH WAS LINKED TO THE RELEASE OF THE ORGANIZATION'S ANNUAL REPORT. SCHULTZ SAYS THE IS "NO CONSISTENCY IN US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY OR THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY," AND THAT THE LESSON FROM THE BALKANS IS THE "TRAGEDIES HAPPEN WHEN WORLD LEADERS 'ALLOW PERPETRATORS TO COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES WITH

IMPUNITY." SCHULTZ CALLED UPON THE ADMINISTRATION TO SUPPORT THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 29 STATE 112895 170247Z
PASSAGE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS INFORMATION ACT, AND EXTRADITION OF PINOCHET.

Q: US REACTION TO AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S ANNUAL REPORT AND ITS SPECIFIC CRITICISMS OF US POLICY?

A: WE WELCOME THE RELEASE OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH PROVIDE IMPRTANT INFORMATION ABOUT CONDITIONS AROUND THE WORLD.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL HAS BEEN A LEADING VOICE ON BEHALF OF HUMAN RIGHTSS AROUND THE WORLD. THEIR WORK AND REPORT HELPS FOCUS ATT'ENTION ON AND MOBILIZE ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE CRITICAL STATEMENTS BY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ON THE UNITED STATES FLY IN THE FACE OF OUR STRONG AND CONSISTENT ADVOCACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD.

WE TAKE CRITICISM OF US POLICIES SERIOUSLY AND DO TAKE STEPS TO REVIEW AND ADDRESS SUCH CONCERNS. HOWEVER, AMNESTY'S CRITTICCISM OF OUR POLICIES MAY DRAW PRESS COVERAGE, BUT IT MIGHT ALSO DETRACT ATTENTIONS FROM OTHER SYSTEMIC SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS WORLDWIDE WHILE DOING LITTLE TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD.

THE U.S. HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN A STRONG ADVOCATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AS DEMONSTRATED BY OUR ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PROACTICES, AND OUR STRONG SUPPORT FOR
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 30 STATE 112895 170247Z
INTERNATIONAL JSUTICE.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE AMNESTY REPORT AND REVIEWING ITS CONTENT.

IF ASKED:

Q: WHAT DO YOU THINK OF AMNESTY'S CRITICISMS OF THE UNITED STATES?

A: THE UNITED STATES IS A WORLD LEADER IN ITS ADVOCACY

AND ACTIVITY TO DEFEND AND ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS.

CONSISTENT WITH OUR RECOGNITION OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND OUR OPENNESS AS A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, WE WELCOME THE INVESTIGATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE. UNITED STATES BY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND OTHERS.

WE ARE PROUD OF OUR POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS AND WELCOME REVIEW OF ITS ELEMENTS.

22. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S SPEECH ON CHILD LABOR AT THE ILO CONFERENCE

CONTEXT: ON WEDNESDAY JUNE 16, 1999, PRESIDENT CLINTON ADDRESSED THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION'S ANNUAL CONFERENCE. THIS WAS THE FIRST VISIT BY AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT TO THE ILO IN THE ILO'S 80-YEAR HISTORY. THE PRESIDENT ENDORSED THE ILO'S CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR, AND PROMISED TO SEND THE CONVENTION TO THE SENATE FOR RATIFICATION UPON HIS

RETURN TO THE U.S. THE PRESIDENT, IN HIS 1999 STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS, CALLED FOR THE U.S. TO TAKE THE LEAD IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE ABUSIVE CHILD LABOR, AND THIS CONVENTION IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN ACHIEVING THAT GOAL. THE U.S. DELEGATION WORKED CLOSELY WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS TO ACHIEVE A CONVENTION THAT WOULD BE WIDELY RATIFIABLE.

Q: DO WE HAVE A READOUT ON THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS AT THE ILO?

A: THE PRESIDENT TODAY ADDRESSED THE ILO CONFERENCE ON THE NEED TO PUT "A HUMAN FACE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY." THE

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WAS AN HISTORIC EVENT, AS IT MARKED THE FIRST TIME THAT A U.S. PRESIDENT HAS ADDRESSED THE ILO.

-- IN HIS SPEECH, THE PRESIDENT HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED TO ELIMINATE THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR, NOTING, "THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR ARE NOT SOME ARCHAIC PRACTICES OUT OF CHARLES DICKENS NOVEL, THEY ARE HAPPENING NOW."

-- THE PRESIDENT FIRST CALLED FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO TAKE THE LEAD IN THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST ABUSIVE CHILD LABOR IN HIS 1998 AND 1999 STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESSES. ACHIEVING A WIDELY RATIFIABLE ILO CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR WAS

ONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S TOP PRIORITIES FOR THIS YEAR, AND WE ARE VERY PLEASED WITH THE CONVENTION.

-- THE RECORD VOTE FOR THE CONVENTION IS TOMORROW (JUNE

17) AND THE VOT'E IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE OVERWHELMINGLY IN FAVOR OF ADOPTION.

-- THE PRESIDENT STATED IN HIS SPEECH, THAT "AFTER I RETURN HOME, I WILL SEND IT TO THE SENATE FOR RATIFICATION, AND ASK ALL OTHER COUNTRIES TO RATIFY AS WELL."
TALBOTT

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E36

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ7260

PAGE 01 JAKART 02830 01 OF 02 092338Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/010W

----------D30B04 092338Z /38

O 092340Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8223
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002830

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: ELECTION DATA: GETTING THERE IN SOME SPOTS ON JAVA

1. (U) ELECTION FIGURES IN JUST ABOUT EVERYWHERE IN EASTERN INDONESIA HAVE BEEN EXCESSIVELY SLOW IN COMING OUT. IN EAST JAVA, CENTRAL JAVA, AND YOGYAKARTA, AND

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 02830 01 OF 02 092338Z
ESPECIALLY IN SURABAYA, THEY SEEM FASTER THAN ELSEWHERE. FOLLOWING ARE THE LATEST VOTING FIGURES FOR THESE AREAS. VOTES ARE FOR THE NATIONAL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (DPR), BUT EXCEPT WHERE NOTED DO NOT VARY SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE VOTES FOR THE PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT SLATES.

2. (U) SURABAYA. EAST JAVA'S JUNE 9 PRESS PUBLISHED WHAT APPEARS TO BE A COMPLETE LIST (OR CLOSE TO IT) FOR SURABAYA MUNICIPALITY. FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF THOSE FIGURES:

PDI-PERJUANGAN: 53.9 PERCENT
PARTAI KEBANGSAAN BANGSA (PKB): 18.1 PERCENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

PARTAI AMANAT NASIONAL (PAN): 10.7 PERCENT
GOLKAR: 8.4 PERCENT
PPP: 1.6 PERCENT
PARTAI BULAN BINTANG (PBB): 1.1 PERCENT
(ALL OTHERS WERE BELOW ONE PERCENT.)
TOTAL NUMBER OF VALID VOTES CAST WAS 1,428,168.

3. (U) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, PDI-PERJUANGAN WON EVERY SUBDISTRICT IN THE CITY, INCLUDING THE MADURESE SECTORS OF TOWN, WHICH ARE NU CENTERS AND WERE THOUGHT TO BE PRIME TERRITORY FOR ABDURRAHMAN WAHID'S PKB. (WE WILL LOOK AT HOW THE PKB FARED IN ITS EAST JAVA STRONGHOLD AS THE PROVINCE VOTE BECOMES CLEARER.) THE PRESS ESTIMATED THAT PDI-PERJUANGAN WOULD GET AT LEAST 20 OF SURABAYA'S 40 MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLY SEATS RESERVED FOR THE PARTIES. (THE MILITARY RETAINS 5.) IT WAS NOTED THAT THE PPP'S VOTE WAS SO SMALL, IT MIGHT NOT GET A SEAT IN THE MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLY. (NOTE: GOLKAR WON 51

PERCENT OF SURABAYA'S VOTE IN 1997, THE PPP 43 PERCENT.)

4. (SBU/NOFORN) EAST JAVA. GIVEN THE SLOWNESS OF THE KPU ELECTION COMPUTATION SYSTEM, WE RECEIVED FROM EAST JAVA GOVERNMENT SOURCES A PROVINCIAL COUNT AS OF EARLY MORNING JUNE 9 (ABOUT 28 PERCENT OF THE VOTE). (WE WERE TOLD THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR TAKING ITS OWN COUNT SINCE, SOME HAVE CHARGED, IT COULD CONFUSE THE POPULATION.) OUT OF 6.923 MILLION VOTES CAST, THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN TALLIED FOR EAST JAVA (ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST THOUSAND):

PDI-PERJUANGAN: 2.745 MILLION
PKB: 2.084 MILLION
GOLKAR: 937 THOUSAND
PAN: 411 THOUSAND
PPP: 239 THOUSAND
ALL OTHERS LESS THAN ONE PERCENT.

5. (SBU) CENTRAL JAVA. ACCORDING TO CENTRAL JAVA'S PPD, WITH APPROXIMATELY 20 PERCENT OF VOTE COUNTED (4.3 MILLION VOTES OUT OF 20.7 MILLION), THE VOTE FOR THE LARGEST FIVE PARTIES IS AS FOLLOWS (ROUNDED TO THE THOUSAND):

PDI-PERJUANGAN: 2.072 MILLION
PKB: 686 THOUSAND
GOLKAR: 620 THOUSAND
PPP: 590 THOUSAND

PAN: 342 THOUSAND

UNCLASSIFIED

(IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT PAN DID ABOUT 9 PERCENT BETTER IN THE PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS THAN WITH THE NATIONAL SLATE.)

6. (SBU) YOGYAKARTA. YOGYAKARTA'S PPD TOLD US THAT IT HAD COUNTED 65 PERCENT OF THE VOTE AS OF THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 9. OF THE 1.258 MILLION VOTES SO FAR TALLIED (OUT OF 1.929 MILLION CAST), THE FOLLOWING PARTIES WERE LEADING (ROUNDED TO THE THOUSAND):

PDI-PERJUANGAN:	449 THOUSAND	(35.7 PERCENT)
PAN:	217 THOUSAND	(17.24 PERCENT)
GOLKAR:	186 THOUSAND	(14.75 PERCENT)
PKB:	172 THOUSAND	(13.64 PERCENT)
PPP:	63 THOUSAND	(4.97 PERCENT)
PARTAI KEADILAN:	20 THOUSAND	(1.6 PERCENT)
PBB:	18 THOUSAND	(1.45 PERCENT)

THE REMAINING VOTES DIVIDED BY OTHERS.

(NOTE: YOGYAKARTA IS A UNIVERSITY TOWN. IF THE PARTAI KEADILAN--A LARGELY ISLAMIC STUDENT PARTY--WERE TO DO WELL ANYWHERE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN YOGYAKARTA. PAN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ7261

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/010W

----------D30B06 092338Z /38

O 092340Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8224
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002830

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: ELECTION DATA: GETTING THERE IN SOME SPOTS ON JAVA

CHAIRMAN AMIEN RAIS IS HEADQUARTERED AND VOTED THERE.)

PIERCE/ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6085

PAGE 01 JAKART 02798 01 OF 04 081236Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W	

----------D23374 081240Z /38

O 081239Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8198
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002798

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: THE DAY AFTER THE ELECTION

REF: A) JAKARTA 2767; B) JAKARTA 2765; C) JAKARTA 2753

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02798 01 OF 04 081236Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: INDONESIANS EAGERLY AWAITED THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION ON JUNE 8, THOUGH THE UNOFFICIAL TABULATION SYSTEM ESTABLISHED BY THE ELECTION COMMISSION YIELDED NO STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AS OF COB, JUNE 8. THE ELECTION COMMISSION'S PLAN IS THAT MEANINGFUL RESULTS SHOULD BE ISSUED VIA THIS TABULATION SYSTEM BY JUNE 9, THOUGH OFFICIAL RESULTS WILL BE NOT BE RELEASED FOR AT LEAST TWO WEEKS. DESPITE NUMEROUS PROBLEMS REPORTED BY DOMESTIC MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS, MAINLY RELATED TO A LACK OF SUPPLIES AT POLLING STATIONS, MOST INDONESIANS WERE UPBEAT ABOUT ELECTION DAY. WE ESPECIALLY NOTED A HIGH LEVEL OF ENTHUSIASM AND PARTICIPATION AT THE POLLING STATIONS WE OBSERVED. AS ANTICIPATED, VOTER TURNOUT IN ACEH WAS LOWER THAN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

IN OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA BASED ON A FEAR OF REPRISALS AND A DESIRE TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTIONS. THE ELECTION IN EAST TIMOR WAS RELATIVELY UNEVENTFUL, WITH MOST EAST TIMORESE MORE FOCUSSED ON THE AUGUST 8 CONSULTATION VOTE. END SUMMARY.

THE DAY AFTER: WHILE WAITING FOR THE RESULTS.

3. (U) ON JUNE 8, INDONESIANS ANXIOUSLY AWAITED THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION. AS REPORTED REFTEL C, IT IS EXPECTED THAT AN "UNOFFICIAL" RESULT SANCTIONED BY THE ELECTION COMMISSION COULD BE AVAILABLE WITHIN 48 HOURS AFTER THE POLLS CLOSED ON JUNE 7. THE FIRST SUCH PARTIAL RESULTS WERE BEGINNING TO TRICKLE IN EARLY IN THE MORNING OF JUNE 8, BUT WERE STILL STATISTICALLY INSIGNIFICANT AS OF COB.

4. (U) THE ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) WILL NOT FINALIZE THE RESULTS OF THE POLL FOR AT LEAST A COUPLE OF WEEKS. THE VOTE

TALLIES MUST BE PROCESSED AND APPROVED AT NUMEROUS LEVELS, INCLUDING THE 320,000 POLLING STATIONS, THE VILLAGES, THE SUB-DISTRICTS, THE DISTRICTS, THE PROVINCES AND FINALLY IN JAKARTA. IN THE MEANTIME, THE KPU HAS SET UP AN ALTERNATIVE REPORTING MECHANISM THROUGH WHICH SUB-DISTRICT POLLING COMMITTEES WILL CALL IN RESULTS DIRECTLY TO A "JOINT MEDIA AND OPERATIONS CENTER" (JOMC) SET UP IN JAKARTA, AND THE FIGURES WILL BE RELEASE AS THEY COME IN.

5. (U) THE PHONE BANKS AT THE JOMC WERE SILENT ON THE MORNING OF JUNE 8 WHEN POLOFFS VISITED. AN AUSTRALIAN CONSULTANT EXPLAINED THAT THE REPORTING PROCESS WAS TAKING TIME. THE POLLING STATIONS HAD TO REPORT RESULTS TO VILLAGE LEVEL ELECTION COMMITTEES WHERE THEY WERE AGGREGATED, REPORTED TO THE SUB-DISTRICT COMMITTEES, AND THEN AGGREGATED AGAIN. THE SUB-DISTRICTS WOULD NOT CALL IN TO JAKARTA UNTIL ALL OF THE VILLAGES HAD PROVIDED RESULTS. EMBOFFS IN THE FIELD WHO WITNESSED VOTE COUNTING AT POLLING STATIONS AND TRANSFER TO VILLAGE-LEVEL TALLYING OFFICES HAVE VERIFIED THAT THIS IS A TIME-CONSUMING PROCESS. MOREOVER, THE VOTE COUNTING DID NOT ALWAYS FINISH ON TIME AT THE POLLING STATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, EMBOFF IN WEST SUMATRA REPORTED THAT IN A RURAL AREA OUTSIDE OF PADANG VOTES WERE STILL BEING COUNTED AT A POLLING STATION AS OF MIDNIGHT ON JUNE 7.

MANY OBSERVERS GENERALLY UPBEAT ON THE POLL

6. (U) ELECTION OFFICIALS, THE MEDIA, AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS WERE GENERALLY UPBEAT ABOUT HOW ELECTION DAY HAD PROCEEDED. DOMESTIC OBSERVERS REPORTED NUMEROUS SPECIFIC PROBLEMS, HOWEVER,

AND AT LEAST ONE GROUP TOLD US THAT GIVEN THE NUMBER OF
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02798 01 OF 04 081236Z
VIOLATIONS, THEY WISHED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS WOULD BE MORE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR REMARKS (SEE BELOW). VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE ELECTION COMMISSION, ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION, AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON JUNE 7, SAID THAT THE VOTING WAS GENERALLY SMOOTH, INCLUDING IN IRIAN JAYA, EAST TIMOR, AND ACEH. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE PROBLEMS IN CARRYING OUT THE POLL IN CERTAIN AREAS, INCLUDING NORTH SUMATRA. SIMILARLY, INDONESIAN ELECTION COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN JACOB TOBING AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON JUNE 8 CHARACTERIZED THE ELECTION AS HAVING PROCEEDED "SMOOTHLY."

INSTANT IMPRESSIONS FORMING
---

7. (C) THE WAIT FOR THE RESULTS DID NOT STOP LOCAL MEDIA FROM PUBLISHING ANY DATA IT COULD GET ITS HANDS ON. THE RESPECTED INDONESIAN DAILY KOMPAS PUT "PRELIMINARY" RESULTS ON THE FRONT PAGE ON JUNE 8 BASED ON THE LESS THAN 100,000 VOTES COUNTED THAT HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY THE ELECTION COMMISSION (OUT OF MORE THAN 100 MILLION ELIGIBLE VOTERS).

8. (C) THIS STATISTICALLY MEANINGLESS RESULT RESONATED, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT CONFORMED WITH THE PRE-ELECTION EXPECTATION THAT MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN WOULD WIN. IT SHOWED PDI-P STRONGLY IN FRONT, WITH PKB, GOLKAR, PPP AND PAN TRAILING BY A WIDE MARGIN. IN ADDITION, IT WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MOOD OBSERVED BY WITNESSES IN JAKARTA AND MANY OTHER POLLING STATIONS WHERE,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6087

PAGE 01 JAKART 02798 02 OF 04 081237Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W	

----------D2337B 081240Z /38

O 081239Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8199
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 002798

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: THE DAY AFTER THE ELECTION

AT THE PUBLIC COUNTS, VOTES FOR PDI-P AND OTHER OPPOSITION PARTIES WERE GREETED WITH CHEERS, WHEREAS VOTES FOR GOLKAR WERE

NOISILY JEERED. ELECTION COMMISSION MEMBER ANDI MALLARENGENG COMMENTED TO THE PRESS THAT PRELIMINARY RESULTS SHOWED THAT PDI-PERJUANGAN WAS DOING VERY WELL IN THE JAKARTA REGION AND WOULD WIN OVER FIFTY PERCENT OF THE VOTE.

9. (U) BY 4:00 PM, POLOFF AT THE JOMC IN JAKARTA REPORTED THAT LESS THAN 800,000 VOTES HAD BEEN FORWARDED IN FROM AROUND THE COUNTRY. THIS STATISTICALLY INSIGNIFICANT SAMPLE SHOWED PDI-PERJUANGAN AHEAD WITH 342,000, PKB WITH 224,000, GOLKAR WITH 107,000, PPP WITH 56,000, AND PAN WITH 45,000 VOTES. MEGAWATI ADVISER LAKSAMANA SUKARDI COMMENTED TO POLCOUNS THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE SLOW PACE OF VOTE REPORTING AS IT PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO MANIPULATE TOTALS (NOTE: THIS WOULD NOT BE EASY TO DO UNLESS THERE WAS A SERIOUS BREAKDOWN IN OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS).

INITIAL TRENDS FROM FIELD REPORTED BY EMBOFFS
---

10. (C) TDY POLOFF IN MEDAN REPORTED THAT PDI-PERJUANGAN OFFICIALS THERE WERE CLAIMING TO HAVE WON SIXTY PERCENT OF THE VOTE IN NORTH SUMATRA. IN CONTRAST, GOLKAR OFFICIALS APPEARED GENUINELY SURPRISED THAT THEY APPARENTLY HAD NOT DONE AS WELL AS EXPECTED. AS OF COB JUNE 8, TDY POLOFF REPORTED THAT PARTIAL RESULTS FROM FIVE DISTRICTS WHERE GOLKAR HAD THOUGHT IT WOULD DO WELL SHOWED PDI-P IN FRONT WITH 78,170 VOTES, FOLLOWED BY GOLKAR WITH 38,358, PPP WITH 11,806, AND PAN WITH 7,918. ALL BUT ONE DISTRICT THAT HAD EXPERIENCED DELAYS IN VOTING ON JUNE 7 IN NORTH SUMATRA (REFTEL A) HAD MANAGED TO FIND ENOUGH SUPPLIES TO PROCEED WITH THE VOTING ON THE EVENING OF JUNE 7 OR ON THE MORNING OF JUNE 8.

11. (C) IN SOUTH SULAWESI, PRESIDENT'S HABIBIE'S HOME TURF, CONGEN SURABAYA REPORTED THAT GOLKAR WAS PERFORMING STRONGLY AS EXPECTED. LOCAL ANALYSTS ESTIMATED FOLLOWING THE VOTE THAT GOLKAR WAS ON ITS WAY TO SECURING TWO THIRDS OR MORE OF THE 24 SEATS AT STAKE IN THAT PROVINCE.

12. (C) IN WEST JAVA, WHERE IT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ASSUMED THAT GOLKAR HAD A GOOD CHANCE OF WINNING, TRAVELLING POLOFF PICKED UP RESULTS FROM VARIOUS POLLING STATIONS IN AND AROUND BANDUNG SHOWING PDI-PERJUANGAN IN THE LEAD. AS OF 1100 JUNE 8, THE PROVINCIAL ELECTION COMMISSION OFFICE HAD RECEIVED RESULTS ACCOUNTING FOR TEN PERCENT OF THE PROVINCE'S 25 MILLION REGISTERED VOTERS. THIS COUNT HAD PDI-PERJUANGAN TAKING APPROXIMATELY 30 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, WITH GOLKAR CLOSE BEHIND, FOLLOWED BY PAN AND PPP. OTHER PARTIES EXPECTED TO DO WELL IN WEST JAVA, SUCH AS PARTAI KEADILAN (PK) AND THE JUSTICE AND UNITY PARTY (PKP) TRAILED FAR BEHIND. PARTIAL RESULTS REPORTED TO THE JOMC BY 4:00 PM ON JUNE 8 WERE NOT FAR DIFFERENT FROM THE TREND REPORTED BY POLOFF, SHOWING PDI-PERJUANGAN AND PPP TIED WITH 12,000 VOTES EACH, GOLKAR WITH 8000, PBB WITH 1400 AND PAN WITH 1100.

13. (C) EMBOFF ON THE GROUND IN HEAVILY MUSLIM WEST SUMATRA REPORTED THAT PAN, PPP AND GOLKAR WERE RUNNING NECK AND NECK WITH THIRTY PERCENT OF THE VOTES COUNTED, WITH PDI-PERJUANGAN A DISTANT FOURTH.

14. (C) EMBOFF TRAVELLING IN JEMBER, EAST JAVA, OBTAINED RESULTS FROM ONE SUB-DISTRICT (KECAMATAN) SHOWING THAT GUS DUR'S PKB WAS DOMINATING, WITH PPP, GOLKAR, AND PDI-P PICKING UP A SMALL PERCENTAGE EACH. (EAST JAVA IS A GUS DUR AND NU STRONGHOLD.)

CONFIDENTIAL

15. (C) EMBOFF TRAVELLING IN KUPANG, EAST NUSA TENGGARA REPORTED THAT PDI-PERJUANGAN AND GOLKAR WERE RUNNING NECK AND NECK IN THE POLLING STATIONS OBSERVED BY EMBOFF, AN AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION, AND AN NDI DELEGATION IN KUPANG AND SURROUNDING AREAS.

REPORTS FROM THE DOMESTIC MONITORS

16. (C) THE UNIVERSITY NETWORK FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS (UNFREL), ONE OF THE MAJOR DOMESTIC MONITORING GROUPS, GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE ON THE EVENING OF JUNE 7 REPORTING ITS FINDINGS AS OF 6:00 PM THAT DAY. IT FOCUSED MOSTLY ON TECHNICAL AND LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM A "LACK OF PREPAREDNESS" FOR THE ELECTION. KIPP CHAIRMAN MULYANAH KUSUMAH ALSO ISSUED A LIST OF FINDINGS, BUT WAS QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS SAYING THAT KIPP DID

NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WERE SUFFICIENT FACTORS TO "DELEGITIMATE" THE ELECTION.

17. (U) UNFREL'S ANNOUNCED FINDINGS INCLUDED:

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT INDELIBLE INK IN MANY POLLING STATIONS, INCLUDING IN JAKARTA. THERE WERE INSTANCES IN WHICH THE INK WAS MIXED WITH WATER OR WHERE IT WAS REPLACED WITH NORMAL INK; OTHER CRITICAL VOTING MATERIALS WERE ALSO MISSING IN CASES WHICH CAUSED VOTING DELAYS;

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6086

PAGE 01 JAKART 02798 03 OF 04 081237Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W	

----------D23380 081240Z /38

O 081239Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8200
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 002798

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: THE DAY AFTER THE ELECTION

THERE WERE INSUFFICIENT NUMBERS OF BALLOTS IN NUMEROUS POLLING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02798 03 OF 04 081237Z
STATIONS CAUSING MANY CITIZENS NOT TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO VOTE;

VIOLATIONS OF ELECTION PROCEDURE WERE REPORTED, SUCH AS PRE-PUNCHED BALLOTS BEING GIVEN TO VOTERS;

UNAUTHORIZED SECURITY APPARATUS WERE IMPROPERLY PRESENT IN SOME VOTING STATIONS.

ELECTIONS IN ACEH

18. (SBU) WHILE DATA ON VOTING RESULTS IN ACEH ARE TOO PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE TO BE RELIABLE, EARLY REPORTS SHOWED PPP IN THE LEAD, WITH PAN A CLOSE SECOND. GOLKAR, THE CRESCENT MOON AND STAR PARTY (PBB), MEGAWATI'S PDI-P AND THE JUSTICE PARTY (PK) ALSO APPEARED TO HAVE ATTRACTED SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT.

19. (SBU) NO RELIABLE INFORMATION IS YET AVAILABLE ON VOTER TURNOUT RATES IN ACEH, BUT IT IS ALREADY CLEAR THAT, AS ANTICIPATED, RATES WERE LOWER THAN IN OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA. THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE, REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS WERE WAIVED TO ENCOURAGE HIGHER PARTICIPATION. PRIOR TO THE ELECTION, PROVINCE-WIDE REGISTRATION RATES WERE 55-60 PERCENT. THESE RATES MAY HAVE BEEN MET OR EXCEEDED IN SOME PARTS OF ACEH, INCLUDING THE CAPITAL BANDA ACEH, CENTRAL ACEH, AND SOUTHEAST ACEH.

20. (SBU) HOWEVER, TURNOUT WAS VERY LOW IN TROUBLED PARTS OF THE PROVINCE. IN THE REGENCIES OF PIDIE AND NORTH ACEH, PRE-ELECTION REGISTRATION RATES WERE 21 AND 22 PERCENT RESPECTIVELY, BUT TURNOUT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN LOWER. A LOCAL OBSERVER GROUP,

YAPPIKA, REPORTS THAT, ACCORDING TO ITS OBSERVERS, ONLY 3 OUT OF 858 PLANNED POLLING STATIONS HAD COMPLETED ELECTION PROCEDURES INCLUDING VOTE COUNTING AS OF 0900 JUNE 8. YAPPIKA WAS ATTEMPTING TO ACCOUNT FOR THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN ITS OBSERVATIONS AND KPU FIGURES REPORTING RESULTS FROM 13 POLLING STATIONS. THE SITUATION WAS MOST EXTREME IN THE DISTRICT OF NORTH ACEH, WHERE ONLY THREE POLLING STATIONS (TPS) WERE OPEN ON ELECTION DAY. THEY WERE LOCATED IN THE LHOKSEUMAWE AREA, AND WERE HEAVILY PROTECTED BY SECURITY FORCES. ELECTION OFFICIALS PLANNED TO OPEN POLLING STATIONS AT SEVEN OTHER SPOTS IN NORTH ACEH ON JUNE 8, AND SEVERAL MORE ON JUNE 9. OFFICIALS CITED THREATS FROM ARMED SEPARATISTS AS THE MAIN REASON FOR LIMITING THE NUMBER OF POLLING STATIONS. ELECTION OFFICIALS WERE ALSO UNABLE TO RECRUIT SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO STAFF THE POLLING STATIONS. POTENTIAL RECRUITS WERE APPARENTLY SCARED OFF BY THREATS OF ATTACKS ON POLLING STATIONS OR PERSONAL REPRISALS BY PRO-BOYCOTT ACEHNESE. A LHOKSEUMAWE NGO REPORTED THAT THE POLLING STATION ERECTED JUNE 8 IN TANAH LUAS, NORTH ACEH, HAD NOT RECEIVED A SINGLE VOTER BY EARLY AFTERNOON.

21. (SBU) WE RECEIVED THE VOTE TOTALS FOR ONE OF THE THREE TPS'S OPEN JUNE 7 IN LHOKSEUMAWE. THE TOP FIVE WINNERS FOR THE NATIONAL DPR IN THIS PARTICULAR TPS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

GOLKAR	394
PAN	243
PKP	130
PDI-P	120
PPP	66
PBB	21

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02798 03 OF 04 081237Z

22. (SBU) THROUGHOUT ACEH, TWO FACTORS GOVERNED THE LOW VOTER TURNOUT: FEAR OF REPRISALS FROM PRO-SEPARATIST ACEHNESE, AND A DESIRE TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTIONS BASED ON PUBLIC FEELINGS OF ALIENATION AND APATHY TOWARD NATIONAL POLITICS. A DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF VOTERS WHO TURNED OUT AT THE LHOKSEUMAWE POLLING STATIONS INDICATED ABOVE WERE RELATIVES OF MILITARY OFFICERS, GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRATS, AND OTHER NON-ACEHNESE RESIDENTS OF THE AREA. THIS GROUP WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO BE PRO-GOLKAR THAN ACEH AS A WHOLE. TWO LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICES WERE BURNED EARLY JUNE 7 IN THE BIREUN AREA, NORTH ACEH. IN SOUTH ACEH, AN NGO REPORTED SEVEN POLLING STATIONS BURNED ON JUNE 6 IN THE SUB-DISTRICT OF BLANG PIDIE.

23. (SBU) IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF PIDIE REGENCY, AS MANY AS 15,000 VILLAGERS FLED THEIR HOMES JUNE 6 IN THE ULEGLEE DISTRICT, AS RUMORS SPREAD OF A FORTHCOMING ANTI-SEPARATIST MILITARY OPERATION IN THE AREA. IN OTHER PORTIONS OF PIDIE, THREE SCHOOLHOUSES WERE BURNED JUNE 6-7. VILLAGERS REPORTEDLY DECLINED TO FIGHT ONE OF THESE FIRES BECAUSE THEY HEARD GUNFIRE IN THE AREA.

ELECTION IN EAST TIMOR

---

24. (C) THE JUNE 7 ELECTION WAS RELATIVELY UNEVENTFUL IN EAST TIMOR, WITH MOST EAST TIMORESE MORE FOCUSSED ON THE AUGUST 8

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6088

PAGE 01 JAKART 02798 04 OF 04 081237Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00

IO-00 LAB-01 L-01 ADS-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00
P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00
DRL-02 G-00 FDIC-01 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /013W
----------D2338D 081240Z /38

O 081239Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8201
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 002798

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: THE DAY AFTER THE ELECTION

CONSULTATION VOTE. PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS APPEARED TO HAVE MOUNTED A HALF-HEARTED CAMPAIGN TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTION, BUT

GIVEN THE CURRENT DISARRAY OF THEIR STRUCTURES IN EAST TIMOR, THIS EFFORT PROBABLY HAD LITTLE IMPACT. THERE WERE NUMEROUS REPORTS OF INTIMIDATION, INCLUDING HOUSE-TO-HOUSE CHECKS BY MILITIAS, COMPELLING EAST TIMORESE TO REGISTER AND VOTE, AND INDICATIONS THAT MANY IN RURAL AREAS WERE PRESSURED TO VOTE FOR GOLKAR. ANECDOTAL REPORTING OF RESULTS FROM DILI SUGGEST THAT MEGAWATI DID WELL, AT LEAST IN THE CAPITAL. INTERESTINGLY, A NUMBER OF OUR EAST TIMORESE PRO-INDEPENDENCE CONTACTS CONTINUE TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR MEGAWATI DESPITE HER PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO EAST TIMOR'S SEPARATION. THEY ARGUE THAT MEGAWATI IS MORE DEMOCRATIC THAN THE CURRENT REGIME AND COULD BE EXPECTED TO RESPECT A FREE AND FAIR PRO-INDEPENDENCE VOTE IN EAST TIMOR.

PROPOSED PRESS GUIDANCE
---

25. (SBU) GIVEN THE PRELIMINARY AND PATCHWORK NATURE OF VOTING RESULTS OBTAINED SO FAR, IT IS TOO EARLY TO CALL THE ELECTION. WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT ANY ANSWERS TO THE PRESS MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

INDONESIA IS TO BE CONGRATULATED ON CARRYING OUT A SUCCESSFUL ELECTION CAMPAIGN. POLITICAL VIOLENCE WAS CONTAINED, NUMEROUS

POLITICAL PARTIES WERE PERMITTED OPENLY TO EXPRESS THEIR IDEAS, AND CITIZENS WERE ABLE FREELY TO PARTICIPATE.

OVERALL, ELECTION DAY PROCEEDED SMOOTHLY IN MOST PARTS OF INDONESIA. IN MOST AREAS, POLLS OPENED ON TIME AND CITIZENS WERE ABLE TO VOTE FOR THE POLITICAL PARTY OF THEIR CHOICE. WE NOTICED A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF ENTHUSIASM ON THE PART OF THE ELECTORATE. THERE WERE NUMEROUS PROBLEMS REPORTED ON ELECTION DAY, INCLUDING CASES IN WHICH ELECTION MATERIALS WERE NOT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02798 04 OF 04 081237Z

PRESENT IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITY AT POLLING STATIONS, BUT THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE AFFECTED THE OVERALL CONDUCT OF THE ELECTION.

GIVEN THE LACK OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DATA ON THE RESULTS, IT IS PREMATURE TO COMMENT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8144

PAGE 01 MANILA 08330 01 OF 02 070936Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 DCP-01
NSAE-00 SP-00 IRM-02 SAS-00 /005W
----------D19A58 070937Z /38

O 070936Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2029
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 1681
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD/PA//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 008330

USIA

USIA FOR EA, I/FW, R/MR
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EAP/P

E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION TIANANMEN ANNIVERSARY INDONESIAN ELECTION

IN HIS COLUMN IN THE INDEPENDENT "MANILA STANDARD" (6/7), FORMER IV GRANTEE NELSON NAVARRO RECALLED A VISIT TO CHINA FIVE DAYS AFTER THE JUNE 4 TIANANMEN MASSACRE. HE WROTE: "...IT WAS A PRE-MEDITATED ATTACK TO DECAPITATE THE PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT. TROOPS FROM FARAWAY WERE FLOWN IN TO REPLACE THE REGULAR ONES WHO HAD BECOME SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE APPEALS OF THE PROTESTERS. THEY

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MANILA 08330 01 OF 02 070936Z
STRUCK WITHOUT MERCY AND WHEN THE SMOKE CLEARED, THE GODDESS OF DEMOCRACY STATUE WAS GONE FROM TIANANMEN.

"AS I WAS LEAVING BEIJING 10 DAYS LATER, THE CITY WAS COMING BACK TO NORMAL. THE SHOPS HAD REOPENED. THE CROWDS HAD REAPPEARED WITH A VENGEANCE. IT WAS AS IF THE TRAGEDY HAD NEVER STRUCK AND WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED WAS NOTHING BUT A TERRIBLE DREAM. ETERNAL CHINA WAS BACK ON THE MARCH."

THE EDITORIAL IN THE THIRD LEADING "PHILIPPINE STAR" (6/7) NOTED: "FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1955, INDONESIANS WILL GO TO THE POLLS TODAY TO CAST THEIR VOTES IN FREE ELECTIONS. THIS IS A WELCOME DEVELOPMENT, BUT THERE'S TREPIDATION AS THE WORLD WATCHES INDONESIA TAKE A MAJOR STEP TOWARD DEMOCRACY....

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

"WHY ARE THE RESULTS OF THIS POLITICAL EXERCISE SO CRUCIAL FOR INDONESIA? BECAUSE IN NOVEMBER, MEMBERS OF THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY WILL CHOOSE THE COUNTRY'S PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT, WHO WILL GOVERN INDONESIA FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. WITH THE STAKES SO HIGH, WILL THE ELECTIONS BE CLEAN, AND WILL THE LOSERS ACCEPT THE RESULTS?.... IN INDONESIA, WHOSE BIRTH AS AN INDEPENDENT NATION WAS DRENCHED WITH BLOOD, THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IS MUCH HIGHER. WITH LITTLE PRACTICE IN FREE ELECTIONS, WILL LOSERS ACCEPT DEFEAT GRACIOUSLY?....

"INDONESIA...IS SIMPLY TOO HUGE TO MONITOR CLOSELY.... THE POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER IS STRONG, AND THE WORLD CAN ONLY HOPE THAT REASON AND ORDER WILL PREVAIL AS INDONESIANS CAST THEIR VOTES."

IN HIS COMMENTARY IN THE LIBERAL "TODAY" (6/7), JUAN T. GATBONTON

UNCLASSIFIED

SAID: "ALL OF SOUTHEAST ASIA HAS A CRUCIAL INTEREST IN THE OUTCOME OF INDONESIA'S FIRST EXERCISE IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AFTER ALMOST HALF A CENTURY OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE. ASEAN HAS DOMESTICATED THE HISTRIONIC SUKARNO'S ROGUE STATE OF THE EARLY 1960S -- TRANSFORMING IT FROM A POTENTIAL THREAT TO A 'BIG BROTHER,' AND THE FIRST AMONG SOUTHEAST ASIAN EQUALS.

"THE SMALLER STATES ALSO REGARD INDONESIA AS A BULWARK AGAINST CHINA'S STRATEGIC PRESSURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA -- A ROLE THAT HAS BEEN WEAKENED CONSIDERABLY BY JAKARTA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES. AND IF ISLAMISM WERE TO TAKE ROOT IN INDONESIA, IT COULD CREATE TREMENDOUS PROBLEMS FOR ITS NEIGHBORS, ALL OF WHOM HAVE LARGE MUSLIM POPULATIONS.

"FORTUNATELY, THERE ARE CONTRARY INFLUENCES WORKING TO SHORE UP INDONESIA'S FLEDGLING DEMOCRACY. NOT THE LEAST ARE INTERNATIONAL AID-GIVER AND INVESTOR OPINION, GLOBALIZATION AND THE NEW COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES.

"IF INDONESIA IS TO HAVE THE GRADUALIST TRANSITION FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE THAT IT NEEDS, JAKARTA'S CONTENDERS FOR POWER MUST DEVELOP SOME LEVEL OF MUTUAL TRUST; AND ITS IMPATIENT STUDENTS MUST LEARN TO BE CONTENT WITH A SEQUENCE OF PIECEMEAL REFORMS INSTEAD OF THE ONCE-AND-FOR-ALL DAWNING OF A DEMOCRATIC UTOPIA."

EDITORIAL CONSULTANT AMANDO DORONILA OF THE SECOND LEADING "PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER" (6/7) WROTE IN A FRONT PAGE COMMENTARY: "...IT IS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THE ELECTION WILL LEAD TO THE DEEPENING OF THE DEMOCRACY TENDENCY THAT HAS AGAIN FOUND A

NEW LIFE.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 MANILA 08330 01 OF 02 070936Z

"THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS ARE ONLY A PRELUDE TO THE MORE IMPORTANT ELECTION BY THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF INDONESIA'S NEXT PRESIDENT. NO ONE IS CERTAIN THAT ANY OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES, INCLUDING MEGAWATI'S CAN WIN A MAJORITY TO FORM GOVERNMENT.

"INDONESIAN POLITICS IS FULL OF SURPRISES. SO FAR THE SURPRISES HAVE BEEN PLEASANT.

"WHEN THE PROCESS OF DICKERING AND POLITICAL MANEUVERING OVER THE NEXT PRESIDENCY BEGINS, OUTCOMES MIGHT BE MORE NASTY."

DR. MAHAR MANGAHAS OF THE SURVEY RESEARCH ORGANIZATION SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, WHO IS CURRENTLY IN JAKARTA AS PART OF THE PHILIPPINE OBSERVER TEAM, WROTE IN HIS COLUMN IN THE INDEPENDENT "MANILA STANDARD" (6/7): "...INDONESIA IS NOT GOING TO ELECT ITS PRESIDENT DIRECTLY ON JUNE 7.

"THE 462 DPR LEGISLATORS TO BE ELECTED ON JUNE 7 WILL JOIN WITH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8145

PAGE 01 MANILA 08330 02 OF 02 070937Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 DCP-01
NSAE-00 SP-00 IRM-02 SAS-00 /005W
----------D19A60 070937Z /38

O 070936Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2030
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 1682
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD/PA//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 MANILA 008330

USIA

USIA FOR EA, I/FW, R/MR
STATE FOR EAP/PIMBS, EAP/P

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION TIANANMEN ANNIVERSARY INDONESIAN ELECTION

38 APPOINTIVE DPR MEMBERS REPRESENTING THE MILITARY, PLUS 135 REPRESENTATIVES TO BE ELECTED LATER FROM AMONG THE 27 PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES (FIVE PER PROVINCE), PLUS 165 REPRESENTATIVES TO BE ELECTED LATER (PROCEDURE STILL UNSPECIFIED) TO REPRESENT CERTAIN SECTORS, TO MAKE A TOTAL OF 700 MEMBERS IN THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR IS THE INDONESIAN ABBREVIATION)....

"THE MPR IS THE BODY WITH THE POWER TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT, BY MAJORITY VOTE, NEXT NOVEMBER. THE ONLY WAY WHEREBY A PARTY CAN WIN THE PRESIDENCY OUTRIGHT THROUGH THE JUNE 7 ELECTION IS TO WIN 351 OF THE 462 SEATS AT STAKE, AMOUNTING TO 76 PERCENT....

"THE INDONESIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PROCEDURE IS EVEN MORE COMPLICATED THAN A CLASSICAL, BRITISH-STYLE, PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM WHICH IS ITSELF ALREADY RELATIVELY DIFFICULT TO ASSESS BY MEANS OF OPINION POLLS. THE SIMPLEST SYSTEM IS OUR PHILIPPINE SYSTEM OF DIRECT ELECTIONS...."

ANDERSON

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8581

PAGE 01 JAKART 02754 01 OF 02 041124Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01
	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W		

----------D0D058 041136Z /38

R 041117Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8159
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002754

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 00097

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-04-08
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: PARTAI KEADILAN CONTACTS STRESS DEMOCRATIC, REFORMIST CREDENTIALS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PO WILLIAM PIERCE. REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE PARTAI KEADILAN, OR JUSTICE PARTY (PK)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02754 01 OF 02 041124Z
IS WIDELY CONSIDERED AN ISLAMIC PARTY REPRESENTING EITHER HARSH MODERNIST ISLAMIC VALUES OR THE STATUS QUO (OR BOTH). PK REPRESENTATIVES IN EASTERN INDONESIA STRONGLY RESIST SUCH LABELS. THEY INSIST THAT THEIR APPROACH TO THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN GOVERNMENT IS GRADUALIST AND MORAL. IT IS NOT ACHIEVED THROUGH DIKTAT. MOREOVER, THEY RESIST ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE PK IS STATUS QUO OR WILL FALL AUTOMATICALLY INTO AN ISLAMIC CAMP. THE PARTY IS REFORMIST AND WILL ALIGN WITH REFORMIST PARTIES, BE THEY ISLAMIC OR NATIONALIST. SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, PK CONTACTS SAID THEY HOPED TO GET 10 PER CENT OF THE VOTE IN THE ELECTION COMING OUT OF UNIVERSITIES AND CITIES. NOW THEY SAY THAT, GIVEN A SUCCESSFUL COUNTRYSIDE CAMPAIGN OF PROVIDING SERVICES AND AVOIDING STERILE PROMISES, THEY SHOULD DO BETTER. PARTY CADRES ARE EDUCATED AND COMMITTED. IF THE PARTY CAN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

AVOID TRAPPING ITSELF IN THE DICHOTOMY OF ISLAMIC/NATIONALIST POLITICS, IT COULD BE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE IN BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. END SUMMARY

3. (C) MOST POLITICAL OBSERVERS CONSIDER THE PK TO BE A STRONG SECOND-TIER PARTY; AFTER THE BIG FIVE DIVIDE UP THE LION'S SHARE OF THE VOTES, PK AND PERHAPS A FEW OTHERS WILL PICK UP ENOUGH SCRAPS TO SECURE SOME SEATS IN THE PARLIAMENT (DPR). WHETHER PK REPRESENTATION IN THE DPR WOULD TEND TO BE REFORMIST (AS THE RECENT JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH PAN AND PPP TO OPPOSE STATUS QUO FORCES MIGHT SUGGEST) OR WOULD LEAN TOWARD PARTNERSHIP WITH AN ISLAMICIZED GOLKAR (AS MANY OBSERVERS ASSUME WILL BE THE CASE WITH ISLAMIC-BASED PARTIES) REMAINS AN OPEN QUESTION. WE HAVE SPOKEN WITH PK LEADERSHIP FROM EAST JAVA (SURABAYA AND JEMBER), CENTRAL JAVA (SEMARANG), WEST NUSA TENGGARA (MATARAM), AND SOUTH SULAWESI (UJUNG PANDANG) TO GET THEIR VIEWS ON WHAT PK REPRESENTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

WE'RE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC, REALLY

4. (SBU) PK IS WIDELY KNOWN AS AN ISLAMIC PARTY. BEYOND THAT, AS OUR CONTACTS TELL IT, TOO LITTLE IS UNDERSTOOD ABOUT THE ROLE AND NATURE OF RELIGION WITHIN THE PARTY. FREQUENTLY, OTHER PARTIES AND POLITICAL OBSERVERS DESCRIBE PK AS RADICAL OR FUNDAMENTALIST. (OBSERVERS IN UJUNG PANDANG SUGGESTED THAT, GIVEN WHAT IS SEEN A THE PK'S UNEXPLAINED, AMPLE FUNDING, IT HAS BEEN BOUGHT AND PAID FOR BY SUHARTO OR HABIBIE.) OUR PK CONTACTS REJECT BOTH LABELS.

5. (SBU) PK IS NOT INTERESTED IN IMPOSING RAPID AND RADICAL CHANGE, WE WERE TOLD. INSTEAD, PARTY LEADERS WISH TO EMPLOY A GRADUALIST APPROACH THAT WILL BRING THE COUNTRY INTO ACCORD WITH CORE MORAL VALUES ROOTED IN THEIR FAITH. THAT GRADUALISM INVOLVES BUILDING A GREATER POLITICAL AWARENESS WITHIN THE POPULACE, ENGAGING IN DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION AND DECISION-MAKING, AND CULTIVATING A RESPECT FOR THE SANCTITY OF LAW, CONTACTS SAID. THE MORAL VALUES THEY MENTIONED WERE NOT PECULIARLY ISLAMIC (AN OPPOSITION TO CORRUPTION, THE UPHOLDING OF JUSTICE, A REFUSAL TO DENIGRATE OTHERS) BUT REALLY UNIVERSAL VALUES FOUND IN ALL RELIGIONS. CONTACTS STRESSED THAT THEY WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF A TEN-YEAR OR GREATER TIME FRAME FOR MAKING REAL PROGRESS ON THEIR GOALS.

6. (SBU) WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS DICTATES OR PROHIBITIONS WITHIN THE PK ORGANIZATION AND FOR A POSSIBLE PK GOVERNMENT, CONTACTS SAID THAT THEY ARE NOT AND WOULD NOT BE USED. UNLIKE WITHIN THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU), GROUPS OF KIAIS

(ISLAMIC CLERICS) INVOLVED WITH PK DO NOT ISSUE FATWA OR
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02754 01 OF 02 041124Z
GUIDANCE TO BE FOLLOWED BY ITS ADHERENTS. RATHER, PK LEADERSHIP RELIES ON DEBATE AND PERSUASION. NOR WOULD A PK GOVERNMENT USE RELIGIOUS DICTATES TO CLAMP DOWN ON BEHAVIOR IT CONSIDERS IMMORAL, CONTACTS SAID. IN ADDRESSING PROBLEMS OF DRUG ABUSE, FOR EXAMPLE, WE WERE TOLD THAT PK WOULD FOCUS ON THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROBLEM.

7. (SBU) OUR CONTACTS RESISTED THE FUNDAMENTALIST LABEL, BELIEVING THAT THOSE TRYING TO TAG THEM WITH IT WISHED TO RAISE THE SPECTER OF AUTHORITARIAN MIDDLE EASTERN REGIMES. (ONE SPOKE OF A TOO COMMON ISLAMO-PHOBIA WHICH FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT MINUS THE REPRESSION.) CONTACTS SAID THAT ISLAM IN INDONESIA COULD NOT BE RIGID BUT RATHER HAD TO ACCOMMODATE ITSELF TO LOCAL CULTURES AND TO THE NEEDS OF LOCAL PEOPLES. PK ADHERENTS CONSIDERED THEMSELVES AS DEVOUT YET TOLERANT.

CUTTING THROUGH THE NATIONALIST/ISLAMIC DIVIDE?
---

8. (C) MUCH PRE-ELECTION SPECULATION HAS FORESEEN A NATIONALIST CAMP, COMPRISED OF MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN AND GUS DUR'S PKB, PITTED AGAINST AN ISLAMIC CAMP, MADE UP OF AN ISLAMICIZED GOLKAR, PPP, AND SMALLER ISLAMIC PARTIES (INCLUDING PK). WHEN PRESENTED WITH THIS SCENARIO, OUR PK

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8584

PAGE 01 JAKART 02754 02 OF 02 041124Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01
	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W			

----------D0D05F 041137Z /38

R 041117Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8160
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002754

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 00097

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-04-08
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: PARTAI KEADILAN CONTACTS STRESS DEMOCRATIC, REFORMIST CREDENTIALS

CONTACTS SAID THAT SUCH ANALYSIS MISUNDERSTOOD THE KEY DYNAMICS OF POST-NEW ORDER INDONESIA. RATHER, REFORM-ORIENTED PARTIES WERE LIKELIER TO LINE UP AGAINST STATUS QUO FORCES.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02754 02 OF 02 041124Z

(NOTE: THE CLEAREST ARTICULATION OF THIS POSITION CAME FROM PK SURABAYA DAYS FTER PPP AND PK JOINED PAN IN THEIR ANTI-STATUS QUO DECLARATION). PK IS FUNDAMENTALLY A REFORM PARTY, WE WERE TOLD. AS SUCH, IT WOULD NOT CONSIDER ALLIANCE WITH AN ISLAMIC-ORIENTED PARTY THAT WAS NOT REFORMIST BUT WOULD ALLY WITH A REFORM PARTY THAT WAS NOT ISLAMIC.

9. (C) WHEN ASKED WHY PK'S RECENT VOTE-SHARING AGREEMENT WAS ONLY WITH OTHER ISLAMIC PARTIES, CONTACTS OFFERED TWO EXPLANATIONS. WHILE THEY HAVE BEEN WILLING TO WORK WITH NON-ISLAMIC REFORM PARTIES, THEY BELIEVE THAT MOST NON-ISLAMIC PARTIES ARE UNWILLING OR HESITANT TO JOIN FORCES WITH THEM DUE TO EXAGGERATED FEARS OF ISLAM. ALSO, CONTACTS TOLD US THAT BECAUSE PK IS COMMITTED TO A RATIONAL, PERSUASIVE STYLE OF CAMPAIGNING, THEY ARE HESITANT TO JOIN WITH PARTIES WHOSE APPEAL IS PRIMARILY EMOTIONAL. (COMMENT: OUR CONTACTS IMPLIED THAT THIS PERCEPTION WAS, FOR THE MOMENT, RULING OUT PARTNERSHIP WITH PDI-P AND PKB. BUT IT IS A STRETCH TO SUGGEST THAT PPP CAMPAIGN METHODS ARE NOT EMOTIONAL, AND YET PK JOINED WITH THE PPP IN THE JOINT DECLARATION. IT MAY BE THAT OUR CONTACTS ARE OUT OF TOUCH WITH A CENTRAL LEADERSHIP PREFERENCE TO WORK WITH FELLOW ISLAMIC PARTIES.)

ELECTION PROSPECTS

10. (C) PK'S STRENGTH IS ON CAMPUSES AND IN CITIES. IN LATE 1998 AND EARLY 999, PK CONTACTS TOLD US THAT THEY HOPED TO BUILD UPON THESE CORE CONSTITUENCIES TO GAIN 10% OF THE VOTE. HOWEVER, THEY ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WAS ONLY A GOAL, AND IN NU STRONGHOLDS LIKE JEMBER, AN ELUSIVE ONE. DURING CONVERSATIONS IN MAY, HOWEVER, PK CONTACTS INDICATED THAT THEY

CONFIDENTIAL

MIGHT BE ABLE TO EXCEED THEIR TARGET DUE TO UNEXPECTED SUCCESS IN REACHING NON-STUDENTS AND IN BUILDING MEMBERSHIP OUTSIDE OF UNIVERSITY TOWNS. THEY ATTRIBUTED THEIR UNEXPECTED SUCCESS TO A CAMPAIGN PROGRAM THAT HAS BEEN CLEAR AND CONCRETE. THE SLIDING-SCALE HEALTH CARE SERVICES PROVIDED THROUGH MOBILE CLINICS HAS PROVEN VERY POPULAR. PEOPLE HAVE ALSO RESPONDED TO PK PROGRAMS DISTRIBUTING FERTILIZER AND PROVIDING LEGAL ADVOCACY REGARDING LAND RIGHTS. (WE WERE TOLD THIS IS NOT MONEY POLITICS SINCE THE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES ARE NOT FREE.) CONTACTS BELIEVED THEIR CAMPAIGN TACTICS TIED IN WELL WITH THEIR MESSAGE OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE (THE INVERSE OF THE NEW ORDER PARADIGM, WE WERE TOLD). VOTERS WERE SEEING THAT PK WAS MOVING BEYOND RHETORIC AND EMPTY PROMISES TO CONCRETE ACTION ASSISTING THE ORDINAY PERSON, THUS GOING BEYOND TRADITIONAL POLITCS OF PROMISES AND SLOGANS.

11. (SBU) OUR EST JAVA CONTACTS ALSO SAID THAQTHEY WERE AVING SOME UNEXPECTED SUCCESS ATTRACTING SUPPORTFROM RURAL PESANTRENS. SOME NU KIAIS HAD REPRTEDLY COME OVER TO PK FROM PKB. CONTACTS SAD THAT MORE SUCH CONVERSIONS MIGHT OCCUR IN FUTURE CAMPAIGNS, AS CULTURAL AND EMOTIONAL AFFILIATIONS GIVE WAY TO RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING.

COMMENT

---

12. (C) MOST ALL OF THE PK CONTACTS WITH WHOM WE MET WERE UNDER 30. THEY ARE WELL EDUCATED, ARTICULATE, AND WELL ORGANIZED. THEY SEEM COMMITTED TO ACHIEVING LONG-TERM GOALS. THE PARTY IS NOT DEPENDENT UPON ANY SINGLE PERSONALITY FOR ITS IDENTITY AND PERPETUATION (THEY PRIDE THEMSELVES ON THAT FACT). THESE INDICATIONS SUGGEST PK SHOULD BE A PLAYER WELL

CONFIDENTIAL

INTO THE FUTURE. FURTHERMORE, EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT, AS LONG AS THE PARTY DOES NOT TRAP ITSELF IN THE DICHOTOMIES OF ISLAM/NATIONALIST, ITS INFLUENCE SHOULD BE POSITIVE IN BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN INDONESIA (EMBASSY COMMENT: RECENT EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH PK IN WEST JAVA GAVE US A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT IMPRESSION OF THE PARTY AND THE SENSE THAT THEY WERE SQUARELY IN THE CAMP OF THOSE WHO WOULD LIKE TO SEE A MUCH STRONGER ROLE FOR ISLAM IN INDONESIAN NATIONAL LIFE.) PK MEMBERS' UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRINCIPLES, THE CHALLENGES, AND THE PACE OF DEMOCRACY SEEMS AS SOUND AS ANY THAT WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED. PIERCE/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5414

PAGE 01 JAKART 02540 01 OF 02 240707Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W		

----------CC1A05 240708Z /38

P 240706Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7918
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002540

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES ELECTION PREPARATIONS WITH

ELECTION COMMISSION CHAIRMAN

REF: JAKARTA 2341

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02540 01 OF 02 240707Z
1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: ON MAY 21, AMBASSADOR ROY CALLED ON ELECTION COMMISSION CHAIRMAN RUDINI TO OBTAIN AN UPDATE ON ELECTION PREPARATIONS AND TO ASK FOR CLARIFICATION ON SPECIFIC ISSUES OF CONCERN. RUDINI CHARACTERIZED PREPARATIONS TO DATE AS "SO FAR, SO GOOD." THEY DISCUSSED THE SYSTEM THAT WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO DETERMINE WINNING CANDIDATES WITHIN PARTIES, CAMPAIGN FINANCE, THE RULES FOR SELECTING THE TWO HUNDRED MEMBERS OF THE MPR NOT ELECTED IN THE GENERAL ELECTION, BALLOT SECURITY, AND ELECTION DAY SECURITY. END SUMMARY

3. (U) AMBASSADOR ROY MET WITH GENERAL (RET.) RUDINI,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU), ON MAY 21. RUDINI WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AHMADI, AN OFFICIAL FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS ON LOAN TO THE KPU. USAID MISSION DIRECTOR MYERS, USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE OFFICER, AND POLOFF ATTENDED.

"SO FAR, SO GOOD." SAYS CHAIRMAN

4. (C) RUDINI OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY DESCRIBING ELECTION PREPARATIONS TO DATE AS "SO FAR, SO GOOD." HE WAS PLEASED THAT POLITICAL PARTIES WERE FOR THE MOST PART ABIDING BY KPU RULES IN THE CAMPAIGN TO DATE. HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROSPECT THAT IF RULING PARTY GOLKAR WERE TO WIN THE ELECTION, AN OUTCOME HE THOUGHT WAS POSSIBLE, OTHERS WOULD REJECT THE OUTCOME. HE WAS URGING MAJOR PARTIES TO PROCEED CALMLY DURING THE CAMPAIGN.

REGULATION ON SEAT ALLOCATION

5. (C) THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE REGULATION ESTABLISHING THE SYSTEM BY WHICH WINNING CANDIDATES WILL BE DETERMINED WITHIN PARTIES WAS VERY IMPORTANT. CITIZENS' FEAR OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PARTY MANIPULATION OF ELECTION OUTCOMES COULD POSE DANGERS TO THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ELECTION. BOTH DANGERS COULD MATERIALIZE, ABSENT A CLEAR RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE.

6. (C) RUDINI PROVIDED A SUBSTANTIVE, YET CONFUSING, RESPONSE TO THIS QUESTION. HE SAID THAT THE 48 POLITICAL PARTIES ON THE KPU HAD FINALLY REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE RULES. AS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED BY LAW, A PARTY WOULD WIN SEATS IN THE NATIONAL LEVEL DPR BASED ON THE PROPORTION OF VOTES IT OBTAINED IN EACH PROVINCE. AS IMPLIED BY THE LAW, THE CENTRAL PARTY LEADERS, WOULD NOT HAVE THE POWER TO DETERMINE WHICH OF THEIR LISTED CANDIDATES WOULD BE SEATED. INDIVIDUAL WINNERS WOULD BE BASED ON THE NUMBER OF VOTES WON IN DISTRICTS AND MUNICIPALITIES. RUDINI BELIEVED THAT THIS REGULATION HAD BEEN ISSUED, THOUGH NEITHER WE NOR IFES HAVE HEARD ABOUT IT, AND KPU STAFF COULD NOT MAKE IT AVAILABLE TO US AFTER THE MEETING.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE

7. (C) THE AMBASSADOR ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING CONTROLS ON THE ROLE OF MONEY IN THE

ELECTION. RUDINI SAID THAT A REGULATION HAD BEEN PASSED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02540 01 OF 02 240707Z
VERY RECENTLY THAT WOULD LIMIT EACH PARTY TO SPENDING 110 BILLION RUPIAH (ALMOST 14 MILLION USD) OVERALL IN THE CAMPAIGN. ONLY GOLKAR HAD OPPOSED THIS LIMIT, ARGUING THAT IT WAS TOO LOW. EACH PARTY'S FINANCES WOULD BE AUDITED SEVEN DAYS BEFORE THE ELECTION, AND THE RESULTS WOULD BE SENT TO THE KPU.

RULES FOR SELECTING 200 EXTRA MEMBERS OF MPR

8. (C) THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ELECTION COULD BE UNDERMINED IF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) WERE TO SELECT A PRESIDENT WHO DID NOT APPEAR TO ENJOY A POPULAR MANDATE, AS REFLECTED BY THE RESULTS OF THE JUNE 7 PALIAMENTARY BALLOTING. (NOTE: IN ADDITION TO THE 462 ELECTED, AND 38 UNELECTED (TNI) MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, THE MPR WILL BE MADE UP OF 135 REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES (UTUSAN DAERAH) AND 65 SOCIETAL REPRESENTATIVES (UTUSAN GOLONGAN) (ALMOST 30 PERCENT) END NOTE.) IT WOULD BE OF CONCERN IF A POLITICAL PARTY THAT CONTROLLED A PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE WERE ABLE TO SELECT ALL FIVE REPRESENTATIVES THAT PROVINCE SENT TO THE MPR (EACH OF INDONESIA'S 27 PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES WILL ELECT FIVE REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MPR). MANY BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE REGIONAL DELEGATIONS WERE CHOSEN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5417

PAGE 01 JAKART 02540 02 OF 02 240707Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W		

----------CC1A16 240708Z /38

P 240706Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7919
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002540

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES ELECTION PREPARATIONS WITH

ELECTION COMMISSION CHAIRMAN

ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS DEPENDING ON HOW PARTIES FARED IN THE PROVINCE, THE AMBASSADOR SAID.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02540 02 OF 02 240707Z
9. (C) RUDINI EXPLAINED THAT THIS ISSUE WAS STILL UNDER DELIBERATION AND SHOULD BE DECIDED BY MONDAY, MAY 24. HE ANTICIPATED THAT THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES WOULD NOT BE PARTY REPRESENTATIVES. AS THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THIS WOULD NOT STOP THEM FROM BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF WHICHEVER PARTY WAS DOMINANT IN THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE, UNLESS A PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM WAS WORKED OUT.

BALLOT SECURITY; DELIVERY OF INK

10. (C) THE AMBASSADOR MENTIONED THAT THERE HAD BEEN CONCERNS RAISED ABOUT THE SECURITY OF BALLOTS AS THEY WERE BEING DISTRIBUTED. RUDINI REPLIED THAT THE SYSTEM OF AFFIXING A HOLOGRAM TO EACH BALLOT WOULD ADDRESS THIS MATTER. REGARDING THE SECURITY OF THE BALLOT COUNT, POLITICAL PARTIES WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO OBSERVE AND SIGN OFF ON THE COUNT AT ALL LEVELS, MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO COMMIT FRAUD.

11. (C) RUDINI EXPECTED THAT A PRELIMINARY VOTE COUNT WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN ONE OR TWO DAYS, BUT THE OFFICIAL RESULTS WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR TWO WEEKS.

12. (C) REGARDING THE INDELIBLE INK THAT WILL BE USED TO STOP MULTIPLE VOTING, RUDINI SAID THAT IT WAS ALREADY ARRIVING AND BEING DELIVERED. THE ARMED FORCES, USING C-130S, WOULD HELP DELIVER IT TO REMOTE AREAS.

SECURITY ON ELECTION DAY

CONFIDENTIAL

13. (C) RUDINI SAID THAT TWO CIVILIAN DEFENSE PERSONNEL (HANSIP) WOULD BE DEPLOYED TO EACH POLLING STATION. POLICE FORCES WOULD FORM THE NEXT RING OF SECURITY, WITH THE ARMED FORCES BACKING THEM UP.

COMPLAINT RESOLUTION BODY (PANWASLU)

14. (C) ASKED ABOUT THE PANWASLU, RUDINI REPLIED THAT ITS CHAIRMAN WAS WORKING TOO SLOWLY.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3564

PAGE 01 JAKART 02339 01 OF 02 102342Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W				

----------C69BBB 102342Z /38

R 102336Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7691
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002339

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0079

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-10-09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: SMALL NU PARTIES AND HABIBIE

REF: JAKARTA 2207

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PO WILLIAM A PIERCE. REASON 1.5 (D)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02339 01 OF 02 102342Z

2. (C) SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH THE NADLATUL ULAMA (NU) LEADERSHIP HAS FOUNDED THE PARTAI KEBANGKITAN BANGSA (PKB) AS THE OFFICIAL PARTY FOR THE NU, OTHER SMALL NU-BASED PARTIES HAVE EMERGED TO SIPHON VOTES AWAY FROM THE PKB AND NU CHAIRMAN ABDURRAHMAN WAHID. THEY HAVE ACCUSED WAHID AND THE NU LEADERSHIP OF DISCRIMINATING IN FAVOR OF THE PKB AND SOWING DISCORD WITHIN THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY. THE MOST NOTED OF THE SMALL PARTIES IS THE PARTAI KEBANGKITAN UMAT (PKU), LED BY WAHID'S UNCLE, YUSUF HASYIM. HE RUNS TEBUIRENG, A PREEMINENT ISLAMIC SCHOOL IN EAST JAVA. DURING THE SCHOOL'S CELEBRATION OF ITS HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY (WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE PRESENT), YUSUF LAUNCHED FURTHER ATTACKS AGAINST WAHID--TO THE SHOCK OF MANY HERE. NU AND PKB CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT YUSUF, A BACKER OF HABIBIE AND NEVER CLOSE TO WAHID, IS BEING PAID BY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUN 2006 200503412

HABIBIE TO UNDERMINE WAHID AND THE PKB. WHILE THE SMALL NU PARTIES' INFLUENCE IS WEAK, THEY MAY GAIN A DPR SEAT OR TWO. END SUMMARY

3. (C) ALTHOUGH THE NU LEADERSHIP FOUNDED THE PARTAI KEBANGKITAN BANGSA (PKB) AS THE OFFICIAL PARTY FOR THE NU, THIS HAS NOT STOPPED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THREE SMALL PARTIES WITH NU LINKS, THE PARTAI KEBANGKITAN UMAT (PKU), THE PARTAI NAHDLATUL UMAT (PNU), AND THE PARTAI SUNI. THEY ARE COMMONLY SEEN AS LESSER CREATIONS DESIGNED TO SYPHON VOTES AWAY FROM THE PKB IN THE JUNE ELECTION. THE PKU IS HEADED BY YUSUF HASYIM, UNCLE OF NU CHAIRMAN ABDURRAHMAN WAHID. THE PNU IS LED BY A KIAI FROM MADURA, NOW BASED IN JAKARTA. PARTAI SUNI IS LED BY ABU HASAN, AN NU PERSONALITY USED BY SUHARTO IN 1996 IN AN UNSUCCESSFUL TRY TO UNSEAT WAHID FROM THE NU CHAIR.

4. (C) THE THREE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO ERODE THE PKB'S SUPPORT AND HAVE FOUND COMMON CAUSE WITH THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP),

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02339 01 OF 02 102342Z

WHOSE ALL-IMPORTANT NU BASE IN CENTRAL AND EAST JAVA HAS BEEN JUMPING TO THE PKB. IN LATE APRIL, THEY JOINTLY ATTACKED THE NU LEADERSHIP (WAHID) FOR DISCRIMINATING IN FAVOR OF THE PKB. TRYING TO EXPLOIT WAHID'S CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH MEGAWATI, THEY ALSO STATED THEY WOULD REJECT A MEGAWATI PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY BECAUSE SHE IS A WOMAN AND BECAUSE SHE IS SUKARNO'S CHILD. (BY IMPLICATION THEY WERE CHALLENGING WAHID TO ADDRESS THESE TWO ISSUES: THE COMPETENCY OF A WOMAN TO BE INDONESIA'S PRESIDENT AND NU'S VIEW ON SUKARNO.)

5. (C) YUSUF HASYIM APPEARS TO BE THE MAIN GADFLY IN THE EFFORT. HIS MAIN SOURCE OF INFLUENCE IS HIS CONTROL OF PONDOK PESANTREN TEBUIRENG, A RENOWNED ISLAMIC SCHOOL IN JOMBANG, EAST JAVA, SET UP BY WAHID'S GRANDFATHER, A FOUNDER OF THE NU. (MANY RELIGIOUS LEADERS STUDIED THERE INCLUDING WAHID HIMSELF.) ON MAY 8 YUSUF HELD A COMMEMORATION OF TEBUIRENG'S HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY. PRESIDENT HABIBIE ATTENDED, IN THE MIDST OF AN EAST JAVA TOUR THAT INCLUDED KEDIRI AND PACITAN.

6. (SBU) IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, YUSUF CHOSE TO LAMBAST WAHID (ALTHOUGH NOT BY NAME). HE SAID THAT NU ELITES WERE SPOILED AND WANTED TO WIN REGARDLESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES. THEIR ROLE IN THE PKB HAD CAUSED THE RECENT CLASHES BETWEEN PPP AND PKB CADRES. THIS WAS DIVISIVE POLITICS THAT WOULD SPLIT THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY." YUSUF WENT ON TO TIE AMIEN RAIS BY PUN TO THE GROUP (KNOWN BY THE ACRONYM "AMIN") BELIEVED BEHIND THE BOMBING OF JAKARTA'S ISTIQLAL MOSQUE. THE AUDIENCE WAS FILLED WITH YUSUF SUPPORTERS WHO CLAPPED AND LAUGHED AT HIS ATTACKS.

7. (SBU) THE LOCAL PRESS PROFESSED SHOCK THAT YUSUF WOULD CHOOSE A

FORUM WITH THE PRESIDENT IN ATTENDANCE TO AIR INTERNAL NU
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02339 01 OF 02 102342Z
DIFFERENCES. A FORMER TEBUIRENG GRADUATE WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT YUSUF WAS OLD AND IN ILL-HEALTH AND WOULD BE BETTER AT ATTENDING THE AFFAIRS OF HIS SCHOOL RATHER THAN ENGAGING IN POLITICS. JOMBANG'S PKB CHAIRMAN STATED THAT YUSUF'S WORDS WERE "LIES AND HOT AIR."

8. (C) HABIBIE, FOR ONE, GAVE NO HINT OF A REACTION. COMING AFTER YUSUF, HIS SPEECH WAS UNEXCEPTIONAL EXCEPT THAT HE PLAYED UP THE COMMUNIST THREAT, WHICH HAS BECOME ONE OF HIS STOCK THEMES NOWADAYS. HE WAS WISE ENOUGH, HOWEVER, NOT TO LUMP SUKARNOISTS IN WITH THE COMMUNISTS AS HE DID IN A ADDRESS THE WEEK BEFORE.

9. (C) MANY ARE CONVINCED THAT YUSUF, AS WELL AS THE OTHER SMALL NU PARTIES, IS WORKING TO PROMOTE HABIBIE AS PRESIDENT AND KEEP THE PKB, PAN, AND MEGAWATI OUT OF GOVERNMENT. (WHEN YUSUF PASSED BY THE CONSULATE LAST FALL, HIS SUPPORT FOR HABIBIE AT THE TIME WAS OPEN AND STRONG.) CLEARLY HE HAS NEVER SUPPORTED WAHID'S ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN THE NU'S SUPPORT OF SECULAR GOVERNMENT.

10. (C) PKB CONTACTS TELL US THAT THE PKU HAS BEEN BEHIND MANY OF THE ATTACKS ON PKB POLITICAL STANDS AT NU MEETINGS (PARA 12 REFTEL). THEY SAY THAT HABIBIE HAS SUBSIDIZED BOTH THE PKU AND PNU WITH MORE THAN A BILLION RUPIAHS EACH--A CHARGE EASY TO LEVEL, IMPOSSIBLE TO SUBSTANTIATE. YET, HABIBIE'S CLOSE TIE TO YUSUF IS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3565

PAGE 01 JAKART 02339 02 OF 02 102342Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W				

----------C69BBE 102342Z /38

R 102336Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7692
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002339

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0079

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-10-09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: SMALL NU PARTIES AND HABIBIE

OBVIOUS BY HIS PRESENCE AT THE CEREMONY. (HABIBIE ALSO APPOINTED YUSUF TO THE SUPREME ADVISORY COUNCIL (DPA) SOON AFTER BECOMING PRESIDENT.)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02339 02 OF 02 102342Z

11. (C) WILL THE SMALL NU PARTIES GAIN ENOUGH VOTES TO HURT THE PKB? WE DOUBT THAT MUCH SUPPORT FOR THEM WILL SURFACE. SINCE THEY HAVE SOME LEGITIMACY WITHIN NU CIRCLES, THEY WILL BE ABLE TO STIR UP DOUBTS OVER WAHID AND HIS MORE SECULAR STATEMENTS WITHIN THE MOST CONSERVATIVE NU CIRCLES. (THERE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN POCKETS OF DISSENT WITHIN EAST JAVA'S NU COMMUNITY OVER MANY OF WAHID'S VIEWS. YET, IT DOES NOT SEEM STRONG ENOUGH TO MOVE TO OPPOSITION.) YUSUF WILL GAIN SOME VOTES IN THE JOMBANG AREA, AND THE PNU WILL SCRATCH UP A FEW IN SAMPANG AND OTHER MADURESE SPOTS IN EAST JAVA. THEY MAY GAIN SOME MORE THROUGH MONEY POLITICS AND BY USING PARTY SYMBOLS THAT RESEMBLE THE PKB'S AND THUS CONFUSE VOTERS. THEY COULD GET A DPR SEAT OR TWO, ULTIMATELY TO BE USED TO SUPPORT HABIBIE OR, IF HE FALLS THROUGH, AN ISLAMIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE TO THEIR LIKING. PIERCE/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2255

PAGE 01 JAKART 02181 01 OF 04 301102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-07	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/018W						

----------C2A0C7 301102Z /38

R 301059Z APR 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7546
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002181

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 00076

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-30-08
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: WEST NUSA TENGGARA: REFORMASI WEAK; ECONOMY OK; GOLKAR STRONG (BUT PERHAPS NOT STRONG ENOUGH)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PRINCIPAL OFFICER, WILLIAM PIERCE.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02181 01 OF 04 301102Z
REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN WEST NUSA TENGARA, INERTIA IS WINNING THE DAY. REFORMASI HAS YET TO BECOME ANY SORT OF FORCE FOR CHANGE IN THE PROVINCE. NEITHER STUDENTS, NGO'S, POLITICAL PARTIES, NOR A CULTURALLY COMPLACENT POPULACE HAVE AGGRESSIVELY PRESSED FOR A MORE RESPONSIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT. THE ECONOMY HAS BEEN HEALTHY ENOUGH, FURTHER CONTRIBUTING TO AN OVERALL SPIRIT OF COMPLACENCY. THOUGH TOURISM AND RELATED TRADES ARE SUFFERING, FARMERS ARE DOING WELL AS ARE SOME HANDICRAFT EXPORTERS. AMIDST THIS STATIC ATMOSPHERE, GOLKAR REMAINS STRONG. BUT MUCH OF THE VOTE THAT HAD GONE TO GOLKAR IN THE PAST IS NOW EXPECTED TO BE SPLIT WITH FIVE OTHER PARTIES CAPABLE OF WINNING SEATS. GOLKAR MAY COME OUT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

AHEAD IN THE POLLING, BUT IS UNLIKELY TO CAPTURE MORE THAN THREE OF THE NINE SEATS AVAILABLE. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) WEST NUSA TENGGARA (NTB) COMPRISED OF LOMBOK, SUMBAWA, AND NUMEROUS SMALLER ISLANDS, IS ONE OF THE POOREST PROVINCES IN INDONESIA, WITH PER-CAPITA INCOME RANKING 26TH OUT OF 27. THE ECONOMY IS PRIMARILY AGRARIAN. IN THE UPCOMING ELECTION, NTB WILL ELECT REPRESENTATIVES TO FILL 9 SEATS IN THE DPR. FROM 4/19-4/21, ECONOFF MET WITH NGOS, POLITICAL PARTIES, BUSINESS LEADERS, AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN MATARAM, THE CAPITAL OF NTB, TO DISCUSS THE LOCAL REFORM MOVEMENT, THE ECONOMY, AND ISSUES SURROUNDING THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS.

REFORMASI, OR THE LACK THERE-OF

INERTIA TOO STRONG

---

4. (C) MOST ALL OF OUR CONTACTS REPORTED THAT THE SPIRIT OF REFORM WAS WEAK IN NTB AS COMPARED WITH JAVA. VERY LITTLE PRESSURE WAS COMING TO BEAR ON THE SCLEROTIC LOCAL BUREAUCRACY, COURTS, OR ELECTED GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THUS, IT HAS BEEN BUSINESS AS USUAL, WITH CIVIL SERVANTS NO MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE POPULATION'S NEEDS THAN DURING THE NEW ORDER, WE WERE TOLD.

5. (C) A NON-CONFRONTATIONAL LOCAL CULTURE HAS BEEN A KEY FACTOR IN MAINTAINING STATUS QUO RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNED, CONTACTS SAID. MORE SO THAN ON JAVA, RESIDENTS OF NTB WERE AVERSE TO MAKING DEMANDS OF PUBLIC SERVANTS, PREFERRING INSTEAD TO COMPROMISE AND "GET BY." SEVERAL CONTACTS SAID THAT THE LOCAL PEOPLE TENDED TO LACK AMBITION, MAKING THEM EVEN LESS INCLINED TO PRESS FOR THEIR OWN INTERESTS.

STUDENTS, NGO'S, POLITICAL PARTIES ALLOW CORRUPT OFFICIALS OFF THE HOOK

---

6. (C) PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, NO GROUP HAS EMERGED TO SERVE AS THE VANGUARD OF A LOCAL REFORM MOVEMENT, CONTACTS SAID. UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN MATARAM HAVE TAKEN TO THE STREETS FROM TIME TO TIME, BUT THEY HAVE NOT FOCUSED ON LOCAL TARGETS, WE WERE TOLD. INSTEAD, THEY HAVE SERVED AS A FAINT ECHO FOR THE DEMANDS COMING FROM JAKARTA STUDENTS. IN CONCENTRATING THEIR PROTESTS ON ABUSES LIKE THE SHOOTINGS AT

SEMANGGI OR TRISAKTI OR OTHER JAKART-OCENTRIC ISSUES, THEY
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02181 01 OF 04 301102Z
HAVE ALLOWED THE ACTIVITIES OF CORRUPT LOCAL OFFICIALS TO GO UNSCRUTINIZED.

7. (C) ONE NGO CONTACT ADMITTED TO US THAT THE LOCAL NGO COMMUNITY HAS TENDED TO FOCUS ON VERY NARROW ISSUES AND HAS NOT, AS YET, BEEN EFFECTIVE IN GENERATING ANY LARGER MOMENTUM TOWARD REFORM. SEVERAL NGO CONTACTS AND SOME BUSINESS CONTACTS CRITICIZED NTB POLITICAL PARTIES FOR CONCENTRATING SOLELY ON THE MECHANICS OF SECURING AN ELECTION VICTORY AND NEGLECTING TO ARTICULATE THE CONTENT OF THE REFORMS FOR WHICH THEY ARE SUPPOSEDLY FIGHTING. (NOTE: IN NEIGHBORING EAST NUSA TENGGARA, THE CATHOLIC CLERGY HAVE BECOME ACTIVE LEADERS IN REFORM (SEPTEL). IN THE PREDOMINANTLY MOSLEM NTB, NO SUCH COMMUNITY EXISTS, AND THE MOSLEM CLERGY SEEM TO TEND TOWARD POLITICAL CONSERVATISM, RELATIVELY SPEAKING. THIS DEMOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATION MAY MEAN REFORMASI IN NTB IS A STEP BEHIND OTHER OUTER ISLANDS THAT HAVE AN ACTIVIST CATHOLIC CLERGY CHAMPIONING REFORM.)

8. (C) CONTACTS AT THE NTB CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OFFERED A DIFFERENT PARTIAL EXPLANATION FOR THE REFORM MOVEMENT'S WEAKNESS IN NTB. THEY BELIEVED THE LACK OF BIG-TICKET DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS FOR THE PROVINCE HAD MEANT FEWER LOCAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE SORT OF LARGE-SCALE GRAFT THAT COULD FOCUS THE ANGER OF WOULD-BE REFORMISTS. THUS, THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2260

PAGE 01 JAKART 02181 02 OF 04 301102Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-07	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/018W						

----------C2A0E9 301103Z /38

R 301059Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7547
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 49Q5

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 002181

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

FROM AMCQNSUL SURABAYA 00076

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-30-8

TAGS: PGOV, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: WEST NUSA QENGGARA: REFORMASI WEAK; ECONOMY OK;

GOLKAR STRONG (BUT PERHAPS NOT STRONG ENOUGH)

GOVERNMENT'S NEGLECT OF THE PROVINCE OVER THE YEARS NQW MEANS, IRONICALLY, THAT FEWER PEOPLE HOLD VQRULENT ANTI-GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES.

THE ECONOMY

---

9. (C) THE REORM MOVEMENT MIGHT ALSO BE STRONGER IF THE ECQNOMIC CRISIS HAD HAD A MORE SEVERE IMPACT ONNTB. ALL OUR CONTACTS SAID THE ECONOMIC CRISQS HAD HURT THE PROVINCE, BUT MOSTLY IN TERMS OF PRICE INFLATION. SINCE THERE IS VERY LITTLEINDUSTRY, SAVE THE MINING AT PT NEWMONT IN SUMBAWA, THERE HAVE BEEN VERY FEW LAY-OFFS IN CMPARISON WITH INDUSTRIAL AREAS ON JAVA. THE ONLY UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM MENTIONED INVOLVED FOCIBLY-RETURNED ILLEGAL MIGRANT WORKERS BY MALQYSIA (CONTACTS ESTIMATED BETWEEN 60,000 AND 100Q000 MIGRANTS, MOSTLY FROM THE LESS-FERTILE AREAS OF SOUTH LOMBOK, WERE WORKING, LEGALLY AD ILLEGALLY, THROUGHOUT SOUTHEAST ASIA AND IN SAUDI ARABIA. THIS HAS PROVIDED AN ECONOMIC BOOST TO THE REGION AS FOREIGN CURRENCY EARNINGS HAVE BEEN SENT BACK HOME). THUS, NTB HAS NOT EXPERIENCED THE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF HAVING LARGE GROUPS OF THE AGITATED-UNEMPLOYED IN ITS MIDST, AND NO PROTESTS HAVE EMERGED FROM THE ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES OF THE RECENTLY-FIRED.

10. (C) TOURISM IS DOWN. MANY OF THE LOCAL HANDICRAFT MAKERS HAVE SEEN SALES DROP AS MANQ OF THE TOURISTS THAT ONCE BOUGHT THEIR WARESHAVE DISAPPEARED. BUT NEW EXPORT

MARKETS FOR LOCAL POTTERY AND CLOTH HAVE MEANT SOLID INCOMES FOR MANY OTHERS. SEVERAL BUSINESS CONTACTS PQAISED A PARTNERSHIP WITH NEW ZEALAND WHEREQY LOCAL POTTERS RECEIVED GUIDANCE ON DESIGN AND QUALITY CONTROL AS WELL AS ACCESS TO NEW ZEAAND MARKETS. THE ARRANGEMENT HAS APPARENTLY BEQN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN BOOSTING LOMBOK'S POTTERQ EXPORTS.

AGRICULTURE OK

11. (C) MOST OF NTB RESIDENTS ARE SMALL-SCALE ARMERS. IN THE FERTILE AREAS OF NORTH AND CEQTRAL LOMBOK, HIGHER SALES PRICES HAVE BEEN A QOON FOR MANY, THOUGH PROFITS HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT OFFSET BY HIGHER COSTS FOR FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDES. CONTACTS MENTIONED TOBACCO AND PEPERS AS TWO OF THE MORE PROFITABLE CROPS. THEEXTRA RAINS FROM LA NINA HAVE ALLOWED MANY FAQMERS TO SQUEEZE A THIRD HARVEST OUT OF THEIR LAND OVER AND ABOVE THE NORMAL TWO. BUT THE EXCESSIVE RAINS HAVE HARMED OTHERS AS THE EXTENED WET SEASON HAS LED TO CROP LOSS DUE TO DISQASE IN MANY AREAS. HARD DATA WERE NOT AVAILABLE, BUT CONTACTS BELIEVED THAT, ON AVERAGE AND ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, FARMERS WERE DOING WELL URING THE ECONOMIC CRISIS.

A LACK OF ECNOMIC RESENTMENT

12. (C) PERHAPS BECAUSE THERE HAS NOT BEEN ENOUGH MONEY FLOWING INTO NTB TO CREATE MUCH OF AN ECONOMIC GAP, ECONOMIC RESENTMENT DOES NOT SEEM TO BE MUCH OF A FACTOR. ALL OF OUR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02181 02 OF 04 301102Z

CONTACTS STRESSED HOW LOMBOK HAS BEEN UNAFFECTED BY THE VIOLENCE TOUCHING OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, THEY DID ACKNOWLEDGE A SMALL CHANCE THAT THEIR LUCK COULD CHANGE. CONTACTS DESCRIBED SOME RESENTMENT DIRECTED AT PT NEWMONT AND THE LOCAL PEARL INDUSTRY FOR BRINGING IN WORKERS FROM JAVA RATHER THAN EMPLOYING LOCALS. THERE HAS BEEN SOME TENSION WITH THE BALINQSE MIGRANTS WHO HAVE TAKEN MANY OF THE JOBS WITHIN THE TOURISM INDUSTRY. THERE HAS BEEN SOME ANTAGONISM TOWARDS THE SMALL CHINESE MINORIY THAT CONTROLS MUCH OF THE BUSINESS IN CAKRAQEGARA, LOMBOK'S COMMERCIAL CENTER. (NOTE: TRQNSMIGRATION WAS NOT MENTIONED AS A SOURCE OF TENSION, PERHAPS SINCE MOST OF THE ACTIVITY HAS IVOLVED MOVING PEOPLE WITHIN THE PROVINCE, FROM THE MORE CROWDED LOMBOK TO THE NEIGHBORING AND CULTURALLY SIMILAR SUMBAWA.) WHILE SOME CONTACTS WONDERED WHETHER VIOLENCE COULD ERUPT IF PROVOCATEURS WERE SENT IN TO STIR THINGS UP, MOST THOUGHT THESE TENSIONS TO BE INSUFFICIENTLY INTENSE TO LEAD TO ANY SERIOUS TROUBQE.

ELECTIONS
---

13. (C) FAR AWAY FROM THE EPICENTER OF "REFORMASI" AND "KRISMON" IN JAKARTA, THE ISLANDS OF NTB AVE NOT EXPERIENCED MUCH TO SHAKE UP THE STATQS QUO. AS A RESULT, ACCORDING TO OUR CONTACTQ, THE POLITICAL PARTY OF THE STATUS QUO, GOLKAR, IS STILL FAIRLY STRONG IN THE PROVINCE. GLKAR MAINTAINS A NETWORK THAT INCLUDES CIVIL QERVANTS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS, AND OTHER LONG-TI
E PARTY ACTIVISTS THAT ALLOW IT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 JAKART 02181 02 OF 04 301102Z
INFLUENCE OVEQ VOTERS IN EVERY CORNER OF NTB. NOBODY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2253

PAGE 01 JAKART 02181 03 OF 04 301101Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/011W

----------C2A0BA 301102Z /38

R 301059Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7548
INFO ASEAN CLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 002181

UCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

FROM AMCONSUL SUABAYA 00076

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-30-08

TAGQ: PGOV, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: WEST NUSA TENGGARAQ REFORMASI WEAK; ECONOMY OK; GOLKAR STRONG (BUT PERHAPS NOT STRONG ENOUGH)

THOUGHT GOLKA WOULD RECEIVE ANYTHING CLOSE TO THE 80 PERCEQT TALLY OF THE 1997 ELECTION, BUT FOR MOST, GOLQAR WAS STILL THE PARTY TO BEAT.

14. (C) CONTACTS FROM OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES AND NGO'S ACUSED GOLKAR OF MAINTAINING WHAT STRENGTH ITHAS BY BENDING AND OFTEN BREAKING CAMPAIGN RUQES. CIVIL SERVANTS, 80 PERCENT OF WHOM WE WEQE TOLD ARE STILL LOYAL TO GOLKAR, HAVE BEEN QUIETLY WORKING TO FURTHER PARTY CAMPAIGN ACTIVIIES, WITHOUT REQUESTING THE LEAVE OF ABSENCETHAT THE LAW REQUIRES. ELECTED VILLAGE HEADS AND DISTRICT HEADS HAVE BEEN VIOLATING NEUTRALITY REQUIREMENTS AND CAMPAIGNING FOR GOLKAR. PAN (AMIEN RAIS'S PARTAI AMANAT NASIONIAL) GAVE AN EXAMPLE WHEREBY VILLAGE HEADS WOULD TURN OUT THE ENTIRE VILLAGE FOR "VOTER-EDUCATION" PRESENTATIONS, BUT WOULD ONLY INVITE A GOLKAR REPRESENTATIVE TO SPEAK. PAN ALSO TOLD US THAT MANY VILLAGE HEADS HAD BEEN PROMISED SEATS IN THE REGIONAL PARLIAMENT IN EXCHANGE FOR CAMPAIGNING ON BEHALF OF GOLKAR

MONEY POLITICS
---

15. (C) ALL OUR POLITICAL PARTY CONTACTS SAID THAT "MONEY POLITICS" (ESSENTIALLY, BUYING SUPPORT AND VOTES) WAS UNDERWAY. PAN, GOLKAR, AND PDI-PERJUANGAN (MEGAWATI'S PARTAI DEMOKRASI INDONESIA-PERJUANGAN) CONTACTS ALL SAID THAT PARTAI DAULAT RAKYAT - A NEW PARTY INFORMALLY AFFILIATED WITH MINISTER OF COOPERATIVES ADI SASONO - HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTING BQSIC STAPLES THROUGH COOPERATIVES AND SAYING THAT THE FOOD WAS COURTESY OF PDR. GOLKAR AND AN BELIEVED THE NGO COMMUNITY WAS PUTTING RESOURCES BEHIND

MEGAWATI. PAN, PDI-P, AND PARTAQ KEADILAN ACCUSED GOLKAR OF PRESENTING SOCIAL SAFETY NET RESOURCES AS GOLKAR FACILITIES, ANDOF DISTRIBUTING CASH TO BUY INFLUENCE. PAN QND PDI-P DID OFFER ONE SPECIFIC EXAMPLE, OF GLKAR BAGMAN BARAMULI DISTRIBUTING 50 MILLION RUPIAH TO KIAIS (MOSLEM CLERGYMEN) THROUGHOUT NTB TO BUY THEIR SUPPORT. BUT THE EXAMPLE MAY QOT, IN ITSELF, CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF CAMPAIGN LAWS. WHEN GOLKAR CONTACTS WERE ASKED ABUT THIS ACCUSATION, THEY REPLIED THAT IN FACT HE AMOUNTS GIVEN HAD BEEN HIGHER. HOWEVER, THQY SAID, THE KIAIS RECEIVING THE MONEY WERE ACQUALLY LONG-TIME GOLKAR ACTIVISTS WHO WERE BEING GIVEN FUNDS TO CONDUCT LEGITIMATE CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES. (WE DID NOT DISCUSS THE SOURCE OR THE INTENDED USE OF THE MONEY.)

AN NGO REPRESENTATIVE OTHERWISE CRITICAL OF GOLKAR AGREED THAT THIS EXAMPLE OF MONEY POLITICS, REPORTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS, MAY NOT IN FACT REPRESENT AN ABUSE, BUT RATHER A REFLECTION OF THE IMMENSE RESOURCES AT GOLKAR'S DISPOSAL.

16. (C) IN ANTICIPATION OF A SURGE IN PAYMENTS TO VOTERS PRIOR TO THE ELECTION, PAN CONTACTS SAID THEY WERE WAGING A CAMPAIGN TO PERSUADE PEOPLE TO ACCEPT MONEY IF OFFERED BUT TO STILL VOTE THEIR CONSCIENCE. PARTY ACTIVISTS ARE TELLING VOTERS THAT SINCE THE MONEY OFFERED REALLY BELONGS TO THE PEOPLE (SUGGESTING IT WAS EMBEZZLED FROM THE PUBLIC PURSE), THEY SHOULD ACCEPT IT BUT FEEL NO OBLIGATION TO OFFER THEIR VOTE IN RETURN. PARTAI KEADILAN CONTACTS EXPLAINED TO US THAT MONEY POLITICS WOULD NOT WORK IF PEOPLE UNDERSTOOD THAT BALLOTS ARE NOT CODED AS THEY WERE IN THE PAST. ONCE PEOPLE KNEW THAT THEY CAN TAKE A PAYMENT FROM A PARTY BUT STILL CAST A BALLOT FOR A DIFFERENTPARTY WITHOUT BEING FOUND OUT, THE SYSTEM OF QONEY POLITICS WILL BE UNDERMINED. AGAINST

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02181 03 OF 04 301101Z

THIS OPTIMISM STANDS THE OBSERVATION OF THE HEAD OF AN NGO DOING RURAL FIELD RESEARCH. WHEN AKING PEOPLE THROUGHOUT NTB FOR WHOM THEY WERE GOING TO VOTE, SHE FREQUENTLY HEARD "FOR WHOEVER GIVES US RICE."

ELECTION MONITORING

17. (C) WHEN ASKED WHETHER THEY HAD CONTACTED ELECTION MONITORING BODIES TO REPORT ALLEGED ABUSES OF ELECTION LAWS, NEITHER PARTAI KEADILAN NOR PAN KNEW WHETHER THE MONITORING GROUPS HAD BEGUN ACTIVITIES. PDI-P SAID THAT THEY HAD REPORTED GOLKAR ABUSES TO SUCH GROUPS (THEY DID NOT SPECIFY WHICH GROUPS) BUT COMPLAINED TAT NOTHING HAD BEEN DONE. THEY CRITICIZED MONQTORING GROUPS FOR FOCUSING MORE ON VOTER EQUCATION THAN ON ACTUAL MONITORING. PAN CONTACTQ STRESSED THAT ONCE MONITORS BECAME ACTIVE, THAT THEY WOULD ONLY BE USEFUL IF THEY CARRIED OT THEIR ACTIVITIES IN REMOTE RURAL AREAS; POLQTICAL PARTIES COULD POLICE ONE ANOTHER IN THE BIGGER CITIES, BUT GOLKAR NEEDED TO BE WATCHED AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL.

GOLKAR, AND THE RES

18. (C) ALTHOUGH ALL QF OUR CONTACTS BELIEVED GOLKAR WOULD LIKELY COME OUT FIRST OR SECOND IN NTB BALLOTING, MOST FELT GOLKAR'S MARGIN OF VICTORY, IF IT WON, WOULD BE SLIGHT. A

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 02181 04 OF 04 010053Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-07	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/018W						

----------C2F311 010054Z /69

R 301059Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7549
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T IA L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 002181

USCINCPAQ FOR FPA AMB TWINING

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 00076

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-30-08

TAGS: PGOV, ECON, ID
SUBJECT: WEST NUSA TENGGARA: REFORMASI WEAK; ECONOMY OK;

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02181 04 OF 04 010053Z
GOLKAR STRONG (BUT PERHAPS NOT STRONG ENOUGH)

COMMON CONCEPTION SEEMED TO BE THAT, AT BEST, GOLKAR WOULD COME OUT A NOSE AHEAD IN A CROWDED FIELD, WITH AROUND 20 PERCENT TO 25 PERCENT OF THE VOTE (BUT UP TO PERHAPS 40 PERCENT IF THE MONEY POLITICS WENT UNCHECKED). GOLKAR'S STRENGTH WOULD BE IN THE VILLAGES, WHERE THE PARTY MACHINERY WAS MORE SOPHISTICATED THAN OTHERS' WERE, AND WHERE 2.7 MILLION OF NTB'S 3.3 MILLION PEOPLE LIVE (THOUGH REPORTEDLY THE ONLY DISTRICT WITH A COMMANDING GOLKAR MAJORITY IS SPARSELY POPULATED DOMPU, WHERE A MERE FIVE PERCENT OF NTB'S POPULATION LIVES. IN OTHER DISTRICTS, IF GOLKAR HAS A LEAD, IT IS THOUGHT TO BE OF A FEW PERCENTAGE POINTS ONLY). CONTACTS BELIEVED FIVE OTHER PARTIES WOULD RECEIVE SIZABLE SHARES OF THE VOTE:

-- PDI-P WAS FREQUENTLY MENTIONED AS THE STRONGEST ALTERNATIVE TO GOLKAR. ITS STRENGTH LIES IN WESTERN LOMBOK WITH A LARGE POPULATION ON BALINESE MIGRANTS. THE PDI CHAIR SAID THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD "WIN" NTB WITH 20 PERCENT OF THE VOTE. THE PARTY HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN WEAKENED BY INFIGHTING BETWEEN TWO FACTIONS.
-- PAN IS STRONG IN THE URBAN CENTERS OF MATARAM AND BIMA, SUMBAWA, BUT IS WEAKER IN RURAL AREAS.
-- PKB HAS GOOD SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THEPROVINCE, BUT IS SEEING THE NU VOTE SPLIT AS QOTERS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH PKB'S SECULAR NATIONQLISM ARE GOING WITH PARTAI SUNI, PARTAI NAHDLATUL UMAT, AND PARTAI KEBANGKITAN UMAT.
-- PBB ND PPP WERE MENTIONED AS THE LIKELY RECIPIENS FOR MUCH OF THE SIZABLE NAHDLATUL WATHAN (NQ) VOTE (AN NAHDLATUL ULAMA-LIKE GROUP PECULIAR TO LOMBOK. SIXTY TO 70 PERCENT OF

CONFIDENTIAL

LOMBOK'S PPULATION IS NW, WE WERE TOLD). NW ADHERENTS QOULD ALSO VOTE GOLKAR, PKB, AND PAN.

PARTAI KEADILAN HAS A UNIVERSITY STUDENT FOLLOWING, BUT IS NOT EXPECTED TO GET A LARGE ENOUGH PERCENTAGE OF THE OFF-CAMPUS VOTE TO WIN EVEN ONE OF THE NINE SEATS.

COMMENT

19. (C) ACCORDING TO CONVENTIONAL WISDOM, GOLKAR NEEDS TO CLEAN UP IN THE OUTER ISLANDS IN ORDER TO COMPENSATE FOR AN ANTICIPATED POOR SHOWING ON JAVA. BUT THE IMPRESSION NTB CONTACTS GIVE IS OF A VOTE FAIRLY EVENLY DIVIDED AMONG SIX PARTIES WITH A FEW STRAGGLERS COMING IN BEHIND. BARRING ELECTION IRREGULARITIES OR A VERY SUCCESSFUL BUY-OUT-THE-VOTE CAMPAIGN, GOLKAR SEEMS LIKELY TO WIN TWO, MAYBE THREE OF THE NINE VOTES AVAILABLE IN NTB -- HARDLY CLEANING UP. PIERCE/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0144

PAGE 01 JAKART 01805 01 OF 02 121120Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/016W			

----------BA8B3C 121120Z /38

P 121058Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7155
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001805

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

TOKYO PASS A/S ROTH
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: ANTI-ELECTION STUDENTS TO HIT THE STREETS (?)
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 01805 01 OF 02 121120Z

REF: (A) JAKARTA 1613, (B) JAKARTA 1511

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: VARIOUS CONTACTS REPORT THAT HARD-LINE STUDENT GROUPS WILL STAGE A DEMONSTRATION IN CENTRAL JAKARTA, AND POSSIBLY OTHER CITIES ACROSS INDONESIA, ON APRIL 13. ACCORDING TO CONTACTS, THE DEMONSTRATIONS WILL BE PRINCIPALLY DIRECTED AGAINST THE "ILLEGITIMATE" NATIONAL ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE. THE STUDENTS HAVE NOT GIVEN OFFICIAL NOTICE OF THEIR PLANS TO THE POLICE, AS REQUIRED BY A 1998 LAW GOVERNING DEMONSTRATIONS. PERHAPS SETTING THE STAGE, LEADERS OF HARD-LINE GROUPS WERE QUOTED IN A NATIONAL DAILY ON APRIL 11 PREDICTING FRAUD AND FAILURE OF THE ELECTIONS. THE STUDENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

GROUPS REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN PLANNING FOR THE APRIL 13 RALLY DO NOT REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE MAINSTREAM STUDENT MOVEMENT, BUT HAVE A PROVEN TRACK RECORD OF DELIVERING LARGE NUMBERS TO THE STREETS. WHILE WE HAVE MULTIPLE REPORTS OF PLANNING FOR THIS DEMONSTRATION, SUCH PLANS OFTEN DO NOT EVENTUATE. END SUMMARY.

RAMPANT RUMORS/CLAIMS OF APRIL 13 DEMONSTRATION

2. (SBU) VARIOUS CONTACTS REPORT THAT SEVERAL ANTI-ELECTION STUDENT GROUPS ARE PLANNING WHAT THEY HOPE WILL BE A LARGE ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION IN JAKARTA ON APRIL 13. ACCORDING TO SOME SOURCES, STUDENTS WILL STAGE SIMULTANEOUS RALLIES IN A TOTAL OF 16 PROVINCES ACROSS INDONESIA, AS PART OF A PLAN DEVISED AT A CONGRESS OF HARD-LINE STUDENTS HELD IN BALI AT THE END OF MARCH (REF B). STUDENTS PLANNING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE JAKARTA ACTION TOLD POLOFF THEY WILL MARCH TO SIGNAL THEIR

OPPOSITION TO THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 7, WHICH THEY BELIEVE WILL NOT BE FREE AND FAIR. THE STUDENTS ARE ALSO DEMANDING THE DISMANTLING OF THE "DWIFUNGSI" SYSTEM, WHICH DEFINES AN ACTIVE ROLE FOR THE MILITARY IN NATIONAL POLITICS.

3. (SBU) OUR CONTACTS CLAIM THAT STUDENTS WILL GATHER AROUND MIDDAY AT THE MEDICAL CAMPUS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA IN SALEMBA, CENTRAL JAKARTA, AND ATTEMPT TO MARCH TO THE PARLIAMENT (DPR), THE SCENE OF THE TUMULTUOUS AND SOMETIMES VIOLENT STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN MAY AND NOVEMBER, 1998. THE STUDENT GROUPS PLANNING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE APRIL 13 ACTION REPORTEDLY INCLUDE FORUM KOTA (CITY FORUM), FAMRED (STUDENT-PEOPLES' ACTION FRONT FOR DEMOCRACY), KBUI (THE "BIG FAMILY" OF THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA) AND KMB (THE UNITED STUDENTS' COMMITEE.)

SETTING THE STAGE

4. (SBU) PERHAPS SETTING THE STAGE FOR A NEW STUDENT ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION CAMPAIGN, TWO LEADERS OF RADICAL STUDENT GROUPS, FORUM KOTA (CITY FORUM) AND FKSMJ (JAKARTA STUDENT SENATES COMMUNICATION FORUM), WERE QUOTED IN THE MASS CIRCULATION DAILY "MERDEKA" ON APRIL 11, PREDICTING FRAUD AND FAILURE IN THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 7. LABELLING THE ELECTIONS INHERENTLY "ILLEGITIMATE" BECAUSE THEY WILL BE STAGED BY AN "ILLEGITIMATE" REGIME, THE STUDENT LEADERS OPINED THAT "STATUS QUO FORCES" WILL CONTINUE TO MANIPULATE

AND CONTROL THE POLITICAL SCENE WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE JUNE ELECTIONS. THE STUDENTS PREDICTED THAT THE ELECTIONS WILL

BE MARRED NOT ONLY BY FRAUD, BUT BY WIDESPREAD AND ORCHESTRATED VIOLENCE. IN PARTICULAR, THEY IDENTIFIED FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AS CONTINUING TO PLAY A SINISTER ROLE, IN COORDINATION WITH ELEMENTS WITHIN THE HABIBIE REGIME. FORUM KOTA, FKSMJ, AND LIKE-MINDED STUDENT GROUPS BELIEVE THAT A NEUTRAL "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT" UNTAINTED BY CONNECTIONS TO THE SOEHARTO REGIME, MUST BE FORMED BEFORE LEGIMITATE ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD.

POTENTIAL CONFRONTATION
---

5. (SBU) IF THE APRIL 13 DEMONSTRATION GOES AHEAD, THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE STUDENTS AND THE SECURITY FORCES. THERE IS NO LOVE LOST BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STUDENT GROUPS, BY NOW VETERANS OF STREET ACTIVISM, AND THE POLICE AND MILITARY TROOPS WHO ARE DEPLOYED TO CONTAIN THEM. GOI OFFICIALS HAVE PREVIOUSLY LABELED FORUM KOTA AND LIKE-MINDED STUDENT GROUPS AS TROUBLE MAKERS, RABBLE-ROUSERS, AND EVEN COMMUNISTS. FOR THEIR PART, MEMBERS OF THESE STUDENT GROUPS TEND TO SEE SECURITY FORCES AS BRUTAL OPPONENTS OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. FURTHERMORE, THERE HAVE BEEN VIOLENT CLASHES BETWEEN STUDENT GROUPS AND SECURITY FORCES AS RECENTLY AS MARCH 31. (SEE REF A FOR DETAILS.)

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-01	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	ED-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/016W			

----------BA8B42 121121Z /38

P 121058Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7156
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

USMISSION GENEVA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001805

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

TOKYO PASS A/S ROTH
USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: ANTI-ELECTION STUDENTS TO HIT THE STREETS (?)
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 01805 02 OF 02 121120Z

6. (SBU) STUDENT CONTACTS WHO CLAIM THEY WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE APRIL 13 DEMONSTRATIONS TOLD POLOFF THEY HAVE NOT GIVEN FORMAL ADVANCE NOTICE OF THEIR PLANS, AS REQUIRED BY LAW NO. 9/1998, WHICH GOVERNS DEMONSTRATIONS. (NOTE: IN THE MARCH 31 DEMONSTRATION WHICH ENDED IN VIOLENCE (REF A), THE STUDENTS DEMONSTRATING - FROM THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY STUDENT GOVERNMENT - WERE CONSIDERABLY MORE MODERATE THAN THE GROUPS REPORTEDLY PLANNING TO MARCH ON APRIL 13 AND HAD FURTHERMORE GIVEN ADVANCE NOTICE, AND SECURED POLICE PERMISSION, FOR THEIR RALLY. END NOTE.) A MEMBER OF FORUM KOTA TOLD POLOFF ON APRIL 12 THAT HIS GROUP DID NOT GIVE NOTICE OF THE DEMONSTRATION ON PRINCIPAL, BECAUSE THEY CONSIDER LAW NO. 9 ILLEGITIMATE.

OUTLOOK
---

7. (SBU) IN ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS FOR AN APRIL 13 DEMONSTRATION TWO FACTORS MUST BE KEPT IN MIND: FIRST, THE STUDENT GROUPS REPORTEDLY ORGANIZING THIS DEMONSTRATION REPRESENT A MINORITY WING, NOT THE MAINSTREAM, OF THE INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT. WHILE VIRTUALLY ALL POLITICALLY ACTIVE INDONESIAN STUDENTS SHARE THESE GROUPS' OPPOSITION TO A MILITARY ROLE IN NATIONAL POLITICS, MANY DO NOT SHARE THIS COALITION'S OPPOSITION TO THE ELECTIONS. IN THE TWO PERIODS OF MASSIVE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS WITNESSED IN 1998, THERE WAS A MUCH BROADER CONCENSUS AMONG STUDENTS THAT SOEHARTO MUST RESIGN IN MAY, AND THAT PRESSURE MUST BE BROUGHT TO BEAR UPON THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) IN NOVEMBER. THAT WIDE CONCENSUS
UNCLASSIFIED

AMONG STUDENTS IS CURRENTLY LACKING.

8. (SBU) THE SECOND FACTOR, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE GROUPS REPORTEDLY PLANNING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE APRIL 13 ACTION HAVE A PROVEN TRACK RECORD OF DELIVERING THOUSANDS OF DISCIPLINED AND MOTIVATED STUDENTS TO THE STREETS AND THEIR POTENTIAL STRENGTH SHOULD NOT BE DISCOUNTED. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT APPARENT DISARRAY AMONG GROUPS ORGANIZING STUDENTS TO MONITOR THE ELECTIONS, AND PUBLIC BEWILDERMENT ABOUT THE MECHANICS OF THE ELECTIONS, COULD BE DRIVING MORE STUDENTS INTO THE ANTI-ELECTIONS CAMP. ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E51

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 01642 01 OF 02 021237Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DINT-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W	

----------B6FF64 021310Z /38

P 020647Z APR 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-PIMBS// PRIORITY 6976
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA-AP//
CJCS WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J51//
DIA WASHDC//DH-3//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001642

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/05/09
TAGS: PINS, PHUM, PINR, MILI, ID

SUBJECT: SENATOR MCCONNELL MEETS WITH GENERAL WIRANTO

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DATT/ARMA - COL JOSEPH H. DAVES, USA,
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01642 01 OF 02 021237Z
REASON, 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: DURING A CORDIAL 40-MINUTE MEETING WITH SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL ON 1 APRIL 1999, GENERAL WIRANTO REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO NEUTRALITY DURING THE GENERAL ELECTIONS. WIRANTO SAID THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ONGOING INTERNAL MILITARY REFORMS, MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL NO LONGER BE INVOLVED IN DAY-TO-DAY POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF THE COUNTRY, BUT WILL RETAIN A "MACRO" ROLE WITH CONTINUING MEMBERSHIP IN THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (DPR). THE ABRI FACTION WILL BE REDUCED TO THE APPROVED NUMBER OF 38 MEMBERS AFTER THE UPCOMING GENERAL ELECTION AND SHOULD BE ELIMINATED AFTER THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTION IN 2004 CONSISTENT WITH A MORE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE GROWING POLITICAL MATURITY OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE, HE SAID. DESCRIBING EAST TIMOR AS A POLITICAL PROBLEM, WIRANTO SAID THE ABRI PRESENCE THERE IS SOLELY AIMED AT PREVENTING CONFLICT BETWEEN VARIOUS PRO- AND ANTI-INTEGRATION FACTIONS. HE AGAIN ENDORSED THE RIGHT OF THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE OPTIONS OF A WIDE-RANGING AUTONOMY OR AN "HONORABLE AND PEACEFUL" SEPARATION FROM INDONESIA. GENERAL WIRANTO SAID THAT, DESPITE LOW SALARIES AND THE MANY CHALLENGES CURRENTLY FACED BY THE ARMED FORCES, MORALE AND ESPRIT DE CORPS IS GOOD. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND SMALL DEFENSE BUDGET HAVE HAD A SEVERE IMPACT ON MILITARY PROCUREMENT. THE ONLY ACTIVE PROCUREMENT BEING UNDERTAKEN AT PRESENT IS FOR RIOT CONTROL GEAR. WIRANTO SAID HE HAS REJECTED OR CANCELED SEVERAL PROCUREMENT REQUESTS, INCLUDING ORDERS FOR FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, HELICOPTERS AND SUBMARINES. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL MET WITH INDONESIAN DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMED FORCES CHIEF, GENERAL WIRANTO, ON 1 APRIL 1999 AT ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS. FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR MG ALBERT

PARUNTU, DEPUTY ASSISTANT FOR INTELLIGENCE BG ZULFAHAMI AND GENERAL WIRANTO'S MILITARY SECRETARY BG BAMBANG SUTEDJO WERE PRESENT DURING THE 40-MINUTE MEETING. U.S. ATTENDEES INCLUDED MS ELAINE CHAO, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER ROBIN CLEVELAND, USMC BG TERRY PAUL, POLCONS AND DATT/ARMA.

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

4. (C) GENERAL WIRANTO DESCRIBED THE DIFFICULTY OF CARRYING OUT INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI) INTERNAL REFORMS, ALONG WITH "TOTAL REFORM" OF NATIONAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL SYSTEMS, ALL IN THE MIDST OF A TERRIBLE ECONOMIC CRISIS. REPEATING HIS OFT-STATED COMMITMENT TO NEUTRALITY DURING THE UPCOMING GENERAL ELECTIONS, HE SAID ABRI'S ROLE WILL BE QUITE DIFFERENT THIS TIME COMPARED TO ELECTIONS DURING THE PAST 30 YEARS - WHEN THE ARMED FORCES OPENLY SUPPORTED THE GOVERNMENT PARTY, GOLKAR. UNLIKE PAST ELECTIONS, ABRI WILL MAINTAIN EQUAL DISTANCE FROM ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND WORK TO PROVIDE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, HE SAID. REGARDING THE ABRI "DUAL FUNCTION" ROLE, WIRANTO SAID MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL NO LONGER BE INVOLVED IN DAY-TO-DAY POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF THE COUNTRY, BUT WILL RETAIN A "MACRO" ROLE WITH MEMBERSHIP IN THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (DPR).

SEPARATION OF THE POLICE

5. (C) GENERAL WIRANTO DESCRIBED THE CEREMONY HELD AT ABRI HEADQUARTERS EARLIER THAT MORNING TO OFFICIALLY MARK THE ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATION OF THE POLICE FROM THE ARMED FORCES. REMARKING THAT THE POLICE HAD BEEN AN INTEGRAL PART OF ABRI FOR THE PAST 35 YEARS, HE SAID THIS IS THE STARTING POINT FROM WHERE THE POLICE WILL GRADUALLY ASSUME THEIR OWN IDENTITY WITH THEIR OWN

PAGE 04 JAKART 01642 01 OF 02 021237Z
ROLES AND MISSIONS. WITH OFFICIAL SEPARATION OF THE POLICE, ABRI WILL NOW BECOME TNI (TENTARA NASIONAL INDONESIA), THE PRE-SOEHARTO DESIGNATION FOR THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES, HE SAID. WIRANTO SAID HE EXPECTS POLICE STRENGTH TO BE ABOUT 200,000 PERSONNEL WHILE TOTAL ARMED FORCES STRENGTH (TNI) WILL BE ABOUT 300,000.

EAST TIMOR SEEN AS A POLITICAL PROBLEM

6. (C) ADDRESSING ABRI'S ROLE IN EAST TIMOR, GENERAL WIRANTO SAID HE VIEWS THE FUTURE OF THE TROUBLED PROVINCE AS A POLITICAL, NOT A MILITARY ISSUE. AGAIN VOICING SUPPORT FOR THE UN-SPONSORED TRIPARTITE PROCESS, HE SAID THE ABRI PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR IS SOLELY AIMED AT PREVENTING CONFLICT BETWEEN VARIOUS PRO- AND ANTI-INTEGRATION FACTIONS. HE ENDORSED THE RIGHT OF THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE OPTIONS OF A WIDE-RANGING AUTONOMY OR AN "HONORABLE AND PEACEFUL" SEPARATION FROM INDONESIA.

STRICT NEUTRALITY DURING THE ELECTIONS

7. (C) WIRANTO SAID ABRI WILL MAINTAIN STRICT NEUTRALITY DURING THE GENERAL ELECTIONS, LIMITING MILITARY INVOLVEMENT TO THE ROLE OF SECURING AND SAFEGUARDING THE ELECTION PROCESS. HE WELCOMED THE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN OBSERVERS, ADDING THAT HE IS CONFIDENT THE ELECTIONS WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN A FAIR, JUST AND TRANSPARENT MANNER. POINTING OUT THAT ABRI PERSONNEL ARE NOT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 01642 02 OF 02 021237Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DINT-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W

----------B6FF58 021310Z /38

P 020647Z APR 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-PIMBS// PRIORITY 6977
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA-AP//
CJCS WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J51//
DIA WASHDC//DH-3//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001642

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/05/09
TAGS: PINS, PHUM, PINR, MILI, ID

SUBJECT: SENATOR MCCONNELL MEETS WITH GENERAL WIRANTO

ENTITLED TO VOTE, WIRANTO SAID HE IS NOT CONCERNED WITH THE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01642 02 OF 02 021237Z
RESULTS OF THE ELECTION, AS LONG AS THE PROCESS IS DEMOCRATIC, PEACEFUL AND TRANSPARENT. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE PLANNED PARTICIPATION OF 48 QUALIFIED POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE ELECTION AND THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE DURING THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD, WIRANTO SAID HE HAD RECOMMENDED TO THE ELECTION COMMISSION THAT CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY BE RESTRICTED TO INDOOR VENUES, PAID POLITICAL ADVERISEMENTS, DIALOGUE AND DEBATE VIA THE MASS MEDIA. FURTHERMORE, POLITICAL PARTY CAMPAIGN EFFORTS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN A PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY MANNER WHILE FOCUSING ON THE ADVANCEMENT OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GOALS, HE SAID.

ABRI MEMBERSHIP IN THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY
---

8. (C) RESPONDING TO THE SENATOR'S QUESTION ABOUT HOW ABRI REPRESENTATIVES TO THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (DPR) ARE SELECTED, WIRANTO SAID HE PERSONALY APPROVES APPOINTMENTS OF SENIOR OFFICERS TO THE ABRI DPR FACTION BASED ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL BACKGROUND, EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS. HE DESCRIBED THE ABRI DPR FACTION AS A "NEUTRAL BODY" THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN REDUCED FROM 100 MEMBERS IN 1997 TO 75 MEMBERS LAST YEAR. THE ABRI FACTION WILL AGAIN BE REDUCED TO THE APPROVED NUMBER OF 38 MEMBERS AFTER THE UPCOMING GENERAL ELECTION AND SHOULD BE ELIMINATED AFTER THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTION IN 2004 CONSISTENT WITH A MORE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE GROWING POLITICAL MATURITY OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE.

PRAISE FOR THE MARINES
---

9. (C) BG PAUL COMMENDED GEN WIRANTO FOR THE WARM RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES, ESPECIALLY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND INDONESIAN MARINES. OBSERVING THAT MOST OF HIS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01642 02 OF 02 021237Z
PRINCIPAL STAFF ADVISORS ARE GRADUATES OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL

MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET) COURSES, GENERAL WIRANTO SAID THESE WERE HIS VERY BEST OFFICERS. THE IMET TRAINING EXPERIENCE IN THE U.S., HE SAID, PROVIDES THESE OFFICERS WITH A GLOBAL VIEW THAT IS PARTICULARLY HELPFUL TACKLING CUURENT CHALLENGES FACED BY THE ARMED FORCES. WIRANTO SAID HE HAS GREAT CONFIDENCE IN THE COMMANDER OF THE INDONESIAN MARINE CORPS, MG SUHARTO, WHO HE DESCRIBED AS A VERY PROFESSIONAL, DISCIPLINED AND HIGHLY SKILLED OFFICER. UNDER MG SUHARTO'S LEADERSHIP, THE MARINES HAVE DONE A GREAT JOB FACING THE CRITICAL SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE COUNTRY, HE SAID.

MORALE AND ESPIRIT STILL GOOD

10. (C) GENERAL WIRANTO SAID THAT, DESPITE LOW SALARIES, THE MORALE AND ESPRIT DE CORPS OF THE ARMED FORCES REMAINS GOOD. "WE ARE NOT MERCENARIES," HE SAID. MOST MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES ENTER THE MILITARY BECAUSE OF PRIDE IN THE NATION AND THE HISTORIC ROLE OF ABRI. ABRI IS THE INSTITUTION THAT HAS SAFEGUARDS THE UNITY OF THE NATION. THE INTRINSIC VALUES THAT ABRI DEVELOPED AS A GUERILLA WARFARE ORGANIZATION FIGHTING FOR INDEPENDENCE ARE STILL RELEVANT TODAY, HE SAID. HE DESCRIBED THE CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE OFFICERS AND THEIR MEN, WITH THE COMMANDER PLAYING THE ROLE OF FATHER AND TEACHER TO HIS SOLDIERS. THESE VALUES ARE DEEPLY INGRAINED INTO ALL ABRI PERSONNEL, "ONE FOR ALL, ALL FOR ONE," HE SAID.

SEVERE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON MILITARY PROCUREMENT

11. (C) WIRANTO READILY ADMITTED THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

HAS HAD A SERIOUS IMPACT ON MILITARY PROCUREMENT. HE SAID THE SMALL DEFENSE BUDGET DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY MONEY FOR NEW WEAPONS OR EQUIPMENT. THE SERVICES ARE FOCUSING THEIR EFFORTS ON MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING EQUIPMENT. THE ONLY ACTIVE PROCUREMENT BEING UNDERTAKEN AT PRESENT IS FOR RIOT CONTROL GEAR, NO PURCHASES OF SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT. WIRANTO SAID HE HAS REJECTED OR CANCELED SEVERAL PROCUREMENT ORDERS, INCLUDING REQUESTS FOR FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, HELICOPTERS AND SUBMARINES.
OWENS

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1754

PAGE 01 JAKART 01549 01 OF 03 261138Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W	

----------B3E13D 261138Z /38

R 261043Z MAR 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6853
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001549

PHNOM PENH PLEASE PASS TO CODEL MCCONNELL

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, EAID, ID
SUBJECT: WITH ONLY 73 DAYS UNTIL THE ELECTION, GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) MOVING SLOWLY

REF: A) JAKARTA 1212; B) JAKARTA 714
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01549 01 OF 03 261138Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: WITH ONLY 73 DAYS UNTIL THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, THERE IS A GROWING PERCEPTION THAT THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) LACKS A SENSE OF URGENCY IN PREPARING FOR THE POLL. THE KPU IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FORMULATING AND APPROVING ALL OF THE REGULATIONS THAT WILL GOVERN THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION, AND SO FAR IT HAS BEEN BOGGED DOWN IN CONSIDERING A FEW IMPORTANT, YET HIGHLY POLITICIZED, ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, IT SPENT MUCH OF THE WEEK OF MARCH 22 DEBATING WHETHER POLITICAL PARTIES

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

COULD USE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THEIR CAMPAIGNS (IT ULTIMATELY DECIDED TO BAN SUCH PARTICIPATION, SEPTEL TO FOLLOW). IN ADDITION, THE KPU IS ONLY THE TIP OF AN IMMENSE NATIONAL ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE, INVOLVING PROVINCIAL, DISTRICT, AND SUB-DISTRICT COMMITTEES, WHICH ARE STILL BEING CREATED. CONCERNS THAT THE STAFF OF THE OLD SOEHARTO-ERA GENERAL ELECTION INSTITUTE (LPU) WOULD BE HELD OVER ON THE KPU APPEAR TO BE CONFIRMED. ALL OF THESE ISSUES AROSE DURING A MEETING BETWEEN KPU VICE CHAIRMAN ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION AND THE CHARGE ON MARCH 24, AT WHICH THE CHARGE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING ADEQUATE AND TIMELY PREPARATIONS FOR THE ELECTION, AND ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE KPU'S EFFORTS. FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER HAS REQUESTED A MEETING WITH THE KPU DURING HIS UPCOMING VISIT, AND WE ANTICIPATE THAT HE WILL RE-EMPHASIZE THESE POINTS. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) CHARGE AND POLOFF HAD LUNCH WITH ADNAN BUYUNG

NASUTION, THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU), ON MARCH 24. A HIGHLY RESPECTED HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER NOW IN PRIVATE PRACTICE (AN ORIGINAL FOUNDER OF THE LEGAL AID FOUNDATION), BUYUNG IS ONE OF THE (GENERALLY IMPRESSIVE) GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES ON THE KPU.

CONCERN ABOUT SLOW MOVING ELECTION PREPARATIONS; ESPECIALLY NEW NATIONAL ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE

---

4. (C) BUYUNG ADDRESSED CONCERNS THAT HE SAID WERE CIRCULATING ABOUT "WHETHER WE CAN HAVE THIS ELECTION ON TIME." THE CHARGE OBSERVED THAT WITH ONLY 70 PLUS DAYS TO GO BEFORE THE ELECTION, MAKING ADEQUATE AND TIMELY PREPARATIONS FOR IT WAS A KEY CONCERN, AND ASKED WHAT STEPS THE KPU WAS TAKING. BUYUNG SAID THAT THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED COMMISSION HAD NOT YET EVEN FIGURED OUT ITS OWN MEETING RULES. MORE TROUBLESOME, THE MULTI-LAYERED NATIONAL ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE TO CARRY OUT THE POLL REQUIRED BY THE NEW ELECTION LAW WAS ONLY IN THE PROCESS OF BEING ESTABLISHED.

5. (U) (NOTE: THE ELECTION LAWS CALL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU), TO BE FOLLOWED BY A NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE (PPI), PROVINCIAL ELECTION COMMITTEES (PPD-I), DISTRICT/KABUPATEN ELECTION COMMITTEES (PPD-II), AND SUB-DISTRICT/KECAMATAN ELECTION COMMITTEES (PPK), REFTEL B, PARAS 13-15.)

6. (C) THE KPU HAD FORMED ITS OPERATIONAL ARM, THE PPI,
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01549 01 OF 03 261138Z
SAID BUYUNG, THAT WAS THIS WEEK IN THE PROCESS OF VISITING REGIONS THROUGHOUT THE NATION TO ESTABLISH THE PROVINCIAL-LEVEL ELECTION COMMITTEES (PPD-I). THE REST OF THE ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE WOULD THEN HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED STEP BY STEP DOWN TO THE LOCAL LEVEL. (NOTE: IN ADDITION TO THE KPU, PPI, PPD-I'S, PPD-II'S, AND PPK'S, GROUPS WILL BE FORMED AT THE SUB-DISTRICT LEVEL (PPS'S)TO REGISTER VOTERS. END NOTE.)

7. (C) POLOFF ASKED WHETHER FORMATION OF THE PPS'S AND VOTER REGISTRATION WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL ALL OF THE COMMITTEES MENTIONED ABOVE HAD BEEN FORMED. BUYUNG RESPONDED THAT IT WAS A "GOOD QUESTION" TO WHICH HE DID NOT KNOW THE ANSWER.

8. (C) BUYUNG SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER SYARWAN HAMID AND PPI HEAD JACOB TOBING (PDI-P) TO INCLUDE PUBLIC FIGURES AS MEMBERS ON ALL OF THE REGIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEES, AS HAS BEEN DONE FOR THE KPU. (ACCORDING TO THE LAW, ALL OF THE COMMITTEES WILL BE MADE UP OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES. AFTER A PUBLIC CONTROVERSY, THE GOVERNMENT OPTED TO CHOOSE A PUBLIC FIGURE SUCH AS BUYUNG AS ONE OF ITS REPRESENTATIVES

NOTE: NOT PASSED TO ABOVE ADDRESSEE(S)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1675

PAGE 01 JAKART 01549 02 OF 03 261057Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W		

----------B3DD55 261100Z /38

R 261043Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6854
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 001549

PHNOM PENH PLEASE PASS TO CODEL MCCONNELL

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, EAID, ID
SUBJECT: WITH ONLY 73 DAYS UNTIL THE ELECTION, GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) MOVING SLOWLY

ON THE KPU. BUYUNG IS HOPING THAT THIS PRECEDENT CAN BE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01549 02 OF 03 261057Z
FOLLOWED FOR THE OTHER COMMITTEES.)

ELECTION REGULATIONS: COMMISSION BOGGED DOWN ON POLITICIZED ISSUES, WHAT ABOUT THE NITTY GRITTY?
---

9. (C) THE KPU IS IN CHARGE OF FORMULATING THE MORE THAN 70 (78 ACCORDING TO BUYUNG) REGULATIONS THAT WILL GOVERN THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION, INCLUDING THE ELECTION SYSTEM, CAMPAIGN FUNDING, VOTER REGISTRATION, AND PROCEDURES FOR SETTING UP POLLING STATIONS. IT HAS MADE SLOW PROGRESS SO FAR. MANY BASIC DECISIONS ABOUT, AND PREPARATIONS FOR, THE ELECTION CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT UNTIL THESE REGULATIONS HAVE BEEN APPROVED AND ISSUED. CRITICAL ACTIVITIES SUCH AS VOTER EDUCATION CANNOT EFFECTIVELY BEGIN BECAUSE NOBODY KNOWS EXACTLY WHAT TO TELL CITIZENS ABOUT THE DETAILS. "TEAM ELEVEN" WAS CHARGED WITH DRAWING UP DRAFT REGULATIONS DURING FEBRUARY, BUT CLEARLY HAD TO SPEND MOST OF ITS TIME "VERIFYING" WHICH POLITICAL PARTIES COULD COMPETE IN THE ELECTIONS.

10. (C) BUYUNG WAS UNABLE TO CLARIFY BY WHAT DATE THE KPU SOUGHT TO CONCLUDE FORMULATION AND APPROVAL OF THE REGULATIONS, BUT HE DID SAY THAT THE COMMISSION HAD SOUGHT TO SPEED UP THE PROCESS BY BREAKING ITSELF DOWN INTO SUB-COMMISSIONS TO WORK ON THESE REGULATIONS. ACCORDING TO KOMPAS (MARCH 19), THE KPU SUBCOMMISSIONS ARE:

-- A: PLANNING AND BUDGETING
-- B: ORGANIZATION AND LEGISLATION

-- C: INFORMATION, EVALUATION AND DATA

-- D: INSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

11. (C) WHILE BUYUNG DID NOT EXPLAIN THE PRECISE DUTIES OF EACH, HE SAID THAT THE SUB-COMMISSIONS WOULD SEND DRAFT REGULATIONS TO THE FULL KPU TO BE CONSIDERED IN PLENARY (COMMENT: SUGGESTING THAT THE REGULATIONS CAN BE APPROVED IN CHUNKS, WHICH WOULD BE A WELCOME DEVELOPMENT).

12. (C) IT APPEARS, HOWEVER, THAT THE KPU IS FOCUSSING AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF TIME AND ENERGY ON A FEW IMPORTANT, YET HIGHLY POLITICIZED ISSUES, AND IT NOT CLEAR HOW MUCH PROGRESS IS BEING MADE ON ALL OF THE NITTY-GRITTY ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, FROM MARCH 22-24, THE PLENARY SESSION WAS DOMINATED BY DEBATE OVER WHETHER GOVERNMENT MINISTERS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS COULD PARTICIPATE IN THE CAMPAIGN. ON MARCH 25 THE KPU VOTED TO BAN POLITICAL PARTIES FROM INCLUDING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT MINISTERS, IN THEIR CAMPAIGNS. THE JUSTICE MINISTER HAS CHALLENGED THE KPU'S AUTHORITY TO LIMIT THE ACTIVITY OF MINISTERS, AND PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAS REPORTEDLY DECIDED TO REFER THE KPU'S DECISION TO THE SUPREME COURT (SEPTEL WITH MORE DETAILS TO FOLLOW). BUYUNG WAS PRE-OCCUPIED WITH THE ISSUE DURING OUR MEETING.

SCHEDULE FOR VOTER REGISTRATION ALREADY SLIPPED
---

13. (U) ACCORDING TO THE INITIAL SCHEDULE, VOTER

REGISTRATION WAS TO BEGIN IN MID-MARCH. THIS DATE SLIPPED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, BECAUSE -- AS NOTED ABOVE -- REGISTRATION REQUIRES REGULATIONS AND INFRASTRUCTURE. AS HAS BEEN WIDELY NOTED, REGISTRATION WILL BE DIFFERENT FROM THE PAST AS VOTERS WILL GO TO OFFICES TO REGISTER THEMSELVES, RATHER THAN WAITING FOR OFFICIALS TO COME TO THEM.

14. (C) BUYUNG NOTED THAT ACCORDING TO THE NEW SCHEDULE VOTER REGISTRATION WOULD BEGIN ON APRIL 1, AND ASKED POINTEDLY, "CAN WE DO IT?"

15. (C) BUYUNG RECALLED THAT THE ISSUE OF NEEDING AN IDENTIFICATION CARD (KTP) TO REGISTER HAD RECEIVED A GREAT

DEAL OF PUBLIC ATTENTION. HE POINTED OUT THAT WHILE MANY CITIZENS DO NOT HAVE KTP'S, THE LAW PROVIDES FOR THE USE OF OTHER FORMS OF IDENTIFICATION IN ORDER TO REGISTER. (COMMENT: HE IS CORRECT. ACCORDING TO THE ACCOMPANYING OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF ARTICLE 32 OF THE ELECTION LAW, A CITIZEN NEEDS IN ORDER TO REGISTER A KTP OR OTHER FORMS OF LEGAL IDENTIFICATION, SUCH AS A DRIVER'S LICENSE, SCHOOL CERTIFICATE, MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE, PASSPORT OR FAMILY CARD. THE PROBLEM IS THAT PETTY GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION IN

NOTE: NOT PASSED TO ABOVE ADDRESSEE(S)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1676

PAGE 01 JAKART 01549 03 OF 03 261057Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/021W	

----------B3DD5C 261100Z /38

R 261043Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6855
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 001549

PHNOM PENH PLEASE PASS TO CODEL MCCONNELL

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, EAID, ID
SUBJECT: WITH ONLY 73 DAYS UNTIL THE ELECTION, GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) MOVING SLOWLY

MANY CASES PLAGUES THE ISSUANCE OF ALL OF THESE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01549 03 OF 03 261057Z

ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS, MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR POOR PEOPLE WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO OBTAIN THEM. END COMMENT.)

OLD GENERAL ELECTION INSTITUTE (LPU) BUREAUCRATS HOLDING ON IN THE KPU

16. (C) ONE OF THE LAST-MINUTE ADDITIONS MADE BY GOVERNMENT TO THE ELECTION BILL BEFORE SUBMITTING IT TO THQNT WAS A REQUIREMENT THAT THE KPU BE ASSISTED BY A SECRETARIAT GENERAL, HEADED BY A SECRETARY GENERAL AND A VICE SECRETARY GENERAL (ARTICLE 9). THE PRESIDENT, NOT THE KPU, WOULD DETERMINE THE ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THIS SECRETARIAT, AND CHOOSE ITS LEADERSHIP. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTS OPERATIONALLY TO THE KPU BUT ADMINISTRATIVELY TO THE GOVERNMENT. (REFTEL B, PARA 13). THIS PROVISION WAS PASSED BY THE DPR.

17. (C) AS MANY HAD FEARED, BUYUNG CONFIRMED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS A "BUREAUCRAT" FROM THE OLD SOEHARTO-ERA LPU, AND THAT ITS MEMBERS WERE LPU HOLDOVERS. ASKED HOW MANY MEMBERS WERE ON THE SECRETARIAT, HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKING THAT QUESTION HIMSELF, AND HAD NOT FOUND THE ANSWER. HE HAD BEEN SEEKING UNSUCCESSFULLY AN ORGANIZATION CHART FOR THE SECRETARIAT AND THE JOB DESCRIPTIONS OF ITS MEMBERS. HE COMPLAINED THAT THE STAFF WAS NOT VERY HELPFUL TO HIM, AND MENTIONED THAT HE HAD ASKED THE UNDP FOR SOME "REAL PROFESSIONALS."

"MONEY POLITICS"

18. (C) THE CHARGE RAISED THE ISSUE OF "MONEY POLITICS," ABOUT WHICH THERE HAS BEEN GROWING PUBLIC DISCUSSION AND CONCERN LATELY, AND ASKED WHAT THE KPU COULD DO. BUYUNG RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS "LOTS OF TALK, BUT NO CONCRETE PROPOSALS." HE ALSO VENTURED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THERE WERE ENOUGH PRESSURES COMING FROM POLITICAL PARTIES, THE PRESS, AND NGO'S TO COUNTER ANY GOLKAR ATTEMPTS TO USE MONEY POLITICS IN THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION.

UPCOMING VISIT OF FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER

19. (C) BUYUNG RESPONDED ENTHUSIASTICALLY TO THE PROPOSAL THAT FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER MEET WITH THE ELECTION

COMMISSION DURING HIS VISIT NEXT WEEK. HE SAID THAT HE AND ALL THE MEMBERS "APPRECIATED THE VISIT."

COMMENT
---

20. (C) WITHOUT BEING ALARMIST, THE ELECTION COMMISSION VICE CHAIRMAN PROVIDED A SOBERING ASSESSMENT OF WHERE ELECTION PREPARATIONS STAND. WITH ONLY 73 DAYS BEFORE THE JUNE 7 POLL, THERE IS A GROWING SENSE THAT THE REPEATED DELAYS THAT HAVE CHARACTERIZED INDONESIA'S PREPARATIONS FOR THE ELECTION COULD CATCH UP WITH THE COUNTRY. DESPITE THE RECOGNITION SINCE JUNE 1998 THAT TIME WAS SHORT TO PREPARE FOR A REAL ELECTION (ONE YEAR), DEADLINES WERE MISSED AT EVERY STEP, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT'S

SUBMISSION OF DRAFT POLITICAL LAWS TO THE PARLIAMENT, THE PARLIAMENT'S DELIBERATION AND PASSAGE OF THE LAWS, AND THE FORMATION OF THE ELECTION COMMISSION.

21. (C) THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) STARTED OUT ON MARCH 10 WITH THE DIFFICULT CHALLENGE OF HAVING ONLY THREE MONTHS TO MAKE ALL OF THE NECESSARY PREPARATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE NEW POLITICAL LAWS. ADDING TO THE CHALLENGE, THESE POLITICAL LAWS CREATE A COMPLEX ELECTION SYSTEM, BUT LEAVE MANY AREAS VAGUE THAT MUST BE FLESHED OUT BY THE KPU.

22. (C) SO FAR, THE PERFORMANCE OF THE KPU IN THIS DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENT HAS NOT BEEN ENCOURAGING. WHILE IT SHOWED ITSELF TO BE INDEPENDENT OF PRESSURE FROM GOLKAR AND SOME ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT BY DECIDING TO BAN CABINET MINISTERS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM CAMPAIGNING, CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE ATE UP FAR TOO MUCH TIME. ONE CONCERN IS THAT THE GROWING TIME CRUNCH AND THE KPU'S SLOW MOVEMENT ARE LEADING TO A SITUATION WHERE KEY DECISIONS ABOUT THE ELECTION COULD END UP BEING MADE WITHOUT SUFFICIENT TRANSPARENCY. OWENS

NOTE: NOT PASSED TO ABOVE ADDRESSEE(S)

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4676

PAGE 01 JAKART 05355 01 OF 04 271220Z
ACTION SSO-00

INFO LOG-00 ANHR-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SS-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------08487A 271220Z /38

O 271137Z OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0965
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 005355

BEIJING FOR U/S PICKERING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2009
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, ASEC, ID
SUBJECT: CABINET CHOICES REFLECT INCLUSIVE APPROACH, BREAK WITH PAST PRACTICES

REFS: A) JAKARTA 5334 (FIRST IMPRESSIONS)
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05355 01 OF 04 271220Z
B) JAKARTA 5333 (FM ALWI SHIHAB)
C) JAKARTA 5328 (FRUSTRATIONS IN UJUNG PANDANG)
D) JAKARTA 5324 (NEW CABINET ANNOUNCED)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM MICHAEL P. OWENS.
REASON: 1.5 (C) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN SHAPING HIS CABINET, PRESIDENT ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (A.K.A. GUS DUR) APPEARS TO HAVE PUT AT LEAST AS MUCH EMPHASIS ON INCLUSION OF ALL POLITICAL FORCES AND ACKNOWLEDGING REGIONAL SENSITIVITIES AS RETURNING POLITICAL FAVORS. AMIEN RAIS, WHO FIRST CHAMPIONED GUS DUR FOR PRESIDENT, DID WELL IN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

SECURING PORTFOLIOS FOR HIS LOYALISTS, BUT VIRTUALLY EVERY SIGNIFICANT FACTION ON THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE GAINED SEATS AT THE TABLE. CONSIDERING THE LARGE NUMBER OF VOTES THEY PROVIDED GUS DUR, THE HABIBIE-LEANING WING OF GOLKAR DID POORLY, AS PUBLIC PRESSURE NOT TO INCLUDE HOLDOVERS FROM DISCREDITED PAST REGIMES APPEARS TO HAVE HAD AN IMPORTANT IMPACT. THE CABINET APPEARS TO REFLECT A BALANCE OF SECULARISTS AND FIGURES FROM ISLAMIC PARTIES. THE CREATION OF A NEW MINISTRY OF REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND THE APPOINTMENT OF MINISTERS FROM LONG-NEGLECTED PROVINCES INDICATE GUS DUR'S CONCERN ABOUT NATIONAL DISINTEGRATION. HUMAN RIGHTS APPEARS SET TO RECEIVE HIGHER PRIORITY WITH THE CREATION OF A HUMAN RIGHTS PORTFOLIO, THE ABOLITION OF THE INFORMATION MINISTRY AND THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 05355 01 OF 04 271220Z

APPOINTMENT OF PROMINENT HUMAN RIGHTS FIGURE MARZUKI DARUSMAN AS ATTORNEY GENERAL. SIGNIFICANTLY, THE COUNTRY HAS ITS FIRST CIVILIAN DEFENSE MINISTER AND FIRST NON-ARMY MILITARY COMMANDER. WIRANTO WAS BUMPED UPSTAIRS TO A MINISTRY WITH NO MILITARY COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND UNCERTAIN INFLUENCE.

3. (C) IN SHORT, GUS DUR'S CABINET REFLECTS INDONESIA'S NEW, MORE DEMOCRATIC REALITY, WITH MANY OF ITS MEMBERS DRAWN FROM THE ELECTED RANKS OF ITS NEW PARLIAMENT AND OTHERS SELECTED TO REPRESENT IMPORTANT IN A DIVERSE BODY POLITIC STILL GRAPPLING WITH THE IMPERATIVES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. RATHER THAN ONE MAN'S WILL, AS WAS THE CASE FOR 32 YEARS, IT REPRESENTS THE CLEAR DESIRE OF AVERAGE INDONESIANS FOR REAL CHANGE IN THE WAY THEIR NATION DOES BUSINESS. END SUMMARY.

INCLUSION IS THE THEME
---

4. (C) AS MUCH AS AN INEVITABLE SETTLING OF POLITICAL DEBTS, PRESIDENT ABDURRAHMAN WAHID'S CABINET CHOICES APPEAR TO REFLECT HIS DESIRE TO RECONCILE INDONESIA'S FRACTIOUS POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AND REGIONS AS AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP TO TACKLING THE COUNTRY'S MANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS. PERSONAL MOTIVES ASIDE, ABDURRAHMAN'S RATIONALE

IN SEEKING THE PRESIDENCY WAS THAT MEGAWATI
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05355 01 OF 04 271220Z
SUKARNOPUTRI, THE CANDIDATE HE HAD INITIALLY SUPPORTED FOR THE JOB, HAD PROVEN TO BE A POLARIZING FIGURE UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO REACH OUT TO OTHER IMPORTANT CENTERS OF POWER -- INCLUDING PRO-STATUS QUO SUPPORTERS OF FORMER PRESIDENTS SOEHARTO AND HABIBIE, MODERNIST MUSLIM REFORMERS ALLIED WITH AMIEN RAIS, AND THE MILITARY (TNI).

5. (C) THE NEW CABINET IS A STUDY IN CAREFUL TARGETING NOT ONLY OF REGIONS AND FACTIONS, BUT ALSO OF FACTIONS WITHIN FACTIONS WITHIN ALLIANCES. CHOOSING THE CABINET WAS LITERALLY A CASE OF "GOVERNING BY CONSENSUS" AS ABDURRAHMAN (GUS DUR) MET SEVERAL TIMES TO THRASH OUT CABINET DECISIONS WITH MEGAWATI, AMIEN RAIS, GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANDJUNG, AND TNI COMMANDER WIRANTO. IN ANNOUNCING THE CABINET GUS DUR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4677

PAGE 01 JAKART 05355 02 OF 04 271220Z
ACTION SSO-00

INFO LOG-00 ANHR-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SS-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------08487F 271220Z /38

O 271137Z OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0966
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 005355

BEIJING FOR U/S PICKERING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2009
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, ASEC, ID
SUBJECT: CABINET CHOICES REFLECT INCLUSIVE APPROACH, BREAK WITH PAST PRACTICES

REVEALED THAT EACH OF THESE LEADERS WAS REQUIRED
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05355 02 OF 04 271220Z
TO "GUARANTEE" THAT CANDIDATES THEY SUPPORTED WOULD NOT "MISBEHAVE." WHILE THIS PROCESS APPEARS TO HAVE RESULTED IN A "DUMBING DOWN" IN SOME PORTFOLIOS (PARTICULARLY THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES), A NUMBER OF POTENTIALLY STRONG CANDIDATES WERE CHOSEN (REF A). NOT SURPRISINGLY, AMIEN RAIS FARED RELATIVELY WELL IN THE JOCKEYING. AMIEN WAS FIRST TO CHAMPION GUS DUR FOR THE PRESIDENCY, AND IT WAS THE MOSTLY MUSLIM "MIDDLE AXIS" PARTIES (POROS TENGAH), NOMINALLY HEADED BY AMIEN, WHICH PROVIDED HIM WITH HIS MOST SOLID BASE OF SUPPORT. EVEN SO, GUS DUR APPEARS TO HAVE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY FOR EVERY SIGNIFICANT POWER BLOC TO HAVE A SEAT AT THE TABLE.

WINNERS AND (FEW) LOSERS

-GOLKAR: WHILE POROS TENGAH PARTIES DID RELATIVELY WELL, GOLKAR DID POORLY, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE HABIBIE-ALIGNED FACTION (GOLKAR HITAM) PROVIDED GUS DUR AT LEAST 100 VOTES. WE HAVE NOT YET LEARNED THE PARTY AFFILIATION (IF ANY) OF SOME OF THE LESSER-KNOWN APPOINTEES, BUT SO FAR WE HAVE ONLY IDENTIFIED FOUR OR FIVE AS MEMBERS OF GOLKAR, AND SOME OF THESE, SUCH AS MARZUKI DARUSMAN (ATTORNEY GENERAL), ARE ALIGNED WITH THE WING OF GOLKAR THAT VOTED FOR MEGAWATI (GOLKAR PUTIH). AT THE SAME TIME, STRONG PUBLIC PRESSURE NOT TO INCLUDE APPOINTEES WITH NEW ORDER
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 05355 02 OF 04 271220Z
LINKS SEEMS TO HAVE INFLUENCED THE FINAL LIST.

-MODERNIST MUSLIM PARTIES: WITHIN POROS TENGAH ONE MINISTRY EACH WENT TO THE HEADS OF THE SMALL MODERNIST MUSLIM CRESCENT AND STAR (PBB) AND JUSTICE (PK) PARTIES (YUSRIL MAHENDRA AS JUSTICE

MINISTER AND NUR MAHMUDI ISMAIL AS FORESTRY AND PLANTATIONS MINISTER, RESPECTIVELY).

-THE UNITY AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) RECEIVED TWO MINISTRIES WHICH WENT TO THE LEADERS OF TWO FACTIONS THAT HAD BEEN HABIBIE-LEANING AND MEGAWATI-LEANING, RESPECTIVELY, BEFORE GUS DUR BECAME A SERIOUS CANDIDATE. THEY ARE PARTY CHAIRMAN HAMZAH HAZ (COORDINATING MINISTER FOR WELFARE AND POVERTY ERADICATION) AND ZARKASIH NUR (MINISTER FOR COOPERATIVES AND SME'S), RESPECTIVELY. BOTH HAVE CONNECTIONS TO GUS DUR'S TRADITIONALIST MUSLIM ORGANIZATION, NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU).

-INTERESTINGLY, GUS DUR DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE GONE OUT OF HIS WAY TO PROVIDE GOODIES TO THE PARTY HE FOUNDED (BUT OF WHICH HE IS NOT A MEMBER), THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB). ALWI SHIHAB WAS APPOINTED FOREIGN MINISTER (REF B) WHILE KHOFIFAH INDAR PARAWANSA WILL BECOME MINISTER OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS. THERE APPEAR TO BE ONE OR TWO NON-PKB APPOINTEES WHO MADE THE GRADE BECAUSE OF CLOSE TIES TO GUS DUR AND/OR NU, SUCH AS HIS POLITICAL ADVISOR MUHAMMAD HIKAM (MINISTER

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05355 02 OF 04 271220Z

OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY).

-NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN): AMIEN RAIS WAS DISPROPORTIONATELY SUCCESSFUL IN PLACING HIS PARTY'S CANDIDATES IN CABINET POSITIONS, TAKING FOUR MINISTRIES INCLUDING THE KEY FINANCE PORTFOLIO. NOTABLY, THE ONE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL FACTION COMPLETELY SHUT OUT WAS THE NOW-MARGINALIZED SECULAR WING OF PAN. BARA HASIBUAN COMPLAINED TO POLOFF IN AN OCTOBER 27 CONVERSATION THAT AMIEN FOUGHT HARD FOR HIS CANDIDATES, WHO WERE APPARENTLY CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF FRIENDSHIP AND PERSONAL LOYALTY TO AMIEN, RATHER THAN FOR THEIR EFFORTS OR STATURE WITHIN THE PARTY. BARA CONFIRMED RUMORS THAT AMIEN HAD FOUGHT HARD FOR FUAD BAWAZIER TO BECOME FINANCE MINISTER AND THEN HAD PUT FORWARD HIS OLD FRIEND BAMBANG SUDIBYO WHEN GUS DUR SHOT DOWN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4678

PAGE 01 JAKART 05355 03 OF 04 271220Z
ACTION SSO-00

INFO LOG-00 ANHR-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SS-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------084884 271220Z /38
O 271137Z OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0967
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 005355

BEIJING FOR U/S PICKERING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2009
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, ASEC, ID
SUBJECT: CABINET CHOICES REFLECT INCLUSIVE
APPROACH, BREAK WITH PAST PRACTICES

FUAD AFTER NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTION TO RUMORS OF
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 05355 03 OF 04 271220Z
HIS CANDIDACY. BARA DID NOT KNOW BAMBANG WELL,
BUT RECALLED THAT DURING A PAN VISIT TO
WASHINGTON IN MARCH, BAMBANG HAD DESCRIBED
HIMSELF AS "HANGER-ON" OF AMIEN, WHO HAD JOINED
THE INDONESIAN ASSOCIATION OF ISLAMIC
INTELLECTUALS (ICMI) AND PAN JUST TO FOLLOW
AMIEN.

-PDI-PERJUANGAN (PDI-P): MEGAWATI'S PARTY ENDED
UP WITH THREE SLOTS (KWIK KIAN GIE AS
COORDINATING ECONOMICS MINISTER, LAKSAMANA
SUKARDI AS INVESTMENT AND STATE ENTERPRISES
DEVELOPMENT MINISTER, AND M.S. PRAKOSA AS
AGRICULTURAL MINSTER), ALTHOUGH MEGAWATI
SUPPORTERS FROM OTHER FACTIONS ALSO RECEIVED
APPOINTMENTS (E.G., MARZUKI DARUSMAN AND ERNA

WITOELAR AS MINSTER OF HOUSING AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT). ON BALANCE, IT APPEARS THAT MEGAWATI AND HER SYMPATHIZERS DID REASONABLY WELL CONSIDERING SHE OPPOSED GUS DUR IN THE ELECTION.

OTHER IMPRESSIONS

6. (C) GUS DUR'S CABINET SELECTIONS SUGGEST A NUMBER OF CONSIDERATIONS WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THAT MAY SIGNIFY IMPORTANT NEW POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR HIS ADMINISTRATION.

-TNI BEING NUDGED ASIDE: WIRANTO HAS BEEN BUMPED UPSTAIRS TO A POSITION WITH NO MILITARY COMMAND

CONFIDENTIAL

RESPONSIBILITIES (COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS) AND QUESTIONABLE INFLUENCE WHILE THE DEFENSE MINISTRY WILL FOR THE FIRST TIME BE IN THE HANDS OF A CIVILIAN (JUWONO SUDARSONO). MEANWHILE, ALTHOUGH ACTIVE AND FORMER TNI OFFICERS WILL OCCUPY SIX CABINET SLOTS, MOST APPEAR TO HAVE REFORMIST CREDENTIALS. IN ANOTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT; A NAVAL OFFICER (WIDODO) WILL BE THE FIRST NON-ARMY MILITARY COMMANDER. SEE SEPTEL FOR DISCUSSION OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS.

-REGIONAL AUTONOMY: THE CREATION OF A NEW REGIONAL AUTONOMY MINISTRY INDICATES GUS DUR'S CONCERN WITH POSSIBLE NATIONAL DISINTEGRATION. FOR THIS IMPORTANT SLOT, HE CHOSE THE RESPECED RYAAS RASYID. HIS CONCERN WAS ALSO EVIDENT IN THE OBVIOUS EFFORT TO ACHIEVE REGIONAL BALANCE IN HIS CABINET. NEARLY HALF OF THE CABINET MINISTERS ARE FROM OUTER ISLANDS, INCLUDING THE FIRST EVER FROM IRIAN JAYA (FREDDY NUMBERI AS MINISTER OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS). SPECIAL ATTENTION WAS PAID TO SOUTH SULAWESI, WHERE HABIBIE'S DEFEAT HAS TOUCHED OFF PROTESTS AND DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY (REF C), WHOSE NATIVES RECEIVED THREE MINISTRIES. (NOTE: MARWAH DAUD IBRAHIM, A CLOSE HABIBIE ALLY AND SOUTH SULAWESIAN WHOSE NAME WAS ON SEVERAL PRELIMINARY LISTS, DID NOT MAKE THE FINAL CUT, SUGGESTING THERE WAS AN EFFORT TO EXCLUDE CANDIDATES TOO CLOSELY TIED TO HABIBIE.) BARA HASIBUAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05355 03 OF 04 271220Z
SUGGESTED THE HUMAN RIGHTS PORTFOLIO WAS
SPECIFICALLY CREATED FOR HASBALLAH SAAD BECAUSE
HE IS ACEHNESE, WHERE TNI HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
HAVE HELPED FEED SEPARATIST SENTIMENTS.

-MARITIME AFFAIRS: THE CREATION OF A MARITIME
AFFAIRS MINISTRY AND WIDODO'S APPOINTMENT APPEAR
TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON GUS DUR'S STATED INTENTION
TO PAY CLOSER ATTENTION TO INDONESIA'S MARITIME
RESOURCES.

-HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CREATION OF HASBALLAH'S
PORTFOLIO SIGNALS AN INTENTION TO MAKE HUMAN
RIGHTS A PRIORITY. ALSO SIGNIFICANT IS THAT THE
INFORMATION MINISTRY, WHOSE FUNCTIONS IN THE PAST
INCLUDED CENSORSHIP AND PROPAGANDA, HAS BEEN
ELIMINATED. ALTHOUGH THE CABINET CHOICES REFLECT
EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE ETHNIC AND REGIONAL BALANCE,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4679

PAGE 01 JAKART 05355 04 OF 04 271220Z
ACTION SSO-00

INFO LOG-00 ANHR-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SS-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------084886 271220Z /38
O 271137Z OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0968
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 005355

BEIJING FOR U/S PICKERING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2009

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, ASEC, ID
SUBJECT: CABINET CHOICES REFLECT INCLUSIVE APPROACH, BREAK WITH PAST PRACTICES

WOMEN DID NOT FARE WELL, RECEIVING ONLY TWO

CABINET POSTS IN ADDITION TO THE VICE PRESIDENCY. ERNA WITOELAR AND KOFIFAH ARE BOTH STRONG CHOICES, BUT WILL HEAD BACKWATER MINISTRIES.

COMMENT:
---

7. (C) LOCAL MEDIA HAVE CHARACTERIZED THIS AS A "COMPROMISE" CABINET, AND QUESTIONED WHETHER POLITICAL PAYBACK MIGHT HAVE BEEN A MORE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION THAN COMPETENCE. OTHER THAN AMIEN RAIS, WHO WAS RICHLY REWARDED, IT APPEARS GREATER ATTENTION WAS PAID TO ENSURING THAT ALL REGIONS AND POLITICAL FACTIONS WERE REPRESENTED. WHILE THE ECONOMIC TEAM MIGHT HAVE BEEN STRONGER, THERE ARE SOME STRONG APPOINTMENTS AND A NUMBER OF POSITIVE SIGNS, INCLUDING THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION INTENDS TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND PAY MORE ATTENTION TO REGIONAL GRIEVANCES AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

8. (C) WE ALSO REGARD AS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT SIGNS THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL BE A GOOD LISTENER, BOTH TO OUR SUGGESTIONS AND TO PUBLIC OPINION. HE CLEARLY ATTEMPTED TO DO SO IN PUTTING TOGETHER THIS CABINET - ESPECIALLY IN HEEDING THE AMBASSADOR'S ADVICE TO AVOID SOEHARTO RETREADS IN ITS ECONOMIC RANKS AND TO EMPHASIZE CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY ON THE SECURITY/POLITICAL SIDE OF THE HOUSE. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, THE NEW CABINET NO LONGER REPRESENTS

THE PRODUCT OF ONE MAN'S WILL -- AS WAS THE CASE FOR THE LAST 32 YEARS. INSTEAD, IT DOES A PRETTY GOOD JOB OF REFLECTING THE DESIRE OF MOST INDONESIANS FOR REAL CHANGE IN THE WAY THEIR NATION DOES BUSINESS. END COMMENT.
GELBARD

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0538

PAGE 01 JAKART 02859 01 OF 02 101230Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W

----------D349CE 101231Z /38

O 101231Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8250
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002859

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: THREE DAYS AFTER THE ELECTION: WHERE ARE THE RESULTS?

REF: A) JAKARTA 2829; B) JAKARTA 2798

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02859 01 OF 02 101230Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THREE DAYS AFTER THE JUNE 7 POLLS CLOSED, INDONESIANS STILL HAD ONLY FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION ABOUT VOTE OUTCOMES. AS OF COB JUNE 10, ONLY 11.5 PERCENT OF THE VOTES NATION-WIDE HAD BEEN UNOFFICIALLY TABULATED AT THE ELECTION COMMISSION'S JOINT OPERATIONS AND MEDIA CENTER (JOMC). THE RESULTS STILL SHOWED MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN WITH A COMMANDING LEAD, THOUGH GOLKAR HAD JUMPED INTO SECOND PLACE AND HAD NARROWED THE GAP WITH PDI-PERJUANGAN. THE SLOW PROCESS PROMPTED QUESTIONS FROM POLITICAL LEADERS AND PROMINENT DOMESTIC MONITORS ON JUNE 9, AS WELL AS CONCERN FROM INTERNATIONAL MONITORS, IN PARTICULAR FROM THE EU. REPORTS FROM THE FIELD SUGGEST DISARRAY AND INEXPERIENCE AT LOCAL ELECTION COMMITTEES THAT IN PART

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

EXPLAINS THE SLOWNESS OF THE TABULATION PROCESS. IT ALSO PROMPTS CONCERN THAT SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO CHECK MANIPULATION COULD BE COMPROMISED. END SUMMARY.

WHERE ARE THE NUMBERS?

3. (U) ON JUNE 10, THREE DAYS AFTER THE JUNE 7 POLLS CLOSED, INDONESIANS STILL HAD ONLY FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION ABOUT VOTE OUTCOMES. THE ELECTION COMMISSION'S JOINT OPERATIONS AND MEDIA CENTER, WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL RESULTS WITHIN 48 HOURS, WAS REPORTING RESULTS BASED ON ONLY 11.5 PERCENT OF THE VOTES COUNTED AT COB JUNE 10. THE FOLLOWING WERE THE RESULTS FOR THE FIVE BIG PARTIES:

PDI-PERJUANGAN 5,092,299

GOLKAR 3,084,615

PKB 1,795,407

PPP 1,573,024

PAN 1,230,819

REACTIONS FROM POLITICAL LEADERS AND ELECTION MONITORS

4. (C) THE SLOW PACE OF THE COUNT, AND THE SUSPICION THAT IT COULD LEAD TO FRAUD AND MANIPUATION AS IN PAST ELECTIONS, HAS ALREADY PROMPTD PUBLIC AND PRIVATE QUESTIONING FROM POLITICAL LEADERS. MEGAWATI TOLD POLCOUNS THAT SHE FEAED THE PROSPECT OF A "STOLEN ELECTION," (REFTL A), HER ADVISER LAKSAANA SUKARDI TOLD THE PRESS THAT HE WAS "WORRIED ABOUT FOUL PLAY IF WE HAVE TO WAIT FOR TOO LONG," AND PAN LEADER AMIEN RAIS SAID THE "PAINFULLY SLOW" VOTE COUNT WAS OF CONCERN. MULYA LUBIS, THE LEADER OF THE UNIVERSITY NETWORK FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS (UNFREL), COMMENTED IN THE PRESS THAT "AN ELECTION CAN ONLY BE DECLARED FREE AND FAIR IF THE PROCESSES OF VOTE COUNTING, DATA PROCESSING AND PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE RESULTS ARE ALSO FREE OF MANIPULATION." INTERNATIONAL MONITORS IN STATEMENTS JUNE 9 ALSO ADDRESSED THE ISSUE. THE HEAD OF THE EU'S MONITORING DELEGATION GAVE HIGH MARKS TO THE VOTING, BUT SAID THAT THE DELEGATION WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SLOW PROCESS OF TABULATING VOTES. IN A SIMILAR VEIN, THE "PRELIMINARY" STATEMENT FROM THE CARTER CENTER/NDI TEAM RELEASED ON JUNE 9 NOTED THAT "CONTINUING DELAYS COULD GIVE RISE TO CONFUSION AND TENSIONS AMONG THE CONTESTANTS AND THE PUBLIC."

DILEMMA FOR THE FRONT RUNNER
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02859 01 OF 02 101230Z

5. (C) MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, THE LEADER OF THE FRONT-RUNNING PDI-PERJUANGAN, TOLD EMBOFF ON JUNE 10 THAT HER PARTY HAD PICKED UP REPORTS FROM LAMPUNG OF LOCAL POLL WORKERS WHO WERE REFUSING TO PROCESS THE RESULTS IN AREAS WHERE HER PARTY HAD DONE WELL. SHE WAS IN A DILEMMA, HOWEVER, ABOUT HOW VOCAL TO BECOME ABOUT SPECIFIC REPORTS SUCH AS THIS AS WELL AS THE OVERALL SLOW VOTE TABULATION PROCESS. SHE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION INDICATING THAT SOME OF THE SMALLER PARTIES THAT HAD RECEIVED ALMOST NO VOTES WERE PREPARING TO REFUSE TO SIGN OFF ON THE RESULTS AT THE KPU. THIS COULD INVALIDATE THE ELECTION AS TWO THIRDS OF THE 48 PARTY REPRESENTATIVES MUST APPROVE THE FINAL RESULTS. THUS, SHE DID NOT WANT TO GIVE THEM AMMUNITION TO USE IN SUCH A MANEUVER.

WHAT IS GOING ON AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

6. (C) TDY OFFICER REPORTED WIDESPREAD CONFUSION AND A NEARLY TOTAL BREAKDOWN IN THE VOTE REPORTING PROCESS IN THE APPROXIMATELY NINE VILLAGE ELECTION COMMITTEES (PPS'S) HE VISITED NEAR MEDAN. AS OF THURSDAY AFTERNOON, NONE OF THE PPS'S APPEARED CLOSE TO COMPLETING THEIR TASKS. THE LEVEL OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF LOW-LEVEL CIVIL SERVANTS WOKING IN THE PPS'S WAS EXTREMELY POOR. MANY WERE OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMED BY THE SIMPLE PROCESS OF COPYING AND ADDING COLUMNS OF NUMBERS AND ENTERING THE DATA ONTO TALLY SHEETS. FRUSTRATED WORKERS AT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0539

PAGE 01 JAKART 02859 02 OF 02 101230Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W	

----------D349D8 101231Z /38

O 101231Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8251
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002859

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: THREE DAYS AFTER THE ELECTION: WHERE ARE THE RESULTS?

THE NEXT HIGHER LEVEL (PPK) REPORTED HAVING TO RETURN 90 PERCENT OF THE REPORTS RECEIVED FROM THE PPS BECAUSE NUMBERS DID NOT ADD

UP. IN MANY OF THE PPS'S, THERE APPEARED TO BE ONLY ONE PERSON WHO UNDERSTOOD THE PROCESS AND WAS, IN EFFECT, WORKING THE NUMBERS ALONE. TDY OFFICER HAD TO BUY A CALCULATOR FOR ONE PPS WHICH DID NOT HAVE ONE. IN ANOTHER PPS, FRUSTRATED OBSERVERS FROM A LOCAL UNIVERSITY TOOK OVER THE COUNTING PROCESS FROM OVERWHELMED STAFF, MANY OF WHOM APPEARED EXHAUSTED OR APATHETIC.

7. (C) WITNESSES AND OBSERVERS ALSO APPEARED TO BE SUFFERING FROM FATIGUE. LESS THAN HALF OF THE PPS'S VISITED HAD A WITNESS AND OBSERVER PROCESS IN PLACE, ALTHOUGH WITNESSES WERE REPORTEDLY VISITING FROM TIME TO TIME. IN SOME PPS'S, WORKERS BLAMED THEIR PROBLEMS ON SLOPPY WITNESSES, WHO WERE SAID TO FORCE RECOUNTS WHEN THEIR OWN VOTE TALLIES DID NOT MATCH THE OFFICIAL COUNT ON WHICH THEY HAD EARLIER SIGNED OFF AT THE POLLING STATIONS.

8. (C) NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONFUSION, TDY OFFICER SAW NO INDICATION OF ANY ATTEMPT TO SKEW OR DELAY THE VOTE CONSOLIDATION AT THE PPS LEVEL. OBSERVERS WITH WHOM HE SPOKE AGREED. RATHER, HE SAW WORKERS, MANY WITH NO MORE THAN A PRIMARY SCHOOL EDUCATION, WHO WERE COMPLETELY UNQUALIFIED FOR THE TASK THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO PERFORM. IF FRAUD WERE TO OCCUR, HE CONSIDERED IT MORE LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE AT THE PPK LEVEL WHERE WORKERS APPEARED MORE SOPHISTICATED. INDONESIAN INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE (KIPP) OFFICIALS IN SEVERAL DISTRICTS OUTSIDE OF MEDAN REPORTED NO PROBLEMS WITH NUMBERS CROSS CHECKED FROM THE PPS LEVEL. IN DISTRICTS FURTHER SOUTH, HOWEVER (MANDAILING NATAL AND TAPANULI SELATAN), KIPP OFFICIALS REPORT THEY ARE INVESTIGATING SEVERAL APPARENT EFFORTS TO SKEW THE VOTE.

COMMENT
---

9. (C) THE ELECTION COMMISSION'S OFFICIAL VOTE TABULATION WAS ALWAYS SUPPOSED TO TAKE AT LEAST TWO WEEKS TO COMPLETE. THE UNOFFICIAL COUNT THROUGH THE ELECTION COMMISSION'S JOINT OPERATIONS AND MEDIA CENTER (JOMC), HOWEVER, WAS INTENDED TO PRODUCE A QUICK RESULT WITHIN 48 HOURS AFTER THE POLLS CLOSED. IT IS NOT A SAMPLING AS REPORTED ON CNN, BUT RATHER THE ACTUAL VOTE TOTALS REPORTED FROM MORE THAN 4,000 SUB-DISTRICTS (KECAMATAN) PHONED IN TO THE JOMC. THOUGH BUREAUCRATIC INEPTITUDE AND INEXPERIENCE ARE AT LEAST PARTLY TO BLAME FOR THE DELAY, THE FACT THAT TABULATIONS ARE TAKING SO LONG IS OF CONCERN. THE AMBASSADOR IS SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH ELECTION COMMISSION CHAIRMAN RUDINI ON JUNE 11 TO DISCUSS THE MATTER.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7945

PAGE 01 JAKART 02890 01 OF 03 111224Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W		

----------D3D546 111232Z /38

O 111225Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8281
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002890

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAISES CONCERNS ABOUT SLOW VOTE COUNT WITH ELECTION COMMISSION CHAIRMAN; MEGAWATI MAINTAINS STRONG LEAD; REPORTS OF GOLKAR CHEATING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02890 01 OF 03 111224Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY:

AMBASSADOR ROY MET WITH ELECTION COMMISSION CHAIRMAN RUDINI ON JUNE 11 TO DISCUSS DELAYS IN VOTE REPORTING. RUDINI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UNOFFICIAL COUNT WAS MOVING SLOWLY, BUT MAINTAINED THAT THE OFFICIAL TABULATION PROCESS WAS ON SCHEDULE AND WOULD BE COMPLETE BY JUNE 21. RUDINI BLAMED INEXPERIENCED ELECTION WORKERS FOR THE SLOW PROCESS. AMBASSADOR ROY EMPHASIZED THAT A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN HANDLING ISSUES SURROUNDING THE VOTE COUNT WOULD RAISE CONCERNS IN INDONESIA AND INTERNATIONALLY.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

WITH 21 PERCENT OF THE VOTES TALLIED UNOFFICIALLY ON JUNE 11, PDI-PERJUANGAN REMAINED IN FRONT WITH 35 PERCENT, FOLLOWED BY GOLKAR WITH 20 PERCENT. A PARALLEL VOTE TABULATION COMPILED BY A DOMESTIC MONITORING ORGANIZATION ALSO SHOWED PDI-PERJUANGAN WITH A STRONG LEAD. OUT OF THE BIG FIVE PARTIES, PAN IS IN LAST PLACE, AN OUTCOME WHICH AMIEN RAIS REPORTEDLY CONCEDED. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT HE WOULD NEVER ALLY PAN WITH RULING PARTY GOLKAR.

LOCAL MONITORS AND POLITICAL PARTIES CONTINUE TO REPORT ELECTION VIOLATIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, ESPECIALLY BY GOLKAR. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CONCERN ABOUT THE SLOW PACE OF THE VOTE COUNT, BUT ALSO A RECOGNITION THAT INEXPERIENCE IS A MAJOR FACTOR. END SUMMARY.

AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH ELECTION COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
---

3. (C) AMBASSADOR ROY, USAID DIRECTOR AND POLOFF MET WITH

GENERAL (RET.) RUDINI, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ELECTION COMMITTEE, ON JUNE 11 TO DISCUSS THE DELAYS IN REPORTING ELECTION RESULTS. RUDINI SAID THAT THE OFFICIAL TABULATION PROCESS WAS PROCEEDING ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE. OFFICIAL RESULTS SHOULD BE FINALIZED AT THE SUBDISTRICT LEVEL (KECAMATAN) BY JUNE 10, AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL (KABUPATEN) BY JUNE 14, AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL BY JUNE 17, AND AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL BY JUNE 21. (NOTE: HE IS TECHNICALLY CORRECT AS THE COMMISSION SAID FROM THE BEGINNING THAT FINAL OFFICIALS RESULTS WOULD BE AVAILABLE APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS AFTER ELECTION DAY. THIS IS NOT STOPPING THE KPU, HOWEVER, FROM RELEASING RESULTS GATHERED THROUGH THE OFFICIAL CHANNEL AS THEY ARRIVE. IN ADDITION, THE ELECTION COMMISSION SANCTIONED A SEPARATE "UNOFFICIAL" MECHANISM TO GATHER RESULTS, BASED ON DATA COMMUNICATED BY PHONE AND FAX FROM THE SUB-DISTRICT LEVEL TO A JOINT OPERATIONS AND MEDIA CENTER (JOMC). THE UNOFFICIAL MECHANISM IS MOVING FAR SLOWER THAN ANTICIPATED, SEE PARA. FIVE.)

4. (C) RUDINI SAID THAT THE PROCESS OF GATHERING AND RELEASING RESULTS WAS MOVING SLOWLY BECAUSE LOCAL ELECTION WORKERS WERE INEXPERIENCED. IN ADDITION, SOME LOCAL ELECTION COMMITTEES WERE REFUSING TO TRANSFER DATA UP THROUGH THE SYSTEM BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT RECEIVED PROMISED BUDGETARY PAYMENTS FROM THE GOVERNMENT. RUDINI CITED JAKARTA AS AN EXAMPLE, AND SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE CITY'S GOVERNOR ABOUT THE ISSUE.

5. (C) AMBASSADOR ROY POINTED OUT TO RUDINI THAT THE SLOW COUNT WAS OF CONCERN BECAUSE IT CREATED FEARS OF VOTE MANIPULATION. EMBASSY OFFICERS HAD WITNESSED IN THE FIELD THE TYPES OF PROBLEMS WITH HUMAN RESOURCES MENTIONED BY RUDINI AND RECOGNIZED

THE PROBLEMS. THE PUBLIC, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02890 01 OF 03 111224Z
UNOFFICIAL RESULTS THROUGH THE COMMISSION-SANCTIONED JOMC WOULD BE PRODUCED WITHIN 48 HOURS, SAID AMBASSADOR ROY. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PLACED A HIGH PRIORITY ON A CREDIBLE COUNT AND CREDIBLE RESULTS, AND IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO DEAL WITH ALL CONCERNS SURROUNDING THE TABULATION PROCESS IN A TRANSPARENT MANNER. ASKED WHEN HE EXPECTED THE JOMC RESULTS TO BE FINALIZED, RUDINI DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY AND INSTEAD SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED IT TO STOP IDENTIFYING ITSELF WITH THE KPU BECAUSE IT WAS CONFUSING THE PUBLIC.

6. (C) AMBASSADOR ROY ALSO POINTED OUT THAT UNCERTAINTY OVER HOW THE 200 EXTRA MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) WOULD BE CHOSEN RAISED CONCERNS THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS IN THE 700 MEMBER MPR WOULD NOT REFLECT THE OUTCOME OF THE GENERAL ELECTION. GOLKAR MEMBERS HAD ALREADY ADMITTED TO HIM THAT THE NUMBER OF SEATS SECURED IN THE MPR DID NOT HAVE TO ACCORD WITH THE PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE WON ON JUNE 7. TO COUNTER THIS POTENTIAL PROBLEM, THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED RUDINI THAT A SYSTEM BE DEVISED TO ENSURE THAT THE MAJOR VOTE GETTERS IN THE ELECTION WOULD HAVE A SAY IN WHO WOULD BE CHOSEN AS THE 65 MEMBERS OF SOCIETAL GROUPS IN THE MPR (NOTE: TO AVOID, FOR EXAMPLE, A SCENARIO WHERE PDI-PERJUANGAN WAS THE LEAD VOTE GETTER, BUT A MAJORITY OF THE FUNCTIONAL REPRESENTATIVES CAME FROM GROUPS LOYAL TO GOLKAR.) SIMILARLY, THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE 135

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7915

PAGE 01 JAKART 02890 02 OF 03 111224Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W	

----------D3D4C9 111229Z /38
O 111225Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8282
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002890

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAISES CONCERNS ABOUT SLOW VOTE COUNT WITH ELECTION COMMISSION CHAIRMAN; MEGAWATI MAINTAINS STRONG LEAD; REPORTS OF GOLKAR CHEATING

REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE CHOSEN BY PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES NOT BE SEEN AS NEGATING THE OUTCOME OF THE JUNE VOTE.

TWENTY ONE PERCENT OF ELECTION RESULTS REPORTED

7. (SBU) BY COB JUNE 11, 21 PERCENT OF THE VOTES HAD UNOFFICIALLY BEEN TABULATED AND REPORTED THROUGH THE JOMC. THE RESULTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

PDI-PERJUANGAN: 9,466,288 (35.4 PERCENT)

GOLKAR 5,382,774 (20 PERCENT)

PKB 3,312,759 (12.4 PERCENT)

PPP 3,065,856 (11.5 PERCENT)

PAN 2,143,995 (8 PERCENT)

PBB 622,781 (2.3 PERCENT)

JUSTICE 413,921 (1.5 PERCENT)

JUSTICE AND UNITY 274,766 (1 PERCENT)

MONITORING GROUP ISSUES RESULTS OF PARALLEL VOTE TABULATION

8. (SBU) THE DOMESTIC MONITORING GROUP RECTORS' FORUM GAVE TO JOURNALISTS ON JUNE 10 THE RESULTS OF ITS PARALLEL VOTE TABULATION IN ELEVEN PROVINCES (MEANT TO BE A STATISTICALLY VALID SAMPLING OF A SELECTED NUMBER OF POLLING STATIONS IN THOSE

PROVINCES). THE PVT SHOWED PDI-PERJUANGAN COMFORTABLY IN THE LEAD, GOLKAR RUNNING SECOND, AND PKB AND PAN TRAILING IN FOURTH AND FIFTH PLACES. THE SURVEY DID NOT INCLUDED THE SEAT-RICH PROVINCES OF NORTH SUMATRA AND SOUTH SULAWESI.

REPORTS OF ELECTION VIOLATIONS

9. (U) LOCAL MEDIA HAVE REPORTED ALLEGATIONS OF GOLKAR ATTEMPTS TO INTIMIDATE VOTERS, BUY VOTES, OR MANIPULATE ELECTION RETURNS IN SOUTHWEST, SOUTH AND CENTRAL SULAWESI AND SOUTH KALIMANTAN, WHERE GOLKAR HAS BEEN RUNNING UNEXPECTEDLY STRONG (SEE SEPTEL FOR MORE DETAILED REPORTING). IN SOUTH SULAWESI 26 POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE DEMANDED THE POLL BE INVALIDATED AND REPEATED IN SIX REGENCIES WHILE BETWEEN 20 AND 26 PARTIES HAVE JOINED IN REJECTING THE COUNT IN SINGLE REGENCIES OF SOUTHEAST SULAWESI, CENTRAL SULAWESI AND SOUTH KALIMANTAN. AMONG THE PARTIES ALLEGING GOLKAR MISDEEDS IN SOME OR ALL OF THE REGENCIES ARE PDI-P, PKB, PPP, AND PAN AS WELL AS THE INDEPENDENT OBSERVER GROUP KIPP. A PAN REPRESENTATIVE CHARGED THAT IN ONE VILLAGE A POLICE SERGEANT FIRED SHOTS IN THE AIR TO REMIND VOTERS TO VOTE FOR GOLKAR WHILE IN OTHERS GOLKAR OFFICIALS DISTRIBUTED MONEY-FILLED ENVELOPES WITH THE MESSAGE "MY CHOICE IS NUMBER 33 (GOLKAR)".

10. (C) TDY POLOFF IN MEDAN REPORTS THAT PDI-P, PAN, PPP, PKB AND KIPP ARE ALSO AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE REJECTED THE VOTE COUNT IN THE SOUTHERN NORTH SUMATRA DISTRICTS OF TAPANULI SELATAN AND MANDAILING NATAL, WHERE GOLKAR HAS TAKEN A COMMANDING LEAD. GOLKAR IS ACCUSED OF BUYING VOTES AND THREATENING VILLAGE HEADS WITH LOSS OF THEIR JOBS IF GOLKAR WERE TO LOSE. KIPP HAS REPORTEDLY IDENTIFIED A NUMBER OF IRREGULARITES IN VOTING

CONFIDENTIAL

PROCEDURES IN THESE DISTRICTS. OFFICIAL RETURNS VARIED SUBSTANTIALLY FROM KIPP'S CROSS-CHECKED FIGURES. TDY POLOFF REPORTS INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS APPEAR TO BE SATISFIED THAT VOTING HAS BEEN LARGELY FREE AND FAIR IN OTHER DISTRICTS OF NORTH SUMATRA. TDY POLOFF POLLED INDEPENDENT MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN NORTH SUMATRA AND FOUND THAT APART FROM THE PROBLEMS MENTIONED ABOVE THEY WERE NOT COMPLAINING ABOUT SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS. HE REPORTED FURTHER THAT VOTING TOOK PLACE ONLY YESTERDAY IN ONE VILLAGE OF SOUTH SUMATRA AND THAT VOTING HAD NOT YET TAKEN PLACE IN 4-5 OTHERS.

11. (C) EMBOFF WHO TRAVELED TO JEMBER, EAST JAVA LEARNED FROM AN INDEPENDENT MONITOR ON THE GROUND THERE THAT AS OF JUNE 11 ONLY SEVEN OF 31 SUB-DISTRICT (KECAMATAN) HAD TABULATED AND REPORTED RESULTS TO THE DISTRICT. KIPP HAD BEEN TOLD BY LOCAL

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THAT THIS WAS DUE TO A LACK OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND TRAINING, BUT THE MONITORING GROUP FEARED THAT UNDUE DELAYS IN REPORTING RESULTS COULD OPEN OPPORTUNITIES FOR MANIPULATION. KIPP WAS PLANNING TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO ALL SUB-DISTRICTS IN THE AREA TO CHECK AGAIN ON PROGRESS.

12. (C) ELECTION MONITORS FROM THE CIVIC FORUM ORGANIZATION IN BANDUNG TOLD POLOFF JUNE 11 THAT INEXPERIENCE, LACK OF BASIC MATHEMATICAL SKILLS, AND SHEAR EXHAUSTION WERE IMPEDING THE PROGRESS OF COUNTING IN BANDUNG CITY AND THE DISTRICT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7916

PAGE 01 JAKART 02890 03 OF 03 111225Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W		

----------D3D4D1 111229Z /38

O 111225Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8283
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002890

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAISES CONCERNS ABOUT SLOW VOTE COUNT WITH ELECTION COMMISSION CHAIRMAN; MEGAWATI MAINTAINS STRONG LEAD; REPORTS OF GOLKAR CHEATING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02890 03 OF 03 111225Z
SURROUNDING IT. THE PREVIOUS EVENING, THE DISTRICT-LEVEL ELECTION COMMISSION OFFICE HAD BEGUN A RECOUNT OF VOTES FROM ALL

26 SUB-DISTRICTS OF THE CITY OF BANDUNG BECAUSE OF DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN VOTE COUNTS SUBMITTED BY LOCAL ELECTION COMMITTEES AND THOSE OF POLITICAL PARTY WITNESSES AND ELECTION MONITORS. THE PROCESS WAS BEING MONITORED AND, AS FAR AS CIVIC FORUM WAS AWARE, THERE WERE NOT INDICATIONS OF FRAUD AS A RESULT OF THE RECOUNTING. NEVERTHELESS, THE PROCESS WOULD BE DRAWN OUT AND IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO MEET THE DEADLINE OF HAVING THE NATIONWIDE OFFICIAL COUNT DONE BY JUNE 21.

CONTINUED POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

13. (U) ACCORDING TO WIRE SERVICE REPORTS, AMIEN RAIS WAS ACCEPTING THAT HIS PARTY TO DATE HAD WON ONLY 8 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, AND WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HE ACCEPTED THE RESULT WHOLEHEARTEDLY. "I DON'T WANT TO MAKE ANY PROTEST BECAUSE, AS FAR AS I KNOW, THE ELECTION WAS FAIR AND FREE," HE REPORTEDLY SAID. HE ALSO SPOKE NEGATIVELY ABOUT THE RULING PARTY, SAYING THAT "TO MAKE A COALITION WITH GOLKAR IS THE LAST CHOICE I MAKE IN THIS WORLD."

14. (C) THE SINGAPORE EMBASSY TOLD US THAT IT HAD HEARD CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT THE HABIBIE FORCES WITHIN GOLKAR WERE PREPARING TO MOVE AGAINST THE PARTY'S GENERAL CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANDJUNG AND ATTEMPT TO HAVE HIM REPLACED BY ONE OF THEIR OWN. THEIR ARGUMENT WOULD BE THAT TANDJUNG WOULD HAVE FAILED IN HIS JOB IF GOLKAR DID NOT OBTAIN THE FORTY PERCENT OF THE VOTE THAT HE PREDICTED (COMMENT: A FIGURE WHICH EVEN MOST GOLKAR FIGURES DID NOT BELIEVE THE PARTY EVER HAD A REALISTIC CHANCE OF SECURING.)

CONFIDENTIAL

15. (U) SHOWING THE STATE OF THE COMPETITION WITHIN GOLKAR, LOCAL PRESS REPORTED THAT TANDJUNG COMMENTED THAT GOLKAR WOULD NOT NAME A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IF IT DID NOT OBTAIN FORTY PERCENT OF THE VOTE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT "IF THE VOTES WE GAIN ARE SIGNIFICANT, WE WILL NOMINATE B.J. HABIBIE AS PRESIDENT." ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1995

PAGE 01 JAKART 02966 01 OF 02 161149Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W		

----------D5A977 161155Z /38

P 161147Z JUN 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8361
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002966

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ELECTION RESULTS STILL ARRIVING SLOWLY; PDI-PERJUANGAN REMAINS STRONGLY AHEAD IN THE POPULAR VOTE

REF: A) JAKARTA 2890; B) JAKARTA 2859; C) JAKARTA 2609

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02966 01 OF 02 161149Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: AS OF JUNE 16, PDI-PERJUANGAN REMAINED STRONGLY AHEAD IN ALL AVAILABLE VOTE COUNTS, INCLUDING THE ELECTION COMMISSION'S (KPU) OFFICIAL CHANNEL, THE JOINT OPERATIONS AND MEDIA CENTER'S (JOMC) UNOFFICIAL CHANNEL, AND GOLKAR'S INTERNAL FIGURES. GOLKAR IS IN THIRD PLACE ACCORDING TO THE KPU COUNT, BUT IN SECOND ACCORDING TO THE JOMC AND INTERNAL GOLKAR FIGURES. THOUGH ELECTION COMMISSION CHAIRMAN RUDINI HAD PROMISED THAT THE POLL RESULTS WOULD BE FINALIZED BY JUNE 21, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT THAT THE SCHEDULE IS LIKELY TO SLIP GIVEN THE SLOW PROGRESS TO DATE. GOLKAR IS CLAIMING THAT BASED ON ITS OWN FIGURES, IT IS LEADING IN MORE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

PROVINCES THAN PDI-PERJUANGAN, THOUGH THE KPU HAS DISPUTED THIS FACT. GOLKAR ALSO ASSUMES THAT IT WILL OBTAIN A GREATER NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE DPR THAN IS INDICATED BY ITS PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULAR VOTE. END SUMMARY.

STATUS OF UNOFFICIAL RESULTS FROM ELECTION

3.(U) AS OF JUNE 16, MORE THAN A WEEK AFTER THE POLLS CLOSED ON JUNE 7, THE UNOFFICIAL VOTE COUNT THROUGH THE JOINT OPERATIONS AND MEDIA CENTER HAD REACHED 61 PERCENT (69,544,388). ACCORDING TO THIS COUNT, THE SPREAD BETWEEN FRONT-RUNNING PDI-PERJUANGAN AND NUMBER TWO GOLKAR HAS NOT CHANGED MUCH OVER THE PAST WEEK, WITH PDI-PERJUANGAN STRONGLY AHEAD BY AT LEAST FIFTEEN POINTS. THE TOTALS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

PDI-PERJUANGAN 24,878,235 (35.8 PERCENT)

GOLKAR 14,557,316 (20.9 PERCENT)

PKB 8,417,416 (12.1 PERCENT)

PPP 7,374,329 (10.6 PERCENT)

PAN 5,370,299 (7.7 PERCENT)

PBB 1,393,274 (2 PERCENT)

JUSTICE 998,074 (1.4 PERCENT)

STATUS OF OFFICIAL RESULTS

4. (U) THE RESULTS REPORTED THROUGH THE OFFICIAL ELECTION COMMISSION CHANNEL AS OF JUNE 16 ALSO SHOWED MEGAWATI IN FRONT, BUT CONTINUED TO HAVE PKB IN SECOND PLACE. EVEN PKB DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WILL REMAIN IN SECOND PLACE, RECOGNIZING THAT BECAUSE THE UNOFFICIAL RESULTS REPRESENT A LARGER PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL VOTE, THEY ARE MORE REFLECTIVE OF THE LIKELY OUTCOME. DESPITE ELECTION COMMISSION CHAIRMAN RUDINI'S CLAIM THAT THE OFFICIAL COUNT WOULD BE FINALIZED BY JUNE 21, A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT INDICATED TO US THAT THIS SCHEDULE WOULD LIKELY SLIP GIVEN THE SLOWNESS OF THE COUNT TO DATE. WITH 40 PERCENT OF THE OFFICIAL VOTE TABULATED, THE NUMBERS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

PDI-PERJUANGAN 17,341,930 (37.6 PERCENT)

PKB 8,695,180 (18.8 PERCENT)

GOLKAR 7,745,245 (16.8 PERCENT)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02966 01 OF 02 161149Z

PPP 4,422,186 (9.6 PERCENT)

PAN 3,120,809 (6.8 PERCENT)

PBB 693,494 (1.5 PERCENT)

PK 550,140 (1.2 PERCENT)

GOLKAR'S OWN INTERNAL COUNT

5. (C) GOLKAR COMPLAINED PUBLICLY EARLY LAST WEEK THAT THE KPU'S OFFICIAL FIGURES INACCURATELY PUT GOLKAR IN THIRD PLACE, AND THAT ACCORDING TO GOLKAR'S OWN FIGURES IT WAS IN SECOND. GOLKAR CONTINUED TO MAKE THIS CLAIM, WHICH WAS BACKED UP BY THE JOMC NUMBER, BUT STOPPED RELEASING ITS INTERNAL DATA. ON JUNE 16, THE THINK TANK CSIS PROVIDED POLOFFS WITH A COPY OF WHAT PURPORTED TO BE GOLKAR'S INTERNAL COUNT (AS OF MIDDAY ON JUNE

6. (U) IT SHOWED PDI-PERJUANGAN STRONGLY IN FRONT WITH A PERCENTAGE IN THE UPPER 30'S, BUT WITH GOLKAR CLOSING INTO A STRONG SECOND WITH A PERCENTAGE IN THE MID 20'S. GOLKAR CLAIMED PUBLICLY ON JUNE 14 THAT, BASED ON ITS INTERNAL CALCULATION IT WAS AHEAD IN 15 PROVINCES, PDI-PERJUANGAN WAS AHEAD IN 11, AND PPP WAS AHEAD IN ONE. THE KPU HAS NOT VERIFIED THIS NUMBER,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1991

PAGE 01 JAKART 02966 02 OF 02 161149Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W		

----------D5A960 161154Z /38

P 161147Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8362
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002966

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: ELECTION RESULTS STILL ARRIVING SLOWLY; PDI-PERJUANGAN REMAINS STRONGLY AHEAD IN THE POPULAR VOTE

THOUGH PDI-PERJUANGAN IS TAKING IT SERIOUSLY. GOLKAR ALSO

ASSUMES THAT IT WILL OBTAIN A LARGER PERCENTAGE OF THE DPR SEATS THAN ITS PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULAR VOTE. THIS IS IN PART DUE TO ITS RELATIVE STRENGTH IN THE OUTER ISLANDS, WHICH HAVE BEEN GIVEN A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE SEATS (REFTEL C). GOLKAR'S INTERNAL NUMBERS, AS PROVIDED TO US BY CSIS, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

PDI-PERJUANGAN 26,275,226

GOLKAR 18,443,191

PKB 9,906,384

PPP 8,803,082

PAN 5,687,919

PBB 1,433,505
ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9833

PAGE 01 JAKART 02767 01 OF 02 071537Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	IRM-02	SSO-00	SVC-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/015W						

----------D1BEBF 071537Z /55

O 071420Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8177
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002767

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/04

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF ELECTION DAY

REF: JAKARTA 2765

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02767 01 OF 02 071537Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: AS OF THE END OF THE VOTING ON JUNE 7, EMBOFFS TRAVELLING THROUGHOUT INDONESIA REPORTED THAT IT PROCEEDED SMOOTHLY IN THE AREAS THEY OBSERVED. INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE APPEARED TO BE MINIMAL, THE POLLS FOR THE MOST PART OPENED AND CLOSED ON TIME, VOTER ENTHUSIASM AND PARTICIPATION WAS HIGH, AND SECURITY FORCES WERE NOT INTRUSIVE. PARTY WITNESSES AND DOMESTIC MONITORS WERE PRESENT IN MOST OF THE POLLING STATIONS WE OBSERVED. THERE WERE NUMEROUS REPORTS OF TECHNICAL OR LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS, HOWEVER, RANGING FROM A LACK OF BALLOTS TO A INK. THE SHORTAGE WAS REPORTEDLY SERIOUS ENOUGH IN SEVERAL AREAS OF NORTH SUMATRA TO DELAY THE VOTING. WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DRAW ANY MEANINGFUL ANALYSIS FROM THE

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a

RESULTS OF THE RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF POLLING STATIONS THAT EMBOFFS OBSERVED, IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THE COUNTS WE WITNESSED WERE IN LINE WITH THE PRE-ELECTION EXPECTATION THAN(##) RONG FRORY.

3. (U) THE FOLLOWI INITIAL IMPRESSIONS, (#) OFFICERS WHO IN INDONESIA FOR (#)OBSERVATIONS FROM OFFI STATIONS IN JAKARTA. PDED NORTH SUMATRA, WEST KALIMANTAN, WEST KALIM#L JAVA, EAST JAVA, WEST (##) AND WEST NUSA TENGARRA. IN ADDITION, NUMEROUS EMBASSY OFFICERS, INCLUDING AMBASSADOR ROY, OBSERVED THE VOTING IN THE FIVE MUNICIPALITIES OF JAKARTA AND THE AREAS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL OF TANGERANG AND BEKASI.

CALM ATMOSPHERE ON ELECTION DAY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02767 01 OF 02 071537Z

4. (C) THE ELECTION DAY HOLIDAY CLOSED BUSINESSES AND GOVERNMENT OFFICES, AND TRAFFIC WAS UNUSUALLY LIGHT IN JAKARTA AND OTHER URBAN AREAS. IN THE POLLING STATIONS WITNESSED BY EMBOFFS, THERE WERE NO SECURITY-RELATED INCIDENTS. ENTHUSIASM AMONG VOTERS AND COMMUNITY MEMBERS WAS HIGH, WITH VOTERS LINING UP AND WAITING THEIR TURN. IN SOME CASES WHOLE COMMUNITIES WERE LOOKING ON. FROM THE NUMBERS OF VOTERS WAITING AT EACH POLLING STATION, IT APPEARED THAT TURNOUT WAS HEALTHY. AS PLANNED, SECURITY WAS PROVIDED BY CIVILIAN DEFENSE FORCES WH

5. (C) EMBOFFS REPORTED THAT, FOR THE MOST PART, THE POLLS OBSERVED WERE RUNNING SMOOTHLY IN BANDUNG, WEST JAVA; BANJARMASIN, SOUTH KALIMANTAN; BEKASI, WEST JAVA; SURABAYA AND JEMBER, EAST JAVA; UJUNG PANDANG, SOUTH SULAWESI; SEMARANG, CENTRAL JAVA; LAMPUNG AND ALL PARTS OF JAKARTA VISITED. ACCORDING TO ALMOST ALL EMBOFFS IN THE FIELD, POLITICAL PARTIES AND DOMESTIC MONITORING ORGANIZAT
WITNESSES AT THE POLIN KUPANG, WEST
TIMORMESTIC MONITORS EXPRESS THAT THEY WOULD BE SPREAD DAY.

6. (C) AN AUSTRALIM EAST TIMOR THAT THERE TURNOUT IN (##) RE, HOWEVER, #S HAD
REGISTERED TO VOTEERS WERE REPORTEDLY
NOT ILI.

NUMEROUS TECHNILS REPORTED
---(---

7. ION COMMISSION'S JOINT MEDOPERATIONS (##) OFFIC (##) IN THE MORNIN(##)
C MON MEET LATE
ON JUNE 7E. THOUGH MOST OF OF THE (##)

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02767 01 OF 02 071537Z
OBSERVE PING:
ELEVEN POLLING SH BALLOTS AS THE POLLS(##)
JAVA AND SOME BALLOR;

A POLLING STATION H SULAWESI WAS
OVERST OTHERS HAD NONE;

IN #NTAN, SOME OF THE INK (##)
D ANHXES;

IN PADANG, WEST(##) POLLING STATION (##)
ED

NOTE: (##) OMISSION IN TEXT. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3745

PAGE 01 JAKART 02767 02 OF 02 080338Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	IRM-02	SSO-00	SVC-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/015W						

----------D20438 080340Z /55
O 071420Z JUN 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8178
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002767

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/04

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF ELECTION DAY

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a

TO BALLOTS FOR SECURITY, AND INSTEAD WAS USING THEM TO TAKE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02767 02 OF 02 080338Z
PRINTS FROM VOTERS AFTER THEIR FINGERS HAD BEEN MARKED WITH INDELIBLE INK;

IN PADANG, VOTERS WERE WASHING THEIR HANDS AFTER USING THE INDELIBLE INK AND CLAIMING THAT IT WAS COMING OFF;

IN BALI SOME MINOR PROBLEMS WERE REPORTED, INCLUDING THAT SECURITY FORCES WERE HELPING SORT OUT PROBLEMS AT THE POLLING STATION AND THAT SOME OF THE POLLING WITNESSES WERE VERY YOUNG;

A POLLING STATION IN JEMBER, EAST JAVA WAS RUNNING OUT OF INDELIBLE INK, BUT IT WAS ABLE TO BORROW SOME FROM ANOTHER POLLING STATION;

IN PONTIANAK, WEST KALIMANTAN, REGISTRATION PROCEDURES FOR VOTERS IN A CAMP FOR MADURESE REFUGEES WERE FOLLOWED VERY LOOSELY;

AS OF JUNE 5, VOTING MATERIALS IN KUPANG HAD BEEN IN SHORT SUPPLY.

NORTH SUMATRA: SERIOUS LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS REPORTED
---

6. (C) WE ALSO RECEIVED REPORTS OF FAR MORE SERIOUS LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS. TDY OFFICER IN MEDAN REPORTED THAT IN THE RURAL DISTRICT (KABUPATEN) OF MANDAILING NATAL (POPULATION 326,759), 26 VILLAGES HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO VOTE AS OF LATE AFTERNOON JUNE 7 BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT RECEIVED ESSENTIAL MATERIALS SUCH AS BALLOTS, AND THE VOTE HAD BEEN POSTPONED. THE INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMITTEE (KIPP) WAS THE INITIAL SOURCE OF THIS REPORT, AND TDY POLOFF CONFIRMED IT WITH THE LOCAL ELECTION COMMITTEE.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02767 02 OF 02 080338Z
REMAINING POLLING STATIONS IN THAT DISTRICT WERE SHORT THOUSANDS OF BALLOTS AND STICKERS.

7. (C) IN THE REGENCIES OF TOBA SAMOSIR (304,110 RESIDENTS) AND LABUHAN BATU (871,500 RESIDENTS), TDY POLOFF REPORTED THAT MANY POLLING STATIONS HAD RECEIVED NO INDELIBLE INK AND INSUFFICIENT BALLOTS, AND THE ELECTION HAD BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL POSSIBLY WEDNESDAY IN AREAS OF THOSE DISTRICTS. THE ISLAND OF NIAS HAD ALSO SUFFERED FROM A SHORTAGE OF INK AND POLLING MATERIAL.

8. (C) TDY POLOFF IN MEDAN ALSO REPORTED THAT ONE POLLING STATION IN MEDAN WAITED THROUGHOUT THE DAY FOR POLLING MATERIALS

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a

TO ARRIVE. FINALLY, BY LATE AFTERNOON, THE EXPECTANT VOTERS RAN OUT OF PATIENCE AND WENT EN MASSE TO THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (LURAH). IT TURNED OUT THAT HE MYSTERIOUSLY HAD THE BALLOTS IN HIS POSSESSION.

9. (C) AS A WHOLE, THE CITY OF MEDAN HAD RECEIVED FAR LESS INK THAN IT NEEDED. AS LEAST SOME THAT HAD ARRIVED WAS NOT INDELIBLE AS TDY POLOFF TESTED IT AND IT WASHED OFF. ANOTHER PROBLEM IN MEDAN WAS THAT THE LOCAL ELECTION COMMITTEE HAD AT THE LAST MOMENT OPENED 200 POLLING STATIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED.

HOW ARE THE PARTIES DOING?
---

10. (C) EMBOFFS WERE ABLE TO OBSERVE THE VOTE COUNT AT THE DOZENS OF MOSTLY URBAN POLLING STATIONS COVERED (OUT OF 320,000 NATION-WIDE). WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BUILD ANY MEANINGFUL ANALYSIS UPON THE RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBERS OF POLLING STATIONS WE OBSERVED, IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THE SAMPLE WAS IN LINE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02767 02 OF 02 080338Z
WITH THE PRE-ELECTION EXPECTATION THAT MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN WAS THE STRONG FRONT-RUNNER. GOLKAR WAS TRAILING PAN AND PPP IN MOST OF THE AREAS WE OBSERVED, THOUGH NOBODY KNOWS YET WHERE THE RURAL VOTE WILL WIND UP. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7010

PAGE 01 JAKART 02765 01 OF 02 070338Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-02	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/016W						

----------D184A1 070338Z /38

O 070330Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8174
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002765

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/99
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS UNDERWAY IN INDONESIA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, REASON: 1.5 (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02765 01 OF 02 070338Z

2. (C) SUMMARY: POLLING IS UNDERWAY IN INDONESIA WHERE OVER 120 MILLION VOTERS ARE SET TO CHOOSE A PARLIAMENT WHICH WILL PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THE SELECTION OF INDONESIA'S FOURTH PRESIDENT. LAST MINUTE CAMPAIGN CHEATING AND INTIMIDATION, NOTABLY BY THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR, HAS REINFORCED APPREHENSION THAT RESULTS SEEN AS UNFAIR, EITHER AT THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL LEVELS, COULD LEAD TO POPULAR PROTEST. ACCORDING TO EMBOFFS REPORTING IN FROM 20 LOCATIONS, INCLUDING 12 IN OUTER PROVINCES, THE FIRST FEW HOURS OF VOTING ON JUNE 7 HAVE BEEN ORDERLY WITH SOME REPORTS OF TECHNICAL PROBLEMS, MOST NOTABLY DEFECTIVE INDELIBLE INK, MEANT TO ENSURE AGAINST MULTIPLE VOTING. IN EAST TIMOR, A WESTERN JOURNALIST REPORTED NO

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

VOTERS HAD APPEARED IN THE FIRST HOUR OFF VOTING IN POLING PLACES HE VISITED IN THE CAPITAL, DILI. SIMILARLY, IN THE NORTH ACEH TOWN OF LHOKSEUMAWE, THE POLING STATIONS WERE EMPTY THROUGH THE EARLY HOURS OF VOTING. END SUMMARY

3. (U) AFTER TWO WEEKS OF SURPRISINGLY PEACEFUL CAMPAIGNING BY 48 POLITICAL PARTIES, THE FIRST GENUINELY CONTESTED PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN 44 YEARS GOT UNDERWAY IN INDONESIA ON TIME ON THE MORNING OF JUNE 7. EMBOFFS IN THE CAPITAL REPORT VOTING UNDERWAY IN LIGHT RAIN. SECURITY PRESENCE IN THE CITY WAS LIGHT AS WAS TRAFFIC ON THIS OFFICIAL HOLIDAY. REPRESENTATIVES OF FIVE OR SIX OF THE MAJOR PARTIES ALONG WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF DOMESTIC MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS WERE ON HAND AT VOTING POSTS VISITED THUS FAR.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02765 01 OF 02 070338Z

4. (SBU) A WESTERN JOURNALIST REPORTED FROM DILI, EAST TIMOR, THAT IN THE FIRST HOUR OF VOTING NO VOTERS HAD SHOWN UP AT THE POLING STATIONS HE WAS MONITORING IN THE CAPITAL. AMONG THOSE CONTENDING FOR LOCAL PARLIAMENT ON THE GOLKAR TICKET IN EAST TIMOR ARE LEADERS OF THE MILITARY-BACKED MILITIAS WHO HAVE CONDUCTED A REIGN OF TERROR AGAINST PRO-INDEPENDENCE EAST TIMORESE OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. A JOURNALIST IN LHOKSEUMAWE, NORTH ACEH REPORTS EMPTY POLING STATIONS ALSO IN THAT TROUBLED AREA WHERE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SENTIMENT AND VIOLENCE LARGELY PRECLUDED POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING.

5. (C) INITIAL CALLS FROM EMBOFFS LOCATED IN THE PROVINCES SUGGEST PROBLEMS ON THE EVE OF THE VOTING, NOTABLY IN NORTHERN SUMATRA. THERE TDY POLOFF BASED IN MEDAN REPORTS THAT GOLKAR CADRE CAMPAIGNED DURING THE WEEKEND WHICH WAS DESIGNATED AS A "QUIET PERIOD" WHEN ALL CAMPAIGNING WAS BANNED. GOLKAR CAMPAIGNING INCLUDED EFFORTS TO ASSURE THAT WORKERS ON STATE-OWNED PLANTATIONS VOTED FOR THE RULING PARTY. OFFICIALS FROM GUS DUR'S "PKB" HAVE COMPLAINED TO EMBOFF OF INTIMIDATION TACTICS IN THE PLANTATIONS. MOREOVER, PLANTATION MANAGERS REPORTEDLY HAVE WARNED WORKERS NOT TO TALK TO ANYONE FROM OUTSIDE THE PLANTATIONS, INCLUDING JOURNALISTS AND POLL MONITORS. ON THE LAST DAY OF OFFICIAL CAMPAIGNING, PLANTATION WORKERS IN AT LEAST TWO DISTRICTS RECEIVED A BONUS ALONG WITH STERN COUNSEL TO VOTE FOR GOLKAR. A PDI-P CADRE, IN DISCUSSION WITH EMBOFF, WORRIED ALOUD THAT OPPOSITION SUPPORTERS WERE CAPABLE OF ATTACKING PLANTATIONS IF IT APPEARED THAT GOLKAR-MANIPULATION OF

THE PLANTATION VOTE WERE SWINGING THE WHOLE DISTRICT INTO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02765 01 OF 02 070338Z
THE GOLKAR COLUMN.

6. (U) IN ADDITION TO GOLKAR ACTIVITY IN THE PLANTATIONS, GOLKAR ORGANIZED CAMPAIGN RALLIES OVER THE WEEKEND IN MEDAN AND SURROUNDING DISTRICTS AT WHICH THEY GAVE OUT FOOD. GOLKAR OFFICIALS ARE ALSO REPORTEDLY CIRCULATING IN MUSLIM AREAS COPIES OF A STATEMENT BY THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL (MUI) WHICH THEY CLAIM FORBIDS MUSLIMS FROM VOTING FOR EITHER AMIEN RAIS'S "PAN" OR GUS DUR'S "PKB." (COMMENT: EARLIER, A MUI STATEMENT CALLED ON MUSLIMS TO VOTE ONLY FOR MUSLIM-BASED PARTIES. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT MUI STATEMENT GOLKAR CADRE ARE CIRCULATING. END COMMENT.)

7. (U) TECHNICAL PROBLEMS APPEAR TO BE BEDEVILING THE VOTE IN A NUMBER OF PROVINCES. CHIEF AMONG PROBLEMS NOTED IN NORTH SUMATRA, BANDUNG (WEST JAVA) AND WEST NUSA TENGGARA, AND EVEN IN THE CAPITAL AREA (BEKASI) ARE SUPPLIES OF WHAT WAS TO BE INDELIBLE INK WHICH EITHER HAS FAILED TO ARRIVE OR APPEARS LESS THAN INDELIBLE. THERE ARE REPORTS OF FAULTY BALLOTS IN SEVERAL AREAS TO INCLUDE SEMARANG EAST JAVA WHERE PARTY BALLOT ICONS ARE MIS-COLORED. IN SOUTH SULAWESI, A RADIO REPORT INDICATES THAT BALLOTS PRE-MARKED FOR GOLKAR HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7012

PAGE 01 JAKART 02765 02 OF 02 070338Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W

----------D184A6 070338Z /38

O 070330Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8175
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002765

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/99
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS UNDERWAY IN INDONESIA

IN NORTH SULAWESI, THERE IS AN INSUFFICIENT SUPPLY OF BALLOTS. IN THE JAKARTA SUBURB OF TANGERANG OFFICIALS APPEAR TO HAVE WAIVED BALLOT INSPECTION PRIOR TO VOTING

AS THE PROCESS WAS SLOWING UP VOTING.

8. (U) IN PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S HOME DISTRICT IN SOUTH SULAWESI THERE IS AN UNCONFIRMED/UNCONFIRMED REPORT OF SEVERAL POLING PLACES BEING DESTROYED OVERNIGHT. (NOTE: THIS IS THE ONLY REPORT OF VIOLENCE SINCE THE CLOSING OF THE OFFICIAL CAMPAIGN PERIOD JUNE 4 AND WE STRESS, IT IS UNCONFIRMED. END NOTE)

9. (U) VOTING IN BALIKPAPAN EAST KALIMANTAN IS UNDERWAY WITHOUT SERIOUS PROBLEMS. ONE OF THE THREE MAJOR DOMESTIC MONITORING GROUPS, THE "RECTORS' FORUM," HAS OBSERVERS AT ALL SIX VOTING PLACES VISITED BY EMBOFF IN THE FIRST TWO HOURS OF VOTING. LINES FOR VOTING RANGE FROM 45 MINUTES TO ONE HOUR. RECTORS' FORUM MONITORS ARE ALSO OUT IN FORCE IN WEST NUSA TENGGARA.

10. (C) COMMENT: THERE IS A CONSENSUS VIEW THAT SHOULD A POPULAR PERCEPTION DEVELOP AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL THAT GOLKAR HAS DONE BETTER THAN EXPECTED BY VIRTUE OF HAVING CHEATED, THERE COULD BE A VIOLENT PUBLIC RESPONSE. THE SAME PHENOMENON COULD DEVELOP ALSO AT LOCAL LEVELS SUCH AS IN NORTH SUMATRA WHERE ILLEGAL GOLKAR CAMPAIGNING (OVER THE WEEKEND) HAS ALREADY EMERGED AS A GRIEVANCE. THUS FAR, NO SUCH PATTERN OF CHEATING HAS YET MANIFESTED ITSELF ON VOTING DAY.

11. (U) POST WILL REPORT INITIAL RESULTS, AND ANY UNEXPECTED DIFFICULTIES IN THE VOTING ASAP. ROY

E60

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3567

PAGE 01 JAKART 02341 01 OF 02 102342Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-05	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W			

----------C69BC5 102343Z /38

O 102336Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7694
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002341

BEIJING FOR A/S ROTH

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/10/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: U.S. NGOS REVIEW ELECTION PREPARATION SHORTCOMINGS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02341 01 OF 02 102342Z

REF: JAKARTA 1915

1. CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: U.S. NGOS PROVIDED AN ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF ELECTION PREPARATIONS TO THE MISSION ON MAY 7 THAT WAS EVEN MORE MIXED THAN THE ONE THAT A/S ROTH HEARD FROM THE SAME GROUP ON APRIL 14 (REFTEL). MAJOR REGULATIONS ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND THE SYSTEM PARTIES WILL USE TO DETERMINE THEIR WINNING CANDIDATES REMAIN OUTSTANDING. THE FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE LATTER ISSUE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

COULD CREATE POST-ELECTION CONFUSION AND NON-ACCEPTANCE OF RESULTS. CRITICAL LOGISTICAL QUESTIONS PERSIST, SUCH AS WHETHER SUFFICIENT INDELIBLE INK TO PREVENT REPEAT VOTING WILL BE DISTRIBUTED IN TIME FOR ELECTION DAY. THOUGH THE PRODUCTION OF BALLOTS IS WELL UNDERWAY, CONCERNS WERE EXPRESSED ABOUT THE ABSENCE OF A TRANSPARENT CONTROL SYSTEM TO REGULATE BALLOT DISTRIBUTION, WHICH HAS ALREADY BEGUN ON A ROLLING BASIS. ISSUES INVOLVING HOW ELECTION OBSERVERS WILL BE ACCREDITED, PROTECTED AND TRANSPORTED MUST STILL BE RESOLVED. ELECTION AUTHORITIES CLAIM A REGISTRATION RATE OF 80 PERCENT, THOUGH THERE WERE DOUBTS EXPRESSED ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THIS NUMBER. THE ELECTION COMPLAINT ADJUDICATION SYSTEM (PANWASLU) IS JUST GETTING STARTED, AND HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED DOWN TO THE LOCAL LEVEL. CONCERNS WERE ALSO EXPRESSED THAT THE GOVERNMENT-STAFFED SECRETARIATS ATTACHED TO THE KPU AND ITS SUBCOMMITTEES APPEAR TO BE PLAYING A DOMINANT ROLE IN THE IMPLEMENATION

OF MANY ELECTION-RELATED DECISIONS. END SUMMARY

3. (U) ON MAY 7, U.S. ELECTION NGOS PROVIDED A STATUS REPORT TO THE MISSION ON INDONESIAN PREPARATIONS FOR THE JUNE 7 POLL. IFES, NDI, IRI, ACILS AND TAF PARTICIPATED, AS DID USAID MISSION DIRECTOR, USAID OFFICERS, AND POLOFF.

LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION

4. (C) INDELIBLE INK WILL BE USED ON ELECTION DAY TO MAKE SURE THAT CITIZENS CANNOT VOTE MORE THAN ONCE. THE INDONESIANS PLAN TO OBTAIN THE INK OVERSEAS, FROM ONE FRENCH AND THREE INDIAN FIRMS. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER PROCUREMENT HAS ALREADY TAKEN PLACE, NOR - IF IT HAS - WHETHER THERE IS SUFFICIENT TIME TO DELIVER INK TO ALL OF THE THOUSANDS OF POLLING STATIONS ACROSS THE ARCHIPELAGO.

5. (C) PRINTING OF ELECTION BALLOTS IS UNDERWAY. IFES REPORTED THAT IT RECEIVED DIFFERENT ESTIMATES FROM ELECTION AUTHORITIES ON HOW MUCH PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE SO FAR, RANGING FROM 25 TO 60 PERCENT OF THE BALLOTS THAT WILL BE NEEDED. AS REPORTED REFTEL, THE BALLOTS DO NOT HAVE INDIVIDUAL SERIAL NUMBERS TO ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY. IFES REPORTED THAT BALLOT DISTRIBUTION HAD ALREADY BEGUN ON A ROLLING BASIS, AND THAT IT WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE WAS NO "TRANSPARENT CONTROL SYSTEM" OVER THIS PROCESS.

THERE ARE ALREADY PRESS REPORTS OF "STOLEN BALLOTS" IN JAKARTA (100-5000, ACCOUNTS VARY).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02341 01 OF 02 102342Z

6. (C) ELECTION AUTHORITIES ARE NOW CLAIMING THAT 80 PERCENT OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS HAVE BEEN REGISTERED, UP FROM THE 69 PERCENT FIGURE ANNOUNCED BY THE KPU ON APRIL 29. THE ELECTION CONSULTANTS STATED THAT THIS CLAIM WAS SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION, AND THAT REGISTRATION FIGURES VARIED WIDELY FROM PROVINCE TO PROVINCE. IN ADDITION, IT HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED YET WHETHER UNREGISTERED VOTERS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO REGISTER ON ELECTION DAY. (NOTE: ON MAY 4, THE ELECTION COMMISSION HAD ANNOUNCED THAT REGISTRATION WOULD BE EXTENDED UNTIL MAY 15 BECAUSE MANY AREAS HAD NOT YET RECEIVED REGISTRATION FORMS.)

7. (C) THE TRAINING OF 2.1 MILLION POLL WORKERS HAS NOT BEGUN AND WILL BE DIFFICULT TO COMPLETE DURING THE TIME REMAINING BEFORE THE ELECTION.

MAJOR REGULATIONS AND OTHER ISSUES STILL OUTSTANDING

8. (C) A REGULATION ESTABLISHING THE SYSTEM BY WHICH WINNING CANDIDATES WILL BE DETERMINED WITHIN PARTIES HAS NOT BEEN ISSUED, AND THE KPU IS SENDING CONFLICTING SIGNALS ABOUT HOW IT INTENDS TO PROCEED (REFTEL). THIS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3568

PAGE 01 JAKART 02341 02 OF 02 102342Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/014W					

----------C69BC7 102343Z /38

O 102336Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7695
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002341

BEIJING FOR A/S ROTH

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/10/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: U.S. NGOS REVIEW ELECTION PREPARATION SHORTCOMINGS

CONFIDENTIAL

COULD LEAD TO POST-ELECTION CONFUSION AND NON-ACCEPTANCE OF RESULTS. ONE ELECTION COMMISSION MEMBER TOLD NDI TWO WEEKS AGO THAT POLITICAL PARTIES WOULD BE PERMITTED TO DETERMINE AFTER THE ELECTION WHETHER THEIR WINNING CANDIDATES WOULD BE SELECTED ON THE BASIS OF PERCENTAGE OF VOTES WON, OR ABSOLUTE NUMBER OF VOTES WON, IN DISTRICTS. (OVERALL, PARTIES STILL SECURE SEATS IN THE DPR ON THE BASIS OF THE PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTES THEY WIN IN EACH PROVINCE. THE CONTROVERSY IS OVER HOW TO DETERMINE WHICH OF THEIR CANDIDATES FROM A LARGER LIST GETS SEATED.) THIS WEEK, NDI WAS TOLD BY ANOTHER KPU MEMBER THAT PARTIES WOULD STILL BE GIVEN THIS CHOICE, BUT THEY WOULD HAVE TO MAKE IT BEFORE THE ELECTION. NDI ALSO HEARD THAT THERE WAS SOME CONSIDERATION OF SIMPLY ALLOWING THE PARTY LEADERSHIP TO DETERMINE WINNING CANDIDATES, AND THAT DISTRICT OUTCOMES WOULD BE IGNORED.

9. (C) THIS APPEARS TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO CONCENTRATE POWER IN CENTRAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS. IT COULD LEAD TO AN OUTCOME, HOWEVER, IN WHICH THE ELECTION VOTE WOULD DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF SEATS WON BY THE PARTY, BUT NOT ITS SPECIFIC WINNERS. INSTEAD, THE WINNERS WOULD BE DETERMINED THROUGH SOME FORM OF BARGAINING PROCESS WITHIN PARTIES AND PERHAPS WITH THE ELECTION COMMISSION. THIS COULD LEAD TO A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION WITHIN AND BETWEEN PARTIES FOLLOWING THE ELECTION AND THE NON-ACCEPTANCE OF RESULTS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL.

10. (C) A REGULATION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE IS STILL OUTSTANDING. THE KPU HAS ALSO YET TO ISSUE REGULATIONS

IN THE AREAS OF POLLING PLACE SECURITY AND PRODECURES, AND THE SELECTION OF FUNCTIONAL GROUP REPRESENTATIVES TO THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR). THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ELECTION COMPLAINT ADJUDICATION SYSTEM (PANWASLU) IS ALSO JUST BEGINNING, AND THERE ARE CONCERNS THAT IT IS UNDERFUNDED AND HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN SOME CASES.

11. (C) THE ISSUES OF HOW OBSERVERS WILL BE ACCREDITED, PROTECTED AND TRANSPORTED AROUND THE COUNTRY STILL MUST BE RESOLVED. ON THE ISSUE OF HOW OBSERVERS WOULD PUBLICIZE THEIR REPORTS, ONE OF THE MAJOR DOMESTIC MONITORING GROUPS HAD JUST REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE KPU THAT IT COULD FORWARD ITS RESULTS TO THE KPU AT THE SAME TIME THAT IT WAS RELEASING THEM PUBLICLY.

WHO IS IN CHARGE?
---

12. (C) THE INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION AND ITS SUBORDINATE BODIES AT THE REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS ALL HAVE GOVERNMENT-STAFFED SECRETARIATS ATTACHED TO THEM. IFES STATED THAT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, THE SECRETARIAT IS "CALLING THE SHOTS" ON MANY ISSUES OF IMPLEMENTATION, AND THAT THIS IS ALSO TRUE AT THE REGIONAL LEVELS.

COMMENT
---

13. (C) THE ELECTION CONSULTANTS ARE PREPARING RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHAT ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN IN THE

CONFIDENTIAL

REMAINING WEEKS TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES. THE AMBASSADOR WILL DISCUSS THESE ISSUES WITH OTHER AMBASSADORS AT THE UNDP MEETING SCHEDULED FOR MAY 12.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2556

PAGE 01 JAKART 00714 01 OF 07 111039Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W		

----------A1D175 111039Z /38

R 111007Z FEB 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6034
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 JAKARTA 000714

USCINCPAC FOR FPR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF POLITICAL LAWS

REF: A) JAKARTA 472; B) JAKARTA 446; C) JAKARTA 412; D) JAKARTA 327; E) JAKARTA 6582

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00714 01 OF 07 111039Z
1.5(D)

1. (U) SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE OUTLINES THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE POLITICAL LAWS THAT WILL BE THE BASIS FOR THE JUNE 7 ELECTION AND THE NOVEMBER PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION. THE THREE LAWS, SIGNED BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON FEBRUARY 1, COVER ELECTIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES, THE PARLIAMENT (DPR), THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), AND REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEGISLATURES. END SUMMARY.

ELECTION SYSTEM: COMPROMISE BETWEEN COMPETING PROPOSALS (ELECTION LAW)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2006 200503412

2. (C) BASED ON RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF "TEAM ELEVEN," THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED COMMITTEE OF NOTABLES WHO WILL FUNCTION AS AN ELECTION COMMISSION UNTIL THE FORMAL COMMISSION IS ESTABLISHED, AND THE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS (IFES), AS WELL AS ON AN EXAMINATION OF THE TEXTS OF THE PUBLISHED LAWS, IT APPEARS THAT THE ACCOUNT GIVEN US BY GOLKAR OFFICIALS ON JANUARY 29 REGARDING THE CONFUSING COMPROMISE REACHED ON THE ELECTION SYSTEM (REF A) WAS ESSENTIALLY ACCURATE.

3. (C) ACCORDING TO THE NEW LLEGISLATION, REPRESENTATIVES TO THE DPR WILL BE CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AT THE PROVINCE LEVEL, AS PROPOSED BY THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND MANY PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED IN THE CURRENT PARLIAMENT. SIMPLY PUT, IF A PARTY WINS 20 PERCENT OF THE VOTES IN A PROVINCE, IT WILL

RECIEVE ROUGHLY 20 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN THE DPR ALLOCATED FOR THAT PROVINCE.

4. (U) THE CONCEPT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IS SPELLED OUT THROUGHOUT THE ELECTION LAW, AND IT APPLIES TO THE ELECTION FOR THE PROVINCIAL AND REGENCY/MUNICIPALITY (KABUPATEN/KOTAMADYA) LEGISLATURES AS WELL. THE GENERAL ELECTION IS CONDUCTED USING A PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTION SYSTEM BASED ON A "RANKING" LIST (ARTICLE 1). FOR THE DPR, THE "ELECTORAL AREA" IS THE PROVINCE (ARTICLE 3 (2). THE TOTAL RESULTS ACHIEVED BY A POLITICAL PARTY AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL DETERMINES THE NUMBER OF SEATS IT OBTAINS IN THE DPR (ARTICLE 67).

5. (U) THE ALLOCATION OF SEATS BASICALLY CORRESPONDS TO THE PERCENTAGE OF VOTES WON IN THE PROVINCE. THE ACTUAL DETERMINATION, HOWEVER, FACTORS IN THE NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE PROVINCE, THE TOTAL VOTES IN THE PROVINCE, AND THE TOTAL VOTES RECEIVED BY EACH PARTY. INITIALLY, UNDISTRIBUTED SEATS INEVITABLY RESULT FROM THIS CALCULATION, AND THE LEGISLATION CALLS FOR ASSIGNING OF THESE SEATS TO THE PARTIES WITH THE "HIGHEST REMAINDER" OF VOTES.)

6. (U) AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED (REF A), AT THE BEHEST OF GOLKAR, THE COMPROMISE ELECTION SYSTEM INCORPORATES THE REGENCIES (KABUPATEN/KOTAMADYA) INTO THIS ESSENTIALLY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEM. EACH CANDIDATE FOR THE DPR WILL HAVE A STATED CONNECTION TO A SPECIFIC REGENCY. THE APPORTIONMENT OF SEATS FOR EACH PROVINCE IS

BASED ON THE PROVINCIAL POPULATION LEVEL, WITH THE
CONFIDENTIAL

PROVINCE RECEIVING A MINIMUM OF ONE SEAT FOR EACH REGENCY (ARTICLE 4). IN PREPARING FOR THE DPR ELECTION, A PARTY'S CENTRAL LEADERSHIP WILL PROPOSE A LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR EACH PROVINCE AND WILL SPECIFY THE REGENCY FOR WHICH THE CANDIDATE IS PROPOSED (ARTICLE 6A)

7. (U) A POTENTIALLY CONFUSING TWIST IS THAT INDIVIDUAL WINNING CANDIDATES FROM PARTICULAR PARTIES WILL ACTUALLY BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF OUTCOMES IN INDIVIDUAL REGENCIES. THE LAW ITSELF ONLY STATES THAT THE ASSIGNMENT OF ELECTED CANDIDATES FOR THE DPR FROM EACH PARTY WILL BE DETERMINED "WITH REFERENCE TO THE LARGEST NUMBER OF VOTES OBTAINED BY THE PARTY IN THE REGENCIES" (ARTICLE 68). (NOTE: THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM PAST INDONESIAN ELECTIONS, WHERE PARTIES RANK-ORDERED THEIR OWN LISTS OF CANDIDATES, WITH WINNERS DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF THEIR PLACES ON THE PARTY'S LIST, AS COMPARED TO THE PERCENTAGE OF THE NATIONAL VOTE THAT PARTY RECEIVED. IN THEORY AT LEAST, THIS NEW SYSTEM GIVES MORE CONTROL TO THE VOTER OVER WHICH CANDIDATE IS SEATED.)

8. (U) THE LAW DOES NOT SPECIFY HOW THIS CONCEPT OF "WITH REFERENCE TO THE LARGEST VOTE TOTALS IN REGENCIES" WILL BE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2557

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W		

----------A1D182 111039Z /38

R 111007Z FEB 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6035
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 07 JAKARTA 000714

USCINCPAC FOR FPR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF POLITICAL LAWS

CARRIED OUT, AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS ONE OF THE ISSUES THAT THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) WILL HAVE TO NAIL DOWN. ON THE OTHER HAND, GOLKAR'S ACCOUNT TO US (REF A) OF HOW THE PARTIES WHO NEGOTIATED THE DEAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00714 02 OF 07 111039Z
THINK THE SYSTEM WOULD WORK APPEARS TO BE ACCURATE. IFES HAS RECEIVED SIMILAR EXPLANATIONS IN ITS CONTACTS.

9. (U) ESSENTIALLY, THE OUTCOMES (BY PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE) IN THE REGENCIES WOULD BE USED BY THE PARTY TO RANK-ORDER ITS OWN PROVINCIAL LIST FOR THE DPR. IN OTHER WORDS, ITS TOP PERCENTAGE WINNER IN ANY REGENCY WOULD BE FIRST ON ITS LIST, AND SO ON DOWN. IFES BELIEVES THAT THIS SYSTEM IS WORKABLE IN TERMS OF MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF A PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEM.

10. (U) THIS STRANGE COMPROMISE SYSTEM, HOWEVER, WILL LEAD TO TWO SIGNIFICANT ANOMALIES, ACCORDING TO IFES. FIRST, IN MANY CASES, THE FIRST PLACE WINNER IN A REGENCY/MUNICIPALITY WILL NOT WIN THE SEAT, AND -- CONVERSELY -- MANY SEATS COULD BE TAKEN BY CANDIDATES WHO CAME IN SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH, ETC. IN A REGENCY. (COMMENT: THOUGH THIS IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL, IT COULD BE IMMENSELY CONFUSING TO THE FIRST PLACE WINNER AND HIS/HER SUPPORTERS IN A REGENCY WHO DID NOT GET THE SEAT.) SECOND, SOME REGENCIES IN A PROVINCE WILL NOT HAVE ANY OF THEIR CANDIDATES ASSUME SEATS AND COULD BE IN THEIR PERCEPTION UNREPRESENTED.

ELECTION TIMING AND LEVELS (ELECTION LAW)
---

11. (U) THE GOVERNMENT HAD PROPOSED THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE JUNE ELECTION, THE PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD A YEAR AFTER THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS FOR THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 00714 02 OF 07 111039Z

DPR (ARTICLE 68 IN ORIGINAL ELECTION BILL). AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED (REFTEL D), THE DPR CHANGED THIS AND DECIDED TO HOLD ELECTIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY AS HAD BEEN DONE IN THE PAST.

12. (U) AS NOTED ABOVE, THE ELECTION FOR THE DPR IS BASED ON THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL RESULTS, AS ARE THE ELECTIONS FOR THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES. THE ELECTIONS FOR THE REGENCY/MUNICIPALITY LEGISLATURES ARE BASED ON THOSE UNITS (ARTICLE 3).

GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION AND OTHER ELECTION BODIES (ELECTION LAW)

13. (U) THOUGH THE PRESIDENT HAS OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ELECTION, A "FREE AND INDEPENDENT" GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KOMISI PEMILIHAN UMUM, KPU) WILL BE FORMED IN JAKARTA TO "IMPLEMENT" THE POLL (ARTICLE 8). IT IS ONLY THE TIP OF A VERY ELABORATE STRUCTURE OF COMMITTEES AT THE PROVINCIAL AND REGENCY LEVEL. THE KPU WILL CONSIST OF FIVE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES (DETERMINED BY THE PRESIDENT) AND ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM EACH POLITICAL PARTY ELIGIBLE TO COMPETE IN THE ELECTION, AND THEY WILL SERVE FIVE-YEAR TERMS. THE TWO BLOCKS WILL HAVE EQUAL AUTHORITY ON THE COMMISSION, HOWEVER, AS THE COMBINED VOTES OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WILL BE THE SAME AS THE GOVERNMENT VOTES. THE COMMISSION WILL ELECT ITS OWN CHAIR AND (2) VICE CHAIRPERSONS. THE COMMISSION WILL BE ASSISTED BY A SECRETARIAT GENERAL, AND THE PRESIDENT WILL DETERMINE THE SECRETARIAT'S ORGANIZATION AND

STRUCTURE, AND CHOOSE THE SECRETARY AND VICE SECRETARY GENERALS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTS OPERATIONALLY TO THE COMMISSION BUT ADMINISTRATIVELY TO THE GOVERNMENT. (ARTICLE 9). (COMMENT: THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) DROPPED THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY'S PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE "SOCIETAL REPRESENTATIVES" AS A THIRD, EQUAL COMPONENT OF THE COMMISSION.)

14. (U) THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) HAS ENORMOUS AND BROADLY DEFINED RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDING: 1)PLANNING AND PREPARING THE ELECTION; 2)ASCERTAINING WHICH POLITICAL PARTIES ARE ELIGIBLE TO CONTEST THE POLL (NOTE: THOUGH THE "TEAM OF ELEVEN" IS ASSISTING WITH THIS TASK GIVEN THAT THE COMMISSION CANNOT BE FORMED UNTIL IT IS KNOWN WHICH PARTIES ARE ELIGIBLE FOR THE ELECTION.); 3) ESTABLISHING THE INDONESIAN ELECTION COMMITTEE (PANITIA PEMILIHAN

INDONESIA, PPI) AND COORDINATING THE GENERAL ELECTION DOWN TO THE POLLING STATIONS (TPS).

15. (U) BENEATH THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION IS A PLETHORA OF LESSER ELECTION COMMITTEES COVERING THE PROVINCIAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS, INCLUDING A (NATIONAL) INDONESIAN ELECTION COMMITTEE (PPI), PROVINCIAL ELECTION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2586

PAGE 01 JAKART 00714 03 OF 07 111045Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W		

----------A1D28F 111045Z /38

R 111007Z FEB 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6036
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 07 JAKARTA 000714

USCINCPAC FOR FPR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF POLITICAL LAWS

COMMITTEES (PPD I), REGENCY ELECTION COMMITTEES (PPD II), AND SUB-DISTRICT ELECTION COMMITTEES (PPK). EACH MIRRORS THE ELECTION COMMISSION TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS MADE UP OF REPRESENTATIVES OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PARTIES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00714 03 OF 07 111045Z
(ARTICLE 12-19). THE INDONESIAN ELECTION COMMITTEE APPEARS TO FUNCTION AS THE OPERATIONAL ARM OF THE ELECTION COMMISSION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. ALL OF THESE COMMITTEES ARE ASSISTED BY SECRETARIATS (ARTICLE 20). IN EACH OF THE

SUB-DISTRICTS, THERE WILL ALSO BE A VOTE "COLLECTION" COMMITTEE (PPS) CHARGED WITH REGISTERING VOTERS AND FORMING POLL WORKERS GROUPS (KPPS) (ARTICLE 23). THE KPPS WILL BE COMPOSED OF CONTESTING POLITICAL PARTIES OR PUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES. EACH POLITICAL PARTY IS PERMITTED TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO JOIN IN HELPING CARRY OUT THE POLLING AT EACH STATION.

SUPERVISION AND MONITORING/OBSERVATION (PEMANTAU) OF THE ELECTION (ELECTION LAW)

16. (U) A COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE CARRYING OUT OF THE ELECTION, CALLED THE PANWAS (SIMILAR TO THE OLD PANWASLAK USED IN PAST ELECTIONS), WILL BE FORMED AT THE NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, REGENCY/MUNICIPALITY, AND SUB-DISTRICT (KECAMATAN) LEVELS. ITS MEMBERS AT THE TOP THREE LEVELS WILL BE JUDGES, REPRESENTATIVES OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, AND THE PUBLIC. AT THE SUB-DISTRICT LEVEL ITS MEMBERS WILL NOT INCLUDE JUDGES (ARTICLE 24). THE PANWAS WILL BE CHARGED WITH OVERSEEING ALL PHASES OF THE ELECTION, SETTLING DISPUTES THAT ARISE DURING THE ELECTION, AND FOLLOWING UP ON UNRESOLVABLE DISPUTES THAT ARE TO BE REPORTED TO THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES (ARTICLE 26).

17. (U) INSTITUTIONS TO MONITOR/OBSERVE (PEMANTAU) THE ELECTION FROM EITHER INDONESIA OR ABROAD ARE PERMITTED TO

MONITOR THE CARRYING OUT OF THE ELECTION UPON REGISTERING WITH THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION. THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED BY THOSE INSTITUTIONS WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY THE COMMISSION (ARTICLE 27).

VOTER REGISTRATION (ELECTION LAW)

18. (C) VOTERS WILL REGISTER AT "SPECIFIED LOCATIONS" BY SHOWING THEIR LEGAL PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION. THE VOTE COLLECTION COMMITTEES (PANITIA PEMUNGUTAN SUARA, PPS), LOCATED IN SUBDISTRICTS AND VILLAGES AND COMPRISED OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES, ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTIVELY REGISTERING VOTERS FROM GEOGRAPHICALLY HARD TO REACH AREAS (ARTICLE 32). AN ATTEMPT HAS BEEN MADE TO COUNTER SOME OF THE DOUBLE VOTING PRACTICES OF THE PAST, AS A VOTER WHO IS FOUND TO DELIBERATELY REGISTER ON MORE THAN ONE LIST WILL LOSE VOTING RIGHTS (ARTICLE 36).

ELECTION ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AND PARTY REGISTRATION (ELECTION LAW)

---

19. (C) AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED (REF D), THE DPR HAD AGREED TO LOOSEN THE RESTRICTIONS PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT ON THE PARTICIPATION OF POLITICAL ARIES FOR THIS ELECTION. THE GOVERNENT'S ORIGINAL DRAFT HAD PROPOSED THAT IN ORDER TO CONTEST THE ELECTION, A POLITICAL PARTY WOULD HAVE TO ESTABLISH BRANCHES IN MORE THAN HALF OF INDONESIA'S PROVINCES (14) AND MORE THAN HALF OF THE REGENCIES

(KABUPATEN) IN THOSE DISTRICTS. ALTERNATIVELY, IT COULD HAVE QUALIFIED BY GATHERING A LIST OF ONE MILLION SUPPORTERS.

20. (C) THE ELECTION LAW DROPS THE ONE MILLION SIGNATURE ALTERNATIVE. FOR THE LONG TERM, IT APPROVED THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL REQUIRING PARTY BOARDS IN MORE THAN HALF THE PROVINCES (ARTICLE 39). FOR THE 1999 ELECTION, HOWEVE, IT SAYS THAT A PARTY WILL BE ELIGIBLE IF IT HS OFFICIALS IN ONLY ONE THIRD OF THE PROVINCES (9) AND ONE HALF OF THE REGENCIES IN THOSE PROVINCES (ARTICLE 82). PARTIES NOT ELIGIBLE TO COMPETE IN THE ELECTION BUT WHO HAVE MET THE REQUIREMENTS IN THE POLITICAL PARTY LAW CAN CONTINUE TO EXIST (ARTICLE 39).

21. (C) (THE GOVERNMENT HAS FORMED A TEAM TO ADVISE IT ON WHICH PARTIES ARE ABLE TO MEET THE CRITERIA. IT IS THE "COMMITTEE TO PREPARE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION" (P3KPU), KNOWN AS "TEAM ELEVEN." IT IS CHAIRED BY WELL-RESPECTED ISLAMIC INTELLECTUAL NURCHOLISH MADJID, AND CO-CHAIRED BY HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION AND FORMER SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ADI ANDOYO, AND INCLUDES SEVERAL OTHER INDEPENDENT INDONESIAN

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00

DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /019W
----------A1D0CA 111031Z /38

R 111007Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6037
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 07 JAKARTA 000714

USCINCPAC FOR FPR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF POLITICAL LAWS

FIGURES. IT WILL ADVISE THE GOVERNMENT ON THE POLITICAL PARTY ISSUE AS WELL AS PAVE THE WAY FOR THE NEW ELECTION COMMISSION BY BEGINNING THE PREPARATION OF THE 70 OR SO NEW ELECTION GUIDELINES THAT THE COMMISSION WILL HAVE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00714 04 OF 07 111031Z
FORMULATE. THE TEAM'S SECRETARY, ANDI MALLARANGENG TOLD POLOFF THAT HE EXPECTED THAT OUT OF THE 141 PARTIES THAT HAD DECLARED THEMSELVES TO DATE, UP TO 30-40 WOULD BE ELIGIBLE TO COMPETE IN THE ELECTION. THE TEAM WILL WORK IN PARALLEL WITH THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AS IT REGISTERS NEW POLITICAL PARTIES.)

22. (U) AS PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT, THERE CONTINUES TO BE A THRESHOLD THAT MUST BE MET BY ALL PARTIES COMPETING IN THE 1999 ELECTION IF THEY ARE TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR FUTURE ELECTIONS (THIS IS NOT/NOT A THRESHOLD OF VOTES THAT MUST BE OBTAINED IN THIS ELECTION IN ORDER TO BE SEATED). IT HAS BEEN DRAMATICALLY LOWERED, HOWEVER, FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL OF 10 PERCENT TO 2 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN THE DPR. A PARTY COULD ALSO QUALIFY FOR THE POST 1999 ELECTION IF IT WON AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN THE PROVINCIAL OR REGENCY LEGISLATURES, DISTRIBUTED IN AT LEAST HALF OF THE PROVINCES OR HALF OF THE REGENCIES. THE PARTIES WHO DO NOT MEET THE THRESHOLD CAN ONLY PARTICIPATE IN FOLLOWING ELECTIONS IF THEY FORM COALITIONS WITH OTHER PARTIES.

CANDIDATE SCREENING (ELECTION LAW)
---

23. (U) THE ELECTION LAW OUTLINES REQUIREMENTS THAT MUST BE MET FOR CANDIDATES FOR THE NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL AND REGENCY LEGISLATURES. THE REQUIREMENTS RANGE FROM THE SIMPLE, LITERACY, TO THE MORE PROFOUND, SUCH AS LOYALTY TO PANCASILA AND THE CONSTITUTION, AND NOT BEING A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OR OTHER BANNED ORGANIZATIONS OR

HAVING BEEN INVOLVED IN THE 1965 COUP ATTEMPT (ARTICLE 43). IN THE PAST, THESE PROVISIONS WERE USED AS A PRETENSE TO INVESTIGATE CANDIDATES AND TO EXCLUDED MANY, A PROCESS KNOWN AS THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION (PENELITIAN KHUSUS OR LITSUS). ACCORDING TO THE ACCOMPANYING EXPLANATION TO THE ELECTION LAW, THE LITSUS WILL BE ELIMINATED. INFORMATION ABOUT A CANDIDATE'S LOYALTY TO PANCASILA, ETC. WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE POLITICAL PARTY LEADERSHIP, AND THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION WILL DETERMINE WHETHER THEY ARE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST OR ANY OTHER BANNED ORGANIZATION.

THE CAMPAIGN (ELECTION LAW)
---

24. (U) THE ELECTION LAW ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS SOME OF THE OBVIOUS CAUSES OF CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE OF THE PAST, THOUGH THE DETAILS OF THE SCHEDULE AND SYSTEM OF THE CAMPAIGN ARE LEFT TO THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION TO ARRANGE (ARTICLE 46). DURING THE CAMPAIGN, IT IS FORBIDDEN TO 1) DISPUTE THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA OR THE CONSTITUTION; 2) DEFAME AN INDIVIDUAL, RELIGION, ETHNIC GROUP, RACE, OR OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES; 3) PROVOKE ONE SOCIETAL GROUP AGAINST ANOTHER; 4) CREATE PUBLIC DISORDER; 5) THREATEN TO CONDUCT VIOLENCE OR TO SUGGEST USING IT TO TAKE POWER FROM THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT; 6) USE GOVERNMENT FACILITIES OR PLACES OF WORSHIP; AND 7) MOBILIZE MASSES FROM ONE "AREA" (DAERAH) TO PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN IN ANOTHER AREA. (ARTICLE 47).

25. (U) A PARTY'S CAMPAIGN FUNDS CAN BE OBTAINED FROM THE

PARTY, THE GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE ENTITIES, COMPANIES, FOUNDATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS. PARTIES ARE PROHIBITED FROM OBTAINING FUNDS AND OTHER ASSISTANCE FOR THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN FROM FOREIGN SOURCES (ARTICLE 48). THE PARTIES' CAMPAIGN FUNDS ARE SUBJECT TO AUDIT BY A PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT, AND THE PARTIES MUST REPORT THE RESULTS TO THE

GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (ARTICLE 49).

VOTE COUNTING (ELECTION LAW)

26. (U) POLLING STATIONS MUST BE LOCATED IN EASILY ACCESSIBLE AREAS (ARTICLE 51). THE BALLOTS WILL BE COUNTED AT THE POLLING STATION AS SOON AS THE VOTING ENDS (ARTICLE 56). POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES, GROUPS OF VOTERS AND "VARIOUS PARTIES" (BERBAGAI PIHAK) HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AND WITNESS THE VOTE COUNT. THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC CAN OBJECT TO THE VOTE COUNTING IF THERE ARE DEVIATIONS, AND IF ACCEPTED THE POLL WORKERS GROUP (KPPS) MUST MAKE IMMEDIATE CORRECTIONS (ARTICLE 56). THE KPPS AT THE END OF THE COUNT MUST ISSUE A STATEMENT OF THE COUNT WHICH IS SIGNED BY THE POLITICAL PARTY OBSERVERS, AND IS OBLIGATED TO GIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2536

PAGE 01 JAKART 00714 05 OF 07 111031Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/020W	

----------A1D0CB 111031Z /38

R 111007Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6038
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 07 JAKARTA 000714

USCINCPAC FOR FPR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF POLITICAL LAWS

THIS STATEMENT TO THE POLITICAL PARTIES.

27. (U) THIS PROCESS OF TABULATING VOTES, WHICH BEGINS AT THE VOTING STATIONS, IS THEN ESSENTIALLY REPLICATED UP THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CHAIN FROM THE VILLAGE/SUB-DISTRICT LEVEL (ARTICLE 58), TO THE DISTRICT LEVEL (ARTICLE 59), TO THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL (ARTICLE 61), AND FINALLY TO THE NATIONAL LEVEL (ARTICLE 62). REPRESENTATIVES OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PUBLIC ARE PERMITTED TO BE PRESENT AT EACH STAGE.

CRIMINAL PENALTIES (ELECTION LAW)
---

28. (U) THE ELECTION LAW LAYS OUT SOME TOUGH PENALTIES FOR VIOLATING ELECTION RULES, INCLUDING FOR FALSIFYING DOCUMENTS, VIOLENTLY OBSTRUCTING SOMEONE FROM VOTING, BRIBING SOMEONE TO VOTE FOR A SPECIFIC PARTY OR NOT TO VOTE AT ALL, CONDUCTING FRAUD, OR VOTING MORE THAN ONCE (ARTICLE 72-73).

POLITICAL PARTY FORMATION AND REGISTRATION (POLITICAL PARTY LAW)
---

29. (U) A POLITICAL PARTY MUST BE FORMED BY AT LEAST 50 PEOPLE. IT MUST MENTION THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA AS THE BASIS OF THE UNITY OF THE COUNTRY IN ITS PARTY STATUTES (NOTE: THIS IS A CHANGE FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S ORIGINAL DRAFT, WHICH SAID A PARTY HAD TO MENTION PANCASILA AS ITS SOLE PRINCIPLE IN THE PARTY STATUTES. THIS REPRESENTS A CONCESSION TO PPP.) THE PARTY'S CHARACTERISTICS, ASPIRATIONS AND PROGRAM CANNOT RUN COUNTER TO PANCASILA. THE PARTY MUST BE OPEN TO ALL CITIZENS IN INDONESIA, AND IT CANNOT USE THE NAME OR SYMBOL OF ANOTHER PARTY (NOTE: A PROVISION WHICH FORCES
CONFIDENTIAL

MEGAWATI TO AMEND HER PARTY NAME, ADDING "PERJUANGANG" TO PDI, AND CHANGING THE SYMBOL.) (ARTICLE 2). THE FORMATION OF A POLITICAL PARTY MUST NOT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY HARM NATIONAL UNITY (ARTICLE 2). ACCORDING TO THE EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE LAW, THIS ARTICLE IS GEARED TOWARD STOPPING POLITICAL PARTIES BASED ON SEPARATIST OBJECTIVES.

30. (U) PRIOR TO THE PASSAGE OF THE POLITICAL LAWS, PARTIES WERE LISTING THEMSELVES AT THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS. NOW, TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES FORMALLY THEY MUST

OBTAIN A NOTARIZED DOCUMENT AND REGISTER WITH THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE. THE JUSTICE MINISTER WILL ONLY ACCEPT A PARTY'S REGISTRATION ONCE IT HAS MET THE REQUIREMENTS LISTED ABOVE. THE JUSTICE MINISTRY WILL THEN VALIDATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POLITICAL PARTY BY ANNOUNCING IT IN THE GOVERNMENT PUBLICATION KNOWN AS THE "BERITA NEGARA REPUBLIC INDONESIA" (ARTICLE 4).

POLITICAL PARTY OBLIGATIONS AND SOURCES OF FUNDS (POLITICAL PARTY LAWS)

31. (U) POLITICAL PARTIES ARE OBLIGATED TO IMPLEMENT PANCASILA AND THE 1945 CONSTITUTION, DEFEND THE "WHOLENESS" ("KEUTUHAN") OF THE COUNTRY AND PROTECT ITS UNITY, CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF DEVELOPMENT; AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF A GOOD ELECTION (ARTICLE 9).

32. (U) THE PROVISION IN THE ORIGINAL BILL PROHIBITING CIVIL SERVANTS AND MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM BECOMING MEMBERS OF OFFICIALS OF PARTIES WAS DROPPED

(ARTICLE 10) FORM THE LAW. (AS NOTED REFTELS, A SEPARATE GOVERNMENT REGULATION WAS ISSUED ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE.)

33. (U) PARTIES CAN OBTAIN FUNDS FROM MEMBERSHIP FEES, DONATIONS AND "OTHER LEGAL EFFORTS" (THE LAST PROVISION WAS ADDED TO THE LAW BY THE DPR). POLITICAL PARTIES WILL RECEIVE AN ANNUAL GRANT FROM THE GOVERNMENT COMMENSURATE WITH THE VOTES OBTAINED IN THE PREVIOUS ELECTION. THE ACCOMPANYING EXPLANATION TO THE LAW APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT ALL PARTIES ELIGIBLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FIRST ELECTION FOLLOWING THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW WILL RECEIVE SUCH MONEY. POLITICAL PARTIES CANNOT ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS OR AID FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY (ARTICLE 12).

34. (U) A POLITICAL PARTY CAN ACCEPT A MAXIMUM OF 15 MILLION RUPIAH PER YEAR FROM ANY INDIVIDUAL, AND 150 MILLION RUPIAH PER YEAR FROM ANY BUSINESS OR OTHER BODY (ARTICLE 14). THIS IS UP FROM 5 MILLION AND 50 MILLION RUPIAH RESPECTIVELY IN THE GOVERNMENT'S ORIGINAL BILL. THE PARTY MUST PREPARE A LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS AND THE AMOUNT OF MONEY RECEIVED AND MAKE IT AVAILABLE TO BE AUDITED BY A PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT (ARTICLE 14). THE DPR DROPPED A SUBSECTION FROM THIS ARTICLE THAT HAD BEEN

PAGE 01 JAKART 00714 06 OF 07 111031Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W		

----------A1D0D0 111031Z /38

R 111007Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6039
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 07 JAKARTA 000714

USCINCPAC FOR FPR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF POLITICAL LAWS

INCLUDED IN THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL THAT SAID THAT A DONATION IN THE FORM OF AN ITEM WOULD BE CONSIDERED AT ITS MARKET VALUE AND MADE EQUAL TO A MONEY DONATION.
RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL PARTIES (POLITICAL PARTY LAW)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00714 06 OF 07 111031Z

35. (U) THE DPR ADDED A NEW SECTION (ARTICLE 16) THAT REITERATES SEVERAL RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL PARTIES. PARTIES CANNOT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH COMMUNISM. THEY CANNOT ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS AND/OR ASSISTANCE IN WHATEVER FORM FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. ACCORDING TO THE EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE LAW, THIS MEANS FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, INSTITUTIONS, BUSINESS ENTITIES, AND CITIZENS WHO ARE LOCATED EITHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE OF INDONESIA. PARTIES CANNOT GIVE CONTRIBUTIONS AND/OR ASSISTANCE IN WHATEVER FORM TO FOREIGNERS THAT EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WOULD DAMAGE THE NATIONAL INTEREST.

36. (U) THE SUPREME COURT OVERSEES THE LAW ON POLITICAL PARTIES, AND IT IS ENTITLED TO DISBAND A PARTY IF IT IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THIS LAW (THE GOVERNMENT'S DRAFT HAS SAID IT COULD DISBAND THE PARTY'S LEADERSHIP BOARD). THE JUSTICE MINISTER WOULD CARRY OUT THE ACTION, FOLLOWING A HEARING IN WHICH TO OBTAIN THE EXPLANATION FROM THE PARTY'S LEADERS AND A JUDICIAL PROCESS. THE LAW ALSO ESTABLISHES FINES FOR ANYONE WHO DELIBERATELY EXCEEDS THE LIMITATIONS ON FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO PARTIES (ARTICLE 19).

ORGANIZATION OF DPR AND PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) (LAW ON DPR, MPR, AND LOCAL LEGISLATURES)
---

37. (U) THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY WILL BE

COMPRISED OF 700 MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE 500 MEMBER DPR, THE 135 REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES (FIVE FROM EACH PROVINCE) AND 65 SOCIETAL REPRESENTATIVES (CHOSEN FROM GROUPS WHICH ARE OTHERWISE UNDERREPRESENTED IN THE MPR). THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES ARE ELECTED BY THE NEW PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES. IN FUTURE ELECTIONS, THE SOCIETAL REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE NOMINATED BY SPECIFIC GROUPS IN SOCIETY AND DECIDED BY THE DPR (ARTICLE 2). IN THE 1999 ELECTION, HOWEVER, THE SOCIETAL REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE CHOSEN BY A DIFFERENT MECHANISM. THE ELECTION COMMISSION WILL DETERMINE THE TYPES OF GROUPS TO BE REPRESENTED AND THE NUMBER THAT EACH WILL RECEIVE. THE IDENTIFIED GROUPS WILL THEN PROPOSE NAMES TO THE COMMISSION, WHICH WILL MAKE THE FINAL DECISION WHICH WILL "BE ADMINISTRATIVELY LEGALIZED BY THE PRESIDENT AS HEAD OF STATE" (ELECTION LAW, ARTICLE 81). THE MPR AND DPR LEADERSHIP WILL BE SEPARATED (ARTICLE 9). (NOTE: CURRENTLY THEY ARE IDENTICAL.)

38. (U) ABRI WILL RECEIVE 38 APPOINTED SEATS IN THE DPR, AND 462 MEMBERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES WILL BE ELECTED (ARTICLE 11). THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES WILL BE COMPRISED OF AT LEAST 45 AND AT MOST 100 MEMBERS, AND THE ARMED FORCES WILL RECEIVE TEN PERCENT OF THE SEATS (ARTICLE 18 (3)). THE REGENCY LEGISLATURES WILL BE COMPRISED OF AT LEAST 20 AND MOST 45 MEMBERS, AND THE ARMED FORCES WILL SIMILARLY RECEIVE TEN PERCENT OF THESE SEATS (ARTICLE 25 (3). THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEGISLATURES WILL BE BROKEN DOWN INTO FACTIONS REFLECTING THE POLITICAL CONFIGURATION OF THOSE BODIES (ARTICLE 37).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 00714 06 OF 07 111031Z
COMMENT:
---

39. (C) THE COMPROMISE ELECTION SYSTEM AGREED TO IN THE DPR APPEARS TO HAVE FRUSTRATED GOLKAR'S ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A DISGUISED DISTRICT SYSTEM (WHICH IT CALLED "PROPORTIONAL PLUS") AND WHAT WAS FEARED COULD HAVE BEEN A BUILT-IN SYSTEMIC ADVANTAGE. FOR THE MOMENT, AT LEAST, PPP GOT THE BEST OF THE DEAL ON THIS ISSUE, AND WE DO NOT SEE EVIDENCE YET THAT ANY PARTY IS AUTOMATICALLY ADVANTAGED BY THIS STRANGE COMPROMISE SYSTEM. THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THE ELECTION LAW APPEARS TO BE FIRM ENOUGH ON THE ISSUE OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL IN CHOOSING DPR MEMBERS. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE GENERALITY OF THE LAW, AND THE FACT THAT THE FINAL DETAILS WILL BE NAILED DOWN IN THE FUTURE BY THE ELECTION COMMISSION, IT WILL BEAR WATCHING THAT THOSE IN CONTROL OF THE PROCESS DO NOT ATTEMPT TO ALTER WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN AGREED, PERHAPS BY TRYING TO ONCE AGAIN MOVE BACK TO A DISTRICT SYSTEM. THE COMPLEXITY OF THIS SYSTEM AND THE CONFUSION IT CREATES GIVES AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR WHOEVER IS IN CHARGE OF IT TO MAKE MISCHIEF.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2545

PAGE 01 JAKART 00714 07 OF 07 111031Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W		

----------A1D0D1 111031Z /38

R 111007Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6040
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 07 JAKARTA 000714

USCINCPAC FOR FPR AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/16
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF POLITICAL LAWS

40. (C) IN ADDITION, THE TWO SERIOUS ANOMALIES CREATED BY THIS COMPROMISE SYSTEM ARE OF CONCERN AND COULD GENERATE TROUBLE UNLESS THEY ARE WELL UNDERSTOOD AMONG THE PARTIES AND SOCIETY. CANDIDATES AND THEIR FOLLOWERS WILL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00714 07 OF 07 111031Z
INEVITABLY BE DISCONTENTED IF THEY COME IN FIRST IN A REGENCY BUT ARE NOT SEATED IN THE DPR, ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY SEE A CANDIDATE WHO CAME IN THIRD IN THE SAME DISTRICT GET THE SEAT. IT PROBABLY WILL NOT MATTER TO THEM THAT THIS RESULT COULD BE PERFECTLY IN LINE WITH THE SYSTEM THAT THEY APPEAR TO BE HEADING TOWARD. THIS HAS THE POTENTIAL NOT ONLY TO CREATE HEARTACHE ON THE GROUND BUT DISTRUST AND SUSPICION WITHIN THE SYSTEM. SIMILARLY, IF A REGENCY RECEIVED NO REPRESENTATION AT ALL, WHICH IS ALSO POSSIBLE UNDER THIS APPROACH, AN ENTIRE AREA COULD SUFFER FROM THESE SAME SENTIMENTS.

41.(C) IT IS CLEAR THAT THE NATIONAL ELECTION COMMISSION WILL BE A KEY FACTOR IN DETERMINING HOW THE ELECTION WORKS OR DOES NOT WORK. THE INCLUSION OF POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES ON THE COMMISSION AND ON ALL OF THE SUBORDINATE COMMITTEES IS IN PRINCIPLE AN ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT. THE PARTIES ARE GOING TO HAVE TO WORK HARD, THOUGH, TO COME UP WITH REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTED TO PLAYING THE NECESSARY ROLE ON THE BODIES ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. ABSENT AN ASSERTIVE POSTURE BY THE PARTIES, THE GOVERNMENT-HEADED SECRETARIATS THAT WILL BE ATTACHED TO ALL OF THESE BODIES COULD BECOME PROBLEMATIC AS THE COMMISSION AND COMMITTEES TRY TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY.

42. (C) FINALLY, WE NOTE THAT THE REPEATED REFERENCES THROUGHOUT THE LAWS TO PROHIBITING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO POLITICAL PARTIES OR CAMPAIGNS IS AN ISSUE THAT WILL REQUIRE FURTHER INVESTIGATION. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 00714 07 OF 07 111031Z

CONFIDENTIAL

E12

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2068

PAGE 01 JAKART 04562 01 OF 06 161220Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/014W						

----------F8A16E 161221Z /38

R 161154Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9955
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMCONSUL AUCKLAND
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 JAKARTA 004562

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04562 01 OF 06 161220Z
WELLINGTON/AUCKLAND FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958:DECL:09/08/09
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ID, UN

SUBJECT: EARLY OCTOBER MPR NOT LIKELY, BUT STILL POSSIBLE; TNI FLOATS POSSIBLE DELAY DUE TO SECURITY ATMOSPHERE (C-AL9-00955) (C-SL9-00978)

REF A) JAKARTA 3740
B) JAKARTA 3131
C) JAKARTA 4080
D) JAKARTA 4215
E) JAKARTA 4397

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 16 SEP 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 02 MAY 2006 200503412

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR PAMELA J. SLUTZ, REASON 1.5 (D).

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: FINALIZATION OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERSHIP ON SEPTEMBER 11 OFFERS HOPE THAT, FROM A TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE, IT MAY STILL BE POSSIBLE TO SEAT THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) IN EARLY OCTOBER. IF THAT OCCURRED, VOTES ON EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE NEXT PRESIDENT WOULD LIKELY BE HELD BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR (SEE PARAGRAPH 4-5). A NUMBER OF PITFALLS REMAIN, HOWEVER, AND PROCEDURAL STEPS MAY HAVE TO BE SCRAPPED TO MEET THAT GOAL. THE MOST FORMIDABLE OBSTACLE IS SELECTION OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MPR BY THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS. IN SIX OF THE COUNTRY'S 27 PROVINCES, DISPUTES OVER SEAT ALLOCATION AND PARTY REPRESENTATION HAVE PREVENTED

PARLIAMENTS FROM BEING SWORN IN TO DATE. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC PRESSURE TO BEGIN THE MPR ON TIME, BUT AS HABIBIE'S POLITICAL TROUBLES HAVE GROWN, THERE IS INCREASING SUSPICION THAT THE MPR WILL BE DELAYED FOR POLITICAL REASONS. THOSE SUSPICIONS WERE BOLSTERED SEPTEMBER 14 WHEN DEPUTY ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIDODO SUGGESTED THE MPR MIGHT HAVE TO BE DELAYED BECAUSE POLITICAL TENSION AND THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE MADE THE SITUATION "NOT CONDUCIVE" TO A NOVEMBER MPR (SEE PARAGRAPH 15). AT THIS POINT, WE HAVE NOT SEEN ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE EITHER HABIBIE OR THE ARMY IS ATTEMPTING TO PUSH BACK THE MPR CALENDAR. THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO CHANCE THE MPR COULD OPEN EARLY, AS SUGGESTED BY MARZUKI DARUSMAN SEPTEMBER 16 (SEPTEL). END SUMMARY.

TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE, BUT DIFFICULT
---

3. (C) IT REMAINS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE THAT THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) SESSION, WHICH WILL INCLUDE A VOTE ON EAST TIMOR'S FORMAL SEPARATION AS WELL AS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, WILL BE SWORN IN BY THE OCTOBER 1 TARGET DATE. FROM A TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE, CHANCES FOR KEEPING THE SCHEDULE ON TRACK APPEARED REMOTE, BUT STRONGER, AFTER THE NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE (PPI) ANNOUNCED SEPTEMBER 11 THAT IT HAD APPROVED THE PARTIES' FINAL LISTS OF CANDIDATES TO BE SEATED IN THE NEW PARLIAMENT (DPR). PPI FINALIZATION OF THE PARTY CANDIDATE LISTS WENT MORE QUICKLY THAN

OBSERVERS EXPECTED, FOLLOWING EARLIER SUBSTANTIAL DELAYS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04562 01 OF 06 161220Z
IN COUNTING THE VOTE, CERTIFYING THE ELECTION RESULTS, AND SELECTING GROUPS ELIGIBLE TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MPR (REFS A-E). IMPORTANT STEPS STILL TO BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE MPR CAN GET UNDERWAY INCLUDE:

--THE KPU MUST FINISH VETTING FUNCTIONAL GROUP REPRESENTATIVES. THE KPU ON SEPTEMBER 13 REJECTED GUS DUR AS GROUP REPRESENTATIVE FROM NAHDLATUL ULAMA BECAUSE HE WAS ADJUDGED TO BE AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) IN CONTRAVENTION OF KPU CRITERIA.

[redacted] B1
[redacted] TOLD POLOFF SEPTEMBER 14 THAT SMALL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES ON THE KPU CONTINUED TO BE DISRUPTIVE BUT THAT OPPORTUNITIES TO SERIOUSLY DERAIL THE PROCESS WERE DWINDLING.

--REMAINING PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS (DPR-D-1'S) MUST BE SEATED, CHOOSE THEIR LEADERSHIP, DECIDE ON A PROCESS FOR CHOOSING THEIR FIVE "REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES", AND THEN CHOOSE THOSE REPRESENTATIVES. ALL BUT SIX PROVINCES ARE ALREADY IN VARIOUS STAGES OF THIS PROCESS. IN ACEH, PROGRESS HAS BEEN STALLED BY SMALL PARTY ATTEMPTS TO BE AWARDED SEATS ON THE PRETEXT THAT VOTER TURNOUT OUT WAS TOO LOW TO INDICATE VOTER PREFERENCES. [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2071

PAGE 01 JAKART 04562 02 OF 06 161220Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/014W

----------F8A173 161221Z /38

R 161154Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9956
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMCONSUL AUCKLAND
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 06 JAKARTA 004562

WELLINGTON/AUCKLAND FOR A/S ROTH
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04562 02 OF 06 161220Z

E.O. 12958:DECL:09/08/09
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ID, UN

SUBJECT: EARLY OCTOBER MPR NOT LIKELY, BUT STILL POSSIBLE; TNI FLOATS POSSIBLE DELAY DUE TO SECURITY ATMOSPHERE (C-AL9-00955) (C-SL9-00978)

EXPECTED THIS PROBLEM TO BE RESOLVED WITHIN ONE TO TWO DAYS. IN NORTH, CENTRAL AND SOUTHEAST SULAWESI AND WEST AND SOUTH KALIMANTAN, SEATING OF PARLIAMENTS HAS BEEN HELD UP BY DISPUTES OVER VOTE COUNTING, SEAT ALLOCATION, AND PARTY INFIGHTING OVER DETERMINING WINNING CANDIDATES. THE OFFICIAL DEADLINE FOR SELECTION OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES IS SEPTEMBER 18. IN LIGHT OF THE PROBLEMS, [redacted] TOLD POLOFF SEPTEMBER 16 B1
THAT THE PPI IS CONSIDERING WHETHER IT IS FEASIBLE TO OPEN THE MPR BEFORE ALL REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES ARE SELECTED.

-- REGULATIONS CALL FOR A TWO-WEEK PERIOD FOR "PUBLIC REACTION" TO THE DPR-D'S REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE CANDIDATES. IT IS HIGHLY LIKELY AUTHORITIES WILL NEED TO COMPRESS OR ELIMINATE THIS PERIOD IN ORDER TO HAVE ANY PROSPECT OF MEETING THE OCTOBER 1 DEADLINE.
PARTY INFIGHTING AND A NUMBER OF SMALLER BUT STILL DIFFICULT ISSUES ALSO COULD POTENTIALLY DELAY THE OPENING OF THE MPR BY A MATTER OF WEEKS (SEE PARAGRAPHS 6-9).

MPR PROCESS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 04562 02 OF 06 161220Z

4. (C) ASSUMING THAT THE MPR IS SEATED IN EARLY OCTOBER, VOTES ON EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE NEXT PRESIDENT WILL BE HELD IN LATE NOVEMBER OR EARLY DECEMBER AT THE EARLIEST, ACCORDING TO CURRENT PLANNING. THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS OF THE NEW MPR WILL BE INSTALLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) AND JPR MEMBERS, LEGALIZATION OF AGENDAS, SELECTION OF THE LEADERSHIP, AND FORMATION OF WORKING COMMITTEES. IN THE SECOND STAGE, COMMITTEES WILL GO INTO SESSION TO PREPARE FOR THE PLENARY. THERE WILL LIKELY BE 3-5 SEPARATE COMMITTEES TO DISCUSS, AMONG OTHER ISSUES: THE BROAD GUIDELINES OF STATE POLICY (GBHN); NON-GBHN BUSINESS (INCLUDING EAST TIMOR); AND, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE MPR PLENARY (INCLUDING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION). ACCORDING TO CURRENT PLANNING, THE VOTE ON EAST TIMOR SEPARATION WILL OCCUR IN THE PLENARY SESSION WHICH FOLLOWS, THOUGH IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER IT WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE OR AFTER THE HIGH POLITICAL DRAMA SURROUNDING THE PRESIDENT'S OPENING "ACCOUNTABILITY" SPEECH, WHICH MAY, IN FACT, HELP RESOLVE THE LONGSTANDING SUSPENSE OVER WHO WILL BE THE COUNTRY'S NEXT PRESIDENT. THERE HAS BEEN SOME TALK, ATTRIBUTED TO PDI-P, OF ADVANCING THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE TO THE FIRST SESSION, I.E., IN OCTOBER. GOLKAR DEPUTY CHAIRMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN ON SEPTEMBER 16 ENDORSED AN IDEA OPPOSITION PARTIES HAD ADVANCED EARLIER THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION BE MOVED TO THE BEGINNING OF THE SESSION (SEPTEL). THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE LITTLE PROSPECT OF OBTAINING SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR SUCH A MOVE ABSENT A PRIOR RESOLUTION ON WHO SHOULD BE THE NATION'S NEXT PRESIDENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04562 02 OF 06 161220Z

5. (C) THE GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION'S (KPU) TIMETABLE ALLOWS APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH FOR COMMITTEE WORK, WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SLATED FOR AROUND NOVEMBER 10. OBSERVERS HAVE LONG BEEN SKEPTICAL THAT COMMITTEE WORK COULD BE CONCLUDED THAT RAPIDLY, HOWEVER. THE MPR HAS HISTORICALLY TAKEN ABOUT TWO AND HALF MONTHS FOR COMMITTEE WORK, EVEN IN THE DAYS WHEN IT FUNCTIONED AS A GOVERNMENTQBERSTAMP. THIS MPR WILL FEATURE 21 PARTIES PLUS ARMED FORCES (TNI) REPRESENTATIVES LOCKING HORNS OVER ISSUES WITH BROAD IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE NATION. OBSERVERS EXPECT RULES OF PROCEDURE TO HAVE AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, WHICH WOULD SUGGEST THAT COMMITTEES MAY HAVE DIFFICULTY COMING TO AGREEMENT. GOLKAR OFFICIALS HAVE LONG VIEWED THE MPR TIMETABLE AS UNREALISTIC, AND

ACKNOWLEDGE THEY DO NOT EXPECT THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE MID-DECEMBER.

FOURTH DOWN, LONG YARDAGE TO THE MPR
---

6. (SBU) THE PPI'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF FINAL CANDIDATE LISTS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2074

PAGE 01 JAKART 04562 03 OF 06 161221Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/014W						

----------F8A17A 161221Z /38

R 161154Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9957
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMCONSUL AUCKLAND
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 06 JAKARTA 004562

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04562 03 OF 06 161221Z
WELLINGTON/AUCKLAND FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958:DECL:09/08/09
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ID, UN

SUBJECT: EARLY OCTOBER MPR NOT LIKELY, BUT STILL POSSIBLE; TNI FLOATS POSSIBLE DELAY DUE TO SECURITY ATMOSPHERE (C-AL9-00955) (C-SL9-00978)

IS ENCOURAGING, THOUGH SEVERAL POTENTIAL PITFALLS REMAIN. OBSERVERS HAD EXPECTED THAT COMPLEXITY AND LACK OF CLARITY IN ELECTION REGULATIONS - WHICH ATTEMPTED A UNIQUE BLEND OF ELEMENTS OF A DISTRICT SYSTEM WITH INDONESIA'S EXISTING PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM - WOULD TOUCH OFF FURTHER ROUNDS OF BITTER FIGHTING, BOTH BETWEEN AND WITHIN PARTIES. AMBIGUITIES IN THE REGULATIONS MADE IT POSSIBLE THAT IN A HIGH PROPORTION OF DISTRICTS, MORE PARTIES WOULD CONSIDER THEMSELVES TO HAVE "WON" THE DISTRICT (BY VIRTUE OF THE DISTRICT HAVING BEEN AMONG THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES' "BEST PERFORMANCES" IN A CERTAIN PROVINCE) THAN THERE WERE SEATS IN THE DISTRICT. THE ONLY SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR PARTIES, IN EFFECT, TO SWAP CLAIMS TO VARIOUS DISTRICTS SO THAT ALL PARTIES WOULD END UP WITH THE NUMBER OF SEATS THEY HAD WON IN THAT PROVINCE.

7. (C) AMONG THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES WITH POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT, [redacted] B1 HIGHLIGHTED THREE IN A RECENT MEETING WITH POLOFF:

CONFIDENTIAL

-- PARTIES MIGHT FIGHT OVER DISTRICTS WITH LARGER POPULATIONS IN ANTICIPATION THAT THE POWER OF INCUMBENCY WOULD GIVE THEM AN ADVANTAGE IN THE NEXT ELECTION.

-- PARTIES FORCED TO GIVE UP ONE DISTRICT IN FAVOR OF ANOTHER WOULD USE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MANIPULATE THEIR CANDIDATE LISTS. THEY MIGHT RETAIN THE CANDIDATE FROM THE DISTRICT THEY WERE FORCED TO GIVE UP AND MOVE HIM TO THE DISTRICT THEY GAINED; RETAIN THE CANDIDATE IN THE DISTRICT THEY GAINED (WHO WOULD HAVE PERFORMED LESS WELL THAN THE FORMER IN THE ELECTION); OR, GET RID OF BOTH AND ASSIGN A COMPLETELY NEW CANDIDATE. THIS WOULD EFFECTIVELY NEGATE THE DISTRICT ELEMENT OF THE SYSTEM.

-- SOME DISTRICTS WOULD END UP WITH REPRESENTATION FROM A PARTY THAT WAS AMONG THE LOWEST PLACE FINISHERS IN THAT DISTRICT, OR FROM UNKNOWN OR UNPOPULAR CANDIDATES, WHILE PARTIES OR CANDIDATES THAT HAD PROVEN MORE POPULAR IN THE DISTRICT WOULD FAIL TO GET A SEAT. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY LIKELY IN DISTRICTS THAT PARTIES FOUND LESS DESIRABLE, WHICH WOULD FALL BY DEFAULT TO SMALL PARTIES

WITH LITTLE LEVERAGE.

8. (C) THE FIRST CONCERN - THAT PARTIES WOULD BOG DOWN IN FIGHTING OVER PREFERRED DISTRICTS - MAY HAVE BEEN OVERBLOWN. THE FACT THAT THE PPI HAS FINALIZED SEAT ASSIGNMENTS INDICATES THAT THE PARTIES WERE ABLE TO WORK OUT THEIR DIFFERENCES. MORE FORMIDABLE ARE THE SECOND AND THIRD PROBLEMS, WHICH MAY STILL PRODUCE DISSENTION WITHIN THE PARTIES AND VOTER DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PROCESS. VARIOUS SOURCES CONFIRMED THAT PARTIES HAD

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04562 03 OF 06 161221Z
SIGNIFICANTLY MANIPULATED THEIR CANDIDATE LISTS, BY MUTUAL CONSENT. PDI-P SOUGHT TO MINIMIZE THE POLITICAL DAMAGE OF HAVING LARGE NUMBERS OF NON-MUSLIM CANDIDATES BY REDUCING THOSE NUMBERS. OTHER PARTIES HAD AN INTEREST IN FINDING SEATS FOR PARTY STALWARTS WHO HAD LOST IN OTHER DISTRICTS OR PROVINCES. IN ONE NOTABLE INSTANCE, CENTRAL JAVA CANDIDATES FROM PNI-FRONT MARHAENIS RESIGNED EN MASSE TO GIVE A SEAT TO FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S HALF BROTHER, PROBOSUTEDJO, WHO HAD RUN IN WEST SUMATRA, WHERE THE PARTY FAILED TO GAIN A SEAT. ANOTHER UNUSUAL OUTCOME WAS THAT SOME SMALL PARTIES WON SEATS FOR SECRETARIES-GENERAL, WHILE PARTY CHAIRMEN FAILED TO GAIN SEATS: PKP CHAIRMAN EDI SUDRAJAT WILL NOT GO TO THE DPR ALTHOUGH SECRETARY-GENERAL SUTRADARA GINTING WILL GET A SEAT; PNU SECRETARY-GENERAL AHMAD SJATARI WILL REPRESENT THE PARTY RATHER THAN CHAIRMAN SJUKRON MA'MUN.

9. (C) SINCE FEW PEOPLE UNDERSTOOD HOW THE QUASI-DISTRICT SYSTEM WAS INTENDED TO WORK (AND THE REGULATIONS WERE AMBIGUOUS, IN ANY CASE) OBSERVERS EXPECT THERE WILL BE CANDIDATES AND FACTIONS WHO FEEL THEY WON SEATS (BY VIRTUE OF A STRONG SHOWING EITHER WITHIN A DISTRICT OR BY COMPARISON TO WINNERS FROM OTHER DISTRICTS) BUT HAVE BEEN CHEATED. THERE HAVE BEEN SCATTERED REPORTS OF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2070

PAGE 01 JAKART 04562 04 OF 06 161221Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00

PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00
/014W

----------F8A181 161221Z /38

R 161154Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9958
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMCONSUL AUCKLAND
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 06 JAKARTA 004562

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04562 04 OF 06 161221Z
WELLINGTON/AUCKLAND FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958:DECL:09/08/09
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ID, UN

SUBJECT: EARLY OCTOBER MPR NOT LIKELY, BUT STILL POSSIBLE; TNI FLOATS POSSIBLE DELAY DUE TO SECURITY ATMOSPHERE (C-AL9-00955) (C-SL9-00978)

DEMONSTRATIONS BY SUPPORTERS OF DISAPPOINTED CANDIDATES, BUT IT IS STILL UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS PROBLEM WILL LEAD TO SERIOUS REARGUARD ACTIONS THAT WOULD SLOW DOWN THE PROCESS. THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE OCCURRED TO DATE APPEAR TO INVOLVE DISTRICT PARLIAMENTS (DPR-D2'S) WHERE THERE MAY BE A CLOSER IDENTIFICATION OF PARTICULAR CANDIDATES WITH THEIR HOME DISTRICTS. [redacted] B1
TOLD POLOFF SEPTEMBER 10 THAT HE EXPECTS DISAPPOINTED CANDIDATES TO CONTINUE TO BE A PROBLEM FOR THE PARTIES, THOUGH AT THE NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS, PARTIES MAY HAVE MORE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO COMPENSATE THE LOSERS.

SELECTION OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES
---

10. (C) [redacted] THAT B1

VISITED FOUR PROVINCES (NORTH AND SOUTH SULAWESI AND EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA) AUGUST 26 TO SEPTEMBER 3 TO OBSERVE ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS. HE REPORTED MIXED PROGRESS IN FORMING DPR-D1'S, CHOOSING LEADERSHIP AND DISCUSSING HOW TO CHOOSE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES, BUT NOTED EXTENSIVE PARTY INFIGHTING AT THE DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL LEVEL
CONFIDENTIAL

OVER CANDIDATE SEATING AND SUCH LONGSTANDING ISSUES AS ELECTION VIOLATIONS AND THE COUNTING OF VOTE REMAINDERS. IN NORTH SULAWESI, PROUD NEW PARLIAMENTARIANS SHOWED UP IN FULL DRESS TO BE SWORN IN SEPTEMBER 4 ONLY TO BE SENT HOME BECAUSE OF UNRESOLVED ALLEGATIONS OF ELECTION IRREGULARITIES.

11. (C) A KEY QUESTION FOR SEATING OF THE MPR IS HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE FOR ALL 27 PROVINCES TO SELECT THEIR REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES. THE KPU LEFT IT TO EACH DPR-D1 TO DETERMINE ITS OWN METHOD OF CHOOSING THE FIVE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES, A PROCESS THAT COULD PROVE CONTENTIOUS IN SOME PROVINCES SINCE DIFFERENT METHODS FAVOR DIFFERENT PARTIES. THE HOME MINISTRY LATER ISSUED NON-BINDING GUIDELINES SUGGESTING A PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM, BUT SOME PROVINCES IN WHICH A SINGLE PARTY DOMINATES APPEAR TO BE EXERCISING THEIR OPTION TO USE A "WINNER TAKE ALL" APPROACH. ANOTHER ISSUE EACH DPR-D1 MUST RESOLVE IS WHETHER ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES (TNI), WHO ARE GIVEN 10 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN EACH DPR-D, WILL BE ELIGIBLE TO SERVE AS REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES.
IN REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS THAT ARE FRAGMENTED AMONG MANY PARTIES, TNI'S 10 PERCENT COULD MAKE THEM THE THIRD OR FOURTH LARGEST BLOC, ALLOWING THEM TO PICK UP A REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE SEAT UNDER A PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM. MANY PEOPLE OPPOSE THIS, SINCE TNI ALREADY HAS 38 UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES BY VIRTUE OF ITS DPR ALLOCATION, BUT THERE IS NOTHING CURRENTLY IN THE REGULATIONS TO PREVENT IT.

12. (C) ON THE BASIS OF HIS OBSERVATIONS, [redacted] SEES B1
CONFIDENTIAL

IT AS HIGHLY UNLIKELY ALL 27 PROVINCES WILL HAVE RESOLVED THESE ISSUES AND SELECTED THEIR REPRESENTATIVES BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER, MUCH LESS THE SEPTEMBER 18 DEADLINE. OF THE FOUR PROVINCES USAID VISITED, EAST JAVA WAS FURTHEST ALONG, HAVING SWORN IN ITS DPR-D1, CHOSEN ITS DPR-D1 LEADERSHIP, AND AGREED ON A PROPORTIONAL METHOD FOR CHOOSING ITS MPR REPRESENTATIVES. DESPITE THE FACT

THAT TWO FRIENDLY PARTIES (PDI-P AND PKB) WITH SIMILAR INTERESTS DOMINATE THE PROVINCE, LEADERS CASUALLY TOLD [redacted] THEY DID NOT ANTICIPATE HAVING THEIR REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES CHOSEN UNTIL THE END OF SEPTEMBER. IN SOUTH SULAWESI, WHERE GOLKAR DOMINATES, THE DPR-D1 LEADERSHIP HAD NOT YET BEEN FORMALLY ELECTED, THOUGH THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP APPEARED LIKELY TO REMAIN IN PLACE. HAVING THAT LUXURY, LEADERS HAD DECIDED ON A "WINNER TAKE ALL METHOD" FOR PICKING MPR REPRESENTATIVES. THEY INCIDENTALLY DENIED RUMORS THAT THEY WERE PLANNING DELIBERATELY TO HOLD UP NAMING OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES TO HELP FAVORITE-SON PRESIDENT HABIBIE WAIT OUT HIS ONGOING POLITICAL TROUBLES. B1

13. (C) IN NORTH SULAWESI, THE DPR-D1 HAD NOT YET BEEN SWORN IN, THOUGH PARTIES WERE NEGOTIATING AMONGST THEMSELVES OVER THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE ISSUE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2072

PAGE 01 JAKART 04562 05 OF 06 161221Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/014W						

----------F8A186 161221Z /38

R 161154Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9959
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMCONSUL AUCKLAND
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
CG III MEF

E.O. 12958:DECL:09/08/09
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ID, UN

SUBJECT: EARLY OCTOBER MPR NOT LIKELY, BUT STILL POSSIBLE; TNI FLOATS POSSIBLE DELAY DUE TO SECURITY ATMOSPHERE (C-AL9-00955) (C-SL9-00978)

RELATIVELY WEAK PDI-P WAS NEGOTIATING WITH TNI IN AN EFFORT TO CAPTURE AN MPR REPRESENTATIVE SEAT. (NOTE: [redacted] OBSERVED THAT NORTH SULAWESI WAS THE ONLY ONE OF THE FOUR PROVINCES WHERE TNI HAD BECOME INVOLVED IN POLITICAL MANEUVERING, SUGGESTING THAT THERE WAS NO COORDINATED EFFORT UNDERWAY TO INCREASE ITS REPRESENTATION IN THE MPR. END NOTE.) [redacted] CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE PROSPECT THAT ALL 27 DPR-D1'S, SOME OF WHOSE MEMBERSHIPS HAVE NOT YET BEEN FINALLY DETERMINED, WILL BE ABLE TO SELECT THEIR REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES BEFORE THE END OF SEPTEMBER. IN ORDER FOR THE FULL MPR TO BEGIN IN EARLY OCTOBER, HE PREDICTED THE TWO-WEEK PERIOD FOR "PUBLIC REACTION" TO THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPRESSED OR SCRAPPED. B1 B1

COUNTERVAILING PRESSURES
---

14. (C) THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVE TO HOLD A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION THIS YEAR WILL PROVIDE THE MAIN IMPETUS TO KEEP THE REST OF THE MPR SCHEDULE MOVING FORWARD. WHILE THERE

IS NO LEGALLY-BINDING REQUIREMENT THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION BE HELD BEFORE 2003 (THE EXPIRATION OF THE FIVE-YEAR TERM HABIBIE INHERITED FROM SOEHARTO), HABIBIE MADE A STRONG PUBLIC COMMITMENT LAST YEAR TO HOLD A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 1999 IN THE FACE OF MOUNTING DEMANDS THAT HE BE REMOVED IN FAVOR OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. STRENUOUS EFFORTS MADE TO HOLD THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION ON TIME, DESPITE THE CLEARLY INADEQUATE STATE OF PREPARATIONS, PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT FEELS BOUND TO STAY ON TRACK.

15. (C) POLITICAL CONSIDERATION MAY PLAY A ROLE AS WELL. AS THE PRESIDENT'S PROSPECTS FOR REELECTION HAVE PLUMMETED IN RECENT WEEKS, OPPOSITION CONTACTS HAVE VOICED CONCERN THAT A DESPERATE HABIBIE CAMP WILL SEEK TO DELAY THE ELECTION. DEPUTY TNI COMMANDER WIDODO FUELED SPECULATION WHEN HE TOLD A MEETING OF ALL THE COUNTRY'S MILITARY REGIONS AND DISTRICT COMMANDS IN JAKARTA SEPTEMBER 13 THAT PARTY LEADERS HAD FAILED TO SHOW A COMMITMENT TO WORK TOWARD COMPROMISE AND CONSENSUS, CREATING A TENSE ATMOSPHERE WHICH COULD EASILY EXPLODE INTO VIOLENCE. HE WARNED PARTY LEADERS TO PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE AND ENSURE THEIR SUPPORTERS REMAINED UNDER CONTROL. WIDODO SAID CURRENT CONDITIONS WERE NOT CONDUCIVE TO HOLDING THE MPR IN NOVEMBER, ALTHOUGH HE STOPPED SHORT OF MAKING A FORMAL RECOMMENDATION THAT THE MPR BE DELAYED AND DID NOT INDICATE IF HE WAS REFLECTING OFFICIAL TNI VIEWS. A RANGE OF PARTY FIGURES REACTED SHARPLY TO WIDODO'S STATEMENT. MARZUKI DARUSMAN, AMIEN RAIS, HAMZAH HAZ, AND OTHER COMMENTATORS PREDICTED FURTHER COMPLICATIONS, OR EVEN CHAOS, IF THE MPR WERE

CONFIDENTIAL

DELAYED. TWO [redacted] LEADERS WITH B1
WHOM POLOFF MET SEPARATELY SEPTEMBER 14 APPEARED UNSURE OF WHAT TO MAKE OF WIDODO'S STATEMENT. ONE SUGGESTED THAT TNI MIGHT FEEL IT IS SPREAD TOO THINLY, WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS IN BOTH ACEH AND EAST TIMOR, BUT BOTH ALLOWED THERE MIGHT BE MOTIVATIONS OF A MORE POLITICAL NATURE.

COMMENT
---

16. (C) THE FACT THAT FINALIZATION OF CANDIDATE LISTS WENT MORE SMOOTHLY THAN EXPECTED (THUS FAR) SUGGESTS THAT FROM A TECHNICAL STANDPOINT, THERE IS STILL HOPE THE MPR CAN BEGIN IN EARLY OCTOBER. THE LARGE PARTIES HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY CAN COOPERATE WHEN IT SUITS THEIR INTERESTS, EVEN IF PROGRESS HAS OFTEN COME AT THE EXPENSE OF PROCESS AND PROCEDURE. IF THERE APPEARS TO BE A REASONABLE POSSIBILITY OF STARTING ON TIME, WE EXPECT THE "PUBLIC REACTION" PERIOD WILL BE WAIVED TO COMPRESS THE TIMETABLE. THERE IS ALSO A CHANCE THE MPR WILL BE SWORN IN AND BEGIN WORK WITHOUT A FULL COMPLEMENT OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES, WHOSE PRESENCE IS DEEMED TO BE MORE CRITICAL IN THE LATER STAGES OF THE MPR.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 04562 06 OF 06 161221Z
ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01
	DINT-00	DOEE-00	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EUR-01
	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
	/014W						

----------F8A18A 161221Z /38

R 161154Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9960
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMCONSUL AUCKLAND
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
CG III MEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 06 JAKARTA 004562

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04562 06 OF 06 161221Z
WELLINGTON/AUCKLAND FOR A/S ROTH

E.O. 12958:DECL:09/08/09
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ID, UN

SUBJECT: EARLY OCTOBER MPR NOT LIKELY, BUT STILL POSSIBLE; TNI FLOATS POSSIBLE DELAY DUE TO SECURITY ATMOSPHERE (C-AL9-00955) (C-SL9-00978)

17. (C) WITH ALL OF THE TROUBLES THE GOVERNMENT IS FACING, WE CANNOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A DELAY FOR POLITICAL REASONS, EITHER ON THE PRETEXT OF TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OR SECURITY. WITH DEMONSTRATIONS AND POLITICAL TENSION INCREASING, HOWEVER, ANY ATTEMPT TO SLIP THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION BEYOND DECEMBER FOR OTHER THAN

CONVINCINGLY TECHNICAL REASONS WOULD ENTAIL GRAVE RISKS. THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS IN RECENT DAYS OF INCREASING POLITICAL MANEUVERING BY TNI FIGURES, WHOSE FATES APPEAR INCREASINGLY LINKED WITH HABIBIE FORCES IN THE WAKE OF THE EAST TIMOR DEBACLE. WIDODO'S WARNING MAY HAVE BEEN A TRIAL BALLOON, AND IT HAS FED SUSPICIONS THAT TNI AND HABIBIE FORCES MIGHT BE WILLING TO BEAR THE RISKS OF AN MPR DELAY. AT THIS POINT WE HAVE NOT SEEN ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE EITHER HABIBIE OR THE ARMY IS ATTEMPTING TO PUSH BACK THE MPR CALENDAR. IF THIS OCCURRED THOUGH, INDONESIA'S POLITICAL TRANSITION AND THE FULFILLMENT OF EAST TIMORESE ASPIRATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE COULD BE AGONIZINGLY PROLONGED.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E14

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6328

PAGE 01 JAKART 04215 01 OF 03 012323Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/011W						

----------F332D7 012324Z /38

R 012304Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9599
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004215

E.O. 12958:DECL:08/31/09
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: KPU CANCELS "STEMBUS ACCORDS" TO RESOLVE IMPASSE OVER VOTE REMAINDERS: PPI RELEASES FINAL PARLIAMENTARY SEAT ALLOCATION

REF A) JAKARTA 3740
B) JAKARTA 3131
C) JAKARTA 4080

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04215 01 OF 03 012323Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR PAMELA J. SLUTZ, REASON 1.5 (D).

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF CONFLICTS FOLLOWING THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, THE INDONESIAN GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) VOTED AUGUST 30 TO CANCEL TWO VOTE-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS ("STEMBUS ACCORDS") PERMITTED AND LEGALIZED UNDER THE ELECTION LAW. THE DECISION ALLOWED PROGRESS TO RESUME TOWARD THE SCHEDULED OCTOBER 1 SWEARING IN OF THE PEOPLES CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH WILL ELECT THE NEXT PRESIDENT LATER THIS YEAR. IT ALSO ALLOWED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 1 SEP 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 02 MAY 2006 200503412

ELECTION AUTHORITIES TO FINALIZE ALLOCATION OF SEATS IN THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) BASED ON RESULTS OF THE JUNE 7 ELECTION (SEE PARAGRAPH 11). THE KPU DECISION APPEARS TO AFFECT MAINLY SMALLER PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN THE "STEMBUS ACCORDS." AS ANOTHER DEVIATION FROM THE SPIRIT OF THE ELECTION LAW, HOWEVER, IT WILL LIKELY FURTHER ERODE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE KPU AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. TWO POTENTIALLY DIFFICULT ISSUES REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE MPR CAN BE SEATED: PARTIES MUST DETERMINE WHICH OF THEIR LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATES WILL ACTUALLY OCCUPY THE DPR SEATS; AND PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS MUST DETERMINE A METHOD FOR AND COMPLETE THE SELECTION OF FIVE "REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES" FROM EACH PROVINCE TO THE MPR. END SUMMARY.

DEADLOCK BROKEN
---

3. (U) UNDER THREAT OF ANOTHER PRESIDENTIAL INTERVENTION (PRESIDENT HABIBIE STEPPED INTO A PREVIOUS DISPUTE AUGUST 3 TO LEGALIZE RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTION - REF A), INDONESIA'S GENERAL ELECTION COMMITTEE VOTED AUGUST 30 TO ANNUL VOTE SHARING ARRANGEMENTS, CALLED "STEMBUS ACCORDS", AS A LAST-DITCH MEANS TO BREAK A DEADLOCK OVER HOW TO ALLOCATE SEATS NOT WON OUTRIGHT IN THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) ELECTION. INSTEAD, THE KPU OPTED TO ALLOCATE SEATS TO PARTIES IN ORDER OF THEIR "LARGEST REMAINDERS" OF LEFTOVER VOTES IN EACH PROVINCE. ISLAMIC PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN ONE OF THE TWO LEGAL "STEMBUS ACCORD" GROUPS IMMEDIATELY THREATENED TO SUE, CHALLENGING THE KPU'S AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH A DECISION. CHAIRMAN RUDINI INSISTED THE KPU HAD THE AUTHORITY, SINCE IT WAS A KPU REGULATION THAT ESTABLISHED THE "STEMBUS ACCORDS". MEANWHILE A NUMBER OF SMALL PARTIES HOPING TO GAIN SEATS AS A RESULT OF THE STALEMATE BOYCOTTED THE VOTE. ON THE BASIS OF THE KPU DECISION, THE NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE (PPI) RELEASED THE FINAL PARLIAMENTARY SEAT ALLOCATION ON SEPTEMBER 1. RESULTS ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 11.

4. (SBU) IN A PATTERN THAT HAS BECOME DEPRESSINGLY FAMILIAR (REFTELS), DISCUSSION IN THE KPU OVER HOW TO HANDLE A TECHNICAL AMBIGUITY IN THE ELECTION REGULATIONS HAD DEVOLVED OVER THE PAST THREE WEEKS INTO OPEN BICKERING, WITH MANY POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES OPENLY DISREGARDING THE SPIRIT OF THE ELECTION LAW IN AN UNSEEMLY SCRAMBLE OVER DPR SEATS. THE KPU COMPRISES

REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH OF THE 48 PARTIES THAT CONTESTED THE ELECTION PLUS FIVE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 04215 01 OF 03 012323Z

DISPUTE OVER "STEMBUS ACCORDS"

5. (U) UNDER INDONESIA'S COMPLICATED ELECTORAL SYSTEM, PARTIES WERE REQUIRED TO GARNER A CERTAIN "QUOTA" OF VOTES (DETERMINED SEPARATELY FOR EACH PROVINCE) FOR EACH SEAT WON IN THE RESPECTIVE PARLIAMENTS (NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEVEL). THE ELECTION REGULATIONS ALLOWED PARTIES THAT REGISTERED "STEMBUS ACCORDS" WITH THE KPU BEFORE THE ELECTION TO POOL LEFTOVER VOTES TO GAIN ADDITIONAL SEATS, WHICH WOULD THEN BE DIVIDED AMONG THE PARTIES ACCORDING TO PRIOR AGREEMENT. THE REGULATIONS CALLED FOR A TWO-STEP PROCESS FOR ALLOCATING SEATS NOT WON WITH A FULL QUOTA (120 OUT OF 462 AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL): SEATS WOULD BE DISTRIBUTED FIRST TO THE "STEMBUS ACCORD" PARTIES AND AFTER THAT TO OTHER PARTIES IN ORDER OF THEIR "LARGEST REMAINDER" OF LEFTOVER VOTES.

6. (SBU) AMONG THE MANY AMBIGUITIES IN THE LAW, HOWEVER, WAS EXACTLY HOW THE VOTE REMAINDERS FOR EACH PARTY UNDER "STEMBUS ACCORDS" WOULD BE CALCULATED. BELATEDLY REALIZING THEY MIGHT ACTUALLY LOSE SEATS UNDER THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6329

PAGE 01 JAKART 04215 02 OF 03 012324Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/011W

----------F332DF 012324Z /38

R 012304Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9600
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE

AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 004215

E.O. 12958:DECL:08/31/09
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: KPU CANCELS "STEMBUS ACCORDS" TO RESOLVE IMPASSE OVER VOTE REMAINDERS: PPI RELEASES FINAL PARLIAMENTARY SEAT ALLOCATION

"STEMBUS ACCORDS," REPRESENTATIVES OF ISLAMIC PARTIES IN THE LARGER "STEMBUS ACCORD" GROUP REJECTED THE FORMULA THE NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE (PPI) ULTIMATELY DECIDED UPON. INSTEAD, THEY ARGUED THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO

CHOOSE TO BE TREATED EITHER INDIVIDUALLY OR AS MEMBERS OF THE "STEMBUS ACCORD" IN EACH PROVINCE, DEPENDING ON WHICH METHOD PROVIDED THEM THE MOST SEATS. THE ISLAMIC PARTIES ESTIMATED THAT THEY WOULD WIN APPROXIMATELY 58 DPR SEATS UNDER THEIR FORMULA, WHEREAS THE PPI FORMULA WOULD GIVE THEM ONLY 39 SEATS.

7. (C) THE MATTER WAS REFERRED TO THE KPU, WHERE PARTY REPRESENTATIVES FURTHER CONFUSED THE ISSUE BY PROPOSING SEVERAL MORE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS. REPRESENTATIVES OF SMALL PARTIES THAT HAD FAILED TO WIN ANY SEATS IN THE ELECTION CHIMED IN WITH A DEMAND THAT THE "STEMBUS ACCORDS" BE CANCELLED, AND THAT EACH OF THE 48 PARTIES THAT CONTESTED THE ELECTION BE GUARANTEED AT LEAST ONE SEAT. THE BALANCE WOULD THEN BE DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO "LARGEST REMAINDERS." THIS WAS ONLY THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF GAMBITS THE SMALL PARTIES (WHICH HAVE COME TO BE CALLED "PARTAI GUREM," OR CHICKEN LICE PARTIES, BECAUSE OF THE ANNOYANCE THEY HAVE BECOME WITHIN THE KPU) HAVE USED TO TRY TO GAIN AT LEAST ONE SEAT IN THE DPR. MANY OBSERVERS BELIEVE THEIR DOGGED PURSUIT OF SEATS MAY BE IN PART EXPLAINED BY THEIR EXPECTATION THAT PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS WILL BE WILLING TO PAY LARGE SUMS OF MONEY FOR VOTES IN THE COMING MPR ELECTION.

LESSER OF TWO EVILS
---

8. (U) PRESIDENT B.J. HABIBIE ULTIMATELY FORCED A RESOLUTION BY THREATENING TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE DECISION IF THE KPU DID NOT ACT BY AUGUST 30. THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A HUMILIATING REPRISE FOR THE KPU OF HABIBIE'S

AUGUST 3 LEGALIZATION OF ELECTION RESULTS FOLLOWING A PREVIOUS DEADLOCK (REF A). WHEN SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE MOST RECENT IMPASSE FAILED, KPU CHAIRMAN RUDINI PRESENTED THE KPU PLENARY WITH A STARK CHOICE: EITHER ACCEPT THE ISLAMIC PARTIES' FORMULA, OR CANCEL THE "STEMBUS ACCORDS" ALTOGETHER AND ALLOCATE SEATS PURELY ACCORDING TO "LARGEST REMAINDERS."

9. (SBU) RUDINI'S DECISION NOT TO PRESENT THE KPU WITH THE THIRD OPTION OF ACCEPTING THE PPI FORMULA, WHICH WAS SEEN AS THE MOST CONSISTENT OF ALL THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS WITH THE INTENT OF THE ELECTION REGULATIONS, APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A PRAGMATIC COMPROMISE: UNDER A PURE "LARGEST REMAINDER" SYSTEM, THE ISLAMIC PARTIES WILL GAIN APPROXIMATELY 48 SEATS. WHILE THEY WOULD HAVE GAINED 58 SEATS IF THEIR FORMULA HAD BEEN ACCEPTED, THEY WILL STILL DO FAR BETTER THAN UNDER THE PPI'S FORMULA, WHICH WOULD HAVE PROVIDED ONLY 39 SEATS. RUDINI APPARENTLY CALCULATED THAT THE ISLAMIC PARTIES WOULD ULTIMATELY ACCEPT THE DECISION.

10. (C) IN AN AUGUST 31 CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF, [redacted] B1 DESCRIBED THE KPU'S DECISION TO GO WITH A "LARGEST REMAINDER" SYSTEM AS THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS, GIVEN THE TWO CHOICES RUDINI PRESENTED. [redacted] VIEWED ANY DEVIATION FROM THE PPI FORMULA AS FURTHER ERODING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE PROCESS, SINCE SEATS GAINED BY THE ISLAMIC PARTIES WERE, IN EFFECT, TAKEN AWAY FROM OTHER PARTIES. THE "LARGEST REMAINDER" SOLUTION TRANSFERRED FEWER SEATS AND WAS THUS

CONFIDENTIAL

PREFERABLE TO THE ISLAMIC PARTIES' SOLUTION. THE EFFECT ON THE MAJOR PARTIES WAS RELATIVELY SMALL. IFES ESTIMATED THAT PDI-P, GOLKAR, AND PAN HAD EACH LOST ONE SEAT.

FINAL SEAT ALLOCATION
---

11. (U) WITH THE IMPASSE BROKEN, ON SEPTEMBER 1, THE PPI WAS ABLE TO ANNOUNCED FINAL RESULTS. 20 OUT OF 48 PARTIES THAT CONTESTED THE ELECTION WON SEATS IN THE DPR ON THE BASIS OF THE "LARGEST REMAINDER" SYSTEM. THE RESULTS FOR THE LARGEST PARTIES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

PDI-PERJUANGAN 153

GOLKAR		120
PARTAI PERSATUAN PEMBANGUNAN	(PPP)	58
PARTAI KEBANGKITAN BANGSA	(PKB)	51
PARTAI AMANAT NASIONAL	(PAN)	34
PARTAI BULAN BINTANG	(PBB)	13
PARTAI KEADILAN	(PK)	7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6330

PAGE 01 JAKART 04215 03 OF 03 012324Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00

/011W

----------F332E1 012324Z /38

R 012304Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9601
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA, ROUTINE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 004215

E.O. 12958:DECL:08/31/09
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: KPU CANCELS "STEMBUS ACCORDS" TO RESOLVE IMPASSE OVER VOTE REMAINDERS: PPI RELEASES FINAL PARLIAMENTARY SEAT ALLOCATION

OTHER PARTIES WINNING MORE THAN ONE SEAT WERE PKP, PNU AND PDKB WITH FIVE SEATS EACH, AND PDI WITH TWO SEATS. NINE OTHER PARTIES WON A SINGLE SEAT EACH INCLUDING PBI,

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 04215 03 OF 03 012324Z
PKD, MASYUMI, PSII, PNI MM, PNI-FM, PDR IPKI AND PP. THE 500-MEMBER DPR ALSO INCLUDES 38 MEMBERS APPOINTED BY THE ARMED FORCES. (POST WILL FORWARD COMPLETE RESULTS BROKEN DOWN BY PROVINCE TO EAP/PIMBS VIA FAX.)

12. (U) IN WINNING 13 SEATS, PBB MANAGED TO PASS THE 2 PERCENT THRESHOLD REQUIRED IN ORDER TO CONTEST THE NEXT ELECTION IN 2004. THE PARTIES WINNING FEWER SEATS WILL BE REQUIRED TO REGISTER UNDER NEW NAMES IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR THE NEXT ELECTION, THOUGH THEY WILL BE SEATED IN THE COMING PARLIAMENT.

NEXT STEPS PROMISE LITTLE RELIEF
---

13. (U) THE ALLOCATION OF SEATS IS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD SEATING A NEW PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH WILL ELECT THE NEXT PRESIDENT LATER THIS YEAR. DELAYS IN THE KPU HAVE INCREASINGLY THREATENED THE OCTOBER 1 TARGET FOR SWEARING IN THE NEW MPR. WITH THE DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS COMPLETE, TWO IMPORTANT STEPS REMAIN BEFORE THE NEW PARLIAMENT AND MPR CAN BE SWORN IN: PARTIES MUST FINALIZE THEIR LISTS OF CANDIDATES WHO WILL ACTUALLY OCCUPY SEATS; AND, REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS MUST DETERMINE A METHOD FOR AND COMPLETE THE SELECTION OF FIVE "REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES" TO THE MPR FROM EACH PROVINCE. BOTH OF THESE STEPS ARE LIKELY TO BE FRAUGHT WITH CONFUSION AND CONTENTION AS A RESULT OF AMBIGUITIES IN ELECTION REGULATIONS AND EXPECTED INTRA-PARTY AND INTER-PARTY COMPETITION. IN ITS AUGUST 26 INTERIM REPORT ON THE ELECTIONS, THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE (NDI)

CONFIDENTIAL

ESTIMATED THAT REMAINING ISSUES MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY RESOLVED BY THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER IN ORDER FOR THE MPR TO BE SWORN IN BY THE OCTOBER 1 TARGET DATE.

14. (U) IT IS ALSO STILL UNCLEAR HOW LONG THE SMOKE WILL TAKE TO SETTLE FROM THE KPU'S LATEST DECISION. BELIEVING THEY HAVE LOST SEATS AS A RESULT OF THE DECISION, EIGHT ISLAMIC PARTIES THAT MADE UP THE LARGER OF THE TWO "STEMBUS ACCORD" GROUPS HAVE SAID THEY WILL FILE SUIT WITH THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE COURT (PTUN). THE KPU'S DECISION WILL ALSO ADD TO CONFUSION IN THE PROVINCES, WHERE THE PROCESS OF ALLOCATING SEATS AND SWEARING IN REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS (DPR-D) WAS ALREADY UNDERWAY. THE KPU HAS SAID THE DECISION WILL APPLY ONLY TO THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND TO THOSE PROVINCES IN WHICH DPR-D SEATS HAVE NOT YET BEEN ALLOCATED. THIS MEANS THE "STEMBUS ACCORDS" WILL STAND IN THE APPROXIMATELY 12 PROVINCES IN WHICH SEATS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ALLOCATED AND DPR-D MEMBERS SWORN IN.

15. (C) COMMENT: CANCELING THE "STEMBUS ACCORDS" ALLOWS

THE KPU TO AVOID ANOTHER EMBARRASSING PRESIDENTIAL INTERVENTION, BUT IT IS YET ANOTHER DEVIATION FROM THE INTENT OF ELECTION REGULATIONS, IN THIS CASE WITH A DIRECT IMPACT ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF DPR SEATS. KPU BICKERING HAS AGAIN DRAWN ATTENTION BOTH TO THE FACT THAT IMPORTANT ISSUES WERE INADEQUATELY ADDRESSED IN THE GOVERNMENT'S HASTE TO HOLD THE JUNE 7 ELECTION ON TIME, AND TO THE NAKED OPPORTUNISM OF SOME POLITICAL PARTY-REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS OF THE KPU. THUS, THIS EPISODE WILL LIKELY FURTHER ERODE THE CREDIBILITY OF INDONESIA'S

ELECTORAL PROCESS.

16. (C) ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, ANOTHER IMPORTANT STEP HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND THE KPU'S ROLE IN COMING STEPS WILL BE LIMITED. THE ACTION WILL NOW SHIFT TO THE PARTIES, WHICH MUST DETERMINE WINNING CANDIDATES, AND TO THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS, WHICH MUST SELECT THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES. WITH THE COMPLETION LAST WEEK OF THE SELECTION OF GROUPS ELIGIBLE TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MPR (REF C), MEETING THE OCTOBER 1 TARGET FOR SEATING THE MPR REMAINS A POSSIBILITY, PROVIDED EXPECTED DIFFICULTIES CAN BE OVERCOME QUICKLY. END COMMENT.

ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E19

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0101

PAGE 01 JAKART 03699 01 OF 03 301200Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/010W	

----------E71E83 301206Z /38

P 301153Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9089
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003699

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/30/04
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: MEGAWATI BREAKS SILENCE IN MAJOR POLICY SPEECH

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY A/POLCOUNS WILLIAM G. GRAY,

REASON:1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. CLAIMING SHE HAS THE "MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT," MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI BROKE HER SEVEN-WEEK SILENCE ON JULY 29 WITH A MAJOR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03699 01 OF 03 301200Z
SPEECH BEFORE SUPPORTERS AT PDI-P HEADQUARTERS. SHE CAREFULLY ENUNCIATED HER POSITION ON KEY ISSUES SUCH AS DEMANDS TO BRING SOEHARTO TO TRIAL, THE EAST TIMOR BALLOT, THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN POLITICS, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, AND A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL PLEDGE TO STOP VIOLENCE IN TROUBLED ACEH PROVINCE. MEDIA RESPONSE HAS BEEN ENTHUSIASTIC; ONLY AMIEN RAIS OF OPPOSITION PARTY PAN HAS RESPONDED CAUSTICALLY. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) MEGAWATI'S CAMP HAS BEEN SMARTING OVER INCREASINGLY CRITICAL REMARKS THAT HER RELUCTANCE TO SPEAK UP AFTER THE JUNE 7 NATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION WAS DUE TO HER INDIFFERENCE, HER GENDER, OR HER OWN LACK OF CONFIDENCE OR ABILITY TO ARTICULATE HER IDEAS. HER SILENCE WAS DELIBERATE, CLAIMED HER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 30 JUL 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200503412

SUPPORTING STAFF, REITERATING THAT SHE HAD PLEDGED NOT TO SPEAK UP UNTIL THE ELECTION RESULTS WERE OFFICIAL. (COMMENT: MEGA HAD COMMITTED HERSELF TO SILENCE ON THE ELECTIONS UNTIL THE FINAL VOTE COUNT; EVEN SHE COULD NOT HAVE ANTICIPATED THE TEDIOUS DRAWN-OUT POST-ELECTION WRANGLE WHICH PROMISES TO CONTINUE UNTIL EARLY NEXT WEEK. ACCORDING TO [redacted] B1
[redacted] HER INNER CIRCLE DECIDED ON JULY 27 TO GO AHEAD WITH HER ADDRESS ON THE AFTERNOON OF THURSDAY, JULY 29. DESIGNED TO CATCH THURSDAY EVENING TV NEWS AND THE FRIDAY PAPERS.)

4. (C) MEGA BASICALLY CAME OUT SWINGING WITH A WELL-CRAFTED SPEECH, DESIGNED, ACCORDING TO [redacted] TO "SHOW HER IDEAS ABOUT THE FIRST 100 DAYS OF HER ADMINISTRATION," WHICH WOULD EMPHASIZE HUMANE RECOVERY

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM THE NEW ORDER REGIME. SHE REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT AS "CARETAKER" AND WARNED IT NOT TO MAKE ANY BINDING STRATEGIC DECISIONS WITHOUT CONSULTING THE PARTY WHICH REPRESENTS THE MAJORITY OF THE VOTERS A POINTED REFERENCE TO A PENDING BILL ON REGIONAL AUTONOMY, AND ANOTHER ON STATE SECURITY. THE LATTER APPEARS TO BE A VEILED CARTE BLANCHE FOR THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN THE EVENT OF SERIOUS THREATS TO THE STATE. INSTEAD, MEGAWATI SAID, ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD SETTLE ALLEGED POLL FRAUD.

5. (C) MEGA'S PRESCRIPTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE SOEHARTO CASE WAS A MAJOR CROWD-PLEASER. SHE CALLED FOR A "DIRECT AND THOROUGH INVESTIGATION AND SAID THAT HER GOVERNMENT WOULD SET UP A JUDICIAL SYSTEM THAT WOULD "NOT HESITATE TO CARRY OUT ITS DUTY," A THINLY-VEILED SWIPE AT THE NOTORIOUSLY CORRUPT JUDICIARY. THIS WOULD NOT APPLY JUST TO SOEHARTO BUT ALSO "TO THE CURRENT PRESIDENT AND THE PRESIDENT TO COME." [redacted] B1
TOLD TDY POLOFF THAT PDI-P'S HIGHEST PRIORITY IS TO DISMANTLE THE CURRENT SUPREME COURT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, AND THE JAKARTA HIGH COURT SYSTEM. TO MEGA-WATCHERS WHO FOLLOWED HER THROUGH THE COUNTLESS LAWSUITS AND COURT APPEARANCES OF THE LAST TWO YEARS, THIS IS A SIGNIFICANT AND EXPECTED STEP. IT MAY BE MOTIVATED BY SOME PERSONAL FEELINGS, BUT ALSO SATISFIES THE NATIONAL HUNGER TO GET EVEN WITH THE SOEHARTO FAMILY AND CRONIES.

6. (C) MEGA CHOSE HER WORDS CAREFULLY ON EAST TIMOR,

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03699 01 OF 03 301200Z
SAYING SHE WOULD ACCEPT THE UN REFERENDUM ("I HAVE NO INTENTION WHATSOEVER NOT TO RESPECT THE DECISION THAT WILL BE TAKEN BY THE EAST TIMORESE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE THROUGH A REFERENDUM.") BUT SHE DELIVERED A SHOT AT HABIBIE, ADDING THAT IF SHE WERE PRESIDENT SHE WOULD NEVER HAVE ALLOWED A VOTE TO GO AHEAD, SINCE THE HABIBIE DECISION "WAS IN CONTEMPT OF THE 1978 MPR DECREE THAT STIPULATES EAST TIMOR AS INDONESIA'S 27TH PROVINCE." AFTER SAYING SHE STILL HOPED THE EAST TIMORESE WOULD CHOOSE TO REMAIN PART OF INDONESIA, MEGAWATI POINTEDLY WARNED AGAINST ALLOWING THE EAST TIMOR VOTE TO BECOME A TREND; "REFERENDUMS CANNOT BE HELD IN OTHER INDONESIAN REGIONS FOR WHATEVER REASONS."

7. (C) [redacted] SUPPLEMENTED MEGA'S REMARKS BY TELLING TDY POLOFF THAT PDI-P STRATEGY IS TO RESTORE THE MEANING AND VALUE OF THE INDONESIAN STATE SLOGAN " UNITY IN DIVERSITY," CLAIMING THAT A MEGA GOVERNMENT WILL PAY MORE ATTENTION TO DIVERSITY THAN UNITY WHILE CITING PROBLEMS IN AREAS LIKE RIAU PROVINCE IN SUMATRA AND KALIMANTAN, WHERE LOCAL NATURAL RESOURCES SUCH AS OIL AND TIMBER HAVE BEEN SUCKED AWAY TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. [redacted] STRESSED THAT A FUTURE PDI-P GOVERNMENT WILL REVISE THE CURRENT REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND RESOURCES BILL PUSHED THROUGH BY HABIBIE'S "LAME DUCK" B1 B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0102

PAGE 01 JAKART 03699 02 OF 03 301201Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/010W	

----------E71E89 301206Z /38

P 301153Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9090
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 003699

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/30/04
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: MEGAWATI BREAKS SILENCE IN MAJOR POLICY SPEECH

DPR.

8. (C) MEGAWATI ALSO CLARIFIED HER EARLIER, INFORMAL REMARKS ON THE CONSTITUTION, FOR WHICH SHE HAS BEEN CRITICIZED AS A CONSERVATIVE OUT OF SYNCH WITH REFORMIST CALLS FOR A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE 1945 DOCUMENT WHICH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03699 02 OF 03 301201Z
FAILS TO PROVIDE FOR CHECKS AND BALANCES ON A STRONG EXECUTIVE. MEGAWATI DECLARED SHE WOULD NOT ALTER THE PREAMBLE (WHICH INCORPORATES THE UNIFYING SECULAR DOCTRINE OF "PANCASILA"), BUT WOULD AGREE TO CHANGES IN THE ARTICLES "AFTER THERE IS CLARITY ON WHICH SPECIFIC ARTICLES ARE TO BE AMENDED, WHY AND FOR WHAT THEY NEED TO BE AMENDED."

9. (C) ON RELATIONS WITH THE MILITARY, MEGA VOWED SHE WOULD RESTORE THE MILITARY'S IMAGE, "WHICH HAS HIT ITS LOWEST POINT IN PUBLIC ESTEEM", BUT SHE URGED HER FOLLOWERS TO BE PATIENT. SHE REAFFIRMED HER COMMITMENT TO PHASING OUT THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN POLITICS BUT SAID SHE WAS BOUND BY THE AGREEMENT SHE SIGNED IN NOVEMBER--THE CIGANJUR ACCORD--WITH OTHER REFORM LEADERS, AMIEN RAIS OF PAN, ABDURRACHMAN WAHID OF PKB AND SULTAN HAMNGKU BUWONO X, WHICH AGREED ON A GRADUAL PULLOUT OF THE MILITARY FROM THE POLITICAL ARENA, INCLUDING THEIR 38 SEATS IN THE DPR.

10. (C) THE HIGHLIGHT OF HER POLITICAL REMARKS, AND PROBABLY THE MOST MEMORABLE MOMENT IN THE ONE AND HALF HOUR SPEECH, WAS HER BREAKDOWN INTO TEARS AS SHE DESCRIBED HER PROMISE TO STOP THE BLOODSHED IN TROUBLED ACEH PROVINCE. MEGA SAID "WHEN CUT NYA (AN ACHENESE LANGUAGE TERM FOR YOUR FEMALE LEADER) LEADS THE COUNTRY, I WILL NOT LET ANY SINGLE DROP OF BLOOD TOUCH THE ACEH SOIL." IN A SINGLE GESTURE, THE DAUGHTER OF SOEKARNO PROVED SHE DID, IN FACT, HAVE SOME OF HER FATHER'S TOUCH. THE ACEH NIGHTMARE IS ONE THAT IS BEDEVILING BOTH HABIBIE AND HIS MILITARY COMMANDER WIRANTO, AND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 03699 02 OF 03 301201Z
THAT WILL TAKE A NEW APPROACH, PERHAPS BY A TOTALLY NEW GOVERNMENT, IF THE WOUNDS OF SEPARATISM ARE TO HEAL.

11. (U) CHARACTERIZING OVERCOMING THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AS A MAJOR PRIORITY, MEGAWATI ENUMERATED THE FIVE MAIN POINTS OF HER FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY. THE ECONOMIC PROGRAM POSITED PDI-P'S GENERAL PRIORITIES OF LEGAL/JUDICIAL REFORM, TRANSPARENCY AND DEMOCRATIZATION, AND CLEAN GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS AS PREREQUISITES FOR A SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC FUTURE. ALTHOUGH LACKING SPECIFIC DETAILS ON HOW INDONESIA'S INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC ACTORS WOULD BE REFORMED, UPGRADED, AND IMPROVED, THE SPEECH AND A PDI-P ECONOMIC POLICY MATRIX INDICATED THAT PDI-P REMAINS ON TRACK WITH A MARKET-BASED ECONOMIC POLICY THAT WELCOMES FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.

12. (U) THE ECONOMIC POLICY MATRIX ELABORATES BRIEFLY ON THE FIVE POINTS, LISTING THE "STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS" FOR EACH (THE GENERAL STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS ARE FOLLOWED BY GENERAL PROGRAM GUIDELINES):

(A) RESTORE CONFIDENCE AND LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH:
--INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY SYSTEM
--EMPOWERMENT OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
--CLEAN AND CREDIBLE GOVERNMENT
--INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

(B) ENSURE SOCIAL STABILITY:
--PROTECTING THE POOR

--PRESERVING HUMAN ASSETS

(C) RESTORE MACROECONOMIC STABILITY:
--MONETARY POLICY (THE PROGRAM GUIDELINE UNDER THIS STRATEGIC DIRECTION IS TO CONTINUE AND IMPROVE THE IMF PROGRAM)
--FISCAL POLICY (THE PROGRAM GUIDELINES INCLUDE RESTRUCTURING GOI EXTERNAL DEBT)
--BUILDING A MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE

(D) UNLEASH NATIONAL ECONOMIC POTENTIAL:
--DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PRIORITIES (GUIDELINES FOCUS ON AN INTEGRATED NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION NETWORK, EDUCATION AND HEALTH, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, AND A PROGRAM TO PRODUCE LOW-COST ENERGY)
--SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES (AGRICULTURE, MARITIME, TOURISM)
--DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES

--STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE PRIVATIZATION (GUIDELINES POSIT REFORMING AND RESTRUCTURING SOE'S PRIOR TO PRIVATIZATION AND PRIVATIZING THROUGH THE CAPITAL MARKET WHEN THE MARKET IS BULLISH)
--REGIONAL AUTONOMY
--PRODUCTIVITY DRIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0104

PAGE 01 JAKART 03699 03 OF 03 301201Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/010W	

----------E71E91 301207Z /38

P 301153Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9091
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 003699

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/30/04
TAGS: PGOV, ID
SUBJECT: MEGAWATI BREAKS SILENCE IN MAJOR POLICY SPEECH

(E) RESTART THE ECONOMY:

--FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS RESTRUCTURING (THE GUIDELINES INCLUDE REORGANIZING THE INDONESIAN BANK RESTRUCTURING AGENCY, IBRA, TO FACILITATE QUICK AND PRUDENT DECISIONS THAT ARE FREE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND INVITING FOREIGN INVESTORS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE BANK

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03699 03 OF 03 301201Z
RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM)
--PRIVATE DEBT RESTRUCTURING (THE GUIDELINES INCLUDES INITIATING A REALISTIC AND WORKABLE "COMMON FRAMEWORK" FOR PRIVATE DEBT RESTRUCTURING)
--CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
--CAPITAL MARKET AND MONEY MARKET REFORM
--FOREIGN INVESTMENT STIMULUS

COMMENT

13. (SBU) THE ECONOMIC POSITIONS WERE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT PDI-P ECONOMIC ADVISORS HAVE BEEN TELLING US FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. ALTHOUGH NOT UNEXPECTED, MEGAWATI'S PERSONAL ENDORSEMENT OF MARKET-BASED PRINCIPLES, THE IMF-SUPPORTED REFORM PROGRAM, AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT WAS REASSURING. PDI-P REPRESENTATIVES HAVE INDICATED ALL ALONG THAT THE PRIMARY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEIR ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE GOVERNMENT'S IS HOW IT WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED (WITHIN A DEMOCRATIC, ACCOUNTABLE, TRANSPARENT, CLEAN SYSTEM), NOT WHAT ITS CONTENT WOULD BE. THE ECONOMIC PLATFORM WAS BROAD ENOUGH THAT IT PROVIDES NO GUIDE TO WHAT PORTIONS OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF A PDI-P-LED GOVERNMENT MIGHT SEEK TO AMEND. AS [redacted] TOLD TDY POLOFF, PDI-P INTENDS TO PURSUE "FAIR" (COMPARED TO "FREE") MARKET POLICIES. THE GENERAL POSITIONS MEGAWATI PRESENTED LEAVE AMPLE SPACE FOR ACCOMMODATING "PEOPLE'S ECONOMY" CONCERNS. B1

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E22

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0255

PAGE 01 JAKART 03630 01 OF 02 271023Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	IRM-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/011W			

----------E5AC86 271023Z /38

R 271017Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9035
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003630

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/05
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MEGAWATI DISCUSSIONS WITH A/S ROTH

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR J.S.ROY. REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI, CHAIRMAN ON THE PDI-P, WHICH WON THE LARGEST NUMBER OF VOTES IN THE JUNE ELECTION FOR INDONESIA'S PARLIAMENT (DPR), SPOKE OF THE DIFFICULTY IN USING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03630 01 OF 02 271023Z
COALITIONS TO GAIN SUPPORT TO BECOME PRESIDENT. INDONESIA'S SYSTEM WAS NOT PARLIAMENTARY. IN ANY EVENT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO ACT SINCE IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET THE FINAL VOTE COUNT AND TO SEE WHICH PERSONS TOOK SEATS IN THE DPR. THE PDI-P HAD, HOWEVER, TALKED WITH PARTAI KEBANGKITAN BANGSA (PKB) AND PARTAI KEADILAN DAN PERSATUAN (PKP) ABOUT SHARING POWER. SHE CONSIDERED PKB'S DE FACTO LEADER ABDURRAHMAN WAHID TOO UNHEALTHY FOR A HIGH POSITION IN GOVERNMENT. MEGAWATI THOUGHT THAT THE WOMAN PRESIDENT ISSUE HAD BEEN DEFUSED. CONCERNING THE ACTUAL VOTE FOR THE PRESIDENT, WHICH WOULD BE MADE BY THE MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), MEGAWATI COULD SEE PROS AND CONS IN EITHER A SECRET OR AN OPEN VOTE. SHE HAD BEEN REMINDING THE MILITARY THAT WITH 38 VOTES IN THE MPR IT SHOULD BACK THE PARTY THAT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE PEOPLE. MEGAWATI HAS LITTLE, IF ANY, MEANS TO

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 27 JUL 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200503412

INFLUENCE THE MILITARY ON EAST TIMOR, NOR DOES THE PDI-P HAVE STANDING TO ACT AS A CALMING FORCE IN ACEH. MEGAWATI AVOIDED MAKING ANY REFERENCE TO AMIEN RAIS OF THE PARTAI AMANAT NASIONAL (PAN) DURING THE MEETING. END SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

3. (U) MEGAWATI TALKED WITH TREASURY U/S GEITHNER, EAP A/S ROTH, AND THE AMBASSADOR ABOUT THE ELECTION AND THE NEXT STEP TOWARD CHOOSING A NEW PRESIDENT AT AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE JULY 13. U/S GEITHNER AND MEGAWATI HAD BEEN DISCUSSING ECONOMIC SUBJECTS (SEPTEL) PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF ROTH AND AMBASSADOR. WITH MEGAWATI WAS PDI-P [redacted] EAP B1 CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON OFFICER KEEGAN AND EMBASSY A/POLCOUNS ATTENDED.

4. (C) ROTH BEGAN BY EXPRESSING THE UNITED STATES' SATISFACTION

OVER HOW PEACEFUL AND HONEST THE ELECTION HAD BEEN. HE CONGRATULATED MEGAWATI ON HER PARTY'S VICTORY IN THE DPR. ALTHOUGH SHE HAD NOT WON A MAJORITY, THE PDI-P WAS CLEARLY NUMBER ONE, WITH GOLKAR A DISTANT SECOND. IN MOST COUNTRIES, SUCH A MARGIN OF VICTORY WOULD BE A LANDSLIDE. IN INDONESIA, HOWEVER, THE ELECTION WAS BUT THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS A FINAL VOTE FOR PRESIDENT IN THE LARGER MPR SOME MONTHS AWAY. HOW DID SHE SEE THE PDI-P CONTINUING FROM THIS POINT? HOW MIGHT THE PDI-P BEGIN COALITION BUILDING?

COALITIONS AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS

5. (C) MEGAWATI SAID THAT COALITIONS WERE DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE SINCE INDONESIA WAS A PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM NOT A PARLIAMENTARY ONE. SHE AND OTHER PDI-P LEADERS HAD BEEN STUDYING THE IDEA BUT UNTIL NOW HAD NOT COME UP WITH A WAY. THEY HAD BEEN TRYING TO FORMULATE AN APPROACH TO A COALITION BUT STILL HAD MANY DOUBTS. IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS TOO EARLY TO ACT SINCE THE VOTE COUNT HAD COME IN FROM ONLY 23 PROVINCES. THERE WOULD BE PERHAPS AS MANY AS FORTY-ONE SMALL PARTIES THAT MIGHT NOT GET SEATS IN THE DPR. THE SITUATION WAS UNCLEAR. (NOTE: FROM THE FINAL VOTE RESULTS, WHICH WERE NOT KNOWN AT THE TIME OF THE MEETING, TWENTY-EIGHT PARTIES WILL LIKELY NOT MAKE THE CUT.) THE COMPOSITION OF EACH OF INDONESIA'S 27 PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES (DPRD'S) FURTHER COMPLICATED THE PICTURE, SHE ADDED.

6. (C) MEGAWATI SAID THAT SHE AND HER ADVISERS HAD LOOKED AT A PLAN FOR SHARED GOVERNMENT WITH THE PKB AND THE PKP. CONSIDERED A TYPE OF GOTONG-ROYONG (LOOSELY TRANSLATED A MUTUAL COOPERATION AMONG ELEMENTS OF A COMMUNITY), THE ARRANGEMENT WOULD HAVE EVERY

PARTY SHARING POWER. THE GROUPS WOULD MAKE AGREEMENTS ON WHO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03630 01 OF 02 271023Z [redacted] B1
WOULD TAKE SPECIFIC PORTFOLIOS IN A NEW GOVERNMENT.
OBSERVED THAT COMBINED THE THREE PARTIES WOULD HAVE JUST OVER
HALF THE SEATS IN THE DPR. (NOTE: THIS IS AT ODDS WITH
CURRENTLY PROJECTED PARTY ALLOCATIONS COMING FROM THE FINAL VOTE.
THE THREE TOGETHER SHOULD FALL SHORT.)

7. (C) ON WAHID'S POWER-SHARING PROPOSAL IN WHICH SHE WOULD BE
PRESIDENT, SULTAN HAMENGKUBUWONO VICE PRESIDENT, AMIEN RAIS DPR
SPEAKER, AND WAHID HIMSELF LEADING THE MPR, MEGAWATI SAID IT WAS
NOT REALISTIC. WAHID'S HEALTH WAS BAD, HE HAD TOO MANY HEART
PROBLEMS TO TAKE ON THE MPR POSITION.

WOMAN PRESIDENT AND THE PKB
---

8. (C) WHEN ASKED IF A WOMAN PRESIDENT REMAINED CONTENTIOUS
WITHIN SOME PKB CIRCLES, MEGAWATI THOUGHT THAT ABDURRAHMAN WAHID,
DE FACTO PARTY LEADER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU),
HAD DEFUSED THE QUESTION. NONETHELESS, WAHID, AS USUAL, HAD MADE
MANY CONFUSING STATEMENTS. [redacted] INJECTED THAT, WAHID'S B1
STATEMENTS NOTWITHSTANDING, CONVERSATIONS WITH PKB CHAIRMAN
MATORI ABDUL DJALIL MADE CLEAR THAT THE PKB WOULD SUPPORT PDI-P.
WAHID HAD EARLY ON STARTED OUT SUGGESTING THAT A WOMAN SHOULD NOT
BE PRESIDENT. AT THAT TIME HE WAS TRYING TO SATISFY THE
SKEPTICISM OF MANY CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN THE NU.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0257

PAGE 01 JAKART 03630 02 OF 02 271023Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-01	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/011W				

----------E5AC8E 271024Z /38

R 271017Z JUL 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9036
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 003630

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/05
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: MEGAWATI DISCUSSIONS WITH A/S ROTH

BUT, HIS STATEMENTS WERE EVOLVING.

MPR DYNAMICS

9. (C) ASKED WHETHER MPR MEMBERS SHOULD VOTE FOR THE PRESIDENT

BY SECRET OR OPEN BALLOT, MEGAWATI SAID EACH WAY HAD PROS AND CONS. A SECRET BALLOT REDUCED THE CHANCE OF INTIMIDATION. AS TO WHETHER MPR MEMBERS SHOULD VOTE IN A BLOCK OR BY INDIVIDUAL, MEGAWATI SAID THAT IT DEPENDED ON WHICH INDIVIDUALS WOULD BE IN THE DPR. THEIR NAMES WOULD NOT BE KNOWN UNTIL AFTER THE VOTE COUNT WAS FINAL AND SEATS FORMALLY ALLOCATED. THE PDI-P NEEDED TO GET A SENSE OF ITS VULNERABILITIES AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE OTHER PARTIES BEFORE MAPPING A STRATEGY. IN THE MPR, SHE CONTINUED, THE PDI-P WOULD FACE A DILEMMA, WHETHER TO LOBBY THE PARTY OR THE GROUP OR WHETHER TO LOBBY THE INDIVIDUAL. INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR PARTIES DID NOT ALWAYS GO IN THE SAME DIRECTION. [redacted] ON THE OTHER HAND, SAID THAT INDIVIDUAL VOTING WAS PREFERRED.

GOLKAR AND MONEY POLITICS

10. (C) [redacted] EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN OVER GOLKAR'S BLATANT USE OF MONEY POLITICS. GOLKAR LEADERS WERE BUYING VOTES AT THE DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS AS SEATS FOR THE DPR, AND THE PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES WERE BEING FORMED. IT WAS PRIMARILY AN EFFORT TO BUY UP MPR MEMBERS. B1

THE MILITARY IN THE MPR

11. (C) AS TO WHAT THE MILITARY MIGHT DO IN THE MPR WITH ITS 38 VOTES, MEGAWATI SAID THAT THE PDI-P HAD BEEN REMINDING THE MILITARY THAT, SINCE THEY SAID THEY WOULD ABIDE BY THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, THEY MUST GIVE THEIR SUPPORT TO THE PARTY THAT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE PEOPLE. MEGAWATI DID NOT KNOW WHETHER GENERAL WIRANTO WAS TRULY INTERESTED IN BECOMING VICE PRESIDENT. SHE AGREED WITH ROTH THAT THE POSITION OF ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WAS

A MORE POWERFUL POSITION AND SHE WOULD BE PUZZLED IF WIRANTO INDEED WANTED THE VICE PRESIDENCY.

EAST TIMOR

12. (C) ON EAST TIMOR, ROTH SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD MEGAWATI'S CONCERNS OVER THE CONSULTATION AND WAS PLEASED THAT SHE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S DECISION WAS TO BE HONORED. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE LACK OF SECURITY FOR THE UN AND THE UNRESTRAINED VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION OF THE TIMORESE PEOPLE BY THE MILITIAS MADE THE SITUATION AN ISSUE FAR GREATER THAN THE FUTURE OF EAST TIMOR. INDONESIA'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION WAS AT RISK. IF YOU WERE TO BECOME PRESIDENT, HE SAID TO MEGAWATI, YOU COULD INHERIT A MAJOR PROBLEM IF THE INDONESIAN MILITARY DOES NOT STOP COLLABORATION WITH THE MILITIAS. THE EVIDENCE FOR THIS IS OVERWHELMING. ROTH ASKED MEGAWATI TO POINT OUT THAT NEED TO THE MILITARY AS SHE MADE CONTACTS WITH MILITARY LEADERS. [redacted] B1 RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT SINCE NEITHER THE GOVERNMENT NOR THE MILITARY WAS OPEN WITH MEGAWATI AND THE PDI-P. [redacted] B1 NOTED THAT THE PDI-P'S OPPOSITION TO MILITARY EXCESSES WAS A MATTER OF RECORD. THE PDI-P EMPATHIZES WITH THE TIMORESE BECAUSE WE OURSELVES WERE SIMILARLY VICTIMIZED IN JULY 1996, HE SAID. (NOTE: THIS IS A REFERENCE TO THE VIOLENT TAKEOVER OF MEGAWATI'S PDI JAKARTA HEADQUARTERS BY THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED WING OF THE PDI REPORTEDLY WITH MILITARY SUPPORT AND ACTUAL MILITARY PARTICIPATION.)

ACEH

13. (C) ROTH EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER ACEH, WHICH, WITH ITS OWN SEPARATIST MOVEMENT AND THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ROLE THERE, WAS A

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03630 02 OF 02 271023Z

DIFFERENT PROBLEM POSING MORE DANGERS. MEGAWATI SAID THAT SHE HAD LITTLE INFLUENCE IN ACEH. HER SUPPORTERS THERE WERE ENTHUSIASTIC BUT FEW IN NUMBER. GIVEN THE MUSLIM DYNAMIC IN ACEH, WAHID WOULD BE THE BETTER ONE TO TRY TO CALM THE SITUATION. MEGAWATI DID NOT RESPOND TO AMBASSADOR'S REMARK THAT AMIEN RAIS MIGHT PLAY A PART. (NOTE: RAIS' AND PAN TOOK SECOND PLACE IN ACEH IN THE JUNE ELECTION. WAHID'S PKB WAS 12TH.)

THE U.S. AND A NEW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT

14. (C) IN CLOSING, MEGAWATI ASKED ROTH WHAT WAS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON A NEW GOVERNMENT IN INDONESIA. ROTH SAID THAT INDONESIA NEEDED A GOVERNMENT THAT WAS CONSIDERED LEGITIMATE IN THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE. THE UNITED STATES WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH A NEW GOVERNMENT.

COMMENT
---

15. (C) DURING THE MEETING, MEGAWATI DID NOT REFER TO AMIEN RAIS AT ALL-SHARING, COALITIONS, OR ACEH, ALTHOUGH ROTH AND AMBASSADOR IN THEIR QUESTIONS RAISED HIS NAME SEVERAL TIMES.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E29

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4421

PAGE 01 JAKART 03131 01 OF 04 281122Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W		

----------DA5CC5 281122Z /38

O 281114Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8514
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 003131

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/05
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL VOTE COUNTING AND COMPLAINT RESOLUTION ENCOUNTER MULTIPLE PROBLEMS; UNOFFICIAL RANKINGS REMAIN STABLE

REF: REF A) JAKARTA 2859; B) JAKARTA 2890 C)JAKARTA 2966

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03131 01 OF 04 281122Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: INDONESIA'S ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) WAS FORCED TO EXTEND ITS JUNE 21 DEADLINE FOR ANNOUNCING RESULTS OF THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, AS TECHNICAL PROBLEMS IN TABULATING AND REPORTING RESULTS AT THE PROVINCIAL, DISTRICT AND SUB-DISTRICT LEVEL CONTINUED. LACK OF PREPARATION WAS ALSO EVIDENT IN THE CONFUSION OVER PROCEDURES TO HANDLE ALLEGATIONS OF WIDESPREAD (IF SMALL-SCALE) ELECTION IRREGULARITES. IN ADDITION, A GROUP OF

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 28 JUN 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200503412

SMALL PARTIES, THREATENED WITH EXTINCTION BY POOR SHOWINGS AT THE POLLS, APPEAR TO HAVE EMBARKED ON A STRATEGY OF SLOWING THE COUNTING PROCESS IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXTRACT VARIOUS CONCESSIONS. THERE IS GROWING CONCERN THAT THE NEW DEADLINE WILL NOT BE MET. THIS POSSIBLY COULD AFFECT THE TIMETABLE FOR SELECTING A NEW PRESIDENT IN NOVEMBER, THOUGH GOI OFFICIALS WILL LIKELY FIND A WAY TO STICK TO THAT SCHEDULE AS THEY DID FOR THE JUNE GENERAL ELECTION. WHILE FURTHER DELAY COULD ERODE CONFIDENCE IN THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION, A FAILURE TO PROPERLY INVESTIGATE AND ADDRESS COMPLAINTS OF IRREGULARITIES COULD BE MORE DAMAGING IN THE LONG TERM. END SUMMARY.

UNOFFICIAL JOMC "QUICK COUNT" SHUTS DOWN
---

3. (SBU) THE JOINT OPERATIONS MEDIA CENTER (JOMC) SHUT

DOWN ITS OPERATIONS ON JUNE 24 WITH JUST UNDER 80 PERCENT OF THE VOTE TABULATED THROUGH ITS UNOFFICIAL PARALLEL SYSTEM. ITS FINAL RANKINGS ARE:

PDI-P	34.3 PERCENT
GOLKAR	22.1 PERCENT
PKB	12.8 PERCENT
PPP	10.7 PERCENT
PAN	7.5 PERCENT
PBB	2.0 PERCENT
PK	1.4 PERCENT

JOMC WAS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE AN INDICATIVE "QUICK COUNT" BY OBTAINING RESULTS DIRECTLY FROM THE SUBDISTRICT LEVEL. IT WAS NOT EXPECTED TO REMAIN IN OPERATION UNTIL 100 PERCENT OF THE VOTE WAS TABULATED. JOMC REMAINED OPEN LONGER THAN EXPECTED BOTH BECAUSE RESULTS ARRIVED THROUGH ITS OWN CHANNEL MORE SLOWLY THAN EXPECTED AND BECAUSE MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH THE KPU'S OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL COUNTING SYSTEMS LEFT IT AS THE MOST RELIABLE AND ACCESSIBLE INDICATOR OF VOTING TRENDS.

4. (SBU) IN TERMS OF RANKING AND APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGES, JOMC FIGURES HAVE BEEN REMARKABLY STABLE SINCE EARLY IN THE COUNTING PROCESS. A PRELIMINARY INTERNAL ANALYSIS BY [redacted] SHOWS A HIGH DEGREE OF CONVERGENCE BETWEEN JOMC'S B1
RESULTS AND THOSE OF OTHER ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDING THE RECTOR'S FORUM, ANTARA NEWS AGENCY AND GOLKAR. THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT THUS FAR JOMC'S FIGURES ARE

MORE INDICATIVE OF THE FINAL OUTCOME THAN KPU'S. KPU NUMBERS ONLY FOR THE FIRST TIME LAST WEEK SHOWED GOLKAR

CONFIDENTIAL

EDGING INTO SECOND PLACE PAST PKB, WITH APPROXIMATELY 18 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL VOTE. UNTIL NOW, THE MORE WIDELY REPORTED KPU FIGURES APPEAR TO UNDERSTATE GOLKAR'S STRENGTH BECAUSE THEY ARE MORE REFLECTIVE OF EARLY RETURNS FROM JAVA WHERE PKB IS RELATIVELY STRONG AND GOLKAR IS RELATIVELY WEAK.

5. (SBU) WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S VOTE TABULATION AND COMPLAINT RESOLUTION MACHINERY ENCOUNTERING SERIOUS PROBLEMS (AS DESCRIBED BELOW), JOMC'S FINAL FIGURES MAY REMAIN THE BEST INDICATOR OF THE ELECTION RESULT AVAILABLE FOR A MATTER OF WEEKS.

OFFICIAL COUNT UP AND STUMBLING

---

6. (U) THE ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU) HAS BEEN FORCED TO POSTPONE ITS JUNE 21 DEADLINE FOR ANNOUNCING OFFICIAL ELECTION RESULTS UNTIL JULY 8, THE DATE ORIGINALLY SET FOR "LEGALIZATION" OF RESULTS. FEWER THAN HALF OF THE 27 PROVINCES HAD TURNED IN RESULTS BY THE DEADLINE. AS REPORTED REFTELS, TECHNICAL PROBLEMS RANGING FROM FAILURE TO DISTRIBUTE REPORTING FORMS, TO POOR TRAINING AND

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4422

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W			

----------DA5CCB 281122Z /38

O 281114Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8515
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 003131

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/05
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL VOTE COUNTING AND COMPLAINT RESOLUTION ENCOUNTER MULTIPLE PROBLEMS; UNOFFICIAL RANKINGS REMAIN STABLE

SKILLS OF POLL WORKERS, TO A FAILURE TO PAY POLL WORKERS FOR THEIR SERVICES APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN THE MAIN CAUSE OF

DELAYS IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-ELECTION PERIOD.

7. (C) WHILE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS REMAIN A FACTOR, CONFUSION OVER HOW TO HANDLE ALLEGED ABUSES AND IRREGULARITES, KPU INFIGHTING, AND AN APPARENTLY DELIBERATE ATTEMPT BY DEFEATED SMALL PARTIES TO HOLD UP THE PROCESS ARE INCREASINGLY BURDENING THE ELECTION MACHINERY. IN MEETINGS OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS WITH A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KPU, THE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS (IFES), THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING GROUP KIPP, [redacted] CONCERN WAS EVIDENT THAT THE PROCESS IS BOGGING DOWN, THREATENING EVEN THE NEW JULY 8 TARGET AND CONCEIVABLY THE TIMETABLE FOR SEATING THE NEW MPR AND SELECTING A PRESIDENT.

INVESTIGATING IRREGULARITES
---

8. (C) A CONSENSUS (THOUGH PRELIMINARY) VIEW AMONG THESE CONTACTS IS THAT WHILE FRAUD, ABUSES, AND IRREGULARIES WERE WIDESPREAD IN SEVERAL PROVINCES, THEY APPEAR NOT TO HAVE BEEN SYSTEMATIC NOR TO HAVE OCCURRED ON A SUFFICIENTLY LARGE SCALE TO UNDERMINE THE OVERALL RESULTS OF THE ELECTION. AS NOTED BY [redacted] B1
[redacted] IT WAS A "VERY SLOPPY" ELECTION, BUT AT THIS STAGE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT LARGE-SCALE RECOUNTING OR REVOTING (AS DEMANDED BY SEVERAL REGIONAL PARTY LEADERS) WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGE THE OUTCOME. [redacted] SUPPORTED THIS VIEW, NOTING THAT KIPP'S EXHAUSTIVE RECOUNT OF THE JAKARTA VOTE HAD YIELDED A RESULT VERY SIMILAR TO THE ORIGINAL TABULATION.

9. (C) LARGE PARTIES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL REPORTEDLY HAVE DRAWN THE SAME CONCLUSION AND ARE ANXIOUS TO WRAP UP THE COUNT. BECAUSE OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SYSTEM, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT WITH MUCH PRECISION THE DISTRIBUTION OF DPR SEATS IN THE ABSENCE OF A FINAL COUNT. AS A RESULT, FRUSTRATED PARTY LEADERS HAVE BEEN LEFT IN LIMBO, UNABLE TO ASSESS ACCURATELY THE DEALS THEY MUST MAKE TO BUILD A WINNING COALITION. BUT AT THE PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEVEL, SOME LARGE PARTY REPRESENTATIVES HAVE JOINED WITH MANY SMALL PARTIES IN CALLING FOR WHOLESALE RECOUNTING OR REVOTING, EVEN IN VOTING STATIONS IN WHICH THERE LITTLE SPECIFIC EVIDENCE THAT IRREGULARITIES OCCURRED.

10. (SBU) THIS IS COMPLICATING THE WORK OF ELECTION OFFICIALS, WHO ARE ONLY NOW BEGINNING TO ESTABLISH PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING THE MANY ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD, ABUSE, MONEY POLITICS, AND OTHER IRREGULARITIES THAT HAVE BEEN LEVELED PRIMARILY AT GOLKAR IN AT LEAST 8 PROVINCES. IN SEPARATE ASSESSMENTS RELEASED LAST WEEK, IFES AND THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (IRI) WARNED THAT WHILE A FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND ADDRESS CREDIBLE REPORTS OF ABUSE COULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE PROCESS, HOLDING NEW POLLS IS THE MOST EXTREME IN A RANGE OF REMEDIES THAT SHOULD ONLY BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE MOST SERIOUS CASES. IRI EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE LACK OF CLEAR GUIDELINES FOR PRESENTING COMPLAINTS OR ESTABLISHED CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REMEDIES.

11. (C) OUR CONTACTS ECHOED IRI'S CONCERN THAT THE
CONFIDENTIAL

ELECTIONS SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE (PANWASLU), WHICH HAS EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE AND ADDRESS THESE ALLEGATIONS, MAY NOT YET BE UP TO THE TASK. IT IS SEEN AS UNDERFUNDED, POORLY ORGANIZED, POORLY TRAINED AND UNSURE OF ITS MANDATE, AT LEAST AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL AND BELOW. NOT SURPRISINGLY, IT IS BEHIND SCHEDULE. PANWASLU HAS ACKNOWLEDGED PUBLICLY IT HAS YET TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF MONEY POLITICS DATING FROM THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD. [redacted] IFES SAID RECENT B1
CONVERSATIONS WITH SEVERAL PANWASLU OFFICIALS REVEALED THAT THEY HAD ONLY BEGUN THINKING ABOUT CRITERIA THEY WOULD USE TO DETERMINE WHETHER REVOTING WAS NECESSARY.

12. (C) IN CONVERSATIONS WITH POLOFF, OFFICIALS APPEARED TO HAVE RECOGNIZED THE NEED TO FOCUS ON THESE PROBLEMS IN ERNEST. KPU [redacted]

B1

AND KIPP [redacted] HIGHLIGHTED THEIR CONCERN THAT THE SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION BE LIMITED TO CASES IN WHICH THERE WAS SPECIFIC EVIDENCE. THEY WORRY THAT THE DIFFICULTY OF ORGANIZING LARGE-SCALE REVOTING IF IT IS DEEMED NECESSARY COULD TIE UP THE PROCESS INDEFINITELY. [redacted] SAID HE HAS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5458

PAGE 01 JAKART 03131 03 OF 04 281414Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SVC-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W	

----------DA732F 281414Z /49

O 281114Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8516
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 003131

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/05
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL VOTE COUNTING AND COMPLAINT RESOLUTION ENCOUNTER MULTIPLE PROBLEMS; UNOFFICIAL RANKINGS REMAIN STABLE

URGED THAT REVOTING SHOULD OCCUR ONLY IN EXTREME CASES SUCH AS FRAUD AND VOTER INTIMIDATION, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03131 03 OF 04 281414Z
THAT THE PANWASLU HAD NOT YET DECIDED ON EXACT CRITERIA.

13. (C) YET PANWASLU IS ALREADY ESTABLISHING PRECEDENTS. PANWASLU HAS ALREADY AGREED TO HOLD NEW POLLS IN 14 VOTING STATIONS IN NORTH SULAWESI AND MULYANA ANTICIPATED

THAT EVEN TAKING A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH, NEW POLLS WOULD BE NECESSARY IN SOME PARTS OF SOUT

[redacted]TOLD POLOFF THAT PANWASLU'S DECISION TO HOLD NEW POLLS IN NORTH SULAWESI WAS BASED PRIMARILY ON THE INCIDENCE OF MONEY POLITICS. INVESTIGATIONS ARE ONGOING IN NORTH, SOUTH, SOUTHEAST SULAWESI, SOUTH KALIMANTAN, WEST AND EAST NUSA TENGGARA, MALUKU AND BENGKULU. OFFICIALS HOPED (BUT SHOWED LITTLE CONFIDENCE) THAT ANY NECESSARY REVOTES COULD BE HELD BY THE JUNE 30 TARGET. (NOS IN SEVERAL DISTRICTS OF HOLD INDEFINITELY PENDING (#) SITUATION.) B1

SMALL PARTIES HOLD OUT

14. (C) COMPOUNDING THE STRESS ON THE ELECTION MACHINERY IS AN APPARENTLY DELIBERATE STRATEGY BY A GROUP OF SMALL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES WITHIN THE KPU TO HOLD UP RESULTS IN ORDER TO EXTRACT VARIOUS CONCESSIONS. WITH ONLY 7 OF THE 48 PARTIES ABOVE OR WITHIN REACH OF THE 2 PERCENT LEGAL THRESHOLD FOR COMPETING IN THE NEXT ELECTION, VOTERS HAVE DISAPPOINTED MANY SUITORS. THE EXCLUDED PARTIES ARE USING THEIR NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY ON THE KPU TO FIGHT BACK, DEMANDING INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED ELECTION ABUSES EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND THREATENING TO WITHOLD THE 2/3 OF PARTY SIGNATURES

CONFIDENTIAL

NEEDED TO CERTIFY ELECTION RESULTS. THEY HAVE REPORTEDLY MADE VARIOUS DEMANDS, INCLUDING THAT THE 2 PERCENT THRESHOLD TO REMAIN IN EXISTENCE BE LIFTED AND/OR THAT EACH PARTY BE GRANTED A DPR SEAT OUTRIGHT. [redacted] BELIEVES SOME ARE HOPING THE FED-UP LARGER PARTIES MIGHT SETTLE WITH CASH. B1

15.(SBU) THE SMALL PARTIES HAVE STAYED ON THE OFFENSIVE, FORCING THE KPU TO SET UP ITS OWN MONITORING TEAM TO INVESTIGATE ELECTION ABUSES, APPARENTLY DUPLICATING THE FUNCTION OF THE LEGALLY-ESTABLISHED PANWASLU. THEY ALSO REJECTED A PROPOSAL TO SPEED UP THE VOTE COUNT BY TABULATING AND CERTIFYING RESULTS AS THEY COME IN FROM THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL, RATHER THAN WAITING FOR FINAL RESULTS FROM ALL PROVINCES AS CURRENTLY STIPULATED.

16. (U) BY MIDWEEK THE POLARIZATON IN THE KPU HAD BROKEN INTO A PUBLIC FEUD. THE DAY AFTER MALLARANGENG AND VICPION OPINED PUBLICLY (#) THRESHOLD SHOULD KPU, OUTRAGED SMALL PD THE PAIR REMOVED FROM DEMANDED THEIR (#) RUDINI DECLARED THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER STHAT MALLARANGENG

AND NTHEIR PERSONAL OPINION BUT THAT SMALL PARTIES
WOULD KEEP THEIR KPU SEATS UNTIL AND UNLESS THE
NEW DPR CHANGED THE LAW.

17. (C) BICKERING IN THE KPU HAS LONG BEEN A PROBLEM,
HOWEVER, AND WITH STAKES INCREASING, IT IS LIKELY TO
REMAIN SO WITH PERHAPS GREATER CONSEQUENCES. EVEN BEFORE
HEARING OF THE LATEST DISPUTE, [redacted] IFES NOTED B1
THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY ON HIS LIST OF LESSONS LEARNED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03131 03 OF 04 281414Z
FROM THE ELECTION SHOULD BE EXCLUDED (#) THAT
THE CONFUSION IN (#) WAS A PREDICABLE C DECISION
NOT TO POSTPODW WEEKS AS RECOMMENDEDORS
.

PATIENCE REQUIRED
---

18. (C) COMMENT: PANWASLU HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO
RESOLVE MANY OF THESE PROBLEMS, INCLUDING SMALL PARTY
OBSTRUCTIONISM. IF THEIR COMPLAINTS ARE DEEMED SPURIOUS,
PANWASLU CAN OVERRULE THE REQUIREMENT FOR 2/3 OF PARTY
SIGNATURES AND CERTIFY THE RESULTS. PUBLIC PRESSURE MAY
ALSO HELP. EDITORIALS ADVISED LAST WEEK THAT SMALL
PARTIES SHOULD "KNOW THEIR PLACE". BUT PANWASLU MUST BE
GIVEN TIME TO DO A CREDIBLE JOB OF INVESTIGATING THE MOST
SERIOUS COMPLAINTS OR RUN THE RISK OF UNDERMINING PUBLIC
CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTION. IN THE MEANTIME, MANY
ELECTION OFFICIALS ARE HOPING THE LARGE AND SMALL PARTIES

(##) GARBLED TEXT CORRECTIONS WILL FOLLOW

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4075

PAGE 01 JAKART 03131 03 OF 04 291805Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W		

----------DB0CB6 291809Z /38

O 281114Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8516

INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 003131

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/05

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL VOTE COUNTING AND COMPLAINT RESOLUTION ENCOUNTER MULTIPLE PROBLEMS; UNOFFICIAL RANKINGS REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL

STABLE

URGED THAT REVOTING SHOULD OCCUR ONLY IN EXTREME CASES SUCH AS FRAUD AND VOTER INTIMIDATION, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PANWASLU HAD NOT YET DECIDED ON EXACT CRITERIA.

13. (C) YET PANWASLU IS ALREADY ESTABLISHING PRECEDENTS. PANWASLU HAS ALREADY AGREED TO HOLD NEW POLLS IN 14 VOTING STATIONS IN NORTH SULAWESI AND MULYANA ANTICIPATED THAT EVEN TAKING A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH, NEW POLLS WOULD BE NECESSARY IN SOME PARTS OF SOUTHEAST SULAWESI. KPU'S [redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT PANWASLU'S DECISION TO HOLD NEW POLLS IN NORTH SULAWESI WAS BASED PRIMARILY ON THE INCIDENCE OF MONEY POLITICS. INVESTIGATIONS ARE ONGOING IN NORTH, SOUTH, SOUTHEAST SULAWESI, SOUTH KALIMANTAN, WEST AND EAST NUSA TENGGARA, MALUKU AND BENGKULU. OFFICIALS HOPED (BUT SHOWED LITTLE CONFIDENCE) THAT ANY NECESSARY REVOTES COULD BE HELD BY THE JUNE 30 TARGET. (NOTE: POSTPONED ELECTIONS IN SEVERAL DISTRICTS OF ACEH APPEAR TO BE ON HOLD INDEFINITELY PENDING IMPROVEMENT IN THE SECURITY SITUATION.) B1

SMALL PARTIES HOLD OUT
---

14. (C) COMPOUNDING THE STRESS ON THE ELECTION MACHINERY IS AN APPARENTLY DELIBERATE STRATEGY BY A GROUP OF SMALL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES WITHIN THE KPU TO HOLD UP RESULTS IN ORDER TO EXTRACT VARIOUS CONCESSIONS. WITH ONLY 7 OF THE 48 PARTIES ABOVE OR WITHIN REACH OF THE 2 PERCENT LEGAL THRESHOLD FOR COMPETING IN THE NEXT ELECTION,

VOTERS HAVE DISAPPOINTED MANY SUITORS. THE EXCLUDED

PARTIES ARE USING THEIR NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY ON THE KPU TO FIGHT BACK, DEMANDING INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED ELECTION ABUSES EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND THREATENING TO WITHOLD THE 2/3 OF PARTY SIGNATURES NEEDED TO CERTIFY ELECTION RESULTS. THEY HAVE REPORTEDLY MADE VARIOUS DEMANDS, INCLUDING THAT THE 2 PERCENT THRESHOLD TO REMAIN IN EXISTENCE BE LIFTED AND/OR THAT EACH PARTY BE GRANTED A DPR SEAT OUTRIGHT. [redacted] B1
BELIEVES SOME ARE HOPING THE FED-UP LARGER PARTIES MIGHT SETTLE WITH CASH.

15.(SBU) THE SMALL PARTIES HAVE STAYED ON THE OFFENSIVE, FORCING THE KPU TO SET UP ITS OWN MONITORING TEAM TO INVESTIGATE ELECTION ABUSES, APPARENTLY DUPLICATING THE FUNCTION OF THE LEGALLY-ESTABLISHED PANWASLU. THEY ALSO REJECTED A PROPOSAL TO SPEED UP THE VOTE COUNT BY TABULATING AND CERTIFYING RESULTS AS THEY COME IN FROM THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL, RATHER THAN WAITING FOR FINAL RESULTS FROM ALL PROVINCES AS CURRENTLY STIPULATED.

16. (U) BY MIDWEEK THE POLARIZATON IN THE KPU HAD BROKEN INTO A PUBLIC FEUD. THE DAY AFTER MALLARANGENG AND VICE-CHAIR BUYUNG NASUTION OPINED PUBLICLY THAT PARTIES BELOW THE 2 PERCENT THRESHOLD SHOULD LOSE THEIR SEATS ON THE KPU, OUTRAGED SMALL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES HAD THE PAIR REMOVED FROM A PLENARY SESSION AND DEMANDED THEIR DISMISSAL. BY FRIDAY KPU CHAIRMAN RUDINI DECLARED THE CRISIS RESOLVED AFTER HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER SYARWAN HAMID EXPLAINED THAT MALLARANGENG AND NASUTION HAD A RIGHT TO THEIR PERSONAL OPINION BUT THAT SMALL PARTIES WOULD KEEP THEIR KPU SEATS UNTIL AND UNLESS THE NEW DPR CHANGED THE

LAW.

17. (C) BICKERING IN THE KPU HAS LONG BEEN A PROBLEM, HOWEVER, AND WITH STAKES INCREASING, IT IS LIKELY TO REMAIN SO WITH PERHAPS GREATER CONSEQUENCES. EVEN BEFORE HEARING OF THE LATEST DISPUTE, [redacted] IFES NOTED B1
THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY ON HIS LIST OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ELECTION WAS THAT SMALL PARTIES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE KPU. [redacted] ADDED THAT THE CONFUSION B1
IN THE VOTE COUNTING PROCESS WAS A PREDICABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE KPU'S DECISION NOT TO POSTPONE THE ELECTION FOR A FEW WEEKS AS RECOMMENDED BY IFES AND OTHER ADVISORS.

PATIENCE REQUIRED
---

18. (C) COMMENT: PANWASLU HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE MANY OF THESE PROBLEMS, INCLUDING SMALL PARTY OBSTRUCTIONISM. IF THEIR COMPLAINTS ARE DEEMED SPURIOUS, PANWASLU CAN OVERRULE THE REQUIREMENT FOR 2/3 OF PARTY SIGNATURES AND CERTIFY THE RESULTS. PUBLIC PRESSURE MAY ALSO HELP. EDITORIALS ADVISED LAST WEEK THAT SMALL PARTIES SHOULD "KNOW THEIR PLACE". BUT PANWASLU MUST BE GIVEN TIME TO DO A CREDIBLE JOB OF INVESTIGATING THE MOST SERIOUS COMPLAINTS OR RUN THE RISK OF UNDERMINING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTION. IN THE MEANTIME, MANY ELECTION OFFICIALS ARE HOPING THE LARGE AND SMALL PARTIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5896

PAGE 01 JAKART 03131 04 OF 04 300114Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DOEE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	OIGO-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W		

----------DB2C4D 300114Z /38

O 281114Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8517
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 003131

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/05
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL VOTE COUNTING AND COMPLAINT RESOLUTION ENCOUNTER MULTIPLE PROBLEMS; UNOFFICIAL RANKINGS REMAIN STABLE

CAN REACH ACCOMODATION ON SOME OF THE LESS SERIOUS PROBLEMS.

19. (C) COMMENT CONT.: WHILE OFFICIALS ARE FRUSTRATED, THE PUBLIC HAS REMAINED PATIENT SO FAR, STILL BUOYED SOMEWHAT BY POST-ELECTION EUPHORIA AND PERHAPS BY THE BELIEF (ON THE BASIS OF FREQUENTLY REPORTED KPU FIGURES) THAT GOLKAR IS FARING RELATIVELY POORLY. BUT PATIENCE MAY WEAR THIN. THE OFFICIAL COUNT HAS SLOWED TO A CRAWL, INCREASING TO JUST OVER 54 PERCENT BY JUNE 27. A LIKELY GOLKAR SURGE AS THE OFFICIAL COUNT CATCHES UP WITH THE MORE INDICATIVE JOMC FIGURES COULD LEAD MANY TO CONCLUDE THAT GOLKAR DIRTY TRICKS HAVE AGAIN TURNED THE OUTCOME OF AN ELECTION, LEAVING IT IN POSITION TO FORM A WINNING COALITION.

20. (C) COMMENT CONT.: KPU AND PANWASLU ARE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS QUICKLY AND WRAP UP THE COUNT. BUT THEY HAVE A RANGE OF TECHNICAL PROBLEMS AS WELL AS SERIOUS ALLEGATIONS OF VOTING IRREGULARITIES TO RESOLVE, WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PRESERVE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE PROCESS. IT WILL NOT BE SURPRISING IF THE JULY 8 DEADLINE PROVES IMPOSSIBLE TO MEET. IF SO, THE NOVEMBER TIMETABLE FOR PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION MAY ALSO SLIP, THOUGH AT THIS STAGE WE SUSPECT THE GOVERNMENT WILL INSIST ON KEEPING THAT IMPORTANT SCHEDULE ON TRACK AS THEY DID IN THE CASE OF THE JUNE 7 GENERAL ELECTION. BUT A FAILURE TO ADDRESS ADEQUATELY PRESENT CONCERNS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY LEAD TO BITTERNESS AND RECRIMINATION LATER, PARTICULARLY IF THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION DOES NOT MEET PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS. AFTER COMING SO FAR, AN AMBIGUOUS OR QUESTIONABLE OUTCOME WOULD BE A SERIOUS SETBACK TO INDONESIA'S

DEMOCRATIZATION.

ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6795

PAGE 01 JAKART 03034 01 OF 03 211028Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W				

----------D78E93 211028Z /38

O 211023Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8415
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
CG III MEF//G2//
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003034

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/04
TAGS: PREF, PINS, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT MULLS THE FUTURE

1. (C) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03034 01 OF 03 211028Z
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: DESPITE MAJOR POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE PAST 18 MONTHS, INDONESIAN STUDENT LEADERS REMAIN FEARFUL THAT THE CORE DEMANDS OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENT WILL BE THWARTED. STUDENT LEADERS HAVE TOLD US THAT THE MOVEMENT WILL CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE GOI, BOTH THROUGH LOBBYING AND DEMONSTRATIONS, TO ADDRESS ISSUES IMPORTANT TO STUDENTS, PARTICULARLY THE DE-POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY AND THE PROSECUTION OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND HIS ASSOCIATES. LEADERS OF MAJOR MUSLIM STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS HAVE DOWNPLAYED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE EMERGENCE OF A MUSLIM RIGHT WING COALITION COULD (FURTHER) DIVIDE THE STUDENT MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, BARRING UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS, NO

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 JUN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUN 2006 200503412

MAJOR STUDENT DEMONSTRATION CAMPAIGNS ARE LIKELY THIS SUMMER, AT LEAST UNTIL THE NEW PARLIAMENT IS FORMED LATER THIS SUMMER. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) SOURCE NOTES: IN THE PAST WEEK, WE MET WITH A RANGE OF INDONESIAN STUDENT AND YOUTH LEADERS TO ASSESS THE MOVEMENT'S OUTLOOK AND POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. OUR INTERLOCUTORS INCLUDED

[redacted] B1

DESPITE THE DIVERSITY OF THIS BODY OF CONTACTS, CORE THEMES AND COMMON DENOMINATORS GENERALLY OVERSHADOWED THEIR DIFFERENCES.

A GNAWING FEELING
---

4. (SBU) THE INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT IS WIDELY CREDITED WITH DRIVING THE REFORM MOVEMENT THAT BROUGHT DOWN THE SOEHARTO REGIME IN MAY, 1998. IN THE FALL OF 1998, THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AGAIN FLEXED ITS MUSCLES: MASSIVE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER PUT PRESSURE ON THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY TO INSTITUTE A SERIOUS POLITICAL REFORM PROGRAM, INCLUDING THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS STAGED IN EARLY JUNE, 1999 AND A RE-WRITING OF THE POLITICAL LAWS. IN SPITE OF THE KEY ROLE THE STUDENT MOVEMENT HAS PLAYED IN SHAPING THE COURSE OF INDONESIA'S RECENT POLITICAL HISTORY, A RANGE OF STUDENT LEADERS WE HAVE SPOKEN WITH RECENTLY FEAR THAT LONG-TERM, STRUCTURAL REFORMS THE STUDENTS HAVE FOUGHT FOR COULD STILL BE LOST.

5. (SBU) STUDENT LEADERS FROM MAINSTREAM, AS WELL AS MORE STRIDENT WINGS OF THE MOVEMENT HAVE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS STAGED ON JUNE 7 AND FEARS THAT THE "WILL OF THE PEOPLE" WOULD SOMEHOW BE THWARTED. ONE OF OUR CONTACTS BITTERLY CRITICIZED FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER FOR "PREMATURELY"

GIVING HIS BLESSING TO THE ELECTIONS. THE CONTACT CLAIMED THAT HE AND MANY OTHER STUDENTS WERE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 03034 01 OF 03 211028Z
DISAPPOINTED THAT CARTER AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS WERE "HASTY" IN PROCLAIMING THE ELECTIONS A SUCCESS. (NOTE: IN POINT OF FACT, CARTER'S STATEMENT NOTED VARIOUS AREAS OF CONCERN AND EMPHASIZED THAT NO CONCRETE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE PROCESS COULD BE MADE UNTIL THE FINAL RESULTS WERE IN. END NOTE.)

6. (SBU) STUDENT LEADERS' FEARS ABOUT THE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL FUTURE FALL INTO TWO CATEGORIES: FIRST, FEARS THAT GOLKAR WOULD SOMEHOW GARNER ENOUGH POWER TO BUILD A COALITION AND FORM THE NEXT GOVERNMENT. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW GOLKAR-BASED GOVERNING COALITION WOULD REPRESENT, FOR MOST INDONESIAN STUDENTS, THE FAILURE OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT THEY CREATED 18 MONTH EARLIER. THE SECOND FEAR IS THAT A "REFORM" COALITION, PRESUMABLY LED BY MEGAWATI'S PDI-P, WOULD FAIL TO IMPLEMENT REFORMS DEMANDED BY THE STUDENTS. TWO STUDENT LEADERS ALLEGED TO POLOFF THAT SEVERAL SENIOR LEADERS IN THE PDI-P WERE CORRUPT AND WOULD BRING TO GOVERNMENT A CROOKED "BUSINESS AS USUAL" ATTITUDE. MOREOVER, STUDENT LEADERS ARE BEGINNING TO QUESTION WHETHER MEGAWATI AND HER PARTY WOULD CHALLENGE THE ARMED FORCE BY DISSOLVING THE "DWI-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6796

PAGE 01 JAKART 03034 02 OF 03 211028Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/018W					

----------D78E97 211028Z /38

O 211023Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8416
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
CG III MEF//G2//
USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 003034

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/04
TAGS: PREF, PINS, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT MULLS THE FUTURE

FUNGSI" SYSTEM WHICH GIVES THE MILITARY A CENTRAL POLITICAL ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT. ABANDONING "DWIFUNGSI" IS A CORE DEMAND OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENT.

(NOTE: IN THE NOVEMBER 1998 "CIGANJUR" STATEMENT, MEGAWATI JOINED AMIEN RAIS, ABDURRAHMAN WAHID AND THE SULTAN OF JOGJAKARTA IN CALLING FOR AN END TO DWI-FUNGSI OVER A SIX YEAR PERIOD. AT THE TIME, AN SINCE, MANY STUDENTS FELT BETRAYED BY THIS GRADUALIST APPROACH. END NOTE)

STUDENTS' CORE DEMANDS
---

7. (SBU) THERE ARE THREE CORE DEMANDS SHARED BY THE VAST MAJORITY OF INDONESIAN STUDENT ACTIVISTS. THE FIRST IS THAT THE MILITARY "RETURN TO THE BARRACKS" AND THE "DWIFUNGSI" SYSTEM BE ABANDONED. SECOND IS THE PROSECUTION OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND HIS ASSOCIATES FOR CORRUPTION, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND VARIOUS OTHER MISDEEDS COMMITTED DURING HIS 30-YEAR REIGN. THE THIRD, AND MOST AMORPHOUS DEMAND, IS AN END TO "KKN" - COLLUSION, CORRUPTION, AND NEPOTISM IN INDONESIAN POLITICS. OTHER POINTS WHICH ENJOY WIDESPREAD SUPPORT WITHIN THE STUDENT MOVEMENT INCLUDE AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION TO WEAKEN THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT, AND OFFERING SUBSTANTIAL AUTONOMY TO OUTLYING DISTRICTS. ALTHOUGH MOST STUDENTS SEE THE FALL OF SOEHARTO AS A VICTORY FOR THEIR MOVEMENT, AND MANY SEE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ELECTIONS AS ANOTHER ACHIEVEMENT, (NOTE: A SIGNIFICANT MINORITY OF STUDENTS OPPOSED THE ELECTIONS AS ILLEGITIMATE. END NOTE.) STUDENT ACTIVISTS ARE ACUTELY AWARE THAT THE CORE DEMANDS OF THEIR MOVEMENT ARE UNMET. STUDENT LEADERS ASSERT THAT ANY GOVERNMENT THAT COMES TO POWER WILL

FACE SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE TO ADDRESS THEIR REFORM AGENDA.

FAULT LINES PERSIST

8. (SBU) THERE ARE STILL SIGNIFICANT DIVISIONS WITHIN THE STUDENT MOVEMENT THAT PRECLUDE MASS, JOINT ACTION AT THE CURRENT TIME. THROUGHOUT THE SPRING, STUDENT ACTIVISTS WERE DIVIDED BETWEEN A MAJORITY, WHICH SEIZED ON THE ELECTIONS AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE, AND A SUBSTANTIAL MINORITY WHOSE DISTRUST OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS SO DEEP THAT THEY DEEMED IMPOSSIBLE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. THIS REJECTIONIST GROUP STEADFASTLY ADHERED TO THE DEMAND FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT" OR RULE BY "INDONESIAN PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES" WHICH COULD IMPLEMENT FAIR ELECTIONS. THESE DEMANDS WERE SHARPLY CRITICIZED AS UNREALISTIC BY STUDENTS IN THE FORMER CAMP.

9. (SBU) IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN TO WHAT EXTENT THIS FAULT LINE WILL DEEPEN OR BE SMOOTHED OVER IN THE POST-ELECTION PERIOD. IF THE "STATUS QUO FORCES" MANAGE TO FORM THE NEXT GOVERNMENT, THIS WILL LIKELY BECOME THE TYPE OF ISSUE WHICH CAN MOBILIZE THE STUDENT MOVEMENT INTO THE KIND OF MASS, JOINT ACTION WITNESSED IN MAY AND NOVEMBER OF 1998. IF A "REFORM COALITION" FORMS THE NEXT GOVERNMENT, STUDENTS WILL WATCH CLOSELY, MANY SKEPTICALLY, TO SEE IF THEIR CORE DEMANDS ARE BEING ADDRESSED. SEVERAL OF OUR CONTACTS,

CONFIDENTIAL

FORMERLY LEADERS OF MAJOR STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS RAN AS PARLIAMENTARY (DPR) CANDIDATES FOR PDI-P, AND IN ONE CASE FOR PKB. SEVERAL OF THESE LEADERS APPEAR LIKELY TO TAKE SEATS IN THE COMING DPR. THESE INDIVIDUALS STILL NOMINALLY HOLD POSITIONS OF POWER IN THEIR STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS AND COULD PLAY A ROLE IN DEFLECTING SOME STUDENT OPPOSITION TO A PDI-P LED COALITION, IF DEEMED INSUFFICIENTLY REFORMIST BY STUDENT LEADERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PRESENCE OF RECENTLY RETIRED STUDENT LEADERS IN A PDI-P LED COALITION WOULD ALSO LIKELY SERVE TO PUSH THE COALITION IN A REFORMIST DIRECTION.

10. (SBU) LEADERS OF [redacted] DOWNPLAYED TO POLOFF B1

THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN GOLKAR AND MUSLIM PARTIES SUCH AS THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), COULD CAUSE MUSLIM STUDENTS TO SPLIT FROM THE MAINSTREAM STUDENT MOVEMENT, WHICH WOULD DEFINITELY OPPOSE A GOLKAR-LED GOVERNMENT. PMII IS THE STUDENT ORGANIZATION OF THE NAHDATUL ULAMA (N.U.), INDONESIA'S LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION. MOST OF PMII'S MEMBERS HAVE GRAVITATED TOWARD THE NATIONAL REAWAKENING PARTY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6797

PAGE 01 JAKART 03034 03 OF 03 211028Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	ED-01	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-01	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019W				

----------D78E9A 211028Z /38

O 211023Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8417
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
CG III MEF//G2//
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 003034

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/04
TAGS: PREF, PINS, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT MULLS THE FUTURE

(PKB) LED BY N.U. CHAIRMAN GUS DUR, WHICH IS FIRMLY IN THE REFORMIST CAMP. HMI'S POSITION, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS MORE OBSCURE. WHILE HMI MEMBERS WERE ACTIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 03034 03 OF 03 211028Z
PARTICIPANTS IN THE STUDENT MOVEMENT IN MAY AND NOVEMBER, ITS LEADERSHIP HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN IDENTIFIED WITH RULING, GOLKAR CIRCLES. HMI WOULD

SEEM A LIKELY CANDIDATE TO DEFECT FROM THE MAINSTREAM STUDENT REFORM MOVEMENT SHOULD STUDENTS HIT THE STREETS IN OPPOSITION TO A NEW GOLKAR-LED GOVERNMENT. INDEED, HMI'S PATRON WITHIN THE GOI IS GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANDJUNG. NONETHELESS, [redacted] B1 [redacted] INSISTED TO POLOFF THAT THE GROUP WAS IN STEP WITH THE STUDENT REFORM MOVEMENT AND THAT A SCHISM BETWEEN MUSLIM STUDENTS AND REFORMIST STUDENTS WAS NOT IN THE CARDS.

SUMMER OUTLOOK
---

11. (SBU) GIVEN THE SUMMER RECESS, THE PERSISTENT IDEOLOGICAL FAULT LINES OUTLINED ABOVE, AND POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY THAT WILL CONTINUE DURING THE SUMMER'S COALITION BUILDING DANCE, MAJOR STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ARE UNLIKELY IN THE NEAR TERM. OUR STUDENT CONTACTS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS WERE POSSIBLE DURING THE NEXT SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR). THE NEW MPR IS EXPECTED TO BE SWORN IN LATE AUGUST, AND IS SCHEDULED TO CONVENE TO SELECT THE NEXT PRESIDENT IN NOVEMBER. (NOTE: THIS SCHEDULE IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE. END NOTE) STUDENT MASS ACTION IS POSSIBLE DURING EITHER OF THESE EVENTS, ESPECIALLY IF IT APPEARS THAT "STATUS-QUO FORCES" HAVE THE UPPER HAND.
GONG

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

SECRET PTO0802

PAGE 01 STATE 112807 170118Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

112807
SOURCE: KODAKC.017016
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:MMADIA -- 06/16/99 7-2927
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
EAP/PIMBS:BCLARKE
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------D5FCB1 170120Z /38
O 170117Z JUN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 112807

STADIS

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/16/09
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 106

FOR ADCM GONG FROM PIMBS

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS ACTING DIRECTOR JON ALOISI.
REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 112807 170118Z

1. (SBU) CROWD CONTROL: AUSSIE REQUEST

WE CONVEYED TO ICITAP THE INP REQUEST TO POSTPONE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CROWD CONTROL TRAINING UNTIL JULY 12. ICITAP IS WORKING WITH ITS CONTRACTORS -- JERRY HARPER AND HIS AS YET UNCHOSEN ASSOCIATE(S) -- TO REJUGGLE SCHEDULES. (IT APPEARS THE PROSPECTIVE TRAINERS PREFER DOING THE TWO PROGRAMS SEQUENTIALLY RATHER THAN SIMULTANEOUSLY). WE'VE ALSO APPRISED THE AUSTRALIANS, WHO WISH TO MAKE SURE THAT THE INDONESIANS HAVE FORMALLY AGREED TO AUSSIE PARTICIPATION IN THE TRAINING PROGRAM (I.E., PARTICIPATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 16 JUN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAY 2006 200503412

AS "OBSERVERS" IN THE TRAINING). THE AUSSIES HAVE REQUESTED THAT OUR EMBASSY (I.E., YOU) SEND A LETTER TO THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN INDONESIA THAT EXPLICITLY STATES GOI AWARENESS OF AND SUPPORT FOR THE AUSTRALIAN ROLE IN THE TRAINING AND RENEWS OUR OWN INVITATION FOR AFP

PARTICIPATION. CAN YOU TAKE CARE OF THIS? YOU COULD ATTACH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TRAINING PROGRAM TO THAT LETTER. SEPARATELY, WE HAVE URGED ICITAP TO SHARE ALL OPERATIONAL DETAILS -- TRAINER HOTEL LOCATION, TRANSPORTATION PLANS, TRAINING LOCATION ETC. -- WITH THEIR AUSTRALIAN POLICE COUNTERPARTS.

2. (U) AL WHITEHOUSE VISIT

AL WHITEHOUSE, COAL FIRES PROJECT DIRECTOR FOR THE OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING IN THE INDONESIAN MINISTRY OF MINES AND ENERGY, STOPPED BY PIMBS TODAY. HE'S DOING THE ROUNDS HERE DISCUSSING RECENT PROGRESS IN THE MINISTRY ON THE

SECRET

FIRES PROBLEM. HE'S CLAIMING RECENT (MODEST) SUCCESS IN PUTTING OUT COAL FIRES, ALTHOUGH SCORES MORE REMAIN ABLAZE. HE POINTED TO LAND CONVERSION, WHICH TRANSFORMS FORMER WETLANDS INTO TIMBERBOXES, AS THE ROOT PROBLEM BEHIND THE FIRES. HE ALSO SAID THAT, IN THE INCREASINGLY OPEN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT, PEOPLE WERE BEGINNING TO USE THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND TO ACTIVATE PUBLIC OPINION TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY IRRESPONSIBLE MINING. SUCH POPULAR PRESSURE COULD HELP PUSH MINING AND OTHER BUSINESSES TO ACT WITH MORE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY -- SOMETHING THEY HAVE NEVER HAD TO EVEN CONSIDER UNTIL RECENTLY. WE ARE SURE YOU KNOW ALL OF THIS, BUT WANTED TO CONVEY IT ANYWAY, AND TO LET YOU KNOW WHITEHOUSE WAS IN TOWN.

3. (S) ROTH-DOWNER EAST TIMOR NOTES

PHIL ANTWEILER WAS THE POOR GUY WHO GOT STUCK WITH THE NOTES FOR DOWNER'S TWO-HOUR INDONESIA LUNCH WITH STANLEY TODAY. HE'LL BE DRAFTING A BLOW-BY-BLOW, WHICH ALSO INCLUDES EXCHANGES ON OTHER ISSUES,

B1

4. (SBU) INDONESIA - UNAMET BUDGET

THE UN HAS PRODUCED AN OFFICIAL BUDGET REQUEST FOR UNAMET, INCLUDING THE CIVPOL AND MLO COMPONENTS, FOR DISCUSSION IN

THE UN FIFTH COMMITTEE. THE TOTAL ESTIMATE IS $52.5 MILLION. THIS COMES IN SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN THE EARLIER $58.2 MILLION ESTIMATE ($45.7 MILLION FOR SETTING UP THE POPULAR CONSULTATION PLUS $12.5 MILLION FOR CIVPOL/MLO) WE USED TO NOTIFY CONGRESS ON UN PLANS.

5. (SBU) INDONESIA - USAID POST-ELECTION STRATEGY

WE ATTENDED AN USAID-HOSTED MEETING TODAY TO DISCUSS POST-JUNE 7 STRATEGY FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE. NDI, IRI, ASIA FOUNDATION AND OTHER NGOS WHO WERE INVOLVED IN

PREPARATIONS FOR THE DPR ELECTIONS PARTICIPATED IN THE EXCHANGE. WHILE POINTING TO SOME FLAWS, THEY JOINED THE CONSENSUS THAT THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS WERE A REMARKABLE ACCOMPLISHMENT. PLANS ARE BEING DEVELOPED TO BUILD ON EXISTING PROJECTS, E.G., TO BOLSTER THE ROLE OF INDONESIAN NGOS AS ADVOCATES FOR CONTINUING DEMOCRATIC REFORM, INCLUDING MONITORING THE SELECTION METHODS FOR "APPOINTED" DELEGATES TO THE MPR, ESTABLISHING THE RULES FOR THE MPR'S CHOICE OF A NEW NATIONAL PRESIDENT/VICE PRESIDENT, CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY, AND DEALING WITH DECENTRALIZATION/SEPARATION ISSUES. U.S. ASSISTANCE WILL ALSO FOCUS ON STRENGTHENING POLITICAL PARTIES AND ON WAYS TO BUILD COALITIONS.

6. (SBU) INDONESIA - UNSC EAST TIMOR DISCUSSION

USUN ADVISES THAT MARKER UPDATED THE COUNCIL THIS MORNING ON THE STATUS OF UNAMET'S DEPLOYMENT. COUNCIL MEMBERS DISCUSSED THE PRECARIOUS SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR, BUT NO ONE RAISED THE IDEA OF POSTPONEMENT OF THE AUGUST 8 POPULAR CONSULTATION. BAHRAIN AND MALAYSIA PLAYED GAMES ON A PRESS STATEMENT FOR RELEASE AFTER THE MEETING, ARGUING THAT INDONESIA SHOULD NOT BE SINGLED OUT ON SECURITY. THEY DIDN'T CONVINCE ANYONE.
TALBOTT

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0274

PAGE 01 JAKART 02858 01 OF 03 101134Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/014W						

----------D3451F 101148Z /38

O 101135Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8247
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002858

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: WHILE WAITING FOR ELECTION RESULTS; POLITICAL MANEUVERING INTENSIFIES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02858 01 OF 03 101134Z
REF: A) JAKARTA 2798; B) JAKARTA 2767; C) JAKARTA 2765

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

2. SUMMARY: WHILE WAITING FOR THE RESULTS OF THE JUNE 7 ELECTION, POLITICAL MANEUVERING AMONG CRITICAL PLAYERS IS INTENSIFYING. A HABIBIE OPERATIVE ANTICIPATES A STRONG SHOWING FOR PDI-PERJUANGAN, AND THAT A REALISTIC OUTCOME FOR GOLKAR IS ONLY 15 TO 20 PERCENT OF THE VOTE. THIS EXPECTATION HAS PROMPTED THE ADMINISTRATION TO BEGIN PREPARING CONTINGENCY PLANS SHOULD MEGAWATI AND HER ALLIES EMERGE DOMINANT IN THE PARLIAMENT (DPR). A PDI-PERJUANGAN OFFICIAL IS CONFIDENT THAT MEGAWATI IS ON HER WAY TO A BIG WIN, BUT ESTIMATES THAT IT COULD RANGE FROM 30 TO 46 PERCENT OF THE VOTE. A PAN OFFICIAL FROM THE MUHAMMADIYAH

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 10 JUN 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAY 2006 200503412

CAMP IS ALREADY GETTING NERVOUS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A LARGE MARGIN OF VICTORY FOR PDI-PERJUANGAN, AND ACKNOWLEDGES THAT SUCH AN OUTCOME COULD LEAD PAN, OR AT LEAST THE ISLAMIC SIDE OF THE PARTY, TOWARD GOLKAR. AS VOTE RETURNS TRICKLE IN SHOWING GOLKAR RUNNING A WEAK SECOND SO FAR, GOLKAR VICE CHAIR MARZUKI DARUSMAN MET WITH LEADERS OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES, AND COULD BE POSITIONING HIMSELF TO JUMP FROM GOLKAR OR TO TRY TO RE-MAKE IT IN HIS NATIONALIST, AS OPPOSED TO HABIBIE'S ISLAMIC, IMAGE. THE ANTICIPATED STRONG SHOWING OF MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN IS ALREADY AFFECTING THE FRAGILE BALANCE OF FORCES WITHIN PAN AND GOLKAR. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) POLOFFS MET WITH POLITICAL OPERATIVES ON JUNE 9 AND 10 TO ASSESS THEIR REACTION TO EARLY VOTE RETURNS. [redacted] B6

POLITICOS EXPECT VICTORY FOR MEGAWATI, BUT BY HOW MUCH?

4. (C) INDONESIAN POLITICIANS ARE REACTING TO THE PARTIAL VOTE RESULTS SHOWING PDI-PERJUANGAN IN A COMMANDING LEAD, AND ARE ALSO USING THEIR OWN INTERNAL, INCOMPLETE POLLING DATA. LIKE EVERYONE ELSE IN INDONESIA, [redacted] B1 PRESIDENT HABIBIE, WAS AWAITING THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION WHEN HE MET WITH POLOFFS ON JUNE 9. HE GAVE US THE CLEAR IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, THAT HE TOOK SERIOUSLY THE LIKELIHOOD THAT MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN WOULD WIN A PLURALITY, PROBABLY BY A LARGE MARGIN. HE WAS DISMISSIVE OF GOLKAR GENERAL CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANDJUNG'S CONTINUED CLAIMS THAT GOLKAR WOULD OBTAIN 38 TO 40 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, AND QUESTIONED PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S CONFIDENCE THAT GOLKAR WOULD WIN THE ELECTION. HE TOLD POLOFFS THAT INDONESIAN INTELLIGENCE (BAKIN) DIRECTOR GENERAL MAULANI HAD PROVIDED HABIBIE WITH THREE SCENARIOS FOR THE ELECTION OUTCOME BASED ON BAKIN'S OWN ESTIMATES.

OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO: GOLKAR WINS 20 PERCENT OR MORE;

REALISTIC SCENARIO: GOLKAR WINS 15-20 PERCENT;

PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO: GOLKAR WINS LESS THAN 15 PERCENT.

5. (C) DURING A MEETING ON JUNE 10, PDI-PERJUANGAN [redacted] B1

[redacted] EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT HIS PARTY WOULD WIN A B1
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02858 01 OF 03 101134Z
PLURALITY OF THE VOTE AND THAT HE WOULD SECURE A PARLIAMENT SEAT
IN [redacted] BUT HE ESTIMATED THAT THE RANGE COULD BE B1
ANYWHERE FROM 30 TO 46 PERCENT. HE ESTIMATED THAT GOLKAR WOULD
WIN NO MORE THAN 10 PERCENT.

6. (C) [redacted] HABIBIE'S STAFF B1
HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO PREPARE "CONTINGENCY PLANS" FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD A MEGAWATI (PDI-PERJUANGAN)/GUS DUR (PKB)
COALITION EMERGE WITH A VICTORY. HE PRESUMED THAT IF THEY WERE
IN A STRONG POSITION, THESE OPPOSITION LEADERS WOULD PUSH TO
HOLD THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION MPR EARLIER THAN NOVEMBER AS NOW
PLANNED, PERHAPS AS SOON AS AUGUST. (NOTE: IN A JOINT COMMUNIQUE
ISSUED AT THE END OF MAY, THESE LEADERS ALONG WITH AMIEN RAIS
SERVED NOTICE THAT THEY WANTED THE MPR TO TAKE PLACE NO LATER
THAN OCTOBER.) WHILE HABIBIE OPPOSED THIS CHANGE IN SCHEDULE,
SUPPOSEDLY BECAUSE HABIBIE WANTED MORE TIME TO DEAL WITH THE
ISSUE OF SOEHARTO'S CORRUPTION, A BIG PDI-PERJUANGAN WIN WOULD
BRING PRESSURE TO MOVE UP THE DATE OF THE MPR SO THE
ADMINISTRATION HAD TO PREPARE FOR SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. PDI-
PERJUANGAN'S [redacted] MADE CLEAR TO POLOFFS THAT HIS PARTY WAS B1
NOT PREPARED TO WAIT UNTIL NOVEMBER FOR A TRANSITION, AND WOULD
ATTEMPT TO ADVANCE THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION TO AS EARLY AS
AUGUST.

COMPETITION BETWEEN NATIONALISTS AND MUSLIMS SHAPING UP

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0276

PAGE 01 JAKART 02858 02 OF 03 101134Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NRRC-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W

----------D34526 101149Z /38

O 101135Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8248
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002858

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: WHILE WAITING FOR ELECTION RESULTS; POLITICAL MANEUVERING INTENSIFIES

7. (C) [redacted] ASSESSED THAT THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ABOUT THE B1
CONFIDENTIAL

SHAPE OF POST-ELECTION INDONESIAN POLITICAL COALITIONS WAS COMING TRUE. ON ONE SIDE, THERE WOULD BE AN ISLAMIC GROUP CENTERED AROUND GOLKAR AND INCLUDING PPP, PBB, PK, AND OTHER SMALL POLITICAL PARTIES. ON THE OTHER SIDE, THERE WOULD BE A NATIONALIST ALLIANCE BETWEEN PDI-PERJUANGAN AND GUS DUR'S PKB. HE ASSESSED THAT THE ARMED FORCES (TNI) AND AMIEN RAIS'S PAN WOULD BE THE SWING FACTORS.

8. (C) PAN'S [redacted] INSISTED THAT HIS PARTY COULD NOT MAKE ANY DECISIONS ABOUT COALITIONS UNTIL IT KNEW ITS RELATIVE STRENGTH FOLLOWING THE OUTCOME OF THE VOTE. HE ECHOED [redacted] HOWEVER, IN DESCRIBING WHAT HE CALLED THE OPPOSING "SECULAR NATIONALIST" AND "RELIGIOUS NATIONALIST" CAMPS, AND PLACED PAN IN THE MIDDLE AS A SWING FACTOR, IN WHAT HE REFERRED TO AS BOTH A POLITICALLY DIFFICULT AND A "LUCKY" POSITION. THOUGH [redacted] EXPRESSED HIS B1
PERSONAL VIEW THAT HE WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE HABIBIE RE-ELECTED BECAUSE THE COUNTRY NEEDED CHANGE, HE INDICATED THAT PAN COULD GO EITHER WAY. BEFORE THE ELECTION, SAID [redacted] PAN WAS NOT PREPARED TO JOIN WITH GOLKAR, BUT GIVEN THE TREND IN RESULTS AFTER JUNE 7, IT HAD BECOME A GREATER POSSIBILITY. THIS APPEARED TO BE A REFERENCE TO MEGAWATI'S HIGH EARLY VOTE TOTALS, AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT GUS DUR'S PARTY PKB HAD BEEN RUNNING A STRONG SECOND (NOTE: THOUGH IT HAD ALREADY DROPPED TO THIRD BY JUNE 10 ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL COUNT BY THE ELECTION COMMISSION'S JOINT OPERATIONS AND MEDIA CENTER.) DURING THE CONVERSATION, HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT BOTH DEVELOPMENTS, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE PAN WAS RUNNING WELL BEHIND AND WOULD BE IN A WEAK POSITION IF IT ATTEMPTED TO JOIN WITH THESE TWO PARTIES AS IT HAD BEEN CONTEMPLATING.

9. (C) [redacted] HAD PARTICIPATED IN A HIGHLY
CONFIDENTIAL

PUBLICIZED MEETING ON JUNE 8 WITH PAN SECRETARY GENERAL FAISAL BASRI, PKB SECRETARY GENERAL MUHAIMIN ISKANDAR, AND GOLKAR VICE CHARIMAN MARZUKI DARUSMAN. HE CLAIMED TO POLOFFS THAT IT WAS NOT AN ATTEMPT TO FORM AN ALLIANCE, BUT RATHER A GATHERING OF FOUR NATIONALIST-ORIENTED LEADERS WHO WERE INTERESTED IN THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY AND HAD GATHERED AT THE ARYADUTA HOTEL IN JAKARTA TO OBSERVE THE INCOMING VOTE COUNTS. THEY WOULD MEET EVERY OTHER DAY, HE SAID. THOUGH [redacted] PDI-PERJUANGAN COLLEAGUE KWIK KIAN GIE HAD COMMENTED ON TELEVISION JUNE 9 THAT HIS PRTY WOULD NEVER JOIN WITH GOLKAR BECAUSE OF ITS CORRUPTION [redacted] ALLOWED THAT A "NEW GOLKAR" UNDER MARZUKI'S LEADERSHIP COULD POSSIBLY BE AN ACCEPTABLE ALLIANCE PARTNER, AT LEAST IN THE LONG TERM. [redacted] HAS TOLD AN EXPAT JOURNALIST THAT HE AND OTHERS IN THE "MODERATE" GOLKAR FACTION ARE CONSIDERING MOVING TOWARD MEGAWATI, EITHER AS INDIVIDUALS OR AS A FACTION WHICH MIGHT DEFECT FROM THE MORE ISLAMIC ELEMENTS WITHIN GOLKAR. [redacted] ADDED THAT SEVERAL GENERALS, INCLUDING AGUM GUMELAR AND HENDROPRIYONO, MIGHT ALSO BE INCLINED TO SUPPORT MEGAWATI, THOUGH HE DID NOT EXPLAIN HOW THIS SUPPORT MIGHT MANIFEST ITSELF (SEE PARA 11). B1

GOLKAR STILL HOPING FOR A WIN?

10. (C) [redacted] ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME MUSLIM LEADERS, [redacted] HAD OVERESTIMATED THEIR ABILITY TO ATTRACT GRASS ROOTS SUPPORT. [redacted] THOUGHT THAT PDI-PERJUANGAN HAD FIGURED OUT HOW TO APPEAL TO THE MASSES, INCLUDING MUSLIMS, WHO AT THE MOMENT CARED MORE ABOUT EXPRESSING THEIR ANGER TOWARD THE POWER STRUCTURE THAN VOTING ALONG RELIGIOUS LINES (NOTE: HE EXPECTED THAT THESE MUSLIM VOTERS WOULD BE SORRY LATER, HOWEVER.) B1

CONFIDENTIAL

11. (C) THOUGH HE SEEMED PESSIMISTIC ABOUT GOLKAR'S CHANCE OF WINNING THE JUNE 7 ELECTION, HE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS STILL IN THE GAME AND THE MAIN COMPETITION FOR PDI-PERJUANGAN. MOREOVER, HE ARGUED THAT GOLKAR COULD STILL CONTROL THE PRESIDENCY BECAUSE THE PERCENTAGE OF VOTES WON NATION WIDE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY TRANSLATE INTO AN EQUAL NUMBER OF SEATS. IN ADDITION, IF GOLKAR DID RELATIVELY WELL IN THE OUTER AREAS IT COULD CAPTURE A LARGE NUMBER OF THE 135 REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MPR. FINALLY, HE CONTENDED, IT STOOD A GOOD CHANCE OF GRABBING A SIGNFICANT PORTION OF THE MPR'S 65 SOCIETAL REPRESENTATIVES. (NOTE: POLOFF POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE OF CONCERN IF THE EXTRA SEATS IN THE MPR DISTORTED THE RESULTS OF THE POPULAR ELECTION.)

WIRANTO'S PROSPECTS
---

12. (C) ACCORDING TO [redacted] ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO DID NOT WANT TO JOIN WITH MEGAWATI BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THAT SHE WOULD REPLACE HIM WITH EITHER GENERAL AGUM GUMELAR OR GENERAL HENDROPRIYONO IF SHE CAME TO POWER. IF MEGAWATI WON A STRONG VICTORY (OVER 35 PERCENT), HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THAT WIRANTO WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO THROW IN WITH THE WINNERS AND SUPPORT MEGAWATI, SAID JUORO. SIMILARLY, AMIEN RAIS' PAN MIGHT JOIN WITH MEGAWATI IF SHE WON CONVINCINGLY, BUT OTHERWISE WAS MORE LIKELY TO GO WITH GOLKAR AND THE ISLAMIC COALITION. (NOTE:

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0275

PAGE 01 JAKART 02858 03 OF 03 101134Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/014W						

----------D3452C 101148Z /38

O 101135Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8249
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002858

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: WHILE WAITING FOR ELECTION RESULTS; POLITICAL MANEUVERING INTENSIFIES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02858 03 OF 03 101134Z
THIS FORMER PAN MEMBER SEEMED TO THINK THAT RAIS' PARTY WAS

HEADING TOWARDS A SPLIT IN ANY CASE. THE MODERNIST MUSLIMS FROM MUHAMMADIYAH WHO MAKE UP A MAJORITY OF THE PARTY'S MEMBERS WOULD NOT WANT TO JOIN WITH MEGAWATI AND GUS DUR, AND THE NGO/MINORITY WING WOULD NOT WANT TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE MUSLIM COALITION. EVEN IF PAN REMAINED INTACT, IT WAS CONCEIVABLE THAT ITS MUHAMMADIYAH MEMBERS COULD SUPPORT AN ISLAMIC CANDIDATE IN THE MPR FOR PRESIDENT, WHILE ITS NGO/MINORITY MEMBERS WOULD SUPPORT THE NATIONALIST CANDIDATE. A PAN MEMBER HAS CONFIRMED TO US EXACTLY THAT THIS TENSION IS MOUNTING INSIDE PAN.)

13. (C) [redacted] BELIEVED THAT WIRANTO DID NOT WANT TO BE PRESIDENT NOW BECAUSE HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ARMED FORCES' REPUTATION WAS IN TATTERS WITHIN INDONESIA. MOREOVER, HE REALIZED THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD NOT BE RECEIVED WELL BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IN [redacted] ESTIMATION, WIRANTO WOULD ACCEPT THE VICE PRESIDENCY UNDER HABIBIE, HOWEVER, BECAUSE HE SAW IT AS A STEPPING STONE TO THE TOP JOB IN THE FUTURE. [redacted] CLAIMED THAT WIRANTO WOULD STILL EXERCISE INFLUENCE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES AS VICE PRESIDENT BECAUSE HE WOULD ENJOY HABIBIE'S BACKING ON ISSUES AFFECTING TNI. B1

COMMENT
---

14. (C) THE FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION AVAILABLE ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR POLITICAL LEADERS TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE. THE INCOMPLETE RETURNS ALREADY AVAILABLE, HOWEVER, ARE CLEARLY STIMULATING THINKING. THE PERCEIVED STRONG SHOWING OF MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN IS AFFECTING THE FRAGILE BALANCE OF FORCES WITHIN PAN AND GOLKAR. PAN'S MUHAMMADIYAH MUSLIM CAMP APPEARS CONCERNED THAT THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02858 03 OF 03 101134Z
SECULAR PDI-PERJUANGAN WILL OVERWHELM IT, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE PAN IS NOT PERFORMING WELL AROUND THE COUNTRY. THIS COULD CONCEIVABLY DRIVE PAN INTO THE ARMS OF GOLKAR, INTO AN OPPOSITION STANCE WITHIN A NEW GOVERNMENT, OR EVEN SPLIT THE PARTY. SIMILARLY, MARZUKI DARUSMAN'S LONGSTANDING UNHAPPINESS WITH THE STATE OF PLAY WITHIN HIS PARTY AND THE LIKELY ISLAMIC DIRECTION TOWARD WHICH IT IS HEADING HAVE ONLY BEEN EXACERBATED BY THE EARLY ELECTION RETURNS, CREATING THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE TOO WILL HEAD OFF IN HIS OWN DIRECTION. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E40

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), 1.4(B), B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4857

PAGE 01 JAKART 02715 01 OF 03 080523Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W		

----------D21BA4 080855Z /38

R 031043Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8108
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002715

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0095

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-04-09
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, ECON, PHUM, PINS, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: BALI: POLITICS AND SECURITY

REFS: A. JAKARTA 2584, B. JAKARTA 2700
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02715 01 OF 03 080523Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PO WILLIAM A PIERCE. REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN BALI, MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN SHOULD COMFORTABLY GET THE MOST VOTES, WITH GOLKAR SECOND. GOLKAR LEADERS SEEM DEFLATED. SINCE BALI'S GOLKAR DID NOT BACK HABIBIE AS THE PARTY CANDIDATE, THE PARTY HAS NOT RECEIVED MUCH FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM NATIONAL GOLKAR LEADERS. IN THE POST-SUHARTO PERIOD, POLITICS RETURNED TO BALI SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED FROM THE PRE-SUHARTO ERA WHEN CLANS AND VILLAGES EN MASSE SUPPORTED ONE PARTY OVER THE OTHER. TRADITIONAL COMMUNITY LEADERS HAVE REGAINED INDEPENDENCE WHICH WAS LOST DURING THE SUHARTO YEARS. THEY REMAIN POLITICALLY NEUTRAL. OBVIOUSLY VIOLENT CLASHES TIED TO ELECTION POLITICS ARE OF CONCERN SINCE SUSTAINED VIOLENCE COULD DESTROY BALI'S TOURISM.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 3 JUN 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAY 2006 200503412

NONETHELESS, INCIDENTS PERSIST. GOLKAR CADRES SEEM THE MOST CULPABLE. ANOTHER SOURCE OF TENSION IS BETWEEN INDIGENOUS BALINESE AND NEWCOMERS FROM JAVA. A RECENT INCIDENT AT A PRIME TOURIST AREA UNDERSCORED HOW STRONG LOCAL BALINESE RESENT MORE BLATANT NEWCOMER EXCESSES. HOWEVER, THEMILITARY, WHICH HAD LONG CONTROLLED THE AREA, HAS BEGUN TO PULL BACK. BALINESE SEE A TREND TOWARDS GREATER GOVERNMENTAL POWER MOVING TO THEM IN THE FUTURE. END SUMMARY

3. (U) INTRODUCTION. MAY 26-28, PO VISITED BALI AND MET WITH A [redacted] B6 DISCUSSIONS CENTERED ON THE ELECTIONS, BALI'S GENERAL POLITICAL CLIMATE, THE SECURITY SITUATION, AND TENSIONS BETWEEN THE BALINESE COMMUNITY AND NEWCOMERS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02715 01 OF 03 080523Z

POLITICAL TRENDS

4. (SBU) IN BALI, NOT SURPRISINGLY, MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED THE FRONT RUNNER BY FAR. A LARGE NUMBER OF BALI'S HINDU COMMUNITY (MORE THAN 90 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION) SUPPORT IT. GOLKAR WITH ITS STRONG, THOUGH WEAKENED ORGANIZATION, WILL LIKELY BE SECOND. IT IS COMMONLY THOUGHT THAT OTHER PARTIES WILL BE ASTERISKS ON THE ELECTION TALLY BOARDS.

PDI-PERJUANGAN

5. (SBU) THE PARTY'S PRESENCE IS OVERWHELMING, WITH RED PDI-PERJUANGAN BANNERS OVERHANGING EVERY CITY STREET AND COUNTRY ROAD, SMOTHERING VIRTUALLY EVERY COMPETITOR. PDI-PERJUANGAN'S PROVINCIAL LEADERS AS WELL AS THOSE FROM THE PROVINCE CAPITAL DENPASAR SPOKE OF WINNING EVERY ONE OF BALI'S NINE DISTRICTS WITH 70 PLUS PERCENT. AS WE HAVE SEEN ELSEWHERE, THEY STRONGLY INSISTED THAT A WIN AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL WOULD ASSURE THE RESPECTIVE DPR SEAT THUS NEGATING ANY REPRESENTATION FOR A RUNNER-UP PARTY THAT MIGHT GET 20 PER CENT PROVINCE-WIDE FROM ANY SEATS AT ALL. ONE NEUTRAL POLITICAL OBSERVER PUT PDI-PERJUANGAN'S WIN CLOSER TO FIVE DPR SEATS. ANOTHER THOUGHT THAT MEGAWATI'S TOTAL WOULD LIKELY FALL JUST UNDER 50 PER CENT. WHEN PUSHED, ONE SAID THAT, IF GOLKAR WERE TO WIN ANYWHERE, IT WOULD LIKELY BE THE NORTHERNMOST DISTRICT OF BULELENG.

6. (C) A POLITICAL OBSERVER [redacted] BEMOANED THE LACK B1 OF VISION IN BALI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN LEADERS. THEY HAVE NO IDEA OF REAL POLITICS OR POLITICAL GOALS, HE EXCLAIMED. THE ABSENCE OF CONTENT IN THEIR SPEECHES WAS SO BLATANT THAT HE HAD TAKEN TO WRITING THEIR ADDRESSES FOR THEM. (NOTE: WE KNOW VERY FEW PDI-

PERJUANGAN LEADERS IN THE EASTERN INDONESIA THAT CAN ARTICULATE
CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL VIEWS--EXCEPTIONS BEING MAINLY FROM CENTRAL JAVA.)

GOLKAR
---

7. (C) GOLKAR CONTACTS IN BALI SEEMED DEMORALIZED, ALTHOUGH THEY PROJECTED AS POSITIVE A SLANT ON THEIR POSITION AS POSSIBLE. GOLKAR'S [redacted] B1
DENPASAR), AFTER BEING ASKED SEVERAL TIMES, PREDICTED THAT HIS PARTY COULD TAKE AS MANY AS 50 PER CENT OF THE GIANYAR VOTE. HIS COLLEAGUE, HOWEVER, EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION OVER CHARGES THAT GOLKAR WAS A CREATURE OF SUHARTO'S NEW ORDER. ISN'T MEGAWATI A HOLDOVER FROM SUKARNO'S OLD ORDER? HE ASKED. HE BRISTLED OVER THE ALLEGATION THAT GOLKAR WAS TURNING ISLAMIC. THE PARTY WAS SECULARLY CENTERED, BUT BROAD ENOUGH TO HOLD DIVERSE VIEWS. THERE WERE NO ISLAMIC ELEMENTS IN THE GIANYAR GOLKAR CHAPTER (NOR, AS THEY NOTED, BARELY ANY MUSLIMS IN GIANYAR AT ALL.) BOTH OFFICIALS UNDERLINED THE TRANQUILLITY OF POLITICS IN GIANYAR, WHICH, JUDGING FROM THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE IN THE TOWN, SEEMED AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT. YET, ENTHUSIASM FOR GOLKAR IN THE MAIN CITY SEEMED MUTED. THERE WERE ARRAYS OF YELLOW GOLKAR BANNERS, BUT AS ELSEWHERE, MEGAWATI RED PREDOMINATED. GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANJUNG HAD THE DAY BEFORE (MAY 26) HELD A RALLY IN GIANYAR. IT WAS A CLOSED BUILDING, WE WERE TOLD. ACCORDING TO PDI-PERJUANGAN CONTACTS, ONLY 1000 ATTENDED.

8. (C) [redacted] A GOLKAR OFFICIAL [redacted] B1
PRESENTED A MORE TELLING RECOUNT OF GOLKAR'S POSITION IN BALI. HE HAD ATTENDED GOLKAR'S MAY 13-14 LEADERSHIP MEETING WHERE HABIBIE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4934

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W		

----------D21D77 080914Z /38

R 031043Z JUN 99

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8109
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002715

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0095

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-04-09
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, ECON, PHUM, PINS, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: BALI: POLITICS AND SECURITY

WAS CHOSEN AS THE PARTY'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. FORMER BALI
CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNOR AND CURRENT POPULATION MINISTER IDA BAGUS OKA HAD PUT HIM AND BALI'S GOLKAR DELEGATION UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE TO BACK HABIBIE. THE BALI DELEGATION REFUSED. "IF WE HAD BACKED HABIBIE, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN KILLED WHEN WE GOT BACK TO BALI," HE SAID. AS A RESULT, GOLKAR CENTRAL HAD GIVEN ONLY RP 200 MILLION TO BALI'S GOLKAR CAMPAIGN, WHILE, HE NOTED, GOLKAR IN LITTLE LOMBOK (BALI'S ADJACENT ISLAND) RECEIVED RP 2 BILLION. (ALL CONTACTS SAID THAT MONEY POLITICS WAS ALMOST NON-EXISTENT IN BALI, EXCEPT PERHAPS THROUGH THE PDR PARTY OF ADI SASONO. GOLKAR LEADER BARAMULI, WHO HAS GAINED A REPUTATION FOR BUYING VOTES IN MANY PROVINCES HAS NOT, WE UNDERSTAND, EVEN VISITED BALI.)

9. (C) [redacted] SPOKE OF HOW HARD IT WAS TO PROMOTE GOLKAR. THE PEOPLE'S LACK OF TRUST IN GOVERNMENT AND THEIR HATRED OF THE MILITARY HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE PARTY. YET, HE CAUTIONED, ONE SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF GOLKAR MAKES SOME GAINS. PDI-PERJUANGAN IS TOO OVERBLOWN, TOO CONFIDENT, AND THIS ATTITUDE MAY CAUSE A NEGATIVE REACTION. [redacted] SAID THAT MANY OF HIS GOLKAR COLLEAGUES HAD JUMPED TO OTHER PARTIES, BUT HE WAS STAYING ON. HE ASSUMED THAT GOLKAR WOULD END UP IN THE OPPOSITION THIS TIME AROUND. BUT, FIVE YEARS FROM NOW, ONCE IT HAD SHOWN ITSELF TO BE A RESPONSIBLE PARTNER IN DEMOCRACY, IT COULD RETURN. B1 B1

EVOLUTION OF POLITICS FROM 1950'S TO POST-SUHARTO

10. (C) SEVERAL CONTACTS WERE MINDFUL OF VIOLENT EPISODES IN BALI'S PAST, THE MOST RECENT BEING THE CLASHES BETWEEN THE PKI (COMMUNISTS) AND THE PNI (THE OLD NATIONALIST PARTY) THAT WRECKED SOCIETY IN THE 1960'S, CULMINATING WITH THE PNI SLAUGHTER OF PKI ADHERENTS IN 1965. ACCORDING TO [redacted] B1

[redacted] AT BALI'S UDAYANA UNIVERSITY, PARTY AFFILIATION AT B1
CONFIDENTIAL

THE TIME HAD BEEN TIED TO VILLAGE AND CLAN. THUS ONE PARTY OR THE OTHER COULD SWALLOW ENTIRE SOCIETAL UNITS IN A GULF. BOTH PARTIES WERE DESTROYED, THE PKI PHYSICALLY, THE PNI MORALLY, OPENING THE WAY TO THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF GOLKAR DOMINATION OVER GOVERNMENT AND TRADITIONAL LEADERS. IN THE POST-SUHARTO ERA, SEVERAL CONTACTS OBSERVED, POLITICS HAD BECOME OPEN. IT WAS NO LONGER THE PRACTICE FOR ENTIRE VILLAGES AND CLANS TO BACK ONE PARTY OVER ANOTHER, PARTY SUPPORT CAME FROM INDIVIDUALS, NOT GROUPS. BALI'S TRADITIONAL LEADERS (THE BANJAR NETWORK) WERE ASSIDUOUSLY NEUTRAL, ALTHOUGH MOST PRIVATELY SUPPORTED MEGAWATI. [redacted] SAID THAT BANJAR LEADERS MADE SECURITY THEIR UTMOST PRIORITY. MOST CONTACTS BELIEVED THAT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TOO AVOIDED POLITICAL PRESSURE TACTICS AND WERE IN THE MAIN NOT TRYING TO PROMOTE GOLKAR. ADNYANA THOUGHT THAT MOST VILLAGE HEADS, AS WELL AS A FEW BUPATIS, IF THEY SUPPORTED ANYONE, WERE MEGAWATI BACKERS

PROTECTING TOURISM
---

11. (C) SEVERAL CONTACTS SAID THAT, SHORTLY AFTER SUHARTO'S FALL, BALI'S POLITICAL, GOVERNMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAD AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER TO ASSURE THE ISLAND'S STABILITY. OBVIOUSLY CIVIL STRIFE WOULD HARM ANY SOCIETY IN INDONESIA, BUT IN BALI, IT WOULD DESTROY TOURISM. IN THE WORDS OF [redacted] B1
THE TOURIST TRADE REPLACED AGRICULTURE AS THE MAIN SOURCE OF REVENUE IN BALI. IF WIDESCALE VIOLENCE WERE TO DISRUPT IT, THE ISLAND'S ECONOMY WOULD CRUMBLE AND NOT RECOVER FOR A VERY LONG TIME. THE ISLAND'S ELITES WERE VERY MUCH AWARE OF THIS, PROVINCIAL PARTY LEADERS CONFERRED CLOSELY WITH EACH OTHER TO TRY TO AVOID CONFLICT. IN ONE INCIDENT, WHERE GOLKAR SECURITY PERSONNEL WERE INVOLVED IN CLASHES WITH LOCAL VILLAGERS, PDI-PERJUANGAN LEADERS DISPATCHED THEIR OWN SECURITY FORCES TO ESCORT THEM SAFELY OUT OF
CONFIDENTIAL

THE AREA. YET, AS ONE CONTACT NOTED, INTIMATE PARTY CONTACTS ARE ONLY AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL. AT THE LOWER LEVELS PARTY LEADERS DO NOT TALK TO EACH OTHER, THUS MAKING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES LESS SMOOTH. GIAMYAR PDI-PERJUANGAN OFFICIALS CONFIRMED THAT THEY HAVE FEW CONTACTS WITH OTHER PARTIES.

VIOLENT INCIDENTS TIED TO THE ELECTION
---

12. (C) ALL CONTACTS WERE CONCERNED OVER THE RECENT CLASHES BETWEEN GOLKAR AND PDI-PERJUANGAN CADRES, ESPECIALLY SINCE THOSE INVOLVED HAD USED SWORDS AND STAKES IN THE INCIDENTS (REF A). MOST ATTEMPTED TO MINIMIZE THEIR IMPORT, ALTHOUGH SOME BELIEVED THAT

B1

VIOLENCE WAS POSSIBLE ANYWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. [redacted] DENIED INTERNATIONAL NEWS REPORTS THAT THREE PEOPLE HAD DIED IN THE FIGHTING. (LATER, HOWEVER, WE TALKED TO A NEIGHBOR OF ONE OF THOSE WHO WAS KILLED.) [redacted] SAID THAT A DAY LATER AT A MEETING OF THE ISLAND'S POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND SECURITY LEADERS BALI'S POLICE CHIEF HAD AGREED TO CONDUCT A SWEEP OF POLITICAL CADRES TO CONFISCATE ANY WEAPONS THEY POSSESSED. (NOTE: AS REF B INDICATED, ARMED GOLKAR SECURITY PERSONNEL CONTINUED TO PROVOKE INCIDENTS ON JUNE 2. FURTHER CLASHES BETWEEN PDI-PERJUANGAN AND GOLKAR BROKE OUT IN DENPASAR ON JUNE 3.)

TENSIONS BETWEEN BALINESE AND NEWCOMERS

13. (C) AS ELSEWHERE IN INDONESIA, BALI HAS TENSIONS BETWEEN ITS INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY AND NEWCOMERS. ESPECIALLY IN TOURIST AREAS LIKE KUTA BEACH, JAVANESE AND MADURESE STREET SELLERS AND POOR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5000

PAGE 01 JAKART 02715 03 OF 03 080524Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CA-02	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W		

----------D21EE4 080930Z /38

R 031043Z JUN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8110
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002715

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0095

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-04-09
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, ECON, PHUM, PINS, CASC, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: BALI: POLITICS AND SECURITY

PEOPLE PREDOMINATE, CLOGGING TRAFFIC AS THEY HAWK WARES AND BEG.
CONFIDENTIAL

(KUTA IS ONE OF THREE MAIN TOURIST SPOTS ON THE ISLAND.) THEY USUALLY ARE NOT LICENSED AND CHOKE OFF LEGITIMATE BUSINESS. NEWCOMER PEDLERS ARE THE MOST INTRUSIVE PRESENCE, BUT MANY BALINESE CONSIDER OTHER, MORE PROSPEROUS NEWCOMERS A DANGER AS WELL. PROFESSOR [redacted] SHARPLY CRITICIZED BALI'S GROWING NUMBER OF MOSQUES AND CHURCHES AND A GENERAL FAILURE OF OUTSIDERS TO RESPECT BALINESE CUSTOMS AND HOLY DAYS. AMONG OTHERS, THE OWNERS OF FIVE STAR HOTELS AND GOLF COURSES (MAINLY CHINESE AND JAVANESE) FALL INTO THE CATEGORY. (THE GROUP POSES A DILEMMA FOR BALINESE CRITICS SINCE THE RESORTS PROVIDE EMPLOYMENT AND BRING IN SO MUCH REVENUE. HOWEVER, THEIR EXCESSES, SUCH AS A MERIDIEN HOTEL COMPLEX THAT HAS SWALLOWED UP THE LAND AROUND THE PARTICULARLY SACRED TANAH LOT TEMPLE HAS SHARPENED THE ANTI-RESORT SIDE OF THE DILEMMA.) B1

14. (C) [redacted] AND OTHERS SAID THE KUTA STREET VENDERS WERE ALLOWED TO OPERATE BECAUSE THEY GAVE THE MILITARY SUBVENTIONS THROUGH A MILITARY COOPERATIVE. THE MILITARY'S ROLE, HOWEVER, WAS LARGER THAN THAT. FOR YEARS, BALI'S CUSTOMARY VILLAGE ADMINISTRATION IN KUTA (THE BANJAR NETWORK) HAD BEEN IGNORED, WHILE KUTA'S FORMAL VILLAGE GOVERNMENT HAD LOST POWER TO THE MILITARY. [redacted] OBSERVED NO BUILDING PERMIT, ZONING INFRACTION, OR EVEN PETTY CRIMINAL OPERATION HAPPENED IN THE KUTA AREA WITHOUT AT LEAST THE TACIT BACKING OF THE LOCAL MILITARY. B1

REASSERTION OF BALINESE CONTROL

15. (C) OVER THE LAST YEAR, BALINESE HAD PRESSED GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS TO REDUCE THE ILLICIT ACTIVITIES AND ADHERE TO LOCAL CUSTOM. KUTA REACHED CRISIS IN LATE APRIL, WHEN BALINESE ACTIVISTS WITH THE COVERT BLESSING OF BANJAR LEADERS TRASHED AND
CONFIDENTIAL

BURNED 150 STREET KIOSKS. (SUBSEQUENTLY, A MADURESE DIED IN A STREET TUSSLE, HEIGHTENING TENSIONS.) [redacted] AND OTHERS SAID THAT THE MILITARY QUICKLY BOWED TO BALINESE DEMANDS AND HAVE BEGUN TO RELOCATE THE VENDERS. BALI'S GOVERNOR, WHO TOOK OFFICE JUST AFTER SUHARTO'S FALL, STRONGLY BACKED THE MOVE. SEVERAL CONTACTS NOTED THAT LOCAL LEADERS ARE BEGINNING TO REGAIN CONTROL OF KUTA'S VILLAGE AFFAIRS--A FIRST STEP IN REASSERTING TRADITIONAL BALINESE INFLUENCE OVER THE ISLAND'S AFFAIRS.

16. (C) AS TO LONGER TERM REASSERTION OF LOCAL CONTROL OVER THE PROVINCE, [redacted] SPOKE OF HOW THE NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS WOULD BE APPLIED IN BALI. [redacted] WORKS B1

[redacted]) UNDER THE NEW ORDER, HE SAID, BALI TURNED OVER SOME TWO TRILLION RUPIAHS IN TAX REVENUES TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ANNUALLY. THE ISLAND RECEIVED BACK ONE PERCENT FOR REINVESTMENT IN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS. UNDER THE NEW SYSTEM, BALI WOULD KEEP 60 PERCENT OF REVENUES COLLECTED. [redacted] B1
BELIEVED THAT THE NEW LAW WOULD WORK, ALTHOUGH IT BIFURCATED POWERS BETWEEN THE DISTRICTS AND THE PROVINCE. THIS ARRANGEMENT MEANT THAT THE TWO ENTITIES WOULD HAVE TO COORDINATE CLOSELY. STANDARDS OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL WOULD BE HIGH AND RIGID. IN HIS VIEW, IF DISTRICT HEADS FAILED TO MEASURE UP, THEY WOULD BE FIRED BY THE DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES (WHICH UNDER THE NEW LAW) WOULD ALSO BE THE BODY THAT ELECTED THEM IN THE FIRST PLACE.

17. (C) [redacted] BELIEVED THAT PLACING POWER IN THE HANDS OF LOCAL B1
GOVERNMENT WOULD BE THE SALVATION OF THE COUNTRY. CONTINUED CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT WOULD NOT WORK FOR A NATION AS DIVERSE AS INDONESIA, BUT IT COULD ULTIMATELY DESTROY IT. WITH A MORE EXTREME VIEW, [redacted] REMARKED THAT WERE JAKARTA AND THE MILITARY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02715 03 OF 03 080524Z
TO KEEP THEIR HOLD ON BALI AND THE BLATANT INTRUSION OF NEWCOMERS PERSISTED, BALI WOULD BE BETTER OFF INDEPENDENT.
PIERCE/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E41

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5783

PAGE 01 JAKART 02615 01 OF 04 270517Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W				

----------CDA302 270517Z /38

R 270514Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7988
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002615

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0089

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-26-09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: AROUND AND ABOUT SULAWESI

REF: JAKARTA 2067

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PO WILLIAM A PIERCE. REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: MAY 17-20, DCM, DATT, AND PO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02615 01 OF 04 270517Z
VISITED SULAWESI'S FOUR PROVINCIAL CAPITALS: UJUNG PADANG (SOUTH SULAWESI), KENDARI (SOUTHEAST SULAWESI), MANADO (NORTH SULAWESI), AND PALU (CENTRAL SULAWESI).

[redacted] B1

HAS STOPPED SEVERAL LOWER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM BACKING INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL PARTIES, YET THE PRACTICE CONTINUES, ALTHOUGH AT FAIRLY LOW LEVELS IN COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS ELECTIONS. IN NORTH SULAWESI, WE HEARD THAT CIVIL SERVANT INVOLVEMENT IN BACKING GOLKAR IS PERVASIVE, BUT MANY VILLAGE HEADS HAVE REFUSED ORDERS FROM HIGHER OFFICIALS TO SUPPORT GOLKAR. IN SOUTH AND NORTH SULAWESI, GOLKAR, WHILE STRONG, HAS WEAKENED. IN NORTH SULAWESI, MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN MAY EQUAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 2 MAY 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAY 2006 200503412

OR BETTER GOLKAR. HABIBIE AS A GOLKAR DRAWING CARD NONETHELESS WILL BE DIFFICULT TO OVERCOME, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTH. LOCAL PERSONALITIES, NOT NATIONAL POLITICS, WILL DECIDE SOME SEATS. THE ECONOMY, MAINLY RELIANT ON THE EXPORT OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND CASH CROPS, HAS WEATHERED THE ECONOMIC CRISIS WELL. THE SECURITY SITUATION SEEMS CALM. MANY OF THE 7000 REFUGEES FROM AMBON WHO FLED TO SOUTH SULAWESI HAVE GONE BACK TO AMBON, BUT MOST OF THE 50,000 WHO CAME BACK TO SOUTHEAST SULAWESI WILL LIKELY REMAIN THERE. IN CENTRAL SULAWESI, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ARE KEY. THE LARGE LORE LINDU PARK IS UNDER THREAT FROM A LOCAL POPULATION HUNGRY FOR LAND. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

POLITICS
---

3. (U) MEGAWATI HAD JUST GONE THROUGH ALL FOUR PROVINCES. SHE HAD DRAWN LARGE CROWDS. IN SOUTH SULAWESI MEGAWATI VISITED TANAH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02615 01 OF 04 270517Z

TORAJA LAND, A NON-MUSLIM AREA IN THE NORTH. PDI-PERJUANGAN CONTACTS TOLD US THAT PERHAPS 200,000 PEOPLE JAMMED ONTO THE FEW ROADS LEADING INTO THE AREA. WHEN SHE VISITED MANADO, NORTH SULAWESI, MEGAWATI HAD PACKED A LOCAL STADIUM WITH CROWDS OVERFLOWING SEVERAL BLOCKS OUT. (GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANDJUNG WHO VISITED IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS DREW A SMALLER CROWD, WHICH GAVE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS HOPE THAT THEY WOULD BEST GOLKAR.) IN PALU, CENTRAL SULAWESI, MEGAWATI ONLY PLANNED TO MEET LOCAL PDI-PERJUANGAN LEADERS BRIEFLY AT THE AIRPORT. STILL THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE PACKED PALU'S STREETS HOPING TO GET A GLIMPSE OF HER.

4. (C) [redacted] EMPHASIZED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS DEALING STERNLY WITH THOSE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FOUND PROMOTING POLITICAL PARTIES. HE REFERRED TO THE SACKING OF A SUBDISTRICT HEAD (CAMAT) WHO HAD OPENLY SUPPORTED GOLKAR (SEE PARA 6, JAKARTA 2067). SEPARATELY, [redacted] AND IS NO FAN OF [redacted] SAID THAT THE [redacted] HAD PUNISHED SEVERAL OTHER CAMATS FOR SIMILAR ACTS. HE THOUGHT THAT [redacted] WHILE STILL LOYAL TO GOLKAR, WAS REPENTING FOR PAST SINS. HOWEVER, [redacted] NOTED, SANCTIONS HAD NEVER BEEN IMPOSED ON DISTRICT HEADS (BUPATIS), SEVERAL OF WHOM WERE LENDING SUPPORT TO GOLKAR. KIPP'S PROTESTS TO THE GOVERNMENT ON THE MATTER HAD GONE UNANSWERED. [redacted] ALLEGED THAT MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS WERE INVOLVED IN PROMOTING GOLKAR, ALTHOUGH THE PRACTICE DID NOT APPEAR WIDESPREAD.

B1

B1

5. (C) SEVERAL CONTACTS AFFIRMED THAT GOLKAR WOULD TAKE THE LARGEST NUMBER OF SOUTH SULAWESI'S 24 DPR SEATS. TYING GOLKAR TO HABIBIE MAY BE A LIABILITY IN JAVA, BUT IN SOUTH SULAWESI, WITH

PAGE 04 JAKART 02615 01 OF 04 270517Z
HABIBIE CAST AS A NATIVE SON OF SOUTH SULAWESI, IT WAS A TONIC FOR THE PARTY. THE PULL OF HABIBIE, AND THUS GOLKAR, REMAINS THE DECIDING FACTOR FOR MANY VOTERS. ONE SENIOR ACADEMIC, A STRONG SUPPORTER OF REFORM WHO WORRIES THAT GOLKAR MIGHT WIN THE ELECTION, EXPRESSED GRUDGING RESPECT FOR HABIBIE. HE WOULD HAVE BEEN A GOOD PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, THE ACADEMIC SAID, HAD HE NOT GOTTEN TRAPPED THROUGH WIRANTO INTO PROTECTING SUHARTO. IF HABIBIE LOSES IT WILL BE BECAUSE OF THAT. IN SMALL-SCALE TESTIMONY TO HABIBIE'S SUPPORT, ONE TAXI DRIVER, WHO SAID THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF PAN, TOLD US THAT HE WOULD NOT BE VOTING JUNE 7. HE COULD NOT OPPOSE HABIBIE. IN ANY EVENT, HE OBSERVED, PAN CHAIRMAN AMIEN RAIS WOULD MAKE A GOOD OPPOSITION LEADER.

6. (C) WHILE THE GOLKAR INFRASTRUCTURE SHOULD STILL PREVAIL IN SOUTH SULAWESI, THERE ARE SOME VULNERABILITIES THAT WILL SAP ITS STRENGTH. GOLKAR'S CANDIDATE LIST FOR THE DPR, LOADED WITH MANY OLD FACES, HAD SOME ESPECIALLY EGREGIOUS SUBMISSIONS. MOST NOTABLE WAS A DPR MEMBER TIED TO PROVINCIAL COOPERATIVES WHO SEVERAL MONTHS AGO WAS CHARGED WITH SIPHONING OFF MORE THAN 100 BILLION RUPIAH FROM FUNDS DEVOTED TO THE CLOVES PROGRAMS (THE CHARGES WERE DROPPED). GOLKAR HAD ORIGINALLY PROPOSED HIM FOR HIS HOME DISTRICT. THE PROTEST FROM THE LOCAL GOLKAR LEADERSHIP WAS SO SHARP THAT HIS NAME WAS DROPPED ONLY TO EMERGE AS THE CANDIDATE FOR A NEARBY DISTRICT, WHERE REPORTEDLY HE GAVE THE

PAGE 01 JAKART 02615 02 OF 04 270517Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/013W			

----------CDA306 270518Z /38
R 270514Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7989
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 002615

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0089

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-26-09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: AROUND AND ABOUT SULAWESI

DISTRICT GOLKAR LEADER RUPIAH 150 MILLION. OTHER CANDIDATES WERE ALSO UNPOPULAR, WITH SOME IN NO WAY RELATED TO THE DISTRICT THEIR CANDIDACIES ARE OFFICIALLY TIED TO. (NOTE: THIS IS A COMMON PRACTICE FOR MANY PARTIES.) WE WERE ALSO TOLD THAT MUHAMMAD YUSUF, A LOCAL ICON (AND THE LAST REMAINING GENERAL OF THE TRIO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02615 02 OF 04 270517Z
THAT GOT THE SUPERSEMAR LETTER FROM SUKARNO IN 1966) HAD TURNED DOWN A REQUEST TO SUPPORT GOLKAR. HE IS ADVANCED IN AGE AND AILING, BUT REPORTEDLY HE ALSO HAS A PERSONAL DISLIKE OF HABIBIE. YUSUF'S BACKING OF ANY POLITICAL PARTY WOULD SWELL ITS VOTES.

7. (C) PDI-PERJUANGAN PARTY LEADERS SAID THAT THEY HAD TARGETED SIX AREAS IN SOUTH SULAWESI WHERE THEY THOUGHT THEY HAD A CHANCE TO WIN DPR DELEGATES AND GAIN SIZEABLE REPRESENTATION AT THE DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS. [redacted] NOTED B1
THAT GOLKAR, IN RESPONSE, HAD REDOUBLED ITS EFFORTS IN THOSE AREAS TO COUNTER THE PDI-PERJUANGAN STRATEGY. NONETHELESS, PDI-PERJUANGAN WAS CONSERVATIVELY PREDICTING THAT IT MIGHT GET FIVE OF THE PROVINCE'S 24 SEATS. [redacted] THOUGHT THE PDI-PERJUANGAN TALLY COULD REACH SEVEN, WITH PAN CLOSE BEHIND. THE PDI-PERJUANGAN PARTY LEADERSHIP ALSO HOPED THAT IT WOULD GET ENOUGH REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY TO GAIN TWO OF THE FIVE MPR SEATS ALLOCATED IN THE PROVINCE'S REGIONAL DELEGATION TO THE MPR.

8. (C) SEVERAL CONTACTS POINTED OUT THAT THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) HAD LITTLE SUPPORT. THE ONE EXCEPTION WAS BAHARUDDIN LOPA (NOW ENDING A ONE YEAR TERM AS INDONESIA'S AMBASSADOR TO SAUDI ARABIA). LOPA HAD BEEN SOUTH SULAWESI'S ATTORNEY GENERAL WHEN SUKARNO FELL; HE WAS POPULAR AND HONEST. MANY HAD PUSHED HABIBIE TO MAKE LOPA ATTORNEY GENERAL BUT, UNDER PRESSURE FROM WIRANTO, GHALIB WAS CHOSEN, OUR CONTACTS SAID. THEY CONCLUDED THAT GHALIB, AS MILITARY, WAS SELECTED BECAUSE HE WAS PLIABLE AND, UNDER WIRANTO'S GUIDANCE, WOULD PROTECT SUHARTO. (A CHARGE WE HAVE HEARD BEFORE.)

9. (C) NORTH SULAWESI: NORTH SULAWESI HAS SEVEN DPR SEATS IN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02615 02 OF 04 270517Z
THIS YEAR'S ELECTION. THE PROVINCE'S POPULATION IS 56 PER CENT

CHRISTIAN (ALMOST ALL PROTESTANT) AND 43 PER CENT MUSLIM. TWO NORTH SULAWESI [redacted] BELIEVED THAT PDI-PERJUANGAN WOULD LIKELY WIN MOST OF THE CHRISTIAN EAST, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS OF SANGIHE TALAUD, WHERE BARAMULI'S BROTHER WAS THE GOLKAR CANDIDATE, AND BITUNG CITY, WITH ITS MAYOR IN CONTROL OF POLITICS AND TILTING THE CITY TOWARD THE PKP. (WE WERE TOLD THAT THE MAYOR, WHO HAD NOT BEEN THE GOLKAR CANDIDATE, WAS ELECTED JUST AFTER SUHARTO FELL. THE GOVERNOR AND GOLKAR IN SOME DISARRAY AT THE TIME COULD NOT GET THEIR CANDIDATE IN.) GOLKAR WOULD TAKE THE WESTERN, ISLAMIC DISTRICTS, BUT THE TWO BELIEVED THAT PDI-PERJUANGAN WOULD COME IN A CLOSE SECOND. (NORTH SULAWESI'S ISLAMIC COMMUNITY IS EVENLY SPLIT BETWEEN NAHDLATUL ULAMA AND MUHAMMADIYAH.) NORTH SULAWESI [redacted] SUGGESTED THAT PPP, PAN, AND PKB WOULD DO WELL IN THE MUSLIM AREAS. [redacted] NOTED THAT A SMALL CHRISTIAN PARTY CALLED KRISNA EARLIER HAD MADE INROADS WITHIN NORTH SULAWESI'S CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY AT THE EXPENSE OF MEGAWATI, BUT ITS SUPPORT HAD DROPPED SINCE IT BECAME SUSPECTED THAT THE PARTY WAS A SUHARTO FABRICATION. (AS AN INDICATION OF KRISNA'S LACK OF BONA FIDES, [redacted] NOTED THAT ITS CHAIRMAN HAD BEEN A FUNCTIONARY INSTALLED IN SURYADI'S QUISLING PDI IN 1996 WHEN MEGAWATI WAS OUSTED FROM THE CHAIR.)

B1

B1

10. (C) ACCORDING TO BOTH [redacted] GOLKAR'S NORTH SULAWESI INFRASTRUCTURE HAD WEAKENED. ASIDE FROM THE PARTY'S LOSS OF CONTROL IN BITUNG, IT HAD SEEN MANY KEY GOLKAR LEADERS SWITCH TO OTHER PARTIES, ESPECIALLY THE PKP. THE DEFECTERS WERE NEEDED NOW MORE THAN EVER TO INFLUENCE LOCAL LEADERS AND ORGANIZE CADRES. [redacted] SAID GOLKAR'S LEADERSHIP WEAKENED WHEN NATIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02615 02 OF 04 270517Z

GOLKAR LEADERS AKBAR TANJUNG AND THEO SAMBUANGA IMPOSED A DPR ALLY AS NORTH SULAWESI GOLKAR CHAIRMAN IN AUGUST. THE GOVERNOR'S CANDIDATE LOST OUT. UNTIL THAT TIME, THE GOVERNOR AND A STRONG LOCAL LEADERSHIP HAD CONTROLLED THE PARTY. THE NEW CHAIRMAN DID NOT HAVE THE SAME STRONG TIES OF LOYALTY AND AUTHORITY WITH GOLKAR CADRES.

11. (C) [redacted] SPOKE OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HEAVILY PROMOTING GOLKAR. AS [redacted] HE HAD CLOSE CONTACTS WITH LOCAL VILLAGE HEADS (KADES). OVER RECENT WEEKS, HE HAD TALKED TO A NUMBER OF THEM IN MINAHASA DISTRICT AND WAS TOLD MOST HAD BEEN ORDERED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE SUB-DISTRICT CHIEFS (CAMATS) TO MOBILIZE THEIR VILLAGES FOR GOLKAR. ROUGHLY 70 PER CENT OF THE KADES HAD REJECTED THE OVERTURES, HE OBSERVED. HE THOUGHT THE SAME THING HAD BEEN GOING ON ACROSS THE PROVINCE. THE KADES' REACTION INDICATED A NEW FOUND DEFIANCE OF TRADITIONAL PRESSURE POLITICS, AS WELL AS A GRASSROOTS COMMITMENT TO REFORM

B1

IN NORTH SULAWESI. [redacted] DID NOT KNOW WHO HAD TOLD THE CAMATS TO PRESS THE KADES, BUT [redacted] LATER SAID THAT THE ORDERS HAD COME FROM THE BUPATIS, ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE SECWILDA (PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATOR). WHILE [redacted] DID NOT KNOW AUTHORITATIVELY, HE CONCLUDED THE SECWILDA WAS FOLLOWING THE WILL OF THE GOVERNOR. B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5786

PAGE 01 JAKART 02615 03 OF 04 270518Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W				

----------CDA30D 270518Z /38

R 270514Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7990
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 002615

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0089

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-26-09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: AROUND AND ABOUT SULAWESI

12. (C) ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN ASKED, [redacted] TOLD US THAT THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAD NOT DISCOVERED ANY INSTANCES OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TRYING TO PROMOTE CERTAIN POLITICAL PARTIES. [redacted] B1

[redacted]

13. (SBU) CENTRAL SULAWESI: WE GOT LITTLE INDICATION OF HOW THE PROVINCE'S FIVE DPR VOTES WILL GO. NGO CONTACTS SUGGESTED THAT GOLKAR COULD GET THREE AND PDI-PERJUANGAN TWO.

14. (SBU) SOUTHEAST SULAWESI: IN THE 1997 ELECTION, GOVERNOR LA ODE STEERED GOLKAR TO A 97 PER CENT WIN. HE IS CONSIDERED A LEADING CHAMPION OF GOLKAR THIS TIME AROUND. SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST SULAWESI IS BASED ON CLAN POLITICS. LA ODE HAS BEEN SHARPLY ACCUSED OF NEPOTISM BY HIS POLITICAL ADVERSARIES. WE ASSUME GOLKAR WILL AT LEAST DO AS WELL IF NOT BETTER HERE THAN IN CENTRAL SULAWESI.

15. (C) COMMENT: THUS, ON THE POLITICAL SCENE, DPR WINS WILL IN THE MAIN BE DECIDED BY NATIONAL POLITICS NOT ONLY IN SULAWESI BUT FOR ALL PROVINCES. YET, AS IS SEEN WITH AMBASSADOR LOPA IN SOUTH SULAWESI AND THE MAYOR OF BITUNG IN NORTH SULAWESI (ABOVE), THERE WILL BE CASES OF INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATES AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL THAT WILL LIKELY KEEP MANY VOTERS' EYES MORE TURNED TO LOCAL AFFAIRS THAN THE NATIONAL SCENE. (WE KNOW OF OTHERS IN EAST JAVA.) DEPENDING ON THE NATIONAL-WIDE NUMBER OF THE LOCALLY POPULAR CANDIDATES, THEY MAY HAVE A CONSIDERABLE IMPACT ON THE DPR RESULTS. THIS SAID, GOLKAR DID NOT APPEAR TO SWEEP SULAWESI AND OPPOSITION PARTIES WILL PROBABLY MAKE A REASONABLE SHOWING.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
---

16. (SBU) ALL FOUR PROVINCES, WHOSE ECONOMIES REST ALMOST TOTALLY ON EXPORT OF CASH CROPS AND NATURAL RESOURCES, HAVE EASILY WEATHERED THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, ALTHOUGH WITH SOME

DISRUPTIONS AND RESHUFFLING OF ECONOMIC BENEFICIARIES. (IN SOUTH SULAWESI FOR EXAMPLE, THE ECONOMY IN 1998 GREW JUST OVER 5 PERCENT, A DROP FROM 8 PERCENT THE YEAR BEFORE.) DEMAND AND PRICE FOR CHOCOLATE PRODUCTION ARE HIGH, WHILE CLOVES PRODUCTION, ESPECIALLY IN NORTH SULAWESI, IS BEGINNING TO RECOVER FROM THE SKEWED MONOPOLY WHICH WAS IMPOSED BY THE SUHARTO FAMILY AND ONLY COLLAPSED LAST YEAR. SINCE PRODUCTION OF CHOCOLATE, AS WELL AS OTHER EXPORT CROPS, LIKE NUTMEG AND COPRA, IS MAINLY IN THE HANDS OF SMALL INDIVIDUAL LANDHOLDERS, ECONOMIC PROFITS FROM THEIR EXPORT ARE ENJOYED BY A LARGE SECTION OF THE POPULATION.

SECURITY
---

17. (C) THE SECURITY SITUATION SEEMS REASONABLY TRANQUIL. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND MILITARY LEADERS, HEIGHTENED SECURITY CONCERNS THAT PROLIFERATED ACROSS NORTH AND CENTRAL SULAWESI EARLIER IN THE YEAR HAVE ABATED. IN NORTH SULAWESI AT THE TIME RUMORS OF VIOLENCE AND LEAFLETS SUGGESTING STRIFE WAS IMMINENT WERE COMMON, BUT [redacted] SAID B1
THE LEAFLETS SUDDENLY STOPPED. NORTH SULAWESI'S [redacted]
[redacted] STILL WORRIED OVER POSSIBLE INCIDENTS. B1
IN CENTRAL SULAWESI, [redacted]

[redacted] SAID THE ETHNIC PROBLEMS THAT AFFECTED THE PROVINCE'S LUWUK DISTRICT IN JANUARY HAD BEEN RESOLVED. IN SOUTH SULAWESI, THE SOCIAL TENSIONS THAT KILLED A SCORE OF PEOPLE IN THE PALOPO AREA HAD CALMED. THAT SAID, THE MILITARY REMAINED WARY OF POTENTIAL OUTBURSTS IN UJUNG PANDANG. ACCORDING TO THE [redacted] B1

[redacted] THE STUDENT B1
ATTACKS ON A FEW CHRISTIAN BUILDINGS IN REACTION TO THE BOMBING OF JAKARTA'S ISTIQLAL MOSQUE IN APRIL WERE SPONTANEOUS, AND NOT ORCHESTRATED BY OUTSIDE FORCES. IN SOUTHEAST SULAWESI, [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] COMMENTED THAT THE RETURN OF EMIGRES FROM AMBON HAD GIVEN NO CAUSE FOR ALARM. (NOTE: SOUTHEAST SULAWESI, WHILE ETHNICALLY DIVERSE, IS ALMOST ENTIRELY MUSLIM. [redacted] EMPHASIZED THE POSSIBILITY FOR B1
RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IS REMOTE.)

REFUGEES FROM AMBON

18. (SBU) SOUTH SULAWESI [redacted] SAID THAT SOME 7000 PEOPLE OF SOUTH SULAWESI ORIGIN HAD FLED AMBON BACK TO THEIR ANCESTRAL HOME AS THE RIOTING IN AMBON INTENSIFIED. ALREADY 60 PER CENT HAD GONE BACK TO AMBON, BUT THE REST WERE WAITING FOR FURTHER SIGNS OF RETURNING STABILITY. IN SOUTHEAST SULAWESI, HOWEVER, THE NUMBER OF BUTONESE WHO HAD SOUGHT REFUGE FROM AMBON WAS AS HIGH AS 50,000, THE [redacted] SAID. [redacted] B6
SAID THAT MOST HAD OPTED TO REMAIN IN SOUTHEAST SULAWESI, ALTHOUGH MANY HAD BEEN BORN IN AMBON. THE GOVERNMENT WAS IN THE MIDST OF CONSTRUCTING HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE TO ACCOMMODATE THEM. (NOTE: MOST OF THOSE WHO FLED TO SOUTH SULAWESI WERE MERCHANTS AND THUS HAVE AN IMPORTANT STAKE IN AMBON. THE BUTONESE FROM SOUTHEAST SULAWESI WERE BY AND LARGE LOWER ON THE ECONOMIC SCALE AND LEFT FEWER ASSETS IN AMBON. THEY THUS HAVE LESS INCENTIVE TO GO BACK.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5787

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W				

----------CDA310 270518Z /38

R 270514Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7991
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 002615

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0089

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-26-09
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: AROUND AND ABOUT SULAWESI

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
---

19. (SBU) THE ENVIRONMENT IS A PRIME TOPIC IN CENTRAL SULAWESI, ESPECIALLY THE FUTURE OF THE LORE LINDU NATIONAL PARK. ACCORDING TO ENVIRONMENTAL NGO'S AND PARK OFFICIALS, LORE LINDU, WHICH IS

217,000 HECTARES OF RAINFOREST, IS SURROUNDED BY 200,000 PEOPLE (SOME LIVE IN THE PARK ITSELF). THEY ARE PRESSING TO FARM CHOCOLATE ON PARKLAND. IN THE ERA OF REFORMATION AND GOVERNMENT DECENTRALIZATION, RESISTING THE PRESSURE WILL BE A MAJOR CHALLENGE. SEVERAL SOCIAL NGO'S ARE CAMPAIGNING TO GIVE VILLAGE PEOPLE MORE RIGHTS OVER LOCAL LANDS, WHICH OUR CONTACTS SAID WOULD ULTIMATELY BE AT THE PARK'S EXPENSE.

20. (C) THE ADB HAS PROVIDED A $30 MILLION LOAN TO STUDY HOW TO IMPROVE THE SOCIAL ECONOMIC WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITIES AROUND LORE LINDU, NAMELY TO STUDY HOW THEY CAN BE MORE INDEPENDENT OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICY IN RUNNING THEIR OWN ECONOMIES. THE PROJECT, AS ORIGINALLY SOUGHT BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, HAD THE MODEST AIM OF REDUCING SCHISTOSOMIASIS, BUT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY ENLARGED IN SCOPE AND COST THROUGH ADB EFFORTS. THE STUDY WILL LOOK AT COMMUNITIES AND AREAS WHERE ONE THIRD OF THE PEOPLE LIVE. IT WILL BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF CENTRAL SULAWESI'S REGIONAL PLANNING SECTION (BAPPEDA), WHICH IS RUMORED TO BE

[redacted] B1

ONE PARK CONTACT QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR THE ADB PROJECT AT ALL. ITS COST AVERAGES OUT TO ABOUT $400 FOR EVERY PERSON AFFECTED AND IT WILL BE ANOTHER BURDEN ADDED TO INDONESIA'S ALREADY LARGE FOREIGN DEBT.
PIERCE/ROY

E42

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0525

PAGE 01 JAKART 02609 01 OF 04 261138Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	IRM-02	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W		

----------CD3EF9 261204Z /38

P 261136Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7982
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002609

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PARTIES MANEUVER AGAINST THE STATUS QUO

REF: A) JAKARTA 2467; B) JAKARTA 2383

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02609 01 OF 04 261138Z
2. (C) SUMMARY: FOLLOWING THE RELEASE ON MAY 17 OF A COMMUNIQUE BY THE THREE MAIN PLURALIST OPPOSITION PARTIES - PKB, PAN, AND PDI-PERJUANGAN, PAN LEADER AMIEN RAIS SIGNED A SIMILAR STATEMENT WITH ISLAMIC PARTIES PPP AND JUSTICE ON MAY 21. THOUGH BOTH COMMUNIQUES TAKE AIM AT "STATUS QUO FORCES" OR GOLKAR, THEY WERE LARGELY UNCOORDINATED EXCEPT FOR RAIS' INVOLVEMENT. IN ATTEMPTING TO STRADDLE THE ISLAMIC AND PLURALIST CAMPS THAT COMPRISE HIS CONSTITUENCY, RAIS INADVERTENTLY RE-FOCUSSED ATTENTION ON HIS LONG STANDING RIVALRY WITH PKB PATRON GUS DUR, WHO REACTED HARSHLY IN PUBLIC TO THE SECOND COMMUNIQUE. THE MAY 17 STATEMENT HAD BEEN ONLY A FIRST STEP TOWARD A FUNCTIONING ALLIANCE BETWEEN PKB, PAN, AND PDI-PERJUANGAN, AND RAIS' DECISION TO ACCOMMODATE THE ISLAMIST SIDE OF HIS PARTY BY SIGNING THE SECOND COMMUNIQUE WITH MUSLIM PARTIES WAS A SETBACK TO THIS EFFORT. WE ARE TOLD, HOWEVER, THAT INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 26 MAY 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAY 2006 200503412

CONTINUE AMONG EXECUTIVES OF PKB, PDI-PERJUANGAN, AND PAN ABOUT HOW TO COOPERATE BEFORE AND AFTER THE ELECTION.

3. (C) SUMMARY CON'T: IT MAY SEEM ODD THAT ASCENDING POPULAR LEADERS FEEL COMPELLED TO ISSUE STATEMENTS AGAINST THE OLD STATUS QUO. IT REFLECTS CONCERN THAT EVEN A WEAK, DISCREDITED GOLKAR COULD ATTEMPT TO CLING TO POWER IF THE MAJOR OPPOSITION FIGURES DO NOT PRESENT A UNITED FRONT AFTER JUNE 7. ONE REASON IS THAT THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION WILL DETERMINE ONLY 66 PERCENT OF THE 700 MEMBER MPR THAT WILL CHOOSE A PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT LATER IN THE YEAR. IT IS FEARED THAT STATUS QUO FORCES LED BY GOLKAR COULD ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE REMAINING 34 PERCENT OF THE MPR SEATS, CREATING THE POSSIBILITY OF A DISTORTION OF THE POPULAR VOTE. END SUMMARY.

PAN, PPP AND JUSTICE SIGN JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON MAY 21

---

4. (U) THE LEADERS OF PAN (AMIEN RAIS), PPP (HAMZAH HAZ), AND THE JUSTICE PARTY (NUR MAHMUDI ISMAIL) SIGNED A JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON MAY 21 PROMISING TO FIGHT THE "STATUS QUO." THOUGH NOT PART OF THE DOCUMENT ITSELF, THEY ALSO INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD NOT SUPPORT HABIBIE'S NOMINATION FOR PRESIDENT. THIS FOLLOWED THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED EARLIER IN THE WEEK BY THE PLURALIST PAN, PKB, AND PDI-PERJUANGAN (REFTEL A), WHICH ALSO TOOK AIM AT THE STATUS QUO.

5. (U) THE MAY 21 COMMUNIQUE, AS REPORTED IN KOMPAS, EXPRESSED AGREEMENT IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

- COMMIT TO A DEMOCRATIC AND FAIR ELECTION WITHOUT VIOLENCE;
- HOLD THE MPR SESSION TO CHOOSE THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT NO MORE THAN THREE MONTHS AFTER THE RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTION ARE FINAL;
- CREATE A COALITION WITH REFORMIST POLITICAL FORCES;
- SEEK A NEW GOVERNMENT THAT IS LEGITIMATE, THAT PRACTICES GOOD GOVERNMENT, AND THAT IS COMMITED TO REFORM;
- OVERCOME OBSTACLES FROM ANTI-REFORM FORCES;
- ALL MEMBERS OF PAN, PPP, AND THE JUSTICE PARTY, AS WELL AS ALL REFORM FORCES, SHOULD MAKE THE ELECTION A SUCCESS.

A BIG COALITION OR TWO DIFFERENT CAMPS?

---

6. (C) THE COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BOTH GROUPS IS PAN AND OPPOSITION TO THE STATUS QUO, UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN GOLKAR AND HABIBIE. ALWI SHIHAB, A PKB VICE CHAIR, WAS PRESENT AT BOTH SIGNINGS, AND EMPHASIZED IN PUBLIC COMMENTS THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNIQUES AS WELL AS THE NEED FOR A LARGE

PAGE 04 JAKART 02609 01 OF 04 261138Z
GROUP OF OPPOSITION FORCES TO CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO. ONE INTERPRETATION IS THAT THEY WANT TO CREATE A PERCEPTION AMONG VOTERS THAT, UNLIKE IN THE PAST, THE STATUS QUO AND GOLKAR CAN BE DEFEATED. EQUALLY CRITICAL IS THE GOAL OF SENDING A WARNING TO THE WEB OF OFFICIALS AROUND THE COUNTRY THAT THE OPPOSITION CAN PREVAIL, AND IF THESE OFFICIALS WERE PLANNING ON HELPING GOLKAR WIN AS IN THE PAST, THEY HAD BETTER THINK TWICE.

7. (C) IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT A LARGER GROUPING, INCLUDING THESE FIVE PARTIES, COULD COME TOGETHER. THE PPP, THOUGH A CREATURE OF THE NEW ORDER, HAS BEEN PUSHING A STRONGLY REFORMIST LINE, AT LEAST SINCE THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR IN NOVEMBER 1998 WHEN IT FOUGHT UNSUCCESSFULLY TO ELIMINATE THE ARMED FORCES APPOINTED SEATS FROM THE PARLIAMENT. IN ADDITION, PPP GRASS ROOTS MEMBERS WORKED WITH MEGAWATI'S SUPPORTERS DURING THE 1997 ELECTION, FORMING THE "MEGA-BINTANG COALITION." THE JUSTICE PARTY ALSO PURPORTS TO HAVE A REFORMIST AGENDA.

8. (C) BUT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PLURALIST GROUP THAT INCLUDES MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN AND GUS DUR'S PKB, AND THE ISLAMIC GROUP THAT INCLUDES PPP AND THE JUSTICE PARTY, ARE FAR MORE STRIKING. THE JUSTICE PARTY IS SUPPORTED BY THE TYPE OF YOUNG MUSLIM ACTIVISTS WHOM MEGAWATI AND HER ALLIES WOULD REFER TO AS "FUNDAMENTALISTS." PPP AND PKB SUPPORTERS HAVE BEEN LITERALLY BATTLING FOR NU SUPPORT AT THE GRASS ROOTS LEVEL.

PAGE 01 JAKART 02609 02 OF 04 261138Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	IRM-02	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W		

----------CD3F00 261204Z /38

P 261136Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7983
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA

AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 002609

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PARTIES MANEUVER AGAINST THE STATUS QUO

9. (C) THE PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE PAN-PPP-JUSTICE PARTY COMMUNIQUE GIVES LITTLE INDICATION THAT THESE FIVE PARTIES ARE MOVING TOWARD ONE ANOTHER. INSTEAD, IT APPEARS THAT TWO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02609 02 OF 04 261138Z
SEPARATE GROUPS ARE FORMING UP, WITH RAIS IN THE MIDDLE TRYING TO STRADDLE THEM. THOUGH RAIS SAID PUBLICLY THAT GUS DUR HAD BEEN INFORMED THE NIGHT BEFORE ABOUT THE SECOND COMMUNIQUE, BOTH GUS DUR AND PKB GENERAL CHAIRMAN MATORI ABDUL DJALIL REACTED ANGRILY TO IT IN PUBLIC COMMENTS.

WHAT ARE THESE PARTIES TRYING TO ACHIEVE?
---

10. (C) MANY OF OUR CONTACTS HAVE BEEN ARGUING FOR MONTHS THAT THE MAJOR PARTIES WILL MAKE THEIR REAL COMMITMENTS AFTER THE JUNE 7 ELECTION WHEN THEY KNOW THEIR VOTE TOTAL AND WHAT THEY EACH BRING TO THE BARGAINING TABLE. REGARDING THE SECOND COMMUNIQUE, ONE PAN LEADER SAID IT WAS IN EFFECT FOR THE CAMPAIGN ONLY. RAIS REMARKED THAT THE THOUGH PAN, PPP, AND JUSTICE HAD DIFFERENT PLATFORMS, THE IMPORTANT ELEMENT WAS THAT THEY HAD AGREED TO BLOCK THE STATUS QUO. PDI-PERJUANGAN AND PKB EXECUTIVES EXPLAINED THAT THEIR COMMUNIQUE WAS A JOINT APPEAL, AND NOT AN AGREEMENT TO FORM A COALITION. [redacted] B1
[redacted] CONTENDED TO US THAT PKB DEFINITELY WANTED A COALITION WITH MEGAWATI, BUT THAT ENTHUSIASM AMONG THESE TWO PARTIES FOR RAIS REMAINED LESS CERTAIN. [redacted] SAID THAT IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER RAIS HAD CONTROL OVER THE MODERNIST MUSLIM CAMP IN HIS PARTY, AND THAT THIS MAKES THEM, ESPECIALLY PDI-PERJUANGAN, UNCOMFORTABLE.

11. (C) SINCE LAST OCTOBER AT THE PDI-PERJUANGAN CONGRESS IN BALI, THERE HAS BEEN A CONSENSUS, ACCEPTED EVEN BY MANY WITHIN THE STATUS QUO FORCES, THAT MEGAWATI IS THE FRONT RUNNER AND WILL LIKELY BE THE BIGGEST VOTE-GETTER. THE COMMON PERCEPTION, HOWEVER, IS THAT HER VICTORY WILL BE LIMITED TO A PLURALITY. BELOW PDI-P, THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE BIG FIVE WILL COMPETE FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02609 02 OF 04 261138Z
POSITION, BUT THERE ARE RADICALLY DIFFERENT ESTIMATIONS OF WHERE THEY WILL END UP. SOME BELIEVE THAT GOLKAR WILL FIND A WAY TO

WIN NEARLY AS MANY VOTES AS PDI-PERJUANGAN, WHILE OTHERS INSIST THAT GOLKAR WILL BE CRUSHED (KNOCKED BELOW 20 PERCENT). IT IS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE WITH ANY CERTAINTY THE RELATIVE OUTCOMES FOR PKB, PAN, AND PPP. ONE MAINSTREAM ANALYST, WITH CLOSE TIES TO GOLKAR AND THE MILITARY, ESTIMATED TO US AS THE CAMPAIGN OPENED THAT PDI-PERJUANGAN WOULD WIN WITH GOLKAR COMING IN A CLOSE SECOND. THE SECOND TIER, HE ARGUED, WOULD INCLUDE PPP AND PKB, THOUGH NEITHER WOULD TAKE MORE THAN 20 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, AND PAN WOULD FOLLOW WITH NO MORE THAN 10 PERCENT. THE ONLY OTHER PARTIES TO SECURE SEATS IN THE DPR, SAID THIS ANALYST, WOULD BE THE ISLAMIC PPP AND JUSTICE PARTIES, WINNING NO MORE THAN THREE PERCENT OF THE SEATS COMBINED.

12. (C) ALL PARTIES ARE OF COURSE FOCUSSED ON MAXIMIZING THEIR ABILITY TO ATTRACT VOTES IN THE RUN-UP TO JUNE 7. IN THIS REFORM ERA, NOBODY WANTS TO BE PERCEIVED AS BEING FOR THE UNPOPULAR STATUS QUO. WHEN MEGAWATI, GUS DUR, AND AMIEN RAIS MADE THEIR MOVE EARLY LAST WEEK, IT IMPLIED THAT ANYONE OUTSIDE OF THEIR CIRCLE, OR WHO HAD NOT MADE A SIMILAR DECLARATION, WAS AGAINST REFORM. THIS CREATED A STRONG MOTIVATION FOR OTHERS TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTION.

13. (C) PPP AND THE JUSTICE PARTY HAVE A SPECIAL PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO THE PERCEPTION THAT THEY ARE PART OF THE STATUS QUO. IT HAS BEEN WIDELY ASSUMED IN POLITICAL CIRCLES THAT THESE STRONGLY MUSLIM PARTIES, ALONG WITH THE ISLAMIC PBB, ARE LOGICAL ALLIANCE PARTNERS FOR HABIBIE AND AN ISLAMIC GOLKAR. PPP GENERAL CHAIRMAN HAMZAH HAZ HAS REPORTEDLY ADMITTED AS MUCH IN PRIVATE OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS (REFTEL B), AS DID [redacted] B1

[redacted]
WITH THE AMBASSADOR (SEPTEL). ONE OF OUR CONTACTS NOTED THAT HAMZAH HAZ SAID PUBLICLY THAT PPP WOULD NOT NOMINATE HABIBIE FOR THE PRESIDENCY, BUT LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBLITY THAT THE PARTY COULD SUPPORT HIM IN THE MPR. WHETHER THIS OPPOSITION TO HABIBIE ON THE PART OF THESE TWO ISLAMIC PARTIES HOLDS UP AFTER JUNE 7, WHEN THE POLITICAL DYNAMIC COULD SHIFT FROM MOBILIZING VOTERS TO INSIDER HORSE TRADING, REMAINS TO BE SEEN. PKB OFFICIAL [redacted] CONTENDED TO POLOFF THAT PPP WAS POSTURING, AND IN THE END WOULD SWING WITH THE COALITION THAT HAD THE BEST CHANCE FOR VICTORY. B1

14. (C) TO THE EXTENT THAT THE TWO COMMUNIQUES REPRESENT SEPARATE GROUPINGS OF POLITICAL FORCES, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT AMIEN RAIS IS TRYING TO APPEAL TO BOTH OF HIS POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES AND HEDGE HIS POLITICAL BETS. AS THE FORMER LEADER OF MUHAMMADIYAH, INDONESIA'S SECOND LARGEST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION, RAIS LOOKS TO MODERNIST MUSLIMS AS HIS PRINCIPAL

BASE OF SUPPORT. AT THE SAME TIME, HE HAS DELIBERATELY SOUGHT TO BROADEN HIS BASE AND BUILD A PLURALIST POLITICAL IMAGE THAT PLAYS ON HIS DESERVED REPUTATION AS A CRITIC OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND A REFORMIST. HIS PLURALIST PAN PARTY REFLECTS THIS DIVIDED POLITICAL BASE, CONTAINING BOTH MUHAMMADIYAH ADHERENTS AND THE BROADER COMMUNITY OF MINORITIES AND NGOS. SIGNING COMMUNIQUES LAST WEEK, FIRST WITH MEGAWATI AND GUS DUR,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7718

PAGE 01 JAKART 02609 03 OF 04 271118Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	IRM-02	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/014W		

----------CDC525 271118Z /22

P 261136Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7984
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 002609

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PARTIES MANEUVER AGAINST THE STATUS QUO

AND THEN WITH PPP AND THE JUSTICE PARTY, WAS AN ATTEMPT TO COVER HIMSELF WITH BOTH CAMPS. PRIOR TO THE MAY 21 COMMUNIQUE, A PAN OFFICIAL FROM THE MUHAMMADIYAH CAMP TOLD US THAT PPP AND JUSTICE COULD BE INCLUDED IN A LARGER COALITION WITH PAN, PKP, AND PDI-

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02609 03 OF 04 271118Z
PERJUANGAN. HE CLAIMED THAT THE SECULAR MEGAWATI AND THE HEAVILY ISLAMIC JUSTICE PARTY COULD LIVE UNDER ONE UMBRELLA. AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT, HOWEVER, A PAN OPERATIVE FROM THE NGO/MINORITY SIDE OF THE PARTY REMARKED TO US THAT "THE SECOND COMMUNIQUE KILLED US."

ACCOUNT FROM COMMUNIQUE ORGANIZER

15. (C) PKB [redacted] CONTENDED TO POLOFF ON MAY 26 B1
THAT ISLAMIC DIEHARDS WITHIN PAN, LIKE A.M. FATWA, PRESSURED RAIS TO SIGN THE SECOND COMMUNIQUE WITH ISLAMIC PARTIES. RAIS WAS "BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE," REALIZING THAT HE RISKED ALIENATING EITHER HIS MUSLIM CONSTITUENCY OR MEGAWATI AND GUS DUR. RAIS HAD SOUGHT TO ADD LANGUAGE MAKING CLEAR THAT THE SECOND DOCUMENT WAS AN EXTENSION OF THE FIRST COMMUNIQUE, WHICH THE MUSLIM PARTIES REJECTED BECAUSE THEY DID NOT WANT TO BE LINKED BACK TO THE SECULAR PARTIES OF GUS DUR AND MEGAWATI. GUS DUR HAD BEEN CONSULTED BY SHIHAB IN ADVANCE OF THE SECOND COMMUNIQUE, AND HE HAD ONLY GRUDGINGLY GONE ALONG. ONE OF HIS CONDITIONS WAS THAT PPP AND JUSTICE SIGN THEIR OWN DOCUMENT WITH PAN, AND NOT BE ADDED TO THE ONE ALREADY ISSUED BY PKB, PAN, AND PDI-PERJUANGAN.

16. (C) ACCORDING TO [redacted] PDI-PERJUANGAN BECAME UPSET WITH B1
GUS DUR AND AMIEN RAIS AFTER THE SECOND COMMUNIQUE WAS SIGNED, PERCEIVING THAT A BLOCK OF MUSLIM PARTIES WAS FORMING THAT WOULD LEAVE IT ISOLATED. THIS IN PART EXPLAINED GUS DUR'S HARSH PUBLIC REACTION (PARA. 8). DESPITE THIS SETBACK, [redacted] SAID THAT INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PAN, PKB, AND PDI-PERJUANGAN CONTINUED ABOUT HOW TO COOPERATE BEFORE AND AFTER THE ELECTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

WHOSE AFRAID OF THE STATUS QUO?

17. (C) THE OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES ARE OF COURSE TRYING TO WIN THE ELECTION, AND THEY RECOGNIZE THE DANGERS THEY FACE FROM THE STATUS QUO, REPRESENTED BY GOLKAR, IF THEY FAIL TO BUILD MOMENTUM TOWARD A UNITED FRONT. THE DIFFICULTY IN MAKING COMMITMENTS NOW IS THAT THE MAIN LEADERS, SUCH AS AMIEN RAIS, MEGAWATI, AND GUS DUR, EACH HAVE THEIR OWN PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS, MAKING IT PROBLEMATIC TO AGREE TO SPECIFICS BEFORE THE ELECTION RESULTS ROLL IN. AS THE PKB, PAN, PDI-PERJUANGAN COMMUNIQUE WAS IN THE WORKS, WE LEARNED FROM AN NU OFFICIAL THAT GUS DUR HAS GONE AS FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT THE THREE SHOULD AGREE THAT NO POLITICAL PARTY LEADER WOULD BECOME PRESIDENT (MEANING RAIS OR MEGAWATI. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, THIS WAS NOT AGREED TO.). MOREOVER, THEIR CONSTITUENCIES, AS WOULD BE EXPECTED, CREATE SEPARATE PRESSURES. FOR EXAMPLE, THOUGH GUS DUR HAS A CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH MEGAWATI AND HAS ER AS PRESIDENT, MANY OF THE INFLUENTIAL MUSLIM
KIAI WITHIN NU HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT SUPPORTING A WOMAN FOR PRESIDENT.

18. (C) MOST REFORM-MINDED ANALYSTS VIEW GOLKAR AS A DISCREDITED

FORCE ENJOYING LITTLE, IF ANY, REAL SUPPORT AMONG THE MASSES. MANY FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT GOLKAR CAN FIND A WAY - ESPECIALLY OFF JAVA -- TO USE ITS RESIDUAL INCUMBENT ADVANTAGES OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, COUPLED WITH FINANCIAL CORRUPTION AND AN INFORMAL WEB OF INFLUENTIAL OFFICIALS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, TO EKE OUT A LARGER PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE THAN IT DESERVES, ALLOWING IT TO REMAIN AT THE BARGAINING TABLE AFTER JUNE 7. AFTER THE MAY 17 COMMUNIQUE WAS ISSUED, MUHAMMAD HIKAM, AN ANALYST FROM THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED THINK TANK LIPI, ARGUED

PUBLICLY THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO FORM A FRONT TO DEFEAT GOLKAR AS THE PARTY WAS STILL RELYING ON MONEY POLITICS AND THE INFLUENCE OF OFFICIALS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL TO INFLUENCE VOTERS. THESE FEARS ARE EXACERBATED BY THE SKEWED DIVISION OF DPR SEATS BETWEEN REGIONS. JAVA AND BALI, WITH ALMOST 60 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION, WILL OBTAIN JUST 52.5 PERCENT OF THE SEATS. IN CONTRAST, THE OUTER ISLANDS, WITH 40 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION, WILL BE AWARDED 47.5 PERCENT OF THE SEATS.

19. (C) IN ADDITION, THERE ARE CONCERNS THAT GOLKAR COULD CAPTURE A DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF THE 238 MEMBERS OF THE MPR WHO WILL NOT BE ELECTED ON JUNE 7, CREATING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE POPULAR VOTE COULD BE DISTORTED. THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION WILL ONLY DECIDE 66 PERCENT (462) OF THE MPR'S 700 MEMBERS. THE REMAINING 34 PERCENT IS COMPRISED OF 38 UNELECTED ABRI MEMBERS (5.4 PERCENT), 65 SOCIETAL REPRESENTATIVES (9.2 PERCENT), AND 135 REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES (19.2 PERCENT). EACH OF INDONESIA'S 27 PROVINCES WILL ELECT 5 REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES. JAVA AND BALI, WHERE IN GENERAL TERMS THE OPPOSITION IS THOUGHT TO BE STRONGEST, MAKE UP JUST SIX PROVINCES AND WILL RECEIVE ONLY 30 SEATS FROM THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES, WHILE THE OUTER ISLANDS, WHERE GOLKAR IS THOUGHT TO HAVE A BETTER CHANCE, WILL ELECT 105 OF THE SEATS. IN ADDITION, THE ARMED FORCES WILL BE GIVEN 10 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN EACH PROVISIONAL LEGISLATURE. THE SELECTION OF THE

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	IRM-02	SVC-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00

DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /014W
----------CDC4CC 271115Z /22

P 261136Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7985
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 002609

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PARTIES MANEUVER AGAINST THE STATUS QUO

REPRESENTATIVES OF SOCIETY WILL BE HANDLED BY THE ELECTION COMMISSION, BUT MANY FEAR THAT THE GROUPS FROM WHICH THESE DELEGATES WILL BE CHOSEN HAVE NOT CHANGED SINCE THE NEW ORDER, AND THAT MANY THE STATUS QUO. FINALRCES HAVE PROMISED NEUT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02609 04 OF 04 271115Z
THEY WILL PLAY A ROLE (###)PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THE OR POLITICAL GROUPING,(#####)
OF THE PARLIAMENTAR@HE MPR
OUTRIGHT (351 ABOUT THE 238 MPR MEMBENE 7. ROY

NOTE: (####)OMISSION IN TEXT. CORRECTION WILL FOLLOW.

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E44

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4477

PAGE 01 JAKART 02467 01 OF 02 181132Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	IRM-03	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/015W		

----------C9C388 181200Z /38

P 181132Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7834
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002467

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: MAJOR OPPOSITION LEADERS (SORT OF) GETTING TOGETHER

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02467 01 OF 02 181132Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS EDMUND MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE THREE MAIN OPPOSITION LEADERS -- ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (GUS DUR), MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, AND QMIEN RAIS - ARE AGAIN ENGAGED IN A SOMEWHAT CNFUSING DANCE. GUS DUR AND RAIS MET LATE ON MAY 17 AND ISSUED A STATEMENT OF JOINT AGREEMENT. MEGWATI WAS EXPECTED TO ATTEND BUT DID NOT ONE OF HER CLOSE ADVISORS TOLD USE THAT SHEHAD NOT SIGNED THE STATEMENT, THOUGH SHE "AGRQED WITH ITS SUBSTANCE." IN THE STATEMENT, THE LEADERS DECLARED THEMSELVES UNIFIED IN CARRYINGOUT REFORM AND CHALLENGING THE FORCES OF THE STATUS QUO. THE EXPRESSED FULL SUPPORT FOR AN HONEST, FAIR AND NON-VIOLENT GENERAL ELECTION THEY CALLED ON ALL GROUPS IN INDONESIA TO BEAVE RESPONSIBLY DURING THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTQON. THEY URGED THAT THE MPR SESSION TO CHOOSE A NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT BE HELD SOONER AFTER THE GENERAL ELECTION THAN IS NOW ATICIPATED. END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 18 MAY 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAY 2006 200503412

SUMMARY.

GUS DUR AND AMIEN RAIS MEET AND ISSUE STATEMENT OF JOINT

AGREEMENT
---

3. (U) LOCAL MEDI WIDELY ANTICIPATED AND REPORTED A MEETING BEQWEEN OPPOSITION LEADERS AMIEN RAIS AND ABDURRAH AN WAHID
LATE ON THE EVENING OF MAY 17, AT WHICH THEY ISSUED A STATEMENT OF JOINT COOPERATIO. IT TOOK PLACE AT THE HOME OF PKB OFFICIAL AND GUS DUR ALLY ALWI SHIHAB, THOUGH THERE HAD BEEN RUMORS THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE HELD AT MEGAWATI
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02467 01 OF 02 181132Z
SOEKARNOPUTRI'S RESIDENCE. THE TWO LEADERS ISSUED A STATEMENT FOLLOWING THE MEETING. THOUGH IT WAS WIDELY ANTICIPATED THAT MEGAWATI WOULD BE PART OF THE MEETING, SHE DID NOT ATTEND. (AT A MASSIVE BOOK LAUNCH HOSTED BY PDI-P THAT NIGHT SHE CONFIDED TO US THAT SHE WAS "EXHAUSTED.")

4. (C) DESPITE PRESS REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY, ONE OF MEGAWATI'S SENIOR ADVISORS TOLD POLOFF THAT SHE HAD NOT SIGNED THE STATEMENT. MEGAWATI "AGREED WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE STATEMENT" AND WAS RELYING ON HER FRIEND ABDURRAHMAN WAHID FOR FOLLOW-UP. (IN A CONFLICTING REPORT THAT WE PICKED UP, A WESTERN JOURNALIST HAD HEARD FRM A SOURCE WITHIN THE GUS DUR CAMP THAT SHE HQD SIGNED THE STATEMENT THIS MORNING.)

5. (C) GUS DUR APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE DRIVING FORC BEHIND THE ATTEMPT TO BRING THE THREE TOGETHQR. LAST WEEK (MAY 13), [redacted] TO GUS DUR, TOLD POLOFF THAT B1
THE CONTINUING EFFORTS TO DO SO -- THAT HAD BEEN ONGING AT THE WORKING LEVEL WITHIN EACH OF THQ THREE ORGANIZATIONS - WERE INTENSIFYING. THQ DAY BEFORE, MAY 12, GUS DUR HAD HELD A PRODUCTIVE MEETING WITH PAN SECRETARY GENERAL FAISAL BSRI, AND THE NEXT STEP, SAID [redacted] WOULD BE O BRING ALL THREE LEADERS TOGETHER.

6. (U) KOMPAS REPORTED THE JOIN STATEMENT ON MAY 18 AS FOLLOWS (EXCERPTS FROM UNOFFICIAL EMBASSY TANSLATION):
BEGIN TEXT. IN THE TRANSITION TOWQRD DEMOCRACY, THIS GENERAL ELECTION IS A CRUCQAL STAGE IN BEGINNING A NEW CHAPTER IN REALIZING A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM AND IN PRODUING A GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE TO THE PEOPLE.
QWE THE UNDERSIGNED COME FROM DIFFERENT POLITICAL FORCES AND
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02467 01 OF 02 181132Z
HAVE DIFFERENT POLITICAL OUTLOOKS, BUT WE AFFIRM OUR TOGETHERNESS AND AGREEMENT OF VIEWS AS FOLLOWS:

ONE: WE REMIND THE ENTIRE INDONESIAN NATION THAT THE PROCESS OF REFORM IS NOT OVER YET. THE STATUS QUO FORCES THAT REFUSE TO SEE REFORM SILL SEEK TO STOP US. WE MUST NO LONGER WASTE TIME AND LET THE FORCES IN QUESTION PLAY FOR TIME IN PURSUING THE NARROW-MINDED INTERESTS OF THEIR PARTIES AND GROUPS. THEREFORE, WE DECLARE THAT WE ARE UNITED IN CARRYING OUT REFORM AND STOPPING ANTI-REFORM FORCES. WE ALSO INVITE THE ENTIRE NATION TO CONTINUE JOINTLY REFORMING THE LIFE OF THE NATION AND THE STATE. ALL THE COMPONENTS OF THE NATION SHOULD TOGETHER CREATE A NEW, DEMOCRATIC INDONESIA BASED ON THE PEOPLE'S SOVEREIGNTY, GUARANTEEING POLITICAL FREEDOM, PRIORITIZING LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY AND ENSURING THAT EVERY CITIZEN IN NOT DISCRIMINATED AGAINST.

TWO: WE ARE DETERMINE TO HOLD A GENERAL ELECTION AND ARE FULLY READY TO PLAY A ROLE IN A DEMOCRATIC, HONEST, FAIR AND NON-VIOLENT GENERAL ELECTION. IN THIS WAY, THE GENERAL ELECTION CAN PRODUCE A LEGITIMATE AND RESPECTED GOVERNMENT IN THE EYES OF THE VOTING PEOPLE AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY. WE ARE READY TO ACCEPT THE OUTCOME OF A DEMOCRATIC GENERAL ELECTION.

THREE: WE REALIZE THAT SUCH A GENERAL ELECTION CONSTITUTES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND REFORM SUPPORTERS. THEREFORE, WE APPEAL TO ALL PEOPLE TO TOGETHER WITH US BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL, ORDERLY, HONEST, JUST AND NON-VIOLENT GENERAL ELECTION. WE DIRECT THIS PLEA TO ALL PARTY ACTIVISTS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 JAKART 02467 01 OF 02 181132Z

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4405

PAGE 01 JAKART 02467 02 OF 02 181132Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W			

----------C9C265 181151Z /38

P 181132Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7835
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 002467

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/09

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: MAJOR OPPOSITION LEADERS (SORT OF) GETTING TOGETHER

AND TO OUR SUPPORTERS, AS WELL AS TO THE RANK AND FILE OF THE BUREAUCRACY AND TO THE SECURITY FORCES AT ALL LEVELS, AS WELL

AS TO ALL OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE.

FOUR: WE BELIEVE THAT THE 1999 GENERAL ELECTION WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN A GOOD MANNER, SO THAT A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT CAN BE CREATED THROUGH DEMOCRATIC MEANS SOON AFTER THE RESULTS OF THE GENERA ELECTION ARE RATIFIED. THEREFORE, WE URGE HAT THE INAUGURATION OF MEMBERS OF THE PARLIA
ENT (DPR) AND
PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) AND THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT BE CARRIED OUT THREE MONTHS FOLLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE GENERAL ELECTION. WE ARE FULLY PREPARED TO MAKE THIS HAPPEN.
FIVE: BY THE GRACE OF GOD, WE ARE RESOLVED TO ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF THE ENTIRE NATION TO CONTINUE THE REFORM MOVEMENT, TO RESIST THE STATUS QUO, TO WIN THE GENERAL ELECTION, AND TO FORM A NEW AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. END TEXT.
COMMENT

7. (C) THE JOINT STATEMENT IS A STRONG EXPRESSION OF COMMON PURPOSE BY REFORM PARTIES AGAINST THE STATUS QUO. ITS LEVEL OF GENERALITY, HOWEVER, DOES NOT INDICATE WHAT THE LEADERS HAVE ACTUALLY AGREED TO IN OPERATIONAL TERMS, AND WILL HAVE TO BE FLESHED OUT. ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2155

PAGE 01 JAKART 02179 01 OF 04 301044Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-07	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W			

----------C29E99 301044Z /38

R 301042Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7540
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002179

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0075

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-29-07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: A PIECE OF THE ELECTION PUZZLE: FLORES

REF: JAKARTA 1431

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PO WILLIAM A PIERCE. REASON 1.5 (D)
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02179 01 OF 04 301044Z

2. (C) SUMMARY: A FOUR-DAY TRIP TO FLORES, THE WESTERN-MOST ISLAND IN NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR PROVINCE (NTT), PROVIDED TDY POLOFF WITH A STARKLY ALTERNATIVE VIEW TO INDONESIA'S POLITICAL HOTHOUSE, JAKARTA, OR EVEN ITS OTHER MAJOR CITY, SURABAYA, WHERE MANY INFORMANTS PROVIDED SOPHISTICATED SCENARIOS AND THOUGHTFUL PREDICTIONS ON THE OUTCOME OF THE JUNE 7 ELECTION. IN FLORES, THE SENSE IS OF A FORGOTTEN, RURAL PORTION OF INDONESIA, SEPARATED BY THE OVERWHELMING AURA OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND CHARACTERIZED BY A LACK OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE FATALISM OF FARMERS AND FISHERMEN, WHO HAVE HAD LITTLE-TO-NO POLITICAL EDUCATION. THE ECONOMY HAS SEEN SOME SHORT-RUN GAINS FROM THE MONETARY CRISIS IN COMMODITY PRICES FROM LOCALLY PRODUCED EXPORT CROPS. YET,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 30 APR 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAY 2006 200503412

THE MAIN BENEFICIARIES ARE PERCEIVED TO BE THE CHINESE TRADING CLASS, ESPECIALLY AS THE PRICE OF RICE CONTINUES TO CLIMB. SINCE THE EARLY NINETIES FLORES WAS CONSIDERED A SOLID GOLKAR BASTION, BUT NOT ANY MORE, DESPITE ABUSIVE TACTICS. LOCAL RESIDENTS NOTED TIES TO EAST TIMOR. END SUMMARY.

THE SETTING

3.(C) POLOFF ARRIVED AT MAUMERE, A NORTHERN COASTAL SEAPORT TOWN OF ABOUT 70,000 AND CAPITAL OF NTT'S SIKKA DISTRICT. IT HAS THE MAIN, MOST RELIABLE AIRPORT ON THE ISLAND. SINCE THE MONETARY CRISIS, OTHER FLORES AIRPORTS ARE EITHER CLOSED OR THE FLIGHTS TO THEM SO UNRELIABLE THEY MAY AS WELL BE. MAUMERE IS FAIRLY NONDESCRIPT, STILL NOT FULLY RECOVERED FROM THE TRIPLE WHAMMY OF A DECEMBER 1992 EARTHQUAKE, SUBSEQUENT TSUNAMI, AND A CYCLONE A MONTH LATER

WHICH REPORTEDLY KILLED ABOUT 3000 PEOPLE AND LEVELLED MOST OF THE BUILDINGS ALONG THE TOWN'S WATERFRONT AND MANY INLAND BUILDINGS AS WELL. THE CATHOLIC CHURCHES WERE ALL DAMAGED, EVEN UP INTO THE HILLS RISING ABOVE THE TOWN WHERE, 19 KMS AWAY, THE SEMINARY OF LADALERO IS STILL BEING REBUILT WITH DONATIONS. MOST GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS HAVE BEEN REBUILT, BUT THE COMMERCIAL STRIP ALONG THE SEAFRONT IS SHODDY, THE MUSLIM QUARTER UNKEMPT. THE DOCK SEEMED LOST IN IDLENESS, WITH A FEW PRAUS AND A SMALL FISH MARKET NEARBY, BUT ON THE DAY POLOFF LEFT, A LARGER SHIP FROM UJUNG PANDANG DOCKED, BRINGING CEMENT AND RICE.

4. (C) POLOFF ALSO VISITED LARANTUKA, THE CAPITAL OF EAST FLORES DISTRICT, A FOUR HOUR DRIVE EAST THROUGH TROPICAL RAINFOREST AND HAIRPIN CURVES TO THE TIP OF FLORES. ANOTHER PORT TOWN IT SERVES AS JUMPING OFF POINT FOR THREE SMALLER ISLANDS HISTORICALLY AND CULTURALLY SIMILAR TO FLORES. AS ELSEWHERE ON FLORES, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH HOLDS VISIBLE SWAY IN THE EAST FLORES DISTRICT, WITH LARGE LAND HOLDINGS AS WELL AS A CATHEDRAL SITUATED IN THE CENTER OF LARANTUKA, AND ANOTHER SEMINARY ON ADJACENT LEMBATA ISLAND. LARANTUKA BACKS UP AGAINST THE ILI MANDIRI VOLCANO, ITS POPULATION (PERHAPS 30,000) IS A FASCINATING MIX OF PORTUGUESE, MELANESIAN, SOME MALAY, AND THE INEVITABLE BUGINESE--AN ANTHROPOLOGIST'S DELIGHT. [redacted] B1

[redacted] NOTED THAT THE INDIAN INFLUENCE STILL LINGERS AS WELL IN THE VISAGE OF SOME AND IN THE USE OF AN ELEPHANT'S TUSK AS A BRIDE PRICE IN SOME COASTAL VILLAGES. ONE IS IMMEDIATELY STRUCK IN FLORES BY THE DIRECTNESS OF PEOPLE, A MORE FORTHCOMING

WILLINGNESS TO EXPRESS OPINIONS TO A STRANGER, UNLIKE IN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02179 01 OF 04 301044Z
JAVA.

WHAT'S ON THEIR MIND

5. (C) POLOFF ASSUMED THAT THE FLORES POPULATION, WHICH VOTED 99 PERCENT FOR GOLKAR IN 1997, PROBABLY WOULD PRODUCE A LARGE GOLKAR MAJORITY IN 1999 DUE TO SEVERAL FACTORS: GOLKAR'S INFRASTRUCTURAL ADVANTAGE; THE CHINESE TRADING CLASS'S COLLUSION WITH GOVERNMENT AND WITH GOLKAR FOR SMALL ADVANTAGES; THE CATHOLIC CHURCH'S REPORTED AVERSION TO CROSSING GOVERNMENT POLICY OR WISHES; AND THE LACK OF TIME FOR ANY REFORMASI SPIRIT TO PENETRATE THE OUTBACK AND ORGANIZE. MOST OF THESE ASSUMPTIONS, HOWEVER, DID NOT STAND UP, BASED ON POLOFF'S CONTACTS. THOSE INTERVIEWED IN

[redacted] B1

[redacted] POLOFF ALSO TALKED WITH MANY PEOPLE IN THE STREET AND HAD CHANCE ENCOUNTERS WITH HOTEL EMPLOYEES, RESTAURANT WORKERS, SOCCER PLAYERS, A PRIEST ON THE STREET, MUSLIM VILLAGE FISHERMEN, A LAWYER AND A SOCIAL WELFARE WORKER ON AIRFLIGHTS, AND TWO TEACHERS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2177

PAGE 01 JAKART 02179 02 OF 04 301052Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-07	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W			

----------C29F1D 301052Z /38

R 301042Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7541
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 002179

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0075

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-29-07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: A PIECE OF THE ELECTION PUZZLE: FLORES

6. (C) THOSE INTERVIEWED AT LENGTH WOULD NOT GO SO FAR AS TO PREDICT THAT A SEA CHANGE IN FLORES SOCIETY WAS TAKING PLACE, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE FACTORS WORKING AGAINST

RAPID MOVEMENT OF ANY KIND IN A POOR SOCIETY USED TO AUTHORITARIAN PRONOUNCEMENTS. ("WE HAVE A LORDS AND SLAVES' MENTALITY," SAID [redacted] WHO SAID HE WAS HOPING TO WATCH A "SMALL EXERCISE IN DEMOCRACY.") EXPECTATIONS AMONG THOSE WHO COULD BE CLASSED AS REFORMASI WERE SMALL AND TENTATIVE. NONETHELESS, THE COMMON THEMES EMERGED ACROSS A RANGE OF CONTACTS, FROM THOSE WHO WERE VERY LITERATE TO THOSE UNABLE TO READ AND WRITE. FIRST, THEY INDICATED THEY WOULD VOTE IF GIVEN THE CHANCE, AND THEY WOULD CHOOSE MEGAWATI'S PDI-P PARTY. MOREOVER, MANY THOUGHT THAT GOLKAR HAD BETRAYED THE PEOPLE WITH FALSE PROMISES ABOUT THE ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT, AND, WITHOUT SOEHARTO AND THE ARMY BEHIND IT, WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO FORCE PEOPLE TO VOTE FOR IT, EVEN IF IT DISPENSED MONEY AROUND. LASTLY, THEY ALL SHOWED SOME DEGREE OF CONFUSION ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF DIRECTION AND PRESENTATION ON THE ELECTION, WITH THE RESULT THAT PEOPLE WERE LITTLE PREPARED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PARTIES. HENCE, A LARGELY NEGATIVE VOTE WAS SEEN AS FORMING, NOT NECESSARILY WITH ANY SPECIFIC AIMS, BUT ONE THAT COULD EASILY BE DERAILED BY SOME EFFECTIVE GOLKAR WORK IN THE HUSTINGS. FLORES WILL ACCOUNT FOR FIVE SEATS IN THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR), BASED ON ITS FIVE DISTRICTS.

B1

GETTING OUT THE WORD

7. (C) OBVIOUSLY THE FLORES' CATHOLIC CHURCH IS CONCERNED OVER THIS DRIFT IN THE ELECTION PROCESS. WHETHER ON ITS OWN OR BECAUSE OF A FIELD GUIDANCE PAMPHLET DISTRIBUTED TO PRIESTS TO CALL ON THE PEOPLE TO MAKE A FREE CHOICE IN THE ELECTIONS, THE CHURCH IS TRYING TO PROMOTE ITS OWN APPROACH

TO VOTER EDUCATION TO INFORM PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE NEW ELECTION LAWS. SEVERAL PRIESTS CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT FOR NOT PUBLICIZING THE LAWS IN A LANGUAGE VILLAGERS COULD COMPREHEND, AND CLAIMED THAT THEY AND THEIR SEMINARIANS WERE ACTIVELY GETTING DOWN TO VILLAGERS WITH THE MESSAGE OF FREE CHOICE. WEEKLY SEMINARS ON POLITICAL EDUCATION ARE MANDATORY AT LEDALERO, FOR INSTANCE. [redacted] SAID, "THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS COMPLETELY B1
CORRUPT IN INDONESIA. UNLIKE THE POST-MARCOS PERIOD IN THE PHILIPPINES, WE HAVE NO LAW TO FALL BACK UPON. WE TRY TO CONTACT ANY GROUP WE CAN. THIS TRANSCENDS CHRISTIANITY, WE WORK WITH MUSLIM LEADERS AS WELL. PEOPLE STILL BELIEVE IN RELIGIOUS LEADERS, SO IT SHOULD BE EFFECTIVE. BUT THERE IS SO LITTLE TIME. HOWEVER, CRISIS IS THE BEST POLITICAL EDUCATION, ISN'T IT? EVEN IN VILLAGES, THEY CAN LISTEN." HE DID NOT MENTION MEGAWATI OR ANY PARTY BY NAME, BUT DID SAY THAT THE IDEA OF A STRICTLY CATHOLIC OR CHRISTIAN PARTY WAS NOT PRODUCTIVE. AS A MINORITY, CHRISTIANS WOULD DO BETTER NOT TO WASTE VOTES BUT TO CAST THEM FOR SOMEONE WHO "REPRESENTS THE MASSES", A NOT-SO-SUBTLE REFERENCE TO MEGAWATI. ANOTHER PRIEST/[redacted] SAID BLUNTLY, "I HAVE MET B1
MEGAWATI THREE TIMES. I DON'T LIKE HER, BUT AS AN ICON, SHE IS GOOD FOR A TRANSITION."

8 (C) MONITORING THE ELECTION WILL BE A PROBLEM IN REMOTE FLORES, WHICH HAS NO UNIVERSITY TO TAP. SEMINARY STUDENTS AND EVEN HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS WILL BE COMMANDEERED. THE CHURCH HAS SENT EMISSARIES TO KUPANG, NTT'S PROVINCIAL CAPITAL IN WEST TIMOR, TO REQUEST SOME UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. ON LEMBATA, HOWEVER, [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02179 02 OF 04 301052Z
EXPLAINED THAT AS LATE AS APRIL 20, REGISTRATION HAD NOT EVEN BEGUN; NO FORMS HAD BEEN SHIPPED IN. IN THE VILLAGES PEOPLE WERE JUST STARTING TO GET THEIR KARTU PENDUDUK, THE ACTUAL PROOF OF RESIDENCE, RENEWED, SINCE ALL OF THEM HAD LAPSED IN 1997.

9. (C) THE NGO COMMUNITY IS NEW IN FLORES, ALTHOUGH CATHOLIC YAYASANS OR FOUNDATIONS HAVE FOR YEARS BEEN INVOLVED IN SOCIAL WORK SUCH AS MOTHER AND SMALL CHILD CLINICS, OR, IN ONE CASE, SETTING UP A BEACH HOTEL 14 YEARS AGO TO USE TOURISM DOLLARS FOR FIVE ORPHANAGES. SANRES (A LOCAL COALITION OF NINE NGOS) CLAIMS THAT SINCE MAY 1998 OVER 45 NEW NGOS HAVE BEEN FORMED IN NTT, ONLY FOUR OF WHICH ARE STRICT POLITICAL ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS. MANY ARE DESIGNED TO TAP INTO MONEY FROM GROUPS LIKE OXFAM, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND,

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, AS WELL AS THE MORE POLITICAL PACT, IRI, NDI, AND ALL PURPOSE FUNDS SUCH AS ASIA FOUNDATION.

B1

NT-00
IE-00
S-00
-00
R-00
00

HE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02179 03 OF 04 301044Z
CONFIDES THAT HE ISON THE [redacted] FOR
REPRESENTAIVE TO NTT'S PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY, IN KUPANG.
HIS ASPIRATIONS AND THOSE OF ONE OTHER, FROM THE PDKB, WERE

THE ONLY EVIDENCE POLOFF GOT THAT PEOPLE WERE ACTIVELY ORGANIZING AND PLANNING FOR NTT PARLIAMENTARY SEATS. PARTIES MUST COMPLETE THEIR LISTS BY MAY 4.

[redacted] B1

HE EXPLAINED THAT HE AND OTHERS DECIDED TO JOIN THE CATHOLIC/PROTESTANT PARTY DECLARED IN AUGUST 1998. IT WAS A "NEW BABY" CONSISTING OF MOSTLY RETIRED PROFESSIONALS WHO WERE SPENDING THEIR OWN MONEY TO GET OUT THE WORD OF KASIH (LOVE) IN A VERY TROUBLED AND VIOLENT INDONESIA. HE ADMITTED THEY HAD VERY LITTLE APPEAL TO YOUTH WHO WANTED BIG PARADES AND RACES, BUT HE HOPED TO FIND MEMBERS IN THE SEMINARIES, NUNNERIES, CHURCH AND LEGAL SOCIETIES. HE WAS CERTAIN THAT THE PDI-P WOULD WIN OVER GOLKAR AT LEAST IN EAST FLORES REGENCY.

GOLKAR'S TRICKS

11. (C) IT SEEMED A COMMON CONCLUSION THAT NO MATTER HOW WIDESPREAD THE POPULARITY OF THE PDI-P MAY BE IN FLORES, GOLKAR STILL HAS CLOUT AND IS USING IT. THIS THEME WAS ECHOED BY MANY WHO, EVEN AS THEY SPOKE, VOLUNTEERED THAT THEY SUPPORTED PDI-P AND THAT IT WAS VERY STRONG. [redacted]

[redacted] B1

HE WOULD GLADLY VOTE FOR MEGAWATI AND A NEW NATIONALIST PARTY THAT RESPECTS CATHOLICS BUT HE WAS AFRAID TO DITCH GOLKAR. HE WAS WORRIED THAT HIS VOTE WOULD BE DETECTED IN THE LURAH WHERE HE LIVES AND WOULD THEREFORE LIKELY VOTE GOLKAR. HE DID NOT WANT TO LOSE HIS JOB, OR THE EXTRA INCOME HIS WIFE RECEIVES, OR THEIR GOVERNMENT-SUPPLIED CAR, OR THE LAND THEY HAVE RECEIVED TO KEEP UPON RETIREMENT. "GOLKAR SAYS IT HAS A NEW PARADIGM, BUT IT IS THE SAME OLD WAY, NOTHING HAS GOTTEN BETTER," HE SAID, HINTING THAT THERE WAS PRESSURE AT HIS DEPARTMENT.

12. (C) TALES OF GOLKAR'S TRICKS IN FLORES AND ADJACENT ISLANDS MIRROR THOSE FROM OTHER PROVINCES IN INDONESIA, ESPECIALLY ONES FAR FROM THE CENTER STAGE ON JAVA. FOR YEARS, POLOFF WAS TOLD, GOLKAR USED THE EFFICIENT METHOD OF HANDING THE VILLAGE CHIEF THE BALLOTS AND HAVING HIM TELL THE VILLAGE THAT HE WAS CASTING THEIR VOTE FOR GOLKAR. AN [redacted] THE PEOPLE B1

DID NOT GO TO VOTE ON ELECTION DAY, NOR WERE THEY AWARE IT WAS HAPPENING. SEVERAL TEACHERS TOLD POLOFF THEY HAD VOTED FOR THE PDI IN THE 1992 ELECTION, BUT WHEN THE TALLIES CAME OUT, THEIR VOTES HAD OBVIOUSLY NOT BEN COUNTED. IN 1997 THEY DID NOT VOTE AT ALL UT STILL WERE COUNTED AS GOLKAR. NOW, IT MAY GET EVEN NASTIER. ACCORDING TO ONE CONTACT WHO RECENTLY SPOKE WITH THE LURAH IN LOWO ELENG VILLAGE ON LEMBATA ISLAND, GOLKAR APPARATCHIKS TOLD THE VILLAGE CHIEF THAT, IF HE DID NOT GET ALL THE VOTES FOR GOLKAR, HE WOULD GO TO PRISON FOR SIX YEARS. ANOTHER NEARBY VILLAGE CHIEF WAS TOLD THAT HE WOULD LOSE HIS JOB AND BE EXILED FROM THE VILLAGE. LAST WEEK IN ULOLONG ON LEMBATA, THE SAME CONTACT

TALKED TO THE VILLAGE CHIEF WHO TOLD HIM OF FIGHTING WHICH BROKE OUT WHEN A GOLKAR REPRESENTATIVE SEEKING SUPPORT TOLD VILLAGERS THAT IDEP, AN AUSTRALIAN AID GROUP, WHICH HAD BUILT CEMENT TOILETS IN THE VILLAGE, WAS ACTUALLY WORKING FOR GOLKAR. THE VILLAGERS HAD PROTESTED THAT THEY KNEW THE AUSTRALIANS WERE RESPONSIBLE, NOT GOLKAR.

13. (C) JUST AS OLD GOLKAR TACTICS PREVAIL ON FLORES, STORIES OF SOEHARTO COMMERCIAL EXCESSES ALSO RILE PEOPLE. IN NGADA DISTRICT, TOMMY SOEHARTO IN 1995 REPORTEDLY SEIZED THOUSANDS OF HECTARES WITH LITTLE OR NO COMPENSATION FOR A CASSAVA PLANTATION AND A TAPIOCA FACTORY. SOURCES TRACED THE GRAB TO THE WORLD BANK AND INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF FOCUSING ON CASH CROPS AND SETTING UP PLANTATIONS RATHER THAN THE MORE DIFFICULT SMALLHOLDER PROJECTS, WHICH WERE NOT PROGRESSING FAST ENOUGH FOR FIVE-YEAR PLAN PROJECTIONS. THE DISTRICT HEAD (BUPATI) COLLUDED WITH SOEHARTO'S FAMILY TO SET UP THE PROJECT WITHIN A NEW KAPET CALLED MBAI. (KAPETS ARE PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ZONES FOR EASTERN INDONESIA INITIALLY THE DIRECTION OF HABIBIE WHEN HE WAS RESEARCH/TECHNOLOGY MINISTER.) INDONESIAN MARINES WERE SENT IN TO PROVIDE SECURITY. THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL NGO, WALHI, HAD PROTESTED THE BLATANT SEIZURE OF LAND AND LED A DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE PROJECT AS THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE TAPIOCA PLANT WERE LAID. AFTER SOEHARTO FELL, THE

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00

H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-07	STR-00
TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
FDIC-01	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W			

----------C29EAC 301045Z /38

R 301042Z APR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7543
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 002179

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0075

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-29-07
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: A PIECE OF THE ELECTION PUZZLE: FLORES

DISPLACED PEASANTS RETOOK THE LAND, SAYS WALHI.

POINTS OF TENSION

CONFIDENTIAL

14. (C) ACCORDING TO SANRES AND OTHER AD HOC INFORMANTS, LAND ISSUES POSE A COMPLEX HINDRANCE TO DEVELOPMENT AND SOURCE OF FRICTION. ADAT LAW, NEVER CODIFIED, DEFINES WHICH TRIBAL OR ETHNIC GROUP CONTROLS LAND. THIS HAS BEDEVILED ECONOMIC PLANNERS AND TECHNOCRATS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW ORDER IN 1966. THE FARTHER FROM JAKARTA, THE LESS THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS ADAT LAW AND THE MORE ARBITRARY HAS BEEN GOVERNMENT SEIZURE OF TRADITIONAL LANDS. NUMEROUS EXAMPLES WERE GIVEN OF "UNFAIR' GOVERNMENT EXPROPRIATION TO BE USED AS "TANAH NEGARA" (STATE LAND) FOR GOOD OR BAD INTENTIONS. POLOFF WAS SHOWN A SMALL MUSLIM VILLAGE NEAR MAUMERE WHICH FEATURED RATHER NEW, STANDARDIZED HOUSES PROVIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO MUSLIM FAMILIES WHO SURVIVED THE DISASTROUS TSUNAMI WAVE ON THEIR ORIGINAL ISLE OFF THE CITY'S BAY IN 1992. UNDER ADAT, THE LAND BELONGED TO A PARTICULAR TRIBE, THAT WAS CATHOLIC, BUT WENT TO THE MUSLIMS. SUCH SITUATIONS NURSED GRUDGES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS THE NEW OCCUPANTS.

15. (C) CATHOLIC/MUSLIM RELATIONS ARE NOT WARM AND BECAME

MORE STRAINED AFTER A FLURRY OF INCIDENTS IN 1996. ACCORDING TO CATHOLIC SOURCES, "SOMEONE", READ MUSLIMS, ATTACKED SEVERAL CHURCHES ON THE ISLAND AND DESTROYED OR STOLE THE HOST, INCLUDING ONE INCIDENT WHERE CRIMINALS TRIED TO MAKE OFF WITH THE WHOLE TABERNACLE. OFFICIALLY, MUSLIMS COMPRISE JUST UNDER 15 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION, MADE UP OF AN ESTABLISHED COMMUNITY AND THE INEVITABLE SULAWESI EMIGRES. ALL CONTACTS COMMENTED, WHEN PRESSED, THAT COMMUNAL RELATIONS WERE "GOOD", CITING SUCH EXAMPLES

AS A MUSLIM PARAMILITARY YOUTH GROUP WHICH GUARDED THIS YEAR'S EASTER PROCESSION AT IT WOUND THROUGH LARANTUKA WITH A MADONNA STATUE A FEW WEEKS AGO. THE AMBON TRAGEDY WAS ON THE MINDS OF VIRTUALLY EVERYONE. HOWEVER, IT WAS DESCRIBED AS SOMETHING THAT "WON'T HAPPEN IN FLORES." YET, MISTRUST INTRUDES INTO THE CATHOLIC PERCEPTION. A LARGE MOSQUE IS BEING BUILT ON LARANTUKA'S MAIN STREET. CATHOLICS BELIEVE IT IS UNNECESSARY (AN OLDER MOSQUE IS ABOUT A KILOMETER AWAY) AND TO THEM ITS FINANCING IS MYSTERIOUS. SOME SAY FROM THE GOVERNMENT, OTHERS REFER TO OVERSEAS MUSLIM AID.

16. (C) SHARP CRITICISM WAS DIRECTED AT FLORES' CHINESE, WHO WERE CHARACTERIZED AS MONEY-HUNGRY, WITH NO COMMUNITY SPIRIT. THEY HELD A TENACIOUS AND RAPACIOUS GRIP ON TRADE, SETTING PRICES AT THE FARM, AT THE MARKET, AND THROUGHOUT THE SHIPPING AND DISTRIBUTION PROCESS. POLOFF WAS TOLD THAT SOME NGOS HAD SET UP A MARKETING NETWORK OF 8000 MEMBERS TO BREAK THE CHINESE MONOPOLY. CHINESE WERE ALSO SEEN AS STINGY IN SUPPORTING CHURCH CHARITIES. MOREOVER, THEY AVOIDED NGO ACTIVITY AND WOULD NOT JOIN POLITICAL PARTIES. WHILE THEY SEEMED AN OBVIOUS TARGET FOR LOCAL ANGER, ESPECIALLY MORE RECENTLY AS THEY TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE KRISMON, ASSURANCES WERE GIVEN THAT FLORES' CHRISTIANS WOULD NOT LET FELLOW BELIEVERS OF ANY RACE BE ATTACKED.

THE TIMOR CONNECTION

17. (C) FLORES AND NEARBY ISLAND SEMINARIES HAVE CONTRIBUTED HUNDREDS OF TEACHERS TO TIMOR ISLAND, BOTH WEST AND EAST. ONE FATHER TOLD OF GETTING PHONED BY THE NUNS WHO FLED LIQUISA TO ATAMBUA AND WHO REPORTED THAT OVER 40

WERE DEAD IN THE APRIL 6 ATTACK. ANOTHER TOLD POLOFF THAT MERPATI AIRLINES HAD STOPPED SHIPPING IN GOODS ON FLIGHTS TO DILI SO THE CHURCH WAS USING ITS OWN VESSEL, THE "RATURASARI" TO BRING IN MEDICINES AND FOODSTUFFS FROM

SURABAYA TO ATAMBUA IN WEST TIMOR AND TRUCKING OVERLAND TO SCHOOLS IN EAST TIMOR. VERY FEW FLORES TEACHERS NOW IN EAST TIMOR HAVE FLED YET, FEELING PROTECTED FROM ANTI-INDONESIAN VIOLENCE BY THEIR TIMORESE-LOOKING FEATURES AND THEIR RELIGION AND EAGER TO KEEP THEIR GOOD SALARIES.

CONCLUSION

18. (C) AS NOTED (REFTEL) AND NOW SEEMS MORE CERTAIN, MEGAWATI AND THE PDI-P SEEM TO BE GAINING SUPPORT ON FLORES WITH THE HELP OF CATHOLIC PRIESTS. THE PARTY MIGHT DO VERY WELL AGAINST GOLKAR, APPARENTLY THE ONLY OTHER COMPETITION. THE FLORES BLOCK OF FIVE DPR SEATS IS SIGNIFICANT IN A PROVINCE WHOSE TOTAL ALLOCATION IS 13--WHICH MAY BE A PRIMARY REASON GOLKAR SEEMS TO BE PRESSING IN FLORES, FAR OUTSIDE ANY LARGER POLITICAL FOCUS EVEN FROM THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF KUPANG. PIERCE/ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E48

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4895

PAGE 01 JAKART 02068 01 OF 03 252358Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NRRC-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W		

----------C063C5 252358Z /38

R 252306Z APR 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7437
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002068

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0072

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-23-07
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL UPDATE ON SOUTH SULAWESI

REF: JAKARTA 0782

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02068 01 OF 03 252358Z
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PO WILLIAM A PIERCE. REASON 1.5 (D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: IN THE VIEW OF SOUTH SULAWESI CONTACTS, INDONESIA WILL ULTIMATELY BECOME A FEDERAL STATE, WHATEVER AUTONOMY IS OFFERED EAST TIMOR WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO BE APPLIED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY'S CURRENT DRAFT LAW ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT IS A SHAM, WHICH, EVEN IF ADOPTED, WILL BE CHANGED TO GRANT THE PROVINCES REALISTIC DECENTRALIZED POWER. MONEY POLITICS, AS PLAYED MAINLY BY GOLKAR AND PERSONIFIED IN DPA HEAD BARAMULI, IS RIFE IN SOUTH SULAWESI. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PROFESSES NEUTRALITY AND HAS MADE EFFORTS TO STOP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM HELPING GOLKAR. GOLKAR, WHILE DIMINISHED IN ITS CAPABILITY TO ATTRACT VOTES, SHOULD STILL WIN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS, ALTHOUGH NOTHING LIKE ITS NINETY-PLUS PER CENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 25 APR 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAY 2006 200503412

TOTALS OF THE PAST. THE NU'S PARTAI KEBANGKITAN BANGSA (PKB) HAS SOME TRADITIONAL BASES OF SUPPORT TO RELY UPON. HOWEVER, HOW MUSLIM VOTERS IN GENERAL WILL DECIDE IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS. END SUMMARY

3. (SBU) INTRODUCTION: IN A VISIT TO UJUNG PANDANG, SOUTH SULAWESI APRIL 13-15, PO MET WITH A NUMBER OF CONTACTS FROM POLITICAL PARTIES, BUSINESS, HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, AND ACADEMIC CIRCLES. THEY DISCUSSED THE GENERAL POLITICAL CLIMATE, THE ISSUE OF FEDERALISM, AND THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IN UJUNG PANDANG COMING OUT OF THE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN FIGHTING IN MALUKU (MANY MUSLIMS THERE HAVE ROOTS IN SOUTH SULAWESI) (SEPTEL). FOREMOST ON THE MINDS OF ALL WAS THE EXTENT OF MONEY POLITICS EMPLOYED BY THE GOLKAR PARTY.

FEDERALISM/DECENTRALIZATION

4. (C) ACCORDING TO OUR CONTACTS, THE NEXT INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT, WOULD ULTIMATELY ADOPT A FORM OF MEANINGFUL DECENTRALIZATION, IF NOT FEDERALISM. [redacted] SAID THAT FEDERALISM HAD BECOME INEVITABLE FOR THE ENTIRE COUNTRY AS SOON AS THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEGUN PROPOSING AUTONOMY STATUS FOR EAST TIMOR AND DISCUSSING IT FOR ACEH AND IRIAN. THE MOLD WOULD BE SET, WIDE-RANGING AUTONOMY PROPOSED FOR ONE PROVINCE WOULD APPLY FOR ALL. [redacted] B1

[redacted] FOR MORE POWER TO SOUTH SULAWESI, AGREED. [redacted] WHO HAS CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE RESEARCH ON [redacted] THOUGHT THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY'S DRAFT DECENTRALIZATION PROPOSAL (REFTEL) WAS A SHAM. THE PROPOSAL, DELIBERATELY VAGUE ON HOW POWER WOULD BE SPLIT BETWEEN JAKARTA AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, WAS A SOP TO NEUTRALIZE REGIONAL DEMANDS AND KEEP CONTROL IN JAKARTA, HE SAID. ITS PROFESSED AIM OF SHIFTING POWER FROM JAKARTA TO THE PROVINCIAL DISTRICTS (KABUPATENS) AND NOT TO THE PROVINCES THEMSELVES WAS UNWORKABLE. IT OBVIOUSLY SPRANG FROM AN UNFOUNDED FEAR THAT THE PROVINCES, IF THEY HAD MORE POWER, WOULD BECOME VEHICLES FOR SEPARATISM. [redacted] BELIEVED THAT, IF ENACTED, THE CURRENTLY PROPOSED LOCAL GOVERNMENT DRAFT WOULD BE CHANGED BY A NEW GOVERNMENT TO REFLECT A TRUE BALANCE OF POWER. B1

MONEY POLITICS

5. (C) VIRTUALLY ALL CONTACTS, AGREEING THAT MONEY POLITICS WAS RIFE IN SOUTH SULAWESI, WERE CONVINCED THAT THE PRIMARY CULPRIT WAS SUPREME NATIONAL ADVISOR COUNCIL (DPA) HEAD BARAMULI, WHOSE LOYALTY TO GOLKAR AND ESPECIALLY HABIBIE WAS UNQUESTIONED. TWO SEPARATE OBSERVERS SPOKE OF BARAMULI DROPPING BILLIONS OF RUPIAH INTO OFFICIALS' POCKETS THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE DURING HIS FREQUENT

VISITS TO SOUTH SULAWESI. (NOTE: WHILE IT SEEMS CERTAIN THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02068 01 OF 03 252358Z
BARAMULI HAS BEEN SPREADING A LOT OF MONEY FOR GOLKAR AND HABIBIE PARTICULARLY AROUND SOUTH SULAWESI, WE SUSPECT THE AMOUNTS ARE GROSSLY EXAGGERATED.)

6. (C) AS DIRECT PROOF OF GOLKAR'S MONEY POLITICS, A PAN OFFICIAL GAVE US A COPY OF A LETTER FROM GOLKAR OFFICES IN THE WAJO DISTRICT TO PARTY LEADERS IN THE PAMMANA SUB-DISTRICT AS WELL AS TO ALL VILLAGE-LEVEL GOVERNMENT LEADERS. PAMMAMA'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEADER (CAMAT) ALSO SIGNED THE LETTER. IT INVITED THEM TO A LAUNCHING CEREMONY FOR GOLKAR'S "TIM SUKSES." AT THE MEETING THEY ALL WOULD RECEIVE GOLKAR UNIFORMS, FLAGS, AND BANNERS, COURTESY OF DR. BARAMULI. OTHER BARAMULI ASSISTANCE WOULD ALSO BE DISTRIBUTED. PAN HAD OBJECTED TO THE GOVERNOR. SIMILAR INFRACTIONS WERE CONTINUING ELSEWHERE IN SOUTH SULAWESI, THE CONTACT SAID. NOTE: PAN'S COMPLAINT MIGHT HAVE WORKED. THE APRIL 22 PRESS REPORTED THAT THE GOVERNOR FIRED THE PAMMANA CAMAT FOR HIS INVOLVEMENT. THE PRESS, HOWEVER, DID NOT MENTION BARAMULI BUT NOTED THAT THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT WAS INVESTIGATING ALLEGATIONS OF OTHER CAMATS' POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

7. (C) THE PARTAI DAULAT RAKYAT (PDR), WITH TIES TO COOPERATIVES MINISTER ADI SASONO, ACCORDING TO OTHER OBSERVERS, WAS ALSO INVOLVED IN MONEY POLITICS. CONTACTS SAID THAT MANY VILLAGERS, TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF LOANS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT COOPERATIVES'

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4893

PAGE 01 JAKART 02068 02 OF 03 252357Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NRRC-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W		

----------C063C0 252358Z /38
R 252306Z APR 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7438
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002068

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0072

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-23-07
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL UPDATE ON SOUTH SULAWESI

PROGRAMS, HAD TO SIGN AFFIDAVITS THAT THEY WERE MEMBERS OF THE PDR BEFORE THEIR APPLICATIONS WOULD BE PROCESSED.

8. (C) ALL CONTACTS BEGRUDGINGLY ADMITTED THAT THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT SEEMED TO BE FOLLOWING THROUGH ON ITS PROFESSIONS OF POLITICAL NEUTRALITY. MOREOVER, IT HAD BEEN MAKING EFFORTS TO KEEP LOWER GOVERNMENT LEVELS THAT WAY AS WELL, AS HAS BEEN RECONFIRMED BY THE GOVERNOR'S FIRING OF A CAMAT (PARA 6 ABOVE). STILL THEY SAY MANY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO BACK GOLKAR, ALTHOUGH IT IS MORE DIFFICULT TO DO THAN IN THE PAST. THEY WARILY CONCLUDED THAT THE MILITARY TOO HAD SO FAR REMAINED OUT OF PARTY POLITICS.

POLITICAL PARTIES: GOLKAR

9. (C) MOST CONTACTS, INCLUDING OTHER POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS, INDICATED THAT GOLKAR HAD THE UPPER HAND. ALTHOUGH ITS VOTE COUNT WOULD DECLINE MARKEDLY, IT WOULD STILL BE SIGNIFICANT. (ONE INDEPENDENT OBSERVER BELIEVED THAT MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN WAS GAINING MOMENTUM. HE SEEMED TO BASE HIS FINDING LARGELY ON THE PDI-PERJUANGAN POSKOS (SMALL PROPAGANDA OFFICES) THAT HAD BEGUN TO SPROUT UP ACROSS SOUTH SULAWESI.) PAN OFFICIALS WERE PARTICULARLY INCENSED OVER BARAMULI'S FREQUENT THEME THAT HABIBIE OFFERED SOUTH SULAWESI'S ONLY CHANCE TO HAVE A NATIVE AS PRESIDENT. ONE CRIED THAT BARAMULI WAS MAKING HABIBIE OVER INTO A LOCAL BUGIS, WHILE TRUTH WAS THAT HE WAS ONLY BORN IN PARE-PARE WITHOUT FAMILY ROOTS IN THE PROVINCE. HIS FATHER CAME FROM NORTH SULAWESI AND HIS MOTHER WAS JAVANESE. STILL, BARAMULI'S MESSAGE WAS ATTRACTING SUPPORT FROM BUGIS AND OTHER SOUTH SULAWESI GROUPS WHO PAID LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE DETAILS.

10. (C) OPPOSITION TO HABIBIE CAME FROM MORE ESTABLISHED CONTACTS AS WELL. [redacted] MAKING NO SECRET OF HIS TIES TO HMI, EXPRESSED STRONG RESERVATIONS OVER HABIBIE. IN [redacted] VIEW, B1

HABIBIE WAS TOO UNFOCUSED, HIS IDEAS VAGUE AND SCATTER-BRAINED. GOLKAR CHAIRMAN AKBAR TANJUNG (WHO ALSO HAS STRONG HMI TIES) WOULD BE THE FAR BETTER GOLKAR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND WOULD TAKE THE NOMINATION IF THE GOLKAR LEADERSHIP CHOSE A CANDIDATE BY SECRET BALLOT. NONETHELESS, HE MUSED, GOLKAR WOULD WIN THE MOST VOTES IN SOUTH SULAWESI ESPECIALLY WITH HABIBIE AS CANDIDATE. A RECENT VISIT BY TANJUNG TO BONE, IN THE BUGIS HEARTLAND, SEEMED TO REINFORCE THE IMPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR GOLKAR. AKBAR ATTRACTED A CROWD OF SOME 30,000 AND WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE SON OF THE FORMER RAJA OF BONE, HIMSELF A TRADITIONAL LEADER.

PARTAI KEADILAN (PK)

11. (C) PARTAI KEADILAN (PK) [redacted] AS WITH MOST PK OFFICIALS WE HAVE MET IN EASTERN INDONESIA, UNDERLINED THAT THE PARTY WAS FORMED FOR THE FUTURE AND WOULD BE FORTUNATE WITH TEN PER CENT OF THE VOTE. NONETHELESS, THE PK HAD BRANCHES IN 21 OF SOUTH SULAWESI'S 23 DISTRICTS AND, IN THE 21, HAD OFFICES IN EVERY SUBDISTRICT AS WELL AS IN 800 VILLAGES, ALTHOUGH AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL THERE WOULD NORMALLY BE ONLY ONE OR TWO PK CADRES. HE NOTED THAT AS PK SENT TEAMS OUT INTO SOUTH SULAWESI'S SMALL ISOLATED VILLAGES, INVARIABLY THEY WERE WELCOMED BUT THEIR MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED WARILY. YET, THE PARTY WAS BEGINNING TO SET UP BASES FOR FUTURE POLITICS. THE PK HAD NOT BEEN MAKING POLITICAL PROMISES BUT LETTING VILLAGERS KNOW THAT IT WOULD BE AROUND FOR THE LONG TERM TO REPRESENT THEIR INTERESTS. FOR THIS ELECTION, THE PK WOULD NOT DO WELL. WITH OLD PARTY BASES COLLAPSING, BIG NAME PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES HAD TO BE THE FOCUS. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES AND POSITIONS DID NOT MATTER, BIG NAME PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES DID. YET, AS DEMOCRACY TOOK ROOT, THE PK WOULD GROW, [redacted] SAID. B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PARTAI KEBANGKITAN BANGSA (PKB)

12. (C) AN OFFICIAL FROM THE NU'S PARTAI KEBANGKITAN BANGSA (PBK) PREDICTED THAT UP TO 40 PER CENT OF THE VOTE COULD FALL TO THE PKB. OTHERS BELIEVED THE PKB WOULD DO MUCH WORSE. THE PKB CONTACT SAID THAT, EVEN THOUGH MOST SOUTH SULAWESI MUSLIMS WERE NU, THE SIGNIFICANT MAJORITY SEPARATE RELIGION FROM POLITICS. SOUTH SULAWESI'S MUSLIM LEADERS, THEMSELVES NU WHO HAD ENDORSED THE PKB, WOULD NOT CAMPAIGN NOR WOULD THEY BE EXPECTED TO. ONLY IN THREE OF THE PROVINCE'S DISTRICTS WERE NU ORGANIZED AROUND TAREQATS SIMILAR TO EAST JAVA'S. THE NU KIAIS THERE HAD A BROADER INFLUENCE IN THEIR COMMUNITIES AND WERE CAMPAIGNING. THUS, HE CONCLUDED AT LEAST THREE DISTRICTS WERE SAFE FOR THE PKB AND HOPED THE PARTAI WOULD GAIN 3-4 MORE ELSEWHERE.

13. (C) PK CONTACTS NOTED THAT IN SOUTH SULAWESI THE PKB'S NU

COMPETITORS (THREE OTHER NU-TIED PARTIES) WERE STRONGER THAN IN JAVA AND SEEMED TO BE CREATING DISARRAY WITHIN THE NU MEMBERSHIP OVER WHICH PARTY TRULY REPRESENTED NU INTEREST. THE PKB'S CASE WAS FURTHER WEAKENED BY THE CONSTANT STREAM OF CONFUSING POLITICAL STATEMENTS UTTERED BY NU CHAIRMAN ABDURRAHMAN WAHID. THEY WERE ERODING WAHID'S POPULARITY AND PKB CHANCES IN SOUTH SULAWESI. PKB CONTACTS SAID THAT PARTY CADRES WERE COORDINATING WITH MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN AS WAS HAPPENING IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA. HOWEVER,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4894

PAGE 01 JAKART 02068 03 OF 03 252358Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	AC-01	NRRC-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W		

----------C063C1 252358Z /38

R 252306Z APR 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7439
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002068

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0072

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-23-07
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL UPDATE ON SOUTH SULAWESI

THEY EMPHASIZED THEIR JOINT EFFORTS WERE INFORMAL AND WOULD NOT GO INTO DETAILS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02068 03 OF 03 252358Z

MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN

14. (C) SEVERAL CONTACTS THOUGHT THAT MEGAWATI'S SUPPORT, EXCEPT

IN THE UNLIKELY CHANCE THAT THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY DESERTED GOLKAR AND SIDED WITH THE PDI-PERJUANGAN, WOULD COME FROM URBANIZED VOTERS IN UJUNG PANDANG AND POSSIBLY FROM THE TORAJA DISTRICTS IN THE NORTH. (MOST TORAJA PEOPLE ARE NON-MUSLIM.) MEGAWATI WOULD BE TRAVELING TO TORAJA LAND WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO BOLSTER SUPPORT.

AMIEN RAIS' PARTAI AMANAT NASIONAL (PAN)

15. (C) PAN OFFICIALS SAID THEY WERE SEEKING 30 PER CENT OF THE VOTE. THE PAN CONTACTS SAID THAT PAN HAD OFFICES OPERATING IN EVERY SUBDISTRICT IN SOUTH SULAWESI AND ITS CADRES WERE WELL-RECEIVED WHEN THEY VISITED SOUTH SULAWESI'S REMOTE VILLAGES. GOLKAR'S STRENGTH WAS HOLLOW AND DEFLATED EASILY, WHEREVER PAN STARTED CAMPAIGNING, THEY SAID. THEY THOUGHT THEY HAD A GOOD CHANCE OF TAKING A LARGE NUMBERS OF VOTES IN AREAS THAT VOTED MASYUMI IN THE 1955 ELECTIONS. REPEATEDLY WE HEARD THAT MASYUMI AS A POLITICAL BASE HAD DIED OUT, ITS FORMER STRONGHOLDS OPEN TO OTHER PARTIES. (MASYUMI TOOK 40 PER CENT OF SOUTH SULAWESI'S 1955 VOTE. IT DID SO WELL BECAUSE OF ITS CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE PERMESTA REBELLION THAT PLAGUED SOUTH SULAWESI AT THE TIME. SUKARNO BANNED THE PARTY IN 1960). YET HOW WELL PAN WOULD DO IN MASYUMI AREAS WAS UNKNOWN. IT WOULD DEPEND ON HOW SOLID THE PAN ORGANIZATION WAS AND HOW THOROUGHLY PAN COULD BLANKET THE OUTLYING AREAS WITH AMIEN RAIS' MESSAGE. MOREOVER, PK CONTACTS NOTED PAN WOULD LIKELY HAVE DIFFICULTY IN GETTING SOLID SUPPORT FROM ALL SOUTH SULAWESI'S MUHAMMADIYAH MEMBERSHIP. (COMMENT: WE HAVE HEARD REPORTS OF

SCHISMS WITHIN SOUTH SULAWESI PAN.)

16. (C) PK CONTACTS BELIEVED THAT THE PARTAI BULAN BINTANG (PBB) WAS SIPHONING OFF VOTERS FROM OLD MASYUMI AREAS. OTHERS SUGGESTED THAT THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), AS THE PBB'S NATURAL COMPETITION WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE, SINCE IT WAS AN ESTABLISHED, FAMILIAR CHOICE.

CONCLUSION

17. (C) AS A PROVINCE, SOUTH SULAWESI, ALLOTTED 24 DPR SEATS, WILL HAVE WITH NORTH SUMATRA THE LARGEST NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES OFF JAVA. WITH THAT SIZEABLE A NUMBER OF SEATS AT STAKE, MOST POLITICAL PARTIES APPEAR CONFUSED OVER HOW TO ADVANCE THEIR IDEAS BEYOND TRADITIONAL CAMPAIGNING, AND THEY SEEM SLOW EVEN IN DOING THAT. WE ARE STRUCK BY PK SURGA'S OBSERVATION THAT THE OLD POLITICAL BASES HAVE COLLAPSED. GOLKAR IS DEFLATING BUT STILL HAS LIFE, YET, IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT EXPECT THE 90 PER CENT TALLIES IT WAS ACCUSTOMED TO IN SOUTH SULAWESI. OTHER NEW ORDER POLITICAL BASES WERE FAR WEAKER THAN IN JAVA, THEY AND NEW PARTIES SEEM STILL

WEAK. AS A RESULT, AS [redacted] SAID, PERSONALITIES, NOT PARTY, WILL BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR FOR MANY OF THE VOTERS. FROM WHAT WE RECALL, PERSONALITIES, NOT PARTY BASES, WERE KEY INFLUENCES ON THE SOUTH SULAWESI VOTE IN 1955 (ANOTHER WAS WIDE SUPPORT FOR THE ON-GOING PERMESTA REBELLION). THIS FACTOR MAY BE COMING BACK. THUS, SOUTH SULAWESI POLITICS SUFFER FROM A LARGER THAN USUAL LACK OF PREDICTABILITY, BEYOND THE SAFE ASSUMPTION THAT GOLKAR (AND HABIBIE) WILL STILL BE A MAJOR, ALTHOUGH DIMINISHED FORCE IN THE JUNE ELECTIONS. PIERCE/ROY

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E53

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9881

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 JAKART 01025 01 OF 03 030253Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	COME-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	USIE-00
	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/016W						

----------A9D85C 030253Z /38

R 030241Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6397
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001025

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/IFD, INR/IL

TREASURY FOR OASIA/INA-MCCOY, SAEGER, KURIYAN

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/16
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, EFIN, OVIP (SUMMERS), ID
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01025 01 OF 03 030253Z
SUBJECT: DEPSEC SUMMERS' MEETINGS WITH MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI AND AMIEN RAIS

REF: JAKARTA 827 (FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS, FEBRUARY)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY LAWRENCE SUMMERS MET SEPARATELY WITH MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI AND AMIEN RAIS, LEADERS OF TWO KEY OPPOSITION PARTIES IN INDONESIA, DURING HIS FEBRUARY 22 VISIT TO JAKARTA. BOTH SAW THE CONDUCT OF FREE AND FAIR GENERAL ELECTIONS IN JUNE AS CRITICAL TO THE NATION'S

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CLARKE N ELLIS
DATE/CASE ID: 24 OCT 2008 200503412

ECONOMIC FUTURE. MEGAWATI EMPHASIZED HER SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC POLICIES CONSISTENT WITH THOSE UNDER INDONESIA'S IMF PROGRAM BUT PLEDGED THAT PDI-PERJUANGAN WOULD SEE THAT SUCH POLICIES WERE HONESTLY AND TRANSPARENTLY IMPLEMENTED. RAIS CHARACTERIZED HIMSELF AS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROSPECTS SO LONG AS "BLOODY INCIDENTS" CAN BE AVOIDED AND THE NEXT GOVERNMENT IS CLEAN AND CREDIBLE. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY LAWRENCE SUMMERS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY DANIEL ZELIKOW, SPECIAL ASSISTANTS TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SHERYL SANDBERG AND STEPHANIE FLANDERS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN NATIONS CHRIS MCCOY, THE AMBASSADOR, AND ECONOFF (NOTETAKER) HAD SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, LEADER OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01025 01 OF 03 030253Z

INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY - STRUGGLE FACTION (PDI-P) AND DR. AMIEN RAIS, LEADER OF THE NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN) AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE ON FEBRUARY 22. ACCOMPANYING MEGAWATI WERE HER ADVISORS LAKSAMANA SUKARDI AND KWIK KIAN GIE, WHILE RAIS WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ADVISORS BARA HASIBUAN, ARIF ARRYMAN, AND BERNADUS DJONOPUTRO.

MEETING WITH MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI

SUPPORT FOR IMF PROGRAM, BUT DONE HONESTLY

4. (C) DEPSEC SUMMERS BEGAN THE MEETING BY OBSERVING THAT THE GENERAL ELECTION SCHEDULED FOR JUNE WOULD BE IMPORTANT BOTH ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY. HE NOTED THAT INDONESIA'S CURRENT PROBLEMS WERE ROOTED IN UNCERTAINTY BOTH POLITICALLY - BECAUSE PEOPLE DID NOT KNOW WHAT LAY IN THE FUTURE - AND ECONOMICALLY - BECAUSE THE NEW ORDER'S ECONOMICS HAD BEEN SO CLOSED. HE SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN SOME MODEST IMPROVEMENT LATELY WHICH HE VIEWED AS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE GOI'S HAVING LARGELY STUCK TO ITS IMF PROGRAM OVER THE LAST MONTHS. SUMMERS ASKED FOR MEGAWATI'S REACTION TO THE IMF PROGRAM AND WHETHER SHE WOULD BE SUPPORTIVE OF IT.

5. (C) MEGAWATI AGREED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GENERAL ELECTION AND SAID THAT HER PARTY WAS PRESSING HARD TO SEE THAT IT TOOK PLACE, [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01025 01 OF 03 030253Z

[redacted] B1

ADDRESSING THE IMF PROGRAM, SHE EMPHASIZED THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICIES WAS AS IMPORTANT AS THEIR SUBSTANCE. [redacted] B1

6. (C) KWIK KIAN GIE ELABORATED THAT PDI-P'S ECONOMIC PRIORITIES WERE IN LINE WITH THOSE OF THE IMF AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, BUT THE DIFFERENCE WAS THAT THE PDI-P WOULD BE OPEN IN DISCLOSING INFORMATION AND DATA ABOUT ECONOMIC INDICATORS AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION. [redacted] B1

GIVEN ITS INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION, PDI-P DID NOT HAVE ANY FOOLPROOF SOLUTIONS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY, BUT IT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9883

PAGE 01 JAKART 01025 02 OF 03 030253Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	COME-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	USIE-00	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/017W					

----------A9D861 030253Z /38

R 030241Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6398
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 001025

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/IFD, INR/IL

TREASURY FOR OASIA/INA-MCCOY, SAEGER, KURIYAN

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/16
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, EFIN, OVIP (SUMMERS), ID
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01025 02 OF 03 030253Z
SUBJECT: DEPSEC SUMMERS' MEETINGS WITH MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI AND AMIEN RAIS

PLEDGED TO BE HONEST AND TRANSPARENT, TO FIGHT CORRUPTION, AND TO GIVE OPEN ACCESS TO ALL DATA WITHOUT SUPPRESSING INFORMATION ABOUT "WHO OWES WHOM." B1

REITERATING THE IMPORTANCE OF HONEST POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, KWIK OBSERVED THAT FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S ECONOMIC BLUEPRINT WAS GENERALLY SOUND; IT WAS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION THAT CORRUPTION AND DISTORTION WERE ALLOWED TO DOMINATE.

7. (C) DAS ZELIKOW REPLIED THAT THE CONDITION OF THE BANKING SECTOR SPOKE TO THE NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS SO THAT CREDITORS WERE CONFIDENT THAT THEY HAD LEGAL RECOURSE, WHICH WOULD IN TURN ENSURE THAT ASSETS WERE APPROPRIATELY VALUED. LAKSAMANA SUKARDI AGREED THAT THE COMMERCIAL COURT'S PROBLEMS PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF HOW THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT CARRY OUT THE IMF ECONOMIC PROGRAM EFFECTIVELY BECAUSE IT HAD NO CREDIBILITY. NO MATTER HOW GOOD THE LAWS WERE, HE SAID, THEY HAD NO CHANCE IN SUCCEEDING WITHOUT THOUROUGHGOING REFORM. B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01025 02 OF 03 030253Z

PROSPECTS FOR COALITION POLITICS

8. (C) MOVING INTO POLITICS, DAS ZELIKOW ASKED FOR MEGAWATI'S VIEWS AS TO POSSIBLE COALITION BUILDING FOLLOWING THE GENERAL ELECTION. MEGAWATI REPLIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN MOVING VERY SLOWLY IN PUTTING TOGETHER THE TOOLS FOR THE GENERAL ELECTION WHICH MADE IT DIFFICULT TO PREDICT UNDER WHAT SYSTEM/FRAMEWORK COALITIONS COULD BE FORMED.

9. (C) WHILE AGREEING WITH KWIK'S OBSERVATION THAT THE THREE LARGEST OPPOSITION PARTIES (NOTE: PDI-P, PAN, AND GUS DUR'S PKB) WOULD PROBABLY BE ABLE TO FORM A COALITION BASED ON THE PERCENTAGES THEY WOULD GET IN THE GENERAL ELECTION, MEGAWATI CAUTIONED THAT A COALITION WAS NO GUARANTEE OF STABILITY. SHE VIEWED A COALITION AS USEFUL ONLY IF IT BUILT COLLECTIVE STRENGTH AND IF ALL PARTIES WERE COMMITTED TO THE COALITION IN THE LONG TERM. IF IT HAD THE POTENTIAL TO WEAKEN THE NATION, I.E., BY THE THREAT OF COALITION MEMBERS' WITHDRAWING SUPPORT IN PARLIAMENTARY-STYLE NO-CONFIDENCE GESTURES, THEN IT WOULD NOT BE THE PREFERRED ROUTE. SUKARDI COMMENTED THAT PDI-P HAD NOT YET SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED COALITION ALTERNATIVES BECAUSE THE FIRST STEP WAS TO HAVE A GOOD, DEMOCRATIC ELECTION. [redacted] B1

10. (C) DEPSEC SUMMERS COMMENTED THAT MANY SAW MEGAWATI'S CANDIDACY AND ANTI-AUTHORITARIAN MESSAGE AS A BREATH OF FRESH AIR BUT THAT, IN SITUATIONS SUCH AS INDONESIA WAS NOW FACING, THERE WAS ALWAYS UNCERTAINTY AMONG OUTSIDE OBSERVERS ABOUT WHETHER THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF POTENTIAL LEADERS WOULD BE PRO-MARKET AND PRO-BUSINESS. HE EMPHASIZED TO MEGAWATI THE IMPORTANCE OF USING THE OPPORTUNITIES OF HER PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO ALLAY SUCH UNCERTAINTY AND SEND THE SIGNAL THAT SHE WOULD HONOR THE LAWS OF ECONOMICS, WELCOME INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, MAINTAIN INDONESIA'S COMPETITIVENESS AND ATTRACT CAPITAL. HE SUGGESTED THAT SUCH AN EFFORT WOULD HELP GIVE CONFIDENCE TO THE MARKET.

MEETING WITH AMIEN RAIS

11. (C) OPENING THE MEETING WITH AMIEN RAIS, DEPSEC SUMMERS ASKED FOR RAIS' PERSPECTIVE ON ECONOMIC POLICY. RAIS REPLIED THAT INDONESIA FIRST NEEDED A POLITICAL SOLUTION AND THAT A FAIR AND HONEST ELECTION WAS THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9884

PAGE 01 JAKART 01025 03 OF 03 030253Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	COME-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	USIE-00
	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00
	/016W						

----------A9D86D 030253Z /38

R 030241Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6399
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 001025

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS, EB/IFD, INR/IL

TREASURY FOR OASIA/INA-MCCOY, SAEGER, KURIYAN

MANILA ALSO FOR USADB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/16
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, EFIN, OVIP (SUMMERS), ID
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01025 03 OF 03 030253Z
SUBJECT: DEPSEC SUMMERS' MEETINGS WITH MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI AND AMIEN RAIS

ONLY WAY TO END THE CURRENT CRISIS OF TRUST IN THE GOVERNMENT AND TACKLE THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. RAIS SAID THAT HE DID NOT SUPPORT ANY DRASTIC ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGES BUT WOULD IMPLEMENT GOOD POLICIES THAT ALREADY EXISTED AND INTRODUCE SYSTEMATIC, INCREMENTAL REFORM

MEASURES. ARIF ARRYMAN OBSERVED THAT THE ENGINES OF GROWTH IN INDONESIA HAD ALMOST STOPPED AND THAT ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT DEPENDED ON THE POLITICAL FUTURE TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY.

12. (C) DEPSEC SUMMERS ASKED RAIS FOR CLARIFICATION ON HIS STATEMENT MADE AT THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM IN DAVOS THAT HE DID NOT SUPPORT BANK RECAPITALIZATION. RAIS SAID THAT HE WAS REACTING TO THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT'S PLAN TO RECAPITALIZE BANKS WITHOUT PROPER SELECTION PROCESS. HE RECALLED THAT IN 1997, BANKS GOT 147 TRILLION RUPIAH IN CAPITAL INJECTIONS, NONE OF WHICH HAD BEEN REPAID. CHALLENGED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE, HE REJOINED THAT COMMON SENSE SAID THAT TRULY BAD BANKS SHOULD BE LIQUIDATED AND THAT HE SUPPORTED A PROCESS OF REASONABLE AND RESPONSIBLE SELECTION. ACCEPTING THAT SUCH A PLAN WOULD HAVE HIGH UPFRONT COSTS TO REPAY DEPOSITORS, HE FAVORED SUCH A COURSE, EVEN IF IT MEANT THAT CREDITORS WOULD NOT BE 100 PERCENT REPAID. FOLLOWING THIS EXCHANGE, DEPSEC SUMMERS EMPHASIZED TO RAIS THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING CAREFUL IN ADDRESSING ECONOMIC POLICIES IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS SO AS NOT TO TRIGGER PANIC AMONG BANKERS AND INVESTORS.

CONFIDENTIAL

13. (C) SUMMERS ASKED RAIS FOR HIS SENSE OF CURRENT SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAMS. RAIS RESPONDED THAT HE WAS IN FAVOR OF SUCH SPENDING IF IT WAS WELL TARGETED, BUT BELIEVED THAT CURRENT PROGRAMS WERE BEING MISUSED BY GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRATS FOR "MONEY POLITICS," ESPECIALLY ON THE OUTER ISLANDS. HE OBSERVED THAT, EVEN AT THIS CRITICAL TIME IN INDONESIA, OFFICIALS WERE REVERTING TO THEIR OLD COURSE OF USING SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING MONEY TO ELECT GOLKAR.

14. (C) REVIEWING PAN'S ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND PROGRAM, RAIS CALLED HIMSELF "NOT TOO PESSIMISTIC" ON PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY. HE PREDICTED THAT, IF "BLOODY INCIDENTS" COULD BE AVOIDED, IF A CREDIBLE GOVERNMENT TOOK OFFICE WHICH WAS CLEAN, WELL MANAGED, AND EFFICIENT, AND IF EXTERNAL SUPPORT WAS FORTHCOMING, THEN THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROCESS COULD BEGIN IN ABOUT TWO YEARS. RAIS AND ARRYMAN BOTH EMPHASIZED RELIANCE ON A MARKET ECONOMY AND THE NEED TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE FOR BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTORS AS KEY ELEMENTS NECESSARY FOR RECOVERY.

15. (C) REGARDING PROSPECTS FOR THE JUNE GENERAL

ELECTION, RAIS SAID THAT HE BELIEVED IT WOULD TAKE PLACE IF THERE WERE NO MAJOR INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE. HE PREDICTED THAT MORE THAN 20 PARTIES WOULD COMPETE BUT THAT ONLY 4-5 WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT (NOTE: PAN, PDI-P, GOLKAR, PKB, AND PPP). REGARDING POTENTIAL COALITIONS, RAIS OBSERVED THAT THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF PDI-P WERE PROBABLY CLOSEST TO HIS, [redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] HE ALSO MADE THE POINT THAT THE B1 DPR WOULD BE WEIGHTED IN FAVOR OF THE "STATUS QUO" DUE TO THE 38 SEATS RESERVED FOR ABRI AND THE 65 THAT WOULD BE APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE.

16. (C) DEPSEC SUMMERS OBSERVED THAT THE ISSUE OF PERSONAL SECURITY FOR ALL INDONESIANS WOULD BE A CENTRAL POINT IN THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE. HE MENTIONED THE PRECARIOUS POSITION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITY AND NOTED CONCERN ABOUT APPEALS TO PREJUDICE. RAIS REPLIED THAT HE UPHELD THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS THAT EACH SOUL WAS SACRED. REGARDING THE CHINESE COMMUNITY, HE PLANNED TO OPEN ALL PREVIOUSLY CLOSED DOORS TO THE CHINESE AND PUT THEM ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH OTHER GROUPS, INCLUDING THE PUBLICATION OF CHINESE LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS. HE OBSERVED THAT THE FACT THAT THEY WERE BLOCKED FROM GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY SERVICE BEFORE FORCED THEM TO CHANNEL ALL OF THEIR ENERGIES INTO BUSINESS.

17. (U) THE SUMMERS PARTY CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

TAB A

RELEASED IN PART B5

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6385

PAGE 01 STATE 011014 210259Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

011014
SOURCE: KODAKB.021098
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:VEMURRAY/RCLARKE:VEM -- 01/20/99 7-L823
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------9914D0 210301Z /38

O 210256Z JAN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 011014

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/04
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 11

FOR A/DCM GONG FROM EAP/PIMBS

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS HARTWICK.
REASON: 1.5 (D)

1. (C) PLANNING MEETING FOR THE SECRETARY'S TRIP

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 011014 210259Z

WE MET TODAY WITH A/S ROTH AND DEPUTY EXECSEC ROSE LIKENS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE SECRETARY'S TRIP TO ASIA. ROTH SAID HE WANTED TO HIGHLIGHT FOR THE SECRETARY THE IMPORTANCE OF HER JAKARTA STOP, WHERE EVERY MEETING SHOULD BE VIEWED AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON INDONESIAN EVENTS. KEEPING IN MIND THAT SOME OF THESE ARE VERY NOTIONAL, HERE BELOW IS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE VARIOUS MEETINGS WE WILL PROPOSE IN A MEMO TOMORROW TO S ALONG WITH PROPOSALS FOR THAILAND AND CHINA. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENT/REACTION BY JANUARY 21 TO THE SUBSTANCE BELOW, PARTICULARLY IF WE HAVE MISSED SOMETHING

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 21 AUG 2006 200504211

OR MISCAST THE VALUE OF THE MEETING.

[redacted]

B5

[redacted]

2. (C) PIMBS-EMBASSY COORDINATION ON VISIT

WE LOOK FORWARD TO COORDINATING CLOSELY WITH YOU ON THE VISIT PAPERS. FOR STARTERS, WE WILL SHARE THE TASKER WITH YOU WHEN IT ARRIVES. SOME OF THE WORK'S BEEN DONE FROM OUR PREVIOUS GO-AROUND, BUT YOU WILL BE IN POSITION TO PROVIDE IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL MATERIAL AND POLICY INPUT FOR OUR DRAFTS. WE WANT TO AVOID DUPLICATIVE WORK AND THUS

MIGHT LOOK TO YOU TO PROVIDE THE WORKING DRAFTS FIRST, WITH US TAKING IT FROM THERE. EFFECTIVE COORDINATION WILL DEPEND ON THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF OUR E-MAIL SYSTEMS. THE UNCLAS SYSTEM IS THE MORE RELIABLE, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO RELY ON THE CLASSIFIED SYSTEM TO SHARE SENSITIVE TEXTS.

3. (SBU) ELECTION ASSISTANCE

A/S ROTH SPOKE BY PHONE WITH GINANDJAR, WHO WAS IN TOKYO, ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 19. GINANDJAR EMBRACED THE NOTION OF ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, BUT AGAIN MENTIONED THAT THIS NOT BE PERCEIVED AS A "FRIENDS OF CAMBODIA" ARRANGEMENT. GINANDJAR HAD APPARENTLY CONFERRED WITH ALATAS, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT HE HAD CONSULTED WITH ANYONE ELSE WITHIN THE GOL. YOU'LL SEE OUR FOLLOW UP TO THE DEMARCHE CABLE ON ELECTION ASSISTANCE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE SOONEST AN UPDATE ON GOL VIEWS ON ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY:

-- WHO BEYOND ALATAS AND GINANDJAR SHOULD BE/HAS BEEN CONSULTED ON THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN ELECTION ASSISTANCE?

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 011014 210259Z

-- WOULD THE GOL BE COMFORTABLE WITH THE IDEA OF A DONORS CONFERENCE IN JAKARTA? IF SO, HOW SOON? WHAT LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION? AT WHAT VENUE? ROTH'S IMPRESSION, BASED ON THE FRIENDS OF CAMBODIA REFERENCE, IS THAT THIS WOULD WORK BEST IF IT TOOK PLACE IN INDONESIA RATHER THAN OVERSEAS AS TOKYO IS SUGGESTING.



B5

5. (U) IPP LETTER

TREASURY ASKS WHETHER YOU'VE ACTUALLY GIVEN COPIES OF GEITHNER'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF FINANCE TO THE U.S. COMPANIES, OR WHETHER YOU'VE "SHARED" THE CONTENTS WITH THEM VERBALLY. TREASURY HAS RECEIVED REQUESTS FOR A COPY OF THE LETTER FROM THE WASHINGTON OFFICES OF SEVERAL OF THE FIRMS. THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO GIVE THE FIRMS COPIES OF THE LETTER, WHICH THEY SEE AS A

GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT, BUT DON'T WANT THE USG PERCEIVED AS HAVING A DOUBLE STANDARD, I.E., PROVIDING THE LETTER IN JAKARTA BUT NOT HERE.

6. (C) UPCOMING AUSSIE TALKS

PER THE AUSSIE EMBASSY HERE, ASHTON CALVERT, AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY (TALBOTT EQUIVALENT), WILL HEAD UP AN AUSSIE TEAM TO VISIT WASHINGTON FEB 25 TO CONSULT ON

INDONESIA, INTER ALIA. WE WILL SET UP AN INTERAGENCY ROUND TABLE EVENT. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHO WILL ACCOMPANY CALVERT. THE SEPTEMBER L997 TALKS REMAIN A ROUGH MODEL, ALTHOUGH CALVERT IS MORE SENIOR THAN ALAN TAYLOR, WHO HEADED UP THE L997 VISIT. OTHER MEETINGS CALVERT WILL BE SEEKING INCLUDE NOTIONAL EIZENSTAT AND PICKERING. SOR HAD ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED TO AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR PEACOCK THAT PERHAPS THE GOA MIGHT SEND OFFICIALS TO JAKARTA TO MEET WITH HIM DURING HIS VISIT IN EARLY FEBRUARY, BUT THEY WERE APPARENTLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS LEAKING. SOR WILL CONFER WITH DOWNER AT DAVOS, HOWEVER.

7. (U) INDONESIA - RELIGIOUS LIBERTY FORUM

AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE ROBERT SEIPLE AND BOB CLARKE SPOKE NOVEMBER 19 AT A RELIGIOUS LIBERTY FORUM DISCUSSION ON "RELIGION AND SOCIETY IN INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR" IN THE DIRKSEN SENATE BUILDING. ALTHOUGH LYNN FREDRIKSSON OF THE EAST TIMOR ACTION NETWORK FOCUSED IN ON HER ISSUE, THE DISCUSSION WAS MAINLY ON RECENT MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN CLASHES IN JAKARTA, KUPANG AND ELSEWHERE. (THE NEWS ABOUT AMBON HAD NOT YET CIRCULATED.) WE PUT THE CLASHES INTO CONTEXT, CLARIFYING FOR SOME THAT INDONESIA IS NOT ON THE BRINK OF AN IRANIAN-STYLE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, AND EMPHASIZINB THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UPCOMING JUNE ELECTIONS.

8. (SBU) INDONESIA - ACEH

KUDOS FOR ANOTHER FINE CABLE, JAKARTA 0248, "TAKING STOCK OF RECENT VIOLENCE IN ACER." PIMBS, INR AND DRL MET JANUARY 19 WITH ACEHNESE REPRESENTATIVES OF A NEW ORGANIZATION, THE INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR ACEH. JAFAR SIDDIQ HAMZAH (FORMERLY OF THE INDONESIA LEGAL AID FOUNDATION) - ACTED AS LEADER, ALTHOUGH THE GROUP

REPRESENTED A RANGE OF VIEWS (NOT INCLUDING THOSE OF ACEH MERDEKA, THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT). THEY NOTED THAT ATTITUDES IN ACEH AGAINST ABRI AND THE GOI HAVE HARDENED CONSIDERABLY IN RECENT MONTHS AND ASSERTED THAT MOST ACEHNESE NOW WANT A REFERENDUM OFFERING A CHOICE BETWEEN "FULL AUTONOMY" AND INDEPENDENCE. THEY SUGGESTED THAT ABRI MIGHT HAVE SET UP SEVEN BATAK SOLDIERS WHO WERE MURDERED BY A MOB, SETTING OFF THE CURRENT ROUND OF REPRISALS AND VIOLENCE. MOST WERE LEANING HEAVILY TOWARDS A BOYCOTT OF THE JUNE ELECTIONS, ALTHOUGH JAFAR SAID HE HAD SOME HOPE THAT ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION WOULD OFFER A WAY FORWARD FOR ACEH AND INDONESIA.

9. (U) APP

FURTHER TO MY DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR ROY ABOUT OPENING MEDAN, I UNDERSTAND THAT DS WILL ASK THE RSO TO DO A QUICK SURVEY OF SOME OF THE SECURITY CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH OPENING AN APP IN MEDAN. THE SALE OF THE OLD CONSULAR OFFICE BUILDING, WHICH APPARENTLY HAD THE FARTHEST SETBACK OF OUR PROPERTIES IN MEDAN, WILL MAKE THE SECURITY ISSUE MORE DIFFICULT.

B5

ALBRIGHT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E2

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B5

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8067

PAGE 01 JAKART 00295 01 OF 02 211527Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------995505 211527Z /15
O 211038Z JAN 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5615

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000295

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/16
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL JAKARTA TO PIMBS

FOR EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR HARTWICK

REF: SECSTATE 11014

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM MICHAEL P. OWENS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) THE AMBASSADOR HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS INFORMALLY SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S POSSIBLE VISIT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS ON JANUARY 21. ALATAS HAD NO PROBLEM WITH ANY OF THE POSSIBLE EVENTS OUTLINED REFTEL. ALATAS ALSO INDICATED THE MARCH 4-5 TENTATIVE DATES FOR THE VISIT WOULD WORK FROM THE INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE. HE MENTIONED HE WILL HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM A GROUP-8

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00295 01 OF 02 211527Z
MEETING IN BANGLADESH.

3. (C) BASED ON REFTEL PROPOSED EVENTS AND OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECRETARY'S LIKELY ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE TIMES, WE'VE PUT TOGETHER THE FOLLOWING NOTIONAL SCHEDULE.

MARCH 4

1500 - ARRIVE HALIM AIRPORT.

1600 - MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 JAN 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 28 JUL 2006 200504211

1800 - COFFEE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS/WOMENS' REPRESENTATIVES AT BOROBUDUR HOTEL
MARCH 5

0730 - BREAKFAST WITH COORDINATING MINISTER GINANDJAR AT BOROBUDOR HOTEL

0900 - CALL ON DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO

1000 - CALL ON PRESIDENT HABIBIE AT PRESIDENTIAL PALACE FOLLOWED BY JOINT PRESS ENCOUNTER WITH FONMIN ALATAS

1130 - EMBASSY MEET AND GREET AT BOROBUDUR HOTEL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 00295 01 OF 02 211527Z
1200 - PRIVATE LUNCH

1300 - ROUNDTABLE WITH MEMBERS OF THE ELECTION COMMISSION AND ELECTION MONITORING NGO'S (AT BOROBUDUR HOTEL, AS WOULD SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WITH OPPOSITION LEADERS)

1400 - MEETING WITH MEGAWATI

1445 - MEETING WITH AMIEN RAIS

1530 - MEETING WITH GUS DUR

1615 - FREE TIME TO PREPARE FOR PRESS CONFERENCE

1645 - PRESS CONFERENCE

1745 - DEPART FOR MEETING WITH XANANA (IT'S POSSIBLE XANANA WILL BE OUT OF PRISON AND UNDER HOUSE ARREST BY EARLY MARCH. IF HE'S STILL INCARCERATED, HIS PRISON IS ON THE WAY TO THE AIRPORT.)

1815 - MEETING WITH XANANA

1900 - DEPART FOR HALIM AIRPORT

1930 - WHEELS UP

3. (C) THE AMBASSADOR EXPLORED WITH ALATAS THE

POSSIBILITY OF HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OVER
BREAKFAST ON FRIDAY, MARCH 5. ALATAS IS AMENABLE BUT
CONFIDENTIAL

MADE IT CLEAR HE WANTS A FULL MEETING AND NOT SIMPLY A BREAKFAST CHAT. HE WAS INITIALLY CONCERNED THAT IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO COVER ALL THE ISSUES OVER BREAKFAST. NEVERTHELESS, HE IS WILLING TO CONSIDER THIS OPTION, PROVIDED ENOUGH TIME IS ALLOWED. THIS SAID, WE STILL THINK A MEETING WITH ALATAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE. HE'S HER HOST, AND THE TWO OF THEM OUGHT TO GET TOGETHER EARLY ON. ALSO, DISCUSSIONS WITH GINANDJAR OVER BREAKFAST WOULD FIT NICELY IN A SECOND DAY'S SCHEDULE, COMING AS THEY DO PRIOR TO THE MEETING WITH HABIBIE (ASSUMING EVERYBODY'S AVAILABLE FOR THESE PARTICULAR TIME SLOTS).

[redacted] B1, B5

/001W

B1, B5

5. (C) WE ARE ALSO EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES FOR HUMAN CONCERN/SOCIAL SAFETY NET FUNCTION OF SOME SORT. THE PROBLEM WILL BE FINDING TIME IN THE SCHEDULE. THE NOTIONAL SCHEDULE ABOVE IS ALREADY HIGHLY COMPRESSED. ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00295 02 OF 02 211527Z

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E3

CONFIDENTIAL PTO0761

RELEASED IN PART
B4, B5

PAGE 01 STATE 012044 220345Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

012044
SOURCE: KODAKA.022139
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMES:VEMURRAY/ROLARKE:VEM -- 01/21/99 7-1823
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMES:DAHARTWICK
EAP/PIMES:JALOISI
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------9997C1 220346Z /38
O 220345Z JAN 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 012044

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/04
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 12

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM EAP/PIMBS

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS HARTWICK.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

1. (U) ROTH APPOINTMENTS IN DAVOS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 012044 220345Z

A/S ROTH'S SCHEDULE IN DAVOS NOW SHOWS YUSUF WANANDI ON FOR 2:00 P.M. AND AMIEN RAIS FOR 3:00 P.M. ON JANUARY 28. ROTH IS STAYING IN THE CENTRAL SPORTHOTEL AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO MEET THERE OR AT ANOTHER VENUE, IF PREFERRED. PLEASE RECONFIRM THE APPOINTMENTS AND THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP WITH ARRANGEMENTS.

2. (SBU) AMBASSADOR ROY'S TRAVEL PLANS

WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM A SENIOR VP AT HEINZ (OF KETCHUP FAME). HE AND A COLLEAGUE INTEND TO TRAVEL TO JAKARTA

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 28 JUL 2006 200504211

FEBRUARY 27-28 AND HOPED TO MEET WITH AMBASSADOR ROY. CAN YOU LET US KNOW WHETHER AMBASSADOR ROY'S PLANS TO TRAVEL TO THE STATES HAVE CHANGED, IN LIGHT OF THE POSSIBLE S

VISIT? [redacted] B4

3. (SBU) UN ELECTION ASSISTANCE FOR INDONESIA

THROUGH TOM CYNKIN AT USUN NEW YORK, WE'VE LEARNED THAT GOL OFFICIALS MET LAST MONTH WITH THE UN'S ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE DIVISION. THIS OFFICE IS ATTACHED TO THE UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND PROVIDES TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, ELECTION MONITORING, ETC. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT MUST MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST BEFORE THE ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE DIVISION CAN HELP. THE REQUEST WOULD BE DISTINCT FROM THE ONE ALREADY MADE TO THE UNDP TO COORDINATE DONOR ASSISTANCE. THE GOL HAS NOT ASKED FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 012044 220345Z

HELP FROM THE ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE DIVISION TO DATE, AND THE UN HAS A STRONG FEELING THAT THE GOL WILL NOT ASK, PERHAPS OUT OF CAUTION ABOUT HAVING TOO MANY INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS. THE UN FOR ITS PART IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT GETTING INVOLVED. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT TIME NEEDED TO MOBILIZE ADEQUATE LEVELS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IS TIGHT, AND ARE CONCERNED THAT THEIR PARTICIPATION WILL BE VIEWED BY THE GOL AS A RUBBER STAMP TO VALIDATE THE RESULTS. (THIS IS A PROBLEM THAT WE WILL ALL FACE AS WE MARSHAL OUR ASSISTANCE AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT.) I INTEND TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK NEXT WEEK FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UNDP AND THIS OFFICE. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD FIND OUT FROM THE GOL WHETHER THEY DO HAVE ANY INTENTION OF REQUESTING TECHNICAL HELP FROM THE UN.

FROM AID, WE'VE ALSO LEARNED THAT HATTIE BABBITT, DURING HER UPCOMING TRIP, MAY WANT TO TOUCH BASE WITH MEMBERS OF THE GOL GROUP MAKING THESE DECISIONS ABOUT ELECTION ASSISTANCE AND HOW TO PROCEED WITH PLANNING. SHE SUGGESTED THERE MIGHT BE VALUE IN ARRANGING FOR MEMBERS OF THAT GROUP TO MEET WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN OTHER GOVERNMENTS (I.E., SOUTH AFRICA) THAT HAVE HAD TO MAKE SIMILAR DECISIONS.

4. (C) SECRETARY'S VISIT

WE'D LIKE YOUR FEEDBACK ON A COUPLE OF IDEAS FOR THE SECRETARY'S SCHEDULE. WE'VE INCLUDED THESE OPTIONS IN THE

TRIP MEMO THAT HAS GONE TO THE S STAFF (A COPY OF OUR DRAFT INPUT IS BEING E-MAILED TO YOU).

B5

5. (U) SOR-MCCARTHY CALL

TO FOLLOW UP ON OUR PHONE CALL TO YOU: SOR DID PLACE A PHONE CALL TO AMBASSADOR MCCARTHY THIS MORNING, THOUGH WE'VE NOT HAD A READOUT OF WHAT THEY DISCUSSED.

6. (C) PITCHING THE EU

SOR MADE HIS PITCH AT THE TROIKA MEETINGS HEADED BY EUR TODAY. HE EXPLAINED THAT MUCH MORE AID WAS NEEDED. THEY PROFESSED INTEREST IN ROUNDING UP OBSERVERS BUT STANLEY COUNTERED THAT GETTING THE ELECTION PROCESS RIGHT IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE REAL TASK AT HAND NOW; WORRYING ABOUT

OBSERVERS IN THE AFTERMATH OF BADLY FLAWED PREPARATIONS WOULD SERVE LITTLE PURPOSE. SOR TOLD ME THAT THE EU DIRECTORS LOOKED DOWN AT THE FINGERNAILS WHEN HE MENTIONED THAT WE HAD LEARNED THAT THE COMMISSION WAS THINKING OF ONLY 2 MILLION EUROS, OR SO. THEY ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN TO HIM THAT THEY NEEDED AN EXIT STRATEGY IF IT LOOKED LIKE THE ELECTIONS WERE NOT GOING TO BE FAIR. SO WOULD WE ALL, SOR RETORTED.

WE DON'T KNOW AT THIS POINT WHAT STANLEY'S PITCH WILL

PRODUCE. WE WILL PROBABLY DO A FOLLOW UP DEMARCHE TO EUR CAPITALS AND USEC IN THE DAYS AHEAD, BUT -- FOR NOW -- WE HAVE SIMPLY MANAGED TO RAISE THE PROFILE.

7. (U) TDY HELP

IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT REQUEST FROM A/S ROTH, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY KRISTIE KENNEY HAS DECIDED THAT THE OPS CENTER CAN SPARE SHAWN DORMAN FOR A TDY TO JAKARTA, BUT ONLY FOR 2 WEEKS IN APRIL. WE WANT TO GET YOUR BLESSING TO SEND

HER OUT FOR A SHORTER PERIOD THAN WE ANTICIPATED. IN LIGHT OF HER EXCELLENT CONTACTS, AND YOUR SPECIFIC REQUEST TO HAVE HER LEND A HAND, WE THOUGHT YOU MIGHT STILL BE ABLE TO USE HER TALENTS. YOUR THOUGHTS?

DAVID DIGIOVANNA HAS INFORMED US THAT HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE A TDY, BUT OTHER FOLKS' PLANS ARE SOLIDIFYING. PHIL ANTWEILER WILL TRY TO ARRIVE IN JAKARTA SOON AFTER MARCH 23 MEETINGS WITH THE AUSTRALIANS IN WASHINGTON. JIM MULLINAX WILL BE FREE TO TRAVEL MAY 15.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E4

CONFIDENTIAL PTO4655

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 024877 100034Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

024877
SOURCE: KODAKC.010016
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:VEMURRAY:RCLARKE -- 02/09/99 7-L823
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:NONE
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------A121B3 100036Z /38
O 100035Z FEB 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 024877

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/04
TAGS: PREL, AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 25

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM EAP/PIMBS

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS HARTWICK.- REASON 1.5 (D)

[redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 9 FEB 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 21 AUG 2006 200504211

B1

2. (U) POLITICAL BILLS UPDATE

OUR SOURCE IN S/P TELLS US THAT THE INDONESIAN PRESS IS REPORTING ON TWO PROPOSED BILLS THAT HAVE GONE, OR ARE ABOUT TO GO TO THE DPR. ONE BILL IS ON SHARING RESOURCES MORE EQUITABLY, THE OTHER A POLITICAL BILL ON CHOOSING ADMINISTRATORS, OR SOMETHING ALONG THOSE LINES. WE PRESUME THAT YOU ARE TRACKING THIS AND LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR ASSESSMENT. OBVIOUSLY, SUCH PIECES OF LEGISLATION, IF CREDIBLE (WE SURE DO USE THAT WORD A LOT THESE DAYS!) WOULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARD DEFLATING THE FORCES FOR AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE MUSHROOMING OUT THERE.

3. (SBU) GINANDJAR VISIT

WE SHARED WITH A/S ROTH JUDITH FERGIN'S E-MAIL ON THE GINANDJAR VISIT. SOR WON'T RETURN TO TOWN FROM HIS LEAVE UNTIL MONDAY FEB 15, BUT WOULD LIKE TO TALK WITH GINANDJAR BY PHONE IF THAT IS POSSIBLE. TREASURY HAS SENT JUDITH A SEPARATE E-MAIL NOTING THAT SUMMERS TOO WILL BE UNAVAILABLE MONDAY. WE HAVEN'T HEARD FROM EIZENSTAT'S OFFICE WHETHER HE MIGHT BE AVAILABLE. THE NBC IS STILL CHECKING INTO THE OTHER QUESTION OF WHETHER LIEBERTHAL WILL ACCOMPANY SUMMERS ON HIS JAKARTA TRIP. (WE HAVE HEARD THAT HE HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY INCLUDED, BUT HAS NOT COMMITTED DEFINITIVELY.)

4. (C) EAST TIMOR

A/S ROTH WAS SCHEDULED TO BRIEF THE SECRETARY ON EAST TIMOR LATE THIS AFTERNOON, ALTHOUGH AS OF THIS WRITING, I DON'T KNOW THAT IT HAPPENED. SHE IS FOLLOWING EVENTS (AS WE ALL ARE) AND WONDERING WHERE THIS IS HEADED. SOR HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH AMBASSADOR MARKER A COUPLE OF TIMES OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS, BUT TO MAKE A LONG STORY SHORT, MARKER'S COMMENTS TO AMBASSADOR NANCY SODERBERG, WHICH SHOULD REACH YOU IN CABLE FORM TODAY, SHOULD GIVE YOU THE RATHER DRAMATIC DIRECTION THINGS ARE TAKING.

5. (SBU) S VISIT AND GUEST LISTS

NOW THAT THE SECRETARY'S TRIP IS OFFICIAL (THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE TODAY), OUR TASKINGS OFFICIALLY

BEGIN. ONE OF MANY REQUESTS: HAVE YOU FORMED A PRELIMINARY GUEST LIST FOR THE DEMOCRACY/HUMAN RIGHTS ROUND TABLE AND THE POLITICAL LEADERS EVENTS? WE'VE BEEN

ASKED TO PROVIDE BY FRIDAY A LIST OF KEY GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC FIGURES THE SECRETARY MIGHT MEET. WE CAN HANDLE THE GOVERNMENT SIDE, AND PROBABLY GUESS MOST OF THE PUBLIC FIGURES, BUT WANTED YOUR INPUT.

6. (SBU) CROWD CONTROL PREPS

WE NEVER DID CONNECT, AS YOU KNOW. WE ARE STILL WORKING TOWARD A WEEKEND DEPARTURE OF THE ASSESSMENT TEAM WITH A DAY OF BRIEFING FOR THEM ON FRIDAY. WE'VE HAD TO ADJUST THE TEAM'S COMPOSITION, BUT OUR INL SUPPORT TELL US THAT THE REAL- CROWD CONTROL EXPERT ON THE TEAM IS GOOD AND COMES WITH AN INTEREST IN INDONESIA (DON'T KNOW WHY). AS YOU CONTINUE YOUR PREPS TO SUPPORT THIS VISIT, BELOW IS AN INL-PREPARED OPERATIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE TASK THE TEAM WILL UNDERTAKE TO GIVE YOU ALL A BETTER IDEA OF WHAT WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE.

BEGIN INL TEXT:

THE ASSESSMENT TEAM TRAVELING TO JAKARTA WILL NEED TO DEVELOP CERTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT THE PRESENT CAPABILITIES OF THE INDONESIAN POLICE TO RESPOND TO CIVIL DISORDERS. ONCE FORMAL INTRODUCTIONS AND MEETINGS ARE CONCLUDED, TEAM MEMBERS WILL NEED TO MEET WITH THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INDONESIAN POLICE:

A. MEMBERS OF THE SENIOR ABRI/POLICE COMMAND STAFF FOR ALL CIVILIAN POLICE FORCES.

THIS IS TO DETERMINE:

-LINES OF AUTHORITY FOR AUTHORIZING A POLICE RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISORDER

-HOW THE CIVILIAN POLICE INTER-RELATE WITH THE MILITARY

-WHAT UNITS HAVE SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCE RESPONSE;

-WHO HAS OVERALL COMMAND AND CONTROL OF POLICE UNITS DURING CIVIL DISTURBANCES.

B. SENIOR COMMANDERS OF CIVIL DISORDER UNITS. THIS WOULD BE A CHIEF OF ALL CIVIL DISORDER UNITS AND SELECTED COMMANDERS WHO REPORT TO HIM.

THIS IS TO DETERMINE:
-LOCATION AND SIZE OF CIVIL DISORDER UNITS
-METHODS OF RESPONSE AND COORDINATION WITH POLICE/MILITARY UNITS
-COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDER UNITS
-SELECTION/TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR MEMBERS OF THE UNITS
-METHODS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING USED IN CIVIL DISTURBANCE RESPONSE
-TACTICAL PLANNING USED IN CIVIL DISTURBANCE RESPONSE

C. OPERATIONAL (LINE) COMMANDERS OF CIVIL DISORDER UNITS. THIS WOULD BE A COMMANDER IN CHARGE OF NO MORE THAN 250 POLICE OFFICERS, AND SELECTED COMMANDERS WHO ARE IN CHARGE OF NO MORE THAN 25 POLICE OFFICERS.

THIS IS TO DETERMINE:

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 024877 100034Z
-TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION ASSETS AVAILABLE IN RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISTURBANCES
-EQUIPMENT BEING USED BY CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNITS NOW
-TACTICS AND METHODS USED IN RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISTURBANCES, TO INCLUDE SQUAD FORMATIONS, CHEMICAL AGENTS, IMPACT WEAPONS

FINALLY, THE TEAM WILL ALSO NEED TO VISIT POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL SITES SUCH AS GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, THE PALACE, ETC.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART B5

CONFIDENTIAL PTO2203

PAGE 01 STATE 030258 180257Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

030258
SOURCE: KODAKC.018027
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:VEMURRAY:RCLARKE -- 02/L7/99 7-1823
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:NONE
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------A439A3 180300Z /38
O 180257Z FEB 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 030258

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/04
TAGS: PREL, AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 28

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM EAP/PIMBS

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS HARTWICK. REASON 1.5 (D) -

1. (U) NURCHOLISH MADJID

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 030258 180257Z

WE UNDERSTAND FROM USIA THAT RICHARD GONG WILL BE MEETING WITH MR. MADJID ON THURSDAY. WE REMAIN INTERESTED IN SETTING UP MEETINGS FOR HIM WITH A/S ROTH AND OTHERS WITHIN STATE WHILE HE IS HERE IN WASHINGTON. COULD YOU ASK MR. GONG TO CONVEY THAT MESSAGE TO MADJID, AND FIND OUT THE BEST POINT OF CONTACT FOR SCHEDULING A MEETING.

2. (U) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

I KNOW THAT YOU ARE WORKING AS HARD AS YOU CAN ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. HOWEVER, THE INDONESIA REPORT MUST

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 28 JUL 2006 200504211

SENT TO "P" AND THE NSC, AND WE CANNOT PUT OFF SENDING THEM VERY MUCH LONGER. A/S ROTH IS ALSO ASKING. DRL PROPOSES TO SEND FORWARD THE REPORTS, CLEARLY MARKED

"DRAFT" ON FRIDAY, AND CAN INDICATE LANGUAGE THAT IS UNDER DEBATE BY PUTTING IT IN BRACKETS OR SOME SUCH. PLEASE LET US KNOW WHETHER THIS MAKES SENSE BY OOB THURSDAY.

3. (C) GINANDJAR VISIT

I SPOKE TO AMB DORODJATUN TUESDAY ABOUT GINANDJAR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON FEB. 15. DORODJATUN SAID THE FOLLOWING:

--PURPOSE WAS TO SOLICIT WB SUPPORT TO SPEED UP LAGGING DISBURSEMENTS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, PARTICULARLY IN THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET AREAS. HE SAID GINANDJAR EMPHASIZED THAT, IF THERE WERE CONCERNS ABOUT DIVERSION OF FUNDS, THE GOI WAS PREPARED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH WB, IMF AND ADB TO AVOID PROBLEMS. BUT QUESTIONS ABOUT DIVERSIONS AS CREATED

BY A LEAKED BANK REPORT COULD RISK JAPANESE CO-FINANCING ASSISTANCE UNDER THE MIYAZAWA FUND. AS A RESULT OF THIS LEAKED REPORT, HE, DORODJATUN, WOULD NOW HAVE TO LAUNCH AN EXPLAINING EFFORT ABOUT GOL INTENTIONS ON THE HILL.

--UPCOMING CGI IN JAKARTA JULY 26-27 WILL BE OPPORTUNITY FOR IMF AND WB TO PROVIDE FURTHER SUPPORT INTO ONGOING GOI EFFORTS TO ADDRESS BANKRUPTCY, CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND BANK RECAPITALIZATION. DORODJATUN SAID THAT THE IMF WAS "ENTHUSIASTIC" ABOUT HELPING FURTHER, TALKING ABOUT AUGMENTING ITS BUDGET ASSISTANCE BY $1-2 BILLION. WORLD BANK SAID IT WOULD SEE TO DISPATCHING A TEAM OF LAWYERS TO HELP EDUCATE/TRAIN INDONESIANS ABOUT BANKRUPTCY LAW PROCEDURES, ETC. DORODJATUN SAID THAT BANKRUPTCY IS A CONCEPT LARGELY UNKNOWN IN INDONESIA, WHICH HAS SLOWED ITS EFFECTIVENESS.

-- DORODJATUN SAID THAT GINANDJAR TOLD WOLFENSOHN THAT HE SUPPORTED A PLEDGING CONFERENCE FOR THE ELECTIONS UNDER THE COORDINATION OF UNDP AND UNDP MOU. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE WELCOMED INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS.

-- RUBIN-GINANDJAR CALL: DORODJATUN SAID THAT GINANDJAR DID SPEAK TO SEC RUBIN BY PHONE YESTERDAY AND WAS SATISFIED WITH THEIR DISCUSSION . DORODJATUN DESCRIBED RUBIN POSITION AS "POSITIVE", THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION THE INDONESIA FACED AND WAS SUPPORTIVE OF INDON'S ONGOING REFORM EFFORTS, PARTICULARLY THE BANK AND

CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING EFFORTS.

MULADI/GHALID: AS WE CLOSED OUR CONVERSATION, DORODJATUN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 030258 180257Z
INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD JUST HEARD LAST NIGHT THAT JUSTICE MINISTER MULADI AND ATTORNEY GENERAL GHALID WOULD BOTH

ATTEND THE VP'S ANTI CORRUPTION CONFERENCE NEXT WEEK. HE SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO SEEK MEETINGS AROUND TOWN FOR EACH, INCLUDING ON THE HILL, AND THAT MULADI WOULD STAY IN TOWN A DAY OR TWO AFTER THE CONFERENCE FOR CONSULTATIONS BUT THAT GHALID WOULD RETURN RIGHT AWAY. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HELP SUPPORT HIM IN ARRANGEMENTS AND APPOINTMENTS AND HE SAID HE1D BE BACK TO US. SUBSEQUENTLY THE INDONESIAN EMBASSY INDICATED THAT MULADI/GHALID WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CALLS ON THE SECRETARY, ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO, THE NSC, AND AROUND CAPITOL HILL. WE WILL ALSO SEEK TO HAVE A/S ROTH MEET WITH MULADI GIVEN HIS ROLE IN THE ELECTIONS. WE WILL KEEP YOU APPRISED.

4. (U) YOU'VE GOT MAIL

MIKE, A MR. RON LUBBERS FROM COLORADO CALLED TO GET YOUR E-MAIL ADDRESS. HE SAID HE'D SENT YOU A MESSAGE SEVERAL WEEKS BACK BUT HADN'T RECEIVED A RESPONSE. HE SAID HE'D TRY AGAIN.

5. (U) SECRETARY'S ADVANCE

S/S WILL SEND PAMELA SPRATLEY TO DO THE JAKARTA ADVANCE. SHE IS CURRENTLY IN PARIS, IS EXPECTED TO LEAVE ON TUESDAY FEB 23 AND ARRIVE IN JAKARTA 0/A FEB. 24.

I MET WITH ROSE LIKINS TODAY TO GO OVER TRIP DETAILS.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 030258 180257Z
YOU, WE, THE S/S ADVANCE, AND S STAFF WILL HAVE TO JUGGLE THESE APPOINTMENTS AROUND UNTIL WE GET A FIT THAT IS DOABLE. AT THIS POINT, EXCEPT FOR THE SPEECH, YOU HAVE PERMISSION TO SEEK THE APPOINTMENTS SUBJECT TO FINAL CONFIRMATION FROM ROSE/S STAFF (I.E. YOU CANNOT COMMIT TO ANYTHING YET; ONLY S STAFF DOES THAT). THE FRIDAY APPOINTMENTS ARE GROUPED (I.E. GOVERNMENT MEETINGS IN MORNING, RESIDENCE EVENTS IN AFTERNOON) BUT CAN BE MOVED AROUND AS NECESSARY, PARTICULARLY THE GUSMAO MEETING WHICH MIGHT FIT IN BETTER IN THE LATE AFTERNOON.

THE SPEECH REMAINS TENTATIVE PENDING A DECISION ON VENUE. AS I TOLD YOU VIA THE PHONE, S STAFF NEEDS VIRTUALLY 100 PERCENT ASSURANCE THAT THERE WILL BE NO HECKLERS IN THE SPEECH ROOM WHO WOULD DISRUPT THE EVENT (DEMONSTRATORS OUTSIDE IS ACCEPTABLE). PLEASE DUST OFF YOUR PREVIOUS NON UNIVERSITY VENUE SUGGESTIONS AND PREFERENCE AND WE WILL FEED THEM INTO THE PROCESS. ROSE SAID THE SECRETARY RECALLED HER SPEECH IN JAKARTA IN 1995 AS UN AMBASSADOR

AND REMEMBERED SHE LIKED THE VENUE, BUT NO ONE HERE SEEMS TO RECALL WHERE IT WAS (DEPLU?).

FINALLY, ON THE POLITICAL LEADERS GATHERING, ROSE SAID S STAFF PREFERS AN INVITE LIST OF 15-L7 PERSONS ATTENDING. SHE URGED YOU TO BE CREATIVE IN HOW THE 10 MINUTE PULL ASIDES ARE CHOREOGRAPHED (I SUGGESTED ONE AT THE VERY BEGINNING OR EVEN EARLY BUT 5 MINUTE OR SO WITH THE OTHER TWO AT THE VERY END SO THAT THE SECRETARY ONLY HAS TO DEPART HER GATHERING ONCE AT THE END. OVER TO YOU.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE TENTATIVE, NOTIONAL SCHEDULE LOOKS LIKE THIS:

THURSDAY MARCH 4:

1545 SECRETARY'S PLANE ARRIVES IN JAKARTA. (NOTE: THIS COULD SLIP BY AN HOUR OR SO TO ACCOMMODATE SLIGHT CHANGES IN THE THAILAND SCHEDULE.)

1700 MEETING WITH ALATAS, 90 MINUTES (NO DINNER, JUST LONGISH MEETING).

1845 JOINT PRESS AVAILABILITY (S STAFF IS OF THE OPINION THAT THIS PRESS MEETING IS AT ALATAS' REQUEST WHICH IS NEWS TO US. IF THIS IS NOT ALATAS' DESIRE, THEN WE WILL DROP IT ALTOGETHER.)

RON FREE

FRIDAY MARCH 5

0900 CALL ON PRESIDENT HABIBIE (75 MINUTES)

1045 PRESS STAKEOUT WITH FM ALATAS (10 MINUTES NEEDS TO BE CONFIRMED)

1115 DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO (60 MINUTES)

TBD (T) SPEECH AT LOCATION TBD (30 MINUTES)

12:15 MEETING WITH XANANA GUSMAO (45 MINUTES)
(THIS COULD BE MOVED TO THE END OF THE DAY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 030258 180257Z
DEPENDING ON LOCATION, TIMING OF SPEECH.)

1415 DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ROUNDTABLE (45 MINUTES) WE SHOULD SHOOT FOR THE SMALL GATHERING,IE. ROUGHLY 6-10 PERSONS TO ALLOW ALL TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK).

1515 POLITICAL LEADERS GATHERING (45 MINUTES) (THIS IS A CHANGE FROM THE ORIGINAL 75 MINUTE SUGGESTION IT WOULD INCLUDE 3 10 MINUTE PULL ASIDES).

1645 EMBASSY MEET AND GREET (20 MINUTES)

1800 DEPART JAKARTA EN ROUTE GUAM

6. (U) TRIP PAPERS

WE'VE FAXED TO YOU A LIST OF THE PAPERS THAT WE ARE HELPING TO PREPARE FOR THE SECRETARY'S TRIP. MOST OF OUR INPUT IS DUE BY THE END OF THIS WEEK (THOUGH THE S/S DEADLINES RUN THROUGH MONDAY).

7. (C) CABLE CLEARANCES

A/S ROTH CLEARS WITHOUT CHANGES THE CABLES REPORTING ON HIS LUNCH WITH IRIANESE AND HIS MEETING WITH GUS DUR. HE HAD TWO SMALL CHANGES ON THE REPORT OF HIS MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM ACEH (AND ONE MAY JUST BE CLARIFICATION OF A GARBLE IN TRANSMISSION). HE SENDS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO THE DRAFTERS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 030258 180257Z
ACEH CABLE:

PARAGRAPH 2, FIFTH SENTENCE: ACEHNESE DO NOT TRUST THE GOVERNMENT AND "HAVE":

PARAGRAPH 6, FIRST SENTENCE SHOULD END: BROAD AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE.

LET US KNOW IF THERE ARE ANY OTHERS OUTSTANDING AND WE'LL

TRACK THEM DOWN.

8. (U) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

DRL IS UNDER PRESSURE ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT AND PLANS TO SEND THEIR LATEST VERSION, WHICH EMBASSY JAKARTA HAS NOT YET FULLY ACCEPTED, TO P AND THE NSC ON FEBRUARY 19 FOR THEIR CLEARANCE. IF DRL HAS NOT HEARD FROM POST, THE INDONESIA DRAFT WILL CLEARLY BE MARKED "DRAFT," WITH LANGUAGE UNDER DEBATE BRACKETED.

9. (U) JUDITH STROTZ TRAVEL

JUDITH STROTZ, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, EAP/RSP REQUESTED COUNTRY CLEARANCE IN STATE 25623. SHE BEGINS HER TRAVELLING EARLY FEBRUARY 22 AND WOULD APPRECIATE A RESPONSE TO HER REQUEST SOONEST.

10. (SBU) SUGGESTED CROWD CONTROL TEAM PRESS GUIDANCE

WE'VE WORKED OVER YOUR SUGGESTIONS ALL DAY AND COME UP

WITH THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE AS A COMBINED EFFORT FROM YOU, PIMBS, S/P AND DRL. IT HAS A/S ROTH'S CLEARANCE TO BE USED ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

Q. WHO ARE THE U.S. OFFICIALS MEETING WITH ABRI AND THE POLICE THIS WEEK? WHY ARE THEY HERE?

A. THE US BELIEVES THAT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS ON JUNE 7 ARE ESSENTIAL FOR INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL TRANSITION. ONE IMPORTANT CONDITION FOR SUCH AN ELECTION IS THAT ALL INDONESIANS HAVE THE FREEDOM TO EXPRESS THEIR OPINION IN ACCORDANCE WITH INDONESIAN LAW DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD. CLASHES BETWEEN PROTESTORS AND/OR POLITICAL PARTY ACTIVISTS AND SECURITY FORCES WOULD GREATLY DIMINISH THAT FREEDOM, AND WE SHARE INDONESIANS' CONCERN THAT SUCH VIOLENCE COULD DISRUPT THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.

IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF ELECTION-THREATENING VIOLENCE, SEVERAL U.S. CROWD CONTROL EXPERTS ARE IN JAKARTA TO ASSESS WHETHER U.S. EXPERIENCE IN THIS FIELD CAN BE HELPFUL. SUCH ASSISTANCE HAS PROVEN USEFUL IN SAVING LIVES IN OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS BOSNIA, WHERE THERE WAS A HIGH RISK THAT CLASHES BETWEEN POLITICAL OR ETHNIC GROUPS, OR CONFRONTATIONS WITH SECURITY FORCES,

COULD HAVE LED TO LOSS OF LIFE. THE TEAM IS CONSULTING WITH SENIOR ABRI, POLICE, AND MFA OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.

THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF ANY PROGRAM THAT MIGHT COME OUT OF

THIS ASSESSMENT WOULD BE TO PROTECT THE ELECTORAL PROCESS BY DIMINISHING THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENT CLASHES BETWEEN DEMONSTRATORS AND SECURITY FORCES. THAT'S WHY ONE OF THE TEAM MEMBERS IS A WELL RESPECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN

RIGHTS LAWYER WITH EXPERIENCE IN PROVIDING HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING TO POLICE IN BOSNIA AND ELSEWHERE.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT THE TEAM CURRENTLY IN JAKARTA IS THERE ON AN ASSESSMENT BASIS ONLY. ONCE THE TEAM HAS SUBMITTED ITS REPORT TO THE USG, THE USG WILL CONSIDER NEXT STEPS IN CONSULTATION WITH THE US CONGRESS, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHO MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING.

Q. WHO ARE THE TEAM MEMBERS?

A. THE ASSESSMENT TEAM CONSISTS OF FIVE MEMBERS: AN EXPERT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A NON-GOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER, AN OFFICER FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, A PRIVATE LAW ENFORCEMENT CONSULTANT AND A SENIOR U.S. EMBASSY OFFICER.



B5

B5



PLEASE FORGIVE THE RATHER UNORTHODOX PRESENTATION ABOVE.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR THINKING.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B6

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ1040

PAGE 01 JAKART 00880 240210Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 CPR-02 DIM-00 DS-00 EAP-01 UTED-00
IMMC-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 NSCE-00 PA-00 PRS-00 SSO-00
DSCC-00 SAS-00 /004W
----------A6B921 240210Z /75

P 230959Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6246
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

UNCLAS JAKARTA 000880

DEPT FOR S/S

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP, ID
SUBJECT: STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS: SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S
TRIP TO INDONESIA - MARCH 4-5, 1999

THE FOLLOWING ARE STAFF DESIGNATIONS FOR EMBASSY JAKARTA
IN SUPPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S VISIT:

POSITION ASSIGNED HOME PHONE CELLPHONE
-
OVERALL VISIT CONTROL (DCM)
MICHAEL OWENS
-
DEPUTY CONTROL (ECON) PAT HASLACH

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 00880 240210Z
S/S LIAISON (ECON) ROBIN MCCLELLAN
S/S LIAISON (ECON) VICKY ALVARADO
USIS LIAISON (USIS) RICHARD GONG
PRESS LIAISON (USIS) CRAIG STROMME
ADMIN CONTROL (ADM) JOHN SALAZAR
MOTORCADES (ADM) DAVID HERBERT
HOTEL LIAISON CAROLYN CHRISTIAN
BAGGAGE (ADM) FRED MASEDA
MED LIAISON (ADM) DR. TOM YUN
THANKS/GIFTS (POL) NANCY DOE
COMPUTER LIAISON TIM COOK

SITE OFFICERS
-AIRPORT (ADM) RICHARD MORGAN

B6

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 28 JUL 2006 200504211

-PRES PALACE (ECON) JUDITH FERGIN
-FONMIN (ECON) ED GRULICH
-DEFENSE (DAO) JOHN MARAIA
-EMBASSY EVENT (ADM) WADE LEAHY
-HR/DEMO EVENT (AID) MARIA RENDON
-POL PARTIES (ECON) BRUCE PARSELL
-XANANA (CON) TED BURKHALTER
-SPEECH (ECON) BRIAN MCFEETERS

[redacted] B6

NOTETAKERS
-FONMIN (POL) ED MCWILLIAMS
-PRES HABIBIE (POL) JIM SEEVERS
-GEN WIRANTO (DAO) JOE DAVES
-HR/DEMO EVENT (POL) IAN MCCARY
-OPPOSITION (POL) GREG FERGIN
-XANANA (POL) GARY GRAY
ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>



IMRNEWFILE

E7

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6884

PAGE 01 JAKART 01018 01 OF 08 021017Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ANHR-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------A96DB9 021018Z /38
O 021004Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6379
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 JAKARTA 001018

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR ROY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/16
TAGS: PREL, OVIP (ALBRIGHT, M.), PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO JAKARTA

REF: A. 98 JAKARTA 5839, B. 98 JAKARTA 5859

BANGKOK/CHIANG MAI ALSO FOR EAP A/S ROTH

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) YOU ARE COMING TO INDONESIA AT A TIME OF MOMENTOUS CHANGE. THE STAKES ARE ENORMOUS AND GROWING. AUTHORITARIAN RULE HAS ENDED, PRESSURES FOR REFORM ARE STRONG, AND THE PRESS IS LUXURIATING IN ITS NEW FREEDOM.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01018 01 OF 08 021017Z
BUT A NEW MORE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IS NOT YET IN PLACE. INDONESIA HAS MADE A PROMISING START IN THAT DIRECTION BUT IS BURDENED WITH AN ENORMOUS LOAD OF BAD HABITS. THE DANGER OF BACKSLIDING IS REAL. THE GOVERNMENT'S LEGITIMACY IS BADLY FRAYED. URBAN LIVING STANDARDS HAVE PLUNGED. ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS TENSIONS ARE RISING. INSTABILITY IS BECOMING ENDEMIC. NATION-THREATENING SEPARATISM AT THE EXTREMITIES HAS EMERGED FASTER AND IN A MORE VIRULENT FORM THAN ANTICIPATED IN ACEH AND IRIAN JAYA. PERHAPS MOST TROUBLING, INDONESIA IS DEFYING PREDICTABILITY. IT NEEDS ATTENTION. THAT IS WHY YOU ARE COMING.

3. (C) WHILE YOU ARE HERE YOU CAN ENCOURAGE THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 1 MAR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 09 AUG 2006 200504211

GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO HOLD FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, PROMOTE PROGRESS TOWARD ESTABLISHING A CREDIBLE MECHANISM TO OFFER THE EAST TIMORESE A FAIR CHOICE ABOUT THEIR FUTURE, AND EXPAND YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF THIS COUNTRY'S EMERGING LEADERS. INDONESIA NEEDS SUPPORT IF IT IS TO EMERGE FROM ITS CURRENT TIME OF TROUBLES AND OPPORTUNITIES WITH A MORE REPRESENTATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND IN A MANNER THAT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND PROSPERITY. YOUR VISIT CAN ENHANCE THAT OBJECTIVE.

REASONS FOR CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM
==========

POLITICAL OUTLOOK
---

4. (C) THESE ARE FORMIDABLE CHALLENGES, BUT THE

SITUATION IS BRIGHTER THAN IT COULD BE. PREPARATIONS FOR THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS ARE PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY. THE NEW POLITICAL PARTIES THAT HAVE BEEN MULTIPLYING LIKE RABBITS (OVER 140 TO DATE) HAVE ACCEPTED THE ELECTION LAWS PASSED AT THE END OF JANUARY AND ARE RUSHING TO MEET THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS. TWENTY PLUS MAY MAKE THE CUT, PAVING THE WAY FOR INDONESIA'S FIRST MULTI-PARTY FREE ELECTIONS SINCE 1955. DEFYING EXPECTATIONS, THE STUDENTS HAVE KEPT OFF THE STREETS. SOME ARE CAUGHT UP IN EFFORTS TO DEVELOP ELECTION MONITORING SYSTEMS. THE GOVERNMENT IS TOLERATING ACTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FOREIGN NGOS IN ELECTION PREPARATIONS UNDER THE INDONESIAN-UNDP AGREEMENT ON ELECTION SUPPORT. PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAS REPEATEDLY DECLARED FOREIGN ELECTION OBSERVERS WILL BE WELCOME. REAL POLITICS HAS EMERGED, INCLUDING THE USUAL CHICANERY AND BEHIND THE SCENES MANEUVERING. BARRING UPHEAVAL, EGREGIOUS GOVERNMENT ERRORS, OR THE UNEXPECTED (ALL WITHIN THE REALM OF THE POSSIBLE), THE ELECTIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE BARELY THREE MONTHS AFTER YOUR DEPARTURE FROM JAKARTA. WHATEVER POLITICAL PARTIES EMERGE AS THE WINNERS, INDONESIAN POLITICS WILL BE VASTLY DIFFERENT FROM UNDER SOEHARTO, OFFERING MORE CHOICES, MORE BROADLY DISTRIBUTED POWER, AND MORE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONTINUED CHANGE.

EAST TIMOR
---

5. (C) PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S SPECTACULAR OFFER TO EAST TIMOR IN LATE JANUARY OF A CHOICE BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND

QUICK SEPARATION HAS DRAMATICALLY SHIFTED THE LANDSCAPE.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01018 01 OF 08 021017Z
THE DANGEROUS NEAR-FROZEN IMPASSE WITH PORTUGAL OVER
EAST TIMOR HAS SUDDENLY BECOME FLUID AND FAST-MOVING.
THE DANGERS REMAIN, BUT THE OPTIONS ARE IMMENSELY BETTER
THAN BEFORE. THE PORTUGUESE ARE ON THE GROUND IN
INDONESIA WITH A SMALL FIRST-RATE TEAM OF DIPLOMATS.
XANANA HAS BEEN GIVEN FREEDOM OF ACTION FROM HIS LOOSE
HOUSE DETENTION IN JAKARTA TO BECOME ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN
EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE CONTENDING FACTIONS IN EAST
TIMOR. AN AGREED AUTONOMY PACKAGE IS LIKELY TO EMERGE
FROM ALATAS'S NEXT MEETING WITH HIS PORTUGUESE
COUNTERPART MARCH 10-11 IN NEW YORK. THE UNITED NATIONS
IS TRYING TO DEVISE A METHOD TO ASCERTAIN THE WISHES OF
THE EAST TIMORESE, WITH PRESSURES MOUNTING TO ACCOMPLISH
THIS BEFORE THE JUNE 7 ELECTIONS. WITH THE TRAIN
SPEEDING DOWN THE TRACK, THE CHANCES FOR A CATASTROPHIC
WRECK ARE REAL ENOUGH TO INTIMIDATE THE FAINT HEARTED.
THE COMPLEXITIES ARE IMMENSE AND POORLY UNDERSTOOD BOTH
IN INDONESIA AND ABROAD. PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S
CONTROVERSIAL DECISION FACES POCKETS OF STUBBORN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6885

PAGE 01 JAKART 01018 02 OF 08 021017Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ANHR-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------A96DBE 021018Z /38
O 021004Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6380
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 08 JAKARTA 001018

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR ROY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/16
TAGS: PREL, OVIP (ALBRIGHT, M.), PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO JAKARTA

OPPOSITION AND COULD BECOME A DOMESTIC POLITICAL
FOOTBALL IN THE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTIONS, WITH
UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES. WHATEVER EMERGES, EAST TIMOR

WILL REMAIN A NASTY PROBLEM ON INDONESIA'S DOORSTEP, WHETHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE FOLD. BUT A ONCE HOPELESS SITUATION NOW OFFERS HOPE.

THE ECONOMY

6. (C) BY STICKING TO THE IMF PROGRAM, INDONESIA HAS HALTED ITS PRECIPITOUS ECONOMIC DECLINE. THE RUPIAH HAS

STABILIZED AT A LEVEL STRONGER THAN ANTICIPATED. INTEREST RATES ARE COMING DOWN. ONCE SPIRALING INFLATION HAS BEEN REDUCED. WITH INDONESIA'S RICH AGRICULTURAL AND ENERGY RESOURCES, THE EFFECTS OF THE DOWNTURN ARE DEBILITATING RATHER THAN CRIPPLING. DIGGING OUT FROM THE COLLAPSE WILL TAKE LONGER. THE GOVERNMENT IS POISED TO RECAPITALIZE VIABLE PORTIONS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM, BUT IT MISSED ITS FIRST DEADLINE LAST WEEK. CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING WILL TAKE LONGER BUT IS INCHING AHEAD. THE PAIN WILL WORSEN IF TECHNICALLY INSOLVENT COMPANIES THAT HAVE BEEN CARRYING WORKERS ON THEIR PAYROLLS BEGIN MASSIVE LAYOFFS. THIS COULD TRIGGER HEIGHTENED LABOR UNREST. CORRUPTION IS RAMPANT. ONLY OPTIMISTS SEE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL. STILL, THE GLOOM HAS LIGHTENED ENOUGH TO HOLD OUT HOPE THERE IS LIGHT AROUND A NOT TOO DISTANT CORNER -- IF POLITICS DOES NOT GET IN THE WAY.

HUMAN RIGHTS

7. (C) PROBLEMS ABOUND BUT ARE NOW LESS A PRODUCT OF A REPRESSIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME THAN OF BAD OLD HABITS, POORLY DISCIPLINED SECURITY FORCES, INADEQUATE CHECKS AND BALANCES, LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ABUSE OF POWER, AND SOCIAL UNREST THAT HAS FUELED FLAREUPS OF ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICT. GREATER FREEDOM HAS UNLEASHED DEMANDS FOR TIGHTER CURBS ON ABUSIVE PRACTICES, AND THE MEDIA HAVE USED EXPOSURE AS A TOOL TO FRUSTRATE COVERUPS. SOME OF THE MOST DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENTS, SUCH AS THE BACK-DOOR ARMING OF CIVILIANS IN EAST TIMOR, ARE CAUGHT UP IN LARGER ISSUES WHERE THERE ARE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE POWER STRUCTURE. IF THE ELECTIONS PRODUCE

MORE REPRESENTATIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT, THIS WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR SYSTEMATIC STEPS TO STRENGTHEN PROTECTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, WHICH ARE STILL SORELY LACKING. IN THE MEANTIME, INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY OF ABUSES CAN CONTINUE TO HELP OFFSET THE

WEAKNESS OF DOMESTIC SAFEGUARDS.

GOALS FOR YOUR VISIT
==========

8. YOUR VISIT CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN THREE PRINCIPAL AREAS, PLUS A HOST OF OTHERS.

FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
---

9. (C) CREDIBLE ELECTIONS ARE ESSENTIAL TO SHORE UP GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY, SUSTAIN INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, PAVE THE WAY FOR BUILDING MORE ROBUST INSTITUTIONS, AND STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT'S HAND IN DEALING WITH SOCIAL UNREST AND SEPARATIST TENDENCIES. INDONESIANS KNOW THIS. WE SHOULD LEND THEM ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT. YOUR INTEREST AND ATTENTION WILL BUTTRESS DETERRENTS TO MILITARY INTERVENTION, EGREGIOUS ELECTORAL ABUSES, AND BACKSLIDING.

EAST TIMOR
---

10. (C) WE HAVE AN IMPORTANT INTEREST IN SEEING THIS PROCESS THROUGH TO A FAIR CHOICE FOR THE EAST TIMORESE ABOUT THEIR FUTURE. WE SHOULD NOT PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME. DOING SO WOULD INCREASE THE RISKS OF A NATIONALIST

BACKLASH. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A CREDIBLE PROCESS. EVEN MEGAWATI, WHO HAS CRITICIZED PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S DECISION AND IS SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE WISDOM OF THE SEPARATION OPTION, HAS SAID PRIVATELY THAT SHE WILL NOT INTERPOSE OBJECTIONS IF THE EAST TIMORESE FREELY CHOOSE SEPARATION (INDONESIANS PREFER "SEPARATION" TO "INDEPENDENCE," FEELING THE LATTER IMPLIES A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP). YOUR TALKS HERE WILL GIVE YOU THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE STATE OF PLAY ON EAST TIMOR WITH KEY LEADERS, TO LEND OUR SUPPORT TO AN ENDORSABLE PROCESS, AND TO STRESS THE VITAL NEED TO GET STABILIZING MECHANISMS WORKING AND CIVIL MILITIA DISARMED, WITH THE MILITARY PLAYING A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE.

NEW INDONESIAN LEADERS
---

11. (C) THE POLITICAL CHANGES HERE HAVE THRUST A NEW GROUP OF PEOPLE ONTO CENTER STAGE AND WIDENED THE CIRCLE LIKELY TO PLAY KEY ROLES IN WHATEVER NEW GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6887

PAGE 01 JAKART 01018 03 OF 08 021017Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ANHR-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------A96DC1 021018Z /38
O 021004Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6381
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 08 JAKARTA 001018

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR ROY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/16
TAGS: PREL, OVIP (ALBRIGHT, M.), PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO JAKARTA

EMERGES. YOUR VISIT HERE WILL EXPAND YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF THIS COUNTRY'S EMERGING LEADERS. WHEN APPLIED PROPERLY, OUR INFLUENCE HERE IS IMMENSE. DIFFERENCES IN CULTURE AND STYLE ARE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS, BUT INDONESIANS THEMSELVES HAVE GRAVELY AND CONSISTENTLY MISJUDGED PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S INTENTIONS AND POLITICAL STAYING POWER SO THE PROBLEM IS MORE THAN A CULTURAL ONE. THIS STEMS IN PART FROM THE ALTERED POLITICAL CONTEXT. THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER IN SOEHARTO'S HANDS FOR OVER THREE DECADES DENIED THIS ENTIRE GENERATION OF LEADERS THE CHANCE TO COMPETE FOR THE TOP LEADERSHIP POSITIONS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01018 03 OF 08 021017Z
OTHER THAN BY SEEKING SOEHARTO'S FAVOR. NOW THE GLOVES ARE OFF, AND BEHAVIOR PATTERNS ARE CHANGING. THIS HAS INCREASED THE UNPREDICTABILITY FACTOR.

THE POLITICAL SETTING
==========

12. (C) GOVERNMENT PREPARATIONS FOR THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS ARE CREDIBLE. VAST UNCERTAINTIES REMAIN, BUT THE ELECTIONS ARE CERTAIN TO BE A MARKED IMPROVEMENT OVER THE SOEHARTO-ERA CHARADES. ESTIMATES CONCERNING LIKELY OUTCOMES ARE WILDLY DIFFERENT. THE ONE COMMON ELEMENT, POSSIBLY WRONG, IS THE ASSUMPTION THAT NO SINGLE PARTY WILL GAIN A MAJORITY OF SEATS IN THE

PARLIAMENT. GOLKAR CLAIMS IT CAN GET 40 PERCENT OF THE VOTE. ITS RIVALS DISCOUNT THIS. NO ONE KNOWS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO BROAD PUBLIC OPINION POLLS TO DATE THAT WOULD HELP SORT OUT THIS CONFUSING PICTURE.

POLITICAL PARTIES

13. (C) OF THE 140 PLUS PARTIES THAT HAVE SPRUNG INTO EXISTENCE, ONLY 20-30 ARE LIKELY TO MAKE THE CUT TO PARTICIPATE. OF THEM, FIVE ARE SIGNIFICANT:



B1

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6888

PAGE 01 JAKART 01018 04 OF 08 021017Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ANHR-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------A96DC8 021018Z /38
O 021004Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6382
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 08 JAKARTA 001018

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR ROY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/16
TAGS: PREL, OVIP (ALBRIGHT, M.), PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO JAKARTA

ELECTION OUTLOOK
---

14. (C) POLITICAL SPECULATION CENTERS ON WHICH OF THESE PARTIES WILL DO BEST IN THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, AND

IN WHAT COMBINATION. THE ASSEMBLY THAT ELECTS THE PRESIDENT CONSISTS OF THE 500 MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENT PLUS AN ADDITIONAL 200 MEMBERS REPRESENTING REGIONS AND GROUPS WHO ARE NOT DIRECTLY ELECTED. THE ADDITION OF THESE 200 SEATS COULD CHANGE THE BALANCE AMONG THE PARTIES RESULTING FROM THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. TO WHAT EXTENT WILL NOT BECOME CLEAR UNTIL AUGUST.

15. (C) IF NO PARTY ENDS UP WITH AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY IN THE ASSEMBLY, A COALITION WILL BE NECESSARY TO ELECT THE NEW PRESIDENT. MOST ASSUME THAT GOLKAR AND MEGAWATI'S PDI-PERJUANGAN WILL BE THE POLES CONTENDING TO FORM THESE COALITIONS. THE GOLKAR GROUP WOULD BE FORMED AROUND GOLKAR, THE PPP, SMALLER ISLAMIC PARTIES, AND POSSIBLY AMIEN RAIS'S PAN. MEGAWATI'S NATURAL PARTNER FOR COALITION BUILDING WOULD BE GUS DUR'S PKB. ALL RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT POLITICS MAKES FOR STRANGE BEDFELLOWS, SO VIRTUALLY ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE. THE LEAST LIKELY COMBINATION WOULD BE FOR GOLKAR AND MEGAWATI TO TEAM UP. THE MILITARY, WITH 38 APPOINTED SEATS IN THE PARLIAMENT, IS ALSO A FACTOR, BUT ONE IMPOSSIBLE TO CALL AT THE MOMENT. GENERAL WIRANTO HAS PLEDGED THAT THE MILITARY WILL REMAIN NEUTRAL IN THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND HAS KEPT OPEN LINES TO OPPOSITION PARTIES. GENERAL WIRANTO'S PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS, IF THEY EXIST, COULD ONLY BE ADVANCED BY A STANDOFF AMONG THE LEADING PARTIES, GIVING HIM AN INCENTIVE NOT TO THROW ABRI WEIGHT BEHIND GOLKAR, UNLESS IT SEEMED SURE OF WINNING.

16. (C) INDONESIAN OBSERVERS EXPECT THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN TO BE PERSONALITY RATHER THAN ISSUE DRIVEN. PRESIDENT HABIBIE REPRESENTS AN ANOMALY IN THIS RESPECT. HE DOES NOT PROJECT A PRESIDENTIAL IMAGE BY INDONESIAN STANDARDS, AND ELEMENTS WITHIN GOLKAR WOULD BE HAPPY TO SHOVE HIM ASIDE. AS THE INCUMBENT PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, HABIBIE CANNOT BE EASILY ABANDONED, AND HE HAS SHOWN UNEXPECTED SKILL AT FENDING OFF CHALLENGES TO HIS

POSITION. SOME THINK GOLKAR WILL HAVE TO RUN WITH HIM, LIKE IT OR NOT. EVEN IF GOLKAR BACKS HABIBIE AS THEIR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, IT COULD DROP HIM IN THE POST-ELECTION SCRAMBLING TO FORM A COALITION CAPABLE OF ELECTING THE NEW PRESIDENT.

17. (C) IN INDONESIA'S NEW AND UNTESTED POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT, MANY CONVENTIONAL WISDOMS OF THE MOMENT COULD END UP LOOKING FOOLISH. HOWEVER, WERE GOLKAR TO SHOW UNEXPECTED STRENGTH IN THE ELECTIONS, IT WOULD HAVE THE MOST TO LOSE IF THE ELECTIONS WERE LESS THAN CREDIBLE SINCE THE LEGITIMACY OF ITS VICTORY WOULD BE SUSPECT. THIS FACTOR INCREASES THE ODDS AGAINST EGREGIOUS ELECTION FRAUD.

EAST TIMOR
==========

[redacted] B1

RESERVATIONS AMONG INDONESIANS WHO FEAR NATIONAL DISINTEGRATION WILL BE STRENGTHENED BY CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE MOVE ON EAST TIMOR HAS ENERGIZED SEPARATIST TENDENCIES IN IRIAN JAYA AND ACEH. MOST IMPORTANTLY, MOST INDONESIANS HAVE NOT THOUGHT SERIOUSLY ABOUT THE ISSUE. THE STRENGTH OF THEIR CONVICTIONS COULD DEPEND ON HOW THE MATTER IS TREATED DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. SHOULD POLITICAL

OPPONENTS MOUNT A NATIONALISTIC ATTACK ON HABIBIE OVER THE DECISION, THIS COULD HARDEN ATTITUDES AND NARROW OPTIONS. MOREOVER, PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S POLITICAL POSITION IS TOO WEAK TO ALLOW HIM TO BULLDOZE THROUGH THE NECESSARY IMPLEMENTING STEPS AGAINST DETERMINED OBSTRUCTIONISM.

19. (C) THIS SAID, THE HABIBIE DECISION HAS DRAMATICALLY ALTERED THE EQUATION AND OFFERED A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE. INFORMED INDONESIANS RECOGNIZE THAT INDONESIA'S APPROACH ON EAST TIMOR OVER THE PAST 23 YEARS HAS FAILED AND THAT THE ISSUE IS A BURDENSOME INTERNATIONAL ALBATROSS. IN ISLAMIC CIRCLES, NOT A FEW SEE MERIT IN GETTING RID OF A POOR AND PREDOMINANTLY CATHOLIC PROVINCE THAT HAS DRAINED THE COUNTRY'S RESOURCES. SOME ACCUSE THE MILITARY OF TAKING CORRUPT ADVANTAGE OF ITS POWER THERE. ACCORDINGLY, THE INITIAL REACTION TO HABIBIE'S DECISION WAS MUTED, WITH MANY AMONG JAKARTA'S INTELLECTUAL ELITE LENDING IT SUPPORT OR

PAGE 01 JAKART 01018 05 OF 08 021018Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ANHR-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------A96DCD 021018Z /38
O 021004Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6383
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 08 JAKARTA 001018

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR ROY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/16
TAGS: PREL, OVIP (ALBRIGHT, M.), PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO JAKARTA

VIEWING IT AS THE INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE COUNTRY'S MISTAKES IN HANDLING THE PROBLEM.

20. (C) GAUGING THE BEHAVIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IS FRAUGHT WITH PERIL. THE ISSUE IS MADE TO ORDER FOR OPPONENTS TO GIVE LIP-SERVICE SUPPORT AND ENGAGE IN BEHIND THE SCENES DELAYING TACTICS. IF EAST TIMORESE REJECT AUTONOMY, IMPLICITLY OPTING FOR SEPARATION, FINAL APPROVAL MUST STILL BE GIVEN BY THE NEW ASSEMBLY FORMED AFTER THE ELECTIONS. FOR THE MOMENT, THIS IS PROBABLE BUT NOT
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01018 05 OF 08 021018Z
CERTAIN. INTERVENING DEVELOPMENTS COULD BE DECISIVE.

21. (C) THE MANEUVERING IS ALREADY UNDERWAY. PRESIDENT HABIBIE AND HIS SUPPORTERS ON THE ISSUE WOULD LIKE TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING EAST TIMORESE ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION OF THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE BEFORE THE JUNE 7 ELECTIONS, EVEN THOUGH THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT PRESENT HIS RECOMMENDATION TO THE ASSEMBLY UNTIL IT MEETS ON AUGUST 29. IF THE UNITED NATIONS, WHICH IS TASKED WITH COMING UP WITH CREDIBLE PROCEDURES TO DETERMINE EAST TIMORESE VIEWS, CAN MEET THIS COMPRESSED TIME FRAME, THIS WOULD HAVE TWO MERITS: IF THE EAST TIMORESE HAVE ALREADY MADE A CREDIBLE CHOICE FOR SEPARATION, THIS WOULD LESSEN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HOLDING NATIONAL ELECTIONS THERE ON JUNE 7 AND CONFRONT

THE NEW PARLIAMENT AND ASSEMBLY WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI, MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT TO ABORT THE PROCESS; IF THE CHOICE UNEXPECTEDLY WERE FOR AUTONOMY, THIS WOULD STRENGTHEN THE JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESSING AHEAD WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN EAST TIMOR ON JUNE 7.

22. (C) IN THE MEANTIME, OPPONENTS SEEM BENT ON RAISING THE STAKES AND DEMONSTRATING THAT SEPARATION WILL BE BOTH RISKY AND COSTLY. DESPITE MILITARY DENIALS THEY ARE THE SOURCE, WEAPONS HAVE BEEN GETTING INTO THE HANDS OF AGGRESSIVELY PRO-INTEGRATION EAST TIMORESE, WHO HAVE BEEN THREATENING CIVIL WAR AND/OR GUERRILLA RESISTANCE FROM THE HILLS IF THE PROVINCE SEPARATES. LEADERS OF THIS GROUP HAVE THREATENED WESTERN DIPLOMATS, WORKERS, AND JOURNALISTS.

B1

23. (C) THOSE OPPOSED TO SEPARATION SEEM TO BE PINNING THEIR HOPES TO TWO POSSIBILITIES: THAT THE ELECTIONS WILL ALTER THE POLITICAL BALANCE SUFFICIENTLY TO PREVENT PRESIDENT HABIBIE FROM SUBMITTING TO THE ASSEMBLY A PROPOSAL THAT EAST TIMOR BE PERMITTED TO BREAK AWAY; AND/OR THAT AUTONOMY WILL BECOME MORE ATTRACTIVE AS THE POTENTIAL DANGERS AND CONSEQUENCES OF SEPARATION BECOME CLEARER. SUCH HOPES CAN FUEL LAST RESORT TACTICS AIMED AT DELAYING OR OBSTRUCTING A SMOOTH PATH TOWARD SEPARATION.

24. (C) CLEARLY THE ROAD AHEAD WILL BE COMPLEX. MOREOVER, IN INDONESIA'S UNSETTLED CONDITIONS, THE EQUITIES ON EAST TIMOR ARE NOW CAUGHT UP IN LARGER ISSUES INVOLVING INDONESIA'S SURVIVAL AS A VIABLE NATION. OUR APPROACH ON EAST TIMOR CANNOT PROCEED IN ISOLATION FROM THESE BACKGROUND FACTORS.

25. (C) WE ARE ON THE RIGHT COURSE. WE SHOULD LEND OUR FULL WEIGHT TO BACKING A FAIR CHOICE FOR THE EAST TIMORESE (TECHNICALLY THEY WILL ONLY BE ASKED TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE). IN DOING SO, WE SHOULD AVOID ACTIONS OR WORDS THAT SUGGEST WE HAVE PREJUDGED THE OUTCOME OF THIS CHOICE. THIS WILL STRENGTHEN OUR ABILITY TO EXERT CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE, INSULATE US AGAINST A DANGEROUS BACKLASH IF THINGS GO

PAGE 04 JAKART 01018 05 OF 08 021018Z
WRONG, AND MINIMIZE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT OUR ACTIONS WILL STIR NATIONALISTIC PASSIONS. WITH THE MILITARY WE CAN AND SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT DISARMING THE CIVILIANS IN EAST TIMOR WILL BE NECESSARY TO CREATE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH AUTONOMY CAN RECEIVE FAIR CONSIDERATION.

26. (C) THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION WILL REQUIRE SPECIAL ATTENTION. FROM THE INDONESIAN STANDPOINT, EAST TIMOR REMAINS A PROVINCE UNTIL THE ASSEMBLY RESCINDS ITS 1976 DECREE MAKING EAST TIMOR AN INTEGRAL PART OF INDONESIA. IF EVERYTHING ELSE FALLS INTO PLACE, THAT MAY NOT OCCUR UNTIL NOVEMBER, AFTER WHICH THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE CLEAR IT WILL BE FLEXIBLE ON TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS. UNTIL THAT POINT, HOWEVER, INTRODUCING UN PEACE KEEPING FORCES OR OTHER FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES COULD CONFLICT WITH INDONESIA'S CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.

27. (C) FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS HAS DISPLAYED

PAGE 01 JAKART 01018 06 OF 08 021021Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ANHR-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /001W
----------A96E5F 021022Z /38
O 021004Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6384
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 08 JAKARTA 001018

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR ROY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/16
TAGS: PREL, OVIP (ALBRIGHT, M.), PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO JAKARTA

SENSITIVITY TO THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN HIS APPROACH. HE HAS OPPOSED INTRODUCING A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE INTO EAST TIMOR UNTIL AFTER THERE IS AGREEMENT ON AN AUTONOMY PACKAGE AND A METHOD FOR DETERMINING EAST TIMORESE

VIEWS. FOR SIMILAR REASONS, HE PUT OFF AN AUSTRALIAN REQUEST TO OPEN A CONSULATE THERE AS SOMETHING TO BE ADDRESSED AT A LATER STAGE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET CLARIFIED ITS VIEWS ON HOW TO HANDLE SECURITY FOR THE UN TEAM THAT WILL DETERMINE THE EAST TIMORESE CHOICE. IT MAY BE DIVIDED ON THE ISSUE. TO SOME DEGREE ITS POSITION MAY DEPEND N THE SCALE OF THE UN OPERATION,

CONFIDENTIAL

WHICH WILL BQ RELATED TO THE METHOD SELECTED. INDONESIANS MAY DISPLAY FLEXIBILITY IF THEIR OWN RESOURCES ARE CLEARLY INADEQUATE. IF THEY ARE CONFROTED ON SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES, THEY WILL DIG IN THEQR HEELS.

THE KEY PLAYERS

28. (C) THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS SUPPLEMENT THE ASSESSMENTS ALREADY CONVEYED IN REFTELS.



B1

B1

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0265

PAGE 01 JAKART 01018 07 OF 08 030223Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ANHR-01 TEDE-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /001W
------------------A9E9A5 030721Z /38
O 021004Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASDC IMMEDIATE 6385
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 08 JAKARTA 001018

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR ROY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/16
TAGS: PREL, OVIP (ALBRIGHT, M.), PGOV, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO JAKARTA

[redacted] B1

B1



CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E11

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B5

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0547

PAGE 01 STATE 041543 052331Z
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000R

DRAFTED BY: S/S-O: SCOTT BOSWELL
APPROVED BY: S/S-O: KEVIN M JOHNSON
----------AB77F2 052331Z /75
O 052109Z MAR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 041543 TOSEC 050151

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 01097 DATED 051300Z MARCH 99 SENT
ACTION SECSTATE BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO:
QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001097

OPS CENTER ONLY

PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S TRAVELING PARTY, EYES ONLY FOR ROSE
LIKINS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/16
TAGS: OVIP, (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE, K.), AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEFENSE ATTACHE JOSEPH H. DAVES, REASON 1.5
(B).

2. (C) HERE FOLLOWS THE DRAFT MEMCON OF SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S
MEETING WITH INDONESIAN DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMED FORCES CHIEF
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 041543 052331Z
GENERAL WIRANTO, MARCH 5, 1999, JAKARTA, INDONESIA.

CONFIDENTIAL
PROG: 03/05/98
S/S:RLIKINS
S/S:JHDAVES
BLANK
S/S
ZFF4
USDEL SECRETARY IN JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 4 MAR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 31 JUL 2006 200504211

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
ZEN AMCONSUL SURABAYA
CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TWINING

E.O. 12958 DECL: 03/05/16
TAGS: OVIP, (ALBRIGHT, MADELINE K.), PREL, MARR, PGOV, PINS, PHUM, PINR, PGOV, MILI, ID,
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMED FORCES CHIEF GENERAL WIRANTO, MARCH 5, 1999, JAKARTA, INDONESIA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY S/S DEPUTY ROSE LIKINS. REASON: 1.5 (B).

2. (U DATE AND LOCATION: MARCH 5,1999 AT DEFENSE MINISTRY, MERDEKA WEST, CENTRAL JAKARTA, INDONESIA.

3. (U) LIST OF U.S. AND FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS:

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 041543 052331Z
A. (U) U.S.:
SECRETARY OF STATE MADELINE K. ALBRIGHT
AMBASSADOR J. STAPLETON ROY
STANLEY O. ROTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
HAROLD H. KOH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR
LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT H. FOGELSONG, ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
KURT CAMPBELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIA/PACIFIC AFFAIRS
COLONEL JOSEPH H. DAVES, DEFENSE AND ARMY ATTACHE (NOTETAKER)
FRED BURKS, INTERPRETER
B. (U) INDONESIA:
GENERAL WIRANTO, DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMED FORCES CHIEF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL SOEGIONO, ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL BAMBANG YUDHOYONO, ARMED FORCES ASSISTANT FOR TERITORIAL AFFAIRS
MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT PARUNTU, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR
MAJOR GENERAL TYASNO SUDARTO, DIRECTOR OF THE ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BRIGADIER GENERAL SUDRAJAT, DEPUTY HEAD OF THE ARMED FORCES PUBLIC AFFAIRS CENTER
BRIGADIER GENERAL BAMBANG SUTEDJO, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE ARMED FORCES CHIEF
LIEUTENANT COLONEL PRAYITNO, GENERAL WIRANTO'S INTERPRETER
SUMMARY
---
4. (C) DURING A 40-MINUTE MEETING, SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AND GENERAL

WIRANTO DISCUSSED THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN INDONESIA, THE PLANNED SEPARATION OF THE POLICE FROM THE ARMED FORCES AND

CONTINUING VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR. [redacted] B1, B5

[redacted] SECRETARY ALBRIGHT EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SEPARATION OF MILITARY AND POLICE RESPONSIBILITIES IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. WIRANTO SAID THE MILITARY FAVORS A STRONG AND INDEPENDENT POLICE FORCE AND PROMISED THE ARMED FORCES WILL STRIVE TO PROVIDE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR HONEST, FAIR AND OPEN ELECTIONS. ON EAST TIMOR, WIRANTO DEFENDED THE ARMING OF PARAMILITARY FORCES AS CONSTITUTIONAL AND IN THE INTERESTS OF SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST AGGRESSIVE PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS. HOWEVER, HE SAID, ABRI SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS BY THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO REACH AN AGGREEMENT FOR SIMULTANEOUS COLLECTION OF FIREARMS FROM BOTH PARAMILITARY FORCES AND REBEL GROUPS. ABRI ALSO HOPES FOR A FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF THE TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS IN THE TROUBLED PROVINCE. END SUMMARY.

INDONESIA'S IMPORTANCE
---

5. (C) TEXT: SECRETARY ALBRIGHT MET WITH INDONESIAN DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMED FORCES CHIEF, GENERAL WIRANTO, ON MARCH 5, 1999 AT ARMED FORCES (ABRI) HEADQUARTERS. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT RECOGNIZED THE KEY ROLE INDONESIA PLAYS BOTH AS A REGIONAL POWER AND ON THE WORLD SCENE. SHE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S.-INDONESIA RELATIONS AND OUR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE REFORM PROCESS DURING THIS HISTORIC PERIOD, ADDING THAT THE ERA OF REFORM

PRESENTS A WONDERFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR INDONESIAN CULTURE TO FLOWER UNDER A NEW REPRESNTATIVE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. SHE ASKED GENERAL WIRANTO TO ADDRESS SECURITY PLANS DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD, HOW BEST TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER IN A DEMOCRATIC WAY, AND HOW TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE AMONG ARMED FACTIONS IN EAST TIMOR.

POLITICAL FREEDOM VERSUS LAW AND ORDER
---

6. (C) GENERAL WIRANTO NOTED THE MANY CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN INDONESIA DURING THE PAST YEAR. HE POINTED OUT THAT PEOPLE NOW HAVE MUCH GREATER FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ACTION, AS

DEMONSTRATED BY THE EMERGENCE OF MASS DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE STREETS. IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER FREEDOM, SECURITY FORCES HAVE FACED DISTURBANCES IN MANY PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. THREATS FROM LEFT AND RIGHT-WING GROUPS HAVE RE-EMERGED AFTER HAVING BEEN SUPRESSED FOR THE PAST 32 YEARS UNDER THE FORMER GOVERNMENT.

[redacted] B1, B5

8. (C) GENERAL WIRANTO SAID THE ROLE OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI) DURING THIS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS TO SAFEGUARD THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL CHANGE SO THAT IT TAKES PLACE IN A POSITIVE AND PEACEFUL MANNER. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE LARGE NUMBERS OF DEMONSTRATIONS AND MASS MOBILIZATIONS, SECURITY FORCES HAVE FACED

DIFFICULT CHALLENGES IN ENSURING THESE EVENTS ARE CONDUCTED IN A LAWFUL MANNER. HE EXPLAINED THAT, IN THE PAST, IT WAS EASY FOR THE ARMED FORCES TO ARREST PERSONS, SEARCH HOMES AND ESTABLISH CURFEWS, IF NECESSARY, TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER. THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY REVISED THE SUBVERSION LAWS TO CONFORM WITH INTERNATIONALY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

FIRM ACTION AGAINST LAWBREAKERS

9. (C) DURING THE FIRST SEVERAL MONTHS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT, THERE WERE NO REGULATIONS TO CONTROL MASS DEMONSTRATIONS. GROUPS WERE FREE TO STAGE DEMONSTRATIONS ANY TIME AND ANYWHERE, HE SAID. FOR THIS REASON, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ENACTED NEW LAWS TO ENSURE DEMONSTRATIONS ARE CONDUCTED IN A LEGAL AND ORDERLY MANNER. THESE LAWS SPECIFY HOW DEMONSTRATIONS CAN TAKE PLACE AND PROCEDURES FOR NOTIFYING THE AUTHORITIES BEFOREHAND. WIRANTO ADVOCATED STRONG ACTIONS AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW, IN ORDER TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF RIOTS LIKE THOSE THAT OCCURRED IN JAKARTA LAST MAY. HE CHARGED THAT RADICAL GROUPS HAVE BEEN BEHIND MANY OF THE VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND DISTURBANCES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN INDONESIA, AND THAT THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS HAS TENDED TO EXAGERATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THESE INCIDENTS.

SEPARATION OF THE POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES

10. (C) AS PART OF THE MILITARY REFORM EFFORTS, GENERAL WIRANTO DISCUSSED THE PLANNED SEPARATION OF THE POLICE FROM THE ARMED

FORCES, SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE ON APRIL 1. THE TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS, LIKE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING, WILL TAKE PLACE GRADUALLY, HE SAID. HOWEVER, ULTIMATELY A STRENGTHENED AND

INDEPENDENT POLICE FORCE WILL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR OVERALL MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE COUNTRY, WITH THE MILITARY ONLY RESPONDING UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS. THE POLICE WILL BE PLACED EITHER UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENT OR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS, HE SAID.

11. (C) GENERAL WIRANTO THANKED ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH FOR HIS PREVIOUS OFFER OF U.S. ASSISTANCE WITH TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF CROWD CONTROL GENERAL MATTERS OF POLICE PROFESSIONALISM. (COMMENT: A FIVE-PERSON TEAM LED BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERSONNEL RECENTLY VISITED JAKARTA TO EXAMINE POSSIBLE MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE INDONESIAN POLICE FORCE. END COMMENT)

CIVILIAN MILITIA

12. (C) WIRANTO SAID THE NUMBER OF POLICE IN THE COUNTRY IS SMALL IN RELATION TO THE POPULATION AND THE SIZE OF THE COUNTRY: ONLY ABOUT ONE POLICEMAN FOR EVERY 1,200 CITIZENS, COMPARED TO ONE FOR EVERY 300 PERSONS IN THE U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS RECRUITED A CIVILIAN MILITIA FORCE TO ASSIST AND REINFORCE THE POLICE DURING THE GENERAL ELECTIONS. THE MILITIA MEMBERS WILL ASSIST IN MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER AND

SECURING POLLING PLACES, HE SAID.

13. (C) SECRETARY ALBRIGHT EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR THE DELICATE ROLE PLAYED BY GENERAL WIRANTO AND THE ARMED FORCES DURING THIS TRANSITION PERIOD IN INDONESIA. SHE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SEPARATION OF MILITARY AND POLICE RESPONSIBILITIES IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. THE MILITARY PLAYS THE

KEY ROLE IN PROTECTING THE COUNTRY, BUT SHOULD NOT INTERFERE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS, SHE SAID.



B1, B5

B1, B5

EAST TIMOR
---

15. (C) IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S QUESTION ON HOW TO REDUCE THE VIOLENCE AND DISARM VARIOUS GROUPS IN EAST TIMOR, GENERAL WIRANTO STATED THAT THE PRESENCE OF INDONESIAN MILITARY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR IS INTENDED TO CREATE A PEACEFUL AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE TIMORESE PEOPLE. HE CLAIMED THE STRENGTH OF MILITARY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR IS "MINIMAL" WITH MOST UNITS BELONGING TO THE TERRITORIAL FORCES. HISTORICALLY, ABRI HAD RAISED A NUMBER OF TIMORESE PARAMILITARY UNITS FROM SOCIETY TO ASSIST ARMY UNITS AND THE POLICE IN EAST TIMOR. THESE PARAMILITARY FORCES HAVE BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR A LONG TIME AND HAVE TRADITIONALLY BEEN GIVEN FIREARMS DURING PERIODS OF EMERGENCY. THE ARMING OF THESE FORCES IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 041543 052331Z
CONSTITUTION AND APPROPRIATE DUE TO THE RECENT AGGRESSIVE AND ILLEGAL ACTIONS OF ARMED REBELS IN EAST TIMOR, HE SAID.

16. (C) WIRANTO SAID HE SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS BY THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (KOMNAS HAM) TO REACH AN AGREEMENT FOR SIMULTANEOUS COLLECTION OF FIREARMS FROM BOTH PARAMILITARY FORCES AND REBEL GROUPS. ABRI ALSO SUPPORTS TRIPARTITE TALKS ON EAST TIMOR BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS, PORTUGAL AND INDONESIA, AND HOPES FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS IN THE TROUBLED PROVINCE, HE SAID. FINALLY, GENERAL WIRANTO POINTED OUT THAT MOST OF HIS SENIOR STAFF HAVE RECEIVED MILITARY TRAINING IN THE U.S., IMPLYING HE WOULD WELCOME THE REESTABLISHMENT OF CLOSER MILITARY TIES WITH THE U.S. ARMED FORCES.
ROY UNQUOTE PICKERING

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E13

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B5

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9737

PAGE 01 JAKART 01098 01 OF 03 051903Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00
/000W
----------AB5BE7 051903Z /22
O 051331Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6471

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001098

OPS CENTER ONLY

PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S TRAVELING PARTY, EYES ONLY
FOR S/S ROSE LIKINS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/16
TAGS: OVIP, (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM MICHAEL OWENS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) HERE FOLLOWS THE DRAFT MEMCON OF SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S MEETINGS WITH MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, AMIEN RAIS, AND THE GROUP OF POLITICAL LEADERS.

CONFIDENTIAL
PROG 03/05/99
S/S:RLIKINS
POL:EMCWILLIAMS;JSEEVERS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01098 01 OF 03 051903Z
BLANK
S/S
ZFF4
USDEL SECRETARY IN JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/16
TAGS: OVIP, (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETINGS WITH POLITICAL LEADERS, MARCH 5, 1999, JAKARTA, INDONESIA

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 4 MAR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 31 JUL 2006 200504211

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY S/S DEPUTY ROSE LIKINS. REASON 1.5 (D).

SUMMARY

2. (C) MEGAWATI SAID THERE WERE SERIOUS IMPEDIMENTS TO A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION PROCESS, INCLUDING THE INFLUENCE OF MONEY POLITICS, INADEQUATE TIME FOR PREPARATION, AND A PLETHORA OF PARTIES. NONETHELESS, SHE VIEWED THE ELECTION AS ESSENTIAL AND BELIEVED THAT IT COULD BE ORGANIZED BY JUNE 7. AMIEN RAIS EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE UPCOMING ELECTION, BUT VOICED CONCERN THAT THE UNREST THAT HAS PLAGUED INDONESIA, MOST RECENTLY IN AMBON, COULD PROVE A MAJOR OBSTACLE. IN HER MEETING WITH A BROAD RANGE OF POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS, THE SECRETARY RECOGNIZED THE HARD WORK THEY WERE CARRYING OUT IN PUSHING FOR A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY.

END SUMMARY.

MEETING WITH MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI

3. (U) MARCH 5, 1999, BOROBUDUR HOTEL, JAKARTA, INDONESIA.

4. (U) U.S. PARTICIPANTS: THE SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR ROY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY KOH, POLCOUNS (NOTETAKER).

INDONESIAN PARTICIPANTS: MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, CHAIRMAN OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI-P), AND LAKSAMANA SUKARDI, PDI-P TREASURER.

5. (C) THE SECRETARY SAID THE USG HOPED FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS THAT WOULD FINALLY GIVE A REAL CHANCE TO OPPOSITION PARTIES. MEGAWATI SHARED THIS PERSPECTIVE, BUT NOTED THAT, UNLIKE HER OWN PARTY, MOST OF THE PARTIES COMPETING WERE NEW, WITH POOR STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND OFTEN LITTLE CONTACT AT THE LOCAL LEVELS. THERE WAS NOT ADEQUATE TIME FOR MOST PARTIES TO PREPARE FOR THE ELECTIONS AND, IN THE END, PERHAPS ONLY 10 TO 15 WOULD ACTUALLY COMPETE NATIONALLY. NEVERTHELESS, INDONESIA URGENTLY NEEDED A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION THAT WOULD GIVE IT A NEW GOVERNMENT. THE PAST 10 MONTHS HAD SEEN LITTLE ECONOMIC PROGRESS DUE TO ECONOMIC POLICIES THAT WERE INEFFECTIVE AND NOT TRANSPARENT.



B1, B5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9738

PAGE 01 JAKART 01098 02 OF 03 051903Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00
/000W
----------AB5BFA 051904Z /22
O 051331Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6472

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 001098

OPS CENTER ONLY

PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S TRAVELING PARTY, EYES ONLY
FOR S/S ROSE LIKINS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/16
TAGS: OVIP, (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL

B1, B5

8. (C) DISCUSSING WOMEN'S ROLE IN POLITICS, MEGAWATI SAID THAT THE PDI-P HAD ESTABLISHED A WOMEN'S DEPARTMENT TO GET WOMEN INVOLVED IN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT. WOMEN DID NOT HOLD POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT REFLECTING THEIR NUMBERS IN SOCIETY.

B1, B5

MEETING WITH AMIEN RAIS

10. (U) MARCH 5, 1999, BOROBUDUR HOTEL, JAKARTA, INDONESIA.

11. (U) U.S. PARTICIPANTS: THE SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR ROY, A/S ROTH, A/S KOH AND NOTETAKER (POLOFF).

INDONESIAN PARTICIPANTS: AMIEN RAIS, NAITONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN) LEADER AND BARA HASIBUAN, HIS AIDE.

12. (C) DISCUSSING THE PROSPECTS FOR THE UPCOMING ELECTION, AMIEN RAIS SAID HE AND HIS PARTY WERE WORKING HARD TO GUARANTEE THAT THE JUNE 7 POLL WOULD BE FAIR AND HONEST. HE CITED TRAINING OFFERED BY INTERNATIONAL NGOS SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (IRI) AS ESPECIALLY USEFUL. HE STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THAT INDONESIA NEEDED INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS TO HELP PREVENT "OLD HABITS" FROM ENTERING THE ELECTION PROCESS.

CONFIDENTIAL

13. (C) THE SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER OPPOSITION PARTIES HAD PLANS TO FORM A COALITION AND ABOUT HOW THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE CHOSEN FOLLOWING THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION. RAIS RESPONDED THAT "STATUS QUO

FORCES WERE VERY SOLID." THUS THE OPPOSITION HAD TO WORK TOGETHER TO DEFEAT THEM AND CARRY OUT REFORM.

[redacted] B1, B5

14. (C) REGARDING THE NEW ELECTORAL PROCESS, RAIS STATED THAT THE RECENTLY ENACTED POLITICAL LAWS WERE "MUCH BETTER THAN BEFORE," AND CITED AS EXAMPLES PROVISIONS FOR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS AND THE STIPULATION THAT THE ELECTION WOULD BE HELD ON A HOLIDAY.

15. (C) RAIS WAS FAR MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE "CONTINUATION OF BLOODY INCIDENTS," SUCH AS THE RECENT VIOLENCE IN AMBON, AND HOW THIS COULD AFFECT THE ELECTION AND NATIONAL LIFE IN GENERAL. HE CHARGED THAT THERE WAS A COMMON PATTERN TO MUCH OF THE VIOLENCE IN AMBON AND OTHER PLACES THAT DEMONSTRATED TO HIM THAT IT

CONFIDENTIAL

WAS "ENGINEERED AND WELL-FINANCED." [redacted] B1, B5

16. (C) THE SECRETARY ASKED RAIS ABOUT THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN POLITICS AND INDONESIAN NATIONAL LIFE. RAIS EMPHASIZED THAT HIS PARTY WAS PLURALISTIC, BASED ON THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA, AND INCLUDED NON-ISLAMIC MEMBERS. HIS PLURALISTIC APPROACH HAD CONFOUNDED THOSE WHO BELIEVED HE WOULD LOSE SUPPORT IF HE DID NOT FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY ON HIS MUSLIM BASE. HE ASSERTED THAT 90 PERCENT OF MUSLIMS IN INDONESIA HAD ABANDONED THE OLD BELIEFS ADVANCED IN THE 1950'S THAT INDONESIA COULD BECOME AN ISLAMIC STATE. HE BELIEVED THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC THINKING ABOUT ITS ROLE IN THE NATION OVER THE PAST 25 YEARS WAS VERY PROMISING.

17. (C) THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT THIS REPRESENTED A DIFFERENT TREND FROM THAT SEEN IN MANY OTHER PARTS OF

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0059

PAGE 01 JAKART 01098 03 OF 03 052044Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SVC-00
SAS-00 /000W
----------AB665A 052044Z /22
O 051331Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6473

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 001098

OPS CENTER ONLY

PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S TRAVELING PARTY, EYES ONLY
FOR S/S ROSE LIKIN: 03/05/16

E.O. 12958: DECL 03/05/16
TAGS: OVIP,K.), AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: HE MUSLIM WORLD, AND ASKED WHY INDONESIA WAS FOLLOWING
A DIFFERENT PATH. RAIS REPLIED THAT PART OF THE REASON

WAS FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S EFFORTS TO DIMINISH THE

ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN NATIONAL POLITICS. THIS HAD SERVED
TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS.

GROUP MEETING WITH POLITICAL LEADERS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01098 03 OF 03 052044Z
18. (U) MARCH 5, 1999, BOROBUDUR HOTEL, JAKARTA,
INDONESIA.

19. (U) U.S. PARTICIPANTS: THE SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR
ROY, CHIEF OF STAFF ELAINE SHOCAS, A/S ROTH, A/S LARSON,
A/S KOH, AND NOTETAKER (POLOFF).

INDONESIAN PARTICIPANTS:

MATORI ABDUL DJALIL, CHAIRMAN OF PEOPLE'S AWAKENING
PARTY (PKB, ABDURRAHMAN WAHID'S PARTY)

GENERAL (RET.) EDI SUDRADJAT, CHAIRMAN OF THE JUSTICE

AND UNITY PARTY (PKP)

LAKSAMANA SUKARDI, TREASURER, INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY "STRUGGLE" (PDI-P, MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI'S PARTY)

ABDUL GAFUR, VICE SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT AND VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL BOARD, GOLKAR

LENA MARIANA MUKTI, UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), NATIONAL BOARD MEMBER
YUSRIL IHZA MAHENDRA, CHAIRMAN OF THE CRESCENT MOON AND STAR PARTY (PBB)

NUR MAHMUDI ISMAIL, CHAIRMAN OF THE JUSTICE PARTY

SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS, CHAIRMAN OC
UNION PARTY (PUDI)

CONFIDENTIAL

DELIAR NOER, CHAIRMAN OF THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY PARTY (PUI)

SYARIFUDDIN HARAHAP, CHAIRMAN OF THE REPUBLIC PARTY

MARKUS MALI, CHAIRMAN OF THE DEMOCRATIC CATHOLIC PARTY

20. (C) THE SECRETARY RECOGNIZED THE HARD WORK OF THE ASSEMBLED PARTY LEADERS IN PUSHING FOR A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY. THREE OF THE PARTICIPANTS RESPONDED. SRI BINTANG PAMURIRE FOR A MORE DEMOCRATIC TO "BUILD A NEW (###) POINTED OUT THAT(##) ELECTION FOR THE (###) APPRECIATION FOR THE (####)RIFUDDIN HARAHAP SAID THAT MAINTAIN THE UNITY OF E ATION. HE THEN STATED THAT FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO STILL HAD RIGHTS AND A LARGE NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS.
ROY

NOTE: (##)OMISSION IN PARA 20. CORRECTION WILL FOLLOW.

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0878

PAGE 01 JAKART 01098 03 OF 03 051529Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00
/000W
----------AB82E5 060205Z /22
O 051331Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6473

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 001098

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y(TEXT)

OPS CENTER ONLY

PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S TRAVELING PARTY, EYES ONLY
FOR S/S ROSE LIKINS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/16
TAGS: OVIP, (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL

THE MUSLIM WORLD, AND ASKED WHY INDONESIA WAS FOLLOWING A DIFFERENT PATH. RAIS REPLIED THAT PART OF THE REASON WAS FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S EFFORTS TO DIMINISH THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN NATIONAL POLITICS. THIS HAD SERVED TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS.

GROUP MEETING WITH POLITICAL LEADERS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01098 03 OF 03 051529Z
---

18. (U) MARCH 5, 1999, BOROBUDUR HOTEL, JAKARTA, INDONESIA.

19. (U) U.S. PARTICIPANTS: THE SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR ROY, CHIEF OF STAFF ELAINE SHOCAS, A/S ROTH, A/S LARSON, A/S KOH, AND NOTETAKER (POLOFF).

INDONESIAN PARTICIPANTS:

MATORI ABDUL DJALIL, CHAIRMAN OF PEOPLE'S AWAKENING PARTY (PKB, ABDURRAHMAN WAHID'S PARTY)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 31 JUL 2006 200504211

GENERAL (RET.) EDI SUDRADJAT, CHAIRMAN OF THE JUSTICE AND UNITY PARTY (PKP)

LAKSAMANA SUKARDI, TREASURER, INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY "STRUGGLE" (PDI-P, MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI'S PARTY)

ABDUL GAFUR, VICE SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT AND VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL BOARD, GOLKAR

LENA MARIANA MUKTI, UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP), NATIONAL BOARD MEMBER
YUSRIL IHZA MAHENDRA, CHAIRMAN OF THE CRESCENT MOON AND STAR PARTY (PBB)

NUR MAHMUDI ISMAIL, CHAIRMAN OF THE JUSTICE PARTY

SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS, CHAIRMAN OF INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC

UNION PARTY (PUDI)
DELIAR NOER, CHAIRMAN OF THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY PARTY (PUI)

SYARIFUDDIN HARAHAP, CHAIRMAN OF THE REPUBLIC PARTY

MARKUS MALI, CHAIRMAN OF THE DEMOCRATIC CATHOLIC PARTY

20. (C) THE SECRETARY RECOGNIZED THE HARD WORK OF THE ASSEMBLED PARTY LEADERS IN PUSHING FOR A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY. THREE OF THE PARTICIPANTS RESPONDED. SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE FOR A MORE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY AND THE NEED TO "BUILD A NEW INDONESIA." LENA MARIANA MUKTI POINTED OUT THAT INDONESIA WAS FACING A FREE ELECTION FOR THE FIRST TIME, AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S SUPPORT. SYARIFUDDIN HARAHAP SAID THAT HIS PARTY WANTED TO MAINTAIN THE UNITY OF THE NATION. HE THEN STATED THAT FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO STILL HAD RIGHTS AND A LARGE NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS.

ROY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2152

PAGE 01 JAKART 01096 01 OF 02 080151Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /000W
----------ABE6A4 080151Z /69
O 051225Z MAR 99 ZDK PER RUEHCB 6295
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6466

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001096

OPS CENTER ONLY

PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S TRAVELING PARTY, EYES ONLY FOR S/S ROSE LIKINS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/16
TAGS: OVIP, (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION MICHAEL P. OWENS. REASON 1.5 (D).

2. (C) HERE FOLLOWS THE DRAFT MEMCON OF SECRETARY ALBRIGHTS'S MEETING WITH EAST TIMORESE PRO-AUTONOMY SPOKESMEN, MARCH 5, 1999, JAKARTA, INDONESIA.

CON FIDENTIAL
PROG 03/05/99
S/S:RLIKINS
POL:WGGRAY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01096 01 OF 02 080151Z
BLANK
S/S
ZFF4
USDEL SECRETARY IN JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/16

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 AUG 2006 200504211

TAGS: OVIP (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.) PREL, PHUM, PINR, EAID, ID, UN
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH EAST TIMORESE PRO-AUTONOMY SPOKESMEN, MARCH 5, JAKARTA, INDONESIA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY S/S ROSE LIKINS. REASON 1.5 (D).

2. (U) MARCH 5, 1999, BOROBUDUR HOTEL, JAKARTA, INDONESIA

3. (U) U.S. PARTICIPANTS: THE SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR ROY, A/S ROTH, A/S KOH, A/S JAMES RUBIN AND NOTETAKER (POLOFF).

EAST TIMORESE PARTICIPANTS: DOMINGOS SOARES, THE DISTRICT CHIEF OF DILI; JOSE TAVERES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIAL; FLORENTINO SARMENTO, GOLKAR MEMBER OF THE EAST TIMOR LOCAL ASSEMBLY; AND DOMINGOS POLICARPO, A NATIONAL BANK OFFICIAL.

SUMMARY
---

4. (C) A DELEGATION OF PRO-AUTONOMY EAST TIMORESE URGED THAT THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTONOMY AS A COMPROMISE SOLUTION FOR EAST TIMOR. THEY WERE OPPOSED TO ANY CONSULTATION PROCESS, ARGUING THAT EAST TIMOR'S CULTURE WAS NOT AMENABLE TO A ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE EXERCISE. THE SECRETARY STRESSED U.S. SUPPORT FOR A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE. END SUMMARY.

AUTONOMY SEEN AS COMPROMISE
---

5. (C) THE SECRETARY REQUESTED THE DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR DIALOGUE AND THE RECONCILIATION OF DIFFERING POSITIONS, AS WELL AS THE BEST MEANS OF DETERMINING THE WISHES OF THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE. SOARES SAID HIS GROUP, THE "FORUM FOR UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND JUSTICE," WISHED TO RESOLVE THE EAST TIMOR SITUATION BY PEACEFUL MEANS. WHILE THEY PREFERRED FULL INTEGRATION WITH INDONESIA, THEY WOULD ACCEPT WIDE-RANGING AUTONOMY AS A COMPROMISE SOLUTION.

CONSULTATION PROCESS OPPOSED
---

6. (C) SOARES NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS SUPPORTING AUTONOMY IN KOSOVO, AND ARGUED THAT THE UN AUTONOMY PROPOSAL FOR EAST TIMOR SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY WITHOUT ANY PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS. ANY TYPE OF VOTING IN EAST TIMOR, ESPECIALLY A REFERENDUM, WOULD NOT BRING UNITY, "BUT THE OPPOSITE." WHILE HIS

FORUM SUPPORTED DIALOGUE BETWEEN ALL SIDES, SOARES EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT "EXTREMISTS" WHO HAVE FOUGHT AUTONOMY WILL REMAIN A
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01096 01 OF 02 080151Z
THREAT. HE PRESENTED THE SECRETARY WITH A LIST OF ATTACKS HE CLAIMED WERE CARRIED OUT BY THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE FORCES. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION, AND ASKED SOARES TO CLARIFY HIS GROUP'S POSITION ON HOW THE WISHES OF THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE WOULD BE DETERMINED.

ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE NOT POSSIBLE
---

7. (C) SOARES ARGUED THAT EAST TIMOR'S CULTURE WAS NOT AMENABLE TO A ONE-MAN, ONE-VOTE EXERCISE. SARMENTO EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR WHAT HE CALLED LONGSTANDING U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE EAST TIMORESE AND THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISTS IN EAST TIMOR. HE SAID THAT THE EAST TIMOR CONFLICT ESSENTIALLY WAS A CIVIL WAR IN WHICH ONE OF THE BELLIGERENTS REQUESTED INDONESIAN INTERVENTION. THIS INTERVENTION HAD FACILITATED EAST TIMOR'S SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT. SARMENTO ARGUED THAT ECONOMICALLY IT WAS ALMOST NONSENSE TO CONSIDER INDEPENDENCE FOR THE 800,000 EAST

NOT PROCESSED - STRAGGLER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2153

PAGE 01 JAKART 01096 02 OF 02 080152Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /000W
----------ABE6A5 080152Z /69
O 051225Z MAR 99 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6467

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001096

OPS CENTER ONLY

PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S TRAVELING PARTY, EYES ONLY FOR S/S ROSE LIKINS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/16
TAGS: OVIP, (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL

TIMORESE, EVEN AFTER A TRANSITION PERIOD OF SEVERAL YEARS.

SECRETARY URGES PEACEFUL SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO EAST TIMORESE

8. (C) THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY ASSURING THE PRO-AUTONOMY DELEGATION THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE. SHE ADDED THAT WHATEVER SOLUTION EMERGES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A PEACEFUL MANNER.
ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8022

PAGE 01 STATE 043566 092126Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 CPR-02 UTED-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 PA-00 PRS-00
P-00 SSC-01 SS-00 USIE-00 G-00 SAS-00 /004R

043566
SOURCE: KODAKA.009213
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:VEMURRAY -- 03/03/99 71823 O:PIMBS/INDONESIA/E
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK EAP:RDEMING S/S:~L1K1NS
S/S-O:DOLSEN S/S-C:BHAMBRICK P:DSTRAUB
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
S/S-C
----------ACCB6E 092127Z /38
O 092127Z MAR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 043566

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPDC, ID
SUBJECT: IDUL ADHA MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY ALBRIGHT TO FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY ALBRIGHT TO FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME BEFORE MARCH 28, 1999. THE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT OF MESSAGE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA WISHES TO DO SO. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 043566 092126Z

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

I WARNLY EXTEND TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA MY BEST WISHES ON THE HOLY OCCASION OF IDUL ADHA.

IT WAS A PLEASURE MEETING WITH YOU AGAIN IN JARARTA IN EARLY MARCH. THE VISIT REINFORCED IN MY MIND THE IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF A STABLE, PROSPEROUS AND DEMOCRATIC INDONESIA. AS A FRIEND OF YOUR NATION FOR FIFTY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 31 JUL 2006 200504211

YEARS, THE UNITED STATES STANDS READY TO ASSIST INDONESIA

AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY.

MAY YOU AND YOUR FELLOW CITIZENS BE BLESSED WITH GOOD HEALTH, PEACE AND PROSPERITY IN THE COMING MONTHS.

SINCERELY,
MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT

END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E21

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ5278

PAGE 01 STATE 043052 090201Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00
SAS-00 /001R

043052
SOURCE: KODAKA.009024
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:VEMURRAY/ALUDWIG -- 03/08/99 7-1823
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMES:DAHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY
----------AC5EEE 090201Z /38
O 090201Z MAR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 043052

OFFICIAL INFORMAL, SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 40

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

1. (SBU) AMIEN RAIS IN WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 043052 090201Z
RAIS HAD A FULL SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS TODAY: JIM STEINBERG, LEON FUERTH, AND HATTIE BABBITT, THOUGH HE HAD TO CANCEL HIS MEETING WITH A/S ROTH. PALS'S ADDRESS TO A USINDO BREAKFAST GATHERING OF ROUGHLY 100 PEOPLE WAS PREDICTABLE, AND HIS COMMENTS SEEMED TO TRACK WITH HIS RECENT STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY. HE PORTRAYED HIMSELF AS A LEADER OF MODERATE VIEWS, CRITICIZED THE SOEHARTO AND HABIBIE GOVERNMENTS FOR MOST OF INDONESIA'S PROBLEMS, BUT HAD FEW CONCRETE IDEAS ON HOW HE WOULD IMPROVE OR CHANGE MATTERS. PALS PROMINENTLY DREW ATTENTION TO HIS RECENT MEETINGS WITH SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AND FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER, AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 31 JUL 2006 200504211

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DROPPED A/S ROTH'S NAME AS WELL.

2. (U) MEMCON

S/S HAS ASKED THE STATUS OF THE ONE OUTSTANDING MENCON FROM THE SECRETARY'S JAKARTA STOP, THE READOUT OF HER MEETING WITH INDONESIAN OPPOSITION LEADERS (WE'RE NOT SURE IF THIS IS BEING DONE AS ONE PIECE OR AS THREE.) WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT YOU HAVE THE CABLE WELL IN HAND; JUST LET US KNOW AND WE'LL PASS ALONG THE INFORMATION TO ALEX GROSSMAN.

3. (U) VISITING TRADE DG

ELENA MIKALIS OF USDOC ASKS WHETHER YOU KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE PLANS OF A TRADE MINISTRY DIRECTOR GENERAL (NAME UNKNOWN) TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES TO TALK ABOUT AUTOS. HE MAY HEAD TO DETROIT BEFORE COMING TO WASHINGTON.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 043052 090201Z

4. (U) WORLD CONFERENCE ON RELIGION AND PEACE

CAN YOU TELL US ANYTHING ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF "THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON RELIGION AND PEACE" IN INDONESIA? THE GROUP HAS ATTRACTED THE ATTENTION OF SPECIAL AMBASSADOR FOR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS BOB SEIPLE, WHO MAY ARGUE THAT DRL'S ESF FUNDS BE USED TO SUPPORT ITS ACTIVITIES. THE ORGANIZATION WAS APPARENTLY FOUNDED IN KYOTO IN L9VO AND WORK TOWARD GREATER INTERRELIGIOUS COLLABORATION. IT IS HEADQUARTERED AT UNITED NATIONS PLAZA IN NEW YORK, IS ACREDITED TO ECOSOC, AND MAINTAINS CONSULTATIVE STATUS WITH UNESCO. WE'LL FAX YOU A FEW OF THE PAGES OF THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY THAT DRL SHARED WITH US. THE SUMMARY OUTLINES SOME OF THE ACTIVITIES THAT THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON RELIGION AND PEACE PROPOSES TO UNDERTAKE IN INDONESIA. ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E22

EAP

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MAR - 9

RELEASED IN FULL

Dear Mr. Wolf:

Thank you for your letter of January 29, 1999 to Secretary Albright about East Timor and enclosure of a copy of your correspondence to Indonesian President Habibie on his offer to consider independence, if the East Timorese reject a proposal of wide-ranging autonomy.

The Secretary visited Indonesia on March 4-5, 1999 and East Timor was prominently on the agenda for her discussions with senior Indonesian officials. She also met with Xanana Gusmao, the East Timorese leader. The Secretary's purposes in these discussions were to underscore the Administration's interest in a peaceful and enduring resolution of East Timor's status, and to find constructive ways to move forward complex and delicate negotiations on a basis acceptible to all parties.

Indonesia's new policy has multiplied the opportunities for positive changes. As the East Timorese consider either autonomy or independence in the coming months, we look to all parties -- Indonesia, Portugal, the UN secretary general and the East Timorese themselves -- to work constructively and responsibly toward developing realistic transition arrangements. Bishop Belo, Xanana Gusmao, and other East Timorese leaders have said these arrangements should be designed to ensure that this transition is conducted peacefully, and with regard to the stability and viability of East Timor. We agree and continue to be actively engaged in all key aspects of the process.

The Honorable
Frank R. Wolf,
House of Representatives.

0747

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 31 JUL 2006 200504211

Please do not hesitate to contact us again if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Congressional Reply to Rep. Frank R. Wolf 1/29/99 Letter Re: E. Timor

Draft:EAP/PIMBS:RClarke RTC x7-2543 2/24/99
P:\PIMBS\Cong. Wolf (1-99) on E. Timor.doc

Clearances:EAP:SRoth
:EAP:DHartwick,Acting(ok)
:EAP/RSP:DKeegan(info)
:DRL:SSutton(ok)
:EUR/WE:DGlassman(ok)
:H:DPittman(ok)

E25

EAP

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MAR 12 1999

Dear Mr. Blumenauer:

Thank you for your letter to Secretary Albright, dated February 11, 1999, in which you shared your insights on Indonesia. We appreciated your recognition and praise of the work of the staff at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta and the other missions you visited during your recent trip to Asia.

The Secretary visited Indonesia on March 4-5, 1999. The upcoming elections figured prominently in her discussions with senior Indonesian officials as well as the NGO and political leaders she met. She underscored that a successful election is critical to the political and economic stability of the country. Legislation like House Resolution 32 that you co-sponsored helps to reinforce the message that the broad spectrum of U.S. government leaders considers a free and fair election a high priority.

In her discussions of East Timor, the Secretary stressed the Administration's interest in a peaceful and enduring resolution of East Timor's status. She encouraged Indonesian government officials and East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao to find constructive ways to move forward the complex and delicate negotiations on a basis acceptable to all parties. She urged the government of Indonesia to take steps to reduce tension.

Indonesia's new policy has multiplied opportunities for positive changes. As the East Timorese consider either autonomy or independence over the coming months, we look to all parties -- Indonesia, Portugal, the UN secretary general and the East Timorese themselves -- to work constructively and responsibly toward developing realistic transition arrangements. Bishop Belo, Xanana Gusmao, and other East

The Honorable
Earl Blumenauer,
House of Representatives.

1064

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 31 JUL 2006 200504211

Timorese leaders have said these arrangements should be designed to ensure that this transition is conducted peacefully, and with regard to the stability and viability of East Timor. We strongly agree and will continue to be actively engaged in all key aspects of the process.

I understand that you have been in touch with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Ralph Boyce to discuss Indonesia in some depth. I encourage you to continue your dialogue with Mr. Boyce on Indonesia issues. We would be particularly interested to hear whether plans to send a Congressional delegation to observe the Indonesian election have taken further shape.

Please do not hesitate to contact us again if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Congressional Reply to Rep. Earl Blumenaur 2/11/99 Letter
Re: Elections/E. Timor control 1064-001/002

Draft:EAP/PIMBS:VEMurray VM x7-1823 3/9/99
O:\PIMBS\Indonesia/Elections/H-Blumenaur.doc

Clearances:EAP:SRoth SM
:EAP:RLBoyce MK
:EAP/PIMBS:DHartwick/JAloisi VM for
:EAP/RSP:DKeegan (ok)
:DRL:SSutton (ok)
:EUR/WE:MYouth (ok) rmfo
:H:DPittman (info)

RELEASED IN FULL

MAR 12 1999

Dear Senator Wellstone:

Thank you for your letter to Secretary Albright, dated March 1, 1999, regarding the situation in East Timor.

During the Secretary's March 4-5 visit to Indonesia, East Timor figured prominently in her discussions with senior officials of the Indonesian government (GOI) and military (ABRI). She also met with East Timorese resistance leader Xanana Gusmao.

The Indonesian government's announcement on January 27 that it would respect the will of the people of East Timor and take steps to authorize independence, should the East Timorese reject autonomy, has opened new possibilities for a resolution acceptable to all the parties. Indonesian and Portuguese officials continue to work on the details of an autonomy proposal under UN auspices, and the UN is determining a mechanism through which the East Timorese can indicate their acceptance or rejection of that proposal. We continue to support this process as the best vehicle for an enduring and peaceful resolution of East Timor's status.

As East Timor moves toward either autonomy or independence, we look to all parties -- Indonesia, Portugal, the UN Secretary General and the East Timorese themselves -- to work constructively for a sustainable solution with realistic transition arrangements. The transition must give due regard to the stability and viability of East Timor and should not be rushed if that undermines its security and ultimate success.

In that regard, the Secretary expressed deep concern with all her interlocutors in Jakarta about reports from East Timor of escalating political confrontation and human

The Honorable
Paul D. Wellstone,
United States Senate.

PAGES MISSING

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 31 JUL 2006 200504211

(705

Reply on East Timor to Senators Wellstone, R. Feingold, Harkin, Kennedy, Leahy, Moynihan, Lautenberg, Lieberman, Torricelli, Kohl, Reed, Grassley, D. Feinstein, Mikulski and Durbin

Draft:EAP/PIMBS:RClarke x7-2543 3/9/99
O:\INDONESIA\East Timor\Reply Mar 99 to Sen Wellstone & others on E. Timor-2.doc

Clearances:EAP:SRoth(ok)
:EAP:SBoyce(ok)
:EAP/PIMBS:DHartwick(ok)
:EAP/RSP:DKeegan(ok)
:S/P:KBrooks(ok)
:DRL:SSutton(ok)
:EUR/WE:MYouth(ok)
:H:DPittman(ok)



E27

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5227

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 047748 161804Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000R

047748
SOURCE: KODAKA.016124
DRAFTED BY: S/S-S AGROSSMAN/POL:EMCWILLIAMS:LMH -- 03/16/99 7-8349
APPROVED BY: S:THE SECRETARY
EAP:SOROTH S/S:RLIKINS S:ADWOLEE S/S-O:KMJOHNSON
S/S:RMLIKINS
----------AF956E 161807Z /38
O R 161804Z MAR 99 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 047748

NODIS

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/16
TAGS: OVIP (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY
ROUNDTABLE, MARCH 5, 1999, JAKARTA, INDONESIA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROSE
LIKINS. REASON: 1.5(D).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 047748 161804Z
2. (U) MARCH 5, 1999, BOROBUDUR HOTEL, JAKARTA,
INDONESIA.

3. (U) PARTICIPANTS

U.S.:
THE SECRETARY
AMBASSADOR J. STAPLETON ROY
ELAINE SHOCAS, CHIEF OF STAFF
STANLEY ROTH, EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY
HAROLD KOH, DRL ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ALAN LARSON, EB ASSISTANT SECRETARY
KURT CAMPBELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (DOD)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 15 MAR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 07 AUG 2006 200504211

DECAPTIONED

INDONESIANS:

GOENAWAN MOHAMMAD (MAGAZINE PUBLISHER)
NULYA LUBIS (LAW PROFESSOR, HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST)
MARZUKI DARUSMAN (CHAIRMAN OF THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION), MELY TAN (SCHOLAR, SINO INDONESIAN HISTORIAN)
ITA FATHIA NADIA (WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVIST)
REV. PHIL ERARY (SPOKESMAN FOR WEST PAPUAN INTERESTS, CHRISTIAN MINORITY) HASBALLAH SAAD (ACEH HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST)
NURCHOLISH MAJID (ISLAMIC SCHOLAR)
TOHAP SIMUANGKULIT (LABOR LEADER).

SUMMARY

4. (C) NINE PROMINENT HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS DESCRIBED A NEW POLITICAL SCENARIO IN INDONESIA WHICH INCLUDED GREAT PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT WHERE SOME AREAS, SUCH AS THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, STILL LAGGED. THE RULE OF LAW AND AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY WERE STILL LACKING. WHILE THE PRESS WAS FAR MORE FREE, FREE THOUGHT, ESSENTIAL TO DIALOGUE, WAS STILL UNDER SOME CONSTRAINTS. ALTHOUGH WOMEN HAD PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE REFORM MOVEMENT, WOMEN'S RIGHTS WERE STILL NOT PROTECTED, AS EVIDENCED BY THE MILITARY'S USE OF RAPE AS A TOOL OF TERROR IN IRIAN JAYA, ACEH, EAST TIMOR AND IN JAKARTA IN NAY 1998. IRIAN JAYA ("WEST PAPUA") AND ACEH, AFTER DECADES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE, WERE INCREASINGLY DEMANDING INDEPENDENCE. SINO INDONESIANS, VICTIMIZED BY SOEHARTO-ERA POLICIES, WERE DEVELOPING NEW RESPONSES TO IMPROVE THEIR SITUATION IN THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA. UNEMPLOYMENT WAS STALKING WORKERS, LIMITING THE IMPORTANCE OF NEW FOUND FREEDOMS FOR THE POOR WHO NEEDED TO MAKE A LIVING. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT IN OTHER PLACES WHERE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES WERE REMOVED, GREAT EXUBERANCE ENSUED, FOLLOWED BY DISAPPOINTMENT WHEN EXPECTATIONS WERE NOT MET. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP HOPE ALIVE, BUT ALSO TO HAVE REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS. END SUMMARY.

HUMAN RIGHTS OVERVIEW

5. (C) NARZUKI DARUSNAN SAID THAT INDONESIA HAD ENTERED A NEW POLITICAL SCENARIO WITH GREAT POLITICAL

DIVERSITY, EXPANDED PRESS FREEDOM AND A POLITICAL EUPHORIA. IT WAS SEARCHING FOR A FORMAT FOR ITS NEW POLITICAL DYNAMISM. WHILE THERE HAD BEEN GREAT PROGRESS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRONT, SOME AREAS STILL LAGGED, NOTABLY IN THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO SHOULD BE GIVEN UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE. THERE WAS STILL A CONTRAST BETWEEN GOVERNMENT RHETORIC AND ACTUAL HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT. THE ELECTION WOULD BE A BENCHMARK AND A STARTING POINT ON
THE WAY TO SOLVING MANY PROBLEMS, BUT NOT A SOLUTION OF ITSELF.

6. (C) THE NEW POLITICAL EUPHORIA HAD LED TO EXCESSES, SUCH AS IN AMBON, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND NEW POLITICAL LEADERS WERE COUNSELING THEIR FOLLOWERS TO ACT PEACEFULLY. IN ADDITION, THE PARLIAMENT WOULD ADOPT NEW LAWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN ABOUT TWO MONTHS WHICH WOULD REINFORCE THE POSITION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, GIVING IT SUBPOENA POWER AND EMPOWERING IT TO ACT IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES AS A HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL. ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON -HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD ALSO BE SIGNED.

NEED FOR RULE OF LAW AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

7. (C) MULYA LUBIS SAID THAT IN SIX YEARS OF TEACHING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, HE HAD NEVER SEEN STUDENTS AS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN THE SUBJECT AS NOW. CRITICAL PROBLEMS NOW IN THE FIELD WERE INSTITUTIONAL: JUDICIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

INDEPENDENCE WAS KEY TO REAL JUDICIAL REFORM AND ADVANCING THE RULE OF LAW. LUBIS SAID BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE IN THIS AREA WOULD BE CRUCIAL.

8. (C) TURNING BRIEFLY TO POLITICS, LUBIS, WHO WAS DEVELOPING A NATION-WIDE STUDENT-BASED ELECTION MONITORING SYSTEM, SAID THAT THE ELECTION LAWS HAD MANY LOOPHOLES AND, IN SOME AREAS, LOCAL OFFICIALS WERE ATTEMPTING TO BLOCK PEOPLE FROM REGISTERING TO VOTE.

PRESS FREEDOM AND FREEDOM OF THOUGHT

9. (C) GOENAWAN MOHAMMAD SAID PRESS FREEDOM HAD EXPANDED GREATLY IN INDONESIA UNDER THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT AND HE GAVE HIGH MARKS TO MINISTER OF

INFORMATION YUNUS. THESE PRESS FREEDOMS NEEDED TO BE INSTITUTIONALIZED, POSSIBLY BY PERSUADING POLITICAL LEADERS TO COMMIT TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THOSE FREEDOMS.

10. (C) GOENAWAN WAS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN INDONESIA WHICH HE SAID WAS ESSENTIAL TO REAL FREE DEBATE. HE SAID THAT HE SAW NEED FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF SOMETHING LIKE THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION IN INDONESIA.

[redacted] B1

A UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE ABUSE OF WOMEN, WHO VISITED INDONESIA IN LATE 1998, CONCLUDED THAT RAPE HAD BEEN USED AS A TOOL BY THE MILITARY IN A SYSTEMATIC WAY. (NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE PRESENTED AT THE UNHRC MARCH 22. END NOTE.)

12. (C) MELY TAN, ALSO AN ACTIVIST FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS, ADDED THAT WOMEN HAD PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE REFORM MOVEMENT. WOMEN HAD DEMANDED FORMATION OF A "NATIONAL COMMISSION ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN," IN

PART AS A RESPONSE TO THE MASS RAPES OF SING-INDONESIAN WOMEN IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE MAY 1998 VIOLENCE.

[redacted] B1

SINO-INDONESIANS SEEK A NEW PLACE IN SOCIETY

15. (C) MELY TANSAID THAT MUCH OF THE MAY 1998 VIOLENCE IN JAKARTA HAD TARGETED SINO-INDONESIANS ALTHOUGH THEY CONSTITUTE ONLY THREE TO FIVE PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. THIS "HORROR" RESULTED FROM A SOEHARTO NEW ORDER POLICY WHICH ISOLATED SING-INDONESIANS,

LIMITING THEM TO ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ACTIVITY. SINO-INDONESIANS EMERGED WITH THE IMAGE OF "RICH EXPLOITERS." BUT THE SINO-INDONESIANS HAD PROVEN THEMSELVES RESILIENT WITH MANY RESPONDING TO THE ATTACKS ON THEM IN FOUR WAYS: SOME CHOSE TO FORM

ETHNIC POLITICAL PARTIES TO FIGHT FOR THEIR INTERESTS; OTHERS SOUGHT TO FORM "PRESSURE" GROUPS TO LOBBY FOR SINO-INDONESIAN INTERESTS; A THIRD RESPONSE WAS TO FORM SUPPORT GROUPS FOR MUTUAL COMFORT AND ASSISTANCE; AND A FOURTH RESPONSE WAS TO JOIN THE NEW POLITICAL PARTIES, ESPECIALLY THE MAJOR ONES SUCH AS THOSE OF MEGAWATI AND AMIEN RAIS.

AN EXCESS OF FREEDOM

16. (C) NURCHOLISH MAJID SAID THAT IN THE COURSE OF CHAIRING THE "TEAM 11," WHICH REVIEWED NEW POLITICAL PARTIES TO SEE IF THEY MET NEWLY ESTABLISHED CRITERIA TO PARTICIPATE IN THE JUNE ELECTION, HE HAD FOUND GREAT EXUBERANCE ABOUT NEW POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES. WHILE INDONESIA HAD BEEN A FREE NATION FOR 50 YEARS, IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT "WE ARE FREE AS A PEOPLE." THIS HAD
LED TO MANY PROBLEMS INCLUDING UNREST.

LABOR SUFFERS MASSIVE UNEMPLOYMENT

17. (C) TOHAP SIMUANGKULIT UNDERSCORED THAT WHILE THERE

HAD BEEN PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE, THERE HAD NOT BEEN SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN CULTURAL VALUES THAT DISADVANTAGED THE POOR. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS HAD AGGRAVATED THIS SITUATION. THIRTY

MILLION WORKERS WERE OUT OF WORK. ILO AND UNDP REPORTS SUGGESTED THAT 30,000 MORE INDONESIANS LOST THEIR JOBS EVERY DAY. IF JOBS DISAPPEARED AT THIS RATE FOR ANOTHER YEAR, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN.

18. (C) THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET WAS NOT WORKING. HE URGED THAT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE BE APPLIED TO THE GOL TO ACCORD TO NGOS A GREATER ROLE IN MANAGING THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET.

THE SECRETARY'S CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

19. (C) THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT SHE WAS STRUCK BY THE RANGE OF ISSUES THAT HAD BEEN COVERED IN THE DISCUSSION. SHE OBSERVED THAT IN EASTERN EUROPE THERE HAD BEEN SIMILAR PATTERNS. THE REMOVAL OF AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME PRODUCED GREAT HOPES, BUT WHEN THE HOPES FAILED TO MATERIALIZE, GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT ENSUED. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP HOPE ALIVE BUT NOT OVER-PROMISE IN ORDER TO AVOID SWINGS FROM EXUBERANCE TO DESPAIR. SHE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY THE STATISTIC ABOUT GROWING UNEMPLOYMENT WHICH, IN ADDITION TO BEING AN ECONOMIC ISSUE, COULD HAVE MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL STABILITY.

ALBRIGHT
ALBRIGHT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E28

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5923

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 048116 162301Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000R

048116
SOURCE: KODAKA.016127
DRAFTED BY: S/S-S:AGROSSMAN/POL:EMCWILLIAMS:SMA -- 03/16/99 7-8063
APPROVED BY: S:THE SECRETARY
EAP:SOROTH S:ADWOLFF S/S:RMLIKINS S/S-O:KMJOHNSON
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
S/S, S/S-S
----------AFB19A 162304Z /38
O P 162300Z MAR 99 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 048116

NODIS

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/09
TAGS: OVIP (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
ALATAS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROSE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 048116 162301Z
LIKINS. REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) MARCH 4, 1999, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
JARARTA, INDONESIA.

3. (C) U.S. PARTICIPANTS:
THE SECRETARY
AMBASSADOR J. STAPLETON ROY
CHIEF OF STAFF ELAINE SHOCAS
PA ASSISTANT SECRETARY JAMES RUBIN
EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY ROTH
DRL ASSISTANT SECRETARY HAROLD KOH
EB ASSISTANT SECRETARY ALAN LARSON

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 15 MAR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 07 AUG 2006 200504211

GENERAL ROBERT FOGELSONG
EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, NOTETAKER

INDONESIAN PARTICIPANTS:
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALI ALATAS
AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN KUNTJORO-JAKTI
DIRECTOR GENERAL WISNUMURTI
DIRECTOR GENERAL ABDUL GHANI
DIRECTORATE SECRETARY EDHIMURTI SUNOKO
DIRECTOR T.A. SAMODRASRIWIDJAJA
DIRECTOR HADI A. WAYARABI ALHADAR
DIRECTOR MAIMUR WIDODO
SECRETARY ZUBIR AMIN
SUB-DIRECTOR ARIF SUMANTRI HARAHAP
NOTETAKER

SUMMARY

---

4. (C) IN A MEETING ON MARCH 4 WITH FM ALATAS, THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE THE UNITED STATES ATTACHED TO THE HOLDING OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA. FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS DESCRIBED THE ELECTION PROCESS, NOTING THAT IT WOULD LEAD TO A NEW COALITION STYLE OF POLITICS IN WHICH NO SINGLE PARTY WOULD EVER AGAIN HAVE A MASSIVE MAJORITY. HE WELCOMED UNDP COORDINATION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FOR THE ELECTIONS. ON EAST TIMOR, THE SECRETARY URGED THAT THE MILITARY STOP ARMING CIVILIAN GROUPS AND THAT THOSE ARMS ALREADY DISTRIBUTED BE COLLECTED. ALATAS CLAIMED THAT THE ARMS WERE PART OF A GENERAL MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN GUARDS FOR THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OPPOSED THE CONCEPT OF A TWO-STEP, ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE CONSULTATION ON AN AUTONOMY PACKAGE IN EAST TIMOR BUT WAS VAGUE ON A PREFERABLE ALTERNATIVE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE AUGUST 29 CONVENING OF THE NEW PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY WAS A "DEADLINE" FOR COMPLETING CONSULTATIONS AMONG EAST TIMORESE ON THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL. DETAILS OF A CONSULTATION MECHANISM SHOULD BE COMPLETED NEXT WEEK AFTER TRI-PARTITE TALKS. RESPONDING TO THE SECRETARY'S CONCERNS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND CONTINUING BLOODSHED IN INDONESIA, ALATAS INDICATED THAT INVESTIGATIONS OF ABUSES AND

RIOTS WERE CONTINUING. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER RECENT INTENSIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS STRIFE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 048116 162301Z
FOREIGN POLICY

[redacted] B1

THE SECRETARY OUTLINED THE CONCERNS THAT PROMPT U.S. POLICY AND ACTIONS VIS-A-VIS IRAQ, UNDERSCORING USG EFFORTS TO ASSIST THE IRAQI PEOPLE. END SUMMARY.

ALATAS DESCRIBES THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

---

6. (C) FOLLOWING THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS ON THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, ALATAS DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL THE ELECTORAL PROCESS THAT WILL GOVERN THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION AND SUBSEQUENT SELECTION OF A NEW PRESIDENT. INDONESIA PASSED THE FIRST STAGE OF THE PROCESS WITH THE PARLIAMENT'S APPROVAL OF THREE KEY POLITICAL LAWS IN JANUARY. THUS FAR, OVER 140 PARTIES HAD REGISTERED TO COMPETE IN THE ELECTIONS, OF WHICH APPROXIMATELY 50 WOULD LIKELY BE APPROVED TO RUN ON THE BASIS OF THE NEW LAWS' STRICT CRITERIA. PARTIES THAT DID NOT MEET THESE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 048116 162301Z
CRITERIA COULD CONTINUE TO EXIST AS PARTIES. BECAUSE PARTIES MUST RECEIVE FIVE PERCENT OF THE VOTE TO QUALIFY TO PLACE MEMBERS IN PARLIAMENT, ALATAS ESTIMATED ONLY SIX TO EIGHT PARTIES, OR AT THE MOST TEN, WOULD ACTUALLY BE REPRESENTED IN THE PARLIAMENT.

7. (C) ALATAS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS NEW SYSTEM GUAAANTEED THAT NO SINGLE PARTY WOULD EVER AGAIN AMASS AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY, AS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN THE CASE. THE STRUCTURE OF INDONESIA'S POLITICAL FUTURE WOULD BE BASED ON COALITIONS. IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE

DEMOCRATIC AND PLURALISTIC. AS IN THE PAST, THE MILITARY WOULD BE ALLOCATED SEATS IN BOTH THE PARLIAMENT AND THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (INDONESIA'S UPPER HOUSE), ALTHOUGH THEIR NUMBERS WERE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED AS A RESULT OF OBJECTIONS BY SEVERAL PARTIES. GRADUALLY, THIS WOULD CHANGE, WITH THE MILITARY EVENTUALLY ONLY ALLOCATED SEATS IN THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY.

B. (C) THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT, ALATAS SAID, WAS DETERMINED TO HOLD FREE, FAIR AND PEACEFUL ELECTIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE ELECTIONS BE FAIR AND THAT THEY ALSO BE PERCEIVED TO BE BY DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS. FOR THIS REASON, THE GOT HAD ASKED THE UNDP TO ASSIST IN COORDINATING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FOR THE ELECTION PROCESS. THE UNDP WOULD ALSO ASSIST THE GOT BY COORDINATING OBSERVERS, ESPECIALLY FOREIGN OBSERVERS.

9. (C) THE GOT WAS PLEASED THAT A NUMBER OF

GOVERNMENTS HAD ALREADY PLEDGED FINANCIAL SUPPORT, NOTABLY THE AUSTRALIANS (NINE MILLION AUSTRALIAN DOLLARS) AND SEVERAL EUROPEAN STATES WITH UNSPECIFIED PLEDGES. JAPAN'S LEVEL OF SUPPORT WAS STILL UNCLEAR. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE USG WAS PREPARED TO PROVIDE USD 30 MILLION. ALATAS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION, AND HOPED THAT FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD REACH USD 100 MILLION, TO COMPLEMENT THE GOT'S EXPECTED OUTLAY OF 1.3 TRILLION RUPIAN. HE NOTED THAT HE AND A/S ROTH WERE WORKING TO ENCOURAGE AND ACCELERATE CONTRIBUTIONS.

10. (C) THE SECRETARY WELCOMED THE GOT'S COOPERATION WITH THE UNDP AND UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE THE USG ATTACHED TO HOLDING FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. THIS WAS VITAL, NOT ONLY TO THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF A MODERN SOCIETY BUT ALSO TO RESTORING FOREIGN INVESTMENT FLOWS.

A PEACEFUL TRANSITION IN EAST TIMOR

---

11. (C) THE SECRETARY WELCOMED GOL WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER NEW APPROACHES TO THE LONGSTANDING PROBLEM OF EAST TINOR. BUT ALONG WITH NEW OPPORTUNITIES, THERE WERE ALSO NOW DANGERS, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE.

12. (C) ALATAS RECALLED THAT THE GOL HAD OFFERED SPECIAL STATUS AND WIDE RANGING AUTONOMY TO EAST TIMOR SHORTLY AFTER PRESIDENT HABIBIE ASSUMED OFFICE.

PORTUGAL HAD NOT BEEN NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL AS A FINAL SOLUTION. THE TWO PARTIES THUS AGREED TO COOPERATE IN ELABORATING THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL. THEN, IN JANUARY, THE GOL DECIDED THAT IF THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL WERE TO FAIL, IT WOULD PROPOSE THAT THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY, WHEN IT CONVENED ON AUGUST 29, CONSIDER WHETHER TO ALLOW EAST TIMOR TO SEPARATE FROM INDONESIA. FOR HISTORICAL AND GEO-POLITICAL REASONS THE GOL BELIEVED THAT THE AUTONOMY OFFER WAS BEST FOR EAST TIMOR, FOR INDONESIA AND FOR THE REGION. NEVERTHELESS, IF THE EAST TIMORESE CHOSE TO SEPARATE, INDONESIA WAS PREPARED TO PART WAYS IN A PEACEFUL, ORDERLY AND DIGNIFIED WAY. "WE WILL NOT CUT AND RUN, AS SOME ACCUSE US OF DOING," ALATAS STATED.

13. (C) IF EAST TIMOR CHOSE TO SEPARATE, ALATAS SAID, IT WOULD REVERT TO ITS PRE-1976 STATUS, E.G., THAT OF A NON-SELF GOVERNING TERRITORY WITH PORTUGAL AS THE ADMINISTERING POWER. THE GOI WOULD THEN SIT DOWN WITH THE UN AND PORTUGAL TO DISCUSS TROOP REDUCTIONS AND THE DISMANTLING OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT. THE UN WOULD IN TURN HAVE TO SET UP A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. THE DECISION WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE "FAIRLY QUICKLY," AS THE GOL WAS NOT PREPARED TO CARRY THE BURDEN OR RISK CRITICISM ANY LONGER. UNFORTUNATELY, ALATAS CONTINUED, PRESENTING THESE TWO CHOICES HAD LED TO THE HARDENING OF PRO- AND ANTI-INDEPENDENCE VIEWS WITHIN EAST TIMOR.

14. (C) THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR WAS A MAJOR CONCERN. NO MORE ARMS SHOULD BE

GIVEN TO CIVILIANS AND THOSE ALREADY DISTRIBUTED SHOULD BE COLLECTED. AN EXPANDED INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE MIGHT ALSO HELP MAKE THE TRANSITION MORE PEACEFUL.

15. (C) ALATAS CONTENDED THAT THE ARMING OF CIVILIANS IN EAST TIMOR WAS ONLY AN EXTENSION TO EAST TIMOR OF A PROCESS THAT THE ARMED FORCES HAD UNDERTAKEN THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IN LIGHT OF DETERIORATING SECURITY CONDITIONS. THE ARMED FORCES, UNABLE TO AFFORD AN

EXPANSION OF POLICE RANKS, WAS ACTIVATING CIVILIAN GUARDS TO ASSIST THE POLICE ("KAMRA") AND THE MILITARY ("WANRA"). MOST WERE BEING ARMED WITH STICKS, ALTHOUGH A FEW WERE RECEIVING SIDEARMS AND RIFLES.

16. (C) MOREOVER, ALATAS SAID, THE PRO-AUTONOMY AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS WERE ARMING THEMSELVES, THOUGH IT WAS UNCLEAR WHERE THE ARMS WERE COMING FROM. ALATAS ALSO MAINTAINED THAT PRO-INDEPENDENCE GROUPS HAD BEGUN THE FIGHTING BY TERRORIZING PRO-INTEGRATION PEOPLE. THERE WERE MORE HOPEFUL DEVELOPMENTS, HOWEVER. THE TWO EAST TIMORESE BISHOPS (BELO AND NACIAMENTO), ALONG WITH IMPRISONED EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO AND THE INDONESIAN HUAAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WERE ATTEMPTING TO BRING TOGETHER ALL FACTIONS TO WORK TOWARD PEACE AND RECONCILIATION. ABILLIO ARAUJO, A FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE ARMED RESISTANCE, HAD LAUNCHED WHAT ARAUJO CALLED A "THIRD WAY" THAT WAS ALSO ATTRACTING SUPPORT.

17. (C) THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE UN WAS CONSIDERING A TWO-STEP APPROACH TO GAUGING THE VIEWS OF

CONFIDENTIAL

THE EAST TIMORESE ON AUTONOMY - COMPRISING A VOTE FOR A COUNCIL THAT WOULD THEN DEBATE AND DECIDE ON THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE. ALATAS MAINTAINED, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH A VOTE, LIKE A REFERENDUM, WOULD REQUIRE WITHDRAWAL OF INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES AND DISMANTLING OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT. A UN FORCE WOULD HAVE TO REPLACE THE DEPARTING INDONESIAN FORCES. SUCH A COURSE WOULD BE COMPLICATED AND FULL OF RISKS.

18. (C) IT WOULD BE BETTER, ALATAS SAID, FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO DETERMINE THE VIEWS OF ALL EAST TIMORESE IN THE DIASPORA "OVER A COUPLE OF DAYS" AND THEN SIMILARLY POLL PEOPLE IN EAST TIMOR "OVER A COUPLE OF DAYS."

B1

RESPONDING TO A QUESTION FROM A/S ROTH, ALATAS SAID HE EXPECTED THE MARCH 10-11 TALKS IN NEW YORK WOULD PRODUCE AN AUTONOMY PACKAGE AND YIELD AGREEMENT ON A CONSULTATION MECHANISM.

19. (C) ALATAS EMPHASIZED THAT IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO HAVE A CLEAR DECISION FROM EAST TIMORESE ON THE AUTONOMY OFFER BY AUGUST 29, THE DATE OF THE CONVENING

OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY. THIS WAS A "DEADLINE." IF IT WERE MISSED, IT WOULD MEAN `WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT. THEN THINGS COULD GET VERY COMPLICATED." HE ADDED THAT THE AUTONOMY QUESTION COULD BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE JUNE 7 ELECTIONS, WHICH WOULD BE "EVEN BETTER."

CONFIDENTIAL

HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS

---

20. (C) THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE USG HAD SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS, WHICH INCLUDED THE RECENT KILLING OF CHINESE-INDONESIANS, MUSLIM CLERICS AND OTHERS IN EAST JAVA, AND VIOLENCE IN OTHER PROVINCES.

[redacted] B1

21. (C) ALATAS SAID THAT SINCE THE MAY 13-15 RIOTS AND THE FALL OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, THERE HAD BEEN MANY SUCH TRAGEDIES. THE GOI WAS TAKING ACTION, HOWEVER. INVESTIGATIONS WERE NOT COMPLETED IN SOME CASES. IN OTHERS, PERPETRATORS WERE BEING PROSECUTED.

IT WAS CLEAR THAT PROVOCATEURS HAD INSTIGATED SOME OF THE CLASHES, BUT THESE PEOPLE REMAINED UNKNOWN. TYPICALLY, SMALL INCIDENTS WERE FANNED INTO LARGE ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS CONFLAGRATIONS.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

23. (C) ALATAS EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN THAT THE 90 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION THAT WAS MUSLIM COULD TURN ON THE CHRISTIAN AND OTHER MINORITIES AT SOME POINT. WHILE THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS WAS IN PART TO BLAME, DETERIORATION OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE WAS ALSO A

KEY PROBLEM. MOREOVER, THERE WERE POLITICAL FORCES WHO FEARED THAT THE ELECTIONS WOULD TURN OUT BADLY FOR THEM. HENCE, THEY WERE SEEKING TO CREATE CHAOS TO STOP THE ELECTIONS, HE SAID.

DEALING WITH THE BURMA PROBLEM

---

24. (C) TURNING TO FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN BURMA. EFFORTS WERE UNDERWAY TO ENSURE THE DESOTO MISSION WOULD TAKE PLACE, BUT THIS WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE WITH THE OPPOSITION.

B1

B1

SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUES

B1

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 13 STATE 048116 162301Z
IRAQ
---

28. (C) THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE USG SUPPORTED THE PANEL APPROACH NOW TAKEN UP BY THE UNSC. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CLARIFY THAT THE USG WAS DOING ALL WE COULD TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE OIL-FOR-FOOD UNDERTAKING. THE USG SUPPORTED THE REMOVAL OF LIMITS ON THE AMOUNT OF OIL THAT COULD BE SOLD UNDER THIS PROGRAM. ON THE OTHER HAND, SADAM

HUSSEIN WAS SHEDDING CROCODILE TEARS. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT BENAN SEVAN, THE UN OFFICIAL CHARGED WITH DEALING WITH IRAQI HUMANITARIAN NEEDS, HAD REPORTED THAT IRAQ WAS NOT FOLLOWING THROUGH ON ITS OBLIGATION TO DISTRIBUTE FOOD AND MEDICINE TO THE PEOPLE. THE USG SAW NO HOPE, SHE SAID, THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD CHANGE HIS WAYS AND WAS THEREFORE WORKING TO PRODUCE A LEADERSHIP CHANGE, BELIEVING THAT THE IRAQI PEOPLE DESERVED A GOVERNMENT THAT RESPECTED THEM. UNSCOM WAS A UNSC ISSUE, THE SECRETARY SAID, NOT A MATTER FOR THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DO MORE TO RESOLVE THE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS QUESTIONS. UNSCOM HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO COMPLETE ITS WORK IN THESE AREAS. AN ON-THE-GROUND PRESENCE WAS IMPORTANT.

REQUEST THAT THE SECRETARY MEET WITH EAST TIMORESE PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 14 STATE 048116 162301Z
29. (C) ALATAS CONCLUDED BY ASKING THAT THE SECRETARY MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EAST TIMORESE PRO-INTEGRATION FACTION, IN ADDITION TO HER PLANNED MEETING WITH IMPRISONED RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO. THE SECRETARY SAID SHE WOULD GIVE THE REQUEST SERIOUS

CONSIDERATION.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E29

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5103

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 047734 161719Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000R

047734
SOURCE: KODAKA.016122
DRAFTED BY: S/S-S:AGROSSMAN/POL:GGFERGIN:SMA -- 03/16/99 7-8349
APPROVED BY: S:THE SECRETARY
EAP:SOROTH S:ADWOLFF S/S-O:KMJOHNSON S/S:RMLIKINS
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
S/S, S/S-S
----------AF9091 161720Z /38
O P 161718Z MAR 99 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USCINCPAC HONOLULUY HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 047734

NODIS

DECAPTIONED

CINCPAC FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/0~/1G
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 047734 161719Z
TAGS: OVIP (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), PREL, PHUM, PINR, EAID, ID, UN
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH EAST TIMORESE
RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAD, JAKARTA, INDONESIA,
MARCH 5, 1999

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROSE
LIKINS. REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (U) MARCH 5, 1999, NOON, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, JAKARTA, INDONESIA
NOTE: THE MEETING COULD NOT BE HELD AS PLANNED AT
GUSMAG'S HOME DUE TO LARGE DEMONSTRATIONS.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 15 MAR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 02 AUG 2006 200504211

3. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.:
THE SECRETARY
J. STAPLETON ROY, AMBASSADOR
STANLEY ROTH, EAP A/S
HAROLD KOH, DRL A/S
JAMES RUBIN, PA A/S

NOTETAKER (POLOFF).

INDONESIA:
XANANA GUSMAO, COUNCIL FOR TIMORESE NATIONAL RESISTANCE (CNRT) LEADER
HENDARDI, GUSMAC'S LAWYER.

SUMMARY

[redacted] B1

HE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR ELECTION OF A CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (IN PLACE OF A REFERENDUM) TO CONSIDER THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL, BUT ARGUED THAT THIS CONSULTATION PROCESS COULD BEGIN ONLY AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE INDONESIAN MILITARY, THE INSERTION OF AN UNARMED UN POLICE FORCE, AND THE DISARMING OF ALL FACTIONS. EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF EAST TIMORESE WOULD OPT FOR INDEPENDENCE, XANANA FORESAW A TRANSITION PERIOD UNDER THE UN OF NO MORE THAN FIVE YEARS. END SUMMARY.

"THIRD FORCE" IMPEDES RECONCILIATION

5. (C) THE SECRETARY REQUESTED XANANA'S VIEWS ON A PROPOSED PEACE AND RECONCILIATION COUNCIL. XANANA SAID SUCH A COUNCIL COULD ACHIEVE RECONCILIATION AMONG ALL EAST TIMORESE, BUT THAT NOW A "THIRD FORCE" WAS IMPEDING THESE EFFORTS. [redacted] B1

REPORTS OF "WIDESPREAD" VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR WERE FALSE. THERE WERE UPHEAVALS ALONG THE BORDER AND IN A FEW ISOLATED AREAS, BUT NOTHING MORE. IN DILL, THERE WAS AN EFFORT BY THIS "THIRD FORCE" TO

GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF CHAOS, AND FOOD SUPPLIES HAD BEEN CURTAILED TO PROVOKE MORE TENSION AND STRESS AMONG THE POPULATION.

UNARMED UN POLICE FORCE URGED

6. (C) XANANA ADVOCATED THE URGENT DEPLOYMENT OF AN UNARMED UN POLICE FORCE TO MONITOR A CEASE-FIRE AND SUPERVISE DISARMAMENT OF THE FALINTIL GUERRILLAS AND PARAMILITARY GROUPS. HE STRESSED THAT ABRI WOULD ALSO HAVE TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES BEFORE THE POLITICAL CONSULTATION PROCESS COULD BEGIN. XANANA REQUESTED THAT THE UNITED STATES ALSO PRESS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES IN EAST TIMOR TO PROVIDE HEALTH CARE AND FOOD ASSISTANCE.

TRANSITION PERIOD UNDER UN

7. (C) XANANA PROFESSED CERTAINTY THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF EAST TIMORESE DESIRED INDEPENDENCE AND THEREFORE WOULD REJECT WHATEVER AUTONOMY PLAN WAS OFFERED. FOLLOWING THIS DECISION, XANANA FORESAW A TRANSITION PERIOD LASTING A MAXIMUM OF FIVE YEARS, "UNDER THE UN UMBRELLA." HE HOPED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD HELP EAST TIMOR CONSTRUCT THE BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED FOR INDEPENDENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY TO CONSIDER AUTONOMY OFFER

8. (C) THE SECRETARY REQUESTED XANANA'S VIEWS ON THE BEST METHOD OF ASCERTAINING THE WISHES OF THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE. XANANA SAID HIS MOVEMENT STILL SUPPORTED A REFERENDUM IN PRINCIPLE, BUT RESPECTED INDONESIA'S FEARS IN THIS REGARD AND THEREFORE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE ELECTION OF A CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY THAT WOULD THEN TAKE UP THE AUTONOMY OFFER. THIS ASSEMBLY WOULD BE ELECTED ON THE BASIS OF EAST TIMOR'S 13 DISTRICTS, WITH EACH OF THE DISTRICTS CHOOSING TWO TO FIVE REPRESENTATIVES, BASED ON THEIR POPULATION. THE DIASPORA WOULD ALSO ELECT REPRESENTATIVES ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS. XANANA SAID THAT WHILE MORE TIME WOULD HAVE BEEN PREFERABLE, HIS

SIDE COULD BE READY FOR THIS PROCESS EVEN BEFORE THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE. IN ANY CASE, EAST TIMOR SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE INDONESIAN

ELECTIONS.

NO PKO NEEDED

9. (C) THE SECRETARY ASKED IF SUCH A PROCESS COULD BE MANAGED WITHOUT A UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION (PKO). XANANA SAID THAT IN ANY CASE THE SIDES NUST ARRIVE AT A POLITICAL SOLUTION, AND THIS SHOULD NOT REQUIRE A UN MILITARY FORCE. AN UNARMED UN POLICE FORCE, IN

ADDITION TO MONITORING AND DISARMING ALL THE FACTIONS, WOULD ALSO HELP TRAIN A TIMORESE POLICE FORCE CONSISTING OF BOTH FORMER FALINTIL FIGHTERS AND FORMER EAST TIMORESE MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AND POLICE.

CIVIL SOCIETY NEEDED

10. (C) THE SECRETARY ASKED XANANA ABOUT HIS OWN FUTURE ROLE. XANANA SAID HE HOPED ACTIVELY TO PROMOTE THE BUILDING OF DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY, WHICH HE SAW AS THE KEY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EAST TIMOR. THE SECRETARY SAID EAST TIMOR NEEDED LEADERS LIKE XANANA WHO HAD THE ABILITY TO CONNECT WITH THE PEOPLE, AND WHO REALIZED THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

AVOIDING A VACCUUM

11. (C) XANANA SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT THE SECRETARY ALSO PLANNED TO MEET WITH THE PRO-AUTONOMY SIDE, AND REQUESTED THAT SHE URGE THEM TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND DIALOGUE AND NOT TO RESORT TO WAR. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT, IF THE EAST TIMORESE OPTED FOR SEPARATION, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE INDONESIAN MILITARY NOT LEAVE A VACUUM, AND THAT

A TRANSITION PERIOD PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCESS. XANANA AGREED, ADDING THAT AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD MEMBERS OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD SE CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF TECHNICAL ABILITIES AND PROFESSIONAL SKILLS, NOT POLITICAL LEANINGS. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT EAST TIMOR WOULD THEN GRADUALLY SECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT AND NOT BE A BURDEN ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

ALBRIGHT
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4802

PAGE 01 STATE 047684 161546Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSC-01	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	SAS-00	/020R			

047684
SOURCE: KODAKB.016067
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:RCLARKE:RJC -- 03/15/99 X7-2543
APPROVED BY: S:THE SECRETARY
EAP:SOROTH EAP/PIMBS:DHARTWICK P:DSTRAUB DRL:SSUTTON
S/P:KBROOKS EAP:SBOYCE IO/UNP:KLARSON S/S-C:BHAMBRICK
S/S:RMLIKINS S/S-O:KJOHNSON
----------AF8386 161546Z /38
O 161545Z MAR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 047684

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, ID
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO EAST TIMORESE LEADER XANANA GUSMAC

1. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT EMBASSY JAKARTA DELIVER THE MESSAGE AT PARA 2 BELOW FROM THE SECRETARY TO EAST TIMORESE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 047684 161546Z
FOLLOW:

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. GUSMAO:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF MARCH 5, FOLLOWING UP ON OUR MEETING IN JAKARTA EARLIER THAT DAY. I TREMENDOUSLY ENJOYED THE CHANCE TO DISCUSS EAST TIMOR WITH YOU AND CAME AWAY IMPRESSED WITH YOUR COURAGE, VISION AND DETERMINATION.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 AUG 2006 200504211

THE IDEAS IN YOUR LETTER ARE USEFUL AS WE CONTINUE TO EXPLORE WAYS IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES MIGHT HELP TO ENSURE THAT RESOLUTION OF THE EAST TIMOR DISPUTE COMES

ABOUT PEACEFULLY. WE WANT TO REINFORCE ON-GOING EFFORTS TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE ON THE GROUND. I HAVE UNDERLINED OUR SUPPORT FOR PROPOSALS SUCH AS YOURS FOR A BROAD-BASED COUNCIL TO SEEK PEACE AND CALM AND TO BRING ABOUT RECONCILIATION AMONG EAST TIMORESE. IN ADDITION, BOTH IN MY JAKARTA SPEECH AND IN MY MEETINGS WITH INDONESIAN OFFICIALS, I STRESSED DISARMAMENT OF CIVILIAN MILITIAS, CALLED FOR TROOP REDUCTIONS AND OTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, AND BACKED THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE ON EAST TIMOR, IN ADVANCE OF A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT.

AT MY REQUEST, ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY ROTH, AMBASSADOR STAPLETON ROY, AND EMBASSY JAKARTA WILL STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU. I WISH YOU AND THE EAST TIMORESE

PEOPLE WELL AS THE PROCESS MOVES FORWARD.

SINCERELY,
MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT

END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E32

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5426

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 047796 161942Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000R

047796
SOURCE: KODAKC.016097
DRAFTED BY: S/S-S:AGROSSMAN/POL:GGFERGIN:SMA -- 03/16/99 7-8063
APPROVED BY: S:THE SECRETARY
EAP:SOROTH S:ADWOLFF S/S:RMLIKINS S/S-O:KMJOHNSON
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
S/S, S/S-S
----------AF9C86 161944Z /38
O P 161941Z MAR 99 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 047796

NODIS

DECAPTIONED

CINCPAC FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/09
TAGS: OVIP (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), PREL, EFIN, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE,
JAKARTA, INDONESIA, MARCH 5, 1999
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 047796 161942Z

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROSE LIKINS. REASON: 1.5(D).

2. (U) MARCH 5, 1999, 9:00 A.M., ISTANA MERDEKA PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, JAKARTA.

3. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.:
THE SECRETARY
AMBASSADOR J. STAPLETON ROY
CHIEF OF STAFF ELAINE SHOCAS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 15 MAR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 07 AUG 2006 200504211

DECAPTIONED

PA A/S JAMES RUBIN
EAP A/S STANLEY ROTH
EB A/S ALAN LARSON
DRL A/S HAROLD KOH
LEGAL ADVISOR DAVID ANDREWS
LT. GEN. ROBERT FOGLESONG, JCS
DOD DAS KURT CAMPBELL

EMBASSY POLOFF GREGORY FERGIN (NOTETAKER)
FREDERICK BURKS (INTERPRETER)

INDONESIA:
PRESIDENT B. J. HABIBIE
GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA, COORDINATING MINISTER FOR ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
ALL ALATAS, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AKBAR TANJUNG, MINISTER OF STATE/STATE SECRETARY
GEN. WIRANTO, MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY AND
CONFIDENTIAL

COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES
H. MULADI, MINISTER OF JUSTICE
DORODJATUN KUNJORO-JAKTI, AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.
LT. GEN. (RET.) SINTONG PANJAITAN, SECRETARY FOR DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION
NUGROHO WISNUMURTI, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SAMODRA SRIWIDJAJA, DIRECTOR FOR AMERICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

4. (C) SUMMARY: IN A NEARLY TWO-HOUR MEETING, SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AND PRESIDENT HABIBIE DISCUSSED THE STATE OF INDONESIAN REFORMS, PREPARATIONS FOR THE JUNE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES, EAST TIMOR, AND IRIAN JAYA. PRESIDENT HABIBIE DESCRIBED INDONESIA AS A COUNTRY UNDERTAKING AN `INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION" AND ASKED FOR INTERNATIONAL PATIENCE, SUPPORT, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. HE SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FOR THE COURT SYSTEM AND POLICE. THE SECRETARY SAID INDONESIA HAD AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION; THE U.S. WOULD DO ALL IT COULD TO ASSIST THE PROCESS. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF FOLLOWING THROUGH WITH DEMOCRATIZATION, ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING, PROVIDING FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSITION FOR EAST TIMOR TO A NEW STATUS AND HOLDING PERPETRATORS OF PAST HUMAN RIGHT ABUSES ACCOUNTABLE. END SUMMARY.

REFORM AND THE ELECTIONS PROCESS

5. (C) PRESIDENT HABIBIE DESCRIBED THE JUNE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AS "THE MOST IMPORTANT THING

FOR THE FUTURE OF INDONESIA," AND PLEDGED THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT (GOI) WOULD DO ITS UTMOST TO MAKE THEM `FAIR, CLEAN, JUST, AND TRANSPARENT." IN PREPARING FOR THE ELECTION, INDONESIA WELCOMED INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE THAT DID NOT REQUIRE INDONESIAN BUDGETARY SUPPORT AND WAS COORDINATED THROUGH THE U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. FOREIGN ELECTION OBSERVERS WERE ALSO WELCOME. HABIBIE INDICATED HE WAS CONSIDERING INVITING FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER TO COME TO INDONESIA TO MONITOR THE ELECTIONS AND ASKED THE SECRETARY' S ADVICE.

6. (C) THE SECRETARY ENCOURAGED HABIBIE TO INVITE CARTER, WHO HAD AN EXCELLENT REPUTATION AS AN ELECTION OBSERVER. SHE SAID THAT INDONESIA WAS ONE OF THE GREATEST HOPES FOR INCREASING THE NUMBER OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONS IN THE WORLD, WHICH IS ONE OF THE PRIORITIES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. THE U.S. WAS PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE ELECTION PROCESS AND WAS OPEN TO FURTHER EXCHANGES ON THIS IMPORTANT TOPIC. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET THE FIRST POST-SOEHARTO ELECTION RIGHT TO ESTABLISH A SOUND PRECEDENT FOR THE FUTURE.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE COURTS AND POLICE

7. (C) HABIBIE SAID THAT THE EFFORT TO BUILD DEMOCRACY AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDONESIA OVER THE LAST NINE MONTHS AMOUNTED TO AN "INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION" TO BREAK AWAY FROM THE AUTHORITARIAN PAST, INDONESIA NEEDED TO LOOK OUTSIDE FOR MODELS, ADVICE, AND ASSISTANCE. JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS WERE IN PARTICULAR NEED OF RESTRUCTURING TO MAKE THEM BOTH MORE EFFICIENT AND TO ENCOURAGE THE RULE OF LAW. HABIBIE SAID THE GOL WANTED TO SEND A TEAM FROM THE INDONESIAN SUPREME COURT TO THE U.S. TO STUDY HOW ITS U.S. COUNTERPART FUNCTIONS. IN ADDITION, THE INDONESIAN POLICE NEEDED CONSIDERABLE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING IN ORDER TO FULFILL THE ADDED RESPONSIBILITIES IT WOULD BE

TAKING ON WHEN IT SEPARATED FROM THE ARMED FORCES IN APRIL. HE HOPEDTHE U.S. COULD PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE.

8. (C) THE SECRETARY SAID THE USG WANTED TO HELP INDONESIA'S REFORMS WHEREVER POSSIBLE. SHE POINTED OUT THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAD A VARIETY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS WILLING TO ASSIST INDONESIA WITH LEGAL REFORM. SHE WOULD PURSUE THIS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. AMBASSADOR ROY ADDED THAT A U.S. INTER-AGENCY TEAM HAD JUST VISITED INDONESIA TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF ASSISTING THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES MANAGE DEMONSTRATIONS PEACEFULLY.

ECONOMIC REFORM

9. (C) THE SECRETARY REITERATED STRONG U.S. INTEREST IN INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY. IT WAS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TAKE STEPS TO RESTORE THE TRUST OF BOTH INDONESIAN AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ACTORS. SHE EXPRESSED SPECIFIC CONCERN ABOUT THE SLOW PROGRESS OF THE BANK RECAPITALIZATALON PROCESS AND THE CLOSING OF INSOLVENT BANKS.

10. (C) HABIBIE ASSERTED THAT THE GOI WAS COMMITTED TO RECAPITALIZING BANKS THAT DESERVED RECAPITALIZATION ACCORDING TO CRITERIA WORKED OUT WITH THE IMF. THE GOI WOULD NOT PLAY FAVORITES. IN CARRYING OUT ECONOMIC REFORM, THE GOL WAS CREATING NEW LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS THAT WOULD TAKE TIME TO GET ON THEIR FEET. MOREOVER, IT WAS NECESSARY TO CREATE A "POSITIVE SYNERGY" BETWEEN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS, SINCE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS COULD NOT BE DECOUPLED ANY MORE THAN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INFLUENCES. HABIBIE EXPLAINED THE DELAY IN LIQUIDATING BANKS THAT DID NOT FULFILL REQUIREMENTS FOR RECAPITALIZATION AS A MEANS OF GIVING SMALL BANKS (WHICH ONLY ACCOUNTED FOR FIVE PERCENT OF TOTAL BANK CAPITAL) AN ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITY TO WORK OUT THEIR PROBLEMS THROUGH RESTRUCTURING AND MERGERS. THAT WOULD ALLOW THE GOI TO DEFLECT CHARGES THAT IT WAS ONLY HELPING THE RICH (I.E., THE LARGE BANKS). HABIBIE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THE FINAL DEADLINE WOULD BE MARCH 12. COORDINATING MINISTER GINANDJAR ADDED THAT HE HAD CONSULTED WITH THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK ON THE GOI'S

APPROACH. IN THIS CONNECTION, HABIBIE NOTED THAT

FORMER IMF SENIOR OFFICIAL NARVAKAR HAD BROUGHT HIM A LETTER FROM MANAGING DIRECTOR CAMDESSUS.

THE ROLE OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES

11. (C) THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT IN A TIME OF RAPID CHANGE, THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI) HAD A KEY ROLE IN CREATING CONDITIONS IN WHICH PEOPLE COULD EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS FREELY. FINDING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE WAS DIFFICULT [redacted] B1 IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BRING TO JUSTICE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR PAST ABUSES, SUCH AS THE 1998 KIDNAPPING AND DISAPPEARANCE OF ACTIVISTS, THE KILLING OF TRISANTI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, AND RAPES DURING THE MAY 1998 RIOTS IN JAKARTA.

12. (C) HABIBIE PORTRAYED ABRI AS A UNIQUE INSTITUTION "ESTABLISHED BY PEOPLE POWER, NOT THE GOVERNMENT" WHEN INDONESIA BECAME INDEPENDENT IN 1945. THE MILITARY'S MISSION WAS NOT ONLY TO DEFEND AND PROTECT THE PEOPLE, BUT TO ASSIST THEM THROUGH ITS SOCLO-POLITICAL ROLE. SOLDIERS HAD COMMITTED ABUSES, BUT ONE SHOULD DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE DOCTRINE AND SPIRIT OF ABRI

CONFIDENTIAL

AND THE ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEPARATE THE TWO PARTS OF THE DUAL FUNCTION: "THAT WOULD BE LIKE SEPARATING A PERSON'S EYES AFTER 53 YEARS." HABIBIE SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED GEN. WIRANTO TO CONCENTRATE ON A "PROSPERITY APPROACH" RATHER THAN A SECURITY APPROACH. HABIBIE EXPRESSED HIS CONVICTION THAT ABRI COMMANDERS WOULD ALWAYS PROTECT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT, WHOEVER HE IS, AND NEVER BETRAY THE NATION.

13. (C) HABIBIE POINTED OUT THAT THE GOL WAS TAKING A NEW APPROACH TOWARD AREAS WITH A HISTORY OF SEPARATISM. HE RECOUNTED HIS FEBRUARY 26 MEETING WITH IRIAN JAYA LEADERS IN WHICH THEY BEGAN BY "DECLARING THEIR INDEPENDENCE," BUT AFTER A TWO-HOUR EXCHANGE EXPRESSED

THEIR RESPECT FOR HIM AND TOOK SERIOUSLY HIS REQUEST THAT THEY SERIOUSLY PONDER THE BEST COURSE FOR THEM.

EAST TIMOR

14. (C) THE SECRETARY ASSERTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN MORE PROGRESS TOWARD A SOLUTION IN EAST TIMOR DURING THE LAST MONTH THAN THERE HAD BEEN IN THE LAST 22 YEARS, THANKS TO HABIBIE'S HISTORIC CHANGE OF APPROACH. THE U.S. WELCOMED THE CHANGE, BUT ALSO HAD CONCERNS ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOI'S NEW POLICY. THE GOL NEEDED TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO AVOID LARGE-SCALE BLOODSHED AND BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE OCCURRING

NOW. A CEASE-FIRE AND DISARMAMENT WERE URGENTLY NEEDED STEPS WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE PEACEFUL, STABLE ATMOSPHERE, AS WAS AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE ON EAST TIMOR. THE SECRETARY ASKED HABIBIE FOR HIS REACTION TO GUSMAO'S CALL FOR A COUNCIL AND PEACE AND STABILITY. A SECOND SERIOUS CONCERN WAS THE GOL'S RAPID TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWING FROM EAST TIMOR SHOULD THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE CHOOSE INDEPENDENCE. IT WAS CRITICAL TO AVOID A SITUATION LIKE THAT WHICH OCCURRED WHEN PORTUGAL QUICKLY WITHDREW FROM EAST TIMOR IN 1975. INDONESIA'S REPUTATION WOULD BE FURTHER DAMAGED IF A PRECIPITOUS DEPARTURE FROM EAST TIMOR LED TO DISORDER AND MORE VIOLENCE.

15. (C) HABIBIE RESPONDED THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO SEE FURTHER BLOODSHED IN EAST TIMOR AND POINTED OUT THAT 1,490 INDONESIAN SOLDIERS HAD DIED IN COMBAT THERE (A FIGURE HE SAID HAD NEVER BEEN ANNOUNCED). HE REPEATED HIS TIMETABLE FOR ENDING THE GOL PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR BY JANUARY 1, 2000 IF THE EAST TIMORESE CHOSE INDEPENDENCE. HOWEVER, HE SAID INDONESIAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL COULD REMAIN LONGER UNDER UN AUSPICES IF THE UN PAID FOR THEIR SERVICES. FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS INTERJECTED THAT INDONESIA WOULD NOT SIMPLY PACK UP AND LEAVE EAST TIMOR.

16. (C) HABIBIE OUTLINED A RECENT CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH ABILLO ARAUJO, THE FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE EAST TIMORESE SEPARATIST GROUP FRETILIN. ARAUJO HAD PROPOSED THAT HE CONSULT WITH TEN EXPONENTS OF EAST

TIMORESE INDEPENDENCE, INCLUDING XANANA GUSMAO, THEN MEET WITH A GROUP OF 100 EAST TIMORESE "FROM EVERYWHERE" TO IMPLEMENT ANY CONSENSUS REACHED BY THE GROUP OF TEN. HABIBIE SAID HE COULD AGREE TO ARAUJO'S PROPOSAL, PROVIDED: 1) "NOT A SINGLE INDONESIAN" WOULD INTERFERE IN THE EAST TIMORESE DELIBERATIONS; AND 2) THE GROUP OF TEN MUST AGREE UNANIMOUSLY TO ANY DECISION THEY MAKE. HABIBIE SAID ARAUJO'S PROPOSAL IS JUST ONE METHOD TO COME TO A CONCLUSION ABOUT EAST TIMORESE VIEWS; OTHER METHODS WERE POSSIBLE, BUT NEEDED TO BE CREDIBLE. HABIBIE STRESSED HIS OWN PREFERENCE THAT EAST TIMOR REMAIN A PART OF INDONESIA, BUT THAT THE GOI `HAD TO PLAN FOR THE WORST." IN ANY CASE, INDONESIA WOULD APPRECIATE ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.N. AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ACHIEVE A PERAANENT SOLUTION IN EAST TIMOR.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E33

RELEASED IN PART
B6

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Senator Feinstein:

Thank you for your letter of February 23 regarding correspondence from your constituent who is concerned about the incarceration of [redacted] the eco-tourism guide arrested in Wamena, Irian Jaya, in September. B6

We share your constituent's concern. Our embassy in Jakarta has been in periodic contact with [redacted] B6 lawyers concerning his welfare. Embassy Jakarta has also been in touch with the Prosecuting Attorney's office and the police in Wamena for updates on the status of the case against [redacted] In addition, our ambassador has B6 written directly to the Attorney General of Indonesia to underscore the concern of the U.S. Government about Mr. [redacted] and the nine other persons being tried with him. B6 During Secretary of State Albright's visit to Jakarta earlier this month, our ambassador made a special request to Indonesia's Minister of Justice for the release of all political prisoners, including [redacted] and his nine fellow B6 detainees.

According to their defense lawyers, [redacted] and B6 nine others detained in Wamena are being tried on charges of sedition and insulting the government under the Indonesian criminal code. Embassy Jakarta has emphasized to Indonesian authorities the importance of a prompt and fair trial. The trial began as scheduled on February 2, and [redacted] and B6 his colleagues remain detained pending its outcome.

Your constituent urged you to push for a national dialogue on Irian Jaya at this critical time. As you may know, on February 26 an Indonesian government delegation, led by President Habibie, met in Jakarta with 100 Irianese leaders to initiate the National Dialogue on Irian Jaya. The Irianese representatives reportedly presented their list of aspirations and grievances to an attentive Indonesian

The Honorable
Dianne Feinstein,
United States Senate.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 09 AUG 2006 200504211

1285

government delegation, and hailed the meeting a success. A series of related workshops are scheduled to take place in Irian Jaya during the course of this month. We believe that this dialogue process offers promise, and we have encouraged the Indonesian government to move forward with it.

We hope this information is useful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance with this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:
Correspondence returned.

Reply by H A/S Larkin to Senator Feinstein Re: the Detention of Irianese Activist, Izack Windesi

Drafted:EAP/PIMBS:ALudwig X7-2931, date 3/15/98
O:PIMBS/Indonesia/Human Rights/Windesi - Senator Feinstein

Clearances:EAP:RBoyce NN
EAP/PIMBS:DHartwick (ok)
EAP/RSP:DKeegan (ok)
DRL/BA:SSutton (ok)
H/EAP:HDPittman (ok)

E34

RELEASED IN PART
B6

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Senator Stevens:

Thank you for your letter of March 4 regarding correspondence from your long-time friend and constituent, [redacted] who is concerned with the recent wave of inter-communal violence that has hit the eastern Indonesian island of Ambon. B6

We share [redacted] deep concern. The intensity of the violence and the scope of the damage to residences, businesses, and places of worship have taken people familiar with Ambon by surprise. The potential implications for inter-communal relations throughout the Indonesian archipelago are no less troubling. Through our Embassy in Jakarta and our Consulate in Surabaya, we have monitored, and continue to monitor, these developments closely. This includes regular phone calls to police, Christian and Muslim community leaders, and expatriates resident in Ambon. Our embassy has also expressed repeatedly to the Indonesian government and armed forces our interest in seeing the violence brought to an end. B6

During her visit to Indonesia early this month, Secretary Albright made the issue of civil strife and violence the centerpiece of her meetings with President Habibie and Armed Forces Commander in Chief, General Wiranto. She pointedly called for calm and restraint in Ambon. Our Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Stanley Roth, has expressed the same concern with the Indonesian Ambassador here in Washington. We have welcomed Indonesian moves to restore calm to Ambon -- such as peace talks brokered by locally-born senior military officials that took place on Tuesday, March 9 -- and have repeatedly called for an end to the violence.

Like your constituent, we are also concerned with the growing humanitarian dimension of the problem. The Indonesian government, along with various religious groups,

The Honorable
Ted Stevens,
United States Senate.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 07 AUG 2006 200504211

1355

has reportedly mobilized to address critical needs such as shelter, food, clothing, and medicine. But their capacity to deal with the full scope of the problem is inadequate. USAID is in close contact with the World Food Program and the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), who were in Ambon in late February providing assistance and gathering information on further support needs for potential donors. More recently, the ICRC has had difficulty getting permission from the Indonesian government to open up Ambon to a broader international assistance effort. We are urging the Indonesian government to allow access to international assistance groups, and continue to look for ways to further support the international relief effort.

We would be happy to exchange views with [redacted] on other means to address this problem. Feel free to have him call Doug Hartwick, director of the office with oversight over Indonesian affairs here at the State Department. Mr. Hartwick can be reached at 202-647-1221. B6

We hope this information is useful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance with this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:
Correspondence returned.

Reply by H A/S Larkin to Senator Stevens Re: Violence in Ambon

Drafted:EAP/PIMBS:ALudwig X7-2931, date 3/12/99
O:PIMBS/Indonesia/Human Rights/Ambon - Senator Stevens

Clearances:EAP:SRoth
EAP:RBoyce
EAP/PIMBS:DHartwick (ok)
EAP/PIMBS:JAloisi (ok)
EAP/RSP:DKeegan (ok)
DRL/BA:SSutton (ok)
H/EAP:HDFittman (ok)

E35

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3408

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 052909 232321Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000R

052909
SOURCE: KODAKB.023143
DRAFTED BY: S/S:RNLIKINS -- 03/23/99 X78348
APPROVED BY: S:THE SECRETARY
EAP:SROTH S:AWOLFF S/S-C:DOLSEN
----------B28F67 232322Z /38
O 232320Z MAR 99 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 052909

NODIS

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/09
TAGS: OVIP (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: SECRETARYVS MEETING WITH MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROSE LIKINS. REASON 1.5 (D).

2. (U) MARCH 5, 1999, BOROBUDUR HOTEL, JAKARTA, INDONESIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 052909 232321Z

3. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

U.S..
THE SECRETARY
AMBASSADOR STAPLETON ROY
STANLEY ROTH, A/S FOR EAP
HAROLD KOH, A/S FOR DRL
POLCOUNS (NOTE TAKER).

INDONESIA:
MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, CHAIRMAN OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI-P)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 22 MAR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 07 AUG 2006 200504211

LAKSAMANA SUKARDI, PDI-P TREASURER.

SUMMARY

4. (C) MEGAWATI SAID THERE WERE SERIOUS IMPEDIMENTS TO A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION PROCESS, INCLUDING THE INFLUENCE OF MONEY POLITICS, INADEQUATE TIME FOR PREPARATION, AND A PLETHORA OF PARTIES. NONETHELESS, SHE VIEWED THE ELECTION AS ESSENTIAL AND BELIEVED THAT IT COULD BE ORGANIZED BY JUNE 7. AMIEN RAIS EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE UPCOMING ELECTION, BUT VOICED CONCERN THAT THE UNREST THAT HAS PLAGUED INDONESIA, MOST RECENTLY IN AMBON, COULD PROVE A MAJOR OBSTACLE. IN HER MEETING WITH A BROAD RANGE OF POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS, THE SECRETARY RECOGNIZED THE HARD WORK THEY WERE CARRYING OUT IN PUSHING FOR A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 052909 232321Z

MEETING WITH MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI

5. (C) THE SECRETARY SAID THE USG HOPED FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS THAT WOULD FINALLY GIVE A REAL CHANCE TO OPPOSITION PARTIES. MEGAWATI SHARED THIS PERSPECTIVE, BUT NOTED THAT, UNLIKE HER OWN PARTY, MOST OF THE PARTIES COMPETING WERE NEW, WITH POOR STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND OFTEN LITTLE CONTACT AT THE LOCAL LEVELS. THERE WAS NOT ADEQUATE TIME FOR MOST PARTIES TO PREPARE FOR THE ELECTIONS AND, IN THE END, PERHAPS ONLY 10 TO 15 WOULD ACTUALLY COMPETE NATIONALLY. NEVERTHELESS, INDONESIA URGENTLY NEEDED A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION THAT WOULD GIVE IT A NEW GOVERNMENT. THE PAST 10 MONTHS HAD SEEN LITTLE ECONOMIC PROGRESS DUE TO ECONOMIC POLICIES THAT WERE INEFFECTIVE AND NOT TRANSPARENT.

[redacted] B1

FOR THEIR PART, THE MANY NEW PARTIES HAD NO

EXPERIENCE MONITORING ELECTIONS, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD.

7. (C) WHILE COALITION POLITICS WOULD BE INEVITABLE IN A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM, THE ABSENCE OF REGULATIONS GOVERNING HOW PARTIES COULD FORM COALITIONS WAS IMPEDING PROGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION. MOREOVER, THERE WERE TWO CATEGORIES OF

PARTIES: THOSE WITH CLOSED CONSTITUTIONS (NON-PLURALISTIC), SUCH AS THE ISLAMIC-BASED PARTIES, AND THOSE WITH OPEN CONSTITUTIONS (PLURALISTIC) SUCH AS HER OWN PARTY AND THAT OF AMIEN RAIS. A COALITION FORMED SIMPLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ELECTING A PRESIDENT COULD FALL APART OVER A SINGLE ISSUE, WHICH COULD LEAD TO GOVERNMENT INSTABILITY.

8. (C) DISCUSSING WOMEN'S ROLE IN POLITICS, MEGAWATI SAID THAT THE PDI-P HAD ESTABLISHED A WOMEN'S DEPARTMENT TO GET WOMEN INVOLVED IN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT. WOMEN DID NOT HOLD POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT REFLECTING THEIR NUMBERS IN SOCIETY.

9. (C) MEGAWATI SAID THAT HISTORICALLY THE MILITARY HAD RISEN FROM THE PEOPLE, BUT THAT THE MILITARY HAD BEEN MISUSED DURING SOEHARTO'S "NEW ORDER" REGIME. IT WAS NOW IN NEED OF REFORM, BUT THAT REFORM WOULD HAVE TO BE GRADUAL. CIVIL SOCIETY WAS NOT READY I~EDIATELY TO ASSUME ALL THE POSITIONS THAT THE MILITARY HAD COME TO OCCUPY. SHE AND OTHER PROMINENT LEADERS IN THE ~`CIGANJUR GROUP" (AMIEN RAIS, ABDURRARMAN WAHID, THE SULTAN OF JOGJARARTA AND HERSELF) HAD SPECIFICALLY CALLED FOR A GRADUAL END TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS.
ALBRIGHT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E36

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3387

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 052908 232316Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000R

052908
SOURCE: KODAKB.023142
DRAFTED BY: S/S:RMLIKINS -- 03/23/99 X78348
APPROVED BY: S:THE SECRETARY
EAP:SROTH S:AWOLFF S/S-O:DOLSEN
----------B28E9C 232317Z /38
O 232315Z MAR 99 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
INFO USCINPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 052908

NODIS DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/09
TAGS: OVIP (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), PGOV, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S MEETING WITH AMIEN PALS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROSE LIKINS. REASON 1.5(D).

2. (U) MARCH 5, 1999, BOROBUDUR HOTEL, JARARTA, INDONESIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 052908 232316Z

3. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.:
THE SECRETARY
AMBASSADOR J. STAPLETON ROY
STANLEY ROTH, A/S FOR EAP
HAROLD KOH, A/S FOR DRL
NOTE TAKER

INDONESIA:
AMIEN PALS
NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY (PAN) LEADER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 22 MAR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 21 AUG 2006 200504211

DECAPTIONED

AIDE BARA HASIBUAN

MEETING WITH AMIEN RATS

4. (C) DISCUSSING THE PROSPECTS FOR THE UPCOMING ELECTION, AMIEN RATS SAID HE AND HIS PARTY WERE WORKING HARD TO GUARANTEE THAT THE JUNE 7 POLL WOULD BE FAIR AND HONEST. HE CITED TRAINING OFFERED BY INTERNATIONAL NGO'S SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (IRI) AS ESPECIALLY USEFUL. HE STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THAT INDONESIA NEEDED INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS TO HELP PREVENT "OLD HABITS" FROM ENTERING THE ELECTION PROCESS.

5. (C) THE SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER OPPOSITION PARTIES HAD PLANS TO FORM A COALITION AND ABOUT HOW THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE CHOSEN FOLLOWING THE JUNE ~ PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION. RATS RESPONDED THAT "STATUS QUO FORCES WERE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 052908 232316Z

VERY SOLID." THUS THE OPPOSITION HAD TO WORK TOGETHER TO DEFEAT THEM AND CARRY OUT REFORM. B1

[redacted] ASKED ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN POLITICS, RATS RESPONDED THAT IT MUST BE ELIMINATED. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS COULD NOT HAPPEN IMMEDIATELY AND SHOULD TAKE FIVE TO SIX YEARS.

6. (C) REGARDING THE NEW ELECTORAL PROCESS, RATS STATED THAT THE RECENTLY ENACTED POLITICAL LAWS WERE "MUCH BETTER THAN BEFORE," AND CITED AS EXAMPLES PROVISIONS FOR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS AND THE STIPULATION THAT THE ELECTION WOULD BE HELD ON A HOLIDAY.

7. (C) RATS WAS FAR MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE "CONTINUATION OF BLOODY INCIDENTS," SUCH AS THE RECENT VIOLENCE IN AMBON, AND HOW THIS COULD AFFECT THE ELECTION AND NATIONAL LIFE IN GENERAL. HE CHARGED THAT THERE WAS A COMMON PATTERN TO MUCH OF THE VIOLENCE IN AMBON AND OTHER PLACES THAT DEMONSTRATED TO HIM THAT IT WAS "ENGINEERED

AND WELL-FINANCED." RATS MADE A SPECIAL POINT THAT INDONESIA COULD BENEFIT FROM "U.S. INTERVENTION" TO HELP STOP THE VIOLENCE IN AMBON.

8. (C) THE SECRETARY ASKED RATS ABOUT THE ROLE OF ISLAM
CONFIDENTIAL

IN POLITICS AND INDONESIAN NATIONAL LIFE. RATS EMPHASIZED THAT HIS PARTY WAS PLURALISTIC, BASED ON THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA, AND INCLUDED NON-ISLAMIC MEMBERS. HIS PLURALISTIC APPROACH HAD CONFOUNDED THOSE WHO BELIEVED HE WOULD LOSE SUPPORT IF HE DID NOT FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY ON HIS MUSLIM BASE. HE ASSERTED THAT 90 PERCENT OF MUSLIMS IN INDONESIA HAD ABANDONED THE OLD BELIEFS ADVANCED IN THE 195015 THAT INDONESIA COULD BECOME AN ISLAMIC STATE. HE BELIEVED THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC THINKING ABOUT ITS ROLE IN THE NATION OVER THE PAST 25 YEARS WAS VERY PROMISING.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

EAP

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MAR 23 99

Dear Mr. Pitts:

Thank you for your letter to Secretary Albright, dated February 26, 1999, regarding Indonesia.

During the Secretary's March 4-5 visit to Indonesia, she raised all of the concerns you mention -- the upcoming June 7 elections, reports of wide-spread violence, the human rights situation, and East Timor -- in her discussions with senior officials of the Indonesian government (GOI) and military (ABRI). She also met with East Timorese resistance leader Xanana Gusmao.

Indonesia has made real progress in democratic reform since former President Soeharto's resignation in May 1998. Civil society and a free press have flourished, new political laws have been set in place, new political parties established, and the stage has been set for parliamentary elections on June 7. The Indonesian government has made it clear that international visitors are welcome to observe the elections, and extensive preparations are also underway for domestic monitors to help ensure that the polling is free and fair. The U.S. has provided extensive assistance in support of the elections and we believe that they can be a milestone on Indonesia's road toward greater democracy and an improved human rights performance.

We share your concern about continuing riots and widespread violence in Indonesia. Many civil disturbances stem primarily from economic hardships but, in the context of deepened poverty, ethnic and religious differences are exacerbating the troubles. The Secretary stressed to Indonesian officials the need to reestablish law and order, and prevent the spread of anarchic conditions. She emphasized, however, that Indonesian security forces must exercise their authority in responsible ways, without resorting to excessive force to quell unrest.

The Honorable
Joseph R. Pitts,
House of Representatives.

1151

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 07 AUG 2006 200504211

Reply on Indonesia to Representatives Pitts and Frank Wolf

Draft:EAP/PIMBS:RClarke x7-2543 3/15/99
O:\INDONESIA\Human Rights\Reply Mar 99 to Cong. Pitts and Wolf on Indonesia.doc

Clearances:EAP:SRoth
:EAP:SBoyce
:EAP/PIMBS:DHartwick/JAloisi(ok)
:EAP/RSP:DKeegan(ok)
:S/P:KBrooks(ok)
:DRL:SSutton(ok)
:EUR/WE:MYouth(ok)
:H:DPittman(ok)

E38

RELEASED IN FULL

EAP

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MAR 23 1999

Dear Mr. Evans:

Thank you for your letter to Secretary Albright, dated February 26, 1999, regarding the situation in East Timor.

During the Secretary's March 4-5 visit to Indonesia, East Timor figured prominently in her discussions with senior officials of the Indonesian government (GOI) and military (ABRI). She also met with East Timorese resistance leader Xanana Gusmao.

The Indonesian government's announcement on January 27 that it would respect the will of the people of East Timor and take steps to authorize independence, should the East Timorese reject autonomy, has opened new possibilities for a resolution acceptable to all the parties. Indonesian and Portuguese officials negotiating under UN auspices agreed March 11 that a "direct ballot" by July, the modalities of which have yet to be worked out, will be the mechanism through which the East Timorese can indicate their acceptance or rejection of autonomy. The UN is sending a team to East Timor this week to assess logistical requirements for a monitoring presence there before the "direct ballot." We continue to support this UN-led process as the best vehicle for an enduring and peaceful resolution of East Timor's status.

As East Timor moves toward either autonomy or independence, it is critical that all parties -- Indonesia, Portugal, the UN Secretary General and the East Timorese themselves -- work constructively for a sustainable solution with realistic transition arrangements. The transition must give due regard to the stability and viability of East Timor and should not be rushed if that undermines its security and ultimate success.

The Honorable
Lane Evans,
House of Representatives.

1313

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 07 AUG 2006 200504211

For that reason, in both her private meetings and public statements, the Secretary expressed deep concern during her visit to Indonesia about reports from East Timor of escalating political violence and human rights abuses. She urged immediate adoption of measures to break the cycle of violence. She reiterated our call for a halt to distribution of arms to pro-Jakarta civilian militias, and for collection back of those weapons already distributed. The Secretary recognizes that the international community must play both immediate and longer-term supportive roles in East Timor. She expressed U.S. support to the GOI for an expanded international presence on East Timor, in advance of a negotiated agreement, to reduce violence.

Thank you again for sharing your concerns and advice on this important question. Please do not hesitate to contact us again if we can be of further assistance to you on this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:
Correspondence returned.

Reply on East Timor to Representatives Evans, Kennedy and 24 Other Members of Congress

Draft:EAP/PIMBS:RClarke x7-2543 3/15/99
O:\INDONESIA\East Timor\REV Reply Mar 99 to Cong. Evans, Kennedy and Others.doc

Clearances:EAP:SRoth(ok)
:EAP:SBoyce(ok)
:EAP/PIMBS:DHartwick/JAloisi(ok)
:EAP/RSP:DKeegan(ok)
:S/P:KBrooks(ok)
:DRL:SSutton(ok)
:EUR/WE:MYouth(ok)
:H:DPittman(ok)

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO4149

PAGE 01 CANBER 00943 240512Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 ACQ-01 CIAE-00 CPR-02 DODE-00
SRPP-00 DS-00 FBIE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 LAB-01
ADS-00 NSAE-00 PA-00 PRS-00 SSC-01 SSO-00 SS-00
USIE-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 SAS-00 /009W
----------B2AA88 240512Z /38

R 240510Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3225
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

UNCLAS CANBERRA 000943

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPDC, PREL, AS, ID
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER DOWNER TO SECRETARY
OF STATE ALBRIGHT

1. WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN BY CHRIS MORAITIS, DIRECTOR OF THE EAST TIMOR TASK FORCE, AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, THE FOLLOWING LETTER DATED MARCH 11, 1999, FROM MINISTER ALEXANDER DOWNER TO SECRETARY MADELEINE ALBRIGHT:

BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MADELEINE:

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CANBER 00943 240512Z
I AM WRITING TO SAY HOW MUCH I VALUED OUR TELEPHONE EXCHANGE AT THE TIME OF YOUR VISIT TO JAKARTA LAST WEEK. YOUR VISIT WAS CLEARLY A TIMELY AND SIGNIFICANT ONE IN TERMS OF REINFORCING THE KEY MESSAGES THAT WE NEED TO GET ACROSS TO THE INDONESIANS AND EAST TIMORESE THROUGH THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD.

I BELIEVE IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR US TO CAPITALISE ON THE POSITIVE IMPACT OF YOUR VISIT. FOR ITS PART, AS A PRIORITY, AUSTRALIA WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THE KEY PLAYERS TO PURSUE RECONCILIATION AMONGST THE EAST TIMORESE AND TO REDUCE THE ATMOSPHERE OF TENSION AND VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR. I LOOK FORWARD TO STAYING IN TOUCH WITH YOU AS THE PROCESS OF TRANSITION EVOLVES IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 07 AUG 2006 200504211

YOURS SINCERELY,
ALEXANDER DOWNER /S/

END TEXT.

2. THE EMBASSY WILL FORWARD THE ORIGINAL LETTER VIA UNCLASSIFIED POUCH IN CARE OF THE EAP/ANP DESK, REGISTRY NO. 9297536.

HOLMES

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E41

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8426

PAGE 01 JAKART 01577 01 OF 02 300832Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/019W

----------B53E70 300832Z /38

O 300816Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6887

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001577

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/24/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID, UN
SUBJECT: XANANA GUSMAO LETTER TO THE SECRETARY

REF: A) STATE 47684, B) JAKARTA 1413

1. CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE MICHAEL P. OWENS, REASON, 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. FOLLOWING IS A LETTER FROM EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO TO THE SECRETARY, IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY'S LETTER OF MARCH 19 (REF A). THE ORIGINAL IS BEING FORWARDED BY POUCH:

SALEMBA, MARCH 22, 1999

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01577 01 OF 02 300832Z

SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DEAR MADAME SECRETARY,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF MARCH 19. YOUR WORDS ARE OF GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT AND CERTAINLY REINFORCE OUR COMMITMENT FOR PEACE IN EAST TIMOR AS OUR HUMBLE CONTRIBUTION TO A STABLE AND PEACEFUL SOUTHEAST ASIA.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 29 MAR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 07 AUG 2006 200504211

I WILL RECALL OUR MEETING AS A MEMORABLE OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE A MOMENT OF FREEDOM WITH SOMEONE WHO SO CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS ITS MEANING. IT WAS ALSO AN OPPORTUNITY TO VOICE THE YEARNINGS OF MY PEOPLE FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION AND, ABOVE ALL, PEACE OF MIND TO SECURE A FREE AND DIGNIFIED LIFE FOR ALL OUR CHILDREN.

I ALSO WISH TO EXPRESS OUR INTEREST IN STAYING IN CLOSE AND REGULAR TOUCH WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND AMBASSADOR J. STAPLETON ROY. MY PERSONAL ASSISTANT, MS. KIRSTY SWORD, WILL ENSURE THE CONTACT BETWEEN THE US EMBASSY IN JAKARTA AND MY OFFICE.

REPORTS FROM EAST TIMOR ARE UNFORTUNATELY DEPICTING AN ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION AS WELL AS AN INCREASE OF ARMED MILITIAS GROUPS (NAMELY IN LOSPALOS

AND SAME).

[redacted] B1

WE INSIST THAT THE TWO CATHOLIC BISHOPS, MONS. XIMENES BELO AND MONS. BASILIO DO NASCIMENTO, LEAD THE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS. NO ONE ELSE GATHERS SIMILAR CONSENSUS, POLITICAL CREDIBILITY AND LEGITIMACY. WE ARE ALSO SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS CARRIED OUT BY KOMNASHAM (THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION) TO FACILITATE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE EAST TIMORESE, TO SET UP A BROAD-BASED PEACE AND STABILITY COUNCIL.

WE SUPPORT THE TWO CATHOLIC BISHOPS' STANCE ON DEVELOPING THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS IN DILI RATHER THAN JAKARTA AND URGE THAT PRESSURE BE EXERTED UPON JAKARTA TO ENABLE MY PRESENCE IN DILI TO PARTICIPATE

CONFIDENTIAL

IN A FUTURE MEETING CONVENED BY THE BISHOPS.

WE INSIST ON THE NEED TO DISARM AND DISBAND THE ARMED MILITIA GROUPS. WE ARE AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES THIS WILL RAISE GIVEN THE SPONSORSHIP AND SUPPORT GRANTED BY JAKATA AND ABRI. UNFORTUNATELY SUCH A SITUATION HAS FORCED ME TO SHIFT MY CALL FOR A UN POLICE FORCE TO A UN PEACE KEEPING FORCE. THE ACTION CARRIED OUT BY THESE GROUPS IS NOT WARFARE AGAINST AN ARMED COUNTERPART. IT IS COLD-BLOODED MURDER AGAINST DEFENSELESS CIVILIANS, SUCH AS THE MALIANA KILLINGS TWO DAYS AGO, WHERE TWO ELEVEN YEAR OLD CHILDREN WERE SHOT.

WE FULLY AGREE WITH AND HIGHLY APPRECIATE THE POINTS YOU RAISED AS ON-GOING EFFORTS TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE TERRITORY. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS OUR DEEPEST GRATITUDE AND ADMIRATION FOR YOUR WORDS AND SPEECH "INDONESIA, THE UNITED STATES AND DEMOCRACY," ADDRESSED IN JAKARTA BEFORE LEAVING INDONESIA. WE AGREE THAT ONLY AN IMMEDIATE REDUCTION OF ABRI'S PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR WILL ENABLE ITS FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN A UN PEACE KEEPING FORCE AND THAT ONLY A DEMOCRATIC AND CREDIBLE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8427

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	DINT-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00 /020W	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00

----------B53E73 300832Z /38

O 300816Z MAR 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6888

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 001577

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/24/09
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ID, UN

SUBJECT: XANANA GUSMAO LETTER TO THE SECRETARY

MECHANISM TO DETERMINE THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE WILL LAST AND SUCCEED.

WE ARE CERTAIN THAT WITH YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND COMMITMENT TO PEACE IN EAST TIMOR IT WILL BECOME A REALITY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE PLEDGE OUR COMMITMENT TO ENSURE THAT THE FREEDOM OF EAST TIMOR AND THE BIRTH OF OUR NEW NATION WILL BE YET ANOTHER FIRM STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF PEACE AND COOPERATION IN THIS TROUBLED REGION OF THE WORLD.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01577 02 OF 02 300832Z

SINCERELY
KAY RALA XANANA GUSMAO

3. COMMENT: IN OUR VIEW, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT POINTS IN XANANA'S LETTER ARE:

-- AN INSISTENCE THAT THE TWO BISHOPS TAKE THE LEAD IN RECONCILIATION EFFORTS (WHICH CONFIRMS EARLIER REPORTS - REF B), AND HIS DESIRE TO ATTEND ANY RESULTING CHURCH-SPONSORED FORUM IN EAST TIMOR.

-- HIS REITERATION OF SUPPORT FOR KOMNASHAM'S PROPOSED PEACE AND STABILITY COUNCIL. (OTHERS ON THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE ARE LESS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT A KOMNASHAM ROLE.)

-- A CALL FOR A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. XANANA PREVIOUSLY HAD EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR A RELATIVELY SMALL UN POLICE CONTINGENT.

-- HIS CALL FOR A REDUCED ABRI PRESENCE. UNLIKE SOME ON THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIDE, XANANA STOPS SHORT OF DEMANDING A TOTAL ABRI WITHDRAWAL BEFORE THE VOTING PROCESS AND EVEN SUGGESTS THAT ABRI COULD BE PART OF A "PEACEKEEPING FORCE."



B1

B1

OWENS

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2976

PAGE 01 STATE 058561 311657Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DINT-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	G-00	SAS-00	/019R				

058561
SOURCE: KODAKC.031043
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:RCLARKE:RJC -- 03/31/99 X7-2543 O:\INDO\ETIMOR\C
APPROVED BY: EAP:SROTH
EAP/PIMBS:DHARTWICK EAP:SBOYCE
----------B60133 311658Z /38
P 311644Z MAR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 058561

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/29/09
TAGS: PREL, PINR, ID
SUBJECT: SHARING THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO XANANA GUSMAD

REF: (A) STATE 47684, (B) JAKARTA 1548

CLASSIFIED BY EAP A/S STANLEY O. ROTH. REASON: 1.5(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 058561 311657Z
1. (U) EMBASSY JAKARTA IS REQUESTED TO DRAW ON THE TALKING POINTS AT PARA 2 BELOW TO RESPOND TO DEPLU DIRECTOR FOR AMERICAN AFFAIRS SAMODRA SRIWIJAYA'S REQUEST FOR A COPY OF THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO EAST TIMORESE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO (REFTELS).

2. (C) BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

-- WE REGRET THAT WE CANNOT RESPOND POSITIVELY TO YOUR REQUEST TO PROVIDE YOU WITH A COPY OF SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S RECENT LETTER TO XANANA GUSMAO.

-- THE LETTER IS A PRIVATE EXCHANGE FOLLOWING UP ON THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 07 AUG 2006 200504211

SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH GUSMAD AND, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, WE ARE UNABLE TO SHARE ITS CONTENTS WITH THIRD PARTIES.

-- HOWEVER, WE WISH TO ASSURE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE IDEAS ABOUT EAST TIMOR CONTAINED IN THE LETTER ARE COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE SECRETARY DURING HER MEETINGS WITH SENIOR INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHILE VISITING JAKARTA MARCH 4-5.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ7468 RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 059800 011933Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	UTED-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSC-01	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/019R		

059800
SOURCE: KODAKB.001169
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:RCLARKE:RJC -- 03/31/99 X7-2543 O:/INDO/ETIMOR
APPROVED BY: S:THE SECRETARY
EAP:SOROTH EAP/PIMBS:DHARTWICK P:DSTRAUB DRL:SSUTTON
S/P:KBROOKS EAP:SBOYCE S/S-C:BHAMBRICK EUR/WE:DGLASSMAN
S/S:RMLIKINS S/S-O:DMOLSEN
----------B6A779 011934Z /38
O 011933Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 059800

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, ID
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO PORTUGUESE FM JAIME GAMA

1. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT EMBASSY LISBON DELIVER THE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 059800 011933Z
MESSAGE AT PARA 2 BELOW FROM THE SECRETARY TO FM GAMA. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW:

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JAIME:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 23 ON EAST TIMOR. IT WAS USEFUL RECEIVING YOUR VIEWS BEFORE I VISITED INDONESIA MARCH 4-5. EAST TIMOR WAS A HIGH-PRIORITY TOPIC IN MY DISCUSSIONS WITH INDONESIAN OFFICIALS AND WITH EAST TIMORESE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 07 AUG 2006 200504211

BOTH IN MY JAKARTA SPEECH AND IN MY MEETINGS WITH INDONESIAN OFFICIALS, I STRESSED DISARMAMENT OF CIVILIAN

MILITIAS, CALLED FOR TROOP REDUCTIONS AND OTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND BACKED THE IDEA OF AN INCREASED INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR, IN ADVANCE OF A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT.

OUR IMMEDIATE PRIORITY IS TO REINFORCE ON-GOING EFFORTS TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE ON THE GROUND. WE SUPPORT XANANA GUSMAO'S CALL FOR A BROAD-BASED COUNCIL TO SEEK PEACE AND CALM AND TO BRING ABOUT RECONCILIATION AMONG EAST TIMORESE, AND OF COURSE WE WANT TO SEE THE DIRECT VOTE OF CONSULTATION WITH EAST TIMORESE ON INDONESIA'S AUTONOMY OFFER CARRIED OUT.

AS A DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN UN-SPONSORED TALKS WITH THE INDONESIANS ON EAST TIMOR, YOUR NATION HAS A PROMINENT

ROLE IN DETERMINING THE FRAMEWORK WHICH WILL SHAPE EAST TIMOR'S FUTURE. IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE TRANSITION PROCESS IS PEACEFUL AND THAT AN AUTONOMOUS OR INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR IS STABLE AND VIABLE. PORTUGAL'S EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE EAST TIMOR WITH SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IF IT MOVES TO A NEW STATUS IS A LAUDABLE EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT THIS GOAL IS ACHIEVED.

I APPRECIATE OUR EXCHANGES AND CLOSE COORDINATION ON THIS MATTER.

SINCERELY,

MADELEINE

END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E44

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4708

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 062533 060645Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/021R

062533
SOURCE: KODAKB.006073
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:RJCLARKE:RJC -- 04/05/99 X7-2543
APPROVED BY: P:TRPICKERING O:\INDO\ET\P WITH RAMOS HORTA APR 2.DOC
EAP:RHUSO EAP/PIMBS:DHARTWICK P:DSTRAUB
EUR/WE:DGLASSMAN IO/UNP:KLARSON
----------B80C09 060646Z /38
O 060644Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 062533

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/09
TAGS: PREL, UN, ID
SUBJECT: U/S PICKERING'S APRIL 2 MEETING WITH CNRT VICE PRESIDENT RAMOS-HORTA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 062533 060645Z
CLASSIFIED BY U/S THOMAS R. PICKERING. REASON: 1.5(D).

1. (C) SUMMARY: U/S PICKERING MET APRIL 2 WITH EAST TIMORESE LEADER RAMOS-HORTA. [redacted] B1 HE EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR U.S. SUPPORT, INCLUDING THE SECRETARY'S RECENT MEETING WITH GUSMAO, AND CALLED FOR FURTHER ATTENTION TO THE ISSUES OF INDONESIA'S DISARMING OF THE CIVILIAN MILITIAS AND OF ABRI TROOP REDUCTIONS. RAMOS-HORTA STRESSED THAT A LARGE UN PRESENCE - NOT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 5 APR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 07 AUG 2006 200504211

NECESSARILY MILITARY - WAS ESSENTIAL TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE FOR THE CONSULTATION VOTE ON AUTONOMY. HE ALSO URGED A U.S. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING MET APRIL 2 WITH NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TIMORESE RESISTANCE (CNRT) VICE PRESIDENT JOSE RAMOS-HORTA TO DISCUSS EAST TIMOR. RAMOS-HORTA EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSITION AND ESPECIALLY THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 5 MEETING WITH CNRT PRESIDENT XANANA GUSMAO. B1

3. (C) RAMOS-HORTA EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF ESCALATING VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR AS A RESULT OF ABRI'S ARMING OF CIVILIAN MILITIAS. HE SAID HABIBIE -- AND PERHAPS EVEN ABRI CHIEF WIRANTO -- WERE SINCERE IN NOT WANTING VIOLENCE, BUT "ROGUE ELEMENTS" OF ABRI WERE UNDERMINING THEIR EFFORTS. RAMOS-HORTA SAID HE HAD CALLED PUBLICLY FOR TOTAL ABRI WITHDRAWAL, BUT CONFIDED THAT SUBSTANTIAL TROOP REDUCTIONS, AND A CHANGE OF THE ABRI COMMANDER IN EAST TIMOR TO SOMEONE MORE "RESPONSIVE," WOULD CONSTITUTE SIGNIFICANT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. HE ASKED THE U.S. TO INTERCEDE WITH THE GOL ON THE DISARMAMENT AND TROOP REDUCTION ISSUES AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR OUR PREVIOUS HELP.

4. (C) IN RESPONSE TO U/S PICKERING'S INTERVENTIONS, RAMOS-HORTA SAID THAT INDEPENDENCE FOR EAST TIMOR WAS INEVITABLE, ALTHOUGH A THREE-YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD (AS A NON-SELF GOVERNING ENTITY UNDER A UN "ENVELOPE") WOULD PROBABLY BE IDEAL. B1

PAGE 04 STATE 062533 060645Z
THAT IF THE PLANNED "ONE-PERSON, ONE VOTE" CONSULTATION ON THE GOI AUTONOMY PACKAGE WERE CLEAN AND NON-COERCIVE, HE WOULD SUPPORT ANY OUTCOME, ALTHOUGH HE EXPECTED THE

AUTONOMY PROPOSAL WOULD BE REJECTED, LEADING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF HABIBIE'S PROMISE TO SUPPORT INDEPENDENCE. A SIGNIFICANT UN PRESENCE BEFORE AND DURING THE CONSULTATION WOULD BE CRUCIAL. IF INDONESIA RESOLVED THE PROBLEM OF ARMED PARAMILITARIES, THE UN PRESENCE NEED NOT NECESSARILY BE MILITARY. UNARMED POLICE, PERHAPS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UN HIGH COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OR OTHER UN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES, WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO ENSURE THAT EAST TIMORESE COULD VOTE WITHOUT FEAR. RAMOS-HORTA ASKED FOR CONTINUED U.S. BACKING FOR SUCH A UN PRESENCE, AND STRESSED THAT A U.S. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR WOULD ALSO BE "CRUCIAL."

5. (C) U/S PICKERING ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW RAMOS-HORTA SAW THE FUTURE OF AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR UNFOLDING. IN RESPONSE, RAMOS-HORTA SAID THAT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT WOULD BE NECESSARY. PORTUGUESE OFFERS OF SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS WERE WELCOME, BUT EAST TIMOR DID NOT WANT TO BE TOO DEPENDENT ON PORTUGAL; BOTH EAST TIMOR AND PORTUGAL SOUGHT TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF RECOLONIALIZATION. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE RESISTANCE WAS PREPARED TO PUT INTO PLACE DEMOCRATIC MEANS TO CHOOSE A NEW LEADERSHIP FOR THE TERRITORY. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD EVEN BE WILLING TO HOLD A REFERENDUM AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD TO GIVE THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE A FINAL CHANCE TO SAY WHETHER THEY WANTED TO PROCEED TO INDEPENDENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 062533 060645Z

6. (C) RAMOS-HORTA TOLD U/S PICKERING THAT PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS, WHETHER INDONESIAN MIGRANTS (WHOM HE ESTIMATED AT 100,000) OR EAST TIMORESE, WOULD BE TREATED FAIRLY AND BE WELCOME TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR. THERE WOULD BE LAND DISPUTES, BUT HE DESCRIBED HIS IDEA FOR A FUND TO RESETTLE MIGRANTS WITHIN EAST TIMOR AND COMPENSATE THEM AS EAST TIMORESE RETURNED TO LANDS TAKEN ILLEGALLY. AN INCENTIVE FUND TO PERSUADE TURN-IN OF HANDGUNS COULD ALSO BE EFFECTIVE, HE SAID. RAMOS-HORTA SAID THAT PORTUGUESE, WHICH MOST EAST

TIMORESE DON'T SPEAK, WOULD BE THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE, BUT THERE WOULD BE NO BAN ON THE INDONESIAN LANGUAGE.

7. (C) RAMOS-HORTA CLOSED BY EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR U.S. AND NATO HUMANITARIAN ACTIONS IN KOSOVO, WHICH HE CITED AS AN EXTRAORDINARY EXAMPLE OF A PREDOMINANTLY CHRISTIAN FORCE HELPING MUSLIM MINORITIES.

8. (U) HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST BRUCE CAMERON AND LYNN EREDRIKSSON OF THE EAST TIMOR ACTION NETWORK (ETAN) NGO ACCOMPANIED RAMOS-HORTA. P SPECIAL ASSISTANT DAVID STRAUB AND EAP/PIMBS BOB CLARKE (NOTETAKER) SAT IN.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E46

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO6225

PAGE 01 STATE 066534 100123Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AIT-03 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 C-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00
DS-00 FBIE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 ADS-00 M-00
NSAE-00 OIG-03 DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00 MR-00 NFAT-00
SAS-00 /010R

066534
SOURCE: KODAKB.010022
DRAFTED BY: EAP/RSP:MBJOHNSON:MBJ -- 04/08/99 X74393 O/HR/NGOMEETING
APPROVED BY: EAP:SOROTH
DRL:HKOH EAP:RDEMING EAP/RSP:PSLUTZ EAP/RSP:BMALKIN
EAP/CM:RPATTERSON EAP/BCLTV:GKENT EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
----------BA1109 100124Z /38
P 100122Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY
INFO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 066534

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, KDEM, PGOV, ID, TH, CH
SUBJECT: NGO DIALOGUE ON THE SECRETARY'S TRIP

1. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 066534 100123Z

2. (U) SUMMARY: EAP A/S STANLEY ROTH AND DRL A/S HAROLD KOH MET WITH NINETEEN HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS MARCH 24 TO DISCUSS THE SECRETARY'S RECENT TRIP TO CHINA, THAILAND, AND INDONESIA. ROTH AND KOH STRESSED TO THE NGO REPRESENTATIVES THAT IN ALL THREE NATIONS THE DISCUSSIONS COVERED A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES, BUT HUMAN RIGHTS REMAINED A TOP PRIORITY. END SUMMARY.

3. (SBU) ROTH BEGAN BY EXPLAINING TO THE NGO LEADERS THAT THE CHINA TRIP CONTINUED THE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH THE PRC ON IMPORTANT BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ISSUES. THE BROAD AGENDA INCLUDED NONPROLLEERATION, ENVIRONMENTAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 07 AUG 2006 200504211 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PROTECTION, WTO ACCESSION, KOREAN PENINSULA POLICY, SOUTH ASIAN ISSUES, PERSIAN GULF ISSUES, AS WELL AS HUMAN RIGHTS. THE GOAL WAS BETTER COOPERATION FROM THE PRC ON AT LEAST SOME OF OUR POLICIES. THE SECRETARY TOLD PREMIER ZHU AND FM TANG THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF US-PRC RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS,

SUCH AS RELEASE OF DISSIDENTS OR SIGNED AGREEMENTS, ROTH EMPHASIZED THAT THE KEY RESULTS ARE THAT CHINESE LEADERS UNDERSTAND THAT HUMAN RIGHTS WILL NOT BE DROPPED AND THAT THE US EXPECTS MOVEMENT TOWARD REFORM. THE SECRETARY LEFT A CLEAR MESSAGE THAT THE ZHU VISIT WOULD BE MORE SUCCESSFUL IF HE ADDRESSED THE RANGE OF OUR CONCERNS, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS.

4. (SBU) SEVERAL NGO REPS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT HUMAN RIGHTS MAY BE BROUGHT UP IN US-PRC DISCUSSIONS ONLY AS A "FORMALITY" WITH NO REAL HOPE OF PROGRESS. KOH ASSERTED

THAT THE OPPOSITE IS THE CASE: THE SECRETARY CONSISTENTLY SPEAKS DIRECTLY AND FORCEFULLY ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE PRC. HE IS CONVINCED THE CHINESE NOW UNDERSTAND THAT THESE ISSUES WILL NOT BE DOWNPLAYED OR DROPPED, AND THAT ZHU CAN EXPECT FORTHRIGHT DIALOGUES ON HUMAN RIGHTS DURING HIS VISIT. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ON TIBET, KOH TOLD THE NGOS HE HAD BEEN INVITED BY THE PRC TO RETURN TO CHINA DURING THE LATTER PART OF THIS YEAR AND A VISIT TO TIBET IS CURRENTLY ON THE ITINERARY, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO SPECIFICS ON WHEN OR IN WHAT FORM IT MIGHT TAKE.

5. (SBU) ROTH TOLD THE NGO GROUP THAT THE BANGKOK VISIT CENTERED PRIMARILY ON THE APPREHENSION OF KHMER ROUGE LEADER TA MOK, WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL. OTHER CONCERNS THAT SHE DISCUSSED WITH THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT WERE REFUGEES AND EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

6. (SBU) ROTH REPORTED THAT THE INDONESIA PORTION OF THE TRIP WAS HIGHLY PRODUCTIVE, DUE TO PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S COMMITMENT TO PROGRESS TOWARDS THE JUNE ELECTIONS. THE MEETINGS WITH FM ALATAS AND MINDEF GENERAL WIRANTO WERE EQUALLY OPEN.

7. (SBU) IN RESPONSE TO AN NGO QUERY OF WHEN THERE WILL BE MONITORS IN EAST TIMOR, ROTH COMMENTED THAT THE SITUATION IS "NOT AS FAR ALONG AS THAT". ALTHOUGH THE UN WILL BE ALLOWED TO MONITOR DURING THE ELECTIONS, THE SECRETARY'S IMMEDIATE CONCERN IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOL WAS THAT THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

VIOLENCE BE STOPPED AND THAT ONE OF THE PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION BE ACCEPTED AND ACTIVATED.

UNCLASSIFIED

8. (SBU) THE NGOS REPORTED THAT THEIR SOURCES ARE SEEING MORE UNREST THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, MORE ARMS, AND LARGE INFUSIONS OF FUNDS INTO TRADE UNIONS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, CREATING A VOLATILE SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. QUESTIONS FOCUSED ON THE SINCERITY OF THE

MILITARY'S EFFORTS TO HALT THE VIOLENCE IN AMBON, AND ON THE CONTINUED INFLUENCE OF SOEHARTO. KOH REITERATED THAT THE ELECTION PROCESS IS MOVING WELL WITH THE REORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES, VOTER EDUCATION AND REGISTRATION CAMPAIGNS, AND GOL COOPERATION WITH THE US AND OTHER DONORS TO WORK COOPERATIVELY TOWARDS FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE A "LEGACY" FROM THE SOEHARTO YEARS THAT CONTINUES TO RESONATE, LEADERS IN INDONESIA VIEW THE COMING MONTHS AS AN HISTORIC MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY WITH THE HOPE THAT THROUGH THE ELECTIONS A FRAMEWORK FOR LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS CAN BE ESTABLISHED TO DEAL WITH THE ROOT CAUSES OF ETHNIC TENSIONS THROUGHOUT THE ARCHIPELAGO.
ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E47

CONFIDENTIAL PTO0298

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B5

PAGE 01 STATE 067537 122328Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

067537
SOURCE: KODAKA.012215
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PTMBS:VEMURRAY/RCLARKE -- 04/12/99 7-1823
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------BAD7A7 122330Z /38

O 122328Z APR 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 067537

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/04
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 63

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM PIMBS

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS HARTWICK.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

[redacted] B1, B5

~~UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE~~
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 11 APR 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 21 AUG 2006 200504211



B1, B5

[redacted]

B1, B5

2. (U) E-MAIL COMMUNICATIONS

WE RECEIVED THE TEST MESSAGE FROM DCM/OMS THIS MORNING, BUT GOT THE FOLLOWING ERROR MESSAGE WHEN WE SENT A REPLY:

"THE FOLLOWING RECIPIENTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN SYNCHRONIZED AND CANNOT BE DELIVERED TO: PCM:VINESGATE/STDA/ST (DCMOMS@DCM@JAKAR EMBA)." HOPE YOU CAN USE THIS INFORMATION TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM.



B1

5. (U) HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

MIKE JENDRZEJCZYK OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ASIA WILL BE TRAVELLING TO JAKARTA EARLY NEXT WEEK AND HOPES TO CALL ON THE EMBASSY. WE'VE FAXED TO YOU A COPY OF HRW'S FRIDAY PRESS RELEASE, IN WHICH CALL ON CGI GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE A JOINT DEMARCHE URGNING THE DISARMING OF ARMY-BACKED MILITIAS IN EAST TIMOR.

6. (SBU) RESCHEDULING EIZENSTAT

U/S EIZENSTAT'S OFFICE IS MAKING TENTATIVE PLANS TO RESCHEDULE HIS TRIP TO ASIA FOR THE SECOND HALF OF 1999, AVOIDING SEPTEMBER BECAUSE OF APEC. INDONESIA, CHINA, JAPAN, AND POSSIBLY THAILAND OR KOREA WOULD BE KEY STOPS.

CONFIDENTIAL

WE'LL KEEP YOU INFORMED AS PLANS FIRM UP.

[redacted] B5

TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

TAB a

S1 2/10/99

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

ORIG. TO IPS
COPIES TO:
S
D
P
E
T
M
G
C
S/P
S/S
S/S-S
PA
PA(JR)
EAP
DRL
RF/sar

'99 FEB 16 P6:21

FEB 1 1999

ACTION MEMORANDUM 99 FEB 17 P8:37

S/S

9901775

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 1/21/09

TO: The Secretary

MKA

FROM: EAP - Stanley O. Roth

SUBJECT: Your March Trip to Asia

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

ISSUES FOR DECISION

We request your consideration of the following events for your trip to Beijing, Chiang Mai, Bangkok, and Jakarta.

Beijing, China

This stop in China will have a tight working agenda, with no major speeches or travel outside Beijing planned.

- **President Jiang Zemin (30 minutes)**

Courtesy call and discussion of Zhu visit to the U.S. in context of our overall relationship.

Approve: ok 2/16 Disapprove: _____

- **Premier Zhu Rongji (30 minutes)**

Office call with Zhu, who, apart from President Jiang, is the critical decision-maker in China's effort to sustain economic reform in the face of broad concern about the social and economic dislocations that arise from rapid growth and opening to the outside.

Approve: ok 2/16 Disapprove: _____

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 1 FEB 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by EAP A/S Stanley O. Roth
Reason: E.O. 12958 1.5 (b)

- **Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan**

As your counterpart and primary interlocutor, we propose two sessions with Tang. We anticipate that Tang would want to do a short (two questions each) joint press availability of about 20 minutes with you either before or after the meeting.

An office call of ~~two hours~~ 90 mins to cover the broad range of bilateral issues (human rights, nonproliferation, trade, Taiwan, climate change), as well as to discuss Zhu's upcoming trip.

Approve: a 2/16 Disapprove: _____

A working luncheon, lasting 90 minutes, hosted by Tang, devoted to strategic dialogue (particularly Korean Peninsula and South Asia).

Approve: a 2/16 Disapprove: _____

- **Vice Premier Qian Qichen**

We propose exploring with the Chinese whether the Vice Premier would host a small dinner for you on Monday, March 1. If that is not feasible (he may be concerned about undermining Tang's status as Foreign Minister) we suggest an office call in the afternoon for about one hour. Qian's role in the entire range of U.S.-China relations remains pivotal, and he is also an important player on Taiwan.

Small Dinner (90 minutes):

Approve: a 2/16 Disapprove: _____

If Qian is unable to offer dinner, an office call (60 minutes):

Approve: a 2/16 Disapprove: _____

Events:

B1

B1

[redacted]

- **American Business Community (30 minutes)**

Only if time permits, we recommend that you spend 30 minutes with a group of U.S. business representatives at an event organized by the American Chamber and the U.S.-China Business Council. U.S. firms will play an important role in support of NTR renewal and keeping the pressure on China to open its market in WTO talks. You would make brief remarks and take a question or two.

Ahlc Lw

Approve: _____ Disapprove: ___✓___

Press Event:

- **Pre-Departure Press Availability (30 minutes)**

In addition to affording you an opportunity to comment on your meetings, a pre-departure press conference allows you to make some significant observations on U.S.- China

relations [redacted] ? B1

Approve: _____ Disapprove: _____

Thailand

Chiang Mai

- **Chiang Mai Crop Substitution Project Visit (30 minutes)**

After arriving from China and overnighting in Chiang Mai, we propose a visit the next morning to a Royal Crop Substitution project in Nong Hoi village. The visit serves to highlight our interest in counter-narcotics, the environment, and rural development. A visit would provide good opportunities for interaction with villagers.

Approve a 2/16 Disapprove _____

- **Hill Tribes Institute (30 minutes)**

A visit to the Hill Tribes Institute and Museum will offer opportunities to meet with Hmong hill tribe villagers, including at-risk hill tribe women and girls from the "New Life Center," a privately supported American NGO. The stop highlights our interests in health, trafficking, and women in development issues.

Approve a 2/16 Disapprove _____

Bangkok

- **Courtesy Call, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai (30 minutes)**

This courtesy call, preferably upon arrival in Bangkok, will provide time to express our support for Chuan's reform efforts and convey our concerns about the economic crisis, its impact on Thailand's poor, and the fate of key economic reform legislation.

Approve a 2/16 Disapprove _____

- **King Bhumibol (90 minutes)**

Audiences with King Bhumibol, a revered figure and the longest reigning monarch (52 years) in Thai history,

generally begin at 5:30 PM and last 90 minutes. This call, in addition to attracting significant Thai press coverage, will provide a stimulating discussion. You can use the occasion to recognize the King's support for democracy, economic growth and recovery, as well as convey sympathy for the plight of Thailand's poor.

Approve a 2/16 Disapprove _____

- **Foreign Minister Surin (90 minutes)** lunch vice meeting?

We propose a 60-minute meeting with Surin (on your second day in Bangkok) to review the key regional and bilateral political and economic issues. The meeting would be followed by a joint press availability, to last about 30 minutes, including pre-brief.

Approve a 2/16 lunch Disapprove _____

- **Breakfast Roundtable with NGOs and Business leaders (45 minutes)**

We propose you host a roundtable with a mixed group of Thai and U.S. NGO and business leaders, including representatives of businesses that have contributed to social programs. This would be an opportunity to convey to a broader audience our message of concern over the social impact of the economic crisis on the poor. talk + larger

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

- **Embassy Meet and Greet (20 minutes)**

We propose a brief stop at Embassy Bangkok, one of our largest overseas missions in the world, to greet employees and staff before departure for Jakarta.

Approve ca 2/16 Disapprove _____

Indonesia - Proposed Events

- **President Habibie (75 minutes)**

Your meeting with President Habibie would be a review of core topics (e.g., elections, human rights, economic reform, East Timor). This is a long time to set aside, but

necessary given both the important issues on the table and Habibie's style.

Approve c 2/16 Disapprove _____

- **Press "Stakeout" after Habibie Meeting (10 minutes)**

The media will almost certainly "stake-out" the Presidential Palace for your meeting with Habibie. Therefore, we recommend that you and Alatas pause briefly to take 1-2 questions each from the press gathered at the Palace after the Habibie meeting.

Approve c 2/16 Disapprove _____

- **FM Alatas (60 minutes)**

Your meeting with FM Alatas provides an opportunity to review core bilateral issues, especially East Timor, in greater detail than with the President. It is also a good opportunity to discuss regional issues (i.e. Spratly Islands, Burma, Malaysia, Cambodia). We propose a meal with FM Alatas, possibly a ~~dinner~~ meeting, lunch? the evening you arrive.

Approve c 2/16 Disapprove _____

- **Defense Minister Wiranto (60 minutes)**

This is a key meeting (made longer by the need for interpretation) because of the Armed Forces' (ABRI) involvement in many aspects of Indonesian society and politics, including the electoral process. We need to deliver firm messages on a positive ABRI role in election security, and on the need for ABRI to follow up on past human rights abuses and prevent future ones.

Approve c 2/16 Disapprove _____

- **Speech at University (30 minutes plus speech preparation time)**

We recommend that you deliver a major policy speech on U.S.-Indonesian relations at an Indonesian university, which would give you the rare opportunity to stress before a non-traditional audience (i.e., students) the importance we attach to continued progress on democracy, free and fair elections, and human rights. We believe that a speech

provides a better opportunity than a press conference to lay out the key aspects of U.S. policy. While there is the real risk of demonstrators and hecklers at a speech, you face this risk anyway at your hotel and some of your meeting locations.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

- **Election-focused Meet-and-Greet with Three "Pull-asides" (~~45~~ minutes)**

This gathering at the Ambassador's residence would allow you to meet a broad range of political party figures, and members of the newly formed Election Commission (if it is credible), as well as have three "pull-asides" (15 minutes each) with the key opposition leaders. This event will end a strong signal of U.S. interest in a credible transition to democracy. It would also avoid looking like we are taking sides in the elections and the likelihood of overlooking dark horse emerging contenders (such as the United Development Party or PPP). The "pull-asides" would be with: (a) Megawati, Sukarno's daughter and General Chairperson of PDI; (b) Gus Dur, head of Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest "traditionalist" Muslim organization; and, (c) Amien Rais, a "modernist" Muslim leader and founder of the pluralist, but Muslim-based party PAN.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

- **Democracy/Human Rights Roundtable (45 minutes)**

This roundtable with human rights activists, women's representatives, election monitoring NGOs, and members of the newly formed Election Commission (if it is credible) would underscore high U.S. interest in free and fair conduct of the elections and the human rights situation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

- **East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao (45 minutes, plus travel time)**

Pending further soundings with Embassy Jakarta on the difficulties involved, we propose a meeting with jailed East Timorese leader Gusmao. This would demonstrate to our

East Timorese leader Gusmao. This would demonstrate to our Congress, to the GOI, and to the East Timorese the high priority the Administration gives to the East Timor issue.

It would underscore our recognition that Gusmao is a major player in the search for a peaceful and enduring solution.

Approve c 1/16 Disapprove _____

- **Embassy Community "Meet and Greet" (20 minutes)**

This event would be a major morale booster for Embassy Jakarta.

Approve a 1/16 Disapprove _____

P:/FO:/SECASIATRIPMEMO

Drafted: EAP/CM:JKeith; EAP/PIMBS:RClarke;
EAP/BCLTV:MWong/GKent 1/21/99 7-6600

Cleared: EAP:SShirk (ok)
EAP/CM:SSchlaikjer/staff (ok)
P:DStraub (ok)
EAP:SBoyce
EAP/PIMBS:DHartwick
EAP/PIMBS:JAloisi
EAP/PIMBS:VMurray
EAP/BCLTV:RHuso
PA: JFoley
S/P: KBrooks
DRL: SO'Sullivan

(SZ)

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SCANNED
JAN 06 1999

February 5, 1999

CONFIDENTIAL
(UNCLASSIFIED When Separated From Attachment)

RELEASED IN FULL

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary
The Deputy Secretary
All Under Secretaries
All Assistant Secretaries

S/CBED	- Ambassador Morningstar
S/CPR	- Ambassador French
S/CT	- Mr. Sheehan, Acting
S/NIS	- Ambassador Sestanovich
S/NIS/C	- Mr. Taylor, Acting
S/P	- Mr. Halperin
S/PICW	- Ms. Loar
S/RPP	- Mr. Johnstone
S/SAS	- Ambassador Schifter
S/SMEC	- Mr. Ross
S/SR	- Ambassador Gelbard
S/WCI	- Ambassador Scheffer
USUN/W	- Ambassador Burleigh, Acting
D/IPC	- Mr. Fauver
E/CBA	- Ms. Jackson
M/IRP	- Ms. Sims
ACDA	- Ms. Starr
USAID	- Ms. Conroy
USIA	- Mr. Ruth
NSC	- Mr. Davies
CIA	- Ms. Hupp, Acting
DoD	- Col. Reynes
Commerce	- Mr. Dorskind
Treasury	- Mr. Comstock
USTR	- Mr. Montgomery
Justice	- Ms. Gatons

SUBJECT: **Briefing Materials for Secretary Albright's Trip to China, Thailand and Indonesia, February 27 - March 7, 1999**

EAP COORDINATOR: **Steve Blake, EAP, Rm. 4209, 647-9990**

DEPUTY COORDINATORS: **Ben Weber, EAP, Rm. 4318, 647-6819, (China)**
Bob Clarke, EAP, Rm. 5210, 647-2543, (Indonesia)
George Kent, EAP, Rm. 5206, 647-2036, (Thailand)

S/S COORDINATORS: **Alexander Grossman, S/S-S, Room 7241, 647-5289**
Kelly Degnan, S/S-S, Room 7241, 647-7817

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 21 MAR 2006 200504211

This memorandum assigns responsibilities for the preparation of briefing materials for use by the Secretary on her trip to China, Thailand and Indonesia, February 27 - March 7, 1999. This tasker will be updated for all bureaus concerned as soon as additional information is available. Bureaus wishing to suggest additions or changes should contact the S/S Coordinators **immediately** for approval.

I. SCOPE PAPER

EAP should provide a scope paper on the Secretary's trip to China, Thailand, and Indonesia. The scope paper should broadly outline the context and objectives of the Secretary's trip, and what she should seek to accomplish, in no more than three, single-spaced pages. **The scope paper should be cleared by D, P, and S/P and, as appropriate, by E, G, T, and other bureaus, and is due, fully cleared, to the EAP Coordinator by NOON, Wednesday, February 17 and to the S/S Coordinators by 4:00 P.M., Thursday, February 18.**

II. ROADMAPS

EAP should prepare a separate roadmap for each country on the Secretary's itinerary. The roadmaps should include a short overview of all public/private themes the Secretary will focus on in her meetings and events, followed by descriptions of the events the Secretary will attend, the goals/objectives of each meeting/event, and explanations of how the event relates to the overall themes of her visit. If possible, the roadmaps should include the subjects to be discussed at each meeting (please follow attached sample). **Each roadmap should be cleared by D, P, S/P, and by E, T, G as needed, and others as appropriate. The fully cleared roadmaps are due to the S/S Coordinators by 4:00 P.M., Monday, February 22, 1999.**

III. BRIEFING MEMORANDA WITH CHECKLISTS AND TALKING POINTS

Each bureau listed below should prepare a briefing memorandum with a checklist of issues and talking points for events in which the Secretary will participate. Additional briefing memoranda with checklists/talking points will be tasked as additional meetings are scheduled. The checklists should be in the Secretary's standard checklist format.

Talking points should be in bullet/tic format, should be as concise and "telegraphic" as possible. Drafters should not provide "scripted" points that begin with first person pronouns or contain introductory clauses. Talking points should begin with an action verb and a short statement of the points to be made. Each checklist and the corresponding talking points should include any items the Secretary should "**Watch**

Out For" during each meeting. These are items that the drafter thinks may be raised by the Secretary's interlocutor and which the Secretary should be prepared to address only if raised. In addition, each item on the checklist should be in priority order and marked either "Must Do" (no more than 2 items) or "Watch Out For" (or "If Raised"), with the balance left unmarked.

Generally, these checklists and talking points should be drafted in a length appropriate for a 45-minute bilateral meeting (4 - 5 issues including rebuttal points and amplification points, and "watch out for" items as necessary). **EAP** should also provide a list of all participants and seating arrangements for each event.

Checklists and talking points **must be cleared with D, P, S/P, and by E, T, and G as needed, and others as appropriate.** These fully cleared checklists and talking points are due to the appropriate **EAP Coordinator by Noon on Friday, February 19 and to the S/S Coordinators by 4:00 P.M. on Monday, February 22, 1999.**

Note: These events are notional at this time.

	Topic	**Draft**	**Clear**
1.	Bilat w/Chinese President Jiang	EAP	EB, DRL, PM, ACDA
2.	Bilat w/Chinese Premier Zhu	EAP	EB, DRL, PM, ACDA
3.	Bilat w/Chinese FM Tang (bilateral issues)	EAP	EB, DRL, PM, ACDA
4.	Lunch w/Chinese FM Tang (regional issues)	EAP	EB, DRL, PM, ACDA
5.	Bilat with Chinese Vice Premier Qian	EAP	EB, DRL, PM, ACDA
6.	Roundtable on Political Reform/Social Development in China	EAP	DRL, PA
7.	Session with Investigative Journalists in China	EAP	DRL, PA
8.	Bilat with Thai Prime Minister Chuan	EAP	EB
9.	Call on Thai King Bhumibol	EAP	
10.	Bilat w/Thai Foreign Minister Surin	EAP	EB
11.	Roundtable with NGOs and Business Leaders (in Bangkok)	EB	EAP, PA
12.	Bilat w/Indonesian President Habibie	EAP	EB, DRL
13.	Bilat w/Indonesian FM Alatas	EAP	EB, DRL
14.	Bilat w/Indonesian Defense Minister Wiranto	EAP	PM, ACDA
15.	Election-focused gathering with three pull-asides w/opposition leaders	EAP	DRL, PA
16.	Mtg w/East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao	EAP	DRL
17.	Democracy/Human Rights Roundtable (Indonesia)	EAP	PA, DRL

IV. BACKGROUND PAPERS

Bureaus listed below should prepare background papers on the topics listed below for the Secretary's use. Background papers should

be no more than one page in length (unless otherwise indicated), and should be written in single-spaced, full sentences, narrative format with block paragraphs. All papers require clearance by **D, P, S/P,** and by **E, G, and T** as needed, and by others as indicated below and appropriate.

Fully cleared background papers are due to the appropriate **EAP Coordinator by NOON, Wednesday, February 17 and to the S/S Coordinators by 4:00 P.M., Thursday, February 18. Early submissions are welcome.**

	Topic	Draft	Clear
1.	China: Economic Overview	EAP	EB
2.	China: U.S.-China Trade Issues, Civil Aviation	EAP	EB, USTR
3.	China: Human Rights	DRL	EAP, G
4.	China: Chinese approach to non-proliferation and WMD	PM	T, ACDA, EAP
5.	China: North Korea	EAP	
6.	China: Women's Issues (trafficking in women, U.S. programs, etc.)	S/PICW	EAP, G, DRL, USAID
7.	China: Law Enforcement Cooperation	INL	EAP, G
8.	China: Religious Freedom	DRL	EAP, G
9.	China: UN Issues (UNSC, Arrears, etc)	IO	EAP
10.	Thailand: Financial Crisis Overview	EB	EAP, Treas.
11.	Thailand: USG Assistance	EAP	EB, USAID, Treas.
12.	Thailand: Women's Issues (trafficking in women, U.S. programs, etc.)	S/PICW	EAP, G, DRL, USAID
13.	Thailand: Counternarcotics	INL	EAP, G
14.	Thailand: Refugee Issues	PRM	EAP, G
15.	Thailand: Good Governance/Democratic Development	EAP	DRL, EB, Treas.
16.	Thailand: WTO Candidacy	EB	EAP, Treas., USTR
17.	Thailand: Khmer Rouge	EAP	DRL, S/WCI
18.	Thailand: F-16s	PM	EAP, T, DOD
19.	Indonesia: Financial Crisis Overview	EB	EAP, Treas.
20.	Indonesia: USG Assistance	EAP	EB, USAID, Treas.
21.	Indonesia: Human Rights	EAP	DRL
22.	Indonesia: Women's Issues (trafficking in women, U.S. programs, etc.)	S/PICW	EAP, G, DRL, USAID
23.	Indonesia: Good Governance/Democratic Development	EAP	DRL, EB, Treas.
24.	Indonesia: East Timor Update	EAP	DRL
25.	Regional Cooperation	EAP	PRM, INL
26.	Regional: HIV/Aids	EAP	G
27.	Regional: Environmental Issues	OES	EAP, USAID
28.	Regional: Emergency Preparedness	EAP	G, OES, Commerce

V. COUNTRY AT A GLANCE BRIEFS

EB should provide the most recent "Country at a Glance" Briefs prepared by the World Bank for China, Thailand and Indonesia to the **S/S Coordinators by 4:00 P.M., Wednesday, February 17, 1999.**

VI. PRESS AND PUBLIC EVENTS MATERIALS

Building Blocks and Scenarios

EAP should draft one to three pages of building blocks (bullet/tic format) and a briefing memorandum with a one-page scenario for each of the ***proposed*** *events at which the Secretary may give remarks. The building* blocks will be used by the speechwriters to draft the Secretary's final remarks. Building blocks for press availabilities should include points on the status of the bilateral relationship and its future, as well as points on what the Secretary and her interlocutors are expected to discuss. In addition, please include any particular information about the leaders the Secretary is meeting with or the timing, location, etc. of the visit to be used as "grace notes" in remarks. Building blocks should be provided on paper, with drafting and clearance information on a separate labeled page, as well as on diskette (Microsoft Word for Windows).

Remarks should be cleared with D, P, E, S/P, and G, T and other bureaus as necessary or as indicated below. Building blocks must be e-mailed and delivered in hard copy to the speechwriters in S/P with copies to the S/S Coordinators by 4:00 P.M., Monday, February 15, 1999. Briefing memoranda with scenarios are due to the EAP Coordinator by NOON on Friday, February 19 and to the S/S Coordinators by 4:00 P.M. on Monday, February 22, 1999.

	Topic	Draft	Clear
1.	American Business Community in China	EB	EAP, PA
2.	Chiang Mai Crop Substitution Project	EAP	INL, PA
3.	Hill Tribes Institute (Chiang Mai)	EAP	
4.	Meet and Greet (Chiang Mai)	EAP	
5.	Embassy Meet and Greet (Bangkok)	EAP	PA
6.	Speech at University (Indonesia)	EAP	PA, DRL
7.	Embassy Meet and Greet (Indonesia)	EAP	PA
8.	Democracy/Human Rights Roundtable (Indonesia) - building blocks for intro	EAP	
9.	Election-focused gathering with three pull-asides w/opposition leaders (Indonesia) - building blocks for intro	EAP	
10.	Press Availability (China)	EAP	
11.	Press Availability (Thailand)	EAP	EB, S/P
12.	Press Availability (Indonesia)	EAP	EB, S/P

Questions and Answers

EAP should draft appropriate hard Q and A's for the Secretary to prepare for press events. These Q and A's should focus on the five main issues likely to be raised at each of the Secretary's press events on the trip. Assistant Secretaries are requested to clear the Q's and A's. **[Note: the EAP representative on the trip will be expected to review the Q and A's and provide revisions and/or new material by Midnight the day before a press event.]** *The Q's and A's, fully* cleared with **D, P, S/P, PA, and with E, G and T as necessary, are due to the appropriate EAP Coordinator by 4:00 P.M., Thursday, February 18 and to the S/S Coordinators by NOON, Monday, February 22, 1999.**

VII. BIOGRAPHIES

EAP should provide the S/S Coordinator by **NOON, Friday, February 12, 1999** a list of key foreign officials or public figures the Secretary may meet in China, Thailand and Indonesia. Upon receipt, S/S-S will request appropriate biographic materials. **EAP should also provide biographies of the U.S. Ambassadors to these nations, and the Consul in Chiang Mai, and their spouses.**

VIII. RECENT ARTICLES

EAP, in coordination with the State Department Library, should provide a selection of recent articles from leading journals (such as *Foreign Affairs, Atlantic Monthly, Foreign Policy*, etc.) on each of the countries or region the Secretary is visiting. These articles are due **to the S/S Coordinators by 4:00 P.M., Thursday, February 18.**

IX. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

EAP and other concerned bureaus should be advised that subsequent taskings are likely as additional events are added to the agenda or confirmed. S/S will work closely to ensure that bureaus are notified promptly of future briefing materials.

X. DOCUMENT PREPARATION AND DELIVERY TO S/S

Drafters, bureau staffers, and the EAP Coordinators share the responsibility for ensuring that all documents are correctly formatted, edited and spell-checked, and cleared before being submitted to S/S.

THE FORMAT OF DOCUMENTS MUST CONFORM TO THAT OF THE ATTACHED SAMPLES. Drafting and clearance information should be on a **separate, labeled page** for each document.

All documents should be linked to the SSS-EAP library before they are delivered to S/S. All documents should also be given to S/S on disk in Word 6.0 for Windows when the hard copies are submitted. Original plus two copies of all documents should be delivered to the S/S Coordinator and not to the S/RMD logger window. Linked documents and documents on disk must be clearly labeled using standardized, explicit titles, e.g., "Rasmussen:Background:Political Scene," etc.

Thank you very much for your assistance on this project.

Rec M. Jikins for
Kristie A. Kenney
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Sample formats (distributed in hard copy only)

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

FEB 19 1999

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM

RELEASED IN FULL

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EAP - Stanley O. Roth

2/19-
Dist.
S
D
P
C
S/P
EAP
DRL
EB
L
S/S

SUBJECT: Checklist for Your February 22 Meeting on the China, Thailand and Indonesia Trip

Checklist:

China:

-- Situation on the Ground

-- Strategic Dialogue (North Korea, South Asia, South China Sea)

-- TMD

-- Zhu Trip - Bilateral Issues (Human Rights, WTO, Nonproliferation)

Thailand:

-- Situation on the Ground

-- Bilateral Issues (Economic Reform, Supachai)

-- Regional Issues (ASEAN, Burma, Cambodia, South China Sea, Indonesia)

Indonesia:

-- Situation on the Ground

-- Elections

-- East Timor

-- Stability/Human Rights/Role of Military

-- Economy

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

Drafted:EAP:SORoth
O:FO/JPHyland/checklist.doc
7-7159

S4
3/17 6:51

RELEASED IN PART
B5

United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

99046

March 17, 1999

'99 MAR 17 P3:27

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

What does Stanley think. I don't think we should abandon this.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

TO: The Secretary

FROM: L - David R. Andrews

What does Sta think? I don think we shou abandon this

MKA

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit of Indonesian Supreme Court

During your meeting with President Habibie he suggested a judicial exchange program to bring the Indonesian Supreme Court justices here to meet with some or all of our justices. This would not be a difficult program to set up. The U.S. judiciary has an active and established program of hosting foreign judges at the Federal Judicial Center here in Washington as well as through the Judicial Conference's Committee on International Judicial Relations. As a member of the committee, I have frequent interaction with both groups and can explore their interest in hosting an Indonesian delegation.

There are some possible downsides. B5

[redacted]

At the same time, a visit could provide an opportunity for us to stress the importance we attach to an independent and ethical judiciary. It might also serve as a first step towards a broader, more fulsome rule of law program. Such a program, for example, might include judicial training for the newly established Indonesian Commercial Court, the court from which American investors in Indonesia typically seek redress. (The U.S. AmCham in Jakarta told Al Larson last week that the weakness of the Commercial Court is one of the biggest business problems in Indonesia.)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 21 MAR 2006 200504211

USAID and the Indonesia desk are skeptical that the time is ripe to begin such a program; they both believe that corruption remains too serious a problem. While their views warrant caution, there are apparently rumors that a new Indonesian Supreme Court Chief Justice will be appointed, a change reportedly prompted by GOI desires to meet the concerns of overseas critics. Coupled with the upcoming election, these events may make conditions ripe in the near future to begin a program of the sort suggested by President Habibie. By coincidence, my Indonesian MFA counterpart visited yesterday and related his view that stepped-up USG rule of law efforts in Indonesia would be extremely useful. (He also volunteered to serve as the central GOI point of contact.) I introduced him to Joe Onek, and we all agreed to stay in touch. In light of these developments, I will raise President Habibie's suggestion with the Committee on International Judicial Relations as well as Justice Kennedy, with whom I am meeting tomorrow. I will keep you posted.

Drafted by: L/FO:WKissinger BK

7-5036 Doc # 60613

Clearance: G/ROL:Jonek
EB:ALarson (ok)
EAP/PIMBS:RClarke (ok)
L/EAP:MComfort (ok)

S6

9910699

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

FEB 22 1999

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM S/S Rmk 2/22

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 02/19/09

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EAP - Stanley O. Roth

SUBJECT: Scope Paper - Your Visit to China, Thailand, Indonesia, February 27 - March 7, 1999

I. OBJECTIVES

1. China: Advance our strategic dialogue with particular emphasis on North Korea, South Asia, and the South China Sea. Discuss, forcefully and frankly, multiple bilateral issues prior to Premier Zhu's visit, emphasizing need to address non-economic issues as well as economic issues.

2. Thailand: Praise Thailand's regional leadership and democratic development while encouraging the continued pursuit of difficult economic reforms.

3. Indonesia: Publicly underscore the importance of Indonesia to the U.S. and demonstrate the U.S.' support for Indonesian democratization. Highlight credible elections, and post-election actions, as critical towards restoring stability. Emphasize the need for a non-violent transition in East Timor and credible progress on human rights in order to enhance Indonesia's international stature.

II. APPROACH

China

Your trip has three major goals. The first is to sustain your strategic dialogue with FM Tang and hopefully

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 22 FEB 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 28 MAR 2006 200504211

CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by Stanley O. Roth, A/S
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

Vice-Premier Qian. Your goal should be to motivate China to move beyond talk to helpful actions on Korea (preventing another missile test) and South Asia (a fissile material moratorium). You also will want to broaden the dialogue to include some new regional issues such as provocative Chinese construction on South China Sea islands. You should also raise global issues, including Kosovo and the Middle East/Iraq. A review of recent trends in the Asian financial crisis would also be timely and help head-off China's effort to exclude us from its proposed ASEAN plus-three Finance Ministers meeting on the regulation of capital flows in Asia (which Larry Summers will be raising with them the previous week).

Second, although you are not expected to reach agreement or achieve specific deliverables (the Chinese always make their concessions at the last minute) or do trip planning (Lieberthal and Shirk will have visit-prep talks in Beijing before your arrival), your frank and forceful discussion of the full range of bilateral issues will be critical in ensuring that China understands what issues will have to be addressed if Shu'a visit is to be a success.

That said, concluding a bilateral WTO negotiation is the highest priority on the Zhu visit agenda. We have provided a realistic offer to Zhu and his colleagues. Charlene Barshefsky will follow you to Beijing March 3-4. You will want to assist her efforts to drive toward an agreement by reminding your interlocutors that a WTO agreement will transform the Zhu visit from one plagued by business complaints about trade barriers and a growing trade gap, to one viewed as a triumphant confirmation of China's reforms.

Thirdly, you will also want to convey the need for the Zhu visit not to be limited to economics. The progress built through the two Clinton-Jiang summits is threatened. Chinese human rights abuses and reports about their missile build-up have sparked criticisms in Washington of the Administration's China policies. The visit can help rebut these criticisms by demonstrating the benefits of engagement in as many areas as possible, especially on security/foreign policy (a step forward on MTCR, fissile material moratorium, cooperation on Korea) and human rights

[redacted] B1

You will probably find a much tougher atmosphere than on your trip last year. The Chinese will [redacted] B1 blame the current controversies on partisanship and "anti-China elements" in U.S. society. In response, you may want to remind them that the Cox Committee report received a unanimous bipartisan vote of support. In essence, your message is that China's own actions have fed these controversies. This is particularly true with respect to the recent crackdown on dissidents.

[redacted] B1

The public dimension of your visit will have a clear human rights theme, reinforced by the presence and side meetings of Assistant Secretary Koh, Legal Adviser Andrews, and Global Rule of Law Coordinator Onek. We have scheduled a pre-departure press conference at which you can comment on the current situation in China and on US-China relations.

Thailand

When we conceived of your trip to Thailand last November, the focus was on highlighting Thailand as a regional model for democracy and reform. While that remains our overall objective, now there are some prominent bilateral issues that will have to be addressed: our lack of support for Thai Deputy PM Supachai to head the WTO; Thai reluctance to cooperate in bringing Khmer Rouge leader Ta Mok to justice; and how to pick up the pace of economic reform.

Parliamentary second-guessing of reform measures has slowed down implementation of PM Chuan's program. A

package of contentious legislation has to be passed by the end of the parliamentary session (late March) to meet IMF requirements and to avoid a loss of political momentum that would spook the markets. While the essential steps the Chuan government has taken to resolve the financial crisis have stabilized the economy, overall production declined sharply in 1998, unemployment rose to nearly six percent and a drought threatens the critical agricultural sector.

Your visit can bolster PM Chuan's commitment to see through the difficult next steps, including passage of bankruptcy and foreclosure legislation, corporate debt restructuring, and bank recapitalization. You will also be able to highlight successful activities to reduce social pressures by visiting a crop substitution project and a program aimed at providing young women alternatives to prostitution. With FM Surin, you will be able to encourage his efforts to step up Thailand's emerging role as leader within ASEAN, as well as praise Thailand's excellent cooperation on transnational issues such as counter narcotics, law enforcement, refugees, and the environment.

Indonesia

The Indonesia you will visit is at a pivotal juncture in its history. The success of the June elections will in large part determine Indonesia's ability to get beyond its current economic crisis and make a genuine transition to democracy. As such, U.S. support for the electoral process will be a major theme in all of your meetings. In your government meetings, your message will be supportive (the GOI has done a lot to pave the way for the June 7 contest) but also tough (government coffers cannot be used to overwhelm the opposition; and the military must play a positive role in maintaining security and preventing bloodshed.)

Your meetings with non-government groups and political party leaders, on the other hand, will give you the opportunity to publicly underscore that the U.S. supports a process of democratization, not a particular outcome. These meetings will also enable you to help shape attitudes and expectations about the process ahead; you should emphasize that credible elections will be the start, not the culmination, of Indonesia's democratic transition.

The second most pressing agenda item is the issue of East Timor. In your government and public meetings, you should praise the GOI's willingness to entertain new solutions to the longstanding problem of East Timor while reaffirming U.S. understanding to Indonesian concern about its national integrity. But that message must be accompanied by a firm call for the GOI to take immediate steps to reduce tensions and violence on the ground. You must make clear to the President and to the military that the international community is watching closely and that Indonesia cannot just wash its hands of East Timor.

A third area of focus involves the necessity for the Indonesian Government to control the violence which has wracked numerous parts of the country in recent months. Unless brought under control this violence, which threatens both economic recovery and the very social fabric of the nation, could derail the upcoming elections. This violence also perpetuates the image of Indonesia as a major human rights violator and tends to overshadow the very significant progress that has otherwise been made on human rights issues.

Your key meeting on this issue will be with General Wiranto. Despite increasing indications that much of the violence is being deliberately provoked--most observers believe by Soeharto family and cronies--
Wiranto has not taken any effective measures to try to stop the provocations. As a possible Presidential aspirant concerned about both his domestic and international reputation, Wiranto should be amenable to persuasion about the need for him--and ABRI--to be seen as capable of maintaining law and order.

Your speech in Jakarta - your only public remarks on this trip - will provide a forum to combine the important themes above. First, that the U.S. strongly supports Indonesia on its path to democracy and economic recovery and is providing substantial assistance to that objective. Second, that we greatly admire Indonesia's ethnic and cultural diversity and tradition of tolerance, but that justice and accountability are essential elements if a government is to maintain the peoples' trust. Third, that you have a 21st century vision of Indonesia as a strong, democratic, and prosperous partner for the United States which will serve as a role model for the region and the world.

UNCLASSIFIED

S7

9912279

SECRET

RELEASED IN FULL

Trip of Secretary Madeleine K. Albright to China, Thailand and Indonesia

Background Book

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

UNCLASSIFIED

9912279

Secretary Albright's Trip to China, Thailand and Indonesia
February 27 - March 6, 1999
Background Book

Table of Contents

I. SCOPE PAPER

II. BACKGROUND PAPERS

1. China: Economic Overview
2. China: U.S.-China Trade Issues, Civil Aviation
3. China: Human Rights
4. China: Chinese approach to non-proliferation and WMD
5. China: North Korea
6. China: Women's Issues
7. China: Law Enforcement Cooperation
8. China: Religious Freedom
9. China: UN Issues
10. China: Theatre Missile Defense (TMD)
11. China: Demining
12. China: IG Project
13. China: Fact Sheet on Embassy Beijing Facilities
14. Thailand: Financial Crisis Overview
15. Thailand: USG Assistance
16. Thailand: Women's Issues
17. Thailand: Counternarcotics
18. Thailand: Refugee Issues
19. Thailand: Good Governance/Democratic Development
20. Thailand: WTO Candidacy
21. Thailand: Khmer Rouge
22. Thailand: F-16s
23. Thailand: Demining
24. Indonesia: Financial Crisis Overview
25. Indonesia: USG Assistance
26. Indonesia: Human Rights
27. Indonesia: Women's Issues
28. Indonesia: Good Governance/Democratic Development
29. Indonesia: East Timor Update
30. Regional Cooperation
31. Regional: HIV/Aids
32. Regional: Environmental Issues

III. COUNTRY AT A GLANCE

1. Country at a Glance: China
2. Country at a Glance: Thailand
3. Country at a Glance: Indonesia

S7AA

RELEASED IN FULL

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR UPDATE

In a startling announcement on January 27, the Indonesian government (GOI) abruptly abandoned its longstanding East Timor policy, stating that if the East Timorese rejected Indonesia's autonomy offer, it would recommend to the incoming People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to consider "letting go of East Timor" on or about January 1, 2000. How the East Timorese would be consulted was not specified, but the GOI reaffirmed its opposition to a referendum. How separation would take place, and what safeguards would ensure a peaceful transition, were also not unspecified. Meanwhile, already high tensions and violence on the ground have continued to rise as this announcement has helped sharpen differences between pro-independence and pro-Indonesian East Timorese amid widespread reports that the Indonesian army has been arming pro-Indonesian civilian groups.

Many crucial issues require attention, including:

-- Reducing the immediate prospects for violence and armed conflict between the two East Timorese camps. The risk of civil war on East Timor following an Indonesian withdrawal is high, unless paramilitary groups are disarmed and confidence-building measures are taken (such as a verified reduction of the number of Indonesian troops, allowing an international presence on the island, negotiating a cease-fire between the government and resistance forces).

-- Identifying a credible means of determining the will of the East Timorese on the autonomy proposal. The UN agreed to identify by mid-March a mechanism acceptable to all the parties, and Ambassador Marker has said that it must be transparent and involve balloting. The GOI, however, remains staunchly opposed to a referendum.

-- Ensuring that East Timor's transition to either autonomy or independence be secure and successful. Given the short term likelihood of intra-Timorese violence and the long-term challenge posed by an ill-prepared autonomous or independent East Timor, the international community, starting with the UN, will be expected to play a significant security and financial role to ensure success.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 21 MAR 2006 200504211

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

S7AB

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 02/22/09

REGIONAL COOPERATION

In Southeast and North Asia there are four major multilateral fora that promote regional political/military and economic cooperation. The oldest, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), was formed in 1967. Since the mid-1990's ASEAN has faced difficulties absorbing members Vietnam, Laos and Burma, which are poorer and more autocratic. More recently, the Asian financial crisis has diverted Indonesia, which had been one of ASEAN's more influential members. The leadership vacuum has made it all the more difficult to deal with contentious issues, such as the extent to which ASEAN should push Burma for internal reforms. The Burma question aside, ASEAN and the U.S. generally share similar views on political/military matters.

In 1994, ASEAN initiated the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) with the support of the U.S. and ASEAN's other Dialogue Partners. The goal of this 22-member organization is to promote confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy. ARF is the only official security forum in the region, and has made strides in building confidence among countries that had had few political/military links. ARF is moving toward preventive diplomacy, although at a slower pace than the U.S. would like due primarily to the hesitancy of China and India. The U.S. is co-chairing with Thailand the Intersessional Group on Confidence Building Measures, which will be in session while the Secretary visits Bangkok in March.

The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) is an unofficial Track II forum; the members are the U.S., Japan, China, Russia, and the two Koreas (but North has not participated in years, making the forum largely ineffective). Japan, Russia and South Korea support raising NEACD to the official Track I level, but North Korea and China oppose this initiative. The U.S. is non-committal, but is concerned that a new forum could complicate the Four Party talks (China, U.S., two Koreas).

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum was established in 1989 to promote economic integration and sustain economic growth in the region. In 1993 President Clinton initiated the annual APEC Leaders meeting at Blake Island, Washington. We view APEC as the preeminent multilateral economic forum and an integral part of U.S. engagement in the region. APEC has had difficulty finding its niche in addressing the economic crisis. Despite political squabbling and allegations of irrelevance that mired the 1998 meetings in Kuala Lumpur, APEC Leaders agreed on a path toward economic recovery based on growth, reform and maintaining open markets.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

UNCLASSIFIED

Classified by EAP Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth
E.O. 12958 1.5(d)

S7AC

RELEASED IN FULL

HIV/AIDS

An important trend of the 1990s has been the beginning of a shift of the global AIDS problem from Africa to Asia. Until the late 1980s no country in Asia had experienced a major epidemic; however, by 1997 HIV was well established across the continent. Regionally, nearly 7.2 million people are now HIV-infected.

China has an estimated 400,000 adults living with HIV/AIDS (.06% prevalence). Most severely affected are IV drug users in Yunnan and Xinjiang, men who have sex with men (MSN), and commercial sex workers. A Chinese Academy of Preventive Medicine researcher called the apathy of local officials, inadequate HIV/AIDS epidemic monitoring, and the low funding of the HIV/AIDS control effort very serious obstacles to HIV/AIDS prevention. The Chinese Academy of Preventive Medicine predicts 1.2 million HIV infected by the year 2000 and over ten million by 2010 if efforts to prevent the disease from spreading into the larger population are not successful.

Thailand has an estimated 770,000 adults living with AIDS (2.23% prevalence). In the early 1990's, Thailand's thriving commercial sex industry facilitated an explosion in HIV/AIDS infections. The RTG recognized the seriousness of the epidemic and took aggressive action. USAID-supported sexually transmitted disease (STD) screening, condom promotion, and education programs assisted in lowering the infection rate among young men - from 8% in 1992 to 3% in 1997. The RTG also cooperates closely with CDC and DOD in important AIDS research. Thailand's National AIDS Commission in February 1999, announced approval of a newly developed NIH-approved AIDS vaccine trial in Thailand - the first of its kind in the world - to be carried out in cooperation with CDC.

Indonesia has an estimated 51,000 adults living with AIDS (.05% prevalence). USAID has a major bilateral program in HIV/AIDS prevention projects (HAPP, AIDSCAP) which focuses on policy support, changing high-risk behavior, timely treatment of STD's, and distribution of condoms. There are many Indonesian success stories: on Bali, a peer education program among youth resulted in condom use increasing from 22% to 72%.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

RELEASED IN FULL

S7AD

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

REGIONAL: ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

China, Thailand and Indonesia are important players on international environmental issues such as climate change, forests, and fisheries. With them we enjoy extensive and successful bilateral environmental and scientific relations. However, we are more often than not at odds with them (along with other developing Asian countries) in multilateral fora.

All three have consistently opposed developing country commitments in the climate debate and argue for equity-based rights to development. Although they have undertaken a number of significant steps, explicit support for and increased participation in climate efforts would help allay U.S. concerns that developing countries are not sufficiently participating in the global effort. Bilaterally and with others such as Japan, we continue efforts to bring these countries to the recognition that action on climate change can support growth.

Given its sheer size and influence, China's role is critical in addressing regional and global environmental matters, particularly climate change. It is the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases and will surpass us around 2015. The Vice President's Forum on Environment and Development during Premier Zhu Rongji's visit will be important to advancing our environmental objectives with China.

The Indonesia forest fires and haze that gripped Southeast Asia in 1997-98 have largely been mitigated. ASEAN has taken a surprisingly strong effort to organize itself to prevent future outbreaks. We are focusing our current assistance on land-use and forest management, climate change, and marine resources. We hope to work with the World Bank to address illegal logging in Indochina; Thailand is a key player.

We are seeking to negotiate an Indian Ocean Sea Turtle Agreement that would involve both Thailand and Indonesia as part of our response to the WTO complaint brought against us by Thailand and others. All three countries are important to our efforts in APEC, ASEAN, and elsewhere to promote sustainable fisheries and protect coral reefs.

Finally, we believe that as we promote recovery from the regional economic crisis, we should encourage development that considers both environmental costs as well as the potential for promoting growth. The recovery offers an opportunity to promote development that is sustainable.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED

STATE
1/28/99

China at a glance

POVERTY and SOCIAL	China	East Asia & Pacific	Lower-middle-income
1997			
Population, mid-year *(millions)*	1,227.2	1,753	2,282
GNP per capita (Atlas method, US$)	860	970	1,230
GNP *(Atlas method, US$ billions)*	1,055.4	1,707	2,818
Average annual growth, 1991-97			
Population *(%)*	1.1	1.3	1.2
Labor force *(%)*	1.1	1.4	1.3
Most recent estimate (latest year available, 1991-97)			
Poverty *(% of population below national poverty line)*	7	..	..
Urban population *(% of total population)*	32	32	42
Life expectancy at birth *(years)*	70	68	69
Infant mortality *(per 1,000 live births)*	32	38	36
Child malnutrition *(% of children under 5)*	16	16	..
Access to safe water *(% of population)*	90	84	84
Illiteracy *(% of population age 15+)*	19	17	19
Gross primary enrollment *(% of school-age population)*	120	118	114
Male	121	120	116
Female	120	119	113



KEY ECONOMIC RATIOS and LONG-TERM TRENDS

	1976	1986	1996	1997
GDP (US$ billions)	151.8	295.7	818.5	902.0
Gross domestic investment/GDP	27.9	37.7	39.6	38.2
Exports of goods and services/GDP	5.0	12.2	21.0	23.0
Gross domestic savings/GDP	28.5	35.2	41.7	42.7
Gross national savings/GDP	28.5	35.3	40.4	41.4
Current account balance/GDP	0.2	-2.5	0.9	3.2
Interest payments/GDP	..	0.2	0.6	0.6
Total debt/GDP	..	8.0	15.8	16.3
Total debt service/exports	..	9.6	8.7	8.6
Present value of debt/GDP	..	..	..	14.9
Present value of debt/exports	..	..	..	82.7

	1976-86	1987-97	1996	1997	1998-02
(average annual growth)					
GDP	9.3	10.1	9.8	8.8	..
GNP per capita	8.3	8.6	8.7	7.4	..
Exports of goods and services	18.8	16.8	5.6	27.6	..



STRUCTURE of the ECONOMY

(% of GDP)	1976	1986	1996	1997
Agriculture	32.8	27.1	20.4	18.7
Industry	45.4	44.0	49.5	49.2
Manufacturing	29.5	35.5	37.8	37.3
Services	21.7	28.9	30.1	32.1
Private consumption	64.0	51.4	46.7	45.7
General government consumption	7.5	13.4	11.6	11.6
Imports of goods and services	4.5	14.7	18.9	18.5



(average annual growth)	1976-86	1987-97	1996	1997
Agriculture	6.0	4.4	5.1	3.5
Industry	11.0	13.8	12.1	10.8
Manufacturing	12.8	13.3	11.6	9.9
Services	12.0	8.7	7.9	8.3
Private consumption	9.3	6.8	11.1	6.2
General government consumption	9.4	9.9	9.5	8.2
Gross domestic investment	10.8	11.2	8.2	5.6
Imports of goods and services	22.5	12.8	5.9	13.1
Gross national product	9.8	9.9	9.8	8.5



Note: 1997 data are preliminary estimates.

This table was produced from the Development Economics central database.

* The diamonds show four key indicators in the country (in bold) compared with its income-group average. If data are missing, the diamond will be incomplete.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

China

PRICES and GOVERNMENT FINANCE

	1976	1986	1996	1997
Domestic prices				
(% change)				
Consumer prices	..	6.5	8.4	7.9
Implicit GDP deflator	4.0	4.6	5.9	1.2
Government finance				
(% of GDP, includes current grants)				
Current revenue	..	24.0	11.4	12.0
Current budget balance	..	5.6	0.6	0.5
Overall surplus/deficit	..	-1.8	-1.5	-1.5



TRADE

	1976	1986	1996	1997
(US$ millions)				
Total exports (fob)	..	30,942	151,066	182,696
Food	..	4,448	10,232	11,054
Fuel	..	3,683	5,929	6,987
Manufactures	..	19,870	129,141	158,767
Total imports (cif)	..	42,904	138,838	142,361
Food	..	2,002	7,866	6,308
Fuel and energy	..	504	6,877	10,306
Capital goods	..	20,415	59,610	57,930
Export price index *(1995=100)*	..	86	..	..
Import price index *(1995=100)*	..	89	..	..
Terms of trade *(1995=100)*	..	96	..	..



BALANCE of PAYMENTS

	1976	1986	1996	1997
(US$ millions)				
Exports of goods and services	7,383	29,583	171,700	207,253
Imports of goods and services	7,125	37,472	154,100	166,755
Resource balance	258	-7,889	17,600	40,498
Net income	0	176	-12,370	-15,900
Net current transfers	0	255	1,922	4,660
Current account balance	258	-7,458	7,152	29,258
Financing items (net)	..	5,410	28,248	6,599
Changes in net reserves	..	2,048	-35,400	-35,857
Memo:				
Reserves including gold *(US$ millions)*	..	16,417	111,728	148,448
Conversion rate *(DEC, local/US$)*	1.9	3.5	8.3	8.3



EXTERNAL DEBT and RESOURCE FLOWS

	1976	1986	1996	1997
(US$ millions)				
Total debt outstanding and disbursed	..	23,719	128,817	146,697
IBRD	..	965	7,616	8,239
IDA	..	774	7,579	7,830
Total debt service	..	2,974	15,756	18,445
IBRD	..	66	840	858
IDA	..	8	73	81
Composition of net resource flows				
Official grants	..	155	249	228
Official creditors	..	1,165	4,401	4,315
Private creditors	..	3,893	6,454	8,134
Foreign direct investment	..	1,875	40,180	44,236
Portfolio equity	..	0	3,466	8,457
World Bank program				
Commitments	..	1,120	1,900	2,425
Disbursements	..	607	2,097	2,275
Principal repayments	..	0	364	377
Net flows	..	607	1,734	1,898
Interest payments	..	75	549	562
Net transfers	..	532	1,185	1,335



Thailand at a glance

10/1/98

POVERTY and SOCIAL	Thailand	East Asia & Pacific	Lower-middle-income
1997			
Population, mid-year *(millions)*	60.6	1,753	2,285
GNP per capita *(Atlas method, US$)*	2,800	970	1,230
GNP *(Atlas method, US$ billions)*	169.7	1,707	2,818
Average annual growth, 1991-97			
Population *(%)*	1.2	1.3	1.2
Labor force *(%)*	1.5	1.4	1.3
Most recent estimate (latest year available, 1991-97)			
Poverty *(% of population below national poverty line)*	13	..	..
Urban population *(% of total population)*	21	32	42
Life expectancy at birth *(years)*	69	69	69
Infant mortality *(per 1,000 live births)*	33	38	36
Child malnutrition *(% of children under 5)*	..	16	..
Access to safe water *(% of population)*	81	84	84
Illiteracy *(% of population age 15+)*	8	17	19
Gross primary enrollment *(% of school-age population)*	87	115	111
Male	..	118	116
Female	..	116	113



KEY ECONOMIC RATIOS and LONG-TERM TRENDS

	1976	1986	1996	1997
GDP *(US$ billions)*	17.0	43.1	181.4	153.9
Gross domestic investment/GDP	24.0	25.9	41.7	35.0
Exports of goods and services/GDP	20.2	25.6	39.3	47.0
Gross domestic savings/GDP	21.5	27.9	35.9	35.7
Gross national savings/GDP	21.2	25.9	33.2	32.6
Current account balance/GDP	-2.6	0.6	-7.9	-2.0
Interest payments/GDP	0.6	2.4	1.2	2.0
Total debt/GDP	13.7	42.9	50.1	..
Total debt service/exports	10.4	30.1	11.4	..
Present value of debt/GDP	..	..	50.1	..
Present value of debt/exports	..	..	120.0	..

	1976-86	1987-97	1996	1997	1998-02
(average annual growth)					
GDP	6.0	8.7	5.5	-0.4	..
GNP per capita	3.7	7.2	4.0	-2.1	..
Exports of goods and services	8.9	13.5	-1.8	6.6	..



STRUCTURE of the ECONOMY

	1976	1986	1996	1997
(% of GDP)				
Agriculture	26.7	15.7	11.0	11.2
Industry	27.6	33.1	39.5	39.8
Manufacturing	19.7	23.9	28.4	28.8
Services	45.7	51.3	49.5	48.9
Private consumption	67.5	59.3	53.9	54.1
General government consumption	11.0	12.8	10.2	10.3
Imports of goods and services	22.7	23.6	45.1	46.4



	1976-86	1987-97	1996	1997
(average annual growth)				
Agriculture	3.8	3.4	3.6	1.2
Industry	7.1	11.2	7.0	-0.1
Manufacturing	6.2	11.3	6.9	0.2
Services	6.3	8.2	4.6	-1.1
Private consumption	4.7	7.6	5.2	0.0
General government consumption	7.6	5.9	9.5	-0.7
Gross domestic investment	5.0	11.5	5.4	-19.0
Imports of goods and services	4.7	13.7	-0.9	-10.0
Gross national product	5.8	8.5	5.0	-1.1



Note: *1997 data are preliminary estimates.*

* The diamonds show four key indicators in the country (in bold) compared with its income-group average. If data are missing, the diamond will be incomplete.

Thailand

PRICES and GOVERNMENT FINANCE

	1976	1986	1996	1997
Domestic prices				
(% change)				
Consumer prices	4.1	1.8	5.8	5.6
Implicit GDP deflator	4.5	1.7	4.0	5.4
Government finance				
(% of GDP, includes current grants)				
Current revenue	12.4	15.0	18.9	..
Current budget balance	0.7	-0.5	8.5	..
Overall surplus/deficit	-3.6	-4.5	2.2	..



TRADE

	1976	1986	1996	1997
(US$ millions)				
Total exports (fob)	2,960	8,872	56,001	58,431
Rice	422	775	2,012	2,080
Rubber	280	577	2,513	1,900
Manufactures	..	4,649	45,646	48,182
Total imports (cif)	..	9,448	72,768	63,286
Food	..	..	1,660	1,366
Fuel and energy	..	1,225	6,248	5,536
Capital goods	..	..	34,222	31,367
Export price index *(1995=100)*	..	62	99	..
Import price index *(1995=100)*	..	50	99	..
Terms of trade *(1995=100)*	..	124	100	..



BALANCE of PAYMENTS

	1976	1986	1996	1997
(US$ millions)				
Exports of goods and services	3,487	11,105	71,887	72,740
Imports of goods and services	3,900	10,219	83,422	72,673
Resource balance	-433	887	-11,735	67
Net income	-54	-884	-3,386	-3,576
Net current transfers	47	225	761	446
Current account balance	-440	247	-14,360	-3,063
Financing items (net)	521	436	16,529	13,712
Changes in net reserves	-81	-684	-2,169	-10,649
Memo:				
Reserves including gold *(US$ millions)*	1,893	3,776	38,645	26,893
Conversion rate *(DEC, local/US$)*	20.4	26.3	25.3	31.4



EXTERNAL DEBT and RESOURCE FLOWS

	1976	1986	1996	1997
(US$ millions)				
Total debt outstanding and disbursed	2,326	18,505	90,824	..
IBRD	298	2,781	1,607	1,728
IDA	11	109	100	98
Total debt service	378	3,655	6,652	..
IBRD	36	358	318	298
IDA	0	1	3	3
Composition of net resource flows				
Official grants	84	152	96	..
Official creditors	109	294	634	..
Private creditors	139	-505	9,630	..
Foreign direct investment	79	263	2,336	..
Portfolio equity	0	31	1,551	..
World Bank program				
Commitments	158	93	250	767
Disbursements	50	208	138	443
Principal repayments	15	129	196	194
Net flows	35	77	-60	249
Interest payments	22	230	122	105
Net transfers	13	-154	-183	145



Indonesia at a glance

2/10/99

POVERTY and SOCIAL	Indonesia	East Asia & Pacific	Lower-middle-income
1997			
Population, mid-year *(millions)*	200.1	1,753	2,282
GNP per capita *(Atlas method, US$)*	1,110	970	1,230
GNP *(Atlas method, US$ billions)*	222.1	1,707	2,818
Average annual growth, 1991-97			
Population *(%)*	1.6	1.3	1.2
Labor force *(%)*	2.5	1.4	1.3
Most recent estimate (latest year available, 1991-97)			
Poverty *(% of population below national poverty line)*	..	..	..
Urban population *(% of total population)*	37	32	42
Life expectancy at birth *(years)*	65	68	69
Infant mortality *(per 1,000 live births)*	47	38	36
Child malnutrition *(% of children under 5)*	40	16	..
Access to safe water *(% of population)*	62	84	84
Illiteracy *(% of population age 15+)*	16	17	19
Gross primary enrollment *(% of school-age population)*	114	118	114
Male	117	120	116
Female	112	119	113



KEY ECONOMIC RATIOS and LONG-TERM TRENDS

	1976	1986	1996	1997
GDP (US$ billions)	*39.3*	*79.9*	*227.4*	*215.0*
Gross domestic investment/GDP	24.1	26.7	32.1	30.9
Exports of goods and services/GDP	24.5	20.2	25.8	28.0
Gross domestic savings/GDP	27.1	26.3	31.5	30.6
Gross national savings/GDP	..	..	28.7	26.2
Current account balance/GDP	..	..	-3.5	-0.8
Interest payments/GDP	1.2	3.0	2.2	2.4
Total debt/GDP	35.6	53.7	56.7	63.3
Total debt service/exports	..	..	35.8	30.7
Present value of debt/GDP	..	..	..	59.8
Present value of debt/exports	..	..	..	199.8

	1976-86	*1987-97*	*1996*	*1997*	*1998-02*
(average annual growth)					
GDP	6.7	7.6	7.8	4.9	..
GNP per capita	4.1	6.2	7.6	2.7	..
Exports of goods and services	-1.7	8.9	8.2	7.8	..



STRUCTURE of the ECONOMY

	1976	1986	1996	1997
(% of GDP)				
Agriculture	29.7	24.3	16.7	16.0
Industry	34.1	33.8	43.5	42.9
Manufacturing	10.4	16.8	25.6	25.5
Services	36.3	41.9	39.9	41.1
Private consumption	53.5	62.6	62.4	62.5
General government consumption	9.4	11.1	7.6	6.9
Imports of goods and services	21.5	20.5	28.4	28.2



	1976-86	*1987-97*	*1996*	*1997*
(average annual growth)				
Agriculture	4.1	3.2	3.3	0.7
Industry	6.5	10.0	10.7	5.6
Manufacturing	14.5	11.0	11.7	6.4
Services	8.7	7.9	6.6	5.7
Private consumption	10.0	8.1	19.1	6.6
General government consumption	9.2	3.8	0.7	0.1
Gross domestic investment	10.8	11.0	12.9	8.6
Imports of goods and services	7.3	11.7	17.2	14.7
Gross national product	6.2	8.0	9.3	4.3



This table was produced from the Development Economics central database.

* The diamonds show four key indicators in the country (in bold) compared with its income-group average. If data are missing, the diamond will be incomplete.

PRICES and GOVERNMENT FINANCE

	1975	1985	1996	1997
Domestic prices				
(% change)				
Consumer prices	..	5.7	6.6	11.6
Implicit GDP deflator	15.4	-0.2	8.7	12.0
Government finance				
(% of GDP, includes current grants)				
Current revenue	..	15.9	16.5	15.9
Current budget balance	..	-4.6	7.0	5.5
Overall surplus/deficit	..	..	1.1	0.9



TRADE

	1975	1985	1996	1997
(US$ millions)				
Total exports (fob)	..	13,673	49,815	53,547
Commodity 1	..	6,964	11,722	11,603
Commodity 2	..	752	1,894	1,505
Manufactures	..	2,747	21,210	18,568
Total imports (cif)	..	12,760	42,929	41,680
Food	..	711	4,357	3,796
Fuel and energy	..	2,375	3,607	3,924
Capital goods	..	5,005	19,973	19,558
Export price index *(1995=100)*	..	..	..	..
Import price index *(1995=100)*	..	..	..	..
Terms of trade *(1995=100)*	..	..	..	..



BALANCE of PAYMENTS

	1975	1985	1996	1997
(US$ millions)				
Exports of goods and services	..	..	59,129	62,997
Imports of goods and services	..	..	54,167	50,124
Resource balance	..	..	4,962	12,873
Net income	..	..	-12,781	-11,297
Net current transfers	..	..	-250	-3,275
Current account balance	..	..	-8,069	-1,699
Financing items (net)	..	..	14,169	-11,601
Changes in net reserves	..	..	-6,100	13,300
Memo:				
Reserves including gold *(US$ millions)*	..	..	..	..
Conversion rate *(DEC, local/US$)*	415.0	1,282.6	2,342.3	2,909.4



EXTERNAL DEBT and RESOURCE FLOWS

	1975	1985	1996	1997
(US$ millions)				
Total debt outstanding and disbursed	14,010	42,918	128,941	136,174
IBRD	213	5,058	11,139	9,991
IDA	418	857	736	715
Total debt service	1,340	5,984	21,539	19,736
IBRD	4	636	2,249	1,848
IDA	2	12	26	28
Composition of net resource flows				
Official grants	59	136	190	183
Official creditors	839	1,016	-792	535
Private creditors	1,314	528	6,874	5,888
Foreign direct investment	..	..	..	..
Portfolio equity	0	0	3,099	298
World Bank program				
Commitments	..	..	..	..
Disbursements	257	828	905	899
Principal repayments	1	236	1,429	1,165
Net flows	256	592	-523	-266
Interest payments	6	411	846	709
Net transfers	250	181	-1,370	-975



Note: This table was produced from the Development Economics central database.

2/10/99

S7V

RELEASED IN FULL

FINANCIAL CRISIS OVERVIEW: INDONESIA

Indonesia is suffering from the worst recession in Asia. GDP dropped over 13 percent in 1998 and the IMF predicts it will drop another 3.4 percent in 1999. The Government of Indonesia, perhaps optimistically, predicts a recovery to start in the second half of 1999. Poverty and unemployment are up, but initial estimates now appear to have been overstated. The World Bank reports that 14 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, while the ILO estimates the unemployment rate to be between 8 and 11 percent.

Some positive trends have emerged. The IMF has praised Indonesia for adhering to its macroeconomic program. The rupiah continues to fluctuate, but since the summer has strengthened considerably against the U.S. dollar. Inflation, which at one point soared to 80 percent on an annualized basis, has cooled considerably and may fall as low as 10 percent for 1999.

Indonesia still needs to tackle the difficult tasks of financial sector reform and corporate debt restructuring. Bank recapitalization has not progressed far and there is concern about political interference in the process. The Jakarta Initiative, a program to restructure private debt, is having only modest success. Initial judgements from the commercial bankruptcy court have been disappointing. Plagued by physical and human infrastructure limitations and a timid and under-educated judicial culture, the court has resolved only a few cases and provides little incentive for creditors to bring cases to the court.

One continuing challenge is assuring an adequate supply of food (i.e. rice) to the population at affordable prices. Donors have contributed food and money to support the Indonesian government's efforts, and stabilization of the exchange rate has made it easier for the GOI to import needed quantities. The priority now is to target food assistance to families most in need.

Overall, the situation is fragile. To a large extent, economic recovery will depend on political stability, and the successful parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7. Preliminary indications are that populist reaction to the continuing crisis will distract and possibly undercut continued efforts at economic reform.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

S7W

RELEASED IN FULL

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA

The U.S. assistance program for Indonesia emphasizes "relief, recovery, and reform." USAID has expanded its assistance program to achieve four objectives: provide humanitarian assistance, promote democracy and fair election practices, accelerate economic reform and recovery, and encourage better environmental management. Much of USAID's assistance is channeled through NGOs.

Humanitarian assistance is a primary concern. USDA and USAID are donating 600,000 tons of 214(b) wheat, $50 million in Title II grant food aid, and $55 million in Title I concessional loans for purchases of agricultural commodities in FY99. As part of its social safety net assistance activities, USAID also works with local governments and NGOs in securing loans for public works projects, creating employment opportunities, and providing medical training and supplies.

Congress has earmarked $75 million for development and democratization activities in Indonesia in FY99. USAID's democratization activities, part of a broader program to support civil society, center on providing voter education, election administration, and programs to train election monitors. USAID is exploring ways to promote civil-military dialogue, and strengthen institutions of civil society such as a free press.

USAID has placed technical advisers in Indonesia's economic and planning ministries to help design fiscal policy reforms outlined by the IMF. Treasury experts are guiding Indonesian efforts in bank restructuring and supervision, and government debt management. The advisers promote open market economic policies that will improve living standards. EXIM has provided a $1 billion line of short-term credit to help ease trade financing constraints on Indonesian importers.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

(57X)

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

INDONESIA: HUMAN RIGHTS

President Soeharto's ouster in May, 1998 created opportunities for reform in Indonesia's political system and institutional attitudes towards human rights. Change is underway, but in an environment of increased civil disorder since the transition began. Grassroots social, ethnic, and religious pressures, exacerbated by continued economic dislocation and eroding respect for police authorities, remain intense and explosive, often erupting into incidents marked by violence and human rights abuses. The security forces, faced with constant street rallies and demonstrations, walk a precarious line between violent suppression and unresponsive inaction, and have erred in both directions.

President Habibie took early steps to broaden political freedoms, and the Parliament (DPR) passed political reform legislation. Legislative elections are scheduled for June 7, 1999. Civil society has flourished and institutions that have been obstacles to promotion and protection of basic human rights in the past are being transformed. With greater freedom of expression, assembly, and a free press, past and present human rights abuses are highlighted within Indonesia to an unprecedented degree.

The GOI's human rights performance has improved over that of the Soeharto-era, but promises on accountability for past abuses have not been kept, and abuses have continued. These have included violence against demonstrators during the special parliamentary session in November, and extra-judicial killings of unarmed civilians throughout the year, especially in areas with separatist movements such as East Timor and Aceh. The GOI has not credibly investigated and punished those responsible for the violence directed against ethnic Chinese-Indonesians and rape of ethnic Chinese-Indonesian women during the May 1998 riots in Jakarta. It has not followed through on involvement of elements of ABRI in the killing of Trisatki University students, the disappearances of political activists in late 1997-early 1998, and other widely publicized cases.

ABRI, which retains diminished but still significant clout, is the institution most in need of reform. The judiciary remains subordinated to the executive branch and the military. Corruption remains pervasive. Restrictions on organized labor have been eased, but harassment persists. The Human Rights Commission (which exists by presidential decree) has shown independence but lacks subpoena and enforcement authorities.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

RELEASED IN FULL

S7Y

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

WOMEN IN INDONESIA

Political participation. The May 1997 parliamentary election was a step backwards for women, with the percentage of women in Parliament falling from 12 to 9 percent of seats. In the Cabinet, only 2 of 36 ministers are women.

Economic participation. A 1995 national profile showed that 37.4 percent of civil servants were women, but only 5.5 percent were in positions of authority. Female workers in manufacturing usually receive lower wages than men. Many are hired as day laborers instead of as full-time permanent employees and thus not provided benefits, such as maternity leave. Unemployment rates for women are approximately 50 percent higher than for men.

Violence against women. The government has acknowledged that domestic violence is a problem and in 1998 established a National Commission on Violence against Women to improve and coordinate government and NGO efforts to combat violence and provide assistance to victims. Charges leveled against elements of the military regarding systematic rape, torture and abuse of 168 Sino-Indonesian women during the May 12-14, 1998 civil disturbances have been substantiated by the independent National Human Rights Commission and the fact-finding team commissioned by the government. Only 85 incidents of violence were reported by the team, but it was acknowledged that intimidation against witnesses and victims, and a reluctance to report attacks, prevented documenting more attacks. Since the report was issued in early November, there has been no consistent follow-up by Indonesian authorities to investigate the military or other organizers of the violence or to issue compensation or apologies to the victims. The United States government could play an instrumental role in underscoring the importance of the accountability of the Indonesian government to its Sino-Indonesian minority.

Trafficking in women and prostitution. The Department has not developed information on the magnitude of trafficking in women in Indonesia. Prostitution, however, is widespread. Official statistics in 1995 report there were 72,000 registered prostitutes. NGOs, however, estimate there are at least 650,000 prostitutes in the country. Many believe the figures to be even higher due to women losing jobs as a result of the economic crisis and looking for ways to earn money for their families. Child prostitution is also on the rise. The International Labor Organization's report released in August 1998 estimated Indonesia's sex sector accounted for from 0.8 to 2.4 percent of GDP.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

RELEASED IN FULL 572

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

INDONESIA: GOOD GOVERNANCE/DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

The prospects for democratic reform in Indonesia are real, but serious difficulties remain. One of Soeharto's most unfortunate legacies was generally weak and frequently corrupt institutions. After Soeharto's resignation in May 1998, President Habibie lifted remaining controls on the press, political parties, and labor unions, and civil society has blossomed. The House of Representatives (DPR) recently formally set up new rules for the electoral system, the DPR, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), and political parties. Parliamentary elections are set for June 7, 1999 and the newly constituted MPR will select new Indonesian national leaders several months later.

Major opposition figures generally accept the new electoral system and are ready to compete for the 462 elected seats (38 others are to be filled by military appointees) in the new Parliament. The ability of Golkar, the ruling party, to use civil servants, government resources, and "pork" to its advantage in elections has been sufficiently restricted that the election outcome, for the first time since 1955, is unknown. It remains to be seen whether the election campaign will avoid the violence that characterized past campaigns, and whether the elections will be free and fair. The Indonesian Government has recently indicated that it would welcome technical assistance for the elections and the United States has taken the lead in trying to organize an international pledging conference for electoral assistance. The United States will provide more than $30 million in electoral assistance.

Many students and other urban activists, however, remain deeply skeptical, both about the elections and the reform process in general. They do not trust Habibie, a Soeharto appointee, to carry out free and fair elections. They believe the military should be completely removed from politics (i.e., not receive any appointed seats in the National Assembly). They also want to see former President Soeharto, his family and cronies prosecuted for corruption. Failure to follow through on numerous human rights cases has also cast serious doubt on the political will of the Habibie government to break with past practice.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

99/264
KL's 991264
thru
991266

RELEASED IN FULL

SECRET

Trip of Secretary Madeleine K. Albright to China, Thailand and Indonesia

Briefing Book

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

UNCLASSIFIED

Secretary Albright's Trip to China, Thailand and Indonesia
February 27 - March 6, 1999
Briefing Book

Table of Contents

I. SCOPE PAPER

II. CHINA

A. Roadmap

B. Briefing Memoranda, Checklist and Talking Points

1. Roundtable on Political Reform/Social Development in China
2. Bilat w/Chinese FM Tang (bilateral issues)
3. Lunch w/Chinese FM Tang (regional issues)
4. Session with Investigative Journalists in China
5. Bilat w/Chinese Premier Zhu
6. Bilat with Chinese Vice Premier Qian
7. Bilat w/Chinese President Jiang
8. Press Availability (China)
9. American Business Community in China
10. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Briefing Paper

III. THAILAND

A. Roadmap

B. Briefing Memoranda, Checklist and Talking Points

1. Chiang Mai Crop Substitution Project
2. Hill Tribes Institute (Chiang Mai)
3. Meet and Greet (Chiang Mai)
4. Roundtable with NGOs and Business Leaders (in Bangkok)
5. Embassy Meet and Greet (Bangkok)
6. Call on Thai King Bhumibol
7. Bilat with Thai Prime Minister Chuan
8. Bilat w/Thai Foreign Minister Surin
9. Press Availability (Thailand)

IV. INDONESIA

A. Roadmap

B. Briefing Memoranda, Checklist and Talking Points

1. Bilat w/Indonesian FM Alatas
2. Bilat w/Indonesian President Habibie
3. Press Availability (Indonesia)
4. Bilat w/Indonesian Defense Minister Wiranto
5. Mtg w/East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao
6. Speech (Indonesia)
7. Democracy/Human Rights Roundtable (Indonesia)
8. Election-focused gathering with three pull-asides w/opposition leaders
9. Embassy Meet and Greet (Jakarta)

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

S8AG

SECRET
DECL: 2/20/2009

Checklist of Key Issues Meeting with Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan

1. (MUST DO) U.S.-Thai Relations
2. (MUST DO) Cambodia and KR
3. (MUST DO) South China Sea
4. Progress on Bilateral Issues
5. Burma
6. Indonesia
7. (Watch out) Scholarships, GSP

1. (MUST DO) U.S.-Thai Relations: Support Thai democratic development and economic reform; new AERA initiative; importance of security alliance; place Supachai candidacy in perspective of long-time friendship.

2. (MUST DO) Cambodia and KR: Credit Thai for new "blacklist" of KR, signaling real ban on Ta Mok entering Thailand; urge concrete steps to help bring Ta Mok to justice, including providing intelligence on his location in Cambodia; urge support for international tribunal for KR.

3. (MUST DO) South China Sea: Concerned about lack of "good faith" will on all participants to resolve; need for more effective mechanism; any role for ARF? Ask if Thailand as non-claimant would consider assuming a larger role.

4. *Progress on Bilateral issues*: announce GLOBE agreement; mention U.S. support of $95,000 and personnel for Surin's April Migration Conference; explain that demining program to begin soon; note ILEA classes start next week.

5. Burma: Ask about recent clashes in Andaman Sea, row with EU over Burmese attendance; SPDC attempting to gut NLD, isolating ASSK; not sure what de Soto will be able to accomplish; need to maintain pressure.

6. Indonesia: Stress U.S. commitment to free and fair elections; explain U.S. thoughts on East Timor, noting you'll meet with Xanana Gusmao; ask Surin for his thoughts.

7. (Watch Out For) Scholarships, GSP: Pitch for continued scholarship assistance; GSP roadblocks (IPR Action Plan, SELRA).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 22 FEB 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

UNCLASSIFIED

1. (MUST DO) U.S.-Thai Relations

- U.S. supports Thailand as a leader in Asia for democratic development and economic reform; emphasize U.S. desire to maintain close, cooperative ties; note personal relationship between Clinton and Chuan.

- U.S. continues to view Thailand as one of its closest friends in Asia, a model for others in the region, and a valued partner on a wide range of issues - security cooperation, ARF and preventative diplomacy, migration and refugees, counternarcotics and law enforcement (ILEA).

- Satisfied with our overall economic and trade relationship; U.S. market an important stimulus to the Thai economy, now Thailand's top export market.

- U.S. private sector is committed to Thailand; large direct investment projects moving forward, and U.S. companies sponsoring retraining and scholarships.

- Empathize with the economic burden the Thai people bear due to lost jobs, savings and opportunity.

- Hope to build on that private-public partnership in our new AERA initiative, starting in Thailand. Kenan Institute will be focus of assistance on bank and corporate restructuring.

- Other elements include improving economic governance (bank, stock market supervision) and targeting of social safety net assistance (health, nutrition). These seem to be three keys for Thailand's economic recovery.

- Glad to see General Shelton visited last week - only stop in Asia. Value the U.S.-Thai security alliance and hope to maintain an active program of joint military exercises, in spite of financial challenges.

- Will work with you on the F-16 request; please be patient.

- Acknowledge Thai disappointment over U.S. position on Supachai's WTO candidacy.

- Emphasize the importance of keeping perspective on the overall U.S.-Thai relationship. Often have our biggest disagreements on trade matters with our closest allies.

2. **(MUST DO) Cambodia and KR accountability**

- We are determined to pursue effort to bring senior KR leaders from the 1975-79 Pol Pot period to justice.

- Thai support for international tribunal will be important. Capture of Ta Mok, the remaining senior KR leader at large, could expedite process of establishing appropriate judicial tribunal.

- New Thai blacklist banning senior KR leaders from entry to Thailand is important; our expectation is that Thai military authorities will ensure that Ta Mok (probably now in Cambodia) will not be permitted occasional safehaven inside Thailand.

- Expect Thailand would detain Ta Mok and turn him over to Cambodian authorities, if he is discovered inside the Thai border; taking such an action would be a key step in the right direction in accord with Thailand's public policy.

B1

- U.S. has offered your government information on Ta Mok's whereabouts; would appreciate your help if you have any information concerning Ta Mok's reported new location in Cambodia.

(Possible lunch topic: status of new Cambodian coalition)

- The new coalition is still finding its feet; should watch its performance to instill rule of law, respect for human rights and democracy before re-engaging our Congress on resumption of direct aid to the government.

- We will maintain modest humanitarian/democracy support aid through NGOs; note our cautious posture at the Tokyo donors (Consultative Group) meeting late February.

- Seek Surin's assessment of Cambodian domestic scene.

3. (MUST DO) **South China Sea (Spratlys)**

- Concerned about destabilizing effect of continued construction of outposts by China (Mischief Reef) and other claimants in disputed areas of the South China Sea.

- In time, these overlapping claims and disputes could threaten freedom of navigation and stability in the region as a whole.

- What is your impression of the situation? Did this issue come up during FM Tang's recent visit to Bangkok?

- There may be now a window of opportunity to reach a political solution before the situation becomes more confrontational; no one claimant now or in the near future has the ability to project military power into the South China Sea.

- Indonesia has hosted nine workshops on South China Sea, most recently in December. Claimants have been able to air differences on some technical issues with the goal of lowering tension.

- But no progress has been made on resolving the competing claims. Perhaps the time has come to seek a more effective mechanism for resolving the complex territorial issues.

- Is there a role for ARF to play? [redacted] B1

- More ambitiously, could the ARF be used to help the claimants reach a political resolution, even though China has previously opposed including the South China Sea on the ARF agenda?

- Would Thailand, as a non-claimant interested in regional stability, be willing to assume a larger role in an effort to reach a peaceful resolution of differences, perhaps in conjunction with Singapore (another non-claimant which enjoys excellent relations with China)?

4. Progress on Bilateral Issues

- Believe we have made progress on a number of bilateral issues since we last spoke in November in Kuala Lumpur.

(Announcing of GLOBE Agreement - note to S/S: contingent on finalization of the agreement)

- Pleased Thailand has agreed to join more than 80 countries participating in GLOBE program, a hands-on initiative combining education, environmental involvement, and internet.

- GLOBE students everywhere increase their scientific and mathematical abilities, equipping themselves with the technical and analytical skills to be future leaders in local and global environmental and scientific efforts.

(Migration Conference/Refugees)

- U.S. contributed $95,000 and personnel to support your Migration Conference next month. Regret that neither Frank Loy nor Julia Taft can attend new dates. Julia's deputy Alan Kreczko and Ambassador Hecklinger will co-lead our delegation.

- Pleased to see trafficking in women and children on agenda. Looking for enhanced strategies for coping with migration, while balancing needs of states with rights of migrants.

(demining)

- USG will fund a two-year humanitarian demining program in Thailand, worth an estimated $3 million. U.S. Special Forces will train instructors, six platoons; the program will also fund purchase demining equipment, community awareness efforts.

- The program is a jointly-funded effort between State and DoD. After Hurricane Mitch devastated Central America, all DoD humanitarian funding was diverted in response. We expect their budget to be supplemented this spring and the Thailand program to begin soon thereafter.

(ILEA)

- Glad to see that ILEA (International Law Enforcement Academy) starts its first classes next week, co-taught by US and Thai officials; the topic - methamphetamine production and precursor chemical distribution - is the top Thai narcotics concern.

- Praise the strong cooperation from Thailand on counternarcotics efforts for over 30 years, success of "Operation Tiger Trap."

5. Burma

- Appreciate Thai efforts to promote meaningful dialogue. I can understand your concerns about border instability, drug trafficking, refugee movements. Tell me more about recent Thai-Burma clashes off the coast. Are you on the way to resolving this?

- General Surayud has said the Army will get out of diplomacy; that means Burma and Cambodia policy. How's that progressing; do you feel the MFA/civilian role is enhanced now?

- Concerned that the SPDC is in the process of gutting the NLD, isolating ASSK, rather than seeking genuine dialogue.

- Is the SPDC willing to meet ASSK's two reasonable conditions: release of all political prisoners and permitting the NLD to function freely?

- Do you believe the de Soto mission has any realistic chance of success? Specifically, is the carrot of international assistance down the line enough to get the SPDC to do what it has steadfastly refused to do thus far - engage in genuine dialogue with the opposition?

- We support the UN initiative but doubt the regime interested in compromise; its goal may be to mute criticism rather than to make progress.

- Positive political change is a pre-condition for the provision of any "carrots." Initially, the only possible carrots are humanitarian and counter-narcotics assistance. Multilateral lending would only come after a transition is underway.

- World Bank presence on de Soto's planned trip is problematic for us. Some in Congress are strongly opposed; we do not wish to jeopardize Congressional approval of the U.S. replenishment for IDA ($800 million in FY 2000).

- At the same time, World Bank participation may be crucial if the mission is to have any chance of success. We're working on a compromise. What's your view of World Bank participation on de Soto's mission?

- On a humanitarian note, deeply disturbed that the regime will not allow ASSK's husband, Michael Aris, to see her before he dies of cancer. Can Thailand help encourage a humanitarian gesture?

6. Indonesia

- Stress our commitment to free and fair elections in Indonesia. crucial to maintain legitimacy of the process, continuing democratization, and hopes for economic recovery.

- Philippines committed to sending election observers. Will Thailand do the same?

- Will be meeting with Xanana Gusmao. USG is deeply concerned about achieving a peaceful resolution in East Timor.

- Need to engage both sides on avoiding violence, ensuring sustainable solution, agreeing on transition period and conditions - whether autonomy or independence is final result. Don't want Indonesia simply to wash hands and walk away.

- Any chance that ASEAN will participate if an international peacekeeping force is established?

7. Watch Out For: USG Assistance, GSP renewal

Scholarships: (Chuan or Surin may raise possible renewal of the $3 million scholarships grant the USG gave Thailand last year. Surin may also raise his regional human development initiative)

- We can look into possibilities, but unfortunately, it doesn't look likely. Glad to see the private sector continues to support hundreds of Thai students in the U.S.

- Understand Alan Goodman from IIE is coming to Bangkok in two weeks. We've talked to him about your interest in a regional human development initiative.

GSP renewal: Potential roadblocks: SELRA (State Enterprise Labor Relations Act), and the perceived lack of Thai progress on IPR Action Plan agreed to with USTR in June '98.

- Will SELRA pass the Senate by the end of the session?

- "Special 301" reviews on IPR are beginning. USTR concerned about a perceived lack of follow through on the "Action Plan" agreed to last June, particularly on enforcement.

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

S8AI

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 2/22/09
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 21 FEB 2011
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

JAKARTA ROAD MAP

March 4-5, 1999

Your visit comes at a key point in Indonesia's ongoing transition to democracy in the post Soeharto period. The Parliament (DPR) passed in late January important new laws on political parties and the electoral system which the opposition has accepted, setting the stage for hopefully reasonably free and fair legislative elections on June 7, Indonesia's first since the mid-1950s. Most Indonesians of various political views appear ready to participate. With a $30 million USAID bilateral program underway to assist with the elections, the U.S. has also sought to strengthen international support by pressing behind the scenes for an elections donors conference which is likely to take place in Jakarta a few days after your visit under UNDP auspices.

On East Timor, President Habibie's surprise dramatic announcement in late January proposing autonomy or independence options has opened up new opportunities for real progress but raised new concerns. Habibie finally provided for a basis for finding a lasting solution, but in the process, may have stirred irredentist sentiments in Aceh and Irian Jaya that also have long suffered human rights and justice abuses at the hands of Jakarta. Indonesia's security forces in both provinces maintain the upper hand, but centralized control from Jakarta set during Soeharto's 30 year rule is inevitably evolving into a more decentralized system which plays into the democratic transition underway.

On the economic side, Indonesia faces compelling economic and humanitarian challenges. However, the IMF has given the Habibie government passing marks on its implementation of reforms, and the U.S. and others are responding to the country's humanitarian needs. Larry Summers visited Jakarta February 21-22 and discussed the progress the GOI has made and our ongoing assistance effort which is steadily producing results, although social safety concerns remain.

This visit to Jakarta will acquaint you with President Habibie, Defense Minister Wiranto and your colleague and friend Ali Alatas, leading opposition political figures, and East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao. You will also engage human rights/democracy activists whose work investigating abuses under both the Soeharto and Habibie administrations and preparations for the elections are integral to the democratic transition underway in Indonesia. The themes for your meetings and press encounters are: U.S. friendship and assistance for Indonesia in its time of need; the centrality of holding free and fair parliamentary elections June 7; U.S. concern about the

destabilizing rise in violence in the run up to the elections; and the need to proceed responsibly and peacefully with transition to a new status for East Timor.

I. MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALI ALATAS

Your meeting with FM Alatas [redacted] B1
[redacted] happy to have you visit following the momentous events of the past year. You will be able to make the major points on U.S. support for political reform and the June 7 elections, and to review briefly our human rights concerns. But Ali's views on the sweeping developments on East Timor should be the meeting's focus, where the Indonesian offer of autonomy or a rapid move to independence has changed calculations dramatically. You can speak frankly of our concerns about provocative ABRI actions in arming civilian militias, seek Alatas's ideas on mechanisms to consult the East Timorese, and make clear our determination to press for a transition to a new status for East Timor that is secure and bloodless, and not rushed according to the short timetable laid out by President Habibie. If time permits, you may wish to raise SLORC intransigence on democratic dialogue in Burma and seek Alatas' views on how to defuse growing tensions in the South China Sea.

II. MEETING WITH PRESIDENT B. J. HABIBIE

Starting from a weak base as Soeharto's appointed vice president, Habibie has in many respects exceeded everyone's expectations. His initiatives - presenting and sticking to a realistic election timetable, the political reform process, prisoner releases; proposals for greater autonomy for disaffected provinces, including a leap forward on East Timor - have given real momentum to this transition even if serious doubts remain about his sincerity. [redacted] B1
[redacted] In this meeting, commending him by recalling his achievements will permit you then to emphasize our paramount interest in seeing that no effort be spared to ensure credible June 7 elections and to engage him on productive discussions on East Timor and human rights.

III. PRESS STAKE OUT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS

At the conclusion of the Habibie meeting, FM Alatas will escort you to a brief press encounter at the Istana Merdeka (Freedom Palace) outside President Habibie's office. Your observations about the meeting, followed by a few questions, are aimed at public presentation of key themes: U.S. friendship for Indonesia, our assistance at a time of need, our interest in

seeing free and fair June 7 elections, and our concerns about destabilizing violence, and desire to see peaceful transition in East Timor will be your key themes.

IV. MEETING WITH GENERAL WIRANTO

Under Soeharto, the Indonesian military (ABRI) was at the core of Indonesia's deplorable human rights record. As ABRI chief, Gen. Wiranto has inherited this unfortunate legacy. In the new Indonesia in transition, Wiranto quietly harbors presidential aspirations, and retains much power. But his failure to address past ABRI abuses, his seeming impotence to head off new ones and the deteriorating law and order situation have put him under renewed pressure and even raised questions about his ability to deliver.

At this point, however, Wiranto remains a key player at this formative juncture and this meeting will be one of the most important of this trip. You should highlight the importance of military neutrality during the election campaign as well as ABRI's responsibility to maintain security without using excessive force. Although Wiranto denied to Stanley Roth that ABRI was engaged in arming civilian militias in East Timor, you should ask about immediate steps taken to reduce the violence there, including disarming citizens, and the need to provide for a peaceful transition toward autonomy or independence. Finally, our ability to pursue a stronger defense cooperation relation with Indonesia will necessarily depend on how convincingly ABRI addresses past and present abuses.

V. SPEECH AT FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY

Your speech is the centerpiece public opportunity during your visit to highlight the theme of U.S. support for Indonesian democratic reform, the importance of the June elections as a milestone in that process, and a future Indonesian-U.S. democratic partnership. Your remarks are designed to underscore for Indonesians that the spotlight of international community attention is focused on their country's emergence from an authoritarian regime and inspire them to participate in its democratic transformation. The speech, which should receive wide publicity, will raise Indonesian awareness of how the United States views this important period in Indonesia's transition, the tangible benefits and challenges that accompany the democratic process, including heightened respect for human rights.

VI. EMBASSY MEET & GREET

Your meeting with American employees, their family members, and Indonesian employees of the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta is a

major morale booster. It will reinforce the dedication with which these members of your foreign service team are working to achieve the goals you highlight during the Jakarta stop.

VII. HUMAN RIGHTS/DEMOCRACY EVENT

This roundtable meeting with approximately 8 prominent English-speaking activists is an opportunity to underscore the depth of U.S. concern about, and support for, democratization and human rights improvements in Indonesia. Two of the activists focus their work on Aceh and Irian Jaya, concerns that have gained new momentum in recent months. After brief introductory points, we have provided specific questions that you can use to draw out the participants on their areas of particular concern. They will be able to convey to you a sense of the difficulties they face, and provide unique perspectives on the prospects for enduring changes.

VIII. POLITICAL LEADERS RECEPTION WITH PULL ASIDES

Under the new laws governing political parties, up to 30 parties may compete in the coming parliamentary elections. This event will introduce you to a select but representative group of political leaders whose organizations probably will hold seats in the first elected post-Soeharto legislative bodies after June 7. It will also include a representative of the ruling GOLKAR faction. These politicians, and particularly the three leaders meeting with you in short pull aside meetings, will greatly influence the future shape of Indonesia. You are scheduled for pull asides with Megawati Soekarnoputri (Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party of Struggle, PDI-P), Dr. Amien Rais (National Mandate Party, PAN), and Abdurrahman Wahid, AKA Gus Dur (Chairman of the Islamic organization Nahdlatul Ulama, NU). A fourth pull aside may be necessary if Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, the governor of Yogyakarta, decides to attend. This event will send a strong signal of U.S. interest in a credible transition to democracy, a theme that will be emphasized in your introductory remarks and in the short one-on-one meetings.

9912662

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

FEB 23

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 2/16/09

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EAP - Stanley O. Roth

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, in Jakarta

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Underscore the importance of credible June 7 elections and the need to prevent election-threatening violence.

2. Urge Indonesia to take immediate steps to stop the violence in East Timor. Probe Ali's thinking on mechanism to consult the East Timorese on autonomy. Emphasize that international community is watching and the GOI can not just wash its hands of East Timor if autonomy rejected.

3. If time permits, express concern over recent tensions in the South China Sea; reiterate U.S. concern about the continued inflexibility of the Burmese regime toward political dialogue.

II. APPROACH

You should not be surprised to find FM Alatas somewhat changed [redacted] from the engaged, sophisticated interlocutor of your previous meetings. [redacted] B1 B1

CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by EAP A/S Stanley O. Roth
Reason: 1.5 (d)

[redacted] B1

Still, Alatas continues to be a key player on East Timor and I envision that this issue will take up most of the meeting. But before entering a lengthy East Timor conversation, I suggest you dispense of the easier issues first. You could start by recognizing that it is the fiftieth anniversary of US-Indonesia relations and reaffirm the importance of the bilateral relationship to the U.S. You should express pleasure at having the opportunity to visit Indonesia at this exciting historical juncture, when the political reforms set in motion by the Habibie government are about to lead to the first democratic elections in over forty years. You should state our strong support for that process, and note our efforts to date on electoral assistance. But you must also make clear that in order for the elections to help set Indonesia on a path to political stability and economic recovery, they must be viewed as credible within Indonesia. Urge the government to step up its efforts to prevent violence in the run up to, and on the day of, the elections; to ensure that money politics not distort the vote; and to support the military's stated goal of neutrality in the elections. Ali will not resist any of these ideas.

[IF the issue of having donor CONFERENCE for election pledges is STILL UNRESOLVED, you will want to press Alatas to have the GOI officially endorse the idea as soon as possible so that a date for such a conference can be set and preparations can begin. Total election costs are expected to vastly exceed what the GOI has budgeted for the process, and it is essential that contributions of other donors be finalized.]

On East Timor, you should praise the new flexibility on the part of the GOI as a sign that the government is serious about finding an enduring solution to this longstanding issue, but should do so in the knowledge that the offer of independence was not Alatas' idea. Having staked many years worth of prestige on the position that East Timor is an integral part of Indonesia and will never be independent, you can imagine why he would be less than enthusiastic about the offer.

He may, however, already be resigned to it. While Alatas is currently knee deep in finalizing the autonomy

package that will be offered to the East Timorese, most observers believe that the chances for the proposal's acceptance are quite low. Alatas will be at the UN March 8-9 to meet with FM Gama and Special Representative Marker to tie up the remaining loose ends on the package. You should try to get a sense of whether Alatas still harbors any hope that autonomy can still work.

During the March 8-9 talks, the parties hope to come to agreement on what mechanism will be employed to ascertain the will of the East Timorese. Indonesia has rejected referendum out of concern that it would provoke civil war and set a dangerous precedent for other troubled territories in Indonesia. There is substance to these concerns, and we are less worried with the actual mechanism than with ensuring that it be seen by the East Timorese themselves as a legitimate way of gauging public sentiment. Although the UN has been tasked to come up with a solution, you should probe Ali's latest thinking on the most promising alternative mechanisms.

You should then take the opportunity to express deep concern about the rise in violence on the ground in East Timor. You must emphasize that no political process - be it towards autonomy or independence - can go forward if the situation on the ground is unstable. It is imperative that arming of civilian groups be stopped and weapons already distributed be recollected. Alatas will likely hedge as to whether or not ABRI has armed or is still arming groups; in my last meeting with him, his initial response to my statement of concern was to ask whether Wiranto told me that the military was indeed arming groups. He is clearly not a player on this, and may not even understand what is actually happening on the ground. Without getting into a debate about who armed who and when, you should be firm that there are credible reports of civilians getting guns on a large scale, and that disarmament must be carried out if the political process is to move forward.

The final point on East Timor may be the most difficult. Under Habibie's timetable, if the East Timorese reject the autonomy plan, and the Indonesian Parliament votes to rescind the GOI legislation which incorporated Indonesia in 1976, then East Timor would "revert to its status as a non-self governing territory under the UN with Portugal as the administrating power." President Habibie's statements that the issue of East Timor must be resolved

once and for all by January 1, 2000, has led to the perception that Indonesia plans to just wash its hands of East Timor if the East Timorese choose independence. In my last meeting with Alatas, he indicated that he understood a January 1, 2000 deadline was unrealistic and that some arrangements would need to be made in order for the province to have a more reasonable transition. But Alatas' public statements have not reflected this more cautious approach and it's unclear if he has made any effort to turn Habibie around on this arbitrary deadline. You must make clear to Alatas that Indonesia can not just walk away from East Timor as the Portuguese did twenty-four years ago. Doing so would be disastrous for the people of East Timor, and would rob Indonesia of the chance to claim credit for the grand act of statesmanship of letting the East Timorese determine their own fate.

Before turning to foreign policy, you should briefly raise human rights, emphasizing the need for better follow-through on past and ongoing human rights abuses. Finally, you should turn to foreign policy where it might be most productive to begin with the South China Sea. You should express concern over the recent rise in tensions in the South China Sea, and ask Alatas if he has any thoughts on ways ASEAN and the U.S. might better engage China on the Spratly situation. You could also engage Ali on recent developments in Burma (the de Soto trip) and ask for Indonesia's help on pressing the Burmese regime to open dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	Indonesia
The Secretary	Foreign Minister Ali Alatas
TBD	TBD

IV. PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

TBD

Attachments:
Tab 1 - Checklist of Key Issues and Talking Points

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 2/16/09

Checklist of Key Issues
Meeting with Foreign Minister Alatas

1. Elections
2. East Timor
3. Human Rights
4. South China Sea
5. Burma

1. **Elections**: Elections key to restoring investor confidence; need to prevent money politics, for ABRI to safeguard elections from violence and provocateurs, importance of donor conference.

2. **(MUST DO) East Timor**: Praise for new flexibility; Moving Gusmao positive; need to disarm civilians, stop violence; ideas about determining East Timorese will on autonomy/independence?; safeguards for secure transition?; crucial international role in transition.

3. **Human Rights**: Disappointing follow-through on human rights pledges; concerned about wide-spread violence, ABRI swings between unresponsiveness, excessive force; need for accountability.

4. **South China Sea**: Ways U.S. and ASEAN could defuse tensions from Chinese on Mischief Reef?; revive ARF workshop? Filipinos want U.S. to take a higher profile, perhaps convene a side meeting at the ARF. Seek Alatas' view.

5. **Burma**: Human rights deterioration; UN initiative stalled; Welcome Indonesia pressure on SPDC re: political dialogue.

1. Elections

- Genuine pleasure to meet with you in Jakarta for my first visit as Secretary of State.

- Pleased I could reschedule my trip following unfortunate cancellation last November due to Iraq.

- Impressed by progress with political reform particularly with passage of political.

- As friend of Indonesia, USG attaches highest priority to success of these elections, believing they are essential step in restoring political stability and economic recovery for Indonesia.

- Perception that elections are free, fair and viewed as credible within Indonesia, will be essential if international confidence, particularly of investors and financial community, is to return.

- Without this confidence economic recovery will be much more difficult.

- General Wiranto told Stanley Roth of his concern that provocateurs are trying to disrupt election preparations. We share this concern.

- Critical that campaign period be as free of violence as possible. ABRI must rise to the occasion to safeguard the electoral process.

- While preparations for the elections are underway, much remains to be done; U.S. actively working to provide needed technical assistance; we will commit $30 million towards elections.

(IF DONOR CONFERENCE STILL UNRESOLVED)

- Still, shortfalls in what will be needed to have the best elections possible substantial.

- Essential that contributions of other donors be finalized as soon as possible.

- Urge GOI to officially endorse donor conference under UNDP stewardship as soon as possible so that for such a conference can be set and preparations can proceed.

(IF DONOR CONFERENCE ISSUE RESOLVED)

- Still, substantial technical assistance from other donors crucial; the U.S. is looking forward to participating in donor conference now being organized by the UNDP and expects substantial pledges of international support.

2. **East Timor**

- Commend Indonesia on willingness to consider new alternatives to long-standing problem, particularly offer of independence if East Timorese reject wide-ranging autonomy.

- Moving Gusmao to house arrest another positive step. Shows your seriousness in search for an enduring solution acceptable to all parties.

- Appreciate that you have dedicated much time and effort over the years to finding a solution to the problem of East Timor; hopeful that such a solution may finally be in sight.

- Still, despite movement toward political settlement, alarming deterioration of conditions in East Timor. Deeply concerned about rise in violence and growing humanitarian pressures as villagers flee to urban centers.

- No political process can move forward if the situation on the ground is unstable.

- First priority is to put an end to the violence. Imperative that arming of civilian groups be stopped and weapons already distributed be recollected. Might an expanded international presence, be it humanitarian or otherwise, serve as a confidence building measure during this interim period?

- Understand proposal on broad-ranging autonomy for East Timor in Marker talks with Portugal is virtually finalized. Sense prospects for autonomy are low, but would like your assessment.

- Mechanism for determining will of the East Timorese has been left to UN. We share the GOI's concern that a referendum might provoke civil war and set dangerous precedent for other troubled regions.

- But if sustainable solution to crisis to be found, whatever mechanism is employed must be viewed as credible by the East Timorese themselves. What, in your opinion, are the most promising possibilities?

- Understand Xanana is in process of establishing a broadly-based Council of East Timorese leaders. Could this perhaps serve as a legitimate mechanism for consultations on autonomy offer?

- If East Timorese reject autonomy plan, question becomes how to achieve transition without repeat of bloodshed of 1975 when Portugal withdrew. Imperative there not be vacuum and that GOI not just wash its hands of the matter.

- You told Stanley Roth that a January 1, 2000 deadline for separation with Indonesia, was too quick. We agree.

- That timetable seems dangerously short for workable transition. How do you see Indonesia's role in preparing for peaceful transition?.

- International role in any transition, be it towards autonomy or independence, will be crucial. In short term enhanced international presence in East Timor would help reduce tensions on the ground and provide mechanism for alleviation of humanitarian pressures during this interim period.

3. **Human Rights**

- Appreciate the progress on human rights that has taken place since President Habibie assumed office.

- Disappointed that more active steps not taken to restore confidence, however, in Sino-Indonesian community after its ordeal of rapes and violence, to punish those responsible for terrible killings of Muslim clergy and others in East Java, for the kidnapping and killing of political activists, and for other widely publicized abuses.

- Perhaps more important, deeply concerned about ongoing, even growing, widespread violence and civil unrest.

- Cannot dismiss increasing reports of deliberate provocation aimed at disrupting the reform process. In face of this provocation, ABRI seems unresponsive in some cases, while acting aggressively and excessively in Aceh and Irian Jaya, which only feeds separatist sentiments. Appreciate your views on this issue.

- Indonesia's international reputation will continue to suffer until there is better accountability and new abuses stop.

- Can ABRI take additional steps to raise confidence that it is serious about accountability?

4. Burma:

- Have seen no progress in Burma since SLORC changed name to SPDC in November 1997. Indeed, the human rights situation has deteriorated.

- UN initiative with de Soto mission, for which we had high hopes last fall, may or may not take place, but prospect for success is low, unless SPDC changes position and is willing to engage in genuine dialogue with the opposition.

- Welcome Indonesian readiness to press Burmese government on the need for positive political change, and to initiate dialogue with NLD, including Aung San Suu Kyi.

5. **South China Sea:**

- Neutral on legal merits of competing claims to sovereignty in South China Sea, but concerned about recent flare-ups in tension over Spratlys over Chinese construction at Mischief Reef.

- Welcome your views on how ASEAN and U.S. might work together to defuse situation and get China especially to be more cooperative.

- Are there ways to engage China in ASEAN Regional Forum or other multilateral setting where U.S. can be helpful

- Filipinos want U.S. to take a higher profile on this issue, perhaps convene a side meeting at the ARF? This would be a major change of strategy. I'm skeptical China would participate. What do you think?

S8AK
9912663

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

FEB 23 1999

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S PM 2/23

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 2/21/09

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EAP - Stanley O. Roth

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Indonesian President B.J. Habibie in Jakarta

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Reaffirm that the U.S. attaches great importance to our long-standing relationship with Indonesia.

2. Underscore the importance of free and fair elections on June 7 to Indonesia's recovery and ability of the U.S. to expand our bilateral relationship.

3. Urge Indonesia to take immediate steps to stop the violence in East Timor. Emphasize that international community is watching and GOI can not just wash its hands of East Timor if autonomy is rejected.

4. Express deep concern about widespread violence in many provinces and growing indications that violence is being provoked. Stress importance of GOI taking effective steps to stop it.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 22 FEB 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 19 JUL 2006 200504211

II. APPROACH

President Habibie can be a difficult interlocutor, for

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by EAP A/S Stanley O. Roth,
for reason 1.5(d).

[redacted] I recommend that you open the meeting on a positive note. Reaffirming Indonesia's importance to the U.S. and emphasizing our desire to help Indonesia on its path to democracy, prosperity and stability would be a good place to start. [redacted] B1
[redacted] you should express pleasure at having the opportunity to visit Indonesia at this exciting historical juncture, when the political reforms set in motion by Habibie are about to lead to the first democratic elections in Indonesia in over forty years.

This is not just gratuitous flattery. Habibie has established and stuck to a timetable for political reform; released restrictions on the press; overseen the overhaul of election laws; and invited political parties to freely mobilize in order to pace the way for fresh elections in June. It is this very momentum that has in fact brought you here, and Habibie deserves credit for pushing this process uphill. Similarly, Habibie was personally responsible for the GOI's dramatic shift in East Timor policy last month. The President's announcement that he would support independence for the territory if the East Timorese reject Indonesia's offer of autonomy has opened up the first prospect for a political settlement in over twenty years, and Habibie should be rightly commended for that.

But [redacted] the tough messages begin. First, on elections. You must convey to Habibie that elections in and of themselves will not be enough; it is critical that the entire process leading up to and immediately following the June 7 vote be viewed as fair within Indonesia. Credibility will be the key to restoration of domestic stability and international confidence. In order to safeguard the credibility of the process, the GOI must make every effort to prevent violence in the run up to, and on the day of, the elections; to ensure that money politics not distort the vote; and to support the military's stated goal of neutrality in the elections. Since Habibie will presumably claim that he agrees with all of these points, you should try to get him to focus -- in a non-confrontational manner - on specifics - what steps is his government taking to accomplish these objectives? B1

Second, on East Timor. While you should commend the President's willingness to entertain new alternatives to

this long-standing problem, you must express deep concern about the rise in violence in the troubled territory. No political process, be it towards autonomy or independence, can go forward if the situation on the ground is unstable. It is imperative that arming of civilian groups be stopped and weapons already distributed be recollected. Habibie will probably deny that the military is arming paramilitary groups. It may even be accurate for him to claim that as a matter of policy the top military leadership in Jakarta is opposed to arming paramilitary groups. But the evidence is clear that whatever the policy in Jakarta, elements of ABRI, with or without orders, have armed (and continue to arm) civilians. You should be firm that there are credible reports to that effect, and that no matter who is responsible, disarmament must be carried out if the political process is to move forward.

There are two other key points to make on East Timor. First, while the U.S. supports the unity and integrity of the Indonesian state and understands Indonesia's concern that a referendum might provoke civil war or set a dangerous precedent for other troubled territories, the mechanism through which the East Timorese are consulted on Indonesia's autonomy package must be viewed as legitimate by the East Timorese themselves. Second, if the East Timorese do reject autonomy, Indonesia can not just pull out and wash its hands of the territory. Doing so would be disastrous for the people of East Timor, and would rob Indonesia of the chance to claim credit for the grand act of statesmanship of letting the people of East Timor determine their own fate. Habibie is a man who wants to be respected in the international community and should be made to understand that his - and Indonesia's - reputation will be on the line.

Finally, if time permits, the final issue that you should address is human rights. Habibie prides himself on his human rights record

B1

While Habibie has opened up the political landscape to the point that today there is virtually complete freedom of speech, press and association in Indonesia, he has made almost no progress in bringing those responsible for past

abuses to justice: a string of political kidnappings and murders which took place before his ascension to the Presidency; the shooting of university students which touched off the massive riots last May; the riots themselves and the widespread rapes of ethnic Chinese women that accompanied them; and the shooting of university students again this past fall, to name a few. His government has also made no progress in investigating the corruption of his predecessor.

We should have no illusions about this; movement on these issues prior to the election of a new government is highly unlikely and therefore addressing these issues should not be the centerpiece of your meeting with him. Still, since a Habibie victory this fall is improbable but not inconceivable, it is important to lay down a marker to let him know that we are watching and care about these issues.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	Indonesia
The Secretary	President B.J. Habibie
TBD	TBD

IV. PRESS

Following your meeting with President Habibie, Foreign Minister Alatas will escort you to a 15 - 20 minute press availability. There will be a podium for you and one for FM Alatas. Video cameras will be placed on risers at the back of the room, still photographers will be behind rope and stanchion, and pre-positioned US, local, and third-country journalists will be seated theatre-style. FM Alatas will make a brief opening statement (3-4 minutes) and then invite you to make a brief opening statement. Journalists will then ask 3-4 questions. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry Spokesman, with the assistance of Assistant Secretary Rubin, will alternate calling on American and Indonesian journalists. After three questions, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry Spokesman will call for a fourth and final question. FM Alatas will then escort you to the motorcade.

Attachments:
Tab 1 - Checklist of Key Issues and Talking Points

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

S8AL

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 2/21/09

1. Bilateral Relationship
2. Political Reform
3. East Timor
4. Human Rights

Checklist of Key Issues
Meeting with President Habibie

1. **(MUST DO) Bilateral Relationship**: Underscore Indonesia remains a key U.S. friend in region; has motivated U.S. support during this historic political and economic transition.

2. **(MUST DO) Political Reform**: Laud Habibie for making possible rapid political reform; credible June 7 elections crucial; good start on preparations, but U.S. concerned re: violence in campaign; Habibie's views?

3. **(MUST DO) East Timor**: Credit Habibie for new flexibility; raise disarming civilian militias and halting violence, international presence, short timetable, and need for credible involvement of East Timorese.

4. **Human Rights**: Mention need for follow-through; stress U.S. concern that on-going, increasing violence will require reconciliation steps to rebuilt Indonesian confidence.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

UNCLASSIFIED

1. **Bilateral Relationship**

- As friend of Indonesia, pleasure to visit at time of such hope and change.

- My first visit as Secretary of State; regret having had to postpone the visit from last November until now due to Iraq mischief.

- Appreciate that my visit comes on the 50th anniversary of bilateral relations of which both our countries should be proud.

- Wish to reaffirm the importance my government and the American people attach to our enduring bilateral relationship.

- Remain convinced that, as a friend, U.S. must assist Indonesia during these challenging times to succeed in its transition to democracy and simultaneously return to road of economic recovery.

2. Political Reform

- Congratulate you on your outstanding leadership during these key formative months of Indonesia's transition to democracy.

- In a remarkably short time, you have made it possible to envision a metamorphosis of the Indonesian political landscape beyond all expectations, and opened up tremendous opportunities for greater democracy and human rights. You have already established a real legacy, an honored place in Indonesia's history.

- Greatly encouraged with progress to date of political reforms and transition timetable you and your government have set in motion under difficult economic and political circumstances.

- Has already resulted in unprecedented flowering of civil society and freedoms, and proliferation of political parties.

- Highly significant that the major political figures have accepted new electoral system and there is wide consensus among Indonesians that June 7 elections will be major step toward greater democratization.

- Share perception that upcoming elections, while not an answer to all problems, are next critical step. Essential elections have broad popular support which, in turn, will bolster financial community confidence to reinvest in new Indonesia.

- Credibility will be seriously affected if perceptions emerge which undermine credibility: widespread violence during campaign period one fear that government must be prepared to address.

- Concerned that "money politics" not feed electorate's concern that elections have been bought by vested interests. Government role here crucial.

- Also, we have worked hard on donor conference to provide technical assistance for the elections, and expect substantial pledges of international support. (**NOTE:** If date for a pledging conference has not been set, you should press Habibie to agree to a date in the first half of March.)

- Despite good start on election preparations, concerns remain.

- Can Indonesia train all the monitors, polling station personnel, and other officials in time?

- Interested in your views on prospects for technical assistance to be effective and how various problems will be handled.

3. **East Timor**

- East Timor is another key issue on which you deserve credit.
- Appreciate detailed briefing you gave Stanley Roth on origins of Indonesia's new willingness to consider independence, if East Timorese reject offer of wide-ranging autonomy.
- U.S. has stated that more progress has been made during your Administration on this issue than in the 22 previous years.
- Commend your flexibility and seriousness in search for an enduring solution acceptable to all parties.
- Wish to share immediate concerns we have, which I am sure you share as well.
- First and most important is need to avoid bloodshed as East Timor moves to new status of autonomy or independence. If, in worst outcome, there is large-scale violence or civil war, Indonesia's reputation will be severely harmed for not having done enough to prevent the disaster.
- Taking effective steps to break the cycle of violence crucial. Disarming the civilian militias, and otherwise reducing the potential for conflict between the military and the guerrillas through a cease-fire and other means will be necessary.
- Believe that international community can help with a presence on the ground that preserves credit for Indonesia. Admittedly, nature of presence will be different if transition is to independence rather than autonomy. We are ready to assist.
- Appreciated press reports of your willingness to support Xanana Gusmao's call for a council to help calm growing tensions and restore sense of stability on the island.
- What steps have you taken to make this a reality? Is this being coordinated between your government and Xanana?
- Looking beyond immediate security concerns, wish to understand your timetable for transition.

- You have said that autonomy offer will be made in April, and if rejected by East Timorese, you will submit independence option to People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) by August. Indonesia could let go of East Timor by January 1, 2000. Does this provide sufficient time to prepare East Timor for independence?

- Concerned over this timetable for involving the East Timorese in the decision on your autonomy offer - a scant two months -- we don't see how adequate arrangements for a secure and successful transition can be made under this timetable, especially if it is to independence.

- Interested in your views on how to prepare interim safeguards -- getting ABRI out, disarming factions -- for peaceful transition in way that strengthens, not damages Indonesia's reputation?

4. **Human Rights**

- Appreciate the progress on human rights that has taken place since you assumed office.

- Deeply concerned about ongoing, even growing, widespread violence and civil unrest.

- Cannot dismiss increasing reports of deliberate provocation aimed at disrupting the reform process.

- In face of this provocation ABRI seems unresponsive in some cases, while acting aggressively and excessively in Aceh and Irian Jaya, which only feeds separatist sentiments. Appreciate your views on this issue.

- Know and appreciate your commitment to human rights, which you and Stanley Roth have discussed many times.

- Hope it will be possible for you to make further progress in bringing those responsible for past abuses to justice, whether it be those responsible for the disappearance and murder of student activists prior to President Soeharto's resignation, or those who killed and injured students at Trisakti University, or those responsible for the rapes of the ethnic Chinese women (which was confirmed by the Joint Fact Finding Team that you appointed).

98M
9912664

RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S Rm 2125

FEB 24 1999

UNCLASSIFIED
DECL: N/A

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EAP - Stanley O. Roth *sor*

SUBJECT: Press Availability after Habibie Meeting

SCENARIO

At the conclusion of the meeting with President Habibie, Foreign Minister Alatas will escort you to a 15-20 minute press availability venue at the Istana Merdeka (Freedom Palace). There will be a podium for you and one for Minister Alatas.

Video cameras will be placed on risers at the back of the room, still photographers will be behind rope and stanchion, and pre-positioned U.S. local, and third country journalists will be seated theater-style.

Foreign Minister Alatas will make a brief opening statement and then invite you to do likewise (3-4 minutes). Your observations about the meeting, followed by a few questions, are aimed at public presentation of key themes: U.S. friendship for Indonesia, our assistance at a time of need, our interest in seeing free and fair June 7 elections, our concerns about destabilizing violence, and desire to see peaceful transition in East Timor.

Journalists will ask three to four questions. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry Spokesman, with the assistance of Assistant Secretary Rubin, will alternate calling on American and Indonesian journalists. Questions are expected to be in English, but if any are in Indonesian, an interpreter will be available.

After three questions, the Indonesian spokesman will call for a fourth and final question. After it is answered, Minister Alatas will escort you to the motorcade for departure.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

S8AN

9912665

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

FEB 23 1999

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S Rpt 2/23

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 02/18/09

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EAP - Stanley O. Roth

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Indonesian Defense Minister and Armed Forces (ABRI) Commander General Wiranto, March 5, 1999 in Jakarta

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Express sympathy for the difficulty of Wiranto's mission: preventing anarchy/lawlessness while avoiding human rights abuses. Ask him his strategy for achieving this objective, including his recent authorization from the Parliament to implement a "shoot to kill" policy for rioters.

2. Emphasize key role that a neutral ABRI must play in ensuring free and fair elections. Ask what Wiranto's strategy is for maintaining law and order, including the use of paramilitary troops. Obtain Wiranto's assessment as to whether professional advice on crowd control from the United States and other countries could be of significant help in the run-up to the election.

3. Probe Wiranto's assertion that "provocateurs" have been responsible for much of the recent violence in East Java, Ambon and elsewhere in Indonesia. If this is correct, push hard on the need for Wiranto to get this problem under control, even if it requires taking action against Soeharto family interests.

4. Urge Wiranto to act vigorously to reduce violence in East Timor, by disarming paramilitary groups, agreeing to

Classified by EAP A/S Stanley O. Roth
Reason: 1.5 (d)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

UNCLASSIFIED

confidence-building measures (such as verified troop reductions on East Timor) and working (presumably indirectly) with Xanana Gusmao to implement his proposal for a commission on peace and stability in East Timor.

II. APPROACH

This may be the most important meeting of your trip. The Indonesian military is a far bigger player than the Foreign Ministry in every one of the key issues of concern: electoral preparations, reducing violence and human rights violations, resolving East Timor peacefully and in a manner which minimizes the negative precedents for Indonesia's territorial integrity.

Based on my own previous meetings, you will find that General Wiranto is quite adept at telling visitors exactly what they want to hear, that the Indonesian military (ABRI) is:

--committed to reform and will be neutral in the upcoming elections;
--willing to get out of politics (gradually) and professionalize;
--doing its best to control violence; and
--supportive of a cease-fire on East Timor and favors the disarmament of all paramilitary groups.

While this is a laudable list, two questions immediately arise: is Wiranto serious and, if so, does he have the power to implement these changes?

I believe that Wiranto is serious both about the need for ABRI to reform and to reduce its political role, if not out of commitment than out of necessity. Whereas ABRI was the single most important institution in Indonesia during the Soeharto era, it is now under siege for its past deplorable human rights record. The more information that comes into the public record about past ABRI abuses, the less willing the Indonesia body politic is to permit it to retain its special role in Indonesian politics. For example, there is now a major debate within Indonesia as to whether ABRI should continue to enjoy the role of "dwi fungsi" (dual function), in which it was recognized that ABRI would have a political as well as military role. Sentiment that ABRI should be limited to purely military functions is clearly

growing. As such, the issue of whether the military should receive any assigned (non-elected) seats in political institutions (the national parliament, the constituent assembly, local parliaments) is a major controversy. Wiranto reportedly favors a gradual reduction in ABRI's role in politics, and this was reflected in the recent legislation halving the number of ABRI's seats in parliament to 38. Wiranto clearly recognizes that if ABRI is to retain any political role in the short-term and maintain dwi fungsi, it will have to be seen both as non-abusive on human rights and politically neutral (i.e. not a tool of the ruling Golkar party).

It is far less clear that Wiranto is serious about his professed desire to reduce the violence that has wracked Indonesia since Soeharto's fall from power. Despite mounting evidence that much of the recent violence has been provoked, and despite increasing suspicions that Soeharto family interests and cronies are behind the violence, Wiranto appears unwilling to confront Soeharto on this issue. Indeed, Gus Dur, a leading opposition figure, told me -- and then openly stated in the Indonesian press -- a few weeks ago that Wiranto had specifically asked him to speak to Soeharto about stopping the provocations, since Wiranto (because of his close ties to Soeharto, whom he still visits regularly) felt unable to do so.

Thus, Wiranto needs to be pressed respectfully but firmly on the need to get the provocateurs under control, even if that means going against Soeharto interests. You should make it clear that both his and ABRI's reputation are at stake.

Even if the provocation issue did not exist, the ability of ABRI to control violence would be questionable, because of the poor state of training of Indonesian police and security forces. The police, who are currently under the control of ABRI, are miserably undersized and underfunded. As was evident during large demonstrations in Jakarta last year, the military will have to be used in the short-term to deal with significant demonstrations. But the military is poorly trained for crowd control as well, and the potential for tragic mistakes (such as the massive mayhem last November at Atma Jaya University in Jakarta, where the security forces fired at point blank range into student demonstrators with rubber bullets, killing 13 and injuring hundreds) is high. Indeed, one of the greatest threats to the June election is that the security forces will overreact to a demonstration,

fueling a counter-reaction that could spiral out of control. To try to avoid this worst case scenario, you should explore with General Wiranto the utility of providing training on crowd control as soon as possible. An inter-agency assessment team is currently working with senior military leaders and NGO groups in Jakarta to prepare recommendations on this issue, and we will have their report prior to your meeting with Wiranto.

It is not entirely clear what Wiranto and ABRI are now thinking about East Timor. Initially, Wiranto's public statements suggested that he was unenthusiastic about Habibie's offer of independence. More recent indications are that Wiranto and much of ABRI actually want to dispose of the Timor albatross and are willing to support independence if autonomy is rejected by the people of East Timor. While praising Indonesia's newfound willingness to negotiate a political resolution for East Timor, you should make absolutely clear that the implementation process for either autonomy or independence must be carried out in such a way that a bloodbath does not result. Wiranto must be made to understand that if Indonesian forces are simply withdrawn, without any provision for either the demobilization of paramilitary forces or the substitution of some kind of international presence, the result is likely to be disastrous. If that happens, Wiranto, ABRI and Indonesia's reputations would all suffer.

While Wiranto has said all the right things about disarming the paramilitary groups on East Timor, it is unclear what specific steps he is taking to make this happen. You should press him on this point, and also try to obtain his thinking about Xanana Gusmao's proposal for a council to promote peace and stability in East Timor. Does Wiranto -- or anyone else in ABRI -- have direct contacts with Xanana? Is he being consulted on what steps will be necessary to reduce violence such as verified troop reductions and an increase in the international presence on the island?

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	Indonesia
The Secretary	General Wiranto
Others TBD	Others TBD

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Checklist and Talking Points.

RELEASED IN FULL

S8P6

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 2/28/09

1. **Overall Relationship**
2. **Controlling Violence**
3. **Elections**
4. **East Timor**

Checklist of Key Issues
Meeting with Defense Minister and Armed Forces Chief General Wiranto

1. **Overall Relations**: Important friend in strategic region; Indonesia cornerstone of unified ASEAN; U.S. supporting democratization, economic reforms, providing food, humanitarian assistance.

2. **Controlling Violence**: Sympathy for critical challenge of maintaining order while protecting human rights; shoot to kill policy as part of overall strategy?; controlling, stopping provocateurs important.

3. **Elections**: Any strategy to maintain order requires ABRI being neutral; role of paramilitary groups?; can international assistance on crowd control help?

4. **East Timor**: GOI responsible for peaceful transition; need credible steps to disarm militias, withdraw troops; contacts with Xanana Gusmao; reaction to East Timor commission proposal?

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Overall Relations

- Welcome opportunity to meet with you. Indonesia an important friend in a strategically and economically vital region.

- A stable Indonesia is cornerstone of unified ASEAN. Events in Indonesia have significant impact on regional stability.

- Would like to pursue a stronger strategic relationship with a democratic Indonesia. Therefore, U.S. has strong interest in success of democratic transition underway.

- Will continue supporting Indonesian political and economic reforms, and assisting with food, humanitarian needs.

2. Controlling Violence

- Have sympathy regarding challenge you face at this volatile moment to strike right balance between preventing lawlessness and anarchy and protecting human rights.

- Understand military criticized for not doing enough to control riots and violence in May and accused of using excessive force at Atma Jaya and in Aceh.

- ABRI had a legitimate role to maintain order but end result ironically may have made ABRI's legitimate role more difficult.

- Given what has transpired, what is ABRI's current strategy for maintaining law and order in increasingly unpredictable circumstances without engaging in unduly harsh or life-threatening tactics?

- How does your much publicized 'shoot-to-kill' policy mesh with your desire to avoid human rights abuses?

- What is your assessment of role of provocateurs in recent violence in East Java, Ambon, elsewhere? Who is behind them?

- Given destabilizing role played by these provocateurs, is critical to get this problem under control, even if it requires taking action against Soeharto family interests.

- ABRI's reputation at stake if provocateurs continue to cause harm without challenge.

3. Elections

- You have historic opportunity to lead ABRI in its crucial support for Indonesia's democratic transformation.

- ABRI has important, but difficult, role to play; maintaining civil order will be a key element in success of the June elections.

- Important to ensure that polls are truly democratic, free, and fair, while security forces perceived to be staunchly neutral in the election process.

- Law and order forces in U.S. during elections viewed by citizens as protectors of Americans' right to vote in a peaceful environment rather than favoring a particular party or candidate.

- What is your strategy for maintaining order in the run-up to the elections? What role will paramilitary troops play?

- Can professional advice on crowd control from the United States and other countries be of significant help in the run-up to the elections? We'd like to help.

4. **East Timor**

- Events surrounding finding a lasting solution to the issue of East Timor have proceeded very quickly.

- Encouraged by government's recent surprise policy shift; provides sufficient flexibility to chart a new, hopefully peaceful course.

- Reducing tensions and restoring peace on East Timor our number one concern. Tensions risk making the search for a lasting solution much more difficult.

- Indonesia has a responsibility to ensure a peaceful transition to autonomy or independence. East Timorese share the same responsibility.

- Leaders of both sides need to ensure they do all possible to ensure climate for resolution is peaceful and supportive.

- If Indonesian forces are abruptly withdrawn, without sufficient provision for either demobilization of paramilitary forces or substitution of some kind of international presence, results could be disastrous.

- Particularly concerned about persistent reports that ABRI may be actively arming civilian groups. You told Stanley Roth during his last visit that this is not true.

- One way of changing that perception in East Timor would be to disarm civilians.

- Are you taking any steps to disarm paramilitary groups?

- Also crucial that you move forward with confidence building measures. Believe it would be in Indonesia's interest to have a third party presence - UN, UNHRC, ICRC - to monitor situation; might help lower tensions.

- As tensions ease, you could revisit idea of reducing troop levels.

- Do you or others in ABRI have contacts with Xanana Gusmao? Interested in your views of Gusmao's proposal on a council to promote peace and stability in East Timor. Would appear to offer confidence-building benefit.

UNCLASSIFIED (S8AP) 9912666

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

FEB 23 1999

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S Ent 2125

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 2/23/09

RELEASED IN FULL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EAP - Stanley O. Roth *for*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with East Timorese Leader Xanana Gusmao in Jakarta

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Meeting with Xanana Gusmao, the charismatic East Timorese leader recently released from prison to house arrest, demonstrates the high-level attention which you and the Administration attach to a peaceful resolution of the East Timor issue.

2. Make clear U.S. interest in seeing immediate steps taken to stop the violence in East Timor and to ensure that any solution is peaceful and sustainable. Ask Xanana about the status of his proposal to establish a Council for Peace and Security, a proposal that President Habibie has supported.

3. Obtain Xanana's views on the acceptability of Indonesian Government proposals for autonomy or independence. Inquire about the length of transition periods needed for either status. Seek his views about the appropriate mechanism for obtaining the preference of the people of East Timor for either autonomy or independence, particularly if the Indonesian Government won't permit either a referendum or an election.

II. APPROACH

Based on my five meetings with him over the past 18 months, I believe you will find Xanana Gusmao to be extraordinarily impressive: thoughtful, pragmatic and articulate. While he prefers to speak either Portuguese or Tetun (a Timorese language), I learned in my last meeting with him a few weeks ago that he can now converse --haltingly -- in English.

You will want to discuss three sets of issues with him. The first issue cluster concerns the current situation on the ground in East Timor. Xanana is greatly concerned about the escalating violence, much of it prompted by the provision of arms by elements of the Indonesian military to pro-integration (i.e. pro-Indonesian) paramilitary groups. Alarmed by the prospect of escalating violence which if unchecked could lead to a return to the civil war conditions of 1975, Xanana has proposed that all paramilitary groups -- pro-integration and resistance -- be disarmed. He has also called for the establishment on East Timor of a Council for Peace and Security, to include representatives of all factions, in an effort to reduce violence and maintain order. President Habibie has endorsed this proposal but it is unclear if any progress is being made in establishing such a Council.

The second set of issues revolves around autonomy. Xanana had supported the idea of autonomy for a period of 2-5 years, provided that at the end of this period a referendum was held to give the people of East Timor a say in their ultimate political status. The presumption, of course, was that they would select independence over continued integration into Indonesia. Now that Habibie has offered independence as early as January 1 of next year, however, it is far from clear that autonomy, even on an interim basis, has any attractiveness for the majority of East Timorese. Nevertheless, the UN negotiations on autonomy are expected to resume on March 8-9 in New York, with agreement expected on the outlines of an autonomy proposal. The real issue will then be how this proposal gets put before the East Timorese people for approval or disapproval. The Indonesian Government has thus far been steadfast in its refusal to permit a referendum on the proposal, primarily because of its very real concern that such a referendum could set a precedent for similar action in other, more important provinces with independence movements (Aceh, Irian Jaya). You should seek Xanana's thinking on how the views of the East Timorese people can be obtained, short of a referendum.

The third set of issues revolves around independence. Xanana has indicated that he believes there is a need for a transition period before independence, although it is unclear how long he believes such a transition period should be.

More important, when I last met with him, he had not yet had time to think through how the transition should take place. You should seek his views on such questions as: Will an international security force, perhaps under UN auspices, be necessary to prevent massive bloodshed? If so, how long would it have to stay? What steps need to be taken to ensure than an independent East Timor is economically viable? What happens if the UN is unwilling to play a central role in East Timor if Indonesia pulls out?

While it will be useful to obtain answers to as many of these questions as possible, you also want to use some of your time to reassure Xanana of the importance which the United States attaches to a peaceful resolution of the East Timor issue and our determination to stay heavily involved throughout the process.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	Indonesia
The Secretary	Xanana Gusmao
TBD	TBD

Attachments:
Tab 1 - Checklist of Key Issues and Talking Points

RELEASED IN FULL

S8AQ

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 2/23/09

1. East Timor- Overall
2. Violence
3. Autonomy
4. Independence

Checklist of Key Issues Meeting with East Timorese Leader Xanana Gusmao

1. **East Timor Overall**: Indonesian policy shift opens possibility of enduring solution; U.S. determined to see peaceful solution found.

2. **Violence**: ABRI arming of civilians potentially most destabilizing, provocative; U.S. urging GOI to collect back weapons. Status of Gusmao Council idea?

3. **Autonomy**: Ask Gusmao views on autonomy offer, length of transition periods, appropriate mechanism to determine E. Timorese views.

4. **Independence**: Transition arrangements if move to independence? Ask Gusmao whether international security force necessary and, if so, how long. How to ensure independent E. Timor economically viable?

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

1. **East Timor**

- Although understand this setting an improvement over that of a few weeks ago, hope that the next time will be in a location and under circumstances entirely of your choice.

- Greatly encouraged by Indonesia's new willingness to consider independence, if East Timorese reject offer of wide-ranging autonomy. Opens up the possibility of an enduring solution acceptable to all parties.

- Want to assure you that the U.S. attaches highest importance to a peaceful resolution of the East Timor issue. We are determined to see that a peaceful, lasting solution is found.

2. Violence

- First, the recent rise in violence and growing humanitarian pressures caused by villagers fleeing to urban centers is deeply troubling.

- Both sides bear some degree of responsibility for incidents, although major provocative factor appears to be ABRI's arming of civilians.

- We have been urging immediate steps be taken to halt the violence.

- We are calling on the GOI to halt this practice and to collect back weapons distributed. How pervasive is this activity? Has it stopped?

- Have also urged GOI to permit international presence as a confidence building step - perhaps U.N. office or agencies, other NGOs, etc. Do you think this could ease tensions? Are there other ideas you have?

- Understand you have called for establishing a Council for Peace and Security.

- President Habibie said he supported it. What is its current status and what role do you see the Council playing? Can I help?

3. Autonomy

- Proposal on autonomy for East Timor coming out of the Indonesia-Portugal negotiations in the Marker talks is virtually finalized. Have you been briefed on its details?

- Sense that prospects uncertain for the autonomy offer in light of Habibie's policy shift offering independence alternative, but would appreciate your assessment.

- What are your views on the length of transition needed to move securely and successfully to either autonomy or independence?

- Devising an acceptable mechanism for determining the will of the East Timorese has been left to Ambassador Marker. Indonesia continues to reject the notion of referendum or an election.

- What are your thoughts? Could your Council for Peace and Security ultimately serve as such a consultative mechanism?

4. **Independence**

- If East Timorese choose independence, question becomes how to achieve successful transition without repeat of 1975 bloodshed when Portugal withdrew.

- A timetable resulting in separation with Indonesia by January 1, 2000, seems dangerously short for a workable transition.

- Are the two factions, pro-integration and pro-independence, likely to attack one another and even scores? What can the international community and the East Timorese leadership do to prevent this?

- What kind of transition arrangements do you envision in the event that East Timor moves toward independence? Do you still favor a 2-3 year transition period before independence?

- What are your hopes and expectations of the UN and the international community? Will a UN peacekeeping force be necessary to prevent massive bloodshed? Would you welcome a UN administrating presence?

- What steps need to be taken to ensure that an independent East Timor is economically viable? What role do you envision for the international community? World Bank? Bilateral donors?

9912667

United States Department of State

RELEASED IN FULL

Washington, D.C. 20520

FEB 23 1999

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S 2/24

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 2/23/09

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EAP - Stanley O. Roth

SUBJECT: Your Human Rights/Democracy Roundtable

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Demonstrate U.S. concern for human rights in Indonesia.

2. Elicit views on the broad human rights situation in Indonesia, including freedom of the press, assembly and religion, women's rights and inter-communal relations.

3. Explore rights of provinces in the context of autonomy/independence movements in East Timor, Irian Jaya, and Aceh.

II. APPROACH

Your roundtable meeting with this respected group of Indonesian NGO representatives active on human rights and democracy issues will give you the opportunity to hear informed views on the human rights situation in Indonesia. As your later meetings with key opposition leaders will focus more specifically on the issue of democratic reform and the road to free and fair elections, you should use this roundtable primarily to address a broader range of human rights concerns.

As this human rights roundtable will be relatively intimate -- there will be no more than 8 Indonesian

participants -- you may wish to ask your interlocutors to identify themselves and to speak briefly on their area of expertise. You could then proceed with follow-up questions directed to each individual's area of expertise. Among those present will be a journalist, a university professor, a priest, a Sino-Indonesia author, an activist on women's rights, and representatives from the provinces of Irian Jaya and Aceh. As such, you will have the opportunity to hear views on discrete subjects that cut across the spectrum of human rights issues. Although you will want to get the particular views of each participant, you might wish to begin the meeting with a general question along the lines of "Has the human rights situation improved under Habibie?"

III. PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

TBD. We anticipate a press spray at the beginning of the meeting.

IV. PARTICIPANTS

U.S	Indonesia
The Secretary	TBD
Others TBD	

Attachments:
Tab 1 - Checklist of Key Issues and Talking Points

RELEASED IN FULL S BAS

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 2/23/09

Checklist of Key Issues
Human Rights/Democracy Roundtable

1. Overview
2. Basic Freedoms
3. Women's/Community Issues
4. E Timor, Irian Jaya, Aceh

1. **Overview:** Came to Indonesia to find out if overall human rights situation improving. What is your impression?

2. **Basic Freedoms:** Appears to be progress on press freedom, rights of assembly? Do you agree? What about religious freedoms, tensions?

3. **Women's/Community Issues:** Role of women; relations among the diverse communities of Indonesia; role of ethnicity in recent violence; ethnic Chinese.

4. **East Timor, Irian Jaya, Aceh:** Will rights and aspirations of provinces get greater hearing? Do events in East Timor portend similar developments in Irian Jaya, Aceh, and elsewhere?

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 19 JUL 2006 200504211

CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: EAP A/S Stanley O. Roth
Reason: E.O. 12958 1.5(D)

1. **Overview**

- Have the impression that overall human rights situation has improved under Habibie despite many remaining problems. Would you agree?

2. **Basic Freedoms**

- Appears to be progress on freedom of speech: press openly criticizes official positions; opposition parties organize rallies; non-violent demonstrations for and against the government. Your views?

- Same holds true for right of assembly: restrictions on unions eased, explosion in union membership, activity. Your views?

- What about religious freedoms? Will inter-religious tension loom larger in Indonesia's future?

3. **Women's/Community Issues**

- Women's role and rights near and dear to me; your views on present circumstances, future prospects of women?

- Principal challenge to Indonesia, given its stupendous diversity, is to maintain harmony among different communities and groups. Protecting ethnic Chinese from being targeted is particularly important. Your views?

4. **East Timor, Irian Jaya, Aceh**

- Do you believe there will be an agreement on a new status for East Timor? What impact will a new status - particularly if it's independence - have on other provinces?

- With respect to Aceh and Irian Jaya, is the issue better governance or a better distribution of resources?

- Do you see any circumstances under which the central government might approve of a new status for either province? What is the current human rights situation and how would you compare it with the past?

- For Irian Jaya Only - What is the goal of the national dialogue? Do you believe it will succeed?

List of Prominent Visitors to China, Indonesia, Thailand Before/After Secretary's Visit

China

22 FEB - 5 MAR AUSTR Cassidy in China - WTO discussions.

23-24 FEB Deputy Treasury Secretary Summers in China.

25 FEB - 2 MAR Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Le Kha Pheiu in Beijing.

28 FEB - 8 MAR Dr. William Perry to PRC (Shanghai, Hangzhou, Beijing - 3/4), HK, Taiwan (3/7) for Track II discussions. Also Ash Carter, Lampton, Prueher, Scowcroft, Shalikashvili, Jan Berris on NCUSCR-sponsored trip.

28 FEB - 1 MAR Japanese Liberal Party leader Ozawa in Beijing.

28 FEB - 2 MAR Cuban FM Robaina in Beijing. Also meeting with FM Tang on 1 March.

2-5 MAR USTR Barshefsky to China - WTO discussions.

Thailand

1-2 MAR Henry Kissinger, private meetings with senior Thai leaders.

2-5 MAR Crown Prince of Brunei

3-6 MAR Lao Prime Minister

5-6 MAR Than Shwe, Burmese Prime Minister

Indonesia

21-22 FEB Treasury Deputy Secretary Larry Summers

23-25 FEB Australian Foreign Minister Downer for meetings with Habibie and Gusmao, among others. Accompanied by delegation of trade and economic leaders.

S9
RELEASED IN FULL

9916802

SCHEDULE AS OF 1225 EST 3/3/99

SECRETARY OF STATE

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S TRIP
TO
BANGKOK, THAILAND AND JAKARTA, INDONESIA

March 4, 1999

DIST: S(2), C, D, P, S/S(4), SSO(2), CMS, SSEX, SSIA, SSIRM, INR, PA, DSCC, WATCH

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

UNCLASSIFIED

THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 1999 PAGE 1

9916802

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

8:40 a.m.	Depart Oriental Hotel en route Government House
9:00 a.m.	Bilateral with PM Chuan
9:50 a.m.	Depart Government House en route Oriental Hotel
10:10 a.m.	PRE-BRIEF/PRIVATE TIME: 25 mins
10:40 a.m.	Depart Oriental Hotel en route Ministry of Foreign Affairs
11:00 a.m.	Bilateral with FM Surin
11:35 a.m.	PRESS PRE-BRIEF TIME: 10 mins
11:50 a.m.	Jt. Press Availability with FM Surin
12:15 p.m.	Lunch with FM Surin
1:20 p.m.	Depart Ministry of Foreign Affairs en route Don Muang Airport
1:55 p.m.	Depart Thailand en route Indonesia Flight time: 3 hrs 15 mins Time change: none
5:10 p.m.	Arrive Jakarta, Indonesia
5:25 p.m.	Depart Halim Airport en route Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel
5:55 p.m.	PRE-BRIEF/PRIVATE TIME: 20 mins
6:20 p.m.	Depart Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel en route Department of Foreign Affairs
6:30 p.m.	Pull-aside with FM Alatas
6:40 p.m.	Bilateral with FM Alatas
7:35 p.m.	PRESS PRE-BRIEF TIME: 10 mins
7:50 p.m.	Jt. Press Availability with FM Alatas
8:15 p.m.	Depart Department of Foreign Affairs en route Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel
8:25 p.m.	PRIVATE TIME: Remainder of evening

RON: Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel
Jakarta, Indonesia

UNCLASSIFIED

GUEST AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

9:30 a.m.	BAGGAGE CALL. Place all luggage outside hotel room door.
9:30 a.m.	CLASSIFIED BAGGAGE CALL. Place all classified and cabin materials outside S & S/S offices.
12:45 p.m.	Proceed to hotel lobby and board van for transportation to airport.
1:00 p.m.	Vans depart Oriental Hotel en route Don Muang Airport.

Staff Van 2	B. Woodward A. Wolff R. Likins J. Hyland T. Gilbert
Staff Van 3	A. Grossman K. Degnan L. Lineberry N. Tucker F. Eatmon L. Sweeney

EVENT: Bilateral with Prime Minister Chuan

8:35 a.m.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Suite and proceeds to motorcade.
8:40 a.m.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Oriental Hotel en route Government House

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS

Lead	
Limo	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT
DS Follow	
Spare	E. Shocas S. George
Amb.	Amb. Hecklinger

DAO	Gen. Foglesong
Staff Van 1	A/S Roth A/S Larson A/S Koh D. Andrews K. Campbell Interpreter

Drive time: 15 minutes

8:55 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Government House and proceeds to Outer Ivory Room.

Met by: Foreign Minister Surin (curbside)
Prime Minister Chuan (outer ivory room)

CAMERA SPRAY OF GREETING

9:00 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT and Prime Minister Chuan proceed to Inner Ivory Room. Bilateral begins.

CAMERA SPRAY AT TOP

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.		GOT	
	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT		Prime Minister Chuan
	Ambassador Hecklinger		Foreign Minister Surin
	E. Shocas		PM Advisor Wiwat Mungkandi
	A/S Roth		Dep. SYG for Pol. Affrs. Varakorn Samakoses
	Gen. Foglesong		
	A/S Larson		Permanent Secretary Saroj Chavanviraj
	A/S Koh		
	D. Andrews		Amer. & Pacific Affrs. DG Somkiati Ariyapruchya
	K. Campbell		
	Notetaker		Interpreter
	Interpreter		

CONSECUTIVE INTERPRETATION

9:45 a.m. Bilateral concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Inner Ivory Room and proceeds to motorcade.

9:50 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Government House en route Oriental Hotel.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS
Same as on arrival

Drive time: 15 minutes

10:05 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Oriental Hotel and proceeds to Suite.

10:10 a.m. PRE-BRIEF/PRIVATE TIME: 25 mins

EVENT: Bilateral with Foreign Minister Surin

10:35 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Suite and proceeds to motorcade.

10:40 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Oriental Hotel en route Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS	
Lead	
Limo	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT
DS Follow	
Spare	E. Shocas S. George
Sr. Staff	A/S Rubin A/S Roth K. Bartels
Amb.	Amb. Hecklinger A/S Larson
DAO	Gen. Foglesong
Press Van	C. Bush Traveling Press

Drive time: 15 minutes

NOTE: Delegation members not participating in the Surin bilat but are participating in the Surin lunch will depart Oriental Hotel at 11:20 a.m.

Staff Van 1
A/S Koh
D. Andrews
K. Campbell
A. Wolff

10:55 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Ministry of Foreign Affairs and proceeds to Traithos East Room, 2nd floor.

CAMERA SPRAY ON ARRIVAL (Bua Kaew room)

Met by: Foreign Minister Surin

11:00 a.m. Bilateral begins.

OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.		GOT	
	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT		Foreign Minister Surin
	Ambassador Hecklinger		Dep. Finance Minister Pisit
	E. Shocas		Permanent Sec. Saroj
	A/S Rubin		Royal Thai Army Cmndr-in-Chief Surayud
	A/S Roth		Amer. & S. Pacific Affrs. Dept. DG Somkiati
	Gen. Foglesong		Econ. Affrs. Dept. DG Kobsak
	A/S Larson		Info. Dept. Dep. DG Kitti
	Notetaker		

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

11:30 a.m. Bilateral concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Traithos East Room and proceeds to Hold Room.

11:35 a.m. PRESS PRE-BRIEF TIME: 10 mins

EVENT: Joint Press Availability with Foreign Minister Surin

11:45 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Hold Room and proceeds to Press Room.

11:50 a.m. Event begins.

OPEN PRESS

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	GOT	Foreign Minister Surin

CONSECUTIVE INTERPRETATION

Order of Events

-- Foreign Minister Surin makes statement.

-- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT makes statement.

-- Qs & As.

12:10 p.m. Event concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Press Room and proceeds to Devavongsa Hall.

EVENT: Lunch with Foreign Minister Surin

12:15 p.m. Lunch begins.

OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	GOT	Foreign Minister Surin
	Ambassador Hecklinger		Dep. Finance Min. Pisit
	E. Shocas		Permanent Secretary Saroj
	A/S Rubin		Royal Thai Army Cmndr-in-Chief Surayud
	A/S Roth		Bank of Thailand Gov. Chatu Mongol Sonakul
	Gen. Foglesong		Amer. & S. Pacific Affrs. Dept. DG Somkiati
	A/S Larson		Econ. Affrs. Dept. DG Kobsak
	A/S Koh		E. Asian Affrs. Dept. DG Virasakdi
	D. Andrews		Protocol Dept. DG Vara-Poj Snidvongs
	K. Campbell		Info. Dept. Dep. DG Kitti
	A. Wolff		
	Notetaker		

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

Order of Events

-- Lunch is served.

-- After lunch, Foreign Minister Surin offers toast.

-- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT responds.

1:15 p.m. Lunch concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Devavongsa Hall and proceeds to motorcade.

EVENT: Departure from Thailand en route Indonesia

1:20 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Ministry of Foreign Affairs en route Don Muang Airport.

Lead	
Limo	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT
DS Follow	
Spare	E. Shocas S. George
Sr. Staff	A/S Rubin A/S Roth K. Bartels
Amb.	Amb. Hecklinger
DAO	Gen. Foglesong
Staff Van 1	A/S Larson A/S Koh D. Andrews K. Campbell A. Wolff

Drive time: 20 minutes

1:40 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Don Muang Airport and proceeds to aircraft.

CAMERA SPRAY ON DEPARTURE

1:55 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Thailand en route Indonesia.

Flight time: 3 hrs 15 mins
Time change: none

EVENT: Arrival in Jakarta, Indonesia

5:10 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Halim Airport and proceeds to motorcade.

CAMERA SPRAY ON ARRIVAL

Met by: Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy
DCM Owens
America Office Dir. Samodra Sriwijaya
Chief of Protocol Slamet Mustafa

5:25 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Halim Airport en route Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS

Lead	
Limo	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT
DS Follow	
Spare	E. Shocas S. George
Sr. Staff	A/S Rubin A/S Roth K. Bartels
DAO	Gen. Foglesong T. Gilbert
Sr. Staff Van	A/S Larson A/S Koh D. Andrews K. Campbell
Staff Van 1	B. Woodward A. Wolff R. Likins J. Hyland

Staff Van 2	A. Grossman K. Degnan F. Eatmon
Staff Van 3	L. Lineberry N. Tucker L. Sweeney
Press Van	C. Bush Traveling Press

Drive time: 25 minutes

5:50 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel and *proceeds to Suite.*

OFFICIAL HOTEL PHOTOGRAPHER

Met by: *Hotel Manager Samora*

5:55 p.m. PRE-BRIEF/PRIVATE TIME: 20 mins

EVENT: Pull-aside with Foreign Minister Alatas

6:15 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Suite and proceeds to motorcade.

6:20 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel en route Department of Foreign Affairs.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS	
Lead	
Limo	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT
DS Follow	
Spare	E. Shocas S. George
Sr. Staff	A/S Rubin A/S Roth K. Bartels
Amb.	Amb. Roth

Sr. Staff Van	A/S Larson A/S Koh D. Andrews K. Campbell

Drive time: 5 minutes

6:25 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Department of Foreign Affairs and proceeds to FM's Office.

Met by: Director of Protocol Slamet Mustafa (curbside)
Foreign Minister Alatas (FM's Office)

6:30 p.m. Pull-aside begins.

CAMERA SPRAY AT TOP

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT Others TBD	GOI	Foreign Minister Alatas Ambassador Kuntjorojakti

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

6:35 p.m. Pull-aside concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT and Foreign Minister Alatas depart FM's Office and proceed to Meeting Room.

EVENT: Bilateral with Foreign Minister Alatas

6:40 p.m. Bilateral begins.

CAMERA SPRAY AT TOP

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT Ambassador Roy E. Shocas A/S Rubin A/S Roth A/S Larson A/S Koh D. Andrews K. Campbell Notetaker	GOI	Foreign Minister Alatas Pol. Affrs. DG Misnumurti Ambassador Kuntjorojakti For. Econ. Rels. DG Saleh Socio-Cultural Rels. & Info DG Ghani Research & Devel. Agency Head Silalahi Asia & Pacific Affrs. Dir. Alhadar Int'l Orgs. Dir. Widodo Amer. Affrs. Dir. Sriwidjaja

	N. Amer. Affrs. Sub-Directorate Head Harahap, Notetaker

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

7:30 p.m. Bilateral concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Meeting Room and proceeds to Hold Room.

7:35 p.m. PRESS PRE-BRIEF TIME: 10 mins

EVENT: Joint Press Availability with Foreign Minister Alatas

7:45 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Hold Room and proceeds to Press Room.

7:50 p.m. Event begins.

OPEN PRESS

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	GOI	Foreign Minister Alatas

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

Order of Events

-- Foreign Minister Alatas makes statement.

-- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT makes statement.

-- Qs & As.

8:10 p.m. Event concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Press Room and proceeds to motorcade.

8:15 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Department of Foreign Affairs en route Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS
Same as on arrival

Drive time: 5 minutes

THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 1999 PAGE 12

8:20 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel and proceeds to Suite.

8:25 p.m. PRIVATE TIME: Remainder of evening

RON: Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel
Jakarta, Indonesia

UNCLASSIFIED

S10

RELEASED IN FULL

SCHEDULE AS OF 1515 EST 3/4/99

9916803

SECRETARY OF STATE

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S TRIP TO JAKARTA, INDONESIA

March 5, 1999

DIST: S(2), C, D, P, S/S(4), SSO(2), CMS, SSEX, SSIA, SSIRM, INR, PA, DSCC, WATCH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE J HEAVNER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAR 2006 200504211

FRIDAY, MARCH 5, 1999 PAGE 1

9916803

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

8:50 a.m.	Depart Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel en route Presidential Palace
9:00 a.m.	Bilateral with President Habibie
10:20 a.m.	PRESS PRE-BRIEF TIME: 5 mins
10:30 a.m.	Jt. Press Stakeout with FM Alatas
10:50 a.m.	Depart Presidential Palace en route Gusmao Residence
11:15 a.m.	Meeting with Xanana Gusmao
12:05 p.m.	Depart Gusmao Residence en route Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel
12:30 p.m.	SPEECH PREP/PRE-BRIEF/PRIVATE TIME: 2 hrs 35 mins
3:15 p.m.	Embassy Meet & Greet
3:35 p.m.	Pull-aside with Megawati Sukarnoputri
3:55 p.m.	Pull-aside with Amien Rais
4:15 p.m.	SPEECH PREP TIME: 15 mins
4:35 p.m.	Speech on Indonesia
5:15 p.m.	Pull-aside with Gus Dur
5:35 p.m.	Political Leaders Gathering
5:55 p.m.	Democracy and Human Rights Roundtable
6:45 p.m.	PRIVATE TIME: 10 mins
7:00 p.m.	Depart Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel en route Jakarta Airport
7:40 p.m.	Depart Indonesia en route TBD
	Flight time: TBD
	Time change: TBD
TBD	Arrive TBD
TBD	Depart TBD Airport en route TBD

GUEST AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS	
2:30 p.m.	BAGGAGE CALL. Place all luggage outside hotel room door.
2:30 p.m.	CLASSIFIED BAGGAGE CALL. Place all classified and cabin materials outside S & S/S offices.
6:45 p.m.	Proceed to hotel lobby and board motorcade for transportation to airport.
7:00 p.m.	Motorcade departs Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel en route Jakarta Airport.

EVENT: Bilateral with President Habibie

8:45 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Suite and proceeds to motorcade.

8:50 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel en route Presidential Palace.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS	
Lead	
Limo	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT
DS Follow	
Spare	E. Shocas S. George
Sr. Staff	A/S Rubin A/S Roth K. Bartels
Amb.	Amb. Roy
DAO	Gen. Foglesong
Sr. Staff Van	D. Andrews A/S Larson A/S Koh

Drive time: 5 minutes

8:55 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Presidential Palace and proceeds to Hold Room to SIGN GUEST BOOK and then to Jepara Meeting Room.

Met by: Chief of Palace Protocol Munawar (curbside)
President Habibie (Jepara meeting room)

9:00 a.m. Bilateral begins.

CAMERA SPRAY AT TOP

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	GOI	President Habibie
	Ambassador Roy		Defense Minister Wiranto
	E. Shocas		Minister of State
	A/S Rubin		Minister of Economy
	D. Andrews		
	A/S Roth		
	Gen. Foglesong		
	A/S Larson		
	A/S Koh		
	Notetaker		

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

10:15 a.m. Bilateral concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Jepara Meeting Room and proceeds to Hold Room.

10:20 a.m. PRESS PRE-BRIEF TIME: 5 mins

EVENT: Joint Press Stakeout with Foreign Minister Alatas

10:25 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Hold Room and proceeds to Press Room.

10:30 a.m. Event begins.

OPEN PRESS

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	GOI	Foreign Minister Alatas

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

Order of Events

– SECRETARY ALBRIGHT & Foreign Minister Alatas take questions.

10:45 a.m. Event concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Press Room and proceeds to motorcade.

GUEST AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

NOTE: Delegation members not participating in the Gusmao mtg. will return to hotel.

DAO	Gen. Foglesong
Sr. Staff Van	D. Andrews A/S Larson

EVENT: Meeting with Xanana Gusmao

10:50 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Presidential Palace en route Gusmao Residence

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS

Lead	
Limo	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT
DS Follow	
Spare	E. Shocas S. George
Sr. Staff	A/S Rubin A/S Roth K. Bartels
Amb.	Amb. Roy A/S Koh

Drive time: 20 minutes

11:10 a.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Gusmao Residence.

POOL SPRAY ON ARRIVAL

11:15 a.m. Meeting begins.

POOL SPRAY AT TOP

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	Jakarta	Xanana Gusmao
	Ambassador Roy		1 Other
	A/S Rubin		
	A/S Roth		
	A/S Koh		
	Notetaker		
	M. Bouquet, Interpreter		

CONSECUTIVE INTERPRETATION
(Portuguese)

12:00 p.m. Meeting concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT proceeds to motorcade.

12:05 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Gusmao Residence en route Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS

Lead	
Limo	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT
DS Follow	
Spare	E. Shocas S. George
Sr. Staff	A/S Rubin A/S Roth K. Bartels
Amb.	Amb. Roy A/S Koh M. Bouquet

Drive time: 20 minutes

12:25 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel and proceeds to Suite.

12:30 p.m. PRE-BRIEF/PRIVATE TIME: 2 hrs 35 mins

FRIDAY, MARCH 5, 1999 PAGE 6

EVENT: Embassy Meet & Greet

3:05 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Suite and proceeds to take MARINE PHOTO.

3:10 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT proceeds to Banda Room B.

3:15 p.m. Event begins.

OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER

PARTICIPANTS
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT Ambassador Roy Embassy personnel & families

Order of Events

-- Ambassador Roy introduces SECRETARY ALBRIGHT.

-- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT makes remarks.

3:30 p.m. Event concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Banda Room B and proceeds to Banda Room A.

EVENT: Pull-aside with Megawati Sukarnoputri

3:35 p.m. Pull-aside begins.

CAMERA SPRAY AT TOP

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT Ambassador Roy A/S Roth Notetaker	Jakarta	Megawati Sukanoputri 1 Other

CONSECUTIVE INTERPRETATION
(if required)

3:50 p.m. Pull-aside concludes. Megawati Sukanoputri departs.

FRIDAY, MARCH 5, 1999 PAGE 7

EVENT: Pull-aside with Amien Rais

3:55 p.m. Amien Rais arrives. Pull-aside begins.

CAMERA SPRAY AT TOP

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT Ambassador Roy A/S Roth *Notetaker*	Jakarta	Amien Rais 1 Other

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

4:10 p.m. Pull-aside concludes. Amien Rais departs.

4:15 p.m. SPEECH PREP TIME: 15 mins

EVENT: Speech on Indonesia

4:30 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Banda Room A and proceeds to Flores Ballroom.

4:35 p.m. *Event begins.*

OPEN PRESS

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	Others	Approx.150 guests

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

Order of Events

-- Ambassador Roy introduces SECRETARY ALBRIGHT.

-- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT delivers address.

5:10 p.m. Event concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Flores Ballroom and proceeds to Banda Room A.

FRIDAY, MARCH 5, 1999 PAGE 8

EVENT: Pull-aside with Gus Dur

5:15 p.m. Pull-aside begins.

CAMERA SPRAY AT TOP

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	Jakarta	Gus Dur
	Ambassador Roy		1 Other
	A/S Roth		
	Notetaker		

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

5:30 p.m. Pull-aside concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Banda Room A and proceeds to Banda Room B.

EVENT: Political Leaders Gathering

5:35 p.m. Event begins.

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	Jakarta	Megawati Soekarnoputri
	Ambassador Roy		Amien Rais
	E. Shocas		Gus Dur
	D. Andrews		Hamza Haz
	A/S Roth		Edi Sudradjat
	A/S Larson		Sri Bintang Pamungkas
	A/S Koh		Matori Abdul Djalil
	K. Campbell		Yusril Ihza Mahendra
	Notetaker		Nurmanmudi Ismail
	Interpreter		Deliar Noer
			Supeni
			Akbar Tanjung
			Partai Katolik Demokratik
			Sarifuddin Harahap

WHISPER INTERPRETATION
(if required)

Order of Events

-- Ambassador Roy introduces SECRETARY ALBRIGHT.

-- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT makes brief remarks.

-- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT greets all participants. (CAMERA SPRAY)

5:50 p.m. Event concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Banda Room B and proceeds to Club Lounge Meeting Room, 18th floor.

EVENT: Democracy and Human Rights Roundtable

5:55 p.m. Roundtable begins.

CAMERA SPRAY AT TOP

PARTICIPANTS			
U.S.	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT	Jakarta	Goenawan Mohammad
	Ambassador Roy		Mulya Lubis
	E. Shocas		Marzuki Darusman
	D. Andrews		Mely Tan
	A/S Roth		Ita Fathia Nadia
	A/S Koh		Phil Erary
	K. Campbell		Dr. Hasballah Saad
	Notetaker		Dr. Nurcholis Madjid

NO INTERPRETATION REQUIRED

Order of Events

-- Ambassador Roy introduces SECRETARY ALBRIGHT.

-- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT makes remarks.

-- Discussion begins.

6:40 p.m. Roundtable concludes. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Club Lounge Meeting Room and proceeds to Suite.

6:45 p.m. PRIVATE TIME: 10 mins

EVENT: Departure from Indonesia en route TBD

6:55 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Suite and proceeds to motorcade.

7:00 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Borobudur Intercontinental Hotel en route Jakarta Airport.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS

Lead	
Limo	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT
DS Follow	
Spare	E. Shocas S. George
Sr. Staff	A/S Rubin A/S Roth K. Bartels
Amb.	Amb. Roy
DAO	Gen. Foglesong
Sr. Staff Van	D. Andrews A/S Larson A/S Koh K. Campbell
Staff Van 1	B. Woodward A. Wolff R. Likins J. Hyland
Staff Van 2	A. Grossman K. Degnan F. Eatmon
Staff Van 3	L. Lineberry N. Tucker L. Sweeney
Press Van	C. Bush Traveling Press

Drive time: 25 minutes

FRIDAY, MARCH 5, 1999 PAGE 11

7:25 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives Jakarta Airport and proceeds to aircraft.

CAMERA SPRAY ON DEPARTURE

Met by: DCM Owens
America Office Dir. Samodra Sriwijaya
Chief of Protocol Slamet Mustafa

7:40 p.m. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs Indonesia en route TBD.

Flight time: TBD
Time change: TBD

EVENT: Arrival in TBD

TBD SECRETARY ALBRIGHT arrives TBD Airport and proceeds to motorcade.

TBD SECRETARY ALBRIGHT departs TBD Airport en route TBD.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS

Lead	
Limo	SECRETARY ALBRIGHT
DS Follow	
Spare	E. Shocas S. George
Sr. Staff	A/S Rubin A/S Roth K. Bartels
DAO	Gen. Foglesong T. Gilbert
Staff Van 1	A/S Larson A/S Koh D. Andrews K. Campbell B. Woodward A. Wolff

Staff Van 2	R. Likins J. Hyland A. Grossman K. Degnan F. Eatmon
Staff Van 3	L. Lineberry N. Tucker L. Sweeney
Press Van 1	C. Bush Traveling Press
Press Van 2	Traveling Press

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ7409

PAGE 01 STATE 085517 130122Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AIT-03 AMAD-01 A-00 EUR-01 UTED-00 TEDE-00
IO-00 ADS-00 NEA-01 OIC-02 OIG-04 SA-01 SAS-00
/014R

085517
SOURCE: KODAKC.013025
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:EMMCDEVITT -- 05/12/98 71029
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES
----------3D1E22 130123Z /38
O P 130120Z MAY 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION USVIENNA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 085517 130122Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 10 MAR 2006 200503888

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS// PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
SACINCUNC KS PRIORITY
USCINCUNC SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
CINCPACFLT HI PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 085517

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: MAY 12, 1998 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS -- ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
USVIENNA FOR UNVIE
ROME FOR STORELLA
BEIJING PASS CHENGDU

1. INDEX

-- INDONESIA: DEMONSTRATIONS/POLITICAL REFORM (PARAS 2 - 5)
-- CHINA: BISHOP ZENG JINGMU (PARAS 4 AND 6)

2. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT ON DEMONSTRATIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM IN

INDONESIA WAS RELEASED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 5/12/98.

3. THE UNITED STATES DEPLORES THE KILLINGS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE AS INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES HAVE CONFRONTED DEMONSTRATORS.

WE STRONGLY URGE THE SECURITY FORCES TO SHOW RESTRAINT AND REFRAIN FROM VIOLENCE WHEN FACING PROTESTORS. WE REPEAT

OUR CALL FOR STUDENTS AND THE PUBLIC TO KEEP THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS PEACEFUL.

INDONESIA NEEDS TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE WHICH APPEARS TO BE EMERGING. ALL PARTIES IN INDONESIA RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR POLITICAL REFORM. SUCH POLITICAL REFORM CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS CITIZENS.

4. THERE WAS NO REGULAR DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING TODAY. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 5/12/98. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

5. INDONESIA: DEMONSTRATIONS/POLITICAL REFORM

CONTEXT: A CROWD OF MORE THAN 5000 STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED TODAY IN WEST JAKARTA AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY. AMIDST STUDENT-POLICE CONFRONTATION, THE POLICE REPORTEDLY FIRED ON STUDENTS WITH RUBBER BULLETS AND LIVE AMMUNITION AFTER THEY TRIED TO MARCH FROM CAMPUS TO THE PARLIAMENT. EMBASSY JAKARTA HAS CONFIRMED THAT AT LEAST FOUR STUDENTS WERE KILLED.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA.

A: WE UNDERSTAND THAT A LARGE DEMONSTRATION AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY IN WEST JAKARTA TURNED VIOLENT TODAY WHEN STUDENTS TRIED TO MARCH FROM THE CAMPUS TO THE PARLIAMENT. THE POLICE REPORTEDLY FIRED ON THE STUDENTS WITH RUBBER BULLETS AND LIVE AMMUNITION. OUR EMBASSY HAS CONFIRMED THAT AT LEAST FOUR STUDENTS HAVE DIED AND THAT AT LEAST 20 STUDENTS WERE WOUNDED.

WE DEPLORE THESE KILLINGS. WE STRONGLY URGE THE SECURITY FORCES TO SHOW RESTRAINT AND REFRAIN FROM VIOLENCE WHEN FACING PROTESTORS. WE REPEAT OUR CALL FOR STUDENTS AND THE PUBLIC TO KEEP THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS PEACEFUL. ALTHOUGH INDONESIA IS NOW MOVING THROUGH A DIFFICULT PERIOD, VIOLENCE WILL BENEFIT NO ONE.

WE HAVE URGED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE TO ALLOW PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS.

Q: DOES POLITICAL REFORM MEAN GETTING RID OF SOEHARTO?

A: IT IS UP TO INDONESIA'S PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR POLITICAL LEADERS AND SHAPE THEIR OWN FUTURE

6. CHINA: BISHOP ZENG JINGMU

CONTEXT: A WIRE SERVICE IS REPORTING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA HAS RELEASED ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP ZENG JINGMU FRORN PRISON ON MAY 9 BUT THEN PLACED HIM UNDER HOUSE ARREST

IN THE CENTRAL PROVINCE OF JIANGXI. THE BISHOP HAS BEEN JAILED VARIOUS TIMES IN THE PAST AND HAS BEEN JAILED INTERMITTENTLY FROM 1994 TO 1998.

Q: WHAT IS THE DEPARTMENT'S REACTION TO WIRE SERVICE REPORTS, SOURCED TO THE CARDINAL KUNG FOUNDATION, THAT BISHOP ZENG IS BEING HELD UNDER HOUSE ARREST WITH ONLY HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY ABLE TO SEE HIM?

A: WE HAVE SEEN THE PRESS REPORTING. WE UNDERSTAND THAT ZENG WAS RELEASED AND IS NOT IN GOOD HEALTH. WE ARE LOOKING INTO WHETHER THERE ARE ANY RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO HIM. AT THIS POINT WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY SUCH RESTRICTIONS, BUT WE WILL BE SEEKING TO CONFIRM ZENG'S STATUS.
ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

E1

PTQ4548

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO3239

PAGE 01 STATE 087444 150207Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	A-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	IM-01
	TEDE-00	IO-00	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	NEA-01	DCP-01
	OIC-02	OIG-04	SA-01	SAS-00	/016R		

087444
SOURCE: KODAKB.015020
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:KHFRITZ -- 05/14/98 V1028
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES
----------3E1FA2 150211Z /38
O P 150206Z MAY 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL PUSAN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION USVIENNA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 087444 150207Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 18 SEP 2006 200504292

SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS// PRIORITY
CHJUSMAO SEOUL KS PRIORITY
SACINCUNC KS PRIORITY
USCINCUNC SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
CINCPACELT HI PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
CIA WASHDC 0000
DIRNSA MD
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC 0000

UNCLAS STATE 087444

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: MAY 14, 1998 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS -- ALSO FOR USIS
SEODEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINOPAC FOR FPA TEARE
USVIENNA FOR UNVIE
ROME FOR STORELLA
BEIJING PASS CHENGDU

1. INDEX

-- INDONESIA: TRAVEL WARNING PAPAS 2 - 3
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 087444 150207Z
-- INDONESIA: SECURITY SITUATION PARAS 4 - 5
-- PHILIPPINES -- ELECTION CHEATING? PAPAS 6 - 7
-- NORTH KOREA -- DMZ PAPAS 6 AND 8
-- INDONESIA: U.S CITIZENS LEAVING PAPAS 6 AND 9
-- INDONESIA: TRAVEL WARNING/AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE PAPAS 10 AND 11
-- INDONESIA: TRAVEL WARNING PARAS 12 - 13
-- INDONESIA -- EMBASSY JAKARTA ORDERED DEPARTURE

DIRECTIVE PAPAS 14 - 15

2. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED ON 5/14/98 BY THE OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN.

3. INDONESIA: TRAVEL WARNING

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WARNS ALL U.S. CITIZENS TO DEFER TRAVEL TO INDONESIA. SERIOUS RIOTING, LOOTING, AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY HAVE OCCURRED IN VARIOUS CITIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. WIDESPREAD PROTESTS HAVE INCREASINGLY BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY VIOLENT CONFRONTATIONS WITH SECURITY FORCES. LIVE AMMUNITION HAS BEEN FIRED AT PROTESTERS, AND SEVERAL DEATHS HAVE OCCURRED.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS ORDERED THE DEPARTURE OF ALL DEPENDENTS OF U.S. EMBASSY JAKARTA AND U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL SURABAYA EMPLOYEES, AS WELL AS EMPLOYEES IN NON-EMERGENCY POSITIONS IN JAKARTA AND SURABAYA.

AMERICAN CITIZENS CURRENTLY IN JAKARTA AND SURABAYA

UNCLASSIFIED

SHOULD DEPART THE COUNTRY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AMERICAN CITIZENS IN OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA MAY ALSO WISH TO CONSIDER DEPARTURE AT THIS TIME. IN THE MEANTIME, AMERICAN CITIZENS SHOULD AVOID LARGE CROWDS AND DEMONSTRATIONS.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, AMERICANS IN INDONESIA SHOULD CONTACT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN JAKARTA (TEL. 011-62-21-344-2211), THE U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL IN SURABAYA (TEL. 011-62-31-568-2287), OR THE U.S. CONSULAR AGENCY IN BALI (TEL. 011-62-361-233-605)

UPDATED INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY IN JAKARTA OR THROUGH THE U.S. EMBASSY'S HOME PAGE AT HTTP: //WWW.USEMBASSYJAKARTA.ORG.

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON TRAVEL TO INDONESIA,

CONSULT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S LATEST CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEET. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TRAVEL INFORMATION AND PUBLICATIONS ARE AVAILABLE AT INTERNET ADDRESS HTTP://TRAVEL.STATE.GOV. U.S. TRAVELERS MAY HEAR RECORDED INFORMATION BY CALLING THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. AT (202) 647-5225 FROM A TOUCH-TONE PHONE, OR MAY RECEIVE INFORMATION BY AUTOMATED FAX BY DIALING (202) 647-3000.

NO. 98-012

THIS TRAVEL WARNING SUPERSEDES THE TRAVEL WARNING FOR INDONESIA ISSUED MAY 13, 1998.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

4. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED ON 5/14/98 AND USED BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE DAILY BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THIS GUIDANCE FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

5. INDONESIA: SECURITY SITUATION

CONTEXT: SERIOUS RIOTING, LOOTING, AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY HAVE OCCURRED IN VARIOUS CITIES THROUGHOUT INDONESIA. WIDESPREAD STUDENT PROTESTS HAVE INCREASINGLY BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY VIOLENT CONFRONTATIONS WITH SECURITY FORCES. LIVE AMMUNITION HAS BEEN FIRED AT PROTESTERS, AND SEVERAL DEATHS HAVE OCCURRED. THE RISK OF FURTHER INCIDENTS REMAINS. SO FAR THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF FOREIGNERS BEING TARGETED BY GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE VIOLENCE AND THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF NON-INDONESIAN CASUALTIES.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON THE SITUATION, RIOTING, DEATHS, ETC.

A: WIDESPREAD LOOTING AND BURNING OF SHOPS AND MAJOR MARKETS SPREAD TO ALL AREAS OF JAKARTA TODAY. WE HAVE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF SINO-INDONESIAN SHOPS AND HOMES BEING TARGETED BY LOOTERS AND SINO-INDONESIANS BEING KILLED.

-- STUDENTS ARE GATHERED ON THE CAMPUSES OF UNIVERSITIES THROUGHOUT JAKARTA. HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS, OFFICE WORKERS, AND OTHER RESIDENTS HAVE JOINED IN DEMONSTRATIONS NEAR THE CAMPUSES. THE

STUDENTS THEMSELVES DO NOT APPEAR TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RIOTING AND LOOTING THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

-- WE HAVE NO REPORTS OF AMERICANS BEING TARGETED. THE AIRPORT REMAINS OPEN, BUT ACCESS TO AIRPORT REMAINS PROBLEMATIC AND HAS COMPLICATED THE AIRPORT'S NORMAL FUNCTIONS.

Q: WHAT DO WE THINK OF RUMORS THAT THE MILITARY MIGHT BE BEHIND UNREST IN AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE SOEHARTO OUT?

A: WE HAVE NO INDICATION THAT THE MILITARY IS BEHIND THE UNREST. THE U.S. DEPLORES THE KILLINGS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS. WE STRONGLY URGE THE SECURITY FORCES TO SHOW RESTRAINT IN MAINTAINING ORDER AND REFRAIN FROM USING LETHAL FORCE.

-- WHILE WE SUPPORT CALLS FOR POLITICAL REFORM, WE BELIEVE DIALOGUE IS THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS.

Q: WHAT IS OUR REACTION TO SOEHARTO'S REPORTED STATEMENT THAT HE MIGHT BE WILLING TO STEP DOWN? DO WE BELIEVE HIS RULE IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO INDONESIA'S RECOVERY?

A: WE HAVE SEEN HIS REMARKS AND SUBSEQUENT COMMENTS BY FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS. IT IS UP TO INDONESIA'S PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR POLITICAL LEADERS AND SHAPE THEIR OWN FUTURE. WE BELIEVE THAT A RESOLUTION TO THIS CRISIS WILL REQUIRE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS CITIZENS ON POLITICAL

REFORM.

Q: IT IS RUMORED THAT MARTIAL LAW MAY BE IMPOSED. WOULD THE U.S. SUPPORT THIS?

A: WE CALL ON ALL PARTIES TN INDONESIA TO REMAIN CALM, REFRAIN FROM VIOLENCE AND COOPERATE IN RESTORING CIVIL PEACE. I DON'T WANT TO SPECULATE ABOUT STEPS THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA MIGHT TAKE, BUT WE WISH TO SEE THE EXERCISE OF RESTRAINT.

Q: WHAT CAN WE SAY ABOUT ADMIRAL PRUEHER'S UPCOMING VISIT?

A: IN LIGHT OF THE ONGOING UNREST AND SECURITY SITUATION IN JAKARTA, ADMIRAL PRUEHER HAS POSTPONED PLANS TO VISIT JAKARTA.

Q: WHAT ABOUT ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH'S REPORTED COMMENT THAT NEITHER THE U.S. OR THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA CAN PROTECT AMERICANS IN INDONESIA. WHAT ARE YOU DOING? WILL YOU EVACUATE AMERICANS?

A: THE U.S. HAS ADVISED ALL AMERICANS TO DEFER UNNECESSARY TRAVEL TO INDONESIA. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS ALSO APPROVED THE AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE FROM INDONESIA OF ALL FAMILY MEMBERS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

EMPLOYEES AND U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES THEMSELVES ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION CLOSELY AND WILL TAKE ALL PRUDENT AND NECESSARY STEPS TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS.

6. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 5/14/98 AND NOT USED BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE DAILY BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THESE GUIDANCES FOR USE ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

7. PHILIPPINES -- ELECTION CHEATING?

CONTEXT: THE VOTE COUNT IN THE MAY 11 PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS IS PROCEEDING SLOWLY, AS IS GENERALLY THE CASE. MOST TABULATION IS DONE BY HAND. A WIDE RANGE OF INDEPENDENT ELECTION OBSERVERS ARE MONITORING THE COUNT. NONE OF THE CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT HAS CHARGED WIDESPREAD FRAUD. ON MAY 14, ONE CANDIDATE CONCEDED DEFEAT, STATING THAT VICE-PRESIDENT ESTRADA HAD WON.

Q: ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT A SLOW VOTE COUNT COULD RESULT IN CHEATING THAT MIGHT ROB VICE-PRESIDENT - ESTRADA OF VICTORY IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

A: VOTE-COUNTING IS DONE LARGELY BY HAND IN THE PHILIPPINES AND IS THEREFORE NORMALLY A SLOW PROCESS. THE COUNTING IS BEING SUPERVISED BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND BEING MONITORED BY A WIDE RANGE OF INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESS. WE HAVE NO ASSESSMENT TO OFFER AT THIS TIME.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 09 STATE 087444 150207Z

8. NORTH KOREA -- DMZ

CONTEXT: THE MAY 13 NEW YORK TIMES STATES THAT NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A DPRK- ROK- U.S. PEACEKEEPING FORCE ON THE DMZ. THE ARTICLE IS BASED ON A CONVERSATION BETWEEN DPRK FOREIGN MINISTER KIM YONG NAM AND SELIG HARRISON OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND.

Q: DOES THE U.S. SUPPORT THE IDEA OF A DPRK- ROK- U.S. PEACEKEEPING FORCE ON THE DMZ? HAS IT PROPOSED SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT?

A: WE HAVE NOT SUGGESTED, NOR HAVE WE RECEIVED, SUCH A PROPOSAL. WE ARE NOW INVOLVED IN FOUR PARTY TALKS AIMED AT REPLACING THE PRESENT ARMISTICE WITH A PERMANENT PEACE. UNTIL A PERMANENT PEACE ARRANGEMENT IS IN PLACE, WE BELIEVE THE ARMISTICE SHOULD BE SCRUPULOUSLY RESPECTED.

9. INDONESIA: U.S. CITIZENS LEAVING

Q: CAN U.S. CITIZENS GET FLIGHTS OUT OF INDONESIA AS YOU ARE ADVISING THEM TO DO?

A: WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE AIRPORT IN JAKARTA REMAINS IN OPERATION AND COMMERCIAL FLIGHT TRAFFIC IS NORMAL. HOWEVER, WE ALSO~UNDERSTAND THAT THE MAIN AIRPORT TOLL ROAD HAS, FROM TIME TO TIME DURING THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS, BEEN BLOCKED BY DEMONSTRATIONS. THIS HAS IMPEDED ACCESS BY PASSENGERS AS WELL AS

AIRPORT PERSONNEL AND PLANE CREWS.

-- TELEPHONES IN INDONESIA ARE ALSO OPERATING NORMALLY.

Q: HOW MANY AMERICANS ARE THERE IN INDONESIA? HOW MANY DO YOU EXPECT TO TRY TO LEAVE?

A: THE DEPARTMENT ESTIMATES 11,000 U.S. CITIZENS IN INDONESIA, WITH SOME 4,800 IN JAKARTA. WE DO NOT EXPECT THAT ALL WILL TRY TO DEPART. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME HAVE FAMILIES IN INDONESIA, OTHERS ARE DUAL CITIZENS WHO LIVE IN THE COUNTRY.

Q: WILL YOU BE ARRANGING AIR CHARTER FLIGHTS TO TAKE AMERICANS OUT OF INDONESIA? WHERE WILL THEY GO?

A: COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS CONTINUE TO OPERATE FROM THE AIRPORTS IN INDONESIA, INCLUDING THE ONE IN JAKARTA. HOWEVER, WE RECOGNIZE THAT ROADS TO THE AIRPORT HAVE BEEN INTERMITTENTLY BLOCKED. WE CONTINUE TO MONITOR

THE SITUATION VERY CLOSELY AND ARE PREPARED TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS AS NECESSARY.

-- WE EXPECT MOST FLIGHTS FROM JAKARTA WILL GO TO SINGAPORE, WHERE THE U.S. EMBASSY IS WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SINGAPORE TO ASSURE THAT ADEQUATE TRANSIT ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE.

-- U.S. CITIZENS TRAVELING OR LIVING IN INDONESIA ARE ADVISED TO REMAIN IN COMMUNICATION WITH THE EMBASSY IN

JAKARTA, THE CONSULATE GENERAL IN SURABAYA OR THE CONSULAR AGENCY IN BALI FOR CURRENT INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION.

Q: TODAY YOU ORDERED THE DEPARTURE OF DEPENDENTS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL AND CERTAIN U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL. YESTERDAY YOU AUTHORIZED THE DEPARTURE OF THE DEPENDENTS. WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE? IS THIS NOW AN EVACUATION?

A: NO. BOTH "ORDERED DEPARTURE" AND "AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE" ARE TYPES OF TRAVEL UNDER STATE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS. UNDER "AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE," FAMILY MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES TN NON-EMERGENCY POSITIONS EXERCISE THE OPTION OF VOLUNTARILY DEPARTING. UNDER "ORDERED DEPARTURE," THE AMBASSADOR DETERMINES WHICH EMPLOYEES ARE ORDERED TO DEPART.

10. THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE WAS CLEARED LATE ON 5/13/98 IN SUPPORT OF THE 5/13/98 TRAVEL WARNING FOR INDONESIA WHICH HAS LARGELY BEEN SUPERSEDED BY THE 5/14 ORDERLY DEPARTURE DIRECTIVE, SEE PARA 3 ABOVE.

11. INDONESIA: TRAVEL WARNING/AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE

CONTEXT: SERIOUS RIOTING, LOOTING, AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY HAVE OCCURRED IN VARIOUS CITIES THROUGHOUT INDONESIA. WIDESPREAD STUDENT PROTESTS HAVE INCREASINGLY BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY VIOLENT CONFRONTATIONS WITH SECURITY FORCES. LIVE AMMUNITION

HAS BEEN FIRED AT PROTESTERS, AND SEVERAL DEATHS HAVE

OCCURRED. THE RISK OF FURTHER INCIDENTS REMAINS. SO FAR THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF FOREIGNERS BEING TARGETED BY GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE VIOLENCE AND THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF NON-INDONESIAN CASUALTIES.

GIVEN THE PATTERN OF GROWING UNREST, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS ISSUED A TRAVEL WARNING RECOMMENDING THAT U.S. CITIZENS DEFER NON-ESSENTIAL TRAVEL TO INDONESIA. BASED ON EMBASSY JAKARTA'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT HAS APPROVED THE AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE FROM INDONESIA OF FAMILY MEMBERS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES WHO WISH TO DEPART POST WILL BE CONSIDERED FOR AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE ON A CASE-BY-CASE

BASIS. OTHER AMERICAN CITIZENS MAY WISH TO CONSIDER DEPARTURE AS WELL.

Q: WHAT IS THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN INDONESIA? IS IT DETERIORATING?

A: SERIOUS RIOTING, LOOTING, AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY HAVE OCCURRED IN VARIOUS CITIES THROUGHOUT INDONESIA. WIDESPREAD STUDENT PROTESTS HAVE INCREASINGLY BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY VIOLENT CONFRONTATIONS WITH SECURITY FORCES. LIVE AMMUNITION HAS BEEN FIRED AT PROTESTERS, AND RECENTLY SEVERAL DEATHS HAVE OCCURRED. THE RISK OF FURTHER INCIDENTS REMAINS.

Q: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF AMERICANS IN INDONESIA? ARE

AMERICANS BEING TARGETED FOR VIOLENCE?

A: SO FAR THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF AMERICANS OR OTHER FOREIGNERS BEING TARGETED BY GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE VIOLENCE. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY NON-INDONESIAN FATALITIES. NONETHELESS, THE PATTERN OF ESCALATING VIOLENCE SUGGESTS THE NEED FOR AMERICANS TO EXERCISE CAUTION AND TO DEFER UNNECESSARY TRAVEL.

Q: WHAT IS THE POSITION OF THE USG REGARDING THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS OCCURRED?

A: THE U.S. DEPLORES THE KILLINGS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS. WE STRONGLY URGE THE SECURITY FORCES TO SHOW RESTRAINT AND REFRAIN FROM VIOLENCE WHEN FACING PROTESTERS. WE REPEAT OUR CALL FOR STUDENTS AND THE PUBLIC TO KEEP THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS PEACEFUL. ALTHOUGH INDONESIA IS NOW MOVING THROUGH A DIFFICULT PERIOD, VIOLENCE WILL BENEFIT NO ONE.

Q: DOES THE AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE OF MISSION PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS SIGNAL A DISTANCING OF THE USG FROM THE GOL OR REFLECT CONCERN THAT INDONESIAN UNIFORMED SERVICES ARE INCAPABLE OF CONTINUING TO MAINTAIN ORDER?

A: THE ACTION REFLECTS CONCERN ABOUT CONDITIONS IN INDONESIA AND CONCERN ABOUT THE POTENTIAL SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS.

(IF ASKED)

Q: CAN AMERICANS WHO WISH TO LEAVE DO SO?

A: YES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT ALL COMMERCIAL MEANS OF TRANSPORT TO AND FROM INDONESIA REMAIN AVAILABLE AND ACCESSIBLE.

12. THE FOLLOWING TRAVEL WARNING WAS ISSUED ON 5/13/98 AND IS LARGELY SUPERSEDED BY THE ORDERED DEPARTURE DIRECTIVE ISSUED 5/14/98, SEE PARA 3 ABOVE.

13. INDONESIA: TRAVEL WARNING

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECOMMENDS THAT U.S. CITIZENS DEFER NON-ESSENTIAL TRAVEL TO INDONESIA. THE DEPARTMENT HAS APPROVED THE AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE FROM INDONESIA OF FAMILY MEMBERS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AND WILL CONSIDER SIMILAR REQUESTS BY EMPLOYEES ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS IN INDONESIA MAY WISH TO CONSIDER DEPARTURE AS WELL.

SERIOUS RIOTING, LOOTING, AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY HAVE OCCURRED IN VARIOUS CITIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. WIDESPREAD STUDENT PROTESTS HAVE INCREASINGLY BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY VIOLENT CONFRONTATIONS WITH SECURITY FORCES. LIVE AMMUNITION HAS BEEN FIRED AT PROTESTERS, AND SEVERAL DEATHS HAVE OCCURRED.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AMERICAN CITIZENS REMAINING IN INDONESIA SHOULD AVOID LARGE CROWDS AND DEMONSTRATIONS THAT COULD TURN VIOLENT. ALL AMERICANS IN INDONESIA SHOULD REGISTER WITH THE U.S. EMBASSY IN JAKARTA (TEL. 011-62-21-344-2211), THE U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL IN SURABAYA (TEL. 011-62-31-567-2287), OR THE U.S. CONSULAR AGENCY IN BALI (TEL. 011-62-361-233-605)

UPDATED INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY IN JAKARTA OR THROUGH THE U.S. EMBASSY'S HOME PAGE AT HTTP: //WWW.USEMBASSYJAKARTA.ORG.

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON TRAVEL TO INDONESIA, PLEASE CONSULT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S LATEST CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEET.

NO. 98-011

THIS TRAVEL WARNING SUPERSEDES THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT FOR INDONESIA ISSUED MAY 6, 1998.

14. THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS TAKEN BY THE SPOKESMAN DURING THE 5/14/98 DAILY BRIEFING.

15. INDONESIA -- EMBASSY JAKARTA ORDERED DEPARTURE DIRECTIVE

Q: HOW MANY U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ARE CURRENTLY RESIDING IN INDONESIA?

A: APPROXIMATELY 195.

Q: HOW MANY U.S. GOVERNMENT DEPENDENTS ARE CURRENTLY RESIDING IN INDONESIA?

A: APPROXIMATELY 330.

Q: HOW MANY EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS WILL BE LEAVING UNDER THE ORDERED DEPARTURE?

A: WE DO NOT YET HAVE A FIGURE ON THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS WHO WILL BE DEPARTING INDONESIA. THE AMBASSADOR WILL MAKE THE DETERMINATION OF WHAT STAFF WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE ORDERED DEPARTURE DIRECTIVE.

Q: HOW WILL OFFICIAL AMERICANS AFFECTED BY THIS ORDER LEAVE INDONESIA?

A: BY COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT.
ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

E2

PTQ7321

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B5

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7321

PAGE 01 STATE 098753 030041Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001R

098753
SOURCE: KODAKB.003004
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:VEMURRAY/DAROCHMAN -- 06/02/98 7-2543
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:ARABASA
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY
----------44A053 030043Z /38
O 030040Z JUN 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 098753

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/08
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 89

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM PIMBS DIRECTOR HARTWICK

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS HARTWICK. REASON:
1.5 (D)

1. (C) DEPUTIES' COMMITTEE MEETING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 18 SEP 2006 200504292

RUST DEMING AND STU EIZENSTAT ATTENDED FOR STATE. THE TOPIC OF AUTHORIZING THE RETURN OF STAFF TO JAKARTA RECEIVED A LOT OF SUPPORT. STANLEY'S UPCOMING VISIT WAS DISCUSSED AS WAS THE ISSUE OF WHETHER IT WOULD BE BETTER TO POSTPONE REA'S TESTIMONY ON THURSDAY BEFORE BEREUTER'S COMMITTEE UNTIL AFTER HIS MEETINGS IN JAKARTA WERE COMPLETED (THE TESTIMONY IS STILL ON TRACK, AND WE CONTINUE OUR DRAFTING.) EIZENSTAT SAID HE WOULD SQLICIT YOURS AND AMBASSADOR ROY'S OPINIONS ON THE MERITS OF POSTPONING/PROCEEDING WITH ADMIRAL PRUEHER'S VISIT. WE ARE SENDING YOU SEPTEL A RUNDOWN OF THE MEETING.

2 (U) STAFFING AND TRAVEL WARNING

ACTING UNDERSECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT MARY RYAN SIGNED OFF ON THE REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION TO SEND ALL STATE, AID, FCS, AND FAS EMPLOYEES YOU REQUESTED BACK TO POST. A SEPARATE MEMO FOR THE OMADP FOLKS IS IN TRAIN-AND SHOULD BE APPROVED TOMORROW. WE UNDERSTAND THAT AID ISALSO INTERESTED IN HAVING MARK JOHNSON RETURN; TREASURY WILL BE SEEKING PERMISSION FOR ONE OF THEIR ADVISERS TO COME (SE BELOW).

THE SENSE WE GOT FROM TODAY'S DC MEETING IS THAT THE POWERS THAT BE WOULD BE WILLING TO AUTHORIZE TRAVEL FOR ANY INDIVIDUALS YOU RECOMMEND, INCLUDING EARLY RETURN OF DEPENDENTS IF YOU THOUGHT THAT ADVISABLE. WENDY SHERMAN IS ONE ADVOCATE IN THE BUILDING FOR REVIEWING THE ORDERED DEPARTURE AUTHORITY BEFORE THE THIRTY DAY MARK JUNE 12. THE DC ALSO SUGGESTED WE CONSIDER REVISING THE TRAVEL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WARNING TO BETTER REFLECT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND.

3 (U) OTHER POTENTIAL VISITORS

THE LINE OF PEOPLE WHO WANT TO TRAVEL TO JAKARTA IS GROWING EVER LONGER.

-- EAP/INR OFFICE DIRECTOR PAULA CAUSEY AND PDAS ED

ABINGDON SENT A CABLE ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO ASKING COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR A JUNE 18-19 VISIT.

-- INTERIOR WANTS ITS REPRESENTATIVE AT THE INDONESIAN MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND MINES, AL WHITEHOUSE, TO RETURN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO WORK ON TWO PROJECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVE: ADDRESSING COAL SEAM FIRES IN INDONESIA AND PEAT FIRES IN THE REGION.

-- DWIGHT SMITH, FROM TREASURY'S OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, WANTS TO JOIN THE WORLD BANK MISSION (AS DESCRIBED IN THE COPY OF THE LETTER FROM THE MINISTER OF FINANCE THAT YOU FAXED YESTERDAY)

-- AID'S OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES WOULD LIKE TO SEND A TEAM TO SHAPE SOME OF THE PROPOSALS THAT EMERGED FROM ITS APRIL TRIP TO INDONESIA;

-- AND EXIM'S CHARLES LEIK WANTS TO ATTEND CREDITOR MEETINGS IN JAKARTA AROUND JUNE 14.

WE'D APPRECIATE YOUR INITIAL REACTION TO THESE PROPOSALS.

CONFIDENTIAL

B1, B5

B1, B5

[redacted]

5 (U) MEETING WITH DEPT OF ENERGY

PAT AND USAID CONTRACTOR DR. ROBERT JOHNSTON BRIEFED DOE ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBERT GEE AND STAFF TODAY ON ENERGY SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA. THE DISCUSSION CENTERED LARGELY ON THE INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCER PROJECTS AND PAYMENT PROBLEMS WITH PLN. GEE, WHO HAS A BACKGROUND IN ELECTRICITY, IS INTERESTED IN HAVING DOE PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. GEE MAY ALSO TRAVEL TO INDONESIA WHEN THE

SITUATION PERMITS TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND PLANS FOR THE UPCOMING U.S.-INDONESIA BILATERALS.

6 (U) OPIC AND LABOR

LARRY JENSEN CALLED FROM PHOENIX. HE HAD SPOKEN TO OPIC WHILE ON THE ASEAN AMBASSADOR'S TOUR. HE'S SET UP A MEETING FOR USDOC, STATE, OPIC AND THE AFL/CIO ON JUNE 11.

ROBERT SHIFFER TOLD LARRY THAT THE RELEASE OF PAKPAHAN, ANNOUNCEMENT THAT INDONESIA WILL JOIN ILO, AND FREEDOM TO CREATE NEW LABOR UNIONS WILL REMOVE INDONESIA FROM AFL CLO'S "BAD BOY" LIST, THEREBY EASING OPIC'S CONCERNS WHICH SHOULD PERMIT THEM TO BE MORE ACTIVE. WE'LL FIND OUT IF

THEY FEEL THE SAME SHOULD THE CALENERGY CASE NOT SORT ITSELF OUT

7. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
TALBOTT

NNNN

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

S001
R

MAY 8 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS Navy
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES DIA
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Military Activities in Indonesia

Continued contact with the Indonesian military can serve US national security interests and contribute to our efforts to urge ABRI and other Indonesian authorities to exercise restraint. However, in the current situation in Indonesia, careful policy-level review of individual activities is necessary.

Accordingly, effective immediately, and until further notice, all US military activities in Indonesia will require prior approval by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This review process is prudent in view of the unsettled political situation in Indonesia, and the related prospects for violence and instability.

(b)(6) Have we Recd any input? If not check w/ C+D and see who this was sent out to for action. S/F (b)(6)

All currently planned FY98 military exercises, training events, subject matter expert exchanges, service-to-service programs or other DoD activities should be submitted for review, through appropriate channels, to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy by 15 May 98. Submissions should include a detailed explanation of the type of activity, the US and Indonesian units/personnel involved, the location and duration of the activity, and whether the activity is new or recurring. Any other proposed bilateral defense or military activities should be similarly notified as soon as possible. No activity will proceed without the explicit authorization of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

In addition, until further notice, official DoD travel to Indonesia will require prior approval by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

U08346 /98

5005

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

I-98/68106

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Prepared by: (b)(6) ISA/AP, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Next Steps on Indonesia (U) -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

DISCUSSION: ~~(C)~~ Soeharto's exit from the presidency, as surprisingly smooth and peaceful as it was, is merely the opening scene of a protracted and rocky political transition. The prospects for violence and chaos have lessened only for the immediate term; the installment of Habibie, who has no support base and only technical, not genuine, legitimacy, raises the specter of other disturbing scenarios in the coming days, weeks and months. Our overall posture now should be one of support for the transition process, but caution in embracing Habibie, whose role is temporary. As the White House, State and Treasury consider our diplomatic posture and the merits of a near-term economic aid package, we recommend the following approach for DoD:

• *DoD profile/senior-level visits:* Since ABRI's role in Soeharto's exit appears to have been responsible, and given our continued interest in a long-term defense relationship, there is interest in proceeding with high-level DoD visits. We believe such visits are premature--symbolically, practically, and substantively. A cautious posture is warranted by the uncertainty of both Habibie's future and the military's role in the political evolution now underway. USG contact and engagement with the Habibie government should come initially and principally from State, the White House, and Treasury, not DoD. We do not want to signal that the military is or should be in charge of the transition, that we categorically support the armed forces, or that we are back to business as usual. Moreover, the Indonesian defense establishment is completely consumed with internal political and security matters, making the purpose of a senior-level visit even less clear.

In this regard, previously scheduled visits, such as those of Gen Ralston and ADM Prueher, should be canceled. We should defer any consideration of senior DoD visits for at least several weeks--perhaps through June--until we have a clearer assessment of near-term political stability and military dynamics. The one exception

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified~~ by: DASD Kurt M. Campbell
Reason: 1.5d
Declassify on: 27 May 2008

DECLASSIFIED
BY ISA/AP
DATE 21 MAR 2006

would be the possible inclusion of a DoD official as part of an interagency team, an idea that is under consideration. Once the situation stabilizes, senior-level DoD visits should be considered on a case-by-case basis in terms of how they fit in with the overall USG posture as well as how they may position DoD for a long-term defense relationship. Any senior visits should require your approval and that of the Deputies.

• *Resumption of the military relationship:* We do not see a return to business as usual with ABRI for the foreseeable future. A healthy security relationship remains our long-term objective, but we should begin the post-Soeharto period with a blank slate regarding our bilateral military engagement. Even in best case scenarios, ABRI will be preoccupied with internal political, social, and economic problems for some time, preoccupations that may argue for adjustments in our traditional engagement approach. If ABRI is consumed with food distribution, for example, we may want to assist with humanitarian assistance and logistics/spare parts support rather than our more traditional military activities. At a minimum, the JCET controversy and the abuses attributed to Gen Prabowo and associates will require us to reassess our standard forms of engagement.

• *Near-term approach:* Your 8 May memo (attached) requiring case-by-case approval of all US military activities in Indonesia remains in effect. In practice, due to the circumstances associated with the collapse of Soeharto regime and the still unstable environment, there is blanket hold on all activities. We have not sought to determine which, if any, of the activities planned for the remainder of FY98 should proceed. Policy also retains approval authority for all DoD official travel to Indonesia. Meanwhile, activities involving ABRI personnel outside Indonesia--E-IMET courses, attendance at conferences, observation of exercises, etc.--are allowed. We recommend this approach remain in place indefinitely. When the political situation stabilizes sufficiently, we will conduct an internal Policy review of our engagement with ABRI in the context of the military's behavior and principal missions over the coming months as the first step in a process of building an engagement strategy for the post-Soeharto period.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve: placing on hold all senior DoD visits indefinitely, until you and the Deputies concur that a visit would advance USG and DoD interests; and continuing to hold in abeyance all military activities in Indonesia while we monitor ABRI's role in the political transition and consider alternative engagement activities.

SECDEF DECISION:

_____ Approved
_____ Disapproved
_____ Other: _____

Attachment:
As stated

Reviewed by DASD ISA/AP _____ 27 MAY 1998

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5200

PAGE 01 STATE 049515 191841Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DS-00	FBIE-00
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ADS-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	DSCC-00	DRL-04	SAS-00	/008R		

DRAFTED BY: EAP/FO:JIM FOSTER
APPROVED BY EAP/FO:JIM FOSTER
----------294319 191841Z /38
O 181830Z MAR 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 049515

NOFORN FOR A/S ROTH AT 4-PARTY TALKS

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 01638, DTG 191031Z MARC 98, SENT ACTION WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IS BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.
QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001638

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PIMBS HARTWICK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/16
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PINS, ID
SUBJECT: LETTER FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 049515 191841Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 17 MAR 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 11 JUL 2008 200503918

FROM MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL COUNSELOR ED MCWILLIAMS;
REASON 1.5(D)

B1

[redacted] B1

7. (C) MEGAWATI, IN DISCUSSIONS WITH JOURNALISTS, HAS CONTINUED TO REFER TO THE SHOOT-ON-SIGHT ORDERS ISSUED PUBLICLY IN THE WAKE OF JULY 27, 1996 RIOTING AND SUPPORTERS AT HER HEADQUARTERS, WHO, ACCORDING TO THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR, NEARLY 20 MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT.

[redacted] B1

9. (U) MEGAWATI'S LETTER FOLLOWS A PRESS CONFERENCE HLED MARCH 16 IN JAKARTA BY A U.S. REPORTER TO PUBLICIZE HIS ALLEGATIONS REGARDING U.S. JOINT TRAINING PROGRAMS. ATH THE GOI'S REQUEST, THE REPORTER, WHO HAD ENTERED ON A TOURIST VISA, LEFT THE COUNTRY MARCH 18.

B1



OWENS UNQUOTE ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ6162

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTO4042

PAGE 01 STATE 050038 200254Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001R

050038
SOURCE: KODAKA.020032
DRAFTED BY: EAP:JFOSTER:JF -- 03/19/98 76600
APPROVED BY: EAP:JFOSTER
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP
----------29698D 200255Z /38
O 200249Z MAR 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 050038

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/19/08
TAGS: AMGT
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL

FOR ASST SECRETARY ROTH AND PAUL MEYER FROM EAP SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOSTER

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: EAP SPECIAL ASSISTANT JIM FOSTER. REASON: 1.5(B)AND (D).

2. (U) FOLLOWING IS THE EAP DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT FOR MARCH 19:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 19 MAR 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 11 JUL 2008 200503918

EAP/FO - DEBBIE BOYER

3. (U) RSP HAS REQUESTED A ONE-HOUR PREBRIEF FOR THE INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP MEETING ON ENVIRONMENT TO BE HELD ON WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26TH. THE OPTIONS ARE 4:30-5:30 ON MONDAY (FIRST DAY BACK) OR 12:30-1:30 ON WEDNESDAY. ALTHOUGH YOUR SCHEDULE IS OPEN AT 11:30, REA IS UNAVAILABLE AT THAT TIME. SIR BRIAN FALL IS SCHEDULED TO MEET YOU AT 1:30 THAT DAY. CONNY ARVIS NOTED THAT PAPERS WOULD NOT BE READY ON MONDAY.

4. (U) MARL PANGESTU, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JAKARTA, HAS REQUESTED AN APPOINTMENT THROUGH KARL JACKSON'S OFFICE. SHE IS IN WASHINGTON MARCH 19 THROUGH MARCH 23. I'VE REFERRED THIS REQUEST TO REA. PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU WOULD PREFER TO MEET WITH MS. PANGESTU INSTEAD.

EAP/CM - JAMES KEITH, ACTING



B1

EAP/PIMBS - DOUG HARTWICK

6. (C) INDONESIA: CJET MILITARY TRAINING. (SEE COMPANION - RSP PIECE ON TUESDAY' S TESTIMONY). DOD HAS NOT PUT ITS BRIEFING TOGETHER FOR THE HILL ON THE CJET MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM FOR INDONESIA. MONDAY APPEARS TO BE THE MOST LIKELY DATE FOR A DOD/STATE BRIEFING OF CONGRESSIONAL STAFF. WE HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE DOD PRESS GUIDANCE AND A BIT MORE BACKGROUND ON THE PROGRAM, WHICH WILL BE FAXED TO YOU. IN THE MEANTIME, MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI HAS WRITTEN A LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ASKING FOR CLARIFICATION ABOUT THESE JOINT EXERCISES. [redacted] B1

[redacted] MEGAWATI HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF IMET AND OUR TESTIMONY CAN RESPOND TO SOME OF HER CONCERNS.

7. (SBU) INDONESIAN CORPORATE DEBT -- CHASE BRIEFING ON WORK OF STEERING COMMITTEE. [redacted] B6

[redacted] CAME TO THE DEPARTMENT WITH CONFIDENTIAL

OTHER CHASE OFFICIALS TO BRIEF EAP, EB AND S/P ON THE WORK OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE, IN WHICH HE REPRESENTS CHASE. (THE OTHER U.S. BANKS IN THE SC ARE CITIBANK AND BANKAMERICA; THERE ARE ELEVEN ASIAN AND EUROPEAN BANKS REPRESENTED). THE SC HAS BEEN MEETING WITH AN INDONESIAN CONTACT COMMITTEE OF DEBTORS, CHAIRED BY ANTHONY SALIM--WHICH IN TURN REPORTS TO A SENIOR COMMITTEE HEADED BY RADIUS PRAWIRO--IN AN EFFORT TO WORK OUT $31 BILLION IN CORPORATE OFFSHORE DEBT.

8. (SBU) [redacted] IDENTIFIED SIX ISSUES THE COMMITTEE WAS STRUGGLING TO RESOLVE BEFORE DEBT RESCHEDULING COULD BE NEGOTIATED: (1) TRANSPARENCY: THE SC WANTS TO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO SEND INTERNATIONAL AUDITORS TO EXAMINE THE BOOKS OF INDONESIAN DEBTOR COMPANIES THAT MISS PAYMENTS; (2) CAPITAL FLIGHT: THIS IS NOT ILLEGAL PER SE, BUT THE SC IS CONCERNED ABOUT FUNDS TAKEN ILLEGALLY OUT OF COMPANIES TO B6

WHOM THEY ARE LENDING; (3) "CAN PAY/MUST PAY" PRINCIPLE: [redacted] SAID THAT MANY COMPANIES ARE NOT EVEN PAYING B6
INTEREST; THEY HAVE DECIDED TO TEST THE CASE OF THREE COMPANIES, WHICH THEY PLAN TO BRING TO PRAWIRO; (4) LEGAL CHANGES: THE SC WOULD LIKE TO SEE A EAST-TRACK BANKRUPTCY COURT; [redacted] SAID INDONESIA ALREADY HAS IN THE BOOKS A B6
GOOD, WORKABLE DUTCH BANKRUPTCY LAW, BUT THE INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM IS NOT EQUIPPED TO APPLY IT; (5) LOCAL BANKING SECTOR REFORM; (6) BURDENSHARING: FOREIGN CREDITORS ARE CONCERNED THAT DOMESTIC CREDITORS WOULD BE PAID FIRST, WITH THE INTERNATIONAL LENDERS LEFT HOLDING THE BAG. [redacted] SAID B6
A LAW PERMITTING DEBT/EQUITY SWAPS IS NEEDED.

9. (SBU) REGARDING A TRADE FINANCING FACILITY, [redacted] SAID B6
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 050038 200254Z
THE IME HAS INFORMALLY APPROACHED THE SC ON THIS ISSUE. THE INDONESIANS MAY BE ABLE TO DRAW $900 MILLION FROM JAPANESE LINES OF CREDIT TO COLLATERALIZE THE FACILITY; INTERNATIONAL BANKS WOULD PROMISE TO CONFIRM STATE-GUARANTEED LETTERS OF CREDIT, THOUGH DETAILS STILL NEED TO BE WORKED OUT. HE THOUGHT THAT AT THE END OF 60 DAYS MORE POSITIVE MOVEMENT MIGHT BE SEEN. ASKED ABOUT THE TIMETABLE FOR THE SC'S WORK, [redacted] REPLIED THAT IT IS BEING WORKED B6
OUT. HE AGREED THAT WHILE WORK HAS BEEN MOVING FORWARD, PROGRESS HAS BEEN SLOW.

EAP/RSP - PAM SLUTZ

10. (SBU) INDONESIA HEARING -- TREASURY AND OSD WANT IN. WE WERE CONTACTED BY GEITHNER'S OFFICE TODAY ASKING IF WE WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO U/S LIPTON JOINING REA ON TUESDAY

BEFORE SEN. THOMAS' SUBCOMMITTEE. IT APPEARS THAT THE IDEA OF LIPTON PARTICIPATING IS SIMPLY A TRIAL BALLOON AT THIS POINT. NEITHER LIPTON NOR RUBEN HAVE BEEN ASKED. LIPTON IS EN ROUTE BACK, SO IT IS NOT CLEAR WHEN HE WILL BE ASKED. EVEN THOUGH THEY RAISED THE ISSUE, GEITHNER'S STAFFER HAD TWO CONCERNS ABOUT TREASURY PARTICIPATION:

1. WOULD HAVING LIPTON TESTIFY WILL ATTRACT MORE ATTENTION TO HIS MISSION THAN WE WANT;

2. IF NOT LIPTON, WOULD IT MAKE SENSE FOR ZELIKOW TO TESTIFY WITH REA?

(SBU) WE ARE INCLINED TO WELCOME TREASURY PARTICIPATION, THOUGH GEITHNER MIGHT BE A MORE EFFECTIVE SPOKESMAN THAN

ZELIKOW.

(SBU) LATER, KURT CAMPBELL TOLD REA THAT HE THOUGHT HE MIGHT BE TESTIFYING WITH HER ON TUESDAY. AGAIN, WE WOULD WELCOME IT, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE LIKELY ATTENTION TO SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING IN INDONESIA. WE SHOULD ADD, HOWEVER, THAT WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EITHER POSSIBLE ADDITION.

(SBU) ANY REACTION ON EITHER POSSIBILITY? IF YOU WANT TO CALL THEM, GEITHNER'S OFFICE NUMBER IS 202-622-0656, CAMPBELL'S 703-695-4175.
ALBRIGHT

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 JAKART 01264 01 OF 05 051005Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	LAB-04
	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00
	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	RPE-01	/070W

------------------989000 051006Z /38

O 050953Z FEB 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1137
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 01264

CINCPAC FOR FPA

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA/EAPR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PGOV, UN, PO, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01264 01 OF 05 051005Z
SUBJECT: CHARGES AND DEFENSE ARGUMENTS IN THE TRIAL OF FRETILIN LEADER JOSE "XANANA" GUSMAO.

REF. A) JAKARTA 1049 B) JAKARTA 999 C) JAKARTA 167 D) 92 JAKARTA 1293 E) 92 JAKARTA 9842

1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
DATE/CASE ID: 12 MAY 2006 200504545

SUMMARY

2. THE FIRST WEEK OF THE TRIAL OF FRETILIN LEADER JOSE "XANANA" GUSMAO WAS MARKED BY INTENSE SECURITY IN AND AROUND DILI, A LEVEL OF UNPRECEDENTED FOREIGN JOURNALISTIC ACTIVITY, QUESTIONS ABOUT GUSMAO'S DEFENSE COUNSEL, AND UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HIS APPARENT PASSIVITY IN THE FACE OF CHARGES THAT CARRY STIFF PENALTIES, INCLUDING DEATH. THE PROSECUTION HAS PORTRAYED GUSMAO AS A CONFIRMED GUERRILLA LEADER WHO LED A 16-YEAR MILITARY AND POLITICAL RAMPAGE AGAINST INDONESIA. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS HAVE QUESTIONED THE RIGHT OF INDONESIAN COURTS TO TRY GUSMAO AT ALL, ALTHOUGH ONE OF HIS ATTORNEYS TOLD POLOFF THEIR BIGGEST HANDICAP IN DEFENDING GUSMAO MAY BE HIS APPARENT RELUCTANCE TO DEFEND HIMSELF. THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL SO FAR REFLECTS THE GOI'S INTEREST IN AVOIDING MAJOR MISTAKES, ESPECIALLY WHILE THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IS MEETING IN GENEVA. COURT AND PROSECUTION OFFICIALS EXPECT THE TRIAL TO END MARCH 20. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INTENSE SECURITY

3. AS REPORTED REF. A, THE TRIAL OF GUSMAO OPENED TO INTENSE SECURITY AND A MASSIVE MEDIA PRESENCE FEB. 1 IN THE DILI DISTRICT COURT. THE ROAD OUTSIDE THE COURTHOUSE WAS BLOCKED OFF TO TRAFFIC, AND SEVERAL HUNDRED PERSONS GATHERED TO LISTEN TO THE PROCEEDINGS VIA LOUDSPEAKERS INSTALLED FOR THE PURPOSE. HEAVILY REPRESENTED IN THE CROWD OUTSIDE WERE POLICE AND CIVILIANS DEPUTIZED FOR SECURITY PURPOSES. INSIDE THE COURTHOUSE, WHICH COULD BE ENTERED ONLY AFTER TWO IDENTITY CHECKS AND BODY SEARCHES, WERE MORE THAN 100 SPECTATORS. A LARGE PROPORTION OF THESE WERE SOME OF THE MORE THAN 70 INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN JOURNALISTS ESTIMATED TO BE IN DILI FOR THE TRIAL'S OPENING, WHICH BY WEEK'S END INCLUDED A CORRESPONDENT FOR THE AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING COMPANY, A FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW REPORTER AND EIGHT PORTUGUESE JOURNALISTS WHO HAD BEEN GIVEN 10-DAY ENTRY PERMITS (FYI: THE JAKARTA-BASED BBC CORRESPONDENT WAS NOT GRANTED PERMISSION TO COVER

THE TRIAL). ALSO PRESENT WERE MEMBERS OF GUSMAO'S FAMILY, INCLUDING HIS MOTHER, FATHER AND FOUR OF HIS SISTERS, ONE OF WHOM, ARMENDINA, WAS BROUGHT FROM THE PRISON WHERE SHE AND HER HUSBAND ARE BEING HELD ON CHARGES OF AIDING GUSMAO. GUSMAO HAS REFUSED FAMILY VISITS SINCE HIS ARREST NOV. 20, ACCORDING TO A CATHOLIC PRIEST, MARCUS WANANDI, WHO VISITED XANANA JAN. 29, JUST AFTER HIS TRANSFER FROM JAKARTA TO DILI.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01264 01 OF 05 051005Z

4. SECURITY PERSONNEL AND OTHER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES WERE ALSO NUMEROUS INSIDE THE COURTROOM ITSELF. BRIG. GEN THEO SYAFEI, COMMANDER OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI) IN EAST TIMOR, SAT IN THE FRONT ROW ON THE FIRST DAY. AN UNIDENTIFIED ONE-STAR GENERAL SAT IN THE SAME PLACE FEB. 3. FEW, IF ANY, AVERAGE TIMORESE GOT INSIDE TO OBSERVE THE TRIAL, AND ONLY ONE NGO, THE JAKARTA-BASED INSTITUTE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CHAIRED BY HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST H.J.C. PRINCEN, APPEARED TO HAVE SENT AN OBSERVER. THAT OBSERVER, A NATIVE EAST TIMORESE, COMPLAINED TO POLOFF THAT THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 01264 02 OF 05 051006Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	LAB-04
	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00
	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	RPE-01	/070W

----------98901A 051007Z /38

O 050953Z FEB 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1138
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 01264

CINCPAC FOR FPA

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA/EAPR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PGOV, UN, PO, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01264 02 OF 05 051006Z
SUBJECT: CHARGES AND DEFENSE ARGUMENTS IN THE TRIAL OF

HEAVY POLICE PRESENCE AND INTRUSIVE SECURITY CHECKS HAD FRIGHTENED AWAY MOST TIMORESE, A STATEMENT CONFIRMED BY A TIMORESE ACQUAINTANCE OF POLOFF WHO WORKS FOR THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND WATCHED THE PROCEEDINGS FROM OUTSIDE THE COURTHOUSE. THE HEAD OF A USAID-FUNDED NGO IN EAST TIMOR TOLD POLOFF SECURITY IN AND AROUND DILI HAD BEEN TIGHTENED OVER THE TWO WEEKS BEFORE FEB. 1, WITH FREQUENT IDENTITY CHECKS WITHIN THE CITY AND ON THE ROADS LEADING TO IT. THE ABC CORRESPONDENT, WHO WAS PERMITTED TO VISIT BAUCAU 100 KILOMETERS EAST OF DILI WITH A GROUP OF REPORTERS FEB. 2 SAID HIS VEHICLE WAS STOPPED AT SEVEN POINTS ON THE ROUND TRIP. BUT THE [redacted] TOLD POLOFF THAT IN CONTRAST TO THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AFTER GUSMAO'S ARREST, HE KNEW OF NO ARRESTS IN JANUARY. B1

DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS

5. POLOFF ATTENDED SESSIONS FEB. 1 AND 3 WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. THE ONLY OTHER DIPLOMAT PRESENT WAS THE POLITICAL COUNSELOR FROM THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, WHO WAS DUE TO LEAVE DILI FEB. 5. WHILE IN DILI POLOFF MET WITH THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE COURT, HIERONYMOUS GODANG, THE HEAD OF THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE IN EAST TIMOR, SAMEN PURBA, AND THE FOUR LAWYERS WHO MAKE UP HIS DEFENSE TEAM. BEFORE LEAVING EAST TIMOR FEB. 4, POLOFF ALSO DISCUSSED THE TRIAL AND RELATED EVENTS WITH EAST TIMOR

GOV. ABILIO OSARIO SOARES. AFTER POLOFF DESCRIBED TO GODANG THE INTEREST IN THE U.S. IN A FAIR AND OPEN TRIAL, GODANG SAID HE REGARDED GUSMAO AS SOMEONE WITH THE SAME RIGHTS AS HE HIMSELF, AND PROMISED THOSE RIGHTS WOULD BE RESPECTED. HE ALSO SAID HE PERSONALLY RESPECTED GUSMAO, AND WAS PLEASED THAT THE 1963 ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS EXCESSIVELY BROAD, WAS NOT BEING USED. SOARES TOLD POLOFF HE BELIEVED GUSMAO'S TRIAL WAS A GOOD THING BECAUSE IT WOULD SHOW INDONESIA WAS A COUNTRY OF LAWS.

QUESTIONS ABOUT NATIONALITY AND PROFESSION

---

6. THE CHARGES THAT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT AGAINST GUSMAO WERE READ ALOUD FEB. 1 BY THE HEAD OF THE THREE-MAN PROSECUTION TEAM, A BALINESE NAMED I KETUT SWARA. THEY FOLLOWED A QUESTIONING PERIOD BY JUDGE GODANG, A DAYAK FROM WEST KALIMANTAN AND 1966 GRADUATE FROM GAJAH MADA UNIVERSITY WHO LEADS THE THREE-JUDGE PANEL HEARING THE CASE. GODANG ESTABLISHED GUSMAO'S AGE, BIRTHPLACE AND SEX, AND THEN ASKED WHAT HIS NATIONALITY WAS, TO WHICH GUSMAO REPLIED THROUGH ONE OF THE TWO INTERPRETERS ASSIGNED TO HIM, "INDONESIAN." GUSMAO WAS ALSO ASKED WHAT HIS PROFESSION WAS. DESPITE PRESS ACCOUNTS THAT QUOTE GUSMAO AS RESPONDING "GPK" -- GEROMBOLAN PENGACAU KEAMANAN, OR SECURITY DISTURBING GROUP, A TERM USED FOR ALL INSURGENTS IN INDONESIA -- POLOFF WAS UNABLE TO HEAR GUSMAO'S ACTUAL RESPONSE. HIS ATTORNEYS, WHO WERE SITTING MUCH CLOSER, SAID THAT GUSMAO DID NOT ANSWER "GPK," BUT WHEN IT WAS MENTIONED BY GODANG, GUSMAO

CONFIDENTIAL

SIGNALED THAT HE AGREED WITH THE DESCRIPTION.

THE CHARGES
---

7. GUSMAO IS CHARGED UNDER FIVE SECTIONS OF THE INDONESIAN CRIMINAL CODE (KUHP). UNDER SECTION 106, HE IS ACCUSED OF "MAKAR" -- ATTACKING THE GOVERNMENT -- WITH THE INTENTION OF SEPARATING A PART OF THE TERRITORY OF INDONESIA. THE MAXIMUM PENALTY UNDER 106 IS EITHER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	LAB-04
	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00
	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	RPE-01	/070W

----------98902B 051007Z /38

O 050953Z FEB 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1139
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 01264

CINCPAC FOR FPA

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA/EAPR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PGOV, UN, PO, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01264 03 OF 05 051007Z
SUBJECT: CHARGES AND DEFENSE ARGUMENTS IN THE TRIAL OF

20 YEARS OR LIFE IN PRISON. THIS IS THE PRIMANY CHARGE IN THE INDICTMENT, AND IS AMPLIFIED BY ARTICLES 64 AND 55 OF THE KUHP, WHICH APPLY TO REPEATED CRIMES AND CRIMES WHICH ARE CARRIED OUT WITH OTHER PEOPLE, SO THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIME IS SHARED BY ALL. A SUBSIDIARY CHARGE IS VIOLATION OF SECTION 108(2) OF KUHP, WHICH DEALS WITH ARMED REBELLION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, AND ALSO CARRIES A MAXIMUM 20-YEAR OR LIFE SENTENCE. TWO OTHER SUBSIDIARY CHARGES WERE BROUGHT UNDER SECTION 110(1) OF KUHP, WHICH DEALS WITH CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE SECTION 106 OR 108, AND CAN RESULT IN A DOUBLED SENTENCE.

8. THE HEAD OF THE DILI PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, SAMEN PURBA, SAID THE GOVERNMENT WOULD FIRST TRY TO PROVE SECTION 106, AND IF IT FAILED WOULD THEN TRY TO PROVE 108. THE EVIDENCE CITED IN THE INDICTMENT TO SUPPORT THE CHARGES READS LIKE THE HISTORY OF FRETILIN FROM 1976-1992. MORE THAN A DOZEN ATTACKS ON ABRI TROOPS, POLICE POSTS, RESIDENTIAL AREAS AND VILLAGES ARE LISTED, WITH THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, LOST WEAPONS AND HOUSES BURNED DETAILED. IN MOST OF THESE CASES, GUSMAO IS NOT ACCUSED OF LEADING THE ATTACKS, BUT OF LEADING THE ORGANIZATION WHICH ORDERED THEM. ALSO DETAILED ARE VARIOUS FRETILIN MEETINGS DURING THE 1976-1992 PERIOD WHICH SAW GUSMAO GO FROM VICE SECRETARY OF THE VIQUEQUE DISTRICT TO THE HEAD OF FRETILIN. PURBA TOLD POLOFF

THAT THE INCIDENTS CITED BEGIN AFTER JULY 17, 1976, WHEN EAST TIMOR WAS OFFICIALLY INTEGRATED INTO INDONESIA, BUT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 01264 03 OF 05 051007Z
MORE THAN SEVEN MONTHS AFTER THE INDONESIAN INVASION OF EAST TIMOR BEGAN. HE SAID THIS WAS DONE PURPOSELY TO AVOID QUESTIONS OF INDONESIAN AUTHORITY IN EAST TIMOR DURING THE INTERVENING PERIOD. THE LAST INCIDENT NOTED OCCURRED OCT. 5, 1992, IN BAUCAU, WHEN THE INDICTMENT SAYS AN ATTACK LED BY A FRETILIN COMMANDER NAMED DAVID ALEX CAUSED ONE ABRI DEATH AND THE LOSS OF AN M-16. THIS IS APPARENTLY THE SAME INCIDENT IN WHICH TWO TIMORESE WERE KILLED, ONE AFTER BEING BEATEN AT THE MILITARY HOSPITAL (REF D). ALSO AMONG THE LAST INCIDENTS LISTED WERE GUSMAO'S ALLEGED EFFORTS FROM 1988 TO 1991 TO ORGANIZE POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY VARIOUS TIMORESE GROUPS INSIDE INDONESIA AND ABROAD. AMONG THESE GROUPS WERE THE COMITE EXECUTIVO AND RENETIL, GROUPS WHICH FIGURED IN THE 1992 TRIALS OF 13 TIMORESE IN JAKARTA AND DILI ON SUBVERSION AND OTHER CHARGES (REF. E AND PREVIOUS).

FIREARMS CHARGE
---

9. SEPARATE FROM THE ARMED OPPOSITION AND REBELLION CHARGES IS THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF LAW NO. 12 OF 1951 DEALING WITH THE IMPORTATION, MANUFACTURING OR POSSESSION OF FIREARMS WITHOUT PERMISSION. THE MAXIMUM PENALTY PRESCRIBED IN THE LAW IS DEATH, OR LIFE IN PRISON, OR 20 YEARS IN PRISON. ACCORDING TO PURBA, LAW NO. 12 IS OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL CODE ITSELF, BUT IS STILL COVERED BY THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE. THIS IS UNLIKE THE 1963 ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW, WHICH IS ALSO OUTSIDE THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 01264 03 OF 05 051007Z
CRIMINAL CODE AND WHICH CARRIES ITS OWN SPECIAL PROCEDURES. THE EVIDENCE CITED TO SUPPORT THE FIREARMS CHARGES IS THAT A PISTOL AND SUBMACHINE GUN, ALONG WITH AMMUNITION, WERE FOUND IN GUSMAO'S HIDING PLACE WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED IN DILI NOV. 20.

10. AFTER THE INDICTMENT WAS READ DURING THE NEARLY TWO HOUR SESSION FEB. 1, JUDGE GODANG ASKED GUSMAO IF HE UNDERSTOOD THE CHARGES, WHICH HAD BEEN TRANSLATED INTO PORTUGUESE AND GIVEN TO GUSMAO TO READ WHILE THEY WERE BEING READ ALOUD IN INDONESIAN. GUSMAO NODDED YES.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 01264 04 OF 05 051007Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	LAB-04
	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00
	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	RPE-01	/070W

----------98903E 051008Z /38

O 050953Z FEB 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1140
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 01264

CINCPAC FOR FPA

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA/EAPR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PGOV, UN, PO, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

GODANG THEN ASKED IF HE WANTED TO MAKE AN "EKSEPSI," OR REBUTTAL TO THE CHARGES, AND GUSMAO SHOOK HIS HEAD NO. HIS ATTORNEYS, HOWEVER, ASKED FOR FIVE DAYS TO PREPARE THEIR EKSEPSI, AND WERE GRANTED TWO. (NOTE: IN THE INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, THERE IS NO PLEADING BY THE DEFENDANT.) GUSMAO'S LEAD ATTORNEY, SUDJONO, LATER SAID HE WOULD BE ABLE TO PREPARE THE EKSEPSI IN TWO DAYS, AND HAD BEEN WORKING ON IT EVEN BEFORE THE TRIAL BEGAN.

DEFENSE ARGUMENTS
---

11. SUDJONO READ HIS 10-PAGE EKSEPSI FEB. 3 IN A MUCH SHORTER SESSION THAT BEGAN AFTER GUSMAO SPOKE TO A GROUP OF REPORTERS BEFORE ENTERING THE COURTROOM. ACCORDING TO THE ABC CORRESPONDENT, WHO WAS WELL PLACED TO SEE AND HEAR GUSMAO, GUSMAO SAID IN ALMOST PERFECT ENGLISH, "YOU MUST ATTEND THIS PROCESS UNTIL THE END." IN SUDJONO'S EKSEPSI, WHICH HE SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH GUSMAO FEB. 2, SUDJONO ARGUED THAT BEFORE EAST TIMOR BECAME PART OF INDONESIA ON JULY 17, 1976, FRETILIN HAD AT TIMES BEEN IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF PORTIONS OF EAST TIMOR. FRETILIN HAD ALSO MADE IT CLEAR FROM THE TIME OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIAL PERIOD THAT IT WANTED INDEPENDENCE FOR EAST TIMOR. SINCE GUSMAO WAS THE LEADER OF FRETILIN, AND FRETILIN HAD NEVER RECOGNIZED INDONESIAN AUTHORITY OVER EAST TIMOR, INDONESIAN INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE COURT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO JUDGE GUSMAO. THE

PROSECUTION RESPONDED IN A 20-MINUTE SESSION FEB. 5, ACCORDING TO THE AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMAT WHO ATTENDED THE

SESSION, BY RETRACING THE LEGAL STEPS BY WHICH EAST TIMOR WAS INTEGRATED INTO INDONESIA, AND ARGUING THAT INDONESIAN LAW THEREFORE APPLIED.

12. AS TO HOW SUDJONO AND HIS LEGAL TEAM CAME TO BE GUSMAO'S ATTORNEYS, SUDJONO SAID HE WAS INTRODUCED TO GUSMAO BY A POLICE COLONEL IN JAKARTA THE SECOND WEEK OF DECEMBER. AFTER THAT, HE MET WITH GUSMAO THREE MORE TIMES IN JAKARTA. ASKED WHAT LANGUAGE HE SPOKE WITH GUSMAO, SUDJONO SAID HE SPEAKS NO PORTUGUESE AND GUSMAO'S SPEAKS POOR INDONESIAN, SO THEY SPOKE IN ENGLISH. SUDJONO HIMSELF SPEAKS FAIR, BUT FAR FROM PERFECT, ENGLISH, AND ICRC SOURCES HAVE TOLD POLOFF THAT GUSMAO ALSO SPEAKS SOME ENGLISH. SUDJONO DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS SOMEONE FAMILIAR WITH CRIMINAL LAW, AND NOTED THAT HE SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDED AN INDONESIAN ACCUSED OF MURDER IN MALAYSIA IN A HIGH-PROFILE CASE LAST YEAR. SUDJONO ALSO HELPED DEFEND AGAPITO CARDOSO, AN EAST TIMORESE WHO WAS SENTENCED TO 10 MONTHS IN PRISON FOR TAKING PART IN A DEMONSTRATION IN JAKARTA IN NOVEMBER 1991. SUDJONO WAS ACCOMPANIED IN DILI BY TWO ASSISTANTS FROM HIS LAW OFFICE AS WELL AS HIS LEGAL "COUNSELLOR," LOEBBY LOQMAN, A WELL-KNOWN LAW PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA AND EXPERT ON POLITICAL CRIMES. SUDJONO SAID HE IS RECEIVING NO MONEY FOR HIS DEFENSE, EVEN FOR HIS EXPENSES. WHEN ASKED WHY HE WAS TAKING THE TASK ON, HE IMPLIED IT WAS BECAUSE OF THE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED. AS REPORTED EARLIER (REF. C), SOME OF SUDJONO'S LEGAL COLLEAGUES IN JAKARTA SAID HE IS VERY

CLOSE TO THE POLICE. WHILE IN DILI, SUDJONO HAD A SECURITY AGENT ASSIGNED FOR HIS PROTECTION BY THE POLICE.

GUSMAO APPEARS RELUCTANT

---

13. AS FOR THE DEFENSE'S STRATEGY, LOQMAN TOLD POLOFF HE INTENDED TO RAISE QUESTIONS CONCERNING GUSMAO'S NATIONALITY AND PROFESSION. HE SAID FEB. 2 HE REGRETED GUSMAO HAD DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS AN INDONESIAN, BUT ADDED

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 01264 05 OF 05 051008Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	LAB-04
	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00
	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	RPE-01	/070W

------------------989050 051008Z /38

O 050953Z FEB 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1141
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 01264

CINCPAC FOR FPA

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA/EAPR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PGOV, UN, PO, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: CHARGES AND DEFENSE ARGUMENTS IN THE TRIAL OF

THIS WOULD NOT STOP THE LAWYERS FROM ARGUING THAT FRETILIN AND GUSMAO WERE NOT CLEARLY COVERED BY INDONESIA LAW, SINCE EAST TIMOR HISTORICALLY HAD NEVER BEEN PART OF THE TERRITORY CLAIMED BY INDONESIA WHEN IT WON INDEPENDENCE FROM THE NETHERLANDS IN 1949. LOQMAN SAID HE WOULD ALSO QUESTION THE TERM "GPK" AS A DESCRIPTION OF GUSMAO'S PROFESSION, MAINLY BECAUSE IT COMPROMISED THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE GUARANTEED UNDER THE INDONESIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE. LOQMAN SAID THAT ONE OF THE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE DEFENSE TEAM WAS THAT GUSMAO HIMSELF SEEMED TO HAVE SURRENDERED. IF HE WAS RELUCTANT TO DEFEND HIMSELF, LOQMAN SAID THIS WOULD MAKE THE DEFENSE TEAM'S JOB ALL THE HARDER.

14. GODANG SAID THE CURRENT TRIAL SCHEDULE CALLED FOR A RULING ON THE INITIAL DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION ARGUMENTS FEB. 11. WITNESSES WOULD BE CALLED BEGINNING FEB. 15. GODANG SAID THAT ALTHOUGH SOME 30 WITNESSES HAD BEEN LISTED BY THE PROSECUTION, HE EXPECTED A LESSER NUMBER WOULD EVENTUALLY BE CALLED. ON OR ABOUT FEB. 26, GODANG SAID GUSMAO HIMSELF WOULD BE EXAMINED (NOTE: UNDER THE INDONESIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE, THERE IS NO RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION). AFTER THE WITNESSES WERE HEARD, THE DEFENSE PHASE WOULD BEGIN, FOLLOWED BY CLOSING ARGUMENTS IN MID-MARCH AND A VERDICT BY MARCH 20. GODANG SAID HE HOPED TO FINISH THE TRIAL BEFORE THE MUSLIM HOLIDAY OF IDUL FITRI BEGINS MARCH 24. THE HOLIDAY WOULD REQUIRE A BREAK OF AT LEAST A WEEK SO

MUSLIMS CONNECTED WITH THE TRIAL COULD RETURN TO THEIR HOME VILLAGES.

COMMENT
---

15. AS WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF GUSMAO'S CASE SINCE HIS CAPTURE, THE GOI IS TAKING PAINS TO AVOID MISTAKES, A PRUDENT MOVE CONSIDERING THE BEGINNING OF HIS TRIAL COINCIDED WITH THE OPENING OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEETING IN GENEVA. HE HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO

TRIAL LESS THAN 90 DAYS AFTER HIS ARREST, WHICH MUST BE A RECORD FOR A HIGH-PROFILE POLITICAL TRIAL AND IS CERTAINLY WITHIN KUHAP-SPECIFIED LIMITS. HE HAS NOT BEEN CHARGED WITH SUBVERSION, WHICH ATTORNEY GENERAL SINGGIH EXPLAINED AGAIN RECENTLY WAS BECAUSE HE HAD COMMITTED HIS ACTS OPENLY, NOT IN A CLANDESTINE FASHION. THERE IS STILL NO EVIDENCE HE HAS BEEN PHYSICALLY TORTURED, ALTHOUGH EXACTLY WHAT HAS MADE HIM SO COOPERATIVE REMAINS UNKNOWN, AND HIS STATEMENT ABOUT WAITING UNTIL THE END OF THE PROCESS HAS LED TO SPECULATION HE MAY HAVE A SURPRISE PREPARED. THE GOI HAS ALLOWED MORE OPEN ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR BY FOREIGN JOURNALISTS THAN EVER, ESPECIALLY BY THE PORTUGUESE, WHICH IS ONE OF THE GOALS INDONESIA WAS PLEDGED TO ACHIEVE IN THE 1992 UNHRC CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT ON EAST TIMOR. WHILE SOME MAY QUESTION THE PROCESS BY WHICH GUSMAO CAME TO SELECT SUDJONO AS HIS ATTORNEY, OR WONDER WHETHER GUSMAO AND SUDJONO CAN REALLY TALK TO EACH OTHER EFFECTIVELY IN ENGLISH, SUDJONO'S PARTNER LOEBBY LOQMAN

CONFIDENTIAL

IS A REPUTABLE ATTORNEY AND LEGAL SCHOLAR WHO WOULD NOT ALLOW HIMSELF TO BE PART OF A CHARADE. WE THEREFORE SUSPECT GUSMAO'S DEFENSE ATTORNEYS MAY BE MORE INTERESTED IN HIS DEFENSE THAN HE HIMSELF APPEARS TO BE AT THIS STAGE. END COMMENT. BARRY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 JAKART 02172 01 OF 05 020955Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	INR-00	LAB-04	L-03
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02
	PRS-01	P-01	RPCS-01	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00
	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	/069W

----------A1C2D4 020956Z /38

P 021047Z MAR 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1627
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 02172

CINCPAC FOR FPA

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA/EAPR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PGOV, UN, PO, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE AGAINST FRETILIN LEADER JOSE "XANANA" GUSMAO

REF. A) JAKARTA 2007 B) JAKARTA 1512 C) JAKARTA 1264 D) 92 JAKARTA 1293

1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ONE MONTH INTO THE TRIAL OF FRETILIN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
DATE/CASE ID: 12 MAY 2006 200504545

LEADER JOSE "XANANA" GUSMAO, THE GOI HAS DOWNSHIFTED SHARPLY THE PACE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, WITH A VERDICT AND SENTENCE NOW UNLIKELY BEFORE APRIL RATHER THAN THE ORIGINAL TARGET OF MARCH 20. THE CASE CONTINUES TO DRAW SUSTAINED INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION FROM DIPLOMATS, JOURNALISTS AND -- BEGINNING THIS WEEK -- FOREIGN NGOS, WITH THE GOI ACTIVELY FACILITATING ACCESS FOR THEM TO DILI. GUSMAO, FOR REASONS WHICH REMAIN UNEXPLAINED, CONTINUES TO ACTIVELY ASSIST THE PROSECUTION IN BUILDING ITS CASE AGAINST HIM, REPEATEDLY CONFIRMING PROSECUTION TESTIMONY AND TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTIONS OF HIS MEN. SECURITY SURROUNDING THE TRIAL HAS EASED CONSIDERABLY, REFLECTING A LOWER LEVEL OF TENSION IN EAST TIMOR GENERALLY.

3. THE BROAD OUTLINES OF THE GOI'S SEDITION CASE AGAINST GUSMAO HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY CLEAR AFTER 15 PROSECUTION WITNESSES. THEY HAVE PLACED GUSMAO AT THE SCENE OF ARMED ATTACKS AGAINST INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI), CONFIRMED HIS POSITION AS THE OVERALL COMMANDER OF FRETILIN MILITARY OPERATIONS, SHOWED HOW HE BUILT A POLITICAL MACHINE TO PROMOTE AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR,

AND TESTIFIED THAT HE FREQUENTLY CARRIED A PISTOL AND SUBMACHINE GUN LIKE THOSE FOUND AT THE TIME OF HIS CAPTURE. SOME OF THIS TESTIMONY APPEARS FLAWED, COMING EITHER FROM WITNESSES WHO HAVE BEEN SEVERELY MISTREATED WHILE IN CUSTODY OR WHOSE INDONESIAN WAS TOO POOR FOR THEM TO COMPREHEND FULLY THE PROCEEDINGS. NONETHELESS, GUSMAO'S ATTORNEY IS CONVINCED HIS CLIENT WILL BE CONVICTED, AND IS FOCUSSING HIS DEFENSE ON FACTORS THAT COULD LIGHTEN HIS EVENTUAL SENTENCE. END SUMMARY.

MANY FOREIGNERS IN DILI

---

4. POLOFF ATTENDED THE FEB. 25 SESSION OF GUSMAO'S TRIAL DURING A FEB. 19-26 VISIT TO EAST TIMOR. POLOFF ALSO TRAVELLED TO SEVERAL TOWNS OUTSIDE OF DILI BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER AMBASSADOR'S FEB. 21-23 VISIT TO THE PROVINCE (SEPTEL). DURING THIS PERIOD A NUMBER OF OTHER FOREIGN VISITORS WERE IN EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING AUSTRALIAN AND BRITISH REPORTERS, A SWISS VISITOR FROM THE ICRC'S GENEVA HEADQUARTERS, AND DIPLOMATS FROM THE

EC, AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN MISSIONS IN JAKARTA. ONE OF THE JOURNALISTS, LINDSAY MURDOCH OF THE MELBOURNE AGE, EVEN MANAGED TO GET HIS VISA EXTENDED BY A WEEK, AN ALMOST UNHEARD OF FEAT FOR A JOURNALIST WHO ONLY JUST RECENTLY WAS TAKEN OFF THE GOI'S IMMIGRATION BLACKLIST FOR A 1991 STORY HE WROTE ON EAST TIMOR. MOST OF THESE FOREIGNERS, ALMOST ALL OF WHOM MADE ONE OR MORE TRIPS OUTSIDE OF DILI WITH VARYING DEGREES OF DIFFICULTY, WERE PRESENT TO ATTEND GUSMAO'S TRIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02172 01 OF 05 020955Z

ASIA WATCH, ICJ ADMITTED

---

5. A VARIETY OF INTERNATIONAL NGO'S ARE ALSO PLANNING TO ATTEND SESSIONS OF GUSMAO'S TRIAL. AN INDIAN CITIZEN REPRESENTING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS (ICJ), FEDRUN DE VITRE, HAS BEEN ADMITTED TO INDONESIA AND LEFT JAKARTA FEB. 27 FOR DILI, ACCORDING TO A SPOKESMAN FOR THE INDONESIAN LEGAL AID INSTITUTE (LBH). THE SPOKESMAN TOLD POLOFF DE VITRE WAS ORIGINALLY FROM

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 02172 02 OF 05 020955Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	INR-00	LAB-04	L-03
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02
	PRS-01	P-01	RPCS-01	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00
	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	/069W

P 021047Z MAR 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1628
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 02172

CINCPAC FOR FPA

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA/EAPR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PGOV, UN, PO, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE AGAINST FRETILIN LEADER

GOA AND SPOKE PORTUGUESE. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED TO EAST TIMOR BY AN LBH ATTORNEY. POLOFF ALSO MET MARCH 2 FRANCES SEYMOUR OF ASIA WATCH, WHO SAID SHE HAD ARRIVED IN JAKARTA FEB. 28 WITH A VISA ALLOWING HER TO VISIT DILI MARCH 9-14. SEYMOUR SAID SHE HAD BEEN OFFERED MEETINGS WITH FM ALATAS AND JUSTICE MINISTER ISMAIL SALEH DURING HER TIME IN JAKARTA, ALTHOUGH SHE HAD ASKED DEPLU OFFICIALS WHETHER SHE MIGHT BE ALLOWED TO GO TO DILI SOONER. THE POLCOUNS AT THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY TOLD POLOFF MARCH 2 THAT AN AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ICJ, DAVID LUCAS, HAD ALSO ARRIVED IN JAKARTA WITH PERMISSION TO ATTEND THE TRIAL, ALTHOUGH HE WAS TRYING TO GET THE DATES OF HIS STAY IN DILI ALTERED.

6. AS DURING A PREVIOUS VISIT (REF. B), POLOFF HAD NO TROUBLE ATTENDING GUSMAO'S TRIAL FEB. 25, AND FOUND THE LEVEL OF SECURITY IN AND AROUND THE DILI COURTHOUSE ONLY

A FRACTION OF THAT PRESENT WHEN THE TRIAL BEGAN FEB. 1. THE STREET IN FRONT OF THE COURTHOUSE WAS OPEN TO NORMAL TRAFFIC, WITH FEW SPECTATORS EVIDENT OUTSIDE AND SEVERAL EMPTY SEATS INSIDE. CHECKPOINTS WITHIN DILI WERE GONE, AND IN TRIPS TO BAUCAU, AILEU AND ERMERA, RESPECTIVELY EAST, SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST OF DILI, POLOFF ENCOUNTERED ONLY ONE OPERATING CHECKPOINT. PROSECUTION, DEFENSE AND COURT OFFICIALS ALSO REMAINED READILY ACCESSIBLE TO POLOFF.

SLOWER PACE

---

7. HIERONYMOUS GODANG, CHIEF OF THE DILI DISTRICT COURT AND HEAD OF THE THREE-JUDGE PANEL TRYING GUSMAO, TOLD POLOFF FEB. 25 THAT HE HAD DELIBERATELY SLOWED THE PACE OF GUSMAO'S TRIAL TO SPARE HIS OWN HEALTH -- HE SAID HE HAS DIABETES -- AND THAT OF THE LEAD PROSECUTOR, WHO IS A MUSLIM FASTING DURING RAMADAN. WHERE 11 PROSECUTION WITNESSES HAD BEEN HEARD IN THREE SESSIONS THE WEEK OF FEB. 14, ONLY FOUR WERE HEARD IN TWO SESSIONS THE WEEK OF FEB. 21. GUSMAO'S LEAD ATTORNEY, SUDJONO, COMPLAINED BITTERLY TO POLOFF FEB. 24 THAT THE SLOW PACE WAS "UNREASONABLE" AND MADE HIS JOB MORE DIFFICULT, SINCE HE WAS CAMPED OUT WITH TWO ASSISTANTS IN A RENT-FREE GOVERNMENT GUEST HOUSE IN DILI FAR FROM HIS PRACTICE AND OTHER CLIENTS IN JAKARTA. JUDGE GODANG SAID THAT IF GUSMAO HIMSELF HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT THE TRIAL'S PACE, HE WOULD SPEED IT UP. BUT GUSMAO, ACCORDING TO BOTH GODANG AND SUDJONO, DID NOT CARE. A SPOKESMAN FOR THE COURT TOLD THE PRESS FEB. 24 THAT ANOTHER REASON FOR SLOWING THE PACE OF GUSMAO'S TRIAL WAS TO COUNTER IMPRESSIONS THAT THE DETAILED SCHEDULE OUTLINED WHEN IT FIRST BEGAN INDICATED ITS OUTCOME WAS "ENGINEERED." GODANG, WHO HAD EARLIER LAID OUT A TRIAL SCHEDULE THAT INCLUDED A FINAL VERDICT MARCH 20, DECLINED TO PREDICT WHEN THE TRIAL WOULD CONCLUDE UNDER THE MORE RELAXED SCHEDULE. BUT HE SAID IT WAS NOW LIKELY TO STRETCH INTO APRIL.

ATTACKING THE GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02172 02 OF 05 020955Z

8. THE QUESTIONS DIRECTED FROM THE BENCH AND PROSECUTION TO THE 15 PROSECUTION WITNESSES THAT HAVE APPEARED SO FAR MAKES THE SHAPE OF THE GOI'S CASE INCREASINGLY CLEAR. AS NOTED REF. C, GUSMAO IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING SECTION 106 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE WHICH MAKES IT A CRIME TO ATTACK THE GOVERNMENT WITH THE INTENTION OF CAUSING THE SEPARATION OF ALL OR PART OF THE AREA OF INDONESIA, OR CAUSING A PART TO FALL INTO THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY. HE IS ALSO CHARGED WITH VIOLATING SECTION 108 BY LEADING A REBELLION. HE IS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 02172 03 OF 05 020956Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	INR-00	LAB-04	L-03
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02
	PRS-01	P-01	RPCS-01	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00
	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	/069W

----------A1C2F5 020956Z /38

P 021047Z MAR 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1629
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 02172

CINCPAC FOR FPA

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA/EAPR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PGOV, UN, PO, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE AGAINST FRETILIN LEADER

FURTHER CHARGED WITH REPEATEDLY VIOLATING THESE SECTIONS, AND ACTING WITH OTHERS TO DO SO. AND HE IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING EMERGENCY LAW NO. 12 OF 1951 BY POSSESSING A FIREARM WITHOUT PERMISSION. AS SHOWN IN REF. A, TESTIMONY HAS DETAILED FRETILIN ATTACKS ON ABRI AND CIVILIAN TARGETS FROM A 1980 ATTACK ON A DILI TELEVISION STATION TO AN ALLEGED OCT. 5, 1992, ATTACK ON A FOOD STALL IN BAUCAU. IN TESTIMONY FEB. 22, GUSMAO'S NO. 2, JOSE DA COSTA, A.K.A. MAUHUDO, TESTIFIED GUSMAO DIRECTLY ORDERED ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN AND MILITARY TARGETS AS THE LEADER OF FRETILIN, AND IN TESTIMONY FEB. 25, A FRETILIN GO-BETWEEN NAMED LUIS DE OLIVERA SAID HE ACTUALLY SAW GUSMAO LEAD ONE SUCH ATTACK ON ABRI FORCES. IN WHAT HAS BECOME A FAMILIAR PATTERN, GODANG ASKED GUSMAO IF HE HAD ANYTHING TO SAY ABOUT DA COSTA'S AND DE OLIVERA'S TESTIMONY, AND GUSMAO REPLIED ON BOTH OCCASIONS HE AGREED WITH WHAT THEY HAD SAID AND ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEEDS OF HIS TROOPS.

POLITICAL ACTIVITY

---

9. SIMILARLY, VARIOUS WITNESSES HAVE TESTIFIED THAT GUSMAO WORKED OVER THE YEARS TO BUILD A POLITICAL NETWORK DOMESTICALLY AND MAINTAIN CONTACTS ABROAD. DA COSTA, ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, TESTIFIED THAT

GUSMAO OFTEN SENT LETTERS ABROAD ASKING FOR SUPPORT AND AMMUNITION, AND DE OLIVERA TESTIFIED FEB. 25 HE CARRIED
CONFIDENTIAL

LETTERS BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN GUSMAO AND FRETILIN SUPPORTERS ABROAD SUCH AS RAMOS HORTA. DE OLIVERA TESTIFIED THAT GUSMAO FORMED A NEW ORGANIZATION IN 1988 CALLED THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF MAUBERE RESISTANCE (CNRM) WHOSE PURPOSE WAS TO UNITE THE VARIOUS PARTIES AND GROUPS IN EAST TIMOR IN THE QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE. ANOTHER FRETILIN GO-BETWEEN, MARIANO DA SILVA, TESTIFIED FEB. 25 THAT HE CARRIED MESSAGES BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN GUSMAO AND HIS POLITICAL NETWORK IN DILI. DA COSTA ALSO TESTIFIED THAT GUSMAO GAVE THE ORDER TO ORGANIZE THE DEMONSTRATION NOV. 12, 1991, IN DILI THAT PRECEDED THE SHOOTING INCIDENT.

10. FINALLY, THE PROSECUTION HAS ASKED ALMOST ALL THE WITNESSES WHO HAD PERSONAL CONTACT WITH GUSMAO WHETHER THEY HAD SEEN HIM WITH WEAPONS SIMILAR TO THOSE FOUND IN HIS HIDING PLACE IN DILI WHEN APPREHENDED NOV. 20, WHICH THEY DISPLAYED IN COURT. THOSE QUESTIONED INCLUDED THE MAN WHOSE HOUSE GUSMAO WAS HIDING UNDER, WHO SAID GUSMAO HAD THE WEAPONS WHEN HE FIRST CAME TO DILI IN AUGUST 1992, THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY TEAM THAT CAPTURED HIM, WHO SAID THEY FOUND THE WEAPONS IN HIS HIDING PLACE, AND OTHERS WHO HAD SEEN GUSMAO OVER THE YEARS.

DOUBTFUL TESTIMONY

---

11. WHILE IT IS INCREASINGLY OBVIOUS WHAT THE PROSECUTION IS TRYING TO PROVE, THE TESTIMONY IT IS PRESENTING SUFFERS FROM A NUMBER OF IRREGULARITIES. THE
CONFIDENTIAL

MOST EGREGIOUS IS THE FRETILIN "ATTACK" OCT. 5, 1992, ON A FOOD STALL IN BAUCAU THAT LEFT ONE POLICE PRIVATE DEAD. THE OWNER OF THE STALL, ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, TESTIFIED THAT A MAN DRESSED IN COMBAT FATIGUES BURST IN AND FIRED UPON THE PRIVATE SEATED

INSIDE, KILLING HIM AND STEALING HIS M-16. ASKED HOW THE STALL OWNER KNEW THE ATTACKER WAS FRETILIN, THE OWNER REPORTEDLY ANSWERED THAT SHE KNEW FRETILIN ALWAYS STOLE WEAPONS. RELIABLE SOURCES, INCLUDING THE ICRC AND EAST TIMOR-BASED CATHOLIC PRIESTS, HAVE TOLD EMBOFFS THAT THE INCIDENT OCT. 5 INVOLVED A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 02172 04 OF 05 020957Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	INR-00	LAB-04	L-03
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02
	PRS-01	P-01	RPCS-01	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00
	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	/069W

----------A1C306 020957Z /38

P 021047Z MAR 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1630
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 02172

CINCPAC FOR FPA

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA/EAPR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PGOV, UN, PO, ID
CONFIDENTIAL

ABRI MEMBERS WHICH CAUSED ONE TO SHOOT THE OTHER (SEE REF. D AND PREVIOUS). APPARENTLY TO COVER UP THE MURDER, ACCORDING TO THESE SOURCES, TWO TIMORESE WHO WERE KNOWN TO BE VOCAL WERE SOUGHT OUT BY SECURITY FORCES AND KILLED, ONE ON THE SPOT AND THE OTHER, INITIALLY WOUNDED, LATER AT A MILITARY HOSPITAL. TWO OF THE FOREIGN JOURNALISTS IN DILI FOR GUSMAO'S TRIAL TOLD POLOFF THEY HAVE CONFIRMED THIS SECOND ACCOUNT WITH FIVE INDEPENDENT SOURCES.

12. THE VALIDITY OF OTHER TESTIMONY IS ALSO OPEN TO DOUBT. THE OWNER OF THE BAUCAU FOOD STALL, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS REPORTEDLY ASKED TO IDENTIFY GUSMAO IN COURT, EVEN THOUGH SHE HAD ALREADY TESTIFIED SHE ONLY KNEW OF THE MAN THROUGH PRESS ACCOUNTS AND HAD NOT SEEN HIM IN PERSON PRIOR TO HER APPEARANCE IN COURT. THE TWO GO-BETWEENS WHO TESTIFIED FEB. 25 CLEARLY HAD DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING INDONESIAN. THEY WERE ASSISTED BY A COURT APPOINTED INTERPRETER, A POLICE LIEUTENANT WHO FREQUENTLY SEEMED TO HAVE TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING WHAT THE WITNESSES WERE SAYING TO HER. BOTH WITNESSES TOOK A LONG TIME ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT THEIR NATIONALITY, AND THEIR RESPONSES WERE TRANSLATED ONLY WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY. UPON QUESTIONING FROM SUDJONO, IT TURNED OUT DA SILVA WAS ILLITERATE. SUDJONO THEREFORE ASKED HIM IF HIS WRITTEN DEPOSITION, WHICH CONSISTS OF STATEMENTS MADE BEFORE THE TRIAL AND IS SUPPOSED TO BE VERIFIED AND SIGNED BY THOSE EXAMINED, HAD BEEN READ ALOUD BACK TO HIM. AGAIN AFTER MUCH CONFUSED
CONFIDENTIAL

TRANSLATING, DA SILVA SAID IT HAD BEEN READ BACK, BUT HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD MOST OF IT.

WITNESSES MISTREATED

---

13. THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE TESTIMONY SO FAR INVOLVE PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHO HAVE BEEN IN CUSTODY PRIOR TO THE TRIAL. DA COSTA, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS CAPTURED JAN. 23, 1992. UNLIKE GUSMAO, HE HAS YET TO BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL. THE ICRC WAS BRIEFLY ALLOWED TO VISIT HIM IN FEBRUARY, BUT NOT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES THAT CONFORM WITH THE ICRC MOU WITH THE GOI, SINCE THE MEETING WAS NOT PRIVATE AND WAS LIMITED IN LENGTH. FOR THE NEXT 10 MONTHS, ACCORDING TO [redacted] B1
[redacted] THE ICRC FAILED TO GAIN ACCESS TO DA COSTA, DESPITE REPEATED REQUESTS. [redacted] SAID ICRC DELEGATES WERE TOLD DA COSTA WAS SICK, OR DIDN'T WANT TO SEE THEM, OR WASN'T IN DILI. ONLY AFTER THE ICRC PRESIDENT IN GENEVA RAISED THE CASE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS IN EARLY DECEMBER WAS [redacted] FINALLY SHOWN DA COSTA IN DECEMBER 1992. [redacted] SAID THE MEETING WAS SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED, AND AGAIN DID NOT CONFORM TO ICRC RULES SINCE MILITARY PERSONNEL OBSERVED DA COSTA AND THE ICRC PERSONNEL AT A DISTANCE, [redacted] WAS NOT ALLOWED TO SEE THE CELL WHERE DA COSTA WAS BEING HELD, AND THE MEETING WAS EXTREMELY BRIEF. BUT [redacted] SAID DA COSTA WAS CLEARLY IN EXTREMELY POOR CONDITION; PALE, HUNCHED OVER AND TREMBLING. AFTER JUST A FEW MINUTES, HE SAID HE COULD NOT TALK ANY FURTHER TO THE DELEGATES. [redacted] SAID

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OTHER PRISONERS IN THE SAME FACILITY TOLD THEM DA COSTA HAD BEEN HELD IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT FOR MONTHS AND HAD BEEN REGULARLY BEATEN.

MITIGATING FACTORS

---

14. GUSMAO'S ATTORNEY, SUDJONO, TOLD POLOFF FEB. 24 HE IS CERTAIN GUSMAO WILL NOT BE ACQUITTED OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM. SINCE HIS INITIAL ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 02172 05 OF 05 020957Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	INR-00	LAB-04	L-03
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02
	PRS-01	P-01	RPCS-01	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00
	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	/069W

----------A1C322 020957Z /38

P 021047Z MAR 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1631
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 02172

CINCPAC FOR FPA

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA/EAPR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PGOV, UN, PO, ID

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AUTHORITY OF THE COURT TO TRY GUSMAO HAVE FAILED, HE SAID HE IS NOW CONCENTRATING ON FACTORS WHICH MIGHT MITIGATE THE EVENTUAL SENTENCE. AMONG THOSE ARE GUSMAO'S COOPERATION WITH THE PROSECUTION AND HIS GOOD BEHAVIOR IN COURT. (NOTE: SUDJONO SPOKE TO POLOFF THE DAY BEFORE GUSMAO WAS REBUKED BY GODANG FOR WAVING AND BLOWING A KISS TO HIS PARENTS IN THE COURTROOM.) SUDJONO SAID HE ALSO PLANS TO CALL SEVERAL DEFENSE WITNESSES WHOSE TESTIMONY WILL SHOW GUSMAO IS MORE OF A POET THAN A BLOODTHIRSTY REBEL, AND THAT HE FELT HE HAD TO ACT AS HE DID TO DEFEND HIMSELF AND HIS COUNTRY. SUDJONO SAID HE HAS HAD NO TROUBLE GAINING REGULAR ACCESS TO HIS CLIENT, BUT THAT HIS SESSIONS WITH HIM HAVE SHED NO FURTHER LIGHT ON GUSMAO'S MOTIVATION IN COOPERATING WITH THE PROSECUTION. SUDJONO SAID HE EVEN SHOOK GUSMAO'S ARM THE FIRST TIME GUSMAO CONFIRMED THE TESTIMONY OF ONE OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES, ASKING HIM IF HE KNEW WHAT HE WAS DOING. GUSMAO SAID HE DID. SUDJONO SAID GUSMAO FEELS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT HIS MEN DID, AND DOESN'T WANT THEM TO BE PUNISHED FOR HIS ACTS. HE ALSO SAID GUSMAO DOESN'T CARE ABOUT PUNISHMENT. ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE TRIAL OUTCOME HAD ALREADY BEEN DETERMINED, SUDJONO SAID HE DID NOT THINK THAT WAS THE CASE.

COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

15. THE RELATIVE EASE WITH WHICH AN INCREASING NUMBER OF OBSERVERS ARE ARRIVING IN DILI SHOWS THE IMPORTANCE OF GUSMAO'S TRIAL TO THE GOI AS A SHOWCASE TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD. ALLOWING ASIA WATCH AND THE ICJ IN PARTICULAR TO ATTEND THE TRIAL HELPS THE GOI TICK OFF ONE MORE REQUIREMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT ON EAST TIMOR APPROVED AT LAST YEAR'S SESSION OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. AS FOR THE NEW, MORE RELAXED TRIAL SCHEDULE, SOME HAVE SPECULATED IT IS RELATED LESS TO THE HEALTH OF THE JUDGES THAN TO THE MPR GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH BEGAN MARCH 1 AND RUNS THROUGH MARCH 11 WITH THE SELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT, OR TO THE

ONGOING UNHRC SESSION IN GENEVA, AT WHICH EAST TIMOR WILL AGAIN BE DISCUSSED.

16. MORE DIFFICULT IS THE PROBLEM OF DECIDING WHETHER GUSMAO'S TRIAL HAS BEEN FAIR. IT IS CLEAR THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED THUS FAR IS TAINTED, OUTRIGHT FALSE, OR IRRELEVANT. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNS OF PHYSICAL ABUSE, QUESTIONS REMAIN ABOUT WHAT OTHER SORTS OF PRESSURE MIGHT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO GUSMAO BEFORE THE TRIAL BEGAN. BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ESCAPE THE FACT THAT GUSMAO LED AN ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST INDONESIA FOR 16 YEARS, AND WAS UNDOUBTEDLY ARMED -- WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORITY -- WHEN HE WAS CAPTURED. BIT BY BIT, GUSMAO IS ADMITTING AS MUCH BY CONFIRMING THE TESTIMONY AGAINST HIM. UNLESS HE HAS A SURPRISE IN STORE, GUSMAO WILL NO DOUBT CONFIRM ALL THE KEY POINTS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE WHEN HE TAKES THE STAND, PROBABLY IN MID-MARCH. THUS EVEN A TRIAL WITHOUT THE FLAWS NOTED ABOVE MIGHT WELL PRODUCE THE SAME

APPARENTLY INEVITABLE RESULT. UNLIKE THE TIMORESE TRIED IN JAKARTA AND DILI LAST YEAR, GUSMAO IS NOT A PRISONER OF CONSCIENCE BEING UNFAIRLY PUNISHED FOR HIS POLITICAL VIEWS. HE IS BEING TRIED FOR ACTS THAT ALMOST ANY COUNTRY WOULD CONSIDER A CRIME. THIS WILL ALSO HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN MAKING A FINAL JUDGMENT ABOUT THE "FAIRNESS" OF THE PROCEEDINGS. END COMMENT. BARRY

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 02850 01 OF 04 170938Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 /000W
----------A81337 170938Z /38

P 170925Z MAR 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1974
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 02850

DECAPTIONED

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECDEF, WHITE HOUSE, AND USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

MILITARY ADDRESSEES PLEASE TREAT AS SPECAT

WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC AND NEC

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PO, ID
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS FOR EAST TIMOR: A FRESH LOOK

REF: (A) JAKARTA 2365, (B) JAKARTA 2375
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02850 01 OF 04 170938Z
-- (C) STATE 67445

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. IN REF B I PROVIDE MY OWN IMPRESSIONS OF THE SITUAT""N IN EAST TIMOR. WHILE HARDLY NOVEL, THEY ARE THE RESULT OF MY OWN FIRST LOOK AT THE SITUATION. THIS CABLE CONTAINS MY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, WHICH ATTEMPT TO MAKE SENSE OF EAST TIMOR IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR BROADER HUMAN RIGHTS AND STRATEGIC CONCERNS IN INDONESIA. I RECOMMEND A MORE ACTIVIST U.S. POLICY DIRECTED AT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
DATE/CASE ID: 12 MAY 2006 200504545

IMPROVING THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR AND THE REST OF INDONESIA. HOWEVER, I DO NOT RECOMMEND ANY CHANGE IN OUR POSITION OF RECOGNIZING INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY.

U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

3. AS IS EVIDENCED BY OUR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, MANY OF THE PROBLEMS OBSERVED IN EAST TIMOR ARE GENERIC TO THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE, AND OUR POLICIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO REFLECT THIS.

-- WE WANT TO PROMOTE POLITICAL REFORM WHICH WILL LEAD TO A MORE OPEN, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY BASED ON THE RULE OF LAW AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- WE WANT TO SEE A MARKET-BASED ECONOMY WITH AN INCREASED ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND REDUCED CORRUPTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-- WE ALSO WANT TO SEE A CONTINUATION OF THE GOI POLICY OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND RECOGNIZE THAT MORE DEMOCRACY COULD LEAD TO MORE RESPONSIVENESS TO GRASS-ROOTS PRESSURE TO ISLAMICIZE THE COUNTRY.

-- WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, INCLUDING AN END TO TORTURE AND A REVISION OF THE HARSH SUBVERSION LAW.

-- WE WANT TO SEE A REDUCED MILITARY ROLE IN GOVERNMENT, THE ECONOMY, AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND AN END TO REPRESSIVE ACTS BY THE MILITARY.

SPECIFIC GOALS FOR EAST TIMOR

4. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED SOME SPECIFIC STEPS WE WOULD LIKE THE GOI TO TAKE IN EAST TIMOR:

-- TO SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR AND ESTABLISH A COMMAND STRUCTURE SIMILAR TO THAT IN OTHER AREAS OF INDONESIA. ELEMENTS OF THAT DRAWDOWN MAY ALREADY HAVE BEGUN. THIS IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT STEP THE GOI COULD TAKE, IF THEY CARRY THROUGH

WITH IT.

-- TO CONTINUE TO OPEN THE PROVINCE TO JOURNALISTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN GROUPS, AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES.

-- TO DEAL WITH THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF THE DILI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02850 01 OF 04 170938Z
MASSACRE; ACCOUNTING FOR THE MISSING, REDUCING THE SENTENCES OF THE CIVILIAN PROTESTORS, AND PROVIDING CONTINUING ACCESS TO THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED OR DETAINED AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST MISTREATMENT.

-- TO PROVIDE HUMANE TREATMENT TO XANANA GUSMAO AND OTHERS WHO HAVE BEEN DETAINED OR ARRESTED.

5. MORE BROADLY, WE HAVE THOUGHT LONG AND HARD ABOUT THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 02850 02 OF 04 170939Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 /000W
----------A81345 170939Z /38

P 170925Z MAR 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1975
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 02850

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECDEF, WHITE HOUSE, AND USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

MILITARY ADDRESSEES PLEASE TREAT AS SPECAT

WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC AND NEC

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PO, ID
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS FOR EAST TIMOR: A FRESH LOOK

CONCEPT OF ADVOCATING AUTONOMY FOR EAST TIMOR. ON BALANCE WE THINK ADOPTING SUCH A SLOGAN MIGHT DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD, SINCE THE CONCEPT HAS NO REAL MEANING TO INDONESIANS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OR TIMORESE EXCEPT AS A WAY STATION ON THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE. WE PREFER THE IDEA OF RECOGNIZING EAST TIMOR'S "SPECIAL STATUS" WHICH HAS PRECEDENT HERE IN ACEH AND YOGYAKARTA. THE FOLLOWING ARE ELEMENTS OF "SPECIAL STATUS" WHICH WE SHOULD PROMOTE QUIETLY IN OUR BILATERAL DIALOGUE AND THROUGH MULTILATERAL CHANNELS, SUCH AS THE TALKS AND THE UNSYG.

0 "TIMORIZING" THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT. SOME PROGRESS IS BEING MADE IN THIS DIRECTION, BUT MORE CAN BE DONE. IF THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH TRAINED TIMORESE AVAILABLE, CHRISTIANS WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE THAN JAVANESE MUSLIMS.

0 DECENTRALIZING AND DEMILITARIZING THE ECONOMY. CURRENTLY THE GOI POURS MONEY INTO THE PROVINCE, BUT THROUGH THE MILITARY AND THE JAVANESE. THE TIMORESE SHOULD BE MORE INVOLVED IN PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING ON ECONOMIC MATTERS AND PRIVATE BUSINESS OUGHT TO ASSUME A GREATER ECONOMIC ROLE.

0 SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS. GOVERNOR ABILIO HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED HIMSELF IN FAVOR OF ESTABLISHING A PORTUGUESE CULTURAL CENTER. THIS AND RELATED MATTERS, SUCH AS PERMITTING THE TEACHING OF PORTUGUESE AS A SECOND LANGUAGE, MIGHT BE USEFUL AS

POSSIBLE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN THE ONGOING TALKS BETWEEN "NDONESIA AND PORTUGAL.

0 SPECIAL ASSURANCES FOR THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. ALTHOUGH THE CHURCH HAS MADE MORE TIMORESE CONVERTS IN 17 YEARS OF INDONESIAN RULE THAN IN A HALF MILLENNIUM UNDER PORTUGAL,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02850 02 OF 04 170939Z

RELATIONS REMAIN UNEASY BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND MANY MEMBERS OF THE CLERGY. REASSURANCES TO THE CHURCH ABOUT ITS SPECIAL ROLE THERE MIGHT BE USEFUL IN HEALING LONG-STANDING WOUNDS, AND WOULD FOLLOW THE PRECEDENT OF RECOGNIZING THE SPECIAL ROLE OF ISLAM IN ACEH IN THE 1950S FOLLOWING SEPARATIST VIOLENCE THERE.

0 INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE. OPENING UP TIMOR WILL BE REASSURING TO THE TIMORESE AND MAY ACT AS A CONSTRAINT ON THE ARMY. WE NEED TO SPEND MORE TIME THERE, FOR EXAMPLE WITH USAID PROJECTS. AND WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE MORE INVOLVEMENT BY UN HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES AND OTHERS.

TACTICS

6. MAKING PROGRESS ON THIS LENGTHY AGENDA WILL NOT BE EASY. I AM PERSUADED, AS MY PREDECESSORS HAVE BEEN, THAT PUBLIC CONFRONTATION WILL NOT WORK. LINKING U.S. TRADE, AID OR MILITARY SALES TO INDONESIAN CONCESSIONS ON EAST TIMOR OR HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL WILL BE NO MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE IMET CUTOFF LAST YEAR WAS. YET MORE SUBTLE APPROACHES HAVE YIELDED BENEFITS OVER TIME; THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT THAT THERE HAVE BEEN IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR AND IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN GENERAL OVER THE LAST TEN OR TWENTY YEARS, AND THAT MORE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED, PLAYING ON SOEHARTO'S DESIRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND THE GRADUAL OPENING OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SCENE HERE.

INTENSIFIED BILATERAL ACTIVITY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 02850 02 OF 04 170939Z

7. WHILE WE SHOULD AVOID "TIMORCENTRISM" IN OUR POLICY TOWARDS INDONESIA, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF BILATERAL STEPS WE SHOULD TAKE.

-- WE SHOULD PUBLICLY ENUNCIATE THE CLINTON

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 02850 03 OF 04 170939Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 /000W
----------A81348 170939Z /38

P 170925Z MAR 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1976
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 02850

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECDEF, WHITE HOUSE, AND USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

MILITARY ADDRESSEES PLEASE TREAT AS SPECAT

WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC AND NEC

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PO, ID
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS FOR EAST TIMOR: A FRESH LOOK

ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW OF THE TIMOR ISSUE, PERHAPS IN THE CONTEXT OF WIN LORD'S CONFIRMATION HEARINGS. SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD SAY THAT WE CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE THE

INCORPORATION OF EAST TIMOR INTO INDONESIA, BUT WOULD HIGHLIGHT SOME OF THE CONCERNS DESCRIBED ABOVE AND OUR RENEWED HOPE FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION UNDER UN AUSPICES.

-- WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE TIMOR AND HUMAN RIGHTS A CENTRAL PART OF OUR DIALOGUE WITH INDONESIA, CAPITALIZING ON FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS' POSSIBLE VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

-- WE SHOULD PURSUE OUR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION PLAN WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE ELEMENTS OF THE TIMOR PROBLEM AND GRADUALLY WORK TOWARDS A FULL TIME USAID PRESENCE THERE.

-- IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A POSITIVE CONTEXT FOR THESE EFFORTS WE SHOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, E.G., BY SEIZING EVERY OPPORTUNITY FOR CABINET-LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH THE GOI.

THE MULTILATERAL CHANNEL
---

8. GETTING THE U.S. TOO FAR IN FRONT IS LIKELY TO BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. WE KNOW MULTILATERAL EFFORTS ARE OFTEN MORE EFFECTIVE IN ELICITING CHANGE FROM THE GOI THAN WESTERN, BILATERAL APPROACHES, ESPECIALLY WHEN THESE MULTILATERAL EFFORTS ARE CLOAKED IN THE MANTLE OF THE UN. THIS IS EVEN MORE TRUE NOW WITH SOEHARTO AT THE HEAD OF
THIS IS EVEN MORE TRUE NOW WITH SOEHARTO AT THE HEAD OF
THE NAM. SOME MULTILATERAL APPROACHES WE MIGHT PURSUE INCLUDE:

-- INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND EAST TIMOR IN THE DIALOGUE

SOEHARTO WANTS WITH THE G-7, HOWEVER THAT IS WORKED OUT.

-- ENCOURAGING BOUTROS GHALI TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE INDONESIAN/PORTUGUESE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH SEEM MORE

LIKELY THAN EVER TO BREAK DOWN GIVEN THE PORTUGUESE "VICTORY" IN THE UNHCR. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SYG SHOULD GET ENGAGED NOW IN PREPARING A MODEST, BALANCED "CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE" TO BE PRESENTED TO INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL IN ROME. SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE ACTION BY PORTUGAL AS WELL AS INDONESIA. IDEALLY IT WOULD RELATE TO TIMOR, FOR EXAMPLE BY ALLOWING PORTUGESE CULTURAL PRESENTATIONS THERE AND INDONESIAN ONES IN PORTUGAL. BUT EVEN SOMETHING UNRELATED, SUCH AS A SPORTS EXCHANGE, IS BETTER THAN NOTHING.

-- RECOGNIZING THE LEVERAGE PORTUGAL HAS ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON THIS ISSUE, WE SHOULD KEEP THE EC IN THE FOREGROUND AND RESIST PORTUGUESE ATTEMPTS TO MAKE EAST TIMOR AN ISSUE IN U.S.-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS.

- WE SHOULD LOOK FOR WAYS TO ASSOCIATE OURSELVES WITH JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA, AS "CONCERNED FRIENDS" WHO ARE QUIETLY ADVISING THE GOI ABOUT CONSTRUCTIVE WAYS TO DEAL WITH TI"MOR AND HUMAN RIGHTS. A NOD IN THE DIRECTION OF THE STRONGLY HELD INDONESIAN (AND ASIAN) VIEW ON THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD SOUND CONSISTENT WITH ROOSEVELT'S EMPHASIS ON "FREEDOM FROM WANT."

SELF-DETERMINATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

9. I HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO CHANGING OUR POLICY ON SELF-DETERMINATION, OR THREATENING TO DO SO IF THE GOI DOES NOT CLEAN UP ITS ACT. I HAVE CONCLUDED THIS WOULD BE A MISTAKE, BOTH BECAUSE IT WOULD BE TACTICALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND STRATEGICALLY MISTAKEN.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 02850 04 OF 04 170940Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 /000W
----------A8134F 170940Z /38

P 170925Z MAR 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1977
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 02850

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECDEF, WHITE HOUSE, AND USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

MILITARY ADDRESSEES PLEASE TREAT AS SPECAT

WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC AND NEC

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PO, ID
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS FOR EAST TIMOR: A FRESH LOOK

-- THE GOI HAS INVESTED TOO MUCH BLOOD AND FACE IN INTEGRATION, AND WILL NOT CHANGE THEIR POSITION ON SELF-DETERMINATION NOW EVEN IF (AS I DOUBT) WE COULD GET A

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02850 04 OF 04 170940Z
NUMBER OF MAJOR AID DONORS TO JOIN US IN CALLING FOR IT.

-- VOCAL U.S. ADVOCACY FOR SELF-DETERMINATION MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE TIMORESE IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO INTEGRATION WHILE ALSO CAUSING THE INDONESIANS TO CRACK DOWN HARDER. THE NET RESULT MIGHT BE BACKWARDS MOVEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- AS WE HAVE SEEN IN YUGOSLAVIA, SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CAN BE CONTRADICTORY PRINCIPLES. I THINK THEY WOULD BE IN EAST TIMOR TOO, WHERE INDEPENDENCE COULD WELL LEAD TO INTERNECINE BATTLES AND ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION.

OTHER U.S. INTERESTS IN INDONESIA

10. FALLING INTO THE TRAP OF TIMORCENTRISM CAN BE COSTLY IN TERMS OF OUR OTHER INTERESTS HERE. MY LETTER OF INSTRUCTION FROM THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION GIVES PRIDE OF PLACE TO OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN INDONESIA IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA, AND I BELIEVE THAT IS WHERE WE SHOULD PUT OUR EMPHASIS. I CONTINUE TO BE SURPRISED AT HOW MANY BIG U.S. COMPANIES, SUCH AS MOBIL, FREEPORT MCMORAN, AND CHASE MANHATTAN HAVE THEIR MOST PROFITABLE OPERATIONS HERE. AND THERE IS THE PROSPECT OF MANY BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN NEW INVESTMENT, AS WELL AS EXPANDED TRADE, IN THE PERIOD AHEAD. U.S. COMPANIES NOW HAVE A SLIGHT EDGE BASED ON THE LONG U.S./INDONESIAN FRIENDSHIP. IN A COUNTRY WHERE ECONOMIC DECISIONS ARE FREQUENTLY MADE ON POLITICAL GROUNDS, THAT EDGE COULD BE REVERSED TO CUT AGAINST US.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

11. OUR SECURITY INTERESTS HERE ARE LESS VITAL THAN THEY WERE 10 YEARS AGO, BUT WITH OUR NEW EMPHASIS ON ACCESS TO "PLACES, NOT BASES," INDONESIA'S STRATEGIC POSITION AS THE WORLD'S LARGEST MUSLIM COUNTRY, STRADDLING THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS REMAINS OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. AND OUR ALLIES IN NORTHEAST ASIA.

12. WE CAN EFFECTIVELY PROMOTE OUR ECONOMIC, STRATEGIC AND HUMAN RIGHTS INTERESTS SIMULTANEOUSLY, BUT WE NEED TO DO SO WITH CARE, BEARING IN MIND THAT OUR ABILITY TO BE EFFECTIVE WILL DEPEND IN PART ON PURSUING WHAT AMOUNTS TO A MORE VIGOROUS HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY WITHOUT AT THE SAME TIME LEADING THE INDONESIANS TO VIEW THE U.S. AS AN ADVERSARY RATHER THAN A CRITICAL FRIEND.

BARRY

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 15135 01 OF 05 090718Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EB-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	SIL-00
	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	USIE-00	RPE-00
	/063W						

----------83B62F 090719Z /38

R 090712Z DEC 92
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9981
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 15135

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, EAID, ID
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION PLAN

1. WHAT FOLLOWS FOR DEPARTMENT'S INFORMATION IS THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION PLAN FOR JAKARTA. ITEMS FOR WHICH FUNDING HAS NOT YET BEEN DEFINITELY ESTABLISHED ARE MARKED WITH A PLUS (&). THE PLAN HAS FULL COUNTRY TEAM SUPPORT AND HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE AMBASSADOR.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 15135 01 OF 05 090718Z
2. BEGIN TEXT:

I. MISSION HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS

IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING ACTION PLANS DEALING WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF THE MISSION'S HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED KEY AREAS OF EMPHASIS FOR OUR TIME AND RESOURCES. THESE AREAS BASICALLY MEET THREE TESTS: THEY DEAL WITH ISSUES OF CLEAR CONCERN ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
DATE/CASE ID: 27 MAY 2009 200504545

FRONT, THEY ARE AREAS WHERE INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENT IS PROBABLY POSSIBLE, AND FINALLY THEY ARE AREAS WHERE WE EITHER HAD PROGRAMS UNDER WAY OR BELIEVE WE CAN BRING THE APPROPRIATE TALENT AND RESOURCES TOGETHER TO HAVE SOME IMPACT.

THE AREAS OF FOCUS ARE:

EAST TIMOR: BROAD INTERNATIONAL CONCERN AS WELL AS CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON IMET HAS SERVED TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON CONTINUING PROBLEMS. DISCRETE BUT CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE CAN PROBABLY PRODUCE SMALL BUT POSITIVE CHANGES AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE CARE WITH WHICH THE GOI HAS HANDLED XANANA'S CAPTURE. CONTINUED ACTION NEEDED ON QUESTIONS OF ACCESS, UN TALKS, DUE PROCESS, REDUCTION IN PRISON SENTENCES, AND POSSIBLE TROOP REDUCTIONS.
LABOR RIGHTS: THE GSP PETITIONS HAVE SIMILARLY FOCUSSED ATTENTION ON WEAKNESS OF THE OFFICIAL LABOR UNION, THE RESTRICTIVE NATURE OF LABOR LAWS AND REGULATIONS, AND OTHER SHORTCOMINGS. CONTINUED ACTION NEEDED ON PROBLEMS OF UNION FORMATION, CHILD LABOR, OBSERVANCE OF MINIMUM WAGE AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LABOR ISSUES.

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL RIGHTS: THIS INCLUDES EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AND STRENGT"EN ALTERNATIVE CENTERS OF POLICY MAKING AND INFLUENCE, ESPECIALLY PARLIAMENT AND NGOS.

RULE OF LAW: WITH A MORE ACTIVE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE ATTENTION FOCUSSED ON THE JUDICIARY BY THE EAST TIMOR TRIALS, PRESSURE HAS GROWN FOR REFORM. WE CAN HELP BY SUPPORTING THE REFORM-MINDED ELEMENTS WITHIN THE SYSTEM WITH TRAINING OR EXPOSURE TO U.S. SYSTEMS. WE CAN ALSO MAINTAIN PRESSURE FOR THE REPEAL OF THE 1963 ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW AND OTHER LEGISLATION WHICH CIRCUMVENTS INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS.

STRENGTHENED PRESS: WHILE THE PRESS IS HARDLY FREE, IT IS CONSIDERABLY MORE OPEN TODAY THAN IN THE RECENT PAST, AND IS A KEY VEHICLE FOR BROACHING NEW IDEAS AND BUILDING A CONSENSUS FOR CHANGE. JOURNALISTS ARE OFTEN THE MOST OPEN ADVOCATES FOR GREATER OPENNESS AND POLITICAL FREEDOM.

GENERAL: IN ADDITION TO THESE TOPICAL AREAS, WE ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN SUPPORTING GENERAL HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, I.E.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, FREEDOM OF TRAVEL, FREEDOM FROM TORTURE, ETC.

II. ACTION PLAN CHECKLIST

THE FOLLOWING CHECKLIST WILL BE USED DURING PERIODIC MEETINGS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS WORKING GROUP TO ASSESS PROGRESS IN THE AREAS OF CONCERN.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 15135 01 OF 05 090718Z
EAST TIMOR

-- LOOK FOR OCCASIONS TO RAISE ISSUES OF ACCESS BY JOURNALISTS OR HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS, DUE PROCESS AND FAIR PRISON SENTENCES FOR ACCUSED OR CONVICTED TIMORESE, AND POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN THE MILITARY PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR IN MEETINGS WITH RELEVANT OFFICIALS OR GROUPS, INCLUDING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, MINISTERS OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE AND FOREIGN RELATIONS, CHIEF JUSTICE, ABRI LEADERS. EXEC, POL, USIS, DAO, OMADP
-- ATTEND TRIALS OF EAST TIMORESE CHARGED WITH SUBVERSION OR OTHER CRIMES RELATED TO POLITICAL ACTIVITY, ESPECIALLY THE LIKELY TRIAL OF JOSE "XANANA" GUSMAO. POL

-- MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE AID PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR,

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 15135 02 OF 05 090719Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-01 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EB-01 HA-09
H-01 INRE-00 INR-01 IO-19 LAB-04 L-03 ADS-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 PA-01 PRS-01 P-01 SIL-00
SP-00 SR-00 SS-00 STR-17 TRSE-00 USIE-00 RPE-00
/063W

----------83B70D 090727Z /20

R 090712Z DEC 92
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9982
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 15135

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, EAID, ID
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION PLAN

INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR THE SOLE INDIGENOUS NGO, ETADEP, AND THE UPCOMING HEALTH SURVEY. SEEK OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER ASSISTANCE. (&) USAID, POL

LABOR RIGHTS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-- USE APPROPRIATE CALLS ON RELEVANT CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS TO STRESS U.S. INTEREST IN LABOR RIGHTS ISSUES GENERALLY AND OUR SPECIFIC CONCERNS RELATED TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE GSP PETITION, I.E. RIGHT TO ORGANIZE, MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN STRIKES, CHILD LABOR, CONTINUED PROGRESS ON MINIMUM WAGE IMPLEMENTATION. EXEC, LAB

-- INVITE LEADERS FROM THE ENTIRE RANGE OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS IN INDONESIA TO APPROPRIATE EMBASSY FUNCTIONS. EXEC, LAB, CONSULATES

-- MONITOR PROGRESS ON PROGRAMMATIC ACTIVITIES:

LEGAL DEFENCE. USAID GRANT TO AAFLI TO DISSEMINATE PRINTED INFORMATION ON WORKERS RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS, EXTEND LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO WORKERS FIGHTING FOR THEIR RIGHTS AND DOCUMENT CASE HISTORIES ON INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES. USAID FY 91-93

AID DEMOCRACY PROGRAM GRANT TO AAFLI. PROGRAM TO CONSOLIDATE A GROUP OF SPSI FACTORY LEVEL UNITS IN THE CHEMICAL SECTOR IN WEST JAKARTA AREA INTO A REGIONAL FEDERATION. USAID FY 93

IV GRANT. SEND AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN LABOR, EITHER A UNION LEADER OR NGO ACTIVIST, TO THE U.S. ON A REGULAR IV GRANT. THE PROGRAM, TO LAST ABOUT 30 DAYS, WILL BE TAILORED TO THE PARTICULAR NEEDS OF THE INDIVIDUAL. USIS FY 93

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DOL/USAID LABOR STUDIES PROGRAM. THREE GROUPS OF THREE PEOPLE TO THE U.S. FOR PROGRAMS ON WOMEN'S ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE, ROLE OF TRADE UNIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, AND HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES. THIS YEAR, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE FUNDING MUST COME FROM INDIVIDUAL AID MISSIONS VICE CENTRAL FUNDING. USAID FY 93 (&)

DISABILITIES INITIATIVE GRANT. WE HAVE PROPOSED AN INDONESIAN ACTIVIST LAWYER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROGRAM "EMPLOYING AND EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES." USIS FY 93 (&)

DEVELOP AN NGO TRADE UNION TRAINING PROGRAM. USING U.S. TRADE UNION EDUCATION MATERIALS AND AN AMERICAN TRADE UNION EDUCATOR, TRAIN RELEVANT NGOS TO TRAIN FACTORY LEVEL UNION OFFICIALS AND WORKER LEADERS IN THE BASIC SKILLS OF ORGANIZATION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. USAID FUNDING PROPOSED. FY 93 (&)

DEVELOP AN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION USIS INITIATIVE GRANT. AN EXCHANGE PROGRAM TO SEND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS PRACTITIONERS TO THE U.S. TO STUDY INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION WITH FOLLOW-UP BY U.S. SPECIALISTS WHO WILL VISIT INDONESIA. USIS FY 93 (&)

USIS VOLUNTARY VISITOR GRANTS. VV GRANTS FOR THE HEAD OF

THE WOMAN'S PROGRAM AT DEPNAKER AND THE DIRECTOR OF TRADE UNION EDUCATION FOR THE GOI-SPONSORED MANPOWER FOUNDATION. USIS FY 93 (&)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 15135 02 OF 05 090719Z
WOMEN'S WORKPLACE RIGHTS. WITH NGOS. A MORE FOCUSSED EFFORT TO EDUCATE WOMEN WORKING IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR REGARDING THEIR RIGHTS, AND TO SUPPORT THEIR CAPABILITIES AND WILLINGNESS TO RAISE THESE ISSUES EFFECTIVELY. USAID NOTIONALLY FY 94 (&)

POLITICAL RIGHTS

-- MAKE REGULAR CALLS ON THE LEADERS OF THE MPR, DPR, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS TO SHOW OUR INTEREST IN THEM AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THEIR CONSTITUENTS AS WELL AS OUR SUPPORT FOR POLICY MAKING ALTERNATIVES TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. EXEC, POL, CONSULATES

-- INVITE KEY LEGISLATIVE AND NGO LEADERS TO EMBASSY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 15135 03 OF 05 090719Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EB-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	SIL-00
	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	USIE-00	RPE-00
	/063W						

R 090712Z DEC 92
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9983
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 15135

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, EAID, ID
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION PLAN

FUNCTIONS, INCLUDING SMALLER LUNCHEONS FOCUSSED ON SPECIFIC TOPICS, SUCH AS THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE NGO COMMUNITY, PENDING LEGISLATION AT THE DPR, LIKELY OUTCOMES OF THE MARCH MPR GENERAL ASSEMBLY. EXEC, POL, CONSULATES

-- MONITOR PROGRESS ON PROGRAMMATIC ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING:

ASSISTANCE TO PARLIAMENT. USAID FUNDS TO THE ASIA FOUNDA""ON TO DEVELOP A STAFFING CAPABILITY IN THE DPR SIMILAR TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. USAID FY 91-93

NGO DEVELOPMENT. USAID ASSISTANCE TO NGOS TO DEVELOP THEIR INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY AND ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTHEN THE VOICE OF THEIR CONSTITUENTS IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. BESIDES ETADEP IN EAST TIMOR, SUPPORT ALSO GIVEN TO WALHI, THE INDONESIAN ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM, AND AN NGO IN IRIAN JAYA. USAID FY 91-94

PUBLIC OPINION POLLING. USAID GRANT FROM THE ASIA DEMOCRACY PROGRAM TO THE ASIA FOUNDATION TO HELP LP3ES, AN NGO WHICH SPECIALIZES IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEVELOP THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT ACCURATE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS ON SOCIAL-POLITICAL MATTERS. USAID FY 93

PROMOTION OF INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY RIGHTS. THROUGH

LP3ES, USAID SUPPORT TO A COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM TO GIVE THE INFORMAL SECTOR A GREATER VOICE IN DECISION MAKING RELATING TO THEIR LIVING CONDITIONS. USAID FY 91-94

YOUTH INITIATIVE GRANT. USIS PROPOSAL TO SEND 10-12 YOUNG INDONESIANS WHO HAVE DEMONSTRATED STRONG LEADERSHIP QUALITIES IN YOUTH AND STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS ON AN OFFICE OF CITIZEN EXCHANGES PROGRAM ON "PUBLIC OPINION AND REPRESENTATIVE POLITICS." USIS FY 93 (&)

RULE OF LAW

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-- EXPAND CONTACTS IN THE LEGAL FIELD, INCLUDING CONTACTS WITH JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN. ATTEND APPROPRIATE TRIALS TO SIGNAL INTEREST IN THE PROCESS AS WELL AS THE OUTCOME. THIS WOULD INCLUDE SUBVERSION TRIALS OTHER THAN THOSE INVOLVING EAST TIMORESE, SUCH AS TRIALS IN ACEH. EXEC, POL, DAO, CONSULATES

-- SEEK OPPORTUNITIES WITH APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS TO HIGHLIGHT OUR CONCERNS WITH THE 1963 ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW, ESPECIALLY ITS BROAD AND VAGUE WORDING, ITS SEVERE PENALTIES, AND THE FACT THAT THOSE CHARGED UNDER IT ARE NOT COMPLETELY PROTECTED BY THE INDONESIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE. EXEC, POL, CONSULATES

-- ROUTINELY INVITE PEOPLE FROM THE LEGAL COMMUNITY TO APPROPRIATE EMBASSY FUNCTIONS, INCLUDING LEGAL SCHOLARS, JUDGES, PROSECUTORS, DEFENSE ATTORNEYS AND OTHER COURT OFFICIALS. EXEC, POL, DAO, CONSULATES

-- MONITOR PROGRESS ON PROGRAMMATIC ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING:

RULE OF LAW IVS. A JUDGE, A PROSECUTOR, A DEFENSE ATTORNEY, AND A JOURNALIST WHO WRITES ON LEGAL AFFAIRS PROPOSED FOR A 30-DAY RULE OF LAW PROGRAM. USIS FY 92-93

1993 CONFERENCE ON CRIMINOLOGY. SPONSOR A U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PARTICIPANT FOR A FEBRUARY 1993 MEETING TO BE HOSTED BY THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE. USIS

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

LEGAL DRAFTING. EXPLORE WHETHER ASSISTANCE ON LEGAL DRAFTING CAN BE PROVIDED THROUGH A SHORT-TERM ADVISOR EITHER RESIDENT IN THE JUSTICE MINISTRY OR MAKING MULTIPLE TRIPS TO INDONESIA. USAID, USIS (&)

USIA ACADEMIC SPECIALIST. A SENIOR JURIST WILL BE RECRUITED TO COME TO INDONESIA FOR FOUR WEEKS TO CONDUCT WORKSHOPS, LECTURE AND SHARE LEGAL EXPERTISE. THIS PERSON COULD ALSO PARTICIPATE IN THE FEBRUARY 1993 CONFERENCE ON CRIMINOLOGY TO BE HELD IN INDONESIA. USAID HAS AGREED TO FUND PER DIEM AND LOCAL TRANSPORTATION. USIS FY 93

PROMOTION OF GOOD GOVERNANCE. THROUGH THE ASIA FOUNDA""ON, ONGOING USAID PROJECT TO PROVIDE JUDICIAL TRAINING, CURRICULUM AND LAW FACULTY DEVELOPMENT (NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL) AND ASSISTANCE TO THE MINISTRY OF

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EB-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	SIL-00
	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	USIE-00	RPE-00
	/063W						

----------83B64F 090720Z /38

R 090712Z DEC 92
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9984
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN

UNCLASSIFIED

AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 15135

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, EAID, ID
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION PLAN

JUSTICE'S NATIONAL LAW DEVELOPMENT AGENCY. FUNDING ALSO PROVIDED TO ESTABLISH A SMALL LEGAL DATA CENTER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA'S DEPOK CAMPUS TO COMPLETE THE CATALOGING OF CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AND TO COMPLETE THE COMPILING OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LAWS ON MICROFICHE. USAID FY 91-93

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HA JUDGES PROGRAM. IN CONJUNCTION WITH HA, BRING TWO JUDGES TO INDONESIA IN 1993 TO MEET WITH OFFICIALS FROM THE AG'S OFFICE, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND SUPREME COURT, AS WELL AS OTHER LEGAL SCHOLARS WORKING ON THE NEW CRIMINAL CODE. THE JUDGES COULD PROVIDE GUIDANCE/TRAINING TO JUDGES USED BY THE SUPREME COURT FOR IN-SERVICE TRAINING OF SITTING JUDGES, ESPECIALLY DURING A PLANNING JUNE-JULY IN-SERVICE SESSION OF HIGH COURT JUDGES IN BANDUNG. JUDGES FROM HA, FUNDING FROM USAID. FY 93 (&)

ENGLISH TEACHER FOR AG'S OFFICE. SEE WHETHER AN APPROPRIATE USIS FELLOWSHIP EXISTS FOR ASSISTING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE IN UPGRADING ITS TOP PROSECUTORS ENGLISH SO THEY CAN PARTICIPATE IN COURSES DESIGNED TO HELP THEM COMBAT CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA. USIS FY 1993 (&)

USIA INITIATIVE GRANT. FIFTEEN INDONESIANS TO BE SENT TO THE U.S. FOR PARTICIPATION IN A RULE OF LAW/HUMAN RIGHTS EXCHANGES PROJECT. FOLLOWED BY A RETURN VISIT BY AMERICAN LEGAL EXPERTS. WILL ALSO ADDRESS AMERICAN APPROACHES TO CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD. USIS FY 93 (&)

JUDICIAL TRAINING. THROUGH NGOS, POSSIBLY IN COORDINATION WITH ELIPS PROJECT, DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE, MULTIYEAR, SYSTEMATIC JUDICIARY TRAINING ACTIVITY. USAID NOTIONALLY FY 93-96 (&)

INCREASED ACCESS FOR WOMEN TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM. WITH

NGOS. FOCUS ON WOMEN'S LEGAL LITERACY AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW (FAMILY AND COMMERCIAL), ESPECIALLY IN OUTER ISLANDS. ALSO WORK THROUGH COMMUNITY EDUCATION AND POLICY DIALOGUE TO CHANGE THE MORE EGREGIOUSLY DISCRIMINATING LEGISLATION (E.G. WORKING WOMEN WITH NON-WORKING SPOUSES ARE DENIED DEDUCTIONS FOR THEIR INCOME TAX DEBTS.) USAID NOTIONALLY FY 94 (&)

STRENGTHENED PRESS

-- ASSIST U.S. JOURNALISTS IN GAINING ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR. EXEC, POL, USIS

-- INSURE INDEPENDENTLY MINDED FOREIGN AND INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS ARE ROUTINELY INCLUDED IN APPROPRIATE EMBASSY FUNCTIONS. EXEC, POL, USIS, CONSULATES

-- MONITOR PROGRESS IN PROGRAMMATIC AREAS, INCLUDING:

DR. SOETOMO PRESS INSTITUTE. THROUGH THE ASIA FOUNDATION, USAID GRANT TO DEVELOP THE FACULTY AND CURRICULUM OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM AND RAISE QUALITY OF WORKING JOURNALISTS THROUGH A CONTINUING TRAINING PROGRAM AND LIBRARY. USAID FY 91-93

VOA TRAINER. IN COOPERATION WITH THE ASIA FOUNDATION, USIS TO PROVIDE VOA TRAINER FOR AN APPROPRIATE PRESS INSTITUTION TO HELP PROMOTE JOURNALISTIC PROFESSIONALISM. USIS FY 93 (&)

PROVINCIAL PRESS. THROUGH LP3ES, USAID PROGRAM TO DEVELOP CAPABILITY OF 10 REGIONAL NEWSPAPERS AND THE SKILLS OF LOCAL JOURNALISTS. USAID FY 91-93

IV GRANTS TO JOURNALISTS. USIS PLANS TO SEND 8-9 JOURNALISTS TO THE U.S. IN FY 93 FOR PROGRAMS FOCUSSED ON PROBLEMS OF JOURNALISTIC ETHICS AND ACCURACY.

MONTHLY CONSUMER MAGAZINE. USAID ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA'S CONSUMER ORGANIZATION (YLKI) FOR PUBLISHING A MONTHLY CONSUMER MAGAZINE. USAID FY 91-93

IMPROVED CAPACITY OF THE PRESS AND MEDIA. THROUGH NGOS, DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE, MULTIYEAR SYSTEMATIC COMMUNICATIONS AND JOURNALISM ENHANCEMENT ACTIVITY, GOING BEYOND THE EXISTING PRESS INSTITUTES. USAID FY 93-96 (&)

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 15135 05 OF 05 090726Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EB-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	SIL-00
	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	USIE-00	RPE-00
	/063W						

----------83B6EF 090726Z /38

R 090712Z DEC 92
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9985
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 15135

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, EAID, ID
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION PLAN

GENERAL

-- INCLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS IN APPROPRIATE EMBASSY FUNCTIONS. EXEC, POL, CONSULATES

-- PROVIDE HUMAN RIGHTS ORIENTATION BRIEFING TO APPROPRIATE U.S. PERSONNEL ARRIVING IN INDONESIA, ESPECIALLY MILITARY TRAINERS. EXEC, POL, OMADP, USAID, DAO

-- CONDUCT THOROUGH DISCUSSION WITH GOI AND APPROPRIATE THINK TANKS IN PERIOD LEADING UP TO 1993 WORLD HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE IN VIENNA IN JUNE. EXEC, POL

-- MONITOR PROGRESS ON PROGRAMMATIC ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING:

FIFTEEN DEMOCRACY BOOKS. THROUGH A USAID GRANT TO OBOR, A LOCAL DEMOCRACY THINK TANK AND PUBLISHER, TRANSLATE 15 BOOKS DEALING WITH DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. USAID FY 91-93.

USIS BOOK TRANSLATIONS. PRODUCTION OF FIVE BOOKS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND ETHICS FOR THE MEDIA. USIS FY 93

AMPART ON 1993 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEETING. BRING APPROPRIATE SPEAKER TO INDONESIA TO DISCUSS ISSUES CONNECTED WITH THE MEETING. USIS FY 93 (&)
WORLDNET ON U.S. APPROACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS. USE USG SPEAKERS IN AN INTERACTIVE TO DISCUSS POLITICAL RIGHTS, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, AND THE U.. APPROACH. USIS FY 93.
BARRY

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CDS
CDSN = CFS997 MCN = 94321/17637 TOR = 943210832
PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1848 3210831-UUUU--RUEANSS.
ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
P 170831Z NOV 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUFQBBA/US SURVEY SHAPE BE
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CARA//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHEPAAB/ACCIS LANGLEY AFB VA
RUFGAID/USCINCEUR INTEL VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2/DIA REP//
RUFTAKA/UCIRF AUGSBURG GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK//CC/DOA//
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 170829Z NOV 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1796
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA// PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3607
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2659
ZEN/AMCONSUL MEDAN PRIORITY
ZEN/AMCONSUL SURABAYA PRIORITY
BT
CONTROLS
UNCLAS JAKARTA 011007
USIA FOR R/MR, I/GEA, I/RFW, I/TES, I/TDHR, I/TGL,
B/VOA/BXN, B/VOA/F, EA, R
SECSTATE FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EAP/P
USCINCPAC FOR USIA ADVISOR
AMCONSUL FOR BPAO
E.O. 12356: N/A
BODY
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION, MEDIA REACTION, NOVEMBER 17,
1994 -- IRAQ; U.S.-INDONESIA RELATIONS: EAST TIMOR.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Steve Blodgett, Senior Reviewer

1. IRAQ
CHRISTIAN-ORIENTED AFTERNOONER "SUARA PEMBARUAN" (11/16), IN EDITORIAL, "RECOGNITION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ," COMMENTED:
"AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT...SAID THE LIVING STANDARDS OF MOST IRAQI FAMILIES HAVE DECLINED, BUT THAT IS NOT THE CASE WITH SADDAM'S FAMILY. TO US, ALBRIGHT'S STATEMENT APPEARS TO BE A PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFENSIVE THAT THE U.S. HAS LAUNCHED IN RESPONSE TO IRAQ'S RECOGNITION OF KUWAIT ...THEREFORE, WE THINK THAT, APPARENTLY, IRAQ'S RECOGNITION OF KUWAIT CANNOT IMMEDIATELY BE FOLLOWED BY LIFTING OF THE OIL EMBARGO (BEFORE) ALL IRAQ'S WEAPONS ARE DESTROYED...ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HOPE THAT BOTH THE UNSC PERMANENT AND NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS CAN BE UNITED...IN AN EFFORT TO LIFT THE EMBARGO ON IRAQ...."
2. U.S.-INDONESIAN RELATIONS: EAST TIMOR
REGARDING THE CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF A PORTION OF THE U.S. EMBASSY COMPOUND BY A SMALL NUMBER OF EAST TIMORESE, INDEPENDENT "MEDIA INDONESIA" (11/17), UNDER "U.S. STANCE CONSIDERED UNFRIENDLY," QUOTED MP THEO SAMBUAGA AS SAYING:
"THE **U.S.**' (**GOVERNMENT** IN **JAKARTA**) STANCE OF LETTING (A GROUP OF) EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS REMAIN IN THE U.S. EMBASSY COMPOUND IS INDICATIVE OF AN UNFRIENDLY ATTITUDE (TOWARD INDONESIA). IN THIS REGARD, THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE FIRM ACTION, EITHER BY DRIVING THEM OFF THE COMPOUND OR BY PROVIDING ASYLUM...THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERSTOOD THE DEMANDS OF THE EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS AND HAS STATED THAT THE STUDENTS COULD NOT MEET BILL CLINTON,...WHEREAS THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ASSURED THAT IT WILL NOT DETAIN THE STUDENTS IF THEY LEAVE THE EMBASSY. 'THEREFORE, THERE IS NO REASON FOR THE U.S. TO LET THEM STAY ON WITHIN U.S. JURISDICTION (I.E., WITHIN THE COMPOUND) FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD. IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DOES NOT ASK THEM TO LEAVE SOON, THAT MAY CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. IS UNFRIENDLY TOWARD INDONESIA,' THEO SAID. 'THE U.S. GOVERNMENT,' ACCORDING TO THEO, 'CAN SIMPLY ASK THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES TO TAKE THE DEMONSTRATORS OUT OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND, (SINCE THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES) CANNOT ACT WITHOUT FIRST RECEIVING A REQUEST FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY."

STEWART
BT
ADMIN
#1848
NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CDS
CDSN = CFS767 MCN = 94315/31076 TOR = 943152328
PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS9777 3152328-UUUU--RUEANSS.
ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
P 112328Z NOV 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 070947Z NOV 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1758
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA// PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3451
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2630
ZEN/AMCONSUL MEDAN PRIORITY
ZEN/AMCONSUL SURABAYA PRIORITY
BT
CONTROLS
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 010748
USIA FOR R/MR, I/GEA, I/RFW, I/TES, I/TDHR, I/TGL,
B/VOA/BXN, B/VOA/F, EA, R
SECSTATE FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EAP/P
USCINCPAC FOR USIA ADVISOR
AMCONSUL FOR BPAO
E.O. 12356: N/A

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
SUBJECT: SPECIAL **JAKARTA** MEDIA REACTION ON APEC
MEETINGS PREPARATION -- NOVEMBER 7,1994.
1. RULING GOLKAR PARTY'S "SUARA KARYA" (150,000, 11/5)
CARRIED AN EDITORIAL TITLED "APEC: CONSENSUS IS THE BEST
CHOICE," WHICH SAID:
"...MICKEY KANTOR SAID THAT THE U.S. EXPECTS THE **APEC**
ECONOMIC LEADERS MEETING WOULD PRODUCE A COMMITMENT TO
FORMING A FREE TRADE AREA IN A SPECIFIC TIME...THIS
MEANS, THE MEETING SHOULD BE USED AS A MOMENTUM TO
EXPAND AND MATERIALIZE THE CONCEPT...THAT THE FUTURE OF

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Steve Blodgett, Senior Reviewer

ADVANCED COUNTRIES WILL BE INCREASINGLY DETERMINED BY THE PACE OF THE PROGRESS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. ...INDEED, A DECISION BY CONSENSUS MAY NOT BRING RESULTS AS MUCH AS EXPECTED. HOWEVER, IF APEC IS TO BE A REALLY WEIGHTED FORUM FOR THE FUTURE OF ITS MEMBERS, DECISIONS REACHED BY CONSENSUS WILL BE THE BEST CHOICE."

2. LEADING INDEPENDENT ENGLISH-LANGUAGE "**JAKARTA** POST" (33,000 11/7) HAD AN EDITORIAL, "THE APEC SUMMIT," WHICH HELD:

"ANYONE...WOULD SURELY AGREE THAT...THE CONFERENCE GOES AS SMOOTHLY AS POSSIBLE... BUT WHAT ABOUT THE TRUE SUBSTANCE OF THE EVENT ITSELF? ...WOULD WE BE ABLE TO CALL THE APEC SUMMIT SUCCESSFUL IF THE FINAL DECLARATION DOES NOT SET A TIMETABLE FOR A FREE-TRADE PROGRAM? ...STILL, WHATEVER DECISIONS THE SUMMIT MIGHT PRODUCE, THE...MEETING OF 18 HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS...IS A SPECTACULAR EVENT IN ITSELF. SURELY THERE WILL BE A LOT OF POSITIVE RESULTS FROM SUCH A CONFERENCE AND THE BILATERAL MEETINGS BETWEEN THE SUMMIT."

3. MUSLIM-INTELLECTUAL "REPUBLIKA" (150,000, 11/7), IN ARTICLE BY INDONESIA'S ROVING AMBASSADOR TO THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, SAYIDIMAN SURYOHADIPROJO, UNDER TITLE "WHAT CAN APEC REACH?" COMMENTED:

"IT IS VERY OBVIOUS THAT THE U.S. STILL FINDS IT NECESSARY TO USE ITS POWER POLITICS TO IMPROVE ITS ECONOMY, WHICH IS IMPOSSIBLE IF IT HAS TO ACCEPT THE APEC EMINENT EXPERT GROUP TERMS. FOR EXAMPLE, REGARDING DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS WHICH WILL CERTAINLY RESTRICT THE U.S. TO USE THE SUPER 301. MALAYSIAN TRADE MINISTER, RAFIDA, HAS EVEN TEASED THAT CERTAIN APEC MAJOR COUNTRY MEMBERS HAVE NOT RATIFIED GATT. THEREFORE, HOW CAN ONE TALK ABOUT FREE TRADE IN APEC, SHE SAID. THIS INDEED MAKES VERY MUCH SENSE."

4.INDEPENDENT "JAWA POS"(350,000, 11/4) OF SURABAYA, IN EDITORIAL, "APEC IS A BIG PARTY INDEED," SAID:

"...THE GIGANTIC SCALE OF APEC IS REMARKABLE. IT EXCEEDS EVEN THE HUGE **JAKARTA** NON-ALIGNMENT MOVEMENT SUMMIT, ATTENDED BY 100 COUNTRIES. WHY IS APEC, WHICH WILL ONLY BE ATTENDED BY 18 COUNTRIES, SO IMPORTANT? BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF **CLINTON**, KIICHI MIYAZAWA, AND OTHER BIG COUNTRIES' LEADERS LIKE THE CANADIAN AND AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTERS...U.S. INFLUENCE PERMEATES

OUR WHOLE UNIVERSE. ACTIONS OF THE LEADER OF THE ONLY SUPERPOWER ALWAYS DRAWS ATTENTION...THOUGH APEC IS NOT AS CRITICAL AS THE GULF (IN TERMS OF NEWS REPORTING), THE MEETING IS CLEARLY EXTRAORDINARY BECAUSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FIGURES. THEREFORE, IT IS NO WONDER THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WAS GRATEFUL THAT FRANCISCO MARTIN DURAN'S ATTACK ON THE WHITE HOUSE (**CLINTON**'S HOME AND OFFICE) WAS HARMLESS.

5. MOST OF SATURDAY'S PAPERS (11/5) REPORTED THE FAILURE OF THE INVESTMENT EXPERT GROUP MEETING 11/3-4 WITH THE REJECTION OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THREE OF THE NON-BINDING INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES PREVIOUSLY AGREED. THOSE PRINCIPLES WERE CONCERNING NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT, PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENT FOR INVESTMENTS, AND REPATRIATION AND CONVERTIBILITY ISSUES. THEY DECIDED, THEN, TO BRING UP THE MATTER TO THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT (CTI) MEETING ON NOVEMBER 6. HOWEVER, ALL TODAY'S PAPERS REPORTED THAT THE U.S. BLOCKED CONSENSUS ON THE SAME PRINCIPLES DURING THE CTI MEETING YESTERDAY (11/6) AND THAT THE MATTER WOULD BE BROUGHT UP THEREFORE AT THE SENIOR OFFICIALS' MEETING (SOM) ON NOVEMBER 8.

6. THE HEAD OF THE INDONESIAN POLICE GENERAL BANURUSMAN

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/

C O R R E C T E D COPY (TEXT LINES TO LONG)

USIA FOR R/MR, I/GEA, I/RFW, I/TES, I/TDHR, I/TGL, B/VOA/BXN, B/VOA/F, EA, R

SECSTATE FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EAP/P

USCINCPAC FOR USIA ADVISOR

AMCONSUL FOR BPAO

E.O. 12356: N/A

SAID (11/6) THAT AS MAQAS 6,000 POLICEMEN, INCLUDING THE BOMB-DEFUSING SPECIAL UNIT MEMBERS, WILL BE DEPLOYED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY FOR THE APEC MEETINGS. (STRIDENTLY NATIONALISTIC "MERDEKA" (35,000, 11/6).

7. MUSLIM INTELLECTUAL "REPUBLIKA" (150,000, 11/7) FRONT-PAGED STATEMENTS BY FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER TO REPORTERS THAT APEC COULD HINDER U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS. KISSINGER IS CURRENTLY IN INDONESIA, NOT TO JOIN THE U.S. APEC DELEGATION, BUT TO

SPEAK IN ASIAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION ON NOVEMBER 7-8 IN **JAKARTA**.

8. THE ARMED FORCES "ANGKATAN BERSENJATA" (50,000, 11/7) REPORTED THE INFORMATION CHIEF OF THE INDONESIAN CONSULATE IN NEW YORK, HARRY KANDAU, AS SAYING THAT ALLAN NAIRN AND AMY GOODMAN, THE TWO AMERICAN REPORTERS WHO WERE PRESENT DURING THE DILI, EAST TIMOR, INCIDENT ON NOVEMBER 12, 1991, WILL BE AMONG THOSE REPORTERS WHO WILL COVER THE APEC MEETINGS.

9. THE STATE-OWNED TELECOMMUNICATION COMPANY, PT TELKOM, HAS TEMPORARILY INSTALLED 4,000 NEW LINES TO SUPPORT THE APEC MEETINGS. ACCORDING TO PT TELKOM'S PRESIDENT SETYANTO P. SANTOSA, THE INSTALLATION HAS COST HIS COMPANY US$1.4 MILLION. ("**JAKARTA** POST" 11/5) MEANWHILE, PRO- GOVERNMENT ENGLISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "INDONESIA TIMES" (7,000, 11/7) REPORTED SANTOSA AS SAYING THAT 20 BROADCASTERS FROM 11 COUNTRIES HAVE BOOKED LINES TO BROADCAST THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MEETINGS.

STEWART

BT

ADMIN

#9778

NNNN

C05332856 IED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-37244 Doc No. C05332856 Date: 05/23/2013

RELEASED IN FULL

CDS
CDSN = CFS570 MCN = 94356/10194 TOR = 943560612
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS9600 3560610-CCCC--RUEANSS.
ZNY CCCCC
HEADER
R 220610Z DEC 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUCIAEA/NAIC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH//DXLA//
RUCMACC/CDRPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC//AORC-POG-SB//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUFGAID/USCINCEUR INTEL VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2/DIA REP//
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK//CC/DOA//
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 211932Z DEC 94
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0000
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0000
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0000
BT
CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 337360
PARIS FOR OECD, BRUSSELS FOR USEC
E.O. 12356: N/A
BODY
TAGS: APECO, ECON, ECIN, ETRD, ID
SUBJECT: SIXTH APEC MINISTERIAL, **JAKARTA**, NOVEMBER 11-12

REF: SECTO 27017

SUMMARY
---

1. APEC HELD ITS SIXTH MINISTERIAL MEETING NOVEMBER 10-12 IN **JAKARTA**, INDONESIA. THE U.S. DELEGATION WAS HEADED BY SECRETARY OF STATE **CHRISTOPHER**, JOINED BY SECRETARY OF

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Steve Blodgett, Senior Reviewer

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-37244 Doc No. C05332856 Date: 05/23/2013

COMMERCE BROWN AND USTR KANTOR. THE U.S. ACCOMPLISHED ITS OVERALL OBJECTIVES AND OBTAINED SUPPORT FOR ITS THREE PROPOSALS: CREATION OF A PERMANENT ASIA PACIFIC BUSINESS ADVISORY COMMITTEE, AGREEMENT THAT THE U.S. SHOULD HOST AN APEC TRANSPORTATION MINISTERS' MEETING; AND, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN APEC EDUCATION FOUNDATION. THE SUBSTANTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE OF THE MINISTERIAL SET THE STAGE FOR A SUCCESSFUL LEADERS MEETING IN BOGOR ON NOVEMBER 15. THE MINISTERS LEFT TO THEIR LEADERS THE DECISION ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A FREE TRADE AREA IN THE REGION BY A DATE CERTAIN.

2. CONSENSUS WAS REACHED ON SEVERAL OTHER KEY ISSUES AS WELL: MINISTERS AGREED TO TRANSFORM THE AD HOC GROUP ON ECONOMIC TRENDS AND ISSUES INTO AN ECONOMIC COMMITTEE; MINISTERS APPROVED THE WORK PROGRAM FOR THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT; AND, ENDORSED A SET OF NON-BINDING INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES. THE MINISTERS ALSO: ISSUED A DECLARATION ON A HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK; ENDORSED AN INDONESIA PROPOSAL FOR PROMOTING COOPERATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT; UPGRADED THE EXPERTS MEETING ON SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZE ENTERPRISES, APPROVED THE CREATION OF A TASK FORCE TO REVIEW THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE APEC SECRETARIAT, AND HAD A FRUITFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP AND THE PACIFIC BUSINESS FORUM REPORTS. MINISTERS AGREED TO THE FOLLOWING FUTURE MINISTERIAL SCHEDULE: 1995 IN JAPAN, 1996 IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1997 IN CANADA AND 1998 IN MALAYSIA. END SUMMARY

SECRETARY **CHRISTOPHER**'S OPENING REMARKS

---

3. FOLLOWING THE WELCOMING REMARKS OF THIS YEAR'S CHAIRMAN, INDONESIAN COORDINATING MINISTER FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY HARTARTO, THE SECRETARY, SPEAKING AS LAST YEAR'S CHAIR, THANKED PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND THE INDONESIAN HOSTS AND HIGHLIGHTED APEC'S PROGRESS SINCE LAST YEAR'S LEADERS' MEETING ON BLAKE ISLAND. THE SECRETARY INTRODUCED THREE PROPOSALS FOR MINISTERS' CONSIDERATION: CREATION OF A PERMANENT ASIA PACIFIC BUSINESS ADVISORY COMMITTEE; CONVENING OF AN APEC TRANSPORTATION MINISTERS' MEETING

C05332856 IED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-37244 Doc No. C05332856 Date: 05/23/2013

NEXT YEAR IN THE U.S. TO BE HOSTED BY SECRETARY PENA; AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NON-PROFIT, PRIVATELY FUNDED APEC EDUCATION FOUNDATION. FINALLY, THE SECRETARY ENDORSED PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S VISION FOR FREE AND OPEN TRADE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION.

ECONOMIC TRENDS AND ISSUES

4. MINISTERS WELCOMED THE REPORT OF THE AD HOC GROUP ON ECONOMIC TRENDS AND ISSUES (ETI) AND APPRECIATED ITS USEFUL WORK DURING THE PAST FOUR YEARS. MINISTERS, WITH U.S. SUPPORT, AGREED TO TRANSFORM THE GROUP INTO AN ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (EC) AND ENDORSED THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE NEW COMMITTEE. CANADA WILL CHAIR THE EC INITIALLY, WHILE CHINESE TAIPEI AND THAILAND WILL BE THE CO-VICE CHAIRS.

5. MINISTERS ENDORSED THE 1995 WORK PLAN FOR THE NEW ECONOMIC COMMITTEE: PREPARATION OF THE 1995 APEC ECONOMIC OUTLOOK; CIRCULATION OF KEY ECONOMIC INFORMATION; ANALYSIS OF THE "THREE E'S" PROJECT (ECONOMIC GROWTH, ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT); AND STUDY OF REGIONAL INVESTMENT TRENDS AND INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL LINKAGES. MINISTERS ALSO WELCOMED JAPAN'S PAPER ENTITLED "PARTNERS FOR PROGRESS" ON PROMOTING FURTHER ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION, NOTING THAT IT WOULD RECEIVE FURTHER STUDY BY SENIOR OFFICIALS. AT THE LAST MINUTE INDONESIA PROPOSED A CONTROVERSIAL STUDY OF EXCHANGE RATES, WHICH WAS MODIFIED AND MADE LESS PROBLEMATIC THROUGH A COMPROMISE OFFERED BY SECRETARY **CHRISTOPHER**.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT ISSUES

6. MINISTERS APPROVED COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT (CTI) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 1995 WORK PROGRAM TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO TARIFF DATA, REDUCE ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS TO TRADE, STREAMLINE CUSTOMS PROCEDURES, DEVELOP STANDARDS, AND ENCOURAGE THE FLOW OF INVESTMENTS. MINISTERS ENDORSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO SUB-COMMITTEES UNDER CTI, ONE ON STANDARDS AND CONFORMANCE AND ANOTHER ON CUSTOMS

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-37244 Doc No. C05332856 Date: 05/23/2013

PROCEDURES. USTR KANTOR SPOKE ON THIS AGENDA ITEM, STRONGLY ENDORSING THE CTI WORK PROGRAM.

7. THE FOCAL POINT OF THIS AGENDA ITEM WAS AGREEMENT WITHOUT OBJECTION BY MINISTERS OF A STATEMENT OF NON-BINDING INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES. USTR KANTOR WELCOMED THE ENDORSEDMENT OF THESE PRINCIPLES, EMPHASIZED THAT THEY REPRESENT A "PRAGMATIC FIRST STEP" AND CALLED FOR CONTINUED WORK NEXT YEAR ON INVESTMENT, INCLUDING PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES WHICH UNDERLIE INVESTMENT REGIMES. THIS AGENDA ITEM HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF INTENSE DEBATE AT THE SENIOR OFFICIALS MEETING. THE MINISTERS AGREED TO THE FOLLOWING REPORT LANGUAGE:

8. QUOTE: THE MINISTERS ENDORSED THE SET OF NON-BINDING INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO THE INITIATIVE OF APEC ECONOMIC LEADERS AT THEIR INFORMAL MEETING IN SEATTLE. THESE PRINCIPLES REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF WORK BY APEC ON INVESTMENT. MINISTERS WELCOMED THESE PRINCIPLES AND DIRECTED THE CTI TO CONTINUE WORK ON INVESTMENT ISSUES, WITH THE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY, TO ENHANCE INVESTMENT AMONG MEMBER ECONOMIES. END QUOTE.

9. CHINESE MINISTER WU YI SAID CHINA ALSO ENDORSED THE LONG-TERM GOAL FOR APEC REGIONAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND FREE TRADE. SHE NOTED THAT NOT ALL APEC MEMBERS HAD CONFIRMED THAT UNCONDITIONAL MFN TREATMENT SHOULD BE OBSERVED OR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT APEC ECONOMIES ARE AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT. WITHOUT CONSENSUS ON THESE ISSUES, IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY DECISIONS ON TRADE LIBERALIZATION WOULD RUN INTO DISPUTES. WU YI NOTED THAT THE BENEFITS OF LIBERALIZATION BY SOME MEMBERS IN APEC SHOULD BE EXTENDED, FOR A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME, TO ALL OTHER APEC MEMBERS ON AN UNCONDITIONAL MFN BASIS. SHE URGED GATT MEMBERS TO IMPLEMENT THE URUGUAY ROUND. SHE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT CHINA COULD DO SO AS WELL, BUT THAT DEPENDED ON THE RESUMPTION OF ITS MEMBERSHIP IN GATT. ITS GATT STATUS WOULD ALSO AFFECT ITS IMPLEMENTATION OF REGIONAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION COMMITMENTS IN APEC. SHE HOPED ALL APEC MEMBERS WOULD SUPPORT CHINA'S EARLY RETURN TO GATT. SHE ALSO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION THAT THE

CONSENSUS ON INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES ACCOMMODATED THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT IN APEC AND REFLECTS THE VIEWS OF ALL APEC MEMBERS.

10. JAPAN SAID IT SEEKS TO RATIFY THE URUGUAY ROUND THIS YEAR. IT STANDS READY TO WORK TO DEVELOP A BLUEPRINT ON APEC TRADE LIBERALIZATION WHEN IT TAKES ON THE CHAIR OF APEC NEXT YEAR. TRADE FACILITATION, IT ARGUED, REQUIRES AN INTEGRATED APPROACH. TECHNICAL COOPERATION MUST BE AVAILABLE FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES WHICH NEED HELP IN SUCH AREAS AS STANDARDS. JAPAN WELCOMED THE CONSENSUS ON INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES AS AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP AND URGED FURTHER WORK TO IMPROVE THE TEXT. IT CAUTIONED AGAINST UNILATERAL ACTION ON TRADE AND CALLED FOR COOPERATION BASED ON OPEN REGIONALISM.

11. INDONESIA STRESSED ITS COMMITMENT TO IMPROVING ITS OWN INVESTMENT CLIMATE, SUGGESTED THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES SOULD BE APEC'S GUIDELINE, AND PROPOSED A MEETING OF APEC INVESTMENT OFFICIAL. CANADA, NEW ZEALAND, AND JAPAN CHARACTERIZED THE STATEMENT ON INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES AS AN INITIAL STEP TOWARD FURTHER LIBERALIZATION. MINISTERS DID NOT REACT TO THE INDONESIAN PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING OF INVESTMENT OFFICIALS. .

REPORTS OF THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP (EPG) AND PACIFIC BUSINESS FORUM (PBF)

---

12. MINISTERS WELCOMED THE EPG AND THE PBF REPORTS, AND NOTED THAT BOTH REPORTS WOULD SERVE AS VALUABLE REFERENCE POINTS FOR FUTURE DELIBERATIONS, INCLUDING AT THE **APEC ECONOMIC LEADERS MEETING** IN BOGOR. DEPUTY USTR BARSHEFSKY EXPRESSED U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE FREE TRADE VISION CONTAINED IN BOTH REPORTS AND UNDERSCORED OUR VIEW THAT APEC TRADE LIBERALIZATION MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE GATT. SECRETARY BROWN STRONGLY ENDORSED THE PBF REPORT'S CALL TO STRENGTHEN THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS AND ARGUED IN FAVOR OF THE RECOMMENDATION TO CREATE A PERMANENT PRIVATE SECTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE IN APEC.

13. NO ACTION WAS TAKEN ON THE EPG OR PBF RECOMMENDATIONS

C05332856 IED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-37244 Doc No. C05332856 Date: 05/23/2013

EXCEPT THE DECISION BY MINISTERS TO ENDORSE SECRETARY **CHRISTOPHER**'S PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT PRIVATE SECTOR ADVISORY BODY AS RECOMMENDED BY THE PBF. DURING THE MINISTERS QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH THE EPG AND PBF MEMBERS AND SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS AMONG MINISTERS, A WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS WERE EXPRESSED ON KEY ELEMENTS OF BOTH REPORTS.

WHILE MINISTERS EXPRESSED BROAD SUPPORT FOR FURTHER APEC TRADE LIBERALIZATION, SOME QUESTIONED TREATMENT OF SPECIFIC ISSUES IN THE REPORT. MALAYSIA WAS CONCERNED THAT THE TRADE PROPOSALS IN THE EPG REPORT COULD LEAD TO A PREFERENTIAL TRADE BLOC. THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES POINTED OUT THE NEED TO CONCENTRATE ON IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND PACKAGE. CHINA WANTED MORE EMPHASIS ON DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. AUSTRALIA IDENTIFIED COVERAGE, TIMING AND TREATMENT OF NON-MEMBERS AS KEY ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED IN A WORKING GROUP ON A TRADE BLUEPRINT NEXT YEAR. JAPAN URGED COORDINATING WITH THE WTO AND ON FOCUSING STANDARDS AND OTHER PRACTICAL ISSUES.

HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN THE APEC MINISTERIAL

14. THE HIGHLIGHT FOR THE U.S. OF MINISTERIAL ACTION UNDER THIS AGENDA ITEM WAS THE MINISTERS' SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH IN SINGAPORE AN APEC EDUCATION FOUNDATION. SECRETARY **CHRISTOPHER**, CITING THE POSITIVE RESULTS THIS YEAR OF THE BLAKE ISLAND APEC EDUCATION INITIATIVE, PROVIDED AN OVERVIEW OF THE EDUCATION FOUNDATION CONCEPT. THE U.S. IS TO PROVIDE A DETAILED CONCEPT PAPER FOR THE SENIOR OFFICIALS MEETING (SOM).
15. MINISTERS ADOPTED THE INDONESIAN-PROPOSED

"DECLARATION ON THE HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK" WHICH IDENTIFIES THE PRINCIPLES AND ELEMENTS OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN (HRD) APEC, WHILE ESTABLISHING A MECHANISM TO PLAN AND MANAGE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES.

16. BRUNEI SUPPORTED THE STATED OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-37244 Doc No. C05332856 Date: 05/23/2013

C05332856 IED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-37244 Doc No. C05332856 Date: 05/23/2013

AND OFFERED TO HOST THE HRD WORKING GROUP IN 1996. NZ SAID THAT IT HAD ASKED ASIA 2000 TO LAUNCH AN EDUCATION INITIATIVE WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE PRIVATE ACADEMIC EXCHANGE AS WELL AS EXCHANGES OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. CHINESE TAIPEI CALLED FOR TRAINING FACILITIES AND QUALIFIED TRAINERS AND SAID THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE SCHOLARSHIPS FOR FOREIGN STUDENTS. JAPAN SAID THAT THE HRD SHO(LD SHIFT FROM A SEMINAR FORMAT TO IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECTS GEARED AT OVERCOMING SPECIFIC PROBLEMS. IT ENDORSED THE US AND THAI SUGGESTIONS FOR HRD AND SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT A CONCRETE ACTION PLAN BE DEVELOPED. JAPAN AGREED TO LAUNCH A HRD PROGRAM IN CONJUNCTION WITH SINGAPORE AND THAILAND. CHINA SUPPORTED THE ADOPTION OF THE HRD FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT AND CALLED FOR DEVELOPING AN EXPERTS GROUP.

COOPERATION IN IMPROVING PUBLIC AND COMMERCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

---

17. MINISTERS NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE REGION'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THEY DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR IMPROVED COORDINATION, INCREASED FUNDING AND IMPROVED DIALOGUE WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR. THE MINISTERS COMMENDED INDONESIA FOR RAISING IMPORTANT ISSUES IN ITS INFRASTRUCTURE PAPER AND TOOK NOTE OF THE WORLD INFRASTRUCTURE FORUM HELD IN **JAKARTA** IN OCTOBER 1994.

18. SECRETARY BROWN COMMENDED APEC'S WORK IN THE AREAS OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND URGED MINISTERIAL APPROVAL OF THE U.S. RECOMMENDATION FOR A MEETING OF TRANSPORT MINISTERS IN 1995. HE SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING AGENDA FOR THE MEETING: INVESTMENT IN TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE; STREAMLINING, STANDARDIZATION, AND AUTOMATION OF DOCUMENTATION AND INSPECTION PROCEDURES; HARMONIZATION OF STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT, OPERATIONS AND SAFETY; AND TRANSFER AND APPLICATION OF TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGIES. THE MINISTERS WELCOMED THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO HOLD THE MEETING OF APEC MINISTERS IN CHARGE OF TRANSPORTATION IN MID-1995 AND ASKED THE WORKING GROUP ON TRANSPORTATION TO ASSIST MINISTERS IN ELABORATING THIS PROPOSAL.

19. SECRETARY BROWN NOTED THAT ANOTHER AREA WHERE APEC IS

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-37244 Doc No. C05332856 Date: 05/23/2013

C05332856 IED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-37244 Doc No. C05332856 Date: 05/23/2013

PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE IS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A REGIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE. HE CITED, IN PARTICULAR THE POSSIBLE LINKAGE OF REGIONAL NETWORKS INTO A "GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE" (GII). HE NOTED THAT THE NETWORK SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED PREVIOUSLY BY VICE PRESIDENT GORE: PRIVATE INVESTMENT; COMPETITION; A FLEXIBLE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK; OPEN ACCESS; AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE. MINISTERS ENCOURAGED THE WORKING GROUP ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER REVELANT FORA TO STUDY THE GII CONCEPT IN THEIR FUTURE WORK.

SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT

20. THE MINISTERS CONGRATULATED JAPAN FOR, HOSTING THE FIRST MINISTERIAL MEETING ON SMES IN OSAKA, COMMENDED CHINESE TAIPEI FOR ITS REPORT OF THE APEC SURVEY ON SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES (SMES), AND ENDORSED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SOM REGARDING SMES. ONE IMPORTANT RECOMMENDATION WAS TO UPGRADE THE SME EXPERTS MEETING INTO AN AD HOC SME POLICY LEVEL GROUP. THE U.S. AND ALMOST ALL OTHER DELEGATIONS VOICED SUPPORT FOR UPGRADING THE SME GROUP.

IMPLEMENTATION OF LEADERS' VISION AND INITIATIVES

21. SECRETARY **CHRISTOPHER** RESPONDED TO CANADA'S REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EIGHT 1993 LEADERS' INITIATIVES BY HIGHLIGHTING OUR SATISFACTION WITH PROGRESS ON THE THREE U.S.-SPONSORED BLAKE ISLAND INITIATIVES: THE SUCCESSFUL PACIFIC BUSINESS FORUM; THE MARCH 1993 APEC FINANCE MINISTERS' MEETING; AND, THE LAUNCHING OF THE APEC EDUCATION INITIATIVE. THE MINISTERIAL REPORT, ENDORSED BY THE MINISTERS, PROVIDES DETAILS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL EIGHT LEADERS' INITIATIVES: THE PBF; FINANCE MINISTERS' MEETING; EDUCATION PROGRAM; BUSINESS VOLUNTEER PROGRAM; NON-BINDING INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES; ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH; CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGE AND TRAINING; THE SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE MINISTERS' MEETING.

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-37244 Doc No. C05332856 Date: 05/23/2013

22. THAILAND AND AUSTRALIA NOTED THAT THE EXTENSIVE WORK OF APEC SHOULD THERE BE MORE WIDELY DISSEMINATED IN THE MASS MEDIA. THE THAI MINISTER PROPOSED TO INSTRUCT SENIOR OFFICIALS TO IDENTIFY "FOCAL POINTS" IN EACH ECONOMY WHICH

WOULD FORM THE BASIS OF THE ASIA PACIFIC BUSINESS NETWORK (APB-NET). THE MINISTERIAL REPORT WELCOMED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE APB-NET AS AN IMPORTANT CHANNEL FOR BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS NETWORKING WITHIN APEC. SINCE SECRETARY **CHRISTOPHER** PROPOSED, AND THE MINISTERS SUPPORTED, CREATION OF A "PERMANENT ASIA PACIFIC BUSINESS ADVISORY COMMITTEE", WE WILL BE LOOKING AT HOW "APB-NET" WOULD RELATE TO THIS PROPOSAL." PROGRESS OF WORKING GROUPS THE PHILIPPINES DESCRIBED THE APEC CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGE AND SMES AND AIRED A VIDEO WHICH PROMOTED THE CONCEPT (AND ITS PROPOSED LOCATION IN THE PHILIPPINES). KOREA REPORTED ON THE APEC NEXT GENERATIONS PROGRAM NOTED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SOME TANGIBLE RESULTS, AND CALLED FOR MORE PROGRESS. KOREA ADDED THAT IT WAS PLEASED THE U.S. WOULD HOST THE SECOND APEC NGP IN SEATTLE IN 1995.

---

23. THE SECRETARIAT REPORTED ON THE PROGRESS OF THE WORKING GROUPS AND NOTED THAT THEY HAD CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE WORK OF APEC IN 1994. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR NOTED THAT ALL THE WORKING GROUPS HAD PAID INCREASED ATTENTION TO POLICY ISSUES AND THAT THEY ALL HAD STEPPED UP THEIR EFFORTS TO FOSTER GREATER BUSINESS AND PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT. HE NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT MORE THAN 10 PUBLICATIONS HAD BEEN PRODUCED SO FAR AND THAT THE QUALITY OF THE REPORTS HAD BEEN IMPROVING. BEFORE MOVING TO THE NEXT AGENDA ITEM, THE CHAIR REPORTED THAT THE MINISTERS HAD ENDORSED THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS WORKING GROUP GUIDELINES FOR THE HARMONMIZATION OF EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION AND THE TRADE IN INTERNATIONAL VALUE ADDED SERVICES PROPOSED BY THE SOM.

ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

APEC SECRETARIAT

---

24. THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE WORK OF AMBASSADOR RUSLI NOOR (INDONESIA) AND HIS STAFF AT THE SECRETARIAT AND TOOK NOTE THAT THE INITIAL PERIOD FOR THE FUNCTIONING OF THE APEC SECRETARIAT IS APPROACHING ITS END. IN THIS REGARD, THE MINISTERS ASKED THE SOM TO REVIEW THE ARRANGEMENT AND FUNCTION OF THE SECRETARIAT AND ENDORSED A JAPANESE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A TASK FORCE FOR THIS PURPOSE.

PARTICIPATION

---

25. AS IN THE SOM, THERE WAS LIVELY DEBATE OVER NON-MEMBER REQUESTS TO PARTICIPATE IN APEC WORKING GROUPS. THE SOM IDENTIFIED FIVE NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES WITH OUTSTANDING REQUESTS -- PERU, RUSSIA, INDIA, ISRAEL AND MONGOLIA. MALAYSIA ARGUED AGAINST "SELECTIVITY" IN APPROACHING NON-MEMBER PARTICIPATION ON THE BASIS THAT THE FIFTH MINISTERIAL DECISION FOR A THREE-YEAR MORATORIUM ON NEW APEC MEMBERS ALLOWED NON-MEMBER PARTICIPATION IN WORKING GROUPS UNDER SOME CONDITIONS. MALAYSIA PUSHED, IN PARTICULAR, FOR APPROVAL OF PERU'S REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FISHERIES AND TOURISM WORKING GROUPS.

26. AUSTRALIA LED THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DEBATE. THE AUSTRALIANS ARGUED THAT SINCE A NUMBER OF NON-MEMBERS HAVE MADE SUCH REQUESTS, MEMBERS MUST DEVELOP A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH ON THE ISSUE RATHER THAN MAKE HASTY DECISIONS BASED ON THE "NOISIEST AND MOST PERSISTENT" REQUESTS. AUSTRALIA NOTED ONE PARTICULAR PROBLEM WHICH COULD RESULT FROM HANDLING THESE REQUESTS IN A HAPHAZARD MANNER. IF THERE IS AN ASSUMPTION THAT PARTICIPATION IN WORKING GROUPS LEADS TO APEC MEMBERSHIP ONCE THE MORATORIUM IS LIFTED, WE MUST BE VERY CAREFUL BEFORE APPROVING ANY NON-MEMBER REQUEST. OTHERWISE IN 1996, APEC WILL FACE AN ONSLAUGHT OF MEMBERSHIP REQUESTS FROM NON-MEMBER WORKING GROUP PARTICIPANTS, ALL OF WHOM WILL LAY CLAIM TO FULL MEMBERSHIP BASED ON THEIR WORKING GROUP EXPERIENCE. MALAYSIA AND SEVERAL OTHER DELEGATIONS ARGUED UNCONVINCINGLY THAT THERE WAS NO PRESUMPTION OF EVENTUAL APEC MEMBERSHIP FOR NON-MEMBER PARTICIPANTS IN WORKING GROUPS.

27. THERE BEING NO CONSENSUS ON THE REQUEST BY PERU AND THE OTHERS, THE CHAIRMAN SOUGHT AND RECEIVED MINISTERS' CONCURRENCE TO ASK THE SOM TO CONSIDER AGAIN THE ISSUE OF MEMBERSHIP AND RELATED PARTICIPATION ISSUES AND TO REPORT BACK TO MINISTERS AT THE 1995 APEC MINISTERIAL.

BUDGET AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

28. MINISTERS WELCOMED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BUDGET AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE (BAC) AND NOTED WITH SATISFACTION ITS SUCCESSFUL OPERATION IN 1994. THE U.S. (AS PAST APEC CHAIR) CHAIRED THE BAC IN 1994. MINISTERS APPROVED A 1995 BUDGET OF USDOLS 2,227,732 AS DRAWN UP BY THE BAC AND ENDORSED BY THE SOM. MINISTERS APPROVED 1995 CONTRIBUTION LEVELS RECOMMENDED BY THE SOM, I.E., EACH MEMBER ECONOMY'S CONTRIBUTION WOULD REMAIN THE SAME, WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT THE CONTRIBUTUTION OF CHILE, THE NEW APEC MEMBER, WOULD BE SET AT USDOLS 55,000. THE U.S. 1995 CONTRIBUTION REMAINS USDOLS 360,000.

OTHER MATTERS

29. THE MINISTERS WELCOMED COMPLETION OF THE FIRST STAGE OF THE APEC COMMUNICATIONS AND DATABASE SYSTEM (ACDS) PROJECT COMMENDED CANADA FOR HOSTING A MEETING OF APEC ENVIRONMENT MINISTERS IN MARCH 1994, AND ASKED THE SOM TO REPORT NEXT YEAR ON PROGRESS IN INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES INTO ONGOING APEC ACTIVITIES. IN A SURPRISE MOVE WELCOMED BY ALL, MALAYSIA OFFERED AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING TO HOST THE TENTH APEC MINISTERIAL IN 1998 FOLLOWING JAPAN IN 1995, PHILIPPINES IN 1996 AND CANADA IN 1997. **CHRISTOPHER**
BT
ADMIN
#9600
NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

CDS
CDSN = CFS530 MCN = 94312/16039 TOR = 943120905
PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1465 3120904-UUUU--RUEANSS.
ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
P 080904Z NOV 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 080901Z NOV 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA// PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3464
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2635
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1762
ZEN/AMCONSUL SURABAYA PRIORITY
ZEN/AMCONSUL MEDAN PRIORITY
BT
CONTROLS
UNCLAS JAKARTA 010768
USIA FOR R/MR, I/GEA, I/RFW, I/TES, I/TDHR, I/TGL,
B/VOA/BXN, B/VOA/F, EA, R
SECSTATE FOR S/S, EAP/PIMBS, EAP/P
USCINCPAC FOR USIA ADVISOR
AMCONSUL FOR BPAO
E.O. 12356: N/A
BODY
SUBJECT: SPECIAL **JAKARTA** MEDIA REACTION ON PREPARATIONS FOR APEC MEETINGS -- NOVEMBER 8, 1994.
1. ALL PAPERS TODAY (11/8) CARRIED STORIES OF THE MEETING BETWEEN FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IN **JAKARTA** 11/7 TO DISCUSS THE UPCOMING APEC MEETINGS IN BOGOR. KISSINGER WAS QUOTED AS EXPRESSING HIS SUPPORT FOR SOEHARTO AS CHAIR OF APEC THIS YEAR. KISSINGER IS IN **JAKARTA** FOR A MEETING OF THE ASIAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION. MOST PAPERS ALSO CARRIED PICTURE OF THE TWO FIGURES.
2. ALL PAPERS TODAY ALSO CARRIED AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY STATE SECRETARY MOERDIONO THAT NOVEMBER 14 AND 15 HAVE

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Steve Blodgett, Senior Reviewer

BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC HOLIDAYS FOR THE **JAKARTA** AREA AND NOVEMBER 15 FOR THE BOGOR AREA IN ORDER TO ALLOW SMOOTH MOVEMENT OF THE APEC DELEGATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO CITIES.

3. LEADING INDEPENDENT DAILY "KOMPAS" (480,000) CARRIED AN EDITORIAL "MUCH HOMEWORK TO DO TO ENSURE INDONESIA'S SUCCESS IN APEC," WHICH SAID:

"HOW APEC WILL TAKE SHAPE AND DEVELOP WILL BECOME CLEARER AFTER THE MEETING OF THE 18 APEC LEADERS, EVEN THOUGH THERE IS AN ASSUMPTION THAT THE APEC MEETINGS IN INDONESIA ARE (BASICALLY) ONLY (A FORUM) FOR DISCUSSIONS, (RATHER THAN FOR TAKING FURTHER) ACTION.... THE SUCCESS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITHIN APEC, IN ANY FORM, WILL DEPEND ON THE ROLES OF BUSINESS PERSONS AS ECONOMIC AGENTS. THE APEC LEADERS ARE QUITE AWARE OF THIS FACT. THE APEC SUMMIT ON BLAKE ISLAND DETERMINED THAT THE BUSINESS WORLD COULD PARTICIPATE. IN THE APEC SENIOR OFFICIALS' MEETING IN INDONESIA, THE FORM OF THAT PARTICIPATION IS TO BE (DISCUSSED.) ONE (FORM OF PARTICIPATION) WAS THE FORMATION OF THE APB-NET...."

4. LEADING INDEPENDENT ENGLISH-DAILY "**JAKARTA** POST" (33,000), IN EDITORIAL "SOEHARTO FOR FREE TRADE," OBSERVED:

"OBVIOUSLY, THE SECOND **APEC ECONOMIC LEADERS MEETING** IN BOGOR NEXT WEEK WILL HAVE TO DISCUSS ... A FIXED TIMETABLE FOR (ESTABLISHING) A FREE TRADE AREA IN THE APEC REGION. AT THE VERY LEAST, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S SUPPORT OF THE IDEA PROVIDES A STRONG SIGNAL TO BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN BUSINESSMEN ABOUT THE FUTURE COURSE OF INDONESIA'S LONG-TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THAT WILL CONSEQUENTLY IMPOSE A LOT OF HOMEWORK (ON INDONESIAN BUREAUCRATS) RELATED TO IMPLEMENTING POLICIES CONDUCIVE TO FREE TRADE...."

5. THE ARMED FORCES' "ANGKATAN BERSENJATA" (50,000) CARRIED AN EDITORIAL "ASEAN CAUCUS WITHIN APEC," WHICH QUOTED STATEMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INDONESIAN CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, HADI SOESASTRO, ON THE NEED TO ESTABLISH A CAUCUS OF ASEAN COUNTRIES WITHIN APEC. THE EDITORIAL SAID:

"ACCORDING TO SOESASTRO, AN ASEAN CAUCUS WOULD BE EVEN MORE USEFUL THAN THE EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC CAUCUS (CONCEIVED BY MAHATHIR MOHAMAMD) BECAUSE, IF ASEAN HAS

TO CONFRONT JAPAN OR CHINA, IT CAN BUILD AN ALLIANCE WITH THE U.S. OR AUSTRALIA. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF WE HAVE TO CONFRONT THE U.S., ASEAN CAN ALLY WITH JAPAN. BUT THE ASEAN SHOULD DO SO AS A GROUP. THIS IS WHAT, ACCORDING TO HADI, (ASEAN COUNTRIES) STILL LACK."

6. "REPUBLIKA" REPORTED THAT ARTISANS IN MAGELANG REGENCY, CENTRAL JAVA, HAVE MADE PREPARATIONS TO WELCOME HILLARY **CLINTON**, WHO MAY VISIT THE REGION TO SEE THE BOROBUDUR TEMPLE AND A MEDICAL CENTER IN THE VILLAGE OF NGADIREJO. THEY HAVE MADE A BRONZE PAINTING OF BOROBUDUR AND A ONE-METER-HIGH STONE STATUE.

7. "REPUBLIKA" REPORTED THAT MINISTER OF MINING AND ENERGY SUDJANA SAID THAT THE RESULTS OF THE NATUNA NATURA
L GAS PROJECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN INDONESIA.AND THE U.S. WILL BE REPORTED TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TODAY. HOWEVER, HE DECLINED TO COMMENT ON A SIGNING OF THE DOCUMENT DURING PRESIDENT **CLINTON**'S VISIT TO INDONESIA....

STEWART
BT
ADMIN
#1465
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN PART B1,1.4(D)

CDS
CDSN = CFS297 MCN = 94322/21324 TOR = 943221056
OTTCZYUW RUEKJCS1674 3221055-CCCC--RUEANSS.
ZNY CCCCC
HEADER
O 181055Z NOV 94
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEKJSA/STOC
RUEALGX/SAFE
O 181055Z NOV 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3633
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0220
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1189
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0603
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1244
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1805
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0321
BT
CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 011045
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY
CINCPAC PLEASE PASS A/S LORD
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR DS, DE/DSS, DS/OP.EAP
ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA/EAPR
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

Classification Extended on : 05/22/2013 ~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~ Authority: DSCG 11-1 ~□ Declassify on: 11/17/2019

BODY
TAGS: PHUM, ASEC, PREL, PO, UN, VT, ID
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS UPDATE ON EAST TIMORESE
REF: **JAKARTA** 11014 AND PREVIOUS
1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: EMBASSY HAS EVIDENCE SUGGESTING THAT AS OF THE AFTERNOON OF NOVEMBER 18 LOCAL TIME, LEAST 87 EAST TIMORESE HAVE BEEN DETAINED IN EAST JAVA. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN ISOLATED INCIDENTS OF HARASSEMENT, DETENTION, AND SURVEILLANCE. FOLLOWING IS OUR LATEST INFORMATION. END SUMMARY.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Steve Blodgett, Senior Reviewer

3. [redacted] (STRICTLY PROTECT) TOLD POL/C THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 18 THAT IT WAS "VERY DIFFICULT" TO OBTAIN GOOD INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF TIMORESE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED BEGINNING NOVEMBER 12. HE ADDED THAT HE "STRONGLY SUPPOSED" THAT SOME TIMORESE HAVE BEEN DETAINED, BUT WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE HARD NUMBERS AT THAT TIME, AND INTENDED TO CONTINUING PURSUING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. THE SAME SOURCE SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED BACK TO REPORT THAT HE COULD CONFIRM THAT 87 EAST TIMORESE ARE BEING DETAINED ON JAVA, PARTICULARLY IN THE MALANG TO SURABAYA AREA OF EAST JAVA, WHERE THERE ARE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF **EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS**. HE ADDED THAT THE "POLICE APPARATUS" APPEARED TO BE GETTING MORE TENSE ABOUT THE SITUATION. 1.4(D) B1

4. [redacted] FURTHER REPORTED THAT HE KNOWS THAT SOME 30 EAST TIMORESE INTERCEPTED BEFORE BEING ABLE TO MAKE THEIR WAY TO THE EMBASSY TO DEMONSTRATE ON NOVEMBER 12 WERE PUT ON A BUS FOR RETURN TO MALANG. AS OF THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 18, THE SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE GROUP, TO HIS KNOWLEDGE, HAD NOT ARRIVED IN MALANG, BUT THAT HE HAD NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING THEIR WHEREABOUTS. CONGEN SURABAYA REPORTED ON NOVEMBER 18, HOWEVER, THAT ACCORDING TO THE SURABAYA BRANCH OF THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE (LBH) SOME 36-39 EAST TIMORESE NORMALLY DOMICILED IN EAST JAVA WHO HAD BEEN DETAINED IN **JAKARTA** AND TRANSFERRED TO SURABAYA HAVE ALL NOW BEEN RELEASED AND ACCOUNTED FOR. WE ARE NOT ABLE TO DETERMINE IF THE GROUP REPORTED BY [redacted] TO BE ON A BUS AND THE GROUP WHOSE WHEREABOUTS AND WELFARE HAD BEEN VERIFIED BY LBH SURABAYA ARE THE SAME.

5. A RELIABLE, INDEPENDENT MEMBER OF THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, TO WHOM THE AMBASSADOR (AT THE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY) HAD GIVEN THE NAMES OF 5 EAST TIMORESE STILL UNDER ARREST IN **JAKARTA**, TOLD POL/C NOVEMBER 18 THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD, IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, THAT THE GROUP HAD BEEN ON THE PREMISES OF THE **JAKARTA** REGIONAL MILITARY COMMAND (KODAM JAYA), BUT HAD NOW BEEN RELEASED. KODAM SOURCES FURTHER STATED TO HIM THAT NO "FORCEFUL METHODS" HAD BEEN USED ON THE GROUP WHILE THEY WERE DETAINED, AND ASSURED THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBER THAT NO SUCH METHODS WOULD BE USED. THE INDIVIDUALS RELEASED WILL REPORTEDLY BE SUBJECT TO "FOLLOW-UP INVESTIGATIONS." OUR SOURCE DID NOT PERSONALLY SEE THE EAST TIMORESE IN QUESTION.

6. A SOURCE FROM THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE IN **JAKARTA** TOLD THE DCM THAT A "FEW" EAST TIMORESE HAD SOUGHT THEIR ASSISTANCE AND WERE BEING SHELTERED IN HOTEL ROOMS IN **JAKARTA** AFTER HAVING REFUSED A REQUEST BY THE AUTHORITIES TO ORGANIZE A COUNTER-DEMONSTRATION

AGAINST THE EAST TIMORESE SITTING IN AT THE EMBASSY.
7. CONGEN SURABAYA REPORTS THAT IN TWO LOCATIONS (MALANG AND UJUNG PANDANG), THERE ARE REPORTS OF PETTY HARASSMENT BY LOCAL SECURITY FORCES; AND IN SEVERAL PLACES THERE ARE SIGNS OF STEPPED-UP MONITORING OF **EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS**.
7. OUR CONSULAR AGENT IN BALI, WHO HAS A BROAD RANGE OF CONTACTS, HAD NOT HEARD OF ANY ARRESTS, DETENTIONS, OR HARASSMENT OF EAST TIMORESE THERE--ALL ALLEGATIONS REPORTED BY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. HE WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW UP ON THIS.
8. CONGEN MEDAN HAS HEARD NOTHING TO INDICATE ARRESTS OR HARASSMENT OF THE LIMITED NUMBER OF EAST TIMORESE RESIDENT IN THAT CONSULAR DISTRICT.
9. EMBASSY WILL BE MEETING WITH OTHER FIGURES FROM THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID INSTITUTE (LBH) IN **JAKARTA** LATER TODAY OR TOMORROW TO SOLICIT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND LBH'S ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. BARRY
BT
ADMIN
#1674
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

CDS
CDSN = CFS818 MCN = 94329/05735 TOR = 943290911
PTTCZYUW RUEKJCS3419 3290910-CCCC--RUEANSS.
ZNY CCCCC
HEADER
P 250910Z NOV 94
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEKJSA/STOC
RUEKMDT/USDP:CCC
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 250907Z NOV 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3737
INFO RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0487
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1198
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0328
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1251
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0232
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0610
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1820
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0488
BT
CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 011255
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR DS, DS/DSS, DS/OP/EAP, EAP/P AND EAP/PIMBS
ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA/EAPR
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
BODY
TAGS: PREL, ASEC, PINS, PHUM, PO, UN, VT, ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMORESE SIT-IN: FINAL SITREP, NUMBER TWELVE
REF: **JAKARTA** 11149 AND PREVIOUS
1. (LOU) THE TWENTY-NINE EAST TIMORESE WHO HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN A SIT-IN ON A PORTION OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND SINCE THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 12 LEFT THE EMBASSY WITHOUT INCIDENT IN A BUS PROVIDED BY THE ICRC AT 17:00 LOCAL TIME ON NOVEMBER 24. (AT EMBASSY REQUEST, THE GROUP VOLUNTARILY MOVED TO A NEW LOCATION ON THE COMPOUND THE

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Steve Blodgett, Senior Reviewer

AFTERNOON OF THE 23RD, FURTHER FROM THE EMBASSY FENCE.) THE TWO TIMORESE WHO HAD BEEN AT A LOCAL HOSPITAL SINCE THE 20TH WERE EARLIER RETURNED TO THE EMBASSY COMPOUND, UNDER THE ESCORT OF TWO EMBOFFS, SO THAT ALL 29 COULD DEPART FOR PORTUGAL TOGETHER. SOME 100 SPECTATORS AND JOURNALISTS HAD GATHERED OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY TO WITNESS THE DEPARTURE OF THE GROUP FROM THE EMBASSY. THE EMBASSY MAINTAINED A HEIGHTENED SECURITY PRESENCE DURING THE TRANSFER OF THE 29 TO THE ICRC'S CUSTODY. THE ICRC EXPERIENCED NO UNTOWARD DIFFICULTIES WITH TRANSFERRING THE GROUP TO THE AIRPORT, AND THEY LEFT INDONESIA AT APPROXIMATELY 19:50 LOCAL TIME ON A KLM FLIGHT BOUND FOR AMSTERDAM.

2. (LOU) THE GROUP GAVE DCM A PETITION THEY ASKED TO BE CONVEYED TO PRESIDENT CLINTON AS THEY BOARDED THE ICRC BUS IN THE COMPOUND. THE GIST OF THE DOCUMENT CALLS FOR THE U.S. TO USE ITS "MORAL STATURE" TO WEIGH-IN ON THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION, AND REQUESTS PRESIDENT CLINTON TO ASK PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TO RELEASE JAILED FRETILIN LEADER XANANA GUSMAO AND OTHER "POLITICAL PRISONERS", TO AUTHORIZE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE EAST TIMORESE CHURCH, THE CNRM, THE UDT AND FRETILIN IN TALKS ABOUT EAST TIMOR, AND TO AUTHORIZE AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OF THE NOVEMBER, 1991 SHOOTING IN THE SANTA CRUZ CEMETERY IN DILI. THE DOCUMENT, WHICH WAS TO BE SIGNED ON BEHALF OF **EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS** AND WORKERS, ALSO URGED THE RELEASE OF OTHER LONG-TERM INDONESIAN "POLITICAL PRISONERS" AND CALLED FOR THE U.S. TO SUPPORT THE RIGHT OF INDONESIAN WORKERS TO ORGANIZE UNIONS FREELY AND THE RELEASE OF JAILED LABOR LEADER MOCHTAR PAKPAHAN.

3. (C) THERE WAS ANOTHER POLITICAL DEMONSTRATION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR IN DILI ON NOVEMBER 24, INVOLVING SEVERAL HUNDRED STUDENTS AND YOUTH, ACCORDING TO LOCAL SOURCES AND PRESS REPORTS. SOME ROCKS WERE REPORTEDLY THROWN, AND TEAR GAS USED BY RIOT POLICE, BUT NO SERIOUS INJURIES WERE INCURRED, AND MOST OF THE CROWD SEEMS TO HAVE DISPERSED FOLLOWING NEGOTIATIONS. SOME SOURCES REPORT THAT THE MILITARY WAS DEPLOYED NEAR THE UNIVERSITY, BUT THAT IT WAS NOT ACTUALLY INVOLVED IN BRINGING THE SITUATION TO AN END.

BARRY

BT

ADMIN

#3419

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

CDS
CDSN = CFS250 MCN = 94320/16783 TOR = 943201229
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS3970 3201228-UUUU--RUEANSS.
ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
O 161228Z NOV 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUWSMXI/AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
RUFGAID/USCINCEUR INTEL VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2/DIA REP//
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK//CC/DOA//
RUEALGX/SAFE
O 161222Z NOV 94
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7994
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6029
RHFQAAA/AFOSI REGION 5 RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC/EAC//
BT
CONTROLS
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 007157
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR, I/RW, EU-MKULLA
STATE FOR EUR/P, EUR/NE
E.O. 12356: N/A
BODY
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS MEDIA REACTION "APEC"
1. SUMMARY:
THE APEC CONFERENCE RECEIVED MAINLY FACTUAL COVERAGE IN THE NETHERLANDS. THE DEMONSTRATIONS BY **EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS** WERE HIGHLIGHTED. TWO PAPERS ANTICIPATED THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT LINK THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS WITH TIDE, CITING RECENT U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AS A PRECEDENT. FOLLOWING PARAS PROVIDE EXCERPTS FROM ONE EDITORIAL AND ONE COMMENTARY.

2. CALVINIST LEFT 'TROUW' INSIDE PAGE COMMENTARY

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Steve Blodgett, Senior Reviewer

"DEMONSTRATORS LEAVE THE U.S. NO OPTIONS"

"TH E DEMONSTRATIONS BY **EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS** ARE TRYING TO MAKE THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS SOMETHING MORE THAN JUST A FOOTNOTE OF THE APEC MEETING IN **JAKARTA**.... THE U.S. IS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION: THERE ARE MAJOR TIDE INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC. THE EIGHTEEN APEC COUNTRIES TOGETHER PROVIDE ONE OF EVERY FOURTEEN AMERICANS WITH AN INCOME....

-

"OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER EXPANSION OF U.S. EXPORT ARE MAINLY IN THIS REGION, AND THESE ARE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH PRESIDENT CLINTON WOULD WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FOR THE RECOVERY OF THE U.S. ECONOMY. HOWEVER, IF PRESIDENT CLINTON DOES NOT MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT COMMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE, THEN THE U.S. WILL BE SENDING THE REVERSE MESSAGE TO INDONESIA AND OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES. THAT MESSAGE WOULD BE THAT VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS NOT TOO SERIOUS IF THERE ARE MAJOR TIDE OPPORTUNITIES INVOLVED."

3. INFLUENTIAL LIBERAL LEFT 'DE VOLKSKRANT' INSIDE PAGE EDITORIAL

"SMALL SUCCESS FOR CLINTON"

"APEC CONSISTS OF WIDE VARIETY OF COUNTRIES, VERY BIG ONES, VERY SMALL ONES; COUNTRIES WITH HIGHLY DEVELOPED ECONOMIES AND COUNTRIES WITH EMERGING ECONOMIES. THEY ARE ALSO COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERENT POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND CULTURES. AT THIS MOMENT IT SEEMS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE BORDERS BETWEEN THESE COUNTRIES WILL EVERY DISAPPEAR FOR GOODS, SERVICES, AND CAPITAL....

-

"THE BOGOR DECLARATION IS MAINLY A DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON. AFTER HIS PAINFUL DEFEAT IN THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, HE NOW HAS BOOKED A SUCCESS, FOR THE APEC AGREEMENT OFFERS SOME PERSPECTIVE ON THE U.S. EXPORT INDUSTRY. IT ALSO GIVES PRESIDENT CLINTON SOME EXTRA ARGUMENTS TO GET THE GATT ACCORD RATIFIED BY CONGRESS...

-
"...THE EAST TIMORESE SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO GET ATTENTION FOR THE ILLEGAL INDONESIAN ANNEXATION OF EAST TIMOR. THEY SUCCEEDED, BUT WHETHER THEIR ACTIONS WILL LEAD TO IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR FATE IS STILL DOUBTFUL. CLINTON'S POLICY TOWARD CHINA TAUGHT US THAT THE U.S. WOULD OTHER NO LONGER COMBINE HUMAN RIGHTS WITH TIDE."
BERGER
BT
ADMIN
#3970
NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C60

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN PART
B6

PAGE 01 JAKART 01355 260911Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /000 W
----------002355 260913Z /38
O 260909Z JAN 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0877

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE JAKARTA 01355

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 13
:
1. (U) FESTIVAL OF INDONESIA
:----------
WE HAVE BEEN MULLING OVER YOUR COMMENTS ON FESTIVAL OF INDONESIA (YOUR O-I NO 12). WHILE WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO QUIETLY ENCOURAGE OUR INDONESIAN FRIENDS TO MOVE ON THE QUESTION OF A U.S. PATRON, WE FEEL WE NEED A BIT MORE UNDERSTANDING OF THE LIKELY RESPONSE FROM OUR SIDE. ARE WE TO TAKE IT FROM YOUR COMMENTS (CITING PETER WATSON) THAT IF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA ASKED IBU TIEN'S COUNTERPART, THE RESPONSE WOULD BE POSITIVE? IF THAT IS THE CASE, WE ARE COMFORTABLE MOVING HERE PROVIDED THAT YOU DO THE SAME WITH AMB RAMLY. PLEASE ADVISE.
:
2. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
:----------
CONCERNING THE NEW LANGUAGE ABOUT KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS IN EAST TIMOR IN 1989, WE URGE THAT SOME QUALIFICATION BE ADDED TO THE COUNT OF "TWO DOZEN OR MORE", GIVEN THE IMPERFECT DEGREE OF ACCURACY THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF THIS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 01355 260911Z

COUNT ATTRIBUTES TO IT (JAKARTA 18385, PARA. 8). THE REFERENCE IN SECTION 1-A WOULD BETTER READ:
"CIVILIANS, NUMBERING PERHAPS TWO DOZEN OR MORE, WERE KILLED BY THE MILITARY IN EAST TIMOR IN 1989."

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

:
3 . (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, CONT.
:----------

WE HAVE NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE FIRST TWO ADDITIONS PROPOSED BY HA IN YOUR O-I NO. 14. THE PROPOSED ADDITION TO SECTION 4 IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. FIRST, THE LANGUAGE WOULD NEED CONSIDERABLE MORE NUANCE TO BE SUITABLE FOR PUBLIC USE; AND SECOND, THE ICRC REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH WHOM WE WOULD HAVE TO CLEAR LANGUAGE IS ABSENT FROM JAKARTA UNTIL NEXT WEEK. NO REFERENCE TO ICRC DIFFICULTIES MAY FIGURE IN THE DOCUMENT WITHOUT LOCAL REPEAT LOCAL ICRC CONCURRENCE.

:
4. (U) BRIAN O'CONNOR'S PUNCAK JAYA EXPEDITION...
:----------

DUE TO A LAST MINUTE CANCELLATION BY AVE'S OFFICE, DICK WILL MEET WITH S. BROTO AFTER BROTO'S RETURN FROM BALI ON JANUARY 29. THIS IS OK - BROTO IS MOST FAMILIAR WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS.

IN SPEAKING WITH MARCIA, BRIAN O'CONNOR'S SECRETARY, DICK WAS POSITIVE BUT MENTIONED CAVEAT THAT INDONESIAN SECURITY MAY BE REVIEWING ITS APPROVAL IN LIGHT OF DECEMBER INCIDENTS INVOLVING OPM IN JAYAPURA. DICK ALSO NOTED THAT EMBASSY'S DECEMBER 8 TRAVEL ADVISORY WAS NOT RELATED IN ANY WAY TO DECEMBER 14 INCIDENT BUT WAS STILL IN EFFECT. FYI, TEXT OF ADVISORY AS SUGGESTED BY 89 STATE 391440, WAS AS FOLLOWS: "THE EMBASSY IN JAKARTA LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 JAKART 01355 260911Z

HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION (FROM WASHINGTON) WHICH SUGGESTS THAT FOREIGN BUSINESSES OR MISSIONARY PERSONNEL IN IRIAN JAYA MAY BE TARGETTED BY THE FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT IN AN ATTEMPT TO EMBARRASS THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA AND PERSONAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS ARE ADVISED."
:
5. (U) SUMMER INTERN
:----------

THANKS FOR THE ALERT IN YOUR O-I NO. 1 ABOUT THE SUMMER INTERN PROGRAM. WE ARE GOING TO LET THE OPPORTUNITY PASS THIS YEAR.
:
6. (U) DESTITUTE AND DISORIENTED USCIT [redacted] B6
:----------

PLEASE ENCOURAGE CA/OCS/EMR TO REPLY IMMEDIATELY TO OUR JANUARY 25 AND 26 CABLES JAKARTA 1204 AND JAKARTA 1327 RE [redacted] WHOSE SITUATION IS INCREASINGLY PRECARIOUS. B6
MONJO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 006332 082254Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

5613
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
EAP/IMBS: BSHARVEY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
EAP/IMBS ONLY - 3 COPIES
----------32A3BD 082255Z /38
P 082251Z JAN 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 006332

FOR DCM FROM IMBS TEARE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 4

1. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT.

BARBARA NEGOTIATED WITH TOM WILLIAMS ON THE TWO REMAINING ISSUES ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (NOT INCLUDING WORKERS' RIGHTS, WHICH IS STILL IN PROCESS).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 006332 082254Z
--INTRODUCTION, PARA 3: HA AGREED TO SUBSTITUTE "AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL CONTROLS" FOR "LACK OF A CLEAR RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT."

--SECTION 1D, PARA 3: WILLIAMS MAINTAINS, AND WE AGREE, THAT MENTION SHOULD BE MADE OF DHARSONO'S RELEASE IN THE 1990 REPORT. AT THE SAME TIME, WILLIAMS IS ADAMANT THAT SOME MENTION BE MADE OF THE CHARACTER OF THE TRIAL. WE LOOKED AGAIN AT THE 1985 REPORT'S TREATMENT OF DHARSONO'S TRIAL. IT COMES IN SECTION 1E, "DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425

TRIAL." THE DISCUSSION OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN GENERAL, AND OF THE DHARSONO TRIAL IN PARTICULAR, APPEARS TO US QUITE CRITICAL (AND RIGHTLY SO). WE (IMBS) HAVE THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT A CHANGE OF POSITION IS CALLED FOR, AND THAT WE SHOULD ABANDON OUR PREVIOUS STRATEGY OF SETTLING FOR DELETION OF REFERENCE TO THE RELEASE IF WE COULD NOT AVOID CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ORIGINAL TRIAL. ACCORDINGLY, WE HAVE GONE BACK TO NEGOTIATING THE LANGUAGE. WILLIAMS IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER WORDING OTHER THAN THE PRESENT "WHAT WAS WIDELY REGARDED AS AN UNFAIR TRIAL." COULD THE EMBASSY LIVE WITH "A TRIAL THAT WAS WIDELY CRITICIZED AT THE TIME FOR FAILING TO MEET INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF FAIRNESS"? IF NOT, CAN YOU SUGGEST OTHER LANGUAGE?

2. (U) OHIO UNIVERSITY VISIT TO JAKARTA

MARGARET TUTWILER'S OFFICE CALLED TO ASK THAT WE LET THE AMBASSADOR KNOW THAT OHIO UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT CHARLES PING MAY REQUEST AN APPOINTMENT. ROGER AILES CONTACTED MS. TUTWILER ON BEHALF OF PING, WHO BEGAN A VISIT TO

JAKARTA ON JANUARY 8. PING'S VISIT IS AT THE SUGGESTION OF AMBASSADOR SALEH BASARAH, FORMER INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR TO BRITAIN AND FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE INDONESIAN AIR FORCE. OHIO UNIVERSITY IS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF FORMING AN ACADEMIC PROGRAM IN COOPERATION WITH A HOST UNIVERSITY IN INDONESIA. PING WILL MEET WITH DR. SUKARDI RANUWINARDJA, DG FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, AS WELL AS WITH SEVERAL INDONESIAN-UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS. PING IS ACCOMPANIED BY DR. STEPHEN FULLER, CHAIRMAN OF WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, AND DENNIS HEFFERNAN, PAST CHAIRMAN OF THE OHIO UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES.

WE HAVE FAXED YOU ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT PING'S VISIT.

3. (U) WANANDI IN WASHINGTON

JUSUF WANANDI WAS IN TOWN FOR SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 24 HOURS. DICK SOLOMON TOOK HIM TO LUNCH TODAY AND INCLUDED GEORGE BENSON AND ME. THE CONVERSATION INCLUDED CAMBODIA, JAPAN, AND THE POLITICS OF THE EAST-WEST CENTER. WANANDI ALSO MET WITH PEOPLE AT DOD, DIA, AND USIA. HE WAS THE BENSONS' GUEST OF HONOR LAST NIGHT AT A DINNER ATTENDED

ALSO BY PAUL AND CLARE WOLFOWITZ, KARL JACKSON AND JEAN ADEN, MARTHA HOLDRIDGE AND BARBARA HARVEY.

4. (C) A STUDY ON U.S.-INDONESIA RELATIONS

IN A CONVERSATION WITH DOD'S HAL MAYNARD, WANANDI REVEALED THAT HE AND HASNAN HABIB ARE COMPLETING A MAJOR CSIS STUDY, APPARENTLY COMMISSIONED BY THE GOI, CONCERNING THE

STATUS AND FUTURE OF U.S.-INDONESIA RELATIONS. WANANDI SAID THE STUDY WILL PROVIDE NO BIG SURPRISES. THE STUDY'S THRUST IS THAT JAPAN IS NOW MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE U.S. TO INDONESIA. WHILE THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP MUST BE KEPT ON AN EVEN KEEL AND INDONESIA MUST CONTINUE TO DO BUSINESS WITH US, THE INDONESIAN RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN MUST NECESSARILY BE MORE INTENSE.



B1

5. (U) MORE CONGRATULATIONS

TIM CARNEY ARRIVED BACK FROM USUN TO CAMP WITH US WHILST DOING INDOCHINA-RELATED PROJECTS. HE IS DELIGHTED TO JOIN US IN SEEING JAKARTA COLLEAGUES, PRESENT AND FORMER, ON THE PROMOTION LIST, NOTABLY: GINA MILLER AND JAN RHODES; BETTY PAPPAS AND BRUCE DUNCOMBE; DICK LIVINGSTON; JIM BAYUK; LES OLY AND WALLY SZCZESNIAK; AND "NEWCOMER" TIM HAMILTON. MANY HAPPY RETURNS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
C86
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN PART
B5

PAGE 01 STATE 427382 192145Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

4472
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
EAP/IMBS ONLY - 3 COPIES
----------2CBA23 192146Z /38
P 192145Z DEC 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 427382

FOR DCM FROM IMBS TEARE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 163

1. (LOU) TONY HALL LETTER - HA REVISIONS

HA HAS PROPOSED A FEW REVISIONS TO THE DRAFT TONY HALL LETTER WHICH WE PROVIDED IN OUR O-I NO. 161. PLEASE FACTOR THESE REVISIONS IN AS YOU CONSIDER COMMENTS. THANKS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 427382 192145Z
PARAGRAPH TWO, SENTENCE ONE. CHANGE IT TO READ: "THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE A CORNERSTONE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. WE ARE COMMITTED TO PROMOTING SUCH BASIC RIGHTS NOT JUST IN EAST TIMOR...."

PARAGRAPH SEVEN, SENTENCES ONE AND TWO. CHANGE THEM TO READ: "IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, SEVERAL DEMONSTRATIONS, SOME OF THEM VIOLENT, TOOK PLACE IN THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, DILI. SECURITY FORCES BEGAN A SERIES..."

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PARAGRAPH EIGHT, SENTENCE ONE. INSERT AFTER "MAY HAVE" THE FOLLOWING: "CREATED AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH".

PARAGRAPH NINE, SENTENCE THREE. INSERT "PERCEIVED" AFTER "BASED ON".

PARAGRAPH ELEVEN, FINAL TWO SENTENCES. SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING: "WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THIS DIALOGUE AND ANY STEPS THAT MIGHT LEAD TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS, BOTH OF WHICH ARE OUR FRIENDS."

PARAGRAPH TWELVE, END. ADD THE FOLLOWING: "WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE HUMAN-RIGHTS SITUATION IN INDONESIA, INCLUDING EAST TIMOR, AND, AS NECESSARY, WILL MAKE OUR CONCERNS KNOWN TO THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT."

2. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

BY NOW YOU HAVE PROBABLY SEEN OUR TAKE SIX WHICH DESCRIBED THE FOUR REMAINING ITEMS IN CONTROVERSY, ASIDE FROM WORKERS RIGHTS. EITHER BARBARA OR I WILL HAVE A MEETING

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SOON WITH HA TO PUSH FOR THE "PATERNALISTIC POLITICAL CONTROLS" LANGUAGE AND TO INSIST ON DROPPING THE CHARACTERIZATION OF DHARSONO'S TRIAL.

HA SEEMS TO BE FIRMING ITS POSITION ON DHARSONO. [redacted] B5

HA IS WILLING TO DROP THE ENTIRE MENTION OF DHARSONO; THAT WOULD REMOVE THE "PRECEDENT-SETTING" ASPECT FROM THE REPORT. HOWEVER, WE SEE DHARSONO'S RELEASE FROM PRISON AS A VERY IMPORTANT HUMAN-RIGHTS EVENT FROM 1990 WHICH MUST RECEIVE MENTION IN THE REPORT.

WHILE THIS MAY ESCALATE TO THE SEVENTH FLOOR, WE STILL HOPE TO RESOLVE IT SHORT OF THAT. AGAIN, IF WE REACH A POINT AT WHICH IT SEEMS NECESSARY TO PLAY AN AMBASSADORIAL-CABLE CARD, WE WILL IMMEDIATELY SIGNAL.

3. (U) INSURANCE EXPERTS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

L'S JAMIE SELBY CALLED. SOME OF HER CONTACTS HAVE HEARD THAT INDONESIA IS SCOUTING AROUND FOR EXPERTS ON THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY TO TAKE A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT INDONESIA'S SYSTEM. SHE KNOWS OF AN AMERICAN FIRM THAT CAN PROVIDE TOP-FLIGHT EXPERTISE FOR SUCH A PROJECT, AND SHE WOULD LIKE TO PUT THAT FIRM IN CONTACT WITH THE APPROPRIATE GOI OFFICIALS. CAN YOU FIND AN INDONESIAN

POINT OF CONTACT?

BAKER

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C87

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN PART
B6

PAGE 01 STATE 420434 130529Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

4000
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
EAP/IMBS ONLY - 3 COPIES
----------29FA2E 130531Z /38
P 130527Z DEC 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 420434

FOR DCM FROM IMBS TEARE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 159

1. (U) LEW READE

AID'S INDONESIA DESK CALLED TO ASK IF AMBASSADOR MONJO EVER SENT IN A CONCURRENCE TO THE APPOINTMENT OF LEW READE AS USAID INDONESIA DIRECTOR. LEW RECALLS A CABLE GOING OUT TO THE AMBASSADOR REQUESTING CONCURRENCE, BUT AID CAN NOT FIND A RESPONSE. SINCE LEW IS ALREADY SWORN IN, THIS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 420434 130529Z
WOULD SEEM JUST A FORMALITY; HOWEVER, THE AID BUREAUCRACY WILL NOT ISSUE TRAVEL ORDERS UNTIL IT HAS AN AMBASSADORIAL CONCURRENCE IN HAND.

2. [redacted]

B6

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

B6

3. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

YOU SHOULD RECEIVE A FRONT-CHANNEL CABLE SHORTLY WITH HA, RP, AND L SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISIONS TO YOUR REVISIONS. YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE DHARSONO-TRIAL LANGUAGE REMAINS A BONE OF CONTENTION WITH HA; HOWEVER, WE HAVE RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT HA NOW SEES THAT ITEM AS A BARGAINING CHIP, NOT SOMETHING THAT WE WILL HAVE TO GO TO THE MAT ON. WE WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE AND DISCUSS WITH HA YOUR FRONT-CHANNEL RESPONSE TO THIS NEW CABLE BEFORE CONSIDERING THE AMBASSADOR'S OFFER TO SEND A FIRST-PERSON CABLE TO THE SEVENTH FLOOR.

4. (LOU) AWARD AND TRAVEL OF PROFESSOR GEORGE KAHIN

YOU WILL ALSO RECEIVE A FRONT-CHANNEL MESSAGE ON THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 STATE 420434 130529Z

INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT'S AWARD OF A MEDAL TO CORNELL PROFESSOR GEORGE KAHIN. IN THE PAST THE KAHINS HAVE SOMETIMES EXPERIENCED DELAYS IN OBTAINING RESEARCH VISAS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE INDONESIAN EMBASSY HERE TO MAKE SURE THERE ARE NO GLITCHES, WE THINK IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE IF THE EMBASSY COULD CHECK WITH CONTACTS AT MFA AND IMMIGRATION TO BE SURE THAT THE WORKING-LEVEL IMMIGRATION PEOPLE AT THE AIRPORT ARE NOTIFIED -- JUST IN CASE THEY ARE WORKING FROM AN OLD BLACKLIST.

BAKER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 JAKART 14625 100951Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-01 ONY-00 /002 W
----------216301 101004Z /38
O 100923Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7983

C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N JAKARTA 14625

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: DEC: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 137

1. (U) CONGRESSIONAL LETTER ON EAST TIMOR

FYI, ONE OF OUR LOCAL CONTACTS JUST PROVIDED US THE TEXT OF REP. HALL'S ANNUAL LETTER ON EAST TIMOR, WHICH CLAIMS 110 CO-SIGNERS TO DATE. REPORTING FROM THE PAST TWO EMBASSY VISITS SHOULD GIVE YOU SUFFICIENT MATERIAL FOR A RESPONSE, ONCE THE LETTER IS DELIVERED TO THE DEPARTMENT. IF NOT, LET US KNOW. IN ANY CASE, WE WOULD LIKE TO CLEAR. WE ALSO RECEIVED FROM OUR CONTACT A STATEMENT PREPARED BY BISHOP MOORE FOR THE UN SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DECOLONIZATION. MOORE SAYS BISHOP BELO STILL WANTS A REFERENDUM ON SELF-DETERMINATION.

2. (C) IRAQI DIPLOMATIC ACCOUNTS
:---



B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425

3 . (LOU-NOFORN) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT CHECKLIST
:----------

WE WILL DOUBTLESS HAVE TO UPDATE PARTS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (JAKARTA 14509) TO REFLECT DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR. HERE IS OUR SHORT LIST OF SPECIFIC ISSUES THAT BEAR WATCHING/INVESTIGATING:

:-- CIVILIANS KILLED IN EAST TIMOR AND ELSEWHERE;

:-- DETAILS OF ANY DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST MILITARY PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR ABUSES;

:-- STATUS OF GOI STANCE ON EXPANDED FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS;

:-- ACCESS BY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS TO EAST TIMOR (COULD YOU OR HA ASK AI AND AW WHETHER THEY HAVE REQUESTED VISITS THIS YEAR?);

:-- ACCESS BY ICRC TO IMPRISONED MUSLIM ACTIVISTS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 14625 100951Z

(SEPTEL).

MONJO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C98

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN PART
B5

PAGE 01 STATE 028547
ORIGIN EAP-03

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /003 R

DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS:DCAMP 8648J
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS:RWTEARE
EAP/IMBS:BSHARVEY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE EAP/IMBS-THREE COPIES FOR IMBS
----------067515 270813Z /20
P 270611Z JAN 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 028547

FOR DCM FROM IMBS TEARE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OGEN, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 15

1. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

[redacted] B5

2. (LOU) PL-480

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 09 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

WE ARE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT FY91 PL-480 FOR INDONESIA, BUT THE IMMEDIATE THREAT IS TO THE FY90 ALLOCATION. AT THIS WEEK'S DCC MEETING, USDA INDICATED A WISH TO ELIMINATE INDONESIA PL-480 FOR THIS YEAR. IT CAME OUT THAT USDA IS GETTING SOME OF ITS INFORMATION ON THE INDONESIAN MARKET FROM U.S. WHEAT ASSOCIATES. WHEN JUNIOR MINISTER SOEDRADJAT WAS AT USDA THIS WEEK, HE WAS REPORTEDLY TOLD THAT INDONESIA WAS EXPORTING WHEAT FLOUR (PERHAPS BASED ON WHEAT ASSOCIATES INFORMATION). HE SAID HE WOULD "LOOK INTO IT."

BECAUSE OF THE CONFUSION ABOUT THE FACTS (AND THE SOURCE OF USDA'S INFORMATION) EB IS DOING A FRONT CHANNEL CABLE TO YOU ASKING FOR YOUR VIEWS AND FOR FACTS. AFTER YOUR REPLY, THE BATTLE IN THE DCC WILL BE REJOINED. OUR VIEW, SHARED BY AID, IS THAT IF INDONESIA IS NOT EXPORTING WHEAT PRODUCTS IN FY90 AND IF BULOG WANTS WHEAT, WE SHOULD HOLD THE DCC TO ITS COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE WHEAT TO MEET THE CP LEVEL (FOR INDONESIA, 10 MILLION DOLLARS) FOR THOSE COUNTRIES WHO CAN ONLY TAKE WHEAT. WE ARE MAKING THE POINT HERE THAT IT IS POLITICALLY IMPORTANT TO MEET OUR IGGI PLEDGE, AND WE ARE DEPENDENT ON PL-480 FOR THAT.

3. (U) PETROLEUM REPORT
----------,-------
STILL NOT RECEIVED. CAN YOU GIVE US A REGISTRY NUMBER? BAKER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), 1.4(B)

PAGE 01 STATE 024778
ORIGIN EAP-03

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /003 R

DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS:DCAMP 8648J
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS:RWTEARE
EAP/IMBS:BSHARVEY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE EAP/IMBS-THREE COPIES FOR IMBS
----------311042 250906Z /23
P 250726Z JAN 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 024778

FOR DCM FROM IMBS TEARE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OGEN, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL,INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 13

1. (C) EAST TIMOR

WE FOUND VERY USEFUL AND THOUGHT-PROVOKING YOUR FIRST REPORT ON THE AMBASSADOR'S TRIP; WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE OTHERS.



B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425

2. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

---,---,---

FYI, IN LIGHT OF YOUR END-OF-THE-YEAR REPORT ON EST TIMOR, HA IS STRENGTHENING THE TWO PORTIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REFERRING TO KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS IN THE PROVINCE. GIVEN THE ADMISSIONS BY CARRASCALAO AND PONT THAT THE MILITARY DID KILL CIVILIANS, REFERENCES TO ALLEGATIONS WILL BE REMOVED; THE INTRODUCTION WILL NOW CITE SIMPLY "KILLINGS" OF CIVILIANS IN EAST TIMOR AND SECTION 1.A. WILL SAY THAT TWO DOZEN OR MORE CIVILIANS WERE KILLED BY THE MILITARY IN EAST TIMOR IN 1989.

3. (LOU) GINANDJAR VISIT

----,---,,----

YOU SHOULD BY NOW HAVE SEEN DOE'S REPLY TO YOUR REQUEST FOR DATES FOR A VISIT BY ADMIRAL WATKINS. TOM CUTLER HAS TOLD ME HE HAD NO LUCK GETTING HIS SENIORS TO APPROVE ASKING THEIR BOSS FOR NEW DATES OR SENDING A FORMAL INVITATION. THE COMPROMISE WE AGREED UPON IS IN THE DOE CABLE, I.E. GIVING THE AMBASSADOR AUTHORIZATION TO RE-EXTEND THE INVITATION HE HAD PREVIOUSLY PUT INTO A LETTER TO GINANDJAR. THIS SHOULD NOT SUGGEST ANY LACK OF INTEREST IN HAVING THE MINISTER VISIT BUT RATHER AN UNWILLINGNESS TO COMMIT WATKINS TO ANYTHING SO FAR IN ADVANCE. (WE EMPATHIZE WITH THEM ON THAT.)

4. (LOU) VISIT OF EXIM CHAIRMAN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 024778

WE UNDERSTAND THAT MACOMBER HAS OPTED FOR THE FEBRUARY 18-20 DATES FOR JAKARTA BECAUSE OF SCHEDULING PROBLEMS ELSEWHERE, DESPITE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR THE PREVIOUS WEEK. HIS STAFF IS CONFIDENT HE WILL BE WILLING TO ADDRESS AN AMCHAM LUNCHEON ON EITHER FEBRUARY 19 OR 20; THE TOPIC WILL LIKELY BE A GENERAL ONE, BUT HE WOULD TOUCH ON THE MIXED CREDITS ISSUE. THE OUTGOING CABLE ANNOUNCING HIS VISIT WILL STATE HIS WILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS AMCHAM-LIKE GROUPS.

5. (LOU) FESTIVAL OF INDONESIA: AMBASSADOR'S PARTICIPATION

---,---

OUR MEMO TO L/M SAID THAT THE AMBASSADOR'S PARTICIPATION IN THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF THE FESTIVAL WOULD BE IN THE USG INTEREST, WOULD NOT INVOLVE FUND-RAISING, AND WOULD BE

LARGELY CEREMONIAL. BASED ON THAT AND SOME FURTHER INQUIRIES THEY MADE DIRECTLY WITH TED TANEN, THE LAWYERS HAVE SAID THERE DOESN'T APPEAR TO BE ANY PROBLEM IN THE AMBASSADOR'S JOINING THE COMMITTEE. THEY SAY, HOWEVER, THAT OUR MEMO TO THEM IS NOT SUFFICIENT; THE AMBASSADOR MUST SEEK PERMISSION DIRECTLY FROM THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, WHO GIVES FINAL AUTHORIZATION AFTER SEEKING L'S VIEWS. A

CABLED REQUEST SHOULD SPECIFY THAT THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF THE FESTIVAL IS A PRIVATE ORGANIZATION. OTHER POINTS MIGHT INCLUDE: IN THE USG INTEREST, NO FUND-RAISING, NO RESPONSIBILITIES CONFLICTING WITH HIS AMBASSADORIAL ROLE, ETC. SLUG YOUR CABLE FOR THE DG, INFO L AND EAP.

6. (U) FESTIVAL VISITORS

HELEN JESSUP CALLED AGAIN TO SAY THAT GALLERY DIRECTOR OSA BROWN HAS A MIDDLE EAR INFECTION, AND THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO LEAVE FOR INDONESIA UNTIL FEBRUARY FIRST. THEY WILL GO DIRECTLY TO JOGJAKARTA, TO WORK WITH THE AUSTRALIAN PHOTOGRAPHER. ACCORDING TO THEIR PRESENT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PLANS, THEY WILL BE IN JAKARTA FEBRUARY 9-18. MS. JESSUP ASKED US TO PASS THIS INFORMATION ON TO THE AMBASSADOR IN VIEW OF HER EARLIER REQUEST FOR A SELAMATAN.

7. (U) TAX TREATY RATIFICATION

SFRC STAFF TOLD US THEY ARE LOOKING AT A LATE FEBRUARY/EARLY MARCH DATE FOR HEARINGS ON THE PENDING TAX TREATIES. THE INTENTION IS TO GET THESE LONG-DELAYED AGREEMENTS CLEARED OFF THE DOCKET AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.

8. (U) FOR ECON SECTION -- DJAKARTA LLOYD

AN INTERIM REPLY SO YOU'LL KNOW IT'S NOT BEEN FORGOTTEN -- THE FOLKS AT PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION MAINTAIN THAT THERE IS NO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR A STATE ORGANIZATION ENGAGED IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES. THEY DON'T SEE ANY PARTICULAR RECOURSE FOR DJAKARTA LLOYD OR ANY ROLE FOR THE USG. WE ARE LOOKING FOR CONFIRMATION OF THAT (OR A LOOPHOLE) FROM STATE LAWYERS. BAKER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN PART
B6

PAGE 01 STATE 413534 202307Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

3005
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: AWBARR
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
EAP/IMBS ONLY - 3 COPIES
----------B9D8CC 202308Z /38
P 202306Z DEC 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 413534

FOR DCM FROM IMBS BARR ACTING

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 188

1. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

THANKS FOR JAKARTA 16396. HA WILL PROBABLY WANT TO PROPOSE ADJUSTMENTS TO SOME OF THE EAST TIMOR LANGUAGE, BUT THEIR COMMENTS MAY NOT COME IN FOR A FEW DAYS.

BY THE WAY, FOR YOUR RUNNING EDIT, WE ASSUME YOU INTENDED TO DROP THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 1.A. FORMER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 413534 202307Z
PARAGRAPH 2, NOW PARAGRAPH 3. IT APPEARS TO BE SUPERCEDED BY THE FIRST SENTENCE OF YOUR NEW PARAGRAPH 2.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING EMBASSY REVISIONS TO SECTION 6 SHORTLY. THANKS.

2. (C) CODEL INOUYE/STEVENS

WE WILL GO TO THE HILL TO BRIEF INOUYE'S STAFF DIRECTOR MONDAY AFTERNOON ON INDONESIA IN GENERAL AND EAST TIMOR IN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425

PARTICULAR. BEFORE THE MEETING, WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS ON POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF THE VISIT, AS WELL AS WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT USE THE CODEL TO PROMOTE U.S. INTERESTS AT THIS SENSITIVE TIME IN THE RELATIONSHIP. THANKS.

3. (LOU) EXTENSION OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT

WE SPOKE WITH JOHN DOOLEY OF OES. THE ISSUE HAS BECOME GENERIC, NOW THAT POLAND HAS A SOMEWHAT SIMILAR SITUATION. PEOPLE ARE STILL WORKING ON THE SOLUTION. DOOLEY SUGGESTS THAT, UNTIL THE GENERIC SOLUTION IS REACHED AND YOU HAVE RECEIVED A FRONT-CHANNEL CABLE OF INSTRUCTION, DO NOT SEND IN A FRONT-CHANNEL CABLE CONVEYING THE TEXT OF THE LATEST DIPNOTE. ALSO, DO NOT MENTION IN ANY FRONT-CHANNEL CABLE A CONNECTION BETWEEN POLAND AND INDONESIA. S/NP CONSIDERS THE POLAND MATTER EXTREMELY SENSITIVE. UNFORTUNATELY, DOOLEY COULD NOT PREDICT WHEN THIS MATTER WILL BE RESOLVED.

4. (LOU) WEOG ACTIVITY IN GENEVA

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] B6 HE INFORMED IO/HW VIA FAX ON DECEMBER 13 THAT A (PORTUGUESE) DRAFT LETTER FROM UNHRC CHAIRMAN BERNALES TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WAS IN THE WORKS AND PROVIDED A TEXT. THE KEY IO/HW OFFICERS WERE OUT SICK AND DID NOT SEE THE PACKET UNTIL LATE ON DECEMBER 16. A FORMAL CABLE GENEVA 13284 WAS SENT ON DECEMBER 16 ANNOUNCING THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT THE DRAFT LETTER UNLESS GENEVA RECEIVED CONTRARY INSTRUCTIONS BY OOB THE 17TH. BY THE TIME IO/HW FOCUSED ON THE ISSUE AND BY THE TIME JAKARTA 16257 HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON, THE WEOG MEETING HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE AND, APPARENTLY, THE U.S. REP HAD AGREED TO THE DRAFT LETTER.

LATE ON DECEMBER 20, IO/HW RECEIVED ANOTHER FAX WHICH, FOR THE FIRST TIME, GAVE INDICATION THAT THE DECEMBER 17 MEETING HAD ACTUALLY TAKEN PLACE AND THAT THE USG HAD SIGNALLED AGREEMENT TO THE LETTER. SINCE THE 17TH, INDONESIA HAS FORMALLY PROTESTED AGAINST SENDING THE LETTER. THE U.S. REP FORWARDED TO IO/HW LANGUAGE BEING CONSIDERED FOR A PROPOSED RESPONSE TO THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. THAT RESPONSE WOULD REAFFIRM THAT BERNALES'

LETTER SHOULD BE SENT. THE U.S. REP SAID HE PLANS TO SUPPORT THE RESPONSE UNLESS HE HEARS FROM IO/HW TO THE CONTRARY BY OOB MONDAY, DECEMBER 23.

NEITHER WE NOR IO/HW IS HAPPY WITH GENEVA'S ACTIONS TO DATE. WE URGED, AND IO/HW AGREED, THAT A FRONT-CHANNEL CABLE WILL GO TO GENEVA ON DECEMBER 20 STATING THAT THE DEPARTMENT INTENDS TO COMMENT ON BOTH THE DRAFT LETTER TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 413534 202307Z

SOEHARTO AND ON THE DRAFT RESPONSE TO THE INDONESIAN PROTEST LETTER. THE CABLE WILL TELL GENEVA TO AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTION BEFORE PROCEEDING. WE ARE FAXING YOU THE INFORMATION IO/HW HAS RECEIVED FROM GENEVA ABOUT THIS ISSUE. PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR THOUGHTS ASAP. FRONT CHANNEL IS PREFERRED, SO THAT GENEVA AND IO/HW GET FORMAL COPIES. THANKS.

EAGLEBURGER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 JAKART 14276 01 OF 02 010932Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001W
----------A7617F 010932Z /38

P 010906Z NOV 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0407

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 14276

FOR EAP/IMBS TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 160
:
1. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
:----------

IN YOUR 0-I NO. 160, YOU NOTE A QUERY FROM HA ON THE NUMBER OF COMMUNISTS REMAINING IN INDONESIA MENTIONED IN SEC. 1(F) OF OUR DRAFT. WE WOULD PROPOSE DELETING THE LANGUAGE BEGINNING WITH THE SENTENCE "GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS TRY..." THROUGH THE REST OF THE SECTION, AND SUBSTITUTING THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT:

GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 14276 01 OF 02 010932Z
ACTIVITIES OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) AND ITS FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY INDIVIDUALS THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP. THE GOVERNMENT STATED IN LATE 1990 THAT THIS LATTER GROUP THEN TOTALLED 1,410,333 PEOPLE. THESE PERSONS AND SOMETIMES THEIR RELATIVES ARE SUBJECT TO SURVEILLANCE, REQUIRED CHECK-INS, AND ARBITRARY ACTIONS BY OFFICIALS, INCLUDING REMOVAL FROM GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425

END TEXT.

2. (C) PAITON PROJECT

[redacted]

B1

4. (U) U.S. -- INDONESIA ENERGY CONSULTATIONS; THE 'OTHER BUSINESS' AGENDA ITEM

STATE 358292 REQUESTS THE INDONESIAN SIDE PROVIDE A SUMMARY OF WHAT IT WILL SAY UNDER THE AGENDA ITEM 'OTHER BUSINESS', PARTICULARLY THE MEANING OF THE INCLUSION: "TRAINING OF INDONESIANS IN THE U.S. AND RELATED SUBJECTS AND PROPOSED PROJECTS WITH POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT." DOE WOULD LIKE A REPLY BEFORE DAS GRUNDY'S LAST DAY IN DC, NOVEMBER 1 .

ON RECEIPT OF THE DOE REQUEST WE FAXED IR. MARZUAN, THE OVERALL COORDINATOR OF THE BILATERAL TALKS ON THE INDONESIAN SIDE, AND PAK SOEMARSO, THE HEAD OF THE BUREAU OF FOREIGN COOPERATION, DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND ENERGY, WHO HAD PROPOSED THIS ADDITION, FOR CLARIFICATION OF WHAT THE INDONESIAN SIDE INTENDED TO

SUGGEST UNDER THIS ITEM.

IR. MARZUAN RESPONDED THE DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND ENERGY WILL EXPRESS ITS APPRECIATION FOR U.S. AID SPONSORSHIP OF TRAINING INDONESIAN OFFICIALS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES. IT MAY ALSO ASK WHETHER IF FEWER EMPLOYEES ARE SENT TO THE U.S. FOR TRAINING WHETHER AID MIGHT ASSUME A GREATER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 14276 01 OF 02 010932Z
PROPORTION OF THE TRANSPORTATION COSTS. ACCORDING TO IR. MARZUAN, IR. SOEMARSO MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS TO RAISE, BUT HE IS UNAVAILABLE AS HE IS TRAVELLING OUT-OF-THE-COUNTRY.

PLEASE ADVISE DOE THAT AID JAKARTA WILL BRIEF THE U.S. DELEGATION ON ITS TRAINING PROGRAMS BEFORE THE CONSULTATIONS BEGIN. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE INDONESIAN SIDE WE WILL BE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 14276 02 OF 02 010932Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001W
----------A7618B 010932Z /38
P 010906Z NOV 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0408

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 14276

FOR EAP/IMBS TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 160

UNPREPARED TO ENTER INTO FURTHER COMMITMENTS AT THIS MEETING AND THE INDONESIAN SIDE APPRECIATES THIS FACT. CONSEQUENTLY, WE REQUEST DOE RECONSIDER THE 'PREMISE' CONTAINED IN STATE 358292, PARA 2.

OTHER QUESTIONS RAISED BY DOE IN RECENT MESSAGES/O/I'S:

:

-- TRANSPORTATION: DRY WILL MEET TOM CUTLER AT THE AIRPORT ON NOVEMBER 2. EMBASSY VAN WILL MEET OTHER ARRIVALS NOVEMBER 3. DRY AND CUTLER PLAN MEETING GRUNDY AND KLUG ON NOVEMBER 4. WE HAVE DECLINED KIND INVITATION OF MIGAS TO MEET GRUNDY AT THE AIRPORT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-- MEETING WITH FCS: TED VILLINSKI WILL BE IN KUALA LUMPUR FOR MOST OF THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 4. COMMERCIAL OFFICER JEFF HARDEE, HOWEVER, WILL BE AVAILABLE TO BRIEF U.S. DELEGATION ON MONDAY AFTERNOON, NOVEMBER 4. TED VILLINSKI MAY BE AVAILABLE TO MEET DELEGATION EARLY MORNING, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 7, PRIOR TO APPOINTMENTS WITH INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

-- GINANDJAR'S SCHEDULE FOR LATER IN THE AUTUMN: GINANDJAR IS SCHEDULED TO GO TO OPEC ON NOVEMBER 26. FROM THERE HE WILL GO TO UK. HE NEXT PLANS TO VISIT JAPAN, AND END UP IN AUSTRALIA DECEMBER 9-10. ACCORDING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND ENERGY, HE MAY STOP EN ROUTE FROM THE UK TO JAPAN IN THE U.S.

:

5. (C) ADB AND THE ELEVENTH ROAD (SECTOR) PROJECT

WE HAVE REVIEWED THE ROAD PROJECT AND DISCUSSED WITH USAID RENTSCHLER'S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE U.S. GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING MDB PROJECTS. BASED ON

ADB'S SEEMINGLY UNFULFILLED ASSURANCES ON HOW THE PROJECT WAS TO BE DESIGNED, PLUS CONCERN ABOUT NOT SETTING THE WRONG PRECEDENT ON THIS, THE FIRST PROJECT UNDER THE BANK'S NEW ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES, WE AGREE THAT THE USD SHOULD SIGNAL OUR CONCERN BY NOT VOTING YES ON THE LOAN. HOWEVER, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE USD ABSTAIN RATHER THAN VOTE NO, SO THAT WE NOT SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL TO THE GOI.

CONFIDENTIAL

MONJO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 JAKART 17465 050622Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 COR-01 ONY-00 /001 W
----------077174 050628Z /12/60

O 050140Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9557

S E C R E T JAKARTA 17465

NOFORN

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 161
1. [redacted] B1

2. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

RESPONSE TO YOUR O-I 151 FOLLOWS:

SECTION 6.A. RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION:

MINISTER OF MANPOWER REGULATION NO. PER-US/MEN/87 GOVERNS THE REGISTRATION OF "LABOR ORGANIZATIONS" - SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 17465 050622Z

ORGANISI PEKERJA.

THE REGULATION DEFINES A LABOR ORGANIZATION AS AN ORGANIZATION WHICH IS VOLUNTARILY ESTABLISHED BY AND FOR THE WORKERS IN THE FORM OF A LABOR UNION AND IS UNITARY IN NATURE.

ONCE THE CRITERIA FOR LEGAL REGISTRATION IS PRESENTED (REPRESENTATION IN 20 PROVINCES, 100

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425

DISTRICTS AND 1,000 LABOR UNITS WITHIN COMPANIES), THE REGULATIONS REFER TO THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INTERCHANGEABLY AS A LABOR UNION ORGANIZATION AND LABOR UNION. THE BRANCH UNITS AT THE PROVINCIAL, DISTRICT AND COMPANY LEVELS ARE REFERRED TO AS ASSOCIATE ORGANIZATIONS. IN PRACTICE ALL BRANCHES ARE REFERRED TO AS THE SPSI.

THE INDONESIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (PGRI), THE INDONESIAN JOURNALIST ASSOCIATION (PWI), AND MEMBERS OF THE SECRETARIAT OF FORMER INDUSTRIAL UNIONS (SEKBER), ALL HOLD THEMSELVES OUT AS EMPLOYEE RQPRESENTATIVES. THE PGRI IS AFFILIATED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE SECRETARIAT, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF FREE TRADE TEACHERS' UNION (IFFTU), AND HAS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (NEA) AND THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (AFT). ONE OF THE SEKBER UNIONS IS AFFILIATED WITH AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE SECRETARIAT AS WELL. THEY CONDUCT TRAINING SESSIONS, SEMINARS, ATTEND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES, ETC., BUT DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT REGISTERED AS LABOR UNIONS.
RE TEACHERS ORGANIZATION
SECRET

LABATT HAS JUST PREPARED A MEMCON ON A RECENT MEETING WITH THE PGRI. THE REPORT PROVIDES USEFUL INFORMATION ON THE OPERATIONS AND POLICIES OF THE ORGANIZATION AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS AS AN EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVE. IT HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO THE DEPARTMENT. THE PGRI HAS NOT APPLIED FOR UNION STATUS AND PROBABLY NEVER WILL DO SO. IT CONSIDERS ITSELF TO BE A PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION NOT A LABOR ORGANIZATION. IT MAINTAINS THAT THOUGH IT DOES NOT ENGAGE IN WHAT IS CONSIDERED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OR RESORT TO STRIKES, IT CONSULTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OVER LEGISLATION OR POLICIES WHICH WILL AFFECT ITS MEMBERS, PROVIDES WRITTEN AND ORAL INPUT, AND HAS SUFFICIENT PULL TO ENSURE THAT ITS IDEAS, POLICIES AND CONTRIBUTIONS ARE REFLECTED IN ANY LEGISLATION, DECREES OR EXECUTIVE DECISIONS PROMULGATED. (TEACHERS OF GOVERNMENT OWNED SCHOOLS ARE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES. ANY POLICIES AND PRACTICES DEFINING THEIR WORKING CONDITIONS ARE NORMALLY ISSUED IN THE FORM OF REGULATIONS, MINISTERIAL DECISIONS, ETC.) MONJO

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C120

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN PART
B4

PAGE 01 JAKART 17360 01 OF 02 011012Z
ACTION EAP-03

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /003 W
----------232235 011047Z /20
O 011006Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9489

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 17360

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 160
1. (U) AMB'S CHRISTMAS CARD ORDER

COULD YOU PLEASE ASK SOMEONE TO TELEPHONE COPENHAVER AND INQUIRE ABOUT STATUS OF ORDER PLACED IN SEPTEMBER IN THE AMOUNT OF $191.25. CHECK DATED SEPTEMBER 5 WAS CASHED SEPTEMBER 20. PENCILED ON CHECK IS "F-61550" WHICH MAY BE COPERHAVER ORDER NUMBER.
2. (U) PERSONNEL - JEFF LUTZ

PLEASE CHECK WITH PER/FCA AND LET US KNOW IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SEND A FRONT CHANNEL MESSAGE FROM THE AMBASSADOR REGARDING JEFF LUTZ'S BID FOR AN EXTENSION HERE IN JAKARTA (JAV'
14Q:QAEQQ3 Q5
3TQQQKQU'
82111 &9-) -,$ 294(0)-, (GWP)

WE TOOK A LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF PARAS. 7 AND 8 OF SECTO 10078'S REPORT ON THE ASEAN PMC AS THE BASIS FOR THE STATEMENT IN OUR FY-90 GWP ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 17360 01 OF 02 011012Z

STANCE THERE ON SEANWFZ AND ZOPFAN. THANKS FOR CLARIFYING THE DISTINCTIONS IN YOUR O-I NO. 149. B4
4. (U) [redacted]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

B4

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

IF APPROPRIATE, PLEASE ADVISE.
5. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

HEREWITH OUR ANSWERS TO THE LATEST QUERIES IN YOUR O-I NO. 150.

(A) THE MAIN POINT TO MAKE ABOUT THE JUDICIARY IS THAT IT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 17360 02 OF 02 011012Z
ACTION EAP-03

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /003 W
----------232250 011050Z /24
O 011006Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9490

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 17360

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 160

IS NOT STRUCTURALLY INDEPENDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE. JUDGES ARE CIVIL SERVANTS, EMPLOYEES OF THE MINISTRIES OF JUSTICE OR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS AND THUS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. JUDGES AUTOMATICALLY BELONG TO KORPRI. WHILE APPOINTMENTS AND DISMISSALS PROBABLY DO OCCUR ON POLITICAL GROUNDS OCCASIONALLY, WE DO NOT HAVE THE FACTS TO SAY SO DEFINITIVELY. PERHAPS THE SENTENCE MIGHT BEST READ: "THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY IS SIGNIFICANTLY CONSTRAINED BY THE FACTS THAT JUDGES ARE CIVIL SERVANTS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND THE SUPREME COURT CAN NOT ANNUL LAWS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT."

(B) THE SUPREME COURT MUST HEAR APPEALS THAT CONFORM WITH SPECIFIED PROCEDURES AND A SPECIFIED TIME LIMIT. THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT MATERIALLY REVIEW CASES (EVIDENCE, WITNESSES, TRIAL CONDUCT) BUT ONLY THE APPLICATION OF LAW BY THE LOWER (DISTRICT AND HIGH) COURTS. HIGH COURTS REVIEW ON APPEAL MATERIAL AND APPLICATION OF LAW ASPECTS OF DISTRICT COURTS' DECISIONS. WE SUGGEST YOU REVISE THE SENTENCE TO READ: "THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 17360 02 OF 02 011012Z

COURT TO HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS. THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT CONSIDER MATERIAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE APPLICATION OF LAW BY LOWER COURTS."

(C) THE POWERS OF THE COURTS AND MINISTRY OF JUSTICE VIS-A-VIS ATTORNEYS REMAIN. WE DROPPED THE LANGUAGE SINCE WE ARE UNAWARE OF THE POWERS BEING EXERCISED THIS YEAR. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO RESTORING THE LANGUAGE.

(D) WE DO NOT HAVE EVIDENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL INFLUENCE BEHIND THE APRIL CALL BY A NATIONAL LEGAL ASSOCIATION TO ITS JAKARTA CHAPTER TO DENY COUNSEL TO CERTAIN PERSONS. ON BALANCE, WE HAVE NO PROBLEM IF THE DEPARTMENT JUDGES MENTION OF THE ASSOCIATION'S MOVE TO BE EXPENDABLE.
MONJO

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN PART
B5

PAGE 01 STATE 005059 071948Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

5485
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
EAP/IMBS ONLY - 3 COPIES
----------3224BC 071949Z /38
P 071952Z JAN 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 005059

FOR DCM FROM IMBS TEARE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 3

1. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

[redacted] B5

2. (LOU) AMBASSADOR'S SPEECH

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 09 NOV 2006 200504425

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NEA HAS NO PROBLEM WITH THE DRAFT SPEECH FOR USE WITH HMI; HOWEVER, THEY DO HAVE A FEW SUGGESTIONS ON THE Q'S AND A'S:

-- ANSWER 6, FINAL SENTENCE SAYS "THE OPTION OF USING MILITARY FORCE TO LIBERATE KUWAIT IS BEING CONSIDERED ONLY IF PEACEFUL MEASURES FAIL." THAT SENTIMENT NEEDS TO BE TIED TO THE JANUARY 15TH DEADLINE.

-- ANSWER 9, FINAL SENTENCE, REVISE TO READ: "THE U.S. BELIEVES ANY REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE PUT IN PLACE CAN NOT BE EFFECTIVE WITHOUT THE CONSENT AND COOPERATION OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION."

-- ANSWER 11: WE DO NOT SPEAK OF A BAKER INITIATIVE. REPLACE "SECRETARY BAKER'S RECENT INITIATIVE" WITH "RECENT STEPS INCLUDING THE ISRAELIS' MAY 14, 1989 INITIATIVE, PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S TEN-POINT INITIATIVE, AND SECRETARY BAKER'S FIVE POINTS...".

-- ANSWER 12, FIRST SENTENCE. WE DO NOT USE THE TERM "SELF-DETERMINATION" IN THIS CONTEXT. DELETE ALL AFTER

"RECOGNIZE", AND REPLACE IT WITH: "AND SUPPORT THE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL RIGHTS FOR THE RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND WISH TO FACILITATE THOSE RIGHTS." (SECOND SENTENCE OK.)
EAGLEBURGER

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

P890155-0718 RELEASED IN FULL

C32

TEXT OF TELEGRAM SECSTATE 397199

ADP062
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 STATE 397199
ORIGIN EAP-02

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /002 R

DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS:DCAMP 0012W
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS:RTEARE
EAP/IMBS:BSHARVEY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
3 COPIES ONLY FOR EAP/IMBS ONLY

----------397001 1400362 /66

P 1400152 DEC 89
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 397199

FOR THE DCM FROM DICK TEARE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 156

1. BELOW IS THE FULL TEXT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, EDITED AND CLEARED BY DEPARTMENT OFFICES, AND SUBSTANTIALLY DONE. A FEW UNCERTAINTIES REMAIN, BUT WE WANTED YOU TO HAVE IT AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE FOR A FINAL CHECK FOR ACCURACY AND ANY NECESSARY UPDATES. YOU MAY FIND THE EDITING OVERLY THOROUGH, BUT YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS YOU HAVE PUT IN IS MUCH APPRECIATED HERE.

2. ONE IMPORTANT PROVISO: THE HA FRONT OFFICE HAS NOT YET GIVEN ITS FINAL APPROVAL TO THE COMPROMISE LANGUAGE WHICH WE SUBMITTED WEEKS AGO TO LEAD OFF SECTION 3. WE WILL RESIST ANY ATTEMPT TO RETURN TO THEIR STATEMENT THAT INDONESIANS DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO CHANGE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 397199

PEACEFULLY THEIR GOVERNMENT.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI)--WHICH INCLUDE THE MILITARY SERVICES AND THE POLICE--ARE THE PREEMINENT INSTITUTIONS IN INDONESIA'S GOVERNMENT, WHICH CAME TO POWER IN THE MID-1960'S AFTER AN ABORTIVE COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP. SINCE 1967 EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY HAS BEEN EXERCISED BY RETIRED AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 09 NOV 2006 200504425

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ACTIVE-DUTY MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN TECHNOCRATS UNDER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S LEADERSHIP. THE PARTLY ELECTED, PARTLY APPOINTED PARLIAMENT (DPR) CONSIDERS BUT DOES NOT INITIATE LEGISLATION. THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR)--CONSISTING OF THE DPR'S 500 MEMBERS AND ANOTHER 500 APPOINTED MEMBERS--MEETS EVERY 5 YEARS TO APPROVE GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY AND ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT.

INDONESIA IS THE FIFTH MOST POPULOUS COUNTRY IN THE WORLD AND THE LARGEST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. SINCE INDEPENDENCE, INDONESIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE SOUGHT TO CREATE A UNIQUE NATIONAL IDENTITY AND TO ACCOMMODATE A DIVERSITY OF ETHNIC, LINGUISTIC, RELIGIOUS, AND SOCIAL GROUPS, WHILE ASSURING INTERNAL SECURITY AND COHESION. THE CENTERPIECE OF THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL PROGRAM IS "PANCASILA," AN ECLECTIC STATE IDEOLOGY EMPHASIZING CONSULTATION AND CONSENSUS AND COMPOSED OF FIVE BROAD PRINCIPLES: BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD, BELIEF IN A JUST AND CIVILIZED HUMANITY, INDONESIAN NATIONAL UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE.

THE ARMED FORCES NUMBER ABOUT 416,000. A LITTLE LESS

THAN HALF SERVE IN THE ARMY, WHICH IS PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH INTERNAL SECURITY. UNDER A "DUAL FUNCTION" CONCEPT, MANY MILITARY OFFICERS SERVE IN PARLIAMENT AND THE CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY AT ALL LEVELS. FREQUENT MILITARY OPERATIONS TOOK PLACE IN EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, WHERE FRETILIN AND ORGANIZATION FOR A FREE PAPUA (OPM) REBELS CONTINUED SPORADIC ACTIVITIES IN LOW-LEVEL INSURGENCIES.

ALTHOUGH INDONESIA'S MIXED ECONOMY INVOLVES THE STATE IN NEARLY ALL SECTORS, THE GOVERNMENT IS PURSUING A SET OF POLICIES DESIGNED TO GIVE GREATER FREEDOM TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR. BEGINNING WITH THE COLLAPSE OF OIL PRICES IN THE EARLY 1980S, DEREGULATION AIMED PRIMARILY AT STIMULATING GROWTH IN NONOIL SECTORS HAS BEEN A MAJOR GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVE. A LARGE DEVALUATION IN 1986, AND A SUBSEQUENT FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATE, HAS HELPED MAINTAIN THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE RUPIAH AND

BOOST NONOIL EXPORTS. THE OIL SECTOR ACCOUNTED FOR LESS THAN 50 PERCENT OF GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS IN 1988. REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) GROWTH IN 1988 WAS 5.7 PERCENT AND THE INDUSTRIAL GROWTH RATE MUCH HIGHER. IN RECENT YEARS, DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN REAL INCOMES IN THE PAST 20 YEARS, THE COUNTRY REMAINS POOR AND WIDE DISPARITIES IN WEALTH CONTINUE. CORRUPTION AND INFLUENCE PEDDLING ARE ENDEMIC AND RESTRICT GROWTH AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DESPITE PROGRESS IN SOME AREAS, INCLUDING GREATER FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR INDONESIANS AND FOREIGNERS TO AND WITHIN EAST TIMOR, CONTINUED TOLERANCE FOR ETHNIC, RACIAL, AND RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES, AND THE CONVICTION AND SENTENCING TO JAIL TERMS OF SEVERAL POLICE OFFICERS FOR MISTREATMENT OR KILLING OF DETAINEES, SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS REMAINED. THESE INCLUDED HARSH

TREATMENT OF MUSLIM ACTIVISTS' EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE OPPOSITION, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE, REPORTS OF EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE IN QUELLING VIOLENCE IN LAMPUNG, PERIODIC DETENTIONS OF EAST TIMORESE SUSPECTED OF FRETILIN SYMPATHIES, UNCONFIRMED REPORTS ALLEGING KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS IN EAST TIMOR, HARSH SENTENCES METED OUT IN SEVERAL SUBVERSION TRIALS, CONTINUED SIGNIFICANT RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOMS OF THE PRESS AND MOVEMENT, AND PERVASIVE POLITICAL CONTROLS WHICH ENSURE CONTINUED MILITARY DOMINATION OF THE GOVERNMENT.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING

CASUALTIES IN LAMPUNG PROVINCE IN A CLASH IN FEBRUARY BETWEEN MEMBERS OF AN ISLAMIC SECT AND THE MILITARY, RESPONDING TO AN OFFICER'S KIDNAPING AND MURDER, OFFICIALLY NUMBERED 38, MOST OF THEM CIVILIANS. THE BACKGROUND OF THE INCIDENT REMAINS OBSCURE BUT PERSISTENT ALLEGATIONS OF A SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER DEATH TOLL THAN OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED RAISE CONCERN ABOUT THE MILITARY'S POSSIBLE USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IN RESTORING ORDER.

A PRESIDENTIAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY PUBLISHED IN APRIL EXPLAINED THAT THE "MYSTERIOUS KILLINGS" OR SUMMARY EXECUTIONS OF THOUSANDS OF SUSPECTED CRIMINALS FROM

1982 TO 1985 WERE A DELIBERATE POLICY TO STEM INCREASED CRIME. AT THAT TIME, OFFICIALS ATTRIBUTED THE KILLINGS TO CRIMINAL GANG WARFARE. UNCONFIRMED, BUT IN SOME INSTANCES DETAILED, REPORTS ALLEGED KILLINGS IN 1989 OF TWO DOZEN OR MORE CIVILIANS BY THE MILITARY IN EAST

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED

TIMOR.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

TEMPORARY DISAPPEARANCE OF INDIVIDUALS HELD FOR INTERROGATION BY SECURITY FORCES OCCURRED PERIODICALLY, PARTICULARLY IN EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA. REPORTS WERE OFTEN UNSPECIFIC AND DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM, BUT IN SOME CASES AUTHORITIES APPEARED TO ACT OUTSIDE THE LAW.

NO EXACT FIGURES ARE AVAILABLE ON THE NUMBER OF PERMANENT DISAPPEARANCES WIDELY BELIEVED TO OCCUR YEARLY. NEWSPAPERS IN MAY PUBLICIZED THE CASES OF NANO AND SONI ABDULLAH, BROTHERS WHO REPORTEDLY DISAPPEARED FOLLOWING ARREST IN PEKANBARU IN 1984. REGULAR INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) ACCESS TO PRISONS IN EAST TIMOR AND ELSEWHERE IN INDONESIA HAS HELPED TO LOCATE SOME MISSING PERSONS IN PAST YEARS.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

CREDIBLE REPORTS OF TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT OF CRIMINAL SUSPECTS, DETAINEES, AND PRISONERS WERE FREQUENT. POLICE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES, EVEN IN MINOR INCIDENTS, OFTEN RESULTS IN PHYSICAL ABUSE. THE PRACTICE OF "SHOOTING TO WOUND" SUSPECTED CRIMINALS ALLEGEDLY ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE ARREST IN MEDAN DECLINED IN 1989. THE LOCAL PRESS, NONETHELESS, CONTINUED TO REPORT AT LEAST ONE INCIDENT EACH MONTH IN WHICH POLICE SHOT A SUSPECT IN THE LEG, OFTEN REPEATEDLY. OFFICIALS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HAVE PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED AND CONDEMNED POLICE BRUTALITY AND UNACCEPTABLE PRISON CONDITIONS AND IN 1989 TOOK DISCIPLINARY ACTION IN SEVERAL INSTANCES. AMONG OTHER INSTANCES, THE YOGYAKARTA MILITARY COURT DISMISSED TWO POLICEMEN AND SENTENCED THEM TO JAIL TERMS OF 2 YEARS 3 MONTHS AND 2 YEARS 6 MONTHS, RESPECTIVELY, FOR BEATING TO DEATH 17-YEAR-OLD BAKRI BUDI SANTOSO AND A MILITARY COURT IN CIANJUR SENTENCED TWO POLICE OFFICERS TO 17 AND 15 YEARS, RESPECTIVELY, FOR KILLING A STUDENT, APUO MAHPUDIN. HOWEVER, MOST OF THESE CASES INVOLVED ACTIONS AGAINST CRIMINAL SUSPECTS. THERE WERE NO KNOWN INSTANCES OF OFFICIALS BEING PUNISHED FOR MISTREATMENT OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

OR DETAINEES. EAST TIMORESE BISHOP BELO AND OTHERS ALLEGED MISTREATMENT AND TORTURE BY SECURITY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED ON SUSPICION OF AIDING OR SYMPATHIZING WITH THE FRETILIN GUERRILLAS, CHARGES DENIED BY OFFICIALS. SIMILAR ALLEGATIONS WERE MADE CONCERNING MISTREATMENT OF INDIVIDUALS IN IRIAN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROL

JAVA SUSPECTED OF TIES WITH OR SYMPATHIES FOR THE ORGANIZATION FOR A FREE PAPUA (OPM) REBELS. REBELS IN BOTH EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAVA REPORTEDLY HARASSED AND TERRORIZED CIVILIANS FROM TIME TO TIME.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE (KUHAP) CONTAINS PROTECTIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION AND SPECIFIES THE RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO LEGAL COUNSEL AND NOTIFICATION OF FAMILY. THESE SAFEGUARDS ARE OFTEN DISREGARDED IN PRACTICE, NOTABLY IN CASES OF ALLEGED SUBVERSION. KUHAP PROVISIONS ARE RESPECTED MORE

REGULARLY IN URBAN AREAS THAN IN SMALL TOWNS OR REMOTE AREAS. SECURITY AGENCIES ARREST AND DETAIN PERSONS TO INTIMIDATE AND INHIBIT ACTIVITIES THEY CONSIDER UNDESIRABLE. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR REDRESS OF SUCH ACTIONS ARE INADEQUATE. THE JAKARTA DISTRICT COURT REJECTED A SUIT BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS AGAINST POLICE FOR ALLEGED UNLAWFUL DETENTION ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE STUDENTS WERE INTERROGATED AS WITNESSES, NOT SUSPECTS, AND THUS NOT ENTITLED TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THEIR DETENTION.

DETAINEES IN CASES OF ALLEGED SUBVERSION CAN BE HELD UP TO A YEAR WITHOUT CHARGES. IN THE PAST THE NUMBER OF PERSONS DETAINED WITHOUT TRIAL WAS ESTIMATED TO BE AS MANY AS 500, ALTHOUGH THIS FIGURE COULD NOT BE VERIFIED AND NO MORE RECENT ESTIMATES WERE AVAILABLE. SECURITY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DETAINED PERSONS FOR DAYS OR WEEKS ON SUSPICION OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY. MOST WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGES. APPLICATION OF A 1987 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE ON REMISSION OF PRISON TERMS PRODUCED UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE STATUS OF SOME PRISONERS, INCLUDING SEVERAL REPORTEDLY STILL IN JAIL DESPITE APPARENT EXPIRATION OF THEIR SENTENCES. MRS. SUNDARI ABDULRAHMAN, A FORMER OFFICIAL IN THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) WHOSE CASE WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN AUGUST. A NUMBER OF EAST TIMORESE LEFT PRISONS IN JAKARTA AND DILI AFTER FINISHING SENTENCES FOR INVOLVEMENT WITH FRETILIN.

THE PRECISE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) REMAINED UNCLEAR. IN LAMPUNG AND ELSEWHERE, ELEMENTS OF THIS ORGANIZATION APPEARED TO EXERCISE THE EMERGENCY SECURITY PROVISIONS ACCORDED ITS PREDECESSOR, THE COMMAND FOR THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RESTORATION OF SECURITY AND ORDER (KOPKAMTIB). KOPKAMTIB, AND NOW PERHAPS BAKORSTANAS, WAS PERMITTED EXCEPTIONS FROM KUHAP PROCEDURES AND WIDE, SPECIAL POWERS TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE PERSONS THOUGHT TO THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY, PARTICULARLY IN CASES OF SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, SABOTAGE, SECESSION, OR CORRUPTION. INDONESIAN LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SUCH ACTIONS OR FOR THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION OR LEGAL AID FOR THE DETAINEES. THEIR CASES ARE RARELY IF EVER PUBLICIZED.

WITH REGARD TO FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR, SEE SECTION 6.C.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

A QUADRIPARTITE JUDICIARY, CONSISTING OF GENERAL, RELIGIOUS, MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS, EXISTS BELOW THE SUPREME COURT, THE HIGHEST COURT OF APPEAL. PARLIAMENT PASSED A LAW IN DECEMBER THAT WILL PERMIT--ONCE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS ARE DRAWN UP--THE RELIGIOUS COURTS USED BY MANY MUSLIMS TO EFFECT JUDGMENTS WITHOUT CONSENT OF THE GENERAL COURTS AND TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER A SOMEWHAT WIDENED FIELD OF FAMILY LAW MATTERS. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY IS SIGNIFICANTLY CONSTRAINED BY THE FACTS THAT JUDGES ARE CIVIL SERVANTS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND THAT THE SUPREME COURT CANNOT ANNUL LAWS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT.

A THREE-JUDGE PANEL CONDUCTS MOST TRIALS, HEARS EVIDENCE, DECIDES GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND ASSESSES PUNISHMENT. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS. THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT CONSIDER MATERIAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE APPLICATION OF LAW BY LOWER COURTS. INITIAL JUDGMENTS ARE RARELY REVERSED, ALTHOUGH SENTENCES ARE OCCASIONALLY CHANGED. MOST COURT SESSIONS ARE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC AND MOST DEFENDANTS, IF THEY CAN PAY, HAVE ACCESS TO COUNSEL. HOWEVER, SUCH ACCESS IS IN SOME CASES SIGNIFICANTLY DELAYED AND THERE ARE OCCASIONAL REPORTS OF OFFICIAL EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE CHOICE OF COUNSEL. IF DESTITUTE, DEFENDANTS CAN FIND PRIVATE LEGAL HELP SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE (LBH). ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT HAS DISCRETION TO PROVIDE A LIMITED AMOUNT OF AID FOR THOSE UNABLE TO AFFORD LEGAL ASSISTANCE. THE STATE MUST ASSURE LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CAPITAL CASES. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE LEGAL AWARENESS AND

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LITERACY, LEGAL TRAINING AND LEGAL RESEARCH CAPABILITIES IS A POSITIVE STEP TOWARD ADDRESSING THE LEGAL SYSTEM'S DEFICIENCIES.

CORRUPTION PERMEATES THE INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM. IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, BRIBES CAN INFLUENCE DECISIONS, PROSECUTION, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCING. USE IN TRIALS OF FORCED CONFESSIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE DEFENSE ARE REPORTEDLY COMMON. THE GOVERNMENT HAS OCCASIONALLY TAKEN ACTION AGAINST FLAGRANT OFFENDERS, BUT BY AND LARGE THESE ABUSES CONTINUE UNCHECKED.

CONVICTION IS VIRTUALLY AUTOMATIC FOR INDIVIDUALS ACCUSED UNDER INDONESIA'S BROAD 1963 SUBVERSION PROVISIONS, WHICH AMONG OTHER THINGS FORBID ADVOCACY OR ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF SECESSION OR CREATION OF AN ISLAMIC STATE, AS WELL AS CRITICISM OF PANCASILA. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SAID IN AUGUST THAT COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FOREIGN IDEOLOGIES, INCLUDING COMMUNISM, WITH

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PANCASILA IS PERMISSIBLE. THE GOVERNMENT TRIED OR ANNOUNCED PREPARATIONS TO TRY SOME 70 PERSONS FOR SUBVERSION IN 1989. A STUDENT AND AN EMPLOYEE AT YOGYAKARTA'S GAJAH MADA UNIVERSITY WERE SENTENCED TO PRISON TERMS OF 7 AND 8 YEARS, RESPECTIVELY, FOR CIRCULATING, POSSESSING OR ADVOCATING BANNED WRITINGS. APPEALS ARE EXPECTED. TRIALS OF SOME DEFENDANTS FROM THE FEBRUARY INCIDENT IN LAMPUNG PRODUCED SENTENCES OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN FIVE CASES AND 20 YEARS IN ANOTHER. ALL BUT ONE OF THESE DEFENDANTS REFUSED THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFER OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE. TRIALS ALSO BEGAN IN JAKARTA AND BIMA OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH SEEKING TO ESTABLISH AN ISLAMIC STATE.

THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE DATA ON THE NUMBER OF PERSONS SERVING SENTENCES UNDER ANTISUBVERSION LAWS. SOME OBSERVERS ESTIMATE THERE MAY BE AT LEAST 400. THIS TOTAL INCLUDES INDIVIDUALS SENTENCED FOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1965 COUP ATTEMPT AND ALLEGED MUSLIN EXTREMISTS, MANY OF WHOM, SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE, WERE CONVICTED FOR PEACEFUL PROTEST ACTIVITY.

THE PRESIDENT (THROUGH THE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY), THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALL CRITICIZED AS TOO LENIENT A DISTRICT COURT DECISION IN MARCH WHICH SENTENCED A CONVICTED SMUGGLER TO A YEAR'S PROBATION. SMUGGLING IS CLASSIFIED AS A SUBVERSIVE OFFENSE AND SUBJECT TO A MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH. IN APRIL A NATIONAL LEGAL ASSOCIATION CALLED ON ITS JAKARTA CHAPTER TO DENY LEGAL COUNSEL TO PERSONS CHARGED WITH

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROL

SMUGGLING AND CORRUPTION.

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

JUDICIAL WARRANTS FOR SEARCHES ARE REQUIRED EXCEPT FOR CASES INVOLVING SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, FORCED OR SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY BY SECURITY AGENCIES REPORTEDLY OCCURS REGULARLY, ESPECIALLY IN EAST TIMOR. SECURITY AGENCIES ALSO CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS AND RESIDENCES TO INTIMIDATE AND ARE BELIEVED TO MONITOR SELECTIVELY LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS, WITHOUT LEGAL RESTRAINT. CORRESPONDENCE GENERALLY IS NOT MONITORED, ALTHOUGH LETTER MAIL TO AND FROM EAST TIMOR MAY STILL BE AN EXCEPTION. GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO TRY TO MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF UP TO 2.5 MILLION FORMER MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) AND THE APPROXIMATELY 20 MILLION MEMBERS OF ITS FRONT GROUPS. ANYONE EVEN RELATED TO SUCH PERSONS CAN SUFFER ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES, E.G., LOSS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

SIGNIFICANT RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS EXIST. LAWS DELINEATING THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS AND THE GOVERNMENT ARE APPLIED BY DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WITH CONSIDERABLE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY AND WITHOUT EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW. PUBLIC STATEMENTS OR PUBLICATIONS WHICH CRITICIZE OR COULD BE PERCEIVED AS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT, PANCASILA, TOP LEADERS, THEIR FAMILIES, OR PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC GROUPS ARE STRONGLY DISCOURAGED IF NOT STRICTLY FORBIDDEN. TRIALS AND CONVICTIONS OF SOME INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE SUBVERSION LAW PERIODICALLY DEMONSTRATE THESE

LIMITATIONS.

THE MEDIA GENERALLY AVOID OR EXERCISE GREAT CAUTION IN DISSEMINATING VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT CRITICS, INCLUDING PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURES, BECAUSE OF THE RISK OF

OFFICIAL DISAPPROVAL OR INFORMAL GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO PUBLISH THEM. THE GENERAL LACK OF

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SPECIFIC, CLEAR GUIDELINES ON WHAT IS PERMISSIBLE HAS GENERATED A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF SELF-CENSORSHIP BOTH IN PUBLIC SPEAKING AND IN THE PRESS. NONETHELESS, THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT TOLERANCE ARE REGULARLY TESTED, AND PUBLIC DISCUSSION AND MEDIA REPORTING OF A NUMBER OF TOPICS GENERALLY REGARDED AS SENSITIVE TO THE GOVERNMENT (INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES) INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY IN 1989. SOME REPRESENTATIVES OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ATTENDING AN APRIL CONFERENCE IN BELGIUM WENT BEYOND THE GOVERNMENTAL BOUNDS, HOWEVER, AND OFFICIALS PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY CHASTISED THEM FOR VOICING CRITICISM OUTSIDE INDONESIA OF THE ALLEGED NEGATIVE SOCIAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF CERTAIN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.

THE GOVERNMENT OPERATES THE NATIONAL TELEVISION NETWORK. IT WAS CRITICIZED BY THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION FOR AIRING SONGS THE GOVERNMENT JUDGED TO BE OF LOW MORAL VALUE AND BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS FOR SHOWING A FILM CONSIDERED OFFENSIVE TO MUSLIMS. A PRIVATE COMPANY WHICH OFFERS A SUBSCRIPTION TELEVISION SERVICE TO VIEWERS IN THE JAKARTA AREA RECEIVED A GOVERNMENT WARNING FOR ADVERTISING AND PROGRAMMING CONSIDERED CULTURALLY INAPPROPRIATE. SATELLITE DISHES ARE USED BY THE MEDIA AND THE ELITE TO MONITOR

TELEVISION BROADCASTS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES. TELEVISION SIGNALS FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES ARE RECEIVED IN SOME PARTS OF INDONESIA. WHILE MORE THAN 400 PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS OPERATE IN INDONESIA, THEY MAY USE ONLY GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED NEWS PROGRAMS. THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION WARNED THE MANY INDONESIANS WHO LISTEN TO SHORT-WAVE RADIO BROADCASTS NOT TO BE UNDULY INFLUENCED BY REPORTS CRITICAL OF THE COUNTRY.

WHILE ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS GUARANTEED, CONSTRAINTS EXIST ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SCHOLARS AND STUDENTS. FACULTIES SOMETIMES REFRAIN FROM PRODUCING MATERIALS, INCLUDING DISSERTATIONS, WHICH THEY BELIEVE MIGHT PROVOKE GOVERNMENT DISPLEASURE. PUBLISHERS ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT MANUSCRIPTS DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES.

THE PRESS IS LARGELY PRIVATELY OWNED. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS REGULARLY ITERATE THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PANCASILA THE PRESS IS "FREE" BUT ALSO "RESPONSIBLE." THE GOVERNMENT EXPECTS THE MEDIA TO SUPPORT NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND STABILITY; TO BE

EDUCATIONAL; AND TO UPHOLD PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS REGULARLY ADVISE EDITORS AND REPORTERS ABOUT NEWS WHICH CANNOT BE REPORTED AND

DECONTROLL

CLOSELY MONITOR MEDIA OUTLETS FOR MATERIAL UNACCEPTABLE
TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT ISSUES ORAL OR
WRITTEN WARNINGS FOR PUBLISHED MATERIAL FOUND
OBJECTIONABLE. IF IGNORED, WARNINGS COULD RESULT IN A
CIRCULATION BAN OR REVOCATION OF THE LICENSE TO
PUBLISH. THE NUMBER OF NEWSPAPER LICENSES IS LIMITED,
AND REGULATIONS CONTROL THE AMOUNT OF ADVERTISING AND
THE NUMBER OF PAGES. SUCH CONTROLS PARTICULARLY
CONSTRAIN SOME OF THE LARGER AND RESPECTED NATIONAL
DAILIES. IN 1989 THE PRESS RECEIVED WARNINGS FOR
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 14 STATE 397199

REPORTS ON LAND DISPUTES, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, AND
SUBVERSION TRIALS; FOR SPECULATION ABOUT FUTURE
POLITICAL LEADERS; FOR PUBLICATION OF SEXUALLY
PROVOCATIVE PICTURES; AND FOR MISQUOTATION OF
OFFICIALS. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BANNED AS CULTURALLY
INAPPROPRIATE AN INDONESIAN-LANGUAGE TRANSLATION OF AN
EDUCATIONAL BOOK FOR CHILDREN DEPICTING THE HUMAN
REPRODUCTIVE PROCESS. SEVERAL OTHER FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC BOOKS WERE BANNED FOR ASSERTEDLY SUBVERSIVE
IDEOLOGICAL CONTENT.

CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF
ONE OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED DAILY NEWSPAPER, CAN NEITHER
BE IMPORTED NOR PRODUCED DOMESTICALLY. ALTHOUGH
ORGANIZED PRIVATE INSTRUCTION OF CHINESE IS
DISCOURAGED, THERE ARE SOME PRIVATE SCHOOL CLASSES,
INFORMAL CIRCLES, AND PRIVATE TEACHERS. NO LAWS
PROHIBIT THE SPEAKING OF CHINESE, BUT THE GOVERNMENT
LAYS HEAVY STRESS ON THE LEARNING AND USE OF THE
NATIONAL LANGUAGE, BAHASA INDONESIA.

THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY REGULATES VISITING AND RESIDENT
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS AND OCCASIONALLY REMINDS THE
LATTER OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DENY REQUESTS FOR VISAS OR
VISA EXTENSIONS. NO FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS WERE DENIED
ENTRY OR EXTENSIONS OF VISAS IN 1989.

THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AND VIDEO
TAPES, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED BY GOVERNMENT CENSORS,
REQUIRES A PERMIT. IMPORTERS USUALLY AVOID FOREIGN
BOOKS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OR DEALING WITH TOPICS
SENSITIVE TO THE GOVERNMENT, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS.
FOREIGN PERIODICALS, READILY AVAILABLE IN INDONESIA,
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 15 STATE 397199

ARE SUBJECT TO CENSORSHIP PRIOR TO DISTRIBUTION.
IMPORTATION OF SOME FOREIGN NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES
AND ALL COMMUNIST PUBLICATIONS IS PROHIBITED. IN 1989

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND SUPREME COURT BANNED FIRST THE IMPORTATION OF "THE SATANIC VERSES" AND THEN ITS DOMESTIC CIRCULATION. CENSORSHIP OF IMPORTED NEWSPAPERS AND OTHER WRITTEN MATERIALS GENERALLY WAS MORE RELAXED IN 1989.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

ALL ORGANIZATIONS MUST HAVE GOVERNMENT PERMISSION TO HOLD REGIONAL AND NATIONAL MEETINGS. LOCAL JURISDICTIONS OFTEN REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FOR SMALLER GATHERINGS AS WELL. WHILE OBTAINING SUCH APPROVAL IS FAIRLY AUTOMATIC AND APPARENTLY WAS EASED IN 1989, AUTHORITIES WITHHOLD PERMISSION ON OCCASION. OFFICIALS REFUSED TO APPROVE A CHRISTIAN YOUTH GATHERING IN A PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM AREA IN SOUTHEAST SULAWESI. STUDENT GATHERINGS HAVE OFTEN SEEN THE TARGET OF DISAPPROVALS, AND OVERT POLITICAL ACTIVITY AT UNIVERSITIES REMAINS FORBIDDEN UNDER THE "CAMPUS LIFE NORMALIZATION" (OR "NKK") LAW OF 1978. NONETHELESS, STUDENT ACTIVISM, INCLUDING PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS, INCREASED MARKEDLY IN 1989. REACTIONS FROM CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS AND UNIVERSITY RECTORS VARIED CONSIDERABLY. SOMETIMES STUDENTS WERE APPLAUDED FOR BRINGING ISSUES TO PUBLIC ATTENTION; OTHER TIMES TOLERATED, WARNED, OR EXPELLED; AND ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS--INCLUDING IN JAKARTA AND YOGYAKARTA--FORCIBLY DISPERSED. SEVERAL STUDENT PROTESTORS WERE HOSPITALIZED IN SEPTEMBER FOLLOWING A CLASH WITH SECURITY FORCES IN YOGYAKARTA. AUTHORITIES DETAINED AND ARRESTED SEVERAL STUDENTS FOR PARTICIPATING IN PROTESTS. TWO OF THESE WENT ON TRIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ON CRIMINAL CHARGES.

THE 1985 "SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS" (OR "ORMAS") LAW REQUIRES ALL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA. THIS PROVISION, WHICH LIMITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD AS PROHIBITING GROUPS WHICH ADVOCATE MAKING INDONESIA AN ISLAMIC STATE. THE LAW EMPOWERS THE GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND ANY ORGANIZATION IT BELIEVES TO BE ACTING AGAINST THE TENETS OF PANCASILA AND REQUIRES PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR ANY ORGANIZATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF FOREIGN FUNDS FROM DONORS. SECURITY FORCES HAVE INFILTRATED AND BROKEN UP ISLAMIC STUDY GROUPS WHICH MET PRIVATELY TO ADVOCATE STRICT OBEDIENCE TO ISLAMIC LAW.

FOR A DISCUSSION OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AS IT

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

APPLIES TO LABOR UNIONS, SEE SECTION 6.A.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR FOUR STATE-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS--ISLAM, CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, AND HINDUISM--AND ALSO PERMITS THE PRACTICE OF MYSTIC AND ANIMIST RELIGION ("ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN"). ALTHOUGH THE INDONESIAN POPULATION IS OVERWHELMINGLY MUSLIM, INDONESIA HAS TRADITIONALLY DISPLAYED A HIGH DEGREE OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECOGNIZED FAITHS ARE RESPECTED. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OPERATES FREELY IN EAST TIMOR.

THERE ARE, HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY. ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL STATISTICS, NEARLY 400 "MISLEADING RELIGIOUS CULTS" ARE BANNED, INCLUDING SOME ISLAMIC GROUPS CONSIDERED HERETICAL. THESE BANNINGS AFFECT PERHAPS 20,000 ADHERENTS OR MORE. NEW BANNINGS OCCUR PERIODICALLY. MEMBERSHIP IN JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AND THE BAHA'I FAITH IS BANNED, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL THOUSAND JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES ARE BELIEVED TO PRACTICE IN JAKARTA ALONE. A CENTRAL JAVA COURT IN 1989 SENTENCED TWO PERSONS TO JAIL TERMS OF 1 1/2 AND 2 1/2 YEARS, RESPECTIVELY, FOR SPREADING JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES' TEACHINGS AND ALLEGEDLY CAUSING UNREST. AUTHORITIES HAVE OCCASIONALLY HARASSED OR DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BAHA'IS. TWELVE MEMBERS OF A BANNED MUSLIM SECT WERE REPORTEDLY ARRESTED IN SOUTH SUMATRA IN SEPTEMBER EN ROUTE TO ACEH FOR PROSELYTIZING. BECAUSE THE FIRST TENET OF THE PANCASILA IS BELIEF IN A SUPREME BEING, ATHEISM IS FORBIDDEN. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA EXTENDS TO ALL RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OFTEN TOLERATES PRIVATE PRACTICE OF BANNED RELIGIONS, ALTHOUGH LOCAL AUTHORITIES OCCASIONALLY HARASS ADHERENTS OR PRESSURE THEM TO CONVERT.

THE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY OPPOSES MUSLIM GROUPS WHICH ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ACKNOWLEDGING ONLY ISLAMIC LAW, BOTH OF WHICH ARE OUTLAWED, AND SECURITY FORCES HAVE INFILTRATED AND BROKEN UP EXTREMIST ISLAMIC STUDY GROUPS ADVOCATING THESE POSITIONS. AN ESTIMATED 120 ALLEGED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS ARE SERVING PRISON TERMS ON CHARGES OF SUBVERSION. SEVERAL FOREIGN MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALIST TEACHERS REPORTEDLY FOUND PROSELYTIZING WHILE ON TOURIST PASSES

WERE DEPORTED DURING THE YEAR WITH SOME PUBLICITY.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THERE IS NO LEGAL BAR TO CONVERSION BETWEEN FAITHS, AND CONVERSIONS OCCUR. HOWEVER, PROSELYTIZING BITWEEN THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS OR IN AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ONE RELIGION OR ANOTHER--EXCLUDING MYSTIC AND ANIMIST RELIGIONS--IS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND DISCOURAGED. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED. IN RECENT YEARS, HOWEVER, SOME FOREIGN MISSIONARIES HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY RENEWING VISAS OR RESIDENCE PERMITS. BASED ON LAWS AND DECREES ISSUED IN THE MID-1970'S, THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT ALLOW FOREIGN MISSIONARIES TO SPEND MORE THAN 10 YEARS IN INDONESIA (15 IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ONLY). WITH RARE EXCEPTIONS, ENFORCEMENT OF THIS POLICY DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE BY SECT OR NATIONALITY. EXCEPTIONS TO THE 10-YEAR RULE HAVE ALSO BEEN GRANTED TO FOREIGN RELIGIOUS WORKERS IN THE REMOTE AREAS OF IRIAN JAYA AND KALIMANTAN SINCE LATE 1987. THE GOVERNMENT SAYS IT INTENDS OVER TIME TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF FOREIGN MISSIONARIES IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE EMPLOYMENT OF INDONESIANS. FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK IS SUBJECT TO THE FUNDING STIPULATIONS OF THE "ORMAS" LAW DISCUSSED ABOVE.

INDONESIAN MUSLIMS, CHRISTIANS, AND BUDDHISTS MAINTAIN ACTIVE LINKS WITH CORELIGIONISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE INDONESIA AND TRAVEL ABROAD FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS. THE GOVERNMENT PERMITS A SET NUMBER OF PILGRIMS TO MAKE THE HAJJ ANNUALLY. SUCH TRIPS ARE AVAILABLE ONLY THOUGH GOVERNMENT-ORGANIZED TOURS. THE POPE VISITED INDONESIA IN OCTOBER, OFFERING MASS TO CATHOLICS IN MEDAN, JAKARTA, YOGYAKARTA, FLORES, AND EAST TIMOR. DURING HIS VISIT, HE PRAISED INDONESIA'S RESPECT FOR THE ETHNIC, CULTURAL, AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AMONG ITS

CITIZENS. MORE THAN 100,000 CATHOLICS FROM EAST AND WEST TIMOR ATTENDED THE SERVICE IN DILI AT WHICH THE POPE OFFICIATED.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT EXIST. PERMITS TO SEEK WORK IN A NEW LOCATION ARE REQUIRED IN CERTAIN AREAS, PRIMARILY TO CONTROL THE FURTHER SHIFT OF POPULATION FROM RURAL TO URBAN AREAS.

THE GOVERNMENT SAID THE ESTIMATED 1,500 NONCITIZEN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ETHNIC CHINESE WHO DID NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A 1988 OFFER OF IMMIGRATION AMNESTY WOULD BE TRIED AS ILLEGAL

IMMIGRANTS. NO SUCH TRIALS HAVE YET TAKEN PLACE. IN THE PAST, SOME ETHNIC CHINESE ENCOUNTERED LEGAL AND BUREAUCRATIC OBSTACLES TO OBTAINING CITIZENSHIP ALTHOUGH ENCOURAGED TO DO SO. OFFICIALS BARRED SO ETHNIC CHINESE CITIZENS FROM FOREIGN TRAVEL FOR A YEAR FOR VISITING CHINA WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORIZATION.

BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, THE GOVERNMENT PERIODICALLY PROHIBITS FOREIGN TRAVEL OF DOMESTIC CRITICS AND OTHERS IN DISFAVOR. ALTHOUGH RELIABLE FIGURES ARE NOT AVAILABLE, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT SOME 5,000 INDONESIANS--INCLUDING SOME PROMINENT PAST CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS--CURRENTLY MAY NOT LEAVE THE COUNTRY. SOME CRITICS, HOWEVER, ARE FREE TO TRAVEL ABROAD, AND A PERSON BANNED AT ONE TIME MAY BE PERMITTED TO TRAVEL SUBSEQUENTLY. STUDENTS DO NOT NEED GOVERNMENT PERMISSION TO GO ABROAD FOR STUDY. IN APRIL THE GOVERNMENT ABOLISHED THE EXIT VISA REQUIREMENT FOR ACTIVE-DUTY AND RETIRED MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, STATE OFFICIALS, CIVIL SERVANTS, AND THEIR FAMILIES, A

STEP POTENTIALLY AFFECTING AN ESTIMATED 11 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION.

RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT BY INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN CITIZENS TO AND WITHIN PARTS OF IRIAN JAYA CONTINUE, OFFICIALLY BASED ON THE GROUNDS OF SECURITY RISK OR THE CULTURAL VULNERABILITY OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES. BEGINNING IN JANUARY 1989, RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT TO, FROM, AND WITHIN EAST TIMOR EASED CONSIDERABLY UNDER A POLICY OF "NORMALIZING" EAST TIMOR'S STATUS. NONETHELESS, FREQUENT SECURITY CHECKS AFFECT VIRTUALLY ALL TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL IN EAST TIMOR OUTSIDE DILI. CURFEWS AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT ARE OFTEN IN FORCE AT TIMES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN A GIVEN AREA. FAMILY VISITS BACK TO EAST TIMOR BY EAST TIMORESE NOW LIVING IN AUSTRALIA BEGAN IN 1988 AND CONTINUED IN 1989.

FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, MUST NOTIFY AUTHORITIES OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND MAY NOT CHANGE THEIR RESIDENCE WITHOUT OFFICIAL PERMISSION. MEMBERS OR ALLEGED SUPPORTERS OF THE BANNED INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) OUTSIDE INDONESIA HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO RETURN ONLY ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

UNDER ITS REFUGEE POLICY, INDONESIA HAS GIVEN FIRST ASYLUM TO OVER 100,000 INDOCHINESE REFUGEES SINCE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

1975. THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE POPULATION AT

INDONESIA'S GALANG FACILITY STOOD AT ABOUT 6,600 AT THE END OF OCTOBER. OF THIS NUMBER, 1,200 ARE CLASSIFIED AS REFUGEES UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION ON
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 21 STATE 397199

INDOCHINESE REFUGEES (CPA) ADOPTED AT THE JUNE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINESE REFUGEES IN GENEVA; THE REST ARE CLASSIFIED AS ASYLUM SEEKERS PENDING SCREENING BY INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES FOR REFUGEE STATUS ELIGIBILITY. SINCE MAY INDONESIA ACCEPTED REFUGEE BOATS PUSHED OFF FROM MALAYSIA WITH A TOTAL OF 2,500 INDOCHINESE ASYLUM SEEKERS.

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

THERE ARE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS THAT PERMIT INDONESIANS TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS LEADERSHIP, BUT STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL OBSTACLES EXIST WHICH MAKE SUCH CHANGE UNLIKELY. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND A SMALL GROUP OF ACTIVE-DUTY AND RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN TECHNOCRATS EXERCISE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. THE MILITARY, UNDER A DUAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE OF DEFENSE/SECURITY PLUS SOCIAL/POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIES, IS PREEMINENT IN MOST AREAS OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY, ALTHOUGH IN SOME PARTS OF THE GOVERNMENT ITS PRESENCE HAS DECLINED IN RECENT YEARS. THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES PARLIAMENT A MECHANISM TO CALL THE PRESIDENT TO ACCOUNT IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES BUT WHETHER IT COULD BE USED EFFECTIVELY IS IN DOUBT. GOVERNMENT LEADERS DO SEEK OUT AND RECEIVE PUBLIC OPINION INFORMALLY. IN SEVERAL CASES IN 1989, PETITIONS TO MINISTERS AND THE PARLIAMENT ABOUT INEQUITABLE LAND DECISIONS AND OTHER DEMONSTRABLE INJUSTICES RECEIVED WIDE PUBLICITY. REFLECTING A STRONG CULTURAL PREFERENCE, INDONESIAN LEADERS EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF DECISIONMAKING THROUGH "CONSULTATION LEADING TO CONSENSUS," RATHER THAN VOTING, TO RESOLVE DISPUTES.

IN 1989 LIVELY PUBLIC DEBATE AMONG ELITES ON THE NEED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 22 STATE 397199

FOR POLITICAL OPENNESS TO KEEP PACE WITH AND SUPPORT ECONOMIC PROGRESS FOCUSED ATTENTION ON THE PATERNALISTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE CHALLENGE OF MANAGING CHANGE. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT PREVENT SUCH DISCUSSION, WHEN ASKED PUBLICLY WHETHER THERE IS A

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NEED FOR CHANGES IN ELECTORAL PROCEDURES, POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS RESPONDED THAT THE CURRENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS APPROPRIATE AND ADEQUATE.

THE PARLIAMENT--WHOSE MEMBERSHIP MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO

THE GOVERNMENT--CONSIDERS BILLS PRESENTED TO IT BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES AND DOES NOT DRAFT LAWS ON ITS OWN, ALTHOUGH IT HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DO SO. THE GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO RESOLVE POTENTIAL PARLIAMENTARY CONCERNS BEFORE BILLS ARE OFFICIALLY PRESENTED. PARLIAMENT CHANGES THE TEXT AND OCCASIONALLY INTENT OF BILLS IT REVIEWS AND IN 1989 SIGNIFICANTLY ALTERED MAJOR BILLS ON THE NATIONAL EDUCATION SYSTEM AND RELIGIOUS COURTS.

ONLY THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE ALLOWED BY LAW. THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) ARE NOT CONSIDERED OPPOSITION PARTIES. BY LAW THEY EMBRACE THE PANCASILA, AND THEY SELDOM ESPOUSE POLICIES MUCH DIFFERENT FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S. THE THIRD, GOLKAR, IS A LONGSTANDING, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ORGANIZATION OF FUNCTIONAL GROUPS WHICH ACTS AS A POLITICAL PARTY. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) AND SOME OTHER BANNED PARTIES MAY NOT RUN FOR OFFICE OR BE ACTIVE POLITICALLY.

THE LEADERS OF THE THREE LEGAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

ARE APPROVED, IF NOT CHOSEN, BY THE GOVERNMENT, AND THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED AND OFTEN GUIDED BY GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES. GOLKAR MAINTAINS CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH THE ARMED FORCES AND KORPRI, THE NONUNION ASSOCIATION TO WHICH ALL CIVIL SERVANTS AUTOMATICALLY BELONG. CIVIL SERVANTS MAY JOIN ANY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WITH OFFICIAL PERMISSION BUT THE VAST MAJORITY ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR.

GENERAL ELECTIONS FOR PARLIAMENT AND FOR PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES ARE EVERY 5 YEARS. GOLKAR WON 72 PERCENT OF THE VOTE IN THE 1987 ELECTIONS. ALL ADULT CITIZENS, EXCEPT ACTIVE-DUTY ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL, CONVICTED CRIMINALS SERVING PRISON SENTENCES, AND SOME FORMER PKI MEMBERS, ARE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE. VOTING IS NOT MANDATORY, BUT STRONG SOCIAL PRESSURES ENSURE PARTICIPATION. PROTEST VOTES TAKE THE FORM OF BLANK OR DELIBERATELY SPOILED BALLOTS. AS IN 1988, VOTERS IN SEVERAL VILLAGES IN JAVA REJECTED GOVERNMENT-PROPOSED CANDIDATES RUNNING UNOPPOSED FOR THE POSITION OF VILLAGE HEAD.

UNDER THE 1988 ELECTION LAW, THE PARLIAMENT ELECTED IN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

APRIL 1987 CONSISTS OF 500 MEMBERS, 400 ELECTED BY THE VOTERS AND 100 APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE ARMED FORCES. THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) CONSISTS OF PARLIAMENT PLUS 500 OTHER MEMBERS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND BY REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS. THE MPR, WHICH CONVENES EVERY 5 YEARS, ENDED ITS MOST RECENT SESSION IN MARCH 1988 AFTER APPROVING GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR THE NEXT 5 YEARS AND REELECTING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TO A NEW 5-YEAR TERM, WITH RETIRED LT. GEN. SUDHARMONO AS VICE PRESIDENT. FOR THE FIRST TIME AN ALTERNATE CANDIDATE VIED FOR THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN 1988, UNTIL ULTIMATELY WITHDRAWING FROM CONTENTION.

PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS BY INDONESIA'S MANY ETHNIC GROUPS AND MINORITIES VARIES. SOME ARE WELL AND PROMINENTLY REPRESENTED; SOME ARE UNDERREPRESENTED AND WITHOUT INFLUENCE; AND OTHERS HAVE A SIGNIFICANT VOICE ONLY THROUGH INFORMAL CHANNELS. WOMEN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN FORMAL AND INFORMAL POLITICS BUT NOT COMMENSURATE WITH THEIR NUMBERS.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR, FOR EXAMPLE, BY GROUPS SUCH AS AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (AI) AND ASIA WATCH--WHICH THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS BIASED--IS NOT ALLOWED. DIPLOMATS AND SOME JOURNALISTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO VISIT. REPRESENTATIVES OF AI AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS HAVE BEEN REFUSED ACCESS TO INDONESIA, ALTHOUGH ASIA WATCH WAS PERMITTED TO VISIT IN 1988. THE GOVERNMENT IGNORED CALLS BY DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND ACTIVISTS FOR IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE FEBRUARY LAMPUNG INCIDENT AND DETENTIONS OF RADICAL PREACHERS IN SUMBAWA IN MARCH. WHILE VARIOUS DOMESTIC ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS INTERESTED IN HUMAN RIGHTS OPERATE ENERGETICALLY, THE GOVERNMENT USES ITS CONSIDERABLE POWERS TO DISCOURAGE SUSTAINED, MEANINGFUL HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING MAINTENANCE OF CLOSE TIES WITH FOREIGN HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

UNDER A 1985 AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT, THE ICRC VISITS PERSONS JAILED IN CONNECTION WITH ARMED RESISTANCE IN EAST TIMOR; PROVIDES MEDICAL AND FOOD AID TO PRISONERS AND THEIR FAMILIES; CARRIES OUT MEDICAL AND NUTRITIONAL SURVEYS IN VILLAGES IN EAST TIMOR; ARRANGES FAMILY REUNIFICATION IN EAST TIMOR AND ABROAD (MAINLY PORTUGAL); AND ARRANGES REPATRIATION TO PORTUGAL OF FORMER PORTUGUESE CIVIL SERVANTS AND THEIR

FAMILIES IN EAST TIMOR. THE ICRC OPENED AN OFFICE IN IRIAN JAYA IN 1969 TO ASSIST FUTURE BORDER CROSSERS RETURNING FROM CAMPS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA AND TO MONITOR CONDITIONS OF PERSONS JAILED IN CONNECTION WITH OPM ACTIVITIES. IN 1988 AND 1989, THE ICRC VISITED AND INTERVIEWED ALL REMAINING PRISONERS CONVICTED OF PARTICIPATION IN THE 1965 COMMUNIST-BACKED ATTEMPTED COUP. THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT ALLOW ACCESS BY THE ICRC OR ANY OTHER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN GROUP TO THE NUMEROUS MUSLIM ACTIVISTS HELD PRISONER.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

WHILE INDONESIA GENERALLY EXHIBITS CONSIDERABLE TOLERANCE FOR ETHNIC, RACIAL, AND MAJOR RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES, OFFICIAL AND INFORMAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE IS A SIGNIFICANT EXCEPTION. THEY ARE PRESSURED TO TAKE INDONESIAN NAMES. SINCE 1959 NONCITIZEN ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO RUN BUSINESSES IN RURAL INDONESIA. GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF ALL-CHINESE SCHOOLS AND INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING, FORMATION OF EXCLUSIVELY CHINESE CULTURAL GROUPS OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND PUBLIC DISPLAY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS. HOWEVER, THESE RESTRICTIONS ARE NOT ALWAYS OBSERVED IN PRACTICE. MANY PEOPLE OF CHINESE ANCESTRY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS. SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS WHICH ARE, IN EFFECT, ALL-CHINESE ARE NOT PROSCRIBED AND DO EXIST. PERFORMANCES OF A CHINESE OPERA FROM TAIWAN IN JAKARTA AND OF A PLAY ABOUT CHINESE IN MEDAN WERE CANCELED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN 1989.

WOMEN ARE EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW, WITH THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES AFFORDED MEN. INDONESIA HAS RATIFIED THE UN CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN. SOME INDONESIAN WOMEN ENJOY A HIGH DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FREEDOM. WOMEN OCCUPY IMPORTANT MID-LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, LABOR UNIONS, THE MILITARY, THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PROFESSIONS, AND PRIVATE BUSINESS. WOMEN MAKE UP APPROXIMATELY 37 PERCENT OF THE WORK FORCE, WITH THE MAJORITY IN THE RURAL SECTOR. THE 41-MEMBER CABINET APPOINTED IN 1988 INCLUDES 2 WOMEN, AND THERE ARE 100 WOMEN IN THE 1000-MEMBER MPR.

DESPITE LEGAL GUARANTEES OF EQUAL TREATMENT, WOMEN

SELDOM RECEIVE EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK. THE MINISTER FOR THE ROLE OF WOMEN, MRS. A. SULASIKIN MURPRATONO, HAS CALLED PUBLIC ATTENTION TO WOMEN'S UNDUE BURDEN OF ILLITERACY, POOR HEALTH, AND POOR NUTRITION. TRADITIONAL PRACTICES ("ADAT") CAN ALSO IN SOME CASES UNDERCUT STATE POLICY. SPOUSES OF CIVIL SERVANTS ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO PARTICIPATE IN A GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION). SEVERAL VOLUNTARY, PRIVATE GROUPS WORK ACTIVELY TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 27 STATE 287199

THE MEDIA PERIODICALLY REPORT INSTANCES OF RAPE AND OTHER ABUSE AGAINST WOMEN AND SUBSEQUENT LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PERPETRATORS. HOWEVER, RELIABLE DATA CONCERNING THE EXTENT OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IS NOT AVAILABLE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS RECOGNIZED PUBLICLY THAT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS AN EMERGING PROBLEM FOR INDONESIAN SOCIETY. IN MAY IT HELD A SEMINAR TO ENCOURAGE EFFORTS TO UNDERSTAND AND OVERCOME THIS PROBLEM. SEVERAL UNIVERSITY CENTERS STUDYING THE ROLE OF WOMEN FOCUS SOME ATTENTION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. ONE JAKARTA-BASED ORGANIZATION PROVIDED COUNSELING TO VICTIMS AND FAMILIES IN 210 CASES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN 1988 AND IN 94 CASES AS OF APRIL IN 1989. THE MINISTRY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS ALSO OFFERS COUNSELING TO MARRIED COUPLES. HOWEVER, CULTURAL, SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND OTHER FACTORS INHIBIT REPORTING OF SUCH ABUSE AND RECOURSE TO COUNSELING AND LEGAL PROTECTION. IN 1989 THE MEDIA LURIDLY DEPICTED THE MURDER AND DISMEMBERMENT OF SEVERAL WOMEN.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS ARE FREE TO FORM OR JOIN UNIONS WITHOUT PREVIOUS AUTHORIZATION BUT SUCH UNIONS, IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY, MUST BELONG TO THE ALL INDONESIA WORKERS UNION (SPSI), WHICH, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, IS THE ONLY LEGAL TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION IN INDONESIA. ABOUT FIVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL LABOR FORCE OF NEARLY 75 MILLION IS ORGANIZED. THE SPSI NOW CONSISTS OF 9 DEPARTMENTS COVERING BROAD INDUSTRIAL SECTORS AND 9 SPECIALIZED INSTITUTES. IT

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ESTIMATES THAT IT HAS ABOUT 10,000 LOCAL UNITS AT THE PLANT LEVEL, OVER 3 MILLION MEMBERS, AND REPRESENTATION IN ALL 27 PROVINCES. A NUMBER OF GROUPS AND
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 28 STATE 297199

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, E.G., THE TEACHERS' AND JOURNALISTS' ASSOCIATIONS, FUNCTION AS QUASI-TRADE UNIONS AND OPERATE OPENLY, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT HAVE

THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. THE SPSI AND ITS LOCAL UNITS DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.

THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS UNIONS AS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF ITS DEVELOPMENT PLANS, WITH THE ROLE OF INCREASING WORKER PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT, MAINTAINING INDUSTRIAL PEACE, AND ELUCIDATING THE GOVERNMENT'S PHILOSOPHY OF PANCASILA AS IT APPLIES TO INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN INDONESIA ARE SUPPOSED TO BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF PANCASILA PINCIPLES WHICH EMPHASIZE CONSULTATION AMONG THE PARTIES AND AVOIDANCE OF CONFRONTATION. THERE IS PRESSURE ON SPSI OFFICIALS TO JOIN GOLKAR. GOLKAR MEMBERS, WHO OFTEN HAVE LITTLE OR NO TRADE UNION BACKGROUND, DOMINATE THE LEADERSHIP.

THE ORMAS LAW DISCUSSED IN SECTION 2.B. GOVERNS THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SPSI AND THE QUASI-UNIONS. GOVERNMENT APPROVAL IS NEEDED FOR MEETINGS OUTSIDE SPSI HEADQUARTERS. PERMISSION IS ROUTINELY GIVEN TO THE SPSI AND TO NONREGISTERED ORGANIZATIONS OVERTLY FUNCTIONING AS UNIONS. A UNION MAY BE DISSOLVED, AS MAY ANY OTHER MASS ORGANIZATION IF THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES IT IS ACTING AGAINST THE TENETS OF PANCASILA. THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS WHICH SPECIFICALLY LAY OUT THE PROCEDURES FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF A UNION AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO CASES OF UNION DISSOLUTION.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 29 STATE 297199

ALTHOUGH THE SPSI MAINTAINS EXTENSIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS, IT IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION, EXCEPT THE ASEAN TRADE UNION COUNCIL--A REGIONAL BODY CONSISTING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY OF AFFILIATES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (ICFTU). AS A FALLOUT OF THE 1985 RESTRUCTURING OF THE UNION, THERE HAS BEEN NO FORMAL ICFTU PRESENCE IN INDONESIA SINCE 1986. INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION SECRETARIATS RETAIN LINKS WITH SOME ELEMENTS OF THE SPSI, SUCH AS THE PORT AND MARITIME

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

WORKERS. THE "JOINT SECRETARIAT," GROUPING ELEMENTS OF THE SPSI AND THE UNIONS NOT LEGALLY RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT, HAS LINKS WITH THE WORLD CONFEDERATION OF LABOR. THE SPSI IS SEEKING TO AFFILIATE WITH THE ICFTU.

ALL ORGANIZED WORKERS HAVE A LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CIVIL SERVANTS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE 21 INDUSTRIES DESIGNATED BY A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE IN 1983 AS VITAL TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST. MANY OF THE INSTALLATIONS AND PROJECTS COVERED BY THE DECREE NO

LONGER EXIST OR HAVE BEEN ABSORBED INTO OTHER AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS. THOSE THAT REMAIN COVER ABOUT 170,000 WORKERS.

STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND CIVIL SERVANTS MUST BELONG TO KORPRI, THE INDONESIAN CORPS OF CIVIL SERVANTS--A NONUNION ASSOCIATION CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. THE CENTRAL BOARD OF KORPRI AND ITS SECRETARIATS ON ALL PROVINCIAL LEVELS HAVE EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BUREAUS, RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTLING EMPLOYEE DISPUTES. SOME GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS HAVE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER WHICH CALL FOR THE CONVENING OF A LABOR COMMITTEE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES.

A PRIVATE SECTOR UNION MUST NOTIFY THE LOCAL DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER OFFICE THAT ITS ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE DISAGREEMENTS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS HAVE FAILED AND THAT THE UNION WILL GO ON STRIKE. NO APPROVAL IS REQUIRED. DURING THE 1988/89 PERIOD THERE WERE 53 REPORTED STRIKES INVOLVING 11,496 WORKERS. MOST STRIKES ARE BRIEF, SPONTANEOUS, AND NONVIOLENT. SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT FOR EVERY OFFICIALLY RECORDED STRIKE, THERE MAY BE 4 TO 5 OTHERS.

THE STRIKE OUTCOMES VARIED. A REVIEW OF APPROXIMATELY 20 STRIKES NEAR JAKARTA SHOWED SOME EMPLOYEE DEMANDS WERE MET. SOME INVOLVED CONCILIATION BY THE LOCAL BRANCH OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER, SOME WERE RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS WITH MANAGEMENT, AND OTHERS RESULTED IN THE FIRING OF UNION OFFICIALS FOR OSTENSIBLY WORK-RELATED REASONS.

PRIVATE SECTOR INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ARE SUBMITTED TO TRIPARTITE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. THESE TRIBUNALS HEAR ARGUMENTS AND ISSUE EXECUTABLE, ENFORCEABLE DECISIONS. DECISIONS OF THE TRIBUNALS AND PRIVATE ARBITRATORS CAN BE ENFORCED THROUGH THE COURTS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER CAN NULLIFY DECISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS ON LEGAL OR NATIONAL INTEREST

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED

GROUNDS. ALTHOUGH TECHNICALLY THE MINISTER'S DECISIONS CAN BE APPEALED TO THE COURTS, IN PRACTICE IT IS RARELY DONE. UNDER THE LAW THE PARTIES CAN ELECT BINDING ARBITRATION IN LIEU OF THE TRIPARTITE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM. HOWEVER, THIS PROVISION IS SELDOM USED; MOST CASES ARE HANDLED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 31 STATE 397199

INDONESIA HAS RATIFIED ILO CONVENTION 98 ON THE RIGHT

TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY, BUT HAS NOT RATIFIED CONVENTION 87 ON THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION.

THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (AFL-CIO) BELIEVES THAT INDONESIAN WORKERS ARE DENIED THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION. SPECIFICALLY, IT ALLEGES THAT THE SPSI IS DOMINATED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND IS AN AGENT OF GOVERNMENT LABOR POLICY, THAT THE GOVERNMENT UNILATERALLY DENIES THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN CERTAIN INDUSTRIES, THAT THE GOVERNMENT REGULARLY GUARANTEES A NON-UNION ENVIRONMENT TO FOREIGN INVESTORS, AND THAT PUBLIC EMPLOYEES MAY NOT ORGANIZE OR STRIKE. THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (CFA) HAS UNDER CONSIDERATION A 1987 COMPLAINT BY THE ICFTU WHICH ALLEGES THAT INDONESIAN LEGISLATION RESTRICTS TRADE UNION RIGHTS, PARTICULARLY THE RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE PROVISIONS OF ILO CONVENTION NO. 98. THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED AT ITS NOVEMBER 1988 SESSION THAT THE GOVERNMENT TAKE STEPS TO AMEND ITS LEGISLATION IN SOME AREAS AND TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON OTHERS. THE GOVERNMENT SAID IN ITS FEBRUARY RESPONSE THAT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ARE FULLY RESPECTED AND THAT INDONESIA IS NOW IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING "THE MOST SUITABLE PATTERN" OF APPLYING THESE RIGHTS. IN MAY 1989, THE CFA STILL FOUND THAT A LARGE SECTION OF THE INDONESIAN WORK FORCE DOES NOT HAVE FREEDOM TO FORM OR JOIN A WORKERS' ORGANIZATION OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING AND REQUESTED THE GOVERNMENT TO AMEND ITS LEGISLATION TO PERMIT GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO ESTABLISH UNIONS OUTSIDE THE KORPRI STRUCTURE AND TO REMOVE OTHER RESTRICTIONS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 32 STATE 397199

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS GUARANTEED BY LAW; THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER VIGOROUSLY PROMOTES COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF PANCASILA INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE SPSI'S COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS ARE NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED BILATERALLY WITH THE EMPLOYER. ONCE AN EMPLOYER HAS BEEN NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED A UNION, HE IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO BARGAIN. AS A TRANSITIONAL STAGE TO ENCOURAGE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT EVERY COMPANY WHICH HAS 25 OR MORE EMPLOYEES MUST ISSUE COMPANY REGULATIONS DEFINING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. OF THE APPROXIMATELY 10,000 LOCAL SPSI

UNITS, ONLY ABOUT HALF HAVE EXECUTED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. IN WHAT THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER HAS CHARACTERIZED AS AN EFFORT TO PROMOTE VOLUNTARY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS, IT HAS ENCOURAGED EMPLOYERS TO ORGANIZE UNIONS IN WHICH MANAGERS SERVE AS "WORKING UNIT" PRESIDENTS. CRITICS ARGUE THAT THESE ARE NOT VALID UNIONS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER HAS SET A TARGET OF 2,000 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS OVER THE NEXT 5 YEARS. BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO CONCLUDE WITHIN 30 DAYS. IF NOT, THE MATTER IS TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION/ARBITRATION. IN PRACTICE MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED BEFORE THE END OF THE 30 DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE VALID FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED FOR 1 YEAR.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 33 STATE 397199

THE LAW PROTECTS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS AND THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS BY IMPOSING OBLIGATIONS ON BOTH THE UNION AND THE EMPLOYER. BOTH PARTIES ARE OBLIGATED TO EXECUTE THE AGREEMENTS AND TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH. THERE ARE NO LAWS WHICH PREVENT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FROM TAKING PLACE IN THE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES, AND SOME OF THE COMPANIES IN THESE ZONES HAVE SPSI UNITS. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN THE ZONES.

REGULATIONS EXPRESSLY FORBID EMPLOYERS FROM PREJUDGING OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, AND EMPLOYEES ARE URGED TO REPORT HARASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE SPSI CLAIMS, SUPPORTED BY REPORTED INCIDENTS, THAT SOME EMPLOYERS DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ITS MEMBERS AND THOSE WISHING TO FORM SPSI UNITS. CHARGES OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE HANDLED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS.

WORKERS CAN ORGANIZE WITHOUT RESTRICTION IN A PRIVATE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTR

ENTERPRISE EVEN IF IT IS DESIGNATED VITAL BY THE GOVERNMENT. IF THE STATE HAS A PARTIAL INTEREST, THE ENTERPRISE IS CONSIDERED TO BE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE DOMAIN, BUT THIS DOES NOT LEGALLY LIMIT ORGANIZING. THERE ARE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT/PRIVATE JOINT ENTERPRISES WHICH HAVE LABOR UNIONS AND WHICH BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY.

THE AFL-CIO ALSO ALLEGES THAT INDONESIA DENIES WORKERS THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY. THE AFL-CIO HAS CHARGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT ROUTINELY DENIES PERMISSION FOR UNION MEETINGS AND SUBVERTS

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY ROUTINELY SUBSTITUTING COMPULSORY ARBITRATION FOR GENUINE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. THE 1987 ICFTU COMPLAINT ALLEGED THAT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INDONESIAN REGULATIONS PERMIT ONLY THE SPSI TO REGISTER AS A LEGITIMATE TRADE UNION, THEREBY FAILING TO ENCOURAGE AND PROMOTE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND THAT THE LAWS IN PLACE DO NOT SATISFY THE ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENT OF ILO CONVENTION NO. 98.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

FORCED LABOR IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED AND IN PRACTICE DOES NOT EXIST.

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

IN 1987 THE INDONESIAN DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ISSUED NEW REGULATIONS ON CHILD LABOR, ACKNOWLEDGED A CLASS OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 14 WHO FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC REASONS MUST WORK AND NOTED THAT INDONESIA'S CHILD LABOR LAWS HAVE NOT BEEN PROPERLY ENFORCED. THESE LAWS PROVIDE DETAILED SAFEGUARDS, INCLUDING REQUIREMENTS FOR PARENTAL CONSENT, PROHIBITION OF DANGEROUS WORK AND NIGHT WORK AND LIMITING THE WORKDAY TO 4 HOURS. EMPLOYERS MUST ALSO COOPERATE WITH PUBLIC AUTHORITIES TO ASSURE THAT CHILDREN UNDER 14 COMPLY WITH THE 1989 NATIONAL EDUCATION LAW, WHICH REQUIRES THAT CHILDREN COMPLETE 9 YEARS OF SCHOOL BEGINNING AT AGE 7. HOWEVER, THESE REGULATIONS ARE INADEQUATELY ENFORCED AND SOME OBSERVERS HAVE CALLED FOR NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES.

THE NEW REGULATIONS CALL FOR IMPROVED ENFORCEMENT OF THE CHILD LABOR LAW. EMPLOYERS ARE NOW REQUIRED TO REPORT IN DETAIL ON EVERY CHILD EMPLOYED AND PERIODIC INSPECTIONS ARE TO BE CARRIED OUT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MANPOWER. EMPLOYERS NOT COMPLYING WITH THE LAW AND REGULATIONS WILL BE SUBJECT TO FINES OF 100,000 RUPIAHS ($68) AND/OR UP TO 3 MONTHS IN JAIL FOR EACH INFRACTION.

THE MANPOWER DEPARTMENT, AS A FOLLOWUP TO ITS NEW REGULATIONS, HAS ISSUED DIRECTIVES TO REMIND LOCAL DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER OFFICES OF THEIR INSPECTION OBLIGATIONS AND TO INCREASE INSPECTION IN THE INFORMAL SECTORS. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO THE DEPARTMENT, AS OF MARCH 1989 THERE WERE ONLY 4,749 CHILDREN REGISTERED AS EMPLOYED IN INDONESIA. SOME LOCAL OBSERVERS CLAIM THAT AS MANY AS 2 MILLION YOUTH UNDER THE AGE OF 14 ARE WORKING ONE-HALF TO FULL TIME OR MORE, THOUGH MOST OF

THESE ARE THOUGHT TO BE EMPLOYED IN FAMILY-RUN BUSINESSES IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND AT AGRICULTURAL SITES WHERE NORMAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS ARE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ADMITS THAT EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW REGULATIONS IS FAR LESS THAN IDEAL AND THAT IT STILL LACKS QUALIFIED INSPECTORS TO CARRY OUT THE INSPECTIONS. IT ESTIMATES THAT LESS THAN 50 PER CENT OF COMPANIES EMPLOYING CHILDREN HAVE REGISTERED.

PRESENT EFFORTS TO CONTROL CHILD LABOR FOCUS PRIMARILY ON INSTITUTING EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR CHILDREN WHO MUST WORK. FUTURE PROGRAMS CALL FOR ALLOCATION OF SPECIAL FUNDS TO PROVIDE EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR WORKING CHILDREN COOPERATING WITH SELF-HELP INSTITUTES WHICH WILL PROVIDE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS, AND INCREASED GOVERNMENT INSPECTION. THE GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, STILL RELIES UPON PERSUASION AND TEACHING EMPLOYERS RATHER THAN PENALIZING THEM.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7-HOUR WORKDAYS AND 40-HOUR WORKWEEKS, WITH ONE-HALF HOUR OF REST FOR EACH 4 HOURS OF WORK. THE DAILY OVERTIME RATE IS ONE AND ONE-HALF THE NORMAL HOURLY RATE FOR THE FIRST HOUR, AND TWICE THE HOURLY RATE FOR ADDITIONAL OVERTIME. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER WITH AGREEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEES. THERE IS NO LEGAL DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN WORKERS IN THE FREE TRADE ZONES AND THOSE WHO WORK ELSEWHERE.

IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE, MINIMUM WAGES ARE ESTABLISHED FOR EACH REGION AND FOR SECTORS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROL

AND SUBSECTORS WITHIN THE REGION BY REGIONAL WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL. THIS IS A QUADRIPARTITE BODY CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM LABOR, MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT, AND UNIVERSITIES. IT ALSO ESTABLISHES A BASIC "PHYSICAL NEEDS" FIGURE FOR EACH PROVINCE--A MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER OR FAMILY TO MEET BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. THE ANNUALLY CALCULATED FIGURE REFLECTS CHANGES IN THE LOCAL CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI) FOR FOOD, CLOTHING, HOUSING, TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER FAMILY NEEDS. FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE WAGE COUNCILS IN SETTING MINIMUM RATES INCLUDE CHANGES IN THE LOCAL CPI, SKILL LEVEL OF WORKERS, LOCAL SUPPLY OF MANPOWER,

AND THE ABILITY OF FIRMS TO PAY. MINIMUM WAGE RATES FALL SHORT OF PROVIDING THE DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING THE GOVERNMENT ENVISAGES. GDP PER CAPITA IN 1988 WAS $434. FIGURES FROM 1983, THE LATEST AVAILABLE, SHOW THAT 26 PER CENT OF THE URBAN DWELLERS AND 44 PER CENT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OF RURAL POPULATION LIVE BELOW THE ABSOLUTE POVERTY LEVEL AS DEFINED BY THE WORLD BANK. THE MINIMUM WAGE IN THE CAPITAL CITY OF JAKARTA RANGES BETWEEN $0.89 AND $1.18 PER DAY, DEPENDING ON THE INDUSTRY.

A 1989 REGULATION ON MINIMUM WAGES CALLS FOR A REVIEW OF MINIMUM WAGES EVERY 2 YEARS, FORBIDS EMPLOYERS FROM LOWERING WAGES ALREADY HIGHER THAN THE MINIMUM, AND PROVIDES MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCEMENT AND PENALTIES FOR EMPLOYER NONCOMPLIANCE. IT ALSO GIVES THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER A LEGAL BASIS FOR ENTERING THE PLACE OF WORK TO CARRY OUT INSPECTIONS.

LABOR LAW AND MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PROVIDE WORKERS WITH VACATION PAY, MATERNITY LEAVE, SOCIAL SECURITY INSURANCE, WORK PLACE ACCIDENT INSURANCE, 12 PAID PUBLIC HOLIDAYS, GENEROUS OVERTIME AND SICK LEAVE PAY, GUARANTEED SEVERANCE AND SERVICE PAY, PAID LEAVE FOR PERSONAL AND FAMILY OCCASIONS AND PROTECTION FROM THE DELAY IN PAYMENT. IN ADDITION WORKERS USUALLY RECEIVE TRANSPORTATION ALLOWANCES, FOOD ALLOWANCES IN CASH OR IN KIND OR BOTH, AND HOLIDAY BONUSES. WORKERS IN MORE MODERN FACILITIES OFTEN RECEIVE HEALTH BENEFITS, SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS, AND FREE MEALS.

OBSERVANCE OF THE MINIMUM WAGE VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND FROM REGION TO REGION, AND THERE ARE NO RELIABLE FIGURES ON COMPLIANCE. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF OVERTIME AND MINIMUM WAGE REGULATIONS HOWEVER, IS CONSIDERED TO BE FAIRLY COMMON. MANPOWER OFFICIALS BACKED BY THE NEW MINIMUM WAGE REGULATION HAVE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED

THREATENED TO AUDIT COMPANIES NOT PAYING THE MINIMUM WAGE AND TO TAKE TOUGHER ACTION.

BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. FIVE NEW HEALTH AND

SAFETY REGULATIONS HAVE BEEN PROMULGATED IN THE LAST 4 YEARS. A NATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY COUNCIL WAS CREATED TO OVERSEE THE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS OF THE OVER 6,000 COMPANY SAFETY COMMITTEES. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER CONDUCTS YEARLY NATIONAL CAMPAIGNS TO PROMOTE PUBLIC AWARENESS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY NEEDS AMONG WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS AND ADMINISTERS A COUNTRY-WIDE COMPREHENSIVE INSPECTION SYSTEM.

WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS AND EMPLOYERS ARE PREVENTED BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO. AN ILO-SPONSORED PROGRAM TO ENHANCE THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES OF GOVERNMENT INSPECTORS AND PLANT PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF CHEMICAL AND MAJOR HAZARDS CONTROL WAS SIGNED IN 1988 AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES TO INCREASE INSPECTION CAPABILITIES. SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS IN THE COUNTRY'S OVER 100,000 LARGER, REGISTERED INDUSTRIES IN THE NONOIL SECTOR ARE HAMPERED BY A LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED INSPECTORS--LESS THAN 1,300; THE SLOWNESS WITH WHICH THE FIRMS ESTABLISHED THE REQUIRED PLANT SAFETY COMMITTEES (ONLY ABOUT 6,000 AS OF MAY 1989); AND THE NEED FOR MORE AND BETTER TRAINING OF GOVERNMENT INSPECTORS AND PLANT SAFETY PERSONNEL. EAGLEBURGER

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C33

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 01 OF 17 050915Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

------------------312411 050939Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7907
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

REF: (A) STATE 227544, (B) STATE 267382, (C) STATE 311045

1. LOU - NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS THE 1990 COUNTRY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA.

3. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND THE MILITARY ARE INDONESIA'S PREDOMINANT GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS. SINCE THE MID-1960S, AFTER AN ABORTIVE COUP BACKED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY, RETIRED AND ACTIVE-DUTY MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN TECHNOCRATS HAVE EXERCISED CENTRALIZED EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY UNDER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S LEADERSHIP. THE PARTLY ELECTED, PARTLY APPOINTED PARLIAMENT (DPR) CONSIDERS BUT DOES NOT INITIATE LEGISLATION. THE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 14509 01 OF 17 050915Z

QPEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) -- CONSISTING OF 500 APPOINTED MEMBERS AND THE 500 DPR MEMBERS -- MEETS EVERY 5 YEARS TO APPROVE GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY AND TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 02 NOV 2006 200504425

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

INDONESIA IS THE FIFTH MOST POPULOUS COUNTRY IN THE WORLD AND THE LARGEST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. SINCE INDEPENDENCE, INDONESIAN LEADERS HAVE SOUGHT TO CREATE A UNIQUE NATIONAL IDENTY AND TO ACCOMMODATE ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC AND GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSITIES, WHILE FOSTERING COHESION, INTERNAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT. THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES ALLEGIANCE TO "PANCASILA," FIVE BROAD, GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL LIFE: BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD, A JUST AND CIVILIZED HUMANITY, INDONESIAN NATIONAL UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE.

THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI) -- WHICH INCLUDE THE MILITARY SERVICES AND THE POLICE -- NUMBER ABOUT 416,000. THE ARMY CONSTITUTES ABOUT HALF AND FOCUSES MAINLY ON INTERNAL SECURITY. UNDER A "DUAL FUNCTION" CONCEPT, MANY MILITARY OFFICERS SERVE IN THE CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY AT ALL LEVELS AND IN PARLIAMENT. FREQUENT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST DWINDLING INSURGENCY MOVEMENTS IN THE PROVINCES OF EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA TOOK PLACE. TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT, IRIANESE VILLAGERS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS FLED INTO NEIGHBORING PAPUA NEW GUINEA. AN UPSURGE IN ACEH OF SEPARATIST VIOLENCE AND ALLEGED VIOLENT CRIME, LINKED TO ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL GRIEVANCES, PROVOKED A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN MILITARY PRESENCE AND OPERATIONS THERE.

ALTHOUGH INDONESIA'S MIXED ECONOMY INVOLVES THE STATE IN
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

QNEARLY ALL SECTORS, GOVERNMENT POLICIES ARE EXPANDING THE ROLE AND FREEDOM OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR. DEREGULATION AIMED PRIMARILY AT STIMULATING GROWTH IN NONOIL SECTORS HAS BEEN A MAJOR GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVE SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF OIL PRICES IN THE EARLY 1980S. A LARGE DEVALUATION IN 1986 AND A SUBSEQUENT FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATE HAVE HELPED BOOST NONOIL EXPORTS GREATLY. REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) GROWTH IN 1989 WAS 7.4 PERCENT. DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN REAL INCOMES AND IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF MOST INDONESIANS IN THE PAST 20 YEARS, THE COUNTRY IS POOR, THERE IS SIGNIFICANT UNEMPLOYMENT, AND WIDE DISPARITIES IN WEALTH EXIST. CORRUPTION AND INFLUENCE PEDDLING ARE ENDEMIC AND RESTRICT GROWTH AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THERE WERE BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS IN 1990. SERIOUS PROBLEMS EXIST, SUCH AS PHYSICAL MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES, A CORRUPT JUDICIAL SYSTEM, WIDE APPLICATION OF THE ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW, PATERNALISTIC POLITICAL CONTROLS, AND PERSISTENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE. KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS BY THE MILITARY TOOK PLACE IN EAST TIMOR AND ACEH AND PARTICIPANTS IN SEVERAL PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS WERE BEATEN. POSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS IN 1990 INCLUDED SOME RELAXATION OF PRESS CENSORSHIP, GREATER TOLERANCE FOR POLITICAL DISCUSSION, THE RELEASE FROM PRISON OF A LEADING DISSIDENT, PRECEDENTIAL ACQUITTALS IN TWO SUBVERSION TRIALS, AN ENHANCED ROLE FOR THE PARLIAMENT, STEPS TO ENFORCE MINIMUM WAGE REQUIREMENTS, THE REGISTRATION OF A NEW UNION, AND A REDUCED INCIDENCE OF ABUSES BY THE MILITARY IN EAST TIMOR.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 02 OF 17 050916Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

------------------312430 050940Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7908
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

SECTION 1
RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING

MILITARY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR, ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE REPORTS, KILLED OVER 10 CIVILIANS, SHOWING SOME IMPROVEMENT OVER 1989. OFFICIAL SOURCES CONFIRMED THE DEATHS OF 5 CIVILIANS IN A MILITARY OPERATION IN ACEH. UNSPECIFIED DISCIPLINARY ACTION WAS INSTIGATED BY THE LOCAL MILITARY AUTHORITIES AGAINST THE SUBORDINATES RESPONSIBLE IN CERTAIN CASES.

B. DISAPPEARANCE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TEMPORARY DISAPPEARANCE OF INDIVIDUALS TAKEN FOR INTERROGATION BY SECURITY FORCES OCCURED PERIODICALLY IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, ACEH AND ELSEWHERE AND USUALLY WITHOUT NOTIFICATION TO FAMILIES. MOST REPORTS ARE UNSPECIFIC AND DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM. NO CASES OF BELIEVED PERMANENT DISAPPEARANCE WERE RESOLVED.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

CREDIBLE REPORTS OF TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT, INCLUDING RAPE, OF CRIMINAL SUSPECTS, DETAINEES AND PRISONERS WERE FREQUENT. POLICE OFTEN RESORT TO PHYSICAL ABUSE, EVEN IN MINOR INCIDENTS. OFFICIALS HAVE PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED AND CONDEMNED POLICE BRUTALITY AND UNACCEPTABLE PRISON CONDITIONS AND PERIODICALLY INSTIGATED DISCIPLINARY ACTION, INCLUDING TRANSFER, DISMISSAL, TRIAL AND CONVICTION TO PRISON TERMS. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO KNOWN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

INSTANCES OF OFFICIALS BEING PUNISHED FOR MISTREATMENT OF POLITICAL PRISONERS OR DETAINEES. PRE-TRIAL MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES TO OBTAIN CONFESSIONS IS REPORTEDLY COMMON.

THE PRACTICE IN MEDAN OF "SHOOTING TO WOUND" CRIMINAL SUSPECTS ALLEGEDLY ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE CAPTURE CONTINUED, AND EFFORTS BY POLICE IN JAKARTA TO COPE WITH INCREASED CRIME RATES RAISED CONCERNS ABOUT EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE AGAINST SUSPECTS IN SEVERAL CASES. LOCAL MILITARY -- SOME OF WHOM WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCIPLINED BY TRANSFER -- RAPED, BEAT AND ROBBED INDOCHINESE ASYLUM SEEKERS LANDING AT KUKU ISLAND IN THE SPRING. ONE OF THE VICTIMS DIED. PEACEFUL THOUGH AT TIMES UNRULY DEMONSTRATORS IN EAST TIMOR WERE ON TWO OCCASIONS BEATEN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AND WOUNDED BY SECURITY PERSONNEL. THREE PARTICIPANTS REQUIRED HOSPITALIZATION AFTER RIOT POLICE FORCIBLY DISPERSED A DEMONSTRATION IN EAST TIMOR DURING THE JANUARY VISIT OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR. REBELS IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA AND ACEH PERIODICALLY HARASSED AND TERRORIZED CIVILIANS.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE (KUHAP) CONTAINS PROTECTIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION AND SPECIFIES THE RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO LEGAL COUNSEL AND NOTIFICATION OF FAMILY. THESE SAFEGUARDS ARE OFTEN DISREGARDED IN PRACTICE. DETAINEES IN CASES OF ALLEGED SUBVERSION CAN BE HELD UP TO A YEAR WITHOUT CHARGES. SECURITY AGENCIES DETAIN AND ARREST PERSONS, INCLUDING STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS, TO INTIMIDATE AND INHIBIT ACTIVITIES JUDGED UNDESIRABLE. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR REDRESS OF SUCH ACTIONS ARE INADEQUATE. THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF PERSONS DETAINED WITHOUT TRIAL IS UNKNOWN, ALTHOUGH PAST ESTIMATES WERE UP TO 500. APPLICATION OF A 1987 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE ON REMISSION OF PRISON TERMS LEAVES UNCERTAIN THE STATUS OF SOME PRISONERS, INCLUDING SEVERAL REPORTEDLY STILL IN JAIL DESPITE APPARENT EXPIRATION OF THEIR SENTENCES.

THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) OPERATES OUTSIDE KUHAP PROCEDURES AND HAS WIDE DISCRETION TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE PERSONS THOUGHT TO THREATEN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY. INDONESIAN LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SUCH ACTIONS OR FOR THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION OR LEGAL AID FOR THE DETAINEES. THEIR CASES ARE RARELY IF EVER PUBLICIZED.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 03 OF 17 050917Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

----------312443 050941Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7909
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

SECURITY FORCES PERIODICALLY DETAINED PERSONS ON SUSPICION OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY FOR DAYS OR WEEKS IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA AND ACEH, SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASING MOST WITHOUT CHARGES. THE YOUTHS TEMPORARILY DETAINED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
FOR DEMONSTRATING DURING THE POPE'S OCTOBER 1989 VISIT TO EAST TIMOR WERE FREED BY JANUARY. SIX WENT ON TRIAL, WITH TWO SENTENCED TO SHORT PRISON TERMS SERVED RETROACTIVELY. IN SEPTEMBER ONE OF THE COUNTRY'S LEADING DISSIDENTS, RETIRED LT. GEN. H.R. DHARSONO, WAS RELEASED FOR GOOD BEHAVIOR AFTER SERVING 5 YEARS 8 MONTHS OF A 7-YEAR SUBVERSION SENTENCE. FOLLOWING A VIGOROUS PUBLIC OUTCRY, JUSTICE MINISTRY OFFICIALS REVERSED THE TRANSFER BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF 8 YOUNG POLITICAL PRISONERS TO A PRISON NORMALLY USED FOR HARDENED CRIMINALS. EARLY
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASES HAVE REDUCED TO 10 THE NUMBER OF EAST TIMORESE SERVING SENTENCES IN DILI AND JAKARTA FOR INVOLVEMENT WITH THE FRETILIN REBELS.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

A QUADRIPARTITE JUDICIARY OF GENERAL, RELIGIOUS, MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS EXISTS BELOW THE SUPREME COURT. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT TO HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS. THE SUPREME COURT, WITH A CURRENT BACKLOG OF SOME 16,000 CASES, DOES NOT CONSIDER MATERIAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF LAW. INITIAL JUDGMENTS ARE RARELY REVERSED IN THE APPEALS PROCESS, ALTHOUGH SENTENCES ARE SOMETIMES INCREASED OR REDUCED. A 3-JUDGE PANEL CONDUCTS MOST TRIALS, PUTS QUESTIONS, HEARS EVIDENCE, DECIDES GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND ASSESSES PUNISHMENT. SINCE JUDGES ARE CIVIL SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE SUPREME COURT CAN NOT ANNUL LAWS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT, THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY IS SIGNIFICANTLY CONSTRAINED.

MOST COURT SESSIONS ARE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC AND MOST DEFENDANTS HAVE ACCESS TO COUNSEL. SUCH ACCESS IS SOMETIMES SIGNIFICANTLY DELAYED. DESTITUTE DEFENDANTS CAN OBTAIN PRIVATE LEGAL HELP SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE (LBH). COURTS ALSO CAN PROVIDE A LIMITED AMOUNT OF AID FOR THOSE UNABLE TO AFFORD LEGAL ASSISTANCE. THE STATE MUST ASSURE LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CAPITAL CASES.

CORRUPTION PERMEATES THE INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM. IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, PAYMENT OF BRIBES CAN INFLUENCE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECISIONS, PROSECUTION, CONVICTION AND SENTENCING. USE IN TRIALS OF FORCED CONFESSIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE ARE REPORTEDLY COMMON. THE GOVERNMENT HAS OCCASIONALLY TAKEN ACTION AGAINST FLAGRANT OFFENDERS, BUT BY AND LARGE THESE ABUSES CONTINUE UNCHECKED. THE DEFICIENCIES AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO INFLUENCE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM HAVE EXACERBATED DISPUTES OVER LAND USE. THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE LEGAL AWARENESS, TRAINING AND RESEARCH.

CONVICTION IS VIRTUALLY AUTOMATIC IN CASES INVOLVING INDONESIA'S BROAD 1963 ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW, ALTHOUGH IN 1990 COURTS ACQUITTED 2 PERSONS CHARGED WITH SUBVERSION ON GROUNDS OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, RESPECTIVELY. ADVOCACY OR ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF SECESSION OR CREATION OF AN ISLAMIC STATE, CRITICISM OF PANCASILA, AND SMUGGLING ARE CLASSIFIED SUBVERSIVE OFFENSES SUBJECT TO A MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH. IN APRIL THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ORDERED INCLUSION IN THIS LIST OF THE PRODUCTION OF FAKE PESTICIDES DAMAGING TO CROPS. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE DATA ON THE NUMBER OF PERSONS SERVING SUBVERSION SENTENCES, CAREFUL ESTIMATES BASED ON THE INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AVAILABLE SUGGEST A TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 400. THIS ESTIMATE INCLUDES PERSONS SENTENCED FOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1965 COMMUNIST COUP ATTEMPT AND ALLEGED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, MANY OF WHOM, SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE, WERE CONVICTED FOR PEACEFUL PROTEST ACTIVITY. SOME PRISONERS ARE SERVING SENTENCES FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ILLEGAL UNDER CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL CODE.

DOZENS OF SUBVERSION TRIALS TOOK PLACE IN 1990, MOST RELATED TO PRIOR INCIDENTS IN LAMPUNG, JAKARTA AND SUMBAWA INVOLVING ALLEGED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS CHARGED WITH

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 04 OF 17 050918Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

----------312463 050941Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7910
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 04 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

SEEKING TO ESTABLISH AN ISLAMIC STATE. DEFENDANTS COMMITTED OR ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE PLOTTED ACTS OF VIOLENCE IN MANY OF THE CASES. SENTENCES RANGED FROM SIX TO SEVENTEEN YEARS. NEARLY 50 CASES OF ALLEGED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS WERE BELIEVED TO BE PENDING AS OF SEPTEMBER. IN IRIAN JAYA 3 PERSONS WHO UNSUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT ASYLUM AT THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA CONSULATE WERE LATER TRIED AND SENTENCED FOR 1989 SECESSIONIST ACTIVITIES, DESPITE REPORTED ASSURANCES THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT PROSECUTE. THE 7- AND 8-YEAR SUBVERSION SENTENCES FROM 1989 OF A STUDENT AND AN EMPLOYEE AT YOGYAKARTA'S GAJAH MADA UNIVERSITY WERE UPHELD, AND THE TRIAL OF BONAR TIGOR NAIPOSPOS ALSO CHARGED WITH SPREADING WRITINGS BANNED FOR COMMUNIST CONTENT BEGAN.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 14509 04 OF 17 050918Z

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

JUDICIAL WARRANTS FOR SEARCHES ARE REQUIRED EXCEPT FOR CASES INVOLVING SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, FORCED OR SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY BY SECURITY AGENCIES REPORTEDLY OCCURS REGULARLY. SECURITY AGENCIES CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS AND RESIDENCES TO INTIMIDATE AND ARE BELIEVED TO MONITOR SELECTIVELY LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS, WITHOUT LEGAL RESTRAINT. CORRESPONDENCE GENERALLY IS NOT MONITORED. GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS TRY TO MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF UP TO 2.5 MILLION FORMER MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) AND THE APPROXIMATELY 20 MILLION MEMBERS OF ITS FRONT GROUPS. THESE PERSONS AND SOMETIMES THEIR RELATIVES ARE SUBJECT TO SURVEILLANCE, REQUIRED CHECK-INS, AND ARBITRARY ACTIONS BY OFFICIALS, INCLUDING REMOVAL FROM GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT. WHILE NEW REGULATIONS BASED ON AN APRIL DECREE WERE PROMULGATED TO REGULARIZE IDEOLOGICAL SCREENING OF PERSONS IN GOVERNMENT AND OTHER JOBS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE THE POTENTIAL FOR OFFICIAL DISCRIMINATION REMAINS.

SECTION 2

RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

SIGNIFICANT RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS EXIST. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES EXERCISE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY IN APPLYING LAWS CONCERNING THE RIGHTS OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INDIVIDUALS AND EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW IS LACKING. PUBLIC STATEMENTS OR PUBLICATIONS WHICH CRITICIZE OR COULD BE PERCEIVED AS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT, PANCASILA, TOP LEADERS, THEIR FAMILIES, OR PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC GROUPS ARE STRONGLY DISCOURAGED. SIX STUDENTS WERE SENTENCED TO PRISON TERMS AVERAGING 3 YEARS ON CRIMINAL CHARGES OF INSULTING THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER'S AUGUST 1989 VISIT TO THE BANDUNG INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. A JAKARTA COURT SENTENCED BAMBANG BEATHOR SURYADI TO 4 YEARS 5 MONTHS FOR

SPREADING FALSE RUMORS THAT INSULTED NATIONAL LEADERS AND ENCOURAGING THE PUBLIC TO ACT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. WHILE SUBVERSION AND CRIMINAL SENTENCES PERIODICALLY DEMONSTRATE LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PUBLIC AND MEDIA AIRING OF ISSUES REGARDED AS SENSITIVE TO THE GOVERNMENT INCREASED IN 1990. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO SANCTIONED THE EXPRESSION OF DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW IN AN ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT AUGUST 16.

THE RISK OF OFFICIAL DISAPPROVAL AND INFORMAL GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTIONS GENERALLY INFLUENCE THE MEDIA TO AVOID OR EXERCISE GREAT CAUTION IN DISSEMINATING VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT CRITICS. HOWEVER, COVERAGE OF OPPOSITION VIEWS CONVEYED TO THE PARLIAMENT IN AUGUST AND OF LT. GEN. DHARSONO'S SEPTEMBER RELEASE FROM PRISON WAS EXTENSIVE. LACK OF CLEAR GUIDELINES ON WHAT IS PERMISSIBLE HAS GENERATED A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF SELF-CENSORSHIP BOTH IN PUBLIC SPEAKING AND IN THE PRESS, ALTHOUGH THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT TOLERANCE ARE REGULARLY TESTED AND AT TIMES WIDENED IN 1990.

WHILE ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS GUARANTEED, CONSTRAINTS EXIST ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SCHOLARS. THEY SOMETIMES REFRAIN FROM PRODUCING MATERIALS WHICH THEY BELIEVE MIGHT PROVOKE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 05 OF 17 050920Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

---------- 312533 050942Z /20

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7911
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 05 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

GOVERNMENT DISPLEASURE. PUBLISHERS ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT MANUSCRIPTS DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. ALTHOUGH CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF EAST TIMOR TOOK PLACE, AUTHORITIES CANCELLED A SEMINAR SCHEDULED TO PRESENT THE FINDINGS OF SCHOLARS' STUDY OF ITS ECONOMY.

THE GOVERNMENT OPERATES THE NATIONAL TELEVISION NETWORK. A PRIVATE COMPANY OFFERS TELEVISION SERVICE TO VIEWERS IN JAKARTA, AND A PRIVATE COMMERCIAL STATION BEGAN OPERATING IN SURABAYA. MORE THAN 400 PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS OPERATE IN INDONESIA IN ADDITION TO THE NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK. PRIVATE TELEVISION AND RADIO STATIONS, WHICH HAVE CONSIDERABLE PROGRAMMING LATITUDE, ARE SUBJECT TO CAREFUL OFFICIAL SCRUTINY AND REQUIRED TO USE GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED NEWS PROGRAMS. PRIVATE RADIO
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 14509 05 OF 17 050920Z

STATIONS FREQUENTLY SUPPLEMENT SUCH NEWS PROGRAMS WITH THEIR OWN REPORTS. FOREIGN TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS ARE ACCESSIBLE TO THOSE WHO CAN AFFORD THE TECHNOLOGY.

THE PRESS IS LARGELY PRIVATELY OWNED. OFFICIALS STATE THAT THE PRESS IS "FREE" BUT ALSO "RESPONSIBLE" AND EXPECTED TO SUPPORT NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND STABILITY; TO BE EDUCATIONAL; AND TO UPHOLD PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS. THE GOVERNMENT OFTEN ADVISES EDITORS AND REPORTERS ABOUT NEWS WHICH CANNOT BE REPORTED AND CLOSELY MONITORS MEDIA OUTLETS. THE GOVERNMENT ISSUES ORAL OR WRITTEN WARNINGS FOR PUBLISHED MATERIAL FOUND UNACCEPTABLE. IF IGNORED, WARNINGS CAN RESULT IN A BAN ON CIRCULATION OR REVOCATION

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

OF THE LICENSE TO PUBLISH. DIFFERENT CABINET OFFICIALS CHALLENGED AND SUPPORTED THE APPROPRIATENESS OF SUCH REVOCATION. THE GOVERNMENT LIMITS THE NUMBER OF NEWSPAPER LICENSES, THE AMOUNT OF ADVERTISING AND THE NUMBER OF PAGES.

IN 1990 THE PRESS RECEIVED WARNINGS FOR A VARIETY OF REPORTS FOUND OBJECTIONABLE BY THE GOVERNMENT. NUMEROUS REPORTS ON SENSITIVE ISSUES, PARTICULARLY IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE DOMESTIC PRESS, NONETHELESS WENT UNCHALLENGED. THE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR SECURITY AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS ANNOUNCED IN AUGUST AN END TO THE INEFFICACIOUS GOVERNMENT PRACTICES OF TELEPHONING EDITORS TO SUPPRESS STORIES AND CENSORING FOREIGN PERIODICALS. SOME NEWSPAPERS CONTINUED THEREAFTER TO RECEIVE TELEPHONE DIRECTIVES. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BANNED 4 BOOKS, ONE BY A U.S. AUTHOR CHARGING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WITH MASTERMINDING THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP. THE OTHER BOOKS CONCERNED THE VIOLENT FEBRUARY 1989 CLASH BETWEEN MEMBERS
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OF AN ISLAMIC SECT AND THE MILITARY, THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING "THE SATANIC VERSES," AND FORMER PRESIDENT SOEKARNO'S ROLE IN THE 1965 COUP. THE JUSTICE MINISTER TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED ONE NEWSPAPER'S ACCESS TO THE MINISTRY. A JOURNALIST CHARGED WITH CREATING UNREST AND DAMAGING THE ECONOMY IN CONNECTION WITH A 1988 STORY ABOUT PORK FAT IN FOOD PRODUCTS WAS SENTENCED IN AUGUST TO ONE YEAR IN JAIL.

CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED DAILY NEWSPAPER, CAN NEITHER BE IMPORTED NOR PRODUCED DOMESTICALLY. PRIVATE INSTRUCTION OF CHINESE IS DISCOURAGED BUT TAKES PLACE TO A LIMITED EXTENT. NO LAWS PROHIBIT SPEAKING CHINESE, BUT THE GOVERNMENT LAYS HEAVY STRESS ON THE LEARNING AND USE OF THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE, BAHASA INDONESIA.

THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY REGULATES VISITING AND RESIDENT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS AND OCCASIONALLY REMINDS THE LATTER OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DENY REQUESTS FOR VISA EXTENSIONS.

THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AND VIDEO TAPES, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED BY GOVERNMENT CENSORS, REQUIRES A PERMIT. IMPORTERS USUALLY AVOID FOREIGN MATERIALS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OR DEALING WITH TOPICS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. FOREIGN PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPERS, READILY AVAILABLE IN INDONESIA, ARE SUBJECT TO CENSORSHIP PRIOR TO DISTRIBUTION. A MARKED INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ARTICLES INKED OR CUT OUT PRECEDED THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN END TO THE PRACTICE.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 06 OF 17 050920Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

----------312551 050942Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7912
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 06 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ALL ORGANIZATIONS MUST HAVE GOVERNMENT PERMISSION TO HOLD REGIONAL AND NATIONAL MEETINGS. LOCAL JURISDICTIONS OFTEN REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FOR SMALLER GATHERINGS AS WELL. WHILE OBTAINING SUCH APPROVALS IS FAIRLY AUTOMATIC, AUTHORITIES OCCASIONALLY WITHHOLD PERMISSION. MEETINGS OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT DO OCCUR ARE SOMETIMES SUBJECT TO SUBSTANTIAL OFFICIAL EFFORTS TO PRODUCE SPECIFIC OUTCOMES. A LONG-POSTPONED MEETING OF THE INDONESIAN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION ENDED IN DISARRAY OVER SUCH EFFORTS. STUDENT GATHERINGS HAVE OFTEN BEEN THE TARGET OF DISAPPROVALS, AND OSTENSIBLE POLITICAL ACTIVITY AT UNIVEQSITIES REMAINS FORBIDDEN UNDER THE "CAMPUS LIFE NORMALIZATION" (OR "NKK") LAW OF 1978. THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE ISSUED REVISIONS IN JUNE TO ALLOW LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 14509 06 OF 17 050920Z

STUDENT SENATES AT UNIVERSITIES, ALTHOUGH THE BODY'S PRESCRIBED COMPOSITION AND AUTONOMY FALL SHORT OF MANY STUDENTS' DEMANDS.

STUDENT ACTIVISM CONTINUED IN 1990, THOUGH NOT AT THE SAME PITCH AS IN 1989. DELEGATIONS RAISED LAND ISSUES AT PARLIAMENT, EXPRESSED FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS AT EMBASSIES, ADDRESSED HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS TO THE VISITING CHAIRMAN OF INDONESIA'S INTERNATIONAL DONOR GROUP, WELCOMED LT. GEN. DHARSONO ON HIS RETURN TO FREEDOM, AND PROTESTED THE ARBITRARY HANDLING OF STUDENT PRISON INMATES TO PARLIAMENT AND THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE. PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATORS IN EAST TIMOR WERE FORCIBLY DISPERSED IN JANUARY, AND SEVERAL WERE DETAINED TEMPORARILY AND BEATEN BY SECURITY PERSONNEL FOLLOWING A DEMONSTRATION THERE IN SEPTEMBER.

THE 1985 "SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS" (OR "ORMAS") LAW REQUIRES ALL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA. THIS PROVISION, WHICH LIMITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD AS PROHIBITING GROUPS WHICH SEEK TO MAKE INDONESIA AN ISLAMIC STATE. THE LAW EMPOWERS THE GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND ANY ORGANIZATION IT BELIEQES TO BE ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA AND REQUIRES PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR ANY ORGANIZATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS FROM FOREIGN DONORS. SUBJECT TO SOME CONSTRAINTS, WORKERS CAN FORM UNIONS AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

THE CONSTITUTION RECOGNIZES AND GUARANTEES RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR ISLAM, CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, AND HINDUISM,
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AND PERMITS PRACTICE OF THE MYSTICAL, ANIMISTIC BELIEFS OF "ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN". WITH AN OVERWHELMINGLY MUSLIM POPULATION, INDONESIA EXHIBITS A HIGH DEGREE OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, AND THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECOGNIZED FAITHS ARE RESPECTED. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OPERATES FREELY IN EAST TIMOR. VARIOUS RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY NONETHELESS EXIST. ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL STATISTICS, NEARLY 400 "MISLEADING RELIGIOUS CULTS" ARE BANNED, INCLUDING SOME ISLAMIC GROUPS CONSIDERED HERETICAL. EXISTING BANS AFFECT MANY THOUSANDS OF ADHERENTS, AND NEW BANNINGS BY NATIONAL OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES OCCUR PERIODICALLY.

ALTHOUGH BANNED, SEVERAL THOUSAND JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES ARE BELIEVED TO PRACTICE IN JAKARTA ALONE. ADHERENTS ARE PERIODICALLY DETAINED AND THEIR RELIGIOUS MATERIALS CONFISCATED. A SPOKESMAN FOR THE MINISTRY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS URGED SECURITY AUTHORITIES TO CRACK DOWN ON PRACTITIONERS FOR SEEKING CONVERTS AND INCITING UNREST. A 1963 BAN ON THE BAHA'I FAITH CONTINUES IN FORCE, AND SOME OBSERVERS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT STRICTER IMPLEMENTATION. THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF BANNED RELIGIONS IS OFTEN TOLERATED, ALTHOUGH AUTHORITIES PERIODICALLY HARASS ADHERENTS OR PRESSURE THEM TO CONVERT TO THE RECOGNIZED FAITHS. BECAUSE THE FIRST TENET OF PANCASILA IS BELIEF IN A SUPREME BEING, ATHEISM IS FORBIDDEN. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA EXTENDS TO ALL RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS.

THE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY OPPOSES MUSLIM GROUPS WHICH ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ACKNOWLEDGING ONLY ISLAMIC LAW, BOTH OF WHICH ARE OUTLAWED. OVER 100 AND POSSIBLY MANY MORE ALLEGED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS ARE ESTIMATED TO BE SERVING PRISON TERMS ON SUBVERSION

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 07 OF 17 050921Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

----------312562 050943Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7913
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 07 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

CHARGES. THE MINISTER OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS AFFIRMED THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTINUING DETERMINATION TO TAKE STERN MEASURES AGAINST FOREIGN RELIGIOUS TEACHERS FOUND PROSELYTIZING WHILE ON TOURIST PASSES. VISITING MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALIST TEACHERS HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO DEPORTATION.

THERE IS NO LEGAL BAR TO CONVERSION BETWEEN FAITHS, AND CONVERSIONS OCCUR. HOWEVER, PROSELYTIZING BETWEEN THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS OR IN AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ONE RECOGNIZED RELIGION OR ANOTHER IS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND DISCOURAGED. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED. IN RECENT YEARS, HOWEVER, SOME FOREIGN MISSIONARIES HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY RENEWING VISAS OR RESIDENCE PERMITS. LAWS AND DECREES

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

FROM THE 1970S DO NOT ALLOW FOREIGN MISSIONARIES TO SPEND MORE THAN 10 YEARS IN INDONESIA, WITH EXTENSIONS TO 15 IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ONLY. WITH RARE EXCEPTIONS, ENFORCEMENT OF THIS POLICY DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE BY SECT OR NATIONALITY. EXCEPTIONS TO THE 10-YEAR RULE HAVE BEEN GRANTED TO FOREIGN RELIGIOUS WORKERS SINCE LATE 1987 IN THE REMOTE AREAS OF IRIAN JAYA AND KALIMANTAN AND MORE RECENTLY IN OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT SAYS IT INTENDS OVER TIME TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF FOREIGN MISSIONARIES IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE EMPLOYMENT OF INDONESIANS. FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK IS SUBJECT TO THE FUNDING STIPULATIONS OF THE "ORMAS" LAW DISCUSSED ABOVE.

INDONESIANS PRACTICING THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS MAINTAIN ACTIVE LINKS WITH CORELIGIONISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE INDONESIA AND TRAVEL ABROAD FOR QELIGIOUS GATHERINGS. THE GOVERNMENT PERMITS A SET NUMBER OF PILGRIMS TO MAKE THE HAJ ANNUALLY.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT EXIST. PERMITS TO SEEK WORK IN A NEW LOCATION ARE REQUIRED IN CERTAIN AREAS, PRIMARILY TO CONTROL FURTHER POPULATION MOVEMENT TO CROWDED CITIES. PREVIOUSLY SOME ETHNIC CHINESE ENCOUNTERED LEGAL AND BUREAUCRATIC OBSTACLES TO OBTAINING CITIZENSHIP ALTHOUGH ENCOURAGED TO DO SO. IN CONNECTION WITH THE AUGUST RENEWAL OF DIPLOMATIC TIES BETWEEN INDONESIA AND CHINA, OFFICIALS ANNOUNCED THAT STATELESS CHINESE -- CURRENTLY ESTIMATED TO NUMBER 300,000 -- MUST ADOPT THE CITIZENSHIP OF ONE COUNTRY OR THE OTHER AND THAT INDONESIA'S PROCEDURES WOULD BE SIMPLIFIED AND

SHORTENED. TRAVEL TO CHINA REMAINS RESTRICTED, AND THE STATE SECRETARY EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO THE RUMORED PLANS OF MANY ETHNIC CHINESE TO ATTEND THE ASIAN GAMES IN BEIJING. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION ANNOUNCED THE EXEMPTION OF ADDITIONAL CATEGORIES OF CITIZENS FROM

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THE EXIT VISA REQUIREMENT.

THE GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGES MAINTAINING A "BLACKLIST" THAT INCLUDES DOMESTIC CRITICS AND OTHERS IN DISFAVOR WHOSE FOREIGN TRAVEL IS PERIODICALLY PROHIBITED. ALTHOUGH RELIABLE FIGURES ARE NOT AVAILABLE, AN ESTIMATED 5,000 INDONESIANS -- INCLUDING PROMINENT PAST CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS -- CURRENTLY MAY NOT LEAVE THE COUNTRY. SOME CRITICS, HOWEVER, ARE FREE TO TRAVEL ABROAD, AND A PERSON PROHIBITED AT ONE TIME MAY BE PERMITTED TO TRAVEL SUBSEQUENTLY. STUDENTS WISHING AND ABLE TO DO SO CAN GENERALLY GO ABROAD FOR STUDY.

RESTRICTIONS EXIST ON MOVEMENT BY INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN CITIZENS TO AND WITHIN PARTS OF IRIAN JAYA, OFFICIALLY BASED ON THE GROUNDS OF SECURITY RISK OR THE CULTURAL VULNERABILITY OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES. SECURITY CHECKS AFFECTING TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL IN EAST TIMOR OUTSIDE DILI OCCURED SPORADICALLY, AND PERMISSION IS REQUIRED TO VISIT CERTAIN DISTRICTS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE FOR SECURITY REASONS. SOME JOURNALISTS VISITING EAST TIMOR WERE RESTRICTED FROM TRAVELLING EVERYWHERE THEY WANTED, WHILE SOME OTHERS VISITING AS TOURISTS TRAVELLED EXTENSIVELY. CURFEWS WERE OFTEN IN FORCE IN CONNECTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS IN PARTS OF EAST TIMOR AND ACEH. FAMILY VISITS BACK TO EAST TIMOR BY EAST TIMORESE NOW LIVING IN AUSTRALIA CONTINUED.

FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-01 INR-05 SS-01 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-01 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 L-03
LAB-04 TRSE-00 EAP-01 PA-01 STR-18 SIL-01 INRE-00
RP-10 USIE-00 SP-01 SR-01 PRS-01 P-02 /082 W
----------312576 050943Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7914
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 08 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

WITH THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, MUST NOTIFY AUTHORITIES OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND MAY NOT CHANGE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE WITHOUT OFFICIAL PERMISSION. A SPOKESMAN FOR BAKORSTANAS REASSERTED THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH TO MEMBERS OR ALLEGED SUPPORTERS OF THE BANNED INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) OUTSIDE INDONESIA, SAYING THAT THOSE LIVING IN EASTERN EUROPE CAN RETURN BUT MUST UNDERGO INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION BEFORE RESUMING A NORMAL LIFE.

INDONESIA HAS GENEROUSLY GIVEN FIRST ASYLUM TO OVER (NUMBER TO BE SUPPLIED) INDOCHINESE REFUGEES SINCE 1975. THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE POPULATION AT INDONESIA'S VASTLY OVERCROWDED GALANG FACILITY STOOD AT OVER 19,000 AT THE END OF AUGUST. OF THIS NUMBER, (NUMBER TO BE SUPPLIED)
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 14509 08 OF 17 050921Z

ARE CLASSIFIED AS REFUGEES UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION ON INDOCHINESE REFUGEES (CPA); (NUMBER TO BE SUPPLIED) HAVE BEEN SCREENED OUT AND UNDER THE CPA WILL BE EXPECTED TO RETURN TO VIETNAM; THE REST, INCLUDING SOME (NUMBER TO BE SUPPLIED) CAMBODIANS NOT COVERED BY THE CPA ARE CONSIDERED ASYLUM SEEKERS PENDING SCREENING BY INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES FOR REFUGEE STATUS ELIGIBILITY. IN ADDITION TO ASYLUM SEEKERS WHO REACHED INDONESIA DIRECTLY, (NUMBER TO BE SUPPLIED) INDOCHINESE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ASYLUM SEEKERS PUSHED OFF FROM ELSEWHERE ARRIVED. THREE BOATLOADS OF CAMBODIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS REPORTEDLY BOUND FOR AUSTRALIA WERE ASSISTED ON THEIR WAY.

SECTION 3

RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

PARLIAMENT, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC HAVE LIMITED ABILITY TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT DECISIONS BUT NOT TO CHANGE THE SYSTEM OR ITS LEADERSHIP. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND A SMALL GROUP OF ACTIVE-DUTY AND RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN TECHNOCRATS EXERCISE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. THE MILITARY HAS RESPONSIBILITY UNDER A "DUAL FUNCTION" DOCTRINE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY PLUS SOCIO-POLITICAL AFFAIRS. THE MILITARY IS PREDOMINANT IN THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY FIELDS. THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES PARLIAMENT A MECHANISM TO CALL THE PRESIDENT TO ACCOUNT IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES. GOVERNMENT LEADERS SEEK OUT AND RECEIVE PUBLIC PUBLIC OPINION INFORMALLY. REFLECTING A STRONG CULTURAL PREFERENCE, INDONESIAN LEADERS EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECISIONMAKING AND RESOLVING DISPUTES THROUGH "CONSULTATION LEADING TO CONSENSUS."

IN 1990 PUBLIC DISCUSSION AMONG ELITES FOCUSED CONTINUED ATTENTION ON THE PATERNALISTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM, LAWS REGULATING POLITICAL ACTIVITY, AND THE CHALLENGE OF MANAGING POLITICAL CHANGE TO KEEP PACE WITH AND SUPPORT ECONOMIC PROGRESS. SOME TOP OFFICIALS INDICATED INCREASED TOLERANCE FOR PLURALISTIC POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND EXPRESSION, WHILE ALSO RESPONDING WITH VARYING EFFECTIVENESS TO PUBLIC CONCERNS ABOUT THE GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR, DOMINATION OF THE ECONOMY BY CONGLOMERATES, LAND USE DISPUTES, AND FUEL PRICES.

THE PARLIAMENT -- WHOSE MEMBERS ARE SCREENED BY THE GOVERNMENT BEFORE ELECTION OR APPOINTMENT -- CONSIDERS BILLS PRESENTED TO IT BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES AND DOES NOT DRAFT LAWS ON ITS OWN, ALTHOUGH IT HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DO SO. THE GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO RESOLVE POTENTIAL PARLIAMENTARY CONCERNS BEFORE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

BILLS ARE OFFICIALLY PRESENTED. PARLIAMENT CHANGES THE TEXT AND OCCASIONALLY THE INTENT OF BILLS IT REVIEWS. THROUGH CONSULTATIONS AND HEARINGS WITH QINISTERS AND OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS, PRESS STATEMENTS AND FIELD TRIPS, PARLIAMENT IS MORE ACTIVELY CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONTENT AND EXECUTION OF GOVERNMENT POLICY THAN PREVIOUSLY.

ONLY THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE ALLOWED BY LAW. GOLKAR, A GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ORGANIZATION OF DIVERSE FUNCTIONAL GROUPS, DOMINATES. TWO SMALL POLITICAL PARTIES -- THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) -- ALSO OPERATE. BY LAW THEY EMBRACE PANCASILA. THEY ARE NOT CONSIDERED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 09 OF 17 050922Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

312605 050944Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7915
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 09 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

OPPOSITION PARTIES AND SELDOM ESPOUSE POLICIES MUCH DIFFERENT FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S. THE LEADERS OF ALL THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE APPROVED, IF NOT CHOSEN, BY THE GOVERNMENT, AND THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED AND OFTEN GUIDED BY GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES. GOLKAR MAINTAINS CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH THE ARMED FORCES AND KORPRI, THE NONUNION ASSOCIATION TO WHICH ALL CIVIL SERVANTS AUTOMATICALLY BELONG. CIVIL SERVANTS MAY JOIN EITHER OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WITH OFFICIAL PERMISSION, BUT MOST ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) AND SOME OTHER BANNED PARTIES MAY NOT RUN FOR OFFICE OR BE ACTIVE POLITICALLY.

GENERAL ELECTIONS FOR PARLIAMENT AND FOR PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES ARE HELD EVERY FIVE YEARS. THE HOME
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AFFAIRS MINISTER PUT INTO DEBATE THE ROLE OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES BY SUGGESTING THEIR ABOLISHMENT. GOLKAR WON 73 PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL VOTE IN THE 1987 ELECTIONS. ALL ADULT CITIZENS ARE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE, EXCEPT ACTIVE-DUTY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, CONVICTED CRIMINALS SERVING PRISON SENTENCES, AND SOME FORMER PKI MEMBEQS. HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS APPLAUDED THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO SCREEN SOME 40,000 OF THE LATTER FOR ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 1992 ELECTIONS. THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER ANNOUNCED THAT BALLOTING IN 1992 WOULD NOT BE CONDUCTED IN GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS OR SCHOOLS, A PRACTICE THOUGHT TO HAVE BENEFITED GOLKAR IN THE PAST. VOTING IS NOT MANDATORY, BUT STRONG SOCIAL PRESSURES ENSURE HIGH PARTICIPATION. PROTEST VOTES TAKE THE FORM OF BLANK OR DELIBERATELY SPOILED BALLOTS. UNDER THE 1985 ELECTION LAW, THE PARLIAMENT ELECTED IN APRIL 1987 CONSISTS OF 500 MEMBERS, 400 ELECTED BY THE VOTERS AND 100 APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE ARMED FORCES. THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) CONSISTS OF PARLIAMENT PLUS 500 OTHER MEMBERS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND BY REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS. THE MPR, WHICH CONVENES EVERY 5 YEARS, ENDED ITS MOST RECENT SESSION IN MARCH 1988 AFTER APPROVING GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR THE NEXT 5 YEARS AND REELECTING

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TO A NEW 5-YEAR TERM, WITH RETIRED LT. GEN. SUDHARMONO AS VICE PRESIDENT. FOR THE FIRST TIME AN ALTERNATE CANDIDATE VIED FOR THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN 1988 BEFORE ULTIMATELY WITHDRAWING FROM CONTENTION.

PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS BY INDONESIA'S MANY ETHNIC GROUPS AND MINORITIES VARIES. SOME ARE WELL AND PROMINENTLY REPRESENTED; SOME ARE UNDERREPRESENTED AND WITHOUT INFLUENCE; AND OTHERS HAVE A SIGNIFICANT VOICE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 JAKART 14509 09 OF 17 050922Z

ONLY THROUGH INFORMAL CHANNELS. WOMEN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN FORMAL AND INFORMAL POLITICS BUT NOT COMMENSURATE WITH THEIR NUMBERS.

SECTION 4

GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

WHILE THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, IT FACILITATED ACCESS IN 1990 BY ASIA WATCH REPRESENTATIVES PREPARING A REPORT CRITICAL OF PRISON CONDITIONS AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER MET ASIA WATCH'S EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL HAS BEEN REFUSED ACCESS TO INDONESIA. INFORMAL ASIA WATCH VISITS, IN ADDITION TO THE PRISON STUDY, HAVE OCCURED THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. ACCESS SPECIFICALLY TO EAST TIMOR BY SUCH ORGANIZATIONS
WHICH THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS BIASED -- HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN RESTRICTED THOUGH NOT TESTED SINCE THE FORMAL NORMALIZATION OF THE PROVINCE'S STATUS IN 1989. DIPLOMATS AND SOME JOURNALISTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO VISIT THE PROVINCE. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND THE ICFTU GENERAL SECRETARY MET IN MARCH AND DISCUSSED WORKER RIGHTS ISSUES. THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY IGNORES CALLS BY DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND ACTIVISTS FOR INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS INCIDENTS. WHILE VARIOUS DOMESTIC ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS INTERESTED IN HUMAN RIGHTS OPERATE ENERGETICALLY, THE GOVERNMENT DISCOURAGES PUBLIC HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITIES.

UNDER A 1985 AGREEMENT, THE ICRC IS AUTHORIZED BY THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 10 OF 17 050923Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

----------312621 050944Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7916
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 10 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

GOVERNMENT TO VISIT PERSONS JAILED IN CONNECTION WITH ARMED RESISTANCE IN EAST TIMOR. THE CONDITIONS OF SUCH ACCESS IMPROVED IN 1990, ALTHOUGH LAPSES BY OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO OCCUR. THE ICRC IN EAST TIMOR ALSO PROVIDES MEDICAL AND FOOD AID TO DETAINEES AND THEIR FAMILIES; SURVEYS MEDICAL AND NUTRITIONAL CONDITIONS IN VILLAGES; FACILITATES FAMILY REUNIFICATION; AND ARRANGES REPATRIATION TO PORTUGAL OF FORMER PORTUGUESE CIVIL SERVANTS AND THEIR FAMILIES. IN IRIAN JAYA THE ICRC FACILITATED THE RETURN OF SOME BORDER CROSSERS FROM PAPUA

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
NEW GUINEA AND VISITED PERSONS JAILED IN CONNECTION WITH SEPARATIST ACTIVITIES. THE ICRC ANNUALLY VISITS AND INTERVIEWS THE PRISONERS CONVICTED OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ABORTIVE, COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP IN 1965. DESPITE REPEATED REQUESTS, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT TO DATE ALLOWED LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACCESS BY THE ICRC -- OR ANY OTHER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN GROUP -- TO IMPRISONED MUSLIM ACTIVISTS.

SECTION 5

DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

INDONESIA EXHIBITS CONSIDERABLE TOLERANCE FOR ETHNIC, RACIAL, AND MAJOR RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES, ALTHOUGH OFFICIAL AND INFORMAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE IS A MAJOR EXCEPTION. SINCE 1959 NONCITIZEN ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO RUN BUSINESSES IN RURAL INDONESIA. REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF ALL-CHINESE SCHOOLS FOR INDONESIANS, FORMATION OF EXCLUSIVELY CHINESE CULTURAL GROUPS OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND PUBLIC DISPLAY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS. MANY PEOPLE OF CHINESE ANCESTRY HAVE NONETHELESS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS IS OFTEN HAPHAZARD. SOME ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE ENJOYED PARTICULAR GOVERNMENT FAVOR. SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS EXIST WHICH ARE, IN EFFECT, ALL-CHINESE AND ARE NOT PROSCRIBED. IN 1990 JAKARTA AUTHORITIES ENDED THE PRACTICE OF MARKING LOCAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS TO INDICATE CHINESE ETHNICITY, AND IN BANDUNG A CONTROVERSIAL DECREE TO REMOVE CHINESE CHARACTERS FROM TOMBSTONES AND PLACES OF WORSHIP WAS RESCINDED. PUBLICIZED STATISTICS FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE ON PERSONS ACCUSED OF ECONOMIC CORRUPTION CATEGORIZED THEM AS ETHNIC CHINESE OR INDIGENOUS INDONESIAN. VARIOUS MATERIALS FOR COMMERCIAL SALE BEARING CHINESE CHARACTERS WERE SEIZED.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

UNDER THE LAW, AND AS PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND OTHER OFFICIALS PERIODICALLY AFFIRM, WOMEN ARE EQUAL TO AND HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS AND OPPORTUNIQIES AS MEN. INDONESIA HAS RATIFIED THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN. SOME INDONESIAN WOMEN ENJOY A HIGH DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FREEDOM AND OCCUPY IMPORTANT MID-LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, THE MILITARY, THE PROFESSIONS, AND PRIVATE BUSINESS. ALTHOUGH WOMEN CONSTITUTE ONE QUARTER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, THEY OCCUPY ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THE SERVICE'S TOP POSTS. WOMEN MAKE UP ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF THE OVERALL WORKFORCE, WITH THE MAJORITY IN THE RURAL SECTOR. DESPITE LEGAL GUARANTEES OF EQUAL TREATMENT, WOMEN SELDOM RECEIVE EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK AND DISPROPORTIONATELY EXPERIENCE ILLITERACY AND POOR HEALTH AND NUTRITION. TRADITIONAL PRACTICES UNDERCUT STATE POLICY IN SOME AREAS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER, ADDRESSING CONCERNS ABOUT REPORTED ABUSE OF FEMALE LABORERS EXPORTED TO THE MIDDLE EAST, STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND MANPOWER SUPPLY COMPANIES ARE DOING THEIR UTMOST TO ASSURE PROTECTION. FEMALE SPOUSES OF CIVIL SERVANTS ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO PARTICIPATE IN A GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION. SEVERAL VOLUNTARY, PRIVATE GROUPS WORK ACTIVELY TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGE SOME SUCCESS IN GAINING OFFICIAL COGNIZANCE OF THEIR CONCERNS.

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IS AN ACKNOWLEDGED THOUGH INADEQUATELY DOCUMENTED PROBLEM. IN RESPONSE TO A CALL FOR A NEW LAW TO PROTECT WOMEN, INCLUDING APPLICATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN RAPE CASES, THE JUSTICE MINISTER ARGUED INSTEAD THAT BETTER ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING LAWS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

----------312654 050945Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7917
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 11 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

AND REGULATIONS IS NECESSARY. THE MEDIA FREQUENTLY -- AND SOMETIMES LURIDLY -- REPORT INSTANCES OF RAPE AND OTHER ABUSE AGAINST WOMEN AND SUBSEQUENT LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PERPETRATORS. ONE PROMINENT CASE IN 1990 INVOLVED A MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT'S SUPREME ADVISORY COUNCIL, ACCUSED ALONG WITH OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS OF REPEATEDLY ASSAULTING A DOMESTIC SERVANT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS RECOGNIZED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A PROBLEM IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY AND PROVIDES SOME COUNSELING, AS DO SEVERAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS. HOWEVER, CULTURAL, SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND OTHER FACTORS INHIBIT REPORTING OF SUCH ABUSE AND RECOURSE BY VICTIMS TO COUNSELING AND LEGAL PROTECTION.

:

SECTION 6
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PRIVATE-SECTOR WORKERS, INCLUDING THOSE IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES, ARE FREE TO FORM OR JOIN UNIONS WITHOUT PREVIOUS AUTHORIZATION. IN ORDER TO BARGAIN ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES A UNION MUST MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION AND REGISTER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION ARE REPRESENTATION IN AT LEAST 20 OF THE 27 PROVINCES, BRANCH OFFICES IN AT LEAST 100 DISTRICTS AND 1,000 LOCAL UNITS AT PLANT LEVEL. PRESENTLY THERE ARE TWO LEGALLY RECOGNIZED UNIONS: THE TEACHERS UNION (PGRI) WHICH REGISTERED IN APRIL 1990 AND THE ALL INDONESIA WORKERS UNION (SPSI). ABOUT SIX PERCENT OF THE 76 MILLION WORKFORCE IS ORGANIZED. THE SPSI CONSISTS OF 9 DEPARTMENTS COVERING BROAD INDUSTRIAL SECTORS AND 9 SPECIALIZED INSTITUTES. THE SPSI CLAIMS THAT IT HAS OVER 3 MILLION MEMBERS THOUGH ONLY ABOUT 900,000 ACTUALLY PAY DUES. IT HAS ABOUT 10,000 LOCAL UNITS AT THE PLANT LEVEL. THE PGRI CONSISTS OF 1.3 MILLION TEACHERS, INCLUDING TEACHERS IN RELIGIOUS, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS. IT HAS REPRESENTATION IN ALL 27 PROVINCES, THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL AND IN THE SCHOOLS. A NUMBER OF GROUPS AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, E.G. THE JOURNALIST ASSOCIATION AND THE JOINT SECRETARIAT OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONS, FUNCTION AS QUASI-TRADE UNIONS AND OPERATE OPENLY, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. THE UNIONS DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

REPRESENTATIVES.

THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS UNIONS AS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF ITS DEVELOPMENT PLANS, WITH THE ROLE OF INCREASING WORKER PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT, MAINTAINING INDUSTRIAL PEACE, AND ELUCIDATING PANCASILA AS IT APPLIES TO INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN INDONESIA ARE SUPPOSED TO BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF PANCASILA AND EMPHASIZE CONSULTATION AMONG GOVERNMENT, EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES AND AVOIDANCE OF CONFLICT. THE GOVERNMENT AND EMPLOYERS HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER UNION AFFAIRS DUE TO THIS TRIPARTITE CONCEPT AND THE OVERALL PATERNALISTIC NATURE OF INDONESIAN POLITICAL DYNAMICS. A RETIRED MILITARY LT. COLONEL AND GOLKAR

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRICT CHAIRMAN WITH SOME PRIOR UNION EXPERIENCE, WAS RECENTLY ELECTED CHAIRMAN OF THE LARGEST PROVINCIAL BRANCH OF THE SPSI, PARTIALLY DUE TO GOVERNMENT BACKING. THERE IS PRESSURE ON SPSI OFFICIALS TO JOIN GOLKAR, AND GOLKAR MEMBERS DOMINATE THE LEADERSHIP.

THE ORMAS LAW DISCUSSED IN SECTION 2.B. GOVERNS THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNIONS AND THE QUASI-UNIONS. GOVERNMENT APPROVAL IS NEEDED FOR MEETINGS OUTSIDE UNION HEADQUARTERS. PERMISSION IS ROUTINELY GIVEN. A UNION MAY BE DISSOLVED, AS WITH OTHER MASS ORGANIZATIONS, IF THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES IT IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA. THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS WHICH LAY OUT THE PROCEDURES FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF A UNION, AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO CASES OF UNION DISSOLUTION.

THE SPSI MAINTAINS EXTENSIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 12 OF 17 050924Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

----------312657 050945Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7918
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

BUT IT IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION, EXCEPT THE ASEAN TRADE UNION COUNCIL -- A REGIONAL BODY CONSISTING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY OF AFFILIATES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (ICFTU). AS A FALLOUT OF THE 1985 RESTRUCTURING OF THE SPSI, THERE HAS BEEN NO FORMAL ICFTU PRESENCE IN INDONESIA SINCE 1986. THE ICFTU CONDUCTS LIMITED ORGANIZATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS WITH THE SPSI. THE SPSI HAS APPLIED FOR ICFTU MEMBERSHIP. INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION SECRETARIATS RETAIN LINKS WITH SOME ELEMENTS OF THE SPSI, SUCH AS THE PORT AND MARITIME WORKERS. THE JOINT SECRETARIAT, GROUPING ELEMENTS OF THE SPSI AND UNIONS NOT LEGALLY RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT, HAS LINKS WITH THE WORLD FEDERATION OF LABOR. THE PGRI IS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AFFILIATED WITH THE WORLD CONFEDERATION OF ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TEACHING PROFESSION (WCOTP) AND IS A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF FREE TEACHERS UNIONS.

ALL ORGANIZED WORKERS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CIVIL SERVANTS, HAVE A LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. IN JUNE 1990 PRESIDENT SOEHARTO REVOKED A 1963 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE WHICH PROHIBITED STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN VITAL INDUSTRIES, SERVICES AND ENTERPRISES. THIS PROHIBITION WAS APPLICABLE TO ABOUT 170,000 WORKERS.

A PRIVATE SECTOR UNION MUST NOTIFY THE LOCAL DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER OFFICE THAT ITS ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE DISAGREEMENTS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS HAVE FAILED AND THAT THE EMPLOYEES WILL GO ON STRIKE. NO APPROVAL IS REQUIRED. THERE WERE 19 REPORTED STRIKES IN 1989 INVOLVING 6,168 WORKERS. AS OF JUNE 1990 THERE WERE 26 REPORTED STRIKES. SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT FOR

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

EVERY OFFICIALLY REPORTED STRIKE, THERE MAY BE 4 TO 5 OTHERS. MOST STRIKES ARE SPONTANEOUS, LAST FOR A FEW HOURS AND ARE NONVIOLENT. THE STRIKE OUTCOMES VARIED. A REVIEW OF NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS OF OVER 20 STRIKES, NOT NECESSARILY THOSE REPORTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER, SHOWED THAT SOME EMPLOYEE DEMANDS WERE MET. SOME CASES ARE PENDING BEFORE THE LABOR DISPUTES TRIBUNALS. OTHER CASES WERE MEDIATED BY DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER (DEPNAKER) OFFICIALS. SOME RESULTED IN THE FIRING OF UNION OFFICIALS OR THE LEADERS OF THE STRIKES. SOME INVOLVED THE INTERVENTION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES. IN A HIGHLY PUBLICIZED CASE, OVER 21 WORKERS WHO PROTESTED THE DISMISSAL OF 7 WOMEN WORKERS AND LOW WAGES, WERE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DISMISSED AS WELL. A NUMBER OF THOSE FIRED WERE UNION OFFICIALS. ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE, THE DISMISSALS WERE BASED ON A STRIKE REPORT FILED BY THE POLICE. THE MINIMUM WAGE WAS INCREASED, THE SEVEN WOMEN WERE SUBSEQUENTLY REHIRED, BUT THE LEADERS WERE NOT. IN MEDIATION PROCEDURES WITH THE COMPANY AND THE LOCAL DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER, SOME OF THE EMPLOYEES ARE BEING REPRESENTED BY THE SPSI, OTHERS BY THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE (LBH). IN ANOTHER HIGHLY PUBLICIZED CASE, OVER 4,000 WORKERS OF A PLYWOOD FACTORY LOCATED IN SURABAYA WENT ON STRIKE FOR HIGHER WAGES AND INCREASED INSURANCE BENEFITS. WHILE WAITING FOR THE RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH MANAGEMENT, RESTLESS EMPLOYEES DAMAGED THE MANAGER'S CAR. A GUARD WAS ROUGHED UP BUT THERE WERE NO SERIOUS INJURIES. AFTER AN ALL DAY BARGAINING SESSION, THE LABORERS RECEIVED A WAGE INCREASE AND OTHER BENEFITS. THEY WERE THEN TOLD TO GO BACK TO WORK OR BE FIRED. THEY WENT BACK TO WORK.

PRIVATE-SECTOR INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ARE SUBMITTED TO TRIPARTITE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. THESE TRIBUNALS HEAR ARGUMENTS AND ISSUE EXECUTABLE, ENFORCEABLE DECISIONS. DECISIONS OF THE TRIBUNALS AND PRIVATE ARBITRATORS CAN BE ENFORCED THROUGH THE COURTS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER CAN NULLIFY DECISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS ON LEGAL OR NATIONAL INTEREST GROUNDS. ALTHOUGH TECHNICALLY THE MINISTER'S DECISIONS CAN BE APPEALED TO THE COURTS, IN PRACTICE IT IS RARELY DONE. UNDER THE LAW, THE PARTIES CAN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ELECT BINDING ARBITRATION IN LIEU OF THE TRIPARTITE MECHANISM. HOWEVER, THIS PROVISION IS SELDOM USED; MOST CASES ARE HANDLED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 13 OF 17 050925Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

------------------312670 050946Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7919
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 13 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND CIVIL SERVANTS MUST BELONG TO KORPRI, THE INDONESIAN CORPS OF CIVIL SERVANTS -- A NONUNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

AFFAIRS. THE CENTRAL BOARD OF KORPRI AND ITS SECRETARIATS AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL HAVE EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BUREAUS, WHICH ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTLING EMPLOYEE DISPUTES. SOME GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS HAVE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER WHICH CALL FOR THE CONVENING OF A LABOR COMMITTEE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES. IN SEPTEMBER A SUBUNIT OF KORPRI ENGAGED IN UNPRECEDENTED BARGAINING ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES OF COMPANIES OPERATING UNDER MINING CONTRACTS WITH THE STATE OWNED COAL COMPANY. THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NATIONAL KORPRI UNIT IS NOT REGISTERED AS A UNION. TO COMPLY WITH LEGAL REQUIREMENTS THE SUBUNIT WAS EXEMPTED FROM STANDING REQUIREMENTS AND ALLOWED TO REGISTER WITH THE LOCAL DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AS A UNION.

INDONESIA HAS RATIFIED INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION CONVENTION NO. 98 ON THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY, BUT HAS NOT RATIFIED CONVENTION 87 ON THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (AFL-CIO) BELIEVES THAT INDONESIA WORKERS ARE DENIED THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION. SPECIFICALLY, IN ITS JUNE 1989 PETITION TO REMOVE INDONESIA'S GSP PRIVILEGES, IT ALLEGED THAT THE SPSI IS DOMINATED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND IS AN AGENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S LABOR POLICY, THAT THE MILITARY IS ATTEMPTING TO TAKE OVER THE UNIONS, THAT THE GOVERNMENT REGULARLY GUARANTEES A NONUNION ENVIRONMENT TO FOREIGN INVESTORS, AND THAT PUBLIC EMPLOYEES MAY NOT ORGANIZE OR STRIKE. AFTER INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEGATIONS, THE USTR IN APRIL 1990 DETERMINED THAT INDONESIA WAS TAKING STEPS TO AFFORD WORKERS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED WORKER RIGHTS PARTICULARLY IN THE AREAS OF CONDITIONS OF WORK, CHILD LABOR AND THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE, BUT NOTED THAT THERE REMAIN CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH REGARDS TO THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION. THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (CFA) HAS UNDER CONSIDERATION A 1987 COMPLAINT BY THE ICFTU WHICH ALLEGES THAT INDONESIAN LEGISLATION RESTRICTS THE RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE PROVISIONS OF ILO CONVENTION 98. IN APRIL AND MAY 1990 THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT INFORMED THE COMMITTEE THAT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1963 WOULD BE REPEALED, THAT THE PGRI HAD REGISTERED AS A UNION AND EXPLAINED THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR PUBLIC SERVANTS TO HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS THE LEGISLATION ADEQUATELY COVERS CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. THE COMMITTEE NOTED THE DEVELOPMENTS, REITERATED ITS CONCERNS REGARDING THE RIGHT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO ESTABLISH UNIONS OUTSIDE THE KORPRI STRUCTURE AND REFERRED THE CASE TO THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS FOR FURTHER EXAMINATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CONVENTION NO. 98 .

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS GUARANTEED BY LAW; THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER VIGOROUSLY PROMOTES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS INSTRUMENTS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PANCASILA. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE SPSI'S COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS ARE NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED BILATERALLY WITH THE EMPLOYER. THE PGRI IS A NEWLY FORMED UNION AND HAS NO EXPERIENCE WITH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. ONCE AN EMPLOYER HAS BEEN NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED THE UNION, HE OR SHE IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO BARGAIN. AS A TRANSITIONAL STAGE TO ENCOURAGE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT EVERY COMPANY WHICH HAS 25 OR MORE EMPLOYEES MUST ISSUE COMPANY REGULATIONS DEFINING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. OF THE APPROXIMATELY 10,000 SPSI UNITS ONLY ABOUT HALF HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. BY REGULATION NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS. IF NOT THE MATTER IS TO BE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 14 OF 17 050925Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

----------312700 050946Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7920
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 14 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION/ARBITRATION. IN PRACTICE MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE VALID FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED FOR 1 YEAR.

ATTACHED TO THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS A MODEL CONTRACT WHICH COVERS BROAD CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS WHICH ORDINARILY WOULD BE INCLUDED IN A LABOR AGREEMENT. HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES AND OTHERS POINT TO THIS MODEL AS EVIDENCE THAT THERE IS NO TRUE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING TAKING PLACE IF THE GOVERNMENT DICTATES THE CONTENTS OF THE AGREEMENT. THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS THAT THE MODEL IS IN THE REGULATIONS TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE SOLELY. UNION
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 14509 14 OF 17 050925Z

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NEGOTIATORS CONTACTED MAINTAIN THAT THEY DO NOT FEEL OBLIGATED TO FOLLOW THE MODEL BUT FIND IT USEFUL. A PERUSAL OF MANY UNION CONTRACTS FOUND THAT THERE IS NO SET FORMAT THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT THE MODEL IS STRICTLY FOLLOWED, THOUGH IT IS EVIDENT THAT IT IS DEFINITELY REFERRED TO. SOME OF THE AGREEMENTS WENT BEYOND THE MODEL. MOST ADJUSTED THE MODEL TO MEET THE CONDITIONS OF THE PARTICULAR COMPANY. LESS SOPHISTICATED SPSI UNITS GREATLY DEPENDENT UPON THE PERCEIVED WISDOM ANQ EXPERIENCE OF EMPLOYERS AND MANPOWER OFFICIALS PROBABLY FEEL COMPELLED TO FOLLOW THE AGREEMENT. BOTH PARTIES ARE OBLIGATED TO EXECUTE AGREEMENTS AND TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH. THE LAW APPLIES EQUALLY IN THE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES. SOME COMPANIES IN THESE ZONES HAVE SPSI UNITS; HOWEVER, NONE HAS NEGOTIATED A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.

REGULATIONS EXPRESSLY FORBID EMPLOYERS FROM PREJUDGING OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, AND EMPLOYEES ARE URGED TO REPORT HARASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH A SPECIAL P.O. BOX. THE SPSI CLAIMS, SUPPORTED BY REPORTED INCIDENTS, THAT SOME EMPLOYERS DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ITS MEMBERS AND THOSE WISHING TO FORM SPSI UNITS. MANY OF THE STRIKES AND PROTESTS TAKING PLACE ARE IN SUPPORT OF FIRED UNION OFFICIALS. CHARGES OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE HANDLED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. THOUGH THERE ARE NO RELIABLE FIGURES AVAILABLE DEMONSTRATING THE BREAKDOWN OF TRIBUNAL DECISIONS, MANY UNION MEMBERS BELIEVE THAT THE DECISIONS OF THE TRIBUNALS IN GENERAL FAVOR THE EMPLOYER. TWO MEMBERS OF THE JAKARTA CITY COUNCIL'S SOCIAL WELFARE COMMISSION STATED PUBLICLY THAT THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS ARE INCLINED TO TAKE SIDES WITH EMPLOYERS WHEN SETTLING LABOR DISPUTES IN GENERAL. BECAUSE OF THIS PARTIALITY, MANY WORKERS REJECT OR AVOID THE PROCESS AND PRESENT THEIR DISPUTES BEFORE THE LEGISLATURE AND OTHER AGENCIES.

WORKERS CAN ORGANIZE WITHOUT RESTRICTION IN A PRIVATE ENTERPRISE EVEN IF IT IS DESIGNATED VITAL BY THE GOVERNMENT. IF THE STATE HAS A PARTIAL INTEREST, THE ENTERPRISE IS CONSIDERED TO BE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DOMAIN, BUT THIS DOES NOT LEGALLY LIMIT ORGANIZING. THERE ARE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT/PRIVATE JOINT ENTERPRISES WHICH HAVE LABOR UNIONS AND WHICH BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY.

THE AFL-CIO ALSO ALLEGES THAT INDONESIA DENIES WORKERS THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY. THE AFL-CIO HAS CHARGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT ROUTINELY DENIES PERMISSION FOR UNION MEETINGS AND SUBVERTS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY ROUTINELY SUBSTITUTING COMPULSORY ARBTRATION FOR GENUINE COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION. THE 1987 ICFTU COMPLAINT ALLEGED THAT THE INDONESIAN REGULATIONS PERMIT ONLY THE SPSI TO REGISTER LEGITIMATELY AND THAT THE LAWS DO NOT SATISFY THE ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENT OF ILO CONVENTION NO. 98.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

FORCED LABOR IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. INDONESIA HAS RATIFIED ILO CONVENTION NO. 29 CONCERNING FORCED LABOR. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP ASSERTS THAT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS IN IRIAN JAYA COOPERATE WITH JAKARTA-BASED TIMBER COMPANIES TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 15 OF 17 050926Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

----------312710 050946Z /20

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7921
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 15 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

COMPEL ASMAT TRIBESPEOPLE TO CUT DOWN TREES AND TRANSPORT THEM DOWNSTREAM TO WAITING SHIPS AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT. IT ALSO ALLEGES THAT THERE ARE DOCUMENTED REPORTS OF LABOR CONTRACTORS IN JAKARTA SELLING GIRLS AS DOMESTIC SERVANTS OR TO BROTHELS NEAR PLANTATIONS, AND THAT MEN ARE SOLD AS AGRICULTURE WORKERS. THE GOVERNMENT IS PRESENTLY INVESTIGATING THE ALLEGATIONS.

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

IN 1987 DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ISSUED NEW REGULATIONS ON WORKING CHILDREN. THE REGULATIONS ACKNOWLEDGE A CLASS OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 14 WHO FOR SOCIOECONOMIC
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 14509 15 OF 17 050926Z

REASONS MUST WORK AND NOTE THAT INDONESIA'S CHILD LABOR LAWS HAVE NOT BEEN PROPERLY ENFORCED. THESE LAWS PROVIDED DETAILED SAFEGUARDS, INCLUDING REQUIREMENTS FOR PARENTAL CONSENT, PROHIBITION OF DANGEROUS WORK AND NIGHT WORK AND LIMITING THE WORKDAY TO 4 HOURS. EMPLOYERS MUST COOPERATE WITH PUBLIC AUTHORITIES TO ENSURE THAT CHILDREN UNDER 14 COMPLY WITH THE 1989 NATIONAL EDUCATION LAW, WHICH REQUIRES THAT CHILDREN COMPLETE 9 YEARS OF SCHOOLING BEGINNING AT AGE 7. THESE REGULATIONS ARE STILL INADEQUATELY ENFORCED AND OBSERVERS HAVE CALLED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES.

EMPLOYERS ARE NOW REQUIRED TO REPORT IN DETAIL ON

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

EVERY CHILD EMPLOYED, AND PERIODIC INSPECTIONS ARE TO BE CARRIED OUT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. EMPLOYERS NOT COMPLYING WITH THE LAW AND REGULATIONS WILL BE SUBJECT TO FINES OF $65 AND /OR UP TO THREE MONTHS IN JAIL FOR EACH INFRACTION. AS A FOLLOW UP TO THE REGULATIONS, THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ISSUED DIRECTIVES TO REMIND LOCAL MANPOWER OFFICERS OF THEIR INSPECTION OBLIGATIONS IN BOTH THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ADMITS THAT EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW REGULATIONS IS FAR LESS THAN IDEAL AND THAT IT STILL LACKS QUALIFIED INSPECTORS TO CARRY OUT THE INSPECTIONS. IT ESTIMATES THAT LESS THAN 50 PERCENT OF COMPANIES EMPLOYING CHILDREN HAVE REGISTERED. OBSERVERS CLAIM THAT AS MANY AS 2 MILLION YOUTHS UNDER THE AGE OF 14 ARE WORKING ONE-HALF TO FULL TIME OR MORE, THOUGH MOST OF THESE ARE THOUGHT TO BE EMPLOYED IN FAMILY RUN BUSINESSES IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND AT AGRICULTURAL SITES WHERE NORMAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS ARE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT. THERE HAS BEEN A NOTICEABLE DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF SCHOOL AGED CHILDREN SELLING GOODS ON THE MAJOR STREETS OF JAKARTA DUE LARGELY THOUGH TO A CONTROVERSIAL CAMPAIGN TO RESTRICT PEDDLERS' ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL. AUTHORITIES, THE UNION AND PRIVATE INSTITUTES ARE PRESENTLY STUDYING HOW BEST TO MONITOR THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN WHO FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS WILL CONTINUE TO SELL THEIR GOODS ON THE STREETS. PRESENT EFFORTS TO CONTROL CHILD LABOR HOWEVER, FOCUS PRIMARILY ON INSTITUTING EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR CHILDREN WHO MUST WORK. THE GOVERNMENT STILL RELIES ON PERSUASION AND TEACHING EMPLOYERS RATHER THAN PENALIZING THEM.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7-HOUR WORKDAYS AND 40-HOUR WORKWEEKS, WITH ONE-HALF HOUR OF REST FOR EACH 4 HOURS OF WORK. THE DAILY OVERTIME RATE IS ONE AND ONE-HALF THE NORMAL HOURLY RATE FOR THE FIRST HOUR, AND TWICE THE HOURLY RATE FOR ADDITIONAL OVERTIME. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEES.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE, MINIMUM WAGES ARE ESTABLISHED FOR EACH REGION, AND FOR SECTORS AND SUBSECTORS WITHIN THE REGION, BY REGIONAL WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL. THIS IS A QUADRIPARTITITE BODY CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM LABOR, MANAGEMENT GOVERNMENT, AND UNIVERSITIES. IT ALSO ESTABLISHES A BASIC NEEDS FIGURE FOR EACH PROVINCE -- A MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 16 OF 17 050927Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

----------312726 050947Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7922
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 16 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

OR FAMILY TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING AND SHELTER. THIS FIGURE CONSTANTLY LAGS FAR BEHIND THE MINIMUM WAGE. FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE WAGE COUNCILS IN SETTING MINIMUM RATES INCLUDE CHANGES IN THE LOCAL CPI, THE SKILL LEVEL OF THE WORKERS, THE LOCAL SUPPLY OF MANPOWER, AND THE ABILITY OF FIRMS TO PAY. MINIMUM WAGE RATES FALL SHORT OF PROVIDING THE DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING THE GOVERNMENT ENVISAGES. GDP PER CAPITA IN 1989 WAS $499. ACCORDING TO A RECENT WORLD BANK STUDY, IN 1987 20.1 PERCENT OF THE URBAN POPULATION AND 16.4 PERCENT OF THE RURAL POPULATION LIVED BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL. THE MINIMUM WAGE IN THE CAPITAL CITY OF JAKARTA IS 1.13 PER DAY. A 1989 REGULATION ON MINIMUM WAGES CALLS FOR A REVIEW OF MINIMUM WAGES EVERY TWO YEARS, FORBIDS EMPLOYERS
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FROM LOWERING WAGES ALREADY HIGHER THAN THE MINIMUM, AND PROVIDES MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCEMENT AND PENALTIES FOR EMPLOYER NONCOMPLIANCE. LABOR LAW AND MININSTERIAL REGULATIONS PROVIDE WORKERS WITH VACATION PAY, MATERNITY LEAVE, SOCIAL SECURITY INSURANCE, WORKPLACE ACCIDENT INSURANCE, 12 PAID PUBLIC HOLIDAYS, OVERTIME AND SICK LEAVE PAY, GUARANTEED SEVERANCE AND SERVICE PAY, PAID LEAVE FOR PERSONAL AND FAMILY OCCASIONS AND PROTECTION FROM DELAY IN PAYMENT. IN ADDITION , WORKERS IN MORE MODERN FACILITIES OFTEN RECEIVE HEALTH BENEFITS, SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS AND FREE MEALS.

OBSERVANCE OF MINIMUM WAGE AND OTHER LAWS REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND FROM REGION TO REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATION OF THESE GUARANTEES IS CONSIDERED TO BE FAIRLY COMMON, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO OVERTIME, MEAL/TRAVEL ALLOWANCES AND SEVERANCE PAY AND OFTEN THE SUBJECT OF STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT HAVE BEEN LARGELY WEAK OR NONEXISTENT. IN MARCH 1990 SPURRED ON BY AN AAFLI/SPSI MINIMUM WAGE COMPLIANCE PROJECT WHICH REVEALED THAT FROM 50-70 PERCENT OF EMPLOYERS IN 3 TARGETED AREAS IN JAKARTA WERE PAYING LESS THAN THE MINIMUM WAGES, THE MANPOWER MINISTER DESIGNATED 1990 AS THE YEAR OF THE WAGE AND BEGAN TO ACTUALLY PROSECUTE EMPLOYERS FOR VIOLATING MINIMUM WAGE REGULATIONS. THE PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIAL INSURANCE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
PROGRAM (ASTEK) FOLLOWED SUIT AND BEGAN PROSECUTING EMPLOYERS WHO HAD NOT ENROLLED THEIR EMPLOYEES IN (ASTEK) AS REQUIRED BY LAW. THE ACTUAL NUMBER PROSECUTED FOR MINIMUM WAGE VIOLATIONS-LESS THAN
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THIRTY-IS CONSIDERED BY OBSERVERS TO BE A PALTRY SUM BUT BETTER THAN NOTHING AS IT DEMONSTRATES TO SOME DEGREE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS MOVING BEYOND ENCOURAGING COMPANIES TO STEPPED UP ENFORCEMENT AND SUPERVISORY EFFORTS.

THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPTS TO PROJECT JAKARTA AS A GREAT MODERN CITY DREW UNUSUAL ATTENTION TO THE WORKING CONDITIONS AND PLIGHT OF THOUSANDS OF PEDICAB DRIVERS AND STREET PEDDLERS WHO RESISTED GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO RESTRICT THEIR AREA OF OPERATIONS AND TO PREVENT THEM FROM CARRYING OUT THEIR LIVELIHOOD. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMS PROVED TO BE CONTROVERSIAL. CRITICS HAVE FOCUSED ON THE INADEQUACY OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF EMPLOYMENT PROVIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR THOSE DISPLACED, ROUGH HANDLING OF THE PEDICAB DRIVERS, FORCED ENTRY ONTO PRIVATE PROPERTY TO SEIZE PEDICABS AND SEIZURE OF ASSETS WITHOUT COMPENSATION. OFFICIALS OF THE CITYS PEDDLERS ASSOCIATION HAVE ASKED FOR LEGAL PROTECTION AND COMPLAINED ABOUT ARBITRARY ACTION BY POLICEMEN INVOLVED IN THE ON-GOING CRACKDOWN ON PEDDLERS.

BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. FIVE NEW HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATIONS HAVE BEEN PROMULGATED IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS. A NATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY COUNCIL WAS CREATED TO OVERSEE THE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS OF THE OVER 6,000 COMPANY SAFETY COMMITTEES. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER CONDUCTS YEARLY NATIONAL CAMPAIGNS TO PROMOTE PUBLIC AWARENESS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY NEEDS AMONG WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS AND ADMINISTERS A COUNTRY-WIDE COMPREHENSIVE INSPECTION SYSTEM. TO HIGHLIGHT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES, VICE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 14509 17 OF 17 050926Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-01	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-01	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	P-02	/082 W

----------312720 050947Z /20

P 050844Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7923
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 17 OF 17 JAKARTA 14509

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1990

PRESIDENT SUDHARMONO WAS THE MAIN SPEAKER AT THE INAUGURAL CEREMONY OF THIS YEARS NATIONAL SAFETY CAMPAIGN PROGRAM.

WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS AND EMPLOYERS ARE PREVENTED BY LAW FROM RETAILIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO. AN ILO-SPONSORED PROGRAM TO ENHANCE THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES OF GOVERNMENT INSPECTQRS AND PLANT PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF CHEMICAL AND MAJOR HAZARDS CONTROL WAS SIGNED IN 1988, AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES TO INCREASE INSPECTION CAPABILITIES. THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER SIGNED AN AGREEMENT TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENENSS OF OVER 520 COMPANY HEALTH

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CARE CENTERS COVERING OVER 180,000 WORKERS IN 18 MAJOR CITIES.

SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS IN THE COUNTRY'S OVER 100,000 LARGER, REGISTERED INDUSTRIES IN THE NON-OIL SECTOR ARE STILL HAMPERED BY THE LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED INSPECTORS-LESS THAN 1,300; THE SLOWNESS WITH WHICH THE FIRMS ESTABLISH THE REQUIRED PLANT SAFETY COMMITTEES, THE NEED FOR MORE AND BETTER TRAINING OF GOVERNMENT INSPECTORS AND PLANT SAFETY PERSONNEL AND THE LACK OF EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION FOR SOUND HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES.

MONJO

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C34

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 12446 01 OF 14 250800Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	/078W						

----------98B1A8 250800Z /38

R 250739Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6738

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 14 JAKARTA 12446

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

1. LOU-NOFORN-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE 1991 COUNTRY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA.
:
3. INDONESIA IS THE FIFTH MOST POPULOUS COUNTRY IN THE WORLD AND THE LARGEST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. SINCE INDEPENDENCE, INDONESIAN LEADERS HAVE SOUGHT TO CREATE A

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 12446 01 OF 14 250800Z
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND TO ACCOMMODATE ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC, AND GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSITIES, WHILE FOSTERING COHESION, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND DEVELOPMENT. THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES ALLEGIANCE TO "PANCASILA," FIVE BROAD, GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL LIFE: BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD, A JUST AND CIVILIZED HUMANITY, INDONESIAN NATIONAL UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND THE MILITARY WIELD PREDOMINANT POLITICAL POWER; OPPOSITION GROUPS EXIST BUT IN FACT HAVE NO REAL CHANCE TO OBTAIN POWER.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 02 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SINCE THE MID-1960'S, AFTER AN ABORTIVE COUP BACKED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY, RETIRED AND ACTIVE-DUTY MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN TECHNOCRATS HAVE EXERCISED CENTRALIZED EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY UNDER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S LEADERSHIP. THE PARTLY ELECTED, PARTLY APPOINTED PARLIAMENT (DPR) CONSIDERS BUT DOES NOT INITIATE LEGISLATION, ALTHOUGH IT HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DO SO. THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR)--CONSISTING OF 500 APPOINTED MEMBERS AND THE 500 DPR MEMBERS--MEETS EVERY 5 YEARS TO APPROVE GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY AND TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT.

THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI)--WHICH INCLUDE THE MILITARY SERVICES AND THE POLICE--NUMBER ABOUT 445,000. THE ARMY CONSTITUTES ABOUT HALF OF THE ARMED FORCES AND FOCUSES MAINLY ON INTERNAL SECURITY. UNDER A "DUAL FUNCTION" CONCEPT, MANY MILITARY OFFICERS SERVE IN TH/ CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY AT ALL LEVELS AND IN PARLIAMENT. THE MILITARY CONTINUED OPERATIONS AGAINST SEPARATIST GROUPS IN EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, ALTHOUGH AT REDUCED LEVELS,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AND INTENSIFIED OPERATIONS IN THE SPECIAL DISTRICT OF ACEH.

ALTHOUGH INDONESIA'S MIXED ECONOMY INVOLVES THE STATE IN NEARLY ALL SECTORS, GOVERNMENT POLICIES ARE EXPANDING THE ROLE AND FREEDOM OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR. ONGOING DEREGULATION EFFORTS HELPED THE ECONOMY TO CONTINUE ITS STRONG EXPANSION IN 1990, WHEN INDONESIA'S INFLATION-ADJUSTED GDP GREW BETWEEN 7.0 AND 7.5 PERCENT. NON-OIL EXPORT GROWTH SLOWED DUE TO SOFTENING PRICES FOR INDONESIA'S MAJOR NON-OIL COMMODITIES, BUT EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURED GOODS REMAINED STRONG. THE ECONOMY'S GROWTH WAS EXPECTED TO SLOW SOME IN 1991, BUT STILL MAINTAIN A REAL GDP GROWTH RATE OF BETWEEN 5 AND 6 PERCENT. DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN REAL INCOMES AND IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF MOST INDONESIANS IN THE PAST 20 YEARS, THE COUNTRY IS POOR, THERE IS SIGNIFICANT UNEMPLOYMENT, AND WIDE DISPARITIES IN WEALTH EXIST. CORRUPTION AND INFLUENCE PEDDLING ARE ENDEMIC AND DISTORT GROWTH AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY.

HUMAN RIGHTS REMAINED CIRCUMSCRIBED IN 1991. AN UPSURGE OF VIOLENCE IN ACEH LED TO THE DEATHS OF HUNDREDS OF

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CIVILIANS, DOZENS OF SUBVERSION TRIALS WHERE THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANTS WERE LIMITED, AND NUMEROUS CREDIBLE REPORTS OF TORTURE AT THE HANDS OF THE POLICE AND MILITARY. ABUSES IN EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA ALSO CONTINUED, ALTHOUGH AT A REDUCED RATE FROM PAST YEARS. WHILE THE DPR HELD SEVERAL WELL-PUBLICIZED HEARINGS ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE RESTRICTED CIVIL RIGHTS OF SOME OF INDONESIA'S PROMINENT DISSIDENTS, THE HEARINGS

FAILED TO PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THESE AREAS. INDONESIA'S PARLIAMENT ITSELF WAS INCREASINGLY ASSERTIVE, EVIDENCE OF THE HALTING PROGRESS THE COUNTRY HAS MADE TOWARD GREATER OPENNESS IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DIALOGUE. INDONESIAN WORKERS WERE LESS HESITANT ABOUT EXERCISING THEIR RIGHT TO STRIKE, ESPECIALLY TO DEMAND COMPLIANCE WITH MINIMUM WAGE STANDARDS. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED ITS GENEROUS POLICY TOWARD INDOCHINESE REFUGEES, ALLOWED FOREIGN PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS TO VISIT EAST TIMOR, AND RELEASED SEVERAL LONG-TIME POLITICAL PRISONERS. IT ALSO GRANTED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) ACCESS TO PRISONERS IN ACEH AND TO IMPRISONED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS.

NNNN

ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

/078W

----------98B1B6 250801Z /38

R 250739Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6739

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 14 JAKARTA 12446

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING

HUNDREDS, PERHAPS THOUSANDS, OF INDIVIDUALS HAVE DIED IN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE SPECIAL DISTRICT OF ACEH SINCE MID-1989 AS A RESULT OF A STRUGGLE BETWEEN SEPARATIST REBELS AND GOVERNMENT TROOPS. THE CASUALTIES, WHOSE NUMBERS HAVE SO FAR BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH WITH PRECISION, HAVE INCLUDED POLICE AND ARMY TROOPS AS WELL AS REBEL FORCES. A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THOSE KILLED IN 1991, HOWEVER, APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN CIVILIANS. DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1991, DOZENS OF BODIES WERE FOUND ALONG ROADSIDES, IN MARKET PLACES AND IN RIVERS. THE MILITARY AND OTHER GOVERNMENT LEADERS HAVE CLAIMED REBEL FORCES, WHICH ARE CALLED GPK (SECURITY DISTURBING GANG) BY THE GOVERNMENT AND ACEH MERDEKA (FREE ACEH) BY THEIR SUPPORTERS, WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE DEATHS. BUT HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS, ESPECIALLY ASIA WATCH, HAVE CHARGED THE SECURITY FORCES WITH SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEIR ANTI-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN ACEH, ESPECIALLY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1991. THESE INCLUDE SUMMARY EXECUTIONS OF SUSPECTED ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS -- PART OF AN EFFORT TO INTIMIDATE OR ELIMINATE POTENTIAL REBEL

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
SYMPATHIZERS -- AS WELL AS THE INCITEMENT OF VILLAGERS TO SUMMARILY KILL SUSPECTED GUERRILLAS. SUBSTANTIATION OF INDIVIDUAL CASES IS OFTEN LACKING, AND REBEL FORCES DOUBTLESS HAVE CAUSED SOME CIVILIAN DEATHS. BUT THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF A PATTERN OF ABUSE AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF ACEH BY SECURITY FORCES WHICH LEND CREDENCE TO THE CHARGES OF HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS. IN ADDITION, THE ABILITY OF THE REBEL FORCES TO INFLICT SIGNIFICANT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES WAS SEVERELY LIMITED IN 1991 SINCE, BY THE MILITARY'S OWN ASSESSMENT, MOST OF THE ARMED REBEL ELEMENTS HAD BEEN ELIMINATED OR RENDERED INEFFECTIVE. WHILE SOME MILITARY COMMANDERS HAVE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACKNOWLEDGED PRIVATELY THAT EXCESSIVE FORCE WAS SOMETIMES EMPLOYED BY THEIR TROOPS, THE GOVERNMENT HAS DENIED A PATTERN OF ABUSE, AND NO CHARGES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE CIVILIAN DEATHS.

IN EAST TIMOR, WHERE THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION HAD GENERALLY IMPROVED, THE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN DEATHS ATTRIBUTED TO SECURITY FORCES WAS ESTIMATED AT SEVEN, DOWN FROM AN ESTIMATED 21 IN 1990. IN IRIAN JAYA, A LEADER OF THE BANNED FREE PAPUA ORGANIZATION (OPM), MALKIANUS SALOSA, WAS FOUND DEAD IN THE JUNGLE THREE WEEKS AFTER ALLEGEDLY ESCAPING FROM A MILITARY PRISON. SALOSA WAS CONVICTED IN MARCH 1991 OF INVOLVEMENT IN A 1988 ATTACK ON TRANSMIGRANTS IN IRIAN JAYA, AND SENTENCED TO LIFE IN PRISON. POLICE SAID SALOSA DIED OF NATURAL CAUSES, BUT THERE WERE UNSUBSTANTIATED REPORTS THE CAUSE OF DEATH WAS BULLET WOUNDS.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

SECURITY FORCES PERIODICALLY TOOK PERSONS FOR INTERROGATION, USUALLY WITHOUT NOTIFICATION TO FAMILIES, RESULTING IN AT LEAST THEIR TEMPORARY DISAPPEARANCE. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN ACEH, WHERE INDIVIDUALS WOULD SOMETIMES DISAPPEAR FOR MONTHS AFTER BEING TAKEN INTO POLICE CUSTODY.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THE USE OF TORTURE TO EXTRACT INFORMATION FROM CRIMINAL SUSPECTS OR WITNESSES IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE INDONESIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE (KUHAP). NONETHELESS, CREDIBLE REPORTS OF TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT, INCLUDING RAPE, OF CRIMINAL SUSPECTS, DETAINEES, AND PRISONERS WERE FREQUENT. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN ACEH, WHERE THERE WERE NUMEROUS CREDIBLE REPORTS OF SYSTEMATIC TORTURE OF SUSPECTED REBEL SYMPHATHIZERS WHILE IN MILITARY OR POLICE CUSTODY.

POLICE OFTEN RESORT TO PHYSICAL ABUSE, EVEN IN MINOR INCIDENTS, AND PRISON CONDITIONS IN INDONESIA TEND TO BE HARSH. THE PRACTICE IN MEDAN OF "SHOOTING TO WOUND" CRIMINAL SUSPECTS ALLEGEDLY ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE CAPTURE

NNNN

ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00

/078W

----------98B1C9 250802Z /38

R 250739Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6740

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

CONTINUED, AND EFFORTS BY POLICE IN JAKARTA TO COPE WITH INCREASINGLY BRUTAL CRIME RAISED CONCERNS ABOUT EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE AGAINST SUSPECTS. IN THE MONTH OF AUGUST, FOR EXAMPLE, CREDIBLE PRESS REPORTS INDICATE 17 SUSPECTS WERE SHOT BY POLICE IN METROPOLITAN JAKARTA, EIGHT OF WHOM DIED FROM THEIR WOUNDS. NINE OTHER CRIMINAL SUSPECTS WERE REPORTEDLY KILLED BY MOBS WHO CAUGHT THE SUSPECTS IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME.

OFFICIALS HAVE PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED AND CONDEMNED POLICE BRUTALITY AND HARSH PRISON CONDITIONS AND OCCASIONALLY INSTIGATE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, INCLUDING TRANSFER, DISMISSAL, TRIAL, AND SENTENCING TO PRISON TERMS.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE CONTAINS PROTECTIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION AND SPECIFIES THE RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO LEGAL COUNSEL AND NOTIFICATION OF FAMILY. THESE SAFEGUARDS ARE OFTEN DISREGARDED IN PRACTICE. DETAINEES IN CASES OF ALLEGED SUBVERSION MAY BE HELD UP TO A YEAR WITHOUT CHARGES. SECURITY AGENCIES DETAIN AND ARREST PERSONS, INCLUDING STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS, TO INTIMIDATE THEM AND INHIBIT ACTIVITIES JUDGED UNDESIRABLE. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR REDRESS OF SUCH ACTIONS ARE INADEQUATE. THE NUMBER OF PERSONS DETAINED WITHOUT TRIAL IS UNKNOWN. BUT IN THE SPECIAL DISTRICT OF ACEH, FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOVERNMENT RELEASED 526 INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD BEEN HELD WITHOUT TRIAL FOR PERIODS OF UP TO SEVERAL MONTHS ON SUSPICION OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY OR KNOWLEDGE THEREOF, AND HUNDREDS MORE WERE BELIEVED TO STILL BE IN CUSTODY BY LATE SEPTEMBER. INDIVIDUALS WERE DETAINED IN EAST TIMOR FOR DAYS OR WEEKS, AND SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGES.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
APPLICATION OF A 1987 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE ON REMISSION OF PRISON TERMS LEAVES UNCERTAIN THE STATUS OF SOME PRISONERS, INCLUDING SEVERAL REPORTEDLY STILL IN JAIL DESPITE APPARENT EXPIRATION OF THEIR SENTENCES. TWO
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CONVICTED MEMBERS OF THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI) WERE RELEASED IN JULY, SEVERAL YEARS AFTER THEIR SENTENCES WERE SUPPOSED TO HAVE EXPIRED.

THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) OPERATES OUTSIDE KUHAP PROCEDURES AND HAS WIDE DISCRETION TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE PERSONS THOUGHT TO THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY. INDONESIAN LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SUCH ACTIONS OR FOR THE RIGHT.TO PROTECTION OR LEGAL AID FOR THE DETAINEES. THEIR CASES ARE RARELY IF EVER PUBLICIZED.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

A QUADRIPARTITE JUDICIARY OF GENERAL, RELIGIOUS, MILITARY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS EXISTS BELOW THE SUPREME COURT. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT TO HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS. THE SUPREME COURT, WITH A CURRENT BACKLOG OF SOME 17,000 CASES, DOES NOT CONSIDER MATERIAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF LAW. INITIAL JUDGMENTS ARE RARELY REVERSED IN THE APPEALS PROCESS, ALTHOUGH SENTENCES ARE SOMETIMES INCREASED OR REDUCED. A THREE-JUDGE PANEL CONDUCTS MOST TRIALS, POSES QUESTIONS, HEARS EVIDENCE, DECIDES GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND ASSESSES PUNISHMENT. THE JUDICIARY IS NOT INDEPENDENT. WHILE JUDGES RECEIVE GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT ON LEGAL MATTERS, THEY ARE CIVIL SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THE SUPREME COURT CANNOT ANNUL LAWS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MOST COURT SESSIONS ARE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC, AND MOST DEFENDANTS HAVE ACCESS TO COUNSEL ALTHOUGH SUCH ACCESS IS SOMETIMES SIGNIFICANTLY DELAYED. DESTITUTE DEFENDANTS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CAN OBTAIN PRIVATE LEGAL HELP, SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE (LBH). COURTS ALSO CAN PROVIDE A LIMITED AMOUNT OF AID FOR THOSE UNABLE TO AFFORD LEGAL ASSISTANCE. THE STATE MUST ENSURE LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CAPITAL CASES.

CORRUPTION PERMEATES THE INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM. IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, PAYMENT OF BRIBES CAN INFLUENCE DECISIONS, PROSECUTION, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCING. USE IN TRIALS OF FORCED CONFESSIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE ARE REPORTEDLY COMMON.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 12446 04 OF 14 250802Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	/078W						

----------98B1D6 250802Z /38
R 250739Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6741

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 04 OF 14 JAKARTA 12446

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THE GOVERNMENT HAS OCCASIONALLY TAKEN ACTION AGAINST FLAGRANT OFFENDERS, BUT BY AND LARGE THESE ABUSES CONTINUE UNCHECKED. THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE LEGAL AWARENESS, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH.

CONVICTION IS VIRTUALLY AUTOMATIC IN CASES INVOLVING INDONESIA'S BROAD 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW. ADVOCACY OR ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF SECESSION OR CREATION OF AN ISLAMIC

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

STATE, CRITICISM OF PANCASILA, AND SMUGGLING ARE CLASSIFIED SUBVERSIVE OFFENSES SUBJECT TO A MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE DATA ON THE NUMBER OF PERSONS SERVING SUBVERSION SENTENCES, THE BEST INFORMED ESTIMATES SUGGEST A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 500. THIS FIGURE INCLUDES PERSONS SENTENCED FOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1965 COMMUNIST COUP ATTEMPT, ALLEGED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, AND THOSE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN CONNECTION WITH SEPARATIST ACTIVITIES IN ACEH, EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, SOME OF WHOM ADVOCATED OR EMPLOYED VIOLENCE. IN AUGUST, THE GOVERNMENT REDUCED THE SENTENCES OF AND RELEASED FOUR INDIVIDUALS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION, INCLUDING THREE MUSLIMS ACCUSED OF DELIVERING INFLAMMATORY SERMONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE TANJUNG PRIOK RIOTS OF 1984.

MORE THAN 30 SUBVERSION TRIALS WERE CONDUCTED IN 1991, THE MAJORITY OF THEM IN SUMATRA, WHERE MORE THAN TWO DOZEN INDIVIDUALS WERE TRIED IN CONNECTION WITH SEPARATIST ACTIVITIES IN ACEH. ALL THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE FOUND GUILTY AND RECEIVED SENTENCES OF UP TO 20 YEARS IN PRISON. ALTHOUGH THE FACT THAT PUBLIC TRIALS WERE HELD REPRESENTED AN IMPROVEMENT OVER AN EARLIER SITUATION IN WHICH ACCUSED ACEH SEPARATISTS WERE HELD WITHOUT TRIAL, THE PROCEEDINGS WERE IN MANY CASES SERIOUSLY FLAWED. HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS CHARGE MANY OF THE DEFENDANTS HAD BEEN TORTURED TO ELICIT CONFESSIONS, WERE ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANTS, AND WERE NOT CLEARLY TOLD THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THEIR DETENTION. SOME OF THE DEFENDANTS WERE UNABLE TO SELECT THEIR DEFENSE COUNSEL FREELY, AS GUARANTEED UNDER KUHAP. LBH, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD RECEIVED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

POWERS OF ATTORNEY FROM THE FAMILIES OF 13 OF THE DEFENDANTS ASKING FOR REPRESENTATION, BUT WERE PREVENTED BY THE AUTHORITIES FROM DOING SO IN ALL BUT ONE CASE. WHEN OTHER ATTORNEYS WERE FOUND TO REPRESENT THEM, THEY OFTEN MET THEIR CLIENTS THE DAY OF THE TRIAL, AND THEREFORE HAD /NADEQUATE TIME TO PREPARE A DEFENSE.

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

JUDICIAL WARRANTS FOR SEARCHES ARE REQUIRED EXCEPT FOR CASES INVOLVING SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, FORCED OR SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY BY SECURITY AGENCIES REPORTEDLY OCCURS REGULARLY. SECURITY AGENCIES INTIMIDATE BY CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS AND RESIDENCES, AND THEY ARE BELIEVED TO MONITOR SELECTIVELY LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS WITHOUT LEGAL RESTRAINT. CORRESPONDENCE GENERALLY IS NOT MONITORED. GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS TRY TO MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF UP TO 2.5 MILLION FORMER MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) AND THE APPROXIMATELY 20 MILLION FORMER MEMBERS OF ITS FRONT GROUPS. THESE PERSONS AND SOMETIMES THEIR RELATIVES ARE SUBJECT TO SURVEILLANCE, REQUIRED CHECK-INS, AND ARBITRARY ACTIONS BY OFFICIALS, INCLUDING REMOVAL FROM GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SIGNIFICANT RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS EXIST. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES EXERCISE BROAD DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY IN APPLYING LAWS CONCERNING THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS, AND EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW IS LACKING. PUBLIC STATEMENTS OR PUBLICATIONS WHICH CRITICIZE THE GOVERNMENT OR ARE PERCEIVED AS CRITICAL OF PANCASILA, TOP LEADERS, THEIR FAMILIES, OR PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC GROUPS ARE OFTEN HARSHLY PUNISHED.

FOR EXAMPLE, A YOUNG MOSLEM INTELLECTUAL, M.H. AINUN NADJIB, WAS BANNED BY AUTHORITIES IN CENTRAL JAVA FROM

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

HOLDING LECTURES IN THE PROVINCE APPARENTLY BECAUSE OF COMMENTS HE MADE DURING A PUBLIC DISCUSSION ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A GOVERNMENT-RUN CIVICS COURSE ON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 12446 05 OF 14 250803Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	/078W						

----------98B1EE 250803Z /38

R 250739Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6742

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 05 OF 14 JAKARTA 12446

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

PANCASILA. EARLIER IN THE YEAR, TWO STUDENTS WERE DETAINED AND OTHERS QUESTIONED FOR THEIR PART IN DISTRIBUTING A "LAND FOR THE PEOPLE" CALENDAR THAT CONTAINED CARICATURES OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, HIS WIFE, AND OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

THE GOVERNMENT OPERATES THE NATIONAL TELEVI SION NETWORK.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SURABAYA EXPANDED TO OTHER AREAS, AND A PRIVATE EDUCATIONAL CHANNEL BEGAN OPERATING NATIONALLY. SOME 537 PRIVATE RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANIES EXIST IN INDONESIA IN ADDITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK. PRIVATE TELEVISION AND RADIO STATIONS, WHICH HAVE CONSIDERABLE PROGRAMMING LATITUDE, ARE SUBJECT TO OFFICIAL SCRUTINY AND ARE REQUIRED TO USE GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED NEWS PROGRAMS. PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS FREQUENTLY SUPPLEMENT SUCH NEWS PROGRAMS WITH THEIR OWN REPORTS. FOREIGN TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS ARE ACCESSIBLE TO THOSE WHO CAN AFFORD THE TECHNOLOGY.

THE PRINT MEDIA ARE LARGELY PRIVATELY OWNED. OFFICIALS STATE THAT THE PRESS IS "FREE" BUT ALSO "RESPONSIBLE." IT IS EXPECTED TO SUPPORT NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND STABILITY, BE EDUCATIONAL, AND UPHOLD PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS. THE GOVERNMENT LIMITS THE NUMBER OF NEWSPAPER LICENSES, THE AMOUNT OF ADVERTISING, AND THE NUMBER OF PAGES, AND EXERCISES STRONG CONTROL OVER THE PRESS THROUGH ITS CONTROL OF PUBLISHING PERMITS, KNOWN BY THEIR INDONESIAN ACRONYM, SIUPP. THE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT TO REVOKE A NEWSPAPER'S SIUPP WAS THE TOPIC OF A PARLIAMENTARY HEARING IN JUNE. EDITORS WHO TESTIFIED PROTESTED THAT THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION HAS REVOKED SIUPP'S IN THE PAST WITHOUT GIVING THE OFFENDING PUBLICATIONS AN ADEQUATE CHANCE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. THEY ALSO PROTESTED PUNISHING AN ENTIRE ORGANIZATION FOR THE ALLEGED SINS OF ONE OR SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS. THE MINISTER LATER TOLD PARLIAMENT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF MODIFYING HIS CONTROL OVER THE SIUPP. A NEWSPAPER EDITOR

WHOSE NEWSPAPER LOST ITS SIUPP IN 1990 FOR PUBLISHING A POLL WHICH WAS JUDGED INSULTING TO THE PROPHET MOHAMMED WAS SENTENCED IN APRIL TO FIVE YEARS IN PRISON, LATER REDUCED BY SIX MONTHS, ON CRIMINAL CHARGES OF INSULTING A RELIGION.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
THE GOVERNMENT OCCASIONALLY CENSORS PUBLICATIONS AND CONTINUES THE PRACTICE OF TELEPHONING EDITORS TO SUPPRESS STORIES AND CENSORING FOREIGN PERIODICALS. AN ARTICLE ABOUT EAST TIMORESE WORKERS IN JAVA THAT WAS TO APPEAR IN THE PROMINENT NEWS WEEKLY "TEMPO," FOR EXAMPLE, WAS CENSORED IN EARLY SEPTEMBER AT THE INSISTENCE OF MILITARY OFFICERS WHO CAME TO THE MAGAZINE'S OFFICES.

THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY REGULATES ACCESS TO INDONESIA BY VISITING AND RESIDENT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS AND OCCASIONALLY REMINDS THE LATTER OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DENY REQUESTS FOR VISA EXTENSIONS. THE AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS ALLOWED TO REOPEN A BUREAU IN JAKARTA AFTER A LENGTHY BREAK CAUSED BY CONTROVERSY OVER AUSTRALIAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF INDONESIA. THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AND VIDEO TAPES, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED BY GOVERNMENT CENSORS, REQUIRES A PERMIT. IMPORTERS USUALLY AVOID FOREIGN MATERIALS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OR DEALING WITH TOPICS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. FOREIGN PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPERS, READILY AVAILABLE IN INDONESIA, ARE SUBJECT TO CENSORSHIP PRIOR TO DISTRIBUTION. THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE WAS ALLOWED TO RESUME DISTRIBUTION IN MARCH AFTER A FOUR-MONTH HIATUS CAUSED BY A 1990 ARTICLE CRITICAL OF

THE BUSINESS DEALINGS OF MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT EXPRESSED OUTRAGE AT THE ARTICLE, THE NEWSPAPER'S INDONESIAN DISTRIBUTOR CEASED DISTRIBUTION.

THE RISK OF OFFICIAL SANCTIONS AND INFORMAL GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTIONS GENERALLY INFLUENCE THE MEDIA TO AVOID OR EXERCISE GREAT CAUTION IN DISSEMINATING VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT CRITICS. HOWEVER, COVERAGE OF OPPOSITION VIEWS CONVEYED TO THE PARLIAMENT IN JULY DURING A MEETING WITH THE PETITION OF 50 DISSIDENT GROUP WAS EXTENSIVE. LACK OF CLEAR GUIDELINES ON WHAT IS PERMISSIBLE HAS GENERATED A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF SELF-CENSORSHIP BOTH IN PUBLIC SPEAKING AND IN THE PRESS. HOWEVER, AS IN 1990,

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 12446 06 OF 14 250804Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	/078W						

----------98B204 250804Z /38
R 250739Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6743

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 06 OF 14 JAKARTA 12446

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT TOLERANCE WERE REGULARLY TESTED IN 1991 IN PUBLISHED ED/TORIALS, OPINION PIECES, CARTOONS, AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

WHILE ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS PROVIDED FOR IN LAW, CONSTRAINTS EXIST ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SCHOLARS. THEY SOMETIMES REFRAIN FROM PRODUCING MATERIALS WHICH THEY BELIEVE MIGHT PROVOKE GOVERNMENT DISPLEASURE. PUBLISHERS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 12446 06 OF 14 250804Z
ARE OFTEN UNWILLING TO ACCEPT MANUSCRIPTS DEALING WITH

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, AND THOSE THAT DO SOMETIMES FIND WORKS BANNED LONG AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED. FOR EXAMPLE, AN INDONESIAN TRANSLATION OF A JAPANESE SCHOLAR'S WORK ON INDONESIA WAS BANNED IN SEPTEMBER A YEAR AFTER ITS PUBLICATION BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT FELT IT DISCREDITED PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. THIS WAS ONE OF AT LEAST FIFTEEN BOOKS BANNED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN 1991.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

ALL ORGANIZATIONS MUST HAVE GOVERNMENT PERMISSION TO HOLD REGIONAL AND NATIONAL MEETINGS. LOCAL JURISDICTIONS OFTEN REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FOR SMALLER GATHERINGS AS WELL. WHILE OBTAINING SUCH APPROVALS IS FAIRLY AUTOMATIC, AUTHORITIES OCCASIONALLY WITHHOLD PERMISSION. THE INDONESIAN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS UNABLE TO GET GOVERNMENT PERMISSION TO HOLD ITS NATIONAL MEETING. MEETINGS OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE SOMETIMES SUBJECT TO SUBSTANTIAL OFFICIAL EFFORTS TO PRODUCE SPECIFIC OUTCOMES. STUDENT GATHERINGS HAVE OFTEN BEEN THE TARGET OF DISAPPROVALS, AND OSTENSIBLE POLITICAL ACTIVITY AT UNIVERSITIES REMAINS FORBIDDEN UNDER THE "CAMPUS LIFE NORMALIZATION" (NKK) LAW OF 1978. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO BANNED POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING IN CONNECTION WITH THE 1992 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS FROM UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES.

THE 1985 "SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS" (ORMAS) LAW REQUIRES ALL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA. THIS PROVISION,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WHICH LIMITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD AS PROHIBITING GROUPS WHICH SEEK TO MAKE INDONESIA AN ISLAMIC STATE. THE LAW EMPOWERS THE GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND ANY ORGANIZATION IT BELIEVES TO BE ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA AND REQUIRES PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR ANY ORGANIZATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS FROM FOREIGN DONORS.

GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS VARIED. JAKARTA POLICE IN AUGUST ENTERED A PRIVATE HOME WITHOUT A WARRANT AND BROKE UP A GATHERING OF MEMBERS OF THE DISSIDENT GROUP KNOWN AS THE PETITION OF 50. THE MEETINGS HAD BEEN HELD WEEKLY IN THE SAME HOME FOR NEARLY 11 YEARS WITHOUT PRIOR INCIDENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, THREE NEW DISCUSSION GROUPS CONCERNED WITH PROMOTING

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS WERE FORMED AND OPERATED WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

THE CONSTITUTION RECOGNIZES AND PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR ISLAM, CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, AND HINDUISM, AND PERMITS PRACTICE OF THE MYSTICAL, ANIMISTIC BELIEFS OF "ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN." ALTHOUGH THE POPULATION IS OVERWHELMINGLY MUSLIM, THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECOGNIZED FAITHS ARE RESPECTED. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, FOR EXAMPLE, OPERATES WIDELY IN EAST TIMOR. VARIOUS RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY NONETHELESS EXIST. ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL STATISTICS, NEARLY 400 "MISLEADING RELIGIOUS CULTS" ARE BANNED, INCLUDING SOME ISLAMIC GROUPS CONSIDERED HERETICAL. EXISTING BANS AFFECT MANY THOUSANDS OF ADHERENTS, AND NEW BANNINGS BY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NATIONAL OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES OCCUR PERIODICALLY. TEN OF THE BOOKS BANNED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN 1991 CONCERNED RELIGIOUS TOPICS.

ALTHOUGH BANNED, SEVERAL THOUSAND JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES ARE BELIEVED TO PRACTICE IN JAKARTA ALONE. ADHERENTS ARE PERIODICALLY DETAINED AND THEIR RELIGIOUS MATERIALS CONFISCATED. A 1963 BAN ON THE BAHA'I FAITH CONTINUES IN FORCE. THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF BANNED RELIGIONS IS OFTEN TOLERATED, ALTHOUGH AUTHORITIES PERIODICALLY HARASS ADHERENTS OR PRESSURE THEM TO CONVERT TO THE RECOGNIZED FAITHS. BECAUSE THE FIRST TENET OF PANCASILA IS BELIEF IN A SUPREME BEING, ATHEISM IS FORBIDDEN. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA EXTENDS TO ALL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	/078W						

----------98B217 250806Z /38

R 250739Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6744

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 07 OF 14 JAKARTA 12446

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS.

THE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY OPPOSES MUSLIM GROUPS WHICH ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ACKNOWLEDGING ONLY ISLAMIC LAW, BOTH OF WHICH ARE OUTLAWED. OVER 300 AND POSSIBLY MANY MORE ALLEGED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS ARE ESTIMATED TO BE SERVING PRISON TERMS ON SUBVERSION CHARGES. VISITING MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALIST TEACHERS HAVE

BEEN PARTICULARLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO DEPORTATION.

THERE IS NO LEGAL BAR TO CONVERSION BETWEEN FAITHS, AND CONVERSIONS OCCUR. HOWEVER, PROSELYTIZING BETWEEN THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS OR IN AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ONE RECOGNIZED RELIGION OR ANOTHER IS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND IS DISCOURAGED. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED. IN RECENT YEARS, HOWEVER, SOME FOREIGN MISSIONARIES HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RENEWING VISAS OR RESIDENCE PERMITS--A FEW ON UNSPECIFIED "SECURITY GROUNDS." LAWS AND DECREES FROM THE 1970'S DO NOT ALLOW FOREIGN MISSIONARIES TO SPEND MORE THAN 10 YEARS IN INDONESIA, WITH EXTENSIONS TO 15 IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ONLY. WITH RARE EXCEPTIONS, ENFORCEMENT OF THIS POLICY DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE BY SECT OR NATIONALITY. EXCEPTIONS TO THE 10-YEAR RULE HAVE BEEN GRANTED TO FOREIGN RELIGIOUS WORKERS SINCE LATE 1987 IN THE REMOTE AREAS OF IRIAN JAYA AND KALIMANTAN AND, MORE RECENTLY, IN OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT SAYS IT INTENDS OVER TIME TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF FOREIGN MISSIONARIES IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE EMPLOYMENT OF INDONESIANS. FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK IS SUBJECT TO THE FUNDING STIPULATIONS OF THE "ORMAS" LAW DISCUSSED ABOVE.

INDONESIANS PRACTICING THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS MAINTAIN ACTIVE LINKS WITH CORELIGIONISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE INDONESIA AND TRAVEL ABROAD FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS. THE GOVERNMENT PERMITS A SET NUMBER OF PILGRIMS TO MAKE THE HAJJ ANNUALLY.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT EXIST. PERMITS TO SEEK WORK IN A NEW LOCATION ARE REQUIRED IN CERTAIN AREAS, PRIMARILY TO CONTROL FURTHER POPULATION MOVEMENT TO CROWDED CITIES. PREVIOUSLY SOME ETHNIC CHINESE ENCOUNTERED LEGAL AND BUREAUCRATIC OBSTACLES TO OBTAINING CITIZENSHIP, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED POLICY WAS TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO APPLY. IN CONNECTION WITH THE 1990 RENEWAL OF DIPLOMATIC TIES BETWEEN INDONESIA AND CHINA, OFFICIALS ANNOUNCED THAT STATELESS CHINESE--CURRENTLY ESTIMATED TO NUMBER 300,000--MUST ADOPT THE CITIZENSHIP OF ONE COUNTRY OR THE OTHER AND THAT INDONESIA'S PROCEDURES WOULD BE SIMPLIFIED AND SHORTENED. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL TO CHINA WERE LIFTED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN AUGUST.

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME 17,000 INDONESIANS ARE UNDER AN ABSOLUTE FOREIGN TRAVEL BAN CALLED "CEKAL." INCLUDED IN THIS GROUP ARE FORMER POLITICAL PRISONERS AND GOVERNMENT CRITICS SUCH AS SOME MEMBERS OF THE PETITION OF 50. OFFICIALS ALSO

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A SECOND LIST EXISTS OF PERSONS WHOSE PERMISSION TO TRAVEL IS DECIDED ONLY WHEN THEY APPLY FOR AN EXIT PERMIT. SOME CRITICS, HOWEVER, ARE FREE TO TRAVEL ABROAD, AND A PERSON PROHIBITED AT ONE TIME MAY BE PERMITTED TO TRAVEL SUBSEQUENTLY. STUDENTS WISHING AND ABLE TO DO SO CAN GENERALLY GO ABROAD FOR STUDY.

RESTRICTIONS EXIST ON MOVEMENT BY INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN CITIZENS TO AND WITHIN PARTS OF IRIAN JAYA. SECURITY

CHECKS AFFECTING TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL IN ACEH OCCURRED SPORADICALLY IN EARLY 1991, AND PERMISSION WAS REQUIRED TO VISIT CERTAIN DISTRICTS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE FOR SECURITY REASONS. CURFEWS WERE SOMETIMES IN FORCE IN CONNECTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS IN PARTS OF EAST TIMOR AND ACEH. FAMILY VISITS BACK TO EAST TIMOR BY EAST TIMORESE NOW LIVING IN AUSTRALIA CONTINUED. FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, MUST NOTIFY AUTHORITIES OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND MAY NOT CHANGE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE WITHOUT OFFICIAL PERMISSION.

INDONESIA CONTINUED ITS GENEROUS ATTITUDE REGARDING INDOCHINESE ASYLUM SEEKERS. IT HAS GRANTED FIRST ASYLUM

NNNN

ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 PA-01 PRS-01 P-01 RP-10
SIL-01 SP-01 SR-01 SS-01 STR-18 TRSE-00 USIE-00
/078W

----------98B22D 250807Z /38

R 250739Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6745

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 08 OF 14 JAKARTA 12446

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

TO OVER 123,000 INDOCHINESE ASYLUM SEEKERS SINCE 1975, AND THE POPULATION OF ITS GALANG ISLAND FACILITY WAS ABOUT 20,000 THROUGH MOST OF 1991. GALANG'S CAMBODIAN POPULATION WAS ABOUT 1,750. INDONESIA CONSIDERS THE CAMBODIANS ILLEGAL ENTRANTS RATHER THAN ASYLUM SEEKERS. NEVERTHELESS, CAMBODIANS HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN INDONESI/, PENDING AN INTERNATIONAL DECISION ON HOW TO RESOLVE THEIR SITUATION. INDONESIA ALSO CONTINUED ITS

COOPERATION WITH THE UNHCR AND ICRC ON THE RETURN OF RESIDENTS OF IRIAN JAYA WHO HAD FLED TO PAPUA NEW GUINEA DURING SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE PROVINCE.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

PARLIAMENT, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC HAVE LIMITED ABILITY TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT DECISIONS BUT CAN NOT CHANGE THE SYSTEM OR ITS LEADERSHI/. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND A SMALL GROUP OF ACTIVE-DUTY AND RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS EXERCISE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. THE MILITARY HAS RESPONSIBILITY UNDER A "DUAL FUNCTION" DOCTRINE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY PLUS SOCIOPOLITICAL AFFAIRS. THE MILITARY IS PREDOMINANT IN THE POLITICAL

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
AND SECURITY FIELDS. THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES PARLIAMENT A MECHANISM TO CALL THE PRESIDENT TO ACCOUNT IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES. GOVERNMENT LEADERS SEEK OUT AND RECEIVE PUBLIC OPINION INFORMALLY. REFLECTING A STRONG CULTURAL PREFERENCE, INDONESIAN LEADERS EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF DECISIONMAKING AND RESOLVING DISPUTES THROUGH "CONSULTATION LEADING TO CONSENSUS."

THE PARLIAMENT CONSIDERS BILLS PRESENTED TO IT BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES BUT DOES NOT DRAFT LAWS ON ITS OWN, ALTHOUGH IT HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DO SO. THE GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO RESOLVE POTENTIAL PARLIAMENTARY CONCERNS BEFORE BILLS ARE OFFICIALLY PRESENTED. PARLIAMENT MAKES TECHNICAL AND OCCASIONALLY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS TO BILLS IT REVIEWS. THROUGH CONSULTATIONS AND HEARINGS WITH MINISTERS AND OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS, PRESS STATEMENTS, AND FIELD TRIPS, PARLIAMENT IS MORE ACTIVELY CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONTENT AND EXECUTION OF GOVERNMENT POLICY THAN PREVIOUSLY. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN 1991, WHEN DEBATES OVER "OPENNESS," PRESS CONTROL, LAND TENURE, TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS, AND THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT ITSELF WERE GIVEN WIDE PUBLICITY. NONETHELESS, PARLIAMENT REMAINS CLEARLY SUBORDINATE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

ONLY THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE ALLOWED BY LAW. GOLKAR, A GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ORGANIZATION OF DIVERSE FUNCTIONAL GROUPS, DOMINATES. TWO SMALL POLITICAL PARTIES--THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI)--ALSO OPERATE. BY LAW THEY EMBRACE PANCASILA. THEY ARE NOT CONSIDERED OPPOSITION PARTIES AND SELDOM ESPOUSE POLICIES MUCH DIFFERENT FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S. THE LEADERS OF ALL THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE APPROVED, IF NOT CHOSEN, BY THE GOVERNMENT, AND THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED AND OFTEN GUIDED BY GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES. GOLKAR MAINTAINS CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH THE ARMED FORCES AND KORPRI, THE NONUNION ASSOCIATION TO WHICH ALL CIVIL SERVANTS AUTOMATICALLY BELONG. CIVIL SERVANTS MAY JOIN EITHER OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WITH OFFICIAL PERMISSION, BUT MOST ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND SOME OTHER BANNED PARTIES MAY NOT RUN FOR OFFICE OR BE ACTIVE POLITICALLY.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 JAKART 12446 08 OF 14 250805Z
DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES ARE HELD EVERY 5 YEARS. GOLKAR WON 73 PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL VOTE IN THE 1987 ELECTIONS, AND NEW ELECTIONS ARE SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN JUNE 1992. ALL ADULT CITIZENS ARE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE, EXCEPT ACTIVE-DUTY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, CONVICTED CRIMINALS SERVING PRISON SENTENCES, AND 36,345 FORMER PKI MEMBERS. VOTERS MAY CHOOSE BY SECRET BALLOT BETWEEN THE THREE APPROVED POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHO FIELD CANDIDATE LISTS IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT. THOSE LISTS MUST BE SCREENED BY BAKORSTANAS, WHICH DETERMINES WHETHER CANDIDATES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST COUP OR ADHERE TO OTHER BANNED IDEOLOGIES. CRITICS CHARGED THESE SCREENINGS WERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, SINCE THERE IS NO WAY TO APPEAL THE RESULTS. THEY ALSO SAID

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 12446 09 OF 14 250806Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	/078W						

----------98B24A 250807Z /38
R 250739Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6746

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

THE SCREENING PROCESS COULD BE USED TO ELIMINATE GOVERNMENT CRITICS FROM PARLIAMENT.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS OF

ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, FOR EXAMPLE, IS BANNED FROM INDONESIA. NONETHELESS, THE GOVERNMENT GRANTED ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) TO POLITICAL PRISONERS ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INSURGENCY IN ACEH, AND ALSO ALLOWED THE ICRC ACCESS TO JAILED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS. UNDER A 1985 AGREEMENT, THE ICRC IS AUTHORIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO VISIT PERSONS HELD FOR SECURITY REASONS IN EAST TIMOR. THE ICRC ANNUALLY VISITS AND INTERVIEWS THE PRISONERS CONVICTED OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ABORTIVE, COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP IN 1965.

VARIOUS FOREIGN PARLIAMENTARIAN GROUPS WERE ENCOURAGED TO VISIT TROUBLE SPOTS SUCH AS ACEH AND EAST TIMOR. PERMISSION HAD ALSO BEEN GIVEN TO A PORTUGESE PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION TO VISIT EAST TIMOR, AND TO THE U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE TO VISIT INDONESIA IN LATE 1991.

THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY IGNORES CALLS BY DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND ACTIVISTS FOR INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS INCIDENTS. WHILE VARIOUS DOMESTIC ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONS INTERESTED IN HUMAN RIGHTS OPERATE ENERGETICALLY, THE GOVERNMENT DISCOURAGES PUBLIC

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITIES. SOME HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS HAVE COMPLAINED OF GOVERNMENT HARASSMENT.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INDONESIANS EXHIBIT CONSIDERABLE TOLERANCE FOR ETHNIC, RACIAL, AND MAJOR RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES, WITH THE MAJOR EXCEPTION OF OFFICIAL AND INFORMAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE. SINCE 1959, NONCITIZEN ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO RUN BUSINESSES IN RURAL INDONESIA. REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF ALL-CHINESE SCHOOLS FOR ETHNIC CHINESE CITIZENS, FORMATION OF EXCLUSIVELY CHINESE CULTURAL GROUPS OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND PUBLIC DISPLAY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS. CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED DAILY NEWSPAPER, CAN NEITHER BE IMPORTED NOR PRODUCED DOMESTICALLY. PRIVATE INSTRUCTION OF CHINESE IS DISCOURAGED BUT TAKES PLACE TO A LIMITED EXTENT. NO LAWS PROHIBIT SPEAKING CHINESE, BUT THE GOVERNMENT LAYS HEAVY STRESS ON THE LEARNING AND USE OF THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE, BAHASA INDONESIA.

MANY PEOPLE OF CHINESE ANCESTRY HAVE NONETHELESS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS, AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS IS OFTEN HAPHAZARD. SOME ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE ENJOYED PARTICULAR GOVERNMENT FAVOR. SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS EXIST WHICH ARE, IN EFFECT, ALL-CHINESE AND ARE NOT PROSCRIBED. JAKARTA AUTHORITIES HAVE ENDED THE PRACTICE OF MARKING LOCAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS TO INDICATE CHINESE ETHNICITY. HOWEVER, 1991 SAW A RISE IN ANTI-CHINESE FEELING IN MANY QUARTERS OF INDONESIAN SOCIETY, PARTICULARLY AGAINST THE AFFLUENT CHINESE.

UNDER THE LAW, AND AS PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND OTHER OFFICIALS PERIODICALLY AFFIRM, WOMEN ARE EQUAL TO AND

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MEN. SOME INDONESIAN WOMEN ENJOY A HIGH DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FREEDOM AND OCCUPY IMPORTANT MID-LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, THE MILITARY, THE PROFESSIONS, AND PRIVATE BUSINESS. ALTHOUGH WOMEN CONSTITUTE ONE QUARTER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, THEY OCCUPY ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THE SERVICE'S TOP POSTS. WOMEN MAKE UP ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF THE OVERALL WORK FORCE, WITH THE MAJORITY IN THE RURAL SECTOR. DESPITE LEGAL GUARANTEES OF EQUAL TREATMENT, WOMEN SELDOM RECEIVE EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK AND DISPROPORTIONATELY EXPERIENCE ILLITERACY AND POOR HEALTH AND NUTRITION. TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES WHICH LIMIT WOMEN'S ASPIRATIONS, ACTIVITIES,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 12446 10 OF 14 250807Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	/078W						

----------98B25C 250808Z /38

R 250739Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6747

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 10 OF 14 JAKARTA 12446

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

AND STATUS UNDERCUT STATE POLICY IN SOME AREAS. SEVERAL VOLUNTARY, PRIVATE GROUPS WORK ACTIVELY TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGE SOME SUCCESS IN GAINING OFFICIAL COGNIZANCE OF THEIR CONCERNS.

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IS AN ACKNOWLEDGED THOUGH INADEQUATELY DOCUMENTED PROBLEM. THE GOVERNMENT HAS

RECOGNIZED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A PROBLEM IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY AND PROVIDES SOME COUNSELING, AS DO SEVERAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS. HOWEVER, CULTURAL, SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND OTHER FACTORS INHIBIT REPORTING OF SUCH ABUSE AND RECOURSE BY VICTIMS TO COUNSELING AND LEGAL PROTECTION.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS, INCLUDING THOSE IN EXPORT-PROCESSING ZONES, ARE FREE TO FORM OR JOIN UNIONS WITHOUT PREVIOUS AUTHORIZATION, BUT IN ORDER TO BARGAIN ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES A UNION MUST MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION AND REGISTER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION ARE REPRESENTATION IN AT LEAST 20 OF THE 27 PROVINCES, BRANCH OFFICES IN AT LEAST 100 DISTRICTS, AND 1,000 LOCAL UNITS AT PLANT LEVEL. THE UNIONS DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES WHILE UNDER CLOSE GOVERNMENT SCRUTINY AND SUBJECT TO GOVERNMENT APPROVAL PRIOR TO REGISTRATION.

LESS THAN 6 PERCENT OF THE ESTIMATED 78-MILLION-MEMBER WORK FORCE IS ORGANIZED. THE ALL INDONESIA WORKERS UNION (SPSI), WHICH GROUPS TOGETHER PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS, IS THE ONLY RECOGNIZED INTERSECTORAL TRADE UNION BODY. THE SPSI'S PREDECESSOR ORGANIZATION, FBSI, WAS SET UP IN 1973 THROUGH A GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED MERGER OF VARIOUS NON-COMMUNIST UNIONS AND ADOPTED ITS PRESENT NAME AND

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

STRUCTURE, ALSO WITH HEAVY GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT, IN 1985. IN 1990 THE SPSI REORGANIZED INTO 13 AUTONOMOUS DIVISIONS COVERING BROAD INDUSTRIAL SECTORS AND SPECIALIZED INSTITUTES. IT HAS ABOUT 10,000 LOCAL UNITS AT THE PLANT LEVEL AND CLAIMS OVER 3 MILLION MEMBERS, ALTHOUGH ONLY ABOUT 900,000 ACTUALLY PAY DUES.

IN NOVEMBER 1990, A NUMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGNERS CREATED THE SETIA KAWAN (SOLIDARITY) FREE TRADE UNION, ALLEGING THAT THE SPSI HAD FAILED TO DEFEND WORKER INTERESTS ADEQUATELY. WHILE THE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS INITIALLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT APPROVE THE NEW TRADE UNION WHEN IT SOUGHT TO REGISTER BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD VIOLATE THE GOVERNMENT'S SINGLE-TRADE UNION POLICY, HE LATER INDICATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TOLERATE THE NEW ORGANIZATION IF IT DID NOT DO ANYTHING ILLEGAL. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO FORMAL MOVE TO BAN SETIA KAWAN.

IN JUNE SETIA KAWAN SECRETARY GENERAL SAUT ARITONANG REPORTED HE WAS ABDUCTED BY ARMED MEN AND DETAINED FOR SEVERAL DAYS. PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT, ARITONANG HAD INDICATED HE WOULD BE GOING TO GENEVA TO BRING SETIA KAWAN'S CASE BEFORE THE ILO DURING THE ILO'S ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE. THE INDONESIAN MINISTER OF MANPOWER WAS EXPECTED TO BE ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE. THE INDONESIA GOVERNMENT HAS DENIED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARITONANG'S DISAPPEARANCE AND ARITONANG HAS NOT PUBLICLY SPECULATED ON THE IDENTITY OF HIS ABDUCTORS.

A NUMBER OF GROUPS AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, E.G., THE JOURNALIST ASSOCIATION AND THE JOINT SECRETARIAT OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONS, ARE PERMITTED TO CARRY OUT CERTAIN LIMITED TRADE UNION FUNCTIONS AND OPERATE OPENLY, BUT THEY MAY NOT ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. IN 1990 THE NONUNION TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (PGRI) WAS ALLOWED TO REGISTER AS A TRADE UNION WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION FOR THIS SECTOR. THE PGRI, WHICH CONSISTS OF 1.3 MILLION TEACHERS, INCLUDING TEACHERS IN RELIGIOUS, PRIVATE, AND

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PUBLIC SCHOOLS, HAS REPRESENTATION IN ALL 27 PROVINCES. IT HAS NOT, HOWEVER, SOUGHT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ITS NEW STATUS TO BARGAIN OVER WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS. IT HAS PREFERRED ITS TRADITIONAL ROLE OF WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO PURSUE THE INTERESTS OF ITS MEMBERS. STATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 12446 11 OF 14 250807Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	/078W						

----------98B26F 250809Z /38
R 250739Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6748

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 11 OF 14 JAKARTA 12446

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND CIVIL SERVANTS MUST BELONG TO KORPRI, A NONUNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. IN 1990, FOR THE FIRST TIME, A KORPRI SUBUNIT SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED FOUR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS WITH THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
STATE-OWNED COAL COMPANY.

THE GOVERNMENT AND EMPLOYERS HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OVER UNION AFFAIRS; A RETIRED MILITARY LIEUTENANT COLONEL AND GOLKAR DISTRICT CHAIRMAN WITH SOME PRIOR UNION EXPERIENCE IS CHAIRMAN OF THE LARGEST PROVINCIAL BRANCH OF THE SPSI, PARTLY DUE TO GOVERNMENT BACKING. SPSI OFFICIALS ARE PRESSURED TO JOIN GOLKAR, AND GOLKAR MEMBERS DOMINATE THE SPSI LEADERSHIP. SEVERAL SPSI LEADERS ARE IN THE DPR AND ARE MEMBERS OF THE GOLKAR FACTION. /

UNDER THE ORMAS LAW (SEE SECTION 2.B.), GOVERNMENT APPROVAL IS NEEDED FOR MEETINGS OUTSIDE UNION HEADQUARTERS. PERMISSION IS ROUTINELY GIVEN. A UNION MAY BE DISSOLVED IF THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES IT IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA. THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS LAYING OUT THE PROCEDURES FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF A UNION, AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO CASES OF UNION DISSOLUTION.

THE SPSI MAINTAINS INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS, BUT IT IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION, EXCEPT THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) TRADE UNION COUNCIL. THE SPSI'S GOVERNMENT-ENDORSED APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE ICFTU IS STILL PENDING. SOME ELEMENTS OF THE SPSI, SUCH AS THE INDONESIAN SEAFARERS UNION, MAINTAIN LINKS WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION SECRETARIATS. THE JOINT SECRETARIAT, GROUPING ELEMENTS OF THE SPSI AND UNIONS NOT LEGALLY RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT, HAS LINKS WITH THE WORLD CONFEDERAT/ON OF LABOR.

WHILE PANCASILA PRINCIPLES CALL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES TO BE SETTLED BY CONSENSUS, ALL ORGANIZED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WORKERS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CIVIL SERVANTS, HAVE A LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. IN JUNE 1990 PRESIDENT SOEHARTO REVOKED A 1963 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE WHICH PROHIBITED STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN VITAL INDUSTRIES, SERVICES, AND

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
ENTERPRISES. THIS PROHIBITION, ALTHOUGH REPORTEDLY NEVER IMPLEMENTED, WAS THEORETICALLY APPLICABLE TO ABOUT 170,000 WORKERS. BEFORE A STRIKE CAN OCCUR IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE LAW REQUIRES INTENSIVE MEDIATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND PRIOR NOTICE REGARDING THE INTENT TO STRIKE, BUT NO APPROVAL IS REQUIRED. MOST DISPUTES, HOWEVER, ARE SETTLED THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND CONSENSUS. IN 1991, THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF STRIKES, ESPECIALLY ON THE PART OF WORKERS DEMANDING EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL MINIMUM WAGE. IN A NUMBER OF INSTANCES, THE MILITARY OR POLICE WERE CALLED TO THE SCENE OF THE STRIKE.

THE LARGEST STRIKE, INVOLVING APPROXIMATELY 12,000 WORKERS ENGAGED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF AUTOMOBILE TIRES IN THE INDUSTRIAL AREA WEST OF JAKARTA, PROMPTED THE MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY TO CHARGE THAT "WOULD BE HEROES" AND OTHER UNNAMED PARTIES WERE BEHIND THE RECENT STRIKES. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER STATED THE STRIKES WERE THE RESULT OF WORKERS INCREASING AWARENESS OF THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS. THERE WERE XX STRIKES OFFICIALLY REPORTED IN 1991 COMPARED TO 45 STRIKES FOR ALL OF 1990. MANY STRIKES OCCUR SUDDENLY AND WITHOUT PRIOR ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS AND MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN OFFICIAL STATISTICS.

STRIKE OUTCOMES VARIED. IN SOME CASES EMPLOYERS HAVE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

QUICKLY COMPLIED WITH WORKER DEMANDS THAT SALARIES BE INCREASED TO THE LEGAL MINIMUN WAGE. OTHERS HAVE BEEN LESS SUCCESSFUL WITH WORKERS RETURNING TO WORK WITH ONLY PARTIAL GAINS OR NONE AT ALL.

IN PRACTICE THERE ARE NO CLEAR ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THE VARIOUS LAWS, INTERPRETATIVE RULES, INSTRUCTIONS, AND PRACTICES INDICATE THAT THE PARTIES SHOULD TRY TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE THEMSELVES. IF THEY CANNOT SETTLE THE MATTER THEN THEY SHOULD SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE. IF THE PARTIES DO NOT ACCEPT THE MEDIATOR'S DECISION, THEN THE MEDIATOR OR EITHER PARTY MAY SUBMIT THE MATTER TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 12446 12 OF 14 250808Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	/078W						

----------98B27B 250809Z /38

R 250739Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6749

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 12 OF 14 JAKARTA 12446

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

/RIPARTITE (GOVERNMENT, EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEES)
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS OR TO ARBITRATION. THESE
TRIBUNALS HEAR ARGUMENTS AND ISSUE DECISIONS ENFORCEABLE
THROUGH THE COURTS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER CAN NULLIFY
THE DECISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS ON LEGAL OR
NATIONAL INTEREST GROUNDS. ALTHOUGH TECHNICALLY THE
MINISTER'S DECISIONS MAY BE APPEALED TO THE COURTS, IN
PRACTICE IT IS RARELY DONE. UNDER THE LAW, THE PARTIES

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CAN ELECT BINDING ARBITRATION IN LIEU OF THE TRIPARTITE MECHANISM. HOWEVER, THIS PROVISION IS SELDOM USED; MOST CASES ARE HANDLED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE.

THE CENTRAL BOARD OF KORPRI AND ITS SECRETARIATS AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL HAVE EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BUREAUS, WHICH ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTLING EMPLOYEE DISPUTES. SOME GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS HAVE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER, WHICH CALL FOR THE CONVENING OF A LABOR COMMITTEE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES.

INDONESIA HAS FOR MANY YEARS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF COMPLAINTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO). THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, A LONGSTANDING CRITIC, HAS BROUGHT WORKER RIGHTS COMPLAINTS AGAINST INDONESIA IN U.S. TRADE PROCEEDINGS. IN MAY 1989, THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (CFA) REACHED FINAL CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE UNCOMPLETED ASPECTS OF A 1987 COMPLAINT BY THE ICFTU PERTAINING TO THE BAN ON ORGANIZING PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS, INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION AGAINST ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION, AND RESTRICTIONS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE. CONCLUDING THAT A LARGE SECTION OF THE WORK FORCE DOES NOT HAVE FREEDOM TO FORM OR JOIN A WORKERS' ORGANIZATION OF ITS OWN CHOOSING, THE CFA REQUESTED THE GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW PUBLIC EMPLOYEES TO ESTABLISH UNIONS OUTSIDE KORPRI AND TO REMOVE OTHER RESTRICTIONS. IN APRIL AND MAY 1990, THE GOVERNMENT INFORMED THE CFA THAT THE 1963 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE WOULD BE REPEALED AND THAT THE PGRI HAD REGISTERED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AS A UNION. IT ALSO ARGUED THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR PUBLIC SERVANTS TO HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS THE LEGISLATION ADEQUATELY COVERS CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. IN JUNE THE CFA POINTED OUT THAT THE LIMITED NATURE OF THE "ASSOCIATIONS" PUBLIC SERVANTS CAN FORM WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A RESTRICTION ON UNIONIZATION, EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO EXPLICIT LEGISLATIVE BAN. IN NOVEMBER 1990 THE CFA TOOK NOTE OF THE REPEAL OF THE 1963 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE AND OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REPORT THAT COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN CONCLUDED BY ONE KORPRI SUBUNIT.

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, BUT ONLY REGISTERED TRADE UNIONS CAN DO IT. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER VIGOROUSLY PROMOTES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PANCASILA. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE SPSI'S COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS ARE NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED BILATERALLY WITH EMPLOYERS. ONCE NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED A REGISTERED UNION, THE EMPLOYER IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO BARGAIN. AS A TRANSITIONAL STAGE TO ENCOURAGE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT EVERY COMPANY WHICH HAS 25 OR MORE EMPLOYEES MUST ISSUE COMPANY REGULATIONS DEFINING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. BEFORE A COMPANY CAN REGISTER OR RENEW ITS COMPANY REGULATIONS IT MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT IT HAS CONSULTED WITH A COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES, IN THE ABSENCE OF A UNION. OF THE APPROXIMATELY 10,000 SPSI UNITS, ONLY ABOUT HALF HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. THE DEGREE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS ARE FREELY NEGOTIATED BETWEEN UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE VARIES. BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS. IF NOT, THE MATTER IS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION/ARBITRATION. IN PRACTICE, MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED FOR 1 MORE.

LABOR LAW APPLIES EQUALLY IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES. WHILE SOME COMPANIES IN THESE ZONES HAVE SPSI UNITS, NONE HAVE NEGOTIATED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. REGULATIONS EXPRESSLY FORBID EMPLOYERS PREJUDGING OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, AND

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 12446 13 OF 14 250809Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	/078W						

----------98B28A 250809Z /38
R 250739Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6750

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 13 OF 14 JAKARTA 12446

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

EMPLOYEES ARE URGED TO REPORT HARASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE SPSI CLAIMS THAT SOME EMPLOYERS DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ITS MEMBERS AND THOSE WISHING TO FORM SPSI UNITS.

MANY STRIKES AND PROTESTS TAKE PLACE IN SUPPORT OF FIRED UNION OFFICIALS. CHARGES OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE HANDLED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. MANY UNION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 12446 13 OF 14 250809Z
MEMBERS BELIEVE THAT THE TRIBUNALS GENERALLY SIDE WITH THE EMPLOYER. BECAUSE OF THIS PERCEIVED PARTIALITY, MANY WORKERS REJECT OR AVOID THE PROCESS AND PRESENT THEIR DISPUTES BEFORE THE PARLIAMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES.

WORKERS CAN ORGANIZE WITHOUT RESTRICTION IN A PRIVATE ENTERPRISE EVEN IF IT IS DESIGNATED VITAL BY THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

GOVERNMENT. IF THE STATE HAS A PARTIAL INTEREST, THE ENTERPRISE IS CONSIDERED TO BE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE DOMAIN, BUT THIS DOES NOT LEGALLY LIMIT ORGANIZING. THERE ARE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT/PRIVATE JOINT ENTERPRISES WHICH HAVE LABOR UNIONS AND WHICH BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

FORCED LABOR IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. INDONESIA HAS RATIFIED ILO CONVENTION 29 CONCERNING FORCED LABOR. IN 1990 THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, A U.S.-BASED NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, ASSERTED THAT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS IN IRIAN JAYA COOPERATE WITH JAKARTA-BASED TIMBER COMPANIES TO COMPEL ASMAT TRIBESPEOPLE TO CUT DOWN TREES AND TRANSPORT THEM DOWNSTREAM TO WAITING SHIPS, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT. IT ALSO ALLEGED THAT THERE ARE DOCUMENTED REPORTS OF LABOR CONTRACTORS IN JAKARTA SELLING GIRLS AS DOMESTIC SERVANTS OR TO BROTHELS NEAR PLANTATIONS, AND THAT MEN ARE SOLD AS AGRICULTURAL WORKERS. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONDED THAT IT IS INVESTIGATING THE ALLEGATIONS. TO DATE IT HAS NOT RELEASED THE RESULTS OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THIS INVESTIGATION.

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

CHILD LABOR CONTINUES TO BE A MAJOR PROBLEM. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A CLASS OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 14 WHO, FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS, MUST WORK AND NOTES THAT THE CHILD LABOR LAWS HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY ENFORCED. THESE LAWS PROVIDE DETAILED SAFEGUARDS, INCLUDING REQUIREMENTS FOR PARENTAL CONSENT, PROHIBITION OF DANGEROUS WORK AND NIGHT WORK, AND A LIMIT OF THE WORKDAY TO 4 HOURS. EMPLOYERS MUST COOPERATE WITH PUBLIC AUTHORITIES TO ENSURE THAT CHILDREN UNDER 14 COMPLY WITH THE 1989 NATIONAL EDUCATION LAW, WHICH REQUIRES THAT CHILDREN COMPLETE 9 YEARS OF SCHOOLING BEGINNING AT AGE 7.

EMPLOYERS ARE REQUIRED TO REPORT IN DETAIL ON EVERY CHILD EMPLOYED, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER CARRIES OUT PERIODIC INSPECTIONS. EMPLOYERS NOT COMPLYING WITH THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LAW AND REGULATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO FINES OF $65 AND/OR UP TO 3 MONTHS IN JAIL FOR EACH INFRACTION, BUT THE GOVERNMENT STILL RELIES ON PERSUASION AND TEACHING EMPLOYERS RATHER THAN PENALIZING THEM. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER CONTINUES TO ADMIT THAT EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS IS INADEQUATE (LESS THAN 50 PERCENT OF COMPANIES EMPLOYING CHILDREN HAVE REGISTERED), AND THAT IT STILL LACKS ENOUGH QUALIFIED INSPECTORS TO CARRY OUT INSPECTIONS. OBSERVERS CLAIM THAT OVER 2 MILLION CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14 ARE WORKING HALF TO FULL TIME, MOSTLY IN FA/ILY-RUN BUSINESSES IN THE INFORMAL

SECTOR AND AT AGRICULTURAL SITES, WHERE ENFORCEMENT IS DIFFICULT. EFFORTS TO CONTROL CHILD LABOR FOCUS PRIMARILY ON INSTITUTING EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR WORKING CHILDREN.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7-HOUR WORKDAYS AND 40-HOUR WORKWEEKS, WITH ONE-HALF HOUR OF REST FOR EACH 4 HOURS OF WORK. THE DAILY OVERTIME RATE IS ONE AND ONE-HALF TIMES THE NORMAL HOURLY RATE FOR THE FIRST HOUR, AND TWICE THE HOURLY RATE FOR ADDITIONAL OVERTIME. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER WITH THE AGREEMENT OF

NNNN

ACTION HA-09

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-01 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EAP-01
EB-01 H-01 INRE-00 INR-01 IO-19 LAB-04 L-03
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 PA-01 PRS-01 P-01 RP-10
SIL-01 SP-01 SR-01 SS-01 STR-18 TRSE-00 USIE-00
/078W

----------98B295 250810Z /38

R 250739Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6751

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 14 OF 14 JAKARTA 12446

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND S/IL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

THE EMPLOYEES.

IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE, MINIMUM WAGES ARE ESTABLISHED BY REGIONAL WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL. THIS IS A QUADRIPARTITE BODY CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM LABOR, MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT, AND UNIVERSITIES. IT ALSO ESTABLISHES A BASIC-NEEDS FIGURE FOR EACH PROVINCE--A

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 12446 14 OF 14 250809Z

MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER OR FAMILY TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. THE MINIMUM WAGE RATES CONSTANTLY LAG FAR BEHIND THE BASIC-NEEDS FIGURES AND FALL SHORT OF PROVIDING A DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING. THE MINIMUM WAGE IN THE CAPITAL CITY OF JAKARTA IS THE EQUIVALENT OF $XX.XX PER DAY. LABOR LAW AND MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PROVIDE WORKERS WITH A VARIETY OF OTHER BENEFITS SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY, AND WORKERS IN MORE MODERN FACILITIES OFTEN RECEIVE HEALTH BENEFITS AND FREE MEALS.

OBSERVANCE OF MINIMUM WAGE AND OTHER LAWS REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND FROM REGION TO REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF THESE GUARANTEES ARE CONSIDERED TO BE FAIRLY COMMON AND OFTEN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THE SUBJECT OF STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT HAVE BEEN WEAK OR NONEXISTENT. IN MAY 1989, THE MANPOWER MINISTER ISSUED REGULATIONS GIVING DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS A LEGAL BASIS TO CARRY OUT PERIODIC INSPECTIONS AND PROVIDING FOR FINES OR IMPRISONMENT FOR EMPLOYERS WHO DO NOT COMPLY. IN MARCH 1990, SPURRED ON BY AN ASIAN-AMERICAN FREE LABOR INSTITUTE/SPSI MINIMUM WAGE COMPLIANCE PROJECT, WHICH SHOWED THAT 50 TO 70 PERCENT OF EMPLOYERS IN THREE TARGETED AREAS IN JAKARTA WERE PAYING LESS THAN THE MINIMUM WAGES, THE MANPOWER MINISTER BEGAN TO PROSECUTE EMPLOYERS FOR VIOLATING MINIMUM WAGE REGULATIONS. ACCORDING TO THE MINISTRY XX PROSECUTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. IN THE MORE PROFITABLE AND LARGELY WESTERN-OPERATED OIL SECTOR, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUNCTION REASONABLY WELL. HOWEVER, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS IN THE COUNTRY'S OVER 100,000 LARGER, REGISTERED COMPANIES IN THE NONOIL SECTOR ARE STILL HAMPERED BY THE LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED INSPECTORS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER (LESS THAN 1,300), THE SLOWNESS WITH WHICH THE FIRMS ESTABLISH THE REQUIRED PLANT-SAFETY COMMITTEES, THE NEED FOR MORE AND BETTER TRAINING OF GOVERNMENT INSPECTORS AND PLANT-SAFETY PERSONNEL, AND THE LACK OF EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION FOR SOUND HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES. A NATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY COUNCIL, AN ADVISORY BODY ESTABLISHED UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER, WAS CREATED IN 1990 TO OVERSEE THE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS OF OVER 6,000 COMPANY SAFETY COMMITTEES.

WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS, AND EMPLOYERS ARE PREVENTED BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO. AN ILO-SPONSORED PROGRAM TO ENHANCE THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES OF GOVERNMENT INSPECTORS AND PLANT PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF CHEMICAL AND MAJOR HAZARDS CONTROL WAS SIGNED IN 1988, AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES TO INCREASE INSPECTION CAPABILITIES. WILSON

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C35

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 17458 01 OF 06 070848Z

RELEASED IN FULL

ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 HA-09 SSO-00 /010W
----------2786D6 071023Z /11

O 070834Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9557
INFO RUMJDN/AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 06 JAKARTA 17458

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

REF: (A) STATE 400309, (B) STATE 409134

1. LOU/NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT

2. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES EMBASSY'S COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT DRAFT OF THE 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA (REFS). WE HAVE UPDATED WHERE NECESSARY AND ANSWERED SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. WE ALSO HAVE URGED A NUMBER OF REVISIONS TO PROMOTE ACCURACY, CLARITY, AND A DETACHED TONE -- AND TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE LIMITS TO OUR KNOWLEDGE.

3. INTRODUCTION.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 17458 01 OF 06 070848Z

FIRST PARAGRAPH, FIRST SENTENCE. THIS SENTENCE IS WRONG IN FACT AND THEORY AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE ELABORATION IN SECTION 3. GOLKAR, STILL AN ELECTION-WINNING MACHINE RATHER THAN A COHERENT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, DOMINATES THE POLITICAL PARTIES BUT NOT THE STATE. SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING, A NUANCED STIFFENING OF THE 1989 OPENER: "PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND THE MILITARY WIELD PREDOMINANT POLITICAL POWER."

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 02 NOV 2006 200504425

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THIRD PARAGRAPH, LAST TWO SENTENCES. COMBINE TO READ: "THERE WERE NUMEROUS UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF MILITARY ABUSES AGAINST ALLEGED CRIMINALS AND SUSPECTED SEPARATISTS -- INCLUDING ARBITRARY ARREST, MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES, AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLINGS -- WHICH HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED BY SOME OBSERVERS AS SUGGESTING A GOVERNMENT CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENT INTIMIDATION DIRECTED AT THESE REBELS AND THEIR SYMPATHIZERS."

FOURTH PARAGRAPH. RESTORE THE SHORT SENTENCE ON GDP GROWTH ("REAL GDP GROWTH IN 1989 WAS 7.4 PERCENT.") TO PRESENT A FAIR DESCRIPTION OF THE ECONOMY.

FIFTH PARAGRAPH. ARGUABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE PARAGRAPH OF THE REPORT, THIS SUMMARY -- COMPARED WITH LAST YEAR'S -- SUGGESTS INCORRECTLY A MAJOR DETERIORATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS. THERE IS LITTLE REFLECTION OF THE ESSENTIAL NUANCES IN THE REMAINDER OF THE REPORT. SPECIFICALLY, THE ADDITION OF FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT, AND WORKER RIGHTS TO THE KEY PROBLEM AREAS -- IN LIGHT OF PAST

REPORTS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THESE AREAS -- IS NOT JUSTIFIED. NEITHER IS THE CURRENT LANGUAGE ON EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLINGS (WHERE IS THE HARD PROOF?) AND THE ABSENCE OF FAIR TRIAL (WHICH MEANS NO/NO TRIALS ARE FAIR -- A DUBIOUS ASSERTION). THIS SECTION MUST NOT NEGLECT PARLIAMENT'S INCREASING ROLE, A MAJOR FOCUS OF U.S. EFFORTS TO ENHANCE RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS HERE. TAKING THE DEPARTMENT'S DRAFT RATHER THAN THE EMBASSY'S NOW-DATED LANGUAGE AS THE POINT OF DEPARTURE, WE URGE A COMPLETE REWRITE ALONG THESE LINES:

"HUMAN RIGHTS REMAINED CIRCUMSCRIBED IN 1990. AREAS OF ABUSE INCLUDED THE KILLING AND PHYSICAL MISTREATMENT, SOMETIMES TORTURE, OF CIVILIANS BY MILITARY AND THE POLICE IN AREAS PRIMARILY OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY; THE OFTEN UNFAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, ESPECIALLY IN CASES UNDER THE BROAD ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW; SIGNIFICANT RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; PATERNALISTIC POLITICAL CONTROLS; AND PERSISTENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE. THERE WAS, ON THE OTHER HAND, SOME FITFUL EASING OF PRESS CENSORSHIP AND A MODEST RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL DISCUSSION; UNPRECEDENTED ACQUITTALS IN TWO SUBVERSION

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

TRIALS; THE EARLY RELEASE FROM PRISON OF A LEADING DISSIDENT; AN ENHANCED ROLE FOR PARLIAMENT; FORMATION OF A SECOND LABOR UNION; AND BEGINNING STEPS TOWARD ENFORCING /INIMUM WAGE REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING CONVICTION OF SOME OFFENDING EMPLOYERS. MILITARY ABUSES IN EAST TIMOR CONTINUED BUT AT AN APPARENTLY REDUCED RATE OVERALL, WHILE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST SEPARATISTS IN ACEH PRODUCED REPORTS OF NEW, SERIOUS ABUSES THERE."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 JAKART 17458 01 OF 06 070848Z
4. SECTION 1.A.

REVISE AS FOLLOWS: "MILITARY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR, ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE REPORTS, KILLED AT LEAST 15 CIVILIANS, A DECREASE FROM 1989. IN OCTOBER A MILITARY SPOKESMAN PUBLICLY DENIED THE REPORTS. OFFICIAL SOURCES CONFIRMED THE DEATHS OF FIVE CIVILIANS IN A MILITARY OPERATION IN ACEH. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTS OF EXECUTION-STYLE KILLINGS THERE. EIGHT BODIES -- SOME

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 17458 02 OF 06 070849Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 HA-09 SSO-00 /010W
---------2786E0 071023Z /11
O 070834Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9558
INFO RUMJDN/AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

MUTILATED -- WERE REPORTEDLY FOUND IN AREAS OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY DURING SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER. THESE DISCOVERIES, AS WELL AS REPORTS FROM NORTH JAKARTA IN JANUARY, REVIVED SPECULATION ABOUT "MYSTERIOUS KILLINGS," I.E., VIGILANTE KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES, WHICH HAD ABATED IN RECENT YEARS. INSURGENTS AND ALLEGED CRIMINALS IN ACEH HAVE KILLED AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICIALS, AND REPORTEDLY KILLED SEVERAL INFORMANTS AS WELL. LOCAL MILITARY AUTHORITIES CLAIMED TO HAVE TAKEN DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST SOME SUBORDINATES RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BUT DID NOT SPECIFY WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

5. SECTION 1.B.

FIRST AND THIRD SENTENCES. REVISE AND RUN CONSECUTIVELY AS FOLLOWS: "SECURITY FORCES PERIODICALLY TOOK PERSONS FOR INTERROGATION, USUALLY WITHOUT NOTIFICATION TO FAMILIES, RESULTING IN AT LEAST THEIR TEMPORARY DISAPPEARANCE. THIS OCCURRED PARTICULARLY IN EAST TIMOR AND ACEH, BUT ALSO IN IRIAN JAYA AND ELSEWHERE." THEN CONTINUE WITH "MOST REPORTS ARE UNSPECIFIC....NO CASES OF PERMANENT DISAPPEARANCE WERE RESOLVED."

6. SECTION 1.C.

FIRST PARAGRAPH, FIRST SENTENCE. ADD AS REQUESTED FOLLOW-UP SENTENCE: "POLICE IN JAKARTA, FOR INSTANCE, ON SEVERAL REPORTED OCCASIONS, BEAT INDIVIDUALS TAKEN TEMPORARILY INTO CUSTODY; YOUTHS DETAINED IN EAST TIMOR IN CONNECTION WITH CIVIL UNREST WERE BEATEN, SOMETIMES SEVERELY -- AND IN SOME CASES SUBJECTED TO MORE SERIOUS PHYSICAL MISTREATMENT."

FIRST PARAGRAPH, THIRD SENTENCE. USE "OCCASIONALLY" AS SUGGESTED RATHER THAN "PERIODICALLY" TO CONVEY THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
INFREQUENCY OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST OFFICIALS.
SECOND PARAGRAPH, FIRST SENTENCE. "REVIVED" IS
INACCURATE. USE THE EMBASSY-PROPOSED "CONTINUED" OR
"OCCURRED REPEATEDLY".

SECOND PARAGRAPH, SENTENCES SIX THROUGH EIGHT. THESE
LURID DETAILS, SOME OF WHICH WE CANNOT CONFIRM, ARE
UNNECESSARY AS THE POINT IS ALREADY ESTABLISHED. WE URGE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THEY BE DELETED. SEE THE ADDITION TO SECTION 1.D. BELOW.

SECOND PARAGRAPH, SENTENCE NINE. REPHRASE AS FOLLOWS:
"IN ACEH THERE WERE ALSO REPORTS THAT POLICE AND SOLDIERS
HAD BEATEN AND TERRORIZED SUSPECTED REBEL SYMPATHIZERS."
THE MAIN THRUST OF THE REPORTS IS CREDIBLE, BUT WE DO NOT
HAVE THE HARD FACTS TO CONFIRM THEM.

7. SECTION 1.D.

THIRD PARAGRAPH, FIRST SENTENCE. INSERT "OR KNOWLEDGE
THEREOF" AFTER "SUSPICION OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY."

THIRD PARAGRAPH, SENTENCES FOUR THROUGH SEVEN. WE HAVE
NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM ALL THESE DETAILS AND SUGGEST
THE FOLLOWING REFORMULATION: "FOLLOWING A
PRO-INDEPENDENCE DEMONSTRATION IN SEPTEMBER IN EAST
TIMOR, SEVERAL PARTICIPANTS WERE REPORTEDLY DETAINED
TEMPORARILY AND A FEW ARRESTED. OFFICIALS ASSERTED THAT
THIS WAS A RESPONSE TO CRIMINAL ACTS SUCH AS THROWING
STONES. AS MANY AS 40 YOUTHS WERE DETAINED TEMPORARILY
FOR QUESTIONING FOLLOWING/OCTOBER DISTURBANCES AT TWO
SCHOOLS. THESE INCIDENTS REFLECTED A CYCLE OF INCREASED
CIVIL UNREST, INCLUDING VIOLENT ATTACKS ON SOLDIERS AND
POLICEMEN, AND SUBSEQUENT OVER-REACTION BY SECURITY
FORCES."

THIRD PARAGRAPH, EIGHTH SENTENCE. DELETE "HANDED DOWN IN
WHAT WAS WIDELY REGARDED AS AN UNFAIR TRIAL." WE DID NOT
VENTURE THIS OBSERVATION ON THE DHARSONO TRIAL IN THE
1985 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT AND SHOULD FOR CREDIBILITY'S
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SAKE AVOID RETROACTIVE REVISIONS NOW.

8. SECTION 1.E.

FIRST PARAGRAPH, THIRD SENTENCE. THE SUPREME COURT BACKLOG IS NOW "SOME 17,000 CASES" VICE "16,000."

THIRD PARAGRAPH, END. THE USG THROUGH AID AND TAF IS FUNDING SOME OF THE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE LEGAL SYSTEM.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 HA-09 SSO-00 /010W
---------- 2786E6 071023Z /11
O 070834Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9559
INFO RUMJDN/AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 06 JAKARTA 17458

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

WE URGE RESTORATION OF THE DELETED EMBASSY-PROPOSED SENTENCE READING: "THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE LEGAL AWARENESS, TRAINING AND RESEARCH." THIS IS A SHORTENED VERSION OF A SIMILAR SENTENCE IN THE 1989 REPORT.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

FOURTH PARAGRAPH, PENULTIMATE SENTENCE. THE SHARPENING OF THE PHRASES DESCRIBING ALLEGED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS PUTS US TOO FAR OUT ON A LIMB. THE FOLLOWING REFORMULATION IS ACCEPTABLE: "...ALLEGED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, MANY OF WHOM, ACCORDING TO SOME CREDIBLE REPORTS, WERE UNFAIRLY CONVICTED FOR PEACEFUL PROTEST ACTIVITY."

FIFTH PARAGRAPH, AFTER FIRST SENTENCE. FOR THE SAKE OF OBJECTIVITY, RESTORE THE DELETED SENTENCE ON CHARGES AGAINST THE ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS WHICH READS: "DEFENDANTS COMMITTED OR ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE PLOTTED ACTS OF VIOLENCE IN MANY OF THE CASES."

FIFTH PARAGRAPH, FOURTH SENTENCE. REVISE AS FOLLOWS: "THE 7- AND 8-YEAR SUBVERSION SENTENCES FROM 1989 OF A STUDENT AND AN EMPLOYEE AT YOGYAKARTA'S GAJAH MADA UNIVERSITY WERE UPHELD. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS CASE, A COURT IN OCTOBER CONVICTED ANOTHER STUDENT FOR POSSESSING BANNED BOOKS ALLEGEDLY ESPOUSING MARXIST IDEOLOGY AND SENTENCED HIM TO 8 YEARS AND 6 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT." BELOW WE RECOMMEND CHANGING THE CURRENT LANGUAGE ON THIS MATTER IN SECTION 2.A.

SIXTH PARAGRAPH. DELETE THE NEW SENTENCE ON 50 POLITICAL PRISONERS IN EAST TIMOR AT YEAR'S END. JAKARTA 17392 ON THE PROBLEM OF BEATINGS DURING DETENTION THERE EXPLAINS THE IMPRECISION OF THIS NUMBER AND THE CATEGORY "POLITICAL PRISONER." SOME OF THESE DETAINEES COMMITTED CRIMINAL OFFENSES.

9. SECTION 1.F. WHILE EAST TIMOR HAS LOTS OF PROBLEMS, WE DO NOT HAVE GROUNDS TO MAKE AN EAST TIMOR EXCEPTION TO THE GENERALIZATION ABOUT CORRESPONDENCE.

10. SECTION 2.A.

PARAGRAPH TWO, THIRD THROUGH FIFTH SENTENCES. (IN OUR COUNTING, PARAGRAPH TWO BEGINS WITH "FOR EXAMPLE, SIX

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

STUDENTS....") CONDENSE AS FOLLOWS: "SUBVERSION AND CRIMINAL SENTENCES, AS DISCUSSED IN SECTION 1.E., DEMONSTRATE LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH." WE SHOULD AVOID THE POTENTIAL CONFUSION OF DISCUSSING THE THIRD YOGYAKARTA CASE IN TWO DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE REPORT.

PARAGRAPH TWO, AFTER THE NEW FIFTH SENTENCE RECOMMENDED ABOVE. INSERT THIS UPDATE: "AUTHORITIES BANNED TWO POPULAR THEATRICAL PRODUCTIONS, ONE ALMOST THROUGH ITS RUN AND THE OTHER HAVING PLAYED WITHOUT INTERFERENCE IN THE PAST, FOR CONTENTS DEEMED HARMFUL TO PUBLIC ORDER. A POET INSTRUCTED NOT TO READ TWO OF HIS WORKS CANCELLED A PLANNED PERFORMANCE. IN DECEMBER PARLIAMENT HELD A HEARING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ARTISTIC COMMUNITY CRITICAL OF THESE BANNINGS, WHICH DREW SPIRITED AND NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTIONS."

PARAGRAPH TWO, PENULTIMATE SENTENCE. REVISE AS FOLLOWS TO MEET THE REQUEST FOR SPECIFICS: "PUBLIC AND MEDIA AIRING OF ISSUES REGARDED AS SENSITIVE TO THE GOVERNMENT INCLUDING COMPLAINTS AGAINST OFFICIALS, THE PRESIDENT'S TENURE IN OFFICE, THE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY, AND CALLS FOR CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM -- INCREASED IN 1990."

PARAGRAPH THREE. THE QUESTION OF "HOW CRITICAL" WERE OPPOSITION VIEWS AS DISSEMINATED BY THE MEDIA MISSES THE POINT THAT SUCH VIEWS RECEIVED UNPRECENDENTED MEDIA ATTENTION. CRITICS/DISSIDENTS WERE NAMED AND PICTURED; OBJECTIVES SUCH AS IMPROVING RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HAVING ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSES INVESTIGATED, LIMITING

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FUTURE PRESIDENTS' TERMS IN OFFICE, SAFEGUARDING ARTISTIC EXPRESSION, AND EXPANDING MEANINGFUL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION WERE SPECIFICALLY CITED.

PARAGRAPH THREE, LAST SENTENCE. REVISE AS FOLLOWS TO MEET THE REQUEST FOR SPECIFICS: "LACK OF CLEAR GUIDELINES ON WHAT IS PERMISSIBLE HAS GENERATED A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF SELF-CENSORSHIP BOTH IN PUBLIC SPEAKING AND IN THE PRESS. HOWEVER, THE LIMITS OF

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 17458 04 OF 06 070850Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 HA-09 SSO-00 /010W
----------2786EA 071023Z /11
O 070834Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9560
INFO RUMJDN/AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 04 OF 06 JAKARTA 17458

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

GOVERNMENT TOLERANCE WERE REGULARLY TESTED IN 1990 -- USUALLY BY INDIRECTION -- IN PUBLISHED EDITORIALS, OPINION PIECES, CARTOONS, AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT SOMETIMES TWEAKED THE GOVERNMENT, SOMETIMES MORE SERIOUSLY QUESTIONED IT."

PARAGRAPH FOUR, LAST SENTENCE. DELETE "SCHOLAR'S". THE STUDY WAS BY SEVERAL ACADEMICS.

PARAGRAPH FIVE, SECOND SENTENCE. UPDATE AS FOLLOWS: "A PRIVATE COMPANY OFFERS TELEVISION SERVICE TO VIEWERS IN JAKARTA. A PRIVATE COMMERCIAL STATION BEGAN OPERAGING IN SURABAYA AND ANOTHER WAS APPROVED FOR YOGYAKARTA."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PARAGRAPH SIX, FOURTH SENTENCE. REVISE AND UPDATE AS FOLLOWS: "THE GOVERNMENT EXERCISES STRONG CONTROL OVER THE PRESS THROUGH ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLISHING PERMITS. ONE PERIODICAL LOST ITS PERMIT AFTER NEGATIVE REACTIONS TO POLLING RESULTS IT RELEASED JUDGED INSULTING TO THE PROPHET MOHAMMED." THIS WORKS IN THE COMPLEX "MONITOR" CASE AND TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT SOME HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVERS AND EVEN A CABINET OFFICIAL QUESTION THE GOVERNMENT'S "RIGHT" TO REVOKE PUBLISHING PERMITS.

PARAGRAPH SEVEN, SECOND SENTENCE. TO LIST AGAIN SPECIFIC "SENSITIVE ISSUES" IS NO LONGER EDUCATIVE. READERS HAVE GOT THE PICTURE. BUT HOW ABOUT: "...ISSUES CONSIDERED SENSITIVE BY THE GOVERNMENT..."

PARAGRAPH SEVEN, FOURTH SENTENCE. INSERT "IN AUGUST" AFTER "THE ATTORRNEY GENERAL BANNED".

PARAGRAPH SEVEN, AFTER FIFTH SENTENCE. INSERT UPDATE AS FOLLOWS: "IN DECEMBER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BANNED ANOTHER FOUR BOOKS, GIVING AS GROUNDS THAT ONE DISPARAGED ISLAM; ANOTHER (CONTAINING REBUTTALS OF THE INDICTMENTS AGAINST THE BANDUNG UNIVERSITY STUDENTS) CONTAINED INACCURACIES AND DISCREDITED THE GOVERNMENT; AND TWO MORE HAD UNACCEPTABLE SEXUAL CONTENT."

PARAGRAPH SEVEN, ADDITIONAL SENTENCES PROVIDED IN REF B. CHANGE "STRESSED" TO "SPECULATED ABOUT".

PARAGRAPH NINE. WE KNOW OF NO DENIALS OF VISA EXTENSION
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

REQUESTS IN 1990.

PARAGRAPH TEN, LAST SENTENCE. UPDATE AS FOLLOWS: "A MARKED NUMBER OF ARTICLES INKED OR CUT OUT PRECEDED THE AUGUST ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN END TO THE PRACTICE WHICH AT YEAR'S END CONTINUED SPORADICALLY AND UNPREDICTABLY."

11. SECTION 2.B.

PARAGRAPH TWO, LAST SENTENCE. REPHRASE AS FOLLOWS: "SECURITY FORCES INTERVENED IN TWO SCHOOLS IN EAST TIMOR IN OCTOBER AFTER EXPRESSION OF PRO-INDEPENDENCE VIEWS BY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SOME STUDENTS. AN OFFICIAL WHO REPORTEDLY PROVOKED THE STUDENT OUTBURST AT ONE SCHOOL WAS FIRED." WE DO NOT HAVE RELIABLE DETAILS ABOUT THE SCHOOLS' CLOSURE OR STUDENT VIOLENCE IN THESE SPECIFIC INCIDENTS.

12. SECTION 2.C.

FIRST PARAGRAPH, SECOND SENTENCE. REPHRASE AS FOLLOWS: "THE POPULATION IS OVERWHELMINGLY MUSLIM; THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECONGIZED FAITHS ARE RESPECTED." THIS AVOIDS THE UNINTENTIONAL NEGATIVE IMPLICATION AGAINST MUSLIMS OF THE CURRENT "ALTHOUGH" FORMULATION.

FIRST PARAGRAPH, THIRD AND FOURTH SENTENCES. WE CAN ACCEPT "WIDELY" INSTEAD OF "FREELY" IN DESCRIBING CATHOLIC CHURCH ACTIVITIES IN EAST TIMOQ ARE CURIOUS ABOUT THE THINKING BEHIND THE CHANGE. DOES THE PHRASE IN THE NEXT SENTENCE ON "PROHIBITION ON SERVICES IN THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

VERNACULAR" REFER TO EAST TIMOR? IF SO, CATHOLIC CLERGY/EN HAVE TOLD US THIS IS NOT TRUE. THE PHRASE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO INDONESIA AS A WHOLE EITHER AND SHOULD BE DELETED.

PARAGRAPH FOUR, FOURTH SENTENCE. UPDATE AS FOLLOWS: "IN RECENT YEARS, HOWEVER, SOME FOREIGN MISSIONARIES HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY RENEWING VISAS OR RESIDENCE PERMITS -- A FEW ON UNSPECIFIED 'SECURITY GROUNDS'."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 HA-09 SSO-00 /010W
---------2786F4 071023Z /11
O 070834Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9561
INFO RUMJDN/AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 05 OF 06 JAKARTA 17458

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

13. SECTION 2.D.

PARAGRAPH ONE, PENULTIMATE SENTENCE. WE ARE UNABLE TO CORROBORATE THE ADDITION WHICH READS: "AS WELL AS OF ELDERLY INDONESIANS WHO MAY HAVE RECOLLECTIONS OF THE PKI FROM THEIR YOUTH." THAT WAS NOT PART OF THE STATE SECRETARY'S REMARKS AS WE SAW THEM REPORTED

PARAGRAPH TWO. HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST MULYA LUBIS RETURNED TO AND DEPARTED FROM INDONESIA IN 1990. HE MAY, HOWEVER, BE A SPECIAL CASE AND WE DO NOT HAVE FURTHER EXAMPLES TO MAKE A SUPPORTABLE GENERALIZATION.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PARAGRAPH THREE, FIRST SENTENCE. THE FOLLOWING PHRASE IN THE CURRENT DRAFT IS ACCURATE BUT SOUNDS EDITORIAL AND SHOULD BE DELETED: "BUT WHICH ALSO HAVE THE EFFECT OF MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES THERE."
PARAGRAPH THREE, SECOND SENTENCE. INSERT "PROVINCIAL" BEFORE "CAPITAL".

PARAGRAPH FOUR, END. UPDATE WITH THE FOLLOWING:
"PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, RETURNING FROM A TRIP TO CHINA AND VIETNAM IN NOVEMBER, SAID EX-PKI MEMBERS CAN RETURN TO

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
INDONESIA PROVIDED THEY SUBMIT TO THE LEGAL PROCESS, AS DID THEIR COLLEAGUES WHO NEVER LEFT."

PARAGRAPH FIVE. UPDATE AS FOLLOWS: "INDONESIA HAS GIVEN FIRST ASYLUM TO OVER 120,000 INDOCHINESE REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS SINCE 1975. THE POPULATION OF INDONCHINESE REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS AT INDONESIA'S VASTLY OVERCROWDED GALANG FACILITY STOOD AT 20,306 AT THE END OF OCTOBER. OF THIS NUMBER, 168 HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED AS REFUGEES UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION ON INDOCHINESE REFUGEES (CPA); 1,802 ARE CAMBODIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS NOT COVERED UNDER THE CPA; THE REMAINING 18,336 VIETNAMESE ARE CONSIDERED ASYLUM SEEKERS SUBJECT TO SCREENING UNDER THE CPA TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY QUALIFY AS REFUGEES. IN ADDITION TO ASYLUM SEEKERS WHO REACHED INDONESIA DIRECTLY, 10,284 VIETNAMESE REJECTED ELSWEWHERE ARRIVED. THREE BOATLOADS OF CAMBODIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS REPORTEDLY BOUND FOR AUSTRALIA WERE ASSISTED ON THEIR WAY."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

14. SECTION 3.

FIRST PARAGRAPH, FIFTH SENTENCE. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM TO CALL THE PRESIDENT TO ACCOUNT WAS USED TO FORMALLY REMOVE SUKARNO FROM POWER. DELETE THE INCORRECT QUALIFYING PHRASE ("BUT IT HAS NEVER BEEN EXERCISED").

FIRST PARAGRAPH, LAST SENTENCE. "CONSULTATION LEADING TO CONSENSUS" IS THE PROCESS BY WHICH INDONESIANS MAKE THE COMPROMISES NECESSARY FOR DECISION AND ACTION. TO MANY INDONESIANS, VOTING DOES NOT GIVE SUFFICIENT VOICE TO THE MINORITY. THE ADDED QUALIFYING PHRASE ("BUT WHICH TO OPPONENTS MAY APPEAR TO BE SIMPLY A DEMAND FOR OBEDIENCE") SOUNDS EDITORIAL AND IS BEST DELETED.

FIFTH PARAGRAPH, LAST SENTENCE. THE MONTH IS FEBRUARY.

15. SECTION 4.

SECOND PARAGRAPH. IN RESPONSE TO DEPARTMENT'S QUERY, WE DO NOT HAVE EVIDENCE OF OFFICIAL THREATS TO OR HARASSMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS. THE TELEPHONED DEATH THREATS TO AND HARASSMENT OF PRINCEN WERE AN ANONYMOUS, TEMPORARY AND UNUSUAL PHENOMENON.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

16. SEQ 5.

SECOND PARAGRAPH. TO PRESENT AN IMPARTIAL VIEW OF THE GOI STANCE TOWARD WOMEN, WE URGE RESTORATION OF THE FOLLOWING EXCISED SENTENCE: "SEVERAL VOLUNTARY, PRIVATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

GROUPS WORK ACTIVELY TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGE SOME SUCCESS IN GAINING OFFICIAL COGNIZANCE OF THEIR CONCERNS." THE 1989 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT HAD SOME SPECIFIC EXAMPLES IF THEY ARE NEEDED.

SECOND PARAGRAPH, LAST SENTENCE. REVISE AS FOLLOWS WITH REQUESTED ADDITIONS: "TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES WHICH LIMIT WOMEN'S ASPIRATIONS, ACTIVITIES AND STATUS UNDERCUT STATE POLICY IN SOME AREAS."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 HA-09 SSO-00 /010W
----------2786FB 071024Z /11

O 070834Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9562
INFO RUMJDN/AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

THIRD PARAGRAPH, FOURTH SENTENCE. UPDATE AS FOLLOWS: "ONE PROMINENT CASE IN 1990 INVOLVED AN EVENTUALLY-EXONERATED MEMBER OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY, ACCUSED ALONG WITH OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS OF REPEATEDLY ASSAULTING A DOMESTIC SERVANT. IN OCTOBER A COURT CONVICTED AND SENTENCED THE FAMILY MEMBERS."

17. SECTION 6. WE WILL PROVIDE COMMENTS AS SOON AS CURRENT DEPARTMENT DRAFT OF THIS SECTION IS RECEIVED.

MONJO

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 18185 01 OF 04 180956Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /000 W
----------251643 180957Z /38
O 180942Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9899

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 18185

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 169
(
1. (C) EXCHANGES ON CAMBODIA
(----------
WE WILL BE GOING TO DEPLU WITH A BRIEFING ON THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO SHEVARNADZE ABOUT CAMBODIA. THE DEPARTMENT CABLE (STATE 400318) REFERS TO A NOVEMBER SOVIET LETTER TO BAKER. ANY CHANCE OF THAT BEING SENT OUT?
2. (LOU) GINANDJAR VISIT

REF YOUR O/I NO. 157, PETROLEUM OFFICER HAD EXPLORED IDEA OF GINANDJAR VISITING WASHINGTON IN MAY, POSSIBLY IN ROUTE TO OR FROM THE OPEC MINISTERIAL, DURING MEETING WITH THE MINISTER'S SPECIAL ADVISOR WIJARSO ON DECEMBER 6 (REPORTED AS JAKARTA 17669). ACCORDING TO WIJARSO, THAT IDEA HAD BEEN CONSIDERED AND REJECTED BY GINANDJAR. DURING THE F-16 ARRIVAL CEREMONY DECEMBER 12, GINANDJAR TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE OPEC MEETINGS AND OTHER COMMITMENTS REQUIRED HIM TO POSTPONE HE WASHINGTON TRIP UNTIL JUNE OR JULY. WIJARSO HAD ACKNOWLEDGED DIFFICULTIES IN SCHEDULING
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 18185 01 OF 04 180956Z

AROUND THE JULY 4 HOLIDAYS, BUT HAD PROPOSED JUNE TO EARLY JULY TIMEFRAME TO GIVE THE LARGEST POSSIBLE WINDOW TO SECRETARY WATKINS. DOE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE A JUNE OR EARLY JULY DATE AS REQUESTED IN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 02 NOV 2006 200504425

JAKARTA 17669.
3. (U) GSP PETITION - INDONESIA'S RESPONSE

BOTH AAFLI AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER HAVE APPROACHED LABATT REGARDING INDONESIA'S 75-PAGE BRIEF SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE AFL-CIO PETITION. WHEN CAN WE EXPECT TO RECEIVE A COPY?
4. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
(----------

WE HAVE READ CAREFULLY THE CURRENT VERSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (YOUR O-I NO. 156). SINCE WE CONTINUE TO TAKE A PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN THE FINAL PRODUCT WITH WHICH WE WILL ALL HAVE TO LIVE, WE PROVIDE BELOW SEVERAL SUBSTANTIVE AND EDITORIAL SUGGESTIONS. POINTS ON WHICH WE FEEL STRONGLY ARE SO IDENTIFIED.

(A) INTRODUCTION:

LINE 4. CHANGE "WHIAH" TO "WHICH".

4TH PARA. DELETE THE CONFUSING "IN RECENT YEARS" FROM THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE.

LAST PARAGRAPH. YOU HAVE MENTIONED YOUR ONGOING EFFORTS TO RESTORE BALANCE TO THIS SECTION. IT BADLY NEEDS IT. HERE IS SOME AMMUNITION. THIS SECTION NOW LEADS WITH THE NEGATIVELY-TONED "DESPITE" AND
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 18185 01 OF 04 180956Z

ELIMINATES MENTION OF TWO OF THE SIGNIFICANT PLUSES OF 1989: DEBATE ABOUT POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE DPR'S INCREASED ACTIVISM. BOTH PHENOMENA HAVE LIMITS BUT THE DIRECTION IS BOTH GOOD AND SOMETHING U.S. LEADERS FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT ON DOWN HAVE ENCOURAGED. THESE PHENOMENA ARE ALSO DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO THE JUDGMENTS MADE IN SECTION 3, ABOUT WHICH MORE BELOW.

(B) SECTION 1.B: OUR DRAFT INCLUDED REFERENCE TO THE "DISAPPEARED" PERSONS WHO TURNED OUT TO BE ALIVE AND WELL IN JAYAPURA. SEE JAKARTA 931 FOR BACKGROUND. AI MADE THE INCORRECT ACCUSATION OF THEIR DEATHS. IS NOT THE FACT THAT PEOPLE CLAIMED AS HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS ARE ALIVE AND NOT DEAD APPROPRIATE FOR THIS REPORT?

(C) SECTION 1.C: THE BACK AND FORTH ON SUBSTANCE HAS PRODUCED SOME INELEGANT PHRASEOLOGY AND UNCLEAR EMPHASIS. WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING REVISION: "OFFICIALS HAVE PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED AND CONDEMNED POLICE BRUTALITY AND UNACCEPTABLE PRISON CONDITIONS AND IN 1989 TOOK DISCIPLINARY ACTION IN SEVERAL CASES INVOLVING ACTIONS AGAINST CRIMINAL SUSPECTS." FURTHER INTO THIS SECTION, DELETE THE REPETITIVE SENTENCE: "HOWEVER, MOST OF THESE CASES INVOLVED ACTIONS AGAINST CRIMINAL SUSPECTS." IF "MOST" OF THE CASES ARE CRIMINAL AND WE KNOW OF NO POLITICAL ONES, WHAT IS LEFT?

(D) SECTION 1.E: CHANGE "BIMA" TO "SUMBAWA" FOR CONSISTENCY WITH REFERENCE IN SECTION 4. BIMA IS A CITY ON SUMBAWA ISLAND.

(E) SECTION 1.F: TWO ADDITIONS TO OUR DRAFT STRIKE US

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 18185 02 OF 04 180956Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /000 W
----------251664 180957Z /38
O 180942Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9900

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 18185

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 169

AS EXCESSIVE AND A DEPARTURE FROM THE DETERMINEDLY NEUTRAL TONE OF THE DOCUMENT AS A WHOLE. THE FIRST SPECIFIES THAT OFFICIALS "GO TO GREAT LENGTHS" TO TRY TO MONITOR EX-PKI MEMBERS. THE FACT OF MONITORING OR ATTEMPTED MONITORING IS THE MAIN POINT. GOI EXERTIONS NOTWITHSTANDING, MOST OBSERVERS CONCLUDE THAT THE TRAIL OF MANY EX-PKI MEMBERS IS LONG COLD. THE SECOND INSTANCE IS THE PHRASE "ANYONE EVEN RELATED TO SUCH PERSONS"....HOW ABOUT THE LESS RHETORICAL "EVEN RELATIVES OF SUCH PERSONS"?

(F) SECTION 2.A., 5TH PARA: DELETE "SUCH CONTROLS PARTICULARLY CONSTRAIN SOME OF THE LARGER AND RESPECTED NATIONAL DAILIES." IT TURNS OUT THAT THE EFFECT OF ADVERTISING AND PAGE CONTROLS ON LARGE VERSUS SMALL NEWSPAPERS IS LEGITIMATELY DEBATABLE.

(G) SECTION 2.B, 2ND PARA:

CHANGE "FOREIGN FUNDS FROM DONORS" TO "FOREIGN FUNDS" OR "FUNDS FROM FOREIGN DONORS".
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 18185 02 OF 04 180956Z

THE NEW SENTENCE ABOUT INFILTRATION AND BREAKING UP OF ISLAMIC STUDY GROUPS REPEATS NEARLY VERBATIM THAT IN SECTION 2.C. WE CAN DEBATE WHETHER THE ISSUE IS MORE ONE OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION OR FREEDOM OF RELIGION, BUT BY PUTTING IT IN BOTH PLACES IT GETS UNDUE EMPHASIS. PLEASE DROP ONE OF THE REFERENCES.

(H) SECTION 2.D, 2ND PARA: DELETE "THE ESTIMATED 1,500". CHANGE THE NEXT SENTENCE TO READ: "ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF PERSONS POTENTIALLY AFFECTED VARY CONSIDERABLY AND NO SUCH TRIALS HAVE YET TAKEN PLACE."

(I) SECTION 3:

THE ADDITIONAL 1ST PARA LANGUAGE "BUT WHETHER IT COULD BE USED EFFECTIVELY IS IN DOUBT" IS UNNECESSARY. WE ALREADY SPECIFY THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES ARE FOR "EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES," AS WHEN THE

PROVISIONAL MPR WITHDREW SUKARNO'S MANDATE AS PRESIDENT.

AN ELISION IN THE 2ND HAS PRODUCED A SENTENCE THAT WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND: "WHILE THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT PREVENT SUCH DISCUSSION, WHEN ASKED PUBLICLY WHETHER THERE IS A NEED FOR CHANGES IN ELECTORAL PROCEDURES, POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS RESPONDED THAT THE CURRENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS APPROPRIATE AND ADEQUATE." OUR DRAFT MADE TWO POINTS: (A) GOI PARTICIPATION IN THE "OPENNESS" DEBATE HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE THOUGH SOMETIMES AMBIGUOUS; AND (B) THE PARTIES SAID THE CURRENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS FINE WHEN THEY WERE ASKED FOR SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT (BY THE PRESIDENT).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE IMPORTANT, WE ARE GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FACT THAT HA MAY STILL ENDEAVOR TO INSERT ITS INAPPROPRIATE LANGUAGE AS THE INTRODUCTION TO THIS SECTION. HERE IS THE TEXT OF A FIRST-PERSON MESSAGE THE AMBASSADOR WILL SEND TO AS SOLOMON AND AS SCHIFTER IF YOU TELL US HE NEEDS TO:

"I UNDERSTAND THAT SERIOUS ATTENTION IS BEING GIVEN TO SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGING THE EMPHASIS OF SECTION 3 OF THE 1989 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON INDONESIA. SPECIFICALLY, THE ISSUE IS APPARENTLY WHETHER TO BEGIN THE SECTION WITH THE INACCURATE AND POLITICALLY INSENSITIVE CONCLUSION THAT CITIZENS HAVE NO ABILITY PEACEFULLY TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT OR ITS LEADERSHIP. THE SENTENCE IS WRONG FACTUALLY SINCE THE GOVERNMENT, WHILE AUTHORITARIAN, RESPONDS TO POPULAR OPINION AND SINCE THE CONSTITUTION GIVES PARLIAMENT THE RIGHT AND SPECIFIC PROCEDURES TO RECALL THE PRESIDENT. EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE TO APPLY, AS THEY DID ONCE IN INDONESIA'S HISTORY. ANOTHER CONSIDERATION: WHILE NO ONE HAS CHALLENGED SOEHARTO AS PRESIDENT AND HE HAS HIS WARTS, MOST OBSERVERS AGREE THAT NO OTHER INDIVIDUAL COULD HAVE PLAYED THE ROLE HE HAS IN STABILIZING AND DEVELOPING THIS COUNTRY OVER MORE THAN 20 YEARS.

THE SENTENCE IN QUESTION IS ALSO WRONG POLITICALLY. IT IS A NEAR DIRECT CONDEMNATION OF THE SOEHARTO TENURE AND SUGGESTS A SHIFT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE GOI. THIS WOULD COME AS QUITE AN UNEXPECTED BLOW, ESPECIALLY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 18185 03 OF 04 180957Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /000 W
----------251715 180958Z /38
O 180942Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9901

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 18185

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 169

GIVEN THE REAFFIRMATIONS OF U.S./INDONESIAN FRIENDSHIP THAT HAVE COME JUST THIS YEAR FROM PRESIDENT BUSH AND VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE, AMONG OTHERS. I STRONGLY URGE ON THE BASIS OF FACT AND CONSISTENT U.S. POLICY AGAINST THE PROPOSED INTRODUCTORY LANGUAGE. A CAREFUL COMPARISON OF LAST YEAR'S LANGUAGE WITH WHAT IS IN THE CURRENT DRAFT WILL INDICATE A CAREFUL STRENGTHENING OF TONE THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES. TO GO FURTHER IS TO BE BOTH INFLAMMATORY AND INACCURATE."

(J) SECTION 4: WE KNOW YOU ARE TRYING TO GET CURRENT INFORMATION FROM AI AND AW ABOUT WHETHER THEY HAVE FORMALLY REQUESTED PERMISSION TO VISIT EAST TIMOR THIS YEAR.

(K) SECTION 5:

THE SECTION BEGINS WITH THE NEGATIVE "WHILE" IN MENTIONING INDONESIA'S CONSIDERABLE TOLERANCE. THIS CHARACTERISTIC IS ONE OF THE MOST REMARKABLE FACETS OF CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOMINANTLY-MUSLIM SOCIETY. IT IS ALSO A PREOCCUPATION OF THE GOI. WE STRONGLY URGE THIS REFORMULATION: "INDONESIA GENERALLY EXHIBITS CONSIDERABLE TOLERANCE FOR ETHNIC, RACIAL, AND MAJOR RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES, ALTHOUGH OFFICIAL AND INFORMAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE IS A SIGNIFICANT EXCEPTION." INDONESIA DESERVES ITS KUDOS WITHOUT UNDUE QUALIFICATION.

WE ARE GLAD TO SEE THE LANGUAGE ON FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION DROPPED. THE INSTRUCTIONS PUT US IN THE POSITION OF MAKING AN ISSUE OF SOMETHING THAT IS A NON-ISSUE HERE.

(LOU) SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

(A) THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION:

LINE 9.

WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING IS A MORE ACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF THE SPSI.

"THE SPSI HAS REPRESENTATION IN ALL 27 PROVINCES. IT ESTIMATES THAT IT HAS ABOUT 10
000 LOCAL UNITS AT THE
PLANT LEVEL AND OVER 3 MILLION MEMBERS."

LINE 12.

THE JOINT SECRETARIAT OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONS (SEBKER) SHOULD BE ADDED AS AN EXAMPLE OF A GROUP FUNCTIONING AS A QUASI-TRADE UNION.

CONFIDENTIAL

LINE 25.

WHAT IS MEANT BY THISQSTATEMENT? "LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF PANCASILA PRINCIPLES..."

LINES 29-31.

WE HAVE NEVER STATED THAT THE LEADERSHIP HAS LITTLE OR NO TRADE UNION BACKGROUND. CURRENTLY THERE ARE 15 MEMBERS ON THE EXECUTIVE BOARD. THE FOLLOWING IS BASED ON BIOGRAPHIC DATA MAINTAINED IN EMBASSY FILES:

THE GENERAL CHAIRMAN AND HIS FIVE CHAIRMEN ALL HAVE EXTENSIVE TRAQE UNION EXPERIENCE. THE GENERAL CHAIRMAN AND FOUR OF HIS CHAIRMEN CAN TRACE THEIR TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES AS FAR BACK AS THE MID 60S/EARLY 70S. THE ONLY CHAIRMAN LACKING EXTENSIVE TRADE UNION EXPERIENCE IS A GOLKAR SECRETARY FOR MANPOWER AFFAIRS. THE REMAINING NINE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE, WERE ALL MEMBERS OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONS BEFORQ JOINING THE SPSI AND INVOLVED IN THE LABOR MOVEMENT.

WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THE TRADE UNION EXPERIENCE OF THE MORE THAN 40,000 COMPANY LEADERS, OR THE 3,000 PLUS CITY/BRANCH LEADERS AND 400 PLUS PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBERS.

(B) THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 18185 04 OF 04 180957Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /000 W
----------251702 180958Z /38
O 180942Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9902

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 18185

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 169

PARA 2 LINES 5. REGARDING THE SENTENCE "IN WHAT THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER HAS CHARACTERIZED AS AN EFFORT TO PROMOTE VOLUNTARY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS, IT HAS ENCOURAGED EMPLOYERS TO ORGANIZE UNIONS IN WHICH MANAGERS SERVE AS "WORKING UNIT" PRESIDENTS.", WE COMMENT AS FOLLOWS.

WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS IS THE CASE. THIS IS JUST THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT WE SUBMITTED IN OUR DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. IT IS NOT A STATEMENT WE CAN SUPPORT AND, IN FACT, COUNTERS WHAT WE HAVE SUBMITTED IN OTHER REPORTS ON THE ISSUE (JAKARTA 03383, JAKARTA 15036, JAKARTA 15188). WE PREFER THE LANGUAGE OF THE DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT AND BELIEVE IT ACCURATELY DESCRIBES THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S CAMPAIGN.
MONJO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C41

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 17386 01 OF 02 020459Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-00	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-00	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-02	SR-06	PRS-01	P-02	/084 W

----------353640 022322Z /49 38

R 020500Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9521
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 17386

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR PASS ILAB/OFR-T.LINSENMAYER

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: UPDATE OF DRAFT 1989 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR
- INDONESIA

REF: JAKARTA 14324

1. NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THIS MESSAGE UPDATES SEVERAL DETAILS OF THE DRAFT 1989 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA (REF).

3. SECTION 1.E. (FIRST PARAGRAPH) AND SECTION 3 (THIRD PARAGRAPH): THE RELIGIOUS COURTS BILL HAS YET TO PASS PARLIAMENT. MOST OBSERVERS STILL PREDICT PASSAGE THIS MONTH, AS REF ANTICIPATES. WE WILL LET YOU KNOW.

4. SECTION 1.E. (LAST PARAGRAPH): THE LANGUAGE ON THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 17386 01 OF 02 020459Z

LAMPUNG TRIALS SHOULD BE REVISED AS FOLLOWS: "TRIALS OF SOME DEFENDANTS FROM THE FEBRUARY INCIDENT IN LAMPUNG PRODUCED SENTENCES OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN 5 CASES AND A 20 YEARS IN ANOTHER. ALL BUT ONE OF THESE DEFENDANTS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 02 NOV 2006 200504425

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
REFUSED THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFER OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE. TRIALS ALSO BEGAN IN JAKARTA AND BIMA OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH SEEKING TO ESTABLISH AN ISLAMIC STATE."

5. SECTION 2.B. (FIRST PARAGRAPH): DUE TO LACK OF SUFFICIENT CORROBORATING INFORMATION, DELETE THE SENTENCE ABOUT THE POLICE BREAKUP OF A PDI MEETING.

6. SECTION 2.B. (ALSO FIRST PARAGRAPH): DELETE "REPORTEDLY" FROM THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE . THE STUDENTS' HOSPITALIZATION IS ACKNOWLEDGED FACT. AFTER THE LAST SENTENCE ADD: "TWO OF THESE WENT ON TRIAL ON CRIMINAL CHARGES."

7. SECTION 2.C. (FIRST PARAGRAPH): THE LATEST INFORMATION IS THAT THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES RECEIVED SENTENCES OF 1.5 AND 2.5 YEARS, VICE TWO AND THREE YEARS.

8. SECTION 2.C. (LAST SENTENCE): CHANGE "AN ESTIMATED 400,000" TO "MORE THAN 100,000." THE CROWD AT THE POPE'S OCTOBER 12 MASS IN DILI WAS SMALLER THAN PREDICTED.

9. SECTION 2.D. (LAST PARAGRAPH): UPDATE THE FIGURES ON REFUGEES AS FOLLOWS: "THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE POPULATION AT INDONESIA'S GALANG FACILITY STOOD AT ABOUT 6,600 AT THE END OF OCTOBER. OF THIS NUMBER 1,200 ARE CLASSIFIED AS REFUGEES UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION ON INDOCHINESE REFUGEES (CPA); THE REST ARE CLASSIFIED AS ASYLUM SEEKERS PENDING SCREENING BY INDONESIAN
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AUTHORITIES FOR REFUGEE STATUS ELIGIBILITY. TO ITS CREDIT, INDONESIA ACCEPTED REFUGEE BOATS PUSHED OFF FROM ELSEWHERE SINCE MAY WITH A TOTAL OF 2,500 INDOCHINESE ASYLUM SEEKERS."

10. SECTION 4 (SECOND PARAGRAPH): GIVEN SOME ICRC DIFFICULTY GAINING ACCESS TO PRISONERS IN EAST TIMOR THIS YEAR (JAKARTA 12050), THE FIRST SENTENCE SHOULD BEGIN: "UNDER A 1985 AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT, THE ICRC VISITS PERSONS JAILED IN CONNECTION WITH ARMED RESISTANCE IN EAST TIMOR...." AFTER THIS SENTENCE, INSERT THE FOLLOWING REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ICRC PROGRAM AND PRESENCE IN IRIAN JAYA (JAKARTA 15893 AND 16591): "THE ICRC OPENED AN OFFICE IN IRIAN JAYA IN 1989 TO ASSIST FUTURE BORDER CROSSERS RETURNING FROM CAMPS IN PAPUA NEW

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

GUINEA AND TO MONITOR CONDITIONS OF PERSONS JAILED IN CONNECTION WITH OPM ACTIVITIES."

11. SECTION 5 (FIRST PARAGRAPH): THE POPE DESCRIBED INDONESIA AS "A MODEL OF HARMONY, RESPECTFUL OF ETHNIC, CULTURAL AND EVEN RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AMONG ITS CITIZENS" (ROME 22253 AND JAKARTA 15109). WE SUGGEST INCLUSION OF THE POPE'S OBSERVATION IF APPROPRIATE.

12. SECTION 6.D. (FIRST PARAGRAPH): REVISE THE EIGHTH AND NINTH SENTENCES TO READ: "EMPLOYERS WITH YOUTHS UNDER FOURTEEN ON THE PAYROLL ARE REQUIRED TO COOPERATE WITH PUBLIC AUTHORITIES TO ASSURE THAT THE CHILDREN HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE AN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL EDUCATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE 1989 NATIONAL EDUCATION LAW. THIS LAW, SUBJECT TO IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, REQUIRES CHILDREN STARTING AT AGE SEVEN TO COMPLETE NINE YEARS OF SCHOOL, INCREASED FROM THE PREVIOUS SIX REQUIRED YEARS."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 17386 02 OF 02 020458Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-00	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	L-03
	LAB-04	TRSE-00	EAP-00	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-02	SR-06	PRS-01	P-02	/084 W

------------------353634 022322Z /49 38

R 020500Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9522
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 17386

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR PASS ILAB/OFR-T.LINSENMAYER

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: UPDATE OF DRAFT 1989 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR

MONJO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C45

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 18182 01 OF 03 240436Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01	EB-01
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-05	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-02	RP-10	SIL-01
	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00	IMIS-01
	/083W						

----------2E6A6E 241928Z /49

P 240428Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9976

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 18182

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: SECTION 6, 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

REF: STATE 426418

1. LOU/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS IN REFTEL. WHERE APPROPRIATE POST HAS CHANGED THE LANGUAGE OF THE DRAFT TO PROMOTE CLARITY AND TO REFLECT CURRENT EVENTS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 18182 01 OF 03 240436Z
3. A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

FIRST PARAGRAPH, NOTE RE LAWYER'S COMMITTEE: UNION LEADERS INCLUDING SOME AT THE FACTORY LEVEL, ARE ELECTED BY A SPECIAL ELECTION COMMITTEE. THIS COMMITTEE GENERALLY ELECTS THE UNION LEADERS BY VOTE OR BY CONSENSUS. THE MEMBERS OF THE ELECTION COMMITTEE ARE ELECTED BY UNION MEMBERS DURING THE VARIOUS CONGRESSES.

SECOND PARAGRAPH, THIRD SENTENCE. IN LINE WITH JAKARTA

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 02 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

17422 WE WOULD SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE: " THE SPSI CONSISTING OF 13 AUTONOMOUS DIVISIONS COVERING BROAD INDUSTRIAL SECTORS AND SPECIALIZED INSTITUTES, HAS ETC. " (NOTE: THE SPSI IS IN THE PROCESS OF RESTRUCTURING THE INSTITUTES. PLANS CALL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THREE INSTITUTES.)

THIRD PARAGRAPH, SECOND SENTENCE. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO BELIEVE THAT THIS WILL HAPPEN. THIS SENTENCE DOES NOT COMPORT WITH JAKARTA 17074 WHERE WE STATED THAT SUDOMO WOULD NOT DISTURB THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED SETIA KAWAN AS LONG AS THE ORGANIZATION DID NOT BREAK THE LAW. WE DID NOT PROVIDE THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED IN THE STATE DRAFT NOR DO WE THINK IT CAN BE EXTRAPOLATED FROM WHAT WE HAVE REPORTED.

FIFTH PARAGRAPH, SECOND SENTENCE. ACCORDING TO VARIOUS RELIABLE SOURCES THE RETIRED MILITARY LIEUTENANT COLONEL WAS ONE OF SEVERAL FBSI VICE CHAIRMEN DURING THE EARLY SEVENTIES.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

EIGHTH PARAGRAPH, RE NOTE ON PRESIDENTIAL DECREE: TO OUR KNOWLEDGE THE STATEMENT AS WE REPORTED IT IS CORRECT. IT IS BASED ON INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER.

EIGHTH PARAGRAPH RE LEGAL STRIKES: THERE IS NO SYSTEMATIC SYSTEM FOR RECORDING STRIKES. MANY OF THE STRIKES REPORTED WERE NOT LEGAL FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS. IN SOME INSTANCES THE PARTIES DID NOT SEEK MANPOWER MEDIATION AS IS REQUIRED. SOME OF THE STRIKE INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER BY THE MEDIA, EMPLOYERS OR OTHERS AND NOTED IN THE OFFICIAL DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER RECORDS. THESE COULD BE CASES IN WHICH THE DEPARTMENT WAS NOT NOTIFIED AS REQUIRED. STRIKES ARE ALSO NOTED IN THE OFFICIAL RECORD IF THE PARTIES SEEK MANPOWER ASSISTANCE AFTER THE STRIKE HAS TAKEN PLACE. FROM JUNE-DECEMBER THERE WERE 19 REPORTED STRIKES BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER TO 45 REPORTED SO FAR IN 1990.

NINTH PARAGRAPH RE NOTE: THE STRIKE TOOK PLACE AT A TEXTILE FACTORY.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

TENTH PARAGRAPH: IN PRACTICE THERE ARE NO CLEAR ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THE VARIOUS LAWS, INTERPRETATIVE RULES, INSTRUCTIONS AND PRACTICES INDICATE THAT THE PARTIES SHOULD TRY TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE THEMSELVES. IF THEY CANNOT SETTLE THE MATTER THEN THEY SHOULD SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S MEDIATION SERVICE. IF THE PARTIES DO NOT ACCEPT THE MEDIATOR'S

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 JAKART 18182 01 OF 03 240436Z
DECISION THEN THE MATTER SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS OR TO ARBITRATION. EITHER PARTY MAY SUBMIT THE DISPUTE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. THE MEDIATOR MAY SUBMIT THE DISPUTE AS WELL.

TENTH PARAGRAPH RE APPEALING MINISTER OF MANPOWER DECISIONS: WE DO NOT KNOW WHY DECISIONS ARE RARELY APPEALED. SO FEW CASES REACH THE MINISTER. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER BELIEVES THAN LESS THAN 3& OF THE CASES ARE APPEALED TO THIS LEVEL. THE PARTY WOULD HAVE TO HAVE A VERY STRONG CASE TO COUNTER A MINISTERIAL DECISION BASED ON LEGAL OR NATIONAL INTEREST GROUNDS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 18182 02 OF 03 240437Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01	EB-01
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-05	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-02	RP-10	SIL-01
	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00	IMIS-01

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

/083W

----------2E6A71 241929Z /49

P 240428Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9977

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 18182

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: SECTION 6, 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR

TENTH PARAGRAPH RE BINDING ARBITRATION: WE CAN ONLY GUESS AS TO WHY THIS PROVISION IS SELDOM USED. THE SOCIETY PROMOTES THE CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION APPROACH TO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT. THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM ITSELF FOSTERS THE IDEA OF MEDIATION AND CONSENSUS RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION AND ENCOURAGES THE TRIPARTITE APPROACH WHICH ACCEPTS GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS.

4. B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

FIRST PARAGRAPH, NOTE RE TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT: AS REPORTED IN 89 JAKARTA 15188 COMPANIES HAVING 25 OR MOR/ EMPLOYEES MUST ISSUE COMPANY REGULATIONS. BEFORE A COMPANY CAN REGISTER OR RENEW ITS COMPANY REGULATION IT MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT IT HAS CONSULTED WITH A COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES, IN THE ABSENCE OF A UNION. IF THE COMPANY HAS LESS THAN 25 EMPLOYEES THEN IT IS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO ISSUE COMPANY REGULATIONS ESTABLISHING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT.

FIRST PARAGRAPH RE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: IN 89 JAKARTA 03923 POST GAVE ITS ASSESSMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BASED ON DISCUSSIONS WITH SPSI MEMBERS, THE AAFLI LOCAL/EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYERS. MULTINATIONAL AND MORE MODERN COMPANIES PROBABLY ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A WAY THAT IS FAMILIAR TO THE U.S. IN SMALLER DOMESTIC COMPANIES THE PROCESS VARIES DEPENDING

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
ON THE LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION OF THE PARTIES, THE RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER OF EACH AND THE AMOUNT OF INFLUENCE HELD BY DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER OFFICIALS. SOME AGREEMENTS ARE THE PRODUCT OF TRUE NEGOTIATIONS. SOME ARE NOT.

FIRST PARAGRAPH RE AGREEMENTS IN THE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES: THE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE'S RECORD REFLECTS THE GENERAL STATE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN INDONESIA. OF THE MORE THAN 10,000 SPSI UNITS IN THE COUNTRY, APPROXIMATELY HALF HAVE EXECUTED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. SPSI EXECUTIVE BOARD OFFICIALS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ADMIT THAT THEY HAVE NOT MADE ANY SPECIAL EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE THE SPSI UNITS IN THE ZONES TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS. THEY BELIEVE THE SPSI UNITS LACK STRONG LEADERSHIP AND THAT THE EMPLOYEES ARE AFRAID OF EMPLOYER RESISTANCE AND DON'T WANT TO JEOPARDIZE THEIR JOBS BY DEMANDING AN AGREEMENT OR BY REPORTING INCIDENTS OF EMPLOYER RESISTANCE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER.

5. C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

WE HAVE A COPY OF ILO CONVENTION NO. 29 WHICH IS INCLUDED IN THE PUBLISHED VOLUMES OF INDONESIA'S LABOR LAWS AND REGULATIONS. THE CONVENTION IS PREFACED BY THE STATEMENT THAT THE CONVENTION WAS RATIFIED BY THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT MARCH 31 1933 (NED. STBL. 1933 NO. 26 JO. 1933 NO. 236) AND ENFORCED IN INDONESIA BY IND. STSTBL. 1933 NO. 261. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THESE TWO DOCUMENTS TO SEE JUST WHAT THEY ENTAIL AND WHETHER OR NOT THEY CONSTITUTE LAWS PROHIBITING FORCED LABOR OR MERELY RATIFY ILO CONVENTION NO. 29.

RE ALLEGATIONS: WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM THESE ALLEGATIONS. THE LOCAL DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER IN IRIAN JAYA HAS YET TO RESPOND TO JAKARTA'S REQUEST TO INVESTIGATE THE MATTER. NONE OF OUR SOURCES COULD CONFIRM THESE ALLEGATIONS. NONE SEEMED TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THE ISSUES. RE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM: EMBASSY OFFICERS WHO HAVE VISITED TRANSMIGRATION SITES OVER THE YEARS HAVE NOT REPORTED BACK THAT PEOPLE WERE BEING

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

FORCED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM. GIVEN THE ABOVE WE HAVE NO REASON AT THIS POINT TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATIONS RAISED BY THE LAWYER'S COMMITTEE.

6. D. MINIMUM AGE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

WE BELIEVE OUR STATEMENT WHICH INDICATES THAT EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS IS INADEQUATE IS STILL A VALID ONE.

7. E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

RE NOTE ON MINIMUM WAGE: MINIMUM WAGES ARE ESTABLISHED

NNNN

ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01	EB-01
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-05	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-02	RP-10	SIL-01
	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00	IMIS-01
	/083W						

----------2E6A74 241929Z /49

P 240428Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9978

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 18182

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: SECTION 6, 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR

FOR THE 27 REGIONS. FOR EACH REGION THERE ARE ALSO SECTOR AND SUBSECTOR MINIMUM WAGES. THERE ARE OVER 500 SECTOR AND SUBSECTOR MINIMUM WAGES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. QUITE OFTEN THE SECTOR AND SUBSECTOR WAGES ARE HIGHER THAN THE REGIONAL MINIMUM WAGES. ACEH IS A CASE IN POINT. THE REGIONAL MINIMUM WAGE FOR ACEH IS ABOUT 1.14 A DAY; THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR MINIMUM WAGE FOR ACEH IS 1.19 A DAY. THOSE WORKING IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR ARE ENTITLED TO THE MANUFACTURING MINIMUM WAGE. IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER SECTOR OR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SUB-SECTOR MINIMUM WAGES FOR THE REGION, THE EMPLOYEE IS ENTITLED TO THE REGIONAL MINIMUM WAGE. THE MINIMUM WAGE FOR THE JAKARTA REGION IS 1.13 PER DAY. NO SECTOR MINIMUM WAGES HAVE BEEN SET FOR JAKARTA. NUMEROUS SUB-SECTOR MINIMUM WAGES HAVE BEEN SET FOR JAKARTA.

RE FOURTH PARAGRAPH: THE INSPECTORS ARE EMPLOYEES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. THE NATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY COUNCIL IS AN ADVISORY BODY ESTABLISHED UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER.

MONJO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C46

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 17953 01 OF 02 180905Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 HA-09 L-03 RP-10 SSO-00 /023W
----------2BE4C7 180914Z /11
O 180904Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9826

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 17953

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

REF: STATE 421330

1. LOU/NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT

2. THIS MESSAGE -- TAKE FIVE OF THE 1990 INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXERCISE -- PROVIDES EMBASSY'S COMMENTS ON REF'S COMMENTS ON EMBASSY'S COMMENTS ON HA'S REVISION OF EMBASSY'S INITIAL DRAFT. SEPTEL DEALS WITH SECTION 6. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SEVERAL POINTS NOTED BELOW AND BARRING ANY FAST-BREAKING DEVELOPMENTS, WE BELIEVE THE CURRENT DRAFT CONSTITUTES A SOLID AND COMPREHENSIVE PRODUCT. UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, CHANGES PROPOSED IN REF ARE ACCEPTABLE.

3. INTRODUCTION.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 17953 01 OF 02 180905Z

THIRD PARAGRAPH. LAST TWO SENTENCES. SOME QUALIFICATION IS REQUIRED IF THE WORDS "WHICH HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED BY SOME OBSERVERS AS" ARE DROPPED. IN PLACE OF THAT PHRASE, WE COULD ACCEPT "RAISING THE POSSIBILITY OF A GOVERNMENT CAMPAIGN...."

FOURTH PARAGRAPH. THE BEST WE CAN DO ON GDP IS TO SAY: "REAL GDP GROWTH IN 1989 WAS 7.4 PERCENT AND IS ESTIMATED TO BE OF A SIMILAR ORDER OF MAGNITUDE IN 1990."

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 02 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

FIFTH PARAGRAPH. WE STRONGLY PREFER "PATERNALISTIC POLITICAL CONTROLS" TO "LACK OF A CLEAR RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT."

4. SECTION 1.A.
SEVENTH SENTENCE. WE RECOMMEND SUBSTITUTING "FOUND IN" FOR "FROM".

5. SECTION 1.C.

SECOND PARAGRAPH, SEVENTH SENTENCE. IF THE SENTENCE HA AGREES TO DELETE IS THE ONE CITING "EYEWITNESS" REPORTS OF A VICTIM'S CUTS, BRUISES, AND WEAKNESS FROM HUNGER, THEN WE CAN ACCEPT THE BRACKETING SENTENCES HA WISHES TO RETAIN.

6. SECTION 1.D.

THIRD PARAGRAPH, SENTENCES FOUR THROUGH SEVEN. HA'S SUGGESTED CHANGES OF OUR REFORMULATION ARE ACCEPTABLE,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PROVIDED THAT IN THE LAST SENTENCE THE PHRASE "BY SOME YOUTHS" IS INSERTED AFTER "VIOLENT ATTACKS".

THIRD PARAGRAPH, EIGHTH SENTENCE. PUBLIC DEPICTION OF THE DHARSONO TRIAL AS "UNFAIR" FIVE YEARS AFTER THE EVENT CONTINUES IS UNWARRANTED REVISIONISM. MENTION OF HIS RELEASE AND HIS IDENTIFICATION AS "ONE OF THE COUNTRY'S LEADING DISSIDENTS" ADEQUATELY CONVEYS THE MESSAGE THAT HE DID NOT BELONG IN JAIL IN THE FIRST PLACE. TO GO FURTHER RISKS CREDIBILITY AND RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BILATERAL POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP FOR THE DUBIOUS SATISFACTION OF PASSING RETROSPECTIVE JUDGMENT. THERE IS NO END TO THIS PATH ONCE IT IS TAKEN.

7. SECTION 1.E.

THIRD PARAGRAPH. THE GARBLED WORDS WERE EXPLANATION FOR INCLUDING THE SENTENCE HA HAS AGREED TO RESTORE.

FIFTH PARAGRAPH, AFTER FIRST SENTENCE. HA'S COUNTER-PROPOSAL DOES NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE CONFIRMED FACT THAT SOME OF THE LAMPUNG DEFENDANTS KIDNAPPED AND MURDERED A MILITARY OFFICER. WE MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THIS INCIDENT AND OTHER POSSIBLE VIOLENT PROVOCATIONS OF WHICH WE DO NOT HAVE DETAILS, WHILE ALSO COVEYING THE IDEA THAT MANY OF THE CHARGES OF VIOLENCE (COMMITTED OR CONTEMPLATED) ARE HOGWASH. WE RECOMMEND THE SENTENCE READ: "SOME OF THESE DEFENDANTS COMMITTED ACTS OF VIOLENCE; HOWEVER, CHARGES OF COMMITTING OR PLOTTING TO COMMIT VIOLENCE AGAINST OTHER DEFENDANTS APPEARED EXAGGERATED."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SIXTH PARAGRAPH. PARAGRAPH FOUR CONTAINS OUR BEST ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, INCLUDING THE "APPROXIMATELY 400" CONVICTED FOR SUBVERSION PLUS THE VAGUER "SOME PRISONERS" UNDER CRIMINAL SENTENCES FOR ILLEGAL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. WE RISK FALSE PRECISION BY GOING FURTHER WITH THESE FIGURES AND CATEGORIES. HOWEVER, TO CAPTURE EXPLICITLY THE FLUCTUATING EAST TIMOR SITUATION, WE SUGGEST CHANGING THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH FOUR TO READ: "SOME PRISONERS AND DETAINEES,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 HA-09 L-03 RP-10 SSO-00 /023W

----------2BE4D2 180914Z /11

O 180904Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMED(ATE 9827

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 17953

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

INCLUDING IN EAST TIMOR, ARE CHARGED WITH OR SUSPECTED OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ILLEGAL UNDER CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL CODE."

8. SECTION 1.F.

SENTENCE THREE. THE REWRITE IS ACCEPTABLE, PROVIDED IT CONTINUES: "...AND THEY ARE BELIEVED...."

9. SECTION 2.A.

SECOND PARAGRAPH, THIRD THROUGH FIFTH SENTENCES. WE CONTINUE TO PREFER TREATING A CASE ONCE RATHER THAN TWICE. HOWEVER, WE CAN ACCEPT DOUBLE TREATMENT IF THE LANGUAGE IN THIS SECTION IS SIMILAR ENOUGH TO THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LANGUAGE IN SECTION 1.E. TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION OF TWO DIFFERENT CASES. THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY INSERTING "AT YOGYAKARTA'S GAJAH MADA UNIVERSITY" AFTER "STUDENT" IN THE FOURTH SENTENCE (SECOND PARAGRAPH, SECTION 2.A.)

SECOND PARAGRAPH. WE NEED TO UPDATE THE UPDATE ON BANNED CULTURAL PERFORMANCES (SEE JAKARTA 17776). WE RECOMMEND ADDING: "THE GOVERNMENT SUBSEQUENTLY REVOKED THESE BANNINGS."

SEVENTH PARAGRAPH, SECOND SENTENCE. THIS SENTENCE MAKES AN IMPORTANT POINT -- BUTTRESSED BY DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED IN JAKARTA 17776 -- AND SHOULD BE RETAINED WITH THE WORDING "ISSUES CONSIDERED SENSITIVE BY THE GOVERNMENT". WE DO NOT BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THESE ISSUES REQUIRE TO BE SPELLED OUT AGAIN IN THE SAME SECTION.

10. SECTION 2.D.

FIFTH PARAGRAPH. FIRST, SECOND AND FIFTH SENTENCES. THE REWRITE IS ACCEPTABLE WITH THE SUBSTITUTION OF "THE POPULATION OF ITS GALANG ISLAND FACILITY" VICE "THE GALANG CAMP'S POPULATION" IN THE FIRST SENTENCE. ALSO,

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SUBSTITUTE "7,000" FOR "10,000" IN THE SECOND SENTENCE AND INSERT "INTERNATIONAL" BEFORE "DECISION" IN THE FIFTH SENTENCE.

NEW SIXTH PARAGRAPH. RP'S TREATMENT OF THE KUKU ISLAND INCIDENT HERE INSTEAD OF IN SECTION 1.C. IS ACCEPTABLE, ALTHOUGH WE RECOMMEND DELETING THE WORD "CAMP". MONJO

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 421330 132130Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AMAD-01 HA-09 L-03 RP-10 SIL-01
/025R

4055
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
EAP/IMBS: BSHARVEY
HA: JUNDERRINER
EAP/RA: BMALKIN (INFO)
RP: MSARDINAS (SUBS)
L/HRR: JKOVAR (INFO)
----------2A60A6 132133Z /38
P 132132Z DEC 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 421330

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM ELAB ID
SUBJECT: 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA (TAKE 4)
REF: (A) 90 JAKARTA 17458, (B) 90 STATE 400309

1. LOU/NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. HA AND EAP/IMBS HAVE DISCUSSED EMBASSY JAKARTA'S CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTS (REF A) CONCERNING THE HA REVISION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 421330 132130Z
(REF B) OF THE 1990 INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON MOST POINTS. L/HRR (WHICH NOTED AT THE TOP "EXCELLENT REPORT") AND RP HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED A FEW REVISIONS. PLEASE PROVIDE FURTHER EMBASSY COMMENT BY DECEMBER 18 ON THE PROPOSED REVISIONS NOTED BELOW.

3. INTRODUCTION.

FIRST PARAGRAPH, FIRST SENTENCE. HA PROPOSES TAKING THE EMBASSY'S NEW LANGUAGE AND ADDING AN ADDITIONAL CLAUSE: "PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND THE MILITARY WIELD PREDOMINANT POLITICAL POWER; OPPOSITION GROUPS EXIST BUT IN FACT HAVE NO REAL CHANCE TO OBTAIN POWER."

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 02 NOV 2006 200504425

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THIRD PARAGRAPH, SECOND SENTENCE. L ADDS "OF THE ARMED FORCES" AFTER "HALF."

THIRD PARAGRAPH, AFTER FIFTH SENTENCE. HA PROPOSES ADDING A NEW SENTENCE TO REFLECT RECENT REPORTING FROM EAST TIMOR: "BEGINNING IN OCTOBER, THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN REPORTS OF SECURITY-FORCE BEATINGS OF DETAINEES THERE."

THIRD PARAGRAPH, THE SENTENCE FOLLOWING THE INSERTED SENTENCE. L ADDS "(NORTHWEST SUMATRA)" AFTER "ACEH."

THIRD PARAGRAPH, LAST TWO SENTENCES. HA CAN ACCEPT THE EMBASSY'S NEW LANGUAGE IF THE WORDS "WHICH HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED BY SOME OBSERVERS AS" ARE DELETED.

FOURTH PARAGRAPH. HA ACCEPTS REINCLUSION OF THE SENTENCE

ON GDP, BUT WONDERS IF ANY 1990 PART-YEAR FIGURES ARE AVAILABLE TO MAKE THE REFERENCE CURRENT.

FIFTH PARAGRAPH. HA PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS TO THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED IN REF A:

-- IN SENTENCE TWO, DELETE THE WORDS "IN AREAS PRIMARILY OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY". HA SEES THAT LANGUAGE AS UNNECESSARILY SUGGESTING MITIGATING FACTORS.

-- IN SENTENCE TWO, CHANGE "FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS" TO READ "FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS, AND ASSEMBLY". ALSO, REPLACE "PATERNALISTIC POLITICAL CONTROLS" WITH "LACK OF A CLEAR RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT". HA SEES THESE CHANGES NOT AS SUGGESTING DETERIORATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS, BUT AS NOTING THEMES DEVELOPED LATER IN THE REPORT. FAILURE SPECIFICALLY TO MENTION A SUBJECT IN THE INTRODUCTION LAST YEAR IS NOT A CONVINCING REASON FOR NOT MENTIONING IT THIS TIME.

-- MOVE THE FINAL SENTENCE UP TO BECOME THE THIRD SENTENCE, FOLLOWING "CHINESE." STRUCTURALLY, THIS KEEPS THE NEGATIVES AND POSITIVES GROUPED TOGETHER WITHIN THE PARAGRAPH.

4. SECTION 1.A.

HA ACCEPTS THE REVISION IF THE SECOND SENTENCE IS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
DELETED. THE GOVERNMENT DENIAL DOES NOT ALTER THE REALITY THAT KILLINGS TOOK PLACE.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SENTENCE SEVEN. L NOTED A LACK OF CLARITY. WE PROPOSE REVISING THE SENTENCE AS FOLLOWS: "THOSE DISCOVERIES, AS WELL AS REPORTS OF BODIES FROM NORTH JAKARTA IN JANUARY,..."

5. SECTION 1.B.

HA ACCEPTS THE EMBASSY LANGUAGE.

6. SECTION 1.C.

FIRST PARAGRAPH, FIRST SENTENCE AND THIRD SENTENCE. HA ACCEPTS.

SECOND PARAGRAPH, FIRST SENTENCE. HA ACCEPTS "CONTINUED."

SECOND PARAGRAPH, SECOND AND THIRD SENTENCES. RP RECOMMENDS MOVING DISCUSSION OF THIS INCIDENT TO SECTION 2.D. PARAGRAPH FIVE.

SECOND PARAGRAPH, SENTENCES FIVE THROUGH SEVEN (NOTE: WE BELIEVE REF A'S NOTATION OF SIX THROUGH EIGHT WAS IN ERROR). SINCE WE CAN CLEARLY CONFIRM SENTENCE FIVE AND SINCE SENTENCE SIX CONTAINS A SPECIFIC REFERENCE CONCERNING RECENT CREDIBLE REPORTS OF TORTURE OF EAST TIMOR DETAINEES, HA WISHES TO RETAIN THEM. HA CONCURS IN DELETING SENTENCE SEVEN.

SECOND PARAGRAPH, SENTENCE NINE. HA ACCEPTS.

7. SECTION 1.D.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THIRD PARAGRAPH, FIRST SENTENCE. HA ACCEPTS.

THIRD PARAGRAPH, SENTENCES FOUR THROUGH SEVEN. HA ACCEPTS THE REF A FORMULATION WITH THE FOLLOWING CHANGES:

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

-- DELETE THE SECOND SENTENCE.

-- ADD AFTER THE SENTENCE ENDING WITH "SCHOOLS", THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: "IN ONE INCIDENT, POLICE WERE REPORTEDLY CALLED IN WHEN A "SUBVERSIVE TEXT" (A PRO-INDEPENDENCE SIGN) WAS FOUND."

THIRD PARAGRAPH, EIGHTH SENTENCE. HA CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT THE LANGUAGE ABOUT DHARSONO'S TRIAL REMAIN IN THE REPORT, ARGUING THAT FAILURE TO MENTION UNFAIRNESS AT THE TIME DOES NOT ABSOLVE US FROM CRITICIZING IT NOW.

8. SECTION 1.E.

FIRST PARAGRAPH, THIRD SENTENCE. HA ACCEPTS. L ADDS THE WORD "BUT" AFTER "CASE,".

FIRST PARAGRAPH, FIFTH SENTENCE. L SUBSTITUTES "POSES" FOR "PUTS".

THIRD PARAGRAPH. REF A WAS GARBLED HERE. HA ACCEPTS RESTORATION OF THE SENTENCE, "THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE LEGAL AWARENESS, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH." IF REF A WAS ALSO PROPOSING TO ADD LANGUAGE ABOUT USAID AND TAF FUNDING EFFORTS, HA WILL RESIST

BECAUSE THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT DOES NOT COMMENT ON USG PROJECTS.

FOURTH PARAGRAPH, PENULTIMATE SENTENCE. HA ACCEPTS IF THE WORD "SOME" IS DELETED.

FIFTH PARAGRAPH, AFTER FIRST SENTENCE. HA PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING REFORMULATION OF THE LANGUAGE IN REF A: "DEFENDANTS REPORTEDLY COMMITTED ACTS OF VIOLENCE IN SOME OF THE CASES."

FIFTH PARAGRAPH, FINAL SENTENCE. HA ACCEPTS.

SIXTH PARAGRAPH. HA DOES NOT INSIST ON ITS DRAFT LANGUAGE, BUT THE REPORT INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRE SOME ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AT YEAR END. COULD EMBASSY JAKARTA PROPOSE A CREDIBLE, IF SOMEWHAT FUDGED, ESTIMATE?

9. SECTION 1.F.

HA ACCEPTS THAT NO SPECIFIC EAST TIMOR LANGUAGE IS POSSIBLE.

SENTENCE THREE. TO ACCOMODATE AN L SUGGESTION, WE PROPOSE REWRITING AS FOLLOWS: "SECURITY AGENCIES INTIMIDATE BY CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS AND RESIDENCES, AND THEY..."

SENTENCE SEVEN. L REQUESTS CLARIFICATION OF THE PHRASE "TO REGULARIZE IDEOLOGICAL SCREENING". WE PROPOSE TO

SUBSTITUTE: "TO MAKE LESS ARBITRARY THE IDEOLOGICAL SCREENING".

10. SECTION 2.A.

PARAGRAPH TWO, THIRD THROUGH FIFTH SENTENCES. HA WISHES TO RETAIN ITS LANGUAGE. SO LONG AS A CASE APPROPRIATELY FALLS UNDER TWO DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE REPORT, HA PREFERS TO INCLUDE DETAILS TWICE, RATHER THAN INSERT A REFERENCE TO ANOTHER SECTION.

PARAGRAPH TWO, NEW INSERTION ON BANNINGS. HA ACCEPTS.

PARAGRAPH TWO, PENULTIMATE SENTENCE. HA ACCEPTS.

PARAGRAPHS THREE THROUGH FIVE. HA ACCEPTS.

PARAGRAPH SIX, FOURTH SENTENCE. HA ACCEPTS WITH SUBSTITUTION OF "CONTROL" FOR "ADMINISTRATION".

PARAGRAPH SEVEN, SECOND SENTENCE. HA PROPOSES THAT THE SENTENCE BE DELETED.

PARAGRAPH SEVEN, OTHER SENTENCES. HA ACCEPTS.

PARAGRAPHS NINE AND TEN. HA ACCEPTS. IN PARAGRAPH TEN, SECOND SENTENCE, L PROPOSES ADDING "BY THE GOVERNMENT" AFTER "SENSITIVE".

11. SECTION 2.B. HA ACCEPTS.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

12. SECTION 2.C.

FIRST PARAGRAPH, SECOND SENTENCE. HA DOES NOT BELIEVE ITS LANGUAGE FROM REF B CARRIES NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS. HA FINDS THE EMBASSY REWORDING AWKWARD AND PREFERS ITS FORMULATION.

HA ACCEPTS THE OTHER SUGGESTIONS FOR THIS SECTION.

13. SECTION 2.D.

PARAGRAPHS ONE AND TWO. HA ACCEPTS. PARAGRAPH ONE, SENTENCE THREE. L REQUESTED A REWRITE. WE PROPOSE: "PREVIOUSLY SOME ETHNIC CHINESE ENCOUNTERED LEGAL AND BUREAUCRATIC OBSTACLES TO OBTAINING CITIZENSHIP, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED POLICY WAS TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO APPLY."

PARAGRAPH THREE, FIRST SENTENCE. HA PROPOSES INSTEAD TO DELETE EVERYTHING AFTER "IRIAN JAYA."

PARAGRAPH THREE, SECOND SENTENCE. HA ACCEPTS.

PARAGRAPH FOUR, END. HA ACCEPTS WITH DELETION OF THE CLAUSE, "RETURNING FROM A TRIP TO CHINA AND VIETNAM IN NOVEMBER,".

PARAGRAPH FIVE. RP PROPOSED A REWRITE, AS DETAILED STATISTICS ARE NOT NECESSARY. WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING, EDITED FOR LENGTH, AS SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ENTIRE PARAGRAPH:

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INDONESIA HAS GIVEN FIRST ASYLUM TO OVER 125,000 INDOCHINESE ASYLUM-SEEKERS SINCE 1975, AND THE GALANG CAMP'S POPULATION WAS OVER 20,000 AT YEAR'S END. VIETNAMESE ARRIVALS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY IN 1990; OVER 10,000 HAD BEEN REDIRECTED FROM NEARBY MALAYSIA. GALANG'S CAMBODIAN POPULATION WAS ABOUT 1800. INDONESIA CONSIDERS THE CAMBODIANS ILLEGAL ENTRANTS RATHER THAN ASYLUM SEEKERS. NEVERTHELESS, CAMBODIANS HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN INDONESIA, PENDING A DECISION ON HOW TO RESOLVE THEIR SITUATION. THREE BOATLOADS OF CAMBODIANS WERE REFITTED, REPROVISIONED, AND ASSISTED TO SAIL TO AUSTRALIA.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

IN JUNE/JULY 1990, SOME ASYLUM SEEKERS REPORTED EXPERIENCING ABUSE WHILE TRANSITING TO GALANG CAMP. MILITARY PERSONNEL--SOME OF WHOM WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSFERRED--RAPED, BEAT, AND ROBBED ASYLUM SEEKERS WHO LANDED AT KUKU ISLAND. AT LEAST ONE VICTIM DIED. UNHCR IMMEDIATELY INVESTIGATED AND NOTIFIED RELEVANT AUTHORITIES; SUBSEQUENTLY, REPORTS OF SUCH INCIDENTS ENDED.

14. SECTION 3. HA ACCEPTS ALL THREE CHANGES.

PARAGRAPH THREE, SENTENCE THREE. L REQUESTED MORE CLARITY. WE PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING: "PARLIAMENT MAKES TECHNICAL AND OCCASIONALLY SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS TO BILLS IT REVIEWS."

PARAGRAPH FIVE, SENTENCE TWO. L SUGGESTS CHANGING "ABOLISHMENT" TO "ABOLITION."

15. SECTION 4.

PARAGRAPH TWO. WHEN THREE INDONESIAN HUMAN-RIGHTS LAWYERS VISITED THE DEPARTMENT DURING AN IV PROGRAM THIS FALL, THEY RESPONDED TO A QUESTION FROM HA BY SAYING THAT THEY HAD EXPERIENCED OFFICIAL HARASSMENT. BASED ON THAT CONVERSATION, HA PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING FINAL SENTENCE: "SOME HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS HAVE COMPLAINED OF GOVERNMENT HARASSMENT."

16. SECTION 5.

FIRST PARAGRAPH, THIRD SENTENCE. L PROPOSES CHANGING "INDONESIANS" TO "ETHNIC-CHINESE CITIZENS".

SECOND PARAGRAPH. HA ACCEPTS BOTH CHANGES.

THIRD PARAGRAPH, FOURTH SENTENCE. HA PROPOSES DELETING THE ENTIRE SENTENCE.

17. SECTION 6. FYI: HA IS WORKING ON CLEARANCE OF AN AGREED HA AND S/IL DRAFT OF THIS SECTION. IT SHOULD REACH YOU SHORTLY FOR COMMENT.
BAKER

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 17406 01 OF 02 060903Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001W
----------26EC27 060933Z /10
O 060857Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9511

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 17406

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 156
:
1- (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
:----------
OUR COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT DRAFT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (STATE 400309 AND 409134) ARE NEARLY READY TO TRANSMIT. THE QUANTITY OF CHANGES WE FEEL ARE NECESSARY AND A TOP-LEVEL MILITARY VISIT HAVE PREVENTED US FROM MAKING THE DECEMBER 6 DEADLINE. WE ARE AIMING FOR DECEMBER 7 -- WHICH SOMEHOW SEEMS APPROPRIATE. WE STILL AWAIT THE DEPARTMENT'S CURRENT DRAFT OF SECTION 6, PER YOUR O-I NO. 154.
2. (U) YOUR REQUEST ON SLUG LINES
:----------
RE YOUR O-I NO 156, YOU ARE INDEED CORRECT ABOUT THE

PAGE 02 JAKART 17406 01 OF 02 060903Z
CLERICAL ERROR. OUR PUBLICATIONS OFFICE HAS BEEN ASKED TO WATCH THEIR SLUG LINES.
:
3. (LOU) MOTION PICTURE MARKET ACCESS
:----------

AMBASSADOR MET WITH MIKE CONNORS, MPEAA, ON NOVEMBER 29. CONNORS REQUESTED THIS MEETING TO BRIEF THE AMBASSADOR ON MPEAA MEMBER CONCERNS ABOUT THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN INDONESIA ON THE MOTION PICTURE MARKET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ACCESS ISSUE AND VIDEOTAPE PIRACY. MPEAA MEMBERS WERE GOING TO HAVE AN ANTI-PIRACY MEETING IN KUALA LUMPUR ON DECEMBER 4 AND A GENERAL MEETING IN NEW YORK ON JANUARY 24, 1991. CONNORS WAS CONCERNED THAT GIVEN THE LACK OF TANGIBLE PROGRESS ON EITHER ISSUE THE COMPANIES WOULD BE INCLINED TO TAKE SOME TYPE OF ACTION. HE SAID THAT MPEAA HAD BEEN ONE OF THE MAJOR FORCES BEHIND THE INDUSTRY-FILED 301 AGAINST THAILAND FOR RAMPANT PIRACY AND THE MEMBERS WERE BECOMING IMPATIENT WITH INDONESIA.

CONNORS EXPLAINED THAT P.T. SUBENTRA, THE FILM IMPORT MONOPOLY, WAS NOT PROVING TO BE VERY HELPFUL IN MPEAA'S EFFORTS TO SECURE DISTRIBUTION RIGHTS FOR ITS MEMBERS DESPITE THE MONOPOLY'S PLEDGE TO ASSIST. MPEAA MEMBERS HAD BOYCOTTED THE INDONESIAN MARKET FOR SEVERAL MONTHS BUT EACH COMPANY AGREED TO SUPPLY FOUR FILMS BASED ON ASSURANCES THAT P.T. SUBENTRA WOULD HELP PERSUADE THE GOI TO CHANGE THE LAW PROHIBITING DIRECT DISTRIBUTION. THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY MOVEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOI. P.T. SUBENTRA HAS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ALSO NOT COOPERATED WITH THE MPEAA INDONESIA REPRESENTATIVE'S EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE CRITICAL MARKET INFORMATION SUCH AS ATTENDANCE AND BOX OFFICE COLLECTIONS. AT THE END OF OCTOBER, 63 AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN FILMS HAD BEEN IMPORTED OUT OF THE ANNUAL IMPORT QUOTA OF 80 FILMS.

ON FEBRUARY 1, MPEAA FILED TWO CRIMINAL INFRINGEMENT CASES WITH THE CENTRAL JAKARTA POLICE DEPARTMENT. POLICE RAIDS WERE CONDUCTED ON FEBRUARY 26 AND INFRINGING VIDEOCASSETTES WERE SEIZED. THE CASES HAVE YET TO BE PROSECUTED AND MPEAA HAS WRITTEN A LETTER AND A FOLLOW UP LETTER TO MINISTER OF JUSTICE ISMAIL SALEH REQUESTING HIS SUPPORT.

WITH NO PROGRESS TO REPORT ON EITHER DISTRIBUTION OR COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT, CONNORS THOUGHT THE COMPANIES MIGHT DECIDE TO REVIVE THE BOYCOTT OR POSSIBLY FILE A 301 AGAINST INDONESIA. AMBASSADOR MONJO WONDERED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE GOI SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT BUT DID NOT ALLOW DISTRIBUTION. CONNORS SAID DISTRIBUTION WAS THE TOP PRIORITY AND MEMBERS WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED WITHOUT THAT.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

AMBASSADOR MONJO WAS NOT SANGUINE ABOUT THE CHANCES FOR A GOI POLICY CHANGE IN THE SHORT TERM. HE ADVISED CONNORS TO URGE JACK VALENTI TO MEET WITH AMBASSADOR RAMLY.

CONNORS TALKED TO CO JEFF HARDEE ON DECEMBER 6 AND INFORMED HIM THAT HE HAD ALREADY SENT A NOTE TO VALENTI SUGGESTING A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR RAMLY.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 JAKART 17406 01 OF 02 060903Z

CONNORS ALSO SAID THAT DURING THE DECEMBER 4 MPEAA MEETING, MPEAA MEMBERS AGREED TO PAY THE INDONESIAN ASSOCIATION FOR RECORDING INDUSTRIES (ASIRI) TO ASSIST IN HALTING VIDEOTAPE PIRACY. ASIRI HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCING AUDIOCASSETTE PIRACY AND CLAIMS TO HAVE THE SUPPORT OF MINISTER HARMOKO AND TOP POLICE AND MILITARY OFFICIALS TO STOP VIDEOTAPE PIRACY. ASIRI THINKS THAT 90 PERCENT OF THE PROBLEM CAN BE ELIMINATED WITHING THREE MONTHS. MPEAA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 17406 02 OF 02 060903Z

ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001W

----------26EC2B 060933Z /10

O 060857Z DEC 90

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9512

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 17406

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 156

AND ASIRI ARE STILL WORKING OUT THE PRICE AND LENGTH OF CONTRACT.

WHILE THIS MAY PROVE TO BE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT ON THE PIRACY SIDE, THERE DO NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY POSITIVE SIGNS ON THE ISSUE OF DISTRIBUTION. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER AMBASSADOR RAMLY IS FULLY INFORMED ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF THESE ISSUES AND HOW ENGAGED HE IS IN WORKING OUT A SOLUTION.

MONJO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED C49

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 STATE 409134 042243Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

RELEASED IN FULL

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AMAD-01 HA-09 /011R

3366
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
EAP/IMBS: BSHARVEY
HA: JUNDERRINER
----------261F4A 042244Z /38
P 042244Z DEC 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 409134

NOFORN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM ID
SUBJECT: 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA (CHANGES TO TAKE 2)
REF: (A) 90 STATE 400309

1. THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 1.B. OF THE DRAFT INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT PROVIDED IN REFTEL IS CONFUSED DUE TO A CLERICAL ERROR. THE BEGINNING OF THE SENTENCE SHOULD READ: "SECURITY FORCES PERIODICALLY TOOK PERSONS FOR INTERROGATION IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA...."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 409134 042243Z

2. IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 2.A. PARAGRAPH 3, CHANGE "DISAPPROVAL" TO "SANCTIONS."

3. AT THE END OF THE SEVENTH PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 2.A. ADD THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES:

"IN NOVEMBER THE GOVERNMENT BANNED A FOREIGN JOURNALIST FROM RETURNING TO INDONESIA FOR "DEFAMING" PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IN A NEWSPAPER ARTICLE. THE ARTICLE DESCRIBED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THE SOEHARTO FAMILY'S BUSINESS ACTIVITIES AND STRESSED THE IMPACT THEY MAY HAVE ON SOEHARTO'S DECISION WHETHER TO SEEK REELECTION. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD INVESTIGATE THE INDONESIAN DISTRIBUTOR OF THE TWO INTERNATIONAL NEWSPAPERS THAT CARRIED THE ARTICLE FOR FAILING TO "EXERCISE SELF-CENSORSHIP."
BAKER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 16483 01 OF 05 230935Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EB-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SSO-00	SS-01	STR-20	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	FMP-01	/081W				

----------BA5118 230936Z /38
O 230921Z DEC 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1678

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 16483

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: WORKERS RIGHTS SECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS, INCLUDING THOSE IN EXPORT-PROCESSING ZONES, ARE FREE TO FORM OR JOIN UNIONS WITHOUT PREVIOUS AUTHORIZATION, BUT IN ORDER TO BARGAIN ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES A UNION MUST MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION AND REGISTER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION ARE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 16483 01 OF 05 230935Z
REPRESENTATION IN AT LEAST 20 OF THE 27 PROVINCES, BRANCH OFFICES IN AT LEAST 100 DISTRICTS, AND 1,000 LOCAL UNITS AT PLANT LEVEL. THE UNIONS DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES THOUGH UNDER CLOSE GOVERNMENT SCRUTINY AND SUBJECT TO GOVERNMENT APPROVAL PRIOR TO REGISTRATION. LESS THAN 6 PERCENT OF THE ESTIMATED 78 MILLION MEMBER WORK FORCE IS ORGANIZED. THE ALL INDONESIA WORKERS UNION (SPSI), WHICH GROUPS TOGETHER PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS, IS THE ONLY RECOGNIZED INTERSECTORAL TRADE UNION BODY. IN 1990 THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SPSI REORGANIZED INTO 13 AUTONOMOUS DIVISIONS COVERING BROAD INDUSTRIAL SECTORS AND SPECIALIZED INSTITUTES. IT HAS ABOUT 10,000 LOCAL UNTS AT THE PLANT LEVEL AND CLAIMS OVER 3 MILLION MEMBERS, ALTHOUGH ONLY ABOUT 900,000 ACTUALLY PAY DUES.

IN NOVEMBER 1990, A NUMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGNERS CREATED THE SETIA KAWAN (SOLIDARITY) FREE TRADE UNION, ALLEGING THAT THE SPSI HAD FAILED TO DEFEND WORKER INTERESTS ADEQUATELY. WHILE THE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS INITIALLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT APPROVE THE NEW TRADE UNION WHEN IT SOUGHT TO REGISTER, BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD VIOLATE THE GOVERNMENT'S SINGLE-TRADE UNION POLICY, HE LATER INDICATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TOLERATE THE NEW ORGANIZATION IF IT DID NOT DO ANYTHING ILLEGAL. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO FORMAL MOVE TO BAN SETIA KAWAN. HOWEVER, THE SETIA KAWAN IS NOT ABLE TO FUNCTION AS A LAB/R UNION SINCE IT DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENT FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THIS SECTION. IN JUNE SETIA KAWAN SECRETARY GENERAL SAUT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ARITONANG REPORTED HE WAS ABDUCTED BY ARMED MEN AND DETAINED FOR SEVERAL DAYS. PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT, ARITONANG HAD INDICATED HE WOULD BE GOING TO GENEVA TO BRING SETIA KAWAN'S CASE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) DURING THE ILO'S ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE. THE INDONESIAN MINISTER OF MANPOWER WAS EXPECTED TO BE ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS DENIED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARITONANG'S DISAPPEARANCE AND ARITONANG HAS NOT PUBLICLY SPECULATED ON THE IDENTITY OF HIS ABDUCTORS.

PRIOR TO THE 1990 SPSI NATIONAL CONGRESS THE JOINT SECRETARIAT OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONS CARRIED OUT CERTAIN LIMITED TRADE UNION FUNCTIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. AT THE 1990 CONGRESS, HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF ITS PRINCIPAL LEADERS REJOINED THE SPSI AND WHILE THE JOINT SECRETARIAT CONTINUES TO EXIST IN NAME, IT IS NOT A FUNCTIONING ORGANIZATION. IN 1990 THE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (PGRI) WAS ALLOWED TO REGISTER AS A TRADE UNION WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION FOR THIS SECTOR. THE PGRI, WHICH CONSISTS OF 1.3 MILLION TEACHERS, INCLUDING TEACHERS IN RELIGIOUS, PRIVATE, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, HAS REPRESENTATION IN ALL 27 PROVINCES. IT HAS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
NOT, HOWEVER, ATTEMPTED TO BARGAIN OVER WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS, PREFERRING ITS TRADITIONAL ROLE OF WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO PURSUE THE INTERESTS OF ITS MEMBERS. STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND CIVIL SERVANTS MUST BELONG TO KORPRI, A NONUNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. IN 1990, FOR THE FIRST TIME, A KORPRI SUBUNIT SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED FOUR COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING AGREEMENTS WITH THE STATE-OWNED COAL COMPANY. (NOTE 6: EMBASSY: ARE TOP PGRI OFFICIALS ALSO OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION? PGRI MEMBERS STILL HAVE TO BE MEMBERS OF KORPRI? WOULD THE PGRI BE ALLOWED TO FUNCTION AS A REAL, IN THE WESTERN SENSE, TRADE UNION? EMBASSY RESPONSE: SEVERAL PGRI OFFICIALS ARE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION EMPLOYEES, BUT NOT BY ANY MEANS ARE ALL OF THEM. PGRI MEMBERS WHO ARE PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS MUST ALSO BE KORPRI MEMBERS; TEACHERS IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS ARE NOT.
WOULD PGRI BE PERMITTED TO FUNCTION AS A "REAL" TRADE UNION, CANNOT BE ANSWERED WITH ANY CERTAINTY. IT WOULD DEPEND ON THE SITUATION AT ANY GIVEN TIME.)

NNNN

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EB-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SSO-00	SS-01	STR-20	TRSE-00

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

USIE-00 FMP-01 /081W

----------BA5122 230937Z /38

O 230921Z DEC 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1679

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 16483

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: WORKERS RIGHTS SECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

THE GOVERNMENT AND EMPLOYERS HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER UNION AFFAIRS; A RETIRED MILITARY LIEUTENANT COLONEL AND GOLKAR DISTRICT CHAIRMAN WITH SOME PRIOR UNION EXPERIENCE IS CHAIRMAN OF THE LARGEST PROVINCIAL BRANCH OF THE SPSI, PRIMARILY DUE TO GOVERNMENT BACKING. SPSI OFFICIALS ARE PRESSURED TO JOIN GOLKAR, AND GOLKAR MEMBERS DOMINATE THE SPSI LEADERSHIP. SEVERAL SPSI LEADERS ARE IN THE DPR AND ARE MEMBERS OF THE GOLKAR FACTION.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNDER THE ORMAS LAW (SEE SECTION 2.B.), GOVERNMENT APPROVAL IS NEEDED FOR MEETINGS OUTSIDE UNION HEADQUARTERS. PERMISSION IS ROUTINELY GIVEN. A UNION MAY BE DISSOLVED IF THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES IT IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA. THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS LAYING OUT THE PROCEDURES FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF A UNION, AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO CASES OF UNION DISSOLUTION. THE SPSI IS FREE TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS.

WHILE PANCASILA PRINCIPLES CALL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES TO BE SETTLED BY CONSENSUS, ALL ORGANIZED WORKERS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CIVIL SERVANTS, HAVE A LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. HOWEVER, BEFORE A STRIKE CAN OCCUR IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE LAW REQUIRES INTENSIVE MEDIATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND PRIOR NOTICE REGARDING THE INTENT TO STRIKE. MOST DISPUTES, ARE SETTLED THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND CONSENSUS DUE IN PART AT LEAST TO FEAR OF POLICE AND EMPLOYER RETALIATION. IN 1991 THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
STRIKES, ESPECIALLY ON THE PART OF WORKERS DEMANDING EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL MINIMUM WAGE. IN A NUMBER OF INSTANCES, THE MILITARY OR POLICE WERE CALLED TO THE SCENE OF THE STRIKE. (NOTE 7: EMBASSY: WHAT ACTIONS TAKEN BY POLICE/MILITARY? DID THEY COERCE/INTIMIDATE WORKERS?) (NEW TEXT:) THE NATURE OF MILITARY AND POLICE INVOLVEMENT AT WORK STOPPAGE SITES HAS BEEN VARIED. MOST OFTEN THE SECURITY FORCES HAVE LIMITED THEMSELVES TO PROTECTING PROPERTY AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE THOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF CONSCIOUS ATTEMPTS TO INTIMIDATE STRIKERS. THEIR MERE PRESENCE HAS NO DOUBT HAD A DAMPENING EFFECT ON THE WILLINGNESS OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WORKERS TO PURSUE STRIKE OR OTHER PROTEST ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTS THAT MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO MEDIATE AT STRIKE SITES AND WORKED TO SETTLE DISPUTES TO WHICH THEY WERE CALLED.

THE LARGEST STRIKE IN 1990, INVOLVING APPROXIMATELY 12,000 WORKERS ENGAGED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF AUTOMOBILE TIRES IN THE INDUSTRIAL AREA WEST OF JAKARTA, PROMPTED THE MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY TO CHARGE THAT "WOULD-BE HEROS" AND OTHER UNNAMED PARTIES WERE BEHIND THE RECENT STRIKES. IN CONTRAST, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER STATED THE STRIKES WERE THE RESULT OF WORKERS' INCREASING AWARENESS OF THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS. THERE WERE (NOTE 8: EMBASSY: FILL IN AT YEAR'S END PLEASE. DURING FIRST 11 MONTHS THERE WERE 112 OFFICIALLY RECORDED STRIKES. FULL YEAR'S DATA NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL EARLY JANUARY.) STRIKES OFFICIALLY REPORTED IN 1991 COMPARED TO 45 STRIKES FOR ALL OF 1990. MANY STRIKES OCCUR SUDDENLY AND WITHOUT PRIOR ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS AND MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN OFFICIAL STATISTICS. (NOTE 9: EMBASSY: IS THERE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT EMPLOYER RETALIATION?) THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW REPORTS OF EMPLOYER RETALIATION AGAINST STRIKE LEADERS, BUT THIS SEEMS CLEARLY TO BE THE EXCEPTION AND NOT THE RULE. MOST STRIKES ARE SETTLED RELATIVELY QUICKLY AND ALL WORKERS RETURN TO WORK.

STRIKE OUTCOMES VARIED. IN SOME CASES EMPLOYERS HAVE QUICKLY COMPLIED WITH WORKER DEMANDS THAT SALARIES BE INCREASED TO THE LEGAL MINIMUM WAGE. OTHERS HAVE BEEN LESS SUCCESSFUL WITH WORKERS RETURNING TO WORK WITH ONLY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PARTIAL GAINS OR NONE AT ALL.

IN PRACTICE THERE ARE NO CLEAR, ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. IF THE PARTIES CANNOT SETTLE THE MATTER IT IS USUALLY SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE. IF THE PARTIES DO NOT ACCEPT THE MEDIATOR'S DECISION, THE MEDIATOR OR EITHER PARTY MAY SUBMIT THE MATTER TO TRIPARTITE (GOVERNMENT, EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEES) ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS OR TO ARBITRATION. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER CAN NULLIFY THE DECISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS ON LEGAL OR NATIONAL INTEREST GROUNDS. ALTHOUGH TECHNICALLY THE MINISTER'S DECISIONS MAY BE APPEALED TO THE COURTS, IN PRACTICE IT IS RARELY DONE.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EB-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SSO-00	SS-01	STR-20	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	FMP-01	/081W				

----------BA5144 230938Z /10

O 230921Z DEC 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1680

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 16483

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: WORKERS RIGHTS SECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

(NOTE 10: : THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH IS MUCH TOO LONG. IF YOU CAN SUMMARIZE THE ESSENTIALS IN A COUPLE OF SENTENCES, WE CAN INCLUDE IT, OTHERWISE DELETE.) INDONESIA HAS FOR MANY YEARS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF COMPLAINTS IN THE ILO. THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (AFL-CIO), A LONGSTANDING CRITIC, HAS BROUGHT WORKER RIGHTS COMPLAINTS AGAINST INDONESIA IN U.S. TRADE PROCEEDINGS. IN MAY 1989, THE ILO COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (CFA)

REACHED FINAL CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE UNCOMPLETED ASPECTS OF A 1987 COMPLAINT BY THE ICFTU PERTAINING TO THE BAN ON ORGANIZING PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS, INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION AGAINST ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION, AND RESTRICTIONS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE. CONCLUDING THAT A LARGE SECTION OF THE WORK FORCE DOES NOT HAVE FREEDOM TO FORM OR JOIN A WORKERS' ORGANIZATION OF ITS OWN CHOOSING, THE CFA REQUESTED THE GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW PUBLIC EMPLOYEES TO ESTABLISH UNIONS OUTSIDE KORPRI AND TO REMOVE OTHER RESTRICTIONS. IN APRIL AND MAY 1990, THE GOVERNMENT INFORMED THE CFA THAT THE 1963 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE WOULD BE REPEALED AND THAT THE PGRI HAD REGISTERE/ AS A UNION. IT ALSO ARGUED THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR PUBLIC SERVANTS TO HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS THE LEGISLATION ADEQUATELY COVERS CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. IN JUNE THE CFA POINTED OUT THAT THE LIMITED NATURE OF "ASSOCIATIONS" PUBLIC SERVANTS CAN FORM WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A RESTRICTION ON UNIONIZATION, EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO EXPLICIT LEGISLATIVE BAN. IN NOVEMBER 1990 THE CFA TOOK NOTE OF THE REPEAL OF THE 1963 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE AND OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REPORT THAT COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN CONCLUDED BY ONE KORPRI SUBUNIT.

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, BUT ONLY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
REGISTERED TRADE UNIONS CAN ENGAGE IN IT. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER VIGOROUSLY PROMOTES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PANCASILA. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE SPSI'S

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS ARE NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED BILATERALLY WITH EMPLOYERS. ONCE NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED A REGISTERED UNION, THE EMPLOYER IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO BARGAIN. AS A TRANSITIONAL STAGE TO ENCOURAGE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT EVERY COMPANY WHICH HAS 25 OR MORE EMPLOYEES MUST ISSUE COMPANY REGULATIONS DEFINING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. BEFORE A COMPANY CAN REGISTER OR RENEW ITS COMPANY REGULATIONS IT MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT IT HAS CONSULTED WITH A COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES, IN THE ABSENCE OF A UNION. OF THE APPROXIMATELY 10,000 SPSI UNITS, ONLY ABOUT HALF HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS ARE FREELY NEGOTIATED BETWEEN UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE VARIES. BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS. IF NOT, THE MATTER IS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION/ARBITRATION. IN PRACTICE, MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED FOR 1 MORE.

LABOR LAW APPLIES EQUALLY IN EXPORT-PROCESSING ZONES. WHILE SOME COMPANIES IN THESE ZONES HAVE SPSI UNITS, NONE HAVE NEGOTIATED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. REGULATIONS EXPRESSLY FORBID EMPLOYERS PREJUDGING OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, AND EMPLOYEES ARE URGED TO REPORT HARASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE SPSI CLAIMS THAT SOME EMPLOYERS DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ITS MEMBERS AND THOSE WISHING TO FORM SPSI UNITS.

MANY STRIKES AND PROTESTS TAKE PLACE IN SUPPORT OF FIRED UNION OFFICIALS. CHARGES OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

HANDLED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. MANY UNION MEMBERS BELIEVE THAT THE TRIBUNALS GENERALLY SIDE WITH THE EMPLOYER. BECAUSE OF THIS PERCEIVED PARTIALITY, MANY WORKERS REJECT OR AVOID THE PROCESS AND PRESENT THEIR GRIEVANCES TO THE PARLIAMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES. (NOTE 11: EMBASSY. WHAT ABOUT CRITIQUE CLAIM THAT THIS OFTEN RESULTS IN RETALIATION BY THE POLICE OR THE MILITARY? EMBASSY RESPONSE: WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS CHARGE.) WORKERS CAN ORGANIZE WITHOUT RESTRICTION IN A PRIVATE ENTERPRISE EVEN IF IT IS DESIGNATED VITAL BY THE GOVERNMENT. IF THE STATE HAS A PARTIAL INTEREST, THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 16483 04 OF 05 230938Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EB-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SSO-00	SS-01	STR-20	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	FMP-01	/081W				

----------BA5145 230938Z /38
O 230921Z DEC 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1681

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 16483

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: WORKERS RIGHTS SECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

ENTERPRISE IS CONSIDERED TO BE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
DOMAIN, BUT THIS DOES NOT LEGALLY LIMIT ORGANIZING. THERE ARE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT/PRIVATE JOINT ENTERPRISES WHICH HAVE LABOR UNIONS AND WHICH BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

FORCED LABOR IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. HOWEVER, IN 1990 CREDIBLE REPORTS ASSERTED THAT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OFFICIALS IN IRIAN JAYA COOPERATE WITH JAKARTA-BASED TIMBER COMPANIES TO COMPEL ASMAT TRIBES PEOPLE TO CUT DOWN TREES AND TRANSPORT THEM DOWNSTREAM TO WAITING SHIPS, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT. THERE ARE ALSO DOCUMENTED REPORTS OF LABOR CONTRACTORS IN JAKARTA SELLING GIRLS AS DOMESTIC SERVANTS OR TO BROTHELS NEAR PLANTATIONS, AND OF MEN SOLD AS AGRICULTURAL WORKERS. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONDED THAT IT WAS INVESTIGATING THE ALLEGATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET RELEASED THE RESULTS OF THIS INVESTIGATION, HOWEVER.

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

CHILD LABOR CONTINUES TO BE A MAJOR PROBLEM. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A CLASS OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 14 WHO, FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS, MUST WORK AND NOTES THAT THE CHILD LABOR LAWS, WHICH PROVIDE DETAILED SAFEGUARDS, HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY ENFORCED.

EMPLOYERS ARE SUPPOSED TO REPORT IN DETAIL ON EVERY CHILD EMPLOYED, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER IS SUPPOSED TO CARRY OUT PERIODIC INSPECTIONS. EMPLOYERS NOT COMPLYING WITH THE LAW AND REGULATIONS ARE LEGALLY SUBJECT TO FINES OF USD 65 AND/OR UP TO 3 MONTHS IN JAIL FOR EACH INFRACTION, BUT THE GOVERNMENT SILL RELIES ON PERSUASION AND TEACHING EMPLOYERS RATHER THAN PENALIZING THEM. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER CONTINUES TO ADMIT THAT EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS IS INADEQUATE (LESS THAN 50 PERCENT OF COMPANIES EMPLOYING CHILDREN HAVE REGISTERED), AND THAT IT STILL LACKS ENOUGH QUALIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

INSPECTORS TO CARRY OUT INSPECTIONS. OBSERVERS CLAIM THAT OVER 2 MILLION CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14 ARE WORKING HALF TO FULL TIME, MOSTLY IN FAMILY-RUN BUSINESSES IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND AT AGRICULTURAL SITES, WHERE ENFORCEMENT IS DIFFICULT. EFFORTS TO CONTROL CHILD LABOR FOCUS PRIMARILY ON INSTITUTING EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR WORKING CHILDREN.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7-HOUR WORKDAYS AND 40-HOUR WORKWEEKS, WITH ONE-HALF HOUR OF REST FOR EACH 4 HOURS OF WORK. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYEES TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEES. IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE, MINIMUM WAGES ARE ESTABLISHED BY REGIONAL WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL. THIS IS A QUADRIPARTITE BODY CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM LABOR, MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT, AND UNIVERSITIES. IT ALSO ESTABLISHES BASIC-NEEDS FIGURES FOR EACH PROVINCE--A MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER OR FAMILY TO MEET BASIC NUTRITIONAL NEEDS. THE MINIMUM-WAGE RATES CONSTANTLY LAG FAR BEHIND THE BASIC-NEEDS FIGURES AND FALL SHORT OF PROVIDING A DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING. OBSERVANCE OF MINIMUM WAGE AND OTHER LAWS REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND FROM REGION TO REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF THESE GUARANTEES ARE CONSIDERED TO BE FAIRLY COMMON AND OFTEN THE SUBJECT OF STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION AND

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ENFORCEMENT HAVE BEEN WEAK OR NONEXISTENT. IN MAY 1989, THE MANPOWER MINISTER ISSUED REGULATIONS GIVING DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS A LEGAL BASIS TO CARRY OUT PERIODIC INSPECTIONS AND PROVIDING FOR FINES OR IMPRISONMENT FOR EMPLOYERS WHO DO NOT COMPLY. IN MARCH 1990, SPURRED ON BY AN ASIAN-AMERICAN FREE LABOR INSTITUTE/SPSI MINIMUM WAGE COMPLIANCE PROJECT, WHICH SHOWED THAT 50 TO 70 PERCENT OF EMPLOYERS IN THREE TARGETED AREAS IN JAKARTA WERE PAYING LESS THAN THE MINIMUM WAGES, THE MANPOWER MINISTER BEGAN TO PROSECUTE EMPLOYERS FOR VIOLATING MINIMUM WAGE REGULATIONS. ACCORDING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MANPOWER, XXX PROSECUTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE. (NOTE 12: WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN THIS FIGURE. IF FIGURE IS UNAVAILABLE BY PRESS TIME, SUGGEST LAST SENTENCE BE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 16483 05 OF 05 230944Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EB-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SSO-00	SS-01	STR-20	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	FMP-01	/081W				

----------BA51E5 230945Z /38

O 230934Z DEC 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1682

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 16483

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: WORKERS RIGHTS SECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

DELETED AND FOLLOWING ADDED TO CURRENT PENULTIMATE SENTENCE "..., ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF CASES WAS RELATIVELY SMALL COMPARED TO THE NUMBER OF FIRMS THOUGHT TO BE IN VIOLATION OF THE MINIMUM WAGE LAWS.)

BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. IN THE MORE PROFITABLE AND LARGELY WESTERN-OPERATED OIL SECTOR, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUNCTION REASONABLY WELL. HOWEVER, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS IN THE COUNTRY'S OVER 100,000 LARGE,

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
REGISTERED COMPANIES IN THE NON-OIL SECTOR ARE STILL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HAMPERED BY THE LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED INSPECTORS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER (LESS THAN 1,300), THE SLOWNESS WITH WHICH THE FIRMS ESTABLISH THE REQUIRED PLANT-SAFETY COMMITTEES, THE NEED FOR MORE AND BETTER TRAINING OF GOVERNMENT INSPECTORS AND PLANT-SAFETY PERSONNEL, AND THE LACK OF EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION FOR SOUND HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES. A NATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY COUNCIL, AN ADVISORY BODY ESTABLISHED UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER, WAS CREATED IN 1990 TO OVERSEE THE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS OF OVER 6,000 COMPANY SAFETY COMMITTEES. WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS, AND EMPLOYERS ARE PREVENTED BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO.

END TEXT.

FOLLOWING ARE POSTS REACTIONS TO S/IL CONCERNS WHICH WERE NOT ADDRESSED IN TEXT ABOVE:

QUERY REGARDING WHETHER STRIKES WERE LEGAL OR WILD-CAT. THE GREATEST MAJORITY OF STRIKES IN INDONESIA TEND TO BE SPONTANEOUS--WILD-CAT--AND TECHNICALLY ILLEGAL. HOWEVER, THE PRIMARY INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT IS IN RESTORING PEACE AND WE KNOW OF NO INSTANCES IN WHICH STRIKE LEADERS OR WORKERS WERE PROSECUTED FOR CONDUCTING AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.

QUERY ABOUT REST PERIOD. INDONESIAN LABOR LAW INCLUDES A PROVISION FOR A 24 HOUR REST PERIOD PER WEEK.

MONJO

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C51

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 398344 062304Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EB-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-20	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	/080R						

1944
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
EAP/IMBS: AWBARR
EAP/RA: BAMALKIN (SUBS)
HA: DHARRIS (SUBS)
S/IL: AIRONS (SUBS)
----------B48157 062307Z /38
P 062306Z DEC 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 398344

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM ELAB ID
SUBJECT: S/IL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE 1991 COUNTRY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

1. S/IL'S ANTHONY FREEMAN PROVIDED EAP/IMBS A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS, REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, AND EDITORIAL CHANGES
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 398344 062304Z
TO SECTION 6 OF THE 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA. FREEMAN USED THE HA-1 TEXT AS HIS BASE. HA AND EAP/RA REVIEWED THE S/IL COMMENTS, REVISING OR DELETING SOME, BUT RETAINING MOST. THE FOLLOWING TEXT SHOWS THE S/IL COMMENTS/QUESTIONS IN BRACKETS. MR. FREEMAN REQUESTED THAT S/IL'S CONCERNS BE ADDRESSED PRIOR TO THE CIRCULATION OF A FINAL DRAFT FOR CLEARANCE.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

PRIVATE-SECTOR WORKERS, INCLUDING THOSE IN EXPORT-PROCESSING ZONES, ARE FREE TO FORM OR JOIN UNIONS WITHOUT PREVIOUS AUTHORIZATION, BUT IN ORDER TO BARGAIN ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES A UNION MUST MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION AND REGISTER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION ARE REPRESENTATION IN AT LEAST 20 OF THE 27 PROVINCES, BRANCH OFFICES IN AT LEAST 100 DISTRICTS, AND 1,000 LOCAL UNITS AT PLANT LEVEL. THE UNIONS DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES WHILE UNDER CLOSE GOVERNMENT SCRUTINY AND SUBJECT TO GOVERNMENT APPROVAL PRIOR TO REGISTRATION. LESS THAN 6 PERCENT OF THE ESTIMATED 78-MILLION-MEMBER WORK FORCE IS ORGANIZED. THE ALL INDONESIA WORKERS UNION (SPSI), WHICH GROUPS TOGETHER PRIVATE-SECTOR WORKERS, IS THE ONLY RECOGNIZED INTERSECTORAL TRADE UNION BODY. IN 1990 THE SPSI REORGANIZED INTO 13 AUTONOMOUS DIVISIONS COVERING BROAD INDUSTRIAL SECTORS AND SPECIALIZED INSTITUTES. IT HAS ABOUT 10,000 LOCAL UNITS AT THE PLANT LEVEL AND CLAIMS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OVER 3 MILLION MEMBERS, ALTHOUGH ONLY ABOUT 900,000 ACTUALLY PAY DUES.

IN NOVEMBER 1990, A NUMBER OF HUMAN-RIGHTS CAMPAIGNERS CREATED THE SETIA KAWAN (SOLIDARITY) FREE TRADE UNION, ALLEGING THAT THE SPSI HAD FAILED TO DEFEND WORKER INTERESTS ADEQUATELY. WHILE THE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS INITIALLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT APPROVE THE NEW TRADE UNION WHEN IT SOUGHT TO REGISTER BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD VIOLATE THE GOVERNMENT'S SINGLE-TRADE-UNION POLICY, HE LATER INDICATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TOLERATE THE NEW ORGANIZATION IF IT DID NOT DO ANYTHING ILLEGAL. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO FORMAL MOVE TO BAN SETIA KAWAN. HOWEVER, THE SETIA KAWAN IS NOT ABLE TO FUNCTION AS A LABOR UNION SINCE IT DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENT FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THIS SECTION.

IN JUNE SETIA KAWAN SECRETARY GENERAL SAUT ARITONANG REPORTED HE WAS ABDUCTED BY ARMED MEN AND DETAINED FOR SEVERAL DAYS. PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT, ARITONANG HAD INDICATED HE WOULD BE GOING TO GENEVA TO BRING SETIA KAWAN'S CASE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
(ILO) DURING THE ILO'S ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE, (INSERT: WHERE THE) INDONESIAN MINISTER OF MANPOWER WAS EXPECTED TO BE ELECTED (INSERT: CONFERENCE PRESIDENT.) THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS DENIED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARITONANG'S DISAPPEARANCE, AND ARITONANG HAS NOT PUBLICLY SPECULATED ON THE IDENTITY OF HIS ABDUCTORS. (INSERT: OTHER SK ORGANIZERS HAVE BEEN BEATEN BY UNKNOWN ASSAILANTS.)

A NUMBER OF GROUPS AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, E.G., THE JOURNALIST ASSOCIATION AND THE JOINT SECRETARIAT OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONS (QUERY: IS THE "JOINT SECRETARIAT" A REAL BODY, OR, AS THE SPSI TESTIFIED BEFORE THE ILO, JUST A GROUP OF LEADERS WITHOUT ANY RANK-AND-FILE. THE IMPLICATION IS THAT IT IS A CLUB OF EX-FBSI LEADERS WHOM THE GOVERNMENT TOLERATES, BUT WHO DO NOT PERFORM TRADE UNION FUNCTIONS AND DO NOT REPRESENT ANYBODY EXCEPT THEMSELVES), ARE PERMITTED TO CARRY OUT CERTAIN LIMITED TRADE UNION FUNCTIONS SUCH AS (EMBASSY TO FILL IN A COUPLE OF FUNCTIONS) AND TO OPERATE OPENLY, BUT THEY MAY NOT ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. IN 1990 THE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (PGRI) WAS ALLOWED TO REGISTER AS A TRADE UNION WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION FOR THIS SECTOR. THE PGRI, WHICH CONSISTS OF 1.3 MILLION TEACHERS, INCLUDING TEACHERS IN RELIGIOUS, PRIVATE, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, HAS REPRESENTATION IN ALL 27 PROVINCES. IT HAS NOT, HOWEVER, ATTEMPTED TO BARGAIN OVER WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS, PREFERRING ITS TRADITIONAL ROLE OF WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO PURSUE THE INTERESTS OF ITS MEMBERS. (QUERY: EMBASSY PLEASE CONFIRM THAT "TOP PGRI OFFICIALS ARE ALSO OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND AUTOMATICALLY MEMBERS OF KORPRI.") (INSERT: EMPLOYEES OF STATE ENTERPRISES, DEFINED TO INCLUDE COMPANIES IN WHICH THE STATE HAS AT LEAST A FIVE PERCENT HOLDING, AND CIVIL SERVANTS MUST BELONG TO KORPRI), A NONUNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. IN 1990, FOR THE FIRST TIME, A KORPRI SUBUNIT SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED FOUR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS WITH THE STATE-OWNED COAL

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

COMPANY.

THE GOVERNMENT AND EMPLOYERS HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER UNION AFFAIRS; A RETIRED MILITARY LIEUTENANT COLONEL AND GOLKAR DISTRICT CHAIRMAN WITH SOME PRIOR UNION EXPERIENCE IS CHAIRMAN OF THE LARGEST PROVINCIAL BRANCH OF THE SPSI, PRIMARILY DUE TO GOVERNMENT BACKING. (INSERT: THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER IS A MEMBER OF ITS CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL AND RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS OCCUPY IMPORTANT LEADERSHIP POSITIONS.) SPSI OFFICIALS ARE PRESSURED TO JOIN GOLKAR, AND GOLKAR MEMBERS DOMINATE THE SPSI LEADERSHIP. SEVERAL SPSI LEADERS ARE MEMBERS OF THE GOLKAR FACTION (INSERT: IN THE DPR).

UNDER THE ORMAS LAW (SEE SECTION 2.B.), GOVERNMENT APPROVAL IS NEEDED FOR MEETINGS OUTSIDE UNION HEADQUARTERS. PERMISSION IS ROUTINELY GIVEN. A UNION MAY BE DISSOLVED IF THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES IT IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA. THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS LAYING OUT THE PROCEDURES FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF A UNION, AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO CASES OF UNION DISSOLUTION. THE SPSI IS FREE TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS.

WHILE PANCASILA PRINCIPLES CALL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES TO BE SETTLED BY CONSENSUS, ALL ORGANIZED WORKERS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CIVIL SERVANTS (INSERT: WHICH INCLUDES PUBLIC-SCHOOL TEACHERS), HAVE A LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. HOWEVER, BEFORE A STRIKE CAN OCCUR IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE LAW REQUIRES INTENSIVE MEDIATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND PRIOR NOTICE REGARDING THE INTENT TO STRIKE. MOST DISPUTES, ARE SETTLED THROUGH
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NEGOTIATION AND CONSENSUS DUE IN PART AT LEAST TO FEAR OF POLICE AND EMPLOYER RETALIATION. IN 1991 THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF STRIKES, ESPECIALLY ON THE PART OF WORKERS DEMANDING EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL MINIMUM WAGE. (QUERY: WERE ANY OF THESE STRIKES CONSIDERED LEGAL OR WERE THEY ALL WILDCAT?) IN A NUMBER OF INSTANCES, THE MILITARY OR POLICE WERE CALLED TO THE SCENE OF THE STRIKE. (QUERY: WHAT ACTIONS WERE TAKEN BY THE POLICE/MILITARY?)

THE LARGEST STRIKE, INVOLVING APPROXIMATELY 12,000 WORKERS ENGAGED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF AUTOMOBILE TIRES IN THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
INDUSTRIAL AREA WEST OF JAKARTA, PROMPTED THE MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY TO CHARGE THAT "WOULD-BE HEROES" AND OTHER UNNAMED PARTIES WERE BEHIND THE RECENT STRIKES. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER STATED THE STRIKES WERE THE RESULT OF WORKERS' INCREASING AWARENESS OF THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS. THERE WERE (TO BE FILLED IN AT YEAR'S END) STRIKES OFFICIALLY REPORTED IN 1991 COMPARED TO 61 (BASED ON JAKARTA 8855) STRIKES FOR ALL OF 1990. MANY STRIKES OCCUR SUDDENLY AND WITHOUT PRIOR ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS AND MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN OFFICIAL STATISTICS. STRIKE OUTCOMES VARIED. IN SOME CASES EMPLOYERS HAVE QUICKLY COMPLIED WITH WORKER DEMANDS THAT SALARIES BE INCREASED TO THE LEGAL MINIMUM WAGE. OTHERS HAVE BEEN LESS SUCCESSFUL WITH WORKERS RETURNING TO WORK WITH ONLY PARTIAL GAINS OR NONE AT ALL.

IN PRACTICE THERE ARE NO CLEAR, ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. IF THE PARTIES CANNOT SETTLE THE MATTER IT IS USUALLY SUBMITTED TO THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE. IF THE PARTIES DO NOT ACCEPT THE MEDIATOR'S DECISION, THE MEDIATOR OR EITHER PARTY MAY SUBMIT THE MATTER TO TRIPARTITE (GOVERNMENT, EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEES) ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS OR TO ARBITRATION. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER CAN NULLIFY THE DECISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS ON LEGAL OR NATIONAL INTEREST GROUNDS. ALTHOUGH TECHNICALLY THE MINISTER'S DECISIONS MAY BE APPEALED TO THE COURTS, IN PRACTICE IT IS RARELY DONE.

(INSERT: INDONESIA HAS FOR MANY YEARS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF COMPLAINTS IN THE ILO REGARDING THE BAN ON ORGANIZING PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONS, INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION AGAINST ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION, AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE REGISTRATION OF TRADE UNIONS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE. THE ILO CONFERENCE IN JUNE AGAIN REGRETTED THAT INDONESIAN LAW WAS STILL NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ILO CONVENTION 98, WHICH INDONESIA HAS RATIFIED.)

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, BUT ONLY REGISTERED TRADE UNIONS CAN ENGAGE IN IT. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER VIGOROUSLY PROMOTES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
AN INSTRUMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PANCASILA. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE SPSI'S COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS ARE NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED BILATERALLY WITH EMPLOYERS. ONCE NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED A REGISTERED UNION, THE EMPLOYER IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO BARGAIN. AS A TRANSITIONAL

STAGE TO ENCOURAGE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT EVERY COMPANY WHICH HAS 25 OR MORE EMPLOYEES MUST ISSUE COMPANY REGULATIONS DEFINING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. BEFORE A COMPANY CAN REGISTER OR RENEW ITS COMPANY REGULATIONS IT MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT IT HAS CONSULTED WITH A COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES, IN THE ABSENCE OF A UNION. OF THE APPROXIMATELY 10,000 SPSI UNITS, ONLY ABOUT HALF HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS ARE FREELY NEGOTIATED BETWEEN UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE VARIES. BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS. IF NOT, THE MATTER IS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION/ARBITRATION. IN PRACTICE, MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED FOR 1 MORE.

LABOR LAW APPLIES EQUALLY IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES. WHILE SOME COMPANIES IN THESE ZONES HAVE SPSI UNITS, NONE HAVE NEGOTIATED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. REGULATIONS EXPRESSLY FORBID EMPLOYERS PREJUDGING OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, AND EMPLOYEES ARE URGED TO REPORT HARASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE SPSI CLAIMS THAT SOME EMPLOYERS DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ITS MEMBERS AND THOSE WISHING TO FORM SPSI UNITS.

MANY STRIKES AND PROTESTS TAKE PLACE IN SUPPORT OF FIRED UNION OFFICIALS. CHARGES OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE HANDLED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. MANY UNION

MEMBERS BELIEVE THAT THE TRIBUNALS GENERALLY SIDE WITH THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

EMPLOYER. BECAUSE OF THIS PERCEIVED PARTIALITY, MANY WORKERS REJECT OR AVOID THE PROCESS AND PRESENT THEIR DISPUTES BEFORE THE PARLIAMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES. WORKERS CAN ORGANIZE WITHOUT RESTRICTION, (INSERT: SUBJECT TO THE RECOGNITION PROCEDURES PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED,) IN A PRIVATE ENTERPRISE EVEN IF IT IS DESIGNATED VITAL BY THE GOVERNMENT. IF THE STATE HAS A PARTIAL INTEREST, THE ENTERPRISE IS CONSIDERED TO BE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE DOMAIN, BUT THIS DOES NOT LEGALLY LIMIT ORGANIZING. THERE ARE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT/PRIVATE JOINT ENTERPRISES WHICH HAVE (INSERT: KORPRI- OR SPSI-AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS) AND WHICH BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

FORCED LABOR IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. HOWEVER, IN 1990 CREDIBLE REPORTS ASSERTED THAT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS IN IRIAN JAYA COOPERATE WITH JAKARTA-BASED TIMBER COMPANIES TO COMPEL ASMAT TRIBESPEOPLE TO CUT DOWN TREES AND TRANSPORT THEM DOWNSTREAM TO WAITING SHIPS, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT. THERE ARE ALSO DOCUMENTED REPORTS OF LABOR CONTRACTORS IN JAKARTA SELLING GIRLS AS DOMESTIC SERVANTS OR TO BROTHELS NEAR PLANTATIONS, AND OF MEN SOLD AS AGRICULTURAL WORKERS. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONDED THAT IT WAS INVESTIGATING THE ALLEGATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT RELEASE THE RESULTS OF THIS INVESTIGATION, HOWEVER, IN 1990 (INSERT: OR) IN 1991.

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CHILD LABOR CONTINUES TO BE A MAJOR PROBLEM. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A CLASS OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 14 WHO, FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS, MUST WORK AND NOTES THAT THE CHILD LABOR LAWS, WHICH PROVIDE DETAILED SAFEGUARDS, HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY ENFORCED.

EMPLOYERS ARE SUPPOSED TO REPORT IN DETAIL ON EVERY CHILD EMPLOYED, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER IS SUPPOSED TO CARRY OUT PERIODIC INSPECTIONS. EMPLOYERS NOT COMPLYING WITH THE LAW AND REGULATIONS ARE LEGALLY SUBJECT TO FINES OF 65 AND/OR UP TO 3 MONTHS IN JAIL FOR EACH INFRACTION, BUT THE GOVERNMENT STILL RELIES ON PERSUASION AND TEACHING EMPLOYERS RATHER THAN PENALIZING THEM. THE DEPARTMENT OF

MANPOWER CONTINUES TO ADMIT THAT EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS IS INADEQUATE (LESS THAN 50 PERCENT OF COMPANIES EMPLOYING CHILDREN HAVE REGISTERED), AND THAT IT STILL LACKS ENOUGH QUALIFIED INSPECTORS TO CARRY OUT INSPECTIONS. OBSERVERS CLAIM THAT OVER 2 MILLION CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14 ARE WORKING HALF TO FULL TIME, MOSTLY IN FAMILY-RUN BUSINESSES IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND AT AGRICULTURAL SITES, WHERE ENFORCEMENT IS DIFFICULT. EFFORTS TO CONTROL CHILD LABOR FOCUS PRIMARILY ON INSTITUTING EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR WORKING CHILDREN.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7-HOUR WORKDAYS AND 40-HOUR WORKWEEKS, WITH ONE-HALF HOUR OF REST FOR EACH 4 HOURS OF WORK. (QUERY: DOES THE LAW ALSO PROVIDE AT LEAST ONE 24-HOUR REST PERIOD PER WEEK?) REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO

DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEES.

IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE, MINIMUM WAGES ARE ESTABLISHED BY REGIONAL WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL. THIS IS A QUADRIPARTITE BODY CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM LABOR, MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT, AND UNIVERSITIES. IT ALSO ESTABLISHES A BASIC-NEEDS FIGURE FOR EACH PROVINCE -- A MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER OR FAMILY TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. THE MINIMUM-WAGE RATES CONSTANTLY LAG FAR BEHIND THE BASIC-NEEDS FIGURES AND FALL SHORT OF PROVIDING A DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING.

OBSERVANCE OF MINIMUM WAGE AND OTHER LAWS REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND FROM REGION TO REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF THESE GUARANTEES ARE CONSIDERED TO BE FAIRLY COMMON AND OFTEN THE SUBJECT OF STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT HAVE BEEN WEAK OR NONEXISTENT. IN MAY 1989, THE MANPOWER MINISTER ISSUED REGULATIONS GIVING DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS A LEGAL BASIS TO CARRY OUT PERIODIC INSPECTIONS AND PROVIDING FOR FINES OR IMPRISONMENT FOR EMPLOYERS WHO DO NOT COMPLY. IN MARCH 1990, SPURRED ON BY AN ASIAN-AMERICAN FREE LABOR INSTITUTE/SPSI MINIMUM WAGE COMPLIANCE PROJECT, WHICH

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
SHOWED THAT 50 TO 70 PERCENT OF EMPLOYERS IN THREE TARGETED AREAS IN JAKARTA WERE PAYING LESS THAN THE MINIMUM WAGES, THE MANPOWER MINISTER BEGAN TO PROSECUTE EMPLOYERS FOR VIOLATING MINIMUM WAGE REGULATIONS.

ACCORDING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER, (NUMBER TO BE FILLED IN) PROSECUTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. IN THE MORE PROFITABLE AND LARGELY WESTERN-OPERATED OIL SECTOR, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUNCTION REASONABLY WELL. HOWEVER, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS IN THE COUNTRY'S OVER 100,000 LARGE, REGISTERED COMPANIES IN THE NONOIL SECTOR ARE STILL HAMPERED BY THE LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED INSPECTORS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER (LESS THAN 1,300), THE SLOWNESS WITH WHICH THE FIRMS ESTABLISH THE REQUIRED PLANT-SAFETY COMMITTEES, THE NEED FOR MORE AND BETTER TRAINING OF GOVERNMENT INSPECTORS AND PLANT-SAFETY PERSONNEL, AND THE LACK OF EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION FOR SOUND HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES. A NATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY COUNCIL, AN ADVISORY BODY ESTABLISHED UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER, WAS CREATED IN 1990 TO OVERSEE THE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS OF OVER 6,000 COMPANY SAFETY COMMITTEES. WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS, AND EMPLOYERS ARE PREVENTED BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO, (INSERT: BUT IN PRACTICE ENFORCEMENT IS WEAK (NOTE: ADAPTED FROM JAKARTA 15072)).

BAKER

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 011140 112228Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 HA-09 SIL-01 /011R

5966
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
EAP/IMBS: BSHARVEY
HA: DHARRIS
S/IL: AIRONS
----------3448DA 120512Z /12
P 112228Z JAN 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 011140

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL ELAB ID
SUBJECT: S/IL COMMENTS AND QUERIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT SECTION 6
REF: (A) 90 STATE 426418, (B) 90 JAKARTA 18182

1. REF B PROVIDED VERY HELPFUL COMMENTS CONCERNING REF A, WHICH CONVEYED THE DEPARTMENT'S REVISION OF SECTION 6 OF THE 1990 INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. S/IL HAS PREPARED THE FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO REF B. HA CAN ACCEPT S/IL'S PROPOSALS. AS TIME IS NOW RUNNING SHORT, WE REQUEST EMBASSY JAKARTA'S REACTIONS ASAP. THANKS MUCH.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 011140 112228Z

2. BEGIN TEXT OF S/IL MEMORANDUM TO EAP/IMBS, INFO HA AND EAP/RA, DATED JANUARY 10, 1991:

GIVEN JAKARTA'S RESPONSES TO REFTEL A, WE PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS IN THE TEXT. (THE PARAGRAPH NUMBERS REFERRED TO ARE THOSE THAT APPEAR IN THE TEXT IN REFTEL A). IN SOME CASES YOU MAY FEEL IT NECESSARY TO GO BACK TO THE POST FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION. IN ANY CASE, WE REQUEST THAT OUR COMMENTS BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE EMBASSY FOR ITS INFORMATION.

SECTION 6A, 1ST PARAGRAPH: EMBASSY'S ANSWER, REFTEL B, APPEARS TO REFUTE THE LAWYERS COMMITTEE ASSERTION AND WE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425

AGREE THAT THE ASSERTION SHOULD BE DROPPED.

2ND PARAGRAPH, 3RD SENTENCE: WE CONCUR WITH EMBASSY'S SUGGESTED CHANGE, BUT TO HIGHLIGHT THAT A CHANGE HAS TAKEN PLACE WE PROPOSE TO SUBSTITUTE "RECENTLY REORGANIZED INTO" IN LIEU OF "CONSISTING OF" (SEE REFTEL B).

3RD PARAGRAPH, 2ND SENTENCE: S/IL'S PROPOSED LANGUAGE, WHICH WAS DRAFTED PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF EMBASSY REPORTING ON THE SUBJECT, WAS BASED ON STATEMENTS REPORTEDLY MADE TO "KOMPAS" BY MINISTER SUDOMO AND REPRINTED BY FBIS, NOVEMBER 17, 1990 WITH THE CAPTION "MINISTER SAYS NEW TRADE UNION WILL NOT BE TOLERATED." THE MINISTER WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ONLY RECOGNIZE ONE ORGANIZATION FOR EVERY PROFESSION AND THE SPSI IS THE SOLE RECOGNIZED GROUPING FOR WORKERS." THIS IS A RESTATEMENT OF WHAT HAS BEEN A FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS LABOR SINCE THE CREATION OF THE FBSI AND HAS BEEN AT THE HEART OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMPLAINT AGAINST INDONESIA. IF THE GOVERNMENT NOW INTENDS TRULY TO PERMIT A PARALLEL UNION FOR THE FIRST TIME, IT WOULD MARK A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN GOVERNMENT POLICY. WE HAVE SEEN NO CONVINCING EVIDENCE, YET, THAT THIS IS THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION.

WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO ADDING THAT THE MINISTER HAS TAKEN A NEW PUBLIC POSTURE, BUT WE THINK IT IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THIS WAS NOT HIS INITIAL REACTION, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE COULD REVERSE HIMSELF ONCE AGAIN ON THIS ISSUE. WE SEE NO REASON TO BE CONFIDENT THAT SUDOMO WILL NECESSARILY STICK TO HIS CURRENT POSTURE IF "SOLIDARITY" DOES PROVE TO HAVE THE STAYING POWER TO MEET THE STIFF QUALIFICATIONS FOR REGISTRATION AS A TRADE UNION (NOT JUST AN ORGANIZATION UNDER ORMAS). IN FACT, GIVEN HIS TRACK RECORD, WE WOULD BE SURPRISED IF SUDOMO DID NOT TRY BEHIND THE SCENES TO DERAIL SOLIDARITY FROM ITS AIM OF MEETING THE TRADE UNION REQUIREMENTS.

THEREFORE WE AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING COMPROMISE REDRAFT LANGUAGE, A COPY OF WHICH WE HAVE RECEIVED AND WHICH WE BELIEVE TO HAVE BEEN CRAFTED BY HA: "HOWEVER, THE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS INITIALLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT APPROVE THE NEW TRADE UNION WHEN IT SEEKS TO REGISTER, BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD VIOLATE THE GOVERNMENT'S SINGLE TRADE UNION

POLICY. HE LATER STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TOLERATE THE NEW ORGANIZATION IF IT DID NOT DO ANYTHING ILLEGAL."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 STATE 011140 112228Z

4TH PARAGRAPH: WE AGREE TO THE SUGGESTION (EAP'S WE PRESUME) TO ADD: "DURING AUGUST, FOR THE FIRST TIME, A KORPRI SUBUNIT SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED FOUR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS WITH THE STATE-OWNED COAL COMPANY."

5TH PARAGRAPH, 2ND SENTENCE: WE APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S CONFIRMATION.

8TH PARAGRAPH, 1ST NOTE: WE APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S ATTEMPT AT CONFIRMATION. SUBJECT TO THE MINOR MODIFICATION SUGGESTED BELOW, WE AGREE TO GOING ALONG WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S INFORMATION PROVIDED THE EMBASSY, EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE GOI ASSERTED TO THE ILO THAT DECREE NO. 123 HAD NEVER BEEN APPLIED. (THE GOVERNMENT MERELY STATED THAT THE DECREE WAS ISSUED OVER 25 YEARS AGO AND "IS NO LONGER RELEVANT TO THE CURRENT SITUATION" SINCE "MANY OF...(THE) GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES, ENTERPRISES AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ARE NO LONGER IN OPERATION."). THE MINOR MODIFICATION WE SUGGEST IS TO INJECT "REPORTEDLY" AFTER "ALTHOUGH" AND BEFORE "NEVER" IN THE PROPOSED TEXT, REFTEL A.

8TH PARAGRAPH, 2D NOTE: WE UNDERSTAND THE EMBASSY'S RESPONSE TO BE TO CHANGE THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE IN THIS PARAGRAPH TO READ: "THERE WERE 45 STRIKES REPORTED IN 1990, COMPARED TO 19 IN 1989, MANY OF WHICH WERE NOT LEGAL." WE AGREE, PROVIDED THAT THIS MEANS THERE HAVE BEEN SOME LEGAL STRIKES IN INDONESIA AND THAT THE EMBASSY CANNOT CONFIRM THAT "MOST" OR "ALL" HAVE NOT BEEN LEGAL.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 05 STATE 011140 112228Z

9TH PARAGRAPH: WE UNDERSTAND THAT "AT A TEXTILE FACTORY" WILL BE INSERTED IN THE TEXT IN THE APPROPRIATE PLACE.

10TH PARAGRAPH, 1ST NOTE: WE WISH THERE WERE GREATER DEFINITION ON THIS QUESTION SINCE IT GOES TO THE HEART OF THE ISSUE WHETHER THERE REALLY IS A RIGHT TO STRIKE IN

INDONESIA. BASED ON THE EMBASSY'S RESPONSE, WE BELIEVE THAT "ARE SUBMITTED" IN THE TEXT SHOULD BE CHANGED TO "ARE REQUIRED TO BE SUBMITTED BY THE CONTENDING PARTIES." HOWEVER, IF EMBASSY OBJECTS WE COULD CONCUR WITH "ARE EXPECTED TO BE SUBMITTED BY THE CONTENDING PARTIES," PROVIDED EMBASSY CAN RECONFIRM THAT THERE INDEED HAVE BEEN AT LEAST SOME LEGAL STRIKES IN INDONESIA.

10TH PARAGRAPH, 2D NOTE: OK. NO CHANGE.

10TH PARAGRAPH, 3D NOTE: THE IMPLICATION OF THE EMBASSY'S RESPONSE IS NOT TO MODIFY THE TEXT FURTHER SINCE ANY ANSWER TO THE QUESTION WOULD BE MERE CONJECTURE. WE WOULD AGREE, PROVIDED WHAT THE EMBASSY IS SAYING IS THAT THERE HAVE BEEN CASES WHERE THE DEPARTMENT'S MEDIATION EFFORTS HAVE FAILED AND THAT IN THOSE CASES THE ISSUE HAS THEN GONE FROM THERE TO EITHER RESOLUTION BY THE TRIPARTITE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OR BINDING ARBITRATION. (IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE TEXT WHO ARE THE BINDING ARBITRATORS IN THE LATTER CASE). IF, HOWEVER, THE LAST STOP IN ALL THESE CASES IS DEPARTMENT "MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION" (THAT IS, DEPARTMENT ARBITRATION BY A DIFFERENT NAME), THEN WE SHOULD NOTE THAT "MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION" IS A EUPHEMISM FOR DEPARTMENT BINDING ARBITRATION.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

6B, 1ST PARAGRAPH, LST NOTE: AS PER THE EMBASSY'S RESPONSE, WE CONCUR WITH INSERTING THE EMBASSY'S LANGUAGE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SENTENCE IN THE TEXT WHICH BEGINS WITH "AS A TRANSITIONAL STAGE," AND ENDS WITH "DEFINING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT," AS FOLLOWS:

"BEFORE A COMPANY CAN REGISTER OR RENEW ITS COMPANY REGULATION IT MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT IT HAS CONSULTED WITH A COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES, IN THE ABSENCE OF A UNION."

1ST PARAGRAPH, 2D NOTE: BASED ON THE EMBASSY'S RESPONSE, WE PROPOSE AN INSERTION ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: "THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS ARE FREELY NEGOTIATED BETWEEN UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE VARIES."

2D PARAGRAPH: BASED ON THE EMBASSY RESPONSE, WE SUGGEST TACKING ON THE FOLLOWING INSERTION AT THE END OF THE 1ST SENTENCE: "STEMMING FROM LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS AND CONCERN

ABOUT EMPLOYER RESISTANCE."

6C, 1ST NOTE: OK, NO CHANGE IN TEXT THIS YEAR, BUT WE REQUEST THAT EMBASSY RESEARCH FOR NEXT YEAR.

6C, 2D NOTE: WE DEFER TO HA, BUT WOULD BE INCLINED TO RETAIN THE TEXT SINCE THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT REJECTED THE ASSERTIONS AND HAS AGREED TO INVESTIGATE THEM.

6D: WE APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S CLARIFICATION THAT THE SENTENCE IN THE TEXT INDICATING INADEQUATE EMPLOYER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

COMPLIANCE APPLIES TO THE EDUCATION LAW AS WELL AS TO CHILD LABOR REGULATIONS. THE QUESTION WAS RELEVANT BECAUSE LAST YEAR'S REPORT SAID (IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMPULSORY SCHOOLING LAW) THAT ENFORCEMENT OF THESE LAWS HAD "IMPROVED SUBSTANTIALLY." IN VIEW OF SPACE LIMITATIONS, HOWEVER, WE AGREE THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO ADD AN ADDITIONAL SENTENCE REFERRING SPECIFICALLY TO THE LACK OF EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE EDUCATION LAWS THIS YEAR.

6E, 2D PARAGRAPH: WE UNDERSTAND, THEN, THAT NO CHANGE IN THE TEXT IS CALLED FOR.

6E, 4TH PARAGRAPH, 1ST NOTE: BASED ON THE EMBASSY'S RESPONSE, "DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER" SHOULD BE INSERTED IN THE 3D SENTENCE OF THIS PARAGRAPH AFTER "QUALIFIED" AND BEFORE "INSPECTORS--LESS THAN 1,300";.

6E, 4TH PARAGRAPH, 2D NOTE: BASED ON THE EMBASSY RESPONSE, INSERT "IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER" AFTER "WAS CREATED" AND BEFORE "TO OVERSEE..." IN THE TEXT.

END TEXT.
EAGLEBURGER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C57

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 426418 190143Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AMAD-01 HA-09 SIL-01 /012R

4391
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: DLLINDE
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
EAP/RA: BAMALKIN (INFO)
HA: JUNDERRINER (SUBS)
----------2C4B29 190148Z /38
O 190143Z DEC 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 426418

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM ELAB ID
SUBJECT: SECTION 6, 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA (TAKE 2)

1. LOU/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECTION 6 (WORKER RIGHTS) OF DRAFT 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA AS CLEARED BY EB, HA, L/HRR, AND S/IL. PLEASE PROVIDE ANY FURTHER EMBASSY COMMENTS/REVISIONS BY DECEMBER 24.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 426418 190143Z

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS, INCLUDING THOSE IN EXPORT-PROCESSING ZONES, ARE FREE TO FORM OR JOIN UNIONS WITHOUT PREVIOUS AUTHORIZATION, BUT IN ORDER TO BARGAIN ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES A UNION MUST MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION AND REGISTER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION ARE REPRESENTATION IN AT LEAST 20 OF THE 27 PROVINCES, BRANCH OFFICES IN AT LEAST 100 DISTRICTS, AND 1,000 LOCAL UNITS AT PLANT LEVEL. THE UNIONS DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES WHILE UNDER CLOSE GOVERNMENT SCRUTINY AND SUBJECT TO GOVERNMENT APPROVAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
PRIOR TO REGISTRATION. (NOTE: EMBASSY. THE LAWYERS' COMMITTEE SAYS THAT UNION LEADERS ARE APPOINTED, REPEAT APPOINTED, AT ALL BUT THE FACTORY LEVEL. IS THIS TRUE?)

ABOUT 6 PERCENT OF THE 76-MILLION-MEMBER WORK FORCE IS ORGANIZED. THE ALL INDONESIA WORKERS UNION (SPSI), WHICH GROUPS TOGETHER PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS, IS THE ONLY RECOGNIZED INTERSECTORAL TRADE UNION BODY. THE SPSI'S PREDECESSOR ORGANIZATION, FBSI, WAS SET UP IN 1973 THROUGH A GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED MERGER OF VARIOUS NON-COMMUNIST UNIONS AND ADOPTED ITS PRESENT NAME AND STRUCTURE, ALSO WITH HEAVY GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT, IN 1985. THE SPSI, CONSISTING OF 9 DEPARTMENTS COVERING BROAD INDUSTRIAL SECTORS AND 9 SPECIALIZED INSTITUTES, HAS ABOUT 10,000 LOCAL UNITS AT THE PLANT LEVEL AND CLAIMS OVER 3 MILLION MEMBERS, ALTHOUGH ONLY ABOUT 900,000 ACTUALLY PAY DUES.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

IN NOVEMBER A NUMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGNERS ANNOUNCED THE CREATION OF THE SETIA KAWAN (SOLIDARITY) FREE TRADE UNION, ALLEGING THAT THE SPSI HAD FAILED TO DEFEND WORKER INTERESTS ADEQUATELY. HOWEVER, THE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT APPROVE THE NEW TRADE UNION WHEN IT SEEKS TO REGISTER BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD VIOLATE THE GOVERNMENT'S SINGLE TRADE UNION POLICY. A NUMBER OF GROUPS AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, E.G., THE JOURNALIST ASSOCIATION AND THE JOINT SECRETARIAT OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONS, ARE PERMITTED TO CARRY OUT CERTAIN LIMITED TRADE UNION FUNCTIONS AND OPERATE OPENLY, BUT THEY MAY NOT ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. THE NONUNION TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (PGRI) IN APRIL WAS ALLOWED TO REGISTER AS A TRADE UNION WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION FOR THIS SECTOR. THE PGRI, WHICH CONSISTS OF 1.3 MILLION TEACHERS, INCLUDING TEACHERS IN RELIGIOUS, PRIVATE, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, HAS REPRESENTATION IN ALL 27 PROVINCES.

STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND CIVIL SERVANTS MUST BELONG TO KORPRI, A NONUNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS.

THE GOVERNMENT AND EMPLOYERS HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER UNION AFFAIRS. A RETIRED MILITARY LIEUTENANT COLONEL AND GOLKAR DISTRICT CHAIRMAN WITH SOME PRIOR UNION EXPERIENCE (NOTE: EMBASSY. PLEASE RECONFIRM THIS.) WAS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
RECENTLY ELECTED CHAIRMAN OF THE LARGEST PROVINCIAL BRANCH OF THE SPSI, PARTLY DUE TO GOVERNMENT BACKING. SPSI OFFICIALS ARE PRESSURED TO JOIN GOLKAR, AND GOLKAR MEMBERS

DOMINATE THE SPSI LEADERSHIP.

UNDER THE ORMAS LAW (SEE SECTION 2.B.), GOVERNMENT APPROVAL IS NEEDED FOR MEETINGS OUTSIDE UNION HEADQUARTERS. PERMISSION IS ROUTINELY GIVEN. A UNION MAY BE DISSOLVED IF THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES IT IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA. THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS LAYING OUT THE PROCEDURES FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF A UNION, AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO CASES OF UNION DISSOLUTION.

THE SPSI MAINTAINS INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS, BUT IT IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION, EXCEPT THE ASEAN TRADE UNION COUNCIL. THE SPSI'S GOVERNMENT-ENDORSED APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS IS STILL PENDING. SOME ELEMENTS OF THE SPSI, SUCH AS THE PORT AND MARITIME WORKERS, MAINTAIN LINKS WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION SECRETARIATS. THE JOINT SECRETARIAT, GROUPING ELEMENTS OF THE SPSI AND UNIONS NOT LEGALLY RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT, HAS LINKS WITH THE WORLD CONFEDERATION OF LABOR.

WHILE PANCASILA PRINCIPLES CALL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES TO BE SETTLED BY CONSENSUS, ALL ORGANIZED WORKERS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CIVIL SERVANTS, HAVE A LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. IN JUNE PRESIDENT SOEHARTO REVOKED A 1963 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE WHICH PROHIBITED STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN VITAL INDUSTRIES, SERVICES, AND ENTERPRISES. THIS PROHIBITION, ALTHOUGH NEVER IMPLEMENTED, WAS THEORETICALLY APPLICABLE TO ABOUT 170,000 WORKERS. (NOTE: EMBASSY. IS THIS CORRECT?) BEFORE A STRIKE CAN

OCCUR IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE LAW REQUIRES INTENSIVE MEDIATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND PRIOR NOTICE REGARDING THE INTENT TO STRIKE, BUT NO APPROVAL IS REQUIRED. MOST DISPUTES, HOWEVER, ARE SETTLED THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND CONSENSUS. AS OF JUNE, THERE WERE 26 STRIKES REPORTED IN 1990 COMPARED TO 19 STRIKES FOR ALL OF

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
1989. (NOTE: EMBASSY. WERE THE AFOREMENTIONED STRIKES LEGAL? CAN YOU UPDATE THE FIGURE FOR STRIKES IN 1990?) MANY STRIKES ARE NOT REPORTED.

STRIKE OUTCOMES VARIED. IN ONE HIGHLY PUBLICIZED STRIKE, MORE THAN 21 WORKERS, INCLUDING SOME UNION OFFICIALS, WHO PROTESTED THE DISMISSAL OF 7 WOMEN WORKERS AND LOW WAGES, WERE DISMISSED. (NOTE: EMBASSY. IN WHAT INDUSTRY WAS THIS STRIKE?) THE MINIMUM WAGE WAS INCREASED, AND THE SEVEN WOMEN REHIRED, BUT THE STRIKERS WERE NOT.

PRIVATE SECTOR INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ARE SUBMITTED TO TRIPARTITE (GOVERMENT, EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEES) ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. (NOTE: EMBASSY. IS SUCH SUBMISSION MANDATORY OR OPTIONAL? BY WHOM IS IT SUBMITTED?) THESE TRIBUNALS HEAR ARGUMENTS AND ISSUE DECISIONS ENFORCEABLE THROUGH THE COURTS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER CAN NULLIFY THE DECISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS ON LEGAL OR NATIONAL INTEREST GROUNDS. ALTHOUGH TECHNICALLY THE MINISTER'S DECISIONS CAN BE APPEALED TO THE COURTS, IN PRACTICE IT IS RARELY DONE. (NOTE: EMBASSY. WHAT IS THE REASON WHY SUCH DECISIONS ARE "RARELY" APPEALED?) UNDER THE LAW, THE PARTIES CAN ELECT BINDING ARBITRATION IN LIEU OF THE TRIPARTITE MECHANISM. HOWEVER, THIS PROVISION IS SELDOM USED; MOST CASES ARE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HANDLED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE. (NOTE: EMBASSY. WHY IS THIS PROVISION SELDOM USED?)

THE CENTRAL BOARD OF KORPRI AAND ITS SECRETARIATS AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL HAVE EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BUREAUS, WHICH ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTLING EMPLOYEE DISPUTES. SOME GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS HAVE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER, WHICH CALL FOR THE CONVENING OF A LABOR COMMITTEE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES.

INDONESIA HAS RATIFIED INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) CONVENTION 98 ON THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY, BUT HAS NOT RATIFIED CONVENTION 87 ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION.

INDONESIA HAS FOR MANY YEARS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF COMPLAINTS IN THE ILO. THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, A LONGSTANDING CRITIC, HAS BROUGHT WORKER RIGHTS COMPLAINTS AGAINST

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
INDONESIA IN U.S. TRADE PROCEEDINGS. IN MAY 1989, THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (CFA) REACHED FINAL CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE UNCOMPLETED ASPECTS OF A 1987 COMPLAINT BY THE ICFTU PERTAINING TO THE BAN ON ORGANIZING PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS, INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION AGAINST ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION, AND RESTRICTIONS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE. CONCLUDING THAT A LARGE SECTION OF THE WORK FORCE DOES NOT HAVE FREEDOM TO FORM OR JOIN A WORKERS' ORGANIZATION OF ITS OWN CHOOSING, THE CFA REQUESTED THE GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW PUBLIC EMPLOYEES TO ESTABLISH UNIONS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OUTSIDE KORPRI AND TO REMOVE OTHER RESTRICTIONS. IN APRIL AND MAY 1990, THE GOVERNMENT INFORMED THE CFA THAT THE 1963 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE WOULD BE REPEALED AND THAT THE PGRI HAD REGISTERED AS A UNION. IT ALSO ARGUED THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR PUBLIC SERVANTS TO HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS THE LEGISLATION ADEQUATELY COVERS CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. IN JUNE THE CFA POINTED OUT THAT THE LIMITED NATURE OF THE "ASSOCIATIONS" PUBLIC SERVANTS CAN FORM WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A RESTRICTION ON UNIONIZATION, EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO EXPLICIT LEGISLATIVE BAN. IN NOVEMBER THE CFA TOOK NOTE OF THE REPEAL OF THE 1963 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE AND OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REPORT THAT COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN CONCLUDED BY ONE KORPRI SUBUNIT.

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, BUT ONLY REGISTERED TRADE UNIONS CAN DO IT. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER VIGOROUSLY PROMOTES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PANCASILA. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE SPSI'S COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS ARE NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED BILATERALLY WITH EMPLOYERS. ONCE NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED A REGISTERED UNION, THE EMPLOYER IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO BARGAIN. (NOTE: EMBASSY: IN THE ABSENCE OF A REGISTERED UNION, HOW AND BY WHOM ARE THE TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT ESTABLISHED?) AS A TRANSITIONAL STAGE TO ENCOURAGE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT EVERY COMPANY WHICH HAS 25 OR MORE EMPLOYEES MUST ISSUE COMPANY REGULATIONS DEFINING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. OF THE APPROXIMATELY 10,000

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SPSI UNITS, ONLY ABOUT HALF HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. (NOTE: EMBASSY. ARE THESE REALLY NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS?) BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS. IF NOT, THE MATTER IS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION/ARBITRATION. IN PRACTICE, MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED FOR 1 MORE.

THE LAW APPLIES EQUALLY IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES. WHILE SOME COMPANIES IN THESE ZONES HAVE SPSI UNITS NONE HAVE NEGOTIATED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. (NOTE: EMBASSY. WHY HAVE NONE OF THESE NEGOTIATED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS?) REGULATIONS EXPRESSLY FORBID EMPLOYERS PREJUDGING OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, AND EMPLOYEES ARE URGED TO REPORT HARASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE SPSI CLAIMS THAT SOME EMPLOYERS DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ITS MEMBERS AND THOSE WISHING TO FORM SPSI UNITS.

MANY STRIKES AND PROTESTS TAKE PLACE IN SUPPORT OF FIRED UNION OFFICIALS. CHARGES OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE HANDLED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. MANY UNION MEMBERS BELIEVE THAT THE TRIBUNALS GENERALLY SIDE WITH THE EMPLOYER. TWO MEMBERS OF THE JAKARTA CITY COUNCIL'S SOCIAL WELFARE COMMISSION STATED PUBLICLY THAT THE TRIBUNALS ARE INCLINED TO FAVOR EMPLOYERS WHEN SETTLING LABOR DISPUTES. BECAUSE OF THIS PARTIALITY, MANY WORKERS REJECT OR AVOID THE PROCESS AND PRESENT THEIR DISPUTES BEFORE THE PARLIAMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WORKERS CAN ORGANIZE WITHOUT RESTRICTION IN A PRIVATE ENTERPRISE EVEN IF IT IS DESIGNATED VITAL BY THE GOVERNMENT. IF THE STATE HAS A PARTIAL INTEREST, THE ENTERPRISE IS CONSIDERED TO BE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE DOMAIN, BUT THIS DOES NOT LEGALLY LIMIT ORGANIZING. THERE ARE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT/PRIVATE JOINT ENTERPRISES WHICH HAVE LABOR UNIONS AND WHICH BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

FORCED LABOR IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. (NOTE: EMBASSY. IS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
THERE A LAW PROHIBITING THIS?) INDONESIA HAS RATIFIED ILO CONVENTION 29 CONCERNING FORCED LABOR. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, A U.S.-BASED NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, ASSERTS THAT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS IN IRIAN JAYA COOPERATE WITH JAKARTA-BASED TIMBER COMPANIES TO COMPEL ASMAT TRIBESPEOPLE TO CUT DOWN TREES AND TRANSPORT THEM DOWNSTREAM TO WAITING SHIPS, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT. IT ALSO ALLEGES THAT THERE ARE DOCUMENTED REPORTS OF LABOR CONTRACTORS IN JAKARTA SELLING GIRLS AS DOMESTIC SERVANTS OR TO BROTHELS NEAR PLANTATIONS, AND THAT MEN ARE SOLD AS AGRICULTURAL WORKERS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS RESPONDED THAT IT IS INVESTIGATING THE ALLEGATIONS. (NOTE: EMBASSY. WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ABOUT THESE ASSERTIONS, E.G., IS THE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM LESS THAN VOLUNTARY? ALSO, NOTE REQUEST IN SECTION 5 TO COMMENT ON TRADITIONAL PRACTICES UNDERCUTTING STATE POLICY IN SOME AREAS.)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

CHILD LABOR CONTINUES TO BE A MAJOR PROBLEM. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A CLASS OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 14 WHO, FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS, MUST WORK AND NOTES THAT THE CHILD LABOR LAWS HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY ENFORCED. THESE LAWS PROVIDE DETAILED SAFEGUARDS, INCLUDING REQUIREMENTS FOR PARENTAL CONSENT, PROHIBITION OF DANGEROUS WORK AND NIGHT WORK, AND A LIMIT OF THE WORKDAY TO 4 HOURS. EMPLOYERS MUST COOPERATE WITH PUBLIC AUTHORITIES TO ENSURE THAT CHILDREN UNDER 14 COMPLY WITH THE 1989 NATIONAL EDUCATION LAW, WHICH REQUIRES THAT CHILDREN COMPLETE 9 YEARS OF SCHOOLING BEGINNING AT AGE 7. (NOTE: EMBASSY. HAS THERE BEEN ANY PROGRESS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW?)

EMPLOYERS ARE REQUIRED TO REPORT IN DETAIL ON EVERY CHILD EMPLOYED, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER CARRIES OUT PERIODIC INSPECTIONS. EMPLOYERS NOT COMPLYING WITH THE LAW AND REGULATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO FINES OF 65 AND/OR UP TO 3 MONTHS IN JAIL FOR EACH INFRACTION, BUT THE GOVERNMENT STILL RELIES ON PERSUASION AND TEACHING EMPLOYERS RATHER THAN PENALIZING THEM. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER CONTINUES TO ADMIT THAT EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS IS INADEQUATE (LESS THAN 50 PERCENT OF COMPANIES EMPLOYING CHILDREN HAVE REGISTERED), AND THAT IT

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

STILL LACKS ENOUGH QUALIFIED INSPECTORS TO CARRY OUT INSPECTIONS. OBSERVERS CLAIM THAT AS MANY AS 2 MILLION CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14 ARE WORKING HALF TO FULL TIME, MOSTLY IN FAMILY-RUN BUSINESSES IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND AT AGRICULTURAL SITES, WHERE ENFORCEMENT IS

DIFFICULT. EFFORTS TO CONTROL CHILD LABOR FOCUS PRIMARILY ON INSTITUTING EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR WORKING CHILDREN.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7-HOUR WORKDAYS AND 40-HOUR WORKWEEKS, WITH ONE-HALF HOUR OF REST FOR EACH 4 HOURS OF WORK. THE DAILY OVERTIME RATE IS ONE AND ONE-HALF TIMES THE NORMAL HOURLY RATE FOR THE FIRST HOUR, AND TWICE THE HOURLY RATE FOR ADDITIONAL OVERTIME. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEES.

IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE, MINIMUM WAGES ARE ESTABLISHED BY REGIONAL WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL. THIS IS A QUADRIPARTITITE BODY CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM LABOR, MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT, AND UNIVERSITIES. IT ALSO ESTABLISHES A BASIC-NEEDS FIGURE FOR EACH PROVINCE--A MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER OR FAMILY TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. THE MINIMUM WAGE RATES CONSTANTLY LAG FAR BEHIND THE BASIC-NEEDS FIGURES AND FALL SHORT OF PROVIDING A DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING. THE MINIMUM WAGE IN THE CAPITAL CITY OF JAKARTA IS 1.13 PER DAY. (NOTE: EMBASSY. IN WHAT SECTOR? A 1.19 HOURLY RATE WAS REPORTED IN JUNE FOR THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR IN ACEH. PLEASE CLARIFY.) LABOR LAW AND MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PROVIDE WORKERS WITH A VARIETY OF OTHER BENEFITS SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY, AND WORKERS IN MORE MODERN FACILITIES OFTEN RECEIVE HEALTH BENEFITS AND FREE MEALS.

OBSERVANCE OF MINIMUM WAGE AND OTHER LAWS REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND FROM REGION TO REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF THESE

GUARANTEES ARE CONSIDERED TO BE FAIRLY COMMON AND OFTEN THE SUBJECT OF STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT HAVE BEEN WEAK OR NONEXISTENT. IN MAY 1989, THE MANPOWER MINISTER ISSUED REGULATIONS GIVING DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS A LEGAL BASIS TO CARRY OUT PERIODIC INSPECTIONS AND PROVIDING FOR FINES OR IMPRISONMENT FOR EMPLOYERS WHO DO NOT COMPLY. IN MARCH 1990, SPURRED ON BY AN ASIAN-AMERICAN FREE LABOR INSTITUTE/SPSI MINIMUM WAGE COMPLIANCE PROJECT WHICH SHOWED THAT 50 TO 70 PERCENT OF EMPLOYERS IN THREE TARGETED AREAS IN JAKARTA WERE PAYING LESS THAN THE MINIMUM WAGES, THE MANPOWER MINISTER BEGAN TO PROSECUTE EMPLOYERS FOR VIOLATING MINIMUM WAGE REGULATIONS. THE PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAM (ASTEK) FOLLOWED SUIT AND BEGAN PROSECUTING EMPLOYERS WHO HAD NOT ENROLLED THEIR EMPLOYEES IN ASTEK AS REQUIRED BY LAW. THE ACTUAL NUMBER PROSECUTED FOR MINIMUM WAGE VIOLATIONS WAS ABOUT 30.

BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. IN THE MORE PROFITABLE AND LARGELY WESTERN-OPERATED OIL SECTOR, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUNCTION REASONABLY WELL. HOWEVER, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS IN THE COUNTRY'S OVER 100,000 LARGER, REGISTERED COMPANIES IN THE NONOIL SECTOR ARE STILL HAMPERED BY THE LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED INSPECTORS--LESS THAN 1,300, (NOTE: EMBASSY. WHO DO THESE INSPECTORS WORK FOR?); THE SLOWNESS WITH WHICH THE

FIRMS ESTABLISH THE REQUIRED PLANT-SAFETY COMMITTEES; THE NEED FOR MORE AND BETTER TRAINING OF GOVERNMENT INSPECTORS AND PLANT-SAFETY PERSONNEL; AND THE LACK OF EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION FOR SOUND HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES. A NATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY COUNCIL WAS CREATED TO OVERSEE THE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS OF OVER 6,000 COMPANY SAFETY COMMITTEES. (NOTE: EMBASSY. IS THIS COUNCIL PART OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER?)

WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS, AND EMPLOYERS ARE PREVENTED BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO. AN ILO-SPONSORED PROGRAM TO ENHANCE THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES OF GOVERNMENT INSPECTORS AND PLANT PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF CHEMICAL AND MAJOR HAZARDS CONTROL WAS SIGNED IN 1988, AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES TO INCREASE INSPECTION CAPABILITIES.

BAKER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C58

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 400309 272230Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AMAD-01 HA-09 SIL-01 /012R

PAGES MISSING

DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS:DLLINDE:DLL
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS:RWTEARE
HA:JUNDERRINER (INFO) EAP/RA:BMALKIN (INFO)
----------224942 272230Z /38
P 272223Z NOV 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 400309

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR MALAYSIA (TAKE 2)

1. LOU/NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE DRAFT 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA, AS REVISED BY THE BUREAU OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPH 4. THE DEPARTMENT ASKS THAT THE EMBASSY EXAMINE THIS REVISED VERSION CAREFULLY AND SUPPLY ANSWERS/ELABORATIONS AS NOTED IN THE TEXT UNDER SECTIONS 1C, 1D, 1F, 2A, 2D, 3, 4, 5, 6A, AND 6C. THIS REVISED DRAFT HAS ALSO GONE TO OTHER DEPARTMENT OFFICES AND BUREAUS FOR CLEARANCE. HA HAS ASKED EAP/IMBS TO RETURN A COMPLETED AND CLEARED REPORT BY DECEMBER 13. EAP/IMBS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 400309 272230Z
WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING YOUR ANSWERS, ELABORATIONS, AND ANY PROPOSED REVISIONS BY DECEMBER 6.

3. THE EMBASSY WILL NOTE THAT HA HAS MADE CONSIDERABLE SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS TO THE INTRODUCTION AND SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 5. HA HAS CONSIDERABLY REDUCED THE LENGTH OF SECTION 6. S/IL HAS HAS INDICATED IT WILL HAVE REVISIONS TO SECTION 6, BUT S/IL WISHED TO AWAIT HA'S FIRST EDIT BEFORE OFFERING LANGUAGE. EAP/IMBS WILL FORWARD S/IL'S

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
REVISIONS AS SOON AS THEY ARE AVAILABLE.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT REPORT:

INDONESIA IS IN FACT, IF NOT IN THEORY, A ONE-PARTY STATE IN WHICH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND THE MILITARY WIELD POWER. SINCE THE MID-1960S, AFTER AN ABORTIVE COUP BACKED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY, RETIRED AND ACTIVE-DUTY MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN TECHNOCRATS HAVE EXERCISED CENTRALIZED EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY UNDER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S LEADERSHIP. THE PARTLY ELECTED, PARTLY APPOINTED PARLIAMENT (DPR) CONSIDERS BUT DOES NOT INITIATE LEGISLATION. THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR)--CONSISTING OF 500 APPOINTED MEMBERS AND THE 500 DPR MEMBERS--MEETS EVERY 5 YEARS TO APPROVE GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY AND TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT.

INDONESIA IS THE FIFTH MOST POPULOUS COUNTRY IN THE WORLD AND THE LARGEST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. SINCE INDEPENDENCE, INDONESIAN LEADERS HAVE SOUGHT TO CREATE A NATIONAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

IDENTITY AND TO ACCOMMODATE ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC, AND GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSITIES, WHILE FOSTERING COHESION, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND DEVELOPMENT. THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES ALLEGIANCE TO "PANCASILA," FIVE BROAD, GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL LIFE: BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD, A JUST AND CIVILIZED HUMANITY, INDONESIAN NATIONAL UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE.

THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI)--WHICH INCLUDE THE MILITARY SERVICES AND THE POLICE--NUMBER ABOUT 416,000. THE ARMY CONSTITUTES ABOUT HALF AND FOCUSES MAINLY ON INTERNAL SECURITY. UNDER A "DUAL FUNCTION" CONCEPT, MANY MILITARY OFFICERS SERVE IN THE CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY AT ALL LEVELS AND IN PARLIAMENT. FREQUENT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST DWINDLING INSURGENCY MOVEMENTS IN THE PROVINCES OF EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA TOOK PLACE. IN EAST TIMOR, AT LEAST 15 CIVILIANS WERE KILLED BY THE MILITARY IN 1990, A FIGURE DOWN FROM PREVIOUS YEARS. AN UPSURGE IN ACEH OF SEPARATIST VIOLENCE AND ALLEGED VIOLENT CRIM

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED C62

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 421016 312046Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EB-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-20	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	FMP-01	/081R					

3513
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
HA: PSHOTZE
EAP/RA: BAMALKIN (INFO)
----------BCE5B3 312047Z /38
P 312043Z DEC 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 421016

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM ELAB ID
SUBJECT: HA COMMENTS CONCERNING EMB-2 VERSION OF THE 1991 INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
REF: (A) 91 JAKARTA 16396

1. LOU-NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. HA PROVIDES THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS CONCERNING EMBASSY
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 421016 312046Z
JAKARTA'S PROPOSED REVISIONS TO SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 5 OF THE HA-1 TEXT OF THE 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA. COMMENTS REGARDING REVISIONS TO SECTION 6 WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL. COMMENTS ARE KEYED TO THE SUBPARAGRAPHS OF REFTEL. (THE ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC COMMENT ABOUT A SUBPARAGRAPH INDICATES HA AGREEMENT WITH THE EMBASSY'S SUGGESTED REVISION.)

-- INTRODUCTION, PARA. 5, NEW SENTENCE 3 AND FOLLOWING:
REMOVE THE WORDS "POLITICALLY CHARGED" FROM NEW SENTENCE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

3. DELETE THE LAST CLAUSE FROM THE FINAL SENTENCE AND REPLACE IT WITH A NEW LAST SENTENCE: "THE COMMISSION ISSUED AN ADVANCE REPORT ON DECEMBER 26 (SEE SECTION 1.A.)."

-- SECTION 1.A., PARA. 1, FIRST SENTENCE: HA DOES NOT AGREE TO ADD THE PHRASE "PRECIPITATED BY THE REBELS". HA ARGUES THAT MANY OBSERVERS BELIEVE GOI POLICY PRECIPITATED THE INSURGENCY.

-- SECTION 1.A., PARA. 1, SECOND TO LAST SENTENCE: HA CAN ACCEPT THE EMBASSY'S NEW WORDING SO LONG AS "CLEARLY" IS INSERTED BETWEEN "FORCES" AND "APPEAR".

-- SECTION 1.A., NEW PARA. 2: IN THE INTEREST OF CONSERVING SPACE, HA OFFERS THE FOLLOWING REVISION, BUT IS NOT WEDDED TO SPECIFIC LANGUAGE:

IN EAST TIMOR, WHERE A SHIFT FROM SECURITY OPERATIONS TO CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS BY THE ARMED FORCES HAD BROUGHT ABOUT A GRADUAL REDUCTION IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SITUATION DETERIORATED SHARPLY BEGINNING IN OCTOBER. ON OCTOBER 28, SHORTLY AFTER A PROPOSED VISIT BY PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENTARIANS WAS CANCELLED, A CLASH BETWEEN PRO- AND ANTI-INDONESIA YOUTHS RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF TWO YOUTHS, ONE FROM EACH FACTION. A MEMORIAL SERVICE FOR THE ANTI-INDONESIA YOUTH ON NOVEMBER 12 IN DILI LED TO A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH THOUSANDS TOOK PART. AN ARMY MAJOR WAS STABBED AND, LATER AT A CEMETERY, SECURITY FORCES OPENED FIRE ON THE CROWD, KILLING AND WOUNDING SCORES OF CIVILIANS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE USE OF SUCH DEADLY FORCE WAS JUSTIFIED. IN ADDITION, THE ACKNOWLEDGED 19 KILLED WERE BURIED IN UNMARKED GRAVES AND, FOR TWELVE DAYS AFTER THE INCIDENT, THE ARMY DENIED THE ICRC ACCESS TO THE MILITARY HOSPITAL TO WHICH THE DEAD AND WOUNDED HAD BEEN TAKEN.

WITHIN A WEEK, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO APPOINTED SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO A NATIONAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT, THE FIRST SUCH COMMISSION IN INDONESIAN HISTORY. THE COMMISSION SPENT MORE THAN TWO WEEKS INVESTIGATING IN EAST TIMOR. IN A PRELIMINARY REPORT PRESENTED DECEMBER 26, THE COMMISSION CONCLUDED THAT "ABOUT" 50 HAD BEEN KILLED AND ACKNOWLEDGED SOME

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

EYEWITNESS REPORTS THAT THE TOTAL WAS OVER 100. THE COMMISSION SAID THAT MORE THAN THE PREVIOUS OFFICIAL FIGURE OF 91 WERE WOUNDED. THE REPORT WENT ON TO STATE THAT "THE ACTS OF A NUMBER OF ARMED FORCES MEMBERS EXCEEDED THE BOUNDS OF APPROPRIATENESS," AND CALLED FOR LEGAL MEASURES TO BE TAKEN AGAINST ALL THOSE SUSPECTED OF VIOLATING INDONESIAN LAW.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TWO DAYS AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THE REPORT, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ORDERED THAT THE MILITARY COMMANDERS IN EAST TIMOR AND THE LARGER REGION WHICH INCLUDES EAST TIMOR BE RELIEVED. HE ALSO ORDERED THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF TO HEAD AN "HONORARY COUNCIL" IN AN INVESTIGATION OF HOW SECURITY FORCES HANDLED THE INCIDENT.

-- SECTION 1.A., FORMER PARA. 2: IN CONSIDERING WHETHER TO DELETE THE LAST SENTENCE, HA REQUESTS ANY BACKGROUND INFORMATION THE EMBASSY HAS CONCERNING SALOSA'S ESCAPE AND DEATH. DID THE POLICE FIND THE BODY? DID ANY INDEPENDENT (NON-POLICE) OBSERVERS SEE THE BODY? IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE, OTHER THAN RUMOR, THAT HE WAS KILLED?

-- SECTION 2.C., PARA. 1, SENTENCE 3: HA CAN ACCEPT THE EMBASSY'S REVISED SENTENCE IF THE FIRST "POLITICAL" IS REMOVED.

3. PLEASE PROVIDE EMBASSY REACTIONS ASAP. THANKS. EAGLEBURGER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C63

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 409229 172131Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EB-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-20	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	FMP-01	/081R					

2675
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
EAP/IMBS: AWBARR
HA: DHARRIS (SUBS)
L/HRR: DPSTEWART (SUBS)
EAP/RA: BMALKIN (INFO)
----------B85090 172132Z /38
P 172133Z DEC 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 409229

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM ELAB ID
SUBJECT: QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

1. L/HRR HAS REVIEWED THE HA-1 DRAFT OF THE 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA. PLEASE PROVIDE ANSWERS (PLUS
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 409229 172131Z
SUGGESTED REVISED LANGUAGE WHERE NECESSARY) TO RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WHICH WERE RAISED IN THAT REVIEW:

-- SECTION 1.E., FIRST PARAGRAPH, SECOND SENTENCE: DOES THE RIGHT OF APPEAL EXIST IN EACH OF THE FOUR SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE?

-- SECTION 1.E., FIRST PARAGRAPH, THIRD SENTENCE: THE DRAFT USES THE WORDING "MATERIAL ASPECTS". SHOULD IT READ INSTEAD, "FACTUAL ASPECTS"?

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

-- SECTION 1.E., FIRST PARAGRAPH, NEXT TO LAST SENTENCE: THE MEANING OF "LIMITED AMOUNT OF AID" IS UNCLEAR. DOES IT MEAN THAT COURTS HAVE SOME MONEY WITH WHICH TO PAY FOR PRIVATE LAWYERS TO REPRESENT INDIGENTS? IF SO, HOW/WHEN DO THEY DECIDE TO PAY IT? OR DOES IT MEAN THAT ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF LAWYERS ARE AVAILABLE TO REPRESENT INDIGENTS? IF SO, WHO DECIDES WHEN THEY ARE ASSIGNED TO A CASE?

-- SECTION 1.E., FINAL PARAGRAPH, FOURTH SENTENCE: WHAT DOES "THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THEIR DETENTION" MEAN? OTHER POSSIBLE PHRASINGS MIGHT BE: "THE CRIMES WITH WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED" OR "THE REASONS WHY THEY WERE DETAINED".

2. THANKS FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE.
EAGLEBURGER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN FULL

C64

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 STATE 398363 062318Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

PAGES MISSING

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EB-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-20	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	/080R						

1947
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
EAP/IMBS: AWBARR
EAP/RA: BAMALKIN (SUBS)
HA: DHARRIS (SUBS)
----------B482ED 062329Z /38
P 062320Z DEC 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 398363

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM ELAB ID
SUBJECT: 1991 COUNTRY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA: REVISED VERSION

1. LOU NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE REVISED VERSION OF THE COUNTRY HUMAN
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 398363 062318Z
RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA ALONG WITH ANY QUESTIONS RAISED. (QUESTIONS ARE IN THE BODY OF THE REPORT AND MARKED BY THE WORDS "NOTE: EMBASSY:" FOLLOWED BY THE QUESTION.) PLEASE LET US HAVE YOUR REPLIES TO ALL SUCH QUESTIONS AND ANY COMMENTS YOU WISH TO MAKE ON THE PROPOSED CHANGES WITHIN 2 WEEKS, AND SOONER IF POSSIBLE. IN RESPONDING TO THE QUESTIONS, PLEASE USE THE PRECISE LANGUAGE YOU WOULD LIKE TO SEE INSERTED IN THE TEXT. OBVIOUSLY, THE EMBASSY SHOULD REVISE THIS "HA-1" DRAFT, WHICH WAS COMPLETED ON NOVEMBER 8, TO INCORPORATE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
REFERENCE TO THE NOVEMBER 12 INCIDENT IN EAST TIMOR AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. SEPTEL WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL S/IL SUGGESTIONS/COMMENTS FOR SECTION 6.

BEGIN TEXT OF HA-1:

INDONESIA IS THE FIFTH MOST POPULOUS COUNTRY IN THE WORLD AND THE LARGEST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. SINCE INDEPENDENCE, INDONESIAN LEADERS HAVE SOUGHT TO CREATE A NATIONAL IDENTITY AND TO ACCOMMODATE ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC, AND GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSITIES, WHILE FOSTERING COHESION, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND DEVELOPMENT. THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES ALLEGIANCE TO "PANCASILA," FIVE BROAD, GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL LIFE: BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD, A JUST AND CIVILIZED HUMANITY, INDONESIAN NATIONAL UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE.

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND THE MILITARY WIELD PREDOMINANT POLITICAL POWER; OPPOSITION GROUPS EXIST BUT IN FACT HAVE NO REAL CHANCE TO OBTAIN POWER. SINCE THE MID-1960'S, AFTER AN ABORTIVE COUP BACKED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C69

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 032435 312218Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	CIAE-00	AMAC-01	DODE-00	EB-01
	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00	INR-05	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-02	RP-10
	SIL-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01	STR-18	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	/083R						

PAGES MISSING

7444
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
HA: JUNDERRINER
EAP/RA: BMALKIN

----------3C5706 312333Z /63 38

P 312222Z JAN 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY
INFO RUMJDN/AMCONSUL MEDAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL SURABAYA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 032435

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM ID
SUBJECT: 1990 INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

REF: A. STATE 30957

1. THE FINAL VERSION OF THE 1990 INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 032435 312218Z
REPORT FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPH 3. THE DEPARTMENT IS DELIVERING THE 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON THE EVENING OF JANUARY 31. AS REPORTED REF A, HA A/S SCHIFTER WILL HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE ON FEBRUARY 1 AT 3:30 PM EST TO RELEASE THE REPORTS TO THE PRESS AND PUBLIC. THIS IS A DEPARTURE FROM THE PREVIOUS PRACTICE OF RELEASING THE REPORTS IN MID-FEBRUARY, AFTER THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARING.

2. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE A COPY OF THE REPORT TO

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IMMEDIATELY WITH THE REQUEST THAT THE REPORT NOT BE RELEASED PUBLICLY BEFORE 4 PM EST (2100 GMT) ON FEBRUARY 1. USIA WILL SEND TEXT VIA WIRELESS FILE ON FEBRUARY 2.

3. BEGIN TEXT

INDONESIA

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND THE MILITARY WIELD PREDOMINANT POLITICAL POWER; OPPOSITION GROUPS EXIST BUT IN FACT HAVE NO REAL CHANCE TO OBTAIN POWER. SINCE THE MID-1960'S, AFTER AN ABORTIVE COUP BACKED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY, RETIRED AND ACTIVE-DUTY MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN TECHNOCRATS HAVE EXERCISED CENTRALIZED EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY UNDER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S LEADERSHIP. THE PARTLY ELECTED, PARTLY APPOINTED PARLIAMENT (DPR) CONSIDERS BUT DOES NOT INITIATE LEGISLATION. THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR)--CONSISTING OF 500 APPOINTED MEMBERS AND THE 500 DPR MEMBERS--MEETS EVERY 5 YEARS TO APPROVE GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY AND TO ELECT THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT.

INDONESIA IS THE FIFTH MOST POPULOUS COUNTRY IN THE WORLD AND THE LARGEST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. SINCE INDEPENDENCE, INDONESIAN LEADERS HAVE SOUGHT TO CREATE A NATIONAL IDENTITY AND TO ACCOMMODATE ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC, AND GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSITIES, WHILE FOSTERING COHESION, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND DEVELOPMENT. THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES ALLEGIANCE TO "PANCASILA," FIVE BROAD, GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL LIFE: BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD, A JUST AND CIVILIZED HUMANITY, INDONESIAN NATIONAL UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE.

THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI)--WHICH INCLUDE THE MILITARY SERVICES AND THE POLICE--NUMBER ABOUT 416,000. THE ARMY CONSTITUTES ABOUT HALF OF THE ARMED FORCES AND FOCUSES MAINLY ON INTERNAL SECURITY. UNDER A "DUAL FUNCTION" CONCEPT, MANY MILITARY OFFICERS SERVE IN THE CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY AT ALL LEVELS AND IN PARLIAMENT. FREQUENT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST DWINDLING INSURGENCY MOVEMENTS IN THE PROVINCES OF EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA TOOK PLACE. IN EAST TIMOR, AT LEAST 15 CIVILIANS WERE KILLED BY THE MILITARY IN 1990, A FIGURE REDUCED FROM PREVIOUS YEARS.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

FOR 2 MONTHS, BEGINNING IN OCTOBER, THERE WAS A TEMPORARY INCREASE IN REPORTS OF SECURITY FORCE BEATINGS OF DETAINEES THERE. AN UPSURGE IN ACEH (NORTHWEST SUMATRA) OF SEPARATIST VIOLENCE AND ALLEGED VIOLENT CRIME, LINKED TO ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL GRIEVANCES, PROVOKED A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN MILITARY PRESENCE AND OPERATIONS THERE. THERE WERE NUMEROUS UNCO

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C71

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 01064 250413Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 HA-09 SIL-01 /011W
----------396DC1 250427Z /60
P 250400Z JAN 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0660

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE JAKARTA 01064

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1990 INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

REF: (A) STATE 21931; (B) JAKARTA 570

1. LOU/NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE HAVE ONLY THESE CHANGES TO SUGGEST AFTER A FINAL REVIEW OF THE 1990 INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (REF A):

-- INTRODUCTION, THIRD PARAGRAPH, SIXTH SENTENCE. GIVEN THE AUTHORITATIVE REPORT (REF B) THAT THE OCTOBER/NOVEMBER CAMPAIGN OF BEATING DETAINEES IN EAST TIMOR HAS CEASED, CHANGE "AN INCREASE" TO "A TEMPORARY INCREASE".

-- SECTION 2.D., THIRD PARAGRAPH, FIRST SENTENCE. CORRECT THE SPELLING OF "MOVEMENT".

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 01064 250413Z

-- SECTION 6.E., THIRD PARAGRAPH. A LETTER IS MISSING FROM SEVERAL WORDS IN THE FIRST SEVEN LINES. MONJO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C84

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 18076 210426Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 HA-09 SIL-01 SSO-00 /011W
----------2D5E52 210455Z /11
O 210423Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9903

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE JAKARTA 18076

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

REF: STATE 427215

1. LOU/NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT

EMBASSY'S POSITION ON ASPECTS OF THE 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (INTRODUCTION AND SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 5) STILL UNDER DISCUSSION FOLLOWS.

ISSUE ONE. "PATERNALISTIC POLITICAL CONTROLS" IS PREFERABLE TO HA'S FORMULATION. EMBASSY'S LANGUAGE IS A MORE FORTHRIGHT DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM AND IS LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO POLITICALLY DAMAGING MISINTERPRETATION. WE COULD ALSO ACCEPT "AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL CONTROLS".

ISSUE TWO. DHARSONO'S EARLY RELEASE IS AN ENTIRELY

PAGE 02 JAKART 18076 210426Z
APPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR TREATMENT IN THE 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. THE 1985 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT DEALT WITH HIS TRIAL. A REVISIONIST CHARACTERIZATION NOW OF THAT TRIAL AS UNFAIR IS UNACCEPTABLE FOR THE REASONS THE EMBASSY HAS PREVIOUSLY ELABORATED.

ISSUE THREE. HA'S ALTERNATIVE CONCLUDING SENTENCE FOR THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 1.E. DEALS ONLY WITH EAST TIMOR. THE PROBLEM IS BIGGER THAN THAT. WE COULD ACCEPT THE FOLLOWING REWORKING OF HA'S LANGUAGE: "ALTHOUGH THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

EXACT NUMBERS ARE UNDETERMINED, SOME PERSONS ARE SERVING SENTENCES OR UNDER DETENTION FOR PEACEFUL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN EAST TIMOR AND ELSEWHERE.

ISSUE FOUR. "FABRICATED" IS ACCEPTABLE. MONJO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C85

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 427215 191928Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AMAD-01 HA-09 SIL-01 /012R

4447
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
HA: JUNDERRINER
EAP/RA: BMALKIN (INFO)
----------2CADEF 191928Z /38
P 191928Z DEC 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 427215

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM ELAB ID
SUBJECT: 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA (TAKE 6)
REF: (A) 90 JAKARTA 17953

1. LOU/NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. HA ACCEPTS ALL BUT FOUR OF EMBASSY JAKARTA'S PROPOSALS IN REFTEL. ON TWO ISSUES HA AND EAP/IMBS WILL CONTINUE DISCUSSION HERE BUT AT HIGHER LEVELS:

-- INTRODUCTION, FIFTH PARAGRAPH, SECOND SENTENCE: WHETHER "PATERNALISTIC POLITICAL CONTROLS" OR "LACK OF A
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 427215 191928Z
CLEAR RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT" IS THE MORE ACCURATE FORMULATION.

-- SECTION 1.D., THIRD PARAGRAPH, EIGHTH SENTENCE: WHETHER TO DELETE FROM THG HA-1 DRAFT THE DEPICTION OF DHARSONO'S SENTENCE AS "HANDED DOWN IN WHAT WAS WIDELY REGARDED AS AN UNFAIR TRIAL." IF THE SENTENCE REMAINS, HA INSISTS ON RETAINING THE CLAUSE; HOWEVER, HA OFFERS AS AN ALTERNATIVE DELETING THE ENTIRE SENTENCE.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

3. ON TWO OTHER ISSUES, WE REQUEST EMBASSY COMMENT ON HA OFFERS OF COMPROMISE LANGUAGE:

SECTION 1.E.

FOURTH PARAGRAPH, FINAL SENTENCE. IN LIEU OF A SIXTH PARAGRAPH WITH A ROUGH ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL DETAINEES IN EAST TIMOR, HA CAN ACCEPT REVISING THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH FOUR. HOWEVER, HA PREFERS THE FOLLOWING FORMULATION: "ALTHOUGH THE EXACT NUMBER IS UNDETERMINED, SOME PEOPLE WERE ALSO DETAINED IN EAST TIMOR FOR PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS."

FIFTH PARAGRAPH, AFTER FIRST SENTENCE. HA CAN ACCEPT THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED IN REFTEL IF THE FINAL WORD IS CHANGED FROM "EXAGGERATED" TO "FABRICATED". THIS WOULD MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT YOUR VIEW THAT MANY OF THE CHARGES ARE "HOGWASH."

BAKER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C90

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 343444
ORIGIN EAP-03

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-01 ONY-00 /004 R

9182
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
EAP/IMBS ONLY - 3 COPIES
----------254624 102215Z /66
P 102211Z OCT 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 343444

FOR DCM FROM IMBS TEARE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 130

1. (U) VISIT OF PATENT LAW EXPERT

KAREL JORDA, PROFESSOR OF INTELLECTUAL-PROPERTY LAW AT FRANKLIN PIERCE LAW CENTER IN CONCORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE, CALLED THE OFFICE TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE SAFETY OF TRAVEL TO INDONESIA. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED HIS ADVICE ON IMPLEMENTING THE NEW PATENT LAW. HE DEPARTS ON NOVEMBER 2 FOR SIX WEEKS CONSULTATIONS IN JAKARTA. JORDA SAYS HE HAS BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE, AND INTENDS TO CONTACT THE EMBASSY SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL.

2. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 343444

IN PROOFING THE DRAFT INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, WE ARE PUZZLED BY A SENTENCE IN SECTION 6, SUBSECTION E, DEALING WITH ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK. THE FOURTH SENTENCE OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THAT SUBSECTION SEEMS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

TO CONTRADICT THE REST OF THE PARAGRAPH. THE SENTENCE MIGHT BE DROPPED, OR IT COULD BE TURNED AROUND TO READ: "THE MINIMUM WAGE RATES CONSTANTLY LAG FAR BEHIND THE BASIC-NEEDS FIGURES."
BAKER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 00459 01 OF 02 100945Z
ACTION EAP-00

RELEASED IN FULL

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /000 W
----------064666 100946Z /38
O 100939Z JAN 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0420

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 00459

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 05
:
1
(C) GENERAL SANOESI'S U.S. TRIP
:----------

COL. TONY SUGIARTO, THE INDONESIAN INTERPOL LIAISON WHO IS HANDLING ARRANGEMENTS FOR GENERAL SANOESI'S VISIT TO THE U.S., CALLED ON AMBASSADOR MONJO JANUARY 8 TO DISCUSS THE TRIP. SUGIARTO EXPLAINED THAT GENERAL SANOESI WAS UNABLE TO SET SPECIFIC DATES FOR HIS VISIT YET BECAUSE HE DOESN'T YET KNOW WHETHER HE WILL BE RETIRED WHEN HE REACHES THE NORMAL MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGE OF 55 IN MARCH 1990, OR EXTENDED AS POLICE CHIEF. THE DECISION WILL BE MADE ABOUT THE END OF JANUARY. GEN. SANOESI WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER OUR INVITATION IS STILL VALID IF HE WERE RETIRED SHORTLY AFTER HIS TRIP. THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT THE INVITATION STILL STOOD, BECAUSE THE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WERE IMPORTANT IN ANY CASE, AND THE GENERAL'S DELEGATION WOULD BENEFIT FROM THE EXPERIENCE GAINED DURING THE TRIP IN THEIR ONGOING WORK. COL. SUGIARTO THEN SAID GENERAL SANOESI WOULD LIKE TO COME THE THIRD WEEK OF FEBRUARY IF HE FACES RETIREMENT, BUT NOT UNTIL MID-MARCH IF HIS ASSIGNMENT IS EXTENDED.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00459 01 OF 02 100945Z

AMBASSADOR MONJO SAID WE WOULD DO OUR BEST TO COME UP WITH A GOOD PROGRAM IF THE DATES CHANGED FROM FEBRUARY TO MARCH, BUT COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT THE TOP LEVEL PEOPLE SANOESI ASKED TO MEET WOULD BE AVAILABLE.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425

SUGIARTO SAID THAT SANOESI PLANNED TO TAKE THREE PEOPLE WITH HIM: CID DIRECTOR BRIG. GEN. KOESPARMONO IRSAN, CID TRAINING DIRECTOR COL. LUTAN AHWIL (FYI: A CANDIDATE FOR CHIEF OF THE POLICE NARCOTICS SUBDIRECTORATE), AND EITHER SUGIARTO HIMSELF OR THE POLICE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL (NAME NOT GIVEN). SANOESI IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH THE FBI AND DEA TRAINING ACADEMIES IN ORDER TO UPGRADE POLICE TRAINING IN INDONESIA. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO VISIT AN FBI FIELD OFFICE IN FLORIDA, CHICAGO, NEW YORK, OR LOS ANGELES (ALL POTENTIAL STOPS ON HIS TRIP) TO LEARN HOW FBI FIELD OPERATIONS WORK.

MEANWHILE, THE DCM CALLED JIM MILFORD, FORMERLY OF DEA JAKARTA BUT NOW A SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO DEA ADMINISTRATOR LAWN. MILFORD (TELEPHONE 202-633-1185) SAID IN PRINCIPLE LAWN WOULD MEET WITH SANOESI, SUBJECT TO HIS AVAILABILITY ONCE TRIP DATES ARE ESTABLISHED.

WHILE TIMING IS STILL UP IN THE AIR, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THIS COULD BE USEFUL VISIT AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR EXPLORING PROGRAM IDEAS IN A PRELIMINARY FASHION. IN ADDITION TO DEA AND FBI, WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR APPROACHING ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVITSKY'S OFFICE TO SEE IF HE WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET SANOESI. OTHER IDEAS THAT OCCUR TO US:

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S COUNTER NARCOTICS CENTER

(CNC) (EMBASSY HAS ALREADY BRIEFED SANOESI ON THIS POSSIBILITY AND ALERTED CNC THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS);

A MEETING WITH DRUG CZAR WILLIAM BENNETT? WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR EXPLORING FEASIBILITY OF THIS WITH OR THROUGH INM.

A SESSION WITH U.S. CUSTOMS. INDONESIAN POLICE PARTICIPATED IN U.S. CUSTOMS COURSE HERE IN JULY 1989. US CUSTOMS TRAINERS FOR THAT COURSE WERE JIM PETREE (377-9073) AND NANCY MCDOWELL (SAME NUMBER), CUSTOMS OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

:

2. (U) ENVELOPE QUANDRY

:----------

ON JANUARY 8 WE RECEIVED THREE IDENTICAL WHITE HOUSE ENVELOPES, ON LINEN-LIKE PAPER, ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT, FOREIGN MINISTER AND AMBASSADOR RESPECTIVELY. THE TRANSMITTAL SHEET CAME FROM THE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF PROTOCOL. THE AMBASSADOR'S IS AN XMAS CARD AS, PRESUMABLY ARE THE REST. THIS LEAVES AT QUESTION WHAT WAS IN THE CARD-SIZED SEALED ENVELOPE OF ORDINARY PAPER WITH A BLUE "WHITE HOUSE" IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER WHICH WE GOT WITH NO TRANSMITTAL SHEET O/A 4 JANUARY. CAN YOU HELP? WE'D BE RELUCTANT TO SEND TWO XMAS CARDS TO SOEHARTO FROM THE PRESIDENT.

:

3. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

THANKS FOR THE UPDATE IN YOUR O-I NO. 4. PARLIAMENT APPROVED THE RELIGIOUS COURTS BILL LAST MONTH AND THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JAKART 00459 02 OF 02 100945Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /000 W
----------064674 100946Z /38
O 100939Z JAN 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0421

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 00459

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 05

PRESIDENT SIGNED IT 29 DECEMBER, SO REFERENCES TO THIS MATTER CAN STAND. YOUR COMPROMISES WITH HA ON THE OPENING OF SECTION 3 AND THE "POSITIVE ITEMS" OF THE INTRODUCTION ARE FINE WITH ONE QUIBBLE. SINCE THE "BROADENED DEBATE" IS ABOUT MUCH MORE THAN PARLIAMENT, WE SUGGEST SAYING: "A BROADENED DEBATE, INCLUDING ENHANCING THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT VIS-A-VIS THE EXECUTIVE, AND NEW GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS...." THE NEW LANGUAGE FOR SECTION 4 ON ACCESS BY NGOS ARGUES FOR REORDERING AND SLIGHTLY EDITING THE FIRST SENTENCES OF THE SECTION IN THE INTEREST OF CLARITY. WE SUGGEST: "THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. AI HAS BEEN REFUSED ACCESS TO INDONESIA; ASIA WATCH VISITED IN 1988 AND 1989. ACCESS SPECIFICALLY TO EAST TIMOR BY REPRESENTATIVES OF SUCH ORGANIZATIONS -- WHICH THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS BIASED -- HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN RESTRICTED. HOWEVER, AI AND ASIA WATCH HAVE NOT YET TESTED THE NEW "NORMALIZATION" POLICY, WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE LOOSENED THOSE RESTRICTIONS. DIPLOMATS AND JOURNALISTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO VISIT EAST TIMOR. THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 00459 02 OF 02 100945Z

GOVERNMENT IGNORED CALLS...."
:
4. (U) FESTIVAL OF INDONESIA
:----------

S. DILLON RIPLEY HAS WRITTEN THE AMB ASKING HIM TO JOIN THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR THE FESTIVAL OF INDONESIA. COULD YOU CHECK WITH L TO SEE IF THERE ARE ANY REASONS WHY THE AMBASSADOR SHOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS INVITATION.

5. (LOU) WHITEHEAD VISIT
:----------

JOHN WHITEHEAD HAD A VERY SUCCESSFUL VISIT HERE INCLUDING CALLS ON SOEHARTO, ALATAS, SUMARLIN AND MOECHTAR. DURING THE SOEHARTO CALL, THE PRESIDENT AGREED TO OPEN AN ASIA SOCIETY SPONSORED CONFERENCE FOR BUSINESSMEN TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED IN BALI IN THE SPRING OF 1991. WHITEHEAD ALSO ASKED HIM TO OPEN THE ASIA SOCIETY EXHIBIT RELATED TO THE FESTIVAL OF

INDONESIA ON SEPTEMBER 17 IN NEW YORK AND SUGGESTED THAT HE, WHITEHEAD, WAS SURE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH WOULD "LOOK FORWARD TO SOME KIND OF MEETING" WITH THE SOEHARTOS IF THEY CAME TO THE U.S. SOEHARTO WAS NON COMMITTAL BUT WE UNDERSTAND FROM FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES THAT THEY MAY BE TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO BE IN NEW YORK DURING THE UNGA THIS FALL. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION HERE. IN THE MEANWHILE, COULD YOU PLEASE PROVIDE US WITH A DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF VISITS AVAILABLE FOR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. MONJO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 025682 252229Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

6933
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
EAP/IMBS: BSHARVEY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
EAP/IMBS ONLY - 3 COPIES
----------39DDC4 252230Z /38
P 252228Z JAN 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 025682

FOR DCM FROM IMBS TEARE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 15

1. (U) OPIC AND THE COWS

WE SPOKE WITH SUE GOERANSSON AT OPIC. SHE HAD NOT YET SEEN JAKARTA 627. WE FAXED IT IMMEDIATELY. SUE SAID HER OPINION DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM MANTRUST'S ON SEVERAL POINTS. SHE IS PREPARING A CABLE, AND MAY ALSO PHONE YOU.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 025682 252229Z
2. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

THANKS FOR JAKARTA 1064. HA SAID USING "TEMPORARILY" IN THE SIXTH SENTENCE OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF THE INTRODUCTION WAS TOO VAGUE. AFTER A BIT OF NEGOTIATION, WE ARRIVED AT THE FOLLOWING FORMULATION FOR BEGINNING THE SENTENCE: "FOR TWO MONTHS BEGINNING IN OCTOBER, THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN REPORTS..." WE BELIEVE THE NEW LANGUAGE MAKES CLEAR THAT THE INCREASE WAS LIMITED TO THE MONTHS OF OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER AND DID NOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425

THE TWO OTHER CORRECTIONS LISTED IN JAKARTA 1064 WERE REACTIONS TO GLITCHES IN TRANSMISSION OF STATE 21931. THE REPORT ITSELF DOES NOT REQUIRE CORRECTION.

3. (U) FOR THE AMBASSADOR

BERNIE KALB HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH US FOR BACKGROUND READING ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN INDONESIA. HE PLANS TO ATTEND THE CSIS/ASIA SOCIETY EVENT IN BALI IN EARLY MARCH -- OR HE DID AS OF EARLY JANUARY.

4. (LOU) EAST TIMOR

INDONESIAN EMBOFFS VISITED IO ON JANUARY 25 TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ABOUT THE UPCOMING UNHRC MEETING IN GENEVA. THEY MENTIONED TENTATIVE PLANS TO INVITE UNHRC DELEGATES TO EAST TIMOR NEXT SUMMER. THEY SAID THE GOI IS ALSO CONSIDERING ANOTHER CONGRESSIONAL STAFFDEL VISIT THIS YEAR. THEIR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE PORTUGUESE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PARLIAMENTARY VISIT IS STILL UP IN THE AIR.

5. (C) TRAVEL ADVISORY

THIS MAY SEEM INCREDIBLE, BUT JAKARTA 945 WHICH PROPOSES A TRAVEL ADVISORY FOR INDONESIA WAS NOT DISTRIBUTED TO EAP. IF THERE IS A MORAL, IT MAY BE THAT "PREL" MUST BE INCLUDED ON THE TAG LINE IF YOU WANT TO GUARANTEE US A COPY OF YOUR CABLES.

WE FOUND OUT ABOUT THE PROPOSED ADVISORY WHEN CA BROUGHT A DRAFT BY FOR CLEARANCE. THE CA DRAFT ADDS A BIT AND SUBTRACTS A BIT FROM YOUR PROPOSAL. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS BEFORE WE RESPOND.

CA'S DRAFT BEGINS AS FOLLOWS: "THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ADVISES U.S. CITIZENS THAT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION HAS RESULTED IN UNSETTLED CONDITIONS IN THE AREA AND HAS INCREASED THE THREAT OF POSSIBLE TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS AND AMERICAN PROPERTY." IT THEN CONTINUES WITH THE TEXT PROPOSED IN JAKARTA 945, BUT DELETES THE CLAUSE "WHILE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES ARE BEING HELPFUL AND WE HAVE NO

INFORMATION REGARDING A SPECIFIC TERRORIST THREAT AT THIS TIME,". THE ADVISORY CONCLUDES WITH THE TEXT OF THE PREVIOUS ADVISORY OF DECEMBER 31 REGARDING ACEH AND IRIAN JAYA.

OUR TENTATIVE PLAN IS TO RESPOND TO CA AS FOLLOWS:

-- ADJUST THE FIRST SENTENCE TO READ: "THE DEPARTMENT OF

STATE ADVISES U.S. CITIZENS THAT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION HAS RESULTED IN AN INCREASED POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS AND AMERICAN PROPERTY IN INDONESIA."

-- REINSERT THE DELETED CLAUSE, SINCE THAT INFORMATION IS ESSENTIAL IF POTENTIAL TRAVELERS ARE TO MAKE REASONED DECISIONS ABOUT TRAVEL PLANS.

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR COMMENTS ASAP. THANKS.

6. (U) FRED GORDON AND GRAYMOR

FRED GORDON OF GRAYMOR CORPORATION CALLED TO ASK WHY THE EMBASSY CONSULAR SECTION NEVER RESPONDED TO HIS FAXES OF LAST FALL CONCERNING A COURT CASE IN INDONESIA. WE PROMISED TO INFORM THE EMBASSY OF HIS CALL. HE SAID HE WOULD FAX AGAIN THE INFORMATION HE PROVIDED LAST FALL, PLUS A LETTER PROVIDING MORE RECENT INFORMATION ABOUT HIS PROBLEM. ON JANUARY 25, WE RECEIVED BY FAX COPIES OF THE PACKET, SO WE ASSUME RICHARD LIVINGSTON HAS RECEIVED THEM, TOO.

BAKER

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C116

RELEASED IN FULL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 17949 130909Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /000 W
----------312224 130910Z /38
O 130906Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9794

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE JAKARTA 17949

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 167

1. (U) TRAVEL OF INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE URUGUAY ROUND

AMBASSADOR KARTADJOEMENA WAS IN INDONESIA LAST WEEK. HE HAD NO DEFINITE TRAVEL PLANS AT THAT TIME, ALTHOUGH WE PRESUME A STOP IN WASHINGTON REMAINS AN OPTION AT SOME POINT. AS HE IS ARMED WITH THE EAP/IMBS PHONE NUMBER, WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF HE CONTACTED YOU DIRECTLY WHEN AND IF HE GETS TO WASHINGTON.

2. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS: VISITORS AND THE REPORT

JAKARTA 17362 REPORTED THE PRESENCE OF VARIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VISITORS. BISHOP MOORE LATER TURNED UP, MET THE AMBASSADOR DECEMBER 4, AND THEN HEADED OFF FOR BALI AND EAST TIMOR. WE ASSISTED HIM WITH CONTACTS AROUND TOWN AND ASKED FOR FEEDBACK WHEN HE GETS HOME. ASIA WATCH (AW) CHAIRMAN JACK GREENBERG ALSO VISITED INDONESIA
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 17949 130909Z

THIS YEAR, WEARING HIS COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY HAT ON A USIS PROGRAM (JAKARTA 7817). WITHOUT KNOWING THE PRECISE CURRENT LANGUAGE YOU ARE WORKING WITH, WE THINK THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (SECTION 4) SHOULD NOTE THAT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

"SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS REPRESENTING OR ASSOCIATED WITH ASIA WATCH VISITED/WERE PERMITTED TO VISIT INDONESIA IN 1988 AND 1989." WE ENCOUNTERED SYDNEY JONES SOCIALLY AND TALKED SUBSTANCE FOR A FEW MINUTES ON TWO OCCASIONS DURING HER VISIT, BUT HAD NO CHANCE TO ASK WHETHER ASIA WATCH HAS ACTUALLY REQUESTED PERMISSION TO VISIT EAST TIMOR THIS YEAR, OR LAST. WHEN WAS THEIR LAST REQUEST? (JONES DID ACKNOWLEDGE "LEAVING EAST TIMOR" TO BISHOP MOORE.") WE SUGGEST PUTTING THESE QUESTIONS TO AW AND AI TO ENSURE THE ACCURACY OF OTHER LANGUAGE IN SECTION 4. MONJO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C121

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 383203
ORIGIN EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS:DCAMP 0013W
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS:RTEARE
EAP/IMBS:BSHARVEY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
3 COPIES ONLY FOR EAP/IMBS ONLY
----------207273 010251Z /72
P 010222Z DEC 89
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 383203

FOR THE DCM FROM DICK TEARE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 151

1. (U) PETROLEUM REPORT

WE HAVEN'T YET RECEIVED THE POUCH COPIES OF THE PETROLEUM REPORT, WHICH WERE POUCHED IN OCTOBER. DO YOU HAVE A REGISTRY NUMBER SO THAT WE CAN TRY TO TRACK THEM DOWN? THERE IS ALWAYS A CLAMOR FOR COPIES.

2. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT -- AGAIN

WE HAVE NEGOTIATED SOME CHANGES IN THE WORKERS' RIGHTS SECTION WHICH DO NOT AFFECT THE GENERAL THRUST. A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS REMAIN:

SECTION 6. A. RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION: WE HAVE DISCUSSED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 383203

A NEW FIRST SENTENCE SAYING THAT PRIVATE-SECTOR WORKERS ARE FREE TO FORM OR JOIN UNIONS WITHOUT PREVIOUS AUTHORIZATION, "BUT SUCH UNIONS MUST BELONG TO THE ALL INDONESIA WORKERS UNION, WHICH FOR ALL PRACTICAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PURPOSES IS THE ONLY LEGAL TRADE UNION." S/IL HAS ASKED WHETHER WE SHOULD BE REFERRING TO SPSI AS A TRADE

UNION, A FEDERATION, OR SOMETHING ELSE. WHAT LANGUAGE IS USED IN THE LAW WHICH CALLS FOR BROAD REPRESENTATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY FOR A LABOR ORGANIZATION?

SAME SECTION: CAN YOU PROVIDE A COUPLE OF EXAMPLES OF OTHER GROUPS AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS WHICH FUNCTION AS QUASI-TRADE UNIONS? DO THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY?

IN THE SAME PARAGRAPH, WE PROPOSE TO SAY THAT THE TEACHERS' UNION HAS APPLIED FOR UNION STATUS, AND THAT THE APPLICATION IS STILL PENDING. IS THAT ACCURATE AND UP-TO-DATE? IF THE TEACHERS ARE LIKELY TO BE RECOGNIZED, WE MAY NEED TO MODIFY OUR EVALUATION ABOVE THAT SPSI IS THE ONLY LEGAL TRADE UNION.

EAGLEBURGER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C124

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 358760
ORIGIN EAP-03

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /003 R

DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS:DCAMP 0013W
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS:RTEARE
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
3 COPIES ONLY FOR EAP/IMBS ONLY
----------306660 080929Z /23
R 080119Z NOV 89
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 358760

FOR THE DCM AND POL FROM DICK TEARE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 141

1. SUBJECT IS THE ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT:

HA HAS COMPLETED ITS INITIAL EDITING OF YOUR DRAFT REPORT. WHILE MOST OF THE CHANGES ARE STYLISTIC OR FOR BREVITY, SOME CHANGE THE TONE AND THE MEANING OF THE REPORT. WE ARE NEGOTIATING A RETURN TO YOUR TEXT OR COMPROMISE LANGUAGE IN SOME AREAS. BELOW FOR YOUR INFORMATION/ COMMENT ARE SOME OF THE MORE EGREGIOUS CHANGES AND WHAT WE ARE DOING ABOUT THEM:

2. SECTION 1.B. DISAPPEARANCES. HA HAS ADDED A SENTENCE: HOWEVER, A REPORT OF A UN WORKING GROUP NOTED THAT 55 OUT OF 70 CASES OF ALLEGED DISAPPEARANCE TRANSMITTED TO THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT RECEIVED A RESPONSE. (WE HAVE ASKED FOR THE SOURCE OF THIS
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 358760

INFORMATION)

3. SECTION 1.C. TORTURE. HA HAS PROPOSED ADDING TWO SENTENCES AFTER YOUR DESCRIPTION OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 09 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

TAKEN AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS: HOWEVER, MOST (ALL?) OF THOSE CASES INVOLVED ACTION AGAINST CRIMINAL SUSPECTS. THERE WERE NO KNOWN INSTANCES OF OFFICIALS BEING PUNISHED FOR MISTREATMENT OF POLITICAL PRISONERS OR DETAINEES. (WE NEED YOUR COMMENT ON WHETHER THIS IS FACTUALLY ACCURATE.)

4. SECTION 1.E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL. IN THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH, DISCUSSING ACCESS TO COUNSEL, HA HAS ADDED THAT: DEFENDANTS HAVE IN SOME CASES BEEN PRESSURED INTO ACCEPTING DEFENSE COUNSEL OTHER THAN THAT OF THEIR CHOICE. (TRUE?)

5. SAME SECTION. PARA FIVE. HA ADDS TWO SENTENCES QUOTING AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: AI IN ITS 1989 REPORT, CALLED ATTENTION TO A JULY 1988 STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE THAT THOUSANDS WERE BEING HELD PRISONER UNDER THE ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW. AI ADDED THAT SERIOUS DOUBTS EXISTED ABOUT THE FAIRNESS OF TRIALS HELD UNDER THIS LEGISLATION. (IF THE MINISTER DID SAY THIS, IT IS WORTH INCLUDING EVEN THOUGH A YEAR OLD. IF SO, WE SHOULD PROBABLY REVISE THE EARLIER SENTENCE SAYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE DATA ON THE NUMBER OF PERSONS SERVING SENTENCE FOR SUBVERSION. CAN YOU CONFIRM THE MINISTER'S STATEMENT?)

6. SECTION 3. FOR THE THIRD YEAR IN A ROW, HA HAS MOVED TO TOUGHEN THIS SECTION, AND PROPOSES TO BEGIN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 STATE 358760

THE SECTION WITH THE ABRUPT (AND INACCURATE) STATEMENT THAT: CITIZENS DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY PEACEFULLY TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT OR ITS LEADERSHIP. WE HAVE PROPOSED AN ALTERNATIVE TEXT, WHICH HA HAS NOT YET ACCEPTED: THERE ARE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS THAT PERMIT INDONESIANS TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS LEADERSHIP, BUT STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL OBSTACLES EXIST WHICH MAKE SUCH CHANGE UNLIKELY.

7. SECTION 5. DISCRIMINATION. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN. THANK YOU FOR JAKARTA 14933. WE APOLOGIZE FOR HAVING TO BELABOR THIS POINT BUT HA HAS ASKED US TO PASS ON TO YOU ITS DESIRE FOR FURTHER DETAIL ON THE QUESTION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN. SPECIFICALLY, HA SAYS IT NEEDS AN EVALUATION FROM YOU OF WHETHER SUCH VIOLENCE IS A

"SIGNIFICANT" PROBLEM IN INDONESIA OR WHETHER IT IS "WIDESPREAD." (THEY COULD NOT GIVE US BENCHMARKS TO DETERMINE WHAT IS "SIGNIFICANT" OR "WIDESPREAD") THEY SUGGEST THAT YOU CONSULT GOVERNMENT (MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS, MINISTRY OF STATE FOR WOMEN'S ROLE, OR POLICE) TO GET THEIR JUDGMENT. IF THE ANSWER IS THAT IT IS

SIGNIFICANT, WHAT IS THE GOI DOING ABOUT IT? WE HAVE POUCHED A MODEL FROM THE KUWAIT REPORT TO JULIEN. WE HAVE TOLD HA THAT IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE INCIDENCE OF SUCH VIOLENCE IS RELATIVELY LOW IN INDONESIA, BUT THEY WANT AN AUTHORITY FOR SUCH A STATEMENT.

8. SECTION 6. A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION. S/IL HAS NOT DONE ITS EDITING OF THE WORKER RIGHTS SECTION YET. HOWEVER, HA HAS ADDED A PHRASE THAT: SUCH UNIONS MUST BELONG TO THE ALL INDONESIA WORKERS UNION (SPSI) WHICH IS THE ONLY TRADE UNION BODY LEGALLY PERMITTED IN INDONESIA. WE HAVE PROPOSED AN ALTERNATIVE STATEMENT THAT: SPSI IS FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES THE ONLY LEGAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 STATE 358760

TRADE UNION IN INDONESIA. EAGLEBURGER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C127

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 325910
ORIGIN EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 HA-09 /009 R

DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS:DCAMP 0004W
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS:RTEARE
HA/HR:TWILLIAMS (PHONE) 71025 EAP/RA:BMALKIN
----------220203 120704Z /24
R 112259Z OCT 89
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 325910

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

REF: STATE 303879

1. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES TIMELY SUBMISSION OF POST'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. OUR INITIAL REVIEW OF THE OTHERWISE-THOROUGH REPORT SUGGESTS A NEED FOR FURTHER INFORMATION IN SECTION 5. PER REFTEL, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN THE QUESTION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES WE NEED MORE DETAIL ON WHETHER THERE IS SUCH VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA AND HOW WIDESPREAD IT IS. YOU MAY WANT TO CITE ANY POLICE, NEWSPAPER, OR GOVERNMENT REPORTS, IF THEY EXIST. IF, IN THE POST'S JUDGMENT, IT IS NOT A PROBLEM, YOU SHOULD STATE YOUR BASIS FOR THAT CONCLUSION, E.G. DISCUSSIONS WITH WOMEN'S OR HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS.

2. ON QUESTION OF FEMALE CIRCUMCISION DISCUSSED IN REPORT, DOES THIS PRACTICE AFFECT SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 325910

OF WOMEN? OR IS IT PRACTICED ONLY BY ISOLATED TRIBES?

3. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES YOUR ASSISTANCE. BAKER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 09 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C128

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 14933 130859Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-07	SS-00	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-00	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09
	L-03	LAB-04	TRSE-00	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00
	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-02	SR-06	PRS-01	P-02	/086 W

316210 131014Z /20

P 130857Z OCT 89
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8294

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE JAKARTA 14933

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA--1989

REFS: A) STATE 325910, B) JAKARTA 14324

1. NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT
-
2. PER REF A, LAST THREE SENTENCES OF REF B'S SECTION 5 CONCERNING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND FEMALE CIRCUMCISION MIGHT BE EXPANDED AS FOLLOWS:
-
SEVERAL VOLUNTARY, PRIVATE GROUPS WORK ACTIVELY TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. ONE ORGANIZATION IS DEALING WITH THE UNPUBLICIZED PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, CHIEFLY BY PROVIDING COUNSELING. INSTANCES OF RAPE AND SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN ARE REPORTED PERIODICALLY BY THE MEDIA, ALTHOUGH THE ACTUAL EXTENT OF SUCH PROBLEMS IS NOT RELIABLY KNOWN. THE MEDIA LURIDLY REPORTED AND PORTRAYED THE DISMEMBERMENT OF SEVERAL WOMEN MURDERED IN 1989. SYMBOLIC OR ACTUAL FEMALE CIRCUMCISION OCCURS ROUTINELY AMONG TRIBAL SOCIETIES AS WELL AS URBANITES IN PARTS OF
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 14933 130859Z

INDONESIA WHERE IT IS VIEWED AS ANALOGOUS TO MALE CIRCUMCISION. OTHER PRACTICES OF FEMALE AND MALE GENITAL MUTILATION ARE ALSO KNOWN TO EXIST BUT ARE DIFFICULT TO DOCUMENT.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 09 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MONJO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

C147

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 017687 172208Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

6421
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
EAP/IMBS: BSHARVEY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
EAP/IMBS ONLY - 3 COPIES
----------36A82C 172210Z /38
P 172207Z JAN 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 017687

FOR DCM FROM IMBS TEARE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 10

1. (LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

WITH AGREEMENT ON THE DHARSONO LANGUAGE, WE HAVE RETURNED THE 1990 INDONESIA REPORT TO HA FOR FINAL POLISHING. AS SOON AS HA CONCLUDES THAT PROCESS WE WILL CABLE THE DOCUMENT TO YOU FOR A LAST FACT CHECK. AFTER THAT, WE END

PAGE 02 STATE 017687 172208Z
THE EXERCISE FOR ANOTHER YEAR. THANKS FOR ALL THE CREATIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR COMPROMISE AND FOR THE SERIES OF RAPID TURNAROUNDS.

BAKER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 09 NOV 2006 200504425

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

C94

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 01891 060947Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-00	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	SSO-00
	HA-09	L-03	LAB-04	TRSE-00	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01
	INRE-00	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-02	SR-06	PRS-01	P-02
	/084 W						

----------000005 060949Z /12

O 060947Z FEB 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1217

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE JAKARTA 01891

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND EAP/IMBS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: CORRECTION

REF: STATE 37442

1. EMBASSY PERCEIVES TWO ITEMS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON INDONESIA SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS (REF) THAT SHOULD BE CORRECTED.

2. SECTION 4. THE LAST PARAGRAPH CONCERNING ICRC ACTIVITIES IN INDONESIA CONTAINS TWO SENTENCES ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS TO DETAINEES IN EAST TIMOR. THE FIRST SUCH SENTENCE (SECOND SENTENCE OF THE PARAGRAPH) IS ACCURATE, ACCEPTABLE AND AGREED. STATE 26390, JAKARTA 1355, AND STATE 28547 PROVIDE THE BACKGROUND. THE SECOND SENTENCE ABOUT ICRC DIFFICULTIES LATER IN THE PARAGRAPH APPEARS INADVERTENT. IT IS DUPLICATIVE AND MISPLACED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 01891 060947Z

BETWEEN DESCRIPTIONS OF ICRC ACTIVITIES WITH COMMUNISTS AND NON-ACCESS TO INCARCERATED MUSLIM ACTIVISTS. MORE SERIOUSLY, THIS SECOND SENTENCE PUTS US IN THE POSITION OF PUBLICLY CITING PRIVATELY-EXPLAINED ICRC PROBLEMS WITH

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THE GOI WHILE THE ICRC HAS NOT. WE URGE THIS SECOND SENTENCE BE DELETED.

3. SECTION 6.B. THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH 1 BEGINNING LINE 15 CONTINUES TO STRIKE US AS ERRONEOUS AND INSUPPORTABLE: "IN WHAT THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER HAS CHARACTERIZED AS AN EFFORT TO PROMOTE VOLUNTARY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS, IT HAS ENCOURAGED EMPLOYERS TO ORGANIZE UNIONS." SEE JAKARTA 18185 FOR BACKGROUND. WE CANNOT SUPPORT THIS STATEMENT AND URGE ITS REPLACEMENT WITH THE ORIGINAL LANGUAGE SUBMITTED (89 JAKARTA 14324), THAT IS: "IN WHAT THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER HAS CHARACTERIZED AS AN EFFORT TO PROMOTE VOLUNTARY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYEES AND TO ENCOURGE UNIONISM, THE DEPARTMENT, BACKED BY SOME LOCAL OFFICIALS, HAS EMBARKED UPON A CAMPAIGN TO TEAR DOWN WHAT IT VIEWS AS THE BARRIERS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING -- EMPLOYER RESISTANCE AND EMPLOYEE INDIFFERENCE."

MONJO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

[redacted]

[redacted] B5

PAGE 01 STATE 427382 192145Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

4472
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
EAP/IMBS ONLY - 3 COPIES
----------2CBA23 192146Z /38
P 192145Z DEC 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

[redacted] STATE 427382

FOR DCM FROM IMBS TEARE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 163

1. ~~(LOU)~~ TONY HALL LETTER - HA REVISIONS

HA HAS PROPOSED A FEW REVISIONS TO THE DRAFT TONY HALL LETTER WHICH WE PROVIDED IN OUR O-I NO. 161. PLEASE FACTOR THESE REVISIONS IN AS YOU CONSIDER COMMENTS. THANKS.

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 02 STATE 427382 192145Z
PARAGRAPH TWO, SENTENCE ONE. CHANGE IT TO READ: "THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE A CORNERSTONE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. WE ARE COMMITTED TO PROMOTING SUCH BASIC RIGHTS NOT JUST IN EAST TIMOR...."

PARAGRAPH SEVEN, SENTENCES ONE AND TWO. CHANGE THEM TO READ: "IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, SEVERAL DEMONSTRATIONS, SOME OF THEM VIOLENT, TOOK PLACE IN THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, DILI. SECURITY FORCES BEGAN A SERIES..."

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL
APPEAL ACTION: RELEASED IN FULL
DATE/CASE ID: 05 OCT 2007 200504425

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425

PARAGRAPH EIGHT, SENTENCE ONE. INSERT AFTER "MAY HAVE" THE FOLLOWING: "CREATED AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH".

PARAGRAPH NINE, SENTENCE THREE. INSERT "PERCEIVED" AFTER "BASED ON".

PARAGRAPH ELEVEN, FINAL TWO SENTENCES. SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING: "WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THIS DIALOGUE AND ANY STEPS THAT MIGHT LEAD TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS, BOTH OF WHICH ARE OUR FRIENDS."

PARAGRAPH TWELVE, END. ADD THE FOLLOWING: "WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE HUMAN-RIGHTS SITUATION IN INDONESIA, INCLUDING EAST TIMOR, AND, AS NECESSARY, WILL MAKE OUR CONCERNS KNOWN TO THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT."

2. ~~(LOU)~~ HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

BY NOW YOU HAVE PROBABLY SEEN OUR TAKE SIX WHICH DESCRIBED THE FOUR REMAINING ITEMS IN CONTROVERSY, ASIDE FROM WORKERS RIGHTS. EITHER BARBARA OR I WILL HAVE A MEETING

[redacted]

SOON WITH HA TO PUSH FOR THE "PATERNALISTIC POLITICAL CONTROLS" LANGUAGE AND TO INSIST ON DROPPING THE CHARACTERIZATION OF DHARSONO'S TRIAL.

HA SEEMS TO BE FIRMING ITS POSITION ON DHARSONO. THEY SEE THE REFERENCE, OR LACK THEREOF, TO HIS TRIAL AS PRECEDENT-SETTING FOR A FUTURE DAY WHEN WE HEAR THAT THE FINAL PKI PRISONERS ARE ABOUT TO BE EXECUTED. AT THAT TIME, HA WILL WANT THE DEPARTMENT TO PROTEST ON THE BASIS THAT THE TRIALS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE 1960S WERE UNFAIR. ATTEMPTING TO COUNTER OUR PRESSURE, HA IS WILLING TO DROP THE ENTIRE MENTION OF DHARSONO; THAT WOULD REMOVE THE "PRECEDENT-SETTING" ASPECT FROM THE REPORT. HOWEVER, WE SEE DHARSONO'S RELEASE FROM PRISON AS A VERY IMPORTANT HUMAN-RIGHTS EVENT FROM 1990 WHICH MUST RECEIVE MENTION IN THE REPORT.

[redacted]

WHILE THIS MAY ESCALATE TO THE SEVENTH FLOOR, WE STILL HOPE TO RESOLVE IT SHORT OF THAT. AGAIN, IF WE REACH A POINT AT WHICH IT SEEMS NECESSARY TO PLAY AN AMBASSADORIAL-CABLE CARD, WE WILL IMMEDIATELY SIGNAL.

3. (U) INSURANCE EXPERTS

L'S JAMIE SELBY CALLED. SOME OF HER CONTACTS HAVE HEARD THAT INDONESIA IS SCOUTING AROUND FOR EXPERTS ON THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY TO TAKE A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT INDONESIA'S SYSTEM. SHE KNOWS OF AN AMERICAN FIRM THAT CAN PROVIDE TOP-FLIGHT EXPERTISE FOR SUCH A PROJECT, AND SHE WOULD LIKE TO PUT THAT FIRM IN CONTACT WITH THE APPROPRIATE GOI OFFICIALS. CAN YOU FIND AN INDONESIAN

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 04 STATE 427382 192145Z
POINT OF CONTACT?

BAKER

[redacted]

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~RELEASED IN PART~~
~~B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)~~

PAGE 01 JAKART 14625 100951Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-01 ONY-00 /002 W
----------216301 101004Z /38
O 100923Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7983

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L J A K A R T A~~ JAKARTA 14625

FOR EAP/IMBS DICK TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: DEC: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 137

1. (U) CONGRESSIONAL LETTER ON EAST TIMOR

FYI, ONE OF OUR LOCAL CONTACTS JUST PROVIDED US THE TEXT OF REP. HALL'S ANNUAL LETTER ON EAST TIMOR, WHICH CLAIMS 110 CO-SIGNERS TO DATE. REPORTING FROM THE PAST TWO EMBASSY VISITS SHOULD GIVE YOU SUFFICIENT MATERIAL FOR A RESPONSE, ONCE THE LETTER IS DELIVERED TO THE DEPARTMENT. IF NOT, LET US KNOW. IN ANY CASE, WE WOULD LIKE TO CLEAR. WE ALSO RECEIVED FROM OUR CONTACT A STATEMENT PREPARED BY BISHOP MOORE FOR THE UN SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DECOLONIZATION. MOORE SAYS BISHOP BELO STILL WANTS A REFERENDUM ON SELF-DETERMINATION.

2. (C) IRAQI DIPLOMATIC ACCOUNTS

THE LOCAL CHASE MANHATTAN REP RECEIVED A CALL LAST WEEK FROM A BANK INDONESIA OFFICIAL INQUIRING ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE IRAQI EMBASSY'S ACCOUNT WITH CHASE. THE BANK INDONESIA OFFICIAL REPORTEDLY SAID ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 JAKART 14625 100951Z

THE ASEAN MEMBERS HAD REACHED A CONSENSUS THAT IRAQI DIPLOMATIC ACCOUNTS SHOULD BE UNFROZEN FOR "HUMANITARIAN" PURPOSES. HE ADDED THAT THE GOI WOULD BE MAKING A REQUEST ALONG THESE LINES THROUGH ITS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL
APPEAL ACTION: RELEASED IN FULL
DATE/CASE ID: 05 OCT 2007 200504425

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425

WASHINGTON EMBASSY. WE ARE SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT AT BANK INDONESIA TO DELIVER A DEMARCHE ON IRAQ SANCTIONS AND TO DISCUSS THE STATUS OF THE FROZEN IRAQI ACCOUNT. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE HAD FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE REPORTED ASEAN "CONSENSUS" OR ANY APPROACH FROM THE INDONESIAN EMBASSY REQUESTING THE UNFREEZING OF THE CHASE ACCOUNT. CAN YOU THROW ANY LIGHT ON THESE QUESTIONS?

3 . ~~(LOU-NOFORN)~~ HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT CHECKLIST

:----------

WE WILL DOUBTLESS HAVE TO UPDATE PARTS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (JAKARTA 14509) TO REFLECT DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR. HERE IS OUR SHORT LIST OF SPECIFIC ISSUES THAT BEAR WATCHING/INVESTIGATING:

:-- CIVILIANS KILLED IN EAST TIMOR AND ELSEWHERE;

:-- DETAILS OF ANY DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST MILITARY PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR ABUSES;

:-- STATUS OF GOI STANCE ON EXPANDED FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS;

:-- ACCESS BY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS TO EAST TIMOR (COULD YOU OR HA ASK AI AND AW WHETHER THEY HAVE REQUESTED VISITS THIS YEAR?);

:-- ACCESS BY ICRC TO IMPRISONED MUSLIM ACTIVISTS

[redacted]

[redacted]

(SEPTEL).

MONJO

[redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]

PAGE 01 JAKART 14276 01 OF 02 010932Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001W
----------A7617F 010932Z /38

P 010906Z NOV 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0407

[redacted] SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 14276

FOR EAP/IMBS TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 160
:
1. [redacted] HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
:----------

IN YOUR 0-I NO. 160, YOU NOTE A QUERY FROM HA ON THE NUMBER OF COMMUNISTS REMAINING IN INDONESIA MENTIONED IN SEC. 1(F) OF OUR DRAFT. WE WOULD PROPOSE DELETING THE LANGUAGE BEGINNING WITH THE SENTENCE "GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS TRY..." THROUGH THE REST OF THE SECTION, AND SUBSTITUTING THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT:

GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 02 JAKART 14276 01 OF 02 010932Z
ACTIVITIES OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) AND ITS FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY INDIVIDUALS THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP. THE GOVERNMENT STATED IN LATE 1990 THAT THIS LATTER GROUP THEN TOTALLED 1,410,333 PEOPLE. THESE PERSONS AND SOMETIMES THEIR RELATIVES ARE SUBJECT TO SURVEILLANCE, REQUIRED CHECK-INS, AND ARBITRARY ACTIONS BY OFFICIALS, INCLUDING REMOVAL FROM GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL
APPEAL ACTION: RELEASED IN FULL
DATE/CASE ID: 05 OCT 2007 200504425

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425

END TEXT.

:

2. (U) PAITON PROJECT

:----------

RE YOUR 0-I 169 ON THE PAITON PROJECT, WE HAVE NOTHING FURTHER TO OFFER BEYOND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN JAKARTA 13649. AS TO ANOTHER JAPANESE COUNTERATTACK WE ASSUME ROY MUST HAVE BEEN REFERRING TO MITSUI BECAUSE, AS WE NOTED BEFORE, THERE ARE ONLY TWO CONSORTIA IN COMPETITION HERE. IN ANY CASE, WE ARE UNAWARE OF ANY MAJOR JAPANESE INITIATIVE BUT THAT DOESN'T MEAN IT MAY NOT BE THE CASE. JAKARTA IS RIFE WITH RUMORS ABOUT THE DECISION; HOWEVER, THE FACT IS THAT WE HAVE SEEN NO DEFINITIVE DOCUMENTS SUBSTANTIATING THAT A DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN.

3. (U) PAITON LETTER

:----------

RE ITEM TWO, SAME O-I, THE REQUEST FOR AN AMBASSADORIAL [redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 03 JAKART 14276 01 OF 02 010932Z

LETTER CAME FROM MISSION ENERGY, NOT G.E. WE ASSUME ANY RESPONSE WILL BE CLEARED WITH OVP IN VIEW OF THEIR LIVELY INTEREST IN THIS PROJECT.

:

4. (U) U.S. -- INDONESIA ENERGY CONSULTATIONS; THE 'OTHER BUSINESS' AGENDA ITEM

:----------

STATE 358292 REQUESTS THE INDONESIAN SIDE PROVIDE A SUMMARY OF WHAT IT WILL SAY UNDER THE AGENDA ITEM 'OTHER BUSINESS', PARTICULARLY THE MEANING OF THE INCLUSION: "TRAINING OF INDONESIANS IN THE U.S. AND RELATED SUBJECTS AND PROPOSED PROJECTS WITH POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT." DOE WOULD LIKE A REPLY BEFORE DAS GRUNDY'S LAST DAY IN DC, NOVEMBER 1 .

ON RECEIPT OF THE DOE REQUEST WE FAXED IR. MARZUAN, THE OVERALL COORDINATOR OF THE BILATERAL TALKS ON THE INDONESIAN SIDE, AND PAK SOEMARSO, THE HEAD OF THE BUREAU OF FOREIGN COOPERATION, DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND ENERGY, WHO HAD PROPOSED THIS ADDITION, FOR CLARIFICATION OF WHAT THE INDONESIAN SIDE INTENDED TO

SUGGEST UNDER THIS ITEM.

IR. MARZUAN RESPONDED THE DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND ENERGY WILL EXPRESS ITS APPRECIATION FOR U.S. AID SPONSORSHIP OF TRAINING INDONESIAN OFFICIALS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES. IT MAY ALSO ASK WHETHER IF FEWER EMPLOYEES ARE SENT TO THE U.S. FOR TRAINING WHETHER AID MIGHT ASSUME A GREATER

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 04 JAKART 14276 01 OF 02 010932Z
PROPORTION OF THE TRANSPORTATION COSTS. ACCORDING TO IR. MARZUAN, IR. SOEMARSO MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS TO RAISE, BUT HE IS UNAVAILABLE AS HE IS TRAVELLING OUT-OF-THE-COUNTRY.

PLEASE ADVISE DOE THAT AID JAKARTA WILL BRIEF THE U.S. DELEGATION ON ITS TRAINING PROGRAMS BEFORE THE CONSULTATIONS BEGIN. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE INDONESIAN SIDE WE WILL BE

[redacted]

NNNN

[redacted]

PAGE 01 JAKART 14276 02 OF 02 010932Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001W
----------A7618B 010932Z /38
P 010906Z NOV 91
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0408

[redacted] SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 14276

FOR EAP/IMBS TEARE FROM DCM WILSON

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL JAKARTA TO IMBS NO. 160

UNPREPARED TO ENTER INTO FURTHER COMMITMENTS AT THIS MEETING AND THE INDONESIAN SIDE APPRECIATES THIS FACT. CONSEQUENTLY, WE REQUEST DOE RECONSIDER THE 'PREMISE' CONTAINED IN STATE 358292, PARA 2.

OTHER QUESTIONS RAISED BY DOE IN RECENT MESSAGES/O/I'S:

:

-- TRANSPORTATION: DRY WILL MEET TOM CUTLER AT THE AIRPORT ON NOVEMBER 2. EMBASSY VAN WILL MEET OTHER ARRIVALS NOVEMBER 3. DRY AND CUTLER PLAN MEETING GRUNDY AND KLUG ON NOVEMBER 4. WE HAVE DECLINED KIND INVITATION OF MIGAS TO MEET GRUNDY AT THE AIRPORT.

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 02 JAKART 14276 02 OF 02 010932Z

-- MEETING WITH FCS: TED VILLINSKI WILL BE IN KUALA LUMPUR FOR MOST OF THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 4. COMMERCIAL OFFICER JEFF HARDEE, HOWEVER, WILL BE AVAILABLE TO BRIEF U.S. DELEGATION ON MONDAY AFTERNOON, NOVEMBER 4. TED VILLINSKI MAY BE AVAILABLE TO MEET DELEGATION EARLY MORNING, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 7, PRIOR TO APPOINTMENTS WITH INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

-- GINANDJAR'S SCHEDULE FOR LATER IN THE AUTUMN: GINANDJAR IS SCHEDULED TO GO TO OPEC ON NOVEMBER 26. FROM THERE HE WILL GO TO UK. HE NEXT PLANS TO VISIT JAPAN, AND END UP IN AUSTRALIA DECEMBER 9-10. ACCORDING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND ENERGY, HE MAY STOP EN ROUTE FROM THE UK TO JAPAN IN THE U.S.

:

5. (U) ADB AND THE ELEVENTH ROAD (SECTOR) PROJECT

WE HAVE REVIEWED THE ROAD PROJECT AND DISCUSSED WITH USAID RENTSCHLER'S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE U.S. GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING MDB PROJECTS. BASED ON

ADB'S SEEMINGLY UNFULFILLED ASSURANCES ON HOW THE PROJECT WAS TO BE DESIGNED, PLUS CONCERN ABOUT NOT SETTING THE WRONG PRECEDENT ON THIS, THE FIRST PROJECT UNDER THE BANK'S NEW ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES, WE AGREE THAT THE USD SHOULD SIGNAL OUR CONCERN BY NOT VOTING YES ON THE LOAN. HOWEVER, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE USD ABSTAIN RATHER THAN VOTE NO, SO THAT WE NOT SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL TO THE GOI.

[redacted]

[redacted]

MONJO

[redacted]

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~RELEASED IN PART~~
~~B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)~~

PAGE 01 STATE 006332 082254Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

5613
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
EAP/IMBS: BSHARVEY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
EAP/IMBS ONLY - 3 COPIES
----------32A3BD 082255Z /38
P 082251Z JAN 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 006332

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 7 JAN 2019
APPEAL ACTION: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
REASON(S): B1, 1.4(D)
DATE/CASE ID: 16 SEP 2009 200504425

FOR DCM FROM IMBS TEARE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 4

1. ~~(LOU)~~ HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT.

BARBARA NEGOTIATED WITH TOM WILLIAMS ON THE TWO REMAINING ISSUES ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (NOT INCLUDING WORKERS' RIGHTS, WHICH IS STILL IN PROCESS).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 006332 082254Z
--INTRODUCTION, PARA 3: HA AGREED TO SUBSTITUTE "AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL CONTROLS" FOR "LACK OF A CLEAR RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT."

--SECTION 1D, PARA 3: WILLIAMS MAINTAINS, AND WE AGREE, THAT MENTION SHOULD BE MADE OF DHARSONO'S RELEASE IN THE 1990 REPORT. AT THE SAME TIME, WILLIAMS IS ADAMANT THAT SOME MENTION BE MADE OF THE CHARACTER OF THE TRIAL. WE LOOKED AGAIN AT THE 1985 REPORT'S TREATMENT OF DHARSONO'S TRIAL. IT COMES IN SECTION 1E, "DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 03 NOV 2006 200504425

TRIAL." THE DISCUSSION OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN GENERAL, AND OF THE DHARSONO TRIAL IN PARTICULAR, APPEARS TO US QUITE CRITICAL (AND RIGHTLY SO). WE (IMBS) HAVE THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT A CHANGE OF POSITION IS CALLED FOR, AND THAT WE SHOULD ABANDON OUR PREVIOUS STRATEGY OF SETTLING FOR DELETION OF REFERENCE TO THE RELEASE IF WE COULD NOT AVOID CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ORIGINAL TRIAL. ACCORDINGLY, WE HAVE GONE BACK TO NEGOTIATING THE LANGUAGE. WILLIAMS IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER WORDING OTHER THAN THE PRESENT "WHAT WAS WIDELY REGARDED AS AN UNFAIR TRIAL." COULD THE EMBASSY LIVE WITH "A TRIAL THAT WAS WIDELY CRITICIZED AT THE TIME FOR FAILING TO MEET INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF FAIRNESS"? IF NOT, CAN YOU SUGGEST OTHER LANGUAGE?

2. (U) OHIO UNIVERSITY VISIT TO JAKARTA

MARGARET TUTWILER'S OFFICE CALLED TO ASK THAT WE LET THE AMBASSADOR KNOW THAT OHIO UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT CHARLES PING MAY REQUEST AN APPOINTMENT. ROGER AILES CONTACTED MS. TUTWILER ON BEHALF OF PING, WHO BEGAN A VISIT TO

[redacted]

[redacted]

JAKARTA ON JANUARY 8. PING'S VISIT IS AT THE SUGGESTION OF AMBASSADOR SALEH BASARAH, FORMER INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR TO BRITAIN AND FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE INDONESIAN AIR FORCE. OHIO UNIVERSITY IS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF FORMING AN ACADEMIC PROGRAM IN COOPERATION WITH A HOST UNIVERSITY IN INDONESIA. PING WILL MEET WITH DR. SUKARDI RANUWINARDJA, DG FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, AS WELL AS WITH SEVERAL INDONESIAN-UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS. PING IS ACCOMPANIED BY DR. STEPHEN FULLER, CHAIRMAN OF WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, AND DENNIS HEFFERNAN, PAST CHAIRMAN OF THE OHIO UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES.

WE HAVE FAXED YOU ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT PING'S VISIT.

3. (U) WANANDI IN WASHINGTON

JUSUF WANANDI WAS IN TOWN FOR SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 24 HOURS. DICK SOLOMON TOOK HIM TO LUNCH TODAY AND INCLUDED GEORGE BENSON AND ME. THE CONVERSATION INCLUDED CAMBODIA, JAPAN, AND THE POLITICS OF THE EAST-WEST CENTER. WANANDI ALSO MET WITH PEOPLE AT DOD, DIA, AND USIA. HE WAS THE BENSONS' GUEST OF HONOR LAST NIGHT AT A DINNER ATTENDED

ALSO BY PAUL AND CLARE WOLFOWITZ, KARL JACKSON AND JEAN ADEN, MARTHA HOLDRIDGE AND BARBARA HARVEY.

4. (S) A STUDY ON U.S.-INDONESIA RELATIONS

IN A CONVERSATION WITH DOD'S HAL MAYNARD, WANANDI REVEALED THAT HE AND HASNAN HABIB ARE COMPLETING A MAJOR CSIS STUDY, APPARENTLY COMMISSIONED BY THE GOI, CONCERNING THE

[redacted]

[redacted]

STATUS AND FUTURE OF U.S.-INDONESIA RELATIONS. WANANDI SAID THE STUDY WILL PROVIDE NO BIG SURPRISES. THE STUDY'S THRUST IS THAT JAPAN IS NOW MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE U.S. TO INDONESIA. WHILE THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP MUST BE KEPT ON AN EVEN KEEL AND INDONESIA MUST CONTINUE TO DO BUSINESS WITH US, THE INDONESIAN RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN MUST NECESSARILY BE MORE INTENSE.

[redacted] YOGI SUPARDI ENDED HIS TOUR AS AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN [redacted] YOGI'S REPLACEMENT IS LIKELY TO BE SOEDIBJO RAHARDJO. [redacted] GENERAL RAJAGUGUK WILL BE MOVED TO AN AMBASSADORSHIP, MAKING ROOM FOR WISMOYO TO TAKE HIS PLACE. AFTER A SHORT WHILE, WISMOYO WILL THEN MOVE UP TO REPLACE EDI SUDRADJAT.

[redacted] THE RECENT ARMY SEMINAR WAS A FIZZLE. ALL THE GENERALS DID WAS WORK ON THE ARMY'S VERSION OF THE NEXT 25-YEAR PLAN, A TASK PRACTICALLY EVERYONE ELSE IN JAKARTA IS ALSO DOING.

B1 B1 B1 B1

5. (U) MORE CONGRATULATIONS

TIM CARNEY ARRIVED BACK FROM USUN TO CAMP WITH US WHILST DOING INDOCHINA-RELATED PROJECTS. HE IS DELIGHTED TO JOIN US IN SEEING JAKARTA COLLEAGUES, PRESENT AND FORMER, ON THE PROMOTION LIST, NOTABLY: GINA MILLER AND JAN RHODES; BETTY PAPPAS AND BRUCE DUNCOMBE; DICK LIVINGSTON; JIM BAYUK; LES OLY AND WALLY SZCZESNIAK; AND "NEWCOMER" TIM HAMILTON. MANY HAPPY RETURNS.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

NNNN

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 01 STATE 024778
ORIGIN EAP-03

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 ONY-00 /003 R

DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS:DCAMP 8648J
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS:RWTEARE
EAP/IMBS:BSHARVEY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE EAP/IMBS-THREE COPIES FOR IMBS
----------311042 250906Z /23

P 250726Z JAN 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

[redacted] STATE 024778

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL
APPEAL ACTION: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
REASON(S): B1, 1.4(D)
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2009 200504425

FOR DCM FROM IMBS TEARE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OGEN, SCUL, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL,INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 13

1. (S) EAST TIMOR

WE FOUND VERY USEFUL AND THOUGHT-PROVOKING YOUR FIRST REPORT ON THE AMBASSADOR'S TRIP; WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE OTHERS. YOU MAY BE INTERESTED IN SOME USEFUL WORK DONE BY [redacted] FOLLOWING UP THE PERSISTENT PRESS REPORTS THAT THERE WERE DEATHS AMONG THE DEMONSTRATORS. [redacted] B1 B1

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 02 STATE 024778

[redacted] AND IS B1
THEREFORE WILLING TO BELIEVE (IN THIS CASE) THE GOI'S ASSURANCES THAT THERE WERE NO DEATHS IN DILI.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 08 NOV 2006 200504425

2. ~~(LOU)~~ HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

---,---,---

FYI, IN LIGHT OF YOUR END-OF-THE-YEAR REPORT ON EST TIMOR, HA IS STRENGTHENING THE TWO PORTIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REFERRING TO KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS IN THE PROVINCE. GIVEN THE ADMISSIONS BY CARRASCALAO AND PONT THAT THE MILITARY DID KILL CIVILIANS, REFERENCES TO ALLEGATIONS WILL BE REMOVED; THE INTRODUCTION WILL NOW CITE SIMPLY "KILLINGS" OF CIVILIANS IN EAST TIMOR AND SECTION 1.A. WILL SAY THAT TWO DOZEN OR MORE CIVILIANS WERE KILLED BY THE MILITARY IN EAST TIMOR IN 1989.

3. ~~(LOU)~~ GINANDJAR VISIT

----,---,,----

YOU SHOULD BY NOW HAVE SEEN DOE'S REPLY TO YOUR REQUEST FOR DATES FOR A VISIT BY ADMIRAL WATKINS. TOM CUTLER HAS TOLD ME HE HAD NO LUCK GETTING HIS SENIORS TO APPROVE ASKING THEIR BOSS FOR NEW DATES OR SENDING A FORMAL INVITATION. THE COMPROMISE WE AGREED UPON IS IN THE DOE CABLE, I.E. GIVING THE AMBASSADOR AUTHORIZATION TO RE-EXTEND THE INVITATION HE HAD PREVIOUSLY PUT INTO A LETTER TO GINANDJAR. THIS SHOULD NOT SUGGEST ANY LACK OF INTEREST IN HAVING THE MINISTER VISIT BUT RATHER AN UNWILLINGNESS TO COMMIT WATKINS TO ANYTHING SO FAR IN ADVANCE. (WE EMPATHIZE WITH THEM ON THAT.)

4. ~~(LOU)~~ VISIT OF EXIM CHAIRMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WE UNDERSTAND THAT MACOMBER HAS OPTED FOR THE FEBRUARY 18-20 DATES FOR JAKARTA BECAUSE OF SCHEDULING PROBLEMS ELSEWHERE, DESPITE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR THE PREVIOUS WEEK. HIS STAFF IS CONFIDENT HE WILL BE WILLING TO ADDRESS AN AMCHAM LUNCHEON ON EITHER FEBRUARY 19 OR 20; THE TOPIC WILL LIKELY BE A GENERAL ONE, BUT HE WOULD TOUCH ON THE MIXED CREDITS ISSUE. THE OUTGOING CABLE ANNOUNCING HIS VISIT WILL STATE HIS WILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS AMCHAM-LIKE GROUPS.

5. ~~(LOU)~~ FESTIVAL OF INDONESIA: AMBASSADOR'S PARTICIPATION

---,---

OUR MEMO TO L/M SAID THAT THE AMBASSADOR'S PARTICIPATION IN THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF THE FESTIVAL WOULD BE IN THE USG INTEREST, WOULD NOT INVOLVE FUND-RAISING, AND WOULD BE

LARGELY CEREMONIAL. BASED ON THAT AND SOME FURTHER INQUIRIES THEY MADE DIRECTLY WITH TED TANEN, THE LAWYERS HAVE SAID THERE DOESN'T APPEAR TO BE ANY PROBLEM IN THE AMBASSADOR'S JOINING THE COMMITTEE. THEY SAY, HOWEVER, THAT OUR MEMO TO THEM IS NOT SUFFICIENT; THE AMBASSADOR MUST SEEK PERMISSION DIRECTLY FROM THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, WHO GIVES FINAL AUTHORIZATION AFTER SEEKING L'S VIEWS. A

CABLED REQUEST SHOULD SPECIFY THAT THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF THE FESTIVAL IS A PRIVATE ORGANIZATION. OTHER POINTS MIGHT INCLUDE: IN THE USG INTEREST, NO FUND-RAISING, NO RESPONSIBILITIES CONFLICTING WITH HIS AMBASSADORIAL ROLE, ETC. SLUG YOUR CABLE FOR THE DG, INFO L AND EAP.

6. (U) FESTIVAL VISITORS

HELEN JESSUP CALLED AGAIN TO SAY THAT GALLERY DIRECTOR OSA BROWN HAS A MIDDLE EAR INFECTION, AND THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO LEAVE FOR INDONESIA UNTIL FEBRUARY FIRST. THEY WILL GO DIRECTLY TO JOGJAKARTA, TO WORK WITH THE AUSTRALIAN PHOTOGRAPHER. ACCORDING TO THEIR PRESENT

[redacted]

PLANS, THEY WILL BE IN JAKARTA FEBRUARY 9-18. MS. JESSUP ASKED US TO PASS THIS INFORMATION ON TO THE AMBASSADOR IN VIEW OF HER EARLIER REQUEST FOR A SELAMATAN.

7. (U) TAX TREATY RATIFICATION

SFRC STAFF TOLD US THEY ARE LOOKING AT A LATE FEBRUARY/EARLY MARCH DATE FOR HEARINGS ON THE PENDING TAX TREATIES. THE INTENTION IS TO GET THESE LONG-DELAYED AGREEMENTS CLEARED OFF THE DOCKET AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.

8. (U) FOR ECON SECTION -- DJAKARTA LLOYD

AN INTERIM REPLY SO YOU'LL KNOW IT'S NOT BEEN FORGOTTEN -- THE FOLKS AT PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION MAINTAIN THAT THERE IS NO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR A STATE ORGANIZATION ENGAGED IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES. THEY DON'T SEE ANY PARTICULAR RECOURSE FOR DJAKARTA LLOYD OR ANY ROLE FOR THE USG. WE ARE LOOKING FOR CONFIRMATION OF THAT (OR A LOOPHOLE) FROM STATE LAWYERS. BAKER

[redacted]

RELEASED IN PART
B5

PAGE 01 STATE 005059 071948Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

5485
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: LMDINGER
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: RWTEARE
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
EAP/IMBS ONLY - 3 COPIES
----------3224BC 071949Z /38
P 071952Z JAN 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

[redacted] STATE 005059

FOR DCM FROM IMBS TEARE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 3

1. ~~(LOU)~~ HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

[redacted]

B5

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 02 STATE 005059 071948Z
-- SENTENCE ONE: SUBSTITUTE "HELD FOR SECURITY REASONS" FOR "JAILED IN CONNECTION WITH ARMED RESISTANCE".

-- SENTENCE TWO: INSERT "SOMEWHAT" AFTER "IMPROVED", AND DELETE "ALTHOUGH LAPSES BY OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO OCCUR".

-- FINAL SENTENCE: DELETE "DESPITE REPEATED REQUESTS,".

2. ~~(LOU)~~ AMBASSADOR'S SPEECH

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL
APPEAL ACTION: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
REASON(S): B5
DATE/CASE ID: 05 OCT 2007 200504425

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 09 NOV 2006 200504425

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NEA HAS NO PROBLEM WITH THE DRAFT SPEECH FOR USE WITH HMI; HOWEVER, THEY DO HAVE A FEW SUGGESTIONS ON THE Q'S AND A'S:

-- ANSWER 6, FINAL SENTENCE SAYS "THE OPTION OF USING MILITARY FORCE TO LIBERATE KUWAIT IS BEING CONSIDERED ONLY IF PEACEFUL MEASURES FAIL." THAT SENTIMENT NEEDS TO BE TIED TO THE JANUARY 15TH DEADLINE.

-- ANSWER 9, FINAL SENTENCE, REVISE TO READ: "THE U.S. BELIEVES ANY REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE PUT IN PLACE CAN NOT BE EFFECTIVE WITHOUT THE CONSENT AND COOPERATION OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION."

-- ANSWER 11: WE DO NOT SPEAK OF A BAKER INITIATIVE. REPLACE "SECRETARY BAKER'S RECENT INITIATIVE" WITH "RECENT STEPS INCLUDING THE ISRAELIS' MAY 14, 1989 INITIATIVE, PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S TEN-POINT INITIATIVE, AND SECRETARY BAKER'S FIVE POINTS...".

-- ANSWER 12, FIRST SENTENCE. WE DO NOT USE THE TERM "SELF-DETERMINATION" IN THIS CONTEXT. DELETE ALL AFTER

[redacted]

[redacted]

"RECOGNIZE", AND REPLACE IT WITH: "AND SUPPORT THE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL RIGHTS FOR THE RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND WISH TO FACILITATE THOSE RIGHTS." (SECOND SENTENCE OK.)
EAGLEBURGER

[redacted]

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 162013 272229Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 CORE-00
/001R

1980
DRAFTED BY: EAP/IMBS: KSBROWN (EAP)
APPROVED BY: EAP/IMBS: DGBROWN (EAP)
EAP/IMBS: JALOISI (EAP)
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
3 COPIES - EAP ONLY

----------C4B8E1 272230Z /38
P 272226Z MAY 93
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 162013

FOR DCM FROM IMBS DIRECTOR BROWN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL IMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 75

1. (C) SCHEDULE PLANNING

D IS CONSIDERING THE VARIOUS SUGGESTIONS FROM POSTS ON HIS PROPOSED TRAVEL AND IS PLANNING TO SEND A FRONT CHANNEL MESSAGE WITH A REVISED ITINERARY WHICH LARGELY ACCOMMODATES SUGGESTIONS FROM THE FIELD. AS WE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 162013 272229Z
UNDERSTAND IT, THIS TENATIVE REVISED SCHEDULE WILL HAVE HIM ARRIVING IN JAKARTA AROUND NOON ON SUNDAY, JUNE 27 AND DEPARTING VERY EARLY ON THE MORNING OF TUESDAY JUNE 29 FOR A BREIF DAYTIME STOPOVER IN BRUNEI. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THESE DATES COINCIDE WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE CGI IN PARIS AND THAT SEVERAL POSSIBLE INTERLOCUTORS WILL BE OUT OF TOWN. FYI, WE UNDERSTAND D KNEW PROFESSOR SUMITRO FROM HIS DAYS IN MALAYSIA WHEN SUMITRO WAS IN HIDING AND ALSO MENTIONED WIDJOJO AND ALI WARDHANA DURING THE CONVERSATION WITH HABIBIE EARLIER THIS MONTH. D WILL BE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200504416

LEAVING DC AROUND JUNE 18 AND WE ARE WORKING WITH S/S ON TASKING FOR THE BRIEFING BOOK WHICH WILL BE DUE JUNE 14. WE ANTICIPATE THAT WE WILL SHORTLY BE TASKED TO PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS ON SCHEDULES FOR EACH STOP. TO FACILITATE PLANNING HERE, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE YOUR SUGGESTIONS ON A NOTIONAL SCHEDULE MAKING BEST USE OF THE TIME TENTATIVELY AVAILABLE. D STAFF ASKS THAT SUNDAY BE KEPT ESSENTIALLY FREE OF OFFICIAL EVENTS. PLEASE SEND YOUR SUGGESTIONS BY O-I TO REACH US BY OOB TUESDAY, JUNE 1. THANKS.

2. (U) BACKGROUND NOTES

WE HAVE CHECKED WITH EAP/P REGARDING THE BACKGROUND NOTES AND THERE IS NO NEW FORMAT. THEIR ONLY SUGGESTION WAS THAT IF SEVERAL PEOPLE WRITE IT, SOMEONE IN THE END LOOK IT OVER TO BE SURE THE STYLE IS CLEAR AND CONSISTENT. YOU CAN SEND IT IN AS A CABLE ONCE REVISED. YOUR EFFORTS WILL BE MUCH APPRECIATED.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 162013 272229Z

3. (C) GSP WR -- INTER-AGENCY "PROCESS" CONTINUES

THERE IS, AS YET, NO CONSENSUS ON THE QUESTION OF "NEW BENEFITS." INTER-AGENCY CONTACTS AT HIGH LEVELS CONTINUE. ONE REASON FOR THE APPARENT LACK OF URGENCY IS THAT KEY DECISIONS ON HOW TO HANDLE OTHER COUNTRY CASES (ESPECIALLY OMAN) HAVE YET TO BE MADE. EB AND EAP AGREE TO OPPOSE ADDING THE "NO NEW BENEFITS" PLANK TO THE TOUGH PEND PACKAGE, BUT THAT VIEW IS NOT YET OFFICIAL DEPARTMENT POLICY. WE'VE JUST RECEIVED A VERSION OF THE INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT/PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION/DEMARCHE AND WILL BE EXAMINING IT IN DETAIL.

4. (C) GSP WR -- EMBASSY'S DRAFT PAPERS RE CASE

WE'VE CIRCULATED PAPERS FAXED BY GREG TO IMBS ON 5/14 WITHIN STATE. THE FIRST PAPER -- U.S. GSP AND WORKER RIGHTS -- POSES FEW PROBLEMS AS IT CONTAINS GENERAL STATEMENTS. WE PREFER, HOWEVER, THAT YOU REFER INTERESTED PARTIES TO APPENDIX 2 OF THE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (PAGE 1187 IN THE 1992 EDITION)

WHICH PRESENTS OFFICIAL DEFINITIONS OF THE FIVE INTERNATIONALLY-RECOGNIZED WORKER RIGHTS IN A USEFUL CONTEXT; AND SECTION SIX OF THE INDONESIA REPORT WHICH PRESENTS THE OFFICIAL UNCLASSIFIED USG VIEW OF THE LABOR SCENE.

EB WILL CLEAR NO/NO EMBASSY PAPER WHICH CONTAINS SPECIFIC COMMENT ON THE INDONESIAN SITUATION. THE DETAILED

"PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION" HAMMERED OUT IN INTER-AGENCY DISCUSSIONS HERE WILL HAVE TO SERVE. THIS SAID, WE KNOW IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO GET YOU PRESS GUIDANCE AND THE TEXT OF THE JUSTIFICATION, PREFERABLY BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

5. (U) LETTER TO HABIBIE

THE LETTER FROM D TO HABIBIE IS SIMPLY A ENJOYED MEETING YOU AND THANK YOU FOR YOUR GIFT LETTER. FEEL FREE TO OPEN IT, CORRECT THE SPELLING OF HABIBIE'S NAME WHERE WRONG, AND SEND ALONG AS YOU SEE FIT.

6. (C) XANANA

WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM ERIC SCHWARTZ AT THE NSC WHO GOT A FAX FROM BRUCE CAMERON, A WASHINGTON LOBBYIST FOR RAMOS HORTA.



B1

7. (C) * YUGOSLAV VESSELS

ANY FOLLOW-UP YOU CAN PROVIDE ON YUGOSLAV VESSELS IN INDONESIAN PORTS WOULD BE WELCOME. COULD YOU PLEASE CONFIRM THAT YOU HAVE DELIVERED THE DEMARCHE IN STATE 157461? THANKS.
WHARTON

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED E3

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 005060 072133Z
ORIGIN HA-09

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 EAP-01 ADS-00 SIL-00 /010R

0387
DRAFTED BY: HA/BA: PSHOTZE
APPROVED BY: HA: TEWILLIAMS/EBB
HA/BA: YFTHAYER(INFO)
HA/CRT: DSHARRIS(INFO)
EAP/IMBS: KSBROWN(INFO)
EAP/RA: BAMALKIN(INFO)
----------8E02F9 072257Z /64
P 072132Z JAN 93
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 005060

NOFORN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM ELAB KSPR ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 1992 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
REF: (A) 92 JAKARTA 15574, (B) 92 JAKARTA 15373,
(C) 92 JAKARTA 15095, (D) 92 STATE 295100 AND PREVIOUS

1. LOU-NOFORN--ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING FOR YOUR FINAL REVIEW IS THE 1992 REPORT ON
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 005060 072133Z
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR INDONESIA. THIS IS NOT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO REWRITE THE REPORT OR ADD MORE INFORMATION,
BUT TO REVIEW THE TEXT FOR SIGNIFICANT FACTUAL OR OTHER
ERRORS. IT HAS BEEN CLEARED BY ALL APPROPRIATE DEPARTMENT
OFFICES. DUE TO THE NECESSITY TO PRESENT THE REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON JANUARY 19, YOU ARE REQUESTED TO RESPOND
WITHIN TWO WORKING DAYS. PLEASE REMEMBER THAT THE REPORT
MUST CONTINUE TO BE TREATED AS LIMITED OFFICIAL
USE--NOFORN UNTIL SUCH TIME AS IT IS OFFICIALLY RELEASED
TO THE PUBLIC. DUE NOTIFICATION WILL BE MADE TO YOU PRIOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200504416 DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

TO RELEASE.

3. THE LENGTH OF THE REPORT NECESSITATES TRANSMISSION IN TWO CABLES. SEPTEL WILL TRANSMIT THE SECOND PORTION OF THE REPORT.

4. TEXT OF REPORT:
INDONESIA IS A VERY LARGE, POPULOUS, DEVELOPING COUNTRY WHOSE PEOPLE COME FROM HUNDREDS OF DIFFERENT ETHNIC, CULTURAL, AND LINGUISTIC BACKGROUNDS. WITH THE LARGEST MUSLIM POPULATION IN THE WORLD, IT IS A SECULAR STATE WHICH ADVOCATES RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND STRIVES TO BALANCE THE NEED FOR STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT WITH RESPECT AND TOLERANCE FOR THE DIVERSITY OF ITS PEOPLE. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES ALLEGIANCE TO FIVE BROAD, GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL LIFE KNOWN AS "PANCASILA": BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD, A JUST AND CIVILIZED HUMANITY, INDONESIAN NATIONAL UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE. THE GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITARIAN RULE RESTRICTS BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY OF THE STATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

IS THE 1,000-MEMBER PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH MEETS EVERY 5 YEARS TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AND SET THE BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY. IN THEORY, THE PRESIDENT IS SUBORDINATE TO THE ASSEMBLY; IN FACT, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI) WIELD PREDOMINANT POLITICAL POWER, WITH 20 PERCENT OF THE DPR, OR PARLIAMENT, APPOINTED FROM THE RANKS OF ABRI. THE PARLIAMENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING LAWS BUT HAS NOT USED ITS POWER TO INITIATE LEGISLATION IN THE 27 YEARS OF SOEHARTO'S GOVERNMENT. IT REMAINS ESSENTIALLY PASSIVE IN ITS DEALINGS WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. QUINQUENNIAL PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS ARE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY. THE DE FACTO GOVERNMENT PARTY, GOLKAR, WON 68 PERCENT OF THE VOTE IN THE MOST RECENT ELECTIONS IN JUNE 1992.

THE ARMED FORCES WHICH INCLUDE THE MILITARY SERVICES AND THE POLICE NUMBER 445,000. THE ARMY CONSTITUTES ABOUT HALF OF THE ARMED FORCES AND FOCUSES MAINLY ON INTERNAL SECURITY. TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES FOR 1989, THE LAST YEAR FOR WHICH THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY CONDUCTED A DETAILED ANALYSIS, WERE 1,510,000,000. GIVEN THE RELATIVELY MODEST SIZE OF THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
MILITARY FORCES AND THEIR BUDGET, THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO REDUCE THESE EXPENDITURES IN THE NEAR FUTURE. UNDER A "DUAL FUNCTION" CONCEPT, MANY MILITARY OFFICERS SERVE IN THE CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY AT ALL LEVELS AND IN PARLIAMENT. PUBLIC DISCUSSION ABOUT REDUCING THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN NATIONAL AFFAIRS INCREASED DURING THE YEAR. SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED OPERATIONS AGAINST SEPARATIST GROUPS IN ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, AND EAST
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TIMOR IN 1992. ON OCCASION, POLICE IN JAKARTA AND MEDAN EMPLOYED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN SUBDUING SUSPECTED CRIMINALS.

INDONESIA HAS A LARGELY FREE MARKET ECONOMY CHARACTERIZED BY LARGE OIL REVENUES AND GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO ENCOURAGE NONOIL EXPORTS AND REVENUES. THE ECONOMY CONTINUED TO EXPAND IN 1992, GROWING APPROXIMATELY 6 PERCENT DESPITE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO CONTAIN INFLATION. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN REAL INCOMES AND IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF MOST INDONESIANS IN THE PAST 20 YEARS, THE COUNTRY REMAINS POOR, WITH SIGNIFICANT UNEMPLOYMENT AND WIDE DISPARITIES IN WEALTH. CORRUPTION AND INFLUENCE PEDDLING ARE ENDEMIC AND DISTORT GROWTH AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY.

THE MOST IMPORTANT HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE YEAR CONCERNED GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO COPE WITH THE AFTERMATH OF ARMY TROOPS' KILLING OF UNARMED DEMONSTRATORS ON NOVEMBER 12, 1991, IN EAST TIMOR. AT THE RECOMMENDATION OF A MILITARY INVESTIGATING BODY FORMED ON PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S ORDERS, UNPRECEDENTED DISCIPLINARY ACTION WAS TAKEN AGAINST 6 SENIOR OFFICERS AND 10 OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT. THIRTEEN TIMORESE CIVILIANS WERE CONVICTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCIDENT. MOST OF THE LATTER RECEIVED EXTREMELY HARSH SENTENCES. MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES INVOLVED IN THE SHOOTINGS WERE CHARGED ONLY WITH RELATIVELY MINOR OFFENSES. WHILE THE CIVILIANS' TRIALS WERE OPEN AND GENERALLY CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INDONESIAN LAW, THEY FAILED TO MEET ALL INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF FAIRNESS. SUBVERSION TRIALS IN NORTH SUMATRA AND ACEH
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ALSO FAILED TO MEET INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS.

IN ADDITION TO EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS AND UNFAIR TRIALS, OTHER SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS CONTINUED. THEY INCLUDE TORTURE AND OTHER MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS AND DETAINEES, ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION, ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, SIGNIFICANT RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS, ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION, AND ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, AND THE INABILITY OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT. OTHER PROBLEM AREAS INCLUDE HARASSMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, DISCRIMINATION AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, AND RESTRICTIONS ON WORKER RIGHTS.

IN OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS AREAS, FOREIGN TRAVEL REQUIREMENTS WERE EASED. THE JUNE 9 ELECTIONS WERE FREE FROM VIOLENCE AND INTERFERENCE FROM SECURITY FORCES, AND, WHILE MINOR IRREGULARITIES OCCURRED, THE ACTUAL BALLOTING WAS CONSIDERED FAIR. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED ITS GENEROUS POLICY TOWARD INDOCHINESE REFUGEES AND ITS COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) ON THE REPATRIATION OF IRIANESE WHO HAD FLED TO PAPUA NEW GUINEA BECAUSE OF SEPARATIST VIOLENCE. BUT OFFICIAL AND INFORMAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE PERSISTED. THE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT AT THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WHICH COMMITS IT TO RESPOND TO RECOMMENDATIONS ON PREVENTING TORTURE AND TO ALLOWING GREATER ACCESS BY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS TO EAST TIMOR. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS AS YET MADE NO RESPONSE ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS, NOR HAS IT ALLOWED GREATER ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING

THE NUMBER OF CREDIBLE REPORTS OF POLITICALLY RELATED CIVILIAN DEATHS HAS DECLINED SUBSTANTIALLY SINCE 1991, OWING PRIMARILY TO THE FACT THAT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, AND EAST TIMOR DECLINED. IN ACEH IN PARTICULAR, THE EGREGIOUS ABUSES OF THE CIVILIAN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

POPULATION EASED CONSIDERABLY COMPARED TO 1991, AS SECURITY FORCES, HAVING ELIMINATED ALL BUT A HANDFUL OF ACEH MERDEKA (FREE ACEH) ARMED SEPARATISTS, TURNED TO CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS. THE SECURITY SITUATION IN IRIAN JAYA WAS ALSO GENERALLY CALM, WITH FEW, IF ANY, CIVILIAN DEATHS REPORTED DUE TO ACTIONS BY THE MILITARY.

IN EAST TIMOR, TIGHTENED SECURITY AND REVISED MILITARY PROCEDURES PUT INTO PLACE FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER 12, 1991, SHOOTING INCIDENT IN DILI APPEARED TO HAVE LED TO A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN CIVILIAN DEATHS ATTRIBUTABLE TO SECURITY FORCES. THE EXACT NUMBER AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATHS OF SEVERAL FRETILIN GUERRILLAS REPORTED KILLED COULD NOT BE CONFIRMED. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT DID TAKE ACTION AGAINST THOSE INVOLVED IN THE NOVEMBER 1991 INCIDENT IN EAST TIMOR, THE GOVERNMENT MADE NO EFFORTS IN 1992 TO TRY AND PUNISH APPROPRIATELY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR KILLINGS, TORTURE, AND OTHER ABUSES COMMITTED IN PREVIOUS YEARS IN ACEH AND OTHER AREAS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

IN BAUCAU, EAST TIMOR, TWO EAST TIMORESE WERE SHOT ON OCTOBER 5. ONE WAS KILLED OUTRIGHT BY ABRI FORCES. A CREDIBLE SOURCE BELIEVES THE OTHER, WHO WAS TAKEN TO A MILITARY HOSPITAL, WAS BEATEN TO DEATH WHILE IN THE HANDS OF ABRI.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO DEAL WITH THE NOVEMBER 12, 1991, SHOOTING OF CIVILIANS IN EAST TIMOR. A MILITARY "HONORARY COUNCIL" APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IN DECEMBER 1991 TO INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF SECURITY FORCES IN THE INCIDENT ANNOUNCED ITS RESULTS IN FEBRUARY, FINDING THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES HAD BEEN NEGLIGENT, HAD FAILED TO ANTICIPATE PROBLEMS ADEQUATELY, OR HAD VIOLATED MILITARY ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE. AS A RESULT OF THIS FINDING, 4 OFFICERS AND 6 ENLISTED MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES WERE COURT-MARTIALED IN MAY AND JUNE, ONE ON CHARGES OF ASSAULT AND 9 OTHERS ON CHARGES OF EXCEEDING OR FAILING TO OBEY OFFICIAL ORDERS. NO CHARGES WERE BROUGHT AGAINST ABRI PERSONNEL FOR ACTUALLY KILLING CIVILIANS DURING THE INCIDENT IN WHICH 50 TO 100 PEOPLE ARE THOUGHT TO HAVE DIED AS A RESULT OF MILITARY ACTION. ALL OF THE SOLDIERS WERE CONVICTED IN SESSIONS OPEN TO DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS AND THE PRESS AND RECEIVED SENTENCES RANGING FROM 6 TO 18 MONTHS IN PRISON. SIX SENIOR

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICERS WERE DISCIPLINED; THREE, INCLUDING THE BRIGADIER GENERAL WHO COMMANDED SECURITY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, WERE DISCHARGED. FIVE OTHER OFFICERS WERE INVESTIGATED FURTHER, ONE OF WHOM WAS TO BE RETIRED EARLY BECAUSE OF HIS ALLEGED FAILURE TO ACT DECISIVELY DURING THE INCIDENT.

LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE IN LOCATING THOSE DEMONSTRATORS STILL MISSING AFTER THE INCIDENT. THE NATIONAL INVESTIGATORY COMMISSION REFUTED EARLIER MILITARY CLAIMS THAT ONLY 19 PEOPLE DIED ON NOVEMBER 12 BY STATING IN DECEMBER 1991 THAT "ABOUT 50" WERE KILLED. THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES REPORTED TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IN JULY THAT 66 PEOPLE REMAINED MISSING. BUT DESPITE MORE THAN 6 MONTHS OF INVESTIGATION, THE MILITARY CLAIMED IT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO FIND ANY ADDITIONAL BODIES BEYOND THE 19 ORIGINALLY ACCOUNTED FOR. ALTHOUGH OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS SUGGESTED THAT SOME OF THE 66 WERE STILL IN HIDING, CREDIBLE SOURCES BELIEVED MOST, IF NOT ALL, OF THEM WERE DEAD.

POLICE CONTINUE TO USE EXCESSIVE LETHAL FORCE IN EFFORTS TO APPREHEND SUSPECTED CRIMINALS. ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, POLICE IN JAKARTA IN 1991 SHOT 75 CRIMINAL SUSPECTS WHO WERE REPORTEDLY FLEEING OR RESISTING ARREST, OF WHOM 38 DIED. IN 1992 UP TO AUGUST, 40 SUSPECTS HAD BEEN SHOT, 20 OF WHOM DIED. THESE SHOOTINGS CAME AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF A DECLINING OVERALL CRIME RATE, BUT AN INCREASE IN VIOLENT CRIMES.

IN MEDAN, THE CAPITAL OF NORTH SUMATRA, WHERE THE CRIME RATE WAS ALSO FALLING, POLICE ANNOUNCED IN 1992 THAT 182 SUSPECTS HAD BEEN SHOT IN 1991, OF WHOM 2 DIED. IN NORTH SUMATRA AS A WHOLE 220 SUSPECTS WERE SHOT. THROUGH EARLY DECEMBER 1992, 93 SUSPECTS HAD BEEN SHOT IN NORTH SUMATRA, MANY OF THEM 4 AND 5 TIMES. TWO DIED OF THEIR WOUNDS. AUTHORITIES MAINTAINED THOSE SHOT HAD BEEN FLEEING AND

WERE GIVEN WARNINGS, OR WERE RESISTING ARREST. THEY ALSO

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DENIED THEY WERE PURSUING A SYSTEMATIC POLICY AIMED AT DISCOURAGING CRIME. BUT HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS REPORTED THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THOSE SHOT CLAIMED THEY HAD BEEN CAUGHT FIRST, HANDCUFFED, AND THEN SHOT, SOMETIMES AT THE POLICE STATION.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED ABDUCTIONS IN 1992. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR THOSE STILL MISSING FROM THE NOVEMBER 12, 1991, SHOOTING INCIDENT WERE INEFFECTIVE (SEE SECTION 1.A.).

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

THE INDONESIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE (KUHAP) CONTAINS A NUMBER OF PROVISIONS AIMED AT PROTECTING THE ACCUSED. STATEMENTS FROM SUSPECTS OR WITNESSES, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE SUPPOSED TO BE EXTRACTED WITHOUT PRESSURE OF ANY KIND, AND PRETRIAL PROCEDURES GIVE SUSPECTS OR THEIR FAMILIES THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THEIR ARREST OR DETENTION. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT OF CRIMINAL SUSPECTS, DETAINEES, AND PRISONERS ARE COMMON, AND THE LEGAL PROTECTIONS ARE VIOLATED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

THE U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR FOR TORTURE STATED IN HIS JANUARY REPORT THAT, BASED ON HIS NOVEMBER 1991 VISIT TO INDONESIA, HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT "TORTURE OCCURS IN INDONESIA, IN PARTICULAR IN CASES WHICH ARE CONSIDERED TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ENDANGER THE SECURITY OF THE STATE." THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR CONTINUED THAT IN AREAS SUCH AS ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, AND EAST TIMOR WHICH "ARE DEEMED TO BE UNSTABLE...TORTURE IS SAID TO BE PRACTICED RATHER ROUTINELY." IN 1992 ACEH CONTINUED TO BE THE AREA OF GREATEST CONCERN, ALTHOUGH VARIOUS CREDIBLE OBSERVERS NOTED A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES AND PRISONERS, PERHAPS RELATED TO THE OVERALL REDUCTION IN TENSIONS THERE.

POLICE OFTEN RESORT TO PHYSICAL ABUSE, EVEN IN MINOR INCIDENTS, AND PRISON CONDITIONS IN INDONESIA TEND TO BE HARSH. OFFICIALS HAVE PUBLICLY CONDEMNED POLICE BRUTALITY AND HARSH PRISON CONDITIONS AND OCCASIONALLY INSTIGATE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DISCIPLINARY ACTION, INCLUDING TRANSFER, DISMISSAL, TRIAL, AND SENTENCING TO PRISON TERMS. IN 1992 SEVERAL POLICEMEN WERE COURT-MARTIALED FOR MISTREATING OR BEATING PRISONERS. IN ONE CASE, AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS, THE CONVICTED POLICEMAN CONTINUED TO BEAT A SUSPECT EVEN THOUGH THE SUSPECT HAD ALREADY CONFESSED. THE SUSPECT DIED SHORTLY THEREAFTER. THIS POLICEMAN WAS DISMISSED FROM SERVICE AND SENTENCED TO 4 YEARS' IMPRISONMENT. IN ACEH, A MILITARY TRIBUNAL IN JANUARY SENTENCED THREE POLICEMEN TO BETWEEN 2 1/2 AND 3 MONTHS IN PRISON FOR BEATING A PRISONER.
A MEDAN MILITARY COURT IN JULY SENTENCED A POLICE SERGEANT TO 14 MONTHS IN PRISON FOR BEATING A SUSPECT TO DEATH.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

KUHAP CONTAINS PROTECTIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DETENTION AND SPECIFIES THE RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO NOTIFICATION OF FAMILY. WARRANTS MUST BE PRODUCED DURING AN ARREST EXCEPT UNDER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS, SUCH AS WHEN A SUSPECT IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME. WARRANTS ARE ISSUED BY POLICE INVESTIGATORS TO ASSIST IN THEIR INVESTIGATIONS OR IF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED. DEFENDANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL OF THEIR CHOICE AT EVERY PHASE OF AN INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL, AND ALSO HAVE THE RIGHT TO KNOW IN DETAIL THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM. DEFENDANTS ARE PRESUMED INNOCENT AND MAY BE GRANTED BAIL. THEY OR THEIR FAMILIES MAY ALSO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THEIR ARREST AND DETENTION IN A PRETRIAL HEARING AND ARE ENTITLED TO SUE FOR COMPENSATION IF WRONGFULLY DETAINED. KUHAP ALSO CONTAINS SPECIFIC LIMITS ON PERIODS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION AND SPECIFIES WHEN THE COURTS MUST GET INVOLVED TO APPROVE EXTENSIONS.

IN PRACTICE, THESE SAFEGUARDS ARE OFTEN VIOLATED. BAIL IS RARELY GRANTED, ESPECIALLY IN POLITICAL CASES. THE AUTHORITIES FREQUENTLY INTERFERE WITH ACCESS TO DEFENSE COUNSEL. EXTENSIONS OF PERIODS OF DETENTION ARE ROUTINELY APPROVED. PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS ARE RARELY INITIATED. IN ADDITION, SUSPECTS CHARGED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW ARE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL PROCEDURES OUTSIDE OF KUHAP THAT ALLOW, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY TO HOLD A SUSPECT FOR UP TO A YEAR BEFORE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

TRIAL. THIS 1-YEAR PERIOD IS RENEWABLE WITHOUT LIMIT. SPECIAL LAWS ON CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND NARCOTICS ARE SIMILARLY EXEMPT FROM KUHAP'S PROTECTIONS. THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) OPERATES OUTSIDE KUHAP AND HAS WIDE DISCRETION TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE PERSONS THOUGHT TO THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY.

NATIONAL ESTIMATES ON THE NUMBER OF ARBITRARY ARRESTS OR DETENTIONS WITHOUT TRIAL ARE NOT AVAILABLE. IN ACEH 180 PEOPLE ACCUSED OF BEING MEMBERS OF ACEH MERDEKA (FREE ACEH) WERE RELEASED IN 1992 AFTER VARYING PERIODS OF DETENTION, OFTEN INCOMMUNICADO AND WITHOUT TRIAL. THE AUTHORITIES RELEASED A TOTAL OF 653 DETAINEES IN 1991, YIELDING A TOTAL OF AT LEAST 833 PERSONS DETAINED WITHOUT TRIAL FOR VARIOUS PERIODS IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACEH INSURGENCY. MANY OF THOSE RELEASED WERE REQUIRED TO REPORT BACK TO THE AUTHORITIES AT REGULAR INTERVALS. AT LEAST 50 MORE ACEHNESE WERE BELIEVED TO BE AWAITING TRIAL AT YEAR'S END, MANY WITHOUT CLEAR KNOWLEDGE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM. (SEE SECTION 1.E. FOR A DISCUSSION OF THOSE ACEHNESE WHO RECEIVED TRIALS.)

IN EAST TIMOR MILITARY AUTHORITIES CONTINUED THE PRACTICE OF DETAINING PEOPLE WITHOUT CHARGES FOR SHORT PERIODS AND THEN REQUIRING THEM TO REPORT DAILY OR WEEKLY TO POLICE AFTER THEIR RELEASE. THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF SCORES OF PEOPLE BEING DETAINED WITHOUT CHARGES AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE YEAR FOR ENFORCED "VOCATIONAL TRAINING." THIS OCCURRED DURING PERIODS OF POTENTIAL UNREST, SUCH AS THE FEBRUARY VISIT TO EAST TIMOR OF THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL ENVOY, AMOS WAKO, AND THE MARCH APPROACH OF THE PORTUGUESE CAR FERRY, THE LUSITANIA EXPRESSO. ARRESTS, OTHER TEMPORARY DETENTIONS, INTRUSIVE SEARCHES AND SOME BEATINGS ALSO OCCURRED JUST BEFORE THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ANNIVERSARY OF THE NOVEMBER 12 SHOOTINGS AND IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE NOVEMBER 20 ARREST OF FRETILIN LEADER JOSE "XANANA" GUSMAO. THERE HAVE BEEN CREDIBLE REPORTS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THAT TIMORESE DETAINEES HAVE BEEN MISTREATED. IN ADDITION, 24 TIMORESE ARRESTED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE NOVEMBER 12 INCIDENT WERE OFFICIALLY "RELEASED" ON MARCH 2 WHEN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DECIDED ONLY 8 DETAINEES IN EAST TIMOR WOULD BE TRIED. BUT THE MILITARY COMMANDER OF EAST TIMOR CONTINUED TO HOLD THE 24 IN MILITARY CAMPS AROUND EAST TIMOR FOR MOST OF THE REMAINDER OF 1992 FOR INTENSIVE INSTRUCTION ON INDONESIAN CIVICS. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE ALLOWED VISITS BY FAMILY MEMBERS, AND 10 WERE SEEN BY THE ICRC, THEIR CONTINUED DETENTION IN MILITARY FACILITIES WITHOUT CHARGES WAS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF KUHAP.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

A QUADRIPARTITE JUDICIARY OF GENERAL, RELIGIOUS, MILITARY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS EXISTS BELOW THE SUPREME COURT. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT TO HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS IN ALL FOUR SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE. THE SUPREME COURT, WITH A CURRENT BACKLOG VARIOUSLY ESTIMATED AT 13,000 TO 17,000 CASES, DOES NOT CONSIDER FACTUAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF LAW. INITIAL JUDGMENTS ARE RARELY REVERSED IN THE APPEALS PROCESS, ALTHOUGH SENTENCES ARE SOMETIMES INCREASED OR REDUCED. A THREE-JUDGE PANEL CONDUCTS TRIALS AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL, POSES QUESTIONS, HEARS EVIDENCE, DECIDES GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND ASSESSES PUNISHMENT.

DEFENDANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES. AN EXCEPTION IS ALLOWED IN CASES WHERE DISTANCE OR EXPENSE ARE DEEMED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

EXCESSIVE FOR TRANSPORTING WITNESSES TO COURT, IN WHICH CASE SWORN AFFIDAVITS MAY BE INTRODUCED. IN AT LEAST ONE CASE IN 1992, THIS PRACTICE HAD THE EFFECT OF PREVENTING CROSS-EXAMINATION OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

THE USE IN TRIALS OF FORCED CONFESSIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE ARE COMMON. DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, AND IN SEVERAL CASES IN 1992 WERE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN THEIR OWN TRIALS AND IN RELATED TRIALS RUNNING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IN CAPITAL CASES AND THOSE INVOLVING A PRISON SENTENCE OF 15 YEARS OR MORE, A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED. IN CASES INVOLVING POTENTIAL SENTENCES OF 5 YEARS OR MORE, A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IF THE ACCUSED DESIRES AN ATTORNEY BUT IS INDIGENT. DESTITUTE DEFENDANTS CAN OBTAIN PRIVATE LEGAL HELP, SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE (LBH).

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THE JUDICIARY IN INDONESIA IS NOT INDEPENDENT. THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER LAWS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT. ALTHOUGH THE SUPREME COURT HAS SINCE 1985 HAD THE POWER TO REVIEW MINISTERIAL DECREES AND REGULATIONS, THE COURT HAS NOT YET USED THIS POWER; CHIEF JUSTICE PURWOTO GANDASUBRATA, HOWEVER, TOOK A CASE DEALING WITH A MINISTERIAL DECREE CONTROLLING NEWSPAPER PUBLISHING PERMITS UNDER ADVISEMENT IN NOVEMBER. WHILE JUDGES RECEIVE GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT ON LEGAL MATTERS, THEY ARE CIVIL SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THEY ARE SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM MILITARY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES. IN ADDITION, CORRUPTION PERMEATES THE INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM. IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, THE PAYMENT OF BRIBES CAN INFLUENCE PROSECUTION, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCING.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE SAID IN AUGUST THAT WHILE PROVING JUDICIAL CORRUPTION WAS OFTEN DIFFICULT, 266 JUDGES HAD BEEN PROSECUTED SINCE 1980. IN SEPTEMBER THE NEWLY APPOINTED CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, WHO PLEDGED TO COMBAT JUDICIAL IMPROPRIETY, RECOMMENDED THE DISMISSAL OF TWO ADMINISTRATIVE COURT JUSTICES WHO ALLEGEDLY ACCEPTED BRIBES. THE FINAL DECISION, HOWEVER, RESTED WITH THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND THE PRESIDENT, WHO AT YEAR'S END HAD NOT ACTED ON THE MATTER. THE SUPREME COURT ENGAGED IN A NATIONWIDE EFFORT TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF DISTRICT COURT JUDGES, BUT PUBLIC RESPECT FOR THE LEGAL SYSTEM REMAINED LOW.

THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW, WHICH CARRIES A MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH, WAS ATTACKED IN SEVERAL 1992 SUBVERSION TRIALS AS OUTMODED, UNFAIR, AND EXCESSIVELY HARSH. THE LAW MAKES IT A CRIME TO ENGAGE IN ACTS THAT COULD DISTORT, UNDERMINE, OR DEVIATE FROM THE STATE IDEOLOGY OR BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, OR WHICH COULD DISSEMINATE FEELINGS OF HOSTILITY OR AROUSE HOSTILITY, DISTURBANCES, OR ANXIETY AMONG THE POPULATION. THE U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR FOR TORTURE RECOMMENDED IN HIS JANUARY REPORT THAT THE LAW BE REPEALED. HE NOTED THAT THE LAW'S DEFINITIONS ARE "VERY BROAD AND LOOSE," AND THAT NO REQUIREMENT EXISTS TO PROVE THAT ALLEGEDLY SUBVERSIVE ACTS ACTUALLY ENDANGERED THE SECURITY OF THE STATE, ONLY THAT THEY COULD HAVE. THE VAGUENESS OF THE LAW MAKES A SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE; ONLY TWO PERSONS HAVE EVER BEEN ACQUITTED OF SUBVERSION CHARGES. OTHER STATUTES THAT ARE PART OF THE INDONESIAN CRIMINAL CODE AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO KUHAP PROTECTIONS MAKE IT A FELONY TO INSULT OR SOW HATRED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OR TO SEEK THE SEPARATION OF ONE AREA FROM THE REST OF THE COUNTRY. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS ALSO ATTACKED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THESE LAWS AS HOLDOVERS FROM THE DUTCH COLONIAL PERIOD AND AS UNWARRANTED RESTRAINTS ON FREE SPEECH.

MORE THAN TWO DOZEN SUBVERSION TRIALS WERE CONDUCTED IN 1992. AS IN 1991, THE MAJORITY OF THESE CASES WERE IN SUMATRA WHERE AS OF AUGUST 19 PEOPLE HAD BEEN TRIED AND CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACEH MERDEKA INSURGENCY, INCLUDING FOUR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE OBSERVERS, KUHAP PROVISIONS WERE WIDELY VIOLATED IN THE CONDUCT OF THESE TRIALS, WITH LACK OF ACCESS TO ATTORNEYS AND PRETRIAL MISTREATMENT OF THE ACCUSED THE MOST FREQUENTLY CITED PROBLEMS.

FOUR TIMORESE WERE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN 1992 IN TRIALS IN DILI AND JAKARTA. THE FOUR WERE PART OF A GROUP OF 13 TIMORESE CHARGED IN CONNECTION WITH EITHER A NOVEMBER 12, 1991, DEMONSTRATION IN DILI THAT PRECEDED THE SHOOTING INCIDENT, OR A NOVEMBER 19, 1991, DEMONSTRATION IN JAKARTA THAT PROTESTED THE SHOOTINGS. THE OTHER 9 WERE TRIED ON FELONY HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION CHARGES. THESE TRIALS WERE ATTENDED BY INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN PRESS, AND THE U.S. AND OTHER EMBASSIES. IN GENERAL, THE TRIALS WERE SUBSTANTIALLY FAIRER THAN THE ACEH PROCEEDINGS. BUT IN THE DILI TRIALS IN PARTICULAR, THEY DID NOT MEET INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR FAIR TRIAL. FOR EXAMPLE, ACCESS TO LEGAL COUNSEL WAS OBSTRUCTED TO THE EXTENT THAT THE DEFENDANTS IN SEVERAL CASES MET THEIR CHOSEN ATTORNEYS ONLY ON THE DAY THEIR TRIALS BEGAN. EVEN THEN, THE DILI DISTRICT COURT BARRED ATTORNEYS IN THE SUBVERSION CASES FROM REPRESENTING THE ACCUSED ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS UNTIL THE SUPREME COURT INTERVENED. ALL 13 ACCUSED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TIMORESE WERE CONVICTED. ONE RECEIVED A 6-MONTH SENTENCE AND WAS RELEASED IMMEDIATELY. SEVEN RECEIVED SENTENCES OF 10 YEARS OR MORE, AND ONE RECEIVED A LIFE SENTENCE, WHICH IS UNUSUALLY HARSH EVEN IN A SUBVERSION CASE. SECURITY PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SHOOTINGS WERE CHARGED WITH RELATIVELY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MINOR OFFENSES. THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THESE HARSH SENTENCES WERE INTENDED SPECIFICALLY TO DETER FUTURE SUCH ANTI-INTEGRATION ACTIVITY.

THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT MAKE AVAILABLE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE CURRENTLY SERVING SUBVERSION SENTENCES OR SENTENCES UNDER THE FELONY "HATE-SOWING" OR SEDITION LAWS. BUT INFORMED SOURCES INDICATED SOME 300 PERSONS WERE SERVING SENTENCES FOR SUBVERSION IN 1992, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI), MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, AND THOSE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN IRIAN JAYA, ACEH, AND EAST TIMOR. SCORES MORE WERE BELIEVED TO BE SERVING SENTENCES UNDER THE HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. AT LEAST SOME OF THESE PERSONS ADVOCATED OR EMPLOYED VIOLENCE.

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

JUDICIAL WARRANTS FOR SEARCHES ARE REQUIRED EXCEPT FOR CASES INVOLVING SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, FORCED OR SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY BY SECURITY AGENCIES OCCURS REGULARLY. SECURITY AGENCIES INTIMIDATE BY CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS AND RESIDENCES, AND THEY ARE BELIEVED TO MONITOR SELECTIVELY LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS WITHOUT LEGAL RESTRAINT. GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF FORMER

MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND ITS FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY PERSONS THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP. THE GOVERNMENT STATED IN LATE 1990 THAT THIS LATTER GROUP THEN TOTALED 1,410,333 PEOPLE. THESE PERSONS AND THEIR RELATIVES SOMETIMES ARE SUBJECT TO SURVEILLANCE, REQUIRED CHECK-INS, AND ARBITRARY ACTIONS BY OFFICIALS, INCLUDING REMOVAL FROM GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT AND THREATS OF REMOVAL FROM SUCH EMPLOYMENT.

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

SIGNIFICANT RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS EXIST. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES EXERCISE BROAD DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY IN APPLYING LAWS CONCERNING THE RIGHTS OF EXPRESSION, AND EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW IS LACKING. PUBLIC STATEMENTS OR PUBLICATIONS WHICH CRITICIZE THE GOVERNMENT OR ARE PERCEIVED AS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CRITICAL OF PANCASILA, TOP LEADERS, THEIR FAMILIES, OR PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC GROUPS ARE OFTEN HARSHLY PUNISHED. TWO STUDENTS WERE ARRESTED PRIOR TO THE JUNE 9 ELECTIONS FOR CRITICIZING THE ELECTION PROCESS AND ADVOCATING THE CASTING OF BLANK BALLOTS OR STAYING AWAY FROM THE POLLS. THEY WERE RELEASED IN LATE JUNE, ALTHOUGH THE CHARGES WERE NOT DROPPED. FIVE TIMORESE WERE CONVICTED OF SOWING HATRED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING A NOVEMBER 19, 1991, PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION IN JAKARTA (TWO OF THESE WERE ALSO CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION.) (SEE SECTION 1.E.).

THE LEADER OF INDONESIA'S LARGEST MUSLIM ORGANIZATION WAS PREVENTED BY THE AUTHORITIES FROM SPEAKING IN SURABAYA IN APRIL.

THE GOVERNMENT OPERATES THE NATIONWIDE TELEVISION NETWORK. PRIVATE TELEVISION COMPANIES BROADCASTING IN JAKARTA AND SURABAYA EXPANDED TO OTHER AREAS, AND A PRIVATE EDUCATIONAL CHANNEL BEGAN OPERATING NATIONALLY. SOME 550 PRIVATE RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANIES EXIST IN INDONESIA IN ADDITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK. PRIVATE TELEVISION AND RADIO STATIONS, WHICH HAVE CONSIDERABLE PROGRAMMING LATITUDE, ARE NONETHELESS SUBJECT TO OFFICIAL SCRUTINY AND REQUIRED TO USE GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED NEWS PROGRAMS. PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS FREQUENTLY SUPPLEMENT SUCH NEWS PROGRAMS WITH THEIR OWN REPORTS. FOREIGN TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS ARE READILY ACCESSIBLE TO THOSE WHO CAN AFFORD THE TECHNOLOGY.

THE PRINT MEDIA, INCLUDING THE NATION'S 273 DAILY NEWSPAPERS, ARE LARGELY PRIVATELY OWNED. OFFICIALS STATE THAT THE PRESS IS "FREE" BUT ALSO "RESPONSIBLE." IT IS EXPECTED TO SUPPORT NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND STABILITY, BE EDUCATIONAL, AND UPHOLD PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS. THE GOVERNMENT LIMITS THE NUMBER OF NEWSPAPER LICENSES, THE AMOUNT OF ADVERTISING, AND THE NUMBER OF PAGES, AND EXERCISES STRONG CONTROL OVER THE PRESS THROUGH ITS CONTROL OF PUBLISHING PERMITS. JOURNALISTS HAVE PROTESTED IN THE PAST THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION HAS REVOKED THESE PERMITS WITHOUT GIVING THE OFFENDING PUBLICATIONS AN ADEQUATE CHANCE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. THE GOVERNMENT OCCASIONALLY CENSORS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AND, IN A PRACTICE KNOWN LOCALLY AS "TELEPHONE CULTURE," TELEPHONES EDITORS TO SUPPRESS STORIES. IN MAY A PROVINCIAL OFFICIAL IN SOUTH SUMATRA ORDERED THE REMOVAL OF AN ARTICLE DEALING WITH THE JUNE ELECTION FROM THE EDITING TABLES OF THE DAILY NEWSPAPER, THE SRIWIJAYA POST. HIS ACTIONS WERE CRITICIZED BY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER RUDINI, WHO SAID THAT PRESS CENSORSHIP SHOULD BE REDUCED TO A MINIMUM. ALTHOUGH THE RISK OF OFFICIAL SANCTIONS AND INFORMAL GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTIONS GENERALLY LEAD EDITORS TO EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE SELF-CENSORSHIP IN DISSEMINATING VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT CRITICS, THE DOMESTIC PRINT MEDIA CONTINUED TO PRESS THE LIMITS OF OFFICIAL TOLERANCE IN COVERAGE OF ELECTION ISSUES, EAST TIMOR, AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. CARTOONS OFTEN POINTEDLY CRITICAL OF TOP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS APPEARED ROUTINELY IN SEVERAL NEWSPAPERS.

THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY REGULATES ACCESS TO INDONESIA, AND PARTICULARLY TO CERTAIN AREAS OF INDONESIA, BY VISITING AND RESIDENT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS AND OCCASIONALLY REMINDS THE LATTER OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DENY REQUESTS FOR VISA EXTENSIONS. ALTHOUGH AN AMERICAN REPORTER WAS ORDERED TO LEAVE EAST TIMOR IN FEBRUARY, OTHER JOURNALISTS WERE ALLOWED TO VISIT IN MAY AND NOVEMBER.

THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AND VIDEO TAPES, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED BY GOVERNMENT CENSORS, REQUIRES A PERMIT. IMPORTERS AVOID FOREIGN MATERIALS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OR DEALING WITH TOPICS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS, FROM TIME MAGAZINE TO THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL, ARE NORMALLY AVAILABLE ALTHOUGH SEVERAL ISSUES WERE DELAYED OR EMBARGOED IN 1992 WHEN THEY CARRIED SENSITIVE STORIES OR, IN ONE CASE, AN ADVERTISEMENT SOME FOUND OFFENSIVE TO THE PRESIDENT. IN EACH INSTANCE THE DECISION TO HALT DISTRIBUTION WAS ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRIVATE DISTRIBUTOR, ALTHOUGH GOVERNMENT PRESSURE IS ASSUMED TO HAVE TRIGGERED THAT DECISION.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WHILE ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS PROVIDED FOR IN LAW, CONSTRAINTS EXIST ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SCHOLARS. THEY SOMETIMES REFRAIN FROM PRODUCING MATERIALS WHICH THEY BELIEVE MIGHT PROVOKE GOVERNMENT DISPLEASURE. PUBLISHERS ARE OFTEN UNWILLING TO ACCEPT MANUSCRIPTS DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, AND THOSE THAT DO SOMETIMES FIND WORKS BANNED LONG AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED. TWO ACADEMIC WORKS WERE AMONG THE FOUR BOOKS BANNED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN 1992. ANOTHER WORK BANNED WAS THE REPORT BY THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE (LBH) ON VIOLATIONS OF KUHAP DURING THE 1991 ACEH SUBVERSION TRIALS. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SAID HE BANNED THE REPORT BECAUSE IT COULD MISLEAD THE PUBLIC AND DAMAGE NATIONAL UNITY.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION ARE RECOGNIZED IN ARTICLE 28 OF THE CONSTITUTION. NONETHELESS, SIGNIFICANT CONTROLS ARE PLACED ON CITIZENS WHO ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE THIS FREEDOM. ALL ORGANIZATIONS MUST HAVE GOVERNMENT PERMISSION TO HOLD REGIONAL AND NATIONAL MEETINGS. LOCAL JURISDICTIONS OFTEN REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FOR SMALLER GATHERINGS AS WELL. WHILE OBTAINING SUCH APPROVAL IS FAIRLY AUTOMATIC, THE AUTHORITIES OCCASIONALLY WITHHOLD PERMISSION. TWO GATHERINGS OF THE DISCUSSION GROUP DEMOCRATIC FORUM WERE ORDERED ENDED BY POLICE IN FEBRUARY AND APRIL BECAUSE THEY LACKED A POLICE PERMIT, EVEN THOUGH ORGANIZERS ARGUED THEY WERE HOLDING INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS RATHER THAN A FORMAL MEETING. A MAY GATHERING OF THE ALL INDONESIA ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS WAS ALSO ENDED PREMATURELY BECAUSE IT LACKED THE APPROPRIATE PERMIT. REGULATIONS WERE ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH THE JUNE ELECTIONS THAT BANNED A WIDE VARIETY OF MASS MEETINGS AROUND

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ELECTION DAY. STUDENT GATHERINGS HAVE OFTEN BEEN THE TARGET OF DISAPPROVALS, AND OSTENSIBLE POLITICAL ACTIVITY AT UNIVERSITIES REMAINED FORBIDDEN UNDER THE CAMPUS LIFE NORMALIZATION (NKK) LAW OF 1978. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO BANNED POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING FROM UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES IN CONNECTION WITH THE 1992 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.

THE 1985 SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW (ORMAS) REQUIRES ALL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA. THIS PROVISION, WHICH LIMITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD AS BEING DESIGNED TO INHIBIT THE ACTIVITIES OF GROUPS WHICH SEEK TO MAKE INDONESIA AN ISLAMIC STATE. THE LAW EMPOWERS THE GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND ANY ORGANIZATION IT BELIEVES TO BE ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA AND REQUIRES PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR ANY ORGANIZATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS FROM FOREIGN DONORS.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND BELIEF IN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ONE SUPREME GOD. THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES ISLAM, CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, AND HINDUISM, AND PERMITS PRACTICE OF THE MYSTICAL, TRADITIONAL BELIEFS OF "ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN." ALTHOUGH THE POPULATION IS OVERWHELMINGLY MUSLIM, THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECOGNIZED FAITHS ARE RESPECTED. VARIOUS RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY EXIST. ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL STATISTICS, NEARLY 400 "MISLEADING RELIGIOUS CULTS" ARE BANNED, INCLUDING JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AND BAHA'I. BECAUSE THE FIRST TENET OF PANCASILA IS BELIEF IN A SUPREME BEING, ATHEISM IS FORBIDDEN. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA EXTENDS TO ALL RELIGIOUS AND

SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY OPPOSES MUSLIM GROUPS WHICH ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ACKNOWLEDGING ONLY ISLAMIC LAW, BOTH OF WHICH ARE OUTLAWED.

THERE IS NO LEGAL BAR TO CONVERSION BETWEEN FAITHS, AND CONVERSIONS OCCUR. HOWEVER, PROSELYTIZING BETWEEN THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS OR IN AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ONE RECOGNIZED RELIGION OR ANOTHER IS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND IS DISCOURAGED. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED. IN RECENT YEARS, SOME FOREIGN MISSIONARIES HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY RENEWING VISAS OR RESIDENCE PERMITS--A FEW ON UNSPECIFIED "SECURITY GROUNDS." LAWS AND DECREES FROM THE 1970'S DO NOT ALLOW FOREIGN MISSIONARIES TO SPEND MORE THAN 10 CONSECUTIVE YEARS IN INDONESIA, WITH SOME EXTENSIONS GRANTED IN REMOTE AREAS LIKE IRIAN JAYA. ENFORCEMENT OF THIS POLICY DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE BY SECT OR NATIONALITY. FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK IS SUBJECT TO THE FUNDING STIPULATIONS OF THE ORMAS LAW (SEE SECTION 2.B.).

INDONESIANS PRACTICING THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS MAINTAIN ACTIVE LINKS WITH CORELIGIONISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE INDONESIA AND TRAVEL ABROAD FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS.

THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZES THE ANNUAL HAJJ PILGRIMAGE, AND MORE THAN 100,000 INDONESIANS MADE IT IN 1992.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT EXIST. THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS AN UNPUBLISHED BLACKLIST OF SOME 17,000 PEOPLE MADE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

UP OF INDONESIANS WHO ARE FORBIDDEN TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING VARIOUS PROMINENT HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, AND FOREIGNERS WHO ARE FORBIDDEN TO ENTER, ESPECIALLY CERTAIN FOREIGN JOURNALISTS. REPORTEDLY 14 JOURNALISTS WERE REMOVED FROM THE LIST IN JULY, BUT THEIR NAMES WERE NOT MADE PUBLIC. THE DPR PASSED NEW LEGISLATION IN 1992 AFFECTING THE TRAVEL BAN WHICH ELEVATED IT TO THE STATUS OF LAW AND REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO NOTIFY PEOPLE WHEN THEY HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE LIST. PREVIOUSLY, PEOPLE DISCOVERED THEIR STATUS ONLY WHEN THEY TRIED TO ENTER OR LEAVE. AS A RESULT OF THE NEW LEGISLATION, THE GOVERNMENT ALSO ELIMINATED THE REQUIREMENT OF OBTAINING AN EXIT PERMIT. BUT THE NEW LEGISLATION ADDED A PROVISION THAT WILL ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT TO BAN INDONESIAN CITIZENS WHOSE RETURN WOULD POSE PROBLEMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS PROVISION WAS OPPOSED BY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND CERTAIN LEGISLATORS BUT STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY THE DPR'S MILITARY FACTION.

RESTRICTIONS EXIST ON MOVEMENT BY INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN CITIZENS TO AND WITHIN PARTS OF INDONESIA. PERMITS TO SEEK WORK IN A NEW LOCATION ARE REQUIRED IN CERTAIN AREAS, PRIMARILY TO CONTROL FURTHER POPULATION MOVEMENT TO CROWDED CITIES. SPECIAL PERMITS ARE REQUIRED TO VISIT CERTAIN PARTS OF IRIAN JAYA. SECURITY CHECKS AFFECTING TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL TO AND WITHIN EAST TIMOR OCCURRED SPORADICALLY IN 1992, AND CURFEWS IN CONNECTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE OCCASIONALLY IMPOSED. FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, MUST NOTIFY AUTHORITIES OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND MAY NOT CHANGE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE WITHOUT OFFICIAL PERMISSION.

INDONESIA CONTINUED ITS GENEROUS ATTITUDE REGARDING INDOCHINESE ASYLUM SEEKERS IN 1992. IT HAS GRANTED FIRST ASYLUM TO OVER 123,000 INDOCHINESE ASYLUM SEEKERS SINCE 1975 AND CONTINUED TO OPERATE A REFUGEE FACILITY ON GALANG ISLAND. CAMBODIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS, WHOM THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS, HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN INDONESIA PENDING REPATRIATION. INDONESIA ALSO CONTINUED ITS COOPERATION WITH THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) AND THE ICRC ON THE RETURN OF RESIDENTS OF IRIAN JAYA WHO HAD FLED TO PAPUA NEW GUINEA DURING

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE PROVINCE. A NEW WAVE OF SEVERAL HUNDRED IRIANESE FLED TO PAPUA NEW GUINEA IN 1992 FOLLOWING BORDER CLASHES BETWEEN OPM INSURGENTS AND SECURITY FORCES, BRINGING THE TOTAL OF IRIANESE IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S EAST AWIN REFUGEE CAMP TO APPROXIMATELY 3,700. MORE THAN 100 ACEHNESE WHO FLED TO MALAYSIA DURING THE HEIGHT OF SEPARATIST VIOLENCE IN 1990-1991 RETURNED TO ACEH. OTHERS CONTINUED TO SEEK ASYLUM IN MALAYSIA, INCLUDING A GROUP OF 43 WHO ENTERED THE UNHCR COMPOUND IN KUALA LUMPUR IN JUNE CLAIMING THEIR LIVES WOULD BE THREATENED IF THEY RETURNED TO INDONESIA.

EAGLEBURGER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E5

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 00309 01 OF 02 110813Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EB-01
	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SIL-00	SP-00	SR-00	STR-17	TRSE-00	USIE-00	RPE-00
	/063W						

----------8ECBBB 110814Z /38

P 110810Z JAN 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0620

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 00309

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSPR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 1992 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES

REF: A. STATE 5060, B. 92 JAKARTA 15095

1. LOU-NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE FOLLOWING RESPONDS TO REF. A REQUEST FOR CORRECTION OF SIGNIFICANT FACTUAL OR OTHER ERRORS IN THE 1992 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA. REFERENCES ARE KEYED TO THE DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT AS TRANSMITTED REF. A.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 00309 01 OF 02 110813Z
3. INTRODUCTION -- FIFTH PARAGRAPH, BEGINNING "THE MOST IMPORTANT": DELETE SENTENCE FIVE, BEGINNING "MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES." WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE HARSHNESS OF CIVILIAN SENTENCES AND THE LIGHTNESS OF MILITARY ONES OBSCURES THE CAUSES OF OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE FORMER AND DEPARTS FROM DEPARTMENT POLICY. HARSH SENTENCES IN THE CIVILIAN CASES ARE IPSO FACTO OBJECTIONABLE, REGARDLESS OF THE TREATMENT OF MILITARY OFFENDERS.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200504416
DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

4. SECTION 1, SUBSECTION A, "POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLING" -- SECOND PARAGRAPH, BEGINNING "IN EAST TIMOR": IN LAST SENTENCE, BEGINNING "ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT," REPLACE "NO EFFORTS" WITH "ONLY MINOR EFFORTS." THE REVISED SENTENCE SHOULD READ: "ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT DID TAKE ACTION AGAINST THOSE INVOLVED IN THE NOVEMBER 1991 INCIDENT IN EAST TIMOR, THE GOVERNMENT MADE ONLY MINOR EFFORTS IN 1992 TO TRY AND PUNISH APPROPRIATELY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR KILLINGS, TORTURE, AND OTHER ABUSES COMMITTED IN PREVIOUS YEARS IN ACEH AND OTHER AREAS." AS NOTED IN SECTION 1, SUBSECTION C, PARAGRAPH 3, SEVERAL POLICE OFFICERS, INCLUDING THREE IN ACEH, WERE TRIED AND CONVICTED IN 1992 FOR ABUSE OF PERSONS IN CUSTODY. WHILE WE WOULD DESCRIBE THESE EFFORTS AS "ONLY MINOR," IT WOULD BE INCORRECT TO SAY NO EFFORTS AT ALL WERE MADE.

5. SECTION 1, SUBSECTION E, "DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL" -- SEVENTH PARAGRAPH, BEGINNING "FOUR TIMORESE WERE CONVICTED": DELETE SENTENCE 12, BEGINNING "SECURITY PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE," FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH IN

PARA. 3 ABOVE. FURTHERMORE, SUBSECTION E DEALS WITH DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL. WHATEVER SHORTCOMINGS WE MAY HAVE NOTED IN BRINGING TO JUSTICE SECURITY PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE DILI INCIDENT, WE HAVE NEVER ARGUED THE MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO WERE COURT-MARTIALED WERE DENIED FAIR PUBLIC TRIALS. FINALLY, SENTENCE 13, WHICH REFERS TO "THESE HARSH SENTENCES," SHOULD FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY UPON DISCUSSION OF THE CIVILIAN TRIALS. INCLUSION OF SENTENCE 12 INTERRUPTS THIS LOGICAL PROGRESSION.

6. SECTION 2, SUBSECTION B, "FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION" -- FIRST PARAGRAPH, BEGINNING "FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION": SENTENCE 9, BEGINNING "STUDENT GATHERINGS," DELETE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE CAMPUS LIFE NORMALIZATION (NKK) LAW OF 1978." THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE ISSUED A DECREE IN JULY 1990 WHICH SUPERSEDED NKK. NEVERTHELESS, "OSTENSIBLE POLITICAL ACTIVITY AT UNIVERSITIES REMAINED FORBIDDEN" IN 1992.

7. SECTION 2, SUBSECTION D, "FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION" -- FIRST PARAGRAPH, BEGINNING "RESTRICTIONS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ON FREEDOM": SENTENCE TWO, BEGINNING "THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS," DELETE "SOME 17,000 PEOPLE MADE UP OF," SO THAT THE SENTENCE READS AS FOLLOWS: "THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS AN UNPUBLISHED BLACKLIST OF INDONESIANS WHO ARE FORBIDDEN TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING VARIOUS PROMINENT HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, AND FOREIGNERS WHO ARE FORBIDDEN TO ENTER, ESPECIALLY CERTAIN FOREIGN JOURNALISTS." ADD THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE TO THE END OF

THE PARAGRAPH: "THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IN EARLY JANUARY 1993 THAT THE NUMBER OF PERSONS CURRENTLY AFFECTED BY THE TRAVEL BAN WAS 8,897, REPRESENTING A REDUCTION OF NEARLY 50 PERCENT FROM PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED FIGURES." ALTHOUGH THIS ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE IN 1993, IT APPEARS TO REFLECT THE SITUATION AT THE END OF 1992 AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS YEAR'S REPORT.

8. SECTION 6, SUBSECTION A, "RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION" -- FOURTH PARAGRAPH BEGINNING "MINISTER OF MANPOWER DECISION," DELETE FROM THE LAST SENTENCE "WITHIN THE COMPANY." THE REFERENCE TO EDUCATION LEVEL IN THE MINISTERIAL DECISION RELATES TO THE LEVEL OF SCHOOLING AND NOT TRAINING WITHIN THE COMPANY.

NNNN

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EB-01
	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	LAB-04	L-03
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SIL-00 SP-00 SR-00 STR-17 TRSE-00 USIE-00 RPE-00
/063W

----------8ECBBD 110814Z /38

P 110810Z JAN 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0621

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 00309

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSPR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 1992 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

9. SECTION 6, SUBSECTION E, "ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK," -- FIRST PARAGRAPH BEGINNING "IN THE ABSENCE," IN THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE CHANGE THE MINIMUM WAGE IN JAKARTA TO 1.45 PER DAY SINCE THE GOVERNMENT HAS RAISED JAKARTA'S MINIMUM WAGE TO RP 3000 EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1.

BARRY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 13391 01 OF 04 140946Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00
	EAP-01	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-04
	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01
	P-01	SIL-00	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-16	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	RPE-01	/060W				

----------10119C 140947Z /38

P 140938Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7460
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 013391

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSPR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: INITIAL EDIT OF 1993 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: POST RESPONSES

REFS. A) STATE 358479 B) STATE 358478 C) JAKARTA 10642 D) JAKARTA 10979

1. LOU-NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS CABLE UPDATES INFORMATION SUBMITTED IN REFS. C & D, AND RESPONDS TO QUESTIONS POSED IN REFS. A & B. MATERIAL IS KEYED TO PARA. NUMBERS IN REFS. A & B.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 13391 01 OF 04 140946Z

3. AS A GENERAL COMMENT, POST WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS ITS VIEW THAT THE INITIAL EDIT OF THE 1993 REPORT SEEMS TO REFLECT A SYSTEMATIC EFFORT TO MAKE THE REPORT MORE NEGATIVE. NEGATIVE MATERIAL WAS REPOSITIONED TO PRECEDE POSITIVE MATERIAL IN A GIVEN SECTION, ESPECIALLY THE INTRODUCTION. POSITIVE ADJECTIVES WERE DELETED. NEGATIVE ADJECTIVES OR STATEMENTS WERE ADDED TO FACTUAL DESCRIPTIONS OF EVENTS. THE RESULT IS A REPORT WHICH THE COUNTRY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200504416

TEAM BELIEVES NO LONGER ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE SITUATION HERE, AND WHICH UNFAIRLY MINIMIZES WHAT POSITIVE STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS. WE HAVE ALREADY DOCUMENTED IN DETAIL THE PROBLEMS HERE, AND HAVE TRIED TO DO SO THROUGH THE PRESENTATION OF FACTS WHICH SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. A FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE PROGRESS WILL NOT SERVE OUR INTERESTS, SINCE IT MAY WELL LEAD TO A CONCLUSION THAT OUR REPORTS ARE BIASED, AND THAT POSITIVE EFFORTS ARE IGNORED. WE REALIZE THAT THE LENGTH OF THE REPORT MAY HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO INCLUDE INFORMATION ON GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND LIVING STANDARDS, AND THEREFORE WILL NOT RECLAMA ITS DELETION. HOWEVER, WE WOULD NOTE THAT THIS DELETION ALSO COMPOUNDS THE LACK OF BALANCE IN THE EDITED VERSION OF THE REPORT. WHAT FOLLOWS IS OUR ATTEMPT TO RIGHT THE BALANCE, AS WELL AS UPDATE MATERIAL AND RESPOND TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS.

4. IN PARA. 6, DELETE THE THIRD SENTENCE BEGINNING "THE ECONOMY...." REPLACE IT WITH THE FOLLOWING: "AGRICULTURE AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, ESPECIALLY OIL AND GAS, REMAINED IMPORTANT SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY. BUT A BROAD AND EXPANDING MANUFACTURING SECTOR ACCOUNTED FOR A GROWING PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS."

5. PARA. 7, DELETE THE FIRST SENTENCE AND REPLACE WITH THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE, UPDATED, FROM REF. C: "1993 SAW A BLOSSOMING

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OF A BOLDER AND MORE ASSERTIVE PRESS, A LIBERALIZED PUBLIC DIALOGUE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE FORMATION OF A NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, AND A SHARP REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF INDONESIANS FORBIDDEN FROM TRAVELLING ABROAD. FEWER INDONESIANS WERE TRIED UNDER THE HARSH AND ARBITRARY ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW, AND SEVERAL LONG-TERM CONVICTED SUBVERSIVES WERE RELEASED. THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINED ITS OPEN AND HUMANE POLICIES TOWARD INDOCHINESE REFUGEES." PICK UP WITH THE SENTENCE BEGINNING, "IN EAST TIMOR...."

6. ALSO IN PARA. 7, THE SENTENCE BEGINNING "LEGAL SAFEGUARDS...." DELETE THE SECOND PART OF THAT SENTENCE BEGINNING "PARTICULARLY BY THE AGENCY FOR...." BAKORSTANAS, WHILE CERTAINLY A PROBLEM, ACCOUNTS FOR TOO FEW OF THE COUNTRY'S HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES TO BE SINGLED OUT IN THE INTRODUCTION.

7. DELETE PARA. 8. THIS MATERIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN MOVED BACK TO WHERE IT ORIGINALLY WAS. THE FIRST SENTENCE IS A DISTORTION OF OUR ORIGINAL AND OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. THE PRESS HERE CONTINUOUSLY TESTS THE LIMITS OF WHAT IS PERMITTED; RECENTLY THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PUSH THOSE LIMITS FARTHER THAN HAS BEEN THE

CASE IN RECENT YEARS. DESCRIBING THIS AS "BEING LESS WILLING TO SUBMIT TO SELF-CENSORSHIP" MISSES THE POINT THAT THE REAL CHANGE IS ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS PERMITTED THE LIMITS TO EXPAND.

8. PARA. 9. ADD A NEW SECOND SENTENCE, USING MATERIAL FROM REF. C, WHICH READ, "HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS, NEWSPAPER EDITORS, OR RELIGIOUS FIGURES ARE NOT ROUTINELY THE VICTIMS OF DEATH SQUADS OR SUMMARY EXECUTIONS BY GOVERNMENT FORCES." THE INSTRUCTIONS MAKE IT CLEAR THE GOAL IN THESE REPORTS IS TO DESCRIBE THE

GENERAL SITUATION AS WELL AS SPECIFIC INCIDENTS. IN GENERAL, SUMMARY EXECUTIONS ARE RARE IN INDONESIA OUTSIDE OF AREAS OF SEPARATIST ACTIVITY.

9. ALSO IN PARA. 9, DELETE THE SENTENCE BEGINNING, "SECURITY FORCE MEMBERS WHO...." AS NOTED IN THIS AND LAST YEAR'S REPORT, MILITARY OFFICERS ARE NOT IMMUNE FROM PUNISHMENT, AND THE NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO SUFFER ADMINISTRATIVE OR CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IS INCREASING.

10. PARA. 10, REPLACE THE THIRD SENTENCE BEGINNING "THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE...." WITH THE FOLLOWING: "THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) JUDGED THAT THE SITUATION IN IRIAN JAYA HAD IMPROVED TO THE POINT WHERE IT NO LONGER NEEDED AN OFFICE IN THE CAPITAL OF JAYAPURA AND COULD COVER THE PROVINCE ADEQUATELY FROM JAKARTA." THIS MAKES IT CLEAR WHY THE OFFICE IN JAYAPURA WAS CLOSED.

11. PARA. 11, SECOND SENTENCE, BEGINNING "THE FIRST PULLOUT...."

NNNN

PAGE 01 JAKART 13391 02 OF 04 140947Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00
	EAP-01	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-04
	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01
	P-01	SIL-00	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-16	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	RPE-01	/060W				

----------1011B4 140948Z /38

P 140938Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7461
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 013391

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSPR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: INITIAL EDIT OF 1993 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: POST RESPONSES

ADD A CLAUSE AFTER THE WORD "OCTOBER," AS FOLLOWS: "ALTHOUGH BY EARLY DECEMBER THE STATUS OF THIS PULLOUT WAS NOT CLEAR." CHANGE THE THIRD SENTENCE BEGINNING "IN APRIL..." TO READ AS FOLLOWS: "IN APRIL THE SPECIAL OPERATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND FOR EAST TIMOR WAS DISBANDED AND REPLACED WITH A COMMAND STRUCTURE SIMILAR TO THAT IN THE OTHER 26 PROVINCES." THE STATEMENT AT THE END OF THAT PARA. REMAINS TRUE, AND WILL BE UPDATED AS NECESSARY.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 13391 02 OF 04 140947Z
12. PARA. 12, ADD A NEW THIRD SENTENCE TO READ: "HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS ESTIMATED BETWEEN 60 AND 70 INDIVIDUALS HAD BEEN SHOT BY POLICE IN THE CAPITAL BY THE END OF THE YEAR, ALTHOUGH EXACT STATISTICS WERE NOT AVAILABLE." REPLACE THE SENTENCE BEGINNING "PRESS ACCOUNTS..." WITH THE FOLLOWING: "PRESS ACCOUNTS INDICATE THAT UP UNTIL EARLY DECEMBER POLICE IN NORTH SUMATRA HAD SHOT 74 SUSPECTS, EIGHT FATALLY, WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY RESISTING ARREST." ADD A NEW LAST SENTENCE TO READ: "THE STATUS OF THIS CASE WAS NOT CLEAR AT YEAR'S END."

13. PARA. 13, ADD A NEW SENTENCE AT THE END TO READ: "AUTHORITIES DECLINED TO REVEAL THE DISPOSITION OF THIS CASE."

14. PARA. 14, ADD A NEW SENTENCE AT THE END TO READ: "SEVERAL OF THE SECT'S SURVIVORS WERE TRIED AND CONVICTED ON ASSAULT CHARGES AND RECEIVED SENTENCES OF BETWEEN 3 AND 9 MONTHS IN LATE NOVEMBER."

15. PARA. 15, REPLACE THE SENTENCE BEGINNING "SECURITY FORCES..." THROUGH THE END OF THE PARAGRAPH WITH THE FOLLOWING: "SECURITY FORCES INITIALLY REPORTED THE CROWD, WHICH NUMBERED SOME 500, HAD ACTED IN A THREATENING MANNER AND CONTINUED TO ADVANCE ON THEM, DESPITE SEVERAL WARNING SHOTS FIRED BY THE TROOPS. HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS DECRIED THE USE OF WHAT THEY CALLED EXCESSIVE FORCE, AND CONDUCTED THEIR OWN INVESTIGATION, WHICH FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF WARNING SHOTS AND PLACED THE DEMONSTRATORS AT A CONSIDERABLY GREATER DISTANCE FROM SECURITY FORCES. ARMED FORCES COMMANDER FEISAL TANJUNG IN MID-OCTOBER PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED A BREAKDOWN IN MILITARY DISCIPLINE HAD OCCURRED, RELIEVED THE COMMANDERS OF THE POLICE AND ARMY UNITS INVOLVED, AND REMANDED THE TWO DOZEN MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL INVOLVED

TO ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS FOR POSSIBLE FURTHER DISCIPLINARY ACTION. NO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS HAD BEEN INITIATED AGAINST THEM BY YEAR'S END."

16. PARA. 16, REPLACE THE SECOND SENTENCE AND THE REMAINDER OF THE PARAGRAPH WITH THE FOLLOWING: "NINE CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY WERE ARRESTED IN OCTOBER IN CONNECTION WITH HER MURDER, AND TRIALS WERE BEGUN IN NOVEMBER. AT LEAST ONE ARMY OFFICER WAS ALSO ARRESTED AND A SECOND RELIEVED OF HIS POST, ALTHOUGH THE STATUS OF THEIR CASES WAS UNCLEAR IN EARLY DECEMBER. TESTIMONY AND PRESS STORIES ALLEGED COLLUSION EXISTED BETWEEN COMPANY OFFICIALS AND SECURITY FORCES IN MARSINAH'S ABDUCTION AND MURDER. SECURITY FORCES OFTEN INTRUDE IN LABOR MATTERS AND INTIMIDATE LABOR ACTIVISTS (SEE SECTION 6)."

17. PARA. 17, END THE SENTENCE THAT BEGINS "THE GOVERNMENT VIGOROUSLY..." AFTER "...IN 1991." INSERT A NEW SENTENCE IMMEDIATELY AFTER TO READ AS FOLLOWS: "THE TRIAL, HOWEVER, WAS WIDELY REGARDED AS AN EFFORT TO UNDERMINE THE PDI LEADERSHIP, AND THE ACCUSED PARTY OFFICIAL WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUITTED."

18. PARA. 19, END THE FIRST SENTENCE AFTER "...IN INDONESIA."

DELETE THE FOLLOWING WORD "BUT" AND BEGIN THE SECOND SENTENCE AS FOLLOWS: "IN PRACTICE, WHILE THE ...."

19. PARA. 21, REPLACE THE FIRST TWO SENTENCES WITH THE FOLLOWING: "POLICE OFTEN RESORT TO PHYSICAL ABUSES EVEN IN MINOR INCIDENTS AND PRISON CONDITIONS ARE HARSH, WITH VIOLENCE AMONG PRISONERS AND MISTREATMENT OF INMATES BY GUARDS REPORTEDLY COMMON. HOWEVER, THE INCIDENCE OF MISTREATMENT BY PRISON OFFICIALS DROPS SHARPLY ONCE AN INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM POLICE OR MILITARY CUSTODY INTO THE CIVILIAN PRISON SYSTEM, AND PRISON CONDITIONS GENERALLY HAVE IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS."

20. PARA. 22, DELETE THE SECOND SENTENCE AND THE REMAINDER OF THE PARAGRAPH, AND REPLACE WITH THE FOLLOWING: "IN 1993 THE ICRC AND SEVERAL FOREIGN PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATIONS WERE ALLOWED TO VISIT PRISONERS IN CIPINANG IN JAKARTA, AND DESCRIBED THE FACILITY AS SPARTAN BUT ADEQUATE. THE ICRC WAS ALSO GRANTED ACCESS TO OTHER PRISONS IN JAVA, SUMATRA, EAST TIMOR, ACEH AND OTHER PROVINCES, ALTHOUGH IT SUSPENDED PRISON VISITS IN ACEH AND EAST TIMOR AT VARIOUS TIMES IN 1993 WHEN IT FELT AUTHORITIES WERE VIOLATING AGREED-UPON TERMS FOR THE VISITS. THESE DISAGREEMENTS WERE ALL EVENTUALLY SETTLED AND THE VISITS RESUMED." THIS ADDITION MAKES CLEAR THE EXTENT OF ICRC ACCESS, WHICH IS LAUDABLE, AND STRESSES THAT WHILE PROBLEMS HAVE OCCURRED, THEY HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.

21. PARA. 23, AFTER THE SENTENCE WHICH BEGINS "WARRANTS ARE ISSUED..." INSERT THE FOLLOWING NEW SENTENCE: "DESPITE THESE

NNNN

PAGE 01 JAKART 13391 03 OF 04 140948Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00
	EAP-01	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-04
	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01
	P-01	SIL-00	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-16	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	RPE-01	/060W				

----------1011C3 140949Z /38

P 140938Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7462
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 013391

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSPR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: INITIAL EDIT OF 1993 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: POST RESPONSES

REQUIREMENTS, ARRESTS ARE OFTEN MADE WITHOUT WARRANTS, SUCH AS IN THE MARSINAH MURDER CASE WHERE SEVERAL SUSPECTS WERE HELD FOR 18 DAYS WITHOUT WARRANTS OR NOTIFICATION OF THEIR FAMILIES."

22. PARA. 28, FIRST SENTENCE, DELETE THE PHRASE "AND SELF-INCRIMINATION." AS NOTED FURTHER DOWN, THERE ARE NO PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION UNDER INDONESIAN LAW.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 13391 03 OF 04 140948Z
23. PARA. 35, CHANGE THE LAST SENTENCE TO READ AS FOLLOWS: "AT YEAR'S END HE WAS IN CIPINANG PRISON IN JAKARTA."

24. PARA. 39, AFTER THE SENTENCE THAT BEGINS "THE DISTRIBUTION OF..." INSERT THE FOLLOWING NEW SENTENCES: "THE STUDENTS WERE FOUND GUILTY IN NOVEMBER AND SENTENCED TO FOUR MONTHS IN PRISON. HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION WAS BLOCKED BY UNIVERSITY AUTHORITIES FROM ADDRESSING A SEMINAR IN EARLY DECEMBER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA, AS WAS THE OUTSPOKEN POET W.S. RENDRA."

25. PARA. 50, SECOND SENTENCE. REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE LCHR BELIEVES, LBH OFFICIALS HERE BELIEVE THE BLACKLIST HAS INDEED SHRUNK DRAMATICALLY. THE CURRENT LBH EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR BELIEVES THAT VIRTUALLY NO ONE IS CURRENTLY ON THE LIST FOR POLITICAL REASONS, AND CITES THE RECENT TRAVEL OF PRINCEN AND NASUTION AS EVIDENCE. WE THEREFORE PROPOSE STICKING WITH THE ORIGINAL LANGUAGE.

26. PARA. 52, SECOND AND THIRD SENTENCES, CHANGE THE FIGURE 123,000 TO 145,000; THE FIGURE 10,000 TO 8,000; AND THE FIGURE 2,500 TO 2,000. THIS UPDATES THE CURRENT POPULATION IN GALANG.

27. PARA. 60, THE FIRST SENTENCE, ADD THE FOLLOWING CLAUSE AT THE END: "...ALTHOUGH THE ARMED FORCES DID CONDUCT ITS OWN REVIEW OF THE SEPTEMBER MADURA INCIDENT THAT RESULTED IN DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST FOUR OFFICERS."

28. PARA. 62, END THE LAST SENTENCE AFTER "...ALI SAID." ADD A NEW LAST SENTENCE: "THE NAMES OF THE OTHER COMMISSION MEMBERS WERE ANNOUNCED IN DECEMBER. ALTHOUGH SKEPTICISM EXISTED ABOUT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 JAKART 13391 03 OF 04 140948Z

THE COMMISSION'S INDEPENDENCE FROM THE GOVERNMENT, AND VIRTUALLY ALL THE PRIVATE HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS WHO HAD BEEN ASKED TO JOIN REFUSED, MANY OF THOSE APPOINTED WERE VIEWED BY HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS AS CREDIBLE SPOKESMEN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY."

29. PARA. 69, REPLACE THE LAST SENTENCE WITH THE FOLLOWING: "LAW NO. 4 OF 1979 ON CHILDREN'S WELFARE GUARANTEES CERTAIN RIGHTS TO CHILDREN AND DEFINES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE AND PARENTS TO NURTURE AND PROTECT THEM. IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN DEVELOPED, HOWEVER, AND THE LAW'S PROVISIONS HAVE YET TO GO INTO EFFECT."

30. PARA. 70, ADD THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES AT THE END OF THE PARAGRAPH: "LAWS EXIST WHICH PROTECT CHILDREN FROM INDECENT ACTIVITIES, PROSTITUTION AND INCEST, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS."

31. PARA. 76, THE ILO'S NUMERICAL STANDARD IS EXPLICATED IN THE ILO PUBLICATION "FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A WORKERS' EDUCATION MANUAL," SECOND (REVISED) EDITION, PUBLISHED IN 1987. THE BOOK STATES ON PAGE 36 THAT "A PROVISION REQUIRING 50 FOUNDING MEMBERS HAS BEEN CONSIDERED SO HIGH AS TO HINDER OR EVEN RENDER IMPOSSIBLE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNION, BUT IN ANOTHER INSTANCE

20 WAS NOT CONSIDERED UNREASONABLE." THE PUBLIC STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE GSP SUBCOMMITTEE FOLLOWING THE DECISION TO "PEND" THE INDONESIAN GSP WORKER RIGHTS CASE ALSO CITED THESE SAME NUMBERS, DRAWING THEM FROM THE ILO'S "DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE" (3RD EDITION).

32. PARA. 82, THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN NO PARTICULAR ACTION AGAINST COMPANIES AT WHICH STRIKES HAVE OCCURRED TO FORM SPSI

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNITS. THESE STRIKES ARE INVARIABLY SUCCESSFUL AND THE FORMATION OF AN SPSI UNIT FOLLOWS SHORTLY THEREAFTER. SEE PARA 92.

33. PARA. 84, FOR THE SAKE OF ACCURACY THE THIRD SENTENCE SHOULD BE CHANGED TO READ AS FOLLOWS: "THE HEAD OF THE SPSI IS A SENIOR MEMBER OF GOLKAR, AND HE AND TWO OTHER SENIOR SPSI OFFICIALS ARE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT REPRESENTING GOLKAR."

34. PARA. 85, IN THE SENTENCE THAT BEGINS "ON JUNE 19...," ADD THE YEAR "1993" TO THIS DATE.

35. PARA. 92, TO BE TRUE THE LAST SENTENCE SHOULD READ "SOME EMPLOYERS REPORTEDLY HAVE ...."

36. PARA. 93, ADD THE WORD "DISCRIMINATION" TO THE END OF THE LAST SENTENCE.

37. PARA. 94, FIRST SENTENCE, CHANGE "CAN" TO "MAY."

38. PARA. 95, THE REFERENCE TO THE MARSINAH CASE SHOULD READ:

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00
	EAP-01	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-04
	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01
	P-01	SIL-00	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-16	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	RPE-01	/060W				

----------1011C8 140949Z /38

P 140938Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7463
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 013391

DEPARTMENT FOR HA AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSPR, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: INITIAL EDIT OF 1993 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: POST RESPONSES

"IN MAY A WOMAN UNION ACTIVIST IN SURABAYA WAS MURDERED. IN ADDITION TO SEVERAL OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE FACTORY AT WHICH SHE WORKED, THE COMMANDER OF A LOCAL MILITARY UNIT WAS ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MURDER, AND A SECOND OFFICER WAS RELIEVED OF HIS POST."

39. PARA. 97, WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY PRESS REPORTS DURING THIS YEAR OF FORCED LABOR IN IRIAN JAYA. SEVERAL YEARS AGO THERE WERE

REPORTS OF THIS NATURE. IN ITS PETITION TO THE GSP SUBCOMMITTEE THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS EDUCATION AND RESEARCH FUND MAKES THE GENERAL STATEMENT THAT "IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THOUSANDS MORE MAY BE INCARCERATED UNDER FORCED LABOR CONDITIONS IN REMOTE AREAS OF THE COUNTRY SUCH AS IRIAN JAYA, WHERE ACCESS TO HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES IS VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT." THE PETITION DOES NOT INDICATE WHO HAS PROVIDED THIS ESTIMATE OR ANY SOURCES FOR IT AND THEREFORE THIS REFERENCE SHOULD BE DELETED. THE SENTENCE SHOULD READ: "HOWEVER, THERE WERE REPORTS OF FRAUDULENT RECRUITMENT OF TIMORESE WORKERS FOR EMPLOYMENT IN JAVA WHICH HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS HAVE CHARGED FALLS UNDER THE DESCRIPTION OF FORCED

LABOR. THESE ACTIVISTS ALSO CHARGE THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT FULLY INVESTIGATED THESE ALLEGATIONS."

40. PARA. 98, AS EMBASSY HAS INDICATED IN JAKARTA 11165 AND JAKARTA 12568 WE DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO DETERMINE WHICH INDUSTRIES, MUCH LESS EXPORT INDUSTRIES, HAVE SERIOUS CHILD LABOR PROBLEMS. IT IS A PROBLEM WHICH PERMEATES THE ECONOMY, BUT THERE ARE NO STATISTICS AVAILABLE AT THE INDUSTRY LEVEL AND THERE ARE NO SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES WHERE CHILD LABOR IS AN OBVIOUS PROBLEM.

41. PARA. 100, THE LAST SENTENCE IS CORRECT.

42. PARA. 101, THE MINIMUM WAGE RATES WILL BE RAISED IN MOST AREAS ON JANUARY 1, WITH THE REMAINING AREAS COMING ON LINE APRIL 1, TO THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURE FOR EACH PROVINCE. THEREFORE THE FOURTH SENTENCE SHOULD BE REVISED AS FOLLOWS AND A NEW FIFTH SENTENCE INSERTED: "WHILE INDONESIA HAS SUCCEEDED IN DRAMATICALLY LOWERING THE LEVEL OF POVERTY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, THE MINIMUM WAGE RATES HAVE LAGGED BEHIND THE BASIC

NEEDS FIGURES. HOWEVER, EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1994, THE MINIMUM WAGE FOR MOST PROVINCES WILL BE RAISED TO THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURE WITH THE MINIMUM WAGES IN THE REMAINING AREAS BEING ADJUSTED AS OF APRIL 1." BARRY

NNNN

 RELEASED IN FULL
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE09C 191701Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2955
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

1. LOU NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS THE 1994 COUNTRY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA.

3. INDONESIA, THE WORLD'S FOURTH MOST POPULOUS NATION, IS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

A DEVELOPING COUNTRY WHOSE PEOPLE COME FROM HUNDREDS OF DIFFERENT CULTURAL, LINGUISTIC, AND ETHNIC BACKGROUNDS. ITS INCREASINGLY OPEN AND DEREGULATED ECONOMY CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH ITS POLITICAL SYSTEM WHICH, DESPITE THE TRAPPINGS OF DEMOCRATIC FORMS, REMAINS STRONGLY AUTHORITARIAN.

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, A SMALL GROUP OF HIS ADVISORS, AND THE MILITARY DOMINATE THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT'S REQUIREMENT OF UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE TO THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA--WHICH INCLUDES BELIEF IN A SUPREME GOD, A JUST AND CIVILIZED HUMANITY, NATIONAL UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE--IS USED AT TIMES TO RESTRICT THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITION ELEMENTS.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200504416

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THOUGH STILL A POOR COUNTRY, INDONESIA'S ECONOMY CONTINUED TO EXPAND IN 1994, WITH GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PROJECTED TO GROW BY 6.2 PERCENT. MANUFACTURING AGAIN INCREASED ITS SHARE OF THE ECONOMY AGAINST THE STILL IMPORTANT AGRICULTURAL AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES. WITH INFLATION REMAINING UNDER CONTROL, THE COUNTRY'S CONTINUOUS ECONOMIC GROWTH HAS PRODUCED STEADY GAINS IN LIVING STANDARDS FOR MUCH OF INDONESIAN SOCIETY. THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE LIVING BELOW THE POVERTY LINE HAS FALLEN DRAMATICALLY FROM 70 MILLION IN 1970 TO 27 MILLION 1990. ACCORDING TO WORLD BANK STUDIES, INCOME INEQUALITY HAS ALSO BEEN SLIGHTLY REDUCED OVER THE PAST QUARTER CENTURY. WIDESPREAD UNDEREMPLOYMENT PERSISTS, HOWEVER, AS DO CORRUPTION AND INFLUENCE PEDDLING.

UNDER A DOCTRINE OF "DUAL FUNCTION," THE MILITARY IS GIVEN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SPECIAL CIVIC RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, INCLUDING UNELECTED MILITARY SEATS IN PARLIAMENT AND LOCAL LEGISLATURES, IN ADDITION TO ITS DEFENSE AND SECURITY ROLES. THE 450,000 MEMBER ARMED FORCES, INCLUDING 175,000 POLICE, CONSIDER THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY THEIR PRIMARY MISSION, AND HAVE TRADITIONALLY ACTED TO SUPPRESS ANY PERCEIVED THREAT, WHETHER FROM CRIME, SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS, CIVIL UNREST, OR ALLEGEDLY SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, WITH A VIGOR THAT HAS FREQUENTLY LED TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. WHILE SUCH ABUSES CONTINUED IN 1994, HEIGHTENED PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF SECURITY ACTIONS HAS INCREASED AWARENESS AMONG SOME IN THE MILITARY OF THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT IN CONTROLLING CROWDS AND DEMONSTRATORS, FOR EXAMPLE IN MEDAN AND DILI, AS WELL AS INCREASED ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE.

AGAINST THE LONG TERM TREND OF PERMITTING GREATER OPENNESS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IN 1994 WITHDREW THE LICENSES OF THREE LEADING PUBLICATIONS AND INCREASED PRESSURES ON OTHERS TO AVOID TOPICS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE. EARLIER IN THE YEAR, THE GOVERNMENT SIGNALLED A MORE RESTRICTIVE POLICY ON ALLOWING DEMONSTRATIONS TO TAKE PLACE, AND SOME PEACEFUL PROTESTS IN EAST TIMOR AND ELSEWHERE, INCLUDING DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE PRESS CLOSURES, WERE BROKEN UP BY FORCE. HOWEVER, THESE CONSTRAINTS DID NOT COMPLETELY DAMPEN DISSENTING VOICES IN THE MEDIA AND SOCIETY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO'S) CONTINUED TO

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

BE ACTIVE. AS OF SEPTEMBER, THE GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARING A DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE TO REGULATE THE ACTIVITIES OF NGO'S, WHICH HAVE PROLIFERATED IN RECENT YEARS, ALTHOUGH

THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THIS MAY NOW BE ON HOLD.

SOMEWHAT GREATER ACCESS WAS PERMITTED TO EAST TIMOR BY FOREIGN JOURNALISTS AND OTHERS, INCLUDING A JULY VISIT BY THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON SUMMARY, ARBITRARY AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL EXECUTIONS, ALTHOUGH SOME NGO REPRESENTATIVES AND FOREIGN J
OURNALISTS CONTINUED TO
ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES OR WERE DENIED ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR. NO PROGRESS WAS MADE IN ACCOUNTING FOR THE MISSING FOLLOWING THE 1991 DILI INCIDENT.

EXTRAJUDICIAL ARRESTS AND DETENTION BY THE ARMED FORCES, TORTURE OF SOME IN CUSTODY, AND EXCESSIVELY VIOLENT TECHNIQUES FOR DEALING WITH SUSPECTED CRIMINALS, INCLUDING EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS, CONTINUED. HOWEVER, RELATIVELY FEW INDONESIANS WERE TRIED UNDER THE HARSH AND ARBITRARY ANTISUBVERSION LAW, AND SOME PERSONS PREVIOUSLY CONVICTED WERE RELEASED. THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINED ITS OPEN AND HUMANE POLICIES TOWARD INDOCHINESE REFUGEES.

ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE0A5 191701Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2956
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

ON WORKER RIGHTS, THE MINIMUM WAGE WAS INCREASED, AND GOVERNMENT LABOR REGULATIONS WERE REVISED TO REDUCE THE MILITARY'S INVOLVEMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES AND TO ALLOW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS THAT COULD ENTER INTO BINDING COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS WITH THEIR EMPLOYERS. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE CHANGES IS IN THE EARLY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

STAGE AND THEIR FULL EFFECT REMAINS UNCLEAR. FOLLOWING LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS THAT DEGENERATED INTO ANTI-CHINESE RIOTING IN MEDAN, THE GOVERNMENT CRACKED DOWN ON LABOR ACTIVITIES THERE, ARRESTING AND BRINGING TO TRIAL THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN AND LOCAL LEADERSHIP OF AN INDEPENDENT THOUGH UNRECOGNIZED UNION.

WITH RESPECT TO INSTITUTION-BUILDING, THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT, WHILE STILL LARGELY POWERLESS, HELD A SERIES OF HEARINGS AT WHICH CABINET MINISTERS WERE QUERIED ABOUT THEIR PROGRAMS AND PROPOSED EXPENDITURES; AND IT CONTINUED TO BE SOUGHT OUT AS A POINT OF APPEAL BY STUDENTS AND VARIOUS GRIEVANTS. THE JUDICIARY--WHILE TECHNICALLY INDEPENDENT--REMAINS FOR THE MOST PART SUBSERVIENT TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND MILITARY, AND CORRUPTION IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS WIDESPREAD. HOWEVER, A SUPREME COURT DECISION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN A LAND COMPENSATION CASE, MADE PUBLIC IN 1994, RAISED HOPE FOR MORE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE. THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, ESTABLISHED IN 1993, BEGAN OPERATION IN JANUARY 1994 AND HAS SHOWN ENCOURAGING INDEPENDENCE AND A WILLINGNESS TO CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND ACTIONS.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS

POLITICAL OR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS OCCUR MOST OFTEN IN AREAS WHERE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS ARE ACTIVE AND WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT IS INVOLVED. PUNISHMENTS FOR SECURITY FORCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MEMBERS WHO COMMIT EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS SELDOM CORRESPOND TO THE CRIMES COMMITTED. ALL POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL TRIED FOR KILLING OR MISTREATING PRISONERS, OR FOR ANY OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, ARE TRIED BY MILITARY COURTS; THE SENTENCES, WHEN IMPOSED, ARE RARELY HEAVY.

SECURITY FORCES CONTINUE TO EMPLOY HARSH MEASURES AGAINST SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS AND THEIR SUSPECTED SUPPORTERS (ESPECIALLY IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA AND ACEH), INCLUDING EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS. IN 1994, HOWEVER, RELATIVELY FEW CLASHES WERE REPORTED BETWEEN SEPARATIST GROUPS AND SECURITY FORCES IN THESE AREAS, AND CONFIRMED KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS BY GOVERNMENT FORCES CONTINUED TO BE FAR LOWER THAN A FEW YEARS AGO. FOR EXAMPLE, ONLY FIVE DEATHS OF ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS WERE REPORTED, FOUR IN A CLASH WITH AN ARMY UNIT IN JANUARY AND ONE ALLEGEDLY RESISTING AN ARMY INTELLIGENCE UNIT IN APRIL. PRESS REPORTS ALSO INDICATED THAT FOUR MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE KILLED IN A CLASH WITH ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS. RELIABLE CIVILIAN SOURCES ALSO REPORTED THAT SEVERAL TIMORESE CIVILIANS WERE KILLED BY SECURITY FORCES DURING THE YEAR. THE NUMBER OF SUCH REPORTS, HOWEVER, WAS LOWER THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) IS STILL SEEKING A PERMANENT PRESENCE IN THE PROVINCE OF ACEH. (SEE SECTION 4).

TWO ARMY BATTALIONS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM EAST TIMOR IN LATE 1993-EARLY 1994. COMMANDERS THERE HAVE STATED THAT THEY INTEND TO REVIEW THE LEVEL OF TROOPS IN THE PROVINCE FOR POSSIBLE FURTHER REDUCTIONS ON A TWICE YEAR

LY BASIS.
DESPITE THE TWO BATTALION REDUCTION, MOST SOURCES IN EAST TIMOR REPORT THAT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION HAS SO FAR PERCEIVED LITTLE CHANGE IN WHAT THEY VIEW AS AN OPPRESSIVE MILITARY PRESENCE THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE. CIVIC ACTION ORIENTED TROOPS PREDOMINATE OVER COMBAT BATTALIONS, ALTHOUGH CIVIC ACTION TROOPS ALSO CARRY WEAPONS AND CONDUCT PATROLS. THE GOVERNMENT OFFERED A GENERAL AMNESTY TO MEMBERS OF THE TIMORESE RESISTANCE WHO SURRENDER THEIR ARMS, AND WERE REPORTED TO HAVE RELEASED SOME WHO WERE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

APPREHENDED RATHER THAN TRYING THEM.

EXCESSIVE FORCE IS OFTEN EMPLOYED IN APPREHENDING SUSPECTS OR COPING WITH ALLEGED CRIMINALS. IN JAKARTA, FOR EXAMPLE, WHERE POLICE WERE ENGAGED IN AN ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM DUBBED "OPERATION CLEANSING," POLICE CONTINUED TO EMPLOY DEADLY FORCE AGAINST SUSPECTS WHO WERE USUALLY SAID TO BE FLEEING OR RESISTING ARREST. ALTHOUGH EXACT STATISTICS WERE NOT AVAILABLE, FATAL SHOOTINGS BY POLICE SEEMED TO BE ON THE INCREASE, TOGETHER WITH VIOLENT CRIME, WITH SOME 150 INCIDENTS REPORTED IN WEST JAVA (INCLUDING

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 10044 03 OF 22 181007Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE0AF 191701Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2957
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

JAKARTA) BY MID JULY. IN NORTH SUMATRA, WHERE 50 SHOOTINGS BY POLICE INCLUDING FOUR DEATHS WERE REPORTED BY EARLY AUGUST 1994, A POLICY OF SHOOTING SUSPECTED CRIMINALS, SOMETIMES REPEATEDLY IN THE LEGS, ALSO CONTINUED. HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS PROTESTED THAT THE METHODS USED ARE UNJUSTIFIABLY HARSH AND VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

POLICE HAVE GENERALLY ASSERTED THAT THOSE KILLED WERE DANGEROUS CRIMINALS, AND HAVE DENIED A REPETITION OF THE OFFICIALLY SPONSORED "MYSTERIOUS KILLINGS" OF THE MID-1980'S DIRECTED AGAINST CRIMINAL ELEMENTS.

OFFICIAL ACTION IS SELDOM TAKEN AGAINST POLICE FOR USING EXCESSIVE FORCE, BUT THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THIS PRACTICE IS CHANGING. A POLICEMAN ACCUSED OF SHOOTING A SUSPECT TRYING TO ESCAPE LAST YEAR WAS SENTENCED TO THREE MONTHS IN PRISON BY A MILITARY COURT IN MEDAN IN 1994. IN MARCH A MILITARY COURT SENTENCED FOUR POLICEMEN IN PALEMBANG TO PRISON TERMS OF TWO TO THREE MONTHS FOR SHOOTING A SUSPECT AT CLOSE RANGE. NONE OF THE FIVE POLICE DETAINED IN 1993 IN NORTH SUMATRA IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEATH OF SYAMSUL BAHRI WERE PUT ON TRIAL, AS THE FAMILY APPARENTLY DID NOT PURSUE THE CASE. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT AS OF JULY AT LEAST 14 POLICE IN EAST TIMOR HAD BEEN SANCTIONED FOR INDISCIPLINARY ACTIONS. AS OF LATE JULY, 1994, THE SEPTEMBER, 1993 KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES OF FOUR DEMONSTRATORS PROTESTING CONSTRUCTION OF A DAM IN MADURA, WHICH INVOLVED SOME TWO DOZEN POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL, WAS STILL UNDER INVESTIGATION BY THE MILITARY THOUGH NO TRIALS HAD YET COMMENCED. RESIDENTS FROM THE AREA MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN MAY TO REQUEST LEGAL ACTION AGAINST CIVILIANS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCUSED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE SHOOTINGS.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

IN GENERAL, POLITICALLY MOTIVATED ABDUCTIONS ARE RARE IN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INDONESIA, AND THERE ARE NO CONFIRMED CASES IN 1994. SECURITY FORCES IN AREAS WITH ACTIVE GUERILLA INSURGENCIES OFTEN HOLD SUSPECTS FOR LONG PERIODS WITHOUT FORMAL CHARGES, BUT THESE CASES USUALLY END WITH OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF DETENTION (SEE SECTION L.D.). IN EAST TIMOR, DETENTIONS, USUALLY FOR SHORT PERIODS OF TIME, REMAIN FREQUENT. OF THOSE ALLEGED TO HAVE DISAPPEARED DURING THE MID-JULY DISTURBANCES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR, RELIABLE SOURCES REPORT THAT ALL BUT ONE HAS BEEN LOCATED. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE REMAINING INDIVIDUAL IS A CASE OF DISAPPEARANCE OR NOT.

GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MISSING AND DEAD

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

FROM THE NOVEMBER 12, 1991, MILITARY SHOOTING OF CIVILIANS IN DILI, EAST TIMOR, REMAINED INADEQUATE. NO ADDITIONAL CASES OF THOSE STILL LISTED AS MISSING IN A REPORT THE MILITARY GAVE TO ASIA WATCH WERE RESOLVED DURING THE YEAR. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN BROADLY IMPLIED THAT THEIR FAILURE TO LOCATE THOSE MISSING WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO THE SUCCESS OF THOSE PERSONS IN EVADING DETECTION. MANY KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS, HOWEV
ER, CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE
MISSING ARE DEAD AND THAT SOME IN THE MILITARY KNOW WHERE THEIR BODIES ARE.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

TORTURE IS AGAINST THE LAW IN INDONESIA. THE INDONESIAN CRIMINAL CODE MAKES IT A CRIME PUNISHABLE BY UP TO 4 YEARS IN PRISON FOR ANY OFFICIAL TO USE VIOLENCE OR FORCE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ELICIT A CONFESSION, AND ESTABLISHES PRETRIAL PROCEDURES TO GIVE SUSPECTS OR THEIR FAMILIES THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF AN ARREST OR DETENTION. IN PRACTICE, WHILE THE SITUATION HAS IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS, TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF MISTREATMENT STILL EXIST, PARTICULARLY IN REGIONS OF SECURITY CONCERNS, SUCH AS ACEH AND EAST TIMOR, AND LEGAL PROTECTIONS ARE BOTH INADEQUATE AND WIDELY IGNORED. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE PROVIDES THAT STATEMENTS FROM WITNESSES OR SUSPECTS MUST BE ELICITED WITHOUT PRESSURE OF ANY KIND, THE CIVILIANS CONVICTED IN THE 1993 MURDER CASE OF THE LABOR ACTIVIST MARSINAH ALL CLAIMED THAT THEIR CONFESSIONS HAD BEEN OBTAINED UNDER DURESS, INCLUDING TORTURE.

ACCORDING TO THE JANUARY, 1994 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE MOST COMMONLY USED METHODS ARE: BEATING ON THE HEAD, SHINS, AND TORSO WITH FISTS, LENGTHS OF WOOD, IRON BARS, BOTTLES, ROCKS, AND ELECTRIC CABLES; KICKING WITH HEAVY BOOTS; BURNING WITH LIGHTED CIGARETTES; ELECTRIC SHOCKS; SLASHING WITH RAZOR BLADES AND KNIVES;

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE0BC 191701Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2958
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 04 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

DEATH THREATS, FAKED EXECUTIONS AND DELIBERATE WOUNDING WITH FIREARMS; POURING WATER THROUGH THE NOSE; PROLONGED IMMERSION IN FETID WATER; HANGING UPSIDE DOWN BY THE FEET; PLACING HEAVY OBJECTS ON KNEES AND OTHER JOINTS; ISOLATION; SLEEP AND FOOD DEPRIVATION; GENITAL MUTILATION, SEXUAL MOLESTATION AND RAPE. REPORTS OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 10044 04 OF 22 181007Z
TORTURE HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY FREQUENT IN ACEH. CIVILIAN SOURCES IN EAST TIMOR REPORT THAT TORTURE, PRIMARILY BY SECURITY AGENCIES BEFORE RELEASE TO POLICE CUSTODY, STILL OCCURS, THOUGH ITS INCIDENCE, PARTICULARLY THE USE OF ELECTRIC SHOCKS, AND PERHAPS ITS SEVERITY HAS DECREASED.

POLICE OFTEN RESORT TO PHYSICAL ABUSES EVEN IN MINOR INCIDENTS, AND PRISON CONDITIONS ARE HARSH, WITH VIOLENCE AMONG PRISONERS AND MISTREATMENT AND EXTORTION OF INMATES BY GUARDS REPORTEDLY COMMON. HOWEVER, THE INCIDENCE OF MISTREATMENT BY PRISON OFFICIALS DROPS SHARPLY ONCE A PRISONER HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM POLICE OR MILITARY CUSTODY INTO THE CIVILIAN PRISON SYSTEM, AND PRISON CONDITIONS GENERALLY HAVE IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS. OFFICIALS HAVE PUBLICLY CONDEMNED POLICE BRUTALITY AND HARSH PRISON CONDITIONS AND OCCASIONALLY INSTIGATE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DISCIPLINARY ACTION, INCLUDING TRANSFER, DISMISSAL, AND TRIALS LEADING TO PRISON. A CIVILIAN EMPLOYED AT A MEDAN JAIL WENT ON TRIAL IN AUGUST ON CHARGES OF CAUSING THE DEATH OF AN INMATE WHO DIED FROM INJURIES SUSTAINED IN A BEATING. SUCH ACTIONS HOWEVER ARE AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE OF GENERAL IMPUNITY.

POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE USUALLY MIXED WITH THE GENERAL PRISON POPULATION, ALTHOUGH IN THE CIPINANG PRISON IN JAKARTA HIGH- PROFILE POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE HELD TOGETHER IN A SEGREGATED AREA. IN 1994 THE ICRC WAS ALLOWED TO VISIT PRISONERS IN CIPINANG IN JAKARTA AND WAS ALSO GRANTED ACCESS TO OTHER PRISONS IN JAVA, SUMATRA, EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND OTHER PROVINCES. CONDITIONS WERE DESCRIBED AS SPARTAN BUT ADEQUATE, AND IN SOME CASES HAVE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

IMPROVED IN AREAS SUCH AS SANITATION AFTER ICRC INTERVENTION. IN JANUARY, VISITATION RIGHTS FOR JAILED EAST TIMORESE FRETILIN LEADER XANANA GUSMAO WERE SUSPENDED FOR ONE MONTH FOLLOWING RELEASE OF A LETTER HE SENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS WHICH WAS DEEMED OBJECTIONABLE BY INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES. SEVERAL MONTHS PASSED BEFORE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY WERE ABLE TO VISIT XANANA AND HE WAS ABLE TO TRANSFER HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY TO THE SOCIETY FROM HIS PREVIOUS ATTORNEY.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE CONTAINS PROTECTIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION WHICH ARE ROUTINELY VIOLATED IN PRACTICE. THE CODE SPECIFIES THE RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO NOTIFY THEIR FAMILIES. WARRANTS MUST BE PRODUCED DURING AN ARREST EXCEPT UNDER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS, SUCH AS WHEN A SUSPECT IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME. WARRANTS ARE ISSUED BY POLICE INVESTIGATORS TO ASSIST IN THEIR INVESTIGATIONS OR IF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED. DESPITE THESE REQUIREMENTS, ARRESTS ARE SOMETIMES MADE WITHOUT WARRANTS. SOME PERSONS SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE MEDAN RIOTS IN APRIL WERE ARRESTED BEFORE FORMAL WARRANTS WERE ISSUED.

DEFENDANTS ARE PRESUMED INNOCENT AND MAY BE GRANTED BAIL. THEY OR THEIR FAMILIES MAY ALSO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THEIR ARREST AND DETENTION IN A PRETRIAL HEARING AND ARE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ENTITLED TO SUE FOR COMPENSATION IF WRONGFULLY DETAINED. THE CODE ALSO CONTAINS SPECIFIC LIMITS ON PERIODS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION AND SPECIFIES WHEN THE COURTS MUST GET INVOLVED TO APPROVE EXTENSIONS, USUALLY AFTER 60 DAYS.

WHERE ACTIVE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS EXIST, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR AND ACEH, PEOPLE ARE ROUTINELY DETAINED WITHOUT WARRANTS, CHARGES, OR COURT PROCEEDINGS. BAIL IS RARELY GRANTED, ESPECIALLY IN POLITICAL CASES. THE AUTHORITIES FREQUENTLY INTERFERE WITH ACCESS TO DEFENSE COUNSEL, AND MAKE IT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE FOR LEGAL ASSISTANCE FROM VOLUNTARY LEGAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS TO BE UTILIZED. EXTENSIONS OF PERIODS OF DETENTION ARE ROUTINELY APPROVED. PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS ARE RARELY INITIATED. IN ADDITION, SUSPECTS CHARGED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW ARE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL PROCEDURES OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE WHICH ALLOW, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY TO HOLD A SUSPECT UP TO A YEAR BEFORE TRIAL. THIS ONE-YEAR PERIOD IS RENEWABLE WITHOUT LIMIT. SPECIAL LAWS ON CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND NARCOTICS ARE SIMILARLY EXEMPT FROM THE CODE'S

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE0C7 191702Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2959
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 05 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

PROTECTIONS. THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) OPERATES OUTSIDE THE CODE AND HAS WIDE DISCRETION TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE PERSONS THOUGHT TO THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY. NATIONAL ESTIMATES ON THE NUMBER OF ARBITRARY ARRESTS OR DETENTIONS WITHOUT TRIAL ARE NOT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AVAILABLE. IN MARCH, 1994, 59 PEOPLE BEING HELD IN CONNECTION WITH THE 1989-1991 ACEH INSURGENCY WERE RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGES OR TRIALS, BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER RELEASED SINCE 1990 TO AROUND 965 PERSONS. MANY HAD BEEN HELD INCOMMUNICADO WITHOUT KNOWING THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM; SOME, INCLUDING AT LEAST FIVE OF THOSE RELEASED IN 1994, HAD BEEN HELD FOR OVER TWO YEARS. MANY OF THOSE RELEASED ARE REQUIRED TO REPORT BACK TO THE AUTHORITIES AT REGULAR INTERVALS. THREE OTHER ACEHNESE CONVICTED PREVIOUSLY OF SUBVERSION WERE RELEASED IN 1994 AFTER SERVING TWO-THIRDS OF THEIR SENTENCES. THE DECLINE IN ARMED SEPARATIST ACTIVITY LED TO FEWER DETENTIONS, AND FEWER THAN 100 ACEHNESE WERE BELIEVED TO BE IN DETENTION AT YEAR'S END. AN ADDITIONAL FIVE PERSONS WERE SENTENCED FOR SUBVERSION IN ACEH IN 1994.

IN EAST TIMOR MILITARY AUTHORITIES CONTINUED THE PRACTICE OF DETAINING PEOPLE WITHOUT CHARGES FOR SHORT PERIODS AND THEN REQUIRING THEM TO REPORT DAILY OR WEEKLY TO POLICE AFTER THEIR RELEASE. THREE EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS WERE DETAINED BY POLICE IN AUGUST FOR BRINGING FORBIDDEN BOOKS AND FOREIGN ITEMS INTO THE PROVINCE. TWO CONTINUE TO BE REQUIRED TO REPORT TO AUTHORITIES IN JAVA. SIX EAST TIMORESE WHO RECEIVED LENGTHY SENTENCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE NOVEMBER, 1991 SHOOTINGS IN DILI WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON IN SEMARANG WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO THEIR FAMILIES OR HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS, AND THEIR WHEREABOUTS WERE UNKNOWN FOR SEVERAL DAYS. JOSE ANTONIO NEVES, AN ACKNOWLEDGED MEMBER OF THE CLANDESTINE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, WAS ARRESTED IN MAY. AS OF SEPTEMBER, CHARGES HAD YET TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

BE BROUGHT
AGAINST HIM.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATES THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, BUT IN PRACTICE THE JUDICIARY IS SUBORDINATE TO THE EXECUTIVE AND THE MILITARY, AND IN MANY CASES PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AGAINST COERCED CONFESSIONS, ARE INADEQUATE TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL. A QUADRIPARTITE JUDICIARY OF GENERAL, RELIGIOUS, MILITARY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS EXISTS BELOW THE SUPREME COURT. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT TO HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS IN ALL FOUR SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE. THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT CONSIDER FACTUAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF LAW. A THREE-JUDGE PANEL CONDUCTS TRIALS AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL, POSES QUESTIONS, HEARS EVIDENCE, DECIDES GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND ASSESSES PUNISHMENT. INITIAL JUDGMENTS ARE RARELY REVERSED IN THE APPEALS PROCESS, ALTHOUGH SENTENCES ARE SOMETIMES INCREASED OR REDUCED (BOTH THE DEFENSE AND THE PROSECUTION MAY APPEAL). IN 1994 FOR EXAMPLE, THE FOUR YEAR SENTENCE OF A STUDENT TRIED IN JAKARTA FOR INSULTING THE PRESIDENT IN LEAFLETS HE DISTRIBUTED AT THE PARLIAMENT IN NOVEMBER, 1993 WAS RAISED TO FIVE YEARS UPON APPEAL OF THE PROSECUTOR. THE RELATIVELY LIGHT (SIX MONTHS) SENTENCES OF 21 OTHER STUDENTS WHO WERE ALSO CONVICTED OF INSULTING THE PRESIDENT DURING DEMONSTRATIONS AT PARLIAMENT IN DECEMBER, 1993 WERE INCREASED TO BETWEEN EIGHT AND FOURTEEN MONTHS FOLLOWING PROSECUTOR APPEAL.

DEFENDANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES. AN EXCEPTION IS ALLOWED IN CASES WHERE DISTANCE OR EXPENSE IS DEEMED EXCESSIVE FOR TRANSPORTING WITNESSES TO COURT, IN WHICH CASE SWORN AFFIDAVITS MAY BE INTRODUCED. IN CASES TRIED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW, TRIALS IN ABSENTIA ARE PERMITTED, AND PUBLIC ACCESS GENERALLY REQUIRES ADVANCE APPROVAL BY THE MILITARY.

THE USE IN TRIALS OF FORCED CONFESSIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE IS COMMON. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CONFESSIONS OF THE NINE CIVILIANS CONVICTED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

IN CONNECTION WITH THE MURDER OF MARSINAH IN SURABAYA IN 1993 WERE ADMITTED ALTHOUGH THEY CLAIMED IN COURT THAT THEIR CONFESSIONS HAD BEEN OBTAINED BY COERCION AND TORTURE. THE DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN THE CASE OF THE STUDENT MENTIONED ABOVE WHOSE SENTENCE WAS RAISED TO FIVE YEARS ON APPEAL WERE ONLY ALLOWED TO CALL ONE OUT OF SEVENTEEN WITNESSES THEY WISHED TO PRESENT.

DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND CAN BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN THEIR OWN TRIALS. THE CRIMINAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 10044 06 OF 22 181008Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE0D0 191702Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2960
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 06 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

PROCEDURES CODE GIVES DEFENDANTS THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY FROM THE MOMENT OF THEIR ARREST THROUGH THE INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL. ACCORDING TO LAW, A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IN CAPITAL CASES AND THOSE INVOLVING A PRISON SENTENCE OF 15 YEARS OR MORE. IN CASES INVOLVING POTENTIAL SENTENCES OF 5 YEARS OR MORE, A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IF THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 10044 06 OF 22 181008Z

ACCUSED DESIRES AN ATTORNEY BUT IS INDIGENT. DESTITUTE DEFENDANTS CAN OBTAIN PRIVATE LEGAL HELP, SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE (LBH). IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, DEFENDANTS ARE OFTEN PERSUADED NOT TO HIRE AN ATTORNEY, OR ACCESS TO AN ATTORNEY OF THEIR CHOICE IS IMPEDED. SEVERAL DEFENDANTS TRIED IN MEDAN ON CHARGES STEMMING FROM LABOR UNREST IN APRIL WHICH TURNED INTO ANTI-CHINESE RIOTS WERE REPORTEDLY PRESSURED BY AUTHORITIES TO DECLINE ATTORNEYS, WHILE SOME ATTORNEYS INVOLVED IN THE CASES WERE SUBJECTED TO OFFICIAL HARASSMENT OF VARIOUS KINDS. FIVE EAST TIMORESE SENTENCED TO TWENTY MONTHS FOR PUBLICLY EXPRESSING ANTI-INDONESIAN SENTIMENTS DURING A BANNER-WAVING INCIDENT BEFORE FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WERE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. AUTHORITIES CLAIM THEY DECLINED THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, WHILE CIVILIAN SOURCES INDICATE ACCESS TO COUNSEL WAS IMPEDED AND THAT THE THEY WERE NOT NOTIFIED THAT SENTENCING WAS TO BEGIN PRIOR TO BEING BROUGHT TO COURT.

WHILE THEORETICALLY THE SUPREME COURT STANDS COEQUAL WITH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES, IT DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF J
UDICIAL REVIEW OVER LAWS PASSED BY
PARLIAMENT. ALTHOUGH THE SUPREME COURT HAS SINCE 1985 HAD THE POWER TO REVIEW MINISTERIAL DECREES AND REGULATIONS, THE COURT HAS NOT YET EXERCISED THIS POWER. IN 1993, CHIEF JUSTICE PURWOTO GANDASUBRATA LAID OUT JUDICIAL PROCEDURES FOR LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND SOME CASES OF THIS KIND WERE INITIATED IN 1994. WHILE JUDGES RECEIVE GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT ON LEGAL MATTERS, THEY ARE CIVIL SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WHICH CONTROLS

THEIR ASSIGNMENTS, PAY, AND PROMOTION. THEY ARE SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM MILITARY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES. SUCH CONTROL OFTEN DETERMINES THE OUTCOME OF A CASE. CORRUPTION PERMEATES THE INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM. IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, THE PAYMENT OF BRIBES CAN INFLUENCE PROSECUTION, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCING.

AN ENCOURAGING INDICATION OF GREATER INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY WAS THE SURPRISE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN A LONGSTANDING LAND DISPUTE BETWEEN THE CENTRAL JAVA GOVERNMENT AND THIRTY-FOUR FARMERS WHO HAD BEEN FORCED TO SELL THEIR LAND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE KEDUNGOMBO DAM, A DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FUNDED BY THE WORLD BANK. THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

VILLAGERS SUED FOR INCREASED COMPENSATION. THE SUPREME COURT OVERTURNED DECISIONS OF BOTH THE SEMARANG DISTRICT COURT AND THE CENTRAL JAVA HIGH COURT IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT, AWARDING THE PLAINTIFFS EVEN GREATER COMPENSATION THAN THEY HAD SOUGHT, INCLUDING "NONMATERIAL LOSSES." THE GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE DECISION, WHICH WAS CRITICIZED BY PROMINENT GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY FIGURES, AND ASKED THE SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW THE CASE AGAIN. THE SUPREME COURT AGREED IN AUGUST, 1994 TO REVIEW THE CASE, BUT REJECTED A GOVERNMENT MOTION FOR A STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING THE REVIEW.

IN AUGUST 1994, THE SUPREME COURT ORDERED THE RELEASE OF THOSE AMONG THE TWENTY-ONE STUDENTS MENTIONED ABOVE WHOSE SENTENCES HAD BEEN RAISED TO EIGHT MONTHS WHEN THEY WERE STILL BEING HELD A WEEK FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THEIR SENTENCES.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 JAKART 10044 06 OF 22 181008Z

FEW PERSONS WERE PROSECUTED IN 1994 UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW, WHICH CARRIES A MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH. THIS LAW MAKES IT A CRIME TO ENGAGE IN ACTS THAT COULD DISTORT, UNDERMINE, OR DEVIATE FROM THE STATE IDEOLOGY OR BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, OR WHICH COULD DISSEMINATE FEELINGS OF HOSTILITY OR AROUSE HOSTILITY, DISTURBANCES, OR ANXIETY AMONG THE POPULATION. IT HAS BEEN ATTACKED AS EXCESSIVELY VAGUE AND HARSH, AND INAPPROPRIATE TO INDONESIA'S CURRENT LEVEL OF STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT. THE FIVE PERSONS SENTENCED FOR SUBVERSION IN ACEH IN 1994 RECEIVED SENTENCES OF 19 TO 20 YEARS.

THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT MAKE AVAILABLE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE CURRENTLY SERVING SUBVERSION SENTENCES OR SENTENCES UNDER THE FELONY HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. INFORMED ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE SERVING SENTENCES FOR SUBVERSION IN 1994, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI), MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, AND THOSE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN IRIAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 10044 07 OF 22 181008Z
ACTION DRL-09

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE0DC 191702Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2961
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 07 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

JAYA, ACEH, AND EAST TIMOR ARE AROUND 300. SCORES, AND POSSIBLY HUNDREDS, MORE WERE BELIEVED TO BE SERVING SENTENCES UNDER FELONY HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. AT LEAST SOME OF THESE PERSONS ADVOCATED OR EMPLOYED VIOLENCE, BUT MANY ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO WERE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPTING TO EXERCISE SUCH UNIVERSALLY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH OR ASSOCIATION OR WHO WERE CONVICTED IN MANIFESTLY UNFAIR TRIALS. SIX PRISONERS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION REMAINED UNDER DEATH SENTENCE. FIVE OF THESE WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, ARE 78 OR MORE YEARS OLDER, AND HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED FOR 29 YEARS. IN JUNE, 1994, TWO STUDENTS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN 19B9 FOR POSSESSING BANNED LITERATURE AND PARTICIPATING IN ILLEGAL DISCUSSION GROUPS WERE GRANTED CONDITIONAL RELEASE AFTER SERVING TWO-THIRDS OF THEIR SENTENCES. THREE PRISONERS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSIONS WERE RELEASED IN JAKARTA OR SURABAYA AF
TER SERVING LENGTHY SENTENCES.

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

JUDICIAL WARRANTS FOR SEARCHES ARE REQUIRED EXCEPT FOR CASES INVOLVING SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, FORCED OR SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY BY SECURITY AGENCIES OCCURS REGULARLY. SECURITY AGENCIES INTIMIDATE BY CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS AND RESIDENCES AND SELECTIVELY MONITORING LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS WITHOUT LEGAL RESTRAINT. GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND ITS FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY PERSONS THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP. THE GOVERNMENT STATED IN LATE 1990 THAT THIS LATTER GROUP THEN TOTALED 1,410,333 PEOPLE. THESE PERSONS AND THEIR RELATIVES SOMETIMES ARE SUBJECT TO SURVEILLANCE, REQUIRED

CHECK-INS, PERIODIC INDOCTRINATION, AND RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL OUTSIDE THEIR CITY OF RESIDENCE. THEIR LEGALLY REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION CARDS CARRY THE INITIALS "E.T." WHICH STAND FOR "EX-TAPOL," OR FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER, WHICH READILY IDENTIFIES THEM TO PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYERS OR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

THE TREND TOWARD INCREASING OPENNESS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE PRESS, WHICH CONTINUED THROUGH THE FIRST HALF OF 1994, SUFFERED A SERIOUS SETBACK ON JUNE 21 WHEN THE GOVERNMENT REVOKED THE PUBLISHING PERMITS OF THREE OF INDONESIA'S BEST KNOWN WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS: TEMPO, DETIK, AND EDITOR. ONE OF THE THREE, TEMPO, WAS THE NATION'S MOST INFLUENTIAL NEWS MAGAZINE, WHICH WAS FOUNDED IN 1971 AND WAS WIDELY RESPECTED FOR THE BREADTH AND DEPTH OF ITS COVERAGE. DETIK, ORIGINALLY A KIND OF DETECTIVE MAGAZINE, WAS TRANSFORMED IN 1993 INTO A HARD-HITTING TABLOID SPECIALIZING IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL ISSUES. EDITOR WAS A RESPECTED VOICE ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS. THE OFFICIAL REASONS GIVEN FOR REVOCATION OF THE PUBLICATION LICENSES WERE THAT TEMPO HAD ENDANGERED NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH ITS REPORTING, AND THAT THE OTHER TWO HAD COMMITTED ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATIONS. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT TOO OPEN REPORTING OF ALLEGED DIFFERENCES IN THE CABINET OVER A CONTROVERSIAL MILITARY PROCUREMENT ISSUE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ALTHOUGH FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS THE 1982 PRESS LAW, THE ISSUANCE OF PUBLISHING LICENSES UNDER A 1984 MINISTERIAL DECREE IS ONE WAY THE GOVERNMENT USES TO CONTROL THE PRESS. THREE OTHER PUBLICATIONS HAD THEIR LICENSES REVOKED IN THE LAST DECADE, THOUGH TWO LATER REAPPEARED WITH NEW NAMES AND CHANGES IN TOP MANAGEMENT. OTHER MEANS OF CONTROL INCLUDE REGULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF ADVERTISING PERMITTED, AND THE NUMBER OF PAGES ALLOWED IN NEWSPAPERS. THE PRACTICE OF TELEPHONING EDITORS TO CAUTION AGAINST PUBLISHING CERTAIN STORIES--THE SO-CALLED TELEPHONE CULTURE--CONTINUED, AND ITS INCIDENCE SEEMED TO INCREASE FOLLOWING THE ACTION AGAINST THE THREE PUBLICATIONS IN JUNE. SELF-CENSORSHIP CONTINUED TO BE ANOTHER PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED BRAKE ON FREE EXPRESSION WHOSE EFFECTIVENESS INCREASED AFTER JUNE.

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES CONTINUED IN SOME CASES TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS, MORE OR LESS SUBTLE, TO LOCAL JOURNALISTS ON WHAT THEY COULD PRINT. FOR EXAMPLE, AFTER

ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE0E3 191702Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2962
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 08 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF THE APRIL STRIKES AND RIOTS, PRESS COVERAGE OF LABOR ISSUES DROPPED MARKEDLY IN MEDAN FOLLOWING APPEALS FROM AUTHORITIES TO CUT BACK ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. IN JAKARTA, PAPERS WERE WARNED AGAINST COVERING TOPICS RANGING FROM THE PROLONGED SUMMER DROUGHT TO THE BAN OF THE THREE PUBLICATIONS. MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

POLICE TRIED TO CURB FOREIGN COVERAGE OF THE APRIL DISTURBANCES BY INSISTING ON SPECIAL PERMITS FROM THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, AND AT LEAST TWO FOREIGN REPORTERS WERE FORCED TO LEAVE THE CITY. STAFF OF EAST TIMOR'S ONLY NEWSPAPER WERE SUBJ
ECT TO VARIOUS FORMS OF
INTIMIDATION BY UNKNOWN SOURCES, AND A VEHICLE OF THE NEWSPAPER WAS BURNT AND HEAVILY DAMAGED FOLLOWING THE NEWSPAPER'S PRINTING OF AN ACCOUNT OF A MID-JULY DEMONSTRATION WHICH WAS AT VARIANCE WITH THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ARRANGED SEVERAL GROUP TOURS OF FOREIGN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES TO EAST TIMOR, BUT FOREIGN MEDIA ACCESS TO THE PROVINCE ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS REMAINS DIFFICULT.

THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AGAINST PRESS FREEDOM IN 1994 HAD THE EFFECT OF SHARPLY DAMPENING, THOUGH NOT ENTIRELY ELIMINATING, THE KIND OF INCISIVE AND PENETRATING REPORTING THAT HAS EMERGED IN INDONESIAN JOURNALISM IN RECENT YEARS. THOUGH PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS DWINDLED FOLLOWING THE HARSH GOVERNMENT REACTION AGAINST SOME DEMONSTRATORS (SEE ABOVE), ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT PRESS MEASURES CONTINUED IN OTHER CHANNELS. A NUMBER OF UNSANCTIONED JOURNALS WERE CIRCULATING BY THE FALL OF THE YEAR WHICH CONTINUED TO PROVIDE CRITICAL COVERAGE OF SENSITIVE ISSUES. IN AUGUST, 55 JOURNALISTS FOUNDED THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS, RIVALING THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION PWI, TO WORK FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND OPPOSE ANY FORM OF CENSORSHIP AND INTERFERENCE IN PRESS FREEDOM. IN SEPTEMBER THE FORMER CHIEF EDITOR OF TEMPO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

BROUGHT A LAWSUIT IN JAKARTA ADMINISTRATIVE COURT AGAINST THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION OVER THE REVOCATION OF TEMPO'S LICENSE, A FIRST IN INDONESIA'S HISTORY. IN OCTOBER, MOST OF THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF DETIK JOINED THE STAFF OF THE EXISTING PUBLICATION SYMPHONY AND REVAMPED IT TO RESEMBLE DETIK. HOWEVER, PUBLICATION WAS SUSPENDED AFTER ONLY A FEW DAYS WHEN THE WITHDRAWAL OF LEGALLY REQUIRED APPROVAL BY PWI AND THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION JEOPARDIZED SYMPHONY'S OWN PUBLICATION LICENSE.

WHILE PUBLIC DIALOGUE IS STILL MORE FREE THAN WAS THE CASE A FEW YEARS AGO, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON FREE SPEECH. FOR EXAMPLE, NOTED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION WAS PROHIBITED BY SECURITY FORCES ON AUGUST 29 FROM ADDRESSING A SEMINAR ON DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY IN SURABAYA. SEVERAL OTHER PUBLIC FIGURES, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WERE ALSO PREVENTED FROM PARTICIPATING IN PUBLIC SEMINARS ON ONE OR MORE OCCASIONS. APPLICATION OF THESE STRICTURES IS OFTEN CAPRICIOUS AND CLEAR JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROHIBITION IS FREQUENTLY LACKING. IN EAST TIMOR AUTHORITIES DENIED PERMISSION FOR NGO'S AND THE LOCAL UNIVERSITY TO HOLD AN OPEN SEMINAR ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT. IN FEBRUARY, AUTHORITIES IN EAST JAVA BANNED THE PERFORMANCE IN SURABAYA OF A PLAY BY WELL KNOWN AUTHOR EMHA AINUN NADJIB WHICH WAS CRITICAL OF GOVERNMENT LAND POLICIES IN DEVELOPMENT CASES. PERFORMANCE OF THE PLAY, WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY PERFORMED IN JOGJAKARTA, WAS LATER ALLOWED. TWO U. S. MOVIES WERE BANNED FOLLOWING PROTEST

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

BY ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS LEADERS. HOWEVER, A PLAY ABOUT THE CONTROVERSIAL MURDER OF LABOR ACTIVIST MARSINAH WAS STAGED IN JAKARTA IN SEPTEMBER.

WHILE ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS PROVIDED FOR IN LAW, CONSTRAINTS EXIST ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SCHOLARS. THEY SOMETIMES REFRAIN FROM PRODUCING OR INCLUDING IN LECTURES AND CLASS DISCUSSIONS MATERIALS THAT THEY BELIEVE MIGHT PROVOKE GOVERNMENT DISPLEASURE. AN INDONESIAN ACADEMIC WHO HAS CONDUCTED STUDIES ON EAST TIMOR WHOSE CONCLUSIONS ARE AT VARIANCE WITH THE GOVERNMENT WAS STRONGLY CRITICIZED BY GOVERNMENT FIGURES AND HIS HOUSE STONED BY UNKNOWN YOUTHS.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PUBLISHERS ARE SOMETIMES UNWILLING TO ACCEPT MANUSCRIPTS DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. PUBLICATIONS AND BOOKS MAY BE BANNED OUTRIGHT. IN JANUARY, 1994, A BOOK DEALING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTOS RISE TO POWER WAS BANNED, AND IN AUGUST, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BANNED A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE LEADER OF THE MESSIANIC ISLAMIC SECT DARUL ARQAM, THE THIRD BOOK OF THIS GROUP TO BE BANNED IN INDONESIA. ON THE OTHER H
AND, "THE FUGITIVE," A BOOK BY THE PROMINENT

ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE0EA 191703Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2963
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 09 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

INDONESIAN NOVELIST AND FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER PRAMOEDYA ANATA TOER, WHICH TOGETHER WITH OTHER WORKS BY PRAMOEDYA HAD BEEN BANNED FOR MANY YEARS, WAS PUBLISHED IN AUGUST, 1994.

THE COURTS SOMETIMES HAND OUT STIFF PENALTIES TO PERSONS

CONVICTED IN CASES INVOLVING FREE EXPRESSION, AS IN THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

TWO CASES OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS MENTIONED ABOVE WHOSE SENTENCES WERE RAISED ON APPEAL (SECTION L.E.), WHILE AT OTHER TIMES THEY ARE MORE LENIENT. ON JUNE 27, 1994, SECURITY FORCES VIOLENTLY BROKE UP TWO PEACEFUL MARCHES ON THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION BY PERSONS PROTESTING THE WITHDRAWAL OF PUBLICATION LICENSES FROM THE THREE PUBLICATIONS MENTIONED ABOVE. AROUND THIRTY PERSONS WERE DETAINED BY THE AUTHORITIES AND SEVERAL DEMONSTRATORS WERE INJURED. ALL BUT ONE OF THE PERSONS ARRESTED WERE SENTENCED NEXT DAY BY THE JAKARTA CENTRAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DEMONSTRATING WITHOUT A PERMIT AND RELEASED AFTER PAYING A NOMINAL FINE OF ABOUT ONE DOLLAR. THE REMAINING PERSON, A PAROLEE, WAS RETURNED TO PRISON TO FINISH HIS SENTENCE. ON JULY 7, POLICE ENTERED THE COMPOUND OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, A PROMINENT INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, AND ARRESTED FORTY-ONE HUNGER STRIKERS WHO WERE PROTESTING THE MEDIA BANNING. THESE DEMONSTRATORS TOO WERE SENTENCED TO PAY TOKEN FINES AND RELEASED AFTER TWO DAYS. OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS ON THIS ISSUE DURING THIS PERIOD WERE ALLOWED TO TAKE PLACE WITHOUT INCIDENT, SUCH AS A JULY 5 DEMONSTRATION OF JOURNALISTS IN JAKARTA.

A GROUP OF SEVERAL HUNDRED PEOPLE WHO HAD ASSEMBLED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR WISHING TO MARCH TO THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY TO AIR THEIR VIEWS ABOUT AN INCIDENT OF ALLEGED RELIGIOUS DISRESPECT THE PREVIOUS DAY WERE DISPERSED BY RIOT POLICE WHO REFUSED TO LET THE MARCH PROCEED WITHOUT A PERMIT. AROUND A DOZEN INDIVIDUALS WERE LIGHTLY INJURED IN THIS INCIDENT AND A NUMBER WERE BRIEFLY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DETAINED. THE AUTHORITIES SHOWED GREATER RESTRAINT THAN IN PAST INCIDENTS INVOLVING CROWDS, USING POLICE RATHER THAN THE ARMY, AND AVOIDING THE USE OF FIREARMS. AUTHORITIES CONTEND THE INTENT OF THE CROWD WAS UNCLEAR, THAT IT HAD BECOME UNRULY AND BEGAN THROWING STONES BEFORE POLICE ACTED, AND THAT THEY ACTED TO PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SITUATION WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO LOSS OF LIVES. CIVILIAN SOURCES DISPUTE THIS CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CROWD AND CONTEND THAT OTHER MEANS WERE AVAILABLE TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION.

THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA REMAINED MORE CAUTIOUS THAN THE PRINTED MEDIA. THE GOVERNMENT OPERATES THE NATIONWIDE TELEVISION NETWORK, WHICH HAS TWELVE REGIONAL STATIONS. PRIVATE TELEVISION COMPANIES CONTINUED TO EXPAND, WITH A

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

FIFTH STATION SCHEDULED TO BEGIN OPERATION IN NOVEMBER. ALL ARE REQUIRED TO BROADCAST GOVERNMENT-PRODUCED NEWS, BUT MANY ALSO PRODUCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STYLE PROGRAMMING THAT BORDERS ON NEWS.

APPROXIMATELY 600 PRIVATE RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANIES EXIST IN INDONESIA IN ADDITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT RADIO STATION PRODUCES "NATIONAL NEWS," WHICH IS BY LAW THE ONLY RADIO NEWS BROADCAST IN INDONESIA, AND IS RELAYED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BY THE PRIVATE STATIONS AND 49 REGIONAL AFFILIATES OF THE GOVERNMENT STATION. BY LAW, THE PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS MAY PRODUCE ONLY "LIGHT" NEWS, SUCH AS HUMAN INTEREST STORIES, AND MAY NOT DISCUSS POLITICS. IN PRACTICE, MANY BROADCAST INTERVIEWS AND FOREIGN NEWS AS WELL.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 JAKART 10044 09 OF 22 181009Z

FOREIGN TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS ARE READILY ACCESSIBLE TO THOSE WHO CAN AFFORD THE TECHNOLOGY, AND SATELLITE DISHES HAVE PROLIFERATED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT MAKES NO EFFORTS TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO THIS PROGRAMMING.

THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY REGULATES ACCESS TO INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY TO CERTAIN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, BY VISITING AND RESIDENT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS, AND OCCASIONALLY REMINDS THE LATTER OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DENY REQUESTS FOR VISA EXTENSIONS. THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIG
N
PUBLICATIONS AND VIDEO TAPES, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED BY GOVERNMENT CENSORS, REQUIRES A PERMIT. IMPORTERS SOMETIMES AVOID FOREIGN MATERIALS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OR DEALING WITH TOPICS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS ARE NORMALLY AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL ISSUES WERE DELAYED OR EMBARGOED IN 1994 WHEN THEY CARRIED STORIES CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 10044 10 OF 22 181010Z
ACTION DRL-09

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

INFO LOG-00 AID-01 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 EAP-01
EB-01 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-16 LAB-01 L-01
ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 PA-01 PRS-01 P-01
SP-00 SR-00 STR-01 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PRME-01 G-00
(ANHR-01 ADS-00) /039W
----------7EE0F2 191703Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2964
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 10 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

ALTHOUGH FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION ARE RECOGNIZED BY THE CONSTITUTION, THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT CONTROLS PLACED ON THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. ALL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE.

ORGANIZATIONS MUST HAVE GOVERNMENT PERMISSION TO HOLD REGIONAL AND NATIONAL MEETINGS. PUBLIC MARCHES AND DEMONSTRATIONS ALSO REQUIRE PERMITS, WHICH ARE FREQUENTLY NOT GRANTED. DURING THE YEAR, GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES RETURNED TO A STIFFER LINE AGAINST ALLOWING PUBLIC PROTESTS, HAVING LOOSENED SUCH RESTRICTIONS FOR A WHILE DURING THE LATTER HALF OF 1993. MANY JURISDICTIONS OFTEN REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FOR SMALLER GATHERINGS AS WELL. WHILE OBTAINING SUCH APPROVAL IS USUALLY ROUTINE, THE AUTHORITIES OCCASIONALLY WITHHOLD PERMISSION, OR BREAK UP PEACEFUL GATHERINGS FOR WHICH NO PERMIT HAS BEEN OBTAINED, INCLUDING IN 1994 A MEETING BETWEEN AN ATTORNEY AND HIS CLIENTS IN A LABOR COMPENSATION CASE, AND A PUBLIC SEMINAR ON LAND ISSUES WHICH WAS SPONSORED BY A WELL KNOWN NGO. POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DISCUSSIONS AT UNIVERSITIES, WHILE NO LONGER FORMALLY BANNED, REMAINED TIGHTLY CONTROLLED.

THE 1985 SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW (ORMAS) REQUIRES ALL

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, TO ADHERE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA. THIS PROVISION, WHICH LIMITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD AS BEING DESIGNED TO INHIBIT ACTIVITIES OF GROUPS WHICH SEEK TO MAKE INDONESIA AN ISLAMIC STATE. THE LAW EMPOWERS THE GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND ANY ORGANIZATION IT BELIEVES TO BE ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA AND REQUIRES PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR ANY ORGANIZATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS FROM FOREIGN DONORS, HINDERING THE WORK OF MANY LOCAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE WITHOUT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OFFICIAL RECOGNITION UNDER THE ORMAS LAW. FOR INSTANCE, THE INDEPENDENT LABOR ORGANIZATION SERIKAT BURUH SEJAHTERA INDONESIA (SBSI), THOUGH DENIED LEGAL STATUS EITHER AS A LABOR UNION OR A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE SUBJECT OF STRONG OFFICIAL DISAPPROVAL, HAS NOT BEEN DISBANDED (SEE SECTION 6).

IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) ACTIVE IN SUCH FIELDS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND CONSUMER PROTECTION PROLIFERATED IN INDONESIA'S CLIMATE OF INCREASING OPENNESS. IN LATE 1994, THE GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARING A DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE THAT WOULD BRING THE MORE THAN 700 NGOS UNDER CONTROLS SIMILAR TO THE ORMAS LAW. A DRAFT MADE AVAILABLE BY THE GOVERNMENT INDICATED THAT NGOS WOULD HAVE TO RECEIVE GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR THE USE OF ANY FOREIGN ASSISTANCE THEY ACCEPT, AND SUCH ASSISTANCE MUST BE DEEMED CONSISTENT WITH NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND NOT DETRIMENTAL TO NATIONAL INTERESTS. NGOS WOULD ALSO BE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY, AND WOULD RECEIVE GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE ON FULFILLING THEIR DECLARED FUNCTIONS. MANY NGOS, FEARING THAT THE PROPOSED NEW DECREE IS AN EFFORT BY THE GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL THEIR ORGANIZATIONS OR CURB SOME OF THEIR ACTIVITIES, REACTED STRONGLY TO THE DRAFT AND, ACCORDING TO ONE KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCE, THE DECREE IS CURRENTLY ON HOLD.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD. THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES ISLAM,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, AND HINDUISM, AND PERMITS PRACTICE OF THE MYSTICAL, TRADITIONAL BELIEFS OF "ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN." ALTHOUGH THE POPULATION IS OVERWHELMINGLY MUSLIM, THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECOGNIZED FAITHS
ARE GENERALLY RESPECTED, AND THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES MUTUAL TOLERANCE AND HARMONY AMONG THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS. SOME RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY EXIST.

BECAUSE THE FIRST TENET OF PANCASILA IS BELIEF IN A SUPREME BEING, ATHEISM IS FORBIDDEN. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA EXTENDS TO ALL RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY OPPOSES MUSLIM GROUPS WHICH ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ACKNOWLEDGING ONLY ISLAMIC LAW. THERE ARE GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES FOR BANNING RELIGIOUS SECTS IN INDONESIA. AMONG THOSE PROHIBITED ARE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AND BAHA'I. IN 1994, THE MESSIANIC ISLAMIC SECT DARUL ARQAM WAS BANNED IN A NUMBER OF PROVINCES. THREE OF ITS BOOKS HAVE BEEN PROHIBITED IN INDONESIA, AND IN AUGUST,

ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE0FB 191703Z /38
R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2965
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 11 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

1994, ITS LEADER, ABUYA SHEIKH IMAM ASHAARI MUHAMMAD, WAS FORBIDDEN TO ENTER INDONESIA.

VIOLENCE BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS IN THE HURIA KRISTEN BATAK PROTESTAN (HKBP), INDONESIA'S LARGEST PROTESTANT CHURCH, CONTINUED IN NORTH SUMATRA THROUGHOUT 1994, WITH AT LEAST

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SIX FATALITIES. IN EARLY 1993, CITING A THREAT TO CIVIL ORDER, THE NORTHERN SUMATRA REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER HAD INTERVENED IN AN INTERNAL LEADERSHIP DISPUTE WHICH BROKE OUT WITHIN THE HKBP THE PREVIOUS YEAR, APPOINTED A NEW BISHOP, AND HELPED THE NEW BISHOP'S SUPPORTERS TAKE OVER CHURCH PROPERTY. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE NEW BISHOP. ALL OF THE APPROXIMATELY THIRTY PERSONS IN CUSTODY FOR FACTIONAL VIOLENCE BY THE END OF AUGUST, 1994, AND THE THREE PERSONS WHO HAD RECEIVED SENTENCES OF UP TO SIX MONTHS, WERE SUPPORTERS OF THE FORMER BISHOP, DESPITE CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT MEMBERS OF BOTH FACTIONS HAD INITIATED VIOLENCE. THERE WERE WIDESPREAD REPORTS FROM RELIGIOUS MINORITIES INDICATING THAT THE EXTENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE WEAKENED SOMEWHAT DURING THE YEAR AND THAT RELIGIOUS MINORITIES FELT THEY WERE LESS 'FREE TO CARRY OUT THEIR RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES UNIMPEDED. HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, SPOKE OUT SEVERAL TIMES EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. TWO PRIVATES ACCUSED OF PROVOCATIVE BEHAVIOR DURING A CATHOLIC MASS IN EAST TIMOR IN JUNE WERE DETAINED AND COURT-MARTIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING AGAINST THEM. IN MID-JULY, TWO NUNS WERE SUBJECTED TO INSULTING BEHAVIOR BY SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS ON THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR CAMPUS. TO DATE, THE PERPETRATORS OF THESE ACTS HAVE NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED OR ARRESTED.

THERE IS NO LEGAL BAR TO CONVERSION BETWEEN FAITHS, AND CONVERSIONS OCCUR. MARRIAGES BETWEEN PERSONS OF DIFFERENT RELIGIONS ARE DIFFICULT TO REGISTER IN SOME AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. PROSELYTIZING BY THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS IN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ONE RECOGNIZED RELIGION OR ANOTHER IS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND IS DISCOURAGED. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED, ALTHOUGH IN EAST TIMOR AND OCCASIONALLY ELSEWHERE MISSIONARIES HAVE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES AND DELAYS IN RENEWING RESIDENCE PERMITS, AND VISAS ALLOWING THE ENTRANCE OF NEW FOREIGN CLERGY ARE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. LAWS AND DECREES FROM THE 1970'S LIMIT THE NUMBER OF YEARS FOREIGN MISSIONARIES CAN SPEND IN INDONESIA, WITH SOME EXTENSIONS GRANTED IN REMOTE AREAS LIKE IRIAN JAYA. FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK IS SUBJECT TO THE FUNDING STAPULATIONS OF THE ORMAS LAW (SEE SECTION 2.B.).

INDONESIANS PRACTICING THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS MAINTAIN ACTIVE LINKS WITH CORELIGIONISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE INDONESIA AND TRAVEL ABROAD FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS. THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZES THE ANNUAL HAJJ PILGRIMAGE FOR MUSLIM BELIEVERS.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

IN 1993, THE GOVERNMENT DRASTICALLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BARRED EITHER FROM ENTERING OR DEPARTING INDONESIA FROM A PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED FIGURE OF 8,897 "BLACKLISTED" PEOPLE IN JANUARY TO A FEW HUNDRED BY AUGUST. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT AUTHORI
TIES, NO ONE IS NOW PROHIBITED FROM
LEAVING THE COUNTRY FOR POLITICAL REASONS. RESTRICTIONS EXIST ON MOVEMENT BY INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN CITIZENS TO AND WITHIN PARTS OF INDONESIA. PERMITS TO SEEK WORK IN A

NEW LOCATION ARE REQUIRED IN CERTAIN AREAS, PRIMARILY TO CONTROL FURTHER POPULATION MOVEMENT TO CROWDED CITIES. SPECIAL PERMITS ARE REQUIRED TO VISIT CERTAIN PARTS OF IRIAN JAYA. SECURITY CHECKS AFFECTING TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL TO AND WITHIN EAST TIMOR OCCURRED SPORADICALLY IN 1994, AND CURFEWS IN CONNECTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE OCCASIONALLY IMPOSED. FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, MUST NOTIFY AUTHORITIES OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND MAY NOT CHANGE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE WITHOUT OFFICIAL PERMISSION (SEE SECTION L.F.).

WITH INDOCHINESE ASYLUM SEEKER ARRIVALS AT A TRICKLE, INDONESIA HAS TURNED ITS ATTENTION TO EMPTYING ITS GALANG

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ISLAND CAMP OF SCREENED-IN REFUGEES AND SCREENED-OUT ASYLUM SEEKERS UNDER THE INTERNATIONALLY APPROVED COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (CPA) BY THE END OF 1995. OF MORE THAN 145,000 INDOCHINESE GRANTED ASYLUM IN INDONESIA, JUST OVER 8,000 REMAIN, OF WHOM ONLY 250 ARE REFUGEES AWAITING RESETTLEMENT. THE GOI PLANS TO WORK WITH VIETNAM UNDER A TRIPARTITE (WITH THE UNHCR) MOU SIGNED IN 1993 TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 10044 12 OF 22 181010Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE103 191703Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2966
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 12 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

PEACEFULLY REPATRIATE THE REMAINING ASYLEES TO VIETNAM. THERE ARE SOME 450 CAMBODIANS AS WELL, WHO ARE TO BE REPATRIATED TO CAMBODIA SEPARATELY. THE GOVERNMENT HAS STRESSED ITS COMMITMENT TO CARRYING OUT THE CPA HUMANELY, PRESERVING THE DIGNITY AND WELL BEING OF THE ASYLEES, IN COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 10044 12 OF 22 181010Z
UNHCR. INDONESIA ALSO CONTINUED WORKING WITH THE UNHCR AND THE ICRC REGARDING THE RETURN OF RESIDENTS OF IRIAN JAYA WHO HAD FLED TO PAPUA NEW GUINEA DURING SEPARATIST

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

VIOLENCE IN THE EASTERN PART OF THAT PROVINCE. ACEHNESE WHO FLED TO MALAYSIA DURING THE HEIGHT OF SEPARATIST VIOLENCE THERE IN 1990-91 CONTINUE TO RETURN TO ACEH. OTHERS CONTINUE TO SEEK ASYLUM IN MALAYSIA, INCLUDING A GROUP THAT TOOK REFUGE IN THE UNHCR COMPOUND IN KUALA LUMPUR IN 1992 CLAIMING THAT THEIR LIVES WOULD BE THREATENED IF THEY RETURNED TO INDONESIA.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

CITIZENS DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEMOCRATIC MEANS. THE 1,000-MEMBER PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY OF THE STATE AND MEETS EVERY FIVE YEARS TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AND SET THE BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, IS CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE APPOINTMENT OF HALF ITS MEMBERSHIP. THE REMAINING HALF COME FROM THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR), 80 PERCENT OF WHOSE MEMBERS ARE ELECTED. IN 1993, THE MPR ELECTED SOEHARTO TO HIS SIXTH UNCONTESTED FIVE-YEAR TERM AS PRESIDENT. LEGALLY, THE PRESIDENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SUBORDINATE TO THE PARLIAMENT, BUT ACTUALLY HE AND A SMALL GROUP OF ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS EXERCISE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.

UNDER A DOCTRINE KNOWN AS "DUAL FUNCTION," THE MILITARY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ASSUMES A SIGNIFICANT SOCIOPOLITICAL AS WELL AS A SECURITY ROLE. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARE ALLOTTED AN UNELECTED 20 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND DISTRICT PARLIAMENTS, AND OCCUPY NUMEROUS KEY POSITIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION. THE OTHER 80 PERCENT OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL PARLIAMENTARY SEATS ARE FILLED THROUGH ELECTIONS HELD EVERY 5 YEARS. ALL ADULT CITIZENS ARE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE, EXCEPT ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, CONVICTED CRIMINALS SERVING PRISON SENTENCES, AND SOME 36,000 FORMER PKI MEMBERS. VOTERS CHOOSE BY SECRET BALLOT BETWEEN THE THREE GOVERNMENT-APPROVED POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH FIELD CANDIDATE LISTS IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT. THOSE LISTS MUST BE SCREENED BY THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) (SE
E
SECTION L.D.), WHICH DETERMINES WHETHER CANDIDATES WERE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST COUP OR POSE OTHER BROADLY DEFINED SECURITY RISKS. CRITICS CHARGE THESE SCREENINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, SINCE THERE IS NO WAY TO APPEAL THE RESULTS, AND NOTE THAT THEY CAN BE USED TO ELIMINATE CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM PARLIAMENT.

STRICT RULES ESTABLISH THE LENGTH OF THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN, ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC MEDIA, SCHEDULES FOR PUBLIC APPEARANCES, AND THE POLITICAL SYMBOLS THAT CAN BE USED. ONLY THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE PERMITTED TO EXIST AND CONTEST ELECTIONS. GOLKAR, A GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ORGANIZATION OF DIVERSE FUNCTIONAL GROUPS, WON 68 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN THE 1992 ELECTIONS. TWO SMALL POLITICAL PARTIES, THE UNITY DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 JAKART 10044 12 OF 22 181010Z

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF INDONESIA (PDI), SPLIT THE REMAINING VOTE. BY LAW ALL THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS MUST EMBRACE PANCASILA, AND NONE IS CONSIDERED AN OPPOSITION PARTY. THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED AND OFTEN GUIDED BY GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES. MEMBERS OF THE DPR AND THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES MAY BE RECALLED FROM OFFICE BY PARTY LEADERS.

GOLKAR MAINTAINS CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH THE ARMED FORCES AND KORPRI, THE NONUNION ASSOCIATION TO WHICH ALL CIVIL SERVANTS AUTOMATICALLY BELONG. CIVIL SERVANTS MAY JOIN ANY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WITH OFFICIAL PERMISSION, BUT MOST ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND SOME OTHER BANNED PARTIES MAY NOT RUN FOR OFFICE OR BE ACTIVE POLITICALLY. THE 500 MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR) CONSIDER BILLS PRESENTED TO THEM BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES BUT DO NOT DRAFT LAWS ON THEIR OWN, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DO SO. THE DPR MAKES TECHNICAL AND OCCASIONALLY SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS TO BILLS IT REVIEWS. IN PRACTICE IT REMAINS CLEARLY SUBORDINATE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 10044 13 OF 22 181011Z

ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 PA-01 PRS-01 P-01
SP-00 SR-00 STR-01 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PRME-01 G-00
(ANHR-01 ADS-00) /039W
----------7EE10A 191704Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2967
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 13 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, BUT RECENTLY HAS BECOME MUCH MORE ACTIVE IN SCRUTINIZING GOVERNMENT POLICY THROUGH HEARINGS AT WHICH MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, MILITARY COMMANDERS, AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS ARE ASKED TO TESTIFY. FOR EXAMPLE, PARLIAMENTARY EXAMINATION BROUGHT TO LIGHT A MAJOR SCANDAL IN GOVERNMENT BANKS AND FORCED THE GOVERNMENT TO ADDRESS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

IT SERIOUSLY. THE DPR HAS ALSO BECOME INCREASINGLY A FOCAL POINT OF APPEALS AND PETITIONS FROM STUDENTS, WORKERS, DISPLACED FARMERS, AND OTHERS PROTESTING ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND AIRING OTHER GRIEVANCES.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY IGNORES CALLS BY DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND ACTIVISTS FOR INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS INCIDENTS, THERE ARE SIGNS THAT IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY SENSITIVE TO SUCH CONCERNS. ONE EXAMPLE IN 1994 WAS THE CONVICTION OF NINE CIVILIANS AND ONE MILITARY OFFICER IN CONNECTION WITH THE 1993 MURDER OF THE LABOR ACTIVIST MARSINAH. SERIOUS QUESTIONS REMAIN, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE MANNER IN WHICH THE CONVICTIONS WERE OBTAINED AND WHETHER ALL THOSE INVOLVED WERE INDICTED (SEE SECTIONS L.C. AND L.E.). WHILE VARIOUS DOMESTIC ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONS INTERESTED IN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

HUMAN RIGHTS OPERATE ENERGETICALLY, SOME HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS FACE GOVERNMENT HARASSMENT SUCH AS FREQUENT VISITS BY POLICE OR AGENTS FROM MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, INTERROGATIONS AT POLICE STATIONS, OR CANCELLATIONS OF PRIVATE MEETINGS (SEE SECTION 2.B.). SOME MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN MEDAN WERE SUBJECTED TO HARASSMENT AFTER THE APRIL RIOTING WHEN THEY TRIED TO DEFEND WORKERS AND OTHERS CHARGED WITH CRIMES AS A RESULT OF THE RIOTS. THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND EMPHASIZES ITS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

BELIEF THAT LINKING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE. IN 1994, INDONESIA BROUGHT PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SEVERAL NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO PROHIBIT OR RESTRICT N
GO SPONSORED HUMAN RIGHTS SEMINARS
ON THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR.

THE DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARING IN 1994 TO REGULATE THE ACTIVITIES OF NGOS, WHICH HAVE FLOURISHED LARGELY UNREGULATED IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THOSE ACTIVE IN PROMOTING AND DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS AS WELL AS OTHER FIELDS. SEE SECTION 2.B.

NONETHELESS, THE GOVERNMENT IN 1994 CONTINUED TO BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND CONCERNS THAN IN THE RECENT PAST. THE ICRC CONTINUED TO OPERATE IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, AND ACEH, AND TO VISIT PRISONERS CONVICTED OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ABORTIVE, COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP IN 1965, CONVICTED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, AND EAST TIMORESE PRISONERS. AS OF SEPTEMBER, THE ICRC'S REQUEST TO OPEN AN OFFICE IN ACEH HAD NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE GOVERNMENT, THOUGH OFFICIAL COOPERATION ON ACCESS BY ITS DELEGATES FROM JAKARTA SHOWED SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN 1994. ICRC ACCESS ALSO GREATLY IMPROVED IN OTHER AREAS, INCLUDING EAST TIMOR WHERE IT HAS AN OFFICE. THE ICRC NO LONGER MAINTAINS AN OFFICE IN IRIAN JAYA, AND VISITS THAT PROVINCE FROM JAKARTA SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR. HOWEVER, IN 1994 THE VISITING REPRESENTATIVE OF A KEY U. S. HUMAN RIGHTS NGO WAS DENIED PERMISSION TO VISIT MEDAN AND EAST TIMOR. THE GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZED THE VISIT OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THE UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMMARY AND ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS, AND ALLOWED HIM TO SEE THOSE HE HAD REQUESTED TO SEE. THE RAPPORTEUR PUBLICLY QUESTIONED, HOWEVER, WHETHER ALL THOSE WHO MIGHT HAVE WANTED TO SPEAK WITH HIM HAD BEEN AFFORDED FULL ACCESS.

IN JANUARY, 1994, THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, MOST OF WHOSE MEMBERS WERE NAMED THE MONTH BEFORE, BEGAN OPERATIONS. DESPITE CONTINUING SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE COMMISSION'S INDEPENDENCE, COMMISSION MEMBERS DURING THE COURSE OF THE YEAR ACTIVELY LOOKED INTO MANY OF THE NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS AND PETITIONS PRESENTED TO THE COMMISSION AND IN SOME CASES HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES WILLING TO QUESTION GOVERNMENT ACTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE COMMISSION STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE GOVERNMENT'S REVOCATION OF THE PUBLICATION LICENSES OF THREE PUBLICATIONS (SECTION 2.A.) AS AN INFRINGEMENT OF FREE SPEECH, AND HAS CRITICIZED THE WAY IN WHICH THE SUSPECTS IN THE MARSINAH MURDER CASE WERE PROSECUTED AS WELL AS QUESTIONING WHETHER ALL THE GUILTY HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO JUSTICE. LACKING ENFORCEMENT POWERS, THE COMMISSION ATTEMPTS TO WORK WITHIN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE112 191704Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2968
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 14 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

- INDONESIA

THE SYSTEM, SENDING TEAMS WHERE NECESSARY TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS AND EMPLOYING PERSUASION, PUBLICITY, AND MORAL AUTHORITY TO HIGHLIGHT ABUSES AND ENCOURAGE CORRECTIVE ACTION. IT HAS ALSO OFFERED ITS SERVICES IN MEDIATING LAND TITLE DISPUTES, THE BIGGEST CATEGORY OF COMPLAINTS RECEIVED BY THE COMMISSION, AND IN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 10044 14 OF 22 181011Z
SOME OTHER AREAS. A TEAM VISITED EAST TIMOR IN SEPTEMBER. OPERATIONS IN 1994 WERE HAMPERED SOMEWHAT BY START-UP PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE NECESSITY TO HIRE STAFF, FIND PERMANENT QUARTERS, AND DEVELOP OPERATING PROCEDURES.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

WOMEN

BY LAW, WOMEN ARE EQUAL TO AND HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN. INDONESIA HAS RATIFIED THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW) AND THE CONVENTION ON THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN. IN PRACTICE WOMEN OFTEN FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO EXERCISE THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN DIVORCE CASES WOMEN OFTEN BEAR A HEAVIER EVIDENTIARY BURDEN THAN MEN, ESPECIALLY IN THE ISLAMIC-BASED FAMILY COURT SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH SOME INDONESIAN WOMEN ENJOY A HIGH DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FREEDOM AND OCCUPY IMPORTANT MIDLEVEL POSITIONS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, THE MILITARY, THE PROFESSIONS, AND PRIVATE BUSINESS, THE OVERWHELMING NUMBER OF INDONESIAN WOMEN DO NOT EXPERIENCE SUCH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOMS. EVEN FOR THOSE WHO DO, THEY ARE OFTEN D
ISPROPORTIONATELY AT THE
LOWER END OF THE POSITION SCALE. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH WOMEN CONSTITUTE ONE-QUARTER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, THEY OCCUPY ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THE SERVICE'S TOP POSTS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 JAKART 10044 14 OF 22 181011Z
THIRTY-SIX PERCENT OF THE WORKFORCE ARE WOMEN. FORTY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PERCENT OF WOMEN WORK, WITH THE MAJORITY IN THE RURAL SECTOR AND A THIRD IN SERVICE SECTOR. DESPITE LEGAL GUARANTEES OF EQUAL TREATMENT, WOMEN SELDOM RECEIVE EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK. THERE IS A COMMON BELIEF THAT WOMEN WILL WORK FOR A LOWER WAGE, WILL DO WORK A MAN WOULD NOT DO, AND WILL NOT COMPLAIN. STUDIES HAVE SHOWN THAT THE AVERAGE WAGES OF FEMALES TO MALES IS 65 PERCENT OF MEN'S WAGES. THIS DIFFERENCE DIMINISHES AS THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF WOMEN RISES BEYOND HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION: WOMEN WITH NO EDUCATION AND SOME PRIMARY SCHOOL--65 PERCENT; PRIMARY SCHOOL GRADUATES--59 PERCENT; MIDDLE SCHOOL GRADUATES--69 PERCENT; HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES--86 PERCENT; AND THOSE WITH SOME COLLEGE EDUCATION OR COLLEGE DIPLOMAS--74 PERCENT.

WOMEN ARE OFTEN NOT GIVEN THE EXTRA SALARY THAT IS THEIR DUE WHEN THEY ARE THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD AND IN SOME CASES DO NOT RECEIVE EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR THEIR HUSBAND AND CHILDREN, SUCH AS MEDICAL INSURANCE. DESPITE LAWS GUARANTEEING WOMEN A THREE MONTH MATERNITY LEAVE, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS CONCEDED THAT PREGNANT WOMEN ARE OFTEN DISMISSED OR ARE REPLACED WHILE ON LEAVE. SOME COMPANIES REQUIRE THAT WOMEN SIGN GUARANTEES THAT THEY WILL NOT BECOME PREGNANT.

WOMEN WORKERS IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE EMPLOYED IN CERTAIN INDUSTRIES, SUCH AS FOOD, GARMENT AND SHOE PRODUCTION, AND RECEIVE LOWER WAGES COMPARED TO MALE PRODUCTION WORKERS IN OTHER INDUSTRIAL SECTORS. WOMEN WORKERS ARE ALSO MORE LIKELY TO BE HIRED

ON A DAILY BASIS AND BE COMPENSATED ON THE BASIS OF PIECE WORK. AS A RESULT OF BEING HIRED ON A DAILY BASIS, THEY ARE LESS LIKELY TO RECEIVE BENEFITS LEGALLY MANDATED FOR PERMANENT WORKERS. WOMEN WORKERS ALSO HAVE COMPLAINED OF BEING SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED BY FOREMEN AND FACTORY OWNERS.

INDONESIAN WOMEN DISPROPORTIONATELY EXPERIENCE ILLITERACY, POOR HEALTH, AND INADEQUATE NUTRITION, ALTHOUGH THEIR LIFE EXPECTANCY IS 63 YEARS COMPARED TO 60 YEARS FOR MEN. WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS HAVE IMPROVED IN THE LAST DECADE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NUMBER OF GIRLS GRADUATING FROM HIGH SCHOOL TRIPLED FROM 1980 TO 1990. HOWEVER, COMPARED TO MEN, WOMEN CONTINUE TO HAVE LOWER GRADUATION RATES. ONE EXAMPLE OF WOMEN'S POOR HEALTH INDICATORS IS THE PARTICULARLY HIGH NATIONAL MATERNAL MORTALITY RATIO WHICH

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

WAS ESTIMATED FROM A 1992 HOUSEHOLD HEALTH SURVEY CONDUCTED BY THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AS 421 MATERNAL DEATHS PER 100,000 LIVE BIRTHS. THE RATIO WAS WIDELY DIVERGENT AMONG PROVINCES RANGING FROM 130 IN YOGYAKARTA TO 750 IN WEST NUSATENGGARA.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 10044 15 OF 22 181012Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE120 191704Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2969
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 15 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

ALTHOUGH SEVERAL VOLUNTARY, PRIVATE GROUPS WORK ACTIVELY TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CLAIM SOME SUCCESS IN GAINING OFFICIAL COGNIZANCE OF WOMEN'S CONCERNS, TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES WHICH LIMIT WOMEN'S ASPIRATIONS, ACTIVITIES, AND STATUS UNDERCUT STATE POLICY IN SOME AREAS. THE INDONESIAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 10044 15 OF 22 181012Z
NATIONAL POLICE REPORTED 1,341 RAPE CASES FOR 1991, 1,356 CASES FOR 1992, AND XXXX CASES FOR 1993. HOWEVER, WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS BELIEVE RAPE IS GROSSLY UNDERREPORTED IN INDONESIA, SHAME BEING ONE OF THE PRIMARY REASONS. SOME LEGAL EXPERTS STATE THAT IF A WOMEN DOES NOT GO

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATELY TO THE HOSPITAL FOR A PHYSICAL EXAM WHICH PRODUCES SEMEN OR OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF RAPE, SHE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BRING CHARGES. ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE ALSO SUGGESTS SOME WOMEN FAIL TO REPORT RAPE TO POLICE OUT OF FEAR OF BEING MOLESTED AGAIN BY THE POLICE THEMSELVES.

A COMMON BELIEF, EVEN AMONG WOMEN OF THE UPPER CLASSES, IS THAT WOMEN WHO WALK ALONE AT NIGHT WILL BE PERCEIVED AS "FAIR GAME." MANY WOMEN GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO AVOID BEING IN PUBLIC ALONE IN THE EVENINGS. THE DANGER INHERENT IN RETURNING HOME ALONE IN THE E
VENINGS IS
ACKNOWLEDGED BY GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS REQUIRING EMPLOYERS TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION FOR WOMEN WHOSE WORK REQUIRES THEM TO RETURN HOME AT NIGHT. HOWEVER, THIS REGULATION IS OFTEN HONORED ONLY IN THE BREACH, AS ARE PROVISIONS GRANTING WOMEN MATERNITY AND MENSTRUAL LEAVE.

IN GENERAL, THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REMAINS POORLY DOCUMENTED. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY, WHICH SOME SAY HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY RECENT SOCIAL CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY RAPID URBANIZATION. HOWEVER, LONGSTANDING TRADITIONAL BELIEFS THAT THE HUSBAND MAY "TEACH" OR "CONTROL" THE WIFE THROUGH SEVERAL MEANS, INCLUDING VIOLENCE, ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROBLEM. THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

GOVERNMENT PROVIDES SOME COUNSELING, AND SEVERAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS EXIST TO ASSIST WOMEN. MANY OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS FOCUS MAINLY ON REUNITING THE FAMILY RATHER THAN ON PROVIDING PROTECTION TO THE WOMEN INVOLVED. THERE ARE NO BATTERED WOMEN'S SHELTERS IN INDONESIA. MANY WOMEN RELY ON EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEMS FOR SHELTER DURING COOLING-OFF PERIODS.

FEMALE CIRCUMCISION IS NOT UNCOMMON IN SOME PARTS OF INDONESIA. USUALLY A SMALL SECTION OF THE TIP OF THE CLITORIS IS CUT OR A SMALL INCISION IS MADE IN THE TIP OF THE CLITORIS WITH THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING A FEW DROPS OF BLOOD. TOTAL REMOVAL OF THE CLITORIS IS NOT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PRACTICE, ALTHOUGH IT DOES OCCUR IF INEPTLY PERFORMED. IN JAVA, FEMALE CIRCUMCISION USUALLY TAKES PLACE WITHIN THE FIRST YEAR AFTER BIRTH AND IS PERFORMED EITHER AT A HOSPITAL OR BY A LOCAL TRADITIONAL PRACTITIONER OR "DUKUN," ESPECIALLY IN RURAL AREAS.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CHILDREN

INDONESIA IS A SIGNATORY OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND WAS ON THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE OF THE WORLD SUMMIT FOR CHILDREN. THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF) AND NGO'S CONCERNED WITH CHILD WELFARE ARE ALSO ACTIVE IN INDONESIA, AND UNICEF IN PARTICULAR HAS PRAISED GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE LIVES OF CHILDREN THROUGH POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND IMPROVEMENTS IN PRIMARY EDUCATION, MATERNITY SERVICES, AND FAMILY PLANNING. LAW NO. 4 OF 1979 ON CHILDREN'S WELFARE GUARANTEES CERTAIN RIGHTS TO CHILDREN AND DEFINES THE

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE AND PARENTS TO NURTURE AND PROTECT THEM. IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN DEVELOPED, HOWEVER, AND THE LAW'S PROVISIONS HAVE YET TO GO INTO EFFECT.

BEGINNING IN SCHOOL YEAR 1994-95, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT EXPANDED FREE COMPULSORY EDUCATION TO INCLUDE THREE ADDITIONAL GRADES (7TH-9TH) THOUGH ADMITTING THAT THERE WILL BE DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTING THE EXPANSION DUE TO LACK OF TEACHERS AND CLASSROOMS. THERE IS NO PENALTY FOR PARENTS WHO DO NOT ENROLL THEIR CHILDREN IN SCHOOL. UNICEF ESTIMATES THAT MORE THAN ONE MILLION CHILDREN DROP OUT OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EVERY YEAR DUE MAINLY TO THE COST OF SUPPLIES, UNIFORMS AND OTHER EXPENSES, IN ADDITION TO THE PROFESSED NEED FOR THE CHILDREN TO SUPPLEMENT FAMILY INCOME. THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF STREET CHILDREN LIVING IN JAKARTA AND OTHER INDONESIAN CITIES, WHO SURVIVE THROUGH SELLING NEWSPAPERS, ACTING AS PARKING ATTENDANTS, SHINING SHOES, AND PROSTITUTION. NGOS CRITICIZE THE GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO HELP THESE CHILDREN AS INADEQUATE AND INEFFECTIVE AT PROVIDING CONCRETE

ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

(ANHR-01 ADS-00) /039W
----------7EE128 191704Z /38
R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2970
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 16 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

SERVICES. (SEE ALSO SECTION 6.D ON CHILD LABOR.)

ALTHOUGH CHILD SEXUAL AND OTHER PHYSICAL ABUSE IS KNOWN TO OCCUR IN INDONESIA, ESPECIALLY CASES OF INCEST BETWEEN STEPFATHERS AND STEPDAUGHTERS, SOME EXPERTS IN CHILD CARE BELIEVE ITS INCIDENCE IN INDONESIA IS RELATIVELY LOW.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LAWS EXIST WHICH PROTECT CHILDREN FROM INDECENT ACTIVITIES, PROSTITUTION, AND INCEST, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES SEVERAL INDIGENOUS POPULATION GROUPS IN INDONESIA, BASED LARGELY ON CRITERIA RELATING TO ISOLATION. THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THESE GROUPS' RIGHTS TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN INDONESIAN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
LIFE; CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS, FOR EXAMPLE, WERE MADE TO INSURE THAT ISOLATED GROUPS PARTICIPATED IN THE 1992 ELECTIONS. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH IS BASICALLY PATERNALISTIC AND DESIGNED MORE TO BRING THESE GROUPS INTO THE INDONESIAN FAMILY THAN TO PROTECT TRADITIONAL WAYS OF LIFE. WHERE INDIGENOUS GROUPS CLASH WITH DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES, THE DEVELOPERS ALMOST ALWAYS WIN. FOR EXAMPLE, IN KALIMANTAN MEMBERS OF A DAYAK TRIBE WERE FORCED FROM THEIR LAND BY A TIMBER CONCESSION IN AUGUST 1994. IN RETALIATION, THEY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ATTACKED COMPANY FACILITIES AND SEVERAL WERE SUBSEQUENTLY ARRESTED.

CONCERNS HAVE ALSO BEEN RAISED ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAMS, WHICH FREQUENTLY DISRUPT THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE OF INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES WHEN TRANSMIGRANTS ARE RELOCATED FROM POPULOUS JAVA TO LESS POPULATED OUTER ISLANDS. MANY OTHERS HAVE ALSO SETTLED IN THE OUTER ISLANDS ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE. MOST CIVIL

SERVANTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN IRIAN JAYA AND OTHER ISOLATED AREAS CONTINUE TO COME PRIMARILY FROM JAVA, RATHER THAN FROM THE INDIGENOUS POPULACE.

NATIONAL/RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

INDONESIANS EXHIBIT CONSIDERABLE RACIAL AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE, WITH THE IMPORTANT EXCEPTION OF OFFICIAL AND INFORMAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE, WHO COMPRISE ABOUT 3 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. SINCE 1959 NONCITIZEN ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO RUN BUSINESSES IN RURAL INDONESIA. REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF ALL CHINESE SCHOOLS FOR ETHNIC CHINESE, FORMATION OF EXCLUSIVELY CHINESE CULTURAL GROUPS OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND PUBLIC DISPLAY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS. IN AUGUST 1994, THE BAN ON USE OF CHINESE CHARACTERS WAS EASED SLIGHTLY TO ALLOW FIRMS WORKING IN THE TOURIST INDUSTRY TO PRODUCE CHINESE-LANGUAGE BROCHURES, PROGRAMS, AND SIMILAR MATERIAL FOR CHINESE-SPEAKING GUESTS. HOWEVER, CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE GOVERNMENT OWNED DAILY NEWSPAPER, MAY NEITHER BE IMPORTED NOR PRODUCED DOMESTICALLY. PRIVATE INSTRUCTION IN CHINESE IS GENERALLY PROHIBITED BUT TAKES PLACE TO A LIMITED EXTENT, AND SINCE AUGUST, 1994 HAS BEEN ALLOWED IN TRAINING EMPLOYEES IN THE TOURISM INDUSTRY IN FUNCTIONAL MANDARIN. THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA HAS AN ASIAN STUDIES DEPARTMENT WHICH INCLUDES CHINESE LANGUAGE COURSES. STATE UNIVERSITIES HAVE NO FORMAL QUOTAS THAT LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ETHNIC CHINESE. NO LAWS PROHIBIT SPEAKING CHINESE, BUT THE GOVERNMENT LAYS HEAVY STRESS ON THE LEARNING AND USE OF THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE, BAHASA

INDONESIA. IN 1993, ETHNIC CHINESE WERE REMINDED BY THE GOVERNMENT THAT INDONESIA LAW FORBIDS THE CELEBRATION OF THE CHINESE NEW YEAR IN TEMPLES OR PUBLIC PLACES. WHILE THIS LAW REMAINS IN EFFECT, ITS ENFORCEMENT WAS LIMITED IN 1994, AND CHINESE NEW YEAR DECORATIONS WERE DISPLAYED IN PUBLIC SHOPPING AREAS IN MAJOR CITIES.

DESPITE THESE LIMITATIONS, MANY PEOPLE OF CHINESE ANCESTRY HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS, AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS IS OFTEN HAPHAZARD. SOME ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE ENJOYED PARTICULAR GOVERNMENT FAVOR. SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS EXIST WHICH ARE, IN EFFECT, ALL CHINESE AND NOT PROSCRIBED. CHINESE IS SPOKEN IN BUSINESSES AND BY THE PUBLIC AT ENTERTAINMENT EVENTS. MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT CONDEMNED THE ANTI-CHINESE RIOTS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN MEDAN IN APRIL. AUTHORITIES ALSO TOOK ACTION TO ENSURE THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANTI-CHINESE DISTURBANCES IN BANDUNG DID NOT OCCUR IN MAY 1994.

PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 10044 17 OF 22 181012Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE12E 191705Z /38
R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2971
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 17 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

THE DISABLED IN INDONESIA DO NOT RECEIVE SPECIAL PROGRAMS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

OR ATTENTION, AND NO NATIONAL LAW SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSES THEIR STATUS. VIRTUALLY NO PUBLIC BUILDINGS OR PUBLIC MEANS OF TRANSPORT ARE DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY FOR ACCESS BY THE HANDICAPPED. ALTHOUGH A 1992 TRAFFIC LAW IMPLEMENTED IN 1993 NOTES THE RIGHT OF THE HANDICAPPED TO SPECIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TRANSPORTATION SERVICES SUCH AS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TOOLS AND FACILITIES, SPECIAL REG
ULATIONS FOR OBTAINING
DRIVERS' LICENSES, AND APPROPRIATE VEHICLES. THE HANDICAPPED FACE CONSIDERABLE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT.

IN 1989, THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED REGULATIONS COVERING EDUCATION FOR THE MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS EXIST IN JAKARTA AND OTHER LARGE CITIES IN FOUR CATEGORIES: FOR THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, BLIND, DEAF AND PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS, INCLUDING THOSE IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES, ARE FREE TO FORM WORKER ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION. HOWEVER, UNTIL 1994 ONLY A RECOGNIZED UNION COULD BARGAIN ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES OR REPRESENT WORKERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S LABOR COURTS. A NEW REGULATION PROMULGATED IN JANUARY, 1994, PROVIDES THAT WORKERS IN A SINGLE COMPANY WITH MORE THAN 25 EMPLOYEES CAN JOIN TOGETHER AND NEGOTIATE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH THEIR EMPLOYER OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF SPSI, THE ONLY LEGALLY RECOGNIZED UNION (SEE BELOW). THESE PLANT-LEVEL WORKERS ASSOCIATIONS ARE ENCOURAGED TO JOIN SPSI. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES, AS OF SEPTEMBER, 1994, ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY OF THESE PLANT-LEVEL ASSOCIATIONS HAD BEEN FORMED, OF WHICH ONE HAD

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CONCLUDED A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT WITH MANAGEMENT. PRIVATE SECTOR FIRMS WITHOUT SPSI OR PLANT-LEVEL WORKERS ASSOCIATIONS ARE REQUIRED TO ISSUE COMPANY REGULATIONS COVERING TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT. WORKERS ARE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SUPPOSED TO BE CONSULTED PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF THESE REGULATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER APPROVAL IS ALSO REQUIRED FOR COMPANY REGULATIONS (SEE SECTION 6.B.).

IN ORDER TO BE RECOGNIZED AS A UNION, A WORKERS' ORGANIZATION MUST REGISTER AS A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS UNDER THE ORMAS LAW (SEE SECTION 2.B.) AND MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR RECOGNITION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER, NAMELY: UNION OFFICES IN AT LEAST FIVE OF THE COUNTRY'S 27 PROVINCES, BRANCH OFFICES IN AT LEAST 25 DISTRICTS, AND 100 PLANT-LEVEL UNITS. IF, BECAUSE THE INDUSTRY OR TYPE OF WORK IS LOCALIZED, WITH THE RESULT THAT A UNION IS CONFINED TO ONLY A FEW LOCATIONS, E.G. MINING, THE UNION NEEDS 10,000 MEMBERS FOR REGISTRATION PURPOSES. THESE REQUIREMENTS WERE INTRODUCED BY MINISTERIAL REGULATION PER-03/MEN/1993, SIGNED BY THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER IN FEBRUARY 1993. WHILE THE CURRENT RECOGNITION REQUIREMENTS ARE LOWER THAN THOSE SPECIFIED PREVIOUSLY, THEY STILL CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT BARRIER TO RECOGNITION AND THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. IN ADDITION, MINISTERIAL REGULATION PER-03/MEN/1993 REQUIRES THAT A UNION BE SET UP "BY AND FOR WORKERS" (ARTICLE L.A.). THE MINISTRY OF MANPOWER INTERPRETS THIS CLAUSE TO DENY RECOGNITION TO GROUPS IN WHICH WHAT IT CONSIDERS NONWORKERS, SUCH AS LAWYERS OR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, ARE INVOLVED AS ORGANIZERS. IN SEPTEMBER 1993, THE SERIKAT PEKERJA SELURUH INDONESIA

(SPSI, ALL INDONESIAN WORKERS UNION), THE ONLY RECOGNIZED UNION, BEGAN A TRANSFORMATION FROM A UNITARY (CENTRALIZED) TO A FEDERATIVE (DECENTRALIZED) STRUCTURE. AS OF AUGUST, 1994, 12 OF ITS 13 INDUSTRIAL SECTORS WERE REGISTERED AS INDEPENDENT UNIONS. THIS CHANGE WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY REGULATIONS, KEP-438/MEN/1992, SIGNED BY THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER IN OCTOBER 1992, AND PER-03/MEN/1993 OF FEBRUARY 1993. THE FORMER REMOVED THE REQUIREMENT THAT A (PLANT-LEVEL) UNION BE A COMPONENT OF THE SPSI WHILE THE LATTER LOWERED THE REQUIREMENTS FOR (NATIONWIDE) UNION RECOGNITION. TO BECOME FINAL, THE SPSI'S CONSTITUTION MUST BE ALTERED. THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE AT THE NEXT SCHEDULED SPSI CONGRESS IN 1995. AS OF SEPTEMBER, 1994 THEREFORE, THE DECENTRALIZATION OF SPSI TO A FEDERAL STRUCTURE REMAINED LARGELY ON PAPER. NONE OF THE NEW SECTORAL UNIONS HAD YET HELD NEW LEADERSHIP ELECTIONS OR CHANGED THEIR CONSTITUTIONS.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

AS OF JUNE, 1994, THE SPSI HAD 10,517 UNITS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, WITH 7,591 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN PLACE. SPS

ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE133 191705Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2972
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 18 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

I CLAIMS A MEMBERSHIP OF ABOUT 1.9 MILLION DUES-PAYING MEMBERS, ABOUT 2.5 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL WORK FORCE. HOWEVER, IF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS AND OTHERS IN CATEGORIES SUCH AS SELF-EMPLOYED AND FAMILY WORKERS WHO ARE NOT NORMALLY UNION MEMBERS ARE EXCLUDED, THE PERCENTAGE OF UNION MEMBERS RISES TO APPROXIMATELY 6

PERCENT.

THERE IS, DE FACTO, A SINGLE UNION SYSTEM, AND IT IS THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED POLICY TO SEEK TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECOGNIZED SPSI UNIONS RATHER THAN TO EASE FURTHER THE PROCESS FOR THE FORMATION OF ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS. THE ONLY UNIONS RECOGNIZED BY THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ARE THOSE WHICH PREVIOUSLY CONSTITUTED THE SPSI'S INDUSTRIAL SECTORS.

TWO OTHER LABOR GROUPS, SETIA KAWAN (SOLIDARITY), ALSO KNOWN AS SERIKAT BURUH MERDEKA (SBM, FREE TRADE UNION), AND SERIKAT BURUH SEJAHTERA INDONESIA (SBSI, INDONESIAN WORKERS WELFARE UNION), HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED BUT ARE NOT REGISTERED. SETIA KAWAN, FOUNDED THREE YEARS AGO, IS NOW ESSENTIALLY MORIBUND. THE SBSI, CREATED IN 1992, CONTINUES TO ATTEMPT TO FORM THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF FACTORY-LEVEL UNITS TO MEET THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION AS A LABOR UNION. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER HAS STATED THAT ANY UNIONS WHICH IS FORMED SHOULD AFFILIATE WITH THE SPSI FEDERATION AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT RECOGNIZE ANY UNIONS OUTSIDE THE FEDERATION. THERE HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN TENTATIVE OVERTURES TO BRING THE SBSI INTO THE SPSI. THE SBSI, HOWEVER, HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THESE OFFERS.

THE SBSI HAS TWICE ATTEMPTED TO REGISTER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS AS A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE ORMAS LAW, ON OCTOBER 28, 1992, AND AUGUST 10, 1993. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE NO ACTION WAS TAKEN ON ITS APPLICATION, AND IN THE SECOND AN OFFICIAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE SBSI'S

DOCUMENTATION WITHOUT A POSITIVE RECOMMENDATION FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER, WHICH WAS REFUSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT ITS FOUNDERS WERE NOT WORKERS BUT HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS AND LAWYERS. (ACCORDING TO THE SBSI, ONLY TWO MEMBERS OF ITS EXECUTIVE BOARD ARE LAWYERS, AND THE REST ARE WORKERS.) GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE SAID THAT IF THE SBSI RECONSTITUTES ITSELF AS AN NGO, IT COULD BE REGISTERED UNDER THE ORMAS LAW. THE SBSI HAS INDICATED THAT IT IS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN SEEKING RECOGNITION AS A MASS ORGANIZATION.

THE SBSI IS CONSIDERED ILLEGAL BY THE GOVERNMENT. THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT MOVED TO DISBAND IT, IT HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO CONTINUAL HARASSMENT, ESPECIALLY AFTER LARGE SCALE LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS, WHICH IT WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN ORGANIZING IN MEDAN IN APRIL, 1994, DEGENERATED INTO ANTI-CHINESE RIOTING. MUCH OF THE MEDAN LEADERSHIP OF SBSI WAS ARRESTED IN THE SPRING, AND THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN OF SBSI, MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, WAS ARRESTED IN AUGUST, 1994 AND CHARGED UNDER ARTICLE 160 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE WITH INCITING VIOLENCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE RIOTS. IN MID

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

OCTOBER, SOME OF THE MEDAN LEADERSHIP WERE SENTENCED TO BETWEEN SIX AND EIGHT MONTHS IN PRISON, WHILE THE TRIALS OF PAKPAHAN AND THE OTHERS WERE STILL IN PROGRESS. MANY BELIEVE THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AGAINST THE SBSI LEADERSHIP IS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED WITH A VIEW TO DISCREDIT OR DESTROY THE ORGANIZATION. ON AUGUST 24, 1994, THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE ILO SENT A STRONGLY WORDED LETTER TO THE INDONESIAN MINISTER OF MANPOWER EXPRESSING "SERIOUS CONCERN" OVER THE ARREST OF MR. PAKPAHAN.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 JAKART 10044 18 OF 22 181013Z

UNTIL OCTOBER 1992, WHEN IT WAS REPLACED BY MINISTERIAL REGULATION KEP-438/MEN/1992, MINISTER OF MANPOWER DECISION 1109/MEN/1986 DEFINED THE PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING AN SPSI FACTORY UNIT AND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR UNION OFFICIALS. THIS REGULATION ENJOINED WORKERS TO CONSULT WITH THE EMPLOYER DURING THE PROCESS OF SETTING UP AN SPSI BRANCH. WHILE THIS REGULATION WAS IN EFFECT, THERE WERE NUMEROUS REPORTS THAT EMPLOYERS WOULD AGREE TO THE ORGANIZATION OF SPSI UNITS ONLY IF THEY WERE ALLOWED TO SELECT THE UNITS' OFFICIALS. BECAUSE OF THIS, M
ANY
CURRENT SPSI FACTORY UNITS ARE LED BY INDIVIDUALS SELECTED BY EMPLOYERS AND WHO HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH THEIR UNITS' MEMBERS. THE NEW REGULATION STATES THAT EMPLOYEES MUST ONLY NOTIFY THEIR EMPLOYER THAT THEY WISH TO FORM A UNION AND THAT THEY MAY PROCEED IF THEY DO NOT RECEIVE A RESPONSE FROM THEIR EMPLOYER WITHIN 2 WEEKS. DESPITE THIS NEW PROVISION, STRIKES CONTINUE TO OCCUR BECAUSE EMPLOYERS ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF UNION BRANCHES. THESE STRIKES ARE INVARIABLY SUCCESSFUL AND THE FORMATION OF AN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 10044 19 OF 22 181013Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE13A 191705Z /38

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2973
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 19 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

SPSI UNIT FOLLOWS SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HOWEVER, WORKERS WHO ARE ACTIVE IN THE FORMATION OF THE UNION ARE FREQUENTLY DISMISSED.

CIVIL SERVANTS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO JOIN UNIONS AND MUST BELONG TO KORPRI, A NONUNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL

DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. TEACHERS MUST BELONG TO THE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (PGRI). WHILE TECHNICALLY CLASSED AS A UNION (ITS STATUS WAS CHANGED FROM ASSOCIATION SIMILAR TO KORPRI IN APRIL 1990), PGRI HAS CONTINUED TO FUNCTION MORE AS A WELFARE ORGANIZATION AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ENGAGED IN TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES. STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES, DEFINED TO INCLUDE THOSE WORKING IN ENTERPRISES IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A 5-PERCENT HOLDING OR GREATER, USUALLY ARE REQUIRED TO JOIN KORPRI, BUT A SMALL NUMBER OF STATE ENTERPRISES HAVE SPSI UNITS.

UNIONS MAY DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE OVER THE SPSI AND ITS FEDERATED UNIONS. THE HEAD OF THE SPSI IS A SENIOR MEMBER OF GOLKAR, AND HE AND TWO OTHER SENIOR SPSI OFFICIALS ARE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT REPRESENTING GOLKAR. WITH ONE EXCEPTION, ALL MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR. THESE PERSONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN POSITIONS IN THE NEW FEDERATED INDUSTRIAL SECTOR UNIONS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER IS A MEMBER OF THE SPSI'S CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL. NUMEROUS REGIONAL OFFICIALS ALSO ARE GOLKAR MEMBERS, SOMETIMES SERVING IN REGIONAL

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LEGISLATURES. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE REPORTS, THE GOVERNMENT INTERFERES IN THE SELECTION OF SPSI OFFICERS, ESPECIALLY BY PLACING RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS IN MID-LEVEL SPSI POSITIONS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS STATED THAT IT INTENDS TO CEASE THE PRACTICE OF PLACING MILITARY OFFICERS IN UNION POSITIONS AND EVENTUALLY TO REMOVE OFFICIALS WITH SIGNIFICANT GOLKAR CONNECTIONS.

UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE, POLICE APPROVAL IS NEEDED FOR ALL MEETINGS OF FIVE PEOPLE OR MORE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE OFFICES OR NORMAL WORK SITES. THIS PROVISION ALSO APPLIES TO UNION MEETINGS. PERMISSION IS ROUTINELY GIVEN TO THE SPSI, BUT NOT TO RIVAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS SBSI, WHICH WAS PREVENTED FROM HOLDING SEVERAL MEETINGS OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS, INCLUDING ITS FIRST CONGRESS IN 1993. THE GOVERNMENT MAY DISSOLVE A UNION IF IT BELIEVES THE UNION IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA, THOUGH IT HAS NEVER ACTUALLY DONE SO AND THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS SPECIFYING PROCEDURES FOR UNION DISSOLUTION.

THE SPSI MAINTAINS INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS BUT IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS EXCEPT THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) TRADE UNION COUNCIL. SOME ELEMENTS OF THE SPSI, NOW REGISTERED AS INDUSTRIAL SECTOR UNIONS, MAINTAIN LINKS WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION SECRETARIATS. THE SPSI STILL HAS ITS APPLICATION PENDING FOR MEMBERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (ICFTU). THE UNRECOGNIZED SBSI (SEE ABOVE) ALSO FILED AN APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE ICFTU.

ON APRIL 20, 1994, THE ICFTU LODGED A FORMAL COMPLAINT AGAINST INDONESIA WITH THE ILO, SUPPLEMENTING A PREVIOUS COMPLAINT FILED IN 1987, WHICH ACCUSED THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA OF DENIAL OF WORKERS' RIGHT TO SET UP UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, HARASSMENT OF INDEPENDENT WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS, AND OTHER ACTIONS CONTRARY TO ILO CONVENTIONS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO

COLLECTIVE BARGAIN
ING.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

WHILE PANCASILA PRINCIPLES CALL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES TO BE SETTLED BY CONSENSUS, ALL ORGANIZED WORKERS EXCEPT CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. WHILE STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND TEACHERS RARELY EXERCISE THIS RIGHT, PRIVATE SECTOR STRIKES ARE FREQUENT. BEFORE A STRIKE CAN OCCUR IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE LAW REQUIRES INTENSIVE MEDIATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND PRIOR NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE. HOWEVER, NO APPROVAL IS REQUIRED. IN PRACTICE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ARE NOT FOLLOWED FULLY, AND FORMAL NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE IS RARELY GIVEN. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROCEDURES ARE TIME CONSUMING, AND DECISIONS ARE HANDED DOWN USUALLY ONLY AFTER A PROLONGED PERIOD HAS ELAPSED. THESE PROCESSES HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH WORKERS AND ARE MOSTLY IGNORED. STRIKES, THEREFORE, TEND TO BE SUDDEN, THE RESULT OF LONGSTANDING GRIEVANCES OR RECOGNITION THAT LEGALLY MANDATED BENEFITS OR RIGHTS ARE NOT BEING RECEIVED. WHILE STRIKE LEADERS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 10044 20 OF 22 181013Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE145 191706Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2974
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 20 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

ARE NOT ARRESTED FOR ILLEGAL STRIKES, THEY OFTEN LOSE THEIR JOBS. THE NUMBER OF STRIKES, WHICH HAD BEEN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

INCREASING OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS, INCREASED DRAMATICALLY IN THE FIRST PART OF 1994. MOST WERE OVER FAILURE OF COMPANIES TO PAY LEGALLY MANDATED MINIMUM WAGES OR BECAUSE COMPANIES WERE RESISTING THE FORMATION OF A FACTORY-LEVEL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNION. FIGURES MADE PUBLIC BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER SHOWED THERE WERE 246 STRIKES IN THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF 1994. STRIKES FELL OFF SHARPLY BEGINNING IN MARCH, WITH ONLY 6? OCCURRING BETWEEN MARCH AND JUNE. THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF STRIKES MOST LIKELY WAS LARGER.

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROMOTES IT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NATIONAL IDEOLOGY, PANCASILA. UNTIL RECENTLY ONLY RECOGNIZED TRADE UNIONS, THAT IS, SPSI AND ITS COMPONENTS, COULD LEGALLY ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. AS NOTED IN SECTION 6.A. ABOVE, NEW GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS IN 1994 ALSO PERMIT UNAFFILIATED PLANT-LEVEL WORKERS ASSOCIATIONS TO CONCLUDE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH EMPLOYERS, THOUGH ONLY ONE HAD YET DONE SO BY SEPTEMBER, 1994. AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY ANY OTHER GROUPS ARE NOT CONSIDERED LEGALLY BINDING AND ARE NOT PERMITTED TO BE REGISTERED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER.

THE MAJORITY OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE SPSI AND EMPLOYERS ARE NEGOTIATED BILATERALLY. ONCE NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED A REGISTERED SPSI OR INDEPENDENT PLANT LEVEL UNION, AN EMPLOYER IS OBLIGATED TO BARGAIN WITH IT. AS A TRANSITIONAL STAGE TO ENCOURAGE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT EVERY COMPANY WITH 25 OR MORE EMPLOYEES ISSUE COMPANY REGULATIONS DEFINING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. BEFORE A COMPANY CAN REGISTER OR RENEW ITS COMPANY REGULATIONS IT MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT IT CONSULTED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WITH THE UNION OR, IN ITS ABSENCE, A COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES. IN COMPANIES WITHOUT UNIONS, THE GOVERNMENT DISCOURAGES WORKERS FROM UTILIZING OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE, SUCH AS FROM NGO'S, DURING CONSULTATIONS WITH EMPLOYERS OVER COMPANY REGULATIONS.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PREFERS THAT WORKERS SEEK ITS ASSISTANCE AND BELIEVES THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE IS TO PROTECT WORKERS. THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT FOR SOME COMPANIES CONSULTATIONS ARE PERFUNCTORY AT BEST AND USUALLY WITH MANAGEMENT-SELECTED WORKERS. THERE ARE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY FROM U.S. COMPANIES.

OVER HALF OF THE FACTORY-LEVEL SPSI UNITS HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS ARE FREELY NEGOTIATED BETWEEN UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE VARIES. BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS OR BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION OR ARBITRATION. MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED FOR 1 MORE YEAR. ACCORDING TO INDONESIAN AND NON-INDONESIAN NGO'S INVOLVED IN LABOR ISSUES, THE PROVISIONS OF THESE AGREEMENTS RARELY GO BEYOND THE LEGAL MINIMUM STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE AGREEMENTS ARE OFTEN MERELY PRESENTED TO WORKER REPRESENTATIVES FOR SIGNING RATHER THAN BEING NEGOTIATED.

WORKERS MAY ORGANIZE IN A PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, EVEN IF IT IS DESIGNATED VITAL BY THE GOVERNMENT. IF THE STATE HAS A PARTIAL INTEREST, THE ENTERPRISE IS CONSIDERED TO BE IN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE PUBLIC SERVICE DOMAIN, BUT THIS DOES NOT ALWAYS LEGALLY LIMIT ORGANIZING. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF JOINT VENTURES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE WHICH HAVE SPSI UNITS AND WHICH BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY.

THOUGH GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS PROHIBIT EMPLOYERS FROM DISCRIMINATING OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS FROM UNION OFFICIALS, OF EMPLOYER RETRIBUTION AGAINST UNION ORGANIZERS, INCLUDING FIRING, WHICH IS NOT EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED OR REMEDIED IN PRACTICE. SOME EMPLOYERS REPORTEDLY HAVE WARNED THEIR EMPLOYEES AGAINST CONTACT WITH UNION ORGANIZERS FROM THE UNRECOGNIZED SBSI ORGANIZATION.

CHARGES OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE ADJUDICATED BY ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. HOWEVER, MANY UNION MEMBERS BELIEVE THE TRIBUNALS GENERALLY SIDE WITH EMPLOYERS. BECAUSE OF THIS PERCEIVED PARTIALITY, MANY WORKERS REJECT

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

OR AVOID THE PROCEDURE AND PRESENT THEIR GRIEVANCES
DIRECTLY TO PARLIAMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES. ADMINISTRATIVE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 JAKART 10044 21 OF 22 181014Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE149 191706Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2975
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 21 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF FIRED WORKERS TEND TO BE MONETARY AWARDS; WORKERS ARE RARELY REINSTATED. THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO FIRE WORKERS, BUT THE LAW IS OFTEN IGNORED IN PRACTICE.

THE ARMED FORCES, WHICH INCLUDES THE POLICE, CONTINUED TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 10044 21 OF 22 181014Z
INVOLVE ITSELF IN SOME LABOR DISPUTES, DESPITE NEW REGULATIONS PROMULGATED IN JANUARY TO PROHIBIT MILITARY INTERFERENCE WHEN THERE IS NO THREAT TO SECURITY. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE INCIDENCE OF SUCH MILITARY INVOLVEMENT DECREASED IN 1994, AND MANY OBSERVERS CREDIT GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES WITH RESTRAINT IN RESTORING ORDER IN THE MEDAN RIOTS OF APRIL. HOWEVER, THESE PERCEPTIONS ARE NOT SHARED BY ALL INTERESTED OBSERVERS.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

WORKERS HAVE CHARGED THAT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES HAVE ATTEMPTED TO INTIMIDATE UNION ORGANIZERS AND STRIKE LEADERS AND HAVE BEEN PRESENT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS DURING SOME STRIKES, EVEN WHEN THERE HAS BEEN NO DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER VIOLENCE. MEMBERS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ATTENDED AND MONITORED TRADE UNION EDUCATION SEMINARS RUN BY THE ASIAN-AMERICAN FREE LABOR INSTITUTE (AAFLI), EVEN THOUGH THESE PROGRAMS WERE APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. IN 1993, THE MILITARY COMMAND IN SURABAYA ALSO HALTED AN AAFLI-SPSI PROGRAM ON LEGAL AID FOR INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. BY SEPTEMBER, 1994 THE PROGRAM HAD NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO RESUME DESPITE GOVERNMENT ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD BE. MILITARY OFFICIALS OCCASIONALLY HAVE BEEN REPORTED PRESENT DURING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND MANAGEMENT. THEIR PRESENCE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS INTIMIDATING BY PLANT-LEVEL UNION OFFICIALS. A MILITARY OFFICER WAS AMONG THOSE CONVICTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MARSINAH MURDER CASE.

LABOR LAW APPLIES EQUALLY IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FORCED LABOR IS STRICTLY FORBIDDEN AND ENFORCEMENT IS GENERALLY ADEQUATE. NGO REPORTS HAVE ALLEGED THAT SOME CASES OF FORCED LABOR IN THE FORM OF DEBT BONDAGE BY LOGGING COMPANIES EXIST IN IRIAN JAYA. THE GOVERNMENT SAYS THAT IT IS UNABLE TO VERIFY THESE ALLEGATIONS, WHICH ARE INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC. NO COMPLAINTS OR INFORMATION ON FORCED LABOR IN IRIAN JAYA HAD COME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AS OF LATE SEPTEMBER. SEE ALSO SECTION V.

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

CHILD LABOR EXISTS IN BOTH INDUSTRIAL AREAS AND RURAL AREAS. THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 2.7 MILLION WORKING CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 14, ACCORDING TO A 1994 REPORT OF THE U. N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. INDONESIA WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO BE SELECTED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ILO'S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOR (IPEC), AND SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ILO TO GUIDE THEIR

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

COLLABORATION UNDER THIS PROGRAM ON MAY 29, 1992. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PLAN OF ACTION WERE DEVELOPED AT A NATIONAL CONFERENCE IN BOGOR IN JULY, 1993. DURING 1994, 120 INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT LABOR INSPECTORS RECEIVED ILO-SPONSORED TRAINING ON CHILD LABOR MATTERS UNDER THE IPEC PROGRAM.

THE GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A CLASS OF CHILDREN WHO MUST WORK FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS, AND IN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

1987 THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER ISSUED REGULATION PER-OL/MEN/1987, "PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FORCED TO WORK," TO REGULATE THIS SITUATION. THIS REGULATION LEGALIZES THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14 WHO MUST WORK TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCOME OF THEIR FAMILIES. IT REQUIRES PARENTAL CONSENT, PROHIBITS DANGEROUS OR DIFFICULT WORK, LIMITS WORK TO 4 HOURS DAILY, AND REQUIRES EMPLOYERS TO REPORT THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN WORKING UNDER ITS PROVISIONS. IT DOES NOT SET A MINIMUM AGE FOR CHILDREN IN THIS CATEGORY, EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDING THE COLONIAL-ERA GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE OF DECEMBER 17, 1925, ON "MEASURES LIMITING CHILD LABOUR AND NIGHTWORK OF WOMEN," WHICH IS STILL THE CURRENT LAW GOVERNING CHILD LABOR AND SETS A MINIMUM AGE OF 12 FOR EMPLOYMENT. THE 1987 REGULATION IS NOT ENFORCED. NO EMPLOYERS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO COURT FOR VIOLATING ITS RESTRICTIONS ON THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR CHILDREN, AND NO REPORTS ARE COLLECTED FROM ESTABLISHMENTS EMPLOYING CHILDREN. THERE ARE NO STATISTICS AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER CHILD LABOR IS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN EXPORT OR ANY OTHER INDUSTRIES.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	G-00
	(ANHR-01	ADS-00	) /039W				

----------7EE150 191706Z /38

R 181000Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2976
INFO ZEN AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 22 OF 22 JAKARTA 010044

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - - INDONESIA

ACT NO. 1 OF 1951 WAS INTENDED TO BRING INTO FORCE CERTAIN LABOR MEASURES, INCLUDING PROVISIONS ON CHILD LABOR WHICH WOULD REPLACE THOSE OF THE 1925 LEGISLATION. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS FOR THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN ISSUED. THUS THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS IN THE 1951 ACT HAVE NO VALIDITY. IN SEPTEMBER 1993 THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IT WOULD REVIEW ITS CHILD LABOR REGULATIONS WITH THE INTENTION OF TIGHTENING ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS ON CHILD LABOR. AS OF AUGUST, 1994, THE REVIEW WAS NOT COMPLETED.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE, AREA WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL ESTABLISH MINIMUM WAGES FOR REGIONS. THESE COUNCILS ARE QUADRIPARTITE BODIES CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM LABOR, MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT, AND UNIVERSITIES. THEY ALSO ESTABLISH A BASIC NEEDS FIGURE FOR EACH PROVINCE--A MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. WHILE INDONESIA HAS SUCCEEDED IN DRAMATICALLY LOWERING THE LEVEL OF POVERTY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, THE MINIMUM WAGE RATES HAVE LAGGED BEHIND THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURES. MINIMUM WAGE RATES WERE RAISED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IN THREE STAGES BY PROVINCE ON JANUARY 1, APRIL 1, AND AUGUST 1, 1994. WHILE IN MOST CASES THE NEW RATES STILL DID NOT EQUAL THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURE, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IN AUGUST THAT NEW INCREASES WOULD TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ON APRIL 1, 1995. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROJECTS THAT AT THAT TIME MINIMUM WAGE RATES ON THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
AVERAGE WILL EQUAL 106 PERCENT OF THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURE, UP FROM 97 PERCENT AS OF AUGUST 1, 1994. PAYMENT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE IS ANOTHER QUESTION. THERE ARE NO RELIABLE STATISTICS. THE GOVERNMENT'S ESTIMATE IN SEPTEMBER, 1994, THAT 96 PERCENT OF ALL COMPANIES WERE PAYING AT LEAST THE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

REGIONAL MINIMUM WAGE IS CERTAINLY EXAGGERATED; INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS' ESTIMATES RANGE BETWEEN 30 AND 60 PERCENT. GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT IS WEAK, AND SANCTIONS VERY LIGHT AGAINST EMP
LOYERS WHO FAIL TO PAY THE MINIMUM
WAGE (SEE BELOW). NEVERTHELESS, AS A RESULT OF GOVERNMENT PRESSURES, THE WAVE OF STRIKES IN THE FIRST QUARTER, AND THE MEDAN RIOTS, SOME IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 1994. LABOR LAW AND MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PROVIDE WORKERS WITH A VARIETY OF OTHER BENEFITS, SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY, AND WORKERS IN MORE MODERN FACILITIES OFTEN RECEIVE HEALTH BENEFITS AND FREE MEALS.

THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7-HOUR WORKDAYS AND 40-HOUR WORKWEEKS, WITH ONE 30-MINUTE REST PERIOD FOR EACH 4 HOURS OF WORK. THE DAILY OVERTIME RATE IS 1 1/2 TIMES THE NORMAL HOURLY RATE FOR THE FIRST HOUR, AND TWICE THE HOURLY RATE FOR ADDITIONAL OVERTIME. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE. OBSERVANCE OF LAWS REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND BY REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ARE FAIRLY COMMON AND OFTEN RESULT IN STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER CONTINUES PUBLICLY TO URGE EMPLOYERS TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW. HOWEVER, IN GENERAL, GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ARE WEAK.

BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. IN THE LARGELY WESTERN-OPERATED OIL SECTOR, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUNCTION REASONABLY WELL. HOWEVER, IN THE COUNTRY'S 100,000 LARGER REGISTERED COMPANIES IN THE NONOIL SECTOR,

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THE QUALITY OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAMS VARIES GREATLY. THE ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS IS SEVERELY HAMPERED BY THE LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER INSPECTORS AS WELL AS BY THE LOW LEVEL OF EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION FOR SOUND HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES. ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION ON THE PART OF INSPECTORS ARE NOT UNCOMMON. WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS. EMPLOYERS ARE FORBIDDEN BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO, BUT THE LAW IS NOT EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED. BARRY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E10

RELEASED IN FULL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ2717

PAGE 01 STATE 337938 220034Z
ORIGIN DRL-09

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 EAP-01 TEDE-00 L-01 ADS-00 /011R

DRAFTED BY: DRL: SYIP
APPROVED BY: DRL: TEWILLIAMS
EAP/PIMBS: SBLAKE (INFO)
EAP/RSP: BMALKIN (INFO)
----------953BEB 220101Z /63
P 220033Z DEC 94
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 337938

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM ELAB KSPR ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA : INITIAL EDIT OF 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
REF: (A) 94 JAKARTA 10044, (B) 94 STATE 238530, (C) AND PREVIOUS

1. LOU-NOFORN ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE INITIAL EDITED VERSION (VERSION 1) OF THE 1994 DRAFT REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR INDONESIA IS TRANSMITTED HEREWITH. PLEASE PROVIDE RESPONSES TO ALL QUESTIONS AS WELL AS YOUR OWN COMMENTS WITHIN TWO WEEKS OR INFORM THE DEPARTMENT IF UNABLE TO DO SO. RESPONSES SHOULD BE KEYED TO THE NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS OF THIS
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200504416

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE. POSTS SHOULD PROVIDE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE FOR ANY PROPOSED CHANGES; DO NOT RETRANSMIT A REVISED REPORT IN ITS ENTIRETY.

3. AS YEAR'S END APPROACHES, AS APPROPRIATE POST SHOULD UPDATE ANY SIGNIFICANT ISSUES AND STATISTICS.

4. TEXT OF REPORT:
THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, DESPITE A SURFACE ADHERENCE TO DEMOCRATIC FORMS, REMAINS STRONGLY AUTHORITARIAN. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, NOW IN HIS SIXTH 5-YEAR TERM, A SMALL GROUP OF ADVISORS, AND THE MILITARY DOMINATE THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL LIFE OF THIS HEAVILY POPULATED AND DISPARATE NATION. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES UNIVERSAL ALLEGIANCE TO A STATE IDEOLOGY KNOWN AS "PANCASILA" AND HAS USED THIS REQUIREMENT TO RESTRICT THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITION ELEMENTS.

5. UNDER A DOCTRINE OF "DUAL FUNCTION," THE MILITARY IS GIVEN SPECIAL CIVIC RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, INCLUDING UNELECTED MILITARY SEATS IN PARLIAMENT (DPR) AND LOCAL LEGISLATURES, IN ADDITION TO ITS DEFENSE AND SECURITY ROLES. THE 450,000 MEMBER ARMED FORCES, INCLUDING 175,000 POLICE, CONSIDER THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY AS THEIR PRIMARY MISSION, AND THEY HAVE TRADITIONALLY ACTED SWIFTLY TO SUPPRESS PERCEIVED THREATS TO SECURITY, WHETHER FROM CRIMINAL ACTS, SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS, OR ALLEGEDLY SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, WITH A VIGOR THAT HAS OFTEN LED TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. A FEW MILITARY LEADERS SOMETIMES RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THIS "SECURITY APPROACH," BUT THERE CONTINUED

TO BE NUMEROUS CREDIBLE REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE ARMED FORCES.

6. THOUGH STILL A POOR COUNTRY, DESPITE RELATIVELY LARGE OIL RESOURCES, INDONESIA'S ECONOMY CONTINUED TO EXPAND IN 1994 ESPECIALLY IN MANUFACTURING, WITH GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT EXPECTED TO INCREASE BY 6.2 PERCENT. THE CONTINUED ECONOMIC GROWTH HAS PRODUCED STEADY GAINS IN LIVING STANDARDS FOR MUCH OF INDONESIAN SOCIETY.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

HOWEVER, 27 MILLION PEOPLE STILL REMAIN BELOW THE POVERTY LINE, WIDESPREAD UNEMPLOYMENT STILL EXISTS, AND CORRUPTION AND INFLUENCE PEDDLING CONTINUE TO DISTORT THE ECONOMY.

7. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO COMMIT SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND IN SOME AREAS, NOTABLY FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, IT BECAME MARKEDLY MORE REPRESSIVE. THE MOST SERIOUS ABUSES INCLUDED THE CONTINUING INABILITY OF THE PEOPLE TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT, MILITARY OCCUPATION OF EAST TIMOR AND HARSH REPRESSION OF EAST TIMORESE DISSIDENTS; EXTRAJUDICIAL ARRESTS, DETENTIONS, AND KILLINGS; TORTURE OF THOSE IN CUSTODY, AND EXCESSIVELY VIOLENCEIN DEALING WITH SUSPECTED CRIMINALS OR PERCEIVED TROUBLEMAKERS; HARSH LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOMS OF SPEECH, PRESS, AND ASSEMBLY, INCLUDING HARASSSMENT OF ATTORNEYS, STUDENTS, HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, AND OTHERS CONSIDERED TO BE CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND REPRESSION OF EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A FREE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT. THE ARMED FORCES CONTINUED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOST SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. SOME MILITARY LEADERS SHOWED A WILLINGNESS TO ADMIT MISCONDUCT PUBLICLY AND TAKE ACTION

AGAINST OFFENDERS, BUT THE GOVERNMENT RARELY BROUGHT ABUSERS TO JUSTICE, AND ON THE RARE OCCASION WHEN THEY WERE PUNISHED THE PENALTY RARELY MATCHED THE SEVERITY OF THE ABUSE. THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED TO BE SUBSERVIENT TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND MILITARY AND WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM REMAINED A SERIOUS PROBLEM.

8. THE GOVERNMENT WITHDREW THE LICENSES OF THREE LEADING PUBLICATIONS, PREPARED A DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DCREE TO RESTRICT NONGOVERMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND INCREASED CRACKDOWNS ON ANTIGOVERNMENT CRITICS, LABOR ACTIVISTS, AND ALLEGED CRIMINALS IN AN ANTICRIME CAMPAIGN DUBBED "OPERATION CLEANSING." THIS, HOWEVER, DID NOT COMPLETELY DAMPEN DISSENTING VOICES IN THE MEDIA, AND THE MANY HUMAN RIGHTS NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO'S) CONTINUED TO BE ACTIVE. THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ESTABLISHED IN 1993, ALTHOUGH ITS AUTONOMY REMAINS IN QUESTION, SHOWED SOME INDEPENDENCE AND A WILLINGNESS TO

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND ACTIONS. ((NOTE: EMB: PLEASE SUPPLY SOME EVIDENCE TO BACK UP THIS STATEMENT. IF NONE AVAILABLE, WE WILL DELETE IT.)) A SUPREME COURT DECISION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT RAISED HOPES OF A MORE INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY.

9. (NOTE: EMB: WHEN DRAFTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR 1994, POST PROBABLY DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO THE VIEWS OF THE LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS (LCHR) WHICH WERE CRITICAL OF OUR 1993 REPORT. OUR EDITING HAS TRIED TO TAKE LCHR'S VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT BECAUSE THE CRITIQUES CAN BE A USEFUL SOURCE OF BOTH FACTS AND JUDGMENTS. WHILE WE DO NOT ALWAYS AGREE WITH THE LCHR'S JUDGMENTS,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WE NEED TO CONSIDER THEM CAREFULLY, AND, WHERE THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED A PROBLEM, FIX IT. EMBASSY SHOULD REVIEW THIS DRAFT, CONFIRMING OR CLARIFYING BOTH THE TONE AND INFORMATION, AND KEEPING IN MIND THE LCHR CRITIQUE, WHICH YOU SHOULD NOW HAVE.)

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM;

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS

10. THE SECURITY FORCES COMMIT BY FAR THE LARGEST NUMBER OF POLITICAL OR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS. THE GOVERNMENT SELDOM PUNISHES SECURITY FORCE MEMBERS WHO COMMIT EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS, AND WHEN THEY ARE PUNISHED IT SELDOM CORRESPOND IN SEVERITY TO THE CRIMES COMMITTED. MILITARY COURTS TRY ALL POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCUSED OF KILLING OR MISTREATING PRISONERS, OR FOR ANY OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. SENTENCES, WHEN IMPOSED, ARE RARELY HEAVY. ((NOTE: EMB: ARE SENTENCES IMPOSED IN THESE CASES EVER HEAVY?))

11. SECURITY FORCES CONTINUE TO EMPLOY HARSH MEASURES, INCLUDING EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS, AGAINST THOSE WHO ADVOCATE SEPARATION OR WHO PUBLICLY CRITICIZE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

GOVERNMENT POLICIES, ESPECIALLY IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, AND ACEH. IN 1994, HOWEVER, RELATIVELY FEW CLASHES WERE REPORTED BETWEEN SEPARATIST GROUPS AND SECURITY FORCES IN THESE AREAS, AND CONFIRMED KILLINGS OF

CIVILIANS BY GOVERNMENT FORCES CONTINUED TO BE FAR LOWER THAN A FEW YEARS AGO. ((NOTE: EMB: WE SAID EXACTLY THE SAME THING LAST YEAR. WHAT IS YOUR BENCHMARK? HOW MANY EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS DID GOVERNMENT FORCES COMMIT IN 1993? HOW MANY IN 1994? IF 1994 DOES NOT SHOW A STRONG DECLINE, WE WILL DELETE.)) ON ACEH FIVE DEATHS OF ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS WERE REPORTED, FOUR IN A CLASH WITH AN ARMY UNIT IN JANUARY AND ONE ALLEGEDLY RESISTING AN ARMY INTELLIGENCE UNIT IN APRIL. PRESS REPORTS ALSO INDICATED THAT FOUR MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE KILLED IN A CLASH WITH ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS. RELIABLE CIVILIAN SOURCES ALSO REPORTED THAT IN EAST TIMOR SECURITY FORCES KILLED SEVERAL TIMORESE CIVILIANS. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF SUCH KILLINGS ON IRIAN JAYA.

12. TWO ARMY BATTALIONS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM EAST TIMOR IN LATE 1993-EARLY 1994. COMMANDERS THERE HAVE STATED THAT THEY INTEND TO REVIEW THE LEVEL OF TROOPS IN THE PROVINCE FOR POSSIBLE FURTHER REDUCTIONS ON A TWICE YEARLY BASIS.

13. THE POLICE OFTEN EMPLOY EXCESSIVE FORCE IN APPREHENDING SUSPECTS OR COPING WITH ALLEGED CRIMINALS. IN JAKARTA POLICE IN APRIL MOUNTED AN ANTICRIME PROGRAM DUBBED "OPERATION CLEANSING," IN WHICH THEY EMPLOYED DEADLY FORCE AGAINST SUSPECTS WHO, THEY USUALLY CLAIMED, WERE FLEEING OR RESISTING ARREST. ALTHOUGH ACCURATE STATISTICS WERE UNAVAILABLE, FATAL SHOOTINGS BY POLICE SEEMED TO BE ON THE INCREASE, WITH SOME 150 INCIDENTS REPORTED IN WEST JAVA (INCLUDING JAKARTA) BY MID-JULY. ((NOTE: EMB: PLEASE UPDATE.)) IN NORTH SUMATRA, 50

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SHOOTINGS BY POLICE INCLUDING 4 DEATHS WERE REPORTED BY EARLY AUGUST 1994. IN RESPONSE TO PROTESTS THAT THE METHODS USED ARE UNJUSTIFIABLY HARSH AND AMOUNT TO EXECUTION WITHOUT TRIAL, POLICE HAVE GENERALLY CLAIMED, WITHOUT EXPLAINING WHY THEY THOUGH THE 'FORMALITY" OF A TRIAL WAS UNNECESSARY.

14. THE AUTHORITIES HAVE SELDOM TAKEN ACTION AGAINST POLICE FOR USING EXCESSIVE FORCE, AND ACTION WHEN TAKEN WAS NOT COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF POLICE ABUSES. FOR EXAMPLE, A MILITARY COURT IN MEDAN SENTENCED A POLICEMAN ACCUSED OF SHOOTING A SUSPECT ((NOTE: EMB: DID THE POLICEMAN KILL HIM?)) ALLEGEDLY TRYING TO ESCAPE IN 1993 WAS SENTENCED TO 3 MONTHS IN PRISON IN 1994. IN MARCH A MILITARY COURT SENTENCED FOUR POLICEMEN IN PALEMBANG TO PRISON TERMS OF 2 TO 3 MONTHS FOR SHOOTING ((NOTE: EMB: AND KILLING?)) A SUSPECT AT CLOSE RANGE. THE FIVE POLICE OFFICERS DETAINED IN 1993 IN NORTH SUMATRA IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEATH OF SYAMSUL BAHRI NOT TRIED, APPARENTLY BECAUSE THE FAMILY DID NOT PURSUE THE CASE. ((NOTE: EMB: WHY DID THE FAMILY NOT PURSUE THE CASE? WERE THEY THREATENED OR OTHERWISE COERCED?)) AT YEAR'S END THE MILITARY CLAIMED TO BE STILL INVESTIGATING THE SEPTEMBER 1993 KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES OF FOUR DEMONSTRATORS WHO WERE PEACEFULLY PROTESTING CONSTRUCTION OF A DAM IN MADURA, WHICH INVOLVED SOME TWO DOZEN POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL. NO TRIALS HAD YET COMMENCED. RESIDENTS FROM THE AREA MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN MAY TO REQUEST LEGAL ACTION AGAINST CIVILIANS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCUSED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE SHOOTINGS. ((NOTE: EMB: PLEASE

UPDATE. UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN ANY ACTION ON THIS WE WILL DELETE.))

B. DISAPPEARANCE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

15. THERE WERE NO POLITICALLY MOTIVATED ABDUCTIONS SECURITY FORCES IN AREAS OF CONFLICT OFTEN HOLD SUSPECTS FOR LONG PERIODS WITHOUT FORMAL CHARGES, BUT THESE CASES USUALLY END WITH OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF DETENTION (SEE SECTION L.D.). RELIABLE SOURCES REPORT THAT ALL BUT ONE OF THOSE ALLEGED TO HAVE DISAPPEARED DURING THE MID-JULY DISTURBANCES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR, HAVE BEEN LOCATED. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE REMAINING PERSON STILL MISSING IS A CASE OF A "DISAPPEARED" PERSON. ((NOTE: EMB: WERE THESE PEOPLE DETAINED? IF SO, COULD THE LAST PERSON UNACCOUNTED FOR STILL BE IN DETENTION?))

16. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MISSING AND DEAD FROM THE NOVEMBER 12, 1991 MILITARY SHOOTING OF CIVILIANS IN DILI, EAST TIMOR, REMAINED INADEQUATE. NO ADDITIONAL CASES OF THOSE STILL LISTED AS MISSING IN A REPORT THE MILITARY GAVE TO ASIA WATCH WERE RESOLVED DURING THE YEAR. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN IMPLIED THAT THEIR FAILURE TO LOCATE THOSE MISSING WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO THE SUCCESS OF THOSE PERSONS IN EVADING DETECTION. MANY KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS, HOWEVER, CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE MISSING ARE DEAD AND THAT SOME PEOPLE IN THE ARMED FORCES KNOW WHERE THEIR BODIES ARE.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

17. ALTHOUGH THE CRIMINAL CODE MAKES IT A CRIME PUNISHABLE BY UP TO 4 YEARS IN PRISON FOR ANY OFFICIAL TO USE VIOLENCE OR FORCE TO ELICIT A CONFESSION, AND ESTABLISHES PRETRIAL PROCEDURES TO GIVE SUSPECTS OR THEIR FAMILIES THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF AN ARREST OR DETENTION, IN PRACTICE, SECURITY FORCES CONTINUE FREQUENTLY TO EMPLOY TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF MISTREATMENT, PARTICULARLY IN ACEH AND EAST TIMOR. LEGAL PROTECTIONS ARE BOTH INADEQUATE AND WIDELY IGNORED. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE PROVIDES THAT STATEMENTS FROM WITNESSES OR SUSPECTS MUST BE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ELICITED WITHOUT PRESSURE OF ANY KIND, THE CIVILIANS CONVICTED IN THE 1993 MURDER CASE OF THE LABOR ACTIVIST MARSINAH ALL CLAIMED CREDIBLY THAT THEIR CONFESSIONS HAD BEEN OBTAINED UNDER DURESS, INCLUDING TORTURE. ACCORDING TO THE JANUARY, 1994 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE MOST COMMONLY USED METHODS ARE: BEATING ON THE HEAD, SHINS, AND TORSO WITH FISTS, LENGTHS OF WOOD, IRON BARS, BOTTLES, ROCKS, AND ELECTRIC CABLES; KICKING WITH HEAVY BOOTS; BURNING WITH LIGHTED CIGARETTES; ELECTRIC SHOCKS; SLASHING WITH RAZOR BLADES AND KNIVES; DEATH THREATS, FAKED EXECUTIONS AND DELIBERATE WOUNDING WITH FIREARMS; POURING WATER THROUGH THE NOSE; PROLONGED IMMERSION IN FETID WATER; HANGING UPSIDE DOWN BY THE FEET; PLACING HEAVY OBJECTS ON KNEES AND OTHER JOINTS; ISOLATION; SLEEP AND FOOD DEPRIVATION; GENITAL MUTILATION, SEXUAL MOLESTATION, AND RAPE. REPORTS OF TORTURE HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY FREQUENT IN ACEH. CIVILIAN SOURCES IN EAST

TIMOR REPORT THAT SECURITY AGENCIES STILL EMPLOY TORTURE BEFORE RELEASING SUSPECTS TO POLICE CUSTODY, PARTICULARLY ELECTRIC SHOCKS, THOUGH ITS INCIDENCE HAS DECREASED. ((NOTE: EMB: WHAT/WHO ARE THESE CIVILIAN SOURCES? UNLESS THEY ARE RELIABLE STATISTICS, WE WILL DELETE.))

18. POLICE OFTEN RESORT TO PHYSICAL ABUSES EVEN IN MINOR INCIDENTS, AND PRISON CONDITIONS ARE HARSH, WITH VIOLENCE AMONG PRISONERS AND MISTREATMENT AND EXTORTION OF INMATES BY GUARDS REPORTEDLY COMMON. THE INCIDENCE OF MISTREATMENT BY PRISON OFFICIALS DROPS SHARPLY ONCE A PRISONER HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM POLICE OR MILITARY CUSTODY INTO THE CIVILIAN PRISON SYSTEM, AND PRISON CONDITIONS GENERALLY HAVE IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS. OFFICIALS HAVE PUBLICLY CONDEMNED POLICE BRUTALITY AND HARSH PRISON CONDITIONS AND OCCASIONALLY INSTIGATE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, INCLUDING TRANSFER, DISMISSAL, AND TRIALS LEADING TO PRISON. IN AUGUST A CIVILIAN EMPLOYED AT A MEDAN JAIL WAS TRIED ON CHARGES OF CAUSING THE DEATH OF AN INMATE WHO DIED FROM INJURIES SUSTAINED IN A BEATING. ((NOTE: EMB: WHAT SENTENCE DID HE RECEIVE?)) SUCH ACTIONS, HOWEVER, ARE AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE OF

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

GENERAL IMPUNITY.

19. POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE USUALLY MIXED WITH THE GENERAL PRISON POPULATION, ALTHOUGH IN THE CIPINANG PRISON IN JAKARTA HIGH- PROFILE POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE SEGREGATED. IN 1994 THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWED THE ICRC TO VISIT PRISONERS IN CIPINANG IN JAKARTA AND ALSO GRANTED ACCESS TO PRISONS ELSEWHERE IN JAVA, AND IN SUMATRA, EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND OTHER PROVINCES. THE ICRC DESCRIBED

CONDITIONS AS SPARTAN BUT ADEQUATE, AND IN SOME CASES THERE WERE IMPROVEMENTS AFTER ICRC INTERVENTION. IN JANUARY INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES SUSPENDED VISITATION RIGHTS FOR JAILED EAST TIMORESE FRETILIN LEADER XANANA GUSMAO WERE SUSPENDED FOR 1 MONTH FOLLOWING RELEASE OF A LETTER HE SENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS WHICH INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES DEEMED OBJECTIONABLE.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

20. THE POLICE ROUTINELY VIOLATED THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE PROTECTIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION. THE CODE SPECIFIES THE RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO NOTIFY THEIR FAMILIES, AND THAT WARRANTS MUST BE PRODUCED DURING AN ARREST EXCEPT UNDER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS, SUCH AS WHEN A SUSPECT IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME. IT ALSO AUTHORIZES INVESTIGATORS TO ISSUE WARRANTS TO ASSIST IN THEIR INVESTIGATIONS OR IF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED. DESPITE THESE REQUIREMENTS, AUTHORITIES OFTEN MADE ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS. SOME PERSONS SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE MEDAN RIOTS IN APRIL WERE ARRESTED BEFORE FORMAL WARRANTS WERE ISSUED.

21. THE LAW PRESUMES DEFENDANTS INNOCENT AND OERMITS BAIL. THEY OR THEIR FAMILIES MAY ALSO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THEIR ARREST AND DETENTION IN A PRETRIAL HEARING AND MAY SUE FOR COMPENSATION IF WRONGFULLY DETAINED. HOWEVER, IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO INVOKE THIS PROCEDURE, LET ALONE RECEIVE COMPENSATION AFTER BEING RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGE. IN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COURTS, APEALS BASED ON LEGALITY OF ARREST AND DETENTION ARE RARELY, IF EVER, ACCEPTED. THE CODE ALSO CONTAINS SPECIFIC LIMITS ON PERIODS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION AND SPECIFIES WHEN THE COURTS MUST GET INVOLVED TO APPROVE EXTENSIONS, USUALLY AFTER 60 DAYS.

22. WHERE ACTIVE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS EXIST, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR AND ACEH, PEOPLE ARE ROUTINELY DETAINED WITHOUT WARRANTS, CHARGES, OR COURT PROCEEDINGS. BAIL IS RARELY GRANTED, ESPECIALLY IN POLITICAL CASES. THE AUTHORITIES FREQUENTLY INTERFERE WITH ACCESS TO DEFENSE COUNSEL, AND MAKE IT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO GET LEGAL ASSISTANCE FROM VOLUNTARY LEGAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS. THE AUTHORITIES ROUTINELY APPROVE EXTENSIONS OF PERIODS OF DETENTION. SUSPECTS CHARGED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW ARE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL PROCEDURES OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE WHICH ALLOW, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY TO HOLD A SUSPECT UP TO A YEAR BEFORE TRIAL. HE MAY RENEW THIS 1-YEAR PERIOD WITHOUT LIMIT. SPECIAL LAWS ON CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND NARCOTICS ARE SIMILARLY EXEMPT FROM THE CODE'S PROTECTIONS.

23. THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) OPERATES OUTSIDE THE CODE AND HAS WIDE DISCRETION TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE PERSONS THOUGHT TO THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO STATE THE EXACT NUMBER OF ARBITRARY ARRESTS OR DETENTIONS WITHOUT TRIAL BUT IN MARCH 59 PEOPLE BEING HELD IN CONNECTION WITH THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

1989-1991 ACEH INSURGENCY WERE RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGES OR TRIALS, BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER RELEASED SINCE 1990 TO AROUND 965 PERSONS. MANY HAD BEEN HELD INCOMMUNICADO WITHOUT KNOWING THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM; SOME, INCLUDING AT LEAST FIVE OF THOSE RELEASED IN 1994, HAD BEEN HELD FOR OVER 2 YEARS. THE AUTHORITIES REQUIRE MANY OF THOSE RELEASED TO REPORT BACK AT REGULAR INTERVALS. THREE OTHER ACEHNESE CONVICTED PREVIOUSLY OF SUBVERSION WERE RELEASED IN 1994 AFTER SERVING TWO-THIRDS OF THEIR SENTENCES. THE DECLINE IN ARMED SEPARATIST ACTIVITY LED TO FEWER DETENTIONS, AND FEWER THAN 100 ACEHNESE WERE BELIEVED TO BE IN DETENTION AT YEAR'S END. AN ADDITIONAL FIVE PERSONS WERE SENTENCED FOR SUBVERSION IN ACEH IN 1994.

24. IN EAST TIMOR MILITARY AUTHORITIES CONTINUED THE PRACTICE OF DETAINING PEOPLE WITHOUT CHARGES FOR SHORT PERIODS AND THEN REQUIRING THEM TO REPORT DAILY OR WEEKLY TO POLICE AFTER THEIR RELEASE. THREE EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS DETAINED BY POLICE IN AUGUST FOR BRINGING FORBIDDEN BOOKS AND FOREIGN ITEMS INTO THE PROVINCE, WERE RELEASED BUT TWO OF THEM ARE REQUIRED TO REPORT TO AUTHORITIES IN JAVA. ((NOTE: EMB: IS THIS CORRECT AS REWRITTEN? HOW OFTEN MUST THEY REPORT? WHAT IS THE DISTANCE?)) SIX EAST TIMORESE WHO RECEIVED LENGTHY SENTENCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE NOVEMBER, 1991 SHOOTINGS IN DILI WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON IN SEMARANG WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO THEIR FAMILIES OR HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS, AND THEIR WHEREABOUTS WERE UNKNOWN FOR SEVERAL DAYS. JOSE ANTONIO NEVES, AN ACKNOWLEDGED MEMBER OF THE CLANDESTINE PROINDEPENDENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MOVEMENT, AND IN DETENTION SINCE MAY, WAS CHARGED WITH SEDITION IN NOVEMBER. HIS DEFENSE ATTORNEY ASKED FOR DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGES, CITING PROCEDURAL FLAWS IN NEVES' ARREST. THEY ALSO ALLEGE THAT POLICE DENIED HIM ACCESS TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR THE FIRST 2 MONTHS OF HIS DETENTION. ((NOTE: EMB: PLEASE UPDATE ON DETENTIONS REPORTED ON THE EVE OF AND DURING APEC.)). AS OF SEPTEMBER, CHARGES HAD YET TO BE BROUGHT AGAINST HIM.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

25. THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATES THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, BUT IN PRACTICE THE JUDICIARY IS SUBORDINATED TO THE EXECUTIVE AND THE MILITARY, AND IN MANY CASES PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AGAINST COERCED CONFESSIONS, ARE INADEQUATE TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL. A QUADRIPARTITE JUDICIARY OF GENERAL, RELIGIOUS, MILITARY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS EXISTS BELOW THE SUPREME COURT. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT TO HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS IN ALL FOUR SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE. THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT CONSIDER FACTUAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF LAW. A THREE-JUDGE PANEL CONDUCTS TRIALS AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL, POSES QUESTIONS, HEARS EVIDENCE, DECIDES GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND ASSESSES PUNISHMENT. INITIAL JUDGMENTS ARE RARELY REVERSED IN THE APPEALS PROCESS, ALTHOUGH SENTENCES ARE SOMETIMES INCREASED OR REDUCED (BOTH THE DEFENSE AND THE PROSECUTION MAY APPEAL). IN 1994 FOR EXAMPLE, THE 4-YEAR SENTENCE OF A STUDENT TRIED IN JAKARTA FOR INSULTING THE PRESIDENT IN LEAFLETS HE DISTRIBUTED AT THE PARLIAMENT IN NOVEMBER, 1993 WAS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INCREASED TO 5 YEARS UPON APPEAL OF THE PROSECUTOR. THE RELATIVELY LIGHT (6 MONTHS) SENTENCES OF 21 OTHER STUDENTS WHO WERE ALSO CONVICTED OF INSULTING THE PRESIDENT DURING DEMONSTRATIONS AT PARLIAMENT IN DECEMBER, 1993 WERE INCREASED TO BETWEEN 8 AND 14 MONTHS FOLLOWING APPEAL BY THE PROSECUTOR.

26. DEFENDANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AND TO PRODUCE WITNESSES IN THEIR DEFENSE. HOWEVER, THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR WITNESS IMMUNITY OR FOR COMPULSORY PROCESS OF DEFENSE WITNESSES. AS A RESULT, WITNESSES ARE SOMETIMES TOO AFRAID OF RETRIBUTION TO TESTIFY AGAINST THE AUTHORITIES.. AN EXCEPTION IS ALLOWED IN CASES WHERE DISTANCE OR EXPENSE IS DEEMED EXCESSIVE FOR TRANSPORTING WITNESSES TO COURT, IN WHICH CASE SWORN AFFIDAVITS MAY BE INTRODUCED. IN CASES TRIED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW, TRIALS IN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ABSENTIA ARE PERMITTED, AND PUBLIC ACCESS GENERALLY REQUIRES ADVANCE APPROVAL BY THE MILITARY. THE COURTS COMMONLY ALLOWED THE FORCED CONFESSIONS AND LIMITED THE PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE IN TRIALS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE COURT TRYING THE SUSPECTS IN THE MARSINAH MURDER ADMITTED THEIR CONFESSIONS AND CONVICTED THEM OF THE MURDER ALTHOUGH THEY CLAIMED THAT THEIR CONFESSIONS HAD BEEN OBTAINED BY COERCION AND TORTURE.

27. THE COURT ALLOWED DEFENSE ATTORNEYS FOR THE STUDENT MENTIONED ABOVE WHOSE SENTENCE WAS RAISED TO 5 YEARS ON APPEAL TO CALL ONLY ONE OUT OF 17 WITNESSES THEY WISHED TO PRESENT. DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND CAN BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN THEIR OWN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TRIALS. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE GIVES DEFENDANTS THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY FROM THE MOMENT OF THEIR ARREST THROUGH THE INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL. THE LAW REQUIRES THAT A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IN CAPITAL CASES AND THOSE INVOLVING A PRISON SENTENCE OF 15 YEARS OR MORE. IN CASES INVOLVING POTENTIAL SENTENCES OF 5 YEARS OR MORE, A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IF THE ACCUSED DESIRES AN ATTORNEY BUT IS INDIGENT. DESTITUTE DEFENDANTS CAN OBTAIN PRIVATE LEGAL HELP, SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, DEFENDANTS ARE OFTEN PERSUADED NOT TO HIRE AN ATTORNEY, OR ACCESS TO AN ATTORNEY OF THEIR CHOICE IS IMPEDED. THE AUTHORITIES REPORTEDLY PRESSURED SEVERAL DEFENDANTS TRIED IN MEDAN ON CHARGES STEMMING FROM LABOR UNREST IN APRIL WHICH TURNED INTO ANTI-CHINESE RIOTS TO DECLINE ATTORNEYS, WHILE SOME ATTORNEYS INVOLVED IN THE CASES WERE SUBJECTED TO OFFICIAL HARASSMENT OF VARIOUS KINDS. FIVE EAST TIMORESE SENTENCED TO 20 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT FOR PUBLICLY EXPRESSING ANTI-INDONESIAN SENTIMENTS DURING A BANNER-WAVING INCIDENT BEFORE FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WERE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. AUTHORITIES CLAIM THEY DECLINED THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, WHILE NONGOVERNMENTAL SOURCES INDICATED ACCESS TO COUNSEL WAS IMPEDED AND THAT THE DEFENSE LAWYERS WERE NOT NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE OF THEIR APPEARANCE IN COURT THAT SENTENCING WAS TO BEGIN.

28. THE SUPREME COURT THEORETICALLY STANDS COEQUAL WITH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES, BUT IT DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER LAWS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT. THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOT YET EXERCISED ITS POWER (HELD SINCE 1985) TO REVIEW MINISTERIAL DECREES AND

REGULATIONS. EXERCISED THIS POWER. IN 1993 CHIEF JUSTICE PURWOTO GANDASUBRATA LAID OUT JUDICIAL PROCEDURES FOR LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW, ((NOTE: EMB: OF WHAT?)) AND SOME CASES OF THIS KIND WERE INITIATED IN 1994. JUDGES ARE CIVIL SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WHICH CONTROLS THEIR ASSIGNMENTS, PAY, AND PROMOTION. MILITARY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIESSUBJECT THEM TO CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE, AND THIS OFTEN DETERMINES THE OUTCOME OF A CASE. CORRUPTION PERMEATES THE INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM. IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, THE PAYMENT OF BRIBES CAN INFLUENCE PROSECUTION, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCING.

29. THE SUPREME COURT SHOWED SOME SIGNS OF GREATER INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY ON A LONGSTANDING LAND DISPUTE BETWEEN THE CENTRAL JAVA GOVERNMENT AND 34 FARMERS WHO HAD BEEN FORCED TO SELL THEIR LAND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE KEDUNGOMBO DAM, A DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FUNDED BY THE WORLD BANK. THE VILLAGERS SUED FOR INCREASED COMPENSATION. THE SUPREME COURT OVERTURNED DECISIONS OF BOTH THE SEMARANG DISTRICT COURT AND THE CENTRAL JAVA HIGH COURT IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT, AWARDING THE PLAINTIFFS EVEN GREATER COMPENSATION THAN THEY HAD SOUGHT, INCLUDING "NONMATERIAL LOSSES." PROMINENT GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY FIGURES CRITICIZED THE DECISION, WHICH THE GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO ACCEPT. AT THE GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST, THE SUPREME COURT AGREED IN AUGUST TO REVIEW THE CASE, BUT IT REJECTED A GOVERNMENT MOTION FOR A STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING THE REVIEW. ((NOTE: EMB: ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS?))

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

30. IN AUGUST 1994, THE SUPREME COURT ORDERED THE RELEASE OF 21 STUDENTS WHO WERE STILL BEING HELD A WEEK FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THEIR SENTENCES.

31. THE AUTHORITIES TRIED AT LEAST FIVE PERSONS IN 1994 UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW FOR SUBSVERSION IN ACEH AND SENTENCED THEM TO 19 TO 20 YEARS' IMPRISONMENT. THE ANTISUBVERSION LAW MAKES IT A CRIME TO ENGAGE IN ACTS THAT COULD DISTORT, UNDERMINE, OR DEVIATE FROM THE STATE IDEOLOGY OR BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, OR WHICH COULD DISSEMINATE FEELINGS OF HOSTILITY OR AROUSE HOSTILITY, DISTURBANCES, OR ANXIETY AMONG THE POPULATION. THE EXCESSIVELY VAGUE LANGUAGE MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO PROSECUTE PEOPLE MERELY FOR PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF VIEWS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT.

32. THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT MAKE AVAILABLE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE CURRENTLY SERVING SUBVERSION SENTENCES OR SENTENCES CLASSIFIED AS FELONIES UNDER THE SO-CALLED HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. INFORMED SOURCES ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE SERVING SENTENCES FOR SUBVERSION IN 1994, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI), MUSLIM MILITANTS, AND THOSE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN IRIAN JAYA, ACEH, AND EAST TIMOR AT AROUND 300. SCORES, AND POSSIBLY HUNDREDS, MORE WERE BELIEVED TO BE SERVING SENTENCES UNDER THE HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. SOME OF THESE PERSONS ADVOCATED OR EMPLOYED VIOLENCE, BUT MANY ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO WERE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPTING TO EXERCISE SUCH UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH OR ASSOCIATION OR WHO WERE CONVICTED IN MANIFESTLY

UNFAIR TRIALS. SIX PRISONERS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION REMAINED UNDER DEATH SENTENCE. FIVE OF THESE WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, ARE 78 OR

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MORE YEARS OLDER, AND HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED FOR 29 YEARS. IN JUNE TWO STUDENTS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN 1993 FOR POSSESSING BANNED LITERATURE AND PARTICIPATING IN ILLEGAL DISCUSSION GROUPS WERE GRANTED CONDITIONAL RELEASE AFTER SERVING TWO-THIRDS OF THEIR SENTENCES. THREE PRISONERS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION WERE RELEASED AFTER SERVING LENGTHY SENTENCES. ((NOTE: EMB: WHICH THREE WERE THESE?))

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

33. JUDICIAL WARRANTS FOR SEARCHES ARE REQUIRED EXCEPT FOR CASES INVOLVING SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, SECURITY AGENCIES REGULARLY MAKE FORCED OR SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES. SECURITY AGENCIES INTIMIDATE BY CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS AND RESIDENCES AND SELECTIVELY MONITORING LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS WITHOUT LEGAL RESTRAINT. GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND ITS FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY PERSONS THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP. THE GOVERNMENT STATED IN LATE 1990 THAT THIS LATTER GROUP THEN TOTALED 1,410,333 PEOPLE. THESE PERSONS AND THEIR RELATIVES SOMETIMES ARE SUBJECT TO SURVEILLANCE, REQUIRED CHECK-INS, PERIODIC INDOCTRINATION, AND RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL OUTSIDE THEIR

CITY OF RESIDENCE. THEIR LEGALLY REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION CARDS CARRY THE INITIALS "E.T." WHICH STAND FOR "EX-TAPOL," OR FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER, WHICH READILY IDENTIFIES THEM TO PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYERS OR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

34. THE GOVERNMENT'S LONGSTANDING, AMBITIOUS TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM TO MOVE LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE FROM OVERPOPULATED ISLANDS TO MORE ISOLATE AND BACKWARD ONES HAS BEEN CRITICIZED BY HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS. THEY SAY THAT IT NOT ONLY VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE BUT ALSO THOSE OF THE TRANSMIGRANTS, CLAIMING THAT

THEY ARE FREQUENTLY DUPED INTO LEAVING THEIR HOME VILLAGES WITHOUT ANY MEANS OF RETURN. (SEE ALSO SECTION 5.) IN A 1993 INCIDENT, 198 TRANSMIGRANTS (INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN) WHO HAD BEEN RESTTLED IN A PALM OIL PLANTATION IN SUMATRA WERE ARRESTED FOLLOWING A PROTEST DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH SOME OF THE PROTESTERS WERE STRUCK BY RIFLE BUTTS AND SIX WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED. TWO WERE REPORTED AS HAVING DIED IN CUSTODY LATER.

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

35. THE GOVERNMENT IMPOSED HARSH RESTRICTIONS ON THESE FREEDOMS. ON JUNE 21 THE GOVERNMENT REVOKED THE PUBLISHING PERMITS OF THREE OF INDONESIA'S BEST KNOWN WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS: TEMPO, DETIK, AND EDITOR. ONE OF THE THREE, TEMPO, WAS THE NATION'S MOST INFLUENTIAL NEWS MAGAZINE, FOUNDED IN 1971 AND WIDELY RESPECTED FOR THE

BREADTH AND DEPTH OF ITS COVERAGE. DETIK WAS A HARD-HITTING TABLOID SPECIALIZING IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL ISSUES. EDITOR WAS A RESPECTED VOICE ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS. THE OFFICIAL REASONS GIVEN FOR REVOCATION OF THE PUBLICATION LICENSES WERE THAT TEMPO HAD ENDANGERED NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH ITS REPORTING, AND THAT THE OTHER TWO HAD COMMITTED ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATIONS. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT TOO OPEN REPORTING OF ALLEGED DIFFERENCES IN THE CABINET OVER A CONTROVERSIAL MILITARY PROCUREMENT ISSUE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION.

36. ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 1982 PRESS LAW PROVIDE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THE ISSUANCE OF PUBLISHING LICENSES UNDER A 1984 MINISTERIAL DECREE IS ONE METHOD THE GOVERNMENT USES TO CONTROL THE PRESS. THREE OTHER PUBLICATIONS HAD THEIR LICENSES REVOKED IN THE LAST DECADE, ALTHOUGH TWO LATER REAPPEARED WITH NEW NAMES AND CHANGES IN TOP MANAGEMENT. OTHER MEANS OF CONTROL INCLUDE REGULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF ADVERTISING PERMITTED AND OF THE NUMBER OF PAGES ALLOWED IN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

NEWSPAPERS. THE PRACTICE OF TELEPHONING EDITORS TO CAUTION AGAINST PUBLISHING CERTAIN STORIES--THE SO-CALLED TELEPHONE CULTURE--CONTINUED, AND ITS INCIDENCE SEEMED TO INCREASE FOLLOWING THE ACTION AGAINST THE THREE PUBLICATIONS IN JUNE. SELF-CENSORSHIP CONTINUED TO BE ANOTHER PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED BRAKE ON FREE EXPRESSION WHOSE EFFECTIVENESS INCREASED AFTER JUNE.

37. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES CONTINUED IN SOME CASES TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS, MORE OR LESS SUBTLE, TO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LOCAL JOURNALISTS ON WHAT THEY COULD PRINT. FOR EXAMPLE, AFTER EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF THE APRIL STRIKES AND RIOTS, PRESS COVERAGE OF LABOR ISSUES DROPPED MARKEDLY IN MEDAN FOLLOWING DIRECTIVES FROM AUTHORITIES TO CUT BACK ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. IN JAKARTA, PAPERS WERE WARNED AGAINST COVERING TOPICS RANGING FROM THE PROLONGED SUMMER DROUGHT TO THE BAN OF THE THREE PUBLICATIONS. MEDAN POLICE TRIED TO CURB FOREIGN COVERAGE OF THE APRIL DISTURBANCES BY INSISTING ON SPECIAL PERMITS FROM THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, AND AT LEAST TWO FOREIGN REPORTERS WERE FORCED TO LEAVE THE CITY. STAFF OF EAST TIMOR'S ONLY NEWSPAPER WERE SUBJECT TO VARIOUS FORMS OF INTIMIDATION BY UNKNOWN SOURCES, AND A NEWSPAPER-OWNED VEHICLE WAS BURNED AND HEAVILY DAMAGED FOLLOWING THE NEWSPAPER'S PRINTING OF AN ACCOUNT OF A MID-JULY DEMONSTRATION WHICH WAS AT VARIANCE WITH THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ARRANGED SEVERAL GROUP TOURS OF FOREIGN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES TO EAST TIMOR, BUT FOREIGN MEDIA ACCESS TO IT ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS REMAINS DIFFICULT.

38. THOUGH PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS DWINDLED FOLLOWING THE HARSH GOVERNMENT REACTION AGAINST SOME DEMONSTRATORS, ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT PRESS MEASURES CONTINUED IN OTHER CHANNELS. A NUMBER OF UNSANCTIONED JOURNALS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE CRITICAL COVERAGE OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, BUT THEY WERE CIRCULATED ONLY IN SMALL NUMBERS ONLY IN MAJOR CITIES AND REACHED A VERY SMALL AUDIENCE. ((NOTE: EMB: CORRECT?)) IN SEPTEMBER THE FORMER CHIEF EDITOR OF TEMPO BROUGHT A LAWSUIT IN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION OVER THE REVOCATION OF TEMPO'S LICENSE, THE FIRST EVER SUCH LAWSUIT. AT YEAR'S END,
.....((NOTE: EMB: PLEASE COMPLETE.)) IN OCTOBER MOST OF THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF DETIK JOINED THE STAFF OF THE EXISTING PUBLICATION SYMPHONY AND REVAMPED IT TO RESEMBLE DETIK. HOWEVER, PUBLICATION WAS SUSPENDED AFTER ONLY A FEW DAYS WHEN THE PWIH WITHDREW LEGALLY REQUIRED APPROVAL THUS JEOPARDIZING SYMPHONY'S OWN PUBLICATION LICENSE.

39. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON FREE SPEECH. FOR EXAMPLE, SECURITY FORCES PROHIBITED NOTED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION ON AUGUST 29 FROM ADDRESSING A SEMINAR ON DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY IN SURABAYA. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO PREVENTED SEVERAL OTHER PUBLIC FIGURES, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, FROM PARTICIPATING IN PUBLIC SEMINARS ON ONE OR MORE OCCASIONS. AUTHORITIES OFTEN CAPRICIOUSLY APPLIED THESE STRICTURES WITHOUT CLEAR JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROHIBITION. IN EAST TIMOR AUTHORITIES DENIED PERMISSION FOR NGO'S AND THE LOCAL UNIVERSITY TO HOLD AN OPEN SEMINAR ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT. IN FEBRUARY AUTHORITIES IN EAST JAVA BANNED THE PERFORMANCE IN SURABAYA OF A PLAY, BY WELL-KNOWN AUTHOR EMHA AINUN NADJIB, WHICH WAS CRITICAL OF GOVERNMENT LAND POLICIES IN DEVELOPMENT CASES. SUBSEQUENTLY THE AUTHORITIES ALLOWED PERFORMANCE OF THE PLAY, WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY PERFORMED IN JOGJAKARTA. TWO U. S. MOVIES WERE BANNED FOLLOWING PROTEST BY ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS LEADERS. HOWEVER, A PLAY ABOUT THE CONTROVERSIAL MURDER OF LABOR ACTIVIST

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MARSINAH WAS STAGED IN JAKARTA IN SEPTEMBER.

40. WHILE THE LAW PROVIDES FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM, CONSTRAINTS EXIST ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SCHOLARS. SCHOLARS SOMETIMES REFRAIN FROM PRODUCING OR INCLUDING IN LECTURES AND CLASS DISCUSSIONS MATERIALS THAT THEY BELIEVE MIGHT PROVOKE GOVERNMENT DISPLEASURE. AN INDONESIAN ACADEMIC WHO HAS CONDUCTED STUDIES ON EAST TIMOR AND WHOSE CONCLUSIONS ARE AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS STRONGLY CRITICIZED BY GOVERNMENT FIGURES AND HIS HOUSE STONED BY UNKNOWN YOUTHS. PUBLISHERS SOMETIMES REFUSE TO ACCEPT MANUSCRIPTS DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. ON OCCASION THE GOVERNMENT BANS PUBLICATIONS AND BOOKS OUTRIGHT. IN JANUARY IT BANNED A BOOK DEALING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S RISE TO POWER, AND IN AUGUST, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BANNED A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE LEADER OF THE MESSIANIC ISLAMIC SECT DARUL ARQAM, THE THIRD BOOK OF THIS GROUP TO BE BANNED IN INDONESIA. ON THE OTHER HAND, "THE FUGITIVE," A BOOK BY THE PROMINENT INDONESIAN NOVELIST AND FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER PRAMOEDYA ANATA TOER, WHICH TOGETHER WITH OTHER WORKS BY PRAMOEDYA HAD BEEN BANNED FOR MANY YEARS, WAS PUBLISHED IN AUGUST.

41. THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA REMAINED MORE CAUTIOUS THAN THE PRINTED MEDIA. THE GOVERNMENT OPERATES THE NATIONWIDE TELEVISION NETWORK, WHICH HAS TWELVE REGIONAL STATIONS. PRIVATE TELEVISION COMPANIES CONTINUED TO EXPAND, WITH A FIFTH STATION SCHEDULED TO BEGIN OPERATION IN NOVEMBER. ALL ARE REQUIRED TO BROADCAST GOVERNMENT-PRODUCED NEWS, BUT MANY ALSO PRODUCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STYLE PROGRAMMING

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THAT BORDERS ON NEWS.

42. APPROXIMATELY 600 PRIVATE RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANIES EXIST IN INDONESIA IN ADDITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK. THE GOVERNMENT RADIO STATION PRODUCES "NATIONAL NEWS," WHICH IS BY LAW THE ONLY RADIO NEWS BROADCAST IN INDONESIA, AND IT IS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RELAYED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BY THE PRIVATE STATIONS AND 49 REGIONAL AFFILIATES OF THE GOVERNMENT STATION. BY LAW, THE PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS MAY PRODUCE ONLY "LIGHT" NEWS, SUCH AS HUMAN INTEREST STORIES, AND MAY NOT DISCUSS POLITICS. IN PRACTICE, MANY BROADCAST INTERVIEWS AND FOREIGN NEWS AS WELL.

43. FOREIGN TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS ARE READILY ACCESSIBLE TO THOSE WHO CAN AFFORD THE TECHNOLOGY, AND SATELLITE DISHES HAVE PROLIFERATED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT MAKES NO EFFORTS TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO THIS PROGRAMMING.

44. THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY REGULATES ACCESS TO INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY TO CERTAIN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, BY VISITING AND RESIDENT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS, AND OCCASIONALLY REMINDS THE LATTER OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DENY REQUESTS FOR VISA EXTENSIONS. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES A PERMIT FOR THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AND VIDEO TAPES, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED BY GOVERNMENT CENSORS. IMPORTERS SOMETIMES AVOID FOREIGN MATERIALS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OR DEALING WITH TOPICS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS ARE NORMALLY AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH

SEVERAL ISSUES WERE DELAYED OR EMBARGOED IN 1994 WHEN THEY CARRIED STORIES ON MATTERS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

45. ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION, THE GOVERNMENT PLACES SIGNIFICANT CONTROLS ON THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. ALL ORGANIZATIONS MUST HAVE GOVERNMENT PERMISSION TO HOLD REGIONAL AND NATIONAL MEETINGS. PUBLIC MARCHES AND DEMONSTRATIONS ALSO REQUIRE PERMITS, WHICH ARE FREQUENTLY NOT GRANTED. DURING THE YEAR, GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES RETURNED TO A STIFFER LINE AGAINST ALLOWING PUBLIC PROTESTS, HAVING LOOSENED SUCH RESTRICTIONS FOR A WHILE DURING THE LATTER HALF OF 1993. MANY JURISDICTIONS

OFTEN REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FOR SMALLER GATHERINGS AS WELL. WHILE OBTAINING SUCH APPROVAL IS USUALLY ROUTINE, THE AUTHORITIES OCCASIONALLY WITHHOLD PERMISSION, OR BREAK UP PEACEFUL GATHERINGS FOR WHICH NO PERMIT HAS BEEN OBTAINED. IN 1994 AUTHORITIES BROKE UP A MEETING BETWEEN AN ATTORNEY AND HIS CLIENTS IN A LABOR COMPENSATION CASE, AND A PUBLIC SEMINAR ON LAND ISSUES WHICH WAS SPONSORED BY A WELL-KNOWN NGO. POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DISCUSSIONS AT UNIVERSITIES, WHILE NO LONGER FORMALLY BANNED, REMAINED TIGHTLY CONTROLLED.

46. THE COURTS SOMETIMES HAND OUT STIFF PENALTIES TO PERSONS CONVICTED IN CASES INVOLVING FREE EXPRESSION, AS IN THE TWO CASES OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS MENTIONED IN SECTION L.E. ABOVE WHOSE SENTENCES WERE INCREASED ON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

APPEAL, WHILE AT OTHER TIMES THEY ARE MORE LENIENT. ON JUNE 27 SECURITY FORCES VIOLENTLY BROKE UP TWO PEACEFUL MARCHES ON THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION BY PERSONS PROTESTING THE WITHDRAWAL OF PUBLICATION LICENSES FROM THE THREE PUBLICATIONS MENTIONED ABOVE. AROUND 30 PERSONS WERE DETAINED BY THE AUTHORITIES AND SEVERAL DEMONSTRATORS WERE INJURED. THE JAKARTA CENTRAL DISTRICT COURT SENTENCED ALL BUT ONE OF THE PERSONS ARRESTED ON THE DAY AFTER THEIR ARREST FOR DEMONSTRATING WITHOUT A PERMIT, AND THEY WERE RELEASED AFTER PAYING A NOMINAL FINE EQUIVALENT TO 1.00. THE REMAINING PERSON, A PAROLEE, WAS RETURNED TO PRISON TO FINISH HIS SENTENCE. ((NOTE: EMB: NOT CLEAR. WHAT SENTENCE?)) ON JULY 7 POLICE ENTERED THE COMPOUND OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, A PROMINENT INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS NGO, AND ARRESTED 41 HUNGER STRIKERS WHO WERE PROTESTING THE MEDIA BANNING. THESE DEMONSTRATORS TOO WERE SENTENCED TO PAY TOKEN FINES AND RELEASED AFTER 2 DAYS. OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS ON THIS ISSUE DURING THIS PERIOD WERE ALLOWED TO TAKE PLACE WITHOUT INCIDENT, SUCH AS A JULY 5 DEMONSTRATION OF JOURNALISTS IN JAKARTA.

47. A GROUP OF SEVERAL HUNDRED PEOPLE WHO HAD ASSEMBLED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR WISHING TO MARCH TO THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY TO AIR THEIR VIEWS ABOUT AN INCIDENT

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

OF ALLEGED RELIGIOUS DISRESPECT THE PREVIOUS DAY WERE DISPERSED BY RIOT POLICE WHO REFUSED TO LET THE MARCH PROCEED WITHOUT A PERMIT. AROUND A DOZEN INDIVIDUALS WERE LIGHTLY INJURED IN THIS INCIDENT AND A NUMBER WERE BRIEFLY DETAINED. THE AUTHORITIES SHOWED GREATER RESTRAINT THAN IN PAST INCIDENTS INVOLVING CROWDS, USING

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

POLICE RATHER THAN THE ARMY, AND AVOIDING THE USE OF FIREARMS.

48. THE 1985 SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW (ORMAS) REQUIRES ALL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, TO ADHERE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA. THIS PROVISION, WHICH LIMITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD AS BEING DESIGNED TO INHIBIT ACTIVITIES OF GROUPS WHICH SEEK TO MAKE INDONESIA AN ISLAMIC STATE. THE LAW EMPOWERS THE GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND ANY ORGANIZATION IT BELIEVES TO BE ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA AND REQUIRES PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR ANY ORGANIZATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS FROM FOREIGN DONORS, THEREBY HINDERING THE WORK OF MANY LOCAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE WITHOUT OFFICIAL RECOGNITION UNDER THE ORMAS LAW.

49. IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO'S) ACTIVE IN SUCH FIELDS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION PROLIFERATED. IN LATE 1994, THE GOVERNMENT PREPARED A DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE THAT WOULD BRING THE MORE THAN 700 NGO'S UNDER CONTROLS SIMILAR TO THE ORMAS LAW. THE DRAFT DECREE INDICATED THAT NGO'S WOULD HAVE TO RECEIVE GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR THE USE OF ANY FOREIGN ASSISTANCE THEY ACCEPT, AND SUCH ASSISTANCE MUST BE DEEMED CONSISTENT WITH NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND NOT DETRIMENTAL TO NATIONAL INTERESTS. NGO'S WOULD ALSO BE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY, AND WOULD RECEIVE GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE ON FULFILLING THEIR DECLARED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

FUNCTIONS. MANY NGO'S, FEARING THAT THE PROPOSED NEW DECREE IS AN EFFORT BY THE GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL THEIR ORGANIZATIONS OR CURB SOME OF THEIR ACTIVITIES, REACTED STRONGLY TO THE DRAFT WHICH, AT YEAR'S END THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET PUT INTO EFFECT. ((NOTE: EMB: PLEASE UPDATE IF NEEDED.))

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

50. THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD. ((NOTE: EMB: THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, BUT WHAT EXACTLY DOES IT SAY ABOUT BELIEF IN ONE GOD? DOES IT ENCOURAGE, REQUIRE, MANDATE, OR WHAT?)) THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES ISLAM, CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, AND HINDUISM, AND PERMITS PRACTICE OF THE MYSTICAL, TRADITIONAL BELIEFS OF "ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN." ALTHOUGH THE POPULATION IS OVERWHELMINGLY MUSLIM, THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS ARE GENERALLY RESPECTED, AND THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES MUTUAL TOLERANCE AND HARMONY AMONG THEM. SOME RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY EXIST. ((NOTE: EMB: PLEASE SUPPLY SUCCINCTLY A FEW EXAMPLES OF SUCH RESTRICTIONS.))

51. BECAUSE THE FIRST TENET OF PANCASILA IS BELIEF IN A SUPREME BEING, ATHEISM IS FORBIDDEN. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA EXTENDS TO ALL RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY OPPOSES MUSLIM GROUPS WHICH ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ACKNOWLEDGING ONLY ISLAMIC LAW. THERE ARE GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES FOR BANNING

RELIGIOUS SECTS IN INDONESIA. AMONG THOSE PROHIBITED ARE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AND BAHA'I. IN 1994 THE GOVERNMENT

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

BANNED THE MESSIANIC ISLAMIC SECT DARUL ARQAM IN A NUMBER OF PROVINCE AND THREE OF ITS BOOKS HAVE BEEN PROHIBITED FROM INDONESIA, AND IN AUGUST FORBADE ITS LEADER, ABUYA SHEIKH IMAM ASHAARI MUHAMMAD, FROM ENTERING INDONESIA.

52. VIOLENCE BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS IN THE HURIA KRISTEN BATAK PROTESTAN (HKBP), INDONESIA'S LARGEST PROTESTANT CHURCH, CONTINUED IN NORTH SUMATRA THROUGHOUT 1994, WITH AT LEAST SIX FATALITIES. IN EARLY 1993, CITING A THREAT TO CIVIL ORDER, THE NORTHERN SUMATRA REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER HAD INTERVENED IN AN INTERNAL LEADERSHIP DISPUTE WHICH BROKE OUT WITHIN THE HKBP THE PREVIOUS YEAR, APPOINTED A NEW BISHOP, AND HELPED THE NEW BISHOP'S SUPPORTERS TAKE OVER CHURCH PROPERTY. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE NEW BISHOP. ONLY SUPPORTERS OF THE FORMER BISHOP REMAINED IN CUSTODY AND RECEIVED SENTENCES DESPITE CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT MEMBERS OF BOTH FACTIONS HAD INITIATED THE 1993 VIOLENCE.

53. THERE WERE WIDESPREAD REPORTS FROM RELIGIOUS MINORITIES INDICATING THAT THE EXTENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE WEAKENED SOMEWHAT DURING THE YEAR AND THAT RELIGIOUS MINORITIES FELT THEY WERE LESS FREE TO CARRY OUT THEIR RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES UNIMPEDED. HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, SPOKE OUT SEVERAL TIMES TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. TWO ARMY PRIVATES ACCUSED OF PROVOCATIVE BEHAVIOR DURING A CATHOLIC MASS IN EAST TIMOR IN JUNE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WERE DETAINED AND COURT-MARTIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING AGAINST THEM. ((NOTE: EMB: PLEASE SUPPLY A YEAR'S END UPDATE.))

THE LAW ALLOWS CONVERSION BETWEEN FAITHS, AND SUCH CONVERSIONS OCCUR. MARRIAGES BETWEEN PERSONS OF DIFFERENT RELIGIONS ARE ALLOWED. THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS PROSELYTIZING BY THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS IN AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ONE RECOGNIZED RELIGION OR ANOTHER AS POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND DISCOURAGES IT. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED, ALTHOUGH IN EAST TIMOR AND OCCASIONALLY ELSEWHERE MISSIONARIES

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

HAVE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES AND DELAYS IN RENEWING RESIDENCE PERMITS, AND VISAS ALLOWING THE ENTRANCE OF NEW FOREIGN CLERGY ARE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. LAWS AND DECREES FROM THE 1970'S LIMIT THE NUMBER OF YEARS FOREIGN MISSIONARIES CAN SPEND IN INDONESIA, WITH SOME EXTENSIONS GRANTED IN REMOTE AREAS LIKE IRIAN JAYA. FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK IS SUBJECT TO THE FUNDING STIPULATIONS OF THE ORMAS LAW (SEE SECTION 2.B.). INDONESIANS PRACTICING THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS MAINTAIN ACTIVE LINKS WITH CORELIGIONISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE INDONESIA AND TRAVEL ABROAD FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

54. IN 1993 THE GOVERNMENT DRASTICALLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BARRED EITHER FROM ENTERING OR DEPARTING INDONESIA FROM A PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED FIGURE OF 8,897 "BLACKLISTED" PEOPLE IN JANUARY TO A FEW HUNDRED BY AUGUST. ((NOTE: EMB: PLEASE UPDATE AT YEAR'S END.))

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES, NO ONE IS NOW PROHIBITED FROM LEAVING THE COUNTRY FOR POLITICAL REASONS. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT RESTRICTS MOVEMENT BY INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN CITIZENS TO AND WITHIN PARTS OF INDONESIA. IN ADDITION, IT REQUIRES PERMITS TO SEEK WORK IN A NEW LOCATION IN CERTAIN AREAS, PRIMARILY TO CONTROL FURTHER POPULATION MOVEMENT TO CROWDED CITIES, AND SPECIAL PERMITS ARE REQUIRED TO VISIT CERTAIN PARTS OF IRIAN JAYA. ((NOTE: EMB: WHAT ABOUT EAST TIMOR AND THE JOURNALISTS FOR APEC?)) THE MILITARY CARRIED OUT SECURITY CHECKS AFFECTING TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL TO AND WITHIN EAST TIMOR SPORADICALLY IN 1994, AND IT OCCASIONAL IMPOSED CURFEWS IN CONNECTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE AUTHORITIES REQUIRE FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, TO GIVE NOTICE OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND TO HAVE OFFICIAL PERMISSION (SEE SECTION L.F.) TO CHANGE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE.

55. IN PAST YEARS THE GOVERNMENT ADMITTED LARGE NUMBERS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

OF ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM INDOCHINA. ONLY A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER NOW REMAIN AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED IT WILL REPATRIATE PEACEFULLY THE REMAINING REFUGEES TO VIETNAM.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

56. CITIZENS DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEMOCRATIC MEANS. THE GOVERNMENT CONTROLS THE 1,000-MEMBER PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

(MPR), WHICH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY OF THE STATE AND MEETS EVERY 5 YEARS TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AND SET THE BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY. OF ITS 1,000 MEMBERS, 500 ARE DIRECTLY APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR ITS QUINQUENNIAL MEETING; THE OTHER 500 BEING THE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR)--20 PERCENT OF WHOSE MEMBERS ARE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT. IN 1993 THE MPR ELECTED SOEHARTO TO HIS SIXTH UNCONTESTED 5-YEAR TERM AS PRESIDENT. LEGALLY, THE PRESIDENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SUBORDINATE TO THE DPR, IN ACTUALITY, HE AND A SMALL GROUP OF ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS EXERCISE COMPLETE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.

57. UNDER A DOCTRINE KNOWN AS "DUAL FUNCTION," THE MILITARY ASSUMES A SIGNIFICANT SOCIOPOLITICAL AS WELL AS A SECURITY ROLE. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARE ALLOTTED AN UNELECTED 20 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND DISTRICT PARLIAMENTS, AND OCCUPY NUMEROUS KEY POSITIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION. ((NOTE: EMB: ARE THESE DIRECTLY APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT?)) THE OTHER 80 PERCENT OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL PARLIAMENTARY SEATS ARE FILLED THROUGH ELECTIONS HELD EVERY 5 YEARS. ALL ADULT CITIZENS ARE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE, EXCEPT ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, CONVICTED CRIMINALS SERVING PRISON SENTENCES, AND SOME 36,000 FORMER PKI MEMBERS. VOTERS CHOOSE BY SECRET BALLOT BETWEEN THE THREE GOVERNMENT-APPROVED POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH FIELD CANDIDATE LISTS IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT. THOSE LISTS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MUST BE SCREENED BY BAKORSTANAS (SEE SECTION L.D.), WHICH DETERMINES WHETHER CANDIDATES WERE INVOLVED IN THE

ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST COUP OR POSE OTHER BROADLY DEFINED SECURITY RISKS. CRITICS CHARGE THESE SCREENINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, SINCE THERE IS NO WAY TO APPEAL THE RESULTS, AND NOTE THAT THEY CAN BE USED TO ELIMINATE CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM PARLIAMENT.

58. STRICT RULES ESTABLISH THE LENGTH OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC MEDIA, SCHEDULES FOR PUBLIC APPEARANCES, AND THE POLITICAL SYMBOLS THAT CAN BE USED. THE GOVERNMENT PERMITS ONLY THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EXIST AND CONTEST ELECTIONS. THE LARGEST AND MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS GOLKAR, A GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ORGANIZATION OF DIVERSE FUNCTIONAL GROUPS WHICH WON 68 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN THE 1992 ELECTIONS. THE PRESIDENT SELECTS THE LEADERS OF GOLKAR, AND HE HAS THE LAST WORD ON ALL GOLKAR DECISIONS. THE OTHER TWO SMALL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE UNITY DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF INDONESIA (PDI), SPLIT THE REMAINING VOTE. BY LAW, THE PRESIDENT HAS THE POWER TO SUPERVISE SELECTION OF THEIR EXECUTIVE BOARDS AND TO MONITOR THEIR ACTIVITIES. THE LAW ALSO REQUIRES ALL THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EMBRACE PANCASILA, AND NONE OF THE ORGANIZATIONS IS CONSIDERED AN OPPOSITION PARTY. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES CLOSELY SCRUTINIZE AND OFTEN GUIDE THEIR ACTIVITIES. MEMBERS OF THE DPR AND THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES MAY BE RECALLED FROM OFFICE BY PARTY LEADERS.

59. GOLKAR MAINTAINS CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH THE ARMED FORCES AND KORPRI, THE ASSOCIATION TO WHICH ALL CIVIL SERVANTS AUTOMATICALLY BELONG. CIVIL SERVANTS MAY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

JOIN ANY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WITH OFFICIAL PERMISSION, BUT MOST ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND SOME OTHER BANNED PARTIES MAY NOT RUN FOR OFFICE OR BE ACTIVE POLITICALLY. THE DPR CONSIDERS BILLS PRESENTED TO IT BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES BUT DOES NOT DRAFT LAWS ON ITS OWN, ALTHOUGH IT HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DO SO. THE DPR MAKES TECHNICAL AND OCCASIONALLY SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS TO BILLS IT REVIEWS. IN PRACTICE IT REMAINS CLEARLY SUBORDINATE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, BUT RECENTLY HAS BECOME MUCH MORE ACTIVE IN SCRUTINIZING GOVERNMENT POLICY THROUGH HEARINGS AT WHICH MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, MILITARY COMMANDERS, AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS ARE ASKED TO TESTIFY. FOR EXAMPLE, PARLIAMENTARY EXAMINATION BROUGHT TO LIGHT A MAJOR SCANDAL IN GOVERNMENT BANKS AND FORCED THE GOVERNMENT TO ADDRESS IT SERIOUSLY. THE DPR HAS ALSO BECOME INCREASINGLY A FOCAL POINT OF APPEALS AND PETITIONS FROM STUDENTS, WORKERS, DISPLACED FARMERS, AND OTHERS PROTESTING ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND AIRING OTHER GRIEVANCES. ((NOTE: EMB: PLEASE SUBMIT SEVERAL SENTENCES ON THE ROLE OF MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT. SEE LAST PARA OF PARA 39 IN STATE 215437. ALSO, ARE MOST SENIOR POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT HELD BY JAVANESE?))

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

60. WHILE VARIOUS DOMESTIC ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONS INTERESTED IN HUMAN RIGHTS OPERATE ENERGETICALLY, SOME

HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS FACE GOVERNMENT HARASSMENT SUCH AS FREQUENT VISITS BY POLICE OR AGENTS FROM MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, INTERROGATIONS AT POLICE STATIONS, OR CANCELLATIONS OF PRIVATE MEETINGS (SEE SECTION 2.B.). SOME MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN MEDAN WERE SUBJECTED TO HARASSMENT AFTER THE APRIL RIOTING WHEN THEY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

TRIED TO DEFEND WORKERS AND OTHERS CHARGED WITH CRIMES AS A RESULT OF THE RIOTS. ((NOTE: EMB: WHO DID THE HARASSING? WE NEED TO CONVERT THIS TO ACTIVE VOICE?)) MOREOVER, AS NOTED IN SECTION 2.B., THE GOVERNMENT PREPARED IN 1994 A DRAFT DECREE WHICH, IF IMPLEMENTED, WILL GIVE THE GOVERNMENT VIRTUALLY TOTAL CONTROL OVER ALL ACTIVITIES OF NGO'S CONCERNED WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND SERIOUSLY THEIR ABILITY TO FUNCTION.

61. THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND EMPHASIZES ITS BELIEF THAT LINKING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE. IN 1994 INDONESIA BROUGHT PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SEVERAL NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO PROHIBIT OR RESTRICT NGO-SPONSORED HUMAN RIGHTS SEMINARS ON THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR. ((NOTE: EMB: WHICH ONES BESIDES THE PHILIPPINES?))

62. NONETHELESS, THE GOVERNMENT DID ALLOW SOME ACTIVITY BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS. THE ICRC CONTINUED TO OPERATE IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, AND ACEH, AND TO VISIT PRISONERS CONVICTED OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ABORTIVE, COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP IN 1965, CONVICTED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, AND EAST TIMORESE PRISONERS. HOWEVER, AS OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

YEAR'S END, THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT APPROVED THE ICRC'S REQUEST TO OPEN AN OFFICE IN ACEH, THOUGH OFFICIAL COOPERATION ON ACCESS BY ITS DELEGATES FROM JAKARTA SHOWED SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN 1994. ((NOTE: EMB: PLEASE INCLUDE STATUS IN YEAR'S END UPDATES.))

63. ICRC ACCESS ALSO GREATLY IMPROVED IN OTHER AREAS, INCLUDING EAST TIMOR WHERE IT HAS AN OFFICE. THE ICRC NO LONGER MAINTAINS AN OFFICE IN IRIAN JAYA, AND VISITS THAT PROVINCE FROM JAKARTA SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR. HOWEVER, IN 1994 THE VISITING REPRESENTATIVE OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, A KEY U. S. HUMAN RIGHTS NGO, WAS DENIED PERMISSION TO VISIT MEDAN AND EAST TIMOR. THE GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZED THE VISIT OF THE U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMMARY AND ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS, AND IT

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ALLOWED HIM TO SEE THOSE PERSONS HE HAD REQUESTED TO SEE. THE RAPPORTEUR PUBLICLY QUESTIONED, HOWEVER, WHETHER ALL THOSE WHO MIGHT HAVE WANTED TO SPEAK WITH HIM HAD BEEN AFFORDED FULL ACCESS.

64. IN JANUARY THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, MOST OF WHOSE MEMBERS WERE NAMED THE MONTH BEFORE, BEGAN OPERATIONS. DESPITE CONTINUING SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE COMMISSION'S INDEPENDENCE, BECAUSE ITS MEMBERS ARE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT, COMMISSION MEMBERS DURING THE COURSE OF THE YEAR ACTIVELY LOOKED INTO MANY OF THE NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS AND PETITIONS PRESENTED TO THE COMMISSION AND IN SOME CASES SHOWED THEMSELVES WILLING TO QUESTION GOVERNMENT ACTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE COMMISSION STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE GOVERNMENT'S REVOCATION OF THE PUBLICATION LICENSES OF THREE PUBLICATIONS (SECTION 2.A.)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AS AN INFRINGEMENT OF FREE SPEECH, AND IT HAS CRITICIZED THE WAY IN WHICH THE SUSPECTS IN THE MARSINAH MURDER CASE WERE PROSECUTED, AS WELL AS QUESTIONING WHETHER ALL THE GUILTY HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO JUSTICE. LACKING ENFORCEMENT POWERS, THE COMMISSION ATTEMPTS TO WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM, SENDING TEAMS WHERE NECESSARY TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS AND EMPLOYING PERSUASION, PUBLICITY, AND MORAL AUTHORITY TO HIGHLIGHT ABUSES AND ENCOURAGE CORRECTIVE ACTION. ((NOTE: EMB: HRW/ASIA SEEMS TO THINK THE COMMISSION HAS NO INVESTIGATORY POWERS. PLEASE INDICATE WHERE/WHEN/WHAT IT INVESTIGATED.))

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

65. ((NOTE: EMB: DOES THE CONSTITUTION OR LAW PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON THE ABOVE FACTORS?))

66. WOMEN

67. BY LAW WOMEN ARE EQUAL TO AND HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN, BUT IN PRACTICE THEY FACE SOME LEGAL DISCRIMINATION. FOR EXAMPLE, IN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DIVORCE CASES WOMEN OFTEN BEAR A HEAVIER EVIDENTIARY BURDEN THAN MEN, ESPECIALLY IN THE ISLAMIC-BASED FAMILY COURT SYSTEM. WHILE SOME WOMEN OCCUPY IMPORTANT MIDLEVEL POSITIONS IN BOTH THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS, MOST ARE EMPLOYED IN LOW WAGE POSITIONS. DESPITE LEGAL GUARANTEES OF EQUAL TREATMENT, WOMEN SELDOM RECEIVE EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK. THE AVERAGE WAGE IS 65 PERCENT OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEN'S WAGES.

68. WOMEN ARE OFTEN NOT GIVEN THE EXTRA SALARY THAT IS THEIR DUE WHEN THEY ARE THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD AND IN SOME CASES DO NOT RECEIVE EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR THEIR HUSBAND AND CHILDREN, SUCH AS MEDICAL INSURANCE. DESPITE LAWS GUARANTEEING WOMEN A 3-MONTH MATERNITY LEAVE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONCEDED THAT PREGNANT WOMEN ARE OFTEN DISMISSED OR ARE REPLACED WHILE ON LEAVE. SOME COMPANIES REQUIRE THAT WOMEN SIGN GUARANTEES THAT THEY WILL NOT BECOME PREGNANT. WOMEN WORKERS ALSO HAVE COMPLAINED OF BEING SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED BY FOREMEN AND FACTORY OWNERS.

69. INDONESIAN WOMEN DISPROPORTIONATELY EXPERIENCE ILLITERACY, POOR HEALTH, AND INADEQUATE NUTRITION. ALTHOUGH SEVERAL VOLUNTARY, PRIVATE GROUPS WORK ACTIVELY TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CLAIM SOME SUCCESS IN GAINING OFFICIAL COGNIZANCE OF WOMEN'S CONCERNS, TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES LIMIT WOMEN'S ASPIRATIONS AND ACTIVITIES.

70. THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE REPORTED 1,341 RAPE CASES FOR 1991, 1,356 CASES FOR 1992, AND XXXX CASES FOR 1993. ((NOTE: EMB: PLEASE FILL IN FIGURES FOR 1993. ARE THERE ANY FOR 1994?)) HOWEVER, WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS BELIEVE RAPE IS GROSSLY UNDERREPORTED IN INDONESIA OWING TO THE SOCIAL STIGMA ATTACHED TO THE VICTIM. THE LAW REQUIRE THAT A WOMEN GO IMMEDIATELY TO THE HOSPITAL FOR A PHYSICAL EXAM WHICH PRODUCES SEMEN OR OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF RAPE IN ORDER TO BRING CHARGES. ((NOTE: EMB: IS THIS THE LAW REQUIREMENT?

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

HAVE ANY RAPE VICTIMS BROUGHT CHARGES SUCCESSFULLY? HAS THE GOVERNMENT DONE ANYTHING TO MAKE RAPE A PUNISHABLE OFFENSE?)) SOME WOMEN FAIL TO REPORT RAPE TO POLICE OUT OF FEAR OF BEING MOLESTED AGAIN BY THE POLICE THEMSELVES. MOST WOMEN AVOID WALKING ALONE AT NIGHT LEST THEY BE PERCEIVED AS "FAIR GAME."

71. IN GENERAL, THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REMAINS POORLY DOCUMENTED. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY, WHICH SOME SAY HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY RECENT SOCIAL CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY RAPID URBANIZATION. LONGSTANDING TRADITIONAL BELIEFS THAT THE HUSBAND MAY "TEACH" OR "CONTROL" THE WIFE THROUGH SEVERAL MEANS, INCLUDING VIOLENCE, ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROBLEM. ((NOTE: EMB: IS VIOLENCE AGAINST A WIFE A CRIME?)) THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES SOME COUNSELING, AND SEVERAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS EXIST TO ASSIST WOMEN. MANY OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS FOCUS MAINLY ON REUNITING THE FAMILY RATHER THAN ON PROVIDING PROTECTION TO THE WOMEN INVOLVED. THERE ARE NO BATTERED WOMEN'S SHELTERS IN INDONESIA. MANY WOMEN RELY ON EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEMS FOR IN CASES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.

72. CHILDREN

73. THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND WELFARE, BUT IS HAMPERED BY A LACK OF RESOURCES IN TRANSLATING THIS COMMITMENT INTO PRACTICE. A 1979 LAW ON CHILDREN'S WELFARE GUARANTEES CERTAIN RIGHTS TO CHILDREN AND DEFINES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE AND PARENTS

TO NURTURE AND PROTECT CHILDREN, HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTING

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

REGULATIONS FOR THE LAW HAVE NEVER BEEN DEVELOPED. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE PARTICULAR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PRIMARY EDUCATION, MATERNITY SERVICES, AND FAMILY PLANNING.

74. THROUGHOUT THE CITIES OF INDONESIA THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF STREET CHILDREN SELLING NEWSPAPERS, SHINING SHOES, HELPING TO PARK OR WATCH CARS, AND OTHERWISE EARNING MONEY. MANY THOUSANDS MORE WORK IN FACTORIES AND FIELDS (SEE ALSO SECTION 6.D.). NGO'S CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO HELP THESE CHILDREN AS INADEQUATE.

75. CHILD PROSTITUTION AND OTHER SEXUAL ABUSES OCCUR, ESPECIALLY CASES OF INCEST BETWEEN STEPFATHERS AND STEPDAUGHTERS, BUT DATA ON THEIR INCIDENCE IS LACKING. SOME CHILD CARE EXPERTS BELIEVE IT TO BE LOW. WHILE THERE ARE LAWS DESIGNED TO PROTECT CHILDREN FROM INDECENT ACTIVITIES, PROSTITUTION, AND INCEST, THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE LITTLE EFFORT TO ENFORCE THEM.

76. FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM), WHICH IS WIDELY CONDEMNED BY HEALTH EXPERTS AS BOTH PHYSICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY DANGEROUS TO WOMEN'S HEALTH, IS WIDELY PRACTICED IN INDONESIA. IN JAVA, IT USUALLY TAKES PLACE WITHIN THE FIRST YEAR AFTER BIRTH AND IS PERFORMED EITHER AT A HOSPITAL OR BY A LOCAL TRADITIONAL PRACTITIONER OR "DUKUN," ESPECIALLY IN RURAL AREAS.

77. INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

78. THE GOVERNMENT STATES PUBLICLY THAT IT RECOGNIZES

THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL INDIGENOUS POPULATION GROUPS, AND THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE. CRITICS MAINTAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH IS BASICALLY PATERNALISTIC AND DESIGNED MORE TO INTEGRATE THEM MORE CLOSELY INTO INDONESIAN SOCIETY THAN TO PROTECT THEIR TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE. A CONSULTANT TO THE U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HAS NAMED INDONESIA AS ONE OF FOUR COUNTRIES THAT HAS VIOLATED THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE.

79. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF LOGGING COMPANIES IN RELATION TO INDONESIA'S LARGE-SCALE TRANSMIGRATION PROJECT DESIGNED TO MOVE LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE FROM HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS SUCH AS JAVA TO MORE THINLY POPULATED ISLANDS. ASIA WATCH HAS DOCUMENTED HOW LOGGING COMPANIES HAVE RECRUITED NATIVE PEOPLES ON IRIAN JAYA, SEPARATING THEM FROM THEIR TRADITIONAL SUBSISTENCE OR HUNTER-GATHERER ECONOMIES. WORKERS ARE PAID WITH COMPANY-ISSUED CREDIT CARDS THAT CAN BE USED ONLY AT COMPANY STORES AND AT COMPANY-FIXED PRICES. THE ENSUING SPIRALING DEBT ENSURES THAT THE WORKERS REMAIN INDENTURED TO THE COMPANY.

80. A LARGER PROBLEM IS CAUSED BY THE FACT THAT THE LANDS OF THE INDIGENOUS GATHERER-HUNTERS AND SHIFTING CULTIVATORS ARE OFTEN LEFT FALLOW FOR YEARS AT A TIME. THEY ARE THEN CLASSIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT AS "EMPTY LANDS" BELONGING TO THE STATE. UNDER THIS CLASSIFICATION, THE LANDS ARE LICENSED TO LOGGING COMPANIES AND LARGE-SCALE AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS; THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE ARE NOT CONSULTED, AND THEY RECEIVE NO

COMPENSATION. JAVANESE TRANSMIGRANTS ARE FREQUENTLY BROUGHT IN TO WORK THESE LANDS. BY MID-1993 IRIAN JAYA ALONE HAD RECEIVED AROUND 43,000 FAMILIES WITH ANOTHER 52,000 SCHEDULED OVER THE NEXT 5 YEARS. THE SOU MOI PEOPLE OF IRIAN JAYA, THE ANAK DALAM HUNTER-GATHERERS OF NORTH SUMATRA, THE PEOPLE OF YAMDENA, AND THE BENTIAN SHIFTING CULTIVATORS OF EAST KALIMANTAN ALL CONTINUE TO PROTEST VIOLATIONS OF THEIR LAND RIGHTS. IN SOME CASES THE RESENTMENT BOILS OVER INTO VIOLENCE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN KALIMANTAN MEMBERS OF A DAYAK TRIBE FORCED FROM THEIR LAND BY A LOGGING COMPANY IN AUGUST RETALIATED BY ATTACKING COMPANY FACILITIES, AND SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE TRIBE WERE ARRESTED SUBSEQUENTLY.

81. NATIONAL/RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

82. INDONESIANS EXHIBIT CONSIDERABLE RACIAL AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE, WITH THE IMPORTANT EXCEPTION OF OFFICIAL AND INFORMAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE, WHO

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

COMPRISE ABOUT 3 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. SINCE 1959 NONCITIZEN ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO RUN BUSINESSES IN RURAL INDONESIA. REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF ALL CHINESE SCHOOLS FOR ETHNIC CHINESE, FORMATION OF EXCLUSIVELY CHINESE CULTURAL GROUPS OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND PUBLIC DISPLAY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS. IN AUGUST THE BAN ON USE OF CHINESE CHARACTERS WAS EASED SLIGHTLY TO ALLOW FIRMS WORKING IN THE TOURIST INDUSTRY TO PRODUCE CHINESE-LANGUAGE BROCHURES, PROGRAMS, AND SIMILAR MATERIAL FOR CHINESE-SPEAKING TOURISTS. HOWEVER, CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE GOVERNMENT-OWNED DAILY NEWSPAPER, MAY NEITHER BE IMPORTED

NOR PRODUCED DOMESTICALLY. PRIVATE INSTRUCTION IN CHINESE IS GENERALLY PROHIBITED BUT TAKES PLACE TO A LIMITED EXTENT, AND SINCE AUGUST HAS BEEN ALLOWED IN TRAINING EMPLOYEES IN THE TOURISM INDUSTRY IN FUNCTIONAL MANDARIN. STATE UNIVERSITIES HAVE NO FORMAL QUOTAS THAT LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ETHNIC CHINESE. THE LAW FORBIDS THE CELEBRATION OF THE CHINESE NEW YEAR IN TEMPLES OR PUBLIC PLACES, BUT ITS ENFORCEMENT WAS LIMITED IN 1994, AND CHINESE NEW YEAR DECORATIONS WERE DISPLAYED IN PUBLIC SHOPPING AREAS IN MAJOR CITIES.

83. EAST TIMORESE AND VARIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS CHARGE THAT THE EAST TIMORESE ARE UNDERREPRESENTED IN THE CIVIL SERVICE IN EAST TIMOR. WHILE EAST TIMORESE STILL OUTNUMBER NON-TIMORESE BY FIVE TO ONE, ONLY THREE OUT OF SEVEN CIVIL SERVICE JOBS ARE FILLED BY EAST TIMORESE. EAST TIMORESE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S TRANSMIGRATIONS PROGRAM WILL LEAD TO GREATER IMBALANCE IN EMPLOYMENT AND EVENTUALLY DESTROY EAST TIMOR'S CULTURAL IDENTITY. ((NOTE: EMB: IS THIS ACCURATE?))

84. PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

85. NO NATIONAL LAW SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSES THE PROBLEMS OR STATUS OF THE DISABLED, NOR DO THEY RECEIVE SPECIAL PROGRAMS OR ATTENTION. VIRTUALLY NO PUBLIC BUILDINGS OR PUBLIC MEANS OF TRANSPORT ARE DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY FOR ACCESS BY THE HANDICAPPED. THE HANDICAPPED FACE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CONSIDERABLE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT. ((NOTE: EMB: HAS THE GOVERNMENT TRIED TO ADDRESS THIS DISCRIMINATION? IF THERE IS INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT,

PLEASE KEEP IT VERY BRIEF.))

86. IN 1989 THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED REGULATIONS COVERING EDUCATION FOR THE MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS EXIST IN JAKARTA AND OTHER LARGE CITIES FOR THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, BLIND, DEAF AND PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

87. PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS ARE FREE TO FORM WORKER ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION. UNTIL 1994 ONLY A RECOGNIZED UNION COULD BARGAIN ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES OR REPRESENT WORKERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S LABOR COURTS. A NEW REGULATION PROMULGATED IN JANUARY PROVIDES THAT WORKERS IN A SINGLE COMPANY WITH MORE THAN 25 EMPLOYEES CAN JOIN TOGETHER AND NEGOTIATE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH THEIR EMPLOYER OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ALL INDONESIAN WORKERS UNION (SPSI), THE ONLY LEGALLY RECOGNIZED UNION (SEE BELOW) BUT THE GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES THESE PLANT-LEVEL WORKERS ASSOCIATIONS TO JOIN THE SPSI. MOREOVER, WHILE 120 OF THESE PLANT-LEVEL ASSOCIATIONS WERE FORMED ONLY ONE HAD CONCLUDED A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT WITH MANAGEMENT. CURRENT NUMERICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR UNION RECOGNITION STILL CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT BARRIER TO RECOGNITION AND THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. IN ADDITION, THE MINISTRY OF MANPOWER USES A MINISTERIAL REGULATION THAT REQUIRES THAT A UNION BE SET

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

UP "BY AND FOR WORKERS" TO DENY RECOGNITION TO GROUPS IN WHICH WHAT IT CONSIDERS NONWORKERS, SUCH AS LAWYERS OR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, ARE INVOLVED AS ORGANIZERS.

88. THERE IS, DE FACTO, A SINGLE UNION SYSTEM, AND IT IS THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED POLICY TO SEEK TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECOGNIZED SPSI UNIONS RATHER THAN TO EASE FURTHER THE PROCESS FOR THE FORMATION OF ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS. THE ONLY UNIONS RECOGNIZED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ARE THOSE WHICH PREVIOUSLY CONSTITUTED THE SPSI'S INDUSTRIAL SECTORS.

89. TWO OTHER LABOR GROUPS, SETIA KAWAN (SOLIDARITY), ALSO KNOWN AS SERIKAT BURUH MERDEKA (SBM, FREE TRADE UNION), AND SERIKAT BURUH SEJAHTERA INDONESIA (SBSI, INDONESIAN WORKERS WELFARE UNION), HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED BUT ARE NOT REGISTERED. SETIA KAWAN, FOUNDED 3 YEARS AGO, IS NOW ESSENTIALLY MORIBUND. THE SBSI, CREATED IN 1992, CONTINUES TO ATTEMPT TO FORM THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF FACTORY-LEVEL UNITS TO MEET THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION AS A LABOR UNION. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER HAS STATED THAT ANY UNIONS WHICH ARE FORMED SHOULD AFFILIATE WITH THE SPSI FEDERATION AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT RECOGNIZE ANY UNIONS OUTSIDE THE FEDERATION. THERE HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN TENTATIVE OVERTURES TO BRING THE SBSI INTO THE SPSI. THE SBSI, HOWEVER, HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THESE OFFERS.

90. THE SBSI HAS TWICE ATTEMPTED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO REGISTER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS AS A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE ORMAS LAW.

91. THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE SBSI ILLEGAL. THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT DISBANDED IT, IT HAS CONTINUALLY HARASSED IT, ESPECIALLY AFTER LARGE-SCALE LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS, WHICH THE SBSI HELPED TO ORGANIZE IN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MEDAN IN APRIL DEGENERATED INTO ANTI-CHINESE RIOTING. THE GOVERNMENT ARRESTED DOZENS OF THE MEDAN SBSI LEADERSHIP IN THE SPRING, AND IT ARRESTED THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN OF THE SBSI, MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, IN AUGUST AND CHARGED HIM WITH INCITING VIOLENCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE RIOTS. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) SENT A STRONGLY WORDED LETTER TO THE INDONESIAN MINISTER OF MANPOWER EXPRESSING "SERIOUS CONCERN" OVER THE ARREST OF PAKPAHAN. IN MID-OCTOBER, SOME OF THE MEDAN LEADERSHIP RECEIVED SENTENCES OF BETWEEN 6 AND 8 MONTHS IN PRISON. IN NOVEMBER PAKPAHAN WAS SENTENCED TO A 3-YEAR JAIL TERM. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AGAINST THE SBSI LEADERSHIP ARE INTENDED TO DISCREDIT OR DESTROY THE ORGANIZATION.

92. BECAUSE OF PAST MINISTER OF MANPOWER REGULATIONS, MANY SPSI FACTORY UNITS ARE LED BY PERSONS WHO HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH THEIR UNITS' MEMBERS BECAUSE THEY WERE SELECTED BY EMPLOYERS. A NEW REGULATION STATES THAT EMPLOYEES MUST ONLY NOTIFY THEIR EMPLOYER THAT THEY WISH TO FORM A UNION AND THAT THEY MAY PROCEED IF THEY DO NOT RECEIVE A RESPONSE FROM THEIR EMPLOYER WITHIN 2 WEEKS. DESPITE THIS NEW PROVISION, STRIKES CONTINUE TO OCCUR BECAUSE EMPLOYERS ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF UNION BRANCHES. THESE STRIKES ARE INVARIABLY SUCCESSFUL,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AND THE FORMATION OF AN SPSI UNIT FOLLOWS SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HOWEVER, WORKERS WHO ARE ACTIVE IN THE FORMATION OF THE UNION ARE FREQUENTLY DISMISSED AND HAVE NO PRACTICAL PROTECTION BY EITHER LAW OR GOVERNMENT PRACTICE.

93. CIVIL SERVANTS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO JOIN UNIONS AND MUST BELONG TO KORPRI, A NONUNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. TEACHERS MUST BELONG TO THE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (PGRI). STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES, DEFINED TO INCLUDE THOSE WORKING IN ENTERPRISES IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A 5-PERCENT HOLDING OR GREATER, USUALLY ARE REQUIRED TO JOIN KORPRI, BUT A SMALL NUMBER OF STATE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ENTERPRISES HAVE SPSI UNITS. WHILE TECHNICALLY CLASSED AS A UNION, THE PGRI CONTINUES TO FUNCTION MORE AS A WELFARE ORGANIZATION AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ENGAGED IN TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES SUCH AS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.

94. UNIONS MAY DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE OVER THE SPSI AND ITS FEDERATED UNIONS. THE HEAD OF THE SPSI IS A SENIOR MEMBER OF GOLKAR, AND HE AND TWO OTHER SENIOR SPSI OFFICIALS ARE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT REPRESENTING GOLKAR. WITH ONE EXCEPTION, ALL MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR. THESE PERSONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN POSITIONS IN THE NEW FEDERATED INDUSTRIAL SECTOR UNIONS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER IS A MEMBER OF THE SPSI'S CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL. NUMEROUS REGIONAL SPSI OFFICIALS ALSO ARE GOLKAR MEMBERS, SOMETIMES SERVING IN REGIONAL

LEGISLATURES. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE REPORTS, THE GOVERNMENT INTERFERES IN THE SELECTION OF SPSI OFFICERS, ESPECIALLY BY PLACING RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS IN MID-LEVEL SPSI POSITIONS.

95. UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE, POLICE APPROVAL IS NEEDED FOR ALL MEETINGS OF FIVE PEOPLE OR MORE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE OFFICES OR NORMAL WORK SITES. THIS PROVISION ALSO APPLIES TO UNION MEETINGS. PERMISSION IS ROUTINELY GIVEN TO THE SPSI, BUT NOT TO RIVAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS SBSI, WHICH WAS PREVENTED FROM HOLDING SEVERAL MEETINGS OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS, INCLUDING ITS FIRST CONGRESS IN 1993. THE GOVERNMENT MAY DISSOLVE A UNION IF IT BELIEVES THE UNION IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA, THOUGH IT HAS NEVER ACTUALLY DONE SO AND THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS SPECIFYING PROCEDURES FOR UNION DISSOLUTION.

96. THE SPSI MAINTAINS INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS BUT IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS EXCEPT THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) TRADE UNION COUNCIL.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

97. ON APRIL 20, 1994, THE ICFTU LODGED A FORMAL COMPLAINT AGAINST INDONESIA WITH THE ILO, SUPPLEMENTING A PREVIOUS COMPLAINT FILED IN 1987, WHICH ACCUSED THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA OF DENIAL OF WORKERS' RIGHT TO SET UP UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, HARASSMENT OF INDEPENDENT WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS, AND OTHER ACTIONS CONTRARY TO ILO STANDARDS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.

98. WHILE PANCASILA PRINCIPLES CALL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES TO BE SETTLED BY CONSENSUS, ALL ORGANIZED WORKERS EXCEPT CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. WHILE STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND TEACHERS RARELY EXERCISE THIS RIGHT, PRIVATE SECTOR STRIKES ARE FREQUENT. BEFORE A STRIKE CAN OCCUR IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE LAW REQUIRES INTENSIVE MEDIATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND PRIOR NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE. HOWEVER, NO APPROVAL IS REQUIRED. IN PRACTICE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ARE NOT FOLLOWED, AND FORMAL NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE IS RARELY GIVEN BECAUSE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROCEDURES ARE SLOW. THESE PROCEDURES HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH WORKERS, WHO IGNORE THEM. SUDDEN STRIKES, THEREFORE, TEND TO RESULT FROM LONGSTANDING GRIEVANCES OR RECOGNITION THAT LEGALLY MANDATED BENEFITS OR RIGHTS ARE NOT BEING RECEIVED. WHILE STRIKE LEADERS ARE NOT ARRESTED FOR ILLEGAL STRIKES, THEY OFTEN LOSE THEIR JOBS AND HAVE NO LEGAL RECOURSE FOR REINSTATEMENT. THE NUMBER OF STRIKES INCREASED DRAMATICALLY IN THE FIRST PART OF 1994. ((NOTE: EMB: PLEASE UPDATE AT YEAR'S END AND TRY TO CHARACTERIZE INCREASE IN TERMS OF ENTIRE YEAR.))

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

99. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROMOTES IT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE NATIONAL IDEOLOGY, PANCASILA. UNTIL RECENTLY ONLY RECOGNIZED TRADE UNIONS, THAT IS, SPSI AND ITS COMPONENTS, COULD LEGALLY ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

BARGAINING. AS NOTED, NEW GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS ALSO PERMIT UNAFFILIATED PLANT-LEVEL WORKERS ASSOCIATIONS TO CONCLUDE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH EMPLOYERS, THOUGH ONLY ONE HAD DONE SO BY SEPTEMBER. AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY ANY OTHER GROUPS ARE NOT CONSIDERED LEGALLY BINDING AND ARE NOT REGISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER.

100. THE MAJORITY OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE SPSI UNITS AND EMPLOYERS ARE NEGOTIATED BILATERALLY. ONCE NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED A REGISTERED SPSI OR INDEPENDENT PLANT LEVEL UNION, AN EMPLOYER IS OBLIGATED TO BARGAIN WITH IT. IN COMPANIES WITHOUT UNIONS, THE GOVERNMENT DISCOURAGES WORKERS FROM UTILIZING OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE, E.G., DURING CONSULTATIONS WITH EMPLOYERS OVER COMPANY REGULATIONS. INSTEAD, THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PREFERS THAT WORKERS SEEK ITS ASSISTANCE AND BELIEVES THAT ITS IS TO PROTECT WORKERS. THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT FOR SOME INDONESIAN COMPANIES CONSULTATIONS ARE PERFUNCTORY AT BEST AND USUALLY WITH MANAGEMENT-SELECTED WORKERS. THERE ARE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY FROM U.S. COMPANIES. OVER HALF OF THE FACTORY-LEVEL SPSI UNITS HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS ARE FREELY NEGOTIATED BETWEEN UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE VARIES. BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS OR BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION OR ARBITRATION. MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

FOR 1 MORE YEAR. ACCORDING TO INDONESIAN AND NON-INDONESIAN NGO'S INVOLVED IN LABOR ISSUES, THE PROVISIONS OF THESE AGREEMENTS RARELY GO BEYOND THE LEGAL MINIMUM STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE AGREEMENTS ARE OFTEN MERELY PRESENTED TO WORKER REPRESENTATIVES FOR SIGNING RATHER THAN BEING NEGOTIATED.

101. THOUGH GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS PROHIBIT EMPLOYERS FROM DISCRIMINATING OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS FROM UNION OFFICIALS, OF EMPLOYER RETRIBUTION AGAINST UNION ORGANIZERS, INCLUDING FIRING, WHICH IS NOT EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED OR REMEDIED IN PRACTICE. SOME EMPLOYERS REPORTEDLY HAVE WARNED THEIR EMPLOYEES AGAINST CONTACT WITH UNION ORGANIZERS FROM THE UNRECOGNIZED SBSI ORGANIZATION. IN ADDITION TO MARSINAH (SEE SECTION 1.E.), SEVERAL OTHER LABOR UNION ACTIVISTS HAVE DIED IN MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS.

102. CHARGES OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE ADJUDICATED BY ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. HOWEVER, MANY UNION MEMBERS BELIEVE THE TRIBUNALS GENERALLY SIDE WITH EMPLOYERS. BECAUSE OF THIS PERCEIVED PARTIALITY, MANY WORKERS REJECT OR AVOID THE PROCEDURE AND PRESENT THEIR GRIEVANCES DIRECTLY TO PARLIAMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF FIRED WORKERS TEND TO BE MONETARY AWARDS; WORKERS ARE RARELY REINSTATED. THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO FIRE WORKERS, BUT THE LAW IS OFTEN IGNORED IN PRACTICE.

103. THE ARMED FORCES, WHICH INCLUDE THE POLICE,

CONTINUES TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN LABOR ISSUES, DESPITE NEW REGULATIONS PROMULGATED IN JANUARY TO PROHIBIT MILITARY INTERFERENCE WHEN THERE IS NO THREAT TO SECURITY. MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES HAVE ATTEMPTED TO INTIMIDATE UNION ORGANIZERS AND STRIKE LEADERS AND HAVE BEEN PRESENT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS DURING SOME STRIKES, EVEN WHEN THERE HAS BEEN NO DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER VIOLENCE. MEMBERS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ATTEND AND MONITOR TRADE UNION EDUCATION SEMINARS RUN BY THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ASIAN-AMERICAN FREE LABOR INSTITUTE (AAFLI), EVEN THOUGH THESE PROGRAMS ARE APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. IN 1993, THE MILITARY COMMAND IN SURABAYA ALSO HALTED AN AAFLI-SPSI PROGRAM ON LEGAL AID FOR INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. AT YEAR'S END THE PROGRAM HAD NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO RESUME DESPITE GOVERNMENT ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD BE. MILITARY OFFICIALS OCCASIONALLY HAVE BEEN REPORTED PRESENT DURING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND MANAGEMENT. THEIR PRESENCE IS DESCRIBED AS INTIMIDATING BY PLANT-LEVEL UNION OFFICIALS. A MILITARY OFFICER WAS AMONG THOSE CONVICTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MARSINAH MURDER CASE.

104. LABOR LAW APPLIES EQUALLY IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

105. THE LAW FORBIDS FORCED LABOR, AND THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY ENFORCES IT. NGO REPORTS HAVE ALLEGED THAT SOME CASES OF FORCED LABOR IN THE FORM OF DEBT BONDAGE BY LOGGING COMPANIES EXIST IN IRIAN JAYA. THE GOVERNMENT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SAYS THAT IT IS UNABLE TO VERIFY THESE ALLEGATIONS BECAUSE THEY ARE INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC. NO COMPLAINTS OR INFORMATION ON FORCED LABOR IN IRIAN JAYA HAD COME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AS OF LATE SEPTEMBER. (SEE ALSO SECTION 5 INDIGENOUS PEOPLE.)

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

106. CHILD LABOR EXISTS IN BOTH INDUSTRIAL AREAS AND RURAL AREAS. THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 2.7 MILLION WORKING CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 14, ACCORDING TO A 1994 REPORT OF THE U. N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.

107. THE GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A CLASS OF CHILDREN WHO MUST WORK FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS, AND IN 1987 THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER ISSUED REGULATION PER-OL/MEN/1987, "PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FORCED TO WORK,"

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

TO REGULATE THIS SITUATION. THIS REGULATION LEGALIZES THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14 WHO MUST WORK TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCOME OF THEIR FAMILIES. IT REQUIRES PARENTAL CONSENT, PROHIBITS DANGEROUS OR DIFFICULT WORK, LIMITS WORK TO 4 HOURS DAILY, AND REQUIRES EMPLOYERS TO REPORT THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN WORKING UNDER ITS PROVISIONS. IT DOES NOT SET A MINIMUM AGE FOR CHILDREN IN THIS CATEGORY, EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDING THE COLONIAL-ERA GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE OF DECEMBER 17, 1925, ON "MEASURES LIMITING CHILD LABOUR AND NIGHTWORK OF WOMEN," WHICH IS STILL THE CURRENT LAW GOVERNING CHILD LABOR AND SETS A MINIMUM AGE OF 12 FOR EMPLOYMENT. THE 1987 REGULATION IS NOT ENFORCED. NO

EMPLOYERS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO COURT FOR VIOLATING ITS RESTRICTIONS ON THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR CHILDREN, AND NO REPORTS ARE COLLECTED FROM ESTABLISHMENTS EMPLOYING CHILDREN.

108. ACT NO. 1 OF 1951 WAS INTENDED TO BRING INTO FORCE CERTAIN LABOR MEASURES, INCLUDING PROVISIONS ON CHILD LABOR WHICH WOULD REPLACE THOSE OF THE 1925 LEGISLATION. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS FOR THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN ISSUED. THUS THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS IN THE 1951 ACT HAVE NO VALIDITY. IN SEPTEMBER 1993, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IT WOULD REVIEW ITS CHILD LABOR REGULATIONS WITH THE INTENTION OF TIGHTENING ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS ON CHILD LABOR. AS OF AUGUST, 1994, THE REVIEW WAS NOT COMPLETED. ((NOTE: EMB: PLEASE SUPPLY YEAR'S END UPDATE.))

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

109. IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE, AREA WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL ESTABLISH MINIMUM WAGES FOR REGIONS AND BASIC NEEDS FIGURES FOR EACH PROVINCE--A MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. WHILE INDONESIA HAS SUCCEEDED IN DRAMATICALLY LOWERING THE LEVEL OF POVERTY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MINIMUM WAGE RATES HAVE LAGGED BEHIND THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURES. MINIMUM WAGE RATES WERE RAISED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IN THREE STAGES BY PROVINCE ON JANUARY 1, APRIL 1, AND AUGUST 1, 1994. WHILE IN MOST CASES THE NEW RATES

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

STILL DID NOT EQUAL THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURE, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IN AUGUST THAT NEW INCREASES WOULD TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ON APRIL 1, 1995. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROJECTS THAT AT THAT TIME MINIMUM WAGE RATES ON THE AVERAGE WILL EQUAL 106 PERCENT OF THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURE, UP FROM 97 PERCENT AS OF AUGUST 1, 1994. PAYMENT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE IS ANOTHER QUESTION. THERE ARE NO RELIABLE STATISTICS. THE GOVERNMENT'S ESTIMATE IN SEPTEMBER, 1994, THAT 96 PERCENT OF ALL COMPANIES WERE PAYING AT LEAST THE REGIONAL MINIMUM WAGE IS CERTAINLY EXAGGERATED; INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS' ESTIMATES RANGE BETWEEN 30 AND 60 PERCENT. GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT IS WEAK, AND SANCTIONS VERY LIGHT AGAINST EMPLOYERS WHO FAIL TO PAY THE MINIMUM WAGE. NEVERTHELESS, AS A RESULT OF GOVERNMENT PRESSURES, THE WAVE OF STRIKES IN THE FIRST QUARTER, AND THE MEDAN RIOTS, SOME IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE. LABOR LAW AND MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PROVIDE WORKERS WITH A VARIETY OF OTHER BENEFITS, SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY, AND WORKERS IN MORE MODERN FACILITIES OFTEN RECEIVE HEALTH BENEFITS AND FREE MEALS.

110. THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7-HOUR WORKDAYS AND 40-HOUR WORKWEEKS, WITH ONE 30-MINUTE REST PERIOD FOR EACH 4 HOURS OF WORK. ((NOTE: EMB: DOES THE LAW MANDATE A WEEKLY 24-HOUR REST PERIOD?)) THE DAILY OVERTIME RATE IS 1 1/2 TIMES THE NORMAL HOURLY RATE FOR THE FIRST HOUR, AND TWICE THE HOURLY RATE FOR ADDITIONAL OVERTIME. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE. OBSERVANCE OF LAWS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND BY REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ARE FAIRLY COMMON AND OFTEN RESULT IN STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. IN GENERAL, GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ARE WEAK.

111. BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. IN THE LARGELY WESTERN-OPERATED OIL SECTOR, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUNCTION REASONABLY WELL. HOWEVER, IN THE COUNTRY'S 100,000 LARGER REGISTERED COMPANIES IN THE NONOIL SECTOR, THE QUALITY OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAMS VARIES GREATLY. THE ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS IS SEVERELY HAMPERED BY THE LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER INSPECTORS AS WELL AS BY THE LOW LEVEL OF EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION FOR SOUND HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES. ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION ON THE PART OF INSPECTORS ARE COMMON. WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS. EMPLOYERS ARE FORBIDDEN BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO, BUT THE LAW IS NOT EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED. ((NOTE: EMB: DO WORKERS HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMOVE THEMSELVES FROM DANGEROUS WORK SITUATIONS WITHOUT JEOPARDY TO CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT?))

CHRISTOPHER

NNNN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PTQ4414

RELEASED IN FULL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ4414

PAGE 01 STATE 021951 271814Z
ORIGIN DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01	EB-01
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-14	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SP-00
	SR-00	SS-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	PRME-01
	G-00	/035R					

DRAFTED BY: DRL: SYIP
APPROVED BY: EAP/FO: SO'LEARY
EAP/PIMBS: SBUTCHER
EAP/PIMBS: SJBLAKE
EAP/PIMBS: MJFLECK
EAP/RSP: BAMALKIN
----------A0369A 271839Z /45
O 271811Z JAN 95
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 021951

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM ELAB KSPR ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: V-3 OF 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
REF: (A) 94 STATE 238530, (B) AND PREVIOUS

1. LOU (NOFORN) - ENTIRE TEXT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 021951 271814Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200504416

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

2. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE. SEE PARAGRAPH 3.

3. BELOW IS THE REVISED HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA. POST IS REQUESTED TO REVIEW THE TEXT FOR FACTUAL OR OTHER ERRORS, BUT NOT TO RENEGOTIATE THE TEXT OR ADD NEW INFORMATION UNLESS IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL AND SUCCINCT. POST'S COMMENTS SHOULD BE KEYED TO THE SECTIONS AND SUBSECTIONS OF THE REPORT. REQUEST RESPONSE BY IMMEDIATE CABLE WITHIN 24 HOURS OF RECEIPT OF THIS CABLE.

4. TEXT:

INDONESIA

5. THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, DESPITE A SURFACE ADHERENCE TO DEMOCRATIC FORMS, REMAINS STRONGLY AUTHORITARIAN. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, NOW IN HIS SIXTH 5-YEAR TERM, A SMALL GROUP OF ADVISORS, AND THE MILITARY DOMINATE THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THIS HEAVILY POPULATED DEVELOPING COUNTRY, WHOSE PEOPLE COME FROM HUNDREDS OF DIFFERENT CULTURAL, LINGUISTIC, AND ETHNIC BACKGROUNDS. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES ALLEGIANCE TO A STATE IDEOLOGY KNOWN AS "PANCASILA" WHICH INCLUDES BELIEF IN A SUPREME GOD, A JUST AND CIVILIZED HUMANITY, NATIONAL UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND HAS USED PANCASILA AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR RESTRICTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITION ELEMENTS.

6. UNDER A DOCTRINE OF "DUAL FUNCTION," THE MILITARY IS GIVEN SPECIAL CIVIC RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, INCLUDING UNELECTED MILITARY SEATS IN PARLIAMENT (DPR)

AND LOCAL LEGISLATURES, IN ADDITION TO ITS DEFENSE AND SECURITY ROLES. THE 450,000 MEMBER ARMED FORCES, INCLUDING 175,000 POLICE, CONSIDER THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY AS THEIR PRIMARY MISSION, AND THEY HAVE TRADITIONALLY ACTED SWIFTLY TO SUPPRESS PERCEIVED THREATS TO SECURITY, WHETHER FROM CRIMINAL ACTS, SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS, OR ALLEGEDLY SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, WITH A VIGOR THAT HAS OFTEN LED TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. A FEW MILITARY LEADERS SOMETIMES RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

VALIDITY OF THIS "SECURITY APPROACH." THERE CONTINUED TO BE NUMEROUS, CREDIBLE REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE MILITARY AND POLICE, ALTHOUGH THEY EXHIBITED SOME RESTRAINT IN CONTROLLING CROWDS AND DEMONSTRATIONS.

7. IN CONTRAST TO ITS RESTRICTIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM, INDONESIA HAS AN INCREASINGLY OPEN AND DEREGULATED ECONOMY. THOUGH STILL A POOR COUNTRY, INDONESIA'S ECONOMY CONTINUED TO EXPAND IN 1994 ESPECIALLY IN MANUFACTURING, WITH GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT EXPECTED TO INCREASE BY 6.2 PERCENT. WITH INFLATION REMAINING UNDER CONTROL, THE CONTINUED ECONOMIC GROWTH HAS PRODUCED STEADY GAINS IN LIVING STANDARDS FOR MUCH OF INDONESIAN SOCIETY. THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE LIVING BELOW THE POVERTY LINE HAS FALLEN FROM 70 MILLION IN 1970 TO 27 MILLION IN 1990. INCOME INEQUALITY HAS BEEN SLIGHTLY REDUCED OVER THE PAST QUARTER CENTURY. WIDESPREAD UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTS, HOWEVER, AS DO CORRUPTION AND INFLUENCE PEDDLING.

8. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO COMMIT SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND IN SOME AREAS, NOTABLY FREEDOM OF

EXPRESSION, IT BECAME MARKEDLY MORE REPRESSIVE, DEPARTING FROM A LONG-TERM TREND TOWARDS GREATER OPENNESS. THE MOST SERIOUS ABUSES INCLUDED THE CONTINUING INABILITY OF THE PEOPLE TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT, AND HARSH REPRESSION OF EAST TIMORESE DISSIDENTS. REPORTS OF EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS DECLINED. SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO TORTURE THOSE IN CUSTODY: SOME SOURCES REPORTED THAT THE USE OF TORTURE DECLINED BUT DEFINITIVE STATISTICS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. EXTRAJUDICIAL ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS CONTINUED, AS DID THE USE OF EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE IN DEALING WITH SUSPECTED CRIMINALS OR PERCEIVED TROUBLEMAKERS.

9. THE GOVERNMENT IMPOSED SEVERE LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOMS OF SPEECH, PRESS, AND ASSEMBLY, AND SUPPRESSED EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A FREE TRADE MOVEMENT. THE ARMED FORCES CONTINUED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOST SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. SOME MILITARY LEADERS SHOWED A

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

WILLINGNESS TO ADMIT MISCONDUCT PUBLICLY AND TAKE ACTION AGAINST OFFENDERS. THE GOVERNMENT IN A FEW CASES BROUGHT ABUSERS TO JUSTICE, BUT THEIR PUNISHMENTS RARELY MATCHED THE SEVERITY OF THE ABUSE. THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED TO BE LARGELY SUBSERVIENT TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE MILITARY. WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM REMAINED A SERIOUS PROBLEM.

10. THE GOVERNMENT WITHDREW THE LICENSES OF THREE LEADING PUBLICATIONS AND ANNOUNCED THAT NO NEW LICENSES WOULD BE ISSUED TO GENERAL NEWS PUBLICATIONS IN THE FOLLOWING YEAR. IT PREPARED A DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE THAT WOULD RESTRICT FURTHER THE ACTIVITIES OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO'S), AND INCREASED CRACKDOWNS ON ANTIGOVERNMENTAL CRITICS, LABOR ACTIVISTS, AND ALLEGED CRIMINALS DURING THE YEAR, INCLUDING IN AN ANTICRIME CAMPAIGN DUBBED "OPERATION CLEANUP." THESE CONSTRAINTS, HOWEVER, DID NOT COMPLETELY DAMPEN DISSENTING VOICES IN THE MEDIA, AND THE MANY HUMAN RIGHTS NGO'S CONTINUED TO BE ACTIVE. THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ESTABLISHED IN 1993 SHOWED SOME INDEPENDENCE AND A WILLINGNESS TO CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND ACTIONS.

11. ON EAST TIMOR, NO PROGRESS WAS MADE IN ACCOUNTING FOR THE MISSING FOLLOWING THE 1991 DILI INCIDENT, AND TROOP LEVELS REMAINED UNJUSTIFIABLY HIGH. SOMEWHAT GREATER ACCESS WAS PERMITTED TO FOREIGN JOURNALISTS AND OTHERS, INCLUDING A JULY VISIT BY THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON SUMMARY, ARBITRARY AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL EXECUTIONS, ALTHOUGH SOME NGO REPRESENTATIVES AND FOREIGN JOURNALISTS CONTINUED TO ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES OR WERE DENIED ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS

12. HISTORICALLY, POLITICALLY MOTIVATED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS GENERALLY HAVE OCCURRED MOST FREQUENTLY IN AREAS

WHERE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS WERE ACTIVE, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAYA. ALTHOUGH SECURITY FORCES CONTINUE TO EMPLOY HARSH MEASURES AGAINST SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN THESE THREE AREAS, THERE WERE NO CONFIRMED REPORTS OF POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS IN 1994.

13. HOWEVER, THERE WERE REPORTS OF SECURITY FORCES KILLING ARMED INSURGENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, SIX DEATHS OF ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS WERE REPORTED IN CLASHES IN ACEH. AT LEAST FOUR MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES WERE ALSO REPORTED KILLED IN THESE CLASHES. RELIABLE CIVILIAN SOURCES ALSO REPORTED THAT IN EAST TIMOR SECURITY FORCES KILLED SEVERAL TIMORESE CIVILIANS. THE NUMBER OF SUCH REPORTS WAS LOWER THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS, HOWEVER. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF SUCH KILLINGS IN IRIAN JAYA.

14. TROOPS STRENGTH IN EAST TIMOR DECLINED IN 1994. RELIABLE ESTIMATES INDICATED ABOUT 6,000 ARMY TROOPS FROM OUTSIDE THE PROVINCE REINFORCED THE NORMAL GARRISON OF ABOUT 3,000. THERE ARE ALSO ABOUT 3,000 POLICE IN EAST TIMOR. COMMANDERS THERE HAVE STATED THAT THEY INTEND TO REVIEW THE LEVEL OF TROOPS IN THE PROVINCE FOR POSSIBLE FURTHER REDUCTIONS ON A TWICE YEARLY BASIS. THE GOVERNMENT OFFERED A GENERAL AMNESTY TO MEMBERS OF THE TIMORESE RESISTANCE WHO SURRENDER THEIR ARMS, AND WERE REPORTED TO HAVE RELEASED SOME WHO WERE APPREHENDED RATHER THAN TRYING THEM.

15. THE POLICE OFTEN EMPLOY EXCESSIVE FORCE IN APPREHENDING SUSPECTS OR COPING WITH ALLEGED CRIMINALS.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

IN JAKARTA POLICE IN APRIL MOUNTED AN ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM DUBBED "OPERATION CLEANUP," IN WHICH THEY EMPLOYED DEADLY FORCE AGAINST SUSPECTS. IN RESPONSE TO PROTESTS THAT THE METHODS USED ARE UNJUSTIFIABLY HARSH AND AMOUNT TO EXECUTION WITHOUT TRIAL, POLICE HAVE GENERALLY CLAIMED THAT THE SUSPECTS WERE FLEEING, RESISTING ARREST, OR THREATENING THE POLICE. ALTHOUGH ACCURATE STATISTICS WERE UNAVAILABLE, FATAL SHOOTINGS BY POLICE SEEMED TO BE ON THE INCREASE, WITH SOME 150 INCIDENTS REPORTED IN WEST JAVA (INCLUDING JAKARTA) BY MID-JULY. HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THIS CLEANUP CAMPAIGN WAS INTENSIFIED IN THE WEEKS LEADING UP TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION FORUM (APEC) MEETING IN NOVEMBER, AND CONTRIBUTED TO A DETERIORATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION N INDONESIA. IN NORTH SUMATRA, 80 SHOOTINGS BY POLICE INCLUDING FOUR DEATHS WERE REPORTED BY MID-DECEMBER 1994.

16. IN THE PAST THE AUTHORITIES ALMOST NEVER TOOK ACTION AGAINST POLICE FOR USING EXCESSIVE FORCE. HOWEVER, THERE IS SOME INDICATION THAT THE SITUATION IS CHANGING, THOUGH ACTION WHEN TAKEN STILL IS NOT COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF POLICE ABUSES. FOR EXAMPLE, A MILITARY COURT IN MEDAN SENTENCED A POLICEMAN ACCUSED OF KILLING A SUSPECT ALLEGEDLY TRYING TO ESCAPE IN 1993 TO THREE MONTHS IN PRISON IN 1994. IN MARCH A MILITARY COURT SENTENCED FOUR POLICEMEN IN PALEMBANG TO PRISON TERMS OF TWO TO THREE MONTHS FOR SHOOTING, BUT NOT KILLING, A SUSPECT AT CLOSE RANGE. THE FIVE POLICE OFFICERS DETAINED IN 1993 IN NORTH SUMATRA IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEATH OF SYAMSUL BAHRI WERE NOT TRIED, APPARENTLY BECAUSE

THE FAMILY DID NOT PURSUE THE CASE. BY YEAR'S END AT LEAST ONE OF THE TEN POLICE CADETS ACCUSED OF BEATING A MAN TO DEATH IN KUPANG IN APRIL WAS SENTENCED TO TWO YEARS IN PRISON. AT YEAR'S END THE MILITARY CLAIMED TO

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

BE STILL INVESTIGATING THE SEPTEMBER 1993 KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES OF FOUR DEMONSTRATORS WHO WERE PEACEFULLY PROTESTING CONSTRUCTION OF A DAM IN MADURA, WHICH INVOLVED SOME TWO DOZEN POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL. NO TRIALS HAD YET COMMENCED. RESIDENTS FROM THE AREA MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN MAY AND DECEMBER TO REQUEST LEGAL ACTION AGAINST CIVILIANS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCUSED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE SHOOTINGS.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

17. THERE WERE NO POLITICALLY MOTIVATED ABDUCTIONS. SECURITY FORCES IN AREAS OF CONFLICT OFTEN HOLD SUSPECTS FOR LONG PERIODS WITHOUT FORMAL CHARGES, BUT THESE CASES USUALLY END WITH OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF DETENTION (SEE SECTION L.D.). RELIABLE SOURCES REPORT THAT ALL THOSE ALLEGED TO HAVE DISAPPEARED DURING THE MID-JULY DISTURBANCES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR, HAVE BEEN LOCATED.

18. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MISSING AND DEAD FROM THE NOVEMBER 12, 1991 MILITARY SHOOTING OF CIVILIANS IN DILI, EAST TIMOR, REMAINED INADEQUATE. NO ADDITIONAL CASES OF THOSE STILL LISTED AS MISSING IN A REPORT THE MILITARY GAVE TO ASIA WATCH WERE RESOLVED DURING THE YEAR. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN IMPLIED THAT THEIR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FAILURE TO LOCATE THOSE MISSING WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO THE SUCCESS OF THOSE PERSONS IN EVADING DETECTION. MANY KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS, HOWEVER, CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE MISSING ARE DEAD AND THAT SOME PEOPLE IN THE ARMED FORCES KNOW WHERE THEIR BODIES ARE.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

19. THE CRIMINAL CODE MAKES IT A CRIME PUNISHABLE BY UP TO FOUR YEARS IN PRISON FOR ANY OFFICIAL TO USE VIOLENCE OR FORCE TO ELICIT A CONFESSION, AND ESTABLISHES PRETRIAL PROCEDURES TO GIVE SUSPECTS OR THEIR FAMILIES THE RIGHT

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF AN ARREST OR DETENTION. IN PRACTICE, WHILE SOME SOURCES REPORTED THAT THE USE OF TORTURE DECLINED, TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF MISTREATMENT STILL EXIST, PARTICULARLY IN REGIONS OF SECURITY CONCERNS, SUCH AS ACEH AND EAST TIMOR, AND LEGAL PROTECTIONS ARE BOTH INADEQUATE AND WIDELY IGNORED. ACCORDING TO THE JANUARY, 1994 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE MOST COMMONLY USED METHODS ARE: BEATING ON THE HEAD, SHINS, AND TORSO WITH FISTS, LENGTHS OF WOOD, IRON BARS, BOTTLES, ROCKS, AND ELECTRIC CABLES; KICKING WITH HEAVY BOOTS; BURNING WITH LIGHTED CIGARETTES; ELECTRIC SHOCKS; SLASHING WITH RAZOR BLADES AND KNIVES; DEATH THREATS, FAKED EXECUTIONS AND DELIBERATE WOUNDING WITH FIREARMS; POURING WATER THROUGH THE NOSE; PROLONGED IMMERSION IN FETID WATER; HANGING UPSIDE DOWN BY THE FEET; PLACING HEAVY OBJECTS ON KNEES AND OTHER JOINTS; ISOLATION; SLEEP AND FOOD DEPRIVATION;

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

GENITAL MUTILATION, SEXUAL MOLESTATION, AND RAPE. REPORTS OF TORTURE HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY FREQUENT IN ACEH. CIVILIAN SOURCES IN EAST TIMOR REPORT THAT SECURITY AGENCIES STILL EMPLOY TORTURE BEFORE RELEASING SUSPECTS TO POLICE CUSTODY, PARTICULARLY ELECTRIC SHOCKS, THOUGH ITS INCIDENCE HAS DECREASED.

20. POLICE OFTEN RESORT TO PHYSICAL ABUSES EVEN IN MINOR INCIDENTS, AND PRISON CONDITIONS ARE HARSH, WITH VIOLENCE AMONG PRISONERS AND MISTREATMENT AND EXTORTION OF INMATES BY GUARDS REPORTEDLY COMMON. THE INCIDENCE OF MISTREATMENT BY PRISON OFFICIALS DROPS SHARPLY ONCE A PRISONER HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM POLICE OR MILITARY CUSTODY INTO THE CIVILIAN PRISON SYSTEM, AND PRISON CONDITIONS GENERALLY HAVE IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS. OFFICIALS HAVE PUBLICLY CONDEMNED POLICE BRUTALITY AND HARSH PRISON CONDITIONS AND OCCASIONALLY INSTIGATE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, INCLUDING TRANSFER, DISMISSAL, AND TRIALS LEADING TO PRISON. IN AUGUST A CIVILIAN EMPLOYED AT A MEDAN JAIL WAS TRIED ON CHARGES OF CAUSING THE DEATH OF AN INMATE WHO DIED FROM INJURIES SUSTAINED IN A BEATING. HE WAS SENTENCED TO SIX MONTHS IN JAIL. SUCH

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ACTIONS, HOWEVER, ARE AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE OF GENERAL IMPUNITY.

21. POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE USUALLY MIXED WITH THE GENERAL PRISON POPULATION, ALTHOUGH IN THE CIPINANG PRISON IN JAKARTA HIGH-PROFILE POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE SEGREGATED. IN 1994 THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWED THE ICRC TO VISIT PRISONERS IN CIPINANG IN JAKARTA AND ALSO GRANTED ACCESS TO PRISONS ELSEWHERE IN JAVA, AND IN SUMATRA, EAST

TIMOR, ACEH, AND OTHER PROVINCES. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO HAS ALLOWED THE ICRC TO ORGANIZE FAMILY VISITS TO POLITICAL PRISONERS. CONDITIONS WERE DESCRIBED AS SPARTAN BUT ADEQUATE, AND IN SOME CASES THERE WERE IMPROVEMENTS AFTER ICRC INTERVENTION. IN JANUARY INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES SUSPENDED VISITATION RIGHTS FOR JAILED EAST TIMORESE FRETILIN LEADER XANANA GUSMAO FOR 1 MONTH FOLLOWING RELEASE OF A LETTER HE SENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS WHICH INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES DEEMED OBJECTIONABLE.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

22. THE POLICE ROUTINELY VIOLATED THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE PROTECTIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION. THE CODE SPECIFIES THE RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO NOTIFY THEIR FAMILIES, AND THAT WARRANTS MUST BE PRODUCED DURING AN ARREST EXCEPT UNDER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS, SUCH AS WHEN A SUSPECT IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME. IT ALSO AUTHORIZES INVESTIGATORS TO ISSUE WARRANTS TO ASSIST IN THEIR INVESTIGATIONS OR IF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED. DESPITE THESE REQUIREMENTS, AUTHORITIES SOMETIMES MAKE ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS. SOME PERSONS SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE MEDAN RIOTS IN APRIL WERE ARRESTED BEFORE FORMAL WARRANTS WERE ISSUED.

23. THE LAW PRESUMES DEFENDANTS INNOCENT AND PERMITS BAIL. THEY OR THEIR FAMILIES MAY ALSO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THEIR ARREST AND DETENTION IN A PRETRIAL HEARING AND MAY SUE FOR COMPENSATION IF WRONGFULLY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DETAINED. HOWEVER, IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO INVOKE THIS PROCEDURE, LET ALONE RECEIVE COMPENSATION, AFTER BEING RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGE. IN BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COURTS, APPEALS BASED ON LEGALITY OF ARREST AND DETENTION ARE RARELY, IF EVER, ACCEPTED. THE CODE ALSO CONTAINS SPECIFIC LIMITS ON PERIODS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION AND SPECIFIES WHEN THE COURTS MUST GET INVOLVED TO APPROVE EXTENSIONS, USUALLY AFTER 60 DAYS.

24. WHERE ACTIVE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS EXIST, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR AND ACEH, PEOPLE ARE ROUTINELY DETAINED WITHOUT WARRANTS, CHARGES, OR COURT PROCEEDINGS. BAIL IS RARELY GRANTED, ESPECIALLY IN POLITICAL CASES. THE AUTHORITIES FREQUENTLY INTERFERE WITH ACCESS TO DEFENSE COUNSEL, AND MAKE IT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO GET LEGAL ASSISTANCE FROM VOLUNTARY LEGAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS. THE AUTHORITIES ROUTINELY APPROVE EXTENSIONS OF PERIODS OF DETENTION. SUSPECTS CHARGED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW ARE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL PROCEDURES OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE WHICH ALLOW, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY TO HOLD A SUSPECT UP TO A YEAR BEFORE TRIAL. HE MAY RENEW THIS 1-YEAR PERIOD WITHOUT LIMIT. SPECIAL LAWS ON CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND NARCOTICS ARE SIMILARLY EXEMPT FROM THE CODE'S PROTECTIONS.

25. THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) OPERATES OUTSIDE THE CODE AND HAS WIDE DISCRETION TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE PERSONS THOUGHT TO THREATEN NATIONAL

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO STATE THE EXACT NUMBER OF ARBITRARY ARRESTS OR DETENTIONS WITHOUT TRIAL BUT IN MARCH 59 PEOPLE BEING HELD IN CONNECTION WITH THE 1989-1991 ACEH INSURGENCY WERE RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGES OR TRIALS, BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER RELEASED SINCE 1990 TO AROUND 965 PERSONS. MANY HAD BEEN HELD INCOMMUNICADO WITHOUT KNOWING THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM; SOME, INCLUDING AT LEAST FIVE OF THOSE RELEASED IN 1994, HAD BEEN HELD FOR OVER 2 YEARS. THE AUTHORITIES REQUIRE MANY OF THOSE RELEASED TO REPORT BACK AT REGULAR INTERVALS. THREE OTHER ACEHNESE CONVICTED PREVIOUSLY OF SUBVERSION WERE RELEASED IN 1994 AFTER SERVING TWO-THIRDS OF THEIR SENTENCES. THE DECLINE IN ARMED SEPARATIST ACTIVITY LED TO FEWER DETENTIONS, AND FEWER THAN 100 ACEHNESE WERE BELIEVED TO BE IN DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL AT YEAR'S END. AN ADDITIONAL FIVE PERSONS WERE SENTENCED FOR SUBVERSION IN ACEH IN 1994, AND THE TRIALS OF FIVE OTHERS ON CHARGES OF SUBVERSION AND NARCOTICS SMUGGLING WERE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN IN MID-DECEMBER.

26. IN EAST TIMOR MILITARY AUTHORITIES CONTINUED THE PRACTICE OF DETAINING PEOPLE WITHOUT CHARGES FOR SHORT PERIODS AND THEN REQUIRING THEM TO REPORT DAILY OR WEEKLY TO POLICE AFTER THEIR RELEASE. THREE EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS DETAINED BY POLICE IN AUGUST FOR BRINGING FORBIDDEN BOOKS AND FOREIGN ITEMS INTO THE PROVINCE, WERE RELEASED BUT TWO OF THEM ARE REQUIRED TO REPORT TO THE AUTHORITIES. SIX EAST TIMORESE WHO RECEIVED LENGTHY SENTENCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE NOVEMBER, 1991 SHOOTINGS IN DILI WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON IN SEMARANG WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO THEIR FAMILIES OR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS, AND THEIR WHEREABOUTS WERE UNKNOWN FOR SEVERAL DAYS. JOSE ANTONIO NEVES, AN ACKNOWLEDGED MEMBER OF THE CLANDESTINE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, AND IN DETENTION SINCE MAY, WAS CHARGED WITH SEDITION IN NOVEMBER. HIS DEFENSE ATTORNEY ASKED FOR DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGES, CITING PROCEDURAL FLAWS IN NEVES' ARREST. THEY ALSO ALLEGE THAT POLICE DENIED HIM ACCESS TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR THE FIRST 2 MONTHS OF

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

HIS DETENTION. OVER 100 PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED DURING DEMONSTRATIONS AND OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE IN DILI AROUND THE TIME OF THE NOVEMBER APEC MEETINGS.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

27. THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATES THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, BUT IN PRACTICE THE JUDICIARY IS SUBORDINATED TO THE EXECUTIVE AND THE MILITARY, AND IN MANY CASES PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AGAINST COERCED CONFESSIONS, ARE INADEQUATE TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL. A QUADRIPARTITE JUDICIARY OF GENERAL, RELIGIOUS, MILITARY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS EXISTS BELOW THE SUPREME COURT. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT TO HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS IN ALL FOUR SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE. THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT CONSIDER FACTUAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF LAW. A THREE-JUDGE PANEL CONDUCTS TRIALS AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL, POSES QUESTIONS, HEARS EVIDENCE, DECIDES GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND ASSESSES PUNISHMENT. INITIAL JUDGMENTS ARE RARELY REVERSED IN THE APPEALS PROCESS, ALTHOUGH SENTENCES ARE SOMETIMES INCREASED OR REDUCED (BOTH THE DEFENSE AND THE PROSECUTION MAY APPEAL). IN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

1994 FOR EXAMPLE, THE 4-YEAR SENTENCE OF A STUDENT TRIED IN JAKARTA FOR INSULTING THE PRESIDENT IN LEAFLETS HE DISTRIBUTED AT THE PARLIAMENT IN NOVEMBER, 1993 WAS INCREASED TO 5 YEARS UPON APPEAL OF THE PROSECUTOR. THE RELATIVELY LIGHT (6 MONTHS) SENTENCES OF 21 OTHER STUDENTS WHO WERE ALSO CONVICTED OF INSULTING THE PRESIDENT DURING DEMONSTRATIONS AT PARLIAMENT IN DECEMBER, 1993 WERE INCREASED TO BETWEEN 8 AND 14 MONTHS FOLLOWING APPEAL BY THE PROSECUTOR. IN AUGUST 1994, THE SUPREME COURT ORDERED THE RELEASE OF THOSE AMONG THE 21 STUDENTS MENTIONED ABOVE WHOSE SENTENCES HAD BEEN RAISED TO 8 MONTHS WHEN THEY WERE STILL BEING HELD A WEEK FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THEIR SENTENCES.

28. DEFENDANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AND TO PRODUCE WITNESSES IN THEIR DEFENSE. AN EXCEPTION IS ALLOWED IN CASES WHERE DISTANCE OR EXPENSE IS DEEMED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

EXCESSIVE FOR TRANSPORTING WITNESSES TO COURT, IN WHICH CASE SWORN AFFIDAVITS MAY BE INTRODUCED. HOWEVER, THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR WITNESS IMMUNITY OR FOR COMPULSORY PROCESS OF DEFENSE WITNESSES. AS A RESULT, WITNESSES ARE SOMETIMES TOO AFRAID OF RETRIBUTION TO TESTIFY AGAINST THE AUTHORITIES. IN CASES TRIED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW, TRIALS IN ABSENTIA ARE PERMITTED, AND PUBLIC ACCESS GENERALLY REQUIRES ADVANCE APPROVAL BY THE MILITARY. THE COURTS COMMONLY ALLOWED THE FORCED CONFESSIONS AND LIMITED THE PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE. FOR EXAMPLE,THE COURT TRYING THE SUSPECTS IN THE MARSINAH MURDER ADMITTED THEIR CONFESSIONS AND CONVICTED THEM OF THE MURDER ALTHOUGH THEY CLAIMED THAT THEIR CONFESSIONS HAD BEEN OBTAINED BY

COERCION AND TORTURE.

29. THE COURT ALLOWED DEFENSE ATTORNEYS FOR THE STUDENT MENTIONED ABOVE WHOSE SENTENCE WAS RAISED TO 5 YEARS ON APPEAL TO CALL ONLY ONE OUT OF 17 WITNESSES THEY WISHED TO PRESENT. MOCHTAR PAKPAHAN WAS NOT ALLOWED TO CALL EXPERT LEGAL WITNESSES IN HIS DEFENSE (SEE SECTION 6). DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND CAN BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN THEIR OWN TRIALS. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE GIVES DEFENDANTS THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY FROM THE MOMENT OF THEIR ARREST THROUGH THE INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL. THE LAW REQUIRES THAT A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IN CAPITAL CASES AND THOSE INVOLVING A PRISON SENTENCE OF 15 YEARS OR MORE. IN CASES INVOLVING POTENTIAL SENTENCES OF 5 YEARS OR MORE, A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IF THE ACCUSED DESIRES AN ATTORNEY BUT IS INDIGENT. DESTITUTE DEFENDANTS CAN OBTAIN PRIVATE LEGAL HELP, SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, DEFENDANTS ARE OFTEN PERSUADED NOT TO HIRE AN ATTORNEY, OR ACCESS TO AN ATTORNEY OF THEIR CHOICE IS IMPEDED. THE AUTHORITIES REPORTEDLY PRESSURED SEVERAL DEFENDANTS TRIED IN MEDAN ON CHARGES STEMMING FROM LABOR UNREST IN APRIL WHICH TURNED INTO ANTI-CHINESE RIOTS TO DECLINE ATTORNEYS, WHILE SOME ATTORNEYS INVOLVED IN THE CASES WERE SUBJECTED TO OFFICIAL HARASSMENT OF VARIOUS KINDS. FIVE EAST TIMORESE SENTENCED TO 20 MONTHS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

IMPRISONMENT FOR PUBLICLY EXPRESSING ANTI-INDONESIAN SENTIMENTS DURING A BANNER-WAVING INCIDENT BEFORE FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WERE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. AUTHORITIES CLAIM THEY DECLINED THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, WHILE NONGOVERNMENTAL SOURCES INDICATED ACCESS TO COUNSEL WAS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

IMPEDED AND THAT THE DEFENSE LAWYERS WERE NOT NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE OF THEIR APPEARANCE IN COURT THAT SENTENCING WAS TO BEGIN.

30. THE SUPREME COURT THEORETICALLY STANDS COEQUAL WITH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES, BUT IT DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER LAWS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT. THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOT YET EXERCISED ITS POWER (HELD SINCE 1985) TO REVIEW MINISTERIAL DECREES AND REGULATIONS. IN 1993 CHIEF JUSTICE PURWOTO GANDASUBRATA LAID OUT JUDICIAL PROCEDURES FOR LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND SOME CASES OF THIS KIND WERE INITIATED IN 1994. JUDGES ARE CIVIL SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WHICH CONTROLS THEIR ASSIGNMENTS, PAY, AND PROMOTION. THEY ARE SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM MILITARY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES. SUCH CONTROL OFTEN DETERMINES THE OUTCOME OF A CASE. CORRUPTION PERMEATES THE INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM. IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, THE PAYMENT OF BRIBES CAN INFLUENCE PROSECUTION, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCING. TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT THE SALARIES OF JUDGES WOULD BE DOUBLED AS OF JANUARY 1, 1995.

31. THE SUPREME COURT BOWED TO GOVERNMENT PRESSURE IN A LONGSTANDING LAND DISPUTE BETWEEN THE CENTRAL JAVA GOVERNMENT AND 34 FARMERS WHO HAD BEEN FORCED TO SELL THEIR LAND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE KEDUNGOMBO DAM, A DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FUNDED BY THE WORLD BANK. THE VILLAGERS SUED FOR INCREASED COMPENSATION. THE SUPREME COURT INITIALLY OVERTURNED DECISIONS OF BOTH THE SEMARANG DISTRICT COURT AND THE CENTRAL JAVA HIGH COURT IN FAVOR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

OF THE GOVERNMENT, AWARDING THE PLAINTIFFS EVEN GREATER COMPENSATION THAN THEY HAD SOUGHT, INCLUDING "NONMATERIAL LOSSES." HOWEVER, THE SUPREME COURT LATER REVERSED ITS OWN RULING AFTER THE GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO ACCEPT IT AND ASKED THE COURT TO REVIEW IT AGAIN.

32. IN AN UNUSUAL MOVE IN NOVEMBER, THE EAST JAVA HIGH COURT OVERTURNED THE CONVICTION OF THE REPUTED MASTERMIND OF THE MARSINAH MURDER FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS APPEALED THE DECISION TO THE SUPREME COURT DESPITE PROVISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL CODE WHICH DISALLOW AN APPEAL IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.

33. FOR THE FOURTH CONSECUTIVE YEAR, FEWER PERSONS WERE PROSECUTED IN 1994 UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW, WHICH CARRIES A MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH. THE AUTHORITIES TRIED AT LEAST FIVE PERSONS IN 1994 UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW FOR SUBVERSION IN ACEH AND SENTENCED THEM TO 19 TO 20 YEARS' IMPRISONMENT. THE ANTISUBVERSION LAW MAKES IT A CRIME TO ENGAGE IN ACTS THAT COULD DISTORT, UNDERMINE, OR DEVIATE FROM THE STATE IDEOLOGY OR BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, OR WHICH COULD DISSEMINATE FEELINGS OF HOSTILITY OR AROUSE HOSTILITY, DISTURBANCES, OR ANXIETY AMONG THE POPULATION. THE EXCESSIVELY VAGUE LANGUAGE MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO PROSECUTE PEOPLE MERELY FOR PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF VIEWS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT.

34. THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT MAKE AVAILABLE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE CURRENTLY SERVING SUBVERSION SENTENCES OR SENTENCES CLASSIFIED AS FELONIES UNDER THE

SO-CALLED HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. INFORMED SOURCES ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE SERVING SENTENCES FOR SUBVERSION IN 1994, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE BANNED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI), MUSLIM MILITANTS, AND THOSE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN IRIAN JAYA, ACEH, AND EAST TIMOR, AT AROUND 300. SCORES, AND POSSIBLY HUNDREDS, MORE WERE BELIEVED TO BE SERVING SENTENCES UNDER THE HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. SOME OF THESE PERSONS ADVOCATED OR EMPLOYED VIOLENCE, BUT MANY ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO WERE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPTING TO EXERCISE SUCH UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH OR ASSOCIATION OR WHO WERE CONVICTED IN MANIFESTLY UNFAIR TRIALS. SIX PRISONERS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION REMAINED UNDER DEATH SENTENCE. FIVE OF THESE WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, ARE 78 OR MORE YEARS OLDER, AND HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED FOR 29 YEARS. IN JUNE TWO STUDENTS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN 1993 FOR POSSESSING BANNED LITERATURE AND PARTICIPATING IN ILLEGAL DISCUSSION GROUPS WERE GRANTED CONDITIONAL RELEASE AFTER SERVING TWO-THIRDS OF THEIR SENTENCES. THREE ALLEGED MEMBERS OF ACEH MERDEKA CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION WERE RELEASED AFTER SERVING LENGTHY SENTENCES.

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

35. JUDICIAL WARRANTS FOR SEARCHES ARE REQUIRED EXCEPT FOR CASES INVOLVING SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, SECURITY AGENCIES REGULARLY MAKE FORCED OR SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES. SECURITY AGENCIES INTIMIDATE BY CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS

AND RESIDENCES AND SELECTIVELY MONITORING LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS WITHOUT LEGAL RESTRAINT. GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND ITS FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY PERSONS THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP. THE GOVERNMENT STATED IN LATE 1990 THAT THIS LATTER GROUP THEN TOTALED 1,410,333 PEOPLE. THESE PERSONS AND THEIR RELATIVES SOMETIMES ARE SUBJECT TO SURVEILLANCE, REQUIRED CHECK-INS, PERIODIC INDOCTRINATION, AND RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL OUTSIDE THEIR CITY OF RESIDENCE. THEIR LEGALLY REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CARDS CARRY THE INITIALS "E.T." WHICH STAND FOR "EX-TAPOL," OR FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER, WHICH READILY IDENTIFIES THEM TO PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYERS OR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

36. THE GOVERNMENT'S LONGSTANDING, AMBITIOUS TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM TO MOVE LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE FROM OVERPOPULATED ISLANDS TO MORE ISOLATED AND BACKWARD ONES HAS BEEN CRITICIZED BY NONGOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS. THEY SAY THAT IT NOT ONLY VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE BUT ALSO THOSE OF THE TRANSMIGRANTS, CLAIMING THAT THEY ARE FREQUENTLY DUPED INTO LEAVING THEIR HOME VILLAGES WITHOUT ANY MEANS OF RETURN. (SEE ALSO SECTION 5.)

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 21 STATE 021951 271814Z

37. THE TREND TOWARD GREATER OPENNESS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE PRESS, WHICH CONTINUED THROUGH THE FIRST HALF OF 1994, SUFFERED A SERIOUS SETBACK ON JUNE 21 WHEN THE GOVERNMENT REVOKED THE PUBLISHING PERMITS OF THREE OF INDONESIA'S BEST KNOWN WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS: TEMPO, DETIK, AND EDITOR. ONE OF THE THREE, TEMPO, WAS THE NATION'S MOST INFLUENTIAL NEWS MAGAZINE, FOUNDED IN 1971 AND WIDELY RESPECTED FOR THE BREADTH AND DEPTH OF ITS COVERAGE. DETIK WAS A HARD-HITTING TABLOID SPECIALIZING IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL ISSUES. EDITOR WAS A RESPECTED VOICE ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS. THE OFFICIAL REASONS GIVEN FOR REVOCATION OF THE PUBLICATION LICENSES WERE THAT TEMPO HAD ENDANGERED NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH ITS REPORTING, AND THAT THE OTHER TWO HAD COMMITTED ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATIONS. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT TOO OPEN REPORTING OF ALLEGED DIFFERENCES IN THE CABINET OVER A CONTROVERSIAL MILITARY PROCUREMENT ISSUE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION.

38. ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 1982 PRESS LAW

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PROVIDE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THE ISSUANCE OF PUBLISHING LICENSES UNDER A 1984 MINISTERIAL DECREE IS ONE METHOD THE GOVERNMENT USES TO CONTROL THE PRESS. THREE OTHER PUBLICATIONS HAD THEIR LICENSES REVOKED IN THE LAST DECADE, ALTHOUGH TWO LATER REAPPEARED WITH NEW NAMES AND CHANGES IN TOP MANAGEMENT. IN DECEMBER, MINISTER OF INFORMATION HARMOKO STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ISSUE NO NEW PRESS LICENSES DURING 1995 FOR PUBLICATIONS ON CURRENT AFFAIRS, AND SAID THERE WAS NO CHANCE THAT THE MAJORITY GROUP OF JOURNALISTS FROM THE

FORMER TEMPO MAGAZINE WOULD BE ISSUED A PRESS PERMIT TO FOUND A SUCCESSOR PUBLICATION; RATHER, THE MINISTER NOTED THAT A PRESS PERMIT HAD ALREADY BEEN ISSUED TO A SMALLER GROUP OF FORMER TEMPO EMPLOYEES. OTHER MEANS OF CONTROL INCLUDE REGULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF ADVERTISING PERMITTED AND OF THE NUMBER OF PAGES ALLOWED IN NEWSPAPERS. THE PRACTICE OF TELEPHONING EDITORS TO CAUTION AGAINST PUBLISHING CERTAIN STORIES--THE SO-CALLED TELEPHONE CULTURE--CONTINUED, AND ITS INCIDENCE SEEMED TO INCREASE FOLLOWING THE ACTION AGAINST THE THREE PUBLICATIONS IN JUNE. SELF-CENSORSHIP CONTINUED TO BE ANOTHER PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED BRAKE ON FREE EXPRESSION WHOSE EFFECTIVENESS INCREASED AFTER JUNE.

39. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES CONTINUED IN SOME CASES TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS, MORE OR LESS SUBTLE, TO LOCAL JOURNALISTS ON WHAT THEY COULD PRINT. FOR EXAMPLE, AFTER EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF THE APRIL STRIKES AND RIOTS, PRESS COVERAGE OF LABOR ISSUES DROPPED MARKEDLY IN MEDAN FOLLOWING DIRECTIVES FROM AUTHORITIES TO CUT BACK ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. IN JAKARTA, PAPERS WERE WARNED AGAINST COVERING TOPICS RANGING FROM THE PROLONGED SUMMER DROUGHT TO THE BAN OF THE THREE PUBLICATIONS. MEDAN POLICE TRIED TO CURB FOREIGN COVERAGE OF THE APRIL DISTURBANCES BY INSISTING ON SPECIAL PERMITS FROM THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, AND AT LEAST TWO FOREIGN REPORTERS WERE FORCED TO LEAVE THE CITY. STAFF OF EAST TIMOR'S ONLY NEWSPAPER WERE SUBJECT TO VARIOUS FORMS OF INTIMIDATION BY UNKNOWN SOURCES, AND A NEWSPAPER-OWNED VEHICLE WAS BURNED AND HEAVILY DAMAGED FOLLOWING THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DEMONSTRATION WHICH WAS AT VARIANCE WITH THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ARRANGED SEVERAL GROUP TOURS OF FOREIGN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES TO EAST TIMOR, BUT FOREIGN MEDIA ACCESS TO IT ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS REMAINS DIFFICULT.

40. THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AGAINST PRESS FREEDOM IN 1994 LIMITED THE INCREASINGLY VOCAL AND INDEPENDENT PRESS THAT HAS EMERGED IN INDONESIAN JOURNALISM IN RECENT YEARS. THOUGH PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS DWINDLED FOLLOWING THE HARSH GOVERNMENT REACTION AGAINST SOME DEMONSTRATORS, ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT PRESS MEASURES CONTINUED IN OTHER CHANNELS. A NUMBER OF UNSANCTIONED JOURNALS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE CRITICAL COVERAGE OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, BUT THEY WERE CIRCULATED IN SMALL NUMBERS LARGELY IN MAJOR CITIES. IN AUGUST, 55 JOURNALISTS FOUNDED THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS, RIVALLING THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (PWI), TO WORK FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND OPPOSE ANY FORM OF CENSORSHIP AND INTERFERENCE IN PRESS FREEDOM. IN SEPTEMBER THE FORMER CHIEF EDITOR OF TEMPO BROUGHT A LAWSUIT IN JAKARTA ADMINISTRATIVE COURT AGAINST THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION OVER THE REVOCATION OF TEMPO'S LICENSE, THE FIRST EVER SUCH LAWSUIT. AT YEAR'S END, THIS SUIT WAS STILL NOT DECIDED. IN OCTOBER MOST OF THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF DETIK JOINED THE STAFF OF THE EXISTING PUBLICATION SYMPHONY AND REVAMPED IT TO RESEMBLE DETIK. HOWEVER, PUBLICATION WAS SUSPENDED AFTER ONLY A FEW DAYS WHEN THE PWI WITHDREW LEGALLY REQUIRED APPROVAL THUS JEOPARDIZING SYMPHONY'S OWN PUBLICATION LICENSE.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

41. WHILE PUBLIC DIALOGUE IS STILL MORE FREE THAN WAS THE CASE A FEW YEARS AGO, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON FREE SPEECH. FOR EXAMPLE, SECURITY FORCES PROHIBITED NOTED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION ON AUGUST 29 FROM ADDRESSING A SEMINAR ON DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY IN SURABAYA. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO PREVENTED SEVERAL OTHER PUBLIC FIGURES, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, FROM PARTICIPATING IN PUBLIC SEMINARS ON ONE OR MORE OCCASIONS. AUTHORITIES OFTEN CAPRICIOUSLY APPLIED THESE STRICTURES WITHOUT CLEAR JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROHIBITION. IN EAST TIMOR AUTHORITIES DENIED PERMISSION FOR NGO'S AND THE LOCAL UNIVERSITY TO HOLD AN OPEN SEMINAR ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT. IN FEBRUARY AUTHORITIES IN EAST JAVA BANNED THE PERFORMANCE IN SURABAYA OF A PLAY, BY WELL-KNOWN AUTHOR EMHA AINUN NADJIB, WHICH WAS CRITICAL OF GOVERNMENT LAND POLICIES IN DEVELOPMENT CASES. SUBSEQUENTLY THE AUTHORITIES ALLOWED PERFORMANCE OF THE PLAY, WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY PERFORMED IN JOGJAKARTA. TWO U. S. MOVIES WERE BANNED FOLLOWING PROTEST BY ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS LEADERS. HOWEVER, A PLAY ABOUT THE CONTROVERSIAL MURDER OF LABOR ACTIVIST MARSINAH WAS STAGED IN JAKARTA IN SEPTEMBER.

42. WHILE THE LAW PROVIDES FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM, CONSTRAINTS EXIST ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SCHOLARS. SCHOLARS SOMETIMES REFRAIN FROM PRODUCING OR INCLUDING IN LECTURES AND CLASS DISCUSSIONS MATERIALS THAT THEY BELIEVE MIGHT PROVOKE GOVERNMENT DISPLEASURE. AN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INDONESIAN ACADEMIC WHO HAS CONDUCTED STUDIES ON EAST TIMOR AND WHOSE CONCLUSIONS ARE AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS STRONGLY CRITICIZED BY GOVERNMENT FIGURES AND HIS HOUSE STONED BY UNKNOWN YOUTHS. PUBLISHERS SOMETIMES REFUSE TO ACCEPT MANUSCRIPTS DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. ON OCCASION THE GOVERNMENT BANS PUBLICATIONS AND BOOKS OUTRIGHT. IN JANUARY IT

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

BANNED A BOOK DEALING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S RISE TO POWER, AND IN AUGUST, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BANNED A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE LEADER OF THE MESSIANIC ISLAMIC SECT DARUL ARQAM, THE THIRD BOOK OF THIS GROUP TO BE BANNED IN INDONESIA. ON THE OTHER HAND, "THE FUGITIVE," A BOOK BY THE PROMINENT INDONESIAN NOVELIST AND FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER PRAMOEDYA ANATA TOER, WHICH TOGETHER WITH OTHER WORKS BY PRAMOEDYA HAD BEEN BANNED FOR MANY YEARS, WAS PUBLISHED IN AUGUST.

43. THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA REMAINED MORE CAUTIOUS THAN THE PRINTED MEDIA. THE GOVERNMENT OPERATES THE NATIONWIDE TELEVISION NETWORK, WHICH HAS TWELVE REGIONAL STATIONS. PRIVATE TELEVISION COMPANIES CONTINUED TO EXPAND, WITH A FIFTH STATION SCHEDULED TO BEGIN OPERATION IN NOVEMBER. ALL ARE REQUIRED TO BROADCAST GOVERNMENT-PRODUCED NEWS, BUT MANY ALSO PRODUCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STYLE PROGRAMMING THAT BORDERS ON NEWS.

44. APPROXIMATELY 600 PRIVATE RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANIES EXIST IN INDONESIA IN ADDITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK. THE GOVERNMENT RADIO STATION PRODUCES "NATIONAL NEWS," WHICH IS BY LAW THE ONLY RADIO NEWS BROADCAST IN INDONESIA, AND IT IS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELAYED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BY THE PRIVATE STATIONS AND 49 REGIONAL AFFILIATES OF THE GOVERNMENT STATION. BY LAW, THE PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS MAY PRODUCE ONLY "LIGHT" NEWS, SUCH AS HUMAN INTEREST STORIES, AND MAY NOT DISCUSS POLITICS. IN PRACTICE, MANY BROADCAST INTERVIEWS AND FOREIGN NEWS AS WELL.

45. FOREIGN TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS ARE READILY ACCESSIBLE TO THOSE WHO CAN AFFORD THE TECHNOLOGY, AND SATELLITE DISHES HAVE PROLIFERATED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT MAKES NO EFFORTS TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO THIS PROGRAMMING.

46. THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY REGULATES ACCESS TO INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY TO CERTAIN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, BY VISITING AND RESIDENT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS, AND

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

OCCASIONALLY REMINDS THE LATTER OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DENY REQUESTS FOR VISA EXTENSIONS. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES A PERMIT FOR THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AND VIDEO TAPES, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED BY GOVERNMENT CENSORS. IMPORTERS SOMETIMES AVOID FOREIGN MATERIALS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OR DEALING WITH TOPICS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS ARE NORMALLY AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL ISSUES WERE DELAYED OR EMBARGOED IN 1994 WHEN THEY CARRIED STORIES ON MATTERS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR.

47. SPECIAL PERMISSION IS NECESSARY FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TO TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR, AND THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED A NUMBER OF GROUP TRIPS TO THE PROVINCE DURING

THE YEAR. APPROVAL FOR INDIVIDUAL TRIPS BY JOURNALISTS TO THE PROVINCE, AND FOR TRAVEL OUTSIDE DILI, REMAINS DIFFICULT. DURING THE NOVEMBER APEC MEETINGS, THE GOVERNMENT APPROVED TRAVEL TO THE PROVINCE BY SEVERAL DOZEN FOREIGN JOURNALISTS, THE LARGEST NUMBER TO VISIT THE PROVINCE IN MANY YEARS. SOME SIX JOURNALISTS AND FREE-LANCERS WHO HAD NOT OBTAINED PERMITS WERE DENIED ACCESS TO THE PROVINCE, OR INSTRUCTED BY AUTHORITIES TO LEAVE EAST TIMOR.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

48. ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION, THE GOVERNMENT PLACES SIGNIFICANT CONTROLS ON THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. ALL ORGANIZATIONS MUST HAVE GOVERNMENT PERMISSION TO HOLD REGIONAL AND NATIONAL MEETINGS. PUBLIC MARCHES AND DEMONSTRATIONS ALSO REQUIRE PERMITS, WHICH ARE FREQUENTLY NOT GRANTED. DURING THE YEAR, GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES RETURNED TO A STIFFER LINE AGAINST ALLOWING PUBLIC PROTESTS, HAVING LOOSENED SUCH RESTRICTIONS FOR A WHILE DURING THE LATTER HALF OF 1993. MANY JURISDICTIONS OFTEN REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FOR SMALLER GATHERINGS AS WELL. WHILE OBTAINING SUCH APPROVAL IS USUALLY ROUTINE, THE AUTHORITIES OCCASIONALLY WITHHOLD PERMISSION, OR

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

BREAK UP PEACEFUL GATHERINGS FOR WHICH NO PERMIT HAS BEEN OBTAINED. IN 1994 AUTHORITIES BROKE UP A MEETING BETWEEN AN ATTORNEY AND HIS CLIENTS IN A LABOR COMPENSATION CASE, AND A PUBLIC SEMINAR ON LAND ISSUES WHICH WAS SPONSORED BY A WELL-KNOWN NGO. POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DISCUSSIONS AT UNIVERSITIES, WHILE NO LONGER FORMALLY BANNED,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

REMAINED TIGHTLY CONTROLLED.

49. THE COURTS SOMETIMES HAND OUT STIFF PENALTIES TO PERSONS CONVICTED IN CASES INVOLVING FREE EXPRESSION, AS IN THE TWO CASES OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS MENTIONED IN SECTION L.E. ABOVE WHOSE SENTENCES WERE INCREASED ON APPEAL, WHILE AT OTHER TIMES THEY ARE MORE LENIENT. ON JUNE 27 SECURITY FORCES VIOLENTLY BROKE UP TWO PEACEFUL MARCHES ON THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION BY PERSONS PROTESTING THE WITHDRAWAL OF PUBLICATION LICENSES FROM THE THREE PUBLICATIONS MENTIONED ABOVE. APPROXIMATELY 30 PERSONS WERE DETAINED BY THE AUTHORITIES AND SEVERAL DEMONSTRATORS WERE INJURED. THE JAKARTA CENTRAL DISTRICT COURT SENTENCED ALL BUT ONE OF THE PERSONS ARRESTED ON THE DAY AFTER THEIR ARREST FOR DEMONSTRATING WITHOUT A PERMIT, AND THEY WERE RELEASED AFTER PAYING A NOMINAL FINE EQUIVALENT TO 1.00. THE REMAINING PERSON, A PAROLEE, WAS RETURNED TO PRISON TO FINISH HIS SENTENCE. ON JULY 7 POLICE ENTERED THE COMPOUND OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, A PROMINENT INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS NGO, AND ARRESTED 41 HUNGER STRIKERS WHO WERE PROTESTING THE MEDIA BANNING. THESE DEMONSTRATORS TOO WERE SENTENCED TO PAY TOKEN FINES AND RELEASED AFTER 2 DAYS. OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS ON THIS ISSUE DURING THIS PERIOD WERE ALLOWED TO TAKE PLACE WITHOUT INCIDENT, SUCH AS A JULY 5 DEMONSTRATION OF JOURNALISTS IN JAKARTA.

50. A GROUP OF SEVERAL HUNDRED PEOPLE WHO HAD ASSEMBLED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR WISHING TO MARCH TO THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY TO AIR THEIR VIEWS ABOUT AN INCIDENT OF ALLEGED RELIGIOUS DISRESPECT THE PREVIOUS DAY WERE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DISPERSED BY RIOT POLICE WHO REFUSED TO LET THE MARCH PROCEED WITHOUT A PERMIT. AROUND A DOZEN INDIVIDUALS WERE LIGHTLY INJURED IN THIS INCIDENT AND A NUMBER WERE BRIEFLY DETAINED. THE AUTHORITIES SHOWED GREATER RESTRAINT THAN IN PAST INCIDENTS INVOLVING CROWDS, USING POLICE RATHER THAN THE ARMY, AND AVOIDING THE USE OF FIREARMS.

51. THE 1985 SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW (ORMAS) REQUIRES ALL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, TO ADHERE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA. THIS PROVISION, WHICH LIMITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD AS BEING DESIGNED TO INHIBIT ACTIVITIES OF GROUPS WHICH SEEK TO MAKE INDONESIA AN ISLAMIC STATE. THE LAW EMPOWERS THE GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND ANY ORGANIZATION IT BELIEVES TO BE ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA AND REQUIRES PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR ANY ORGANIZATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS FROM FOREIGN DONORS, THEREBY HINDERING THE WORK OF MANY LOCAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INDEPENDENT LABOR ORGANIZATION SERIKAT BURUH SEJAHTERA INDONESIA (SBSI), CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE WITHOUT OFFICIAL RECOGNITION UNDER THE ORMAS LAW.
(SEE SECTION 6).

52. IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO'S) ACTIVE IN SUCH FIELDS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION PROLIFERATED. IN LATE 1994, THE GOVERNMENT PREPARED A DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE THAT WOULD BRING THE MORE THAN

700 NGO'S UNDER CONTROLS SIMILAR TO THE ORMAS LAW. THE DRAFT DECREE MADE AVAILABLE BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR COMMENT

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

INDICATED THAT NGO'S WOULD HAVE TO RECEIVE GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR THE USE OF ANY FOREIGN ASSISTANCE THEY ACCEPT, AND SUCH ASSISTANCE MUST BE DEEMED CONSISTENT WITH NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND NOT DETRIMENTAL TO NATIONAL INTERESTS. NGO'S WOULD ALSO BE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY, AND WOULD RECEIVE GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE ON FULFILLING THEIR DECLARED FUNCTIONS. MANY NGO'S, FEARING THAT THE PROPOSED NEW DECREE IS AN EFFORT BY THE GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL THEIR ORGANIZATIONS OR CURB SOME OF THEIR ACTIVITIES, REACTED STRONGLY TO THE DRAFT WHICH, AT YEAR'S END THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET PUT INTO EFFECT.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

53. THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD. THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES ISLAM, CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, AND HINDUISM, AND PERMITS PRACTICE OF THE MYSTICAL, TRADITIONAL BELIEFS OF "ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN." ALTHOUGH THE POPULATION IS OVERWHELMINGLY MUSLIM, THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS ARE GENERALLY RESPECTED, AND THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES MUTUAL TOLERANCE AND HARMONY AMONG THEM. SOME RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY EXIST (SEE BELOW).

54. BECAUSE THE FIRST TENET OF PANCASILA IS BELIEF IN A SUPREME BEING, ATHEISM IS FORBIDDEN. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA EXTENDS TO ALL

RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY OPPOSES MUSLIM GROUPS WHICH ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ACKNOWLEDGING ONLY ISLAMIC LAW. THERE ARE GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES FOR BANNING RELIGIOUS SECTS IN INDONESIA. AMONG THOSE PROHIBITED ARE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AND BAHA'I. IN 1994 THE GOVERNMENT BANNED THE MESSIANIC ISLAMIC SECT DARUL ARQAM IN A NUMBER OF PROVINCE AND THREE OF ITS BOOKS HAVE BEEN PROHIBITED FROM INDONESIA, AND IN AUGUST FORBADE ITS LEADER, ABUYA SHEIKH IMAM ASHAARI MUHAMMAD, FROM ENTERING INDONESIA.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

55. VIOLENCE BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS IN THE HURIA KRISTEN BATAK PROTESTAN (HKBP), INDONESIA'S LARGEST PROTESTANT CHURCH, CONTINUED IN NORTH SUMATRA THROUGHOUT 1994, WITH AT LEAST SIX FATALITIES. IN EARLY 1993, CITING A THREAT TO CIVIL ORDER, THE NORTHERN SUMATRA REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER HAD INTERVENED IN AN INTERNAL LEADERSHIP DISPUTE WHICH BROKE OUT WITHIN THE HKBP THE PREVIOUS YEAR, APPOINTED A NEW BISHOP, AND HELPED THE NEW BISHOP'S SUPPORTERS TAKE OVER CHURCH PROPERTY. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE CALLED THE DISPUTE AN INTERNAL CHURCH MATTER THAT SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THE HKBP MEMBERS THEMSELVES. TO DATE, HOWEVER, ONLY SUPPORTERS OF THE FORMER BISHOP HAVE BEEN PROSECUTED FOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE DESPITE EVIDENCE THAT MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSING FACTION HAVE ENGAGED IN VIOLENT ACTS AS WELL.

56. THERE WERE WIDESPREAD REPORTS FROM RELIGIOUS MINORITIES INDICATING THAT THE EXTENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE WEAKENED SOMEWHAT DURING THE YEAR AND THAT RELIGIOUS MINORITIES FELT THEY WERE LESS FREE TO CARRY

OUT THEIR RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES UNIMPEDED. HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, SPOKE OUT SEVERAL TIMES TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. TWO ARMY PRIVATES ACCUSED OF PROVOCATIVE BEHAVIOR DURING A CATHOLIC MASS IN EAST TIMOR IN JUNE WERE COURT-MARTIALED. IN OCTOBER, BOTH WERE EXPELLED FROM THE ARMY, AND RECEIVED PRISON SENTENCES OF TWO, AND TWO AND ONE-HALF YEARS RESPECTIVELY. THE LAW ALLOWS CONVERSION BETWEEN FAITHS, AND SUCH CONVERSIONS OCCUR. MARRIAGES BETWEEN PERSONS OF DIFFERENT RELIGIONS ARE ALLOWED. THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS PROSELYTIZING BY THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS IN AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ONE RECOGNIZED RELIGION OR ANOTHER AS POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND DISCOURAGES IT. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED, ALTHOUGH IN EAST TIMOR AND OCCASIONALLY ELSEWHERE MISSIONARIES HAVE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES AND DELAYS IN RENEWING RESIDENCE PERMITS, AND VISAS ALLOWING THE ENTRANCE OF NEW FOREIGN CLERGY ARE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. LAWS AND DECREES FROM THE 1970'S LIMIT THE NUMBER OF YEARS FOREIGN MISSIONARIES CAN SPEND

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

IN INDONESIA, WITH SOME EXTENSIONS GRANTED IN REMOTE AREAS LIKE IRIAN JAYA. FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK IS SUBJECT TO THE FUNDING STIPULATIONS OF THE ORMAS LAW (SEE SECTION 2.B.). INDONESIANS PRACTICING THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS MAINTAIN ACTIVE LINKS WITH CO-RELIGIONISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE INDONESIA AND TRAVEL ABROAD FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

57. IN 1993 THE GOVERNMENT DRASTICALLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BARRED EITHER FROM ENTERING OR DEPARTING INDONESIA FROM A PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED FIGURE OF 8,897 "BLACKLISTED" PEOPLE IN JANUARY TO A FEW HUNDRED BY AUGUST. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES, NO ONE IS NOW PROHIBITED FOR POLITICAL REASONS FROM LEAVING THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT RESTRICTS MOVEMENT BY INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN CITIZENS TO AND WITHIN PARTS OF INDONESIA. IN ADDITION, IT REQUIRES PERMITS TO SEEK WORK IN A NEW LOCATION IN CERTAIN AREAS, PRIMARILY TO CONTROL FURTHER POPULATION MOVEMENT TO CROWDED CITIES, AND SPECIAL PERMITS ARE REQUIRED TO VISIT CERTAIN PARTS OF IRIAN JAYA. THE MILITARY CARRIED OUT SECURITY CHECKS AFFECTING TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL TO AND WITHIN EAST TIMOR SPORADICALLY IN 1994, AND IT OCCASIONAL IMPOSED CURFEWS IN CONNECTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE AUTHORITIES REQUIRE FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, TO GIVE NOTICE OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND TO HAVE OFFICIAL PERMISSION (SEE SECTION L.F.) TO CHANGE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE.

58. IN PAST YEARS THE GOVERNMENT ADMITTED LARGE NUMBERS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM INDOCHINA. ONLY A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER NOW REMAIN AND THE GOVERNMENT PLANS TO WORK WITH VIETNAM UNDER A TRIPARTITE (WITH UNHCR) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING SIGNED IN 1993 TO PEACEFULLY REPATRIATE THE REMAINING ASYLEES TO VIETNAM.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

59. CITIZENS DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEMOCRATIC MEANS. THE 1,000-MEMBER PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY OF THE STATE AND MEETS EVERY FIVE YEARS TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AND SET THE BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, IS CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE APPOINTMENT OF HALF ITS MEMBERSHIP. THE REMAINING HALF COME FROM THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR), 80 PERCENT OF WHOSE MEMBERS ARE ELECTED. IN 1993, THE MPR ELECTED SOEHARTO TO HIS SIXTH UNCONTESTED FIVE-YEAR TERM AS PRESIDENT. LEGALLY, THE PRESIDENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SUBORDINATE TO THE PARLIAMENT, BUT ACTUALLY HE AND A SMALL GROUP OF ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS EXERCISE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.

60. UNDER A DOCTRINE KNOWN AS "DUAL FUNCTION," THE MILITARY ASSUMES A SIGNIFICANT SOCIO-POLITICAL AS WELL AS A SECURITY ROLE. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARE ALLOTTED AN UNELECTED 20 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND DISTRICT PARLIAMENTS, AND OCCUPY NUMEROUS KEY POSITIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION. THE OTHER 80 PERCENT OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL PARLIAMENTARY SEATS ARE FILLED THROUGH ELECTIONS HELD EVERY 5 YEARS. ALL ADULT CITIZENS ARE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE, EXCEPT ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, CONVICTED CRIMINALS SERVING PRISON SENTENCES, AND SOME 36,000 FORMER PKI MEMBERS. VOTERS CHOOSE BY SECRET BALLOT BETWEEN THE THREE GOVERNMENT-APPROVED POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH FIELD CANDIDATE LISTS IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT. THOSE LISTS MUST BE SCREENED BY BAKORSTANAS (SEE SECTION L.D.), WHICH

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DETERMINES WHETHER CANDIDATES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST COUP OR POSE OTHER BROADLY DEFINED SECURITY RISKS. CRITICS CHARGE THESE SCREENINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, SINCE THERE IS NO WAY TO APPEAL THE RESULTS, AND NOTE THAT THEY CAN BE USED TO ELIMINATE CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM PARLIAMENT.

61. STRICT RULES ESTABLISH THE LENGTH OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC MEDIA, SCHEDULES FOR PUBLIC APPEARANCES, AND THE POLITICAL SYMBOLS THAT CAN BE USED. THE GOVERNMENT PERMITS ONLY THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EXIST AND CONTEST ELECTIONS. THE LARGEST AND MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS GOLKAR, A GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ORGANIZATION OF DIVERSE FUNCTIONAL GROUPS WHICH WON 68 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN THE 1992 ELECTIONS. THE PRESIDENT STRONGLY INFLUENCES THE SELECTION OF THE LEADERS OF GOLKAR, AND HE HAS THE LAST WORD ON ALL GOLKAR DECISIONS. THE OTHER TWO SMALL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE UNITY DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF INDONESIA (PDI), SPLIT THE REMAINING VOTE. THE LAW REQUIRES ALL THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EMBRACE PANCASILA, AND NONE OF THE ORGANIZATIONS IS CONSIDERED AN OPPOSITION PARTY. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES CLOSELY SCRUTINIZE AND OFTEN GUIDE THEIR ACTIVITIES. MEMBERS OF THE DPR AND THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES MAY BE RECALLED FROM OFFICE BY PARTY LEADERS.

62. GOLKAR MAINTAINS CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH THE ARMED FORCES AND KORPRI, THE ASSOCIATION TO WHICH ALL CIVIL SERVANTS AUTOMATICALLY BELONG. CIVIL SERVANTS MAY JOIN ANY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WITH OFFICIAL

PERMISSION, BUT MOST ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND SOME OTHER BANNED PARTIES MAY NOT RUN FOR OFFICE OR BE ACTIVE POLITICALLY. THE DPR CONSIDERS BILLS PRESENTED TO IT BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES BUT DOES NOT DRAFT LAWS ON ITS OWN, ALTHOUGH IT HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DO SO. THE DPR MAKES

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

TECHNICAL AND OCCASIONALLY SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS TO BILLS IT REVIEWS. IN PRACTICE IT REMAINS CLEARLY SUBORDINATE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, BUT RECENTLY HAS BECOME MUCH MORE ACTIVE IN SCRUTINIZING GOVERNMENT POLICY THROUGH HEARINGS AT WHICH MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, MILITARY COMMANDERS, AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS ARE ASKED TO TESTIFY. FOR EXAMPLE, PARLIAMENTARY EXAMINATION BROUGHT TO LIGHT A MAJOR SCANDAL IN GOVERNMENT BANKS AND FORCED THE GOVERNMENT TO ADDRESS IT SERIOUSLY. THE DPR HAS ALSO BECOME INCREASINGLY A FOCAL POINT OF APPEALS AND PETITIONS FROM STUDENTS, WORKERS, DISPLACED FARMERS, AND OTHERS PROTESTING ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND AIRING OTHER GRIEVANCES. WHILE THERE ARE NO DE JURE RESTRICTIONS ON WOMEN IN POLITICS, ONLY FIFTY-FIVE OUT OF 500 MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT ARE WOMEN; TWO WOMEN ARE CABINET MEMBERS.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

63. WHILE VARIOUS DOMESTIC ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONS INTERESTED IN HUMAN RIGHTS OPERATE ENERGETICALLY, SOME HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS FACE GOVERNMENT HARASSMENT SUCH AS FREQUENT VISITS BY POLICE OR AGENTS FROM MILITARY

INTELLIGENCE, INTERROGATIONS AT POLICE STATIONS, OR CANCELLATIONS OF PRIVATE MEETINGS (SEE SECTION 2.B.). FOLLOWING THE APRIL LABOR UNREST IN MEDAN, LOCAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES INCREASED SURVEILLANCE AND HARASSMENT OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN NORTH SUMATRA WHICH WERE ACTIVE IN LABOR AFFAIRS. MOREOVER, THE GOVERNMENT PREPARED IN 1994 A DRAFT DECREE WHICH, IF ISSUED AND FULLY IMPLEMENTED, WOULD GIVE THE GOVERNMENT BROAD POWERS TO CONTROL THE ACTIVITIES OF NGOS CONCERNED WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND SERIOUSLY IMPEDE THEIR ABILITY TO FUNCTION.

64. THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND EMPHASIZES ITS BELIEF THAT LINKING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE IS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

UNACCEPTABLE. IN 1994 INDONESIA BROUGHT PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SEVERAL NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO PROHIBIT OR RESTRICT NGO-SPONSORED HUMAN RIGHTS SEMINARS ON THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR.

65. THE ICRC CONTINUED TO OPERATE IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, AND ACEH, AND TO VISIT PRISONERS CONVICTED OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ABORTIVE, COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP IN 1965, CONVICTED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, AND EAST TIMORESE PRISONERS. HOWEVER, AS OF YEAR'S END, THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT APPROVED THE ICRC'S REQUEST TO OPEN AN OFFICE IN ACEH, THOUGH OFFICIAL COOPERATION ON ACCESS BY ITS DELEGATES FROM JAKARTA SHOWED SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN 1994.

66. ICRC ACCESS ALSO GREATLY IMPROVED IN OTHER AREAS,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INCLUDING EAST TIMOR WHERE IT HAS AN OFFICE. THE ICRC NO LONGER MAINTAINS AN OFFICE IN IRIAN JAYA, AND VISITS THAT PROVINCE FROM JAKARTA SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR. HOWEVER, IN 1994 THE VISITING REPRESENTATIVE OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, A KEY U. S. HUMAN RIGHTS NGO, WAS DENIED PERMISSION TO VISIT MEDAN AND EAST TIMOR. THE GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZED THE VISIT OF THE U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMMARY AND ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS, AND IT ALLOWED HIM TO SEE THOSE PERSONS HE HAD REQUESTED TO SEE. THE RAPPORTEUR PUBLICLY QUESTIONED, HOWEVER, WHETHER ALL THOSE WHO MIGHT HAVE WANTED TO SPEAK WITH HIM HAD BEEN AFFORDED FULL ACCESS.

67. IN JANUARY THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, MOST OF WHOSE MEMBERS WERE NAMED THE MONTH BEFORE, BEGAN OPERATIONS. DESPITE CONTINUING SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE COMMISSION'S INDEPENDENCE, IN PART BECAUSE ITS MEMBERS ARE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT, COMMISSION MEMBERS DURING THE COURSE OF THE YEAR ACTIVELY LOOKED INTO MANY OF THE NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS AND PETITIONS PRESENTED TO THE COMMISSION AND IN SOME CASES SHOWED THEMSELVES WILLING TO QUESTION GOVERNMENT ACTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE COMMISSION STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE GOVERNMENT'S REVOCATION OF THE PUBLICATION LICENSES OF THREE PUBLICATIONS (SECTION 2.A.)

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

AS AN INFRINGEMENT OF FREE SPEECH, AND IT HAS CRITICIZED THE WAY IN WHICH THE SUSPECTS IN THE MARSINAH MURDER CASE WERE PROSECUTED, AS WELL AS QUESTIONING WHETHER ALL THE GUILTY HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO JUSTICE. LACKING ENFORCEMENT POWERS, THE COMMISSION ATTEMPTS TO WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM, SENDING TEAMS WHERE NECESSARY TO INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS AND EMPLOYING PERSUASION,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PUBLICITY, AND MORAL AUTHORITY TO HIGHLIGHT ABUSES AND ENCOURAGE CORRECTIVE ACTION. A TEAM VISITED EAST TIMOR IN SEPTEMBER AND DECEMBER. OPERATIONS IN 1994 WERE HAMPERED SOMEWHAT BY START-UP PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE NECESSITY TO HIRE STAFF, FIND PERMANENT QUARTERS, AND DEVELOP OPERATING PROCEDURES.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

68. WOMEN

69. BY LAW WOMEN ARE EQUAL TO AND HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN. HOWEVER, IN PRACTICE WOMEN FACE SOME LEGAL DISCRIMINATION. FOR EXAMPLE, IN DIVORCE CASES WOMEN OFTEN BEAR A HEAVIER EVIDENTIARY BURDEN THAN MEN, ESPECIALLY IN THE ISLAMIC-BASED FAMILY COURT SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH SOME INDONESIAN WOMEN ENJOY A HIGH DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FREEDOM AND OCCUPY IMPORTANT MID-LEVEL POSITIONS IN BOTH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, THE MAJORITY OF INDONESIAN WOMEN DO NOT EXPERIENCE SUCH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOMS, AND ARE OFTEN DISPROPORTIONATELY AT THE LOWER END OF THE POSITION SCALE. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH WOMEN CONSTITUTE ONE-QUARTER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, THEY OCCUPY ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THE SERVICE'S TOP POSTS. INCOME DISPARITY BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN DIMINISHES SIGNIFICANTLY WITH GREATER EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT.

70. WOMEN ARE OFTEN NOT GIVEN THE EXTRA SALARY THAT IS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THEIR DUE WHEN THEY ARE THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD AND IN SOME CASES DO NOT RECEIVE EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR THEIR HUSBAND AND CHILDREN, SUCH AS MEDICAL INSURANCE. DESPITE LAWS GUARANTEEING WOMEN A 3-MONTH MATERNITY LEAVE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONCEDED THAT PREGNANT WOMEN ARE OFTEN DISMISSED OR ARE REPLACED WHILE ON LEAVE. SOME COMPANIES REQUIRE THAT WOMEN SIGN GUARANTEES THAT THEY WILL NOT BECOME PREGNANT. WOMEN WORKERS ALSO HAVE COMPLAINED OF BEING SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED BY FOREMEN AND FACTORY OWNERS.

71. WOMEN WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING GENERALLY RECEIVE LOWER WAGES THAN MEN AND ALSO ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE HIRED ON A DAILY BASIS. AS A RESULT, THEY ARE LESS LIKELY TO RECEIVE BENEFITS LEGALLY MANDATED FOR PERMANENT WORKERS. INDONESIAN WOMEN DISPROPORTIONATELY EXPERIENCE ILLITERACY, POOR HEALTH, AND INADEQUATE NUTRITION. HOWEVER, WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS HAVE IMPROVED IN THE LAST DECADE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NUMBER OF GIRLS GRADUATING FROM HIGH SCHOOL TRIPLED FROM 1980 TO 1990. SEVERAL VOLUNTARY, PRIVATE GROUPS WORK ACTIVELY TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CLAIM SOME SUCCESS IN GAINING OFFICIAL COGNIZANCE OF WOMEN'S CONCERNS.

72. RAPE IS A PUNISHABLE OFFENSE IN INDONESIA. MEN HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND SENTENCED FOR RAPE AND ATTEMPTED RAPE. THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE REPORTED 1,341 RAPE CASES FOR 1991, 1,356 CASES FOR 1992, AND 1.341 CASES FOR 1993. HOWEVER, WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS BELIEVE RAPE IS GROSSLY UNDERREPORTED IN INDONESIA OWING TO THE SOCIAL STIGMA ATTACHED TO THE VICTIM. THE LAW REQUIRES THAT A

WOMAN GO IMMEDIATELY TO THE HOSPITAL FOR A PHYSICAL EXAM

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

WHICH PRODUCES SEMEN OR OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF RAPE IN ORDER TO BRING CHARGES. SOME WOMEN FAIL TO REPORT RAPE TO POLICE OUT OF FEAR OF BEING MOLESTED AGAIN BY THE POLICE THEMSELVES. MOST WOMEN AVOID WALKING ALONE AT NIGHT LEST THEY BE PERCEIVED AS "FAIR GAME."

73. IN GENERAL, THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REMAINS POORLY DOCUMENTED. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY, WHICH SOME SAY HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY RECENT SOCIAL CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY RAPID URBANIZATION. LONGSTANDING TRADITIONAL BELIEFS THAT THE HUSBAND MAY "TEACH" OR "CONTROL" THE WIFE THROUGH SEVERAL MEANS, INCLUDING VIOLENCE, ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROBLEM. THOUGH WOMEN'S GROUPS ARE TRYING TO CHANGE THE LAW, RAPE BY A HUSBAND OF A WIFE IS NOT A CRIME IN INDONESIA. WHILE POLICE COULD BRING ASSUALT CHARGES AGAINST A HUSBAND FOR BEATING HIS WIFE, DUE TO SOCIAL ATTITUDES THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO DO SO. THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES SOME COUNSELING, AND SEVERAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS EXIST TO ASSIST WOMEN. MANY OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS FOCUS MAINLY ON REUNITING THE FAMILY RATHER THAN ON PROVIDING PROTECTION TO THE WOMEN INVOLVED. THERE ARE NO BATTERED WOMEN'S SHELTERS IN INDONESIA. MANY WOMEN RELY ON EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEMS FOR IN CASES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.

74. CHILDREN

75. THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND

WELFARE, BUT IS HAMPERED BY A LACK OF RESOURCES IN TRANSLATING THIS COMMITMENT INTO PRACTICE. A 1979 LAW ON CHILDREN'S WELFARE DEFINES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE AND PARENTS TO NURTURE AND PROTECT CHILDREN. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN DEVELOPED AND THE LAW'S PROVISIONS HAVE YET TO GO INTO EFFECT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE PARTICULAR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PRIMARY EDUCATION, MATERNITY SERVICES, AND FAMILY PLANNING.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

76. UNICEF ESTIMATES THAT MORE THAN ONE MILLION CHILDREN DROP OUT OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EVERY YEAR DUE MAINLY TO THE COST OF SUPPLIES, UNIFORMS AND OTHER EXPENSES, IN ADDITION TO THE PROFESSED NEED FOR THE CHILDREN TO SUPPLEMENT FAMILY INCOME. THOUSANDS OF STREET CHILDREN LIVING IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES SELL NEWSPAPERS, SHINE SHOES, HELP TO PARK OR WATCH CARS, AND OTHERWISE EARN MONEY. MANY THOUSANDS MORE WORK IN FACTORIES AND FIELDS (SEE ALSO SECTION 6.D.). NGO'S CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO HELP THESE CHILDREN AS INADEQUATE.

77. CHILD PROSTITUTION AND OTHER SEXUAL ABUSES OCCUR, ESPECIALLY CASES OF INCEST BETWEEN STEPFATHERS AND STEPDAUGHTERS, BUT DATA ON THEIR INCIDENCE IS LACKING. SOME CHILD CARE EXPERTS BELIEVE IT TO BE LOW. WHILE THERE ARE LAWS DESIGNED TO PROTECT CHILDREN FROM INDECENT ACTIVITIES, PROSTITUTION, AND INCEST, THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS.

78. FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM) IS COMMON IN SOME PARTS OF INDONESIA. IN JAVA, IT USUALLY TAKES PLACE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WITHIN THE FIRST YEAR AFTER BIRTH AND IS PERFORMED EITHER AT A HOSPITAL OR BY A LOCAL TRADITIONAL PRACTITIONER OR "DUKUN," ESPECIALLY IN RURAL AREAS. USUALLY A SMALL SECTION OF THE TIP OF THE CLITORIS IS CUT OR A SMALL INCISION IS MADE IN THE TIP OF THE CLITORIS WITH THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING A FEW DROPS OF BLOOD. TOTAL REMOVAL OF THE CLITORIS IS NOT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PRACTICE, ALTHOUGH IT DOES OCCUR IF INEPTLY PERFORMED.

79. INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

80. THE GOVERNMENT STATES PUBLICLY THAT IT RECOGNIZES THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL INDIGENOUS POPULATION GROUPS, AND THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE. CRITICS MAINTAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH IS BASICALLY PATERNALISTIC AND DESIGNED MORE TO INTEGRATE THEM MORE CLOSELY INTO INDONESIAN SOCIETY THAN TO PROTECT THEIR TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

81. THE GOVERNMENT'S TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM WHICH MOVED LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE FROM OVERPOPULATED ISLANDS TO MORE ISOLATED AND BACKWARD ONES HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY CUT BACK IN RECENT YEARS. THE PROGRAM IS CRITICIZED BY HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS WHO SAY THAT IT NOT ONLY SOMETIMES VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE BUT ALSO THOSE OF SOME OF THE TRANSMIGRANTS WHO CLAIM THAT THEY ARE DUPED INTO LEAVING THEIR HOME VILLAGES WITHOUT ANY MEANS OF RETURN. EAST TIMORESE HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM COULD LEAD TO FEWER EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THEM AND MIGHT EVENTUALLY DESTROY EAST

TIMOR'S CULTURAL IDENTITY.

82. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE PRACTICES OF SOME LOGGING COMPANIES WHICH RECRUIT INDIGENOUS PEOPLE FOR WORK. ACCORDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THIS ACTIVITY IN IRIAN JAYA HAS SEPARATED THESE PEOPLE FROM THEIR TRADITIONAL ECONOMIES. WORKERS REPORTEDLY ARE PAID USING COMPANY-ISSUED CREDIT CARDS THAT CAN BE USED ONLY AT COMPANY STORES WHERE PRICES ARE FIXED. WORKERS GO INTO DEBT AND REMAIN INDENTURED TO THE COMPANY.

83. WHERE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE CLASH WITH DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES, THE DEVELOPERS ALMOST ALWAYS WIN. FOR EXAMPLE, IN KALIMANTAN MEMBERS OF A DAYAK TRIBE WERE FORCED FROM THEIR LAND BY A TIMBER CONCESSION IN AUGUST. IN RETALIATION, THEY ATTACKED COMPANY FACILITIES AND SEVERAL WERE SUBSEQUENTLY ARRESTED.

84. MOST CIVIL SERVANTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN IRIAN JAYA AND OTHER ISOLATED AREAS CONTINUE TO COME PRIMARILY FROM JAVA RATHER THAN THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION. EAST TIMORESE AND VARIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS CHARGE THAT THE EAST TIMORESE ARE UNDERREPRESENTED IN THE CIVIL SERVICE IN EAST TIMOR. IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM OR DENY THE CHARGES AS THERE APPEARS TO BE NO REGISTRY OF THE THE BIRTH PLACE OF CIVIL SERVANTS, WHO CAN BE TRANSFERRED ANYWHERE.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

85. NATIONAL/RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

86. INDONESIANS EXHIBIT CONSIDERABLE RACIAL AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE, WITH THE IMPORTANT EXCEPTION OF OFFICIAL AND INFORMAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE, WHO COMPRISE ABOUT 3 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. SINCE 1959 NON-CITIZEN ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO RUN BUSINESSES IN RURAL INDONESIA. REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF ALL CHINESE SCHOOLS FOR ETHNIC CHINESE, FORMATION OF EXCLUSIVELY CHINESE CULTURAL GROUPS OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND PUBLIC DISPLAY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS. IN AUGUST THE BAN ON USE OF CHINESE CHARACTERS WAS EASED SLIGHTLY TO ALLOW FIRMS WORKING IN THE TOURIST INDUSTRY TO PRODUCE CHINESE-LANGUAGE BROCHURES, PROGRAMS, AND SIMILAR MATERIAL FOR CHINESE-SPEAKING TOURISTS. HOWEVER, CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE GOVERNMENT-OWNED DAILY NEWSPAPER, MAY NEITHER BE IMPORTED NOR PRODUCED DOMESTICALLY. PRIVATE INSTRUCTION IN CHINESE IS GENERALLY PROHIBITED BUT TAKES PLACE TO A LIMITED EXTENT, AND SINCE AUGUST HAS BEEN ALLOWED IN TRAINING EMPLOYEES IN THE TOURISM INDUSTRY IN FUNCTIONAL MANDARIN. STATE UNIVERSITIES HAVE NO FORMAL QUOTAS THAT LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ETHNIC CHINESE. THE LAW FORBIDS THE CELEBRATION OF THE CHINESE NEW YEAR IN TEMPLES OR PUBLIC PLACES, BUT ITS ENFORCEMENT WAS LIMITED IN 1994, AND CHINESE NEW YEAR DECORATIONS WERE DISPLAYED IN PUBLIC SHOPPING AREAS IN MAJOR CITIES.

87. EAST TIMORESE AND VARIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS CHARGE THAT THE EAST TIMORESE ARE UNDERREPRESENTED IN THE CIVIL SERVICE IN EAST TIMOR. IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM OR DENY THE CHARGES AS THERE APPEARS TO BE NO REGISTRY OF THE BIRTH PLACE OF CIVIL SERVANTS, WHO CAN BE TRANSFERRED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ANYWHERE. EAST TIMORESE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S TRANSMIGRATIONS PROGRAM WILL LEAD TO GREATER IMBALANCE IN EMPLOYMENT AND EVENTUALLY DESTROY EAST TIMOR'S CULTURAL IDENTITY.

88. PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

89. NO NATIONAL LAW SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSES THE PROBLEMS OR STATUS OF THE DISABLED, NOR DO THEY RECEIVE SPECIAL PROGRAMS OR ATTENTION. HOWEVER, DURING 1994 THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE BEGAN DRAFTING REGULATIONS ON TREATMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED PARTLY BASED ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, AND PRESIDENT SOEHARTO GAVE HIS APPROVAL OF SUBMISSION OF THESE NEW REGULATIONS TO THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT. VIRTUALLY NO PUBLIC BUILDINGS OR PUBLIC MEANS OF TRANSPORT ARE DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY FOR ACCESS BY THE HANDICAPPED. THE HANDICAPPED FACE CONSIDERABLE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT.

90. THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTION OF 1945 INCLUDES THE RIGHT OF EVERY CITIZEN TO OBTAIN AN EDUCATION. IN 1989 THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED REGULATIONS COVERING EDUCATION FOR THE MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED. HOWEVER, THE REGULATIONS DO NOT GRANT A RIGHT TO PUBLIC EDUCATION FOR HANDICAPPED CHILDREN. WHILE THERE ARE SOME PUBLIC SCHOOLS FOR THE HANDICAPPED, THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS THE CONCEPT THAT EDUCATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE COMMUNITY IN THE FORM OF NGO-RUN PRIVATE SCHOOLS THAT MAY RECEIVE SOME PUBLIC FUNDS.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

91. PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS INCLUDING THOSE IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES ARE FREE TO FORM WORKER ORGANIZATIONS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION. UNTIL 1994 ONLY A RECOGNIZED UNION COULD BARGAIN ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES OR REPRESENT WORKERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S LABOR COURTS. A NEW REGULATION PROMULGATED IN JANUARY PROVIDES THAT WORKERS IN A SINGLE COMPANY WITH MORE THAN 25 EMPLOYEES CAN JOIN TOGETHER AND NEGOTIATE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH THEIR EMPLOYER OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ALL INDONESIAN WORKERS UNION (SPSI), THE ONLY LEGALLY RECOGNIZED UNION (SEE BELOW). THE GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES THESE PLANT-LEVEL WORKERS ASSOCIATIONS TO JOIN THE SPSI. WHILE 192 OF THESE PLANT-LEVEL ASSOCIATIONS WERE FORMED BY THE END OF THE YEAR ONLY ONE HAD CONCLUDED A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT WITH MANAGEMENT. CURRENT NUMERICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR UNION RECOGNITION, THOUGH LOWERED IN 1993, STILL CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT BARRIER TO RECOGNITION AND THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. IN ADDITION, THE MINISTRY OF MANPOWER USES A MINISTERIAL REGULATION THAT REQUIRES THAT A UNION BE SET UP "BY AND FOR WORKERS" TO DENY RECOGNITION TO GROUPS WHICH INCLUDE PEOPLE IT CONSIDERS NONWORKERS, SUCH AS LAWYERS OR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, WHO ARE INVOLVED AS ORGANIZERS.

92. THERE IS, DE FACTO, A SINGLE UNION SYSTEM, AND IT IS THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED POLICY TO SEEK TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECOGNIZED SPSI UNIONS RATHER THAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TO FURTHER THE PROCESS FOR THE FORMATION OF ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS. THE SPSI BEGAN IN 1993 A TRANSFORMATION FROM A UNITARY (CENTRALIZED) TO A FEDERATIVE (DECENTRALIZED) STRUCTURE. ITS 13 INDUSTRIAL SECTORS ARE NOW REGISTERED AS INDEPENDENT UNIONS. THE ONLY UNIONS RECOGNIZED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ARE THOSE WHICH PREVIOUSLY CONSTITUTED THE SPSI'S INDUSTRIAL SECTORS.

93. TWO OTHER LABOR GROUPS, SETIA KAWAN (SOLIDARITY), ALSO KNOWN AS SERIKAT BURUH MERDEKA (SBM, FREE TRADE UNION), AND SERIKAT BURUH SEJAHTERA INDONESIA (SBSI, INDONESIAN WORKERS WELFARE UNION), HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED BUT ARE NOT REGISTERED. SETIA KAWAN, FOUNDED 3 YEARS AGO, IS NOW ESSENTIALLY MORIBUND. THE SBSI, CREATED IN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

1992, CLAIMS IT HAS FORMED THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF FACTORY-LEVEL UNITS TO MEET THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION AS A LABOR UNION, BUT ITS MOST RECENT REQUEST IN NOVEMBER FOR REGISTRATION AS A TRADE UNION WAS DENIED. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER HAS STATED THAT ANY UNIONS WHICH ARE FORMED SHOULD AFFILIATE WITH THE SPSI FEDERATION AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT RECOGNIZE ANY UNIONS OUTSIDE THE FEDERATION. THERE HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN TENTATIVE OVERTURES TO BRING THE SBSI INTO THE SPSI. THE SBSI, HOWEVER, HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THESE OFFERS.

94. THE SBSI ALSO HAS ATTEMPTED UNSUCCESSFULLY THREE TIMES TO REGISTER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS AS A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE ORMAS LAW, A PREREQUISITE TO RECOGNITION AS A LABOR UNION. THE HOME AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT HAD NOT REPLIED AT YEAR'S END TO SBSI'S MOST

RECENT REQUEST OF NOVEMBER 17, 1994.

95. THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE SBSI ILLEGAL. THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT DISBANDED IT, IT HAS CONTINUALLY HARASSED IT, ESPECIALLY AFTER LARGE-SCALE LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS, WHICH THE SBSI HELPED TO ORGANIZE IN MEDAN IN APRIL, DEGENERATED INTO ANTI-CHINESE RIOTING. THE GOVERNMENT ARRESTED A NUMBER OF THE MEDAN SBSI LEADERSHIP IN THE SPRING, AND IT ARRESTED THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN OF THE SBSI, MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, IN AUGUST. THEY WERE CHARGED WITH INCITING VIOLENCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE RIOTS. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) SENT A STRONGLY WORDED LETTER TO THE INDONESIAN MINISTER OF MANPOWER EXPRESSING "SERIOUS CONCERN" OVER THE ARREST OF PAKPAHAN. THE MEDAN LEADERSHIP RECEIVED SENTENCES OF BETWEEN 3 AND 15 MONTHS IN PRISON. IN NOVEMBER PAKPAHAN WAS SENTENCED TO A 3-YEAR JAIL TERM, A SENTENCE THAT WAS EXTENDED TO FOUR YEARS IN JANUARY, 1995 WHEN HIS APPEAL WAS REJECTED. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AGAINST THE SBSI LEADERSHIP ARE INTENDED TO DISCREDIT OR DESTROY THE ORGANIZATION.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

96. ALSO ON NOVEMBER, THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, IN ITS CONCLUSIONS ON THE COMPLAINT MADE BY THE SBSI AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF RECOGNIZING ONLY THE SPSI, AND COMMENTED THAT "BEYOND THE SPECIFIC EVENTS RAISED IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE COMMITTEE FEELS BOUND TO NOTE THAT THE ALLEGATIONS REVEAL, FROM A MORE GENERAL PERSPECTIVE, A SITUATION OF A TRADE UNION MONOPOLY IN PRACTICE, AND OF

HEAVY INVOLVEMENT OF THE POLICE AND ARMED FORCES IN LABOR MATTERS," AND CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO REFRAIN FROM SHOWING FAVORITISM TOWARD, OR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST, ANY PARTICULAR UNIONS.

97. BECAUSE OF PAST MINISTRY OF MANPOWER REGULATIONS, MANY SPSI FACTORY UNITS ARE LED BY PERSONS WHO HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH THEIR UNITS' MEMBERS BECAUSE THEY WERE SELECTED BY EMPLOYERS. A NEW REGULATION STATES THAT EMPLOYEES MUST ONLY NOTIFY THEIR EMPLOYER THAT THEY WISH TO FORM A UNION AND THAT THEY MAY PROCEED IF THEY DO NOT RECEIVE A RESPONSE FROM THEIR EMPLOYER WITHIN 2 WEEKS. DESPITE THIS NEW PROVISION, STRIKES CONTINUE TO OCCUR BECAUSE EMPLOYERS ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF UNION BRANCHES. THESE STRIKES ARE INVARIABLY SUCCESSFUL, AND THE FORMATION OF AN SPSI UNIT FOLLOWS SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HOWEVER, WORKERS WHO ARE ACTIVE IN THE FORMATION OF THE UNION ARE FREQUENTLY DISMISSED AND HAVE NO PRACTICAL PROTECTION BY EITHER LAW OR GOVERNMENT PRACTICE.

98. CIVIL SERVANTS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO JOIN UNIONS AND MUST BELONG TO KORPRI, A NONUNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES, DEFINED TO INCLUDE THOSE WORKING IN ENTERPRISES IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A 5-PERCENT HOLDING OR GREATER, USUALLY ARE REQUIRED TO JOIN KORPRI, BUT A SMALL NUMBER OF STATE ENTERPRISES HAVE SPSI UNITS. TEACHERS MUST BELONG TO THE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (PGRI). WHILE TECHNICALLY CLASSED AS A UNION, THE PGRI CONTINUES TO FUNCTION MORE AS A WELFARE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ORGANIZATION AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ENGAGED IN TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES SUCH AS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.

99. UNIONS MAY DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE OVER THE SPSI AND ITS FEDERATED UNIONS. THE HEAD OF THE SPSI IS A SENIOR MEMBER OF GOLKAR, AND HE AND TWO OTHER SENIOR SPSI OFFICIALS ARE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT REPRESENTING GOLKAR. WITH ONE EXCEPTION, ALL MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR. THESE PERSONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN POSITIONS IN THE NEW FEDERATED INDUSTRIAL SECTOR UNIONS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER IS A MEMBER OF THE SPSI'S CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL. NUMEROUS REGIONAL SPSI OFFICIALS ALSO ARE GOLKAR MEMBERS, SOMETIMES SERVING IN REGIONAL LEGISLATURES. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE REPORTS, THE GOVERNMENT INTERFERES IN THE SELECTION OF SPSI OFFICERS, ESPECIALLY BY PLACING RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS IN MID-LEVEL SPSI POSITIONS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS STATED THAT IT WILL CEASE THE PRACTICE OF PLACING MILITARY OFFICERS IN UNION POSITIONS AND EVENTUALLY WILL REMOVE OFFICIALS WITH SIGNIFICANT GOLKAR CONNECTIONS.

100. UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE, POLICE APPROVAL IS NEEDED FOR ALL MEETINGS OF FIVE PEOPLE OR MORE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE OFFICES OR NORMAL WORK SITES. THIS PROVISION ALSO APPLIES TO UNION MEETINGS. PERMISSION IS ROUTINELY GIVEN TO THE SPSI, BUT NOT TO RIVAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS SBSI, WHICH WAS PREVENTED FROM HOLDING SEVERAL MEETINGS OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS, INCLUDING ITS FIRST CONGRESS IN 1993. THE GOVERNMENT MAY

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DISSOLVE A UNION IF IT BELIEVES THE UNION IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA, THOUGH IT HAS NEVER ACTUALLY DONE SO AND THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS SPECIFYING PROCEDURES FOR UNION DISSOLUTION.

101. THE SPSI MAINTAINS INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS BUT IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS EXCEPT THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) TRADE UNION COUNCIL.

102. ON APRIL 20, 1994, THE ICFTU LODGED A FORMAL COMPLAINT AGAINST INDONESIA WITH THE ILO, SUPPLEMENTING A PREVIOUS COMPLAINT FILED IN 1987, WHICH ACCUSED THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA OF DENIAL OF WORKERS' RIGHT TO SET UP UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, HARASSMENT OF INDEPENDENT WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS, AND OTHER ACTIONS CONTRARY TO ILO STANDARDS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.

103. WHILE PANCASILA PRINCIPLES CALL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES TO BE SETTLED BY CONSENSUS, ALL ORGANIZED WORKERS EXCEPT CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. WHILE STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND TEACHERS RARELY EXERCISE THIS RIGHT, PRIVATE SECTOR STRIKES ARE FREQUENT. BEFORE A STRIKE CAN OCCUR IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE LAW REQUIRES INTENSIVE MEDIATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND PRIOR NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE. HOWEVER, NO APPROVAL IS REQUIRED. IN PRACTICE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ARE NOT FOLLOWED, AND FORMAL NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE IS RARELY GIVEN BECAUSE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROCEDURES ARE SLOW.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THESE PROCEDURES HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH WORKERS, WHO IGNORE THEM. SUDDEN STRIKES, THEREFORE, TEND TO RESULT FROM LONGSTANDING GRIEVANCES OR RECOGNITION THAT LEGALLY MANDATED BENEFITS OR RIGHTS ARE NOT BEING RECEIVED. WHILE STRIKE LEADERS ARE NOT ARRESTED FOR ILLEGAL STRIKES, THEY OFTEN LOSE THEIR JOBS AND HAVE NO LEGAL RECOURSE FOR REINSTATEMENT. THE NUMBER OF STRIKES INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY DURING 1994 COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR, WITH THE MOST DRAMATIC INCREASES OCCURRING

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE YEAR.

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

104. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROMOTES IT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE NATIONAL IDEOLOGY, PANCASILA. UNTIL RECENTLY ONLY RECOGNIZED TRADE UNIONS, THAT IS, THE SPSI AND ITS COMPONENTS, COULD LEGALLY ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. AS NOTED, NEW GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS ALSO PERMIT UNAFFILIATED PLANT-LEVEL WORKERS ASSOCIATIONS TO CONCLUDE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH EMPLOYERS, THOUGH ONLY ONE HAD DONE SO BY YEAR'S END. AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY ANY OTHER GROUPS ARE NOT CONSIDERED LEGALLY BINDING AND ARE NOT REGISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER.

105. THE MAJORITY OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE SPSI UNITS AND EMPLOYERS ARE NEGOTIATED BILATERALLY. ONCE NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED A REGISTERED SPSI OR INDEPENDENT PLANT LEVEL UNION, AN EMPLOYER IS OBLIGATED TO BARGAIN WITH IT. IN

COMPANIES WITHOUT UNIONS, THE GOVERNMENT DISCOURAGES WORKERS FROM UTILIZING OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE, E.G., DURING CONSULTATIONS WITH EMPLOYERS OVER COMPANY REGULATIONS. INSTEAD, THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PREFERS THAT WORKERS SEEK ITS ASSISTANCE AND BELIEVES THAT ITS ROLE IS TO PROTECT WORKERS. THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT FOR SOME INDONESIAN COMPANIES CONSULTATIONS ARE PERFUNCTORY AT BEST AND USUALLY WITH MANAGEMENT-SELECTED WORKERS. THERE ARE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY FROM U.S. COMPANIES. OVER HALF OF THE FACTORY-LEVEL SPSI UNITS HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS ARE FREELY NEGOTIATED BETWEEN UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE VARIES. BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS OR BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION OR ARBITRATION. MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

FOR 1 MORE YEAR. ACCORDING TO INDONESIAN AND NON-INDONESIAN NGO'S INVOLVED IN LABOR ISSUES, THE PROVISIONS OF THESE AGREEMENTS RARELY GO BEYOND THE LEGAL MINIMUM STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE AGREEMENTS ARE OFTEN MERELY PRESENTED TO WORKER REPRESENTATIVES FOR SIGNING RATHER THAN BEING NEGOTIATED.

106. THOUGH GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS PROHIBIT EMPLOYERS FROM DISCRIMINATING OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS FROM UNION OFFICIALS, OF EMPLOYER RETRIBUTION AGAINST UNION ORGANIZERS, INCLUDING FIRING, WHICH IS NOT EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED OR REMEDIED IN PRACTICE. SOME EMPLOYERS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

REPORTEDLY HAVE WARNED THEIR EMPLOYEES AGAINST CONTACT WITH UNION ORGANIZERS FROM THE UNRECOGNIZED SBSI ORGANIZATION. IN ADDITION TO MARSINAH (SEE SECTION 1.E.), SEVERAL OTHER LABOR UNION ACTIVISTS HAVE DIED IN MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS. SOME HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR NGO'S BELIEVE THAT THE AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATED THESE DEATHS.

107. CHARGES OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE ADJUDICATED BY ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. HOWEVER, MANY UNION MEMBERS BELIEVE THE TRIBUNALS GENERALLY SIDE WITH EMPLOYERS. BECAUSE OF THIS PERCEIVED PARTIALITY, MANY WORKERS REJECT OR AVOID THE PROCEDURE AND PRESENT THEIR GRIEVANCES DIRECTLY TO PARLIAMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF FIRED WORKERS TEND TO BE MONETARY AWARDS; WORKERS ARE RARELY REINSTATED. THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO FIRE WORKERS, BUT THE LAW IS OFTEN IGNORED IN PRACTICE.

108. THE ARMED FORCES, WHICH INCLUDE THE POLICE, CONTINUES TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN LABOR ISSUES, DESPITE NEW REGULATIONS PROMULGATED IN JANUARY TO PROHIBIT MILITARY INTERFERENCE WHEN THERE IS NO THREAT TO SECURITY. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE INCIDENCE OF SUCH MILITARY INVOLVEMENT DECREASED IN 1994, AND SOME OBSERVERS CREDIT GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES WITH RESTRAINT IN RESTORING ORDER IN THE MEDAN RIOTS OF APRIL. HOWEVER, THESE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PERCEPTIONS ARE NOT SHARED BY ALL OBSERVERS. WORKERS CHARGE THAT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES ATTEMPT TO INTIMIDATE UNION ORGANIZERS AND STRIKE LEADERS AND HAVE BEEN PRESENT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS DURING SOME STRIKES,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

EVEN WHEN THERE HAS BEEN NO DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER VIOLENCE. MEMBERS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ATTENDED AND MONITORED TRADE UNION EDUCATION SEMINARS RUN BY THE ASIAN-AMERICAN FREE LABOR INSTITUTE (AAFLI), EVEN THOUGH THESE PROGRAMS WERE APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. IN 1993, THE MILITARY COMMAND IN SURABAYA ALSO HALTED AN AAFLI-SPSI PROGRAM ON LEGAL AID FOR INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. AT YEAR'S END THE PROGRAM HAD NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO RESUME DESPITE GOVERNMENT ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD BE. MILITARY OFFICIALS OCCASIONALLY HAVE BEEN REPORTED PRESENT DURING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND MANAGEMENT. THEIR PRESENCE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS INTIMIDATING BY PLANT-LEVEL UNION OFFICIALS. A MILITARY OFFICER WAS AMONG THOSE CONVICTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MARSINAH MURDER CASE.

109. LABOR LAW APPLIES EQUALLY IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

110. THE LAW FORBIDS FORCED LABOR, AND THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY ENFORCES IT. NGO REPORTS HAVE ALLEGED THAT SOME CASES OF FORCED LABOR IN THE FORM OF DEBT BONDAGE BY LOGGING COMPANIES EXIST IN IRIAN JAYA. THE GOVERNMENT SAYS THAT IT IS UNABLE TO VERIFY THESE ALLEGATIONS BECAUSE THEY ARE INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC. NO COMPLAINTS OR INFORMATION ON FORCED LABOR IN IRIAN JAYA HAD COME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AS OF LATE SEPTEMBER. (SEE ALSO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION 5 INDIGENOUS PEOPLE.)

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

111. CHILD LABOR EXISTS IN BOTH INDUSTRIAL AREAS AND RURAL AREAS. THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 2.7 MILLION WORKING CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 14, ACCORDING TO A 1994 REPORT OF THE U. N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. INDONESIA WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO BE SELECTED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ILO'S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOR (IPEC), AND SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ILO TO GUIDE THEIR COLLABORATION UNDER THIS PROGRAM ON MAY 29, 1992. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PLAN OF ACTION WERE DEVELOPED AT A NATIONAL CONFERENCE IN BOGOR IN JULY 1993. DURING 1994, 120 INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT LABOR INSPECTORS RECEIVED ILO-SPONSORED TRAINING ON CHILD LABOR MATTERS UNDER THE IPEC PROGRAM.

112. THE GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A CLASS OF CHILDREN WHO MUST WORK FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS, AND IN 1987 THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER ISSUED REGULATION PER-OL/MEN/1987, "PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FORCED TO WORK," TO REGULATE THIS SITUATION. THIS REGULATION LEGALIZES THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14 WHO MUST WORK TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCOME OF THEIR FAMILIES. IT REQUIRES PARENTAL CONSENT, PROHIBITS DANGEROUS OR DIFFICULT WORK, LIMITS WORK TO 4 HOURS DAILY, AND REQUIRES EMPLOYERS TO REPORT THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN WORKING UNDER ITS PROVISIONS. IT DOES NOT SET A MINIMUM AGE FOR CHILDREN IN THIS CATEGORY, EFFECTIVELY

SUPERSEDING THE COLONIAL-ERA GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE OF DECEMBER 17, 1925, ON "MEASURES LIMITING CHILD LABOUR AND NIGHTWORK OF WOMEN," WHICH IS STILL THE CURRENT LAW GOVERNING CHILD LABOR AND SETS A MINIMUM AGE OF 12 FOR

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

EMPLOYMENT. THE 1987 REGULATION IS NOT ENFORCED. NO EMPLOYERS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO COURT FOR VIOLATING ITS RESTRICTIONS ON THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR CHILDREN, AND NO REPORTS ARE COLLECTED FROM ESTABLISHMENTS EMPLOYING CHILDREN.

113. ACT NO. 1 OF 1951 WAS INTENDED TO BRING INTO FORCE CERTAIN LABOR MEASURES, INCLUDING PROVISIONS ON CHILD LABOR WHICH WOULD REPLACE THOSE OF THE 1925 LEGISLATION. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS FOR THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN ISSUED. THUS THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS IN THE 1951 ACT HAVE NO VALIDITY. IN SEPTEMBER 1993, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IT WOULD REVIEW ITS CHILD LABOR REGULATIONS WITH THE INTENTION OF TIGHTENING ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS ON CHILD LABOR. AT YEAR'S END, THE REVIEW WAS NOT COMPLETED.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

114. IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE, AREA WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL ESTABLISH MINIMUM WAGES FOR REGIONS AND BASIC NEEDS FIGURES FOR EACH PROVINCE--A MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. WHILE INDONESIA HAS SUCCEEDED IN DRAMATICALLY LOWERING THE LEVEL OF POVERTY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, THE

MINIMUM WAGE RATES HAVE LAGGED BEHIND THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURES. MINIMUM WAGE RATES WERE RAISED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IN THREE STAGES BY PROVINCE ON JANUARY 1, APRIL 1, AND AUGUST 1, 1994. WHILE IN MOST CASES THE NEW RATES STILL DID NOT EQUAL THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURE, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IN AUGUST THAT NEW INCREASES WOULD TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ON APRIL 1, 1995. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROJECTS THAT AT THAT TIME MINIMUM WAGE RATES ON THE AVERAGE WILL EQUAL 106 PERCENT OF THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURE, UP FROM 97 PERCENT AS OF AUGUST 1, 1994. PAYMENT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE IS ANOTHER QUESTION. THERE ARE NO RELIABLE STATISTICS. THE GOVERNMENT'S ESTIMATE IN SEPTEMBER 1994, THAT 96 PERCENT

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

OF ALL COMPANIES WERE PAYING AT LEAST THE REGIONAL MINIMUM WAGE IS CERTAINLY EXAGGERATED; INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS' ESTIMATES RANGE BETWEEN 30 AND 60 PERCENT. GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT IS WEAK, AND SANCTIONS LIGHT AGAINST EMPLOYERS WHO FAIL TO PAY THE MINIMUM WAGE. NEVERTHELESS, AS A RESULT OF GOVERNMENT PRESSURES, THE WAVE OF STRIKES IN THE FIRST QUARTER, AND THE MEDAN RIOTS, SOME IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE. LABOR LAW AND MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PROVIDE WORKERS WITH A VARIETY OF OTHER BENEFITS, SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY, AND WORKERS IN MORE MODERN FACILITIES OFTEN RECEIVE HEALTH BENEFITS AND FREE MEALS.

115. THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7-HOUR WORKDAYS AND 40-HOUR WORKWEEKS, WITH ONE 30-MINUTE REST PERIOD FOR EACH 4 HOURS OF WORK. THE LAW ALSO REQUIRES ONE DAY OF REST OUT OF EVERY WEEK. THE DAILY OVERTIME RATE IS 1 1/2 TIMES THE NORMAL HOURLY RATE FOR THE FIRST HOUR, AND TWICE THE

HOURLY RATE FOR ADDITIONAL OVERTIME. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE. OBSERVANCE OF LAWS REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND BY REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ARE FAIRLY COMMON AND OFTEN RESULT IN STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. THE MINISTRY OF MANPOWER CONTINUES PUBLICLY TO URGE EMPLOYERS TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW. HOWEVER, IN GENERAL, GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ARE WEAK.

116. BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. IN THE LARGELY WESTERN-OPERATED OIL SECTOR, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUNCTION REASONABLY WELL. HOWEVER, IN THE COUNTRY'S 100,000 LARGER REGISTERED COMPANIES IN THE NONOIL SECTOR, THE QUALITY OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAMS VARIES GREATLY. THE ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS IS SEVERELY HAMPERED BY THE LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER INSPECTORS AS WELL AS BY THE LOW LEVEL OF EMPLOYEE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

APPRECIATION FOR SOUND HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES. ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION ON THE PART OF INSPECTORS ARE COMMON. WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS. EMPLOYERS ARE FORBIDDEN BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO, BUT THE LAW IS NOT EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED.

CHRISTOPHER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PTQ5069

RELEASED IN FULL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ5069

PAGE 01 STATE 025235 312230Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	OASY-00	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-14	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01
	P-01	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-01	USIE-00	PRME-01
	DRL-09	G-00	/035R				

DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:SJBLAKE:SJB
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:WSBUTCHER
EAP/PIMBS:MJFLECK DRL/AAA:MCARTER
DRL/CRT:DHARRIS DRL/AAA:SCYIP
EAP/RSP:BMALKIN
----------A171BD 312251Z /64
O R 312203Z JAN 95
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 0000
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 025235

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: V-4 FINAL COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES: INDONESIA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200504416

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

1. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. TRANSMITTED BELOW IS THE FINAL (V-4) VERSION OF THE INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR 1994 AS IT WILL GO TO CONGRESS ON TUESDAY JANUARY 31. DEPARTMENT PRINCIPALS WILL RELEASE THE REPORT TO THE PUBLIC AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, AT 12:30 P.M. POST MAY, AT ITS DISCRETION, PROVIDE A COPY TO HOST GOVERNMENT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS BEFORE 12:30 P.M. EST, FEBRUARY 1, ON CONDITION THAT HOST GOVERNMENT OBSERVE AN EMBARGO ON ITS RELEASE UNTIL THE TIME OF PUBLIC RELEASE IN WASHINGTON.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

INDONESIA

THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, DESPITE A SURFACE ADHERENCE TO DEMOCRATIC FORMS, REMAINS STRONGLY AUTHORITARIAN. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, NOW IN HIS SIXTH

5-YEAR TERM, A SMALL GROUP OF ADVISERS, AND THE MILITARY DOMINATE THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THIS HEAVILY POPULATED DEVELOPING COUNTRY, WHOSE PEOPLE COME FROM HUNDREDS OF DIFFERENT CULTURAL, LINGUISTIC, AND ETHNIC BACKGROUNDS. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES ALLEGIANCE TO A STATE IDEOLOGY KNOWN AS "PANCASILA," WHICH INCLUDES BELIEF IN A SUPREME GOD, A JUST AND CIVILIZED HUMANITY, NATIONAL UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE. IT HAS USED PANCASILA AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR RESTRICTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF

OPPOSITION ELEMENTS.

UNDER A DOCTRINE OF "DUAL FUNCTION," THE MILITARY IS GIVEN SPECIAL CIVIC RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, INCLUDING UNELECTED MILITARY SEATS IN PARLIAMENT (DPR) AND LOCAL LEGISLATURES, IN ADDITION TO ITS DEFENSE AND SECURITY ROLES. THE 450,000-MEMBER ARMED FORCES, INCLUDING 175,000 POLICE, CONSIDER THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNA SECURITY AS THEIR PRIMARY MISSION, AND THEY HAVE TRADITIONALLY ACTED SWIFTLY TO SUPPRESS PERCEIVED THREATS TO SECURITY, WHETHER

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

FROM CRIMINAL ACTS, SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS, OR ALLEGEDLY SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, WITH A VIGOR THAT HAS OFTEN LED TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. A FEW MILITARY LEADERS SOMETIMES RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THIS "SECURITY APPROACH." THERE CONTINUED TO BE NUMEROUS, CREDIBLE REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE MILITARY AND POLICE, ALTHOUGH THEY EXHIBITED SOME RESTRAINT IN CONTROLLING CROWDS AND DEMONSTRATIONS.

IN CONTRAST TO ITS RESTRICTIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM, INDONESIA HAS AN INCREASINGLY OPEN AND DEREGULATED ECONOMY. THOUGH STILL A POOR COUNTRY, INDONESIA'S ECONOMY CONTINUED TO EXPAND IN 1994, ESPECIALLY IN MANUFACTURING, WITH GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT EXPECTED TO INCREASE BY 6.7 PERCENT. WITH INFLATION REMAINING UNDER CONTROL, THE CONTINUED ECONOMIC GROWTH HAS PRODUCED STEADY GAINS IN LIVING STANDARDS FOR MUCH OF INDONESIAN SOCIETY. THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE LIVING BELOW THE POVERTY LINE HAS FALLEN FROM 70 MILLION IN 1970 TO 27 MILLION IN 1990. INCOME INEQUALITY HAS BEEN SLIGHTLY REDUCED OVER THE PAST QUARTER CENTURY. WIDESPREAD UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTS, HOWEVER, AS DO

CORRUPTION AND INFLUENCE PEDDLING.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO COMMIT SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND IN SOME AREAS, NOTABLY FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, IT BECAME MARKEDLY MORE REPRESSIVE, DEPARTING FROM A LONG-TERM TREND TOWARDS GREATER OPENNESS. THE MOST SERIOUS ABUSES INCLUDED THE CONTINUING INABILITY OF THE PEOPLE TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT AND HARSH REPRESSION OF

EAST TIMORESE DISSIDENTS. REPORTS OF EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS DECLINED. SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO TORTURE THOSE IN CUSTODY: SOME SOURCES REPORTED THAT THE USE OF TORTURE DECLINED, BUT DEFINITIVE STATISTICS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. EXTRAJUDICIAL ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS CONTINUED, AS DID THE USE OF EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE IN DEALING WITH SUSPECTED CRIMINALS OR PERCEIVED TROUBLEMAKERS.

THE GOVERNMENT IMPOSED SEVERE LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOMS OF SPEECH, PRESS, AND ASSEMBLY, AND SUPPRESSED EFFORTS TO

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DEVELOP A FREE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT. THE ARMED FORCES CONTINUED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOST SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. SOME MILITARY LEADERS SHOWED A WILLINGNESS TO ADMIT MISCONDUCT PUBLICLY AND TAKE ACTION AGAINST OFFENDERS. THE GOVERNMENT IN A FEW CASES BROUGHT ABUSERS TO JUSTICE, BUT THEIR PUNISHMENT RARELY MATCHED THE SEVERITY OF THE ABUSE. THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED TO BE LARGELY SUBSERVIENT TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE MILITARY. WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM REMAINED A SERIOUS PROBLEM.

THE GOVERNMENT WITHDREW THE LICENSES OF THREE LEADING

PUBLICATIONS. IT PREPARED BUT HAS NOT ISSUED A DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE THAT WOULD RESTRICT FURTHER THE ACTIVITIES OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO'S), AND IT INCREASINGLY CRACKED DOWN ON ANTIGOVERNMENTAL CRITICS, LABOR ACTIVISTS, AND ALLEGED CRIMINALS DURING THE YEAR, INCLUDING IN AN ANTICRIME CAMPAIGN DUBBED "OPERATION CLEANUP" BY THE GOVERNMENT. THESE CONSTRAINTS, HOWEVER, DID NOT COMPLETELY DAMPEN DISSENTING VOICES IN THE MEDIA, AND THE MANY HUMAN RIGHTS NGO'S CONTINUED TO BE ACTIVE. THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ESTABLISHED IN 1993 SHOWED SOME INDEPENDENCE AND A WILLINGNESS TO CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND ACTIONS.

ON EAST TIMOR, NO PROGRESS WAS MADE IN ACCOUNTING FOR THE MISSING PERSONS FOLLOWING THE 1991 DILI INCIDENT, AND TROOP LEVELS REMAINED UNJUSTIFIABLY HIGH. SOMEWHAT GREATER ACCESS WAS PERMITTED TO FOREIGN JOURNALISTS AND OTHERS, INCLUDING A JULY VISIT BY THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON SUMMARY, ARBITRARY AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL EXECUTIONS, ALTHOUGH SOME NGO REPRESENTATIVES AND FOREIGN JOURNALISTS CONTINUED TO ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES OR WERE DENIED ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON,

INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HISTORICALLY, POLITICALLY MOTIVATED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS GENERALLY HAVE OCCURRED MOST FREQUENTLY IN AREAS WHERE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS WERE ACTIVE, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAYA. ALTHOUGH SECURITY FORCES CONTINUE TO EMPLOY HARSH MEASURES AGAINST SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN THESE THREE AREAS, THERE WERE NO CONFIRMED REPORTS OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS IN 1994.

HOWEVER, THERE WERE REPORTS OF SECURITY FORCES KILLING ARMED INSURGENTS INCLUDING SIX ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS IN CLASHES IN ACEH. AT LEAST FOUR MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES WERE ALSO REPORTED KILLED IN THESE CLASHES. RELIABLE CIVILIAN SOURCES REPORTED THAT IN EAST TIMOR SECURITY FORCES KILLED SEVERAL TIMORESE CIVILIANS. THE NUMBER OF SUCH REPORTS WAS LOWER THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS, HOWEVER. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF SUCH KILLINGS IN IRIAN JAYA.

TROOP STRENGTH IN EAST TIMOR DECLINED IN 1994. RELIABLE ESTIMATES INDICATED THAT ABOUT 6,000 ARMY TROOPS FROM OUTSIDE THE PROVINCE REINFORCED THE NORMAL GARRISON OF ABOUT 3,000. THERE ARE ALSO ABOUT 3,000 POLICE IN EAST TIMOR. COMMANDERS THERE HAVE STATED THAT THEY INTEND TO REVIEW THE LEVEL OF TROOPS IN THE PROVINCE FOR POSSIBLE FURTHER REDUCTIONS ON A TWICE YEARLY BASIS. THE GOVERNMENT OFFERED A GENERAL AMNESTY TO MEMBERS OF THE TIMORESE RESISTANCE WHO SURRENDER THEIR ARMS, AND IT WAS REPORTED TO HAVE RELEASED SOME WHO WERE APPREHENDED RATHER THAN TRYING THEM.

THE POLICE OFTEN EMPLOY EXCESSIVE FORCE IN APPREHENDING

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

SUSPECTS OR COPING WITH ALLEGED CRIMINALS. IN JAKARTA POLICE IN APRIL MOUNTED AN ANTICRIME PROGRAM DUBBED "OPERATION CLEANUP," IN WHICH THEY EMPLOYED DEADLY FORCE AGAINST SUSPECTS. IN RESPONSE TO PROTESTS THAT THE METHODS USED ARE UNJUSTIFIABLY HARSH AND AMOUNT TO EXECUTION WITHOUT TRIAL, POLICE HAVE GENERALLY CLAIMED THAT THE SUSPECTS WERE FLEEING, RESISTING ARREST, OR THREATENING THE POLICE. ALTHOUGH ACCURATE STATISTICS WERE UNAVAILABLE, THE NUMBER OF FATAL SHOOTINGS BY POLICE SEEMED TO BE INCREASING. WITH SOME 150 INCIDENTS REPORTED IN WEST JAVA (INCLUDING JAKARTA) BY MID-JULY. HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THIS CLEANUP CAMPAIGN WAS INTENSIFIED IN THE WEEKS LEADING UP

TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION FORUM (APEC) MEETING IN NOVEMBER. IN NORTH SUMATRA, 80 SHOOTINGS BY POLICE, INCLUDING 4 DEATHS, WERE REPORTED BY MID-DECEMBER.

IN THE PAST THE AUTHORITIES ALMOST NEVER TOOK ACTION AGAINST POLICE FOR USING EXCESSIVE FORCE. HOWEVER, THERE IS SOME INDICATION THAT THE SITUATION IS IMPROVING, ALTHOUGH ACTION TAKEN BY THE AUTHORITIES IS STILL NOT COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF POLICE ABUSES. FOR EXAMPLE, A MILITARY COURT IN MEDAN SENTENCED A POLICEMAN ACCUSED OF KILLING A SUSPECT IN 1993, WHO WAS ALLEGEDLY TRYING TO ESCAPE, TO 3 MONTHS IN PRISON IN 1994. IN MARCH A MILITARY COURT SENTENCED FOUR POLICEMEN IN PALEMBANG TO PRISON TERMS OF 2 TO 3 MONTHS FOR SHOOTING, BUT NOT KILLING, A SUSPECT AT CLOSE RANGE. THE FIVE POLICE OFFICERS DETAINED IN 1993 IN NORTH SUMATRA IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEATH OF SYAMSUL BAHRI WERE NOT TRIED, APPARENTLY

BECAUSE THE FAMILY DID NOT PURSUE THE CASE. AT LEAST ONE OF THE 10 POLICE CADETS ACCUSED OF BEATING A MAN TO DEATH IN KUPANG IN APRIL WAS SENTENCED TO 2 YEARS IN PRISON. AT YEAR'S END THE MILITARY CLAIMED TO BE STILL INVESTIGATING THE SEPTEMBER 1993 KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES OF FOUR

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DEMONSTRATORS WHO WERE PEACEFULLY PROTESTING CONSTRUCTION OF A DAM IN MADURA; SOME TWO DOZEN POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE INVOLVED. RESIDENTS FROM THE AREA MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN MAY AND DECEMBER TO REQUEST LEGAL ACTION AGAINST CIVILIANS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCUSED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE SHOOTINGS.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

THERE WERE NO POLITICALLY MOTIVATED ABDUCTIONS. SECURITY FORCES IN AREAS OF CONFLICT OFTEN HOLD SUSPECTS FOR LONG PERIODS WITHOUT FORMAL CHARGES, BUT THESE CASES USUALLY END WITH OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF DETENTION (SEE SECTION L.D.). RELIABLE SOURCES REPORT THAT ALL THOSE ALLEGED TO HAVE DISAPPEARED DURING THE MID-JULY DISTURBANCES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR HAVE BEEN LOCATED.

GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MISSING AND DEAD FROM THE NOVEMBER 12, 1991 MILITARY SHOOTING OF CIVILIANS IN DILI, EAST TIMOR, REMAINED INADEQUATE. NO ADDITIONAL CASES OF THOSE STILL LISTED AS MISSING IN A REPORT THE MILITARY GAVE TO HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA WERE RESOLVED DURING THE YEAR. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN IMPLIED THAT THEIR FAILURE TO LOCATE THOSE MISSING WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO THOSE

PERSONS WISHING TO EVADE DETECTION. MANY KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS, HOWEVER, CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE MISSING ARE DEAD AND THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES KNOW WHERE THEIR BODIES ARE LOCATED.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

THE CRIMINAL CODE MAKES IT A CRIME PUNISHABLE BY UP TO 4 YEARS IN PRISON FOR ANY OFFICIAL TO USE VIOLENCE OR FORCE TO ELICIT A CONFESSION, AND IT ESTABLISHES PRETRIAL PROCEDURES TO GIVE SUSPECTS OR THEIR FAMILIES THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF AN ARREST OR DETENTION. IN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PRACTICE, SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO EMPLOY TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF MISTREATMENT, PARTICULARLY IN REGIONS OF SECURITY CONCERNS SUCH AS ACEH AND EAST TIMOR, ALTHOUGH SOME SOURCES REPORTED THAT THE USE OF TORTURE DECLINED. LEGAL PROTECTIONS ARE BOTH INADEQUATE AND WIDELY IGNORED. ACCORDING TO THE JANUARY, 1994 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE MOST COMMONLY USED METHODS ARE: BEATING ON THE HEAD, SHINS, AND TORSO WITH FISTS, LENGTHS OF WOOD, IRON BARS, BOTTLES, ROCKS, AND ELECTRIC CABLES; KICKING WITH HEAVY BOOTS; BURNING WITH LIGHTED CIGARETTES; ELECTRIC SHOCKS; SLASHING WITH RAZOR BLADES AND KNIVES; DEATH THREATS, FAKED EXECUTIONS AND DELIBERATE WOUNDING WITH FIREARMS; POURING WATER THROUGH THE NOSE; PROLONGED IMMERSION IN FETID WATER; HANGING UPSIDE DOWN BY THE FEET; PLACING HEAVY OBJECTS ON KNEES AND OTHER JOINTS; ISOLATION; SLEEP AND FOOD DEPRIVATION AND GENITAL

MUTILATION, SEXUAL MOLESTATION, AND RAPE. CIVILIAN SOURCES IN EAST TIMOR REPORT THAT SECURITY AGENCIES STILL EMPLOY TORTURE BEFORE RELEASING SUSPECTS TO POLICE CUSTODY' PARTICULARLY ELECTRIC SHOCKS, THOUGH ITS INCIDENCE HAS DECREASED.

POLICE OFTEN RESORT TO PHYSICAL ABUSES EVEN IN MINOR INCIDENTS, AND PRISON CONDITIONS ARE HARSH, WITH VIOLENCE AMONG PRISONERS AND MISTREATMENT AND EXTORTION OF INMATES BY GUARDS REPORTEDLY COMMON. THE INCIDENCE OF MISTREATMENT BY PRISON OFFICIALS DROPS SHARPLY ONCE A FRISONER HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM POLICE OR MILITARY CUSTODY INTO THE CIVILIAN PRISON SYSTEM, AND PRISON CONDITIONS GENERALLY HAVE IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS. OFFICIALS HAVE PUBLICLY CONDEMNED POLICE BRUTALITY AND HARSH PRISON CONDITIONS AND OCCASIONALLY INSTIGATE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, INCLUDING TRANSFER, DISMISSAL, AND TRIALS LEADING TO PRISON. IN AUGUST A CIVILIAN EMPLOYED

AT A MEDAN JAIL WAS TRIED ON CHARGES OF CAUSING THE DEATH OF AN INMATE WHO DIED FROM INJURIES SUSTAINED IN A BEATING. HE WAS SENTENCED TO 6 MONTHS IN JAIL. SUCH ACTIONS, HOWEVER, ARE AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE OF GENERAL

IMPUNITY.

POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE USUALLY MIXED WITH THE GENERAL PRISON POPULATION' ALTHOUGH IN THE CIPINANG PRISON IN JAKARTA HIGH-PROFILE POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE SEGREGATED. IN 1994 THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) TO VISIT PRISONERS IN CIPINANG IN JAKARTA AND ALSO GRANTED ACCESS TO PRISONS ELSEWHERE IN

JAVA, SUMATRA, ACEH, AND OTHER PROVINCES AS WELL AS EAST TIMOR. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO HAS ALLOWED THE ICRC TO ORGANIZE FAMILY VISITS TO POLITICAL PRISONERS. IN JANUARY THE AUTHORITIES SUSPENDED VISITATION RIGHTS FOR JAILED EAST TIMORESE FRETILIN LEADER XANANA GUSMAO FOR 1 MONTH FOLLOWING RELEASE OF A LETTER HE SENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS WHICH INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES DEEMED OBJECTIONABLE.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE CONTAINS PROVISIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION WHICH ARE ROUTINELY VIOLATED. THE CODE SPECIFIES THE RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO NOTIFY THEIR FAMILIES, AND THAT WARRANTS MUST BE PRODUCED DURING AN ARREST EXCEPT UNDER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS, SUCH AS WHEN A SUSPECT IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME. IT ALSO AUTHORIZES INVESTIGATORS TO ISSUE WARRANTS TO ASSIST IN THEIR INVESTIGATIONS OR IF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED. DESPITE THESE REQUIREMENTS, AUTHORITIES SOMETIMES MAKE ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS. SOME PERSONS SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE MEDAN RIOTS IN APRIL WERE ARRESTED BEFORE FORMAL WARRANTS WERE ISSUED.

THE LAW PRESUMES DEFENDANTS INNOCENT AND PERMITS BAIL. THEY OR THEIR FAMILIES MAY ALSO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THEIR ARREST AND DETENTION IN A PRETRIAL HEARING AND MAY SUE FOR COMPENSATION IF WRONGFULLY DETAINED. HOWEVER, IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO INVOKE THIS PROCEDURE, LET ALONE RECEIVE COMPENSATION, AFTER BEING

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGE. IN BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COURTS, APPEALS BASED ON LEGALITY OF ARREST AND DETENTION ARE RARELY, IF EVER, ACCEPTED. THE CODE ALSO CONTAINS SPECIFIC LIMITS ON PERIODS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION AND SPECIFIES WHEN THE COURTS MUST GET INVOLVED TO APPROVE

EXTENSIONS, USUALLY AFTER 60 DAYS

IN AREAS WHERE ACTIVE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS EXIST SUCH AS EAST TIMOR AND ACEH, PEOPLE ARE ROUTINELY DETAINED WITHOUT WARRANTS, CHARGES, OR COURT PROCEEDINGS. BAIL IS RARELY GRANTED, ESPECIALLY IN POLITICAL CASES. THE AUTHORITIES FREQUENTLY PREVENT ACCESS TO DEFENSE COUNSEL AND MAKE IT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO GET LEGAL ASSISTANCE FROM VOLUNTARY LEGAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS. THE AUTHORITIES ROUTINELY APPROVE EXTENSIONS OF PERIODS OF DETENTION. IN ADDITION, SUSPECTS CHARGED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW ARE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL PROCEDURES OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE WHICH ALLOW, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD A SUSPECT UP TO 1 YEAR BEFORE TRIAL. HE MAY RENEW THIS 1-YEAR PERIOD WITHOUT LIMIT. SPECIAL LAWS ON CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND NARCOTICS ARE SIMILARLY EXEMPT FROM THE CODE'S PROTECTIONS.

THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) OPERATES OUTSIDE THE CODE AND HAS WIDE DISCRETION TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE PERSONS THOUGHT TO THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO STATE THE EXACT NUMBER OF ARBITRARY ARRESTS OR DETENTIONS WITHOUT TRIAL BUT IN MARCH

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

59 PEOPLE BEING HELD IN CONNECTION WITH THE 1989-91 ACEH INSURGENCY WERE RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGES OR TRIALS, BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER RELEASED SINCE 1990 TO AROUND 965 PERSONS. MANY HAD BEEN HELD INCOMMUNICADO WITHOUT KNOWING THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM; SOME, INCLUDING AT LEAST FIVE OF THOSE RELEASED IN 1994, HAD BEEN HELD FOR OVER 2 YEARS. THE AUTHORITIES REQUIRE MANY OF THOSE RELEASED TO REPORT BACK AT REGULAR INTERVALS. THREE OTHER ACEHNESE CONVICTED PREVIOUSLY OF SUBVERSION WERE RELEASED IN 1994 AFTER SERVING TWO-THIRDS OF THEIR SENTENCES. THE DECLINE IN ARMED SEPARATIST ACTIVITY LED TO FEWER DETENTIONS, AND FEWER THAN 100 ACEHNESE WERE BELIEVED TO BE IN DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL AT YEAR'S END. AN ADDITIONAL FIVE PERSONS WERE SENTENCED FOR SUBVERSION IN ACEH IN 1994 AND THE TRIALS OF FIVE OTHERS ON CHARGES OF SUBVERSION AND NARCOTICS SMUGGLING WERE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN IN MID-DECEMBER.

IN EAST TIMOR MILITARY AUTHORITIES CONTINUED THE PRACTICE OF DETAINING PEOPLE WITHOUT CHARGES FOR SHORT PERIODS AND THEN REQUIRING THEM TO REPORT DAILY OR WEEKLY TO POLICE AFTER THEIR RELEASE. THREE EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS DETAINED BY POLICE IN AUGUST FOR BRINGING FORBIDDEN BOOKS

AND FOREIGN ITEMS INTO THE PROVINCE WERE RELEASED, BUT TWO OF THEM ARE REQUIRED TO REPORT TO THE AUTHORITIES. SIX EAST TIMORESE WHO RECEIVED LENGTHY SENTENCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE NOVEMBER 1991 SHOOTINGS IN DILI WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON IN SEMARANG WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO THEIR FAMILIES OR HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS, AND THEIR WHEREABOUTS WERE UNKNOWN FOR SEVERAL DAYS. JOSE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ANTONIO NEVES, AN ACKNOWLEDGED MEMBER OF THE CLANDESTINE PROINDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, AND IN DETENTION SINCE MAY, WAS CHARGED WITH SEDITION IN SEPTEMBER. HIS DEFENSE ATTORNEY ASKED FOR DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGES, CITING PROCEDURAL FLAWS IN NEVES' ARREST. THEY ALSO ALLEGE THAT POLICE DENIED HIM ACCESS TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR THE FIRST 2 MONTHS OF HIS DETENTION. AROUND 100 PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED DURING DEMONSTRATIONS AND OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE IN DILI AROUND THE TIME OF THE NOVEMBER APEC MEETINGS. SOME

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

REMAINED IN CUSTODY AT YEAR'S END.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATES THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, BUT IN PRACTICE THE JUDICIARY IS SUBORDINATED TO THE EXECUTIVE AND THE MILITARY, AND IN MANY CASES PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AGAINST COERCED CONFESSIONS, ARE INADEQUATE TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL. A QUADRIPARTITE JUDICIARY OF GENERAL, RELIGIOUS, MILITARY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS EXISTS BELOW THE SUPREME COURT. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT TO HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS IN ALL FOUR SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE. THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT CONSIDER FACTUAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF LAW. A THREE-JUDGE PANEL CONDUCTS TRIALS AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL, POSES QUESTIONS, HEARS EVIDENCE, DECIDES GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND ASSESSES PUNISHMENT. INITIAL JUDGMENTS ARE RARELY REVERSED IN THE APPEALS PROCESS, ALTHOUGH SENTENCES ARE SOMETIMES INCREASED OR REDUCED (BOTH THE DEFENSE AND THE PROSECUTION MAY APPEAL). IN 1994 FOR EXAMPLE, THE 4-YEAR SENTENCE OF A STUDENT TRIED IN JAKARTA FOR INSULTING THE

PRESIDENT IN LEAFLETS HE DISTRIBUTED NEAR THE PARLIAMENT IN NOVEMBER 1993 WAS INCREASED TO 5 YEARS UPON APPEAL OF THE PROSECUTOR. THE RELATIVELY LIGHT (6 MONTHS) SENTENCES OF 21 OTHER STUDENTS WHO WERE ALSO CONVICTED OF INSULTING THE PRESIDENT DURING DEMONSTRATIONS AT PARLIAMENT IN DECEMBER 1993 WERE INCREASED TO BETWEEN 8 AND 14 MONTHS FOLLOWING APPEAL BY THE PROSECUTOR. IN AUGUST THE SUPREME COURT ORDERED THE RELEASE OF THOSE AMONG THE 21 STUDENTS WHOSE SENTENCES HAD BEEN RAISED TO 8 MONTHS WHEN THEY WERE STILL BEING HELD A WEEK FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THEIR

SENTENCES.

DEFENDANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AND TO PRODUCE WITNESSES IN THEIR DEFENSE. AN EXCEPTION IS ALLOWED IN CASES IN WHICH DISTANCE OR EXPENSE IS DEEMED EXCESSIVE FOR TRANSPORTING WITNESSES TO COURT. IN SUCH CASES, SWORN AFFIDAVITS MAY BE INTRODUCED. HOWEVER, THE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR WITNESSES' IMMUNITY OR FOR COMPULSORY PROCESS OF DEFENSE WITNESSES. AS A RESULT, WITNESSES ARE SOMETIMES TOO AFRAID OF RETRIBUTION TO TESTIFY AGAINST THE AUTHORITIES.

IN CASES TRIED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW, TRIALS IN ABSENTIA ARE PERMITTED AND PUBLIC ACCESS GENERALLY REQUIRES ADVANCE APPROVAL BY THE MILITARY. THE COURTS COMMONLY ALLOW FORCED CONFESSIONS AND LIMIT THE PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE COURT TRYING THE SUSPECTS IN THE MARSINAH MURDER ADMITTED THEIR CONFESSIONS INTO EVIDENCE AND CONVICTED THEM OF THE MURDER, EVEN THOUGH THE DEFENDANTS CLAIMED THAT THEIR

CONFESSIONS HAD BEEN OBTAINED BY COERCION AND TORTURE. THE COURT ALLOWED DEFENSE ATTORNEYS FOR THE STUDENT MENTIONED ABOVE WHOSE SENTENCE WAS RAISED TO 5 YEARS ON APPEAL, TO CALL ONLY ONE OUT OF 17 WITNESSES THEY WISHED TO PRESENT. MOCHTAR PAKPAHAN WAS NOT ALLOWED TO CALL EXPERT LEGAL WITNESSES IN HIS DEFENSE (SEE SECTION 6). DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND CAN BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN THEIR OWN TRIALS.

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE GIVES DEFENDANTS THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY FROM THE MOMENT OF THEIR ARREST THROUGH THE INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL. THE LAW REQUIRES THAT A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IN CAPITAL CASES AND THOSE INVOLVING A PRISON SENTENCE OF 15 YEARS OR MORE. IN CASES INVOLVING POTENTIAL SENTENCES OF 5 YEARS OR MORE, A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IF THE DEFENDANT DESIRES AN ATTORNEY AND IS INDIGENT. IN THEORY DESTITUTE DEFENDANTS MAY OBTAIN PRIVATE LEGAL HELP, SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, DEFENDANTS ARE OFTEN PERSUADED NOT TO HIRE AN ATTORNEY, OR ACCESS TO AN ATTORNEY OF THEIR CHOICE IS IMPEDED. THE AUTHORITIES REPORTEDLY PRESSURED SEVERAL DEFENDANTS TRIED IN MEDAN ON CHARGES STEMMING FROM LABOR UNREST IN APRIL, WHICH TURNED INTO ANTI-CHINESE RIOTS, TO DECLINE ATTORNEYS WHILE SOME ATTORNEYS INVOLVED IN THE CASES WERE SUBJECTED TO OFFICIAL HARASSMENT OF VARIOUS KINDS. FIVE EAST TIMORESE SENTENCED TO 20 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT FOR PUBLICLY EXPRESSING

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

ANTI-INDONESIAN SENTIMENTS DURING A BANNER-WAVING INCIDENT

IN THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WERE NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. AUTHORITIES CLAIM THEY DECLINED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, WHILE NONGOVERNMENTAL SOURCES
INDICATED ACCESS TO COUNSEL WAS IMPEDED, AND THAT THE
DEFENSE LAWYERS WERE NOT NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE OF THEIR
APPEARANCE IN COURT THAT SENTENCING WAS TO BEGIN.

THE SUPREME COURT THEORETICALLY STANDS COEQUAL WITH THE
EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES, BU IT DOES NOT HAVE
THE RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER LAWS PASSED BY
PARLIAMENT. THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOT YET EXERCISED ITS
POWER (HELD SINCE 1985) TO REVIEW MINISTERIAL DECREES AND
REGULATIONS. IN 1993 CHIEF JUSTICE PURWOTO GANDASUBRATA
LAID OUT JUDICIAL PROCEDURES FOR LIMITED JUDICIA REVIEW,
AND SOME CASES OF THIS KIND WERE INITIATED IN 1994.
JUDGES ARE CIVIL SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH, WHICH CONTROLS THEIR ASSIGNMENTS, PAY, AND
PROMOTION. THEY ARE SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM
MILITARY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES. SUCH CONTROL
OFTEN DETERMINES THE OUTCOME OF A CASE. CORRUPTION
PERMEATES THE LEGAL SYSTEM. IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES,
THE PAYMENT OF BRIBES CAN INFLUENCE PROSECUTION,
CONVICTION, AND SENTENCING. TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM, THE
GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT THE SALARIES OF JUDGES WOULD BE
DOUBLED AS OF JANUARY 1, 1995.

THE SUPREME COURT BOWED TO GOVERNMENT PRESSURE IN A
LONGSTANDING LAND DISPUTE BETWEEN THE CENTRAL JAVA
GOVERNMENT AND 34 FARMERS WHO HAD BEEN FORCED TO SELL
THEIR LAND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE KEDUNGOMBO DAM, A
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FUNDED BY THE WORLD BANK. THE
VILLAGERS SUED FOR INCREASED COMPENSATION. THE SUPREME
COURT INITIALLY OVERTURNED DECISIONS OF BOTH THE SEMARANG
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRICT COURT AND THE CENTRAL JAVA HIGH COURT IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT, AWARDING THE PLAINTIFFS EVEN GREATER COMPENSATION THAN THEY HAD SOUGHT, INCLUDING "NONMATERIAL LOSSES." HOWEVER, THE SUPREME COURT LATER REVERSED ITS OWN RULING AFTER THE GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO ACCEPT IT AND ASKED THE COURT TO REVIEW IT AGAIN.

IN AN UNUSUAL MOVE IN NOVEMBER, THE EAST JAVA HIGH COURT OVERTURNED THE CONVICTION OF THE REPUTED MASTERMIND OF THE MARSINAH MURDER FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS APPEALED THE DECISION TO THE SUPREME COURT DESPITE PROVISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL CODE WHICH DISALLOW AN APPEAL IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.

FOR THE FOURTH CONSECUTIVE YEAR, THERE WAS A DECLINE IN

THE NUMBER OF PERSONS PROSECUTED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW, WHICH CARRIES A MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH. THE AUTHORITIES TRIED AT LEAST FIVE PERSONS IN 1994 UNDER THE LAW FOR SUBVERSION IN ACEH AND SENTENCED THEM TO FROM 19 TO 20 YEARS' IMPRISONMENT. THE ANTISUBVERSION LAW MAKES IT A CRIME TO ENGAGE IN ACTS THAT COULD DISTORT, UNDERMINE, OR DEVIATE FROM THE STATE IDEOLOGY OR BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, OR WHICH COULD DISSEMINATE FEELINGS OF HOSTILITY OR AROUSE HOSTILITY, DISTURBANCES, OR ANXIETY AMONG THE POPULATION. THE EXCESSIVELY VAGUE LANGUAGE MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO PROSECUTE PEOPLE MERELY FOR PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF VIEWS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT.

THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT MAKE AVAILABLE STATISTICS ON THE

NUMBER OF PEOPLE CURRENTLY SERVING SUBVERSION SENTENCES OR SENTENCES CLASSIFIED AS FELONIES UNDER THE SO-CALLED HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. INFORMED SOURCES ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE SERVING SENTENCES FOR SUBVERSION IN

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

1994, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI)' MUSLIM MILITANTS, AND THOSE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN IRIAN JAYA, ACEH, AND EAST TIMOR, AT AROUND 300. SCORES, AND POSSIBLY HUNDREDS, MORE WERE BELIEVED TO BE SERVING SENTENCES UNDER THE HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. SOME OF THESE PERSONS ADVOCATED OR EMPLOYED VIOLENCE, BUT MANY ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO WERE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPTING TO EXERCISE SUCH UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH OR ASSOCIATION OR WHO WERE CONVICTED IN MANIFESTLY UNFAIR TRIALS. SIX PRISONERS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION REMAINED UNDER DEATH SENTENCE. FIVE OF THESE WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, ARE 78 OR MORE YEARS OLD, AND HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED FOR 29 YEARS. IN JUNE TWO STUDENTS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN 1993 FOR POSSESSING BANNED LITERATURE AND PARTICIPATING IN ILLEGAL DISCUSSION GROUPS WERE GRANTED CONDITIONAL RELEASE AFTER SERVING TWO-THIRDS OF THEIR SENTENCES. THREE ALLEGED MEMBERS OF ACEH MERDEKA CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION WERE RELEASED AFTER SERVING LENGTHY SENTENCES.

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

JUDICIAL WARRANTS FOR SEARCHES ARE REQUIRED EXCEPT FOR CASES INVOLVING SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, SECURITY AGENCIES REGULARLY MAKE

FORCED OR SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES. THEY ALSO INTIMIDATE BY SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS AND RESIDENCES AND SELECTIVE

MONITORING OF LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS WITHOUT LEGAL RESTRAINT. GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND ITS FRONT ORGANIZATIONS ESPECIALLY PERSONS THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP. THE GOVERNMENT STATED IN LATE 1990 THAT THIS LATTER GROUP THEN TOTALED 1,410,333 PEOPLE. THESE PERSONS AND THEIR RELATIVES SOMETIMES ARE SUBJECT TO SURVEILLANCE, REQUIRED CHECK-INS, PERIODIC INDOCTRINATION, AND RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL OUTSIDE THEIR CITY OF

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

RESIDENCE. THEIR LEGALLY REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION CARDS CARRY THE INITIALS "E.T." WHICH STAND FOR "EX-TAPOL," OR FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER, WHICH READILY IDENTIFIES THEM TO PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYERS OR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

THE GOVERNMENT'S TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM WHICH MOVED LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE FROM OVERPOPULATED ISLANDS TO MORE ISOLATED AND BACKWARD ONES HAS BEEN CRITICIZED BY NONGOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS. THEY SAY THAT IT NOT ONLY VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE BUT ALSO THOSE OF THE TRANSMIGRANTS, CLAIMING THAT THEY ARE FREQUENTLY DUPED INTO LEAVING THEIR HOME VILLAGES WITHOUT ANY MEANS OF RETURN (SEE SECTION 5.).

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE TREND TOWARD GREATER OPENNESS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE PRESS, WHICH BEGAN IN 1993 AND CONTINUED THROUGH THE FIRST HALF OF 1994, SUFFERED A SERIOUS SETBACK ON JUNE 21 WHEN THE GOVERNMENT REVOKED THE PUBLISHING PERMITS OF THREE OF INDONESIA'S BEST KNOWN WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS: TEMPO, DETIK, AND EDITOR. TEMPO WAS THE NATION'S MOST INFLUENTIAL NEWSMAGAZINE, FOUNDED IN 1971 AND WIDELY RESPECTED FOR THE BREADTH AND DEPTH OF ITS COVERAGE. DETIK WAS A HARD-HITTING TABLOID SPECIALIZING IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL ISSUES. EDITOR WAS A RESPECTED VOICE ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS. THE OFFICIAL REASONS GIVEN FOR REVOCATION OF THE LICENSES WERE THAT TEMPO HAD ENDANGERED NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH ITS REPORTING, AND THAT THE OTHER TWO HAD COMMITTED ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATIONS. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT REPORTING OF ALLEGED DIFFERENCES IN THE CABINET OVER A CONTROVERSIAL MILITARY PROCUREMENT ISSUE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION.

ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 1982 PRESS LAW PROVIDE

FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THE ISSUANCE OF PUBLISHING

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LICENSES UNDER A 1984 MINISTERIAL DECREE IS ONE METHOD THE GOVERNMENT USES TO CONTROL THE PRESS. THREE OTHER PUBLICATIONS HAD THEIR LICENSES REVOKED IN THE LAST DECADE, ALTHOUGH TWO LATER REAPPEARED WITH NEW NAMES AND CHANGES IN TOP MANAGEMENT. IN DECEMBER MINISTER OF INFORMATION HARMOKO STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ISSUE NO NEW PRESS LICENSES DURING 1995 FOR PUBLICATIONS ON CURRENT AFFAIRS, AND HE SAID THERE WAS NO CHANCE THAT THE MAJORITY GROUP OF JOURNALISTS FROM THE FORMER TEMPO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MAGAZINE WOULD BE ISSUED A PRESS PERMIT TO FOUND A SUCCESSOR PUBLICATION; RATHER, THE MINISTER NOTED THAT A PRESS PERMIT HAD ALREADY BEEN ISSUED TO A SMALLER GROUP OF FORMER TEMPO EMPLOYEES. OTHER MEANS OF CONTROL INCLUDE REGULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF ADVERTISING PERMITTED AND OF THE NUMBER OF PAGES ALLOWED IN NEWSPAPERS. THE PRACTICE OF TELEPHONING EDITORS TO CAUTION AGAINST PUBLISHING CERTAIN STORIES--THE SO-CALLED TELEPHONE CULTURE--CONTINUED, AND ITS INCIDENCE SEEMED TO INCREASE FOLLOWING THE ACTION AGAINST THE THREE PUBLICATIONS IN JUNE. SELF-CENSORSHIP CONTINUED TO BE ANOTHER PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED BRAKE ON FREE EXPRESSION WHOSE EFFECTIVENESS INCREASED AFTER JUNE.

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES CONTINUED IN SOME CASES TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS, MORE OR LESS SUBTLE, TO LOCAL JOURNALISTS ON WHAT THEY COULD PRINT. FOR EXAMPLE, AFTER EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF THE APRIL STRIKES AND RIOTS, PRESS COVERAGE OF LABOR ISSUES DROPPED MARKEDLY IN MEDAN FOLLOWING DIRECTIVES FROM AUTHORITIES TO CUT BACK ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. IN JAKARTA, PAPERS WERE WARNED AGAINST COVERING TOPICS RANGING FROM THE PROLONGED SUMMER DROUGHT TO THE BAN OF THE THREE PUBLICATIONS. MEDAN POLICE TRIED TO CURB FOREIGN COVERAGE OF THE APRIL DISTURBANCES BY INSISTING ON SPECIAL PERMITS FROM THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, AND AT LEAST TWO FOREIGN REPORTERS WERE FORCED TO LEAVE THE CITY. THE STAFF OF EAST TIMOR'S ONLY NEWSPAPER WERE SUBJECT TO VARIOUS FORMS OF INTIMIDATION BY UNKNOWN SOURCES, AND A NEWSPAPER-OWNED VEHICLE WAS BURNED AND HEAVILY DAMAGED FOLLOWING THE NEWSPAPER'S COVERAGE OF A MID-JULY DEMONSTRATION WHICH WAS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AT VARIANCE WITH THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT.

THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AGAINST PRESS FREEDOM IN 1994 LIMITED THE INCREASINGLY VOCAL AND INDEPENDENT PRESS THAT HAS EMERGED IN RECENT YEARS. ALTHOUGH PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS DWINDLED FOLLOWING THE HARSH GOVERNMENT REACTION AGAINST SOME DEMONSTRATORS, ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO

THE NEW GOVERNMENT PRESS MEASURES CONTINUED IN OTHER CHANNELS. A NUMBER OF UNSANCTIONED JOURNAS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE CRITICAL COVERAGE OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, BUT THEY WERE CIRCULATED IN SMALL NUMBERS LARGELY IN MAJOR CITIES. IN AUGUST, 55 JOURNALISTS FOUNDED THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS, RIVALING THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (PWI), TO WORK FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND OPPOSE ANY FORM OF CENSORSHIP AND INTERFERENCE IN PRESS FREEDOM. IN SEPTEMBER THE FORMER CHIEF EDITOR OF TEMPO BROUGHT A LAWSUIT IN JAKARTA ADMINISTRATIVE COURT AGAINST THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION OVER THE REVOCATION OF TEMPO'S LICENSE, THE FIRST EVER SUCH LAWSUIT. AT YEAR'S END, THIS SUIT WAS STILL NOT DECIDED. IN OCTOBER MOST OF THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF DETIK JOINED THE STAFF OF THE EXISTING PUBLICATION SYMPHONY AND REVAMPED IT TO RESEMBLE DETIK. HOWEVER, PUBLICATION WAS SUSPENDED AFTER ONLY A FEW DAYS WHEN THE PWI WITHDREW ITS LEGALLY REQUIRED APPROVAL, THUS JEOPARDIZING SYMPHONY'S OWN PUBLICATION LICENSE.

WHILE PUBLIC DIALOG IS STILL FREER THAN IT WAS A FEW YEARS AGO, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON FREE SPEECH. FOR EXAMPLE, ON AUGUST 29 SECURITY FORCES

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PROHIBITED NOTED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION FROM ADDRESSING A SEMINAR ON DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY IN SURABAYA. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO PREVENTED SEVERAL OTHER PUBLIC FIGURES, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, FROM PARTICIPATING IN PUBLIC SEMINARS ON ONE OR MORE OCCASIONS. AUTHORITIES OFTEN CAPRICIOUSLY APPLIED THESE STRICTURES WITHOUT CLEAR JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROHIBITION. IN EAST TIMOR AUTHORITIES DENIED PERMISSION FOR NGO'S AND THE LOCAL UNIVERSITY TO HOLD AN OPEN SEMINAR ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT. IN FEBRUARY AUTHORITIES IN EAST JAVA BANNED THE PERFORMANCE IN SURABAYA OF A PLAY BY WELL-KNOWN AUTHOR EMHA AINUN NADJIB, WHICH WAS CRITICAL OF GOVERNMENT LAND POLICIES IN DEVELOPMENT CASES. SUBSEQUENTLY THE AUTHORITIES ALLOWED PERFORMANCE OF THE PLAY, WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY PERFORMED IN JOGJAKARTA. TWO U.S. MOVIES WERE BANNED FOLLOWING PROTEST BY ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS LEADERS. HOWEVER A PLAY ABOUT THE CONTROVERSIAL MURDER OF LABOR ACTIVIST MARSINAH WAS STAGED IN JAKARTA IN SEPTEMBER.

THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA REMAINED MORE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR COVERAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT THAN THE PRINTED MEDIA. THE GOVERNMENT OPERATES THE NATIONWIDE TELEVISION NETWORK WHICH HAS 12 REGIONAL STATIONS. PRIVATE TELEVISION

COMPANIES CONTINUED TO EXPAND, WITH A FIFTH STATION SCHEDULED TO BEGIN OPERATION IN NOVEMBER. ALL ARE REQUIRED TO BROADCAST GOVERNMENT-PRODUCED NEWS, BUT MANY ALSO PRODUCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STYLE PROGRAMMING THAT BORDERS ON NEWS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

APPROXIMATELY 600 PRIVATE RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANIES EXIST IN ADDITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK. THE GOVERNMENT RADIO STATION PRODUCES "NATIONAL NEWS," WHICH IS BY LAW THE ONLY RADIO NEWS BROADCAST IN INDONESIA, AND IT IS RELAYED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BY THE PRIVATE STATIONS AND 49 REGIONAL AFFILIATES OF THE GOVERNMENT STATION. BY LAW, THE PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MAY PRODUCE ONLY "LIGHT" NEWS, SUCH AS HUMAN INTEREST STORIES, AND MAY NOT DISCUSS POLITICS. IN PRACTICE, MANY BROADCAST INTERVIEWS AND FOREIGN NEWS AS WELL.

FOREIGN TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS ARE READILY ACCESSIBLE TO THOSE WHO CAN AFFORD THE TECHNOLOGY, AND SATELLITE DISHES HAVE PROLIFERATED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT MAKES NO EFFORTS TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO THIS PROGRAMMING.

THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY REGULATES ACCESS TO INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY TO CERTAIN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, BY VISITING AND RESIDENT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS, AND OCCASIONALLY REMINDS THE LATTER OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DENY REQUESTS FOR VISA EXTENSIONS. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES A PERMIT FOR THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AND VIDEO TAPES, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED BY GOVERNMENT CENSORS. IMPORTERS SOMETIMES AVOID FOREIGN MATERIALS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OR DEALING WITH TOPICS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS ARE NORMALLY AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL ISSUES WERE DELAYED OR EMBARGOED IN 1994 WHEN THEY CARRIED STORIES ON MATTERS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR.

SPECIAL PERMISSION IS NECESSARY FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TO TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR, AND THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED A NUMBER OF GROUP TRIPS TO THE PROVINCE DURING THE YEAR. APPROVAL FOR INDIVIDUAL TRIPS BY JOURNALISTS TO THE PROVINCE, AND FOR TRAVEL OUTSIDE DILI, REMAINS DIFFICULT. DURING THE NOVEMBER APEC MEETINGS, THE GOVERNMENT APPROVED TRAVEL TO THE PROVINCE BY SEVERAL DOZEN FOREIGN JOURNALISTS, THE LARGEST NUMBER TO VISIT THE PROVINCE IN MANY YEARS. SOME SIX JOURNALISTS AND FREELANCERS WHO HAD NOT OBTAINED PERMITS WERE DENIED ACCESS TO THE PROVINCE OR INSTRUCTED BY AUTHORITIES TO LEAVE EAST TIMOR

WHILE THE LAW PROVIDES FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM, CONSTRAINTS EXIST ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SCHOLARS. POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DISCUSSIONS AT UNIVERSITIES, WHILE NO LONGER FORMALLY BANNED, REMAINED TIGHTLY CONTROLLED. SCHOLARS SOMETIMES

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

REFRAIN FROM PRODUCING OR INCLUDING IN LECTURES AND CLASS DISCUSSIONS MATERIALS THAT THEY BELIEVE MIGHT PROVOKE GOVERNMENT DISPLEASURE. AN INDONESIAN ACADEMIC WHO HAS CONDUCTED STUDIES ON EAST TIMOR AND WHOSE CONCLUSIONS ARE AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS STRONGLY CRITICIZED BY GOVERNMENT FIGURES AND HIS HOUSE STONED BY UNKNOWN YOUTHS. PUBLISHERS SOMETIMES REFUSE TO ACCEPT MANUSCRIPTS DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. ON OCCASION THE GOVERNMENT BANS PUBLICATIONS AND BOOKS OUTRIGHT. IN JANUARY IT BANNED A BOOK DEALING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S RISE TO POWER, AND IN AUGUST, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BANNED A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE LEADER OF THE MESSIANIC ISLAMIC SECT DARUL ARQAM, THE THIRD BOOK OF THIS GROUP TO BE BANNED IN INDONESIA. ON THE OTHER HAND,

"THE FUGITIVE," A BOOK BY THE PROMINENT INDONESIAN NOVELIST AND FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER PRAMOEDYA ANATA TOER, WHICH TOGETHER WITH OTHER WORKS BY PRAMOEDYA HAD BEEN BANNED FOR MANY YEARS, WAS PUBLISHED IN AUGUST.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION, THE GOVERNMENT PLACES SIGNIFICANT CONTROLS ON THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. ALL ORGANIZATIONS MUST HAVE GOVERNMENT PERMISSION TO HOLD REGIONAL AND NATIONAL MEETINGS. PUBLIC MARCHES AND DEMONSTRATIONS ALSO REQUIRE PERMITS, WHICH ARE FREQUENTLY NOT GRANTED. DURING THE YEAR, GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES RETURNED TO A MORE RESTRICTIVE POLICY ON AUTHORIZING PUBLIC PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS, AFTER LOOSENING SUCH RESTRICTIONS FOR A WHILE DURING THE LATTER HALF OF 1993. MANY JURISDICTIONS OFTEN REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FOR SMALLER GATHERINGS AS WELL. WHILE OBTAINING SUCH APPROVAL IS USUALLY ROUTINE, THE AUTHORITIES OCCASIONALLY WITHHOLD PERMISSION OR BREAK UP PEACEFUL GATHERINGS FOR WHICH NO PERMIT HAS BEEN OBTAINED. IN 1994 AUTHORITIES BROKE UP A MEETING BETWEEN AN ATTORNEY AND HIS CLIENTS IN A LABOR COMPENSATION CASE, AND A PUBLIC SEMINAR ON LAND ISSUES WHICH WAS SPONSORED BY A WELL-KNOWN NGO.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THE COURTS SOMETIMES HAND OUT STIFF PENALTIES TO PERSONS CONVICTED IN CASES INVOLVING FREE EXPRESSION AS IN THE TWO CASES OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS (MENTIONED IN SECTION

L.E. ABOVE), WHOSE SENTENCES WERE INCREASED ON APPEAL,
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 28 STATE 025235 312230Z
WHILE AT OTHER TIMES THEY ARE MORE LENIENT. ON JUNE 27, SECURITY FORCES VIOLENTLY BROKE UP TWO PEACEFUL MARCHES ON THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION BY PERSONS PROTESTING THE WITHDRAWAL OF PUBLICATION LICENSES FROM THE THREE PUBLICATIONS MENTIONED ABOVE. APPROXIMATELY 30 PERSONS WERE DETAINED BY THE AUTHORITIES AND SEVERAL DEMONSTRATORS WERE INJURED. THE JAKARTA CENTRAL DISTRICT COURT SENTENCED ALL BUT ONE OF THE PERSONS ARRESTED ON THE DAY AFTER THEIR ARREST FOR DEMONSTRATING WITHOUT A PERMIT, AND THEY WERE RELEASED AFTER PAYING A NOMINAL FINE EQUIVALENT TO DOLLARS 1. THE REMAINING PERSON A PAROLEE, WAS RETURNED TO PRISON TO FINISH HIS SENTENCE. ON JULY 7, POLICE ENTERED THE COMPOUND OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, A PROMINENT INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS NGO, AND ARRESTED 41 HUNGER STRIKERS WHO WERE PROTESTING THE MEDIA BANNING. THESE DEMONSTRATORS, TOO, WERE SENTENCED TO PAY TOKEN FINES AND RELEASED AFTER 2 DAYS. OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS ON THIS ISSUE DURING THIS PERIOD WERE ALLOWED TO TAKE PLACE WITHOUT INCIDENT, SUCH AS A JULY 5 DEMONSTRATION OF JOURNALISTS IN JAKARTA.

A GROUP OF SEVERAL HUNDRED PEOPLE, WHO HAD ASSEMBLED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR WISHING TO MARCH TO THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY TO AIR THEIR VIEWS ABOUT AN INCIDENT OF ALLEGED RELIGIOUS DISRESPECT THE PREVIOUS DAY, WERE DISPERSED BY RIOT POLICE WHO REFUSED TO LET THE MARCH PROCEED WITHOUT A PERMIT. AROUND A DOZEN INDIVIDUALS WERE LIGHTLY INJURED IN THIS INCIDENT, AND A NUMBER WERE BRIEFLY DETAINED. THE AUTHORITIES SHOWED GREATER RESTRAINT THAN IN PAST INCIDENTS INVOLVING CROWDS, USING POLICE RATHER THAN THE ARMY AND AVOIDING THE USE OF
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

FIREARMS.

THE 1985 SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW (ORMAS) REQUIRES THE ADHERENCE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, TO THE OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA. THIS PROVISION, WHICH LIMITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD AS DESIGNED TO INHIBIT ACTIVITIES OF GROUPS SEEKING TO MAKE INDONESIA AN ISLAMIC STATE. THE LAW EMPOWERS THE GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND ANY ORGANIZATION IT BELIEVES TO BE ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA AND REQUIRES PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR ANY ORGANIZATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS FROM FOREIGN DONORS, THEREBY HINDERING THE WORK OF MANY LOCAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS. NEVERTHELESS A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INDEPENDENT LABOR ORGANIZATION SERIKAT BURUH SEJAHTERA INDONESIA (SBSI),

CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE WITHOUT OFFICIAL RECOGNITION UNDER THIS LAW (SEE SECTION 6).

IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, NGO'S HAVE PROLIFERATED IN SUCH FIELDS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION. IN LATE 1994, THE GOVERNMENT PREPARED A DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE THAT WOULD BRING THE MORE THAN 700 NGO'S UNDER CONTROLS SIMILAR TO THE ORMAS LAW. THE DRAFT DECREE MADE AVAILABLE BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR COMMENT INDICATED THAT NGO'S WOULD HAVE TO RECEIVE GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR THE USE OF ANY FOREIGN ASSISTANCE THEY ACCEPT, AND SUCH ASSISTANCE MUST BE DEEMED CONSISTENT WITH NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND NOT DETRIMENTAL TO NATIONAL INTERESTS. NGO'S WOULD ALSO BE PROHIBITED FROM

ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND WOULD RECEIVE GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE ON FULFILLING THEIR DECLARED FUNCTIONS. MANY NGO'S, FEARING THAT THE PROPOSED NEW

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECREE IS AN EFFORT BY THE GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL THEIR ORGANIZATIONS OR CURB SOME OF THEIR ACTIVITIES, REACTED STRONGLY TO THE DRAFT WHICH, AT YEAR'S END, THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET PUT INTO EFFECT.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD. THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES ISLAM, CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, AND HINDUISM, AND PERMITS PRACTICE OF THE MYSTICAL, TRADITIONAL BELIEFS OF "ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN." ALTHOUGH THE POPULATION IS OVERWHELMINGLY MUSLIM, THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS ARE GENERALLY RESPECTED, AND THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES MUTUAL TOLERANCE AND HARMONY AMONG THEM. SOME RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY EXIST (SEE BELOW).

BECAUSE THE FIRST TENET OF PANCASILA IS BELIEF IN A SUPREME BEING, ATHEISM IS FORBIDDEN. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA EXTENDS TO ALL RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY OPPOSES MUSLIM GROUPS WHICH ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ACKNOWLEDGING ONLY ISLAMIC LAW. THERE ARE GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES FOR BANNING RELIGIOUS SECTS IN INDONESIA. AMONG THOSE PROHIBITED ARE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AND BAHA'I. IN 1994 THE GOVERNMENT BANNED THE MESSIANIC ISLAMIC SECT DARUL ARQAM IN A NUMBER OF PROVINCES,

PROHIBITED THREE OF ITS BOOKS, AND IN AUGUST FORBADE ITS LEADER, ABUYA SHEIKH IMAM ASHAARI MUHAMMAD, FROM ENTERING INDONESIA.

VIOLENCE BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS IN THE HURIA KRISTEN BATAK PROTESTAN (HKBP), INDONESIA'S LARGEST PROTESTANT CHURCH, CONTINUED IN NORTH SUMATRA THROUGHOUT 1994, WITH AT LEAST SIX FATALITIES. IN EARLY 1993, CITING A THREAT TO CIVIL ORDER, THE NORTHERN SUMATRA REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER INTERVENED IN AN INTERNAL LEADERSHIP DISPUTE WHICH BROKE OUT WITHIN THE HKBP THE PREVIOUS YEAR, APPOINTING A NEW BISHOP AND HELPING THE NEW BISHOP'S SUPPORTERS TAKE OVER

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CHURCH PROPERTY. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE CALLED THE DISPUTE AN INTERNAL CHURCH MATTER THAT SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THE HKBP MEMBERS THEMSELVES. TO DATE, HOWEVER, ONLY SUPPORTERS OF THE FORMER BISHOP HAVE BEEN PROSECUTED FOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE DESPITE EVIDENCE THAT MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSING FACTION ENGAGED IN VIOLENT ACTS AS WELL.

THERE WERE WIDESPREAD REPORTS FROM RELIGIOUS MINORITIES INDICATING THAT THE EXTENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE WEAKENED SOMEWHAT DURING THE YEAR AND THAT THEY FELT LESS FREE TO CARRY OUT THEIR RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES UNIMPEDED. HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, SPOKE OUT SEVERAL TIMES TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. TWO ARMY PRIVATES ACCUSED OF PROVOCATIVE BEHAVIOR DURING A CATHOLIC MASS IN EAST TIMOR IN JUNE WERE COURT-MARTIALED. IN OCTOBER BOTH WERE EXPELLED FROM THE ARMY, AND RECEIVED PRISON SENTENCES OF 2, AND 2 AND 1/2 YEARS RESPECTIVELY. THE LAW ALLOWS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CONVERSION BETWEEN FAITHS, AND SUCH CONVERSIONS OCCUR. MARRIAGES BETWEEN PERSONS OF DIFFERENT RELIGIONS ARE ALLOWED. THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS PROSELYTIZING BY THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS IN AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ONE RECOGNIZED RELIGION OR ANOTHER AS POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND DISCOURAGES IT. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED, ALTHOUGH IN EAST TIMOR AND OCCASIONALLY ELSEWHERE MISSIONARIES HAVE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES AND DELAYS IN RENEWING RESIDENCE PERMITS, AND VISAS ALLOWING THE ENTRANCE OF NEW FOREIGN CLERGY ARE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. LAWS AND DECREES FROM THE 1970'S LIMIT THE NUMBER OF YEARS FOREIGN MISSIONARIES CAN SPEND IN INDONESIA, WITH SOME EXTENSIONS GRANTED IN REMOTE AREAS LIKE IRIAN JAYA. FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK IS SUBJECT TO THE FUNDING STIPULATIONS OF THE ORMAS LAW (SEE SECTION 2.B.). INDONESIANS PRACTICING THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS MAINTAIN ACTIVE LINKS WITH CORELIGIONISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE INDONESIA AND TRAVEL ABROAD FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL,

EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

IN 1993 THE GOVERNMENT DRASTICALLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BARRED EITHER FROM ENTERING OR DEPARTING INDONESIA FROM A PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED FIGURE OF 8,897 "BLACKLISTED" PEOPLE IN JANUARY TO A FEW HUNDRED BY AUGUST. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES NO ONE IS NOW PROHIBITED FOR POLITICAL REASONS FROM LEAVING THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER THE GOVERNMENT RESTRICTS MOVEMENT BY INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN CITIZENS TO AND WITHIN PARTS OF INDONESIA. IN ADDITION,

IT REQUIRES PERMITS TO SEEK WORK IN A NEW LOCATION IN CERTAIN AREAS, PRIMARILY TO CONTROL FURTHER POPULATION MOVEMENT TO CROWDED CITIES, AND SPECIAL PERMITS ARE REQUIRED TO VISIT CERTAIN PARTS OF IRIAN JAYA. THE MILITARY CARRIED OUT SECURITY CHECKS AFFECTING TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL TO AND WITHIN EAST TIMOR SPORADICALLY IN 1994, AND IT OCCASIONAL IMPOSED CURFEWS IN CONNECTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE AUTHORITIES REQUIRE FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, TO GIVE NOTICE OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND TO HAVE OFFICIAL PERMISSION (SEE SECTION L.F.) TO CHANGE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE.

IN PAST YEARS THE GOVERNMENT ADMITTED LARGE NUMBERS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM INDOCHINA. ONLY A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER NOW REMAIN AND THE GOVERNMENT PLANS TO WORK WITH VIETNAM UNDER A TRIPARTITE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING SIGNED IN 1993 WITH THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) TO PEACEFULLY REPATRIATE THE REMAINING ASYLEES TO VIETNAM.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

CITIZENS DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEMOCRATIC MEANS. THE 1,000-MEMBER PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY OF THE STATE AND MEETS EVERY 5 YEARS TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AND SET THE BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, IS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED
CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE APPOINTMENT OF
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HALF ITS MEMBERSHIP. THE REMAINING HALF COME FROM THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR) 80 PERCENT OF WHOSE MEMBERS ARE ELECTED. IN 1993 THE MPR ELECTED SOEHARTO TO HIS SIXTH UNCONTESTED 5-YEAR TERM AS PRESIDENT. LEGALLY, THE PRESIDENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SUBORDINATE TO THE PARLIAMENT, BUT ACTUALLY HE AND A SMALL GROUP OF ACTIVE

DUTY AND RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS EXERCISE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.

UNDER A DOCTRINE KNOWN AS "DUAL FUNCTION," THE MILITARY ASSUMES A SIGNIFICANT SOCIOPOLITICAL AS WELL AS A SECURITY ROLE. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARE ALLOTTED AN UNELECTED 20 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN NATIONAL PROVINCIAL, AND DISTRICT PARLIAMENTS, AND OCCUPY NUMEROUS KEY POSITIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION. THE OTHER 80 PERCENT OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL PARLIAMENTARY SEATS ARE FILLED THROUGH ELECTIONS HELD EVERY 5 YEARS. ALL ADULT CITIZENS ARE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE, EXCEPT ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, CONVICTED CRIMINALS SERVING PRISON SENTENCES, AND SOME 36,000 FORMER PKI MEMBERS. VOTERS CHOOSE BY SECRET BALLOT BETWEEN THE THREE GOVERNMENT-APPROVED POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH FIELD CANDIDATE LISTS IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT. THOSE LISTS MUST BE SCREENED BY BAKORSTANAS (SEE SECTION L.D.), WHICH DETERMINES WHETHER CANDIDATES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST COUP OR POSE OTHER BROADLY DEFINED SECURITY RISKS. CRITICS CHARGE THESE SCREENINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, SINCE THERE IS NO WAY TO APPEAL THE RESULTS, AND NOTE THAT THEY CAN BE USED TO ELIMINATE CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM PARLIAMENT.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

STRICT RULES ESTABLISH THE LENGTH OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC MEDIA, SCHEDULES FOR PUBLIC APPEARANCES, AND THE POLITICAL SYMBOLS THAT CAN BE USED. THE GOVERNMENT PERMITS ONLY THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EXIST AND CONTEST ELECTIONS. THE LARGEST AND MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS GOLKAR A GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ORGANIZATION OF DIVERSE FUNCTIONAL GROUPS WHICH WON 68 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN THE 1992 ELECTIONS. THE PRESIDENT STRONGLY INFLUENCES THE SELECTION OF THE LEADERS OF GOLKAR. THE OTHER TWO SMALL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE UNITY DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF INDONESIA (PDI), SPLIT THE REMAINING VOTE. THE LAW REQUIRES ALL THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EMBRACE PANCASILA, AND NONE OF THE ORGANIZATIONS IS CONSIDERED AN OPPOSITION PARTY. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES CLOSELY SCRUTINIZE AND OFTEN GUIDE THEIR ACTIVITIES. MEMBERS OF THE DPR AND THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES MAY BE RECALLED FROM OFFICE BY PARTY LEADERS.

GOLKAR MAINTAINS CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH THE ARMED FORCES AND KORPRI, THE ASSOCIATION TO WHICH ALL CIVIL SERVANTS AUTOMATICALLY BELONG. CIVIL SERVANTS MAY JOIN ANY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WITH OFFICIAL PERMISSION, BUT

MOST ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND SOME OTHER BANNED PARTIES MAY NOT RUN FOR OFFICE OR BE ACTIVE POLITICALLY. THE DPR CONSIDERS BILLS PRESENTED TO IT BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES BUT DOES NOT DRAFT LAWS ON ITS OWN, ALTHOUGH IT HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DO SO. THE DPR MAKES TECHNICAL AND OCCASIONALLY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS TO BILLS IT REVIEWS. IN PRACTICE, IT REMAINS CLEARLY SUBORDINATE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, BUT RECENTLY IT HAS BECOME MUCH MORE ACTIVE IN SCRUTINIZING GOVERNMENT POLICY THROUGH HEARINGS AT WHICH MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, MILITARY COMMANDERS, AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS ARE ASKED TO TESTIFY. FOR EXAMPLE, PARLIAMENTARY EXAMINATION BROUGHT TO LIGHT A MAJOR SCANDAL

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

IN GOVERNMENT BANKS AND FORCED THE GOVERNMENT TO ADDRESS IT SERIOUSLY. THE DPR HAS ALSO BECOME INCREASINGLY A FOCAL POINT OF APPEALS AND PETITIONS FROM STUDENTS, WORKERS, DISPLACED FARMERS, AND OTHERS PROTESTING ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND AIRING OTHER GRIEVANCES.

WHILE THERE ARE NO DE JURE RESTRICTIONS ON WOMEN IN POLITICS, ONLY 55 OUT OF 500 MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT ARE WOMEN; 2 WOMEN ARE CABINET MEMBERS.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

WHILE VARIOUS DOMESTIC ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONS INTERESTED IN HUMAN RIGHTS OPERATE ENERGETICALLY, SOME HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS FACE GOVERNMENT HARASSMENT SUCH AS FREQUENT VISITS BY POLICE OR AGENTS FROM MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, INTERROGATIONS AT POLICE STATIONS, OR CANCELLATIONS OF PRIVATE MEETINGS (SEE SECTION 2.B.). FOLLOWING THE APRIL LABOR UNREST IN MEDAN, LOCAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES INCREASED SURVEILLANCE AND HARASSMENT OF NGO'S IN NORTH SUMATRA THAT WERE ACTIVE IN LABOR AFFAIRS. MOREOVER, THE GOVERNMENT PREFARED IN 1994 A DRAFT DECREE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WHICH, IF ISSUED AND FULLY IMPLEMENTED, WOULD GIVE IT BROAD POWERS TO CONTROL THE ACTIVITIES OF NGO'S CONCERNED WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND SERIOUSLY IMPEDE THEIR ABILITY TO FUNCTION.

THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND EMPHASIZES ITS BELIEF THAT LINKING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE. IN 1994 IT PRESSURED SEVERAL NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO PROHIBIT OR RESTRICT NGO-SPONSORED HUMAN RIGHTS SEMINARS

ON THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR.

THE ICRC CONTINUED TO OPERATE IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, AND ACEH, AND TO VISIT PRISONERS CONVICTED OF

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PARTICIPATION IN THE ABORTIVE, COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP IN 1965, CONVICTED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, AND EAST TIMORESE PRISONERS. HOWEVER, AS OF YEAR'S END, THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT APPROVED THE ICRC'S REQUEST TO OPEN AN OFFICE IN ACEH, THOUGH OFFICIAL COOPERATION ON ACCESS BY ITS DELEGATES FROM JAKARTA SHOWED SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN 1994.

ICRC ACCESS ALSO GREATLY IMPROVED IN OTHER AREAS, INCLUDING EAST TIMOR WHERE IT HAS AN OFFICE. THE ICRC NO LONGER MAINTAINS AN OFFICE IN IRIAN JAYA BUT VISITS THAT PROVINCE FROM JAKARTA SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR. HOWEVER, IN 1994 THE VISITING REPRESENTATIVE OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, A KEY U. S. HUMAN RIGHTS NGO WAS DENIED PERMISSION TO VISIT MEDAN AND EAST TIMOR. THE GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZED THE VISIT OF THE U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON

EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMMARY AND ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS AND ALLOWED HIM TO SEE THOSE PERSONS HE HAD REQUESTED. THE RAPPORTEUR PUBLICLY QUESTIONED, HOWEVER, WHETHER ALL THOSE WHO MIGHT HAVE WANTED TO SPEAK WITH HIM HAD BEEN AFFORDED FULL ACCESS.

IN JANUARY THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, MOST OF WHOSE MEMBERS WERE NAMED THE MONTH BEFORE, BEGAN OPERATIONS. DESPITE CONTINUING SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE COMMISSION'S INDEPENDENCE, IN PART BECAUSE ITS MEMBERS ARE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT, COMMISSION MEMBERS DURING THE COURSE OF THE YEAR ACTIVELY LOOKED INTO MANY OF THE NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS AND PETITIONS PRESENTED TO IT AND IN SOME CASES SHOWED THEMSELVES WILLING TO QUESTION GOVERNMENT ACTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE' THE COMMISSION STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE GOVERNMENT'S REVOCATION OF THE PUBLICATION LICENSES OF THREE PUBLICATIONS (SECTION 2.A.) AS AN INFRINGEMENT OF FREE SPEECH, AND IT HAS CRITICIZED THE WAY IN WHICH THE SUSPECTS IN THE MARSINAH MURDER CASE WERE PROSECUTED, AS WELL AS QUESTIONING WHETHER ALL THE GUILTY HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO JUSTICE. LACKING ENFORCEMENT POWERS, THE COMMISSION ATTEMPTS TO WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM, SENDING TEAMS WHERE NECESSARY TO INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS AND EMPLOYING PERSUASION, PUBLICITY, AND MORAL AUTHORITY TO HIGHLIGHT ABUSES AND ENCOURAGE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CORRECTIVE ACTION. A TEAM VISITED EAST TIMOR IN SEPTEMBER AND DECEMBER. OPERATIONS IN 1994 WERE HAMPERED SOMEWHAT BY STARTUP LOGISTICAL AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WOMEN

BY LAW, WOMEN ARE EQUAL TO AND HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN. HOWEVER' IN PRACTICE WOMEN FACE SOME LEGAL DISCRIMINATION. FOR EXAMPLE, IN DIVORCE CASES WOMEN OFTEN BEAR A HEAVIER EVIDENTIARY BURDEN THAN MEN, ESPECIALLY IN THE ISLAMIC-BASED FAMILY COURT SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH SOME WOMEN ENJOY A HIGH DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FREEDOM AND OCCUPY IMPORTANT MIDLEVEL POSITIONS IN BOTH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, THE MAJORITY OF WOMEN DO NOT EXPERIENCE SUCH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOMS AND ARE OFTEN DISPROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTED AT THE LOWER END OF THE POSITION SCALE. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH WOMEN CONSTITUTE ONE-QUARTER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, THEY OCCUPY ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THE SERVICE'S TOP POSTS. INCOME DISPARITY BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN DIMINISHES SIGNIFICANTLY WITH GREATER EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT.

WOMEN ARE OFTEN NOT GIVEN THE EXTRA BENEFITS AND SALARY THAT MEN RECEIVE THAT IS THEIR DUE WHEN THEY ARE THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, AND IN SOME CASES DO NOT RECEIVE EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR THEIR HUSBAND AND CHILDREN, SUCH AS MEDICAL INSURANCE. DESPITE LAWS GUARANTEEING WOMEN A 3,MONTH MATERNITY LEAVE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONCEDED THAT PREGNANT WOMEN ARE OFTEN DISMISSED OR ARE REPLACED WHILE ON LEAVE. SOME COMPANIES REQUIRE THAT WOMEN SIGN STATEMENTS THAT THEY WILL NOT BECOME PREGNANT. WOMEN WORKERS ALSO HAVE COMPLAINED OF BEING SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED BY FOREMEN AND FACTORY OWNERS.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

WOMEN WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING GENERALLY RECEIVE LOWER WAGES THAN MEN AND ALSO ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE HIRED ON A DAILY ONLY BASIS. AS A RESULT, THEY ARE LESS LIKELY TO RECEIVE BENEFITS LEGALLY MANDATED FOR PERMANENT WORKERS.

WOMEN DISPROPORTIONATELY EXPERIENCE ILLITERACY, POOR HEALTH, AND INADEQUATE NUTRITION. HOWEVER, WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS HAVE IMPROVED IN THE LAST DECADE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NUMBER OF GIRLS GRADUATING FROM HIGH SCHOOL TRIPLED FROM 1980 TO 1990. SEVERAL VOLUNTARY PRIVATE GROUPS WORK ACTIVELY TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CLAIM SOME SUCCESS IN GAINING OFFICIAL COGNIZANCE OF WOMEN'S CONCERNS.

RAPE IS A PUNISHABLE OFFENSE IN INDONESIA. MEN HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND SENTENCED FOR RAPE AND ATTEMPTED RAPE. THE NATIONAL POLICE REPORTED 1,341 RAPE CASES FOR 1991, 1,356 CASES FOR 1992, AND 1,341 CASES FOR 1993. HOWEVER, WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS BELIEVE RAFE IS GROSSLY UNDERREPORTED OWING TO THE SOCIAL STIGMA ATTACHED TO THE VICTIM. SOME LEGAL EXPERTS STATE THAT IF A WOMAN DOES NOT GO IMMEDIATELY TO THE HOSPITAL FOR A PHYSICAL EXAM WHICH PRODUCES SEMEN OR OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF RAPE, SHE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BRING CHARGES. SOME WOMEN FAIL TO REPORT RAPE TO POLICE OUT OF FEAR OF BEING MOLESTED AGAIN BY THE POLICE THEMSELVES."

IN GENERAL, THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REMAINS POORLY DOCUMENTED. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SOCIETY,

WHICH SOME SAY HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY RECENT SOCIAL CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY RAPID URBANIZATION. LONGSTANDING

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

TRADITIONAL BELIEFS THAT THE HUSBAND MAY "TEACH" OR "CONTROL" THE WIFE THROUGH SEVERAL MEANS, INCLUDING VIOLENCE, ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH WOMEN'S GROUPS ARE TRYING TO CHANGE THE LAW, RAPE BY A HUSBAND OF A WIFE IS NOT A CRIME IN INDONESIA. WHILE POLICE COULD BRING ASSAULT CHARGES AGAINST A HUSBAND FOR BEATING HIS WIFE, DUE TO SOCIAL ATTITUDES THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO DO SO. THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES SOME COUNSELING, AND SEVERAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS EXIST TO ASSIST WOMEN. MANY OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS FOCUS MAINLY ON REUNITING THE FAMILY RATHER THAN ON PROVIDING PROTECTION TO THE WOMEN INVOLVED. THERE ARE NO BATTERED WOMEN'S SHELTERS. MANY WOMEN RELY ON EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEMS FOR ASSISTANCE IN CASES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.

CHILDREN

THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND WELFARE, BUT IS HAMPERED BY A LACK OF RESOURCES IN TRANSLATING THIS COMMITMENT INTO PRACTICE. A 1979 LAW ON CHILDREN'S WELFARE DEFINES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE AND PARENTS TO NURTURE AND PROTECT CHILDREN. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN DEVELOPED, AND THE LAW'S PROVISIONS HAVE YET TO GO INTO EFFECT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE PARTICULAR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PRIMARY EDUCATION, MATERNITY SERVICES, AND FAMILY PLANNING.

THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF) ESTIMATES THAT MORE THAN 1 MILLION CHILDREN DROP OUT OF PRIMARY SCHOOL

EVERY YEAR DUE MAINLY TO THE COST OF SUPPLIES UNIFORMS

AND OTHER EXPENSES, IN ADDITION TO THE PROFESSED NEED FOR THE CHILDREN TO SUPPLEMENT FAMILY INCOME. THOUSANDS OF STREET CHILDREN LIVING IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES SELL NEWSPAPERS, SHINE SHOES, HELP TO PARK OR WATCH CARS AND OTHERWISE EARN MONEY. MANY THOUSANDS MORE WORK IN FACTORIES AND FIELDS (SEE ALSO SECTION 6.D.). NGO'S CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO HELP THESE CHILDREN AS INADEQUATE.

CHILD PROSTITUTION AND OTHER SEXUAL ABUSES OCCUR, ESPECIALLY CASES OF INCEST BETWEEN STEPFATHERS AND STEPDAUGHTERS, BUT DATA ON THEIR INCIDENCE IS LACKING. SOME CHILD CARE EXPERTS BELIEVE IT TO BE LOW. WHILE THERE ARE LAWS DESIGNED TO PROTECT CHILDREN FROM INDECENT ACTIVITIES, PROSTITUTION, AND INCEST, THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS.

FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM) OCCURS IN SOME PARTS OF INDONESIA; PRECISE STATISTICS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. IN JAVA, IT USUALLY TAKES PLACE WITHIN THE FIRST YEAR AFTER BIRTH AND IS PERFORMED EITHER AT A HOSPITAL OR BY A LOCAL TRADITIONAL PRACTITIONER OR "DUKUN," ESPECIALLY IN RURAL AREAS. USUALLY A SMALL SECTION OF THE TIP OF THE CLITORIS IS CUT OR A SMALL INCISION IS MADE IN THE TIP OF THE CLITORIS WITH THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING A FEW DROPS OF BLOOD. TOTAL REMOVAL OF THE CLITORIS IS NOT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PRACTICE, ALTHOUGH IT DOES OCCUR IF INEPTLY PERFORMED.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

THE GOVERNMENT STATES PUBLICLY THAT IT RECOGNIZES THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL INDIGENOUS POPULATION GROUPS, AND THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE. CRITICS MAINTAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH IS BASICALLY PATERNALISTIC AND DESIGNED MORE TO INTEGRATE THEM MORE CLOSELY INTO INDONESIAN SOCIETY THAN TO PROTECT THEIR TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE.

THE GOVERNMENT'S TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM, WHICH MOVED LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE FROM OVERPOPULATED ISLANDS TO MORE ISOLATED AND BACKWARD ONES HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED IN RECENT YEARS. THE PROGRAM IS CRITICIZED BY HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS WHO SAY THAT IT NOT ONLY SOMETIMES VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE BUT ALSO THOSE OF SOME OF THE TRANSMIGRANTS WHO CLAIM THAT THEY ARE DUPED INTO LEAVING THEIR HOME VILLAGES WITHOUT ANY MEANS OF RETURN.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE PRACTICES OF SOME LOGGING COMPANIES WHICH RECRUIT INDIGENOUS PEOPLE FOR WORK. ACCORDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THIS ACTIVITY IN IRIAN JAYA HAS SEPARATED THESE PEOPLE FROM THEIR TRADITIONAL ECONOMIES. WORKERS REPORTEDLY ARE PAID USING COMPANY-ISSUED CREDIT CARDS THAT CAN BE USED ONLY AT COMPANY STORES WHERE PRICES ARE FIXED. WORKERS GO INTO DEBT AND REMAIN INDENTURED TO THE COMPANY.

WHERE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE CLASH WITH DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE DEVELOPERS ALMOST ALWAYS WIN. FOR EXAMPLE, IN KALIMANTAN MEMBERS OF A DAYAK TRIBE WERE FORCED FROM THEIR LAND BY A TIMBER CONCESSION IN AUGUST. IN RETALIATION THEY ATTACKED COMPANY FACILITIES AND SEVERAL WERE SUBSEQUENTLY ARRESTED.

MOST CIVIL SERVANTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN IRIAN JAYA AND OTHER ISOLATED AREAS CONTINUE TO COME PRIMARILY FROM JAVA RATHER THAN THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

NATIONAL/RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

INDONESIANS EXHIBIT CONSIDERABLE RACIAL AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE, WITH THE IMPORTANT EXCEPTION OF OFFICIAL AND INFORMAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE, WHO COMPRISE ABOUT 3 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. SINCE 1959 NONCITIZEN ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO RUN BUSINESSES IN RURAL INDONESIA. REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF ALL CHINESE SCHOOLS FOR ETHNIC CHINESE, FORMATION OF EXCLUSIVELY CHINESE CULTURAL GROUPS OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND PUBLIC DISPLAY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS. IN AUGUST THE BAN ON USE OF CHINESE CHARACTERS WAS EASED SLIGHTLY TO ALLOW FIRMS WORKING IN THE TOURIST INDUSTRY TO PRODUCE CHINESE-LANGUAGE BROCHURES, PROGRAMS, AND SIMILAR MATERIAL FOR CHINESE-SPEAKING TOURISTS. HOWEVER, CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE GOVERNMENT-OWNED DAILY NEWSPAPER, MAY NEITHER BE IMPORTED NOR PRODUCED DOMESTICALLY. PRIVATE INSTRUCTION IN CHINESE IS GENERALLY PROHIBITED BUT TAKES PLACE TO A LIMITED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

EXTENT, AND SINCE AUGUST HAS BEEN ALLOWED IN TRAINING EMPLOYEES IN THE TOURISM INDUSTRY IN FUNCTIONAL MANDARIN.

STATE UNIVERSITIES HAVE NO FORMAL QUOTAS THAT LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ETHNIC CHINESE. THE LAW FORBIDS THE CELEBRATION OF THE CHINESE NEW YEAR IN TEMPLES OR PUBLIC PLACES BUT ITS ENFORCEMENT WAS LIMITED IN 1994 AND CHINESE NEW YEAR DECORATIONS WERE DISPLAYED IN PUBLIC SHOPPING AREAS IN

MAJOR CITIES.

EAST TIMORESE AND VARIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS CHARGE THAT THE EAST TIMORESE ARE UNDERREPRESENTED IN THE CIVIL SERVICE IN EAST TIMOR. IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM OR DENY THE CHARGES AS THERE APPEARS TO BE NO REGISTRY OF THE BIRTH PLACE OF CIVIL SERVANTS, WHO CAN BE TRANSFERRED ANYWHERE. EAST TIMORESE HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM COULD LEAD TO FEWER EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND MIGHT EVENTUALLY DESTROY EAST TIMOR'S CULTURAL IDENTITY.

PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

NO NATIONAL LAW SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSES THE PROBLEMS OR STATUS OF THE DISABLED, NOR DO THEY RECEIVE SPECIAL PROGRAMS OR ATTENTION. HOWEVER, DURING 1994 THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE BEGAN DRAFTING REGULATIONS ON TREATMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED PARTLY BASED ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, AND PRESIDENT SOEHARTO GAVE HIS APPROVAL TO SUBMISSION OF THESE NEW REGULATIONS TO THE PARLIAMENT. VIRTUALLY NO PUBLIC BUILDINGS OR PUBLIC MEANS OF TRANSPORT ARE DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY FOR ACCESS BY THE DISABLED. THEY FACE CONSIDERABLE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THE CONSTITUTION INCLUDES THE RIGHT OF EVERY CITIZEN TO OBTAIN AN EDUCATION. IN 1989 THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED REGULATIONS COVERING EDUCATION FOR THE MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED. HOWEVER, THE REGULATIONS DO NOT GRANT A RIGHT TO PUBLIC EDUCATION FOR HANDICAPPED CHILDREN. WHILE THERE ARE SOME PUBLIC SCHOOLS FOR THE HANDICAPPED, THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS THE CONCEPT THAT EDUCATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE COMMUNITY IN THE FORM OF NGO-RUN PRIVATE SCHOOLS THAT MAY RECEIVE SOME PUBLIC FUNDS.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS INCLUDING THOSE IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES ARE FREE TO FORM WORKER ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION. UNTIL 1994 ONLY A RECOGNIZED UNION COULD BARGAIN ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES OR REPRESENT WORKERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S LABOR COURTS. A NEW REGULATION PROMULGATED IN JANUARY PROVIDES THAT WORKERS IN A SINGLE COMPANY WITH MORE THAN 25 EMPLOYEES CAN JOIN TOGETHER AND NEGOTIATE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS

WITH THEIR EMPLOYER OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ALL INDONESIAN WORKERS UNION (SPSI), THE ONLY LEGALLY RECOGNIZED UNION (SEE BELOW). THE GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES THESE PLANT-LEVEL WORKERS ASSOCIATIONS TO JOIN THE SPSI. WHILE 192 OF THESE PLANT-LEVEL ASSOCIATIONS WERE FORMED BY THE END OF THE YEAR, ONLY ONE HAD CONCLUDED A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT WITH MANAGEMENT. CURRENT NUMERICAL

REQUIREMENTS FOR UNION RECOGNITION, THOUGH LOWERED IN 1993, STILL CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT BARRIER TO RECOGNITION AND THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. IN ADDITION, THE MINISTRY OF MANPOWER ENFORCES A REGULATION THAT REQUIRES A UNION BE SET UP "BY AND FOR WORKERS" TO DENY RECOGNITION TO GROUPS WHICH

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

INCLUDE PEOPLE IT CONSIDERS NONWORKERS, SUCH AS LAWYERS OR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, WHO ARE INVOLVED AS LABOR ORGANIZERS.

THERE IS, DE FACTO, A SINGLE UNION SYSTEM, AND IT IS THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED POLICY TO SEEK TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECOGNIZED SPSI UNIONS RATHER THAN TO FURTHER THE PROCESS FOR THE FORMATION OF ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS. THE SPSI BEGAN IN 1993 A TRANSFORMATION FROM A UNITARY (CENTRALIZED) TO A FEDERATIVE (DECENTRALIZED) STRUCTURE. ITS 13 INDUSTRIAL SECTORS ARE NOW REGISTERED AS INDEPENDENT UNIONS. THE ONLY UNIONS RECOGNIZED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ARE THOSE WHICH PREVIOUSLY CONSTITUTED THE SPSI'S INDUSTRIAL SECTORS.

TWO OTHER LABOR GROUPS, SETIA KAWAN (SOLIDARITY), ALSO KNOWN AS SERIKAT BURUH MERDEKA (SBM, FREE TRADE UNION), AND SERIKAT BURUH SEJAHTERA INDONESIA (SBSI, INDONESIAN WORKERS WELFARE UNION), HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED BUT ARE NOT REGISTERED. SETIA KAWAN, FOUNDED 3 YEARS AGO, IS NOW ESSENTIALLY MORIBUND. THE SBSI, CREATED IN 1992, CLAIMS IT HAS FORMED THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF FACTORY-LEVEL UNITS TO MEET THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION AS A LABOR UNION, BUT ITS MOST RECENT REQUEST IN NOVEMBER FOR REGISTRATION AS A TRADE UNION WAS DENIED. THE MINISTER OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MANPOWER HAS STATED THAT ANY UNIONS WHICH ARE FORMED SHOULD AFFILIATE WITH THE SPSI FEDERATION AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT RECOGNIZE ANY UNIONS OUTSIDE THE FEDERATION. THERE HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN TENTATIVE OVERTURES TO BRING THE SBSI INTO THE SPSI. THE SBSI, HOWEVER, HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THESE OFFERS.

THE SBSI ALSO HAS ATTEMPTED UNSUCCESSFULLY THREE TIMES TO REGISTER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS AS A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE ORMAS LAW, A PREREQUISITE TO

RECOGNITION AS A LABOR UNION. THE HOME AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT HAD NOT REPLIED AT YEAR'S END TO SBSI'S MOST RECENT REQUEST OF NOVEMBER 17.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE SBSI ILLEGAL. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT DISBANDED IT, IT HAS CONTINUALLY HARASSED IT, ESPECIALLY AFTER LARGE-SCALE LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS, WHICH THE SBSI HELPED TO ORGANIZE IN MEDAN IN APRIL, DEGENERATED INTO ANTI-CHINESE RIOTING. THE GOVERNMENT ARRESTED A NUMBER OF THE MEDAN SBSI LEADERSHIP IN THE SPRING, AND IT ARRESTED THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN OF THE SBSI, MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, IN AUGUST. THEY WERE CHARGED WITH INCITING VIOLENCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE RIOTS. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) SENT A STRONGLY WORDED LETTER TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER EXPRESSING "SERIOUS CONCERN" OVER THE ARREST OF PAKPAHAN. THE MEDAN LEADERSHIP RECEIVED SENTENCES OF BETWEEN 3 AND 15 MONTHS IN PRISON. IN NOVEMBER PAKPAHAN WAS SENTENCED TO A 3-YEAR PRISON TERM, A SENTENCE THAT WAS EXTENDED TO 4 YEARS IN JANUARY 1995 WHEN HIS APPEAL WAS

REJECTED. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AGAINST THE SBSI LEADERSHIP ARE INTENDED TO DISCREDIT OR DESTROY THE ORGANIZATION.

ASO IN NOVEMBER, THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, IN ITS CONCLUSIONS ON THE COMPLAINT MADE BY THE SBSI AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF RECOGNIZING ONLY THE SPSI AND COMMENTED THAT "BEYOND THE SPECIFIC EVENTS RAISED IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE COMMITTEE FEELS BOUND TO NOTE THAT THE ALLEGATIONS REVEAL, FROM A MORE GENERAL PERSPECTIVE A SITUATION OF A TRADE UNION MONOPOLY IN PRACTICE, AND OF HEAVY INVOLVEMENT OF THE POLICE AND ARMED FORCES IN LABOR MATTERS," AND CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO REFRAIN FROM SHOWING FAVORITISM TOWARD, OR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST, ANY PARTICULAR UNIONS.

BECAUSE OF PAST MINISTRY OF MANPOWER REGULATIONS, MANY SPSI FACTORY UNITS ARE LED BY PERSONS WHO HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH THEIR UNITS' MEMBERS BECAUSE THEY WERE SELECTED BY EMPLOYERS. A NEW REGULATION STATES THAT EMPLOYEES MUST ONLY NOTIFY THEIR EMPLOYER THAT THEY WISH TO FORM A UNION AND THAT THEY MAY PROCEED IF THEY DO NOT RECEIVE A RESPONSE FROM THEIR EMPLOYER WITHIN 2 WEEKS.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DESPITE THIS NEW PROVISION, STRIKES CONTINUE TO OCCUR BECAUSE EMPLOYERS ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF UNION BRANCHES. THESE STRIKES ARE INVARIABLY SUCCESSFUL, AND THE FORMATION OF AN SPSI UNIT FOLLOWS SHORTLY

THEREAFTER. HOWEVER, WORKERS WHO ARE ACTIVE IN THE FORMATION OF THE UNION ARE FREQUENTLY DISMISSED AND HAVE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NO PRACTICAL PROTECTION BY EITHER LAW OR GOVERNMENT PRACTICE.

CIVIL SERVANTS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO JOIN UNIONS AND MUST BELONG TO KORPRI, A NONUNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES, DEFINED TO INCLUDE THOSE WORKING IN ENTERPRISES IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A 5-PERCENT HOLDING OR GREATER, USUALLY ARE REQUIRED TO JOIN KORPRI, BUT A SMALL NUMBER OF STATE ENTERPRISES HAVE SPSI UNITS. TEACHERS MUST BELONG TO THE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (PGRI). WHILE TECHNICALLY CLASSED AS A UNION THE PGRI CONTINUES TO FUNCTION MORE AS A WELFARE ORGANIZATION AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ENGAGED IN TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES SUCH AS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.

UNIONS MAY DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE OVER THE SPSI AND ITS FEDERATED UNIONS. THE HEAD OF THE SPSI IS A SENIOR MEMBER OF GOLKAR, AND HE AND TWO OTHER SENIOR SPSI OFFICIALS ARE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT REPRESENTING GOLKAR. WITH ONE EXCEPTION, ALL MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR. THESE PERSONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN POSITIONS IN THE NEW FEDERATED INDUSTRIAL SECTOR UNIONS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER IS A MEMBER OF THE SPSI'S CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL. NUMEROUS REGIONAL SPSI OFFICIALS ALSO ARE GOLKAR MEMBERS, SOMETIMES SERVING IN REGIONAL LEGISLATURES. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE REPORTS, THE GOVERNMENT INTERFERES IN THE SELECTION OF SPSI OFFICERS, ESPECIALLY BY PLACING RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS IN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

MIDLEVEL SPSI POSITIONS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS STATED THAT IT WILL CEASE THE PRACTICE OF PLACING MILITARY OFFICERS IN UNION POSITIONS AND EVENTUALLY WILL REMOVE OFFICIALS WITH SIGNIFICANT GOLKAR CONNECTIONS.

UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE, POLICE APPROVAL IS NEEDED FOR ALL MEETINGS OF FIVE PEOPLE OR MORE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE OFFICES OR NORMAL WORK SITES. THIS PROVISION ALSO APPLIES TO UNION MEETINGS. PERMISSION IS ROUTINELY GIVEN TO THE SPSI BUT NOT TO RIVAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS SBSI' WHICH WAS PREVENTED FROM HOLDING SEVERAL MEETINGS OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS, INCLUDING ITS FIRST CONGRESS IN 1993. THE GOVERNMENT MAY DISSOLVE A UNION IF IT BELIEVES THE UNION IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA, ALTHOUGH IT HAS NEVER ACTUALLY DONE SO, AND THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS

SPECIFYING PROCEDURES FOR UNION DISSOLUTION

THE SPSI MAINTAINS INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS BUT IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS EXCEPT THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) TRADE UNION COUNCIL.

ON APRIL 20 THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS LODGED A FORMAL COMPLAINT AGAINST INDONESIA WITH THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO), SUPPLEMENTING A PREVIOUS COMPLAINT FILED IN 1987, ACCUSING THE GOVERNMENT OF DENYING WORKERS' RIGHT TO SET UP UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, HARASSING INDEPENDENT WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS, AND OF TAKING OTHER ACTIONS CONTRARY TO ILO STANDARDS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

WHILE PANCASILA PRINCIPLES CALL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES TO BE SETTLED BY CONSENSUS, ALL ORGANIZED WORKERS EXCEPT CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. WHILE STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND TEACHERS RARELY EXERCISE THIS RIGHT, PRIVATE SECTOR STRIKES ARE FREQUENT. BEFORE A STRIKE CAN OCCUR IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE LAW REQUIRES INTENSIVE MEDIATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND PRIOR NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE. HOWEVER, NO APPROVAL IS REQUIRED. IN PRACTICE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ARE NOT FOLLOWED, AND FORMAL NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE IS RARELY GIVEN BECAUSE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROCEDURES ARE SLOW. THESE PROCEDURES HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH WORKERS, WHO IGNORE THEM. SUDDEN STRIKES THEREFORE, TEND TO RESULT FROM LONGSTANDING GRIEVANCES OR RECOGNITION THAT LEGALLY MANDATED BENEFITS OR RIGHTS ARE NOT BEING RECEIVED. WHILE STRIKE LEADERS ARE NOT ARRESTED FOR ILLEGAL STRIKES, THEY OFTEN LOSE THEIR JOBS AND HAVE NO LEGAL RECOURSE FOR REINSTATEMENT. THE NUMBER OF STRIKES INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY DURING 1994 COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR, WITH THE MOST DRAMATIC INCREASES OCCURRING IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE YEAR.

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROMOTES IT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE NATIONAL IDEOLOGY, PANCASILA. UNTIL RECENTLY ONLY RECOGNIZED TRADE UNIONS, THAT IS, THE SPSI AND ITS

COMPONENTS, COULD LEGALLY ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. AS NOTED, NEW GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS ALSO

PERMIT UNAFFILIATED PLANT-LEVEL WORKERS ASSOCIATIONS TO CONCLUDE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH EMPLOYERS, THOUGH ONLY ONE HAD DONE SO BY YEAR'S END. AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY ANY OTHER GROUPS ARE NOT CONSIDERED LEGALLY BINDING AND ARE NOT REGISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER.

THE MAJORITY OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

BETWEEN THE SPSI UNITS AND EMPLOYERS ARE NEGOTIATED BILATERALLY. ONCE NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED A REGISTERED SPSI OR INDEPENDENT PLANT LEVEL UNION, AN EMPLOYER IS OBLIGATED TO BARGAIN WITH IT. IN COMPANIES WITHOUT UNIONS, THE GOVERNMENT DISCOURAGES WORKERS FROM UTILIZING OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE E.G., DURING CONSULTATIONS WITH EMPLOYERS OVER COMPANY REGULATIONS. INSTEAD, THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PREFERS THAT WORKERS SEEK ITS ASSISTANCE AND BELIEVES THAT ITS ROLE IS TO PROTECT WORKERS. THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT FOR SOME INDONESIAN COMPANIES, CONSULTATIONS ARE PERFUNCTORY AT BEST AND USUALLY WITH MANAGEMENT-SELECTED WORKERS; THERE ARE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY FROM U.S. COMPANIES. OVER HALF OF THE FACTORY-LEVEL SPSI UNITS HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS ARE FREELY NEGOTIATED BETWEEN UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE VARIES. BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS OR BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION OR ARBITRATION. MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AGREEMENTS ARE FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED FOR 1 YEAR. ACCORDING TO NGO'S INVOLVED IN LABOR ISSUES, THE PROVISIONS OF THESE AGREEMENTS RARELY GO BEYOND THE LEGAL MINIMUM STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE AGREEMENTS ARE OFTEN MERELY PRESENTED TO WORKER REPRESENTATIVES FOR SIGNING RATHER THAN BEING NEGOTIATED.

ALTHOUGH GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS PROHIBIT EMPLOYERS FROM DISCRIMINATING OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS FROM UNION OFFICIALS, OF EMPLOYER RETRIBUTION AGAINST UNION ORGANIZERS, INCLUDING FIRING, WHICH IS NOT EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED OR REMEDIED IN PRACTICE. SOME EMPLOYERS REPORTEDLY HAVE WARNED THEIR EMPLOYEES AGAINST CONTACT WITH UNION ORGANIZERS FROM THE UNRECOGNIZED SBSI ORGANIZATION. IN ADDITION TO MARSINAH (SEE SECTION 1.E.), SEVERAL OTHER LABOR UNION ACTIVISTS HAVE DIED UNDER MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES DURING THE PAST 2 YEARS. SOME HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR NGO'S BELIEVE THAT THE AUTHORITIES

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

HAVE NOT ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATED THESE DEATHS.

CHARGES OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE ADJUDICATED BY ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. HOWEVER, MANY UNION MEMBERS BELIEVE THE TRIBUNALS GENERALLY SIDE WITH EMPLOYERS. BECAUSE OF THIS PERCEIVED PARTIALITY, MANY WORKERS REJECT OR AVOID THE PROCEDURE AND PRESENT THEIR GRIEVANCES DIRECTLY TO PARLIAMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF DISMISSED WORKERS TEND TO BE MONETARY AWARDS; WORKERS ARE RARELY REINSTATED. THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO FIRE WORKERS, BUT THE LAW IS OFTEN IGNORED IN PRACTICE.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE ARMED FORCES, WHICH INCLUDE THE POLICE, CONTINUES TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN LABOR ISSUES, DESPITE NEW REGULATIONS PROMULGATED IN JANUARY TO PROHIBIT MILITARY INTERFERENCE WHEN THERE IS NO THREAT TO SECURITY. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE INCIDENCE OF SUCH MILITARY INVOLVEMENT DECREASED IN 1994, AND SOME OBSERVERS CREDIT GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES WITH RESTRAINT IN RESTORING ORDER IN THE MEDAN RIOTS OF APRIL. HOWEVER, THESE PERCEPTIONS ARE NOT SHARED BY ALL OBSERVERS. WORKERS CHARGE THAT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES ATTEMPT TO INTIMIDATE UNION ORGANIZERS AND STRIKE LEADERS AND HAVE BEEN PRESENT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS DURING SOME STRIKES, EVEN WHEN THERE HAS BEEN NO DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER VIOLENCE. MEMBERS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ATTENDED AND MONITORED TRADE UNION EDUCATION SEMINARS RUN BY THE ASIAN-AMERICAN FREE LABOR INSTITUTE (AAFLI), EVEN THOUGH THESE PROGRAMS WERE APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. IN 1993 THE MILITARY COMMAND IN SURABAYA ALSO HALTED AN AAFLI-SPSI PROGRAM ON LEGAL AID FOR INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. AT YEAR'S END THE PROGRAM HAD NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO RESUME DESPITE GOVERNMENT ASSURANCES. MILITARY OFFICIALS OCCASIONALLY HAVE BEEN REPORTED PRESENT DURING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND MANAGEMENT. THEIR PRESENCE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS INTIMIDATING BY PLANT-LEVEL UNION OFFICIALS. A MILITARY OFFICER WAS AMONG THOSE CONVICTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MARSINAH MURDER CASE.

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

LABOR LAW APPLIES EQUALLY IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE LAW FORBIDS FORCED LABOR, AND THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY ENFORCES IT. NGO REPORTS HAVE ALLEGED THAT SOME CASES OF FORCED LABOR IN THE FORM OF DEBT BONDAGE BY LOGGING COMPANIES EXIST IN IRIAN JAYA. THE GOVERNMENT SAYS THAT IT IS UNABLE TO VERIFY THESE ALLEGATIONS BECAUSE THEY ARE

INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC. NO COMPLAINTS OR INFORMATION ON FORCED LABOR IN IRIAN JAYA HAD COME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AS OF LATE SEPTEMBER. (SEE ALSO SECTION 5, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE.)

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

CHILD LABOR EXISTS IN BOTH INDUSTRIAL AREAS AND RURAL AREAS. THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 2.7 MILLION WORKING CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 14, ACCORDING TO A 1994 REPORT OF THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. INDONESIA WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO BE SELECTED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ILO'S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOR (IPEC), AND SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ILO TO GUIDE THEIR COLLABORATION UNDER THIS PROGRAM ON MAY 29, 1992. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PLAN OF ACTION WERE DEVELOPED AT A NATIONAL CONFERENCE IN BOGOR IN JULY 1993. DURING 1994, 120 GOVERNMENT LABOR INSPECTORS RECEIVED ILO-SPONSORED TRAINING ON CHILD LABOR MATTERS UNDER THE IPEC PROGRAM.

THE GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A CLASS OF CHILDREN WHO MUST WORK FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS, AND IN 1987 THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER ISSUED REGULATION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

PER-OL/MEN/1987, "PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FORCED TO WORK," TO REGULATE THIS SITUATION. THIS REGULATION LEGALIZES THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14 WHO MUST WORK TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCOME OF THEIR FAMILIES. IT REQUIRES PARENTAL CONSENT, PROHIBITS DANGEROUS OR DIFFICULT WORK, LIMITS WORK TO 4 HOURS DAILY, AND REQUIRES EMPLOYERS TO REPORT THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN WORKING UNDER ITS PROVISIONS. IT DOES NOT SET A MINIMUM AGE FOR CHILDREN IN THIS CATEGORY, EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDING THE COLONIAL-ERA GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE OF DECEMBER 17, 1925, ON "MEASURES LIMITING CHILD LABOUR AND NIGHTWORK OF WOMEN," WHICH IS STILL THE CURRENT LAW GOVERNING CHILD LABOR AND SETS A MINIMUM AGE OF 12 FOR EMPLOYMENT. THE 1987 REGULATION IS NOT ENFORCED. NO EMPLOYERS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO COURT FOR VIOLATING ITS RESTRICTIONS ON THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR CHILDREN, AND NO REPORTS ARE COLLECTED FROM ESTABLISHMENTS EMPLOYING CHILDREN.

ACT NO. 1 OF 1951 WAS INTENDED TO BRING INTO FORCE CERTAIN LABOR MEASURES, INCLUDING PROVISIONS ON CHILD LABOR WHICH WOULD REPLACE THOSE OF THE 1925 LEGISLATION. HOWEVER IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS FOR THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN ISSUED. THUS THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS IN THE 1951 ACT HAVE NO VALIDITY. IN SEPTEMBER 1993, THE

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IT WOULD REVIEW ITS CHILD LABOR REGULATIONS WITH THE INTENTION OF TIGHTENING ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS ON CHILD LABOR. AT YEAR'S END, THE REVIEW HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE, AREA WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL ESTABLISH MINIMUM WAGES FOR REGIONS AND BASIC NEEDS FIGURES FOR EACH PROVINCE--A MONETARY AMOUNT

DECONTROLLED/UNCLASSIFIED

CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. WHILE INDONESIA HAS SUCCEEDED IN DRAMATICALLY LOWERING THE LEVEL OF POVERTY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, THE MINIMUM WAGE RATES HAVE LAGGED BEHIND THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURES. MINIMUM WAGE RATES WERE RAISED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IN THREE STAGES BY PROVINCE ON JANUARY 1, APRIL 1, AND AUGUST 1. WHILE IN MOST CASES THE NEW RATES STILL DID NOT EQUAL THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURE, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IN AUGUST THAT NEW INCREASES WOULD TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ON APRIL 1, 1995. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROJECTS THAT AT THAT TIME MINIMUM WAGE RATES ON THE AVERAGE WILL EQUAL 106 PERCENT OF THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURE, UP FROM 97 PERCENT AS OF AUGUST 1, 1994. PAYMENT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE IS ANOTHER QUESTION. THERE ARE NO RELIABLE STATISTICS. THE GOVERNMENT'S ESTIMATE IN SEPTEMBER, THAT 96 PERCENT OF ALL COMPANIES WERE PAYING AT LEAST THE REGIONAL MINIMUM WAGE IS CERTAINLY EXAGGERATED; INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS' ESTIMATES RANGE BETWEEN 30 AND 60 FERCENT. GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT IS WEAK, AND SANCTIONS ARE LIGHT AGAINST EMPLOYERS WHO FAIL TO PAY THE MINIMUM WAGE. NEVERTHELESS, AS A RESULT OF GOVERNMENT PRESSURES, THE WAVE OF STRIKES IN THE FIRST QUARTER, AND THE MEDAN RIOTS, SOME IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE. LABOR LAW AND MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PROVIDE WORKERS WITH A VARIETY OF OTHER BENEFITS, SUCH AS

SOCIAL SECURITY, AND WORKERS IN MORE MODERN FACILITIES OFTEN RECEIVE HEALTH BENEFITS AND FREE MEALS.

THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7-HOUR WORKDAYS AND 40-HOUR WORKWEEKS, WITH ONE 30-MINUTE REST PERIOD FOR EACH 4 HOURS OF WORK. THE LAW ALSO REQUIRES 1 DAY OF REST OUT OF EVERY WEEK. THE DAILY OVERTIME RATE IS 1 1/2 TIMES THE NORMAL HOURLY RATE FOR THE FIRST HOUR, AND TWICE THE HOURLY RATE FOR ADDITIONAL OVERTIME. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE

EMPLOYEE. OBSERVANCE OF LAWS REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND BY

REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ARE FAIRLY COMMON AND OFTEN RESULT IN STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. THE MINISTRY OF MANPOWER CONTINUES PUBLICLY TO URGE EMPLOYERS TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW. HOWEVER, IN GENERAL, GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ARE WEAK.

BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. IN THE LARGELY WESTERN-OPERATED OIL SECTOR, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUNCTION REASONABLY WELL. HOWEVER, IN THE COUNTRY'S 100,000 LARGER REGISTERED COMPANIES IN THE NONOIL SECTOR, THE QUALITY OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAMS VARIES GREATLY. THE ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS IS SEVERELY HAMPERED BY THE LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER INSPECTORS AS WELL AS BY THE LOW LEVEL OF EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION FOR SOUND HEALTH

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AND SAFETY PRACTICES. ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION ON THE PART OF INSPECTORS ARE COMMON. WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS. EMPLOYERS ARE FORBIDDEN BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO, BUT THE LAW IS NOT EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED.

CHRISTOPHER

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0118

PAGE 01 STATE 026906 080633Z
ORIGIN PRS-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	ACDA-17	AF-01	AIT-03	ARA-01	AS-01
	CG-00	OASY-00	EAP-01	EUR-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-14
	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	OES-09	OIG-04
	OIS-01	PA-02	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00	SA-01	DRL-09
	/068R						

DRAFTED BY: PA/PRESS:SBROWN
APPROVED BY: PA/PRESS:DJOHNSON
S/S-O:BFREDEN
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
OP CENTER
----------A43891 080815Z /20
O 020122Z FEB 95
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE 7925/43
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY ALMATY IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE IMMEDIATE 8875/93
AMEMBASSY TIRANA IMMEDIATE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MASERU IMMEDIATE 1599/
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 5735/53
CTF PROVIDE COMFORT INCIRLIK TU//POLAD// IMMEDIATE
COMUSNAVCENT IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6230/48
DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5999/6017
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2223/41
AMEMBASSY BAKU IMMEDIATE 9360/78
XMT AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY MALABO
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200504416

INFORM CONSULS ALSO FOR USEU/USOECD

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CAPTION, TEXT)

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPRC
SUBJECT: DAILY PRESS BRIEFING - WEDNESDAY FEBRUARY 1, 1995

THE FOLLOWING TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED IN TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING:

ANNOUNCEMENTS/STATEMENTS: RELEASE OF "COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994" (1); THANK YOU TO PRESS OFFICE (1); REMARKS BY U/S FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS TIMOTHY WIRTH AND A/S FOR DRL JOHN SHATTUCK (1-5); INTRODUCTION OF GRACIA HILLMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COORDINATOR FOR WOMEN'S ISSUES (14); CHINA (5-11, 17); RUSSIA (7-8, 14-15); BOSNIA (8-12); MEXICO (9); BURMA (11); RWANDA (12); INDONESIA (13); WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS (14-15); INDIA (15-16); TURKEY (16)

STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER RE: ANNOUNCEMENT ON ME PEACE FROCESS AND CAIRO SUMMIT 2/2 (17); U.S. DISCUSSIONS/CONSULTATIONS WITH PARTIES (17-19)

GREECE: EXTENSION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS (20)

CUBA: TRANSFER OF CUBANS FROM PANAMA TO GUANTANAMO (20); NUMBER OF CUBANS RETURNED TO CUBA (20-21)

BOSNIA/CROATIA: FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE (21); PM SILAJDZIC TESTIMONY ON CAPITOL HILL

(22-23); STATUS OF Z-4 PLAN (24)

TURKEY: REPORTED REMARKS BY U.S. AMBASSADOR GROSSMAN
RE: U.S. POSITION ON PIPELINE TO MEDITERRANEAN (24-25)

INDONESIA: RECOGNITION OF EAST TIMOR (25)

BEGIN TEXT:

PAGE 1

MS. SHELLY: GOOD AFTERNOON, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. AS YOU KNOW, LAST NIGHT WE SENT TO CONGRESS THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ANNUAL REPORT, THE "COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994." WE HAVE TWO SPECIAL BRIEFERS TODAY WHO WILL MAKE OPENING REMARKS AND ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS: UNDER SECRETARY FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS TIMOTHY WIRTH AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR JOHN SHATTUCK ARE OUR GUESTS TODAY.

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THEIR PRESENTATION. WE WILL HAVE OUR REGULAR BRIEFING.

Q CHRISTINE, BEFORE YOU GET STARTED, I THINK THE PRESS OFFICE DESERVES SOME THANKS FOR THE WAY THEY GOT THIS REPORT OUT. IT WAS A TREMENDOUS UNDERTAKING AND THOSE OF US WHO WERE HERE AT 9 O'CLOCK REALLY APPRECIATE

WHAT THEY DID.

MS. SHELLY: THANK YOU, BARRY. I APPRECIATE THAT VERY MUCH AND CERTAINLY WILL MAKE SURE THAT THE PRESS OFFICE GETS THAT THANKS PASSED ON. THANKS.

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH.

MS. SHELLY: IT'S RARE. WE APPRECIATE IT.

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: I WILL PASS ON TO THE SECRETARY THOSE COMPLIMENTS.

Q AND ASK HIM WHO LEAKED THE COPY TO THE NEW YORK

TIMES.

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: AND WHO LEAKED THE COPY TO THE NEW YORK TIMES?

Q BUT WE HAVE OUR OWN SUSPICIONS ALREADY, SO DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT TOO MUCH. DON'T WORRY ABOUT ASKING (INAUDIBLE) --

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: I DON'T HAVE TO REMIND YOU ALL TODAY WE ARE RELEASING THE COUNTRY REPORTS A PROCESS

PAGE 2

REQUIRED BY THE CONGRESS. THIS IS THE 17TH YEAR IN

PAGE 05 STATE 026906 080633Z

WHICH IT'S BEEN DONE, AND I THINK WE CAN PROUDLY SAY THESE BECOME BETTER, MORE THOROUGH, AND COMPREHENSIVE EACH YEAR -- CERTAINLY, THE DEFINITIVE WORLDWIDE REPORT, COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY, ON THE CONDITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE GLOBE.

FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY IS GOING TO BECOME INCREASINGLY COMPLEX BEYOND OUR TRADITIONAL POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS TO ECONOMICS, THE ENVIRONMENT, POPULATION, REFUGEES, INTERNATIONAL CRIME, NARCOTICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, BEYOND OUR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS TRADITIONALLY, AND BEYOND OUR TRADITIONAL STRUCTURES. BEYOND GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIPS TO AN INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND AN INCREASING DEPENDENCY AND COOPERATION WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.

AND IT'S WITHIN THIS CHANGE -- BEYOND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS AND BEYOND POLITICAL STRUCTURES -- THAT WE FIND THIS VERY IMPORTANT COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS RECOGNIZED THE DEEP IMPORTANCE OF THESE NEW ISSUES, THE NEW NON-TRADITIONAL ISSUES. AND SOME OF THE SIGNATURE EVENTS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION CERTAINLY INCLUDE TRADE TREATIES, THE POPULATION CONFERENCE, THE NEW CRIME INITIATIVE, OUR AMBITIOUS CORAL REEF INITIATIVE, THE COMMON AGENDA WITH JAPAN, THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN AFPROACH WITH RUSSIA, AND THIS SHARPENED AND STRENGTHENED HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM.

INITIALLY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS FOCUSED PREDOMINANTLY ON ROGUE GOVERNMENTS, ON OPPRESSIVE-REPRESSIVE CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS AS THE PRIMARY FOCUS. THE TEXTURE NOW HAS BECOME MORE SUBTLE -- THAT IS, BROADENED BEYOND A FOCUS ON GOVERNMENTS A ONE TO RECOGNIZE AS WELL THESE NEW CROSS-CUTTING PRESSURES THAT ARE OF ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE TO THE CONDITION OF INDIVIDUALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS OVERALL IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES -- FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESSURES OF POPULATION IN RWANDA, WHICH HAVE MADE IT INCREASINGLY EASY AND AN INCREASINGLY RIPE GROUND FOR ABUSES AND WE SAW THOSE IN A HORRIBLE WAY IN RWANDA; OR NARCOTICS IN COLOMBIA WHERE WE SEE THE PERVERSION AND PURCHASE OF GOVERNMENTS NOT ONLY IN THE DRUG AREA BUT INCREASINGLY AROUND THE WORLD; ANOTHER CROSS-CUTTING PRESSURE IN THE ABUSE OF WOMEN, A NEW AND MAJOR FOCUS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT LAST YEAR AND OF EVEN STRONGER EMPHASIS THIS YEAR.

AND I WOULD LIKE, JUST VERY BRIEFLY, TO INTRODUCE GRACIA HILLMAN, WHO HAS JOINED THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY AS THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COORDINATOR FOR WOMEN'S ISSUES.

THE FOCUS ON WOMEN IS ALSO A TESTIMONY TO OUR DEEP COMMITMENT AND ENGAGEMENT WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. ABSOLUTELY, WE COULD NOT DO WHAT WE DO WITHOUT THE DEEP INVOLVEMENT WITH AND DEPENDENCE ON

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HAS BEEN, AS ALL OF YOU KNOW, ENGAGED IN THIS SINCE HIS TIME AS DEPUTY SECRETARY IN THE DEPARTMENT IN THE 1970S AND IS VERY PLEASED AND PROUD OF THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE. HE PUT OUT A VERY STRONG STATEMENT, WHICH I BELIEVE ALL OF YOU HAVE; AND HE SHARES WITH ME OUR GREAT PRIDE AND SUPPORT OF THE EFFORTS OF JOHN SHATTUCK, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, WHO WILL GO INTO MORE SPECIFICS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT.

JOHN?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

IN MY OVERVIEW PUBLISHED AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS

YEAR'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, I HAVE CHARACTERIZED, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION CHARACTERIZED, 1994 AS A YEAR OF CRISIS AND PROGRESS -- A YEAR THAT WITNESSED GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND THE RETURN OF AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT TO HAITI; A YEAR IN WHICH DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT TOOK HOLD IN NEW PARTS OF AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, AND EUROPE; AND YET A YEAR THAT ENDED WITH THE ASSAULT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THOUSANDS OF CIVILIANS IN CHECHNYA; AND WITH THE PALE SERBS PURSUING THEIR POLICY OF ETHNIC CLEANSING IN BOSNIA.

THERE IS NO MORE POWERFUL AND POIGNANT AN EXAMPLE OF THE CONTRASTS OF 1994 THAN THE FACT THAT THE MOST UPLIFTING EVENT OF THE YEAR -- THE INAUGURATION OF

NELSON MANDELA -- AS PRESIDENT OF SOUTH AFRICA, TOOK PLACE IN THE SAME MONTH AS THE YEAR'S GREATEST HORROR -- THE MASS MURDERS OF OVER 500,000 TUTSIS IN RWANDA.

THERE ARE FIVE MAJOR THEMES THAT STAND OUT IN THE 1994 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS.

FIRST, THE FLAGRANT AND SYSTEMATIC ABUSES OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS CONTINUED AT THE HANDS OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES SUCH AS CHINA IRAQ, IRAN, BURMA, NORTH KOREA, AND CUBA. IN THESE COUNTRIES, DENIAL OF BASIC FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION, ASSOCIATION AND RELIGION; PERSECUTION OF MINORITIES; AND THE SUPPRESSION OF CIVIL SOCIETY REMAINED THE NORM.

THE FLAGRANT ABUSES WERE NOT LIMITED TO AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS. TORTURE, ARBITRARY DETENTION, OR THE REPRESSION OF FREE SPEECH AND DISSENT, PERSISTED IN OTHER COUNTRIES

PAGE 4

WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS NIGERIA, SAUDI ARABIA, SINGAPORE, EGYPT, INDIA, GUATEMALA, AND TURKEY.

A SECOND THEME OF 1994 IS THAT ARMED CONFLICTS HAD A SERIOUS IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN A GROWING NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. IN RWANDA, BOSNIA, CHECHNYA, ANGOLA, AFGHANISTAN, SUDAN, ALGERIA AND ELSEWHERE, MORTARS AND MACHETES WERE WIELDED, KILLING

MANY INNOCENT CIVILIANS AND LEAVING SOCIETIES WITH BITTER MEMORIES TO PASS ON TO FUTURE GENERATIONS. FAR

TOO OFTEN, CYNICAL POLITICAL LEADERS IN THESE PLACES FANNED THE FLAMES OF ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS TENSION AND ENCOURAGED EXTREMISTS.

THESE FLAGRANT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES POINT TO THE THIRD THEME OF 1994: STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS TO BUILD NEW INSTITUTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY. WHEN COUNTRIES HAVE SUFFERED FROM MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, INSTITUTIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY CAN HELP THEM RECONCILE.

IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, RESPONSIBILITY IS COVERED UP OR IGNORED, THERE CAN BE NO PEACE NO JUSTICE, NO DETERRENT TO FUTURE ABUSES.

IN COUNTRIES THAT ARE TORN APART BY GENOCIDE AND ETHNIC CONFLICT, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS ESTABLISHED A NEW INSTITUTION OF JUSTICE. UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE U.S. THE U.N. HAS ESTABLISHED WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS FOR RWANDA AND YUGOSLAVIA, APPOINTED OUTSTANDING PROSECUTORS, AND HAS BEGUN TO ISSUE INDICTMENTS. THIS IS A MAJOR GROUND-BREAKING DEVELOPMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS SOUTH AFRICA, EL SALVADOR, HAITI, AND NICARAGUA, GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION LEADERS GRAPPLED OVER THE LAST YEAR -- IN SOME CASES IN RECENT

MONTHS -- WITH WAYS TO EXAMINE WHAT HAPPENED IN THE PAST, HOLD HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS RESPONSIBLE, AND MOVE FORWARD WITH NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

THE U.S. HAS ALSO ENCOURAGED THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS IN MANY COUNTRIES AND CHANNELED DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTING INDEPENDENT JUDICIARIES.

A FOURTH THEME OF 1994 WAS THE ROLE OF FREE MARKETS IN THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY. THE GROWTH OF MARKET ECONOMIES, INCREASING TRADE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY WERE POWERFUL FORCES IN MANY COUNTRIES LAST YEAR. AND WHILE THESE FORCES HAVE NOT ALWAYS PRODUCED SHORT-TERM HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS, THEY'RE CREATING INTERNAL PRESSURES FOR MORE OPENNESS, INDIVIDUAL

FREEDOM, AND THE RULE OF LAW.

PAGE 5

BUT THERE IS ALSO RESISTANCE TO THESE PRESSURES FROM AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS IN COUNTRIES LIKE CHINA. THIS RESISTANCE COULD BE SEEN LAST YEAR NOT ONLY IN CRACKDOWNS ON POLITICAL SPEECH AND DISSENT BUT ALSO IN THE SUPPRESSION OF WORKERS SEEKING TO EXERCISE THEIR BASIC FREEDOMS OF ASSOCIATION.

A FIFTH AND FINAL THEME OF 1994 WHICH OUR REPORTS REFLECT, WAS THE STEADY GAINS THAT OCCURRED FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN A WIDE VARIETY OF COUNTRIES IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD, DESPITE THE TERRIBLE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 11 STATE 026906 080633Z

CATASTROPHES THAT ALSO MARKED THE YEAR. THESE GAINS REFLECT THE LONG-TERM SUCCESS OF OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AND THE CONSTANT EFFORT THAT PRODUCES RESULTS BUT OFTEN CANNOT BE MEASURED IN THE SHORT TERM.

IN SOUTH AFRICA, AS IN HAITI. IN NORTHERN IRELAND, IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IN MOZAMBIQUE, IN EL SALVADOR, AND IN SRI LANKA, DRAMATIC PROGRESS OCCURRED TOWARD RESOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS CRISES THAT HAD LONG SEEMED INSOLUBLE, ALTHOUGH THIS PROGRESS WAS SOMETIMES INTERRUPTED BY RENEWED VIOLENCE.

IN URUGUAY, CHILE, BRAZIL, MALAWI, AND NEPAL, SUCCESSFUL ELECTIONS CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS, AS THEY DID IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE.

IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA, IN ALBANIA, AND ELSEWHERE, GOVERNMENTS CONFRONTING ETHNIC TENSIONS SOUGHT THE MEDIATION OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID THE VIOLENCE THAT HAS RIPPED THROUGH BOSNIA AND CROATIA.

AMIDST THE HORROR OF 1994 THEN THERE IS ALSO HOPE, STOKED BY THE BRAVE ACTIVISTS WHO DEDICATE THEIR LIVES

TO REFORM. IN PUBLISHING THESE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, WE SAY TO THOSE HEROES: "YOU ARE NOT ALONE. THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO HELPING SOCIETIES MOVE TOWARD FREEDOM AND OPENNESS -- THE FACTORS ESSENTIAL TO ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN A PEACEFUL WORLD -- AND JUST, HUMANE SOCIETIES.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 12 STATE 026906 080633Z

THE UNITED STATES WILL BE AN ADVOCATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY FOR THE SAKE OF THOSE WHO ARE STRUGGLING TO IMPROVE THE CLIMATE OF FREEDOM IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES AND FOR THE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY OF ALL AMERICANS."

I'D BE HAPPY TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q THIS WAS ALSO THE YEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES DECIDED TO ABANDON USING PRESSURE ON CHINA ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY DENYING THEM TRADE BENEFITS; YOU'VE GIVEN THAT UP.

PAGE 6

CAN YOU GIVE US ANY SPECIFIC EXAMPLES, OR YOUR BEST -- I'M SURE YOU CAN -- BUT CAN YOU GIVE US YOUR BEST SPECIFIC EXAMPLES WHERE U.S. CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DRIVES AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND INFLUENCES WHAT THE U.S. DOES IN ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES PARTICULARLY BIG COUNTRIES WHERE MAYBE YOUR GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS SEEM TO PREDOMINATE OVER YOUR HEART AND SOUL?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: LET ME TAKE THE TWO BIG COUNTRIES. LET'S START WITH CHINA. I THINK THERE, AS YOU KNOW, THE CONCLUSION OF OUR REPORT WAS THAT THERE WAS NO IMPROVEMENT IN MANY ASPECTS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN 1994. THERE WAS A CRACKDOWN ON DISSENT WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR MORE THAN YEAR; IN FACT, OCCURRED BOTH WHEN THERE WAS MFN LINKAGE AS WELL AS WHEN THERE WASN'T MFN LINKAGE.

UNCLASSIFIED

IT WAS CLEAR IN OUR REPORT LAST YEAR AND IN OUR CANDID ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AT THE TIME THAT THE PRESIDENT EXTENDED MFN THAT ISSUES OF HUMAN RIGHTS REMAIN VERY PROBLEMATIC IN CHINA IN THE SHORT RUN.

THE U.S. POLICY, IN RESPONSE, HAS BEEN TO BE VERY FIRM. WE ARE COMMITTED TO PURSUING A RESOLUTION IN THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WITH RESPECT TO CHINA. WE ARE COMMITTED TO CONTINUING TO SPOTLIGHT THE PROBLEMS AND ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA. WE ARE COMMITTED TO A CONTINUATION OF THE SANCTIONS THAT WERE IMPOSED AT THE TIME OF TIANANMEN SQUARE. WE HAVE SENT A CLEAR SIGNAL TO CHINA AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, AND ALSO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THAT IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELATIONS DEPENDS ON IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, WE ARE VERY CLEAR IN OUR POLICY THAT ISOLATING CHINA IS NOT AN ANSWER TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS THAT I'VE OUTLINED.

AT THE SAME TIME, I WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE SITUATION IS FAR MORE COMPLICATED THAN A SIMPLE ONE-LINE

ASSESSMENT CAN MAKE IT, WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA.

OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST YEAR, BOTH DURING THE TIME THAT THERE WAS MFN LINKAGE AND AFTERWARDS, THERE WERE SOME DEVELOPMENTS THAT WERE POSITIVE. THERE WERE PRISONER RELEASES; PARTICULARLY, THE RELEASES OF THE LEADERS OF THE TIANANMEN SQUARE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT.

PASSPORTS TO DISSIDENTS WHO HAVE HAD THEM BLOCKED WERE GRANTED. THERE WAS LIMITED INFORMATION PROVIDED ABOUT

THE STATUS OF HUNDREDS OF PRISONERS ON LISTS; AND TALKS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS INITIATED FOR THE VERY FIRST TIME OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST YEAR.

AT THE SAME TIME, THERE ARE LONGER-TERM CURRENTS IN CHINA, I THINK, THAT CAN BE ENCOURAGED BY THE TRADE AND

PAGE 7

MARKET ECONOMICS THAT OCCURRING -- CURRENTS FOR MORE OPENNESS IN THE RULE OF LAW, AND IN SOME RESPECTS THOSE ARE HAVING AN EFFECT IN SOME OF THE DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO NEW LEGISLATION IN CHINA PARTICULARLY A NEW LAW THAT ALLOWS INDIVIDUALS TO SUE THE GOVERNMENT.

BUT I DON'T WANT TO MAKE ANYTHING BUT THE CLEAREST ASSESSMENT THAT IS CONTAINED IN OUR REPORT WITH RESPECT TO THE LAST YEAR. THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT CRACKDOWN ON DISSENT. BUT THERE ARE ALSO MORE COMPLICATED TRENDS AT WORK IN CHINA. THE U.S. IS ENGAGED ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES ACROSS THE BOARD WITH RESPECT TO CHINA AND AT ALL LEVELS.

Q YOU WERE GOING TO DO RUSSIA, TOO, YOU BEGAN BY SAYING.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: OKAY, I WILL DO RUSSIA.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 15 STATE 026906 080633Z

Q HOW RUSSIA -- AND YOU TALK ABOUT ARBITRARY DECREES BY YELTSIN; WHAT THEY'VE DONE IN CHECHNYA -- TERRIBLE JAIL CONDITIONS, PRISONERS NOT GETTING FED. AND YOU'RE UP ON THE HILL ASKING FOR INCREASED FOREIGN AID TO RUSSIA. WHAT ROLE DOES HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE IN FORMULATING YOUR RUSSIA POLICY?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: A VERY CLEAR ROLE AND A CLEAR ROLE IN THE STATEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE ADMINISTRATION, BOTH BY THE PRESIDENT AND BY THE

SECRETARY, TO THE RUSSIANS, TO THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WITH RESPECT TO OUR INCREASING CONCERN ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN CHECHNYA, INCLUDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE RUSSIANS.

WE HAVE CONVEYED THESE CONCERNS. WE HAVE MADE PUBLIC THESE CONCERNS. WE ARE ALSO IN THE PROCESS OF WORKING WITH THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE WHICH WE HAVE HELPED TO LEAD WITH RESPECT TO A DELEGATION THAT IS SEEKING TO BRING ABOUT A NEGOTIATED END TO THE CONFLICT AND TO DELIVER HUMANITARIAN AID.

WE'RE ALSO REVIEWING OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO SEE IF SOME CAN BE REDIRECTED TO ASSIST REFUGEES. THESE ARE ALL MAJOR ASPECTS OF OUR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA.

Q TO FOLLOW ON CHINA. WHAT WAS THE REPLY OF THE

PRC OFFICIALS THAT YOU TALKED TO WHEN YOU BROUGHT YOUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS? AND I WOULD ASK SPECIFICALLY WITH REGARD TO RELIGIOUS PERSECUTIONS?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: WE HAVE PROVIDED OVER THE COURSE OF THE TIME THAT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS

BEEN IN OFFICE A NUMBER OF CASES, A LARGE NUMBER OF CASES OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN IN PRISON FOR THE EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION FREEDOM OF SPEECH, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. AS I SAID, IN SOME INSTANCE INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN RELEASED. I THINK THERE IS NOW, FINALLY, A MORE ROUTINE WAY OF PROVIDING THESE LISTS AND THEY ARE RECEIVED RATHER THAN SIMPLY BEING REJECTED WHICH THEY HAD BEEN OUT OF HAND IN THE PAST.

I THINK THE STRONG ADVOCACY THAT THE PRESIDENT AND

THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAVE ENGAGED IN, IN RAISING SPECIFIC PRISONER CASES IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN AS WELL AS FOREIGN MINISTER, QIAN QICHEN, SPEAK VERY CLEARLY TO THAT POINT.

STEVE.

Q THE REPORT QUOTES RUSSIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONER, SERGEI KOVALEV, SAYING THAT THERE WERE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ON A MASSIVE SCALE IN CHECHNYA. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGREE WITH THAT

ASSESSMENT?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: WE HAVE CITED THAT ASSESSMENT PRECISELY BECAUSE WE HAVE A VERY HIGH REGARD FOR MR. KOVALEV WHICH WHOM I HAVE INCIDENTALLY MET VERY FREQUENTLY. WE HAVE HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUES WITH RUSSIA. SERGEI KOVALEV IS ONE OF MY REGULAR INTERLOCUTORS. I MIGHT ALSO MENTION THE VERY MOVING FACT THAT SERGEI KOVALEV AND HIS COLLEAGUE, SLAVA BAKHMIN, WERE BOTH FORMER PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION IN SIBERIA I THINK THE FACT OF THEIR APPOINTMENT IS A VERY SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT OF THE INTEREST IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA.

WE HAVE CITED THE KOVALEV ASSESSMENT PRECISELY BECAUSE WE HAVE A VERY HIGH REGARD FOR KOVALEV AND WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HIS SERIOUS CONCERNS ARE NOT CORRECT.

Q IN YOUR OVERVIEW, IN RELATION TO RWANDA AND BOSNIA, YOU TALK ABOUT GENOCIDE AND WAR CRIMES. THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT NAMED NAMES IN BOSNIA OF THOSE SERB NATIONALISTS THEY THINK SHOULD APPEAR BEFORE THE U.N. WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL. ARE YOU NOW PREPARED TO NAME NAMES?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS PROVIDED NINE REPORTS TO THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND TO THE NEW WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL WHICH

CONTAIN A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND ABUSERS AND WHICH DO NAME NAMES. CONSISTENT

WITH THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS, WE ARE NOT GOING TO PUBLICIZE THOSE REPORTS UNTIL THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL ITSELF DECIDES TO DO SO.

PAGE 9

Q I NOTICE IN YOUR REPORT OVERVIEW YOU MENTIONED THAT SANCTIONS ARE JUST ONE ELEMENT IN PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THAT OTHER BROADER MEANS NEED TO BE USED AS

WELL.

SO MY QUESTION IS, IN THE CASE OF MEXICO, WHICH IS CITED IN HERE FOR TORTURE, PRETRIAL PROBLEMS LACK OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH, REPRESSION IN CHECHNYA, EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS THERE, WE HAVE A VERY CLOSE AND FRIENDLY AND NON-SANCTIONS, OPEN AND TRADE AND RELATIONSHIP WITH MEXICO, WHAT WILL BE THE BROADER MEANS OF PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THERE? WILL IT BE ELEVATED TO A HIGHER LEVEL? HOW DO YOU PROPOSE TO USE ,- WHAT METHODS DO YOU --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: IN FACT, I THINK MEXICO IS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF THE VERY ACROSS-THE-BOARD ENGAGEMENT WITH A COUNTRY AND THE RESULT IS AN IMPROVEMENT INDEED, IN DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

MEXICO HAD THE FREEST AND FAIREST ELECTION BY MOST ACCOUNTS IN ITS HISTORY LAST AUGUST. THE RESPONSE OF MEXICO TO THE UPRISING IN CHIAPAS, WHILE INITIALLY

UNCLASSIFIED

RAISING VERY SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS, VERY QUICKLY WAS CHANGED TO A CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CHIAPAS INSURGENTS. INDEED, THIS IS PRECISELY THE WAY THAT A DEMOCRACY COMMITTED TO THE RULE OF LAW AND RECONCILIATION SHOULD BE ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES.

THE PROBLEM OF IMPUNITY, OF COURSE, DOES CONTINUE, AS OUR REPORT VERY CLEARLY POINTS OUT. BUT IF YOU LOOK AT THE PROCESS THAT IS UNDERWAY IN MEXICO, I THINK THERE HAS BEEN IMPROVEMENT. IN FACT, IT IS THIS VERY KIND OF ENGAGEMENT THAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT.

Q MAY I ASK A QUESTION OF SECRETARY WIRTH.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: PLEASE.

Q THE ADMINISTRATION HAD SAID THAT MOST FAVORED NATIONS STATUS WOULD LEAD TO IMPROVEMENTS AND THAT THIS WAS NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE DESPITE THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT WHEN HE WAS RUNNING FOR ELECTION.

NOW THAT IT HAS NOT LED TO IMPROVEMENTS -- THE SITUATION HAS WORSEN -- WHAT COURSE CAN THE ADMINISTRATION TAKE? WHAT WILL YOU DO TO STOP CONGRESS FROM TRYING TO REVERSE THE POLICY?

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: WE'RE GOING TO CONTINUE

TRYING, ANDREA. WE'RE GOING TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE IN EVERY WAY. JOHN WAS RECENTLY THERE IN JANUARY; I WAS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THERE IN DECEMBER. WE CONTINUE TO RAISE THE ISSUES OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE CONTINUE TO WORK WITH VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS ON CHINA'S, IN MANY PLACES VERY REPRESSIVE

UNCLASSIFIED

POPULATION POLICY. WE'RE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ENGAGEMENT OF UNPFA -- CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT IN CHINA.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF AVENUES, ANDREA, THAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO PURSUE. I THINK IT'S OUR OBLIGATION TO TRY TO EXPLAIN TO THE CONGRESS WHY WE'RE DOING THAT, WHAT WE WANT TO DO; THAT CHINA IS AN EXTRAORDINARILY IMPORTANT PLAYER IN THE WORLD. THERE ARE VERY SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN CHINA THAT THEY WOULD LIKE US TO ENGAGE IN WITH THEM, AND WE ARE SAYING THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE GREATER PROGRESS ON THEIR SIDE. THEY'RE CERTAINLY AWARE OF THIS. SO I THINK PROBABLY THE BEST ANSWER IS TO SAY, WE'LL KEEP TRYING.

Q BUT WASN'T DELINKING MFN FROM HUMAN RIGHTS IN RETROSPECT, A MISTAKE, BECAUSE IT REMOVED A LOT OF PRESSURE FROM THE CHINESE?

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: I THINK JOHN EXPLAINED THAT IN HIS GOOD OPENING STATEMENT. IT WAS OUR BELIEF THAT TRYING TO OPEN UP A SERIES OF ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS AND TRYING TO HAVE A BROADER AND FREER AND OPEN SOCIETY WOULD LEAD TO THE RIGHT RESULTS. WE STILL HOPE THAT THAT'S GOING TO BE THE CASE.

UNCLASSIFIED

WE KNOW THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IS IN A PERIOD OF VERY SIGNIFICANT TRANSITION AND PROBABLY THIS IS GOING TO TAKE SOME TIME FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE AS WELL.

Q COULD I FOLLOW THAT UP, PLEASE, ON CHINA, BROADENING IT. SOME HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS ACCUSED THIS ADMINISTRATION OF FOLLOWING A MERCANTILIST HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY IN WHICH COMMERCE BECOMES MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

(1) DO YOU THINK THAT THERE IS ANY JUSTICE -- IS THERE A CONFLICT WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ABOUT INCREASING COMMERCE WITH COUNTRIES WHICH MAY NOT HAVE

VERY GOOD HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES? IS THERE A CONFLICT OF MOTIVES WITHIN THIS ADMINISTRATION ON THOSE POINTS?

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: OF COURSE, THERE IS. I MEAN, THERE ARE CONFLICTS AT ALL TIMES AND MANY, MANY DIFFERENT KINDS OF POLICIES. IT'S NO MYSTERY. THERE IS NOT A SINGLE POLICY THAT GOVERNS WHAT WE ARE DOING BUT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF THINGS WE'RE ATTEMPTING TO DO.

I MEAN, ONE CAN IN THE WORDS OF A FAMOUS AMERICAN PRESIDENT WALK AND CHEW GUM AT THE SAME TIME. WE WOULD LIKE TO ATTEMPT TO PURSUE AGGRESSIVE OPEN TRADE POLICIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES. I'LL GIVE YOU ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF WHERE THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM COMES IN.

WE HAVE HAD A VERY STRONG POLICY FOCUSED ON BURMA WHICH -- AT THE CORE OF THAT HAS BEEN HUMAN RIGHTS. WE ARE NOW INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT COMING OUT OF BURMA IS A VAST AMOUNT OF HEROIN. THERE IS A NEW HEROIN EPIDEMIC BEGINNING TO SHOW IN THE UNITED STATES, AND MUCH OF THAT HEROIN COMES FROM BURMA. ABOUT 60 PERCENT OF IT, WE THINK, COMES FROM BURMA, AND WE ARE RIGHT NOW TRYING TO CALIBRATE A POLICY WHICH WILL NOT ONLY MAINTAIN OUR PRESSURE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS BUT ALSO OPEN UP THE EFFORTS THAT WE MUST MAKE, COOPERATING WITH THE CHINESE AND WITH THE THAIS AND WITH THE AUTHORITIES IN TAIWAN AND OTHERS, ON THIS INCREASING PROBLEM THERE.

THAT'S ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE A SET OF POLICIES THAT ARE INTERRELATED AND HAVE TO BE WE HAVE TO PURSUE A NUMBER OF GOALS AT THE SAME TIME.

Q (INAUDIBLE).

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: I'D ADD TO THAT. IT'S A VERY IMPORTANT QUESTION IF YOU ALLOW ME JUST TO PUT A COUPLE WORDS IN HERE. I THINK THE ISSUE OF TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IS VASTLY OVERBLOWN, IN TERMS OF AN

APPARENT CONFLICT. AS WE SAID IN THE OVERVIEW TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, THERE ARE A WIDE VARIETY OF INSTRUMENTS, BOTH CARROTS AND STICKS, THAT CAN BE AND SHOULD BE USED AND ARE BEING USED BY THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO EFFORTS TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS.

ONE IMPORTANT CARROT IS TRADE. ON THE OTHER HAND

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

IF YOU USE IT AS A STICK THAT IS MUCH TOO BIG, IT MAY NOT HAVE THE EFFECT THAT YOU'RE SEEKING TO HAVE. I THINK IF YOU LOOK AT THE WAY IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS PURSUING ITS HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY OBJECTIVES AROUND THE WORLD, YOU'LL SEE A WIDE VARIETY OF TOOLS THAT ARE BEING USED, AND THE DELINKAGE OF MFN AS ONE INSTRUMENT IN CHINA FROM HUMAN RIGHTS IS BY NO MEANS A SIGNAL THAT TRADE IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE VEHICLE UNDER SOME OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING IN CHINA ITSELF WHERE YOU'RE GOING TO USE LESSER KINDS OF TOOLS.

WITH RESPECT TO BURMA, I STILL WANT TO MAKE VERY CLEAR THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT SHOWS TWO VERY DISTURBING DEVELOPMENTS IN RECENT DAYS. ONE IS THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI FOR THE SECOND TIME. THE MILITARY REGIME IN BURMA HAS DECIDED NOT TO RELEASE THE PRINCIPAL FIGURE OF DEMOCRACY IN THAT COUNTRY; AND, SECOND, AN INVASION BY THE MILITARY OF BURMA OF REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE NORTHERN AREA.

THE UNITED STATES HAS SAID THAT IT WANTS VERY MUCH TO IMPROVE ITS OVERALL COOPERATION AND RELATIONSHIP WITH BURMA, BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WILL ONLY CONTINUE TO BE VERY ISOLATIONIST IN ITS VIEW TO THE EXTENT THAT BURMA DOES NOT

SEEK TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN THAT COUNTRY.

UNCLASSIFIED

Q (INAUDIBLE) THE ISSUE OF GENOCIDE. IT IS A TERM THAT'S USED BOTH FOR RWANDA AND BOSNIA IN THIS REPORT. THERE ARE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS TO USING THAT TERM UNDER THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION, BECAUSE IT DOES REQUIRE THAT ONCE YOU ESTABLISH THAT THAT WAS THE CASE, THAT THE GOVERNMENTS MUST TO DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO PREVENT IT OR TO STOP IT.

WOULD YOU SAY - HAS THE UNITED STATES FULFILLED THE MANDATE UNDER THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION TO STOP THESE GENOCIDES AS THEY WERE OCCURRING? AND. IF NOT, WHY NOT?

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: I THINK THE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO ESTABLISH THE FIRST INTERNATIONA MECHANISM OF JUSTICE TO ADDRESS WAR CRIMES -- CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND GENOCIDE IN THOSE TWO COUNTRIES --

IS A MAJOR COMMITMENT WITH RESPECT TO ALL OF OUR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, NOT JUST THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES, TO ADDRESS GENOCIDE WHEN IT OCCURS.

OBVIOUSLY, THERE ARE MANY OTHER WAYS IN WHICH WE NEED TO ADDRESS IT, INCLUDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WHERE ENORMOUS AMOUNTS OF ASSISTANCE HAVE GONE TO THE VICTIMS OF THESE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN BOTH BOSNIA AND IN RWANDA. THE UNITED STATES IS THE LEADING COUNTRY IN COMMITTING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THOSE EFFORTS.

Q NEITHER ACTION WOULD STOP THE GENOCIDE; CERTAINLY, HUMANITARIAN AID AND A TRIBUNAL WHICH IS

GOING TO TRY PEOPLE WHEN ACTS ARE STILL BEING

COMMITTED. I MEAN, HAS THE UNITED STATES FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION TO STOP THE GENOCIDES NOW THAT YOU'VE DETERMINED THESE WERE GENOCIDES?

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: AS I SAY, ALL COUNTRIES, I THINK IN THIS CASE LED IN MANY RESPECTS BY THE UNITED STATES, ARE MOBILIZING TO ADDRESS THE TERRIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, SOME OF WHICH AMOUNTED TO GENOCIDE IN THESE COUNTRIES; AND ALSO THE SERIOUS EFFORTS THAT ARE BEING PUT INTO THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS BEFORE THEY REACH THIS TERRIBLE STAGE, PARTICULARLY THROUGH THE OSCE, THE DEEP INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES THROUGHOUT THE BALKAN REGION THE WORK THAT'S BEEN DONE IN MACEDONIA AND ALBANIA WHICH I MENTIONED IN MY OPENING STATEMENTS -- THESE ARE SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENTS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS MAKING TO ADDRESS THIS CRISIS.

Q IN WHAT CONTEXT OF THIS YEAR'S INDONESIA REPORT - IT SEEMS TO BE WORSE THAN IN FACT LAST YEAR. YOU SAY HERE THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO COMMIT SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND NOW WITH ANOTHER ELEMENT WHICH IS A CLAMP

PAGE 13

DOWN ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. THE ONLY REAL POSITIVE ASPECT THAT I CAN DETECT HERE ON THIS REPORT ON INDONESIA IS ACTUALLY THEIR ACTION FOR FREE-MARKET INITIATIVES WHICH THEY PURSUE WITH EXTREME VIGOR.

PAGE 26 STATE 026906 080633Z
ON EAST TIMOR, YOU SAY YOU HAVE -- NO PROGRESS WAS MADE IN ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING PEOPLE SINCE 1991 -- KILLED IN A MASSACRE IN 1991. THE QUESTION IS THE SAME

THAT EVERYBODY HAS BEEN MAKING HERE HOW CAN YOU COINCIDE A POLICY WITH THESE PEOPLE? AND I HAVE ONE OBSERVATION: IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHENEVER THERE ARE INDONESIAN RULERS PRESENT HERE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT OR ELSEWHERE, THEY DO APPEAR PROJECTED AS PARTNERS IN FINDING A SOLUTION FOR THE SITUATION THERE, MORE THAN

ACTUALLY CULPRITS FOR WHAT IS GOING ON THERE WHILE YOU IDENTIFY THEM HERE VERY CLEARLY AS CULPRITS.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: I THINK THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA, AS IT IS IN SOME OTHER COUNTRIES THAT ARE HIGHLY AUTHORITARIAN AND WHERE THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, WE TELL THE STORY HONESTLY, CANDIDLY. IT IS THE PURPOSE OF THESE REPORTS TO SHOW THAT THERE ARE LONG-TERM CHALLENGES THAT WE AND THE REST OF THE WORLD AND THE GOVERNMENTS IN QUESTION ALL FACE IN ADDRESSING THESE QUESTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE.

WITH RESPECT TO INDONESIA SPECIFICALLY, WE HAVE ENGAGED WITH THEM AT THE LEVEL OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY ON MANY OF THESE QUESTIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE FORCES THAT ARE BEING UNLEASHED ARE IN FACT OVER TIME GOING TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE CLIMATE OF OFENNESS AND THE PROSPECT OF CHANGE AND MORE FREEDOM.

THERE ALSO ARE, I THINK, IN INDONESIA SOME ASPECTS OF OPENNESS. THE OPERATIONS OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL

ORGANIZATIONS, OF COURSE, ARE VERY IMPORTANT IN THAT COUNTRY. BUT THESE ARE NOT PROBLEMS THAT GET RESOLVED OVER TIME.

Q YOU'RE SAYING THE REPORTS ARE BEING --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: THERE ARE POTENTIAL EFFORTS TO RESTRICT THOSE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND, OF COURSE, WE'VE MADE VERY CLEAR THAT THAT'S WRONG AND INAPPROPRIATE.

Q CAN I JUST HAVE A QUICK FOLLOW-UP?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: I THINK I'VE GIVEN YOU TWO, SO LET ME GO TO SOMEBODY ELSE.

Q HOW FAR IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: I'M SORRY. I WANT TO GET SOMEONE WHO HASN'T HAD A QUESTION YET. EXCUSE ME.

Q WOULD IT BE PROPER TO HEAR FROM MS. HILLMAN ON ONE QUESTION? COULD WE?

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: SHE'S RELATIVELY NEW TO THE BUSINESS, BUT GIVE IT A SHOT.

MS. HILLMAN: DON'T GO TOO FAST.

Q COULD YOU JUST GIVE US YOUR ASSESSMENT OF HOW THE CONDITION OF WOMEN IN THE WORLD -- THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITION OF WOMEN IN THE WORLD FARED IN '94? DID IT IMPROVE? DID IT DETERIORATE? AND WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE BIGGEST CHALLENGE FOR '95 AND WHAT IMPACT CAN U.S. POLICY HAVE ON THAT?

MS. HILLMAN: THREE QUESTIONS? (LAUGHTER) I THINK IT WOULD BE FAIR TO SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN IMPROVEMENT IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN THE FACT THAT THE ISSUES ARE NOW BEING DISCUSSED AND HIGHLIGHTED, NOT ONLY IN CONVERSATIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS HAVING WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, BUT IN THOSE COUNTRIES THEMSELVES.

AS YOU MAY BE AWARE, WE ARE PREPARING FOR THE FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, AND AS THE REGIONAL MEETINGS HAVE BEEN HELD AROUND THE WORLD, A NUMBER OF THESE ISSUES HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED AND WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT PLATFORM FOR ACTION.

THEN FOLLOWING THE CONFERENCE, IT WILL BE THE WORK AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE WOMEN AROUND THE WORLD TO GET THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES WHETHER YOU'RE TALKING ISSUES OF VIOLENCE -- DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM WITH RESPECT TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN OR ECONOMIC ISSUES IN PARLIAMENT THAT WOMEN MIGHT USE THEIR MICRO-ENTERFRISE SKILLS TO HELP THE ECONOMY OF THEIR COUNTRIES. THERE ARE A NUMBER

OF ISSUES THAT WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THAT PLATFORM.

IN ADDITION, THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE

DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES AT THE CONFERENCE THAT WAS HELD IN CAIRO ON POPULATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND THE ENTHUSIASM AND WHAT WOMEN HAVE FELT THE PROGRESS THAT THEY'RE MAKING IN GETTING THEIR COUNTRIES TO DEAL WITH THEIR EFFORTS, AND THE CHALLENGE WE HAVE HERE IN THE UNITED STATES, OF COURSE, IS TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THOSE ISSUES ARE INCORPORATED INTO OVERALL DISCUSSION

ABOUT WOMEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND U S. FOREIGN POLICY.

Q JOHN, WHILE THERE'S NO SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE LINK ANYMORE TO TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, THERE'S

BEEN A LOT OF TALK ON CAPITOL HILL ABOUT LINKING FOREIGN AID TO RUSSIA TO IS PERFORMANCE IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY.

WHAT KIND OF IMPLICATIONS DOES YOUR REPORT PARTICULARLY THE SECTION ON THE INVASION OF CHECHNYA HAVE FOR FOREIGN AID TO RUSSIA? IS IT A WARNING SIGNAL?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: LEE, WE'VE SAID THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE IN RUSSIA HAS BEEN UNEVEN. OBVIOUSLY, AS I'VE SAID BEFORE, THE MASSIVE IMPACT OF THE CHECHNYA INVASION OR CHECHNYA EFFORT HAS HAD ON CIVILIANS IS THE MOST SEVERE PROBLEM, BUT THERE ARE OTHERS AS WELL.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS AN EXTRAORDINARY AMOUNT OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND GENERAL FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

WHICH I THINK HAS PERSISTED AND CONTINUED THROUGHOUT SOME VERY GREAT STRAINS IN RUSSIA.

THERE ARE PROBLEMS, TO BE SURE, IN THE DETENTION AND ARREST -- ARBITRARY ARREST IN SOME INSTANCES BUT THEY DON'T SEEM TO BE CENTRALLY DIRECTED. THERE ARE MANY CHALLENGES IN RUSSIA, AND THE BIGGEST CHALLENGE OF ALL OF COURSE, IS THE CONTINUED PROGRESS OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

BUT IT IS PROGRESS THAT AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF AN ENORMOUSLY REPRESSIVE AND TOTALITARIAN SOCIETY IS REAL, EVEN WITH SIGNIFICANT SETBACKS, AND IT'S FOR THAT REASON THAT WE HAVE CHARACTERIZED THE PERFORMANCE OVER THE COURSE OF THIS YEAR AS UNEVEN.

Q YEAR AFTER YEAR THE STATE DEPARTMENT COMES OUT WITH A PRETTY DAMNING REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN INDIA AND AT THE SAME TIME RECOGNIZES THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, ETC. IS THERE A POLICY AT ALL ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN INDIA? DOES THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE ANY KIND OF A PROPER POLICY ON IT? RECENTLY, AMNESTY JUST A FEW DAYS AGO RELEASED A REPORT WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAS VIRTUALLY DENIED A LOT OF IT.

SO WHAT IS THE POLICY? COULD YOU EXPLAIN IT?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: THE UNITED STATES HAS RAISED HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN INDIA VERY RECENTLY, AND I THINK A VERY IMPORTANT POINT TO BE MADE ABOUT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN OUR ECONOMIC AND OUR HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

IN SOME OF THE VERY STRONG STATEMENTS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, THAT WERE MADE BY SECRETARY BROWN IN HIS MOST RECENT VISIT TO INDIA; AND THE UNITED STATES I THINK HAS FOUND A WIDE VARIETY OF WAYS OF RAISING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN INDIA WITH RESPECT TO NOT ONLY THE DIRECT

INVOLVEMENT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT BUT OTHER AGENCIES AS WELL.

INDIA IS A VERY LARGE DEMOCRACY AND A VERY IMPORTANT DEMOCRACY, AND OF COURSE WE ARE DEEPLY COMMITTED TO THE

PAGE 16

PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE GROWTH OF MARKET ECONOMIES. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A WAY OF INVOLVING THOSE TWO INSTRUMENTS IN THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND IT IS IN THAT CONTEXT THAT MANY OF THESE ISSUES HAVE BEEN RAISED IN INDIA. BUT WE DO NOT SHY AWAY FROM POINTING OUT ALL OF THE PROBLEMS, AS WE HAVE IN THE REPORT THIS YEAR.

Q SIR, WHEN LOOKING FOR THE -- YOUR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, I MEAN THE TURKISH PART, AND WE REALIZE THAT THE U.S. IS FAIR, GIVING MORE PAGES THAN COMMUNIST CHINA AND SOME TOTALITARIAN REGIMES. IRAQ, IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA. EVEN THE BOSNIAN SERBS DESERVED LESS PAGES THAN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. AND WE REALIZE THAT EVEN TURKEY HAS MILITARY RULE, YOUR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT IS ALMOST 10 OR 11 PAGES.

NOW, IT BECAME A MORE OPEN AND MORE DEMOCRATIC

PAGE 32 STATE 026906 080633Z

SOCIETY, AND 39 PAGES. WHAT IS YOUR CRITERIA FOR PREPARING THIS REPORT?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST YEAR, WE HAVE SEEN A WORSENING SIGNIFICANTLY OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN TURKEY AND THAT INDEED IS THE REASON WHY THE REPORT CARRIES THAT INFORMATION. THESE REPORTS CARRY, I THINK, BROAD INTEGRITY AND HONESTY, AND THEY APPEAR REGULARLY THROUGH MANY YEARS. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN TURKEY WAS COVERED VERY

EXTENSIVELY FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WERE SOME SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THAT RESPECT. I'D BE HAPPY TO TALK TO YOU FURTHER ABOUT THEM, BUT I HAVE A FEELING --

Q WHEN YOU COMPARE THESE, EVEN TURKEY IS WORSE THAN THE SERBIAN -- THE SERBS OR IRANIAN OR IRAQI -- SADDAM --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: THESE ARE NOT COMPARATIVE EFFORTS, NOR HAS ANY STATEMENT BEEN MADE THAT THEY ARE TO BE COMPARED WITH THOSE OTHER REGIMES. I THINK THE SITUATION IN TURKEY HAS INVOLVED THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE, A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF TORTURE, ALSO A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TERRORIST USE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS. AND OF COURSE, WE COVER NOT ONLY -- AS UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH POINTED OUT -- NOT ONLY INCURSIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS CARRIED OUT BY GOVERNMENTS BUT BY OTHERS AS WELL; RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, THE PROSECUTION OF PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR FREE EXPRESSION. THESE ARE ALL ISSUES THAT ARE PROPERLY

CONTAINED.

WE ARE VERY STRONG ALLIES OF TURKEY AND SEE TURKEY AS A VERY SIGNIFICANT AND CRUCIAL DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IT'S FOR THAT REASON THAT WE'RE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THESE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

MS. SHELLY: LAST QUESTION.

PAGE 17

Q SIR, YOU HAVE BEEN TALKING WITH THE CHINESE ON HUMAN RIGHTS. JUDGING FROM YOUR MEETINGS WITH THEM, HAVE THEY BECOME MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO YOUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS, OR DO THEY STILL REJECT THEM AS INTERFERENCE IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: THERE ARE MANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, NEEDLESS TO SAY. AND YET OVER THE COURSE OF SEVEN DIALOGUES IN 15, 16 MONTHS -- WHICH IS PERHAPS THE MOST INTENSIVE AMOUNT OF DISCUSSION THAT'S BEEN TAKING PLACE ANYWHERE -- I THINK THERE HAVE BEEN DEEPER

DISCUSSIONS AND MORE EFFORT TO ADDRESS LONGER-TERM SYSTEMIC ISSUES, INCLUDING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE THAT WERE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN THE LAST MEETINGS THAT I HAD THERE.

Q THANK YOU.

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: THANKS VERY MUCH.

(UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK CONCLUDED THEIR BRIEFING AT 1:26 P.M., AFTER WHICH MS. SHELLY IMMEDIATELY BEGAN HER BRIEFING.)

MS. SHELLY: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. I'D LIKE TO BEGIN THE NEXT PART OF THE BRIEFING WITH A STATEMENT WHICH I'M MAKING ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WHICH RELATES TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT MADE EARLIER TODAY ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND THE CAIRO SUMMIT.

THE UNITED STATES APPLAUDS AND ENDORSES PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S BOLD INITIATIVE TO HOLD A SUMMIT MEETING IN CAIRO TOMORROW, FEBRUARY 2. THIS MEETING IS NOT ONLY AN HISTORIC AND UNPRECEDENTED EVENT; IT IS A DRAMATIC DEMONSTRATION OF THE COMMITMENT BY PRESIDENT MUBARAK PRIME MINISTER RABIN, KING HUSSEIN AND PLO CHAIRMAN ARAFAT TO DO ALL THEY CAN TO PROMOTE COOPERATION AND TO BUILD PEACE.

THESE ARE THE LEADERS WHO HAVE THROUGH THEIR COURAGE AND LEADERSHIP, SOUGHT TO PUT CONFLICT BEHIND THEM AND BUILD A MORE HOPEFUL FUTURE. AS SUCH, THIS SUMMIT IS A POWERFUL STATEMENT: THE ENEMIES OF PEACE MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO KILL THE PEACE

OVER THE PAST WEEK, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH EGYPT AND WITH THE PARTIES WHICH WILL GATHER IN CAIRO TOMORROW. THE FOCUS OF THIS COLLECTIVE EFFORT HAS BEEN TO FIND A WAY TO COUNTER THE TERROR AND EXTREMISM OF RECENT WEEKS AND TO ENERGIZE THE

NEGOTIATIONS.

PAGE 18

IN THIS REGARD, THE MEETING TOMORROW CONSTITUTES ONLY THE FIRST STEP IN THIS EFFORT. IN THE PERIOD AHEAD, THE UNITED STATES WILL BE CONSULTING AND WORKING CLOSELY WITH ALL OF THE PARTIES TO DETERMINE HOW BEST TO MOVE FORWARD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO COUNTER THE EFFORTS OF THOSE OPPOSED TO PEACE.

I'LL BE HAPPY TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q CHRISTINE, ON THAT -- YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT THERE, THERE'S ONE PARTY THAT'S NOT GOING TO CAIRO AND THAT'S THE PRESIDENT OF SYRIA, WHO HARBORS -- APPEARS TO HARBOR TERRORISTS IN HIS OWN NATION.

TWO QUESTIONS. (A) SHOULD HE GO TO THIS? AND (B) IS HE AN ENEMY OF PEACE?

MS. SHELLY: SID, AS TO THE FIRST PART OF YOUR QUESTION ABOUT SHOULD HE GO, THIS IS AN INITIATIVE, AS YOU KNOW, OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK. HE EXTENDED THE INVITATIONS, AND I THINK THAT THAT'S A QUESTION APPROPRIATELY DIRECTED TO HIM.

ON SYRIA, WE STILL BELIEVE THAT THEY'RE COMMITTED TO THE PEACE PROCESS, BUT IT'S, I THINK, UP TO SYRIA TO MAKE PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT ITS INTENTIONS AT THIS POINT.

Q CHRISTINE, IS THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR COMING BACK TO WASHINGTON? IS THERE ANY PROSPECT FOR DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA TO RESUME?

MS. SHELLY: HE HAS NOT RETURNED TO WASHINGTON TO MY KNOWLEDGE, AND I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS CERTAINLY THE POSSIBILITY THAT DISCUSSIONS WILL RESUME IN PERHAPS A VARIETY OF DIFFERENT WAYS. I DON'T HAVE ANY ANNOUNCEMENTS TO SIGNAL ON THIS AT THIS POINT.

BUT AS THE SECRETARY ALSO SAID, I THINK LAST WEEK IN TESTIMONY, THAT IN ORDER TO HAVE PROGRESS ON THIS TRACK WE, OF COURSE, NEED TO ACCELERATE THE EFFORTS.

BETSY.

Q WILL THE U.S. BE TALKING WITH THE PARTIES FROM HERE, OR WILL DENNIS (ROSS) TRAVEL TO THE REGION?

MS. SHELLY: WE WILL NOT BE PARTICIPATING IN THIS SUMMIT, ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY, AS I MENTIONED ALREADY, WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PARTIES IN ADVANCE OF THIS INITIATIVE.

WE SHARE THE DESIRE OF THE PARTICIPATING PARTIES TO HAVE THE SUMMIT TAKE PLACE AT THIS TIME AND AT THIS LEVEL.

PAGE 19

Q (INAUDIBLE) FOLLOW-UP ON DISCUSSIONS LEADING

PAGE 37 STATE 026906 080633Z

FROM THIS MEETING?

MS. SHELLY: YES, WE EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE A FOLLOW-UP TO THIS, BUT I DON'T HAVE SPECIFIC DETAILS ON THIS AT THIS POINT.

Q CHRISTINE, JUST TO FOLLOW UP ON THAT AND TO MAKE SURE I UNDERSTAND, THERE'S NO ONE FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WHO WILL BE REPRESENTED AT THESE TALKS

IN ANY CAPACITY, EVEN --

MS. SHELLY: I SAID THE UNITED STATES IS NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE SUMMIT.

Q -- EVEN SITTING THERE WATCHING, EVEN OBSERVING?

MS. SHELLY: THE UNITED STATES IS NOT A PARTICIPANT.

Q WELL, IS THERE DIPLOMATICALLY A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE WORD "OBSERVE" AND "PARTICIPATE"?

MS. SHELLY: NO, I DON'T THINK SO. WE ARE NOT PARTICIPATING IN THIS EVENT.

Q CHRISTINE, WHAT DO YOU HOPE WILL COME OUT OF THIS SUMMIT? WHAT DOES THE UNITED STATES HOPE THIS SUMMIT WILL REACH? IS IT MORE SYMBOLIC, OR DO YOU HOPE THAT ANY SORT OF AGREEMENT WILL COME OUT OF IT?

MS. SHELLY: AGAIN, IT'S JUST TOO EARLY FOR ME TO ANSWER THAT. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS ONLY MADE TODAY AS

I'VE MENTIONED. WE HAD BEEN IN VERY CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES AND WE EXPECT TO REMAIN SO. WE DO EXPECT THAT SOME THINGS WILL BE COMING OUT OF THIS, BUT THE MEETING WILL BE TAKING PLACE TOMORROW. I THINK IT'S UP TO THE PARTICIPANTS IF THEY WISH TO GET OUT AND PUBLICLY DISCUSS THEIR EXPECTATIONS OR THEIR AGENDAS FOR THIS CONFERENCE.

I THINK THE FACT THAT THEY DECIDED THEY WANTED TO DO THIS, THEY AGREED TO MEET AND THEY'RE GOING AHEAD WITH IT, I THINK THAT CERTAINLY SENDS A VERY STRONG SIGNAL IN AND OF ITSELF. BUT I THINK WE'D LEAVE IT TO THOSE WHO ARE PARTICIPATING DIRECTLY IN IT TO SIGNAL OR TO DISCUSS, IF THEY CHOOSE, WHAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE COME OUT OF IT.

Q CHRISTINE, MUBARAK WAS HOSTING LEADERS -- RABIN, ARAFAT, AND HUSSEIN -- BEFORE. WHAT IS THE

REASON THAT THE SECRETARY IS PRAISING THIS HISTORIC EVENT? IS THIS THE ANSWER TO THE ALEXANDRIA SUMMIT BEFORE? IS THERE A SPECIAL, SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE TO THIS GATHERING THAT WAS NOT THERE IN THE PAST?

PAGE 20

MS. SHELLY: NO, I DON'T SEE ANY SPECIFIC LINKAGE BETWEEN THE ALEXANDRIA MEETING TO WHICH YOU REFERRED AND THIS ONE. I THINK, AGAIN, WE ANSWERED YOUR QUESTION VERY DIRECTLY.

THOSE WHO HAVE DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 39 STATE 026906 080633Z
MEETING TOMORROW HAVE SIGNAED THEIR DESIRE TO DO SO AND SPECIFICALLY TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES BEFORE THEM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ACTIONS, THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS OCCURRED, AND GIVING THEIR VERY STRONG SIGNAL THAT THEY WANT THE PROCESS TO GO FORWARD AND THAT THE ENEMIES OF PEACE WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO SUCCEED.

Q LAST WEEK A BILL WAS SUBMITTED TO THE GREEK PARLIAMENT TO INCREASE GREEK TERRITORIAL WATERS TO 12 MILES. HOW DOES THE ADMINISTRATION VIEW THIS DEVELOPMENT?

MS. SHELLY: I'M NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS OF THE BILL. I'LL HAVE TO CHECK ON THAT.

BETSY.

Q TODAY THE UNITED STATES DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IS BEGINNING THE TRANSFER OF CUBANS FROM PANAMA BACK TO GUANTANAMO. WHAT IS OUR CONTINUING POLICY TOWARDS THESE PEOPLE? ARE WE CONSIDERING ALLOWING MORE OF THEM IN UNDER THE NEW VISA REQUIREMENTS THAT YOU ALL HAVE INSTITUTED TOWARDS CUBA? HOW LONG CAN THEY SIT THERE?

MS. SHELLY: THERE ISN'T A TIME LIMIT ON THAT. THE U.S. POLICY ON THIS REMAINS UNCHANGED. CUBANS UNDER U.S. GOVERNMENT SAFEHAVEN PROTECTION WILL NOT BE

PROCESSED FOR ADMISSION TO THE U.S. THEY MAY REMAIN IN SAFEHAVEN INDEFINITELY OR, IF THEY'RE ELIGIBLE, THEY CAN BE RESETTLED IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 40 STATE 026906 080633Z
THEY MIGHT ALSO, AS YOU KNOW. WISH TO RETURN HOME VOLUNTARILY. THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS TO THIS POLICY ARE THOSE WHICH WE PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED ON OCTOBER 14 AND ON DECEMBER 2, AND THOSE AFFECT CATEGORIES -- THE VERY OLD, THE CHRONICALLY SICK, CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES FOR WHOM A PROLONGED STAY IN SAFEHAVEN CONSTITUTES AN EXTREME HUMANITARIAN BURDEN. NO ONE WILL BE COMPELLED TO RETURN HOME AGAINST HIS OR HER WILL.

Q HAVE MORE CUBANS BEEN RETURNED HOME? AND ARE THE CUBANS ACCEPTING MORE READILY AFTER THE RECENT TALKS IN NEW YORK?

MS. SHELLY: IT'S MY IMPRESSION THAT THE FLOW HAS BEEN RELATIVELY STEADY ON THAT. I DON'T THINK I'VE GOT THE NUMBERS. LET ME GET THAT FOR YOU AFTER THE BRIEFING. I

PAGE 21

DON'T THINK I HAVE AN UPDATE ON THAT AT THE MOMENT ON HOW MANY HAVE GONE BACK.

IT'S MY IMPRESSION THAT MOST OF THOSE WHO HAVE ASKED TO GO BACK HAVE GONE OR ARE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEM TO GO BACK. THE SLOW PACE -- IN THE BEGINNING, ESPECIALLY -- WAS SOMETHING THAT WE HAD PREVIOUSLY NOTED, AND THAT WAS SOMETHING THAT WAS DISCUSSED IN THE LAST ROUND OF TALKS THAT WE HAD ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MIGRATION AGREEMENT. BUT I'LL SEE IF I CAN GET THE NUMBERS FOR YOU ON THAT A LITTLE BIT

UNCLASSIFIED

LATER.

Q CHRISTINE, WHAT'S THE U.S. REACTION TO JUPPE'S PROPOSAL FOR A LAST-CHANCE, LAST-GASP INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BOSNIA?

MS. SHELLY: WE'RE STUDYING THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THIS WAS ONE OF A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE WAYS AHEAD WHICH THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER TOUCHED ON IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY WHEN HE WAS HERE A FEW DAYS AGO IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR EXCHANGES ON BOSNIA.

I DON'T HAVE A FORMAL REACTION AT THIS POINT. BUT I THINK, CLEARLY AS A KIND OF FIRST REACTION, ANY CONFERENCE OF THIS TYPE WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE TO BE VERY

WELL PREPARED. WE WOULD WANT TO KNOW HOW IT WOULD RELATE TO THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN. IT DOES REMAIN OUR VIEW THAT THE CONTACT GROUP MAP SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE PARTIES AS A STARTING POINT FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.

I THINK YOU'RE SEEING INDICATIONS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, IN THE MEDIA, THAT A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT IDEAS ARE BEING BANDIED ABOUT. THERE IS CERTAINLY A VERY CLEAR CONSENSUS THAT SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE DONE TO GET THE PROCESS MOVING FORWARD, AND THIS -- I THINK THAT HIS IDEAS ON THIS ABOUT HAVING A CONFERENCE, THAT'S ONE OF THE POSSIBILITIES THAT HAS COME UP, AND WE CERTAINLY WILL BE TRYING TO GET MORE DETAILS ON HIS THINKING ON THIS.

Q HAS THE UNITED STATES PUT FORWARD ANY PROPOSALS?

MS. SHELLY: AS YOU KNOW, THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT

GROUP, INCLUDING OUR OWN REPRESENTATIVE CHARLIE THOMAS, HAVE ALL GONE BACK TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS FOR CONSULTATIONS. WE HAVE BEEN MEETING WITH HIM AND TALKING ABOUT THE WAY AHEAD, AND ALSO CERTAINLY TOSSING AROUND SOME OF OUR OWN IDEAS ON THIS. BUT I DON'T HAVE ANY ANNOUNCEMENTS ON THIS AT THIS POINT.

Q AND SO FAR YOU HAVE NOT PUT FORWARD ANY SORT OF IDEAS TO THE OTHER CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS?

PAGE 22

MS. SHELLY: WE ARE REMAINING CERTAINLY IN VERY CLOSE CONTACT WITH THEM ON BOSNIA CERTAINLY WATCHING THE SITUATION OVERALL ON THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA -- POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVING THAT FORWARD. OBVIOUSLY ALSO WE'RE PAYING A LOT OF ATTENTION TO THE SITUATION IN CROATIA.

WE DON'T HAVE ANY HIGH-LEVEL GROUP MEETINGS OF THE CONTACT GROUP SCHEDULED FOR THIS POINT BUT WE COMMUNICATE WITH THEM FROM OUR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. WE WILL CERTAINLY REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH ON ALL OF THE ISSUES WHICH ARE UNDER STUDY, BUT I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING MORE FORMAL THAN THAT AT THIS POINT.

Q CHRISTINE, CAROL ASKED YOU IF THE UNITED STATES

HAD ANY NEW IDEAS. DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE ANY NEW IDEAS?

MS. SHELLY: SID, THE EFFORT TO CLARIFY IT OR CHARACTERIZE IT AS AN "IDEA"; THIS IS A VERY COMPLEX ISSUE. THERE ARE A LOT OF DIFFERENT POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THIS. CERTAINLY A LOT OF THOSE APPROACHES HAVE BEEN EXPLORED OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS AS THIS CONFLICT HAS FACED US. WE ALWAYS HAVE IDEAS. WE HAVE DIFFERENT WAYS THAT WE LOOK AT, WE EXAMINE WE DO INTERNAL VETTING AND DISCUSSION BEFORE WE PUT THEM ON THE TABLE WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THIS PROCESS.

BUT I'M CERTAINLY NOT GOING TO STAND UP HERE AND TELL YOU THAT WE HAVE NO MORE IDEAS.

Q MR. SILAJDZIC THE OTHER DAY RAISED AN IDEA WHICH WAS TO SET A DEADLINE. DO YOU HAVE SOME RESPONSE TO THAT? AND ALSO, JUST A READOUT OF HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY?

MS. SHELLY: WE'VE ALREADY ANSWERED THE DEADLINE QUESTION.

Q DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE -- I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOUR RESPONSE WAS ON THAT.

MS. SHELLY: THE ANSWER TO THE DEADLINE QUESTION IS THAT WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL AT THIS POINT TO SET A DEADLINE.

PAGE 44 STATE 026906 080633Z
Q NOT USEFUL. DO YOU HAVE ANY MORE COMMENT THEN ON HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE?

MS. SHELLY: NO, I DO NOT.

Q BECAUSE THERE WAS NO READOUT WHATSOEVER. IT IMPLIES THAT THEY HAD -- THEY DID NOT HAVE MANY POINTS OF AGREEMENT.

PAGE 23

MS. SHELLY: I BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS A READOUT ON THAT. I THINK WE --

Q HOLD IT. TWO DAYS RUNNING AND I DIDN'T GET IT.

MS. SHELLY: WE DID PUT SOMETHING UP ON A READOUT ON THAT. I'M NOT SURE I STILL HAVE THAT WITH ME.

THERE IS A READOUT ON THIS; I THINK WE DID IT AS A TAKEN QUESTION, BUT I DON'T HAVE THAT WITH ME. YOU CAN CHECK WITH THE PRESS OFFICE ON THAT.

Q YESTERDAY ON THE HILL MR. SILAJDZIC MENTIONED THAT ARMS WERE CONTINUING TO FLOW FROM SERBIA INTO BOSNIA AND HE GAVE THEIR OWN INTELLIGENCE FIGURES, WHICH INCLUDED TANKS THAT WERE REPAIRED, NEW EQUIPMENT, AND MANPOWER. THE FIGURES WERE CITED IN HIS TESTIMONY TO THE HILL. CAN YOU TAKE THIS AS A QUESTION TO SEE WHETHER THERE'S ANYTHING TO BEAR OUT WHAT HE SAID?

MS. SHELLY: I'M NOT GOING TO TAKE THAT AS A QUESTION. THAT'S HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT WE WOULD GET INTO A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THAT GENERAL SUBJECT MATTER BECAUSE MOST OF THE INFORMATION WE WOULD HAVE WOULD COME FROM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, AND WE WOULD THEREFORE NOT COMMENT ON IT.

Q BUT THIS GOES RIGHT TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE SANCTIONS ARE BEING OBSERVED. I MEAN -, AND HE'S ALLEGING SPECIFIC VIOLATIONS AND HE'S GIVING SPECIFIC FIGURES. IT'S NOT SIMPLY A MATTER OF INTELLIGENCE; IT'S A MATTER OF WHETHER THE U.N RESOLUTIONS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT

MS. SHELLY: I DON'T HAVE THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT SO I'M NOT GOING TO COMMENT ON IT SPECIFICALLY.

Q WOULD YOU LIKE TO HAVE THE FIGURES?

MS. SHELLY: NO, NOT PARTICULARLY.

YES, BILL.

Q COULD I FOLLOW ON THAT? ON THAT GENERAL TOPIC OF WHERE DOES THE UNITED STATES STAND WITH REGARD TO EXTENDING THE CEASE-FIRE BEYOND -- NOT SETTING A DATE, AS YOU SAID, BUT EXTENDING THE CEASE-FIRE, MAINTAINING A STATUS QUO SITUATION? IS THAT SOMETHING THAT THIS GOVERNMENT WOULD FAVOR IN THAT BOSNIA SITUATION?

MS. SHELLY: NO. IN BOSNIA, IT IS CLEAR THAT OUR

POLICY ON THAT IS UNCHANGED. WE'D LIKE TO SEE A PERMANENT RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS, WE'D LIKE TO SEE NEGOTIATION,

WE'D LIKE TO SEE THE BOSNIAN SERBS ACCEPT THE CONTACT GROUP MAP AND PLAN.

Q IN LIEU OF THAT, WOULD IT NOT BE WELL TO CONTINUE A CEASE-FIRE AND A STATUS QUO?

MS. SHELLY: I THINK THAT THE CEASE-FIRE IS CONTINUING AT THIS POINT. THE FIGHTING PICTURE, IN FACT, IS PROBABLY OVERALL SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN IT HAS BEEN FOR SOME TIME. UNPROFOR REPORTS THAT EVEN IN THE BIHAC POCKET FIGHTING HAS EASED WITHIN THE LAST 24 HOURS.

ACROSS BOSNIA, I THINK OVERALL THE CEASE-FIRE APPEARS TO BE HOLDING. SO THERE IS NOT -- THE FIGHTING PICTURE IS CERTAINLY NOT A NEGATIVE ONE AT THIS PARTICULAR JUNCTURE AND IT CERTAINLY OVERALL IS DRAMATICALLY IMPROVED FROM WHAT IT WAS SIX MONTHS AGO, A YEAR AGO.

IT PERHAPS IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SOME PROGRESS TO BE MADE ON THE FOLITICAL TRACK. THAT IS CERTAINLY WHAT WE'D LIKE TO SEE HAPPEN. BUT AGAIN, IT IS A SITUATION THAT WE ARE STILL INTENSELY ENGAGED IN AND SIMPLY NOT IN A POSITION RIGHT NOW TO INDICATE I THINK, IN MORE

CONCRETE TERMS WHAT SOME OF OUR IDEAS ARE.

Q CHRISTINE, DO YOU HAVE ANY REACTION TO THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT REFUSING TO SEE THE GROUP ON THE CROATIAN SETTLEMENT -- AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH AND THE OTHERS?

MS. SHELLY: WE CERTAINLY WERE DISAPPOINTED BY THAT DECISION. WE THOUGHT THAT THE Z-4 PLAN REPRESENTED AN APPROACH VIS-A-VIS SOLVING THE PROBLEMS IN CROATIA THAT HAD VERY GOOD ELEMENTS IN IT AND THAT COULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AMONG THE VARIOUS PARTIES CONCERNED.

HE TURNED DOWN THE OFFER BY THE Z-4 TO GO AND EXPLAIN THEIR PROPOSAL. HE ARGUED THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN CROATIA WAS A MATTER FOR CROATIA AND FOR THE KRAJINA SERBS. OUR POSITION IS THAT IT'S NOT JUST THAT, THAT OBVIOUSLY WHERE MILOSEVIC STANDS IN THIS, I THINK, IS CERTAINLY A FACTOR THAT WOULD IMPACT ON THE ABILITY OF PLANS OF THAT KIND TO ACTUALLY BE STUDIED, NEGOTIATED, AND ULTIMATELY IMPLEMENTED.

WE BELIEVED IT WAS A VIABLE FRAMEWORK FOR BRINGING INCREASED STABILITY TO CROATIA, AND I THINK THAT WE WERE CERTAINLY DISAPPOINTED BY HIS DECISION NOT TO RECEIVE THE GROUP.

Q YESTERDAY U.S. AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY, MR. GROSSMAN, AT ONE PRESS CONFERENCE IN ANKARA HE SAID THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTS A PIPELINE FROM BAKU TO CEYHAN ON THE MEDITERRANEAN COAST. WE COULDN'T UNDERSTAND IT; WHICH

PAGE 25

PART IS THE PIPELINE PASSING THROUGH? EITHER ARMENIA OR GEORGIA? WHAT IS YOUR SUPPORT, WHICH COUNTRY --

MS. SHELLY: I HAVEN'T SEEN HIS REMARKS, AND I'M NOT GOING TO GET ENGAGED ON THAT AT ALL UNTIL I'VE HAD A

CHANCE TO SEE IT.

Q CAN YOU TAKE THIS QUESTION?

MS. SHELLY: I WILL LOOK AND SEE IF I CAN GET A TEXT OF HIS REMARKS, FIRST OF ALL, AND THEN I'LL SEE IF THERE'S SOMETHING WE'D WANT TO SAY.

Q THANK YOU.

Q JUST A SECOND. CHRISTINE, THIS IS A FOLLOW-UP FROM THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO TAKE THIS QUESTION.

MS. SHELLY: PROBABLY NOT, BECAUSE I'M NOT DOING THINGS RELATED TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT.

Q IT'S A GENERAL POLICY; THAT'S WHAT I CONSIDER IT.

MS. SHELLY: TRY ME, TRY ME.

Q THE 1988 POSITION -- POLICY POSITION -- ON EAST

TIMOR, IN WHICH YOU RECOGNIZED THE INCORPORATION IT'S A COMPLEX WORDING.

IN VIEW OF ALL THIS, COULD IT BE CHANGED OR REEVALUATED? THIS IS JUST A QUESTION.

MS. SHELLY: I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING WITH ME ON THIS. LET ME JUST LOOK INTO THIS AND SEE IF WE --

Q THE REEVALUATION OF THE L988 I THINK IT IS.

MS. SHELLY: LET ME JUST TAKE THE QUESTION.

Q THANKS VERY MUCH.

MS. SHELLY: THANKS.

END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>
PTQ0616

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0616

PAGE 01 STATE 026906 020620Z
ORIGIN PRS-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AF-01	AIT-03	ARA-01	AS-01	CG-00
	OASY-00	EAP-01	EUR-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-14	ADS-00
	MMP-00	M-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	OES-09	OIG-04	OIS-01
	PA-02	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00	SA-01	DRL-09	/067R

DRAFTED BY: PA/PRESS:SBROWN
APPROVED BY: PA/PRESS:DJOHNSON
S/S-O:BFREDEN
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
OP CENTER

----------A208A9 020631Z /21
O 020122Z FEB 95
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE 7925/43
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY ALMATY IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE IMMEDIATE 8875/93
AMEMBASSY TIRANA IMMEDIATE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MASERU IMMEDIATE 1599/
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 5735/53
CTF PROVIDE COMFORT INCIRLIK TU//POLAD//IMMEDIATE
COMUSNAVCENT IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6230/48
DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5999/6017
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2223/41
AMEMBASSY BAKU IMMEDIATE 9360/78
XMT AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY MALABO
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI

UNCLAS STATE 026906

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

INFORM CONSULS ALSO FOR USUC/USOECD

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPRC
SUBJECT: DAILY PRESS BRIEFING - WEDNESDAY FEBRUARY 1, 1995

THE FOLLOWING TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED IN TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING:

ANNOUNCEMENTS/STATEMENTS: RELEASE OF "COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994" (1); THANK YOU TO PRESS OFFICE (1); REMARKS BY U/S FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS TIMOTHY WIRTH AND A/S FOR DRL JOHN SHATTUCK (1-5); INTRODUCTION OF GRACIA HILLMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COORDINATOR FOR WOMEN'S ISSUES (14); CHINA (5-11, 17); RUSSIA (7-8, 14-15); BOSNIA (8-12); MEXICO (9); BURMA (11); RWANDA (12); INDONESIA (13); WOMEN'S HUMAN

RIGHTS (14-15); INDIA (15-16); TURKEY (16)

STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER RE: ANNOUNCEMENT ON ME PEACE FROCESS AND CAIRO SUMMIT 2/2 (17); U.S. DISCUSSIONS/CONSULTATIONS WITH PARTIES (17-19)

GREECE: EXTENSION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS (20)

CUBA: TRANSFER OF CUBANS FROM PANAMA TO GUANTANAMO (20); NUMBER OF CUBANS RETURNED TO CUBA (20-21)

BOSNIA/CROATIA: FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCE (21); PM SILAJDZIC TESTIMONY ON CAPITOL HILL (22-23); STATUS OF Z-4 PLAN (24)

TURKEY: REPORTED REMARKS BY U.S. AMBASSADOR GROSSMAN RE: U.S. POSITION ON PIPELINE TO MEDITERRANEAN (24-25)

INDONESIA: RECOGNITION OF EAST TIMOR (25)

BEGIN TEXT:

PAGE 1

MS. SHELLY: GOOD AFTERNOON, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. AS YOU KNOW, LAST NIGHT WE SENT TO CONGRESS THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ANNUAL REPORT, THE "COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR L994." WE HAVE TWO SPECIAL BRIEFERS TODAY WHO WILL MAKE OPENING REMARKS AND ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS: UNDER SECRETARY FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS TIMOTHY WIRTH AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR JOHN SHATTUCK ARE OUR GUESTS TODAY.

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THEIR PRESENTATION. WE WILL HAVE OUR REGULAR BRIEFING.

Q CHRISTINE, BEFORE YOU GET STARTED, I THINK THE PRESS OFFICE DESERVES SOME THANKS FOR THE WAY THEY GOT THIS REPORT OUT. IT WAS A TREMENDOUS UNDERTAKING AND

THOSE OF US WHO WERE HERE AT 9 O'CLOCK REALLY APPRECIATE WHAT THEY DID.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 026906 020620Z

MS. SHELLY: THANK YOU, BARRY. I APPRECIATE THAT VERY MUCH AND CERTAINLY WILL MAKE SURE THAT THE PRESS OFFICE GETS THAT THANKS PASSED ON. THANKS.

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH.

MS. SHELLY: IT'S RARE. WE APPRECIATE IT.

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: I WILL PASS ON TO THE SECRETARY THOSE COMPLIMENTS.

Q AND ASK HIM WHO LEAKED THE COPY TO THE NEW YORK

TIMES.

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: AND WHO LEAKED THE COPY TO THE NEW YORK TIMES?

Q BUT WE HAVE OUR OWN SUSPICIONS ALREADY, SO DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT TOO MUCH. DON'T WORRY ABOUT ASKING (INAUDIBLE) --

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: I DON'T HAVE TO REMIND YOU ALL TODAY WE ARE RELEASING THE COUNTRY REPORTS A PROCESS

PAGE 2

REQUIRED BY THE CONGRESS. THIS IS THE L7TH YEAR IN WHICH IT'S BEEN DONE, AND I THINK WE CAN PROUDLY SAY THESE BECOME BETTER, MORE THOROUGH, AND COMPREHENSIVE

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 026906 020620Z
EACH YEAR -- CERTAINLY, THE DEFINITIVE WORLDWIDE REPORT, COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY, ON THE CONDITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE GLOBE.

FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 2LST CENTURY IS GOING TO BECOME INCREASINGLY COMPLEX BEYOND OUR TRADITIONAL POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS TO ECONOMICS, THE ENVIRONMENT, POPULATION, REFUGEES, INTERNATIONAL CRIME, NARCOTICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, BEYOND OUR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS TRADITIONALLY, AND BEYOND OUR TRADITIONAL STRUCTURES. BEYOND GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIPS TO AN INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND AN INCREASING DEPENDENCY AND COOPERATION WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.

AND IT'S WITHIN THIS CHANGE -- BEYOND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS AND BEYOND POLITICAL STRUCTURES -- THAT WE FIND THIS VERY IMPORTANT COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS RECOGNIZED THE DEEP IMPORTANCE OF THESE NEW ISSUES, THE NEW NON-TRADITIONAL ISSUES. AND SOME OF THE SIGNATURE EVENTS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION CERTAINLY INCLUDE TRADE TREATIES, THE POPULATION CONFERENCE, THE NEW CRIME INITIATIVE, OUR AMBITIOUS CORAL REEF INITIATIVE, THE COMMON AGENDA WITH JAPAN, THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN AFPROACH WITH RUSSIA, AND THIS SHARPENED AND STRENGTHENED HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM.

INITIALLY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS FOCUSED

PAGE 06 STATE 026906 020620Z
PREDOMINANTLY ON ROGUE GOVERNMENTS, ON OPPRESSIVE-REPRESSIVE CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS AS THE PRIMARY FOCUS. THE TEXTURE NOW HAS BECOME MORE SUBTLE -- THAT IS, BROADENED BEYOND A FOCUS ON GOVERNMENTS A ONE TO RECOGNIZE AS WELL THESE NEW CROSS-CUTTING PRESSURES THAT

ARE OF ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE TO THE CONDITION OF INDIVIDUALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS OVERALL IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES -- FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESSURES OF POPULATION IN RWANDA, WHICH HAVE MADE IT INCREASINGLY EASY AND AN INCREASINGLY RIPE GROUND FOR ABUSES AND WE SAW THOSE IN A HORRIBLE WAY IN RWANDA; OR NARCOTICS IN COLOMBIA WHERE WE SEE THE PERVERSION AND PURCHASE OF GOVERNMENTS NOT ONLY IN THE DRUG AREA BUT INCREASINGLY AROUND THE WORLD; ANOTHER CROSS-CUTTING PRESSURE IN THE ABUSE OF WOMEN, A NEW AND MAJOR FOCUS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT LAST YEAR AND OF EVEN STRONGER EMPHASIS THIS YEAR.

AND I WOULD LIKE, JUST VERY BRIEFLY, TO INTRODUCE GRACIA HILLMAN, WHO HAS JOINED THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY AS THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COORDINATOR FOR WOMEN'S ISSUES.

PAGE 3

THE FOCUS ON WOMEN IS ALSO A TESTIMONY TO OUR DEEP COMMITMENT AND ENGAGEMENT WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. ABSOLUTELY, WE COULD NOT DO WHAT WE DO WITHOUT THE DEEP INVOLVEMENT WITH AND DEPENDENCE ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HAS BEEN, AS ALL OF YOU KNOW,

ENGAGED IN THIS SINCE HIS TIME AS DEPUTY SECRETARY IN THE DEPARTMENT IN THE L970S AND IS VERY PLEASED AND PROUD OF THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE. HE PUT OUT A VERY STRONG STATEMENT, WHICH I BELIEVE ALL OF YOU HAVE; AND HE SHARES WITH ME OUR GREAT PRIDE AND SUPPORT OF THE EFFORTS OF JOHN SHATTUCK, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, WHO WILL GO INTO MORE SPECIFICS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT.

JOHN?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

IN MY OVERVIEW PUBLISHED AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS

YEAR'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, I HAVE CHARACTERIZED, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION CHARACTERIZED, L994 AS A YEAR OF CRISIS AND PROGRESS -- A YEAR THAT WITNESSED GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND THE RETURN OF AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT TO HAITI; A YEAR IN WHICH DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT TOOK HOLD IN NEW PARTS OF AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, AND EUROPE; AND YET A YEAR THAT ENDED WITH THE ASSAULT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THOUSANDS OF CIVILIANS IN CHECHNYA; AND WITH THE PALE SERBS PURSUING THEIR POLICY OF ETHNIC CLEANSING IN BOSNIA.

THERE IS NO MORE POWERFUL AND POIGNANT AN EXAMPLE OF THE CONTRASTS OF L994 THAN THE FACT THAT THE MOST UPLIFTING EVENT OF THE YEAR -- THE INAUGURATION OF NELSON MANDELA -- AS PRESIDENT OF SOUTH AFRICA, TOOK PLACE IN THE SAME MONTH AS THE YEAR'S GREATEST HORROR --

UNCLASSIFIED

THE MASS MURDERS OF OVER 500,000 TUTSIS IN RWANDA.

THERE ARE FIVE MAJOR THEMES THAT STAND OUT IN THE L994 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS.

FIRST, THE FLAGRANT AND SYSTEMATIC ABUSES OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS CONTINUED AT THE HANDS OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES SUCH AS CHINA IRAQ, IRAN, BURMA NORTH KOREA, AND CUBA. IN THESE COUNTRIES, DENIAL OF BASIC FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION' ASSOCIATION AND RELIGION; PERSECUTION OF MINORITIES; AND THE SUPPRESSION OF CIVIL SOCIETY REMAINED THE NORM.

THE FLAGRANT ABUSES WERE NOT LIMITED TO AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS. TORTURE, ARBITRARY DETENTION, OR THE REPRESSION OF FREE SPEECH AND DISSENT, PERSISTED IN OTHER COUNTRIES

WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS NIGERIA, SAUDI ARABIA, SINGAPORE, EGYPT, INDIA, GUATEMALA, AND TURKEY.

A SECOND THEME OF L994 IS THAT ARMED CONFLICTS HAD A SERIOUS IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN A GROWING NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. IN RWANDA, BOSNIA, CHECHNYA, ANGOLA, AFGHANISTAN, SUDAN, ALGERIA AND ELSEWHERE, MORTARS AND MACHETES WERE WIELDED, KILLING MANY INNOCENT CIVILIANS AND LEAVING SOCIETIES WITH BITTER MEMORIES TO PASS ON TO FUTURE GENERATIONS. FAR

TOO OFTEN, CYNICAL POLITICAL LEADERS IN THESE PLACES FANNED THE FLAMES OF ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS TENSION AND ENCOURAGED EXTREMISTS.

THESE FLAGRANT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES POINT TO THE THIRD THEME OF L994: STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS TO BUILD NEW INSTITUTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY. WHEN COUNTRIES HAVE SUFFERED FROM MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, INSTITUTIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY CAN HELP THEM RECONCILE.

IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, RESPONSIBILITY IS COVERED UP OR IGNORED, THERE CAN BE NO PEACE NO JUSTICE, NO DETERRENT TO FUTURE ABUSES.

IN COUNTRIES THAT ARE TORN APART BY GENOCIDE AND ETHNIC CONFLICT, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS ESTABLISHED A NEW INSTITUTION OF JUSTICE. UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE U.S. THE U.N. HAS ESTABLISHED WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS FOR RWANDA AND YUGOSLAVIA, APPOINTED OUTSTANDING PROSECUTORS, AND HAS BEGUN TO ISSUE INDICTMENTS. THIS IS A MAJOR GROUND-BREAKING DEVELOPMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS SOUTH AFRICA, EL SALVADOR, HAITI, AND NICARAGUA, GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION LEADERS GRAPPLED OVER THE LAST YEAR -- IN SOME CASES IN RECENT MONTHS -- WITH WAYS TO EXAMINE WHAT HAPPENED IN THE PAST, HOLD HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS RESPONSIBLE, AND MOVE

FORWARD WITH NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

THE U.S. HAS ALSO ENCOURAGED THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS IN MANY COUNTRIES AND CHANNELED DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTING INDEPENDENT JUDICIARIES.

A FOURTH THEME OF L994 WAS THE ROLE OF FREE MARKETS IN THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY. THE GROWTH OF MARKET ECONOMIES, INCREASING TRADE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY WERE POWERFUL FORCES IN MANY COUNTRIES LAST YEAR. AND WHILE THESE FORCES HAVE NOT ALWAYS PRODUCED SHORT-TERM HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS, THEY'RE CREATING INTERNAL PRESSURES FOR MORE OPENNESS, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, AND THE RULE OF LAW.

PAGE 5

BUT THERE IS ALSO RESISTANCE TO THESE PRESSURES FROM AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS IN COUNTRIES LIKE CHINA. THIS RESISTANCE COULD BE SEEN LAST YEAR NOT ONLY IN CRACKDOWNS ON POLITICAL SPEECH AND DISSENT BUT ALSO IN THE SUPPRESSION OF WORKERS SEEKING TO EXERCISE THEIR BASIC FREEDOMS OF ASSOCIATION.

A FIFTH AND FINAL THEME OF L994 WHICH OUR REPORTS REFLECT, WAS THE STEADY GAINS THAT OCCURRED FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN A WIDE VARIETY OF COUNTRIES IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD, DESPITE THE TERRIBLE CATASTROPHES THAT ALSO MARKED THE YEAR. THESE GAINS REFLECT THE LONG-TERM SUCCESS OF OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

AND THE CONSTANT EFFORT THAT PRODUCES RESULTS BUT OFTEN CANNOT BE MEASURED IN THE SHORT TERM.

IN SOUTH AFRICA, AS IN HAITI. IN NORTHERN IRELAND, IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN MOZAMBIQUE, IN EL SALVADOR, AND IN SRI LANKA, DRAMATIC PROGRESS OCCURRED TOWARD RESOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS CRISES THAT HAD LONG SEEMED INSOLUBLE, ALTHOUGH THIS PROGRESS WAS SOMETIMES INTERRUPTED BY RENEWED VIOLENCE.

IN URUGUAY, CHILE, BRAZIL, MALAWI, AND NEPAL, SUCCESSFUL ELECTIONS CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS, AS THEY DID IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE.

IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA, IN ALBANIA, AND ELSEWHERE, GOVERNMENTS CONFRONTING ETHNIC TENSIONS SOUGHT THE MEDIATION OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID THE VIOLENCE THAT HAS RIPPED THROUGH BOSNIA AND CROATIA.

AMIDST THE HORROR OF L994 THEN THERE IS ALSO HOPE, STOKED BY THE BRAVE ACTIVISTS WHO DEDICATE THEIR LIVES TO REFORM. IN PUBLISHING THESE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, WE SAY TO THOSE HEROES: "YOU ARE NOT ALONE. THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO HELPING SOCIETIES MOVE TOWARD FREEDOM AND OPENNESS -- THE FACTORS ESSENTIAL TO ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN A PEACEFUL WORLD -- AND JUST, HUMANE SOCIETIES.
THE UNITED STATES WILL BE AN ADVOCATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY FOR THE SAKE OF THOSE WHO ARE STRUGGLING

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMPROVE THE CLIMATE OF FREEDOM IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES AND FOR THE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY OF ALL AMERICANS."

I'D BE HAPPY TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q THIS WAS ALSO THE YEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES DECIDED TO ABANDON USING PRESSURE ON CHINA ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY DENYING THEM TRADE BENEFITS; YOU'VE GIVEN THAT UP.

CAN YOU GIVE US ANY SPECIFIC EXAMPLES, OR YOUR BEST -- I'M SURE YOU CAN -- BUT CAN YOU GIVE US YOUR BEST SPECIFIC EXAMPLES WHERE U.S. CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DRIVES AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND INFLUENCES WHAT THE U.S. DOES IN ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES PARTICULARLY BIG COUNTRIES WHERE MAYBE YOUR GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS SEEM TO PREDOMINATE OVER YOUR HEART AND SOUL?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: LET ME TAKE THE TWO BIG COUNTRIES. LET'S START WITH CHINA. I THINK THERE, AS YOU KNOW, THE CONCLUSION OF OUR REPORT WAS THAT THERE WAS NO IMPROVEMENT IN MANY ASPECTS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN 1994. THERE WAS A CRACKDOWN ON DISSENT WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR MORE THAN YEAR; IN FACT, OCCURRED BOTH WHEN THERE WAS MFN LINKAGE AS WELL AS WHEN THERE WASN'T MFN LINKAGE.

IT WAS CLEAR IN OUR REPORT LAST YEAR AND IN OUR CANDID ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AT THE TIME THAT THE

PRESIDENT EXTENDED MFN THAT ISSUES OF HUMAN RIGHTS REMAIN VERY PROBLEMATIC IN CHINA IN THE SHORT RUN.

THE U.S. POLICY, IN RESPONSE, HAS BEEN TO BE VERY FIRM. WE ARE COMMITTED TO PURSUING A RESOLUTION IN THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WITH RESPECT TO CHINA. WE ARE COMMITTED TO CONTINUING TO SPOTLIGHT THE PROBLEMS AND ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA. WE ARE COMMITTED TO A CONTINUATION OF THE SANCTIONS THAT WERE IMPOSED AT THE TIME OF TIANANMEN SQUARE. WE HAVE SENT A CLEAR SIGNAL TO CHINA AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, AND ALSO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THAT IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELATIONS DEPENDS ON IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, WE ARE VERY CLEAR IN OUR POLICY THAT ISOLATING CHINA IS NOT AN ANSWER TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS THAT I'VE OUTLINED.

AT THE SAME TIME, I WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE SITUATION IS FAR MORE COMPLICATED THAN A SIMPLE ONE-LINE

ASSESSMENT CAN MAKE IT, WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA.

OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST YEAR, BOTH DURING THE TIME THAT THERE WAS MFN LINKAGE AND AFTERWARDS, THERE WERE SOME DEVELOPMENTS THAT WERE POSITIVE. THERE WERE PRISONER RELEASES; PARTICULARLY, THE RELEASES OF THE LEADERS OF THE TIANANMEN SQUARE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT. PASSPORTS TO DISSIDENTS WHO HAVE HAD THEM BLOCKED WERE GRANTED. THERE WAS LIMITED INFORMATION PROVIDED ABOUT

THE STATUS OF HUNDREDS OF PRISONERS ON LISTS; AND TALKS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS INITIATED FOR THE VERY FIRST TIME OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST YEAR.

AT THE SAME TIME, THERE ARE LONGER-TERM CURRENTS IN CHINA, I THINK, THAT CAN BE ENCOURAGED BY THE TRADE AND

MARKET ECONOMICS THAT OCCURRING -- CURRENTS FOR MORE OPENNESS IN THE RULE OF LAW, AND IN SOME RESPECTS THOSE ARE HAVING AN EFFECT IN SOME OF THE DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO NEW LEGISLATION IN CHINA PARTICULARLY A NEW LAW THAT ALLOWS INDIVIDUALS TO SUE THE GOVERNMENT.

BUT I DON'T WANT TO MAKE ANYTHING BUT THE CLEAREST ASSESSMENT THAT IS CONTAINED IN OUR REPORT WITH RESPECT TO THE LAST YEAR. THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT CRACKDOWN ON DISSENT. BUT THERE ARE ALSO MORE COMPLICATED TRENDS AT WORK IN CHINA. THE U.S. IS ENGAGED ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES ACROSS THE BOARD WITH RESPECT TO CHINA AND AT ALL LEVELS.

Q YOU WERE GOING TO DO RUSSIA, TOO, YOU BEGAN BY SAYING.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: OKAY, I WILL DO RUSSIA.

Q HOW RUSSIA -- AND YOU TALK ABOUT ARBITRARY

UNCLASSIFIED

DECREES BY YELTSIN; WHAT THEY'VE DONE IN CHECHNYA -- TERRIBLE JAIL CONDITIONS, PRISONERS NOT GETTING FED. AND YOU'RE UP ON THE HILL ASKING FOR INCREASED FOREIGN AID TO RUSSIA. WHAT ROLE DOES HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE IN FORMULATING YOUR RUSSIA POLICY?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: A VERY CLEAR ROLE AND A CLEAR ROLE IN THE STATEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE ADMINISTRATION, BOTH BY THE PRESIDENT AND BY THE SECRETARY, TO THE RUSSIANS, TO THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WITH RESPECT TO OUR INCREASING CONCERN ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN CHECHNYA, INCLUDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE RUSSIANS.

WE HAVE CONVEYED THESE CONCERNS. WE HAVE MADE PUBLIC THESE CONCERNS. WE ARE ALSO IN THE PROCESS OF WORKING WITH THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE WHICH WE HAVE HELPED TO LEAD WITH RESPECT TO A DELEGATION THAT IS SEEKING TO BRING ABOUT A NEGOTIATED END TO THE CONFLICT AND TO DELIVER HUMANITARIAN AID.

WE'RE ALSO REVIEWING OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO SEE IF SOME CAN BE REDIRECTED TO ASSIST REFUGEES. THESE ARE ALL MAJOR ASPECTS OF OUR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA.

Q TO FOLLOW ON CHINA. WHAT WAS THE REPLY OF THE PRC OFFICIALS THAT YOU TALKED TO WHEN YOU BROUGHT YOUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS? AND I WOULD ASK SFECIFICALLY

UNCLASSIFIED

WITH REGARD TO RELIGIOUS PERSECUTIONS?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: WE HAVE PROVIDED OVER THE COURSE OF THE TIME THAT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS

BEEN IN OFFICE A NUMBER OF CASES, A LARGE NUMBER OF CASES OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN IN PRISON FOR THE EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION FREEDOM OF SPEECH, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. AS I SAID, IN SOME INSTANCE INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN RELEASED. I THINK THERE IS NOW. FINALLY, A MORE ROUTINE WAY OF PROVIDING THESE LISTS AND THEY ARE RECEIVED RATHER THAN SIMPLY BEING REJECTED WHICH THEY HAD BEEN OUT OF HAND IN THE PAST.

I THINK THE STRONG ADVOCACY THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAVE ENGAGED IN, IN RAISING SPECIFIC PRISONER CASES IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN AS WELL AS FOREIGN MINISTER, QIAN QICHEN, SPEAK VERY CLEARLY TO THAT POINT.

STEVE.

Q THE REPORT QUOTES RUSSIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONER, SERGEI KOVALEV, SAYING THAT THERE WERE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ON A MASSIVE SCALE IN CHECHNYA. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGREE WITH THAT ASSESSMENT?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: WE HAVE CITED THAT ASSESSMENT PRECISELY BECAUSE WE HAVE A VERY HIGH REGARD FOR MR. KOVALEV WHICH WHOM I HAVE INCIDENTALLY MET VERY FREQUENTLY. WE HAVE HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUES WITH

RUSSIA. SERGEI KOVALEV IS ONE OF MY REGULAR INTERLOCUTORS. I MIGHT ALSO MENTION THE VERY MOVING FACT THAT SERGEI KOVALEV AND HIS COLLEAGUE, SLAVA BAKHMIN, WERE BOTH FORMER PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION IN SIBERIA I THINK THE FACT OF THEIR APPOINTMENT IS A VERY SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT OF THE INTEREST IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA.

WE HAVE CITED THE KOVALEV ASSESSMENT PRECISELY BECAUSE WE HAVE A VERY HIGH REGARD FOR KOVALEV AND WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HIS SERIOUS CONCERNS ARE NOT CORRECT.

Q IN YOUR OVERVIEW, IN RELATION TO RWANDA AND BOSNIA, YOU TALK ABOUT GENOCIDE AND WAR CRIMES. THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT NAMED NAMES IN BOSNIA OF THOSE SERB NATIONALISTS THEY THINK SHOULD APPEAR BEFORE THE U.N. WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL. ARE YOU NOW PREPARED TO NAME NAMES?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS PROVIDED NINE REPORTS TO THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND TO THE NEW WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL WHICH CONTAIN A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND ABUSERS AND WHICH DO NAME NAMES. CONSISTENT WITH THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS, WE ARE NOT GOING TO PUBLICIZE THOSE REPORTS UNTIL THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

ITSELF DECIDES TO DO SO.

PAGE 9

Q I NOTICE IN YOUR REPORT OVERVIEW YOU MENTIONED THAT SANCTIONS ARE JUST ONE ELEMENT IN PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THAT OTHER BROADER MEANS NEED TO BE USED AS

WELL.

SO MY QUESTION IS, IN THE CASE OF MEXICO, WHICH IS CITED IN HERE FOR TORTURE, PRETRIAL PROBLEMS LACK OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH, REPRESSION IN CHECHNYA, EXTRAJUDICIAL

KILLINGS THERE, WE HAVE A VERY CLOSE AND FRIENDLY AND NON-SANCTIONS, OPEN AND TRADE AND RELATIONSHIP WITH MEXICO, WHAT WILL BE THE BROADER MEANS OF PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THERE? WILL IT BE ELEVATED TO A HIGHER LEVEL? HOW DO YOU PROPOSE TO USE ,- WHAT METHODS DO YOU --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: IN FACT, I THINK MEXICO IS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF THE VERY ACROSS-THE-BOARD ENGAGEMENT WITH A COUNTRY AND THE RESULT IS AN IMPROVEMENT INDEED, IN DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

MEXICO HAD THE FREEST AND FAIREST ELECTION BY MOST ACCOUNTS IN ITS HISTORY LAST AUGUST. THE RESPONSE OF MEXICO TO THE UPRISING IN CHIAPAS, WHILE INITIALLY RAISING VERY SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS, VERY QUICKLY WAS CHANGED TO A CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE

CHIAPAS INSURGENTS. INDEED, THIS IS PRECISELY THE WAY THAT A DEMOCRACY COMMITTED TO THE RULE OF LAW AND RECONCILIATION SHOULD BE ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES.

THE PROBLEM OF IMPUNITY, OF COURSE, DOES CONTINUE, AS OUR REPORT VERY CLEARLY POINTS OUT. BUT IF YOU LOOK AT THE PROCESS THAT IS UNDERWAY IN MEXICO, I THINK THERE HAS BEEN IMPROVEMENT. IN FACT, IT IS THIS VERY KIND OF ENGAGEMENT THAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT.

Q MAY I ASK A QUESTION OF SECRETARY WIRTH.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: PLEASE.

Q THE ADMINISTRATION HAD SAID THAT MOST FAVORED NATIONS STATUS WOULD LEAD TO IMPROVEMENTS AND THAT THIS WAS NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE DESPITE THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT WHEN HE WAS RUNNING FOR ELECTION.

NOW THAT IT HAS NOT LED TO IMPROVEMENTS -- THE SITUATION HAS WORSEN -- WHAT COURSE CAN THE

ADMINISTRATION TAKE? WHAT WILL YOU DO TO STOP CONGRESS FROM TRYING TO REVERSE THE POLICY?

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: WE'RE GOING TO CONTINUE

TRYING, ANDREA. WE'RE GOING TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE IN EVERY WAY. JOHN WAS RECENTLY THERE IN JANUARY; I WAS THERE IN DECEMBER. WE CONTINUE TO RAISE THE ISSUES OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE CONTINUE TO WORK WITH VARIOUS MEMBERS

OF THE CONGRESS ON CHINA'S, IN MANY PLACES VERY REPRESSIVE

POPULATION POLICY. WE'RE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ENGAGEMENT OF UNPFA -- CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT IN CHINA.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF AVENUES, ANDREA, THAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO PURSUE. I THINK IT'S OUR OBLIGATION TO TRY TO EXPLAIN TO THE CONGRESS WHY WE'RE DOING THAT, WHAT WE WANT TO DO; THAT CHINA IS AN EXTRAORDINARILY IMPORTANT PLAYER IN THE WORLD. THERE ARE VERY SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN CHINA THAT THEY WOULD LIKE US TO ENGAGE IN WITH THEM, AND WE ARE SAYING THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE GREATER PROGRESS ON THEIR SIDE. THEY'RE CERTAINLY AWARE OF THIS. SO I THINK PROBABLY THE BEST ANSWER IS TO SAY, WE'LL KEEP TRYING.

Q BUT WASN'T DELINKING MFN FROM HUMAN RIGHTS IN RETROSPECT, A MISTAKE, BECAUSE IT REMOVED A LOT OF PRESSURE FROM THE CHINESE?

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: I THINK JOHN EXPLAINED THAT IN HIS GOOD OPENING STATEMENT. IT WAS OUR BELIEF THAT TRYING TO OPEN UP A SERIES OF ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS AND TRYING TO HAVE A BROADER AND FREER AND OPEN SOCIETY WOULD LEAD TO THE RIGHT RESULTS. WE STILL HOPE THAT THAT'S GOING TO BE THE CASE.

WE KNOW THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IS IN A PERIOD

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OF VERY SIGNIFICANT TRANSITION AND PROBABLY THIS IS GOING TO TAKE SOME TIME FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE AS WELL.

Q COULD I FOLLOW THAT UP, PLEASE, ON CHINA, BROADENING IT. SOME HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS ACCUSED THIS ADMINISTRATION OF FOLLOWING A MERCANTILIST HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY IN WHICH COMMERCE BECOMES MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

(1) DO YOU THINK THAT THERE IS ANY JUSTICE -- IS THERE A CONFLICT WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ABOUT INCREASING COMMERCE WITH COUNTRIES WHICH MAY NOT HAVE

VERY GOOD HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES? IS THERE A CONFLICT OF MOTIVES WITHIN THIS ADMINISTRATION ON THOSE POINTS?

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: OF COURSE, THERE IS. I MEAN, THERE ARE CONFLICTS AT ALL TIMES AND MANY, MANY DIFFERENT KINDS OF POLICIES. IT'S NO MYSTERY. THERE IS NOT A SINGLE POLICY THAT GOVERNS WHAT WE ARE DOING BUT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF THINGS WE'RE ATTEMPTING TO DO.

I MEAN, ONE CAN IN THE WORDS OF A FAMOUS AMERICAN PRESIDENT WALK AND CHEW GUM AT THE SAME TIME. WE WOUD LIKE TO ATTEMPT TO PURSUE AGGRESSIVE OPEN TRADE POLICIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES. I'LL GIVE YOU ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF WHERE THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM COMES IN.

WE HAVE HAD A VERY STRONG POLICY FOCUSED ON BURMA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

WHICH -- AT THE CORE OF THAT HAS BEEN HUMAN RIGHTS. WE ARE NOW INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT COMING OUT OF BURMA IS A VAST AMOUNT OF HEROIN. THERE IS A NEW HEROIN EPIDEMIC BEGINNING TO SHOW IN THE UNITED STATES, AND MUCH OF THAT HEROIN COMES FROM BURMA. ABOUT 60 PERCENT OF IT, WE THINK, COMES FROM BURMA, AND WE ARE RIGHT NOW TRYING TO CALIBRATE A POLICY WHICH WILL NOT ONLY MAINTAIN OUR PRESSURE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS BUT ALSO OPEN UP THE EFFORTS THAT WE MUST MAKE, COOPERATING WITH THE CHINESE AND WITH THE THAIS AND WITH THE AUTHORITIES IN TAIWAN AND OTHERS, ON THIS INCREASING PROBLEM THERE.

THAT'S ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE A SET OF POLICIES THAT ARE INTERRELATED AND HAVE TO BE WE HAVE TO PURSUE A NUMBER OF GOALS AT THE SAME TIME.

Q (INAUDIBLE).

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: I'D ADD TO THAT. IT'S A VERY IMPORTANT QUESTION IF YOU ALLOW ME JUST TO PUT A COUPLE WORDS IN HERE. I THINK THE ISSUE OF TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IS VASTLY OVERBLOWN, IN TERMS OF AN APPARENT CONFLICT. AS WE SAID IN THE OVERVIEW TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, THERE ARE A WIDE VARIETY OF INSTRUMENTS, BOTH CARROTS AND STICKS, THAT CAN BE AND SHOULD BE USED AND ARE BEING USED BY THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO EFFORTS TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS.

ONE IMPORTANT CARROT IS TRADE. ON THE OTHER HAND

IF YOU USE IT AS A STICK THAT IS MUCH TOO BIG, IT MAY

NOT HAVE THE EFFECT THAT YOU'RE SEEKING TO HAVE. I THINK IF YOU LOOK AT THE WAY IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS PURSUING ITS HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY OBJECTIVES AROUND THE WORLD, YOU'LL SEE A WIDE VARIETY OF TOOLS THAT ARE BEING USED, AND THE DELINKAGE OF MFN AS ONE INSTRUMENT IN CHINA FROM HUMAN RIGHTS IS BY NO MEANS A SIGNAL THAT TRADE IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE VEHICLE UNDER SOME OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING IN CHINA ITSELF

WHERE YOU'RE GOING TO USE LESSER KINDS OF TOOLS.

WITH RESPECT TO BURMA, I STILL WANT TO MAKE VERY CLEAR THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT SHOWS TWO VERY DISTURBING DEVELOPMENTS IN RECENT DAYS. ONE IS THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI FOR THE SECOND TIME. THE MILITARY REGIME IN BURMA HAS DECIDED NOT TO RELEASE THE PRINCIPAL FIGURE OF DEMOCRACY IN THAT COUNTRY; AND, SECOND, AN INVASION BY THE MILITARY OF BURMA OF REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE NORTHERN AREA.

THE UNITED STATES HAS SAID THAT IT WANTS VERY MUCH TO IMPROVE ITS OVERALL COOPERATION AND RELATIONSHIP WITH BURMA, BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WILL ONLY CONTINUE TO BE VERY ISOLATIONIST IN ITS VIEW TO THE EXTENT THAT BURMA DOES NOT

PAGE 12

SEEK TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN THAT COUNTRY.

Q (INAUDIBLE) THE ISSUE OF GENOCIDE. IT IS A

PAGE 24 STATE 026906 020620Z

TERM THAT'S USED BOTH FOR RWANDA AND BOSNIA IN THIS REPORT. THERE ARE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS TO USING THAT TERM UNDER THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION, BECAUSE IT DOES REQUIRE THAT ONCE YOU ESTABLISH THAT THAT WAS THE CASE, THAT THE GOVERNMENTS MUST TO DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO PREVENT IT OR TO STOP IT.

WOULD YOU SAY - HAS THE UNITED STATES FULFILLED THE MANDATE UNDER THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION TO STOP THESE GENOCIDES AS THEY WERE OCCURRING? AND. IF NOT, WHY NOT?

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: I THINK THE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO ESTABLISH THE FIRST INTERNATIONA MECHANISM OF JUSTICE TO ADDRESS WAR CRIMES -- CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND GENOCIDE IN THOSE TWO COUNTRIES --

IS A MAJOR COMMITMENT WITH RESPECT TO ALL OF OUR

INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, NOT JUST THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES, TO ADDRESS GENOCIDE WHEN IT OCCURS.

OBVIOUSLY, THERE ARE MANY OTHER WAYS IN WHICH WE NEED TO ADDRESS IT, INCLUDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WHERE ENORMOUS AMOUNTS OF ASSISTANCE HAVE GONE TO THE VICTIMS OF THESE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN BOTH BOSNIA AND IN RWANDA. THE UNITED STATES IS THE LEADING COUNTRY IN COMMITTING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THOSE EFFORTS.

Q NEITHER ACTION WOULD STOP THE GENOCIDE; CERTAINLY, HUMANITARIAN AID AND A TRIBUNAL WHICH IS GOING TO TRY PEOPLE WHEN ACTS ARE STILL BEING COMMITTED. I MEAN, HAS THE UNITED STATES FULFILLED ITS

OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION TO STOP THE GENOCIDES NOW THAT YOU'VE DETERMINED THESE WERE GENOCIDES?

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: AS I SAY, ALL COUNTRIES. I THINK IN THIS CASE LED IN MANY RESPECTS BY THE UNITED STATES, ARE MOBILIZING TO ADDRESS THE TERRIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, SOME OF WHICH AMOUNTED TO GENOCIDE IN THESE COUNTRIES; AND ALSO THE SERIOUS EFFORTS THAT ARE BEING PUT INTO THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS BEFORE THEY REACH THIS TERRIBLE STAGE, PARTICULARLY THROUGH THE OSCE, THE DEEP INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES THROUGHOUT THE BALKAN REGION THE WORK THAT'S BEEN DONE IN MACEDONIA AND ALBANIA WHICH I MENTIONED IN MY OPENING STATEMENTS -- THESE ARE SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENTS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS MAKING TO ADDRESS THIS CRISIS.

Q IN WHAT CONTEXT OF THIS YEAR'S INDONESIA REPORT - IT SEEMS TO BE WORSE THAN IN FACT LAST YEAR. YOU SAY HERE THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO COMMIT SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND NOW WITH ANOTHER ELEMENT WHICH IS A CLAMP

DOWN ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. THE ONLY REAL POSITIVE ASPECT THAT I CAN DETECT HERE ON THIS REPORT ON

INDONESIA IS ACTUALLY THEIR ACTION FOR FREE-MARKET INITIATIVES WHICH THEY PURSUE WITH EXTREME VIGOR.

ON EAST TIMOR, YOU SAY YOU HAVE -- NO PROGRESS WAS MADE IN ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING PEOPLE SINCE 1991 --

KILLED IN A MASSACRE IN 1991. THE QUESTION IS THE SAME

THAT EVERYBODY HAS BEEN MAKING HERE HOW CAN YOU COINCIDE A POLICY WITH THESE PEOPLE? AND I HAVE ONE OBSERVATION: IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHENEVER THERE ARE INDONESIAN RULERS PRESENT HERE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT OR ELSEWHERE, THEY DO APPEAR PROJECTED AS PARTNERS IN FINDING A SOLUTION FOR THE SITUATION THERE, MORE THAN ACTUALLY CULPRITS FOR WHAT IS GOING ON THERE WHILE YOU IDENTIFY THEM HERE VERY CLEARLY AS CULPRITS.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: I THINK THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA, AS IT IS IN SOME OTHER COUNTRIES THAT ARE HIGHLY AUTHORITARIAN AND WHERE THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, WE TELL THE STORY HONESTLY, CANDIDLY. IT IS THE PURPOSE OF THESE REPORTS TO SHOW THAT THERE ARE LONG-TERM CHALLENGES THAT WE AND THE REST OF THE WORLD AND THE GOVERNMENTS IN QUESTION ALL FACE IN ADDRESSING THESE QUESTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE.

WITH RESPECT TO INDONESIA SPECIFICALLY, WE HAVE ENGAGED WITH THEM AT THE LEVEL OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY ON MANY OF THESE QUESTIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE FORCES THAT ARE BEING UNLEASHED ARE IN FACT OVER TIME GOING TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE CLIMATE OF OFENNESS AND THE PROSPECT OF CHANGE AND MORE FREEDOM.

THERE ALSO ARE, I THINK, IN INDONESIA SOME ASPECTS OF OPENNESS. THE OPERATIONS OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, OF COURSE, ARE VERY IMPORTANT IN THAT COUNTRY. BUT THESE ARE NOT PROBLEMS THAT GET RESOLVED

OVER TIME.

Q YOU'RE SAYING THE REPORTS ARE BEING --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: THERE ARE POTENTIAL EFFORTS TO RESTRICT THOSE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND, OF COURSE, WE'VE MADE VERY CLEAR THAT THAT'S WRONG AND INAPPROPRIATE.

Q CAN I JUST HAVE A QUICK FOLLOW-UP?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: I THINK I'VE GIVEN YOU TWO, SO LET ME GO TO SOMEBODY ELSE.

Q HOW FAR IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT --

PAGE 14

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: I'M SORRY. I WANT TO GET SOMEONE WHO HASN'T HAD A QUESTION YET. EXCUSE ME.

Q WOULD IT BE PROPER TO HEAR FROM MS. HILLMAN ON ONE QUESTION? COULD WE?

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: SHE'S RELATIVELY NEW TO THE BUSINESS, BUT GIVE IT A SHOT.

MS. HILLMAN: DON'T GO TOO FAST.

Q COULD YOU JUST GIVE US YOUR ASSESSMENT OF HOW THE CONDITION OF WOMEN IN THE WORLD -- THE HUMAN RIGHTS

CONDITION OF WOMEN IN THE WORLD FARED IN '94? DID IT IMPROVE? DID IT DETERIORATE? AND WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE BIGGEST CHALLENGE FOR '95 AND WHAT IMPACT CAN U.S.

POLICY HAVE ON THAT?

MS. HILLMAN: THREE QUESTIONS? (LAUGHTER) I THINK IT WOULD BE FAIR TO SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN IMPROVEMENT IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN THE FACT THAT THE ISSUES ARE NOW BEING DISCUSSED AND HIGHLIGHTED, NOT ONLY IN CONVERSATIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS HAVING WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, BUT IN THOSE COUNTRIES THEMSELVES.

AS YOU MAY BE AWARE, WE ARE FREPARING FOR THE FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, AND AS THE REGIONAL MEETINGS HAVE BEEN HELD AROUND THE WORLD, A NUMBER OF THESE ISSUES HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED AND WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT PLATFORM FOR ACTION.

THEN FOLLOWING THE CONFERENCE, IT WILL BE THE WORK AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE WOMEN AROUND THE WORLD TO GET THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES WHETHER YOU'RE TALKING ISSUES OF VIOLENCE -- DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM WITH RESPECT TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN OR ECONOMIC ISSUES IN PARLIAMENT THAT WOMEN MIGHT USE THEIR MICRO-ENTERFRISE SKILLS TO HELP THE ECONOMY OF THEIR COUNTRIES. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THAT PLATFORM.

IN ADDITION, THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES AT THE CONFERENCE THAT WAS HELD IN CAIRO ON POPULATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND

THE ENTHUSIASM AND WHAT WOMEN HAVE FELT THE PROGRESS THAT THEY'RE MAKING IN GETTING THEIR COUNTRIES TO DEAL WITH THEIR EFFORTS, AND THE CHALLENGE WE HAVE HERE IN THE UNITED STATES, OF COURSE, IS TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THOSE ISSUES ARE INCORPORATED INTO OVERALL DISCUSSION

ABOUT WOMEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND U S. FOREIGN POLICY.

Q JOHN, WHILE THERE'S NO SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE LINK ANYMORE TO TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, THERE'S

BEEN A LOT OF TALK ON CAPITOL HILL ABOUT LINKING FOREIGN AID TO RUSSIA TO IS PERFORMANCE IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY.

WHAT KIND OF IMPLICATIONS DOES YOUR REPORT PARTICULARLY THE SECTION ON THE INVASION OF CHECHNYA HAVE FOR FOREIGN AID TO RUSSIA? IS IT A WARNING SIGNAL?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: LEE, WE'VE SAID THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE IN RUSSIA HAS BEEN UNEVEN. OBVIOUSLY, AS I'VE SAID BEFORE, THE MASSIVE IMPACT OF THE CHECHNYA INVASION OR CHECHNYA EFFORT HAS HAD ON CIVILIANS IS THE MOST SEVERE PROBLEM, BUT THERE ARE OTHERS AS WELL.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS AN EXTRAORDINARY AMOUNT OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND GENERAL FREEDOM OF THE PRESS WHICH I THINK HAS PERSISTED AND CONTINUED THROUGHOUT SOME VERY GREAT STRAINS IN RUSSIA.

UNCLASSIFIED

THERE ARE PROBLEMS, TO BE SURE, IN THE DETENTION AND ARREST -- ARBITRARY ARREST IN SOME INSTANCES BUT THEY DON'T SEEM TO BE CENTRALLY DIRECTED. THERE ARE MANY CHALLENGES IN RUSSIA, AND THE BIGGEST CHALLENGE OF A L OF COURSE, IS THE CONTINUED PROGRESS OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

BUT IT IS PROGRESS THAT AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF AN ENORMOUSLY REPRESSIVE AND TOTALITARIAN SOCIETY IS REAL, EVEN WITH SIGNIFICANT SETBACKS, AND IT'S FOR THAT REASON THAT WE HAVE CHARACTERIZED THE PERFORMANCE OVER THE COURSE OF THIS YEAR AS UNEVEN.

Q YEAR AFTER YEAR THE STATE DEPARTMENT COMES OUT WITH A PRETTY DAMNING REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN INDIA AND AT THE SAME TIME RECOGNIZES THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, ETC. IS THERE A POLICY AT ALL ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN INDIA? DOES THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE ANY KIND OF A PROPER POLICY ON IT? RECENTLY, AMNESTY JUST A FEW DAYS AGO RELEASED A REPORT

WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAS VIRTUALLY DENIED A LOT OF IT.

SO WHAT IS THE POLICY? COULD YOU EXPLAIN IT?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: THE UNITED STATES HAS RAISED HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN INDIA VERY RECENTLY, AND I THINK A VERY IMPORTANT POINT TO BE MADE ABOUT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN OUR ECONOMIC AND OUR HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN SOME OF THE VERY STRONG STATEMENTS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, THAT WERE MADE BY SECRETARY BROWN IN HIS MOST

RECENT VISIT TO INDIA; AND THE UNITED STATES I THINK HAS FOUND A WIDE VARIETY OF WAYS OF RAISING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN INDIA WITH RESPECT TO NOT ONLY THE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT BUT OTHER AGENCIES AS WELL.

INDIA IS A VERY LARGE DEMOCRACY AND A VERY IMPORTANT DEMOCRACY, AND OF COURSE WE ARE DEEPLY COMMITTED TO THE

PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE GROWTH OF MARKET ECONOMIES. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A WAY OF INVOLVING THOSE TWO INSTRUMENTS IN THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND IT IS IN THAT CONTEXT THAT MANY OF THESE ISSUES HAVE BEEN RAISED IN INDIA. BUT WE DO NOT SHY AWAY FROM POINTING OUT ALL OF THE PROBLEMS, AS WE HAVE IN THE REPORT THIS YEAR.

Q SIR, WHEN LOOKING FOR THE -- YOUR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, I MEAN THE TURKISH PART, AND WE REALIZE THAT THE U.S. IS FAIR, GIVING MORE PAGES THAN COMMUNIST CHINA AND SOME TOTALITARIAN REGIMES. IRAQ, IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA. EVEN THE BOSNIAN SERBS DESERVED LESS PAGES THAN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. AND WE REALIZE THAT EVEN TURKEY HAS MILITARY RULE, YOUR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT IS ALMOST 10 OR 11 PAGES.

NOW, IT BECAME A MORE OPEN AND MORE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, AND 39 PAGES. WHAT IS YOUR CRITERIA FOR

PREPARING THIS REPORT?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST YEAR, WE HAVE SEEN A WORSENING SIGNIFICANTLY OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN TURKEY AND THAT INDEED IS THE REASON WHY THE REPORT CARRIES THAT INFORMATION. THESE REPORTS CARRY, I THINK, BROAD INTEGRITY AND HONESTY, AND THEY APPEAR REGULARLY THROUGH MANY YEARS. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN TURKEY WAS COVERED VERY

EXTENSIVELY FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WERE SOME SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THAT RESPECT. I'D BE HAPPY TO TALK TO YOU FURTHER ABOUT THEM, BUT I HAVE A FEELING --

Q WHEN YOU COMPARE THESE, EVEN TURKEY IS WORSE THAN THE SERBIAN -- THE SERBS OR IRANIAN OR IRAQI -- SADDAM --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: THESE ARE NOT COMPARATIVE EFFORTS, NOR HAS ANY STATEMENT BEEN MADE THAT THEY ARE TO BE COMPARED WITH THOSE OTHER REGIMES. I THINK THE SITUATION IN TURKEY HAS INVOLVED THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE, A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF TORTURE, ALSO A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TERRORIST USE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS. AND OF COURSE, WE COVER NOT ONLY -- AS UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH POINTED OUT -- NOT ONLY INCURSIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS CARRIED OUT BY GOVERNMENTS BUT BY OTHERS AS WELL; RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, THE PROSECUTION OF PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR FREE EXPRESSION. THESE ARE ALL ISSUES THAT ARE PROPERLY CONTAINED.

WE ARE VERY STRONG ALLIES OF TURKEY AND SEE TURKEY AS A VERY SIGNIFICANT AND CRUCIAL DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IT'S FOR THAT REASON THAT WE'RE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THESE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

MS. SHELLY: LAST QUESTION.

PAGE 17

Q SIR, YOU HAVE BEEN TALKING WITH THE CHINESE ON HUMAN RIGHTS. JUDGING FROM YOUR MEETINGS WITH THEM, HAVE THEY BECOME MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO YOUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS, OR DO THEY STILL REJECT THEM AS INTERFERENCE IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK: THERE ARE MANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, NEEDLESS TO SAY. AND YET OVER THE COURSE OF SEVEN DIALOGUES IN 15, 16 MONTHS -- WHICH IS PERHAPS THE MOST INTENSIVE AMOUNT OF DISCUSSION THAT'S BEEN TAKING PLACE ANYWHERE -- I THINK THERE HAVE BEEN DEEPER DISCUSSIONS AND MORE EFFORT TO ADDRESS LONGER-TERM SYSTEMIC ISSUES, INCLUDING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE THAT WERE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN THE LAST MEETINGS THAT I HAD THERE.

Q THANK YOU.

UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH: THANKS VERY MUCH.

(UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SHATTUCK CONCLUDED THEIR BRIEFING AT 1:26 P.M., AFTER WHICH MS. SHELLY IMMEDIATELY BEGAN HER BRIEFING.)

MS. SHELLY: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. I'D LIKE TO BEGIN THE NEXT PART OF THE BRIEFING WITH A STATEMENT WHICH I'M MAKING ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WHICH RELATES TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT MADE EARLIER TODAY ON THE

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND THE CAIRO SUMMIT.

THE UNITED STATES APPLAUDS AND ENDORSES PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S BOLD INITIATIVE TO HOLD A SUMMIT MEETING IN CAIRO TOMORROW, FEBRUARY 2. THIS MEETING IS NOT ONLY AN HISTORIC AND UNPRECEDENTED EVENT; IT IS A DRAMATIC DEMONSTRATION OF THE COMMITMENT BY PRESIDENT MUBARAK PRIME MINISTER RABIN, KING HUSSEIN AND PLO CHAIRMAN ARAFAT TO DO ALL THEY CAN TO PROMOTE COOPERATION AND TO BUILD PEACE.

THESE ARE THE LEADERS WHO HAVE THROUGH THEIR COURAGE AND LEADERSHIP, SOUGHT TO PUT CONFLICT BEHIND THEM AND BUILD A MORE HOPEFUL FUTURE. AS SUCH, THIS SUMMIT IS A POWERFUL STATEMENT: THE ENEMIES OF PEACE MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO KILL THE PEACE

OVER THE PAST WEEK, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH EGYPT AND WITH THE PARTIES WHICH WILL GATHER IN CAIRO TOMORROW. THE FOCUS OF THIS COLLECTIVE EFFORT HAS BEEN TO FIND A WAY TO COUNTER THE TERROR AND EXTREMISM OF RECENT WEEKS AND TO ENERGIZE THE NEGOTIATIONS.

IN THIS REGARD, THE MEETING TOMORROW CONSTITUTES ONLY THE FIRST STEP IN THIS EFFORT. IN THE PERIOD AHEAD, THE UNITED STATES WILL BE CONSULTING AND WORKING CLOSELY WITH ALL OF THE PARTIES TO DETERMINE HOW BEST TO MOVE FORWARD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO COUNTER THE EFFORTS OF THOSE OPPOSED TO PEACE.

I'LL BE HAPPY TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q CHRISTINE, ON THAT -- YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT THERE, THERE'S ONE PARTY THAT'S NOT GOING TO CAIRO AND THAT'S THE PRESIDENT OF SYRIA, WHO HARBORS -- APPEARS TO HARBOR TERRORISTS IN HIS OWN NATION.

TWO QUESTIONS. (A) SHOULD HE GO TO THIS? AND (B) IS HE AN ENEMY OF PEACE?

MS. SHELLY: SID, AS TO THE FIRST PART OF YOUR QUESTION ABOUT SHOULD HE GO, THIS IS AN INITIATIVE, AS YOU KNOW, OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK. HE EXTENDED THE INVITATIONS, AND I THINK THAT THAT'S A QUESTION APPROPRIATELY DIRECTED TO HIM.

ON SYRIA, WE STILL BELIEVE THAT THEY'RE COMMITTED TO THE PEACE PROCESS, BUT IT'S, I THINK, UP TO SYRIA TO MAKE PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT ITS INTENTIONS AT THIS POINT.

Q CHRISTINE, IS THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR COMING BACK TO WASHINGTON? IS THERE ANY PROSPECT FOR DIRECT TALKS

BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA TO RESUME?

MS. SHELLY: HE HAS NOT RETURNED TO WASHINGTON TO MY KNOWLEDGE, AND I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS CERTAINLY THE POSSIBILITY THAT DISCUSSIONS WILL RESUME IN PERHAPS A VARIETY OF DIFFERENT WAYS. I DON'T HAVE ANY ANNOUNCEMENTS TO SIGNAL ON THIS AT THIS POINT.

BUT AS THE SECRETARY ALSO SAID, I THINK LAST WEEK IN TESTIMONY, THAT IN ORDER TO HAVE PROGRESS ON THIS TRACK WE, OF COURSE, NEED TO ACCELERATE THE EFFORTS.

BETSY.

Q WILL THE U.S. BE TALKING WITH THE PARTIES FROM HERE, OR WILL DENNIS (ROSS) TRAVEL TO THE REGION?

MS. SHELLY: WE WILL NOT BE PARTICIPATING IN THIS SUMMIT, ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY, AS I MENTIONED A LREADY, WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PARTIES IN ADVANCE OF THIS INITIATIVE.

WE SHARE THE DESIRE OF THE FARTICIPATING PARTIES TO HAVE THE SUMMIT TAKE PLACE AT THIS TIME AND AT THIS LEVEL.

Q (INAUDIBLE) FOLLOW-UP ON DISCUSSIONS LEADING FROM THIS MEETING?

MS. SHELLY: YES, WE EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE A FOLLOW-UP TO THIS, BUT I DON'T HAVE SPECIFIC DETAILS ON THIS AT THIS POINT.

Q CHRISTINE, JUST TO FOLLOW UP ON THAT AND TO MAKE SURE I UNDERSTAND, THERE'S NO ONE FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WHO WILL BE REPRESENTED AT THESE TALKS IN ANY CAPACITY, EVEN --

MS. SHELLY: I SAID THE UNITED STATES IS NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE SUMMIT.

Q -- EVEN SITTING THERE WATCHING, EVEN OBSERVING?

MS. SHELLY: THE UNITED STATES IS NOT A PARTICIPANT.

Q WELL, IS THERE DIPLOMATICALLY A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE WORD "OBSERVE" AND "PARTICIPATE"?

MS. SHELLY: NO, I DON'T THINK SO. WE ARE NOT PARTICIPATING IN THIS EVENT.

Q CHRISTINE, WHAT DO YOU HOPE WILL COME OUT OF THIS SUMMIT? WHAT DOES THE UNITED STATES HOFE THIS SUMMIT WILL REACH? IS IT MORE SYMBOLIC, OR DO YOU HOPE THAT ANY SORT OF AGREEMENT WILL COME OUT OF IT?

MS. SHELLY: AGAIN, IT'S JUST TOO EARLY FOR ME TO ANSWER THAT. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS ONLY MADE TODAY AS I'VE MENTIONED. WE HAD BEEN IN VERY CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES AND WE EXPECT TO REMAIN SO. WE DO

EXPECT THAT SOME THINGS WILL BE COMING OUT OF THIS, BUT THE MEETING WILL BE TAKING PLACE TOMORROW. I THINK IT'S UP TO THE PARTICIPANTS IF THEY WISH TO GET OUT AND PUBLICLY DISCUSS THEIR EXPECTATIONS OR THEIR AGENDAS FOR THIS CONFERENCE.

I THINK THE FACT THAT THEY DECIDED THEY WANTED TO DO THIS, THEY AGREED TO MEET AND THEY'RE GOING AHEAD WITH IT, I THINK THAT CERTAINLY SENDS A VERY STRONG SIGNAL IN AND OF ITSELF. BUT I THINK WE'D LEAVE IT TO THOSE WHO ARE PARTICIPATING DIRECTLY IN IT TO SIGNAL OR TO DISCUSS, IF THEY CHOOSE, WHAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE COME OUT OF IT.

Q CHRISTINE MUBARAK WAS HOSTING LEADERS -- RABIN, ARAFAT, AND HUSSEIN -- BEFORE. WHAT IS THE REASON THAT THE SECRETARY IS PRAISING THIS HISTORIC EVENT? IS THIS THE ANSWER TO THE ALEXANDRIA SUMMIT BEFORE? IS THERE A SPECIAL, SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE TO THIS GATHERING THAT WAS NOT THERE IN THE PAST?

PAGE 20

MS. SHELLY: NO, I DON'T SEE ANY SPECIFIC LINKAGE BETWEEN THE ALEXANDRIA MEETING TO WHICH YOU REFERRED AND THIS ONE. I THINK, AGAIN, WE ANSWERED YOUR QUESTION VERY DIRECTLY.

THOSE WHO HAVE DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS MEETING TOMORROW HAVE SIGNAED THEIR DESIRE TO DO SO AND SPECIFICALLY TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES BEFORE THEM IN THE

CONTEXT OF THE ACTIONS, THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS OCCURRED, AND GIVING THEIR VERY STRONG SIGNAL THAT THEY WANT THE

PROCESS TO GO FORWARD AND THAT THE ENEMIES OF PEACE WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO SUCCEED.

Q LAST WEEK A BILL WAS SUBMITTED TO THE GREEK PARLIAMENT TO INCREASE GREEK TERRITORIAL WATERS TO 12 MILES. HOW DOES THE ADMINISTRATION VIEW THIS DEVELOPMENT?

MS. SHELLY: I'M NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS OF THE BILL. I'LL HAVE TO CHECK ON THAT.

BETSY.

Q TODAY THE UNITED STATES DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IS BEGINNING THE TRANSFER OF CUBANS FROM PANAMA BACK TO GUANTANAMO. WHAT IS OUR CONTINUING POLICY TOWARDS THESE PEOPLE? ARE WE CONSIDERING ALLOWING MORE OF THEM IN UNDER THE NEW VISA REQUIREMENTS THAT YOU ALL HAVE INSTITUTED TOWARDS CUBA? HOW LONG CAN THEY SIT THERE?

MS. SHELLY: THERE ISN'T A TIME LIMIT ON THAT. THE U.S. POLICY ON THIS REMAINS UNCHANGED. CUBANS UNDER U.S. GOVERNMENT SAFEHAVEN PROTECTION WILL NOT BE PROCESSED FOR ADMISSION TO THE U.S. THEY MAY REMAIN IN SAFEHAVEN INDEFINITELY OR, IF THEY'RE ELIGIBLE, THEY CAN BE RESETTLED IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

THEY MIGHT ALSO, AS YOU KNOW. WISH TO RETURN HOME VOLUNTARILY. THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS TO THIS POLICY ARE

THOSE WHICH WE PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED ON OCTOBER 14 AND ON DECEMBER 2, AND THOSE AFFECT CATEGORIES -- THE VERY OLD, THE CHRONICALLY SICK, CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES FOR WHOM A PROLONGED STAY IN SAFEHAVEN CONSTITUTES AN EXTREME HUMANITARIAN BURDEN. NO ONE WILL BE COMPELLED TO RETURN HOME AGAINST HIS OR HER WILL.

Q HAVE MORE CUBANS BEEN RETURNED HOME? AND ARE THE CUBANS ACCEPTING MORE READILY AFTER THE RECENT TALKS IN NEW YORK?

MS. SHELLY: IT'S MY IMPRESSION THAT THE FLOW HAS BEEN RELATIVELY STEADY ON THAT. I DON'T THINK I'VE GOT THE NUMBERS. LET ME GET THAT FOR YOU AFTER THE BRIEFING. I

PAGE 21

DON'T THINK I HAVE AN UPDATE ON THAT AT THE MOMENT ON HOW MANY HAVE GONE BACK.

IT'S MY IMPRESSION THAT MOST OF THOSE WHO HAVE ASKED TO GO BACK HAVE GONE OR ARE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEM TO GO BACK. THE SLOW PACE -- IN THE BEGINNING, ESPECIALLY -- WAS SOMETHING THAT WE HAD PREVIOUSLY NOTED, AND THAT WAS SOMETHING THAT WAS DISCUSSED IN THE LAST ROUND OF TALKS THAT WE HAD ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MIGRATION AGREEMENT. BUT I'LL SEE IF I CAN GET THE NUMBERS FOR YOU ON THAT A LITTLE BIT LATER.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 41 STATE 026906 020620Z

Q CHRISTINE, WHAT'S THE U.S. REACTION TO JUPPE'S PROPOSAL FOR A LAST-CHANCE, LAST-GASP INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BOSNIA?

MS. SHELLY: WE'RE STUDYING THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THIS WAS ONE OF A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE WAYS AHEAD WHICH THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER TOUCHED ON IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY WHEN HE WAS HERE A FEW DAYS AGO IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR EXCHANGES ON BOSNIA.

I DON'T HAVE A FORMAL REACTION AT THIS POINT. BUT I THINK, CLEARLY AS A KIND OF FIRST REACTION, ANY CONFERENCE OF THIS TYPE WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE TO BE VERY

WELL PREPARED. WE WOULD WANT TO KNOW HOW IT WOULD RELATE TO THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN. IT DOES REMAIN OUR VIEW THAT THE CONTACT GROUP MAP SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE PARTIES AS A STARTING POINT FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.

I THINK YOU'RE SEEING INDICATIONS IN THE FUBLIC DOMAIN, IN THE MEDIA, THAT A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT IDEAS ARE BEING BANDIED ABOUT. THERE IS CERTAINLY A VERY CLEAR CONSENSUS THAT SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE DONE TO GET THE PROCESS MOVING FORWARD, AND THIS -- I THINK THAT HIS IDEAS ON THIS ABOUT HAVING A CONFERENCE, THAT'S ONE OF THE POSSIBILITIES THAT HAS COME UP, AND WE CERTAINLY WILL BE TRYING TO GET MORE DETAILS ON HIS THINKING ON THIS.

Q HAS THE UNITED STATES PUT FORWARD AN PROPOSALS?

PAGE 42 STATE 026906 020620Z

MS. SHELLY: AS YOU KNOW, THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP, INCLUDING OUR OWN REPRESENTATIVE CHARLIE THOMAS, HAVE ALL GONE BACK TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS FOR CONSULTATIONS. WE HAVE BEEN MEETING WITH HIM AND TALKING ABOUT THE WAY AHEAD, AND ALSO CERTAINLY TOSSING AROUND SOME OF OUR OWN IDEAS ON THIS. BUT I DON'T HAVE ANY ANNOUNCEMENTS ON THIS AT THIS POINT.

Q AND SO FAR YOU HAVE NOT PUT FORWARD ANY SORT OF IDEAS TO THE OTHER CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS?

PAGE 22

MS. SHELLY: WE ARE REMAINING CERTAINLY IN VERY CLOSE CONTACT WITH THEM ON BOSNIA CERTAINLY WATCHING THE SITUATION OVERALL ON THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA -- POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVING THAT FORWARD. OBVIOUSLY ALSO WE'RE PAYING A LOT OF ATTENTION TO THE SITUATION IN CROATIA.

WE DON'T HAVE ANY HIGH-LEVEL GROUP MEETINGS OF THE CONTACT GROUP SCHEDULED FOR THIS POINT BUT WE COMMUNICATE WITH THEM FROM OUR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. WE WILL CERTAINLY REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH ON ALL OF THE ISSUES WHICH ARE UNDER STUDY, BUT I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING MORE FORMAL THAN THAT AT THIS POINT.

Q CHRISTINE, CAROL ASKED YOU IF THE UNITED STATES

HAD ANY NEW IDEAS. DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE ANY NEW IDEAS?

MS. SHELLY: SID, THE EFFORT TO CLARIFY IT OR CHARACTERIZE IT AS AN "IDEA"; THIS IS A VERY COMPLEX ISSUE. THERE ARE A LOT OF DIFFERENT POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THIS. CERTAINLY A LOT OF THOSE APPROACHES HAVE BEEN EXPLORED OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS AS THIS CONFLICT HAS FACED US. WE ALWAYS HAVE IDEAS. WE HAVE DIFFERENT WAYS THAT WE LOOK AT, WE EXAMINE WE DO INTERNAL VETTING AND DISCUSSION BEFORE WE PUT THEM ON THE TABLE WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THIS PROCESS.

BUT I'M CERTAINLY NOT GOING TO STAND UP HERE AND TELL YOU THAT WE HAVE NO MORE IDEAS.

Q MR. SILAJDZIC THE OTHER DAY RAISED AN IDEA WHICH WAS TO SET A DEADLINE. DO YOU HAVE SOME RESPONSE TO THAT? AND ALSO, JUST A READOUT OF HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY?

MS. SHELLY: WE'VE ALREADY ANSWERED THE DEADLINE QUESTION.

Q DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE -- I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOUR RESPONSE WAS ON THAT.

MS. SHELLY: THE ANSWER TO THE DEADLINE QUESTION IS THAT WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL AT THIS POINT TO SET A DEADLINE.

Q NOT USEFUL. DO YOU HAVE ANY MORE COMMENT THEN ON HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE?

UNCLASSIFIED

MS. SHELLY: NO, I DO NOT.

Q BECAUSE THERE WAS NO READOUT WHATSOEVER. IT IMPLIES THAT THEY HAD -- THEY DID NOT HAVE MANY POINTS OF AGREEMENT.

PAGE 23

MS. SHELLY: I BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS A READOUT ON THAT. I THINK WE --

Q HOLD IT. TWO DAYS RUNNING AND I DIDN'T GET IT.

MS. SHELLY: WE DID PUT SOMETHING UP ON A READOUT ON THAT. I'M NOT SURE I STILL HAVE THAT WITH ME.

THERE IS A READOUT ON THIS; I THINK WE DID IT AS A TAKEN QUESTION, BUT I DON'T HAVE THAT WITH ME. YOU CAN CHECK WITH THE PRESS OFFICE ON THAT.

Q YESTERDAY ON THE HILL MR. SILAJDZIC MENTIONED THAT ARMS WERE CONTINUING TO FLOW FROM SERBIA INTO BOSNIA AND HE GAVE THEIR OWN INTELLIGENCE FIGURES, WHICH INCLUDED TANKS THAT WERE REPAIRED, NEW EQUIPMENT, AND MANPOWER. THE FIGURES WERE CITED IN HIS TESTIMONY TO THE HILL. CAN YOU TAKE THIS AS A QUESTION TO SEE WHETHER THERE'S ANYTHING TO BEAR OUT WHAT HE SAID?

MS. SHELLY: I'M NOT GOING TO TAKE THAT AS A QUESTION. THAT'S HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT WE WOULD GET INTO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THAT GENERAL SUBJECT MATTER BECAUSE MOST OF THE INFORMATION WE WOULD HAVE WOULD COME FROM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, AND WE WOULD THEREFORE NOT COMMENT ON IT.

Q BUT THIS GOES RIGHT TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER

UNCLASSIFIED

THE SANCTIONS ARE BEING OBSERVED. I MEAN -, AND HE'S ALLEGING SPECIFIC VIOLATIONS AND HE'S GIVING SPECIFIC FIGURES. IT'S NOT SIMPLY A MATTER OF INTELLIGENCE; IT'S A MATTER OF WHETHER THE U.N RESOLUTIONS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT

MS. SHELLY: I DON'T HAVE THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT SO I'M NOT GOING TO COMMENT ON IT SPECIFICALLY.

Q WOULD YOU LIKE TO HAVE THE FIGURES?

MS. SHELLY: NO, NOT PARTICULARLY.

YES, BILL.

Q COULD I FOLLOW ON THAT? ON THAT GENERAL TOPIC OF WHERE DOES THE UNITED STATES STAND WITH REGARD TO EXTENDING THE CEASE-FIRE BEYOND -- NOT SETTING A DATE, AS YOU SAID, BUT EXTENDING THE CEASE-FIRE, MAINTAINING A STATUS QUO SITUATION? IS THAT SOMETHING THAT THIS GOVERNMENT WOULD FAVOR IN THAT BOSNIA SITUATION?

MS. SHELLY: NO. IN BOSNIA, IT IS CLEAR THAT OUR POLICY ON THAT IS UNCHANGED. WE'D LIKE TO SEE A PERMANENT RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS, WE'D LIKE TO SEE

NEGOTIATION,

PAGE 24

WE'D LIKE TO SEE THE BOSNIAN SERBS ACCEPT THE CONTACT GROUP MAP AND PLAN.

Q IN LIEU OF THAT, WOULD IT NOT BE WELL TO CONTINUE A CEASE-FIRE AND A STATUS QUO?

MS. SHELLY: I THINK THAT THE CEASE-FIRE IS CONTINUING AT THIS POINT. THE FIGHTING PICTURE, IN FACT, IS PROBABLY OVERALL SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN IT HAS BEEN FOR SOME TIME. UNPROFOR REPORTS THAT EVEN IN THE BIHAC POCKET FIGHTING HAS EASED WITHIN THE LAST 24

HOURS.

ACROSS BOSNIA, I THINK OVERALL THE CEASE-FIRE APPEARS TO BE HOLDING. SO THERE IS NOT -- THE FIGHTING PICTURE IS CERTAINLY NOT A NEGATIVE ONE AT THIS PARTICULAR JUNCTURE AND IT CERTAINLY OVERALL IS DRAMATICALLY IMPROVED FROM WHAT IT WAS SIX MONTHS AGO, A YEAR AGO.

IT PERHAPS IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SOME PROGRESS TO BE MADE ON THE FOLITICAL TRACK. THAT IS CERTAINLY WHAT WE'D LIKE TO SEE HAPPEN. BUT AGAIN, IT IS A SITUATION THAT WE ARE STILL INTENSELY ENGAGED IN AND SIMPLY NOT IN A POSITION RIGHT NOW TO INDICATE I THINK, IN MORE CONCRETE TERMS WHAT SOME OF OUR IDEAS ARE.

Q CHRISTINE, DO YOU HAVE ANY REACTION TO THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT REFUSING TO SEE THE GROUP ON THE CROATIAN SETTLEMENT -- AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH AND THE OTHERS?

MS. SHELLY: WE CERTAINLY WERE DISAPPOINTED BY THAT DECISION. WE THOUGHT THAT THE Z-4 PLAN REPRESENTED AN APPROACH VIS-A-VIS SOLVING THE PROBLEMS IN CROATIA THAT HAD VERY GOOD ELEMENTS IN IT AND THAT COULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AMONG THE VARIOUS PARTIES CONCERNED.

HE TURNED DOWN THE OFFER BY THE Z-4 TO GO AND EXPLAIN THEIR PROPOSAL. HE ARGUED THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN CROATIA WAS A MATTER FOR CROATIA AND FOR THE KRAJINA SERBS. OUR POSITION IS THAT IT'S NOT JUST THAT, THAT OBVIOUSLY WHERE MILOSEVIC STANDS IN THIS, I THINK, IS CERTAINLY A FACTOR THAT WOULD IMPACT ON THE ABILITY OF PLANS OF THAT KIND TO ACTUALLY BE STUDIED, NEGOTIATED, AND ULTIMATELY IMPLEMENTED.

WE BELIEVED IT WAS A VIABLE FRAMEWORK FOR BRINGING INCREASED STABILITY TO CROATIA, AND I THINK THAT WE WERE CERTAINLY DISAPPOINTED BY HIS DECISION NOT TO RECEIVE THE GROUP.

Q YESTERDAY U.S. AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY, MR. GROSSMAN, AT ONE PRESS CONFERENCE IN ANKARA HE SAID THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTS A PIPELINE FROM BAKU TO CEYHAN ON THE MEDITERRANEAN COAST. WE COULDN'T UNDERSTAND IT; WHICH

PART IS THE PIPELINE PASSING THROUGH? EITHER ARMENIA OR GEORGIA? WHAT IS YOUR SUPPORT, WHICH COUNTRY --

MS. SHELLY: I HAVEN'T SEEN HIS REMARKS, AND I'M NOT GOING TO GET ENGAGED ON THAT AT ALL UNTIL I'VE HAD A CHANCE TO SEE IT.

Q CAN YOU TAKE THIS QUESTION?

MS. SHELLY: I WILL LOOK AND SEE IF I CAN GET A TEXT OF HIS REMARKS, FIRST OF ALL, AND THEN I'LL SEE IF THERE'S SOMETHING WE'D WANT TO SAY.

Q THANK YOU.

Q JUST A SECOND. CHRISTINE, THIS IS A FOLLOW-UP FROM THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO TAKE THIS QUESTION.

MS. SHELLY: PROBABLY NOT, BECAUSE I'M NOT DOING THINGS RELATED TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT.

Q IT'S A GENERAL POLICY; THAT'S WHAT I CONSIDER IT.

MS. SHELLY: TRY ME, TRY ME.

Q THE L988 POSITION -- POLICY POSITION -- ON EAST TIMOR, IN WHICH YOU RECOGNIZED THE INCORPORATION IT'S A COMPLEX WORDING.

IN VIEW OF ALL THIS, COULD IT BE CHANGED OR REEVALUATED? THIS IS JUST A QUESTION.

MS. SHELLY: I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING WITH ME ON THIS. LET ME JUST LOOK INTO THIS AND SEE IF WE --

Q THE REEVALUATION OF THE L988 I THINK IT IS.

MS. SHELLY: LET ME JUST TAKE THE QUESTION.

Q THANKS VERY MUCH.

MS. SHELLY: THANKS.

END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4464

PAGE 01 STATE 031947 090423Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DS-00	INM-02	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-14	JUSE-00	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	USIE-00	DSCC-00	DRL-09	/030R

DRAFTED BY:EAP/P:JOHTA
APPROVED BY:EAP/P:JOHTA
----------A4AA83 090424Z /38
R 090418Z FEB 95
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USMISSION GENEVA

UNCLAS STATE 031947

FOLLOWING STATE 031947 DTD 07 FEB SENT ACTION
ALEAP COLL GUANGZHOU MEDAN PUSAN SHANGHAI SHENYANG
SURABAYA NSC USIA USUN INFO BONN LONDON MOSCOW
PARIS CINCPACFLT CHJUSMAG SEOUL COMUSKOREA SACINCUNC KS
USCINCUNC SEOUL SECDEF JOINT STAFF USCINCPAC USVIENNA
HQ USSPACRCOM CO RPTD FOR UR INFO.
QTE:

UNCLAS STATE 031947

USIA FOR EA P/G; TOKYO FOR KANEDA; MOSCOW FOR FERGIN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL OPRC XE US
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 031947 090423Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200504416

SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 7 PRESS GUIDANCE FOR THE EAP REGION
REF: (A) 95 JAKARTA 1083

ALL POSTS -- ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA SALMON
USVIENNA FOR UNVIE
PARIS FOR ZEYA
USSPACECOM FOR RICHARDSON
BEIJING -- PASS CHENGDU

1. JAKARTA -- SEE PARA 7 FOR PRESS GUIDANCE REQUESTED IN REFTEL.

2. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 2/7/95. ACTING SPOKESMAN CHRISTINE SHELLY USED PARA 3 AND THE FIRST ANSWER IN PARA 4 AT THE BRIEFING THAT DAY. THE REMAINDER MAY BE USED ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

3. KOREA: FOREIGN MINISTER GONG'S VISIT

Q. WHAT DID THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER GONG DISCUSS AT THEIR MEETING YESTERDAY?

A. GONG RO-MYUNG, SOUTH KOREA'S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, MET WITH THE SECRETARY FOR A WORKING LUNCH ON FEBRUARY 6, THE FIRST DAY OF A TWO-DAY VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

-- THE MINISTERS REVIEWED WORK THUS FAR TO IMPLEMENT THE US-NORTH KOREA AGREED FRAMEWORK, STRESSING THE

NEED FOR PROGRESS TOWARD RESUMPTION OF CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA.

-- THEY AGREED THAT INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND IS ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

-- FOREIGN MINISTER GONG RECONFIRMED THE ROK'S READINESS TO PLAY THE CENTRAL ROLE IN THE PROVISION OF LIGHT WATER REACTORS, AS CALLED FOR IN THE AGREED FRAMEWORK. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AGREED THAT THE REACTORS WILL BE DESIGNED AND BUILT BY SOUTH KOREA.

4. U.S.-DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK: LWR'S

Q. HAVE THE NORTH KOREANS REJECTED ROK LIGHT WATER REACTORS TO REPLACE THE CURRENT GRAPHITE-MODERATED REACTORS?

A. AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND OF LWR CONTRACT TALKS, ONE OF THE ISSUES YET TO BE RESOLVED WAS THAT OF THE TYPE OF REACTOR TO BE PROVIDED BY KEDO TO THE DPRK.

-- THE LWR TALKS ARE SCHEDULED TO RESUME IN MARCH IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE THIS AND OTHER REMAINING ISSUES.

-- THE NORTH KOREANS ARE WELL AWARE OF THE U.S. POSITION THAT THE SOUTH KOREAN MODEL REACTOR IS THE ONLY OPTION FOR THE LWR PROJECT.

Q. DOES THE NORTH KOREAN REJECTION OF THE ROK LWR DESIGN ENDANGER THE AGREED FRAMEWORK?

A. THE TALKS ON THE LWR PROJECT WILL CONTINUE IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES SUCH AS THE TYPE OF REACTOR TO BE PROVIDED BY KEDO TO THE DPRK.

-- AS SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID YESTERDAY IN WELCOMING ROK FOREIGN MINISTER GONG TO WASHINGTON, "THERE ARE SO MANY POSITIVE ELEMENTS OF" THE AGREED FRAMEWORK; "IT BEHOOVES US TO WORK VERY HARD AND EFFECTIVELY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION ....THAT IS WHAT HAS BEEN GOING ON IN RECENT DAYS AND WEEKS."

5. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES, ALSO PREPARED ON 2/7/95, WERE NOT USED AT THE BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THEM ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

6. CHINA: PRISON LABOR

Q. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF PRISON LABOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CHINA?

A. U.S. LAW PROHIBITS IMPORTS OF GOODS MADE BY PRISON LABOR, AND I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE FOR A STATUS REPORT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

EFFORTS.

-- SECTION 6 (C) OF THE 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR CHINA RELEASED LAST WEEK POINTS OUT THAT IN ADDITION TO PRISONS AND REFORM THROUGH LABOR FACILITIES, WHICH CONTAIN INMATES SENTENCED THROUGH JUDICIAL PROCEDURES, CHINA ALSO MAINTAINS A NETWORK OF "REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR" CAMPS, WHERE INMATES ARE SENTENCED THROUGH NONJUDICIAL PROCEDURES.

-- INMATES OF THESE REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR FACILITIES ARE GENERALLY REQUIRED TO WORK. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS HAVE SAID THAT IN REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR FACILITIES THERE IS A MUCH HEAVIER EMPHASIS ON EDUCATION THAN ON LABOR.

-- MOST REPORTS CONCLUDE THAT WORK CONDITIONS IN THE PENAL SYSTEM'S LIGHT MANUFACTURING FACTORIES ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE IN ORDINARY FACTORIES, BUT CONDITIONS ON FARMS AND IN MINES CAN BE HARSH. AS IN MOST CHINESE WORKPLACES, SAFETY IS NOT A HIGH PRIORITY.

-- SOME PENAL FACILITIES CONTRACT WITH REGULAR INDUSTRIES FOR PRISONERS TO PERFORM LIGHT MANUFACTURING AND ASSEMBLY WORK.

-- IN 1991 THE GOVERNMENT PUBLISHED A REITERATION OF ITS REGULATIONS BARRING THE EXPORT OF PRISON-MADE GOODS. ON AUGUST 7, 1992, THE U.S. AND CHINESE

GOVERNMENTS SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) PROHIBITING TRADE IN PRISON LABOR PRODUCTS. A STATEMENT OF COOPERATION DETAILING SPECIFIC WORKING PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOU WAS AGREED TO AND SIGNED ON MARCH 14, 1994.

7. INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR EXECUTIONS

Q. HAS THE U.S. RAISED WITH THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT THE ALLEGATION THAT EAST TIMORESE CITIZENS WERE EXECUTED LAST MONTH BY INDONESIAN MILITARY FORCES?

A. WE ARE AWARE OF THE ALLEGATIONS AND HAVE RAISED THEM WITH THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT AN INVESTIGATION IS IN PROGRESS.

IF PRESSED:

-- WE WILL NOT HAVE ANY COMMENT UNTIL MORE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE.

CHRISTOPHER
UQNTE CHRISTOPHER

NNNN
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>
PTQ8660

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8660

PAGE 01 STATE 031947 072306Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	CTME-00	OASY-00
	DS-00	EUR-01	INM-02	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-14	JUSE-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04	DSCC-00	DRL-09
	/038R						

DRAFTED BY: EAP/P: KRWALKIN
APPROVED BY: EAP/P: JOHTA
----------A41863 072308Z /38
O P 072305Z FEB 95
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL MEDAN IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL PUSAN IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS// PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 031947 072306Z
SACINCUNC KS PRIORITY
USCINCUNC SEOUL KS PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
HQ USSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO//POLAD// PRIORITY
USMISSION USVIENNA PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 031947

USIA FOR EA P/G; TOKYO FOR KANEDA; MOSCOW FOR FERGIN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL OPRC XE US
SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 7 PRESS GUIDANCE FOR THE EAP REGION
REF: (A) 95 JAKARTA 1083

ALL POSTS -- ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA SALMON
USVIENNA FOR UNVIE
PARIS FOR ZEYA
USSPACECOM FOR RICHARDSON
BEIJING -- PASS CHENGDU

1. JAKARTA -- SEE PARA 7 FOR PRESS GUIDANCE REQUESTED IN REFTEL.

2. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 2/7/95. ACTING SPOKESMAN CHRISTINE SHELLY USED PARA 3 AND THE FIRST ANSWER IN PARA 4 AT THE BRIEFING THAT DAY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 031947 072306Z
THE REMAINDER MAY BE USED ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

3. KOREA: FOREIGN MINISTER GONG'S VISIT

Q. WHAT DID THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER GONG DISCUSS AT THEIR MEETING YESTERDAY?

A. GONG RO-MYUNG, SOUTH KOREA'S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, MET WITH THE SECRETARY FOR A WORKING LUNCH ON FEBRUARY 6, THE FIRST DAY OF A TWO-DAY VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

-- THE MINISTERS REVIEWED WORK THUS FAR TO IMPLEMENT THE US-NORTH KOREA AGREED FRAMEWORK, STRESSING THE NEED FOR PROGRESS TOWARD RESUMPTION OF CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA.

-- THEY AGREED THAT INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND IS ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

-- FOREIGN MINISTER GONG RECONFIRMED THE ROK'S READINESS TO PLAY THE CENTRAL ROLE IN THE PROVISION OF LIGHT WATER REACTORS, AS CALLED FOR IN THE AGREED FRAMEWORK. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AGREED THAT THE REACTORS WILL BE DESIGNED AND BUILT BY SOUTH KOREA.

4. U.S.-DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK: LWR'S

Q. HAVE THE NORTH KOREANS REJECTED ROK LIGHT WATER REACTORS TO REPLACE THE CURRENT GRAPHITE-MODERATED REACTORS?

A. AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND OF LWR CONTRACT TALKS, ONE OF THE ISSUES YET TO BE RESOLVED WAS THAT OF THE TYPE OF REACTOR TO BE PROVIDED BY KEDO TO THE DPRK.

-- THE LWR TALKS ARE SCHEDULED TO RESUME IN MARCH IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE THIS AND OTHER REMAINING ISSUES.

-- THE NORTH KOREANS ARE WELL AWARE OF THE U.S. POSITION THAT THE SOUTH KOREAN MODEL REACTOR IS THE ONLY OPTION FOR THE LWR PROJECT.

Q. DOES THE NORTH KOREAN REJECTION OF THE ROK LWR DESIGN ENDANGER THE AGREED FRAMEWORK?

A. THE TALKS ON THE LWR PROJECT WILL CONTINUE IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES SUCH AS THE TYPE OF REACTOR TO BE PROVIDED BY KEDO TO THE DPRK.

-- AS SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID YESTERDAY IN WELCOMING ROK FOREIGN MINISTER GONG TO WASHINGTON, "THERE ARE SO MANY POSITIVE ELEMENTS OF" THE AGREED FRAMEWORK; "IT BEHOOVES US TO WORK VERY HARD AND EFFECTIVELY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION ....THAT IS WHAT HAS BEEN GOING ON IN RECENT DAYS

AND WEEKS."

5. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES, ALSO PREPARED ON 2/7/95, WERE NOT USED AT THE BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THEM ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

6. CHINA: PRISON LABOR

Q. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF PRISON LABOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CHINA?

A. U.S. LAW PROHIBITS IMPORTS OF GOODS MADE BY PRISON LABOR, AND I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE FOR A STATUS REPORT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS.

-- SECTION 6 (C) OF THE 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR CHINA RELEASED LAST WEEK POINTS OUT THAT IN ADDITION TO PRISONS AND REFORM THROUGH LABOR FACILITIES, WHICH CONTAIN INMATES SENTENCED THROUGH JUDICIAL PROCEDURES, CHINA ALSO MAINTAINS A NETWORK OF "REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR"

CAMPS, WHERE INMATES ARE SENTENCED THROUGH NONJUDICIAL PROCEDURES.

-- INMATES OF THESE REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR FACILITIES ARE GENERALLY REQUIRED TO WORK. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS HAVE SAID THAT IN REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR FACILITIES THERE IS A MUCH HEAVIER EMPHASIS ON EDUCATION THAN ON LABOR.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-- MOST REPORTS CONCLUDE THAT WORK CONDITIONS IN THE PENAL SYSTEM'S LIGHT MANUFACTURING FACTORIES ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE IN ORDINARY FACTORIES, BUT CONDITIONS ON FARMS AND IN MINES CAN BE HARSH. AS IN MOST CHINESE WORKPLACES, SAFETY IS NOT A HIGH PRIORITY.

-- SOME PENAL FACILITIES CONTRACT WITH REGULAR INDUSTRIES FOR PRISONERS TO PERFORM LIGHT MANUFACTURING AND ASSEMBLY WORK.

-- IN 1991 THE GOVERNMENT PUBLISHED A REITERATION OF ITS REGULATIONS BARRING THE EXPORT OF PRISON-MADE GOODS. ON AUGUST 7, 1992, THE U.S. AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) PROHIBITING TRADE IN PRISON LABOR PRODUCTS. A STATEMENT OF COOPERATION DETAILING SPECIFIC WORKING PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOU WAS AGREED TO AND SIGNED ON MARCH 14, 1994.

7. INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR EXECUTIONS

Q. HAS THE U.S. RAISED WITH THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT THE ALLEGATION THAT EAST TIMORESE CITIZENS WERE EXECUTED LAST MONTH BY INDONESIAN MILITARY FORCES?

A. WE ARE AWARE OF THE ALLEGATIONS AND HAVE RAISED THEM WITH THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT AN INVESTIGATION IS IN PROGRESS.

IF PRESSED:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-- WE WILL NOT HAVE ANY COMMENT UNTIL MORE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE.

CHRISTOPHER

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ7058

PAGE 01 STATE 069773 220235Z
ORIGIN SA-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

DRAFTED BY: SA/PAB:CWWEBSTER:RMS
APPROVED BY: SA/PAB:LOCOLDREN
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
SA/PAB ONLY; THREE COPIES ONLY
----------B2FF82 220242Z /38
O 220225Z MAR 95
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 069773

FOR DCM AND CONSULS GENERAL FROM SA/PAB LEE O. COLDREN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PK, US
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

1. PARA 2 CONTAINS THE TEXT OF DRL A/S SHATTUCK'S MARCH 16 TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HIRC'S ASIA AND PACIFIC AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE

2. BEGIN TEXT:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 069773 220235Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUL 2006 200504416

MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN ASIA WITH YOU. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THIS DYNAMIC REGION IS A KEY ELEMENT OF U.S. POLICY FOR THE REGION. WE ARE COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH THE CONGRESS TO DEVISE THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ADVANCING THIS INTEREST WITHIN OUR MORE GENERAL ASIA POLICY.

I WILL ADDRESS SOME KEY ASIAN COUNTRIES IN MY REMARKS, AND USE THEM TO ILLUSTRATE SOME GENERAL FEATURES THAT I BELIEVE WE CAN DISTINGUISH IN THE REGION, BUT WE MUST REMEMBER THAT EACH OF THE SEVERAL DOZEN SOCIETIES HERE IS QUITE DISTINCT - AND THAT DISTINCTIVENESS SHAPES OUR BILATERAL DIPLOMACY.

AN OVERVIEW

BEFORE LOOKING AT THE SPECIFIC SITUATIONS OF KEY COUNTRIES, AND THE MEANS WE HAVE AVAILABLE TO AFFECT THOSE SITUATIONS, I WILL ATTEMPT TO MAKE A GENERAL ASSESSMENT. CATEGORIZATION OF THE LARGE ARRAY OF COUNTRIES THAT MAKE UP THE REGION FROM THE STANDPOINT OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IS AT ONCE SIMPLE AND COMPLEX. THE EXTREMES ARE EASY TO IDENTIFY; THERE ARE DEMOCRACIES THAT EQUAL THOSE ELSEWHERE, SUCH AS JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA AND THERE ARE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES WHOSE ONLY CONCESSION TO DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS LIES IN THEIR NAMES OR THEIR PAPER CONSTITUTIONS. WITHIN THESE EXTREMES IS A VERY DIVERSE COLLECTION OF NATIONS AND STANDARDS OF ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT.

INDIA, FOR EXAMPLE, IS THE WORLD'S LARGEST DEMOCRACY AND ONE OF THE OLDEST IN ASIA, BUT HAS A VERY PROBLEMATIC RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE PHILIPPINES AND SOUTH KOREA ARE VALUED DEMOCRATIC PARTNERS OF THE U.S. AND INDEED, OUR ALLIANCES WITH THEM HAVE BEEN MADE STRINGER THAN EVER BY THEIR DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS. THAILAND, CAMBODIA, MONGOLIA AND SRI LANKA HAVE MADE TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY BUT HAVE VARYING RECORDS IN PRACTICE OF ADHERENCE TO

DEMOCRATIC STANDARDS AND QUITE DISPARATE HISTORIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

IN A NUMBER OF STATES CIRCUMSTANCES ARE LESS ENCOURAGING; ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS STRIFE OR IDEOLOGY OR SIMPLE DESIRE FOR POWER HAS ALL TOO FREQUENTLY RESTRICTED THE OPERATION OF DEMOCRACY OR SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS. AMONG THOSE WE COULD CITE IS INDONESIA, WHERE AN AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT RULES DESPITE A VENEER OF DEMOCRACY, AND WHERE THERE ARE MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH BOTH HUMAN AND WORKER RIGHTS AS WELL. HUMAN RIGHTS ARE ROUTINELY VIOLATED ON A LARGE SCALE IN AFGHANISTAN. IN PAKISTAN, RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC RIVALRIES HAVE RESULTED IN NUMEROUS MURDERS, BOMBINGS, AND CIVIL DISTURBANCES, WITH OVER A THOUSAND PEOPLE KILLED IN THE LAST YEAR IN THE CITY OF KARACHI ALONE.

AT THE ABSOLUTIST END OF THE SPECTRUM LIE CHINA, BURMA, AND VIETNAM. BECAUSE OF ITS SIZE AND INFLUENCE, CHINA'S FUTURE DEVELOPMENT WILL HAVE ENORMOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REGION AND THE WORLD. NORTH KOREA HAS SEALED ITSELF FROM THE WORLD. NOT ONLY ONE-PARTY BUT ONE-MAN RULE HAS BEEN

THE ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE OF THE STATE. THE NORTH KOREAN DICTATORSHIP MAINTAINS EXTREMELY TIGHT CONTROLS OVER ITS CITIZENS.

VIETNAM IS ALSO A ONE-PARTY STATE, AND ITS GOVERNMENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUBSTANTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. IT IS OPENING TO THE WEST, HOWEVER, AND WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE, WHICH WILL BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR OWN DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM. FINALLY I WOULD CITE BURMA, WHERE A POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY WAS CRUSHED BY THE MILITARY IN 1990 THIS AUTHORITARIAN REGIME CONTINUES YEAR AFTER YEAR TO SHOW A CALLOUS DISREGARD FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES THAT OCCUR IN THE STATES I HAVE HIGHLIGHTED OFTEN DOMINATE THE NEWS. THESE ABUSES ARE SERIOUS AND WIDESPREAD, AND IT IS FITTING THAT THEY DRAW

THE ATTENTION OF THE PRESS. BUT THERE IS ANOTHER SIDE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS STORY IN ASIA, WHICH DOES NOT RECEIVE THE ATTENTION IT MERITS. THERE ARE MORE AND MORE SIGNS THAT THE CENTER OF GRAVITY IN ASIAN SOCIETIES DOES NOT REST PERMANENTLY WITH THE AUTHORITARIANS. INTERNAL PRESSURES FOR CHANGE ARE CONFRONTING EVEN THE STERNEST REGIMES. PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS ARE SPEAKING OUT AND MAKING KNOWN THEIR COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS EVEN WHEN THE COSTS ARE HIGH. WE SEE THOSE PRESSURES NOW IN CHINA, BURMA, AND VIETNAM, AND I AM SURE THEY WILL COME IN NORTH KOREA. IT IS OUR TASK TO ENSURE THAT THE U.S. CONTINUES TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROGRESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY AS THESE SOCIETIES TRANSFORM THEMSELVES. THERE

WILL BE PROGRESS AND THERE WILL BE SERIOUS BACKSLIDING. IT IS, HOWEVER, INCUMBENT ON US TO TAKE THE LONG VIEW AND NOT BECOME TOO DISCOURAGED BY SETBACKS OR TOO COMPLACENT IN THE FACE OF PROGRESS.

U.S. POLICY GOALS AND STRATEGIES

BEFORE I DISCUSS SPECIFIC COUNTRIES, I WILL BRIEFLY ADDRESS TWO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES IN ASIA. FIRST WE ARE NOT TRYING TO IMPOSE A WESTERN FORM OF SOCIETY OR IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THESE IDEALS ARE REFLECTED IN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS SUBSCRIBED TO BY ASIAN GOVERNMENTS AS WELL AS OTHERS. I WOULD QUOTE SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S REMARK ABOUT THIS LAST YEAR: "COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY IS NEITHER OCCIDENTAL NOR ACCIDENTAL. WE ARE NOT IMPOSING AN AMERICAN MODEL; WE ARE SUPPORTING A UNIVERSAL IMPULSE FOR FREEDOM."

SECOND, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IS IN OUR VIEW, IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES, AS OF ALL NATIONS. OUR SHARED ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS IN ASIA ARE BEST SERVED IN THE LONG RUN BY A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORDER THAT RESPECTS THE RULE OF LAW, WHERE FREEDOM OF SPEECH IS A SAFETY VALVE, AND WHERE GOVERNMENT IS ACCOUNTABLE TO ITS CITIZENS.

AS HISTORY HAS SHOWN, DEMOCRACIES SELDOM IF EVER MAKE WAR ON EACH OTHER. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR INTERESTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA AND OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS THERE. TRADE RELATIONS IN

THEMSELVES ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR VIGOROUS HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TRADE AND THE ACCOMPANYING SOCIAL MOBILITY DO NOT SUFFICE TO CREATE POLITICAL PLURALISM. THEY DO, HOWEVER, CREATE POWERFUL PRESSURES FOR POLITICAL CHANGE. FREE AND OPEN MARKETS NEED OPEN SOCIETIES THAT RESPECT BASIC RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW.

ASSERTIONS CONTINUE TO BE HEARD, SOMETIMES FROM SENIOR OFFICIALS IN ASIA, THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MUST TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER DEMOCRACY OR RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. THIS POSITED TRADEOFF IS ULTIMATELY FALSE. IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS AN INTEREST IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN ASIA THAT IT PROMOTES HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT. PRESIDENT CLINTON EXPLAINED THIS ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE FOR THE APEC SUMMIT IN JAKARTA LAST NOVEMBER:

"IN SOCIETIES WHERE THE RULE OF LAW PREVAILS, WHERE GOVERNMENTS ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO THEIR PEOPLE AND WHERE IDEAS AND INFORMATION FREELY CIRCULATE, WE ARE MORE LIKELY TO FIND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL STABILITY."

TOOLS FOR PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

HOW CAN WE PROMOTE THESE CENTRAL GOALS? THROUGHOUT THE WORLD THE UNITED STATES PURSUES A BROAD-BASED APPROACH TO PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT MY BUREAU WORKS CLOSELY WITH THE REGIONAL BUREAUS TO FASHION PLANS APPROPRIATE FOR EACH COUNTRY AND ISSUE, ALONG WITH MULTILATERAL APPROACHES WHERE THIS WOULD

BE EFFECTIVE. AND I CHAIR THE NEW INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP ON DEMOCRACY TO COORDINATE DEMOCRACY-PROMOTION ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

BILATERAL DIPLOMACY IS THE FOUNDATION OF OUR INTERNATIONA DIALOGUE. THERE ARE INTENSIVE DIALOGUES ON HUMAN RIGHTS WITH CHINA, VIETNAM, AND INDONESIA, WHICH I PLAN TO VISIT NEXT MONTH. BEYOND THE HEADLINES, WE REGULARLY RAISE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WITH INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS, FOR EXAMPLE, ENCOURAGING THE THAI GOVERNMENT TO PASS NEW LEGISLATION AMENDING THE 1991 LABOR LAW THAT CONSTRICTED WORKER RIGHTS THERE. WE ARE ALSO DISCUSSING CONTINUING CONCERNS ABOUT WORKER RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, AND PAKISTAN.

FOLLOWING A 1993 WORLDWIDE DIRECTIVE BY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, A SYSTEM OF EMBASSY-BASED WORKING GROUPS HAS BEEN OPERATING TO COORDINATE REPORTING AND DEVELOPMENT OF ACTION PLANS FOCUSED ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY ISSUES SPECIFIC TO THE HOST COUNTRY. MEASURABLE BENCHMARK ACTIVITIES ARE BUILT INTO THESE PLANS. WHICH ARE REVIEWED AND ADJUSTED PERIODICALLY. OUR ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PLAY A RELATED ROLE IN THIS BILATERAL DIPLOMACY. THEY ARE A GUIDE FOR THE EMBASSY WORKING GROUPS, AND THEY ARE WIDELY PUBLICIZED THROUGHOUT ASIA AND READ BY GOVERNMENTS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS. BOTH OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE SOURCES OFTEN ISSUE STATEMENTS ACKNOWLEDGING THE REPORTS; EVEN IN THEIR ASSERTIONS CRITICIZING THE REPORTS, SOME GOVERNMENTS FOR THE FIRST TIME ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED TO CONFORM TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS.

OUR BILATERAL DEMOCRACY STRATEGIES TARGET KEY "COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION" ACROSS ASIA WITH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT IN MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL

EFFORTS CONCENTRATED ON ACCOUNTABILITY AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. IN CAMBODIA, FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE PLEDGED DOLLARS 40 MILLION IN 1995 TO ADVANCE THESE GOALS. THE USAID PROGRAM FOCUSES IN FOUR AREAS: POPULATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH, INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT, BUILDING DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTING BROAD-BASED ECONOMIC GROWTH. THROUGH THE DEMOCRACY INITIATIVES PROJECT (DOLLARS 15 MILLION OVER 5 YEARS), WE WILL WORK TO STRENGTHEN PUBLIC AND NGO INSTITUTIONS IN TRANSITION TO A DEMOCRATIC AND FREE MARKET SOCIETY. ASSISTANCE IS PROVIDED THROUGH ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE ASIA FOUNDATION AND THE ASIAN-AMERICAN FREE LABOR INSTITUTE. WE ALSO GRANTED DOLLARS 500,000 TO YALE UNIVERSITY IN JANUARY FOR THE SUPPORT OF WORK RELATED TO THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE JUSTICE ACT PASSED BY THE CONGRESS IN 1994. IN MONGOLIA WE HAVE SUPPORTED A VARIETY OF ACTIVITIES TO ASSIST THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS, AND WHILE OUR FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT BUDGET NO LONGER INCLUDES

MONGOLIA, WE WILL REMAIN COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS THERE.

MULTILATERAL APPROACHES CAN SOMETIMES BE AN EFFECTIVE COMPLEMENT TO UNILATERAL PRESSURE. IN PARTICULAR, WE ARE TRYING TO MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF THE UN SYSTEM WHERE WE ARE ASKING FOR GREATER SUPPORT FROM ASIAN DEMOCRACIES. WE WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN CREATING THE NEW POSITION OF UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAST YEAR, AND HAVE

SUPPORTED HIS WORK. WE HAVE SUCCESSFULLY CALLED FOR SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS ON PROBLEMS SUCH AS TORTURE, RACISM, ARBITRARY DETENTION, EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS AND RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE (AND THE LATTER HAS RECENTLY VISITED CHINA). IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WE SPONSORED OR SUPPORTED KEY RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS FOCUSED ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN ASIA, INCLUDING CHINA, BURMA AND EAST TIMOR. THIS YEAR FOR THE FIRST TIME, CHINA FAILED TO PREVENT ACTION ON THE RESOLUTION, WHICH LOST BY ONLY ONE VOTE. WE ARE ALSO ENCOURAGING THE EFFORTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS TO VISIT POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SOME ASIAN COUNTRIES, SUCH AS CHINA, INDONESIA AND INDIA.

ALTHOUGH WE PREFER TO COOPERATE POSITIVELY WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS, WE HAVE AVAILABLE A RANGE OF NEGATIVE INDUCEMENTS, TO USE WHEN NECESSARY. THESE INCLUDE TRADE SANCTIONS, OPPOSITION TO LOANS BY MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS, REDUCTION OF U.S. ECONOMIC OR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, REDUCTION OR SUSPENSION OF SENIOR-LEVEL VISITS, PROHIBITION OF SOME OR ALL MILITARY SALES, AND TERMINATION OF OPIC COVERAGE AND EXIM LENDING. PRIVILEGES OF DUTY-FREE EXPORTS TO THE U.S. UNDER THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP) ARE CONDITIONED, IN PART UPON COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS BY THE EXPORTING COUNTRY. EXAMPLES OF THESE METHODS INCLUDE OUR OPPOSITION TO LOANS TO CHINA EXCEPT FOR PROJECTS AIMED AT BASIC HUMAN NEEDS, AND TO BURMA; OUR RESTRICTIONS ON OFFICIAL VISITS TO NORTH KOREA AND BURMA; OUR GSP REVIEWS OF INDONESIA AND PAKISTAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES; AND OUR CALIBRATED ARMS SALES POLICY WHICH AFFECTS SEVERAL STATES

UNCLASSIFIED

IN THE REGION.

OUR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUPPORTS THESE BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS. U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE STRESSED HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY CONCERNS IN REGIONAL SETTINGS SUCH AS THE ASEAN POST-MINISTERIAL MEETINGS IN BANGKOK IN JULY 1994 AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE APEC MEETINGS IN JAKARTA LAST

NOVEMBER. AFTER THOSE MEETINGS, SECRETARIES CHRISTOPHER AND BROWN HELD PRODUCTIVE MEETINGS WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION THERE. OFFICIALS WHO VISIT ASIA INCLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY MESSAGES IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF LOCAL DEFENDERS OF FREEDOM AND TO REMIND PUBLIC OFFICIALS OF THEIR IMPORTANCE. THERE IS A STRONG DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONTENT IN VOA BROADCASTING, AND RESOURCES ARE FOCUSED ON RELATIVELY CLOSED SOCIETIES. IN ADDITION RADIO FREE ASIA HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED AND FUNDING APPROPRIATED BY THE CONGRESS.

COOPERATION WITH U.S. NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IS VITAL. THEY CONDUCT THEIR OWN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS AND PROVIDE CRITICAL FEEDBACK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS. AMONG THE ORGANIZATIONS WITH PROGRAMS IN ASIA ARE THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, THE ASIA FOUNDATION AND THE ASIAN-AMERICAN FREE LABOR INSTITUTE ALL OF WHICH RECEIVE SUPPORT FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND WORK WITH GRASSROOTS ASIAN NGOS. WE HAVE ALSO CONSULTED WITH THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY, WHICH HAS A STAKE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW BECAUSE IT IS THE BEST GUARANTEE THAT

CONTRACTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS WILL BE RESPECTED. U.S. BUSINESSES ARE ALSO IMPORTANT IN ENSURING RESPECT FOR WORKER RIGHTS.

WE ALSO SEEK PARTNERSHIPS WITH ASIAN DEMOCRACIES TO FACILITATE COOPERATION ON MUTUAL OBJECTIVES, AND LOOK FOR REGIONAL INITIATIVES TO SUPPORT, SUCH AS THE ASEAN COLLOQUIUM ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH RECOMMENDED THAT ASEAN FORM ITS OWN SUBREGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. WE HAVE ALSO SUPPORTED INITIATIVES BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS, SUCH AS THE FORUM FOR DEMOCRATIC LEADERS ESTABLISHED IN DECEMBER 1994 BY THE KIM DAE JUNG PEACE FOUNDATION (KOREA) WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF PROMOTING ASIAN DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY. FINALLY, WE ARE WORKING WITH ASIAN WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS TO PREPARE FOR THE UN WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN TO BE HELD IN SEPTEMBER 1995 IN BEIJING.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

WE HAVE ALSO FOCUSED ON THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION AND DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS. OUR MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAMS RECENTLY HAVE BEEN RESTRUCTURED TO INCORPORATE THIS. DIRECT TRAINING (FORMERLY CALLED INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING OR IMET) NOW INCLUDES TRAINING FOR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICES (AND TO

SOME EXTENT CIVILIANS) IN A VARIETY OF DISCIPLINES AND SUBJECTS, INCLUDING RULE OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE FUNCTION OF THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. THESE PROGRAMS INCREASE OUR INFLUENCE ON BOTH MILITARY AND

CIVILIAN LEADERS THROUGHOUT THE REGION. THEY CAN ADVANCE INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND THE SUPPORTIVE SUBORDINATE ROLE OF THE MILITARY TO CIVILIAN AUTHORITY. AND THEY TAKE PLACE IN THE U.S., EXPOSING THE PARTICIPANTS TO AMERICANS AND OUR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.

U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS WHO VISIT THE REGION OR INTERACT IN OTHER WAYS WITH THEIR MILITARY COUNTERPARTS INCLUDE MATERIAL ON THESE ISSUES IN THEIR TALKING POINTS, TO ENSURE THAT THE MESSAGE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN MAINTAINING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IS CONVEYED TO MILITARY AUDIENCES.

KEY COUNTRIES IN 1994

I WOULD NOW LIKE TO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS IN A FEW KEY COUNTRIES IN MORE DETAIL, AND AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDE YOU WITH A SYNOPSIS OF OUR COUNTRY POLICIES AND STRATEGIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY.

CHINA

CHINA, THE LARGEST AND MOST POPULOUS COUNTRY IN ASIA, CONTINUES TO ENGAGE IN VERY SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. AS WE NOTED IN OUR ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, 1994 BROUGHT NO IMPROVEMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CHINA. THERE CONTINUED TO BE WIDESPREAD AND WELL-DOCUMENTED EXAMPLES OF THE AUTHORITIES' INTOLERANCE OF DISSENT AND SHARP RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH,

ASSOCIATION, AND RELIGION. ADDITIONAL ABUSES INCLUDE INSTANCES OF TORTURE, ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION WITHOUT PUBLIC TRIAL LONG DETENTION OF TIBETANS FOR PEACEFULLY EXPRESSING THEIR POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS VIEWS, AND THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PERSONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH.

WE ALSO REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS OF COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING PRACTICES, PARTICULARLY IN RURAL AREAS OF CHINA. THIS ISSUE IS REGULARLY BROUGHT UP DURING OUR HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE. I HAVE ALSO RAISED THIS ISSUE AT RELEVANT CHINESE MINISTRIES, AS HAVE OTHERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION, INCLUDING UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH. PHYSICAL COMPULSION TO

SUBMIT TO ABORTION OR STERILIZATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED, BUT CHINESE OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGE PRIVATELY THAT THERE ARE INSTANCES WHERE IT OCCURS. OFFICIALS HAVE ALSO MAINTAINED THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE ARE DISCIPLINED AND UNDERGO RETRAINING. WE HAVE ASKED THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT FOR EXAMPLES OF CASES WHERE SUCH DISCIPLINE HAS OCCURRED, AND THE CHINESE AGREED TO PROVIDE US WITH SUCH AN ACCOUNTING - BUT HAVE NOT YET DONE SO.

CHINA IS ALSO AN EXTRAORDINARILY DYNAMIC AND DIVERSE COUNTRY THAT IS UNDERGOING A SWEEPING ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION WHILE FACING A LEADERSHIP TRANSITION. ITS DIVERSITY CAN BE SEEN IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION LAST YEAR. GREATER DISPOSABLE INCOME, LOOSER IDEOLOGICAL CONTROLS, AND FREER ACCESS TO OUTSIDE SOURCES OF INFORMATION LED TO MORE FREEDOM IN CULTURAL LIFE AND MEDIA REPORTING. IN SEVERAL INSTANCES, THE GOVERNMENT ACTED TO

MOVE TOWARDS CONFORMITY WITH INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED NORMS, AND IT CONTINUED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED FOR THE RULE OF LAW AND THE NECESSARY LEGAL STRUCTURE TO IMPLEMENT IT. HERE, HOWEVER, I STRESS THAT, IN PRACTICE, CHINA'S LEGAL REFORM EFFORTS HAVE NOT YET HAD A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON PROTECTING THE RIGHTS GRANTED TO CITIZENS IN CHINA'S CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAWS.

IN MAY 1994 PRESIDENT CLINTON ANNOUNCED HIS DECISION TO DELINK CHINA'S MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS FROM ITS NEAR-TERM HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE. AT THAT TIME HE ALSO SET FORTH FIVE INITIATIVES AIMED AT PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS: BILATERAL DIPLOMACY; MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY; WORKING TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S CIVIL SOCIETY; WORKING WITH THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS; AND INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING. ALL FIVE ARE MOVING FORWARD. OVER THE LAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD THE MOST INTENSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE WITH CHINA THAT IT HAS HAD WITH ANY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. OUR MOST RECENT ROUND, THE SEVENTH, TOOK PLACE IN BEIJING IN MID-JANUARY. IN THIS DIALOGUE WE HAVE RAISED CORE ISSUES - FREEDOM OF SPEECH, ASSOCIATION AND RELIGION AND THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AND PERSONS DETAINED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN THESE DIALOGUES--BUT HAVE ALSO SOUGHT TO BROADEN AND MAKE SUBSTANTIVE OUR ENGAGEMENT ON THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL EXCHANGES.

WE HAVE CONTINUED OUR EFFORTS TO WORK FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CHINA IN MULTILATERAL FORA. LAST WEEK, TOGETHER WITH TWENTY-SIX OTHER COUNTRIES, WE

SPONSORED A CHINA RESOLUTION AT THE UN. THE U .S. WORKED WITH OTHER SPONSORS TO PUT TOGETHER A COALITION OF COUNTRIES THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME INCLUDED A NON-WESTERN MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES FROM ALL REGIONS OF THE WORLD TO SUPPORT A CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION. ALSO FOR THE FIRST TIME, CHINA FAILED IN ITS EFFORTS TO PASS A "NO-ACTION" MOTION AND PREVENT ITS HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FROM COMING UNDER INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY, AND THE RESOLUTION ITSELF FELL SHORT ONLY BY ONE VOTE.

CONSULTATIONS CONTINUE WITH U.S. BUSINESSES, HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE CONGRESS ON A SET OF VOLUNTARY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES TO BE USED BY U.S. BUSINESS IN CHINA AND ELSEWHERE. WE ARE ALSO WORKING ON INCREASED SUPPORT FOR U.S. NGOS ACTIVE IN CHINA WITH THE AIM OF PROMOTING A STRONGER CIVIL SOCIETY. THE VOICE OF AMERICA

HAS INCREASED ITS PROGRAMMING TO CHINA. AND RADIO FREE ASIA WILL COMMENCE BROADCASTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BURMA

SINCE THE BURMESE MILITARY'S ASSUMPTION OF POWER IN 1962, AND ESPECIALLY SINCE ITS USURPATION OF THE 1990 DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS - WHICH OVERWHELMINGLY REJECTED MILITARY RULE - BURMESE CITIZENS HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO THE ARBITRARY AND SOMETIMES BRUTAL DICTATES OF THE MILITARY. GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES COMMIT SERIOUS ABUSES, INCLUDING EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS AND RAPE, AND FORCED LABOR ON PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS. ALTHOUGH SOME POLITICAL PRISONERS

HAVE BEEN RELEASED, NOBEL LAUREATE AUNG SAN SUU KYI BEGAN HER SIXTH YEAR OF HOUSE ARREST LAST JULY, AND KEY LEADERS OF HER NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY PARTY REMAIN IN PRISON UNDER HARSH CONDITIONS.

THE MILITARY REGIME, OR SLORC, HAS ALSO RENEWED ITS OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE KAREN ETHNIC MINORITY, PUSHING SOME 10,000 REFUGEES ACROSS THE BORDER TO THAILAND AND UNDERMINING ITS AVOWED POLICY OF RECONCILIATION WITH ETHNIC MINORITIES. AND IN A SITUATION WITH DEVASTATING IMPACT ON OUR INTERESTS, OPIUM PRODUCTION HAS DOUBLED IN BURMA SINCE THE SLORC TOOK POWER, AND THE DRUG TRADE HAS BECOME MORE DEEPLY INGRAINED IN BURMA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE. IN THE LONG RUN, OUR INTEREST IN NARCOTICS CONTROL IN BURMA IS INEXTRICABLY LINKED TO OUR INTEREST IN ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW.

MULTILATERALLY, WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN PASSING STRONG

RESOLUTIONS ON BURMA AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND AT THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, AND WILL DO THE SAME THIS YEAR AT THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION. WE ALSO OPPOSE MULTILATERAL LOANS TO BURMA. IN NOVEMBER 1994, A U.S. DELEGATION LED BY EAP DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY TOM HUBBARD AND NANCY ELY-RAPHEL, MY PRINCIPAL DEPUTY, MET WITH THE MILITARY

LEADERSHIP IN RANGOON TO OUTLINE TWO VISIONS OF A FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH BURMA - THE FIRST, AN IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP BASED ON IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS DEMOCRATIZATION, AND COUNTERNARCOTICS; THE SECOND, FURTHER ISOLATION AND A DETERIORATING RELATIONSHIP IN THE ABSENCE

UNCLASSIFIED

OF SUCH IMPROVEMENTS. THE REGIME MUST CHOOSE. WE HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED BY THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO DATE AND HAVE EXPRESSED OUR DISPLEASURE TO THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT.

VIETNAM

AS A RESULT OF MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMIC REFORMS, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY HAS RELAXED MANY OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON PERSONAL FREEDOMS OF AVERAGE VIETNAMESE CITIZENS. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS REACTED HARSHLY TO ITS POLITICAL OPPONENTS, AND HAS CONTINUED TO MONITOR THOSE SUSPECTED OF ENGAGING IN POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES THAT IT CONSIDERS OPPOSE THE GOVERNMENT. RESTRICTIONS ON BASIC CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING FREE SPEECH PRESS, AND ASSEMBLY REMAIN IN PLACE IN ORDER TO CONTROL DISSENTING VOICES, AND ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION REMAIN A SERIOUS PROBLEM. NUMEROUS POLITICAL PRISONERS HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO HARD LABOR CAMPS FOR THE PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF THEIR VIEWS AND THE GOVERNMENT RECENTLY ARRESTED SEVERAL MONKS AFFILIATED WITH THE UNIFIED BUDDHIST CHURCH OF VIETNAM.

LAST YEAR WHEN THE PRESIDENT LIFTED THE TRADE EMBARGO, HE INITIATED A HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE WITH THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. WE BEGAN THIS DIALOGUE IN FEBRUARY 1994 AND HELD A SECOND ROUND OF TALKS IN WASHINGTON IN AUGUST 1994; WE PLAN TO CONTINUE THESE DISCUSSIONS IN HANOI THIS SPRING. IN ALL OUR DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO RELEASE ALL PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE AND

UNCLASSIFIED

COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO VIETNAM THAT ITS PERFORMANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS WILL AFFECT THE STRENGTH OF OUR FUTURE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. WE HAVE RAISED SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS CASES AND CONCERNS WITH THE

VIETNAMESE IN BOTH WASHINGTON AND HANOI. ALTHOUGH THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF OUR POWS AND MIAS REMAINS OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY, HUMAN RIGHTS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AS OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP MOVES FORWARD.

INDONESIA

INDONESIA IS A COMPLEX SOCIETY, WHOSE AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT IS COUPLED WITH EMERGING DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS AND A RAPIDLY DEVELOPING MARKET ECONOMY. PRESSURES FOR GREATER FREEDOM HAVE LED TO PERIODS OF OPENNESS, AND AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS CRITICIZED GOVERNMENT ACTIONS, BUT THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO RESTRICT DEVELOPMENT OF AN OPPOSITION. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN INDONESIA HAS DETERIORATED SINCE EARLY 1994. FOLLOWING THE ARBITRARY ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS OF LABOR ACTIVISTS FOR LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS LAST APRIL, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IN JUNE REVERSED A TREND TOWARDS GREATER "OPENNESS" BY REVOKING THE LICENSES OF THREE MAJOR PUBLICATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO PREPARED A DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE THAT WOULD SERIOUSLY LIMIT THE ACTIVITIES OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS INTERESTED IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORKER RIGHTS, ALTHOUGH THIS DECREE NOW

APPEARS TO BE ON HOLD.

THERE ARE ALSO PROBLEMS ON THE LABOR FRONT. THE GOI

REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE THE INDEPENDENT SBSI LABOR ORGANIZATION AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES INTERFERE IN LABOR MATTERS. KEY SBSI LEADER PAKPAHAN WAS CONVICTED ON CHARGES OF INCITEMENT, AND HIS SENTENCE OF THREE YEARS WAS EXTENDED TO FOUR WHEN HE APPEALED.

FINALLY, THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR, WHICH BEGAN DETERIORATING IN LATE 1994, WORSENED FURTHER IN JANUARY THIS YEAR, WITH REPORTS THAT SECURITY FORCES HAD EXECUTED SIX CIVILIANS WHILE SUPPRESSING SUSPECTED SEPARATIST ACTIVITY. FOLLOWING AN INVESTIGATION THE ARMED FORCES ANNOUNCED THAT THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS BY THE MILITARY DURING THE RAID IN WHICH THE SIX DIED, AND FORMED AN HONOR COUNCIL TO HOLD ACCOUNTABLE ANY WRONGDOERS, WHILE ASSERTING THAT THE SIX VICTIMS WERE STRONGLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE ARMED SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT, FRETILIN. THE INDEPENDENT NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, HOWEVER, SAID THERE WAS CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE VICTIMS, WHO IT SAID WERE NON-COMBATANT CIVILIANS, HAD BEEN TORTURED BEFORE THEIR DEATHS. WE ARE VERY CONCERNED

ABOUT THIS AND OTHER SIGNS OF INCREASING VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR, AND I PLAN TO VISIT INDONESIA, INCLUDING EAST TIMOR, NEXT MONTH.

WE HAVE STEADILY PURSUED OUR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY AGENDA, WORKING WITH INDONESIANS BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT, AND USING OUR USAID AND USIA PROGRAMS TO

SUPPORT NGOS. BOTH PRESIDENT CLINTON AND SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER PRESSED FOR CONTINUED PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS DURING THEIR BILATERAL MEETINGS IN NOVEMBER, STRESSING THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WOULD NOT REACH ITS FULL POTENTIAL WITHOUT SUCH PROGRESS. WE ARE MONITORING THE GOI'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTION PLAN ON WORKER RIGHTS AGREED TO LAST NOVEMBER, EVEN THOUGH THE FORMAL REVIEW OF THE INDONESIA GSP CASE IS SUSPENDED. WE WILL ALSO RESPOND TO THE GOI'S INVITATION TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS ON IMPROVING ITS LABOR LEGISLATION. FINALLY, WE HAVE BANNED THE SALE OF SMALL ARMS AND CROWD CONTROL DEVICES AS PART OF OUR ARMS SALES POLICY TOWARD INDONESIA.

WE HAVE URGED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR FOR INDONESIAN AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; ENCOURAGED INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION OF THE SPECIAL STATUS OF EAST TIMOR, WITH GREATER LOCAL CONTROL OVER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL LIFE; EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF REDUCING MILITARY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR; AND SUPPORTED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL.

CAMBODIA

IN 1994, CAMBODIA COMPLETED ITS FIRST FULL YEAR UNDER DEMOCRATIC RULE, FOLLOWING THE MAY 1993 ELECTIONS OVERSEEN BY THE UN TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC), IN WHICH 90 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION FARTICIPATED. THE PRESS AND INDIGENOUS NGOS ARE ACTIVE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS

SITUATION HAS IMPROVED SINCE THE PRE-UNTAC PERIOD. HOWEVER, CAMBODIA SUFFERS FROM MANY PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE ONGOING THREAT OF THE KHMER ROUGE. THE RECENT KILLINGS OF THREE JOURNALISTS CREATED A CLIMATE OF FEAR AMONG MEMBERS OF THE PRESS, AND THERE WERE SEVERAL EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS IN 1994 THAT APPEARED TO BE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. EMERGING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE REMAINED WEAK. IN ADDITION, THE KHMER ROUGE CONTINUED TO SUMMARILY EXECUTE LARGE NUMBERS OF CIVILIANS, INCLUDING CAMBODIANS THAIS,

VIETNAMESE RESIDENTS AND WESTERN TOURISTS.

THE U.S. WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO HELP CAMBODIANS BUILD DEMOCRACY AFTER MORE THAN TWENTY YEARS OF CIVIL WAR AND AUTOCRATIC REGIMES, AND WE ARE COMMITTED TO ASSISTING THE ROYAL CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT AS IT DEVELOPS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. WITH PLEDGES IN 1995 OF DOLLARS 40 MILLION WE ARE PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH INDIGENOUS NGOS, HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING FOR THE MILITARY, AND SUPPORT FOR THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER. WE

HAVE PRESSED THE GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN ITS COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND WE HAVE RAISED SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS CASES AND CONCERNS AND ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION WITH SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

INDIA

ALTHOUGH INDIA ENJOYS THE EXTENSIVE SAFEGUARDS OF A LONGSTANDING PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, INCLUDING A FREE

PRESS AND A CIVILIAN-CONTROLLED MILITARY, WE HAVE DOCUMENTED PERSISTENT AND SIGNIFICANT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. THEY MAY BE ROOTED IN ANCIENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS, EXPRESSED AS INTERCASTE OR INTER-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE OR ARISE FROM THE INTENSE SOCIAL TENSIONS. THERE IS POLITICAL VIOLENCE BY ANTI-GOVERNMENT MILITANTS; POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST THOSE IN CUSTODY; AND INCOMMUNICADO DETENTION WITHOUT CHARGES FOR PROLONGED PERIODS UNDER SPECIAL SECURITY LAWS. EXPLOITATION OF AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, CHILDREN AND INDENTURED OR BONDED LABOR ARE ALSO SERIOUS PROBLEMS.

ATTEMPTS BY THE AUTHORITIES TO REPRESS SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS GENERATE MANY ABUSES. KASHMIR REMAINS A FLASHPOINT, BUT WE ALSO ARE CONCERNED ABOUT VIOLENT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY PARAMILITARY FORCES IN NORTHEASTERN INDIA AS THOSE FORCES REACT TO INCREASINGLY VIOLENT SECESSIONIST TACTICS. IN PUNJAB, INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM BY SIKH MILITANTS HAVE LARGELY CEASED; HOWEVER, THE POLICE FORCES IN THAT STATE CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR GRAVE ABUSES SUCH AS EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLINGS, ARBITRARY ARRESTS AND TORTURE, ALTHOUGH AT A MUCH REDUCED RATE THAN IN THE PAST

A COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS IS ENSHRINED IN INDIA'S CONSTITUTION AND DEMOCRATIC TRADITION BEGINNING WITH ITS INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, AND IT HAS TAKEN SOME POSITIVE STEPS TO OVERCOME THESE PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT PROSECUTED AND APPROPRIATELY PUNISHED POLICE AND

SECURITY FORCES IMPLICATED IN ABUSES, AND ABUSIVE

DETENTION LAWS REMAIN ON THE BOOKS AND ARE ENFORCED. THE

GOVERNMENT HAS ALLOWED SOME HUMANITARIAN GROUPS RESTRICTED ACCESS TO KASHMIR; HOWEVER, INDIA HAS DENIED OTHER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS TO ENTER THE COUNTRY OR TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO KASHMIR. IT HAS, HOWEVER ESTABLISHED A NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WHICH WE HOPE WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME AN EFFECTIVE ADVOCATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS ENERGETICALLY ENGAGED THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BOTH PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY, AT EVERY LEVEL. I PLAN TO TRAVEL TO INDIA ON A HUMAN RIGHTS MISSION IN MAY. THERE IS A GROWING AWARENESS WITHIN INDIA THAT MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY INDIA'S CONSTITUTION. WE HAVE STRESSED A COOPERATIVE, CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH BELIEVING THAT THE SOLUTIONS LIE IN FULL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PROBLEMS, AND INSTITUTION BUILDING. INDIGENOUS NGOS WILL BE ESSENTIAL AND WE SEEK TO FOSTER THEIR WORK.

PAKISTAN

PAKISTAN IS AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, IN WHICH CITIZENS ARE ABLE TO PEACEFULLY CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT ALTHOUGH SEVERAL MILLION BONDED LABORERS AND NOMADS ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE VOTE. THE GOVERNMENT DOES HOWEVER HARASSES ITS POLITICAL OPPONENTS AND IT REPRESSES THE SINDH-BASED MOHAJIR QOUMI MOVEMENT POLITICAL PARTY. GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS, ARBITRARY

ARREST AND DETENTION, AND TORTURE OF PRISONERS AND DETAINEES. POLICE AND PARAMILITARY FORCES ARE UNCHECKED BY ANY SERIOUS GOVERNMENT EFFORT TO REFORM THEM OR TO PROSECUTE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR ABUSE.

ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS ZEALOTS DISCRIMINATE AGAINST AND PERSECUTE RELIGIOUS MINORITIES, BASING THEIR ACTIVITIES IN PART ON DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION AGAINST THOSE RELIGIOUS MINORITIES. THE GOVERNMENT HAS PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE SO-CALLED BLASPHEMY LAW TO LIMIT ITS ABUSE, BUT NO CHANGES HAVE YET BEEN ENACTED AND ABUSE CONTINUES. IN FEBRUARY THE LAHORE HIGH COURT OVERTURNED THE BLASPHEMY CONVICTION OF TWO CHRISTIANS. SO SEVERE WERE THE THREATS AGAINST THEM, HOWEVER, THEY FLED THE COUNTRY.

THE GOVERNMENT AND EMPLOYERS RESTRICT WORKERS' RIGHTS SIGNIFICANTLY. THE USE OF CHILD AND BONDED LABOR IS WIDESPREAD IN SPITE OF BOTH LEGISLATION TO RESTRICT THESE PRACTICES AND THE SIGNING OF A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CHILD LABOR WITH THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION. LITTLE HAS BEEN DONE TO IMPROVE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN. FEMALE CHILDREN CONTINUED TO FALL BEHIND THEIR MALE COUNTERPARTS IN SUCH MEASURES AS LEVELS OF HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION.

CONCLUSION

MY PREPARED STATEMENT, THOUGH LENGTHY, HAS BARELY SKIMMED THE VAST ARRAY OF DEVELOPMENTS, SOME DISAPPOINTING, SOME

ENCOURAGING, IN THIS HUGE REGION. I WILL LEAVE FURTHER DETAIL TO ANY QUESTIONS THAT YOU MAY HAVE, AND CLOSE WITH THIS HUMAN RIGHTS APPEAL TO THE WORLD FROM AUNG SAN SUU KYI:

IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE CULTURAL DIVERSITY OF THE WORLD THAT IT IS NECESSARY FOR DIFFERENT NATIONS AND

PEOPLES TO AGREE ON THOSE BASIC HUMAN VALUES WHICH WILL ACT AS A UNIFYING FACTOR...THE VALUES THAT DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS SEEK TO PROMOTE CAN BE FOUND IN MANY CULTURES. HUMAN BEINGS THE WORLD OVER NEED FREEDOM AND SECURITY SO THAT THEY MAY BE ABLE TO REALIZE THEIR FULL POTENTIAL.

THANK YOU.

END TEXT. DAVIS

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B6

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5012

PAGE 01 JAKART 01091 01 OF 02 260054Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	ACQ-01	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/036W			

----------204461 260055Z /38

R 260054Z FEB 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0049
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001091

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/03
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINS, EFIN, ECON, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DIALOGUE WITH THE GOI ABOUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON INDONESIA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 01091 01 OF 02 260054Z
REF: JAKARTA 0729

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200504418

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ED MCWILLIAMS; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS ISSUED A STATEMENT HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE INDONESIAN PORTION OF THE 1997 STATE DEPARTMENT ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. [redacted] B6

END SUMMARY

3. (U) THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA HAS REACTED TO THE INDONESIAN PORTION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT WITH A PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT CHALLENGES BOTH FACTS WITHIN THE REPORT AND THE APPROPRIATENESS OF SUCH REPORTING. AS REPORTED REFTEL, THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) HAS TOLD US THAT IT BELIEVED THAT ITS PROPOSED "JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION" WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE FORUM TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL.

4. (SBU) [redacted] B6

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] B6

5. (SBU) POLOFF PROPOSED THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ITSELF "ENGAGE" WITH THE EMBASSY, AND ADDED THAT THE EMBASSY (USIS) HAD UNDERTAKEN TO TRANSLATE THE ENTIRE INDONESIAN PORTION OF THE REPORT TO FACILITATE

B6

6. (U) THERE FOLLOWS A FULL TEXT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS STATEMENT REGARDING THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. EMBASSY WILL PRESENT COPIES OF THE REPORT IN INDONESIAN TO THE DFA WITH AN OFFER TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC AND GENERAL GOI CONCERNS ABOUT THE REPORT.

BEGIN TEXT

INDONESIA'S RESPONSE TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES INDONESIA FOR 1997

INDONESIA EXPRESSES ITS SERIOUS CONCERN OVER THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT'S REPORT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDONESIA. IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT UNITED STATES FEELS PRIVILEGED TO CONTINUE TO SYSTEMATICALLY TARGET A NUMBER OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES LIKE INDONESIA AS THE VIOLATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THEIR OWN PEOPLES. IT DOES NOT ONLY ARROGATE THEMSELVES THE RIGHT TO PATRONIZE AND PASS

JUDGEMENT ON ANOTHER GROUP OF COUNTRIES WHICH ENJOY FULL RIGHTS TO AN EQUAL STATUS, BUT IT ALSO RESORT TO A FALSE PRISM WHICH IS SOLELY BASED ON THEIR OWN EXPERIENCE WHEN THEY SEEK TO JUDGE SITUATIONS WHICH ARE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE AFFECTING THEIR OWN SOCIETIES. THE REPORT REFLECTS AN IMBALANCED AND BIASED VIEWS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN INDONESIA, CONTAINS MIS-PERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE POLICIES OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS CONDUCTS, AND REPLETE WITH INACCURACIES WHICH REFLECT A SIMPLISTIC AND SUPERFICIAL GRASP OF THE FACTS REGARDING VARIOUS CASES CITED IN THE REPORT. THE REPORT ALSO FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE SOCIO-CULTURAL SENSITIVITIES AND HISTORICAL PARTICULARITY OF INDONESIA, RESULTING IN THE REPORT'S ETHNO-CENTRIC TENDENCY IN MEASURING THE CONDITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDONESIA (AND IN ALL OTHER COUNTRIES). IN MANY INSTANCES IN THE REPORT, A NUMBER OF EVENTS WHICH RELATE TO THE DISRUPTION OF PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY AND INIMICAL TO SOCIAL TOLERANCE AND HARMONY ARE FALSELY DEPICTED AS

AN ISSUE OF "FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION" OR "LIBERTY."
FURTHERMORE, THE STATEMENT IN THE REPORT THAT OUR NATIONAL
PHILOSOPHY OF PANCASILA IS "USED TO LIMIT DISSENT" IS
TOTALLY ABSURD.

THE PROTECTION, PROMOTION AND SAFEGUARDING OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INDONESIA IS, AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN, A

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ5013

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5013

PAGE 01 JAKART 01091 02 OF 02 260055Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ARA-01	ACQ-01	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FBIE-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-10	PRME-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/037W		

----------204466 260055Z /38

R 260054Z FEB 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0050
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

USCINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/03
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINS, EFIN, ECON, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: DIALOGUE WITH THE GOI ABOUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON INDONESIA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REF: JAKARTA 0729

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE. THE VERY PURPOSE OF OUR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IS TO UPLIFT THE HUMAN DIGNITY AND INTEGRITY OF ALL INDONESIAN CITIZENS. WHILE REALIZING THAT MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE, THE PROGRESS THUS FAR ACHIEVED NEEDS TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED.

INDONESIA'S ADHERENCE TO BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM IS CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL -- FOR IT FLOWS FROM THE STATE PHILOSOPHY OF PANCASILA, FROM PROVISIONS OF OUR 1945 CONSTITUTION, FROM OUR NATIONAL LAWS AND FROM THE VALUES, CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS OF OUR PEOPLE. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA ALSO CONSIDERS STABILITY TO BE CRITICAL TO THE CONTINUED POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT WILL DO EVERYTHING REQUIRED TO PROTECT THE FREEDOMS OF ALL INDONESIANS THAT ARE GUARANTEED BY OUR NATIONAL PHILOSOPHY, PANCASILA, AND ENSURE THAT THERE IS AN ENVIRONMENT THAT ENABLES ALL OUR CITIZENS TO EXERCISE THOSE RIGHTS.

AS A PEOPLE WHO FOR CENTURIES SUFFERED THE CRUELTIES OF COLONIAL DOMINATION, THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE ARE ACUTELY AWARE OF THE MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. FURTHERMORE, TOO MANY INDONESIANS PAID THE SUPREME SACRIFICE IN THE REVOLUTION THAT CREATED THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA TO ALLOW ANY INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP TO JEOPARDIZE WHAT SO MANY HAVE WORKED SO HARD TO ACHIEVE.

HOWEVER, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD OF

INDONESIA IS NOT PERFECT -- NO NATION HAS A PERFECT RECORD WHEN IT COMES TO HUMAN RIGHTS -- BUT WE ARE DOING ALL WE CAN TO TAKE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST ALL VIOLATIONS, TO ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSES OF SUCH VIOLATIONS, AND TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE, IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF OUR CITIZENS.

INDONESIA BELIEVES THAT A BALANCED, OBJECTIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE CONSIDERATION OF THE SITUATION IN ANY COUNTRY IN TODAY'S PLURALISTIC WORLD, AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN DEALING WITH THE VERY COMPLEX AND SENSITIVE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ARE MOST ESSENTIAL FOR THE EFFECTIVE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. PUBLICATION OF IMBALANCED AND SELF-RIGHTEOUS REPORTS CONTAINING INACCURACIES, BASELESS ACCUSATION AND HERESIES SUCH AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REPORT WILL ONLY HAMPER EFFORTS TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS.

JAKARTA, 6 FEBRUARY 1998

END TEXT.
ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9425

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 01 OF 21 272321Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/023W						

----------F109C6 272321Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8403
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL

1. SBU NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS THE 1995 COUNTRY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA.

3. THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, DESPITE A SURFACE ADHERENCE TO DEMOCRATIC FORMS, REMAINS STRONGLY AUTHORITARIAN. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, NOW IN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200504418

HIS SIXTH 5-YEAR TERM, A SMALL GROUP OF ADVISERS, AND THE MILITARY DOMINATE THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THIS HEAVILY POPULATED DEVELOPING COUNTRY, WHOSE PEOPLE COME FROM HUNDREDS OF DIFFERENT CULTURAL, LINGUISTIC, AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES ALLEGIANCE TO A STATE IDEOLOGY KNOWN AS "PANCASILA," WHICH INCLUDES BELIEF IN A SUPREME GOD, A JUST AND CIVILIZED HUMANITY, NATIONAL UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE. IT HAS USED PANCASILA AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR RESTRICTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITION ELEMENTS.

UNDER A DOCTRINE OF "DUAL FUNCTION," THE MILITARY IS GIVEN SPECIAL CIVIC RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, INCLUDING UNELECTED MILITARY SEATS IN PARLIAMENT (DPR) AND LOCAL LEGISLATURES, IN ADDITION TO ITS DEFENSE AND SECURITY ROLES. THE 450,000-MEMBER ARMED FORCES, INCLUDING 175,000 POLICE, CONSIDER THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY AS THEIR PRIMARY MISSION, AND THEY HAVE TRADITIONALLY ACTED SWIFTLY TO SUPPRESS PERCEIVED THREATS TO SECURITY, WITH A VIGOR THAT HAS OFTEN LED TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. SOME MILITARY LEADERS HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THIS "SECURITY APPROACH." THERE CONTINUED TO BE NUMEROUS, CREDIBLE REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE MILITARY AND POLICE, ALTHOUGH THEY EXHIBITED SOME RESTRAINT IN CONTROLLING CROWDS AND DEMONSTRATIONS.

IN CONTRAST TO ITS RESTRICTIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM, INDONESIA HAS AN INCREASINGLY OPEN AND DEREGULATED

ECONOMY. THOUGH STILL A POOR COUNTRY, INDONESIA'S ECONOMY CONTINUED TO EXPAND IN 1995, ESPECIALLY IN MANUFACTURING, WITH GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT EXPECTED TO INCREASE BY 7.2 PERCENT. THE CONTINUED ECONOMIC GROWTH HAS PRODUCED STEADY GAINS IN LIVING STANDARDS FOR MUCH OF INDONESIAN SOCIETY. THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE LIVING BELOW THE POVERTY LINE HAS FALLEN FROM

OVER 60 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION TO UNDER 15 PERCENT. WIDESPREAD UNDEREMPLOYMENT PERSISTS, HOWEVER, AS DO CORRUPTION AND INFLUENCE PEDDLING.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO COMMIT SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. THE MOST SERIOUS ABUSES INCLUDED THE CONTINUING INABILITY OF THE PEOPLE TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT AND HARSH REPRESSION OF EAST TIMORESE DISSIDENTS. REPORTS OF DISAPPEARANCES, EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS AND TORTURE OF THOSE IN CUSTODY BY SECURITY FORCES INCREASED. REPORTS OF EXTRAJUDICIAL ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS AND THE USE OF EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE IN DEALING WITH SUSPECTED CRIMINALS OR PERCEIVED TROUBLEMAKERS CONTINUED.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO IMPOSE SEVERE LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOMS OF SPEECH, PRESS, AND ASSEMBLY. IT SUPPRESSED EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A TRULY FREE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT, BUT ENCOURAGED SOME DEVELOPMENTS THAT COULD LEAD TO GREATER INDEPENDENCE IN THE APPROVED UNION SYSTEM. ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES CONTINUED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOST SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. MILITARY LEADERS IN SOME CASES SHOWED WILLINGNESS TO PUBLICLY ADMIT

ABUSES BY MILITARY PERSONNEL AND TAKE ACTION AGAINST THEM, INCLUDING IN A BRUTAL INCIDENT IN EAST TIMOR. PUNISHMENT HOWEVER RARELY MATCHED THE SEVERITY OF THE ABUSE. THE JUDICIARY, WHILE STILL LARGELY SUBSERVIENT TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND SUBJECT TO WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION, MADE SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENT INTERESTS THAT ARE SUGGESTIVE OF SOMEWHAT GREATER JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO EXERT STRONG PRESSURE AGAINST ANTIGOVERNMENT CRITICS, INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS, AND LABOR ACTIVISTS.

THESE CONSTRAINTS, HOWEVER, DID NOT COMPLETELY DAMPEN DISSENTING VOICES IN THE PUBLIC AND THE MEDIA. MANY HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS REMAINED ACTIVE, AND THE GOVERNMENT TOLERATED WIDE PRESS COVERAGE OF MANY

SENSITIVE ISSUES. THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED A PHASING-OUT OF A DISCRIMINATORY SYMBOL ON THE I.D. CARDS OF EX-POLITICAL PRISONERS AND THEIR FAMILIES,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNPTQ9433

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9433

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 02 OF 21 272321Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00

/023W

----------F109D2 272322Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8404
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

AND SOME EASING OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF FREE ASSEMBLY. THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MAINTAINED ITS INDEPENDENCE, SPOTLIGHTING ABUSES AND SOMETIMES TAKING POSITIONS AT VARIANCE WITH GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND ACTIONS.

ON EAST TIMOR, NO PROGRESS WAS MADE IN ACCOUNTING FOR THE MISSING PERSONS FOLLOWING THE 1991 DILI INCIDENT, AND TROOP LEVELS REMAINED UNJUSTIFIABLY HIGH. THE GOVERNMENT REIMPOSED TIGHT ACCESS TO THE

PROVINCE BY FOREIGN JOURNALISTS.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS

HISTORICALLY, POLITICALLY MOTIVATED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS GENERALLY HAVE OCCURRED MOST FREQUENTLY IN AREAS WHERE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS WERE ACTIVE, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAYA. SECURITY FORCES CONTINUE TO EMPLOY HARSH MEASURES AGAINST SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN THESE THREE AREAS. SECURITY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR KILLED SIX UNARMED CIVILIANS IN LIQUISA PROVINCE IN JANUARY. THE MILITARY COURT MARTIALED TWO SOLDIERS FOR THIS KILLING (SEE BELOW). THERE WERE ALSO SEVERAL OTHER MYSTERIOUS KILLINGS IN EAST TIMOR; THE LIMITED EVIDENCE AVAILABLE SUGGESTS SOME OF THESE TOO COULD ALSO BE CASES OF SUMMARY EXECUTION BY SECURITY FORCES, THOUGH AT LEAST THREE ARE ATTRIBUTED TO EAST TIMORESE INSURGENTS. THERE WERE CREDIBLE, DETAILED REPORTS FROM CHURCH AND NGO

SOURCES OF SECURITY FORCES KILLING SIXTEEN OR MORE CIVILIANS IN IRIAN JAYA BETWEEN MID-1994 AND MID-1995. KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES REPORT AT LEAST TWO UNCONFIRMED INSTANCES OF SECURITY FORCES IN ACEH PROVINCE KILLING CIVILIANS WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION.

THERE WERE REPORTS OF SECURITY FORCES KILLING

MEMBERS OF INSURGENT GROUPS IN ARMED CLASHES, INCLUDING FIVE ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS IN ACEH AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF ALLEGED ARMED OPPOSITION MEMBERS IN EAST TIMOR. INSURGENT GROUPS ALSO ATTACKED AND KILLED SECURITY FORCES.

THE GOVERNMENT WITHDREW TWO ARMY BATTALIONS FROM EAST TIMOR IN SEPTEMBER. THE GOVERNMENT OFFERED A GENERAL AMNESTY TO MEMBERS OF THE TIMORESE RESISTANCE WHO SURRENDER THEIR ARMS, AND IT WAS REPORTED TO HAVE RELEASED SOME WHO WERE APPREHENDED RATHER THAN TRYING THEM. A SIMILAR POLICY WAS APPLIED TO SEVERAL LEADERS OF THE TIMORESE CLANDESTINE POLITICAL MOVEMENT.

THE POLICE OFTEN EMPLOY EXCESSIVE AND SOMETIMES DEADLY FORCE IN APPREHENDING SUSPECTS OR COPING WITH ALLEGED CRIMINALS. IN RESPONSE TO PROTESTS THAT THE METHODS USED ARE UNJUSTIFIABLY HARSH AND AMOUNT TO EXECUTION WITHOUT TRIAL, POLICE GENERALLY CLAIM THAT THE SUSPECTS WERE FLEEING, RESISTING ARREST, OR THREATENING THE POLICE. IN NORTH SUMATRA, FOR EXAMPLE, 45 SHOOTINGS BY POLICE, INCLUDING 3 DEATHS, WERE REPORTED BY MID-AUGUST. ACCURATE STATISTICS WERE UNAVAILABLE, HOWEVER.

IN THE PAST THE AUTHORITIES ALMOST NEVER TOOK ACTION AGAINST POLICE FOR USING EXCESSIVE FORCE. HOWEVER, THERE IS SOME INDICATION THAT THE SITUATION IS IMPROVING, ALTHOUGH ACTION TAKEN BY THE AUTHORITIES IS STILL NOT COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF POLICE

ABUSES. THREE POLICEMEN WERE REPORTED TO BE FACING COURT MARTIAL IN PADANG, WEST SUMATRA, ON CHARGES OF DELIBERATELY STRIKING A MOTORCYCLIST WITH THEIR CAR DURING A CHASE IN APRIL, ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL HAD NOT BEGUN AS OF LATE AUGUST. IN JUNE, A MILITARY COURT MARTIAL SENTENCED AN ARMY SECOND LIEUTENANT TO FOUR AND A HALF YEARS IN PRISON AND A PRIVATE TO FOUR YEARS FOR KILLING SIX UNARMED, BOUND CIVILIANS IN LIQUISA REGENCY, EAST TIMOR IN JANUARY. SEVEN POLICEMEN WERE DETAINED IN ACEH PROVINCE ON SUSPICION OF TORTURING A RAPE SUSPECT AND CAUSING HIS DEATH IN LATE JULY. IN NORTHERN SUMATRA, AT LEAST TWO CIVIL CASES OF ALLEGED EXCESSIVE FORCE ON THE PART OF POLICE OFFICIALS, IN ONE OF WHICH THE VICTIM DIED, WERE SETTLED OUT OF COURT THROUGH MONETARY COMPENSATION.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9436

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 03 OF 21 272322Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00

/023W

----------F109E1 272322Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8405
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF SECURITY FORCES ABDUCTING FIVE CIVILIANS IN DILI, EAST TIMOR, IN JANUARY. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT RESPOND TO REPEATED REQUESTS OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGTS COMMISSION AND OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO CLARFY THE FATE OF THESE INDIVIDUALS. AT LEAST FIVEOTHER PERSONS DISAPPEARED IN EAST TIMOR UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGESTING POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT BY THESECURITY FORCES, AND THESE PERSONS ARE WIDELY BEIEVED TO HAVE BEEN EXECUTED. INDONESIAN NGOS DOUMENTED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

REPORTS OF AT LEAST FOUR CIVILIANS WHO DISAPPEARED AFTER BEING DETAINED BY MILITARY FORCES IN IRIAN JAYA AT THE END OF 1994. THE WHEREABOUTS OF THOSE ABDUCTED IS NOT KNOWN, AND THEY ARE FEARED DEAD. SECURITY FORCES DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE ABDUCTIONS, BUT ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WERE INVESTIGATING THE IRIAN JAYA REPORTS AND RELATED CHARGES OF MILITARY KILLINGS AND TORTURE IN THAT PROVINCE. SINCE THEIR INVESTIGATION OF THE LIQUISA INCIDENT IN EAST TIMOR IN JANUARY, 1995 SECURITY FORCES HAVE BECOME LESS WILLING TO PROVIDE INFORMATION OR TO UNDERTAKE INVESTIGATIONS ABOUT NEW CASES OF CONCERN. SECURITY FORCES IN AREAS OF CONFLICT OFTEN HOLD SUSPECTS FOR SUBSTANTIAL PERIODS WITHOUT FORMAL CHARGES, BUT THESE CASES OFTEN END WITH OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF DETENTION. THIS PRACTICE APPEARS TO HAVE INCREASED IN EAST TIMOR BEGINNING IN NOVEMBER, 1994. (SEE SECTION I.D.).

THE GOVERNMENT MADE NO NEW EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MISSING AND DEAD FROM THE NOVEMBER 12, 1991 MILITARY SHOOTING OF CIVILIANS IN DILI, EAST TIMOR. OF THOSE STILL LISTED AS MISSING IN A REPORT THE MILITARY GAVE TO HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, NO ADDITIONAL CASES WERE RESOLVED DURING THE YEAR. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN IMPLIED THAT THEIR FAILURE TO LOCATE THOSE MISSING WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO THOSE PERSONS WISHING TO EVADE DETECTION. MANY KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS, HOWEVER, CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE MISSING ARE DEAD AND THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES KNOW WHERE THEIR

BODIES ARE LOCATED.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

THE CRIMINAL CODE MAKES IT A CRIME PUNISHABLE BY UP TO 4 YEARS IN PRISON FOR ANY OFFICIAL TO USE VIOLENCE OR FORCE TO ELICIT A CONFESSION, AND IT ESTABLISHES PRETRIAL PROCEDURES TO GIVE SUSPECTS OR

THEIR FAMILIES THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF AN ARREST OR DETENTION. IN PRACTICE, LEGAL PROTECTIONS ARE BOTH INADEQUATE AND WIDELY IGNORED, AND SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO EMPLOY TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF MISTREATMENT, PARTICULARLY IN REGIONS OF SECURITY CONCERNS SUCH AS ACEH AND EAST TIMOR.

IN AUGUST, NGO AND CHURCH SOURCES PROVIDED EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS TO THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF OVER FORTY VICTIMS OF ALLEGED TORTURE BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN IRIAN JAYA IN LATE 1994 AND EARLY 1995. ACCORDING TO THESE SOURCES, METHODS OF TORTURE EMPLOYED INCLUDED KICKING WITH HEAVY BOOTS; BEATING WITH FISTS, STICKS, STONES, AND RIFLE BUTTS; STARVATION; SHACKLING THUMBS, ARMS AND LEGS; TAPING EYES SHUT; STAMPING ON HANDS; AND FORCING VICTIMS TO STAND FOR PROLONGED PERIODS WHILE BEARING HEAVY WEIGHTS OR TO KNEEL WITH AN IRON BAR IN THE KNEE HOLLOW. IN EAST TIMOR, TORTURE INCREASED IN FREQUENCY BEGINNING IN NOVEMBER, 1994, AND INCLUDED ELECTRIC SHOCKS, MOCK EXECUTION, SEVERE BEATINGS, AND BURNING WITH CIGARETTES. FOLLOWING COMPLAINTS,

THIS PROBLEM APPEARS TO HAVE EASED IN THE CASE OF THE PROVINCIAL POLICE, BUT CONTINUED OR WORSENED IN DETENTION FACILITIES RUN BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

POLICE OFTEN RESORT TO PHYSICAL ABUSES EVEN IN MINOR INCIDENTS, AND PRISON CONDITIONS ARE HARSH, WITH VIOLENCE AMONG PRISONERS AND MISTREATMENT AND EXTORTION OF INMATES BY GUARDS REPORTEDLY COMMON. THE INCIDENCE OF MISTREATMENT BY PRISON OFFICIALS DROPS SHARPLY ONCE A PRISONER HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM POLICE OR MILITARY CUSTODY INTO THE CIVILIAN PRISON SYSTEM, AND PRISON CONDITIONS GENERALLY HAVE IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS. SPORADIC CASES OF ILL-TREATMENT HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN EAST TIMORESE PRISONS. OFFICIALS HAVE PUBLICLY CONDEMNED POLICE BRUTALITY AND HARSH PRISON CONDITIONS AND OCCASIONALLY INSTIGATE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, INCLUDING TRANSFER, DISMISSAL, AND TRIALS LEADING TO

PRISON. SUCH ACTIONS, HOWEVER, ARE AN EXCEPTION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNPTQ9437

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9437

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 04 OF 21 272322Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00

/023W

----------F109E7 272322Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8406
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 04 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

TO THE RULE OF GENERAL IMPUNITY. POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE USUALLY MIXED WITH THE GENERAL PRISON POPULATION, ALTHOUGH IN THE CIPINANG PRISON IN JAKARTA HIGH-PROFILE POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE SEGREGATED. IN 1995 THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) TO VISIT PRISONERS IN CIPINANG IN JAKARTA AND ALSO GRANTED ACCESS TO PRISONS ELSEWHERE IN JAVA, SUMATRA, ACEH, AND OTHER PROVINCES AS WELL AS EAST TIMOR. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO HAS ALLOWED THE ICRC TO

ORGANIZE FAMILY VISITS TO POLITICAL PRISONERS. AUTHORITIES ALLOWED VISITING U.S. OFFICIALS OR NGO REPRESENTATIVES TO VISIT EAST TIMOR PRISONERS OF THEIR CHOOSING ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE CONTAINS PROVISIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION WHICH ARE ROUTINELY VIOLATED. THE CODE SPECIFIES THE RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO NOTIFY THEIR FAMILIES, AND THAT WARRANTS MUST BE PRODUCED DURING AN ARREST EXCEPT UNDER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS, SUCH AS WHEN A SUSPECT IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME. IT ALSO AUTHORIZES INVESTIGATORS TO ISSUE WARRANTS TO ASSIST IN THEIR INVESTIGATIONS OR IF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED. DESPITE THESE REQUIREMENTS, AUTHORITIES SOMETIMES MAKE ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS. SECURITY FORCES REPORTEDLY ARRESTED MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS IN MARCH BEFORE FORMAL WARRANTS WERE ISSUED (SEE SECTION 2.A). THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT LEAST TEMPORARILY WITHOUT WARRANT BY SECURITY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR INCREASED DURING LATE 1994 AND 1995.

THE LAW PRESUMES DEFENDANTS INNOCENT AND PERMITS BAIL. THEY OR THEIR FAMILIES MAY ALSO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THEIR ARREST AND DETENTION IN A PRETRIAL HEARING AND MAY SUE FOR COMPENSATION IF WRONGFULLY DETAINED. HOWEVER, IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR

DETAINEES TO INVOKE THIS PROCEDURE, LET ALONE RECEIVE COMPENSATION, AFTER BEING RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGE. IN BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COURTS, APPEALS BASED ON LEGALITY OF ARREST AND DETENTION ARE RARELY, IF EVER, ACCEPTED. THE CODE ALSO CONTAINS SPECIFIC LIMITS ON PERIODS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION AND SPECIFIES WHEN THE COURTS MUST GET INVOLVED TO APPROVE EXTENSIONS, USUALLY AFTER 60 DAYS. IN AREAS WHERE ACTIVE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS EXIST SUCH AS EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA AND ACEH, PEOPLE ARE ROUTINELY DETAINED WITHOUT WARRANTS, CHARGES, OR COURT PROCEEDINGS. BAIL IS RARELY GRANTED, ESPECIALLY IN POLITICAL CASES. THE AUTHORITIES FREQUENTLY PREVENT ACCESS TO DEFENSE COUNSEL AND MAKE IT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO GET LEGAL ASSISTANCE FROM VOLUNTARY LEGAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS. THE AUTHORITIES ROUTINELY APPROVE EXTENSIONS OF PERIODS OF DETENTION. IN ADDITION, SUSPECTS CHARGED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW ARE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL PROCEDURES OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE WHICH ALLOW, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD A SUSPECT UP TO 1 YEAR BEFORE TRIAL. HE MAY RENEW THIS 1-YEAR PERIOD WITHOUT LIMIT. SPECIAL LAWS ON CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND NARCOTICS ARE SIMILARLY EXEMPT FROM THE CODE'S PROTECTIONS.

THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) OPERATES OUTSIDE THE CODE AND HAS WIDE DISCRETION TO

DETAIN AND INTERROGATE PERSONS THOUGHT TO THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO STATE THE EXACT NUMBER OF ARBITRARY ARRESTS OR DETENTIONS WITHOUT TRIAL, PARTICULARLY IN ACEH AND IRIAN JAYA. IN 1995, AUTHORITIES RELEASED AT LEAST 29 SUPPOSED ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS WHO WERE BEING HELD WITHOUT TRIAL, BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ACCUSED ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS RELEASED SINCE 1990 TO AROUND 994 PERSONS. MANY HAD BEEN HELD INCOMMUNICADO WITHOUT KNOWING THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM; SOME HAD BEEN HELD FOR OVER 2 YEARS. THE AUTHORITIES OFTEN REQUIRE THOSE RELEASED TO REPORT BACK AT REGULAR INTERVALS, BUT IN MAY 916 FORMER DETAINEES WERE RELIEVED OF THIS OBLIGATION. IN EAST TIMOR, MILITARY AUTHORITIES CONTINUED THE PRACTICE OF DETAINING PEOPLE WITHOUT CHARGES FOR SHORT PERIODS AND THEN REQUIRING THEM TO REPORT DAILY OR WEEKLY TO POLICE AFTER THEIR RELEASE. AROUND 100 PEOPLE WERE DETAINED WITHOUT CHARGE DURING DEMONSTRATIONS AND

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9440

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 05 OF 21 272322Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/023W						

----------F109F7 272323Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8407
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 05 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE IN DILI AROUND THE TIME OF THE NOVEMBER, 1994 APEC MEETINGS. DETENTIONS CONTINUED DURING FURTHER DISTURBANCES IN DECEMBER, 1994 AND JANUARY, 1995. AUTHORITIES EVENTUALLY CHARGED AND SENTENCED SOME OF THESE DETAINEES FOR INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL DISTURBANCES OR ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTESTS, INCLUDING AT LEAST EIGHT EAST TIMORESE WHO RECEIVED PRISON SENTENCES OF 12 TO 30 MONTHS. FIVE OTHER EAST TIMORESE, WIDELY CONSIDERED WRONGLY ACCUSED, WERE SENTENCED TO FIVE MONTHS IMPRISONMENT FOR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 08147 05 OF 21 272322Z
INVOLVEMENT IN MYSTERIOUS NIGHT-TIME INCIDENTS OF HARASSMENT, BEATING, AND FEAR-MONGERING BY

INDIVIDUALS TERMED "NINJAS."

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATES THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, BUT IN PRACTICE THE JUDICIARY IS SUBORDINATED TO THE EXECUTIVE AND THE MILITARY, AND IN MANY CASES PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AGAINST COERCED CONFESSIONS, ARE INADEQUATE TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL. A QUADRIPARTITE JUDICIARY OF GENERAL, RELIGIOUS, MILITARY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS EXISTS BELOW THE SUPREME COURT. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT TO HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS IN ALL FOUR SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE. THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT CONSIDER FACTUAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF LAW. A THREE-JUDGE PANEL CONDUCTS TRIALS AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL, POSES QUESTIONS, HEARS EVIDENCE, DECIDES GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND ASSESSES PUNISHMENT. INITIAL JUDGMENTS ARE RARELY REVERSED IN THE APPEALS PROCESS, ALTHOUGH SENTENCES ARE SOMETIMES INCREASED OR REDUCED (BOTH THE DEFENSE AND THE PROSECUTION MAY APPEAL). IN JANUARY, THE 3-YEAR SENTENCE OF INDEPENDENT LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN (WHO WAS LATER PROVISIONALLY RELEASED) WAS RAISED BY THE HIGH COURT FROM THREE TO FOUR YEARS, AND THE SENTENCE OF AMOSI TELAUMBANUA, ANOTHER UNION LEADER, WAS RAISED FROM 15 MONTHS TO 3 YEARS (LATER REVERSED BY THE SUPREME COURT). SEE BELOW.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEFENDANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AND TO PRODUCE WITNESSES IN THEIR DEFENSE. AN EXCEPTION IS ALLOWED IN CASES IN WHICH DISTANCE OR EXPENSE IS DEEMED EXCESSIVE FOR TRANSPORTING WITNESSES TO COURT. IN SUCH CASES, SWORN AFFIDAVITS MAY BE INTRODUCED. HOWEVER, THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR WITNESSES' IMMUNITY OR FOR COMPULSORY PROCESS OF DEFENSE WITNESSES. AS A RESULT, WITNESSES ARE SOMETIMES TOO AFRAID OF RETRIBUTION TO TESTIFY AGAINST THE AUTHORITIES.

IN CASES TRIED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW, TRIALS IN ABSENTIA ARE PERMITTED AND PUBLIC ACCESS GENERALLY REQUIRES ADVANCE APPROVAL BY THE MILITARY. THE COURTS COMMONLY ALLOW FORCED CONFESSIONS AND LIMIT THE PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE. DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND CAN BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN THEIR OWN TRIALS. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE GIVES DEFENDANTS THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY FROM THE MOMENT OF THEIR ARREST THROUGH THE INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL. THE LAW REQUIRES THAT A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IN CAPITAL CASES AND THOSE INVOLVING A PRISON SENTENCE OF 15 YEARS OR MORE. IN CASES INVOLVING POTENTIAL SENTENCES OF 5 YEARS OR MORE, A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IF THE DEFENDANT DESIRES AN ATTORNEY AND IS INDIGENT. IN THEORY, DESTITUTE DEFENDANTS MAY OBTAIN PRIVATE LEGAL HELP, SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, DEFENDANTS ARE OFTEN PERSUADED NOT TO HIRE AN

ATTORNEY, OR ACCESS TO AN ATTORNEY OF THEIR CHOICE IS IMPEDED. THE MILITARY HELD FIVE ALLEGED ACEH MERDEKA MEMBERS, WHO WERE SENTENCED IN EARLY 1995 (SEE BELOW), FOR UP TO A YEAR WITHOUT ACCESS TO ATTORNEYS; THE AUTHORITIES DID NOT ALLOW THEM TO CHOSE THEIR ATTORNEYS, AND THOSE APPOINTED BY THE COURT COULD NOT SEE THE DEFENDANTS UNTIL JUST BEFORE THE TRIAL.

THE SUPREME COURT THEORETICALLY STANDS COEQUAL WITH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES, BUT IT DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER LAWS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT. THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOT YET EXERCISED ITS POWER (HELD SINCE 1985) TO REVIEW MINISTERIAL DECREES AND REGULATIONS. IN 1993 CHIEF JUSTICE PURWOTO GANDASUBRATA LAID OUT JUDICIAL PROCEDURES FOR LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW. JUDGES ARE CIVIL SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WHICH CONTROLS THEIR ASSIGNMENTS, PAY, AND

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNPTQ9441

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9441

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 06 OF 21 272323Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00

/023W

----------F10A04 272323Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8408
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 06 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

PROMOTION. THEY ARE SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM MILITARY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES. SUCH PRESSURE OFTEN DETERMINES THE OUTCOME OF A CASE, AND WAS WIDELY SUSPECTED OF BEING BEHIND AN ATTEMPT BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE TO THWART THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SUPREME COURT RULING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF IRIAN JAYA IN A LAND COMPENSATION DISPUTE. CORRUPTION PERMEATES THE LEGAL SYSTEM. IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, THE PAYMENT OF BRIBES CAN INFLUENCE PROSECUTIQ, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCING.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 08147 06 OF 21 272323Z

AS OF SEPTEMBER, THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET IMPLEMENTED ITS ANNOUNCED PLANS TO ADDRESS JUDICIAL CORRUPTION BY DOUBLING JUDGES' SALARIES.

SEVERAL IMPORTANT COURT DECISIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN 1995 MAY BE A SIGN OF NASCENT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE. IN FEBRUARY, THE SUPREME COURT COMMUTED THE 1993 SENTENCE OF AN ACEHNESE SERVING FIVE YEARS FOR SUBVERSION AND ORDERED HIS RELEASE. IT ALSO UPHELD THE APPEALS COURT'S QUASHING OF THE CONVICTION OF THE ALLEGED MASTERMIND IN THE 1993 MURDER OF LABOR ACTIVIST MARSINAH, AND OVERTURNED THE REMAINING EIGHT CIVILIANS' CONVICTIONS AS WELL FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, INDIRECTLY VINDICATING CHARGES BY THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND SOME NGO'S THAT THEIR CONFESSIONS HAD BEEN COERCED. IN MAY, THE SUPREME COURT PROVISIONALLY RELEASED CONVICTED LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN PENDING A DECISION ON HIS APPEAL UNDER A SELDOM HONORED PROVISION OF THE PENAL CODE, AND LATER OVERTURNED THE HIGH COURT DECISION THAT INCREASED AMOSI TELAUMBANUA'S SENTENCE FROM 15 TO 36 MONTHS (SEE ABOVE). AN ADMINISTRATIVE COURT IN JAKARTA FOUND IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS, EMPLOYEES OF THE BANNED PERIODICAL TEMPO, IN THEIR CIVIL SUIT AGAINST THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE FOR REVOKING TEMPO'S PUBLICATION LICENSE IN 1993. THE GOVERNMENT IS APPEALING THIS DECISION.

THE ANTISUBVERSION LAW, WHICH CARRIES A MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH, MAKES IT A CRIME TO ENGAGE IN ACTS

THAT COULD DISTORT, UNDERMINE, OR DEVIATE FROM THE STATE IDEOLOGY OR BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, OR WHICH COULD DISSEMINATE FEELINGS OF HOSTILITY OR AROUSE HOSTILITY, DISTURBANCES, OR ANXIETY AMONG THE POPULATION. THE EXCESSIVELY VAGUE LANGUAGE MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO PROSECUTE PEOPLE MERELY FOR PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF VIEWS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN ACEH PROVINCE, AUTHORITIES SENTENCED AT LEAST FIVE ACCUSED ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS UNDER THE ANTISUBVERSION LAW TO FROM 6 TO 20 YEARS IN PRISON (SEE SECTION 1.E).

THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT MAKE AVAILABLE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE CURRENTLY SERVING SUBVERSION SENTENCES OR SENTENCES CLASSIFIED AS FELONIES UNDER THE SO-CALLED HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO GRANTED CLEMENCY IN AUGUST TO THREE FORMER HIGH OFFICIALS, SUBANDRIO, OMAR DHANI, AND SUGENG SUTARTO, WHO WERE SERVING LIFE SENTENCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABORTIVE COMMUNIST COUP IN 1965. SIX PRISONERS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN PAST YEARS REMAINED UNDER DEATH SENTENCE. IN AUGUST, AUTHORITIES ANNOUNCED THAT TWO OF THEM, WHOSE APPEALS FOR CLEMENCY WERE DENIED BY THE PRESIDENT, WERE SOON TO BE EXECUTED, BUT THE EXECUTIONS HAD NOT BEEN CARRIED OUT AS OF LATE SEPTEMBER.

DIFFERENT SOURCES ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE SERVING SENTENCES FOR SUBVERSION IN 1995, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI), MUSLIM MILITANTS, AND THOSE CONVICTED OF

SUBVERSION IN IRIAN JAYA, ACEH, AND EAST TIMOR, AT BETWEEN 250 AND 350. SCORES, AND POSSIBLY HUNDREDS, MORE WERE BELIEVED TO BE SERVING SENTENCES UNDER THE HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. SOME OF THESE PERSONS ADVOCATED OR EMPLOYED VIOLENCE, BUT MANY ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO WERE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPTING TO EXERCISE SUCH UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH OR ASSOCIATION OR WHO WERE CONVICTED IN MANIFESTLY UNFAIR TRIALS. THE COURTS SENTENCED THREE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS (AJI) AND A FOURTH UNDERGROUND JOURNALIST TO PRISON TERMS OF FROM 20 TO 32 MONTHS UNDER THE HATE-SOWING ARTICLES (SEE SECTION 2.A). IN AUGUST, PROSECUTORS REQUESTED A ONE YEAR SENTENCE FOR A WELL KNOWN INDONESIAN PSYCHIC CHARGED UNDER THESE ARTICLES FOR ALLEGED BLASPHEMY AGAINST ISLAM IN A CLOSED ACADEMIC SEMINAR IN APRIL. IN FEBRUARY, A DISTRICT COURT IN MALANG, EAST JAVA SENTENCED JOSE ANTONIO NEVES TO

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 07 OF 21 272346Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00

/023W

----------F10B1D 272347Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8409
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 07 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

FOUR YEARS IN PRISON ON CHARGES OF SEDITION FOR ADVOCATING EAST TIMORESE INDEPENDENCE AND ACCUSING THE ARMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN LETTERS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

JUDICIAL WARRANTS FOR SEARCHES ARE REQUIRED EXCEPT FOR CASES INVOLVING SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC

PAGE 02 JAKART 08147 07 OF 21 272346Z
CRIMES, AND CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, SECURITY AGENCIES REGULARLY MAKE FORCED OR SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES. THEY ALSO INTIMIDATE BY SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS AND RESIDENCES AND SELECTIVE MONITORING OF LOCAL AND

INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS WITHOUT LEGAL RESTRAINT. GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND ITS FRONT ORGANIZATIONS ESPECIALLY PERSONS THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP. THESE PERSONS AND THEIR RELATIVES SOMETIMES ARE SUBJECT TO SURVEILLANCE, REQUIRED CHECK-INS, PERIODIC INDOCTRINATION, AND RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL OUTSIDE THEIR CITY OF RESIDENCE. THEIR LEGALLY REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION CARDS CARRY THE INITIALS "E.T." WHICH STAND FOR "EX-TAPOL," OR FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER, WHICH READILY IDENTIFIES THEM TO PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYERS OR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND SUBJECTS THEM TO VARIOUS FORMS OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL DISCRIMINATION. THE NUMBER OF PERSONS BEARING "E.T." ON THEIR IDENTIFICATION CARDS TOTALED 1,352,896 PEOPLE IN 1992, ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD PHASE OUT THE USE OF THE E.T. IN THE PROCESS OF INTRODUCING A NEW TYPE OF IDENTIFICATION CARD BEGINNING IN AUGUST, WHILE LEAVING OTHER FORMS OF MONITORING AND CONTROL IN PLACE.

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON PRESS FREEDOM CONTINUED IN 1995, FOLLOWING THE REVOCATION OF THE PUBLISHING LICENSES OF THREE WELL KNOWN NEWS MAGAZINES THE PREVIOUS YEAR. IN MAY, FORMER EMPLOYEES OF TEMPO, ONE OF THE BANNED PERIODICALS, WON A LAWSUIT AGAINST THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE COURT CONTESTING THE REVOCATION, BUT THE GOVERNMENT HAS APPEALED THE DECISION.

ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 1982 PRESS LAW PROVIDE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THE ISSUANCE OF PUBLISHING LICENSES UNDER A 1984 MINISTERIAL DECREE

IS ONE METHOD THE GOVERNMENT USES TO CONTROL THE PRESS. OTHER MEANS OF CONTROL INCLUDE REGULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF ADVERTISING PERMITTED AND OF THE NUMBER OF PAGES ALLOWED IN NEWSPAPERS. AUTHORITIES CONTINUED IN SOME CASES TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS, MORE OR LESS SUBTLE, TO LOCAL JOURNALISTS ON WHAT THEY COULD PRINT. THE PRACTICE OF TELEPHONING EDITORS TO CAUTION AGAINST PUBLISHING CERTAIN STORIES--THE SO-CALLED TELEPHONE CULTURE--CONTINUED. IN AUGUST, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WARNED IN A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT PAPERS CARRYING SPECULATIVE STORIES ABOUT THE RUMORED EXISTENCE OF A SOEKARNO-ERA REVOLUTION FUND RISKED CRIMINAL CHARGES. AUTHORITIES ALSO WARNED EDITORS TO END COVERAGE OF THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION'S ALLEGED PUBLIC MISREADING OF KORANIC VERSES, WHICH HAD CAUSED A PUBLIC OUTCRY, AND TEMPORARILY BANNED THE SUNDAY EDITION OF A JAKARTA DAILY NEWSPAPER FOR CARRYING STORIES ON SENSITIVE

SUBJECTS. SELF-CENSORSHIP CONTINUED TO BE ANOTHER PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED BRAKE ON FREE EXPRESSION. IN MEDAN, COVERAGE OF SENSITIVE ISSUES SUCH AS WORK STOPPAGES AND PEASANT PROTESTS AGAINST LAND CLEARANCE OPERATIONS HAS REMAINED AT A LOW LEVEL SINCE THE PRESS BANNINGS OF JUNE 1994.

IN MARCH, THE GOVERNMENT STRUCK AGAINST TWO OF THE UNLICENSED UNDERGROUND PUBLICATIONS WHICH HAVE APPEARED IN DEFIANCE OF GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT FREE AND OPEN NEWS REPORTING. POLICE ARRESTED THE EDITOR OF KABAR DARI PIJAR AND THREE PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS (AJI), WHICH PUBLISHES THE UNDERGROUND BULLETIN INDEPENDEN. THEY WERE TRIED AND SENTENCED FOR SOWING HATRED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT (SEE SECTION 1.E). AJI WAS FORMED TO WORK FOR PRESS FREEDOM IN 1994 BY JOURNALISTS OUTRAGED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S REVOCATION OF THE PUBLICATION LICENSES

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNPTQ9484

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9484

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 08 OF 21 272351Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/023W						

----------F10BCC 272353Z /38
R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8410
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 08 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

OF THE THREE PERIODICALS (SEE ABOVE).

THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS (PWI) EXPELLED THIRTEEN AJI MEMBERS AND THE GOVERNMENT THREATENED LICENSED PERIODICALS WITH SANCTIONS IF THEY EMPLOYED JOURNALISTS NOT AFFILIATED WITH PWI. ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT PRESS MEASURES STILL CONTINUED, HOWEVER. INDEPENDEN AND A NUMBER OF OTHER UNSANCTIONED JOURNALS CONTINUED TO PUBLISH, PROVIDING CRITICAL

COVERAGE OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES TO A LIMITED AUDIENCE MAINLY IN MAJOR CITIES. VIGOROUS DEBATE ON A NUMBER OF SENSITIVE TOPICS SUCH AS CORRUPTION, COLLUSION, THE ROLE OF THE FIRST FAMILY IN BUSINESS, AND LACK OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY FOR FUNDS EXPENDED REBOUNDED DURING 1995, PARTICULARLY IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE PRESS. HOWEVER, MAJOR INDONESIAN LANGUAGE PAPERS REMAIN CAUTIOUS IN COVERING CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS AND THE STATEMENTS OF PROMINENT CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

WHILE PUBLIC DIALOGUE IS MORE FREE THAN IT WAS A NUMBER OF YEARS AGO, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON FREE SPEECH. BANDUNG AUTHORITIES PROHIBITED NOTED POET W. S. RENDRA FROM READING SOME OF HIS POEMS AT A FUND RAISING EVENT, THOUGH HE HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO READ THEM EARLIER IN SURABAYA. IN MARCH, AUTHORITIES WITHDREW PERMISSION FOR "RECALLED" PPP LEGISLATOR SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS TO ADDRESS A SEMINAR ON ECONOMICS AT GARUT, EAST JAVA. PAMUNGKAS WAS ONE OF TWO LEGISLATORS WITHDRAWN OR "RECALLED" FROM PARLIAMENT BY THEIR PARTIES (THE OTHER WAS FROM GOLKAR) FOR THEIR OUTSPOKEN CRITICISMS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE POLICE ALSO INVESTIGATED PAMUNGKAS ON VARIOUS CHARGES RELATED TO HIS ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN PROTESTS AGAINST PRESIDENT SOEHARTO DURING THE PRESIDENT'S APRIL VISIT TO GERMANY. IN APRIL, MEDAN POLICE BRIEFLY DETAINED AND QUESTIONED BUT DID NOT CHARGE EIGHT STUDENT PROTESTORS FOR ALLEGEDLY SLANDERING

PRESIDENT SUHARTO. IN MAY, THE JAKARTA OFFICE OF
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 JAKART 08147 08 OF 21 272351Z
THE DIRECTORATE OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS, WHICH TOGETHER WITH SEVERAL OTHER GOVERNMENT ENTITIES MUST GIVE APPROVAL FOR THEATRICAL PERFORMANCES, BLOCKED A PERMIT FOR A WORKERS' THEATER GROUP TO PERFORM A PLAY IN THE CAPITAL ABOUT EXPLOITATION OF FACTORY WORKERS. IN SEPTEMBER JAKARTA POLICE PREVENTED A DIFFERENT GROUP FROM STAGING ANOTHER PLAY ON A LABOR THEME FOR WHICH AUTHORITIES HAD ALREADY GRANTED PERMISSION. IN SEPTEMBER, A COURT SENTENCED A PSYCHIC TO SEVEN MONTHS IN PRISON FOR REMARKS HE MADE ABOUT THE PROPHET MOHAMMED IN AN ACADEMIC SEMINAR, BUT PROVISIONALLY RELEASED HIM FROM CUSTODY THE NEXT DAY.

THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA REMAINED MORE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR COVERAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT THAN THE PRINT MEDIA. THE GOVERNMENT OPERATES THE NATIONWIDE TELEVISION NETWORK, WHICH HAS 12 REGIONAL STATIONS. PRIVATE COMMERCIAL TELEVISION COMPANIES, MANY WITH OWNERSHIP/MANAGEMENT TIES TO THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY, CONTINUED TO EXPAND. ALL ARE REQUIRED TO BROADCAST GOVERNMENT-PRODUCED NEWS, BUT MANY ALSO PRODUCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STYLE PROGRAMMING THAT BORDERS ON NEWS.

APPROXIMATELY 634 PRIVATE RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANIES EXIST IN ADDITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK. THEY ARE ALL REQUIRED TO BELONG TO THE GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS (PRSSNI) TO RECEIVE A
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

BROADCASTING LICENSE. THE GOVERNMENT RADIO STATION PRODUCES "NATIONAL NEWS," WHICH IS BY LAW THE ONLY RADIO NEWS BROADCAST IN INDONESIA, AND IT IS RELAYED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BY THE PRIVATE STATIONS AND 49 REGIONAL AFFILIATES OF THE GOVERNMENT STATION. BY LAW, THE PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS MAY PRODUCE ONLY "LIGHT" NEWS, SUCH AS HUMAN INTEREST STORIES, AND MAY NOT DISCUSS POLITICS. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, MANY BROADCAST INTERVIEWS AND FOREIGN NEWS AS WELL. HOWEVER, GOVERNMENT PRESSURE RESULTED IN ONE TALK SHOW ON THE PRIVATE STATION SCTV BEING TAKEN OFF THE AIR FOR COVERING SENSITIVE SUBJECTS.

FOREIGN TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS ARE READILY ACCESSIBLE TO THOSE WHO CAN AFFORD THE EXPENSIVE TECHNOLOGY, AND SATELLITE DISHES HAVE PROLIFERATED AMONG THE AFFLUENT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT MAKES NO EFFORTS TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO THIS PROGRAMMING, AND HAS PROCLAIMED AN "OPEN SKIES"

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 09 OF 21 272351Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/023W						

----------F10BD0 272353Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8411
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 09 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

POLICY, ALTHOUGH MORE AND MORE SIGNALS ARE BEING SCRAMBLED BY THE BROADCASTERS FOR COMMERCIAL REASONS.

THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY REGULATES ACCESS TO INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY TO CERTAIN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, BY VISITING AND RESIDENT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS, AND OCCASIONALLY REMINDS THE LATTER OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DENY REQUESTS FOR VISA EXTENSIONS. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES A PERMIT FOR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 JAKART 08147 09 OF 21 272351Z
THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AND VIDEO TAPES, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED BY GOVERNMENT CENSORS. IMPORTERS SOMETIMES AVOID FOREIGN MATERIALS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OR DEALING WITH TOPICS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS ARE WIDELY AVAILABLE.

SPECIAL PERMISSION IS NECESSARY FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TO TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR, ACEH AND IRIAN JAYA. THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED AT LEAST ONE GROUP JOURNALIST TRIP TO EAST TIMOR. APPROVAL FOR INDIVIDUAL TRIPS BY JOURNALISTS TO THE PROVINCE, AND FOR TRAVEL OUTSIDE DILI, BECAME MORE RESTRICTIVE, WITH A NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS REPEATEDLY REQUESTING PERMISSION, WITHOUT SUCCESS, TO VISIT THE PROVINCE. WHILE THE LAW PROVIDES FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM, CONSTRAINTS EXIST ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SCHOLARS. POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DISCUSSIONS AT UNIVERSITIES, WHILE NO LONGER FORMALLY BANNED, REMAINED CONSTRAINED. SCHOLARS SOMETIMES REFRAIN FROM PRODUCING OR INCLUDING IN LECTURES AND CLASS DISCUSSIONS MATERIALS THAT THEY BELIEVE MIGHT PROVOKE GOVERNMENT DISPLEASURE. PUBLISHERS SOMETIMES REFUSE TO ACCEPT MANUSCRIPTS DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. ON OCCASION THE GOVERNMENT BANS PUBLICATIONS AND BOOKS OUTRIGHT. IN FEBRUARY, THE CENTRAL JAVA GOVERNMENT ORDERED A NEW EDITION OF THE BOOK "CERITA DARI BLORA," BY THE PROMINENT INDONESIAN NOVELIST AND FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER PRAMOEDYA ANATA TOER, WHICH HAD BEEN BANNED IN 1976, WITHDRAWN FROM BOOKSTORES, AND IN APRIL THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL ORDERED THE WITHDRAWAL OF HIS BOOK "NYANI SUNYI SEORANG BISU" FROM SALE. MOST OF PRAMOEDYA'S WORKS ARE BANNED IN INDONESIA.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION. THE GOVERNMENT PLACES SIGNIFICANT CONTROLS ON THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT, BUT ANNOUNCED AN EASING OF THE RESTRICTIONS. UNTIL THIS YEAR, PUBLIC MEETINGS OF FIVE OR MORE PERSONS, AS WELL AS ACADEMIC OR OTHER SEMINARS AND MARCHES AND DEMONSTRATIONS, REQUIRED PERMITS FROM THE POLICE AND SEVERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. WHILE OBTAINING SUCH APPROVAL WAS USUALLY ROUTINE, THE AUTHORITIES

OCCASIONALLY ARBITRARILY AND INCONSISTENTLY WITHHELD PERMISSION OR BROKE UP PEACEFUL GATHERINGS FOR WHICH NO PERMIT HAD BEEN OBTAINED. THE PRESS REPORTED FIVE INSTANCES OF AUTHORITIES DENYING PERMITS AND 26 CASES OF DISPERSING UNAUTHORIZED MEETINGS IN THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS OF THE YEAR. IN JANUARY A ONE DAY SEMINAR ON THE ANTISUBVERSION LAW AT THE JAKARTA OFFICE OF THE LEGAL AID FOUNDATION, IN WHICH MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION PARTICIPATED, NARROWLY AVERTED BEING CLOSED BY THE POLICE, WHO REMAINED ON THE PREMISES IN FORCE DURING THE SESSION. AUTHORITIES IN JAKARTA AND SEMARANG BROKE UP MAY 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR DAY DEMONSTRATIONS BY STUDENTS PROTESTING GOVERNMENT LABOR POLICES, AND ARRESTED THIRTEEN DEMONSTRATORS IN MEDAN WHO WERE PROTESTING GOVERNMENT

INVESTIGATION OF PROMINENT DISSIDENTS ACCUSED OF TAKING PART IN DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST PRESIDENT SUHARTO IN DRESDEN. THE EAST JAVA GOVERNMENT REPEATEDLY DENIED PERMISSION TO THE HEAD OF THE PDI PARTY TO MEET WITH PARTY OFFICIALS IN THAT PROVINCE. IN JUNE, JAKARTA AUTHORITIES FORCIBLY DISPERSED AN UNAUTHORIZED SEMINAR ON ISLAM AND CHARGED ITS ORGANIZER WITH HOLDING A PUBLIC GATHERING WITHOUT A PERMIT. IF CONVICTED,HE FACES A MAXIMUM FOUR-YEAR SENTENCE.

IN RESPONSE TO GROWING PUBLIC CRTICISM OF THE PERMIT PROCESS, INCLUDING FROM THENATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE GOVERNMENT IN JUNE DROPPED THE PERMIT REQUIREMENT FOR UNIVERITY APPROVED ON-CAMPUS SCIENTIFIC SEMINARS. ONAUGUST 30 THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT BY THE ED OF THE YEAR PERMITS WOULD NO LONGER BE REQUIRE FOR OTHER GATHERINGS EXCEPT THOSE HELD IN STREETS AND PUBLIC

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNPTQ9486

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9486

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 10 OF 21 272351Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00

/023W

----------F10BD2 272353Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8412
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 10 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

PLACES WHERE PUBLIC ORDER COULD BE AFFECTED.
ORGANIZERS OF POLITICAL MEETINGS AND OFF-CAMPUS

SCIENTIFIC SEMINARS WOULD STILL HAVE TO NOTIFY THE POLICE IN ADVANCE, HOWEVER. IT IS NOT YET CERTAIN WHETHER, AND WITH WHAT DEGREE OF CLARITY AUTHORITIES WILL DEFINE "POLITICAL" MEETINGS.

THE 1985 SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW (ORMAS) REQUIRES THE ADHERENCE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, TO THE

OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA. THIS PROVISION, WHICH LIMITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD AS DESIGNED TO INHIBIT ACTIVITIES OF GROUPS SEEKING TO MAKE INDONESIA AN ISLAMIC STATE. THE LAW EMPOWERS THE GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND ANY ORGANIZATION IT BELIEVES TO BE ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA AND REQUIRES PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR ANY ORGANIZATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS FROM FOREIGN DONORS, THEREBY HINDERING THE WORK OF MANY LOCAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS. NEVERTHELESS A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INDEPENDENT LABOR ORGANIZATION SERIKAT BURUH SEJAHTERA INDONESIA (SBSI), CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE WITHOUT OFFICIAL RECOGNITION UNDER THIS LAW (SEE SECTION 6).

IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, NGO'S HAVE PROLIFERATED IN SUCH FIELDS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION. IN GENERAL, THE GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN THEM RATHER WIDE LATITUDE TO PURSUE THEIR AIMS, INCLUDING PUBLIC CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND IN SOME CASES LAW SUITS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO HAVE QUIETLY SHELVED A 1994 DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE SIMILAR TO THE ORMAS LAW THAT WOULD HAVE BROUGHT THE MORE THAN 700 NGO'S UNDER MORE STRINGENT CONTROLS. HOWEVER, THERE REMAIN LIMITS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF NGO ACTIVITIES, AND AUTHORITIES REACTED FORCEFULLY AGAINST CERTAIN NGOS PARTICIPATING IN LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS OR PUBLISHING UNLICENSED NEWSLETTERS. THE GOVERNMENT REACTS PARTICULARLY

NEGATIVELY TO NGO LEADERS AND OTHERS WHO CRITICIZE ABROAD INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD. THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES ISLAM, CATHOLICISM, PROTESTANTISM, BUDDHISM, AND HINDUISM, AND PERMITS THE PRACTICE OF THE MYSTICAL, TRADITIONAL BELIEFS OF "ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN." ALTHOUGH THE POPULATION IS OVERWHELMINGLY MUSLIM, THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS ARE GENERALLY RESPECTED, AND THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES MUTUAL TOLERANCE AND HARMONY AMONG THEM. SOME RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY EXIST (SEE BELOW).

BECAUSE THE FIRST TENET OF PANCASILA IS BELIEF IN A SUPREME BEING, ATHEISM IS FORBIDDEN. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA EXTENDS TO ALL RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY OPPOSES MUSLIM GROUPS WHICH ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ACKNOWLEDGING ONLY ISLAMIC LAW. THERE ARE GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES FOR BANNING RELIGIOUS SECTS IN INDONESIA. AMONG THOSE PROHIBITED ARE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, BAHA'I, AND IN SOME PROVINCES THE MESSIANIC ISLAMIC SECT DARUL ARQAM. THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY MONITORS ISLAMIC SECTS CONSIDERED IN DANGER OF DEVIATING FROM ORTHODOX TENETS, AND IN THE PAST HAS ON OCCASION

DISSOLVED SUCH GROUPS.

VIOLENCE BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS IN THE HURIA KRISTEN BATAK PROTESTAN (HKBP), INDONESIA'S LARGEST PROTESTANT CHURCH, CONTINUED IN NORTH SUMATRA THROUGHOUT 1995, WITH AT LEAST ONE FATALITY. IN EARLY 1993, CITING A THREAT TO CIVIL ORDER, THE NORTHERN SUMATRA REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER INTERVENED IN AN INTERNAL LEADERSHIP DISPUTE WHICH BROKE OUT WITHIN THE HKBP THE PREVIOUS YEAR, APPOINTING A NEW BISHOP AND HELPING THE NEW BISHOP'S SUPPORTERS TAKE OVER CHURCH PROPERTY. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE CALLED THE DISPUTE AN INTERNAL CHURCH MATTER THAT SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THE HKBP MEMBERS THEMSELVES. TO DATE, HOWEVER, ONLY SUPPORTERS OF THE FORMER BISHOP HAVE BEEN PROSECUTED FOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE DESPITE EVIDENCE THAT MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSING FACTION ENGAGED IN VIOLENT ACTS AS WELL.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNPTQ9489

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00
EB-01 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-02 LAB-01 L-01
ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 PA-01 PRS-01 P-00
SP-00 STR-01 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PRME-01 DRL-09 G-00
/023W

----------F10BD5 272353Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8413
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 11 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECT FOR RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN THE COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING INCIDENTS OF RELIGIOUS TENSION IN AREAS SUCH AS FLORES AND EAST AND WEST TIMOR. LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, ARE FREQUENTLY ALLEGED TO BE RELUCTANT TO FACILITATE AND PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES. THE LAW ALLOWS CONVERSION BETWEEN FAITHS, AND SUCH CONVERSIONS OCCUR.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MARRIAGES BETWEEN PERSONS OF DIFFERENT RELIGIONS ARE ALLOWED. THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS PROSELYTIZING BY THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS IN AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ONE RECOGNIZED RELIGION OR ANOTHER AS POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND DISCOURAGES IT. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED, ALTHOUGH IN EAST TIMOR AND OCCASIONALLY ELSEWHERE MISSIONARIES HAVE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES AND DELAYS IN RENEWING

RESIDENCE PERMITS, AND VISAS ALLOWING THE ENTRANCE OF NEW FOREIGN CLERGY ARE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. LAWS AND DECREES FROM THE 1970'S LIMIT THE NUMBER OF YEARS FOREIGN MISSIONARIES CAN SPEND IN INDONESIA, WITH SOME EXTENSIONS GRANTED IN REMOTE AREAS LIKE IRIAN JAYA. FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK IS SUBJECT TO THE FUNDING STIPULATIONS OF THE ORMAS LAW (SEE SECTION 2.B.). INDONESIANS PRACTICING THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS MAINTAIN ACTIVE LINKS WITH CORELIGIONISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE INDONESIA AND TRAVEL ABROAD FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

ALTHOUGH IN 1993 THE GOVERNMENT DRASTICALLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BARRED EITHER FROM ENTERING OR DEPARTING INDONESIA FROM A PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED FIGURE OF 8,897 "BLACKLISTED" PEOPLE TO A FEW HUNDRED, SUCH RESTRICTIONS STILL EXIST. THE GOVERNMENT BANNED THE OUSTED PARLIAMENT MEMBER SRI BINTANG PAMUNKAS FROM TRAVELLING ABROAD WHILE INVESTIGATING HIS EARLIER ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY (SEE SECTION 2.A), AND

NOVELIST PRAMOEDYA ANATA TOER WAS UNABLE TO TRAVEL TO THE PHILIPPINES TO ACCEPT A LITERARY AWARD FROM THE MAGSAYSAY FOUNDATION. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO RESTRICTS MOVEMENT BY INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN CITIZENS TO AND WITHIN PARTS OF INDONESIA. IN ADDITION, IT REQUIRES PERMITS TO SEEK WORK IN A NEW LOCATION IN CERTAIN AREAS, PRIMARILY TO CONTROL FURTHER POPULATION MOVEMENT TO CROWDED CITIES, AND SPECIAL PERMITS ARE REQUIRED TO VISIT CERTAIN PARTS OF IRIAN JAYA. THE MILITARY CARRIED OUT SECURITY CHECKS AFFECTING TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL TO AND WITHIN EAST TIMOR SPORADICALLY IN 1995, AND IT OCCASIONAL IMPOSED CURFEWS IN CONNECTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE AUTHORITIES REQUIRE FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, TO GIVE NOTICE OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND TO HAVE OFFICIAL PERMISSION (SEE

SECTION 1.F.) TO CHANGE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE. IN PAST YEARS THE GOVERNMENT ADMITTED LARGE NUMBERS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM INDOCHINA. ONLY A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER NOW REMAIN AND THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO WORK WITH VIETNAM UNDER A TRIPARTITE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING SIGNED IN 1993 WITH THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) TO PEACEFULLY REPATRIATE THE REMAINING ASYLEES TO VIETNAM.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CITIZENS DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEMOCRATIC MEANS. THE 1,000-MEMBER PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY OF THE STATE AND MEETS EVERY 5 YEARS TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AND SET THE BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, IS CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE APPOINTMENT OF HALF ITS MEMBERSHIP. THE REMAINING HALF COME FROM THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR), 80 PERCENT OF WHOSE MEMBERS ARE ELECTED. IN 1993 THE MPR ELECTED SOEHARTO TO HIS SIXTH UNCONTESTED 5-YEAR TERM AS PRESIDENT. LEGALLY, THE PRESIDENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SUBORDINATE TO THE PARLIAMENT, BUT ACTUALLY HE AND A SMALL GROUP OF ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS EXERCISE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.

UNDER A DOCTRINE KNOWN AS "DUAL FUNCTION," THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNPTQ9490

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9490

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 12 OF 21 272351Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00

/023W

----------F10BDA 272353Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8414
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 12 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

MILITARY ASSUMES A SIGNIFICANT SOCIOPOLITICAL AS WELL AS A SECURITY ROLE. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARE ALLOTTED UNELECTED SEATS IN THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR). IN 1995, THE GOVERNMENT

LEGISLATED A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF THESE SEATS FROM 100 TO 75, OR 15 PERCENT OF A TOTAL OF 500 EFFECTIVE 1997. THE MILITARY WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD AN UNELECTED 20 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT PARLIAMENTS, AND OCCUPY NUMEROUS KEY POSITIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION. THE OTHER 85

PERCENT OF NATIONAL AND 80 PERCENT OF LOCAL PARLIAMENTARY SEATS ARE FILLED THROUGH ELECTIONS HELD EVERY 5 YEARS. ALL ADULT CITIZENS ARE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE, EXCEPT ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, CONVICTED CRIMINALS SERVING PRISON SENTENCES, AND SOME 36,000 FORMER MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. VOTERS CHOOSE BY SECRET BALLOT BETWEEN THE THREE GOVERNMENT-APPROVED POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH FIELD CANDIDATE LISTS IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT. THOSE LISTS MUST BE SCREENED BY BAKORSTANAS (SEE SECTION 1.D.), WHICH DETERMINES WHETHER CANDIDATES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST COUP OR POSE OTHER BROADLY DEFINED SECURITY RISKS. CRITICS CHARGE THESE SCREENINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, SINCE THERE IS NO WAY TO APPEAL THE RESULTS, AND NOTE THAT THEY CAN BE USED TO ELIMINATE CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM PARLIAMENT.

STRICT RULES ESTABLISH THE LENGTH OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC MEDIA, SCHEDULES FOR PUBLIC APPEARANCES, AND THE POLITICAL SYMBOLS THAT CAN BE USED. THE GOVERNMENT PERMITS ONLY THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EXIST AND CONTEST ELECTIONS. THE LARGEST AND MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS GOLKAR, A GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ORGANIZATION OF DIVERSE FUNCTIONAL GROUPS WHICH WON 68 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN THE 1992 ELECTIONS. THE PRESIDENT STRONGLY INFLUENCES THE SELECTION OF THE LEADERS OF GOLKAR. THE OTHER TWO SMALL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE UNITY DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF INDONESIA (PDI), SPLIT THE

REMAINING VOTE. THE LAW REQUIRES ALL THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EMBRACE PANCASILA, AND NONE OF THE ORGANIZATIONS IS CONSIDERED AN OPPOSITION PARTY. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES CLOSELY SCRUTINIZE AND OFTEN GUIDE THEIR ACTIVITIES. MEMBERS OF THE DPR AND THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES MAY BE RECALLED FROM OFFICE BY PARTY LEADERS. IN 1995, BOTH GOLKAR AND PPP RECALLED LEGISLATORS WHO WERE CONSIDERED TOO OUTSPOKEN.

GOLKAR MAINTAINS CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH THE ARMED FORCES AND KORPRI, THE ASSOCIATION TO WHICH ALL CIVIL SERVANTS AUTOMATICALLY BELONG. CIVIL SERVANTS MAY JOIN ANY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WITH OFFICIAL PERMISSION, BUT MOST ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND SOME OTHER BANNED PARTIES MAY NOT RUN FOR OFFICE OR BE ACTIVE POLITICALLY. THE DPR CONSIDERS BILLS PRESENTED TO IT BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES BUT DOES NOT DRAFT LAWS ON ITS OWN, ALTHOUGH IT HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DO SO. THE DPR MAKES TECHNICAL AND OCCASIONALLY SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS TO BILLS IT REVIEWS. IN PRACTICE, IT REMAINS CLEARLY SUBORDINATE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, BUT RECENTLY IT HAS BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN SCRUTINIZING GOVERNMENT POLICY, AND EXERCISING OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES THROUGH HEARINGS AT WHICH MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, MILITARY COMMANDERS, AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS ARE ASKED TO TESTIFY. THE DPR HAS ALSO BECOME INCREASINGLY A FOCAL POINT OF APPEALS AND PETITIONS FROM STUDENTS,

WORKERS, DISPLACED FARMERS, AND OTHERS PROTESTING ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND AIRING OTHER

GRIEVANCES. WHILE THERE ARE NO DE JURE RESTRICTIONS ON WOMEN IN POLITICS, ONLY 55 OUT OF 500 MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT ARE WOMEN; 2 WOMEN ARE CABINET MEMBERS.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

WHILE VARIOUS DOMESTIC ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONS INTERESTED IN HUMAN AND WORKER RIGHTS OPERATE ENERGETICALLY, SOME, SUCH AS THE UNRECOGNIZED TRADE UNION SBSI AND THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS, FACED GOVERNMENT HARASSMENT INCLUDING POLICE RAIDS ON THEIR OFFICES, SURVEILLANCE BY POLICE OR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, INTERROGATIONS AT POLICE STATIONS, OR CANCELLATIONS OF PRIVATE

NNNNPTQ9470

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 13 OF 21 272346Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00

EB-01 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-02 LAB-01 L-01
ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 PA-01 PRS-01 P-00
SP-00 STR-01 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PRME-01 DRL-09 G-00
/023W

----------F10B1B 272347Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8415
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 13 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

MEETINGS.

THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND EMPHASIZES ITS BELIEF THAT LINKING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE.

THE ICRC CONTINUED TO OPERATE IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, AND ACEH, AND TO VISIT PRISONERS CONVICTED OF

PARTICIPATION IN THE ABORTIVE, COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP IN 1965, CONVICTED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, AND EAST TIMORESE PRISONERS.

WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS, ICRC ENJOYS GENERALLY GOOD ACCESS, ESPECIALLY IN EAST TIMOR WHERE IT HAS AN OFFICE. THE ICRC NO LONGER MAINTAINS AN OFFICE IN IRIAN JAYA BUT VISITS THAT PROVINCE FROM JAKARTA SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR. ICRC ALSO VISITS ACEH REGULARLY, BUT THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT APPROVED THE

ICRC'S REQUEST TO OPEN AN OFFICE THERE.

THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, IN ITS SECOND YEAR OF OPERATION, BECAME INCREASINGLY ACTIVE IN EXAMINING REPORTED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND CONTINUED TO SHOW INDEPENDENCE AND A WILLINGNESS TO CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND POLICIES. THE COMMISSION'S REPORT OF ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE JANUARY 12 KILLING OF SIX EAST TIMORESE IN LIQUISA CHARGED THAT THE MILITARY FORCES INVOLVED TORTURED AND MURDERED THE SUSPECTS, CALLING INTO QUESTION THE MILITARY'S ORIGINAL CONTENTION THAT THEY WERE KILLED IN A FIREFIGHT. THE COMMISSION ALSO SENT INVESTIGATIVE TEAMS TO IRIAN JAYA IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, AND FOUND EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SERIOUS NGO AND CHURCH REPORTS OF THE TORTURE, KILLING, AND DISAPPEARANCES OF CIVILIANS BY SECURITY FORCES IN THAT PROVINCE. LACKING ENFORCEMENT POWERS, THE COMMISSION ATTEMPTS TO WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM, SENDING TEAMS WHERE NECESSARY TO INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS AND EMPLOYING

PERSUASION, PUBLICITY, AND MORAL AUTHORITY TO HIGHLIGHT ABUSES, MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGAL AND REGULATORY CHANGES AND ENCOURAGE CORRECTIVE ACTION. THE COMMISSION HAS YET TO OBTAIN ITS OWN FACILITIES, AND CONTINUES TO HAVE VERY LIMITED STAFF SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT APPOINTED THE ORIGINAL COMMISSION MEMBERS, THE COMMISSION FILLS VACANCIES IN ITS RANKS INDEPENDENTLY BY INTERNAL ELECTION.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS.

WOMEN

BY LAW, WOMEN ARE EQUAL TO AND HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN. HOWEVER, IN PRACTICE WOMEN FACE SOME LEGAL DISCRIMINATION. FOR EXAMPLE, IN DIVORCE CASES WOMEN OFTEN BEAR A HEAVIER EVIDENTIARY BURDEN THAN MEN, ESPECIALLY IN THE

ISLAMIC-BASED FAMILY COURT SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH SOME WOMEN ENJOY A HIGH DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FREEDOM AND OCCUPY IMPORTANT MIDLEVEL POSITIONS IN BOTH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, THE MAJORITY OF WOMEN DO NOT EXPERIENCE SUCH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOMS AND ARE OFTEN DISPROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTED AT THE LOWER END OF THE POSITION SCALE. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH WOMEN CONSTITUTE ONE-QUARTER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, THEY OCCUPY ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THE SERVICE'S TOP POSTS. INCOME DISPARITY BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN DIMINISHES SIGNIFICANTLY WITH GREATER EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT.

WOMEN ARE OFTEN NOT GIVEN THE EXTRA BENEFITS AND SALARY THAT MEN RECEIVE THAT IS THEIR DUE WHEN THEY ARE THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, AND IN SOME CASES DO NOT RECEIVE EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR THEIR HUSBAND AND CHILDREN, SUCH AS MEDICAL INSURANCE. DESPITE LAWS GUARANTEEING WOMEN A 3 MONTH MATERNITY LEAVE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONCEDED THAT PREGNANT WOMEN ARE OFTEN DISMISSED OR ARE REPLACED WHILE ON LEAVE. SOME COMPANIES REQUIRE THAT WOMEN SIGN STATEMENTS THAT THEY WILL NOT BECOME PREGNANT. WOMEN WORKERS ALSO HAVE COMPLAINED OF BEING SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED BY FOREMEN AND FACTORY OWNERS.

WOMEN WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING GENERALLY RECEIVE LOWER WAGES THAN MEN AND ALSO ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE HIRED ONLY ON A DAILY BASIS. AS A RESULT, THEY ARE LESS LIKELY TO RECEIVE BENEFITS LEGALLY MANDATED FOR PERMANENT WORKERS. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR WOMEN ARE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNPTQ9472

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9472

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 14 OF 21 272347Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/023W						

----------F10B21 272347Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8416
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 14 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT HIGHER THAN FOR MEN.

WOMEN DISPROPORTIONATELY EXPERIENCE ILLITERACY, POOR HEALTH, AND INADEQUATE NUTRITION. HOWEVER, WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS HAVE IMPROVED IN THE LAST DECADE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NUMBER OF GIRLS GRADUATING

FROM HIGH SCHOOL TRIPLED FROM 1980 TO 1990. SEVERAL VOLUNTARY PRIVATE GROUPS WORK ACTIVELY TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CLAIM SOME SUCCESS IN GAINING OFFICIAL

COGNIZANCE OF WOMEN'S CONCERNS.

RAPE IS A PUNISHABLE OFFENSE IN INDONESIA. MEN HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND SENTENCED FOR RAPE AND ATTEMPTED RAPE. THE NATIONAL POLICE REPORTED 1,341 RAPE CASES FOR 1991, 1,356 CASES FOR 1992, 1,341 CASES FOR 1993, AND XXXX FOR 1994. HOWEVER, WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS BELIEVE RAPE IS GROSSLY UNDERREPORTED OWING TO THE SOCIAL STIGMA ATTACHED TO THE VICTIM. SOME LEGAL EXPERTS STATE THAT IF A WOMAN DOES NOT GO IMMEDIATELY TO THE HOSPITAL FOR A PHYSICAL EXAM WHICH PRODUCES SEMEN OR OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF RAPE, SHE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BRING CHARGES. SOME WOMEN FAIL TO REPORT RAPE TO POLICE OUT OF FEAR OF BEING MOLESTED AGAIN BY THE POLICE THEMSELVES.

IN GENERAL, THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REMAINS POORLY DOCUMENTED. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SOCIETY, WHICH SOME SAY HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY RECENT SOCIAL CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY RAPID URBANIZATION. LONGSTANDING TRADITIONAL BELIEFS THAT THE HUSBAND MAY "TEACH" OR "CONTROL" THE WIFE THROUGH SEVERAL MEANS, INCLUDING VIOLENCE, ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH WOMEN'S GROUPS ARE TRYING TO CHANGE THE LAW, RAPE BY A HUSBAND OF A WIFE IS NOT A CRIME IN INDONESIA. WHILE POLICE COULD BRING ASSAULT CHARGES AGAINST A HUSBAND FOR BEATING HIS WIFE, DUE TO SOCIAL ATTITUDES THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO DO SO. THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES SOME COUNSELING, AND SEVERAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS EXIST

TO ASSIST WOMEN. MANY OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS FOCUS MAINLY ON REUNITING THE FAMILY RATHER THAN ON PROVIDING PROTECTION TO THE WOMEN INVOLVED. IN 1995, THE FIRST DROP-IN CENTER FOR BATTERED WOMEN WAS FOUNDED IN JAKARTA BY A NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION. THERE ARE NO BATTERED WOMEN'S SHELTERS. MANY WOMEN RELY ON EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEMS FOR ASSISTANCE IN CASES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.

CHILDREN

THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND WELFARE, BUT IS HAMPERED BY A LACK OF RESOURCES IN TRANSLATING THIS COMMITMENT INTO PRACTICE. A 1979 LAW ON CHILDREN'S WELFARE DEFINES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE AND PARENTS TO NURTURE AND PROTECT CHILDREN. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN DEVELOPED, AND THE LAW'S PROVISIONS HAVE YET TO GO INTO EFFECT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE PARTICULAR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PRIMARY EDUCATION, MATERNITY SERVICES, AND FAMILY PLANNING. THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF) ESTIMATES THAT MORE THAN 1 MILLION CHILDREN DROP OUT OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EVERY YEAR DUE MAINLY TO THE COST OF SUPPLIES, UNIFORMS AND OTHER EXPENSES, IN ADDITION TO THE PROFESSED NEED FOR THE CHILDREN TO SUPPLEMENT FAMILY INCOME. THOUSANDS OF STREET CHILDREN LIVING IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES SELL NEWSPAPERS, SHINE SHOES, HELP TO PARK OR WATCH CARS AND OTHERWISE EARN MONEY. MANY THOUSANDS MORE WORK IN FACTORIES

AND FIELDS (SEE ALSO SECTION 6.D.). NGO'S CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO HELP THESE CHILDREN AS INADEQUATE.

CHILD PROSTITUTION AND OTHER SEXUAL ABUSES OCCUR, ESPECIALLY CASES OF INCEST BETWEEN STEPFATHERS AND STEPDAUGHTERS, BUT DATA ON THEIR INCIDENCE IS LACKING. SOME CHILD CARE EXPERTS BELIEVE IT TO BE LOW. WHILE THERE ARE LAWS DESIGNED TO PROTECT CHILDREN FROM INDECENT ACTIVITIES, PROSTITUTION, AND INCEST, THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS. A SEPARATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR JUVENILES DOES NOT EXIST, THOUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IS DRAFTING LEGISLATION TO ESTABLISH A SPECIAL COURT SYSTEM AND CRIMINAL CODE FOR JUVENILES. IN 1995, MEDIA ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CASE OF A NINE YEAR OLD WHO WAS ARRESTED FOR THEFT AND HELD WITH ADULT OFFENDERS BY POLICE. THE CHILD WAS ALSO ALLEGEDLY BEATEN BY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNPTQ9473

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9473

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 15 OF 21 272347Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00

SP-00 STR-01 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PRME-01 DRL-09 G-00
/023W

----------F10B23 272347Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8417
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 15 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

POLICE DURING INTERROGATION. POLICE OFFICIALS ADMITTED THAT JUVENILES ARE OFTEN IMPRISONED WITH ADULT OFFENDERS.

FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM) OCCURS IN SOME PARTS OF INDONESIA; PRECISE STATISTICS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. IN JAVA, IT USUALLY TAKES PLACE WITHIN THE FIRST YEAR AFTER BIRTH AND IS PERFORMED EITHER AT A HOSPITAL OR BY A LOCAL TRADITIONAL PRACTITIONER OR "DUKUN," ESPECIALLY IN RURAL AREAS. USUALLY A SMALL

SECTION OF THE TIP OF THE CLITORIS IS CUT OR A SMALL INCISION IS MADE IN THE TIP OF THE CLITORIS WITH THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING A FEW DROPS OF BLOOD. TOTAL REMOVAL OF THE CLITORIS IS NOT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PRACTICE, ALTHOUGH IT DOES OCCUR IF INEPTLY PERFORMED.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

THE GOVERNMENT STATES PUBLICLY THAT IT RECOGNIZES THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL INDIGENOUS POPULATION GROUPS, AND THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE

FULLY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE. CRITICS MAINTAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH IS BASICALLY PATERNALISTIC AND DESIGNED MORE TO INTEGRATE THEM MORE CLOSELY INTO INDONESIAN SOCIETY THAN TO PROTECT THEIR TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS IN RECENT YEARS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED ITS TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM, WHICH MOVES LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE FROM OVERPOPULATED ISLANDS TO MORE ISOLATED AND BACKWARD ONES. THE PROGRAM IS CRITICIZED BY HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS WHO SAY THAT IT NOT ONLY SOMETIMES VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE BUT ALSO THOSE OF SOME OF THE TRANSMIGRANTS WHO CLAIM THAT THEY ARE DUPED INTO LEAVING THEIR HOME VILLAGES WITHOUT ANY MEANS OF RETURN.

WHERE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE CLASH WITH DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, THE DEVELOPERS ALMOST ALWAYS WIN. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE

PRACTICES OF SOME LOGGING COMPANIES WHICH RECRUIT INDIGENOUS PEOPLE FOR WORK. ACCORDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THIS ACTIVITY IN IRIAN JAYA HAS SEPARATED THESE PEOPLE FROM THEIR TRADITIONAL ECONOMIES. MOST CIVIL SERVANTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN IRIAN JAYA AND OTHER ISOLATED AREAS CONTINUE TO COME PRIMARILY FROM JAVA RATHER THAN THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

NATIONAL/RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

INDONESIANS EXHIBIT CONSIDERABLE RACIAL AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE, WITH THE IMPORTANT EXCEPTION OF OFFICIAL AND INFORMAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE, WHO COMPRISE ABOUT 3 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. SINCE 1959 NONCITIZEN ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO RUN BUSINESSES IN RURAL INDONESIA. REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF ALL CHINESE SCHOOLS FOR ETHNIC CHINESE, FORMATION OF EXCLUSIVELY CHINESE CULTURAL GROUPS OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND PUBLIC DISPLAY OF CHINESE

CHARACTERS. SINCE AUGUST 1994, FIRMS WORKING IN THE TOURIST INDUSTRY ARE ALLOWED TO PRODUCE CHINESE-LANGUAGE BROCHURES, PROGRAMS, AND SIMILAR MATERIAL FOR CHINESE-SPEAKING TOURISTS. HOWEVER, CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE GOVERNMENT-OWNED DAILY NEWSPAPER, MAY NEITHER BE IMPORTED NOR PRODUCED DOMESTICALLY. PRIVATE INSTRUCTION IN CHINESE IS GENERALLY PROHIBITED BUT TAKES PLACE TO A LIMITED EXTENT, AND SINCE 1994 HAS BEEN ALLOWED IN TRAINING EMPLOYEES IN THE TOURISM

INDUSTRY IN FUNCTIONAL MANDARIN. STATE UNIVERSITIES HAVE NO FORMAL QUOTAS THAT LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ETHNIC CHINESE. THE LAW FORBIDS THE CELEBRATION OF THE CHINESE NEW YEAR IN TEMPLES OR PUBLIC PLACES BUT ITS ENFORCEMENT WAS LIMITED IN 1995 AND CHINESE NEW YEAR DECORATIONS WERE DISPLAYED IN PUBLIC SHOPPING AREAS IN MAJOR CITIES.

EAST TIMORESE AND VARIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS CHARGE THAT THE EAST TIMORESE ARE UNDERREPRESENTED IN THE CIVIL SERVICE IN EAST TIMOR. IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM OR DENY THE CHARGES AS THERE APPEARS TO BE NO REGISTRY OF THE BIRTH PLACE OF CIVIL SERVANTS, WHO CAN BE TRANSFERRED ANYWHERE. EAST TIMORESE HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM COULD LEAD TO FEWER EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND MIGHT EVENTUALLY DESTROY EAST TIMOR'S CULTURAL IDENTITY. IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, INFORMAL MIGRATION TO THE PROVINCE HAS BEEN A GREATER CONCERN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNPTQ9474

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9474

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 16 OF 21 272347Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/023W						

----------F10B32 272348Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8418
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 16 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

THAN THE FORMALLY SPONSORED TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM. IN MID 1995, EAST TIMOR'S PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTED ITS OFFICIALS TO PREVENT THE IN-MIGRATION OF NON-TIMORESE WHO DO NOT HAVE JOB OFFERS IN THE PROVINCE. IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF THESE MEASURES.

PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

NO NATIONAL LAW SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSES THE PROBLEMS
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OR STATUS OF THE DISABLED, NOR DO THEY RECEIVE SPECIAL PROGRAMS OR ATTENTION. HOWEVER, DURING 1994 THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE BEGAN DRAFTING REGULATIONS ON TREATMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED PARTLY BASED ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT. IN 1994 PRESIDENT SOEHARTO GAVE HIS APPROVAL TO SUBMISSION OF THESE NEW REGULATIONS TO THE PARLIAMENT; HOWEVER, THE LEGISLATION HAD NOT YET BEEN FORWARDED TO THE PARLIAMENT AS OF SEPTEMBER, 1995. VIRTUALLY NO PUBLIC BUILDINGS OR PUBLIC MEANS OF TRANSPORT ARE DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY FOR ACCESS BY THE DISABLED. THEY FACE CONSIDERABLE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT.

THE CONSTITUTION INCLUDES THE RIGHT OF EVERY CITIZEN TO OBTAIN AN EDUCATION. IN 1989 THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED REGULATIONS COVERING EDUCATION FOR THE MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED. HOWEVER, THE REGULATIONS DO NOT GRANT A RIGHT TO PUBLIC EDUCATION FOR HANDICAPPED CHILDREN. WHILE THERE ARE SOME PUBLIC SCHOOLS FOR THE HANDICAPPED, THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS THE CONCEPT THAT EDUCATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE COMMUNITY IN THE FORM OF NGO-RUN PRIVATE SCHOOLS THAT MAY RECEIVE SOME PUBLIC FUNDS.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS INCLUDING THOSE IN EXPORT
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PROCESSING ZONES ARE BY LAW FREE TO FORM WORKER ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION. HOWEVER, GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND CURRENT NUMERICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR UNION RECOGNITION CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT BARRIER TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. THE MINISTRY OF MANPOWER USES A REGULATION THAT REQUIRES THAT A UNION BE SET UP "BY AND FOR WORKERS" TO DENY RECOGNITION TO GROUPS WHICH INCLUDE PEOPLE IT CONSIDERS NONWORKERS, SUCH AS LAWYERS OR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, WHO ARE INVOLVED AS LABOR ORGANIZERS. UNTIL 1994, ONLY THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ALL-INDONESIA WORKERS UNION, SPSI, COULD BARGAIN ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES OR REPRESENT WORKERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S LABOR COURTS. A 1994 REGULATION PROVIDES THAT WORKERS IN A SINGLE COMPANY WITH MORE THAN 25 EMPLOYEES CAN JOIN TOGETHER AS A "PLANT-LEVEL UNION" AND NEGOTIATE A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT WITH THEIR EMPLOYER OUTSIDE THE SPSI FRAMEWORK, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES THESE PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS TO JOIN THE SPSI. OVER 800 PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS EXISTED BY JUNE, 1995.

THERE IS, DE FACTO, A SINGLE UNION SYSTEM, THE SPSI AND ITS 13 FEDERATED SECTORAL UNIONS. THE SPSI MAINTAINS INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS BUT IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS EXCEPT THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) TRADE UNION COUNCIL. THE SPSI COMPLETED IN 1995 A TRANSFORMATION FROM A UNITARY

(CENTRALIZED) TO A FEDERATIVE (DECENTRALIZED) STRUCTURE. ITS 13 INDUSTRIAL SECTRS ARE NOW REGISTERED AS INDEPENDENT UNIONS AND AE THE ONLY UNIONS RECOGNIZED BY THE DEPARTMENT O MANPOWER. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER HAS STATED TAT ANY UNIONS WHICH ARE FORMED SHOULD AFFILIATE ITH THE SPSI

FEDERATION AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT ILL NOT RECOGNIZE ANY UNIONS OUTSIDE THE FEDERATIN. THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED POLICY IS TO SEEK TOIMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECOGNIZED SPSI UNONS RATHER THAN TO ALLOW THE FORMATION OF ALTERNTIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

TWO OTHER LABOR GROUPS, SETIA KAWAN (SOLIDARITY), ALSO KNOWN AS SERIKAT BURUH MERDEKA (SBM, FREE TRADE UNION), AND SERIKAT BURUH SEJAHTERA INDONESIA (SBSI, INDONESIAN WORKERS WELFARE UNION), HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED BUT ARE NOT REGISTERED. SETIA KAWAN, FOUNDED 4 YEARS AGO, IS NOW ESSENTIALLY MORIBUND.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNPTQ9477

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9477

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 17 OF 21 272348Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/023W						

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8419
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 17 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

SBSI, CREATED IN 1992, CLAIMS IT HAS FORMED THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF FACTORY-LEVEL UNITS TO MEET THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION AS A LABOR UNION, BUT ITS MOST RECENT REQUEST IN NOVEMBER 1994 FOR REGISTRATION AS A TRADE UNION WAS DENIED. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER HAS ALSO BLOCKED SBSI ATTEMPTS TO REGISTER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS AS A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE ORMAS LAW.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS SBSI ILLEGAL. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT DISBANDED IT, IT HAS CONTINUALLY HARASSED SBSI, ESPECIALLY AFTER LARGE-SCALE LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS, WHICH SBSI HELPED TO ORGANIZE IN MEDAN IN APRIL, 1994, DEGENERATED INTO ANTI-CHINESE RIOTING. THE GOVERNMENT ARRESTED A NUMBER OF THE MEDAN SBSI LEADERSHIP AND ITS NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, AND TRIED AND CONVICTED THEM OF INCITING VIOLENCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE RIOTS, CHARGES WHICH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, THE ILO, AND MANY INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS BELIEVED WERE UNJUSTIFIED. ALL EXCEPT PAKPAHAN HAVE NOW SERVED THEIR SENTENCES AND HAVE BEEN RELEASED. THE SUPREME COURT PROVISIONALLY FREED PAKPAHAN IN MAY PENDING ITS

DECISION ON HIS APPEAL OF A FOUR YEAR SENTENCE (SEE PART I.E). IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AGAINST THE SBSI LEADERSHIP WERE INTENDED TO DISCREDIT OR DESTROY THE ORGANIZATION.

BECAUSE OF PAST MINISTRY OF MANPOWER REGULATIONS, MANY SPSI FACTORY UNITS ARE LED BY PERSONS WHO HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH THEIR UNITS' MEMBERS BECAUSE THEY WERE SELECTED BY EMPLOYERS. A NEW REGULATION STATES THAT EMPLOYEES MUST ONLY NOTIFY THEIR EMPLOYER THAT THEY WISH TO FORM A UNION AND THAT THEY MAY PROCEED IF THEY DO NOT RECEIVE A RESPONSE FROM THEIR EMPLOYER WITHIN 2 WEEKS. DESPITE THIS NEW PROVISION, STRIKES CONTINUE TO OCCUR BECAUSE EMPLOYERS ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF UNION BRANCHES. THESE STRIKES ARE INVARIABLY SUCCESSFUL,

AND THE FORMATION OF AN SPSI UNIT FOLLOWS SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HOWEVER, WORKERS WHO ARE ACTIVE IN THE FORMATION OF THE UNION ARE FREQUENTLY DISMISSED AND HAVE NO PRACTICAL PROTECTION BY EITHER LAW OR GOVERNMENT PRACTICE.

CIVIL SERVANTS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO JOIN UNIONS AND MUST BELONG TO KORPRI, A NONUNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES, DEFINED TO INCLUDE THOSE WORKING IN ENTERPRISES IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A 5-PERCENT HOLDING OR GREATER, USUALLY ARE REQUIRED TO JOIN KORPRI, BUT A SMALL NUMBER OF STATE ENTERPRISES HAVE SPSI UNITS. TEACHERS MUST BELONG TO THE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (PGRI). WHILE TECHNICALLY CLASSED AS A UNION THE PGRI CONTINUES TO FUNCTION MORE AS A WELFARE ORGANIZATION AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ENGAGED IN TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES SUCH AS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. UNIONS MAY DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE OVER THE SPSI AND ITS

FEDERATED UNIONS. THE HEAD OF THE SPSI IS A SENIOR MEMBER OF GOLKAR, AND HE AND TWO OTHER SENIOR SPSI OFFICIALS ARE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT REPRESENTING GOLKAR. WITH ONE EXCEPTION, ALL MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR. THESE PERSONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN POSITIONS IN THE NEW FEDERATED INDUSTRIAL SECTOR UNIONS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER IS A MEMBER OF THE SPSI'S CONSULTATIVE

COUNCIL. NUMEROUS REGIONAL SPSI OFFICIALS ALSO ARE GOLKAR MEMBERS, SOMETIMES SERVING IN REGIONAL LEGISLATURES. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE REPORTS, THE GOVERNMENT INTERFERES IN THE SELECTION OF SPSI OFFICERS, ESPECIALLY BY PLACING RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS IN MIDLEVEL SPSI POSITIONS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS STATED THAT IT WILL CEASE THE PRACTICE OF PLACING MILITARY OFFICERS IN UNION POSITIONS AND EVENTUALLY WILL REMOVE OFFICIALS WITH SIGNIFICANT GOLKAR CONNECTIONS. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER SUPPORTED SPSI IN ITS SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE TO AN ATTEMPT BY THE REGENT OF KUDUS, CENTRAL JAVA, TO NAME A RETIRED MILITARY OFFICER AS SPSI DISTRICT HEAD.

UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE, POLICE APPROVAL IS NEEDED FOR ALL MEETINGS OF FIVE OR MORE PEOPLE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE OFFICES OR NORMAL WORK SITES, THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT LATE IN 1995 ANNOUNCED ITS

NNNNPTQ9478

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9478

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 18 OF 21 272348Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00

/023W

----------F10B72 272349Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8420
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 18 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

INTENTION TO RELAX THIS REGULATION (SEE SECTION 2.B). THIS PROVISION ALSO APPLIES TO UNION MEETINGS. PERMISSION IS ROUTINELY GIVEN TO THE SPSI BUT NOT TO RIVAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS SBSI WHICH WAS PREVENTED FROM HOLDING SEVERAL MEETINGS OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS, INCLUDING ITS FIRST CONGRESS IN 1993. IN APRIL, 1995, POLICE CURTAILED AN SPSI THIRD ANNIVERSARY GATHERING IN JAKARTA. THE GOVERNMENT MAY DISSOLVE A UNION IF IT BELIEVES THE UNION IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA, ALTHOUGH IT HAS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NEVER ACTUALLY DONE SO, AND THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS SPECIFYING PROCEDURES FOR UNION DISSOLUTION.

IN 1994, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS LODGED A FORMAL COMPLAINT AGAINST INDONESIA WITH THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO), ACCUSING THE GOVERNMENT OF DENYING WORKERS' RIGHT TO SET UP UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, HARASSING INDEPENDENT WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS, AND OF TAKING OTHER ACTIONS CONTRARY TO ILO STANDARDS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. IN CONSIDERING THIS COMPLAINT, THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION DECLARED IN APRIL THAT "LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS NEGATE THE RIGHT OF WORKERS TO ESTABLISH ORGANIZATIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING" AND DEEPLY DEPLORED "THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ALLEGATIONS, WHICH LED IT TO BELIEVE THAT THE GENERAL SITUATION OF WORKERS IN INDONESIA HAS NOT EVOLVED BUT IS STILL CHARACTERIZED BY SERIOUS AND WORSENING INFRINGEMENTS OF BASIC HUMAN AND TRADE UNION RIGHTS AND VIOLATIONS OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION PRINCIPLES IN LAW AND PRACTICE."

WHILE PANCASILA PRINCIPLES CALL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES TO BE SETTLED BY CONSENSUS, ALL ORGANIZED WORKERS EXCEPT CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. WHILE STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND TEACHERS RARELY EXERCISE THIS RIGHT, PRIVATE SECTOR STRIKES ARE FREQUENT. BEFORE A STRIKE CAN OCCUR IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE LAW

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

REQUIRES INTENSIVE MEDIATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND PRIOR NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE. HOWEVER, NO APPROVAL IS REQUIRED. IN PRACTICE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ARE NOT FOLLOWED, AND FORMAL NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE IS RARELY GIVEN BECAUSE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROCEDURES ARE SLOW. THESE PROCEDURES HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH WORKERS, WHO IGNORE THEM. SUDDEN STRIKES THEREFORE, TEND TO RESULT FROM LONGSTANDING GRIEVANCES OR RECOGNITION THAT LEGALLY MANDATED BENEFITS OR RIGHTS ARE NOT BEING RECEIVED. WHILE STRIKE LEADERS ARE NOT ARRESTED FOR ILLEGAL STRIKES, THEY OFTEN LOSE THEIR JOBS AND HAVE NO LEGAL RECOURSE FOR REINSTATEMENT. THE NUMBER OF STRIKES HAVE DECREASED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THE LATTER HALF OF 1994, REVERSING A TREND OF THE PREVIOUS FEW YEARS. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS TO RAISE AND MORE VIGOROUSLY ENFORCE MINIMUM WAGE RATES MAY BE PARTLY RESPONSIBLE.

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROMOTES IT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE NATIONAL IDEOLOGY, PANCASILA. UNTIL 1994, ONLY RECOGNIZED TRADE UNIONS, THAT IS, THE SPSI AND ITS COMPONENTS, COULD LEGALLY ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. SINCE EARLY 1994, NEW GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS ALSO PERMIT UNAFFILIATED PLANT-LEVEL WORKERS ASSOCIATIONS TO CONCLUDE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH EMPLOYERS, AND SOME TWENTY

FOUR HAD DONE SO BY MID-1995 ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES. AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY ANY OTHER GROUPS ARE NOT CONSIDERED LEGALLY BINDING AND ARE NOT REGISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. THE MAJORITY OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE SPSI UNITS AND EMPLOYERS ARE NEGOTIATED BILATERALLY. ONCE NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED A REGISTERED SPSI OR INDEPENDENT PLANT LEVEL

UNION, AN EMPLOYER IS OBLIGATED TO BARGAIN WITH IT. IN COMPANIES WITHOUT UNIONS, THE GOVERNMENT DISCOURAGES WORKERS FROM UTILIZING OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE, E.G., DURING CONSULTATIONS WITH EMPLOYERS OVER COMPANY REGULATIONS. INSTEAD, THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PREFERS THAT WORKERS SEEK ITS ASSISTANCE AND BELIEVES THAT ITS ROLE IS TO PROTECT WORKERS. THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT FOR SOME INDONESIAN COMPANIES, CONSULTATIONS ARE PERFUNCTORY AT BEST AND USUALLY WITH MANAGEMENT-SELECTED WORKERS; THERE ARE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS TO THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNPTQ9479

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9479

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 19 OF 21 272348Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/023W						

----------F10B79 272350Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8421
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 19 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

CONTRARY FROM U.S. COMPANIES. OVER HALF OF THE FACTORY-LEVEL SPSI UNITS HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS ARE FREELY NEGOTIATED BETWEEN UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE VARIES. BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS OR BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION OR ARBITRATION. MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED FOR 1

YEAR. ACCORDING TO NGO'S INVOLVED IN LABOR ISSUES, THE PROVISIONS OF THESE AGREEMENTS RARELY GO BEYOND THE LEGAL MINIMUM STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE AGREEMENTS ARE OFTEN MERELY PRESENTED TO WORKER REPRESENTATIVES FOR SIGNING RATHER THAN BEING NEGOTIATED.

ALTHOUGH GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS PROHIBIT EMPLOYERS FROM DISCRIMINATING OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS FROM UNION OFFICIALS OF EMPLOYER RETRIBUTION AGAINST UNION ORGANIZERS, INCLUDING FIRING, WHICH IS NOT EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED OR REMEDIED IN PRACTICE. SOME EMPLOYERS REPORTEDLY HAVE WARNED THEIR EMPLOYEES AGAINST CONTACT WITH UNION ORGANIZERS FROM THE UNRECOGNIZED SBSI ORGANIZATION. CHARGES OF

ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE ADJUDICATED BY ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. HOWEVER, BECAUSE MANY UNION MEMBERS BELIEVE THE TRIBUNALS GENERALLY SIDE WITH EMPLOYERS, MANY WORKERS REJECT OR AVOID THE PROCEDURE AND PRESENT THEIR GRIEVANCES DIRECTLY TO PARLIAMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF DISMISSED WORKERS TEND TO BE MONETARY AWARDS; WORKERS ARE RARELY REINSTATED. THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO FIRE WORKERS, BUT THE LAW IS OFTEN IGNORED IN PRACTICE.

COMMENTING ON ANTI-UNION DISCRIMINATION AND RESTRICTIONS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE CONTEXT OF ILO CONVENTION NUMBER 98 ON THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY, THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON THE

APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS' JUNE REPORT EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT "IN SPITE OF THE DIRECT CONTACTS MISSION THAT WENT TO INDONESIA IN NOVEMBER, 1993, THE DISCUSSION WITHIN THE PRESENT COMMITTEE LAST YEAR, AND THE TECHNICAL ADVISORY MISSION THAT WENT TO INDONESIA IN JANUARY, 1995, MUCH PROGRESS WAS YET TO BE ACHIEVED TO ENSURE IN LAW AND IN PRACTICE THE FULL APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION."

THE ARMED FORCES, WHICH INCLUDE THE POLICE, CONTINUES TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN LABOR ISSUES, DESPITE NEW REGULATIONS PROMULGATED IN 1994 TO PROHIBIT MILITARY INTERFERENCE WHEN THERE IS NO THREAT TO SECURITY. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE INCIDENCE OF SUCH MILITARY INVOLVEMENT HAS DECREASED SINCE 1994, BUT NOT ALL OBSERVERS SHARE THIS PERCEPTION. WORKERS CHARGE THAT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES ATTEMPT TO INTIMIDATE UNION ORGANIZERS AND STRIKE LEADERS AND HAVE BEEN PRESENT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS DURING SOME STRIKES, EVEN WHEN THERE HAS BEEN NO DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER VIOLENCE. MEMBERS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ATTENDED AND MONITORED TRADE UNION EDUCATION SEMINARS RUN BY THE ASIAN-AMERICAN FREE LABOR INSTITUTE (AAFLI) AND AN

AAFLI-SPSI SPONSORED SEMINAR ON DEMOCRATIZATION, EVEN THOUGH THESE PROGRAMS WERE APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. AN AAFLI-SPSI PROGRAM ON LEGAL AID FOR INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER, WHICH THE MILITARY COMMAND IN SURABAYA HALTED IN 1993, WAS NEVER ALLOWED TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RESUME DESPITE GOVERNMENT ASSURANCES. MILITARY OFFICIALS OCCASIONALLY HAVE BEEN REPORTED PRESENT DURING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND MANAGEMENT. THEIR PRESENCE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS INTIMIDATING BY PLANT-LEVEL UNION OFFICIALS. A MILITARY OFFICER WAS AMONG THOSE CONVICTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MARSINAH MURDER CASE. LABOR LAW APPLIES EQUALLY IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

THE LAW FORBIDS FORCED LABOR, AND THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY ENFORCES IT. HOWEVER, THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF TEENAGED CHILDREN BEING BEING FORCED TO WORK UNDER HIGHLY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS ON FISHING PLATFORMS OFF THE COAST OF NORTHEASTERN SUMATRA. THESE PLATFORMS ARE MILES OFF SHORE, WITH ACCESS CONTROLLED BY THE EMPLOYERS, AND IN MANY CASES THE CHILDREN ARE HELD VIRTUAL PRISONERS ON THE PLATFORMS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNPTQ9480

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9480

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 20 OF 21 272349Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00

/023W

----------F10B7F 272350Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8422
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 20 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

AND FORCED TO WORK FOR UP TO THREE MONTHS AT A TIME FOR WELL BELOW THE MINIMUM WAGE. ACCORDING TO KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES, HUNDREDS OF CHILDREN MAY BE INVOLVED. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT HAS DONE LITTLE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM.

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

CHILD LABOR EXISTS IN BOTH INDUSTRIAL AND RURAL AREAS, AND IN BOTH THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 2.7 MILLION WORKING CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 14, ACCORDING TO A 1994 REPORT OF THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. THE NUMBER OF OUT-OF-SCHOOL CHILDREN AGE 7 TO 15 WHO ARE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE MAY BE AS HIGH AS 6.5 MILLION, ACCORDING TO A 1989 STUDY, AND THE NUMBER WOULD BE EVEN GREATER IF THOSE WHO HAVE NOT LEFT SCHOOL ARE INCLUDED. INDONESIA WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO BE SELECTED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ILO'S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOR (IPEC), AND SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ILO TO GUIDE THEIR COLLABORATION UNDER THIS PROGRAM ON MAY 29, 1992. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PLAN OF ACTION WERE DEVELOPED AT A NATIONAL CONFERENCE IN BOGOR IN JULY 1993. DURING 1995, 30 GOVERNMENT LABOR INSPECTORS RECEIVED ILO-SPONSORED TRAINING ON CHILD LABOR MATTERS UNDER THE IPEC PROGRAM. HOWEVER, ENFORCEMENT REMAINS LAX.

THE GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A CLASS OF CHILDREN WHO MUST WORK FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS, AND IN 1987 THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER ISSUED REGULATION PER-OL/MEN/1987, "PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FORCED TO WORK," TO REGULATE THIS SITUATION. THIS REGULATION LEGALIZES THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14 WHO MUST WORK TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCOME OF THEIR FAMILIES. IT REQUIRES PARENTAL CONSENT, PROHIBITS DANGEROUS OR DIFFICULT WORK, LIMITS WORK TO 4 HOURS DAILY, AND REQUIRES EMPLOYERS TO REPORT THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN WORKING UNDER ITS PROVISIONS. IT DOES NOT SET A MINIMUM AGE FOR

CHILDREN IN THIS CATEGORY, EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDING

THE COLONIAL-ERA GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE OF DECEMBER 17, 1925, ON "MEASURES LIMITING CHILD LABOUR AND NIGHTWORK OF WOMEN," WHICH IS STILL THE CURRENT LAW GOVERNING CHILD LABOR AND SETS A MINIMUM AGE OF 12 FOR EMPLOYMENT. THE 1987 REGULATION IS NOT ENFORCED. NO EMPLOYERS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO COURT FOR VIOLATING ITS RESTRICTIONS ON THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR CHILDREN, AND NO REPORTS ARE COLLECTED FROM ESTABLISHMENTS EMPLOYING CHILDREN.

ACT NO. 1 OF 1951 WAS INTENDED TO BRING INTO FORCE CERTAIN LABOR MEASURES, INCLUDING PROVISIONS ON CHILD LABOR WHICH WOULD REPLACE THOSE OF THE 1925 LEGISLATION. HOWEVER IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS FOR THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN ISSUED. THUS THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS IN THE 1951 ACT HAVE NO VALIDITY.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE, AREA WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL ESTABLISH MINIMUM WAGES FOR REGIONS AND BASIC NEEDS FIGURES FOR EACH PROVINCE--A MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. WHILE INDONESIA HAS SUCCEEDED IN DRAMATICALLY LOWERING THE LEVEL OF POVERTY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, THE MINIMUM WAGE RATES UNTIL RECENTLY HAVE USUALLY LAGGED BEHIND INFLATION AND

EVEN THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURES. THE GOVERNMENT RAISED MINIMUM WAGE RATES IN 1994 AND AGAIN ON APRIL 1, 1995. WHILE IN CERTAIN PROVINCES THE NEW RATES ARE STILL BELOW THE PROVINCIAL BASIC NEEDS FIGURES, THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ESTIMATES THAT ON THE AVERAGE MINIMUM WAGE RATES NOW EQUAL 108 PERCENT OF THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURES, UP FROM 97 PERCENT AS OF AUGUST 1, 1994. THERE ARE NO RELIABLE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYERS PAYING AT LEAST THE MINIMUM WAGE. INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS' ESTIMATES RANGE

BETWEEN 30 AND 60 PERCENT. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER INCREASED THE NUMBER OF LABOR INSPECTORS AND ANNOUNCED A SCHEME OF "BLACKLISTING" OFFENDING COMPANIES, BUT ENFORCEMENT OF MINIMUM WAGE AND OTHER LABOR REGULATIONS REMAINS INADEQUATE, AND SANCTIONS TOO LIGHT. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER HAS DRAFTED A REVISION OF A BASIC LABOR LAW THAT WOULD RAISE STATUTORY FINES, WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVALUED BY INFLATION, TO MORE APPROPRIATE LEVELS. SOME

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNPTQ9483

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PTQ9483

PAGE 01 JAKART 08147 21 OF 21 272349Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-02	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-00
	SP-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00

/023W

----------F10B82 272350Z /38

R 272317Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8423

AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMCONSUL MEDAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 21 OF 21 JAKARTA 008147

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

OBSERVERS BELIEVE INCREASED GOVERNMENT PRESSURES ON EMPLOYERS AND MEMORIES OF THE 1994 MEDAN RIOTS HAVE IMPROVED MINIMUM WAGE COMPLIANCE SOMEWHAT.

LABOR LAW AND MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PROVIDE WORKERS WITH A VARIETY OF OTHER BENEFITS, SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY, AND WORKERS IN MORE MODERN FACILITIES OFTEN RECEIVE HEALTH BENEFITS AND FREE MEALS. THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7-HOUR WORKDAYS AND 40-HOUR WORKWEEKS, WITH ONE 30-MINUTE REST PERIOD

FOR EACH 4 HOURS OF WORK. THE LAW ALSO REQUIRES 1 DAY OF REST OUT OF EVERY WEEK. THE DAILY OVERTIME RATE IS 1 1/2 TIMES THE NORMAL HOURLY RATE FOR THE FIRST HOUR, AND TWICE THE HOURLY RATE FOR ADDITIONAL OVERTIME. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE. OBSERVANCE OF LAWS REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND BY REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ARE FAIRLY COMMON AND OFTEN RESULT IN STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. THE MINISTRY OF MANPOWER CONTINUES PUBLICLY TO URGE EMPLOYERS TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW. HOWEVER, IN GENERAL, GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ARE WEAK.

BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM

STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. IN THE LARGELY WESTERN-OPERATED OIL SECTOR, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUNCTION REASONABLY WELL. HOWEVER, IN THE COUNTRY'S 100,000 LARGER REGISTERED COMPANIES IN THE NONOIL SECTOR, THE QUALITY OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAMS VARIES GREATLY. THE ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS IS SEVERELY HAMPERED BY THE LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER INSPECTORS AS WELL AS BY THE LOW LEVEL OF EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION FOR SOUND HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES. ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION ON THE PART OF INSPECTORS ARE COMMON. WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS.

EMPLOYERS ARE FORBIDDEN BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO, BUT THE LAW IS NOT EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED. HARVEY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ8212

PAGE 01 STATE 043400 041923Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-01
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/026R

DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS: SJBLAKE : SJB
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMES : MJFLECK
DRL/CRT : DHARRIS
----------1F78B0 041927Z /25
O R 041738Z MAR 96
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
CIA WASHDC 0000
SECDEF WASHDC 0000
NSC WASHDC 0000
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC 0000
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

UNCLAS STATE 043400

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: 1995 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 043400 041923Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200504418

1. SBU/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS CABLE PROVIDES THE FINAL VERSION OF THE 1995 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES THAT WILL BE DELIVERED TO CONGRESS ON MARCH 5, WITH PUBLIC RELEASE AT THE DEPARTMENT'S DAILY PRESS BRIEFING ON MARCH 6 AT 12:30 PM.

3. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE REPORTS REMAIN ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED (SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - NOFORN) UNTIL THEY ARE OFFICIALLY RELEASED. ONLY THE PUBLIC VERSION BECOMES RELEASABLE WHILE ALL EARLIER DRAFTS REMAIN CONTROLLED.

4. THE COUNTRY REPORTS ARE EMBARGOED UNTIL THE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICIAL RELEASE DATE. PLEASE ENSURE THAT THE TEXT OF THIS REPORT IS CLOSELY HELD IN ADVANCE OF THAT DATE. IT MAY NOT BE GIVEN TO MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES, DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES, OR OTHERS UNTIL OFFICIALLY RELEASED. HOWEVER, POST IS AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE AN

EMBARGOED COPY TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT APPROXIMATELY 24 HOURS IN ADVANCE OF THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF THE REPORT, ONLY UPON CONDITION THAT THE HOST GOVERNMENT NOT RELEASE THE TEXT PUBLICLY UNTIL THE TIME OF ITS RELEASE IN WASHINGTON.

BEGIN TEXT:

INDONESIA
UNCLASSIFIED

THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, DESPITE A SURFACE ADHERENCE TO DEMOCRATIC FORMS, REMAINS STRONGLY AUTHORITARIAN. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO (NOW IN HIS SIXTH 5-YEAR TERM), A SMALL GROUP OF ADVISERS, AND THE MILITARY DOMINATE THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THIS HEAVILY POPULATED DEVELOPING COUNTRY, WHOSE PEOPLE COME FROM HUNDREDS OF DIFFERENT CULTURAL, LINGUISTIC, AND ETHNIC BACKGROUNDS. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES ALLEGIANCE TO A STATE IDEOLOGY

KNOWN AS "PANCASILA," WHICH INCLUDES BELIEF IN A SUPREME GOD, A JUST AND CIVILIZED HUMANITY, NATIONAL UNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE. IT HAS USED PANCASILA AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR RESTRICTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITION ELEMENTS.

UNDER A DOCTRINE OF "DUAL FUNCTION," THE MILITARY IS GIVEN SPECIAL CIVIC RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, INCLUDING UNELECTED MILITARY SEATS IN PARLIAMENT (DPR) AND LOCAL LEGISLATURES, IN ADDITION TO ITS DEFENSE AND SECURITY ROLES. THE 450,000-MEMBER ARMED FORCES, INCLUDING 175,000 POLICE, CONSIDER THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY AS THEIR PRIMARY MISSION. THEY HAVE TRADITIONALLY ACTED SWIFTLY TO SUPPRESS PERCEIVED THREATS TO SECURITY, WITH A VIGOR THAT HAS OFTEN LED TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. SOME MILITARY LEADERS HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THIS "SECURITY APPROACH." THERE CONTINUED TO BE NUMEROUS, CREDIBLE REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE MILITARY AND POLICE, ALTHOUGH THEY EXHIBITED SOME RESTRAINT IN CONTROLLING CROWDS AND DEMONSTRATIONS.

IN CONTRAST TO ITS RESTRICTIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM, INDONESIA HAS AN INCREASINGLY OPEN AND DEREGULATED ECONOMY. ALTHOUGH STILL A POOR COUNTRY, THE ECONOMY CONTINUED TO EXPAND, ESPECIALLY IN MANUFACTURING, WITH GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT EXPECTED TO INCREASE BY 7.2 PERCENT IN 1995. THE CONTINUED ECONOMIC GROWTH HAS PRODUCED STEADY GAINS IN LIVING STANDARDS FOR MUCH OF INDONESIAN SOCIETY. THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE LIVING BELOW THE POVERTY LINE HAS FALLEN

FROM OVER 60 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION TO UNDER 15 PERCENT. WIDESPREAD UNDEREMPLOYMENT PERSISTS, HOWEVER, AS DO CORRUPTION AND INFLUENCE PEDDLING.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO COMMIT SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. THE MOST SERIOUS ABUSES INCLUDED HARSH REPRESSION OF DISSIDENTS IN EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAYA. REPORTS OF EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCES, AND TORTURE OF THOSE IN CUSTODY BY SECURITY FORCES INCREASED. REPORTS OF ARBITRARY ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS AND THE USE OF

EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE (INCLUDING DEADLY FORCE) IN DEALING WITH SUSPECTED CRIMINALS OR PERCEIVED TROUBLEMAKERS CONTINUED. PRISON CONDITIONS REMAINED HARSH, AND SECURITY FORCES REGULARLY VIOLATED CITIZENS? RIGHT TO PRIVACY.

THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE CONTINUE TO LACK THE ABILITY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO IMPOSE SEVERE LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOMS OF SPEECH, PRESS, ASSEMBLY, AND ASSOCIATION. IT SUPPRESSED EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A TRULY FREE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT, BUT ENCOURAGED SOME DEVELOPMENTS THAT APPEAR TO OPEN THE DOOR TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY WITHIN THE REGISTERED TRADE UNION FEDERATION.

UNCLASSIFIED

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS TRYING TO COMPETE WITH THE OFFICIAL TRADE UNION FEDERATION WERE SUBJECT TO CONTINUING HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION. ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES CONTINUED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOST SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. MILITARY LEADERS IN SOME CASES SHOWED WILLINGNESS TO ADMIT PUBLICLY ABUSES BY MILITARY PERSONNEL AND TAKE ACTION AGAINST THEM, INCLUDING IN A BRUTAL INCIDENT IN EAST TIMOR. PUNISHMENT, HOWEVER, RARELY MATCHED THE SEVERITY OF THE ABUSE. THE JUDICIARY, WHILE STILL LARGELY SUBSERVIENT TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND SUBJECT TO WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION, MADE SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENT INTERESTS THAT SUGGESTED SOMEWHAT GREATER JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO EXERT STRONG PRESSURE AGAINST ANTIGOVERNMENT CRITICS, INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS, AND LABOR ACTIVISTS. THESE CONSTRAINTS, HOWEVER, DID NOT COMPLETELY DAMPEN DISSENTING VOICES IN THE PUBLIC AND THE MEDIA. MANYHUMAN RIGHTS NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO'S) REMAINED ACTIVE, AND THE GOVERNMENT TOLERATED WIDE PRESS COVERAGE OF SOME SENSITIVE ISSUES. THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED A PHASING-OUT OF A DISCRIMINATORY SYMBOL ON THE IDENTIFICATION CARDS OF EX-POLITICAL PRISONERS AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND SOME EASING OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF FREE ASSEMBLY BOTH BEGINNING IN EARLY 1996. THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

DISPLAYED INCREASING INDEPENDENCE, SPOTLIGHTING ABUSES AND

OCCASIONALLY TAKING POSITIONS AT VARIANCE WITH GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND ACTIONS.

ON EAST TIMOR, NO PROGRESS WAS MADE IN ACCOUNTING FOR THE MISSING PERSONS FOLLOWING THE 1991 DIII INCIDENT OR THE 10 OTHER TIMORESE THAT DISAPPEARED IN 1995. TROOP LEVELS REMAINED UNJUSTIFIABLY HIGH. THE ARMED FORCES USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN MAKING ARRESTS FOLLOWING ANTI-INTEGRATION RIOTING IN DIII IN OCTOBER. THE GOVERNMENT REIMPOSED RESTRICTED ACCESS TO THE PROVINCE BY FOREIGN JOURNALISTS.

IN IRIAN JAYA, TENSIONS WITH INDIGENOUS INHABITANTS SEEKING GREATER AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE LED TO VIOLENT REPRESSIVE MEASURES BY MILITARY UNITS, RESULTING IN DEATHS AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES DOCUMENTED BY SEVERAL SOURCES, INCLUDING THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, AND NGO'S. SECURITY FORCES REPORTEDLY KILLED 16 OR MORE CIVILIANS THROUGHOUT IRIAN JAYA BETWEEN MID-1994 AND MID-1995.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJQKILLINGS

HISTORICALLY, POLITICALLY MOTIVATED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS GENERALLY HAVE OCCURRED MOST FREQUENTLY IN AREAS WHERE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS WERE ACTIVE, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAYA. SECURITY FORCES CONTINUE TO EMPLOY HARSH MEASURES AGAINST SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN THESE THREE AREAS. SECURITY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR KILLED SIX UNARMED

PAGE 07 STATE 043400 041923Z
CIVILIANS IN LIQUISA PROVINCE IN JANUARY. THE MILITARY COURT-MARTIALED TWO SOLDIERS FOR THIS KILLING (SEE BELOW). THERE WERE ALSO SEVERAL OTHER MYSTERIOUS KILLINGS IN EAST TIMOR; THE LIMITED EVIDENCE AVAILABLE SUGGESTS SOME OF THESE TOO COULD ALSO BE CASES OF SUMMARY EXECUTION BY SECURITY FORCES, THOUGH AT LEAST SEVEN ARE ATTRIBUTED TO EAST TIMORESE INSURGENTS. THERE WERE CREDIBLE, DETAILED REPORTS FROM CHURCH AND NGO SOURCES THAT SECURITY FORCES KILLED 16 OR MORE CIVILIANS IN IRIAN JAYA BETWEEN MID-1994 AND MID-1995. KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES REPORT AT LEAST TWO UNCONFIRMED INSTANCES OF SECURITY FORCES IN ACEH PROVINCE KILLING CIVILIANS WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION.

THERE WERE REPORTS THAT SECURITY FORCES KILLED MEMBERS OF INSURGENT GROUPS IN ARMED CLASHES, INCLUDING FIVE ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS IN ACEH AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF ALLEGED ARMED OPPOSITION MEMBERS IN EAST TIMOR. INSURGENT GROUPS ALSO ATTACKED AND KILLED SECURITY FORCES.

THE GOVERNMENT WITHDREW TWO ARMY BATTALIONS FROM EAST TIMOR IN SEPTEMBER, BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO NOTICEABLE DECREASE IN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE TERRITORY. AFTER OCTOBER RIOTS IN DILI, SOME ANTIRIOT UNITS WERE REINFORCED. THE GOVERNMENT OFFERED A GENERAL AMNESTY TO MEMBERS OF THE TIMORESE RESISTANCE WHO SURRENDER THEIR ARMS, AND IT WAS REPORTED TO HAVE RELEASED SOME WHO WERE APPREHENDED RATHER THAN PUT THEM ON TRIAL. A SIMILAR POLICY WAS APPLIED TO SEVERAL LEADERS OF THE TIMORESE CLANDESTINE POLITICAL MOVEMENT.

THE POLICE OFTEN EMPLOY EXCESSIVE AND SOMETIMES DEADLY

PAGE 08 STATE 043400 041923Z
FORCE IN APPREHENDING SUSPECTS OR COPING WITH ALLEGED CRIMINALS. IN RESPONSE TO PROTESTS THAT THE METHODS USED ARE UNJUSTIFIABLY HARSH AND AMOUNT TO EXECUTION WITHOUT TRIAL, POLICE GENERALLY CLAIM THAT THE SUSPECTS WERE FLEEING, RESISTING ARREST, OR THREATENING THE POLICE. IN

NORTH SUMATRA, FOR EXAMPLE, 45 SHOOTINGS BY POLICE, INCLUDING 3 DEATHS, WERE REPORTED BY MID-AUGUST. ACCURATE STATISTICS WERE UNAVAILABLE, HOWEVER.

IN THE PAST THE AUTHORITIES ALMOST NEVER TOOK ACTION AGAINST POLICE FOR USING EXCESSIVE FORCE. HOWEVER, THERE IS SOME INDICATION THAT THIS SITUATION IS IMPROVING, ALTHOUGH ACTION TAKEN BY THE AUTHORITIES IS STILL NOT COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF POLICE ABUSES. AMONG A NUMBER OF DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS TAKEN BY AUTHORITIES, THREE POLICEMEN WERE REPORTED TO BE FACING COURT-MARTIAL IN PADANG, WEST SUMATRA, ON CHARGES OF DELIBERATELY STRIKING A MOTORCYCLIST WITH THEIR CAR DURING A CHASE IN APRIL, ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL HAD NOT BEGUN AS OF LATE AUGUST. IN JUNE A MILITARY COURT-MARTIAL SENTENCED AN ARMY SECOND LIEUTENANT TO 4 AND 1/2 YEARS IN PRISON AND A PRIVATE TO 4 YEARS FOR KILLING SIX UNARMED, BOUND CIVILIANS IN LIQUISA REGENCY, EAST TIMOR IN JANUARY. IN OCTOBER MILITARY AUTHORITIES ARRESTED A SECOND LIEUTENANT AND THREE PRIVATES SUSPECTED OF KILLING CIVILIANS IN IRIAN JAYA (SEE ABOVE), AND PLANNED TO COURT-MARTIAL THEM BEGINNING IN JANUARY 1996. SEVEN POLICEMEN WERE DETAINED IN ACEH PROVINCE ON SUSPICION OF TORTURING A SUSPECTED RAPIST AND CAUSING HIS DEATH IN LATE JULY. IN NORTHERN SUMATRA, AT LEAST TWO CIVIL CASES OF ALLEGED EXCESSIVE FORCE ON THE

PART OF POLICE OFFICIALS, IN ONE OF WHICH THE VICTIM DIED, WERE SETTLED OUT OF COURT THROUGH MONETARY COMPENSATION.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT SECURITY FORCES ABDUCTED FIVE CIVILIANS IN DIII, EAST TIMOR, IN JANUARY. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT RESPOND TO REPEATED REQUESTS FROM THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO CLARIFY THE FATE OF THESE PERSONS. AT LEAST FIVE OTHER PERSONS DISAPPEARED IN EAST TIMOR UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGESTING POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT BY THE SECURITY FORCES, AND SOME CREDIBLE SOURCES BELIEVE THEY HAVE BEEN EXECUTED. INDONESIAN NGO'S DOCUMENTED REPORTS

OF AT LEAST FOUR CIVILIANS WHO DISAPPEARED AFTER BEING DETAINED BY MILITARY FORCES IN IRIAN JAYA AT THE END OF 1994. THE WHEREABOUTS OF THOSE ABDUCTED ARE NOT KNOWN, AND CREDIBLE SOURCES BELIEVE THEY ARE DEAD. SECURITY FORCES DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE ABDUCTIONS, BUT ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WERE INVESTIGATING THE IRIAN JAYA REPORTS AND RELATED CHARGES OF MILITARY KILLINGS AND TORTURE IN THAT PROVINCE. SINCE THEIR INVESTIGATION OF THE LIQUISA INCIDENT IN EAST TIMOR IN JANUARY, SECURITY FORCES HAVE BECOME LESS WILLING TO PROVIDE INFORMATION OR TO UNDERTAKE INVESTIGATIONS ABOUT NEW CASES OF CONCERN. SECURITY FORCES IN AREAS OF CONFLICT SOMETIMES HOLD SUSPECTS INCOMMUNICADO FOR PERIODS OF TIME BEFORE ACKNOWLEDGING THEIR DETENTION. THIS APPEARS TO HAVE BECOME MORE FREQUENT IN EAST TIMOR DURING THE LATTER PART OF 1994 AND EARLY 1995, BEFORE EASING SOMEWHAT LATER IN THE YEAR. SUSPECTS ARE ALSO FREQUENTLY HELD FOR SUBSTANTIAL PERIODS

OF TIME WITHOUT FORMAL CHARGES BEING BROUGHT.

THE GOVERNMENT MADE NO NEW EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MISSING AND DEAD FROM THE NOVEMBER 12, 1991 MILITARY SHOOTING OF CIVILIANS IN DILI, EAST TIMOR. OF THOSE STILL LISTED AS MISSING IN A REPORT THE MILITARY GAVE TO HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, NO ADDITIONAL CASES WERE RESOLVED DURING THE YEAR. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN IMPLIED THAT THEIR FAILURE TO LOCATE THOSE MISSING WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO THOSE PERSONS WISHING TO EVADE DETECTION. MANY KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS, HOWEVER, CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE MISSING ARE DEAD AND THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES KNOW WHERE THEIR BODIES ARE LOCATED.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

THE CRIMINAL CODE MAKES IT A CRIME PUNISHABLE BY UP TO 4 YEARS IN PRISON FOR ANY OFFICIAL TO USE VIOLENCE OR FORCE TO ELICIT A CONFESSION, AND IT ESTABLISHES PRETRIAL PROCEDURES TO GIVE SUSPECTS OR THEIR FAMILIES THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF AN ARREST OR DETENTION. IN PRACTICE, LEGAL PROTECTIONS ARE BOTH INADEQUATE AND WIDELY

IGNORED, AND SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO EMPLOY TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF MISTREATMENT, PARTICULARLY IN REGIONS OF SECURITY CONCERNS SUCH AS ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, AND EAST TIMOR.

IN AUGUST NGO AND CHURCH SOURCES PROVIDED EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS TO THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF OVER 40 VICTIMS OF ALLEGED TORTURE BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN

IRIAN JAYA IN LATE 1994 AND EARLY 1995. ACCORDING TO THESE SOURCES, METHODS OF TORTURE EMPLOYED INCLUDED KICKING WITH HEAVY BOOTS; BEATING WITH FISTS, STICKS, STONES, AND RIFLE BUTTS; STARVATION; SHACKLING THUMBS, ARMS AND LEGS; TAPING EYES SHUT; STAMPING ON HANDS; AND FORCING VICTIMS TO STAND FOR PROLONGED PERIODS WHILE BEARING HEAVY WEIGHTS OR TO KNEEL WITH AN IRON BAR IN THE KNEE HOLLOW. IN EAST TIMOR, TORTURE INCREASED IN FREQUENCY BEGINNING IN NOVEMBER 1994, AND INCLUDED ELECTRIC SHOCKS, MOCK EXECUTION, SEVERE BEATINGS, AND BURNING WITH CIGARETTES. FOLLOWING COMPLAINTS, THIS PROBLEM APPEARS TO HAVE EASED IN THE CASE OF THE PROVINCIAL POLICE, BUT CONTINUED OR WORSENED IN DETENTION FACILITIES RUN BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

POLICE OFTEN RESORT TO PHYSICAL ABUSE, EVEN IN MINOR INCIDENTS. PRISON CONDITIONS ARE HARSH, WITH VIOLENCE AMONG PRISONERS AND MISTREATMENT AND EXTORTION OF INMATES BY GUARDS REPORTEDLY COMMON. THE INCIDENCE OF MISTREATMENT BY PRISON OFFICIALS DROPS SHARPLY ONCE A PRISONER HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM POLICE OR MILITARY CUSTODY INTO THE CIVILIAN PRISON SYSTEM, AND PRISON CONDITIONS GENERALLY HAVE IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS. SPORADIC CASES OF ILL-TREATMENT HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN EAST TIMORESE PRISONS. OFFICIALS HAVE PUBLICLY CONDEMNED POLICE BRUTALITY AND HARSH PRISON CONDITIONS AND OCCASIONALLY INSTIGATE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, INCLUDING TRANSFER, DISMISSAL, AND TRIALS LEADING TO PRISON. SUCH ACTIONS, HOWEVER, ARE AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE OF GENERAL IMPUNITY. POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE USUALLY MIXED WITH THE GENERAL PRISON POPULATION, ALTHOUGH IN THE CIPINANG PRISON

IN JAKARTA HIGH-PROFILE POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE SEGREGATED. IN 1995 THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) TO VISIT

PRISONERS IN CIPINANG IN JAKARTA AND ALSO GRANTED ACCESS TO PRISONS ELSEWHERE IN JAVA, SUMATRA, ACEH, AND OTHER PROVINCES AS WELL AS EAST TIMOR. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO HAS ALLOWED THE ICRC TO ORGANIZE FAMILY VISITS TO POLITICAL PRISONERS. AUTHORITIES ALLOWED VISITING DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS OR NGO REPRESENTATIVES TO VISIT EAST TIMOR PRISONERS OF THEIR CHOOSING ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE CONTAINS PROVISIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION WHICH ARE ROUTINELY VIOLATED. THE CODE SPECIFIES THE RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO NOTIFY THEIR FAMILIES, AND THAT WARRANTS MUST BE PRODUCED DURING AN ARREST EXCEPT UNDER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS, SUCH AS WHEN A SUSPECT IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME. IT ALSO AUTHORIZES INVESTIGATORS TO ISSUE WARRANTS TO ASSIST IN THEIR INVESTIGATIONS OR IF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED. DESPITE THESE REQUIREMENTS, AUTHORITIES SOMETIMES MAKE ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS. SECURITY FORCES REPORTEDLY ARRESTED MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS IN MARCH BEFORE FORMAL WARRANTS WERE ISSUED (SEE SECTION 2.A.). THE NUMBER OF PERSONS DETAINED AT LEAST TEMPORARILY WITHOUT WARRANT BY SECURITY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR INCREASED DURING LATE 1994 AND 1995.

THE LAW PRESUMES DEFENDANTS INNOCENT AND PERMITS BAIL. THEY OR THEIR FAMILIES MAY ALSO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THEIR ARREST AND DETENTION IN A PRETRIAL HEARING AND MAY SUE FOR COMPENSATION IF WRONGFULLY DETAINED. HOWEVER, IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO INVOKE THIS PROCEDURE, LET ALONE RECEIVE COMPENSATION, AFTER BEING RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGE. IN BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COURTS, APPEALS BASED ON LEGALITY OF ARREST AND DETENTION ARE RARELY, IF EVER, ACCEPTED. THE CODE ALSO CONTAINS SPECIFIC LIMITS ON PERIODS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION AND SPECIFIES WHEN THE COURTS MUST GET INVOLVED TO APPROVE EXTENSIONS, USUALLY AFTER 60 DAYS. IN AREAS WHERE ACTIVE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS EXIST SUCH AS EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, AND ACEH, PEOPLE ARE ROUTINELY DETAINED WITHOUT WARRANTS, CHARGES, OR COURT PROCEEDINGS. BAIL IS RARELY GRANTED, ESPECIALLY IN POLITICAL CASES. THE AUTHORITIES FREQUENTLY PREVENT ACCESS TO DEFENSE COUNSEL AND MAKE IT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO GET LEGAL ASSISTANCE FROM VOLUNTARY LEGAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS. THE AUTHORITIES ROUTINELY APPROVE EXTENSIONS OF PERIODS OF DETENTION. IN ADDITION, SUSPECTS CHARGED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION

LAW ARE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL PROCEDURES OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE WHICH ALLOW, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD A SUSPECT UP TO 1 YEAR BEFORE TRIAL. HE MAY RENEW THIS 1-YEAR PERIOD WITHOUT LIMIT. SPECIAL LAWS ON CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND NARCOTICS ARE SIMILARLY EXEMPT FROM THE CODE'S PROTECTIONS.

THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) OPERATES

OUTSIDE THE CODE AND HAS WIDE DISCRETION TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE PERSONS THOUGHT TO THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO STATE THE EXACT NUMBER OF ARBITRARY ARRESTS OR DETENTIONS WITHOUT TRIAL, PARTICULARLY IN ACEH AND IRIAN JAYA. IN 1995 AUTHORITIES RELEASED AT LEAST 64 SUPPOSED ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS WHO WERE BEING HELD WITHOUT TRIAL, BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ACCUSED ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS RELEASED SINCE 1990 TO AROUND 1,000 PERSONS. MANY HAD BEEN HELD INCOMMUNICADO

WITHOUT KNOWING THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM; SOME HAD BEEN HELD FOR OVER 2 YEARS. THE AUTHORITIES OFTEN REQUIRE THOSE RELEASED TO REPORT BACK AT REGULAR INTERVALS, BUT IN MAY 916 FORMER DETAINEES WERE RELIEVED OF THIS OBLIGATION. IN EAST TIMOR, MILITARY AUTHORITIES CONTINUED THE PRACTICE OF DETAINING PEOPLE WITHOUT CHARGES FOR SHORT PERIODS AND THEN REQUIRING THEM TO REPORT DAILY OR WEEKLY TO POLICE AFTER THEIR RELEASE. ABOUT 100 PEOPLE WERE DETAINED WITHOUT CHARGE DURING DEMONSTRATIONS AND OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE IN DILI AROUND THE TIME OF THE NOVEMBER 1994 ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (APEC) MEETINGS. DETENTIONS CONTINUED DURING FURTHER DISTURBANCES IN DECEMBER 1994 AND JANUARY 1995. THE AUTHORITIES EVENTUALLY CHARGED AND SENTENCED SOME OF THESE DETAINEES FOR INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL DISTURBANCES OR ANTIGOVERNMENT PROTESTS1 INCLUDING AT LEAST EIGHT EAST TIMORESE WHO RECEIVED PRISON SENTENCES OF 12 TO 30 MONTHS. FIVE OTHER EAST TIMORESE, WIDELY CONSIDERED WRONGLY ACCUSED, WERE SENTENCED TO 5 MONTHS' IMPRISONMENT FOR INVOLVEMENT IN MYSTERIOUS NIGHTTIME INCIDENTS OF HARASSMENT, BEATING, AND FEARMONGERING BY PERSONS TERMED "NINJAS." MORE THAN 200 PERSONS WERE ARRESTED IN

ADDITIONAL DISTURBANCES IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1995. AUTHORITIES HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT SEVERAL DOZEN WILL BE PUT ON TRIAL.

THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT USE FORCED EXILE.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATES THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, BUT IN PRACTICE THE JUDICIARY IS SUBORDINATED TO THE EXECUTIVE AND THE MILITARY, AND IN MANY CASES PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AGAINST COERCED CONFESSIONS, ARE INADEQUATE TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL.

A QUADRIPARTITE JUDICIARY OF GENERAL, RELIGIOUS, MILITARY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS EXISTS BELOW THE SUPREME COURT. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT TO HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS IN ALL FOUR SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE. THE

SUPREME COURT DOES NOT CONSIDER FACTUAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF LAW. A PANEL OF JUDGES CONDUCTS TRIALS AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL, POSES QUESTIONS, HEARS EVIDENCE, DECIDES GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND ASSESSES PUNISHMENT. WHILE THERE WERE SOME SIGNIFICANT EXCEPTIONS IN 1995, INITIAL JUDGMENTS ARE RARELY REVERSED IN THE APPEALS PROCESS, ALTHOUGH SENTENCES ARE SOMETIMES INCREASED OR REDUCED (BOTH THE DEFENSE AND THE PROSECUTION MAY APPEAL).

IN JANUARY THE 3-YEAR SENTENCE OF INDEPENDENT LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN WAS INCREASED BY THE HIGH COURT TO 4 YEARS, BUT THE SUPREME COURT LATER OVERTURNED HIS

CONVICTION (SEE BELOW). THE SENTENCE OF AMOSI TELAUMBANUA, ANOTHER UNION LEADER, WAS RAISED FROM 15 MONTHS TO 3 YEARS (LATER REVERSED BY THE SUPREME COURT, SEE BELOW.) DEFENDANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AND TO PRODUCE WITNESSES IN THEIR DEFENSE. AN EXCEPTION IS ALLOWED IN CASES IN WHICH DISTANCE OR EXPENSE IS DEEMED EXCESSIVE FOR TRANSPORTING WITNESSES TO COURT. IN SUCH CASES, SWORN AFFIDAVITS MAY BE INTRODUCED. HOWEVER, THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR WITNESSES' IMMUNITY OR FOR COMPULSORY PROCESS OF DEFENSE WITNESSES. AS A RESULT, WITNESSES ARE SOMETIMES TOO AFRAID OF RETRIBUTION TO TESTIFY AGAINST THE AUTHORITIES.

IN CASES TRIED UNDER THE 1963 ANTI SUBVERSION LAW, TRIALS IN ABSENTIA ARE PERMITTED AND PUBLIC ACCESS GENERALLY REQUIRES ADVANCE APPROVAL BY THE MILITARY. THE COURTS COMMONLY ALLOW FORCED CONFESSIONS AND LIMIT THE PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE. DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND CAN BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN THEIR OWN TRIALS. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE GIVES DEFENDANTS THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY FROM THE MOMENT OF THEIR ARREST THROUGH THE INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL. THE LAW REQUIRES THAT A LAWYER BE APPOINTED IN CAPITAL CASES AND THOSE INVOLVING A PRISON SENTENCE OF 15 YEARS OR MORE. IN CASES INVOLVING POTENTIAL SENTENCES OF 5 YEARS OR MORE, A

LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IF THE DEFENDANT DESIRES AN

ATTORNEY AND IS INDIGENT. IN THEORY, DESTITUTE DEFENDANTS MAY OBTAIN PRIVATE LEGAL HELP, SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, DEFENDANTS ARE OFTEN PERSUADED NOT TO HIRE AN ATTORNEY, OR ACCESS TO

AN ATTORNEY OF THEIR CHOICE IS IMPEDED. THE MILITARY HELD FIVE ALLEGED ACEH MERDEKA MEMBERS, WHO WERE SENTENCED IN EARLY 1995 (SEE BELOW), FOR UP TO A YEAR WITHOUT ACCESS TO ATTORNEYS; THE AUTHORITIES DID NOT ALLOW THEM TO CHOSE. THEIR ATTORNEYS, AND THOSE APPOINTED BY THE COURT COULD NOT SEE THE DEFENDANTS UNTIL JUST BEFORE THE TRIAL.

THE SUPREME COURT THEORETICALLY STANDS COEQUAL WITH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES, BUT IT DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER LAWS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT. THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOT YET EXERCISED ITS POWER (HELD SINCE 1985) TO REVIEW MINISTERIAL DECREES AND REGULATIONS. IN 1993 CHIEF JUSTICE PURWOTO GANDASUBRATA LAID OUT PROCEDURES FOR LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW. JUDGES ARE CIVIL SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WHICH CONTROLS THEIR ASSIGNMENTS, PAY, AND PROMOTION. THEY ARE SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM MILITARY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES. SUCH PRESSURE OFTEN DETERMINES THE OUTCOME OF A CASE, AND WAS WIDELY SUSPECTED OF BEING BEHIND AN ATTEMPT BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE TO THWART THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SUPREME COURT RULING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF IRIAN JAYA IN A LAND COMPENSATION DISPUTE. CORRUPTION PERMEATES THE LEGAL SYSTEM. IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, THE PAYMENT OF BRIBES CAN INFLUENCE PROSECUTION, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCING. TO ADDRESS JUDICIAL CORRUPTION, THE GOVERNMENT DOUBLED JUDGES' SALARIES IN 1995.

SEVERAL IMPORTANT COURT DECISIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN 1995 MAY BE A SIGN OF NASCENT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE. IN FEBRUARY THE SUPREME COURT COMMUTED THE 1993 SENTENCE

OF AN ACEHNESE SERVING 5 YEARS FOR SUBVERSION AND ORDERED HIS RELEASE. IT ALSO UPHELD THE APPEALS COURT'S QUASHING OF THE CONVICTION OF THE ALLEGED MASTERMIND IN THE 1993 MURDER OF LABOR ACTIVIST MARSINAH AND OVERTURNED HIS CONVICTION. IT ALSO REVERSED THE REMAINING EIGHT CIVILIANS' CONVICTIONS AS WELL FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, INDIRECTLY VINDICATING CHARGES BY THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND SOME NGO'S THAT THEIR CONFESSIONS HAD BEEN COERCED. IN MAY THE SUPREME COURT PROVISIONALLY RELEASED CONVICTED LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN PENDING A DECISION ON HIS APPEAL UNDER A SELDOM HONORED PROVISION OF THE PENAL CODE, AND LATER OVERTURNED HIS CONVICTION. IT

ALSO REVERSED THE HIGH COURT DECISION THAT INCREASED AMOSI TELAUMBANUA'S SENTENCE FROM 15 TO 36 MONTHS (SEE ABOVE). AN ADMINISTRATIVE COURT IN JAKARTA FOUND IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS, EMPLOYEES OF THE BANNED PERIODICAL TEMPO, IN THEIR CIVIL SUIT AGAINST THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE FOR REVOKING TEMPO'S PUBLICATION LICENSE IN 1993. THE HIGH COURT UNANIMOUSLY UPHELD THIS DECISION IN NOVEMBER, STATING THAT THE MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PERMITTING PUBLICATIONS TO BE BANNED WERE IN CONFLICT WITH PRESS FREEDOMS CONTAINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. THE GOVERNMENT HAS APPEALED THE HIGH COURT RULING TO THE SUPREME COURT.

THE ANTISUBVERSION LAW, WHICH CARRIES A MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH, MAKES IT A CRIME TO ENGAGE IN ACTS THAT COULD DISTORT, UNDERMINE, OR DEVIATE FROM THE STATE IDEOLOGY OR BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, OR WHICH COULD DISSEMINATE FEELINGS OF HOSTILITY OR AROUSE HOSTILITY, DISTURBANCES, OR ANXIETY AMONG THE POPULATION. THE EXCESSIVELY VAGUE

LANGUAGE OF THIS LAW MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO PROSECUTE PEOPLE MERELY FOR PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF VIEWS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN ACEH PROVINCE, AUTHORITIES SENTENCED AT LEAST FIVE ACCUSED ACEH MERDEKA SUPPORTERS

UNDER THE ANTISUBVERSION LAW TO 6 TO 20 YEARS IN PRISON (SEE SECTION I.E.).

THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT MAKE AVAILABLE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE CURRENTLY SERVING SUBVERSION SENTENCES OR SENTENCES CLASSIFIED AS FELONIES UNDER THE SO-CALLED HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO GRANTED CLEMENCY IN AUGUST TO THREE FORMER HIGH OFFICIALS, SUBANDRIO, OMAR DHANI, AND SUGENG SUTARTO, WHO WERE SERVING LIFE SENTENCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABORTIVE COMMUNIST COUP IN 1965. SIX PRISONERS CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN PAST YEARS REMAINED UNDER DEATH SENTENCE. IN AUGUST THE AUTHORITIES ANNOUNCED THAT TWO OF THEM, WHOSE APPEALS FOR CLEMENCY WERE DENIED BY THE PRESIDENT, WERE SOON TO BE EXECUTED, BUT THE EXECUTIONS HAD NOT BEEN CARRIED OUT AS OF YEAR'S END.

DIFFERENT SOURCES ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE SERVING SENTENCES FO-R SUBVERSION IN 1995, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI), MUSLIM MILITANTS, AND THOSE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN IRIAN JAYA, ACEH, AND EAST TIMOR, AT BETWEEN 250 AND 350. SCORES, AND POSSIBLY HUNDREDS, MORE WERE BELIEVED TO BE SERVING SENTENCES UNDER THE HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. SOME OF THESE PERSONS ADVOCATED OR EMPLOYED VIOLENCE, BUT MANY ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO WERE CONVICTED FOR

ATTEMPTING TO EXERCISE SUCH UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH OR ASSOCIATION OR WHO WERE CONVICTED IN MANIFESTLY UNFAIR TRIALS. THE COURTS SENTENCED THREE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS (AJI) AND A FOURTH UNDERGROUND JOURNALIST TO PRISON TERMS OF 20 TO 36 MONTHS UNDER THE HATE-SOWING ARTICLES (SEE SECTION 2.A). IN SEPTEMBER A COURT SENTENCED A WELL-KNOWN PSYCHIC TO 7 MONTHS IN JAIL UNDER THE ARTICLES FOR BLASPHEMY AGAINST ISLAM IN A CLOSED ACADEMIC SEMINAR IN APRIL (SEE SECTION 2.A.). IN FEBRUARY A DISTRICT COURT IN MALANG, EAST JAVA SENTENCED JOSE ANTONIO NEVES TO 4 YEARS IN PRISON ON CHARGES OF SEDITION FOR ADVOCATING EAST TIMORESE INDEPENDENCE AND ACCUSING THE

ARMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN LETTERS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

JUDICIAL WARRANTS FOR SEARCHES ARE REQUIRED EXCEPT FOR CASES INVOLVING SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, SECURITY AGENCIES REGULARLY MAKE FORCED OR SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES. THEY ALSO INTIMIDATE BY SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS AND RESIDENCES AND SELECTIVE MONITORING OF LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS WITHOUT LEGAL RESTRAINT. GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND ITS FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY PERSONS THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP. THESE PERSONS AND THEIR RELATIVES SOMETIMES ARE SUBJECT TO SURVEILLANCE, REQUIRED CHECK-INS,

PERIODIC INDOCTRINATION, AND RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL OUTSIDE THEIR CITY OF RESIDENCE. THEIR LEGALLY REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION CARDS CARRY THE INITIALS "E.T." WHICH STAND FOR "EX-TAPOL," OR FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER. THIS READILY IDENTIFIES THEM TO PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYERS OR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND SUBJECTS THEM TO VARIOUS FORMS OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL DISCRIMINATION. THE NUMBER OF PERSONS BEARING E.T. ON THEIR IDENTIFICATION CARDS TOTALED 1,352,896 IN 1992, ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD PHASE OUT THE USE OF E.T. IN THE PROCESS OF INTRODUCING A NEW TYPE OF IDENTIFICATION CARD BEGINNING IN EARLY 1996, WHILE LEAVING OTHER FORMS OF MONITORING AND CONTROL IN PLACE.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS IN RECENT YEARS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED ITS TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM, WHICH MOVES LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE FROM OVERPOPULATED ISLANDS TO MORE ISOLATED AND

BACKWARD ONES. THE PROGRAM IS CRITICIZED BY HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS WHO SAY THAT IT NOT ONLY SOMETIMES VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE BUT ALSO THOSE OF SOME OF THE TRANSMIGRANTS WHO CLAIM THAT THEY ARE DUPED INTO LEAVING

THEIR HOME VILLAGES WITHOUT ANY MEANS OF RETURN.

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON PRESS FREEDOM CONTINUED, FOLLOWING THE REVOCATION OF THE PUBLISHING LICENSES OF THREE WELL-KNOWN NEWSMAGAZINES THE PREVIOUS YEAR. IN MAY

FORMER EMPLOYEES OF TEMPO, ONE OF THE BANNED PERIODICALS, WON A LAWSUIT AGAINST THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE COURT CONTESTING THE REVOCATION; THE GOVERNMENT LOST ITS APPEAL OF THE DECISION TO A HIGHER COURT, BUT HAS APPEALED TO THE SUPREME COURT.

ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 1982 PRESS LAW PROVIDE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THE ISSUANCE OF PUBLISHING LICENSES UNDER A 1984 MINISTERIAL DECREE IS ONE METHOD THE GOVERNMENT USES TO CONTROL THE PRESS. OTHER MEANS OF CONTROL INCLUDE REGULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF ADVERTISING PERMITTED AND OF THE NUMBER OF PAGES ALLOWED IN NEWSPAPERS. AUTHORITIES CONTINUED IN SOME CASES TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS, MORE OR LESS SUBTLE, TO LOCAL JOURNALISTS ON WHAT THEY COULD PRINT. THE PRACTICE OF TELEPHONING EDITORS TO CAUTION AGAINST PUBLISHING CERTAIN STORIES--THE SO-CALLED TELEPHONE CULTURE--CONTINUED. IN AUGUST THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WARNED IN A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT NEWSPAPERS CARRYING SPECULATIVE STORIES ABOUT THE RUMORED EXISTENCE OF A SOEKARNO-ERA REVOLUTION FUND RISKED CRIMINAL CHARGES. AUTHORITIES ALSO WARNED EDITORS TO END COVERAGE OF THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION'S ALLEGED PUBLIC MISREADING OF KORANIC VERSES, WHICH HAD CAUSED A PUBLIC OUTCRY, AND TEMPORARILY BANNED THE SUNDAY EDITION OF A JAKARTA DAILY NEWSPAPER FOR CARRYING STORIES ON SENSITIVE SUBJECTS. SELF-CENSORSHIP CONTINUED TO BE ANOTHER PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED BRAKE ON FREE EXPRESSION. IN MEDAN, COVERAGE OF SENSITIVE ISSUES SUCH AS WORK STOPPAGES AND PEASANT PROTESTS AGAINST LAND CLEARANCE OPERATIONS HAS REMAINED AT A LOW LEVEL SINCE THE PRESS BANNINGS OF JUNE 1994.

IN MARCH THE GOVERNMENT STRUCK AGAINST TWO OF THE UNLICENSED UNDERGROUND PUBLICATIONS WHICH HAD APPEARED IN DEFIANCE OF GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT FREE AND OPEN

NEWS REPORTING. POLICE ARRESTED THE EDITOR OF "KABAR DARI PIJAR" AND THREE PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS (AJI), WHICH PUBLISHES THE UNDERGROUND BULLETIN "INDEPENDEN." THEY WERE TRIED AND SENTENCED FOR SOWING HATRED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT (SEE SECTION I.E.). AJI WAS FORMED TO WORK FOR PRESS FREEDOM IN 1994 BY JOURNALISTS OUTRAGED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S REVOCATION THAT YEAR OF THE PUBLICATION LICENSES OF THREE PERIODICALS.

THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS (PWI) EXPELLED 13 AJI MEMBERS, AND THE GOVERNMENT THREATENED LICENSED PERIODICALS WITH SANCTIONS IF THEY EMPLOYED JOURNALISTS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE PWI. ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT PRESS MEASURES STILL CONTINUED, HOWEVER. INDEPENDEN AND A NUMBER OF OTHER UNSANCTIONED JOURNALS CONTINUED TO PUBLISH, PROVIDING CRITICAL COVERAGE OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES TO A LIMITED AUDIENCE MAINLY IN MAJOR CITIES. VIGOROUS DEBATE ON A NUMBER OF SENSITIVE TOPICS SUCH AS CORRUPTION, COLLUSION, THE ROLE OF THE FIRST FAMILY IN BUSINESS, AND LACK OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY FOR FUNDS EXPENDED REBOUNDED DURING 1995, PARTICULARLY IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE PRESS. HOWEVER, MAJOR INDONESIAN LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS REMAIN CAUTIOUS IN COVERING CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS AND THE STATEMENTS OF PROMINENT CRITICS OF THE

GOVERNMENT.

WHILE PUBLIC DIALOG IS MORE FREE THAN IT WAS A NUMBER OF YEARS AGO, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON FREE SPEECH. BANDUNG AUTHORITIES PROHIBITED NOTED POET W. S. RENDRA FROM READING SOME OF HIS POEMS AT A FUND-RAISING EVENT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO READ THEM EARLIER IN SURABAYA. IN MARCH THE AUTHORITIES WITHDREW PERMISSION FOR "RECALLED" UNITY DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) LEGISLATOR SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS TO ADDRESS A SEMINAR ON ECONOMICS AT GARUT, EAST JAVA. PAMUNGKAS WAS ONE OF TWO LEGISLATORS WITHDRAWN OR RECALLED FROM PARLIAMENT BY THEIR PARTIES (THE OTHER WAS FROM THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED GOLKAR ORGANIZATION--SEE SECTION 3) FOR THEIR OUTSPOKEN CRITICISMS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE POLICE ALSO INVESTIGATED PAMUNGKAS ON VARIOUS CHARGES RELATED TO HIS ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN PROTESTS AGAINST PRESIDENT SOEHARTO DURING THE PRESIDENT'S APRIL VISIT TO GERMANY AND AT YEAR1S END WERE TRYING HIM ON CHARGES OF INSULTING THE PRESIDENT DURING A SPEECH HE MADE IN GERMANY. IN APRIL MEDAN POLICE BRIEFLY DETAINED AND QUESTIONED BUT DID NOT CHARGE EIGHT STUDENT PROTESTORS FOR

ALLEGEDLY SLANDERING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. IN MAY THE JAKARTA OFFICE OF THE DIRECTORATE OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS, WHICH TOGETHER WITH SEVERAL OTHER GOVERNMENT ENTITIES MUST GIVE APPROVAL FOR THEATRICAL PERFORMANCES, BLOCKED A PERMIT FOR A WORKERS' THEATER GROUP TO PERFORM A PLAY IN THE CAPITAL ABOUT EXPLOITATION OF FACTORY WORKERS. IN SEPTEMBER JAKARTA POLICE PREVENTED A DIFFERENT GROUP FROM STAGING ANOTHER PLAY ON A LABOR THEME

FOR WHICH AUTHORITIES HAD ALREADY GRANTED PERMISSION.

THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA REMAINED MORE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR COVERAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT THAN THE PRINT MEDIA. THE GOVERNMENT OPERATES THE NATIONWIDE TELEVISION NETWORK, WHICH HAS 12 REGIONAL STATIONS. PRIVATE COMMERCIAL TELEVISION COMPANIES, MANY WITH OWNERSHIP OR MANAGEMENT TIES TO THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY, CONTINUED TO EXPAND. ALL

ARE REQUIRED- TO BROADCAST GOVERNMENT-PRODUCED NEWS, BUT MANY ALSO PRODUCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STYLE PROGRAMMING THAT BORDERS ON NEWS.

OVER 600 PRIVATE RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANIES EXIST IN ADDITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK. THEY ARE ALL REQUIRED TO BELONG TO THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS (PRSSNI) TO RECEIVE A BROADCASTING LICENSE. THE GOVERNMENT RADIO STATION PRODUCES "NATIONAL NEWS," WHICH IS BY LAW THE ONLY RADIO NEWS BROADCAST IN INDONESIA, AND IT IS RELAYED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BY THE PRIVATE STATIONS AND 49 REGIONAL AFFILIATES OF THE GOVERNMENT STATION. BY LAW, THE PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS MAY PRODUCE ONLY "LIGHT" NEWS, SUCH AS HUMAN INTEREST STORIES, AND MAY NOT DISCUSS POLITICS. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, MANY BROADCAST INTERVIEWS AND FOREIGN NEWS AS WELL. HOWEVER, GOVERNMENT PRESSURE RESULTED IN ONE TALK SHOW ON THE PRIVATE STATION SCTV BEING TAKEN OFF THE AIR FOR COVERING SENSITIVE SUBJECTS.

FOREIGN TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS ARE READILY ACCESSIBLE TO THOSE WHO CAN AFFORD THE EXPENSIVE TECHNOLOGY, AND SATELLITE DISHES HAVE PROLIFERATED

THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT MAKES NO EFFORTS TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO THIS PROGRAMMING, AND HAS PROCLAIMED AN "OPEN SKIES" POLICY, ALTHOUGH MORE AND MORE SIGNALS ARE BEING SCRAMBLED BY BROADCASTERS FOR COMMERCIAL REASONS.

THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY REGULATES ACCESS TO INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY TO CERTAIN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, BY VISITING AND RESIDENT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS AND OCCASIONALLY REMINDS THE LATTER OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DENY REQUESTS FOR

VISA EXTENSIONS. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES A PERMIT FOR THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AND VIDEO TAPES, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED BY GOVERNMENT CENSORS. IMPORTERS SOMETIMES AVOID FOREIGN MATERIALS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OR DEALING WITH TOPICS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS ARE WIDELY AVAILABLE.

SPECIAL PERMISSION IS NECESSARY FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TO TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAYA. THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED AT LEAST ONE GROUP JOURNALIST TRIP TO EAST TIMOR. APPROVAL FOR INDIVIDUAL TRIPS BY JOURNALISTS TO THE PROVINCE, AND FOR TRAVEL OUTSIDE DILI (THE CAPITAL), BECAME MORE RESTRICTIVE, WITH A NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS REPEATEDLY REQUESTING PERMISSION, WITHOUT SUCCESS, TO VISIT THE PROVINCE.

WHILE THE LAW PROVIDES FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM, CONSTRAINTS EXIST ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SCHOLARS. POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DISCUSSIONS AT UNIVERSITIES, WHILE NO LONGER FORMALLY BANNED, REMAINED CONSTRAINED. IN SEPTEMBER A COURT

SENTENCED A PSYCHIC TO 7 MONTHS IN PRISON FOR REMARKS HE MADE ABOUT THE PROPHET MOHAMMED IN AN ACADEMIC SEMINAR, BUT IT PROVISIONALLY RELEASED HIM FROM CUSTODY THE NEXT DAY.

SCHOLARS SOMETIMES REFRAIN FROM PRODUCING OR INCLUDING IN LECTURES AND CLASS DISCUSSIONS MATERIALS THAT THEY BELIEVE MIGHT PROVOKE GOVERNMENT DISPLEASURE. PUBLISHERS SOMETIMES REFUSE TO ACCEPT MANUSCRIPTS DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. ON OCCASION THE GOVERNMENT BANS PUBLICATIONS AND BOOKS OUTRIGHT. IN FEBRUARY THE CENTRAL JAVA GOVERNMENT ORDERED A NEW EDITION OF THE BOOK "CERITA DARI BLORA," BY THE PROMINENT INDONESIAN NOVELIST AND FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER PRAMOEDYA ANATA TOER, WHICH HAD BEEN BANNED IN 1976, WITHDRAWN FROM BOOKSTORES, AND IN APRIL THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ORDERED THE WITHDRAWAL OF HIS BOOK "NYANI SUNYI SEORANG EISU" FROM SALE. MOST OF PRAMOEDYA'S WORKS ARE BANNED IN INDONESIA.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION. THE GOVERNMENT PLACES SIGNIFICANT CONTROLS ON THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT, BUT ANNOUNCED AN EASING OF THE RESTRICTIONS WHICH ARE STILL NOT PROMULGATED. UNTIL 1995 PUBLIC MEETINGS OF FIVE OR MORE PERSONS, AS WELL AS

ACADEMIC OR OTHER SEMINARS AND MARCHES AND DEMONSTRATIONS,

REQUIRED PERMITS FROM THE POLICE AND SEVERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. WHILE OBTAINING SUCH APPROVAL WAS USUALLY ROUTINE, THE AUTHORITIES OCCASIONALLY ARBITRARILY AND

INCONSISTENTLY WITHHELD PERMISSION OR BROKE UP PEACEFUL GATHERINGS FOR WHICH NO PERMIT HAD BEEN OBTAINED. THE PRESS REPORTED 5 INSTANCES OF AUTHORITIES DENYING PERMITS AND 26 CASES OF DISPERSING UNAUTHORIZED MEETINGS IN THE FIRST 8 MONTHS OF 1995. IN JANUARY A 1-DAY SEMINAR ON THE ANTISUBVERSION LAW AT THE JAKARTA OFFICE OF THE LEGAL AID FOUNDATION, IN WHICH MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION PARTICIPATED, NARROWLY AVERTED BEING CLOSED BY THE POLICE, WHO REMAINED ON THE PREMISES IN FORCE DURING THE SESSION. AUTHORITIES IN JAKARTA AND SEMARANG BROKE UP MAY 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR DAY DEMONSTRATIONS BY STUDENTS PROTESTING GOVERNMENT LABOR POLICIES, AND ARRESTED 13 DEMONSTRATORS IN MEDAN WHO WERE PROTESTING GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION OF PROMINENT DISSIDENTS ACCUSED OF TAKING PART IN DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IN DRESDEN. THE EAST JAVA GOVERNMENT REPEATEDLY DENIED PERMISSION TO THE HEAD OF THE PDI PARTY TO MEET WITH PARTY CHAPTERS AND HOLD PUBLIC RALLIES IN THAT PROVINCE. IN JUNE JAKARTA AUTHORITIES FORCIBLY DISPERSED AN UNAUTHORIZED SEMINAR ON ISLAM AND CHARGED ITS ORGANIZER WITH HOLDING A PUBLIC GATHERING WITHOUT A PERMIT. IF CONVICTED, HE FACES A MAXIMUM 4-YEAR SENTENCE.

IN RESPONSE TO GROWING PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE PERMIT PROCESS, INCLUDING FROM THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE GOVERNMENT IN JUNE DROPPED THE PERMIT REQUIREMENT FOR UNIVERSITY APPROVED ON-CAMPUS SCIENTIFIC SEMINARS. ON AUGUST 30, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT REGULATIONS REQUIRING PERMITS FOR OTHER TYPES OF MEETINGS WOULD BE LIBERALIZED BY THE END OF THE YEAR, TO TAKE EFFECT IN EARLY 1996. IN DECEMBER THE GOVERNMENT

PROMULGATED REGULATIONS GOVERNING PUBLIC GATHERINGS WHICH STIPULATE THAT GATHERINGS WHICH ARE SOCIAL, CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS, OR SCIENTIFIC IN CHARACTER--AS WELL AS ACTIVITIES HELD IN PRIVATE PREMISES--DO NOT REQUIRE A PERMIT FROM OR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION TO THE POLICE. SEVEN DAYS PRIOR NOTICE MUST BE GIVEN TO THE POLICE BEFORE SOCIOPOLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS HOLD POLITICAL MEETINGS, AND FOR ANY MEETINGS WHICH WILL DISCUSS POLITICAL ISSUES OR WHICH ASPIRE TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC POLICY. SUCH MEETINGS WILL NOT, HOWEVER, REQUIRE PERMITS. PERMITS ARE STILL REQUIRED FOR PUBLIC FESTIVITIES, FAIRS, CARNIVALS, PARADES, AND RALLIES. SUCH EVENTS ARE ASSUMED TO HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED AT LEAST 3 DAYS PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULED DATE FOR THE EVENT. THE NEW REGULATIONS DO NOT GOVERN

ACTIVITIES CONSIDERED TO BE DEMONSTRATIONS.

THE 1985 SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW (ORMAS) REQUIRES THE ADHERENCE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZED RELIGIOQE OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY OF
PANCASILA. THIS PROVISION, WHICH LIMITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD AS DESIGNED TO INHIBIT ACTIVITIES OF GROUPS SEEKING TO MAKE INDONESIA AN ISLAMIC STATE, REVIVE COMMUNISM, OR RETURN THE COUNTRY TO A SITUATION OF PARTISAN IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION. THIS LAW EMPOWERS THE GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND ANY ORGANIZATION IT BELIEVES TO BE ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA AND REQUIRES PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR ANY ORGANIZATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS FROM FOREIGN DONORS, THEREBY HINDERING THE WORK OF MANY LOCAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE

INDEPENDENT LABOR ORGANIZATION SERIKAT BURUH SEJAHTERA INDONESIA (SBSI), CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE WITHOUT OFFICIAL RECOGNITION UNDER THIS LAW (SEE SECTION 6).

IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, NGO'S HAVE PROLIFERATED IN SUCH FIELDS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION. IN GENERAL, THE GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN THEM RATHER WIDE LATITUDE TO PURSUE THEIR AIMS, INCLUDING PUBLIC CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND IN SOME CASES LAWSUITS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO HAVE QUIETLY SHELVED A 1994 DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE SIMILAR TO THE ORMAS LAW THAT WOULD HAVE BROUGHT THE MORE THAN 700 NGO'S UNDER MORE STRINGENT CONTROLS. HOWEVER, THERE REMAIN LIMITS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF NGO ACTIVITIES, AND AUTHORITIES REACTED FORCEFULLY AGAINST CERTAIN NGO'S PARTICIPATING IN LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS OR PUBLISHING UNLICENSED NEWSLETTERS. THE GOVERNMENT REACTS PARTICULARLY NEGATIVELY TO NGO LEADERS AND OTHERS WHO CRITICIZE ITS POLICIES WHEN ABROAD.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD. THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES ISLAM, CATHOLICISM, PROTESTANTISM, BUDDHISM, AND HINDUISM, AND PERMITS THE PRACTICE OF THE MYSTICAL, TRADITIONAL BELIEFS OF "ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN." ALTHOUGH THE POPULATION IS OVERWHELMINGLY MUSLIM, THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS ARE GENERALLY RESPECTED, AND THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES MUTUAL TOLERANCE AND HARMONY AMONG THEM. HOWEVER, SOME RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN

TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY EXIST.

BECAUSE THE FIRST TENET OF PANCASILA IS BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD, ATHEISM IS FORBIDDEN. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA EXTENDS TO ALL RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY OPPOSES MUSLIM GROUPS WHICH ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ACKNOWLEDGING ONLY ISLAMIC LAW AND IN THE FALL ANNOUNCED LARGE SCALE QUESTIONING AND SEVERAL ARRESTS OF PEOPLE IN CENTRAL JAVA ALLEGED TO ADVOCATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISLAMIC STATE. THERE ARE GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES FOR BANNING RELIGIOUS SECTS IN INDONESIA.

AMONG THOSE PROHIBITED ARE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, BAHA'I, AND IN SOME PROVINCES THE MESSIANIC ISLAMIC SECT DARUL ARQAM. THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY MONITORS ISLAMIC SECTS CONSIDERED IN DANGER OF DEVIATING FROM ORTHODOX TENETS, AND IN THE PAST HAS ON OCCASION DISSOLVED SUCH GROUPS.

VIOLENCE BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS IN THE HURIA KRISTEN BATAK PROTESTAN (HKBP), INDONESIA'S LARGEST PROTESTANT CHURCH, CONTINUED IN NORTH SUMATRA THROUGHOUT 1995, WITH AT LEAST ONE FATALITY. IN EARLY 1993, CITING A THREAT TO CIVIL ORDER, THE NORTHERN SUMATRA REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER INTERVENED IN AN INTERNAL LEADERSHIP DISPUTE WHICH BROKE OUT WITHIN THE HKBP THE PREVIOUS YEAR, APPOINTING A NEW BISHOP AND HELPING THE NEW BISHOP'S SUPPORTERS TAKE OVER CHURCH PROPERTY. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE CALLED THE DISPUTE AN INTERNAL CHURCH MATTER THAT SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THE HKBP MEMBERS THEMSELVES. FOR THE MOST PART, ONLY SUPPORTERS OF THE FORMER BISHOP HAVE BEEN PROSECUTED FOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE DESPITE EVIDENCE THAT

MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSING FACTION ENGAGED IN VIOLENT ACTS AS WELL. IN LATE 1995, HOWEVER, AUTHORITIES FOR THE FIRST TIME TOOK ACTION AGAINST SOME PARTISANS OF THE NEW BISHOP AS WELL.

HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECT FOR RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN THE COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING INCIDENTS OF RELIGIOUS TENSION IN AREAS SUCH AS FLORES, EAST AND WEST TIMOR, AND PARTS OF JAVA. LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, ARE FREQUENTLY ALLEGED TO BE RELUCTANT TO FACILITATE AND PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES. THERE WAS AN OUTBREAK OF RELIGION-BASED VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER. IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, TIMORESE BURNED MARKETS AND DAMAGED SEVERAL MOSQUES FOLLOWING REPORTS THAT AN INDONESIAN OFFICIAL MADE DEROGATORY COMMENTS ABOUT CATHOLICISM. THE OFFICIAL IN QUESTION HAS BEEN SENTENCED TO 4 YEARS, 10 MONTHS IN

PRISON. SEVERAL PROTESTANT CHURCHES WERE ALSO BURNED IN SEPTEMBER, SPARKED BY THE CELEBRATION OF A RELIGIOUSLY

MIXED MARRIAGE. CLASHES IN MID-OCTOBER BETWEEN SECURITY FORCES AND GROUPS OF YOUTHS LED TO EXTENSIVE DAMAGE, AT LEAST 2 DEATHS, AND 151 ARRESTS. THERE HAS BEEN AN ISLAMIC BACKLASH ON JAVA CALLING FOR THE DEFENSE OF MUSLIMS IN EAST TIMOR. PROPERTY WAS DESTROYED AND MEMBERS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITY HARASSED IN SEPARATE INCIDENTS IN PEKALONGAN AND PURWORKERTO, CENTRAL JAVA, FOLLOWING INCIDENTS IN WHICH CHINESE INDIVIDUALS WERE BELIEVED TO HAVE INSULTED ISLAMIC TRADITIONS.

THE LAW ALLOWS CONVERSION BETWEEN FAITHS, AND SUCH CONVERSIONS OCCUR. MARRIAGES BETWEEN PERSONS OF DIFFERENT RELIGIONS ARE ALLOWED. THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS PROSELYTIZING BY THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS IN AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ONE RECOGNIZED RELIGION OR ANOTHER AS POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND DISCOURAGES IT. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED, ALTHOUGH IN EAST TIMOR AND OCCASIONALLY ELSEWHERE MISSIONARIES HAVE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES AND DELAYS IN RENEWING RESIDENCE PERMITS, AND VISAS ALLOWING THE ENTRANCE OF NEW FOREIGN CLERGY ARE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. LAWS AND DECREES FROM THE 1970'S LIMIT THE NUMBER OF YEARS FOREIGN MISSIONARIES CAN SPEND IN INDONESIA, WITH SOME EXTENSIONS GRANTED IN REMOTE AREAS LIKE IRIAN JAYA. FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK IS SUBJECT TO THE FUNDING STIPULATIONS OF THE ORMAS LAW (SEE SECTION 2.B.). INDONESIANS PRACTICING THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS MAINTAIN ACTIVE LINKS WITH CORELIGIONISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY AND TRAVEL ABROAD FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

ALTHOUGH IN 1993 THE GOVERNMENT DRASTICALLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BARRED EITHER FROM ENTERING OR DEPARTING INDONESIA FROM A PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED FIGURE OF 8,897 "BLACKLISTED" PEOPLE TO A FEW HUNDRED, SUCH RESTRICTIONS STILL EXIST. THE GOVERNMENT BANNED OUSTED PARLIAMENT MEMBER SRI BINTANG PAMUNKAS FROM TRAVELING ABROAD WHILE INVESTIGATING HIS EARLIER ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY (SEE

SECTION 2.A.). THE GOVERNMENT HAS APPEALED A STATE

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT DECISION IN DECEMBER THAT THE BAN IS ILLEGAL. NOVELIST PRAMOEDYA ANATA TOER WAS UNABLE TO TRAVEL TO THE PHILIPPINES TO ACCEPT A LITERARY AWARD FROM THE MAGSAYSAY FOUNDATION. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO RESTRICTS MOVEMENT BY INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN CITIZENS TO AND WITHIN

PARTS OF INDONESIA. IN ADDITION, IT REQUIRES PERMITS TO SEEK WORK IN A NEW LOCATION IN CERTAIN AREAS, PRIMARILY TO CONTROL FURTHER POPULATION MOVEMENT TO CROWDED CITIES. SPECIAL PERMITS ARE REQUIRED TO VISIT CERTAIN PARTS OF IRIAN JAYA. THE MILITARY CARRIED OUT SECURITY CHECKS AFFECTING TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL TO AND WITHIN EAST TIMOR SPORADICALLY IN 1995, AND IT OCCASIONALLY IMPOSED CURFEWS IN CONNECTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE AUTHORITIES REQUIRE FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, TO GIVE NOTICE OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND TO HAVE OFFICIAL PERMISSION (SEE SECTION 1.F.) TO CHANGE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE.

IN PAST YEARS THE GOVERNMENT ADMITTED LARGE NUMBERS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM INDOCHINA. ONLY A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER NOW REMAIN, AND THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO WORK WITH VIETNAM UNDER A TRIPARTITE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING SIGNED IN 1993 WITH THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES TO REPATRIATE PEACEFULLY THE REMAINING ASYLUM SEEKERS TO VIETNAM.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

CITIZENS DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO CHANGE THEIR

GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEMOCRATIC MEANS. THE 1,000-MEMBER PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY OF THE STATE AND MEETS EVERY 5 YEARS TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AND SET THE BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, IS CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE APPOINTMENT OF HALF ITS MEMBERSHIP. THE REMAINING HALF COME FROM THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR), 80 PERCENT OF WHOSE MEMBERS ARE ELECTED. IN 1993 THE MPR ELECTED SOEHARTO TO HIS SIXTH UNCONTESTED 5-YEAR TERM AS PRESIDENT. LEGALLY, THE PRESIDENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SUBORDINATE TO THE PARLIAMENT, BUT ACTUALLY HE AND A SMALL GROUP OF ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS EXERCISE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.

UNDER A DOCTRINE KNOWN AS DUAL FUNCTION, THE MILITARY ASSUMES A SIGNIFICANT SOCIOPOLITICAL AS WELL AS A SECURITY ROLE. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARE ALLOTTED UNELECTED SEATS IN THE DPR. IN 1995 THE GOVERNMENT LEGISLATED A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF THESE SEATS FROM 100 TO 75, OR 15 PERCENT OF A TOTAL OF 500, EFFECTIVE 1997. THE MILITARY WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD AN UNELECTED 20 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT PARLIAMENTS, AND TO

OCCUPY NUMEROUS KEY POSITIONS IN THE AQOTHER 85 PERCENT OF NATIONAL AND 80 PERCENT OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS ARE FILLED THROUGH ELECTIONS HELD EVERY 5 YEARS. ALL ADULT CITIZENS, EXCEPT ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, CONVICTED CRIMINALS SERVING PRISON SENTENCES, AND SOME 36,000 FORMER MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ARE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE. VOTERS CHOOSE BY SECRET BALLOT BETWEEN THE THREE GOVERNMENT-APPROVED

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH FIELD CANDIDATE LISTS IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT. THOSE LISTS MUST BE SCREENED BY BAKORSTANAS (SEE SECTION L.D.), WHICH DETERMINES WHETHER CANDIDATES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST COUP OR POSE OTHER BROADLY DEFINED SECURITY RISKS. CRITICS CHARGE THESE SCREENINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, SINCE THERE IS NO WAY TO APPEAL THE RESULTS, AND NOTE THAT

THEY CAN BE USED TO ELIMINATE CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM PARLIAMENT.

STRICT RULES ESTABLISH THE LENGTH OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC MEDIA, SCHEDULES FOR PUBLIC APPEARANCES, AND THE POLITICAL SYMBOLS THAT CAN BE USED. THE GOVERNMENT PERMITS ONLY THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EXIST AND CONTEST ELECTIONS. THE LARGEST AND MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS GOLKAR, A GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ORGANIZATION OF DIVERSE FUNCTIONAL GROUPS WHICH WON 68 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN THE 1992 ELECTIONS. THE PRESIDENT STRONGLY INFLUENCES THE SELECTION OF THE LEADERS OF GOLKAR. THE OTHER TWO SMALL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE UNITY DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF INDONESIA (PDI), SPLIT THE REMAINING VOTE. THE LAW REQUIRES ALL THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EMBRACE PANCASILA, AND NONE OF THE ORGANIZATIONS IS CONSIDERED AN OPPOSITION PARTY. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES CLOSELY SCRUTINIZE AND OFTEN GUIDE THEIR ACTIVITIES. MEMBERS OF THE DPR AND THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES MAY BE RECALLED FROM OFFICE BY PARTY LEADERS. IN 1995 BOTH GOLKAR AND PPP RECALLED LEGISLATORS WHO WERE CONSIDERED TOO OUTSPOKEN.

GOLKAR MAINTAINS CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH THE ARMED

FORCES AND KORPRI, THE ASSOCIATION TO WHICH ALL CIVIL SERVANTS AUTOMATICALLY BELONG. CIVIL SERVANTS MAY JOIN ANY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WITH OFFICIAL PERMISSION, BUT MOST ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND SOME OTHER BANNED PARTIES MAY NOT RUN FOR OFFICE OR BE ACTIVE POLITICALLY. THE DPR CONSIDERS BILLS PRESENTED TO IT BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES BUT DOES NOT DRAFT LAWS ON ITS OWN, ALTHOUGH IT HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DO SO. THE DPR MAKES TECHNICAL AND OCCASIONALLY

SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS TO BILLS IT REVIEWS. IN PRACTICE, IT REMAINS CLEARLY SUBORDINATE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, BUT RECENTLY IT HAS BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN SCRUTINIZING GOVERNMENT POLICY, AND EXERCISING OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH HEARINGS AT WHICH MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, MILITARY

COMMANDERS, AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS ARE ASKED TO TESTIFY. THE DPR HAS ALSO BECOME INCREASINGLY A FOCAL POINT OF APPEALS AND PETITIONS FROM STUDENTS, WORKERS, DISPLACED FARMERS, AND OTHERS PROTESTING ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND AIRING OTHER GRIEVANCES.

WHILE THERE ARE NO DE JURE RESTRICTIONS ON WOMEN IN POLITICS, ONLY 55 OUT OF 500 MEMBERS OF THE DPR ARE WOMEN; 2 WOMEN ARE CABINET MEMBERS.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

WHILE VARIOUS DOMESTIC ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONS

INTERESTED IN HUMAN AND WORKER RIGHTS OPERATE ENERGETICALLY, SOME, SUCH AS THE UNRECOGNIZED TRADE UNION SBSI (SEE SECTION 6.A.) AND THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS, FACED GOVERNMENT HARASSMENT INCLUDING POLICE RAIDS ON THEIR OFFICES, SURVEILLANCE BY POLICE OR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, INTERROGATIONS AT POLICE STATIONS, OR CANCELLATIONS OF PRIVATE MEETINGS.

THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND EMPHASIZES ITS BELIEF THAT LINKING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE.

THE ICRC CONTINUED TO OPERATE IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, AND ACEH, AND TO VISIT PRISONERS CONVICTED OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ABORTIVE, COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP IN 1965, CONVICTED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, AND EAST TIMORESE PRISONERS.

WHILE RECEIVING WIDE SUPPORT FOR ITS WORK FROM THE GOVERNMENT IN JAKARTA, THE ICRC CONTINUALLY FACED DIFFICULTY IN IMPLEMENTING ITS HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM IN EAST TIMOR DURING 1995. THE ICRC NO LONGER MAINTAINS AN OFFICE IN IRIAN JAYA BUT VISITS THAT PROVINCE FROM JAKARTA SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR. THE ICRC ALSO VISITS ACEH

REGULARLY, BUT THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT APPROVED THE ICRC'S REQUEST TO OPEN AN OFFICE THERE. THE GOVERNMENT

FACILITATED THE VISIT OF U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONER JOSE AYALA LASSO TO JAKARTA AND EAST TIMOR IN DECEMBER. TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR BY FOREIGN HUMAN RIGHTS NGO'S HAS NOT

BEEN APPROVED. INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS ARE ABLE TO VISIT EAST TIMOR, BUT HAVE NOT BEEN AUTHORIZED TO OPEN OFFICES THERE.

THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, IN ITS SECOND YEAR OF OPERATION, BECAME INCREASINGLY ACTIVE IN EXAMINING REPORTED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND CONTINUED TO SHOW INDEPENDENCE AND A WILLINGNESS TO CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND POLICIES. THE COMMISSION'S REPORT OF ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE JANUARY 12 KILLING OF SIX EAST TIMORESE IN LIQUISA CHARGED THAT THE MILITARY FORCES INVOLVED TORTURED AND MURDERED THE SUSPECTS, CALLING INTO QUESTION THE MILITARY'S ORIGINAL CONTENTION THAT THEY WERE KILLED IN A FIREFIGHT. THE COMMISSION ALSO SENT INVESTIGATIVE TEAMS TO IRIAN JAYA IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, AND FOUND EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT NGO AND CHURCH REPORTS OF THE TORTURE AND KILLING OF CIVILIANS BY SECURITY FORCES IN THAT PROVINCE, AS WELL AS SECURITY POLICE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISAPPEARANCES OF CIVILIANS. LACKING ENFORCEMENT POWERS, THE COMMISSION ATTEMPTS TO WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM, SENDING TEAMS WHERE NECESSARY TO INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS AND EMPLOYING PERSUASION, PUBLICITY, AND MORAL AUTHORITY TO HIGHLIGHT ABUSES, MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGAL AND REGULATORY CHANGES, AND ENCOURAGE CORRECTIVE ACTION. THE COMMISSION HAS YET TO OCCUPY ITS OWN PERMANENT FACILITIES AND CONTINUES TO HAVE VERY LIMITED STAFF SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT APPOINTED THE ORIGINAL COMMISSION MEMBERS, THE COMMISSION FILLS VACANCIES IN ITS RANKS INDEPENDENTLY BY INTERNAL ELECTION.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EXPLICITLY FORBID DISCRIMINATION BASED ON GENDER, RACE, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS. HOWEVER, THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATES EQUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL INDONESIAN CITIZENS, BOTH NATIVE AND NATURALIZED. CHAPTER 4 OF THE 1993 GUIDELINES OF STATE POLICY (LEGAL STATUTES ADOPTED BY THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY) EXPLICITLY STATES THAT WOMEN HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN.

ARTICLE 29 OF THE CONSTITUTION GRANTS INDONESIANS THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE THEIR INDIVIDUAL RELIGION AND BELIEFS.

WOMEN

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REMAINS POORLY DOCUMENTED. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SOCIETY, WHICH SOME SAY HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY RECENT SOCIAL CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY RAPID URBANIZATION. LONGSTANDING TRADITIONAL BELIEFS THAT THE HUSBAND MAY "TEACH" OR "CONTROL" THE WIFE THROUGH SEVERAL MEANS, INCLUDING VIOLENCE, ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH WOMEN'S GROUPS ARE TRYING TO CHANGE THE LAW, RAPE BY A HUSBAND OF A WIFE IS NOT A CRIME IN INDONESIA. WHILE POLICE COULD BRING ASSAULT CHARGES AGAINST A HUSBAND FOR BEATING HIS WIFE, DUE TO SOCIAL ATTITUDES THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO DO SO. THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES SOME COUNSELING, AND SEVERAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS EXIST TO ASSIST WOMEN. MANY OF THESE

ORGANIZATIONS FOCUS MAINLY ON REUNITING THE FAMILY RATHER THAN ON PROVIDING PROTECTION TO THE WOMEN INVOLVED. IN

1995, THE FIRST DROP-IN CENTER FOR BATTERED WOMEN WAS FOUNDED IN JAKARTA BY AN NGO. THERE ARE NO BATTERED WOMEN'S SHELTERS. MANY WOMEN RELY ON EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEMS FOR ASSISTANCE IN CASES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.

RAPE IS A PUNISHABLE OFFENSE IN INDONESIA. MEN HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND SENTENCED FOR RAPE AND ATTEMPTED RAPE ALTHOUGH RELIABLE STATISTICS ARE UNAVAILABLE. WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS BELIEVE RAPE IS GROSSLY UNDERREPORTED OWING TO THE SOCIAL STIGMA ATTACHED TO THE VICTIM. SOME LEGAL EXPERTS STATE THAT IF A WOMAN DOES NOT GO IMMEDIATELY TO THE HOSPITAL FOR A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION WHICH PRODUCES SEMEN OR OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF RAPE, SHE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BRING CHARGES. SOME WOMEN FAIL TO REPORT RAPE TO POLICE OUT OF FEAR OF BEING MOLESTED AGAIN BY THE POLICE THEMSELVES.

BY LAW, WOMEN ARE EQUAL TO AND HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN. HOWEVER, IN PRACTICE WOMEN FACE SOME LEGAL DISCRIMINATION. FOR EXAMPLE, IN DIVORCE CASES WOMEN OFTEN BEAR A HEAVIER EVIDENTIARY BURDEN THAN MEN, ESPECIALLY IN THE ISLAMIC-BASED FAMILY COURT SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH SOME WOMEN ENJOY A HIGH DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FREEDOM AND OCCUPY IMPORTANT MIDLEVEL POSITIONS IN BOTH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, THE MAJORITY OF WOMEN DO NOT EXPERIENCE SUCH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOMS AND ARE OFTEN DISPROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTED AT THE LOWER END OF THE SCALE. ALTHOUGH WOMEN CONSTITUTE ONE-QUARTER OF THE CIVIL

SERVICE, THEY OCCUPY ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THE SERVICE'S TOP POSTS. INCOME DISPARITY BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN DIMINISHES SIGNIFICANTLY WITH GREATER EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT.

WOMEN ARE OFTEN NOT GIVEN THE EXTRA BENEFITS AND SALARY THAT MEN RECEIVE THAT IS THEIR DUE WHEN THEY ARE THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, AND IN SOME CASES DO NOT RECEIVE EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR THEIRQ AS MEDICAL
INSURANCE. DESPITE LAWS GUARANTEEING WOMEN A 3-MONTH

MATERNITY LEAVE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONCEDED THAT PREGNANT WOMEN ARE OFTEN DISMISSED OR ARE REPLACED WHILE ON LEAVE. SOME COMPANIES REQUIRE THAT WOMEN SIGN STATEMENTS THAT THEY WILL NOT BECOME PREGNANT. WOMEN WORKERS ALSO HAVE COMPLAINED OF BEING SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED BY FOREMEN AND FACTORY OWNERS.

WOMEN WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING GENERALLY RECEIVE LOWER WAGES THAN MEN AND ALSO ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE HIRED ONLY ON A DAILY BASIS. AS A RESULT, THEY ARE LESS LIKELY TO RECEIVE BENEFITS LEGALLY MANDATED FOR PERMANENT WORKERS. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR WOMEN ARE APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT HIGHER THAN FOR MEN.

WOMEN DISPROPORTIONATELY EXPERIENCE ILLITERACY, POOR HEALTH, AND INADEQUATE NUTRITION. HOWEVER, WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS HAVE IMPROVED IN THE LAST DECADE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NUMBER OF GIRLS GRADUATING FROM HIGH SCHOOL TRIPLED FROM 1980 TO 1990. SEVERAL VOLUNTARY PRIVATE GROUPS WORK ACTIVELY TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL,

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CLAIM SOME SUCCESS IN GAINING OFFICIAL COGNIZANCE OF WOMEN'S CONCERNS.

CHILDREN

THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND WELFARE, BUT IS HAMPERED BY A LACK OF RESOURCES TO TRANSLATE THIS COMMITMENT INTO PRACTICE. A 1979 LAW ON CHILDREN'S WELFARE DEFINES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE AND PARENTS TO NURTURE AND PROTECT CHILDREN. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN DEVELOPED, AND THE LAW'S PROVISIONS HAVE YET TO GO INTO EFFECT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE PARTICULAR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PRIMARY EDUCATION, MATERNITY SERVICES, AND FAMILY PLANNING. THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF) ESTIMATES THAT MORE THAN 1 MILLION CHILDREN DROP OUT OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EVERY YEAR DUE MAINLY TO THE COST OF SUPPLIES, UNIFORMS AND OTHER EXPENSES, IN ADDITION TO THE PROFESSED NEED FOR

THE CHILDREN TO SUPPLEMENT FAMILY INCOME. THOUSANDS OF

STREET CHILDREN LIVING IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES SELL NEWSPAPERS, SHINE SHOES, HELP TO PARK OR WATCH CARS, AND OTHERWISE EARN MONEY. MANY THOUSANDS MORE WORK IN FACTORIES AND FIELDS (SEE ALSO SECTION 6.D.). NGO'S CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO HELP THESE CHILDREN AS INADEQUATE.

CHILD PROSTITUTION AND OTHER SEXUAL ABUSES OCCUR, ESPECIALLY CASES OF INCEST BETWEEN STEPFATHERS AND STEPDAUGHTERS, BUT DATA ON THEIR INCIDENCE ARE LACKING. SOME CHILD CARE EXPERTS BELIEVE IT TO BE LOW. WHILE THERE

ARE LAWS DESIGNED TO PROTECT CHILDREN FROM INDECENT ACTIVITIES, PROSTITUTION, AND INCEST, THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS. A SEPARATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR JUVENILES DOES NOT EXIST; HOWEVER, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IS DRAFTING LEGISLATION TO ESTABLISH A SPECIAL COURT SYSTEM AND CRIMINAL CODE FOR JUVENILES. IN 1995 MEDIA ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CASE OF A 9-YEAR OLD WHO WAS ARRESTED FOR THEFT AND HELD WITH ADULT OFFENDERS BY POLICE. THE CHILD WAS ALSO ALLEGEDLY BEATEN BY POLICE DURING INTERROGATION. POLICE OFFICIALS ADMITTED THAT JUVENILES ARE OFTEN IMPRISONED WITH ADULT OFFENDERS.

FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM) OCCURS IN SOME PARTS OF INDONESIA. THERE ARE NO STATISTICS AVAILABLE; THE ONLY INFORMATION AVAILABLE IS ANECDOTAL. IN JAVA, IT USUALLY TAKES PLACE WITHIN THE FIRST YEAR AFTER BIRTH AND IS PERFORMED EITHER AT A HOSPITAL OR BY A LOCAL TRADITIONAL PRACTITIONER OR "DUKUN," ESPECIALLY IN RURAL AREAS. USUALLY A SMALL SECTION OF THE TIP OF THE CLITORIS IS CUT OR A SMALL INCISION IS MADE IN THE TIP OF THE CLITORIS WITH THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING A FEW DROPS OF BLOOD. TOTAL REMOVAL OF THE CLITORIS IS NOT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PRACTICE, ALTHOUGH IT DOES OCCUR IF INEPTLY PERFORMED.

PARLIAMENT MEMBERS ASKED DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH OFFICIALS TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENCE OF FGM AFTER THE U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT CAME OUT 3 YEARS AGO. THEY INFORMALLY CONTACTED THE HEADS OF GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS

DEPARTMENTS AT JAKARTA HOSPITALS WHO REPORTED NO EVIDENCE OF HEALTH PROBLEMS DUE TO FGM.
UNCLASSIFIED

PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

NO NATIONAL LAW SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSES THE PROBLEMS OR STATUS OF THE DISABLED, NOR DO THEY RECEIVE SPECIAL

PROGRAMS OR ATTENTION. HOWEVER, DURING 1994 THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE BEGAN DRAFTING REGULATIONS ON TREATMENT OF THE DISABLED PARTLY BASED ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT. IN 1994 PRESIDENT SOEHARTO GAVE HIS APPROVAL TO SUBMIT THESE NEW REGULATIONS TO THE PARLIAMENT; HOWEVER, THE DRAFT IS IN THE CABINET SECRETARIAT BEING READIED FOR SUBMISSION IN EARLY 1996. VIRTUALLY NO PUBLIC BUILDINGS OR PUBLIC MEANS OF TRANSPORT ARE DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY FOR ACCESS BY THE DISABLED. THEY FACE CONSIDERABLE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT.

THE CONSTITUTION INCLUDES THE RIGHT OF EVERY CITIZEN TO OBTAIN AN EDUCATION. IN 1989 THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED REGULATIONS COVERING EDUCATION FOR THE MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED. HOWEVER, THE REGULATIONS DO NOT GRANT A RIGHT TO PUBLIC EDUCATION FOR DISABLED CHILDREN. WHILE THERE ARE SOME PUBLIC SCHOOLS FOR THE DISABLED, THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS THE CONCEPT THAT EDUCATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE COMMUNITY IN THE FORM OF NGO-RUN PRIVATE SCHOOLS THAT MAY RECEIVE SOME PUBLIC FUNDS.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

THE GOVERNMENT STATES PUBLICLY THAT IT RECOGNIZES THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL INDIGENOUS POPULATION GROUPS, AND

PAGE 46 STATE 043400 041923Z
THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE. CRITICS MAINTAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH IS BASICALLY PATERNALISTIC AND DESIGNED MORE TO INTEGRATE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE MORE CLOSELY INTO INDONESIAN SOCIETY THAN TO PROTECT THEIR TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS CRITICIZE THE GOVERNMENT'S TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM FOR VIOLATING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE (SEE SECTION L.F.).

WHERE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE CLASH WITH DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, THE DEVELOPERS ALMOST ALWAYS WIN. TENSIONS WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN IRIAN JAYA, INCLUDING IN THE VICINITY OF THE FREEPORT MCMORAN MINING CONCESSION AREA NEAR TIMIKA, LED TO A CRACKDOWN BY GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES, RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF CIVILIANS AND OTHER VIOLENT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. THESE ABUSES (SEE SECTION L.B.) WERE DOCUMENTED BY THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, AND NGO'S. IN ITS REPORTS ON THESE INCIDENTS, THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION DID NOT INDICATE THAT THE FREEPORT COMPANY, WHICH OPERATES A LARGE COPPER AND GOLD MINE IN THE PROVINCE, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE AREA. FREEPORT HAS DENIED ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE ABUSES; SOME NGO'S BELIEVE FURTHER

INVESTIGATION IS WARRANTED. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE PRACTICES OF SOME LOGGING COMPANIES WHICH RECRUIT INDIGENOUS PEOPLE FOR WORK. ACCORDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, THIS ACTIVITY IN IRIAN JAYA HAS SEPARATED THESE PEOPLE FROM THEIR TRADITIONAL ECONOMIES. MOST CIVIL SERVANTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN IRIAN JAYA AND OTHER ISOLATED AREAS
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 47 STATE 043400 041923Z
CONTINUE TO COME PRIMARILY FROM JAVA, RATHER THAN FROM THE LOCAL INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

NATIONAL/RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

INDONESIANS EXHIBIT CONSIDERABLE RACIAL AND ETHNIC

TOLERANCE, WITH THE IMPORTANT EXCEPTION OF OFFICIAL AND INFORMAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE, WHO COMPRISE ABOUT 3 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. SINCE 1959 NONCITIZEN ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO RUN BUSINESSES IN RURAL INDONESIA. REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF ALL CHINESE SCHOOLS FOR ETHNIC CHINESE, FORMATION OF EXCLUSIVELY CHINESE CULTURAL GROUPS OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND PUBLIC DISPLAY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS. SINCE AUGUST 1994, FIRMS WORKING IN THE TOURIST INDUSTRY ARE ALLOWED TO PRODUCE CHINESE-LANGUAGE BROCHURES, PROGRAMS, AND SIMILAR MATERIAL FOR CHINESE-SPEAKING TOURISTS. HOWEVER, CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE GOVERNMENT-OWNED DAILY NEWSPAPER, MAY NEITHER BE IMPORTED NOR PRODUCED DOMESTICALLY. PRIVATE INSTRUCTION IN CHINESE IS GENERALLY PROHIBITED BUT TAKES PLACE TO A LIMITED EXTENT, AND SINCE 1994 HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO TRAIN EMPLOYEES IN THE TOURISM INDUSTRY IN FUNCTIONAL MANDARIN. STATE UNIVERSITIES HAVE NO FORMAL GUOTAS THAT LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ETHNIC CHINESE. THE LAW FORBIDS THE CELEBRATION OF THE CHINESE NEW YEAR IN TEMPLES OR PUBLIC PLACES, BUT ITS ENFORCEMENT WAS LIMITED IN 1995. CHINESE NEW YEAR DECORATIONS WERE DISPLAYED IN PUBLIC SHOPPING AREAS IN MAJOR CITIES.

EAST TIMORESE AND VARIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS CHARGE THAT

THE EAST TIMORESE ARE UNDER REPRESENTED IN THE CIVIL SERVICE IN EAST TIMOR. IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM OR DENY THE CHARGES AS THERE APPEARS TO BE NO REGISTRY OF THE BIRTHPLACE OF CIVIL SERVANTS, WHO CAN BE TRANSFERRED ANYWHERE. EAST TIMORESE HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERNS THAT THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM (SEE SECTION L.F.) COULD LEAD TO FEWER EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND MIGHT EVENTUALLY DESTROY EAST TIMOR'S CULTURAL IDENTITY. HOWEVER, THESE CONCERNS PROBABLY WERE EXAGGERATED. IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, INFORMAL MIGRATION TO THE PROVINCE HAS SPARKED

SOCIOECONOMIC TENSION IN URBAN AREAS, PROVING AN EVEN GREATER CONCERN THAN THE FORMALLY SPONSORED TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM. IN MID-1995, EAST TIMOR'S PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTED ITS OFFICIALS TO LIMIT THE STAY IN THE PROVINCE

OF NON-TIMORESE SEEKING JOBS TO A MAXIMUM OF 3 MONTHS. IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS HOW WELL THESE NEW MEASURES HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS, INCLUDING THOSE IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES, ARE BY LAW FREE TO FORM WORKER ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION. HOWEVER, GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND CURRENT NUMERICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR UNION RECOGNITION CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT BARRIER TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER USES A REGULATION THAT REQUIRES THAT A UNION BE SET UP "BY AND

FOR WORKERS" TO DENY RECOGNITION TO GROUPS WHICH INCLUDE PEOPLE IT CONSIDERS NONWORKERS, SUCH AS LAWYERS OR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, WHO ARE INVOLVED AS LABOR ORGANIZERS. UNTIL 1994 ONLY THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ALL-INDONESIA WORKERS UNION SPSI COULD BARGAIN ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES OR REPRESENT WORKERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S LABOR COUQ PROVIDES THAT WORKERS IN A SINGLE COMPANY WITH MORE THAN 25 EMPLOYEES CAN JOIN TOGETHER AS A "PLANT-LEVEL UNION" AND NEGOTIATE A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT WITH THEIR EMPLOYER OUTSIDE THE SPSI FRAMEWORK, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES THESE PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS TO JOIN THE SPSI. OVER 900 PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS EXISTED BY DECEMBER.

THERE IS A DE FACTO SINGLE UNION SYSTEM, THE SPSI AND ITS 13 FEDERATED SECTORAL UNIONS. THE SPSI MAINTAINS INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS BUT IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS EXCEPT THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) TRADE UNION COUNCIL. THE SPSI COMPLETED IN 1995 A TRANSFORMATION FROM A UNITARY (CENTRALIZED) TO A FEDERATIVE (DECENTRALIZED) STRUCTURE. ITS 13 INDUSTRIAL SECTORS ARE NOW REGISTERED AS INDEPENDENT UNIONS AND ARE THE ONLY UNIONS RECOGNIZED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER

HAS STATED THAT ANY UNIONS WHICH ARE FORMED SHOULD AFFILIATE WITH THE SPSI FEDERATION, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT RECOGNIZE ANY UNIONS OUTSIDE THE FEDERATION. THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED POLICY IS TO IMPROVE

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECOGNIZED SPSI UNIONS RATHER THAN TO ALLOW THE FORMATION OF ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

TWO OTHER LABOR GROUPS, SETIA KAWAN (SOLIDARITY), ALSO KNOWN AS SERIKAT BURUH MERDEKA (SBM, FREE TRADE UNION), AND SERIKAT BURUH SEJAHTERA INDONESIA (SBSI, INDONESIAN WORKERS WELFARE UNION), HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED BUT ARE NOT REGISTERED. SETIA KAWAN, FOUNDED 4 YEARS AGO, IS NOW ESSENTIALLY MORIBUND.

THE SBSI, CREATED IN 1992, CLAIMS THAT IT HAS FORMED THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF FACTORY-LEVEL UNITS TO MEET THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION AS A LABOR UNION, BUT ITS MOST RECENT REQUEST (IN NOVEMBER 1994) FOR REGISTRATION AS A TRADE UNION WAS DENIED. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER HAS ALSO BLOCKED SBSI ATTEMPTS TO REGISTER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS AS A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE ORMAS LAW. THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE SBSI TO BE ILLEGAL. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT DISBANDED IT, IT HAS CONTINUALLY HARASSED THE SBSI, ESPECIALLY AFTER LARGE-SCALE LABOR DEMONSTRATIONS, WHICH SBSI HELPED TO ORGANIZE IN MEDAN IN APRIL 1994, DEGENERATED INTO ANTI-CHINESE RIOTING. THE GOVERNMENT ARRESTED A NUMBER OF THE MEDAN SBSI LEADERSHIP AND ITS NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, AND TRIED AND CONVICTED THEM OF INCITING VIOLENCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE RIOTS, CHARGES WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) AND MANY INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS BELIEVED WERE UNJUSTIFIED. THIS VIEW APPEARS TO BE CORRECT. ALL THE OTHERS HAVE NOW SERVED THEIR SENTENCES AND HAVE BEEN RELEASED. THE SUPREME COURT OVERTURNED PAKPAHAN'S SENTENCE (SEE SECTION I.E.). IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AGAINST THE SBSI LEADERSHIP WERE INTENDED TO

DISCREDIT OR DESTROY THE ORGANIZATION. GOVERNMENT HARASSMENT OF SBSI, INCLUDING DISBANDING ITS MEETINGS AND TRAINING SEMINARS, CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 1995.

BECAUSE OF PAST DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER REGULATIONS, MANY SPSI FACTORY UNITS ARE LED BY PERSONS WHO HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH THEIR UNITS' MEMBERS BECAUSE THEY WERE SELECTED BY EMPLOYERS. A NEW REGULATION STATES THAT EMPLOYEES MUST ONLY NOTIFY THEIR EMPLOYER THAT THEY WISH TO FORM A UNION AND THAT THEY MAY PROCEED IF THEY DO NOT RECEIVE A RESPONSE FROM THEIR EMPLOYER WITHIN 2 WEEKS. DESPITE THIS NEW PROVISION, STRIKES CONTINUE TO OCCUR BECAUSE EMPLOYERS ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF UNION BRANCHES. THESE STRIKES ARE INVARIABLY SUCCESSFUL, AND THE FORMATION OF AN SPSI UNIT FOLLOWS SHORTLY

THEREAFTER. HOWEVER, WORKERS WHO ARE ACTIVE IN THE FORMATION OF THE UNION ARE FREQUENTLY DISMISSED AND HAVE NO PRACTICAL PROTECTION BY EITHER LAW OR GOVERNMENT PRACTICE.

CIVIL SERVANTS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO JOIN UNIONS AND MUST BELONG TO KORPRI, A NONUNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES, DEFINED TO INCLUDE THOSE WORKING IN ENTERPRISES IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A 5-PERCENT HOLDING OR GREATER, USUALLY ARE REQUIRED TO JOIN KORPRI, BUT A SMALL NUMBER OF STATE ENTERPRISES HAVE SPSI UNITS. TEACHERS MUST BELONG TO THE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (PGRI). WHILE TECHNICALLY CLASSED AS A UNION, THE PGRI CONTINUES TO FUNCTION MORE AS A WELFARE ORGANIZATION AND

DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ENGAGED IN TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES

SUCH AS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.

UNIONS MAY DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE OVER THE SPSI AND ITS FEDERATED UNIONS. THE NEW HEAD OF SPSI IS A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FOR GOLKAR, AND MANY MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF GOLKAR AND ITS CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONAL GROUPS. THESE PERSONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN POSITIONS IN THE NEW FEDERATED INDUSTRIAL SECTOR UNIONS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER IS A MEMBER OF THE SPSI'S CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL. NUMEROUS REGIONAL SPSI OFFICIALS ALSO ARE GOLKAR MEMBERS, SOMETIMES SERVING IN REGIONAL LEGISLATURES. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE REPORTS, THE GOVERNMENT INTERFERES IN THE SELECTION OF SPSI OFFICERS, ESPECIALLY BY PLACING RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS IN MID-LEVEL SPSI POSITIONS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS STATED THAT IT WILL CEASE THE PRACTICE OF PLACING MILITARY OFFICERS IN UNION POSITIONS AND EVENTUALLY WILL REMOVE OFFICIALS WITH SIGNIFICANT GOLKAR CONNECTIONS. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER SUPPORTED THE SPSI IN ITS SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE TO AN ATTEMPT BY THE REGENT OF KUDUS, CENTRAL JAVA, TO NAME A RETIRED MILITARY OFFICER AS SPSI DISTRICT HEAD.

UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE, POLICE APPROVAL IS NEEDED FOR ALL MEETINGS OF FIVE OR MORE PEOPLE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE OFFICES OR NORMAL WORK SITES, THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT LATE IN 1995 ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO RELAX THIS REGULATION (SEE SECTION 2.B.). THIS PROVISION ALSO APPLIES TO UNION MEETINGS. PERMISSION IS ROUTINELY QIVEN

TO THE SPSI BUT NOT TO RIVAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE SBSI WHICH WAS PREVENTED FROM HOLDING SEVERAL MEETINGS

OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS, INCLUDING ITS FIRST CONGRESS IN 1993. IN APRIL POLICE CURTAILED AN SPSI THIRD ANNIVERSARY GATHERING IN JAKARTA. THE GOVERNMENT MAY DISSOLVE A UNION IF IT BELIEVES THE UNION IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA, ALTHOUGH IT HAS NEVER ACTUALLY DONE SO, AND THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS SPECIFYING PROCEDURES FOR UNION DISSOLUTION.

IN 1994 THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS LODGED A FORMAL COMPLAINT AGAINST INDONESIA WITH THE ILO, ACCUSING THE GOVERNMENT OF DENYING WORKERS' RIGHT TO SET UP UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, HARASSING INDEPENDENT WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS, AND OF TAKING OTHER ACTIONS CONTRARY TO ILO STANDARDS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. IN CONSIDERING THIS COMPLAINT, THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION DECLARED IN APRIL THAT "LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS NEGATE THE RIGHT OF WORKERS TO ESTABLISH ORGANIZATIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING" AND DEEPLY DEPLORED "THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ALLEGATIONS, WHICH LED IT TO BELIEVE THAT THE GENERAL SITUATION OF WORKERS IN INDONESIA HAS NOT EVOLVED BUT IS STILL CHARACTERIZED BY SERIOUS AND WORSENING INFRINGEMENTS OF BASIC (HUMAN AND TRADE UNION RIGHTS AND VIOLATIONS OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION PRINCIPLES IN LAW AND PRACTICE."

WHILE PANCASILA PRINCIPLES CALL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES TO BE SETTLED BY CONSENSUS, ALL ORGANIZED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

WORKERS EXCEPT CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. WHILE STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND TEACHERS RARELY EXERCISE THIS RIGHT, PRIVATE SECTOR STRIKES ARE FREQUENT. BEFORE A STRIKE CAN OCCUR IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE LAW REQUIRES INTENSIVE MEDIATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND PRIOR NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE. HOWEVER, NO APPROVAL IS REQUIRED. IN PRACTICE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ARE NOT FOLLOWED, AND FORMAL NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE IS RARELY GIVEN BECAUSE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROCEDURES ARE SLOW. THESE PROCEDURES HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH WORKERS, WHO IGNORE THEM. THEREFORE, SUDDEN STRIKES TEND TO RESULT FROM LONGSTANDING GRIEVANCES OR RECOGNITION THAT LEGALLY MANDATED BENEFITS OR RIGHTS ARE NOT BEING RECEIVED. WHILE STRIKE LEADERS ARE NOT ARRESTED FOR ILLEGAL STRIKES, THEY OFTEN LOSE THEIR JOBS AND HAVE NO LEGAL RECOURSE FOR REINSTATEMENT. THE NUMBER OF STRIKES HAS DECREASED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THE LATTER HALF OF 1994, REVERSING A TREND OF THE PREVIOUS FEW YEARS. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS TO

RAISE AND MORE VIGOROUSLY ENFORCE MINIMUM WAGE RATES MAY

BE PARTLY RESPONSIBLE.

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROMOTES IT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE NATIONAL IDEOLOGY, PANCASILA. UNTIL 1994 ONLY RECOGNIZED TRADE UNIONS--THE SPSI AND ITS COMPONENTS--COULD LEGALLY ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. SINCE EARLY 1994, NEW GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS

ALSO PERMIT UNAFFILIATED PLANT-LEVEL WORKERS' ASSOCIATIONS TO CONCLUDE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH EMPLOYERS, AND SOME 24 HAD DONE SO BY MID-1995, ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES. AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY ANY OTHER GROUPS ARE NOT CONSIDERED LEGALLY BINDING AND ARE NOT REGISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. THE MAJORITY OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE SPSI UNITS AND EMPLOYERS ARE NEGOTIATED BILATERALLY. ONCE NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED A REGISTERED SPSI OR INDEPENDENT PLANT LEVEL UNION, AN EMPLOYER IS OBLIGATED TO BARGAIN WITH IT. IN COMPANIES WITHOUT UNIONS, THE GOVERNMENT DISCOURAGES WORKERS FROM UTILIZING OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE, E.G., DURING CONSULTATIONS WITH EMPLOYERS OVER COMPANY REGULATIONS. INSTEAD, THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PREFERS THAT WORKERS SEEK ITS ASSISTANCE AND BELIEVES THAT ITS ROLE IS TO PROTECT WORKERS. THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT FOR SOME COMPANIES, CONSULTATIONS ARE PERFUNCTORY AT BEST AND USUALLY WITH MANAGEMENT-SELECTED WORKERS; THERE ARE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY FROM FOREIGN COMPANIES. OVER HALF OF THE FACTORY-LEVEL SPSI UNITS HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS ARE FREELY NEGOTIATED BETWEEN UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE VARIES. BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS OR BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION OR ARBITRATION. MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED FOR 1

YEAR. ACCORDING TO NGO'S INVOLVED IN LABOR ISSUES, THE PROVISIONS OF THESE AGREEMENTS RARELY GO BEYOND THE LEGAL MINIMUM STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE

AGREEMENTS ARE OFTEN MERELY PRESENTED TO WORKER REPRESENTATIVES FOR SIGNING RATHER THAN BEING NEGOTIATED.

ALTHOUGH GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS PROHIBIT EMPLOYERS FROM DISCRIMINATING OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS FROM UNION OFFICIALS OF EMPLOYER RETRIBUTION AGAINST UNION

ORGANIZERS, INCLUDING FIRING, WHICH IS NOT EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED OR REMEDIED IN PRACTICE. SOME EMPLOYERS REPORTEDLY HAVE WARNED THEIR EMPLOYEES AGAINST CONTACT WITH UNION ORGANIZERS FROM THE UNRECOGNIZED SBSI ORGANIZATION. CHARGES OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE ADJUDICATED BY ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. HOWEVER, BECAUSE MANY UNION MEMBERS BELIEVE THE TRIBUNALS GENERALLY SIDE WITH EMPLOYERS, MANY WORKERS REJECT OR AVOID THE PROCEDURE AND PRESENT THEIR GRIEVANCES DIRECTLY TO PARLIAMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF DISMISSED WORKERS TEND TO BE MONETARY AWARDS; WORKERS ARE RARELY REINSTATED. THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO FIRE WORKERS, BUT THE LAW IS OFTEN IGNORED IN PRACTICE.

COMMENTING ON ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION AND RESTRICTIONS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE CONTEXT OF ILO CONVENTION 98 ON THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY, THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS1 JUNE REPORT EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT "IN SPITE OF THE DIRECT CONTACTS MISSION THAT WENT TO INDONESIA IN NOVEMBER 1993, THE DISCUSSION WITHIN THE PRESENT COMMITTEE LAST YEAR, AND THE TECHNICAL ADVISORY

PAGE 57 STATE 043400 041923Z
MISSION THAT WENT TO INDONESIA IN JANUARY 1995, MUCH PROGRESS WAS YET TO BE ACHIEVED TO ENSURE IN LAW AND IN PRACTICE THE FULL APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION."

THE ARMED FORCES, WHICH INCLUDE THE POLICE, CONTINUES TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN LABOR ISSUES, DESPITE NEW REGULATIONS PROMULGATED IN 1994 TO PROHIBIT MILITARY INTERFERENCE WHEN THERE IS NO THREAT TO SECURITY. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE INCIDENCE OF SUCH MILITARY INVOLVEMENT HAS DECREASED SINCE 1994, BUT NOT ALL OBSERVERS SHARE THIS PERCEPTION. WORKERS CHARGE THAT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES ATTEMPT TO INTIMIDATE UNION ORGANIZERS AND STRIKE LEADERS AND HAVE BEEN PRESENT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS DURING SOME STRIKES, EVEN WHEN THERE HAS BEEN NO DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER VIOLENCE. MEMBERS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ATTENDED AND MONITORED TRADE UNION EDUCATION SEMINARS RUN BY THE ASIAN-AMERICAN FREE LABOR INSTITUTE (AAFLI) AND AN AAFLI-SPSI SPONSORED SEMINAR ON DEMOCRATIZATION, EVEN THOUGH THESE PROGRAMS WERE APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. AN AAFLI-SPSI PROGRAM ON LEGAL AID FOR INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER, WHICH THE MILITARY COMMAND IN SURABAYA HALTED IN 1993, WAS NEVER ALLOWED TO RESUME DESPITE GOVERNMENT ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY. MILITARY OFFICIALS OCCASIONALLY HAVE BEEN REPORTED PRESENT DURING

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND MANAGEMENT. THEIR PRESENCE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS INTIMIDATING BY PLANT-LEVEL UNION OFFICIALS. A MILITARY OFFICER WAS AMONG THOSE CONVICTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MARSINAH MURDER CASE.

PAGE 58 STATE 043400 041923Z
LABOR LAW APPLIES EQUALLY IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

THE LAW FORBIDS FORCED LABOR, AND THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY

ENFORCES IT. HOWEVER, THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF TEENAGE CHILDREN BEING FORCED TO WORK UNDER HIGHLY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS ON FISHING PLATFORMS OFF THE COAST OF NORTHEASTERN SUMATRA. THESE PLATFORMS ARE MILES OFF SHORE, WITH ACCESS CONTROLLED BY THE EMPLOYERS, AND IN MANY CASES THE CHILDREN ARE HELD VIRTUAL PRISONERS ON THE PLATFORMS AND FORCED TO WORK FOR UP TO 3 MONTHS AT A TIME FOR WELL BELOW THE MINIMUM WAGE. ACCORDING TO KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES, HUNDREDS OF CHILDREN MAY BE INVOLVED. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT HAS DONE LITTLE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM.

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

CHILD LABOR EXISTS IN BOTH INDUSTRIAL AND RURAL AREAS, AND IN BOTH THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS. THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 2.7 MILLION WORKING CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 14, ACCORDING TO A 1994 REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. THE NUMBER OF OUT-OF-SCHOOL CHILDREN AGE 7 TO 15 WHO ARE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE MAY BE AS HIGH AS 6.5 MILLION, ACCORDING TO A 1989 STUDY, AND THE NUMBER WOULD BE EVEN GREATER IF THOSE WHO HAVE NOT LEFT SCHOOL ARE INCLUDED. INDONESIA WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO BE SELECTED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ILO'S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOR (IPEC), AND IT SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF

UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ILO ON MAY 29, 1992 TO GUIDE COLLABORATION UNDER THIS PROGRAM. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN ACTION PLAN WERE DEVELOPED AT A NATIONAL CONFERENCE IN BOGOR IN JULY 1993. DURING 1995, 30 GOVERNMENT LABOR INSPECTORS RECEIVED ILO-SPONSORED TRAINING ON CHILD LABOR MATTERS UNDER THE IPEC PROGRAM. HOWEVER, ENFORCEMENT REMAINS LAX.

THE GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A CLASS OF CHILDREN WHO MUST WORK FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS, ANCI IN 1987 THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER ISSUED REGULATION PER-OL/MEN/1987, "PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FORCED TO WORK,"

TO REGULATE THIS SITUATION. THIS REGULATION LEGALIZES THE

EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14 WHO MUST WORK TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCOME OF THEIR FAMILIES. IT REQUIRES PARENTAL CONSENT, PROHIBITS DANGEROUS OR DIFFICULT WORK, LIMITS WORK TO 4 HOURS DAILY, AND REQUIRES EMPLOYERS TO REPORT THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN WORKING UNDER ITS PROVISIONS. IT DOES NOT SET A MINIMUM AGE FOR CHILDREN IN THIS CATEGORY, EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDING THE COLONIAL-ERA GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE OF DECEMBER 17, 1925, ON "MEASURES LIMITING CHILD LABOR AND NIGHTWORK OF WOMEN, WHICH IS STILL THE CURRENT LAW GOVERNING CHILD LABOR AND SETS A MINIMUM AGE OF 12 FOR EMPLOYMENT. THE 1987 REGULATION IS NOT ENFORCED. NO EMPLOYERS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO COURT FOR VIOLATING ITS RESTRICTIONS ON THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR CHILDREN, AND NO REPORTS ARE COLLECTED FROM ESTABLISHMENTS EMPLOYING CHILDREN.

ACT NO. 1 OF 1951 WAS INTENDED TO BRING INTO FORCE CERTAIN

UNCLASSIFIED

LABOR MEASURES, INCLUDING PROVISIONS ON CHILD LABOR WHICH WOULD REPLACE THOSE OF THE 1925 LEGISLATION. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS FOR THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN ISSUED. THUS THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS IN THE 1951 ACT HAVE NO VALIDITY.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE, AREA WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL ESTABLISH MINIMUM WAGES FOR REGIONS AND BASIC NEEDS FIGURES FOR EACH PROVINCE--A MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. WHILE INDONESIA HAS SUCCEEDED IN DRAMATICALLY LOWERING THE LEVEL OF POVERTY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, THE MINIMUM WAGE RATES UNTIL RECENTLY HAVE USUALLY LAGGED BEHIND INFLATION AND EVEN THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURES. THE GOVERNMENT RAISED MINIMUM WAGE RATES IN 1994 AND AGAIN ON APRIL 1. THERE IS NO NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE. THE MINIMUM WAGE VARIES FROM PROVINCE TO PROVINCE. IN JAKARTA IT IS ABOUT 2 DOLLARS (RP 4600) PER DAY. WHILE IN CERTAIN PROVINCES THE NEW RATES ARE STILL BELOW THE PROVINCIAL BASIC NEEDS FIGURES,

THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ESTIMATES THAT, ON THE AVERAGE, MINIMUM WAGE RATES EQUAL 108 PERCENT OF THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURES, UP FROM 97 PERCENT AS OF AUGUST 1, 1994. THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IN NOVEMBER THAT FURTHER INCREASES WOULD TAKE EFFECT APRIL 1, 1996. THERE ARE NO RELIABLE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYERS PAYING AT LEAST THE MINIMUM WAGE. INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS' ESTIMATES RANGE

BETWEEN 30 AND 60 PERCENT. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER INCREASED THE NUMBER OF LABOR INSPECTORS AND ANNOUNCED A SCHEME OF "BLACKLISTING1' OFFENDING COMPANIES, BUT ENFORCEMENT OF MINIMUM WAGE AND OTHER LABOR REGULATIONS REMAINS INADEQUATE, AND SANCTIONS TOO LIGHT. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER HAS DRAFTED A REVISION OF A BASIC LABOR LAW THAT WOULD RAISE STATUTORY FINES, WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVALUED BY INFLATION, TO MORE APPROPRIATE LEVELS. SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE INCREASED GOVERNMENT PRESSURES ON EMPLOYERS AND MEMORIES OF THE 1994 MEDAN RIOTS HAVE IMPROVED MINIMUM WAGE COMPLIANCE SOMEWHAT.

LABOR LAW AND MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PROVIDE WORKERS WITH A VARIETY OF OTHER BENEFITS, SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY, AND WORKERS IN MORE MODERN FACILITIES OFTEN RECEIVE HEALTH BENEFITS AND FREE MEALS. THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7-HOUR WORKDAYS AND 40-HOUR WORKWEEKS, WITH ONE 30-MINUTE REST PERIOD FOR EACH 4 HOURS OF WORK. THE LAW ALSO REQUIRES 1 DAY OF REST WEEKLY. THE DAILY OVERTIME RATE IS 1 1/2 TIMES THE NORMAL HOURLY RATE FOR THE FIRST HOUR, AND TWICE THE HOURLY RATE FOR ADDITIONAL OVERTIME. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE. OBSERVANCE OF LAWS REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND BY REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ARE FAIRLY COMMON AND OFTEN RESULT IN STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. THE MINISTRY OF MANPOWER CONTINUES PUBLICLY TO URGE EMPLOYERS TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW. HOWEVER, IN GENERAL, GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ARE WEAK.

UNCLASSIFIED

BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. IN THE LARGELY WESTERN-OPERATED OIL SECTOR, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUNCTION REASONABLY WELL. HOWEVER, IN THE COUNTRY'S 100,000 LARGER REGISTERED COMPANIES IN THE NONOIL SECTOR, THE QUALITY OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAMS VARIES GREATLY. THE ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS IS SEVERELY HAMPERED BY THE LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER INSPECTORS AS WELL AS BY THE LOW LEVEL OF EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION FOR SOUND HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES. ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION ON THE PART OF INSPECTORS ARE COMMON. WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS. EMPLOYERS ARE FORBIDDEN BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO, BUT THE LAW IS NOT EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED.

END TEXT
TALBOTT

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3576

PAGE 01 JAKART 07285 01 OF 05 041427Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7B4E 041427Z /38

P 041425Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2881
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 007285

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART TWO

1. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

2. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE CONTAINS PROVISIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION, BUT LACKS ADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS. THE CODE SPECIFIES THAT PRISONERS HAVE THE RIGHT TO

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200504418

NOTIFY THEIR FAMILIES AND THAT WARRANTS MUST BE PRODUCED DURING AN ARREST EXCEPT UNDER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS, SUCH AS WHEN A SUSPECT IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME. THE LAW ALSO REQUIRES THAT FAMILIES OF DETAINEES BE NOTIFIED PROMPTLY. THE LAW AUTHORIZES INVESTIGATORS TO ISSUE WARRANTS TO ASSIST IN THEIR INVESTIGATIONS OR IF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED. DESPITE THESE REQUIREMENTS, AUTHORITIES SOMETIMES MADE ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS.

3. IN THE PERIOD MARCH 10-13, IRIANESE RIOTED IN THE TIMIKA-TEMBAGAPURA AREA. THERE WAS ALSO RIOTING IN A SUBURB OF JAYAPURA MARCH 18-19. FATALITIES WERE REPORTED IN BOTH INSTANCES THOUGH NOT, APPARENTLY, AT THE HANDS OF SECURITY FORCES. APPROXIMATELY SEVEN PERSONS WERE DETAINED IN THE WAKE OF THE RIOTING IN TIMIKA-TEMBAGAPURA, WHILE OVER 100 REPORTEDLY WERE DETAINED IN THE WAKE OF THE RIOTING IN THE JAYAPURA SUBURB.

4. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE REPORTS, NUMEROUS INDIVIDUALS WERE SEIZED FROM THEIR HOMES IN DILI AND ARBITRARILY DETAINED IN EARLY 1996. SIMILARLY, ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT FROM A FOREIGN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP, FOUR IRIANESE WERE DETAINED DUE TO A PEACEFUL PROTEST THEY CARRIED OUT IN JAKARTA. WITHOUT BEING INFORMED OF THE CHARGES, THEY WERE HELD INCOMMUNICADO FOR OVER A WEEK AND THEN RELEASED. DOCUMENTS CONFISCATED FROM ONE OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE NOT RETURNED.

5. ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNMENT, 206 PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED ON THE WEEKEND OF JULY 27 IN CONNECTION WITH THE VIOLENT GOVERNMENT-ASSISTED TAKEOVER OF PDI HEADQUARTERS AND THE ENSUING DISTURBANCES. AS OF EARLY SEPTEMBER, 124 FROM THAT GROUP REMAINED IN DETENTION AWAITING TRIAL. IN ADDITION, THE LEADER OF

AN UNSANCTIONED LABOR UNION, MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, AND TEN MEMBERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S PARTY (PRD), INCLUDING ITS LEADER BUDIMAN, HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND WERE BEING HELD IN JAKARTA AWAITING LEGAL ACTION UNDER THE ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE NUMEROUS ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS OUTSIDE OF JAKARTA, SOME TEMPORARY, OF THOSE SUSPECTED OF HAVING A CONNECTION TO THE PRD OR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE JULY 27 RIOTS. FOR EXAMPLE, FIVE STUDENTS WERE DETAINED IN YOGYAKARTA IN EARLY

AUGUST. AT LEAST TWO PRD MEMBERS WERE DETAINED IN SEMARANG IN SEPTEMBER. THE SEMARANG DETAINEES WERE HELD INCOMMUNICADO FOR AT LEAST TWO WEEKS. FOLLOWING THE JULY 27 VIOLENCE IN JAKARTA, INDIVIDUALS WERE DETAINED BY POLICE AND BY MILITARY ELEMENTS IN SOME CASES WITHOUT PROPER WARRANTS AND WITHOUT PROMPT NOTIFICATION OF THE DETAINEES FAMILIES, AS REQUIRED BY LAW. IN A RAID CONDUCTED AGAINST AN NGO DEVOTED TO ASSISTING MIGRANT WOMEN WORKERS, DETAINING FORCES FAILED TO PROVIDE IDENTIFICATION OR MIS-IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES. IN RESPONSE TO INSTANCES OF ILLEGAL MILITARY DETENTION OF SUSPECTS, THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ISSUED A PUBLIC CAUTION THAT ONLY POLICE WERE EMPOWERED TO CARRY OUT ARRESTS.

6. THE LAW PRESUMES DEFENDANTS INNOCENT AND PERMITS BAIL. THEY OR THEIR FAMILIES MAY ALSO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THEIR ARREST AND DETENTION IN A PRETRIAL HEARING AND MAY SUE FOR COMPENSATION IF WRONGFULLY DETAINED. HOWEVER, IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO INVOKE THIS PROCEDURE, OR TO RECEIVE COMPENSATION, AFTER BEING RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGE. IN BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COURTS, APPEALS BASED ON CLAIMS OF IMPROPER ARREST AND DETENTION ARE RARELY, IF EVER, ACCEPTED. THE CODE ALSO CONTAINS SPECIFIC LIMITS ON PERIODS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION AND SPECIFIES WHEN THE COURTS MUST GET INVOLVED TO APPROVE EXTENSIONS, USUALLY

AFTER 60 DAYS. IN ADDITION, SUSPECTS CHARGED UNDER THE 1963 ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW ARE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL PROCEDURES OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE. THESE GIVE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD A SUSPECT UP TO 1 YEAR BEFORE TRIAL. HE MAY RENEW THIS 1-YEAR PERIOD WITHOUT LIMIT. IN THE CASE OF INDIVIDUALS HELD BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE IN CONNECTION WITH THE JULY 27 VIOLENCE IN JAKARTA, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE WAIVED AUTHORITY UNDER THE ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW TO HOLD SUSPECTS INDEFINITELY, AND SOUGHT JUDICIAL APPROVAL OF CONTINUED DETENTION AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER CRIMINAL LAW. THE AUTHORITIES ROUTINELY APPROVE EXTENSIONS OF PERIODS OF DETENTION. IN AREAS WHERE ACTIVE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS EXIST, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, THERE ARE MORE INSTANCES OF PEOPLE BEING DETAINED WITHOUT WARRANTS, CHARGES, OR COURT PROCEEDINGS. THIS WAS ALSO THE CASE FOLLOWING THE JULY 27 VIOLENCE IN JAKARTA. BAIL IS RARELY GRANTED, ESPECIALLY IN POLITICAL CASES. THE AUTHORITIES FREQUENTLY PREVENT ACCESS TO DEFENSE COUNSEL WHILE SUSPECTS ARE

BEING INVESTIGATED AND MAKE IT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO GET LEGAL ASSISTANCE FROM VOLUNTARY LEGAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS. SPECIAL LAWS ON CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND NARCOTICS ARE SIMILARLY EXEMPT FROM THE CODE'S PROTECTIONS.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ3578

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3578

PAGE 01 JAKART 07285 02 OF 05 041427Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7B51 041427Z /38

P 041425Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2882
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 007285

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART TWO

7. THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) OPERATES OUTSIDE THE LEGAL CODE AND HAS WIDE DISCRETION TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE PERSONS THOUGHT TO THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY. DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS AGENCY, ABRI BEGAN DISCUSSING PUBLICLY IN SEPTEMBER THE NEED FOR A NEW INTERNAL SECURITY ACT TO GIVE THE

GOVERNMENT GREATER POWER TO SUPPRESS DISSENT IN THE RUN-UP TO THE 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. THERE IS NO RELIABLE DATA ON WHICH TO QUANTIFY THE NUMBER OF ARBITRARY ARRESTS OR DETENTIONS WITHOUT TRIAL, PARTICULARLY IN EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA.

8. IN FEBRUARY, 15 WOMEN REPORTEDLY PROTESTED THE FIVE MONTH DETENTION OF THEIR HUSBANDS AND SONS TO THE LOCAL LAMPUNG LEGISLATURE. THEY CLAIMED THAT THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS HAD NOT RECEIVED DUE PROCESS, THAT ONE OF THE DETAINEES HAD BEEN KILLED IN PRISON, AND THAT ANOTHER HAD BEEN SEVERELY INJURED.

9. THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT USE FORCED EXILE.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

10. THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATES THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY. IN PRACTICE THE JUDICIARY IS SUBORDINATED TO THE EXECUTIVE AND THE MILITARY, AND IN MANY CASES PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AGAINST COERCED CONFESSIONS, PARTICULARLY BY THE POLICE AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (BIA), ARE INADEQUATE TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL.

11. A QUADRIPARTITE JUDICIARY OF GENERAL, RELIGIOUS, MILITARY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS EXISTS BELOW THE SUPREME COURT. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT TO HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS IN ALL FOUR SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE. THE SUPREME COURT

DOES NOT CONSIDER FACTUAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF LAW. A PANEL OF JUDGES CONDUCTS TRIALS AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL, POSES QUESTIONS, HEARS EVIDENCE, DECIDES GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND ASSESSES PUNISHMENT. INITIAL JUDGMENTS ARE RARELY REVERSED IN THE APPEALS PROCESS, ALTHOUGH

SENTENCES CAN BE INCREASED OR REDUCED. BOTH THE DEFENSE AND THE PROSECUTION MAY APPEAL.

12. DEFENDANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AND TO PRODUCE WITNESSES IN THEIR DEFENSE. AN EXCEPTION IS ALLOWED IN CASES IN WHICH DISTANCE OR EXPENSE IS DEEMED EXCESSIVE FOR TRANSPORTING WITNESSES TO COURT. IN SUCH CASES, SWORN AFFIDAVITS MAY BE INTRODUCED. HOWEVER, THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR WITNESSES' IMMUNITY OR FOR COMPULSORY PROCESS OF DEFENSE WITNESSES. AS A RESULT, WITNESSES ARE SOMETIMES UNWILLING TO TESTIFY AGAINST THE AUTHORITIES. IN EARLIER CASES TRIED UNDER THE 1963 ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW, TRIALS IN ABSENTIA WERE PERMITTED AND PUBLIC ACCESS GENERALLY REQUIRED ADVANCE APPROVAL BY THE MILITARY. THE COURTS COMMONLY ALLOW FORCED CONFESSIONS AND LIMIT THE PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE. DEFENDANTS CAN BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN THEIR OWN TRIALS. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE GIVES DEFENDANTS THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY FROM THE MOMENT OF THEIR ARREST, BUT NOT DURING THE PRE-ARREST INVESTIGATION PERIOD, WHICH MAY INVOLVE PROLONGED DETENTION. PERSONS SUMMONED TO APPEAR AS WITNESSES IN INVESTIGATIONS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY LAWYERS EVEN THOUGH INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN THE COURSE OF RENDERING TESTIMONY CAN SUBSEQUENTLY BECOME THE BASIS OF AN INVESTIGATION OF THE WITNESS. THE LAW REQUIRES THAT A LAWYER BE APPOINTED IN CAPITAL CASES AND THOSE INVOLVING A PRISON SENTENCE OF 15 YEARS OR MORE. IN CASES INVOLVING POTENTIAL SENTENCES OF 5 YEARS OR MORE, A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IF THE DEFENDANT DESIRES AN ATTORNEY AND IS INDIGENT. IN THEORY, DESTITUTE DEFENDANTS MAY OBTAIN PRIVATE LEGAL HELP, SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE LEGAL AID INSTITUTE (LBH). IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, DEFENDANTS ARE OFTEN PERSUADED NOT TO HIRE AN ATTORNEY, OR ACCESS TO AN ATTORNEY OF THEIR CHOICE IS

IMPEDED.

13. THE SUPREME COURT THEORETICALLY STANDS COEQUAL WITH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES, BUT IT DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER LAWS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT. THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOT YET EXERCISED ITS POWER (HELD SINCE 1985) TO REVIEW MINISTERIAL DECREES AND REGULATIONS. IN 1993 CHIEF JUSTICE PURWOTO GANDASUBRATA LAID OUT PROCEDURES FOR LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW. JUDGES ARE CIVIL SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WHICH CONTROLS THEIR ASSIGNMENTS, PAY, AND PROMOTION. THEY ARE SUBJECT TO PRESSURE FROM MILITARY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES THAT OFTEN DETERMINES THE OUTCOME OF A CASE. IT IS OFTEN CHARGED THAT CORRUPTION PERMEATES THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THAT THE PAYMENT OF BRIBES CAN INFLUENCE PROSECUTION, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCING IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES. IN 1996, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE WHO ALLEGED WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION AND COLLUSION WITHIN THE COURT SYSTEM WAS THE SUBJECT OF EFFORTS BY THE SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE TO SECURE HIS DISMISSAL FROM THE COURT. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT ACT ON THIS RECOMMENDATION.

14. SIGNS OF NASCENT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE WERE LESS EVIDENT IN

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3577

PAGE 01 JAKART 07285 03 OF 05 041427Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

------------------6C7B59 041427Z /38

P 041425Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2883
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 007285

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART TWO

1996. THE SUPREME COURT IN JUNE OVERTURNED RULINGS BY THE LOWER COURTS AND MAINTAINED THE BAN ON THE PERIODICAL "TEMPO" AND TWO OTHER PUBLICATIONS. IN 1995 AN ADMINISTRATIVE COURT IN JAKARTA HAD FOUND IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS, EMPLOYEES OF TEMPO, IN THEIR CIVIL SUIT AGAINST THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION FOR REVOKING TEMPO'S PUBLICATION LICENSE IN 1993. THE HIGH COURT UNANIMOUSLY UPHELD THIS DECISION IN NOVEMBER 1995, STATING THAT THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 07285 03 OF 05 041427Z
MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PERMITTING PUBLICATIONS TO BE BANNED WERE IN CONFLICT WITH PRESS FREEDOMS CONTAINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. THE GOVERNMENT APPEALED THE HIGH COURT RULING TO THE SUPREME

COURT, WHICH FOUND IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT. SIMILARLY, A JAKARTA DISTRICT COURT SUPPORTED THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WHEN IT CONVICTED FORMER MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS, IN MAY, OF INSULTING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO DURING AN APRIL 1995 LECTURE IN BERLIN. HE WAS SENTENCE TO TWO YEARS, TEN MONTHS, BUT HAS NOT YET STARTED SERVING HIS SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL.

15. THE ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW, WHICH CARRIES A MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH (NEVER INVOKED IN RECENT YEARS), MAKES IT A CRIME TO ENGAGE IN ACTS THAT COULD DISTORT, UNDERMINE, OR DEVIATE FROM THE STATE IDEOLOGY OR BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, OR WHICH COULD DISSEMINATE FEELINGS OF HOSTILITY OR AROUSE HOSTILITY, DISTURBANCES, OR ANXIETY AMONG THE POPULATION. THE VAGUE LANGUAGE OF THIS LAW MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO PROSECUTE PEOPLE MERELY FOR PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF VIEWS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT.

16. VARIOUS SOURCES ESTIMATE THAT SEVERAL HUNDRED PEOPLE ARE SERVING SENTENCES FOR SUBVERSION, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI), MUSLIM MILITANTS, AND THOSE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN IRIAN JAYA, ACEH, AND EAST TIMOR. IN RESPONSE TO THE JULY 27 VIOLENCE IN JAKARTA, THE GOVERNMENT INDICATED THAT IT WOULD CHARGE ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW. SCORES, AND POSSIBLY HUNDREDS, MORE WERE BELIEVED TO BE SERVING SENTENCES UNDER THE HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. SOME OF THESE PERSONS ADVOCATED OR EMPLOYED VIOLENCE, BUT OTHERS ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO WERE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPTING TO EXERCISE SUCH UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED RIGHTS AS

FREEDOM OF SPEECH OR ASSOCIATION, OR WHO WERE CONVICTED IN CONTROVERSIAL TRIALS. IN 1996, SCORES OF PERSONS WERE DETAINED BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR REFUSING TO SHUT DOWN A "FREE SPEECH FORUM" ORGANIZED BY SUPPORTERS OF OUSTED PDI LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND CONTINUING TO OCCUPY THE PDI HEADQUARTERS. PLAIN CLOTHES POLICE CLANDESTINELY TAPE RECORDED SPEECHES GIVEN AT THE FORUM THAT WERE GENERALLY CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT.

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

17. FOLLOWING THE JULY 27 INCIDENT, THE AUTHORITIES LAUNCHED A

NATIONWIDE MANHUNT FOR DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S PARTY (PRD) MEMBERS AND PROMISED TO CAPTURE THE MASTERMINDS BEHIND IT. THEY INTIMIDATED POLITICAL ACTIVISTS THROUGH A CAMPAIGN OF POLICE QUESTIONING. OUSTED PDI CHAIR MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI WAS REPEATEDLY QUESTIONED AS A WITNESS IN SEVERAL CASES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR AND DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS FACED SIMILAR TREATMENT. THE QUESTIONING SESSIONS BY THE POLICE OR ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE WERE LENGTHY, LASTING A FULL DAY IN SOME CASES. MOST OF THOSE QUESTIONED WERE NOT NAMED AS SUSPECTS, BUT THE GOVERNMENT STATED PUBLICLY THAT WITNESSES COULD BECOME SUSPECTS. FOLLOWING UP ON THIS THREAT, IN LATE SEPTEMBER THE GOVERNMENT CALLED A PDI LEGISLATOR IN FOR QUESTIONING AS A SUSPECT, CLAIMING THAT HE HAD "INSULTED THE PRESIDENT" AT THE "FREE SPEECH FORUM."

18. JUDICIAL WARRANTS FOR SEARCHES ARE REQUIRED EXCEPT FOR CASES INVOLVING SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, SECURITY AGENCIES REGULARLY MADE FORCED OR SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES. AS NOTED EARLIER, AN NGO WHICH ASSISTED MIGRANT WOMEN WORKERS WAS RAIDED BY SECURITY PERSONNEL WHO MIS-IDENTIFIED

THEMSELVES AS POLICE. THE INTRUDERS REPORTEDLY TORTURED ONE STAFF MEMBER AND CONFISCATED DOCUMENTS. THE NGO HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO REGAIN THE CONFISCATED DOCUMENTS BECAUSE THE INTRUDING OFFICIALS NEITHER PRESENTED A WARRANT NOR PROPERLY IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES. SECURITY FORCES ALSO ENGAGED IN SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS AND RESIDENCES AND SELECTIVE MONITORING OF LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS WITHOUT LEGAL RESTRAINT.

19. IN RECENT YEARS THE GOVERNMENT SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED ITS TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM, WHICH MOVES LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE FROM OVERPOPULATED ISLANDS TO MORE ISOLATED AND LESS DEVELOPED ONES. THE PROGRAM HAS BEEN CRITICIZED BY HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS WHO CLAIM THAT IT VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND DUPES SOME TRANSMIGRANTS INTO LEAVING THEIR HOME VILLAGES WITHOUT ANY MEANS OF RETURN. IN 1996, TRANSMIGRANTS AND MIGRANTS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM RECEIVED INDIRECT GOVERNMENT SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND CONTRACTS WITH ABRI OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THIS PRACTICE, PARTICULARLY IN EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, LED TO RESENTMENT AMONG INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS. THE RESULTING COMMUNAL TENSIONS LED TO RIOTING IN BOTH LOCATIONS IN 1996.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ3579

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3579

PAGE 01 JAKART 07285 04 OF 05 041427Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7B5F 041427Z /38

P 041425Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2884
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 007285

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID

SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART TWO

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

20. GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON PRESS FREEDOM CONTINUED, FOLLOWING THE REVOCATION OF THE PUBLISHING LICENSES OF THREE

WELL-KNOWN NEWS MAGAZINES IN 1994. IN JUNE 1996 THE SUPREME COURT UPHELD THE 1994 BAN ON TEMPO MAGAZINE AND OVERTURNED LOWER COURT RULINGS.

21. ALTHOUGH THE 1945 CONSTITUTION AND THE 1982 PRESS LAW PROVIDE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THE ISSUANCE OF PUBLISHING LICENSES UNDER A 1984 MINISTERIAL DECREE IS USED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL THE PRESS. OTHER MEANS OF CONTROL INCLUDE REGULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF ADVERTISING PERMITTED AND OF THE NUMBER OF PAGES ALLOWED IN NEWSPAPERS. IN SENSITIVE AREAS, THE AUTHORITIES CONTINUED TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO LOCAL JOURNALISTS AND EDITORS ON WHAT THEY SHOULD PRINT, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MANY CASES WHERE SUCH GUIDANCE WAS IGNORED.

22. VIGOROUS DEBATE ON A NUMBER OF SENSITIVE TOPICS, SUCH AS CORRUPTION, COLLUSION, THE ROLE OF THE FIRST FAMILY IN BUSINESS, AND LACK OF GOVERNMENT FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, CONTINUED DURING 1996, PARTICULARLY IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE PRESS. MAJOR INDONESIAN LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS WERE MORE CAUTIOUS IN COVERING CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS.

23. PUBLIC DIALOGUE WAS MORE FREE THAN IN RECENT YEARS. HOWEVER, THE VIOLENT EXPULSION OF MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI SUPPORTERS FROM THE PDI HEADQUARTERS IN JAKARTA ON JULY 27 EFFECTIVELY SHUT DOWN THE "FREE SPEECH FORUM" THAT HAD BEEN HELD AT THE HEADQUARTERS FOR SEVERAL WEEKS.

24. A JOURNALIST IN YOGYAKARTA WAS ATTACKED IN HIS HOME BY UNIDENTIFIED INTRUDERS IN AUGUST, POSSIBLY IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLES HE HAD WRITTEN THAT WERE CRITICAL OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

OFFICIALS OVER LAND CASES. HE DIED SEVERAL DAYS LATER AS A

RESULT OF THE INJURIES SUSTAINED DURING THE ATTACK. THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE CASE WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE HANDS OF THE LOCAL POLICE SEVERAL WEEKS AFTER THE INCIDENT.

25. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE SEVERAL CASES OF VIOLENT ATTACKS ON, AND INTIMIDATION OF, THE NEWS MEDIA DURING AND AFTER THE PDI RELATED DISTURBANCES IN JAKARTA. DURING A JUNE 20 CLASH BETWEEN PDI DEMONSTRATORS AND SECURITY FORCES, AN EMPLOYEE OF A FOREIGN NEWS ORGANIZATION WAS HIT BY SECURITY PERSONNEL, AND THERE WERE REPORTS THAT OTHER FOREIGN AND LOCAL NEWS PERSONNEL SUFFERED INJURIES THAT DAY AS WELL. DURING THE JULY 27 INCIDENT, AT LEAST THREE FOREIGN JOURNALISTS HAD MINOR INJURIES INFLICTED BY THE POLICE. AT LEAST TWO LOCAL JOURNALISTS SUFFERED POLICE BEATINGS THAT REQUIRED HOSPITALIZATION. TWO JOURNALISTS IN SURABAYA WERE REPORTEDLY DETAINED DURING A PROTEST AGAINST THE TAKEOVER OF PDI HEADQUARTERS. ALTHOUGH THEY IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS JOURNALISTS, THEY WERE BEATEN WHILE IN CUSTODY. A GROUP OF WESTERN JOURNALISTS WAS THREATENED WITH A DRAWN PISTOL BY A POLICE OFFICER WHILE WITNESSING THE VIOLENT BREAK UP OF A PDI DEMONSTRATION BY SECURITY FORCES ON JULY 28.

26. THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA REMAINED MORE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR COVERAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT THAN THE PRINT MEDIA. THE GOVERNMENT OPERATES A NATIONWIDE TELEVISION NETWORK WITH 12 REGIONAL STATIONS. PRIVATE COMMERCIAL TELEVISION COMPANIES, MANY WITH OWNERSHIP BY OR MANAGEMENT TIES TO THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY, CONTINUED TO EXPAND. ALL WERE REQUIRED TO BROADCAST GOVERNMENT-PRODUCED NEWS, BUT MANY ALSO PRODUCED PUBLIC AFFAIRS STYLE PROGRAMMING WITH NEWS CONTENT.

27. OVER 600 PRIVATE RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANIES EXIST IN

ADDITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK. THEY ALL WERE REQUIRED TO BELONG TO THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS (PRSSNI) TO RECEIVE A BROADCASTING LICENSE. THE GOVERNMENT RADIO STATION PRODUCES "NATIONAL NEWS" THAT IS THE ONLY NEWS PERMITTED BY LAW TO BE BROADCAST IN INDONESIA. IT IS RELAYED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BY PRIVATE STATIONS AND 49 REGIONAL AFFILIATES OF THE GOVERNMENT STATION. BY LAW, THE PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS MAY PRODUCE ONLY "LIGHT" NEWS, SUCH AS HUMAN INTEREST STORIES, AND MAY NOT DISCUSS POLITICS. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, MANY BROADCAST INTERVIEWS AND FOREIGN NEWS AS WELL.

28. FOREIGN TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS WERE READILY ACCESSIBLE. SATELLITE DISHES HAVE PROLIFERATED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, AND THERE WAS ACCESS TO THE INTERNET. THE GOVERNMENT MADE NO EFFORT TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO THIS PROGRAMMING, AND HAS PROCLAIMED AN "OPEN SKIES" POLICY. SOME SIGNALS HAVE BEEN SCRAMBLED BY BROADCASTERS FOR COMMERCIAL REASONS.

29. THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY REGULATED ACCESS TO INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY TO CERTAIN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, BY VISITING AND

NNNNPTQ3580

PAGE 01 JAKART 07285 05 OF 05 041427Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7B60 041427Z /38

P 041425Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2885
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 007285

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART TWO

RESIDENT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS. IT OCCASIONALLY REMINDED THE LATTER OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DENY REQUESTS FOR VISA EXTENSIONS. NUMEROUS FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WERE STILL IN JAKARTA ON JULY 27 FOLLOWING THE ASEAN MEETINGS THE WEEK BEFORE, AND WERE ABLE TO COVER THE EVENTS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCE. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES A PERMIT FOR THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AND VIDEO TAPES, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED BY GOVERNMENT CENSORS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 07285 05 OF 05 041427Z
IMPORTERS SOMETIMES AVOIDED FOREIGN MATERIALS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OR DEALING WITH TOPICS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS WERE WIDELY AVAILABLE.

30. SPECIAL PERMISSION IS NECESSARY FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TO TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAYA. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOME AUSTRALIAN JOURNALISTS ACCOMPANYING A DIPLOMATIC

DELEGATION IN APRIL, PRESS ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR WAS RESTRICTED. A NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS REPEATEDLY REQUESTED PERMISSION TO GO TO EAST TIMOR WITHOUT SUCCESS. WHILE THE LAW PROVIDES FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM, CONSTRAINTS EXISTED ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SCHOLARS. POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DISCUSSIONS AT UNIVERSITIES, WHILE NO LONGER FORMALLY BANNED, REMAINED CONSTRAINED.

31. SOME SCHOLARS DISPLAYED CAUTION IN PRODUCING OR INCLUDING IN LECTURES AND CLASS DISCUSSIONS MATERIALS THAT MIGHT PROVOKE GOVERNMENT DISPLEASURE. PUBLISHERS ALSO SOMETIMES REFUSED TO ACCEPT MANUSCRIPTS DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. MOST OF PRAMOEDYA ANANTA TOER'S BOOKS ARE BANNED IN INDONESIA. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE REPORTED PUBLICLY THAT TWO PUBLICATIONS WERE BANNED IN 1996.

ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6278

PAGE 01 JAKART 07287 01 OF 04 062313Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6CFDC2 062313Z /38

P 041443Z OCT 96 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2890
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 007287

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART FOUR

1. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

2. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EXPLICITLY FORBID DISCRIMINATION BASED ON GENDER, RACE, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200504418

HOWEVER, THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATES EQUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL INDONESIAN CITIZENS, BOTH NATIVE AND NATURALIZED. CHAPTER 4 OF THE 1993 GUIDELINES OF STATE POLICY (LEGAL STATUTES ADOPTED BY THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY) EXPLICITLY STATES THAT WOMEN HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN. HOWEVER, MARRIAGE LAW DICTATES THAT MEN ARE THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY.

3. ARTICLE 29 OF THE CONSTITUTION GRANTS INDONESIANS THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE THEIR INDIVIDUAL RELIGION AND BELIEFS.

WOMEN

4. ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, WOMEN ARE EQUAL TO AND HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN. HOWEVER, IN PRACTICE WOMEN FACE SOME LEGAL DISCRIMINATION. ALTHOUGH INDONESIA RATIFIED THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN 1984, THERE ARE NO LEGAL SANCTIONS AGAINST VIOLATORS. CURRENTLY, WOMEN MAKE UP ABOUT 12 PERCENT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. DURING THE 1996 SELECTION PROCESS OF CANDIDATES FOR PARLIAMENT, DISCUSSION OF THE UNDER-REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN HAS ARISEN. THE MINISTER OF WOMEN'S ROLES COMPLAINED PUBLICLY THAT GOLKAR WAS NOMINATING FEWER WOMEN THAN HAD BEEN PROMISED.

5. MARRIAGE LAW, BASED ON ISLAMIC LAW, STILL ALLOWS FOR MEN TO HAVE UP TO FOUR WIVES IF THE FIRST WIFE IS UNABLE "TO FULFILL HER TASKS AS A WIFE." PERMISSION OF THE FIRST WIFE IS REQUIRED, BUT REPORTEDLY MOST WOMEN CANNOT REFUSE THEIR HUSBAND. A CIVIL SERVANT WHO WISHES TO MARRY A SECOND WOMAN MUST HAVE THE CONSENT OF HIS FIRST WIFE AND HIS SUPERVISOR. TO SET AN EXAMPLE, THE

PRESIDENT HAS FORBIDDEN CABINET OFFICIALS AND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS FROM HAVING SECOND WIVES. IN DIVORCE CASES WOMEN OFTEN BEAR A HEAVIER EVIDENTIARY BURDEN THAN MEN, ESPECIALLY IN THE ISLAMIC-BASED FAMILY COURT SYSTEM. ALIMONY IS RARELY RECEIVED BY DIVORCED WOMEN, AND THERE IS NO ENFORCEMENT OF ALIMONY PAYMENT. BY LAW, A WOMAN CANNOT PASS INDONESIAN CITIZENSHIP TO HER CHILD, BORN INSIDE OR OUTSIDE INDONESIA, IF THE FATHER OF THE CHILD IS NOT AN INDONESIAN CITIZEN. THE CHILD MUST OBTAIN RESIDENCY VISAS

TO REMAIN IN INDONESIA, AND CAN ONLY APPLY FOR CITIZENSHIP WHEN HE OR SHE REACHES THE AGE OF 18. DURING 1996, MUCH MEDIA ATTENTION WAS PAID TO A CASE IN WHICH THE COURT ORDERED THE DEPORTATION OF A FOUR YEAR OLD CHILD OF AN INDONESIAN WOMAN AND NON-INDONESIAN MAN.

6. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REMAINS POORLY DOCUMENTED. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SOCIETY, WHICH SOME SAY HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY SOCIAL CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY RAPID URBANIZATION. LONGSTANDING TRADITIONAL BELIEFS THAT THE HUSBAND MAY "TEACH" OR "CONTROL" THE WIFE THROUGH SEVERAL MEANS, INCLUDING VIOLENCE, ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROBLEM. RAPE BY A HUSBAND OF A WIFE IS NOT A CRIME IN INDONESIA, ALTHOUGH WOMEN'S GROUPS ARE TRYING TO CHANGE THIS LAW. WHILE POLICE COULD BRING ASSAULT CHARGES AGAINST A HUSBAND FOR BEATING HIS WIFE, DUE TO SOCIAL ATTITUDES THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO DO SO. CULTURAL NORMS DICTATE THAT PROBLEMS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE PRIVATE PROBLEMS, THUS VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE HOME IS RARELY REPORTED. THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES SOME COUNSELING, AND SEVERAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS EXIST TO ASSIST WOMEN. MANY OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS FOCUS MAINLY ON REUNITING THE FAMILY RATHER THAN ON PROVIDING PROTECTION TO THE WOMEN INVOLVED. MANY WOMEN RELY ON EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEMS FOR ASSISTANCE IN

CASES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. IN 1995, THE FIRST DROP-IN CENTER FOR BATTERED WOMEN WAS FOUNDED IN JAKARTA BY AN NGO. ANOTHER DROP-IN CENTER WAS FOUNDED IN JAKARTA BY THE NATIONAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION (KOWANI). THERE IS ONE CRISES CENTER FOR WOMEN IN YOGYAKARTA. THERE ARE PLANS FOR TRAINING VOLUNTEER COUNSELORS TO WORK AT A WOMEN'S CRISIS CENTER/SHELTER, WHICH WILL ALSO HAVE A HOT-LINE, THAT WILL OPEN AS SOON AS FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE.

7. RAPE IS A PUNISHABLE OFFENSE IN INDONESIA. MEN HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND SENTENCED FOR RAPE AND ATTEMPTED RAPE ALTHOUGH RELIABLE STATISTICS ARE UNAVAILABLE. MOB VIOLENCE AGAINST ACCUSED RAPISTS IS FREQUENTLY REPORTED. WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS BELIEVE RAPE IS GROSSLY UNDERREPORTED OWING TO THE SOCIAL STIGMA ATTACHED TO THE VICTIM. SOME LEGAL EXPERTS STATE THAT IF A WOMAN DOES NOT GO IMMEDIATELY TO THE HOSPITAL FOR A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION WHICH PRODUCES PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF RAPE, SHE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BRING CHARGES. A WITNESS IS ALSO REQUIRED IN

ORDER TO BRING CHARGES, AND ONLY IN RARE CASES IS THERE A WITNESS. SOME WOMEN REPORTEDLY FAIL TO REPORT RAPE TO POLICE, BECAUSE THE POLICE DO NOT TAKE THEIR ALLEGATIONS SERIOUSLY. THERE IS NO SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, ONLY AN INDECENT BEHAVIOR LAW.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ3654

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3654

PAGE 01 JAKART 07287 02 OF 04 041445Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7D78 041445Z /38

P 041443Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2891
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 007287

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART FOUR

SEXUAL HARASSMENT CHARGES, HOWEVER, CAN DAMAGE A CIVIL SERVICE CAREER. THE CURRENT LAW REPORTEDLY COVERS PHYSICAL ABUSE ONLY, AND REQUIRES TWO WITNESSES.

8. ALTHOUGH SOME WOMEN ENJOY A HIGH DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FREEDOM AND OCCUPY IMPORTANT MIDLEVEL POSITIONS IN BOTH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, THE MAJORITY OF WOMEN DO NOT

EXPERIENCE SUCH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOMS AND ARE OFTEN DISPROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTED AT THE LOWER END OF THE SCALE. ALTHOUGH WOMEN CONSTITUTE ONE-QUARTER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, THEY OCCUPY ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THE SERVICE'S TOP POSTS. INCOME DISPARITY BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN DIMINISHES SIGNIFICANTLY WITH GREATER EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT.

9. WOMEN WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING GENERALLY RECEIVE LOWER WAGES THAN MEN. MANY WOMEN FACTORY WORKERS ARE HIRED AS DAY LABORERS INSTEAD OF AS FULL-TIME PERMANENT EMPLOYEES, AND COMPANIES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE BENEFITS, SUCH AS MATERNITY LEAVE, TO DAY LABORERS. WOMEN ACTIVISTS REPORT THAT A GROWING TREND IN MANUFACTURING IS THE HIRING OF WOMEN TO DO WORK IN THEIR HOMES FOR LESS THAN MINIMUM WAGE. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR WOMEN ARE APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT HIGHER THAN FOR MEN. WOMEN ARE OFTEN NOT GIVEN THE EXTRA BENEFITS AND SALARY THAT MEN RECEIVE THAT IS THEIR DUE WHEN THEY ARE THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, AND IN SOME CASES DO NOT RECEIVE EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR THEIR HUSBAND AND CHILDREN, SUCH AS MEDICAL INSURANCE AND INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS.

10. DESPITE LAWS GUARANTEEING WOMEN A 3-MONTH MATERNITY LEAVE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONCEDED THAT PREGNANT WOMEN ARE OFTEN DISMISSED OR ARE REPLACED WHILE ON LEAVE. SOME COMPANIES REQUIRE THAT WOMEN SIGN STATEMENTS THAT THEY WILL NOT BECOME PREGNANT. INDONESIA'S EMPLOYMENT LAW MANDATES TWO DAYS OF MENSTRUAL LEAVE PER MONTH FOR WOMEN. COMPANIES EMPLOYING WOMEN AS DAY LABORERS

ARE NOT OBLIGATED TO PROVIDE BENEFITS. WOMEN JOB APPLICANTS AND WORKERS HAVE COMPLAINED OF BEING SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED BY FOREMEN AND FACTORY OWNERS.

11. WOMEN DISPROPORTIONATELY EXPERIENCE ILLITERACY, POOR HEALTH,

AND INADEQUATE NUTRITION. IN 1996, THE PRESIDENT CALLED FOR EXPANDED EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE MATERNAL MORTALITY RATE, WHICH IS HIGHER THAN ALL OTHER ASEAN COUNTRIES AT 425 PER 100,000 DELIVERIES. THE GOVERNMENT, WITH THE HELP OF INTERNATIONAL DONORS, IS LAUNCHING A MAJOR EFFORT IN DECEMBER TO REDUCE THE MATERNAL MORTALITY RATE. WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS HAVE IMPROVED IN THE LAST DECADE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NUMBER OF GIRLS GRADUATING FROM HIGH SCHOOL TRIPLED FROM 1980 TO 1990. A NUMBER OF VOLUNTARY PRIVATE GROUPS WORK ACTIVELY TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CLAIM SOME SUCCESS IN GAINING OFFICIAL COGNIZANCE OF WOMEN'S CONCERNS.

12. WOMEN'S NGO'S HAVE FELT PRESSURE FROM INCREASED GOVERNMENT SCRUTINY OF ALL NGO'S IN THE WAKE OF THE JULY 27 VIOLENCE IN JAKARTA. ONE NGO OFFICE ASSISTING INDONESIAN MIGRANT WORKERS WAS RAIDED IN SEPTEMBER. THREE STAFF MEMBERS WERE INTERROGATED, ONE MALE STAFF MEMBER ALLEGEDLY WITH TORTURE, AND THE GROUP'S WORKING DOCUMENTS WERE SEIZED.

CHILDREN

13. THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND WELFARE, BUT IS HAMPERED BY A LACK OF RESOURCES TO TRANSLATE THIS COMMITMENT INTO PRACTICE. A 1979 LAW ON CHILDREN'S WELFARE DEFINES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE AND PARENTS TO NURTURE AND PROTECT CHILDREN. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN DEVELOPED, AND THE LAW'S PROVISIONS HAVE YET TO GO INTO EFFECT. INDONESIA RATIFIED THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD IN 1990, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT NOTED THAT OBLIGATIONS THAT WENT BEYOND INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED.

14. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE PARTICULAR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PRIMARY EDUCATION, MATERNITY SERVICES, AND FAMILY PLANNING. THOUGH PRIMARY EDUCATION IS IN PRINCIPAL UNIVERSAL, THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF) ESTIMATES THAT MORE THAN 1 MILLION CHILDREN DROP OUT OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EVERY YEAR DUE MAINLY TO THE COST OF SUPPLIES, UNIFORMS AND OTHER EXPENSES, IN ADDITION TO THE PROFESSED NEED FOR THE CHILDREN TO SUPPLEMENT FAMILY INCOME. GOVERNMENT FIGURES PUT THE NUMBER OF WORKING CHILDREN AGED 10 TO 14 AT 8 OUT OF EVERY 100, 4 OF WHOM GO TO SCHOOL AND ALSO WORK AND 4 OF WHOM WORK EXCLUSIVELY. UNOFFICIAL ESTIMATES ARE HIGHER.

15. THOUSANDS OF STREET CHILDREN LIVING IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES SELL NEWSPAPERS, SHINE SHOES, HELP TO PARK OR WATCH CARS, AND OTHERWISE EARN MONEY. MANY THOUSANDS MORE WORK IN FACTORIES AND FIELDS (SEE ALSO SECTION 6.D.). IN SEVERAL PROVINCES, CHILDREN WORK AND LIVE ON FLOATING FISHING PLATFORMS IN POOR CONDITIONS FOR LOW WAGES. NGO'S CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO HELP STREET CHILDREN AND WORKING CHILDREN AS INADEQUATE. THERE IS REPORTEDLY GROWING GOVERNMENT CONCERN ABOUT STREET CHILDREN,

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3655

PAGE 01 JAKART 07287 03 OF 04 041445Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7D7C 041445Z /38

P 041443Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2892
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 007287

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART FOUR

BECAUSE IN MANY CITIES THEY HAVE BECOME WELL-ORGANIZED AND ARE BECOMING AWARE OF THEIR RIGHTS.

16. NGO'S WORKING FOR RIGHTS OF CHILDREN EXPERIENCED INCREASED HARASSMENT BY THE AUTHORITIES IN 1996. SEVERAL GROUPS HAVE REPORTED THAT IT HAD BECOME MORE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN THE REQUIRED GOVERNMENT PERMISSION FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES. THE EXHIBITION AND

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 07287 03 OF 04 041445Z
SEMINAR ABOUT STREET CHILDREN AND VIOLENCE PLANNED FOR SEPTEMBER IN MEDAN WAS CANCELED BY THE AUTHORITIES THE DAY BEFORE IT WAS TO OPEN. VISITING STREET CHILDREN FROM JAVA WERE PUT IN SEVERAL

BUSES AND ESCORTED TO SOUTHERN SUMATRA BY THE MILITARY.

17. CHILD PROSTITUTION AND OTHER SEXUAL ABUSES OCCUR, BUT DATA ON THEIR INCIDENCE ARE LACKING. WHILE THERE ARE LAWS DESIGNED TO PROTECT CHILDREN FROM INDECENT ACTIVITIES, PROSTITUTION, AND INCEST, THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS. IN 1996, GREATER ATTENTION WAS PAID TO THE PROBLEM OF CHILD PROSTITUTION IN THE PRESS, WHICH MAY HAVE RESULTED IN INCREASING AWARENESS OF A PROBLEM THAT IS POORLY DOCUMENTED IN INDONESIA.

18. A SEPARATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR JUVENILES DOES NOT EXIST. POLICE OFFICIALS ADMIT THAT JUVENILES ARE OFTEN IMPRISONED WITH ADULT OFFENDERS. CURRENTLY JUVENILE CRIME IS HANDLED BY ORDINARY COURTS. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS DRAFTED A JUVENILE JUSTICE BILL TO ESTABLISH A SPECIAL COURT SYSTEM AND CRIMINAL CODE FOR JUVENILES. IT COVERS JUVENILE CRIME AS WELL AS CIVIL CASES CONCERNING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, NEGLECT, CHILD CUSTODY, AND ADOPTION. IN MARCH, THE DRAFT BILL WAS SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. THE BILL IS CONTROVERSIAL BECAUSE ASPECTS OF IT, SPECIFICALLY DEALING WITH ADOPTION, ARE NOT IN LINE WITH ISLAMIC LAW AND DOCTRINE. EFFORTS TO PASS SUCH A BILL HAVE BEEN POSTPONED, AND WILL BE TAKEN UP AGAIN AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

19. A FORM OF FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FMG) OCCURS IN SOME PARTS OF INDONESIA. THERE ARE NO STATISTICS AVAILABLE, THE ONLY INFORMATION BEING ANECDOTAL. USUALLY A SMALL SECTION OF THE TIP

OF THE CLITORIS IS CUT OR A SMALL INCISION IS MADE WITH THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING A FEW DROPS OF BLOOD. TOTAL REMOVAL OF THE CLITORIS IS NOT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PRACTICE, ALTHOUGH IT DOES OCCUR IF INEPTLY PERFORMED. IN JAVA, IT USUALLY TAKES PLACES WITHIN THE FIRST YEAR AFTER BIRTH AND IS PERFORMED EITHER AT A HOSPITAL OR BY A LOCAL TRADITIONAL PRACTITIONER OR "DUKUN," ESPECIALLY IN RURAL AREAS.

PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

20. NO NATIONAL LAW SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSES THE PROBLEMS OR STATUS OF THE DISABLED, NOR DO THEY RECEIVE SPECIAL PROGRAMS OR

ATTENTION. HOWEVER, THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE HAS DRAFTED REGULATIONS ON TREATMENT OF THE DISABLED, PARTLY BASED ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT. IN 1996, THE DRAFT BILL WAS SUBMITTED TO PARLIAMENT AND BY SEPTEMBER HAD REACHED STAGE 2 IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, DISCUSSION AT THE COMMISSION LEVEL. STAGE 3 WOULD BE A FULL VOTE, AND STAGE 4 APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION. THERE IS A SMALL CHANCE THAT THE BILL WILL BE PASSED BY THE END OF 1996, BUT WILL PROBABLY TAKE LONGER. THE NEW DRAFT LAW INCLUDES REQUIREMENTS FOR INSTALLING FACILITIES FOR THE DISABLED IN PUBLIC PLACES SUCH AS AIRPORTS, HOSPITALS AND PUBLIC TOILETS. IN ADDITION, IT COVERS AREAS SUCH AS EXPANDING EDUCATIONAL AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE DISABLED.

21. VIRTUALLY NO PUBLIC BUILDINGS OR PUBLIC MEANS OF TRANSPORT ARE DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY FOR ACCESS BY THE DISABLED. THEY FACE CONSIDERABLE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, THOUGH THERE ARE A FEW FACTORIES THAT HAVE MADE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO HIRE DISABLED WORKERS. IN SEVERAL PROVINCES, THERE ARE "REHABILITATION CENTERS" FOR THE DISABLED. DISABLED PEOPLE ARE REPORTEDLY TAKEN

OFF THE STREETS BY THE AUTHORITIES AND BROUGHT TO THESE CENTERS FOR JOB TRAINING.

22. THE CONSTITUTION INCLUDES THE RIGHT OF EVERY CITIZEN TO OBTAIN AN EDUCATION. IN 1989 THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED REGULATIONS COVERING EDUCATION FOR THE MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED. HOWEVER, THE REGULATIONS DO NOT GRANT A RIGHT TO PUBLIC EDUCATION FOR DISABLED CHILDREN. WHILE THERE ARE SOME PUBLIC SCHOOLS FOR THE DISABLED, THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS THE CONCEPT THAT EDUCATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE COMMUNITY IN THE FORM OF NGO-RUN PRIVATE SCHOOLS THAT MAY RECEIVE SOME PUBLIC FUNDS. THERE IS REPORTEDLY A SHORTAGE, ESPECIALLY OUTSIDE JAVA, OF QUALIFIED TEACHERS TO HANDLE SPECIAL NEEDS OF THE DISABLED.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

23. THE GOVERNMENT STATES PUBLICLY THAT IT RECOGNIZES THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL INDIGENOUS POPULATION GROUPS, AND THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE. CRITICS MAINTAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH IS BASICALLY PATERNALISTIC AND DESIGNED MORE TO INTEGRATE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ3658

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3658

PAGE 01 JAKART 07287 04 OF 04 041445Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7D7F 041445Z /38

P 041443Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2893
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 007287

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID

SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART FOUR

MORE CLOSELY INTO INDONESIAN SOCIETY THAN TO PROTECT THEIR TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS CRITICIZE THE GOVERNMENT'S TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM FOR VIOLATING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE (SEE SECTION I.F.).

24. A MAJORITY OF THE CASES BROUGHT TO LEGAL AID ORGANIZATIONS THROUGHOUT INDONESIA CONCERN COMPLAINTS ABOUT LAND SEIZURE.

ACCORDING TO AN INDONESIAN LAW DERIVED FROM DUTCH PRACTICES, ALL SUB-SURFACE MINERAL RESOURCES BELONG TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. THIS LAW SOMETIMES SERVES AS JUSTIFICATION FOR EVICTION OF INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, WHO REPORTEDLY ARE POORLY COMPENSATED BY THE GOVERNMENT AFTER BEING FORCED TO MOVE.

25. WHERE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE CLASH WITH DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, THE DEVELOPERS ALMOST ALWAYS WIN. TENSIONS WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN IRIAN JAYA, INCLUDING IN THE VICINITY OF THE FREEPORT MCMORAN MINING CONCESSION AREA NEAR TIMIKA, CONTINUED IN 1996. AS A RESULT OF THE DEATHS OF CIVILIANS AND OTHER VIOLENT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BROUGHT TO LIGHT IN 1995, FOUR SOLDIERS RECEIVED PRISON TERMS IN FEBRUARY 1996. (SEE SECTION 1A) IRIANESE RIOTED IN THE TIMIKA-TEMBAGAPURA AREA AND IN JAYAPURA IN MARCH. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE PRACTICES OF SOME LOGGING COMPANIES WHICH RECRUIT INDIGENOUS PEOPLE FOR WORK. ACCORDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, THIS ACTIVITY IN IRIAN JAYA HAS SEPARATED THESE PEOPLE FROM THEIR TRADITIONAL ECONOMIES. MOST CIVIL SERVANTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN IRIAN JAYA AND OTHER ISOLATED AREAS CONTINUE TO COME PRIMARILY FROM JAVA, RATHER THAN FROM THE LOCAL INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

NATIONAL/RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

26. INDONESIANS EXHIBIT CONSIDERABLE RACIAL AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE, WITH THE IMPORTANT EXCEPTION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC CHINESE, WHO COMPRISE ABOUT 3 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. SINCE 1959 NONCITIZEN ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO RUN BUSINESSES IN RURAL INDONESIA. REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF ALL CHINESE SCHOOLS FOR ETHNIC CHINESE, FORMATION OF

PUBLIC DISPLAY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS. SINCE AUGUST 1994, FIRMS WORKING IN THE TOURIST INDUSTRY ARE ALLOWED TO PRODUCE CHINESE-LANGUAGE BROCHURES, PROGRAMS, AND SIMILAR MATERIAL FOR CHINESE-SPEAKING TOURISTS. HOWEVER, CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE GOVERNMENT-OWNED DAILY NEWSPAPER, MAY NEITHER BE IMPORTED NOR PRODUCED DOMESTICALLY.

27. PRIVATE INSTRUCTION IN CHINESE IS GENERALLY PROHIBITED BUT TAKES PLACE TO A LIMITED EXTENT, AND SINCE 1994 HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO TRAIN EMPLOYEES IN THE TOURISM INDUSTRY IN FUNCTIONAL MANDARIN. THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA HAS CHINESE LANGUAGE COURSES. STATE UNIVERSITIES HAVE NO FORMAL QUOTAS THAT LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ETHNIC CHINESE. THE LAW FORBIDS THE CELEBRATION OF THE CHINESE NEW YEAR IN TEMPLES OR PUBLIC PLACES, BUT ITS ENFORCEMENT WAS LIMITED IN 1995. CHINESE NEW YEAR DECORATIONS WERE DISPLAYED IN PUBLIC SHOPPING AREAS IN MAJOR CITIES.

28. EAST TIMORESE AND VARIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS CHARGE THAT THE EAST TIMORESE ARE UNDERREPRESENTED IN THE CIVIL SERVICE IN EAST TIMOR. IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM OR DENY THE CHARGES AS THERE APPEARS TO BE NO REGISTRY OF THE BIRTHPLACE OF CIVIL SERVANTS, WHO CAN BE TRANSFERRED ANYWHERE. EAST TIMORESE HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERNS THAT THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM (SEE SECTION L.F.) COULD LEAD TO FEWER EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND MIGHT EVENTUALLY DESTROY EAST TIMOR'S CULTURAL IDENTITY. HOWEVER, TRANSMIGRATION PROJECTS IN TIMOR HAVE BEEN REDUCED IN RECENT YEARS AND ARE LIMITED TO HINDUS AND CHRISTIANS TO AVOID ETHNIC FRICTION. IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, INFORMAL PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM MIGRATION TO THE PROVINCE HAS SPARKED SOCIOECONOMIC TENSION IN URBAN AREAS, PROVING AN EVEN GREATER CONCERN THAN THE FORMALLY SPONSORED TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3569

PAGE 01 JAKART 07284 01 OF 04 041424Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7B0B 041424Z /38

P 041423Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2877
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 007284

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART ONE

1. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE 1996 COUNTRY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA.

3. IN 1996 THE UNDERLYING CONDITIONS LEADING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN INDONESIA REMAINED, BUT THERE WERE COUNTERBALANCING

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200504418

DEVELOPMENTS. RISING PRESSURES FOR CHANGE TRIGGERED GOVERNMENT ACTIONS TO CURB POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND OPPONENTS THAT INFRINGED ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. THE AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNING SYSTEM MAINTAINED ITS TIGHT GRIP ON THE POLITICAL PROCESS, WHICH DENIES THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE THE ABILITY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT DEMOCRATICALLY. IN OTHER AREAS, SUCH AS INCREASED POLICE AND ARMY ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ABUSES, THE DECLINE IN EXTRA LEGAL EXECUTIONS, ACCESS TO PRISONERS, THE VARIETY OF INFORMATION SOURCES, AND TOLERANCE OF PUBLIC CRITICISM, THERE WERE ENCOURAGING SIGNS ALONG WITH SUBSTANTIAL GROUNDS FOR CONTINUING CONCERN.

4. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO BE DOMINATED BY AN ELITE COMPRISING THE PRESIDENT AND CLOSE ASSOCIATES. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES ALLEGIANCE TO A STATE IDEOLOGY KNOWN AS "PANCASILA." THIS IDEOLOGY, WHICH STRESSES CONSULTATION AND CONSENSUS, HAS BEEN USED TO LIMIT DISSENT AND TO ENFORCE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL COHESION, REFLECTING INDONESIAN AWARENESS THAT THE COUNTRY'S UNITY RESTS ON SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT OF ITS ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY.

5. PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS STIMULATED PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS TO FORM AN INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE, A MOVE THAT MET A MIXED GOVERNMENT RESPONSE. SEPARATELY, THE GOVERNMENT CRUDELY ENGINEERED THE REMOVAL OF AN OPPOSITION PARTY LEADER AND THE FORCIBLE TAKE OVER OF THE PARTY HEADQUARTERS. THE SUBSEQUENT RIOTING IN JAKARTA, THE WORST IN DECADES, RESULTED IN A HANDFUL OF DEATHS AND SCORES OF INJURED. THE GOVERNMENT, INVOKING LIMITED USE OF THE CONTROVERSIAL ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW, RESPONDED WITH A WAVE OF ARRESTS AND INTERROGATIONS AIMED AT REINING IN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

AND POLITICAL ACTIVISTS. THE ICRC AND THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WERE ABLE TO VISIT THOSE DETAINED AFTER THE RIOT.

6. IN 1996 USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS, ILLEGAL ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS, KILLINGS OF UNARMED CIVILIANS, AND ACCUSATIONS OF MISTREATMENT AND TORTURE OF DETAINEES PERSISTED. A PROMINENT CORRUPTION CASE FOCUSED ATTENTION ON THE NEED FOR REFORM OF INDONESIA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM, WHICH LACKS INDEPENDENCE

AND HAS A REPUTATION FOR VENALITY. REVERSING LOWER COURT DECISIONS, THE SUPREME COURT UPHELD THE LEGALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S CLOSURE OF THREE MAGAZINES IN 1994. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GOVERNMENT GAVE BROAD LATITUDE TO THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WHICH VIGOROUSLY UNDERTOOK INVESTIGATIONS AND PUBLICIZED ITS FRANK FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. IN SOME BUT NOT ALL CASES, THE GOVERNMENT ACTED ON THESE FINDINGS.

7. DESPITE A DROP IN THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE OR RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS IN KEY GOVERNMENT POSITIONS, THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES RETAINED SUBSTANTIAL NON-MILITARY POWER UNDER A "DUAL FUNCTION" CONCEPT THAT ACCORDS IT A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ROLE IN DEVELOPING THE NATION. THE NUMBER OF APPOINTED MILITARY POSITIONS IN THE 500 MEMBER PARLIAMENT WILL DROP TO 75 IN 1997. IN REGIONAL TERMS, THE SIZE AND BUDGET OF THE INDONESIAN MILITARY IS SMALL. ITS PRIMARY MISSION IS MAINTAINING INTERNAL UNITY AND STABILITY.

8. SECURITY FORCES DISPLAYED IMPROVED DISCIPLINE IN RESPONDING TO UNREST IN IRIAN JAYA, WHERE NEWLY ISSUED HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDELINES WERE IN EFFECT, BUT BRUTALITY IN HANDLING UNRULY DEMONSTRATIONS IN PONTIANAK AND UJUNG PANDANG RESULTED IN CIVILIAN DEATHS. HIGHER AUTHORITIES PUNISHED INCREASED NUMBERS

OF POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL, INCLUDING OFFICERS, FOR INFRACTIONS OF THE LAW OR INDISCIPLINE. IN THE JULY RIOTING IN JAKARTA, THE POLICE BEAT BUT DID NOT FIRE ON DEMONSTRATORS AND ONLOOKERS.

9. INDONESIA CONTINUED TO BOAST A VIGOROUS AND RAPIDLY GROWING ECONOMY. THE WORLD BANK ESTIMATED IN 1996 THAT THE DISPERSION OF THE BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA RANKED AMONG THE BEST IN ASIA. OTHER SURVEYS HIGHLIGHTED THE EXTENT OF CORRUPTION. PRESSURES FOR CHANGE AND SPORADIC UNREST LED TO STRONGER DEMANDS THAT THE GOVERNMENT ACT MORE EFFECTIVELY TO ADDRESS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INEQUITIES. IN RURAL AREAS, DISCONTENT OFTEN FOCUSED ON THE GRIEVANCES OF SMALL LAND OWNERS. THE ECONOMIC BOOM HAS RELIED HEAVILY ON EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, OFTEN WITH INADEQUATE REGARD FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES.

10. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO EXERCISE INDIRECT CONTROL OVER AND INTIMIDATION OF THE PRESS. CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS TOLERATED, BUT DIRECT CENSURE OF THE PRESIDENT OR SENIOR OFFICIALS RISKED HARASSMENT OR ARREST. IN SOME CASES, THOSE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ3570

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3570

PAGE 01 JAKART 07284 02 OF 04 041424Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7B0F 041425Z /38

P 041423Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2878
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 007284

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART ONE

TARGETED BY INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM OR CRITICAL REPORTING RESPONDED WITH INTIMIDATION, BEATINGS AND EVEN MURDER OF JOURNALISTS. NEVERTHELESS, OBSERVERS CONSIDERED THE MEDIA MORE OPEN AND OUTSPOKEN THAN IN RECENT YEARS.

11. THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINED ITS OPPOSITION TO ALTERNATIVES TO THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED LABOR MOVEMENT. MEMBERS OF THE

PRINCIPAL UNAUTHORIZED LABOR ORGANIZATION CITED INSTANCES OF HARASSMENT. THE GOVERNMENT BROUGHT SUBVERSION CHARGES AGAINST THE LEADER OF THIS ORGANIZATION FOR ALLEGED POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. LABOR ABUSES, INCLUDING RELIANCE ON CHILD LABOR, MISTREATMENT, AND INADEQUATE REMUNERATION OF LABOR CONTINUED. CONVERSELY, THE GOVERNMENT RAISED THE MINIMUM WAGE AND FOR THE FIRST TIME ALLOWED UNIONS TO COLLECT AND DISTRIBUTE THEIR OWN DUES.

12. IN EAST TIMOR, STILL TROUBLED BY A LOW-GRADE INSURGENCY, THERE WERE FURTHER INSTANCES OF KILLINGS AND EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE BY THE MILITARY AND INSURGENTS. RESPECTED OBSERVERS NOTED A DECREASE IN SERIOUS INCIDENTS. IN SEVERAL CASES, THE MILITARY PUNISHED ABUSES BY THEIR PERSONNEL. THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OPENED A BRANCH OFFICE IN DILI IN 1996. UNABATED DISAFFECTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT FUELED INTRUSIONS INTO EMBASSIES IN JAKARTA BY YOUNG EAST TIMORESE SEEKING ASYLUM AND PUBLICITY.

13. IN IRIAN JAYA, TRIBAL RESENTMENT CONTINUED AGAINST GOVERNMENT POLICIES VIEWED AS HEAVY-HANDED AND ARBITRARY. REAL AND PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NATIVE IRIAN PEOPLE LED TO SEVERAL OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE AND A STRENGTHENED MILITARY PRESENCE IN TIMIKA. GUERRILLA TERRORISTS TOOK HOSTAGES IN FOUR INCIDENTS AND MURDERED SEVERAL OF THEIR CAPTIVES.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JAKART 07284 02 OF 04 041424Z

14. HISTORICALLY, POLITICALLY RELATED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS HAVE OCCURRED MOST FREQUENTLY IN AREAS WHERE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS WERE ACTIVE, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAYA. SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO EMPLOY HARSH MEASURES AGAINST SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA. WHILE THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT "ACEH MERDEKA" STILL EXISTS, ITS ACTIVITIES ARE APPARENTLY NOW UNDERGROUND. SECURITY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR KILLED TWO UNARMED CIVILIANS IN APRIL IN SEPARATE UNRELATED INCIDENTS, NEAR BAUCAU AND IN DILI. A STUDENT WAS KILLED IN EARLY AUGUST AFTER QUARRELING WITH SOLDIERS AND THEN SEEKING TO ESCAPE ARREST. A MILITARY OFFICER WAS CONVICTED IN THE FIRST CASE, BUT THE KILLING WAS RULED ACCIDENTAL. FOUR SOLDIERS RECEIVED PRISON TERMS IN FEBRUARY AS A RESULT OF THE KILLING OF THREE CIVILIANS IN IRIAN JAYA IN THE SPRING OF 1995. THESE CONVICTIONS SPRANG FROM REPORTS BY THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND NGO'S ABOUT THE KILLINGS OF 16 OR MORE CIVILIANS IN IRIAN JAYA BETWEEN MID-1994 AND MID-1995. HOWEVER, THESE CONVICTIONS RESULTED FROM ONE CASE ONLY. FIVE OTHER CASES OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN IRIAN JAYA, CITED IN A SEPTEMBER 1995 REPORT BY THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, HAVE LANGUISHED. MOREOVER, IN THE ONE PROSECUTED IRIAN JAYA CASE, MANY COURT DOCUMENTS WERE DECLARED TO BE "STATE DOCUMENTS," PRECLUDING THEIR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC.

15. IRIAN JAYA REBELS, INCLUDING SOME FROM THE FREE PAPUA ORGANIZATION (OPM), ABDUCTED CIVILIAN HOSTAGES ON FOUR OCCASIONS IN IRIAN JAYA. IN TWO OF THESE INCIDENTS HOSTAGES WERE KILLED BY THEIR ABDUCTORS. A RESCUE ATTEMPT BY INDONESIAN SPECIAL FORCES MAY 15, SUCCEEDED IN FREEING NINE HOSTAGES, BUT TWO OTHERS DIED OF SLASH WOUNDS INFLICTED BY THEIR ABDUCTORS. GOVERNMENT TROOPS

UNCLASSIFIED

KILLED EIGHT OF THE ABDUCTORS IN A FIREFIGHT THAT ALSO INVOLVED ARMED LOCAL VILLAGERS WHO SUPPORTED THE REBELS. EARLIER IN THIS HOSTAGE TAKING, GOVERNMENT FORCES SOUGHT TO BRING AN END TO THE INCIDENT THROUGH ICRC MEDIATION, WHICH EVENTUALLY FAILED DUE TO BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE ABDUCTOR LEADER, KELLY KWALIK. IN A SECOND HOSTAGE TAKING BY AN UNKNOWN GROUP, TWO OF AN INITIAL 17 HOSTAGES WERE KILLED, APPARENTLY BY THEIR ABDUCTORS. IN A PROLONGED MILITARY OPERATION TO RESCUE THE HOSTAGES, ONE OF THE HOSTAGE TAKERS WAS KILLED.

16. ABRI FORCES REPORTEDLY SUFFERED CASUALTIES IN EAST TIMOR DURING A CLASH WITH GUERRILLAS IN AUGUST. IN ENSUING MILITARY OPERATIONS, FIVE EAST TIMORESE REPORTEDLY WERE ARRESTED. GUERRILLAS IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR CARRIED OUT ATTACKS AGAINST IMMIGRANTS AND PRO-GOVERNMENT TIMORESE THAT RESULTED IN SEVERAL DEATHS.

17. EAST TIMORESE CONTINUED TO CLAIM THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINED AN EXCESSIVE MILITARY PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR. ALTHOUGH TROOPS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM EAST TIMOR IN SEPTEMBER 1995, THERE WAS NO MEASURABLE DECREASE IN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE

NNNNPTQ3571

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3571

PAGE 01 JAKART 07284 03 OF 04 041424Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7B16 041425Z /38

P 041423Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2879
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 007284

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART ONE

TERRITORY. ABRI RECRUITED LOCAL EAST TIMORESE TO CONSTITUTE AN EAST TIMORESE FORCE SUBORDINATE TO ABRI. SOME EAST TIMORESE SOURCES CHARGED THIS FORCE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AS WELL. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO RELIED ON BANDS OF YOUTHS, ORGANIZED AND DIRECTED BY THE GOVERNMENT, TO INTIMIDATE AND HARASS ITS OPPONENTS IN EAST TIMOR, AS IT DOES ELSEWHERE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 07284 03 OF 04 041424Z
18. THE KILLING OF UNARMED CIVILIANS BY SECURITY FORCES WAS NOT LIMITED TO THE AREAS WITH ACTIVE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS. MILITARY PERSONNEL ABDUCTED AND TORTURED AN UNARMED CIVILIAN IN WEST

KALIMANTAN IN APRIL FOLLOWING A MINOR TRAFFIC ACCIDENT. ONE CIVILIAN WAS KILLED AND AT LEAST FOUR WERE INJURED WHEN MILITARY PERSONNEL FIRED UPON UNARMED CIVILIANS WHO ATTACKED THE LOCAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN PROTEST. SIX MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE TRIED AND CONVICTED FOR INVOLVEMENT IN THIS INCIDENT. SIX OTHERS, WHO HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN NAMED BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES AS SUSPECTS IN THE CASE, WERE PUNISHED FOR DISCIPLINARY INFRACTIONS BUT NOT TRIED.

19. SIMILARLY, AT LEAST THREE CIVILIAN DEATHS OCCURRED WHEN SECURITY PERSONNEL IN UJUNG PANDANG RESPONDED TO STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN APRIL. THE GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THREE DEATHS OCCURRED, CLAIMING THAT THE STUDENTS DROWNED IN A RIVER WHILE FLEEING SECURITY FORCES. HOWEVER, PHOTOS OF THE THREE BODIES OF THE DEAD STUDENTS SHOWED BRUISES AND WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN KNIFE WOUNDS. THE INVESTIGATION BY THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CONFIRMED THE NUMBER OF DEATHS BUT IDENTIFIED EXCESSES BY THE TROOPS. STUDENT GROUPS ASSERT THAT THE NUMBER KILLED WAS HIGHER. TWELVE SOLDIERS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CHARGED IN THE CASE. THE TRIAL OF SIX BEGAN IN LATE SEPTEMBER, WITH THE TRIALS OF THE OTHER SIX REPORTEDLY TO FOLLOW.

20. ADDITIONALLY, THE GOVERNMENT-ASSISTED FORCIBLE TAKEOVER OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S (PDI) HEADQUARTERS ON JULY 27, AND THE HARSH TREATMENT OF DEMONSTRATORS LATER IN THE DAY BY SECURITY FORCES, SPARKED RIOTING WHICH RESULTED IN SEVERAL DEATHS. THE GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT FOUR DEATHS OCCURRED. AN INTERIM REPORT RELEASED BY THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

COMMISSION PUT THE NUMBER AT FIVE. NO MILITARY OR POLICE HAVE BEEN HELD ACCOUNTABLE BY THE GOVERNMENT IN ASSOCIATION WITH THIS VIOLENCE, WHICH INCLUDED POLICE CANING OF CITIZENS WHO FELL AMONG A CROWD FACING A POLICE CHARGE.

21. THE POLICE EMPLOYED EXCESSIVE AND SOMETIMES DEADLY FORCE IN APPREHENDING SUSPECTS OR COPING WITH ALLEGED CRIMINALS. IN RESPONSE TO PROTESTS THAT THE METHODS USED WERE UNJUSTIFIABLY HARSH AND AMOUNTED TO EXECUTION WITHOUT TRIAL, POLICE GENERALLY CLAIMED THAT THE SUSPECTS WERE FLEEING, RESISTING ARREST, OR THREATENING THE POLICE.

22. IN THE PAST HIGHER AUTHORITIES RARELY PUNISHED THE MILITARY OR POLICE FOR USING EXCESSIVE FORCE. AS NOTED ABOVE, THERE WERE INDICATIONS IN 1996 THAT THIS SITUATION WAS IMPROVING. FOUR MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE SENTENCED IN ONE IRIAN JQE.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

23. FOLLOWING THE JULY 27 VIOLENCE AND ITS AFTERMATH, THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ON AUGUST 31 RELEASED AN INTERIM REPORT THAT LISTED 74 MISSING, 149 INJURED, AND FIVE KILLED. THE COMMISSION LATER CLARIFIED THAT THE CATEGORY MISSING INCLUDED MANY INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE TEMPORARILY UNACCOUNTED FOR (E.G. IN HIDING), AND THAT THE NUMBER IN ITS FINAL REPORT WOULD BE LOWER THAN 74. IN EARLY OCTOBER, THE NUMBER OF MISSING HAD BEEN REDUCED TO 30. THE COMMISSION'S ATTENTION TO THE NUMBER OF MISSING REFLECTED PERSISTENT REPORTS FROM HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS THAT PEOPLE WERE UNACCOUNTED FOR FOLLOWING JULY 27. IN CONTRAST, THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ANY PEOPLE WERE MISSING.

24. SECURITY FORCES IN INDONESIA SOMETIMES HELD SUSPECTS INCOMMUNICADO BEFORE ACKNOWLEDGING THEIR DETENTION. IN CERTAIN CASES, SUSPECTS WERE HELD FOR SUBSTANTIAL PERIODS OF TIME WITHOUT FORMAL CHARGES BEING BROUGHT.

25. THERE WERE NO NEW EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MISSING AND DEAD FROM THE NOVEMBER 12, 1991 MILITARY SHOOTING OF CIVILIANS IN DILI, EAST TIMOR. OF THOSE STILL LISTED AS MISSING IN A REPORT THE MILITARY GAVE TO HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, NO ADDITIONAL CASES WERE RESOLVED DURING THE YEAR. KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE MISSING ARE DEAD AND THAT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES KNOW WHERE THEIR BODIES ARE LOCATED.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMANE, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

26. THE CRIMINAL CODE MAKES IT A CRIME PUNISHABLE BY UP TO 4 YEARS IN PRISON FOR ANY OFFICIAL TO USE VIOLENCE OR FORCE TO ELICIT A CONFESSION. IT ESTABLISHES PRETRIAL PROCEDURES TO GIVE SUSPECTS OR THEIR FAMILIES THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ3572

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3572

PAGE 01 JAKART 07284 04 OF 04 041424Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7B19 041425Z /38

P 041423Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2880
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 007284

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID

SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART ONE

AN ARREST OR DETENTION. IN PRACTICE, LEGAL PROTECTIONS ARE BOTH INADEQUATE AND WIDELY IGNORED, AND SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO EMPLOY TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF MISTREATMENT, PARTICULARLY IN REGIONS WHERE THERE WERE ACTIVE SECURITY CONCERNS, SUCH AS IRIAN JAYA AND EAST TIMOR.

27. FOR EXAMPLE, IN EAST TIMOR, ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE REPORTS,

SECURITY FORCES SEIZED NINE EAST TIMORESE FROM THEIR HOMES IN JANUARY IN THE ZUMLAI "KECAMATAN" BECAUSE THEY WERE SUSPECTED OF COOPERATING WITH GUERRILLA FORCES. ONE OF THE DETAINEES ALLEGED THAT THEY HAD BEEN BEATEN AND MISTREATED, INCLUDING BEING PLACED IN A SMALL UNDERGROUND HOLE.

28. THERE WERE PERSISTENT, SECOND-HAND, REPORTS THAT SOME OF THE PRISONERS AND DETAINEES SEIZED ON JULY 27 AND DURING THE SUBSEQUENT CRACKDOWN WERE SUBJECTED TO MISTREATMENT. THIS INCLUDED BOTH PRISONERS WHO WERE AWAITING TRIAL AND DETAINEES WHO WERE QUESTIONED AND THEN RELEASED. EXAMPLES OF THE ALLEGED MISTREATMENT INCLUDED KICKING, BEATING, AND ELECTRIC SHOCKS, NOTABLY WHILE IN THE CUSTODY OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OR THE POLICE. THE ICRC AND NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS WERE UNABLE TO CONFIRM THESE ALLEGATIONS. ONE CASE OF ALLEGED MISTREATMENT INVOLVED FIVE STUDENTS WHO WERE SAID TO HAVE BEEN BEATEN IN YOGYAKARTA WHILE IN POLICE DETENTION IN EARLY AUGUST. ANOTHER CASE INVOLVED A RAID ON THE HEADQUARTERS OF AN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION DEVOTED TO ASSISTING MIGRANT WOMEN WORKERS. ONE OF THE STAFF MEMBERS DETAINED, THE RELATIVE OF A MEMBER OF A SMALL UNAUTHORIZED POLITICAL PARTY THAT THE AUTHORITIES CONSIDER SUBVERSIVE (THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OR PRD), WAS SUBJECTED TO BEATINGS AND ELECTRIC SHOCKS. REGARDING THE ARRESTS OF PRD MEMBERS FOLLOWING JULY 27, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ASIA TESTIFIED BEFORE THE U.S. CONGRESS IN SEPTEMBER THAT "A CLEAR PATTERN HAS EMERGED WHERE STUDENTS ARE TAKEN FIRST TO MILITARY INTELLIGENCE FOR INTERROGATION AND OFTEN SUBJECTED TO SEVERE PHYSICAL ABUSE, INCLUDING ELECTRIC SHOCKS, FOR A PERIOD THAT CAN LAST UP TO A WEEK."

29. INSTANCES OF THE POLICE RESORTING TO PHYSICAL ABUSE, EVEN IN
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JAKART 07284 04 OF 04 041424Z
MINOR INCIDENTS, CONTINUED TO OCCUR. VIOLENCE AMONG PRISONERS AND MISTREATMENT AND EXTORTION OF INMATES BY GUARDS ARE REPORTEDLY COMMON. THE INCIDENCE OF MISTREATMENT BY PRISON OFFICIALS DROPPED SHARPLY ONCE A PRISONER HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM POLICE OR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (BIA) CUSTODY INTO THE CIVILIAN PRISON SYSTEM OR INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. PRISON CONDITIONS GENERALLY HAVE IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS. OFFICIALS PUBLICLY CONDEMNED POLICE BRUTALITY AND HARSH PRISON CONDITIONS AND OCCASIONALLY TOOK DISCIPLINARY ACTION, INCLUDING TRANSFER, DISMISSAL, AND TRIALS LEADING TO PRISON. POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE USUALLY MIXED WITH THE GENERAL PRISON POPULATION, ALTHOUGH IN THE CIPINANG PRISON IN JAKARTA HIGH-PROFILE POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE SEGREGATED. IN 1996 THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWED THE ICRC ACCESS ON ONE OCCASION TO THOSE DETAINED UNDER ANTI-SUBVERSION CHARGES BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOLLOWING THE JULY 27 VIOLENCE. AUTHORITIES PERMITTED A U.S. SENATOR TO VISIT EAST TIMOR, BUT DENIED HIM ACCESS TO IMPRISONED EAST TIMORESE GUERRILLA LEADER XANANA GUSMAO IN JAKARTA. IN SEPTEMBER, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE INVITED A SENIOR DELEGATION FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO VISIT TWO INDIVIDUALS DETAINED IN CONNECTION WITH THE JULY 27 VIOLENCE.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3661

PAGE 01 JAKART 07288 01 OF 05 041445Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7D85 041446Z /38

P 041443Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2894
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 007288

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES --
INDONESIA -- PART FIVE

1. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

2. PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS, INCLUDING THOSE IN EXPORT PROCESSING

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200504418

ZONES, ARE BY LAW FREE TO FORM WORKER ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION. HOWEVER, GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND CURRENT NUMERICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR UNION RECOGNITION CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT BARRIER TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER USES A REGULATION THAT REQUIRES THAT A UNION BE SET UP "BY AND FOR WORKERS" TO DENY RECOGNITION TO GROUPS WHICH INCLUDE PEOPLE IT CONSIDERS NONWORKERS, SUCH AS LAWYERS OR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, WHO ARE INVOLVED AS LABOR ORGANIZERS. UNTIL 1994 ONLY THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED FEDERATION OF ALL-INDONESIAN TRADE UNIONS (FSPSI) COULD LEGALLY BARGAIN ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES OR REPRESENT WORKERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S LABOR COURTS. HOWEVER, SINGLE COMPANY UNIONS WERE WIDESPREAD IN PRACTICE. A 1994 REGULATION PROVIDES THAT WORKERS IN A SINGLE COMPANY WITH MORE THAN 25 EMPLOYEES CAN JOIN TOGETHER AS A "PLANT-LEVEL UNION" AND NEGOTIATE A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT WITH THEIR EMPLOYER OUTSIDE THE FSPSI FRAMEWORK, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES THESE PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS TO JOIN THE FSPSI. ACCORDING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER, 1,123 PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY AUGUST 1996. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS HAVE CHARGED, HOWEVER, THAT MANY OF THESE UNIONS ARE "YELLOW UNIONS" FORMED BY COMPANY MANAGEMENT WITH LITTLE OR NO WORKER PARTICIPATION. THERE ARE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT LOCAL DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER OFFICIALS ACCEPT PAYMENTS FROM EMPLOYERS TO SET UP PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS IN THEIR FACTORIES BECAUSE THEY ARE CONSIDERED EVEN WEAKER THAN FSPSI. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE NUMEROUS REPORTS OF SUCCESSFUL STRIKES BY THESE SINGLE COMPANY UNIONS, PARTICULARLY AGAINST FOREIGN VENTURES.

3. THERE IS A DE FACTO SINGLE UNION SYSTEM, HE FSPSI AND ITS 13 FEDERATED SECTORAL UNIONS. THE FSPSI MAINTAINS INTERNATIONAL

CONTACTS BUT IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS EXCEPT THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) TRADE UNION COUNCIL. THE FSPSI COMPLETED IN 1995 A TRANSFORMATION FROM A UNITARY (CENTRALIZED) TO A FEDERATIVE (DECENTRALIZED) STRUCTURE. ITS 13 INDUSTRIAL SECTORS ARE NOW REGISTERED AS SEPARATE NATIONAL UNIONS; THE FSPSI IS THE ONLY TRADE UNION FEDERATION RECOGNIZED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER HAS STATED THAT ANY UNIONS WHICH ARE

FORMED SHOULD AFFILIATE WITH THE FSPSI FEDERATION, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT RECOGNIZE ANY UNIONS OUTSIDE THE FEDERATION. THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED POLICY IS TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECOGNIZED FSPSI UNIONS RATHER THAN TO ALLOW THE FORMATION OF ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

4. THE GOVERNMENT MAY DISSOLVE A UNION IF IT BELIEVES THE UNION IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA, ALTHOUGH IT HAS NEVER ACTUALLY DONE SO, AND THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS SPECIFYING PROCEDURES FOR UNION DISSOLUTION.

5. TWO LABOR GROUPS OTHER THAN FSPSI ARE ACTIVE BUT NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT: THE SERIKAT BURUH SEJAHTERA INDONESIA (SBSI, INDONESIAN WORKERS WELFARE UNION), AND THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS (AJI). THE SBSI, CREATED IN 1992, CLAIMS THAT IT HAS FORMED THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF FACTORY-LEVEL UNITS TO MEET THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION AS A LABOR UNION, BUT ITS MOST RECENT REQUEST (IN NOVEMBER 1994) FOR REGISTRATION AS A TRADE UNION WAS DENIED. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER HAS ALSO BLOCKED SBSI ATTEMPTS TO REGISTER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS AS A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE ORMAS LAW. THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE SBSI TO BE ILLEGAL. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT DISBANDED IT, IT HAS

CONTINUED TO HARASS THE SBSI DURING 1996, BY MEANS SUCH AS DISBANDING ITS MEETINGS AND TRAINING SEMINARS. SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AGAINST SBSI INCLUDED THE DETENTION OF ROLIATI HAREFA, AN SBSI ORGANIZER IN BINJAI, NORTH SUMATRA, FOR A MONTH IN JANUARY 1996 AND AGAIN IN APRIL. THIS FOLLOWED HER COMPLAINT TO POLICE THAT HER SUPERVISOR HAD ASSAULTED HER, RESULTING IN ASSAULT CHARGES BEING FILED AGAINST HER. AS INDICATED IN SECTION 1.D., SBSI LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN WAS ARRESTED ON JULY 30 AND IS BEING HELD IN JAKARTA AWAITING LEGAL ACTION UNDER THE ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW. THE GOVERNMENT HAS STATED HE IS BEING HELD FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, NOT LABOR ACTIVITIES.

6. GOVERNMENT PRESSURE ON SBSI HAS INTENSIFIED SINCE THE JULY 27 VIOLENCE IN JAKARTA, AS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE HAS QUESTIONED MEMBERS OF THE UNION'S CENTRAL LEADERSHIP COUNCIL AND SBSI ORGANIZERS AROUND THE COUNTRY. POLICE CONFISCATED SBSI ARCHIVES FROM THE UNION'S CENTRAL OFFICE IN JAKARTA, AND CLOSED

DOWN THE UNION'S OFFICE IN GARUT, WEST JAVA. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AGAINST THE SBSI LEADERSHIP WERE INTENDED TO DISCREDIT OR DESTROY THE ORGANIZATION.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ3670

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3670

PAGE 01 JAKART 07288 02 OF 05 041445Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7D88 041446Z /38

P 041443Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2895
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 007288

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART FIVE

7. THE ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS (PWI) IS THE ONLY GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING JOURNALISTS. ALTHOUGH PRESS LAWS STIPULATE THAT ALL JOURNALISTS MUST BELONG TO PWI, A FEW JOURNALISTS HAVE AVOIDED MEMBERSHIP. IN THE WAKE OF THE 1994 BANNING OF THREE PUBLICATIONS APPROXIMATELY 80 JOURNALISTS FORMED THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS (AJI)

AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE GOVERNMENT UNION. A GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN IN MARCH 1995 RESULTED IN THE IMPRISONMENT OF THREE AJI MEMBERS CHARGED WITH "SOWING HATE". DESPITE OCCASIONAL PRESSURE ON PUBLICATIONS EMPLOYING AJI MEMBERS, THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWS AJI A CONTINUED UNDERGROUND EXISTENCE.

8. BECAUSE OF PAST DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER REGULATIONS, MANY FSPSI FACTORY UNITS ARE LED BY PERSONS WHO HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH THEIR UNITS' MEMBERS BECAUSE THEY WERE SELECTED BY EMPLOYERS. A 1995 REGULATION STATES THAT EMPLOYEES MUST ONLY NOTIFY THEIR EMPLOYER THAT THEY WISH TO FORM A UNION AND THAT THEY MAY PROCEED IF THEY DO NOT RECEIVE A RESPONSE FROM THEIR EMPLOYER WITHIN 2 WEEKS. DESPITE THIS PROVISION, STRIKES CONTINUE TO OCCUR WHERE EMPLOYERS ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF UNION BRANCHES. THESE STRIKES ARE GENERALLY SUCCESSFUL, AND THE FORMATION OF AN FSPSI UNIT FOLLOWS SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HOWEVER, WORKERS WHO ARE ACTIVE IN THE FORMATION OF THE UNION ARE FREQUENTLY DISMISSED AND HAVE NO PRACTICAL PROTECTION BY EITHER LAW OR GOVERNMENT PRACTICE.

9. CIVIL SERVANTS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO JOIN UNIONS AND MUST BELONG TO KORPRI, A NONUNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES, DEFINED TO INCLUDE THOSE WORKING IN ENTERPRISES IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A 5-PERCENT HOLDING OR GREATER, USUALLY ARE REQUIRED TO JOIN KORPRI, BUT A SMALL NUMBER

OF STATE ENTERPRISES HAVE FSPSI UNITS. TEACHERS MUST BELONG TO THE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (PGRI). WHILE TECHNICALLY CLASSED AS A UNION, THE PGRI CONTINUES TO FUNCTION MORE AS A WELFARE ORGANIZATION AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ENGAGED IN TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES SUCH AS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. MANDATORY KORPRI AND

PGRI CONTRIBUTIONS ARE AUTOMATICALLY DEDUCTED FROM TEACHERS' SALARIES.

10. UNIONS MAY DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE OVER THE FSPSI AND ITS FEDERATED UNIONS. THE HEAD OF FSPSI IS A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FOR GOLKAR, AND MANY MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF GOLKAR AND ITS CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONAL GROUPS. THESE PERSONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN POSITIONS IN THE FEDERATED INDUSTRIAL SECTOR UNIONS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER IS A MEMBER OF THE FSPSI'S CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL.

11. AS NOTED IN SECTION 2.B., THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED LATE IN 1995 ITS INTENTION TO RELAX A REGULATION REQUIRING POLICE APPROVAL FOR ALL MEETINGS OF FIVE OR MORE PEOPLE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE OFFICES OR NORMAL WORK SITES. HOWEVER, DURING 1996 IN PRACTICE THIS REGULATION CONTINUED TO APPLY TO UNION MEETINGS. PERMISSION WAS ROUTINELY GIVEN TO THE FSPSI BUT NOT TO RIVAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE SBSI.

12. IN 1994 THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS LODGED A FORMAL COMPLAINT AGAINST INDONESIA WITH THE ILO, ACCUSING THE GOVERNMENT OF DENYING WORKERS' RIGHT TO SET UP UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, HARASSING INDEPENDENT WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS, AND OF TAKING OTHER ACTIONS CONTRARY TO ILO STANDARDS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. IN CONSIDERING THIS COMPLAINT, THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION DECLARED IN APRIL 1995 THAT "LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS NEGATE THE RIGHT OF WORKERS TO ESTABLISH ORGANIZATIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING" AND DEEPLY DEPLORED "THE

SERIOUSNESS OF THE ALLEGATIONS, WHICH LED IT TO BELIEVE THAT THE GENERAL SITUATION OF WORKERS IN INDONESIA HAS NOT EVOLVED BUT IS STILL CHARACTERIZED BY SERIOUS AND WORSENING INFRINGEMENTS OF BASIC HUMAN AND TRADE UNION RIGHTS AND VIOLATIONS OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION PRINCIPLES IN LAW AND PRACTICE."

13. WHILE PANCASILA PRINCIPLES CALL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES TO BE SETTLED BY CONSENSUS, ALL ORGANIZED WORKERS EXCEPT CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. WHILE STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND TEACHERS RARELY EXERCISE THIS RIGHT, PRIVATE SECTOR STRIKES ARE FREQUENT. BEFORE A STRIKE CAN OCCUR LEGALLY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE LAW REQUIRES INTENSIVE MEDIATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND PRIOR NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE. HOWEVER, NO APPROVAL IS REQUIRED. IN PRACTICE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ARE NOT FOLLOWED, AND FORMAL NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE IS RARELY GIVEN BECAUSE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROCEDURES ARE SLOW AND HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH WORKERS. THEREFORE, SUDDEN STRIKES TEND TO RESULT FROM LONGSTANDING GRIEVANCES OR RECOGNITION THAT LEGALLY MANDATED BENEFITS OR RIGHTS ARE NOT BEING RECEIVED. STRIKE LEADERS OFTEN LOSE THEIR JOBS AND HAVE NO LEGAL RECOURSE FOR

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3665

PAGE 01 JAKART 07288 03 OF 05 041445Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7D8F 041446Z /38

P 041443Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2896
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 007288

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART FIVE

REINSTATEMENT. THE NUMBER OF STRIKES INCREASED IN THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 1996 OVER 1995, FROM 249 TO 286 (ACCORDING TO DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FIGURES). NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS BELIEVE THAT THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF STRIKES IS HIGHER, BUT AGREE WITH THE GENERAL TREND. THE LARGEST-SCALE LABOR PROTESTS OCCURRED IN SURABAYA ON JULY 8-9, INVOLVING THOUSANDS OF WORKERS. POLICE ARRESTED 26 PERSONS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS INCIDENT.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 07288 03 OF 05 041445Z

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

14. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROMOTES IT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE NATIONAL IDEOLOGY, PANCASILA. UNTIL 1994 ONLY RECOGNIZED TRADE UNIONS--THE FSPSI AND ITS COMPONENTS--COULD LEGALLY ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. SINCE EARLY 1994, GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS ALSO PERMIT UNAFFILIATED PLANT-LEVEL WORKERS' ASSOCIATIONS TO CONCLUDE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH EMPLOYERS, AND SOME 24 HAD DONE SO BY MID-1995, ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES. AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY ANY OTHER GROUPS ARE NOT CONSIDERED LEGALLY BINDING AND ARE NOT REGISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. ONCE NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED A REGISTERED FSPSI OR INDEPENDENT PLANT LEVEL UNION, AN EMPLOYER IS OBLIGATED TO BARGAIN WITH IT. IN COMPANIES WITHOUT UNIONS, THE GOVERNMENT DISCOURAGES WORKERS FROM UTILIZING OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE, E.G., DURING CONSULTATIONS WITH EMPLOYERS OVER COMPANY REGULATIONS. INSTEAD, THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PREFERS THAT WORKERS SEEK ITS ASSISTANCE AND BELIEVES THAT ITS ROLE IS TO PROTECT WORKERS. THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT FOR MANY COMPANIES, CONSULTATIONS ARE PERFUNCTORY AT BEST AND USUALLY WITH MANAGEMENT-SELECTED WORKERS; THERE ARE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY FROM FOREIGN COMPANIES. OVER HALF OF THE FACTORY-LEVEL FSPSI UNITS HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS ARE FREELY NEGOTIATED BETWEEN UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE VARIES. BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS OR BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION OR ARBITRATION. MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE

EXTENDED FOR 1 YEAR. ACCORDING TO NGO'S INVOLVED IN LABOR ISSUES, THE PROVISIONS OF THESE AGREEMENTS RARELY GO BEYOND THE LEGAL MINIMUM STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE AGREEMENTS ARE OFTEN MERELY PRESENTED TO WORKER REPRESENTATIVES FOR SIGNING RATHER THAN BEING NEGOTIATED. ALTHOUGH GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS PROHIBIT EMPLOYERS FROM DISCRIMINATING OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS FROM UNION OFFICIALS OF EMPLOYER RETRIBUTION AGAINST UNION ORGANIZERS, INCLUDING FIRING, WHICH IS NOT EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED OR REMEDIED IN PRACTICE. SOME EMPLOYERS REPORTEDLY HAVE WARNED THEIR EMPLOYEES AGAINST CONTACT WITH UNION ORGANIZERS FROM THE UNRECOGNIZED SBSI ORGANIZATION. CHARGES OF ANTIUNION

DISCRIMINATION ARE ADJUDICATED BY ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. HOWEVER, BECAUSE MANY UNION MEMBERS BELIEVE THE TRIBUNALS GENERALLY SIDE WITH EMPLOYERS, MANY WORKERS REJECT OR AVOID THE PROCEDURE AND PRESENT THEIR GRIEVANCES DIRECTLY TO THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, PARLIAMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF DISMISSED WORKERS TEND TO BE MONETARY AWARDS; WORKERS ARE RARELY REINSTATED. THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO FIRE WORKERS, BUT THE LAW IS OFTEN IGNORED IN PRACTICE.

15. COMMENTING ON ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION AND RESTRICTIONS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE CONTEXT OF ILO CONVENTION 98 ON THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY, THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS' JUNE REPORT EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT "IN SPITE OF THE DIRECT CONTACTS MISSION THAT WENT TO INDONESIA IN NOVEMBER 1993, THE DISCUSSION WITHIN THE PRESENT COMMITTEE LAST YEAR, AND THE TECHNICAL ADVISORY MISSION THAT WENT TO INDONESIA IN JANUARY 1995, MUCH PROGRESS WAS YET TO BE ACHIEVED TO ENSURE IN LAW AND

IN PRACTICE THE FULL APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION."

16. ON JUNE 1 THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER ISSUED A NEW REGULATION PERMITTING UNIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE FSPSI TO COLLECT UNION DUES DIRECTLY THROUGH THE CHECK-OFF SYSTEM, RATHER THAN HAVING THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER COLLECT DUES AND TRANSFER THEM TO THE FSPSI. DUES ARE TO BE COLLECTED AT THE LOCAL LEVEL AND THEN TRANSMITTED UP THE UNION CHAIN. THE THIRTEEN NATIONAL UNIONS COMPRISING FSPSI WERE BEGINNING TO IMPLEMENT THE NEW SYSTEM DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1996.

17. THE ARMED FORCES, WHICH INCLUDE THE POLICE, CONTINUE TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN LABOR ISSUES, DESPITE THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER'S REVOCATION IN 1994 OF A 1986 REGULATION ALLOWING THE MILITARY TO INTERVENE IN STRIKES AND OTHER LABOR ACTIONS. HOWEVER, A 1990 DECREE GIVING THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF NATIONAL STABILITY (BAKORSTANAS) TO INTERVENE IN STRIKES IN THE INTEREST OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY REMAINS IN EFFECT. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LABOR MATTERS DECREASED FROM 1995 TO MID-1996, BUT NOT ALL OBSERVERS SHARE THIS PERCEPTION. WORKERS CHARGE THAT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ3666

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3666

PAGE 01 JAKART 07288 04 OF 05 041446Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7D96 041446Z /38

P 041443Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2897
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 007288

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID

SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART FIVE

ATTEMPT TO INTIMIDATE UNION ORGANIZERS AND STRIKE LEADERS AND HAVE BEEN PRESENT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS DURING SOME STRIKES, EVEN WHEN THERE HAS BEEN NO DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER VIOLENCE. MILITARY OFFICIALS OCCASIONALLY HAVE BEEN PRESENT DURING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND MANAGEMENT. THEIR PRESENCE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS INTIMIDATING BY PLANT-LEVEL UNION OFFICIALS.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

18. THE LAW FORBIDS FORCED LABOR, AND THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY ENFORCES IT. HOWEVER, THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF TEENAGE CHILDREN BEING FORCED TO WORK UNDER HIGHLY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS ON FISHING PLATFORMS OFF THE COAST OF NORTHEASTERN SUMATRA. THESE PLATFORMS ARE MILES OFF SHORE, WITH ACCESS CONTROLLED BY THE EMPLOYERS, AND IN MANY CASES THE CHILDREN ARE HELD VIRTUAL PRISONERS ON THE PLATFORMS AND FORCED TO WORK FOR UP TO 3 MONTHS AT A TIME FOR WELL BELOW THE MINIMUM WAGE. ACCORDING TO KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES, HUNDREDS OF CHILDREN MAY BE INVOLVED. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT HAS DONE LITTLE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM.

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

19. CHILD LABOR EXISTS IN BOTH INDUSTRIAL AND RURAL AREAS, AND IN BOTH THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS. ACCORDING TO A 1995 REPORT OF THE INDONESIAN CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, FOUR PER CENT OF INDONESIAN CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 14 WORK, AND ANOTHER FOUR PER CENT WORK IN ADDITION TO GOING TO SCHOOL. INDONESIA WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO BC SELECTED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ILO'S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOR (IPEC), AND IT SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ILO ON MAY 29, 1992 TO GUIDE COLLABORATION UNDER THIS PROGRAM. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN ACTION PLAN WERE DEVELOPED AT A NATIONAL CONFERENCE IN BOGOR IN JULY 1993. DURING 1995, 30 GOVERNMENT LABOR INSPECTORS RECEIVED ILO-SPONSORED TRAINING ON CHILD LABOR MATTERS UNDER THE IPEC PROGRAM. HOWEVER, ENFORCEMENT REMAINS LAX.

20. THE GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A CLASS OF CHILDREN WHO MUST WORK FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS, AND IN 1987 THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER ISSUED REGULATION PER-OL/MEN/1987, "PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FORCED TO WORK," TO REGULATE THIS SITUATION. THIS REGULATION LEGALIZES THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14 WHO MUST WORK TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCOME OF THEIR FAMILIES. IT REQUIRES PARENTAL CONSENT, PROHIBITS DANGEROUS OR DIFFICULT WORK, LIMITS WORK TO 4 HOURS DAILY, AND REQUIRES EMPLOYERS TO REPORT THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN WORKING UNDER ITS PROVISIONS. IT DOES NOT SET A MINIMUM AGE FOR CHILDREN IN THIS CATEGORY, EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDING THE COLONIAL-ERA GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE OF DECEMBER 17, 1925, ON "MEASURES LIMITING CHILD LABOR AND NIGHTWORK OF WOMEN," WHICH IS STILL THE CURRENT LAW GOVERNING CHILD LABOR AND SETS A MINIMUM AGE OF 12 FOR EMPLOYMENT. THE 1987 REGULATION IS NOT ENFORCED. NO EMPLOYERS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO COURT FOR VIOLATING ITS RESTRICTIONS ON THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR CHILDREN, AND NO REPORTS ARE COLLECTED FROM ESTABLISHMENTS EMPLOYING CHILDREN.

21. ACT NO. 1 OF 1951 WAS INTENDED TO BRING INTO FORCE CERTAIN LABOR MEASURES, INCLUDING PROVISIONS ON CHILD LABOR WHICH WOULD REPLACE THOSE OF THE 1925 LEGISLATION. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS FOR THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN ISSUED. THUS THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS IN THE 1951 ACT HAVE NO VALIDITY.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

22. INDONESIA DOES NOT HAVE A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE. RATHER, AREA WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL ESTABLISH MINIMUM WAGES FOR REGIONS AND BASIC NEEDS

FIGURES FOR EACH PROVINCE--A MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. WHILE INDONESIA HAS SUCCEEDED IN DRAMATICALLY LOWERING THE LEVEL OF POVERTY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, THE MINIMUM WAGE RATES UNTIL RECENTLY HAVE USUALLY LAGGED BEHIND INFLATION AND EVEN THE BASIC NEEDS FIGURES. THE GOVERNMENT RAISED MINIMUM WAGE RATES THE LAST THREE YEARS, AND IN 1996 REQUIRED EMPLOYERS TO PAY WORKERS FOR 30 DAYS DURING A MONTH. IN JAKARTA THE MINIMUM WAGE IS ABOUT $2.28 (RP 5200) PER DAY. AN ADDITIONAL INCREASE IS PLANNED FOR LATE 1996.

23. THERE ARE NO RELIABLE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYERS PAYING AT LEAST THE MINIMUM WAGE. INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS' ESTIMATES RANGE BETWEEN 30 AND 60 PERCENT. SEVERAL FSPSI SECTOR CHAIRMEN SIGNED AGREEMENTS WITH INDUSTRY LEADERS DELAYING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MINIMUM WAGE IN THEIR SECTORS. ACCORDING TO DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FIGURES, THE DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATED 51 CASES OF MINIMUM WAGE VIOLATIONS DURING THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS OF 1996; FOUR CASES RESULTED IN PRISON SENTENCES FOR COMPANY MANAGEMENT AND TWELVE IN FINES. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER INCREASED THE NUMBER OF LABOR INSPECTORS AND ANNOUNCED A SCHEME

NNNNPTQ3667

PAGE 01 JAKART 07288 05 OF 05 041446Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7D99 041446Z /38

P 041443Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2898
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 007288

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART FIVE

OF "BLACKLISTING" OFFENDING COMPANIES, BUT ENFORCEMENT OF MINIMUM WAGE AND OTHER LABOR REGULATIONS REMAINS INADEQUATE, AND SANCTIONS TOO LIGHT. OVER TWO HUNDRED COMPANIES HAVE APPLIED FOR AND BEEN GRANTED RELIEF FROM THE LATEST MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES ON THE GROUND THAT THE COMPANIES WOULD OTHERWISE CLOSE. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER HAS DRAFTED A REVISION OF A BASIC LABOR LAW THAT WOULD RAISE STATUTORY FINES, WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVALUED BY

PAGE 02 JAKART 07288 05 OF 05 041446Z
INFLATION, TO MORE APPROPRIATE LEVELS. SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE INCREASED GOVERNMENT PRESSURES ON EMPLOYERS AND MEMORIES OF THE 1994 MEDAN RIOTS HAVE IMPROVED MINIMUM WAGE COMPLIANCE.

24. LABOR LAW AND MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PROVIDE WORKERS WITH A VARIETY OF OTHER BENEFITS, SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY, AND WORKERS IN MORE MODERN FACILITIES OFTEN RECEIVE HEALTH BENEFITS, FREE

MEALS, AND TRANSPORTATION. THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7-HOUR WORKDAYS AND 40-HOUR WORKWEEKS, WITH ONE 30-MINUTE REST PERIOD FOR EACH 4 HOURS OF WORK. THE LAW ALSO REQUIRES 1 DAY OF REST WEEKLY. THE DAILY OVERTIME RATE IS 1/2 TIMES THE NORMAL HOURLY RATE FOR THE FIRST HOUR, AND TWICE THE HOURLY RATE FOR ADDITIONAL OVERTIME. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE. WORKERS IN INDUSTRIES WHICH PRODUCE RETAIL GOODS FOR EXPORT FREQUENTLY WORK OVERTIME TO FULFILL CONTRACT QUOTAS. OBSERVANCE OF LAWS REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND BY REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ARE FAIRLY COMMON AND OFTEN RESULT IN STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. THE MINISTRY OF MANPOWER CONTINUES PUBLICLY TO URGE EMPLOYERS TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW. HOWEVER, IN GENERAL, GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ARE WEAK.

25. BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. IN THE LARGELY WESTERN-OPERATED OIL SECTOR, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUNCTION REASONABLY WELL. HOWEVER, IN THE COUNTRY'S 100,000 LARGER REGISTERED COMPANIES IN THE NONOIL SECTOR, THE QUALITY OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAMS VARIES GREATLY. THE ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS IS SEVERELY HAMPERED BY THE LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER INSPECTORS AS WELL AS BY THE LOW LEVEL OF EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION FOR SOUND HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES. ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION ON THE PART OF INSPECTORS ARE COMMON. WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS. EMPLOYERS ARE FORBIDDEN BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO, BUT THE LAW IS NOT EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3583

PAGE 01 JAKART 07286 01 OF 04 041429Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7BA5 041429Z /38

P 041428Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2886
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 007286

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART THREE

1. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

2. THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION. THE GOVERNMENT PLACES SIGNIFICANT CONTROLS ON THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. THE 1985 SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200504418

(ORMAS) REQUIRES THE ADHERENCE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, TO THE OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA. THIS PROVISION, WHICH LIMITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD AS DESIGNED TO INHIBIT ACTIVITIES OF GROUPS SEEKING TO MAKE INDONESIA AN ISLAMIC STATE, REVIVE COMMUNISM, OR RETURN THE COUNTRY TO A SITUATION OF PARTISAN IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION. THIS LAW EMPOWERS THE GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND ANY ORGANIZATION IT BELIEVES TO BE ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA AND REQUIRES PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR ANY ORGANIZATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS FROM FOREIGN DONORS. NEVERTHELESS, A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INDEPENDENT LABOR ORGANIZATION SERIKAT BURUH SEJAHTERA INDONESIA (SBSI), CONTINUED TO BE ACTIVE WITHOUT OFFICIAL RECOGNITION UNDER THIS LAW. SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS ESTABLISHED THE DEMOCRATIC UNION PARTY (PUDI) IN MAY. AS ONLY THREE POLITICAL PARTIES ARE PERMITTED IN INDONESIA, IT WAS NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT BUT WAS NOT BANNED.

3. IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, NGO'S HAVE PROLIFERATED IN SUCH FIELDS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION. UNTIL 1996, THE GOVERNMENT GAVE THEM RATHER WIDE LATITUDE TO PURSUE THEIR AIMS, INCLUDING PUBLIC CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND IN SOME CASES LAWSUITS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. FOLLOWING THE JULY 27 VIOLENCE, THE GOVERNMENT MOVED TO MONITOR ACTIVITIES BY CERTAIN NGOS AND ACTIVISTS MORE CLOSELY WHICH HAD AN INTIMIDATING EFFECT. EVEN BEFORE JULY, THERE WERE SIGNS OF GOVERNMENT CONCERN OVER POLITICAL ACTIVISM. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE (KIPP) BY POLITICAL ACTIVISTS IN MARCH MET WITH A MIXED RESPONSE FROM THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND ENCOUNTERED SPORADIC HARASSMENT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. FOR EXAMPLE, ON APRIL 21, 1996 THE LEGAL AID

FOUNDATION'S (LBH) MEDAN OFFICE WAS STONED BY UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS DURING A GATHERING OF LOCAL ACTIVISTS PREPARING TO FORM A LOCAL CHAPTER OF KIPP. SEVERAL POLICE OFFICERS WERE NEARBY BUT TOOK NO ACTION TO STOP THE ATTACK. EARLY THE NEXT MORNING, THE LBH OFFICE WAS BURNED AND COMPLETELY DESTROYED.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

4. THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD. THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES ISLAM, CATHOLICISM, PROTESTANTISM, BUDDHISM, AND HINDUISM, AND PERMITS THE PRACTICE OF THE MYSTICAL, TRADITIONAL BELIEFS OF "ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN." ALTHOUGH THE POPULATION IS OVERWHELMINGLY MUSLIM, THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS ARE GENERALLY RESPECTED, AND THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES MUTUAL TOLERANCE AND HARMONY AMONG THEM. HOWEVER, SOME RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY EXIST.

5. BECAUSE THE FIRST TENET OF PANCASILA IS BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD, ATHEISM IS FORBIDDEN. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA EXTENDS TO ALL RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY OPPOSES MUSLIM GROUPS WHICH ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ACKNOWLEDGING ONLY ISLAMIC LAW. THERE ARE GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES FOR BANNING RELIGIOUS SECTS IN INDONESIA. AMONG THOSE PROHIBITED ARE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, BAHA'I, AND IN SOME PROVINCES THE MESSIANIC ISLAMIC SECT DARUL ARQAM. THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY MONITORS ISLAMIC SECTS CONSIDERED IN DANGER OF DEVIATING FROM ORTHODOX TENETS, AND IN THE PAST HAS ON OCCASION DISSOLVED SUCH GROUPS.

6. SEVERAL INSTANCES OF VIOLENCE, AT LEAST IN PART RELATED TO

RELIGION, OCCURRED IN 1996. IN JULY, SEVERAL CHRISTIAN CHURCHES WERE BURNED IN SURABAYA. IN SEPTEMBER, A GROUP OF YOUNG PEOPLE BURNED A CATHOLIC CHURCH IN EAST JAKARTA. THE GROUP WAS APPARENTLY MUSLIM, AND WAS SEEKING TO ELIMINATE NON-MUSLIM INFLUENCES IN THE AREA. IN AUGUST IN VIQUEQUE, EAST TIMORESE DEMONSTRATED AGAINST GOVERNMENT SPONSORED MUSLIM MIGRANTS TO THE AREA, AND BURNED A NUMBER OF SHOPS OWNED BY THESE MIGRANTS. IN JUNE, ALSO IN EAST TIMOR, THE DESECRATION OF EITHER A PICTURE OR STATUE OF THE VIRGIN MARY IN BAUCAU SPARKED RIOTING ON THE PART OF THE CATHOLIC EAST TIMORESE. THIS LED TO NUMEROUS ARRESTS AND AT LEAST ONE SERIOUS INJURY.

7. HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND EMPHASIZE BY EXAMPLE THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECT FOR RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN THE COUNTRY. LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, WERE FREQUENTLY ALLEGED TO BE RELUCTANT TO FACILITATE AND PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES.

8. THE LAW ALLOWS CONVERSION BETWEEN FAITHS, AND SUCH CONVERSIONS OCCUR. MARRIAGES BETWEEN PERSONS OF DIFFERENT RELIGIONS ARE ALLOWED. THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS PROSELYTIZING BY THE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ3585

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3585

PAGE 01 JAKART 07286 02 OF 04 041429Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7BA8 041430Z /38

P 041428Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2887
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 007286

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART THREE

RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS IN AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ONE RECOGNIZED RELIGION OR ANOTHER AS POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND DISCOURAGES IT. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED, ALTHOUGH IN EAST TIMOR AND OCCASIONALLY ELSEWHERE MISSIONARIES HAVE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES AND DELAYS IN RENEWING RESIDENCE PERMITS, AND VISAS ALLOWING THE ENTRANCE OF NEW FOREIGN CLERGY ARE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. LAWS AND DECREES FROM THE 1970'S LIMIT

THE NUMBER OF YEARS FOREIGN MISSIONARIES CAN SPEND IN INDONESIA, WITH SOME EXTENSIONS GRANTED IN REMOTE AREAS LIKE IRIAN JAYA. FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK IS SUBJECT TO THE FUNDING STIPULATIONS OF THE ORMAS LAW. INDONESIANS PRACTICING THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS MAINTAIN ACTIVE LINKS WITH CORELIGIONISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY AND TRAVEL ABROAD FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

9. ALTHOUGH IN 1993 THE GOVERNMENT DRASTICALLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BARRED EITHER FROM ENTERING OR DEPARTING INDONESIA FROM A PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED FIGURE OF 8,897 "BLACKLISTED" PEOPLE TO A FEW HUNDRED, SUCH RESTRICTIONS STILL EXIST. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO RESTRICTS MOVEMENT BY INDONESIAN AND FOREIGN CITIZENS TO AND WITHIN PARTS OF INDONESIA. IN ADDITION, IT REQUIRES PERMITS TO SEEK WORK IN A NEW LOCATION IN CERTAIN AREAS, PRIMARILY TO CONTROL FURTHER POPULATION MOVEMENT TO CROWDED CITIES. SPECIAL PERMITS ARE REQUIRED TO VISIT CERTAIN PARTS OF IRIAN JAYA. THE AUTHORITIES REQUIRE FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, TO GIVE NOTICE OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND TO HAVE OFFICIAL PERMISSION TO CHANGE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE. FOLLOWING THE JULY 27 INCIDENT, A TRAVEL BAN WAS IMPOSED ON BUDIMAN AND OTHER PRD MEMBERS SOUGHT BY GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES.

10. IN PAST YEARS THE GOVERNMENT ADMITTED LARGE NUMBERS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM INDOCHINA. IN 1996, INDONESIA'S GALANG ISLAND CAMP WAS CLOSED AS THE LAST REMAINING ASYLUM SEEKERS WERE PEACEFULLY REPATRIATED TO VIETNAM. A NUMBER OF EAST TIMORESE ASYLUM SEEKERS WHO TOOK REFUGE IN VARIOUS EMBASSIES IN JAKARTA

WERE PERMITTED TO EMIGRATE AFTER EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

11. CITIZENS DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEMOCRATIC MEANS. THIS WAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED IN 1996 BY THE GOVERNMENT-ENGINEERED OUSTER OF THE LEADER OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) IN JUNE, AND THE SUBSEQUENT VIOLENT REMOVAL OF HER SUPPORTERS FROM PDI HEADQUARTERS IN JULY.

12. THE 1,000-MEMBER PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), IS CONSTITUTIONALLY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY OF THE STATE. IT MEETS EVERY 5 YEARS TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AND TO SET THE BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY. IT IS CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE APPOINTMENT OF OVER HALF ITS MEMBERSHIP. FIVE HUNDRED MEMBERS OF THE MPR COME FROM THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR), 425 OF WHOSE MEMBERS WILL BE ELECTED IN ELECTIONS IN 1997 (UP FROM 400 ELECTED MEMBERS IN 1992). THE REMAINING 75 MEMBERS WILL BE MILITARY APPOINTEES. IN 1993 THE MPR ELECTED SOEHARTO TO HIS SIXTH UNCONTESTED 5-YEAR TERM AS PRESIDENT. LEGALLY, THE PRESIDENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SUBORDINATE TO THE PARLIAMENT, BUT ACTUALLY HE AND A SMALL GROUP OF ASSOCIATES EXERCISE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.

13. UNDER A DOCTRINE KNOWN AS DUAL FUNCTION, THE MILITARY ASSUMES A SIGNIFICANT SOCIOPOLITICAL AS WELL AS A SECURITY ROLE. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARE ALLOTTED UNELECTED SEATS IN THE DPR, IN PARTIAL COMPENSATION FOR NOT BEING PERMITTED TO VOTE. IN 1995 THE GOVERNMENT LEGISLATED A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF THESE SEATS FROM 100 TO 75, OR 15 PERCENT OF A TOTAL OF 500, EFFECTIVE

UNCLASSIFIED

1997. THE MILITARY WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD AN UNELECTED 20 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT PARLIAMENTS, AND TO OCCUPY NUMEROUS KEY POSITIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION. THE OTHER 85 PERCENT OF NATIONAL AND 80 PERCENT OF LOCAL PARLIAMENTARY SEATS ARE FILLED THROUGH ELECTIONS HELD EVERY 5 YEARS. ALL ADULT CITIZENS, EXCEPT ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, CONVICTED CRIMINALS SERVING PRISON SENTENCES, AND SOME 36,000 FORMER MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ARE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE. VOTERS CHOOSE BY SECRET BALLOT BETWEEN THE THREE GOVERNMENT-APPROVED POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH FIELD CANDIDATE LISTS IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT. THOSE LISTS MUST BE SCREENED BY BAKORSTANAS, WHICH DETERMINES WHETHER CANDIDATES WARE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COMMUNIST COUP OR POSE OTHER BROADLY DEFINED SECURITY RISKS. CRITICS CHARGE THESE SCREENINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, SINCE THERE IS NO WAY TO APPEAL THE RESULTS, AND NOTE THAT THEY CAN BE USED TO ELIMINATE CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM PARLIAMENT.

14. STRICT RULES ESTABLISH THE LENGTH OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC MEDIA, SCHEDULES FOR PUBLIC APPEARANCES, AND THE POLITICAL SYMBOLS THAT CAN BE USED. THE GOVERNMENT PERMITS

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ3584

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3584

PAGE 01 JAKART 07286 03 OF 04 041429Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7BB0 041430Z /38

P 041428Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2888
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 007286

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART THREE

ONLY THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EXIST AND CONTEST ELECTIONS. THE LARGEST AND MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS GOLKAR, A GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ORGANIZATION OF DIVERSE FUNCTIONAL GROUPS WHICH WON 68 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN THE 1992 ELECTIONS. THE PRESIDENT STRONGLY INFLUENCES THE SELECTION OF THE LEADERS OF GOLKAR. THE OTHER TWO SMALL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE UNITY DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF INDONESIA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 07286 03 OF 04 041429Z
(PDI), SPLIT THE REMAINING VOTE. THE TWO SMALLER PARTIES ARE NOT PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN PARTY OFFICES BELOW THE DISTRICT LEVEL, PLACING THEM AT A DISADVANTAGE VIS A VIS THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED

GOLKAR. THE LAW REQUIRES ALL THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EMBRACE PANCASILA, AND NONE OF THE ORGANIZATIONS IS CONSIDERED AN OPPOSITION PARTY. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES CLOSELY SCRUTINIZE AND OFTEN GUIDE THEIR ACTIVITIES, AS EVIDENCED BY ITS BLATANT INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE PDI IN 1996. MEMBERS OF THE DPR AND THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES MAY BE RECALLED FROM OFFICE BY PARTY LEADERS.

15. GOLKAR MAINTAINS CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH THE ARMED FORCES AND KORPRI, THE ASSOCIATION TO WHICH ALL CIVIL SERVANTS AUTOMATICALLY BELONG. CIVIL SERVANTS MAY JOIN ANY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WITH OFFICIAL PERMISSION, BUT MOST ARE MEMBERS OF GOLKAR. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND SOME OTHER BANNED PARTIES MAY NOT RUN FOR OFFICE OR BE ACTIVE POLITICALLY. THE DPR CONSIDERS BILLS PRESENTED TO IT BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES BUT HAS NEVER PASSED A LAW THAT IT INITIATED. THE DPR MAKES TECHNICAL, OCCASIONALLY SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS TO BILLS IT REVIEWS. IN PRACTICE, IT REMAINS CLEARLY SUBORDINATE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, BUT RECENTLY IT HAS BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN SCRUTINIZING GOVERNMENT POLICY, AND EXERCISING OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH HEARINGS AT WHICH MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, MILITARY COMMANDERS, AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS ARE ASKED TO TESTIFY. THE SPEAKER OF THE DPR HAS PUBLICLY CALLED FOR A LARGER ROLE FOR THE BODY. THE DPR HAS ALSO BECOME INCREASINGLY A FOCAL POINT OF APPEALS AND PETITIONS FROM STUDENTS, WORKERS, DISPLACED FARMERS, AND OTHERS PROTESTING ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND AIRING OTHER GRIEVANCES. IT RARELY IS THE SOURCE OF ANY RELIEF TO

PETITIONERS OTHER THAN PROVIDING A CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH THEIR COMPLAINTS CAN BE AIRED.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

16. DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER NGO'S HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO A SYSTEMATIC GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN SINCE THE JULY 27 VIOLENCE AT PDI HEADQUARTERS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS USED THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH JULY 27 AS A PRETEXT TO INTIMIDATE, ARREST, AND

OTHERWISE PRESSURE HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER ACTIVISTS INTO LIMITING THEIR ACTIVITIES.

17. THE GOVERNMENT HAS RESISTED A PROPOSAL BY THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO OPEN AN OFFICE IN JAKARTA WHICH WOULD HAVE THE CAPACITY TO MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS. THE GOVERNMENT HAD INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO PERMIT AN OFFICE TO OPEN IN JAKARTA SO LONG AS ITS MISSION WAS RESTRICTED TO TECHNICAL OPERATIONS SUCH AS CONDUCTING SEMINARS WITHOUT ANY MONITORING FUNCTION.

18. THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS OR FOREIGN-BASED CRITICISM OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IT EMPHASIZES ITS BELIEF THAT LINKING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE OR OTHER SANCTIONS RELATED TO ITS HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE CONSTITUTES INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND IS THEREFORE UNACCEPTABLE.

19. THE ICRC CONTINUED TO OPERATE IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, AND

ACEH, AND TO VISIT PRISONERS CONVICTED OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ABORTIVE, COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP IN 1965, CONVICTED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, AND EAST TIMORESE PRISONERS. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO PERMITTED THE ICRC TO VISIT 10 DETAINEES IN THE CUSTODY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE JULY 27 VIOLENCE IN JAKARTA. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO INVITED SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS TO VISIT WITH TWO OF THESE DETAINEES ON ONE OCCASION.

20. WHILE RECEIVING SUPPORT FOR ITS WORK FROM THE GOVERNMENT IN PRINCIPLE, THE ICRC CONTINUALLY FACED DIFFICULTY IN IMPLEMENTING ITS HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM IN EAST TIMOR DURING 1996. THE ICRC NO LONGER MAINTAINS AN OFFICE IN IRIAN JAYA, BUT IT VISITS THAT PROVINCE FROM JAKARTA SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR. THE ICRC WAS DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE AN END TO THE JANUARY-MAY HOSTAGE CRISIS IN IRIAN JAYA, WORKING IN CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO ACHIEVE A NON-VIOLENT END TO THAT MATTER. THE ICRC ALSO VISITS ACEH REGULARLY, BUT THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT APPROVED THE ICRC'S REQUEST TO OPEN AN OFFICE THERE. TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR BY FOREIGN HUMAN RIGHTS NGO'S HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED. INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS ARE ABLE TO VISIT EAST

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ3586

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ3586

PAGE 01 JAKART 07286 04 OF 04 041430Z
ACTION DRL-09

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/030W			

----------6C7BB5 041430Z /38

P 041428Z OCT 96
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2889
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 007286

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, ID

SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA -- PART THREE

TIMOR.

21. THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, IN ITS THIRD YEAR OF OPERATION, CONTINUED TO BE ACTIVE IN EXAMINING REPORTED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND CONTINUED TO SHOW INDEPENDENCE AND A WILLINGNESS TO CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND POLICIES. IT INVESTIGATED THE APRIL DEATHS OF STUDENTS IN

UJUNG PANDANG, ISSUED A FORTHRIGHT STATEMENT IN JUNE CONDEMNING THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL PDI AFFAIRS, AND TACKLED AN INVESTIGATION OF THE JULY 27 INCIDENT, WHICH WAS WIDELY CONSIDERED TO BE ITS GREATEST CHALLENGE YET. LACKING ENFORCEMENT POWERS, THE COMMISSION ATTEMPTS TO WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM, SENDING TEAMS WHERE NECESSARY TO INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS AND EMPLOYING PERSUASION, PUBLICITY, AND MORAL AUTHORITY TO HIGHLIGHT ABUSES, MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGAL AND REGULATORY CHANGES, AND ENCOURAGE CORRECTIVE ACTION. THE COMMISSION WILL SOON OCCUPY ITS OWN PERMANENT FACILITIES, BUT STILL CONTINUES TO HAVE VERY LIMITED STAFF SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT APPOINTED THE ORIGINAL COMMISSION MEMBERS, THE COMMISSION FILLS VACANCIES IN ITS RANKS INDEPENDENTLY BY INTERNAL ELECTION. A NEW CHAIRMAN AND FOUR NEW MEMBERS, REPLACING THOSE WHO HAD DIED WHILE IN OFFICE, WERE ELECTED IN THE FALL.

22. THE COMMISSION OPENED AN EAST TIMOR OFFICE IN JUNE 1996. THIS WAS WIDELY REGARDED AS A POSITIVE STEP FORWARD IN THE ONGOING EFFORT TO ADDRESS AND RESOLVE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN EAST TIMOR. HOWEVER, MANY ALSO HAD DOUBTS ABOUT ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS BECAUSE OF ITS LOCATION NEXT TO THE LOCAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, ITS LEADERSHIP BY A NON-TIMORESE, ITS RELIANCE ON GOVERNMENT PROVIDED STAFFING, AND THE FACT THAT IT COULD ONLY RECEIVE COMPLAINTS AND SEND THEM BACK TO JAKARTA, BUT NOT TAKE ACTION ITSELF. THE INITIAL FLOW OF CITIZENS TO THE FACILITY TENDED TO COMPRISE PEOPLE WHO DID NOT BEAR COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES, CONVEYING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE LOCAL POPULATION WERE RELUCTANT TO APPROACH THE FACILITY. IT IS EXPECTED THAT SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE IMPEDED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OFFICE WILL BE RESOLVED AT

THE END OF 1996 OR EARLY IN 1997.

23. FINDINGS ISSUED BY THE BODY WHICH WERE CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OR DISAGREED WITH THE GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE, NOTABLY WITH REGARD TO THE JULY 27 RIOTING IN JAKARTA, HAVE DRAWN THINLY VEILED GOVERNMENT REBUKES AND WARNINGS. MOREOVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS TENDED TO IGNORE SOME COMMISSION FINDINGS OR, IN SOME INSTANCES HAS MOVED LETHARGICALLY IN REACTION TO THEM. OF SIX CASES OF ABRI ABUSE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN IRIAN JAYA IDENTIFIED BY THE COMMISSION IN SEPTEMBER 1995, ONLY ONE HAD LED TO COURT ACTION BY THE END OF 1996.

ROY

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6745

PAGE 01 JAKART 00200 100753Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00
	EB-00	OIGO-01	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00
	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10
	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/028W			

----------8E0A5F 100821Z /38

P 100746Z JAN 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4131
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

UNCLAS JAKARTA 000200

E.O. 12958: N/A/
TAGS: PHUM, PREF, ID
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON REFUGEES FOR COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES

REF: STATE 319

1. IN LIGHT OF THE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REPORTING ON REFUGEE AND RESETTLEMENT ISSUES (REFTEL PARA 9-10) EMBASSY PROPOSES FOLLOWING REVISION OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 2, PART D:

IN PAST YEARS THE GOVERNMENT OFFERED FIRST ASYLUM TO OVER 125,000 INDOCHINESE BOAT PEOPLE. IN SEPTEMBER 1996, INDONESIA'S GALANG ISLAND CAMP WAS CLOSED AS THE LAST REMAINING ASYLUM SEEKERS WERE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 00200 100753Z
REPATRIATED. THERE REMAIN, HOWEVER, SOME 18 "REFUGEES" AWAITING A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200504418

THIRD COUNTRY RESETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITY. WHILE PROVIDING FIRST ASYLUM FOR VIETNAMESE AND CAMBODIAN BOAT PEOPLE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT FORMULATED A POLICY REGARDING ASYLUM SEEKERS OF OTHER NATIONALITIES. IN 1996, UNHCR ASSISTED 21 SUCH NON-INDOCHINESE WHO WERE RECOGNIZED AS REFUGEES UNDER UNHCR MANDATE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS REFUSED TO GRANT THESE REFUGEES ASYLUM OR LEGAL STAY. SOME HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED FOR RESETTLEMENT IN THIRD COUNTRIES, WHILE OTHERS HAVE BEEN HELD IN DETENTION OR ALLOWED TO STAY IN INDONESIA WITHOUT LEGAL STATUS. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF FORCED RETURN OF PERSONS TO A COUNTRY WHERE THEY FEARED PERSECUTION.

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9642

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 01 OF 31 151014Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF56C1 151014Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7804

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

1. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS THE 1997 COUNTRY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

3. DESPITE A SURFACE ADHERENCE TO DEMOCRATIC FORMS, THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAINS STRONGLY AUTHORITARIAN. THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200504418

GOVERNMENT IS DOMINATED BY AN ELITE COMPRISING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO (NOW IN HIS SIXTH FIVE-YEAR TERM), HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES, AND THE MILITARY. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES ALLEGIANCE TO A STATE IDEOLOGY KNOWN AS "PANCASILA," WHICH STRESSES CONSULTATION AND CONSENSUS, BUT IS ALSO USED TO LIMIT DISSENT, TO ENFORCE SOCAL AND POLITICAL COHESION, AND TO RESTRICT THEDEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITION ELEMENTS. THE JUDICIARY IS EFFECTIVELY SUBORDINATED TO THE EXECUTIVE AND THE MILITARY.

THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE 450,000-MEMBER ARMED FORCES, WHICH INCLUDES 175,000 POLICE, IS MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY. MILITARY SPENDING IS APPROXIMATELY 1.4 PERCENT OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT. DESPITE A DECREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE OR RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS IN KEY GOVERNMENT POSIIONS, THE MILITARY RETAINED SUBSTANTIAL NONMILTARY POWERS UNDER A "DUL FUNCTION" CONCEPT THAT ACCORDS IT A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ROLE IN "DEVELOPING THE NATION." THERE CONTINUED TO BE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE MILITARY AND THE POLICE.

INDONESIA HAS A VIGOROUS AND RAPIDLY GROWING ECONOMY, THOUGH THE CURRENCY CRISIS THAT HIT THE REGION IN THE MIDDLE OF THE YEAR WAS EXPECTED TO SLOW ECONOMIC EXPANSION. THE BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ARE WIDELY DISPERSED AND LIVING STANDARDS HAVE RISEN SIGNIFICANTLY, BUT A LARGE SEGMENT OF THE POPULATION REMAINS POOR. PERVASIVE CORRUPTION REMAINS A PROBLEM. SPORADIC UNREST LED TO STRONGER DEMANDS THAT THE GOVERNMENT ACT MORE EFFECTIVELY TO ADDRESS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INEQUITIES. IN RURAL AREAS, DISCONTENT OFTEN FOCUSED ON THE GRIEVANCES OF SMALL LAND OWNERS--ESPECIALLY THOSE FORCED OFF THEIR LAND BY POWERFUL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTERESTS. IN SOME REGIONS, EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES HAS ENTAILED SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL

DEGRADATION WITH ADVERSE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO COMMIT SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. RISING PRESSURES FOR CHANGE FROM POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND OPPONENTS MET TOUGH GOVERNMENT REACTIONS THAT DAMPENED DISSENT IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION. THE GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WOULD NOT TOLERATE CHALLENGES TO THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM BY ARRESTING AND PLACING ON

TRIAL SOME OF ITS CRITICS. REPORTS CONTINUED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS, INCLUDING OF UNARMED CIVILIANS, DISAPPEARANCES, TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES, AND ARBITRARY ARRESTS AND DETENTION.

THERE WERE ALSO CONTINUING DEVELOPMENTS IN CIVIL SOCIETY THAT COULD HELP CURB FUTURE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. THE INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE (KIPP) CARRIED OUT LIMITED, YET SIGNIFICANT, MONITORING ACTIVITIES DURING THE CAMPAIGN AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE KIPP AND RESTRICTED ITS ACTIVITIES, THE ORGANIZATION GATHERED INFORMATION ABOUT ELECTION VIOLATIONS AND PRESENTED IT TO THE PUBLIC. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DESPITE LIMITED RESOURCES AND OCCASIONAL GOVERNMENT PRESSURE, UNDERTOOK INVESTIGATIONS AND PUBLICIZED ITS INDEPENDENT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, BUT LACKED ENFORCEMENT POWERS. THE GOVERNMENT IGNORED OR RESPONDED SLOWLY TO SOME COMMISSION FINDINGS. THE INCREASE OF PRIVATE HUMAN RIGHTS MOITORING IN EAST TIMOR WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, AND THE GOVERNMENT TOOK SOME ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO CRITICISM OF ITS HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE; FOR EXAMPLE, A HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW TRAINING SEMINAR WAS CONDUCTED FOR THE MILITARY BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC).

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 06040 01 OF 31 151014Z

THE AUTHORITIES MAINTAINED THEIR TIGHT GRIP ON THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THE MAY 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, IN LINE WITH THE PREVIOUS FIVE HELD SINCE 1971, DENIED CITIZENS THE ABILITY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT DEMOCRATICALLY. THE STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM CONTINUED TO GUARANTEE VICTORY TO THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR, WHICH SECURED ITS BIGGEST WIN EVER. GOVERNMENT-OUTED INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND HER SUPPORTERS WERE NOT PERMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO RUNAS CANDIDATES IN THE GENERAL ELECTION OR TO MKE COMMON CAUSE WITH THE MUSLIM-ORIENTED UNITEDDEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP). THE ELECTION AND AMPAIGN WERE MARRED BY CREDIBLE ALLEGATIONS O FRAUD AS WELL AS BY SPORADIC, YET SIGNIFICANT, VIOLENCE.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO IMPOSE SEVERE LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, ASEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION. MEETINGS OF NGOS AND LABOR

UNIONS, AS WELL AS PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS, WERE PREVENTED OR BROKEN UP BY THE GOVERNMENT, SOMETIMES VIOLENTLY. HOWEVER, THERE WERE NOTABLE EXAMPLES OF WELL-PUBLICIZED MEETINGS, SMINARS, AND GATHERINGS ON SENSITIVE SUBJECTS, AS WELL AS PUBLIC

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ0041

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0041

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 02 OF 31 151240Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	INL-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00
	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00
	MR-00	/029W					

----------EF6668 151241Z /45

R 151009Z OCT 97(CCY-SECTION INFO-045)
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7805

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 02 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

CORRECTED COPY -(SECTION INFORMATION)
NOFORN

DEPARTMET FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES --

INDONESIA

DEMONSTRATIONS, THAT WERE NOT STOPPED. FOURTEEN YOUNG ACTIVISTS BELONGING TO, OR ASSOCIATED WITH, THE SMALL, UNAUTHORIZED, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) WERE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION BASED MOSTLY ON THEIR WRITINGS, SPEECHES, AND ORGANIZATIONAL

ACTIVITIES. INDEPENDENT LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN FACED SUBVERSION CHARGES MAINLY FOR EXPRESSING HIS POLITICAL VIEWS. FORMER PARLIAMENTARIAN SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS WAS DETAINED UNDER THE ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW FOR THE POLITICAL PRONOUNCEMENTS OF HIS UNRECOGNIZED INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION PARTY (PUDI). SITTING PARLIAMENTARIAN ABERSON MARLE SIHALOLO WAS SENTENCED TO NINE MONTHS IN PRISON FOR ALLEGEDLY INSULTING THE PRESIDENT AND MILITARY IN REMARKS MADE AT A "FREE SPEECH FORUM" IN JULY 1996 AT THE FORMER PDI HEADQUARTERS. AN ASSISTANT TO THE AUTHOR OF A BOOK BANNED BY THE GOVERNMENT WAS BROUGHT TO TRIAL FOR HIS ROLE IN ITS PUBLICATION.

INDONESIAN LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH USED THE COURTS TO PROSECUTE GOVERNMENT CRITICS AND POLITICAL OPPONENTS. MOST COURTS REFUSED TO HEAR THE LAWSUITS FILED THROUGHOUT INDONESIA BY MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND HER SUPPORTERS PROTESTING HER OUSTER AS PDI LEADER, ALTHOUGH A FEW AT A PRELIMINARY LEVEL ACCEPTED THE CASE AND RULED IN HER FAVOR. THE COURTS HAVE A REPUTATION FOR PERVASIVE CORRUPTION.

THE GOVERNMENT EXERCISES INDIRECT CONTROL OVER THE PRESS AND USES INTIMIDATION TO SUPPRESS HOSTILE COMMENTARY. MILD CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS TOLERATED, BUT CRITICS OF THE PRESIDENT, SENIOR OFFICIALS, OR POWERFUL LOCAL INTERESTS RISKED HARASSMENT OR ARREST. DESPITE THESE PROBLEMS, THE PRINT MEDIA PROVIDED WIDE COVERAGE OF POLITICAL ISSUES AND REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

VIOLATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT FULLY INVESTIGATE OR RESOLVE MANY CASES OF ATTACKS ON RELIGIOUS FACILITIES AND CHURCHES DURING RIOTS, ALTHOUGH IT ISSUED SEVERAL PUBLIC APPEALS FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN AND THE

DISABLED AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ARE ENDEMIC PROBLEMS.

SECURITY FORCES GENERALLY REFRAINED FROM USING FORCE TO STOP THE PROHIBITED, MASSIVE STREET RALLIES THAT DOMINATED THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND IN MOST CASES DID NOT USE LETHAL FORCE IN RESPONDING TO MAJOR RIOTS. HOWEVER, SECURITY FORCES WERE CRITICIZED FOR NOT ACTING IN TIME TO PROTECT CITIZENS AND PROPERTY FROM THE LARGE SCALE DESTRUCTION THAT OCCURRED. THE RIOTING RESULTED FROM A COMBINATION OF ECONOMIC, COMMUNAL, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL FACTORS. IT BEGAN IN 1996, CONTINUED INTO 1997, ABATED AFTER THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION, AND ERUPTED AGAIN IN UJUNG PANDANG, SOUTH SULAWESI IN SEPTEMBER. DESPITE THEIR REDUCED USE OF LETHAL FORCE, SECURITY FORCES OFTEN RESORTED TO BRUTALITY IN REACTING TO PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS OR IN DISPUTES WITH CITIZENS.

THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINED ITS OPPOSITION TO ALTERNATIVES TO THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED LABOR MOVEMENT AND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FREE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT, BUT PERMITTED AN EXTRAORDINARILY OPEN DEBATE OVER A NEW BASIC LABOR LAW. MEMBERS OF THE PRINCIPAL UNAUTHORIZED LABOR ORGANIZATION CITED CONTINUED INSTANCES OF HARASSMENT, AND ITS PLANNED THREE-DAY CONGRESS WAS SHUT DOWN BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES IN SEPTEMBER ON THE FIRST DAY. THE GOVERNMENT URGED EMPLOYERS TO PAY ON TIME THE INCREASED MINIMUM WAGE AND MANDATED BENEFITS, AND GAVE GREATER EMPHASIS TO WORKER SAFETY AND HEALTH. HOWEVER, ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR STANDARDS REMAINED WEAK. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) SIGNED A NEW MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CHILD LABOR TO PROMOTE THE PROTECTION OF WORKING CHILDREN AND TO MOVE PROGRESSIVELY TOWARD ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOR. HOWEVER, MILLIONS OF CHILDREN STILL WORK, OFTEN UNDER POOR CONDITIONS, AND ARE THUS UNABLE TO ATTEND SCHOOL.

IN EAST TIMOR, IN EARLY 1997 THE SECURITY FORCES RESPONDED TO THE MASSIVE DECEMBER 1996 DEMONSTRATIONS IN SUPPORT OF NOBEL PEACE PRIZE RECIPIENT BISHOP BELO, THE BEATING AND DEATH OF ONE OUT-OF-UNIFORM POLICE, AND THE INJURY OF SEVERAL OTHER POLICE DURING THE DEMONSTRATIONS WITH A CAMPAIGN OF HARASSMENT AND DETENTIONS. THESE DEVELOPMENTS RAISED TENSIONS TO A HIGH LEVEL. DURING THE MAY ELECTION PERIOD AND ITS AFTERMATH, EAST TIMOR'S LOW-LEVEL INSURGENCY INTENSIFIED WITH GUERRILLA ATTACKS INFLICTING THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IN YEARS ON SECURITY PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY THE CAPTURE AND DEATH OF A PROMINENT GUERRILLA COMMANDER AND WIDESPREAD DETENTIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY REPORTS OF KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCES, TORTURE, AND EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE ON THE PART OF THE AUTHORITIES. THESE DEVELOPMENTS EXACERBATED LONGSTANDING RESENTMENTS ON THE PART OF THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION. BY MID-YEAR, THIS MOST RECENT CYCLE OF HIGH TENSION HAD ABATED AS BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL ON EAST TIMOR RESUMED IN NEW YORK. ONE POLITICAL PRISONER WAS RELEASED WHEN HE BECAME ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE. NO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WAS MADE IN ACCOUNTING FOR THE MISSING PERSONS FOLLOWING THE 1991 DILI INCIDENT OR OTHERS WHO DISAPPEARED IN RECENT YEARS. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN A LARGE MILITARY PRESENCE OF MORE THAN 16,000 PERSONNEL. THE GOVERNMENT GRANTED LIMITED ACCESS TO THE AREA TO FOREIGN

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9643

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 03 OF 31 151014Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF56C9 151014Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7806

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 03 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

JOURNALISTS BUT BANNED TRAVEL BY ALL FOREIGN HUMAN RIGHTS NGO'S EXCEPT THE ICRC. THE DILI BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH OPENED IN 1996, REMAINED INEFFECTIVE, BUT INCREASED EFFORTS BY THE CHURCH AND OTHERS, ALONG WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN NORMS AMONG SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, IMPROVED THE OVERALL QUALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING IN EAST TIMOR. SEEKING ASYLUM OR PUBLICITY FOR THEIR

PAGE 02 JAKART 06040 03 OF 31 151014Z
CAUSE, YOUNG EAST TIMORESE MOUNTED FURTHER INTRUSIONS INTO VARIOUS EMBASSIES IN JAKARTA.

IN IRIAN JAYA, RESENTMENT AMONG INDIGENOUS GROUPS AGAINST GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE COMPANIES' POLICIES WHICH THEY VIEWED AS HEAVYHANDED AND ARBITRARY REMAINED. REAL AND PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NATIVE IRIAN PEOPLE PERSISTED. TWO INCIDENTS OF INTER-TRIBAL FIGHTING AND ONE CLASH BETWEEN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND SECURITY FORCES OCCURRED IN THE TIMIKA-TEMBAGAPURA AREA, THE LOCATION OF A FOREIGN MINING COMPANY, AND RESULTED IN SEVERAL DEATHS. THE COMPANY BEGAN MOVING FORWARD ON ITS PLAN TO DISTRIBUTE A PERCENTAGE OF ITS PROFITS TO INDIGENOUS GROUPS IN THE AREA AS PART OF A REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT EFFORT, BUT SUSPENDED THIS INITIATIVE IN AUGUST BECAUSE OF DISPUTES OVER HOW THE FUNDS SHOULD BE ALLOCATED. THE GOVERNMENT'S CLOSURE OF CERTAIN AREAS OF THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS CONTINUED INTO THE BEGINNING OF 1997, DUE TO THE MILITARY'S SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGAINST AN INDIGENOUS SEPARATIST GROUP THAT HAD TAKEN HOSTAGES IN 1996, BUT THESE RESTRICTIONS WERE LOOSENED IN THE LATTER PART OF THE YEAR. THERE WERE REPORTS THAT IN THE RESTRICTED AREAS THE MILITARY HAD FORCED VILLAGERS TO PERFORM UNCOMPENSATED LABOR, THAT HUTS HAD BEEN BURNED IN ONE VILLAGE, AND THAT IN LATE 1996 THERE WERE INSTANCES OF BEATINGS AND OTHER ABUSE. THE MILITARY DENIED SUCH REPORTS AND BLAMED ABUSE ON THE SEPARATIST GROUP.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS

HISTORICALLY, POLITICALLY RELATED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS HAVE OCCURRED MOST FREQUENTLY IN AREAS WHERE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS WERE ACTIVE, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAYA. SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO EMPLOY HARSH MEASURES AGAINST SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, WHEREAS THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN ACEH HAD LARGELY SUBSIDED FOLLOWING THE GOVERNMENT'S MILITARY CAMPAIGN CARRIED OUT IN PREVIOUS YEARS. THERE WERE ALSO NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF REPORTED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES IN CASES INVOLVING ALLEGED COMMON CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.

CREDIBLE SOURCES CONFIRMED SEVERAL DEATHS IN DETENTION IN EAST

TIMOR DURING THE YEAR. IN JUNE, A CERTAIN "JANUARIO" WAS DETAINED IN BAUCAU, SEVERELY BEATEN, AND DIED WHILE BEING TRANSPORTED TO DILI. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS BELIEVED A NUMBER OF OTHER KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES OF CIVILIANS MAY HAVE OCCURRED, ESPECIALLY IN MORE ISOLATED AREAS, BUT THESE WERE IMPOSSIBLE TO CONFIRM. THERE WERE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS OF DETAINEES IN EAST TIMOR BEING SHOT TO DEATH WHILE ALLEGEDLY ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE.

THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF DEATHS IN, OR RELATED TO, DETENTION IN OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA AS WELL. IN MARCH, TEGUH SUNARTO DIED IN EAST JAVA NOT LONG AFTER HIS RELEASE FROM POLICE DETENTION. SUNARTO AND TWO OTHERS WERE DETAINED ON MARCH 17 BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT IN POSSESSION OF IDENTITY CARDS. TWO POLICE REPORTEDLY ORDERED 15 INMATES TO BEAT THE THREE DETAINEES, AND IT WAS ALSO ALLEGED THAT THE THREE WERE SUBJECTED TO ADDITIONAL SEVERE MISTREATMENT, INCLUDING CIGARETTE BURNS. TWO OF THE POLICE INVOLVED WERE DETAINED. IN APRIL, A FARMER IN CENTRAL LAMPUNG, SUKIRNO, DIED IN POLICE CUSTODY. ACCORDING TO A CREDIBLE REPORT, TEN POLICE AND FORESTRY SERVICE OFFICERS TOOK

HIM FROM HIS HOME ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 14, ACCUSING HIM OF POSSESSING A HOME-MADE GUN AND POACHING FROM A PROTECTED FOREST. TWO DAYS LATER SUKIRNO'S FAMILY WAS INFORMED THAT HE COMMITTED SUICIDE WHILE IN POLICE CUSTODY. HOWEVER, NUMEROUS WOUNDS AND BRUISES WERE REPORTEDLY FOUND ON SUKIRNO'S BODY.

TWO IRIANESE WERE SHOT AND KILLED BY SECURITY FORCES IN TIMIKA ON AUGUST 22 IN AN ALTERCATION IN WHICH THE IRIANESE PELTED THE SECURITY FORCES WITH ARROWS AND ROCKS, INJURING AT LEAST TWO. THE SECURITY FORCES CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD USED RUBBER BULLETS. SOME SOURCES SAID THAT THE SECURITY FORCES ACTED IN SELF DEFENSE, WHILE OTHERS SAID THAT THE SECURITY FORCES FIRED FIRST. THE INCIDENT WAS SPARKED BY THE EARLIER UNEXPLAINED DEATHS OF TWO OTHER IRIANESE.

THE POLICE OFTEN EMPLOYED DEADLY FORCE IN APPREHENDING SUSPECTS OR COPING WITH ALLEGED CRIMINALS, MANY OF WHOM WERE UNARMED. IN RESPONSE TO PROTESTS THAT THE METHODS USED WERE UNJUSTIFIABLY HARSH AND AMOUNTED TO EXECUTION WITHOUT TRIAL, POLICE GENERALLY CLAIMED THAT THE SUSPECTS WERE FLEEING, RESISTING ARREST, OR THREATENING THE POLICE.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9654

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9654

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 04 OF 31 151014Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF56CD 151014Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7807

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 04 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID

SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

COMPLETE STATISTICS ABOUT THE NUMBER OF THESE CASES HAVE NOT BEEN RELEASED. HOWEVER, PRESS REPORTS, INCLUDING STATEMENTS OF POLICE OFFICIALS, SHOW A PATTERN OF INCREASED LETHAL SHOOTINGS BY THE POLICE OF CRIMINAL SUSPECTS, MANY OF WHOM WERE UNARMED. AT LEAST SEVEN CRIME SUSPECTS WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN SHOT DEAD BY POLICE IN JAKARTA IN JANUARY, AND THE NUMBER REPORTEDLY CLIMBED

TO 32 BY APRIL, COMPARED TO A REPORT THAT 46 HAD BEEN SHOT BY POLICE IN THE CAPITAL DURING ALL OF 1996. IT WAS REPORTED THAT 28 HAD BEEN SIMILARLY SHOT BY THE POLICE IN SURABAYA DURING THE SAME TIME PERIOD IN 1997. IN MAY, A JAKARTA POLICE SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT 63 SHOOTINGS BY POLICE HAD OCCURRED BETWEEN JANUARY AND APRIL, THOUGH HE SAID THAT AT LEAST 15 PERCENT WERE NOT FATAL. THE TREND OF POLICE SHOOTINGS OF SUSPECTED CRIMINALS CONTINUED IN THE FOLLOWING MONTHS.

IN THE PAST, HIGHER AUTHORITIES RARELY PUNISHED THE MILITARY OR POLICE FOR USING EXCESSIVE FORCE. THERE WERE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THIS SITUATION WAS IMPROVING, ALTHOUGH THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE AUTHORITIES WAS USUALLY NOT COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF THE ABUSES. A MILITARY TRIBUNAL ON JULY 23 SENTENCED THE FORMER CHIEF OF THE BOGOR DETECTIVE UNIT TO NINE MONTHS IN PRISON. THE DETECTIVE WAS INVOLVED IN THE TORTURE OF A SUSPECT, TJETJE TADJUDIN, WHO DIED IN POLICE CUSTODY IN OCTOBER 1996. THE COURT HEARD TESTIMONY THAT TJETJE HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO ELECTRIC SHOCKS AND BEATINGS DURING POLICE INTERROGATION. THE POLICE DETECTIVE AND TWO ASSISTANTS WERE CHARGED WITH MISTREATING TJETJE AND THEREBY CAUSING HIS DEATH (ARTICLE 351 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE) AND MISUSE OF AUTHORITY (ARTICLE 126 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE). THE PROSECUTOR REQUESTED SEVENTEEN MONTHS FOR THESE CRIMES, BUT THE DETECTIVE WAS SENTENCED TO NINE MONTHS AND TEN DAYS ON JULY 23 BECAUSE HE WAS FOUND GUILTY ONLY OF "MISUSE OF AUTHORITY". NOBODY HAS YET BEEN HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR TJETJE'S DEATH AND THE CONVICTED POLICE DETECTIVE WAS NOT REMOVED FROM THE POLICE FORCE PENDING APPEAL.

THE FOUR POLICE OFFICERS WHO MISTREATED RELIGIOUS TEACHERS IN

THERE, WERE FOUND GUILTY BY A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND GIVEN SENTENCES RANGING FROM 22 TO 28 MONTHS.

FIVE CASES OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN IRIAN JAYA INVOLVING THE DEATH OF IRIANESE CIVILIANS, CITED IN A SEPTEMBER 1995 REPORT BY THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, HAVE LANGUISHED, AND THE COMMISSION HAS REQUESTED FOLLOW-UP ACTION IN 1997.

THE MILITARY SUFFERED ITS HIGHEST NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IN RECENT YEARS IN EAST TIMOR, MOST IN A WAVE OF GUERRILLA ATTACKS DURING THE MAY ELECTION PERIOD AND ITS AFTERMATH. EIGHTEEN SECURITY PERSONNEL WERE KILLED IN A SINGLE ATTACK NEAR BAUCAU IN MAY. IN ADDITION TO NUMEROUS OTHER KILLINGS OF SOLDIERS AND POLICE BY THE GUERRILLAS, IN SOME INSTANCES CIVILIAN EAST TIMORESE SUSPECTED OF WORKING FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND OTHER CIVILIANS WERE KILLED BY GUERRILLAS. A SCHOOL TEACHER AND MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY WERE KILLED BY GUERRILLAS DURING THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD. A LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL IN EAST TIMOR, WHO WAS ALSO CHIEF OF THE LOCAL PARAMILITARY "GADA PAKSI" GROUP, AND FOUR OTHER CIVILIANS WERE KILLED IN APRIL WHEN THEIR CAR WAS ATTACKED NEAR VIQUEQUE, PRESUMABLY BY GUERRILLAS.

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN ACEH HAS IMPROVED SINCE THE EARLY 1990S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ACEHNESE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT. ALTHOUGH ACEH MERDEKA WAS LARGELY ELIMINATED AS A VIABLE FORCE, ACEH IS STILL OFFICIALLY LISTED AS ONE OF INDONESIA'S THREE "TROUBLED AREAS" (ALONG WITH EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA). BECAUSE THE AREA HAD BEEN RELATIVELY PEACEFUL FOR SEVERAL YEARS, THERE WAS DISCUSSION IN JANUARY OF DECLARING ACEH SECURE AND REMOVING THE CLASSIFICATION OF TROUBLED AREA AS A REFLECTION OF CONFIDENCE IN

THE SECURITY SITUATION. THE DISCUSSION WAS SUSPENDED AFTER MILITARY OPERATIONS NETTED WEAPONS CACHES, ALLEGEDLY BELONGING TO ACEH MERDEKA, IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH, FOLLOWING A VIOLENT BANK ROBBERY DURING WHICH THREE BANK EMPLOYEES WERE SHOT AND KILLED BY THE CRIMINALS. DURING THE MILITARY OPERATION AND SEARCH FOR THE CRIMINALS THAT FOLLOWED, AT LEAST TWO SUSPECTS, ALLEGED BY THE MILITARY TO BE FROM ACEH MERDEKA, WERE SHOT TO DEATH BY THE MILITARY DURING RAIDS. A MILITARY SOURCE CLAIMED THAT THE VICTIMS WERE ARMED. DURING A ROUNDUP OF SUSPECTED ACEH MERDEKA SEPARATISTS, AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF SUSPECTS WERE ARRESTED DURING FEBRUARY AND MARCH. THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT A SMALL NUMBER OF ACEH MERDEKA MEMBERS REMAIN IN ACEH, AND MAINTAIN SOME SYMPATHY AMONG THE LOCAL POPULATION, BUT THEY ARE NOT SEEN AS POSING AN ACTIVE SECURITY THREAT. THERE ARE ALLEGATIONS OF CRIMINAL AND ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN REGIONS OF ACEH WHICH WERE FORMERLY AREAS WHERE ACEH MERDEKA SEPARATISTS OPERATED.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

RELIABLE SOURCES IN EAST TIMOR REPORTED NUMEROUS DISAPPEARANCES,

NNNNPTQ9655

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 05 OF 31 151014Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF56D6 151014Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7808

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 05 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

ESPECIALLY IN MORE ISOLATED AREAS. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MISSING AND DEAD FROM THE NOVEMBER 12, 1991 MILITARY SHOOTING OF CIVILIANS IN DILI, EAST TIMOR. NO ADDITIONAL CASES WERE RESOLVED DURING THE YEAR. KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE MISSING ARE DEAD AND THAT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES KNOW WHERE THEIR BODIES ARE LOCATED.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 06040 05 OF 31 151014Z

THE GOVERNMENT MADE LITTLE PROGRESS IN RESOLVING THE 1996 "JULY 27 INCIDENT." THE INCIDENT INVOLVED THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED VIOLENT TAKEOVER OF INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) HEADQUARTERS THAT TRIGGERED DAMAGING RIOTING IN JAKARTA. THE GOVERNMENT MOVED SLOWLY IN RESPONDING TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION'S OCTOBER 1996 REPORT ON THIS INCIDENT THAT LISTED 23

MISSING, 149 INJURED AND 5 DEAD, ONE OF WHOM HAD BEEN SHOT. (SEE SECTION 4). IN SEPTEMBER, THE AUTHORITIES REPORTEDLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE JULY 27 CASE HAD NOT BEEN CLOSED AND AGREED THAT A SEARCH WOULD BE CONDUCTED FOR THE 16 PEOPLE THAT THE COMMISSION REPORTED WERE STILL MISSING.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

THE CRIMINAL CODE MAKES IT A CRIME PUNISHABLE BY UP TO 4 YEARS IN PRISON FOR ANY OFFICIAL TO USE VIOLENCE OR FORCE TO ELICIT A CONFESSION. IT ESTABLISHES PRETRIAL PROCEDURES TO GIVE SUSPECTS OR THEIR FAMILIES THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF AN ARREST OR DETENTION. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, LEGAL PROTECTIONS ARE BOTH INADEQUATE AND WIDELY IGNORED, AND SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO EMPLOY TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF MISTREATMENT, PARTICULARLY IN REGIONS WHERE THERE WERE ACTIVE SECURITY CONCERNS, SUCH AS IRIAN JAYA AND EAST TIMOR. POLICE OFTEN RESORT TO PHYSICAL ABUSE, EVEN IN MINOR INCIDENTS.

IN EAST TIMOR, MILITARY UNITS REGULARLY DETAIN CIVILIANS FOR INTERROGATION; MOST ARE HELD IN EXTRA-LEGAL MILITARY DETENTION CENTERS, OFTEN WITH NO NOTIFICATION OF RELATIVES, MISTREATED FOR SEVERAL DAYS AND THEN RELEASED. FAMILY MEMBERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS ENCOUNTER SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN IDENTIFYING AND VISITING DETAINEES HELD IN THESE MILITARY FACILITIES. MANY CREDIBLE SOURCES AGREED THAT PERSONS DETAINED BY THE POLICE IN EAST TIMOR WERE ROUTINELY BEATEN WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING DETAINED. ALL 32 PEOPLE DETAINED FOLLOWING A DEMONSTRATION AT THE MAKHOTA HOTEL IN DILI IN MARCH SUFFERED BEATINGS AT THE HANDS OF THE POLICE, ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES.

FOUR RESIDENTS OF LAVATERI VILLAGE NEAR BAUCAU, EAST TIMOR DETAINED ON APRIL 4 BY AN INTELLIGENCE TEAM, WERE REPORTEDLY BEATEN WITH RIFLE BUTTS, WITH ONE INDIVIDUAL SUFFERING A BROKEN RIB AND ANOTHER HAVING A CROSS CARVED INTO THE PALM OF HER HAND. SIX EAST TIMORESE DETAINED BY THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE UNIT (SGI) IN LIQUICA ON FEBRUARY 26 WERE REPORTEDLY TORTURED WITH ELECTRIC SHOCKS AND IMMERSION IN ICE WATER. FIVE EAST TIMORESE CIVILIANS

DETAINED BY SECURITY FORCES NEAR LIQUICA ON APRIL 30 WERE REPORTEDLY BEATEN WITH RIFLE BUTTS AND SUFFERED ELECTRIC SHOCKS.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN A LARGE MILITARY PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR, TOTALING MORE THAN 16,000 PERSONNEL, WHICH MANY EAST TIMORESE AND OTHERS VIEWED AS EXCESSIVE. THE GOVERNMENT, AS IT DOES ELSEWHERE, ALSO RELIED ON BANDS OF YOUTHS, ORGANIZED AND DIRECTED BY THE MILITARY, TO INTIMIDATE AND HARASS ITS OPPONENTS IN EAST TIMOR. SUCH A GROUP, KNOWN AS THE "GADA PAKSI," WAS ESPECIALLY INVOLVED IN NIGHTTIME RAIDS IN DILI NEIGHBORHOODS IN THE EARLY PART OF THE YEAR AND WAS WIDELY BLAMED FOR PROVOKING SERIOUS DISTURBANCES IN VIQUEQUE IN FEBRUARY. GADA PAKSI ACTIVITY ABATED IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE YEAR.

TWO CASES OF RAPE OF EAST TIMORESE WOMEN BY MILITARY PERSONNEL
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

HAVE GAINED PUBLIC ATTENTION AS HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS TRY TO BRING THE CASES TO TRIAL. LEGAL ACTION IS BEING PURSUED IN THE CASE OF ONE EAST TIMORESE WOMAN ALLEGEDLY THE VICTIM OF REPEATED RAPES BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN NOVEMBER 1996 WHILE IN MILITARY CUSTODY. SHE WAS DETAINED AFTER A RELATIVE ALLEGEDLY TOLD THE AUTHORITIES THAT SHE WAS OFTEN VISITED BY GUERRILLAS, WHO ASKED FOR SOAP AND OTHER BASIC SUPPLIES. AFTER HER RELEASE, SHE REPORTED THE RAPES TO HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, AND WROTE A LETTER TO THE LOCAL MILITARY COMMAND UNIT, WHO FORWARDED IT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. A DECISION IS PENDING ON WHETHER THE CASE WILL BE TRIED IN MILITARY OR CIVIL COURT.

LAWYERS ARE PLANNING TO SUBMIT TO COURT THE CASE OF RAPE BY MILITARY PERSONNEL OF ANOTHER EAST TIMORESE WOMAN, WHOSE HUSBAND IS KNOWN TO BE WITH THE GUERRILLAS. SHE WAS ALLEGEDLY GANG RAPED BY 10 SOLDIERS. SHE REPORTED THE CASE TO THE CHURCH ON APRIL 8.

THERE WERE INSTANCES WHERE SECURITY FORCES RESPONDED WITH BRUTALITY TO PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS OR IN DISPUTES WITH CITIZENS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY GENERALLY REFRAINED FROM USING FORCE TO STOP THE PROHIBITED, MASSIVE STREET RALLIES THAT

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9779

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9779

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 06 OF 31 151045Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF5AA9 151045Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7809

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 06 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES --
INDONESIA

DOMINATED THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. ON APRIL 2, SECURITY FORCES

VIOLENTLY BROKE-UP A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION BY APPROXIMATELY 200 SUPPORTERS OF MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI IN DENPASAR, BALI. AFTER THEIR LAWSUIT AGAINST THE OUSTER OF MEGAWATI HAD BEEN DISMISSED IN COURT, THE GROUP MARCHED TO THE OFFICE OF THE RIVAL, GOVERNMENT-BACKED PDI TO SEEK A DIALOGUE. WHILE A CONTINGENT OF THE MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WAS INSIDE THE LOCAL HEADQUARTERS

CONDUCTING THE DIALOGUE, SECURITY FORCES FORCIBLY DISPERSED THE REMAINING SUPPORTERS WAITING OUTSIDE. THE SECURITY FORCES USED RATTAN CANES, DOZENS AMONG THE GROUP OF WAITING DEMONSTRATORS SUFFERED MINOR INJURIES.

ON APRIL 28, UNIFORMED AND PLAINCLOTHES SECURITY FORCES ASSAULTED A SMALL GROUP OF PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATORS OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL JAKARTA DISTRICT COURT FOLLOWING THE SENTENCING OF PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) ACTIVISTS. THE SECURITY FORCES BEAT DEMONSTRATORS WITH RATTAN CANES AND KICKED SOME DEMONSTRATORS LYING ON THE GROUND, INJURING AT LEAST TWO. ON JUNE 23, SECURITY FORCES ARMED WITH BAYONETS AND CLUBS ENTERED THE INDONESIAN CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY (UKI) CAMPUS AND ATTACKED A GROUP OF STUDENTS. AT LEAST FIVE OF THE STUDENTS WERE INJURED AND AT LEAST THREE WERE HOSPITALIZED WITH SERIOUS HEAD WOUNDS. THE SECURITY FORCES WERE RETALIATING AFTER A SOLDIER WAS INJURED IN AN ALTERCATION WITH STUDENTS. ON SEPTEMBER 1, ACCORDING TO RELIABLE REPORTS, 27 STUDENTS AND LOCAL RESIDENTS IN BANDA ACEH WERE INJURED, SOME SERIOUSLY, WHEN THREE TRUCKLOADS OF POLICE ATTACKED A GROUP OF STUDENTS AFTER A SOCCER MATCH IN WHICH A DISPUTE BETWEEN A POLICE AND A STUDENT OVER A POSTER HAD ENSUED. STUDENTS AND BYSTANDERS WERE ALLEGEDLY FORCED TO STRIP ON THE SOCCER FIELD AND WERE BEATEN. THOSE WHO RAN AWAY WERE CHASED INTO HOMES AND BEATEN.

THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE WAVE OF MAJOR RIOTS THAT HIT INDONESIA HAD MIXED RESULTS. SECURITY FORCES DID NOT IN MOST CASE USE LETHAL FORCE IN RESPONDING TO THESE MAJOR RIOTS AND THUS SHOWED RELATIVE RESTRAINT. HOWEVER, THERE WAS PUBLIC CRITICISM THAT SECURITY FORCES IN MANY CASES DID NOT ACT IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO PROTECT CITIZENS AND PROPERTY FROM THE LARGE SCALE DESTRUCTION

THAT OCCURRED. THE RIOTING RESULTED FROM A COMBINATION OF ECONOMIC, COMMUNAL, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL FACTORS. IT BEGAN IN 1996, CONTINUED INTO 1997, ABATED AFTER THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION AND ERUPTED AGAIN IN UJUNG PANDANG, SOUTH SULAWESI IN SEPTEMBER.

ON JANUARY 30, SECURITY FORCES RESTORED ORDER IN RENGASDENGKLOK, WEST JAVA WITHOUT RESORT TO LIVE AMMUNITION FIRE OR BRUTAL TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS, THOUGH NOT BEFORE MOBS HAD ATTACKED SHOPS AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS. THE MOST DEADLY RIOT OCCURRED IN BANJARMASIN, SOUTH KALIMANTAN ON MAY 23 ON THE LAST DAY OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. AT LEAST 123 PEOPLE DIED IN A FIRE CAUSED BY THE RIOT AND ENSUING LOOTING OF A DEPARTMENT STORE. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION, AND, ACCORDING TO ITS PUBLISHED STATEMENT, IT CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF LIVE AMMUNITION TO SUBDUE THE RIOTERS. THE COMMISSION ALSO FOUND THAT SOME OF THE ARRESTED SUSPECTS WHO WERE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE RIOTING HAD BEEN BEATEN AFTER ARREST. THE COMMISSION'S STATEMENT INCLUDED THE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT SECURITY FORCES SHOULD TAKE PREVENTIVE MEASURES, AND INSURE THAT MEASURES TAKEN TO CONTROL THE RIOTERS NOT BE EXCESSIVE, IN HANDLING CASES SUCH AS BANJARMASIN.

THE FIGHTING BETWEEN LARGELY CHRISTIAN DAYAK AND MUSLIM MADURESE IN WEST KALIMANTAN DURING LATE DECEMBER 1996, AND JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1997, LED TO HUNDREDS OF DEATHS, MOSTLY AMONG MADURESE, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL ESTIMATES. SOME OBSERVERS CLAIMED THE NUMBER KILLED COULD HAVE BEEN MORE THAN 1000. MOST OF THE DEATHS WERE AS A RESULT OF DAYAK ATTACKS ON MADURESE. THERE WERE INSTANCES, HOWEVER, WHERE SECURITY FORCES FIRED ON DAYAKS WHO WERE HUNTING MADURESE WHO HAD SOUGHT PROTECTION WITH THE

AUTHORITIES. FACING DAYAKS ARMED IN SOME INSTANCES WITH FIRE ARMS, AND TRYING TO PROTECT MADURESE, THE MILITARY USED LETHAL

FORCE ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS RESULTING IN NUMEROUS DEATHS.

PRISON CONDITIONS ARE HARSH WITH VIOLENCE AMONG PRISONERS AND MISTREATMENT AND EXTORTION OF INMATES BY GUARDS COMMON. THE INCIDENCE OF MISTREATMENT DROPS SHARPLY ONCE A PRISONER HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM POLICE OR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (BIA) CUSTODY INTO THE CIVILIAN PRISON SYSTEM OR INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE SOMETIMES MIXED WITH THE GENERAL PRISON POPULATION. IN THE CIPINANG AND SALEMBA PRISONS IN JAKARTA SOME POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE SEGREGATED. THE ICRC WAS DENIED ACCESS TO POLITICAL PRISONERS UNTIL JULY, EXCEPT IN EAST TIMOR WHERE VISITS WERE GENERALLY ALLOWED. SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISITING DIGNITARIES WERE SOMETIMES MADE, ALLOWING THEM TO VISIT SOME PROMINENT POLITICAL PRISONERS.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE CONTAINS PROVISIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION, BUT IT LACKS ADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT

NNNNPTQ9696

OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF57B0 151020Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7810

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 07 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR RL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES --

INDONESIA

MECHANISMS AND IS ROUTINELY VIOLATED. THE CODE SPECIFIES THAT PRISONERS HAVE THE RIGHT TO NOTIFY THEIR FAMILIES AND THAT WARRANTS MUST BE PRODUCED DURING AN ARREST EXCEPT UNDER SPECIFIED

CONDITIONS, SUCH AS WHEN A SUSPECT IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME. THE LAW ALSO REQUIRES THAT FAMILIES OF DETAINEES BE NOTIFIED PROMPTLY. THE LAW AUTHORIZES INVESTIGATORS TO ISSUE WARRANTS TO ASSIST IN THEIR INVESTIGATIONS OR IF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED. HOWEVER, AUTHORITIES SOMETIMES MADE ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS.

THE LAW PRESUMES DEFENDANTS INNOCENT AND PERMITS BAIL. THEY OR THEIR FAMILIES MAY ALSO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THEIR ARREST AND DETENTION IN A PRETRIAL HEARING AND MAY SUE FOR COMPENSATION IF WRONGFULLY DETAINED. HOWEVER, IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR

DETAINEES TO INVOKE THIS PROCEDURE, OR TO RECEIVE COMPENSATION, AFTER BEING RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGE. IN BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COURTS, APPEALS BASED ON CLAIMS OF IMPROPER ARREST AND DETENTION ARE RARELY, IF EVER, ACCEPTED. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE ALSO CONTAINS SPECIFIC LIMITS ON PERIODS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION AND SPECIFIES WHEN THE COURTS MUST APPROVE EXTENSIONS, USUALLY AFTER 60 DAYS. IN ADDITION, SUSPECTS CHARGED UNDER THE 1963 ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW ARE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL PROCEDURES OUTSIDE THE CODE. THESE GIVE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD A SUSPECT UP TO 1 YEAR BEFORE TRIAL. HE MAY RENEW THIS 1-YEAR PERIOD WITHOUT LIMIT.

THE AUTHORITIES ROUTINELY APPROVE EXTENSIONS OF PERIODS OF DETENTION. IN AREAS WHERE ACTIVE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS EXIST, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, THERE ARE MANY INSTANCES OF PEOPLE BEING DETAINED WITHOUT WARRANTS, CHARGES, OR COURT PROCEEDINGS. THIS IS ALSO TRUE IN ACEH. BAIL IS RARELY GRANTED, ESPECIALLY IN POLITICAL CASES. OVER ONE HUNDRED PEOPLE WERE DETAINED FOLLOWING THE MILITARY DISCOVERY OF WEAPONS CACHES IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF ACEH, BEGINNING IN FEBRUARY. THEY WERE ALLEGEDLY HELD

INCOMMUNICADO AT MILITARY CAMPS. THE AUTHORITIES FREQUENTLY PREVENT ACCESS TO DEFENSE COUNSEL WHILE SUSPECTS ARE BEING INVESTIGATED AND MAKE IT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO GET LEGAL ASSISTANCE FROM VOLUNTARY LEGAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS. SPECIAL LAWS ON CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND NARCOTICS DO NOT COME UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE'S PROTECTIONS.

THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) OPERATES OUTSIDE THE LEGAL CODE AND HAS WIDE DISCRETION TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE PERSONS THOUGHT TO THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY. DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS AGENCY, THE MILITARY BEGAN DISCUSSING PUBLICLY IN 1996 THE NEED FOR A NEW INTERNAL SECURITY ACT TO GIVE THE GOVERNMENT GREATER POWER TO SUPPRESS DISSENT. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS FURTHER PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THIS PROPOSAL DURING 1997, IT HAD NOT BEEN SENT TO PARLIAMENT.

THERE ARE NO RELIABLE DATA ON THE NUMBER OF ARBITRARY ARRESTS OR DETENTIONS WITHOUT TRIAL, PARTICULARLY IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA AND ACEH, THOUGH IN EAST TIMOR, PARTIALLY AS A RESULT OF

INCREASED DEMONSTRATIONS IN LATE 1996 AND IN 1997, AS WELL AS INCREASED GUERILLA ACTIVITY, THE NUMBER OF DETENTIONS DURING 1997 WAS RELATIVELY HIGH COMPARED TO PREVIOUS YEARS.

ARBITRARY DETENTIONS IN EAST TIMOR WERE A PARTICULAR PROBLEM FOLLOWING INCREASED GUERRILLA ATTACKS IN BAUCAU AND LOS PALOS. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES, NUMEROUS PEOPLE NOT INVOLVED IN THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT WERE DETAINED AND MISTREATED AS SECURITY FORCES SWEPT THROUGH LOCAL NEIGHBORHOODS IN SEARCH OF PERPETRATORS OF VARIOUS ATTACKS. IN THE EARLY PART OF THE YEAR THE CIVILIAN PARA-MILITARY GADA PAKSI GROUP ALSO FREQUENTLY

DETAINED AND BEAT CIVILIANS.

THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT USE FORCED EXILE.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATES THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, BUT IN PRACTICE THE JUDICIARY IS SUBORDINATED TO THE EXECUTIVE AND THE MILITARY. IN MANY CASES PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AGAINST COERCED CONFESSIONS, PARTICULARLY THOSE COERCED BY THE POLICE AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (BIA), ARE INADEQUATE TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL. ONGOING COURT CHALLENGES TO THE GOVERNMENT'S TRANSPARENT MANIPULATION OF THE PDI LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE IN 1996, WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS, CONTINUED TO BE DISMISSED IN 1997.

A QUADRIPARTITE JUDICIARY OF GENERAL, RELIGIOUS, MILITARY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS EXISTS BELOW THE SUPREME COURT. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT TO HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS IN ALL FOUR SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE. THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT CONSIDER FACTUAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF LAW. THE SUPREME COURT THEORETICALLY STANDS COEQUAL WITH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES, BUT IT DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER LAWS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT. THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOT YET EXERCISED ITS

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9690

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9690

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 08 OF 31 151019Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF5788 151019Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7811

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 08 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

AUTHORITY (HELD SINCE 1985) TO REVIEW MINISTERIAL DECREES AND REGULATIONS. IN 1993 CHIEF JUSTICE PURWOTO GANDASUBRATA LAID OUT PROCEDURES FOR LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW. JUDGES ARE CIVIL SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WHICH CONTROLS THEIR ASSIGNMENTS, PAY, AND PROMOTION. LOW SALARIES ENCOURAGE

WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION. JUDGES ARE SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES THAT OFTEN DETERMINES THE

OUTCOME OF A CASE. IT IS OFTEN CHARGED THAT CORRUPTION IS A COMMON FEATURE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE PAYMENT OF BRIBES CAN INFLUENCE PROSECUTION, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCING IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES.

A PANEL OF JUDGES CONDUCTS TRIALS AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL, POSES QUESTIONS, HEARS EVIDENCE, DECIDES GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND ASSESSES PUNISHMENT. INITIAL JUDGMENTS ARE RARELY REVERSED IN THE APPEALS PROCESS, ALTHOUGH SENTENCES CAN BE INCREASED OR REDUCED. BOTH THE DEFENSE AND THE PROSECUTION MAY APPEAL.

DEFENDANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AND TO PRODUCE WITNESSES IN THEIR DEFENSE. AN EXCEPTION IS ALLOWED IN CASES IN WHICH DISTANCE OR EXPENSE IS DEEMED EXCESSIVE FOR TRANSPORTING WITNESSES TO COURT. IN SUCH CASES, SWORN AFFIDAVITS MAY BE INTRODUCED. HOWEVER, THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR WITNESSES' IMMUNITY OR FOR DEFENSE POWER OF SUBPOENA. AS A RESULT, WITNESSES ARE GENERALLY UNWILLING TO TESTIFY AGAINST THE AUTHORITIES. THE COURTS COMMONLY ALLOW FORCED CONFESSIONS AND LIMIT THE PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE. IN ONE INSTANCE, A WITNESS STATED IN MARCH 1997 IN OPEN COURT THAT HE HAD BEEN TORTURED WITH ELECTRIC SHOCK IN THE COURSE OF INTERROGATION IN 1996 BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (BIA). NO INVESTIGATION OF HIS CHARGE, GIVEN UNDER OATH, WAS LAUNCHED. DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND CAN BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY AGAINST THEMSELVES. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE GIVES DEFENDANTS THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY FROM THE MOMENT OF THEIR ARREST, BUT NOT DURING THE PRE-ARREST INVESTIGATION PERIOD, WHICH MAY INVOLVE PROLONGED DETENTION. PERSONS SUMMONED TO APPEAR AS WITNESSES IN INVESTIGATIONS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY LAWYERS EVEN THOUGH INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN THE COURSE OF

RENDERING TESTIMONY CAN SUBSEQUENTLY BECOME THE BASIS OF AN INVESTIGATION OF THE WITNESS. THE LAW REQUIRES THAT A LAWYER BE APPOINTED IN CAPITAL CASES AND THOSE INVOLVING A PRISON SENTENCE OF 15 YEARS OR MORE. IN CASES INVOLVING POTENTIAL SENTENCES OF 5 YEARS OR MORE, A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IF THE DEFENDANT DESIRES AN ATTORNEY AND IS INDIGENT. IN THEORY, DESTITUTE DEFENDANTS MAY OBTAIN PRIVATE LEGAL HELP, SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE INDONESIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION (YLBHI). IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, DEFENDANTS ARE OFTEN PERSUADED NOT TO HIRE AN ATTORNEY, OR ACCESS TO AN ATTORNEY OF THEIR CHOICE IS IMPEDED.

THERE WERE FEW SIGNS OF NASCENT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE. THE COURT CONTINUED TO BE USED TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND GOVERNMENT CRITICS. THE GOVERNMENT VIGOROUSLY PURSUED THE NUMEROUS SUBVERSION CASES STARTED AT THE END OF 1996, AND INITIATED OR THREATENED NEW CASES. MANY INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS INTERPRETED THIS AS AN EFFORT TO SEND A SIGNAL CHILLING DISSENT IN ADVANCE OF THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION. THE GOVERNMENT CONVICTED 14 YOUNG ACTIVISTS BELONGING TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) UNDER THE ANTISUBVERSION IN APRIL AND JUNE. IT ALSO TRIED INDEPENDENT LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, AND DETAINED POLITICAL DISSIDENTS SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS AND TWO OF HIS COLLEAGUES, UNDER THIS LAW (SECTION 2A). SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS CHARGED WITH INCITING THE RIOTING THAT TOOK PLACE IN TASIKMALAYA, WEST JAVA IN DECEMBER 1996 WERE BROUGHT TO TRIAL IN 1997 ON CHARGES OF SUBVERSION. MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI FILED SUIT IN COURTS THROUGHOUT INDONESIA TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THE JUNE 1996 GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED MEDAN CONGRESS THAT OUSTED HER FROM THE PDI LEADERSHIP. MOST COURTS REFUSED TO HEAR THE CASE. HOWEVER, SEVERAL COURTS ACCEPTED THE CASE AND RULED IN HER BEHALF, SHOWING SOME INDEPENDENCE.

THE ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW, WHICH CARRIES A MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH (WHICH HAS NOT BEEN INVOKED IN RECENT YEARS), MAKES IT A CRIME TO ENGAGE IN ACTS THAT COULD DISTORT, UNDERMINE, OR DEVIATE FROM THE STATE IDEOLOGY OR BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, OR WHICH COULD DISSEMINATE FEELINGS OF HOSTILITY OR AROUSE HOSTILITY,

DISTURBANCES, OR ANXIETY AMONG THE POPULATION. THE EXCESSIVELY VAGUE LANGUAGE OF THIS LAW MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO PROSECUTE PEOPLE MERELY FOR PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF VIEWS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT.

MANY PRISONERS ARE SERVING SENTENCES FOR SUBVERSION, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI), MUSLIM MILITANTS, AND THOSE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN IRIAN JAYA, ACEH, AND EAST TIMOR. MORE ARE SERVING SENTENCES UNDER THE HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. SOME OF THESE PERSONS ADVOCATED OR EMPLOYED VIOLENCE, BUT OTHERS ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO WERE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPTING TO EXERCISE SUCH UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH OR ASSOCIATION, OR WHO WERE CONVICTED IN MANIFESTLY UNFAIR TRIALS. JUVENCIO DE JESUS MARTINS, A PROMINENT EAST TIMORESE PRISONER, WAS RELEASED UNDER NORMAL

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9740

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 09 OF 31 151034Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF595E 151034Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASQDC 7812

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 09 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CR; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/Q
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

REMISSION PROCEDURES ON INDONESIAN INEPENDENCE DAY, AUGUST 17.

F. ARBITRAY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

JUDICIAL WARRANTS QOR SEARCHES ARE REQUIRED EXCEPT FOR CASES INVOLVING SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, QND CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, SECURITY AGENCIES REGQLARLY MADE FORCED OR SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES. QECURITY FORCES ALSO ENGAGED IN SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS AND RESIDENCES AND SELECTIVE MONITORNG OF LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLSWITHOUT LEGAL RESTRAINT. THE GOVERNMENT TRIEDAND CONVICTED PDI LEGISLATOR ABERSON MARLE SIQALOHO FOR "INSULTING THE PRESIDENT." THE BASIS OF THE CONVICTION WAS A SPEECH ABERSON MADE N JULY 1996 AT THE "FREE SPEECH FORUM" IN FROQT OF PDI HEADQUARTERS THAT THE GOVERNMENT VIDQOTAPED. HE BECAME THE FIRST SITTING PARLIAMENTARIAN IN RECENT MEMORY TO FACE TRIAL AND BE CONVICTED.

GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA

(PKI) AND ITS FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY PERSONS THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP. THESE PERSONS AND THEIR RELATIVES SOMETIMES ARE SUBJECTED TO SURVEILLANCE, REQUIRED CHECK-INS, PRIODIC INDOCTRINATION, AND RESTRICTIONS ON TRQVEL OUTSIDE THEIR CITY OF RESIDENCE. ONE OFQ THE METHODS THE GOVERNMENT HAS USED TO MONITOQ THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE PEOPLE HAS BEEN TO REQUIRE THAT THE INITIALS "E.T." ("EX-TAPOL" OR OLITICAL PRISONER) BE STAMPED IN THEIR IDENTIQICATION CARDS. THIS ALLOWS THE GOVERNMENT AD PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYERS TO IDENTIFY FORMER COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS, AND SUBJECTS THEM TO OFFCIAL AND UNOFFICIAL DISCRIMINATION. ALTHOUGH HE REQUIREMENT THAT E.T. BE STAMPED IN IDENTIFIQATION CARDS HAS BEEN OFFICIALLY ENDED, HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS OBSERVE THAT IN PRACTICE IT IS STILL USED IN MANY CASES.

AFTER SEVERAL YERS DURING WHICH THE GOVERNMENT SIGNIFICANTLY

QEDUCED ITS TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM, THAT PROGRAMWAS REVIVED WITH PRIVATE CORPORATE SUPPORT. THE PROGRAM MOVES LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE FRM OVERPOPULATED ISLANDS TO MORE ISOLATED AND LEQS DEVELOPED ONES. IT IS ALSO USED TO RESETTLQ LOCAL POPULATIONS WITHIN EAST TIMOR AND IRIA JAYA. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS SAY THAT THE PROGRAM VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND DUPES SOME TRANSMIGRANTS INTO LEAVING THEIR HOME VILLAGES WITHOUT ANY MEANS OF RETURN. CONDITIONS AT SOME SITES ARE LIFE THREATENING, WITH INADEQUATE MEASURES TO PROTECT THE TRANSMIGRANT POPULATION AGAINST DISEASES ENDEMIC TO THE TRANSMIGRATION SITES. TRANSMIGRANTS AND MIGRANTS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM RECEIVED INDIRECT GOVERNMENT SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND CONTRACTS WITH ABRI OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THIS PRACTICE, PARTICULARLY IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA AND KALIMANTAN, LED TO RESENTMENT AMONG INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS.

THE GOVERNMENT PROHIBITS THE IMPORT OF CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS (SEE SECTION 5).

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

ALTHOUGH THE 1945 CONSTITUTION AND THE 1982 PRESS LAW PROVIDE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO RESTRICT PRES FREEDOM IN PRACTICE. THE GOVERNMENT USES TE ISSUANCE OF PUBLISHING LICENSES UNDER A 198Q MINISTERIAL DECREE TO CONTROL THE PRESS. OTHER MEANS OF CONTROL INCLUDE REGULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF ADVERTISING PERMITTED AND OF THE NUQBER OF PAGES ALLOWED IN NEWSPAPERS. IN SENSIQIVE AREAS, THE AUTHORITIES

CONTINUED TO PROVIQE GUIDANCE TO LOCAL JOURNALISTS AND EDITORS ON WHAT THEY SHOULD PRINT, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MANY CASES WHERE SUCH GUIDANCE WAS IGNORED. SELF CENSORSHIP BY THE PRESS CONTINUED, ESPECIALLY ON SUBJECTS KNOWN TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE GOVERNMENT.

WITHIN THESE LIMITS, COVERAGE OF A NUMBER OF SENSITIVE TOPICS, SUCH AS CORRUPTION, THE ROLE OF THE FIRST FAMILY IN BUSINESS, AND LACK OF GOVERNMENT FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, DID OCCUR, PARTICULARLY IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE PRESS. MAJOR INDONESIAN-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS WERE MORE CAUTIOUS IN COVERING CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS. MOREOVER, BROADCAST MEDIA WHICH REACHES A FAQ LARGER PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAN DOES THE PRINT MEDIA RARELY IF EVER DEALS WITH SENSITIVE TOPICS.

MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE JANUARY-FEBRUARY ETHNIC FIGHTING BETWEEN CHRISTIAN DAYAK AND MUSLIM MADURESE IN WEST KALIMANTAN WAS AT TIMES EXTREMELY RESTRICTED. THE MILITARY HELD A CLOSED MEETING WITH SENIOR EDITORS EARLY IN FEBRUARY IN THE MIDST OF THE ETHNIC STRIFE. FEW LOCAL NEWSPAPER REPORTS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN WEST KALIMANTAN APPEARED UNTIL THE FIGHTING WAS WELL UNDERWAY. SOME OTHER INSTANCES OF SOCIAL UNREST, SUCH AS IN RENGASDENGKLOK, WEST JAVA ON JANUARY 30, AND LATER INSTANCES RELATED TO THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, RECEIVED MORE MEDIA COVERAGE.

NNNNPTQ9656

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9656

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 10 OF 31 151015Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF56FC 151015Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7813

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 10 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

ALTHOUGH LIMITED DEBATE ON POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES WAS PERMITTED IN THE PRESS AND OTHER PUBLIC FORA, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON FREE SPEECH, ESPECIALLY IN CASES INVOLVING DIRECT OPPOSITION TO THE EXISTING SYSTEM. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE JULY 27, 1996 INCIDENT, AND IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MAY 1997 GENERAL ELECTION, THE GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATED THAT IT

WOULD NOT TOLERATE CHALLENGES TO THE FUNDAMENTAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, IN PARTICULAR BY ARRESTING, PLACING ON TRIAL, AND HARSHLY SENTENCING SOME OF ITS CRITICS.

FOURTEEN YOUNG ACTIVISTS BELONGING TO, OR ASSOCIATED WITH, THE SMALL, OPPOSITIONIST PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) WERE CONVICTED UNDER THE CONTROVERSIAL 1963 ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW. ON APRIL 28, THE DAY AFTER THE GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN BEGAN, COURTS IN JAKARTA CONVICTED NINE OF THE ACTIVISTS. ORIGINALLY ARRESTED IN AUGUST 1996 AMIDST GOVERNMENT ACCUSATIONS OF MASTERMINDING THE "JULY 27" INCIDENT, THE CONVICTIONS RESTED INSTEAD ON THEIR WRITINGS, SPEECHES, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES, WHICH WERE DEEMED SUBVERSIVE.

THE PRD'S LEADER, BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO, RECEIVED A 13-YEAR SENTENCE, WHICH WAS INCREASED TO 15 YEARS ON APPEAL. THIS WAS ONE OF THE MOST SEVERE SENTENCES IMPOSED IN A SUBVERSION CASE IN MANY YEARS. HIS ASSOCIATES RECEIVED SENTENCES RANGING FROM 12 YEARS TO 18 MONTHS. TWO MORE PRD ACTIVISTS WERE CONVICTED IN JAKARTA ON JUNE 16, AND GIVEN FOUR AND FIVE YEAR SENTENCES. THE OTHER PRD-RELATED CASES SAW THE CONVICTIONS IN SURABAYA OF DITA INDAH SARI AND TWO OTHERS FOR SUBVERSION ON APRIL 22 AND APRIL 23 BASED ON THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES, WHICH INCLUDED CALLING FOR AN END TO THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF DUAL FUNCTION AND ORGANIZING LABOR STRIKES.

INDEPENDENT LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN'S SUBVERSION TRIAL, WHICH BEGAN ON DECEMBER 12, 1996, CONTINUED IN THE EARLY PART OF THE YEAR, AND WAS INTERRUPTED DUE TO HIS SERIOUS HEALTH PROBLEMS. IT RESUMED IN SEPTEMBER. AS WITH THE YOUNG PRD ACTIVISTS, THE SUBVERSION CHARGES RESTED ON HIS CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT,

RATHER THAN HIS PURPORTED ROLE IN THE JULY 27, 1996 VIOLENCE, AS

HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN PUBLICLY CLAIMED BY THE GOVERNMENT. (SEE SECTION 6A)

SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS, THE FORMER UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) LEGISLATOR AND FOUNDER OF THE UNAUTHORIZED INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION PARTY (PUDI), WAS DETAINED ON MARCH 6 BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, ALONG WITH PUDI'S DEPUTY CHAIRMAN JULIUS USMAN AND SECRETARY GENERAL SALEH ABDULLAH. ALL THREE WERE DETAINED UNDER THE ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW FOR PUDI'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING ITS CALL FOR AN ELECTION BOYCOTT AND REVISION OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION. PUDI HAD REPORTEDLY SENT HOLIDAY GREETING CARDS URGING AN ELECTION BOYCOTT AND OTHER MEASURES TO SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INCLUDING THE VICE PRESIDENT. ON APRIL 3, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE RELEASED USMAN AND ABDULLAH, BUT THEY WERE REQUIRED TO REPORT BACK EACH WEEK. BINTANG WAS MOVED FROM DETENTION IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE TO THE CIPINANG PRISON AFTER HIS 1996 CONVICTION FOR INSULTING THE PRESIDENT WAS UPHELD BY THE SUPREME COURT. HE HAS NOT BEEN BROUGHT TO TRIAL YET ON THE SUBVERSION CHARGES.

ABERSON MARLE SIHALOHO, A SITTING PARLIAMENTARIAN FROM THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) AND A SUPPORTER OF OUSTED PDI LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI, WAS CONVICTED ON JULY 21 FOR ALLEGEDLY INSULTING THE PRESIDENT, ARMED FORCES, AND OTHER PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS. HE RECEIVED A NINE-MONTH PRISON SENTENCE. HIS REMARKS WERE MADE IN JULY 1996 AT THE "FREE SPEECH FORUM" IN FRONT OF THE THEN-PDI HEADQUARTERS AND HAD BEEN VIDEOTAPED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

THE JAKARTA CITY POLICE CONCLUDED ITS CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OF

FATHER ROMO IGNATIUS SANDYAWAN SUMARDI ON JULY 7 AND TURNED THE CASE OVER TO THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE IN BEKASI OUTSIDE JAKARTA. HE WAS ACCUSED OF HARBORING THREE OF THE PRD ACTIVISTS DURING THE MANHUNT FOR THEM THAT TOOK PLACE IN AUGUST 1996. THE AUTHORITIES BLOCKED FATHER SANDYAWAN FROM SEEKING NEEDED MEDICAL TREATMENT ABROAD BECAUSE, THEY SAID, OF THE INVESTIGATION LAUNCHED IN AUGUST 1996.

THE GOVERNMENT SIMILARLY TOOK HARSH ACTION AGAINST SOME INDIVIDUALS WHO PUBLISHED MAGAZINES OR BOOKS THAT CHALLENGED THE

SYSTEM. ANDI SYAPUTRA WAS SENTENCED APRIL 7 TO 30 MONTHS IN PRISON UNDER ARTICLE 134 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE FOR PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTING PRINTED MATERIAL ALLEGEDLY DEFAMING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. THE GOVERNMENT BANNED A 22-PAGE BOOK WRITTEN BY ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE LONG-OUTLAWED INDONESIAN SOCIALIST PARTY (PSI), SOEBADIO SASTROSATOMO ON MARCH 4. THE GOVERNMENT THEN BROUGHT SOEBADIO'S PRIVATE SECRETARY TO TRIAL AUGUST 5 ON CHARGES OF HAVING "INSULTED" THE PRESIDENT. HIS ALLEGED CRIME WAS THAT HE ASSISTED IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE BOOK. HE WAS RELEASED FROM DETENTION IN SEPTEMBER WHILE HIS TRIAL WAS STILL IN PROGRESS.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9658

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9658

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 11 OF 31 151015Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF5703 151015Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

SECSTATE WASHDC 7814

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 11 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

PIJAR ACTIVIST TRI AGUS SISWOMIHARDJO WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON MARCH 10 AFTER SERVING 24 MONTHS FOR DISSEMINATING MATERIALS ALLEGEDLY DEFAMING THE PRESIDENT. EKO MARIYADI AND ACHMAD TAUFIK, OF THE UNRECOGNIZED INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS' ASSOCIATION (AJI), WERE RELEASED FROM PRISON ON JULY 18. THEY HAD SERVED TWO YEARS AND FOUR MONTHS OF THEIR THREE-YEAR SENTENCES FOR ALLEGEDLY SLANDERING THE PRESIDENT AND SPREADING HATRED AGAINST THE

GOVERNMENT. THEY WERE CONVICTED BASED ON ARTICLES THEY WROTE FOR THE UNDERGROUND JOURNAL "INDEPENDEN," AND FOR PUBLISHING "INDEPENDEN" WITHOUT A GOVERNMENT LICENSE.

THE KILLING OF A JOURNALIST WHO PUBLISHED CRITICAL REPORTS IN 1996, AND AT LEAST ONE MORE SIMILAR CASE IN 1997, ATTRACTED DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION. TRIAL BEGAN IN THE 1996 KILLING IN YOGYAKARTA OF A JOURNALIST, FUAD MUHAMMAD SYAFRUDIN (UDIN), WHO WORKED FOR THE YOGYAKARTA DAILY NEWSPAPER BERNAS. HE HAD BEEN ATTACKED IN HIS HOME, POSSIBLY IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLES HE HAD WRITTEN THAT WERE CRITICAL OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS IN LAND CASES. HOWEVER, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE CONTROVERSY AS TO WHETHER AUTHORITIES HAD ARRESTED THE RIGHT SUSPECT, AS THE VICTIM'S WIFE, AN EYEWITNESS TO THE CRIME, TESTIFIED IN COURT ON SEPTEMBER 2 THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT THE ONE WHO KILLED HER HUSBAND. MOREOVER, THE SUSPECT IDENTIFIED BY THE POLICE CLAIMED THAT HIS CONFESSION WAS COERCED BY THE AUTHORITIES.

ON JULY 26, A JOURNALIST FOR THE JAKARTA WEEKLY MAGAZINE SINAR PAGI, NAIMULLAH, WAS FOUND DEAD IN HIS CAR OUTSIDE PONTIANAK, WEST KALIMANTAN. HE REPORTEDLY HAD INJURIES TO HIS NECK, HEAD, TEMPLES, CHEST, AND WRISTS AND FOUR INDIVIDUALS WERE SEEN NEAR HIS CAR. HE HAD PUBLISHED REPORTS ON TIMBER SMUGGLING AND THEFT THAT ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED LOCAL OFFICIALS. THE INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS' ASSOCIATION CALLED FOR AN IMPARTIAL POLICE INVESTIGATION. THE POLICE IN WEST KALIMANTAN ANNOUNCED IN AUGUST THAT THE CASE WAS STILL BEING INVESTIGATED. ACCORDING TO PRELIMINARY REPORTS FROM INDEPENDENT SOURCES, THE DEATH OF MUHAMMAD SAYUTI HAJI BOCHARI, A JOURNALIST FOR THE POS MAKASSAR IN SOUTH SULAWESI, WAS ACCIDENTAL. HE DIED IN THE HOSPITAL ON

JUNE 11 AFTER HE HAD BEEN FOUND LYING UNCONSCIOUS IN THE STREET. THIS OCCURRED SHORTLY AFTER HIS REPORTS ON LOCAL CORRUPTION WERE PUBLISHED, AND THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT HIS DEATH WAS CONNECTED TO HIS REPORTING. LOCAL WITNESSES HAD CLAIMED THAT HIS INJURIES SHOWED THAT HE HAD BEEN BEATEN, BUT THE LOCAL MILITARY AND POLICE AUTHORITIES ASSERTED THAT HE HAD DIED DUE TO AN ACCIDENT WHEN HE FELL OFF HIS MOTORCYCLE.

THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA REMAINED MORE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR COVERAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT THAN THE PRINT MEDIA. THE GOVERNMENT OPERATES A NATIONWIDE TELEVISION NETWORK WITH 12 REGIONAL STATIONS. PRIVATE COMMERCIAL TELEVISION COMPANIES, MOST WITH OWNERSHIP BY, OR MANAGEMENT TIES TO, THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY, CONTINUED TO EXPAND. ALL ARE REQUIRED TO BROADCAST GOVERNMENT-PRODUCED NEWS, BUT MANY ALSO PRODUCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STYLE PROGRAMMING WITH NEWS CONTENT.

OVER 600 PRIVATE RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANIES EXIST IN ADDITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK. THEY ALL WERE REQUIRED TO BELONG TO THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS (PRSSNI) TO RECEIVE A BROADCASTING LICENSE. THE GOVERNMENT RADIO STATION PRODUCES THE PROGRAM "NATIONAL NEWS," WHICH IS THE ONLY NEWS PERMITTED BY LAW TO BE BROADCAST IN INDONESIA. IT IS RELAYED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BY PRIVATE STATIONS AND 53 REGIONAL AFFILIATES OF THE GOVERNMENT STATION. BY LAW, THE PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS MAY PRODUCE ONLY "LIGHT" NEWS, SUCH AS HUMAN INTEREST STORIES, AND MAY NOT DISCUSS POLITICS. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, MANY BROADCAST INTERVIEWS AND FOREIGN NEWS AS WELL. MOREOVER, "TALK RADIO" CALL-IN PROGRAMS

INCREASINGLY TOUCH ON POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES.

FOREIGN TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS WERE READILY ACCESSIBLE.
UNCLASSIFIED

SATELLITE DISHES HAVE PROLIFERATED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, AND THERE WAS ACCESS TO THE INTERNET. THE GOVERNMENT MADE NO EFFORT TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO THIS PROGRAMMING, AND HAS PROCLAIMED AN "OPEN SKIES" POLICY. SOME SIGNALS HAVE BEEN SCRAMBLED BY BROADCASTERS FOR COMMERCIAL REASONS. FOREIGN PERIODICALS ARE WIDELY AVAILABLE. DISTRIBUTION IS SOMETIMES DELAYED BY A DAY OR MORE BY AUTHORITIES, ALTHOUGH THIS IS RARE.

THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY REGULATES ACCESS TO INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY TO CERTAIN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, BY VISITING AND RESIDENT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS. IT OCCASIONALLY REMINDS THE LATTER OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DENY REQUESTS FOR VISA EXTENSIONS. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES A PERMIT FOR THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AND VIDEO TAPES, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED BY GOVERNMENT CENSORS. IMPORTERS SOMETIMES AVOIDED FOREIGN MATERIALS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OR DEALING WITH TOPICS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF MATERIALS BYPASSING CUSTOMS AND CENSORSHIP PROCEDURES.

PUBLISHERS SOMETIMES REFUSED TO ACCEPT MANUSCRIPTS DEALING WITH

NNNNPTQ9659

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9659

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 12 OF 31 151015Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF5708 151015Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7815

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 12 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. MOST BOOKS BY THE PROMINENT INDONESIAN NOVELIST AND FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER, PRAMOEDYA ANANTA TOER, ARE BANNED, THOUGH SOME WERE IN CIRCULATION. THE GOVERNMENT IN MARCH BANNED A BOOK WHICH WAS WRITTEN BY A FORMER LEADER OF THE LONG-BANNED INDONESIAN SOCIALIST PARTY (PSI), SOEBADIO SASTROSATOMO.

UNCLASSIFIED

SPECIAL PERMISSION IS NECESSARY FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TO TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAYA. WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS, PRESS ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR WAS RESTRICTED. A NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS REPEATEDLY REQUESTED PERMISSION TO GO TO EAST TIMOR WITHOUT SUCCESS. THE LOCAL PRESS IN ACEH IS TIGHTLY CONTROLLED.

WHILE THE LAW PROVIDES FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM, CONSTRAINTS EXIST ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SCHOLARS. POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DISCUSSIONS AT UNIVERSITIES, WHILE NO LONGER FORMALLY BANNED, REMAINED CONSTRAINED. SOME SCHOLARS DISPLAYED CAUTION IN PRODUCING OR INCLUDING IN LECTURES AND CLASS DISCUSSIONS MATERIALS THAT MIGHT PROVOKE GOVERNMENT DISPLEASURE.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION; HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT PLACES SIGNIFICANT CONTROLS ON THE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS. UNTIL 1995, PUBLIC MEETINGS OF FIVE OR MORE PERSONS, AS WELL AS ACADEMIC OR OTHER SEMINARS AND MARCHES AND DEMONSTRATIONS, REQUIRED PERMITS FROM THE POLICE AND SEVERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. WHILE OBTAINING SUCH APPROVAL WAS USUALLY ROUTINE, THE AUTHORITIES OCCASIONALLY WITHHELD PERMISSION OR BROKE UP PEACEFUL GATHERINGS FOR WHICH NO PERMIT HAD BEEN OBTAINED. THE GOVERNMENT PROMULGATED REGULATIONS IN DECEMBER 1995 THAT ELIMINATED THE PERMIT REQUIREMENTS FOR SOME TYPES OF PUBLIC MEETINGS. A REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY THE POLICE REMAINED, AND IN PRACTICE NUMEROUS PUBLIC MEETINGS CONTINUED TO BE PREVENTED OR BROKEN UP (SEE BELOW).

THE 1985 SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW (ORMAS) REQUIRES THE ADHERENCE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS AND

ASSOCIATIONS, TO THE OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA. THIS PROVISION, WHICH LIMITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD AS DESIGNED TO INHIBIT ACTIVITIES OF GROUPS SEEKING TO ENGAGE IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL COMPETITION, MAKE INDONESIA AN ISLAMIC STATE, REVIVE COMMUNISM, OR RETURN THE COUNTRY TO A SITUATION OF

PARTISAN IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION. IT EMPOWERS THE GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND ANY ORGANIZATION IT BELIEVES TO BE ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA AND REQUIRES PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR ANY ORGANIZATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS FROM FOREIGN DONORS, THEREBY HINDERING THE WORK OF MANY LOCAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, NUMEROUS ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INDEPENDENT LABOR ORGANIZATION, THE INDONESIAN PROSPERITY TRADE UNION (SBSI), AND THE INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE (KIPP), WERE ACTIVE WITHOUT OFFICIAL RECOGNITION UNDER THIS LAW.

IN AN EFFORT TO CONTROL NGOS, UNRECOGNIZED POLITICAL GROUPS, AND SOME STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE JULY 27, 1996 INCIDENT AND IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION, THE GOVERNMENT PREVENTED OR BROKE UP NUMEROUS MEETINGS, SEMINARS, AND OTHER PUBLIC GATHERINGS. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT IMPOSED THESE LIMITATIONS INCONSISTENTLY, AS THERE WERE NOTABLE EXAMPLES OF WELL-PUBLICIZED MEETINGS, SEMINARS, AND GATHERINGS ON SENSITIVE SUBJECTS, AS WELL AS PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS, THAT WERE NOT STOPPED. THE NOVEMBER 1996 PUBLIC THREATS BY HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO TAKE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST SELECTED NGOS DEEMED TO BE "TROUBLE-MAKING" WERE NOT CARRIED OUT. HOWEVER, CLOSE MONITORING, IN ADDITION TO THE PREVENTION OF MEETINGS AND OTHER MEASURES, OCCURRED WHICH HAD AN INTIMIDATING EFFECT. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO TOOK ACTION, AT TIMES VIOLENT, TO PREVENT OR TO BREAK UP MANY PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS, THOUGH IT ALLOWED OTHERS TO OCCUR.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE POLICE IN JAKARTA ON MARCH 13 BROKE UP A SEMINAR FOCUSSED ON THE UPCOMING GENERAL ELECTION JOINTLY SPONSORED BY A STUDENT GROUP, SEVERAL NGOS AND THE INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE (KIPP). THE GROUPS SAID PUBLICLY THAT THEY HAD NOTIFIED THE POLICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH RELEVANT REGULATIONS, BUT THE AUTHORITIES STILL REFUSED TO ALLOW THE EVENT TO PROCEED.

SECURITY FORCES IN MEDAN, NORTH SUMATRA ON APRIL 11 STOPPED AN NGO SEMINAR ON ADVOCACY TRAINING FOR AGRARIAN AFFAIRS DURING ITS SECOND DAY. THE SEMINAR HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO RUN FOR FIVE DAYS. A JUNE NGO "REFLECTION" IN BANDA ACEH WAS CANCELED BY THE AUTHORITIES ON THE DAY IT WAS TO BEGIN. AN EVENING DISCUSSION SPONSORED BY STUDENT GROUPS HELD THE DAY BEFORE THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1996 "JULY 27 INCIDENT" WAS BROKEN UP AND FIVE STUDENTS

WERE INTERROGATED. ON JULY 29, POLICE IN THE LAMPUNG PROVINCE OF SUMATRA BROKE UP A TRAINING SESSION HELD BY THE UNRECOGNIZED LABOR FEDERATION, SBSI. THE SESSION WAS INTO ITS THIRD DAY OF A TEN-DAY SCHEDULE WHEN THE POLICE SHUT IT DOWN. TWENTY-SIX SBSI MEMBERS WERE ARRESTED, AND THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT SOME OF THEM WERE BEATEN WHILE IN DETENTION.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9660

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9660

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 13 OF 31 151015Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF5711 151016Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7816

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 13 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO GRANT OFFICIAL RECOGNITION TO THE INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE (KIPP), IT ALLOWED KIPP TO CARRY OUT LIMITED, YET SIGNIFICANT, MONITORING ACTIVITIES DURING THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO PERMITTED KIPP TO HOLD PRESS CONFERENCES IN JAKARTA EVALUATING THE ELECTION AND TO ISSUE A PUBLIC REPORT WITH ITS FINDINGS, WHICH OUTLINED MANY FLAWS IN THE ELECTION.

DESPITE THIS SMALL, YET RELATIVELY SIGNIFICANT, STEP FORWARD IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION MONITORING IN INDONESIA, THERE WERE ALSO INSTANCES WHERE KIPP WAS SUBJECTED TO SERIOUS RESTRICTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, ON APRIL 7, THE POLICE IN SOUTH SULAWESI CANCELED A PROGRAM ORGANIZED BY THE LOCAL KIPP CHAPTER DESIGNED TO TRAIN VOLUNTEER ELECTION MONITORS EVEN THOUGH THE PROGRAM ORGANIZERS HAD NOTIFIED THE POLICE. KIPP WAS UNABLE TO FUNCTION IN ACEH, DUE TO PRESSURES AGAINST IT. AN APRIL DISCUSSION THERE SPONSORED BY KIPP WAS CANCELED BY THE AUTHORITIES.

SECURITY FORCES DETAINED 24 STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS AT GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY IN YOGYAKARTA ON APRIL 1. THE POLICE ACCUSED THE STUDENTS OF CALLING FOR AN ELECTION BOYCOTT. ON APRIL 2, EIGHT STUDENTS WERE VIOLENTLY ARRESTED DURING A SECOND DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH THEY CALLED FOR THE RELEASE OF THE FIRST GROUP. ALL 32 WERE RELEASED ON APRIL 3. ON MARCH 11, THREE STUDENT ACTIVISTS WERE REPORTEDLY BEEN ARRESTED IN JAKARTA BECAUSE THEY WERE ALLEGEDLY ATTEMPTING TO CALL FOR AN ELECTION BOYCOTT BY PUTTING UP POSTERS AND WRITING GRAFFITI.

SECURITY FORCES VIOLENTLY DISPERSED A PEACEFUL GATHERING OF MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI SUPPORTERS IN BALI IN APRIL, ASSAULTED A

GROUP OF DEMONSTRATORS FOLLOWING THE SENTENCING OF PRD ACTIVISTS IN APRIL, AND ATTACKED A GROUP OF STUDENTS AT THE INDONESIAN CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY CAMPUS IN JUNE (SECTION 1C). SECURITY FORCES ON SEPTEMBER 19 STOPPED A CONGRESS HELD IN JAKARTA BY SBSI. IT WAS THE FIRST DAY OF A PLANNED THREE-DAY SCHEDULE. EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS' ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITTEE, TWO AUSTRALIAN TRADE UNIONISTS AND TWO DUTCH JOURNALISTS WERE DETAINED OVERNIGHT.

SECURITY FORCES IN JAKARTA MOBILIZED ON JULY 27 TO PREVENT SUPPORTERS OF MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI FROM CARRYING OUT WHAT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE A LARGE COMMEMORATION OF THE 1996 "JULY 27 INCIDENT" AT THE PDI'S FORMER HEADQUARTERS. INSTEAD, SEVERAL SMALLER GROUPS WERE ABLE TO APPROACH THE HEADQUARTERS WHERE THEY PEACEABLY CONDUCTED GROUP PRAYERS SURROUNDED BY SECURITY FORCES. SEVERAL THOUSAND MEGAWATI SUPPORTERS WERE PERMITTED TO RALLY ON THE STREET IN FRONT OF THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT ON APRIL 15. SEVERAL HUNDRED POLICE ON THE SCENE PREVENTED ACCESS TO PARLIAMENT GROUNDS, BUT TOOK NO ACTION TO STOP THE GATHERING.

A SEMINAR SPONSORED BY AN NGO ON EAST TIMOR WAS HELD IN JAKARTA ON SEPTEMBER 12 WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE. A PUBLIC DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT AND NGOS WAS HELD SEPTEMBER 8.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR MEMBERS OF FIVE ACCEPTED RELIGIONS AND BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD. THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES ISLAM, CATHOLICISM, PROTESTANTISM, BUDDHISM, AND HINDUISM, AND PERMITS THE PRACTICE OF THE MYSTICAL, TRADITIONAL BELIEFS OF "ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN." ALTHOUGH THE POPULATION IS OVER 85 PERCENT MUSLIM, THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS ARE GENERALLY RESPECTED, AND THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES MUTUAL TOLERANCE AND HARMONY AMONG THEM. HOWEVER, SOME RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY, INCLUDING UNRECOGNIZED RELIGIONS, EXIST.

BECAUSE THE FIRST TENET OF PANCASILA IS BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME

GOD, ATHEISM IS FORBIDDEN. ALTHOUGH INDIVIDUALS ARE NOT COMPELLED TO PRACTICE ANY PARTICULAR FAITH, ALL CITIZENS MUST CHOOSE ONE OF THE FIVE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA EXTENDS TO ALL RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY OPPOSES MUSLIM GROUPS THAT ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ACKNOWLEDGING ONLY ISLAMIC LAW. THE GOVERNMENT BANNED SOME RELIGIOUS SECTS INCLUDING JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, BAHA'I, CONFUCIANISM AND IN SOME PROVINCES THE MESSIANIC ISLAMIC SECT DARUL ARQAM. THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY MONITORS ISLAMIC SECTS CONSIDERED IN DANGER OF DEVIATING FROM ORTHODOX TENETS, AND IN THE PAST HAS ON OCCASION DISSOLVED SUCH GROUPS.

HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND EMPHASIZE BY EXAMPLE THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECT FOR RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY. LOWER-LEVEL OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, WERE FREQUENTLY ALLEGED TO BE RELUCTANT TO FACILITATE AND PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES.
THE LAW ALLOWS CONVERSION BETWEEN FAITHS, AND SUCH CONVERSIONS OCCUR. INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS NOTE THAT INTERFAITH MARRIAGE BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND NON-MUSLIMS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9666

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 14 OF 31 151015Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF5716 151016Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7817

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 14 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

DIFFICULT. PEOPLE FROM RELIGIONS OUTSIDE THE FIVE ACCEPTED RELIGIONS HAVE DIFFICULTY GETTING PERMISSION TO MARRY. THERE WAS ONE PROMINENT CASE OF A CONFUCIAN COUPLE THAT WAS PROHIBITED FROM GETTING MARRIED.

THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS PROSELYTIZING BY RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS IN AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ANOTHER RECOGNIZED RELIGION AS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 06040 14 OF 31 151015Z

POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND DISCOURAGES IT. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED, ALTHOUGH IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, AND OCCASIONALLY ELSEWHERE MISSIONARIES HAVE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES AND DELAYS IN RENEWING RESIDENCE PERMITS, AND VISAS ALLOWING THE ENTRANCE OF NEW FOREIGN CLERGY ARE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. LAWS AND DECREES FROM THE 1970'S LIMIT THE NUMBER OF YEARS THAT FOREIGN MISSIONARIES CAN SPEND IN INDONESIA, WITH SOME EXTENSIONS GRANTED IN REMOTE AREAS LIKE IRIAN JAYA. FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK IS SUBJECT TO THE FUNDING STIPULATIONS OF THE MASS ORGANIZATIONS LAW. CITIZENS PRACTICING THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS MAINTAIN ACTIVE LINKS WITH CO-RELIGIONISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY AND TRAVEL ABROAD FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

ALTHOUGH IN 1993 THE GOVERNMENT DRASTICALLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BARRED EITHER FROM ENTERING OR DEPARTING INDONESIA FROM A PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED FIGURE OF 8,897 "BLACKLISTED" PEOPLE TO A FEW HUNDRED, SUCH RESTRICTIONS STILL EXIST. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO RESTRICTS MOVEMENT BY CITIZENS AND FOREIGNERS TO AND WITHIN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. IN ADDITION, IT REQUIRES PERMITS TO SEEK WORK IN A NEW LOCATION IN CERTAIN AREAS, PRIMARILY TO CONTROL FURTHER POPULATION MOVEMENT TO CROWDED CITIES. SPECIAL PERMITS ARE REQUIRED TO VISIT CERTAIN PARTS OF IRIAN JAYA. THE AUTHORITIES REQUIRE FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, TO GIVE NOTICE OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND TO HAVE OFFICIAL PERMISSION TO CHANGE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE (SEE SECTION 1.F.).

AUTHORITIES CARRIED OUT OPERATIONS TO INVESTIGATE CITIZENS' IDENTIFICATION CARDS (KTP), INCLUDING STOPPING MOTORISTS AND RAIDING ENTERTAINMENT SITES. ON JULY 15 IN WEST JAKARTA POLICE REPORTEDLY CHECKED THE DOCUMENTS OF 3,000 PEOPLE AND FINED MANY FOR NOT HAVING PROPER PERMISSION TO BE IN JAKARTA. TEGUH SUNARTO WAS DETAINED DURING A SIMILAR OPERATION IN SURABAYA FOR NOT HAVING HIS IDENTIFICATION CARD. HE WAS MISTREATED AND DIED AFTER HIS RELEASE FROM DETENTION (SECTION 1A).

THE GOVERNMENT BLOCKED THE OVERSEAS TRAVEL OF SOME POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, SOME OF WHOM WERE SEEKING MEDICAL TREATMENT. IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES AT THE AIRPORT IN JAKARTA ON APRIL 10 STOPPED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHER ROMO SANDYAWAN SOEMARDI FROM LEAVING INDONESIA TO UNDERGO EYE SURGERY IN PERTH, AUSTRALIA. HE HAD BEEN QUESTIONED IN AUGUST 1996 IN CONNECTION WITH THE CASES AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD). THE JAKARTA ADMINISTRATIVE COURT ON JANUARY 28 UPHELD THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DECISION TO IMPOSE A ONE-YEAR TRAVEL BAN ON SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS ON APRIL 18, 1996. IT WAS THE SECOND ONE-YEAR BAN. THE GOVERNMENT REFUSED INDEPENDENT LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN'S REQUEST TO RECEIVE OVERSEAS MEDICAL EVALUATION AND TREATMENT. ALREADY SERVING A PRISON SENTENCE STEMMING FROM A 1994 CONVICTION, HE WAS ALSO BEING TRIED FOR SUBVERSION. THE TRIAL HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED DUE TO PAKPAHAN'S NEED FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT, AND IT WAS AT THAT POINT WHILE HE WAS STILL IN THE HOSPITAL THAT HE HAD SOUGHT PERMISSION TO OBTAIN TREATMENT OVERSEAS.

THE GOVERNMENT'S 1996 CLOSURE OF CERTAIN AREAS OF IRIAN JAYA'S CENTRAL HIGHLANDS TO NON-RESIDENTS CONTINUED INTO THE BEGINNING OF 1997, BUT THE CLOSURE WAS LOOSENED BY THE LATTER PART OF THE

YEAR AND THE AREAS WERE REPORTEDLY REOPENED TO TOURISM AND RESEARCH. THE AREAS HAD BEEN CLOSED DUE TO THE MILITARY'S SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SEPARATIST FREE PAPUA ORGANIZATION (OPM), THE GROUP THAT CARRIED OUT KIDNAPPINGS IN 1996. EXCEPTIONS WERE MADE DURING THE CLOSURE OF THESE AREAS, INCLUDING FOR SOME RELIGIOUS PERSONNEL. INFORMATION WAS DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN DUE TO THE RESTRICTIONS. YET CREDIBLE SOURCES ASSERTED THAT SECURITY FORCES WERE OCCUPYING VILLAGES IN THE HIGHLANDS AND EXERCISING TIGHT CONTROL OVER THEIR MOVEMENTS, AND FORCING THEM TO PERFORM UNCOMPENSATED LABOR DURING THE RESTRICTION PERIOD. THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT IN LATE 1996 SECURITY FORCES HAD MISTREATED LOCALS IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA, INCLUDING BEATINGS AND HARSH INTERROGATION, DESTRUCTION OF HOMES AND CROPS, AND SEXUAL ABUSE, AND THAT IN JANUARY SECURITY FORCES BURNED HUTS IN ONE VILLAGE. THE MILITARY DENIED THAT IT WAS RESTRICTING VILLAGERS' MOVEMENTS OR COMMITTING ABUSES, AND ASSERTED THAT THE OPM WAS INTIMIDATING VILLAGERS.

IN PAST YEARS, THE GOVERNMENT OFFERED FIRST ASYLUM TO OVER 125,000 INDOCHINESE BOAT PEOPLE. INDONESIA'S GALANG ISLAND CAMP WAS CLOSED IN 1996 AS THE LAST REMAINING ASYLUM SEEKERS WERE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9667

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9667

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 15 OF 31 151016Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF571B 151016Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7818

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 15 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

REPATRIATED. THERE REMAIN, HOWEVER, SOME 17 PERSONS AWAITING A THIRD COUNTRY RESETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITY. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT FORMULATED A POLICY REGARDING ASYLUM SEEKERS OF OTHER NATIONALITIES, BUT IT HAS IN PRACTICE RESPECTED THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF

CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

CITIZENS DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEMOCRATIC MEANS. THERE HAS NEVER BEEN AN ELECTORAL CHALLENGE TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. THE 1,000-MEMBER PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) IS CONSTITUTIONALLY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY OF THE STATE. IT MEETS EVERY 5 YEARS TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AND TO SET THE BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY. THE MPR IS EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND HIS GOVERNMENT. FIVE HUNDRED MEMBERS OF THE MPR COME FROM THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR), 425 OF WHOSE MEMBERS WERE ELECTED IN THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION (UP FROM 400 ELECTED MEMBERS IN 1992). THE REMAINING 75 MEMBERS ARE MILITARY APPOINTEES. IN 1993 THE MPR ELECTED SOEHARTO TO HIS SIXTH UNCONTESTED 5-YEAR TERM AS PRESIDENT. LEGALLY THE PRESIDENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SUBORDINATE TO THE MPR, BUT ACTUALLY HE AND A SMALL GROUP OF ASSOCIATES EXERCISE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.

UNDER A DOCTRINE KNOWN AS DUAL FUNCTION, THE MILITARY ASSUMES A SIGNIFICANT SOCIOPOLITICAL AS WELL AS A SECURITY ROLE. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARE ALLOTTED 75 UNELECTED SEATS IN THE DPR, IN PARTIAL COMPENSATION FOR NOT BEING PERMITTED TO VOTE. THE MILITARY HOLDS AN UNELECTED 20 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT PARLIAMENTS, AND OCCUPIES NUMEROUS KEY POSITIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION.

THE OTHER 85 PERCENT OF NATIONAL AND 80 PERCENT OF LOCAL

PARLIAMENTARY SEATS ARE FILLED THROUGH ELECTIONS HELD EVERY 5 YEARS. ALL ADULT CITIZENS, EXCEPT ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, CONVICTED CRIMINALS SERVING PRISON SENTENCES, AND SOME 36,000 FORMER MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ARE ELIGIBLE

TO VOTE. VOTERS CHOOSE BY SECRET BALLOT BETWEEN THE THREE GOVERNMENT-APPROVED POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH FIELD CANDIDATE LISTS IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT. THOSE LISTS MUST BE SCREENED BY BAKORSTANAS, WHICH DETERMINES WHETHER CANDIDATES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP OR POSE OTHER BROADLY DEFINED SECURITY RISKS. CRITICS CHARGE THAT THESE SCREENINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, SINCE THERE IS NO WAY TO APPEAL THE RESULTS, AND NOTE THAT THEY CAN BE USED TO ELIMINATE CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM PARLIAMENT. STRICT RULES ESTABLISH THE LENGTH OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC MEDIA, SCHEDULES FOR PUBLIC APPEARANCES, AND THE POLITICAL SYMBOLS THAT CAN BE USED.

THE GOVERNMENT FORMALLY PERMITS ONLY THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EXIST AND CONTEST ELECTIONS. THE LARGEST AND MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS GOLKAR, A GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ORGANIZATION OF DIVERSE FUNCTIONAL GROUPS. THE PRESIDENT STRONGLY INFLUENCES THE SELECTION OF THE LEADERS OF GOLKAR OF WHICH HE IS THE SENIOR LEADER. GOLKAR MAINTAINS CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH THE ARMED FORCES AND KORPRI, THE ASSOCIATION TO WHICH ALL CIVIL SERVANTS AUTOMATICALLY BELONG. CIVIL SERVANTS MAY JOIN ANY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WITH OFFICIAL PERMISSION, BUT THEY ARE IN PRACTICE COMPELLED TO SUPPORT GOLKAR. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND SOME OTHER BANNED PARTIES MAY NOT RUN FOR OFFICE OR BE ACTIVE POLITICALLY.

THE OTHER TWO, SMALL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI), ARE NOT CONSIDERED OPPOSITION PARTIES, AND, ALONG WITH GOLKAR, ARE REQUIRED BY LAW TO EMBRACE THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA. THE SMALLER PARTIES ARE NOT PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN PARTY OFFICES BELOW THE DISTRICT LEVEL, PLACING THEM AT A

DISADVANTAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED GOLKAR, WHICH HAS OFFICES AT THE DISTRICT AND LOWER ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES CLOSELY SCRUTINIZE AND OFTEN GUIDE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, MANY SERVING PARLIAMENTARIANS AS WELL AS POTENTIAL NEW CANDIDATES FROM THE PDI WERE NOT PERMITTED TO RUN IN THE MAY 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION AFTER THE GOVERNMENT IN JUNE 1996 ENGINEERED THE OUSTER OF THE POPULAR LEADER OF THE PDI -- MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI. SHE HAD BECOME THE SUBJECT OF PUBLIC SPECULATION AS A POSSIBLE CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT IN 1998. MEMBERS OF THE DPR AND THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES MAY BE RECALLED FROM OFFICE BY PARTY LEADERS. AN OUTSPOKEN DPR MEMBER FROM THE ABRI FACTION, MAJ. GEN. THEO SYAFEI, WAS REMOVED FROM THE HOUSE PRIOR TO THE MAY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION. ALTHOUGH MEMBERS OF THE ABRI FACTION IN THE DPR CAN BE REPLACED AT ANY TIME AT THE BEHEST OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND ARE THUS NOT TECHNICALLY SUBJECT TO RECALL, THE TIMING OF SYAFEI'S DISMISSAL WAS CONSIDERED UNUSUAL. IT OCCURRED SOON AFTER HE HAD PUBLICLY EMPHASIZED THAT VOTERS HAD THE RIGHT TO VOID THEIR BALLOTS BY MARKING THE SYMBOLS FOR ALL THREE POLITICAL PARTIES.

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9668

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 16 OF 31 151016Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF5720 151016Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7819

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 16 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

THE MAY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, IN LINE WITH THE PREVIOUS FIVE HELD SINCE 1971, DENIED CITIZENS THE RIGHT TO CHANGE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT DEMOCRATICALLY. THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR SECURED ITS LARGEST ELECTORAL VICTORY EVER WITH MORE THAN 74 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, WITH APPROXIMATELY 22 PERCENT OF THE VOTES FOR THE PPP AND JUST OVER 3 PERCENT FOR PDI. GOVERNMENT-OUSTED PDI LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND HER SUPPORTERS WERE NOT PERMITTED TO

PAGE 02 JAKART 06040 16 OF 31 151016Z
TAKE PART IN THE ELECTION, WHICH MANY INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS PUBLICLY CONCLUDED LED TO THE DROP IN THE PDI'S VOTE SHARE FROM THE 17 PERCENT LEVEL IT OBTAINED IN THE PREVIOUS ELECTION.

SPORADIC, YET SIGNIFICANT, VIOLENCE OCCURRED DURING THE 27-DAY CAMPAIGN PERIOD THAT PRECEDED THE VOTE, INCLUDING CLASHES BETWEEN AND AMONG POLITICAL CONTESTANTS, BETWEEN POLITICAL CONTESTANTS AND SECURITY FORCES, AND GENERAL RIOTING. MOST OF THE HUNDREDS OF DEATHS DURING THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD HAPPENED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENTS DURING THE MASSIVE STREET RALLIES. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES, 123 DIED IN BANJARMASIN, SOUTH KALIMANTAN ON MAY 23, THE LAST DAY OF THE CAMPAIGN, DURING A FIRE THAT BROKE OUT IN A DEPARTMENT STORE AMIDST MAJOR RIOTING AND LOOTING. IN ADDITION, NUMEROUS INJURIES RESULTED FROM CLASHES BEFORE AND, IN SOME PLACES, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ELECTION. MANY OBSERVERS CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS THE MOST VIOLENT CAMPAIGN EVER IN INDONESIA. THE GOVERNMENT SUCCEEDED IN RESTRICTING THE CONTENT AND STRUCTURE OF THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION, PERHAPS EVEN MORE SO THAN IN PAST YEARS. HOWEVER, DESPITE NEW RULES DESIGNED TO STOP THE STREET RALLIES THAT HAD BEEN PREVALENT IN PREVIOUS CAMPAIGNS, AND NUMEROUS HIGH LEVEL PUBLIC WARNINGS TO ABIDE BY THESE RULES, LARGE RALLIES WERE REPEATEDLY CARRIED OUT BY GOLKAR, PPP, AND, TO A FAR LESSER EXTENT, BY PDI.

IN THE MIDST OF THE CAMPAIGN, THE GOVERNMENT BANNED ALL MATERIALS SUPPORTING AN EMBRYONIC ALLIANCE BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP). IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MAY POLL, THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THROUGH A SERIES OF BLUNT PRONOUNCEMENTS STRONGLY URGED CITIZENS TO IGNORE THE FEW, MOSTLY INDIRECT, CALLS THAT WERE MADE TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTION. THE GOVERNMENT REPEATEDLY MADE IT KNOWN

THAT SUCH CALLS WERE ILLEGAL, THROUGH PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THE ARRESTS OF THOSE WHO ADVOCATED A BOYCOTT, SUCH AS PUBLIC FIGURE SRI BINTANG AND STUDENTS WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY DISTRIBUTING LEAFLETS CALLING FOR A BOYCOTT. A FEW STUDENT AND CHURCH GROUPS WHO ALSO INDIRECTLY CALLED FOR AN ELECTION BOYCOTT WERE NOT AFFECTED.

THE ELECTION AND CAMPAIGN WERE MARRED BY NUMEROUS, CREDIBLE, CHARGES OF FRAUD AND OTHER VIOLATIONS, MOSTLY COMMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR, BUT ALSO SOME CAMPAIGN VIOLATIONS BY THE PPP AND PDI. THE REPORTS OF FRAUD AND OTHER VIOLATIONS INCLUDED DOUBLE VOTING BY MEMBERS OF THE RULING PARTY GOLKAR, GOVERNMENT INTIMIDATION OF PPP AND PDI POLL WITNESSES, AND IMPROPER SUPERVISION OF THE VOTE COUNTING. IN A FEW

DISTRICTS IN EAST JAVA, THE COMPLAINTS OF LARGE-SCALE VOTE FRAUD RESULTED IN DESTRUCTIVE RIOTING, FORCING THE AUTHORITIES TO CARRY OUT A RE-VOTE BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO OFFICIALS, BALLOT BOXES WERE DESTROYED. AFTER THE ELECTION WAS OVER, THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMED TO HAVE DISCOVERED THAT 64,000 VOTES HAD BEEN MISCOUNTED, GIVING ONE MORE PARLIAMENT SEAT TO PDI.

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT, PARLIAMENT, ELECTION CONTESTANTS, AND PUBLIC LEADERS TO CONDUCT AND OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTION. THE GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC DISCUSSION FOCUSSED MOSTLY ON IMPROVING THE TECHNIQUES OF CAMPAIGNING RATHER THAN ON THE UNDERLYING FACTORS THAT LED TO PROBLEMS DURING THE ELECTION. THE GOVERNMENT SAID IT WOULD INVESTIGATE THE REPORTS OF CAMPAIGN VIOLATIONS FORWARDED BY ALL THREE ELECTION CONTESTANTS, BUT PROMISED NO RESULTS UNTIL 1998.

THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) CONSIDERS BILLS PRESENTED TO IT BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES BUT DOES NOT DRAFT LAWS ON

ITS OWN, ALTHOUGH IT HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO DO SO. DURING A FIVE-YEAR TERM ENDING IN OCTOBER, THE DPR CONSIDERED AND PASSED OVER 70 PIECES OF LEGISLATION, INCLUDING ONE BILL TWO TIMES. IN AN UNPRECEDENTED AND POSSIBLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MOVE, THE PRESIDENT RETURNED A BROADCASTING BILL ALREADY APPROVED BY THE PARLIAMENT FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REVISION. THE DPR DOES MAKE TECHNICAL, AND OCCASIONALLY SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS TO BILLS IT REVIEWS. THERE WERE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT THE DPR WAS TO A LIMITED, BUT POSSIBLY INCREASING, EXTENT ABLE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES TO BILLS THAT REFLECTED THE INTERESTS EXPRESSED BY OUTSIDE GROUPS, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE MANPOWER BILL.

WHILE THE DPR REMAINS CLEARLY SUBORDINATE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, IT RECENTLY HAS BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN SCRUTINIZING GOVERNMENT POLICY, AND EXERCISING OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH HEARINGS AT WHICH MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, MILITARY COMMANDERS, AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS ARE ASKED TO TESTIFY. THE DPR HAS ALSO BECOME INCREASINGLY A FOCAL POINT OF APPEALS AND PETITIONS FROM STUDENTS, WORKERS, DISPLACED FARMERS, AND OTHERS CHARGING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND AIRING OTHER GRIEVANCES. IT RARELY IS THE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9673

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9673

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 17 OF 31 151016Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF5726 151016Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7820

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 17 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES --

SOURCE OF ANY RELIEF TO PETITIONERS OTHER THAN PROVIDING A CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH THEIR COMPLAINTS CAN BE AIRED.

WHILE THERE ARE NO LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN POLITICS, THEY ARE UNDERREPRESENTED IN GOVERNMENT. THE 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION REPRESENTED A STEP BACKWARDS FOR WOMEN IN TERMS OF REPRESENTATION, WITH THEIR PERCENTAGE FALLING FROM 12

PERCENT TO 9 PERCENT. IN THE CURRENT CABINET, 2 OUT OF 41 MINISTERS ARE WOMEN.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

GOVERNMENT PRESSURE ON DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER NGO'S THAT BEGAN AFTER THE JULY 27 1996 VIOLENCE CONTINUED IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MAY 1997 GENERAL ELECTION (SEE SECTION 2A).

THE GOVERNMENT REITERATED ITS REJECTION OF A PROPOSAL BY THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO OPEN AN OFFICE IN JAKARTA THAT WOULD HAVE THE CAPACITY TO MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS. THE GOVERNMENT HAD INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO PERMIT AN OFFICE TO OPEN IN JAKARTA IF ITS MISSION WERE RESTRICTED TO TECHNICAL OPERATIONS, SUCH AS CONDUCTING SEMINARS WITHOUT ANY MONITORING FUNCTION.

THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS OR FOREIGN-BASED CRITICISM OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IT EMPHASIZES ITS BELIEF THAT LINKING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE OR OTHER SANCTIONS RELATED TO ITS HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND IS THEREFORE UNACCEPTABLE. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT ARTICULATE A CLEAR PUBLIC POLICY ON WHETHER IT WOULD INVITE OR ALLOW FOREIGNERS TO MONITOR THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION, TWO INTERNATIONAL GROUPS DID OBSERVE THE ELECTION ON A LIMITED BASIS.

THE ICRC CONTINUED TO OPERATE IN EAST TIMOR. IT ALSO VISITED PRISONERS CONVICTED OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP,

CONVICTED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS AND EAST TIMORESE AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS OUTSIDE OF EAST TIMOR. HOWEVER, THROUGHOUT THE YEAR IT FACED DETERMINED OBSTACLES AND UNWILLINGNESS TO ALLOW VISITS EXCEPT IN EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING CONTINUING SERIOUS DELAYS IN VISITING SOME RECENT OR NEW DETAINEES OR PRISONERS CHARGED WITH SUBVERSION AND DETAINED IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE AFTER THE 1996 "JULY 27 INCIDENT." AFTER AN INITIAL VISIT IN AUGUST 1996, THE ICRC WAS NOT PERMITTED TO VISIT THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) PRISONERS IN JAKARTA UNTIL THE FOLLOWING JULY.

WHILE RECEIVING SUPPORT FOR ITS WORK FROM THE GOVERNMENT IN PRINCIPLE, THE ICRC PERIODICALLY FACED DIFFICULTY IN IMPLEMENTING ITS HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM IN EAST TIMOR. COOPERATION WITH LOCAL COMMANDERS IMPROVED FOLLOWING AN ICRC SEMINAR FOR MILITARY OFFICERS HELD IN JAKARTA. PARTICIPANTS IN THIS SEMINAR SHOWED IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING AND OPENNESS FOR THE ICRC MISSION AND FREQUENTLY EASED ACCESS TO DETAINEES IN EAST TIMOR. WHILE THE ICRC WAS ABLE TO ACCESS THE VAST MAJORITY OF THOSE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DETAINED IN EAST TIMOR, PROBLEMS CONTINUED IN ACCESSING DETAINEES HELD BY THE MILITARY IN ACEH AND NORTH SUMATRA (REMOVE: AND OCCASIONAL UNCOOPERATIVE COMMANDERS.) THE ICRC HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET ACCESS TO ACEH SINCE MARCH 1997 WHEN MILITARY OPERATIONS TOOK PLACE.

TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR BY FOREIGN HUMAN RIGHTS NGO'S HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED. DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS ARE ABLE TO VISIT, HOWEVER.

THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, IN ITS FOURTH YEAR OF OPERATION, CONTINUED TO BE ACTIVE IN EXAMINING REPORTED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND CONTINUED TO SHOW

INDEPENDENCE. LACKING ENFORCEMENT POWERS, THE COMMISSION ATTEMPTS TO WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM, SENDING TEAMS WHERE NECESSARY TO INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS AND EMPLOYING PERSUASION, PUBLICITY, AND MORAL AUTHORITY TO HIGHLIGHT ABUSES, MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGAL AND REGULATORY CHANGES, AND ENCOURAGE CORRECTIVE ACTION.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS TENDED TO IGNORE SOME COMMISSION FINDINGS OR, IN SOME INSTANCES, HAS MOVED LETHARGICALLY IN REACTION TO THEM. THE COMMISSION IN SEPTEMBER ASKED THE AUTHORITIES TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE. OF SIX CASES OF ABRI ABUSE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN IRIAN JAYA, INVOLVING A NUMBER OF DEATHS, IDENTIFIED BY THE COMMISSION IN SEPTEMBER 1995, ONLY ONE WAS EVER BROUGHT TO TRIAL, AND THE COMMISSION REQUESTED FOLLOW-UP ACTION IN 1997. THE GOVERNMENT MADE LITTLE PROGRESS IN RESOLVING THE 1996 "JULY 27 INCIDENT." THE GOVERNMENT MOVED SLOWLY IN RESPONSE TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION'S OCTOBER 1996 REPORT ON THIS INCIDENT WHICH LISTED 23 MISSING, 149 INJURED AND 5 DEAD, ONE OF WHOM HAD BEEN SHOT. TWO GOVERNMENT MINISTERS PUBLICLY DECLARED THE CASE CLOSED IN AUGUST AND SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO MORE PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE INCIDENT. THE COMMISSION MET WITH SENIOR GOVERNMENT

NNNNPTQ9674

ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF572C 151016Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7821

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 18 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

OFFICIALS IN SEPTEMBER WHO REPORTEDLY AGREED TO SEARCH FOR THE 16 WHO WERE STILL MISSING AND THAT THE CASE HAD NOT BEEN SOLVED. SUPPORTERS OF OUSTED PDI LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI HAD ANNOUNCED IN JUNE THAT SIX OF THE 23 MISSING HAD BEEN FOUND, AND TQCOMMISSION SAID ON SEPTEMBER 4 THAT THE NUMBER WAS DOWN TO 16. NO ACTION WAS PROMISED ON THE COMMISSION'S ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATION THAT LEGAL ACTION BE TAKEN AGAINST THOSE WHO

Q TOOK OVER PDI HEADQUARTERS.

THE COMMISSION OPENED AN EAST TIMOR OFFICE IN JUNE 1996, WHICH WAS WIDELY REGARDED AS A POSITIVE STEP IN THE ONGOING EFFORT TO ADDRESS AND RESOLVE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN EAST TIMOR. HOWEVER, MANY OBSERVERS ALSO HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EAST TIMOR OFFICE BECAUSE OF ITS LOCATION NEXT TO THE LOCAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, ITS RELIANCE ON GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED

STAFFING, AND THE FACT THAT IT COULD ONLY RECEIVE COMPLAINTS AND SEND THEM BACK TO JAKARTA, BUT COULD NOT TAKE ACTION ITSELF. THE INITIAL FLOW OF CITIZENS TO THE FACILITY TENDED TO COMPRISE PEOPLE WHO DID NOT MAKE COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY, OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES, CONVEYING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE LOCAL POPULATION WERE RELUCTANT TO APPROACH THE FACILITY. THE OFFICE LIMITED ITSELF TO DEALING ONLY WITH NON-POLITICAL CASES AND THEREFORE HAD MADE LITTLE IMPACT WITH REGARD TO THE MORE SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN EAST TIMOR. THE COMMISSION HAS BEEN TRYING TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS, BUT BY THE YEAR'S END THE OFFICE REMAINED INEFFECTIVE.

THE GOVERNMENT APPOINTED THE COMMISSION'S ORIGINAL CHAIRMAN, WHO THEN APPOINTED THE OTHER 24 COMMISSION MEMBERS. THE COMMISSION FILLS VACANCIES IN ITS RANKS INDEPENDENTLY BY INTERNAL ELECTION. A NEW CHAIRMAN AND FOUR NEW MEMBERS, REPLACING THOSE WHO HAD DIED WHILE IN OFFICE, WERE ELECTED IN THE FALL OF 1996. THE TERM OF THE CURRENT COMMISSION MEMBERS WILL EXPIRE IN 1998. THE COMMISSION MOVED INTO ITS OWN PERMANENT FACILITIES LAST YEAR, AND HAS HIRED SEVERAL PROFESSIONAL STAFF TO SUPPORT ITS 25 MEMBERS WITH THEIR INVESTIGATIVE AND OTHER SUBSTANTIVE WORK.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION,

DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EXPLICITLY FORBID DISCRIMINATION BASED ON GENDER, RACE, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS. HOWEVER, IT STIPULATES EQUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL CITIZENS, BOTH NATIVE AND NATURALIZED. THE 1993 GUIDELINES OF STATE POLICY (LEGAL STATUTES ADOPTED BY THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY) EXPLICITLY STATES THAT WOMEN HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN. HOWEVER, THESE GUIDELINES FROM 1978, 1983, 1988, AND 1993, ALSO STATE THAT WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS MUST NOT CONFLICT WITH THEIR ROLE IN IMPROVING FAMILY WELFARE AND THE EDUCATION OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION. MARRIAGE LAW DICTATES THAT MEN ARE THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY. THE CONSTITUTION GRANTS CITIZENS THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE THEIR INDIVIDUAL RELIGION AND BELIEFS; HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT ONLY RECOGNIZES FIVE RELIGIONS AND IMPOSES SOME RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY.

WOMEN

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REMAINS POORLY DOCUMENTED. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SOCIETY, WHICH HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY SOCIAL CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY RAPID URBANIZATION. RAPE BY A HUSBAND OF A WIFE IS NOT CONSIDERED A CRIME IN INDONESIAN LAW. ALTHOUGH WOMEN'S GROUPS ARE TRYING TO CHANGE THE LAW, THEY HAVE NOT MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS.

CULTURAL NORMS DICTATE THAT PROBLEMS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE PRIVATE MATTERS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE HOME IS RARELY REPORTED. WHILE POLICE COULD BRING ASSAULT CHARGES AGAINST A

HUSBAND FOR BEATING HIS WIFE, DUE TO SOCIAL ATTITUDES, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO DO SO. NONETHELESS, ACCORDING TO RELIABLE SOURCES, THE POLICE HAVE BECOME SOMEWHAT MORE RESPONSIVE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COMPLAINTS.

RAPE IS A PUNISHABLE OFFENSE IN INDONESIA. MEN HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND SENTENCED FOR RAPE AND ATTEMPTED RAPE ALTHOUGH RELIABLE STATISTICS ARE UNAVAILABLE. THE MAXIMUM PRISON SENTENCE FOR RAPE IS 12 YEARS, BUT OBSERVERS SAY THAT SENTENCES ARE USUALLY MUCH SHORTER. MOB VIOLENCE AGAINST ACCUSED RAPISTS IS FREQUENTLY REPORTED. WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS BELIEVE THAT RAPE IS GROSSLY UNDER-REPORTED OWING TO THE SOCIAL STIGMA ATTACHED TO THE VICTIM. SOME LEGAL EXPERTS REPORT THAT IF A WOMAN DOES NOT GO IMMEDIATELY TO THE HOSPITAL FOR A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION THAT PRODUCES PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF RAPE, SHE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BRING CHARGES. A WITNESS IS ALSO REQUIRED IN ORDER TO BRING CHARGES, AND ONLY IN RARE CASES IS THERE A WITNESS, ACCORDING TO LEGAL EXPERTS. SOME WOMEN REPORTEDLY FAIL TO REPORT RAPE TO POLICE BECAUSE THE POLICE DO NOT TAKE THEIR ALLEGATIONS SERIOUSLY.

TWO CASES OF ALLEGED RAPE OF EAST TIMORESE WOMEN BY MILITARY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9675

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9675

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 19 OF 31 151016Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF5732 151017Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7822

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 19 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

PERSONNEL HAVE GAINED PUBLIC ATTENTION AS HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS TRY TO BRING THEM TO TRIAL (SEE SECTION 1). IN CONNECTION WITH

DETENTIONS AFTER THE MARCH DEMONSTRATION AT THE MAKHOTA HOTEL, DURING UNITED NATIONS AMBASSADOR MARKER'S VISIT, TWO WOMEN WERE REPORTEDLY SEVERELY BEATEN AND VERBALLY ABUSED.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS NOT A CRIME UNDER THE LAW, ONLY INDECENT

BEHAVIOR. SEXUAL HARASSMENT CHARGES, HOWEVER, CAN DAMAGE A CIVIL SERVICE CAREER. THE CURRENT LAW REPORTEDLY COVERS PHYSICAL ABUSE ONLY, AND REQUIRES TWO WITNESSES. WOMEN JOB APPLICANTS AND WORKERS HAVE COMPLAINED OF BEING SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED BY FOREMEN AND FACTORY OWNERS.

THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND OF TEMPORARY "CONTRACT MARRIAGES" WITH FOREIGNERS IN CERTAIN AREAS, SUCH AS KALIMANTAN AND SUMATRA, THOUGH THE EXTENT OF THIS PRACTICE IS UNCLEAR. THESE MARRIAGES ARE NOT CONSIDERED LEGAL, AND THE CHILDREN BORN FROM THEM ARE CONSIDERED BORN OUT-OF-WEDLOCK. OFFICIAL STATISTICS FROM 1994 REPORT THAT THERE WERE 70,684 PROSTITUTES IN INDONESIA, 9,000 OF WHOM WERE IN JAKARTA.

THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES SOME COUNSELING FOR ABUSED WOMEN, AND SEVERAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS EXIST TO ASSIST WOMEN. MANY OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS FOCUS ON REUNITING THE FAMILY RATHER THAN ON PROVIDING PROTECTION TO THE WOMEN INVOLVED. MANY WOMEN RELY ON EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEMS FOR ASSISTANCE IN CASES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. THERE ARE ONLY A FEW WOMEN'S CRISIS CENTERS IN INDONESIA, INCLUDING A DROP-IN CENTER FOUNDED IN JAKARTA BY THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED NATIONAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION (KOWANI) IN 1996 AND A CRISIS CENTER FOR WOMEN IN YOGYAKARTA RUN BY AN NGO. A NEW CRISIS CENTER FOR WOMEN, "WOMEN'S PARTNER," WHICH OPENED IN JAKARTA IN APRIL, RUNS A 24-HOUR HOTLINE AND A TEMPORARY SHELTER FOR ABUSED WOMEN. TRAINING OF COUNSELORS FOR ANOTHER JAKARTA CRISIS CENTER, CALLED "SPEAK," IS UNDERWAY.

A GROWING NUMBER OF NGO'S AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY GROUPS ARE WORKING TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. THEY HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN GAINING OFFICIAL

COGNIZANCE OF WOMEN'S CONCERNS. THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CONFERENCES, SEMINARS AND WORKSHOPS CONNECTED WITH WOMEN'S ISSUES. MOST WERE SPONSORED BY NGO'S, ALTHOUGH SOME WERE ORGANIZED BY ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS AND BY THE GOVERNMENT. MOST SESSIONS SOUGHT TO RAISE AWARENESS AND/OR PROMOTE ADVOCACY FOR WOMEN.

INDONESIA RATIFIED THE CONVENTION ON ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN 1984. ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, WOMEN ARE EQUAL TO AND HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN. HOWEVER, IN PRACTICE WOMEN FACE SOME LEGAL DISCRIMINATION. MARRIAGE LAW FOR MUSLIMS, BASED ON ISLAMIC LAW, ALLOWS MEN TO HAVE UP TO FOUR WIVES IF THE FIRST WIFE IS UNABLE "TO FULFILL HER TASKS AS A WIFE." PERMISSION OF THE FIRST WIFE IS REQUIRED, BUT REPORTEDLY MOST WOMEN CANNOT REFUSE. CIVIL SERVANTS AND MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES WHO WISH TO MARRY A SECOND WOMAN MUST ALSO HAVE PERMISSION FROM THEIR SUPERVISORS. TO SET AN EXAMPLE, THE PRESIDENT HAS FORBIDDEN CABINET OFFICIALS AND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS TO HAVE SECOND WIVES. IN DIVORCE CASES WOMEN OFTEN BEAR A HEAVIER EVIDENTIARY BURDEN THAN MEN, ESPECIALLY IN THE ISLAMIC-BASED FAMILY COURT SYSTEM. ALIMONY IS RARELY RECEIVED BY DIVORCED WOMEN, AND THERE IS NO ENFORCEMENT OF ALIMONY PAYMENT.

THE 1958 CITIZENSHIP LAW STATES THAT CHILDREN'S CITIZENSHIP IS BASED ONLY ON THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE FATHER. IN PRACTICE, THIS LAW HAS CAUSED PROBLEMS IN CASES OF MIXED MARRIAGES. CHILDREN OF INDONESIAN MOTHERS AND FOREIGN FATHERS LIVING IN INDONESIA ARE CONSIDERED FOREIGNERS, AND NEED VISAS TO REMAIN IN INDONESIA UNTIL THE AGE OF 18, WHEN THEY CAN APPLY FOR INDONESIAN CITIZENSHIP. THEY ARE PROHIBITED FROM ATTENDING INDONESIAN

SCHOOLS, AND HAVE TO ATTEND INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS, WHICH ARE EXPENSIVE. THE CASE OF ONE CHILD, THE FIVE-YEAR OLD SON OF AN INDONESIAN WOMAN AND A JAPANESE MAN, ATTRACTED MEDIA ATTENTION IN

1996, AFTER THE CHILD WAS ORDERED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY FOLLOWING THE DIVORCE OF HIS PARENTS AND THE EXPIRATION OF HIS RESIDENCY VISA. IN 1997, THE CHILD RETURNED TO INDONESIA WITH ANOTHER VISA, BUT BECAUSE HIS MOTHER COULD NOT AFFORD TO KEEP HIM IN AN INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, HE EVENTUALLY WAS SENT TO JAPAN TO LIVE WITH HIS FATHER.

FOREIGN WOMEN MARRIED TO INDONESIAN MEN FACE DIFFICULTIES AS WELL. THEIR CHILDREN ARE INDONESIAN AND THUS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO ATTEND INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS IN INDONESIA. THESE WOMEN ARE USUALLY TAXED AS THE FOREIGN HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE PROPERTY, BUSINESS OR INHERITANCE RIGHTS IN INDONESIA. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH DISCUSSION ABOUT PROBLEMS WITH THE CITIZENSHIP LAW, AND NGO'S AND THE GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO AGREE THAT THE LAW NEEDS TO BE REVISED.
ALTHOUGH SOME WOMEN ENJOY A HIGH DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FREEDOM AND OCCUPY IMPORTANT POSITIONS IN BOTH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, THE MAJORITY DO NOT EXPERIENCE SUCH SOCIAL AND

NNNNPTQ9677

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 20 OF 31 151017Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01

TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 OIC-02 OPIC-01 PRS-00 P-00 SP-00 STR-00
TRSE-00 USIE-00 PRM-10 PRME-01 G-00 /027W
----------EF5738 151017Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7823

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 20 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

ECONOMIC FREEDOMS AND ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTED AT THE LOWER END OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC SCALE. THE 1995 NATIONAL PROFILE OF WOMEN'S POSITIONS AND ROLES SHOWED THAT 37.4 PERCENT OF INDONESIAN CIVIL SERVANTS WERE WOMEN, BUT ONLY 5.5 PERCENT WERE IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY. THE 1997 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION WAS THE FIRST ELECTION DURING THE NEW ORDER PERIOD IN WHICH THE NUMBER OF WOMEN PARLIAMENTARIANS ELECTED DECLINED. TWELVE

PERCENT OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CURRENT PARLIAMENT (ELECTED IN 1992) ARE WOMEN, WHILE ONLY NINE PERCENT OF THE NEWLY ELECTED PARLIAMENT ARE WOMEN.

INCOME DISPARITY BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN DIMINISHES SIGNIFICANTLY WITH GREATER EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT. FEMALE WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING GENERALLY RECEIVE LOWER WAGES THAN MEN. MANY FEMALE FACTORY WORKERS ARE HIRED AS DAY LABORERS INSTEAD OF AS FULL-TIME PERMANENT EMPLOYEES, AND COMPANIES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE BENEFITS, SUCH AS MATERNITY LEAVE, TO DAY LABORERS. WOMENS' RIGHTS ACTIVISTS REPORT THAT A GROWING TREND IN MANUFACTURING IS THE HIRING OF WOMEN TO DO WORK IN THEIR HOMES

FOR LESS THAN MINIMUM WAGE. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR WOMEN ARE APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT HIGHER THAN FOR MEN. WOMEN ARE OFTEN NOT GIVEN THE EXTRA BENEFITS AND SALARY THAT ARE THEIR DUE WHEN THEY ARE THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, AND IN SOME CASES DO NOT RECEIVE EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR THEIR HUSBAND AND CHILDREN, SUCH AS MEDICAL INSURANCE AND INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS.

DESPITE LAWS THAT PROVIDE WOMEN WITH A 3-MONTH MATERNITY LEAVE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONCEDED THAT PREGNANT WOMEN ARE OFTEN DISMISSED OR ARE REPLACED WHILE ON LEAVE. SOME COMPANIES REQUIRE THAT WOMEN SIGN STATEMENTS THAT THEY WILL NOT BECOME PREGNANT. THE EMPLOYMENT LAW MANDATES TWO DAYS OF MENSTRUAL LEAVE PER MONTH FOR WOMEN, ALTHOUGH THIS LEAVE IS NOT ALWAYS ALLOWED. MANY GROUPS COMPLAINED ABOUT THE DRAFT LABOR BILL FOR BEING VAGUE ABOUT REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS BY NO LONGER SPECIFYING THE LENGTH OF MATERNITY AND MENSTRUAL LEAVE TIME TO WHICH WOMEN ARE ENTITLED. IT ALSO DID NOT MANDATE THAT EMPLOYERS GIVE BREAST-FEEDING WOMEN TIME DURING WORK HOURS TO FEED THEIR BABIES. THE NEW LAW THAT WAS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT SEPTEMBER 12 HAD BEEN REVISED TO INCLUDE

THESE RIGHTS ONCE AGAIN. MANY GROUPS HAVE CRITICIZED THE MANPOWER LAW FOR NOT ADDRESSING SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE, AND FOR PROVIDING INADEQUATE PROTECTION IN AREAS OF EMPLOYMENT WHERE WOMEN HAVE REGULARLY SUFFERED ABUSE, SUCH AS OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSEHOLD SERVICE.

WOMEN DISPROPORTIONATELY EXPERIENCE ILLITERACY, POOR HEALTH, AND INADEQUATE NUTRITION. THE PRESIDENT CALLED FOR EXPANDED EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE MATERNAL MORTALITY RATE, WHICH AT 425 PER 100,000 LIVE BIRTHS, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL FIGURES, AND ESTIMATES OF UP TO 650 FROM OTHER SOURCES, IS THE HIGHEST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE GOVERNMENT LAUNCHED THE "MOTHER FRIENDLY MOVEMENT" IN DECEMBER 1996 TO ADDRESS MATERNAL MORTALITY, AND IS CURRENTLY EXPANDING THE SCOPE TO COVER MORE DISTRICTS. CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DATA ESTIMATES THAT TWO THIRDS OF INDONESIAN WOMEN ARE ANEMIC, AND THAT 24 PERCENT OF WOMEN OF REPRODUCTIVE AGE SUFFER FROM CHRONIC ENERGY DEFICIENCY. WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS HAVE IMPROVED IN THE LAST DECADE. THE NUMBER OF GIRLS GRADUATING FROM HIGH SCHOOL TRIPLED FROM 1980 TO 1990.

CHILDREN

THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND WELFARE, BUT IS HAMPERED BY A LACK OF RESOURCES THAT PREVENTS IT FROM TRANSLATING THIS COMMITMENT INTO PRACTICE. THE GOVERNMENT ALLOCATES ONLY 2.2 PERCENT OF GNP TO EDUCATION, THE LOWEST LEVEL IN THE REGION. A 1979 LAW ON CHILDREN'S WELFARE DEFINES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE AND PARENTS TO NURTURE AND PROTECT CHILDREN. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE PARTICULAR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PRIMARY EDUCATION AND MATERNITY SERVICES.

LOW COST MEDICAL CARE IS AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH ACCESS AND AVAILABILITY IS SOMETIMES SPORADIC, ESPECIALLY IN RURAL AREAS. MOREOVER, THE GOVERNMENT COMMITS ONLY 0.7 PERCENT OF GNP TO THE HEALTH SECTOR, THE LOWEST IN THE REGION. ACCORDING TO UNITED NATIONS DATA, 36 PERCENT OF CHILDREN UNDER 5 SUFFER FROM PROTEIN-ENERGY MALNUTRITION, AND 35 PERCENT SUFFER FROM IRON DEFICIENCY.

ALTHOUGH PRIMARY EDUCATION IS IN PRINCIPLE UNIVERSAL, THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF) ESTIMATES THAT MORE THAN ONE MILLION CHILDREN DROP OUT OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EVERY YEAR DUE MAINLY TO THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH EDUCATION AND THE PROFESSED NEED FOR THE CHILDREN TO SUPPLEMENT FAMILY INCOME. A 1994 LAW RAISED COMPULSORY EDUCATION FROM 6 TO 9 YEARS, BUT THE LAW HAS NOT BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED DUE TO INADEQUATE SCHOOL FACILITIES AND THE LACK OF FAMILY FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO SUPPORT CHILDREN STAYING IN SCHOOL. OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL FEES FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, INCLUDING PAYMENTS FOR REGISTRATION, BOOKS, MEALS, TRANSPORT, AND UNIFORMS HAVE RISEN TO PROHIBITIVELY HIGH LEVELS FOR MANY FAMILIES.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9678

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9678

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 21 OF 31 151017Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF573B 151017Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7824

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 21 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES, 8 PERCENT OF CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 14 WORK. HALF GO TO SCHOOL AND ALSO WORK, AND HALF WORK EXCLUSIVELY. UNOFFICIAL ESTIMATES ARE HIGHER. ACCORDING TO THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS, 20,000 STREET CHILDREN LIVE IN JAKARTA. THOUSANDS MORE LIVE IN OTHER CITIES. THEY SELL NEWSPAPERS, SHINE SHOES, HELP TO PARK OR WATCH CARS,

AND OTHERWISE ATTEMPT TO EARN MONEY. MANY CHILDREN WORK IN

HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS AS SCAVENGERS AND GARBAGE PICKERS, AND ON FISHING PLATFORMS AND FISHING BOATS. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES, THERE ARE SEVERAL THOUSAND CHILDREN WORKING IN HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS ON FISHING PLATFORMS OFF THE EAST COAST OF NORTH SUMATRA (SEE SECTION 6.C.). MANY THOUSANDS WORK IN FACTORIES AND FIELDS (SEE SECTION 6.D.).

STREET CHILDREN AND CHILD LABORERS IN SOME CITIES HAVE BECOME ORGANIZED AND INTERESTED IN PROTECTING THEIR RIGHTS. AT LEAST 30 NGO'S AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS WORK WITH STREET CHILDREN IN INDONESIA. NGO'S HAVE CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT FOR MAKING INSUFFICIENT AND INADEQUATE EFFORTS TO HELP STREET CHILDREN AND WORKING CHILDREN. THE GOVERNMENT IS WORKING IN COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP), THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF), THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE (ILO), AND WITH NGO'S TO CREATE PROGRAMS FOR STREET CHILDREN AND CHILD LABORERS. ONE PROJECT INCORPORATES MANY IDEAS GENERATED BY THE NGO COMMUNITY, INCLUDING ESTABLISHING "OPEN HOUSES" IN TARGETED AREAS THAT PROVIDE VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND BASIC EDUCATION TO STREET CHILDREN. EFFORTS HAVE BEEN INITIATED TO START A PILOT PROJECT OF OPEN HOUSES FOR STREET CHILDREN IN SEVEN PROVINCES. COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH HAS NOT BEEN DONE WHICH ACCURATELY SURVEYS THE STREET CHILDREN AND CHILD LABOR SITUATION.

ANOTHER APPROACH TAKEN TO THE STREET CHILDREN PROBLEM UTILIZES THE NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR DISCIPLINE AND CLEAN CITIES DECREE. THE STREET CHILDREN ARE PHYSICALLY REMOVED FROM CITIES BY BUS. USUALLY, THEY ARE TAKEN OUTSIDE THE CITY AND LEFT THERE. SOMETIMES THEY ARE TAKEN TO "HOLDING HOUSES" WHERE THEY ARE FIRST INTERROGATED AND LATER RELEASED.

CHILD PROSTITUTION AND OTHER SEXUAL ABUSES OCCUR, BUT FIRM DATA ARE LACKING. WHILE THERE ARE LAWS DESIGNED TO PROTECT CHILDREN FROM INDECENT ACTIVITIES, PROSTITUTION, AND INCEST, THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS.

A SEPARATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR JUVENILES DOES NOT EXIST. POLICE OFFICIALS ADMIT THAT JUVENILES ARE OFTEN IMPRISONED WITH ADULT OFFENDERS. JUVENILE CRIME IS CURRENTLY HANDLED BY ORDINARY COURTS. A JUVENILE JUSTICE LAW WAS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT IN DECEMBER 1996, AND WAS SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT IN JANUARY. HOWEVER, IT WILL NOT COME INTO EFFECT UNTIL JANUARY 1998. IT DEFINES JUVENILES AS CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 8 AND 18, AND ESTABLISHES A SPECIAL COURT SYSTEM AND CRIMINAL CODE FOR THEM.

FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM), WHICH IS WIDELY CONDEMNED BY INTERNATIONAL HEALTH EXPERTS AS DAMAGING TO BOTH PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, IS NOT SEEN AS A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM IN INDONESIA. FEMALE CIRCUMCISION IS WIDELY PRACTICED IN INDONESIA, AND THE METHOD VARIES DEPENDING ON ETHNIC, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS TRADITION. HOWEVER, THE MOST PREVALENT FORM OF FEMALE CIRCUMCISION IS A CEREMONIAL PRACTICE WHICH INVOLVES THE PRICKING, SCRAPING, OR TOUCHING OF THE CLITORIS OF A BABY OR YOUNG GIRL, OFTEN WITH THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING SEVERAL DROPS OF BLOOD. SOMETIMES, A PLANT ROOT IS USED SYMBOLICALLY AND THE GIRL IS NOT TOUCHED.

A MORE SERIOUS FORM OF CIRCUMCISION THAT IS PRACTICED IN INDONESIA, WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED FGM, INVOLVES THE REMOVAL OF THE VERY TIP OF THE CLITORIS. THIS PRACTICE APPEARS TO BE DECLINING, AND THERE IS DISAGREEMENT ABOUT HOW WIDELY PRACTICED

IT IS. IT IS REPORTEDLY STILL PRACTICED IN MADURA, SOUTH SULAWESI AND OTHER AREAS. SINCE CIRCUMCISION AND FGM ARE NOT REGULATED, AND NO FORMAL POSITION HAS BEEN TAKEN BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS, THE CIRCUMCISION METHOD USED IS OFTEN LEFT UP TO THE INDIVIDUAL LOCAL TRADITIONAL PRACTITIONER. CIRCUMCISION USUALLY TAKES PLACE WITHIN THE FIRST YEAR AFTER BIRTH, OFTEN ON THE 40TH DAY, THOUGH IT IS DONE IN SOME AREAS UP TO AGE TEN. IT IS

PERFORMED EITHER AT A HOSPITAL OR, ESPECIALLY IN RURAL AREAS, BY THE LOCAL TRADITIONAL PRACTITIONER. THERE ARE NO STATISTICS AVAILABLE ON FEMALE CIRCUMCISION IN INDONESIA.

PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

THE UNITED NATIONS ESTIMATES THAT THERE ARE 10 MILLION DISABLED PEOPLE IN INDONESIA, WHILE THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS ESTIMATES THREE PERCENT OF THE POPULATION, OR 6 MILLION. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO PRECISE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBERS OF DISABLED IN THE GENERAL POPULATION. FAMILIES OFTEN HIDE THEIR DISABLED FAMILY MEMBERS TO AVOID SOCIAL STIGMA OR EMBARRASSMENT. THE DISABLED FACE CONSIDERABLE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, ALTHOUGH SOME FACTORIES HAVE MADE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO HIRE

NNNNPTQ9683

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 22 OF 31 151017Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF5743 151017Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7825

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 22 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

DISABLED WORKERS. SEVERAL PROVINCES HAVE ESTABLISHED "REHABILITATION CENTERS" FOR THE DISABLED. DISABLED PEOPLE ARE REPORTEDLY TAKEN OFF THE STREETS BY THE AUTHORITIES AND BROUGHT TO THESE CENTERS FOR JOB TRAINING.

NGO'S ARE THE PRIMARY PROVIDERS OF EDUCATION FOR THE DISABLED. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 1,084 SCHOOLS FOR THE DISABLED; 680 ARE

PRIVATE, AND 404 ARE GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS. OF THE GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS 165 ARE "INTEGRATED," SERVING BOTH REGULAR AND SPECIAL EDUCATION STUDENTS. IN JAKARTA THERE ARE 98 SCHOOLS FOR THE DISABLED, 2 OF WHICH ARE GOVERNMENT-RUN, AND 96 OF WHICH ARE PRIVATE. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO RUNS THREE NATIONAL SCHOOLS FOR THE VISUALLY, HEARING, AND MENTALLY DISABLED. THESE SCHOOLS ACCEPT CHILDREN FROM THROUGHOUT INDONESIA.

A DISABILITY LAW WAS PASSED IN JANUARY. IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN ISSUED, SO THE IMPACT THE LAW REMAINS UNCLEAR. THE LAW STRIVES TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND ASSISTANCE FOR THE DISABLED. IT REQUIRES COMPANIES EMPLOYING OVER 100 PEOPLE TO GIVE ONE PERCENT OF THE JOBS TO THE DISABLED. THE LAW MANDATES ACCESSIBILITY FOR THE DISABLED TO PUBLIC FACILITIES. VIRTUALLY NO BUILDINGS OR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION HAVE BEEN DESIGNED WITH SUCH ACCESSIBILITY IN MIND.

THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDE CARE FOR ORPHANS AND THE DISABLED, BUT DOES NOT SPECIFY HOW THE TERM "CARE" SHOULD BE DEFINED, AND THE PROVISION OF EDUCATION TO ALL MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED CHILDREN HAS NEVER BEEN INFERRED. REGULATIONS SPECIFY THAT THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISH AND REGULATE A NATIONAL CURRICULUM FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION BY STIPULATING THAT THE "COMMUNITY" PROVIDE SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES TO ITS CHILDREN.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE TERM "INDIGENOUS PEOPLE" TO BE A MISNOMER, BECAUSE IT CONSIDERS ALL INDONESIANS TO BE INDIGENOUS. NONETHELESS, IT PUBLICLY RECOGNIZES THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL

"ISOLATED COMMUNITIES," AND THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE. THE GOVERNMENT ESTIMATES THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN ISOLATED COMMUNITIES IS 1.5 MILLION. THIS INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, GROUPS SUCH AS THE DAYAK POPULATION IN KALIMANTAN WHO LIVE IN REMOTE FOREST AREAS, INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES THROUGHOUT IRIAN JAYA, AND ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED FAMILIES LIVING AS SEA NOMADS ON BOATS NEAR RIAU IN EAST SUMATRA AND NEAR UJUNG PANDANG IN SOUTHERN SULAWESI. CRITICS MAINTAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH IS BASICALLY PATERNALISTIC AND DESIGNED MORE TO INTEGRATE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE INTO INDONESIAN SOCIETY THAN TO PROTECT THEIR TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE.

60 PERCENT OF INDONESIA'S POPULATION OF 200 MILLION LIVE IN JAVA, WHICH REPRESENTS ONLY 7 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY'S TERRITORY. THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM SEEKS TO RESETTLE PEOPLE FROM DENSELY POPULATED AREAS TO SPARSELY POPULATED AREAS OUTSIDE JAVA. THE MAJORITY OF MIGRANTS ARE SPONTANEOUS MIGRANTS WHO ARE NOT PART OF THE OFFICIAL PROGRAM. THE CURRENT FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN CALLS FOR 600,000 FAMILIES TO BE RESETTLED, WITH 80,000 PLANNED FOR THE 1997-98 FISCAL YEAR.

CRITICS OF TRANSMIGRATION CLAIM THAT IT OFTEN THREATENS INDIGENOUS CULTURES AND SPARKS SOCIAL ENVY. SOME CRITICS CLAIM THAT IT HAS BEEN USED AS A POLITICAL TOOL TO INJECT NON-

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES INTO CERTAIN AREAS TO "INDONESIANIZE" THESE AREAS, IN PART TO PRECLUDE SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS. IN SOME AREAS, RELATIONS BETWEEN TRANSMIGRANTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ARE HOSTILE, SUCH AS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF KALIMANTAN, EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA. COMPLAINTS ABOUT TRANSMIGRATION COME FROM INDIGENOUS GROUPS RECEIVING LESS GOVERNMENT SUPPORT AND FUNDING THAN

TRANSMIGRANTS, AND FROM TRANSMIGRANTS, WHO ARE IN SOME CASES MOVED TO AREAS WITH INADEQUATE INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT THEM AND LESS THAN DESIRABLE LAND.

THERE WERE PROTRACTED OUTBREAKS OF SERIOUS RIOTING BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS IN WEST KALIMANTAN IN LATE DECEMBER 1996 AND IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY 1997 WHEN THOUSANDS OF LARGELY CHRISTIAN DAYAK TRIBESMEN ATTACKED IMMIGRANT MUSLIM MADURESE. HUNDREDS, POSSIBLY OVER ONE THOUSAND, PRIMARILY MADURESE DIED IN THE FIGHTING, AND AN ESTIMATED 15,000 MADURESE FLED THE VIOLENCE. THE EXPLOSION OF VIOLENCE, THE SIXTH DAYAK-MADURESE CONFRONTATION IN THE PAST 30 YEARS, GREW PARTLY OUT OF DAYAK PERCEPTION THAT THEY WERE BEING MARGINALIZED IN THEIR NATIVE LANDS. THE MADURESE COMMUNITY IN WEST KALIMANTAN GREW AROUND AN EARLIER CORE OF TRANSMIGRANTS, ALTHOUGH THE MAJORITY OF MADURESE ARE SPONTANEOUS IMMIGRANTS.

THE GOVERNMENT'S EMPHASIS ON RELATIVELY RAPID GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES, BURGEONING URBANIZATION AND AGGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT-BACKED COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES INEVITABLY RESULTS IN CONTINUED TENSION OVER LAND TENURE ISSUES. THAT TENSION IS OFTEN EXPRESSED ALONG RACIAL/ETHNIC LINES AS

NNNNPTQ9684

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9684

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 23 OF 31 151017Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF5748 151017Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7826

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 23 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

DEVELOPERS ARE FREQUENTLY MINORITY ETHNIC CHINESE INDONESIANS. LAND DISPUTES REPRESENT THE LARGEST CATEGORY OF COMPLAINTS SUBMITTED TO THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE CASES BROUGHT TO LEGAL AID FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER LEGAL ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS.

ACCORDING TO A LAW DERIVED FROM DUTCH PRACTICES, ALL SUBSURFACE

MINERAL RESOURCES BELONG TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE BASIC AGRARIAN LAW STATES THAT LAND RIGHTS CANNOT BE "IN CONFLICT WITH NATIONAL AND STATE INTERESTS," WHICH PROVIDES THE GOVERNMENT WITH A BROAD LEGAL BASIS FOR LAND SEIZURES. WHEN DISPUTES CANNOT BE SETTLED THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DEFINE FAIR COMPENSATION FOR LAND.

THERE ARE NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF THE USE OF INTIMIDATION, SOMETIMES BY THE MILITARY, AND OFTEN BY HIRED "THUGS," TO ACQUIRE LAND FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. SUCH OCCURRENCES HAVE TRANSPIRED IN JAKARTA, OTHER PARTS OF JAVA, NORTH SUMATRA, ACEH, AND OTHER AREAS. COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND IS OFTEN MINIMAL OR EVEN NON-EXISTENT. IN ONE CASE, ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES, RESIDENTS LIVING IN AN AREA NEEDED FOR A NEW CEMENT FACTORY IN ACEH WERE PAID RUPIAH 500 (LESS THAN 20 CENTS) PER SQUARE METER OF LAND, WHICH THEY FELT WAS INADEQUATE COMPENSATION. IN JULY, RESIDENTS OF MAGELANG, CENTRAL JAVA COMPLAINED TO THE REGIONAL PARLIAMENT ABOUT THE MIITARY TAKING OVER THEIR LAND FOR MILITARY USE. THE COMPLAINT ALLEGES THAT LOCAL RESIDENTS WEE COERCED, VISITED AT NIGHT BY MILITARY AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES, AND TOLD TO ACCEPT RUPIAH 5,000 PER SQUARE METER FOR THEIR LAND, WHICH THEY SAW AS INSUFFICIENT COMPENSATION.

NGO'S ASSERT THAT VIOLATIONS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE'S RIGHTS ARE FREQUENT IN MINING AND LOGGING AREAS, CLAIMING VIOLATIONS STEM FROM THE STATE'S DENIAL OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE'S OWNERSHIP OF ANCESTRAL LAND, DENIAL OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND FORCED TAKEOVER OF LAND. THESE PROBLEMS ARE MOST PREVALENT IN IRIAN JAYA AND KALIMANTAN.

NGO'S REPORT THAT LOCAL PEOPLE HAVE SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF A

PROJECT IN CENTRAL KALIMANTAN TO TURN ONE MILLION HECTARES OF PEAT LAND INTO AGRICULTURAL LAND FOR RICE CULTIVATION. THE SITE

IS DESIGNATED AS A MAJOR TRANSMIGRATION AREA. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES, 100,000 INDIGENOUS PEOPLE ARE AFFECTED BY THE PROJECT. FORCED TO CEASE THEIR TRADITIONAL FARMING AND FOREST-BASED LIVELIHOODS, MANY INDIGENOUS PEOPLES LIVING IN THE AREA HAVE BECOME POORLY PAID LABORERS ON THE PROJECT.

LOCALS IN THE ISOLATED TANIMBAR ISLANDS IN SOUTHEAST MALUKU STAGED FUTILE PROTESTS AGAINST THE DESTRUCTION OF FORESTS, FAUNA AND LOCAL TRIBAL CULTURES PRIMARILY DUE TO LOGGING.

WHERE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE CLASH WITH DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, THE DEVELOPERS ALMOST ALWAYS WIN. DECISIONS REGARDING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, RESOURCE-USE CONCESSIONS, AND OTHER ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES ARE GENERALLY CARRIED OUT WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OR INFORMED CONSENT OF THE AFFECTED COMMUNITIES.

TENSIONS WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN IRIAN JAYA, INCLUDING IN THE VICINITY OF A FOREIGN MINING CONCESSION AREA NEAR TIMIKA, CONTINUED. INDIGENOUS IRIAN JAYA RESIDENTS COMPLAIN OF RACISM, RELIGIOUS BIAS, PATERNALISM, AND CONDESCENSION AS CONSTANT IMPEDIMENTS TO BETTER RELATIONS WITH NON-IRIANESE PEOPLE, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY AND THE NON-IRIANESE BUSINESS COMMUNITY. THEY ALSO COMPLAIN OF ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR BY THE INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES. A RELIABLE NGO SOURCE CLAIMS THAT 20 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION OF IRIAN JAYA IS NOW MADE UP OF MIGRANTS, WHO ARE ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY DOMINANT. MOST CIVIL SERVANTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN IRIAN JAYA AND OTHER ISOLATED AREAS CONTINUE TO COME PRIMARILY FROM JAVA, RATHER THAN FROM THE LOCAL INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

THE ANTICIPATED DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS FROM A FOREIGN MINING COMPANY CREATED TENSIONS THAT HELPED LEAD TO A CLASH BETWEEN TRIBAL GROUPS AND SECURITY FORCES IN AUGUST IN THE TIMIKA-TEMBAGAPURA AREA THAT LED TO THE SHOOING DEATHS OF TWO IRIANESE AND INJURIES TO SECURITY FORCES. (SEE SECTION 1 A). AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, TWO GROUPS SUPPORTING RIVAL LEADERS OF THE MONI TRIBAL GROUP HELD DEMONSTRATIONS OVER THEIR CLAIMS TO PART OF THE FUNDS FROM THE FOREIGN MINING COMPANY, AND THEN LATER MASSED TOGETHER NEAR THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL DISTRICT LEADER TO PRESS THEIR DEMANDS. CREDIBLE NGO SOURCES HAVE CLAIMED BYSTANDERS TO THIS

EVENT WERE ASSAULTED BY SECURITY FORCES. DUE TO LOCAL PROTESTS OVER HOW THE FUNDS WOULD BE ALLOCATED, THE COMPANY SUSPENDED THIS INITIATIVE IN AUGUST, AND EFFORTS BY THE COMPANY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM ARE CONTINUING.

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR MEMBERS OF FIVE ACCEPTED RELIGIONS AND BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD, AND THE GOVERNMENT HA HISTORICALLY MADE THIS A HIGH PRIORITY. INCIDENTS

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9685

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9685

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 24 OF 31 151017Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF574D 151017Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7827

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 24 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

OF ATTACKS AGAINST CHURCES, TEMPLES, AND OTHER RELIGIOUS FACILITIES,MANY OF WHICH OCCURRED IN THE MIDST OF LARGER RIOTS, AS WELL AS EXAMPLES OF PREACHING AND PUBLICATIONS AGAINST CHRISTIANS, LED TO CONCERNS THAT THE CLIMATE OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE WAS UNDER PRESSURE. UNDERLYING SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TENSIONS WERE KEY TO EXPLAINING THIS PRESSURE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT FULLY RESOLVED MANY CASES OF ATTACKS ON

RELIGIOUS FACILITIES AND CHURCHES THAT OCCURRED DURING RIOTS AND IN OTHER CASES HAS NOT INVESTIGATED AT ALL.

DURING FEBRUARY, THE ISLAMIC FASTING MONTH OF RAMADAN, MANY CHURCHES AROUND INDONESIA REPORTEDLY RECEIVED THREATENING PHONE CALLS OR FAXES FROM UNKNOWN GROUPS WARNING OF FUTURE DESTRUCTION ON SPECIFIC DATES. WHILE THERE WERE INCIDENTS OF CHURCH BURNINGS AND ATTACKS DURING THIS PERIOD, THE WIDESPREAD ATTACKS THAT WERE THREATENED DID NOT MATERIALIZE BUT THE THREATS CAUSED FEAR IN MANY CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES. SOURCES IN MEDAN, NORTH SUMATRA CLAIMED THAT LOCALS, IN ONE CASE WITH THE HELP OF THE ARMED FORCES, GUARDED CHURCHES DURING THESE PERIODS. A CATHOLIC CHURCH IN BANDUNG, A MORMON CHURCH IN SEMARANG, AND CHURCHES IN JAKARTA, AMONG OTHERS, RECEIVED THREATS. RELIABLE SOURCES REPORTED THAT CATHOLIC COMMUNITIES WERE THREATENED WITH VIOLENCE IN A TOWN IN CENTRAL JAVA, BUT A LOCAL INTER-RELIGIOUS MEETING SERVED TO DIFFUSE TENSIONS. THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF THREATS AGAINST CHRISTIANS AND ETHNIC CHINESE IN THE CENTRAL JAVANESE TOWNS OF PURWOKERTO AND PURWOREDJO DURING THIS TIME AS WELL. RELIABLE SOURCES REPORTED THAT MANY CHURCHES THAT WERE THREATENED WERE

GUARDED BY CHURCH GROUPS AND LOCAL ALLIANCES OF CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM YOUTH DURING THIS TIME.

A CATHOLIC SCHOOL IN AMBON WAS BURNED IN FEBRUARY, BUT LOCALS DESCRIBED IT AS AN UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE IN AMBON, WHERE RELATIONS BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC GROUPS ARE SAID TO BE GENERALLY GOOD. A CHURCH IN GARUT, WEST JAVA WAS BURNED ON FEBRUARY 22, AND ANOTHER WAS DESTROYED THERE ON MARCH 6.

THERE WERE SEVERAL INSTANCES OF MOB VIOLENCE THAT INCLUDED ATTACKS ON CHURCHES, OTHER RELIGIOUS FACILITIES, AND CHINESE-

OWNED BUSINESSES. RIOTING AND CHURCH BURNINGS OCCURRED IN RENGESDENGKLOK, WEST JAVA IN JANUARY, IN WHICH FIVE CHURCHES WERE DESTROYED BY MOB VIOLENCE. THE INCIDENT WAS SPARKED AFTER A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN A CHINESE WOMAN AND LOCAL MUSLIM YOUTHS. THE RIOTING THAT FOLLOWED CAUSED WIDESPREAD DAMAGE TO CHURCHES. TWO BUDDHIST TEMPLES WERE ALSO DAMAGED OR BURNED.

A CREDIBLE REPORT CHRONICLES, WITH PHOTOGRAPHS, DAMAGE TO CHURCHES AND CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS IN 1997, INCLUDING: STONE-THROWING INCIDENTS IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH IN GARUT, SURABAYA, NGAWI, AND WONOSOBO; BURNING OF A PENTECOSTAL CHURCH IN TUBAN, EAST JAVA IN MAY; DESTRUCTION OF A CHURCH IN MANADO, NORTH SULAWESI IN MAY; AND DESTRUCTION OF A CHURCH IN BOGOR IN MAY. THIS REPORT CITES CHURCH BURNINGS AND CHURCH DESTRUCTION IN MANY CITIES ON MAY 23, THE LAST DAY OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, INCLUDING: 13 CHURCHES IN BANJARMASIN, KALIMANTAN; FIVE IN PASUARUAN, EAST JAVA; ONE IN SURABAYA; THREE IN JAKARTA AREA; AND ONE IN MADURA. A PROTESTANT CHURCH IN JAKARTA, WHICH WAS STONED TWICE DURING THE LAST WEEK OF THE CAMPAIGN, WAS BURNED ON MAY 23.

FOLLOWING THE MAY 29 ELECTION, TENSIONS EASED AND INCIDENTS BECAME MUCH LESS FREQUENT. MANY OF THE CHURCHES THAT WERE BURNED OR DAMAGED DURING THE OCTOBER 1996 SITUBONDO RIOT WERE SUCCESSFULLY REBUILT WITH COOPERATION BETWEEN CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES.

AN INTER-RELIGIOUS ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL STUDENT AND YOUTH GROUPS WAS FORMED IN FEBRUARY, IN PART AS A RESPONSE TO INCREASED TENSIONS FOLLOWING THE SITUBONDO RIOT AND CHURCH BURNINGS IN

OCTOBER 1996, TO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE GRASS ROOTS LEVEL

TO PREVENT FURTHER UNREST. THIS GROUP, CALLED THE NATIONALITY FORUM FOR INDONESIAN YOUTH, CURRENTLY INCLUDES ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING MUSLIM (NAHDLATUL ULAMA), CHRISTIAN, CATHOLIC, AND HINDU YOUTH.

A 1969 REGULATION DICTATES THAT BEFORE A HOUSE OF WORSHIP CAN BE BUILT, AGREEMENT MUST BE OBTAINED FROM LOCAL RESIDENTS LIVING NEAR THE SITE AND A LICENSE MUST BE OBTAINED FROM THE REGIONAL OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF RELIGION. CHRISTIANS CLAIM THAT THIS REGULATION IS BEING USED TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST THEM AND TO PREVENT THEM FROM BUILDING CHURCHES.

DESPITE THE PROBLEMS, THE BUILDING OF CHURCHES CONTINUES. THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS PROSELYTIZING BY RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS IN AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ANOTHER RECOGNIZED RELIGION AS POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND DISCOURAGES BUT DOES NOT PROHIBIT IT. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED.

NATIONAL/RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALLY PROMOTES RACIAL AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE.

NNNNPTQ9686

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9686

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 25 OF 31 151017Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF574F 151017Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7828

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 25 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

ETHNIC CHINESE, AND AT APPROXIMATELY 3 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION BY FAR THE LARGEST NON-INDIGENOUS MINORITY GROUP, HAVE HISTORICALLY PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY. THEY ARE THE TARGET OF DISCRIMINATION. ANTI-CHINESE SENTIMENT, TIED TO PERCEPTIONS OF CHINESE WEALTH, HAS LED TO ATTACKS ON CHINESE-OWNED BUSINESSES DURING PERIODS OF SOCIAL UNREST, AS WAS SEEN DURING THE RENGESDENKLOK RIOT IN JANUARY AND THE UJUNG PANDANG

UNCLASSIFIED

RIOTS IN SEPTEMBER. WIDESPREAD ANTI-CHINESE RIOTING IN UJUNG PANDANG, SOUTH SULAWESI WAS SPARKED BY A MENTALLY ILL INDONESIAN OF CHINESE DESCENT KILLING A NINE YEAR OLD ON A CITY STREET. THE INCIDENT SPARKED SEVERAL DAYS OF RIOTING, IN WHICH SIX PEOPLE REPORTEDLY DIED, OVER 1000 SHOPS WERE REPORTEDLY DAMAGED, ALONG WITH A NUMBER OF CHINESE-OWNED BANKS AND A HOTEL. MOST PROPERTY DESTROYED WAS SINGLED OUT BECAUSE OF PERCEIVED CHINESE CONNECTIONS. CHINESE TEMPLES WERE ATTACKED, AND THE MOST HISTORIC LOCAL TEMPLE WAS DESTROYED.

SINCE 1959 NONCITIZEN ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO RUN BUSINESSES IN RURAL INDONESIA. REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF CHINESE SCHOOLS, FORMATION OF EXCLUSIVELY CHINESE CULTURAL GROUPS OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND PUBLIC DISPLAY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS, ALTHOUGH CHINESE CHARACTERS ARE SEEN ON SOME PRODUCTS. LEGISLATION BANS THE IMPORT, SALE OR DISTRIBUTION OF CHINESE-LANGUAGE MATERIAL. HOWEVER, CHINESE LANGUAGE MATERIALS HAVE BEGUN TO APPEAR IN CHINESE NEIGHBORHOODS IN JAKARTA AND POSSIBLY ELSEWHERE. SINCE 1994, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALLOWED CHINESE LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION FOR TRAINING EMPLOYEES IN THE TOURISM INDUSTRY, AND HAS ALLOWED DISTRIBUTION OF LOCALLY PRINTED TOURIST BROCHURES, PROGRAMS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL TO CHINESE SPEAKING TOURISTS.

PRIVATE INSTRUCTION IN CHINESE IS GENERALLY PROHIBITED BUT TAKES PLACE TO A LIMITED EXTENT. THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA HAS CHINESE LANGUAGE COURSES. STATE UNIVERSITIES HAVE INFORMAL QUOTAS THAT LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ETHNIC CHINESE. THE LAW FORBIDS THE CELEBRATION OF THE CHINESE NEW YEAR IN TEMPLES OR PUBLIC PLACES, BUT ITS ENFORCEMENT IS LIMITED. CHINESE NEW YEAR DECORATIONS WERE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED AND SOLD IN PUBLIC

SHOPPING AREAS IN AT LEAST A FEW CITIES. IN JUNE, A SENIOR OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF ETHNIC INTEGRATION WAS QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS SAYING THAT THE BAN ON CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS SHOULD NOT BE HASTILY RELAXED, DUE TO RACIAL CONCERNS.

EAST TIMORESE AND VARIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS CHARGE THAT THE

EAST TIMORESE ARE UNDER-REPRESENTED IN THE CIVIL SERVICE IN EAST TIMOR. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE SOME EFFORTS TO RECRUIT MORE CIVIL SERVANTS IN BOTH EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, AND THERE HAS BEEN SOME INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CIVIL SERVANT TRAINEES FOR THESE TWO PROVINCES, DESPITE A "NO GROWTH" POLICY FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE AS A WHOLE. EAST TIMORESE HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERNS THAT THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM (SEE SECTION 1.F.) COULD LEAD TO FEWER EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND MIGHT EVENTUALLY DESTROY EAST TIMOR'S CULTURAL IDENTITY. THE GOVERNMENT SAID IN 1997 THAT THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM IN EAST TIMOR FOCUSSED MOSTLY ON RESETTLEMENT OF TIMORESE, WITH A MUCH SMALLER PORTION OF PREDOMINANTLY CHRISTIAN AND HINDU NON-TIMORESE COMING IN FROM OUTSIDE. IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, INFORMAL, PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM MIGRATION TO THE PROVINCE HAS SPARKED SOCIOECONOMIC TENSION IN URBAN AREAS, PROVOKING AN EVEN GREATER CONCERN THAN THE FORMALLY SPONSORED TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS ARE BY LAW FREE TO FORM WORKER ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION. HOWEVER, GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND CURRENT NUMERICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR UNION RECOGNITION CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT BARRIER TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND

THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER USES A REGULATION THAT REQUIRES THAT A UNION BE SET UP "BY AND FOR WORKERS" TO DENY RECOGNITION TO GROUPS THAT INCLUDE PEOPLE IT CONSIDERS NONWORKERS, SUCH AS LAWYERS OR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, WHO ARE INVOLVED AS LABOR ORGANIZERS. UNDER A NEW "LAW ON MANPOWER AFFAIRS" WHICH THE PARLIAMENT PASSED IN SEPTEMBER, WORKERS MAY FORM UNIONS ON THE BASIS OF "DEMOCRATIC CONSULTATION" WITH OTHER WORKERS IN THE SAME COMPANY, AND MAY JOIN WITH OTHER UNIONS TO FORM SECTORAL AND INTER-SECTORAL FEDERATIONS. THE NEW LAW, WHICH IN SEPTEMBER WAS AWAITING PRESIDENTIAL SIGNATURE, DOES NOT TAKE EFFECT UNTIL OCTOBER 1, 1998, AND REQUIRES IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS.

AT PRESENT THERE IS A DE FACTO SINGLE UNION SYSTEM, THE SPSI AND ITS 13 FEDERATED SECTORAL UNIONS. THE SPSI COMPLETED IN 1995 A

TRANSFORMATION FROM A UNITARY (CENTRALIZED) TO A FEDERATIVE (DECENTRALIZED) STRUCTURE. ITS 13 INDUSTRIAL SECTORS ARE NOW REGISTERED AS SEPARATE NATIONAL UNIONS; THE SPSI IS THE ONLY TRADE UNION FEDERATION RECOGNIZED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER HAS STATED THAT ANY UNIONS THAT ARE FORMED SHOULD AFFILIATE WITH THE SPSI FEDERATION, AND THAT THE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9687

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9687

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 26 OF 31 151017Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF5754 151018Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7829

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 26 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

GOVERNMENT WILL NOT RECOGNIZE ANY UNIONS OUTSIDE THE FEDERATION. THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED POLICY IS TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECOGNIZED SPSI UNIONS RATHER THAN TO ALLOW THE FORMATION OF ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

THE GOVERNMENT MAY DISSOLVE A UNION IF IT BELIEVES THAT THE UNION IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA, ALTHOUGH IT HAS NEVER ACTUALLY DONE

SO, AND THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS SPECIFYING PROCEDURES FOR UNION DISSOLUTION.

UNTIL 1994, ONLY THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED FEDERATION OF ALL-INDONESIAN TRADE UNIONS (SPSI) COULD LEGALLY BARGAIN ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES OR REPRESENT WORKERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S LABOR COURTS. A 1994 REGULATION PROVIDES THAT WORKERS IN A SINGLE COMPANY WITH MORE THAN 25 EMPLOYEES CAN JOIN TOGETHER AS A "PLANT-LEVEL UNION" AND NEGOTIATE A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT WITH THEIR EMPLOYER OUTSIDE THE SPSI FRAMEWORK, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES THESE PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS TO JOIN THE SPSI. APPROXIMATELY 1200 PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY SEPTEMBER, REFLECTING A SMALL INCREASE DURING THE YEAR. NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS HAVE CHARGED, HOWEVER, THAT MANY OF THESE UNIONS ARE "YELLOW UNIONS" FORMED BY COMPANY MANAGEMENT WITH LITTLE OR NO WORKER PARTICIPATION. THERE WERE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT LOCAL DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER OFFICIALS HAVE ACCEPTED PAYMENTS FROM EMPLOYERS TO SET UP PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS IN THEIR FACTORIES BECAUSE THEY ARE CONSIDERED EVEN WEAKER THAN SPSI.

TWO LABOR GROUPS OTHER THAN SPSI ARE ACTIVE BUT NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT: THE INDONESIAN PROSPERITY TRADE UNION (SBSI) AND THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS (AJI). THE SBSI, CREATED

IN 1992, CLAIMS THAT IT HAS FORMED THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF FACTORY-LEVEL UNITS TO MEET THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION AS A LABOR UNION, BUT ITS MOST RECENT REQUEST (IN NOVEMBER 1994) FOR REGISTRATION AS A TRADE UNION WAS DENIED. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER HAS ALSO BLOCKED SBSI ATTEMPTS TO REGISTER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS AS A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE ORMAS LAW. THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE SBSI TO BE

ILLEGAL. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT DISBANDED IT, IT CONTINUES TO HARASS THE SBSI, BY PRESSURING COMPANIES TO FIRE ITS MEMBERS AND DISBANDING ITS MEETINGS AND TRAINING SEMINARS. SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AGAINST THE SBSI DURING THE YEAR INCLUDED THE DETENTION AND INTERROGATION OF TWO MEMBERS IN BINJAI, NORTH SUMATRA IN MAY AND THE BREAKING UP OF A SBSI TRAINING SESSION IN LAMPUNG, SOUTHERN SUMATRA IN JULY, DURING WHICH 26 SBSI MEMBERS WERE DETAINED FOR TWO DAYS. IN SEPTEMBER POLICE BROKE UP SBSI'S SECOND NATIONAL CONGRESS AS UNION MEMBERS WERE CONCLUDING THE FIRST DAY OF A SCHEDULED TWO-DAY MEETING.

AS NOTED IN SECTION 2.A, THE TRIAL OF SBSI LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN ON CHARGES OF SUBVERSION AND SOWING HATRED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH BEGAN IN DECEMBER 1996, RESUMED IN SEPTEMBER AFTER A FIVE-MONTH SUSPENSION DUE TO PAKPAHAN'S ILL HEALTH. WHILE THE TRIAL WAS SUSPENDED, PAKPAHAN MADE TWO REQUESTS FOR MEDICAL EXAMINATION AND TREATMENT OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY OF A LUNG TUMOR. AFTER GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED PANELS OF PHYSICIANS EXAMINED HIM IN EACH INSTANCE, THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND ATTORNEY GENERAL RULED THAT HIS CONDITION COULD BE TREATED IN INDONESIA. HE REMAINED IN THE HOSPITAL UNDER GUARD AS OF SEPTEMBER. IN JANUARY, PAKPAHAN REQUESTED THAT THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW ITS OCTOBER 1996 DECISION REQUIRING HIM TO SERVE OUT A 4-YEAR SENTENCE FOR FOMENTING LABOR UNREST THAT IT HAD PREVIOUSLY OVERTURNED. IN AUGUST, PAKPAHAN PRESENTED NEW ARGUMENTS TO A LOWER COURT THAT HE WAS INNOCENT OF THE CHARGES; THE CASE WAS STILL PENDING AS OF SEPTEMBER.

THE ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS (PWI) IS THE ONLY GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING JOURNALISTS. ALTHOUGH PRESS LAWS STIPULATE THAT ALL JOURNALISTS MUST BELONG TO

PWI, A FEW JOURNALISTS HAVE CHOSEN NOT TO JOIN. IN THE WAKE OF THE 1994 BANNING OF THREE PUBLICATIONS APPROXIMATELY 80 JOURNALISTS FORMED THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS (AJI) AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE GOVERNMENT UNION. A GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN IN MARCH 1995 RESULTED IN THE IMPRISONMENT OF THREE AJI MEMBERS CHARGED WITH "SOWING HATE." AS NOTED IN SECTION 2.A, THEY WERE RELEASED DURING THE YEAR. DESPITE OCCASIONAL PRESSURE ON PUBLICATIONS EMPLOYING AJI MEMBERS, THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWS AJI A CONTINUED UNDERGROUND EXISTENCE.

BECAUSE OF PAST DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER REGULATIONS, MANY SPSI FACTORY UNITS ARE LED BY PERSONS WHO HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH THEIR UNITS' MEMBERS BECAUSE THEY WERE SELECTED BY EMPLOYERS. A 1995 REGULATION STATES THAT EMPLOYEES MUST ONLY NOTIFY THEIR EMPLOYER THAT THEY WISH TO FORM A UNION AND THAT THEY MAY PROCEED IF THEY DO NOT RECEIVE A RESPONSE FROM THEIR EMPLOYER WITHIN 2 WEEKS. DESPITE THIS PROVISION, STRIKES CONTINUE TO OCCUR WHEN EMPLOYERS ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF UNION BRANCHES. THESE STRIKES ARE GENERALLY SUCCESSFUL, AND THE FORMATION OF AN SPSI UNIT FOLLOWS SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HOWEVER, WORKERS WHO ARE ACTIVE IN THE FORMATION OF THE UNION ARE FREQUENTLY DISMISSED AND

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9688

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 27 OF 31 151018Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF575F 151018Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7830

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 27 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

HAVE NO PRACTICAL PROTECTION BY EITHER LAW OR GOVERNMENT PRACTICE.

CIVIL SERVANTS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO JOIN UNIONS AND MUST BELONG TO KORPRI, A NONUNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES, DEFINED TO INCLUDE THOSE WORKING IN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 06040 27 OF 31 151018Z
ENTERPRISES IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A 5-PERCENT HOLDING OR

GREATER, USUALLY ARE REQUIRED TO JOIN KORPRI, BUT A SMALL NUMBER OF STATE ENTERPRISES HAVE SPSI UNITS. TEACHERS MUST BELONG TO THE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (PGRI). WHILE TECHNICALLY CLASSED AS A UNION, THE PGRI CONTINUES TO FUNCTION MORE AS A WELFARE ORGANIZATION AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ENGAGED IN TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES SUCH AS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. MANDATORY KORPRI AND PGRI CONTRIBUTIONS ARE AUTOMATICALLY DEDUCTED FROM TEACHERS' SALARIES.

UNIONS MAY DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE OVER THE SPSI AND ITS FEDERATED UNIONS. THE HEAD OF SPSI AND MANY MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF GOLKAR AND ITS CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONAL GROUPS. THESE PERSONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN POSITIONS IN THE FEDERATED INDUSTRIAL SECTOR UNIONS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER IS A MEMBER OF THE SPSI'S CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL.

THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED LATE IN 1995 ITS INTENTION TO RELAX A REGULATION REQUIRING POLICE APPROVAL FOR ALL MEETINGS OF FIVE OR MORE PEOPLE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE OFFICES OR NORMAL WORK SITES (SEE SECTION 2.B.). HOWEVER, IN PRACTICE THIS REGULATION CONTINUES TO APPLY TO UNION MEETINGS. PERMISSION WAS ROUTINELY GIVEN TO THE SPSI, BUT NOT TO RIVAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE SBSI.

IN 1994 THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS LODGED A FORMAL COMPLAINT AGAINST INDONESIA WITH THE ILO, ACCUSING THE GOVERNMENT OF DENYING WORKERS THE RIGHT TO SET UP UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, HARASSING INDEPENDENT WORKERS'

ORGANIZATIONS, AND OF TAKING OTHER ACTIONS CONTRARY TO ILO STANDARDS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. IN MARCH, THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAD SENT PARTIAL INFORMATION ON THE ALLEGATIONS MADE IN THE CASE AND REQUESTED THE GOVERNMENT TO SEND REMAINING INFORMATION WITHOUT DELAY. IN NOVEMBER 1996 THE COMMITTEE HAD "DEEPLY DEPLORED" THE FACT THAT "VIRTUALLY NO REMEDIAL ACTION WAS TAKEN BY THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES" IN RESPONSE TO OLD AND NEW ALLEGATIONS AGAINST IT. THE COMMITTEE FOUND THAT "INDONESIAN LEGISLATION

COMPRISES REQUIREMENTS THAT ARE SO STRINGENT AS TO CONSTITUTE A MAJOR LIMITATION TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION." THE COMMITTEE URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO "TAKE ALL THE NECESSARY MEASURES" TO ENSURE THAT THE SBSI BE REGISTERED "WITHOUT DELAY." THE COMMITTEE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT "THERE EXISTS A STRONG PRESUMPTION, WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT REVERSED, TO THE EFFECT THAT UNDER THE COVER OF ALLEGATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY, THE CHARGES BROUGHT AND THE MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST MR. PAKPAHAN ARE LINKED TO HIS TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES." IT URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO "TAKE WITHOUT DELAY THE NECESSARY MEASURES FOR MR. PAKPAHAN'S RELEASE (AND) TO DROP THE CHARGES RELATED TO THE JULY 1996 EVENTS."

WHILE PANCASILA PRINCIPLES CALL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES TO BE SETTLED BY CONSENSUS, ALL ORGANIZED WORKERS EXCEPT CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND TEACHERS RARELY EXERCISE THIS RIGHT, BUT PRIVATE SECTOR STRIKES ARE FREQUENT. BEFORE A STRIKE CAN OCCUR LEGALLY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE LAW REQUIRES INTENSIVE MEDIATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND PRIOR NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE. HOWEVER, NO APPROVAL IS REQUIRED. THE NEW "LAW ON MANPOWER AFFAIRS," WHICH PARLIAMENT PASSED IN SEPTEMBER, ALLOWS

STRIKES ONLY IN THE CONCERNED COMPANY IF AN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY THE CONCERNED PARTIES OR THROUGH THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS. THE NEW LAW REQUIRES THAT STRIKING WORKERS BE PAID IF THEY ARE STRIKING TO OBTAIN BENEFITS DETERMINED BY LAW, REGULATION, A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, OR COMPANY REGULATIONS.

IN PRACTICE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ARE RARELY FOLLOWED, AND FORMAL NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE IS RARELY GIVEN BECAUSE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROCEDURES ARE SLOW AND HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH WORKERS. THEREFORE, SUDDEN STRIKES TEND TO RESULT FROM LONGSTANDING GRIEVANCES OR RECOGNITION THAT LEGALLY MANDATED BENEFITS OR RIGHTS ARE NOT BEING RECEIVED.

THE SPSI MAINTAINS INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS BUT ITS ONLY INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION AFFILIATION AS A FEDERATION IS THE ASEAN TRADE UNION COUNCIL. SEVERAL OF SPSI'S FEDERATED SECTORAL UNIONS ARE MEMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE SECRETARIATS.

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9750

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9750

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 28 OF 31 151037Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF59A3 151037Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7831

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 28 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROMOTES IT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE NATIONAL IDEOLOGY, PANCASILA. UNTIL 1994, ONLY RECOGNIZED TRADE UNIONS--THE SPSI AND ITS COMPONENTS--COULD LEGALLY ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. SINCE EARLY 1994, GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS ALSO PERMIT UNAFFILIATED PLANT-LEVEL WORKERS' ASSOCIATIONS TO CONCLUDE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH EMPLOYERS, AND SOME 732

HAD DONE SO BY THE END OF 1996, ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES. AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY ANY OTHER GROUPS ARE NOT CONSIDERED LEGALLY BINDING AND ARE NOT REGISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. ONCE NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED A REGISTERED SPSI OR INDEPENDENT PLANT-LEVEL UNION, AN EMPLOYER IS OBLIGATED TO BARGAIN WITH IT. IN COMPANIES WITHOUT UNIONS, THE GOVERNMENT DISCOURAGES WORKERS FROM UTILIZING NONGOVERNMENT OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE, E.G., DURING CONSULTATIONS WITH EMPLOYERS OVER COMPANY REGULATIONS. INSTEAD, THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PREFERS THAT WORKERS SEEK ITS ASSISTANCE AND BELIEVES THAT ITS ROLE IS TO PROTECT WORKERS. THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT FOR MANY COMPANIES, CONSULTATIONS ARE PERFUNCTORY AT BEST AND USUALLY WITH MANAGEMENT-SELECTED WORKERS; THERE ARE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY FROM FOREIGN COMPANIES. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT STATISTICS, APPROXIMATELY 80 PERCENT OF THE FACTORY-LEVEL SPSI UNITS HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS ARE FREELY NEGOTIATED BETWEEN UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE VARIES. BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS OR BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION OR ARBITRATION. MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED FOR 1 YEAR. THE NEW "LAW ON MANPOWER AFFAIRS," WHICH THE PARLIAMENT PASSED IN SEPTEMBER, SPECIFIES NO TIME LIMIT ON NEGOTIATIONS, BUT REQUIRES THAT THE UNION NEGOTIATING THE CONTRACT BE SUPPORTED BY A MAJORITY OF WORKERS IN THE CONCERNED COMPANY.

ACCORDING TO NGO'S INVOLVED IN LABOR ISSUES, IN CURRENT PRACTICE THE PROVISIONS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS RARELY GO BEYOND THE LEGAL MINIMUM STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT,

AND THE AGREEMENTS ARE OFTEN MERELY PRESENTED TO WORKER REPRESENTATIVES FOR SIGNING RATHER THAN BEING NEGOTIATED. ALTHOUGH GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS PROHIBIT EMPLOYERS FROM DISCRIMINATING OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS FROM UNION OFFICIALS OF EMPLOYER RETRIBUTION AGAINST UNION ORGANIZERS, INCLUDING FIRING, WHICH IS NOT EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED OR REMEDIED IN PRACTICE. SOME EMPLOYERS REPORTEDLY HAVE WARNED THEIR EMPLOYEES AGAINST CONTACT WITH UNION ORGANIZERS FROM THE UNRECOGNIZED SBSI ORGANIZATION. CHARGES OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE ADJUDICATED BY REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEES, AND THEIR DECISIONS CAN BE APPEALED TO THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT. IN SEPTEMBER, THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT REVERSED A NATIONAL LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION BOARD RULING THAT ORDERED THE HONG KONG BANK TO REINSTATE 166 UNION MEMBERS WHO WENT ON STRIKE, DESPITE GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS MAKING IT ILLEGAL TO FIRE WORKERS SOLELY FOR STRIKING OR OTHER UNION ACTIVITY. BECAUSE OF DECISIONS LIKE THIS ONE, MANY UNION MEMBERS BELIEVE THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEES GENERALLY SIDE WITH EMPLOYERS. AS A RESULT, WORKERS FREQUENTLY PRESENT THEIR GRIEVANCES DIRECTLY TO THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, PARLIAMENT AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF DISMISSED WORKERS TEND TO BE MONETARY AWARDS; WORKERS ARE RARELY REINSTATED. CURRENT LAW REQUIRES THAT EMPLOYERS OBTAIN THE APPROVAL OF THE LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEE BEFORE FIRING WORKERS, BUT THE LAW IS OFTEN IGNORED IN PRACTICE. THE NEW "LAW ON MANPOWER AFFAIRS" REQUIRES ONLY THAT EMPLOYERS CONSULT WITH CONCERNED WORKERS AND THEIR UNIONS ABOUT THEIR INTENTION TO TERMINATE THE WORKERS' EMPLOYMENT.

COMMENTING ON ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION AND RESTRICTIONS ON

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE CONTEXT OF ILO CONVENTION 98 ON THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY, THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS' JUNE 1996 REPORT EXPRESSED "THE FIRM HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL PROVIDE IT IN ITS NEXT REPORT INFORMATION WITH REGARD TO THE MEASURES ACTUALLY TAKEN IN ORDER TO BRING LAW AND PRACTICE MORE IN LINE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION, AND IN PARTICULAR TO STRENGTHEN THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS AGAINST ACTS OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ACCOMPANIED BY EFFECTIVE AND DISSUASIVE SANCTIONS, TO ADOPT SPECIFIC PROVISIONS TO PROTECT WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS AGAINST ACTS OF INTERFERENCE BY EMPLOYERS OR THEIR ORGANIZATIONS AND TO ELIMINATE THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON FREE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING." THE NEW "LAW ON MANPOWER AFFAIRS" WHICH TAKES EFFECT ON OCTOBER 1, 1998, PROHIBITS EMPLOYERS FROM OBSTRUCTING THE FORMATION OF UNIONS OR FROM FIRING WORKERS FOR UNION ACTIVITY OR ENGAGING IN STRIKES, AND PROVIDES FOR FINES OF UP TO 200 MILLION RUPIAH (APPROXIMATELY 60,000 DOLLARS) OR IMPRISONMENT UP TO TWO YEARS FOR VIOLATIONS.

ON JUNE 1, 1996, THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER ISSUED A NEW REGULATION PERMITTING UNIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SPSI TO COLLECT UNION DUES DIRECTLY THROUGH THE CHECKOFF SYSTEM, RATHER THAN HAVING THE

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 29 OF 31 151019Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF578E 151019Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7832

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 29 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER COLLECT DUES AND TRANSFER THEM TO THE SPSI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SYSTEM DURING THE YEAR WAS UNEVEN. SOME WORKPLACE UNITS OF THE SPSI REPORTED THAT THEY WERE RECEIVING DUES COLLECTED THROUGH THE CHECKOFF SYSTEM FROM THEIR EMPLOYERS. OTHER WORKPLACE UNITS REPORTED THAT THEIR COMPANIES REFUSED TO RELEASE DUES TO THE UNION AND CONTINUED TO DEPOSIT DUES INTO DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ACCOUNTS. DEPARTMENT OF

PAGE 02 JAKART 06040 29 OF 31 151019Z
MANPOWER OFFICIALS STATE THAT THE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTED ITS REGIONAL OFFICES TO CLOSE ACCOUNTS PREVIOUSLY USED FOR UNION DUES, BUT ACCORDING TO REPORTS FROM VARIOUS REGIONS, NOT ALL OFFICES HAD CARRIED OUT THIS INSTRUCTION. UNION OFFICIALS AT SPSI HEADQUARTERS STATED THAT NOT ALL LOCAL BRANCHES OF THE

UNIONS ARE SENDING A PORTION OF DUES COLLECTED TO REGIONAL AND CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AS PROVIDED IN SPSI'S BY-LAWS.

THE ARMED FORCES, WHICH INCLUDE THE POLICE, CONTINUE TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN LABOR ISSUES, DESPITE THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER'S REVOCATION IN 1994 OF A 1986 REGULATION ALLOWING THE MILITARY TO INTERVENE IN STRIKES AND OTHER LABOR ACTIONS. A 1990 DECREE GIVING THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF NATIONAL STABILITY (BAKORSTANAS) AUTHORITY TO INTERVENE IN STRIKES IN THE INTEREST OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY REMAINS IN EFFECT. UNION AND NGO OBSERVERS NOTE A SHIFT OVER THE PAST TWO TO THREE YEARS FROM OPEN INTERVENTION AND DEMONSTRATIONS OF FORCE BY UNIFORMED TROOPS TO LESS VISIBLE MEASURES. UNION ACTIVISTS COMPLAIN THAT BOTH POLICE AND LOCAL MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES HARASS AND OCCASIONALLY DETAIN UNION LEADERS AND SEIZE MATERIALS FROM UNION OFFICES WITHOUT WARRANTS. IN ADDITION, POLICE FREQUENTLY BLOCK OR BREAK UP MEETINGS WHICH UNION ORGANIZERS OR NGO REPRESENTATIVES HAVE WITH WORKERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE ORGANIZED BY THE SBSI. HOWEVER, THE MOST COMMON FORM OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LABOR MATTERS, ACCORDING TO UNION AND NGO REPRESENTATIVES, IS A LONGSTANDING PATTERN OF COLLUSION BETWEEN POLICE AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES AND EMPLOYERS, WHICH USUALLY TAKES THE FORM OF INTIMIDATION OF WORKERS BY SECURITY PERSONNEL IN CIVILIAN DRESS. EMPLOYERS' AND UNION REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT "INVISIBLE COSTS" OF CORRUPTION WHICH THEY AND OTHERS ESTIMATE COMPRISE UP TO 30 PERCENT OF A COMPANY'S EXPENSES.

LABOR LAW AND PRACTICE ARE THE SAME IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES AS IN THE REST OF THE COUNTRY.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

THE LAW FORBIDS FORCED LABOR, AND THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY ENFORCES IT. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES, THERE ARE SEVERAL THOUSAND CHILDREN WORKING ON FISHING PLATFORMS OFF THE EAST COAST OF NORTH SUMATRA IN CONDITIONS OF BONDED LABOR. MOST ARE RECRUITED FROM FARMING COMMUNITIES, AND ONCE THEY ARRIVE AT THE WORK SITE, ARE NOT PERMITTED TO LEAVE FOR AT LEAST THREE MONTHS AND UNTIL A REPLACEMENT WORKER CAN BE FOUND. CHILDREN RECEIVE AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES OF $17 TO $32. THEY LIVE IN

ISOLATION ON THE SEA, WORKING 12 TO 20 HOURS PER DAY IN OFTEN DANGEROUS CONDITIONS, SLEEPING IN THE WORKSPACE WITH NO ACCESS TO SANITARY FACILITIES. THERE ARE REPORTS OF PHYSICAL, VERBAL AND SEXUAL ABUSE OF THE CHILDREN.

D. STATUS OF CHILD LABOR PRACTICES AND MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT

CHILD LABOR EXISTS IN BOTH URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, AND IN BOTH THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS. ACCORDING TO A 1995 REPORT OF THE INDONESIAN CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 4 PERCENT OF INDONESIAN CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 14 WORK, AND ANOTHER 4 PERCENT WORK IN ADDITION TO GOING TO SCHOOL. THE 1994 GOI LABOR FORCE SURVEY REPORTED THAT THERE WERE 2.08 MILLION ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE CHILDREN AGED 10 TO 14, BUT MANY OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT NUMBER TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERSTATED, BECAUSE DOCUMENTS VERIFYING AGE ARE EASILY FALSIFIED, AND BECAUSE CHILDREN UNDER 10

WERE NOT INCLUDED.

INDONESIA WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO BE SELECTED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ILO'S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOR (IPEC), AND IT SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ILO IN 1992 TO GUIDE COLLABORATION UNDER THIS PROGRAM. THE GOI AND THE ILO SIGNED ANOTHER MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CHILD LABOR IN MARCH COMMITTING TO "PROMOTE CONDITIONS TO ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT WORKING CHILDREN AND PROGRESSIVELY PROHIBIT, RESTRICT AND REGULATE CHILD LABOR WITH A VIEW TO ITS ULTIMATE ELIMINATION." ALTHOUGH THE ILO HAS SPONSORED TRAININGS OF LABOR INSPECTORS ON CHILD LABOR MATTERS UNDER THE IPEC PROGRAM, ENFORCEMENT REMAINS LAX.

THE GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A CLASS OF CHILDREN WHO MUST WORK FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS, AND IN 1987 THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER ISSUED A REGULATION, "PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FORCED TO WORK." THIS REGULATION LEGALIZES THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14 WHO MUST WORK TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCOME OF THEIR FAMILIES. IT REQUIRES PARENTAL CONSENT, PROHIBITS DANGEROUS OR DIFFICULT WORK, LIMITS WORK TO 4 HOURS DAILY, AND

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNPTQ9695

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9695

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 30 OF 31 151019Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	/027W	

----------EF57A5 151019Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7833

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 30 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES --
INDONESIA

REQUIRES EMPLOYERS TO REPORT THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN WORKING UNDER ITS PROVISIONS. IT DOES NOT SET A MINIMUM AGE FOR CHILDREN IN THIS CATEGORY, EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDING THE COLONIAL-ERA GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE OF DECEMBER 17, 1925, ON "MEASURES LIMITING CHILD LABOR AND NIGHTWORK OF WOMEN," WHICH IS STILL THE CURRENT LAW GOVERNING CHILD LABOR AND SETS A MINIMUM AGE OF 12 FOR EMPLOYMENT. THE 1987 REGULATION IS NOT ENFORCED. NO EMPLOYERS

HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO COURT FOR VIOLATING ITS RESTRICTIONS ON THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR CHILDREN, AND NO REPORTS ARE COLLECTED FROM ESTABLISHMENTS EMPLOYING CHILDREN.

ACT NO. 1 OF 1951 WAS INTENDED TO BRING INTO FORCE CERTAIN LABOR MEASURES, INCLUDING PROVISIONS ON CHILD LABOR THAT WOULD REPLACE THOSE OF THE 1925 LEGISLATION. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS FOR THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN ISSUED. THUS THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS IN THE 1951 ACT HAVE NO VALIDITY. THE GOVERNMENT PROHIBITS FORCED AND BONDED LABOR BY CHILDREN, BUT DOES NOT ENFORCE THIS PROHIBITION EFFECTIVELY (SEE SECTION 6.C.).

THE NEW "LAW ON MANPOWER AFFAIRS" WHICH TAKES EFFECT ON OCTOBER 1, 1998, PROHIBITS EMPLOYERS FROM HIRING CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF FIFTEEN, EXCEPT THAT EMPLOYERS MAY HIRE CHILDREN WHO ARE FORCED FOR ECONOMIC REASONS TO WORK. THE NEW LAW PLACES RESTRICTIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE 1987 REGULATION (SEE ABOVE) ON EMPLOYERS HIRING CHILDREN. THE NEW LAW ALSO STATES THAT ADOLESCENTS (AGES 15-17) CANNOT WORK DURING CERTAIN HOURS OF THE NIGHT, BELOW GROUND, IN MINES, OR IN JOBS THAT WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON MORALITY, SUCH AS IN ENTERTAINMENT FACILITIES.

ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT LABOR FORCE DATA, MOST WORKING CHILDREN WORK IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF WORKING CHILDREN IN URBAN AREAS HAS RISEN SIGNIFICANTLY WITH URBANIZATION. MORE CHILD LABORERS WORK IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR THAN THE FORMAL SECTOR. WHERE CHILDREN WORK IN THE FORMAL SECTOR, SUCH WORK TENDS TO OCCUR ON THE BORDERLINE BETWEEN THE INFORMAL AND FORMAL ECONOMIES, SUCH AS ALONGSIDE THEIR PARENTS IN HOME ENTERPRISES AND ON PLANTATIONS, AND IN FAMILY-OWNED SHOPS AND SMALL FACTORIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT ARE "SATELLITES" OF

LARGE INDUSTRIES. THERE ARE CHILDREN WORKING IN LARGE FACTORIES, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER IS UNKNOWN, ESPECIALLY SINCE DOCUMENTS VERIFYING AGE ARE EASILY FALSIFIED. IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR, THEY SELL NEWSPAPERS, SHINE SHOES, HELP TO PARK OR WATCH CARS, AND OTHERWISE EARN MONEY. MANY CHILDREN WORK IN HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS AS SCAVENGERS AND GARBAGE PICKERS, AND ON FISHING PLATFORMS AND FISHING BOATS. MANY DOMESTIC WORKERS ARE FEMALE CHILDREN UNDER AGE 15. ALTHOUGH ACCURATE FIGURES ARE UNAVAILABLE, ESTIMATES PUT THE NUMBER OF CHILD DOMESTIC WORKERS AT UP TO 1.5 MILLION. A SURVEY DONE IN 1995 REVEALED THAT THESE CHILDREN WORK LONG HOURS, RECEIVE LOW PAY, ARE GENERALLY UNAWARE OF THEIR RIGHTS, AND ARE OFTEN FAR FROM THEIR FAMILIES.

A 1994 LAW RAISED COMPULSORY EDUCATION FROM SIX TO NINE YEARS, BUT THE LAW HAS NOT BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED DUE TO INADEQUATE SCHOOL FACILITIES AND DUE TO LACK OF FAMILY FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO SUPPORT CHILDREN STAYING IN SCHOOL.

SOME EMPLOYERS HIRE CHILDREN BECAUSE THEY ARE EASIER THAN ADULTS TO MANAGE, AND TEND NOT TO ORGANIZE OR MAKE DEMANDS ON EMPLOYERS. CHILDREN WORKING IN FACTORIES USUALLY WORK THE SAME NUMBER OF HOURS AS ADULTS. CHILDREN WORK IN THE RATTAN AND WOOD FURNITURE INDUSTRIES, THE GARMENT INDUSTRY, THE FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY, FOOD PROCESSING, AND TOY MAKING, AMONG OTHERS.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

THERE IS NO NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE. RATHER, AREA WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL ESTABLISH MINIMUM WAGES FOR REGIONS AND BASIC NEEDS FIGURES FOR EACH PROVINCE--A MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE

A SINGLE WORKER TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. THE GOVERNMENT HAS INCREASED THE AVERAGE MINIMUM WAGE 70 PER CENT (WHEN ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION) OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS. AFTER THE LATEST INCREASE IN APRIL, WHICH AVERAGED 10 PERCENT NATIONWIDE, THE AVERAGE MINIMUM WAGE WAS EQUAL TO 95 PERCENT OF THE GOVERNMENT-DETERMINED "MINIMUM LIVING NEED." IN JAKARTA THE MINIMUM WAGE IS ABOUT $57 (RP 172,500) PER MONTH. AN ADDITIONAL INCREASE IS EXPECTED IN EARLY 1998.

THERE ARE NO RELIABLE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYERS PAYING AT LEAST THE MINIMUM WAGE. INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS' ESTIMATES RANGE BETWEEN 30 AND 60 PERCENT. ENFORCEMENT OF MINIMUM WAGE AND OTHER LABOR REGULATIONS REMAINS INADEQUATE, AND SANCTIONS TOO LIGHT, ALTHOUGH THE NEW "LAW ON MANPOWER AFFAIRS," AS OF OCTOBER 1, 1998, INCREASES PENALTIES FOR NOT PAYING THE MINIMUM WAGE FROM $30 (RP 100,000) TO $60,000 (RP 200,000,000). DURING THE YEAR, ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES 464 COMPANIES APPLIED FOR RELIEF FROM THE MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES ON THE GROUND THAT THEY WOULD OTHERWISE CLOSE, AND 276 RECEIVED PERMISSION FOR EXCEPTIONS OR POSTPONEMENTS OF THE NEW WAGE RATE.

NNNNPTQ9694

INFO LOG-00 INLB-01 AID-00 AMAD-01 ARA-01 CIAE-00 INL-01
OASY-00 DODE-00 ANHR-01 SRPP-00 EAP-01 EB-00 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 OIC-02 OPIC-01 PRS-00 P-00 SP-00 STR-00
TRSE-00 USIE-00 PRM-10 PRME-01 G-00 /027W
----------EF57A4 151019Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 0834

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 31 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
AGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUQTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES --

INDONQSIA

LABOR LAW AND MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PROVIDE WORKERS WITH A VARIETY OF OTHER BENEFITS,SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY, AND WORKERS IN MORE QODERN FACILITIES OFTEN RECEIVE HEALTH BENEFITS, FREE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 06040 31 OF 31 151018Z
MEALS, AND TRANSPORTATION. THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7- OR 8-HOUR WORKDAYS AND 40-HOUR WOKWEEKS, WITH ONE 30-MINUTE REST PERIOD FOR EAQH 4 HOURS OF WORK. THE LAW ALSO REQUIRES 1 DAYOF REST WEEKLY. THE DAILY OVERTIME RATE IS 1-1/2 TIMES THE NORMAL HOURLY RATE FOR THE FIST HOUR, AND 2 TIMES THE HOURLY RATE FOR ADDIIONAL OVERTIME. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUET TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER AND WITH THE AGEEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE. WORKERS IN INDUSTRIQS THAT PRODUCE RETAIL GOODS FOR EXPORT FREQUENTLY WORK OVERTIME TO

FULFILL CONTRACT QUOTAS. OBSERVANCE OF LAWS REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND BY REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ARE FAIRLY COMMON AND OFTEN RESULT IN STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. THE MINISTRY OF MANPOWER CONTINUES PUBLICLY TO URGE EMPLOYERS TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW. HOWEVER, IN GENERAL, GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ARE WEAK.

BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. IN JANUARY THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED A NEW OCCUPQTIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEM UNQER WHICH COMPANIES WITH MORE THAN 100 EMPLOYEES COULD OBTAIN PUBLIC RECOGNITION OF THEIR COMPLANCE WITH SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS BY SUBMITTING TO A SAFETY AUDIT PROCEDURE. IN THE LARGELY WESTERN-OPERATED OIL SECTOR, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUNCTION REASONABLY WELL. HOWVER, IN THE COUNTRY'S 100,000 LARGER REGISTERQD COMPANIES OUTSIDE THE OIL SECTOR, THE QUALITYQ OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAMS VARIES GREATLY. THE ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS IS SEVERELY HAMPERED BY THE IMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWQR INSPECTORS AS WELL AS BY THE LOW LEVEL OF E
PLOYEE APPRECIATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR SOUND HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES. ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION ON HE PART OF INSPECTORS ARE COMMON. WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIOS. EMPLOYERS ARE FORBIDDEN BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO, BUT THE LAW IS NOT EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN
@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>
PTQ9657

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9657

PAGE 01 JAKART 06040 151014Z
ACTION DRL-04

INFO	LOG-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	ANHR-01	SRPP-00	EAP-01	EB-00	H-01
	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OPIC-01	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	G-00	MR-00

/028W

----------EF56EA 151015Z /38

R 151009Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA
SECSTATE WASHDC 7805

UNCLAS E F T O SECTIN 02 OF 31 JAKARTA 006040

NOFORN

DEPARTMET FOR DRL/CRT; INLB/DRL/CRT; AND EAP/PIMBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1996 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES --

INDONESIA

DEMONSTRATIONS, THAT WERE NOT STOPPED. FOURTEEN YOUNG ACTIVISTS BELONGING TO, OR ASSOCIATED WITH, THE SMALL, UNAUTHORIZED, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) WERE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION BASED MOSTLY ON THEIR WRITINGS, SPEECHES, AND ORGANIZATIONAL

ACTIVITIES. INDEPENDENT LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN FACED SUBVERSION CHARGES MAINLY FOR EXPRESSING HIS POLITICAL VIEWS. FORMER PARLIAMENTARIAN SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS WAS DETAINED UNDER THE ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW FOR THE POLITICAL PRONOUNCEMENTS OF HIS UNRECOGNIZED INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION PARTY (PUDI). SITTING PARLIAMENTARIAN ABERSON MARLE SIHALOLO WAS SENTENCED TO NINE MONTHS IN PRISON FOR ALLEGEDLY INSULTING THE PRESIDENT AND MILITARY IN REMARKS MADE AT A "FREE SPEECH FORUM" IN JULY 1996 AT THE FORMER PDI HEADQUARTERS. AN ASSISTANT TO THE AUTHOR OF A BOOK BANNED BY THE GOVERNMENT WAS BROUGHT TO TRIAL FOR HIS ROLE IN ITS PUBLICATION.

INDONESIAN LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH USED THE COURTS TO PROSECUTE GOVERNMENT CRITICS AND POLITICAL OPPONENTS. MOST COURTS REFUSED TO HEAR THE LAWSUITS FILED THROUGHOUT INDONESIA BY MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND HER SUPPORTERS PROTESTING HER OUSTER AS PDI LEADER, ALTHOUGH A FEW AT A PRELIMINARY LEVEL ACCEPTED THE CASE AND RULED IN HER FAVOR. THE COURTS HAVE A REPUTATION FOR PERVASIVE CORRUPTION.

THE GOVERNMENT EXERCISES INDIRECT CONTROL OVER THE PRESS AND USES INTIMIDATION TO SUPPRESS HOSTILE COMMENTARY. MILD CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS TOLERATED, BUT CRITICS OF THE PRESIDENT, SENIOR OFFICIALS, OR POWERFUL LOCAL INTERESTS RISKED HARASSMENT OR ARREST. DESPITE THESE PROBLEMS, THE PRINT MEDIA PROVIDED WIDE

COVERAGE OF POLITICAL ISSUES AND REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT FULLY INVESTIGATE OR RESOLVE MANY CASES OF ATTACKS ON RELIGIOUS FACILITIES AND CHURCHES DURING RIOTS, ALTHOUGH IT ISSUED SEVERAL PUBLIC APPEALS FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN AND THE

DISABLED AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ARE ENDEMIC PROBLEMS.

SECURITY FORCES GENERALLY REFRAINED FROM USING FORCE TO STOP THE PROHIBITED, MASSIVE STREET RALLIES THAT DOMINATED THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND IN MOST CASES DID NOT USE LETHAL FORCE IN RESPONDING TO MAJOR RIOTS. HOWEVER, SECURITY FORCES WERE CRITICIZED FOR NOT ACTING IN TIME TO PROTECT CITIZENS AND PROPERTY FROM THE LARGE SCALE DESTRUCTION THAT OCCURRED. THE RIOTING RESULTED FROM A COMBINATION OF ECONOMIC, COMMUNAL, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL FACTORS. IT BEGAN IN 1996, CONTINUED INTO 1997, ABATED AFTER THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION, AND ERUPTED AGAIN IN UJUNG PANDANG, SOUTH SULAWESI IN SEPTEMBER. DESPITE THEIR REDUCED USE OF LETHAL FORCE, SECURITY FORCES OFTEN RESORTED TO BRUTALITY IN REACTING TO PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS OR IN DISPUTES WITH CITIZENS.

THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINED ITS OPPOSITION TO ALTERNATIVES TO THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED LABOR MOVEMENT AND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FREE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT, BUT PERMITTED AN EXTRAORDINARILY OPEN DEBATE OVER A NEW BASIC LABOR LAW. MEMBERS OF THE PRINCIPAL UNAUTHORIZED LABOR ORGANIZATION CITED CONTINUED INSTANCES OF HARASSMENT, AND ITS PLANNED THREE-DAY CONGRESS WAS SHUT DOWN BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES IN SEPTEMBER ON THE FIRST DAY. THE GOVERNMENT URGED EMPLOYERS TO PAY ON TIME THE INCREASED MINIMUM WAGE AND MANDATED BENEFITS, AND GAVE GREATER EMPHASIS TO WORKER SAFETY AND HEALTH. HOWEVER, ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR STANDARDS REMAINED WEAK. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) SIGNED A NEW MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CHILD LABOR TO PROMOTE THE PROTECTION OF WORKING CHILDREN AND TO MOVE PROGRESSIVELY TOWARD ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOR. HOWEVER, MILLIONS OF CHILDREN STILL WORK, OFTEN UNDER POOR CONDITIONS, AND ARE THUS UNABLE TO ATTEND SCHOOL.

IN EAST TIMOR, IN EARLY 1997 THE SECURITY FORCES RESPONDED TO THE MASSIVE DECEMBER 1996 DEMONSTRATIONS IN SUPPORT OF NOBEL PEACE PRIZE RECIPIENT BISHOP BELO, THE BEATING AND DEATH OF ONE OUT-OF-UNIFORM POLICE, AND THE INJURY OF SEVERAL OTHER POLICE DURING THE DEMONSTRATIONS WITH A CAMPAIGN OF HARASSMENT AND DETENTIONS. THESE DEVELOPMENTS RAISED TENSIONS TO A HIGH LEVEL. DURING THE MAY ELECTION PERIOD AND ITS AFTERMATH, EAST TIMOR'S LOW-LEVEL INSURGENCY INTENSIFIED WITH GUERRILLA ATTACKS INFLICTING THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IN YEARS ON SECURITY PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY THE CAPTURE AND DEATH OF A PROMINENT GUERRILLA COMMANDER AND WIDESPREAD DETENTIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY REPORTS OF KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCES, TORTURE, AND EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE ON THE PART OF THE AUTHORITIES. THESE DEVELOPMENTS EXACERBATED LONGSTANDING RESENTMENTS ON THE PART OF THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION. BY MID-YEAR, THIS MOST RECENT CYCLE OF HIGH TENSION HAD ABATED AS BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL ON EAST TIMOR RESUMED IN NEW YORK. ONE POLITICAL PRISONER WAS RELEASED WHEN HE BECAME ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE. NO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WAS MADE IN ACCOUNTING FOR THE MISSING PERSONS FOLLOWING THE 1991 DILI INCIDENT OR OTHERS WHO DISAPPEARED IN RECENT YEARS. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN A LARGE MILITARY PRESENCE OF MORE THAN 16,000 PERSONNEL. THE GOVERNMENT GRANTED LIMITED ACCESS TO THE AREA TO FOREIGN

NNNN

PTQ2488

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO0214

PAGE 01 STATE 017237 311814Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001R

017237
SOURCE: KODAKB.300118
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAROCHMAN:DAR -- 01/29/98 X72543
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:ARABASA
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY
----------160FB2 311820Z /45
O 300653Z JAN 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 017237

OFFICIAL INFORMAL SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

1. (SBU) BELOW IS THE TEXT OF THE FINAL VERSION OF THIS YEAR'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA. DRL INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE REPORT ARE AS FOLLOWS:

THE L997 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE CONGRESS ON THURSDAY, JANUARY 29, AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200504418

WILL BE RELEASED PUBLICLY AT DRL ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1:00 P.M. EST ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 30.

POSTS HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY A SECOND ALDAC (STATE L4357, DTG 262301Z JAN 98) THAT THEY ARE AUTHORIZED, AT THEIR DISCRETION, TO DELIVER AN EMBARGOED COPY OF THE REPORT TO HOST GOVERNMENTS NO EARLIER THAN 24 HOURS IN ADVANCE OF PUBLIC RELEASE IN WASHINGTON AT 1:00 P.M. EST ON JANUARY 30 AND ONLY UPON CONDITION THAT THE HOST GOVERNMENT NOT RELEASE THE TEXT PUBLICLY UNTIL THE TIME OF ITS RELEASE IN WASHINGTON. DESKS, HOWEVER, ARE NOT TO PROVIDE A COPY TO WASHINGTON EMBASSIES AHEAD OF RELEASE.

THE FINAL OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE REPORTS WILL BE AVAILABLE ELECTRONICALLY ON USIA COMPUTER SYSTEMS, AS WELL AS ON THE INTERNET (HTTP://WWW.STATE.GOV)

THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WILL PUBLISH THE BOUND VOLUME OF THE REPORT, PROBABLY 3 TO 7 WEEKS AFTER ITS DELIVERY TO CONGRESS. THE DEPARTMENT WILL POUCH COPIES TO POSTS AS SOON AS THEY ARE AVAILABLE, AS SET OUT IN ALDAC STATE 4808.

2. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT.

INDONESIA

DESPITE A SURFACE ADHERENCE TO DEMOCRATIC FORMS, THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAINS STRONGLY

AUTHORITARIAN. THE GOVERNMENT IS DOMINATED BY AN ELITE COMPRISING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO (NOW IN HIS SIXTH 5-YEAR TERM), HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES, AND THE MILITARY. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES ALLEGIANCE TO A STATE IDEOLOGY KNOWN AS "PANCASILA," WHICH STRESSES CONSULTATION AND CONSENSUS, BUT IS ALSO USED TO LIMIT DISSENT, TO ENFORCE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL COHESION, AND TO RESTRICT THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITION ELEMENTS. THE JUDICIARY IS EFFECTIVELY

SUBORDINATED TO THE EXECUTIVE AND THE MILITARY AND SUFFERS FROM CORRUPTION.

THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE 450,000-MEMBER ARMED FORCES, WHICH INCLUDES LV5,000 POLICE, IS MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY. DESPITE A DECREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE OR RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS IN KEY GOVERNMENT POSITIONS, THE MILITARY RETAINED SUBSTANTIAL NONMILTARY POWERS UNDER A "DUAL FUNCTION" CONCEPT THAT ACCORDS IT A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ROLE IN "DEVELOPING THE NATION." THE MILITARY AND THE POLICE CONTINUED TO COMMIT NUMEROUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

THE CURRENCY CRISIS THAT HIT THE REGION IN THE MIDDLE OF THE YEAR SLOWED THE EXPANSION OF THE ECONOMY WHICH HAD BEEN VIGOROUS AND RAPID IN PAST YEARS. THE BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ARE WIDELY DISPERSED AND LIVING STANDARDS HAVE RISEN SIGNIFICANTLY, BUT A LARGE SEGMENT OF THE POPULATION REMAINS POOR. PERVASIVE CORRUPTION REMAINS

A PROBLEM. SPORADIC UNREST LED TO STRONGER DEMANDS THAT THE GOVERNMENT ACT MORE EFFECTIVELY TO ADDRESS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INEQUITIES. IN RURAL AREAS, DISCONTENT OFTEN

FOCUSED ON THE GRIEVANCES OF SMALL LAND OWNERS--ESPECIALLY THOSE FORCED OFF THEIR LAND BY POWERFUL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTERESTS. IN SOME REGIONS, EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES HAS ENTAILED SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION WITH ADVERSE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO COMMIT SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. RISING PRESSURES FOR CHANGE FROM POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND OPPONENTS MET TOUGH GOVERNMENT REACTIONS PRIOR TO THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION. THE GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WOULD NOT TOLERATE CHALLENGES TO THE FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM BY ARRESTING AND PLACING ON TRIAL SOME OF ITS CRITICS. THE AUTHORITIES MAINTAINED THEIR TIGHT GRIP ON THE POLITICAL PROCESS, AND IN THE MAY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, AS IN THE PREVIOUS FIVE HELD SINCE L97L, DENIED CITIZENS THE ABILITY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT DEMOCRATICALLY. THE STRUCTURE OF THE

POLITICAL SYSTEM CONTINUED TO ENSURE VICTORY FOR THE RULING GOLKAR PARTY, WHICH SECURED ITS BIGGEST WIN EVER. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT PERMIT THE OUSTED INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND HER SUPPORTERS TO RUN IN THE GENERAL ELECTION OR TO MAKE COMMON CAUSE WITH THE MUSLIM-ORIENTED UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP). THE ELECTION AND CAMPAIGN WERE MARRED BY CREDIBLE ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD AS WELL AS BY SPORADIC, YET SIGNIFICANT, VIOLENCE BETWEEN PARTIES, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED GOLKAR ORGANIZATION. SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS, INCLUDING OF UNARMED CIVILIANS, DISAPPEARANCES, TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES, AND ARBITRARY ARRESTS AND DETENTION. IN PRACTICE LEGAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST TORTURE ARE INADEQUATE.

PRISON CONDITIONS REMAINED HARSH. THE JUDICIARY IS PERVADED BY CORRUPTION, AND REMAINS SUBORDINATED TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WHICH USES THE COURTS TO PROSECUTE GOVERNMENT CRITICS AND POLITICAL OPPONENTS. MOST COURTS REFUSED TO HEAR THE LAWSUITS FILED THROUGHOUT INDONESIA BY MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND HER SUPPORTERS PROTESTING HER OUSTER AS PDI LEADER, ALTHOUGH A FEW AT A PRELIMINARY LEVEL ACCEPTED THE CASE AND RULED IN HER FAVOR. SECURITY FORCES REGULARLY VIOLATED CITIZENS' RIGHT TO PRIVACY.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO IMPOSE SERIOUS LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND RESTRICT PRESS FREEDOM, ALTHOUGH AT YEAR'S END GOVERNMENT CRITICS WERE SPEAKING OUT MORE BOLDLY. THE GOVERNMENT EXERCISES INDIRECT CONTROL OVER THE PRESS AND USES INTIMIDATION TO SUPPRESS HOSTILE COMMENTARY AND ENCOURAGES SELF-CENSORSHIP. MILD CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS TOLERATED, BUT CRITICS OF THE PRESIDENT, SENIOR OFFICIALS, OR POWERFUL LOCAL INTERESTS RISKED HARASSMENT OR ARREST. DESPITE THESE PROBLEMS, THE PRINT MEDIA PROVIDED WIDE COVERAGE OF POLITICAL ISSUES AND REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. FOURTEEN YOUNG ACTIVISTS BELONGING TO, OR ASSOCIATED WITH, THE SMALL, UNAUTHORIZED, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) WERE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION BASED MOSTLY ON THEIR WRITINGS, SPEECHES, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES. INDEPENDENT LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN FACED SUBVERSION CHARGES

BASED MAINLY ON EXPRESSION OF HIS POLITICAL VIEWS BUT ALSO INCLUDING HIS LABOR ACTIVITIES. FORMER PARLIAMENTARIAN SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS WAS BROUGHT TO TRIAL IN DECEMBER UNDER THE ANTISUBVERSION LAW FOR THE POLITICAL VIEWS AND ACTIONS OF HIS UNRECOGNIZED INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION

PARTY (PUDI). PARLIAMENTARIAN ABERSON MARLE SIHALOLO WAS SENTENCED TO 9 MONTHS IN PRISON FOR ALLEGEDLY INSULTING THE PRESIDENT AND MILITARY IN~REMARKS MADE AT A "FREE SPEECH FORUM" IN JULY 1996 AT THE FORMER PDI HEADQUARTERS. AN ASSISTANT TO THE AUTHOR OF A BOOK BANNED BY THE GOVERNMENT WAS BROUGHT TO TRIAL FOR HIS ROLE IN ITS PUBLICATION.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO IMPOSE SERIOUS LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION. IT PREVENTED OR BROKE-UP MEETINGS OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO'S) AND LABOR UNIONS, AS WELL AS PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS, SOMETIMES VIOLENTLY. IT BROUGHT TO TRIAL A CATHOLIC PRIEST AND HIS BROTHER FOR PROTECTING POLITICAL ACTIVISTS WHO IN 1996 HAD BEEN SOUGHT BY THE POLICE. HOWEVER, THERE WERE NOTABLE EXAMPLES OF WELL-PUBLICIZED MEETINGS, SEMINARS, AND GATHERINGS ON SENSITIVE SUBJECTS, AS WELL AS PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS, THAT WERE NOT STOPPED. SECURITY FORCES GENERALLY REFRAINED FROM USING FORCE TO STOP THE PROHIBITED, MASSIVE STREET RALLIES THAT DOMINATED THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND IN MOST CASES DID NOT USE LETHAL FORCE IN RESPONDING TO MAJOR RIOTS. ON OCCASION SECURITY FORCES WERE CRITICIZED FOR NOT ACTING IN TIME TO PROTECT CITIZENS AND PROPERTY FROM THE LARGE-SCALE DESTRUCTION

THAT OCCURRED. THE RIOTING RESULTED FROM A COMBINATION OF ECONORNIC, COMMUNAL, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL FACTORS. IT BEGAN IN L996, CONTINUED INTO L997, ABATED AFTER THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION, AND ERUPTED AGAIN IN UJUNG PANDANG, SOUTH SULAWESI IN SEPTEMBER. DESPITE THEIR REDUCED USE OF LETHAL FORCE, SECURITY FORCES OFTEN REACTED

HARSHLY TO PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS OR IN DISPUTES WITH CITIZENS.

THE GOVERNMENT LEGALLY PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR FIVE ACCEPTED RELIGIONS; UNRECOGNIZED RELIGIONS ARE SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT FULLY INVESTIGATE OR RESOLVE MANY CASES OF ATTACKS ON RELIGIOUS FACILITIES AND CHURCHES DURING RIOTS, ALTHOUGH IT ISSUED SEVERAL PUBLIC APPEALS FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO RESTRICT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, THE DISABLED, AND ETHNIC MINORITIES, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ARE ENDEMIC PROBLEMS.

THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINED ITS OPPOSITION TO ALTERNATIVES TO THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED LABOR MOVEMENT AND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FREE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT, BUT PERMITTED A VERY OPEN DEBATE OVER A NEW BASIC LABOR LAW. MEMBERS OF THE PRINCIPAL UNAUTHORIZED LABOR ORGANIZATION CITED CONTINUED INSTANCES OF HARASSMENT, AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES SHUT DOWN THE ORGANIZATION'S PLANNED 3-DAY CONGRESS IN SEPTEMBER ON THE FIRST DAY. THE GOVERNMENT URGED EMPLOYERS TO PAY ON TIME THE INCREASED MINIMUM WAGE AND MANDATED BENEFITS, AND IMPLEMENTED A NEW AUDIT SYSTEM FOR WORKER SAFETY AND HEALTH. HOWEVER, ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR STANDARDS REMAINED WEAK. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILD) SIGNED A NEW MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CHILD LABOR TO PROMOTE THE PROTECTION OF WORKING CHILDREN AND TO MOVE PROGRESSIVELY TOWARD ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOR. HOWEVER, MILLIONS OF CHILDREN STILL WORK, OFTEN UNDER POOR CONDITIONS, AND ARE

THUS UNABLE TO ATTEND SCHOOL. SOME CHILDREN FORCED TO WORK UNDER CONDITIONS OF BONDED LABOR REPORTEDLY SUFFER ABUSE.

THERE WERE SOME POTENTIALLY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE (KIPP) CARRIED OUT LIMITED, YET SIGNIFICANT, MONITORING ACTIVITIES DURING THE CAMPAIGN AND THE PARLIAMENTARY

ELECTION. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THE KIPP AND RESTRICTED ITS ACTIVITIES, THE ORGANIZATION GATHERED INFORMATION ABOUT ELECTION VIOLATIONS AND PRESENTED IT TO THE PUBLIC. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DESPITE LIMITED RESOURCES AND OCCASIONAL GOVERNMENT PRESSURE, UNDERTOOK INVESTIGATIONS AND PUBLICIZED ITS INDEPENDENT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, BUT LACKED ENFORCEMENT POWERS. THE GOVERNMENT IGNORED OR RESPONDED SLOWLY TO SOME COMMISSION FINDINGS. THE INCREASE IN PRIVATE HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING IN EAST TIMOR WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, AND THE GOVERNMENT TOOK SOME ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO CRITICISM OF ITS HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE; FOR EXAMPLE, A HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW TRAINING SEMINAR WAS CONDUCTED FOR THE MILITARY BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC)

IN EAST TIMOR, FOLLOWING MASSIVE DECEMBER 1996 DEMONSTRATIONS IN SUPPORT OF NOBEL PEACE PRIZE RECIPIENT BISHOP BELO, IN WHICH SECURITY PERSONNEL SUFFERED INJURIES AND AN OUT-OF-UNIFORM POLICE OFFICER WAS KILLED, AN EARLY 199V CAMPAIGN OF HARASSMENT AND DETENTION BY THE SECURITY FORCES RAISED TENSION TO A HIGH LEVEL. DURING THE MAY

ELECTION PERIOD AND ITS AFTERMATH, EAST TIMOR'S LOW-LEVEL INSURGENCY INTENSIFIED WITH GUERRILLA ATTACKS THAT INFLICTED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF DEATHS IN YEARS ON SECURITY PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS. THESE ATTACKS WERE FOLLOWED BY THE CAPTURE AND DEATH OF A PROMINENT GUERRILLA COMMANDER AND WIDESPREAD DETENTIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY REPORTS OF KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCES, TORTURE, AND EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE ON THE PART OF THE AUTHORITIES. THESE DEVELOPMENTS EXACERBATED LONGSTANDING RESENTMENTS ON THE PART OF THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION. IN NOVEMBER AT LEAST FIVE STUDENTS WERE INJURED WHEN A LARGE NUMBER OF SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL ENTERED THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST

TIMOR CAMPUS FIRING THEIR WEAPONS. ONE POLITICAL PRISONER WAS RELEASED WHEN HE BECAME ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE. NO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WAS MADE IN ACCOUNTING FOR PERSONS MISSING FOLLOWING THE 1991 DILI INCIDENT OR OTHERS WHO DISAPPEARED IN RECENT YEARS. TROOP LEVELS REMAINED UNJUSTIFIABLY HIGH. THE GOVERNMENT GRANTED LIMITED ACCESS TO THE AREA TO FOREIGN JOURNALISTS BUT BANNED TRAVEL BY ALL FOREIGN HUMAN RIGHTS NGO'S EXCEPT THE ICRC. THE DILI BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH OPENED IN 1996, REMAINED INEFFECTIVE, BUT INCREASED EFFORTS BY THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND OTHERS, ALONG WITH A

BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN NORMS AMONG SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, IMPROVED THE OVERALL QUALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING IN EAST TIMOR. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO COMMITTED ABUSES IN EAST TIMOR BEING PUNISHED. SEEKING ASYLUM OR PUBLICITY FOR THEIR CAUSE, YOUNG EAST TIMORESE MOUNTED FURTHER INTRUSIONS INTO VARIOUS EMBASSIES IN JAKARTA.

UNCLASSIFIED

IN IRIAN JAYA, RESENTMENT AMONG INDIGENOUS GROUPS AGAINST GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE COMPANIES' POLICIES THAT THEY VIEWED AS HEAVYHANDED AND ARBITRARY REMAINED. REAL AND PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NATIVE IRIANESE PERSISTED. A CLASH BETWEEN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND SECURITY FORCES OCCURRED IN THE TIMIKA-TEMBAGAPURA AREA, THE LOCATION OF A FOREIGN MINING COMPANY, AND RESULTED IN SEVERAL DEATHS. THE COMPANY BEGAN MOVING FORWARD ON ITS PLAN TO DISTRIBUTE A PERCENTAGE OF ITS PROFITS TO INDIGENOUS GROUPS IN THE AREA AS PART OF A REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT EFFORT, BUT SUSPENDED DISBURSEMENTS FOR NEW PROJECTS UNDER THIS INITIATIVE IN AUGUST BECAUSE OF DISPUTES OVER HOW THE FUNDS SHOULD BE ALLOCATED. THE GOVERNMENT'S CLOSURE OF CERTAIN AREAS OF THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS CONTINUED DURING 1997, DUE TO THE MILITARY'S SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGAINST AN INDIGENOUS SEPARATIST GROUP THAT HAD TAKEN AND EXECUTED HOSTAGES IN 1996. THERE WERE REPORTS THAT IN THE RESTRICTED AREAS THE MILITARY HAD FORCED VILLAGERS TO PERFORM UNCOMPENSATED LABOR, THAT HUTS HAD BEEN BURNED IN ONE VILLAGE, AND THAT IN LATE 1996

THERE WERE INSTANCES OF BEATINGS AND OTHER ABUSE. THE MILITARY DENIED SUCH REPORTS AND BLAMED ABUSE ON THE SEPARATIST GROUP.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOIN FROM:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING

HISTORICALLY, POLITICALLY RELATED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS HAVE OCCURRED MOST FREQUENTLY IN AREAS WHERE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS WERE ACTIVE, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAYA. SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO EMPLOY HARSH MEASURES AGAINST SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN ALL THREE AREAS. THERE

WERE ALSO NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF REPORTED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES IN CASES INVOLVING ALLEGED COMMON CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.

CREDIBLE SOURCES CONFIRMED SEVERAL DEATHS IN DETENTION IN EAST TIMOR DURING THE YEAR. IN JUNE AN INDIVIDUAL KNOWN AS FWJANUARIOI, WAS DETAINED IN BAUCAU, SEVERELY BEATEN, AND DIED WHILE BEING TRANSPORTED TO DILI. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS BELIEVED THAT A NUMBER OF OTHER KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES OF CIVILIANS MAY HAVE OCCURRED, ESPECIALLY IN MORE ISOLATED AREAS, BUT THESE WERE IMPOSSIBLE TO CONFIRM. THERE WERE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT DETAINEES IN EAST TIMOR WERE SHOT TO DEATH WHILE ALLEGEDLY ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE.

THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF DEATHS IN, OR RELATED TO, DETENTION IN OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY AS WELL. IN MARCH TEGUH SUNARTO (ATOK) DIED IN EAST JAVA NOT LONG AFTER HIS RELEASE FROM POLICE DETENTION. HE AND TWO OTHERS WERE DETAINED ON MARCH L7 BY POLICE BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT IN POSSESSION OF IDENTITY CARDS. TWO POLICE OFFICERS REPORTEDLY SUBJECTED ALL THREE DETAINEES TO SEVERE

BURNS. IN ADDITION, THE POLICE REPORTEDLY ORDERED OTHER PRISONERS TO BEAT SUNARTO AND THE OTHER TWO DETAINEES. THE TWO POLICE OFFICERS INVOLVED WERE DETAINED. IN APRIL A FARMER IN CENTRAL LAMPUNG, SUKIRNO, DIED IN POLICE CUSTODY. ACCORDING TO A CREDIBLE REPORT, 10 POLICE AND FORESTRY SERVICE OFFICERS TOOK HIM FROM HIS HOME ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 14, ACCUSING HIM OF POSSESSING A HOMEMADE GUN AND POACHING FROM A PROTECTED FOREST. TWO DAYS LATER SUKIRNO'S FAMILY WAS INFORMED THAT HE COMMITTED SUICIDE WHILE IN POLICE CUSTODY. HOWEVER, NUMEROUS WOUNDS AND BRUISES WERE REPORTEDLY FOUND ON SUKIRNO `S BODY.

SECURITY FORCES SHOT AND KILLED TWO IRIANESE IN TIMIKA ON AUGUST 22 IN AN ALTERCATION IN WHICH THE IRIANESE REPORTEDLY PELTED THE SECURITY FORCES WITH ARROWS AND ROCKS, INJURING AT LEAST TWO. THE SECURITY FORCES CLAIMED THAT THEY USED RUBBER BULLETS. SOME SOURCES SAID THAT THE SECURITY FORCES ACTED IN SELF DEFENSE, WHILE OTHERS SAID THAT THE SECURITY FORCES FIRED FIRST. THE INCIDENT WAS SPARKED BY THE EARLIER UNEXPLAINED DEATHS OF TWO IRIANESE ON THE PROPERTY OF A FOREIGN MINING CONCESSION NEAR A MILITARY CHECKPOINT.

THE POLICE OFTEN EMPLOYED DEADLY FORCE IN APPREHENDING SUSPECTS OR COPING WITH ALLEGED CRIMINALS, MANY OF WHOM WERE UNARMED. IN RESPONSE TO PROTESTS THAT THE METHODS USED WERE UNJUSTIFIABLY HARSH AND AMOUNTED TO EXECUTION WITHOUT TRIAL, POLICE GENERALLY CLAIMED THAT THE SUSPECTS WERE FLEEING, RESISTING ARREST, OR THREATENING THE POLICE.

COMPLETE STATISTICS ABOUT THE NUMBER OF THESE CASES HAVE

NOT BEEN RELEASED. HOWEVER, PRESS REPORTS, INCLUDING STATEMENTS OF POLICE OFFICIALS, SHOW A PATTERN OF INCREASED LETHAL SHOOTINGS BY THE POLICE OF CRIMINAL SUSPECTS, MANY OF WHOM WERE UNARMED. AT LEAST SEVEN CRIME SUSPECTS WERE REPORTEDLY SHOT AND KILLED BY POLICE IN JAKARTA IN JANUARY, AND THE NUMBER REPORTEDLY CLIMBED TO 32 BY APRIL. IT WAS REPORTED THAT 28 HAD BEEN SIMILARLY SHOT BY THE POLICE IN SURABAYA DURING THE SAME TIME PERIOD. IN MAY A JAKARTA POLICE SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT 63 SHOOTINGS BY POLICE HAD OCCURRED BETWEEN JANUARY AND APRIL; APPROXIMATELY 85 PERCENT WERE FATAL. THE TREND OF POLICE SHOOTINGS OF SUSPECTED CRIMINALS CONTINUED IN THE FOLLOWING MONTHS, WITH USUALLY RELIABLE PRESS REPORTS NOTING ABOUT-90 SUCH DEATHS IN JAKARTA DURING THE YEAR.

IN THE PAST, HIGHER AUTHORITIES RARELY PUNISHED THE MILITARY OR POLICE FOR USING EXCESSIVE FORCE. THERE WERE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THIS SITUATION WAS IMPROVING, ALTHOUGH THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE AUTHORITIES USUALLY WAS NOT COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF THE ABUSES. A MILITARY TRIBUNAL ON JULY 23 SENTENCED THE FORMER CHIEF OF THE BOGOR DETECTIVE UNIT TO 9 MONTHS IN PRISON. THE DETECTIVE WAS INVOLVED IN THE TORTURE OF A SUSPECT, TJETJE TADJUDIN, WHO DIED IN POLICE CUSTODY IN OCTOBER 1996. THE COURT HEARD TESTIMONY THAT TJETJE HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO ELECTRIC SHOCKS AND BEATINGS DURING POLICE INTERROGATION. THE POLICE DETECTIVE AND TWO ASSISTANTS WERE CHARGED WITH MISTREATING TJETJE AND THEREBY CAUSING HIS DEATH AND MISUSE OF AUTHORITY. THE PROSECUTOR REQUESTED A L7-MONTH SENTENCE FOR THESE CRIMES, BUT THE DETECTIVE WAS SENTENCED TO 9 MONTHS AND 10 DAYS BECAUSE HE WAS FOUND GUILTY ONLY

OF "MISUSE OF AUTHORITY." NOBODY HAS YET BEEN HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR TJETJE'S DEATH AND THE CONVICTED POLICE DETECTIVE WAS NOT REMOVED FROM THE POLICE FORCE PENDING APPEAL.

FIVE CASES OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN IRIAN JAYA INVOLVING THE DEATH OF IRIANESE CIVILIANS, CITED IN A

SEPTEMBER 1995 REPORT BY THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, HAVE LANGUISHED, AND THE COMMISSION HAS REQUESTED FOLLOWUP ACTION.

IN SEPTEMBER POLICE ANNOUNCED A "TEMPORARY POSTPONEMENT" IN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE 1993 MURDER OF LABOR ACTIVIST MARSINAH. HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS INTERPRETED THIS AS AN EFFORT TO CLOSE THE INVESTIGATION, AND HAVE CALLED FOR ITS REVIVAL.

THE MILITARY SUFFERED ITS HIGHEST NUMBER OF FATAL CASUALTIES IN RECENT YEARS IN EAST TIMOR, MOST IN A WAVE OF GUERRILLA ATTACKS DURING THE MAY ELECTION PERIOD AND ITS AFTERMATH. EIGHTEEN SECURITY PERSONNEL WERE KILLED IN A SINGLE ATTACK NEAR EAUCAU IN MAY. IN ADDITION TO NUMEROUS KILLINGS OF SOLDIERS AND POLICE BY THE GUERRILLAS, THEY ALSO KILLED CIVILIAN EAST TIMORESE SUSPECTED OF WORKING FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND SOME OTHER CIVILIANS. A SCHOOL TEACHER AND MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY WERE KILLED BY GUERRILLAS DURING THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD. A LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL IN EAST TIMOR, WHO WAS ALSO CHIEF OF THE LOCAL PARAMILITARY "GADA PAKSI" GROUP, AND FOUR OTHER CIVILIANS WERE KILLED IN APRIL WHEN THEIR CAR WAS ATTACKED NEAR VIQUEQUE, PRESUMABLY BY

GUERRILLAS.

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN ACEH HAS IMPROVED SINCE THE EARLY 1990'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ACEHNESE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT. ALTHOUGH ACEH MERDEKA WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN LARGELY ELIMINATED AS A VIABLE FORCE, ACEH IS STILL OFFICIALLY LISTED AS ONE OF INDONESIA'S THREE "TROUBLED AREAS" (ALONG WITH EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA). BECAUSE THE AREA HAD BEEN RELATIVELY PEACEFUL FOR SEVERAL YEARS, THERE WAS DISCUSSION IN JANUARY OF DECLARING ACEH SECURE AND REMOVING THE CLASSIFICATION OF TROUBLED AREA AS A REFLECTION OF CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITY SITUATION. THE DISCUSSION WAS SUSPENDED AFTER MILITARY OPERATIONS NETTED WEAPONS CACHES, ALLEGEDLY BELONGING TO ACEH MERDEKA, IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH, FOLLOWING A VIOLENT BANK ROBBERY DURING WHICH THREE BANK EMPLOYEES WERE SHOT AND KILLED BY

THE CRIMINALS.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

RELIABLE SOURCES IN EAST TIMOR REPORTED NUMEROUS DISAPPEARANCES, ESPECIALLY IN MORE ISOLATED AREAS.

THE GOVERNMENT MADE LITTLE PROGRESS IN RESOLVING THE 1996 "JULY 27 INCIDENT." THE INCIDENT INVOLVED THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED VIOLENT TAKEOVER OF INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) HEADQUARTERS, WHICH TRIGGERED SERIOUS RIOTING IN JAKARTA. THE GOVERNMENT MOVED SLOWLY IN RESPONDING TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION'S OCTOBER 1996 REPORT ON THIS INCIDENT, WHICH LISTED 23 MISSING, 149 INJURED, AND 5 DEAD, ONE OF WHOM HAD BEEN SHOT (SEE SECTION 4) . IN

SEPTEMBER THE AUTHORITIES REPORTEDLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE CASE HAD NOT BEEN CLOSED AND AGREED THAT A SEARCH WOULD BE CONDUCTED FOR THE 16 PEOPLE THAT THE COMMISSION REPORTED WERE STILL MISSING, BUT LITTLE ADDITIONAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE BY YEAR'S END.

THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT EFFORTS BY THE~GOVERNMENT TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MISSING AND DEAD FROM THE NOVEMBER 12, 1991 MILITARY SHOOTING OF CIVILIANS IN DILI. NO ADDITIONAL CASES WERE RESOLVED DURING THE YEAR. KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE MISSING ARE DEAD AND THAT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES KNOW WHERE THEIR BODIES ARE LOCATED.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

THE CRIMINAL CODE MAKES IT A CRIME PUNISHABLE BY UP TO 4 YEARS IN PRISON FOR ANY OFFICIAL TO USE VIOLENCE OR FORCE TO ELICIT A CONFESSION. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, LEGAL PROTECTIONS ARE BOTH INADEQUATE AND WIDELY IGNORED, AND SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO EMPLOY TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF MISTREATMENT, PARTICULARLY IN REGIONS WHERE THERE WERE ACTIVE SECURITY CONCERNS, SUCH AS IRIAN JAYA AND EAST TIMOR. POLICE OFTEN RESORT TO PHYSICAL ABUSE, EVEN IN

MINOR INCIDENTS.

IN EAST TIMOR, MILITARY UNITS REGULARLY DETAIN CIVILIANS FOR INTERROGATION; MOST ARE HELD IN EXTRALEGAL MILITARY DETENTION CENTERS, OFTEN WITH NO NOTIFICATION OF RELATIVES, MISTREATED FOR SEVERAL DAYS, AND THEN RELEASED.

FAMILY MEMBERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS ENCOUNTER SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN IDENTIFYING AND VISITING

DETAINEES HELD IN THESE MILITARY FACILITIES. MANY CREDIBLE SOURCES AGREED THAT PERSONS DETAINED BY THE POLICE IN EAST TIMOR WERE ROUTINELY BEATEN WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING DETAINED. ALL 32 PEOPLE DETAINED FOLLOWING A DEMONSTRATION AT THE MAKHOTA HOTEL IN DILI IN MARCH SUFFERED BEATINGS AT THE HANDS OF THE POLICE, ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES.

FOUR RESIDENTS OF LAVATERI VILLAGE NEAR BAUCAU, EAST TIMOR DETAINED ON APRIL 4 BY AN INTELLIGENCE TEAM, WERE REPORTEDLY BEATEN WITH RIFLE BUTTS, WITH ONE INDIVIDUAL SUFFERING A BROKEN RIB AND ANOTHER HAVING A CROSS CARVED INTO THE PALM OF HER HAND. SIX EAST TIMORESE DETAINED BY THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE UNIT (801) IN LIQUICA ON FEBRUARY 26 WERE REPORTEDLY TORTURED WITH ELECTRIC SHOCKS AND IMMERSION IN ICE WATER. FIVE EAST TIMORESE CIVILIANS DETAINED BY SECURITY FORCES NEAR LIQUICA ON APRIL 30 WERE REPORTEDLY BEATEN WITH RIFLE BUTTS AND SUFFERED ELECTRIC SHOCKS.

DURING THE MILITARY OPERATION AND SEARCH FOR THE CRIMINALS THAT FOLLOWED, AT LEAST TWO SUSPECTS, ALLEGED BY THE MILITARY TO BE FROM ACEH MERDEKA, WERE SHOT TO DEATH BY THE MILITARY DURING RAIDS. A MILITARY SOURCE CLAIMED THAT THE VICTIMS WERE ARMED. DURING A ROUNDUP OF SUSPECTED ACEH MERDEKA SEPARATISTS, AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF SUSPECTS WERE ARRESTED DURING FEBRUARY AND MARCH. THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT A SMALL NUMBER OF ACEH MERDEKA

MEMBERS REMAIN IN ACEH, AND MAINTAIN SOME SYMPATHY AMONG THE LOCAL POPULATION, BUT THEY ARE NOT SEEN AS POSING AN ACTIVE SECURITY THREAT. THERE ARE ALLEGATIONS OF CRIMINAL AND ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN REGIONS OF ACEH THAT WERE FORMERLY AREAS WHERE ACEH MERDEKA SEPARATISTS OPERATED.

THERE WERE INSTANCES WHERE SECURITY FORCES RESPONDED WITH BRUTALITY TO PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS OR DISPUTES WITH CITIZENS, ALTHOUGH THEY GENERALLY REFRAINED FROM USING FORCE TO STOP THE PROHIBITED, MASSIVE STREET RALLIES THAT DOMINATED THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. ON APRIL 2, SECURITY FORCES VIOLENTLY BROKE UP A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION BY APPROXIMATELY 200 SUPPORTERS OF MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI IN DENPASAR, BALI. THE SECURITY FORCES USED RATTAN CANES, AND DOZENS AMONG THE GROUP SUFFERED MINOR INJURIES. IN YOGYAKARTA, SECURITY FORCES REPORTEDLY BEAT SOME STUDENT

MARCHERS COMMEMORATING HUMAN RIGHTS DAY AND BROKE UP THEIR MARCH. IN SOUTHEAST SULAWESI, POLICE REPORTEDLY SHOWED RESTRAINT IN RESPONDING TO STUDENT RIOTS PROVOKED BY A POLICE ASSAULT ON STUDENTS DURING A RAID ON A DORMITORY.

ON APRIL 28, UNIFORMED AND PLAINCLOTHES SECURITY FORCES BEAT WITH RATTAN CANES AND KICKED A SMALL GROUP OF PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATORS OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL JAKARTA DISTRICT COURT FOLLOWING THE SENTENCING OF PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) ACTIVISTS, INJURING TWO DEMONSTRATORS. ON JUNE 23, SECURITY FORCES ARMED WITH BAYONETS AND CLUBS ENTERED THE INDONESIAN CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY (UKI) CAMPUS IN JAKARTA AND ATTACKED A GROUP OF

STUDENTS. AT LEAST FIVE OF THE STUDENTS WERE INJURED AND THREE WERE HOSPITALIZED WITH SERIOUS HEAD WOUNDS. THE

SECURITY FORCES WERE RETALIATING AFTER A SOLDIER WAS INJURED IN AN ALTERCATION WITH STUDENTS. ON SEPTEMBER 1, ACCORDING TO RELIABLE REPORTS, 27 STUDENTS AND LOCAL RESIDENTS IN EANDA ACEH WERE INJURED, SOME SERIOUSLY, WHEN THREE TRUCKLOADS OF POLICE OFFICERS ATTACKED A GROUP OF STUDENTS AFTER A SOCCER MATCH DURING WHICH A DISPUTE BETWEEN A POLICE OFFICER AND A STUDENT OVER A POSTER HAD ARISEN. POLICE ALLEGEDLY BEAT STUDENTS AND BYSTANDERS ON THE SOCCER FIELD AND CHASED THOSE WHO RAN AWAY INTO HOMES AND BEAT THEM.

THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE WAVE OF MAJOR RIOTS THAT HIT INDONESIA RECEIVED A MIXED RESPONSE. SECURITY FORCES DID NOT, IN MOST CASES, USE LETHAL FORCE IN RESPONDING TO THESE RIOTS AND SHOWED RELATIVE RESTRAINT. IN MANY CASES, THERE WAS PUBLIC CRITICISM THAT SECURITY FORCES DID NOT ACT IN SUFFICIENT TIME OR WITH SUFFICIENT FORCE TO PROTECT CITIZENS AND PROPERTY FROM THE LARGE-SCALE DESTRUCTION THAT OCCURRED. THE RIOTING RESULTED FROM A COMBINATION OF ECONOMIC, COMMUNAL, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL FACTORS. IT BEGAN IN 1996, CONTINUED INTO L997, ABATED AFTER THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION, AND ERUPTED AGAIN IN UJUNG PANDANG, SOUTH SULAWESI IN SEPTEMBER.

ON JANUARY 30, SECURITY FORCES RESTORED ORDER IN RENGASDENGKLOK, WEST JAVA WITHOUT RESORT TO LIVE AMMUNITION FIRE OR BRUTAL TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS, THOUGH NOT BEFORE MOBS HAD ATTACKED SHOPS AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS. THE MOST DEADLY RIOT OCCURRED IN

BANJARMASIN, SOUTH KALIMANTAN ON MAY 23 ON THE LAST DAY OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. AT LEAST 123 PEOPLE DIED IN A FIRE CAUSED BY THE RIOT AND ENSUING LOOTING OF A DEPARTMENT STORE. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATED, AND CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF LIVE AMMUNITION TO SUBDUE THE RIOTERS. THE COMMISSION ALSO FOUND THAT SOME OF THE SUSPECTED RIOTERS WERE BEATEN AFTER THEIR ARREST, AND RECOMMENDED MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT FUTURE RIOT CONTROL NOT BE EXCESSIVELY VIOLENT.

TN NOVEMBER FOLLOWING AN APPARENT ALTERCATION BETWEEN YOUTHS AND INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL NEAR' THE UNIVERSITY OF EAST TIMOR, LARGE NUMBERS OF SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL ENTERED THE UNIVERSITY CAMPUS, DISCHARGING THEIR WEAPONS AND BEATING STUDENTS. AT LEAST FIVE STUDENTS WERE INJURED AND UNIVERSITY FACILITIES WERE SEVERELY DAMAGED. AUTHORITIES SAID THAT SECURITY FORCES HAD USED ONLY RUBBER BULLETS BUT SEVERAL OF THE INJURED STUDENTS WERE REPORTEDLY SHOT, AND TWO SUFFERED BAYONET WOUNDS, ACCORDING TO INDEPENDENT HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS. ONE INJURED STUDENT WAS REMOVED FROM AN ICRC VEHICLE, BEATEN WITH RIFLE BUTTS BY POLICE, AND THEN TAKEN TO A MILITARY HOSPITAL. THE ICRC WAS PERMITTED TO VISIT THE WOUNDED STUDENTS. A NUMBER OF STUDENTS WERE ALSO REPORTEDLY DETAINED FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT.

THERE WERE REPORTS THAT THE SECURITY FORCES BEAT AND ABUSED VILLAGERS IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OF IRIAN JAYA; THE MILITARY DENIED COMMITTING SUCH ABUSES (SEE SECTION

2.D.).

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN AN UNJUSTIFIABLY HIGH MILITARY PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR, TOTALING MORE THAN 16,000 PERSONNEL. THE GOVERNMENT, AS IT DOES ELSEWHERE, ALSO RELIED ON BANDS OF YOUTHS, ORGANIZED AND DIRECTED BY THE MILITARY, TO INTIMIDATE AND HARASS ITS OPPONENTS. SUCH A CIVILIAN PARAMILITARY GROUP, KNOWN AS THE GADA PAKSI, WAS FREQUENTLY INVOLVED IN NIGHTTIME RAIDS IN DIII NEIGHBORHOODS IN THE EARLY PART OF THE YEAR AND WAS WIDELY BLAMED FOR PROVOKING SERIOUS DISTURBANCES IN VIQUEQUE IN FEBRUARY. GADA PAKSI ACTIVITY ABATED IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE YEAR.

ONE CASE OF ALLEGED RAPE OF EAST TIMORESE WOMEN BY MILITARY PERSONNEL GAINED PUBLIC ATTENTION AS HUMAN RIGHTS

LAWYERS TRIED TO BRING THE CASE TO TRIAL. LEGAL ACTION ALSO IS BEING PURSUED IN THE CASE OF AN EAST TIMORESE WOMAN ALLEGEDLY THE VICTIM OF REPEATED RAPES BY MILITARY

PERSONNEL IN NOVEMBER 1996 WHILE IN MILITARY CUSTODY. THE WOMAN REPORTED THE RAPES TO HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, AND WROTE A LETTER TO THE LOCAL MILITARY COMMAND UNIT, WHICH FORWARDED IT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. AT YEAR'S END, IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER LAWYERS WOULD SUCCEED IN GETTING THE CASE TRIED IN EITHER MILITARY OR CIVIL COURT.

HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS REPORT THAT RAPE BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM, AND THAT SOLDIERS ARE RARELY HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THESE CRIMES.

THE FOUR POLICE OFFICERS WHO MISTREATED RELIGIOUS TEACHERS IN TASIKMALAYA, WEST JAVA, IN A 1996 EVENT WHICH SPARKED A MA~OR RIOT THERE, WERE FOUND GUILTY BY A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND GIVEN SENTENCES RANGING FROM 22 TO 28 MONTHS.

PRISON CONDITIONS ARE HARSH WITH VIOLENCE AMONG PRISONERS AND MISTREATMENT AND EXTORTION OF INMATES BY GUARDS COMMON. THE INCIDENCE OF MISTREATMENT DROPS SHARPLY ONCE A PRISONER HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM POLICE OR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (BIA) CUSTODY INTO THE CIVILIAN PRISON SYSTEM OR INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE SOMETIMES MIXED WITH THE GENERAL PRISON POPULATION. IN THE CIPINANG AND SALEMBA PRISONS IN JAKARTA SOME POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE SEGREGATED.

THE ICRC WAS DENIED ACCESS TO POLITICAL PRISONERS UNTIL JULY, EXCEPT IN EAST TIMOR WHERE VISITS WERE GENERALLY ALLOWED. SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISITING DIGNITARIES TO VISIT SOME PROMINENT POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE SOMETIMES MADE. SOME NONPOLITICAL PRISONERS ALSO HAVE BEEN VISITED BY HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, ALTHOUGH THIS APPEARS TO BE ON A CASE-TO-CASE BASIS.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE CONTAINS PROVISIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION, BUT IT LACKS ADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AND AUTHORITIES ROUTINELY VIOLATE

IT. THE CODE SPECIFIES THAT PRISONERS HAVE THE RIGHT TO NOTIFY THEIR FAMILIES AND THAT WARRANTS MUST BE PRODUCED

DURING AN ARREST EXCEPT UNDER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS, SUCH AS WHEN A SUSPECT IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME. THE LAW ALSO REQUIRES THAT FAMILIES OF DETAINEES BE NOTIFIED PROMPTLY. THE LAW AUTHORIZES INVESTIGATORS TO ISSUE WARRANTS TO ASSIST IN THEIR INVESTIGATIONS OR IF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED. HOWEVER, AUTHORITIES SOMETIMES MADE ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS.

THE LAW PRESUMES DEFENDANTS INNOCENT AND PERMITS BAIL. THEY OR THEIR FAMILIES MAY ALSO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THEIR ARREST AND DETENTION IN A PRETRIAL HEARING AND MAY SUE FOR COMPENSATION IF WRONGFULLY DETAINED. HOWEVER, IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO INVOKE THIS PROCEDURE, OR TO RECEIVE COMPENSATION, AFTER BEING RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGE. IN BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COURTS, APPEALS BASED ON CLAIMS OF IMPROPER ARREST AND DETENTION ARE RARELY, IF EVER, ACCEPTED. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE ALSO CONTAINS SPECIFIC LIMITS ON PERIODS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION AND SPECIFIES WHEN THE COURTS MUST APPROVE EXTENSIONS, USUALLY AFTER 60 DAYS. IN ADDITION, SUSPECTS CHARGED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW ARE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL PROCEDURES OUTSIDE THE CODE. THESE GIVE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD A SUSPECT FOR UP TO 1 YEAR BEFORE TRIAL. HE MAY RENEW THIS 1-YEAR PERIOD WITHOUT LIMIT.

THE AUTHORITIES ROUTINELY APPROVE EXTENSIONS OF PERIODS OF DETENTION. IN AREAS WHERE ACTIVE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS EXIST, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, THERE ARE MANY

PAGE 24 STATE 017237 311814Z
INSTANCES OF PEOPLE BEING DETAINED WITHOUT WARRANTS, CHARGES, OR COURT PROCEEDINGS. THIS IS ALSO TRUE IN ACEH. BAIL IS RARELY GRANTED, ESPECIALLY IN POLITICAL CASES. OVER 100 PEOPLE WERE DETAINED FOLLOWING THE DISCOVERY OF WEAPONS CACHES IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF ACEH, BEGINNING IN FEBRUARY. THEY ALLEGEDLY WERE HELD INCOMMUNICADO AT MILITARY CAMPS. THE AUTHORITIES FREQUENTLY PREVENT ACCESS TO DEFENSE COUNSEL WHILE SUSPECTS ARE BEING INVESTIGATED AND MAKE IT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO GET LEGAL ASSISTANCE FROM VOLUNTARY LEGAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS. SPECIAL LAWS ON CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND NARCOTICS DO NOT COME UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE'S PROTECTIONS.

THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) OPERATES OUTSIDE THE LEGAL CODE AND HAS WIDE DISCRETION TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE PERSONS THOUGHT TO THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY. DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS AGENCY, THE MILITARY BEGAN DISCUSSING PUBLICLY IN 1996 THE NEED FOR A NEW INTERNAL SECURITY ACT TO GIVE THE GOVERNMENT GREATER POWER TO SUPPRESS DISSENT. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS FURTHER PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THIS PROPOSAL DURING 1997, IT HAD NOT BEEN SENT TO PARLIAMENT.

SECURITY FORCES BROKE UP DEMONSTRATIONS AND MEETINGS AND DETAINED PARTICIPANTS (SEE SECTIONS L.C. AND 2.B.).

THERE ARE NO RELIABLE DATA ON THE NUMBER OF ARBITRARY ARRESTS OR DETENTIONS WITHOUT TRIAL, PARTICULARLY IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, AND ACEH. IN EAST TIMOR, PARTIALLY AS
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 25 STATE 017237 311814Z
A RESULT OF INCREASED DEMONSTRATIONS IN LATE 1996 AND IN 1997, AS WELL AS INCREASED GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, THE NUMBER OF DETENTIONS DURING 1997 WAS HIGHER THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS.

ARBITRARY DETENTIONS IN EAST TIMOR WERE A PARTICULAR

PROBLEM FOLLOWING INCREASED GUERRILLA ATTACKS IN BAUCAU AND LOS PALOS. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES, NUMEROUS PEOPLE NOT INVOLVED IN THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT WERE DETAINED AND MISTREATED AS SECURITY FORCES SWEPT THROUGH LOCAL NEIGHBORHOODS IN SEARCH OF THE PERPETRATORS OF VARIOUS ATTACKS. IN THE EARLY PART OF THE YEAR THE CIVILIAN PARAMILITARY GADA PAKSI GROUP ALSO FREQUENTLY DETAINED AND BEAT CIVILIANS.

THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT USE FORCED EXILE.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATES THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, BUT IN PRACTICE THE JUDICIARY IS SUBORDINATED TO THE EXECUTIVE AND THE MILITARY. COURT CHALLENGES IN VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS TO THE GOVERNMENTFS TRANSPARENT MANIPULATION OF THE PDI LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE IN 1996, WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS, CONTINUED TO BE DISMISSED IN 1997. JUDGES ARE CIVIL SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WHICH CONTROLS THEIR ASSIGNMENTS, PAY, AND PROMOTION. LOW SALARIES ENCOURAGE WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION.

JUDGES ARE SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES THAT OFTEN DETERMINES THE OUTCOME

OF A CASE.

A QUADRIPARTITE JUDICIARY OF GENERAL, RELIGIOUS, MILITARY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS EXISTS BELOW THE SUPREME COURT. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT TO HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS IN ALL FOUR SYSTEMS. THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT CONSIDER FACTUAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF LAW. THE SUPREME COURT THEORETICALLY STANDS COEQUAL WITH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES, BUT IT DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER LAWS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT. THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOT YET EXERCISED ITS AUTHORITY (HELD SINCE 1985) TO REVIEW MINISTERIAL DECREES AND REGULATIONS. IN 1993 CHIEF JUSTICE PURWOTO GANDASUBRATA LAID OUT PROCEDURES FOR LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW.

A PANEL OF JUDGES CONDUCTS TRIALS AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL, POSES QUESTIONS, HEARS EVIDENCE, DECIDES GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND ASSESSES PUNISHMENT. INITIAL JUDGMENTS ARE RARELY REVERSED IN THE APPEALS PROCESS, ALTHOUGH SENTENCES CAN BE INCREASED OR REDUCED. BOTH THE DEFENSE AND THE PROSECUTION MAY APPEAL.

DEFENDANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AND TO PRODUCE WITNESSES IN THEIR DEFENSE. AN EXCEPTION IS ALLOWED IN CASES IN WHICH DISTANCE OR EXPENSE IS DEEMED EXCESSIVE FOR TRANSPORTING WITNESSES TO COURT. IN SUCH CASES, SWORN AFFIDAVITS MAY BE INTRODUCED. HOWEVER, THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR WITNESSES IMMUNITY OR FOR DEFENSE POWER OF SUBPOENA. AS A RESULT, WITNESSES ARE GENERALLY UNWILLING TO TESTIFY AGAINST THE

AUTHORITIES. THE COURTS COMMONLY ALLOW FORCED CONFESSIONS AND LIMIT THE PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE. IN A TRIAL IN MARCH A WITNESS STATED IN OPEN COURT THAT HE HAD BEEN TORTURED WITH ELECTRIC SHOCK IN THE COURSE OF INTERROGATION IN 1996 BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (BIA). NO INVESTIGATION OF HIS CHARGE, GIVEN UNDER OATH, WAS LAUNCHED. DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND CAN BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY AGAINST THEMSELVES. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE GIVES DEFENDANTS THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY FROM THE MOMENT OF THEIR ARREST, BUT NOT DURING THE PREARREST INVESTIGATION PERIOD, WHICH MAY INVOLVE PROLONGED DETENTION. PERSONS SUMMONED TO APPEAR

AS WITNESSES IN INVESTIGATIONS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY LAWYERS EVEN THOUGH INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN THE COURSE OF RENDERING TESTIMONY CAN SUBSEQUENTLY BECOME THE BASIS OF AN INVESTIGATION OF THE WITNESS. THE LAW REQUIRES THAT A LAWYER BE APPOINTED IN CAPITAL CASES AND THOSE INVOLVING A PRISON SENTENCE OF 15 YEARS OR MORE. IN CASES INVOLVING POTENTIAL SENTENCES OF 5 YEARS OR MORE, A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IF THE DEFENDANT DESIRES AN ATTORNEY AND IS INDIGENT. IN THEORY, DESTITUTE DEFENDANTS MAY OBTAIN PRIVATE LEGAL HELP, SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE INDONESIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION. IN PRACTICE,

HOWEVER, DEFENDANTS ARE OFTEN PERSUADED NOT TO HIRE AN ATTORNEY, OR ACCESS TO AN ATTORNEY OF THEIR CHOICE IS IMPEDED.

IN MANY CASES PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AGAINST COERCED CONFESSIONS, PARTICULARLY THOSE COERCED BY THE POLICE AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (BIA), ARE INADEQUATE

TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL. CORRUPTION IS A COMMON FEATURE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE PAYMENT OF BRIBES CAN INFLUENCE PROSECUTION, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCING IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES.

THERE WERE FEW SIGNS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE. THE COURT CONTINUED TO BE USED TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND GOVERNMENT CRITICS. THE GOVERNMENT VIGOROUSLY PURSUED THE NUMEROUS SUBVERSION CASES STARTED AT THE END OF 1996, AND INITIATED OR THREATENED NEW CASES. MANY INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS INTERPRETED THIS AS AN EFFORT TO CHILL DISSENT IN ADVANCE OF THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION. THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTED AND THE COURT CONVICTED 14 YOUNG ACTIVISTS BELONGING TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) UNDER THE ANTISUBVERSION LAW IN APRIL AND JUNE, HANDING DOWN THE HARSHEST SENTENCES FOR PEACEFUL POLITICAL DISSENT IN RECENT YEARS (SEE SECTION 2.A.). THE GOVERNMENT ALSO TRIED INDEPENDENT LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, AND FORMER PARLIAMENTARIAN SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS UNDER THIS LAW. FOUR YOUTHS CHARGED WITH INCITING THE RIOTING THAT TOOK PLACE IN TASIKMALAYA, WEST JAVA IN DECEMBER 1996 WERE BROUGHT TO TRIAL IN L997 ON CHARGES OF SUBVERSION. THE TRIALS CONCLUDED IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, RESULTING IN SENTENCES OF 22 MONTHS, 24 MONTHS, 8 YEARS, AND 10 YEARS IN PRISON. MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI FILED SUIT IN COURTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THE JUNE 1996 GOVERNMENT-

SUPPORTED MEDAN CONGRESS THAT OUSTED HER FROM THE PDI LEADERSHIP. MOST COURTS REFUSED TO HEAR THE CASE. HOWEVER, SEVERAL COURTS ACCEPTED THE CASE AND RULED IN HER

FAVOR.

THE ANTISUBVERSION LAW, WHICH CARRIES A MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH (WHICH HAS NOT BEEN INVOKED IN RECENT YEARS), MAKES IT A CRIME TO ENGAGE IN ACTS THAT COULD DISTORT, UNDERMINE, OR DEVIATE FROM THE STATE IDEOLOGY OR BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, OR WHICH COULD DISSEMINATE FEELINGS OF HOSTILITY OR AROUSE HOSTILITY, DISTURBANCES, OR ANXIETY AMONG THE POPULATION. THE EXCESSIVELY VAGUE LANGUAGE OF THIS LAW MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO PROSECUTE PEOPLE MERELY FOR PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF VIEWS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT.

MANY PRISONERS ARE SERVING SENTENCES FOR SUBVERSION, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI), MUSLIM MILITANTS, AND THOSE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN IRIAN JAYA, ACEB, AND EAST TIMOR. MORE ARE SERVING SENTENCES UNDER THE HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. SOME OF THESE PERSONS ADVOCATED OR EMPLOYED VIOLENCE, BUT OTHERS ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO WERE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPTING TO EXERCISE SUCH UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH OR ASSOCIATION, OR WHO WERE CONVICTED IN UNFAIR TRIALS. JUVENCIO DE JESUS MARTINS, AN EAST TIMORESE PRISONER, WAS RELEASED UNDER NORMAL REMISSION PROCEDURES ON INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY, AUGUST 17.

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, EAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

JUDICIAL WARRANTS FOR SEARCHES ARE REQUIRED EXCEPT FOR

CASES INVOLVING SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND

CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, SECURITY AGENCIES REGULARLY MADE FORCED OR SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES. SECURITY FORCES ALSO ENGAGED IN SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS AND RESIDENCES AND SELECTIVE MONITORING OF LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS WITHOUT LEGAL RESTRAINT.

GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND ITS FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY PERSONS THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP. THESE PERSONS

AND THEIR RELATIVES SOMETIMES ARE SUBJECTED TO SURVEILLANCE, REQUIRED CHECK-INS, PERIODIC INDOCTRINATION, AND RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL OUTSIDE THEIR CITY OF RESIDENCE. ONE OF THE METHODS THE GOVERNMENT HAS USED TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE PEOPLE HAS BEEN TO REQUIRE THAT THE INITIALS "E.T." ("EX-TAPOL" OR POLITICAL PRISONER) BE STAMPED IN THEIR IDENTIFICATION CARDS. THIS ALLOWS THE GOVERNMENT AND PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYERS TO IDENTIFY FORMER PKI MEMBERS, AND SUBJECTS THEM TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL DISCRIMINATION. ALTHOUGH THE REQUIREMENT THAT E.T. BE STAMPED IN IDENTIFICATION CARDS HAS BEEN OFFICIALLY ENDED, IN PRACTICE IT IS STILL USED IN MANY CASES.

AFTER SEVERAL YEARS DURING WHICH THE GOVERNMENT SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED ITS TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM, THE PROGRAM WAS REVIVED DURING THE YEAR WITH PRIVATE CORPORATE SUPPORT. THE PROGRAM MOVES LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE FROM OVERPOPULATED ISLANDS TO MORE ISOLATED AND LESS DEVELOPED

ONES. IT IS ALSO USED TO RESETTLE LOCAL POPULATIONS WITHIN EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS SAY THAT THE PROGRAM VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND DUPES SOME TRANSMIGRANTS INTO LEAVING THEIR HOME VILLAGES WITHOUT ANY MEANS OF RETURN. CONDITIONS AT SOME SITES ARE LIFE THREATENING, WITH INADEQUATE MEASURES TO PROTECT THE TRANSMIGRANT POPULATION AGAINST DISEASES ENDEMIC TO THE TRANSMIGRATION SITES. TRANSMIGRANTS AND MIGRANTS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM RECEIVED INDIRECT GOVERNMENT SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF

DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND CONTRACTS WITH THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI) OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THIS PRACTICE, PARTICULARLY IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA AND NALIMANTAN, LED TO RESENTMENT AMONG INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, WHICH BELIEVED THAT THEIR RIGHTS WERE INFRINGED UPON (SEE SECTION 5)

THERE WERE REPORTS THAT SECURITY FORCES OCCUPIED VILLAGES IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OF IRIAN JAYA AND DESTROYED HOMES AND CROPS. THE MILITARY DENIED COMMITTING ABUSES (SEE SECTION 2.D.)

THE GOVERNMENT PROHIBITS THE IMPORT OF CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS (SEE SECTION 5)

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

ALTHOUGH THE 1945 CONSTITUTION AND THE 1982 PRESS LAW PROVIDE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED

TO RESTRICT PRESS FREEDOM IN PRACTICE. THE GOVERNMENT USES THE ISSUANCE OF PUBLISHING LICENSES UNDER A 1984 MINISTERIAL DECREE TO CONTROL THE PRESS. OTHER MEANS OF CONTROL INCLUDE REGULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF ADVERTISING PERMITTED AND OF THE NUMBER OF PAGES ALLOWED IN NEWSPAPERS. IN SENSITIVE AREAS, THE AUTHORITIES CONTINUED TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO LOCAL JOURNALISTS AND EDITORS ON WHAT THEY SHOULD PRINT, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MANY CASES IN WHICH SUCH GUIDANCE WAS IGNORED. SELF-CENSORSHIP BY THE PRESS CONTINUED, ESPECIALLY ON SUBJECTS KNOWN TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE GOVERNMENT. AT YEAR'S END, CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT GREW STRONGER AND THE PRESS CARRIED IT MORE OPENLY.

COVERAGE OF A NUMBER OF SENSITIVE TOPICS, SUCH AS CORRUPTION, THE ROLE OF THE FIRST FAMILY IN BUSINESS, AND LACK OF GOVERNMENT FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, DID OCCUR, PARTICULARLY IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE PRESS. MAJOR INDONESIAN-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS WERE MORE CAUTIOUS. THE

BROADCAST MEDIA, WHICH REACHES A FAR LARGER PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAN DOES THE PRINT MEDIA, RARELY IF EVER DEALS WITH SENSITIVE TOPICS.

MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE JANUARY-FEBRUARY ETHNIC FIGHTING BETWEEN CHRISTIAN DAYAK AND MUSLIM MADURESE IN WEST KALIMANTAN WAS AT TIMES EXTREMELY RESTRICTED. THE MILITARY HELD A CLOSED MEETING WITH SENIOR EDITORS EARLY IN FEBRUARY IN THE MIDST OF THE ETHNIC STRIFE. FEW LOCAL NEWSPAPER REPORTS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN WEST KALIMANTAN APPEARED UNTIL THE FIGHTING WAS WELL UNDERWAY. OTHER INSTANCES OF SOCIAL UNREST, SUCH AS IN RENGASDENGKLOK,

WEST JAVA ON JANUARY 30, AND INSTANCES RELATED TO THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, RECEIVED MORE MEDIA COVERAGE.

THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE YEAR, LIMITED DEBATE ON POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES WAS PERMITTED IN THE PRESS AND OTHER PUBLIC FORUMS, BUT THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON FREE SPEECH, ESPECIALLY IN CASES INVOLVING DIRECT OPPOSITION TO THE EXISTING SYSTEM. AT YEAR'S END, PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT GREW STRONGER AND THE

PRESS CARRIED IT MORE OPENLY. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE JULY 27, 1996 INCIDENT, AND IN THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION, THE GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WOULD NOT TOLERATE CHALLENGES TO THE FUNDAMENTAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, IN PARTICULAR BY ARRESTING, PLACING ON TRIAL, AND HARSHLY SENTENCING SOME OF ITS CRITICS.

FOURTEEN ACTIVISTS BELONGING TOR OR ASSOCIATED WITH, THE SMALL, OPPOSITION PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) WERE CONVICTED UNDER THE CONTROVERSIAL 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW. ON APRIL 28, THE DAY AFTER THE GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN BEGAN, COURTS IN JAKARTA CONVICTED NINE OF THE ACTIVISTS. ALTHOUGH THE YOUNG ACTIVISTS ORIGINALLY WERE ARRESTED IN AUGUST 1996 AMIDST GOVERNMENT ACCUSATIONS OF MASTERMINDING THE "JULY 27" INCIDENT, THE CONVICTIONS RESTED INSTEAD ON WRITINGS, SPEECHES, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES, WHICH WERE DEEMED SUBVERSIVE (SEE SECTION L.E.).

THE PRD'S LEADER, BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO, RECEIVED A 13-YEAR SENTENCE, WHICH WAS INCREASED TO 15 YEARS ON APPEAL. THIS

WAS ONE OF THE MOST SEVERE SENTENCES IMPOSED IN A SUBVERSION CASE IN RECENT YEARS. HIS ASSOCIATES RECEIVED SENTENCES RANGING FROM 12 YEARS TO 18 MONTHS. TWO MORE PRD ACTIVISTS WERE CONVICTED IN JAKARTA ON JUNE 16, AND GIVEN 4- AND 5-YEAR SENTENCES. OTHER PRD-RELATED CASES INCLUDED THE CONVICTIONS IN SURABAYA OF DITA INDAH SARI AND TWO OTHERS FOR SUBVERSION ON APRIL 22 AND APRIL 23 BASED ON THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES, WHICH INCLUDED CALLING FOR AN END TO THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF DUAL FUNCTION AND ORGANIZING LABOR STRIKES.

INDEPENDENT LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN'S SUBVERSION TRIAL, WHICH BEGAN ON DECEMBER 12, 1996, CONTINUED IN THE EARLY PART OF THE YEAR, AND WAS INTERRUPTED DUE TO HIS SERIOUS HEALTH PROBLEMS. IT RESUMED IN SEPTEMBER. AS WITH THE YOUNG PRD ACTIVISTS, THE SUBVERSION CHARGES RESTED ON HIS CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT, RATHER THAN HIS PURPORTED ROLE IN THE JULY 27, 1996 VIOLENCE, AS HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN PUBLICLY CLAIMED BY THE GOVERNMENT (SEE SECTION 6.A.).

THE SUBVERSION TRIAL OF SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS, THE FORMER UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) LEGISLATOR, BEGAN ON

DECEMBER 22. ACCORDING TO THE PROSECUTION, HE WAS CHARGED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW BECAUSE HE FORMED THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION PARTY (PUDI), ISSUED A PUDI MANIFESTO, NAMED HIMSELF A CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT, AND SENT OUT HOLIDAY (IDUL FITRI) CARDS IN JANUARY CARRYING THE PUDI'S AGENDA. THE PUDI'S PROGRAM INCLUDED REJECTION

OF THE 199V ELECTION, REJECTION OF ANOTHER SOEHARTO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY, AND A CALL TO PREPARE FOR THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA. BINTANG WAS DETAINED ON MARCH 6, ALONG WITH THE PUDI'S DEPUTY CHAIRMAN JULIUS USMAN AND SECRETARY GENERAL SALEH ABDULLAH, BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ANTISUBVERSION LAW. HIS COLLEAGUES WERE RELEASED FROM DETENTION ON APRIL 3.

ABERSON MARLE SIHALOHO, A PARLIAMENTARIAN FROM THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) AND A SUPPORTER OF OUSTED PDI LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI, WAS CONVICTED ON JULY 21 FOR ALLEGEDLY INSULTING THE PRESIDENT, ARMED FORCES, AND OTHER PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS. HE RECEIVED A 9-MONTH PRISON SENTENCE. THE BASIS OF HIS CONVICTION WAS A SPEECH HE MADE IN JULY 1996 AT THE "FREE SPEECH FORUM" IN FRONT OF THE PDI HEADGUARTERS, WHICH HAD BEEN VIDEOTAPED BY THE GOVERNMENT. HE BECAME THE FIRST PARLIAMENTARIAN IN RECENT YEARS TO FACE TRIAL AND BE CONVICTED.

THE GOVERNMENT TOOK SIMILAR HARSH ACTION AGAINST SOME INDIVIDUALS WHO PUBLISHED MAGAZINES OR BOOKS THAT CHALLENGED THE SYSTEM. ANDI SYAPUTRA WAS SENTENCED ON APRIL 7 TO 30 MONTHS IN PRISON FOR PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTING PRINTED MATERIAL ALLEGEDLY DEFAMING PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. ON MARCH 4, THE GOVERNMENT BANNED A 22-PAGE PAMPHLET WRITTEN BY SOEBADIO SASTROSATOMO, ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE LONG-OUTLAWED INDONESIAN SOCIALIST PARTY (PSI). THE GOVERNMENT THEN BROUGHT SOEBADIO'S PRIVATE SECRETARY TO TRIAL AUGUST 5 ON CHARGES OF HAVING "INSULTED: THE PRESIDENT. HIS ALLEGED CRIME WAS THAT HE ASSISTED IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE BOOK. HE WAS RELEASED

FROM DETENTION IN SEPTEMBER WHILE HIS TRIAL WAS STILL IN PROGRESS.

AN ACTIVIST FROM THE NGO CENTER FOR INFORMATION AND ACTION NETWORK FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM, TRI AGUS SISWOMIHARDJO, WAS

RELEASED FROM PRISON MARCH 10 AFTER SERVING 24 MONTHS FOR DISSEMINATING MATERIALS ALLEGEDLY DEFAMING THE PRESIDENT. EKO MARIYADI AND ACHMAD TAUFIK, OF THE UNRECOGNIZED

INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS' ASSOCIATION (AJI), WERE RELEASED FROM PRISON ON JULY 18. THEY HAD SERVED 2 YEARS AND 4 MONTHS OF THEIR THREE-YEAR SENTENCES FOR ALLEGEDLY SLANDERING THE PRESIDENT AND SPREADING HATRED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THEY WERE CONVICTED BASED ON ARTICLES THEY WROTE FOR THE UNDERGROUND JOURNAL INDEPENDEN, AND FOR PUBLISHING INDEPENDEN WITHOUT A GOVERNMENT LICENSE.

THE KILLING OF A JOURNALIST WHO PUBLISHED CRITICAL REPORTS IN 1996, AND AT LEAST ONE OTHER SIMILAR CASE IN L997, ATTRACTED DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION. A TRIAL WAS CARRIED OUT IN THE 1996 KILLING IN YOGYAKARTA OF A JOURNALIST, KUAD MUHAMMAD SYAFRUDIN (UDIN), WHO WORKED FOR THE YOGYAKARTA DAILY NEWSPAPER BERNAS. HE HAD BEEN ATTACKED IN HIS HOME, POSSIBLY IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLES HE HAD WRITTEN THAT WERE CRITICAL OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS IN LAND CASES. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE CONTROVERSY AS TO WHETHER AUTHORITIES HAD ARRESTED THE RIGHT SUSPECT, AS THE VICTIM'S WIFE, AN EYEWITNESS TO THE CRIME, TESTIFIED IN COURT ON SEPTEMBER 2 THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT THE ONE WHO KILLED HER HUSBAND. THE ACCUSED CLAIMED THAT HIS CONFESSION WAS COERCED BY THE

AUTHORITIES. PROSECUTORS FINALLY DROPPED THE CASE, AND THE DEFENDANT WAS RELEASED ON NOVEMBER 27.

ON JULY 26, A JOURNALIST FOR THE JAKARTA WEEKLY MAGAZINE SINAR PAGI, NAIMULLAH, WAS FOUND DEAD IN HIS CAR OUTSIDE PONTIANAK, WEST KALIMANTAN. HE REPORTEDLY HAD INJURIES TO HIS NECK, HEAD, TEMPLES, CHEST, AND WRISTS AND FOUR INDIVIDUALS WERE SEEN NEAR HIS CAR. HE HAD PUBLISHED REPORTS ON TIMBER SMUGGLING AND THEFT THAT ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED LOCAL OFFICIALS. THE INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS' ASSOCIATION CALLED FOR AN IMPARTIAL POLICE INVESTIGATION. THE POLICE IN WEST KALIMANTAN ANNOUNCED IN AUGUST THAT THE CASE WAS STILL BEING INVESTIGATED. BY YEAR'S END, IT HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED.

THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA REMAINED MORE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR COVERAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT THAN THE PRINT MEDIA. THE GOVERNMENT OPERATES A NATIONWIDE TELEVISION NETWORK WITH 12 REGIONAL STATIONS. PRIVATE COMMERCIAL TELEVISION COMPANIES, MOST WITH OWNERSHIP BY, OR MANAGEMENT TIES TO, THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY, CONTINUED TO EXPAND. ALL ARE REQUIRED TO BROADCAST GOVERNMENT-PRODUCED NEWS, BUT MANY

ALSO PRODUCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STYLE PROGRAMMING WITH NEWS CONTENT.

OVER 600 PRIVATE RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANIES EXIST IN ADDITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK. THEY ALL WERE REQUIRED TO BELONG TO THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS (PRSSNI) TO RECEIVE A BROADCASTING LICENSE. THE GOVERNMENT RADIO STATION

PRODUCES THE PROGRAM "NATIONAL NEWS," WHICH IS THE ONLY NEWS PERMITTED BY LAW TO BE BROADCAST IN INDONESIA. IT IS RELAYED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BY PRIVATE STATIONS AND 53 REGIONAL AFFILIATES OF THE GOVERNMENT STATION. BY LAW, THE PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS MAY PRODUCE ONLY "LIGHT" NEWS, SUCH AS HUMAN INTEREST STORIES, AND MAY NOT DISCUSS POLITICS. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, MANY BROADCAST INTERVIEWS AND FOREIGN NEWS AS WELL. MOREOVER, "TALK RADIO" CALL-IN PROGRAMS INCREASINGLY TOUCH ON POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES.

FOREIGN TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS WERE READILY ACCESSIBLE. SATELLITE DISHES HAVE PROLIFERATED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, AND THERE WAS ACCESS TO THE INTERNET. THE GOVERNMENT MADE NO EFFORT TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO THIS PROGRAMMING, AND HAS PROCLAIMED AN "OPEN SKIES" POLICY. FOREIGN PERIODICALS ARE WIDELY AVAILABLE. DISTRIBUTION IS SOMETIMES DELAYED BY A DAY OR MORE BY AUTHORITIES, ALTHOUGH THIS IS RARE. THE GOVERNMENT RESTRICTS THE IMPORT OF CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS (SEE SECTION 5)

THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY REGULATES ACCESS TO INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY TO CERTAIN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, BY VISITING

AND RESIDENT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS. IT OCCASIONALLY REMINDS THE LATTER OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DENY REQUESTS FOR VISA EXTENSIONS. SPECIAL PERMISSION IS NECESSARY FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TO TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAYA. WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS, PRESS ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR WAS RESTRICTED. A NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS REPEATEDLY REQUESTED PERMISSION TO GO TO EAST TIMOR WITHOUT SUCCESS. THE LOCAL PRESS IN ACEH IS TIGHTLY CONTROLLED.

IN NOVEMBER A FOREIGN NGO WORKER WAS DETAINED IN DILI FOR PARTICIPATING IN AND PHOTOGRAPHING A PEACEFUL, CANDLELIGHT VIGIL. AUTHORITIES ACCUSED HER OF ACTING AS A JOURNALIST WITHOUT THE PROPER VISA. SHE WAS EXPELLED TO BALI, FOLLOWING 10 HOURS OF QUESTIONING BY AUTHORITIES.

THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES A PERMIT FOR THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AND VIDEOTAPES, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED BY GOVERNMENT CENSORS. IMPORTERS SOMETIMES AVOIDED FOREIGN MATERIALS CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OR DEALING WITH TOPICS CONSIDERED SENSITIVE, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF MATERIALS BYPASSING CUSTOMS AND CENSORSHIP PROCEDURES.

PUBLISHERS S6METIMES REFUSED TO ACCEPT MANUSCRIPTS DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. MOST BOOKS BY THE PROMINENT NOVELIST AND FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER, PRAMOEDYA ANANTA TOER, ARE BANNED, THOUGH SOME WERE IN CIRCULATION. THE GOVERNMENT IN MARCH BANNED A PAMPHLET WHICH WAS WRITTEN BY A FORMER LEADER OF THE LONG-BANNED INDONESIAN SOCIALIST PARTY (PSI), SOEBADIO SASTROSATOMO.

IN DECEMBER, POLICE BANNED THE PERFORMANCE OF A PLAY IN BANDUNG, WEST JAVA BASED ON THE LIFE OF LABOR ACTIVIST MARSINAH, WHO WAS MURDERED IN 1993, THE PLAY HAD BEEN CLOSED DOWN EARLIER IN SURABAYA EAST JAVA ON NOVEMBER 26, AND WAS STOPPED IN OTHER CITIES AS WELL. IT WAS PERFORMED IN JAKARTA AND SOME OTHER VENUES.

WHILE THE LAW PROVIDES FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM, CONSTRAINTS

EXIST ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SCHOLARS. POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DISCUSSIONS AT UNIVERSITIES, WHILE NO LONGER FORMALLY BANNED, REMAINED CONSTRAINED. SOME SCHOLARS DISPLAYED CAUTION IN PRODUCING OR INCLUDING IN LECTURES AND CLASS DISCUSSIONS MATERIALS THAT MIGHT PROVOKE GOVERNMENT DISPLEASURE.

B. EREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY; HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT PLACES SIGNIFICANT CONTROLS ON THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. THE GOVERNMENT PROMULGATED REGULATIONS IN DECEMBER 1995 THAT ELIMINATED THE PERMIT REQUIREMENTS FOR SOME TYPES OF PUBLIC MEETINGS. A REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY THE POLICE REMAINED FOR MOST OTHERS, AND IN PRACTICE NUMEROUS PUBLIC MEETINGS CONTINUED TO BE PREVENTED OR BROKEN UP.

IN AN EFFORT TO CONTROL NGO'S, UNRECOGNIZED POLITICAL GROUPS, AND SOME STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF

THE JULY 27, 1996 INCIDENT AND IN THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION AND AFTERWARDS, THE GOVERNMENT PREVENTED OR BROKE UP NUMEROUS MEETINGS, SEMINARS, AND OTHER PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS, AND PUBLIC GATHERINGS, ALTHOUGH IT ALLOWED OTHERS TO OCCUR. IN NOVEMBER 1996, HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS MADE PUBLIC THREATS TO TAKE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST SELECTED NGO'S DEEMED TO BE "TROUBLE-MAKING." SEVERAL OF THOSE GROUPS, SPECIFICALLY THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) AND ITS AFFILIATES WERE BANNED BY THE GOVERNMENT ON SEPTEMBER 29, AND THE

AUTHORITIES USED CLOSE MONITORING TO INTIMIDATE OTHER NGO'S, WHICH NONETHELESS CONTINUED TO OPERATE.

ON MARCH 13, THE POLICE IN JAKARTA BROKE UP A SEMINAR FOCUSED ON THE UPCOMING GENERAL ELECTION JOINTLY SPONSORED BY A STUDENT GROUP, SEVERAL NGO'S, AND THE INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE. THE GROUPS SAID PUBLICLY THAT THEY HAD NOTIFIED THE POLICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH RELEVANT REGULATIONS, BUT THE AUTHORITIES STILL REFUSED TO ALLOW THE EVENT TO PROCEED.

ON APRIL 11, SECURITY FORCES IN MEDAN, NORTH SUMATRA STOPPED AN NGO SEMINAR ON ADVOCACY TRAINING FOR AGRARIAN AFFAIRS DURING ITS SECOND DAY. THE SEMINAR HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO RUN FOR 5 DAYS. IN JUNE A MEETING BRINGING TOGETHER NGO'S IN PANDA ACEH WAS CANCELED BY THE AUTHORITIES ON THE DAY IT WAS TO BEGIN.

AN EVENING DISCUSSION SPONSORED BY STUDENT GROUPS HELD THE DAY BEFORE THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1996 "JULY 27 INCIDENT" WAS BROKEN UP AND FIVE STUDENTS WERE INTERROGATED.

ON JULY 29, POLICE IN THE LAMPUNG PROVINCE OF SUMATRA BROKE UP A TRAINING SESSION HELD BY THE UNRECOGNIZED LABOR FEDERATION, THE INDONESIAN PROSPERITY TRADE UNION (SBSI) THE SESSION WAS IN ITS THIRD DAY OF A 10-DAY SCHEDULE WHEN THE POLICE SHUT IT DOWN. TWENTY-SIX SBSI MEMBERS WERE ARRESTED, AND THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT SOME OF THEM WERE BEATEN WHILE IN DETENTION.

ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO GRANT OFFICIAL

RECOGNITION TO THE INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE, IT ALLOWED THE KIPP TO CARRY OUT LIMITED, YET SIGNIFICANT, MONITORING ACTIVITIES DURING THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO PERMITTED THE KIPP TO HOLD

PRESS CONFERENCES IN JAKARTA EVALUATING THE ELECTION AND TO ISSUE A PUBLIC REPORT WITH ITS FINDINGS, WHICH OUTLINED MANY FLAWS IN THE ELECTION.

HOWEVER, THERE WERE ALSO INSTANCES WHERE THE KIPP WAS SUBJECTED TO SERIOUS RESTRICTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, ON APRIL 7, THE POLICE IN SOUTH SULAWESI CANCELED A PROGRAM ORGANIZED BY THE LOCAL KIPP CHAPTER DESIGNED TO TRAIN VOLUNTEER ELECTION MONITORS EVEN THOUGH THE PROGRAM ORGANIZERS HAD NOTIFIED THE POLICE. THE KIPP WAS UNABLE TO FUNCTION IN ACEH, DUE TO PRESSURES AGAINST IT. AN APRIL DISCUSSION THERE SPONSORED BY THE KIPP WAS CANCELED BY THE AUTHORITIES.

SECURITY FORCES DETAINED 24 STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS AT GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY IN YOGYAKARTA ON APRIL 1. THE POLICE ACCUSED THE STUDENTS OF CALLING FOR AN ELECTION BOYCOTT. ON APRIL 2, EIGHT STUDENTS WERE VIOLENTLY ARRESTED DURING A SECOND DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH THEY CALLED FOR THE RELEASE OF THE FIRST GROUP. ALL 32 WERE RELEASED ON APRIL 3. ON MARCH 11, THREE STUDENT ACTIVISTS WERE REPORTEDLY ARRESTED IN JAKARTA BECAUSE THEY WERE ALLEGEDLY ATTEMPTING TO CALL FOR AN ELECTION BOYCOTT BY PUTTING UP POSTERS AND WRITING GRAFFITI.

SECURITY FORCES VIOLENTLY DISPERSED A PEACEFUL GATHERING

OF SUPPORTERS OF MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI IN BALI IN APRIL, ASSAULTED A GROUP OF DEMONSTRATORS FOLLOWING THE SENTENCING OF PRD ACTIVISTS IN APRIL, AND ATTACKED A GROUP OF STUDENTS AT THE INDONESIAN CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY CAMPUS IN JAKARTA IN JUNE (SEE SECTION L.C.). ON SEPTEMBER 19, SECURITY FORCES STOPPED A CONGRESS HELD BY THE SBSI IN JAKARTA. IT WAS THE FIRST DAY OF A PLANNED 3-DAY SCHEDULE. EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS'S ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITTEE, TWO AUSTRALIAN TRADE UNIONISTS, AND TWO DUTCH JOURNALISTS WERE DETAINED OVERNIGHT. SECURITY FORCES BROKE UP A YEAR-END CELEBRATION GATHERING AT THE EBSI HEADQUARTERS ON DECEMBER 27. THE SECURITY FORCES CLAIMED THAT THE SBSI HAD NOT OBTAINED THE NECESSARY PERMIT, AND 2V PEOPLE WERE DETAINED. MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS, RECORDINGS OF LABOR SONGS, SBST ARCHIVES, BANNERS, PHOTOS, AND PARTICIPANTS BELONGINGS WERE CONFISCATED.

SECURITY FORCES IN JAKARTA MOBILIZED ON JULY 27 TO PREVENT

SUPPORTERS OF MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI FROM CARRYING OUT WHAT

WAS SUPPOSED TO BE A COMMEMORATION OF THE 1996 "JULY 27 INCIDENT11 AT THE PDI'S FORMER HEADQUARTERS. SEVERAL SMALLER GROUPS WERE ABLE TO APPROACH THE HEADQUARTERS WHERE THEY PEACEABLY CONDUCTED GROUP PRAYERS SURROUNDED SECURITY FORCES. SEVERAL THOUSAND SUPPORTERS OF MEGAWATI WERE PERMITTED TO RALLY ON THE STREET IN FRONT OF THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT ON APRIL 15. SEVERAL HUNDRED POLICE OFFICERS ON THE SCENE PREVENTED ACCESS TO PARLIAMENT GROUNDS, BUT TOOK NO ACTION TO STOP THE GATHERING.

AN NGO-SPONSORED SEMINAR ON EAST TIMOR WAS HELD IN JAKARTA

ON SEPTEMBER 12 WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE. A PUBLIC DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT AND NGO'S WAS HELD ON SEPTEMBER 8.

FATHER ROMO IGNATIUS SANDYAWAN SUMARDI AND HIS BROTHER WERE BROUGHT TO TRIAL IN BEKASI, WEST JAVA IN OCTOBER. HE WAS ACCUSED OF HARBORING THREE POLITICAL DISSIDENTS INCLUDING PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) LEADER BUDIMAN SUDJATMIKO AND TWO OF HIS LIEUTENANTS DURING THE MANHUNT FOR THEM THAT TOOK PLACE IN AUGUST 1996. THE AUTHORITIES STATED THAT THEY BLOCKED FATHER SANDYAWAN FROM SEEKING NEEDED MEDICAL TREATMENT ABROAD BECAUSE OF THE INVESTIGATION LAUNCHED IN AUGUST 1996.

ON DECEMBER 10, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS PLANNED TO MARK HUMAN RIGHTS DAY. THE MILITARY BLOCKED SOME BUT PERMITTED OTHERS.

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION; HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT PLACES SIGNIFICANT CONTROLS ON THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. THE 1985 SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW (ORMAS) REQUIRES THE ADHERENCE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, TO THE OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA. THIS PROVISION, WHICH LIMITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD AS DESIGNED TO INHIBIT ACTIVITIES OF GROUPS SEEKING TO ENGAGE IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL COMPETITION, MAKE INDONESIA AN

ISLAMIC STATE, REVIVE COMMUNISM, OR RETURN THE COUNTRY TO A SITUATION OF PARTISAN IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION. IT EMPOWERS THE GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND ANY ORGANIZATION IT BELIEVES TO BE ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA AND REQUIRES PRIOR GOVERNMENT

APPROVAL FOR ANY ORGANIZATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS FROM FOREIGN DONORS. NEVERTHELESS, NUMEROUS ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INDEPENDENT LABOR ORGANIZATION, THE SBSI,

AND THE KIPP, WERE ACTIVE WITHOUT OFFICIAL RECOGNITION UNDER THIS LAW.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR MEMBERS OF FIVE ACCEPTED RELIGIONS AND BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD. THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES ISLAM, CATHOLICISM, PROTESTANTISM, BUDDHISM, AND HINDUISM, AND PERMITS THE PRACTICE OF THE MYSTICAL, TRADITIONAL BELIEFS OF "ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN." ALTHOUGH THE POPULATION IS OVER 85 PERCENT MUSLIM, THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS ARE GENERALLY RESPECTED, AND THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES MUTUAL TOLERANCE AND HARMONY AMONG THEM. HOWEVER, SOME RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY, INCLUDING UNRECOGNIZED RELIGIONS, EXIST.

BECAUSE THE FIRST TENET OF PANCASILA IS BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD, ATHEISM IS FORBIDDEN. ALTHOUGH INDIVIDUALS ARE NOT COMPELLED TO PRACTICE ANY PARTICULAR FAITH, ALL CITIZENS MUST CHOOSE ONE OF THE FIVE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS. AS THIS CHOICE MUST BE NOTED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS THE IDENTIFICATION CARD, FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A RELIGION CAN MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN SUCH DOCUMENTS. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA EXTENDS TO ALL RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS. THE

GOVERNMENT STRONGLY OPPOSES MUSLIM GROUPS THAT ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ACKNOWLEDGING ONLY ISLAMIC LAW. THE GOVERNMENT BANNED SOME RELIGIONS, INCLUDING JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, BAHA'I, CONFUCIANISM AND IN SOME PROVINCES THE MESSIANIC ISLAMIC SECT DARUL ARGAM. THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY MONITORS ISLAMIC SECTS CONSIDERED IN DANGER OF DEVIATING FROM ORTHODOX TENETS, AND IN THE PAST HAS ON OCCASION DISSOLVED SUCH GROUPS.

HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND EMPHASIZE BY EXAMPLE THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECT FOR RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY. LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, WERE FREQUENTLY ALLEGED TO BE RELUCTANT TO FACILITATE AND PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES.

A L9G9 REGULATION DICTATES THAT BEFORE A HOUSE OF WORSHIP CAN BE BUILT, AGREEMENT MUST BE OBTAINED FROM LOCAL RESIDENTS LIVING NEAR THE SITE AND A LICENSE MUST BE

OBTAINED FROM THE REGIONAL OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF RELIGION. SOME CHRISTIANS CLAIM THAT THIS REGULATION IS BEING USED TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST THEM AND TO PREVENT THEM FROM BUILDING CHURCHES. DESPITE THE PROBLEMS, THE BUILDING OF CHURCHES CONTINUES.

THE LAW ALLOWS CONVERSION BETWEEN FAITHS, AND SUCH CONVERSIONS OCCUR. INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS NOTE THAT INTERFAITH MARRIAGE BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND NON-MUSLIMS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT. PEOPLE FROM RELIGIONS OUTSIDE THE FIVE ACCEPTED RELIGIONS HAVE DIFFICULTY HAVING THEIR MARRIAGE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED. THERE WAS ONE

PROMINENT CASE OF A CONFUCIAN COUPLE THAT WAS PROHIBITED FROM GETTING MARRIED.

THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS PROSELYTIZING BY RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS

IN AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ANOTHER RECOGNIZED RELIGION AS POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND DISCOURAGES IT. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED, ALTHOUGH IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, AND OCCASIONALLY ELSEWHERE MISSIONARIES HAVE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES AND DELAYS IN RENEWING RESIDENCE PERMITS, AND VISAS ALLOWING THE ENTRANCE OF NEW FOREIGN CLERGY ARE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. LAWS AND DECREES FROM THE 1970'S LIMIT THE NUMBER OF YEARS THAT FOREIGN MISSIONARIES CAN SPEND IN INDONESIA, WITH SOME EXTENSIONS GRANTED IN REMOTE AREAS LIKE IRIAN JAYA. FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK IS SUBJECT TO THE FUNDING STIPULATIONS OF THE ORMAS LAW. CITIZENS PRACTICING THE RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS MAINTAIN ACTIVE LINKS WITH CORELIGIONISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY AND TRAVEL ABROAD FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

ALTHOUGH IN 1993 THE GOVERNMENT DRASTICALLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BARRED EITHER FROM ENTERING OR DEPARTING INDONESIA FROM A PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED FIGURE OF 8,897 "BLACKLISTED" PEOPLE TO A FEW HUNDRED, SUCH RESTRICTIONS STILL EXIST. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO RESTRICTS MOVEMENT BY CITIZENS AND FOREIGNERS TO AND WITHIN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. IN ADDITION, IT REQUIRES PERMITS TO SEEK WORK IN A NEW LOCATION IN CERTAIN AREAS, PRIMARILY TO CONTROL

FURTHER POPULATION MOVEMENT TO CROWDED CITIES. SPECIAL PERMITS ARE REQUIRED TO VISIT CERTAIN PARTS OF IRIAN JAYA.

THE AUTHORITIES REQUIRE FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, TO GIVE NOTICE OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND TO HAVE OFFICIAL PERMISSION TO CHANGE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE (SEE SECTION L.F.)

AUTHORITIES CARRIED OUT OPERATIONS TO INVESTIGATE CITIZENS' IDENTIFICATION CARDS (KTP), INCLUDING STOPPING MOTORISTS AND RAIDING ENTERTAINMENT SITES. ON JULY 15, IN WEST JAKARTA POLICE REPORTEDLY CHECKED THE DOCUMENTS OF

3,000 PEOPLE AND FINED MANY FOR NOT HAVING PROPER PERMISSION TO BE IN JAKARTA. TEGUH SUNARTO WAS DETAINED DURING A SIMILAR OPERATION IN SURABAYA FOR NOT HAVING HIS IDENTIFICATION CARD. HE WAS MISTREATED AND DIED AFTER HIS RELEASE FROM DETENTION (SEE SECTION L.A.).

THE GOVERNMENT BLOCKED THE OVERSEAS TRAVEL OF SOME POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, SOME OF WHOM WERE SEEKING MEDICAL TREATMENT. TMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES AT THE AIRPORT IN JAKARTA ON APRIL 10 STOPPED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHER ROMO SANDYAWAN SOEMARDI FROM LEAVING INDONESIA TO UNDERGO EYE SURGERY IN PERTH, AUSTRALIA. HE HAD BEEN QUESTIONED IN AUGUST 1996 IN CONNECTION WITH THE CASES AGAINST THE PRD. THE JAKARTA ADMINISTRATIVE COURT ON JANUARY 28 UPHELD THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DECISION TO IMPOSE A 1-YEAR TRAVEL BAN ON SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS ON APRIL 18, 1996. IT WAS THE SECOND 1-YEAR BAN. THE GOVERNMENT INITIALLY REFUSED DETAINED, INDEPENDENT LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR

PAKPAHAN'S REQUEST TO RECEIVE OVERSEAS MEDICAL EVALUATION AND TREATMENT. IN DECEMBER THE GOVERNMENT PERMITTED A TEAM OF CANADIAN DOCTORS TO EXAMINE PAKPAHAN. ALREADY SERVING A PRISON SENTENCE STEMMING FROM A 1994 CONVICTION, HE WAS BEING TRIED FOR SUBVERSION. THE TRIAL HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED DUE TO PAKPAHAN'S NEED FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT, AND IT WAS AT THAT POINT WHILE HE WAS STILL IN THE HOSPITAL THAT HE HAD SOUGHT PERMISSION TO OBTAIN TREATMENT OVERSEAS.

THE GOVERNMENT'S 1996 CLOSURE OF CERTAIN AREAS OF IRIAN JAYA'S CENTRAL HIGHLANDS TO NONRESIDENTS CONTINUED INTO 199V. THE AREAS HAD BEEN CLOSED DUE TO THE MILITARY'S SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SEPARATIST FREE PAPUA ORGANIZATION (OPH), THE GROUP THAT CARRIED OUT KILLINGS AND KIDNAPINGS IN 1996. EXCEPTIONS WERE MADE DURING THE CLOSURE OF THESE AREAS, INCLUDING FOR SOME RELIGIOUS

PERSONNEL. INFORMATION WAS DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN DUE TO THE RESTRICTIONS. HOWEVER, CREDIBLE SOURCES ASSERTED THAT SECURITY FORCES WERE OCCUPYING VILLAGES IN THE HIGHLANDS, EXERCISING TIGHT CONTROL OVER VILLAGERS' MOVEMENTS, AND

FORCING THEM TO PERFORM UNCOMPENSATED LABOR DURING THE RESTRICTION PERIOD. THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT IN LATE 1996 SECURITY FORCES HAD MISTREATED LOCAL RESIDENTS IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA, INCLUDING BEATINGS AND HARSH INTERROGATION, DESTRUCTION OF HOMES AND CROPS, AND SEXUAL ABUSE, AND THAT IN JANUARY SECURITY FORCES BURNED HUTS IN ONE VILLAGE. ACCORDING TO RELIABLE REPORTS, THE MILITARY CARRIED OUT FORCED MOVEMENTS AND HARASSMENT OF VILLAGERS IN LATE 1997, WHICH EXACERBATED FOOD SHORTAGES IN SOME

INSTANCES. THE MILITARY DENIED THAT IT WAS RESTRICTING VILLAGERS' MOVEMENTS OR COMMITTING ABUSES, AND ASSERTED THAT THE OPM WAS INTIMIDATING VILLAGERS.

IN PAST YEARS, THE GOVERNMENT OFFERED FIRST ASYLUM TO OVER 125,000 INDOCHINESE BOAT PEOPLE. INDONESIA'S GALANG ISLAND CAMP WAS CLOSED IN 1996 AS THE LAST REMAINING ASYLUM SEEKERS WERE REPATRIATED. THERE REMAIN, HOWEVER, SOME 14 PERSONS AWAITING A RESETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITY IN ANOTHER COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT FORMULATED A POLICY REGARDING ASYLUM SEEKERS OF OTHER NATIONALITIES, BUT IT HAS IN PRACTICE RESPECTED THE PRINCIPLE OF NOT RETURNING ASYLUM SEEKERS TO THE COUNTRY FROM WHICH THEY HAD FLED. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF THE FORCED RETURN OF PERSONS TO A COUNTRY WHERE THEY FEARED PERSECUTION.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

CITIZENS DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEMOCRATIC MEANS. THERE HAS NEVER BEEN AN ELECTORAL CHALLENGE TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO. THE 1,000-MEMBER PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) IS CONSTITUTIONALLY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY OF THE STATE. IT MEETS EVERY 5 YEARS TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AND TO SET THE BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY. THE MPR IS EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND HIS GOVERNMENT. FIVE HUNDRED MEMBERS OF THE MPR COME FROM THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR), 425 OF WHOSE MEMBERS WERE ELECTED IN THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION (UP FROM 400 ELECTED MEMBERS IN 1992). THE REMAINING 75 MEMBERS ARE

MILITARY APPOINTEES. IN 1993 THE MPR ELECTED SOEHARTO TO

HIS SIXTH UNCONTESTED 5-YEAR TERM AS PRESIDENT. LEGALLY THE PRESIDENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SUBORDINATE TO THE MPR, BUT ACTUALLY HE AND A SMALL GROUP OF ASSOCIATES EXERCISE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.

UNDER A DOCTRINE KNOWN AS DUAL FUNCTION, THE MILITARY ASSUMES A SIGNIFICANT SOCIOPOLITICAL AS WELL AS A SECURITY ROLE. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARE ALLOTTED VS UNELECTED SEATS IN THE DPR, IN PARTIAL COMPENSATION FOR NOT BEING PERMITTED TO VOTE. THE MILITARY HOLDS AN UNELECTED 20 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT PARLIAMENTS, AND OCCUPIES NUMEROUS KEY POSITIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION. THE OTHER 85 PERCENT OF NATIONAL AND 80 PERCENT OF LOCAL PARLIAMENTARY SEATS ARE FILLED THROUGH ELECTIONS HELD EVERY 5 YEARS. ALL ADULT CITIZENS, EXCEPT ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, CONVICTED CRIMINALS SERVING PRISON SENTENCES, AND SOME 36,000 FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI, ARE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE. VOTERS CHOOSE BY SECRET BALLOT BETWEEN THE THREE GOVERNMENT-APPROVED POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH FIELD CANDIDATE LISTS IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT. THOSE LISTS MUST BE SCREENED BY BAKORSTANAS, WHICH DETERMINES WHETHER CANDIDATES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP OR POSE OTHER BROADLY DEFINED SECURITY RISKS. CRITICS CHARGE THAT THESE SCREENINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, SINCE THERE IS NO WAY TO APPEAL THE RESULTS, AND NOTE THAT THEY CAN BE USED TO ELIMINATE CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM PARLIAMENT. STRICT RULES ESTABLISH THE LENGTH OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC MEDIA, SCHEDULES FOR PUBLIC

APPEARANCES, AND THE POLITICAL SYMBOLS THAT CAN BE USED.

THE GOVERNMENT FORMALLY PERMITS ONLY THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EXIST AND CONTEST ELECTIONS. THE LARGEST AND MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS GOLKAR, A GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ORGANIZATION OF DIVERSE FUNCTIONAL GROUPS. THE PRESIDENT STRONGLY INFLUENCES THE SELECTION OF THE LEADERS OF GOLKAR, OF WHICH HE IS THE SENIOR LEADER. GOLKAR MAINTAINS CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH THE ARMED FORCES AND KORPRI, THE ASSOCIATION TO WHICH ALL CIVIL SERVANTS AUTOMATICALLY BELONG. CIVIL SERVANTS MAY JOIN ANY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WITH OFFICIAL PERMISSION, BUT THEY ARE IN PRACTICE COMPELLED TO SUPPORT GOLKAR. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKT AND SOME OTHER BANNED PARTIES MAY NOT RUN FOR OFFICE OR BE ACTIVE POLITICALLY.

THE OTHER TWO SMALL, LEGAL, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI), ARE NOT CONSIDERED OPPOSITION PARTIES, AND, ALONG WITH GOLKAR, ARE REQUIRED BY LAW TO EMBRACE THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA. THESE SMALLER PARTIES ARE NOT PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN PARTY OFFICES BELOW THE DISTRICT LEVEL, PLACING THEM AT A DISADVANTAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED GOLKAR, WHICH HAS OFFICES AT THE DISTRICT AND LOWER ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES CLOSELY SCRUTINIZE AND OFTEN GUIDE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, MANY SERVING PARLIAMENTARIANS AS WELL AS POTENTIAL NEW CANDIDATES FROM THE PDI WERE NOT PERMITTED TO RUN IN THE MAY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION AFTER THE GOVERNMENT IN JUNE 1996 ENGINEERED THE OUSTER OF THE

POPULAR LEADER OF THE PDI, MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI. SHE HAD BECOME THE SUBJECT OF PUBLIC SPECULATION AS A POSSIBLE CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT IN 1998. MEMBERS OF THE DPR AND THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES MAY BE RECALLED FROM OFFICE BY PARTY LEADERS. AN OUTSPOKEN DPR MEMBER FROM THE ABRI FACTION, MAJOR GENERAL THEO SYAFEI, WAS REMOVED FROM THE HOUSE PRIOR TO THE MAY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION. ALTHOUGH MEMBERS OF THE ABRI FACTION IN THE DPR CAN BE REPLACED AT

ANY TIME AT THE BEHEST OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND ARE THUS NOT TECHNICALLY SUBJECT TO RECALL, THE TIMING OF SYAFEI'S DISMISSAL WAS CONSIDERED UNUSUAL. IT OCCURRED SOON AFTER HE HAD PUBLICLY EMPHASIZED THAT VOTERS HAD THE RIGHT TO VOID THEIR BALLOTS BY MARKING THE SYMBOLS FOR ALL THREE POLITICAL PARTIES.

THE MAY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, IN LINE WITH THE PREVIOUS FIVE ELECTIONS HELD SINCE L97L, DENIED CITIZENS THE RIGH;B TO CHANGE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT DEMOCRATICALLY. THE RULING GOLKAR PARTY SECURED ITS LARGEST ELECTORAL VICTORY EVER WITH MORE THAN 74 PERCENT OF THE VOTE; THE PPP RECEIVED APPROXIMATELY 22 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, AND THE PDI JUST OVER 3 PERCENT. GOVERNMENT-OUSTED PDI LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND HER SUPPORTERS WERE NOT PERMITTED TO TAKE PART IN THE ELECTION, A FACTOR THAT MANY INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS PUBLICLY CONCLUDED LED TO THE DROP IN THE PDI'S VOTE SHARE FROM THE L7 PERCENT LEVEL IT OBTAINED IN THE PREVIOUS ELECTION.

SPORADIC, YET SIGNIFICANT, VIOLENCE OCCURRED DURING THE 27-DAY CAMPAIGN PERIOD THAT PRECEDED THE VOTE, INCLUDING

CLASHES BETWEEN AND AMONG POLITICAL CONTESTANTS, BETWEEN POLITICAL CONTESTANTS AND SECURITY FORCES, AND GENERAL RIOTING. MOST OF THE HUNDREDS OF DEATHS DURING THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD HAPPENED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENTS DURING THE MASSIVE STREET RALLIES. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES, 123 PERSONS DIED IN BANJARMASIN, SOUTH KALIMANTAN ON MAY 23, THE LAST DAY OF THE CAMPAIGN, DURING A FIRE THAT BROKE OUT IN A DEPARTMENT STORE AMIDST MAJOR RIOTING AND LOOTING. IN ADDITION, NUMEROUS INJURIES RESULTED FROM CLASHES BEFORE, AND, IN SOME PLACES, AFTER THE ELECTION. MANY OBSERVERS CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS THE MOST VIOLENT CAMPAIGN EVER. THE GOVERNMENT SUCCEEDED IN RESTRICTING THE CONTENT AND STRUCTURE OF THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION, PERHAPS EVEN MORE SO THAN IN PAST YEARS. HOWEVER, DESPITE NEW RULES DESIGNED TO STOP THE STREET RALLIES THAT HAD BEEN PREVALENT IN PREVIOUS CAMPAIGNS, AND NUMEROUS HIGH LEVEL PUBLIC WARNINGS TO ABIDE BY THESE RULES, LARGE

RALLIES WERE REPEATEDLY CARRIED OUT BY GOLKAR, THE PPP, AND, TO A FAR LESSER EXTENT, BY THE PDI.

IN THE MIDST OF THE CAMPAIGN, THE GOVERNMENT BANNED ALL MATERIALS SUPPORTING AN EMBRYONIC ALLIANCE BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP). IN THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE ELECTION, THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THROUGH A SERIES OF BLUNT PRONOUNCEMENTS STRONGLY URGED CITIZENS TO IGNORE THE FEW, MOSTLY INDIRECT, CALLS THAT WERE MADE TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTION. THE GOVERNMENT REPEATEDLY MADE IT KNOWN THAT SUCH CALLS WERE ILLEGAL, THROUGH PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THE ARRESTS OF THOSE WHO ADVOCATED A BOYCOTT, INCLUDING PUBLIC FIGURE

SUCH AS SRI BINTANG AND STUDENTS WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY DISTRIBUTING LEAFLETS CALLING FOR A BOYCOTT. A FEW STUDENT AND CHURCH GROUPS THAT ALSO INDIRECTLY CALLED FOR AN ELECTION BOYCOTT WERE NOT AFFECTED.

THE ELECTION AND CAMPAIGN WERE MARRED BY NUMEROUS, CREDIBLE CHARGES OF FRAUD AND OTHER VIOLATIONS, MOSTLY COMMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND GOLKAR, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE ALSO SOME CAMPAIGN VIOLATIONS BY THE PPP AND THE PDI. THE REPORTS OF FRAUD AND OTHER VIOLATIONS INCLUDED DOUBLE VOTING BY MEMBERS OF GOLKAR, GOVERNMENT INTIMIDATION OF PPP AND PDI POLL WITNESSES, AND IMPROPER SUPERVISION OF THE VOTE COUNTING. IN A FEW DISTRICTS IN EAST JAVA, THE COMPLAINTS OF LARGE-SCALE VOTE FRAUD RESULTED IN

DESTRUCTIVE RIOTING, FORCING THE AUTHORITIES TO CARRY OUT A RE-VOTE BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO OFFICIALS, BALLOT BOXES WERE DESTROYED. AFTER THE ELECTION WAS OVER, THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMED TO HAVE DISCOVERED THAT 64,000 VOTES HAD BEEN MISCOUNTED, GIVING ONE MORE PARLIAMENTARY SEAT TO PDI.

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT, PARLIAMENT, ELECTION CONTESTANTS, AND PUBLIC LEADERS TO CONDUCT AN OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTION. THE GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC DISCUSSION FOCUSED MOSTLY ON

IMPROVING THE TECHNIQUES OF CAMPAIGNING RATHER THAN ON THE UNDERLYING FACTORS THAT LED TO PROBLEMS DURING THE ELECTION. THE GOVERNMENT SAID THAT IT WOULD INVESTIGATE THE REPORTS OF CAMPAIGN VIOLATIONS FORWARDED BY ALL THREE ELECTION CONTESTANTS, BUT PROMISED NO RESULTS UNTIL 1998.

THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) CONSIDERS BILLS PRESENTED TO IT BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES BUT DOES NOT DRAFT LAWS ON ITS OWN, ALTHOUGH IT HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO DO SO. DURING A 5-YEAR TERM ENDING IN OCTOBER, THE DPR CONSIDERED AND PASSED OVER 70 PIECES OF LEGISLATION, INCLUDING ONE BILL TWO TIMES. IN AN UNPRECEDENTED AND POSSIBLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MOVE, THE PRESIDENT RETURNED A BROADCASTING BILL ALREADY APPROVED BY THE PARLIAMENT FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REVISION. THE DPR DOES MAKE TECHNICAL, AND OCCASIONALLY SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS TO BILLS IT REVIEWS. THERE WERE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT THE DPR WAS TO A LIMITED EXTENT ABLE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES TO BILLS THAT REFLECTED THE INTERESTS EXPRESSED BY OUTSIDE GROUPS. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY APPARENT WITH REGARD TO THE MANPOWER BILL (SEE SECTION 6). HOWEVER, THERE WAS PUBLIC CRITICISM AFTER REPORTS THAT THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER USED $1.3 MILLION FROM THE GOVERNMENT-MANDATED WORKERS SOCIAL INSURANCE FUND (JAMSOSTEK) TO FACILITATE PASSAGE IN PARLIAMENT OF THE MANPOWER BILL.

WHILE THE DPR REMAINS CLEARLY SUBORDINATE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, IT HAS BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN SCRUTINIZING GOVERNMENT POLICY, AND IN EXERCISING OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH HEARINGS AT WHICH MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, MILITARY COMMANDERS, AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS ARE ASKED TO TESTIFY. THE DPP ALSO HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY A

FOCAL POINT OF APPEALS AND PETITIONS FROM STUDENTS,

WORKERS, DISPLACED FARMERS, AND OTHERS CHARGING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND AIRING OTHER GRIEVANCES. IT RARELY IS THE SOURCE OF ANY RELIEF TO PETITIONERS OTHER THAN PROVIDING A CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH THEIR COMPLAINTS CAN BE AIRED.

WHILE THERE ARE NO LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN POLITICS, THEY ARE UNDERREPRESENTED IN GOVERNMENT. THE MAY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION REPRESENTED A STEP BACKWARDS FOR WOMEN IN TERMS OF REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT, WITH THEIR PERCENTAGE FALLING FROM 12 PERCENT TO 9 PERCENT OF SEATS. IN THE CABINET, 2 OF 41 MINISTERS ARE WOMEN.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

GOVERNMENT PRESSURE ON DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER NGO'S THAT BEGAN AFTER THE JULY 27 1996 VIOLENCE CONTINUED IN THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION (SEE SECTION 2.A.)

NGO'S FACED GOVERNMENT HARASSMENT, INCLUDING POLICE RAIDS ON THEIR OFFICES SURVEILLANCE BY POLICE OR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, INTERROGATION AT POLICE STATIONS, OR CANCELLATION OF PRIVATE MEETINGS. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AS IN 1996, PUBLICLY THREATENED TO TAKE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST SOME NGQ'S.

THE GOVERNMENT REITERATED ITS REJECTION OF A PROPOSAL BY THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO OPEN AN

OFFICE IN JAKARTA THAT WOULD HAVE THE CAPACITY TO MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS. THE GOVERNMENT HAD INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO PERMIT AN OFFICE TO OPEN IN JAKARTA IF ITS

MISSION WERE RESTRICTED TO TECHNICAL OPERATIONS, SUCH AS CONDUCTING SEMINARS WITHOUT ANY MONITORING FUNCTION.

THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS OR FOREIGN-BASED CRITICISM OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IT EMPHASIZES ITS BELIEF THAT LINKING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE OR OTHER SANCTIONS RELATED TO ITS HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND IS THEREFORE UNACCEPTABLE. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT

ARTICULATE A CLEAR PUBLIC POLICY ON WHETHER IT WOULD INVITE OR ALLOW FOREIGNERS TO MONITOR THE MAY GENERAL ELECTION, TWO INTERNATIONAL GROUPS DID OBSERVE THE ELECTION ON A LIMITED BASIS.

THE ICRG CONTINUED TO OPERATE IN EAST TIMOR. IT ALSO VISITED PRISONERS CONVICTED OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, CONVICTED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, AND EAST TIMORESE AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS OUTSIDE OF EAST TIMOR. HOWEVER, THROUGHOUT THE YEAR IT FACED OBSTACLES AND UNWILLINGNESS TO ALLOW VISITS, INCLUDING CONTINUING SERIOUS DELAYS IN VISITING SOME RECENT OR NEW DETAINEES OR PRISONERS CHARGED WITH SUBVERSION AND DETAINED IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE AFTER THE 1996 "JULY 27 INCIDENT." AFTER AN INITIAL VISIT IN AUGUST 1996, THE ICRC WAS NOT PERMITTED FURTHER VISITS TO THE PRD PRISONERS IN JAKARTA UNTIL THE FOLLOWING JULY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 59 STATE 017237 311814Z

WHILE RECEIVING SUPPORT FOR ITS WORK FROM THE GOVERNMENT IN PRINCIPLE, THE ICRC PERIODICALLY FACED DIFFICULTY IN IMPLEMENTING ITS HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM IN EAST TIMOR. COOPERATION WITH LOCAL COMMANDERS IMPROVED FOLLOWING AN ICRO SEMINAR FOR MILITARY OFFICERS HELD IN JAKARTA. PARTICIPANTS IN THE SEMINAR SHOWED IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING AND OPENNESS FOR THE ICRC MISSION AND FREQUENTLY EASED ACCESS TO DETAINEES IN EAST TIMOR. WHILE THE ICRC WAS ABLE TO VISIT THE VAST MAJORITY OF THOSE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DETAINED IN EAST TIMOR, PROBLEMS CONTINUED IN VISITING DETAINEES HELD BY THE MILITARY IN ACEH AND NORTH

SUMATRA. THE ICRC HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO ACEH SINCE MARCH, WHEN MILITARY OPERATIONS TOOK PLACE.

TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR BY FOREIGN HUMAN RIGHTS NGO'S OTHER THAN THE ICRO HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED. DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS ARE ABLE TO VISIT, HOWEVER. ONE FOREIGN NGO WORKER WAS DETAINED IN EAST TIRNOR IN NOVEMBER, DURING WHICH TIME SHE STATED THAT SHE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO CONTACT HER EMBASSY, WHEN SHE PARTICIPATED IN AND PHOTOGRAPHED A CANDLELIGHT VIGIL COMMEMORATING THE 1991 DILI MASSACRE. SHE WAS EXPELLED TO BALI FOLLOWING 10 HOURS OF QUESTIONING.

THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, IN ITS 4TH YEAR OF OPERATION, CONTINUED TO BE ACTIVE IN EXAMINING REPORTED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND CONTINUED

TO SHOW INDEPENDENCE. LACKING ENFORCEMENT POWERS, THE COMMISSION ATTEMPTS TO WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM, SENDING

TEAMS WHERE NECESSARY TO INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS AND EMPLOYING PERSUASION, PUBLICITY, AND MORAL AUTHORITY TO HIGHLIGHT ABUSES, MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGAL AND REGULATORY CHANGES, AND ENCOURAGE CORRECTIVE ACTION.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS TENDED TO IGNORE SOME COMMISSION FINDINGS OR, IN SOME INSTANCES, HAS MOVED LETHARGICALLY IN REACTION TO THEM. IT WAS REPORTED PUBLICLY THAT THE COMMISSION ASKED THE AUTHORITIES TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE. IN SEPTEMBER 1995, THE COMMISSION IDENTIFIED SIX CASES OF ABRI ABUSE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN IRIAN JAYA, INVOLVING A NUMBER OF DEATHS; ONLY ONE WAS EVER BROUGHT TO TRIAL, AND THE COMMISSION REQUESTED FOLLOWUP ACTION IN 1997. THE GOVERNMENT MADE LITTLE PROGRESS IN RESOLVING THE 1996 "JULY 27 INCIDENT." THE GOVERNMENT MOVED SLOWLY IN RESPONSE TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION'S OCTOBER 1996 REPORT ON THE INCIDENT WHICH LISTED 23 PERSONS MISSING, 149 INJURED, AND 5 DEAD, 1 OF WHOM HAD BEEN SHOT. TWO GOVERNMENT MINISTERS PUBLICLY DECLARED THE CASE CLOSED IN AUGUST AND SAID THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MORE PUBLIC

DISCUSSION OF THE INCIDENT. SUPPORTERS OF OUSTED PDI LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI HAD ANNOUNCED IN JUNE THAT 6 OF THE 23 MISSING PERSONS HAD BEEN FOUND, AND THE COMMISSION SAID ON SEPTEMBER 4 THAT THE NUMBER OF MISSING PERSONS WAS DOWN TO 16. THE COMMISSION MET WITH SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN SEPTEMBER WHO REPORTEDLY AGREED THAT THE CASE HAD NOT BEEN SOLVED AND AGREED TO CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR THE REMAINING 16 PERSONS. NO ACTION WAS PROMISED ON THE COMMISSION'S ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATION THAT LEGAL ACTION BE TAKEN AGAINST THOSE WHO TOOK OVER PDI

HEADQUARTERS.

THE COMMISSION OPENED AN EAST TIMOR OFFICE IN JUNE 1996, WHICH WAS WIDELY REGARDED AS A POSITIVE STEP IN THE EFFORT TO ADDRESS AND RESOLVE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES THERE. HOWEVER, MANY OBSERVERS ALSO HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OFFICE BECAUSE OF ITS LOCATION NEXT TO THE LOCAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, ITS RELIANCE ON GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED STAFFING, AND THE FACT THAT IT COULD ONLY RECEIVE COMPLAINTS AND SEND THEM BACK TO JAKARTA, BUT COULD NOT TAKE ACTION ITSELF. THE INITIAL FLOW OF CITIZENS TO THE FACILITY TENDED TO COMPRISE PEOPLE

WHO DID NOT MAKE COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY, OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES, CONVEYING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE LOCAL POPULATION WAS RELUCTANT TO APPROACH THE FACILITY. THE OFFICE LIMITED ITSELF TO DEALING ONLY WITH NONPOLITICAL CASES AND THEREFORE HAD MADE LITTLE IMPACT WITH REGARD TO THE MORE SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN EAST TIMOR. THE COMMISSION HAS BEEN TRYING TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS, BUT BY YEAR'S END THE OFFICE REMAINED INEFFECTIVE.

THE GOVERNMENT APPOINTED THE COMMISSION 5 ORIGINAL CHAIRMAN, WHO THEN APPOINTED THE OTHER 24 COMMISSION MEMBERS. THE COMMISSION FILLS VACANCIES IN ITS RANKS INDEPENDENTLY BY INTERNAL ELECTION. A NEW CHAIRMAN AND FOUR NEW MEMBERS, REPLACING THOSE WHO HAD DIED WHILE IN OFFICE, WERE ELECTED IN THE FALL OF 1996. THE COMMISSION MOVED INTO ITS OWN PERMANENT FACILITIES IN 1996, AND HAS

HIRED SEVERAL PROFESSIONAL STAFF TO SUPPORT ITS 25 MEMBERS

WITH THEIR INVESTIGATIVE AND OTHER SUBSTANTIVE WORK.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EXPLICITLY FORBID DISCRIMINATION BASED ON GENDER, RACE, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS. HOWEVER, IT STIPULATES EQUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL CITIZENS, BOTH NATIVE AND NATURALIZED. THE 1993 GUIDELINES OF STATE POLICY (LEGAL STATUTES ADOPTED BY THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY) EXPLICITLY STATES THAT WOMEN HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN. HOWEVER, THESE GUIDELINES FROM L978, 1983, 1988, AND 1993, ALSO STATE THAT WOMEN S PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS MUST NOT CONFLICT WITH THEIR ROLE IN IMPROVING FAMILY WELFARE AND THE EDUCATION OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION. MARRIAGE LAW DICTATES THAT THE MAN IS THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY. THE CONSTITUTION GRANTS CITIZENS THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE THEIR INDIVIDUAL RELIGION AND BELIEFS; HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT ONLY RECOGNIZES FIVE RELIGIONS AND IMPOSES SOME RESTRICTIONS ON OTHER RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY.

WOMEN

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REMAINS POORLY DOCUMENTED. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SOCIETY, WHICH HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY SOCIAL CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY RAPID URBANIZATION. RAPE BY A HUSBAND OF A WIFE IS NOT CONSIDERED A CRIME UNDER THE LAW. ALTHOUGH WOMEN 5 GROUPS ARE TRYING TO CHANGE THE

LAW, THEY HAVE NOT MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS.

CULTURAL NORMS DICTATE THAT PROBLEMS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE PRIVATE MATTERS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE HOME IS RARELY REPORTED. WHILE POLICE COULD BRING ASSAULT CHARGES AGAINST A HUSBAND FOR BEATING HIS WIFE, DUE TO SOCIAL ATTITUDES, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO DO SO. NONETHELESS, ACCORDING TO RELIABLE SOURCES, THE POLICE HAVE BECOME SOMEWHAT MORE RESPONSIVE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COMPLAINTS.

RAPE IS A PUNISHABLE OFFENSE. MEN HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND SENTENCED FOR RAPE AND ATTEMPTED RAPE ALTHOUGH RELIABLE STATISTICS ARE UNAVAILABLE. THE MAXIMUM PRISON SENTENCE FOR RAPE IS 12 YEARS, BUT OBSERVERS SAY THAT SENTENCES ARE USUALLY MUCH SHORTER. MOB VIOLENCE AGAINST ACCUSED RAPISTS IS FREQUENTLY REPORTED. WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS BELIEVE THAT RAPE IS SERIOUSLY UNDERREPORTED DUE TO THE SOCIAL STIGMA ATTACHED TO THE VICTIM. SOME LEGAL EXPERTS REPORT THAT IF A WOMAN DOES NOT GO IMMEDIATELY TO THE HOSPITAL FOR A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION THAT PRODUCES PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF RAPE, SHE CAN NOT BRING CHARGES. A WITNESS IS ALSO REQUIRED IN ORDER TO BRING CHARGES, AND ONLY IN RARE QASES IS THERE A WITNESS, ACCORDING TO LEGAL EXPERTS. SOME WOMEN REPORTEDLY FAIL TO REPORT RAPE TO POLICE BECAUSE THE POLICE DO NOT TAKE THEIR ALLEGATIONS SERIOUSLY.

THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES SOME COUNSELING FOR ABUSED WOMEN, AND SEVERAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS EXIST TO ASSIST WOMEN. MANY OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS FOCUS ON REUNITING THE FAMILY

RATHER THAN ON PROVIDING PROTECTION TO THE WOMEN INVOLVED. MANY WOMEN RELY ON THE EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEM FOR ASSISTANCE IN CASES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. THERE ARE ONLY A FEW WOMEN'S CRISIS CENTERS IN INDONESIA, INCLUDING A DROP-IN CENTER FOUNDED IN JAKARTA BY THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED NATIONAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION (KOWANI) IN 1996

AND A CRISIS CENTER FOR WOMEN IN YOGYAKARTA RUN BY AN NGO. A NEW CRISIS CENTER FOR WOMEN, "WOMEN'S PARTNER," WHICH OPENED IN JAKARTA IN APRIL, RUNS A 24-HOUR HOT LINE AND A TEMPORARY SHELTER FOR ABUSED WOMEN. TRAINING OF COUNSELORS FOR ANOTHER JAKARTA CRISIS CENTER, CALLED "SPEAK," IS UNDERWAY.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS NOT A CRIME UNDER THE LAW, ONLY INDECENT BEHAVIOR. SEXUAL HARASSMENT CHARGES, HOWEVER, CAN DAMAGE A CIVIL SERVICE CAREER. THE CURRENT LAW REPORTEDLY COVERS PHYSICAL ABUSE ONLY, AND REQUIRES TWO WITNESSES. FEMALE JOB APPLICANTS AND WORKERS HAVE COMPLAINED OF BEING SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED BY FOREMEN AND FACTORY OWNERS.

THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND OF TEMPORARY "CONTRACT MARRIAGES" WITH FOREIGNERS IN CERTAIN AREAS, SUCH AS KALIMANTAN AND SUMATRA, THOUGH THE EXTENT OF THIS PRACTICE IS UNCLEAR. THESE MARRIAGES ARE NOT CONSIDERED LEGAL, AND THE CHILDREN BORN FROM THEM ARE CONSIDERED BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK. PROSTITUTION IS WIDESPREAD. OFFICIAL STATISTICS FROM 1994 REPORT THAT THERE WERE 70,684 PROSTITUTES IN INDONESIA, 9,000 OF WHOM WERE IN JAKARTA.

ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, WOMEN ARE EQUAL TO AND HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN. HOWEVER, IN PRACTICE WOMEN FACE SOME LEGAL DISCRIMINATION. MARRIAGE LAW DICTATES THAT THE MAN IS THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY. MARRIAGE LAW FOR MUSLIMS, BASED ON ISLAMIC LAW, ALLOWS MEN TO HAVE UP TO FOUR WIVES IF THE FIRST WIFE IS UNABLE "TO FULFILL HER TASKS AS A WIFE." PERMISSION OF THE FIRST WIFE IS REQUIRED, BUT REPORTEDLY MOST WOMEN CANNOT REFUSE. CIVIL SERVANTS AND MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES WHO WISH TO MARRY A SECOND WOMAN MUST ALSO HAVE PERMISSION FROM THEIR SUPERVISORS. TO SET AN EXAMPLE, THE PRESIDENT HAS FORBIDDEN CABINET OFFICIALS AND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS TO HAVE SECOND WIVES. IN DIVORCE CASES WOMEN OFTEN BEAR A HEAVIER EVIDENTIARY BURDEN THAN MEN, ESPECIALLY IN THE ISLAMIC-BASED FAMILY COURT SYSTEM.

ALIMONY IS RARELY RECEIVED BY DIVORCED WOMEN, AND THERE IS NO ENFORCEMENT OF ALIMONY PAYMENT.

THE 1958 CITIZENSHIP LAW STATES THAT CHILDREN'S CITIZENSHIP IS BASED ONLY ON THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE

FATHER. CHILDREN OF CITIZEN MOTHERS AND FOREIGN FATHERS ARE CONSIDERED FOREIGNERS, AND NEED VISAS TO REMAIN IN INDONESIA UNTIL THE AGE OF 18, WHEN THEY CAN APPLY FOR CITIZENSHIP. THEY ARE PROHIBITED FROM ATTENDING INDONESIAN SCHOOLS, AND HAVE TO ATTEND INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS, WHICH ARE EXPENSIVE. THE CASE OF ONE CHILD, THE 5-YEAR-OLD SON OF A FEMALE CITIZEN AND A JAPANESE MAN, ATTRACTED MEDIA ATTENTION IN 1996, AFTER THE CHILD WAS ORDERED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY FOLLOWING THE DIVORCE OF HIS

PARENTS AND THE EXPIRATION OF HIS RESIDENCY VISA. IN L997 THE CHILD RETURNED WITH ANOTHER VISA, BUT BECAUSE HIS MOTHER COULD NOT AFFORD TO KEEP HIM IN AN INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, HE EVENTUALLY WAS SENT TO JAPAN TO LIVE WITH HIS FATHER.

FOREIGN WOMEN MARRIED TO CITIZENS ALSO FACE DIFFICULTIES. THEIR CHILDREN ARE CITIZENS AND THUS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO ATTEND INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS IN INDONESIA. THESE WOMEN ARE USUALLY TAXED AS THE FOREIGN HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE PROPERTY, BUSINESS, OR INHERITANCE RIGHTS. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH DISCUSSION ABOUT PROBLEMS WITH THE CITIZENSHIP LAW, AND NGO'S AND THE GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO AGREE THAT THE LAW NEEDS TO BE REVISED.

ALTHOUGH SOME WOMEN ENJOY A HIGH DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FREEDOM AND OCCUPY IMPORTANT POSITIONS IN BOTH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, THE MAJORITY DO NOT ENJOY SUCH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOMS AND ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTED AT THE LOWER END OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC SCALE. THE 1995 NATIONAL PROFILE OF WOMEN'S POSITIONS AND ROLES SHOWED THAT 37.4 PERCENT OF CIVIL SERVANTS WERE WOMEN, BUT ONLY 5.5 PERCENT WERE IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY.

INCOME DISPARITY BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN DIMINISHES

SIGNIFICANTLY WITH GREATER EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT.
FEMALE WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING GENERALLY RECEIVE LOWER
WAGES THAN MEN. MANY FEMALE FACTORY WORKERS ARE HIRED AS
DAY LABORERS INSTEAD OF AS FULL-TIME PERMANENT EMPLOYEES,
AND COMPANIES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE BENEFITS, SUCH
AS MATERNITY LEAVE, TO DAY LABORERS. WOMENS' RIGHTS

ACTIVISTS REPORT THAT THERE IS A GROWING TREND IN
MANUFACTURING TO HIRE WOMEN TO DO WORK IN THEIR HOMES FOR
LESS THAN THE MINIMUM WAGE. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR WOMEN
ARE APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT HIGHER THAN FOR MEN. WOMEN
ARE OFTEN NOT GIVEN THE EXTRA BENEFITS AND SALARY THAT ARE

THEIR DUE WHEN THEY ARE THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, AND IN SOME
CASES DO NOT RECEIVE EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR THEIR HUSBAND
AND CHILDREN, SUCH AS MEDICAL INSURANCE AND INCOME TAX
DEDUCTIONS.

DESPITE LAWS THAT PROVIDE WOMEN WITH A 3-MONTH MATERNITY
LEAVE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PREGNANT WOMEN
ARE OFTEN DISMISSED OR ARE REPLACED WHILE ON LEAVE. SOME
COMPANIES REQUIRE THAT WOMEN SIGN STATEMENTS THAT THEY
WILL NOT BECOME PREGNANT. THE EMPLOYMENT LAW MANDATES 2
DAYS OF MENSTRUAL LEAVE PER MONTH FOR WOMEN, ALTHOUGH THIS
LEAVE IS NOT ALWAYS ALLOWED. MANY GROUPS COMPLAINED THAT
THE DRAFT MANPOWER BILL WAS VAGUE AND DID NOT SPECIFY THE
LENGTH OF MATERNITY AND MENSTRUAL LEAVE TIME TO WHICH
WOMEN ARE ENTITLED. IT ALSO DID NOT MANDATE THAT
EMPLOYERS GIVE BREAST-FEEDING WOMEN TIME DURING WORK HOURS
TO FEED THEIR BABIES. THE NEW LAW PASSED BY PARLIAMENT ON
SEPTEMBER 12 WAS REVISED TO ONCE AGAIN INCLUDE THESE
RIGHTS. MANY GROUPS HAVE CRITICIZED THE LAW FOR NOT
ADDRESSING SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN
THE WORKPLACE, AND FOR PROVIDING INADEQUATE PROTECTION IN
AREAS OF EMPLOYMENT WHERE WOMEN HAVE REGULARLY SUFFERED
ABUSE, SUCH AS OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSEHOLD SERVICE.
THE LAW IS EXPECTED TO TAKE EFFECT IN OCTOBER 1998.

WOMEN DISPROPORTIONATELY EXPERIENCE ILLITERACY, POOR HEALTH, AND INADEQUATE NUTRITION. THE PRESIDENT CALLED FOR EXPANDED EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE HIGH MATERNAL MORTALITY RATE, WHICH IS 425 PER 100,000 LIVE BIRTHS, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL FIGURES, AND UP TO 650, ACCORDING TO ESTIMATES FROM OTHER SOURCES. THE GOVERNMENT LAUNCHED THE "MOTHER FRIENDLY MOVEMENT" IN DECEMBER 1996 TO ADDRESS MATERNAL MORTALITY, AND IS CURRENTLY EXPANDING ITS SCOPE TO COVER MORE DISTRICTS. ACCORDING TO CURRENT U.N. DATA, TW6-THIRDS OF INDONESIAN WOMEN ARE ANEMIC, AND 24 PERCENT OF WOMEN OF REPRODUCTIVE AGE SUFFER FROM CHRONIC ENERGY DEFICIENCY. WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS HAVE IMPROVED IN THE LAST DECADE. THE NUMBER OF GIRLS GRADUATING FROM HIGH SCHOOL TRIPLED FROM 1980 TO 1990.

A GROWING NUMBER OF NGO'S ARE WORKING TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. THEY HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN GAINING OFFICIAL COGNIZANCE OF WOMEN S CONCERNS. THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CONFERENCES, SEMINARS, AND WORKSHOPS CONNECTED WITH

WOMEN'S ISSUES. MOST WERE SPONSORED BY NGO'S, ALTHOUGH SOME WERE ORGANIZED BY ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS AND BY THE GOVERNMENT. MOST SESSIONS SOUGHT TO RAISE AWARENESS OR PROMOTE ADVOCACY FOR WOMEN.

CHILDREN

THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND WELFARE, BUT IS HAMPERED BY A LACK OF RESOURCES THAT PREVENTS IT FROM TRANSLATING THIS COMMITMENT INTO

PRACTICE. THE GOVERNMENT ALLOCATES ONLY 2.2 PERCENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT TO EDUCATION. A 1979 LAW ON

CHILDREN'S WELFARE DEFINES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE AND PARENTS TO NURTURE AND PROTECT CHILDREN. HOWEVER, THE LAW'S PROVISIONS ON PROTECTION OF CHILDREN HAVE YET TO GO INTO EFFECT BECAUSE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS ARE STILL BEING NEGOTIATED. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE PARTICULAR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PRIMARY EDUCATION AND MATERNITY SERVICES.

LOW COST MEDICAL CARE IS AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH ACCESS AND AVAILABILITY IS SOMETIMES SPORADIC, ESPECIALLY IN RURAL AREAS. MOREOVER, THE GOVERNMENT COMMITS ONLY 0.7 PERCENT OF GNP TO THE HEALTH SECTOR. ACCORDING TO U.N. DATA, 36 PERCENT OF CHILDREN UNDER 5 YEARS OF AGE SUFFER FROM PROTEIN-ENERGY MALNUTRITION, AND 35 PERCENT SUFFER FROM IRON DEFICIENCY.

ALTHOUGH PRIMARY EDUCATION IS IN PRINCIPLE UNIVERSAL, THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF) ESTIMATES THAT MORE THAN 1 MILLION CHILDREN DROP OUT OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EVERY YEAR DUE MAINLY TO THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH EDUCATION AND THE NEED FOR THE CHILDREN TO SUPPLEMENT FAMILY INCOME. A 1994 LAW RAISED COMPULSORY EDUCATION FROM 6 TO 9 YEARS, BUT THE LAW HAS NOT BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED DUE TO INADEQUATE SCHOOL FACILITIES AND THE LACK OF FAMILY FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO SUPPORT CHILDREN STAYING IN SCHOOL. OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL FEES FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, INCLUDING PAYMENTS FOR REGISTRATION, BOOKS, MEALS, TRANSPORT, AND UNIFORMS HAVE RISEN TO PROHIBITIVELY HIGH LEVELS FOR MANY FAMILIES.

ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT STATISTICS, 8 PERCENT OF ALL CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 14 WORK. HALF GO TO SCHOOL AND ALSO WORK, AND HALF WORK EXCLUSIVELY.

UNOFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF WORKING CHILDREN ARE HIGHER. ACCORDING TO THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS, 20,000 STREET CHILDREN LIVE IN JAKARTA. THOUSANDS MORE LIVE IN OTHER CITIES. THEY SELL NEWSPAPERS, SHINE SHOES, HELP TO PARK OR WATCH CARS, AND OTHERWISE ATTEMPT TO EARN MONEY. MANY CHILDREN WORK UNDER HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS AS SCAVENGERS AND

GARBAGE PICKERS, AND ON FISHING PLATFORMS AND FISHING BOATS. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES, THERE ARE SEVERAL THOUSAND CHILDREN WORKING IN HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS ON FISHING PLATFORMS OFF THE EAST COAST OF NORTH SUMATRA (SEE SECTION 6.C.). MANY THOUSANDS WORK IN FACTORIES AND FIELDS (SEE SECTION 6.D.).

STREET CHILDREN AND CHILD LABORERS IN SOME CITIES HAVE BECOME ORGANIZED AND INTERESTED IN PROTECTING THEIR RIGHTS. AT LEAST 30 NGO'S WORK WITH STREET CHILDREN. NGO'S HAVE CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT FOR MAKING INSUFFICIENT AND INADEQUATE EFFORTS TO HELP STREET CHILDREN AND WORKING CHILDREN. THE GOVERNMENT IS WORKING IN COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP), UNICEF, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO), AND WITH NGO'S TO CREATE PROGRAMS FOR STREET CHILDREN AND CHILD LABORERS. ONE PROJECT INCORPORATES MANY IDEAS GENERATED BY THE NGO COMMUNITY, INCLUDING ESTABLISHING "OPEN HOUSES" IN TARGETED AREAS THAT PROVIDE VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND BASIC EDUCATION TO STREET

CHILDREN. EFFORTS HAVE BEEN INITIATED TO START OPEN HOUSES FOR STREET CHILDREN IN SEVEN PROVINCES.

ANOTHER APPROACH TO THE STREET CHILDREN PROBLEM UTILIZES THE NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR DISCIPLINE AND CLEAN CITIES DECREE. THE STREET CHILDREN ARE PHYSICALLY REMOVED FROM CITIES BY BUS. USUALLY, THEY ARE TAKEN OUTSIDE THE CITY AND LEFT THERE. SOMETIMES THEY ARE TAKEN TO "HOLDING HOUSES" WHERE THEY ARE FIRST INTERROGATED AND LATER RELEASED. UNLIKE PAST YEARS, THERE WERE NO REPORTS THAT NGO'S WORKING FOR THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN EXPERIENCED HARASSMENT BY THE AUTHORITIES.

CHILD PROSTITUTION AND OTHER SEXUAL ABUSES OCCUR, BUT FIRM DATA ARE LACKING. WHILE THERE ARE LAWS DESIGNED TO PROTECT CHILDREN FROM INDECENT ACTIVITIES, PROSTITUTION, AND INCEST, THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS.

A SEPARATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR JUVENILES DOES NOT

EXIST. POLICE OFFICIALS ADMIT THAT JUVENILES ARE OFTEN IMPRISONED WITH ADULT OFFENDERS. JUVENILE CRIME IS CURRENTLY HANDLED BY ORDINARY COURTS. A JUVENILE JUSTICE LAW WAS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT IN DECEMBER 1996, AND WAS SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT IN JANUARY. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT COME INTO EFFECT UNTIL ,JANUARY 1998. IT DEFINES JUVENILES AS CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 8 AND 18, AND ESTABLISHES A SPECIAL COURT SYSTEM AND CRIMINAL CODE FOR THEM.

FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM), WHICH IS WIDELY CONDEMNED BY INTERNATIONAL HEALTH EXPERTS AS DAMAGING TO BOTH

PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, IS PRACTICED IN SOME PARTS OF INDONESIA. THE METHOD VARIES DEPENDING ON ETHNIC, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS TRADITION. HOWEVER, THE MOST PREVALENT PRACTICE IS A CEREMONIAL ONE THAT INVOLVES THE PRICKING, SCRAPING, OR TOUCHING OF THE CLITORIS OF A BABY OR YOUNG GIRL, OFTEN WITH THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING SEVERAL DROPS OF BLOOD. SOMETIMES, A PLANT ROOT IS USED SYMBOLICALLY AND THE GIRL IS NOT TOUCHED. A MORE SERIOUS FORM OF FGM INVOLVES THE REMOVAL OF THE TIP OF THE CLITORIS. THIS PRACTICE APPEARS TO BE DECLINING, AND THERE IS DISAGREEMENT ABOUT HOW WIDELY PRACTICED IT IS. IT REPORTEDLY STILL IS PRACTICED IN MADURA, SOUTH SULAWESI, AND OTHER AREAS. SINCE FGM IS NOT REGULATED, AND NO FORMAL POSITION HAS BEEN TAKEN BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS, THE METHOD USED IS OFTEN LEFT UP TO THE INDIVIDUAL LOCAL TRADITIONAL PRACTITIONER. FGM USUALLY TAKES PLACE WITHIN THE FIRST YEAR AFTER BIRTH, OFTEN ON THE 40TH DAY, THOUGH IT IS DONE IN SOME AREAS UP TO AGE 10. IT IS PERFORMED EITHER AT A HOSPITAL OR, ESPECIALLY IN RURAL AREAS, BY THE LOCAL TRADITIONAL PRACTITIONER. THERE ARE NO STATISTICS AVAILABLE ON FGM.

PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

ACCORDING TO U.N. ESTIMATES, THERE ARE 10 MILLION DISABLED PERSONS IN THE COUNTRY, WHILE THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS ESTIMATES THAT 3 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION, OR 6 MILLION PERSONS ARE DISABLED. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO PRECISE STATISTICS. FAMILIES OFTEN HIDE THEIR DISABLED

FAMILY MEMBERS TO AVOID SOCIAL STIGMA OR EMBARRASSMENT.
THE DISABLED FACE CONSIDERABLE DISCRIMINATION IN

EMPLOYMENT, ALTHOUGH SOME FACTORIES HAVE MADE SPECIAL
EFFORTS TO HIRE DISABLED WORKERS. SEVERAL PROVINCES HAVE

ESTABLISHED "REHABILITATION CENTERS" FOR THE DISABLED.
DISABLED PERSONS ARE REPORTEDLY TAKEN OFF THE STREETS BY
THE AUTHORITIES AND BROUGHT TO THESE CENTERS FOR JOB
TRAINING.

NGO'S ARE THE PRIMARY PROVIDERS OF EDUCATION FOR THE
DISABLED. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 1,084 SCHOOLS FOR THE
DISABLED; 680 ARE PRIVATE, AND 404 ARE GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS.
OF THE GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS 165 ARE "INTEGRATED," SERVING
BOTH REGULAR AND SPECIAL EDUCATION STUDENTS. IN JAKARTA
THERE ARE 98 SCHOOLS FOR THE DISABLED, 2 OF WHICH ARE
GOVERNMENT-RUN, AND 96 OF WHICH ARE PRIVATE. THE
GOVERNMENT ALSO RUNS THREE NATIONAL SCHOOLS FOR THE
VISUALLY, HEARING, AND MENTALLY DISABLED. THESE SCHOOLS
ACCEPT CHILDREN FROM THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

A DISABILITY LAW WAS PASSED IN JANUARY. IMPLEMENTING
REGULATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN ISSUED, SO THE IMPACT OF THE LAW
REMAINS UNCLEAR. THE LAW STRIVES TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO
EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND ASSISTANCE FOR THE DISABLED.
IT REQUIRES COMPANIES EMPLOYING OVER 100 PEOPLE TO GIVE 1
PERCENT OF THE JOBS TO THE DISABLED. THE LAW MANDATES
ACCESSIBILITY FOR THE DISABLED TO PUBLIC FACILITIES.
VIRTUALLY NO BUILDINGS OR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION HAVE BEEN
DESIGNED WITH SUCH ACCESSIBILITY IN MIND.

THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDE CARE
FOR ORPHANS AND THE DISABLED, BUT DOES NOT SPECIFY HOW THE

TERM "CARE" SHOULD BE DEFINED, AND THE PROVISION OF EDUCATION TO ALL MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED CHILDREN HAS NEVER BEEN INFERRED. REGULATIONS SPECIFY THAT THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISH AND REGULATE A NATIONAL CURRICULUM FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION BY STIPULATING THAT THE "COMMUNITY" PROVIDE SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES TO ITS CHILDREN.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE TERM "INDIGENOUS PEOPLE" TO BE A MISNOMER, BECAUSE IT CONSIDERS ALL INDONESIANS TO BE INDIGENOUS. NONETHELESS, IT PUBLICLY RECOGNIZES THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL "ISOLATED COMMUNITIES," AND THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE. THE GOVERNMENT ESTIMATES THAT THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN ISOLATED COMMUNITIES IS 1.5 MILLION. THIS INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, GROUPS SUCH AS THE DAYAK POPULATION IN KALIMANTAN WHO LIVE IN REMOTE FOREST AREAS, INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES THROUGHOUT IRIAN JAYA, AND ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED FAMILIES LIVING AS SEA NOMADS ON BOATS NEAR RIAU IN EAST SUMATRA AND NEAR UJUNG PANDANG IN SOUTHERN SULAWESI. CRITICS MAINTAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH IS BASICALLY PATERNALISTIC AND DESIGNED MORE TO INTEGRATE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE INTO SOCIETY THAN TO PROTECT THEIR TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS CRITICIZE THE GOVERNMENT'S TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM FOR VIOLATING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE.

SIXTY PERCENT OF THE POPULATION OF 200 MILLION LIVE IN JAVA, WHICH REPRESENTS ONLY 7 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY'S TERRITORY. THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED TRANSMIGRATION
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PROGRAM SEEKS TO RESETTLE PEOPLE FROM DENSELY POPULATED AREAS TO SPARSELY POPULATED AREAS OUTSIDE JAVA. THE MAJORITY OF MIGRANTS ARE SPONTANEOUS MIGRANTS WHO ARE NOT PART OF THE OFFICIAL PROGRAM. THE CURRENT 5-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN CALLS FOR 600,000 FAMILIES TO BE RESETTLED, WITH 80,000 PLANNED FOR THE 1997-98 FISCAL

YEAR.

CRITICS OF TRANSMIGRATION CLAIM THAT IT OFTEN THREATENS INDIGENOUS CULTURES AND SPARKS SOCIAL ENVY. SOME CRITICS CLAIM THAT IT HAS BEEN USED AS A POLITICAL TOOL TO INJECT NONINDIGENOUS PEOPLE INTO CERTAIN AREAS TO "INDONESIANIZE" THESE AREAS, IN PART TO PRECLUDE SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS. IN SOME AREAS, SUCH AS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF KALIMANTAN, EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, RELATIONS BETWEEN TRANSMIGRANTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE ARE HOSTILE. COMPLAINTS ABOUT TRANSMIGRATION COME FROM INDIGENOUS GROUPS RECEIVING LESS GOVERNMENT SUPPORT AND FUNDING THAN TRANSMIGRANTS, AND FROM TRANSMIGRANTS, WHO ARE IN SOME CASES MOVED TO AREAS WITH INADEGUATE INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT THEM AND LESS THAN DESIRABLE LAND.

THERE WERE PROTRACTED OUTBREAKS OF SERIOUS RIOTING BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS IN NEST KALIMANTAN IN LATE DECEMBER 1996, AND IN JANUARY AND EEBRUARY WHEN THOUSANDS OF LARGELY CHRISTIAN DAYAK TRIBESMEN ATTACKED IMMIGRANT MUSLIM MADURESE. HUNDREDS, POSSIBLY OVER 1,000 PERSONS, PRIMARILY MADURESE, DIED IN THE FIGHTING, AND AN ESTIMATED 15,000 MADURESE FLED THE VIOLENCE. THE EXPLOSION OF VIOLENCE, THE SIXTH DAYAK-MADURESE CONFRONTATION IN THE PAST 30 YEARS, GREW PARTLY OUT OF DAYAK PERCEPTION THAT

THEY WERE BEING MARGINALIZED IN THEIR NATIVE LANDS. THE MADURESE COMMUNITY IN WEST KALIMANTAN GREW AROUND AN EARLIER CORE OF TRANSMIGRANTS, ALTHOUGH THE MAJORITY OF MADURESE ARE SPONTANEOUS IMMIGRANTS.

THE GOVERNMENT'S EMPHASIS ON RELATIVELY RAPID GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES, BURGEONING URBANIZATION, AND AGGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT-BACKED COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES RESULTS IN CONTINUED TENSION OVER LAND TENURE ISSUES. THAT TENSION IS OFTEN EXPRESSED ALONG RACIAL/ETHNIC LINES AS DEVELOPERS ARE FREQUENTLY ETHNIC CHINESE INDONESIANS. LAND DISPUTES REPRESENT THE LARGEST CATEGORY OF COMPLAINTS SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE CASES BROUGHT TO LEGAL AID FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER LEGAL

ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS.

ACCORDING TO A LAW DERIVED FROM DUTCH PRACTICES, ALL SUBSURFACE MINERAL RESOURCES BELONG TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE BASIC AGRARIAN LAW STATES THAT LAND RIGHTS CANNOT BE "IN CONFLICT WITH NATIONAL AND STATE INTERESTS," WHICH PROVIDES THE GOVERNMENT WITH A BROAD LEGAL BASIS FOR LAND SEIZURES. WHEN DISPUTES CANNOT BE SETTLED THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DEFINE FAIR COMPENSATION FOR LAND.

THERE ARE NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF THE USE OF INTIMIDATION, SOMETIMES BY THE MILITARY, AND OFTEN BY HIRED "THUGS," TO ACQUIRE LAND FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, PARTICULARLY IN AREAS CLAIMED BY INDIGENOUS PEOPLE. SUCH INTIMIDATION HAS BEEN USED IN JAKARTA, OTHER PARTS OF JAVA, NORTH SUMATRA, ACEH, AND OTHER AREAS. COMPENSATION PAID FOR THE LAND IS

OFTEN MINIMAL OR EVEN NONEXISTENT. IN ONE CASE, ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES, RESIDENTS LIVING IN AN AREA NEEDED FOR A NEW CEMENT FACTORY IN ACEH WERE PAID LESS THAN THE EQUIVALENT OF 20 CENTS PER SQUARE METER OF LAND, WHICH

THEY FELT WAS INADEQUATE COMPENSATION. IN JULY RESIDENTS OF MAGELANG, CENTRAL JAVA COMPLAINED TO THE REGIONAL PARLIAMENT ABOUT THE MILITARY TAKING OVER THEIR LAND FOR MILITARY USE. THE COMPLAINT ALLEGES THAT LOCAL RESIDENTS WERE COERCED, VISITED AT NIGHT BY MILITARY AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES, AND TOLD TO ACCEPT $2.00 PER SQUARE METER FOR THEIR LAND, WHICH THEY SAW AS INSUFFICIENT COMPENSATION.

NCO'S ASSERT THAT VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE ARE FREQUENT IN MINING AND LOGGING AREAS, AND STATE THAT VIOLATIONS STEM FROM THE STATE'S DENIAL OF OWNERSHIP BY INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF ANCESTRAL LAND, DENIAL OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FORCED TAKEOVER OF LAND. THESE PROBLEMS ARE MOST PREVALENT IN IRIAN JAYA AND KALIMANTAN.

NGO'S REPORT THAT LOCAL PEOPLE HAVE SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF A PROJECT IN CENTRAL KALIMANTAN TO TURN ONE MILLION HECTARES OF PEAT LAND INTO AGRICULTURAL LAND FOR RICE CULTIVATION. THE SITE IS DESIGNATED AS A MAJOR

TRANSMIGRATION AREA. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES, 100,000 INDIGENOUS PEOPLE ARE AFFECTED BY THE PROJECT. FORCED TO CEASE THEIR TRADITIONAL FARMING AND FOREST-BASED LIVELIHOODS, MANY INDIGENOUS PEOPLE LIVING IN THE AREA HAVE BECOME POORLY PAID LABORERS ON THE PROJECT.

LOCAL RESIDENTS IN THE ISOLATED TANIMBAR ISLANDS IN

SOUTHEAST MALUKU STAGED FUTILE PROTESTS AGAINST THE DESTRUCTION OF FORESTS, FAUNA, AND LOCAL TRIBAL CULTURES PRIMARILY DUE TO LOGGING.

WHERE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE CLASH WITH DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, THE DEVELOPERS ALMOST ALWAYS WIN. DECISIONS REGARDING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, RESOURCE-USE CONCESSIONS, AND OTHER ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES ARE GENERALLY CARRIED OUT WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OR INFORMED CONSENT OF THE AFFECTED COMMUNITIES. UNLIKE IN PAST YEARS, THERE WERE NO REPORTS THAT ENVIRONMENTAL NGO'S THAT SOUGHT TO AID THESE COMMUNITIES WERE SUBJECTED TO VERBAL ATTACKS, RAIDS, AND OTHER FORMS OF INTIMIDATION BY GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES.

TENSIONS WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN IRIAN JAYA, INCLUDING IN THE VICINITY OF A FOREIGN MINING CONCESSION AREA NEAR TIMIKA, CONTINUED. INDIGENOUS IRIAN JAYA RESIDENTS COMPLAIN OF RACISM, RELIGIOUS BIAS, PATERNALISM, AND CONDESCENSION AS CONSTANT IMPEDIMENTS TO BETTER RELATIONS

WITH NON-IRIANESE PEOPLE, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY AND THE NON-IRIANESE BUSINESS COMMUNITY. THEY ALSO COMPLAIN OF ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR BY THE SECURITY FORCES. A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION OF IRIAN JAYA IS NOW MADE UP OF MIGRANTS, WHO ARE ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY DOMINANT. MOST CIVIL SERVANTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN TRIAN JAYA AND OTHER ISOLATED AREAS CONTINUE TO COME PRIMARILY FROM OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA, RATHER THAN FROM THE LOCAL INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

THE ANTICIPATED DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS FROM A FOREIGN MINING COMPANY CREATED TENSIONS THAT HELPED LEAD TO A CLASH BETWEEN TRIBAL GROUPS AND SECURITY FORCES IN AUGUST IN THE TIMIKA-TEMBAGAPURA AREA, WHICH LED TO THE SHOOING DEATHS OF TWO TRIANESE AND INJURIES TO SECURITY FORCES (SEE SECTION 1.A.). AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, TWO GROUPS SUPPORTING RIVAL LEADERS OF THE MONI TRIBAL GROUP HELD DEMONSTRATIONS OVER THEIR CLAIMS TO PART OF THE FUNDS FROM THE FOREIGN MINING COMPANY, AND THEN LATER MASSED TOGETHER NEAR THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL DISTRICT LEADER TO PRESS THEIR DEMANDS. CREDIBLE NGO SOURCES REPORT THAT BYSTANDERS TO THIS EVENT WERE ASSAULTED BY SECURITY FORCES. DUE TO LOCAL PROTESTS OVER HOW THE FUNDS WOULD BE ALLOCATED, THE COMPANY SUSPENDED DISBURSEMENTS FOR NEW PROJECTS UNDER THIS INITIATIVE.

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

THERE WERE A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF ATTACKS AGAINST CHURCHES, TEMPLES, AND OTHER RELIGIOUS FACILITIES, MANY OF WHICH OCCURRED IN THE MIDST OF LARGER RIOTS. THERE WERE ALSO INSTANCES OF PREACHING AND PUBLICATIONS AGAINST CHRISTIANS, WHICH LED TO CONCERNS THAT THE SOCIETAL SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE WAS UNDER PRESSURE. UNDERLYING SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TENSIONS, IN MANY INSTANCES BETWEEN POOR MUSLIMS AND WELL-TO-DO ETHNIC CHINESE CHRISTIANS, WERE KEY FACTORS IN SUCH INCIDENTS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT FULLY RESOLVED MANY CASES OF ATTACKS ON RELIGIOUS FACILITIES AND CHURCHES THAT OCCURRED DURING RIOTS, AND IN OTHER CASES HAS NOT INVESTIGATED AT ALL.

DURING FEBRUARY, THE ISLAMIC FASTING MONTH OF RAMADAN, MANY CHURCHES AROUND THE COUNTRY REPORTEDLY RECEIVED

THREATENING PHONE CALLS OR FAXES FROM UNKNOWN GROUPS WARNING OF FUTURE DESTRUCTION ON SPECIFIC DATES. WHILE THERE WERE INCIDENTS OF CHURCH BURNINGS AND ATTACKS DURING THIS PERIOD, THE WIDESPREAD ATTACKS THAT WERE THREATENED DID NOT MATERIALIZE. NEVERTHELESS, THE THREATS CAUSED FEAR IN MANY CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES. SOURCES IN MEDAN, NORTH SUMATRA REPORTED THAT LOCAL RESIDENTS, IN ONE CASE WITH THE HELP OF THE ARMED FORCES, GUARDED CHURCHES DURING THESE PERIODS. A CATHOLIC CHURCH IN BANDUNG, A MORMON CHURCH IN SEMARANG, AND CHURCHES IN JAKARTA, AMONG OTHERS, RECEIVED THREATS. RELIABLE SOURCES REPORTED THAT CATHOLIC COMMUNITIES WERE THREATENED WITH VIOLENCE IN A TOWN IN CENTRAL JAVA, BUT A LOCAL INTERRELIGIOUS MEETING SERVED TO DEFUSE TENSIONS. THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF THREATS AGAINST CHRISTIANS AND ETHNIC CHINESE IN THE CENTRAL JAVANESE TOWNS OF PURWOKERTO AND PURWOREDJO DURING THIS TIME AS WELL. RELIABLE SOURCES REPORTED THAT MANY CHURCHES THAT WERE THREATENED WERE GUARDED BY CHURCH GROUPS AND LOCAL ALLIANCES OF CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM YOUTH.

A CATHOLIC SCHOOL IN AMBON WAS BURNED IN FEBRUARY, BUT LOCAL RESIDENTS DESCRIBED IT AS AN UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE IN AMBON, WHERE RELATIONS BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC GROUPS ARE SAID TO BE GENERALLY GOOD. A CHURCH IN GARUT, WEST JAVA WAS BURNED ON FEBRUARY 22, AND ANOTHER WAS DESTROYED THERE ON MARCH 6.

UNCLASSIFIED

THERE WERE SEVERAL INSTANCES OF MOB VIOLENCE THAT INCLUDED ATTACKS ON CHURCHES, OTHER RELIGIOUS FACILITIES, AND CHINESE-OWNED BUSINESSES. RIOTING AND CHURCH BURNINGS OCCURRED IN RENGESDENGKLOK, WEST JAVA IN JANUARY, IN WHICH FIVE CHURCHES WERE DESTROYED BY MOB VIOLENCE. THE INCIDENT WAS SPARKED AFTER A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN A CHINESE WOMAN AND LOCAL MUSLIM YOUTHS. THE RIOTING THAT FOLLOWED CAUSED WIDESPREAD DAMAGE TO CHURCHES. TWO BUDDHIST TEMPLES WERE ALSO DAMAGED OR BURNED.

THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF CHURCH BURNING AND DAMAGE TO CHURCHES AND CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS DURING THE YEAR. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WERE TWO INCIDENTS IN CARUT, WEST JAVA, DURING WHICH ONE CHURCH WAS BURNED IN FEBRUARY AND ANOTHER WAS WRECKED IN MARCH. THERE WERE STONE THROWING INCIDENTS AT TWO CHURCHES IN WONOSOBO, CENTAL JAVA AND FOUR CHURCHES IN SURABAYA, CENTRAL JAVA IN MARCH AND APRIL. A CHURCH IN NGAWI, CENTRAL JAVA WAS WRECKED IN MARCH; A PENTECOSTAL

CHURCH IN TUBAN, EAST JAVA WAS BURNED IN MAY; A PENTECOSTAL CHURCH IN MANADO, NORTH SULAWESI WAS WRECKED IN MAY; AND A CHURCH IN BOGOR WAS DESTROYED IN MAY.

THERE WERE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS OF CHURCH BURNING AND CHURCH DESTRUCTION IN MANY CITIES ON MAY 23, THE LAST DAY OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, INCLUDING: 13 CHURCHES BURNED OR WRECKED IN BANJARMASIN, SOUTH KALIMANTAN; 5 CHURCHES WRECKED IN PASURUAN, EAST JAVA; 1 CHURCH WRECKED IN KUDUS, CENTRAL JAVA; 7 CHURCHES WRECKED IN THE AREA SURROUNDING JAKARTA; AND 1 CHURCH WRECKED IN MADURA, EAST JAVA. A PROTESTANT CHURCH IN JAKARTA, WHICH WAS STONED TWICE

DURING THE LAST WEEK OF THE CAMPAIGN, WAS BURNED ON MAY 23.

AFTER THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, TENSIONS EASED BUT THERE WERE MORE CHURCHES ATTACKED: 1 CHURCH WAS BURNED IN MADURA IN JUNE; 1 CHURCH WAS BURNED IN BOGOR, WEST JAVA IN JULY; 1 CHURCH WAS BURNED IN KEDIRI, EAST JAVA IN JULY; 1 CHURCH IN SOUTH KALIMANTAN WAS BURNED IN AUGUST; 1 CHURCH WAS WRECKED IN GORONTALO, NORTH SULAWESI IN SEPTEMBER; A NUMBER OF CHURCHES AND CATHOLIC SCHOOLS WERE ATTACKED DURING RIOTING IN UJUNG PANDANG, SOUTH SULAWESI IN SEPTEMBER; 1 CHURCH IN JEMBER, EAST JAVA WAS ATTACKED IN OCTOBER; 1 CHURCH WAS ATTACKED IN BLITAR, EAST JAVA IN OCTOBER AND 2 OTHERS WERE BURNED IN NOVEMBER; IN YOGYAKARTA, 1 CHURCH WAS BURNED AND ANOTHER WAS WRECKED IN NOVEMBER.

MANY OF THE CHURCHES THAT WERE BURNED OR DAMAGED DURING THE OCTOBER 1996 SITUBONDO RIOT WERE SUCCESSFULLY REBUILT

WITH COOPERATION BETWEEN CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES.

AN INTERRELIGIOUS ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL STUDENT AND YOUTH GROUPS CALLED THE NATIONALITY FORUM FOR INDONESIAN YOUTH, WAS FORMED IN FEBRUARY, IN PART AS A RESPONSE TO INCREASED TENSIONS FOLLOWING THE SITUBONDO RIOT AND CHURCH BURNINGS IN OCTOBER 1996, TO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE GRASS ROOTS TO PREVENT FURTHER UNREST. THIS GROUP INCLUDES ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING MUSLIM (NAHDLATUL ULAMA), PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, AND HINDU YOUTH.

NATIONAL/RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALLY PROMOTES RACIAL AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE. ETHNIC CHINESE, AT APPROXIMATELY 3 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION BY FAR THE LARGEST NONINDIGENOUS MINORITY GROUP, HAVE HISTORICALLY PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE ECONOMY. THEY ARE THE TARGET OF DISCRIMINATION. ANTI-CHINESE SENTIMENT HAS LED TO ATTACKS ON CHINESE-OWNED BUSINESSES DURING PERIODS OF SOCIAL UNREST, AS WAS SEEN DURING THE RENGESDENKLOK RIOT IN JANUARY AND THE UJUNG PANDANG RIOTS IN SEPTEMBER. WIDESPREAD ANTI-CHINESE RIOTING IN UJUNG PANDANG, SOUTH SULAWESI WAS SPARKED BY THE ACT OF A MENTALLY ILL INDONESIAN OF CHINESE DESCENT WHO KILLED A 9-YEAR-OLD ON A CITY STREET. THE INCIDENT SPARKED SEVERAL DAYS OF RIOTING IN WHICH 6 PEOPLE REPORTEDLY DIED, AND OVER 1,000 SHOPS WERE REPORTEDLY DAMAGED, AS WERE A NUMBER OF CHINESE-OWNED BANKS AND A HOTEL. MOST OF THE DESTROYED PROPERTY WAS TARGETED BECAUSE OF CHINESE CONNECTIONS. CHINESE TEMPLES WERE ATTACKED, AND THE MOST HISTORIC LOCAL TEMPLE WAS DESTROYED.

SINCE 1959 NONCITIZEN ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO RUN BUSINESSES IN RURAL INDONESIA. REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF CHINESE SCHOOLS, FORMATION OF EXCLUSIVELY CHINESE CULTURAL GROUPS OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND PUBLIC DISPLAY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS, ALTHOUGH CHINESE CHARACTERS ARE SEEN ON SOME PRODUCTS. THE GOVERNMENT

PERMITS THE PUBLICATION OF ONE GOVERNMENT-OWNED CHINESE-LANGUAGE DAILY NEWSPAPER, OTHERWISE LEGISLATION BANS THE IMPORT, SALE OR DISTRIBUTION OF CHINESE-LANGUAGE MATERIAL.

HOWEVER, CHINESE-LANGUAGE MATERIALS HAVE BEGUN TO APPEAR IN CHINESE NEIGHBORHOODS IN JAKARTA AND POSSIBLY ELSEWHERE. SINCE 1994 THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALLOWED CHINESE-LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION FOR EMPLOYEES IN THE TOURISM INDUSTRY, AND HAS ALLOWED DISTRIBUTION OF LOCALLY PRINTED CHINESE-LANGUAGE TOURIST BROCHURES, PROGRAMS, AND SIMILAR MATERIAL TO CHINESE SPEAKING TOURISTS.

PRIVATE INSTRUCTION IN CHINESE IS GENERALLY PROHIBITED BUT TAKES PLACE TO A LIMITED EXTENT. THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA OFFERS CHINESE-LANGUAGE COURSES. STATE UNIVERSITIES HAVE INFORMAL QUOTAS THAT LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ETHNIC CHINESE STUDENTS. THE LAW FORBIDS THE CELEBRATION OF THE CHINESE NEW YEAR IN TEMPLES OR PUBLIC PLACES, BUT ENFORCEMENT IS LIMITED. CHINESE NEW YEAR DECORATIONS WERE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED AND SOLD IN PUBLIC SHOPPING AREAS IN

AT LEAST A FEW CITIES. IN JUNE A SENIOR OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF ETHNIC INTEGRATION WAS QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS SAYING THAT THE BAN ON CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS SHOULD NOT BE HASTILY RELAXED, DUE TO RACIAL CONCERNS.

EAST TIMORESE AND VARIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS CHARGE THAT THE EAST TIMORESE ARE UNDERREPRESENTED IN THE CIVIL SERVICE IN EAST TIMOR. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE SOME EFFORTS TO RECRUIT MORE CIVIL SERVANTS IN BOTH EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, AND THERE HAS BEEN SOME INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CIVIL SERVANT TRAINEES FOR THESE TWO PROVINCES, DESPITE A "NO GROWTH" POLICY FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE AS A WHOLE. EAST TIMORESE HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERNS THAT THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM (SEE SECTION 1.F.) COULD LEAD TO

FEWER EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND MIGHT EVENTUALLY DESTROY EAST TIMOR'S CULTURAL IDENTITY. THE GOVERNMENT SAID THAT THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM IN EAST TIMOR FOCUSED MOSTLY ON RESETTLEMENT OF TIMORESE, WITH A MUCH SMALLER PORTION OF PREDOMINANTLY CHRISTIAN AND HINDU NON-TIMORESE COMING IN FROM OUTSIDE. IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, INFORMAL, PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM MIGRATION TO THE PROVINCE HAS SPARKED SOCIOECONOMIC TENSION IN URBAN AREAS, PROVOKING EVEN GREATER CONCERN THAN THE FORMALLY SPONSORED TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS ARE BY LAW FREE TO FORM WORKER ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION. HOWEVER, GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND NUMERICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR UNION RECOGNITION CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT BARRIER TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER USES A REGULATION THAT REQUIRES THAT A UNION BE SET UP "BY AND FOR WORKERS" TO DENY RECOGNITION TO GROUPS THAT INCLUDE PEOPLE IT CONSIDERS NONWORKERS, SUCH AS LAWYERS OR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, WHO ARE INVOLVED AS LABOR ORGANIZERS. UNDER A NEW LAW ON MANPOWER AFFAIRS THAT THE PARLIAMENT PASSED IN SEPTEMBER, WORKERS MAY FORM UNIONS ON THE BASIS OF "DEMOCRATIC CONSULTATION" WITH OTHER WORKERS IN THE SAME COMPANY, AND MAY JOIN WITH OTHER UNIONS TO FORM SECTORAL AND INTERSECTORAL FEDERATIONS. THE NEW LAW DOES NOT TAKE

EFFECT UNTIL OCTOBER 1, 1998, AND REQUIRES IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS.

THERE IS A DE FACTO SINGLE UNION SYSTEM, THE ALL-INDONESIAN TRADE UNION (SPSI) AND ITS 13 FEDERATED

SECTORAL UNIONS. THE SPSI COMPLETED IN 1995 A TRANSFORMATION FROM A UNITARY (CENTRALIZED) TO A FEDERATIVE (DECENTRALIZED) STRUCTURE. ITS 13 INDUSTRIAL SECTORS ARE REGISTERED AS SEPARATE NATIONAL UNIONS; THE SPSI IS THE ONLY TRADE UNION FEDERATION RECOGNIZED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER HAS STATED THAT ANY UNIONS THAT ARE FORMED SHOULD AFFILIATE WITH THE SPSI FEDERATION, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE ANY UNIONS OUTSIDE THE FEDERATION. THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED POLICY IS TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECOGNIZED SPSI UNIONS RATHER THAN TO ALLOW THE FORMATION OF ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

THE GOVERNMENT MAY DISSOLVE A UNION IF IT BELIEVES THAT THE UNION IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA, ALTHOUGH IT HAS NEVER ACTUALLY DONE SO, AND THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS SPECIFYING PROCEDURES FOR UNION DISSOLUTION.

UNTIL 1994 ONLY THE SPSI COULD LEGALLY BARGAIN ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES OR REPRESENT WORKERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER'S LABOR COURTS. A 1994 REGULATION PROVIDES THAT WORKERS IN A SINGLE COMPANY WITH MORE THAN 25 EMPLOYEES CAN JOIN TOGETHER AS A "PLANT-LEVEL UNION" AND NEGOTIATE A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT WITH THEIR EMPLOYER OUTSIDE THE SPSI FRAMEWORK, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES THESE PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS TO JOIN THE SPSI. BY YEAR'S END, 1,234

PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, REFLECTING A SMALL INCREASE DURING THE YEAR. NGO'S HAVE CHARGED, HOWEVER, THAT MANY OF THESE UNIONS ARE 11YELLOW UNIONS" FORMED BY COMPANY MANAGEMENT WITH LITTLE OR NO WORKER PARTICIPATION. THERE WERE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT LOCAL DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER OFFICIALS HAVE ACCEPTED PAYMENTS FROM EMPLOYERS TO SET UP PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS IN THEIR FACTORIES BECAUSE THEY ARE CONSIDERED EVEN WEAKER THAN THE SPSI.

TWO LABOR GROUPS OTHER THAN THE SPSI ARE ACTIVE BUT NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT: THE INDONESIAN PROSPERITY TRADE UNION (SBSI) AND THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS (AJI). THE SBSI, CREATED IN 1992, CLAIMS THAT

IT HAS FORMED THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF FACTORY-LEVEL UNITS TO MEET THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION AS A LABOR UNION, BUT ITS MOST RECENT REQUEST (IN NOVEMBER 1994) FOR REGISTRATION AS A TRADE UNION WAS DENIED. THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER HAS ALSO BLOCKED SESI ATTEMPTS TO REGISTER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS AS A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE ORMAS LAW. THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE SBSI TO BE ILLEGAL. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT DISBANDED IT, IT CONTINUES TO HARASS THE SBSI BY DISBANDING ITS MEETINGS AND TRAINING SEMINARS AND PRESSURING COMPANIES TO FIRE ITS MEMBERS. SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AGAINST THE SBSI DURING THE YEAR INCLUDED THE DETENTION AND INTERROGATION OF TWO MEMBERS IN BINJAI, NORTH SUMATRA IN MAY AND THE BREAKING UP OF AN SESI TRAINING SESSION IN LAMPUNG, SOUTHERN SUMATRA IN DULY, DURING WHICH 26 SBSI MEMBERS WERE DETAINED FOR 2-

UNCLASSIFIED

DAYS. IN SEPTEMBER POLICE BROKE UP THE SESI'S SECOND NATIONAL CONGRESS AS UNION MEMBERS WERE CONCLUDING THE FIRST DAY OF A SCHEDULED 3-DAY MEETING.

THE TRIAL OF SBSI LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN ON CHARGES OF SUBVERSION AND SOWING HATRED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH BEGAN IN DECEMBER 1996, RESUMED IN SEPTEMBER AFTER A 5-MONTH SUSPENSION DUE TO PAKPAHAN'S ILL HEALTH. WHILE THE TRIAL WAS SUSPENDED, PAKPAHAN MADE TWO REQUESTS FOR MEDICAL EXAMINATION AND TREATMENT OF A LUNG TUMOR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. AFTER GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED PANELS OF PHYSICIANS EXAMINED HIM IN EACH INSTANCE, THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND ATTORNEY GENERAL RULED THAT HIS CONDITION COULD BE TREATED IN INDONESIA. IN DECEMBER THE GOVERNMENT PERMITTED A TEAM OF CANADIAN DOCTORS TO EXAMINE HIM. IN JANUARY PAKPAHAN REQUESTED THAT THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW ITS OCTOBER 1996 DECISION REQUIRING HIM TO SERVE OUT A 4-YEAR SENTENCE FOR FOMENTING LABOR UNREST A DECISION THAT THE COURT HAD PREVIOUSLY OVERTURNED. IN AUGUST PAKPAHAN PRESENTED NEW ARGUMENTS TO A LOWER COURT THAT HE WAS INNOCENT OF THE CHARGES; THE CASE WAS STILL PENDING AT YEAR'S END (SEE SECTION 2.A.)

THE ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS (PWI) IS THE ONLY GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING JOURNALISTS. ALTHOUGH PRESS LAWS STIPULATE THAT ALL JOURNALISTS MUST BELONG TO THE PWI, A FEW JOURNALISTS HAVE CHOSEN NOT TO JOIN. IN THE WAKE OF THE 1994 BANNING OF THREE PUBLICATIONS, APPROXIMATELY 80 JOURNALISTS FORMED

THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS (AJI) AS AN

ALTERNATIVE TO THE GOVERNMENT UNION. A GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN IN MARCH 1995 RESULTED IN THE IMPRISONMENT OF THREE AJI MEMBERS CHARGED WITH "SOWING HATE." THEY WERE RELEASED DURING THE YEAR (SEE SECTION 2.A.). DESPITE OCCASIONAL PRESSURE ON PUBLICATIONS EMPLOYING AJI MEMBERS, THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWS AJI A CONTINUED UNOFFICIAL EXISTENCE.

BECAUSE OF PAST DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER REGULATIONS, MANY SPSI FACTORY UNITS ARE LED BY PERSONS WHO HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH THEIR UNITS' MEMBERS BECAUSE THEY WERE SELECTED BY EMPLOYERS. A 1995 REGULATION STATES THAT EMPLOYEES MUST ONLY NOTIFY THEIR EMPLOYER THAT THEY WISH TO FORM A UNION AND THAT THEY MAY PROCEED IF THEY DO NOT RECEIVE A RESPONSE FROM THEIR EMPLOYER WITHIN 2 WEEKS. DESPITE THIS PROVISION, STRIKES CONTINUE TO OCCUR WHEN EMPLOYERS ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF UNION BRANCHES. THESE STRIKES ARE GENERALLY SUCCESSFUL, AND THE FORMATION OF AN SPSI UNIT FOLLOWS SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HOWEVER, WORKERS WHO ARE ACTIVE IN THE FORMATION OF THE UNION ARE FREQUENTLY DISMISSED AND HAVE NO PRACTICAL PROTECTION BY EITHER LAW OR GOVERNMENT PRACTICE.

CIVIL SERVANTS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO JOIN UNIONS AND MUST BELONG TO KORPRI A NONUNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES, DEFINED TO INCLUDE THOSE WORKING IN ENTERPRISES IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A 5-PERCENT HOLDING OR GREATER, USUALLY ARE REQUIRED TO JOIN KORPRI, BUT A SMALL NUMBER OF STATE ENTERPRISES HAVE SPSI UNITS. TEACHERS MUST BELONG TO THE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION

(PGRI) . WHILE TECHNICALLY CLASSED AS A UNION, THE PGRI CONTINUES TO FUNCTION MORE AS A WELFARE ORGANIZATION AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ENGAGED IN TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES SUCH AS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. MANDATORY KORPRI AND PGRI CONTRIBUTIONS ARE DEDUCTED AUTOMATICALLY FROM TEACHERS' SALARIES.

UNIONS MAY DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE OVER THE SPSI AND ITS FEDERATED UNIONS. THE HEAD OF THE SPSI AND MANY MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF GOLKAR AND ITS CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONAL GROUPS. THESE PERSONS HAVE BEEN

GIVEN POSITIONS IN THE FEDERATED INDUSTRIAL SECTOR UNIONS. THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER IS A MEMBER OF THE SPSIFS CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL.

THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED LATE IN 1995 ITS INTENTION TO RELAX A REGULATION REQUIRING POLICE APPROVAL FOR ALL MEETINGS OF FIVE OR MORE PEOPLE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE OFFICES OR NORMAL WORK SITES (SEE SECTION 2.B.). HOWEVER, IN PRACTICE THIS REGULATION CONTINUES TO APPLY TO UNION MEETINGS. PERMISSION WAS ROUTINELY GIVEN TO THE SPSI, BUT NOT TO RIVAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE SBSI.

IN 1994 THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF EREE TRADE UNIONS LODGED A FORMAL COMPLAINT AGAINST INDONESIA WITH THE ILO, ACCUSING THE GOVERNMENT OF DENYING WORKERS THE RIGHT TO SET UP UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, HARASSING INDEPENDENT WORKERS ORGANIZATIONS, AND OF TAKING OTHER

ACTIONS CONTRARY TO ILO STANDARDS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. IN NOVEMBER THE COMMITTEE ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OF INFORMATION FROM THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IN RESPONSE TO EARLIER REQUESTS, BUT REPORTED THAT IT REMAINED "DEEPLY CONCERNED" BY "SERIOUS AND WORSENING INFRINGEMENTS OF BASIC HUMAN AND TRADE UNION RIGHTS." THE COMMITTEE URGED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO ELIMINATE IMPEDIMENTS TO THE REGISTRATION OF UNIONS, INCLUDING THE SBSI, TO INSTITUTE AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE HOMICIDE OF MARSINAH, TO DROP CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST PAKPAHAN AND TO HAVE HIM RELEASED, AND TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON...OTHER CASES."

WHILE PANCASILA PRINCIPLES CALL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES TO BE SETTLED BY CONSENSUS, ALL ORGANIZED WORKERS EXCEPT CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND TEACHERS RARELY EXERCISE THIS RIGHT, BUT PRIVATE SECTOR STRIKES ARE FREQUENT. BEFORE A STRIKE CAN OCCUR LEGALLY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE LAW REQUIRES INTENSIVE MEDIATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND PRIOR NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE. HOWEVER, NO APPROVAL IS REQUIRED. THE MANPOWER LAW PASSED IN SEPTEMBER, WHICH IS NOT YET IN EFFECT, ALLOWS STRIKES ONLY IF AN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY THE CONCERNED PARTIES OR THROUGH THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS. THE LAW REQUIRES THAT STRIKING WORKERS BE PAID IF THEY ARE STRIKING TO

OBTAIN BENEFITS DETERMINED BY LAW, REGULATION, A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, OR COMPANY REGULATIONS.

IN PRACTICE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ARE RARELY FOLLOWED, AND FORMAL NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE IS RARELY GIVEN BECAUSE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROCEDURES ARE SLOW AND HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH WORKERS. THEREFORE, SUDDEN STRIKES TEND TO RESULT FROM LONGSTANDING GRIEVANCES OR RECOGNITION THAT LEGALLY MANDATED BENEFITS OR RIGHTS ARE NOT BEING RECEIVED. ACCORDING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER STATISTICS, THERE WERE 226 STRIKES INVOLVING 141,968 WORKERS DURING THE FIRST 11 MONTHS OF THE YEAR, A

SIGNIFICANT DECREASE FROM 1996. HOWEVER, IN 199V THE GOVERNMENT ONLY COUNTED WORK STOPPAGES IN WHICH AT LEAST A FULL DAY'S PRODUCTION WAS LOST AS STRIKES. SHORTER WORK STOPPAGES ("UNJUK RASA") ARE MUCH MORE FREQUENT, BUT THE GOVERNMENT KEPT NO OFFICIAL COUNT OF THEM IN 1997. IN INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE ILO COMMITTEE ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, THE GOVERNMENT REPORTED THAT THERE WERE 890 STRIKES INVOLVING 500,000 WORKERS IN 1996. NGO'S BELIEVE THAT THE NUMBER OF STRIKES AND WORKERS INVOLVED WAS HIGHER THAN THIS. THE LARGEST CONCENTRATION OF STRIKES OCCURRED FOLLOWING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW MINIMUM WAGE IN APRIL, AND INVOLVED TENS OF THOUSANDS OF WORKERS. THE LARGEST SINGLE STRIKE TOOK PLACE IN NOVEMBER AND INVOLVED 40,000 WORKERS AT A CIGARETTE FACTORY IN EAST JAVA. ROUR STRIKES DURING THE YEAR ARE KNOWN TO HAVE RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO FACTORIES.

THE SPSI MAINTAINS INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS BUT ITS ONLY INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION AFFILIATION AS A FEDERATION IS THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS TRADE UNION COUNCIL. SEVERAL OF THE SPSI'S FEDERATED SECTORAL UNIONS

ARE NIEMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE SECRETARIATS.

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROMOTES IT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE NATIONAL IDEOLOGY, PANCASILA. UNTIL 1994 ONLY RECOGNIZED TRADE UNIONS--THE SPSI AND ITS COMPONENTS--COULD LEGALLY ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. SINCE EARLY 1994, GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS ALSO PERMIT UNAFFILIATED PLANT-LEVEL WORKERS' ASSOCIATIONS TO CONCLUDE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH EMPLOYERS, AND SOME 732 HAD DONE SO BY THE END OF 1996, ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES. AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY ANY OTHER GROUPS ARE NOT CONSIDERED LEGALLY BINDING AND ARE NOT REGISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. ONCE NOTIFIED THAT 25 EMPLOYEES HAVE JOINED A REGISTERED SPSI OR INDEPENDENT PLANT-LEVEL UNION, AN EMPLOYER IS OBLIGATED TO BARGAIN WITH IT.

IN COMPANIES WITHOUT UNIONS, THE GOVERNMENT DISCOURAGES WORKERS FROM UTILIZING NONGOVERNMENT OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE, E.G., DURING CONSULTATIONS WITH EMPLOYERS OVER COMPANY REGULATIONS. INSTEAD, THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PREFERS THAT WORKERS SEEK ITS ASSISTANCE AND BELIEVES THAT ITS ROLE IS TO PROTECT WORKERS. THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT FOR MANY COMPANIES, CONSULTATIONS ARE PERFUNCTORY AT BEST AND USUALLY WITH MANAGEMENT-SELECTED WORKERS; THERE ARE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY FROM FOREIGN COMPANIES. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT STATISTICS, APPROXIMATELY 80 PERCENT OF THE FACTORY-LEVEL SPSI UNITS HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. THE DEGREE TO

WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS ARE FREELY NEGOTIATED BETWEEN UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE VARIES. BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS OR BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION OR ARBITRATION. MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE FOR 2 YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED FOR 1 YEAR. THE NEW MANPOWER LAW, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO TAKE EFFECT LATE IN 1998, SPECIFIES NO TIME LIMIT ON NEGOTIATIONS, BUT REQUIRES THAT THE UNION NEGOTIATING THE CONTRACT BE SUPPORTED BY A MAJORITY OF WORKERS IN THE CONCERNED COMPANY.

ACCORDING TO NGO' S INVOLVED IN LABOR ISSUES, IN CURRENT PRACTICE THE PROVISIONS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

AGREEMENTS RARELY GO BEYOND THE LEGAL MINIMUM STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE AGREEMENTS ARE OFTEN MERELY PRESENTED TO WORKER REPRESENTATIVES FOR SIGNING RATHER THAN BEING NEGOTIATED. THE SPSI STATED IN SEPTEMBER THAT OF 23,525 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SIGNED BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND WORKERS, 10,776 OF THESE AGREEMENTS WERE ONLY "IMITATION" AGREEMENTS BECAUSE THEY WERE CONCLUDED IN COMPANIES WHERE WORKERS WERE NOT REPRESENTED BY A UNION. ALTHOUGH GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS PROHIBIT EMPLOYERS FROM DISCRIMINATING AGAINST OR HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, THERE ARE

CREDIBLE REPORTS FROM UNION OFFICIALS OF EMPLOYER RETRIBUTION AGAINST UNION ORGANIZERS, INCLUDING FIRING, WHICH IS NOT EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED OR REMEDIED IN PRACTICE. SOME EMPLOYERS REPORTEDLY HAVE WARNED THEIR

EMPLOYEES AGAINST CONTACT WITH UNION ORGANIZERS FROM THE UNRECOGNIZED SBSI ORGANIZATION. CHARGES OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE ADJUDICATED BY REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEES, AND THEIR DECISIONS CAN BE APPEALED TO THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT. IN SEPTEMBER THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT REVERSED A NATIONAL LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION BOARD RULING THAT ORDERED THE HONG KONG BANK TO REINSTATE 166 UNION MEMBERS WHO WENT ON STRIKE, DESPITE GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS MAKING IT ILLEGAL TO FIRE WORKERS SOLELY FOR STRIKING OR OTHER UNION ACTIVITY. DECISIONS SUCH AS THIS LEAD MANY UNION MEMBERS TO BELIEVE THAT THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEES GENERALLY SIDE WITH EMPLOYERS. AS A RESULT, WORKERS FREQUENTLY PRESENT THEIR GRIEVANCES DIRECTLY TO THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, PARLIAMENT, AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF DISMISSED WORKERS TEND TO BE MONETARY AWARDS; WORKERS ARE RARELY REINSTATED. THE LAW REQUIRES THAT EMPLOYERS OBTAIN THE APPROVAL OF THE LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEE BEFORE FIRING WORKERS, BUT THE LAW IS OFTEN IGNORED IN PRACTICE. THE NEW MANPOWER LAW, WHICH TAKES EFFECT IN LATE 1998, REQUIRES ONLY THAT EMPLOYERS CONSULT WITH CONCERNED WORKERS AND THEIR UNIONS ABOUT THEIR INTENTION TO TERMINATE THE WORKERS' EMPLOYMENT.

COMMENTING ON ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY, THE JUNE REPORT OF THE ILO'S COMMITTEE ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS "OBSERVED WITH DEEP CONCERN THAT THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE CONVENTION ON

THE ONE HAND, AND LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL PRACTICE ON THE OTHER, HAVE CONTINUED FOR MANY YEARS." THE COMMITTEE ALSO OBSERVED THAT "THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT GIVEN SUFFICIENT PROOF OF A WILLINGNESS TO COMPLY" WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ILO CONVENTION 98, "AS IT HAS NOT REQUESTED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THIS RESPECT." THE COMMITTEE EXPRESSED ITS DEEP CONCERN OVER THIS SITUATION AND ASKED THE GOVERNMENT URGENTLY TO AMEND THE LEGISLATION AND REPORT ON THE MEASURES TAKEN OR ENVISAGED IN THIS RESPECT. THE COMMITTEE URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO ENSURE FULL RESPECT OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES ESSENTIAL FOR THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION.

ON JUNE 1, 1996, THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER ISSUED A NEW REGULATION PERMITTING UNIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SPSI TO COLLECT UNION DUES DIRECTLY THROUGH THE CHECKOFF SYSTEM, RATHER THAN HAVING THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER COLLECT DUES AND TRANSFER THEM TO THE SPSI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SYSTEM DURING THE YEAR WAS UNEVEN. SOME WORKPLACE UNITS OF THE SPSI REPORTED THAT THEY WERE RECEIVING DUES COLLECTED THROUGH THE CHECKOFF SYSTEM FROM THEIR EMPLOYERS. OTHER WORKPLACE UNITS REPORTED THAT THEIR COMPANIES REFUSED TO RELEASE DUES TO THE UNION AND CONTINUED TO DEPOSIT DUES INTO DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER ACCOUNTS. DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER OFFICIALS STATE THAT THE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTED ITS REGIONAL OFFICES TO CLOSE ACCOUNTS PREVIOUSLY USED FOR UNION DUES, BUT ACCORDING TO REPORTS FROM VARIOUS REGIONS, NOT ALL OFFICES HAD CARRIED OUT THIS INSTRUCTION. UNION OFFICIALS AT SPSI HEADQUARTERS STATED THAT NOT ALL LOCAL BRANCHES OF THE UNIONS ARE SENDING A PORTION OF DUES COLLECTED TO REGIONAL

AND CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AS PROVIDED IN THE SPSI'S BY-LAWS.

THE POLICE, AS WELL AS THE MILITARY, CONTINUE TO INVOLVE

THEMSELVES IN LABOR ISSUES, DESPITE THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER'S REVOCATION IN 1994 OF A 1986 REGULATION ALLOWING THE MILITARY TO INTERVENE IN STRIKES AND OTHER LABOR ACTIONS. A 1990 DECREE GIVING THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF NATIONAL STABILITY (BAKORSTANAS) AUTHORITY TO INTERVENE IN STRIKES IN THE INTEREST OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY REMAINS IN EFFECT. UNION AND NGO OBSERVERS NOTE A SHIFT OVER THE PAST 2 TO 3 YEARS FROM OPEN INTERVENTION AND DEMONSTRATIONS OF FORCE BY UNIFORMED TROOPS TO LESS VISIBLE MEASURES. UNION ACTIVISTS COMPLAIN

THAT BOTH POLICE AND LOCAL MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES HARASS AND OCCASIONALLY DETAIN UNION LEADERS AND SEIZE MATERIALS FROM UNION OFFICES WITHOUT WARRANTS. IN ADDITION, POLICE FREQUENTLY BLOCK OR BREAK UP MEETINGS BETWEEN UNION ORGANIZERS OR NGO REPRESENTATIVES AND WORKERS, ESPECIALLY MEETINGS ORGANIZED BY THE SESI. HOWEVER, THE MOST COMMON FORM OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LABOR MATTERS, ACCORDING TO UNION AND NGO REPRESENTATIVES, IS A LONGSTANDING PATTERN OF COLLUSION BETWEEN POLICE AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES AND EMPLOYERS, WHICH USUALLY TAKES THE FORM OF INTIMIDATION OF WORKERS BY SECURITY PERSONNEL IN CIVILIAN DRESS. EMPLOYER AND UNION REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE "INVISIBLE COSTS" OF CORRUPTION, WHICH THEY AND OTHERS ESTIMATE CONSTITUTE UP TO 30 PERCENT OF A COMPANY'S EXPENSES.

LABOR LAW AND PRACTICE ARE THE SAME IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES AS IN THE REST OF THE COUNTRY.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

THE LAW FORBIDS FORCED LABOR, AND THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY ENFORCES IT. THE GOVERNMENT PROHIBITS FORCED AND BONDED LABOR BY CHILDREN, BUT DOES NOT ALWAYS ENFORCE THIS EFFECTIVELY. THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT SEVERAL THOUSAND CHILDREN ARE FORCED TO WORK ON FISHING PLATFORMS OFF THE EAST COAST OF NORTH SUMATRA IN CONDITIONS OF BONDED LABOR. MOST ARE RECRUITED FROM FARMING COMMUNITIES, AND ONCE THEY ARRIVE AT THE WORK SITE MILES

OFFSHORE, THEY ARE HELD AS VIRTUAL PRISONERS AND ARE NOT PERMITTED TO LEAVE FOR AT LEAST 3 MONTHS AND UNTIL A REPLACEMENT WORKER CAN BE FOUND. CHILDREN RECEIVE AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES OF $17 TO $32, WELL BELOW THE REGIONAL MINIMUM WAGE. THEY LIVE IN ISOLATION ON THE SEA, WORK 12 TO 20 HOURS PER DAY IN OFTEN DANGEROUS CONDITIONS, AND SLEEP IN THE WORKSPACE WITH NO ACCESS TO SANITARY FACILITIES. THERE ARE REPORTS OF PHYSICAL, VERBAL, AND SEXUAL ABUSE OF THE CHILDREN.

THERE WERE REPORTS THAT THE MILITARY FORCED VILLAGERS TO PERFORM UNCOMPENSATED LABOR IN IRIAN JAYA; THE MILITARY DENIED SUCH REPORTS (SEE SECTION 2.D.).

D. STATUS OF CHILD LABOR PRACTICES AND MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT

CHILD LABOR EXISTS IN BOTH URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, AND IN

UNCLASSIFIED

BOTH THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS. ACCORDING TO A 1995 REPORT OF THE INDONESIAN CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 4 PERCENT OF CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 14 WORK FULL-TIME, AND ANOTHER 4 PERCENT WORK PART-TIME IN ADDITION TO GOING TO SCHOOL. THE 1994 GOVERNMENT LABOR FORCE SURVEY REPORTED THAT THERE WERE 2.08 MILLION CHILDREN AGE 10 TO 14 IN THE LABOR FORCE, BUT MANY OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT NUMBER TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERSTATED, BECAUSE DOCUMENTS VERIFYING AGE ARE EASILY FALSIFIED, AND BECAUSE CHILDREN UNDER 10 WERE NOT INCLUDED.

INDONESIA WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO BE SELECTED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ILO'S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOR (IPEC), AND IT SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ILO IN 1992 TO GUIDE COLLABORATION UNDER THIS PROGRAM. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ILO SIGNED ANOTHER MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CHILD LABOR IN MARCH COMMITTING TO "PROMOTE CONDITIONS TO ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT WORKING CHILDREN AND PROGRESSIVELY PROHIBIT, RESTRICT AND REGULATE CHILD LABOR WITH A VIEW TO ITS ULTIMATE ELIMINATION." ALTHOUGH THE ILO

HAS SPONSORED TRAINING OF LABOR INSPECTORS ON CHILD LABOR MATTERS UNDER THE IPEC PROGRAM, ENFORCEMENT REMAINS LAX.

THE GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A CLASS OF CHILDREN WHO MUST WORK FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS, AND IN 1987 THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER ISSUED A REGULATION, "PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FORCED TO WORK." THIS REGULATION LEGALIZES THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14 WHO MUST WORK TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCOME OF THEIR

FAMILIES. IT REQUIRES PARENTAL CONSENT, PROHIBITS DANGEROUS OR DIFFICULT WORK, LIMITS WORK TO 4 HOURS DAILY, AND REQUIRES EMPLOYERS TO REPORT THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN WORKING UNDER ITS PROVISIONS. IT DOES NOT SET A MINIMUM AGE FOR CHILDREN IN THIS CATEGORY, EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDING THE COLONIAL-ERA GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE OF DECEMBER 17, 1925, ON "MEASURES LIMITING CHILD LABOR AND NIGHTWORK OF WOMEN," WHICH IS STILL THE CURRENT LAW GOVERNING CHILD LABOR AND SETS A MINIMUM AGE OF 12 FOR EMPLOYMENT. THE L987 REGULATION IS NOT ENFORCED. NO EMPLOYERS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO COURT FOR VIOLATING ITS RESTRICTIONS ON THE

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR CHILDREN, AND NO REPORTS ARE COLLECTED FROM ESTABLISHMENTS EMPLOYING CHILDREN.

ACT NO. 1 OF 1951 WAS INTENDED TO BRING INTO FORCE CERTAIN LABOR MEASURES, INCLUDING PROVISIONS ON CHILD LABOR THAT WOULD REPLACE THOSE OF THE 1925 LEGISLATION. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS FOR THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN ISSUED. THUS THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS IN THE 1951 ACT HAVE NO VALIDITY. THE GOVERNMENT PROHIBITS FORCED AND BONDED LABOR BY CHILDREN, BUT DOES NOT ENFORCE THIS PROHIBITION EFFECTIVELY (SEE SECTION 6.C.).

THE NEW MANPOWER LAW, WHICH TAKES EFFECT ON OCTOBER 1, 1998, PROHIBITS EMPLOYERS FROM HIRING CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 15, EXCEPT THAT EMPLOYERS MAY HIRE CHILDREN WHO ARE FORCED FOR ECONOMIC REASONS TO WORK. THE NEW LAW PLACES RESTRICTIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE 1987 REGULATION ON EMPLOYERS HIRING CHILDREN. IT ALSO STATES THAT

UNCLASSIFIED

ADOLESCENTS (AGES 15 TO 17) CANNOT WORK DURING CERTAIN HOURS OF THE NIGHT, BELOW GROUND, IN MINES, OR IN JOBS THAT WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON MORALITY, SUCH AS IN ENTERTAINMENT FACILITIES.

ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT LABOR FORCE DATA, MOST WORKING CHILDREN WORK IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF WORKING CHILDREN IN URBAN AREAS HAS RISEN SIGNIFICANTLY WITH URBANIZATION. MORE CHILD LABORERS WORK IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR THAN THE FORMAL SECTOR. WHERE CHILDREN WORK IN THE FORMAL SECTOR, SUCH WORK TENDS TO OCCUR ON THE BORDER LINE BETWEEN THE INFORMAL AND FORMAL ECONOMIES, SUCH AS ALONGSIDE THEIR PARENTS IN HOME ENTERPRISES AND ON PLANTATIONS, AND IN FAMILY-OWNED SHOPS AND SMALL FACTORIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT ARE SATELLITES" OF LARGE INDUSTRIES. THERE ARE CHILDREN WORKING IN LARGE FACTORIES, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER IS UNKNOWN, ESPECIALLY SINCE DOCUMENTS VERIFYING AGE ARE EASILY FALSIFIED. IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR, THEY SELL NEWSPAPERS, SHINE SHOES, HELP TO PARK OR WATCH CARS, AND OTHERWISE EARN MONEY. MANY CHILDREN WORK IN HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS AS SCAVENGERS AND GARBAGE PICKERS, AND ON FISHING PLATFORMS AND FISHING BOATS. MANY DOMESTIC WORKERS ARE FEMALE CHILDREN UNDER AGE 15. ALTHOUGH ACCURATE FIGURES ARE UNAVAILABLE, ESTIMATES PUT THE NUMBER OF CHILD DOMESTIC WORKERS AT UP TO 1.5 MILLION. A SURVEY

DONE IN 1995 REVEALED THAT THESE CHILDREN WORK LONG HOURS, RECEIVE LOW PAY, ARE GENERALLY UNAWARE OF THEIR RIGHTS, AND ARE OFTEN FAR FROM THEIR FAMILIES.

A 1994 LAW RAISED COMPULSORY EDUCATION FROM 6 TO 9 YEARS, BUT THE LAW HAS NOT BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED DUE TO INADEQUATE SCHOOL FACILITIES AND DUE TO LACK OF FAMILY FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO SUPPORT CHILDREN STAYING IN SCHOOL.

SOME EMPLOYERS HIRE CHILDREN BECAUSE THEY ARE EASIER THAN ADULTS TO MANAGE, AND TEND NOT TO ORGANIZE OR MAKE DEMANDS ON EMPLOYERS. CHILDREN WORKING IN FACTORIES USUALLY WORK THE SAME NUMBER OF HOURS AS ADULTS. CHILDREN WORK IN THE RATTAN AND WOOD FURNITURE INDUSTRIES, THE GARMENT INDUSTRY, THE FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY, FOOD PROCESSING, AND TOY MAKING, AMONG OTHERS.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

THERE IS NO NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE. RATHER, AREA WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL ESTABLISH MINIMUM WAGES FOR REGIONS AND BASIC NEEDS FIGURES FOR EACH PROVINCE--A MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. THE GOVERNMENT HAS INCREASED THE AVERAGE MINIMUM WAGE 70 PERCENT (WHEN ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION) OVER THE PAST 5 YEARS. AFTER THE LATEST INCREASE IN APRIL, WHICH AVERAGED 10 PERCENT NATIONWIDE, THE AVERAGE MINIMUM WAGE WAS EQUAL TO 95 PERCENT OF THE GOVERNMENT-DETERMINED "MINIMUM LIVING NEED. " IN JAKARTA THE MINIMUM WAGE, WHICH WAS ABOUT $70 (RP 172,500) PER MONTH AT THE TIME IT WENT INTO EFFECT, HAS, BECAUSE OF THE FALL IN THE VALUE OF THE RUPIAH, BECOME ABOUT $30 AT YEAR'S END. AN ADDITIONAL INCREASE IS EXPECTED IN EARLY 1998.

THERE ARE NO RELIABLE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYERS PAYING AT LEAST THE MINIMUM WAGE. INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS ESTIMATES RANGE BETWEEN 30 AND 60 PERCENT. ENFORCEMENT OF MINIMUM WAGE AND OTHER LABOR REGULATIONS REMAINS INADEQUATE, AND SANCTIONS TOO LIGHT, ALTHOUGH THE NEW MANPOWER LAW, WHICH IS TO TAKE EFFECT ON OCTOBER 1, 1998, INCREASES PENALTIES FOR NOT PAYING THE MINIMUM WAGE

FROM RUPIAH 100,000 (ABOUT $30 AT THE TIME OF ENACTMENT $18 AT THE END OF THE YEAR) TO RUPIAH 200,000,000 ($60,000 AT THE TIME OF ENACTMENT, $36,000 AT YEAR'S END). DURING THE YEAR, ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES, 464 COMPANIES APPLIED FOR RELIEF FROM THE MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES ON THE GROUND THAT THEY WOULD OTHERWISE CLOSE, AND 276 RECEIVED PERMISSION FOR EXCEPTIONS OR POSTPONEMENTS OF THE NEW WAGE RATE.

LABOR LAW AND MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PROVIDE WORKERS WITH A VARIETY OF OTHER BENEFITS, SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY, AND WORKERS IN MORE MODERN FACILITIES OFTEN RECEIVE HEALTH BENEFITS, FREE MEALS, AND TRANSPORTATION. THE LAW ESTABLISHES 7- OR 8-HOUR WORKDAYS AND A 40-HOUR WORKWEEK, WITH ONE 30-MINUTE REST PERIOD FOR EACH 4 HOURS OF WORK. THE LAW ALSO REQUIRES 1 DAY OF REST WEEKLY. THE DAILY OVERTIME RATE IS 1 1/2 TIMES THE NORMAL HOURLY RATE FOR THE FIRST HOUR, AND 2 TIMES THE HOURLY RATE FOR ADDITIONAL OVERTIME. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE. WORKERS IN INDUSTRIES THAT PRODUCE RETAIL GOODS FOR EXPORT FREQUENTLY

WORK OVERTIME TO FULFILL CONTRACT QUOTAS. OBSERVANCE OF LAWS REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND BY REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ARE FAIRLY COMMON AND OFTEN RESULT IN STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. THE MINISTRY OF MANPOWER CONTINUES PUBLICLY TO URGE EMPLOYERS TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW. DURING THE YEAR, THE GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATED 31 COMPANIES FOR LABOR LAW VIOLATIONS, OF WHICH 13 WERE TAKEN TO COURT, 6 OF THESE CASES RESULTED IN PRISON SENTENCES FOR COMPANY MANAGEMENT AND 6 IN FINES. HOWEVER, IN GENERAL, GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ARE WEAK.

BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. IN JANUARY THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED A NEW OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEM UNDER WHICH COMPANIES WITH MORE THAN 100 EMPLOYEES

COULD OBTAIN PUBLIC RECOGNITION OF THEIR COMPLIANCE WITH SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS BY SUBMITTING TO A SAFETY AUDIT PROCEDURE. IN THE LARGELY WESTERN-OPERATED OIL SECTOR, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUNCTION REASONABLY WELL. HOWEVER, IN THE COUNTRY'S 100,000 LARGER REGISTERED COMPANIES OUTSIDE THE OIL SECTOR, THE QUALITY OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAMS VARIES GREATLY. THE ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS IS SEVERELY

HAMPERED BY THE LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER INSPECTORS AS WELL AS BY THE LOW LEVEL OF EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION FOR SOUND HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES. ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION ON THE PART OF INSPECTORS ARE COMMON. WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT

HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS. ERNPLOYERS ARE FORBIDDEN BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST THOSE WHO DO, BUT THE LAW IS NOT EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED.

END TEXT.
TALBOTT

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6289

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 01 OF 34 232121Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEE4D 232121Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3740
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

1. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS THE 1998 COUNTRY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR INDONESIA

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 01 OF 34 232121Z

3. INDONESIA'S AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM CAME UNDER SUSTAINED CHALLENGE DURING 1998, RESULTING IN SOEHARTO'S DEPARTURE FROM OFFICE AND OPENING THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY FOR MEANINGFUL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN OVER THIRTY YEARS. THE ULTIMATE EXTENT OF THESE REFORMS REMAINED UNCLEAR. TWO MONTHS AFTER HIS REELECTION TO A SEVENTH FIVE-YEAR TERM IN MARCH, POPULAR PRESSURE FORCED SOEHARTO TO RESIGN IN FAVOR OF HIS HAND-PICKED VICE PRESIDENT, B.J. HABIBIE. THE NEW PRESIDENT IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED A SERIES OF STEPS TO ADDRESS DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS. WITH MANY QUESTIONING HIS LEGITIMACY BECAUSE OF HIS CLOSE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200504419

ASSOCIATION WITH SOEHARTO, PRESIDENT HABIBIE ESTABLISHED A WORKING ALLIANCE WITH THE MILITARY, FORMED A CABINET DRAWING HEAVILY ON HOLDOVERS FROM THE LAST SOEHARTO CABINET, AND STRENGTHENED HIS POSITION WITHIN THE RULING PARTY, GOLKAR. IN RESPONSE TO DEMANDS FOR EARLY ELECTIONS, PRESIDENT HABIBIE PLEDGED TO ADVANCE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS BY THREE YEARS, TO HOLD THEM UNDER FUNDAMENTALLY REVISED ELECTORAL LAWS, AND TO COMPLETE SELECTION OF A NEW PRESIDENT BY THE END OF 1999. THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWED NEW POLITICAL PARTIES TO FORM AND ADOPTED A MORE RESPONSIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD GROUPS DEMANDING IMPROVED PROTECTIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. WITH THE ECONOMIC CRISIS GENERATING FRICTION AMONG SOCIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS, THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF "PANCASILA," WHICH STRESSES CONSULTATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, RECEIVED LESS EMPHASIS AS A BLATANT TOOL TO LIMIT DISSENT AND ENFORCE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL COHESION. THE JUDICIARY REMAINED SUBORDINATED TO THE EXECUTIVE AND SUFFERS FROM PERVASIVE CORRUPTION.

THE ARMED FORCES HAVE BROAD NON-MILITARY POWERS UNDER A "DUAL FUNCTION" CONCEPT THAT ACCORDS THEM A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ROLE IN GOVERNMENT. THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE 450,000-MEMBER ARMED FORCES, WHICH INCLUDES 175,000 POLICE, IS MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY. IN THE MORE OPEN POST-SOEHARTO CLIMATE, THE DUAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE CAME UNDER CHALLENGE FROM STUDENT AND OTHER SOCIAL GROUPS. THE ARMED FORCES PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED SEVERAL AREAS OF PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND LAUNCHED STILL ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS INTO SOME OF THE WORST VIOLATIONS. IN THE ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS, THE MILITARY AND POLICE CONTINUED TO COMMIT NUMEROUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES THROUGHOUT THE YEAR.

THE COUNTRY'S SEVERE ECONOMIC CRISIS LEAD TO MASSIVE UNEMPLOYMENT, FOOD SHORTAGES, AND A DRAMATIC DROP IN LIVING STANDARDS, AND A RISE IN CRIME, LOOTING, AND OTHER SYMPTOMS OF SOCIAL BREAKDOWN. WIDE-SPREAD CORRUPTION REMAINED A PROBLEM. MAJOR UNREST SPURRED DEMANDS BOTH FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO ACT MORE EFFECTIVELY TO ADDRESS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INEQUITIES AND TO CURB DISORDERS. IN RURAL AREAS, DISCONTENT OFTEN FOCUSED ON THE GRIEVANCES OF SMALL LAND OWNERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE FORCED OFF THEIR LAND BY POWERFUL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTERESTS. IN SOME REGIONS, EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES ENTAILED SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION WITH ADVERSE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO COMMIT SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. ITS PERFORMANCE IMPROVED AFTER THE RESIGNATION OF

PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, WHEN IT ENDORSED BROADENED PRESS FREEDOM, RELEASED NUMEROUS POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND SIGNED OR RATIFIED IMPORTANT HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR CONVENTIONS. IN ADDITION, IT FACED MOUNTING PUBLIC PRESSURE TO STRENGTHEN PROTECTIONS FOR HUMAN, LABOR AND CIVIL RIGHTS. DURING SOEHARTO'S FINAL YEAR IN OFFICE, AT LEAST 20 ACTIVISTS DISAPPEARED. THE ARMED FORCES IN AUGUST ACKNOWLEDGED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ILLEGALLY KIDNAPPING NINE ACTIVISTS WHO HAD ALREADY BEEN RELEASED, MANY OF WHOM SAID THEY WERE TORTURED WHILE IN DETENTION. AT LEAST 12 ACTIVISTS REMAINED MISSING AS OF SEPTEMBER. PUNISHMENTS SHORT OF CRIMINAL SANCTION WERE IMPOSED ON THREE HIGH RANKING OFFICERS IN CONNECTION WITH THESE KIDNAPPINGS, AND PLANS WERE ANNOUNCED TO COURT MARTIAL TEN OTHER LOWER-RANKING MILITARY PERSONNEL. SECURITY FORCES SHOT AND KILLED FOUR UNARMED STUDENTS PARTICIPATING IN A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ON MAY 12. TWO POLICE OFFICERS WERE SENTENCED TO SHORT JAIL TERMS FOR THESE KILLINGS, THOUGH MANY VIEWED THEM AS SCAPEGOATS, BELIEVING THAT OTHER AUTHORITIES WERE RESPONSIBLE. DURING MASSIVE RIOTS IN MID MAY, MOBS TARGETED THE ETHNIC CHINESE COMMUNITY, WHICH WAS NOT PROTECTED BY THE AUTHORITIES. FOLLOWING THE RIOTS, SERIOUS ALLEGATIONS OF MASS RAPE OF ETHNIC CHINESE WOMEN WERE MADE, FORCING THE GOVERNMENT TO

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00 /026W	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00

----------6DEE59 232121Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3741

INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

ESTABLISH A CREDIBLE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE RIOTS AND RAPES. SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, INCLUDING OF UNARMED CIVILIANS, IN PARTICULAR IN EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA.

THE PARLIAMENT APPROVED THE TORTURE CONVENTION, BUT LEGAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST TORTURE ARE STILL INADEQUATE. PRISON CONDITIONS REMAINED HARSH.

THE GOVERNMENT'S LIMITS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS LOOSENED CONSIDERABLY DURING THE FIRST FIVE MONTHS OF THE YEAR. PRIOR TO SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION, PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT INTENSIFIED AND RECEIVED BROAD COVERAGE IN THE PRESS. THE MEDIA ALSO CARRIED REGULAR REPORTS OF CALLS FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM AND FOR SOEHARTO TO STEP DOWN. FOLLOWING SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION, PRESS FREEDOM EXPANDED DRAMATICALLY BUT STILL LACKS INSTITUTIONALIZED PROTECTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT FLOATED PROPOSALS FOR LICENSING JOURNALISTS, REQUIRING PERMITS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS AND CONTROLLING NEWS COVERAGE OF DEMONSTRATIONS.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO IMPOSE LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION, ESPECIALLY DURING THE FIRST FIVE MONTHS OF THE YEAR. THOUGH STUDENTS WERE GENERALLY PERMITTED TO DEMONSTRATE ON CAMPUS, SECURITY FORCES FREQUENTLY USED FORCE TO PREVENT THEM FROM TAKING PROTESTS OFF-CAMPUS AND OCCASIONALLY ENTERED THE CAMPUSES AND BEAT STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS. IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MARCH PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION, NUMEROUS PEACEFUL PROTESTS WERE BROKEN UP BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES, LEADING TO THE ARREST, TRIAL AND CONVICTION OF ACTIVISTS. SECURITY FORCES THROUGHOUT THE YEAR OFTEN REACTED HARSHLY TO PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS OR IN DISPUTES WITH CITIZENS, LEADING IN MANY CASES TO INJURY TO, AND IN SOME CASES THE KILLING OF,

DEMONSTRATORS. IN RESPONDING TO MAJOR RIOTS, SECURITY

FORCES GENERALLY REFRAINED FROM USING LETHAL FORCE. THEY WERE FREQUENTLY CRITICIZED, HOWEVER, FOR NOT ACTING IN TIME TO PROTECT CITIZENS AND PROPERTY FROM THE LARGE-SCALE DESTRUCTION THAT OCCURRED. IN THE CASE OF THE MAY RIOTS, THERE WERE ALLEGATIONS THAT THE UNREST WAS ORGANIZED AND HAD LINKS TO SECURITY FORCES. NUMEROUS DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED FOLLOWING SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION, AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT ISSUED A CONTROVERSIAL DECREE RESTRICTING DEMONSTRATIONS. THE DECREE WAS RESCINDED, BUT THEN SENT TO THE PARLIAMENT IN THE FORM OF LEGISLATION FOR CONSIDERATION.

THE GOVERNMENT LEGALLY PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR FIVE DESIGNATED RELIGIONS; UNRECOGNIZED RELIGIONS ARE SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, THE DISABLED, AND ETHNIC MINORITIES, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ARE ENDEMIC PROBLEMS.

DESPITE WORSENING CONDITIONS FOR WORKERS DUE TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, THE GOVERNMENT TOOK SEVERAL POSITIVE STEPS IN REGARD TO WORKER RIGHTS. THE GOVERNMENT RELEASED THE COUNTRY'S BEST-KNOWN LABOR LEADER FROM DETENTION AND WITHDREW ALL CHARGES AGAINST HIM. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO RATIFIED INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) CONVENTION 87 ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, ALLOWED NEW AND PREVIOUSLY UNRECOGNIZED INDEPENDENT TRADE UNIONS TO OPERATE, AND POSTPONED IMPLEMENTATION OF A CONTROVERSIAL MANPOWER LAW TO PERMIT REVISION AND PUBLIC CONSULTATION. HOWEVER, THE MILITARY AND POLICE CONTINUED TO INTERVENE IN LABOR DISPUTES, ALBEIT LESS HARSHLY THAN IN THE EARLY 1990'S, AND ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR STANDARDS REMAINED WEAK.

ECONOMIC PRESSURES FORCED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF CHILDREN OUT OF SCHOOL AND LIKELY INCREASED THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN WORKING. THE PRACTICE OF BONDED CHILD LABOR ON FISHING PLATFORMS CONTINUED.

WITH THE DEMISE OF THE SOEHARTO REGIME, UN-SPONSORED PORTUGUESE-INDONESIAN TALKS ON EAST TIMOR GAINED NEW MOMENTUM, AS THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO DISCUSS AN INDONESIAN PLAN OFFERING SPECIAL STATUS FOR EAST TIMORESE GOING WELL BEYOND WHAT WAS POSSIBLE UNDER THE OLD GOVERNMENT. ((TALKS WERE SCHEDULED TO RESUME IN OCTOBER --UPDATE WILL BE NEEDED)) IN EAST TIMOR ITSELF, THERE WERE INCREASING

EXPRESSIONS OF POPULAR OPPOSITION TO THE INDONESIAN ADMINISTRATION, AND PRO-REFERENDUM FORCES BEGAN TO OPERATE MORE OPENLY. A SURGE OF SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE FOLLOWING SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION CAUSED TENSIONS TO RISE SHARPLY AND PRECIPITATED THE DEPARTURE OF SEVERAL THOUSAND INDONESIAN OFFICIALS AND OTHER NON-EAST TIMORESE, REPORTEDLY CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR SECURITY. SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES CONTINUED DESPITE A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY. EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS ROSE SHARPLY, WITH CONFIRMED REPORTS OF 37 KILLINGS IN THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS OF THE YEAR. CREDIBLE SOURCES ATTRIBUTED THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THESE INCIDENTS TO THE INDONESIAN MILITARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6316

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 03 OF 34 232122Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00 /026W	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00

----------6DEE71 232122Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3742
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

THE INSURGENTS ALSO CARRIED OUT 6 EXECUTIONS. AS IN PAST YEARS, DISAPPEARANCES, TORTURE AND EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE ON THE PART OF THE AUTHORITIES CONTINUED. FOLLOWING THE MAY EVENTS, THERE WAS A MORE OPEN ATMOSPHERE IN EAST TIMOR

WITH INCREASED TOLERANCE FOR FREEDOMS OF ASSEMBLY, EXPRESSION, AND PRESS. A JUNE VISIT BY A TROIKA OF EUROPEAN AMBASSADORS WAS GREETED WITH LARGE PRO-REFERENDUM DEMONSTRATIONS. THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT RELEASED (AS OF LATE AUGUST) 29 EAST TIMORESE POLITICAL PRISONERS BUT RESISTANCE LEADER XANANA GUSMAO REMAINED IN PRISON DESPITE INTERNATIONAL CALLS THAT HE BE FREED TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS. NO PROGRESS WAS MADE IN ACCOUNTING FOR PERSONS MISSING FOLLOWING THE 1991 DILI INCIDENT OR OTHERS WHO DISAPPEARED IN RECENT YEARS. WHILE THE MILITARY CARRIED OUT A HIGHLY PUBLICIZED WITHDRAWAL OF SOME 1000 TROOPS, IT COULD NOT BE CONFIRMED WHETHER THIS WAS A REDUCTION IN THE HIGH NUMBER OF TROOPS IN EAST TIMOR OR A TROOP ROTATION. THE GOVERNMENT GRANTED INCREASED ACCESS TO THE AREA TO FOREIGN JOURNALISTS BUT CONTINUED TO BAN TRAVEL BY FOREIGN HUMAN RIGHTS NGO'S EXCEPT FOR THE ICRC. IN JULY, A RESPECTED EAST TIMORESE WAS APPOINTED DIRECTOR OF THE PREVIOUSLY DORMANT BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH HAD OPENED IN 1996. WHILE IN MOST CASES THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS WENT UNPUNISHED, THE MILITARY PROSECUTED A SOLDIER WHO HAD KILLED A CIVILIAN.

IN IRIAN JAYA, RESENTMENT AMONG INDIGENOUS GROUPS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT BOILED OVER IN DEMONSTRATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE FROM INDONESIA IN FOUR CITIES JULY 1-6. SECURITY FORCES RESPONDED HARSHLY, KILLING ONE PERSON IN JAYAPURA, ONE IN SORONG, AND A STILL UNDETERMINED NUMBER IN BIAK. DEMONSTRATORS BEAT A PLAINCLOTHES POLICEMAN TO DEATH IN JAYAPURA AND INJURED SECURITY PERSONNEL IN OTHER CITIES. THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT, THE NATIONAL HUMAN

RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, AND A CONSORTIUM OF NGOS ALL CONDUCTED INVESTIGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN IRIAN JAYA. AN INVESTIGATION BY A GROUP OF IRIANESE CHURCHES AND THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CONFIRMED EARLIER REPORTS OF 11 EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OF IRIAN JAYA AND IS CONTINUING ITS INVESTIGATION INTO REPORTS THAT SECURITY FORCES KILLED ANOTHER 43 PERSONS IN 1997.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON,

INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING

HISTORICALLY, POLITICALLY RELATED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS HAVE OCCURRED MOST FREQUENTLY IN AREAS WHERE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS WERE ACTIVE, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAYA, AND SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO EMPLOY HARSH MEASURES AGAINST SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN THESE AREAS. IN ADDITION TO THESE THREE OFFICIALLY DESIGNATED "TROUBLED AREAS," SECURITY FORCES KILLED UNARMED STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS, AND THERE WERE ALSO NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF REPORTED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES IN CASES INVOLVING ALLEGED COMMON CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.

SECURITY FORCES BEAT FOUR BYSTANDERS WHILE BREAKING UP A LARGE STUDENT DEMONSTRATION IN YOGYAKARTA ON MAY 9. ONE

OF THE VICTIMS DIED FROM THE BEATING. SECURITY FORCES SHOT AND KILLED FOUR UNARMED STUDENTS PARTICIPATING IN A LARGE, PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION AT JAKARTA'S TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY ON MAY 12. SOCIETAL ANGER OVER THE KILLINGS HELPED CAUSE THE RIOTING THAT TOOK PLACE IN JAKARTA ON MAY 13-14. THE INCIDENT OCCURRED AFTER SECURITY FORCES BLOCKED THE PROTESTORS FROM MARCHING TO THE PARLIAMENT. THE TWO SIDES ENGAGED IN A BRIEF CONFRONTATION WHICH WAS RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATION, AND THE STUDENTS BEGAN RETURNING TO CAMPUS. AT THAT POINT SHOTS WERE FIRED KILLING THE STUDENTS, ALLEGEDLY BY THE POLICE.

CREDIBLE SOURCES CONFIRMED SOME 37 EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS IN EAST TIMOR IN THE FIRST 8 MONTHS OF THE YEAR. IN A CASE UNDER INVESTIGATION BY THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, FOUR EAST TIMORESE CIVILIANS WERE KILLED BY INDONESIAN FORCES IN JANUARY IN THE BOBONARO AREA. A HERDSMAN WAS KILLED BY INDONESIAN SPECIAL FORCES TROOPS NEAR VENILALE IN FEBRUARY. IN APRIL, AN EAST TIMORESE WOMAN AND HER TWO CHILDREN WERE KILLED WHEN INDONESIAN FORCES ASSAULTED HER HOUSE IN BAUCAU. IN ANOTHER ATTACK ON A HOUSE IN BAUCAU, TWO EAST TIMORESE MEN WERE KILLED IN MAY. ALSO IN MAY, MILITARY PERSONNEL REPORTEDLY KILLED COSTODIO DA SILVA NUNES WHEN HE RAN FROM

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 04 OF 34 232122Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEE88 232122Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3743
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

THEM NEAR LIQUICA. IN JUNE, HERMAN DAS DOARES SOARES WAS SHOT IN THE BACK BY THE MILITARY NEAR MANATUTO WHILE GATHERING WOOD, AND DIED ON HIS WAY TO THE HOSPITAL. ONE SOLDIER WAS FOUND GUILTY OF MURDER IN THE INCIDENT AND

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 04 OF 34 232122Z
SENTENCED TO TEN YEARS IMPRISONMENT. ALSO IN JUNE, MANUEL MARQUES SOARES WAS APPARENTLY KILLED BY A STRAY BULLET WHEN SECURITY FORCES FIRED AT A CROWD OF PROTESTORS IN MANATUTO. IN LATE JUNE, ORLANDO MARCELINO DA COSTA WAS KILLED BY SECURITY FORCES WHO FIRED INTO A CROWD DEMONSTRATING DURING THE VISIT OF THE EUROPEAN TROIKA AMBASSADORS TO BAUCAU. IN AUGUST, SECURITY FORCES FATALLY SHOT A CIVILIAN IN BOBONARO, EAST TIMOR IN WHAT THE LOCAL OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CALLED A RETALIATION KILLING FOLLOWING AN EARLIER ALTERCATION. CREDIBLE SOURCES REPORTED THAT THE RESISTANCE CARRIED OUT 6 EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS OF SUSPECTED CIVILIAN COLLABORATORS.

IN IRIAN JAYA, A GROUP OF IRIANESE CHURCHES ISSUED A

REPORT IN MAY CHARGING THE INDONESIAN MILITARY WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING OF 11 PERSONS IN THE SOUTH CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OF IRIAN JAYA DURING A MILITARY OPERATION AIMED AT CAPTURING SEPARATISTS WHO KIDNAPPED (AND LATER KILLED TWO MEMBERS OF) A GROUP OF RESEARCHERS IN JANUARY 1996. THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED THE KILLINGS AND IS CONTINUING AN INVESTIGATION INTO 43 OTHER DEATHS WHICH THE CHURCH COMMISSION SAID WERE CAUSED BY THE MILITARY. THE INDONESIAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IS CONTINUING AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REPORTED SHOOTING DEATHS OF AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF PERSONS AFTER SECURITY FORCES FORCEFULLY BROKE UP A LARGE DEMONSTRATION IN FAVOR OF INDEPENDENCE FOR IRIAN JAYA IN BIAK ON JULY 6.

IN ACEH, THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF MASS GRAVES AND

KILLINGS CARRIED OUT BY SECURITY FORCES IN THE PAST AND INTO 1998. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND A PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION CARRIED OUT INVESTIGATIONS OF MASS GRAVES, EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCES, RAPE AND TORTURE THAT TOOK PLACE IN ACEH DURING 1989-91 AND 1997-98. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ISSUED A PRELIMINARY REPORT IN AUGUST FINDING THAT 781 PEOPLE HAD BEEN KILLED, 163 DISAPPEARED, 368 TORTURED, 3,000 WIDOWED, 15-20,000 ORPHANED, 102 RAPED, AND 102 BUILDINGS DESTROYED. REPORTS OF DISAPPEARANCES AND OTHER SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES CONTINUED UNTIL MAY OF 1998. BETWEEN 24-34 ACEHNESE WERE REPORTEDLY ABDUCTED IN THE PERIOD DECEMBER 1997 TO MAY 1998 AND REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR. THE ARMED FORCES COMMANDER VISITED ACEH AND APOLOGIZED FOR "EXCESSES" COMMITTED BY THE MILITARY IN THE PROVINCE. SINCE THE VISIT, THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE SEPARATIST ACEH MERDEKA MOVEMENT HAS BEEN ELIMINATED AS A VIABLE FORCE. NONETHELESS, TENSIONS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE LOCAL POPULATION IN THE PROVINCE REMAIN HIGH, AS REFLECTED BY RIOTING IN LHOKSUMAWE IN LATE AUGUST AND EARLY SEPTEMBER. DURING THE LHOKSUMAWE RIOTING, ONE LOCAL RESIDENT WAS KILLED AND EIGHT OTHERS INJURED BY GUNFIRE IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH SECURITY FORCES.

THE POLICE OFTEN EMPLOYED DEADLY FORCE IN APPREHENDING SUSPECTS OR COPING WITH ALLEGED CRIMINALS, MANY OF WHOM WERE UNARMED. IN RESPONSE TO PROTESTS THAT THE METHODS USED WERE UNJUSTIFIABLY HARSH AND AMOUNTED TO EXECUTION WITHOUT TRIAL, POLICE GENERALLY CLAIMED THAT THE SUSPECTS WERE FLEEING, RESISTING ARREST, OR THREATENING THE POLICE.

UNCLASSIFIED

COMPLETE STATISTICS ABOUT THE NUMBER OF THESE CASES HAVE NOT BEEN RELEASED. A POLICE SPOKESMAN IN JAKARTA TOLD THE PRESS THAT A SUSPECTED DRUG DEALER HAD BEEN SHOT BY POLICE IN FEBRUARY WHEN HE RESISTED ARREST BY PULLING A KNIFE AND IGNORING WARNING SHOTS. ACCORDING TO A PRESS REPORT, THE VICTIM DIED FROM A SHOT TO THE HEAD.

IN THE PAST, HIGHER AUTHORITIES RARELY PUNISHED THE MILITARY OR POLICE FOR USING EXCESSIVE FORCE. THE ARMED FORCES' INVESTIGATION INTO THE TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS IMPLICATED 18 POLICE OFFICERS, TWO OF WHOM WERE COURT MARTIALED AS OF SEPTEMBER. LAWYERS FOR THE DEFENDANTS CHARGED THAT THEIR CLIENTS HAD BEEN WRONGLY ACCUSED. THE PROSECUTION HAD INDICATED THAT THE POLICE FIRED RUBBER BULLETS, BUT THE DEFENSE AND OTHERS CONTENDED THAT THE STUDENTS HAD BEEN KILLED BY LIVE AMMUNITION. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN A MAY 27 STATEMENT INDICATED THAT IT WAS NOT ABLE TO MEET WITH A NUMBER OF WITNESSES TO THE SHOOTINGS BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN "THREATENED BY AN UNIDENTIFIED PERSON." IT ALSO REPORTED THAT IT HAD OBTAINED EVIDENCE THAT THE POLICE HAD NOT USED LIVE AMMUNITION. ON AUGUST 12, THE TWO POLICE OFFICERS WERE CONVICTED BY A MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF DISOBEYING OR EXCEEDING ORDERS BY ORDERING THEIR SUBORDINATES TO SHOOT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEE8E 232123Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3744
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

INTO THE DEMONSTRATING STUDENTS. THE TWO RECEIVED SENTENCES OF 10 MONTHS AND FOUR MONTHS IN PRISON. TRIALS IN THE CASES OF THE OTHER 16 DEFENDANTS HAD YET TO BEGIN AS OF SEPTEMBER.

FIVE CASES OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN IRIAN JAYA INVOLVING THE DEATH OF IRIANESE CIVILIANS, CITED IN A 1995 REPORT BY THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, HAVE LANGUISHED.

POLICE RESUMED THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 1993 MURDER OF LABOR ACTIVIST MARSINAH, QUESTIONING OLD AND NEW WITNESSES, AFTER NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND LABOR GROUPS CALLED FOR A FRESH EFFORT TO SOLVE THE CASE. IN SEPTEMBER 1997 POLICE HAD ANNOUNCED A "TEMPORARY POSTPONEMENT" IN THE INVESTIGATION.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

SECURITY FORCES ABDUCTED, DETAINED, AND IN SOME CASES TORTURED, NUMEROUS STUDENT AND NGO ACTIVISTS. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, THE CONFIRMED DISAPPEARANCES OCCURRED IN THREE PHASES: NEAR THE TIME OF THE MAY 1997 ELECTION, IN THE TWO MONTHS PRIOR TO THE MARCH 1997 PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) SESSION, AND IN THE PERIOD JUST BEFORE SOEHARTO'S MAY 21 RESIGNATION. BY MAY, NINE OF THOSE KIDNAPPED IN THE SECOND PHASE WERE RELEASED FROM CAPTIVITY AND HAD "REAPPEARED." THEY WERE PIUS LUSTRILANANG, DESMON MAHESA, HARYANTO TASLAM, FAISOL REZA, RAHARDJO WALUYO DJATI, NEZAL PATRIA, MUGIANTO, AAN RUSDIANTO, AND ANDI ARIEF. SEVERAL SPOKE OUT PUBLICLY ABOUT THEIR EXPERIENCES. NONE OF THE THOSE ABDUCTED IN THE FIRST AND THIRD PHASES HAD REAPPEARED AS OF SEPTEMBER.

PIUS LUSTRILANANG, CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (ALDERA), TESTIFIED BEFORE THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON APRIL 27 ABOUT HIS ORDEAL. ACCORDING TO HIS STATEMENT, HE WAS KIDNAPPED IN JAKARTA ON FEBRUARY 4 WHILE WAITING FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION BY AN ARMED MAN WHO SHOVED HIM INTO A CAR. HE WAS HANDCUFFED AND BLINDFOLDED. HE WAS TAKEN TO AN UNIDENTIFIED PLACE WHERE HE WAS QUESTIONED AND TORTURED (SEE SECTION 1C). HE DESCRIBED THE FACILITY WHERE HE WAS HELD THAT CONTAINED SIX CELLS AND OTHER DISAPPEARED ACTIVISTS. PRIOR TO HIS APRIL 2 RELEASE, HE WAS THREATENED WITH DEATH IF HE SPOKE OF HIS EXPERIENCE. HE NEVER SAW THE KIDNAPPERS DURING HIS TWO MONTHS OF CAPTIVITY. DESMON MAHESA, THE CHAIRMAN OF LBH NUSANTARA AND A MEMBER OF ALDERA, ON MAY 12 GAVE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCE. ON FEBRUARY 3 HE WAS ON HIS WAY TO A MEETING AND WAS APPROACHED BY TWO MEN ARMED WITH PISTOLS WHO BEAT HIM. HE WAS PULLED INTO A CAR AND A BAG WAS PUT OVER HIS HEAD. HE WAS TAKEN TO A ROOM WHERE HE WAS INTERROGATED AND TORTURED (SEE SECTION 1C). HE WAS HELD IN THE SAME FACILITY AS PIUS LUSTRILANANG. MAHESA WAS RELEASED ON APRIL 3 AT THE JAKARTA AIRPORT. RAHARDJO WALUYO DJATI, FROM THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE (KNPD), PUBLICLY SPOKE ON JUNE 4 ABOUT HIS MARCH 12 ABDUCTION. HE WAS TAKEN TO AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION WHERE HE WAS INTERROGATED AND, FOR THE FIRST THREE DAYS, TORTURED (SEE SECTION 1C). THE KIDNAPPERS TRANSFERRED HIM TO THE POLICE ON APRIL 17. FAIZAL REZA, GAVE PUBLIC TESTIMONY ON JUNE 26 ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS ABDUCTED AND THROWN INTO A CAR AND BLINDFOLDED WHILE WAITING FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION. HE WAS TAKEN TO

A LARGE BUILDING IN JAKARTA AND TORTURED (SEE SECTION 1C). ANDI ARIEF, THE HEAD OF THE STUDENT WING (SMID) OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD), ON JULY 21 PUBLICLY SPOKE ABOUT HIS MARCH 28 KIDNAPPING FROM LAMPUNG, SOUTH SUMATRA AND SUBSEQUENT INTERROGATION. HE HAD BEEN HELD CAPTIVE FOR ALMOST THREE WEEKS IN JAKARTA ALONG WITH OTHER POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, AND THEN TURNED OVER TO THE INDONESIAN POLICE WHO HELD UNTIL HE WAS RELEASED ON JULY 15. HE WAS NOT PHYSICALLY TORTURED.

FOUR MORE OF THE DISAPPEARED ALSO RESURFACED, INCLUDING INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) OFFICIAL HARYANTO TASLAM AND STUDENTS NEZAR PATRIA, MUGIANTO, AND AAN RUSDIANTO.

LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS LIST 12 MISSING AS OF SEPTEMBER, AND THERE ARE FEARS THAT SOME OR ALL MAY HAVE BEEN KILLED BY THEIR ABDUCTORS. A MEMBER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION THE END OF AUGUST CALLED ON THE ARMED FORCES TO EXPLAIN TO THE PUBLIC THE STATUS OF THE MISSING AND TO FIND THEM, ALIVE OR DEAD.

SIX OF THOSE STILL MISSING ARE THOUGHT TO HAVE DISAPPEARED IN JAKARTA IN 1997 NEAR THE TIME OF THE GENERAL ELECTION. THEIR NAMES ARE M. YUSUF, YANI AVRI, SONNY, NOVAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 06 OF 34 232123Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEE97 232123Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3745
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

ALKATIRI, DEDDY HAMDUM, AND ISMAIL. TWO DISAPPEARED DURING THE RUN-UP TO THE MARCH MPR, BUT -- UNLIKE THE NINE OTHER FROM THAT PERIOD WHO WERE RELEASED-- HAVE NOT REAPPEARED. THEIR NAMES ARE SUYAT, WHO DISAPPEARED IN

SOLO, AND HERMAN HENDRAWAN, WHO DISAPPEARED IN JAKARTA. FOUR DISAPPEARED AFTER THE MPR, MOST ON MAY 14 IN JAKARTA. THEY INCLUDED BIMO PETRUS, UCOK MUNANDAR SIAHAAN, HENDRA HAMBALIE, AND YADIN MUHIDIDN (MAY 14). AN ACTIVIST AND STREET SINGER LIVING IN SOLO WENT MISSING IN MAY. HE WAS FOUND DEAD IN EAST JAVA ON MAY 23. THERE WERE SUSPICIONS THAT HE HAD BEEN KILLED BECAUSE OF HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

THERE WERE NUMEROUS REPORTS OF DISAPPEARANCES IN EAST TIMOR. IN MOST CASES THE MISSING PERSONS TURN OUT TO HAVE BEEN DETAINED WITHOUT NOTIFICATION TO THEIR FAMILIES.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ISSUED A STATEMENT ON APRIL 30 FINDING THAT A "WELL-ORGANIZED GROUP" HAD CARRIED OUT THE DISAPPEARANCES, CONCLUDING THAT THERE WERE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT "ELEMENTS OF SECURITY FORCES" WERE INVOLVED. PRIOR TO THAT, DEFENSE MINISTER/ARMED FORCES COMMANDER GENERAL WIRANTO HAD SAID THAT THERE WAS NO ORDER FOR ARMED FORCES TO KIDNAP PEOPLE AND THAT THE ARMED FORCES WOULD HELP FIND THE MISSING. ON JUNE 29, WIRANTO REVEALED THAT THE ARMED FORCES HAD IDENTIFIED SEVERAL OF ITS PERSONNEL WHO WERE "ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED" IN THE KIDNAPPING OF ACTIVISTS AND WHO "EXCEEDED THEIR AUTHORITY" AND SAID THAT THE ARMED FORCES WAS WORKING WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND A LOCAL NGO IN ITS INVESTIGATION. ON JULY 3 THE ARMED FORCES REVEALED THAT ITS INTERNAL INVESTIGATION HAD CONCLUDED THAT SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL WERE INVOLVED IN THE DISAPPEARANCES, BUT CLAIMED THAT THIS RESULTED FROM "PROCEDURAL ERRORS" AND EXCESSES AGAINST THE LAW. TWENTY SOLDIERS HAD BEEN QUESTIONED. ON JULY 14,

THE MILITARY POLICE ANNOUNCED THAT SEVERAL SPECIAL FORCES' OFFICERS HAD BEEN DETAINED, WITH SPECULATION IN THE PRESS THAT THEY INCLUDED ONE CAPTAIN, ONE MAJOR, TWO COLONELS, AND A GENERAL. THE MILITARY POLICE CHIEF SAID THAT SPECIAL FORCES MEMBERS WERE INVOLVED IN THE KIDNAPPINGS OF EIGHT ACTIVISTS WHO WERE RELEASED AT THAT TIME, PLUS ONE MORE (ANDI ARIEF) WHO WOULD SOON BE RELEASED. WIRANTO ON AUGUST 3 ANNOUNCED THAT A MILITARY OFFICERS' HONOR COUNCIL HAD BEEN FORMED TO QUESTION SENIOR OFFICERS ABOUT THE KIDNAPPING AND TORTURE OF ACTIVISTS. THEY WOULD QUESTION LT. GENERAL PRABOWO, MAJ. GENERAL MUCHDI PURWOPRANJONO AND COLONEL CHAIRAWAN (FORMER COMMANDER OF "GROUP 4" WITHIN SPECIAL FORCES.) TEN LOWER RANKING TROOPS WERE TO FACE A MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT.

DESPITE ADMITTING TO AN OFFICERS' HONOR COUNCIL HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE ABDUCTION OF THE NINE ACTIVISTS WHO REAPPEARED, LET. GENERAL PRABOWO WAS HONORABLY DISCHARGED FROM THE MILITARY, AND AS OF SEPTEMBER WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO CRIMINAL SANCTION. PRABOWO TOOK NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REMAINING MISSING ACTIVISTS. THE OTHER TWO OFFICERS INVESTIGATED BY THE HONOR COUNCIL WERE NOT REMOVED FROM THE ARMED FORCES.

THE INDONESIAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES' INVESTIGATION OF THE SECURITY FORCES' FORCEFUL BREAKUP OF A DEMONSTRATION IN BIAK, IRIAN JAYA, IN JULY DISCOVERED 51 "MYSTERIOUS" BODIES FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT. SOME OF THE BODIES SHOWED SIGNS OF HAVING DRIFTED FROM THE SITE OF A TIDAL WAVE IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, BUT OTHERS WERE CLEARLY IRIANESE. A RELATED INVESTIGATION BY A CONSORTIUM OF IRIANESE CHURCHES

AND NGO'S LISTED ELEVEN PERSONS AS MISSING FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CONTINUED TO LIST 16 PEOPLE MISSING FROM THE GOVERNMENT-BACKED VIOLENT TAKEOVER OF INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI) HEADQUARTERS ON JULY 27, 1996. ON AUGUST 12, IT ISSUED A STATEMENT THAT NOTED THAT THE COMMISSION'S OCTOBER 1996 RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE JULY 27 INCIDENT HAD NOT RECEIVED A FULL RESPONSE FROM THE GOVERNMENT.

THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MISSING AND DEAD FROM THE NOVEMBER 12, 1991 MILITARY SHOOTING OF CIVILIANS IN DILI. NO ADDITIONAL CASES WERE RESOLVED DURING THE YEAR. KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE MISSING ARE DEAD AND THAT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES KNOW WHERE THEIR BODIES ARE LOCATED.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

THE CRIMINAL CODE MAKES IT A CRIME PUNISHABLE BY UP TO FOUR YEARS IN PRISON FOR ANY OFFICIAL TO USE VIOLENCE OR

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 07 OF 34 232124Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEEA1 232124Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3746
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

FORCE TO ELICIT A CONFESSION. THE PARLIAMENT IN JULY APPROVED A BILL REGARDING THE TORTURE CONVENTION. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, LEGAL PROTECTIONS ARE BOTH INADEQUATE AND WIDELY IGNORED, AND SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 07 OF 34 232124Z
EMPLOY TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF MISTREATMENT, PARTICULARLY IN REGIONS WHERE THERE WERE ACTIVE SECURITY CONCERNS, SUCH AS IRIAN JAYA AND EAST TIMOR. POLICE OFTEN RESORT TO PHYSICAL ABUSE, EVEN IN MINOR INCIDENTS.

SEVERAL OF THE STUDENT AND NGO ACTIVISTS KIDNAPPED BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES (SEE SECTION 1B) TESTIFIED PUBLICLY THAT THEY HAD BEEN TORTURED DURING INTERROGATION. LT. GENERAL PRABOWO, THE SON-IN-LAW OF FORMER PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF THE ELITE SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) AT THE TIME, ADMITTED TO A MILITARY HONOR BOARD THAT HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE AND OTHER ABDUCTIONS (SEE SECTION 1B).

PIUS LUSTRILANANG TESTIFIED PUBLICLY BEFORE THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON APRIL 27 THAT HIS

CAPTORS ELECTROCUTED HIM WITH WIRES ATTACHED TO HIS FEET AS THEY ASKED HIM QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF VARIOUS OPPOSITION FIGURES. THEY ALSO SUBMERGED HIS HEAD IN WATER SO THAT HE COULD NOT BREATHE AND KICKED AND HIT HIM. THE TORTURE AND INTERROGATION CONTINUED FOR THE FIRST THREE DAYS OF HIS CAPTIVITY BUT NOT AFTERWARD. DESMON MAHESA SAID PUBLICLY ON MAY 12 THAT ON THE FIRST DAY OF HIS CAPTIVITY HE HAD BEEN TORTURED WHILE ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. HIS CAPTORS COVERED HIS EYES AND HANDCUFFED HIM TO A CHAIR. THEY ELECTROCUTED HIM ON HIS FEET AND HEAD, AND BEAT AND KICKED HIM. THEY FORCED HIM TO IMMERSE HIS HEAD IN WATER SO THAT HE COULD NOT BREATHE. RAHARDJO WALUYO DJATI ON JUNE 4 PUBLICLY RECOUNTED HOW HE TOO HAD BEEN BEATEN AND SUBJECTED TO ELECTRIC SHOCKS DURING HIS CAPTIVITY. HIS

KIDNAPPERS ALSO MADE HIM LIE ON A BLOCK OF ICE. FAIZOL REZA TESTIFIED ON JUNE 26 THAT DURING HIS CAPTIVITY HE HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO A VARIETY OF ABUSE AND TORTURE, INCLUDING BEATINGS, APPLICATION OF ELECTRICITY TO VARIOUS PARTS OF HIS BODY, BURNING BY CIGARETTES, AND SLEEP DEPRIVATION. HE WAS ASKED QUESTIONS MAINLY ABOUT HIS ROLE IN THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD).

A CREDIBLE LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR REPORTED THAT FIVE PEOPLE FROM GARUT, WEST JAVA CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN TORTURED IN FEBRUARY WHEN THEY WERE BEING HELD BY LOCAL MILITARY WITHOUT A WARRANT. THEY SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN STRIPPED, SLAPPED, KICKED, CHOKED, PISTOL WHIPPED, IMMERSED IN WATER, ABUSED VERBALLY, FORCED TO SWALLOW BULLETS AND HAD THEIR HAIR PULLED.

TWELVE STUDENTS QUESTIONED IN MAY REGARDING THE DEATH OF A POLICE OFFICER IN BOGOR WERE BEATEN AND NOT PERMITTED LEGAL COUNSEL DURING THEIR QUESTIONING, ACCORDING TO LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS. THREE OF THE STUDENTS WERE ACCUSED IN THE DEATH OF THE POLICE OFFICER, WHO WAS ALLEGEDLY KILLED BY A STONE WHEN HE TRIED TO INTERVENE TO HELP A COLLEAGUE WHO WAS UNDER ATTACK BY STUDENTS. A FORENSIC EXPERT LATER PUBLICLY STATED FINDINGS THAT THE POLICE OFFICER HAD DIED OF A HEART ATTACK RATHER THAN A BLOW TO THE HEAD.

IN EAST TIMOR, MILITARY UNITS AND CIVILIAN PARA-MILITARY FORCES REGULARLY DETAIN CIVILIANS FOR INTERROGATION; MOST ARE HELD IN EXTRALEGAL MILITARY DETENTION CENTERS, OFTEN WITH NO NOTIFICATION OF RELATIVES, MISTREATED FOR SEVERAL

PAGE 04 JAKART 05023 07 OF 34 232124Z
DAYS, AND THEN RELEASED. FAMILY MEMBERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS OFTEN ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES IN IDENTIFYING AND VISITING DETAINEES HELD IN THESE MILITARY FACILITIES. MANY CREDIBLE SOURCES AGREED THAT PERSONS DETAINED BY THE POLICE IN EAST TIMOR ARE ROUTINELY BEATEN WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING DETAINED. THERE WERE SOME INDICATIONS THAT SECURITY FORCES IN EAST TIMOR WERE BEING MORE CAREFUL IN THEIR HANDLING OF DETAINEES FOLLOWING THE FALL OF THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, REPORTS OF ILL-TREATMENT CONTINUED ((TO BE AMPLIFIED)).

THERE WERE INSTANCES WHERE SECURITY FORCES RESPONDED WITH BRUTALITY TO PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS. ON AUGUST 25, A GROUP OF 750 WORKERS FROM A TEXTILE FACTORY IN CENTRAL JAVA, INCLUDING MOSTLY YOUNG WOMEN, TRIED TO MARCH FROM A LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION IN JAKARTA WHERE THEY WERE HOLDING A FREE SPEECH FORUM TO THE LOCAL OFFICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION. WHEN SECURITY FORCES ATTEMPTED TO PUSH THEM OFF THE STREET, A SHOVING MATCH ENSUED, AND SECURITY FORCES BEAT THE DEMONSTRATORS WITH RATTAN CANES AND KICKED THEM UNTIL THEY RETREATED. UP TO NINETEEN DEMONSTRATORS WERE INJURED. ON JUNE 12, APPROXIMATELY 400 SECURITY FORCES VIOLENTLY BROKE-UP A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION BY EAST TIMORESE PROTESTERS AT THE

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6330

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 08 OF 34 232129Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEF2C 232129Z /69
R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3747
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 08 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

FOREIGN MINISTRY IN JAKARTA. UPON BEING CONFRONTED AND BLOCKED BY SECURITY FORCES, MANY DEMONSTRATORS TRIED TO BREAK THOUGH THE LINE OF SECURITY FORCES AND THEY WERE BEATEN WITH BATONS AND KICKED. SOME OF THE 180 PERSONS

ARRESTED FOLLOWING THE JULY 6 SHOOTING OF DEMONSTRATORS IN BIAK WERE REPORTEDLY BEATEN IN DETENTION. ON SEPTEMBER 8, SECURITY FORCES BROKE UP A STUDENT DEMONSTRATION AT THE PARLIAMENT. THEY INJURED SEVERAL STUDENTS, INCLUDING TWO WHO WERE REPORTEDLY STABBED WITH COMBAT KNIVES. ON SEPTEMBER 11, IN JAKARTA, SECURITY FORCES BEAT WITH RATTAN CANES NUMEROUS IRIANESE AMONG A GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY FORTY DEMONSTRATORS ATTEMPTING TO DEMONSTRATE NEAR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY. ON SEPTEMBER 14, A GROUP OF STUDENTS ATTEMPTED TO STAGE A DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY, BUT WERE BEATEN BY SECURITY FORCES AS THEY ATTEMPTED TO GET OUT OF THEIR BUSES AND WERE FORCED TO RETREAT.

THOUGH AUTHORITIES ALLOWED HUNDREDS OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS TO TAKE PLACE ON CAMPUS BETWEEN JANUARY AND MAY, IN NUMEROUS CASES SECURITY FORCES VIOLENTLY STOPPED STUDENTS FROM ATTEMPTING TO MOVE THEIR PROTESTS OFF CAMPUS. ONE EXAMPLE OCCURRED INQLO, CENTRAL JAVA ON MAY 8, THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS AND LOCAL RESIDENTS GATHERED AT A LOCAL UNIVERSITYQPARTICIPATE IN A DEMONSTRATION CALLING FOR LOWER PRICES, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM, AND SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION. WHEN THEY TRIED TO MARCH OFF CAMPUS, SECURITY FORCES DROVE THEM BACK USING RATTAN CANES. WHEN THE DEMONSTRATORS RESPONDED BY THROWING STONES AND MOLOTOV COCKTAILS, THE POLICE USED TEAR GAS, WATER CANNONS, AND RUBBER BULLETS. NEGOTIATIONS FAILED TO HALT THE PROTEST AND POLICE AGAIN ATTACKED DEMONSTRATORS WITH RATTAN CANES, SEVERELY INJURING HUNDREDS.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE OCCURRED ON MARCH 19, WHEN 400 TO 500

SECURITY FORCES BLOCKED AT THE ENTRY GATE A STUDENT DEMONSTRATION OF 2,000-3,000 PARTICIPANTS AT LAMPUNG UNIVERSITY FROM MOVING TO ANOTHER CAMPUS, ACCORDING TO A LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR. ROCKS WERE THROWN AT THE SECURITY FORCES, BY EITHER STUDENTS OR PROVOCATEURS, AND THE SECURITY FORCES RESPONDED BY THROWING ROCKS BACK. SECURITY FORCES ENTERED THE CAMPUS, FIRED WARNING SHOTS AND TEAR GAS, AND DRAGGED STUDENTS INTO THE STREET AND BEAT THEM. MANY STUDENTS AND SEVERAL POLICE WERE INJURED. ON APRIL 8 1000-2000 STUDENTS AT SURABAYA'S AIRLANGGA UNIVERSITY WERE PUSHED BACK BY SECURITY FORCES USING WATER CANNON WHEN THEY TRIED TO LEAVE CAMPUS. STUDENTS RESPONDED BY THROWING STONES BACK AT THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES, AND WHEN IT APPEARED THAT SECURITY FORCES WOULD ATTEMPT TO ENTER THE CAMPUS THEY LAID DOWN IN FRONT OF ADVANCING WATER CANNON. SEVENTEEN STUDENTS WERE REPORTEDLY INJURED IN THE CLASH THAT BROKE OUT.

IN MAY, VIOLENT UNREST EXPLODED IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES. IT INCLUDED MASSIVE LOOTING AND BURNING, ESPECIALLY OF COMMERCIAL AREAS, AND THE ETHNIC CHINESE COMMUNITY WAS A PARTICULAR TARGET OF THE VIOLENCE. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ISSUED A STATEMENT ON JUNE 2 CONCLUDING THAT THE SECURITY APPARATUS DID NOT TAKE ACTION TO STOP THE UNREST FROM SPREADING AND FAILED TO TAKE SUFFICIENT ANTICIPATORY ACTION TO STOP IT FROM BEGINNING. SOME LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS CLAIMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY PLAYED A ROLE IN INCITING THE RIOTING AND VIOLENCE. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT SOURCES, 499 PEOPLE DIED DURING THE UNREST, MANY OF THEM PURPORTEDLY LOOTERS WHO BECAME TRAPPED IN STORES THAT WERE

BEING BURNED. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, HOWEVER, SAID IN ITS JUNE 2 STATEMENT THAT IT HAD RECEIVED A REPORT LISTING 1188 DEATHS AND 101 INJURED.

LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS CHARGED THAT BETWEEN MAY AND EARLY JULY 168 WOMEN WERE THE VICTIMS OF RAPE OR SEXUAL ABUSE, 152 FROM JAKARTA AND 16 IN SOLO, MEDAN, PALEMBANG AND SURABAYA. IN A JULY 8 STATEMENT, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION FOUND THAT DURING THE RIOTING THAT TOOK PLACE MAY 12-14 AND AFTERWARD IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES IT HAD BEEN "UNEQUIVOCALLY ASCERTAINED" THAT "WIDESPREAD AND REPEATED RAPE OF A PARTICULARLY INHUMANE NATURE OCCURRED, PERPETRATED BY BRUTAL GANGS SUCCESSIVELY IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES." IT WAS CARRIED OUT IN A "SYSTEMATIC MANNER" AND FOCUSSED ON ETHNIC CHINESE WOMEN AND GIRLS.

THE COMMISSION NOTED IN PARTICULAR THAT SOME RAPES OCCURRED IN FRONT OF THE FAMILIES OF VICTIMS. THE COMMISSION FOUND THAT THERE WAS A UNIFORM "MODUS OPERANDI" IN THE WAY THAT THE RAPES WERE CARRIED OUT. IT STATED THAT THE SECURITY VACUUM DURING THE INITIAL DAYS OF THE UNREST INDICATED THE NEGLECT OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY WHICH COULD HAVE PERMITTED THE SEXUAL VIOLENCE TO OCCUR.

TWO MONTHS AFTER THE MAY UNREST, THE GOVERNMENT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 09 OF 34 232142Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DF062 232142Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3748
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 09 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

ESTABLISHED A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE MAY RIOTS AND RAPES. IT WAS MADE UP OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT, MILITARY, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, AND NGOS, AND THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WAS

ELECTED AS ITS CHAIRMAN. IT WAS GIVEN THREE AND ONE HALF MONTHS TO COMPLETE ITS WORK. AFTER ITS ESTABLISHMENT, HOWEVER, MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICIALS BEGAN PUBLICLY QUESTIONING WHETHER RAPES HAD TAKEN PLACE OR WHETHER THEY HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED, AND THREATENED PROSECUTION OF ANYONE MAKING EXAGGERATED CLAIMS. TEAM MEMBERS COMPLAINED THAT THIS IMPEDED THEIR INVESTIGATION BY INTIMIDATING WITNESSES AND VICTIMS.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN AN UNJUSTIFIABLY HIGH MILITARY PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR, TOTALING MORE THAN 16,000 PERSONNEL. IN JULY, THE GOVERNMENT HIGHLY PUBLICIZED A WITHDRAWAL OF SOME 1000 TROOPS FROM EAST TIMOR BUT IT COULD NOT BE VERIFIED WHETHER OVERALL TROOP LEVELS DECREASED. THE GOVERNMENT, AS IT DOES ELSEWHERE, ALSO RELIED ON BANDS OF YOUTHS, ORGANIZED AND DIRECTED BY THE MILITARY, TO INTIMIDATE AND HARASS ITS OPPONENTS. CIVILIAN PARAMILITARY GROUPS WERE FREQUENTLY INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

((FOLLOW-UP ON CASES OF ALLEGED RAPE OF EAST TIMORESE WOMEN BY MILITARY PERSONNEL MENTIONED IN 1997 REPORT TO BE PROVIDED BY END OF YEAR))

PRISON CONDITIONS ARE HARSH WITH VIOLENCE AMONG PRISONERS AND MISTREATMENT AND EXTORTION OF INMATES BY GUARDS COMMON. THE INCIDENCE OF MISTREATMENT DROPS SHARPLY ONCE A PRISONER HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM POLICE OR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (BIA) CUSTODY INTO THE CIVILIAN PRISON SYSTEM OR INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. CREDIBLE SOURCES REPORT THAT CRIMINAL PRISONERS IN SOME FACILITIES

ARE ROUTINELY AND SYSTEMATICALLY BEATEN AS PUNISHMENT FOR INFRACTIONS OF PRISON DISCIPLINE AND TO EXTRACT INFORMATION ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE PRISON. PUNISHMENTS INCLUDE ELECTROCUTION WITH SHOCK BATONS AND STAPLING OF THE EARS, NOSE AND LIPS. POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE SOMETIMES MIXED WITH THE GENERAL PRISON POPULATION. POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE CIPINANG, SALEMBA, AND OTHER PRISONS TEND TO BE SEGREGATED FROM THE CRIMINAL POPULATION AND GENERALLY RECEIVE MORE HUMANE TREATMENT. IN EAST TIMOR, SOME 83 PRISONERS IN DILI REPORTEDLY SUFFERED SEVERE FOOD POISONING IN JUNE AND DOZENS WERE HOSPITALIZED.

SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISITING DIGNITARIES TO VISIT SOME PROMINENT POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE SOMETIMES MADE, INCLUDING ALLOWING A VISITING MEMBER OF CONGRESS TO ENTER

CIPINANG PRISON IN JAKARTA AND VISIT ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS THERE. SOME NONPOLITICAL PRISONERS ALSO HAVE BEEN VISITED BY HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, ALTHOUGH THIS APPEARS TO BE ON A CASE-TO-CASE BASIS.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE CONTAINS PROVISIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION, BUT IT LACKS ADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AND AUTHORITIES ROUTINELY VIOLATE IT. THE CODE SPECIFIES THAT PRISONERS HAVE THE RIGHT TO NOTIFY THEIR FAMILIES AND THAT WARRANTS MUST BE PRODUCED DURING AN ARREST EXCEPT UNDER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS, SUCH AS WHEN A SUSPECT IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME. THE LAW ALSO REQUIRES THAT FAMILIES OF DETAINEES BE NOTIFIED PROMPTLY. THE LAW AUTHORIZES INVESTIGATORS TO

ISSUE WARRANTS TO ASSIST IN THEIR INVESTIGATIONS OR IF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED. HOWEVER, AUTHORITIES SOMETIMES MADE ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS.

THE LAW PRESUMES DEFENDANTS INNOCENT AND PERMITS BAIL. THEY OR THEIR FAMILIES MAY ALSO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THEIR ARREST AND DETENTION IN A PRE-TRIAL HEARING AND MAY SUE FOR COMPENSATION IF WRONGFULLY DETAINED. HOWEVER, IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO INVOKE THIS PROCEDURE, OR TO RECEIVE COMPENSATION, AFTER BEING RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGE. IN BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COURTS, APPEALS BASED ON CLAIMS OF IMPROPER ARREST AND DETENTION ARE RARELY, IF EVER, ACCEPTED. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE ALSO CONTAINS SPECIFIC LIMITS ON PERIODS OF PRE-TRIAL DETENTION AND SPECIFIES WHEN THE COURTS MUST APPROVE EXTENSIONS, USUALLY AFTER 60 DAYS. IN ADDITION, SUSPECTS CHARGED UNDER THE 1963 ANTISUBVERSION LAW ARE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL PROCEDURES OUTSIDE THE CODE. THESE GIVE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD A SUSPECT FOR UP TO ONE YEAR BEFORE TRIAL. HE MAY RENEW THIS ONE-YEAR PERIOD WITHOUT LIMIT.

THE AUTHORITIES ROUTINELY APPROVE EXTENSIONS OF PERIODS OF

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DF077 232142Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3749
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 10 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

DETENTION. IN AREAS WHERE ACTIVE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS EXIST, SUCH AS EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, THERE ARE MANY INSTANCES OF PEOPLE BEING DETAINED WITHOUT WARRANTS, CHARGES, OR COURT PROCEEDINGS. THIS IS ALSO TRUE IN ACEH.

BAIL IS RARELY GRANTED, ESPECIALLY IN POLITICAL CASES. THE AUTHORITIES FREQUENTLY PREVENT ACCESS TO DEFENSE COUNSEL WHILE SUSPECTS ARE BEING INVESTIGATED AND MAKE IT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE FOR DETAINEES TO GET LEGAL ASSISTANCE FROM VOLUNTARY LEGAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS. SPECIAL LAWS ON CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND NARCOTICS DO NOT COME UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE'S PROTECTIONS.

THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY (BAKORSTANAS) OPERATES OUTSIDE THE LEGAL CODE AND HAS WIDE DISCRETION TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE PERSONS THOUGHT TO THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY ((TO BE DISSOLVED?)).

SECURITY FORCES BROKE UP DEMONSTRATIONS AND MEETINGS AND DETAINED PARTICIPANTS (SEE SECTIONS L.C. AND 2.B.).

THERE ARE NO RELIABLE DATA ON THE NUMBER OF ARBITRARY ARRESTS OR DETENTIONS WITHOUT TRIAL, PARTICULARLY IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, AND ACEH. IN EAST TIMOR, ARBITRARY DETENTIONS WERE A CONTINUING PROBLEM. THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT USE FORCED EXILE.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATES THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, BUT IN PRACTICE THE JUDICIARY IS SUBORDINATED TO THE EXECUTIVE AND THE MILITARY. JUDGES ARE CIVIL SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WHICH CONTROLS THEIR ASSIGNMENTS, PAY, AND PROMOTION. LOW SALARIES ENCOURAGE WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION. JUDGES ARE SUBJECT TO

CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES THAT OFTEN DETERMINES THE OUTCOME OF A CASE.

A QUADRIPARTITE JUDICIARY OF GENERAL, RELIGIOUS, MILITARY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS EXISTS BELOW THE SUPREME COURT. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT TO HIGH COURT TO SUPREME COURT EXISTS IN ALL FOUR SYSTEMS. THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT CONSIDER FACTUAL ASPECTS OF A CASE, ONLY THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF LAW. THE SUPREME COURT THEORETICALLY STANDS CO-EQUAL WITH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES, BUT IT DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER LAWS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT.

A PANEL OF JUDGES CONDUCTS TRIALS AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL, POSES QUESTIONS, HEARS EVIDENCE, DECIDES GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND ASSESSES PUNISHMENT. INITIAL JUDGMENTS ARE RARELY REVERSED IN THE APPEALS PROCESS, ALTHOUGH SENTENCES CAN BE INCREASED OR REDUCED. BOTH THE DEFENSE AND THE PROSECUTION MAY APPEAL.

DEFENDANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AND TO PRODUCE WITNESSES IN THEIR DEFENSE. AN EXCEPTION IS ALLOWED IN CASES IN WHICH DISTANCE OR EXPENSE IS DEEMED EXCESSIVE FOR TRANSPORTING WITNESSES TO COURT. IN SUCH CASES, SWORN AFFIDAVITS MAY BE INTRODUCED. HOWEVER, THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR WITNESSES' IMMUNITY OR FOR DEFENSE POWER OF SUBPOENA. AS A RESULT, WITNESSES ARE GENERALLY UNWILLING TO TESTIFY AGAINST THE AUTHORITIES. THE COURTS COMMONLY ALLOW FORCED CONFESSIONS AND LIMIT THE PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE. DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND CAN

BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY AGAINST THEMSELVES.

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CODE GIVES DEFENDANTS THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY FROM THE MOMENT OF THEIR ARREST, BUT NOT DURING THE PRE-ARREST INVESTIGATION PERIOD, WHICH MAY INVOLVE PROLONGED DETENTION. PERSONS SUMMONED TO APPEAR AS WITNESSES IN INVESTIGATIONS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY LAWYERS EVEN THOUGH INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN THE COURSE OF RENDERING TESTIMONY CAN SUBSEQUENTLY BECOME THE BASIS OF AN INVESTIGATION OF THE WITNESS. THE LAW REQUIRES THAT A LAWYER BE APPOINTED IN CAPITAL CASES AND THOSE INVOLVING A PRISON SENTENCE OF 15 YEARS OR MORE. IN CASES INVOLVING POTENTIAL SENTENCES OF FIVE YEARS OR MORE, A LAWYER MUST BE APPOINTED IF THE DEFENDANT DESIRES AN ATTORNEY AND IS INDIGENT. IN THEORY, DESTITUTE DEFENDANTS MAY OBTAIN PRIVATE LEGAL HELP, SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY THE INDONESIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, DEFENDANTS ARE OFTEN PERSUADED NOT TO HIRE AN ATTORNEY, OR ACCESS TO AN ATTORNEY OF THEIR CHOICE IS IMPEDED.

IN MANY CASES PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AGAINST COERCED CONFESSIONS, PARTICULARLY THOSE COERCED BY THE POLICE AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (BIA), ARE INADEQUATE

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DF089 232143Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3750
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 11 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL. CORRUPTION IS A COMMON FEATURE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE PAYMENT OF BRIBES CAN INFLUENCE PROSECUTION, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCING IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES.

THERE WERE FEW SIGNS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE. THE COURT CONTINUED TO BE USED TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST, OR DENY LEGAL REMEDY TO, POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND GOVERNMENT CRITICS. BY THE BEGINNING OF MAY, THE GOVERNMENT TRIED, CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO TIME SERVED MOST OF THE 122 MEMBERS OF THE "RED AND WHITE FRONT" ARRESTED IN FEBRUARY FOR HOLDING A PEACEFUL MARCH. IT ALSO INITIATED LEGAL ACTION AGAINST THREE MEMBERS OF "THE VOICE OF CONCERNED MOTHERS." THE GOVERNMENT DROPPED CHARGES AGAINST THESE THREE, HOWEVER, DURING PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S FIRST WEEK IN OFFICE. RATNA SURAMPAET AND FOUR OTHER WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED WHILE HOLDING A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION ON MARCH 10 WERE TRIED, CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO TIME SERVED. (SECTION 2B). AFTER MAY, LEGAL ACTION AGAINST MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN AND SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS CEASED ONCE THE GOVERNMENT RELEASED THEM FROM PRISON. THE SUPREME COURT HOWEVER, PROVED INCAPABLE OF PROVIDING REDRESS FOR MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI, RULING THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S TRANSPARENT MANIPULATION OF THE PDI LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE IN 1996 WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER. THEREFORE, MEGAWATI COULD NOT BRING SUIT AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, ONLY THE GOVERNMENT-INSTALLED PDI LEADERSHIP. THE TRIAL OF LOIR BOTOR DINGIT, A PROMINENT DEFENDER OF DAYAK LAND, IN EAST KALIMANTAN CONTINUED AS WELL. THE TRIAL INVOLVED THE ACTIVIST'S ATTEMPT TO GAIN COMPENSATION FOR ALLEGED DESTRUCTION OF DAYAK CROPS AND SACRED SITES IN A 1993 LOGGING OPERATION BY A TIMBER CORPORATION, AND HIS ALLEGED LISTING OF SOME DECEASED INDIVIDUALS AS THOSE WHO HAD LOST LAND, IGNORING TRADITIONAL LAW WHICH FECORES LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE NAME OF THE DECEASED. THE TRIAL SESSION REQUIRED 30 HOURS

TRAVEL FROM DINGIT'S REMOTE TRIBAL LANDS, A FACTOR THAT DISRUPTS HIS ACTIVITIES IN DEFENSE OF TRADITIONAL LAND RIGHTS.

THE ANTISUBVERSION LAW, WHICH CARRIES A MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH (WHICH HAS NOT BEEN INVOKED IN RECENT YEARS), MAKES IT A CRIME TO ENGAGE IN ACTS THAT COULD DISTORT, UNDERMINE, OR DEVIATE FROM THE STATE IDEOLOGY OR BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY, OR WHICH COULD DISSEMINATE FEELINGS OF HOSTILITY OR AROUSE HOSTILITY, DISTURBANCES, OR ANXIETY AMONG THE POPULATION. THE EXCESSIVELY VAGUE LANGUAGE OF THIS LAW MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO PROSECUTE PEOPLE MERELY FOR PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF VIEWS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT. MANY PRISONERS ARE SERVING SENTENCES FOR SUBVERSION, INCLUDING ALLEGED MEMBERS OF THE BANNED COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI), MUSLIM MILITANTS, AND THOSE CONVICTED OF SUBVERSION IN IRIAN JAYA, ACEH, AND EAST TIMOR. MORE ARE SERVING SENTENCES UNDER THE HATE-SOWING OR SEDITION LAWS. SOME OF THESE PERSONS ADVOCATED OR EMPLOYED VIOLENCE, BUT OTHERS ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO WERE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPTING TO EXERCISE SUCH UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH OR ASSOCIATION, OR WHO WERE CONVICTED IN UNFAIR TRIALS.

DURING HIS FIRST THREE MONTHS IN OFFICE, PRESIDENT HABIBIE RELEASED POLITICAL PRISONERS, THOUGH HE HAS TAKEN A GRADUAL APPROACH AND MANY OF THE MOST HIGH PROFILE POLITICAL PRISONERS REMAIN IN JAIL. PRISONERS AND OTHERS CLAIM HABIBIE IS USING PRISONER RELEASES AT SELECTED MOMENTS TO CURRY FAVOR WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, THUS

TREATING THE PRISONERS AS IF THEY WERE HOSTAGES. INDEPENDENT LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, FORMER MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS, NUKU SULEIMAN (CHAIRMAN OF PIJAR), AND ANDI SYAHPUTRA, A MEMBER OF THE INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATION OF JOURNALISTS (AJI) WERE RELEASED IN MAY. IN JUNE, SEVEN POLITICAL PRISONERS IN EAST TIMOR WERE RELEASED, IN ADDITION TO ACTIVIST COKY ARITONANG AND EIGHT EAST TIMORESE DETAINEES. IN JULY, THE GOVERNMENT RELEASED PRISONERS BELONGING TO OR AFFILIATED WITH THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD), 36 MEMBERS OF A PARAMILITARY GROUP WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN EAST JAVA IN 1997, 2 PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN CONVICTED FOR SUBVERSION IN THE TASIKMALAYA UNREST THAT OCCURRED IN 1996, AND TWO MEMBERS OF AJI WHO WERE ALREADY ON PROBATION. IT ALSO STOPPED LEGAL ACTION AGAINST ABERSON MARLE SIHALOLO, A FORMER MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FROM THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC

PARTY (PDI) AND RACHMAD BUCHORI, THE PRIVATE SECRETARY TO A WRITER WHOSE BOOKS HAVE BEEN BANNED. IN AUGUST, IN CONJUNCTION WITH INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (AUGUST 17), THE GOVERNMENT FREED 27 MORE POLITICAL PRISONERS, INCLUDING THREE WHO WERE ALLEGED TO HAVE HAD TIES TO THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI), ALLEGED SEPARATISTS FROM EAST TIMOR (6), ACEH (9), AND IRIAN (3), AS WELL AS SIX FROM LAMPUNG WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN CLASH WITH THE

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6396

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 12 OF 34 232144Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DF097 232144Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3751
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 12 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

GOVERNMENT. SOME OF THESE RELEASES CAME AS THE RESULT OF ACCUMULATED SENTENCE REMISSIONS. IT ALSO RESTORED THE NAME OF FOUR DISSIDENTS.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 12 OF 34 232144Z
F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR

CORRESPONDENCE

JUDICIAL WARRANTS FOR SEARCHES ARE REQUIRED EXCEPT FOR CASES INVOLVING SUSPECTED SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC CRIMES, AND CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, SECURITY AGENCIES REGULARLY MADE FORCED OR SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES. SECURITY FORCES ALSO ENGAGED IN SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS AND RESIDENCES AND SELECTIVE MONITORING OF LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS WITHOUT LEGAL RESTRAINT.

GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS MONITOR THE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND ITS FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY PERSONS THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP. THESE PERSONS AND THEIR RELATIVES SOMETIMES ARE SUBJECTED TO SURVEILLANCE, REQUIRED CHECK-INS, PERIODIC INDOCTRINATION, AND RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL OUTSIDE THEIR CITY OF RESIDENCE.

THE REQUIREMENT THAT "E.T." ("EX-TAPOL" OR POLITICAL PRISONER) BE STAMPED ON THE IDENTIFICATION CARDS OF THESE PRISONERS WAS OFFICIALLY ENDED IN 1995, THOUGH IN PRACTICE IT CONTINUED IN USE IN MANY CASES. IT IS CONFIRMED THAT AT LEAST SOME INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD E.T. STAMPED ON THEIR IDENTITY CARDS WERE ABLE TO HAVE THE STAMP REMOVED. THIS STAMP HAS BEEN ONE OF THE METHODS THE GOVERNMENT HAS USED TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE PEOPLE, ALLOWING THE GOVERNMENT AND PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYERS TO IDENTIFY ALLEGED FORMER PKI MEMBERS WHICH SUBJECTED THEM TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL DISCRIMINATION. EVEN WHEN THE STAMP HAS BEEN

REMOVED, THESE FORMER POLITICAL PRISONERS CONTINUE TO FACE DISCRIMINATION AND RESTRICTIONS ON EMPLOYMENT.

PLANS TO REVIVE THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM IN 1998, AFTER SEVERAL YEARS DURING WHICH THE GOVERNMENT REDUCED ITS SUPPORT FOR IT, FELL VICTIM TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. THE MINISTER OF TRANSMIGRATION, DURING THE BRIEF SEVENTH SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT, SAID PUBLICLY THAT THE MINISTRY OF TRANSMIGRATION WOULD FOCUS ITS EFFORTS IN 1998 ON IMPROVING CONDITIONS AT EXISTING TRANSMIGRATION SITES RATHER THAN ON DEVELOPING NEW ONES. THE MINISTER ALSO SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TRY TO SETTLE NUMEROUS DISPUTES BETWEEN TRANSMIGRANTS AND LOCAL PEOPLES AT SCORES OF RESETTLEMENT SITES WHERE THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN TRANSMIGRANTS AND LOCAL LAND HOLDERS OVER LAND RIGHTS AND OTHER ISSUES. THE PROGRAM MOVES LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE FROM OVERPOPULATED AREAS TO MORE ISOLATED AND LESS

DEVELOPED ONES. IT IS ALSO USED TO RESETTLE LOCAL POPULATIONS WITHIN EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS SAY THAT THE PROGRAM VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND DUPES SOME TRANSMIGRANTS INTO LEAVING THEIR HOME VILLAGES WITHOUT ANY MEANS OF RETURN. HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS HAVE ALSO CLAIMED THAT A NUMBER OF THOSE RESETTLED ARE PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN FORCED OFF LANDS WHICH ARE COVETED BY DEVELOPERS WHO HAVE COLLUSIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND/OR SECURITY FORCES. CONDITIONS AT SOME SITES ARE LIFE THREATENING WITH INADEQUATE MEASURES TO PROTECT THE TRANSMIGRANT POPULATION AGAINST DISEASES ENDEMIC TO THE TRANSMIGRATION SITES. TRANSMIGRANTS AND MIGRANTS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM RECEIVED INDIRECT GOVERNMENT

SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND CONTRACTS WITH THE ARMED FORCES (ABRI) OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THIS PRACTICE, PARTICULARLY IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA AND PARTS OF KALIMANTAN, LED TO RESENTMENT AMONG INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, WHICH BELIEVED THAT THEIR RIGHTS WERE INFRINGED UPON AND THAT THEY WERE BEING DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BY VIRTUE OF THE DISBURSEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT FUNDS TO THOSE WHO WERE IN SOME CASES THEIR NEWLY ARRIVED ECONOMIC RIVALS.

THE GOVERNMENT PROHIBITS THE IMPORT OF CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS (SEE SECTION 5).

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

THE 1945 CONSTITUTION AND THE 1982 PRESS LAW PROVIDE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, AND THE GOVERNMENT MARKEDLY INCREASED ITS RESPECT FOR THIS RIGHT, ESPECIALLY IN THE LATTER PART OF THE YEAR. THOUGH SOME SERIOUS RESTRICTIONS AND MONITORING CONTINUED, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY, AS SENSITIVE ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED AND

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00 /026W	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00

----------6DF0A5 232145Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3752
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 13 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

DISSENTING OPINIONS EXPRESSED AT PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS, SEMINARS, AND IN STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS.

THE GOVERNMENT IN JUNE REVOKED THE 1984 DECREE ALLOWING
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 13 OF 34 232144Z
THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION TO CANCEL PRESS PUBLICATION LICENSES. THIS DECREE HAD BEEN USED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL THE PRESS IN PRACTICE. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO SIMPLIFIED THE LICENSING PROCEDURE FOR STARTING A PUBLICATION. THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED A NEW DECREE, HOWEVER, RETAINING THE RIGHT TO SUSPEND PUBLISHING LICENSES FOR AN UNSPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME, PROVOKING OBJECTIONS FROM THE ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN JOURNALIST (PWI) AND THE ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN PUBLISHERS (SPS). OTHER MEANS OF CONTROL INCLUDE REGULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF ADVERTISING PERMITTED AND OF THE NUMBER OF PAGES ALLOWED IN NEWSPAPERS. ((WILL NEED UPDATE AT END OF YEAR REGARDING NEW PRESS LAW))

IN THE FIRST FIVE MONTHS OF THE YEAR, PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT INTENSIFIED, AND THE PRESS CARRIED IT MORE OPENLY. THE GOVERNMENT STILL MADE ATTEMPTS TO REIN IN THE MEDIA, HOWEVER. IN MARCH, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD TAKE THE MAGAZINE DETEKTIF DAN ROMANTIKA (D&R) TO

COURT BECAUSE OF A COVER DEPICTING THEN-PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AS THE KING OF SPADES. THE MAGAZINE'S EDITOR HAD ALREADY BEEN FORCED TO APOLOGIZE TO THE GOVERNMENT. IN MAY, THEN-PRESIDENT SOEHARTO PUBLICLY CONDEMNED THE PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA FOR WAGING A "PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR" ON INDONESIA IN THE WAY THAT IT WAS PORTRAYING THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY. SOME JOURNALISTS COVERING STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN MAY WERE REPORTEDLY SUBJECTED TO INTIMIDATION BY AUTHORITIES. TWO FOREIGN JOURNALISTS, WHO WERE FILMING A MAY 6 CLASH BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES IN JAKARTA, REPORTEDLY WERE STONED AND FIRED UPON BY POLICE BUT ESCAPED UNINJURED. A FOREIGN JOURNALIST FILMING

SECURITY FORCES FIRING INTO A CROWD IN MEDAN WAS SEIZED AND THREATENED WITH A PISTOL.

FOLLOWING SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION, PRESS FREEDOM IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY, AND THERE WERE FEW SIGNS OF SELF-CENSORSHIP THAT HAD PERVADED REPORTING IN THE PAST, EVEN ON SUBJECTS KNOWN TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE GOVERNMENT. THOUGH THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE PRESS WAS AT THE CUTTING EDGE OF OPENNESS, THE INDONESIAN LANGUAGE PRESS WAS NOT FAR BEHIND. ATTEMPTS BY AUTHORITIES TO DIRECT LOCAL JOURNALISTS AND EDITORS ON WHAT THEY SHOULD PRINT APPEAR TO HAVE CEASED.

PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN JULY OF THE NEED FOR JOURNALISTS TO OBTAIN LICENSES, IN ORDER TO INSURE THAT THEY WERE PROFESSIONALLY QUALIFIED, RAISED CONCERNS THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT TRY TO REIN IN THE NEW FOUND PRESS FREEDOM. NO ACTION WAS TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THIS PROPOSAL, HOWEVER.

THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA ALSO BECAME MORE OPEN, THOUGH THEY REMAINED MORE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR COVERAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT THAN THE PRINT MEDIA. WELL BEFORE SOEHARTO STEPPED DOWN, TELEVISION NEW REPORTS BECAME MORE SUBSTANTIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRIVATE TELEVISION STATIONS BEGAN AIRING FOOTAGE OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATION IN THE WEEKS BEFORE SOEHARTO RESIGNED. LIVE TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MAY 13 FUNERALS OF STUDENTS SHOT AT TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY AND AFTERWARD OF THE TRIAL OF TWO OF THE ACCUSED SECURITY FORCE MEMBERS HELPED FOCUS MASS ATTENTION ON THIS ISSUE.

THE GOVERNMENT OPERATES A NATIONWIDE TELEVISION NETWORK

WITH 12 REGIONAL STATIONS. PRIVATE COMMERCIAL TELEVISION COMPANIES, MOST WITH OWNERSHIP BY, OR MANAGEMENT TIES TO, THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S FAMILY, CONTINUED TO EXPAND. ALL ARE REQUIRED TO BROADCAST GOVERNMENT-PRODUCED NEWS, BUT THEY ALL ALSO PRODUCE NEWS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMMING INDEPENDENTLY.
OVER 600 PRIVATE RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANIES EXIST IN ADDITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK. THEY ALL WERE REQUIRED TO BELONG TO THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS (PRSSNI) TO RECEIVE A BROADCASTING LICENSE. THE GOVERNMENT RADIO STATION PRODUCES THE PROGRAM "NATIONAL NEWS." THE NEW REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN JUNE REDUCED THE NUMBER OF THESE GOVERNMENT BROADCASTS THAT A PRIVATE STATION MUST RUN PER DAY FROM 14 TO FOUR. IT IS RELAYED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BY PRIVATE STATIONS AND 53 REGIONAL AFFILIATES OF THE GOVERNMENT NETWORK. THE NEW REGULATIONS ALLOW PRIVATE STATIONS TO PRODUCE THEIR OWN NEWS PROGRAMS AND MANY ARE DOING SO. MOREOVER, "TALK RADIO" CALL-IN PROGRAMS REGULARLY ADDRESS POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES.

FOREIGN TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS WERE READILY ACCESSIBLE. SATELLITE DISHES HAVE PROLIFERATED

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6388

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 14 OF 34 232141Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DF04E 232141Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3753
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 14 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, AND THERE WAS ACCESS TO THE INTERNET. THE GOVERNMENT MADE NO EFFORT TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO THIS PROGRAMMING, AND HAS PROCLAIMED AN "OPEN SKIES" POLICY. FOREIGN PERIODICALS ARE WIDELY AVAILABLE,
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 14 OF 34 232141Z
AND THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IN JULY THAT THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE AND THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL WOULD BE PERMITTED TO PRINT IN INDONESIA. THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL BEGAN PUBLICATION IN JAKARTA IN SEPTEMBER. DISTRIBUTION IS SOMETIMES DELAYED BY A DAY OR MORE BY AUTHORITIES, ALTHOUGH THIS IS RARE. THE GOVERNMENT RESTRICTS THE IMPORT OF CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS (SEE SECTION 5).

THE GOVERNMENT REGULATES ACCESS TO INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY TO CERTAIN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, BY VISITING AND RESIDENT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS. IT OCCASIONALLY REMINDS THE LATTER OF ITS PREROGATIVE TO DENY REQUESTS FOR VISA EXTENSIONS. SPECIAL PERMISSION IS NECESSARY FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TO TRAVEL TO EAST TIMOR, ACEH, AND IRIAN JAYA; THE GOVERNMENT NOW GRANTS INCREASED ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR TO FOREIGN JOURNALISTS. THE LOCAL PRESS IN ACEH IS TIGHTLY CONTROLLED. A FOREIGN JOURNALIST WAS ORDERED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY IN MARCH BECAUSE THE JOURNALIST ALLEGEDLY BROUGHT OTHER JOURNALISTS INTO A SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) WITHOUT PERMISSION.

THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES A PERMIT FOR THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AND VIDEOTAPES, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED BY GOVERNMENT CENSORS. THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF MATERIALS BYPASSING CUSTOMS AND CENSORSHIP PROCEDURES.

MOST BOOKS BY THE PROMINENT NOVELIST AND FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER PRAMOEDYA ANANTA TOER ARE BANNED, THOUGH SOME WERE IN CIRCULATION. IN MAY, THE GOVERNMENT BANNED A BOOK
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JAKART 05023 14 OF 34 232141Z
BY SOEBADIO SASTROSATOMO ENTITLED "THE NEW ORDER REGIME'S POLITICS OF DOSOMUKO: FEEBLE AND TORMENTING PEOPLE," FOR

ALLEGEDLY DISCREDITING THEN PRESIDENT SOEHARTO.

WHILE THE LAW PROVIDES FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM, CONSTRAINTS EXIST ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SCHOLARS. A BURST OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DISCUSSIONS AT UNIVERSITIES OCCURRED DURING THE YEAR.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY; HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT PLACES SIGNIFICANT CONTROLS ON THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. THE GOVERNMENT PROMULGATED REGULATIONS IN DECEMBER 1995 THAT ELIMINATED THE PERMIT REQUIREMENTS FOR SOME TYPES OF PUBLIC MEETINGS. A REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY THE POLICE REMAINED FOR MOST OTHERS, AND IN PRACTICE NUMEROUS PUBLIC MEETINGS CONTINUED TO BE PREVENTED OR BROKEN UP.

IN EAST TIMOR, SEVERAL LARGE DEMONSTRATIONS AND FREE SPEECH FORA WERE HELD WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE. EAST TIMOR RELATED DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNPRECEDENTED PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS ALSO TOOK PLACE IN JAKARTA. MOST WERE PEACEFUL, BUT IN JUNE A DEMONSTRATION BY EAST TIMORESE STUDENTS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS DISPERSED WITH EXCESSIVE FORCE BY SECURITY FORCES. (SEE SECTION 1C)

IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MARCH RE-SELECTION OF THEN-PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, SECURITY FORCES INTERVENED TO STOP MANY MEETINGS

AND PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS OF DISSIDENTS AND REFORM ADVOCATES. IN FEBRUARY, JAKARTA POLICE WARNED THAT POLITICAL PROTESTS WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED AND THAT POLITICAL DEMONSTRATORS WOULD BE CHARGED UNDER BASED ON AN EMERGENCY DECREE FROM 1963 RELATED TO ILLEGAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY (PRESIDENTIAL DECISION NO. 5/1963). THEY WOULD FACE A MAXIMUM SENTENCE OF FIVE YEARS IN PRISON. THE NATIONAL POLICE ALSO WARNED THE PUBLIC THAT NO POLITICAL ACTIVITIES INVOLVING LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE SHOULD BE HELD BETWEEN FEBRUARY 22 AND MARCH 18, A WEEK BEFORE AND AFTER THE MARCH 1-11 GENERAL SESSION OF THE MPR.
IN ADDITION, THOUGH THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS WERE ALLOWED TO STAGE DAILY POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE MPR AND AFTERWARD, THEIR ACTIVITIES IN LARGE PART WERE RESTRICTED TO CAMPUSES. MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WARNED STUDENTS THAT THEY SHOULD CONFINE THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS TO CAMPUS, AND EXPLICITLY INSTRUCTED STUDENTS NOT TO TAKE THEIR PROTESTS OFF CAMPUS. THE

EDUCATION MINISTER LATER TRIED TO BAN DEMONSTRATIONS ON CAMPUS, THOUGH HIS MOVE WAS IN PRACTICE IGNORED BY RECTORS CHARGED WITH ENFORCING THE ORDER.

IN FEBRUARY, SECURITY AUTHORITIES ARRESTED APPROXIMATELY 150 MEMBERS OF THE "RED AND WHITE FRONT" CONDUCTING A

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6379

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 15 OF 34 232138Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DF00D 232138Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3754
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 15 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

PEACEFUL MARCH IN JAKARTA. 122 WERE HELD AND CHARGED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1963 EMERGENCY DECREE RELATING TO ILLEGAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND SECTIONS OF THE CRIMINAL CODE RELATED TO REFUSAL TO MOVE FROM A PUBLIC PLACE. THEY

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 15 OF 34 232138Z
FILED SUIT AGAINST THE POLICE, AND THE OPENING SESSION OF THEIR TRIAL WAS POSTPONED WHEN THE POLICE FAILED TO RELEASE THEM FROM DETENTION SO THAT THEY COULD ATTEND THE

HEARING. A DELEGATION FROM THE INDONESIAN COMMITTEE FOR THE GLOBAL MARCH AGAINST CHILD LABOR WAS DETAINED BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES FOLLOWING A MEETING WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. FOURTEEN OF THE ACTIVISTS WERE HELD OVERNIGHT AND THEN RELEASED.
SECURITY FORCES ARRESTED THREE OF ABOUT A DOZEN MEMBERS OF "THE VOICE OF CONCERNED MOTHERS" WHO STAGED A PROTEST IN THE CENTER OF JAKARTA AGAINST RISING PRICES, ESPECIALLY OF MILK. THE THREE ARRESTEES WERE KARLINA LEKSONO, INDONESIA'S FIRST FEMALE ASTRONOMER, GADI ARIVIA, A UNIVERSITY LECTURER, AND WILASIH NOVIANA. THE POLICE SAID THE DEMONSTRATION HAD BEEN STOPPED BECAUSE IT WAS UNAUTHORIZED AND THEY WERE CHARGED UNDER ARTICLE 510 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE THAT BANS DEMONSTRATIONS WITH OUT A PERMIT. THE THREE WERE RELEASED THE FOLLOWING DAY, BUT FACED TRIAL ON MARCH 4. ON MARCH 9 THE COURT LEVIED A SMALL FINE ON THE THREE.

IN MARCH, SECURITY FORCES BROKE UP A PEACEFUL, PUBLIC MEETING OF ACTIVISTS IN A NORTH JAKARTA PARK. NINE PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT, INCLUDING ACTRESS RATNA SARUMPAET, GING GINANJAR, ADI HERMAWAN, ALEXIUS S. FATHOM SAULINA, BONAR TIRO NAISPOSPOS ASPAR PATURISI, WIRA KUSUMA AND JOEL THAER. SARUMPAET AND FOUR OTHERS ON MARCH 10 WERE SENTENCED TO TIME SERVED, TWO MONTHS AND 10 DAYS EACH, FOR IGNORING A POLICE ORDER TO HALT A MEETING AND WERE RELEASED. SECURITY FORCES BROKE UP A SMALL PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION HELD BY ACTIVISTS CALLING FOR THE RELEASE OF

LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN AND PROTESTING AGAINST HIGH PRICES. FOUR PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED FOR CONDUCTING AN UNAUTHORIZED DEMONSTRATION. OTHERS WERE ARRESTED FROM THE GROUP THE NIGHT PRIOR TO THE DEMONSTRATION. FOUR MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WERE PUT ON TRIAL, BUT THEY WERE RELEASED FOLLOWING PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE IN MAY.

SECURITY AUTHORITIES ALLOWED STUDENTS TO CARRY OUT HUGE DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE PARLIAMENT COMPLEX BEGINNING ON MAY 18. THE PROTEST NUMBERED UP TO 30,000 AT ITS PEAK AND HELPED LEAD TO THE RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ON MAY 21. THE MILITARY FORCED THE STUDENTS OUT OF THE PARLIAMENT EARLY ON THE MORNING OF MAY 23 WITHOUT VIOLENCE.

THE AUTHORITIES DID NOT STOP MANY DEMONSTRATIONS ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES THAT TOOK PLACE ON A DAILY BASIS IN THE WEEKS FOLLOWING SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION. IT TOOK A STRONG POSITION, HOWEVER, AGAINST SOME DEMONSTRATIONS AND

GATHERINGS. A LARGE CONTINGENT OF SECURITY FORCES PHYSICALLY PREVENTED A DEMONSTRATION BY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION SBSI IN LATE JUNE. THE GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO ALLOW MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI TO HOLD A LARGE PUBLIC GATHERING A SENAYAN SPORTS STADIUM IN JAKARTA TO COMMEMORATE THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE JULY 27 INCIDENT. SHE WAS ABLE TO HOLD A PEACEFUL EVENT AT HER HOME, HOWEVER, WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY MANY THOUSANDS.

IN ADDITION, THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED A CONTROVERSIAL DECREE AT THE END OF JULY THAT REQUIRED A POLICE PERMIT FOR DEMONSTRATIONS OVER FIFTY PEOPLE, PROHIBITED

DEMONSTRATIONS IN FRONT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, MILITARY FACILITIES, PLACES OF WORSHIP, HOSPITALS, PUBLIC TRANSPORT CENTERS AND OTHER IMPORTANT PUBLIC AREAS. AFTER A GREAT DEAL OF PROTEST, THE GOVERNMENT RESCINDED THE DECREE ON AUGUST 13, DECIDING INSTEAD TO SUBMIT IT IN SUBSTANCE TO THE PARLIAMENT FOR PASSAGE.

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION; HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT PLACES SIGNIFICANT CONTROLS ON THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. THE 1985 SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW (ORMAS) REQUIRES THE ADHERENCE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, TO THE OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA. THIS PROVISION, WHICH LIMITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD AS DESIGNED TO INHIBIT ACTIVITIES OF GROUPS SEEKING TO ENGAGE IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL COMPETITION, MAKE INDONESIA AN ISLAMIC STATE, REVIVE COMMUNISM, OR RETURN THE COUNTRY TO A SITUATION OF PARTISAN IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION. IT EMPOWERS THE GOVERNMENT TO DISBAND ANY ORGANIZATION IT BELIEVES TO BE ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA AND REQUIRES PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR ANY ORGANIZATION'S ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS FROM FOREIGN DONORS. A COURT ON AUGUST 10 DECLARED THE 1997 HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY DECREE BANNING THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PRD) ILLEGAL.

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-08 ACDE-00 AF-01 AID-00 ARA-01 CIAE-00

COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
/026W						

----------6DF508 232235Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3755
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 16 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR

MEMBERS OF FIVE ACCEPTED RELIGIONS AND BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD. THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES ISLAM, CATHOLICISM, PROTESTANTISM, BUDDHISM, AND HINDUISM, AND PERMITS THE PRACTICE OF THE MYSTICAL, TRADITIONAL BELIEFS OF "ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN." ALTHOUGH THE POPULATION IS OVER 85 PERCENT MUSLIM, THE PRACTICE AND TEACHINGS OF THE OTHER RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS ARE GENERALLY RESPECTED, AND THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTES MUTUAL TOLERANCE AND HARMONY AMONG THEM. HOWEVER, SOME RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY, INCLUDING UNRECOGNIZED RELIGIONS, EXIST.

BECAUSE THE FIRST TENET OF PANCASILA IS BELIEF IN ONE SUPREME GOD, ATHEISM IS FORBIDDEN. ALTHOUGH INDIVIDUALS ARE NOT COMPELLED TO PRACTICE ANY PARTICULAR FAITH, ALL CITIZENS MUST CHOOSE ONE OF THE FIVE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS. AS THIS CHOICE MUST BE NOTED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS THE IDENTIFICATION CARD, FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A RELIGION CAN MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN SUCH DOCUMENTS. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ADHERE TO PANCASILA EXTENDS TO ALL RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS. THE

GOVERNMENT STRONGLY OPPOSES MUSLIM GROUPS THAT ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ACKNOWLEDGING ONLY ISLAMIC LAW. THE GOVERNMENT BANNED SOME RELIGIONS, INCLUDING JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, BAHA'I, AND IN SOME PROVINCES THE MESSIANIC ISLAMIC SECT DARUL ARGAM. THE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY MONITORS ISLAMIC SECTS CONSIDERED IN DANGER OF DEVIATING FROM ORTHODOX TENETS, AND IN THE PAST HAS ON OCCASION DISSOLVED SUCH GROUPS.

HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS

AND EMPHASIZE BY EXAMPLE THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECT FOR RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY. LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, WERE FREQUENTLY ALLEGED TO BE RELUCTANT TO FACILITATE AND PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES.

A 1969 REGULATION DICTATES THAT BEFORE A HOUSE OF WORSHIP CAN BE BUILT, AGREEMENT MUST BE OBTAINED FROM LOCAL RESIDENTS LIVING NEAR THE SITE AND A LICENSE MUST BE OBTAINED FROM THE REGIONAL OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF RELIGION. SOME CHRISTIANS CLAIM THAT THIS REGULATION IS BEING USED TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST THEM AND TO PREVENT THEM FROM BUILDING CHURCHES. DESPITE THE PROBLEMS, THE BUILDING OF CHURCHES CONTINUES.

THE LAW ALLOWS CONVERSION BETWEEN FAITHS, AND SUCH CONVERSIONS OCCUR. INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS NOTE THAT INTERFAITH MARRIAGE BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND NON-MUSLIMS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT. PEOPLE FROM RELIGIONS OUTSIDE THE FIVE ACCEPTED RELIGIONS HAVE DIFFICULTY HAVING THEIR MARRIAGE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED.

THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS PROSELYTIZING BY RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS IN AREAS HEAVILY DOMINATED BY ANOTHER RECOGNIZED RELIGION AS POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE AND DISCOURAGES IT. FOREIGN MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPEDED, ALTHOUGH IN EAST TIMOR, IRIAN JAYA, AND OCCASIONALLY ELSEWHERE MISSIONARIES HAVE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES AND DELAYS IN RENEWING RESIDENCE PERMITS, AND VISAS ALLOWING THE ENTRANCE OF NEW FOREIGN CLERGY ARE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. LAWS AND DECREES FROM THE 1970'S LIMIT THE NUMBER OF YEARS THAT FOREIGN MISSIONARIES CAN SPEND IN INDONESIA, WITH

SOME EXTENSIONS GRANTED IN REMOTE AREAS LIKE IRIAN JAYA. FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK IS SUBJECT TO THE FUNDING STIPULATIONS OF THE ORMAS LAW. CITIZENS PRACTICING THE

RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS MAINTAIN ACTIVE LINKS WITH CORELIGIONISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY AND TRAVEL ABROAD FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

ALTHOUGH IN 1993 THE GOVERNMENT DRASTICALLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BARRED EITHER FROM ENTERING OR DEPARTING INDONESIA FROM A PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED FIGURE OF 8,897 "BLACKLISTED" PEOPLE TO A FEW HUNDRED, SUCH RESTRICTIONS STILL EXIST. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO RESTRICTS MOVEMENT BY CITIZENS AND FOREIGNERS TO AND WITHIN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. IN ADDITION, IT REQUIRES PERMITS TO SEEK WORK IN A NEW LOCATION IN CERTAIN AREAS, PRIMARILY TO CONTROL FURTHER POPULATION MOVEMENT TO CROWDED CITIES. SPECIAL PERMITS ARE REQUIRED TO VISIT CERTAIN PARTS OF IRIAN JAYA. THE AUTHORITIES REQUIRE FORMER POLITICAL DETAINEES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP, TO GIVE NOTICE OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND TO HAVE OFFICIAL PERMISSION TO CHANGE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE (SEE SECTION

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6883

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 17 OF 34 240118Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6E011A 240118Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3756
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 17 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

1.F.).

IN PAST YEARS, THE GOVERNMENT OFFERED FIRST ASYLUM TO OVER 125,000 INDOCHINESE BOAT PEOPLE. INDONESIA'S GALANG

ISLAND CAMP WAS CLOSED IN 1996 AS THE LAST REMAINING ASYLUM SEEKERS WERE REPATRIATED. THERE REMAIN, HOWEVER, SOME 15 PERSONS AWAITING A RESETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITY IN ANOTHER COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT FORMULATED A POLICY REGARDING ASYLUM SEEKERS OF OTHER NATIONALITIES, BUT IT HAS IN PRACTICE RESPECTED THE PRINCIPLE OF NOT RETURNING ASYLUM SEEKERS TO THE COUNTRY FROM WHICH THEY HAD FLED. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF THE FORCED RETURN OF PERSONS TO A COUNTRY WHERE THEY FEARED PERSECUTION, BUT 1998 SAW A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS PLACED IN DEPORTATION DETENTION.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

SOEHARTO WAS SELECTED FOR A SEVENTH TERM AS PRESIDENT BY THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) ON MARCH 11. HE RESIGNED FROM OFFICE ON MAY 21 UNDER PRESSURE FROM STUDENT ACTIVISTS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY LEADERSHIP. B.J. HABIBIE -- HIS HAND-PICKED VICE PRESIDENT, LONG SERVING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY MINISTER, AND INTIMATE ADVISOR -- REPLACED HIM, AND NEARLY TWO THIRDS OF THE SOEHARTO CABINET WAS CARRIED OVER INTO THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

PRESIDENT HABIBIE PLEDGED TO HOLD A GENERAL ELECTION FOR PARLIAMENT IN THE SPRING OF 1999, TO BE FOLLOWED BY AN MPR SESSION TO SELECT A PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AT THE END OF 1999. THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERTAKEN TO DRAFT NEW LAWS UNDERPINNING ELECTIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) AND PEOPLE'S

CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR), WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE PARLIAMENT BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR.

CITIZENS HAVE NOT HAD THE ABILITY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEMOCRATIC MEANS. PRESIDENT SOEHARTO

NEVER FACED AN ELECTORAL CHALLENGE. THE 1,000-MEMBER PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) THAT RE-SELECTED HIM IN MARCH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY OF THE STATE. IT HAS MET EVERY FIVE YEARS TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AND TO SET THE BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY. THE MPR WAS EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND HIS GOVERNMENT, AS EVIDENCED BY HIS UNCONTESTED AND UNANIMOUS RE-SELECTION IN MARCH. SINCE ASSUMING OFFICE IN MAY, PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAS REPLACED MANY MEMBERS OF THE MPR WITH INDIVIDUALS THAT ARE SAID TO OWE THEIR LOYALTY TO HIM. FIVE HUNDRED MEMBERS OF THE MPR COME FROM THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (DPR), 425 OF WHOSE MEMBERS WERE ELECTED IN THE MAY 1997 GENERAL ELECTION (UP FROM 400 ELECTED MEMBERS IN 1992). THE REMAINING 75 MEMBERS ARE MILITARY APPOINTEES.

UNDER A DOCTRINE KNOWN AS DUAL FUNCTION, THE MILITARY ASSUMES A SIGNIFICANT SOCIO-POLITICAL AS WELL AS A SECURITY ROLE. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARE ALLOTTED 75 UNELECTED SEATS IN THE DPR, IN PARTIAL COMPENSATION FOR NOT BEING PERMITTED TO VOTE. THE MILITARY OCCUPIES NUMEROUS KEY POSITIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION, AND HOLDS AN UNELECTED 20 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT PARLIAMENTS. THE OTHER 85 PERCENT OF NATIONAL AND 80 PERCENT OF LOCAL PARLIAMENTARY SEATS ARE FILLED THROUGH ELECTIONS HELD EVERY FIVE YEARS. ALL ADULT

CITIZENS, EXCEPT ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, CONVICTED CRIMINALS SERVING PRISON SENTENCES, AND SOME 36,000 FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI, ARE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE. VOTERS CHOOSE BY SECRET BALLOT BETWEEN THE THREE GOVERNMENT-APPROVED POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH FIELD CANDIDATE LISTS IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT. THOSE LISTS HAVE BEEN SCREENED BY BAKORSTANAS, WHICH DETERMINES WHETHER CANDIDATES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE 1965 COUP OR POSE OTHER BROADLY DEFINED SECURITY RISKS. CRITICS CHARGE THAT THESE SCREENING ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, SINCE THERE IS NO WAY TO APPEAL THE RESULTS, AND NOTE THAT THEY CAN BE USED TO ELIMINATE CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM PARLIAMENT. STRICT RULES ESTABLISH THE LENGTH OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC MEDIA, SCHEDULES FOR PUBLIC APPEARANCES, AND THE POLITICAL SYMBOLS THAT CAN BE USED.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS FORMALLY PERMITTED ONLY THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EXIST AND CONTEST ELECTIONS. FOLLOWING SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION, PRESIDENT HABIBIE DID NOT STOP NEW PARTIES FROM FORMING THOUGH HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT

RECOGNIZE THEM PENDING THE PASSAGE OF A NEW LAW ON POLITICAL PARTIES. THE LARGEST AND MOST IMPORTANT OF THE RECOGNIZED PARTIES HAS BEEN GOLKAR, A

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6327

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 18 OF 34 232126Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEEDD 232127Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3757
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 18 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ORGANIZATION OF DIVERSE FUNCTIONAL GROUPS. DURING HIS TENURE, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO STRONGLY INFLUENCED THE SELECTION OF THE LEADERS OF GOLKAR, OF WHICH HE WAS THE SENIOR LEADER. SOEHARTO IS STILL THE

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 18 OF 34 232126Z
HEAD OF THE BOARD OF PATRONS, GOLKAR'S HIGHEST LEADERSHIP BODY, THOUGH GOLKAR HAS SAID PUBLICLY THAT IT WILL ELIMINATE THIS BOARD. WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES, PRESIDENT HABIBIE BACKED THE SUCCESSFUL CANDIDACY OF THE NEW GOLKAR GENERAL CHAIRMAN, WHO IS ALSO THE STATE MINISTER/STATE SECRETARY, ONE OF THE MOST POWERFUL

POSITIONS IN THE CABINET.

GOLKAR HAS TRADITIONALLY MAINTAINED CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH THE ARMED FORCES. FOLLOWING SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION, THE ARMED FORCES STATED PUBLICLY THAT IT WOULD NO LONGER INVOLVE ITSELF DIRECTLY IN THE AFFAIRS OF GOLKAR OR BACK THE RULING PARTY IN FUTURE ELECTIONS. DESPITE THIS STATEMENT, THE ARMED FORCES PLAYED A PROMINENT ROLE IN THE VICTORY OF PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S CANDIDATE FOR GOLKAR CHAIRMAN IN JULY OVER A FORMER MINISTER OF DEFENSE. GOLKAR ALSO HAS CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS WITH KORPRI, THE ASSOCIATION TO WHICH ALL CIVIL SERVANTS AUTOMATICALLY BELONG. CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE IN PRACTICE BEEN COMPELLED TO SUPPORT GOLKAR, EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE ABLE TO JOIN ANY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WITH OFFICIAL PERMISSION. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PKI AND SOME OTHER BANNED PARTIES MAY NOT RUN FOR OFFICE OR BE ACTIVE POLITICALLY.

THE OTHER TWO SMALL, LEGAL, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP) AND THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDI), ARE NOT CONSIDERED OPPOSITION PARTIES, AND, ALONG WITH GOLKAR, ARE REQUIRED BY LAW TO EMBRACE THE STATE IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA. THESE SMALLER PARTIES HAVE NOT BEEN PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN PARTY OFFICES

UNCLASSIFIED

BELOW THE DISTRICT LEVEL, PLACING THEM AT A DISADVANTAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED GOLKAR. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES CLOSELY SCRUTINIZE AND OFTEN GUIDE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS. MEMBERS OF THE DPR AND THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES MAY BE RECALLED FROM OFFICE BY PARTY LEADERS.

THE PARLIAMENT (DPR) CONSIDERS BILLS PRESENTED TO IT BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES BUT DOES NOT DRAFT LAWS ON ITS OWN, ALTHOUGH IT HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO DO SO. THE DPR DOES MAKE TECHNICAL, AND OCCASIONALLY SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS TO BILLS IT REVIEWS. THERE WERE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT THE DPR WAS TO A LIMITED EXTENT ABLE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES TO BILLS THAT REFLECTED THE INTERESTS EXPRESSED BY OUTSIDE GROUPS.

WHILE THE DPR HAS BEEN SUBORDINATE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, ITS LEADERSHIP PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN REQUESTING THE RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IN MAY. IT HAS ALSO BEEN ACTIVE IN SCRUTINIZING GOVERNMENT POLICY, AND IN EXERCISING OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH HEARINGS AT WHICH

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, MILITARY COMMANDERS, AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS ARE ASKED TO TESTIFY. THE DPR ALSO HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY A FOCAL POINT OF APPEALS AND PETITIONS FROM STUDENTS, WORKERS, DISPLACED FARMERS, AND OTHERS CHARGING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND AIRING OTHER GRIEVANCES, AND WAS THE SIGHT OF LARGE ANTI-GOVERNMENT STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN MAY. IT RARELY IS THE SOURCE OF ANY RELIEF TO PETITIONERS OTHER THAN PROVIDING A CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH THEIR COMPLAINTS CAN BE AIRED.

WHILE THERE ARE NO LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN POLITICS, THEY ARE UNDERREPRESENTED IN GOVERNMENT. THE MAY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION REPRESENTED A STEP BACKWARDS FOR WOMEN IN TERMS OF REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT, WITH THEIR PERCENTAGE FALLING FROM 12 PERCENT TO 9 PERCENT OF SEATS. IN THE CABINET, 2 OF 36 MINISTERS ARE WOMEN.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

THOUGH STILL SUBJECTED TO MONITORING BY AND INTERFERENCE FROM AUTHORITIES, DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS WERE INTENSELY ACTIVE IN PRESSING THE GOVERNMENT TO IMPROVE ITS HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE. THEY PUSHED FOR GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, INCLUDING THE KIDNAPPING OF ACTIVISTS BY SECURITY FORCES, ACTED AS DEFENSE COUNSEL IN POLITICAL TRIALS, ADVOCATED FOR THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, SOUGHT TO OFFER ASSISTANCE TO THE VICTIMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES, AND URGED IMPROVEMENTS IN GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND LEGISLATION. NUMEROUS RESPECTED NGO REPRESENTATIVES BECAME MEMBERS OF A

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00

USIE-00 SA-01 PMB-00 PRM-01 DRL-04 G-00 SAS-00
/026W

----------6DF01C 232139Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3758
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 19 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

GOVERNMENT-ESTABLISHED COMMISSION INVESTIGATING THE MAY RIOTS AND RAPES.

THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY CONSIDERS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS

OR FOREIGN-BASED CRITICISM OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO BE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IT EMPHASIZES ITS BELIEF THAT LINKING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE OR OTHER SANCTIONS RELATED TO ITS HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND IS THEREFORE UNACCEPTABLE.

ICRC ACCESS TO POLITICAL PRISONERS IN EAST TIMOR IMPROVED OVER THE COURSE OF THE YEAR WITH ICRC GENERALLY ALLOWED ACCESS TO PRISONERS IT COULD IDENTIFY AS BEING DETAINED. EARLIER, IN THE YEAR IT HAD BEEN DENIED ACCESS TO SOME DETAINEES. GENERALLY, ICRC PRISONER ACCESS IN EAST TIMOR WAS IN SOME CASES LIMITED WITH REGARD TO THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF COMMUNICATION WITH THOSE DETAINED. ICRC REQUESTS FOR ACCESS TO POLITICAL PRISONERS ELSEWHERE CONTINUED TO MEET WITH MIXED SUCCESS. AS OF MID-YEAR, ICRC HAD NOT RECEIVED PERMISSION TO VISIT AREAS OF NORTHERN IRIAN JAYA WHERE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WERE REPORTED EITHER MISSING OR IN CUSTODY FOLLOWING POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS IN EARLY JULY. AN ICRC PROGRAM OF FOOD AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE SOUTH CENTRAL HIGHLAND AREA OF IRIAN JAYA CONTINUED UNTIL JULY 1998, BUT WAS NOT EXTENDED DESPITE ICRC OFFERS TO CONTINUE IT. ICRC WAS ALLOWED TO VISIT PRISONERS AND OTHERS DETAINED BY SECURITY FORCES IN

ACEH BEGINNING IN MAY AFTER HAVING HAD TO CEASE OPERATIONS IN ACEH SINCE MARCH 1997. COOPERATION BY CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS IN ACEH AND AT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL, GENERALLY WAS GOOD. ELSEWHERE, ICRC WAS ABLE TO VISIT PRISONERS CONVICTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIOLENCE OF 1965-66, CONVICTED MUSLIM EXTREMISTS AND EAST TIMORESE AS WELL AS OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS OUTSIDE OF EAST

TIMOR, ACEH AND IRIAN JAYA. THE ICRC WAS NOT ABLE TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE MATTER OF THE KIDNAPPING, EXTRA-JUDICIAL DETENTION AND TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS BY SECURITY FORCES ALTHOUGH IT MADE KNOWN TO THE GOVERNMENT ITS WILLINGNESS TO BE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN THESE MATTERS.

THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, IN ITS FIFTH YEAR OF OPERATION, CONTINUED TO BE ACTIVE IN EXAMINING REPORTED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND CONTINUED TO SHOW INDEPENDENCE. LACKING ENFORCEMENT POWERS, THE COMMISSION ATTEMPTS TO WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM, SENDING TEAMS WHERE NECESSARY TO INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS AND EMPLOYING PERSUASION, PUBLICITY, AND MORAL AUTHORITY TO HIGHLIGHT ABUSES, MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGAL AND REGULATORY CHANGES, AND ENCOURAGE CORRECTIVE ACTION. THE GOVERNMENT APPOINTED THE COMMISSION'S ORIGINAL CHAIRMEN, WHO THEN APPOINTED THE OTHER 24 ORIGINAL COMMISSION MEMBERS.

THROUGHOUT THE YEAR THE COMMISSION CONSISTENTLY BECAME INVOLVED IN THE MOST DIFFICULT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, INCLUDING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ACTIVISTS, THE TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS, THE MAY RIOTS AND RAPES, REPORTS OF MASS GRAVES IN ACEH, VIOLENT ACTION AGAINST PROTESTORS IN IRIAN JAYA, AND THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR. THE COMMISSION WAS ABLE TO ISSUE HIGHLY CREDIBLE PUBLIC REPORTS OR PRESS STATEMENTS THAT CARRIED SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT IN INFORMING PUBLIC OPINION.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS IGNORED SOME COMMISSION FINDINGS OR, IN

SOME INSTANCES, HAS MOVED LETHARGICALLY IN REACTION TO THEM. THE COMMISSION ISSUED A REPORT CLEARLY STATING THAT RAPES OF ETHNIC CHINESE WOMEN HAD OCCURRED DURING THE MAY RIOTS AND CALLING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION. PRESIDENT HABIBIE PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE RAPES, AND THE GOVERNMENT IN JULY SET UP

AN INVESTIGATION COMMISSION. HOWEVER, IN AUGUST, HIGH LEVEL MILITARY OFFICIALS BEGAN PUBLICLY QUESTIONING WHETHER ANY RAPES HAD TAKEN PLACE. IN SEPTEMBER 1995, THE COMMISSION IDENTIFIED SIX CASES OF ABRI ABUSE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN IRIAN JAYA, INVOLVING A NUMBER OF DEATHS AND RAPES; ONLY ONE EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING WAS EVER BROUGHT TO TRIAL, AND THE COMMISSION REQUESTED FOLLOW-UP ACTION IN 1997. THE GOVERNMENT MADE NO FURTHER RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION'S OCTOBER 1996 REPORT ON THE JULY 27 INCIDENT.

THE COMMISSION OPENED AN EAST TIMOR BRANCH IN JUNE 1996, WHICH WAS WIDELY REGARDED AS A POSITIVE STEP IN THE EFFORT TO ADDRESS AND RESOLVE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES THERE. HOWEVER, THE OFFICE LIMITED ITSELF TO DEALING ONLY WITH NONPOLITICAL CASES AND WAS LOCATED NEXT TO THE LOCAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, AND THEREFORE HAS MADE LITTLE IMPACT WITH REGARD TO THE MORE SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6383

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 20 OF 34 232140Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DF02C 232140Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3759
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 20 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES --

INDONESIA

PROBLEMS IN EAST TIMOR. IN JULY, A RESPECTED EAST TIMORESE WAS APPOINTED DIRECTOR, AND THERE WAS RENEWED HOPE THAT THE OFFICE COULD BEGIN TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE.

PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATIONS VISITED ACEH AND IRIAN JAYA TO INVESTIGATE REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE.
IN AUGUST, THE GOVERNMENT SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS REGARDING "COOPERATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMS FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDONESIA," WHICH IS UNDERSTOOD TO INCLUDE THE ASSIGNMENT OF A UNHRC PROGRAM OFFICER TO JAKARTA, WHO WOULD HAVE ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR AND ALL OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EXPLICITLY FORBID DISCRIMINATION BASED ON GENDER, RACE, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS. HOWEVER, IT STIPULATES EQUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL CITIZENS, BOTH NATIVE AND NATURALIZED. THE 1993 GUIDELINES OF STATE POLICY (LEGAL STATUTES ADOPTED BY THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY) EXPLICITLY STATES THAT WOMEN HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN. HOWEVER, THESE GUIDELINES FROM 1978, 1983, 1988, AND 1993, ((AND 3/98?)) ALSO STATE THAT WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS MUST NOT CONFLICT WITH THEIR ROLE IN IMPROVING FAMILY WELFARE AND THE EDUCATION OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION. MARRIAGE LAW DICTATES THAT THE MAN IS THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY. THE CONSTITUTION GRANTS CITIZENS THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE THEIR INDIVIDUAL RELIGION AND BELIEFS; HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT

ONLY RECOGNIZES FIVE RELIGIONS AND IMPOSES SOME RESTRICTIONS ON OTHER RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY.

WOMEN

SERIOUS CHARGES EMERGED IN THE EARLY SUMMER OF 1998 THAT 168 ETHNIC CHINESE WOMEN AND GIRLS WERE SYSTEMATICALLY TARGETED FOR RAPE AND SEXUAL ABUSE AMIDST THE CIVIL

DISTURBANCES THAT HIT INDONESIA MAY 12-14. THE ALLEGATIONS WERE GIVEN CREDENCE BY THE INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, A GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED BODY, WHICH ISSUED A PRELIMINARY REPORT CHARGING THAT RAPE OF ETHNICALLY CHINESE WOMEN AND GIRLS WAS CARRIED OUT IN AN ORGANIZED AND COORDINATED MANNER OVER A THREE DAY PERIOD IN JAKARTA AND SEVERAL OTHER MAJOR CITIES. THE ALLEGATIONS HAVE BEEN CHALLENGED BY INDONESIAN POLICE AND MILITARY OFFICIALS. THE INVESTIGATION APPEARED STALLED IN LATE 1998 BECAUSE VERY FEW VICTIMS HAD COME FORWARD TO SUBSTANTIATE THE ALLEGATIONS. (SEE SECTIONS 1C AND THE NATIONAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES IN SECTION 5, BELOW.)

OVERALL, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REMAINS POORLY DOCUMENTED. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SOCIETY, WHICH HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY SOCIAL CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY RAPID URBANIZATION. RAPE BY A HUSBAND OF A WIFE IS NOT CONSIDERED A CRIME UNDER THE LAW. ALTHOUGH WOMEN'S GROUPS ARE TRYING TO CHANGE THE LAW, THEY HAVE NOT MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS.

CULTURAL NORMS DICTATE THAT PROBLEMS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE PRIVATE MATTERS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN

THE HOME IS RARELY REPORTED. WHILE POLICE COULD BRING ASSAULT CHARGES AGAINST A HUSBAND FOR BEATING HIS WIFE, DUE TO SOCIAL ATTITUDES, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO DO SO. NONETHELESS, ACCORDING TO RELIABLE SOURCES, THE POLICE HAVE BECOME SOMEWHAT MORE RESPONSIVE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COMPLAINTS.

RAPE IS A PUNISHABLE OFFENSE. MEN HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND SENTENCED FOR RAPE AND ATTEMPTED RAPE ALTHOUGH RELIABLE STATISTICS ARE UNAVAILABLE. THE MAXIMUM PRISON SENTENCE FOR RAPE IS 12 YEARS, BUT OBSERVERS SAY THAT SENTENCES ARE USUALLY MUCH SHORTER. MOB VIOLENCE AGAINST ACCUSED RAPISTS IS FREQUENTLY REPORTED. WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS BELIEVE THAT RAPE IS SERIOUSLY UNDERREPORTED DUE TO THE SOCIAL STIGMA ATTACHED TO THE VICTIM. SOME LEGAL EXPERTS REPORT THAT IF A WOMAN DOES NOT GO IMMEDIATELY TO THE HOSPITAL FOR A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION THAT PRODUCES PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF RAPE, SHE CAN NOT BRING CHARGES. A WITNESS IS ALSO REQUIRED IN ORDER TO BRING CHARGES, AND ONLY IN RARE CASES IS THERE A WITNESS, ACCORDING TO LEGAL EXPERTS. SOME WOMEN REPORTEDLY FAIL TO REPORT RAPE TO POLICE BECAUSE THE POLICE DO NOT TAKE THEIR ALLEGATIONS SERIOUSLY.

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6335

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 21 OF 34 232130Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEF39 232130Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3760
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 21 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES SOME COUNSELING FOR ABUSED WOMEN, AND SEVERAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS EXIST TO ASSIST WOMEN. MANY OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS FOCUS ON REUNITING THE FAMILY RATHER THAN ON PROVIDING PROTECTION TO THE WOMEN INVOLVED.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 21 OF 34 232130Z
MANY WOMEN RELY ON THE EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEM FOR ASSISTANCE IN CASES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. THERE ARE ONLY A FEW WOMEN'S CRISIS CENTERS IN INDONESIA, INCLUDING A DROP-IN CENTER FOUNDED IN JAKARTA BY THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED NATIONAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION (KOWANI) IN 1Q CRISIS CENTER FOR WOMEN IN YOGYAKARTA RUN BY AN NGO. A NEW CRISIS CENTER FOR WOMEN, "WOMEN'S PARTNER," WHICH OPENED IN 1997, RUNS A 24-HOUR HOT LINE AND A TEMPORARY SHELTER FOR ABUSED WOMEN. TRAINING OF COUNSELORS FOR ANOTHER JAKARTA CRISIS CENTER,

CALLED "SPEAK," IS UNDERWAY.

QRASSMENT IS NOT A CRIME UNDER THE LAW, ONLY INDECENT BEHAVIOR. SEXUAL HARASSMENT CHARGES, HOWEVER, CAN DAMAGE A CIVIL SERVICE CAREER. THE CURRENT LAW REPORTEDLY COVERS PHYSICAL ABUSE ONLY, AND REQUIRES TWO WITNESSES. FEMALE JOB APPLICANTS AND WORKERS HAVE COMPLAINED OF BEING SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED BY FOREMEN AND FACTORY OWNERS.

THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND OF TEMPORARY "CONTRACT MARRIAGES" WITH FOREIGNERS IN CERTAIN AREAS, SUCH AS KALIMANTAN AND SUMATRA, THOUGH THE EXTENT OF THIS PRACTICE IS UNCLEAR. THESE MARRIAGES ARE NOT CONSIDERED LEGAL, AND THE CHILDREN BORN FROM THEM ARE CONSIDERED BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK. PROSTITUTION IS WIDESPREAD. OFFICIAL STATISTICS FROM 1994 REPORT THAT THERE WERE 70,684 PROSTITUTES IN INDONESIA, 9,000 OF WHOM WERE IN JAKARTA. A LOCAL NGO ESTIMATES THAT INDONESIA IS NOW HOME TO AT LEAST 650,000 PROSTITUTES, INCLUDING 150,000 REGISTERED SEX WORKERS. BY COMPARISON, THERE WERE

72,000 REGISTERED PROSTITUTES IN 1995. MANY BELIEVE THE FIGURE TO BE MUCH HIGHER AS WOMEN WHO LOST THEIR JOBS AS A RESULT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS LOOK TO OTHER WAYS TO EARN MONEY FOR THEIR FAMILIES. FEMALE DOMESTIC SERVANTS ARE ALSO VULNERABLE TO EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE. IN APRIL, JAKARTA POLICE RAIDED A BUILDING WHERE MORE THAN 900 WOMEN HAD BEEN HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL FOR UP TO FOUR MONTHS BY A RECRUITMENT AGENCY PREPARING TO SEND THEM TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO WORK AS DOMESTIC SERVANTS.

ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, WOMEN ARE EQUAL TO AND HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS MEN. HOWEVER, IN PRACTICE WOMEN FACE SOME LEGAL DISCRIMINATION. MARRIAGE LAW DICTATES THAT THE MAN IS THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY. MARRIAGE LAW FOR MUSLIMS, BASED ON ISLAMIC LAW, ALLOWS MEN TO HAVE UP TO FOUR WIVES IF THE HUSBAND CAN PROVIDE EQUALLY FOR EACH OF HIS WIVES. PERMISSION OF THE FIRST WIFE IS REQUIRED, BUT REPORTEDLY MOST WOMEN CANNOT REFUSE. CIVIL SERVANTS WHO WISH TO MARRY A SECOND WOMAN MUST ALSO HAVE PERMISSION FROM THEIR SUPERVISORS. CABINET OFFICIALS AND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE CUSTOMARILY BEEN FORBIDDEN TO HAVE SECOND WIVES. IN DIVORCE CASES WOMEN OFTEN BEAR A HEAVIER EVIDENTIARY BURDEN THAN MEN, ESPECIALLY IN THE ISLAMIC-BASED FAMILY COURT SYSTEM. ALIMONY IS RARELY RECEIVED BY DIVORCED WOMEN, AND THERE IS NO ENFORCEMENT OF ALIMONY PAYMENT.

THE 1958 CITIZENSHIP LAW STATES THAT CHILDREN'S CITIZENSHIP IS BASED ONLY ON THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE FATHER. CHILDREN OF CITIZEN MOTHERS AND FOREIGN FATHERS ARE CONSIDERED FOREIGNERS, AND NEED VISAS TO REMAIN IN

INDONESIA UNTIL THE AGE OF 18, WHEN THEY CAN APPLY FOR CITIZENSHIP. THEY ARE PROHIBITED FROM ATTENDING INDONESIAN SCHOOLS, AND HAVE TO ATTEND INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS, WHICH ARE EXPENSIVE.

FOREIGN WOMEN MARRIED TO CITIZENS ALSO FACE DIFFICULTIES. THEIR CHILDREN ARE CITIZENS AND THUS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO ATTEND INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS IN INDONESIA. THESE WOMEN ARE USUALLY TAXED AS THE FOREIGN HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE PROPERTY, BUSINESS, OR INHERITANCE RIGHTS. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH DISCUSSION ABOUT PROBLEMS WITH THE CITIZENSHIP LAW, AND NGO'S AND THE GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO AGREE THAT THE LAW NEEDS TO BE REVISED.

ALTHOUGH SOME WOMEN ENJOY A HIGH DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FREEDOM AND OCCUPY IMPORTANT POSITIONS IN BOTH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, THE MAJORITY DO NOT ENJOY SUCH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOMS AND ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTED AT THE LOWER END OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC SCALE. THE 1995 NATIONAL PROFILE OF WOMEN'S POSITIONS AND ROLES SHOWED THAT 37.4 PERCENT OF CIVIL SERVANTS WERE WOMEN, BUT ONLY 5.5 PERCENT WERE IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY.

INCOME DISPARITY BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN DIMINISHES

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEF4F 232130Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3761
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 22 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

SIGNIFICANTLY WITH GREATER EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT. FEMALE WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING GENERALLY RECEIVE LOWER WAGES THAN MEN. MANY FEMALE FACTORY WORKERS ARE HIRED AS DAY LABORERS INSTEAD OF AS FULL-TIME PERMANENT EMPLOYEES,

AND COMPANIES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE BENEFITS, SUCH AS MATERNITY LEAVE, TO DAY LABORERS. WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS REPORT THAT THERE IS A GROWING TREND IN MANUFACTURING TO HIRE WOMEN TO DO WORK IN THEIR HOMES FOR LESS THAN THE MINIMUM WAGE. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR WOMEN ARE APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT HIGHER THAN FOR MEN. WOMEN ARE OFTEN NOT GIVEN THE EXTRA BENEFITS AND SALARY THAT ARE THEIR DUE WHEN THEY ARE THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, AND IN SOME CASES DO NOT RECEIVE EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR THEIR HUSBAND AND CHILDREN, SUCH AS MEDICAL INSURANCE AND INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS.

DESPITE LAWS THAT PROVIDE WOMEN WITH A THREE-MONTH MATERNITY LEAVE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PREGNANT WOMEN ARE OFTEN DISMISSED OR ARE REPLACED WHILE ON LEAVE. SOME COMPANIES REQUIRE THAT WOMEN SIGN STATEMENTS THAT THEY WILL NOT BECOME PREGNANT. THE EMPLOYMENT LAW MANDATES TWO DAYS OF MENSTRUAL LEAVE PER MONTH FOR WOMEN, ALTHOUGH THIS LEAVE IS NOT ALWAYS ALLOWED. MANY GROUPS CRITICIZED THE 1997 MANPOWER LAW FOR NOT ADDRESSING SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE, AND FOR PROVIDING INADEQUATE PROTECTION IN AREAS OF EMPLOYMENT WHERE WOMEN HAVE REGULARLY SUFFERED ABUSE, SUCH AS OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSEHOLD SERVICE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS POSTPONED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW MANPOWER BILL FOR A YEAR TO ALLOW TIME FOR ITS REVISION.

WOMEN DISPROPORTIONATELY EXPERIENCE ILLITERACY, POOR HEALTH, AND INADEQUATE NUTRITION. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IS MAKING EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE HIGH MATERNAL MORTALITY RATE, WHICH IS 425 PER 100,000 LIVE BIRTHS,

ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL FIGURES, AND UP TO 650, ACCORDING TO ESTIMATES FROM OTHER SOURCES. THE GOVERNMENT IS ALSO TAKING STEPS TO ADDRESS MATERNAL MORTALITY, AND IS CURRENTLY EXPANDING ITS SCOPE TO COVER MORE DISTRICTS. ACCORDING TO CURRENT U.N. DATA, TWO-THIRDS OF INDONESIAN WOMEN ARE ANEMIC, AND 24 PERCENT OF WOMEN OF REPRODUCTIVE AGE SUFFER FROM CHRONIC ENERGY DEFICIENCY. WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS HAVE IMPROVED IN THE LAST DECADE. THE NUMBER OF GIRLS GRADUATING FROM HIGH SCHOOL TRIPLED FROM 1980 TO 1990.

A GROWING NUMBER OF NGO'S ARE WORKING TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S LEGAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. THEY HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN GAINING OFFICIAL COGNIZANCE OF WOMEN'S CONCERNS. THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CONFERENCES, SEMINARS, AND WORKSHOPS CONNECTED WITH WOMEN'S ISSUES. MOST WERE SPONSORED BY NGO'S, ALTHOUGH SOME WERE ORGANIZED BY ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS AND BY THE GOVERNMENT. MOST SESSIONS SOUGHT TO RAISE AWARENESS OR PROMOTE ADVOCACY FOR WOMEN.

CHILDREN

THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND WELFARE, BUT IS HAMPERED BY A LACK OF RESOURCES THAT PREVENTS IT FROM TRANSLATING THIS COMMITMENT INTO PRACTICE. THE GOVERNMENT ALLOCATES ONLY 2.2 PERCENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT TO EDUCATION. SPENDING ON EDUCATION DECLINED SIGNIFICANTLY IN REAL TERMS IN 1998, DUE TO ECONOMIC CONTRACTION. A 1979 LAW ON CHILDREN'S WELFARE DEFINES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE AND

PARENTS TO NURTURE AND PROTECT CHILDREN. HOWEVER, THE LAW'S PROVISIONS ON PROTECTION OF CHILDREN HAVE YET TO GO INTO EFFECT BECAUSE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS ARE STILL BEING NEGOTIATED. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE PARTICULAR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PRIMARY EDUCATION AND MATERNITY SERVICES.

LOW COST MEDICAL CARE IS AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH ACCESS AND AVAILABILITY IS SOMETIMES SPORADIC, ESPECIALLY IN RURAL

AREAS. MOREOVER, THE GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON HEALTH CARE IN 1998 DROPPED IN REAL TERMS DUE TO ECONOMIC CONTRACTION. ACCORDING TO U.N. DATA, 34 PERCENT OF CHILDREN UNDER FIVE YEARS OF AGE SUFFER FROM PROTEIN-ENERGY MALNUTRITION, AND 35 PERCENT SUFFER FROM IRON DEFICIENCY.

A 1994 LAW RAISED COMPULSORY EDUCATION FROM SIX TO NINE YEARS, BUT THE LAW HAS NOT BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED DUE TO INADEQUATE SCHOOL FACILITIES AND THE LACK OF FAMILY FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO SUPPORT CHILDREN STAYING IN SCHOOL. OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL FEES FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, INCLUDING PAYMENTS FOR REGISTRATION, BOOKS, MEALS, TRANSPORT, AND UNIFORMS HAVE RISEN TO PROHIBITIVELY HIGH LEVELS FOR MANY FAMILIES. ALTHOUGH PRIMARY EDUCATION IS IN PRINCIPLE UNIVERSAL, THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 23 OF 34 232131Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEF5A 232131Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3762
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 23 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; Q
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

(UNICEF) ESTIMATES THAT MORE THAN ONE MILLION CHILDREN DROP OUT OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EVERY YEAR DUE MAINLY TO THE

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH EDUCATION AND THE NEED FOR THE CHILDREN TO SUPPLEMENT FAMILY INCOME. ANOTHER CREDIBLE NGO ESTIMATED THAT MILLIONS OF INDONESIAN CHILDREN DROPPED OUT

OF PRIMARY SCHOOL IN 1998 BECAUSE THEIR FAMILIES COULD NO LONGER AFFORD SCHOOL FEES AND RELATED EXPENSES DUE TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS.

CHILDREN'S ADVOCATES AND LABOR ANALYSTS AGREE THAT THE NUMBER OF WORKING CHILDREN HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY DUE TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS WHICH CONTINUED TO AFFECT INDONESIA THROUGHOUT 1998. HOWEVER, STATISTICS TO SUPPORT THIS ASSERTION ARE NOT YET AVAILABLE. ACCORDING TO RECENT GOVERNMENT STATISTICS, EIGHT PERCENT OF ALL CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF TEN AND 14 WORK. HALF GO TO SCHOOL AND ALSO WORK, AND HALF WORK EXCLUSIVELY. UNOFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF WORKING CHILDREN ARE HIGHER. A PROMINENT NGO ESTIMATED THAT IN 1998 MORE THAN 10 PERCENT OF INDONESIAN CHILDREN WORK MORE THAN FOUR HOURS PER DAY.

ACCORDING TO THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS, 20,000 STREET CHILDREN LIVED IN JAKARTA IN 1997. NGO'S REPORT THAT THE NUMBER IN JAKARTA MAY HAVE INCREASED BY MORE THAN SIXTY PERCENT IN 1998 AS A RESULT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. THE NUMBER OF STREET CHILDREN ALSO GREW IN OTHER CITIES IN 1998. STREET CHILDREN SELL QS, SHINE SHOES, HELP TO PARK OR WATCH CARS, AND OTHERWISE ATTEMPT TO EARN MONEY. MANY CHILDREN WORK UNDER HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS AS SCAVENGERS AND GARBAGE PICKERS, AND ON FISHING PLATFORMS AND FISHING BOATS. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES, THERE ARE SEVERAL THOUSAND CHILDREN WORKING IN HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS ON FISHING PLATFORMS OFF THE EAST COAST OF NORTH SUMATRA (SEE SECTION 6.C.). MANY THOUSANDS WORK IN FACTORIES AND FIELDS (SEE SECTION 6.D.).

STREET CHILDREN AND CHILD LABORERS IN SOME CITIES HAVE BECOME ORGANIZED AND INTERESTED IN PROTECTING THEIR RIGHTS. AT LEAST 30 NGO'S WORK WITH STREET CHILDREN. NGO'S HAVE CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT FOR MAKING INSUFFICIENT AND INADEQUATE EFFORTS TO HELP STREET CHILDREN AND WORKING CHILDREN. THE GOVERNMENT IS WORKING IN COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP), UNICEF, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO), AND WITH NGO'S TO CREATE PROGRAMS FOR STREET CHILDREN AND CHILD LABORERS. ONE PROJECT INCORPORATES

MANY IDEAS GENERATED BY THE NGO COMMUNITY, INCLUDING ESTABLISHING "OPEN HOUSES" IN TARGETED AREAS THAT PROVIDE VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND BASIC EDUCATION TO STREET CHILDREN. EFFORTS HAVE BEEN INITIATED TO START OPEN HOUSES FOR STREET CHILDREN IN SEVEN PROVINCES.

ANOTHER APPROACH TO THE STREET CHILDREN PROBLEM UTILIZES THE NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR DISCIPLINE AND CLEAN CITIES DECREE. STREET CHILDREN ARE PHYSICALLY REMOVED FROM CITIES BY BUS. USUALLY, THEY ARE TAKEN OUTSIDE THE CITY AND LEFT THERE. SOMETIMES THEY ARE TAKEN TO "HOLDING HOUSES" WHERE THEY ARE FIRST INTERROGATED AND LATER RELEASED.

CHILD PROSTITUTION AND OTHER SEXUAL ABUSES OCCUR, BUT FIRM DATA ARE LACKING. WHILE THERE ARE LAWS DESIGNED TO PROTECT CHILDREN FROM INDECENT ACTIVITIES, PROSTITUTION, AND INCEST, THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS. A CREDIBLE NGO ASSERTS THAT IT HAS SEEN A PATTERN OF INCREASED CHILD PROSTITUTION IN INDONESIA RESULTING FROM THE ECONOMIC CRISIS WHICH STRUCK

THE COUNTRY IN 1997 AND 1998.

A SEPARATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR JUVENILES DOES NOT EXIST. POLICE OFFICIALS ADMIT THAT JUVENILES ARE OFTEN IMPRISONED WITH ADULT OFFENDERS. JUVENILE CRIME IS CURRENTLY HANDLED BY ORDINARY COURTS. A JUVENILE JUSTICE LAW WAS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT IN DECEMBER 1996, AND WAS SIGNED BY FORMER PRESIDENT SUHARTO IN 1997. IT DEFINES JUVENILES AS CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF EIGHT AND 18, AND ESTABLISHES A SPECIAL COURT SYSTEM AND CRIMINAL CODE FOR THEM.

FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM), WHICH IS WIDELY CONDEMNED BY INTERNATIONAL HEALTH EXPERTS AS DAMAGING TO BOTH PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, IS PRACTICED IN SOME PARTS OF INDONESIA. THE METHOD VARIES DEPENDING ON ETHNIC, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS TRADITION. HOWEVER, THE MOST PREVALENT PRACTICE IS A CEREMONIAL ONE THAT INVOLVES THE PRICKING, SCRAPING, OR TOUCHING OF THE CLITORIS OF A BABY OR YOUNG GIRL, OFTEN WITH THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING SEVERAL DROPS OF BLOOD. SOMETIMES, A PLANT ROOT IS USED SYMBOLICALLY AND THE GIRL IS NOT TOUCHED. A MORE SERIOUS FORM OF FGM INVOLVES THE REMOVAL OF THE TIP OF THE

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6347

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 24 OF 34 232132Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEF67 232132Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3763
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 24 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

CLITORIS. THIS PRACTICE APPEARS TO BE DECLINING, AND THERE IS DISAGREEMENT ABOUT HOW WIDELY PRACTICED IT IS. IT REPORTEDLY STILL IS PRACTICED IN MADURA, SOUTH SULAWESI, AND OTHER AREAS. SINCE FGM IS NOT REGULATED,

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 24 OF 34 232132Z
AND NO FORMAL POSITION HAS BEEN TAKEN BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS, THE METHOD USED IS OFTEN LEFT UP TO THE INDIVIDUAL LOCAL TRADITIONAL PRACTITIONER. FGM USUALLY TAKES PLACE WITHIN THE FIRST YEAR AFTER BIRTH, OFTEN ON THE 40TH DAY, THOUGH IT IS DONE IN SOME AREAS UP TO AGE TEN. IT IS PERFORMED EITHER AT A HOSPITAL OR, ESPECIALLY IN RURAL AREAS, BY THE LOCAL TRADITIONAL PRACTITIONER. THERE ARE NO STATISTICS AVAILABLE ON FGM.

PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

ACCORDING TO U.N. ESTIMATES, THERE ARE TEN MILLION

DISABLED PERSONS IN THE COUNTRY, WHILE THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS ESTIMATES THAT THREE PERCENT OF THE POPULATION, OR SIX MILLION PERSONS ARE DISABLED. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO PRECISE STATISTICS. FAMILIES OFTEN HIDE THEIR DISABLED FAMILY MEMBERS TO AVOID SOCIAL STIGMA OR EMBARRASSMENT. THE DISABLED FACE CONSIDERABLE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, ALTHOUGH SOME FACTORIES HAVE MADE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO HIRE DISABLED WORKERS. SEVERAL PROVINCES HAVE ESTABLISHED "REHABILITATION CENTERS" FOR THE DISABLED. DISABLED PERSONS ARE REPORTEDLY TAKEN OFF THE STREETS BY THE AUTHORITIES AND BROUGHT TO THESE CENTERS FOR JOB TRAINING. MANY DISABLED INDONESIANS BEG FOR A LIVING.

NGO'S ARE THE PRIMARY PROVIDERS OF EDUCATION FOR THE DISABLED. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 1,084 SCHOOLS FOR THE DISABLED; 680 ARE PRIVATE, AND 404 ARE GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS. OF THE GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS 165 ARE "INTEGRATED," SERVING BOTH REGULAR AND SPECIAL EDUCATION STUDENTS. IN JAKARTA

THERE ARE 98 SCHOOLS FOR THE DISABLED, TWO OF WHICH ARE GOVERNMENT-RUN, AND 96 OF WHICH ARE PRIVATE. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO RUNS THREE NATIONAL SCHOOLS FOR THE VISUALLY, HEARING, AND MENTALLY DISABLED. THESE SCHOOLS ACCEPT CHILDREN FROM THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

A DISABILITY LAW WAS PASSED IN 1997. IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN ISSUED, SO THE IMPACT OF THE LAW REMAINS UNCLEAR. THE LAW STRIVES TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND ASSISTANCE FOR THE DISABLED. IT REQUIRES COMPANIES EMPLOYING OVER 100 PEOPLE TO GIVE ONE PERCENT OF THE JOBS TO THE DISABLED. THE LAW MANDATES ACCESSIBILITY FOR THE DISABLED TO PUBLIC FACILITIES. VIRTUALLY NO BUILDINGS OR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION HAVE BEEN DESIGNED WITH SUCH ACCESSIBILITY IN MIND.

THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDE CARE FOR ORPHANS AND THE DISABLED, BUT DOES NOT SPECIFY HOW THE TERM "CARE" SHOULD BE DEFINED, AND THE PROVISION OF EDUCATION TO ALL MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED CHILDREN HAS NEVER BEEN INFERRED. REGULATIONS SPECIFY THAT THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISH AND REGULATE A NATIONAL CURRICULUM FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION BY STIPULATING THAT THE "COMMUNITY" PROVIDE SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES TO ITS CHILDREN.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE TERM "INDIGENOUS PEOPLE" TO

BE A MISNOMER, BECAUSE IT CONSIDERS ALL INDONESIANS EXCEPT SINO-INDONESIANS TO BE INDIGENOUS. NONETHELESS, IT PUBLICLY RECOGNIZES THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL "ISOLATED

COMMUNITIES," AND THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE. THE GOVERNMENT ESTIMATES THAT THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN ISOLATED COMMUNITIES IS 1.5 MILLION. THIS INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, GROUPS SUCH AS THE DAYAK POPULATION IN KALIMANTAN WHO LIVE IN REMOTE FOREST AREAS, INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES THROUGHOUT IRIAN JAYA, AND ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED FAMILIES LIVING AS SEA NOMADS ON BOATS NEAR RIAU IN EAST SUMATRA AND NEAR UJUNG PANDANG IN SOUTHERN SULAWESI. CRITICS MAINTAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH IS BASICALLY PATERNALISTIC AND DESIGNED MORE TO INTEGRATE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE INTO SOCIETY THAN TO PROTECT THEIR TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS CRITICIZE THE GOVERNMENT'S TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM FOR VIOLATING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE.

SIXTY PERCENT OF THE POPULATION OF 200 MILLION LIVE IN JAVA, WHICH REPRESENTS ONLY SEVEN PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY'S TERRITORY. THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM SEEKS TO RESETTLE PEOPLE FROM DENSELY POPULATED AREAS TO SPARSELY POPULATED AREAS OUTSIDE JAVA. THE MAJORITY OF MIGRANTS ARE SPONTANEOUS MIGRANTS WHO ARE NOT PART OF THE OFFICIAL PROGRAM. THE CURRENT FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN CALLS FOR 600,000 FAMILIES TO BE

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEEAA 232124Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3764
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 25 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

RESETTLED, WITH 80,000 PLANNED FOR THE 1997-98 FISCAL YEAR.

CRITICS OF TRANSMIGRATION CLAIM THAT IT OFTEN THREATENS

UNCLASSIFIED

INDIGENOUS CULTURES AND SPARKS SOCIAL ENVY. SOME CRITICS CLAIM THAT IT HAS BEEN USED AS A POLITICAL TOOL TO INJECT NONINDIGENOUS PEOPLE INTO CERTAIN AREAS TO "INDONESIANIZE" THESE AREAS, IN PART TO PRECLUDE SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS. A SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL HAS CONFIRMED THIS. IN SOME AREAS, SUCH AS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF KALIMANTAN, EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, RELATIONS BETWEEN TRANSMIGRANTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE ARE HOSTILE. NGO'S ALSO REPORT TENSIONS BETWEEN TRANSMIGRATED JAVANESE AND INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS IN THE MENTAWAI ISLANDS OFF THE WEST COAST OF SUMATRA. INDIGENOUS GROUPS OFTEN COMPLAIN THAT THEY RECEIVE LESS GOVERNMENT SUPPORT AND FUNDING THAN TRANSMIGRANTS, AND TRANSMIGRANTS COMPLAIN THAT IN SOME CASES THEY ARE MOVED TO AREAS WITH INADEQUATE INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT THEM AND LESS THAN DESIRABLE LAND. TRANSMIGRANTS MAY ALSO BE SETTLED ON LAND OF DISPUTED OWNERSHIP.

TENSIONS ARE PARTICULARLY ACUTE IN WEST KALIMANTAN BETWEEN THE INDIGENOUS DAYAK PEOPLE AND SETTLERS FROM MADURA, AN ISLAND OFF THE EASTERN COAST OF JAVA. THE PAST 30 YEARS HAVE BEEN MARKED BY PERIODIC VIOLENT CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES, GROWING PARTLY OUT OF DAYAK PERCEPTION THAT THEY WERE BEING MARGINALIZED IN THEIR NATIVE LANDS. THE MADURESE COMMUNITY IN WEST KALIMANTAN GREW AROUND AN EARLIER CORE OF TRANSMIGRANTS, ALTHOUGH THE MAJORITY OF MADURESE IN THE AREA ARE SPONTANEOUS IMMIGRANTS.

THE GOVERNMENT'S EMPHASIS ON RELATIVELY RAPID GROWTH AND

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES, BURGEONING URBANIZATION, AND AGGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT-BACKED COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF

NATURAL RESOURCES RESULTS IN CONTINUED TENSION OVER LAND TENURE ISSUES. THAT TENSION IS OFTEN EXPRESSED ALONG RACIAL/ETHNIC LINES AS DEVELOPERS ARE FREQUENTLY ETHNIC CHINESE INDONESIANS. LAND DISPUTES REPRESENT THE LARGEST CATEGORY OF COMPLAINTS SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE CASES BROUGHT TO LEGAL AID FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER LEGAL ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS.

ACCORDING TO A LAW DERIVED FROM DUTCH PRACTICES, ALL SUBSURFACE MINERAL RESOURCES BELONG TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE BASIC AGRARIAN LAW STATES THAT LAND RIGHTS CANNOT BE "IN CONFLICT WITH NATIONAL AND STATE INTERESTS," WHICH PROVIDES THE GOVERNMENT WITH A BROAD LEGAL BASIS FOR LAND SEIZURES. WHEN DISPUTES CANNOT BE SETTLED THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DEFINE FAIR COMPENSATION FOR LAND. THERE ARE NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF THE USE OF INTIMIDATION, SOMETIMES BY THE MILITARY, AND OFTEN BY HIRED "THUGS," TO ACQUIRE LAND FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, PARTICULARLY IN AREAS CLAIMED BY INDIGENOUS PEOPLE.

SUCH INTIMIDATION HAS BEEN USED IN JAKARTA, OTHER PARTS OF JAVA, NORTH SUMATRA, ACEH, AND OTHER AREAS. COMPENSATION PAID FOR THE LAND IS OFTEN MINIMAL OR EVEN NONEXISTENT. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES IN WEST SUMATRA, LARGE TRACTS OF LAND IN THE PROVINCE HAVE BEEN CONFISCATED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS BY COMMERCIAL PLANTATION DEVELOPERS WHO PAID BRIBES TO THE LOCAL GOVERNOR. IN SOME CASES, NGO'S REPORT, FARMERS GROWING RICE AND OTHER CROPS WERE EVICTED FROM THE LAND THEY WERE PLANTING WITHOUT COMPENSATION TO MAKE WAY FOR NEW PALM OIL PLANTATIONS

STAFFED BY JAVANESE TRANSMIGRANTS. A LOCAL NGO ALLEGED THAT WHEN ITS STAFF MEMBERS VISITED THE AREA IN THE SUMMER TO INVESTIGATE LAND DISPUTES MADE BY LOCAL COMMUNITIES, THEY WERE INTIMIDATED BY "THUGS" HIRED BY LOCAL OFFICIALS.

NGO'S ASSERT THAT VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE ARE FREQUENT IN MINING AND LOGGING AREAS, AND STATE THAT VIOLATIONS STEM FROM THE STATE'S DENIAL OF OWNERSHIP BY INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF ANCESTRAL LAND, DENIAL OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FORCED TAKEOVER OF LAND. THESE PROBLEMS ARE MOST PREVALENT IN IRIAN JAYA AND KALIMANTAN.

IN 1998, AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED ENVIRONMENTALIST WHO IS ALSO A PARAMOUNT CHIEF OF THE DAYAK TRIBE OF EAST KALIMANTAN WAS BROUGHT TO TRIAL BY THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT, CHARGED WITH FORGERY AND PERJURY. THE CHARGES STEM FROM THE TRIBE'S OPPOSITION TO LOGGING OPERATIONS BEING CONDUCTED ON LAND CLAIMED BY THE TRIBE. THE OPERATIONS WERE BEING CONDUCTED BY A COMPANY OWNED BY A FORMER MINISTER AND CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF SOEHARTO. THE DEFENDANT ALLEGED THAT HE HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY THREATENED AND HARASSED BY INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES FOR HIS OPPOSITION TO THE LOGGING.

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6352

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 26 OF 34 232132Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEF80 232132Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3765
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 26 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

IN CENTRAL KALIMANTAN, NGO'S REPORT THAT LOCAL PEOPLE HAVE SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF A PROJECT TO TURN ONE MILLION HECTARES OF PEAT LAND INTO AGRICULTURAL LAND FOR RICE CULTIVATION. THE SITE IS DESIGNATED AS A MAJOR

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 26 OF 34 232132Z
TRANSMIGRATION AREA. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE SOURCES, 100,000 INDIGENOUS PEOPLE ARE AFFECTED BY THE PROJECT. FORCED TO CEASE THEIR TRADITIONAL FARMING AND FOREST-BASED LIVELIHOODS, MANY INDIGENOUS PEOPLE LIVING IN THE AREA HAVE BECOME POORLY PAID LABORERS ON THE PROJECT.

THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT BONDED LABOR HAS BECOME A PROBLEM FOR SOME OF THE INDIGENOUS DAYAKS IN EAST KALIMANTAN. ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, ON AT LEAST ONE PROJECT, A LOGGING COMPANY ESTABLISHED A COMPANY STORE IN A REMOTE AREA, WHERE WORKERS HAD TO PURCHASE NECESSITIES AT INFLATED PRICES. SINCE THE WORKERS COULD NOT AFFORD THE PRICES, THEY BOUGHT THE GOODS USING VOUCHERS REPRESENTING FUTURE WAGES, "TURNING ONCE INDEPENDENT AND RELATIVELY WELL-OFF FARMERS INTO IMPOVERISHED BONDED LABORERS TRAPPED IN AN EVER-MOUNTING CYCLE OF DEBT."

WHERE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE CLASH WITH COMMERCIAL/PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, THE DEVELOPERS ALMOST ALWAYS WIN. DECISIONS REGARDING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, RESOURCE-USE CONCESSIONS, AND OTHER ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES ARE GENERALLY CARRIED OUT WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OR INFORMED CONSENT OF THE AFFECTED COMMUNITIES. SOME NGO'S THAT SOUGHT TO AID THESE COMMUNITIES WERE SUBJECTED TO VERBAL ATTACKS, RAIDS, AND OTHER FORMS OF INTIMIDATION BY GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES.

TENSIONS WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN IRIAN JAYA CONTINUED. INDIGENOUS IRIAN JAYA RESIDENTS COMPLAIN OF RACISM, RELIGIOUS BIAS, PATERNALISM, AND CONDESCENSION AS CONSTANT

PAGE 03 JAKART 05023 26 OF 34 232132Z
IMPEDIMENTS TO BETTER RELATIONS WITH NON-IRIANESE PEOPLE, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY AND THE NON-IRIANESE BUSINESS COMMUNITY. A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION OF IRIAN JAYA IS NOW MADE UP OF MIGRANTS, WHO ARE ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY DOMINANT. A CLASH BETWEEN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND RECENT MIGRANTS OVER GOLD MINING CLAIMS IN THE AREA OF NABIRE LED TO THE STABBING DEATH OF THREE IRIANESE AND NINE NON-IRIANESE IN AUGUST. MOST CIVIL SERVANTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN IRIAN JAYA AND OTHER ISOLATED AREAS CONTINUE TO COME PRIMARILY FROM OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA, RATHER THAN FROM THE LOCAL INDIGENOUS POPULATION. THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE SECURITY FORCES IN BIAK FOLLOWING

PRO-INDEPENDENCE DEMONSTRATIONS, AND NEW REVELATIONS CONCERNING ABUSES BY SECURITY FORCES PURSUING SEPARATISTS IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OF IRIAN JAYA (SECTION 1.A-C). IN AUGUST THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THE WITHDRAWAL OF 270 TROOPS FROM THE TIMIKA AREA AND 394 TROOPS FROM THE TASK FORCE OPERATING IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS. AFTER MEETING WITH CHURCH LEADERS IN SEPTEMBER, PRESIDENT HABIBIE AGREED TO HOLD A NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON IRIAN JAYA.

A LARGE FOREIGN MINING CONCESSION AREA NEAR TIMIKA CONTINUED TO DRAW ATTENTION AND CONTROVERSY. IN MARCH, A US FEDERAL JUDGE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE A 1996 SUIT BROUGHT BY A LOCAL INDIGENOUS LEADER. IN JUNE, A LANDSLIDE INTO A LAKE INTO WHICH MINE TAILINGS ARE DEPOSITED CAUSED THE LAKE TO OVERFLOW, DAMAGING SETTLEMENTS AND CROPS. AN ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP BLAMED THE COMPANY'S MINING PRACTICES, WHILE THE COMPANY CITED UNUSUALLY HEAVY RAINS AS THE CAUSE OF THE LANDSLIDE AND

FLOODING. INDIGENOUS RESIDENTS, INCLUDING THE GOVERNOR OF IRIAN JAYA, DEMANDED THAT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RETURN A GREATER PERCENTAGE OF THE MINE'S REVENUES TO THE PROVINCE. THE MINE WAS SHUT DOWN FOR FIVE DAYS WHEN MINE WORKERS WENT ON STRIKE IN AUGUST. THE STRIKE ENDED WHEN THE LOCAL MILITARY AND POLICE COMMANDERS HELD A MEETING WITH WORKERS AND COMPANY OFFICIALS. A PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE WHICH VISITED IRIAN JAYA IN AUGUST RECOGNIZED THAT THE COMPANY'S PRESENCE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND SECURED AND URGED THAT DEMANDS FOR THE COMPANY TO INCREASE ITS PARTICIPATION IN IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNITY WELFARE BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE PROVINCE AND SET FORTH IN A CONTRACT TO GIVE IT A LEGAL BASIS. THE COMMISSION ALSO SUGGESTED THAT COMPANY FUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINE AREA BE DISBURSED IN A FAIR, TRANSPARENT, AND ORGANIZED MANNER.

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

IN 1998, THERE WERE INSTANCES OF ATTACKS ON CHURCHES, TEMPLES, AND OTHER RELIGIOUS FACILITIES, RANGING IN NATURE FROM MINOR VANDALISM TO ARSON. THERE WERE ALSO INSTANCES OF PREACHING AND PUBLICATIONS AGAINST CHRISTIANS, WHICH LED TO CONCERNS THAT THE SOCIETAL SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE WAS UNDER PRESSURE. HOWEVER, THE NUMBER OF

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 27 OF 34 232126Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	SVC-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00
	SAS-00	/026W					

----------6DEECF 232126Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3766
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 27 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES --

INDONESIA

(##)CHURCHES TARGETED FOR VANDALISM AND ARSON WAS
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 27 OF 34 232126Z
SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER IN 1998 THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT FULLY RESOLVED MANY CASES OF ATTACKS ON RELIGIOUS FACILITIES AND CHURCHES THAT OCCURRED DURING RIOTS, AND IN OTHER CASES HAS NOT INVESTIGATED AT ALL.

ON FEBRUARY 13, SERIOUS ANTI-CHRISTIAN AND ANTI-SINO-INDONESIAN VIOLENCE BROKE OUT IN WEST JAVA. 28 CHURCHES WERE ATTACKED IN SEVERAL TOWNS EAST AND SOUTH EAST OF JAKARTA. MOBS STONED WINDOWS, VANDALIZED INTERIORS, AND IN SOME CASES ATTEMPTED TO BURN THE CHURCHES. CARS AND OTHER PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE CHURCH AND CHURCH MEMBERS WAS ALSO TARGETED FOR VANDALISM. INCIDENTS SUCH AS THIS REFLECT UNDERLYING SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TENSIONS BETWEEN POOR MUSLIMS AND WELL-TO-DO ETHNIC CHINESE CHRISTIANS.

ON JULY 24, A PROTESTANT CHURCH WAS BURNED IN THE DEPOK AREA OF SOUTH JAKARTA. THE CHURCH'S DENOMINATION WERE BATAK, AN ETHNIC GROUP WITH ORIGINS IN NORTH SUMATRA. CHRISTIAN ACTIVISTS ALLEGE THAT INDONESIAN POLICE FAILED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO THE CHURCH AND HAVE MADE NO PROGRESS INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT. ((TO BE AMPLIFIED))

MUSLIMS ARE A RELIGIOUS MINORITY IN THE EASTERNMOST PROVINCE OF IRIAN JAYA. IN JANUARY, A MOSQUE WAS BURNED DOWN IN A SMALL VILLAGE NEAR KURIMA IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OF IRIAN JAYA. THE ATTACK ON THE MOSQUE WAS APPARENTLY MOTIVATED BY LOCAL SENTIMENT AGAINST THE EFFORTS OF MUSLIM MISSIONARIES TO WIN CONVERTS IN THE PREDOMINANTLY CHRISTIAN PROVINCE. THE INCIDENT ALSO

REFLECTED LOCAL RESENTMENT OF THE ARRIVAL IN THE PROVINCE OF MAINLY MUSLIM MIGRANTS FROM OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA. INTERRELIGIOUS TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH IN THE PROVINCE.

NATIONAL/RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALLY PROMOTES RACIAL AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE. ETHNIC CHINESE, AT APPROXIMATELY THREE PERCENT OF THE POPULATION BY FAR THE LARGEST NONINDIGENOUS MINORITY GROUP, HAVE HISTORICALLY PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE ECONOMY. IN 1998, ANTI-CHINESE SENTIMENT LED TO SERIOUS AND WIDESPREAD ATTACKS ON CHINESE-OWNED BUSINESSES, ESPECIALLY IN THE DISTURBANCES OF MAY 12-14. CREDIBLE CHARGES EMERGED THAT ATTACKS ON CHINESE PROPERTY DURING THE MAY RIOTING WAS IN SOME CASES ORGANIZED RATHER THAN SPONTANEOUS IN NATURE, AND THAT ATTACKS ON CHINESE PROPERTY WERE COORDINATED IN JAKARTA AND IN OTHER CITIES AND TOWNS ACROSS INDONESIA.

BOTH THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND NGO'S ARE ALSO INVESTIGATING ALLEGATIONS THAT DURING THE MAY RIOTS, MORE THAN 150 ETHNICALLY CHINESE WOMEN WERE TARGETED FORRAPE IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES, AS PART OF A CAMPAIGN TO SPREAD TERROR AMONG THE ETHNIC CHINESE COMMUNITY (SEE SECTION 1C). ALLEGATIONS OF THE ORGANIZED DESTRUCTION OF CHINESE PROPERTY AND THE SYSTEMATIC MASS RAPE OF CHINESE WOMEN ARE VERY CONTROVERSIAL, AND BOTH OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE INVESTIGATIONS OF THESE CHARGES SO FAR HAD DIFFICULTY PRODUCING CONCRETE EVIDENCE, PARTICULARLY FIRST-HAND TESTIMONY.

PAGE 04 JAKART 05023 27 OF 34 232126Z
SINCE 1959, NONCITIZEN ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO RUN BUSINESSES IN RURAL INDONESIA. REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF CHINESE SCHOOLS, FORMATION OF EXCLUSIVELY CHINESE CULTURAL GROUPS OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND PUBLIC DISPLAY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS, ALTHOUGH CHINESE CHARACTERS ARE SEEN ON SOME PRODUCTS. THE GOVERNMENT PERMITS THE PUBLICATION OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED CHINESE-LANGUAGE DAILY NEWSAPER, BUT OTHERWISE LEGISLATION BANS THE IMPOR, SALE OR DISTRIBUTION OF CHINESE-LANGUAGE MATERIAL. HOWEVER, CHINESE-LANGUAGE MATERIALS HAVE BEGUN TO APPEAR IN CHINESE NEIGHBORHOODS IN JAKARTA AND POSSIBLY ELSEWHERE. SINCE 1994 THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALLOWED CHINESE-ANGUAGE INSTRUCTION FOR EMPLOYEES IN THE TOURSM INDUSTRY, AND HAS ALLOWED DISTRIBUTION OF LCALLY PRINTED CHINESE-LANGUAGEQIST BROCHURE, PROGRAMS, AND SIMILAR MATERIAL TO CHINESE SEAKING TOURISTS.

PRIVATE INSTRUCTION IN CHINESE IS GENERALLY PROHIBITED BUT TAKES PLACE TO A LIMITED EXTENT. THE UNIVERSITY OF INDOQ OFFERS CHINQANGUAGE COURSES. STATE UNIVERSITIES HAVE INFORMAL QQ THAT LQHE NUMBER OF ETHNIC CHINESE STUDENTS. THE LAW FORBIDS THE CELEBRATION OF THE CHINESE NEW YEAR IN TEMPLES OR PUBLIC PLACES, BUT ENFORCEMENT IS LIMITED. CHINESE NEW YEAR DECORATIONS WERE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED AND SOLD IN PUBLIC SHOPPING AREAS IN AT LEAST A FEW CITIES. SENIOR OFFICIALS HAVE PREVIOUSLY

(##) GARBLED TEXT CORRECTIONS WILL FOLLOW

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6356

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 28 OF 34 232133Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEFA5 232133Z /69
R 230903Z SEP 98

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3767
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 28 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

SHOWN RELUCTANCE TO RELAX THE BAN ON CHINESE-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS, CITING CONCERNS THAT SUCH AN ACTION COULD PROMOTE INTER-RACIAL TENSIONS.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 28 OF 34 232133Z
EAST TIMORESE AND VARIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS CHARGE THAT THE EAST TIMORESE ARE UNDERREPRESENTED IN THE CIVIL SERVICE IN EAST TIMOR. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE SOME EFFORTS TO RECRUIT MORE CIVIL SERVANTS IN BOTH EAST TIMOR AND IRIAN JAYA, AND THERE HAS BEEN SOME INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CIVIL SERVANT TRAINEES FOR THESE TWO PROVINCES, DESPITE A "NO GROWTH" POLICY FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE AS A WHOLE. EAST TIMORESE HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERNS THAT THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM (SEE SECTION 1.F.) COULD LEAD TO FEWER EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND MIGHT EVENTUALLY DESTROY EAST TIMOR'S CULTURAL IDENTITY. THE GOVERNMENT SAID THAT THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM IN EAST TIMOR FOCUSED MOSTLY ON RESETTLEMENT OF TIMORESE, WITH A MUCH SMALLER PORTION OF PREDOMINANTLY CHRISTIAN AND HINDU NON-TIMORESE COMING IN FROM OUTSIDE. IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, INFORMAL, PREDOMINATLY MUSLIM MIGRATION TO THE PROVINCE HAS SPARKED SOCIOECONOMIC TENSION IN URBAN AREAS, PROVOKING EVEN GREATER CONCERN THAN THE FORMALLY SPONSORED TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM. IN JULY, IN REACTION TO RUMORS AND POSSIBLE INTIMIDATION, AT LEAST SEVERAL THOUSAND NON-EAST TIMORESE FLED THE PROVINCE, BUT MOST LATER RETURNED.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS ARE BY LAW FREE TO FORM WORKER ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION, AND UNIONS AY

DRAW UP THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND RULES AND ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. IN MAY THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT

RATIFIED INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) CONVENTION 87 ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ISSUED A NEW REGULATION ON REGISTRATION OF WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS. THE NEW REGULATION ELIMINATES NUMERICAL AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY A BARRIER TO UNION REGISTRATION. IT PROVIDES FOR REGISTRATION OF UNIONS AT THE FACTORY, DISTRICT, PROVINCIAL, AND NATIONAL LEVEL, AND ALLOWS UNIONS TO FORM FEDERATIONS AND CONFEDERATIONS. THE REGULATION PROHIBITS UNIONS BASED ON POLITICAL ORIENTATION, RELIGION, GENDER, OR ETHNIC GROUPS. THE REGULATION REQUIRES THAT WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS ALREADY RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT, I.E., THE FEDERATION OF ALL-INDONESIAN TRADE UNIONS (SPSI) AND PLANT-LEVEL UNIONS, MUST RE-REGISTER WITHIN 90 DAYS. SINCE THE NEW REGULATION ON TRADE UNION REGISTRATION WENT INTO EFFECT, AT LEAST SIX NEW OR PREVIOUSLY UNRECOGNIZED UNIONS HAVE BEGUN ORGANIZING THEMSELVES TO REGISTER.

THE SPSI, WHICH WAS FORMED BY THE FUSION (WITH STRONG GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGEMENT) OF EXISTING LABOR ORGANIZATIONS IN 1973, IS THE OLDEST TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION. THEHEAD OF THE SPSI AND MANY MEMBERS OF THE EXECTIVE COUNCIL ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE RULING GOLKAR POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND ITS CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONAL GROUPS AND HAVE CLOSE TIES TO THE GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION, THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER IS A MEMBER OF THE SPSI'S CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL.

UNDER THE LAW ON MANPOWER AFFAIRS ENACTED IN OCTOBER 1997, WORKERS MAY FORM UNIONS ON THE BASIS OF "DEMOCRATIC CONSULTATION" WITH OTHER WORKERS IN THE SAME COMPANY, AND MAY JOIN WITH OTHER UNIONS TO FORM SECTORAL AND

INTERSECTORAL FEDERATIONS. THE LAW WAS SCHEDULED TO TAKE EFFECT ON OCTOBER 1, BUT MINISTER OF MANPOWER FAHMI IDRIS ANNOUNCED ON SEPTEMBER 8 THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW WOULD BE POSTPONED FOR A YEAR TO ALLOW TIME FOR REVISION, CONSULTATION WITH CONCERNED GROUPS, AND PREPARATION OF IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS.

THE GOVERNMENT MAY DISSOLVE A UNION, LIKE OTHER MASS ORGANIZATIONS, IF IT BELIEVES THAT THE UNION IS ACTING AGAINST PANCASILA, ALTHOUGH IT HAS NEVER ACTUALLY DONE SO, AND THERE ARE NO LAWS OR REGULATIONS SPECIFYING PROCEDURES

FOR UNION DISSOLUTION.

TWO LABOR GROUPS PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED ILLEGAL BY THE GOVERNMENT, THE INDONESIAN PROSPERITY TRADE UNION (SBSI) AND THE ALLIANCE OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS (AJI), NOW OPERATE OPENLY. SINCE MAY, AJI, FORMED IN 1994 BY JOURNALISTS DISILLUSIONED WITH THE GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS (PWI), HAS CARRIED OUT ITS ACTIVITIES WITHOUT HINDRANCE. SBSI'S FOUNDER AND GENERAL CHAIRMAN, MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, WAS RELEASED AFTER NEARLY TWO YEARS OF DETENTION AND CLEARED OF ALL PREVIOUS CHARGES AND CONVICTIONS IN MAY. HOWEVER, THE SBSI, CREATED IN 1992, CONTINUES TO ENCOUNTER HARASSMENT. AS

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 29 OF 34 232134Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEFB5 232134Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3768
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 29 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

NOTED IN SECTION 2.B., MILITARY AND POLICE PREVENTED THE SBSI FROM HOLDING A LARGE PUBLIC RALLY AT THE PARLIAMENT IN JUNE. IN JULY THE LOCAL MILITARY COMMANDER CANCELED A

SOLO, CENTRAL JAVA. LATER THE SAME MONTH, LOCAL OFFICIALS BROKE UP AN SBSI TRAINING SESSION IN NORTH SUMATRA AND ASSAULTED SBSI LEADERS, AND SECURITY OFFICIALS BEAT AND DETAINED SBSI REPRESENTATIVES IN TANGERANG (NEAR JAKARTA) WHO WERE SEEKING TO REGISTER A WORKPLACE SBSI UNIT WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER OFFICE. SBSI CLAIMS THAT COMPANIES ARE CONTINUING TO FIRE SBSI MEMBERS BECAUSE OF THEIR AFFILIATION WITH THE UNION OR BECAUSE THEY SOUGHT TO ORGANIZE SBSI UNITS WITHIN THEIR FACTORIES, A PROBLEM OTHER LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVISTS HAVE ENCOUNTERED IN TRYING TO FORM UNIONS. IN ADDITION, ACCORDING TO SBSI, LOCAL DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER OFFICES IN NORTH SUMATRA HAVE REJECTED APPLICATIONS FOR REGISTRATION OF SBSI UNITS.

CIVIL SERVANTS MUST BELONG TO KORPRI, A NON-UNION ASSOCIATION WHOSE CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL IS CHAIRED B THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES, DEFINED TO INCLUDE THOSE WORKING IN ENTERPRISES IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A FIVE-PERCENT HOLDING OR GREATER, USUALLY ARE REQUIRED TO JOIN KORPRI, BUT A SMALL NUMBER OF STATE ENTERPRISES HAVE SPSI UNITS. TEACHERS MUST BELONG TO THE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (PGRI). WHILE TECHNICALLY CLASSED AS A UNION, THE PGRI CONTINUES TO FUNCTION MORE AS A WELFARE ORGANIZATION AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ENGAGED IN TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES SUCH AS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. MANDATORY KORPRI AND PGRI CONTRIBUTIONS ARE DEDUCTED AUTOMATICALLY FROM TEACHERS' SALARIES.

THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED LATE IN 1995 ITS INTENTION TO RELAX A REGULATION REQUIRING POLICE APPROVAL FOR ALL MEETINGS OF FIVE OR MORE PEOPLE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS

OUTSIDE OFFICES OR NORMAL WORK SITES. HOWEVER, IN PRACTICE THIS REGULATION CONTINUES TO APPLY TO UNION MEETINGS. PERMISSION WAS ROUTINELY GIVEN TO THE SPSI, BUT THE SBSI AND OTHER LABOR ORGANIZATIONS CLAIM THAT LOCAL CIVILIAN AND SECURITY OFFICIALS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS HAVE DISCOURAGED OR DENY PERMISSION TO THEIR GATHERINGS EVE AFTER THE UNION REGISTRATION PROCESS WAS OPENE UP IN MAY.
IN 1994 THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS LODGED A FORMAL COMPLAINT AGAINST INDONESIA WITH THE ILO, ACCUSING THE GOVERNMENT OF DENYING WORKERS THE RIGHT TO SET UP UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, HARASSING

INDEPENDENT WORKERS ORGANIZATIONS, AND OF TAKING OTHER ACTIONS CONTRARY TO ILO STANDARDS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. IN EARLY JUNE THE COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION SAID THE RELEASE OF MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN AND OTHER SBSI LEADERS CONSTITUTED AN IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE STEP WITH REGARD TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, AND EXPRESSED THE FIRM HOPE THAT THIS WILL BE ONE OF A SERIES OF POSITIVE MEASURES TOWARD FULL RESPECT OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION.

WHILE PANCASILA PRINCIPLES CALL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIFFERENCES TO BE SETTLED BY CONSENSUS, ALL ORGANIZED WORKERS EXCEPT CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO STRIKE. STATE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES AND TEACHERS RARELY EXERCISE THIS RIGHT, BUT PRIVATE SECTOR STRIKES ARE FREQUENT. BEFORE A STRIKE CAN OCCUR LEGALLY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE LAW REQUIRES INTENSIVE MEDIATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND PRIOR NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE. HOWEVER, NO APPROVAL IS REQUIRED. IN

PRACTICE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ARE RARELY FOLLOWED, AND FORMAL NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO STRIKE IS RARELY GIVEN BECAUSE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROCEDURES ARE SLOW AND HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY WITH WORKERS. THEREFORE, SUDDEN STRIKES TEND TO RESULT FROM LONGSTANDING GRIEVANCES, ATTEMPTS BY EMPLOYERS TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF UNION BRANCHES, OR DENIAL OF LEGALLY MANDATED BENEFITS OR RIGHTS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS STATED THAT IT WILL ADDRESS STRIKE PROCEDURES AND INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN REVISING THE 1997 LAW ON MANPOWER AFFAIRS AND IN NEW LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION.

ACCORDING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER STATISTICS, THERE WERE ??? STRIKES INVOLVING ??? WORKERS DURING 1998 (NUMBERS TO BE SUPPLIED CLOSER TO THE END OF THE YEAR). HOWEVER, BEGINNING IN 1997 THE GOVERNMENT ONLY COUNTED WORK STOPPAGES IN WHICH AT LEAST A FULL DAY'S PRODUCTION WAS LOST AS STRIKES. SHORTER WORK STOPPAGES ("UNJUK RASA") ARE MUCH MORE FREQUENT, BUT THE GOVERNMENT KEPT NO OFFICIAL COUNT OF THEM IN 1997. THE LARGEST STRIKE INVOLVED AN ESTIMATED 30,000 WORKERS FROM A SURABAYA MANUFACTURING COMPANY WHO WENT ON STRIKE FOR SIX DAYS IN JUNE FOR INCREASED WAGES AND ALLOWANCES. ONE WORKER DIED OF INJURIES, REPORTEDLY AFTER BEING STRUCK WITH A RIFLE

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6362

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 30 OF 34 232134Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEFC4 232135Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3769
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 30 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

BUTT DURING A CLASH WITH POLICE. AFTER PERIODIC STRIKES IN JULY INVOLVING SEVERAL THOUSAND WORKERS AT A TEXTILE PLANT IN SOLO, CENTRAL JAVA, A GROUP OF 750 WORKERS DEMONSTRATED FOR SEVERAL DAYS IN FRONT OF THE DEPARTMENT

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 30 OF 34 232134Z
OF MANPOWER AND OTHER OFFICES IN JAKARTA. NINETEEN OF THE WORKERS WERE INJURED IN A CLASH WITH POLICE WHEN THE DEMONSTRATORS BLOCKED TRAFFIC ON A BUSY STREET IN JAKARTA. THEY LEFT JAKARTA AFTER THE GOVERNMENT LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION BOARD RULED THAT THE COMPANY SHOULD REINSTATE THEM.

THE SPSI MAINTAINS INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS BUT ITS ONLY INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION AFFILIATION AS A FEDERATION IS THE ASOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS TRADE UNION COUNCIL. SOME OF THE SPSI'S FEDERATED SECTORAL UNIONS ARE MEMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE SECRETARIATS. THE SBSI IS AFFILIATED WITH THE WORLD CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (WCL)

AND SOME INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION SECRETARIATS.

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PROMOTES IT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE NATIONAL IDEOLOGY, PANCASLA. UNTIL 1994 ONLY RECOGNIZED TRADE UNIONS--THE SPSI AND ITS COMPONENTS--COULD LEGALLY ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. SINCE RATIFYING ILO CONVENTION 87 AND ISSUING A NEW REGULATION ON UNION REGISTRATION IN MAY, THE GOVERNMENT HAS OPENED THE DOOR TO NEW WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS WHICH REGISTER WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO CONCLUDE LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH EMPLOYERS.

IN COMPANIES WITHOUT UNIONS, THE GOVERNMENT DISCOURAGES WORKERS FROM UTILIZING NONGOVERNMENT OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE, E.G., DURING CONSULTATIONS WITH EMPLOYERS OVER COMPANY

REGULATIONS. INSTEAD, THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER PREFERS THAT WORKERS SEEK ITS ASSISTANCE AND BELIEVES THAT ITS ROLE IS TO PROTECT WORKERS. THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT FOR MANY COMPANIES, CONSULTATIONS ARE PERFUNCTORY AT BEST AND USUALLY WITH MANAGEMENT-SELECTED WORKERS; THERE ARE ALSO CREDIBLE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY FROM FOREIGN COMPANIES. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT STATISTICS, APPROXIMATELY 80 PERCENT OF THE FACTORY-LEVEL SPSI UNITS HAVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS ARE FREELY NEGOTIATED BETWEEN UNIONS AND ANAGEMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE ARIES. BY REGULATION, NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 30 DAYS OR BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER FOR MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION OR ARBITRATION. MOST NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD. AGREEMENTS ARE FOR TWO YEARS AND CAN BE EXTENDED FOR ONE YEAR.

ACCORDING TO NGO'S INVOLVED IN LABOR ISSUES, IN CURRENT PRACTICE THE PROVISIONS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS RARELY GO BEYOND THE LEGAL MINIMUM STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE AGREEMENTS ARE OFTEN MERELY PRESENTED TO WORKER REPRESENTATIVES FOR SIGNING RATHER THAN BEING NEGOTIATED. THE SPSI STATED IN SEPTEMBER 1997 THAT OF 23,525 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SIGNED BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND WORKERS, 10,776 OF THESE AGREEMENTS WERE ONLY "IMITATION" AGREEMENTS BECAUSE THEY WERE CONCLUDED IN COMPANIES WHERE WORKERS WERE NOT REPRESENTED BY A UNION. ALTHOUGH GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS

PROHIBIT EMPLOYERS FROM DISCRIMINATING AGAINST OR
HARASSING EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP, THERE ARE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 05023 30 OF 34 232134Z
CREDIBLE REPORTS FROM UNION OFFICIALS OF EMPLOYER
RETRIBUTION AGAINST UNION ORGANIZERS, INCLUDING FIRING,
WHICH IS NOT EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED OR REMEDIED IN
PRACTICE. SOME EMPLOYERS REPORTEDLY HAVE WARNED THEIR
EMPLOYEES AGAINST CONTACT WITH UNION ORGANIZERS. CHARGES
OF ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION ARE ADJUDICATED BY REGIONAL
AND NATIONAL LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEES, AND
THEIR DECISIONS CAN BE APPEALED TO THE STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT. IN SEPTEMBER 1997 THE STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT REVERSED A NATIONAL LABOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION BORD RULING THAT ORDERED THE HONG KONG BANK TO
REINSTATE 166 UNION MEMBERS WHO WENT ON STRIKE, DESPITE
GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS MAKING IT ILLEGAL TO FIRE WORKERS
SOLELY FOR STRIKING OR OTHER UNION ACTIVITY. DECISIONS
SUCH AS THIS LEAD MANY UNION MEMBERS TO BELIEVE THAT THE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEES GENERALLY SIDE WITH
EMPLOYERS. AS A RESULT, WORKERS FREQUENTLY PRESENT THEIR
GRIEVANCES DIRECTLY TO THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION, PARLIAMENT, AND NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF
DISMISSED WORKERS TEND TO BE MONETARY AWARDS; WORKERS ARE
RARELY REINSTATED. THE LAW REQUIRES THAT EMPLOYERS
OBTAIN THE APPROVAL OF THE LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
COMMITTEE BEFORE FIRING WORKERS, BUT THE LAW IS OFTEN

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6367

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 31 OF 34 232135Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEFD7 232135Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3770

INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 31 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES --

INDONESIA

IGNORED IN PRACTICE.

COMMENTING ON ANTIUNION DISCRIMINATION AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY, THE ILO'S COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN JUNE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE TO BRING ITS LEGISLATION, INCLUDING THE 1997 MANPOWER LAW, INTO CONFORMITY WITH ILO CONVENTION 98 ON THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY.

ON JUNE 1, 1996, THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER ISSUED A NEW REGULATION PERMITTING UNIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SPSI TO COLLECT UNION DUES DIRECTLY THROUGH THE CHECK-OFF SYSTEM, RATHER THAN HAVING THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER COLLECT DUES AND TRANSFER THEM TO THE SPSI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SYSTEM REMAINS UNEVEN, BUT LABOR OBSERVERS GENERALLY BELIEVE IT HAS GIVEN MORE POWER TO FACTORY-LEVEL UNION UNITS WHERE THE CHECK-OFF SYSTEM IS PRACTICED. UNION OFFICIALS AT SPSI HEADQUARTERS STATED THAT NOT ALL LOCAL BRANCHES OF THE UNIONS ARE SENDING A PORTION OF DUES COLLECTED TO REGIONAL AND CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AS PROVIDED IN THE SPSI'S BY-LAWS.

THE POLICE, AS WELL AS THE MILITARY, CONTINUE TO BE INVOLVED IN LABOR MATTERS, ALTHOUGH SINCE THE MID-1990'S THERE HAS BEEN A SHIFT FROM OPEN INTERVENION AND DEMONSTRATIONS OF FORCE BY UNIFORMED ROOPS TO LESS VISIBLE MEASURES. NEVERTHELESS, IN JUNE ARMY TROOPS GUARDING A STEEL PLANT NEAR JAKARTA DURING A STRIKE FIRED RUBBER BULLETS ON STRIKING WORKERS WHO PELTED THEM WITH ROCKS AND BOTTLES. TWENTY-THREE WORKERS, AS WELL AS THREE SOLDIERS, WERE INJURED. AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 6.A., ON

SEVERAL OCCASIONS SECURITY PERSONNEL INTERFERED WITH ACTIVITIES OF THE INDONESIAN PROSPERITY TRADE UNION (SBSI). HOWEVER, THE MOST COMMON FORM OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LABOR MATTERS, ACCORDING TO UNION AND NGO REPRESENTATIVES, IS A LONGSTANDING PATTERN OF COLLUSION BETWEEN POLICE AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES AND EMPLOYERS, WHICH USUALLY TAKES THE FORM OF INTIMIDATION OF WORKERS BY SECURITY PERSONNEL IN CIVILIAN DRESS. EMPLOYER AND UNION REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE "INVISIBLE COSTS" OF CORRUPTION, WHICH THEY AND OTHERS ESTIMATE CONSTITUTE UP TO 30 PERCENT OF A COMPANY'S EXPENSES.

RESPONDING TO CRITICISM AT THE 1998 INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE OF INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCE INTERVENTION IN LABOR MATTERS, MINISTER OF MANPOWER FAHMI IDRIS SENT A LETTR TO COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS FEISAL TANJUNG REQUESTING THAT INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ALLOW LABOR DISPUTES TO BE SETTLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER. THE COORDINATING MINISTER SUBSEQUENTLY SENT A LETTER TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY AND OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS REQUESTING THAT THEY GIVE ATTENTION TO IDRIS' REQUEST AND IMPLEMENT A POLICY OF PERMITTING INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES SHOULD BE RESOLVED BETWEEN WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS ON THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES. A 1990 DECREE GIVING THE AGENCY FOR COORDINATION OF NATIONAL STABILITY (BAKORSTANAS) AUTHORITY TO INTERVENE IN STRIKES IN THE INTEREST OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY REMAINS IN EFFECT.

LABOR LAW APPLIES IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES AS IN THE

REST OF THE COUNTRY, ALTHOUGH NON-GOVERNMENTAL OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT IN PRACTICE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES IS WEAKER.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

THE LAW FORBIDS FORCED LABOR, AND THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY ENFORCES IT. THE GOVERNMENT PROHIBITS FORCED AND BONDED LABOR BY CHILDREN, BUT DOES NOT ALWAYS ENFORCE THIS EFFECTIVELY. THERE ARE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT SEVERAL THOUSAND CHILDREN ARE FORCED TO WORK ON FISHING PLATFORMS OFF THE EAST COAST OF NORTH SUMATRA IN CONDITIONS OF BONDED LABOR. MOST ARE RECRUITED FROM FARMING

COMMUNITIES, AND ONCE THEY ARRIVE AT THE WORK SITE MILES OFFSHORE, THEY ARE HELD AS VIRTUAL PRISONERS AND ARE NOT PERMITTED TO LEAVE FOR AT LEAST THREE MONTHS AND UNTIL A REPLACEMENT WORKER CAN BE FOUND. CHILDREN RECEIVE AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES OF $17 TO $32, WELL BELOW THE REGIONAL MINIMUM WAGE. THEY LIVE IN ISOLATION ON THE SEA, WORK 12 TO 20 HOURS PER DAY IN OFTEN DANGEROUS CONDITIONS, AND SLEEP IN THE WORKSPACE WITH NO ACCESS TO SANITARY FACILITIES. THERE ARE REPORTS OF PHYSICAL, VERBAL, AND SEXUAL ABUSE OF THE CHILDREN. IN JULY MINISTER OF MANPOWER IDRIS TOLD A PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE THE GOVERNMENT WANTED TO END CHILD LABOR ON THE FISHING PLATFORMS AND TO FIND ALTERNATIVES FOR CHILDREN EMPLOYED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 32 OF 34 232136Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00

/026W

----------6DEFF2 232137Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3771
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 32 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

THERE.

THERE WERE REPORTS IN 1997 THAT THE MILITARY FORCED

THE MILITARY DENIED SUCH REPORTS (SEE SECTION 2.D.).

D. STATUS OF CHILD LABOR PRACTICES AND MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT

CHILD LABOR EXISTS IN BOTH URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, AND IN BOTH THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS. A SURVEY CONDUCTED IN 1996 BY THE INDONESIAN CHILD WELFARE ASSOCIATION, 1.92 MILLION CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 14 WORKED AT LEAST 4 HOURS A DAY. THE ASSOCIATION BELIEVES THIS FIGURE REPRESENTS ABOUT 8.5 PERCENT OF INDONESIAN CHILDREN. HOWEVER, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF WORKING CHILDREN IN INDONESIA IS PROBABLY SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER, BECAUSE DOCUMENTS VERIFYING AGE ARE EASILY FALSIFIED, AND BECAUSE CHILDREN UNDER TEN WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE SURVEY. THIS NUMBER IS BELIEVED TO HAVE RISEN STILL FURTHER DUE TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS WHICH PLAGUED INDONESIAN THROUGHOUT 1998. THOUGH STATISTICS ARE NOT YET AVAILABLE, IT IS WIDELY AGREED THAT ABOUT 2 MILLION INDONESIAN CHILDREN WORKED AT LEAST 4 HOURS A DAY IN 1998.

((MORE STATISTICS MAY BECOME AVAILABLE BY END OF YEAR))

INDONESIA WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO BE SELECTED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ILO'S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOR (IPEC), AND IT SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ILO IN 1992 TO GUIDE COLLABORATION UNDER THIS PROGRAM. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ILO SIGNED ANOTHER MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CHILD LABOR IN MARCH 1997 COMMITTING TO "PROMOTE CONDITIONS TO ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT WORKING CHILDREN AND PROGRESSIVELY PROHIBIT, RESTRICT AND REGULATE CHILD LABOR

WITH A VIEW TO ITS ULTIMATE ELIMINATION." MINISTER OF MANPOWER FAHMI IDRIS TOLD THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE IN JUNE THAT INDONESIA INTENDS TO RATIFY ILO CONVENTION 138 ON MINIMUM WORKING AGE. ALTHOUGH THE ILO HAS SPONSORED TRAINING OF LABOR INSPECTORS ON CHILD LABOR MATTERS UNDER THE IPEC PROGRAM, ENFORCEMENT REMAINS LAX.

THE GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A CLASS OF CHILDREN WHO MUST WORK FOR SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS, AND IN 1987 THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER ISSUED A REGULATION, PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FORCED TO WORK." THIS REGULATION LEGALIZES THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14

WHO MUST WORK TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCOME OF THEIR FAMILIES. IT REQUIRES PARENTAL CONSENT, PROHIBITS DANGEROUS OR DIFFICULT WORK, LIMITS WORK TO 4 HOURS DAILY, AND REQUIRES EMPLOYERS TO REPORT THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN WORKING UNDER ITS PROVISIONS. IT DOES NOT SET A MINIMUM AGE FOR CHILDREN IN THIS CATEGORY, EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDING THE COLONIAL-ERA GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE OF DECEMBER 17, 1925, ON "MEASURES LIMITING CHILD LABOR AND NIGHTWORK OF WOMEN," WHICH IS STILL THE CURRENT LAW GOVERNING CHILD LABOR AND SETS A MINIMUM AGE OF 12 FOR EMPLOYMENT. THE 1987 REGULATION IS NOT ENFORCED. NO EMPLOYERS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO COURT FOR VIOLATING ITS RESTRICTIONS ON THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR CHILDREN, AND NO REPORTS ARE COLLECTED FROM ESTABLISHMENTS EMPLOYING CHILDREN.

ACT NO. 1 OF 1951 WAS INTENDED TO BRING INTO FORCE CERTAIN LABOR MEASURES, INCLUDING PROVISIONS ON CHILD LABOR THAT WOULD REPLACE THOSE OF THE 1925 LEGISLATION. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS FOR THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS

HAVE NEVER BEEN ISSUED. THUS THE CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS IN THE 1951 ACT HAVE NO VALIDITY. THE GOVERNMENT PROHIBITS FORCED AND BONDED LABOR BY CHILDREN, BUT DOES NOT ENFORCE THIS PROHIBITION EFFECTIVELY (SEE SECTION 6.C.).

THE 1997 MANPOWER LAW PROHIBITS EMPLOYERS FROM HIRING CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 15, EXCEPT THAT EMPLOYERS MAY HIRE CHILDREN WHO ARE FORCED FOR ECONOMIC REASONS TO WORK. THE NEW LAW, WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO GO INTO EFFECT IN 1999, PLACES RESTRICTIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE 1987 REGULATION ON EMPLOYERS HIRING CHILDREN. IT ALSO STATES THAT ADOLESCENTS (AGES 15 TO 17) CANNOT WORK DURING CERTAIN HOURS OF THE NIGHT, BELOW GROUND, IN MINES, OR IN JOBS THAT WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON MORALITY, SUCH AS IN ENTERTAINMENT FACILITIES.

ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT LABOR FORCE DATA, MOST WORKING CHILDREN WORK IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF WORKING CHILDREN IN URBAN AREAS HAS RISEN SIGNIFICANTLY WITH URBANIZATION. A PROMINENT NGO ESTIMATED IN 1998 THAT 1.92 MILLION INDONESIAN CHILDREN WORKED MORE THAN 4 HOURS PER DAY. OF THIS NUMBER, 1.67 MILLION WORKED IN RURAL AREAS AND 249,000 WORKED IN URBAN

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6374

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 33 OF 34 232137Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00 /026W	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00

----------6DF003 232138Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3772
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 33 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

AREAS. ACCORDING TO THE NGO'S ESTIMATES, BOY WORKERS OUTNUMBERED GIRL WORKERS IN THE RURAL AREAS: 1.01 MILLION BOYS WORKED AND 662,000 THOUSAND GIRLS WORKED. BY CONTRAST, GIRLS OUTNUMBERED BOYS IN THE URBAN AREAS:

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 33 OF 34 232137Z
119,402 BOYS WORKED AND 130,000 GIRLS WORKED.

MORE CHILD LABORERS WORK IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR THAN THE FORMAL SECTOR. WHERE CHILDREN WORK IN THE FORMAL SECTOR, SUCH WORK TENDS TO OCCUR ON THE BORDER LINE BETWEEN THE INFORMAL AND FORMAL ECONOMIES, SUCH AS ALONGSIDE THEIR PARENTS IN HOME ENTERPRISES AND ON PLANTATIONS, AND IN FAMILY-OWNED SHOPS AND SMALL FACTORIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT ARE SATELLITES OF LARGE INDUSTRIES. THERE ARE CHILDREN WORKING IN LARGE FACTORIES, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER IS UNKNOWN, ESPECIALLY SINCE DOCUMENTS VERIFYING AGE ARE EASILY FALSIFIED. IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR, THEY SELL NEWSPAPERS, SHINE SHOES, HELP TO PARK OR WATCH CARS, AND

OTHERWISE EARN MONEY. MANY CHILDREN WORK IN HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS AS SCAVENGERS AND GARBAGE PICKERS, AND ON FISHING PLATFORMS AND FISHING BOATS. ONE PROMINENT NGO ESTIMATED THAT IN 1998, THERE WERE 3200 CHILDREN WORKING ON OFFSHORE FISHING PLATFORMS, OFTEN UNDER ADVERSE CONDITIONS. OTHER ESTIMATES ARE HIGHER. MANY DOMESTIC WORKERS ARE FEMALE CHILDREN UNDER AGE 15. ALTHOUGH ACCURATE FIGURES ARE UNAVAILABLE, ESTIMATES PUT THE NUMBER OF CHILD DOMESTIC WORKERS AT UP TO 1.5 MILLION. OBSERVERS AGREE THAT THIS NUMBER INCREASED IN 1998 AS A RESULT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. A SURVEY DONE IN 1995 REVEALED THAT THESE CHILDREN WORK LONG HOURS, RECEIVE LOW PAY, ARE GENERALLY UNAWARE OF THEIR RIGHTS, AND ARE OFTEN FAR FROM THEIR FAMILIES.

A 1994 LAW RAISED COMPULSORY EDUCATION FROM SIX TO NINE YEARS, BUT THE LAW HAS NOT BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED DUE TO INADEQUATE SCHOOL FACILITIES AND DUE TO LACK OF FAMILY

FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO SUPPORT CHILDREN STAYING IN SCHOOL. ONE PROMINENT NGO REPORTED THAT 8 MILLION CHILDREN HAD DROPPED OUT OF PRIMARY SCHOOL BY 1998 BECAUSE THEIR FAMILIES COULD NOT AFFORD TO KEEP THEM IN SCHOOL. SOME EMPLOYERS HIRE CHILDREN BECAUSE THEY ARE EASIER THAN ADULTS TO MANAGE, AND TEND NOT TO ORGANIZE OR MAKE DEMANDS ON EMPLOYERS. CHILDREN WORKING IN FACTORIES USUALLY WORK THE SAME NUMBER OF HOURS AS ADULTS. CHILDREN WORK IN THE RATTAN AND WOOD FURNITURE INDUSTRIES, THE GARMENT INDUSTRY, THE FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY, FOOD PROCESSING, AND TOY MAKING, AMONG OTHERS.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

THERE IS NO NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE. RATHER, AREA WAGE COUNCILS WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL WAGE COUNCIL ESTABLISH MINIMUM WAGES FOR REGIONS AND BASIC NEEDS FIGURES FOR EACH PROVINCE--A MONETARY AMOUNT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A SINGLE WORKER TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. THE GOVERNMENT INCREASED THE AVERAGE MINIMUM WAGE 70 PERCENT (WHEN ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION) BETWEEN 1992 AND 1997. HOWEVER, THE HIGH INFLATION RATE IN 1998 HAS SHARPLY DEPRESSED THE PURCHASING POWER OF THE MINIMUM WAGE. AFTER THE LATEST MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES IN AUGUST, WHICH AVERAGED FIFTEEN PERCENT NATIONWIDE, THE AVERAGE MINIMUM WAGE WAS EQUAL TO 76 PERCENT OF THE GOVERNMENT-DETERMINED "MINIMUM LIVING NEED," DOWN FROM 95 PERCENT IN 1997. IN JAKARTA THE MINIMUM WAGE IS NOW ABOUT $17 (RP 198,500 AT

AN EXCHANGE RATE OF RP 11,750 TO THE DOLLAR) PER MONTH.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 05023 33 OF 34 232137Z
THERE ARE NO RELIABLE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYERS PAYING AT LEAST THE MINIMUM WAGE. INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS ESTIMATES RANGE BETWEEN 30 AND 60 PERCENT. ENFORCEMENT OF MINIMUM WAGE AND OTHER LABOR REGULATIONS REMAINS INADEQUATE, AND SANCTIONS TOO LIGHT, ALTHOUGH THE NEW MANPOWER LAW, WHICH IS TO TAKE EFFECT IN OCTOBER 1998 AFTER REVISIONS ARE MADE, WOULD INCREASE PENALTIES FOR NOT PAYING THE MINIMUM WAGE FROM RUPIAH 100,000 (ABOUT $8 AT AN EXCHANGE RATE OF RP 11,750 TO THE DOLLAR) TO RUPIAH 200,000,000 ($60,000 AT THE TIME OF ENACTMENT, $17,000 AT AN EXCHANGE RATE OF RP 11,750 TO THE DOLLAR). ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES, 52 COMPANIES APPLIED FOR RELIEF FROM THE MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES ON THE GROUND THAT THEY WOULD OTHERWISE CLOSE. AS OF SEPTEMBER, THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER WAS STILL REVIEWING THOSE REQUESTS.

LABOR LAW AND MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS PROVIDE WORKERS WITH A VARIETY OF OTHER BENEFITS, SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY, AND WORKERS IN MORE MODERN FACILITIES OFTEN RECEIVE HEALTH BENEFITS, FREE MEALS, AND TRANSPORTATION. THE LAW ESTABLISHES SEVEN- OR EIGHT-HOUR WORKDAYS AND A 40-HOUR WORKWEEK, WITH ONE 30-MINUTE REST PERIOD FOR EACH FOUR HOURS OF WORK.

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ6325

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 34 OF 34 232125Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6DEEBA 232125Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3773
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 34 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

THE LAW ALSO REQUIRES ONE DAY OF REST WEEKLY. THE DAILY OVERTIME RATE IS 1-1/2 TIMES THE NORMAL HOURLY RATE FOR THE FIRST HOUR, AND TWO TIMES THE HOURLY RATE FOR ADDITIONAL OVERTIME. REGULATIONS ALLOW EMPLOYERS TO
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 34 OF 34 232125Z
DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL WORK HOURS UPON REQUEST TO THE MINISTER OF MANPOWER AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE. WORKERS IN INDUSTRIES THAT PRODUCE RETAIL GOODS FOR EXPORT FREQUENTLY WORK OVERTIME TO FULFILL CONTRACT QUOTAS. OBSERVANCE OF LAWS REGULATING BENEFITS AND LABOR STANDARDS VARIES FROM SECTOR TO SECTOR AND BY REGION. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ARE FAIRLY COMMON AND OFTEN RESULT IN STRIKES AND EMPLOYEE PROTESTS. THE MINISTRY OF MANPOWER CONTINUES PUBLICLY TO URGE EMPLOYERS TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW. HOWEVER, IN GENERAL, GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ARE WEAK.
BOTH LAW AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY. IN JANUARY 1997 THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED A NEW OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEM UNDER WHICH COMPANIES WITH MORE THAN 100 EMPLOYEES COULD OBTAIN PUBLIC RECOGNITION OF THEIR COMPLIANCE WITH SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS BY SUBMITTING TO A SAFETY AUDIT PROCEDURE. IN THE LARGELY WESTERN-OPERATED OIL SECTOR, SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUNCTION REASONABLY WELL. HOWEVER, IN THE COUNTRY'S 100,000 LARGER REGISTERED COMPANIES OUTSIDE THE OIL SECTOR, THE QUALITY OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAMS VARIES GREATLY. THE ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS IS SEVERELY HAMPERED BY THE LIMITED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER INSPECTORS AS WELL AS BY THE LOW LEVEL OF EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION FOR SOUND HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES. ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION ON THE PART OF INSPECTORS ARE COMMON. WORKERS ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT HAZARDOUS WORKING CONDITIONS. EMPLOYERS ARE FORBIDDEN BY LAW FROM RETALIATING AGAINST

UNCLASSIFIED

THOSE WHO DO, BUT THE LAW IS NOT EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ4590

PAGE 01 JAKART 05023 27 OF 34 280131Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	ARA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPM-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SA-01	PMB-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	G-00	SAS-00
	/026W						

----------6F3A8A 280139Z /69

R 230903Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3766
INFO AMCONSUL SURABAYA

UNCLAS SECTION 27 OF 34 JAKARTA 005023

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/CRT; EAP/PIMBS; EAP/RSP

C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, ELAB, KSEP, ID
SUBJECT: 1998 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -- INDONESIA

CHURCHES TARGETED FOR VANDALISM AND ARSON WAS SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER IN 1998 THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS. THE

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 05023 27 OF 34 280131Z
GOVERNMENT HAS NOT FULLY RESOLVED MANY CASES OF ATTACKS ON RELIGIOUS FACILITIES AND CHURCHES THAT OCCURRED DURING RIOTS, AND IN OTHER CASES HAS NOT INVESTIGATED AT ALL.

ON FEBRUARY 13, SERIOUS ANTI-CHRISTIAN AND ANTI-SINO-INDONESIAN VIOLENCE BROKE OUT IN WEST JAVA. 28 CHURCHES WERE ATTACKED IN SEVERAL TOWNS EAST AND SOUTH EAST OF JAKARTA. MOBS STONED WINDOWS, VANDALIZED INTERIORS, AND IN SOME CASES ATTEMPTED TO BURN THE CHURCHES. CARS AND OTHER PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE CHURQH AND CHURCH MEMBERS WAS ALSO TARGETED FOR VANDALISM. INCIDENTS SUCH AS THIS REFLECT UNDRLYING SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TENSIONS BQTWEEN POOR MUSLIMS AND WELL-TO-DO ETHNIC CHINESE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2006 200504419

CHRISTIANS.

ON JULY 24, A PROTESTANT CHURCH WAS BURNED IN THE DEPOK AREA OF SOUTH JAKARTA. THE CHURCH'S DENOMINATION WERE BATAK, AN ETHNIC GROUP WITH ORIGINS IN NORTH SUMATRA. CHRISTIAN ACTIVISTS ALLEGE THAT INDONESIAN POLICE FAILED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO THE CHURCH AND HAVE MADE NO PROGRESS INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT. ((TO BE AMPLIFIED))

MUSLIMS ARE A RELIGIOUS MINORITY IN THE EASTERNMOST PROVINCE OF IRIAN JAYA. IN JANUARY, A MOSQUE WAS BURNED DOWN IN A SMALL VILLAGE NEAR KURIMA IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OF IRIAN JAYA. THE ATTACK ON THE MOSQUE WAS APPARENTLY MOTIVATED BY LOCAL SENTIMENT AGAINST THE EFFORTS OF MUSLIM MISSIONARIES TO WIN CONVERTS IN THE PREDOMINANTLY CHRISTIAN PROVINCE. THE INCIDENT ALSO REFLECTED LOCAL RESENTMENT OF THE ARRIVAL IN THE PROVINCE

OF MAINLY MUSLIM MIGRANTS FROM OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA. INTERRELIGIOUS TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH IN THE PROVINCE.

NATIONAL/RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALLY PROMOTES RACIAL AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE. ETHNIC CHINESE, AT APPROXIMATELY THREE PERCENT OF THE POPULATION BY FAR THE LARGEST NONINDIGENOUS MINORITY GROUP, HAVE HISTORICALLY PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE ECONOMY. IN 1998, ANTI-CHINESE SENTIMENT LED TO SERIOUS AND WIDESPREAD ATTACKS ON CHINESE-OWNED BUSINESSES, ESPECIALLY IN THE DISTURBANCES OF MAY 12-14. CREDIBLE CHARGES EMERGED THAT ATTACKS ON CHINESE PROPERTY DURING THE MAY RIOTING WAS IN SOME CASES ORGANIZED RATHER THAN SPONTANEOUS IN NATURE, AND THAT ATTACKS ON CHINESE PROPERTY WERE COORDINATED IN JAKARTA AND IN OTHER CITIES AND TOWNS ACROSS INDONESIA.

BOTH THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND NGO'S ARE ALSO INVESTIGATING ALLEGATIONS THAT DURING THE MAY RIOTS, MORE THAN 150 ETHNICALLY CHINESE WOMEN WERE TARGETED FOR RAPE IN JAKARTA AND OTHER CITIES, AS PART OF A CAMPAIGN TO SPREAD TERROR AMONG THE ETHNIC CHINESE COMMUNITY (SEE SECTION 1C). ALLEGATIONS OF THE ORGANIZED DESTRUCTION OF CHINESE PROPERTY AND THE SYSTEMATIC MASS RAPE OF CHINESE WOMEN ARE VERY CONTROVERSIAL, AND BOTH OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE INVESTIGATIONS OF THESE CHARGES SO FAR HAD DIFFICULTY PRODUCING CONCRETE EVIDENCE, PARTICULARLY FIRST-HAND TESTIMONY.

SINCE 1959, NONCITIZEN ETHNIC CHINESE HAVE BEEN DENIED THE
UNCLASSIFIED

RIGHT TO RUN BUSINESSES IN RURAL INDONESIA. REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF CHINESE SCHOOLS, FORMATION OF EXCLUSIVELY CHINESE CULTURAL GROUPS OR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND PUBLIC DISPLAY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS, ALTHOUGH CHINESE CHARACTERS ARE SEEN ON SOME PRODUCTS. THE GOVERNMENT PERMITS THE PUBLICATION OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED CHINESE-LANGUAGE DAILY NEWSPAPER, BUT OTHERWISE LEGISLATION BANS THE IMPORT, SALE OR DISTRIBUTION OF CHINESE-LANGUAGE MATERIAL. HOWEVER, CHINESE-LANGUAGE MATERIALS HAVE BEGUN TO APPEAR IN CHINESE NEIGHBORHOODS IN JAKARTA AND POSSIBLY ELSEWHERE. SINCE 1994 THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALLOWED CHINESE-LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION FOR EMPLOYEES IN THE TOURISM INDUSTRY, AND HAS ALLOWED DISTRIBUTION OF LOCALLY PRINTED CHINESE-LANGUAGE TOURIST BROCHURES, PROGRAMS, AND SIMILAR MATERIAL TO CHINESE SPEAKING TOURISTS.

PRIVATE INSTRUCTION IN CHINESE IS GENERALLY PROHIBITED BUT TAKES PLACE TO A LIMITED EXTENT. THE UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA OFFERS CHINESE-LANGUAGE COURSES. STATE UNIVERSITIES HAVE INFORMAL QUOTAS THAT LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ETHNIC CHINESE STUDENTS. THE LAW FORBIDS THE CELEBRATION OF THE CHINESE NEW YEAR IN TEMPLES OR PUBLIC PLACES, BUT ENFORCEMENT IS LIMITED. CHINESE NEW YEAR DECORATIONS WERE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED AND SOLD IN PUBLIC SHOPPING AREAS IN AT LEAST A FEW CITIES. SENIOR OFFICIALS HAVE PREVIOUSLY

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E2

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JAKART 07852 01 OF 02 110932Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00
	DOEE-00	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	JUSE-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-02
	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-01
	T-00	USIE-00	DTC-01	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/058W						

----------66B564 110933Z /38
O 110926Z AUG 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1834
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
CDRJFK SPWAR CENSCH FT BRAGG NC
CSA WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB OH
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
CSAF WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 007852

SECSTATE ALSO FOR AID, ACDA, DRL, PM/DRSA, EAP, EB

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 07852 01 OF 02 110932Z

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: MASS, EAID, KSEP, KDEM, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: FY 96 POST PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTING PEACE (FORMERLY: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE OR AIASA

REF: (A) SECSTATE 166550, (B) JAKARTA 7413, (C) SECSTATE 214263

1. REFTEL (A) WAS THE ACTION REQUEST FOR FY 96 BUDGET REQUESTS FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY, PROMOTING PEACE. REFTEL (B) WAS AMEMBASSY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 27 OCT 2006 200504643

JAKARTA SUBMISSION OF RECOMMENDED MILITARY TRAINING FOR SUBJECT PROGRAM UNDER THE BUILDING BLOCK OF PROMOTING PEACE (REGIONAL PEACE, SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION). REFTEL (C) ENCOURAGED POSTS TO REVIEW SUBMISSIONS IN RESPONSE TO REFTEL (A) TO ENSURE PROPOSALS FOR ALL APPROPRIATE OBJECTIVES WERE INCLUDED.

2. A REVIEW OF ALL REFERENCES CONCLUDED THERE IS STRONG JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUDING INDONESIA FOR FUNDING FOR CERTAIN APPLICABLE PROGRAMS UNDER THE BLOCK OF "BUILDING DEMOCRACY" AS A "NATION IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT." PROGRAMS PROPOSED IN THIS MESSAGE ARE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSISTING INDONESIA IN PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. THIS IS ESPECIALLY APPROPRIATE IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT EXPANDED IMET (E-IMET) CURRICULUM OFFERED BY DOD, SEVERAL COURSES OF WHICH ARE TAILORED TO THE SPECIFIC SUBJECT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.
3. IN ADDITION, THE MILITARY TRAINING REQUESTED BY REFTEL (B) IN THE CATEGORY OF SUPPORTING EFFORTS AT PROMOTING PEACE (REGIONAL PEACE, SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION), ARE MOSTLY IN THE E-IMET CATEGORY AS WELL. THIS SUBMISSION IS NOT MEANT TO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE TRAINING REQUESTS IN REF B. RATHER, THIS SUBMISSION SEEKS TO

TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A SERIES OF MOBILE EDUCATION TEAM COURSES OFFERED BY DOD AND SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO MEET THE OBJECTIVES OF PROMOTING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. THESE COURSES ARE TAUGHT IN THE HOST COUNTRY AND CAN REACH A TAILORED AUDIENCE OF CIVIL AND MILITARY LEADERS WITH A HIGHLY COST-EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION.

4. THE ELEMENTS OF REPORTING ALREADY INCLUDED IN REFTEL (B) REMAIN RELEVANT TO THIS SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSION FOR FUNDING UNDER "BUILDING DEMOCRACY" IN SUPPORT OF PROMOTION OF DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. THE PROJECTED FY 96 ASSISTANCE UNDER THIS BLOCK FOLLOWS:

A. AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PROPOSES TO OFFER FOUR COURSES AND SEMINARS TO INDONESIA, ALL DESIGNED TO PROMOTE THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES. THEY ARE:

-- DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT MOBILE EDUCATION TRAINING;

-- CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS MOBILE EDUCATION TRAINING;

-- EXECUTIVE SEMINAR ON INTERNATIONAL MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, PHASES I, III, AND IV; AND

-- HUMAN RIGHTS AND MILITARY OPERATIONS MOBILE EDUCATION TRAINING.

B. ESTIMATED COSTS FOR ALL COURSE IS U.S. DOLLARS 190,000. THIS BUDGET SUBMISSION IS IN ADDITION TO THE U.S. DOLLARS 430,000 REQUESTED AND JUSTIFIED IN REFTEL (B) UNDER "PROMOTING PEACE."

C. INDONESIA IS STILL DEALING WITH THE LEGACY OF A LONG COLONIAL PERIOD AND A GRUELLING WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1945-49), ONE ELEMENT

OF WHICH IS THE GOVERNMENT'S HEAVY RELIANCE ON ITS ARMED FORCES TO MAINTAIN DOMESTIC SECURITY. HOWEVER, BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES THEMSELVES ARE COMMITTED TO MODERNIZATION, NOT ONLY IN EQUIPMENT BUT ALSO IN THE AREA OF PROFESSIONALISM. INDONESIA WELCOMES ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES IN INTRODUCING CONCEPTS FOR ORDERLY TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS WHICH PROMOTE SECURITY WHILE ENHANCING DEVELOPMENT. THE COURSES REQUESTED ABOVE FOR FY 96 HAVE BEEN SELECTED TO ADDRESS WHAT WE CONSIDER CRITICAL CONTEMPORARY ISSUES FACING THE INDONESIAN MILITARY TODAY -- PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ND MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES -- IN THE CONTEXT OF ESTABLISHING AND SOLIDIFYING DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.

D. THESE COURSES PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:

-- DEFENSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT WILL BE OFFERED TO A MIX OF CIVIL AND MILITARY LEADERS IN ORDER TO INTRODUCE THE PROCESS OF SENIOR-LEVEL DEFENSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND ANALYTICAL DECISION MAKING TO THE PRESENT AND FUTURE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN INDONESIA.

-- CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS WILL BE OFFERED TO BOTH CIVILIAN AND

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JAKART 07852 02 OF 02 110932Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00
	DOEE-00	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	JUSE-00
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-02
	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-01
	T-00	USIE-00	DTC-01	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/058W						

----------66B56C 110933Z /38
O 110926Z AUG 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1835
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
CDRJFK SPWAR CENSCH FT BRAGG NC
CSA WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB OH
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
CSAF WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JAKARTA 007852

SECSTATE ALSO FOR AID, ACDA, DRL, PM/DRSA, EAP, EB

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: MASS, EAID, KSEP, KDEM, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: FY 96 POST PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTING PEACE (FORMERLY: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE OR AIASA

MILITARY OFFICIALS AND LEGISLATORS IN ORDER TO EXAMINE THE UNDERLYING SOURCES OF CIVIL-MILITARY CONFLICT THAT DEMOCRACIES CONFRONT. IT WILL ANALYZE ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS TO STRENGTHEN CIVILIAN CONTROL.

-- THE SEMINARS AND COURSES ON INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS WILL BE AIMED AT MIDDLE AND SENIOR-LEVEL MILITARY OFFICERS, INCLUDING NATIONAL POLICE, AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF INDONESIA'S JUDICIARY. THE AIM WILL BE TO DEMONSTRATE THE LINK BETWEEN MILITARY OPERATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE CIVILIAN CITIZENS OF A NATION, AND HOW THIS UNDERSTANDING IS BASED ON HOW SECURITY FORCES SUPPORT DEMOCRACY RATHER THAN SUBVERT IT.
BARRY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5201

PAGE 01 STATE 196895 202142Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

196895
SOURCE: KODAKC.200281
DRAFTED BY: EAP/RSP: STAFF : RPT
APPROVED BY: EAP/RSP : ESHECK
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------674174 202143Z /38

P 202139Z SEP 96
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 196895

STADIS

EAP ONLY, USUN NEW YORK FOR CYNKIN; LONDON-BLAIR HALL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/20/2000
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 196895 202142Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 26 OCT 2006 200504643

TAGS: PREL, PARM, PHUM, ELAB, PREF, UN, XE
SUBJECT: OFFICE OF REGIONAL AND SECURITY POLICY
WEEKLY STATUS REPORT, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996

PARIS FOR PHIL RAVELING; CINCPAC PERSONAL FOR FPA TEARE;

TO: EAP - CHARLES KARTMAN, ACTING

FROM: EAP/RSP - ERNESTINE S. HECK

1. CLASSIFIED BY: ERNESTINE HECK, DIRECTOR, EAP/RSP, DEPARTMENT OF STATE. REASON 1.5 (D).

2. (C) UNGA UPDATE

WE HAVE NOW A CONFIRMED SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS IN NEW YORK FOR NEXT WEEK THAT INCLUDES EVERYTHING WE ASKED FOR. THE SECRETARY WILL MEET WITH THE CHINESE AND SOUTH KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTERS. U/S TARNOFF WILL MEET WITH THE VIETNAMESE, CAMBODIAN, AND INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THE JAPANESE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER. THE SECRETARY

WILL HOST BREAKFAST FOR THE EAP LEADERS ON SEPTEMBER 27. A/S LORD WILL MEET WITH MOST IF NOT ALL OF THE REMAINING FOREIGN MINISTERS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA WHO ARE AVAILABLE NEXT WEEK. ALL OF OUR EAP CONTINGENT WILL BE TOGETHER IN THE WALDORF'S EAP DEMI-OFFICE BY MONDAY AFTERNOON. LET THE GAMES BEGIN AND GOOD LUCK!

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. (C) CHANGES IN PMC FORMAT?

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSIES IN COUNTRIES WHICH ARE ASEAN DIALOGUE PARTNERS IN THE POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS TO SOLICIT THEIR VIEWS ON HOW TO MAKE THE PMC MORE USEFUL. THE FORMATION OF THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM SEVERAL YEARS AGO HAS DETRACTED FROM THE PMC AND RESULTED IN OVERLAPPING AGENDAS AND REDUNDANT

ROLES. WE TOO WILL WEIGH IN WITH ASEAN WITH OUR THOUGHTS ON HOW THE PMC MIGHT BE IMPROVED AND WILL BE ASKING EMBASSY KL TO APPROACH THE MALAYSIANS BEFORE THE UPCOMING ASEAN SOM OCT. 2-4.

4. (U) ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES

DOD WORKING WITH STATE HAS CREATED A NEW PROGRAM TO FOSTER THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEKEEPING CAPABLE MILITARY FORCES. THE EIPC INITIATIVE WILL MOBILIZE RESOURCES ACROSS EXISTING PROGRAMS (INCLUDING FMF, IMET, EDA AND CINC EXERCISES) TO SUPPORT IT. IN THE FY98 CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION DOCUMENT, NEW LANGUAGE WILL HIGHLIGHT FMF FUNDS (FMF/EIPC) SPECIFICALLY TARGETED FOR IMPROVING MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES: COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, EDUCATION PROGRAM TRAINING AIDS AND EQUIPMENT, AND INTEROPERABILITY, INCLUDING POSSIBLE PROVISION OF SELECTED SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS. THESE NEW FUNDS (IN THE RANGE OF 4 TO 11 MILLION DOLLARS WORLDWIDE IN FY98) WILL BE ALLOCATED FIRST TO THIRTEEN "LEVEL ONE" COUNTRIES (MALAYSIA IN EAP) AND THEN

TO UP TO FIVE SELECTED "LEVEL TWO" COUNTRIES (INDONESIA, JAPAN, SINGAPORE AND SOUTH KOREA ARE POSSIBLE CANDIDATES). EIPC ADDRESSES THE IMPROVEMENT OF KEY DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITY READINESS, INCLUDING A COUNTRY'S POLITICAL COMMITMENT, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, MILITARY LEADERSHIP, TRAINING, LOGISTICS, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND INTEROPERABILITY. EIPC IS INTENDED TO REDUCE U.S. COSTS, INCREASE INTERNATIONAL BURDEN-SHARING AND OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY DURING PEACE OPERATIONS, AND ENCOURAGE REGIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION.
CHRISTOPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 JAKART 07413 01 OF 06 010948Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	ACDE-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00
	DOEE-00	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	JUSE-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00
	PRS-01	P-01	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-01	T-00
	USIE-00	DTC-01	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/057W

----------62C625 010949Z /38

O 010944Z AUG 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1616
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J4/POLAD/J45/J5//
SECDEF WASHDC//DSAA
JCS WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO CSAF WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB OH
CDRUSAJFKSPWAR CENSCH FORT BRAGG NC
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//OMB//
CSA WASHDC
CNO WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 JAKARTA 007413

S E C R E T
DELIVERY DURING DUTY HOURS ONLY
SECSTATE ALSO FOR AID, ACDA, DRL, PM/DRSA, EAP, EB

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 07413 01 OF 06 010948Z

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: MASS, EAID, KSEP, KDEM, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: FY 96 POST PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTING PEACE (FORMERLY: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE OR AIASA), (U)

SECTION I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS.

- A. POLITICAL.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 30 JUL 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 28 NOV 2011 200504643

- 1. INDONESIA IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT NATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA IS VITAL IN REALIZING OUR POLITICAL, STRATEGIC, AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION AS WELL AS IN THE LARGER PACIFIC BASIN.

- 2. INDONESIA IS THE FOURTH MOST POPULOUS COUNTRY IN THE WORLD, THE LARGEST NATION IN ASEAN, AND THE LARGEST MUSLIM COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. INDONESIA LIES ASTRIDE VITAL AIR AND SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS AND IS A SOURCE OF VALUABLE RAW MATERIALS. ITS ANNUAL PER CAPITA GNP IS STILL WELL BELOW USD 1000. POLITICALLY, INDONESIA IDENTIFIES ITSELF WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD (INDONESIA IS NOW CHAIR OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, OR NAM). THE GOVERNMENT IS STABLE, DUE IN PART TO THE ROLE OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI) IN MAINTAINING AND GUARANTEEING INTERNAL SECURITY. EXTERNALLY, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT PLAYS A MODERATING ROLE IN VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS IN WHICH IT IS ACTIVE. INDONESIA IS ACTIVE IN GLOBAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE

UNITED NATIONS, NAM, AND THE G-77, GENERALLY SEEKING TO AVOID OR MODERATE IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION BETWEEN POOR AND RICH NATIONS AND ENCOURAGING DIALOGUE ON WAYS TO CREATE STABILITY THROUGH DEVELOPMENT. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. POSITIONS ON ISSUES SUCH AS NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND HAS GENERALLY ACTED TO MODERATE ANTI-WESTERN AND ANTI-DEVELOPED NATION SENTIMENT IN THE ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH IT BELONGS. INDONESIA IS RUNNING FOR A REGIONAL SEAT ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FOR 1995-97; IF SUCCESSFUL, THIS NATION'S VOICE IN THE UN WILL BE GREATLY ENHANCED (ESPECIALLY SINCE INDONESIA IS INFLUENTIAL WITH OTHER NON-ALIGNED, LESS DEVELOPED NATIONS). ACCORDINGLY, THE U.S. WILL FIND MANY OCCASIONS TO SEEK INDONESIAN SUPPORT AND COOPERATION.

- 3. IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION, INDONESIA HAS BEEN A FORCE FOR STABILITY, SECURITY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. AS THE LARGEST MEMBER OF ASEAN, INDONESIA HAS PRESSED THE ORGANIZATION TO MAINTAIN ITS FOCUS ON POLITICAL COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC LINKS AND HAS RESISTED MAKING ASEAN INTO A REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION (WHOSE INTERESTS MIGHT SOMETIMES BE AT ODDS WITH OUR OWN). INSTEAD, INDONESIA HAS PREFERRED TO PURSUE REGIONAL

SECURITY GOALS THROUGH COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS OUTSIDE THE ASEAN FRAMEWORK; FOR EXAMPLE, ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE PARIS GROUP, WHICH BROUGHT AN END TO CAMBODIA'S CIVIL WAR AND OVERSAW ELECTIONS AND THE TRANSITION TO A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; AND ITS SPONSORSHIP OF A SERIES OF INFORMAL "WORKSHOPS" ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, WITH PARTICIPATION BY REGIONAL STATES (INCLUDING CHINA) WHICH HAVE POTENTIALLY

SECRET

CONFLICTING CLAIMS IN THE SPRATLY ISLANDS.

- 4. INDONESIA WILL BE A KEY PLAYER IN THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF) AN 18 NATION CONSULTATIVE FORUM FOCUSING ON SECURITY ISSUES INITIALLY ORGANIZED AND SPONSORED BY ASEAN. FOR THE U.S., THE ARF WILL BE AN IMPORTANT VEHICLE FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE REGION. THIS FORUM WILL PROVIDE THE U.S. AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAINTAIN INDONESIAN UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR OUR GOALS IN THE REGION, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING MATERIALLY TO OUR REGIONAL SEC
URITY GOALS.

- 5. FINALLY, INDONESIA ALSO PLAYS A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION FORUM (APEC). SERVING AS THE APEC CHAIRMAN THIS YEAR, INDONESIA WILL HOST A MEETING OF APEC HEADS OF STATE IN NOVEMBER. INDONESIA IS USING ITS CHAIRMANSHIP TO LEAD APEC AS A VEHICLE TO LIBERALIZE TRADE AND REGIMES IN THE REGION; AS A LEADER OF THE DEVOLPING WORLD AND AN IMPORTANT ASEAN MEMBER, IT IS UNIQUELY POSITIONED TO LEAD APEC IN THIS DIRECTION.

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JAKART 07413 02 OF 06 010948Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	ACDE-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00
	DOEE-00	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	JUSE-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00
	PRS-01	P-01	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-01	T-00
	USIE-00	DTC-01	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/057W

----------62C630 010949Z /38

O 010944Z AUG 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1617
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J4/POLAD/J45/J5//
SECDEF WASHDC//DSAA
JCS WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO CSAF WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB OH
CDRUSAJFKSPWAR CENSCH FORT BRAGG NC
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//OMB//
CSA WASHDC
CNO WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 06 JAKARTA 007413

S E C R E T
DELIVERY DURING DUTY HOURS ONLY
SECSTATE ALSO FOR AID, ACDA, DRL, PM/DRSA, EAP, EB
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 07413 02 OF 06 010948Z

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: MASS, EAID, KSEP, KDEM, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: FY 96 POST PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTING PEACE (FORMERLY: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE OR AIASA), (U)

- B. MILITARY.

- 1. BECAUSE OF ITS PIVOTAL GEOSTRATEGIC LOCATION AS WELL AS ITS KEY POLITICAL POSITION IN ASIA, MANY OF OUR

LARGER REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY INTERESTS HINGE ON INDONESIA'S COOPERATION AND STABILITY. WHAT IS MORE, IN REGIONAL FORUMS INDONESIA HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT VOICE IN SUPPORTING A CONTINUED U.S. PRESENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

- 2. INDONESIA IS AN IMPORTANT PARTICIPANT AND POTENTIAL PARTNER IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PEACE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. AS MENTIONED ABOVE, IT HAS PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN CAMBODIA AND IS NOW SPONSORING A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOG ON THE POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE CONFLICTING CLAIMS IN THE SPRATLY ISLANDS. IT HAS ALSO BEEN A WILLING AND EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTOR OF MILITARY FORCES AND OBSERVERS IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN KUWAIT, SOMALIA, AND CROATIA AND CONTRIBUTED THE LARGEST CONTINGENT OF TROOPS TO UNTAC, THE UN OPERATION IN CAMBODIA. IT IS VERY MUCH IN OUR INTEREST TO SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE INDONESIA'S CONTINUED DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY EFFORTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3. IN THE EVENT OUR COMBINED EFFORT TO PROMOTE PEACE IN THE REGION SHOULD FAIL, INDONESIA'S COOPERATION WOULD BE CRUCIAL TO SUCCESSFUL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE REGION. THE VAST INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO DOMINATES ALL SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AND THE INDIAN OCEAN AS WELL AS BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE ASIAN CONTINENT. UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO INDONESIAN WATERS, TO INCLUDE THE THREE STRATEGIC STRAITS THEY DOMINATE, AS WELL AS ACCESS TO SEAPORT AND AIR FACILITIES ARE CRITICAL TO NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE REGION AS WELL AS POWER PROJECTION FROM THE WESTERN PACIFIC TO THE PERSIAN GULF.

- 4. ASSISTING INDONESIA IN GUARANTEEING ITS OWN SOVEREIGNTY AND STABILITY IS ALSO IMPORTANT FOR OUR LARGER REGIONAL INTERESTS. POSSESSING A CREDIBLE DETERRENT TO POTENTIAL OUTSIDE PRESSURE OR AGGRESSION GIVES INDONESIA THE CAPACITY AND CONFIDENCE NECESSARY TO CONTINUE ITS CONSTRUCTIVE DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY ROLE IN REGIONAL PEACE MANAGEMENT. FURTHER, INDONESIA'S POSITION AT THE CENTER OF A MYRIAD OF INTERLOCKING ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND ECONOMIC TIES IN THE REGION MEANS THAT SERIOUS DOMESTIC INSTABILITIES WOULD LIKELY CONTRIBUTE TO WIDER REGIONAL INSTABILITY.

- 5. AS A COMPONENT OF THE ABOVE, IT IS ALSO IN OUR

INTEREST TO ASSIST INDONESIA IN EVOLVING CONSTRUCTIVE, DOMESTIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND IN PURSUING A POSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA. THESE ARE NECESSARY COMPONENTS OF A STABLE AND JUST DOMESTIC SOCIETY IN THIS RAPIDLY MODERNIZING NATION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 JAKART 07413 02 OF 06 010948Z

- C. ECONOMICS.

- 1. INDONESIA IS THE MAJOR PETROLEUM EXPORTER IN EAST ASIA AND THE WORLD'S LARGEST EXPORTER OF LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS. IN 1993, JAPAN PURCHASED NEARLY HALF (340 MILLION BARRELS) OF INDONESIA'S CRUDE EXPORTS. INDONESIA SUPPLIES THE MAJORITY OF JAPAN'S LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) IMPORTS, ALL OF KOREA'S LNG IMPORT REQUIREMENTS, AND A MAJOR SHARE OF TAIWAN'S REQUIREMENTS AS WELL. INDONESIA IS EMERGING AS A SIGNIFICANT COAL PRODUCER AND EXPORTER. INDONESIA EXPORTS A NUMBER OF OTHER IMPORTANT COMMODITIES SUCH AS RUBBER, COFFEE, COPPER, TIN, NICKEL, ALUMINUM AND GOLD.

- 2. IN THE LAST 10 YEARS, NON-OIL EXPORTS SUCH AS PLYWOOD, TEXTILES, APPAREL, FOOTWEAR, AND ELECTRONIC GOODS HAVE GROWN IN IMPORTANCE AND NOW ACCOUNT FOR THREE-QUARTERS OF THE COUNTRY'S EXPORT EARNINGS. INDONESIA IS AN IMPORTANT MARKET FOR U.S. EXPORTS, PARTICULARLY AIRPLANES, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
, AND OTHER MACHINERY.
U.S. COMPANIES MAINTAIN SIZEABLE INVESTMENTS IN

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JAKART 07413 03 OF 06 010949Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	ACDE-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00
	DOEE-00	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	JUSE-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00
	PRS-01	P-01	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-01	T-00
	USIE-00	DTC-01	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/057W

----------62C63E 010950Z /38

O 010944Z AUG 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1618
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J4/POLAD/J45/J5//
SECDEF WASHDC//DSAA
JCS WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO CSAF WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB OH
CDRUSAJFKSPWAR CENSCH FORT BRAGG NC
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//OMB//
CSA WASHDC
CNO WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 06 JAKARTA 007413

S E C R E T
DELIVERY DURING DUTY HOURS ONLY
SECSTATE ALSO FOR AID, ACDA, DRL, PM/DRSA, EAP, EB
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 07413 03 OF 06 010949Z

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: MASS, EAID, KSEP, KDEM, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: FY 96 POST PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTING PEACE (FORMERLY: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE OR AIASA), (U)

INDONESIA'S PETROLEUM, MINING, AND FINANCIAL SECTORS.

- 3. U.S. POLICY REGARDING ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT INDONESIA'S NATURAL RESOURCES, MANUFACTURED EXPORTS, AND MARKETS ARE IMPORTANT TO THE U.S. AND OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. ONE

EXAMPLE OF INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC VALUE IN RELATION TO U.S. INTERESTS IS A HUGE NEW USD $20-$30 BILLION LIQUIFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) PROJECT IN THE NATUNA SEA WHICH COULD INVOLVE ESSO AS THE PROJECT DEVELOPER. PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE PROJECT AREA, WHICH BORDERS ON AREAS CLAIMED BY THE PRC, WILL CLEARLY CREATE NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE INDONESIAN MILITARY.

SECTION II. ANALYSIS OF HOST COUNTRY DEFENSE SPENDING.
- A. ASSESSMENT OF READINESS.
- 1. THERE ARE NO RELIABLE FIGURES PUBLISHED IN OPEN SOURCES RELATING TO INDONESIAN DEFENSE SPENDING. ONE ESTIMATE IS THAT THE DEFENSE BUDGET IS JUST OVER TWO PERCENT OF GNP. THIS FIGURE INCLUDES FORMAL BUDGET ALLOCATIONS AND AUGMENTATION FROM NON-APPROPRIATED SOURCES SUCH AS SALARIES AND BENEFITS PAID TO SECONDED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND PROFITS FROM COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES OWNED AND OPERATED BY THE ARMED FORCES. THERE IS A CONSCIOUS

NATIONAL POLICY TO EMPHASIZE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES OVER MILITARY EXPENDITURES. THIS POLICY HAS FURTHERED NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND ENSURED STABILITY [redacted] B1

- 2. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (C3) ARE ADEQUATE [redacted] B1

- 3. MATERIAL READINESS IS A PROBLEM AREA. [redacted] B1

- 4. MILITARY TRAINING. THE 288,000 STRONG INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI) IS WELL TRAINED AT THE SMALL UNIT TACTICAL LEVEL AND IN BASIC INDIVIDUAL SKILLS. TRAINING IS RARELY CONDUCTED AT HIGHER THAN BATTALION LEVEL.

[redacted] B1

B1

- B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASSISTANCE. A SMALL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM SUPPORTING MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING WOULD

BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN TERMS OF ACHIEVING U.S. GOVERNMENT NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES. THE PROGRAM WOULD ENCOURAGE EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN POST GRADUATE MANAGEMENT, PME, AND TECHNICAL COURSES TIED TO FMS PROCUREMENTS. THESE WOULD SUPPORT THE FOLLOWING U.S. OBJECTIVES.

- 1. IMPROVE THE OVERALL PROFESSIONALISM AND READINESS OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES.

- 2. EXPOSE INDONESIAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS TO OUR CONCEPTS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE, DEMOCRACY, AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH IMET. FIRST, THIS WILL HELP STRENGTHEN OUR PARTNERSHIP IN REGIONAL PEACE MANAGEMENT EFFORTS. NEXT, IT WILL ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTRUCTIVE DOMESTIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN INDONESIA.

- 3. ASSIST IN ADDRESSING U.S.-INDONESIAN INTEROPERABILITY ISSUES DURING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS BY TRAINING KEY OFFICERS IN OUR DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES.

NNNN

ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	ACDE-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00
	DOEE-00	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	JUSE-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00
	PRS-01	P-01	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-01	T-00
	USIE-00	DTC-01	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/057W

----------62C645 010949Z /38

O 010944Z AUG 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1619
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J4/POLAD/J45/J5//
SECDEF WASHDC//DSAA
JCS WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO CSAF WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB OH
CDRUSAJFKSPWAR CENSCH FORT BRAGG NC
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//OMB//
CSA WASHDC
CNO WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 06 JAKARTA 007413

S E C R E T
DELIVERY DURING DUTY HOURS ONLY
SECSTATE ALSO FOR AID, ACDA, DRL, PM/DRSA, EAP, EB
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 07413 04 OF 06 010949Z

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: MASS, EAID, KSEP, KDEM, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: FY 96 POST PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTING PEACE (FORMERLY: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE OR AIASA), (U)

- 4. SUPPORT U.S. SALES OF DEFENSE ARTICLES THROUGH PROVISION OF TECHNICAL TRAINING ON U.S. EQUIPMENT.

SECTION III. STATUS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

- A. OVER THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD OF FY 1991 TO FY 1996,

THE USAID PROGRAM HAS BEEN/IS BEING FUNDED PRIMARILY FROM THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ACCOUNT, NOW RENAMED THE SUSTAINABLE DEVE
LOPMENT ACCOUNT. IN FY 1991 AND FY 1992, A TOTAL OF $11,991,000 IN ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS (ESF) WERE PROGRAMMED FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT AN EX-IM MIXED CREDIT PROGRAM. THESE ESF FUNDS WERE NOT RELATED TO SECURITY ISSUES IN INDONESIA. THERE HAS BEEN NO ESF FUNDING SINCE FY 1992.

- B. UNDER THE PROPOSED PEACE, PROSPERITY, AND DEMOCRACY ACT (PPDA) WHICH IS CURRENTLY BEING DEBATED IN CONGRESS, INDONESIA WOULD BE CATEGORIZED AS A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT COUNTRY. ACCORDINGLY, INDONESIA NOW RECEIVES ASSISTANCE UNDER THAT ACCOUNT, THE P.L. 480 TITLE II FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND THE HOUSING GUARANTY PROGRAM. USAID IS NOT REQUESTING FUNDING FOR INDONESIA UNDER THE OTHER CATEGORIES.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION IV. DEFENSE TRAINING.

- A. COUNTRY TEAM'S ASSESSMENT. THE DEFENSE TRAINING PROGRAM (FORMERLY IMET) HAS BEEN VERY EFFECTIVE IN FILLING GAPS AND WEAKNESSES IN ABRI'S EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM AS WELL AS ALLOWING THEM TO FURTHER DEVELOP THEIR OWN SYSTEM. THEIR COURSE SELECTION CLEARLY SHOWS THIS. THEY HAVE EMPHASIZED COURSES IN THE FOLLOWING FOUR AREAS.

- 1. POST GRADUATE MANAGEMENT. U.S. TRAINING HAS ENABLED ABRI TO USE MODERN MANAGEMENT THEORIES AND PRACTICES FOR THE RATIONALIZATION AND MODERNIZATION OF THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE, PLANNING, BUDGETING, LOGISTICS, AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS. OVER THE PAST DECADE, 104 INDONESIAN OFFICERS HAVE COMPLETED OR ARE CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN ADVANCE DEGREE PROGRAMS AT THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL IN MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA.

- 2.. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION. COURSES IN THIS AREA HAVE ASSISTED ABRI IN DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE, C3 CAPABILITY, TRAINING, AND MANAGEMENT THROUGH EXPOSURE TO OUR SYSTEM.

- 3. LOW-DENSITY TECHNICAL SKILLS COURSES. THIS HAS ALLOWED THEM TO RECEIVE TRAINING IN AREAS FOR WHICH IT IS NOT COST EFFECTIVE FOR THEM TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN

COURSES. THIS OFTEN INVOLVES TRAINING ON SYSTEMS PROCURED FROM THE U.S.

- 4. ENGLISH LANGUAGE INSTRUCTOR COURSES. HAVE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 JAKART 07413 04 OF 06 010949Z
ALLOWED THEM TO TRAIN AND SUSTAIN THEIR OWN CADRE FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT ENGLISH IS AN INTERNATIONAL MEDIUM FOR EDUCATION AND TRAINING.

- B. HOW HAS THE PROGRAM ENHANCED PROFESSIONALISM AND THE CAPABILITIES OF THE INDONESIAN MILITARY? IMET GRADUATES HAVE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE TRAINING AND EDUCATION SYSTEM. UPON COMPLETION OF AN IMET PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION(PME) COURSE, THE GRADUATE IS NORMALLY ASSIGNED AS A CURRICULUM DEVELOPER. MUCH OF WHAT THEY LEARN IN THE U.S. COURSES IS IMMEDIATELY APPLIED TO WHERE IT CAN HAVE THE WIDEST EFFECT, THAT IS IN THE UPGRADE OF THEIR OWN COURSES. IMET GRADUATES HAVE ALSO BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN RATIONALIZING THE ARMY'S PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DEVELOPING THEIR NEW RESERVE FORCE, ESTABLISHING AND UPGRADING THEIR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, ESTABLISHING A MODERN PATIENT CARE SYSTEM IN THEIR HEALTH SERVICES AS WELL AS INTRODUCING MODERN TRAINING TECHNOLOGIES TO INCLUDE TRAINING SIMULATIONS. MANY U.S. FIELD AND TECHNICAL MANUALS ARE TRANSLATED VERBATIM AND INCORPORATED INTO INDONESIAN PME.

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JAKART 07413 05 OF 06 010949Z
ACTION EAP-01

```
INFO  LOG-00   ACDA-17  ACDE-00  AID-01   AMAD-01  CIAE-00  OASY-00
      DOEE-00  EB-01    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-16    JUSE-00
      L-01     ADS-00   NSAE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   PA-01    PM-00
      PRS-01   P-01     SP-00    SR-00    SS-00    STR-01   T-00
      USIE-00  DTC-01   PMB-00   PRME-01  DRL-09   G-00       /057W
                  ------------------62C64D  010950Z /38
O 010944Z AUG 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1620
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J4/POLAD/J45/J5//
SECDEF WASHDC//DSAA
JCS WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO CSAF WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB OH
CDRUSAJFKSPWAR CENSCH FORT BRAGG NC
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//OMB//
CSA WASHDC
CNO WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 06 JAKARTA 007413


S E C R E T
DELIVERY DURING DUTY HOURS ONLY
SECSTATE ALSO FOR AID, ACDA, DRL, PM/DRSA, EAP, EB
                            SECRET


                            SECRET

PAGE 02         JAKART  07413  05 OF 06  010949Z

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS:  MASS, EAID, KSEP, KDEM, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT:  FY 96 POST PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR BUILDING
DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTING PEACE (FORMERLY: ANNUAL INTEGRATED
ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE OR AIASA), (U)


-  C.  HOW HAS THE PROGRAM CONTRIBUTED TO EFFECTIVE
DEFENSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT?  LARGELY DUE TO IMET, THE
INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES EFFECTIVENESS HAS INCREASED IN
THIS AREA.  SPECIFICALLY, THEY HAVE ESTABLISHED A
PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGET SYSTEM BASED ON THE U.S.
DOD MODEL.  THIS HAS RESULTED IN A LONGER PLANNING
HORIZON, MORE DETAILED PLANNING AND MORE EFFECTIVE
```

PRIORITIZATION OF RESOURCE NEEDS. ANOTHER DEFENSE PROGRAM HAS LED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE AUTOMATED LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR THE INDONESIAN AIR FORCE.

- D. HOW HAS THE PROGRAM CONTRIBUTED TO RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY? ONE OF THE MOST POSITIVE AND BENEFICIAL ASPECTS OF THE IMET PROGRAM IS THE STUDENT'S EXPOSURE TO THE PRINCIPLES THAT GOVERN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN OUR DEMOCRACY. THEY ARE EXPOSED TO THIS BOTH THROUGH EXPLICIT STUDY OF OUR GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS IN MANAGEMENT AND PME COURSES AND THROUGH THEIR IMMERSION IN OUR SOCIETY DURING THEIR EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE. THIS EXPERIENCE ALSO ALLOWS, AND ACTUALLY ENCOURAGES, A SUBSEQUENT, CONTINUED DIALOG ON

SECRET

SECRET

THIS TOPIC BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE U.S. MISSION IN-COUNTRY AND IMET GRADUATES. THE IMPACT IS VISIBLE. IN INDONESIA, IMET GRADUATES FORM THE CORE OF A GROUP OF RAPIDLY RISING, FORWARD LOOKING OFFICERS WHO ARE COMMITTED TO BOTH THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ORIENTED TOWARD A TRADITIONAL DEFENSE ROLE AND TO THE GROWTH OF A MORE OPEN POLITICAL PROCESS. PREVIOUS IMET GRADUATES INCLUDE THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES AND SEVERAL CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE SERVICES.

- E. HOW HAS THE PROGRAM CONTRIBUTED TO RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS? WHILE WE CANNOT USE IMET AS A GUARANTEE OF FUTURE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WE NOTE THAT AFTER AN EGREGIOUS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR IN NOVEMBER 1991, IT WAS IMET GRADUATES THAT WERE CHOSEN TO SIT ON THE HONOR COURT THAT RECOMMENDED THE RELIEF AND COURT MARTIAL OF THE PERPETRATORS. THIS WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DONE, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HONOR COUNCIL WAS PROMOTED TO BECOME THE COMMANDER OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES. ALSO ENCOURAGING WERE COMMENTS MADE IN JUNE 1994 BY BISHOP CARLOS BELO, BISHOP OF THE DIOCESE OF EAST TIMOR. BISHOP BELO SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THE VIEW THAT U.S. MILITARY TRAINING WAS A POSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS INFLUENCE OVER ABRI OFFICERS, ESPECIALLY YOUNGER ONES, ADDING THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS BETTER TO MAINTAIN LINKS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND INDONESIAN MILITARIES. UNQUESTIONABLY, MORE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS IMPERATIVE. HOWEVER, THE CUTOFF OF IMET

HAS BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO THAT GOAL.

- F. STATISTICAL SUMMARY FOR CONTINUITY LEVEL:
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 JAKART 07413 05 OF 06 010949Z
INDONESIA FY 96 DEFENSE TRAINING PROGRAM CONTINUITY LEVEL
DOLS 430K

CATEGORY	STUDENTS	DOLLARS	DOLLARS PERCENT
PME	10	231	54
MGT	7	77	18
PGSCOL	0	0	0
UPT/FLT	0	0	0
TECH	1	12	3
ORIENT TOURS	0	0	0
SUBTOTAL CONUS	18	320	75
OCONUS	0	0	0
SUBTOTAL	18	320	75
TEAMS	1	110	25
TOTAL:	N/A	430	100

SECTION V. PROJECTED FY 1996 ASSISTANCE.

- A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION. THE ARMED FORCES OF INDONESIA

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JAKART 07413 06 OF 06 010950Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 ACDE-00 AID-01 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 OASY-00
DOEE-00 EB-01 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-16 JUSE-00
L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00
PRS-01 P-01 SP-00 SR-00 SS-00 STR-01 T-00
USIE-00 DTC-01 PMB-00 PRME-01 DRL-09 G-00 /057W
----------62C65D 010950Z /38

O 010944Z AUG 94
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1621
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J4/POLAD/J45/J5//
SECDEF WASHDC//DSAA
JCS WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO CSAF WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB OH
CDRUSAJFKSPWAR CENSCH FORT BRAGG NC
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//OMB//
CSA WASHDC
CNO WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 06 OF 06 JAKARTA 007413

S E C R E T
DELIVERY DURING DUTY HOURS ONLY
SECSTATE ALSO FOR AID, ACDA, DRL, PM/DRSA, EAP, EB
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 07413 06 OF 06 010950Z

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: MASS, EAID, KSEP, KDEM, PHUM, ID
SUBJECT: FY 96 POST PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTING PEACE (FORMERLY: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE OR AIASA), (U)

ACKNOWLEDGE THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN SUPPLEMENTING THEIR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAMS. FOREIGN SECURITY ASSISTANCE OFFERED WITHOUT CONDITION IS WELCOME. [redacted] B1

[redacted] THE POLITICAL REALITIES OF THE CURRENT U.S. - INDONESIA SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF POST-COLD WAR POLICIES, HAVE REDUCED PAST PROGRAMS TO BASIC FMS.

THE SUSPENSION OF IMET TO INDONESIA BEGINNING IN FY 93 HAS BEEN A SEVERE BLOW TO U.S.-INDONESIAN SECURITY RELATIONS

[redacted] B1

- B. A MODEST RESUMPTION OF IMET FOR INDONESIA IS REQUESTED IN FY 96. THE PROPOSED PROGRAM IS HEAVILY WEIGHTED TOWARD E-IMET COURSES BECAUSE INDONESIA DESIRES THIS TYPE OF TRAINING AND HAS REQUESTED RESUMPTION OF IMET WITH E-IMET AS THE CORE. THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE ASSISTANCE IS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE A CONTINUAL SOURCE OF LANGUAGE QUALIFIED CANDIDATES FOR TRAINING IN THE U.S. THIS PROPOSED PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO FURTHER U.S. EFFORTS AT DEVELOPING THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES AS A MODERN,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JAKART 07413 06 OF 06 010950Z

RESPONSIBLE, WELL-TRAINED AND EFFECTIVE FORCE TO CARRY OUT ITS LEGITIM
ATE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES AS WELL AS TO CONTINUE TO BE A VIABLE SECURITY PARTNER AND FRIEND OF THE U.S.

SECTION VI. PROGRAM EVALUATION.

- A. THE FOLLOWING REPRESENT REASONABLE OBJECTIVES BY WHICH WE CAN MEASURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. DEFENSE TRAINING PROGRAM IN INDONESIA AT THE END OF FY 96.

- 1. THE DEVELOPMENT AND EXERCISE OF A MODERN DOCTRINE THAT ENCOMPASSES COMBINED, JOINT, MULTI-NATIONAL, AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS-- MOST LIKELY, INITIALLY TAKING THE FORM OF SIMULATIONS AND COMMAND POST EXERCISES. THIS WILL PROVIDE THE U.S. AN INDICATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF C3 TRAINING AS WELL AS DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT-RELATED TRAINING PROVIDED BY OUR PROPOSED DEFENSE TRAINING PROGRAM. FURTHER, THIS SHOULD ALLOW US TO MAKE AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF ABRI'S SUCCESS IN PROMOTING INTEROPERABILITY WITHIN ITS SERVICES AS WELL AS WITH U.S. FORCES.

- 2. AN EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PURSUING AND RESOLVING INTEROPERABILITY ISSUES WITH US IN THE CONTEXT OF COMBINED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

- 3. A CONCERTED EFFORT BY ABRI TO MODERNIZE AND

STREAMLINE ITS LOGISTICS SYSTEM COULD BE AN INDICATOR OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND INFLUENCE OF U.S. TRAINING.

SECRET

SECRET

- 4. THE PLACEMENT OF U.S. FY 96 DEFENSE TRAINING PROGRAM GRADUATES UPON RETURN TO ABRI. THIS WILL BE AN INDICATION OF THE VALUE THAT ABRI PLACES ON THE MID AND HIGH LEVEL MANAGERIAL-TYPE TRAINING WE PROVIDE. WE SHOULD SEE GRADUATES ENTERING KEY ABRI AND DEFENSE MINISTRY POSITIONS WHICH DIRECTLY RELATE TO THE U.S. TRAINING THEY RECEIVED.

- 5. THE ADOPTION OF U.S. MILITARY SYSTEMS. CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. DEFENSE TRAINING IN FY 96 WOULD BE INDICATIONS THAT ABRI IS CONTINUING TO DEVELOP PERSONNEL, LOGISTICAL, AND TACTICAL TRAINING SYSTEMS MODELED ON U.S. SYSTEMS.

- 6. THE BROADENING OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AMONG INDONESIAN OFFICERS. A FINAL INDICATOR WOULD BE A PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WITHIN ABRI WHICH FOCUSES ON THE RULES OF LAND WARFARE AND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT BEGINNING AT THE CADET AND JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING LEVELS.BARRY

SECRET

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN FULL

R6a

JCET Training and the Leahy Amendment

CONTEXT: An August 31 NYT editorial claims U.S. Special Forces have used a 1991 loophole in Congressional prohibitions on giving military assistance to human rights abusers to "work with some of the world's most abusive and brutal armies." The article describes an amendment to the defense appropriations bill, sponsored by Senator Leahy, that would block our Special Forces from training foreign units if the State Department determined that a member of the unit had committed a gross violation of human rights. Exceptions could be made if steps were being taken to prevent further abuses. The article claims the Pentagon supports the proposed amendment.

We should stress that we have reached an interagency (State-DoD-NSC) consensus on applying the same review process for Special Forces Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) as that contemplated in the Leahy amendment. We should note that we have drafted and plan to send this week a cable to all our diplomatic and consular posts to this effect, and should emphasize that the language contained in the cable is modeled on earlier legislation Sen. Leahy drafted that applied to training counternarcotics units. We should also continue to stress that JCETs are important vehicles for training our SOF units, and that they also provide a unique opportunity for face-to-face engagement with host nation military leaders.

Q's and A's

Q: -- What is the State Department doing to ensure U.S. Special Forces do not provide training to foreign units accused of human rights abuses?

A: -- Over the past several months we have worked out an interagency (State-DoD-NSC) consensus on applying the same restrictions on Special Forces Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) as those contemplated in the Leahy amendment described in the NYT article.

-- We have drafted and plan to send to all our diplomatic and consular posts this week a cable to that effect. The language in that cable is similar to the language described in the Leahy amendment the NYT article refers to, and is -- in fact -- modeled on earlier legislation Senator Leahy drafted that applies to training counternarcotics units.

--As has always been the case, we look to our Ambassadors and their country teams to carefully screen the units that

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 18 AUG 2005 200504645

Leahy (D-VT) Box 9 "Intl Narcotics" 1998

UNCLASSIFIED

will receive Special Forces training for human rights abuses and to report any credible evidence of the involvement of such units in gross human rights violations to the State Department and the regional U.S. Commanders-in-Chief. The Ambassador has the final authority when granting clearance for such training, and will not clear training proposals if they involve units that have committed gross human rights violations.

--You should also understand that JCETs are important vehicles for training our Special Operations Forces units, and that they also provide a unique opportunity for face-to-face engagement with host nation military leaders.

Q: -- How would you respond to the NYT article's argument that JCETs have often conflicted with American Foreign policy goals. For example, the article claims U.S. Special Forces train Colombian Army officials in counterterrorism and intelligence gathering, even though Congress voted to limit regular training to counternarcotics.

A: -- We are not circumventing Congressional human rights restrictions on such training. JCET program are authorized by the U.S. Congress, under DoD's 2011 authority which allows U.S. Special Forces to train with foreign militaries.

-- Such training in Colombia focuses on counter-narcotics, force protection, and counterterrorism. The counterterrorism training focuses on hostage rescue, since over 100 US citizens have been kidnapped by Colombian guerrillas since 1980. No 2011-authorized training in Colombia, including JCETs, is being provided for counterinsurgency operations.

-- All 2011 deployments, including JCETs, are now reviewed by the country team on human rights, corruption and narcotics grounds. They are approved by the Ambassador based on background checks provided by the Government of Colombia and cross-checked with the country team.

Q: --Why were we training with Indonesian forces linked to human rights abuses when Congress banned the training in the early 1990's?

A: --Congress banned Indonesia from the IMET (International Military Education and Training) program in 1992. Congress partially lifted this ban in 1996 when it authorized IMET funding for Indonesian officers to participate in E-IMET (Expanded-IMET).

--Congress did not ban training with Indonesian under the auspices of the JCET (Joint Combined Exchange Training) program. The training our Special Forces conducted with Indonesia was legal, and was reported and discussed with relevant Congressional committees on a number of occasions in recent years.

Q: --What about our training with Turkey? What about the anti-guerrilla forces who have a history of killing civilians?

A: -- We believe that forces training with our SOF benefit from exposure to the professional military ethos, and that we can as effectively make our points about the value of human rights and the military in a field training setting as we can in a classroom. I would also point out that Turkey is a NATO ally, and that our training relationship with the Turkish military forces has been extensive and ongoing.

Approved PM/ISP: VRaphael (ok)
Drafted: PM/ISP: SAHubler/YKapoyos, 8/31/98
pmisp/hublersa/JCET4.doc
Cleared: PM/CPA: CKessler
EAP/
ARA/AND: MO'Malley
EUR/
H:
DRL/RWard
DOD:

UNCLASSIFIED

URGENT

R6C

& MASS-IMET (JCETs)

RELEASED IN FULL

ONLY UNCLASSIFIED MATERIALS MAY BE TRANSMITTED USING THIS COVER SHEET

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

TO:		FROM:	
NAME:	Bob Clarke	NAME:	Yanti Kapoyos
OFFICE:	EAP/PIMBS	OFFICE:	PM/ISP
FAX #:	6-4559	FAX #:	(202) 647-4055
TEL #:		TEL #:	(202) 6-7337

DATE AND TIME OF TRANSMISSION: 8/31/98

NUMBER OF PAGES BEING SENT: 4 & cur (INCLUDING COVER)

REMARKS: Bob: attached is press guidance responding to a NY Times editorial about foreign military training, citing, among others, Indonesia. Please review and clear ASAP.

Thanks,
Yanti

URGENT

Cleared
8/31/98

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 13 AUG 2007 200504645 UNCLASSIFIED MATERIALS ONLY

hot 0057 Box 9 "INDONESIA-IMET" 1998

RELEASED IN FULL R7

Title II -- Military Assistance: Only Expanded IMET for Indonesia

Senate Provision

No provision

House Provision

Stipulates that grant international military and education training (IMET) funds for Indonesia be limited to expanded IMET (E-IMET).

Department Position

We oppose provisions that limit the President's latitude to conduct the foreign policy of the United States.

Talking Points

- We oppose this provision because it limits the President's latitude to conduct the foreign policy of the United States, and specifically to adjust quickly U.S. policy toward Indonesia in a period when greater flexibility is required.

- Since President Soeharto's resignation last May, Indonesia has been moving in the direction of greater democracy. The new GOI has committed itself to major political reforms and to investigate and correct human rights abuses of the past.

- No Indonesian institution is under greater pressure than the military to confront its past involvement in human rights abuses and to reform itself. Gen. Wiranto, the Armed Forces Chief, has taken significant steps in the direction of reform, which we would like to encourage.

- Our opposition does not mean that State would support the immediate resumption of IMET funding for Indonesia. We do not. Rather, it reflects the fact that the situation in Indonesia is undergoing fundamental change, and flexibility is needed.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 13 AUG 2007 200504645

"Indo Mass-IMET" 1998

Department Position on Title III Limitation to EIMET Only for Indonesia

Draft:EAP/PIMBS:RClarke x7-2543 9/17/98
O:/Indonesia/Briefers/IMETrest.doc

Clear:EAP:SRoth
:EAP:SBoyce
:EAP/PIMBS:JAloisi (ok)
:EAP/RSP:DKeegan (info)
:DRL/BA:SSutton (ok)
:P:DStraub (ok)
:H:DPittman (ok)

House (the House Senate switched here?)

R7a

	Title III	
pm	1. IMET:	
	Up to $1 million of funds Appropriated are no-year funds	No provision (Last year) Prefer House
pm EAP	IMET for Indonesia is expanded IMET only p28	No provision Support Senate
pm ARA	IMET for Guatemala is subject to CN process	No provision Prefer Senate
pm ~~ARA~~	Use of IMET funds for training at the School of the Americas is subject to a SecDef determination that trng is consistent with standards applied to trning of US military personnel, esp in area of human rights	No provision ?/ Prefer Senate
pm ARA	Report on the School of Americas required from SecDef	No provision ?/ Prefer Senate
	(See related issue, H577)	(See related issue, S589)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN FULL

R22d

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET) PROGRAM

RELEASED IN FULL

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

IMET is a key component of The Security Assistance Program, and provides military education and training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly foreign nations. Section 543 of the Foreign Assistance Act identifies three purposes of the IMET program:

(1) to encourage effective mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security;

(2) to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries; and

(3) to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.

These objectives are achieved through a variety of military education and training activities conducted by the U.S. armed forces for foreign military and civilian officials. These include: formal instruction involving over 2,000 courses taught at approximately 150 U.S. military schools and installations; on-the-job training; observer training (e.g., for foreign medical personnel); orientation tours for senior military and civilian officials; and limited training involving U.S. military and civilian teams conducting training in foreign countries.

The IMET program emphasizes professional military education at senior and intermediate U.S. service schools. Additionally, since proficiency in English is essential, English language training is provided to those international students who lack the necessary language qualifications. Also, all students attending an IMET course are exposed to a DoD-managed Informational Program (IP), a specialized activity to assist the international student in acquiring an understanding of American society, institutions, ideals and values, including an awareness of the importance the United States places on the role of the military in a democratic society, and respect for internationally recognized human rights (The IP is further described below).

EXPANDED IMET

The SACFO wanted the program to focus more on professional-level training in management of defense ministries, forces, and budgets, and in creating and implementing effective military justice systems and codes of conduct, with a special emphasis on the protection of human rights. This "expansion" of

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MURRAY D ZINOMAN
DATE/CASE ID: 13 AUG 2007 200504645

the IMET program -- commonly referred to as expanded IMET (E-IMET) -- was introduced by the SACFO in the FY 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. It was not the Committee's intention to phase-out traditional IMET, only that the Administration place more emphasis on E-IMET. In fact, since inception of E-IMET, DSAA has worked closely with the SACFO and the committee has expressed its pleasure with the progress made in implementing the initiative.

THE INFORMATIONAL PROGRAM - AN IMPORTANT IMET COMPONENT

While much emphasis is put on the formal courses, one of the real strengths of the program is the informal training provided through the informational program (IP). Every military training facility which provides training to international students has an International Military Student Office (IMSO) whose only function is to assist foreign students during their stay in the United States. The IMSO personnel are the real "guts" of the IMET program -- much of the success and positive endorsements that IMET receives can be directly attributed to the hard work of the IMSOs and the DOD IP that they develop and implement.

The IP is accomplished through visits to private homes, local industries, cultural exhibits, civic activities, and so forth. The student is systematically introduced to the U.S. judicial system, our political system, the role of our free press and other communications media, minority problems, the purpose and scope of labor unions, our economic system, our educational institutions, etc., and the way in which all of these elements of American democracy reflect the U.S. commitment to the basic principles of internationally recognized human rights.

This informal aspect of IMET, time spent outside of the classroom, represents a crucial adjunct to the "traditional" program -- an adjunct that exposes foreign students to the American way of life, including U.S. regard for democratic values, respect for human rights, and belief in the rule of law.

IF IMET IS AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM, THEN WHY THE DOUBTERS

Congress has always been interested in the accomplishments of the IMET program. Specifically, the value and impact of the courses offered, the specific accomplishments of the program in terms of advancing U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives in the recipient countries, the cost effectiveness of the program, and whether the program actually changes attitudes about respect for human rights and civilian control of the military.

The Administration has always asserted that IMET does influence the behavior of students trained under the program toward U.S. concerns of civilian control and human rights; however, no quantifiable evidence is available to support such a proposition. We have consistently argued -- based on extensive anecdotal evidence -- that IMET helps the U.S. reach and influence individuals who ultimately rise to positions of prominence, either in their government or in the private sector. We assert that these graduates' positive impressions of the United States can translate into an advocacy for policies, programs, and positions on issues that are usually in the best interest of the United States.

Anecdotal justifications win few supporters. If there is a common theme that surfaces repeatedly during consultations with Senate and House staffers regarding IMET, it's that their members believe that the objectives of the program are worthwhile, but they want evidence, not rhetoric, supporting the program's effectiveness. In short, we must do a better job of selling the program. Anecdotal evidence is not sufficient, we must somehow measure IMET's effectiveness/successes.

To that end, we have so far initiated the following actions:

1. We included an IMET effectiveness evaluation section in the Annual Integrated Assessment for Security Assistance (AIASA) to address the following areas:

   -- How effectively does the host country employ the skills/training of returning IMET graduates.

   -- How has IMET training enhanced professionalism and improved the capabilities of the host country's military.

   -- How has IMET training -- particularly E-IMET -- contributed to effective defense resource management, respect for the principle of civilian control of the military, and respect for internationally recognized human rights.

2. DSAA has initiated a study to measure the effectiveness of the IMET program in Korea. This study will be used as a test case to determine if a more comprehensive study needs to be undertaken. The Korea study will hopefully evolve into a prototype model which can be used for measuring IMET effectiveness worldwide.

ROUTINE

TRANSFERRED TO OTHER AGENCY
TRANSFER FOR DIRECT REPLY - DIA
EAP/L CARDS CENTER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING

Mass IMET 24

(b)(1),(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

PAGE 01 3018477Z 009238 S097658
INFO: PIMS (02) P (01) RA (01) CB (01)
---------- 30/09492 A2 CB (TOTAL COPIES: 005)
ACTION INR-00

INFO LOG-00 EAP-00 TEDE-00 /001W
----------2057E1 3018477Z /38

R 3017467 MAR 98.
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO OCSA WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL (b)(2)
(b)(2)
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(2)
COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
ONI WASHINGTON DC
SAFE
R 3018107 MAR 98 (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(2)
TO DIA WASHDC// (b)(2)
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//
(b)(2) COMSOCPAC HONOLULU HI// (b)(2)
COMPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
(b)(2)
DIA WASHDC// (b)(2)
(b)(2)
SECDEF WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
COMIPAC HONOLULU HI (b)(2)
USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL// //
(b)(2)
USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL (b)(2)

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) INDONESIA (ID).

//IPSP: (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424
SUBJ: (U) IIR /ABRI LIKELY TO ACCEPT EXPANDED IMET (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED~~
- ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
-

- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

-DOI: (U) 980328.
-
(b)(2) REQS: (U)
-

SOURCE: A. (b)(1),(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

3018477Z 009238 S097658

SUMMARY: ~~(C)~~ ARMED FORCES CINC WIRANTO WILL APPROVE THE ACCEPTANCE OF EXPANDED IMET EDUCATION OFFERED BY THE UNITED STATES, BUT MAY BE WAITING UNTIL HE CAN CLEAR THIS DECISION WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO; INDICATIONS ARE GOOD THAT IT WILL BE APPROVED.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C)~~ FOLLOWING THE MEETING OF THE US AMBASSADOR WITH NEW CINC ARMED FORCES AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE, GENERAL (WIRANTO)), RO MEET WITH SEVERAL CONTACTS FOR A READ-OUT OF THE MEETING AND TO DETERMINE THE SITUATION WITH E-IMET FOR INDONESIA. ALL SOURCES ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE DECISION AT WIRANTO'S LEVEL IS POSITIVE.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

2. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) THE DECISION PAPER WAS ON WIRANTO'S DESK AND (b)(1),1.4 (c) GOOD NEWS VERY SOON." (b)(1),1.4 (c)
THAT INDONESIAN FISCAL YEAR BEGINS ON 1 APRIL. WIRANTO WANTED TO WAIT UNTIL HE HAD THE (b)(1),1.4 (c)
OFFICIAL BUDGET PROJECTION BEFORE HE OFFICIALLY ACCEPTED.
(b)(1),1.4 (c) WIRANTO WAS CONCURRENTLY CINC AND MINISTER,

THE DECISION PROCESS WAS QUICKER THAN PREVIOUSLY.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

3. ~~(C)~~ WHEN QUERIED ABOUT THE DELAY, SOURCE SAID GENERAL WIRANTO WANTED TO CLEAR THE DECISION WITH THE (b)(1),1.4 (c)
PRESIDENT SINCE IT TOUCHED ON A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER. SOURCE B THOUGHT THAT THE DECISION WOULD BE FAVORABLE.
HE COULD NOT OFFER ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE TIMING OF THE ACCEPTANCE.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

1. ~~(C)~~ IN EARLIER MEETINGS WITH FORMER STATE SECRETARY MOERDIONO (JUNE 1996) AND THE PRESIDENT (SEPTEMBER 1996), THE GOI HAD INDICATED THAT THE REJECTION OF E-IMET WAS NOT IRREVOCABLE. BOTH HAD INDICATED TO SENIOR AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS THAT IF THE SITUATION CHANGED, INDONESIA WOULD RECONSIDER THE DECISION. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

2. ~~(C)~~ WHEN SECRETARY COHEN VISITED HE MADE A GOOD CASE FOR INDONESIA TO RESUME E-IMET. HIS ARGUMENTS AND THE INTRINSIC WORTH OF THE PROGRAM HAVE PAID DIVIDENDS. THAT SAID, IT AIN'T OVER TILL IT'S OVER. WE AWAIT THE CONFIRMATION FROM THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES THAT E-IMET CAN GO FORWARD THIS YEAR.

3.

(b)(2)

(b)(1),(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

Lot 00D257 Box 9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ "Indo Mass-IMET" 1998

ROUTINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING

EAP/L CARDS CENTER

PAGE 01 301847Z 009239 S097660
INFO: PIMS (02) P (01) RA (01) CB (01)
---------- 30/0949Z A1 CB (TOTAL COPIES: 005)
ACTION INR-00

INFO LOG-00 EAP-00 TEDE-00 /001W
----------2D57E5 .301847Z /38

R 301746Z MAR 98
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO OCSA WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
(b)(2) USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL// (b)(2)
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
(b)(2)
COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
ONI WASHINGTON DC
SAFE
R 301010Z MAR 98 (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(2)
TO DIA WASHDC//
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI// (b)(2)
(b)(2) COMSOCPAC HONOLULU HI// (b)(2)
COMPACAF HICKAM AFB HI (b)(2)
(b)(2)
DIA WASHDC// (b)(2)
(b)(2)

SECDEF WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
COMIPAC HONOLULU HI
(b)(2) USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL// (b)(2)
USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 (b)(2)

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424 SERIAL: (U) IIR
COUNTRY: (U) INDONESIA (ID).
(b)(2)
//IPSP:
SUBJ: (U) IIR ABRI LIKELY TO ACCEPT (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424
EXPANDED IMET (U)

CONTENTS OF THIS IIR. PLEASE REFER ANY QUESTIONS/COMMENTS TO
(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424
COLL: (U)
INSTR: (U) (b)(2)
PREP: (U)
ACQ: (U) (b)(2)
DISSEM: (U) FIELD:
WARNING: (U) REPORT-~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(2)
(b)(2)
DRV FM: (U) (b)(2)
DECL ON: (U) ~~X1~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIA

OMARR

R26

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Printed By: (b)(6)

ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 DS-00 EUR-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 PM-00 PMB-00
DSCC-00 /002W
----------139140 260746Z /38

R 260736Z JAN 98

(b)(3):10 USC 424

TO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

INFO JOINT STAFF WASHDC//

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

SECDEF WASHDC//

SECSTATE WASHDC//

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

CNO WASHDC
CSAF WASHDC
CMC WASHDC

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

CITE: C-0023-98

SUBJECT: THE US-INDONESIA BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP - WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? (U)

SUMMARY: ~~(C)~~ THE ONGOING ECONOMIC CRISIS IN INDONESIA HAS RECAST MANY OF THE ASSUMPTIONS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP; THIS MESSAGE OFFERS SOME THOUGHTS ON WHAT WE MIGHT EXPECT FROM THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AND SOME ACTIONS WE MIGHT CONSIDER TAKING TO MAINTAIN OUR POSITION AND STRENGTHEN OUR INFLUENCE IN THE NEAR TO MID-TERM.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

01 OF 02 1260736

TEXT: 1. ~~(C)~~ THE FREE FALL OF THE INDONESIA RUPIAH HAS DISSOLVED MUCH OF ABRI'S CONFIDENCE IN ITSELF AND IN THEIR SACRIFICIES FOR THE NATION. OFFICERS WE TALK TO ARE IN DISBELIEF AT WHAT HAS HAPPENED. THEIR SELF-CONFIDENCE IS SHAKEN. SOME ARE LOOKING FOR SCAPEGOATS, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES. OTHERS SEE DREAMS OF A ROSY FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES AND THEIR FAMILIES MELTING. THEY HAVE EXPERIENCED "EARTHQUAKES" BEFORE WHERE THE GROUND SHOOK BUT THE DURATION WAS BRIEF AND THE LANDMARKS - POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND SOCIAL - STAYED IN PLACE. THE CURRENT SITUATION IS MORE LIKE A "LANDSLIDE" WHERE THE GROUND BENEATH THEM TURNS PLASTIC. RIGHT NOW, THE LEADERSHIP DOESN'T KNOW WHAT IT DOESN'T KNOW.

2. ~~(C)~~ INDONESIANS ARE A PROUD PEOPLE. THEY WILL CANCEL AN EVENT, NO MATTER HOW BENEFICIAL, RATHER THAN APPEAR TO BE BEGGING FOR HELP. WE SHOULD BE SENSITIVE TO THIS. THEY ALSO HAVE A LONG MEMORY. A FRIEND WHO OFFERS "UNSOLICITED" HELP IN TIME OF NEED IS NEVER FORGOTTEN.

3. ~~(C)~~ AFTER A REVIEW OF OUR ONGOING BILATERAL PROGRAMS, THE (b)(3):10 USC 424 AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE OFFICES HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS:

A. NO NEW PROGRAM OR INITIATIVE WITH THE INDONESIANS IS LIKELY TO BE APPROVED IF IT HAS ANY SIGNIFICANT NEW FINANCIAL OR POLITICAL COST TO ABRI.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Lot 00D257 Box 9 "Indo MARR Mil + Defense" 1998

Printed By: (b)(6)

B. ALL ONGOING EXERCISES AND OTHER PLANNED EVENTS ARE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION OR CANCELLATION. HOWEVER, OUR ABRI COUNTERPARTS SO FAR ARE PRESSING AHEAD WITH ALL SCHEDULED EVENTS AND HAVE CANCELLED NOTHING.

C. WE SHOULD REVIEW ALL EXERCISES, SUBJECT MATTER EXCHANGES, AND OTHER ACTIVITIES TO ENSURE WE GET THE MAXIMUM BENEFIT AND CONTACT WITH THE GREATEST NUMBER OF INDONESIAN MILITARY MEMBERS.

D. ANYTHING WE CAN DO THAT HELPS THE ECONOMY, SUCH AS PORT VISITS, IS WATER ON PARCHED GROUND.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

THE FOUR PILLARS OF OUR MILITARY TO MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

4. ~~(C)~~ EQUIPMENT TRANSFER. FMS AND COMMERCIAL SALES OF EQUIPMENT WILL BE SPARSE FOR AT LEAST A YEAR, PERHAPS MORE. WE SHOULD NOT ABANDON THIS PART OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE (b)(1),1.4 (c) WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP THESE AND OTHER OPPORTUNITIES OPEN AND WORKING. WHEN INDONESIA DOES RECOVER FINANCIALLY, THEIR MILITARY WILL BE IN EVEN MORE NEED OF MODERNIZATION THAN NOW. (b)(1),1.4 (c) (b)(1),1.4 (c) BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THEY WILL HAVE A LOCK ON ANY FUTURE PURCHASES, INCLUDING HELICOPTERS AND FIGHTERS.

5. ~~(C)~~ EDUCATION AND IMET. IT IS UNLIKELY INDONESIA WILL BE ABLE TO PURCHASE ANY FMS TRAINING. HOWEVER, THE PENDING CASE FOR ARMY TRAINING NOW AWAITING APPROVAL FOR MANY MONTHS AT THE STATE DEPART SHOULD BE APPROVED, AT LEAST FOR THE SYMBOLIC GESTURE IT WILL CONVEY. WE CURRENTLY RECEIVE A NO COST INVITATION TO ATTEND THE INDONESIAN STAFF COLLEGE. SEVERAL YEARS AGO WE OFFERED A RECIPROCAL INVITATION TO INDONESIA TO ATTEND US ARMY CGSC, BUT THEY DID NOT RESPOND BECAUSE WE COULD NOT COVER TRAVEL TO CONUS, HOUSING, FOOD, AND OTHER SUPPORT COSTS. WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO EXPLORE WAYS TO DO SOME OF THIS AND RENEW THE OFFER. WE ARE WORKING WITH PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE TRYING TO GET FUNDING

(b)(3):10 USC 424

02 OF 02 1260736

CITE: C-0023-98

SUBJECT: THE US-INDONESIA BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP - WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? (U)

FOR ONE OR TWO INDONESIAN MID-CAREER OFFICERS TO DO GRADUATE SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES.

6. ~~(S)~~ TRAINING EXERCISES. WE ARE FINDING THE SUPPORT COSTS FOR IN-COUNTRY TRAINING ARE DRASTICALLY DECLINING. HOTEL SPACE, FOR EXAMPLE, IS ABOUT HALF THE COST IT WAS A FEW MONTHS AGO. THIS WILL MAKE SOME OF THE OVERHEAD COSTS CHEAPER FOR THE EXERCISES WE DO EXECUTE. ANY ADDITIONAL TITLE 10 FUNDS THAT MAY BECOME AVAILABLE COULD BE REPROGRAMMED TO SUPPORT THE BALANCE IRON AND TEAK IRON EXERCISE PROGRAMS. ANY EXERCISE THAT USES US MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT WE WILL EXPLORE THE FEASIBILITY OF USING AS SPACE AVAILABLE AIRLIFT FOR OTHER BILATERAL MILITARY PROGRAMS. BY DOUBLING UP WE WILL TRY TO DO MULTIPLE JOINT EVENTS SIMULTANEOUSLY. THIS TAKES MORE PLANNING BUT IS COST EFFICIENT.

7. ~~(C)~~ VISITORS. SENIOR OFFICIALS ARE INVALUABLE IN REINFORCING TO THE INDONESIANS OUR COMMITMENT TO THE REGION AND

Printed By: (b)(6)

STABILITY. WE WILL BE ASKING SENIOR VISITORS WHO TRAVEL MIL-AIR TO CONSIDER BRINGING MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFF WHO CAN SEPARATELY INTERACT WITH THE INDONESIAN DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT. WE HAVE HAD SUCCESS WITH MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS WHO COULD SPIN OFF FROM THEIR PRINCIPAL FOR BRIEF SYMPOSIA, CONFERENCES, AND BRIEFINGS. WE WILL BE LOOKING TO DO MORE OF THIS.

FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES

8. ~~(C)~~ THERE ARE EXCELLENT TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE IN INDONESIA. THE SIABU AERIAL RANGE COMPLEX, BATU RAJAH NATIONAL GROUND TRAINING CENTER, AND THE EAST JAVA MARINE CORPS LANDING EXERCISE AREA ARE SOME OF THE BEST AVAILABLE IN ASIA. US FORCES HAVE BEEN INVITED TO USE THESE FACILITIES AND CAN EXPECT TO HAVE ACCESS IN THE FUTURE. WE CAN WORK THESE OPPORTUNITIES FOR BILATERAL AND UNILATERAL EXERCISES. NOW IS THE TIME TO SHOW ABRI AND INDONESIA OUR COMMITMENT TO A STABLE, FIRM, AND EXPANDING RELATIONSHIP.

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)

DIA

& MARR

R23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Printed By: (b)(6) 72343

ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 PM-00 PMB-00 /001W
------------------12ACB1 230625Z /38

P R 230458Z JAN 98 ZDK
(b)(3):10 USC 424
TO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
CJCS WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
(b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//
SECDEF WASHDC//
SECSTATE WASHDC// (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
(b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 (b)(3):10 USC 424

CITE: C-0020-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USDAOJAKAR 01 OF 03 1230458

SUBJECT: SECRETARY COHEN'S VISIT TO INDONESIA (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COHEN HAD AN ESPECIALLY SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO INDONESIA FROM 13 TO 15 JANUARY, MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, MINISTERS OF DEFENSE AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND THE CINC OF THE ARMED FORCES, REPORTED BELOW. HE ALSO VISITED SPECIAL FORCES HEADQUARTERS FOR A REVIEW OF TROOPS AND CAPABILITIES, MET WITH THE NEW INDONESIAN COUNCIL FOR WORLD AFFAIRS, AND SPOKE TO THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. THE SECRETARY?S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GINANDJAR

2. ~~(C)~~ MINISTER GINANDJAR FIRST MET PRIVATELY WITH SECRETARY COHEN; THE TWO LATER JOINED A LARGER GROUP. GINANDJAR EXPLAINED THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL PLANNING MINISTRY, WHICH INCLUDES INVOLVEMENT IN ALL SIGNIFICANT PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE MILITARY. HE RELATED THAT THE FINANCIAL CRISIS HAD NECESSITATED DEFERMENT OF ALL MAJOR EQUIPMENT PURCHASES FOR THE ARMED FORCES. THE PURCHASE OF SU-30 FIGHTERS, MI-17 HELICOPTERS AND SUBMARINES HAD BEEN CANCELED. THE GREATEST NEED IN THE ARMED FORCES IS C-130S, AND GINANDJAR TOLD THE SECRETARY HE HOPED INDONESIA COULD COUNT ON HIS SUPPORT FOR A C-130 PURCHASE WHEN INDONESIA WAS ONCE AGAIN IN A POSITION TO PROCEED WITH PROCUREMENT. GINANDJAR ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF US TRAINING AND HOPED THAT THE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL IMET PROGRAM WOULD BE RESTORED. SECRETARY COHEN RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD HELP OUT IN THE EFFORT TO RESUME IMET, NOTING THAT SOME ATTITUDES IN CONGRESS ARE DIFFICULT TO OVERCOME AND EMPHASIZING THE VALUE OF HAVING US CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS VISIT INDONESIA. GINANDJAR ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WAS STILL ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND THAT NOT ALL WERE SATISFIED WITH THE PACE OF CHANGE, BUT THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT THE COUNTRY WAS MOVING IN THE RIGHT

Lot 00D257 Box 9 "Indo MARR Mil + Defense" 1998

DIRECTION. THOSE WHO WERE CRITICAL OF INDONESIA ON HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE THE GREATEST SUPPORTERS OF IMET, AS EDUCATION WAS THE BEST WAY TO ACCELERATE PROGRESS IN THIS AREA. AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE POSITIVE TRENDS IN INDONESIA, GINANDJAR SAID THAT IT USED TO BE MUCH EASIER FOR INDONESIAN OFFICIALS TO DEAL WITH THE INDONESIAN PRESS AND PARLIAMENT BECAUSE THERE WERE MORE CONTROLS OVER THESE INSTITUTIONS. THIS IS NO LONGER THE CASE--NOW, WE HAVE NO DIRECT CONTROL OVER THE PRESS. IN ADDITION, THE FACT THAT SERIOUS PEOPLE ARE NOW ANNOUNCING THEIR CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENT IS A SIGN THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IS CHANGING.

MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY SUDRADJAT

3. ~~(C)~~ IN HIS WELCOMING REMARKS, MINISTER OF DEFENSE EDI SUDRADJAT SAID THAT THE SECRETARY'S VISIT ITSELF ENHANCED THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, AND NOTED THE IMPORTANCE TO INDONESIA OF DEFENSE TIES WITH THE US. SUDRADJAT THANKED SECRETARY COHEN FOR SENDING C-130 FIREFIGHTING AIRCRAFT DURING INDONESIA?S RECENT FOREST FIRE CRISIS. HE WAS ESPECIALLY GRATEFUL THE SECRETARY HAD PERSONALLY AUTHORIZED THE EXTENSION OF THE C-130 DEPLOYMENT FOR AN ADDITIONAL 30 DAYS, AND NOTED THAT INDONESIA WAS ABLE TO LEARN THE TECHNIQUES AND WORK WITH THE TECHNOLOGY THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN FUTURE DISASTERS. SUDRADJAT ALSO EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THE US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS. HE SAID INDONESIA WELCOMED THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION AND WANTED US FORCES TO REMAIN AS A STABILIZING FACTOR. THE STABILITY OF THE ENTIRE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION WAS CRUCIAL FOR INDONESIA?S DEVELOPMENT, AND INDONESIA MUST DO ITS SHARE TO CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY, ALTHOUGH IT COULD NOT DO AS MUCH AS THE US. HE SAID EVERY SECURITY PROBLEM SHOULD BE DISCUSSED, AND THAT TO ACCOMMODATE THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES WE NEED TO USE ALL AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS, SUCH AS THE ARF. HE CONCLUDED BY STATING HIS SATISFACTION WITH THE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP, BUT SAID THE TIES COULD BE ENHANCED.

4. ~~(C)~~ SECRETARY COHEN ASSURED SUDRADJAT THAT THE US WAS COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING A LONG-TERM PRESENCE IN THE REGION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ABOUT ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PERSONNEL. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE TIMING OF HIS VISIT WAS COINCIDENTAL TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, IT HELPED UNDERSCORE THE MESSAGE THAT THE US IS A SOLID, RELIABLE PARTNER IN GOOD TIMES AND IN BAD. AFTER COMMENDING INDONESIA FOR ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND IN THE ARF, SECRETARY COHEN REFERRED TO THE BILATERAL DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE FACED IN RECENT YEARS. ON IMET, THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS DETERMINED TO OVERCOME THE OBJECTIONS TO THIS IMPORTANT PROGRAM

IN THE US. WHILE UNDERSTANDING INDONESIA'S REASONS FOR ABSTAINING FROM E-IMET, THE SECRETARY SAID HE HOPED WE COULD FIND A WAY TO SUSTAIN AND EVEN INCREASE OUR DEFENSE INTERACTION. FOR EXAMPLE, UNTIL FULL IMET COULD BE RESTORED, IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR INDONESIA TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF E-IMET. IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR INDONESIA TO DO SO, DOD WOULD BE PREPARED TO BRING E-IMET STUDENTS TO WASHINGTON FOR THEIR LAST WEEK OR TWO IN THE STATES FOR INTENSIVE FAMILIARIZATION WITH THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND WASHINGTON POLICY COMMUNITY. ADDITIONALLY, SECRETARY COHEN ASKED SUDRADJAT TO CONSIDER BUILDING A MORE STRATEGIC-LEVEL DEFENSE DIALOGUE, AND PROPOSED TO SEND A TEAM FROM THE PENTAGON TO INDONESIA SOMETIME THIS SUMMER FOR A POLICY-LEVEL DIALOGUE THAT WOULD COVER REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES AS WELL AS BILATERAL ISSUES IN MORE DEPTH.

5. ~~(C)~~ SUDRADJAT SAID HE KNEW THAT DOD FULLY SUPPORTED IMET AND WOULD WORK HARD TO OVERCOME OBJECTIONS OF OTHERS. HE EXPLAINED, HOWEVER, THAT THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WAS SO IMPORTANT AND SO

CHERISHED BY INDONESIA THAT IT WAS WILLING TO FOREGO ANY PROGRAM THAT MIGHT DAMAGE THAT RELATIONSHIP. THE SECRETARY REITERATED THAT E-IMET WAS NOT A HINDRANCE TO THE RELATIONSHIP FROM THE US PERSPECTIVE, AND OBSERVED THAT PARTICIPATION IN E-IMET WOULD LIKELY SOFTEN THE OPPOSITION OF SOME IN CONGRESS TO RESUMING THE FULL PROGRAM. HE REITERATED THAT DOD WOULD EXPLORE WAYS TO ENHANCE THE PROGRAM. SUDRADJAT REPLIED THAT HE WAS ENCOURAGED TO HEAR THIS CLARIFICATION, THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR THE OFFER, INDICATED HE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY, AND RECOMMENDED THAT THEIR STAFFS DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER.

6. ~~(C)~~ A DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES TOUCHED BRIEFLY UPON CAMBODIA, AND TURNED TO US-CHINA RELATIONS. SECRETARY COHEN SAID THE US WAS WORKING COMPREHENSIVELY TO ENGAGE CHINA AND TO DISSUADE BEIJING -- AND OTHERS IN THE REGION -- FROM APPLYING A ZERO-SUM ANALYSIS TO REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS. HE EXPLAINED THE NEED FOR CONTINUED REASSURANCES TO CHINA AND OTHERS THAT ENHANCED US RELATIONS WITH ONE COUNTRY OR SUB-REGION DO NOT COME AT THE EXPENSE OF OUR RELATIONSHIPS ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION. FOR EXAMPLE, OUR EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA DOES NOT COME AT THE EXPENSE OF ASEAN, AND ASEAN'S STRENGTH AND OUR CONTINUED MILITARY PRESENCE TO DO NOT COME AT THE EXPENSE OF CHINA. ALL OF THESE FACTORS TOGETHER CONTRIBUTE TO OVERALL STABILITY THAT IS IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST.

7. ~~(C)~~ SUDRADJAT ASKED ABOUT US RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN, AND ABOUT CHINESE REACTION TO THE US-JAPAN DEFENSE GUIDELINES REVIEW. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT US-JAPAN DEFENSE TIES WERE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST CHINA AND THAT THE US HAD MADE A GREAT EFFORT TO AVOID THIS PERCEPTION. THE REVIEW OF THE US-JAPAN DEFENSE GUIDELINES WAS UNDERTAKEN WITH GREAT TRANSPARENCY. US RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN WERE ANOTHER GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE NEED TO ACTIVELY WORK TO PREVENT THE PERCEPTION THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN ONE RELATIONSHIP DETRACTED FROM ANOTHER. SECRETARY COHEN SAID THAT WE WANT TO ENGAGE CHINA IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE THE RULE OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF BEHAVIOR. BY OUR PRESENCE AND OUR ENGAGEMENT, WE WANT TO PROMOTE CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT AS A GOOD NEIGHBOR. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WANT CHINA TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEY CANNOT BUILD UP THEIR MILITARY AND INTIMIDATE OTHERS WITHOUT PAYING A PRICE. IN SHORT, US RELATIONSHIPS WITH ASEAN, WITH JAPAN AND WITH CHINA BENEFIT EVERYONE IN THE REGION, AND THE REGION WOULD BE CRITICAL OF THE US IF IT BEHAVED IN ANY OTHER FASHION. SECRETARY COHEN ALSO COMMENTED ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, UNDERSCORING THE US INTENTION TO REMAIN ENGAGED AND PRESENT EVEN AFTER REUNIFICATION. SUDRADJAT RESPONDED THAT HE AGREED WITH THE US STRATEGY TOWARD CHINA; IT WAS INDONESIA'S STRATEGY AS WELL. HE ASKED WHAT THE US STRATEGY WAS FOR INDONESIA. SECRETARY COHEN ANSWERED THAT THE UNITED STATES VALUED AND RESPECTED OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA. THE CURRENT CRISIS HAD RAISED THE ATTENTION OF MANY IN THE US TO EVENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND INDONESIA. ASEAN'S EFFECTIVENESS WAS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE LEADERSHIP AND STRENGTH OF INDONESIA. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED WITH AN OVERVIEW OF US DEFENSE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES, NOTING THE JUST-INITIALED STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT WITH THE LATTER.

ARMED FORCES COMMANDER IN CHIEF GENERAL TANJUNG

8. ~~(C)~~ IN WELCOMING THE SECRETARY, GENERAL TANJUNG SAID

BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONS WERE GOOD, THERE HAD BEEN PROGRESS IN BILATERAL COOPERATION, AND THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN HEARING FROM SECRETARY COHEN ANY IDEAS FOR FURTHER ENHANCEMENTS IN DEFENSE COOPERATION. TANJUNG MENTIONED THAT CJCS GEN SHELTON, WHOM HE KNEW, HAD INVITED HIM TO VISIT THE US LATER IN JANUARY,

Printed By: (b)(6) 72343

AN INVITATION HE WAS UNABLE TO ACCEPT BECAUSE OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND HIS NEED TO MONITOR THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION. SECRETARY COHEN OPENED BY GIVING AN OVERVIEW OF US SECURITY STRATEGY IN ASIA, DETAILING THE US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP AND US-CHINA STRATEGY. HE REITERATED THE US COMMITMENT TO A LONG-TERM SECURITY PRESENCE, INCLUDING ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AFTER REUNIFICATION.

9. ~~(C)~~ TURNING TO THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, SECRETARY COHEN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE US AND INDONESIA HAD SOME PROBLEMS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS VERY MUCH IN FAVOR OF RESUMING A FULL IMET PROGRAM FOR INDONESIA AND IN LOOKING FOR WAYS TO FURTHER ENHANCE OUR TIES. HE RELATED HIS DISCUSSION WITH NOD SUDRADJAT ON BRINGING E-IMET STUDENTS TO WASHINGTON AT THE END OF THEIR COURSES. TANJUNG SAID HE WAS PLEASED TO HEAR OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMITMENT TO RESTORING IMET. MOST OF INDONESIA'S HIGHEST RANKING OFFICERS WERE IMET GRADUATES AND INDONESIA CLEARLY BENEFITED FROM THE PROGRAM. BUT IT WAS THE US WHICH IMPOSED THE E-IMET RESTRICTION, AND THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES ON THE INDONESIAN SIDE WITH THE POLITICAL CONTENT OF E-IMET. TANJUNG SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO DEVELOP THE IMET PROGRAM, AND THAT HE ALWAYS RAISES THIS WITH AMERICAN VISITORS. IMET SHOULD BE FOR JUNIOR OFFICERS, SO THAT THEY STAY UP TO DATE WITH THE TRAINING OFFERED BY THE US AND SO THAT THEY CAN MAKE GOOD DECISIONS WHEN THEY RISE THROUGH THE RANKS. HE HOPED THAT FULL IMET COULD BE RESTORED, BUT THIS WAS A DECISION FOR THE US GOVERNMENT. TANJUNG NOTED THAT INDONESIA ALSO GETS TRAINING IN OTHER COUNTRIES. SECRETARY COHEN CLARIFIED THAT INDONESIA WAS CURRENTLY APPROVED ONLY FOR E-IMET BUT THAT HE WOULD WORK FOR RESUMPTION OF THE FULL PROGRAM. IN THE MEANTIME, IT WOULD BENEFIT INDONESIA AND THE US IF INDONESIA DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE IN E-IMET COURSES. TANJUNG REPLIED SIMPLY THAT HE HOPED IMET COULD BE RESTORED. IN THE MEANTIME, THE BILATERAL EXERCISE PROGRAM WAS HEALTHY AND RELATIONS WERE GOOD AT SENIOR MILITARY LEVELS.

10. (U) SECDEF STAFF CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

OSCA
Of MASS - IMET SEA

Updated March 20, 1998
DOD GUIDANCE

R1

TRAINING OF INDONESIAN FORCES
19 March 1998

CURRENT NEWS

U.S. Training of Indonesia Troops Goes on Despite Ban, New York Times, Tim Weiner, 17 March 98.

Administration defends military training in Indonesia, Washington Times, Toni Marshall, 18, 98.

MESSAGES

- Articles are misleading:
- There is no ban on the training of Indonesian Military personnel or units.
- Congress prohibited Indonesia from receiving IMET (International Military Exchange Training) funds in 1992-not a blanket ban on training. No funds were allocated to Indonesia until Congress partially lifted this ban in FY 96, when it authorized IMET funding for Indonesia provided the funds were expended only on "E-IMET" courses.
- Indonesia is not prohibited from purchasing U.S. training with its national funds, and has purchased a number of courses since FY93. This fact has been the subject of discussion in a variety of briefing and hearing over the past several years. Sample courses through FMS:
    a) NDU International Fellow
    b) English Language course
    c) Senior International Defense Management
    d) Advanced Weapons Course
- We are aware there has been interest in, and some discussion in, Congress of extending the ban to cover training purchased by Indonesia, but no such legislation has been passed.
- Our pursuit of strong and bilateral defense ties with the friendly countries of SE Asia, including Indonesia, has been a long-standing and well-articulated component of our East Asian security strategy.
- As is the case throughout SE Asia, our defense relationship with Indonesia is multifaceted: we have senior-level policy discussions, as with Secretary Cohen's January visit to Indonesia, we conduct military staff talks, we hold a variety of exercises and training events, ship visits, and participate with Indonesia in various multilateral military fora.
- The JCET program, which is specifically designed to train U.S. SOF in foreign countries, is only one type of training we engage in with Indonesia.
- The information on JCET activities referred to in the articles was provided to Congressman Evans in response to his 16 September letter to Secretary Cohen requesting wide-ranging information on the training of Indonesian military, particularly the Indonesian Special Forces. Congressman Evans was also

Lot 00D257 Box 9 "Indo Mass Imet" 1998

provided detailed historical information on training conducted under the IMET program and through Foreign Military Sales.

- JCET is not unique to Indonesia - In FY 1996, for example, JCET activities were conducted in 95 countries. Some 7,800 US and 15,000 host nation personnel participated worldwide, and total US expenses to support the missions were $18.5 million. SOF JCET activities, under Title 10, Section 2011 authority, are funded by the USSOCOM Operations and Maintenance budget and are coordinated and prioritized through the theater CINC.

- Congress receives an annual report "Report on Training of Special Operations Forces" from the DoD on JCET events conducted under Section 2011 of Title 10. This includes a country breakdown of activities, costs, and numbers of personnel trained. JCET activities in Indonesia have thus been reported to Congress annually since FY93. There has been no effort to circumvent the law or to hide our relationship with Indonesia. Secretary Cohen has testified on the importance of Indonesia to our security interests, as well as how maintaining a healthy defense relationship helps us advance human rights objectives.

SECRETARY COHEN QUOTES
(01/14/98, Joint Press Conference at Indonesian President Soeharto's Residence):

"Our common security interests include peaceful resolution of disputes, open sea lanes, and engagement with China. Indonesia's participation in the United Nations' peace-keeping missions has made it a force for peace in the world. In addition, Indonesia plays a key role in maintaining regional stability. It is a leader in ASEAN and is a fundamental force and prosperity.

"Indonesia and the United States don't always agree on issues. We have had our differences on human rights, but we have learned to work together on a range of issues for regional security. So we seek an expanded focus on the strategic environment in Asia. As the region continues to change, it is important for us to engage in continuing dialogue on problems and solutions."

- The human rights issue is particularly important to the Defense Department because it is the one issue which prevents us from developing the defense relationship to its maximum potential. We have made this point repeatedly to our defense counterparts in Indonesia. At the same time, however, human rights is not, and should not, be the defining issue in our defense relationship, any more than it should be in our overall bilateral relationship.

- It is unrealistic to assume that any US policies or actions taken toward the Indonesian military will produce quantifiable changes in the military's behavior. We believe, however, that over time, we have influenced and will continue to influence human rights improvements through dialogue, access, and most importantly, training.

- All forms of training that we can provide to members of the Indonesian armed forces expose Indonesian service members to the world's model of military professionalism and respect for civilian control and respect for human rights.

- We believe professionalizing the Indonesian armed forces will help reduce human rights abuses by the military.

BACKGROUND

IMET

- IMET International Military Exchange and Training is an instrument of national security and foreign policy-a key component of U.S. security assistance funded by the DoS that provides U.S. training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations.

- Expanded IMET (E-IMET) courses focus on topics such as military justice and resource management; it also may include participation by civilians.

JCET

- Joint Combined Exchange Training is designed to train U.S. Special Operations Forces military personnel. JCET trains U.S. SOF overseas by having them train with foreign militaries.

- Funding comes from the combatant CINC's operations and maintenance budget as authorized by Section 2011 of Title 10.

- The DoD reports to Congress annually the expenses related to the training of Special Operations Forces with friendly foreign forces per section 2011 of Title 10, United States Code called "Report on Training of Special Operations Forces."

- The Report is published the first of every April since FY 1993. The last report, FY 96, was the first unclassified report.

TOTAL U.S. EXPENSES FOR JCETS WORLDWIDE: $18,5444,000.
TOTAL U.S. EXPENDITURES IN INDO: $111,000.
TOTAL WORLDWIDE EXERCISES: 279
TOTAL INDO. EXERCISES: 10
TOTAL WORLDWIDE HOST NATION PERSONNEL TRAINED: 15,029
TOTAL INDO. PERSONNEL TRAINED: 838

INDONESIAN UNITS TRAINED AND TYPE OF TRAINING:
KOPASSUS-Headquarters, Special Forces Command
Sniper (Aug 93)
Demolition's and Air Operations (Sep 93)
Close Quarters Combat/Medical Lifesaver and Marksmanship (Jan 94)
Pathfinder/Aviation operations (May 94)
Air Operations/Airdrop Ops (May 94)
Parachute Ops/Advanced Sniper Techniques (Feb 95)
Parachute/EOD support for VIP protection (Aug 95)
Maritime ops (Jun 95) (Aug 96)
Peacekeeping Ops Subject Matter Expert Exchange (Sep 95)
Peacekeeping Ops (Oct 95)
Air Assault Leaders Course (May 96)
Special Reconnaissance Training (Aug 96) (Nov 97)
Psyops Training (Dec 96)
Parachute Training (Feb 97)
Mortar Training (Mar 97)
Demolitions/EOD/NBC/Sapper (Aug 97)
Reconnaissance patrolling/Parachute jumpmaster training (June 97)

KOSTRAD-The Army Stragegic Command
Close Quarters Combat (Aug 92)
Sniper (Aug 93)
Reconnaissance patrolling/Parachute jumpmaster training (June 97)
KODAM JAYA-Jakarta Area Military Command
Psyops Training (Dec 96)
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (Nov 97)
KOPASKASAU-Air Force Special Forces

Maritime ops (Aug 96)
Parachute/Jump Clearing Team Training (Sep 97)
PUSDIKIF-Infantry Training Center
Sniper (Aug 93)
PASPAMPRES-Presidential Security Guards
Close Quarters Combat/Medical Lifesaver and Marksmanship (Jan 94)
Parachute/EOD support for VIP protection (Aug 95)
PENERBAD-Army Aviation Squad
Pathfinder/Aviation operations (May 94)
Air Assault Leaders Course (May 96)

Source: DASD ASIA PACIFIC (INDONESIA COUNTRY DIRECTOR), DASD SOLIC (Special Operations)
A/O: (b)(6) OASD (PA): DDI, USMC, (b)(6)

SEA

MARR
(Colum Tashing 1/88)
R25a

Indonesia

How important is Indonesia to US security interests?

- Indonesia is increasingly important to US security interests. Its status as the world's fourth largest country gives it inherent importance, and not enough people outside Southeast Asia fully appreciate how Indonesia's own sensitivity to its size and power have led it to develop and act in a non-threatening fashion that has won the respect and admiration of its regional neighbors and contributed to a stable security environment.

- A stable, prosperous Indonesia is therefore a key component of the regional security equation.

- Indonesia's geostrategic position also makes it important for the US. Even those who know very little about Indonesia cannot help but acknowledge it's geostrategic importance when they look at a map or a globe. Indonesia's vast span of thousands of islands form a gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and straddle some of the world's most critical sea lines of communication.

- As we continue to rationalize and economize on our military deployments globally, military cooperation with key countries such as Indonesia becomes an ever greater element in our ability to project power and influence.

- Our bilateral defense relationships with allies and friends form the core of the security structure in Asia and are widely acknowledged as the cornerstone of regional stability and prosperity. Indonesia and its neighbors in ASEAN provide access to US military forces that allows us to maintain the presence that we and most of Asia believe is critical to regional stability and security.

Are you concerned that the economic crisis in Jakarta could result in civil unrest, a military coup or regional instability?

- Naturally when a country in the throes of a major economic crisis that directly affects many of its citizens, there is some concern about the people's ability to cope with the serious hardships they face.

- Thus far, disturbances related to the economic crisis have been limited and localized. The government has acted quickly and responsibly to address these small-scale problems and has taken steps to reduce the potential for such disturbances, such as by ensuring that sufficient food is available.

Lot 00D257 Box 9 "Indo MARR Mil + Defense" 1998

- We expect that the Indonesian authorities will continue to deal with the crisis in a responsible and professional manner.

Could political and social unrest in Indonesia result in a US military intervention?

- It would be distinctly unhelpful to address such a hypothetical.

- What is important for the US is to reaffirm the importance of the bilateral relationship and to assist Indonesia in restoring economic stability.

DSCA
SEA

Ø MILSS - IMET

DOD GUIDANCE

R31

TRAINING OF INDONESIAN FORCES
19 March 1998

CURRENT NEWS

U.S. Training of Indonesia Troops Goes on Despite Ban, New York Times, Tim Weiner, 17 March 98.

Administration defends military training in Indonesia, Washington Times, Toni Marshall, 18, 98.

MESSAGES

- Articles are misleading:
- There is no ban on the training of Indonesian Military personnel or units.
- Congress prohibited Indonesia from receiving IMET (International Military Exchange Training) funds in 1992-not a blanket ban on training. No funds were allocated to Indonesia until Congress partially lifted this ban in FY 96, when it authorized IMET funding for Indonesia provided the funds were expended only on "E-IMET" courses.
- Indonesia is not prohibited from purchasing U.S. training with its national funds, and has purchased a number of courses since FY93. This fact has been the subject of discussion in a variety of briefing and hearing over the past several years.
- We are aware there has been interest in, and some discussion in, Congress of extending the ban to cover training purchased by Indonesia, but no such legislation has been passed.
- Our pursuit of strong and bilateral defense ties with the friendly countries of SE Asia, including Indonesia, has been a long-standing and well-articulated component of our East Asian security strategy.
- As is the case throughout SE Asia, our defense relationship with Indonesia is multifaceted: we have senior-level policy discussions, as with Secretary Cohen's January visit to Indonesia, we conduct military staff talks; we hold a variety of exercises and training events, ship visits, and participate with Indonesia in various multilateral military fora.
- The JCET program, which is specifically designed to train U.S. SOF in foreign countries, is only one type of training we engage in with Indonesia.
- The information on JCET activities referred to in the articles was provided to Congressman Evans in response to his 16 September letter to Secretary Cohen requesting wide-ranging information on the training of Indonesian military, particularly the Indonesian Special Forces. Congressman Evans was also provided detailed historical information on training conducted under the IMET program and through Foreign Military Sales.
- There has been no effort to circumvent the law or to hide our relationship with Indonesia. Secretary Cohen has testified on the importance of Indonesia to our security interests, as well as how maintaining a health defense relationship helps us advance human rights objectives.

LOT 00D257 BOX9 "Indo MARR Mil + Defense" 1998

- JCET is not unique to Indonesia - In FY 1996, for example, JCET activities were conducted in 95 countries. Some 7,800 US and 15,000 host nation personnel participated worldwide, and total US expenses to support the missions were $18.5 million. SOF JCET activities, under Title 10, Section 2011 authority, are funded by the USSOCOM Operations and Maintenance budget and are coordinated and prioritized through the theater CINC.

- Congress receives an annual report "Report on Training of Special Operations Forces" from the DoD on JCET events conducted under Section 2011 of Title 10. This includes a country breakdown of activities, costs, and numbers of personnel trained. JCET activities in Indonesia have thus been reported to Congress annually since FY93. There has been no effort to circumvent the law or to hide our relationship with Indonesia. Secretary Cohen has testified on the importance of Indonesia to our security interests, as well as how maintaining a healthy defense relationship helps us advance human rights objectives.

- The human rights issue is particularly important to the Defense Department because it is the one issue which prevents us from developing the defense relationship to its maximum potential. We have made this point repeatedly to our defense counterparts in Indonesia. At the same time, however, human rights is not, and should not, be the defining issue in our defense relationship, any more than it should be in our overall bilateral relationship.

- It is unrealistic to assume that any US policies or actions taken toward the Indonesian military will produce quantifiable changes in the military's behavior. We believe, however, that over time, we have influenced and will continue to influence human rights improvements through dialogue, access, and most importantly, training.

- All forms of training that we can provide to members of the Indonesian armed forces expose Indonesian service members to the world's model of military professionalism and respect for civilian control and respect for human rights.

- We believe professionalizing the Indonesian armed forces will help reduce human rights abuses by the military, a view that is shared by human rights activists.

BACKGROUND

IMET

- IMET International Military Exchange and Training is an instrument of national security and foreign policy-a key component of U.S. security assistance funded by the DoS that provides U.S. training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations.

- Expanded IMET (E-IMET) courses focus on topics such as military justice and resource management; it also may include participation by civilians.

JCET

- Joint combined Exchange Training is designed to train U.S. Special Operations Forces military personnel. JCETs trains U.S. SOF overseas by having them train with foreign militaries.

- Funding comes from the combatant CINC's operations and maintenance budget as authorized by Section 2011 of Title 10.

- The DoD reports to Congress annually the expenses related to the training of Special Operations Forces with friendly foreign forces per section 2011 of Title 10, United States Code called "Report on Training of Special Operations Forces."

- The Report is published the first of every April since FY 1993. The last report, FY 96, was the first unclassified report.

TOTAL U.S. EXPENSES FOR JCETS WORLDWIDE: $18,5444,000.
TOTAL U.S. EXPENDITURES IN INDO: $111,000.
TOTAL WORLDWIDE EXERCISES: 279
TOTAL INDO. EXERCISES: 10
TOTAL WORLDWIDE HOST NATION PERSONNEL TRAINED: 15,029
TOTAL INDO. PERSONNEL TRAINED: 838

INDONESIAN UNITS TRAINED AND TYPE OF TRAINING:
KOPASSUS-Headquarters, Special Forces Command
Sniper (Aug 93)
Demolition's and Air Operations (Sep 93)
Close Quarters Combat/Medical Lifesaver and Marksmanship (Jan 94)
Pathfinder/Aviation operations (May 94)
Air Operations/Airdrop Ops (May 94)
Parachute Ops/Advanced Sniper Techniques (Feb 95)
Parachute/EOD support for VIP protection (Aug 95)
Maritime ops (Jun 95) (Aug 96)
Peacekeeping Ops Subject Matter Expert Exchange (Sep 95)
Peacekeeping Ops (Oct 95)
Air Assault Leaders Course (May 96)
Special Reconnaissance Training Aug 96) (Nov 97)
Psyops Training (Dec 96)
Parachute Training (Feb 97)
Mortar Training (Mar 97)
Demolitions/EOD/NBC/Sapper (Aug 97)
Reconnaissance patrolling/Parachute jumpmaster training (June 97)

KISTRAD-The Army Stragegic Command
Close Quarters Combat (Aug 92)
Sniper (Aug 93)
Reconnaissance patrolling/Parachute jumpmaster training (June 97)
KODAM JAYA-Jakarta Area Military Command
Psyops Training (Dec 96)
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (Nov 97)
KOPASKASAU-Air Force Special Forces
Maritime ops (Aug 96)
Parachute/Jump Clearing Team Training (Sep 97)
PUSDIKIF-Infantry Training Center
Sniper (Aug 93)
PASPAMPRES-Presidential Security Guards
Close Quarters Combat/Medical Lifesaver and Marksmanship (Jan 94)
Parachute/EOD support for VIP protection (Aug 95)
PENERBAD-Army Aviation Squad
Pathfinder/Aviation operations (May 94)
Air Assault Leaders Course (May 96)

Source: DASD ASIA PACIFIC (INDONESIA COUNTRY DIRECTOR), DASD SOLIC (Special Operations)
A/O: (b)(6) OASD (PA): DDI, USMC, (b)(6)

Maritime ops (Aug 96)
Parachute/Jump Clearing Team Training (Sep 97)
PUSDIKIF-Infantry Training Center
Sniper (Aug 93)
PASPAMPRES-Presidential Security Guards
Close Quarters Combat/Medical Lifesaver and Marksmanship (Jan 94)
Parachute/EOD support for VIP protection (Aug 95)
PENERBAD-Army Aviation Squad
Pathfinder/Aviation operations (May 94)
Air Assault Leaders Course (May 96)

Source: DASD ASIA PACIFIC (INDONESIA COUNTRY DIRECTOR), DASD SOLIC (Special Operations)
A/O: (b)(6) OASD (PA): DDI, USMC, (b)(6)

DSCA SEA

d MARR R32

CORRECTED COPY

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL # of pages ▸ 4

(b)(6)

Dept./Agency PM, DAS (b)(6)

(b)(6) Fax #

NSN 7540 01 317 7368 5099 101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

TOPIC: INDONESIA – EAST TIMOR

A. BACKGROUND:

As a result of the human rights abuses in East Timor by Indonesian military personnel, Section 599H of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1993, approved 6 Oct 92, prohibited IMET funding for Indonesia due to human rights abuses in the East Timor region of the country. This legislation remained through the FY95 legislation. The IMET program was reinstated in FY96 with the program being limited to Expanded-IMET (E-IMET) only. The limitation for E-IMET training continues to be legislatively mandated. Expanded-IMET (E-IMET) is to emphasize resource management, military justice systems, codes of conduct, civilian control of the military and the protection of human rights.

Additionally, FY95 legislative restrictions contained in Section 582 of the FY95 Foreign Operations and Appropriations bill (P.L. 103-306) prohibited the sale of small or light arms and crowd control equipment to Indonesia until SecState certifies human rights progress in country. These restrictions were not incorporated into the FY96 legislation; however, the Administration maintained these restrictions as policy. The following language has been incorporated into the FY98 Foreign Operations Appropriations and Export Financing Act as Section 571:

"In any agreement for the sale, transfer, or licensing of any lethal equipment or helicopter for Indonesia entered into by the United States pursuant to the authority of the Act or any other Act, the agreement shall state that the United States expects that the items will not be used in East Timor: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be construed to limit Indonesia's inherent right to legitimate self-defense as recognized under the United Nations charter and international law."

B. ADMINISTRATION POSITION

1. The Administration supports the prohibition of sales of light arms and crowd control equipment to Indonesia and have established this principle as U.S. policy. However, the Administration opposed the current language in Section 571 of FY98 Foreign Operations Appropriations and Export Financing Act.

C: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. Do you support the current language in Section 571 of FY98 Foreign Operations Appropriations and Export Financing Act?

Although the Administration objected to this legislative language when it was introduced, the Administration will carry out the language as enacted in the FY98 Foreign Operations Appropriations and Export Financing Act. As previously discussed, U.S. interests in Indonesia are best promoted through continued engagement with Indonesia, and not through additional restrictions. The current language has resulted in the Government of Indonesia looking elsewhere (Russia) for military equipment without restrictions, thereby lessening the potential for the U.S. to influence the GOI conduct and attitude. Continued restrictions by the U.S. towards the GOI may hasten Indonesia to seek military equipment, training and services elsewhere, and may have a negative impact on the future military-to-military relationship with Indonesia.

Lot 00D257 Box 9 "Indo MARR Mil + Defense" 1998

TOPIC: INDONESIA – International Military Education and Training (IMET) SUMMARY

A. BACKGROUND:

All figures are in $M.

	FY 93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	(Proj) FY99
IMET	0*	0	0	.577	.105**	.4	.4

Indonesia is currently a cash customer. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) was suspended 1 Oct 92 as a result of human rights abuses in the East Timor region of the country. The program was reinstated in FY96 with an allocation of $600K for Expanded-IMET (E-IMET) courses only. Section 599H of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1993, approved 6 Oct 92, prohibited IMET funding for Indonesia due to human rights abuses in the East Timor region of the country. The limitation for E-IMET training only continues to be legislatively mandated.

We currently have under consideration a request for training to include Parachutist, Ranger, Airborne, Special Forces Combat Diver, PsyOps, etc for about 8 students. Indonesian national funds will pay for the training valued at $190K. Although this training does not violate current law or policy, State is concerned about the implications of moving forward with this type of training in view of the current human rights situation in Indonesia, and has been "reviewing" this request since October 1997.

The proposed sale of F-16A/B aircraft from Pakistan developed into a significant controversy which contributed to Indonesia's decision to reject E-IMET. In Jul 95, State Department advised Indonesia of the availability of F-16A/B aircraft from Pakistan assets. Initial consultations with the Hill began in Apr/May 96 and continued through Aug 96. During the Aug 96 discussions, staff members indicated that the timing for a Congressional notification of F-16s in Aug/Sep 96 was not good due to late July political unrest in Jakarta. The Administration continued to defer informal or formal notification of this sale. The potential sale was included in the 1997 JAVITS report to Congress. Although the Administration decided to defer notification, the Administration was adamant that this was not an indication of the lessening of the its resolve to consummate the sale. Finally, in May 97, President Soeharto advised President Clinton that Indonesia wished to withdraw the offer to purchase the Pakistani F-16A/B aircraft. President Soeharto's rationale for withdrawing the offer to purchase the F-16 aircraft was because of the continued negative discussions surrounding the potential sale. Additionally, President Soeharto advised the Administration that removing the F-16A/B purchase by the Government of Indonesia from discussion may remove an impediment in U.S.-Indonesia relationship.

B. ADMINISTRATION POSITION

1. The Administration continues to seek ways to maintain military-to-military relationships through exercises, ship exchanges, and FMS training. It is through these programs that Indonesia can experience the U.S. doctrine and understand the value of and importance of human rights. Although IMET funding has been restricted to E-IMET only, State and DOD representatives have discussed the merits of restoring full IMET to Indonesia with the Hill.

C: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. What is the current rationale for moving forward with full IMET for the Indonesians in view of their human rights record?

The decision to propose full IMET training for Indonesia is currently being discussed within the Administration. Although, human rights is always a major factor in our decision to engage foreign governments, it can also be argued that our engagement with the Indonesian military serves a variety of American national objectives. Indonesia is increasingly important to U.S. security, political, and economic interests. Given its large Muslim population and leadership role in the ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations, Indonesia is influential both regionally and globally. It is also geostrategically important, located midway between Japan and the Persian Gulf and situated on critical sea lanes and straits. As we continue to look hard at our military deployments globally, military cooperation with key countries such as Indonesia becomes a more and more important element in our ability to project power and influence.

2. What are the advantages for reinstatement of "full" IMET for Indonesia?

I am firmly convinced that U.S. engagement with the Indonesian military, through the IMET program as well as other military activities, enhances rather than diminishes our ability to positively influence Indonesia's human rights policies and behavior. Through interaction with Indonesian defense personnel--in training and education, policy dialogue, and other forms of defense cooperation--we promote professionalism and demonstrate proper human rights practices. These are important democratic attributes we cannot showcase by distancing ourselves. The IMET program, for example, is regarded by Indonesian human rights activists as an invaluable means of improving the human rights performance of the military.

3. Since the Administration has allocated $400K in FY98 and FY99 for Indonesian IMET, are there indications that the Government of Indonesia (GOI) will participate in E-IMET?

In May 97 Indonesian President Soeharto advised President Clinton that Indonesia wished to withdraw from the IMET program in order to remove any obstacles in the U.S.– Indonesia relationship. Although President Soeharto withdrew Indonesia from the I-MET program, $400,000 was allocated in FY98 and an equal amount was requested for FY99, in case the GOI decides to participate in E-IMET. During the Secretary of Defense visit to Indonesia, Secretary Cohen stressed that their participation in E-IMET was essential to Congress' re-instatement of "full" IMET for the GOI. However, if the money is not used by Indonesia, it will be reallocated to other countries during the end-of-year reallocation process.

D: FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Senior Official: DSAA Director, LTG Michael Davison, Jr., USA (b)(6)
Author: (b)(6)
Date of Issue Paper:: 17 February 1998

PACOM

R8a

1. THESE ARE THE USCINCPAC TITLE 10 (SECTION 401) HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE (HCA) PROGRAM NOMINATIONS FOR PROJECTS TO BE EXECUTED IN THIS THEATER DURING FY99. THE FOLLOWING NOMINATIONS ARE SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL. DETAILS OF EACH PROJECT ARE FORMATTED AS OUTLINED BELOW:

A. PRIORITY NUMBER.
B. PROJECT TITLE.
C. RECIPIENT COUNTRY.
D. LOCATION OF ACTIVITY.
E. TYPE AND DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY.
F. INCLUSIVE DATES OF ACTIVITY.
G. UNIT DESIGNATION(S) AND TOTAL NUMBER OF U. S FORCES PARTICIPATING.
H. UNITED STATES DOLLAR COST OF CONSUMABLES.
I. JUSTIFICATION ON HOW ACTIVITY SERVES THE INTERESTS OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND HOST COUNTRY; HOW ACTIVITY PROMOTES SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL SKILLS OF UNITED STATES MILITARY MEMBERS.
J. COUNTRY TEAM COORDINATION.
K. PROJECT POINT OF CONTACT (POC).

2. USCINCPAC FY99 HCA PROJECT NOMINATIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. PRIORITY ONE
B. INDUSA ENGINEER EX 99
C. INDONESIA (EAP)
D. ASSEM BAGUS, ISLAND OF JAVA.
E. CONSTRUCT/REPAIR/IMPROVE ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE, AS WELL AS CONSTRUCT/RENOVATE MEDICAL CLINIC, VILLAGE SCHOOL, AND VILLAGE TOWN HALL. PROVIDE MEDICAL CIVIC ACTION (MEDCAP) PROJECT IN THE TOWN SURROUNDING KARONG TEKOK.
F. 1ST QUARTER FY99
G. (MARFORPAC) III MEF MARINE ENGINEER FORCES. APPROXIMATELY 40 MARINE ENGINEERS.
H. $150,000
I. JUSTIFICATION:

(1) THE HCA PROJECT WILL HELP SUPPORT USCINCPAC'S COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY BY HELPING DEVELOP CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS WITH ASSEM BAGUS TOWN SURROUNDING THE INDONESIAN MARINE BASE AT KARONG TEKOK. THIS PROJECT WILL ALSO DEMONSTRATE THE POSITIVE USE OF MILITARY ENGINEERS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND GOOD CIVIL RELATIONS.

(2) THE HCA PROJECTS WILL ASSIST THE READINESS OF III MEF BY TRAINING THEM IN THE FOLLOWING JMETL'S:

OP 1.1 CONDUCT OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT
OP 1.1.5 ASSIST HOST NATION IN POPULACE AND RESOURCE CONTROL.

OP 4.3 PROVIDE FOR MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT IN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
OP 4.5 MANAGE LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
OP 4.7 PROVIDE POLITICO-MILITARY SUPPORT TO OTHER NATIONS, GROUPS, AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
OP 5.8 PROVIDE PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
THESE PROJECTS INVOLVE ROAD CONSTRUCTION, IMPROVEMENT AND REPAIR, TO INCLUDE NON-STANDARD BRIDGE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION, AS WELL AS CONCRETE, MASONRY, PLUMBING, AND ELECTRICAL WORK AT SUCH SCALE AS TO PROVIDE EXCELLENT TRAINING VALUE TO MARINE ENGINEER PERSONNEL.
J. COUNTRY TEAM COORDINATION:
(1) CONCURRENCE FOR HCA PROJECT ASSESSMENTS HAS BEEN APPROVED BY USDAO INDONESIA.
(2) HCA PROJECTS WILL BE CONDUCTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH INDUSA ENGINEER EX 99
(3) DETAILED PLAN WILL BE COMPLETED DURING A MEDCAP AND ENGINEER SURVEY THAT WILL BE CONDUCTED FROM 12-24 APRIL 98/99. ?
K. POINT OF CONTACT: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

A. PRIORITY TWO
B. EXERCISE COOPERATION AFLOAT AND EXERCISE TRAINING; CARAT (MEDCAP/ENCAP'S)
EHP
C. INDONESIA
D. VILLAGES VIC OF SURABAYA AND CILACAP, SUBURBS OF JAKARTA.
E. MEDICAL/DENTAL/VETERINARY/ENGINEERING CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS MEDCAP(S) FOR 2000-4000 PATIENTS AND CONSTRUCTION OF CLASSROOM/CLINIC/TOWN MEETING HALL BUILDING TO BE CONDUCTED WITH ASSISTANCE FROM INDONESIAN NAVY/MARINE CORPS (IDN/IDMC).
F. 8-24 JUN 99
G. (PACFLT) COMMANDER TASK FORCE 712 WITH FOUR SHIPS, A 350 MAN USMC LANDING FORCE, SEABEES, EOD, P-3C'S, AND SH-60B'S WILL CONTRIBUTE ABOUT 8 USN/USMC MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND 10-15 USN SEABEE'S. ANTICIPATE ASSISTANCE FROM INDONESIAN DOCTORS, NURSES, AND ENGINEERS.
H. $40,000 ($20,000 FOR ENCAP(S) AND $10,000 EACH FOR MEDCAP(S) AND VETCAP(S))
I. JUSTIFICATION:
(1) CARAT IS A SERIES OF BILATERAL EXERCISES BETWEEN THE USN/USMC AND COUNTERPARTS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES CREATED TO SUPPORT USCINCPAC'S PEACETIME STRATEGY OF PREVENTIVE DEFENSE. PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES (INCLUDING INDONESIA) CONSIDER CARAT ONE OF THEIR MOST IMPORTANT BILATERAL TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES. WITH THE CURRENT ASIAN FINANCIAL SITUATION EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, COMBINED MEDCAPS AND ENCAPS PROVIDE A LOW COST/HIGH YIELD VENUE FOR COOPERATION, ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY

AND CIVILIANS, AND TRAINING FOR USN/USMC MEDICAL PERSONNEL, USN SEABEE'S, USMC ENGINEERS, AND THEIR COUNTERPARTS.

(2) MEDICAL PERSONNEL, SEABEE'S AND ENGINEERS WILL BE PROMOTING THEIR TIES WITH COUNTERPARTS, AND PRACTICING/IMPROVING THEIR MEDICAL OR ENGINEERING SKILLS IN REMOTE/AUSTERE ENVIRONMENTS. MEDICAL PERSONNEL (DOCTORS, DENTISTS, AND/OR VETERINARIANS) WILL BE TREATING DISEASES/INJURIES NOT NORMALLY EXPERIENCED IN THE UNITED STATES. SEABEE'S AND ENGINEERS WILL DEMONSTRATE THEIR ABILITY TO PLAN AND EXECUTE SMALL SCALE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS AND COULD ENCOUNTER NEW BUILDING MATERIALS AND METHODS.

(3) ACTIVITY PROPOSED CONFORMS TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AND APPLICABLE REGULATIONS.

J. COUNTRY TEAM COORDINATION

(1) CONCEPT AND REQUIREMENT FOR PROJECTS AGREED BY USDAO JAKARTA (b)(6) ASS'T NAVAL ATTACHE). ACTUAL DETAILED PROJECT PROPOSALS TO FOLLOW FURTHER COORDINATION WITH IDN/IDMC.

(2) PROPOSED HCA ACTIVITIES COMPLEMENT, BUT DO NOT DUPLICATE OR OTHERWISE CONFLICT WITH, ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL PROGRAMS OF OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.

K. POINTS OF CONTACT:

(1) CLWP N33 (b)(6) (b)(6) FY, USN, CARAT COORDINATOR (b)(6) (b)(6) US NAVAL ATTACHE OR (b)(6) (b)(6) USMC, ASS'T NAVAL ATTACHE, (b)(6)

A. PRIORITY THREE (FY99)

B. BALANCE PISTON 99

C. PHILIPPINES (EAP)

D. DEPLOYMENT WILL TARGET RURAL/REMOTE LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE PHILIPPINES.

E. A MEDICAL TRAINING EVENT FOCUSING ON CROSS-TRAINING WITH HOST NATION FORCES WITH RESPECT TO PROVIDING MEDICAL CIVIC ASSISTANCE TO THE LOCAL POPULACE.

F. 4TH QTR FY 99

NON-Responsive to FOIA request. Section not reviewed

encl (24)

VZCZCCCR405
OTASZYUW RUEAHIC3552 2642050-SSSS--RHHMUNA.
ZNY SSSSS
O 211800Z SEP 99 PSN 844803H27
FM CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI //APOP//
TO RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J4/CAT/CDO//
RUEASCO/CDR25THINFDIVL SCHOFIELD BKS HI //APVG-PT//
RUEARSK/CDRUSARAK FT RICHARDSON AK//APVR-RPTM//
RUATJHA/CDRUSARJ9THTAACOM CP ZAMA JA//APAJ-GC//
INFO RUEADWD/HQ DA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-ODU/AOC//
RUHBABA/CG III MEF//G3//
RUHVPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO/CAT//
RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3/CAT//
RUHEHMS/COMMARFORPAC//G3/CAT//
RUHHHGA/ALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK//J3//
RUEAHIC/TAG HI HONOLULU HI//
RUEARSL/TAG AK ANCHORAGE AK//
RUNGCAZ/TAG GU AGANA GU//
RUEAFDC/CDRICORPS FT LEWIS WA//G3//
RUEASRB/CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP//
RUDHAAA/CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//DCSOPS//
RUHBABA/COMUSF INTERFET//
RUEAHIC/CDR9THRSC FT SHAFTER HI//APIX//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP/APCS//APOP-PLEX//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APPE/APLG/
RHHJRAP/CDRUSARPAC INTEL FT SHAFTER HI//APIN//
RUEAUSA/CDR USACAF//
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJECT: SITREP/USARPAC/21/09/005/SEP
PERIOD/201600ZSEP99/TO:211600ZSEP99/ASOF:211800ZSEP99//
1. (S)

b1

2. (S)

b1

b1

3. (S) b1

A. (S) b1

b1

b1

B. (S) b1

b1

b1

C. (S) b1

b1

D. (U) PIR. NO CHANGE

E. (S) b1

F. (U) RFIS. NO CHANGE

4. (U) b2

A. (U) b2

(1) (U) b2

b2

b2

(2) (U) b2

b2

b2

(3) (U) b2

b2

(4) (U) b2

(A) (U) b2

b2

b2

(B) (U) b2

b2

b2

(C) (U) b2

b2

(D) (U) b2

(E) (U) b2

b2

(F) (U) b2

b2

B. (U) b2

c. (U) b2

(1). (U) b2

b2

(2). (U) b2

b2

5. (U) b2

A. (U) b2

(1) (U) b2

b2

(2) (U) b2

b2

(3) (U) b2

b2

B. (U) b2

b2

6. (U) b2

A. (U) b2

b2

B. (U) b2

b2

7. (U) b2

8. (U) b2

b2

b2

9. (U) b2

A. (U) b2

b2

B. (U) b2

b2

C. (U) b2

b2

b2

D. b2

b2

b2

10. (U) b2

b2

b2

11. (U) b2

A. (U)

(1) (U) b2

b2

(2) ~~(S)~~ b1

b1

(A) ~~(S)~~ b1

b1

(B) ~~(S)~~ b1

b1

(3) ~~(S)~~ b1

b1

(A) (S) b1

b1

12. (S) b1

b1

DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECL: 21 SEP 2001
SOURCE: 7-8 SEP 99
BT
#3552

NNNN

4

O 221800Z SEP 99 PSN 850620H21rom: zGCCS-P
nccs1@jots1.cc.pacom.smil.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, September 22, 1999 21:43
Subject: O 221800Z SEP 99 CDR USARPAC FT SITREP/USARPAC/22/09/006/SEP

VZCZCCCR760
OTASZYUW RUEAHIC3574 2652031-SSSS--RHHMUNA.
ZNY SSSSS
O 221800Z SEP 99 PSN 850620H21
FM CDR USARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP//
TO RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J4/CAT/CDO//
RUEASCO/CDR25THINFDIV L SCHOFIELD BKS HI//APVG-PT//
RUEARSK/CDRUSARAK FT RICHARDSON AK//APVR-RPTM//
RUATJHA/CDRUSARJ9THTAACOM CP ZAMA JA//APAJ-GC//
INFO RUEADWD/HQ DA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-ODU/AOC/SAIS-ZA//
RUHBABA/CG III MEF//G3//
RUHVPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO/CAT//
RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3/CAT//
RUHEHMS/COMMARFORPAC//G3/CAT//
RUWMHGA/ALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK//J3//
RUEAHIC/TAG HI HONOLULU HI//
RUEARSL/TAG AK ANCHORAGE AK//
RUNGCAZ/TAG GU AGANA GU//
RUEAFDC/CDRICORPS FT LEWIS WA//G3/G6//
RUEASRB/CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP//
RUDHAAA/CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//DCSOPS//
RUHBABA/COMUSF INTERFET//
RUEAHIC/CDR9THRSC FT SHAFTER HI//APIX//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP/APCS//APOP-PLEX//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APPE/APLG/
RHHJRAP/CDRUSARPAC INTEL FT SHAFTER HI//APIN//
RUHHJIA/CDR USACAP//
RUERUCD/CDRUSASC FT HUACHUCA AZ//AFSC-OP//
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJECT: SITREP/USARPAC/22/09/006/SEP

PERIOD/211600ZSEP99/TO:221600ZSEP99/ASOF:221800ZSEP99//

1. (U) GENERAL SITUATION.

A. (S) b1

b1

b1

B. (S) b1

b1

b1

2. (S) b1

b1

3. (U) INTELLIGENCE-RECON. ENEMY SITUATION

A. (S) b1

b1

b1

B. (S) b1

b1

C. (S) b1

b1

b1

D. (U) PIR (NO CHANGE)

E. (S) b1

F. (U) RFIS (NEW)

(1). WHAT IS THE STATUS OF ALL NGOS AND PVOS OPERATING IN EAST TIMOR? WHO ARE THEY? NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL? LOCATION?

4. (U) b2

A. (U) b2

(1) (U) b2

b2

(2) (U) b2

6

b2

b2

(3) (U) b2

(A) b2

b2

b2

(B) b2

b2

b2

(C) (U) b2

b2

B. (U) b2

C. (U) b2

(1) (U) b2

b2

(2) (U) b2

b2

5. (U) b2

A. (U) b2

(1) (U) b2

(2) (U) b2

b2

(3) (U) b2

b2

(4) (U) b2

b2

(5) (U) b2

b2

(6) ~~(S)~~ b1

b1

b1

(7) ~~(S)~~ b1

b1

(8) ~~(S)~~ b1

b1

b1

(9) ~~(S)~~ b1

b1

(10) ~~(S)~~ b1

b1

B. (U) b2

(1) (U) b2

b2

(2) b2

b2

(3) b2

6. (U) PERSONNEL. NSTR

7. (U) SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL MILITARY DIPLOMATIC EVENTS. NSTR

8. (U) RESOURCE MANAGEMENT. NSTR

9. (U) b2

A. (U) b2

b2

B. (U) b2

7

b2

c. (U) b2

(1) (U) b2

b2

b2

(2) (U) b2

b2

10. (U) FORCE PROTECTION. NSTR

11. (U) ENGINEERS. NSTR

12. (S) b1

b1

DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECL: 21 SEP 2001
SOURCE: 7-8 SEP 99
BT
#3574

NNNN

8

VZCZCCCR223
OTASZYUW RUEAHIC3594 2662034-SSSS--RHHMUNA.
ZNY SSSSS
O 231800Z SEP 99 PSN 857045H29
FM CDR USARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP//
TO RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J4/CAT/CDO//
RUEASCO/CDR25THINFDIV L SCHOFIELD BKS HI//APVG-PT//
RUEARSK/CDRUSARAK FT RICHARDSON AK//APVR-RPTM//
RUATJHA/CDRUSARJ9THTAACOM CP ZAMA JA//APAJ-GC//
INFO RUEADWD/HQ DA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-ODU/AOC/SAIS-ZA//
RUHBABA/CG III MEF//G3//
RUHVPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO/CAT//
RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3/CAT//
RUHEHMS/COMMARFORPAC//G3/CAT//
RUWMHGA/ALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK//J3//
RUEAHIC/TAG HI HONOLULU HI//
RUEARSL/TAG AK ANCHORAGE AK//
RUNGCAZ/TAG GU AGANA GU//
RUEAFDC/CDRICORPS FT LEWIS WA//G3/G6//
RUEASRB/CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP//
RUDHAAA/CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//DCSOPS//
RUHBABA/COMUSF INTERFET//
RUEAHIC/CDR9THRSC FT SHAFTER HI//APIX//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP/APCS//APOP-PLEX//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APPE/APLG/
RHHJRAP/CDRUSARPAC INTEL FT SHAFTER HI//APIN//
RUHHJIA/CDR USACAP//
RUERUCD/CDRUSASC FT HUACHUCA AZ//AFSC-OP//
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJECT: SITREP/USARPAC/23/09/007/SEP

PERIOD/221600ZSEP99/TO:231600ZSEP99/ASOF:231800ZSEP99//

1.
A. (S) b1

b1

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES.
(1) (S) b1

b1

b1

(2) (S) b1

b1

b1

(3) (S) b1

b1

b1

2. (S) b1

b1

b1

b1

b1

3. (S) b1

A. (S) b1

b1

B. (U) PERCEIVED THREAT CAPABILITIES. NSTR

C. (U) MOST PROBABLE ENEMY COURSE OF ACTION. NSTR

D. (U) PIR (NO CHANGE)

E. (U) IR (NO CHANGE)

F. (U) RFIS (NO CHANGE)

4. (U) b2

A. (U) b2

B. (U) b2

(1) (U) b2

b2

b2

(2) (U) b2

b2

(3) (U) b2

b2

C. (U) b2

D. (U) b2

5. (U) b2

A. (S) b1

b1

B. (U) b2

b2

6. (U) PERSONNEL. NSTR.

7. (U) SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL MILITARY DIPLOMATIC EVENTS. NSTR

8. (U) RESOURCE MANAGEMENT. NSTR

9. (U) b2

A. (U) b2

b2

B. (U) b2

b2

C. (U) b2

D. (U)

(1) (U) b2

b2

(2) (U) b2

b2

10. (U) FORCE PROTECTION. NSTR

11. (U) ENGINEERS. NSTR

12. (S) b1

b1

BT
#3594

NNNN

VZCZCCCR078
OTASZYUW RUEAHIC3623 2682223-SSSS--RHHMUNA.
ZNY SSSSS
O 252144Z SEP 99 PSN 869066H35
FM CDR USARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP//
TO RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J4/CAT/CDO//
RUEASCO/CDR25THINFDIV L SCHOFIELD BKS HI//APVG-PT//
RUEARSK/CDRUSARAK FT RICHARDSON AK//APVR-RPTM//
RUATJHA/CDRUSARJ9THTAACOM CP ZAMA JA//APAJ-GC//
INFO RUEADWD/HQ DA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-ODU/AOC/SAIS-ZA//
RUHBABA/CG III MEF//G3//
RUHVPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO/CAT//
RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3/CAT//
RUHEHMS/COMMARFORPAC//G3/CAT//
RUWMHGA/ALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK//J3//
RUEAHIC/TAG HI HONOLULU HI//
RUEARSL/TAG AK ANCHORAGE AK//
RUNGCAZ/TAG GU AGANA GU//
RUEAFDC/CDRICORPS FT LEWIS WA//G3/G6//
RUEASRB/CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP//
RUDHAAA/CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//DCSOPS//
RUHBABA/COMUSF INTERFET//
RUEAHIC/CDR9THRSC FT SHAFTER HI//APIX//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP/APCS//APOP-PLEX//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APPE/APLG/
RHHJRAP/CDRUSARPAC INTEL FT SHAFTER HI//APIN//
RUHHJIA/CDR USACAP//
RUERUCD/CDRUSASC FT HUACHUCA AZ//AFSC-OP//
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJECT: SITREP/USARPAC/25/09/009/SEP

PERIOD/241600ZSEP99/TO:251600ZSEP99/ASOF:251800ZSEP99//

1. (U) SITUATION.

A. (S) b1

b1

b1

b1

B. (U) SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES.

(1) (S) b1

b1

b1

(2) (S) b1

b1

b1

(3) (S) b1

b1

b1

(A)(S)(U) b1

(B)(S)(U)

12

b1

2. (S) b1

b1

3. (U) INTELLIGENCE-RECON.

A. (S) b1

b1

b1

B. (S) b1

b1

b1

C. (S) b1

b1

b1

D. (U) PIR (NO CHANGE)

E. (U) IR (NO CHANGE)

F. (U) RFIS (NO CHANGE)

4. (U) b2

A. (U) b2

B. (U)

(1) (U) b2

b2

(2) (U) b2

b2

(3) (U) b2

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

A. (S) b1

b1

b1

B. (S) b1

b1

6. (U) PERSONNEL. NSTR.

7. (U) SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL MILITARY DIPLOMATIC EVENTS. NSTR

8. (U) RESOURCE MANAGEMENT. NSTR

9. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NSTR

10. (U) FORCE PROTECTION. NSTR

11. (U) ENGINEERS. NSTR

12. (S) b1

b1

b1

BT
#3623

NNNN

14

VZCZCCCR096
OTASZYUW RUEAHIC3628 2692036-SSSS-RHHMUNA.
ZNY SSSSS
O 260602Z SEP 99 PSN 871985H38
FM CDR USARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP//
TO RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J4/CAT/CDO//
RUEASCO/CDR25THINFDIV L SCHOFIELD BKS HI//APVG-PT//
RUEARSK/CDRUSARAK FT RICHARDSON AK//APVR-RPTM//
RUATJHA/CDRUSARJ9THTAACOM CP ZAMA JA//APAJ-GC//
INFO RUEADWD/HQ DA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-ODU/AOC/SAIS-ZA//
RUHBABA/CG III MEF//G3//
RUHVPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO/CAT//
RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3/CAT//
RUHEHMS/COMMARFORPAC//G3/CAT//
RUWMHGA/ALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK//J3//
RUEAHIC/TAG HI HONOLULU HI//
RUEARSL/TAG AK ANCHORAGE AK//
RUNGCAZ/TAG GU AGANA GU//
RUEAFDC/CDRICORPS FT LEWIS WA//G3/G6//
RUEASRB/CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP//
RUDHAAA/CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//DCSOPS//
RUHBABA/COMUSF INTERFET//
RUEAHIC/CDR9THRSC FT SHAFTER HI//APIX//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP/APCS//APOP-PLEX//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APPE/APLG/
RHHJRAP/CDRUSARPAC INTEL FT SHAFTER HI//APIN//
RUHHJIA/CDR USACAP//
RUERUCD/CDRUSASC FT HUACHUCA AZ//AFSC-OP//
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJECT: SITREP/USARPAC/26/09/010/SEP

PERIOD/251600ZSEP99/TO:261600ZSEP99/ASOF:261800ZSEP99//
1. (S) b1
A. (S) b1

b1

B. (U) b2
(A) (U) b2
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

b2

(B) (U) b2
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

b2

b2

2. (S) b1

b1

15

b1

3. (S) b1
A. (S) b1

b1

b1
B. (S) b1
b1
b1
C. (S) b1
b1
b1

D. (U) PIR (NO CHANGE)
E. (U) IR (NO CHANGE)
F. (U) RFIS (NO CHANGE)

4. (U) LOGISTICS.
A. (U) LOGISTICS ISSUES BEING WORKED. OPERATION REMAINS ON TRACK.
B. (U) MEDICAL. OPERATION REMAINS ON TRACK.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.
A. (S) b1
b1
B. (S) b1

6. (U)
7. (U)
8. (U) b2
b2
9. (U)
10. (U) b2
11. (U)
12. (U) b2
b2

13. (S) b1
14. (S) b1
b1

BT
#3628

16

NNNN

encl (29)

SUBJECT: SITREP/USARPAC/27/09/011/SEP

PERIOD/261600ZSEP99/TO:271600ZSEP99/ASOF:271800ZSEP99//

1. (S) b1

b1

b1

2. (S) b1

b1

3. (S) b1

A. (S) b1

b1

b1

B. (S) b1

b1

C. (S) b1

b1

b1

D. (U) PIR (NO CHANGE)

E. (U) IR (NO CHANGE)

F. (U) RFIS (NO CHANGE)

4. (U) b2

A. (U) b2

b2

b2

B. (U) b2

b2

18

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

A. (S) b1

b1

B. (S) b1

6. (U) PERSONNEL. NSTR.

7. (U) SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL MILITARY DIPLOMATIC EVENTS. NSTR.

8. (U) RESOURCE MANAGEMENT. NSTR.

9. (U) b2

b2

10. (U) b2

b2

11. (U) ENGINEERS. NSTR.

12. (U) SJA. NSTR

13. (S) b1

14. (S) b1

b1

b1

19

VZCZCCCR341
OTASZYUW RUEAHIC3643 2711852-~~SSSS~~-RHHMUNA.
ZNY ~~SSSSS~~
O 281600Z SEP 99 PSN 882406H28
FM CDR USARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP//
TO RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J4/CAT/CDO//
RUEASCO/CDR25THINFDIV L SCHOFIELD BKS HI//APVG-PT//
RUEARSK/CDRUSARAK FT RICHARDSON AK//APVR-RPTM//
RUATJHA/CDRUSARJ9THTAACOM CP ZAMA JA//APAJ-GC//
INFO RUEADWD/HQ DA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-ODU/AOC/SAIS-ZA//
RUHBABA/CG III MEF//G3//
RUHVPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO/CAT//
RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3/CAT//
RUHEHMS/COMMARFORPAC//G3/CAT//
RUWMHGA/ALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK//J3//
RUEAHIC/TAG HI HONOLULU HI//
RUEARSL/TAG AK ANCHORAGE AK//
RUNGCAZ/TAG GU AGANA GU//
RUEAFDC/CDRICORPS FT LEWIS WA//G3/G6//
RUEASRB/CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP//
RUDHAAA/CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//DCSOPS//
RUHBABA/COMUSF INTERFET//
RUEAHIC/CDR9THRSC FT SHAFTER HI//APIX//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP/APCS//APOP-PLEX//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APPE/APLG/
RHHJRAP/CDRUSARPAC INTEL FT SHAFTER HI//APIN//
RUHHJIA/CDR USACAP//
RUERUCD/CDRUSASC FT HUACHUCA AZ//AFSC-OP//
RUATJHA/CDR500THMIGP CP ZAMA JA//
BT
~~S E C R E T~~
SUBJECT: SITREP/USARPAC/28/09/012/SEP

PERIOD/271600ZSEP99/TO:281600ZSEP99/ASOF:281800ZSEP99//

1. ~~(S)~~ b1

A. ~~(S)~~ b1

b1

B. ~~(S)~~ b1

(1) ~~(S)~~ b1

b1

20

(2) (S) b1

b1

2. (S) b1

b1

3. (S) b1

A. (S) b1

b1

B. (U) PERCEIVED THREAT CAPABILITIES. NSTR.
C. (U) MOST PROBABLE ENEMY COURSE OF ACTION. NSTR.
D. (U) PIR (NO CHANGE)
E. (U) IR (NO CHANGE)
F. (U) RFIS (NO CHANGE)

4. (U) b2

b2

5. (S) b1

A. (S) b1

b1

(1) (S) b1

(2) (S) b1

b1

(3) (S) b1

b1

B. (U) NEXT 24 HOURS: NSTR.

6. (U) PERSONNEL. NSTR.

7. (U) SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL MILITARY DIPLOMATIC EVENTS. NSTR.

8. (U) RESOURCE MANAGEMENT. NSTR.

9. (U) b2

A. (U) b2

b2

b2

B. (U) b2

b2

b2

C. (U) b2

b2

b2

b2

10. (U) b2

b2

11. (U) ENGINEERS. NSTR.

12. (U) SJA. NSTR

13. (U) COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. OPERATION REMAINS ON TRACK

14. (S) b1

b1

BT
#3643

NNNN

22

2008-F-06 (BRAD SIMPSON)

ENCLOSURE (1):

☐ USCINCPAC SITREP 002, 17 SEP 99 (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

VZCZCCCR107

OATSZYUW RHHMMCC2482 2610346-SSSS--RHHMUNA RHHMUNS.

ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHMUNA4448 2610357

Z O 180357Z SEP 99 PSN 824083H25

FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//CAT//

TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC

RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J3//

RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//J3//

RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3//

RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ3//

RUCQSOC/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ3//

RUPEUNA/USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO//J3//

RUCUSTR/USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE//J3//

RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3//

RHHMHBA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3//

RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3//

RUHVPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO/CAT//

RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP//

RUHEHMS/COMMARFORPAC//G3//

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: _____
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

UNCLASSIFIED

RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//USFK J3//

RUHHHGA/HQ ALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK

RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//USFJ J3//

RHHMUNS/COMSOCPAC HONOLULU HI

RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI

RUHPOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUHPQUA/COMTHIRDFLT

RUHBABA/CG III MEF//G3/G5//

RHOAMOB/CJTF TSO

RUWFEAA/COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N3//

RHWIDIL/COMVAQWINGPAC WHIDBEY ISLAND WA

RHDIAAA/HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//DO/BSD//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEJDCA/DISA WASHINGTON DC

RUEADLA/DLA FT BELVOIR VA

RUEANQA/NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD//IAWM//

RUEANQC/NIMA RESTON VA//COTP//

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//CAT//

BT

~~S-E-C-R-E-T-//N03500//~~

MSGID/SITREP/USCINCPAC/17/09/002/SEP//

ET99//

MSGID/ORDER/USCINCPAC//

REF/A/GENADMIN/USCINCPAC/110415ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//

REF/B/ORDER/USCINCPAC/312115ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//

REF/C/ORDER/USCINCPAC/312116ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//

REF/D/GENADMIN/USCINCSOC/071605ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//

REF/E/MSG/AUSTRALIAN CDF/080300ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//

REF/F/ORDER/USCINCPAC/100445ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//

REF/G/ORDER/USCINCPAC/280515ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//

REF/H/ORDER/USCINCPAC/010400ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//

REF/I/ORDER/USCINCPAC/040045ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//

UNCLASSIFIED

REF/J/ORDER/USCINCPAC/140530ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//

REF/K/DOC/CJCS/04 DEC 98/-/NOTAL//

REF/L/ORDER/CJCS/161825ZSEP99//

REF/M/MSG/USCINCPAC/170138ZSEP99//

AMPN/(S) REF A RESTRUCTURED PREVIOUS EXERCISE TEMPO BRAVE 99 INTO A REAL-WORLD OPERATIONAL PLANNING EVENT TO SUPPORT POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR. REFS B AND C ARE PLANNING DIRECTIVES FOR EXERCISE TEMPO BRAVE 99A (TB-99A, TEMPO BRAVE 99 RENAMED), A FOCUSED PLANNING EVOLUTION IN PREPARATION FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCE OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR. REF D IS REQUEST FOR USASOC TO DEPLOY PSYOP PLANNING TEAM TO PARTICIPATE IN TB-99A. REF E IS AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE FORCES (ADF) WARNING ORDER FOR OPERATION WARDEN, WHICH COVERS ADF INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN EAST TIMOR (INTERFET). REF F DIRECTS THE DEPLOYMENT OF A USPACOM PLANNING LIAISON TEAM TO AUSTRALIA ISO AUSTRALIAN EAST TIMOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING. REF G IS THE USCINCPAC EXORD TO POSITION FORCES IN THE TIMOR SEA AREA TO SUPPORT AUSTRALIAN NEO OPERATIONS IF REQUESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA. REF H MODIFIED THE FORCE LIST AND TASKING IN REF G. REF I ACTIVATES JOINT TASK FORCE TIMOR SEA OPERATIONS (JTF TSO) AND DIRECTS JTF TSO TO REMAIN WITHIN 72 HOURS OF CJTF-DESIGNATED MODLOC IN TIMOR SEA TO PROVIDE SUPPORT, IF REQUESTED. REF J IS USCINCPAC PREPARE TO DEPLOY ORDER. REF K IS CJCS MEMORANDUM (DEPLOYMENT HEALTH SURVEILLANCE AND READINESS), WHICH CONTAINS GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING PRE- AND POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH ASSESSMENTS. REF L IS EXECUTE ORDER. SECDEF HAS DIRECTED THE DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES AND EXECUTION OF OPERATIONS AS PART OF MULTINATIONAL FORCE OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR. REF M DEFINES PROCEDURES FOR AUSTRALIA TO REQUEST US FORCES.//

PERIOD170001Z/TO: 172359Z/AS OF 172359Z//

HEADING/OWN SITUATION//

5UNIT

/UNITDES /UNIT LOC /CMNTS

/USS MOBILE BAY /09-36S, 127-45E /MOD LOC ON STATION/

/USNS KILUEA /115-0S, 129-10E /MOD LOC ON STATION/

AMPN/(S) BGEN CASTELLAW, USMC ARR SYDNEY 16SEP99.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. (S) DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES IAW USCINCPAC EXECUTE ORDER HAS BEGUN. HAVE REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF THE US FORCES REQUESTED BY AUSTRALIAN INTERFET COMMANDER. BG CASTELLAW HAS ARRIVED IN SYDNEY AND USFORINTERFET IS OPERATING OUT OF THE AUSTRALIAN THEATER COMMAND IN SYDNEY. THE TERMS OF REFERENCE HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO BG CASTELLAW. THE TROJAN SPIRIT HAS BEEN DELAYED TILL D+ 10 AT THE REQUEST OF THE AUSTRALIAN FORCES. WILL COORDINATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THESE ASSETS WITH SUPPORTING CINCS.

2. (S) RELEASED EXORD FOR DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES TO CUSF INTERFET. CONTINUING TO ASSESS ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS SUBMITTED BY COMAST.

GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/

2. (S) EXPECT MULTI-NATIONAL DEPLOYMENT TO EAST TIMOR TO COMMENCE 20SEP99.

A. (S) DEFCON STATUS: PACOM REMAINS AT DEFCON 5

B. (U) CBR OPERATIONS

(1) (S) NUCLEAR: NSTR

(2) (S) CHEMICAL: NSTR

C. (S) GROUND SITUATION:

(1) (S) 1 X MSQ-126; TO ARR 19SEP99

(2) (S) 1 X INTEL AUGMENT TM

(3) (S) 1 X EP3; TO ARR 18SEP99

(4) (S) 1 X TROJAN SPIRIT - ON HOLD UFN

(5) (S) 1 X CMOC

(6) (S) 1 X LOG PLANNING CELL - IN PLACE

D. (S) NAVAL SITUATION: JTF TSO WITH USS MOBILE BAY AND USNS KILAUEA AT MODLOC IN EAST TIMOR SEA.

E. (S) AIR SITUATION: NSTR

F. (S) AIR RECONNAISSANCE: NSTR

G. (S) JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS: NSTR

H. (S) WEATHER: EAST TIMOR WILL BE PARTLY CLOUDY WITH LIGHT EAST TO SOUTHEAST WINDS, HIGHS WILL BE IN THE UPPER 80'S WITH LOWS NEAR 70 DEGREES.

GENTEXT/INTELLIGENCE/RECONNAISSANCE/

UNCLASSIFIED

3. (S) APPROXIMATELY 22,000 TNI/SECURITY FORCES ARE IN EAST TIMOR OR ARE IN THE PROCESS OF EVACUATING TO WEST TIMOR. TWENTY-FIVE INDONESIAN NAVAL (TNI-AL) PLATFORMS AND 11 AIRCRAFT ARE ASSIGNED TO THE EAST TIMOR AREA OF OPERATIONS. THREE AIRCRAFT AND FIVE TNI-AL VESSELS ARE LIKELY ASSIGNED TO CONDUCT THE ONGOING EVACUATION OF TNI/SECURITY FORCES FROM DILI (0833S/12534E)

A. (S) GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION/OPERATIONS - INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) REPORTS TROOP EVACUATIONS WILL BE COMPLETED WITHIN A WEEK, PRIMARILY USING MARITIME TRANSPORTS. TNI IS LIKELY TO ALSO USE THREE C-130 AIRCRAFT CAPABLE OF MOVING APPROXIMATELY 1000 PERSONNEL PER DAY TO KUPANG (1010S/12335E).

B. (S) CAPABILITIES - DESPITE ITS STATED INTENTIONS, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT TNI IS EXPERIENCING LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE DELAYS WHICH WILL NOT ALLOW THEM TO MEET THE SHORTER EVACUATION TIMETABLE. TNI IS EXPECTED TO HAVE SUBSTANTIAL FORCES IN EAST TIMOR WHEN INTERFET DEPLOYS, BUT WILL EXPEDITE WITHDRAWAL SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

C. (S) POSSIBLE/MOST PROBABLE ENEMY COURSE(S) OF ACTION - TNI LEADERSHIP HAS EXPRESSED CONCERNS WITH THE SECURITY SITUATION IN LOS PALOS (0828S/12701E) AND VIQUEQUE (0852S/12622E) ONCE THEY EVACUATE, BELIEVING PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS WILL SEEK REVENGE FOR PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA KILLINGS. MANY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA ARE EXPECTED TO LEAVE EAST TIMOR WHEN TNI WITHDRAWS. SOME REMAINING PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA MAY ELECT TO SWITCH SIDES.

D. (S) PERCEIVED THREAT. TNI EVACUATION IS EXPECTED TO FURTHER BREAKDOWN CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, EXACERBATING WATER AND POWER PROBLEMS. CONDITIONS IN WEST TIMOR REFUGEE CAMPS ARE REPORTEDLY OVERCROWDED, UNSANITARY AND UNHEALTHY. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE INDONESIAN POLICE HAVE BEGUN TO STEP UP ACTIVITY ALONG THE WEST TIMOR BORDER IN AN ATTEMPT TO DENY THE MORE EXTREMIST MILITIAS FROM ENTERING.

GENTEXT/LOGISTICS/

4. (U): IDENTIFYING AND VERIFYING LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FROM EXORD AND DJTFAC.

A. (U) SUPPLY: IDENTIFYING SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR DARWIN.

B. (U) MAINTENANCE AND SERVICES: STANDING BY TO DEPLOY HARVEST EAGLE IF REQUIRED TO DARWIN FOR HQ SUPPORT.

C. (U) POL: IIR 6 805 0185 99 REPORT STATES THERE IS IMMEDIATE NEED FOR FUELS EQUIPMENT AND OPERATORS. DARWIN IS PREPARED FOR SMALL SCALE C-130 OPS WITH A READY DEPLOYMENT FORCE, HOWEVER, LARGE SCALE SUPPLY OPS WILL REQUIRE A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL. CURRENTLY IDENTIFYING SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

UNCLASSIFIED

D. (U) TRANSPORTATION: MSQ 126 DELAYED FOR 24 HOURS AS REQUESTED BY THE ADF. IT IS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE 18 SEP 99 1200W. FIRST FLIGHT FOR HUMANITARIAN DAILY RATIONS (HDR) ARRIVED IN DARWIN ON 18 SEP 0940 (LOCAL TIME). SECOND FLIGHT IS SCHEDULED TO LAND IN DARWIN ON 19 SEP 2013, AND 20 SEP 0515 (LOCAL TIME). TOTAL OF 300K HDRS WILL BE SHIPPED VIA COMMERCIAL LIFT FROM NOW TO 20 SEPTEMBER 1999.

E. (U) FACILITIES: MTMC DIRECTED BY TRANSCOM TO DISPATCH SITE SURVEY TEAM IMMEDIATELY TO ASSESS PORT AT DILI. AIRFIELD ASSESSMENT TEAM PENDING. SCOPING REQUIREMENTS FOR BEDDOWN IN DARWIN.

F. (U) MUNITIONS: NSTR

G. (U) CONSTRUCTION: ASSESSING AIRFIELD REQUIREMENTS IN DARWIN AND DILI.

H. (U) INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS: VERIFYING AUSTRALIAN REQUIREMENTS AND VALIDATING FORCES IDENTIFIED IN EXORD.

I. (S) MEDICAL

(1) (S) THE ADF IS PREPARING TO DEPLOY AN AEROMEDICAL STAGING FACILITY (ASF) AT THE AIRFIELD IN DILI. THE ASF'S ORGANIC COMPLIMENT INCLUDES 3 PHYSICIANS, 3 NURSES, 4 MEDICS, AN EHO (ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH OFFICER), AND A CLERK. THEY WILL BE CO-LOCATED WITH THE TWO DEDICATED MEDEVAC TEAMS (6 PAX PER TEAM). THIS TOTALS 18 PERSONNEL DEDICATED TO THE MEDEVAC MISSION IN DILI.

(2) (S) NEW ZEALAND WILL DEPLOY A 15-BED FACILITY WITH 28 PAX AND SURGICAL CAPABILITY. THEY ARE DUE TO DEPLOY FROM NZ ON 12 OCT, EITHER TO AUSTRALIA FIRST, THEN TO DILI, OR STRAIGHT TO DILI.

(3) (S) THE ADF FORWARD SURGEON, LTC MILLAR, WILL DEPLOY TO DILI ON D+3 TO OVERSEE ADF OPERATIONS IN ET.

(4) (S) ANTICIPATE PACAF SENDING TWO SQUADRON MEDICAL ELEMENTS (SME) TO DARWIN.

UNCLASSIFIED

J. (U) MAJOR DEFICIENCIES: NSTR

GENTEXT/PERSONNEL/

6. (S) EAST TIMOR PERSTAT REPORT 002/US PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF INTERFET FOR THE PERIOD/170001Z SEP 99 TO 172359Z SEP 99//

A. (S) AUSTRALIA (AUS)/

LOC/ UNIT/ ARMY/ AF/ NAVY/ USMC/ CIV/ AFLOAT/ ASHORE/ FEM/

BRISBANE/ PPLT/ 4/ 3/ 0/ 5/ 1/ 0/ 13/ 0/

DARWIN/ MLO/ 1/ 0/ 0/ 2/ 0/ 0/ 3/ 0/

SYDNEY/ PPLT/ 0/ 1/ 1/ 5/ 0/ 0/ 7/ 0/

TOTAL AUS 5/ 4/ 1/ 12/ 1/ 0/ 23/ 0/

B. (S) EAST TIMOR (ET)/

LOC/ UNIT/ ARMY/ AF/ NAVY/ USMC/ CIV/ AFLOAT/ ASHORE/ FEM/

DILI/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/

TOTAL ET/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/

C. (S) AFLOAT/

SHIP/ ARMY/ AF/ NAVY/ USMC/ CIV/ AFLOAT/ ASHORE/ FEM/

USS MOBILE BAY/ 0/ 0/ 368/ 0/ 0/ 368/ 0/ 5/

USNS KILAUEA/ 0/ 0/ 47/ 0/ 122/ 169/ 0/ 7/

TOTAL AFLOAT/ 0/ 0/ 415/ 0/ 122/ 537/ 0/ 12/

D. (S) TOTAL/

TOTAL/ ARMY/ AF/ NAVY/ USMC/ CIV/ AFLOAT/ ASHORE/ FEM/

545/ 5/ 4/ 416/ 12/ 123/ 537/ 23/ 12/

E. (S) NOTES/AMPLIFYING INFO:

(1) (S) PACOM PLANNING LIAISON TEAM (PPLT) INCLUDES CIVILIAN FROM CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AND MARINE FROM III MEF.

(2) (S) NEXT 24 HOURS EXPECT 13 MEMBER COMMAND ELEMENT TO ARRIVE IN DARWIN.

(3) ADDITIONALLY, THERE ARE 969 PERSONNEL IN AUSTRALIA ISO CROCODILE 99//

GENTEXT/COMMUNICATIONS/CONNECTIVITY/

5. (S) MSQ-126 IS PREPARED FOR DEPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT OF COMUSF INTERFET.//

GENTEXT/SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL -MILITARY-DIPLOMATIC EVENTS/

7. (U) NSTR//

UNCLASSIFIED

GENTEXT/COMMANDERS EVALUATION/

8. (S) PROCEEDING WITH DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES PER REF L. CONTINUING TO REFINE TOTAL US FORCE REQUIREMENTS AS WELL AS TIMELINES FOR AUSTRALIAN AND US FORCES ENTERING EAST TIMOR. DURING 1500W VTC, COMAST INDICATED MESSAGE ABOUT READY, CONTRIBUTING NATIONS NOW COMING INTO COALITION PROVIDING SOME OF THE REQUIREMENTS ORIGINALLY REQUESTED OF US. SEE OUR HOMEPAGE HTTP://WWW.PACOM.SMIL.MIL/J3/CRISIS/ET99.HTML FOR MINUTE TO MINUTE CHANGES. THE COMMANDER USFORINTERFET HAS ESTABLISHED A TEMPORARY OPERATIONS CENTER AND COMMUNICATIONS ARE IMPROVING. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ISSUES, FORCE FLOW ISSUES, ATO ISSUES, AS WELL AS OBTAINING APPROVAL TO USE U.S. TRANSCOM ASSETS TO TRANSPORT FOREIGN FORCES.//

CLOSE TEXT/RELEASED BY J3//

CL BY/ PICKAVANCE, RADM, J3, USCINCPAC//

CL REASON 1.5 (A), (B)//

DECL ON/ 30 SEPT 2009//

BT

#2482

NNNN

2008-F-06 (BRAD SIMPSON)

ENCLOSURE (2):

☐ USCINCPAC SITREP 004, 19 SEP 99 (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

ZCZCCCR701
ATSZYUW RHHMMCC1639 2630023-SSSS--RHHMUNA RHHMUNS.
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHMUNA4461 2630036
O 200036Z SEP 99 PSN 831773H29
FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//CAT//
TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J3//
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//J3//
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3//
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ3//
RUCQSOC/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ3//
RUPEUNA/USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO//J3//
RUCUSTR/USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE//J3//
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3//
RHHMHBA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3//
RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3//
RUHVPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO/CAT//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP//
RUHEHMS/COMMARFORPAC//G3//
RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//USFK J3//
RUHHHGA/HQ ALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//USFJ J3//
RHHMUNS/COMSOCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUHPOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHPQUA/COMTHIRDFLT
RUHBABA/CG III MEF//G3/G5//
RHOAMOB/CJTF TSO
RUWFEAA/COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N3//
RHWIDIL/COMVAQWINGPAC WHIDBEY ISLAND WA
RHDIAAA/HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//DO/BSD//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEJDCA/DISA WASHINGTON DC
RUEADLA/DLA FT BELVOIR VA
RUEANQA/NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD//IAWM//
RUEANQC/NIMA RESTON VA//COTP//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//CAT//
BT
~~S-E-C-R-E-T//N03500//~~
MSGID/SITREP/USCINCPAC/18/09/003/SEP//
ET99//
MSGID/ORDER/USCINCPAC//
REF/A/GENADMIN/USCINCPAC/110415ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/ORDER/USCINCPAC/312115ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/ORDER/USCINCPAC/312116ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/D/GENADMIN/USCINCSOC/071605ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/E/MSG/AUSTRALIAN CDF/080300ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/F/ORDER/USCINCPAC/100445ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/G/ORDER/USCINCPAC/280515ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/H/ORDER/USCINCPAC/010400ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/I/ORDER/USCINCPAC/040045ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/J/ORDER/USCINCPAC/140530ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/K/DOC/CJCS/04 DEC 98/-/NOTAL//
REF/L/ORDER/CJCS/161825ZSEP99//
REF/M/MSG/USCINCPAC/170138ZSEP99//
AMPN/(S) REF A RESTRUCTURED PREVIOUS EXERCISE TEMPO BRAVE 99 INTO A

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: _____
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended, Section 3.1

REAL-WORLD OPERATIONAL PLANNING EVENT TO SUPPORT POSSIBLE
CONTINGENCY
OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR. REFS B AND C ARE PLANNING DIRECTIVES FOR
EXERCISE TEMPO BRAVE 99A (TB-99A, TEMPO BRAVE 99 RENAMED), A
FOCUSED
PLANNING EVOLUTION IN PREPARATION FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCE
OPERATIONS
IN EAST TIMOR. REF D IS REQUEST FOR USASOC TO DEPLOY PSYOP PLANNING
TEAM TO PARTICIPATE IN TB-99A. REF E IS AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE FORCES
(ADF) WARNING ORDER FOR OPERATION WARDEN, WHICH COVERS ADF
INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN EAST TIMOR (INTERFET). REF
F DIRECTS THE DEPLOYMENT OF A USPACOM PLANNING LIAISON TEAM TO
AUSTRALIA ISO AUSTRALIAN EAST TIMOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING. REF G IS
THE USCINCPAC EXORD TO POSITION FORCES IN THE TIMOR SEA AREA TO
SUPPORT AUSTRALIAN NEO OPERATIONS IF REQUESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT
OF
AUSTRALIA. REF H MODIFIED THE FORCE LIST AND TASKING IN REF G. REF I
ACTIVATES JOINT TASK FORCE TIMOR SEA OPERATIONS (JTF TSO) AND DIRECTS
JTF TSO TO REMAIN WITHIN 72 HOURS OF CJTF-DESIGNATED MODLOC IN TIMOR
SEA TO PROVIDE SUPPORT, IF REQUESTED. REF J IS USCINCPAC PREPARE TO
DEPLOY ORDER. REF K IS CJCS MEMORANDUM (DEPLOYMENT HEALTH
SURVEILLANCE AND READINESS), WHICH CONTAINS GUIDANCE FOR
CONDUCTING
PRE- AND POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH ASSESSMENTS. REF L IS EXECUTE
ORDER.
SECDEF HAS DIRECTED THE DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES AND EXECUTION OF
OPERATIONS AS PART OF MULTINATIONAL FORCE OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR.
REF M DEFINES PROCEDURES FOR AUSTRALIA TO REQUEST US FORCES.//
PERIOD/190001Z SEP 99/TO: 192359Z SEP 99/AS OF: 192359Z SEP 99//
HEADING/OWN SITUATION//
5UNIT
/UNITDES /UNIT LOC /CMNTS
/USS MOBILE BAY /09-36S, 127-45E /MOD LOC ON STATION/
/USNS KILAUEA /115-0S, 129-10E /MOD LOC ON STATION/
/CTU 72.5.9 /MISAWA JA/ /ON STATION /
/MSQ-126 /HAWAII /ON STATION //
/THREE C-130 /DARWIN /ONE ON STATION, TWO
ENROUTE
GENTEXT/SITUATION/
1. (S) DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES CONTINUES. D-DAY/H HOUR OCCURRED AT
192300Z SEP 99. TNI EXPECTED TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR INITIAL
FOOTPRINT. VALIDATED MOVEMENT OF CMOC TO DARWIN BASED ON COMUSF
INTERFET ANALYSIS. TNI IS CONTINUING THE WITHDRAWAL OF TNI TROOPS
AND FAMILY MEMBERS FROM EAST TIMOR BY SEA AND LAND.
GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/
2. (S) EXPECT MULTI-NATIONAL DEPLOYMENT TO EAST TIMOR TO COMMENCE 20
SEP 99. MG COSGROVE/BG CASTELLAW SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE DILI 200300Z
SEP 99. USARPAC HAS ISSUED DEPORD FOR FIVE AUGMENTEES FOR COMUSF
INTERFET STAFF. EXPECT TO DEPLOY NET 22 SEP 99.
A. (S) DEFCON STATUS: DEFCON 5
B. (U) CBR OPERATIONS
(1) (S) NUCLEAR: NSTR
(2) (S) CHEMICAL: NSTR
C. (S) GROUND SITUATION: NSTR
D. (S) NAVAL SITUATION: JTF TSO WITH USS MOBILE BAY AND USNS KILAUEA
AT MODLOC IN EAST TIMOR SEA.
E. (S) AIR SITUATION: FOUR C130S DEPLOYED TO NEW ZEALAND FOR EXERCISE
CROCODILE AND HAVE BEEN TASKED TO DEPLOY TO DARWIN. ONE C-130
ARRIVED DARWIN 191135Z SEP 99 AND WILL REDEPLOY TO ELMENDORF AFTER
REMAINING 3XC-130S CLOSE AT DARWIN. TWO C-130S ARE AT AMBERLEY, AND
WILL DEPART FOR DARWIN ON 192200Z SEP 99. FOURTH C-130 IS AWAITING
PARTS AT CHRISTCHURCH AND IS PROJECTED TO DEPART 212000Z SEP 99 FOR
DARWIN.
F. (S) AIR RECONNAISSANCE: EP-3 ARRIVED TINDAL 191509Z SEP 99.
G. (S) JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS: NSTR.
H. (S) WEATHER: EAST TIMOR WILL BE PARTLY CLOUDY WITH LIGHT EAST TO
SOUTHEAST WINDS, HIGHS WILL BE IN THE UPPER 80'S WITH LOWS NEAR 70
DEGREES.//

GENTEXT/INTELLIGENCE/RECONNAISSANCE/
3. (S) EAST TIMOR (EM) IS REPORTEDLY CALM AFTER INTERFET PRE-DEPLOYMENT TEAM VISIT. INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) CONTINUE EVACUATION OF SOLDIERS AND SECURITY FORCES FROM DILI (0833S/12534E) AND THE PORT OF COM (0822S/12703E): OVER 11,000 TNI SOLDIERS ARE ESTIMATED PRESENT IN EAST TIMOR, WITH TWO TNI BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS DIRECTING THE OPERATIONS OF FIVE ACTIVE INFANTRY BATTALIONS (APPROXIMATELY 5-6,000 SOLDIERS).
A. (S) GENERAL TNI SITUATION/OPERATIONS. THE ACTIVE BATTALIONS OF TNI FORCES IN EM ARE CONCERNED WITH MAINTAINING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT
BEFORE INTERFET ARRIVES AND PROVIDING SECURITY TO INFANTRY UNITS TRAVELING TO PORTS AND AIRFIELDS FOR EVACUATION. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE TNI IS ATTEMPTING TO MINIMIZE ITS PRESENCE IN EM.
B. (S) CAPABILITIES. TNI IS LIKELY EXPERIENCING COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS IN THE COURSE OF THE GENERAL EVACUATION. UNITS ARE REPORTEDLY WIDELY DISPERSED THROUGHOUT EM, WHICH IS PROBABLY CAUSING
PROBLEMS WITH PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPORTATION.
C. (S) POSSIBLE/MOST PROBABLE TNI COURSE(S) OF ACTION. TNI IS EXPECTED TO COOPERATE WITH THE INTERFET DEPLOYMENT AND CONTINUE EVACUATIONS. TWO BRIGADES CONSISTING OF TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS TOTAL MAY REMAIN IN EM UNTIL A FORMAL TURNOVER WITH INTERFET OCCURS. MILITIAS ARE ASSESSED AS NOT LIKELY TO OPPOSE INITIAL ENTRY OF INTERFET FORCES. PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS ARE LIKELY TO CONDUCT OPPORTUNISTIC ATTACKS AGAINST TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY IN EM AFTER TNI FORMALLY TURNS OVER OPERATIONS TO INTERFET.
D. (S) PERCEIVED THREAT. INTERFET FACES THREE THREATS. 1) HIGHEST THREAT IS FROM PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS OPERATING WITHIN EM OR IN CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS FROM WEST TIMOR WITH INDONESIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (KOPASSUS) SUPPORT. PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY PRO-
INTEGRATION MILITIAS INDICATE LIKELY TARGETING OF AUSTRALIANS MEMBERS OF INTERFET. THIS THREAT LIKELY EXTENDS TO NON-AUSTRALIAN INTERFET MEMBERS OF SIMILAR ETHNIC APPEARANCE. 2) TNI/SECURITY FORCES WITHIN EM THAT HAVE NOT EVACUATED PRIOR TO INTERFET DEPLOYMENT POSE SOME THREAT DUE TO POSSIBLE TNI COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS. 3) THERE EXISTS THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERFET FORCES COMING BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE (FALANTIL) CLASHES, WHICH POSES A THREAT TO PEACEKEEPERS CHARGED WITH MAINTAINING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT.
GENTEXT/LOGISTICS/
4. (U) RESPONDING TO LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FROM EXORD.
A. (S) SUPPLY: STAFFING MESSAGE TO JOINT STAFF J4 AND US ARMY DCSLOG TO COMPLETE COORDINATION FOR LOAN OF BODY ARMOR TO CDF AUS. NEED TO
RESOLVE STRATEGIC AIRLIFT SOURCING (USTRANSCOM OR AUS ASSETS) ONCE DOD APPROVES RELEASE OF THE EQUIPMENT.
B. (U) MAINTENANCE AND SERVICES: NSTR.
C. (S) POL:NSTR.
D. (S) TRANSPORTATION: C-5 CARRYING MSQ 126 ARRIVED DARWIN 191516Z. CONTINUING TO REFINE REQUIREMENTS
F. (U) MUNITIONS: NSTR.
G. (S) CONSTRUCTION: NSTR.
H. (U) INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS: VERIFYING/VALIDATING AUSTRALIAN REQUIREMENTS, TO INCLUDE CN REQUESTS.
GENTEXT/COMMUNICATIONS/CONNECTIVITY/
5. A. (S) JCSE EXERCISE PLANNERS ARRIVED HONOLULU HI, APPROXIMATELY 182357W SEP 99
MSQ-126 ARRIVED DARWIN, APPROXIMATELY 190600W SEP 99.
GENTEXT/PERSONNEL/
6. (S) EAST TIMOR PERSTAT REPORT 004 US PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF INTERFET FOR THE PERIOD/190001Z SEP 99 TO 192359Z SEP 99//
A. (S) AUSTRALIA (AUS)/
LOC/ UNIT/ ARMY/ AF/ NAVY/ USMC/ CIV/ AFLOAT/ ASHORE/ FEM/
BRISBANE/ PPLT/ 4/ 3/ 0/ 5/ 1/ 0/ 13/ 0/
DARWIN/ MLO/ 1/ 28/ 31/ 10/ 0/ 0/ 70/ 0/
SYDNEY/ PPLT/ 0/ 2/ 0/ 5/ 0/ 0/ 7/ 0/

UNCLASSIFIED

TINDAL/ PPLT/ 0/ 0/ 24/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 24/ 0/
TOTAL AUS 5/ 33/ 55/ 20/ 1/ 0/ 114/ 0/
B. (S) EAST TIMOR (ET)/
LOC/ UNIT/ ARMY/ AF/ NAVY/ USMC/ CIV/ AFLOAT/ ASHORE/ FEM/
DILI/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/
TOTAL ET/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/
C. (S) AFLOAT/
SHIP/ ARMY/ AF/ NAVY/ USMC/ CIV/ AFLOAT/ ASHORE/ FEM/
USS MOBILE BAY/ 0/ 0/ 368/ 0/ 0/ 368/ 0/ 5/
USNS KILAUEA/ 0/ 0/ 37/ 0/ 122/ 159/ 0/ 7/
TOTAL AFLOAT/ 0/ 0/ 405/ 0/ 122/ 527/ 0/ 12/
D. (S) TOTAL/
TOTAL/ ARMY/ AF/ NAVY/ USMC/ CIV/ AFLOAT/ ASHORE/ FEM/
641/ 5/ 33/ 460/ 20/ 123/ 527/ 114/ 12/
E. (S) NOTES/AMPLIFYING INFO:
(1) (S) THERE ARE 969 PERSONNEL IN AUSTRALIA ISO CROCODILE.
(2) (S) ADDITIONS INCLUDE ARRIVAL OF USAF C130'S, USN EP-3, MSQ-126 AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORT PERSONNEL.//
GENTEXT/SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL-MILITARY-DIPLOMATIC EVENTS/
7. (U) CAPT CHRIS HUGHES, USMC, STANDING BY TO FLY TO DILI WITH THE FOLLOWING NEWS MEDIA: REPRESENTATIVES FROM ALL U.S. TELEVISION NETWORKS AND REPORTERS FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, WASHINGTON POST AND
USA TODAY.//
GENTEXT/COMMANDERS EVALUATION/
8. A. (S) INITIAL PHASE OF THIS OPERATION ON TRACK. CONTINUING TO WORK WITH COMAST ON REQUESTED US REQUIREMENTS. MONITORING SITUATION IN WEST TIMOR DUE TO THE MIX OF REFUGEES, ARMED MILITIA MEMBERS AND ILL-DISCIPLINED SOLDIERS WITH WEAPONS. PREPARING TO SEND CMOC DOWN RANGE.
B. (U) SEE OUR HOME PAGE --
HTTP://WWW.PACOM.SMIL.MIL/J3/CRISIS/ET99.HTML
FOR THE MOST CURRENT UPDATES.//
CLOSE TEXT/RELEASED BY J3//
CL BY/ PICKAVANCE, RADM, J3, USCINCPAC//
CL REASON 1.5 (A), (B)//
DECL ON/ 30 SEPT 2009//
BT
#1639

NNNN

2008-F-06 (BRAD SIMPSON)

ENCLOSURE (3):

☐ USCINCPAC SITREP 005, 20 SEP 99 (U)

VZCZCCCR255
OATSZYUW RHHMMCC4853 2640302-SSSS--RHHMUNA RHHMUNS.
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHMUNA4464 2640312
Z O 210312Z SEP 99 PSN 839056H31
FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//CAT//
TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J3//
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//J3//
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3//
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ3//
RUCQSOC/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ3//
RUPEUNA/USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO//J3//
RUCUSTR/USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE//J3//
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3//
RHHMHBA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3//
RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3//
RUHVPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO/CAT//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP//
RUHEHMS/COMMARFORPAC//G3//
RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//USFK J3//
RUHHHGA/HQ ALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//USFJ J3//
RHHMUNS/COMSOCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUHPOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHPQUA/COMTHIRDFLT
RUHBABA/CG III MEF//G3/G5//
RHOAMOB/CJTF TSO
RUWFEAA/COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N3//
RHWIDIL/COMVAQWINGPAC WHIDBEY ISLAND WA
RHDIAAA/HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//DO/BSD//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEJDCA/DISA WASHINGTON DC
RUEADLA/DLA FT BELVOIR VA
RUEANQA/NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD//IAWM//
RUEANQC/NIMA RESTON VA//COTP//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//CAT//
BT
~~S-E-C-R-E-T-//N03500//~~
MSGID/SITREP/USCINCPAC/20/09/005/SEP//
ET99//
MSGID/ORDER/USCINCPAC//
REF/A/GENADMIN/USCINCPAC/110415ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/ORDER/USCINCPAC/312115ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/ORDER/USCINCPAC/312116ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/D/GENADMIN/USCINCSOC/071605ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/E/MSG/AUSTRALIAN CDF/080300ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/F/ORDER/USCINCPAC/100445ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/G/ORDER/USCINCPAC/280515ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/H/ORDER/USCINCPAC/010400ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/I/ORDER/USCINCPAC/040045ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/J/ORDER/USCINCPAC/140530ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/K/DOC/CJCS/04 DEC 98/-/NOTAL//
REF/L/ORDER/CJCS/161825ZSEP99//
REF/M/MSG/USCINCPAC/170138ZSEP99//
AMPN/~~(S)~~ REF A RESTRUCTURED PREVIOUS EXERCISE TEMPO BRAVE 99

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: _____
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

INTO A
REAL-WORLD OPERATIONAL PLANNING EVENT TO SUPPORT POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY
OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR. REFS B AND C ARE PLANNING DIRECTIVES FOR
EXERCISE TEMPO BRAVE 99A (TB-99A, TEMPO BRAVE 99 RENAMED), A FOCUSED
PLANNING EVOLUTION IN PREPARATION FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCE OPERATIONS
IN EAST TIMOR. REF D IS REQUEST FOR USASOC TO DEPLOY PSYOP PLANNING
TEAM TO PARTICIPATE IN TB-99A. REF E IS AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE FORCES
(ADF) WARNING ORDER FOR OPERATION WARDEN, WHICH COVERS ADF
INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN EAST TIMOR (INTERFET). REF
F DIRECTS THE DEPLOYMENT OF A USPACOM PLANNING LIAISON TEAM TO
AUSTRALIA ISO AUSTRALIAN EAST TIMOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING. REF G IS
THE USCINCPAC EXORD TO POSITION FORCES IN THE TIMOR SEA AREA TO
SUPPORT AUSTRALIAN NEO OPERATIONS IF REQUESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF
AUSTRALIA. REF H MODIFIED THE FORCE LIST AND TASKING IN REF G. REF I
ACTIVATES JOINT TASK FORCE TIMOR SEA OPERATIONS (JTF TSO) AND DIRECTS
JTF TSO TO REMAIN WITHIN 72 HOURS OF CJTF-DESIGNATED MODLOC IN TIMOR
SEA TO PROVIDE SUPPORT, IF REQUESTED. REF J IS USCINCPAC PREPARE TO
DEPLOY ORDER. REF K IS CJCS MEMORANDUM (DEPLOYMENT HEALTH
SURVEILLANCE AND READINESS), WHICH CONTAINS GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING
PRE- AND POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH ASSESSMENTS. REF L IS EXECUTE ORDER.
SECDEF HAS DIRECTED THE DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES AND EXECUTION OF
OPERATIONS AS PART OF MULTINATIONAL FORCE OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR.
REF M DEFINES PROCEDURES FOR AUSTRALIA TO REQUEST US FORCES.//
PERIOD/200001Z SEP 99/TO: 202359Z SEP 99/AS OF: 202359Z SEP 99//
HEADING/OWN SITUATION//
5UNIT
/UNITDES /UNIT LOC /CMNTS
/USS MOBILE BAY /09-36S, 127-45E /MOD LOC ON STATION/
/USNS KILAUEA /115-0S, 129-10E /MOD LOC ON STATION/
/CTU 72.5.9 /MISAWA JA/ /ON STATION /
/MSQ-126 /DARWIN /ON STATION //
/THREE C-130 /DARWIN /ON STATION
GENTEXT/SITUATION/
1. (S) DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES CONTINUES. D-DAY/H HOUR OCCURRED AT
192300Z SEP 99 AS PLANNED. TNI EXPECTED TO CONTINUE PROVIDING
SECURITY FOR INITIAL FOOTPRINT. TNI IS CONTINUING THE WITHDRAWAL OF
TNI TROOPS AND FAMILY MEMBERS FROM EAST TIMOR BY SEA AND LAND.
EXPECT TO DEPLOY NET 22 SEP 99. MSQ-126 IS NOW OPERATIONAL IN DARWIN
ISO COMUSF INTERFET. CMOC FROM USSOCOM SCHEDULED TO DEPART POPE AFB
211015Z SEP 99 ENROUTE HICKAM AFB, HI,WITH FOLLOW-ON TO DARWIN
GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/
2. (S) MULTI-NATIONAL DEPLOYMENT TO EAST TIMOR COMMENCED 20 SEP 99.
MG COSGROVE/BG CASTELLAW CONDUCTED ON-GROUND INSPECTION IN DILI

200300Z SEP 99. CONTINUING TO FACILITATE FLOW OF INTERFET FORCES INTO AUSTRALIA. CONTINUING TO COORDINATE AUSTRALIAN REQUEST
FOR SUPPORT.
A. (S) DEFCON STATUS: DEFCON 5
(S) THREAT LEVEL IN INDONESIA RAISED TO MEDIUM FROM LOW WITH THE
GEOGRAPHIC EXCEPTION OF TIMOR WHICH IS CONSIDERED A HIGH THREAT AREA.
B. (U) CBR OPERATIONS
(1) (S) NUCLEAR: NSTR
(2) (S) CHEMICAL: NSTR
C. (S) GROUND SITUATION: NSTR
D. (S) NAVAL SITUATION: JTF TSO WITH USS MOBILE BAY AND USNS KILAUEA
AT MODLOC IN EAST TIMOR SEA. USS MOBILE BAY PROVIDING RADAR TRACKING
AND LINK 11 RETURNS FOR TRANSITING AUS HELOS. USNS KILAUEA PROVIDING
EMERGENCY LILY PAD SERVICES AS REQUIRED.
E. (S) AIR SITUATION: THREE USAF C-130'S ARE AT DARWIN ALONG WITH ONE
US MARINE KC-130. FOURTH USAF C-130 IS FMC AT CHRISTCHURCH AND IS
PROJECTED TO DEPART 212130Z FOR DARWIN. INTENT IS TO ROTATE ONE OF
THE OTHER USAF C-130 OUT WHEN THE C-130 FROM CHRISTCHURCH ARRIVES IN
DARWIN. MARINE KC-130 SCHEDULED TO REDEPLOY TO GUAM
210800Z. END STATE AT DARWIN WILL BE THREE USAF C-130 ISO USF INTERFET.
F. (S) AIR RECONNAISSANCE: EP-3 ARRIVED TINDAL 191509Z SEP 99.
FIRST MISSION SCHEDULED FOR 202130Z SEP 99.
G. (S) JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS: NSTR
H. (S) WEATHER: EAST TIMOR WILL BE PARTLY CLOUDY WITH LIGHT EAST TO
SOUTHEAST WINDS, HIGHS WILL BE IN THE UPPER 80'S WITH LOWS NEAR 70
DEGREES. KADENA DECLARED TCCOR-1 AT 211500Z DUE TO TYPHOON BART. KC-
135'S EVAC'D TO GUAM.//
GENTEXT/INTELLIGENCE/RECONNAISSANCE
3. (S) EAST TIMOR (EM) REMAINS GENERALLY CALM FOLLOWING INITIAL
DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN EAST TIMOR (INTERFET).
INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) EVACUATION CONTINUES. PRIMARY POINTS
OF DEPARTURE ARE DILI (0833S/12534E) AND COM (0822S/12703E).
APPROXIMATELY 10,000 TNI SOLDIERS ARE ESTIMATED REMAINING IN EM.
A. (S) GENERAL TNI SITUATION/OPERATIONS. TNI FORCES IN EM REMAIN
CONCERNED WITH PRESENTING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT AS INTERFET EXPANDS
ITS PRESENCE IN EM. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE TNI IS RAPIDLY DECREASING
ITS TROOP STRENGTH IN EM.
B. (S) POSSIBLE/MOST PROBABLE TNI COURSE(S) OF ACTION. TNI WILL
LIKELY CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH INTERFET DEPLOYMENT AS THEY PROCEED
WITH THEIR EVACUATION FROM EM. TNI NOT EXPECTED TO LEAVE WEAPONS
AND/OR AMMUNITION BEHIND. INDONESIAN AIR FORCE (TNI-AU) AND NAVY
(TNI-AL) WILL LIKELY BE ORDERED TO WITHDRAW FROM EM AND RETURN TO
HOME BASES. PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS ARE LIKELY TO CONDUCT

OPPORTUNISTIC ATTACKS AGAINST TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY IN EM AFTER TNI
FORMALLY HANDS OVER OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO INTERFET.
C. (S) PERCEIVED THREAT. INTERFET FACES THREE THREATS: 1) HIGHEST
THREAT IS FROM PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS OPERATING WITHIN EM OR IN
CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS FROM WEST TIMOR WITH THE ASSISTANCE AND
SUPPORT OF INDONESIAN SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS). PUBLIC STATEMENTS
MADE BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIA LEADERS INDICATE LIKELY TARGETING OF
AUSTRALIAN MEMBERS OF INTERFET. THIS THREAT LIKELY EXTENDS TO NON-
AUSTRALIAN INTERFET PERSONNEL OF SIMILAR ETHNIC APPEARANCE. 2)
TNI/SECURITY FORCES WITHIN EM THAT HAVE NOT EVACUATED PRIOR TO
INTERFET DEPLOYMENT POSE SOME THREAT DUE TO POSSIBLE TNI COMMAND AND
CONTROL PROBLEMS; 3) THERE EXISTS THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERFET FORCES
COMING BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE CLASHES, WHICH
POSES A THREAT TO PEACEKEEPERS CHARGED WITH MAINTAINING A SECURE
ENVIRONMENT.
GENTEXT/LOGISTICS/
4. (U) RESPONDING TO LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FROM EXORD.
A. (S) SUPPLY: TRANSMITTED MESSAGE TO US ARMY DCSLOG REQUESTING
AVAILABILITY AND COSTS FOR LOAN OF BODY ARMOR TO CDF AUS. DCSLOG HAS
THE ACTION AND WILL RESPOND WITH REQUESTED INFORMATION.
B. (U) MAINTENANCE AND SERVICES: NSTR.
C. (S) POL: NSTR.
D. (S) TRANSPORTATION: THE FINAL FLIGHT OF 100,000 HDRS WILL ARRIVE
IN DARWIN AT 0930I 21 SEP. AWAITING PRESIDENTIAL DRAWDOWN AUTHORITY
TO VALIDATE NEW ZEALAND LIFT REQUIREMENTS. AUS INDICATES THEY ARE
LEANING TOWARDS USING COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION ASSETS. HAVE ALSO
RECEIVED INFORMAL REQUEST FOR LIFT FROM THAILAND. AWAITING
VALIDATION FROM THE AUSTRALIANS.
E. (U) FACILITIES: NSTR.
F. (U) MUNITIONS: NSTR.
G. (U) CONSTRUCTION: NSTR.
H. (U) INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS: CONTINUING TO WORK AUSTRALIAN
REQUESTS AND USING THE ACSA WHERE POSSIBLE. C-130 SHUTTLE FLIGHTS
BEING CONDUCTED BETWEEN DARWIN AND EAST TIMOR.
I. (U) MEDICAL NSTR
GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/CONNECTIVITY/
5. A. (U) C4I SUPPORT
(U) VTC CAPABILITY ESTABLISHED BETWEEN J6TCCC AND THE MSQ-126 IN
DARWIN
GENTEXT/PERSONNEL/
6. (S) EAST TIMOR PERSTAT REPORT 005 US PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF
INTERFET FOR THE PERIOD/200001Z SEP 99 TO 202359Z SEP 99//
A. (S) AUSTRALIA (AUS)/
LOC/ UNIT/ ARMY/ AF/ NAVY/ USMC/ CIV/ AFLOAT/ ASHORE/ FEM/
BRISBANE/ 5/ 4/ 0/ 5/ 1/ 0/ 15/ 0/
DARWIN/ 1/ 36/ 19/ 20/ 0/ 0/ 76/ 0/
SYDNEY/ 0/ 1/ 0/ 3/ 0/ 0/ 4/ 0/
TINDAL/ / 0/ 0/ 25/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 25/ 0/

TOTAL AUS 6/ 41/ 44/ 28/ 1/ 0/ 120/ 0/
B. (S) EAST TIMOR (ET)/
LOC/ UNIT/ ARMY/ AF/ NAVY/ USMC/ CIV/ AFLOAT/ ASHORE/ FEM/
DILI/ 0/ 0/ 1/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 1/ 0/
TOTAL ET/ 0/ 0/ 1/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 1/ 0/
C. (S) AFLOAT/
SHIP/ ARMY/ AF/ NAVY/ USMC/ CIV/ AFLOAT/ ASHORE/ FEM/
USS MOBILE BAY/ 0/ 0/ 368/ 0/ 0/ 368/ 0/ 5/
USNS KILAUEA/ 0/ 0/ 37/ 0/ 122/ 159/ 0/ 7/
TOTAL AFLOAT/ 0/ 0/ 405/ 0/ 122/ 527/ 0/ 12/
D. (S) TOTAL/
TOTAL/ ARMY/ AF/ NAVY/ USMC/ CIV/ AFLOAT/ ASHORE/ FEM/
648/ 6/ 41/ 450/ 28/ 123/ 527/ 121/ 12/
E. (S) NOTES/AMPLIFYING INFO:
(1) (S) THERE ARE 969 PERSONNEL IN AUSTRALIA ISO CROCODILE.
(2) (S) ONE US NAVY PAO OFFICER IN DILI, EAST TIMOR WITH PRESS POOL.//
GENTEXT/SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL-MILITARY-DIPLOMATIC EVENTS/
7. (U). NSTR//
GENTEXT/COMMANDERS EVALUATION/
8. A. (S) INITIAL PHASE OF THIS OPERATION ON TRACK. CONTINUING TO
WORK WITH COMAST ON ANTICIPATED US FORCE AND STRAT LIFT REQUIREMENTS.
MONITORING SITUATION IN WEST TIMOR DUE TO THE MIX OF REFUGEES, ARMED
MILITIA MEMBERS AND ILL-DISCIPLINED SOLDIERS WITH WEAPONS.
B. (U) TAWAIN EARTHQUAKE SITUATION IS BEING MONITORED AT THIS TIME.
PACOM PERSONNEL UNAFFECTED.
C. (U) SEE OUR HOME PAGE -
HTTP://WWW.PACOM.SMIL.MIL/J3/CRISIS/ET99.HTML FOR THE MOST CURRENT
UPDATES.//
CLOSE TEXT/RELEASED BY J3//
CL BY/ PICKAVANCE, RADM, J3, USCINCPAC//
CL REASON 1.5 (A), (B)//
DECL ON/ 30 SEP 2009//
BT
#4853

NNNN

2008-F-06 (BRAD SIMPSON)

ENCLOSURE (4):

USCINCPAC SITREP 006, 21 SEP 99 (U)

VZCZCCCR762
OATSZYUW RHHMMCA3373 2650158-SSSS--RHHMUNA RHHMUNS.
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHMUNA4469 2650134
O 220134Z SEP 99 PSN 845884H37
FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//CAT//
TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J3//
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//J3//
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3//
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ3//
RUCQSOC/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ3//
RUPEUNA/USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO//J3//
RUCUSTR/USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE//J3//
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3//
RHHMHBA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3//
RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3//
RUHVPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO/CAT//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP//
RUHEHMS/COMMARFORPAC//G3//
RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//USFK J3//
RUHHHGA/HQ ALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//USFJ J3//
RHHMUNS/COMSOCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUHPOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHPQUA/COMTHIRDFLT
RUHBABA/CG III MEF//G3/G5//
RHOAMOB/CJTF TSO
RUWFEAA/COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N3//
RHWIDIL/COMVAQWINGPAC WHIDBEY ISLAND WA
RHDIAAA/HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//DO/BSD//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEJDCA/DISA WASHINGTON DC
RUEADLA/DLA FT BELVOIR VA
RUEANQA/NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD//IAWM//
RUEANQC/NIMA RESTON VA//COTP//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//CAT//
BT
~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ //N03500//
MSGID/SITREP/USCINCPAC/21/09/006/SEP//
ET99//
MSGID/ORDER/USCINCPAC//
REF/A/GENADMIN/USCINCPAC/110415ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/ORDER/USCINCPAC/312115ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/ORDER/USCINCPAC/312116ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/D/GENADMIN/USCINCSOC/071605ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/E/MSG/AUSTRALIAN CDF/080300ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/F/ORDER/USCINCPAC/100445ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/G/ORDER/USCINCPAC/280515ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/H/ORDER/USCINCPAC/010400ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/I/ORDER/USCINCPAC/040045ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/J/ORDER/USCINCPAC/140530ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/K/DOC/CJCS/04 DEC 98/-/NOTAL//
REF/L/ORDER/CJCS/161825ZSEP99//
REF/M/MSG/USCINCPAC/170138ZSEP99//
NARR/ (S) REF A RESTRUCTURED PREVIOUS EXERCISE TEMPO BRAVE 99 INTO A

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: _____
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended, Section 3.1

REAL-WORLD OPERATIONAL PLANNING EVENT TO SUPPORT POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR. REFS B AND C ARE PLANNING DIRECTIVES FOR EXERCISE TEMPO BRAVE 99A (TB-99A, TEMPO BRAVE 99 RENAMED), A FOCUSED PLANNING EVOLUTION IN PREPARATION FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCE OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR. REF D IS REQUEST FOR USASOC TO DEPLOY PSYOP PLANNING TEAM TO PARTICIPATE IN TB-99A. REF E IS AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE FORCES (ADF) WARNING ORDER FOR OPERATION WARDEN, WHICH COVERS ADF INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN EAST TIMOR (INTERFET). REF F DIRECTS THE DEPLOYMENT OF A USPACOM PLANNING LIAISON TEAM TO AUSTRALIA ISO AUSTRALIAN EAST TIMOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING. REF G IS THE USCINCPAC EXORD TO POSITION FORCES IN THE TIMOR SEA AREA TO SUPPORT AUSTRALIAN NEO OPERATIONS IF REQUESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA. REF H MODIFIED THE FORCE LIST AND TASKING IN REF G. REF I ACTIVATES JOINT TASK FORCE TIMOR SEA OPERATIONS (JTF TSO) AND DIRECTS JTF TSO TO REMAIN WITHIN 72 HOURS OF CJTF-DESIGNATED MODLOC IN TIMOR SEA TO PROVIDE SUPPORT, IF REQUESTED. REF J IS USCINCPAC PREPARE TO DEPLOY ORDER. REF K IS CJCS MEMORANDUM (DEPLOYMENT HEALTH SURVEILLANCE AND READINESS), WHICH CONTAINS GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING PRE- AND POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH ASSESSMENTS. REF L IS EXECUTE ORDER. SECDEF HAS DIRECTED THE DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES AND EXECUTION OF OPERATIONS AS PART OF MULTINATIONAL FORCE OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR. REF M DEFINES PROCEDURES FOR AUSTRALIA TO REQUEST US FORCES.//

PERIOD/210001Z SEP 99/TO: 212359Z SEP 99/AS OF: 212359Z SEP 99//

HEADING/OWN SITUATION//

5UNIT

/UNITDES	/UNIT LOC	/CMNTS
/USS MOBILE BAY	/09-36S, 127-45E	/MOD LOC ON STATION/
/USNS KILAUEA	/DARWIN	/PORT CALL/
/CTU 72.5.9 (EP-3)	/MISAWA JA/	/ON STATION /
/MSQ-126	/DARWIN	/ON STATION /
/THREE C-130	/DARWIN	/ON STATION/
/CMOC	/ENROUTE	/ETA 23 SEP 99/

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. (S) SUCCESSFUL DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES CONTINUES. INTERFET HAS MET NO RESISTANCE THUS FAR. EXPECT DILI TO REMAIN QUIET DURING INTERFET'S DEPLOYMENT, ALTHOUGH SPORADIC GUNFIRE FROM MILITIAS IS POSSIBLE. MONITORING SITUATION IN WEST TIMOR. EXPECT HURRICANE BART TO PRECLUDE AIR OPERATIONS VICINITY OKINAWA THROUGH 23 SEP 99 (ZULU).

GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/

2. (S) MULTI-NATIONAL DEPLOYMENT TO EAST TIMOR COMMENCED 20 SEP 99 (ZULU).TWO U.S. PERSONNEL CURRENTLY IN EM. COMUSFOR INTERFET, BG CASTELLAW,RETURNED TO SYDNEY FOLLOWING TRIPS YESTERDAY TO DILI AND DARWIN. IN DILI, HE CONDUCTED ON-GROUND INSPECTION WITH COMINTERFET, MG COSGROVE. DURING BRIEF STAY IN DARWIN, HE MET WITH AUS PRIME MINISTER, MOD, AND OPPOSITION LEADER. HE IS SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH U.S. AMBASSADOR AT AMEMB, CANBERRA 22 SEP 99 AND SELECTED MEMBERS OF ADF. HAVE RECEIVED CLEARANCE FROM OSD FOR 11 US ARMED FORCES MEMBERS ON EXCHANGE DUTY WITH ADF TO JOIN UNITS IN EM. CMOC DEPARTED POPE AFB 21 SEP 99 ENROUTE HICKAM AFB, HI WITH FOLLOW-ON TO DARWIN. CONTINUING TO REFINE, PRIORITIZE, AND COORDINATE AUSTRALIAN REQUEST FOR SUPPORT.

A. (1) (S) DEFCON STATUS: DEFCON 5

(2) (S) THREAT LEVEL IN INDONESIA RAISED TO MEDIUM FROM LOW WITH THE GEOGRAPHIC EXCEPTION OF TIMOR WHICH IS CONSIDERED A HIGH THREAT AREA.

B. (U) CBR OPERATIONS

(1) (S) NUCLEAR: NSTR

(2) (S) CHEMICAL: NSTR

C. (S) GROUND SITUATION: NSTR

D. (S) NAVAL SITUATION: USS MOBILE BAY (MOB) AND USNS KILAUEA (KIL) CHOPPED TO USFOR INTERFET. KIL CONDUCTING PORT VISIT IN DARWIN FOR REPLENISHMENT/PROVISIONING. MOB SCHEDULED FOR SAME 25 SEP 99 (INDIA). MOB RADAR TRACKED HELO MISSIONS FROM DARWIN TO DILI. KIL REMAINED PREPARED TO PROVIDE LILY PAD SERVICES IF REQUIRED. BOTH SHIPS ACTED AS READY SAR PLATFORMS WITH EMBARKED HELOS.

E. (S) AIR SITUATION: FOUR PACAF C-130'S AND ONE MFP KC-130 ARRIVED

DARWIN. KC-130 AND ONE C-130 ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART. THREE C-130'S TO REMAIN FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONS. ONE C-130 SORTIE WAS FLOWN ON 21 SEP 99 (INDIA) AND FOUR ARE SCHEDULED FOR 22 SEP 99 (INDIA). AIR DROPS OF RELIEF FOOD DELAYED DUE TO DEPLOYMENT OF UN PKO FORCES BUT WILL RESUME 22 SEP 99.
F. (S) AIR RECONNAISSANCE: EP-3 COMMENCED OPERATIONS FROM RAAF TINDAL ISO COMUSF INTERFET. INITIAL MISSION FLOWN 202123Z-210657Z SEP 99. SECOND MISSION WAS AIRBORNE AT 212223Z SEP 99 WITH PLANNED LANDING AT 220800Z SEP 99.
G. (S) JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS: NSTR
H. (S) WEATHER: EAST TIMOR WILL BE PARTLY CLOUDY WITH LIGHT EAST TO SOUTHEAST WINDS, HIGHS WILL BE IN THE UPPER 80'S WITH LOWS NEAR 70 DEGREES. TYPHOON BART IS FORECAST TO PASS WITHIN 16 NM OF KADENA WITH WINDS IN EXCESS OF 100 KNOTS AT 221200Z SEP 99. DOD ACTIVITIES IN OKINAWA ARE IN HIGHEST TROPICAL CYCLONE CONDITION OF READINESS (TCCOR 1). DAMAGING WINDS ARE EXPECTED TO END 221800Z SEP 99. NO FLIGHTS ARE EXPECTED IN OR OUT OF KADENA FROM 211700Z TO 221800Z, III MEF FORCE AUGMENT TO COMUSFINTERFET WILL BE UNABLE TO DEPART KADENA UNTIL AFTER STORM PASSAGE.//
GENTEXT/INTELLIGENCE/RECONNAISSANCE
3. (S) INTERFET (INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN EAST TIMOR) DEPLOYMENT TO EAST TIMOR (EM) HAS MET NO RESISTANCE TO DATE. FORMAL HANDOVER AND FINAL TNI WITHDRAWAL FROM EM LIKELY TO OCCUR WITHIN ONE WEEK. MARTIAL LAW LIKELY TO BE LIFTED ALSO WITHIN THE WEEK, AND WILL LIKELY COINCIDE WITH HANDOVER OF RESPONSIBILITY. APPROXIMATELY 11,000 TNI SOLDIERS ARE ESTIMATED PRESENT IN EAST TIMOR, WITH TWO TNI BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS DIRECTING THE OPERATIONS OF FIVE INFANTRY BATTALIONS (APPROXIMATELY 5-6,000 SOLDIERS). THE REMAINING TNI PERSONNEL CONTINUE TO WITHDRAW FROM EM.
A. (S) GENERAL TNI SITUATION/OPERATIONS. TNI FORCES IN EM CONTINUE TO WITHDRAW. TNI IS MAINTAINING A COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE WITH INTERFET TROOPS. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE TNI IS KEEPING A LOW PROFILE IN EM.
B. (S) CAPABILITIES. TNI IS LIKELY EXPERIENCING COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS DURING ITS WITHDRAWAL. WIDELY DISPERSED FORCES ARE LIKELY PRESENTING LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES.
C. (S) POSSIBLE/MOST PROBABLE TNI COURSE(S) OF ACTION. TNI WILL LIKELYCONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH THE INTERFET DEPLOYMENT AS THEY PROCEED WITH THEIR EVACUATION FROM EM. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS TNI WILL LEAVE BEHIND WEAPONS FOR THE MILITIAS. TWO INFANTRY BRIGADES (MINUS)CONSISTING OF TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS TOTAL MAY REMAIN IN EM UNTIL THE FORMAL TURNOVER WITH INTERFET OCCURS. PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS LIKELY WILL CONDUCT SMALL OPPORTUNISTIC ATTACKS AGAINST TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY IN EM, ESPECIALLY IN WESTERN EM AFTER TNI FORMALLY TURNS OVER OPERATIONS TO INTERFET. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE MILITIAS MAY ATTEMPT TO PARTITION EM, ALTHOUGH JICPAC ASSESSES THIS AS UNLIKELY.
D. (S) PERCEIVED THREAT. INTERFET FACES THREE THREATS. 1) HIGHEST THREAT IS FROM PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS OPERATING WITHIN EM OR IN CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS FROM WEST TIMOR WITH INDONESIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (KOPASSUS) SUPPORT. PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS INDICATE LIKELY TARGETING OF AUSTRALIANS MEMBERS OF INTERFET. THIS THREAT LIKELY EXTENDS TO NON-AUSTRALIAN INTERFET MEMBERS OF SIMILAR ETHNIC APPEARANCE; 2) TNI/SECURITY FORCES WITHIN EM THAT HAVE NOT YET EVACUATED POSE SOME THREAT DUE TO POSSIBLE TNI COMMAND AND CONTROL AND VERIFIED DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS; 3) THERE EXISTS THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERFET FORCES COMING BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE (FALANTIL) CLASHES, WHICH POSES A THREAT TO PEACEKEEPERS CHARGED WITH MAINTAINING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT.
GENTEXT/LOGISTICS/
4. (U) RESPONDING TO LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FROM EXORD.
A. (S) SUPPLY: AUSTRALIA HAS CHARTERED COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION TO MOVE BODY ARMOR FROM DLA DEPOT, COLUMBUS OHIO TO CHICAGO AIRPORT, WEDNESDAY 22 SEP FOR TRANSPORT TO MELBOURNE ETA DARWIN ON SATURDAY. PROJECT TO ARRIVE IN TIME TO MEET AUSTRALIAN DEPLOYMENT PLANNING NEEDS. AIRCREW BODY ARMOR WILL BE SHIPPED SEPARATELY FROM MECHANICSBURG, PA.
B. (U) MAINTENANCE AND SERVICES: TAKING ACTIONS TO ESTABLISH ITV FOR SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL MOVING TO COMUSF INTERFET. EXPLORING OPTION

TO ESTABLISH SUSTAINMENT CHANNEL FLIGHT FROM US TO AUSTRALIA.
C. (S) POL: NSTR.
D. (S) TRANSPORTATION: PRESIDENTIAL DRAWDOWN AUTHORITY SIGNED, ANTICIPATE RAPID FLOW OF COALITION LIFT REQUESTS. NZ EXAMINING COMMERCIAL AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT ALTERNATIVES AS WELL AS POSSIBLE US STRATEGIC MOVEMENT OPTIONS. USAF C-130 SHUTTLE FLIGHTS BEING CONDUCTED BETWEEN DARWIN AND EAST TIMOR.
E. (U) FACILITIES: NSTR.
F. (U) MUNITIONS: NSTR.
G. (S) CONSTRUCTION: TRANSCOM AIRFIELD AND SEAPORT SURVEY TEAM ARRIVED DARWIN AND AWAITING TRANSPORT TO EAST TIMOR. CONSTRUCTION PLANNING AND EXECUTION FOR APOD, SPOD AND FUEL SYSTEM RESTORATION DEPENDENT ON SURVEY RESULTS. INVESTIGATING CONTRACT OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT OTHER ENGINEER REQUESTS.
H. (U) INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS: DIPLOMATIC NOTE TO BRING THE NEW ACQUISITION CROSS SERVICING AGREEMENT (ACSA) INTO FORCE RELEASED BY SECSTATE 21 SEP 99.
I. (C) MEDICAL: THE SQUADRON MEDICAL ELEMENT (SME) (INCLUDES THE FLIGHT SURGEON WHO WILL BE THE FIRST CLINICIAN SUPPORTING USFOR) WHICH DEPLOYED FROM HICKAM ON 20 SEP 99 HAS BEEN DELAYED IN KWAJALEIN DUE TO WEATHER. SCHEDULED TO LEAVE AT 212300Z SEP 99 EN-ROUTE DARWIN.
GENTEXT/COMMUNICATIONS/CONNECTIVITY/
5. A. (S) COMUSF INTERFET, LOCATED IN DARWIN, HAS VOICE, VIDEO AND DATA DII CONNECTIVITY PROVIDED BY USCINCPAC'S MSQ 126
B. (U)UHF TACSAT SUPPORT: PROVIDED ONE UHF TACSAT NARROW BAND CHANNEL TO COMINTERFET FOR C2 OF INTERFET FORCES (SATCOMMGMTCEN PAC 210505Z SEP 99 (C))
C. (U) COMSEC:. PUBLISHED COMSEC CALLOUT MESSAGE TO THEATER. (USCINCPAC 210300Z SEP 99 (C))
GENTEXT/PERSONNEL/
6. (S) EAST TIMOR PERSTAT REPORT 006 US PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF INTERFET FOR THE PERIOD/210001Z SEP 99 TO 212359Z SEP 99//
A. (S) AUSTRALIA (AUS)/

LOC/	UNIT/	ARMY/	AF/	NAVY/	USMC/	CIV/	AFLOAT/	ASHORE/	FEM/
BRISBANE/		3/	4/	0/	5/	1/	0/	13/	0/
DARWIN/		2/	63/	19/	16/	0/	0/	100/	0/
SYDNEY/		0/	1/	0/	5/	0/	0/	6/	0/
TINDAL/		0/	0/	25/	0/	0/	0/	25/	0/
TOTAL AUS		5/	68/	44/	26/	1/	0/	144/	0/

B. (S) EAST TIMOR (ET)/

LOC/	UNIT/	ARMY/	AF/	NAVY/	USMC/	CIV/	AFLOAT/	ASHORE/	FEM/
DILI/		0/	0/	0/	2/	0/	0/	2/	0/
TOTAL ET /		0/	0/	0/	2/	0/	0/	2/	0/

C. (S) AFLOAT/

SHIP/	ARMY/	AF/	NAVY/	USMC/	CIV/	AFLOAT/	ASHORE/	FEM/
MOBILE BAY/	0/	0/	368/	0/	0/	368/	0/	5/
USNS KILAUEA/	0/	0/	37/	0/	122/	159/	0/	7/
TOTAL AFLOAT/	0/	0/	405/	0/	122/	527/	0/	12/

D. (S) TOTAL/

TOTAL/	ARMY/	AF/	NAVY/	USMC/	CIV/	AFLOAT/	ASHORE/	FEM/
648/	5/	68/	449/	28/	123/	527/	146/	12/

E. (S) NOTES/AMPLIFYING INFO:
(1) (S) THERE ARE 984 PERSONNEL IN AUSTRALIA ISO CROCODILE 99.
(2) (S) PERSONNEL IN EAST TIMOR:
CAPT HUGHES,USMC (PAO OFFICER AT DILI WITH PRESS POOL.
LTCOL BAKER, USMC (LNO TO 3RD BRIGADE)//
GENTEXT/SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL-MILITARY-DIPLOMATIC EVENTS/
7. (U). NSTR//
GENTEXT/COMMANDERS EVALUATION/
8. A. (S) OPERATION ON TRACK. CLOSE COORDINATION WITH COMAST CONTINUES. EXPECT TO HAVE FULLY FUNCTIONING COMUSFOR INTERFET HQ IN DARWIN BY 25 SEP. MONITORING SITUATION IN WEST TIMOR DUE TO THE MIX OF REFUGEES, ARMED MILITIA MEMBERS AND ILL-DISCIPLINED SOLDIERS WITH WEAPONS.
B. (U) SEE OUR HOME PAGE HTTP://WWW.PACOM.SMIL.MIL/J3/CRISIS/ET99.HTML FOR THE MOST CURRENT UPDATES.//

CLOSE TEXT/RELEASED BY J3//
CL BY/ PICKAVANCE, RADM, J3, USCINCPAC//
CL REASON 1.5 (A), (B)//
DECL ON/ 30 SEP 2009//
BT
#3373

NNNN

2008-F-06 (BRAD SIMPSON)

ENCLOSURE (5):

☐ USCINCPAC MSG 092300Z JUN 98 (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

SD 7-3

RTTCZYUW RUMMUNA0001 1601100-CCCC-RUHPSUU
ZNR CCCCC ZNY
092300Z JUN 98 ZYB
FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
TO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
CJCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP//
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP//
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J04//
BT

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: _____
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L PERS~~ONAL FOR SECDEF COHEN AND GEN SHELTON, INFO USDP SLOCOMBE, A/S ROTH, AMB ROY AND AMB KRISTOFF FROM PRUEHER//N00000//
MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCPAC TANGO 01//
SUBJ/INDONESIA TRIP REPORT (U)//
RMKS/1. (U) MR. SECRETARY AND HUGH, THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES OUR SHORT VISIT IN INDONESIA WITH GEN WIRANTO AND OTHER MILITARY LEADERS. AMB ROY AND DATT, DON MCFETRIDGE, HAVE SENT DETAILS ON OUR MEETINGS, BUT WANT TO AMPLIFY MY TAKE ON CLIMATE, MAIN POINTS, AND IMPRESSIONS. STAN ROTH'S POSITIVE IMPACT WAS EVIDENT.

2. (C) MY MEETINGS WERE WITH:
- GEN WIRANTO, MOD AND CINC ABRI
- FEISAL TANJUNG, MIN FOR POLITICS AND SECURITY (FORMER CINC ABRI)
- LTG BAMBANG YUDHOYONO, CHIEF SOCIAL/POLITICAL FOR ABRI
- MG AGUS WIDJOYO, ASST GEN PLANS ABRI
- RADM YOOST MENKO, ACOS INTEL & SECURITY, ABRI
- OF COURSE STAPE ROY AND EXCELLENT/SEASONED COUNTRY TEAM

3. (C) THE BASIC MESSAGE DELIVERED AT ALL INDONESIAN MEETINGS WAS AS WE HAVE DISCUSSED:

A. POSITIVE RECOGNITION OF ABRI'S RESTRAINT AND OVERALL COHESIVE ROLE FOR PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, ESPECIALLY IN MAY.

B. ENCOURAGEMENT FOR ABRI TO SUPPORT CONTINUED REFORM - AT THE BEST ACHIEVABLE PACE.

C. SOUGHT ABRI VIEWS FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE OF STATUS FOR EAST TIMOR.

D. SOUGHT ABRI VIEW ON ACHIEVABLE TIMING FOR NEW ELECTIONS.

E. EMPHASIZED THAT THOROUGH INVESTIGATIONS OF TRISAKTI SHOOTING WERE IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF OUR CONFIDENCE IN REFORM PROCESS.

F. OUR GOAL WAS REGIONAL STABILITY, WITH A PROSPEROUS INDONESIA A MAJOR PARTNER.

G. THAT WE RECOGNIZED ROUGH ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL ROAD AHEAD, BUT THAT WE (USG, AND OUR MILITARY PIECE) WANT TO SUPPORT GOOD OUTCOME FOR INDONESIAN PEOPLE WITHOUT BEING SEEN TO BE INTRUSIVE.

4. (C) SUMMARY OF OFFICE CALLS:

A. (C) SUNDAY EVENING MEETING WITH STAPE ROY AND HIS OUTSTANDING COUNTRY TEAM PROVIDED A THOROUGH DEBRIEF OF RECENT GEN JOHN BAKER (CDR, AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE FORCE) VISIT. HIS IMPRESSIONS ALIGN CLOSELY WITH MINE AND

UNCLASSIFIED

THOSE OF THE EMBASSY; ECONOMY IS EXCEEDINGLY FRAGILE, AND THE BANKING SYSTEM IS IN CHAOS, DESCRIBED AS "STANDING UP BY HABIT ALONE." POL OFFICERS REPORT THAT REAL POWER REMAINS UP FOR GRABS AND THAT HABIBIE HAS YET TO SECURE IT. AMB ROY OBSERVED THAT HABIBIE HAS APPOINTED A GOOD CABINET THAT IS BEING PREMATURELY JUDGED INEFFECTIVE.

B. (C) WIRANTO AND THE NEW ABRI CHIEF OF STAFF, LTG FACHRUL RAZI: WIRANTO, WHO HAS BEEN WORKING WITH HEAVY PRESSURES, WAS CONFIDENT, HEALTHY, ALERT, BUT A LITTLE TIRED. I BELIEVE HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR VISIT AND MORAL SUPPORT. HE EMPHASIZED THAT SUPPORT FOR THE CONSTITUTION WAS ABRI GUIDE THROUGH THE MAZE OF DECISIONS, AND HE ALSO SUPPORTED HABIBIE BECAUSE " HE IS OUR PRESIDENT BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION." ALTHOUGH WORRIED ABOUT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE CURRENT TURMOIL, HE PORTRAYS CONFIDENCE THE GOVERNMENT CAN SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS, BUT INDONESIA WILL NEED HELP. TOP PRIORITY IS STABILITY IN ORDER TO REGAIN REGIONAL CONFIDENCE AND RECOVER FROM URGENT WOES. NEAR TERM PLAN INCLUDES: GETTING ALL ABRI TO FOLLOW RULE OF LAW AND IMPLEMENTING CHANGES IN THE DWI-FUNGSI (DUAL FUNCTION) PROCESS SO ABRI BECOMES MORE OPEN, HAS MORE TRANSPARENCY, AND IS BETTER UNITED WITH THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY. HE SEES ABRI AS THE NATIONAL LEADER. NOTED THAT MIL-TO-MIL RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. WERE VERY IMPORTANT; WANTS THEM TO RETURN TO NORMAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. COMMENTED THAT HE HAS LOOKED INTO THE RECENT COMPLAINTS BY INDONESIAN FACTIONS ABOUT DESTABILIZING ROLE OF NGO'S AND FOUND THEM TO BE WITHOUT MERIT. HE PROMISED TO DO A BETTER JOB OF EXPLAINING NGO'S ROLE TO THE PUBLIC. LOOKS FORWARD TO ATTENDING PACOM HOSTED CHOD CONFERENCE IN HAWAII IN LATE SEP. HE HOPES TO SEE BOTH OF YOU THERE.

C. (C) FEISAL TANJUNG: ASSURED US THAT THEY ARE WORKING POLITICAL REFORMS HARD AS WELL AS LEGAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS. HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FIRST TWO, WHILE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS GINANJAR IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIRD. GOAL OF REFORMS IS GREATER AND MORE RELAXED FREEDOMS. HE ASKED FOR OUR ASSISTANCE WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS IN SECURING ECONOMIC HELP. ON NEW ELECTION PROCEDURES, HE SAID INDONESIA WOULD PROBABLY ADOPT SOME COMBINATION OF DISTRICT AND PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. ON THE DATE OF ELECTION, HE SAID PROBABLY IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1999. ON EAST TIMOR HE SAID THE WHOLE QUESTION WAS UNDER DISCUSSION WITH THE PORTUGESE AND THAT EAST TIMOR IS "AN INSEPARABLE PART OF INDONESIA."

D. (C) LTG BAMBANG YUDHOYONO, CHIEF OF SOCIAL - POLITICAL AFFAIRS FOR ABRI WHO IS CREDITED WITH BEING THE MILITARY'S INTELLECTUAL LEADER, AND IS CLOSE WIRANTO ADVISOR: BRIGHT, ARTICULATE AND THOUGHTFUL. CHARGED WITH HEADING ABRI PLANS FOR POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL REFORM POST-SOEHARTO. HE INDICATED THAT ALONG WITH GOVERNMENT REFORM, THE DWI-FUNGSI ROLE OF ABRI WILL ALSO BE MODIFIED, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT OFFER SPECIFICS. MENTIONED ELECTIONS WOULD OCCUR WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR,

"THE SOONER, THE BETTER." HE THINKS PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S ACCELERATION TO MAY 99 IS BETTER, BUT MAY NOT BE SOON ENOUGH FOR THE POPULATION. THE KEY POINT FROM ALL IS THAT CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HABIBIE PRESIDENCY PROVIDES AT LEAST SOME STABILITY THE NATION BADLY NEEDS IN THE INTERIM. THOUGHT THE EAST TIMOR SITUATION WILL IMPROVE AS THE REGION IS ALLOWED MORE AUTONOMY. CAUTIONED THAT WHILE POLITICAL PRISONERS WOULD BE RELEASED, CRIMINALS WOULD NOT.

E. (C) MG AGUS WIDJOYO, ASST FOR GENERAL PLANNING FOR ABRI; AND RADM YOOST F. MENGKO, ASST C/S FOR INTEL AND SECURITY, ABRI. AGUS IS JUNIOR, BUT IN INNER CIRCLE OF ADVISORS. AGUS NOTED THERE ARE STILL TOUGH TIMES AHEAD. AS THEY MOVE RAPIDLY TOWARD REFORM THEY WORRY AND CHECK OFTEN TO ENSURE THEY ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK. "WE NEED TO MOVE FAST, BUT NOT RUSH." CONCERNING ELECTIONS, AGUS OFFERED THAT ABRI HAS ALWAYS STUCK TO THE RULES OF THE CONSTITUTION. THEY ARE AWARE OF THE DESIRES OF THE MAJORITY AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE SMALLER ETHNIC AND POLITICAL GROUPS; ANY CHANGE HAS TO BE (AND BE SEEN TO BE) A FAIR GAME FOR EVERYBODY. REGARDING THE MILITARY BUDGET, AGUS EXPECTED ONE MORE REVISION THIS FISCAL YEAR. FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION WILL BE STAGNANT. MILITARY FOCUS IS FIRST ON SECURITY ISSUES, SECOND ON MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT AND THIRD THE NEEDS OF THEIR SERVICE MEMBERS. RADM YOOST COMMENTED THAT WITH REFORM, THERE IS MUCH AT STAKE. THE REFORMERS ARE HOPING FOR A WIN-WIN SITUATION, AND ABRI MUST HELP FIND THAT.

5. (C) TOOK A WINDSHIELD TOUR OF AREA OF JAKARTA WHERE RIOTS WERE HEAVIEST. DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY HAS BEEN SYSTEMATIC AND TARGETED AGAINST SOEHARTO OR CHINESE OWNED BUILDINGS AS REPORTED BY ALL CABLES. CITY APPEARS TO BE TRYING TO RETURN TO NORMAL; BUSINESSES ARE OPEN, PEOPLE AND TRAFFIC ON STREETS AND I WOULD HAVE BEEN COMFORTABLE MINGLING IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. THOUGH OUR MOTORCYCLE ESCORTS MADE US OBVIOUS, WE WERE SHOWN CURIOSITY AND SMILES.

6. (C) FIRST IMPRESSIONS AND TAKEAWAYS:

A. INDONESIA NEEDS U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO GET THROUGH THIS CRISIS.

B. RECOGNITION OF HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION SO HIS TRANSITION GOVERNMENT CAN HELP STABILIZE OVERALL SITUATION IS PROBABLY IN OUR BEST INTEREST, BUT WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE TRANSITIONAL NATURE TO ENHANCE PROSPECT FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY.

C. ABRI LEADERSHIP CLEARLY RECOGNIZES THE ROUGH ROAD AHEAD.

D. ABRI IS CLINGING TO CONSTITUTION AS POLESTAR. I TOLD THEM WE COULD SUPPORT THAT POSITION.

E. THERE IS FLEXIBILITY ON SOME CHANGE FOR EAST TIMOR; POLITICAL PRISONERS WILL BE RELEASED BUT THOSE WHO HAVE CLEARLY VIOLATED CRIMINAL CODES WILL NOT BE RELEASED (E.G. XANANA).

F. ABRI WOULD LIKE TO RESTART MIL-TO-MIL ENGAGEMENT AND AGREED TO SUPPORT MODIFIED PROGRAM THAT AVOIDS JAKARTA AREA AND KOPASSUS UNITS.

GEN WIRANTO SEES NEED INTERNALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY

FOR THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF TRISAKTI SHOOTINGS AND TO A FAIR AND JUST RESOLUTION OF THIS MATTER.

H. GEN WIRANTO HAS ACHIEVED NEAR FULL ABRI UNITY BUT ADMITS TO FURTHER WORK AHEAD. HE WILL SEEK STABILITY FIRST; SUFFERS FROM NO ILLUSIONS REGARDING CHALLENGES.

I. GEN WIRANTO UNDERSTANDS HISTORY AND IMPORTANCE OF NGO'S IN PROVIDING BASIC LIFE NECESSITIES TO RURAL AREAS. GOAL IS TO DO A BETTER JOB OF EXPLAINING TO THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE U.S. ROLE WITH THE NGO'S.

J. ANTI-CHINESE EMOTION RUNS HIGH. SENIOR ABRI DO NOT SEEM TO SHARE THIS VIEW, BUT ACKNOWLEDGE DIFFICULTY TO CHANGE IT, AND SAY THEY ARE TRYING TO DO SO.

K. MOST AGREE ON NEED FOR REFORM; HEARD NO COALESCED PLANS. ABRI LEADERSHIP AGREES. WE HAVE BOTH URGENT AND LONG TERM WORK IN PROGRESS.

7. ~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. IMF DISBURSEMENTS. POLITICAL STABILITY CAN ONLY BE REALIZED IN TANDEM WITH ECONOMIC RECOVERY. RECOMMEND SUPPORT DISBURSEMENT OF APPROVED IMF FUNDS SOON.

B. RE-START A MODIFIED MIL-TO-MIL PROGRAM. PROGRAM SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE ABRI RESPONSIBLE ACTIONS, ENHANCE U.S. STATURE, COORDINATE WITH AUSTRALIA'S PROGRAM, HELP ABRI BURNISH ITS IMAGE, AND PROVIDE STRUCTURED HELP TO INDONESIA WHILE ACCOMODATING US TRAINING. RECOMMEND THESE GENERAL CATEGORIES FOR REVIEW AND PLANNING:
   -- TRANSPORT, LOGISTIC, AND ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES
   -- MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND MEDICAL SUPPLY ACTIVITIES
   -- SHIP VISITS, WELL PLANNED

C. U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT OF UN/NGO/PVO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES FOR INDONESIA.

D. TIMING IS CONTINGENT ON STATE DEPARTMENT DETERMINATION TO RETURN TO NORMAL TRAVEL CONDITION CODE.

8. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY. WE CAN EFFECTIVELY EXERCISE OUR INFLUENCE AND ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS IN INDONESIA THROUGH ABRI. MY OPINION IS THAT ABRI IS MAKING A CONCERTED AND AUTHENTIC EFFORT TO CONTINUE RESTRAINT, WHILE ENSURING THE NECESSARY STABILITY TO BRING REFORM TO THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE. OUR ENGAGEMENT WITH ABRI CAN ASSIST BY HELPING ABRI HELP ITS PEOPLE. IN TURN, WE INCREASE OUR STANDING AND INFLUENCE WITH ABRI. U.S. ASSISTANCE AT THIS PRECARIOUS BUT PIVOTAL MOMENT IN INDONESIA'S HISTORY CAN ONLY HELP BUT TO ADVANCE U.S. INTERESTS IN INDONESIA AND THE LARGER REGION.

9. (U) MY BEST AND VERY RESPECTFULLY, JOE.

CL BY/J. W. PRUEHER, ADM, USCINCPAC//
CL REASON/1.5(A)//
DECL ON/X1//
BT
#0001

NNNN
□□

2008-F-06 (BRAD SIMPSON)

ENCLOSURE (6):

☐ USCINCPAC MSG 290025Z SEP 99 (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

VZCZCCCR231
RATSZYUW RHHMMCA2933 2720236-SSSS--RHHMUNA RHHMUNS.
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHMUNA4515 2720025
R 290025Z SEP 99 PSN 885844H37
FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//CAT//
TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J3//
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//J3//
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3//
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ3//
RUCQSOC/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ3//
RUPEUNA/USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO//J3//
RUCUSTR/USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE//J3//
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3//
RHHMHBA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3//
RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3//
RUHVPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO/CAT//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP//
RUHEHMS/COMMARFORPAC//G3//
RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//USFK J3//
RUHHHGA/HQ ALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//USFJ J3//
RHHMUNS/COMSOCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUHPOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHPQUA/COMTHIRDFLT
RUHBABA/CG III MEF//G3/G5//
RUHHALA/COMUSF INTERFET
RUHBABA/COMUSF INTERFET
RHOAMOB/CJTF TSO
RUHHALA/CINCPAC MSQ
RUWFEAA/COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N3//
RHWIDIL/COMVAQWINGPAC WHIDBEY ISLAND WA
RHDIAAA/HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//DO/BSD//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEJDCA/DISA WASHINGTON DC
RUEADLA/DLA FT BELVOIR VA
RUEANQA/NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD//IAWM//
RUEANQC/NIMA RESTON VA//COTP//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//CAT//
BT
~~S-E-C-R-E-T//N03500//~~
MSGID/SITREP/USCINCPAC/28/09/013/SEP//ET99//
REF/A/MSG/AUSTRALIAN CDF/080300ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/ORDER/USCINCPAC/280515ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/ORDER/USCINCPAC/010400ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/D/ORDER/USCINCPAC/040045ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/E/ORDER/USCINCPAC/140530ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/F/DOC/CJCS/04DEC98/-/NOTAL//
REF/G/ORDER/CJCS/161825ZSEP99//
REF/H/ORDER/CJCS/271300ZSEP99//
NARR/(S) REF A IS AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE FORCES (ADF)
WARNING ORDER FOR OPERATION WARDEN, WHICH COVERS ADF
INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN EAST TIMOR
(INTERFET). REF B IS THE USCINCPAC EXORD TO POSITION
FORCES IN THE TIMOR SEA AREA TO SUPPORT AUSTRALIAN NEO

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: _____
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

OPERATIONS IF REQUESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA. REF C MODIFIED THE FORCE LIST AND TASKING IN REF B. REF D ACTIVATES JOINT TASK FORCE TIMOR SEA OPERATIONS (JTF TSO) AND DIRECTS JTF TSO TO REMAIN WITHIN 72 HOURS OF CJTF-DESIGNATED MODLOC IN TIMOR SEA TO PROVIDE SUPPORT, IF REQUESTED. REF E IS USCINCPAC PREPARE TO DEPLOY ORDER. REF F IS CJCS MEMORANDUM (DEPLOYMENT HEALTH SURVEILLANCE AND READINESS), WHICH CONTAINS GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING PRE- AND POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH ASSESSMENTS. REF G IS EXECUTE ORDER. SECDEF HAS DIRECTED THE DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES AND EXECUTION OF OPERATIONS AS PART OF MULTINATIONAL FORCE OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR. REF H IS MOD 001 TO THE EXECUTE ORDER (REF G).
PERIOD/280001Z SEP 99/TO: 282359Z SEP 99/AS OF: 282359Z SEP 99//
HEADING/OWN SITUATION//
5UNIT

/UNITDES	/UNIT LOC	/CMNTS
/USS MOBILE BAY (MOB)	/09-39S, 127-51E	/MODLOC ON STATION
/USNS KILAUEA (KIL)	/TIMOR SEA	/RESUPPLY MOB
/CTU 72.5.9 (EP-3)	/TINDAL, AS	/ON STATION
/MSQ-126	/DARWIN, AS	/ON STATION
/THREE C-130	/DARWIN, AS	/ON STATION
/LOG PLANNING CELL	/DARWIN, AS	/ON STATION
/CMOC	/DARWIN, AS	/ON STATION
/INTEL AUGMENTATION TEAM	/DARWIN, AS	/ON STATION
/TROJAN SPIRIT INTEL C2	/DARWIN, AS	/ON STATION

GENTEXT/SITUATION/
1. (S) DEPLOYMENT CONTINUES WITHOUT INCIDENT. C-17 ARRIVED DARWIN WITH INTEL AUGMENTATION (9), HUMINT SUPPORT (6), TROJAN SPIRIT (6), MEDICAL SUPPORT (2), AND CMOC (2) AT 280350Z SEP 99.
GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/
2. A. (S) DEFCON STATUS: DEFCON 5
B. (U) CBR OPERATIONS
(1) (S) NUCLEAR: NSTR.
(2) (S) CHEMICAL: NSTR.
C. (S) GROUND SITUATION: NSTR.
D. (S) NAVAL SITUATION: MOB REMAINS UNDERWAY TIMOR SEA PROVIDING SEA SURVEILLANCE, ESCORT AND LILY PAD DUTIES FOR VESSELS MOVING FROM AS TO DILI. KIL DEPARTED DARWIN AT 272330Z SEP 99. SCHEDULED TO LINK UP WITH MOB ON 290500Z SEP 99. USNS SAN JOSE PREPARING TO SAIL FROM GUAM TO REPLACE KIL O/A 5 OCTOBER.
E. (S) AIR SITUATION: 3XC130S ARE DEPLOYED TO DARWIN. CONDUCTED FOUR MISSIONS TO DILI TUESDAY (I). ZERO MISSIONS WEDNESDAY (I). FOUR MISSIONS SCHEDULED THURSDAY (I). US C130S HAVE NOT CONDUCTED AIRDROP MISSIONS. THROUGH 281930Z SEP 99 C130S HAVE FLOWN 26 SORTIES DELIVERING 262 STONS AND 313 PERSONNEL TO DILI.
F. (S) AIR RECONNAISSANCE: NO EP-3 MISSIONS IN PAST 24 HRS. NEXT MISSION SCHEDULED FOR 290300Z SEP 99. FIVE TOTAL EP-3 MISSIONS COMPLETED TO DATE.
G. (S) JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS: NSTR.
H. (S) WEATHER: HIGH PRESSURE DOMINATES. EXPECT CONTINUED SUNNY SKIES AND HIGH TEMPERATURES IN THE 80'S.
GENTEXT/INTELLIGENCE/RECONNAISSANCE
3. (S) APPROXIMATELY 1,400 INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (TNI) SOLDIERS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL REMAIN IN DILI AFTER FORMAL HAND-OVER OF MILITARY CONTROL TO INTERFET. SECURITY SITUATION REMAINED CALM AS INTERFET DEPLOYED FORCES TO LIQUICA (0841S/12520E) AND COM (0822S/12703E).. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE INTERFET APPREHENDED TEN POSSIBLE INDONESIAN SPECIAL FORCES (KOPASSUS) SOLDIERS DURING A MILITIA SWEEP.
A. (S) PAST 24 HOUR ACTIVITY.
(1) (S) MILITIAS: APPROXIMATELY 30 SUSPECTED MILITIAMEN, LIKELY AFFILIATED WITH BESI MERIH PUTIH FLED INTO THE SURROUNDING HILLS OF LIQUICA. INTERFET RECOVERED AN ABANDONED CACHE OF WEAPONS. NEARLY TWENTY SUSPECTED MILITIAMEN WERE APPREHENDED BY INTERFET NEAR COM.

(2) (U) TNI: TNI MAINTAINS A DIMINISHED PRESENCE IN DILI, CONSISTING OF THE 700TH AIRBORNE INFANTRY BATTALION AND SEVERAL COMPANY-SIZED SUPPORT ELEMENTS EXPECTED TO REMAIN IN EAST TIMOR (EM) UNTIL NOVEMBER.
(3) (S) KOPASSUS: TEN SUSPECTED KOPASSUS SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY INTERFET AFTER A MILITIA SWEEP CONDUCTED 28 SEP. INTERFET HAS PUBLICLY INDICATED THE SUSPECTS WILL BE HELD UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) ACKNOWLEDGES THEIR PRESENCE. THE SOLDIERS ARE ASSUMED TO HAVE BEEN OUT OF UNIFORM AND WERE APPARENTLY IDENTIFIED AS TNI BY THEIR IDENTIFICATION CARDS. IT IS POSSIBLE THEY ARE DESERTERS AND/OR WILL BE PRONOUNCED AS SUCH BY GOI.
B. (S) CAPABILITIES.
(1) (S) MILITIAS: ASSESSED AS CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST UNARMED NON-COMBATANTS, THEFT OF HUMANITARIAN AID AND INTIMIDATION OF LOCAL POPULACE. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT MILITIAS CAN SUPPORT A HIGHLY PLANNED, DELIBERATE ONGOING GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN. DESPITE THREATS, MILITIAS HAVE AVOIDED CONFRONTATIONS WITH INTERFET.
(2) (S) TNI: UNLIKELY TO POSE A DIRECT THREAT TO INTERFET, ASIDE FROM MILITIA INVOLVEMENT THROUGH KOPASSUS.
(3) (S) KOPASSUS: UNITS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO PROVIDE CLANDESTINE SUPPORT TO MILITIA GROUPS.
C. (S) INTENTIONS.
(1) (S) MILITIAS: POSE A CREDIBLE THREAT FOR SPORADIC VIOLENCE MOST LIKELY DIRECTED AGAINST UNARMED UNAMET ELEMENTS.
(2) (S) TNI: EXPECTED TO PUBLICLY SUPPORT AND COOPERATE WITH ONGOING INTERFET OPERATIONS TO MAXIMIZE FAVORABLE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. TNI WILL LIKELY USE LIAISON OFFICERS, POLICE AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL TO COLLECT INFORMATION, ASSESS INTERFET CAPABILITIES AND ASSIST MILITIAS IN EVADING CAPTURE.
(3) (S) KOPASSUS: SUPPORT TO MILITIA GROUPS WILL LIKELY BE DRIVEN BY NEED FOR DISASSOCIATION, LIMITING THREAT TO BOMBINGS, BOOBY TRAPS OR ACTIVITIES WHICH AFFORD REMOTE INVOLVEMENT AND LOW PROBABILITY OF COMPROMISE OR CAPTURE.
D. (S) PERCEIVED THREAT. INTERFET FACES THREE THREATS. 1) HIGHEST THREAT IS FROM PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS OPERATING WITHIN EM OR IN CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS FROM WEST TIMOR WITH KOPASSUS SUPPORT; 2) TNI/SECURITY FORCES REMAINING BEHIND IN EM POSE A SMALL AND UNLIKELY DIRECT THREAT TO INTERFET; 3) THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF INTERFET FORCES COMING BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE (FALANTIL) CLASHES WHILE ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN A SECURE ENVIRONMENT.
GENTEXT/LOGISTICS/
4. (U) RESPONDING TO LOGISTICAL REQUESTS FROM COMUSFORINTERFET.
A. (S) SUPPLY: (S) LOAN OF AN/PSC-5 PORTABLE UHF TACSAT SINGLE CHANNEL RADIO SETS: PACOM MSG TO BE RELEASED TODAY REQUESTING PACAF AND MARFORPAC IDENTIFY AND SHIP 2 SETS EA TO AUSTRALIA.
B. (S) MAINTENANCE AND SERVICES: USCINCPAC MSG 280601Z SEP 99 RELEASED TASKING COMPONENTS TO PROVIDE LOG PLANNERS TO ASSIST COMAST-SYDNEY IN PLANNING FOR SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT FOR TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS (TCN) AND IDENTIFICATION OF ANY UNIQUE U.S. SUPPORT THAT MAY BE REQUIRED. MSG TASKED PACAF, TRANSCOM, AND MARFORPAC FOR 1 LOG PLANNER EACH AND USARPAC FOR 2 LOG PLANNERS TO ARRIVE IN SYDNEY NLT 5OCT99(W). USCINCPAC MSG 280416Z SEP 99 TASKED PACAF FOR AERIAL PORT LOAD TEAM TO ASSIST COMUSFORINTERNET AERIAL PORT OPS IN DARWIN.
C. (S) POL: NSTR.
D. (S) TRANSPORTATION: FINAL LEG OF MISSION PMF106TM272, CARRYING AERIAL PORT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FROM PACAF, ARRIVES DARWIN 290850Z SEP 99. NO ADDITIONAL FLIGHTS SCHEDULED AT THIS TIME.
E. (U) FACILITIES: NSTR.
F. (U) MUNITIONS: NSTR.
G. (U) CONSTRUCTION: NSTR.
H. (U) INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS: NSTR.
I. (U) MEDICAL: THE CONDITION OF THE MOBILE BAY SAILOR SUFFERING FROM SEVERE ABDOMINAL PAIN HAS IMPROVED. THE SHIP'S INDEPENDENT DUTY CORPSMAN, IN CONSULTATION WITH A PHYSICIAN AT NAVAL HOSPITAL

YOKOSUKA, HAS DECIDED TO RETAIN THE PATIENT ABOARD THE SHIP. MEDEVAC CANCELLED.
GENTEXT/COMMUNICATIONS/CONNECTIVITY/
5. (S) AWAITING FORMAL JOINT STAFF RESPONSE TO USCINCPAC REQUEST FOR FORCES OF CONUS TASK-ORGANIZED COMM/SIGNAL COMPANY.
GENTEXT/PERSONNEL/
6. (S) EAST TIMOR PERSTAT REPORT. US PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF INTERFET FOR THE PERIOD/280001Z SEP 99 TO 282359Z SEP 99//
A. (S) AUSTRALIA (AUS)/

LOC/ UNIT/	ARMY/	AF/	NAVY/	USMC/	SOF/	CIV/	AFLOAT/	ASHORE/	FEM/
BRISBANE/	0/	1/	0/	0/	/	0/	0/	1/	0/
DARWIN/	15/107/		22/	57/	19/	4/	0/	230/	8/
SYDNEY/	0/	7/	1/	3/	0/	1/	0/	12/	0/
TINDAL/	0/	0/	25/	0/	0/	0/	0/	25/	0/
TOTAL AUS	15/115/		48/	60/	19/	5/	0/	268/	8/

B. (S) EAST TIMOR (EM)/

LOC/ UNIT/	ARMY/	AF/	NAVY/	USMC/	SOF/	CIV/	AFLOAT/	ASHORE/	FEM/
DILI/	0/	0/	0/	8/	0/	0/	0/	8/	0/
TOTAL EM /	0/	0/	0/	8/	0/	0/	0/	8/	0/

C. (S) AFLOAT/

SHIP/	ARMY/	AF/	NAVY/	USMC/	SOF/	CIV/	AFLOAT/	ASHORE/	FEM/
MOBILE BAY/	0/	0/	352/	0/	0/	1/	353/	0/	5/
USNS KILAUEA/	0/	0/	47/	0/	0/116/		163/	0/	6/
TOTAL AFLOAT/	0/	0/	399/	0/	0/117/		516/	0/	11/

D. (S) TOTAL/

TOTAL/	ARMY/	AF/	NAVY/	USMC/	SOF/	CIV/	AFLOAT/	ASHORE/	FEM/
786/	15/115/		447/	68/	19/122/		516/	276/	19/

E. (S) NOTES/AMPLIFYING INFO:
(1). (S) THERE ARE 1605 PERSONNEL IN AUSTRALIA ISO CROCODILE 99.
(2). (S) INTERFET REPORTS TOTAL 13 US MIL IN EAST TIMOR: EIGHT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERFET AND FIVE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL EXCHANGE PROGRAM (PEP) PERSONNEL.
(3). (S) IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS, ANTICIPATE 9 ADDITIONAL US PERSONNEL TO FLOW INTO AUSTRALIA ISO USFORINTERFET.
(4). (S) NUMBERS ADJUSTED TO ACCOUNT FOR PREVIOUSLY INCLUDED UNAMET PERSONNEL. THERE ARE SIX UNAMET PERSONNEL IN DARWIN: THREE ARMY AND THREE MARINE.
GENTEXT/SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL-MILITARY-DIPLOMATIC EVENTS/
7. (U). NSTR//
GENTEXT/COMMANDERS EVALUATION/
8. A. (S) CONTINUING EFFORTS TO COORD HELO/COMM SUPPORT FOR INTERFET.
B. (U) SEE OUR HOME PAGE HTTP://WWW.PACOM.SMIL.MIL/J3/CRISIS/ET99.HTML FOR THE MOST CURRENT UPDATES.//
CLOSE TEXT/RELEASED BY J3//
CL BY/ PICKAVANCE, RADM, J3, USCINCPAC//
CL REASON 1.5 (A), (B)//
DECL ON/ 30 SEP 2009//
BT
#2933

NNNN

2008-F-06 (BRAD SIMPSON)

ENCLOSURE (7):

☐ USCINCPAC MSG 250329Z SEP 99 (U)

VZCZCCCR947
OATSZYUW RHHMMCA8076 2680337-SSSS--RHHMUNA RHHMUNS.
ZNY SSSSS ZUI RHHMUNA4487 2680329
O 250329Z SEP 99 PSN 866332H28
FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//CAT//
TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUBDPLA/MEMBASSY CANBERRA
RUBDPLA/MEMBASSY JAKARTA
RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J3//
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//J3//
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3//
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ3//
RUCQSOC/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ3//
RUPEUNA/USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO//J3//
RUCUSTR/USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE//J3//
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3//
RHHMHBA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3//
RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3//
RUHVPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO/CAT//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP//
RHMFISS/COMMARFORPAC//G3//
RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//USFK J3//
RUHHHGA/HQ ALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//USFJ J3//
RHHMUNS/COMSOCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUHPOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHPQUA/COMTHIRDFLT
RUHBABA/CG III MEF//G3/G5//
RUHHALA/COMUSF INTERFET
RUHBABA/COMUSF INTERFET
RHOAMOB/CJTF TSO
RUHHALA/CINCPAC MSQ
RUWFEAA/COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N3//
RHWIDIL/COMVAQWINGPAC WHIDBEY ISLAND WA
RHDIAAA/HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//DO/BSD//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEJDCA/DISA WASHINGTON DC
RUEADLA/DLA FT BELVOIR VA
RUEANQA/NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD//IAWM//
RUEANQC/NIMA RESTON VA//COTP//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//CAT//
BT
S-E-C-R-E-T//N03500//
MSGID/SITREP/USCINCPAC/24/09/009/SEP//ET99//
REF/A/GENADMIN/USCINCPAC/110415ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/ORDER/USCINCPAC/312115ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/ORDER/USCINCPAC/312116ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/D/GENADMIN/USCINCSOC/071605ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/E/MSG/AUSTRALIAN CDF/080300ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/F/ORDER/USCINCPAC/100445ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/G/ORDER/USCINCPAC/280515ZAUG99/-/NOTAL//
REF/H/ORDER/USCINCPAC/010400ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/I/ORDER/USCINCPAC/040045ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/J/ORDER/USCINCPAC/140530ZSEP99/-/NOTAL//
REF/K/DOC/CJCS/04 DEC 98/-/NOTAL//
REF/L/ORDER/CJCS/161825ZSEP99//
REF/M/MSG/USCINCPAC/170138ZSEP99//

Declassified by HQ USPACOM/J1411
Date Declassified: _____
Authority: E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Section 3.1

NARR/(S) REF A RESTRUCTURED PREVIOUS EXERCISE TEMPO BRAVE 99 INTO A REAL-WORLD OPERATIONAL PLANNING EVENT TO SUPPORT POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR (EM). REFS B AND C ARE PLANNING DIRECTIVES FOR EXERCISE TEMPO BRAVE 99A (TB-99A, TEMPO BRAVE 99 RENAMED), A FOCUSED PLANNING EVOLUTION IN PREPARATION FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCE OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR. REF D IS REQUEST FOR USASOC TO DEPLOY PSYOP PLANNING TEAM TO PARTICIPATE IN TB-99A. REF E IS AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE FORCES(ADF) WARNING ORDER FOR OPERATION WARDEN, WHICH COVERS ADF INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN EAST TIMOR (INTERFET). REF F DIRECTS THE DEPLOYMENT OF A USPACOM PLANNING LIAISON TEAM TO (AUSTRALIA ISO AUSTRALIAN EAST TIMOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING. REF G IS THE USCINCPAC EXORD TO POSITION FORCES IN THE TIMOR SEA AREA TO SUPPORT AUSTRALIAN NEO OPERATIONS IF REQUESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA. REF H MODIFIED THE FORCE LIST AND TASKING IN REF G. REF I ACTIVATES JOINT TASK FORCE TIMOR SEA OPERATIONS (JTF TSO) AND DIRECTS JTF TSO TO REMAIN WITHIN 72 HOURS OF CJTF-DESIGNATED MODLOC IN TIMOR SEA TO PROVIDE SUPPORT, IF REQUESTED. REF J IS USCINCPAC PREPARE TO DEPLOY ORDER. REF K IS CJCS MEMORANDUM (DEPLOYMENT HEALTH SURVEILLANCE AND READINESS), WHICH CONTAINS GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING PRE- AND POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH ASSESSMENTS. REF L IS EXECUTE ORDER.SECDEF HAS DIRECTED THE DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES AND EXECUTION OF OPERATIONS AS PART OF MULTINATIONAL FORCE OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR.REF M DEFINES PROCEDURES FOR AUSTRALIA TO REQUEST US FORCES.// PERIOD/240001Z SEP 99/TO: 242359Z SEP 99/AS OF: 242359Z SEP 99// HEADING/OWN SITUATION//
5UNIT

/UNITDES	/UNIT LOC	/CMNTS
/USS MOBILE BAY (MOB)	/09-39S, 127-51E	/MOD LOC ON STATION
/USNS KILAUEA (KIL)	/DARWIN, AS	/PORT CALL
/CTU 72.5.9 (EP-3)	/TINDAL, AS	/ON STATION
/MSQ-126	/DARWIN, AS	/ON STATION
/FOUR C-130	/DARWIN, AS	/ON STATION
/LOG PLANNING CELL	/DARWIN, AS	/ON STATION
/CMOC	/DARWIN, AS	/ON STATION
/INTEL AUGMENTATION TEAM	/HAWAII	/ETA 28 SEP (ZULU)
/TROJAN SPIRIT INTEL C2	/HAWAII	/ETA 28 SEP (ZULU)

GENTEXT/SITUATION/
1. (S) CONTINUING TO FACILITATE FLOW OF INTERFET FORCES INTO DILI AND AUSTRALIA. DEPLOYMENT CONTINUES WITHOUT INCIDENT. INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION TEAM AND TROJAN SPIRIT EXPECTED TO ARRIVE 28 SEP 99. C2X (HUMINT AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE) TEAM RECENTLY AUTHORIZED FOR DEPLOYMENT. STILL WORKING DEPARTURE DATE. CH-46'S ON USNS KILAUEA REMAIN AVAILABLE PROVIDED NON-HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT AND SECURE LANDING ZONES ARE ASSURED. DEPLOYMENT OF SEVEN (7) PSYOP PLANNERS TO DARWIN COMPLETED. FIRST CONTINGENT OF CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER (CMOC) ARRIVED DARWIN. REMAINDER DEPARTS HAWAII 26 SEP 99. DEPLOYABLE JOINT TASK FORCE AUGMENTATION CELL (DJTFAC) REDEPLOYED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TWO PLANNERS AT DARWIN AND ONE IN SIDNEY.
GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/
2. (S) FORMAL HANDOVER OF EAST TIMOR FROM TNI TO INTERFET EXPECTED END OF THIS WEEK. 30 COUNTRIES HAVE VOLUNTEERED SUPPORT. 17 COUNTRIES NOW HAVE PERSONNEL PHYSICALLY WORKING IN SUPPORT OF THIS OPERATION.
A. (1) (S) DEFCON STATUS: DEFCON 5
(2) (S) THREAT LEVEL IN INDONESIA RAISED TO MEDIUM FROM LOW WITH THE GEOGRAPHIC EXCEPTION OF TIMOR WHICH IS CONSIDERED A HIGH THREAT AREA.
B. (U) CBR OPERATIONS
(1) (S) NUCLEAR: NSTR
(2) (S) CHEMICAL: NSTR
C. (S) GROUND SITUATION: NO REPORTED SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS TO DATE; FAIRLY GOOD COOPERATION WITH TNI, SOME MILITIA ARRESTED BUT NO SERIOUS RESISTANCE. CONTINUING TO BUILD UP FORCES AND BASE OF OPERATIONS AT BOTH DILI AND BAUCAU. ESTIMATED 3877 TROOPS IN AUSTRALIA, 2619 IN EAST TIMOR.
D. (S) NAVAL SITUATION: MOB OPERATING IN ASSIGNED 4W GRID PROVIDING AIR SURVEILLANCE TO FORCES ASHORE AND PARTICIPATING IN MERCHANT ESCORT OPERATIONS ISO STABILISE. KILAUEA REMAINS IN PORT AT DARWIN.
E. (S) AIR SITUATION: SECURITY OF AIRFIELD AT DILI REMAINS CONCERN.

AUSTRALIAN SECURITY ANTICIPATES HAVING COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE AIRFIELD AS SOON AS IT IS OFFICIALLY TURNED OVER FROM THE TNI. COMUSF INTERFET RECOMMDENDS THAT US AIRCRAFT UTILIZE FAR NORTHERN SIDE OF THE PARKING RAMP ALLOWING RAVEN TEAM PROPER BUFFER ZONE TO IDENTIFY AND DETER ANY THREAT. TEAM STANDING BY TO ASSESS BAUCAU AIRFIELD; AWAITING SECURITY ASSURANCE. FOUR C-130 LOGISTICS MISSIONS WERE FLOWN BETWEEN DARWIN AND DILI. C-17 ARRIVED DARWIN, OFFLOADED AND DEPARTED. C-5 ARRIVED DARWIN AND WILL REMAIN OVERNIGHT.
F. (S) AIR RECONNAISSANCE: EP-3 FLEW ONE MISSION. THREE TOTAL MISSIONS FLOWN TO DATE.
G. (S) JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS: NSTR
H. (S) WEATHER: WEATHER IN EAST TIMOR REMAINS FAIR, HIGH TEMPERATURE OF 89 DEGREES WITH A LOW OF 70 DEGREES.//
GENTEXT/INTELLIGENCE/RECONNAISSANCE
3. (S) INTERFET DEPLOYMENT TO EAST TIMOR (EM) MEETING NO RESISTANCE. FORMAL HANDOVER AND FINAL TNI WITHDRAWAL FROM EM LIKELY TO OCCUR BY THE END OF THE WEEK. PRESS REPORTS OF AN INTERFET "ATTACK" AGAINST MILITIA FORCES ARE MISLEADING. INTERFET RAIDED THE HOTEL TROPICANA, HEADQUARTERS OF THE AITARAK MILITIA, IN DILI. NO SHOTS WERE EXCHANGED OR FIRED. CAITANO DA SILVA, A LEADER IN THE AITARAK MILITIA HAS BEEN DETAINED. HE APPARENTLY WILL NOT BE TURNED OVER TO THE TNI AS PREVIOUS MILITIA DETAINEES HAVE BEEN BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN LINKED TO ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.
A (S) PAST 24 HOUR ACTIVITY.
(1). (S) MILITIAS: MILITIAS APPARENTLY TESTING INTERFET RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN THEFT OF HUMANITARIAN AID VEHICLES OUTSIDE DILI. ARRESTS AND DISARMING CONTINUES, WITH MOST DETAINED MILITIA MEMBERS TURNED OVER TO THE TNI.
(2). (S) TNI: TNI MAINTAINS A GENERALLY COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE WITH INTERFET TROOPS. TNI REPORTEDLY FIRING INTO THE AIR AS A GESTURE OF DEFIANCE AS THEY DEPART GARRISONS AND BARRACKS. REMAINING TNI PERSONNEL CONTINUE TO WITHDRAW FROM EM. APPROXIMATELY 9000 TNI SOLDIERS ARE ESTIMATED PRESENT IN EM, WITH TWO TNI BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS DIRECTING THE OPERATIONS OF FIVE INFANTRY BATTALIONS (APPROXIMATELY 3000-4000 EFFECTIVE SOLDIERS).
(3). (S) INDONESIAN SPECIAL OPERTIONS FORCES (KOPASSUS) - NSTR.
B. (S) CAPABILITIES.
(1). (S) MILITIAS - PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS INDICATE LIKELY TARGETING OF AUSTRALIAN MEMBERS OF INTERFET AND OTHER "WHITE PEOPLE." THIS THREAT LIKELY EXTENDS TO NON-AUSTRALIAN INTERFET MEMBERS OF SIMILAR ETHNIC APPEARANCE.
(2). (S) TNI - FORCES WITHIN EM THAT HAVE NOT YET EVACUATED POSE SOME THREAT DUE TO POSSIBLE TNI COMMAND AND CONTROL AND VERIFIED DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS. WIDELY DISPERSED FORCES AND THE RAPID PACE OF EVACUATION OPERATIONS ARE LIKELY PRESENTING LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES.
(3). (S) KOPASSUS: UNITS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE PROVIDING CLANDESTINE SUPPORT TO MILITIA GROUPS.
C. (S) INTENTIONS.
(1). (S) MILITIAS - LIKELY TO CONDUCT SMALL OPPORTUNISTIC ATTACKS AGAINST TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY IN EM, ESPECIALLY IN WESTERN EM AFTER TNI FORMALLY TURNS OVER OPERATIONS TO INTERFET. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE MILITIAS MAY ATTEMPT TO PARTITION EM, ALTHOUGH JICPAC ASSESSES THIS AS UNLIKELY.
(2). (S) TNI TNI WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH THE INTERFET DEPLOYMENT AS THEY PROCEED WITH THEIR EVACUATION FROM EM. TWO INFANTRY BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS, ALONG WITH ELEMENTS OF TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS TOTAL MAY REMAIN IN EM AFTER THE FORMAL TURNOVER WITH INTERFET OCCURS.
(3). (S) KOPASSUS LIKELY TO CONTINUE PROVIDING SUPPORT, INCLUDING POSSIBLE DIRECT PARTICIPATION, TO MILITIA ACTIVITIES.
D. (S) PERCEIVED THREAT. INTERFET FACES THREE THREATS. 1) HIGHEST THREAT IS FROM PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS OPERATING WITHIN EM OR IN CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS FROM WEST TIMOR KOPASSUS SUPPORT. PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS INDICATE LIKELY TARGETING OF AUSTRALIAN MEMBERS OF INTERFET. THIS THREAT LIKELY EXTENDS TO NON-AUSTRALIAN INTERFET MEMBERS OF SIMILAR ETHNIC APPEARANCE; 2) TNI/SECURITY FORCES WITHIN EM THAT HAVE NOT YET EVACUATED POSE SOME THREAT DUE TO POSSIBLE TNI COMMAND AND CONTROL AND VERIFIED

DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS; 3) THERE EXISTS THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERFET FORCES COMING BETWEEN PRO-INTEGRATION AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE (FALANTIL) CLASHES, WHICH POSES A THREAT TO PEACEKEEPERS CHARGED WITH MAINTAINING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT.
GENTEXT/LOGISTICS/
4. (U) RESPONDING TO LOGISTICAL REQUESTS FROM COMUSF INTERFET.
A. (S) SUPPLY:
(1) (S) BODY ARMOR ARRIVED DARWIN SATURDAY AFTERNOON (DARWIN TIME).
(2) (S) WORKING ADF REQUEST FOR LOAN OF 12 AN/PSC-5 PORTABLE UHF TACSAT SINGLE CHANNEL RADIO SETS IN COORDINATION WITH USCINCPAC J6.
B. (U) MAINTENANCE AND SERVICES: WORKING ADF REQUEST FOR FOUR (4) CH47 TRANSMISSIONS. COA IS EXPEDITE REPAIR OF THREE (3) REMAINING ADF TRANSMISSIONS. ONE (1) ADF TRANSMISSION REPAIRED.
C. (S) POL: NSTR.
D. (S) TRANSPORTATION: AIRFIELD SURVEY TEAM WAS AT DILI AND DETERMINED THAT ONLY C130S CAN LAND. NUMEROUS SHORT COMINGS INCLUDING MINIMAL MOG, LACK OF FUELING INFRASTRUCTURE, ONE (1) ADEQUATE OPS BUILDING, NO MHE, ETC. BAUCAU AIRFIELD AND DILI PORT SCHEDULED FOR SURVEYS SATURDAY (DARWIN TIME). C17 MOVING CMOC PAX AND CARGO ARRIVED 2420505Z SEP 99. C5 MOVING TROJAN SPIRIT DEPARTS HICKAM 261950Z SEP 99 ARRIVES DARWIN 280200Z SEP 99.
E. (U) FACILITIES: FINALIZING CAMP FACILITIES AND CAMP SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR USFORINTERFET COMMAND POST AREA.
F. (U) MUNITIONS: NSTR.
G. (S) CONSTRUCTION: NSTR
H. (U) MEDICAL NSTR
GENTEXT/COMMUNICATIONS/CONNECTIVITY/
5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT
A. (U) MSQ-126, NSTR.
B. (S) PREPARING REQUEST FOR FORCES (RFF) MESSAGE REQUESTING COMMUNICATIONS/SIGNAL SUPPORT FOR DEPLOYMENT TO EAST TIMOR IN SUPPORT OF COMMANDER INTERFET.
GENTEXT/PERSONNEL/
6. (S) EAST TIMOR PERSTAT REPORT. US PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF INTERFET FOR THE PERIOD/240001Z SEP 99 TO 242359Z SEP 99//
A. (S) AUSTRALIA (AUS)/

LOC/ UNIT/	ARMY/	AF/	NAVY/	USMC/	CIV/	AFLOAT/	ASHORE/	FEM/
BRISBANE/	0/	1/	0/	0/	0/	0/	1/	0/
DARWIN/	31/103/	22/	59/	2/		0/	217/	0/
SYDNEY/	0/	6/	1/	3/	1/	0/	11/	0/
TINDAL/	0/	0/	25/	0/	0/	0/	25/	0/
TOTAL AUS	31/110/		48/	62/	3/	0/	254/	0/

B. (S) EAST TIMOR (EM)/

LOC/ UNIT/	ARMY/	AF/	NAVY/	USMC/	CIV/	AFLOAT/	ASHORE/	FEM/
DILI/	0/	0/	0/	6/	0/	0/	6/	0/
TOTAL EM /	0/	0/	0/	6/	0/	0/	6/	0/

C. (S) AFLOAT/

SHIP/	ARMY/	AF/	NAVY/	USMC/	CIV/	AFLOAT/	ASHORE/	FEM/
MOBILE BAY/	0/	0/	352/	0/	1/	353/	0/	5/
USNS KILAUEA/	0/	0/	46/	0/	116/	162/	0/	6/
TOTAL AFLOAT/	0/	0/	398/	0/	117/	515/	0/	11/

D. (S) TOTAL/

TOTAL/	ARMY/	AF/	NAVY/	USMC/	CIV/	AFLOAT/	ASHORE/	FEM/
775/	31/110/		446/	68/	120/	515/	260/	11/

E. (S) NOTES/AMPLIFYING INFO:
(1) (S) THERE ARE 1070 PERSONNEL IN AUSTRALIA ISO CROCODILE 99.
(2) (S) FIVE PERSONNEL IN EAST TIMOR BILLETED IN THE INTERFET COMPOUND:
(A) CAPT HUGHES,USMC (PAO OFFICER AT DILI WITH PRESS POOL)
(B) LTCOL BAKER, USMC (LNO TO 3RD BRIGADE)
(C) CAPT WHITNEY, USMC, (III MEF FORCE PROTECTION.CI ASSESSMENT)
(D) MAJ MIRANDA, USMC, (AIR OPS PLANNER).
(E) CWO3 PARKER AND GYSGT SCHMIDT ARRIVED DILI.//
GENTEXT/SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL-MILITARY-DIPLOMATIC EVENTS/
7. (U). NSTR//
GENTEXT/COMMANDERS EVALUATION/
8. A. (S) OPERATION REMAINS ON TRACK. FORMAL HANDOVER FOR REGIONAL SECURITY OF EAST TIMOR FROM TNI TO INTERFET EXPECTED BY 28

SEP 99. REMAINDER OF COMUSFORINTERFET HQ AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL ARRIVED DARWIN. CLOSE COORDINATION WITH COMAST CONTINUES.
B. (U) SEE OUR HOME PAGE HTTP://WWW.PACOM.SMIL.MIL/J3/CRISIS/ET99.HTML FOR THE MOST CURRENT UPDATES.//
CLOSE TEXT/RELEASED BY J3//
CL BY/ PICKAVANCE, RADM, J3, USCINCPAC//
CL REASON 1.5 (A), (B)//
DECL ON/ 30 SEP 2009//
BT
#8076

NNNN

From simpson@umbc.edu
Sent Friday, September 28, 2007 10:16 am
To PACOM.FOIA.FCT@pacom.mil
Cc foiamail@gwu.edu , simpson@umbc.edu
Subject National Security Archive #= 20071934DOD339

The National Security Archive
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
Phone: 202/994-7000; Fax: 202/994-7005
nsarchiv@gwu.edu

20071934DOD339 DOD
RECNO:37681 SEQCOR:136188
FOISG: Parker, Ian
1998-1999 Pac Com information on East Timor

Friday, September 28, 2007

US PACIFIC COMMAND
ATTN J141 FOIA REQUESTER SERVICE CENTER
BOX 64028
CAMP H M SMITH HI 96861-4028

Re: Request under the FOIA, in reply refer to Archive# 20071934DOD339

Dear FOIA Coordinator:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), I hereby request the following:
All documents generated between April 1, 1998 and October 1, 1999 relating in whole or
in part to the movements and operations of Indonesian armed forces personnel and
militia forces in East Timor.

According to the Washington Post ("CINCs Don't Swim with State," By Dana Priest,
Washington Post Saturday, September 30, 2000), "From a windowless concrete building
near Blair's Pacific Command headquarters, seven intelligence analysts at the "Joint
Intelligence Center," the world's largest military intelligence center,
had tracked the movements of Indonesian and militia forces since May 1998. They watched as
East Timor refugees were herded into camps in an effort to intimidate and
control pro-independence peasants. Analysts and United Nations monitors
saw the violence bubbling into a wholesale rampage."

Documents pertaining to this request include but are not limited to cables, memoranda,
reports, records of meetings with Indonesian officials and finished intelligence.
If you regard any of these documents as potentially exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements, I request
that you nonetheless exercise your discretion to disclose them. As the FOIA requires, please release all
reasonably segregable non exempt portions of documents. To permit me to reach an intelligent and informed
decision whether or not to file an administrative appeal of any denied material, please describe any withheld
records (or portions thereof) and explain the basis for your exemption claims.

As a representative of the news media, the National Security Archive qualifies for "representative of the news media" status under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II) and, therefore, may not be charged search and review fees. (See National Security Archive v. U.S. Department of Defense, 880 F.2d 1381 Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S Ct. 1478 (1990)). This request is made as part of a scholarly and news research project that is intended for publication and is not for commercial use. For details on the Archive's research and extensive publication activities please see our website at www.nsarchive.org.

To expedite the release of the requested documents, please disclose them on an interim basis as they become available to you, without waiting until all the documents have been processed. Please notify me before incurring any photocopying costs over $100. If you have any questions regarding the identity of the records, their location, the scope of the request or any other matters, please call me at (202) 994-7000 or email me at foiamail@gwu.edu. I look forward to receiving your response within the twenty day statutory time period.

Sincerely yours,
Ian Parker

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No.: 200804559 SEP 8 2008
Segment CINCP001

Mr. Brad Simpson
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

RE: Archive File No. 20071934DOD339

Dear Mr. Simpson:

I refer to your letter dated September 28, 2007, to the U.S. Pacific Command, requesting the release of certain material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552). Two of the documents retrieved in response to your request were referred to the Department of State for appropriate action and direct response to you.

We have determined that both may be released in full. All released material is enclosed.

Sincerely,

Margaret P. Grafeld
Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

20071934DOD339 DOD
RECNO:37681 SEQCOR:143459
10/1/2008 FOISG: Parker, Ian
1998-1999 Pac Com information on East Timor

RELEASED IN FULL

O 27000 SEP 99
Subject: USDAO Canberra - Update 27 SEP 99

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CLARKE N ELLIS
DATE/CASE ID: 03 SEP 2008 200804559

Update provided by ADF HQs to DATT
General
? INTERFET continues operations to gain the confidence of the local population, including security patrols and food distribution within areas of operation, and provision of security for humanitarian assistance activities. An increase in the number of locals remaining in Dili overnight indicates a perception of increased security provided by INTERFET.
? INTERFET integral transport and heavy logistic elements will be built up over the next 24 hours.
Personnel
o At 3AM on 27 September there were approximately 3,300 INTERFET personnel in East Timor, including approximately 2,800 Australian and 500 other nationals). These
numbers do not include INTERFET personnel on naval ships in the vicinity of East Timor.
Operations
? Maritime Activities.
? HMAS JERVIS BAY disembarked additional INTERFET personnel and stores in Dili this morning and will return to Darwin, arriving late tonight.
? HMA Ships DARWIN and TOBRUK are en route to Darwin from Dili
? The RAN heavy landing craft BALIKPAPAN, LABUAN and BRUNEI continue operations in the vicinity of Dili in support of INTERFET.
? HMA Ships SUCCESS, ANZAC and ADELAIDE, and HMS GLASGOW remain at sea off East Timor.
? Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT), the Motor Vessels (MV) LADY VALISSIA, LADY ELAINE, and ARKTIS ATLANTIQUE are en route to Dili in support of INTERFET.
? Land Activities.
? Security and responsive patrolling continues in and around Dili. 2 RAR continues with distribution of food in Dili.
? Patrols outside of Dili:
? A Philippine infantry company relieved 2 RAR at Baucau airport on Saturday 25 September and has also secured the hospital and electricity plant at Baucau.
? INTERFET patrols continue to improve the force's situational awareness
outside Dili.

? On Sunday 26 September, INTERFET escorted a UN humanitarian assistance convoy to Baucau.
? Air Activities.
33 C-130 sorties to East Timor were conducted on 26 September, including three airdrop sorties.
26 C-130 sorties are planned for today, including 15 RA.AF sorties. This includes one Australian and one French airdrop of humanitarian supplies.
A US Civil Military Operations Centre (CMOC) reconnaissance element and a Canadian reconnaissance element are expected to fly to Dili today in an Army Beechcraft 200 aircraft.
Logistics
Army Engineers have established a water point with initial capacity of 3200 litres per day at the Komoro water plant.
Humanitarian Assistance
? AusAID has funded two staff for the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) in Dili, and will shortly have two counsellors in place at the AS Consulate in Dili to coordinate AS aid efforts.
? On Sun 26 Sep, two ADF C-130s completed food drops at Cailaco, approximately 40 Ian
southwest of Dili, and Suai, near the south coast of East Timor, approximately 15km from the West Timor border. A French C-130 food drop to Remexio, approximately 151an southeast of Dili, dropped most of its cargo of humanitarian supplies, but was unable to complete the full drop.
? The World Food Programme (WFP) aircraft also conducted air drops on Saturday and Sunday.
? Two humanitarian airdrops by INTERFET aircraft are planned for today.

One RAAF C130 is to drop at Ribeira Malailada, and one French C 130 is to drop at Luro.

? A humanitarian delegation from the European Union is visiting Dili today.

? The MV HYLAND BAY unloaded 100 tonnes humanitarian supplies to Dili, and the MV KARINYA is expected to arrive in Dili today carrying Red Cross vehicles.

The countries that now have forces deployed either in Australia or East Timor include Australia, United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, France, Malaysia, Brazil and Italy.

FUTURE OPS

* The TNI have advised that they intend to reduce their presence in Dili to two battalions plus liaison officers by 28 Sep 99. It is stressed that East Timor remains sovereign Indonesian territory until the MPR rules formally on the results of the election. Indonesian territorial responsibility will continue in accordance with the UN mandate until that time.

* A build-up of INTERFET integral transport and heavy logistics elements will continue today through both the port and Dili airport.
* 26 C130 Hercules air sorties are planned for 27 Sep. In addition, two B200 Beechcraft aircraft will transport US personnel to Dili to conduct a reconnaissance prior to the establishment of a Civil/Military Operations Centre.
* Humanitarian Aid.
* Two INTERFET food drops are planned for 27 Sep. One RAAF C130 Hercules will conduct a drop at Ribeira Malailada and a French C130 Hercules will conduct a further drop at Luro.
* The food drop program for the World Food Programme aircraft for today has not been advised.
* The movement of East Timorese Internally Displaced People and Locally Employed Staff evacuees from Darwin to safe havens, is expected to be completed by 28 Sep 99.

CS
Colonel Charles Scaperotto
Defense and Air Attache/USCINCPAC Rep Australia
WP 011-612-6214-5732, Cell 011-614-11557543, HP 011-612-6286-7054

C2

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

VZCZCCCR474
PTTCZYUW RUEHBYA3262 2650734-CCCC--RHHMUNA.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220734Z SEP 99 PSN 847436H32
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4919
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 3445
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1982
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 6521
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0234
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 6302
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 8158
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 4148
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0958
RUEHWLB/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND PRIORITY 0169
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0319
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0418
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 9950
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0429
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1531
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0165
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0655
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1919
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY PRIORITY 9516
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE PRIORITY 2921
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH PRIORITY 1112
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA// PRIORITY
RUHPOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT PRIORITY
RUHGOAB/CG III MEF PRIORITY
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CLARKE N ELLIS
DATE/CASE ID: 03 SEP 2008 200804559

DEPARTMENT PASS AID/BHR/OFDA FOR RWILLIAMS, EKVITASHVILI, ESIMOES, PSMITH AND ANE GANDERSON, GGEORGE, TPIERCE

MANILA FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR JSHERMAN

GENEVA PLEASE PASS TO NKYLOH FOR UNOCHA AND IPRC

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING

ROME FOR FODAG AND VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/04
TAGS: PREF, EAID, PREL, MOPS, KPKO, KCRM, UN, ID, AS
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN AID SITREP FOR SEPTEMBER 22

REF: (A) JAKARTA 004644; (B) JAKARTA 004652; (C) ROME 006530

1. CLASSIFIED BY EMBASSY ECONOMIC COUNSELOR MICHAEL J. DELANEY. REASON: 1.5 B AND D.

2. (U) NOTE: THIS MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED BY AMEMBASSY CANBERRA WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM AMCONSULATE MELBOURNE POL/ECON OFFICER CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO DARWIN.

3. (C) SUMMARY: WITH EIGHT FOOD AIRDROPS (MOSTLY U.S. HDR'S) SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 22-23, THE TEMPO OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS IS PICKING UP. AUSAID OFFICIALS MOSTLY BLAME GOI RECALCITRANCE FOR THE MEAGER AIRDROP AMOUNTS (ONLY THREE FLIGHTS) DELIVERED SO FAR. ACCORDING TO FALANTIL, AIRDROPS HAVE BEEN ACCURATE AND

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCL (2)

EFFECTIVE IN MEETING THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF THE IDP'S. THE AIRDROPS SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL EARLY NEXT WEEK.

4. (C) ATTENTION INCREASINGLY IS SHIFTING TO WEST TIMOR. UNHCR COMMISSIONER OGATA REPORTEDLY WAS ASSURED ON SEPTEMBER 20 BY PRESIDENT HABIBIE THAT IDP'S IN WEST TIMOR WOULD BE PROTECTED AND GIVEN THE CHOICE OF RETURNING TO EAST TIMOR. BOTH OGATA AND AUSAID OFFICIALS ARE SKEPTICAL THAT SUCH ASSURANCES WILL BE FOLLOWED UP ON THE GROUND. GOA OFFICIALS HOPE THAT GOI/TNI CONCERNS OVER POTENTIAL DESTABILIZATION OF WEST TIMOR WILL PROMPT TNI TO CURB MILITIA ACTIVITIES THERE. END SUMMARY

AIRDROP TEMPO INCREASES

---

5. (U) ON SEPTEMBER 22 AUSAID DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL JENNIFER RAWSON BRIEFED EMBASSY ECONOMIC COUNSELOR ON THE STATUS OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS IN EAST AND WEST TIMOR. FOUR AIRDROP FLIGHTS FROM DARWIN ARE SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 22, UTILIZING C-130 AIRCRAFT FROM THE U.S., AUSTRALIA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE WFP. THE WFP C-130 WILL DROP THE "SNOWDROP" HIGH ENERGY BISCUITS, WHILE THE OTHER C-130'S WILL DROP THE U.S.-SUPPLIED HDR'S. PLANS CALL FOR A FURTHER FOUR AIRDROP FLIGHTS TOMORROW (SEPTEMBER 23). WITH THE ARRIVAL OF ALL 300,000 HDR'S IN DARWIN, THERE ARE NOW ADEQUATE FOOD SUPPLIES AVAILABLE IN DARWIN FOR SUSTAINED AIRDROP OPERATIONS.

MEAGER AIRDROP RESULTS BLAMED ON GOI RECALCITRANCE

---

6. (C) AUSAID OFFICIALS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE INCREASED TEMPO OF THE AIRLIFT OPERATION. WHILE THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY FOR FEAR OF FURTHER ANTAGONIZING THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES, THEY LAY THE

DEPARTMENT PASS AID/BHR/OFDA FOR RWILLIAMS, EKVITASHVILI, ESIMOES, PSMITH AND ANE GANDERSON, GGEORGE, TPIERCE

MANILA FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR JSHERMAN

GENEVA PLEASE PASS TO NKYLOH FOR UNOCHA AND IFRC

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING

ROME FOR FODAG AND VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/04
TAGS: PREF, EAID, PREL, MOPS, KPKO, KCRM, UN, ID, AS
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN AID SITREP FOR SEPTEMBER 22

LION'S SHARE OF THE BLAME FOR THE 7-DAY OLD AIRDROP OPERATION'S MEAGER RESULTS (PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 22, ONLY THREE AIRDROP FLIGHTS HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT) SQUARELY ON THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES. THE GOI HAS REQUIRED CASE BY CASE FLIGHT APPROVAL, WHICH NECESSARILY LIMITS THE NUMBER OF FLIGHTS POSSIBLE PER DAY. ALSO, DARWIN-BASED FLIGHTS HAVE HAD TO LAND IN DILI TO BE SEARCHED AND TAKE ON BOARD A TNI VERIFIER/OBSERVER BEFORE PERFORMING THE AIRDROP. AUSAID OFFICIALS ESTIMATE THAT SUCH "GRATUITOUSLY BURDENSOME" REQUIREMENTS HAVE REDUCED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIRDROP OPERATION BY 90 PERCENT (OTHER FACTORS, SUCH AS WEATHER, AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY,

AND LOGISTICAL BOTTLENECKS AT DILI HAVE PLAYED COMPARATIVELY MINOR ROLES IN SLOWING THE OPERATION, ACCORDING TO THESE OFFICIALS). AUSAID OFFICIALS HOPE THAT INTERFET CONTROL OF THE DILI AIRPORT AND THE (IT IS HOPED) IMMINENT AVAILABILITY OF THE BAUCAU AIRPORT (WHICH REPORTEDLY IS A BETTER FACILITY THAN DILI) WILL ALLOW MORE AIRDROP FLIGHTS.

COORDINATION WITH FALANTIL

---

7. (C) WFP OFFICIAL PETER ISKANDER TOLD DARWIN POL/ECON OFFICER THAT HE IS IN DAILY CONTACT WITH XANANA GUSMAO AND HIS AIDES TO COORDINATE FOOD DROPS. EVERYONE INVOLVED ESTIMATES THAT THE AIRDROPS ARE BEING ACCURATELY PLACED AND ARE HAVING A POSITIVE IMPACT ON IDP'S WELFARE.

AIRDROPS TO CONTINUE FOR ANOTHER WEEK

---

8. (U) RAWSON ESTIMATES THAT AIRDROPS WILL BE NECESSARY UNTIL "EARLY NEXT WEEK." AFTER THAT TIME, IT IS HOPED THAT DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS USING TRUCKS AND FOOD DEPOTS WILL BE ADEQUATE.

CIVILIAN/MILITARY COOPERATION IMPROVING

---

9. (U) DARWIN POL/ECON OFFICER REPORTS THAT, UNDER WFP LEADERSHIP, THE AID EFFORT GRADUALLY IS BECOMING BETTER COORDINATED. EARLIER, THE POLITICS BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS UNAMET, UNHCR, AND OCHA LED TO DUPLICATION OF EFFORTS, WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION, AND LACK OF LIAISON. WITH WFP AS A SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT, THINGS ARE IMPROVING ALTHOUGH SOME RIFTS AND PARALLEL OPERATIONS STILL EXIST.

10. (U) AUSAID'S RAWSON TOLD US THAT COORDINATION WITH THE MILITARY (INTERFET) ALSO IS IMPROVING. AUSAID'S REPS IN DARWIN CHARACTERIZED THEIR AGENCY'S EFFORTS TO DATE AS "BUILDING, AND REBUILDING, A HOUSE OF CARDS." THEY RECOUNTED WOES SUCH AS, THAT AUSAID'S

DEPARTMENT PASS AID/BHR/OFDA FOR RWILLIAMS, EKVITASHVILI, ESIMOES, PSMITH AND ANE GANDERSON, GGEORGE, TPIERCE

MANILA FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR JSHERMAN

GENEVA PLEASE PASS TO NKYLOH FOR UNOCHA AND IPRC

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING

ROME FOR FODAG AND VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/04
TAGS: PREF, EAID, PREL, MOPS, KPKO, KCRM, UN, ID, AS
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN AID SITREP FOR SEPTEMBER 22

CONTRACTOR PROVIDED AN AIRCRAFT THAT LACKED AIRDROP FACILITIES; THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY TOLD AUSAID THAT AN AIRCRAFT WAS AVAILABLE AND THEN REVERSED ITSELF; AND LACK OF AIRCRAFT PARKING SPACE WAS CAUSING DELAYS IN DELIVERIES OF RELIEF SUPPLIES. "BUT NOW WE HAVE IN PLACE A GOOD COOPERATION STRUCTURE WITH INTERFET," SAID RAWSON, "AND THINGS ARE GETTING BETTER."

ATTENTION SHIFTING TO WEST TIMOR

---

11. (C) RAWSON SAID THAT HER AGENCY NOW REGARDS WEST TIMOR AS THE MORE WORRISOME ISSUE. ACCESS REMAINS A PROBLEM, PARTICULARLY IN THE LARGER CAMPS WHERE THE MILITIA ARE IN CONTROL. THERE ALSO ARE PROBLEMS WITH ACCESS TO WATER, SANITATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL HYGIENE. RAWSON REPORTS THAT THE GOI HAS GIVEN UNHCR PERMISSION TO BEGIN INTERVIEWING DISPLACED PERSONS IN WEST TIMOR TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY WANT TO RETURN HOME. WFP HAS REPORTED THAT AT THIS STAGE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO DISTRIBUTE FOOD SUPPLIES TO IDP'S IN WEST TIMOR IS THROUGH POSKO, A NETWORK OF LOCAL NGO'S.

12. (C) COMMENTING ON UNHCR COMMISSIONER SADAKO OGATA'S MISSION TO INDONESIA, RAWSON SAID THAT OGATA TOLD GOA OFFICIALS THAT ON SEPTEMBER 20 PRESIDENT HABIBIE HAD ASSURED HER THAT IDP'S IN WEST TIMOR WOULD BE PROTECTED AND GIVEN THE CHOICE OF RETURNING TO EAST TIMOR. HOWEVER, OGATA EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT SUCH ASSURANCES WOULD BE FOLLOWED THROUGH ON THE GROUND. SUCH SKEPTICISM IS ALMOST UNIVERSAL HERE IN AUSTRALIA. HOWEVER, RAWSON SAID THAT THE GOA HOPES THAT GROWING REALIZATION WITHIN THE GOI AND TNI THAT MILITIA CONTROL OF WEST TIMOR COULD LEAD TO DESTABILIZATION OF THAT AREA OF INDONESIA, WILL COMPEL TNI TO REIN IN THE MILITIAS.
HOLMES
BT
#3262

NNNN

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO6143

PAGE 01 STATE 151642 122253Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

151642
SOURCE: CBLEXCLS.009888
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:RCLARKE/ALUDWIG -- 08/12/99 647-1221
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:JALOISI
RCLARKE
----------EBE901 122254Z /38
O 122256Z AUG 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 151642

STADIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2009
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL FROM EAP/PIMBS TO EMBASSY JAKARTA

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS ACTING DIRECTOR JON ALOISI. REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (U) COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY GROUP

A GROUP OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE RESEARCHERS ASSOCIATED WITH COLUMBIA'S EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE ARE HEADING TO JAKARTA TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 151642 122253Z
STUDY THE EFFECT ON INDONESIA OF U.S. AND JAPANESE POLICIES INTENDED TO STRENGTHEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. THEY'LL BE IN TOWN SEPTEMBER 13-14, AND THEIR SCHEDULE IS BEING WORKED BY EITHER THE JAPANESE EMBASSY OR THE UNDP RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE. SOMEONE FROM ONE OF THOSE ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE CALLING YOU TO SEEK APPOINTMENTS WITH THE APPROPRIATE OFFICERS. WE'RE FAXING THE LETTER THEY SENT US, PLUS A NAMELIST. FORMER FSO BOB IMMERMAN IS THE ORGANIZER AT THIS END.

2. (SBU) ADM BLAIR TRIP

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CLARKE N ELLIS
DATE/CASE ID: 02 SEP 2008 200705435

AS YOU KNOW, ADMIRAL BLAIR'S EARLY SEPTEMBER ASIA VISIT WILL END WITH A SWING THROUGH JAKARTA FROM SEP 8 - 11. AMBASSADOR TWINING TOLD THE DESK THAT BLAIR WANTS TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON POLICE CONTACTS DURING HIS VISIT -- AND INVITE AN INL DAS ALONG FOR THE RIDE IF POSSIBLE -- TO REINFORCE PROGRESS MADE SINCE THE APRIL 1 SPLIT WITH THE MILITARY. WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHAT OTHER MESSAGES THE CINC MIGHT USEFULLY BRING TO INDONESIA DURING WHAT PROMISES TO BE AN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND IMPORTANT PERIOD.

3. (SBU) BUDGET TRANSPARENCY ISSUE

THE INTER-AGENCY BUDGET TRANSPARENCY GROUP MET AT THE WORKING LEVEL TODAY TO DISCUSS THE COMPLIANCE STATUS OF KEY ASIAN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING INDONESIA. WE INFORMED THE GROUP THAT YOU WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGING THE GOI ON THE ISSUE, AND HAD RECEIVED REASSURANCES THAT THE INDONESIANS WOULD FULLY ADDRESS OUR CONCERNS. THAT SAID, WE CONVEYED THAT YOU ARE FRUSTRATED THAT ANSWERS HAVE NOT YET BEEN FORTHCOMING.

TREASURY OFFICIALS NOTED THAT THE WORKING LEVEL GROUP WILL MAKE COUNTRY BY COUNTRY RECOMMENDATIONS ON AUGUST 26. INFORMAL CONSULTATION WILL TAKE PLACE ON THE HILL DURING THE FOLLOWING SEVERAL WEEKS, LETTERS OUTLINING THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION WILL GO FROM SUMMERS TO HIS COUNTERPARTS IN NON-COMPLIANT COUNTRIES IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, AND SUMMERS WILL MAKE A FINAL DETERMINATION IN LATE SEPTEMBER. TREASURY IS REQUIRED TO REPORT TO CONGRESS WITH THE RESULTS ON OCTOBER 1.

REMEMBER THAT FINAL DOES NOT MEAN "IRREDEEMABLE," AS TREASURY FULLY EXPECTS REVIEW PANELS, MEETING PERIODICALLY AFTER OCTOBER 1, TO REVERSE PRIOR "NON-COMPLIANCE" DETERMINATIONS AS NEW INFORMATION AND EVIDENCE OF COMPLIANCE EMERGES. NONETHELESS, TIME IS GROWING SHORT. ENCOURAGING ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS PUT FORTH IN OI-142 STILL STAND BETWEEN INDONESIA AND AN "IN-COMPLIANCE" DETERMINATION.

4. (C) SECRETARY MEETING WITH GINANDJAR

OUR FRIENDS IN S/S SAY THE SECRETARY IS SCHEDULED TO BE ELSEWHERE ON THE DATES IN QUESTION (SEP. 1-2), BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE. WE WILL ALSO LOOK INTO A POSSIBLE P OR E MEETING, IF APPROPRIATE.

5. (SBU) EMERGENCY POWERS BILL?

A THINK TANK THAT DOES STUDIES FOR U.S. INVESTORS ASKED US ABOUT THE PROPOSED BILL THAT, IF PASSED, COULD GIVE "SWEEPING

EMERGENCY POWERS" TO PRESIDENT HABIBIE? WE PROMISED WE'D FIND OUT. SOUND FAMILIAR? A BRIEF, INFORMAL READ-OUT OF THE PROSPECT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS WOULD BE VERY USEFUL.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. (C) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION

BOB WORKED WITH IO AND H TODAY ON THE MEMO TO P NECESSARY TO SECURE STATE AGREEMENT TO ASSOCIATE THE USG WITH A NEW UNSC RESOLUTION EXTENDING AND AUGMENTING UNAMET. THIS IS BEING DONE UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT JAKARTA TALKS WILL YIELD GOI AGREEMENT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PLAN. THE UNSC RESOLUTION WOULD NOT COMMIT THE U.S. TO ACTUALLY PARTICIPATING WITH MORE PEOPLE. THAT'S NEXT WEEK'S PROBLEM.

7. (U) FAX WOES

PIMBS' FAX IS SICK. IF YOU HAVE TROUBLE GETTING THROUGH, USE THE BCLTV MACHINE (647-3069).
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN PART
B7(C)

UNCLASSIFIED PTO9378

PAGE 01 STATE 161807 280242Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

161807
SOURCE: KODAKB.028002
DRAFTED BY: EAP/FO:ADFOWLER:GP (O/FO/SCHEDULE/IO DAR TO SOR) -- 08/27/
APPROVED BY: EAP:RMDEMING, ACTING
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP
----------F19162 280244Z /38
O 280245Z AUG 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMCONSUL SYDNEY IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 161807

OFFICIAL INFORMAL, SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL

PLS PASS A/S ROTH

(U) CLASSIFIED BY EAP ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY RUST DEMING. REASON: 1.5 (D).

1. (U) FOR A/S ROTH: THIS IS THE EAP DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT FOR AUGUST 27, 1999.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 161807 280242Z

2. EAP/BCLTV - MARIE C. DAMOUR

(C) CAMBODIA - PROSPECTS FOR A KR TRIBUNAL: DEPUTY SYG RALPH ZACKLIN TOLD EMBASSY PHNOM PENH THAT THE OPENING OF HIS TALKS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRIBUNAL FOR THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERS WITH THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA (RGC) WERE MORE BUSINESSLIKE AND AMICABLE THAN ANTICIPATED. HOWEVER, THE SIDES WERE FAR APART ON SUBSTANCE, "TALKING APPLES AND ORANGES." THE CAMBODIANS REITERATED THEIR NEED FOR A TRIAL UNDER CAMBODIAN LAW IN AN EXTANT CAMBODIAN COURT AND THE UN INSISTED ON A TRIAL UNDER EFFECTIVE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CLARKE N ELLIS
DATE/CASE ID: 02 SEP 2008 200705435

CONTROL OF THE UN SYG (THE UN'S "BOTTOM LINE") WITH INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND A MAJORITY OF FOREIGN JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS. A SECOND SESSION WAS TO TAKE PLACE TODAY. DESPITE THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE CAMBODIANS ARE APPROACHING THESE TALKS, POST BELIEVES THE LARGE GULF BETWEEN THE TWO POSITIONS MEANS NO AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED DURING THIS MISSION BUT HOPES THAT TALKS WILL CONTINUE IN NEW YORK DURING HUN SEN'S VISIT. POST RECEIVED A COPY, IN FRENCH, OF THE RGC'S "DRAFT LAW" OUTLINING THEIR PLANS FOR A CAMBODIAN TRIBUNAL WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION, WHICH THEY WILL FAX TO THE DESK. DAVID SCHEFFER PLANS TO CONTACT ZACKLIN ON THE LATTER'S RETURN TO NY REGARDING NEXT STEPS, AND S/WCI STAFF MEMBER PIERRE PROSPER WILL TRAVEL TO PHNOM PENH IN ROUGHLY THREE WEEKS TO CONFER WITH HUN SEN ADVISOR OM YENTIENG.

3. EAP/J - ROBIN WHITE

(S) U.S.-JAPAN JOINT MILITARY EXERCISE: THE U.S. AND JAPAN ARE SCHEDULED TO CONDUCT JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES (IN JAPAN), INCLUDING TROOP DEPLOYMENT, NOVEMBER 8-19.

4. EAP/RSP - JUDITH STROTZ, ACTING

(U) UNGA: S/S HAS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED THE ASIA-PACIFIC FOREIGN MINISTERS BREAKFAST FOR MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 0800-0915. LAST YEAR WE INVITED ARF MINISTERS MINUS BURMA, CAMBODIA, THE EU, INDIA, AND WE ADDED FIJI. (THE INVITED COUNTRIES WERE AUSTRALIA, BRUNEI, CANADA, CHINA, FIJI, INDONESIA, JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, LAOS, MALAYSIA, MONGOLIA, NEW ZEALAND, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, PHILIPPINES, RUSSIA, SINGAPORE, THAILAND AND VIETNAM.) THIS YEAR WE PROPOSE THE SAME LIST OF INVITEES PLUS CAMBODIA. DO YOU AGREE? PLEASE ADVISE WHAT THEMES YOU WOULD LIKE THE SECRETARY TO EMPHASIZE AT THE BREAKFAST.

(C) U.S-JAPAN-CHINA TRILAT: EMBASSY TOKYO ADVISED US THAT KURT CAMPBELL IS THE ONLY GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL PLANNING TO ATTEND THE TOKYO TRILAT. EARLIER, EZRA VOGEL TOLD US THAT THE TRILAT HAD CHANGED THE RULES AND THAT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OF ALL COUNTRIES, NOT JUST THE HOST, COULD NOW PARTICIPATE. HE SAID THAT KURT WOULD ATTEND TO EXPLAIN THE U.S. POSITION ON TMD. THE CHINESE TMD EXPERT FOR THE TRILAT IS GENERAL PAN, WHO IS NOW RETIRED AND ON THE CONFERENCE CIRCUIT, WHERE HE USUALLY BLASTS TMD AND

OTHER ASPECTS OF U.S. POLICY. NOW THAT WE KNOW NO OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WILL ATTEND, WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY

TO SUGGEST THAT KURT CHANGE HIS MIND. (THE KOREANS COMPLAINED FORMALLY AND STRONGLY TO US WHEN KURT AND LIEBERTHAL ATTENDED THE LAST TRILAT IN BOSTON.) SHALL WE SUGGEST TO KURT THAT HE RECONSIDER?

5. EAP/K - EVANS J.R. REVERE

(SBU) PROTOCOL TO CALL IN ROK A/DCM ON ASSAULT CASE: WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, PROTOCOL WILL CALL IN ROK A/DCM SHIM YOON-JOE REGARDING THE ASSAULT CASE AGAINST [redacted] B7(C)
[redacted] PROTOCOL B7(C)
WILL DELIVER A LETTER TO AMB. LEE, ASKING THE ROK EMBASSY TO WAIVE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY FOR [redacted] SO THEY B7(C)
CAN FACE CHARGES OF ASSAULT ON A POLICE OFFICER AND DISTURBING THE PEACE DURING A MAY 28 DOMESTIC DISPUTE AT THEIR HOME. IF THE EMBASSY DECLINES TO WAIVE IMMUNITY AND NO ACCOMMODATION CAN BE REACHED WITH PROSECUTORS, THE [redacted] WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DEPART THE U.S. THE FAM B7(C)
REQUIRES THAT CHARGES INVOLVING VIOLENCE, WHETHER MISDEMEANOR OR FELONY, TRIGGER THE REQUEST FOR WAIVER/EXPULSION STEP. WE PROVIDED SHIM A HEADS-UP YESTERDAY; HE HAD BEEN UNAWARE OF THE MATTER.

(C) REQUEST FOR TALKS ON AGENT ORANGE COMPENSATION: THE ROK EMBASSY HAS CONTACTED US TO SUGGEST A SEPT 13-14 WASHINGTON VISIT BY MOFAT DEPUTY DG FOR NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS YUN BYUNG SE TO "DISCUSS COMPENSATION FOR KOREAN VETERANS" WHO SERVED IN VIETNAM AND WHO MAY HAVE BEEN EXPOSED TO DIOXIN. EMBASSY SEOUL REPORTS THAT MOFAT IS UNDER SOME DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO "DO SOMETHING." THERE IS ALSO A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT BROUGHT BY ROK VETERANS

PENDING IN FEDERAL COURT IN PENNSYLVANIA. WE ARE WORKING WITH L/EAP TO CRAFT POINTS FOR POST TO USE IN AN EFFORT TO TURN OFF THE TRIP. SUCH MEETINGS LIKELY WOULD BE WELL PUBLICIZED IN KOREA AND CREATE EXPECTATIONS THAT A COMPENSATION DEAL COULD BE FORTHCOMING. ALTHOUGH WE REMAIN WILLING TO MEET WITH THE ROK TO EXPLAIN AGAIN THE USG POSITION ON AGENT ORANGE, AND RELATED TOPICS, WE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE ROKG THAT WE HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE A DEAL.

6. EAP/APEC - RICHARD BOUCHER

(C) HOWARD SUGGESTS A WTO TEXT FOR APEC: AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER JOHN HOWARD, HAS WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENT, CITING THEIR CONVERSATION ABOUT APEC, AND SUGGESTING A SEPARATE, SHORT, READABLE DECLARATION BY LEADERS ON A NEW WTO ROUND. AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY OFFICERS MADE THE ROUNDS

TODAY TO PRESS THE CASE. WE (EAP, WHTTE HOUSE, USTR) ARE GENERALLY GAME TO TRY THE APPROACH IF THE TEXT IS GOOD. THERE ARE A FEW THINGS IN THEIR TEXT THAT WE WANT TO PLAY WITH ("SINGLE UNDERTAKING" LANGUAGE) AND A FEW THINGS WE THINK ARE IMPORTANT THAT THEY'VE LEFT OUT (DUTY FREE CYBERSPACE, TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, A BETTER APPROACH TO SOCIAL ISSUES). HOLLY HAMMONDS IS DRAFTING A FEW POINTS IN RESPONSE; SHOOTING TO TALK TO THE AUSTRALIANS HERE ON MONDAY. IF WE AGREE TO SOMETHING, HOWARD WANTS US TO SHOP IT WITH THE JAPANESE AND KOREANS.

7. EAP/PIMBS - DOUGLAS A. HARTWICK

(C) INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR - WASHINGTON LIAISON GROUP MEETING: FOLLOWING THE SECRETARY'S EAST TIMOR MEETING, THE OPERATIONS CENTER CRISIS MANAGEMENT STAFF HELD A WLG MEETING ON EAST TIMOR. OVER 40 PERSONS FROM STATE, DOD, JCS AND AID CONVENED TO DISCUSS PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS FOR A POSSIBLE NEO IN THE EVENT THE SITUATION DICTATES. THE ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE AUSTRALIANS WILL TAKE THE LEAD IN EVACUATING AMERICANS IN A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT, BUT THAT THE AUSSIES WOULD VERY QUICKLY TURN TO THE USG FOR HELP IN THE EVENT THE SECURITY SITUATION DISRUPTED DOWN NORMAL TRANSPORTATION ROUTES. THE JOINT STAFF REPRESENTATIVE (J-3) TOLD THE GROUP THAT THREE SHIPS WOULD BE IN PORT IN BALI 8/29-9/1, INCLUDING AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIP WITH HOVERCRAFT AND AMPHIBIOUS WHEELED VEHICLES. THE SHIPS ALSO CARRY A REINFORCED RIFLE COMPANY OF 300 MARINES, AND WILL BE TWO STEAMING DAYS FROM THE COAST OFF DILI. FORCES IN OKINAWA CAN TRANSPORT TROOPS AND HELICOPTERS BY AIR ON 21 HOURS NOTICE, BUT WOULD OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE A SECURED LANDING FIELD. WE BRIEFED THE GROUP ON EMBASSY JAKARTA'S PREPARATIONS AND PLANS TO HAVE PERSONNEL ON THE GROUND. DS AND OTHERS RAISED CONCERNS ABOUT THE SAFETY OF AMBASSADOR ROY.

WE WOULD MAKE A DECISION TO EVACUATE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE EMBASSY, AND ALMOST CERTAINLY THE AUSTRALIANS AND THE UN. OTHER GOVERNMENTS, MOST RECENTLY THE JAPANESE, ARE

LOOKING TO US FOR SUPPORT IN EVACUATING THEIR CITIZENS.

(C) INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR - HUMANITARIAN RELIEF PLANS: THE "EAST TIMOR GROUP" OF AN INTER-AGENCY "HUMANITARIAN SUB-GROUP" CHAIRED BY PRM ALSO MET TODAY TO DISCUSS WORST

CASE SCENARIOS AND REVIEW PREPARATIONS. MUCH HAS BEEN DONE TO PREPARE FOR AN OUTFLOW FROM EAST TIMOR INTO WEST TIMOR. STOCKS OF FOOD AND MEDICINE ARE PRE-POSITIONED IN DILI AND WITHIN EASY TRANSPORT DISTANCE, BUT ALL

PARTICIPANT'S WERE CONCERNED THAT A DETERIORATING SITUATION WOULD LIMIT OR CUT OFF ACCESS TO THOSE IN NEED WITHIN EAST TIMOR

(C) INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR -HRWA CALLS FOR PRESIDENTIAL ACTION: MIKE JENDRZEJZYK IS CALLING AROUND TOWN TO HIGHLIGHT HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ASIA'S PRESS RELEASE CALLING ON WORLD LEADERS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT CLINTON TO MAKE "DIRECT PHONE CALLS" TO HABIBIE, THE SUGGESTED MESSAGE IS THAT AID PROGRAMS AND LOANS -- EXCEPT FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY SUSPENDED IMMEDIATELY UNTIL THE SECURITY SITUATION IMPROVES IN EAST TIMORI

(C) INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR - PRO-AUTONOMY PR: EMBASSY JAKARTA HAS RECEIVED A PRESS RELEASE FROM A PRO-INTEGRATION GROUP CLAIMING THAT "ANTI-AUTONOMY RADICALS" PROVOKED THE AUGUST 26 VIOLENCE, CAUSING THE FIVE DEATHS THAT DAY. THAT MAY BE THEIR STORY, BUT NO ONE HERE IS BUYING IT. REPORTS OF POLICE STANDING ASIDE TO ALLOWED ARMED MILITIA TO HAVE THEIR WAY PREDOMINATE. THE SPIN MAY HAVE MORE RESONANCE, HOWEVER, IN JAKARTA AND ELSEWHERE IN INDONESIA.

C) INDONESIA - ATROCITIES MEETING: AMBASSAAADOR SCHEFFER HAS AGREED TO POSTPONE THE IWG MEETING AND HOPES TO

CONVENE THE SESSION SOON AFTER YOUR RETURN.

(SBU) INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR - RAMOS HORTA: EAST TIMORESE INDEPENDENCE LEADER JOSE RAMOS HORTA PLANS TO BE IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK, AND IS REQUESTING MEETINGS WITH AMBASSADOR GELBARD. RAMOS HORTA MAY ALSO SEEK APPOINTMENTS WITH DEPARTMENT PRINCIPALS.

(C) INDONESIA -- BLAIR TRIP: CINCPAC ADMIRAL BLAIR WILL VISIT INDONESIA SEPTEMBER 9-11, AND POLAD AMBASSADOR TWINNING IS ASKING FOR OUR INPUT INTO HIS TALKING POINTS FOR HIS CALLS ON INDONESIAN LEADERS. CLEARLY THERE IS NOT MUCH WE CAN USEFULLY PROVIDE AT THIS TIME, BUT WE WILL STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH TWINNING AS WE GET CLOSER TO THE TRIP.
ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E3

SECRET PTO4322

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 168808 090913Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000R

DRAFTED BY S/S-O: DAVID FETTER
APPROVED BY S/S-O: DAVID FETTER
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
NODIS - NOT FOR ADS

----------F5BA02 090913Z /38

O 090908Z SEP 99 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 168808

DECAPTIONED

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

FOLLOWING JAKARTA 04371 DATED 09 SEP SENT ACTION SECSTATE BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION

QUOTE

S E C R E T JAKARTA 004371

NODIS

E.O.12958: DECL: 09/09/24
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PGOV, UN, PO, ID
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 168808 090913Z
SUBJECT: CINCPAC MEETING WITH GENERAL WIRANTO

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D).

2. (S) IN A FORTY-MINUTE PRIVATE ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH GENERAL WIRANTO SEPTEMBER 9, THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES COMMANDER AND MINISTER FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY, CINCPAC ADMIRAL BLAIR GAVE GENERAL WIRANTO HIS TWO-PAGE TALKING POINTS. IN SEPARATE REMARKS, HE URGED WIRANTO TO PULL BACK FROM THE BRINK OF DISASTER FOR HIS COUNTRY AND SAID WE NEEDED TO SEE IMMEDIATE EVIDENCE OF THIS. [redacted] B1
[redacted] ADMIRAL BLAIR ENDED HIS VISIT AFTER THIS MEETING. HE B1
BRIEFED ME BEFORE DEPARTING.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CLARKE N ELLIS
DATE/CASE ID: 12 SEP 2008 200705435

[redacted] B1

4. (S) IN RESPONSE, ADMIRAL BLAIR GAVE GENERAL WIRANTO A COPY OF HIS TWO-PAGE TALKING POINTS (SEE BELOW). THEN, HE TOLD GENERAL WIRANTO HE HAD HEARD WHAT HE SAID. SPEAKING AS A FRIEND, HE WANTED TO CONVEY A MESSAGE FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE US GOVERNMENT IN WHICH OTHER CLOSE PERSONAL FRIENDS JOINED IN. [redacted] B1 AS A FRIEND, HE ASKED GENERAL WIRANTO TO ASSERT CONTROL OVER THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR AND SAID THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS WILLING TO HELP HIM.

[redacted] B1

6. (S) ADMIRAL BLAIR REPEATED HIS EARLIER MESSAGE AND URGED GENERAL WIRANTO TO TURN THE SITUATION AROUND. [redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

8. (S) ADMIRAL BLAIR'S PREPARED TALKING POINTS, A COPY OF WHICH WAS LEFT WITH WIRANTO, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

I COME TO YOU AT WHAT I CAN ONLY IMAGINE IS ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT MOMENTS IN YOUR CAREER TO CONVEY THE MOST GRAVE CONCERNS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

DESPITE REPEATED ASSURANCES THAT TNI COULD FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN EAST TIMOR; DESPITE SENDING SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF NEW TROOPS TO THE TERRITORY AND TAKING THE EXTRAORDINARY STEP OF IMPOSING MARTIAL LAW; EAST TIMOR HAS DESCENDED INTO ANARCHY.

TNI HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE 5 MAY AGREEMENT. THE UN MISSION IS UNDER SIEGE AND IN THE PROCESS OF EVACUATION.

THE HANDLING OF THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR HAS RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF TNI WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA. IT IS CRITICAL THAT TNI BE SEEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THROUGHOUT INDONESIA AS A LOYAL AND RESPONSIBLE PART OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND STATE.

FURTHER DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION WILL NOT ONLY CAUSE UNNECESSARY LOSS OF LIFE; IT WILL DO POTENTIALLY IRREVOCABLE DAMAGE TO INDONESIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD, INCLUDING THE U.S.

B1

[redacted] B1

LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT THE U.S. HAS NO INTEREST IN SEEING THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO. ON THE CONTRARY, WE STRONGLY SUPPORT INDONESIA'S CONTINUED TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. EAST TIMOR IS A SPECIAL CASE.

[redacted] B1

AS YOU KNOW, A COALITION OF CONCERNED NATIONS IS WILLING TO SEND A MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO EAST TIMOR; SUCH A FORCE WOULD AIM TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION UNTIL THE MPR MEETS TO ENDORSE THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION; THEN NEW ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE MADE WITH THE UN.

AN MNF WOULD ENTER ON THE BASIS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S CONSENT AND SO WOULD REFLECT YOUR DESIRE TO HAVE A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

REFUSAL TO ALLOW SUCH A FORCE IN THE FACE OF ONGOING CHAOS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO EXPLAIN.

INVITING THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN STILL MEANS YOU WOULD AT A MINIMUM MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER UNTIL THEY ARRIVE, WITH FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS TO BE WORKED OUT IN TANDEM WITH THEM.

THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING AS THIS TRAGEDY UNFOLDS, AND INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF INDONESIA HAS GROWN TO A FEVER PITCH. THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY IN WHICH INDONESIA CAN SALVAGE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE WORLD IS RAPIDLY SHUTTING.

THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR IS COMPLICATED, AND TNI HAS VAST RESPONSIBILITIES ELSEWHERE IN INDONESIA. I APPEAL TO YOU TO LET THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HELP INDONESIA HELP ITSELF.
ROY UNQUOTE PICKERING

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO6792

PAGE 01 STATE 169480 100107Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	A-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00
	IO-00	ADS-00	NEA-01	DCP-01	OIC-02	OIG-03	IRM-00
	STR-00	SA-01	DSCC-00	DRL-02	SAS-00	/018R	

169480
SOURCE: CBLEXCLS.001882
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:KRWALKIN -- 09/09/99 202-647-1029
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:DALARGENT
----------F615DB 100112Z /38
O P 100106Z SEP 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CHENGDU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 169480 100107Z
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS// PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CLARKE N ELLIS
DATE/CASE ID: 02 SEP 2008 200705435

TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 169480

USIA FOR EA, MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 9 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS -- ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA
USCINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING
UNVIE FOR FITZPATRICK
USEU FOR RUTH

1. INDEX

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 169480 100107Z
-- FACT SHEET: DOS PREPARATIONS FOR Y2K (PARAS 2-3)
-- STATEMENT: Y2K EXERCISE: 9/9/99 (PARAS 2,4)
-- INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR UPDATE (PARAS 5-6)
-- DPRK: U.S.-DPRK BERLIN BILATS UPDATE (PARAS 5,7)
-- CHINA: ALBRIGHT MEETING WITH FM TANG (PARAS 5,8)
-- CHINA'S WTO ACCESSION (PARAS 5,9)
-- UNSC/IRAQ: NO P5 MEETING (PARAS 5,10)
-- VIETNAM: DISSIDENT TRAVEL TO THE U.S. (PARAS 5,11)

2. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS WERE ISSUED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 9/9/99 AND 9/8/99 RESPECTIVELY.

3.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN
SEPTEMBER 9, 1999

FACT SHEET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PREPARATIONS FOR Y2K

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS FULLY ENGAGED IN GLOBAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE YEAR 2000 (Y2K) ROLLOVER TO PROTECT OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS. SINCE WE LIVE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, LAGGING Y2K PREPARATIONS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD CAN AFFECT OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS. WHILE THE UNITED STATES HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN PREPARING FOR THE Y2K ROLLOVER, WE CANNOT AFFORD TO MERELY HOPE THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD IS READY TOO. BECAUSE THE PROTECTION OF U.S. CITIZENS TRAVELING OR WORKING ABROAD IS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY OF THE DEPARTMENT

PAGE 04 STATE 169480 100107Z
OF STATE, WE WILL PROVIDE THE PUBLIC WITH OUR BEST ASSESSMENTS OF GLOBAL Y2K PREPAREDNESS SO THEY CAN MAKE RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL CHOICES.

LAST NOVEMBER, THE DEPARTMENT ASKED EACH OF OUR EMBASSIES TO ASSESS THEIR COUNTRIES IN RELATION TO Y2K. EACH EMBASSY REPORTED THE LEVEL OF RISK ASSOCIATED WITH EACH OF THE MAJOR SECTORS: TRANSPORTATION, ENERGY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, HEALTH, FINANCE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND WATER AND WASTE WATER. RESPONSES WERE SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL AND OTHERS. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING CONTINUOUSLY UPDATED.

TO PROTECT AGAINST ANY POTENTIAL NEGATIVE IMPACTS FROM Y2K DISRUPTIONS, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS FORMULATED COMPREHENSIVE CONTINGENCY PLANS, WHICH CALLED FOR ASSESSMENTS OF EVERY ASPECT OF OUR 219 EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES AND WASHINGTON-BASED BUILDINGS AND ANNEXES' Y2K READINESS. THE DEPARTMENT SENT OUT THE "POST CONTINGENCY PLANNING TOOL KIT" IN FEBRUARY, WHICH ADDRESSED THE POTENTIAL RESOURCE GAPS (EQUIPMENT, WATER, GENERATORS, ETC.) THAT COULD RESULT FROM Y2K-RELATED PROBLEMS. AGAIN, POSTS ASSESSED SUCH HOST COUNTRY SCENARIOS AS THE EFFECTS OF LOSS OF ELECTRICITY, WATER SHORTAGES, FAILURE OF PRIMARY SOURCES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER EVENTS, DURING THE ROLLOVER PERIOD. EACH EMBASSY HAD TO DETERMINE HOW LONG THEY COULD CONTINUE BUSINESS OPERATIONS AND MAINTAIN THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THEIR STAFF, AND INDICATED WHAT ADDITIONAL RESOURCES WOULD BE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN OPERATIONS IF SERIOUS PROBLEMS DEVELOPED IN THE HOST-COUNTRY INFRASTRUCTURE. PRESENTLY, THE INDIVIDUAL REGIONAL BUREAUS ARE COORDINATING CONTINGENCY

PAGE 05 STATE 169480 100107Z
EFFORTS WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE POSTS.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN Y2K POLICY FORMULATION WITH 16 FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES THROUGH THE Y2K INTERNATIONAL INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP (IWG). THIS GROUP, CO-CHAIRED BY STATE AND DEFENSE, HAS REVIEWED OTHER COUNTRIES' PREPAREDNESS BY VULNERABLE SECTORS. THE IWG REVIEW SEEKS TO PRESERVE REGIONAL POLITICAL-STRATEGIC MILITARY STABILITY, U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS, ENSURE OPERATIONAL READINESS, U.S. MILITARY BASES ABROAD, PROTECT U.S. CITIZENS AND ASSESS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE COUNTRY INVOLVED WOULD NEED EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO OVERCOME POSSIBLE Y2K PROBLEMS. TO THE EXTENT WE ARE ABLE, SPECIAL EFFORTS

WILL BE MADE TO HELP THESE COUNTRIES IDENTIFY VULNERABILITIES AND TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE CONTINGENCY PLANNING. OVERALL, SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON Y2K REMEDIATION AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING WORLDWIDE.

WE HAVE ENLISTED A NUMBER OF PARTNERS IN OUR GLOBAL EFFORTS, INCLUDING THE UNITED NATIONS, THE EUROPEAN UNION, APEC, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, THE IEA AND OTHER BODIES. ON SEPTEMBER 21-22 IN BERLIN, THE G-8 WILL ADDRESS CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE CRITICAL SECTORS OF FEDERAL/ STATE GOVERNMENT PREPAREDNESS, ENERGY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORTATION AND HEALTH CARE. WE ALSO EXPECT IN THIS MEETING TO EXAMINE MORE DEEPLY THE ISSUE OF TECHNICAL RESPONSE FROM A MULTINATIONAL PERSPECTIVE.

BILATERALLY, WE HAVE HAD A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS ON Y2K ISSUES GENERALLY AND POTENTIAL

VULNERABILITIES WITHIN THEIR COUNTRIES. WE ALSO INFORMED THEM OF OUR OBLIGATION TO INFORM THE AMERICAN PUBLIC OF POTENTIAL HAZARDS TO THEIR HEALTH AND SAFETY OCCASIONED BY Y2K PROBLEMS. CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEETS (CIS), CONTAINING SUCH INFORMATION, WERE PROVIDED TO RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS IN LATE AUGUST TO EARLY SEPTEMBER AND WILL BE RELEASED PUBLICLY ON SEPTEMBER 14.

FROM A TECHNICAL STANDPOINT, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S Y2K PROGRAM CAN BE CONVENIENTLY DESCRIBED AS HAVING FOUR CLOSELY RELATED ASPECTS. THEY ARE: (1) THE GLOBAL DEPLOYMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF MISSION-CRITICAL, CRITICAL AND ROUTINE SYSTEMS; (2) AN INDEPENDENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM; (3) END-TO-END TESTING OF CORE BUSINESS FUNCTIONS AND PROCESSES; AND, (4) BUSINESS CONTINUITY, CONTINGENCY AND "DAY ONE" PLANS.

MISSION-CRITICAL SYSTEMS SUPPORT THE BUSINESS PROCESSES WHOSE FAILURE WOULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE DEPARTMENT'S ABILITY TO MEET ITS WORLDWIDE CORE RESPONSIBILITIES. THE 59 MISSION-CRITICAL SYSTEMS SUPPORTING THE DEPARTMENT'S KEY BUSINESS PROCESSES--FINANCIAL, PERSONNEL, MEDICAL, SECURITY, COMMUNICATIONS, CONSULAR AND LOGISTICS--HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY TESTED AND IMPLEMENTED.

NON-MISSION-CRITICAL SYSTEMS (CRITICAL AND ROUTINE) ARE OFTEN IMPORTANT FOR SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS, HAVE A MORE LIMITED USER BASE, AND THEIR DEGRADATION WOULD NOT HAVE THE SAME WORLDWIDE IMPACT AS THAT OF THE MISSION-CRITICAL SYSTEMS, OR AFFECT CORE BUSINESS FUNCTIONS. THE 52 CRITICAL SYSTEMS ARE FULLY

REMEDIATED AND TESTED; 51 OF THESE SYSTEMS ARE IMPLEMENTED,
AND THE FINAL CRITICAL SYSTEM WILL BE DEPLOYED AND
UNCLASSIFIED

IMPLEMENTED GLOBALLY BY MID-SEPTEMBER. WE ARE NEARLY
FINISHED REMEDIATING, TESTING AND IMPLEMENTING THE 126
ROUTINE SYSTEMS. THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS, WHICH INCLUDES
AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE TESTING, IS WELL UNDERWAY.

ALL SYSTEMS, WHETHER MISSION-CRITICAL OR
NON-MISSION-CRITICAL, MUST HAVE TEST PLANS AND TEST RESULTS
INDEPENDENTLY REVIEWED TO BE CONSIDERED REMEDIATED AND
IMPLEMENTED. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES REQUIRE
TESTS OF 17 DATES, INCLUDING THE ROLLOVER OF DATE FROM
DECEMBER 31, 1999, TO JANUARY 1, 2000; SEPTEMBER 9, 1999;
AND, SINCE YEAR 2000 IS A LEAP YEAR, FEBRUARY 29, 2000.

MOREOVER, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS ALSO UNDERTAKING
END-TO-END TESTING OF TRANSACTION FLOWS ACROSS THE MAJOR
BUSINESS FUNCTIONS, APPLICATIONS AND INFRASTRUCTURE WHICH
SUPPORT THOSE TRANSACTIONS. TESTING PLANS WERE DEVELOPED FOR
EIGHT KEY BUSINESS PROCESSES: COMMAND-AND-CONTROL
COMMUNICATIONS; PERSONNEL; E-MAIL; CONSULAR; SECURITY;
FINANCIAL; MEDICAL; AND LOGISTICS. THESE FUNCTIONS SUPPORT
THE DEPARTMENT'S PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF PURSUING U.S.
DIPLOMATIC GOALS AND PROVIDING SERVICES TO AMERICAN CITIZENS.

TESTS WERE DESIGNED TO BE CONDUCTED IN A SERIES OF LOGICALLY
GROUPED "CLUSTERS," WITH APPROPRIATE, EFFECTIVE SCENARIOS,
INCLUDING SYSTEMS TESTS AT OVERSEAS POSTS. FIVE "CLUSTER"
TESTS WERE PREPARED, INCLUDING CONSULAR, BUSINESS MANAGEMENT,
E-MAIL, COMMAND-AND-CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY, WITH
RE-TESTS AS NEEDED.

THE CONSULAR SYSTEMS TESTS, INCLUDING PASSPORT ISSUANCE, VISA
UNCLASSIFIED

AND AMERICAN CITIZEN SERVICES SYSTEMS, HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY
COMPLETED, AS WERE THE E-MAIL AND COMMAND-AND-CONTROL
COMMUNICATIONS TESTS. THE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY
TESTING IS UNDERWAY.

THE DEPARTMENT HAS ALSO PERFORMED AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF THE
BUILDING SYSTEMS AND SECURITY SYSTEMS, BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND
AT ALL OVERSEAS FACILITIES. THE FEW NON-COMPLIANT SYSTEM
COMPONENTS HAVE BEEN REPLACED.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THE REAL CHALLENGES THE DEPARTMENT

HAS MET TO DEPLOY MAJOR Y2K-COMPLIANT SYSTEMS TO EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES IN COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD. ALTHOUGH PROBLEMS CANNOT BE PRECLUDED, WE ARE CONFIDENT THE DEPARTMENT IS WELL PREPARED FOR YEAR 2000, AND READY TO FULFILL ITS MOST IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES: PROTECTING AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD, PURSUING U.S. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS, AND ENSURING THE SAFETY OF OUR STAFF AND FACILITIES.

4.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN
SEPTEMBER 8, 1999

STATEMENT BY JAMES P. RUBIN, SPOKESMAN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PREPARATIONS FOR Y2K
REPORTING EXERCISE: 9-9-99

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS FULLY ENGAGED IN GLOBAL

PREPARATIONS FOR THE Y2K ROLLOVER TO PROTECT OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS. SINCE WE LIVE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, LAGGING Y2K PREPARATIONS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD CAN AFFECT OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS. WHILE THE U.S. HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN PREPARING FOR THE Y2K ROLLOVER, WE CANNOT AFFORD TO MERELY HOPE THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD IS READY TOO. BECAUSE THE PROTECTION OF U.S. CITIZENS TRAVELING OR RESIDING ABROAD IS THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S HIGHEST PRIORITY, WE WILL PROVIDE THE PUBLIC WITH OUR BEST ASSESSMENTS OF GLOBAL Y2K PREPAREDNESS SO THEY CAN MAKE RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL CHOICES.

A TEST OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S ABILITY TO GATHER, ANALYZE AND DISSEMINATE GLOBAL Y2K INFORMATION ON A TIMELY AND ACCURATE BASIS WE WILL BE CONDUCTED ON SEPTEMBER 8 AND 9. THIS WILL BE THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE WORLDWIDE Y2K REPORTING SYSTEM WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

BECAUSE THE DIGITS 9-9-99 MAY CAUSE MINOR COMPUTER MALFUNCTIONS, THIS DATE PRESENTS A TIMELY OPPORTUNITY TO TEST OUR SYSTEMS AND REPORTING PROCESSES. STARTING 4 P.M. WASHINGTON TIME ON SEPTEMBER 8, OFFICERS FROM 167 OVERSEAS POSTS WILL TRANSMIT REPORTS AT NOON LOCAL TIME VIA A WEB-BASED APPLICATION TO AN INFORMATION CENTER HERE AT MAIN STATE. A SPECIAL Y2K TASK FORCE WILL ANALYZE THE RAW DATA, WHICH WILL INCLUDE INFORMATION ON THE LOCAL STATUS OF POWER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORTATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, FINANCES, NATURAL RESOURCES, HEALTH SERVICES AND OTHER EMERGENCY SERVICES.

ALL EMPLOYEES PARTICIPATING IN THIS EXERCISE HAVE RECEIVED SPECIALIZED TRAINING ON THE QUESTIONS EACH POST IS TO ANSWER,
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 10 STATE 169480 100107Z
THE CRITERIA USED TO FORMULATE MEANINGFUL RESPONSES, AND THE SOFTWARE SPECIALLY DEVELOPED TO ACCOMMODATE OUR IMMENSE TASK. THIS EXERCISE WILL INDICATE IF THE TRAINING TO DATE HAS BEEN ADEQUATE AND ENABLE US TO DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT ANY ADDITIONAL TRAINING AS NECESSARY TO FULLY PREPARE OUR OFFICERS FOR THE MILLENNIUM ROLLOVER PERIOD.

IN ADDITION, THE EXERCISE WILL PROVIDE A CRUCIAL OPPORTUNITY TO TROUBLESHOOT THE TECHNICAL HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE AND THE COLLABORATIVE STRUCTURES USED IN THE REPORTING PROCESS. IF ANY PARTICULAR EMBASSY CANNOT USE COMPUTER CAPABILITIES FOR REPORTING, BACKUP CAPABILITIES ARE AVAILABLE. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT ANY GLITCHES EXPOSED BY THE EXERCISE WILL BE REMEDIED LONG BEFORE THE ROLLOVER PERIOD.

THOUGH THIS EXERCISE WILL GREATLY AID THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN EVALUATING AND IMPROVING OUR REPORTING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES, IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO MAKE EVALUATIONS OF GLOBAL Y2K PREPARATIONS THEMSELVES. USING INFORMATION FROM OUR POSTS WORLDWIDE AND A NUMBER OF OTHER SOURCES, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS BEEN FORMULATING GENERAL COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS OF Y2K PREPAREDNESS AND WILL PUBLISH THESE WITHIN UPDATED CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEETS ON SEPTEMBER 14. THESE CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEETS CAN BE ACCESSED AT HTTP://TRAVEL.STATE.GOV. OTHER Y2K-RELATED INFORMATION CAN BE ACCESSED AT HTTP://TRAVEL.STATE.GOV/Y2KCA.HTML.

5. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 9/9/99. THERE WAS NO REGULAR PRESS BRIEFING THAT DAY. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THESE GUIDANCES ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 11 STATE 169480 100107Z

6. INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR UPDATE

CONTEXT: THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR IS STILL CONFUSED. ON SEPTEMBER 9, SECRETARY ALBRIGHT MET WITH CONCERNED FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW ZEALAND, AND CINCPAC ADMIRAL BLAIR MET WITH INDONESIAN MILITARY CHIEF GENERAL WIRANTO IN JAKARTA. BOTH EXPRESSED THEIR SERIOUS CONCERN OVER THE CHAOTIC CONDITIONS IN EAST TIMOR. THUGS ARE HARASSING FOREIGNERS IN WEST TIMOR SEEKING ACCESS TO REFUGEES THERE. THE U.N. HAS DECIDED TO DRAW ITS PERSONNEL TO APPROXIMATELY 40 FOREIGNERS IN EAST

TIMOR. SERVICES HAVE BEEN RESTORED TO THE UNAMET COMPOUND.

Q. PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR.

A. THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR HAS NOT IMPROVED. THE UNITED NATIONS IS CONSIDERING WHETHER TO FURTHER DRAW DOWN ITS FOREIGN STAFF. THE FEW REPORTS RECEIVED OUTSIDE EAST TIMOR INDICATE THAT VIOLENCE CONTINUES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT MILITIA GROUPS ARE OPERATING IN WEST TIMOR AND HAVE BEGUN TARGETING FOREIGNERS FOR INTIMIDATION THERE.

-- THE FIVE NATION U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL DELEGATION (NAMIBIA, MALAYSIA, SLOVENIA, UK, AND THE NETHERLANDS) MET WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE TODAY, BUT HAS YET TO REPORT ITS FINDINGS TO THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL. WE EXPECT TO LEARN ABOUT THEIR VISIT THROUGH THE U.N. SOON.

-- OVER RECENT DAYS, WE HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT RELATIONS

BETWEEN INDONESIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL SUFFER SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES IF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ALLOWS THE CURRENT HUMANITARIAN DISASTER TO CONTINUE AND PREVENTS UNAMET FROM FULFILLING ITS MISSION.

-- WE INFORMED THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TODAY THAT WE ARE SUSPENDING MILITARY-TO-MILITARY TIES (IMET PROGRAM, JOINT EXERCISES). AS WE SAID YESTERDAY, HOW THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT DEALS WITH THE CHALLENGES OF EAST TIMOR WILL ALSO HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CAPACITY AND WILLINGNESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SUPPORT INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM.

-- WE EXPECT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA TO INVESTIGATE ALL VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED EITHER BY MILITARY FORCES OR MILITIA OR PARAMILITARY GROUPS. THE RESULTS OF SUCH INVESTIGATIONS SHOULD BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE, AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH ACTS SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE.

IF ASKED:

Q. IS THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. AND U.N. AT STAKE?

A. WE ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORTED THE U.N.-SPONSORED PROCESS TO DETERMINE THE FUTURE STATUS OF EAST TIMOR THAT RESULTED IN THE HISTORIC VOTE OF AUGUST 30. THE U.N. HAS DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB IN DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS CIRCUMSTANCES. AS

WE HAVE SAID BEFORE, IT IS THE CREDIBILITY OF INDONESIA THAT IS AT STAKE.

TAKEN QUESTION:

Q. WITH WHOM IN THE GOI HAS AMBASSADOR ROY MET AND WHEN?

A. AMBASSADOR ROY HAS HAD NUMEROUS AND REPEATED MEETINGS IN RECENT WEEKS AND DAYS TO DISCUSS U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT EAST TIMOR WITH THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOI, INCLUDING PRESIDENT HABIBIE, FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS, AND DEFENSE MINISTER WIRANTO.

7. DPRK: U.S.-DPRK BERLIN BILATS UPDATE

CONTEXT: THE DPRK DELEGATION IS OBSERVING A HOLIDAY (5LST ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE DPRK) TODAY. ALL MEDIA REPORTED VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KIM GYE GWAN'S REMARKS YESTERDAY ON THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE TALKS ("POSITIVE AND SERIOUS") AND ON THEIR PROSPECTS, "THE RESULT OF OUR TALKS ARE DEPENDENT ON THE U.S. SIDE." THE U.S. DELEGATION CONFIRMED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS GOOD, SERIOUS AND BUSINESSLIKE. (PLEASE REFER TO SEPTEMBER 7 AND 8 GUIDANCE FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.)

Q. CAN YOU UPDATE US ON THE BILATERAL TALKS IN BERLIN?

A. THE DPRK DELEGATION IS OBSERVING A HOLIDAY. THE TALKS ARE RECESSED TODAY AND WILL RESUME ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 10.

-- I CAN TELL YOU THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE TALKS HAS BEEN GOOD. THE PROCEEDINGS HAVE BEEN SERIOUS AND BUSINESSLIKE.

Q. ANY COMMENT ON THE DPRK VICE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PLACING THE ONUS ON THE U.S. FOR THE TALKS' OUTCOME?

A. THE TWO SIDES HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY ENGAGED DURING THIS ROUND. AS IN PREVIOUS ROUNDS, THE OUTCOME OF THESE TALKS WILL DEPEND ON THE EFFORTS OF BOTH SIDES.

8. READOUT OF THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER TANG

CONTEXT: THERE ARE SEVERAL MEDIA STORIES FROM REPORTERS IN

AUCKLAND DESCRIBING THE MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER TANG. ACCORDING TO A BRIEFING ON BACKGROUND BY A SENIOR OFFICIAL, THE TWO HAD A 90-MINUTE CORDIAL AND BUSINESSLIKE BREAKFAST, WHICH SET THE STAGE FOR THE MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS. THE TWO SIDES INDICATED THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE BELGRADE BOMBING. TOPICS DISCUSSED INCLUDED HUMAN RIGHTS, NORTH KOREA, NONPROLIFERATION, WTO ACCESSION, THE ANDREWS TALKS (ON BOMBING-RELATED PAYMENTS), TIBET AND TAIWAN. BECAUSE OF ONGOING AND UPCOMING MEETINGS IN NEW ZEALAND, INCLUDING THAT BETWEEN PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND JIANG, IT WOULD BE BEST TO REFER QUESTIONS TO AUCKLAND.

Q. PLEASE PROVIDE A READOUT OF SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER TANG.

A. TODAY IN AUCKLAND THE SECRETARY HELD A BREAKFAST MEETING WITH CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER TANG. PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND

JIANG WILL MEET ON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 11. THE SECRETARY MADE PUBLIC REMARKS IN AUCKLAND. I REFER YOU TO HER REMARKS AND TO AUCKLAND FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

9. CHINA'S WTO ACCESSION

CONTEXT: THERE ARE SEVERAL MEDIA STORIES FROM REPORTERS IN AUCKLAND DESCRIBING THE RESUMPTION OF BILATERAL DIALOGUE ON CHINA'S WTO ACCESSION. ACCORDING TO A BRIEFING ON BACKGROUND BY A SENIOR OFFICIAL, THE TOPIC WAS RAISED IN THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER TANG, AND THE SECRETARY INDICATED THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO COMPLETE THE NEGOTIATIONS. USTR AMBASSADOR BARSHEFSKY, AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN AUCKLAND, REFERRED TO THE "ICE-BREAKING" MEETINGS THIS WEEK IN BEIJING BETWEEN AUSTR BOB CASSIDY AND HIS COUNTERPART, VICE TRADE MINISTER LONG YONGTU. SHE CONTINUED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD "PICK UP WHERE WE LEFT OFF" IN APRIL. THE U.S. HAS REPEATED STATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A COMMERCIALLY MEANINGFUL WTO ACCESSION PACKAGE. BECAUSE OF ONGOING AND UPCOMING MEETINGS IN AUCKLAND, INCLUDING THAT BETWEEN PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND JIANG, IT WOULD BE BEST TO REFER QUESTIONS TO AUCKLAND.

Q. PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE OF THE WTO TALKS.

A. TODAY IN AUCKLAND THE SECRETARY HELD A BREAKFAST MEETING WITH CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER TANG, AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT USTR AMBASSADOR BARSHEFSKY MET WITH THE CHINESE AS WELL.

PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND JIANG WILL MEET ON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 11. BOTH THE SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR BARSHEFSKY HAVE MADE

PUBLIC REMARKS IN AUCKLAND. I REFER YOU TO THEIR REMARKS AND TO AUCKLAND FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

10. UNSC/IRAQ: NO P5 MEETING IN WASHINGTON

BACKGROUND: IN ADDRESSING YESTERDAY'S TAKEN QUESTION ON "CANCELLATION" OF P5 POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEETING THIS WEEK, THE SPOKESMAN CAN DRAW ON THE FURTHER POINTS BELOW. CHINESE STATEMENTS TO THE NEW YORK PRESS ON WHY CHINA DECLINED TO ATTEND THE "SCHEDULED" MEETING HAVE SUSTAINED PRESS INTEREST IN THIS NON-ISSUE FOR SEVERAL DAYS; BUT IT WOULD NOT SERVE U.S. INTERESTS TO PUBLICLY CHASTISE BEIJING FOR DECLINING U/S PICKERING'S INVITATION. RATHER, WE SHOULD HEW TO THE HIGH ROAD AND DECLINE -- PER STANDARD PRACTICE -- TO COMMENT ON DETAILS OF DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES.

Q. WHY WERE THIS WEEK'S SCHEDULED P5 CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON CALLED OFF? ISN'T THIS A SETBACK FOR U.S. IRAQ POLICY? WILL THE MEETING BE RESCHEDULED IN ANOTHER VENUE?

A. THE P5 ARE CONSULTING CONSTANTLY, ON MANY ISSUES, AT MANY LEVELS AND IN A VARIETY OF VENUES. FOR EXAMPLE, I HAVE MENTIONED A/S WELCH'S RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN BEIJING, LONDON AND MOSCOW, WHICH DEALT WITH IRAQ AND OTHER SUBJECTS.

-- DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE FUTURE MEETINGS AMONG P5 MEMBERS, EITHER MULTILATERAL OR BILATERAL, IS FREQUENT. SOMETIMES MEETINGS ARE ASSEMBLED QUICKLY, SOMETIMES THEY NEED DAYS OR WEEKS OF PREPARATION.

-- AND SOMETIMES, MEETINGS SUGGESTED BY ONE OR MORE P5 MEMBERS ARE RESCHEDULED, MOVED, POSTPONED OR CANCELLED FOR ANY ONE OF A HUNDRED REASONS. THIS IS A COMMON OCCURRENCE IN DIPLOMACY AND HARDLY CONSTITUTES NEWS.

-- IN ANY EVENT, WE WOULD NOT DISCUSS PUBLICLY THE DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WHICH LED UP TO A MEETING BEING SCHEDULED, CANCELLED OR POSTPONED ANY MORE THAN WE WOULD DISCLOSE DETAILS OF DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WITHIN A MEETING WHICH DID OCCUR.

-- P5 MEMBERS HAVE BEEN MEETING REGULARLY FOR QUITE SOME

TIME, IN NEW YORK AND IN CAPITALS, TO DISCUSS THE DUTCH/UK DRAFT RESOLUTION ON IRAQ.

-- THEY ARE SCHEDULED TO MEET AGAIN IN NEW YORK TODAY -- THAT IS IF THE LOOMING CATASTROPHE OF 9/9/99 DOES NOT NECESSITATE THE EVACUATION OF NEW YORK. FEEL FREE TO QUOTE ME ON THAT.

-- WE EXPECT SUCH MEETINGS TO CONTINUE IN NEW YORK AND IN CAPITALS, BUT I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER ON TIMING OR VENUE.

-- AND THAT'S ALL I HAVE FOR YOU ON THIS.

11. VIETNAM: USG-SPONSORED DISSIDENT TRAVEL TO THE U.S.

CONTEXT: RUMOR IS CIRCULATING AMONG THE EMIGRE COMMUNITY, HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND SOME MEDIA THAT THE U.S. HAS INVITED ABOUT 10-11 DISSIDENTS TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S ON AN EXCHANGE

PROGRAM. THIS WAS LIKELY SPARKED BY THE INTEREST OF A CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE TO NOMINATE CERTAIN VIETNAMESE INDIVIDUALS THE INTERNATIONAL VISITOR PROGRAM.

Q. HAS THE U.S. EMBASSY IN HANOI INVITED TEN PROMINENT DISSIDENTS TO TRAVEL ON AN EXCHANGE PROGRAM TO THE U.S.?

A. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SPONSORS MORE THAN 300 VIETNAMESE EXCHANGE VISITORS A YEAR TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. TO INCREASE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. THE U.S. EMBASSY IN HANOI, LIKE OTHER U.S. EMBASSIES AROUND THE WORLD, ADMINISTERS A VARIETY OF EXCHANGE PROGRAMS INCLUDING THE FULBRIGHT PROGRAM, THE INTERNATIONAL VISITORS PROGRAM, THE HUMPHREY PROGRAM, AMERICAN STUDIES INSTITUTES, AND OTHER PROGRAMS SOURCED TO GRANTS FUNDED OR ADMINISTERED BY THE U.S INFORMATION AGENCY IN WASHINGTON.

-- THE U.S. EMBASSY IN HANOI IS ALWAYS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF EXHANGE PROGRAMS WITH A VARIETY OF VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, ACADEMICS, JOURNALISTS, AND WRITERS. TO DATE, THERE HAS BEEN NO INVITATION FOR ANY SPECIAL PROGRAM OF THE TYPE ABOUT WHICH YOU ARE ASKING.

Q. HOW ARE PROSPECTIVE PARTICIPANTS FOR THESE PROGRAMS IDENTIFIED?

A. THE EMBASSY IN HANOI ACCEPTS NOMINATIONS FOR TRAVEL ON EXCHANGE PROGRAMS FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES. THE EMBASSY HAS AN EXCHANGE PROGRAM COMMITTEE WHICH CONSIDERS NOMINATIONS

FROM ALL SOURCES AND DETERMINES HOW BEST TO USE ITS FISCAL
RESOURCES FOR EXCHANGES TO MEET A WIDE VARIETY OF DEVELOPMENT
UNCLASSIFIED

NEEDS IN VIETNAM.
TALBOTT

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTO4719

PAGE 01 STATE 174780 170158Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AF-00	AID-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	A-00
	WHA-01	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	UTED-00	FEMA-01
	H-01	TEDE-00	IO-00	JUSE-00	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00
	NEA-01	DCP-01	OIC-02	OIG-03	IRM-00	SA-01	FMP-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	SAS-00	/021R			

174780
SOURCE: CBLEXCLS.002377
DRAFTED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES -- 09/16/99 202-647-2538
APPROVED BY: EAP/P:KNBAILES
----------F8E5F8 170202Z /38
O P 170157Z SEP 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL MELBOURNE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL PERTH IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SYDNEY IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 174780 170158Z
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY 0000
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS// PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CLARKE N ELLIS
DATE/CASE ID: 02 SEP 2008 200705435

DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 174780

USIA FOR EA, MOSCOW FOR ANDERTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XE, US
SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 16 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS -- ALSO FOR USIS
SECDEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA
UNVIE FOR FITZPATRICK
USEU FOR RUTH

1. INDEX:

--EAST TIMOR: SUPPORT OF MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE (PARAS 2-3)
--EAST TIMOR: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1264 (PARAS 4-5)
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 174780 170158Z
--EAST TIMOR: U.S.-AUSTRALIAN COOPERATION (PARAS 6-7)
--INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR UPDATE (PARAS 8-9)
--INDONESIA: DETENTION OF AMCIT JOURNALIST (PARAS 8 AND 10)
--EAST TIMOR: AIR DROPS AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (PARAS 8 AND 11)
--EAST TIMOR: STATUS OF REFUGEES (PARAS 8 AND 12)
--KOREA: U.S-DPRK FM MEETING AT UNGA? (PARAS 8 AND 13)
--UNSC/IRAQ: P5 POLITICAL DIRECTORS IN LONDON (PARAS 8 AND 14)

2. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON EAST TIMOR AND ON MURDERS IN TEXAS WAS ISSUED BY THE WHITE HOUSE ON 9/16/99.

3. THE PRESIDENT: BEFORE I DEPART FOR THE FEMA OPERATIONS CENTER, I'D LIKE TO SAY JUST A FEW WORDS ABOUT EAST TIMOR AND THE TERRIBLE MURDERS IN TEXAS LAST NIGHT.

FIRST, I'M PLEASED THAT THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL HAS APPROVED THE CREATION OF A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE TO BE LED BY AUSTRALIA, TO DEPLOY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO END VIOLENCE, RESTORE ORDER AND SUPPORT THE RESULTS OF THE AUGUST 30 REFERENDUM, WHERE THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY FOR INDEPENDENCE.

AFTER CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH CONGRESS AND WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA ON THE BEST WAY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION, AND ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF

SECRETARY COHEN AND MY NATIONAL SECURITY TEAM, I HAVE DECIDED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORCE IN A LIMITED, BUT ESSENTIAL, WAY--INCLUDING COMMUNICATIONS AND LOGISTICAL AID,

INTELLIGENCE, AIR LIFTS OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL AND COORDINATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE TRAGEDY.

WE WILL DEPLOY ABOUT 200 PEOPLE, ABOUT HALF OF WHOM WILL SERVE ON THE GROUND IN EAST TIMOR. IN ADDITION, ELEMENTS OF THE PACIFIC FLEET WILL PROVIDE SUPPORT. I AM ESPECIALLY ENCOURAGED THAT ASIAN NATIONS WILL BE TAKING THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY. THE OVERALL FORCE WILL CONTAIN ABOUT 7,500 PEOPLE, ROUGHLY HALF WILL BE AUSTRALIAN; AND I UNDERSTAND THAT THAILAND AND MANY OTHER ASIAN NATIONS WILL CONTRIBUTE, AS WELL AS GOVERNMENTS FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION.

THIS MISSION IS IN AMERICA'S INTERESTS FOR SEVERAL REASONS. INDONESIA'S FUTURE IS IMPORTANT TO US, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF ITS RESOURCES AND ITS SEA LANES, BUT FOR ITS POTENTIAL AS A LEADER IN THE REGION AND THE WORLD. IT IS THE FOURTH MOST POPULOUS NATION IN THE WORLD; THE LARGEST MUSLIM NATION IN THE WORLD. ALL ASIANS AND AMERICANS HAVE AN INTEREST IN A STABLE, DEMOCRATIC, PROSPEROUS INDONESIA.

OUR FUNDAMENTAL VALUES ARE ALSO AT STAKE IN EAST TIMOR. THE ELECTION ON AUGUST 30TH WAS CONDUCTED FAIRLY, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE U.N., WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. IT PRODUCED A CLEAR MANDATE FOR INDEPENDENCE. THE VIOLENCE SINCE IS ABHORRENT TO ALL OF US WHO CARE ABOUT HUMAN DIGNITY AND DEMOCRACY.

OF COURSE, ON ANY MISSION LIKE THIS, THERE ARE DANGERS AND RISKS OF CASUALTIES. THERE REMAINS A GREAT DEAL OF WORK AHEAD; BUT THIS FORCE IS WELL EQUIPPED FOR THE JOB, AND IT IS A JOB THAT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND STABILITY.

LAST NIGHT, IN THE WEDGWOOD BAPTIST CHURCH IN FORT WORTH, DURING A PRAYER SERVICE FOR TEENAGERS, A GUNMAN KILLED SEVEN WORSHIPPERS, WOUNDED SEVEN OTHERS AND KILLED HIMSELF. YET, AGAIN, WE HAVE SEEN A SANCTUARY VIOLATED BY GUN VIOLENCE, TAKING CHILDREN BRIMMING WITH FAITH AND PROMISE AND HOPE BEFORE THEIR TIME. OUR NATION'S SUPPORT AND PRAYERS ARE WITH THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS, THOSE STILL SUFFERING IN THE HOSPITAL, AND THE ENTIRE FORT WORTH COMMUNITY.

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS ARE NOW WORKING WITH STATE OFFICIALS AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO FIND ALL THE ANSWERS. BUT WE KNOW WE HAVE TO REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TO PROTECT OUR CHILDREN. WE KNOW WE HAVE TO ACT AS IF IT WERE OUR OWN CHILDREN BEING TARGETED BY GUN VIOLENCE.

WE KNOW THAT THERE IS NOTHING WE CAN DO TO ASSURE THAT THIS WILL NEVER HAPPEN, BUT THERE IS A LOT MORE WE CAN DO TO ASSURE THAT IT WILL HAPPEN MORE RARELY. AND I CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THE SHOCK OF THIS EVENT WILL SPUR THAT KIND OF ACTION.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

Q: MR. PRESIDENT, DID YOU CONSULT THE LEADERS? YOU SAY YOU CONSULTED THE LEADERS ON THE FORCE, THIS VERY SMALL FORCE?

THE PRESIDENT: YES. YES.

Q: MR. PRESIDENT, ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, NOW THAT YOU'VE ASSERTED THAT, WOULD YOU VOLUNTARILY RELEASE DOCUMENTS?

4. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON EAST TIMOR WAS ISSUED ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE ON 9/15/99.

5. LATE LAST NIGHT, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED RESOLUTION 1264, WHICH AUTHORIZES A MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO RESTORE STABILITY IN EAST TIMOR, AT THE INVITATION OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. NOW WE MUST MOVE WITH PURPOSE AND DISPATCH TO PROTECT THE INNOCENT PEOPLE WHOSE LIVES ARE STILL THREATENED BY THOSE SEEKING TO OVERTURN THE RESULTS OF A FAIR VOTE. I WELCOME THE PASSAGE OF RESOLUTION 1264, AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND OTHERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PUT TOGETHER AN EFFECTIVE FORCE. I HAVE JUST BEEN BRIEFED BY ADMIRAL BLAIR OF CINCPAC ON OUR CLOSE COOPERATION WITH AUSTRALIA, AND I HOPE THE FORCE CAN DEPLOY IN A MATTER OF DAYS. THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS OPERATION, AND WE ARE DISCUSSING WITH OUR AUSTRALIAN ALLIES AND THE CONGRESS AN APPROPRIATE U.S. ROLE.

6. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT BY DEPUTY SPOKESMAN JAMES FOLEY WAS RELEASED BY THE DEPARTMENT ON 9/16/99.

7. EAST TIMOR -- U.S.-AUSTRALIAN COOPERATION

THE U.S., IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, HAS MOVED RAPIDLY TO RESPOND TO THE

UNFOLDING SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR. THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE WORKED CLOSELY AND COOPERATIVELY TOGETHER TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE, BOTH RECENTLY AND OVER AN EXTENDED EARLIER PERIOD. THE U.S. HIGHLY VALUES THE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS MADE TO THE

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL AND LASTING RESOLUTION IN EAST TIMOR. WE HAVE HAD FULL COOPERATION WITH THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE ENTIRE RANGE OF ISSUES ENTAILED IN THESE EFFORTS, AND ANY REPORT TO THE CONTRARY WOULD BE MISLEADING AND FALSE.

8. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED ON 9/16/99. THERE WAS NO REGULAR PRESS BRIEFING ON THAT DAY. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THESE GUIDANCES ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

9. INDONESIA -- EAST TIMOR UPDATE

CONTEXT: DETAILS ON THE COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, AND ITS RELATION WITH THE INDONESIAN MILITARY, ARE BEING FINALIZED IN NEW YORK. THE FIRST DEPLOYMENTS OF THE AUSTRALIAN-LED FORCE, WHICH WILL RECEIVE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM APPROXIMATELY 15 NATIONS, SHOULD BE IN DILI WITHIN SEVERAL DAYS. REPORTS FROM DILI INDICATE THAT MILITIAS MAY BE PREPARING TO DEPART THE CITY. IN RESPONSE TO AUSTRALIAN REQUESTS, THE U.S. IS PLANNING TO PROVIDE STRATEGIC LIFT, COMMUNICATIONS, INTELLIGENCE, AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT YET FORMALLY AUTHORIZED OUR INVOLVEMENT, BUT IS EXPECTED TO DO SO TODAY. AS OF SEPTEMBER 16, AUSTRALIAN PERSONNEL HAD OBTAINED COORDINATES FOR DESIRED FOOD AIRDROPS, BUT THE UN HAD NOT YET OBTAINED CLEARANCES FROM THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. CLEARANCES PERMITTING, THE GOA PLANS TO MAKE THE INITIAL AIRDROPS AS SOON AS TOMORROW. FURTHER AIRDROPS WILL BE UNDERTAKEN BY WFP WITH PRIVATE AIRCRAFT. THE U.S. IS SUPPLYING FUNDS AND FOOD PACKETS TO THIS PROGRAM.

Q: PLEASE PROVIDE AN UPDATE OF THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING THE STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE, DEPARTURE OF MILITIAS, ROLE OF U.S. TROOPS, STATUS OF REFUGEES, HUMANITARIAN AID.

A: THE DETAILS OF THE COMPOSTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO BE DEPLOYED TO EAST TIMOR, INCLUDING

ITS RELATIONS WITH THE INDONESIAN MILITARY, ARE RAPIDLY TAKING SHAPE IN ONGOING DISCUSSIONS IN NEW YORK. AUSTRALIANS WILL COMMAND THE FORCE AND CONTRIBUTE APPROXIMATELY 4,500 TROOPS. A NUMBER OF OTHER NATIONS ARE CONTRIBUTING, OR CONTEMPLATING CONTRIBUTIONS, TO THIS FORCE, WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY BE APPROXIMATELY 7,500 STRONG. INITIAL DEPLOYMENTS OF THE MNF COULD OCCUR WITHIN WELL UNDER A WEEK.

Q: WHAT DO YOU HAVE ON THE DEPARTURE OF MILITIAS?

A: REPORTS FROM EAST TIMOR INDICATE THAT INDONESIAN FORCES ARE MOVING TO RESTORE ORDER IN DILI AND SECURE THE MAIN ROAD TO WEST TIMOR, AND IT APPEARS THAT THE MILITIA MIGHT BE PLANNING TO MOVE OUT OF DILI. THERE IS STILL SHOOTING AND SOME LOOTING, HOWEVER, AND FOREIGNERS TRAVEL ABOUT IN THE TERRITORY ONLY WITH MILITARY ESCORT. THE SITUATION IS FAR FROM SAFE OR NORMAL.

Q: U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO MNF?

A: THE U.S. IS RESPONDING POSITIVELY TO AUSTRALIAN REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE MNF. AS WE HAVE STATED PREVIOUSLY, U.S. SUPPORT WILL COME PRIMARILY IN SEVERAL CATEGORIES

IDENTIFIED AS PRIORITIES BY THE AUSTRALIANS: STRATEGIC LIFT, COMMUNICATIONS, INTELLIGENCE, AND LOGISITICAL SUPPORT. WE ARE CURRENTLY COORDINATING ON DETAILS, AND THE PRECISE NUMBER OF U.S. PERSONNEL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MNF HAS NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED.

Q. STATUS OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF?

A: AS OF MID-DAY ON SEPTEMBER 16, AUSTRALIAN AID PERSONNEL HAD OBTAINED COORDINATES FOR DESIRED FOOD AIRDROPS IN EAST TIMOR, BUT THE UN WAS STILL AWAITING CLEARANCES FROM THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. ASSUMING CLEARANCES ARE OBTAINED, AIRDROPS OF FOOD AND OTHER URGENTLY NEEDED SUPPLIES FOR THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE WITHIN EAST TIMOR COULD BEGIN AS SOON AS EARLY AS TOMORROW MORNING. WE URGE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO EXPEDITE REMAINING CLEARANCES.

WE CONTINUE TO URGE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE SAFE AND SECURE ACCESS BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AGENCIES TO EAST TIMORESE IDPS IN BOTH EAST AND WEST TIMOR.

10. INDONESIA -- DETENTION OF AMCIT JOURNALIST

CONTEXT: AMCIT JOURNALIST AND ACTIVIST ALLAN NAIRN WAS DETAINED BY INDONESIAN MILITARY OFFICIALS IN DILI ON SEPTEMBER 14. ALTHOUGH MR. NAIRN WAS TRANSFERRED TO WEST TIMOR ON SEPTEMBER 15 AND HIS DEPORTATION WAS ORIGINALLY EXPECTED TO BE EXPEDITED, INDONESIAN IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES NOW TELL EMBASSY JAKARTA THAT IT COULD BE ANOTHER THREE TO FOUR DAYS BEFORE THEY CONCLUDE THEIR INVESTIGATION AND

PROCESSING OF HIS CASE. ONLY THEN WILL HE BE PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. IN THE MEANTIME, MR. NAIRN REMAINS IN THE CUSTODY OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES IN KUPANG, WEST TIMOR.

POST HAS RAISED WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT OUR CONCERN THAT MR. NAIRN SHOULD BE RELEASED AND ALLOWED TO LEAVE INDONESIA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ON SEPTEMBER 16, AMBASSADOR ROY RAISED THE ISSUE WITH THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND THE MINISTER OF TRANSMIGRATION, AND ATTEMPTED (UNSUCCESSFULLY) THROUGHOUT THE DAY TO REACH THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE. EMBASSY EFFORTS TO CONTACT THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION HAVE MET WITH THE RESPONSE THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR THE DG TO BE CONTACTED, AS IT IS "UNDER PROCESS AND MR. NAIRN WILL BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE SOON."

CONSULAR OFFICERS FROM EMBASSY JAKARTA HAVE REMAINED IN TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH MR. NAIRN, BUT HE DOES NOT APPEAR EITHER TO NEED OR TO DESIRE CONSULAR ASSISTANCE. MR. NAIRN HAS TOLD CONSULAR OFFICERS THAT HE IS CONFINED TO AN IMMIGRATION "HOUSE OF QUARANTINE" IN KUPANG; HE IS NOT LOCKED IN HIS ROOM, BUT HE IS CONFINED TO THE COMPOUND. MR. NAIRN HAS DESCRIBED HIS ACCOMMODATIONS AS "SPARTAN," BUT SAYS THAT HE IS ALLOWED HIS PRIVACY AND IS BEING FED.

THERE HAS BEEN CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST FROM SENATORS MOYNIHAN AND SCHUMER, REP. DENNIS KUCINICH (D-OHIO) AND REP. PATRICK KENNEDY (D-R.I.), RALPH NADER AND REV. JESSE JACKSON. ADDITIONAL PUBLIC PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. ON THIS CASE HAS BEEN UNRELENTING; EMBASSY JAKARTA REPORTS THAT IT HAS BEEN THE TARGET OF A CALL-IN CAMPAIGN FROM RADIO STATION WBAI IN NEW YORK. THE CONSULAR SECTION IN JAKARTA RECEIVED ABOUT 50

CALLS DURING THE ONE-HOUR PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CALL-IN CAMPAIGN BEGAN.

Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE US ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE STATUS OF U.S. JOURNALIST ALLAN NAIRN, WHO IS BEING DETAINED IN INDONESIA?

A. WE REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH MR. NAIRN. WHILE CONFINED IN AN IMMIGRATION PROCESSING FACILITY, HE HAS NOT INDICATED ANY CONCERN FOR HIS PHYSICAL SAFETY. OUR AMBASSADOR AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICIALS HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN IN CONTACT WITH SENIOR INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES CONCERNING THIS CASE. WE HAVE PRESSED FOR AN EXPEDITIOUS RESOLUTION TO MR. NAIRN'S CASE.

AS OF THE END OF THE DAY SEPTEMBER 16 IN JAKARTA, MR. NAIRN REMAINS IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN KUPANG, WEST TIMOR. IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS IN KUPANG INDICATE THAT MR. NAIRN WILL PROBABLY REMAIN IN DETENTION UNTIL INVESTIGATION AND PROCESSING OF HIS CASE CAN BE COMPLETED, PROBABLY IN ANOTHER THREE TO FOUR DAYS.

Q. DOESN'T THAT SEEM LIKE AN INORDINATE AMOUNT OF TIME FOR SOMEONE'S DEPORTATION TO BE PROCESSED, SINCE A DECISION HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE THAT HE WILL HAVE TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY?

A. OUR EMBASSY IN JAKARTA HAS INFORMED US THAT IN NORMAL CASES OF OVERSTAYS OR STATUS VIOLATIONS, IT IS COMMON FOR THE INDONESIAN IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES TO TAKE FROM TWO TO FIVE DAYS TO PROCESS A U.S. CITIZEN FOR DEPARTURE.

MR. NAIRN WAS PICKED UP IN EAST TIMOR ON TUESDAY MORNING, SEPTEMBER 14. SINCE THAT TIME, WE HAVE BEEN PRESSING THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS RESOLUTION OF HIS CASE. ALTHOUGH AT THIS POINT THE TIMELINE FALLS WITHIN THE NORM OF WHAT WE HAVE SEEN IN OTHER DEPORTATION CASES IN THE PAST, WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE PROCESS WILL BE EXPEDITED.

Q. CAN YOU TELL US ANY MORE ABOUT THE PRECISE CHARGES AGAINST MR. NAIRN THAT HAVE LED TO HIS PENDING DEPORTATION?

A. INDONESIAN OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US THAT MR. NAIRN OVERSTAYED HIS 60-DAY VISA.

Q. WHAT HAS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT BEEN DOING TO ASSIST MR. NAIRN?

A. AS WE HAVE SAID PREVIOUSLY, CONSULAR OFFICERS FROM OUR EMBASSY IN JAKARTA HAVE BEEN IN REGULAR TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH MR. NAIRN SINCE HIS INITIAL DETENTION IN EAST TIMOR EARLY TUESDAY MORNING.

THIS CONTACT CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE DAY WEDNESDAY,

SEPTEMBER 16.

THE EMBASSY HAS ALSO BEEN PRESSING INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AT VARIOUS LEVELS TO RELEASE MR. NAIRN AND ALLOW HIM TO DEPART THE COUNTRY.

Q. ON TUESDAY, JIM FOLEY TRIED TO RECONCILE TWO SEEMINGLY CONTRADICTORY POINTS OF VIEW ON THIS CASE ON THE PART OF THE

U.S. GOVERNMENT. ON THE ONE HAND, HE STATED THAT THE U.S. BELIEVES INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS, INCLUDING JOURNALISTS SUCH AS MR. NAIRN, HAVE A RIGHT TO COVER WHAT IS HAPPENING IN EAST TIMOR. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAID THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAS A RIGHT TO DEPORT WHOMEVER IT WANTS. HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE APPARENT CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THESE TWO STATEMENTS?

A. I DON'T THINK THAT THERE IS ANY CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THOSE TWO STATEMENTS.

INDONESIA, JUST LIKE THE UNITED STATES OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY, HAS THE RIGHT AS A SOVEREIGN NATION TO DETERMINE WHO IS PERMITTED TO ENTER THE COUNTRY AND WHO MUST DEPART. WE DO NOT QUESTION THAT.

HOWEVER, IF THE ONLY REASON THAT MR. NAIRN IS BEING ORDERED TO LEAVE INDONESIA IS BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN REPORTING WHAT HAS BEEN OCCURRING IN EAST TIMOR IN A WAY THAT CASTS THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IN A NEGATIVE LIGHT, WE WOULD STRONGLY OBJECT TO HIS DEPORTATION. JOURNALISTS, LIKE ALL OTHER INDIVIDUALS, ENJOY INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED RIGHTS, INCLUDING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. MR. NAIRN, LIKE OTHER JOURNALISTS -- OR PRIVATE CITIZENS, FOR THAT MATTER -- SHOULD BE ABLE TO EXERCISE THESE RIGHTS WITHOUT BEING HINDERED OR CENSORED BY THE AUTHORITIES.

11. EAST TIMOR: AIR DROPS AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Q: WHAT IS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE AIRDROPS

TO EAST TIMOR'S IDPS?

A: HUMANITARIAN DAILY RATIONS (HDRS) FOR DISTRIBUTION TO THE DISPLACED PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR.
USAID ARRANGED THE TRANSPORT OF THESE HDRS BY COMMERCIAL

AIRCRAFT FROM CALIFORNIA TO DARWIN, AUSTRALIA (AT A COST OF $1.2 MILLION). FLIGHTS BEGAN ON WEDNESDAY.

THE HDRS WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM (WFP) IN DARWIN, WHICH WILL COORDINATE THE AIRDROPS IN EAST TIMOR.

Q: IS THE U.S. CONSIDERING ADDITIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AT THIS TIME?

A: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH UN AGENCIES, INCLUDING THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM AND MEMBERS OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN EAST TIMOR.

USAID IS WORKING TO PROVIDE APPROXIMATELY $225,000 WORTH OF RELIEF SUPPLIES TO A STAGING AREA IN DARWIN, AUSTRALIA. THE FIRST PLANE LOAD OF SUPPLIES IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN DARWIN IN APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK.

USAID IS PLANNING TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING RELIEF SUPPLIES:

500 ROLLS OF PLASTIC SHEETING
20,000 BLANKETS
5,000 FIVE-GALLON COLLAPSIBLE WATER JUGS

12. STATUS OF REFUGEES

Q. WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATUS OF REFUGEES IN EAST TIMOR?
A: POST-INDEPENDENCE-VOTE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR HAS FORCED SOME 350,000 EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE FROM THEIR HOMES. UP TO 150,000 OF THESE DISPLACED PEOPLE HAVE MOVED OR BEEN FORCED INTO WEST TIMOR, WHERE MANY OF THEM HAVE BEEN LIVING IN CAMPS WITH LIMITED FACILITIES. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN GRANTED ONLY LIMITED ACCESS TO THE DISPLACED. MOST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE USING INDONESIAN STAFF TO DELIVER SERVICES OWING TO HOSTILITY AGAINST "WESTERNERS." WE ARE CONCERNED OVER REPORTS THAT MILITIAS ARE OPERATING IN AND AROUND THE CAMPS.

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR IS EVEN LESS CLEAR, OWING TO LACK OF ACCESS. WE ARE GREATLY TROUBLED THAT CITIES LIKE DILI HAVE SUFFERED MASSIVE DESTRUCTION AND THAT EAST TIMOR'S URBAN POPULATION HAS BEEN FORCED TO TAKE REFUGE IN THE HILLS WHERE WATER AND FOOD ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY.

UN-LED AIRDROPS, ORGANIZED BY THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM (WFP) AND OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (OCHA), HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA AS A WAY

OF PROVIDING FOOD IN THE SHORT TERM. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE DROPS CAN BEGIN AS SOON AS THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES GIVE THEIR APPROVAL.

AIRDROPS ALONE ARE INSUFFICIENT TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASK. WHAT WE NEED IS TO HAVE ACCESS AND SECURITY FOR HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS TO BE ABLE TO DELIVER THE LARGE QUANTITIES OF FOOD, EMERGENCY SUPPLIES AND SERVICES WHICH ARE NOW BEING ASSEMBLED IN THE REGION. TO THIS EFFECT, WE ARE HAPPY TO NOTE THAT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1264 AUTHORIZES THE

MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION WITHIN FORCE CAPABILITIES TO FACILITATE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS.

13. KOREA--U.S-DPRK FM MEETING AT UNGA?

CONTEXT: THERE ARE PRESS REPORTS THAT DPRK FOREIGN MINISTER PAIK NAM-SOON WILL ATTEND THE UPCOMING UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA). OTHER REPORTS SPECULATE THAT, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE BERLIN U.S.-DRPK BILATERAL TALKS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT DPRK FIRST VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KANG SOK JU, WHO RECEIVED AN INVITATION DURING THE PERRY-SHERMAN PYONGYANG TRIP LAST MAY, COULD PAY A RECIPROCAL VISIT NEXT MONTH. STILL OTHER REPORTERS SPECULATE ON WHETHER SECRETARY ALBRIGHT WILL MEET FM PAIK AT THE UNGA. WHILE A HIGH LEVEL VISIT LIKE ONE BY KANG WOULD SIGNAL ANOTHER STEP ALONG THE PATH OF IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS AND ADVANCING THE IDEAS DR. PERRY EXPLORED IN PYONGYANG, IT IS PROBABLY TOO EARLY FOR A MINISTERIAL LEVEL ENCOUNTER.

MEANWHILE, DR. PERRY CONTINUES TO BRIEF THE CONGRESS ON HIS REVIEW TODAY, AND THE PRESIDENT IS CONSIDERING SANCTIONS EASING RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE. A WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE SANCTIONS EASING DECISION IS EXPECTED SOON. (SEE SEPTEMBER 14 GUIDANCE.)

Q.: WILL SECRETARY ALBRIGHT MEET DPRK FM PAIK AT THE UPCOMING UNGA?

A: THE DPRK HAS NOT REQUESTED SUCH A MEETING, AND WE DO NOT

PLAN THAT ONE WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS TIME.

CERTAINLY, AS WE BUILD ON THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF OUR TALKS IN BERLIN, SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS COULD MEET WITH DPRK

COUNTERPARTS, ANALOGOUS TO THE VERY USEFUL MEETINGS HELD DURING THE PERRY-SHERMAN TRIP TO PYONGYANG. SUCH CONTACTS WOULD BE NATURAL AS WE MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD DEEPENING OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE DPRK AND EXPLORE FURTHER THE IDEAS DR. PERRY PUT FORWARD.

Q: IS A HIGH-LEVEL NORTH KOREAN OFFICIAL, LIKE FIRST VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KANG SOK JU, GOING TO VISIT WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER?

A: WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED AN INDICATION FROM THE DPRK ABOUT SUCH A VISIT AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, AS OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE DPRK MOVES FORWARD, A VISIT BY A SENIOR NORTH KOREAN OFFICIAL TO WASHINGTON, AS I STATED, WOULD BE A NATURAL EVENT.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE PERRY REPORT?

A: I KNOW THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF PRESS REPORTS ON WHAT MAY BE IN THE REPORT. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMENT ON THEM. DR. PERRY, AMBASSADOR SHERMAN AND AMBASSADOR KARTMAN ARE CONTINUING TO BRIEF THE HILL TODAY. THESE ARE INFORMAL, CLOSED MEETINGS. I DON'T HAVE ADDITIONAL DETAILS FOR YOU ON THE SCHEDULE OR ON THE CONTENT OF THEIR BRIEFINGS.

Q: ANYTHING ON SANCTIONS EASING?

A: THE SECRETARY'S RECOMMENDATION TO EASE SANCTIONS

AFFECTING CERTAIN AREAS OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE DPRK IS WITH THE PRESIDENT. I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR FURTHER DETAILS.

14. UNSC/IRAQ: P5 POLITICAL DIRECTORS IN LONDON

BACKGROUND: U/S PICKERING AND A/S WELCH WERE IN LONDON YESTERDAY FOR A MEETING OF P5 POLITICAL DIRECTORS. THE MEETING FOCUSED ON IRAQ AND KEY PROVISIONS OF THE DUTCH/UK DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN CONSIDERING SINCE APRIL. THE NYT TODAY REPORTS A "POSSIBLE MAJOR SOFTENING" OF THE U.S. POSITION. THE P5 UN MISSIONS ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSING THE IRAQ RESOLUTION ISSUE ON FRIDAY (9/17) IN NEW YORK. THE P5 POLITICAL DIRECTORS TENTATIVELY AGREED IN LONDON TO MEET AGAIN IN NEW YORK EARLY NEXT WEEK, WITH A P5 MINISTERIAL ON IRAQ POSSIBLY TO FOLLOW LATE NEXT WEEK. WE SHOULD AVOID DETAILED COMMENT ON POSSIBLE MEETINGS NEXT WEEK UNTIL THEY ARE CONFIRMED. (NB: THE DRAFT ALREADY HAS NINE CO-SPONSORS (ARGENTINA, BAHRAIN, BRAZIL, CANADA, GAMBIA, NAMIBIA, NETHERLANDS, SLOVENIA, UK) AND 11

SUPPORTERS (CO-SPONSORS GABON, USA) IN THE COUNCIL.)

Q: WHAT WAS THE OUTCOME OF THE P5 POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEETING IN LONDON YESTERDAY?

A: U/S PICKERING WAS IN LONDON YESTERDAY FOR A MEETING WITH HIS P5 COUNTERPARTS. THEIR AGENDA FOCUSED ON IRAQ AND THE DUTCH/UK DRAFT RESOLUTION.

THE LONDON MEETING WAS SERIOUS AND SUBSTANTIVE. IT CAME IN

THE CONTEXT OF ONGOING P5 CONTACTS WHICH WE HOPE WILL PROMOTE CONSENSUS ON IRAQ AND HELP ENABLE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACT SOON ON THE DUTCH/UK DRAFT, WHICH ALREADY HAS THE SUPPORT OF A MAJORITY OF UNSC MEMBERS.

Q: DID THE UNITED STATES AGREE TO DISCUSS SUSPENDING SANCTIONS ON THE IMPORT OF CIVILIAN GOODS IF IRAQ COOPERATES WITH A REVIVED UN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS PROGRAM?

A: WE'VE MADE CLEAR OUR OVERARCHING GOAL: TO GET IRAQ TO COMPLY FULLY WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

OUR ONGOING CONTACTS WITH THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ARE AIMED AT BUILDING SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS ON AN APPROACH WHICH WILL PUT WEAPONS INSPECTION TEAMS BACK IN IRAQ AND IMPROVE THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE, WHILE MAINTAINING SANCTIONS ON THE REGIME UNTIL THERE IS FULL COMPLIANCE.

Q: WOULD YOU AGREE TO LIFT OR EASE SANCTIONS IN ORDER TO GET SADDAM HUSSEIN TO COMPLY WITH THE RESOLUTIONS?

A: THE STANDARD WHICH IRAQ MUST MEET IS THE SAME AS IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN. IRAQ MUST COMPLY FULLY WITH ALL UNSC RESOLUTIONS.

I'M NOT GOING TO GET INTO DETAILS OF THE P-5 DISCUSSION OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION.

Q: WILL THERE BE FURTHER P5 MEETINGS IN COMING DAYS AIMED AT

RESOLVING THIS MATTER?

A: P5 MEMBERS HAVE BEEN MEETING REGULARLY FOR QUITE SOME

TIME, IN NEW YORK AND IN CAPITALS, TO DISCUSS THE DUTCH/UK DRAFT RESOLUTION ON IRAQ.

WE EXPECT SUCH MEETINGS TO CONTINUE IN NEW YORK AND IN CAPITALS UNTIL THE COUNCIL ACTS ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. BUT I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER RIGHT NOW ON TIMING OR VENUE OF SUCH MEETINGS.

Q: WHEN WILL THE SECURITY COUNCIL ACT ON THE DUTCH/UK DRAFT?

A: THAT'S A MATTER FOR THE COUNCIL TO DECIDE. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE COUNCIL ACT ON THE DRAFT.

Q: CHINA, FRANCE AND RUSSIA HAVE ADVOCATED A DIFFERENT APPROACH ON IRAQ. DO YOU EXPECT ONE OF THEM TO VETO THE DUTCH/UK DRAFT WHEN IT COMES BEFORE THE UNSC FOR A VOTE?

A: I'M NOT GOING TO SPECULATE ON FUTURE ACTIONS BY MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE DUTCH/UK DRAFT ALREADY HAS THE SUPPORT OF 11 OF THE 15 SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT ADOPTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH THE BROADEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT WITHIN THE COUNCIL.
ALBRIGHT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E9

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTO0954

PAGE 01 STATE 179275 231505Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000R

179275
SOURCE: KODAKC.023136
DRAFTED BY: EAP:TVAJDA:TV -- 09/22/99 7-6921
APPROVED BY: S:THE SECRETARY
EAP:SOROTH S/S:RLIKINS S:AWOLFF S/S-O:MKLECHESKI
----------FB6E04 231509Z /38
P 231504Z SEP 99 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 179275

NODIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/09
TAGS: OVIP (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), PREL
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER KOMOURA ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1999

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROSE LIKINS; REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (U) SEPTEMBER 9, 1999, 5:15-6:15, STAMFORD PLAZA HOTEL, AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 179275 231505Z

3. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.:
THE SECRETARY
WENDY SHERMAN, COUNSELOR
ALAN LARSON, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC, BUSINESS, AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS
STANLEY ROTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
GEN. DONALD KERRICK, ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CLARKE N ELLIS
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 22 SEP 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 03 SEP 2008 200705435

JAMES FOLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

JAPAN:

FOREIGN MINISTER MASAHIKO KOUMURA
KORESHIGE ANAMI, DIRECTOR-GENERAL, ASIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SHOTARO OSHIMA, DIRECTOR-GENERAL, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS BUREAU, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
NOBOAKI TANAKA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JIRO KODERA, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO FOREIGN MINISTER KOUMURA

4. (C) SUMMARY. THE SECRETARY MET SEPTEMBER 9 WITH JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER KOUMURA ON THE MARGINS OF THE APEC MINISTERIAL MEETING IN AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND. AFTER A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS (MEPP) AND THE POSITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP,

THE SECRETARY AND FM KOUMURA FOCUSED THEIR DISCUSSION ON APEC AND THE WTO, NORTH KOREA, EAST TIMOR, AND IRAN. ON APEC, THE SECRETARY PRESSED FOR U.S.-JAPAN COOPERATION TO ADVANCE REGIONAL LIBERALIZATION AND TO SECURE A STRONG APEC STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE WTO MINISTERIAL AND NEXT WTO ROUND; THAT STATEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE A CALL FOR A BROAD BUT MANAGEABLE WTO AGENDA AND EARLY PROGRESS ON SEVERAL KEY INITIATIVES IN SEATTLE. B1

EXPANDING ON HER PRESENTATION EARLIER IN THE DAY AT A SPECIAL FOREIGN MINISTERS" MEETING ON EAST TIMOR, THE SECRETARY OUTLINED THE CHALLENGES FACING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN DETERMINING THE BEST MEANS TO PERSUADE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO REQUEST THE DEPLOYMENT OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN EAST TIMOR. WHILE RESTORING ORDER WAS CLEARLY INDONESIA'S RESPONSIBILITY, THE SECRETARY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN JAKARTA COULD NOT BE GRANTED AN INDEFINITE AMOUNT OF TIME TO TAKE ACTION, PARTICULARLY IF THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE.

5. (C) FOREIGN MINISTER KOUMURA RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT MANY APEC ECONOMIES FAVORED A "SINGLE UNDERTAKING" FOR WTO NEGOTIATIONS. HE ALSO NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF CHINA'S

ACCESSION TO THE WTO AND EXPRESSED HOPE FOR PROGRESS IN U.S.-PRC TALKS ON THE SUBJECT. B1

KOUMURA SHARED THE SECRETARY'S CONCERNS ON EAST TIMOR AND READILY ACCEPTED HER CALL FOR CLOSE U.S.-JAPAN COORDINATION ON THE ISSUE. B1

END SUMMARY.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

6. (C) FM KOUMURA SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE MEPP

SEEMED TO BE BACK ON TRACK -- WHICH, HE STATED, COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE SECRETARY'S EFFORTS. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS SIMILARLY PLEASED, BUT RECOGNIZED THAT RECENT PROGRESS SHOULD BE VIEWED AS ONLY THE OPENING TO "BIGGER, MORE COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS." KOUMURA AGREED, COMMENTING THAT WHILE HE TOO EXPECTED DIFFICULTIES IN THE FUTURE, NO PROGRESS WOULD BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT SUCH A FIRST STEP.

U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS

7. (C) THE SECRETARY TOLD KOUMURA THAT SHE WELCOMED THE

OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH HIM AGAIN. THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN SHOULD BE PLEASED WITH THE STATUS OF THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT SHE DID NOT WANT TO COVER THE SAME ISSUES DISCUSSED AT HER LAST

MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN JULY AT THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF) IN SINGAPORE. SHE WANTED, HOWEVER, TO REITERATE THE USG'S INTEREST IN WORKING WITH JAPAN TO PREPARE THE 2000 G-8 SUMMIT IN OKINAWA, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR JAPAN TO EXERCISE ITS LEADERSHIP.

B1

THE SECRETARY THEN SUGGESTED THAT SHE AND KOUMURA DISCUSS APEC, NORTH KOREA, AND EAST TIMOR.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 179275 231505Z

KOUMURA AGREED, ADDING THAT, AS INDICATED BY THE SECRETARY, THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WAS "SOLID," WHILE BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, THOUGH SUBJECT TO SOME PROBLEMATIC ISSUES, WERE ALSO "BASICALLY GOOD." KOUMURA REMARKED THAT THE GOJ HOPED TO BUILD ON AND STRENGTHEN U.S.-JAPAN TIES IN ADVANCE OF NEXT SUMMER'S G-8 SUMMIT.

APEC/WTO

8. (C) THE SECRETARY STATED THAT, AS SHE HAD OUTLINED IN HER RECENT LETTER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN NEEDED TO COOPERATE IN APEC TO PROMOTE REGIONAL TRADE AND LIBERALIZATION AND TO ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL WTO MINISTERIAL AND ROUND. AS THE WORLD'S TWO LEADING ECONOMIES, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN BEAR RESPONSIBILITY TO ADVANCE KEY APEC INITIATIVES AND TO MAINTAIN APEC'S CREDIBILITY IN SUPPORTING OPEN MARKETS.

9. (C) THE SECRETARY MADE CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON WOULD TAKE A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE NEW WTO ROUND. THE UNITED STATES WOULD LOOK TO JAPAN TO BACK A STRONG APEC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR THE WTO MINISTERIAL AND NEXT WTO ROUND; THAT STATEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE A COMMON APEC POSITION IN FAVOR OF A BROAD BUT MANAGEABLE AGENDA FOR THE NEXT ROUND AND AN AGREEMENT IN SEATTLE ON TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AND WTO PROCEDURES, ACCELERATED TARIFF LIBERALIZATION AS AGREED IN APEC, AND DUTY-FREE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT, THE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTINUED, THAT THE NEXT WTO ROUND PRODUCE CONCRETE RESULTS TO HELP MAINTAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR AN OPEN GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM. SHE REITERATED THE U.S. INTEREST IN WORKING WITH JAPAN TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, EVEN AS THE

UNITED STATES CONTINUED ITS COOPERATION WITH JAPAN ON OTHER ISSUES IN APEC, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR THE GOJ'S PROPOSALS ON STRENGTHENING MARKETS AND TRAINING PEOPLE FOR ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING.

10. (C) KOUMURA REMARKED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE MINISTERIAL AND LEADERS' MEETINGS IN AUCKLAND SEND A STRONG POLITICAL MESSAGE THAT APEC HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND TO EFFORTS TO LAUNCH A SUCCESSFUL NEW WTO ROUND. WITH REGARD TO THE UPCOMING WTO NEGOTIATIONS, HE CONTINUED, MANY APEC ECONOMIES HAVE ALREADY AGREED ON A "SINGLE UNDERTAKING" ON A BROAD-BASED AGENDA, TO INCLUDE NOT ONLY MARKET ACCESS ISSUES, BUT ALSO WTO RULES AND PROCEDURES. THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PLAY A LEADERSHIP ROLE WITHIN THE WTO, AND THE GOJ WAS EAGER TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES KOUMURA ADDED THAT CHINA'S EARLY ACCESSION TO THE WTO WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE UPCOMING NEGOTIATIONS, AND HE EXPRESSED HOPE FOR PROGRESS IN TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA.

NORTH KOREA

CONFIDENTIAL

11. (C) TURNING TO NORTH KOREA, THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT THE UNITED STATES REMAINED COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COORDINATION WITH JAPAN AND THE ROK ON DPRK POLICY, AS SHOWN BY THE TRILATERAL LEADERS' MEETING SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 12. SHE WELCOMED THE EXCELLENT TRILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR SHERMAN AND HER JAPANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN COUNTERPARTS, WHICH WAS "TRULY REMARKABLE." JAPAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE PERRY PROCESS WAS ALSO GREATLY APPRECIATED.



B1

B1

[redacted]

EAST TIMOR

16. (C) THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE MORNING FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON EAST TIMOR HAD BEEN PRODUCTIVE, AND SHE DID NOT INTEND TO REPEAT HER COMMENTS FROM THAT SESSION. INSTEAD, SHE WANTED TO DISCUSS SEVERAL KEY QUESTIONS. FIRST, DID HE HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD PERSUADE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO REQUEST THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPERS IN EAST TIMOR. SECOND, WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IF INDONESIA REFUSED TO RESTORE STABILITY IN EAST TIMOR AND ALSO REFUSED TO ACCEPT AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE?.

B1

[redacted]

KOUMURA REPEATED HIS RECOMMENDATION THAT JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES SEEK TO PERSUADE INDONESIA TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS IN EAST TIMOR IN A STRONG BUT QUIET MANNER.

19. (C) IN REPLY, THE SECRETARY INFORMED KOUMURA THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS SEEKING TO MAKE CONTACT WITH WIRANTO. ADMIRAL BLAIR, THE U.S. CINCPAC, HAD LEFT FOR JAKARTA TO MEET WITH THE GENERAL. [redacted]

B1

IT WAS ALREADY CLEAR FROM THE QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS AT NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN MINISTER MCKINNON'S PRESS CONFERENCE EARLIER IN THE DAY THAT THE MEDIA WAS ALREADY CRITICAL THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD NOT DONE ENOUGH TO STEM THE VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

B1

[redacted]

23. (C) THE SECRETARY THANKED KOUMURA FOR HIS ASSESSMENT AND STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ALSO INTERESTED IN BETTER RELATIONS WITH IRAN. IRAN REMAINED AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY IN THE REGION WITH GREAT POTENTIAL "FOR BOTH GOOD

AND BAD." SHE EXPLAINED THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON AND SHE HAD BOTH SIGNALED A RESPECT FOR MUSLIMS AND FOR THE HISTORICAL TRADITIONS IN THE REGION. THE UNITED STATES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 15 STATE 179275 231505Z

COULD NOT, HOWEVER, CONSIDER CHANGING ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN UNTIL IRAN ABANDONED ITS DRIVE TO DEVELOP WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, ITS SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, AND ITS OPPOSITION TO THE MEPP. WITH REGARD TO MEPP, SHE CONTINUED, IRAN NOW HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SAY SOMETHING POSITIVE ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, JUST AS JAPAN HAS DONE. IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF IRAN WOULD SIGNAL ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRESS THAT THE ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS HAVE ACHIEVED.

B1

[redacted]

THE SECRETARY REITERATED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE UNABLE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS UNTIL IRAN CHANGES ITS BEHAVIOR WITH REGARD TO WMD, TERRORISM,

CONFIDENTIAL

AND THE MEPP. THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN HAD SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME DISCUSSING HOW NORTH KOREA'S ACTIONS COULD DESTABILIZE THE REGION; THE EFFORTS OF IRAN AND IRAQ TO ACQUIRE WMD HAD A SIMILAR NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND ON U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS.

B1

ALBRIGHT
TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E10

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

SECRET PTQ7093

PAGE 01 JAKART 04839 01 OF 03 301120Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W	

----------FDFF26 301123Z /38

P 301047Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-PIMBS// PRIORITY 0279
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA-AP//
CJCS WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J51//
DIA WASHDC//DH-3//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004839

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/05/09
TAGS: PINS, PHUM, PINR, MILI, ID

SUBJECT: SECDEF CALL ON GENERAL WIRANTO

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DATT/ARMA - COL JOSEPH H. DAVES, USA,
SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 04839 01 OF 03 301120Z
REASON, 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (S) SUMMARY: GENERAL WIRANTO EXPLORED FAMILIAR THEMES IN EXPLAINING TO SECRETARY COHEN WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN EAST TIMOR. THE ARMED FORCES WERE COMMITTED TO DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR HAD BEEN GREATLY EXAGGERATED BY THE MEDIA. [redacted] B1 NOW THAT THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WAS DEPLOYED, THE SITUATION WAS UNDER CONTROL. THE GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTED TO PURSUE ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CLARKE N ELLIS
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 29 SEP 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 11 SEP 2008 200705435

3. (S) IN HIS RESPONSE, SECRETARY COHEN STRESSED THE US COMMITMENT TO A STABLE, PROSPEROUS AND UNITED INDONESIA. HOWEVER, EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR HAD MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR SUCH AN OUTCOME WITHOUT FUNDAMENTAL CORRECTIONS FROM THE INDONESIAN SIDE. NO AMOUNT OF ALLEGED ELECTION IRREGULARITIES COULD JUSTIFY THE RAMPAGE OF VIOLENCE THAT HAD ERUPTED IN EAST TIMOR. TNI SUPPORT FOR THE MILITIAS WAS OVERWHELMINGLY APPARENT AND TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. THE MILITIAS MUST BE DISARMED. THE REFUGEES IN WEST TIMOR MUST BE ALLOWED TO RETURN HOME IN SAFETY. INTERFET MUST BE ALLOWED TO DO ITS WORK WITHOUT BEING HARASSED. THERE HAD TO BE A TRANSPARENT ACCOUNTABILITY TO DEAL WITH THOSE WHO HAD COMMITTED ATROCITIES. WITHOUT THESE STEPS, WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO CONSIDER A RESTORATION OF A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP. END SUMMARY.

SECRET

PAGE 03 JAKART 04839 01 OF 03 301120Z

4. (S) SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM COHEN CALLED ON INDONESIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO ON SEPTEMBER 30. ACCOMPANYING THE SECRETARY WERE AMBASSADOR ROY, DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY BODNER, CHIEF OF STAFF TYRER, SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT RADM JOHNSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS BACON, DAS CAMPBELL, STATE EAP DAS BOYCE AND CINCPAC J-5 MG HAGEE. WITH WIRANTO WERE DEPUTY ARMED FORCES COMMANDER ADMIRAL WIDODO, CHIEF OF STAFF FOR TERRITORIAL AFFAIRS LTG BAMBANG YUDHOYONO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER MG ALBERT PARUNTU AND ARMED FORCES SPOKESMAN MG SUDRAJAT.

5. (S) WIRANTO BEGAN BY WELCOMING THE SECRETARY TO INDONESIA. THE VISIT CAME AT THE "RIGHT TIME," WITH THE MPR SET TO MEET THE NEXT DAY TO DO THREE THINGS: (A) "DECIDE THE GUIDELINES FOR MY NATION," (B) SELECT THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT, AND (C) DECIDE THE FUTURE OF EAST TIMOR. THE MILITARY WOULD HAVE 38 SEATS IN THE MPR AND WANTED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THESE IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

B1

SECRET

PAGE 04 JAKART 04839 01 OF 03 301120Z
POLITICAL LEADERS AGREED WITH HIM AND THUS HAD JOINED HIM
IN ANNOUNCING THAT THE MPR PROCESS MUST BE PEACEFUL.

6. (S) TURNING TO EAST TIMOR, WIRANTO INDICATED THAT HE
WOULD USE AN INTERPRETER. B1



SECRET

SECRET PTQ7096

PAGE 01 JAKART 04839 02 OF 03 301120Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00
	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W	

----------FDFF3E 301123Z /38

P 301047Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-PIMBS// PRIORITY 0280
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA-AP//
CJCS WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J51//
DIA WASHDC//DH-3//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 004839

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/05/09
TAGS: PINS, PHUM, PINR, MILI, ID

SUBJECT: SECDEF CALL ON GENERAL WIRANTO

[redacted] B1

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKART 04839 02 OF 03 301120Z

[redacted] MEANWHILE, INDONESIA HAD B1
RECEIVED THE VISIT OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TEAM, AND WIRANTO HIMSELF HAD HEARD FROM GENERALS SHELTON AND RALSTON AS WELL AS ADMIRAL BLAIR. INDONESIA APPRECIATED ALL THEIR SUGGESTIONS AND WAS PLEASED THAT THE UN TEAM HAD BEEN ABLE TO SEE THE REAL SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR. AS A RESULT, THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE HAD BEEN INVITED IN.

7. (S) WIRANTO SAID HE WAS PLEASED TO INFORM SECRETARY COHEN THAT THREE DAYS EARLIER, TNI HAD TRANSFERRED AUTHORITY IN EAST TIMOR TO INTERFET IN A PROFESSIONAL AND HONORABLE WAY. OPERATIONALLY, TNI WAS STILL SUPPORTING INTERFET THROUGH A TASK FORCE THAT HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE JOINT SECURITY COORDINATION GROUP. [redacted] B1

[redacted] TNI WOULD BE DELIGHTED IF THE REFUGEES WERE TO GO HOME SOON. REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS, WIRANTO TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT TNI HAD IMPLEMENTED "NEW PARADIGMS" RESPECTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY. WIRANTO SAID HE WOULD NOT DENY THAT ON THE GROUND, A NUMBER OF TNI PERSONNEL HAD ENGAGED IN ABUSES. HOWEVER, THAT WAS NOT TNI POLICY. THE VIOLENCE HAD NOT BEEN COORDINATED, CREATED, ENGINEERED OR ASSISTED BY TNI. THUS WIRANTO APPROVED OF THE NEW INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH WOULD BE

SECRET

PAGE 03 JAKART 04839 02 OF 03 301120Z

COORDINATED BY THE EXISTING NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE EVIDENCE AND THE "TRUTH ON THE GROUND" IN EAST TIMOR. BY ESTABLISHING SUCH A

COMMISSION, IT WOULD PROVE THAT TNI WAS COMMITTED TO HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES AS WELL AS CLARIFY THE INFORMATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN EAST TIMOR. [redacted] B1

8. (S) SECRETARY COHEN BEGAN BY TELLING WIRANTO THAT TIME WAS LIMITED AND THUS HE WOULD HAVE TO BE QUITE DIRECT. HE VALUED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK CANDIDLY WITH GENERAL WIRANTO. FIRST, THE SECRETARY SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO STRESS THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTED A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION TO A STABLE, PROSPEROUS AND UNITED INDONESIA. WE HAD NO INTEREST IN FRAGMENTATION OR IN ANY ACTIVITIES THAT WOULD BE DISRUPTIVE TO THIS PROCESS. WE ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT IN RECENT MONTHS TNI HAD DONE SOME POSITIVE THINGS, SUCH AS DISENGAGING POLITICALLY, SEPARATING THE POLICE FROM THE ARMED FORCES AND REMAINING NEUTRAL IN THE JUNE ELECTIONS. HOWEVER, ALL OF THIS HAD NOW BEEN OVERSHADOWED BY EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR. GENERAL WIRANTO HAD INDICATED THAT SOME PEOPLE MIGHT HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED BY THE RESULTS OF THE POLLS, BUT THAT COULD NEVER JUSTIFY THE RAMPAGE WHICH HAD FOLLOWED. IT WAS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE MILITARY WAS BEHIND THE MILITIAS, EITHER ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE VIOLENCE OR PASSIVELY INDIFFERENT TO THE ATROCITIES BEING COMMITTED AGAINST HELPLESS CIVILIANS. WIRANTO HAD

SECRET

PAGE 04 JAKART 04839 02 OF 03 301120Z

MENTIONED THE NEW HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, BUT IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER THOSE IN TNI WHO HAD AIDED AND ABETTED THE MILITIAS WOULD IN FACT BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE. IN EAST TIMOR THERE HAD BEEN GREAT DEVASTATION. REFUGEES WERE RETURNING TO FIND THEIR HOMES DESTROYED. THERE WAS NO INFRASTRUCTURE LEFT TO SPEAK OF. HEALTH PROBLEMS ABOUNDED. THE RAINY SEASON WAS APPROACHING IN JUST A FEW SHORT MONTHS. THERE COULD BE A MAJOR HUMANITARIAN DISASTER LOOMING. WIRANTO NODDED IN ASSENT.

9. (S) CONTINUING, SECRETARY COHEN SAID THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WAS NOW IN PLACE AND WAS ACTIVELY WORKING TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION. EVERYONE WAS CONCERNED WITH THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES IN WEST TIMOR. IT WAS CRUCIAL FOR TNI TO HELP THEM RETURN HOME SAFELY; [redacted] B1

SECRETARY COHEN SAID HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT INDICATIONS THAT THE MILITIAS IN WEST TIMOR WERE

CONSIDERING WAYS IN WHICH THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO THREATEN INTERFET. SUCH ACTIONS WOULD BE TRAGIC IF THEY WERE ALLOWED. IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT WIRANTO SHOW LEADERSHIP IN PREVENTING SUCH ACTIONS. ANY TNI ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN SUCH REPORTS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH HARSHLY.

SECRET

SECRET PTQ7094

PAGE 01 JAKART 04839 03 OF 03 301121Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-01	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00
	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/011W		

----------FDFF2D 301123Z /38

P 301047Z SEP 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-PIMBS// PRIORITY 0281
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA-AP//
CJCS WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J51//
DIA WASHDC//DH-3//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 004839

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/05/09
TAGS: PINS, PHUM, PINR, MILI, ID

SUBJECT: SECDEF CALL ON GENERAL WIRANTO



B1

[redacted] B1

11. (S) SECRETARY COHEN SAID HE CAME TO INDONESIA TO CONVEY THESE POINTS TO WIRANTO PERSONALLY. THE WORLD WAS WATCHING. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE SECRETARY NOTED RECENT PRESS REPORTS ABOUT AUSTRALIA BEING THE "DEPUTY" TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE REGION. SUCH REPORTS WERE WRONG. IT WAS IN BOTH OUR INTERESTS TO HAVE A POSITIVE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, BUT THIS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT PROGRESS IN ALL THE AREAS HE HAD OUTLINED. IT WAS, AS GENERAL WIRANTO HAD NOTED, AN IMPORTANT TIME TO BE IN INDONESIA. THERE WERE MANY IMPORTANT ISSUES BEING DECIDED. HOWEVER, EAST TIMOR HAD ALREADY BEEN DECIDED. THE DECISION TO HAVE A REFERENDUM HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT.

SECRET

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

B1

13. (S) THE MEETING ENDED AFTER ABOUT FIFTY MINUTES, AFTER
SECRET

WHICH THE SECRETARY AND WIRANTO DEPARTED FOR THE
PALACE TO MEET PRESIDENT HABIBIE.

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO9159

PAGE 01 STATE 185071 302311Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SAS-00
/001R

185071
SOURCE: CBLEXCLS.003492
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:JCAROUSO; RCLARKE; AFLUDWIG -- 09/30/99 647-122
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMBS:DAHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:JMALOISI
----------FE4DC1 302312Z /38
O 302310Z SEP 99
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 185071

STADIS

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2009
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 173

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DOUGLAS A. HARWTICK. REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (U) PARIS CLUB

IN ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION ABOUT ANY EFFECT THE FIX TO THE

PARIS CLUB BILATERAL WOULD HAVE ON THE DATE IT GOES INTO FORCE; SINCE THIS IS A CORRECTION, NOT AN AMENDMENT, THERE IS NO EFFECT ON THE ENTRY INTO FORCE DATE (OCTOBER 8).

2. (U) BUSINESS CONCERNED OVER PENDING LEGISLATION

THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ASKED THAT WE MEET WITH THEIR INDONESIA COMMITTEE TODAY. COMMITTEE MEMBERS EXPRESSED THEIR DEEP CONCERN OVER THE PENDING LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS THREATENING FURTHER SANCTIONS ON INDONESIA. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY ALARMED AT WHAT THEY VIEWED AS THE BROAD AND VAGUE LANGUAGE OF THE BILLS SO THAT THEY CAN NOT TELL HOW

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CLARKE N ELLIS
DATE/CASE ID: 02 SEP 2008 200705435

OVERALL TRADE WOULD BE EFFECTED. THEY ALSO FEEL SUCH ACTIONS WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IN EFFORTS TO MOVE THE GOI IN THE PROPER DIRECTION. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS NOT DOING ENOUGH TO FIGHT THESE BILLS. THEY ARE MOBILIZING TO LOBBY CONGRESS AND WILL ADVISE STANLEY ROTH AND AL LARSEN OF THIS.

3. (U) HIRC HEARING

ABOUT 11 MEMBERS ATTENDED PARTS OF CHRIS SMITH'S HEARING TODAY ON EAST TIMOR. DURING THE FIRST PANEL (DRL A/S KOH AND PRM A/S TAFT) MEMBERS QUESTIONED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IMET PROGRAMS IN PROMOTING RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. MEMBERS WERE UNHAPPY THAT DOD DECLINED TO TESTIFY, AND SMITH SHOTS AT DOD'S HANDLING OF THE IMET PROGRAM AND NAIRN'S CHARGES THAT ADMIRAL BLAIR WAS SOFT IN HIS EXCHANGES WITH THE GOI. FALAVEOGA AND LANTOS CRITICIZED JAPAN FOR HIDING BEHIND ITS CONSTITUTION AND AVOID CONTRIBUTIONS TO PKO FORCES. XANANA GUSMAO AND RAMOS HORTA WERE THE WITNESSES FOR THE SECOND

PANEL. WHEN ASKED WHETHER PRO-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS WOULD BECOME SPLIT INTO FACTIONS, GUSMAO AGREED THEY'D LEARNED HARD LESSONS FROM EARLIER INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND WOULD NOT REPEAT THOSE MISTAKES. RAMOS HORTA SPOKE OF THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE AS A TRANSITION TO A FREE EAST TIMOR BASED ON A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE EAST TIMOR RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. HE PRAISED AUSTRALIA AND PORTUGAL FOR THEIR RECENT CONTRIB
UTIONS. NAIRN, ON THE THIRD PANEL, CALLED FOR AN EXTENSIVE AID CUTOFF, AND REPEATED HIS CLAIMS THAT THE U.S. MILITARY GAVE TNI THE "GREEN LIGHT" TO WREACK HAVOC IN EAST TIMOR (AND INDEED THROUGHOUT INDONESIA).

4. (C) INTERFET TRUST FUND

SOR IS ENGAGING WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO TRY TO GIN UP MORE SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERFET TRUST FUND. TO DATE, THE PORTUGUESE ARE AT $5 MILLION, THE SWISS ARE AT $500,000 AND THE NORWEGIANS AT $700,000. AS YOU KNOW, THE JAPANESE ARE INDICATING THAT THEIR CONTRIBUTION WILL BE $100 MILLION. WE'LL BE WORKING ON LISBON AND TOKYO TO RAISE THEIR FIGURES, AND SOR WILL CALL THE BRITS, GERMANS AND THE EU.

5. (C) PHASE III

STANLEY WILL HOST AN IWG TOMORROW, AS HE DID LAST WEEK. WE'LL BE DISCUSSING, INTER ALIA, THE UN'S PHASE III PLAN, WHICH IS COMING TOGETHER IN NEW YORK. THE SECRETARY GENERAL

WILL BE RELEASING A REPORT, WHICH WILL CONTAIN THE OUTLINE OF PHASE III. THIS WILL SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR OUR NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS, SO THAT WE ARE POSITIONED TO VOTE ON A NEW UNSC
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 185071 302311Z
RESOLUTION AS SOON AS THE MPR ACTS. IN THE MEANTIME, THE UN WILL BE BEEFING UP THE PHASE II CIVIL AFFAIRS MISSION, BUT WON'T BE SEEKING TO CHANGE THE MANDATE WITH A UNSC RESOLUTION FOR THAT.

6. (C) A/S KOH VISIT TO WEST TIMOR

A/S KOH, SUSAN O'SULLIVAN (DRL), AND KAREN BROOKS LEAVE WASHINGTON TOMORROW, DESTINATION: WEST TIMOR. IN THE S-ALATAS MEETING YESTERDAY, ALATAS SUGGESTED THAT THE SECRETARY SEND ANOTHER DELEGATION WITH "AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES" TO WEST TIMOR TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK. (HE HIMSELF WAS BEWILDERED BY OUR EXAGGERATED REPORTS OF A SITUATION IN WEST TIMOR THAT HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM THROUGH HIS OWN CHANNELS). THE SECRETARY TOOK HIM UP ON THE OFFER. WE UNDERSTAND THE GROUP WILL CHARTER A PLANE FROM DARWIN, BUT WILL CONFIRM DETAILS WITH YOU BY PHONE.
ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

E12

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0171

PAGE 01 BANGKO 11956 01 OF 03 080835Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	INL-01	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01
	ADS-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	DTC-01	SGHD-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	LBA-01	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W	

----------012608 080835Z /38

O 080817Z OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0073
INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3,J4// PRIORITY
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 011956

STATE FOR EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/9/04
TAGS: PREL, MASS, MARR, MCAP, PGOV, TH
SUBJECT: THAI SUPREME COMMANDER AGREES WITH U.S. CONCERNS

[redacted] B1

REF: (A) BANGKOK 11797 (B) BANGKOK 11862 (C) STATE 186378

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BANGKO 11956 01 OF 03 080835Z
(U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES MARIE HUHTALA.
REASON: 1.5 (B).

[redacted] B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. HEDGBETH, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CLARKE N ELLIS
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 7 OCT 2024
DATE/CASE ID: 11 SEP 2008 200705435

[redacted] B1

---

2. (C) ON OCTOBER 7, 1999, VISITING EAP DAS SKIP BOYCE, ACCOMPANIED BY THE CHARGE, DATT, AND POLOFF, CALLED ON SUPREME COMMANDER GENERAL MONGKON AMPORNPISIT TO FOLLOW UP ON SEVERAL ISSUES RAISED BY DEFENSE SECRETARY COHEN DURING HIS OCTOBER 1 VISIT TO BANGKOK (REF A). ONCE MONGKON REALIZED THE MEETING WOULD BE CONDUCTED IN THAI, HE VISIBLY RELAXED AND OFFERED FRANK COMMENTS ON THE EAST TIMOR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BANGKO 11956 01 OF 03 080835Z

SITUATION. DAS BOYCE BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT

[redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

THE THAI APPROACH TO INTERFET

[redacted] B1

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 BANGKOK 011956

STATE FOR EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/9/04
TAGS: PREL, MASS, MARR, MCAP, PGOV, TH
SUBJECT: THAI SUPREME COMMANDER AGREES WITH U.S. CONCERNS

[redacted] B1

6. (C) BOYCE RESPONDED THAT SECRETARY COHEN - AS WELL AS U.S. SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIALS SUCH AS GENERAL SHELTON, GENERAL RALSTON, AND ADMIRAL BLAIR - HAD CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT TO REASSURE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE TNI THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTED A STABLE, SECURE, PROSPEROUS, AND UNITED INDONESIA. HE NOTED THAT EAST TIMOR HAD A VERY DIFFERENT HISTORY FROM THE REST OF INDONESIA AND THAT EAST TIMOR WAS NOT ACEH OR OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA. MONGKON URGED THE U.S. TO CONTINUE MAKING IT CLEAR TO THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE TNI THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTED A UNIFIED INDONESIA AND THAT WE WANTED TO HELP.

[redacted] B1

IN BOYCE'S VIEW, THE CONTINUING CRISIS IN EAST TIMOR IS NEGATIVELY AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF INDONESIA AND ITS MILLIONS OF PEOPLE. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK -- ALL ARE UNABLE TO HELP INDONESIA BECAUSE OF EAST TIMOR.

[redacted] B1

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ1327

PAGE 01 JAKART 02334 231059Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ACQ-01	CIAE-00
	SMEC-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	FBIE-00
	UTED-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	SS-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W		

----------365C75 231059Z /38

R 231057Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1207
INFO USMISSION GENEVA

UNCLAS JAKARTA 002334

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL PRISONERS: INDONESIA

REF: STATE 65330

1. THE FOLLOWING RESPONDS TO REFTEL REQUEST FOR AN UPDATE ON EMBASSY ACTIVITY ON BEHALF OF THOSE DETAINED BECAUSE OF THEIR POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS VIEWS AND ACTIVITIES.

2. EMBASSY IS NOT AWARE OF INDONESIANS DETAINED FOR

THEIR RELIGIOUS VIEWS. INDIVIDUALS HAVE OCCASIONALLY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 01 AUG 2011 201101654

BEEN CONVICTED FOR ADVOCATING CREATION OF AN ISLAMIC STATE, BUT WE HAVE NOT ACTIVELY TRACKED SUCH CASES.

UNCLASSIFIED

3. NUMEROUS INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN DETAINED OR IMPRISONED, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS OR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. EMBASSY EFFORTS ON THEIR BEHALF CONTINUE AT A HIGH LEVEL:

-- THE AMBASSADOR, IN HIS RECENT CALLS ON NEW CABINET MINISTERS AND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, HAS CONTINUED HIS PRACTICE OF RAISING U.S. CONCERNS REGARDING POLITICAL DETAINEES AND PRISONERS.

-- A CASE THAT HAS ATTRACTED PARTICULAR ATTENTION IS THAT OF LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN, WHO WAS ARRESTED ON JULY 30, 1996 AND WHOSE TRIAL ON CHARGES OF VIOLATING THE BROADLY CRITICIZED ANTI-SUBVERSION LAW WAS INTERRUPTED FOR FIVE MONTHS BY HIS SERIOUS ILLNESS AND HOSPITALIZATION. THE EMBASSY HAS PRESSED THE GOI FOR ADEQUATE MEDICAL EVALUATION AND TREATMENT FOR PAKPAHAN FOR OVER ONE YEAR AND HAS MET WITH HIM REPEATEDLY. PAKPAHAN'S PREVIOUSLY DETERIORATING HEALTH NOW APPEARS TO HAVE STABILIZED FOLLOWING WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN BETTER MEDICAL CARE. HOWEVER, PAKPAHAN STILL WISHES TO RECEIVE ADDITIONAL MEDICAL CARE OVERSEAS, A DESIRE WHICH WE HAVE SUPPORTED.

-- THE AMBASSADOR AND VISITING SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH, HAVE ALSO MADE CLEAR OUR SERIOUS CONCERNS REGARDING RECENT CASES

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS WHO HAVE "DISAPPEARED" UNDER SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. THE PERSONS WHOSE CASES ATTRACTED PARTICULAR ATTENTION HAVE ALL RECENTLY REAPPEARED, BUT THUS FAR HAVE REFUSED TO SPEAK PUBLICLY ABOUT THEIR EXPERIENCES. OTHER EMBASSY STAFF HAVE ALSO RAISED THE CASES OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED OR HAVE BEEN DETAINED FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND WITH SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIALS.

-- EMBASSY OFFICERS REGULARLY ATTEND COURT PROCEEDINGS

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR THOSE DETAINED ON CHARGES RELATED TO POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. OFFICERS ARE CURRENTLY ATTENDING SOME OF THE TRIAL SESSIONS OF LABOR LEADER PAKPAHAN AND THE "RED AND WHITE GROUP" (122 PEOPLE ARRESTED IN A POLITICAL DEMONSTRATION ON FEBRUARY 11). OFFICERS ALSO RECENTLY ATTENDED COURT SESSIONS THAT HEARD APPEALS FROM SEVEN PEOPLE CHARGED WITH TRYING TO ORGANIZE A POLITICAL MEETING ON MARCH 10 AND FROM THE "RED AND WHITE GROUP." (BOTH SETS OF APPEALS HAVE FAILED.) IN THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS, EMBASSY OFFICERS ALSO ATTENDED TRIAL SESSIONS OF A CATHOLIC PRIEST (FATHER ROMO SANDYAWAN) AND OF FORMER PARLIAMENT MEMBER SRI BINTANG PAMUNGKAS AND A SITTING PARLIAMENT MEMBER, MARLE ABERSON. AN EMBASSY OFFICER TRAVELLED RECENTLY TO REMOTE EAST KALIMANTAN TO ATTEND A SESSION OF TRIAL OF A LOCAL ACTIVIST INVOLVED IN THE DEFENSE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT. EMBASSY OFFICERS ALSO ATTENDED TRIAL SESSIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN 1997.

-- THE EMBASSY CLOSELY FOLLOWS THE CASES OF EAST TIMORESE DETAINED FOR THEIR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, MAKING

FREQUENT VISITS TO THE PROVINCE AND MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACTS WITH LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHERS HAVING ACCESS TO THESE PRISONERS. IN 1997, THE EMBASSY EXPRESSED CONCERN TO GOI OFFICIALS REGARDING PROMINENT EAST TIMORESE PRISONER FERNANDO ARAUJO AND ARRANGED FOR DRL ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK TO VISIT ARAUJO, WHO WAS RELEASED ON PAROLE EARLIER THIS YEAR.

-- THE EMBASSY ALSO WORKS THROUGH LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHERS TO MONITOR THE HEALTH OF DETAINEES AND PRISONERS AND HAS ALERTED APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHEN WE HAVE DISCOVERED PROBLEMS.

-- THE AMBASSADOR AND EMBASSY OFFICERS MEET REGULARLY WITH RELIGIOUS LEADERS, INCLUDING LEADERS OF MINORITY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES, TO DISCUSS THEIR PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS. THE AMBASSADOR HAS ON OCCASION EXPRESSED CONCERN TO SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS REGARDING CLAIMS

OF PERSECUTION OR APPARENT THREATS OF PERSECUTION
CONVEYED BY FIGURES FROM VARIOUS RELIGIOUS GROUPS.
ROY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0238

PAGE 01 SINGAP 01722 01 OF 02 200350Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000W
----------34DE9D 200351Z /38
O 200328Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1298
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI 4413

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 001722

EXDIS

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, EFIN, SN, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH'S APRIL 19TH CALL ON SM LEE KUAN YEW

(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR STEVEN GREEN. REASON: 1.5 (B AND D).

1. (C) SUMMARY. IN HIS CALL ON SENIOR MINISTER LEE APRIL 19, A/S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SINGAP 01722 01 OF 02 200350Z
ROTH REPORTED ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA, ESPECIALLY WITH

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 19 APR 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 12 AUG 2011 201101654

RESPECT TO GROWING STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO VIOLENT CLASHES WITH THE POLICE/MILITARY. HE INDICATED THAT THE USG HAS URGED THE GOI TO EXERCISE UTMOST RESTRAINT IN ITS POLICY TOWARD THE STUDENTS. REGARDING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ITSELF, ROTH SAID THAT INDONESIA MAY "MUDDLE THROUGH" WITH THE HELP OF THE IMF, FOREIGN TRADE FINANCING AND FOOD ASSISTANCE.

[redacted] B1

[redacted] LEE ARGUED THAT SOEHARTO IS NOT PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO THE IMF PROGRAM

[redacted] B1

[redacted] LEE PREDICTED. MORE BROADLY, LEE NOTED THAT THE BURSTING OF THE JAPANESE BUBBLE AND THE INABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO TURN THINGS AROUND QUICKLY WAS A MAJOR SOURCE OF THE CURRENT REGIONAL CRISIS. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) TRANSITING SINGAPORE ON APRIL 19, EAP BUREAU A/S STANLEY ROTH CALLED ON SENIOR MINISTER (SM) LEE KUAN YEW TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA. JOINING THE SENIOR MINISTER WERE MFA PERMANENT SECRETARY KISHORE MAHBUBANI AND A NOTETAKER. THE AMBASSADOR AND EMBASSY NOTETAKER ACCOMPANIED A/S ROTH TO THE MEETING AT THE ISTANA.

INDONESIA "NOT OVER THE HUMP"

CONFIDENTIAL

4. (C) A/S ROTH FIRST BRIEFED THE SENIOR MINISTER ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO JAKARTA. ROTH SAID THAT HE CAME OUT OF JAKARTA "MORE NERVOUS" ABOUT PROSPECTS THAN WHEN HE ENTERED. THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN A CABINET QUARREL BETWEEN MINISTERS GINANDJAR AND HASAN, HE SAID. ALTHOUGH GINANDJAR CAME OUT THE WINNER, THIS EARLY SPLIT WITHIN THE CABINET COULD HAVE AN EFFECT ON MARKET CONFIDENCE. THE RUPIAH HAS YET TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE NEW IMF AGREEMENT, ROTH NOTED, WHICH IS PRECISELY THE SCENARIO WHICH LED SOEHARTO TO CONSIDER A CURRENCY BOARD PREVIOUSLY.

5. (C) MORE CRITICALLY, ROTH SAID, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS APPEAR TO BE GROWING NATION-WIDE. THE STUDENTS ARE GETTING SUPPORT FROM THE FACULTY AND WIDESPREAD MEDIA COVERAGE. INCREASINGLY RESTLESS, THEY MAY EVENTUALLY TRY TO BREAK OUT OF THE CAMPUSES. ONE BLOODY CONFRONTATION WITH THE POLICE OR MILITARY, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE SUPPORT FOR THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH ITS FINANCIAL CRISIS. ROTH SAID THAT HE HAS MET WITH GENERAL PRABOWO AND OTHER GOI OFFICIALS TO URGE UTMOST RESTRAINT IN DEALING WITH THE STUDENTS. THE [redacted] ALSO URGED RESTRAINT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO JAKARTA. ROTH EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE PROPOSED DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT/MILITARY AND THE STUDENTS COULD BE INITIATED IN ORDER TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION. B1

6. (C) REGARDING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ITSELF, ROTH INDICATED THAT INDONESIA MAY EVENTUALLY "MUDDLE THROUGH" WITH THE HELP OF THE IMF, FOREIGN TRADE FINANCING AND FOOD ASSISTANCE. NO LONGER LOOKING FOR A SILVER BULLET, HE SAID, THE GOI IS WORKING WITH THE IMF AND OTHERS TO HAMMER OUT A LONG-TERM SOLUTION. THE PRIVATE SECTOR DEBT NEGOTIATION HAS BEEN INITIATED, BUT WILL TAKE SOME MONTHS OR MORE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRODUCE ANY RESULTS. UNLIKE IN THE CASE OF KOREA, INDONESIAN PRIVATE SECTOR DEBTS ARE MORE WIDELY SPREAD AMONG HUNDREDS OF COMPANIES, THUS MAKING DEBT NEGOTIATIONS MUCH MORE COMPLICATED. MEANWHILE, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN TERMS OF TRADE FINANCING PROGRAMS (E.G., FROM THE UNITED STATES, SINGAPORE AND OTHERS) AND FOOD AID MAY BE ABLE TO RELIEVE SOME OF THE MORE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS AND HARDSHIPS CAUSED BY THE CRISIS. ROTH SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE DOES NOT EXPECT A DRAMATIC TURNAROUND AS IN KOREA AND THAILAND.

SOEHARTO "JUST DOESN'T UNDERSTAND"

[redacted] B1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ0252

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0252

PAGE 01 SINGAP 01722 02 OF 02 200400Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000W
----------34DF44 200407Z /38
O 200328Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1299
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI 4414

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 SINGAPORE 01722

EXDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, EFIN, SN, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH'S APRIL 19TH CALL ON SM LEE KUAN YEW

[redacted] B1

8. (C) LEE ALSO INDICATED THAT HE IS "NOT CONVINCED" THAT SOEHARTO IS COMMITTED TO THE IMF PROGRAM, ALTHOUGH SOEHARTO MAY GO ALONG WITH IT FOR THE MOMENT. FOR INSTANCE, LEE SAID, HE HEARD RECENTLY THAT SOEHARTO HAD AGAIN BROUGHT UP THE IDEA OF THE "CURRENCY BOARD" IN A MEETING WITH VISITING [redacted] OFFICIALS. B1
IN ANOTHER INSTANCE, THE [redacted] B1
COLLEAGUE IN JAKARTA THAT, DURING THE FORMER'S FAREWELL CALL ON SOEHARTO A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO, SOEHARTO HAD BOASTED HOW HE HAD USED "GUERRILLA TACTICS" TO "OUTMANEUVER" THE IMF. THIS INDICATED THAT SOEHARTO STILL SEES THE IMF AS THE ENEMY, RATHER THAN AS AN ALLY, LEE SAID.

[redacted] B1

JAPAN'S ROLE CRITICAL TO RESOLVING CRISIS

---

10. (C) MORE BROADLY, LEE NOTED THAT THE BURSTING OF THE JAPANESE BUBBLE AND THE INABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO TURN THINGS AROUND QUICKLY IN THE EARLY 1990'S WAS A MAJOR SOURCE OF THE CURRENT CRISIS. WHEN THE JAPAN BUBBLE BURSTED IN 1991, THE YEN BEGAN TO WEAKEN, WHILE THE U.S. DOLLAR STRENGTHENED. IF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN THE MEASURES THAT THE UNITED STATES TOOK IN THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS, THE JAPANESE ECONOMY COULD HAVE RECOVERED BY 1993 OR 1994, LEE SAID. TODAY, THE JAPANESE CONSUMER HAS LOST CONFIDENCE IN THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY. EVEN IF TAX CUTS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED, JAPANESE CONSUMERS ARE NOW MORE LIKELY TO SAVE THE ADDITIONAL INCOME RATHER THAN SPEND IT, ESPECIALLY AS THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE HAS BEEN RISING AND PEOPLE ARE LOSING JOBS FOR THE FIRST TIME. WHAT JAPAN NEEDS IS CORPORATE INCOME TAX CUTS, LEE ARGUED.

11. (C) A/S ROTH AGREED THAT JAPAN'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY IS KEY TO THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF THE REST OF ASIA, AND THAT ACTION IS NEEDED TO PERSUADE THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE STRONG MEASURES. THE UNITED STATES CANNOT BE THE ONLY ONE TO APPLY PRESSURE, HOWEVER, HE SAID. LEE INDICATED THAT SINGAPORE "WILL TRY."

ASEAN NEEDS TO GLOBALIZE

---

12. (C) RESPONDING TO A/S ROTH'S QUERY ON INITIATIVES THAT MIGHT

BE TAKEN IN APEC OR THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF). THAT GO BEYOND THE CURRENT CRISIS, SM LEE INDICATED THAT EVERYONE APPEARS IN FACT TO BE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE CRISIS AND NOT TO BE LOOKING LONG-TERM. HE AGREED THAT AN INITIATIVE ON DEALING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, SUCH AS THE HAZE, MAY BE WELCOME INSOFAR AS IT DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE ECONOMIES OF THE REGION. FURTHER LIBERALIZATION, HOWEVER, WILL NOT GO DOWN WELL WITH SOEHARTO AND OTHERS WHO BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE MAIN CAUSE OF THEIR CURRENT PROBLEMS. NONETHELESS, LEE SUGGESTED THAT AN EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO CONVINCE THE ASEAN ECONOMIES OF THE NEED TO GLOBALIZE, FOR EXAMPLE, IN TERMS OF STRONGER TIES WITHIN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY. THIS COULD BE DONE IN THE CONTEXT OF APEC, HE SAID. LEE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE RECENT ASIA EUROPE MEETING (ASEM), DESPITE THE LACK OF TANGIBLES, WAS VALUABLE IN GETTING THIS MESSAGE ACROSS.

13. (U) THIS MESSAGE WAS CLEARED BY A/S ROTH.

GREEN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

E59
E3

PTQ7081

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7081

PAGE 01 JAKART 02233 01 OF 05 171202Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W		

----------3437D3 171214Z /38

R 171201Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1113
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 002233

DOL FOR ILAB

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02233 01 OF 05 171202Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 12 AUG 2011 201101654

USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS

GENEVA FOR JOHN LONG

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/08
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, SREF, PHUM, PGOV, ID, MY
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH'S MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR EDMUND MCWILLIAMS. REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS ON APRIL 16. ALATAS OFFERED THE VIEW THAT UPCOMING ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF) TALKS SHOULD ADDRESS TRANSNATIONAL AND SECURITY ISSUES AND THAT THE POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE (PMC) SHOULD DEAL WITH OTHER MATTERS. ALATAS OPPOSED THE U.S. PROPOSAL THAT BURMA BE AN AGENDA ITEM AT THE U.S.-ASEAN DIALOGUE BUT AGREED THAT BURMA COULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER AGENDA ITEMS. ALATAS BELIEVED THINGS WERE GENERALLY GOING WELL IN CAMBODIA BUT IT WAS TIME FOR RANARIDDH TO "GET ON WITH IT AND STOP WHINING." THE TROIKA WILL SEE KING SIHANOUK ON APRIL 19 IN SIEM REAP AND MAY URGE HIM TO RETURN TO PHNOM PENH. ALATAS APPEARED READY TO ACCEPT A BRIEF DELAY IN THE CAMBODIAN ELECTIONS TO ALLOW TECHNICAL PREPARATIONS (INCLUDING VOTER REGISTRATION) TO BE COMPLETED. ON EAST TIMOR, ALATAS WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH RECENT EFFORTS BY THE UNSYG AT THE ASIAN-EUROPEAN MEETING (ASEM) IN LONDON TO MAKE

PROGRESS THROUGH PREMATURE PROPOSALS FOR A SUMMIT BETWEEN INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL AND BY ADVANCING ALREADY REJECTED CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. HE SAW THESE AS A DEPARTURE FROM THE APPROACH ESTABLISHED BY JAMSHED MARKER. ALATAS, NONETHELESS URGED THAT THE SYG TAKE UP MUTUAL INTEREST SECTIONS WITH THE PORTUGUESE. ALATAS SAID HE WAS PRESSING THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ON ICRC ACCESS TO ACEH. WITH REGARD TO DISAPPEARANCES OF GOVERNMENT CRITICS, ALATAS ACKNOWLEDGED INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON INDONESIA ON THE MATTER. HE OFFERED LITTLE HOPE OF A BREAKTHROUGH REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY

THAT JAILED AND HOSPITALIZED LABOR LEADER PAKPAHAN WOULD BE ALLOWED TO GO ABOARD. END SUMMARY

3. (U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS ON APRIL 16. ROTH WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSADOR, EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR HARTWICK, AN INDONESIAN DESK OFFICER, AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER). ACCOMPANYING ALATAS WERE AMERICA'S DIRECTOR SAMEODRA AND ASIA/PACIFIC DIRECTOR HADI WAYARADI.

PART I (MULTILATERAL ISSUES)

4. (C) A/S ROTH EXPLAINED TO ALATAS THAT HIS CURRENT TRAVEL IN THE REGION PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH A NUMBER OF KEY MINISTERS IN THE NEW INDONESIAN CABINET. HE NOTED HE HAD ALSO MET WITH VICE PRESIDENT HABIBIE. HE ALSO WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONGRATULATE MINISTER ALATAS ON CONTINUING IN THE ROLE OF FOREIGN MINISTER, NOTING THAT SECRETARY ALBRIGHT WAS PERSONALLY PLEASED THAT THE MINISTER WAS STAYING ON.

UPCOMING MULTILATERAL MEETINGS AND REGIONAL ISSUES

CONFIDENTIAL

5. (C) ROTH NOTED THAT THE USG WAS ANXIOUS NOT TO LOSE TRACK OF ALL THAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AND THAT WAS BEING ATTEMPTED IN REGIONAL COOPERATION BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT FOCUS ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS. IN THIS CONTEXT, ROTH ASKED ALATAS FOR HIS VIEW OF WHAT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE UPCOMING ARF AND PMC MEETINGS. ALATAS RESPONDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN RECENT ADVANCES IN CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN THE ARF. IN THE UPCOMING MEETING, THE GOI WOULD HAVE ADDITIONAL CONCRETE PROPOSALS. HE ADDED THAT THESE MEETINGS CONSTITUTED A GOOD OPPORTUNITY AND A GOOD FORUM WITHIN WHICH TO DISCUSS MANY ISSUES BUT THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER NOT TO FOCUS ON "EARTH SHAKING INITIATIVES." THERE WAS A DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN ARF AND THE PMC, IN ALATAS'S VIEW, WITH SOME TOPICS MORE APPROPRIATELY DISCUSSED IN ONE AND NOT THE OTHER. THE ARF APPEARED MORE APPROPRIATE FOR DISCUSSION OF SECURITY ISSUES. AT THE PMC, THERE WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW WHAT FINANCE AND ECONOMIC MINISTERS HAD BEEN DOING TO PUSH THE ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA (AFTA), NOTWITHSTANDING THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. ALATAS SAID HE HOPED THAT THOSE PROBLEMS WOULD NOT CAUSE A

"STEPPING BACK" FROM AFTA COMMITMENTS, ADDING -- "CERTAINLY NOT FROM OUT SIDE." THE PMC WOULD ALSO BE THE APPROPRIATE VENUE IN WHICH TO DISCUSS TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES SUCH AS CRIME.

6. (C) HE ADDED THAT NEW ISSUES MIGHT ALSO BE RAISED AT THE ARF,

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9027

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9027

PAGE 01 JAKART 02233 02 OF 05 172151Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W		

----------347B84 172151Z /20

R 171201Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1114
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 JAKARTA 002233

DOL FOR ILAB

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02233 02 OF 05 172151Z
USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS

GENEVA FOR JOHN LONG

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/08
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, SREF, PHUM, PGOV, ID, MY
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH'S MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS

NOTABLY REPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH KOREA ON THE PROGRESS OF KOREAN PENINSULA TALKS. MOREOVER, THERE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE DISCUSSION OF CAMBODIA. GENERALLY, ALATAS SAID, HE PREFERRED TO SEE MATTERS THAT WERE CLEARLY SECURITY RELATED DISCUSSED AT THE ARF.

7. (C) ASKED IF MEMBERSHIP FOR MONGOLIA AND NORTH KOREA WAS LIKELY TO BE DECIDED AT THE ARF, ALATAS RESPONDED THAT HE DOUBTED THAT ANYONE WOULD PUSH FOR MEMBERSHIP FOR THE TWO AT THIS STAGE BUT THAT IT COULD BE DISCUSSED. ROTH EXPLAINED THAT THE USG WAS ENTHUSIASTIC WITH REGARDS TO MONGOLIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE ARF, NOTING IN THIS CONTEXT THAT MONGOLIA'S DIFFICULT GEOGRAPHIC POSITION BETWEEN TWO HUGE NEIGHBORS ARGUED FOR ITS CLOSER INTEGRATION INTO THE REGION. RESPONDING TO ALATAS'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE OPPOSITION TO NORTH KOREAN OR MONGOLIAN

MEMBERSHIP, ROTH NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A MIS-IMPRESSION REGARDING ROK OPPOSITION TO DPRK MEMBERSHIP BUT THIS MIS-IMPRESSION WAS BEING CORRECTED; IT WAS NOW CLEAR THAT SOUTH KOREA WOULD NOT

OBJECT. ALATAS SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE BEST TO MOVE THE TWO NATIONS' MEMBERSHIP FORWARD AS A PACKAGE. CONTINUING ON THE THEME OF ARF MEMBERSHIP, ROTH NOTED THAT THE USG FAVORD A FIVE YEAR MORATORIUM ON NEW MEMBERSHIP AFER THESE TWO COUNTRIES WERE ADMITTED. ALATASEXPRESSED GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION BOTH ON MEMBERSHIP AND A SUBSEQUENT MORATORUM SO THAT THE INSTITUTION DID NOT BECOME "TO HEAVY."

8. (C) ROTH NOTED THAT THE USG ANTQCIPATED EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION ON CAMBODIA AND QDDED THAT HE EXPECTED BURMA TO BE AN ISSUE AS WELL. ROTH NOTED THAT THE ASEAN AND U.S. POSITIONS ON BURMA HAD MOVED CLOSER TO EACH OTHER SINCE LAST YEAR'S MEETING, BECAUSE ASEAN HAD DEMONSTRATED ITS "IRONCLAD DETERMINATION TO PURSUE CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEQENT WITH BURMA." UNFORTUNATELY, MALAYSIA APPEAQED NERVOUS ABOUT ANY DISCUSSION OF BURMA IN MAY AT THE U.S.-ASEAN DIALOGUE. IT WOULD BE UNRELISTIC NOT TO DISCUSS BURMA, HOWEVER. NOTING THQT THE U.S. STILL FAVORED AN AGENDA ITEM ONBURMA, ROTH SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT AT A MQNIMUM BURMA BE A DISCUSSION TOPIC, UNDER THE RUBRICS OF REGIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTER-NARCOTIC. ALATAS REITERATED OPPOSITION TO BURMA AS A AGENDA ITEM BUT AGREED THAT DISCUSSING BUQMA IN THE CONTEXT OF AGENDA ISSUES WOULD NOT POSE A PROBLEM. WITH REGARD TO "SUBSTANCE," ALATS SAID HE WAS MUCH MORE HOPEFUL THAT "WE ARE Q BURMESE LEADERSHIP)
BUQ9. (C) ROTH RECALLED BEEN IMPRESSED
WITHTO TRAIN 60 GOVERNMENTURMESE IN VARIOUS CIVILIAQ

10. (C) SPEAKING CONFQTHAT THE GOVERNMENT
OERY CONCERNED OVER CROQE BURMESE BORDER THAT THAIS."
THAILAND COUQ DOING ANYTHING ABOUT THI, IF THAILAND TRIED TO DOLD BLOW UP." ALATAS THIS WITH TREIGN MINISTER. ROTH AGRE@T IT
WAS UNCLEAR

CONFIDENTIAL

WHAT THELPFUL TO THE NEW THAI THAT THE THAI PRIME MIN
WASHINGTON HAD GONE WETTLINED USG INTENTIONS TO HE
ENVIRONMENTAL SECTOR, @EA OF FIRE FIGHTING.
FOR FIGHTING FIRES FOR ND SPECIFICALLY FOR INDWFTHAT THEN WAS DROPPED
ON FE
FACT

THAT THERE WERE NOWAYSIA, AS WELL AS
INDHOUSLY LENT ITSELF TO APAID.

THE SITUATION I----------

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7082

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7082

PAGE 01 JAKART 02233 03 OF 05 171203Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W			

----------3437D9 171214Z /38

R 171201Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1115
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 JAKARTA 002233

DOL FOR ILAB

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02233 03 OF 05 171203Z
USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS

GENEVA FOR JOHN LONG

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/08
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, SREF, PHUM, PGOV, ID, MY
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH'S MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS

12. (C) TURNING TO CAMBODIA, ALATAS SAID THAT "THINGS ARE GOING REASONABLY WELL." ALATAS SAID THAT IT WAS TIME TO TELL PRINCE RANARIDDH TO "MAKE THE MOST OF IT, STOP WHINING AND GET ON WITH IT." "RANARIDDH STILL WANTS OUR SUPPORT UP FRONT BUT THERE IS A LIMIT," HE ADDED. "WE CANNOT BE SEEN TO BE INTERFERING." ALATAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT RANARRIDH HAD "SOME GROUNDS" FOR HIS COMPLAINTS, NOTING THE GOVERNMENT-ORGANIZED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST HIM. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN ASEAN TALKED TO HUN SEN, HE "GOT THE POINT" AND PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS WERE DROPPED. ROTH SAID HE INTENDED TO TELL RANARIDDH THE NEXT DAY THAT DESPITE PROBLEMS WITH MEDIA ACCESS AND SECURITY, AND EVEN THOUGH HUN SEN IS BETTER FINANCED, HE WAS DISADVANTAGING HIMSELF BY REMAINING IN BANGKOK.

13. (C) ALATAS NOTED THAT THE TROIKA MINISTERS WOULD BE GOING TO SIEM REAP TO MEET KING SIHANOUK ON APRIL 19. THE TROIKA MINISTERS WOULD INFORM THE KING OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE BORDER AMONG OTHER MATTERS. THE VISIT WOULD ALSO BE IN PART SYMBOLIC AS A GESTURE OF RESPECT TO THE HEAD OF STATE. ALATAS EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION WITH

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 JAKART 02233 03 OF 05 171203Z
THE KING, NOTING THAT HE SWUNG FROM DESPONDENCY TO ENTHUSIASM, OFTEN UNDERCUTTING HIS OWN POSITION WITH HIS STATEMENTS. AS AN EXAMPLE HE CITED THE COMPLETE REVERSAL THE KING MADE IN HIS PUBLIC CHARACTERIZATION OF SECOND PRIME MINISTER HUN SEN AFTER THE KING AGREED TO THE AMNESTY FOR RANARIDDH.

14. (C) ALATAS SPECULATED THAT IT MIGHT BE WISE FOR THE TROIKA TO ENCOURAGE THE KING TO GO TO THE CAPITAL, WHERE HE WOULD BE EXPECTED TO HAVE A "CALMING EFFECT." ULTIMATELY, ALATAS EXPLAINED, ASEAN WOULD BRING CAMBODIA IN AS A MEMBER BUT ONLY WITH ELECTIONS "THE WAY WE WANT THEM."

15. (C) ROTH CALLED ALATAS'S ATTENTION TO THE REPORT BY UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONER MARY ROBINSON THAT 50 MORE POLITICAL MURDERS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN CAMBODIA SINCE THE JULY 1997 FIGHTING. HE ALSO

NOTED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE JAPANESE AND THEY WERE STILL TRYING TO COMPLETE ACTION ON THEIR PLAN: RANARIDDH'S DENOUNCING OF THE KHMER ROUGE AND INTEGRATING RANARIDDH'S FORCES INTO THE GOVERNMENT'S MILITARY. THE JAPANESE ANTICIPATED THAT RANARIDDH WOULD MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT, BUT THUS FAR HE HAD NOT DONE SO. ROTH NOTED THAT HE HAD URGED THE JAPANESE TO TRY TO ELICIT A STATEMENT BEFORE THE WEEKEND TROIKA MEETING. IF HUN SEN COULD THEN BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT THIS STATEMENT, IT WOULD REMOVE THE PRINCIPAL REMAINING IMPEDIMENT TO RANARIDDH'S PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTION.

16. (C) ALATAS SAID THAT GENERAL NHEAK BOUN CHAY SHOULD "QUIETLY GO ABROAD." ASSESSING FUNCIPEC GENERALS AS "NOT BAD PEOPLE," ALATAS STILL DESCRIBED THEM AS THE "SEEDS WHICH COULD LEAD TO MORE FIGHTING." RANARIDDH SHOULD "ACCEPT THE FACT THAT HE CAN NOT SAVE THEM THIS TIME."

CONFIDENTIAL

17. (C) AT THE FOC-TROIKA MEETING, ROTH SAID, HE WOULD RAISE THE MATTER OF OBSERVERS. THERE WERE SEVERAL WAYS OF APPROACHING THE OBSERVER ISSUE: ROTH SUGGESTED BRINGING ELECTION MONITORS INTO THE SETTING FAR EARLIER THAN ONE WEEK BEFORE THE ELECTION, WITH DEPLOYMENT TO ALL PROVINCES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THERE BE ASEAN AND WESTERN TEAMS, WITH THE MEDIA ACTING AS A DE FACTO THIRD TEAM. HE CONTINUED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MOVE ON THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS TO THE MEDIA. ROTH NOTED THAT RATHER THAN TRYING TO CREATE A RADIO STATION FOR EACH OPPOSITION PARTY OR FIGURE, A VERY EXPENSIVE PROSPECT, THERE SHOULD BE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON HUN SEN TO ALLOW FAIR ACCESS. ALATAS AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH, NOTING THAT PRESSING FOR FAIR ACCESS TO THE NATIONAL MEDIA WAS THE RIGHT WAY TO GO.

18. (C) REGARDING TIMING OF THE ELECTIONS, ROTH NOTED THAT THERE WAS SOME THINKING REGARDING A BRIEF DELAY OF POSSIBLY THREE WEEKS, REFLECTING THE DELAY IN THE REGISTRATION PROCESS. ALATAS SAID THAT HE WAS FEARFUL THAT A LONG POSTPONEMENT COULD CREATE MORE COMPLICATIONS; "ANYTHING COULD HAPPEN." ON THE OTHER HAND, CONTINUED ALATAS, IF "PHYSICAL PREPARATIONS" WERE NOT READY, A FEW WEEKS DELAY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. ROTH REITERATED THAT WHILE SOME OF THE OPPOSITION HAD SUGGESTED A DELAY OF SIX TO 12 MONTHS, THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ7083

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7083

PAGE 01 JAKART 02233 04 OF 05 171203Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/024W		

----------3437DC 171214Z /38

R 171201Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1116
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 JAKARTA 002233

DOL FOR ILAB

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02233 04 OF 05 171203Z
USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS

GENEVA FOR JOHN LONG

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/08
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, SREF, PHUM, PGOV, ID, MY
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH'S MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS

WAS UNDESIRABLE. ALATAS VOLUNTEERED TO RAISE THE IDEA OF A BRIEF DELAY IN THE ELECTION SCHEDULE WITH THE OTHER TROIKA MEMBERS.

PART II (BILATERAL AND OTHER ISSUES)

EAST TIMOR
---

19. (C) TURNING TO OTHER ISSUES, ROTH EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD MET WITH PORTUGUESE OFFICIALS RECENTLY AND HAD TOLD THEM THAT LEAKING OF SENSITIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOI WAS "DISTINCTLY UNHELPFUL." ROTH QUERIED IF THE USG COULD BE HELPFUL IN ADVANCING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS BY ENCOURAGING CONSIDERATION OF AN EXCHANGE OF INTEREST SECTIONS. ROTH ASKED IF THE GOI WANTED THE USG TO MAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL TO PORTUGAL.

20. (C) IN RESPONSE, ALATAS SHARED WITH ROTH "IN CONFIDENCE" WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED AT THE ASEM MEETING IN LONDON. SECRETARY GENERAL

CONFIDENTIAL

KOFI ANNAN INITIALLY HAD PROPOSED A MEETING OF THE PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AND HIMSELF. ALATAS EXPLAINED THAT THE GOI HAD FELT THIS WAS NOT A GOOD IDEA AS IT HAD NOT BEEN PREPARED. MOREOVER, A MEETING AT THAT LEVEL WOULD GENERATE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO A SETBACK IN THE PROCESS. ALATAS STRESSED THAT THE GOI WAS ALWAYS READY TO MEET AT LOWER LEVELS.

21. (C) THE SYG THEN PROPOSED A TRI-PARTITE MEETING INCLUDING VICE PRESIDENT HABIBIE. TERMING THAT PROSPECT A "DISASTER," (ALATAS EXPLAINED THAT HABIBIE HAS NEVER DEALT WITH THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE), ALATAS OFFERED INSTEAD A MEETING BETWEEN HABIBIE AND ANNAN. ALATAS NOTED THAT, REFLECTING HABIBIE'S LACK OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE ISSUE, THERE WAS 30 MINUTES OF LOST TIME AS HABIBIE HAD TO BE PERSUADED THAT THE THE MATTER WAS NOT SIMPLY A DOMESTIC ISSUE.

22. (C) ALATAS, WHO SAT IN ON THAT MEETING, DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS "SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED" THAT THE SYG PROPOSED THAT THEY DISCUSS CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. ALATAS SAID THAT IN ALMOST FIVE YEARS, THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS WITH THAT APPROACH; THE NEW APPROACH UNDER JAMSHED MARKER OF "MOVING DIRECTLY TO THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM" OFFERED MORE HOPE. MOREOVER, CLAIMED ALATAS, SOME OF THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES THE SYG SUGGESTED, SUCH AS TROOP REDUCTIONS, WERE OLD ONES WHICH ALATAS POINTED OUT TO THE SYG WERE IN FACT FIRST ADVANCED BY THE PORTUGUESE SIDE. MOREOVER, ALATAS CONTINUED, THE GOI SIDE HAD SUPPORTED EVERY INITIATIVE ADVANCED AS A CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE ONLY TO SEE THE PORTUGUESE SIDE ATTACH CONDITIONS WHICH WERE UNACCEPTABLE.

23. (C) SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING THE MATTER OF OPENING INTEREST SECTIONS IN EACH OTHERS' CAPITALS, ALATAS SAID THAT THE GOI WAS

READY TO ACCEPT BUT THAT THE PORTUGUESE HAD "GIVEN A FLAT NO." ALATAS NOTED THAT THE PORTUGUESE CLAIMED THAT INASMUCH AS PORTUGAL

HAD BROKEN RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA, MOVEMENT TOWARD REESTABLISHING THOSE RELATIONS WOULD CONSTITUTE A DIPLOMATIC ADVANCE FOR INDONESIA. ALATAS SAID THAT THE GOI WOULD BE PREPARED TO ALLOW PORTUGUESE DIPLOMATS BASED AT THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY IN JAKARTA ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR. THE PORTUGUESE HAD SUGGESTED AS CONDITIONS FOR INTEREST SECTIONS, A UN PRESENCE IN EAST TIMOR OR THE RELEASE OF REBEL LEADER XANANA GUSMAO. THE LATTER, INDEED THE RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS, ALATAS NOTED, COULD COME NOT AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR INTEREST SECTIONS BUT ONLY AS PART OF AN OVERALL SOLUTION.

24. (C) ALATAS SAID THAT THE SYG HAD ACCEPTED HIS PROPOSAL TO RAISE WITH THE PORTUGUESE THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT INTEREST SECTIONS. ROTH NOTED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED SUCH A POSSIBILITY WITH MARKER. ALATAS SAID THAT INTEREST SECTIONS WOULD BE "A GREAT CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE."

ACEHNESE DEPORTEES FROM MALAYSIA
---

25. (C) ROTH NEXT RAISED THE MATTER OF ACEHNESE BEING DEPORTED FROM MALAYSIA. REFERENCING THE CURRENT SITUATION OF EIGHT ACEHNESE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ9021

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9021

PAGE 01 JAKART 02233 05 OF 05 172148Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-08 ACDE-00 AID-00 ACQ-01 CIAE-00 SMEC-00

PRME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01
FBIE-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01
ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
T-00	USIE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/023W		

----------347B3E 172148Z /20

R 171201Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1117
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY ROME
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION GENEVA
USEU BRUSSELS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 JAKARTA 002233

DOL FOR ILAB

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

USEU, CANBERRA, AND THE HAGUE FOR LABATTS

GENEVA FOR JOHN LONG

CINCPAC FOR FPA AMB TEARE

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/08
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, SREF, PHUM, PGOV, ID, MY
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH'S MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALATAS

ASYLUM SEEKERS AT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN KUALA LUMPUR, ROTH URGED THAT THE ICRC BE ALLOWED ACCESS TO ACEH IN ORDER TO RESOLVE ALLEGATIONS OF MISTREATMENT. NOTING THAT INDONESIA MIGHT BE THE VICTIM OF UNPROVEN ACCUSATIONS, ROTH STRESSED THAT BY GRANTING ICRC ACCESS TO THE RETURNEES INDONESIA COULD HOPE TO REFUTE THESE CLAIMS. ALATAS RESPONDED BY CONTENDING THAT MOST OF THOSE REPATRIATED HAD ALREADY BEEN RELEASED WITH "JUST A HANDFUL" REMAINING. CONTINUING, ALATAS SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN "WORKING ON WIRANTO" (COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE) WITH REGARDS TO ICRC ACCESS. "WE ARE FLABBERGASTED," HE SAID, "THAT WE ARE ACCUSED OF KEEPING 500 IN DETENTION." THOSE REPATRIATED WERE REGISTERED AND, AFTER INTERVIEWING, THREE WERE IDENTIFIED AS INVOLVED IN THE ACEH REBELLION (1989-92). EVEN THEY HAD NOT BEEN JAILED, HE SAID.

26. (C) MORE BROADLY, ALATAS SAID THAT THE GOI HAD TOLD THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT THAT IT HAD A RIGHT TO DEPORT ILLEGAL WORKERS AND THAT THE GOI WOULD COOPERATE BY SENDING NAVAL VESSELS (LST'S) SO THAT REPATRIATED INDONESIANS COULD BE SENT BACK TO THEIR HOME

CONFIDENTIAL

AREAS RATHER THAN PLACED IN RIAU PROVINCE FROM WHICH MANY SIMPLY RETURNED TO MALAYSIA FOR LACK OF FUNDS TO RETURN HOME. THE GOI WAS ALSO EXPLAINING TO VILLAGERS THAT ANYONE GOING TO MALAYSIA WITHOUT PROPER PAPERS WOULD BE DETAINED AND RETURNED.

27. (C) WITH REGARD TO THOSE ACEHNESE AT THE U.S. EMBASSY, ALATAS SAID THAT "WE BELIEVE THESE PEOPLE ARE NOT GOING TO BE CLASSIFIED AS REALLY INVOLVED (IN THE REBELLION). THOSE WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED HAD EITHER BEEN CAPTURED, DIED, OR FLED WELL BEYOND MALAYSIA." THESE ACEHNESE, HE THEORIZED, MIGHT HAVE BEEN FEARFUL BECAUSE OF THE FIGHTING AND "SOUGHT SAFEHAVEN IN MALAYSIA AS ACEHNESE TRADITIONALLY HAVE DONE."

28. (C) ROTH SAID THAT THE ACEHNESE IN QUESTION PROBABLY WERE ECONOMIC MIGRANTS OR ILLEGAL WORKERS BUT THE UN OR ICRC NEEDED TO GET INTO ACEH TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE AND BRUTAL TREATMENT METED OUT TO ACEHNESE DEPORTEES IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OR WHETHER THEY WERE ENTITLED TO REFUGEE STATUS.

DISAPPEARANCES
---

29. (C) ROTH NEXT RAISED THE MATTER OF DISAPPEARANCES, WHICH HE SAID HAD GIVEN INDONESIA A "BLACK EYE." ALATAS SAID THAT THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES WERE "SERIOUS" IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO SOLVE THIS MATTER. THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF WANTED AN END TO SUCH RUMORS AND ACCUSATIONS. ALATAS CITED THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS AS STATING THAT WHILE THE ARMED FORCES AND POLICE HAD THE "DUTY" TO SOLVE MATTERS OF MISSING PERSONS, IT WAS NOT CORRECT TO SAY THAT THE SECURITY FORCES WERE "RESPONSIBLE" FOR THE DISAPPEARANCES. ABRI SPOKESPERSONS HAD MADE THE POINT THAT MOST MISSING PEOPLE WERE

SIMPLY IN HIDING. ALATAS ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT MANY COUNTRIES, NOTABLY EUROPEANS, HAD PRESSED INDONESIA ON THIS MATTER. RESPONDING TO A SPECIFIC QUESTION ABOUT THE DISAPPEARANCE OF MEGAWATI AIDE HARYANTO TASLAM, ALATAS SAID THAT THIS WAS A "BIG QUESTION, A POLITICAL CONCERN MORE THAN JUST A HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERN."

LABOR LEADER MUCHTAR PAKPAHAN

30. (C) WITH REGARDS TO PAKPAHAN, ROTH NOTED THAT NOW WOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO PERMIT PAKPAHAN TO GO OVERSEAS FOR EVALUATION AND TREATMENT NOT ON MEDICAL BUT ON POLITICAL GROUNDS. ALATAS SAID THAT PAKPAHAN WAS "CLEVER AND KNEW HOW TO EMBARRASS US, TO KEEP US ON EDGE." HE DESCRIBED PAKPAHAN AS "ILL, BUT NOT THAT ILL." NEVERTHELESS, ALATAS SAID HE WOULD SEEK TO GAIN APPROVAL FOR THIS APPROACH.

31. (C) AT THE END OF THE MEETING, ALATAS RAISED THE MATTER OF A SMALL GROUP OF VIETNAMESE REFUGEES WHICH HAD NOT YET BEEN PLACED ABROAD (SEE SEPTEL). ROY

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8337

PAGE 01 JAKART 02213 01 OF 03 171804Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	CA-02	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OCS-03	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-00	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/030W

------------------346700 171805Z /38
P 170844Z APR 98 ZDK CTG NUM ZES/1/2 SVCS...
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1085
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BONN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002213

S/S-O PASS ASIAN CRISIS WG

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EAP/EP, EB/OMA, CA,
INR/IL

TREASURY FOR OASIA/GEITHNER, ZELIKOW; OASIA/INA-
CRAWFORD, SAEGER; OASIA/IMB-MURDEN; OASIA/ITA-PENTOLA

TREASURY PLEASE PASS FEDRES WASHDC FOR LOUNGANI
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02213 01 OF 03 171804Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 12 AUG 2011 201101654

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/16
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, EIND, APEC, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH'S MEETING WITH MINISTERS GINANDJAR AND HASAN, APRIL 16

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMB. J. STAPLETON ROY; REASON 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY. EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH AND THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH ECONOMIC COORDINATING MINISTER GINANDJAR AND INDUSTRY AND TRADE MINISTER BOB HASAN ON APRIL 16. GINANDJAR REITERATED THE GOI'S COMMITMENT TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IMF PROGRAM AND INDICATED THAT THE INDONESIAN PUBLIC AS WELL AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD KEEP INDONESIA IN LINE. HE STATED THAT, IN THE WAKE OF SCHEDULED PRICE INCREASES AND SUSTAINED HIGH INTEREST RATES, THE DOMESTIC PROTEST LEVEL WOULD RISE. MINISTER HASAN REVIEWED PLANS FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM; GINANDJAR SAID THAT THE NATIONAL AIRPLANE WAS NO LONGER RECEIVING PUBLIC FUNDING OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGES, BUT THAT OUTSIDE INVESTMENT IN THE PROJECT WOULD BE WELCOME. GINANDJAR CONCURRED WITH A/S ROTH'S HOPES FOR A SUCCESSFUL APEC SUMMIT THIS YEAR UNDER MALAYSIA'S LEADERSHIP. AT THE MEETING'S CONCLUSION, A/S ROTH AND THE AMBASSADOR RAISED THE ISSUE OF POLICE INVESTIGATION OF FOREIGN LAWYERS WORKING IN INDONESIA; THE MINISTERS AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) ON APRIL 16, EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH, EAP/PIMBS HARTWICK AND ROCHMAN, AND THE AMBASSADOR MET

WITH COORDINATING MINISTER FOR ECONOMICS, FINANCE, AND INDUSTRY GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA AND INDUSTRY AND TRADE MINISTER MOHAMMAD (BOB) HASAN. ECONCOUNS PARTICIPATED AS NOTETAKER.

IMF PROGRAM CLEAR; GOI COMMITTED

4. (C) MINISTER GINANDJAR CONFIRMED TO A/S ROTH THAT INDONESIA WOULD IMPLEMENT ALL THREE OF ITS IMF MEMORANDA. HE EMPHASIZED THAT NONE OF THE JANUARY 15

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM'S STRUCTURAL COMMITMENTS HAD BEEN ABANDONED, ALTHOUGH SOME HAD BEEN RESCHEDULED. HE EXPLAINED THAT SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WITH THE FIRST TWO PROGRAMS RESULTED FROM "CONFUSION": IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO THE GOI THAT THE IMF WAS CONCERNED FOR THE PLIGHT OF THE POOR AND OF SMALL ENTERPRISES VULNERABLE TO MARKET OPENING; THE IMF AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WERE SKEPTICAL OF GOI INTENTIONS BECAUSE OF PAST CONFUSION OVER CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM AND HOW TO IMPLEMENT THEM.

5. (C) GINANDJAR CONTINUED THAT SOME INDONESIANS PERCEIVED THE IMF AGREEMENT AS THE END, BUT IT WAS REALLY THE BEGINNING OF A LONG PROCESS. GINANDJAR WAS UNDER NO ILLSION THAT THINGS WOULD IMPROVE IN A MATTER O MONTHS -- IT WOULD BE A MATTER OF YEARS. COMMENTING THAT THERE WERE LINGERING DOUBTS ABOUT INDONESIA'S COMMITMENT, HE STATED, "WE WILL JUST DO IT FIRST; THEN THEY WILL BELIEVE US." THE GOI HAD MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE INDONESIAN PUBLIC AND THE REST OF THE WORLD TO SCRUTINIZE ITS PERFORMANCE BY PUBLISHING THE LATEST AGREEMENT AND THE REFORM SCHEDULE MATRIX. IN ADDITION,

THE GOI HAD INVITED EXPERTS FOR DAILY MONITORING, INCLUDING JAIME JARAMILLO-VALLEJO ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. TREASURY (WITH WHOM HE AND MINISTER HASAN MET IMMEDIATELY AFTER A/S ROTH'S MEETING).

THE SITUATION WILL GET WORSE

6. (C) GINANDJAR RELATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT PLANNED MAJOR HIKES OF DOMESTIC FUEL PRICES, ELECTRICITY TARIFFS, AND TRANSPORT. THESE THREE ALONE, HE COMMENTED, COULD MAKE PEOPLE REVOLT AND HAD IN OTHER COUNTRIES. IN ADDITION, INDONESIA WOULD ELIMINATE FOOD SUBSIDIES EXCEPT ON RICE AND SOYBEANS BY OCTOBER. ON TOP OF THAT, THE INCREASED INTEREST RATES WOULD FORCE COMPANIES TO CLOSE, WITH RISING UNEMPLOYMENT. "IF YOU THINK THE SITUATION IS BAD NOW, WAIT A FEW WEEKS." HE ASKED THE UNITED STATES TO WATCH AND HELP. HE ADDED, "IF YOU ADD POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS NOW, THE FIBERS OF THE SOCIAL FABRIC CANNOT STAND IT. I NEED TIME TO MAKE

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PROGRAM WORK."

U.S. ROLE

---

7. (C) A/S ROTH RECOUNTED WHY THE UNITED STATES HAD AN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ6389

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6389

PAGE 01 JAKART 02213 02 OF 03 170845Z
ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-08	ACDE-00	AID-00	AIT-03	CA-02	CEA-01
	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DINT-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	EXIM-01	E-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	CIO-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	USIE-00	DRL-04	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/030W	

----------3422F9 170845Z /38

P 170844Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1086
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BONN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 JAKARTA 002213

S/S-O PASS ASIAN CRISIS WG

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EAP/EP, EB/OMA, CA, INR/IL

TREASURY FOR OASIA/GEITHNER, ZELIKOW; OASIA/INA-CRAWFORD, SAEGER; OASIA/IMB-MURDEN; OASIA/ITA-PENTOLA

TREASURY PLEASE PASS FEDRES WASHDC FOR LOUNGANI
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JAKART 02213 02 OF 03 170845Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/16
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, EIND, APEC, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH'S MEETING WITH MINISTERS GINANDJAR AND HASAN, APRIL 16

INTEREST IN A STABLE, PROSPEROUS INDONESIA. HE NOTED THAT UNDER SECRETARY EIZENSTAT'S ANNOUNCEMENTS OF FOOD AID COMMITMENTS WERE THE DIRECT RESULT OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S DISCUSSION WITH FORMER VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE. HE ALSO NOTED THE RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF UP TO USD 1 BILLION IN EXPORT-IMPORT BANK CREDITS. A/S ROTH NOTED THAT WHILE REAL DIFFICULTIES LIE AHEAD, BOTH THAILAND AND KOREA HAD MANAGED TO RESTORE MARKET CONFIDENCE BY RESOLUTE, COMMITTED ACTION AND WERE WELL ON THE ROAD TO RECOVERY. GINANDJAR EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE FOR THE ASSISTANCE. HE ALSO CONCURRED WITH A/S ROTH'S OBSERVATION THAT MARKET PERCEPTIONS CAN TURN AROUND QUICKLY AND THAT IT SHOULD BE APPARENT IN MONTHS, NOT YEARS, IF MARKET PERCEPTIONS ABOUT INDONESIA HAVE CHANGED.

CORPORATE DEBT
---

8. (C) GINANDJAR STATED THAT THE PRIVATE DEBT WORKOUT WOULD TAKE MONTHS AND YEARS. CREDITORS' UNDERSTANDING WAS IMPORTANT. AT THIS POINT, INDONESIA NEEDED A POSITIVE STATEMENT FROM THE DEBT MEETING IN NEW YORK. GINANDJAR HAD DISCUSSED THIS ON THE TELEPHONE WITH CHASE MANHATTAN STEERING COMMITTEE COCHAIR DAVID FLUG. IN

NEW BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION WAS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE DEBT WORKOUT; MOST, BUT NOT ALL, COMPANIES WOULD BE ABLE TO PAY AND THOSE UNABLE TO PAY WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH THROUGH BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS. HE STATED THAT THE GOI WOULD ISSUE A DECREE IN A FEW DAYS WHICH WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO PARLIAMENT WHEN IT RESUMED ITS SESSION. THE DECREE WOULD SET UP SPEEDY, TRANSPARENT, AND FAIR BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURES IN A STRUCTURE SIMILAR TO THAT FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS -- A SPECIAL COURT WITH DIRECT APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT.

STRUCTURAL REFORMS
---

9. (C) GINANDJAR CONFIRMED TO A/S ROTH THAT THE GOI HAD DISCONTINUED SUBSIDIES AND SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR THE NATIONAL AIRPLANE COMPANY, IPTN. IF A PRIVATE PARTY WANTED TO INVEST, THAT WOULD BE WELCOME. IN FACT, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE MORE THAN HAPPY IF INVESTORS TOOK IPTN OFF ITS HANDS, HE SAID.

10. (C) ON STRUCTURAL REFORM MORE GENERALLY, MINISTER HASAN STATED THAT THE AIMS OF THE GOI AND IMF WERE THE SAME. HE NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD ABOLISHED REGIONAL LEVIES AND THAT THE WORLD BANK WAS THE GOI'S WATCHDOG ON THE GOVERNORS. HASAN WANTED TO ELIMINATE RED TAPE AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CORRUPTION SO THAT AN EXPORTER COULD COMPLETE HIS DOCUMENTATION "IN AN HOUR."

APEC
---

11. (C) A/S ROTH AND GINANDJAR DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL APEC SUMMIT IN NOVEMBER. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY EXPRESSED THE U.S. HOPE THAT THIS YEAR'S PROCESS WOULD DEVELOP STRONG GOALS AND THAT APEC WOULD REMAIN FOCUSED ON ITS CORE SUBJECT MATTER. GINANDJAR NOTED THAT THE CRISIS HAD CAUSED ASEAN TO LIBERALIZE FASTER THAN ANTICIPATED.

LEGAL SERVICES

12. (C) A/S ROTH AND THE AMBASSADOR RAISED THE CASE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT CONSULTING FIRM STAFFED BY U.S. ATTORNEYS NOW UNDER CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BY THE POLICE. THEY NOTED THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON INDONESIA'S ATTEMPT TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE. THE MINISTERS RESPONDED THAT THE GOI HAD USED FOREIGN ATTORNEYS RESIDENT IN INDONESIA FOR YEARS. MINISTER HASAN WAS INTERESTED TO LEARN THAT SEVERAL ATTORNEYS, INCLUDING THOSE UNDER INVESTIGATION, OPERATE IN INDONESIA UNDER BUSINESS PERMITS ISSUED BY HIS MINISTRY. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR FOREIGN LAWYERS TO WORK WITH THE PROPER DOCUMENTATION (BUSINESS VISAS, WORK PERMITS IF APPROPRIATE). THE MATTER COULD INVOLVE TAX EVASION IF VISITING ATTORNEYS WERE PAID FOR SERVICES

NNNNPTQ6391

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-08 ACDE-00 AID-00 AIT-03 CA-02 CEA-01
CIAE-00 COME-00 CTME-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 EB-00
EUR-01 EXIM-01 E-00 FRB-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
ITC-01 LAB-01 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OCS-03
OMB-01 OPIC-01 CIO-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00
USIE-00 DRL-04 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /030W
----------3422FA 170845Z /38

P 170844Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1087
INFO DEPTTREAS WASHDC
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BONN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 JAKARTA 002213

S/S-O PASS ASIAN CRISIS WG

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/PIMBS, EAP/EP, EB/OMA, CA,
INR/IL

TREASURY FOR OASIA/GEITHNER, ZELIKOW; OASIA/INA-
CRAWFORD, SAEGER; OASIA/IMB-MURDEN; OASIA/ITA-PENTOLA

TREASURY PLEASE PASS FEDRES WASHDC FOR LOUNGANI
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/16
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, EIND, APEC, CASC, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH'S MEETING WITH MINISTERS GINANDJAR
AND HASAN, APRIL 16

RENDERED HERE, BUT PAID THEIR TAXES IN THEIR HOME
JURISDICTIONS INSTEAD OF IN INDONESIA. GINANDJAR AND
HASAN AGREED THAT THE ISSUE COULD UNDERMINE INDONESIA'S

EFFORTS TO REBUILT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CONFIDENCE WHICH WOULD BE HARMFUL. THE MINISTERS SAID THAT THEY WOULD FOLLOW UP WITH THE JUSTICE MINISTER AND THE POLICE.

ROY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ6582

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6582

PAGE 01 STATE 062622 082107Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	ACQ-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00
	DODE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	FBIE-00	IM-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ADS-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	TRSE-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-04	SAS-00	/011R		

DRAFTED BY:EAP/PIMBS:GHOGEMAN
APPROVED BY:EAP/PIMBS:DROCHMAN
EAP/PIMBS:ARABASA
----------31297B 082107Z /68
O 082011Z APR 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 062622

FOLLOWING STATE 062622 DATED 08 APR 98, SENT ACTION
JAKARTA INFO KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE BANGKOK CANBERRA LISBON IS BEING
REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.
QUOTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 062622

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/07
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PREF, EFIN, ID
SUBJECT: A/S ROTH'S APRIL 6 MEETING WITH AMB. DORODJATUN

CLASSIFIED BY EAP A/S STANLEY O. ROTH, REASONS 1.5(D)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 062622 082107Z

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 12 AUG 2011 201101654

1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE, SEE PARAGRAPH 16.

SUMMARY

---

2. (C) AT AN APRIL 6 MEETING, A/S ROTH TOLD INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN THAT HE HOPED THERE WOULD BE AGREEMENT ON A NEW INDONESIA-IMF AGREEMENT SOON AND THAT THE EXIM BANK WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO ANNOUNCE STEPS ON TRADE CREDITS. DORODJATUN CAUTIONED THAT BANK RESTRUCTURING WILL TAKE SOME TIME, POTENTIALLY DELAYING ACTION ON TRADE INSURANCE. ROTH AND ACTING A/S KRECZKO EXPRESSED USG CONCERNS OVER THE FORCIBLE REPATRIATION OF ACEHNESE REFUGEES AND REPORTS OF THEIR MISTREATMENT UPON THEIR RETURN. DORODJATUN SAID THAT ECONOMIC STRESSES WERE PRODUCING HIGH LEVELS OF ECONOMIC MIGRANTS. ROTH TOLD DORODJATUN OF USG CONCERNS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES INCLUDING A POSSIBLE BAN ON ON-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATIONS, DETENTIONS AND DISAPPEARANCES. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM INDONESIAN

DCM NASUTION, ROTH SAID THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE CURRENT MOVEMENT IN THE DIALOGUE ON EAST TIMOR. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY STANLEY ROTH MET WITH INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR DORODJATUN AT A/S ROTH'S REQUEST ON APRIL 6 AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT. ALSO IN ATTENDANCE WERE INDONESIAN DCM NASUTION, INDONESIAN POLITICAL COUNSELOR WIJONO, PRM ACTING A/S KRECZKO, EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR HARTWICK, PRM STAFF, AND INDONESIA DESK OFFICER (NOTETAKER)

IMF AND EXIM ANNOUNCEMENTS

---

4. (C) ROTH BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE HOPED THERE WOULD BE A NEW INDONESIAN AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF PRIOR TO HIS APRIL 15 ARRIVAL IN JAKARTA AND THAT THE USG WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO CONCURRENTLY ANNOUNCE STEPS ON TRADE CREDITS. THE OUTSTANDING ISSUE FOR THE EXIM BANK, HE NOTED, IS A SOVEREIGN GUARANTY. WE WOULD THUS GREATLY APPRECIATE ANYTHING THE GOI COULD DO IN THIS REGARD, AS AN

ANNOUNCEMENT ON TRADE CREDITS WOULD HELP GET THE NEW IMF AGREEMENT OFF TO A BETTER START BY ENHANCING MARKET CONFIDENCE.

5. (C) DORODJATUN SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT THE ISSUES WITH EXIM THAT QUICKLY; THERE WOULD NEED TO BE MORE DONE ON BANK RESTRUCTURING FIRST. IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME FOR THE BANKS UNDER IBRA SCRUTINY TO IMPROVE THEIR CAPITAL BASES, HE SAID. DORODJATUN ADDED THAT HE HOPED FINANCE MINISTER FUAD BAWAZIER AND BANK INDONESIA DIRECTOR SJAHRIL SABIRIN WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON IN MID-APRIL TO WORK OUT PENDING ISSUES. DORODJATUN ALSO EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITIES OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE IBRA.

6. (C) HOWEVER, IF PROBLEMS IMPACTING THE REAL SECTOR ARE NOT IMPROVED SOON, HE CAUTIONED, IT WILL UNDERMINE THE MARKET RESPONSE TO A NEW IMF PACKAGE. JANUARY FIGURES SHOWED INDONESIAN EXPORTS TO THE U.S. DECLINING ON A YEAR-ON-YEAR BASIS, HE SAID. AS THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DETERIORATES, TRADE INSURANCE IS NOW MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER TO ALLOW LABOR- AND IMPORT-INTENSIVE INDONESIAN SMALL

AND MEDIUM-SIZED FIRMS TO RECOVER, DORODJATUN SAID. WITH THE SPECTER OF HYPERINFLATION (AT UP TO 130 PERCENT A YEAR) HANGING OVER THE PUBLIC, HE ADDED, FOOD ASSISTANCE AND HELP FOR SMALL- AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES IS CRUCIAL FOR POLITICAL STABILITY.

REFUGEES/MIGRANTS

7. (C) ROTH NOTED USG CONCERNS ON THE ISSUE OF REPATRIATION OF INDONESIAN REFUGEES AND ILLEGAL MIGRANTS FROM MALAYSIA. LIKE ANY OTHER COUNTRIES, INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA NEED TO CONTROL THEIR BORDERS, HE SAID, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH REFUGEES FROM ECONOMIC MIGRANTS. THE USG IS VERY CONCERNED BY THE RIOTS IN THE CAMPS THAT LED TO NINE DEATHS, THE FORCIBLE REPATRIATION OF ACEHNESE TO INDONESIA AND BY REPORTS OF THEIR MISTREATMENT UPON THEIR RETURN. THE USG HOPES TO HAVE A SERIOUS DIALOGUE

S. (C) KRECZKO SAID THE USG CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT THAT THE GOT: 1) DOES NOTHING TO DISCOURAGE THE GOM FROM ALLOWING UNHCR SCREENING OF INDONESIANS IN MALAYSIA; 2) RESTORE ICRC ACCESS TO DETENTION CENTERS FOR RETURNING REFUGEES; AND 3) ALLOW THE ICRC TO RESUME ASSISTANCE TO RETURNEES. KRECZKO THEN REINFORCED THE MESSAGE OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES AND ENSURING THAT RETURNEES ARE NOT MISTREATED.

9. (C) DORODJATUN RESPONDED THAT ESTIMATES OF NEAR-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT REACH AS HIGH AS 16 MILLION OUT OF A 90

MILLION WORK FORCE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE EFFECTS OF EL NINO ON AGRICULTURE AND THE FACT THAT YOUNGER INDONESIANS HAVE NO EXPERIENCE WITH SEVERE ECONOMIC DOWNTURNS, HAS LED TO LARGE NUMBERS OF ECONOMIC MIGRANTS. DORODJATUN NOTED THAT THE U.S. CONSULATE IN MEDAN (THE CLOSEST POST TO ACEH) HAD CLOSED.

HUMAN RIGHTS/DISAPPEARANCES

10. (C) ROTH SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS HAVE OTHER CONCERNS ON HUMAN RIGHTS INCLUDING:

- A RECENT STATEMENT BY THE EDUCATION MINISTER THAT DEMONSTRATIONS MAY NOT BE ALLOWED ON CAMPUSES;
- THE CONTINUING DETENTION OF HUNDREDS OF PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION PARTICIPANTS; AND
- A NUMBER OF DISAPPEARANCES INCLUDING TIMORESE ACTIVISTS AND A KEY AIDE TO OPPOSITION LEADER MEGAWATI.

11. (C) THE USC APPRECIATES THE MILITARY'S RESTRAINT TO DATE IN DEALING WITH PROTESTS, THE ALLOWANCE OF ON-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATIONS SO FAR, AND THE DECREASE OF ANTI-SINO INDONESIAN VIOLENCE, ROTH SAID. DESPITE THESE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS, HE CONTINUED, RECENT NEGATIVE REPORTS HAVE

CAUSED A SENSE OF ALARM, AND PERCEPTIONS OF INCREASING GOI REPRESSION COULD BE A MAJOR BLOW TO EFFORTS TO ASSIST INDONESIA ECONOMICALLY AND TO ACHIEVE OTHER LONG-TERM GOALS SUCH AS RESUMPTION OF IMET.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

12. (C) DORODJATUN RESPONDED THAT HE BELIEVES THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION IS IN FAVOR OF ALLOWING ON-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATIONS, BUT THE SITUATION HAS BEEN COMPLICATED BY SOME STUDENTS TAKING THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS OFF-CAMPUS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID, THE GOI HOPES TO INITIATE A DIALOGUE WITH STUDENT LEADERS. ROTH REPLIED THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR A DIALOGUE WOULD LIKELY DIMINISH IF ON-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATIONS WERE BANNED. ROTH ADDED THAT THE USC OF COURSE BELIEVES THAT PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATORS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO VOICE THEIR OPINIONS ANYWHERE ON- OR OFF-CAMPUS.

13. (C) DORODJATUN SAID THAT INDONESIA IS NOW IN A CRITICAL PERIOD WHICH IS MADE EVEN MORE SO BY SHORT FOOD SUPPLIES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DRY SEASON, THE "OVERSTRETCHING" AND LACK OF PURCHASING POWER OF THE MILITARY AND POLICE, AND THE ROUGHLY THREE MILLION NEW ENTRANTS TO THE WORK FORCE THIS YEAR WHO WILL BE UNLIKELY TO FIND JOBS. DORODJATUN SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE WORLD BANK ESTIMATES THAT IMPORTS OF FOUR MILLION TONS OF RICE WILL BE NEEDED, HE PERSONALLY BELIEVES THAT THE ACTUAL FIGURE IS CLOSER TO SEVEN MILLION TONS TO ALLOW FOR CARRY-OVER STOCK.

14. (C) ROTH NOTED THAT AGREEMENT ON AND AGGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN IMF PROGRAM CAN RAPIDLY TURN AROUND A SEEMINGLY DIRE SITUATION, AS WAS THE CASE IN THE ROK AND THAILAND.

EAST TIMOR

---

15. (C) NASUTION ASKED ABOUT USC PERCEPTIONS ON

UNCLASSIFIED

DEVELOPMENTS ON EAST TIMOR. ROTH RESPONDED THAT IN THEIR FEBRUARY MEETING, RAMOS HORTA WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE HAD BEEN ENOUGH PROGRESS THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO RETURN TO EAST TIMOR UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE INTRA TIMORESE DIALOGUE. HOWEVER, ROTH SAID, WHEN HE MET WITH FM ALATAS IN MARCH, ALATAS THOUGHT SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE PREMATURE AND WAS NOT A SERIOUS OPTION. ROTH ADDED THAT, DESPITE A LOT OF MOTION ON THE ISSUE INCLUDING AMB. MARKER'S CONTINUED PURSUIT OF THE UN-FACILITATED DIALOGUE, PROGRESS ON EAST TIMOR APPEARS TO HAVE STALLED.

ACTION REQUEST

16 (C) EMBASSY IS INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH THE GOL AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL ON REFUGEE/HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES USING THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

- O WE UNDERSTAND THE STRAINS CAUSED BY THE ONGOING FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN INDONESIA AND YOUR GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN ORDER. HOWEVER, RECENTLY THERE HAVE BEEN SOME DISTURBING REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

- O WE ARE VERY CONCERNED BY REPORTS OF A NUMBER OF DISAPPEARANCES AND DETENTIONS OF REFORM AND OPPOSITION FIGURES INCLUDING HAYANTO TASLAM AND ANDI ARIEF.

- O IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA PUT ITS FULL WEIGHT BEHIND SECURING THE IMMEDIATE AND FULL INVESTIGATION OF ALL DISAPPEARANCES.

- O WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS OF RECENT DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS OF ACTIVISTS INCLUDING RATNA SARUMPAET AND OVER 100 STUDENTS DETAINED FOLLOWING A FEBRUARY 11

PROTEST MARCH. WE ARE ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED BY REPORTS THAT SOME OF THOSE ARRESTED HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO PHYSICAL ABUSE WHILE IN DETENTION.

O WE EXPECT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA WILL ENSURE THAT ALL THOSE DETAINED AND ARRESTED ARE DEALT WITH IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES THAT THEIR DUE PROCESS RIGHTS ARE FULLY RESPECTED AND THAT THEY ARE NOT SUBJECTED TO INHUMANE OR DEGRADING TREATMENT.

O ALTHOUGH THE FIGURES NAMED ABOVE ARE AMONG THE MOST WIDELY KNOWN, THERE ARE MANY OTHER REPORTED DISAPPEARANCES AND DETENTIONS AS WELL. THE FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT NAMED ANY PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN THEIR CASE.

O WE ARE ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ALLEGED MISTREATMENT OF INDONESIAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES, IN PARTICULAR THE ACEHNESE.

O AS WE ARE ALSO DOING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA, WE URGE YOU TO FULLY INVOLVE THE UNHCR AND THE ICRC IN THIS ISSUE SO THAT INDONESIA'S CREDIBILITY REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL RNIGRANTS AND RETURNEES IS ASSURED.

O WE ALSO STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT INTERNATIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN ACCESS TO RETURNED REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS.

O THIS IS A CRITICAL TIME OF INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN INDONESIA. SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT INDONESIA' S COMMITMENT TO DUE PROCESS AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WILL UNDERMINE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO WORK WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE GROWTH AND STABILITY.
ALBRIGHT UNQUOTE ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

PTQ0955

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO2238

PAGE 01 STATE 061639 070111Z
ORIGIN EAP-01

INFO LOG-00 TEDE-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 SAS-00 /001R

061639
SOURCE: KODAKA.007004
DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIMBS:VEMURRAY -- 04/06/98 1-1823
APPROVED BY: EAP/PIMES:DHARTWICK
EAP/PIMBS:ARABASA
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
EAP ONLY

----------30521D 070112Z /38
O 070110Z APR 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 061639

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/01
TAGS: AMGT, ID
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL PIMBS TO JAKARTA NO. 60

FOR DCM MIKE OWENS FROM PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUG HARTWICK

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/PIMBS DIRECTOR DOUGLAS HARTWICK. REASON: 1.5 (D)

1. (U) AMBASSADOR'S EER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 12 AUG 2011 201101654

WE WILL NEED AMBASSADOR ROY'S INPUT FOR HIS EER SOMETIME THIS WEEK SO WE CAN MOVE THE PAPER FORWARD ALONG WITH OTHER AMB EERS. I KNOW ITS A PAIN, BUT BEAR WITH US.

UNCLASSIFIED

2. (C) KUDOS...

INR AND THE FRONT OFFICE EXPRESSED ITS APPRECIATION FOR THE FINE REPORTING RESULTING FROM THE AMBASSADOR'S LUNCH WITH AMIEN RAIS. THE MESSAGE PROVIDED MUCH FOOD FOR THOUGHT ON HOW OPPOSITION FORCES PERCEIVE THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND HOW THEY ARE PREPARING TO MANEUVER IN THE COMING MONTHS. S/P HAS ALSO PRAISED YOUR POLITICAL SITREPS AS SUCCINCT AND INFORMATIVE. WHILE PRAISING YOUR REPORTING, SOME DEPARTMENT READERS HAVE ASKED FOR EVEN MORE REPORTING

ON INTRA-GOVERNMENT MANEUVERING AND GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON RELATIONS WITH THE OPPOSITION.

3. (C) AND REQUESTS...

YOUR UPDATE ON THE FOOD SITUATION AND REPORTING ON YOUR MEETING WITH THE MINISTER FOR SOCIAL AFFAIRS PROMPTED QUESTIONS ON THE ROLE OF ABRI IN THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM. DOES THE ARMY'S ROLE IN FOOD DISTRIBUTION CONTINUE TO INCREASE, AND IF SO, IS THIS BECAUSE THE EXISTING NETWORK OF CHINESE STOREOWNERS IS DISAPPEARING OR ARE SHOP KEEPERS TOO INTIMIDATED TO CONTINUE IN BUSINESS? TO WHAT EXTENT IS ABRI/THE GOVERNMENT GIVING AWAY FOOD VERSUS SELLING IT AT A DISCOUNT? IS THE STRUCTURE OF BULOG ON THE LOCAL LEVEL CHANGING?

FINALLY, INR SAW THE CASTLE GROUP CHART OF INDONESIAN BUSINESS INTERESTS THAT THE ECON SECTION SENT TO THE DESK, AND WONDERS WHETHER YOU HAVE ANY WAY OF GETTING ANOTHER COPY.

4. (U) LAWYERS

UNCLASSIFIED

THANK YOU FOR KEEPING US UP TO SPEED WITH YOUR ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN LAWYERS. I MET TODAY WITH WAYNE FORREST TO GO OVER THE ISSUE. HE WAS APPRECIATIVE OF THE EMBASSY'S EFFORTS BUT MOST CONCERNED ABOUT WHERE THIS ISSUE MAY BE GOING. HE SHARED A COPY OF HIS LETTER WITH ME AS WELL.

5. (U) TDY

WE ARE NOW PLANNING TO SEND DAN ROCHMAN TO JAKARTA ON TDY TO HELP OUT WITH YOUR STAFFING GAPS. HE PLANS TO ARRIVE IN JAKARTA ON APRIL 14 AND STAY UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH. YOU WILL SEE A COUNTRY CLEARANCE CABLE SHORTLY. JIM WILL FILL IN BEHIND HIM HERE.

6. (U) STAFFDEL CORTESE

STAFFDEL CORTESE LEFT WASHINGTON EARLY THIS MORNING. WE HAVE SENT A MESSAGE TO EMBASSY SEOUL ADVISING THAT, IF THE STAFFDEL TRAVELS TO JOGJAKARTA, THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RETURN TO JAKARTA UNTIL APRIL 13. WE HAVE ASKED THEM TO ADVISE YOU WHETHER THEY WOULD STILL LIKE TO INCLUDE A JOGJAKARTA TRIP IN THEIR ITINERARY.

7. (U) ROTH/FOSTER/HARTWICK APPOINTMENTS

WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM WHETHER A/S ROTH WILL BE ABLE TO HEAD UP TO BRUNEL ON THURSDAY AS WE HAVE TENTATIVELY PLANNED. CONSEQUENTLY, HE IS CONTEMPLATING STAYING ANOTHER DAY IN JAKARTA IF WE DON'T HAVE A CLEAR PICTURE ABOUT BRUNEL SCHEDULE BY WEDNESDAY. AT THIS POINT, TO RECALL THE JAKARTA DATES (WITH A BRUNEL VISIT), STANLEY WILL ARRIVE WEDNESDAY APRIL 15, AT 1030 AM (REPEAT 15, NOT 14 AS I SAID OVER THE PHONE) AND DEPART THURSDAY APRIL 16 AT L740 FOR BRUNEI VIA SINGAPORE, ASSUMING THE BRUNEL VISIT MATERIALIZES. A/S ROTH ALSO WOULD LIKE TO GET YOUR JUDGEMENT ABOUT WHETHER HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MEET WITH ANY OPPOSITION TYPES OR WHETHER THIS WOULD CAUSE UNNECESSARY CONCERN. IN ADDITION, HE ASKS WHETHER A GET-TOGETHER WITH CHINESE-INDONESIAN BUSINESS TYCOONS WOULD HAVE VALUE. OVER

UNCLASSIFIED

AS FOR APPOINTMENTS FOR YOURS TRULY OUTSIDE OF THE ROTH PROGRAM, I WOULD LIKE TO CALL ON THE ICRC, RAMLI, DENNIS DE TRAY (IF NOT ON STANLEY'S PROGRAM) SOME SORT OF GETTOGETHER WITH THE ABC, IF POSSIBLE. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO FOLLOW UP WITH BAPPENAS OFFICIAL ASST MINISTER MANUWOTO WHO REPRESENTED INDONESIA IN WASHINGTON AT THE WORLD BANK MEETING LAST WEEK. IF THE WEEKEND ARRANGEMENTS WITH LAKSAMANA DON'T WORK OUT, I WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM AGAIN. FINALLY, GIVEN THE UPCOMING DIALOGUE MEETINGS IN MANILA, I WOULD VALUE A CALL ON NEW ASEAN DG SEVERINO.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR OFFER OF ACCOMODATION. I'M
CONFIDENTIAL

PLEASED TO ACCEPT, AS ARE STANLEY AND JIM TO ACCEPT THE AMBASSADOR'S KIND OFFER.
ALBRIGHT

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

VIP - Roth 9/15-17

RELEASED IN FULL

EB1

***EPF507 04/17/98*EPF507 04/17/98**
TRANSCRIPT: ASST. SEC. ROTH 4/17 JAKARTA PRESS CONFERENCE
(Determination to implement IMF agreement "encouraging") (3660)

Jakarta -- The determination of Indonesian economic cabinet officials to implement the IMF agreement is a very encouraging sign, according to Stanley Roth, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.

During a press conference in Jakarta April 17, Roth said: "The United States has said, on many occasions, that it believes that the key to economic recovery in Indonesia, and the resumption of the high growth that Indonesia has enjoyed in the past, is implementation of the agreement, and my sense after a few days here is that there is a very strong will to make this happen."

Roth also made several points concerning Japan's role in the economic recovery of Indonesia and region as a whole.

"First, I think some people have unfairly attempted to blame Japanese economic policy for the problems of the region," he said. "I think that the problems are from other causes, not because of Japanese economic policy. Second, I believe that it is very important to note the rather large contributions which Japan has made to a number of the bilateral rescue packages for individual countries, including Indonesia."

"The main point, however, ... is that, in my discussion with a number of Asian leaders, the point that is repeatedly emphasized to me is that what the countries want most is not bailouts, they want the opportunity to avoid crisis. They want the opportunities for economic growth and one of the things that they see as critical is that of Japan resuscitating its rather dormant economy and, instead, having Japan resume its role as a second locomotive for the region, in addition to the United States. In other words, the countries in crisis in Southeast Asia and elsewhere would be able to export to Japan," Roth said.

"This requires, to a certain extent, a stimulus in the economy so that higher growth rates can be achieved," he continued. "In that regard, we've noted the steps Prime Minister Hashimoto announced a few days ago, which included a tax cut as part of the very large stimulus package. And, while we are awaiting the full details of that package and to see how implementation goes, we think this could potentially be an important step."

Following is the official transcript of the press conference:

(begin transcript)

Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth
Press Conference
U.S. Embassy, Jakarta-

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 12 AUG 2011 201101654

April 17, 1998

ROTH: Good morning. It's a great pleasure for me to be back in Jakarta on what is my fifth trip here since being appointed assistant secretary last August. I'll be very brief in my remarks so as to maximize the time for your questions. Essentially, I'm here as part of a week-long trip to Southeast Asia. I will also be going to Singapore, and to Bangkok, where I will be having both bilateral meetings and be participating in the ASEAN Troika Friends of Cambodia meeting. So, multiple reasons for coming out to the region this particular week.

In terms of "Why Indonesia?": I have two basic objectives on this trip. First, as you all know, there is a new cabinet with many new faces and, I thought, even though I've been coming to Indonesia for the past eighteen years, there were quite a few ministers in senior positions that I have not met before. I thought it would be useful to get acquainted. And, I should say in this regard, that I am very appreciative of the excellent access that the Indonesian government provided for me on this trip. I had the opportunity to meet with a number of ministers, including Vice President Habibie, which was the first time for me. Of course, I renewed my long-standing acquaintance with Foreign Minister Alatas. I had a very useful discussion with Minister Ginandjar about the economic situation. And, in light of the high priority which the United States continues to attach to environmental issues, I requested a meeting with Environment Minister Juwono as well. So, these were among the many meetings that I held while I was here. I've, of course, met with a large number of individuals from outside the government as well.

My second objective was to, of course, take a look at the economy. Coming shortly after the conclusion of Indonesia's new agreement with the International Monetary Fund, I thought it would be useful to get an assessment of the current situation. In this regard, I should say that I was struck by the determination of the economic cabinet officials with whom I met to implement the IMF agreement. I think this is a very encouraging sign: that government officials appear determined to implement the agreement. The United States has said, on many occasions, that it believes that the key to economic recovery in Indonesia, and the resumption of the high growth that Indonesia has enjoyed in the past, is implementation of the agreement, and my sense after a few days here is that there is a very strong will to make this happen. With those brief remarks, let me open it up to questions.

Q: I wonder if you could talk a little about the death of Pol Pot? Whether the U.S. Government is satisfied that he died of a heart attack and whether, in fact, you're satisfied that that's him?

ROTH: Well, first of all, being here in Jakarta, I'm not in a position to make any identification of the body. I can merely reiterate what's been said out of Washington and out of Bangkok. We have seen the same pictures that the rest of you have seen on CNN. Several individuals have gone and said, "It is him," but we do not have an independent U.S. verification. We support what the Cambodian Government has called for, which would be an autopsy, which would, of course, result both in a positive identification, but equally importantly, the cause of death, but I have no information for you at this point on that subject.

Q: Mr. Roth, I wonder if you could tell us if you have raised the issue of human rights in some of your talks with officials here, and your view on the growing questions over disappearances?

ROTH: Sure. As on my previous trips, and as on the trips of all senior administration officials, human rights issues certainly are part of our agenda with the Indonesian government. I had a discussion of these issues in particular with Foreign Minister Alatas, and I specifically raised the issue of disappearances with him and, I should say, with other officials as well. Needless to say, disappearances are a very serious matter, and we believe that for that reason it is essential to raise this issue. I should say that all the government officials I met with indicated that they were very seized with this issue: they understood the seriousness of it, they were trying to take steps to clarify the status of the disappeared, and I urged them to do this as soon as possible. The sooner the better. I had several opportunities to meet with members of the Human Rights Commission, and they informed me of the Commission's activities in this regard, that they are looking into this issue as well. I'm hopeful that this will lead to an early resolution.

Q: How do you assess the recent movement by the students all over the country to protest the government? What does it mean? Do you think that such a movement by the students may trigger disorder of the population and lead to national upheaval or riots?

ROTH: Let me just make a few points on this subject, starting with basic principles. Obviously, the United States supports freedom of expression. We think it's very important that students, as well as other citizens of Indonesia, have the ability to express their views peacefully. This is a matter of worldwide policy on the part of the United States. At the same time, we hope that a way will be found to promote an effective dialogue between the students and officials from the Indonesian government. I leave it to the students and the government to select the officials and the students. I don't think that's a role for the United States to play -- in picking interlocutors. But I can tell you, that in my meetings with officials, when I raised the issue of the student demonstrations, I was assured that the government gave a very high priority to achieving a dialogue with them. Finally, in my meetings, I emphasized the importance of continued restraint on the part of the authorities in terms of dealing with these demonstrations and was assured that there was every desire to keep these demonstrations peaceful.

Q: The student demonstrations have so far been limited to the campuses: do you see that as a restriction on the freedom of expression?

ROTH: I think that the modalities, really, are questions that have to be worked out in each country, in terms of what the balance is between the freedom of expression and maintaining order. It's not for me to pronounce on that. But, I think, the principle is what I want to emphasize: that we support the right of the students to be able to make their views known peacefully, that they should be able to express themselves.

Q: I wonder if you could give us an idea how critical you think Japan's role will be to recovery in Indonesia and also the region?

ROTH: I think that several points need to be emphasized. First, I think some people have unfairly attempted to blame Japanese economic policy for the problems of the region. I think that is completely unjustified on the merits. I think that the problems are from other causes, not because of Japanese economic policy. Second, I believe that it is very important to note the rather large contributions which Japan has made to a number of the bilateral rescue packages for individual countries, including Indonesia. They have been quite large contributions that I think should not be underestimated.

Third, I would like to come to the main point, however, which is that, in my discussion with a number of Asian leaders, the point that is repeatedly emphasized to me is that what the countries want most is not bailouts, they want the opportunity to avoid crisis. They want the opportunities for economic growth and one of the things that they see as critical is that of Japan resuscitating its rather dormant economy and, instead, having Japan resume its role as a second locomotive for the region, in addition to the United States. In other words, the countries in crisis in Southeast Asia and elsewhere would be able to export to Japan. And this requires, to a certain extent, a stimulus in the economy so that higher growth rates can be achieved. In that regard, we've noted the steps Prime Minister Hashimoto announced a few days ago, which included a tax cut as part of the very large stimulus package. And, while we are awaiting the full details of that package and to see how implementation goes, we think this could potentially be an important step.

Q: In your talks, do you bring a concern over how long it's taking to really nail down these IMF agreements? They are signed, but when will they be implemented? Meanwhile, the discussion has now switched to bankers in Washington and New York. Is this taking too long?

ROTH: I didn't discuss the time table. One, I'm not an economic official, and my sense of passing judgment on the specific timetables wouldn't be that relevant. Two, I think this agreement is unusual in the sense that very public announcements have been made about the many dates and deadlines that are in the agreement itself, some of which are this month. So, I think that there's a quite definite plan that's been laid out. In less than one week after it's been announced, I think it is premature to start talking about whether it's adequate or not. Finally, I don't think you should make an arbitrary distinction, as if there is somehow some competition between the IMF agreement and the New York talks. I think they are of a piece. Needless to say, the corporate debt and the bank debt issues have to be worked out as part of Indonesia's economic recovery, and that complements what's going on in terms of the IMF agreement itself.

Q: When you report the results of this visit, what will you suggest your administration do?

ROTH: My reports to my senior officials will be basically a more detailed version of what I have reported to you: meaning the question of the determination, what the senior officials said to me about implementation of the agreement, how they view the IMF package, how they see implementation going. And so that will be the basic thrust of where we are right now.

Obviously, I'm not in a position to pass judgment on a brand new program with respect to how actual implementation will turn out, but I can report what officials said. I think in terms of what the

U.S. will do, the issue is not new U.S. initiatives; I think we've made clear already, by some of our previous actions, what our policy is.

Just over the past week we have announced, for example, that up to $1 billion dollars in trade credits from the Export-Import Bank can be made available to Indonesia to try to help revive some sectors of the economy, particularly to make sure that there are trade credits for the imports needed for exports in certain cases. Earlier, prior to that announcement, Under Secretary Eizenstat had announced certain humanitarian assistance from the United States, including food and medicine, and many other countries, including your own, have announced similar packages. And so, I think that there isn't necessarily need for a new U.S. initiative. We've been entirely consistent with the very high priority which we attach to economic recovery in Indonesia based on implementatin of the IMF program.

Q: What's your assessment of the fires in East Kalimantan and are there plans for U.S. aid?

ROTH: First, we have already given some assistance, as you know. Last year, President Clinton made the decision to send C-130 aircraft to help with the firefighting and they were of some utility to the Indonesian Government in managing with last year's crisis. We're faced, thanks to El Nino, with the same situation and we have taken several steps. First, Secretary Albright has approved the Southeast Environmental Initiative, which is a $4 million program, just recently approved. We are now discussing with the countries in the region, in an ASEAN context, not just Indonesia, how to spend this money. It includes certain things, such as firefighting capabilities and improving them, but it also includes things like providing data, meteorological data, studying the health impacts, and the like.

Obviously, there is additional work that needs to be done in preventing the fires from being set in the first place. The two parts of the problem are prevention and then dealing with the problem when the fires, if they occur again. In addition to this $4 million program, the United States has also made an additional $2 million available solely for Indonesia, specifically for the purposes of firefighting. Discussions are underway on the specific programs that will be involved with this money. I had some discussions with the environment minister on this topic and we expect some decisions fairly shortly. Finally, I should say that there are other countries involved in this effort as well, in addition to the United States. And so I'm hopeful that progress can be made.

Q: What is the U.S. view on the issue of the Indonesian refugees seeking asylum in the U.S. Embassy, and also is there any need for investigations for human rights violations of the Malaysian camp?

ROTH: Well, in terms of the individuals in our embassy in Kuala Lumpur, I think that the main thing is to understand the principle, and the principle is whether or not these individuals face a fear of persecution if they return to Aceh. For that reason, we believe that this is in accordance with international practice on refugee matters, that they need to be interviewed to have a determination made whether they are refugees or what are called illegal migrants. And that process has started.

The key aspect of the situation is the determination by international organizations, who receive access to Aceh itself, that the situation on the ground is such that we can know with some confidence that they won't be persecuted. I discussed this issue with several of the officials with whom I met, and I again emphasize the importance of allowing international access to Aceh so a determination can be made. I was assured by the officials that there was no policy to in any way persecute these returnees, that they would be returned to their villages. But, that, of course, investigations would be done in the cases of those individuals if they had involvement with terrorism or with crimes. That process is underway.

Q: Two questions: President Soeharto was reported in the press today as issuing a warning that the armed forces will be allowed to take repressive measures against the students. How do you view that? Do you view it as a stern warning? And secondly, will the United States be attaching any conditions to its aid to Indonesia, be it trade or human rights?

ROTH: I have not yet this morning had an opportunity to read the statement itself, but the way it has been described to me is not exactly the way you just described it in terms of words you actually used. But I think the issue, more importantly, is whether there is the right of the students to express their views peacefully and the ability to avoid violence in dealing with the student demonstrations. I have already expressed the U.S. position on both those points.

Your second question, on conditionality of aid: there are many conditions written into U.S. law that, of course, we obey, that apply to all aid recipients, some of which affect the basic human rights conditions in the country. But there are no specific new conditions in terms of these credits that I just mentioned or certainly humanitarian assistance, which is the least conditional of U.S. aid. But other restrictions we obviously apply, whatever is in U.S. law.

Q: Actually, I just wanted to follow on from that previous question. You seemed reasonably optimistic about the assurances you've received from officials in the economic and human rights areas. Do you have concerns that the U.S. Congress won't feel exactly the same way? Also what are the prospects for the upcoming vote on the $18 billion contribution to the IMF?

ROTH: I think that, first of all, one needs to recognize that I detect no basic opposition in the Congress to humanitarian assistance. When you are talking about food or medicine for Indonesian citizens at the bottom of the economic spectrum, who are suffering as a result of the crisis, I haven't seen opposition in the Congress to that nor have I seen any particular problem with the trade credits. I think that there is overwhelming recognition that the Indonesian economy needs to be resuscitated and that this is in everybody's interest: Indonesia's, the United States' and the Asia Pacific Region's as a whole.

Obviously, there have been significant concerns in the Congress on the human rights situation within Indonesia, and, in fact, some restrictions as it applies to the military side of the equation -- in particular with respect to training, that impose certain constraints, which the Administration abides by. And those concerns remain. I think we've had several different Congressional delegations in Indonesia over the past week and they've made Congressional views known directly to Indonesian

officials.

On the IMF package, I am, again, rather far from the Washington scene, so I can't promise you that I have the last up-to-minute details. But, first, this is a very high priority for the administration to secure the passage of this legislation authorizing the funding. The Senate has acted already -- we've had a favorable action on the Senate side -- and we're working very hard to try to match that action in the House, so that this funding can go forward. We think it is critically important that the IMF have sufficient resources to be able to deal with any future situations that might arise anywhere in the world. It is, of course, a global institution.

Q: About the IMF package and the $18 billion that America is going to fund the IMF with. Right now these talks in New York about Indonesian private debt seem to be centering around an Indonesian Government bailout, essentially underwritten by the International Monetary Fund. I would just like to know what the U.S. Government's position is on giving taxpayer's funds to the IMF, which then provides money for foreign governments to help bail out banks?

ROTH: I think you are way ahead of developments on the ground: we don't even have the notional lines of an agreement in New York on the restructuring yet. I wouldn't want to state that this is a public bailout using government funds for either the corporations or the banks. We haven't seen the terms of the package, but my assumption is that there will have to be considerable consolidation of banks, with less viable ones closing down or being absorbed by others, and that the private sector, in fact, will bear the burden for decisions made in the past. Thank you.

(end transcript)

Extract from Atlantic Intelligence Command Executive Summary 181430Z Ap

INDONESIA: TROOPS FAIL TO STOP THE KILLINGS

AN AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATIC REPORT ON THE ALLEGED MASSACRE IN LIQUISIA, A VILLAGE IN EAST TIMOR, FOUND THAT INDONESIAN TROOPS WERE PRESENT BUT FAILED TO STOP THE KILLINGS. DIPLOMATS IN AUSTRALIA'S JAKARTA EMBASSY FOUND THAT THE INDONESIAN MILITARY HAD COLLUDED WITH PRO-JAKARTA MILITIA FORCES IN EVENTS PRECEDING THE ATTACK AND WERE PRESENT IN SOME NUMBERS AT THE TIME OF THE KILLINGS. AN AUSTRALIAN NEWSPAPER REPORTED THAT THE EVIDENCE OF A DIRECT ROLE BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE ATTACK OF LIQUISA IS ONLY CIRCUMSTANTIAL, BUT THE EVIDENCE INCLUDES GUNSHOT WOUNDS FROM WEAPONS OF A TYPE ISSUED BY THE MILITARY.

THE ALLEDGED MASSACRE HAPPENED ON APRIL 6, 1999, AND AN AUATRALIAN NEWSPAPER REPORTED SOME OF THE FINDINGS ON 17 APRIL. THE REPORT FROM THE AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMAT GAVE ENOUGH EVIDENCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF KILLINGS TO WARRANT A DETAILED AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENT. AS MANY AS 25 HAVE BEEN REPORTED DEAD BY EAST TIMOR'S SPIRITUAL LEADER BISHOP CARLOS DELO, WHILE INDONESIA REJECTS REPORTS OF A "MASSACRE" SAYING ONLY FIVE PEOPLE WERE KILLED. A SPOKESMAN FOR AUSTRALIA'S FOREIGN MINISTER STATED THE REPORT DOES EXIST, BUT WOULD NOT BE RELEASED FOR FEAR OF ENDANGERING CONTACTS IN EAST TIMOR. THE AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD REPORTERS THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE EXACTLY HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE KILLED. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ACCUSED THE INDONESIAN MILITARY OF DESTABILISING EAST TIMOR BY ALLOWING PRO-JAKARTA MILITIAS TO MURDER AND RAPE EAST TIMORESE.

MEANWHILE, ON 17 APRIL IN DILI, SEVERAL PEOPLE DIED WHEN INDONESIAN TROOPS OPENED FIRE ON A HOUSE SHELTERING DOZENS OF EAST TIMORESE. THE VIOLENCE CAME AFTER PRO-JARKARTA MILITIAMEN STAGED A RALLY IN SUPPORT OF MAINTAINING TIMOR'S HOMELAND STATUS AS PART OF INDONESIA. MILITIAMEN WENT ON A RAMPAGE AFTER THE RALLY, BURNING CARS AND HOUSES. THE MILITIA COMMANDER, EURICO GUTTERESS, TOLD HIS FOLLOWERS TO CLEAR THE TERRITORY OF GROUPS WHO WERE IN FAVOR OF INDEPENDENCE, USING VIOLENCE IF NECESSARY. THESE TYPES OF ATROCITIES ARE NOT THE FIRST OF ITS KIND IN INDONESIA. IN 1991, A MASSACREIN DILI OF OVER 200 PEOPLE BY THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES (ABRI) MADE EAST TIMOR AN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CAUSE. THE LATEST UPSURGE IN VIOLENCE IN THE REGION RESULTED FROM INDONESIA'S OFFER OF AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE FOR EAST TIMOR IN JANUARY.

THE EAST TIMORESE HAVE NO DESIRE TO REMAIN PART OF INDONESIA AND MOST WILL VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE WHEN UNITED NATIONS SPONSORED DIRECT BALLOTING IS HELD IN JULY. VIOLENCE IN THE REGION WILL CONTINUE BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA KNOWS IT WILL FAIL TO GET AN AUTONOMY OUTCOME AFTER THE VOTES ARE COUNTED. IT WILL ATTEMPT TO BUY VOTES AND MILITIA GROUPS WILL ATTEMPT TO INTIMIDATE VOTERS. HOWEVER, AFTER FIGHTING A 23-YEAR OLD GUERRILLA WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE, THE EAST TIMORESE WILL CHOOSE INDEPENDENCE DESPITE THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPTS TO MANIPULATE THEM. ULTIMATELY, THE GOVERNMENT CAN ONLY ACT TO SAVE FACE AND KEEP A SEPARATIST CONTAGION FROM SPREADING TO OTHER DISGRUNTLED PROVINCES. (AIC, USPACOM, REUTERS, AIC POC: IS2 REYES)